The OAU After Twenty Years 0030624738, 9780030624735

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THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS

Other SAIS Studies on Africa published by Praeger The Political Economy of Nigeria (1982) The Political Economy of Ivory Coast (1984) The Political Economy of Zimbabwe (1984)

THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS Edited by

Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman A SAIS Study on Africa

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: The OAU after twenty years. (A SAIS study on Africa) Includes index. 1. Organization of African Unity—History. I. El-Ayouty, Yassin, 1928II. Zartman, I. William. III. Title: O.A.U. after twenty years. IV. Series. DTI .0752018 1984 341,24'9 83-24676 ISBN 0-03-062473-8 (alls, paper)

The co-editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Forbes Magazine, New York, in the technical preparation for printing of the OAU logo, organigram, and membership map.

Published in 1984 by Proeger Publishers CBS Educational and Professional Publishing a Division of CBS Inc. 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10175 U.S.A. © 1984 by Praeger Publishers All rights reserved 56789

052

98765432

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper.

All rights reserved

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To Professor Vernon McKay Friend of Africa, Africans, and Africanists, for his pioneering work in stimulating American interest in Africa during his long service in government and academia.

Contents PART ONE: 1

INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Introduction

Edem Kodjo 2

3

The OAU in the African State System: Interaction and Evaluation

I. William Zartman 3

13

The OAU and International Law

Edmond Kwam Kouassi 4

67

The Institutional Evolution of the OAU

Michael Wolfers 6

85

The OAU: Primacy in Seeking African Solutions within the UN Charter Berhanykun Andemicael and Davidson Nicol

PART TWO: 7

OPERATIONAL TRENDS

The OAU:

The OAU and Human Rights 155

The OAU and Economic Cooperation: Irresolute Resolutions

John Ravenhill 10

121

123

Edward Kannyo 9

101

Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution

Henry Wiseman 8

45

Alliances within the OAU

Olajide Aluko 5

1

173

Transfer and Development of Technology: Lost Opportunities, Future Potentials

Rend V. L. Wad low

193

vii

viii / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS PART THREE: 11

CASE STUDIES

The OAU and Africa's Refugees

Richard Greenfield 12

13

The OAU and Southern African Liberation VJilliam J. Foltz and Jennifer Widner

249

273

The OAU and Chad

Dean Pittman 15

209

The OAU and Western Sahara

John Damis 14

207

Future of the OAU: its 19th Summit

297 As Seen from

Yassin El-Ayouty

ANNEXES

327

355

1

OAU Charter

357

2

Membership of the OAU

365

3

OAU Organigram

366

4

OAU Chronology

369

5

Ideological Groups in the OAU

377

6

Mediation Efforts

379

7

Selected Bibliography

385

Index

389

About the Co-Editors and the Authors

403

Part One: Institutional Growth

.

1 Introduction Edem Kodjo

INTRODUCTION I have gladly accepted the invitation to write the introduction to this book because, if we cast a retrospective view on the last twenty years, we will note with satisfaction that African peoples have not only succeeded in creating a well-structured continental organization, but they have also promoted economic, political, social, and cultural cooperation among themselves. Indeed, it was not easy to overcome the many differ¬ ences prevailing at the times of independence. Today, we have achieved this. Similarly, who could ever believe that the conflicts that erupted between the newly independent African States could be resolved, paving the way to a new direction and a determination resolutely to face the common enemy—namely, colonialism and racism. That was exactly what has happened in a climate of enthusiasm unequaled on any continent and unparalleled in human history. This is the experience that this book calls us to revive. The modern history of Africa is the history of struggle, a history of resistance against external forces of division. This history took on several dimensions, and it continues with the same ardor in political as well as in economic fields. Africa for its part has chosen the path of struggle for the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

3

4 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS Similarly, all the liberation movements and the entire African peoples are dedicated to achieving the total liberation of our continent. As the second decade of the Organization of African Unity draws to a close, this determination grows stronger. The OAU was established during a period of intense political struggle aimed at promoting the total liberation of the continent and developing closer economic, social, and cultural relations among the Member States. It is, there¬ fore, the living symbol of Africa's determination to free itself from foreign domination and to assume control over its own destiny. In this connection, it is important to consider it, as does this book, as an institution that adequately reflects the African Governments' will to undertake political action together within the international community. Africa's march to independence was arduous. During the first ten years of this march, the OAU had to confront racist oppression in Southern Africa and in the Portuguese colonial territories. In order to grasp the evolution of the OAU, it is neces¬ sary to understand and appreciate, in their true perspec¬ tives, the attempts of African Nations to establish a regional organization, even before their collective decision to establish a continental organization. This is vital because understanding these efforts make it possible to assess the means by which the OAU was able to overcome the ideological differences that divided the regional groupings; and second, because these attempts are a palpable proof of the determination of the African States to achieve unity, development, and the total expansion of the African people. The period 1960—63 was one of intensive political struggle. On the one hand, there was the sustained struggle for independence, and, on the other, divergences and conflicts. The main preoccupation, however, remained an accelerated liberation process. The struggle for freedom and independence saw the birth of regional groupings whose raison d'etre was to safeguard not only the independence of Africa, but to protect what was then perceived as the fundamental interests of the African continent—that is, its unity and its rightful role in world affairs. These attempts to forge unity at the regional level lacked, however, the necessary large-scale strategy needed to help Africa face the advance and the impact of external ideological in¬ fluences . Quite often these external influences succeeded in dis¬ sipating the aspirations for solidarity that were vital for guaranteeing African continental unity. Among the regional

Introduction

/ 5

groupings that came into existence during those first years of independence and that acquired some measure of dimen¬ sion were: •

The Ghana/Guinea Union established on 23 November 1958, which later became Ghana/Guinea/Mali Union on 29 April 1961.

'

The Casablanca Group (7 January 1961) , composed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, United Arab Republic, and the Provisional Government of Algeria. The East Central and Southern African Pan-African Freedom Movement (September 1958, February 1962). The Monrovia Group (8-12 May 1961), composed of Li¬ beria, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Malagasy Re¬ public, Togo, Dahomey (Benin), Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Congo-Brazzaville (People's Republic of Congo), Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia, and Libya. The Brazzaville Group, composed of Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, and Chad, came into being when the Brazzaville Charter, signed on 19 December 1960, came into force on 12 September 1961.

• •

•

MUTUAL INTEREST These regional groupings, established to meet the pressing need to build the continent's unity, shared similar ap¬ proaches and methods. The apparent inability of African States to protect and preserve what everybody had came to recognize as Africa's honor, that is, Africa's freedom and independence, was finally overcome on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa. Thirty Heads of State and Government at a summit meeting signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. That was a victory symbolizing sixty years of the Pan-Africanist aspiration to freedom, equality, justice, peace, and progress. Articles I and II of the Charter define the principles and objectives of the Organization of African Unity as follows: 1. 2.

3.

To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; To defend their sovereignty, and independence;

their territorial integrity,

6

/ THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS 4. 5.

To eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa; and To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To these ends, the harmonize their their following fields: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Member States shall coordinate general policies especially in

Political and diplomatic cooperation; Economic cooperation, especially in the fields transport and communications; Cooperation in the fields of education and culture; Health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation; Scientific and technical cooperation; and Cooperation in matters of defence and security.

and the

of

Right from 1963 it became obvious that to achieve those objectives it was necessary to follow certain guiding princi¬ ples. In that regard, seven fundamental principles were elaborated and incorporated into the Charter. However, some of those principles were subjects of discussions, and led to tensions and conflicts between Member States, be¬ tween African and non-African States. Those principles were: 1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

6. 7.

The sovereign equality of all Member States; Noninterference in the internal affairs of States; Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence; Peaceful settlement of conflicts through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; Unreserved condemnation of all forms of political assassination and subversive activities on the part of neighboring or any other States; Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of African territories still dependent; and Declaration of the policy of nonalignment with regard to all blocs.

We owe this victory to the pioneers, those great PanAfricanists, those illustrious sons of Africa, whose pro¬ phetic vision and political determination will forever remain milestones in the history of Africa. The OAU is the manifestation of forces, feelings, and aspirations of the African peoples. It is a mechanism through which problems are resolved, a mechanism that

Introduction

/

7

among other functions, aims at "diffusing" crises and liquidating conflicts between Member States. The history of the first decade of the OAU is marked by achievements and activities in the fields of decolonization and the liberation struggle against apartheid in Southern Africa, resolution of conflicts, and by activities in the fields of economic, social, education, health, scientific, and cultural development.

DECOLONIZATION AND LIBERATION The decolonization process grew stronger and stronger as the struggle for political emancipation intensified. With the establishment of the OAU Liberation Committee in 1963, the Liberation Struggle was intensified. Military victories scored by the Liberation Struggle were supported by the diplomatic, financial, military, and logistic action of the Member States. Africa's determination to back armed struggle as the legitimate means for the eradication of colonialism and racism in Southern Africa is founded on the moral principle that colonialist and racist injustice in any part of the continent constituted a threat to justice everywhere in the world. Throughout the first decade, OAU Member States had scrupulously fulfilled their commitments, namely, the liberation of African territories under foreign domination. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted by the OAU in 1969, and also by the United Nations and the Conference of the counties of the Non-Aligned Movement clearly defines Africa's stand on the decolonization issue—the legitimacy of the armed struggle being waged by the African peoples to regain and exercise their inalienable rights to independence, freedom, human dignity, and equality. The period between 1963 and 1973 can therefore be con¬ sidered as a decade of commitments, of declarations, of organization, and more particularly, of decision making. The second decade, 1973-83, has been a crucial one in the liberation struggle. At the dawn of this decade, OAU became fully aware of the situation prevailing in such terri¬ tories as: 1. 2. 3.

Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, where the liberation struggle had reached a decisive stage; Zimbabwe and Namibia, which had abandoned the political negotiations to embark on an armed struggle; The Comores, Seychelles, Sao Tom£, and Principe,

8 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS Djibouti (known as French Somalia) , and Africa where nationalists were waging an political struggle.

Southern intensive

It was against this background that the OAU decided to step up its assistance to all those freedom fighters. Conse¬ quently, the last assault against colonialism was launched, leading to victory by the liberation movements. The terri¬ tories that became independent and subsequently joined the OAU were Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Djibouti and Sao Tom£ and Principe gained their independence after protracted political negotiations. As the OAU's second decade draws to a close, Africa is determined to launch the last assault against the last bastion of racism and injustice in Africa. The imminent independence of Namibia gives more impetus to the struggle for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa.

SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS The settlement of conflicts forms part of the efforts de¬ ployed by the OAU to restore peace in Africa and in the world. Article XIX of the Charter stipulates: Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end, decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The said protocol shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter. Africa has not been spared differences and conflicts to which it still has to address itself today. Even though OAU Member States have legally committed themselves to settle their differences peacefully, there are still tensions in several parts of the continent. As the records clearly show and what the authors of this book also stress, most of the differences and conflicts were resolved through peaceful means and in a purely African context. Among the differ¬ ences that were resolved in an African context, mention can be made of those involving the following Member States: Algeria and Morocco; Biafra crises; Uganda and Tanzania; Guinea and the Ivory Coast. The differences yet to be resolved include: Libya and Chad; Egypt and Libya; Kenya

Introduction / 9 and Somalia; Somalia and Ethiopia; the Sudan and Chad. These pending differences relate mainly to territorial claims as a result of colonial border demarcations. The most intractable of these conflicts is the one con¬ cerning Ogaden in the Horn of Africa claimed by Somalia. Ethiopia considers that the Ogaden cannot be a subject of negotiations because it forms an integral part of Ethiopia in accordance with the provisions of Article III, paragraph 3 of the Charter. The OAU has been careful not to be drawn into some territorial claims for the simple reason that doing so may exacerbate tensions and create unnecessary conflicts all over the continent. However, the OAU was compelled to consider some of the conflicts, such as Libya's claim on and occupation of the Ouzou strip in Northern Chad; Uganda's claim (under Amin's government) of the Kagera Salient in Tanzania; Mauritania/Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara, which has long been denounced by Mauritania; and, of course, Somalia's claim over the Ogaden. The OAU's stand in the search for solutions to African problems cannot immediately be fully appreciated. It is useful, nonetheless, in that it discourages any intervention by the Super Powers and other powers to exploit these dif¬ ferences and conflicts to their own advantage. This book examines border questions and territorial conflicts, and discusses the weaknesses and the strong points in the OAU approach in the search for solutions to these problems.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT What has characterized most significantly the determination and readiness of the African States to work hand in hand and to cooperate throughout the twenty years of OAU's existence is undoubtedly the Lagos Plan of Action (1980— 2000) and the Final Act of Lagos for Africa's economic development. In a solemn declaration, the Heads of State and Government pledged individually and collectively, on behalf of their Governments and peoples, to: 1.

2.

3.

Promote the economic and social development and integration of their economies with a view to achieving an increasing measures of self-sufficiency and selfsustainment . Promote the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse. Establish national,

subregional and regional institutions

10 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS which will facilitate the attainment of the objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment." This is a new commitment for economic, social, and cultural integration that marked another stage with emphasis on cooperation, development, and economic integration. The Lagos Plan of Action must be viewed as the crown¬ ing of the past aspirations and declarations on regional economic cooperation that had hitherto been left to regional groupings. The implementation of the Plan of Action is the responsibility of the OAU General Secretariat in cooperation with competent international organizations. African movements have realized that after twenty years of independence, namely, from 1960 to 1980, that: 1. 2. 3.

4.

Africa remains the least developed continent; Africa has twenty-one of the thirty-one least developed countries of the world; African economies continue to be overdependent on the supply of raw materials and basic mineral products; and There are ineffective structures in the African agri¬ cultural systems.

This is a serious situation, particularly if one takes into account the rapid increase in population and in urban development, as well as very low level of food production.

THE FINAL ACT OF LAGOS This declaration stresses the commitment made at the Lagos Summit by the African Heads of State and Government (28—29 April 1980) to endow Africa with an African Economic Community by the year 2000 so as to ensure the continent's economic, social, and cultural integration. The stages of the implementation of this Act have clearly been defined for the 1980s and the following decade.

THE FUTURE If these past experiences, especially those of the last twenty years provide a standard to judge by, one can readily infer that Africa will be more mature in the man¬ agement of its own affairs and will be able more effectively to assume control of its own destiny. Just as the OAU has played the role of catalyst in arousing the collective

Introduction /

11

awareness of the African people, so also, it will continue positively to influence events in the world and defend with sureness the cause of world peace and international co¬ operation . Africa's political maturity will help remove obstacles inherent in the concept of sovereignty, and will keep at bay foreign interferences and interventions in strictly African matters. As has been observed at this threshold of the twenty-first century, the will to transcend these ob¬ stacles has been illustrated by the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the creation of an OAU Defense Force, and a "System of Diffusing Crises." At the economic level, increased cooperation will promote greater solidarity among the African States, and thus serve as the basis for strengthening African Unity in freedom and independence. I am grateful to Professors El-Ayouty and Zartman for their continued interest in Africa, and for this outstanding contribution towards ensuring a better understanding of Africa's experience since the birth of the Organization of African Unity.

Edem Kodjo Secretary-General Organization of African Unity Addis Ababa January 1982

2 The OAU in the African State System: Interaction and Evaluation I. William Zartman

The African interstate system is undergoing change. Anything less would be surprising, for African states themselves are changing and in the process are differenti¬ ating themselves from each other, setting up new dynamic patterns. Whether these changes constitute variations in the extant system, or whether they are moving Africa toward a new system, is a crucial question. More specifi¬ cally, since this work is focused on the Organization of African Unity (OAU), are the changes in the continent imposing temporary aberrations in the behavior of the system's organization component or permanent reorientations in the very framework of that system? And from where do these changes—whatever their magnitude—come?1 The basic change is in size. Africa has become the world's largest region in numbers of members, its fifty-odd states more than twice as numerous as any other region. Although the island continent has remained unchanged, more and more of it has become independent and joined the political and economic interaction that forms the system. The African system is reaching its manifest destiny, as only the South African area (Republic of South Africa, compris¬ ing its provinces and homelands, and its Namibian colony) remain outside. What is striking is that this growth in size has not led to the system's own disintegration. The expan¬ sion in the number of members means a corresponding escalation in the number of interests and relations. It could therefore be expected that would put such strains on

13

14 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS the system that it would either break up into separate systems of fewer members, or require a correspondingly stronger authority to hold it together. At first glance, neither appears to have occurred. Certainly no stronger authority has emerged, but neither have subregions spun away into separate or competing systems. Arab Africa has not broken away from Black Africa, nor has southern Africa established its own separate regionality. Some analysts (Bowman 1968; Grundy 1969; Potholm and Dale 1972; Shaw in Cervenka 1973) have treated the southern subregion as its own system, focusing on the dominant pattern of conflict interaction. Although there are lessons to be learned from such an approach, it ignores the predominance of cooper¬ ation that ties the Frontline states to the other independent Black African countries north of them and overemphasises the integrative effects of the Battleline, and has been little used since the end of Portuguese rule. Although South Africa would like to enter the African system, thus re¬ lieving the pressure on it, its relations are clearly of a different nature than those that tie together the other independent members of the continent. The African re¬ gional system is a cooperative interaction system (with some disruptive conflicts that members try to remove) , engaged in varying degrees in conflictual interaction with South Africa (with some cooperative elements that members try to remove). Nevertheless, evidence can also be shown for the hypoth¬ esized strains. The active agent for the OAU in southern African politics is the group of Frontline states, with Nigeria and the current OAU president playing an ancillary role; OAU members, tired of the divisive Saharan issue, sought ways to throw it to the Arab League under the pretext that it was an Arab states' issue; and on NorthSouth issues where interests become specific, such as the Law of the Sea negotiations or the Lome Conventions with the European Community, Africa has shown itself to be too big to hold together. As a result, it can be said that the expansion in size has had enough effect to warrant addi¬ tional inquiry. This chapter will look beyond size into related changes that have occurred in the structures and norms of interaction within the African system in order to determine at the end the impact of change on the system's organizational component, the OAU itself. AUTONOMY Before turning to an analysis that activity must be placed

of inter-African interaction, within a larger context to

OAU in the African State System /

15

evaluate the autonomy of the system. Autonomy and inter¬ action are two sides of the same coin and are hard to separate. Greater autonomy generally results from greater interaction, although autonomy could also be produced by independent actors with large resources taking care of their own affairs, even without interaction among others in the system. In Africa, resources are so low that autonomy can only be produced by interaction, a necessary but not sufficient condition. Decolonization is the beginning of both interaction and autonomy, but the degree of autonomy that has been attained is highly debated. In political and security matters, African solutions have indeed been overtaking reliance on outside power. With a few exceptions, the foreign interventions of the 1960s to forestall coups and prop up rulers were absent in the 1970s, and when they took place they were African, not extra-African, interventions. The African interventions included Guinean support for Siaka Stevens' government in Sierra Leone in 1969, 1973, 1974, and 1981 and for William Tolbert's government in Liberia in 1979 (before it was eventually overthrown by its own army) , and Senegalese intervention to support (and gradually absorb) the govern¬ ment of Dawda Jawara in Gambia in 1981. The French withdrew from Chad in 1980 leaving (although they had to return again in 1983), maintenance of order to the Nigerians, then the Libyans, and then to the Inter-African Force of Senegal, Nigeria, and Zaire under OAU auspices. Although the French and Belgians intervened in Shaba II in 1978, they were replaced by the Moroccans and an Inter-African Force (not under OAU auspices), who had also intervened in support of the government in the previous Shaba affair in 1977. The clearest exception is the French intervention in Central African then-Empire in 1980 to overthrow the egregious government of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, a job no African state wanted to take on, but one similar to the intervention of Tanzania in Uganda in 1979 to overthrow the equally egregious government of Idi Amin Dada. To an increasing degree, security activities have been taken over by Africans from Europeans. The other exception, or new influence, is the arrival of the Cubo-Russians in force to take on certain security ties when the need was particularly pressing—when the MPLA was threatened with losing its position in the Angolan struggle for power in 1975 and when the Derg was threat¬ ened with losing its Empire in the Ogaden and Eritrean wars in 1978 (Duncan 1980; Donaldson 1981). These forces came to stay, creating a new and less autonomous situation in these two areas. It is for this reason, not just for

16 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS reasons of Cold War rivalry, that the huge influx of CuboRussian troops into Angola and Ethiopia is so serious from an African point of view: The trend of rising autonomy for the system was suddenly reversed, even if only in two states, and Africa has a higher number of foreign troops on its soil than at any time since independence. In economics, autonomy is harder to attain and indeed may even by lessened in comparison with the 1960s. At the end of the second decade of independence in Africa there is a higher level of economic relations with the outside world than at any previous time. Foreign aid is at a record level, both absolutely and relatively as a percentage of recipient countries' GNP. Even in those exceptional cases where the percentage dropped, it represented a larger absolute amount than before. Trade has also expanded, increasing Africa's interdependence with the North; and it too has increased as a percentage of African states' GNP. Arms imports have increased astronomically, requiring logorithmic graphs to portray them (as in Zartman 1983) . Yet along with intensity of exchanges has also come diversification. Diversity is most marked in trade, where new partners have been added to or displaced the metropole. In general, the poorer the country the more domi¬ nant the metropolitan position remains, and metropolitan dominance continues more frequently as a source of African imports than as a customer for African exports. Although the metropole sometimes remains the primary source of aid, in many cases other countries have taken the lead position; and in all cases, other countries play a significant role. Even in regard to technical assistance, diversification is characteristic; and in Nigeria, Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Portuguese-speaking countries, the former metropole is no longer the primary source of technical assistance. In 1970, three states (Malawi, Somalia, Lesotho) received more than 10 percent of their GNP in overseas development assistance (ODA), and another seventeen states received between 5 percent and 10 percent. By mid-decade, nine states (Somalia, Lesotho, Rwanda, Swaziland, Botswana, Benin, Niger, Mauritania, Mali) were receiving more than 10 percent of the GNP in aid (and the first three more than 20 percent); and another nine states (Gambia, Sudan, Tan¬ zania, Malawi, Senegal, Burundi, Togo, Zaire, CAR) more than 5 percent. By the end of the decade, the number of states receiving more than a tenth of their GNP in foreign aid was up to eighteen (Lesotho, Rwanda, Swaziland, Botswana, Somalia, Tanzania, Malawi, Senegal, Burundi, Niger, Chad, Benin, Liberia, Congo, Upper Volta, CAR,

OAU in the African State System /

17

Mauritania, Mali), including the last four over 20 percent, and an additional eight were receiving over 5 percent (Zaire, Kenya, Madagascar, Cameroun, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo, Gambia) . When one considers that African GNPs are increasing, this indicates a sizeable reliance on foreign resources. On the other hand, this heavy reliance on foreign assis¬ tance is also accompanied by a diversification of sources, reducing bilateral dependency. At the beginning of the 1970s, with multilateralization already proceeding apace, all but six countries (Algeria, Chad, Gabon, Swaziland, Li¬ beria, Gambia) had reduced their dependency on their former metropole below the level of 60 percent of all aid; five more (Rwanda, Burundi, Ivory Coast, CAR, Congo) received half of their ODA from one source, their former metropole; and nine received between 40—50 percent of their foreign aid from a single source (Mauritania, Benin, Sen¬ egal, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Kenya, Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana, all but the latter two from their former metropole) . By the end of the decade, no African state except Ethiopia and CAR received more than 40 percent of their ODA from any one source and only eight states received between a quarter and a third of their ODA from any one source (Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Chad, Burundi, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, the primary donor for the last three being Germany, and the rest the former metropole). Since richer and poorer states are found in all categories, these figures show that African states can use both poverty and progress to attract development assistance from an in¬ creasing variety of sources to create a generalized reliance but not specific dependencies on outside sources. Trade flows show an absolute increase over the past decade, but trade occupies a decreasing place in African states' economies. In 1970, one state (Libya) made up three-quarters of its GNP from exports, four others (Mauri¬ tania, Liberia, Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea) half; five others (Ivory Coast, Zambia, Uganda, Gabon, Gambia) about a third; another four (Sierra Leone, Angola, Nigeria, Senegal) about a quarter; and another five (Togo, Cam¬ eroun, Kenya, Algeria, Tanzania) about a fifth. In all of these cases but Zambia, the main trading partner in both directions was the former metropole (for Zambia, the leading export partner was Japan). Another fourteen states earned between 10-20 percent of their GNP from exports, in all but three cases (Burundi, Sudan, Somalia) primarily trading with their metropole. A decade later, only Gabon earned close to half of its GNP in exports, primarily with the metropole; only Zaire earned a third, primarily with the

18 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS metropole; only six states earned between 20—30 percent of their GNP in exports (Congo, Togo, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Algeria), all of which relied on the former metropole for their primary source of imports but of whom only Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast found their primary markets in the former metropole. Thus, state earning more than a fifth of their GNP through trade had dropped from fifteen to eight. The number of states earning between 10—20 percent of their GNP through exports rose from fourteen to sixteen, only nine (instead of eleven) of which found their primary export market as well as import source in the metropole. Less general trade dependency, greater export multilateralization, but continued import dependency are the characteristics of the decade's evolution. Trade balances have turned increasingly to Africa's disfavor. At the beginning of the 1970s, thirteen countries (Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Liberia, Zambia, Burundi, Libya, Swaziland, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon) more than covered their imports with export earnings. Twenty others did not. At the end of the decade, the proportion of states in the two groups was about the same but the proportion of GNP involved was higher. In 1970, four states with a deficit balance had spent more than 30 percent of their GNP on imports, seven had spent 25—30 percent of their GNP on imports and another seven spent 20—25 percent. In 1979, twelve deficit states spent over 25 percent on imports, including eight who spent over 30 percent, and another four spent 20—25 percent. Africa is importing more and covering it less well than it did in earlier years of independence, and the imports come above all from the former metropole. If one combines these figures on the African side, they show that a small number of African countries have a strong dependence on a single European state for aid and export markets, and both this number and the degree of dependency that it represents has decreased significantly. In 1970, sixteen African countries received over half of their ODA, representing 2-6 percent of the GNP, from their former metropole, and the nine former French colonies among these also traded over 40 percent of their imports and exports with the same metropolitan source. By the middle of the decade, the English-speaking members of this group (Malawi, Swaziland, Liberia) had diversified economic ties enough to drop out, along with some French-speaking members (Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, Rwanda, Burundi). Seven states remained, drawing more than 40 percent of their ODA and 40 percent of their imports, each representing 2—7 percent of the GNP, from one source, the former

OAU in the African State System /

19

metropole; all of these seven but Chad and Congo also sent more than 25 percent of their exports to the former metro¬ pole. By the end of the decade, only two states (Chad and CAR) fulfilled the same criteria of 40 percent ODA and imports from one source, but this now represented 6 per¬ cent and 14 percent of their GNP. The other six Frenchspeaking states of the group (Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Senegal, Congo, Gabon) received more than 25 percent of ODA and 45 percent of imports from the same source; export markets and the percentage of GNP covered varied widely. It is clear from these figures that weakness is frequently a characteristic of African economies (see Table 1-1) but dependency is usually not, at least in the specific bilateral sense used by dependency literature. Furthermore, the cases show that the dependency that does exist may be characteristic of radical as well as conservative, and of growing as well as stagnating, states, and that all four of the same types can also be found at the extreme end of "nondependency" relations. Finally, these data indicate that economic relations show a different evolution than political and security relations, where greater autonomy obtains. It is hard to isolate inter-African economics as an autonomous subject, but it is not hard to treat interAfrican politics. It is to that subject that the analysis now turns.

STRUCTURES AND NORMS Change in the African system can be seen through the evolution of its structures and norms. An analysis would seek answers to such questions as: Who interacts with whom, with what effect, under what conditions, and why? and then. What changes have occurred in this interaction, and again why? It would seek to draw a roadmap of African interactions and determine the way that map is used by states in dealing with each other. But measures and even indicators of interaction are difficult to obtain. The clearest evidence is available in the economic field, but economic interaction—as seen—is at a very low level. It can be stated quite flatly that there are no geographic trading clusters in the continent, at either a subcontinental or a fortiori a continental level. While some countries trade with each other, and sometimes more with their neighbors than with other African countries, the level of inter-African trade is so low as to be an insignificant measure of other types of relations. In the political field interaction is hard

TABLE 1-1.

Power Sources in the Region and Subregions

GNP/cap$/ State

pop(106)

GNP($ 106)

GNP/cap$

%growth

1980

1980

1970-80

(continental

mil(IO^)

rankings given in parenthesis)

North Africa Morocco

20.2 (5)

17.7 (5)

860(10)

2.8

100 (3)

A1 geria

19.9 (6)

39.7 (3)

1920 (3)

2.5

90 (4)

Tunisia

6.4(19)

8.5 (8)

1310 (5)

5.9

24(11 )

Li bya

3.0(32)

30.5 (4)

8640 (1)

-2.9

53 (8)

Nigeria

85.0 (1 )

92.0 (1 )

1010 (8)

4.7

165 (2)

Ghana

11.7(11)

15.3 (6)

420(21 )

-2.3

15(19)

Ivory Coast

8.6(14)

10.2 (7)

1150 (7)

0.9

6(26)

Ma 1 i

6.9(18)

1.4(27)

190(42)L

1 .8

5(28)

Upper Volta

5.7(22)

1.1(30)

190(42)L

-0.8

4(32)

Senegal

5.7(23)

2.6(22)

450(20)

-0.9

8(20)

CUinea

5.4(24)

1.5(24)

290(32)L

0.1

16(18)

Ni ger

5.3(25)

1.8(23)

330(28)L

-0.2

3(37)

Beni n

3.5(30)

1.1(30)

300(30)L

0.6

4(32)

Sierra Leone

3.5(31)

1.0(33)

270(34) L

-1.4

2(39)

Togo

2.5(38)

1.0(33)

410(23)

0.4

4(32)

Liberia

1.9(35)

1.0(33)

520(15)

0.1

7(25)

Mauritania

1.6(36)

.5(40)

320(29)L

-1 .2

8(20)

West Africa

Guinea Bissau

.8(41 )

.2(43)

1 60(44) L

0.3

5(28)

Gambia

.6(43)

.2(43)

250(37)L

1 .6

1(43)

Central Africa Zai re

28.3 (4)

5.3(12)

220(39) L

-2.2

23(13)

Cameroun

8.5(15)

5.8(11)

670(12)

3.1

11(21)

Rwanda

5.1(26)

1.1(30)

200(40)L

0.6

Chad

4.5(27)

.5(40)

1 20(46) L

-5.0

4(32) ?

Burundi

4.1(28)

.9(36)

200(40)L

0.9

8(22)

Cent Af Rep

2.3(34)

.7(38)

300(31)L

0.5

4(32)

Congo

1.5(37)

1.2(29)

730(11)

0.1

16(18)

Gabon

.7(41)

3.4(18)

4440 (2)

2.3

5(28)

Equat Guinea

.4(45)

.2(43)

460(19)

2.8

2(39)

20

OAU in the African State System / 21 TABLE 1-1.

Continued

CNP/cap$/ State

pop(106)

GNP($106)

GNP/cap$

^growth

1980

1980

1970-80

mil(10^)

East Africa Ethiopia

31.5 (2)

4.1(16)

140(45) L

0.8

250 (1 )

Sudan

18.4 (7)

7.6 (9)

470(17)

0.4

65 (6)

Kenya

15.9 (9)

6.9(10)

420(21 )

2.1

13(20)

Uganda

13.2(10)

4.2(15)

280(33 )L

-4.4

6(26)

Soma!ia

3.9(29)

1.5(24)

380(25) L

1.4

54 (7)

.4(46)

•2(43)

480(16)

-4.4

South Africa

29.2 (3)

54.0 (2)

1860 (4)

.7

Tanzania

18.1

(8)

4.9(13)

260(35)L

.2

53 (8)

Mozambique

10.5(12)

2.8(21 )

270(34 )L

-3.6

35(11)

Djibouti Southern Africa

70 (5)

Madagascar

8.7(13)

3.2(19)

350(27 )L

-1 .9

20(15)

Zimbabwe

7.4(16)

4.7(14)

630(13)

-0.6

23(13)

Angola

7.1(17)

2.9(20)

470(17)

-6.5

47(10)

Maiawi

6.0(20)

1.5(24)

230(38)L

Zambia

5.7(21)

3.6(17)

560(14)

Lesotho

1.3(38)

.6(39)

Namibia

390(24)L

3.2

5(28)

-2.6

23(13)

7.4

1(43)

1.0(39)

1.3(28)

1300 (6)

.6

Botswana

.8(40)

.8(37)

910 (9)

11.7

3(37)

Swazi land

.6(44)

.4(42)

380(25)

3.4

2(39)

L = least developed

to measure (see McGowan 1969; Johns 1972, 1979; Kontchou Kouomegni 1977). The clearest set of indicators uses the number of mis¬ sions and visits exchanged among African states per year, indicating a formal level of activity rather than measuring its content, but nonetheless giving some basis for evalua¬ tion. These indicators show a rise in the number of diplo¬ matic missions and ministerial visits since 1963 greater than the increase in the number of states (see Table 1—2). The number of diplomatic missions from one African state to another (not counting embassies accredited to a third country) tripled from 164 to 470 between 1963 and 1980, and the average doubled as well, from five to ten. The

22 / THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS number of ministerial visits also tripled, from thirty-three to 109 and the average more than doubled, from one to 2.3, although both the total and the average were higher in the 1970s than in 1980. More significant than the continental growth of diplomatic interchanges, however, has been the subregional level of interaction. Over the same period of two decades, subre¬ gional interaction was consistently higher than the conti¬ nental level and in some cases two to four times higher (see Table 1-2). Among the three North African states, diplo¬ matic missions were highest in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s; at the lowest of any time at the beginning of the 1980s under the impact of the Saharan war, they were still twice as high as the continental average. North African diplo¬ matic visits were highest in the early 1960s, but even in the late 1970s and early 1980s were much higher than the continental average. Missions in West Africa dropped from more to less than twice the continental average and visits fluctuated as well. Missions in central (Equatorial) Africa rose to twice the average, whereas visits were very high in the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. In southern (SADCC) Africa, visits decreased slightly but were still higher than the average by a factor of three, as missions gradually rose. In sum, with a few exceptions, subregionalism is growing to a much higher level in Africa than is continentalism. Faced with increasing numbers and distances, Africa is interacting above all on the subregional level. It is interesting to compare this situation with the ideo¬ logical picture. Indicators are less clear, but interesting evidence for possible evolutions is available. To begin with, there appears to be a growth in the radical minority in Africa over the two decades, from six (Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville) to twelve states (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Benin, Congo, Zimbabwe). At the same time, the clearly identifiable moderates have remained about the same in number, while declining in proportion (although still more numerous than the radicals). This evolution in itself would point to sharpening ideological confrontation, as a clear minority increases its numbers and a clear majority loses its dominance. The indicator shows that throughout the period the identifiable moderates main¬ tained missions with each other at the level of the conti¬ nental average. The radicals maintained missions at a level of twice the average in the first decade of the OAU but dropped significantly in the second. When compared with the regional figures, it is clear that diplomatic missions (which could be both regional and ideological at the same

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