The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy 9781501717598

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The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy

A volume in the series

CORNELL STUDIES IN SECURITY AFFAIRS edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt A full list of titles in the series appears at the end of the book.

The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy TERRY TERRIFF

Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 1995 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1995 by Cornell University Press. Printed in the United States of America ® The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI 739.48-1984. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Terriff, Terry, b. 1953 The Nixon administration and the making of U.S. nuclear strategy / Terry Terriff. p. cm.—(Cornell studies in security affairs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8014-3082-8 (cloth : alk. paper) i. United States—Military policy. 2. Nuclear weapons—United States. 3. Deterrence (Strategy) 4. United States—Politics and government— 1969-1974. I. Title. II. Series. UA23.T43 1995 355.02' 17'0973—dc20 94-45262

Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy. —Carl von Clausewitz, On War

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Contents

Preface Abbreviations

1 The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence 2

The Changing Strategic Environment

3 Disquiet with Assured Destruction 4 The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel

ix XV

1

18

51 97

5 Developing a Policy Consensus 6 The Politics of Strategic Nuclear Policy

159 184

7 Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance 8 Determinants of U.S. Nuclear Strategy

204 223

Appendix: National Security Decision Memorandum 242

237

Index

243

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Preface In this book I examine the innovation of U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy in the early 19705. Nuclear deterrence was the cornerstone of U.S. security policy in the cold war era, and changes in the way the United States endeavored to effect deterrence had significant implications for its ability to manage the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The centrality of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine—and the potentially horrific consequences should it ever fail and nuclear weapons be employed—has led to a rich literature analyzing and debating the relative merits and effectiveness of particular doctrines or general approaches. Crucial but often overlooked are the sources for doctrinal innovation, the objectives U.S. policymakers sought to achieve in refashioning U.S. nuclear doctrine, and the influences that shaped the doctrine. The doctrine of limited nuclear options was promulgated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1974. The doctrine was formulated in a period when both the United States and the Soviet Union had achieved secure strategic nuclear forces sufficient to provide each with a deterrent to the employment of nuclear weapons by the other. The changes in U.S. targeting practices authorized by National Security Decision Memorandum 242 proved to be an important milestone in the evolution of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine, for the document marked a significant shift in the way the United States targeted its nuclear weapons and in U.S. conceptions of nuclear employment. A broader spectrum of targeting options conformed the prospective employment of nuclear weapons more closely to the achievement of U.S. security aims: new targeting objectives were delineated; new target categories were added; and the employment guidances for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were harmonized. The principles for the targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons and the objectives that were

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Preface

developed have provided the foundation of U.S. nuclear targeting practices into the 19905. Subsequent innovations by the Carter and Reagan administrations were either marginal changes to or refinements of the basic principles and objectives set forth in 1974. Why were U.S. policymakers motivated to innovate, and what objectives did they hope to achieve with the revision of nuclear targeting practices? A generally held perception is that the doctrine of limited nuclear options was devised to couple the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent more closely to the security of Western Europe. This view emerged because Schlesinger publicly defended the new targeting doctrine as being a response to a perception that the advent of strategic parity had created a crisis in the U.S. extended deterrent strategy in Western Europe. Contrary to Schlesinger's explanation and general belief, I argue that factors originating outside the situation in Europe were primarily responsible for the development of the new nuclear strategy. Four different constituencies were involved in the innovation process, each with its own perspectives and objectives. Most critical as driving forces behind the innovation process were the desire of Henry Kissinger to have credible nuclear options available for diplomacy and deterrence purposes and the concern of civilian officials in the Department of Defense that the United States needed to have available the appropriate means of nuclear employment should deterrence fail. I also suggest that factors other than strategic calculation—budgetary, technological, bureaucratic, and political considerations—influenced the innovation of the Schlesinger Doctrine. Perhaps the most significant of these were political factors, which conditioned the way the new strategy was publicly presented. Schlesinger's explication of the new doctrine, in which he stressed the deterrence extended to Western Europe, was aimed to further his own political agenda and to deal with two key political constituencies—the Congress and U.S. allies—that had been largely ignored during the innovation process. I begin with a depiction of the substance of the doctrine of limited nuclear options as enunciated by Schlesinger and an examination of the motives for developing the new strategy. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Nixon administration's perception of the changing nature of the strategic nuclear balance and how it attempted to manage the change from 1969 to 1973, as well as a review of the transatlantic debate over the use of nuclear weapons and conventional [x]

Preface deterrence in Europe. I then examine the strategic calculations of the main policy constituencies, their efforts to refashion U.S. nuclear targeting practices, and the process that led to the promulgation and implementation of limited nuclear options. Chapter 3 focuses on Henry Kissinger and the National Security Council (NSC) staff and their attempts to revise U.S. nuclear strategy. Chapter 4 analyzes the role of two groups within the Department of Defense (DoD)—officials in the Office of Secretary of Defense and the uniformed military—and examines their reformulation of U.S. nuclear targeting practices. Chapter 5 looks at how the DoD forged a bureaucratic consensus of support for the policy guidance it had developed, first by bringing in other bureaucratic actors such as selected officials from the State Department and Henry Kissinger, and then by submitting the guidance for official interagency review. Chapter 6 examines the circumstances of the public announcement of the new strategy by Schlesinger and the considerations that conditioned his explication of the change in targeting. Finally, in Chapter 7 I explore the process and the main issues involved in the implementation of the new doctrine. In Chapter 8, I offer concluding remarks. The text of National Security Decision Memorandum 242 is in the Appendix. Any analysis of U.S. targeting policy is hampered by its highly sensitive nature. Although much documentation is now becoming available regarding aspects of U.S. strategic nuclear policy in the 19505 and 19605, very little has been made public from the Nixon administrations. Partly this results from President Nixon's private papers having only recently been installed in the presidential library in Yorba Linda, California. At the time of writing the librarians have regrettably had little real opportunity to start a thorough review of Nixon's papers for possible public release. Documentation directly germane to nuclear targeting in the 19705 is at any rate not likely to be forthcoming soon. The operating principles and main objectives of the targeting policy discussed by Schlesinger in 1974 continue to underpin U.S. nuclear strategy today. As a consequence, such information remains highly classified, and unless and until ongoing events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lead to a fundamental and radical change in U.S. nuclear policy it seems destined to remain classified material for a great many years to come. Some information is available in the public literature, but most books do not focus on the Schlesinger Doctrine and therefore miss,

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Preface for the most part, much of importance in the innovation process during the early 19705. One particularly useful source regarding the subject is Lynn Davis' study of the Schlesinger Doctrine, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine. Fifteen years after it was written, her analysis stands heads above anything else in elucidating the strategic perspectives that motivated the innovation process. Another generally good source is the testimony by U.S. officials during congressional hearings. Schlesinger's public pronouncements about the strategy that bears his name were exceptionally detailed and provide excellent information about the reasoning behind the change in U.S. nuclear policy and about its substance. Certain caveats, however, must be made about relying too much on some of what was said publicly, for reasons explained in this book. Overall, much can be done with these sources, yet in the end any study dependent on them labors under considerable limitations. This book draws on more than fifty interviews conducted in 1989 and 1990 with former officials from the Nixon administrations. Most gave freely of what they remember, but documentation of this aspect of the study does not exist publicly. An effort has been made to corroborate the main points; nevertheless, gaps exist, particularly regarding the line of reasoning that underlies some aspects of the strategy. Analysis has had to be undertaken in many instances to develop a reasonable explanation for why certain decisions were made and why the thinking about nuclear strategy took certain of the turns it did. Again, aside from some relevant statements by strategic analysts regarding deterrence theory, documentation of this aspect tends to be skimpy. So it would not be putting too fine a point on it to say that this book and its investigation depend to a great extent on the recollections of former officials of the Nixon administrations. The reader should therefore be aware that the book is subject to the same limitations that may be attributed to any analysis based on oral history. Parts of this book were written while I was at the department of War Studies, King's College, from 1987 to 1989. The Ford Foundation provided financial support while I was studying in London, and the Department of War Studies, King's College, and the Central Research Fund of the University of London generously provided funding to support my research in the United States. In Washington, DC., the Brookings Institution considerately furnished me with an office. The

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Nuclear History Program at the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland provided me the opportunity to present the initial results of my research to analysts and former officials in two senior seminars. I developed many of my ideas and finished the manuscript while I was a senior research fellow with the Strategic Studies Program, University of Calgary, from 1989 to 1993.1 am grateful to these institutions. I am especially indebted to Lawrence Freedman for providing the initial inspiration for this investigation and for his continuing encouragement and patience as my research and writing dragged on. More important, he furnished intellectual guidance and offered suggestions that have been invaluable in the completion of this work. Philip Sabin and Peter Nailor offered many useful comments. I also thank Robert Jervis, who provided many insightful comments and suggestions that have found their way into this book. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Ivo Daalder. In the later stages of my research he provided me with many valuable insights into the theory and practice of flexible response, and shared sources of information that I might not otherwise have been aware were available. He also read drafts of this book and furnished me with many useful suggestions on how it could be improved. My thanks are due to W. Harriet Critchley, director of the Strategic Studies Program, University of Calgary, for her steadfast support of my work and her patience. I am also grateful for the continued support of Annie Maclnnes, Nancy Pearson-Mackie, and Elizabeth Retzer. In the course of my research I had the privilege of interviewing many former officials from the Nixon administrations. Most of those with whom I talked preferred not to be cited. In an effort to be fair I decided that all the people interviewed should retain their anonymity. I regret that, as a result, I am unable here to thank them individually. To these people, who graciously shared with me their experiences and views and exhibited great patience with my analytical efforts, I owe a debt of thanks which simple words can never repay. Finally, my family, and in particular my mother and father, deserve my heartfelt thanks for their moral and material support. Similarly, my friends also deserve my sincere gratitude for their support and patience. TERRY TERRIFF Calgary, Alberta [xiii]

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Abbreviations

ACDA DoD DPRC DR&E JCS JSTPS LNOs MAOs MIRV NCA NPG NSDM NSSM NSTAP NU-OPTS NUWEP OSA OSD P/M PPGs

PRC RAOs SALT SAOs SEPs [XV]

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Department of Defense Defense Program Review Committee Defense Research and Engineering Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Limited Nuclear Options Major Attack Options multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles National Command Authority Nuclear Planning Group National Security Decision Memorandum National Security Study Memorandum National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Nuclear Options Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Office of Systems Analysis Office of the Secretary of Defense Political-Military Bureau "Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO" People's Republic of China Regional Attack Options Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Selective Attack Options Selective Employment Plans

Abbreviations SLBM SIOP TNF report WEU WP WSAG

sea-launched ballistic missile Single Integrated Operational Plan The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe report Western European Union Warsaw Pact Washington Special Actions Group

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The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy

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[1] The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

On 10 January 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger revealed that the United States was in the process of changing its nuclear targeting plans. In answering questions on this change, he set forth in a somewhat disjointed manner some of the central elements of the new U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine. Given the Soviet Union's acquisition of an invulnerable second-strike force, Schlesinger stressed that the threat to use U.S. strategic nuclear weapons "initially and massively" against Soviet cities, as was premised by the doctrine of "assured destruction," would if executed inevitably lead to a devastating counterstrike against American cities. Such an outcome, he maintained, meant that the threat of assured destruction was not employable and would be seen as such by opponents. What the United States wanted was to "have targeting options which are more selective and which do not necessarily involve major mass destruction on the other side, and that the purpose of this . . . is to maintain the capability to deter any desire on the part of an opponent to inflict major damage on the United States or its allies."1 The change in targeting entailed adding a range of limited nuclear options against different sets of targets, including military targets, that would reduce the potential for counterattacks against U.S. cities. The Schlesinger Doctrine, as the new strategy has come to be known, was officially endorsed by Nixon on 17 January 1974, when he signed National 1

Press conference of U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, 10 January 1974, at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., reprinted in P. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly, and Jack Merritt, eds., Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 99-100.

[i]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, the political guidance document for the targeting of U.S. strategic forces.2 In this book, I examine the innovation of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine by the Nixon administrations from 1969 to 1974. Schlesinger claimed that the new targeting policy was needed because, with the coming of strategic parity, the U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to Western Europe was no longer credible and the Soviet Union had gained a capacity to engage in limited nuclear strikes against the United States. Schlesinger's explanation for the innovation was not accurate. An examination of the innovation of NSDM-242 based on new evidence, including extensive interviews, reveals that strategic calculations other than those set forth by Schlesinger were significant and that factors other than strategic logic influenced both the decision to innovate and the shape of the new doctrine. The following study of why and how the United States revised its nuclear strategy from 1969 to 1974 dispels the misconceptions about why the strategy propagated by Schlesinger was developed and provides an examination of the process of strategic doctrinal innovation within the U.S. governmental system.

LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS: THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE AND SELECTIVE RESPONSE The cornerstone of the revised strategy was the introduction of smaller, more-limited nuclear options. To buttress deterrence, Schlesinger contended that "what we need is a series of measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence."3 Options consisting of limited strikes against selected target sets would allow the United States to retaliate without necessarily causing widespread urban damage and fatalities. Responses could thus be made to demonstrate the unwillingness of the United States to tolerate a threat to 2

See "National Security Decision Memorandum 242: Planning Nuclear Weapons Employment for Deterrence/' in The Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military, ed. William M. Arkin et al. (New York: Harper & Row, 1990) pp. 487-89; and Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 185, 1981), p. 18. 3 James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975, 4 March 1974, p. 38 (hereafter cited as DoD Report, FY 1975).

[2]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence its security interests without having to impose significant damage to Soviet urban industrial centers.4 The addition of smaller, more-discriminate targeting options was designed to introduce flexibility and selectivity in the employment of U.S. strategic forces. Flexibility derived from having many preplanned target sets from which to choose and from force capabilities, such as retargeting capability and employment adaptability.5 Selectivity, on the other hand, was a function of target grouping—that is, the number and types of targets—and of minimizing collateral damage.6 Limitation of collateral damage was to be achieved through the utilization of smaller numbers of weapons involved in the response and by insuring that the selected target set was not intermingled with population centers.7 Schlesinger maintained that targeting flexibility and selectivity was desirable because the United States could not predict with any assurance what form of attack an adversary might choose to initiate. The expectation was that the United States would thus be able to foreclose any possibilities that the Soviet Union might be able to conceive, thereby providing the United States with a seamless deterrent across the entire spectrum of risk.8 Using the concept of limited nuclear options and the derived notions of flexibility and selectivity, officials devised a strategy of selective response to address the various problems they perceived.9 Broadly outlined, the strategy had three sequential objectives. First, and foremost, it was to deter war at any level of conflict, nuclear and conventional. Second, should deterrence fail, the United States would endeavor to terminate nuclear hostilities at the lowest level of conflict possible. And third, should nuclear war escalate to general war, the 4 U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1:46 (hereafter cited as HCAS, DoD Appropriations, FY 1975). 5 HCAS, DoD Appropriations, FY 1975, 1:345. 6 The size and scale of the limited nuclear options could range from the obvious fullscale strike to, as Schlesinger suggested, "as few as one or two missiles." U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., September 1974, p. 22 (sanitized and made public on 10 January 1975). Hereafter cited as Briefing on Counterforce Attacks. 7 James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in Europe, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., March-April 1974, p. 169 (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy). B DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 5; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 34, 53. 9 The term selective response is used throughout to differentiate it from NATO's strategy of flexible response.

[3]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

United States would seek to secure the best possible outcome for itself and its allies.10 Deterrence The fundamental function of U.S. strategic forces was "to deter attack against the United States, and against major security interests of the United States overseas, of which NATO is perhaps the most striking example/'11 Prior understanding of the capability of the United States to respond in a flexible and selective manner would give any potential aggressor pause should it contemplate an attack. Schlesinger argued that having recourse to limited options would enhance deterrence "because they are commensurate with the nature of the provocation are more credible to our opponent, ourselves and all interested parties. They are likely to deter far more effectively the range of threats short of an all-out nuclear attack/'12 A wide range of options would permit the United States to retaliate in a manner that was not out of proportion to its interests at risk. Having ready recourse to limited options was seen as communicating to any opponent contemplating armed aggression that the United States had the capability and will to respond, thereby serving to restore the credibility of the U.S. commitment to respond to Soviet provocations and thus reinforcing deterrence.13 Being able to retaliate flexibly and selectively also allowed the United States to tailor its responses to meet an armed challenge in ways other than merely inflicting punitive devastation on the aggressor. Schlesinger claimed that "if the United States possesses the ability to respond in kind, then the Soviet planner is faced with the prospect that the United States would respond and leave him in a no gain situation and, therefore, he would continue to be deterred."14 More direct, Schlesinger maintained that selective response provided "the clear ability to prevent any potential enemy from achieving objec10 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September lyjT Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, hearings, 94th Cong., ist sess., 1975, p. 2,076. 11 Schlesinger, testimony, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 8. 12 HCAS, DoD Appropriations, FY 1975, 1:43. 13 DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 38. 14 Testimony, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 9.

[4]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

tives against us that he might consider meaningful/'15 Thus under the new strategy the United States, should it or its allies be attacked, would seek in retaliating either to inflict on the opponent losses sufficient to offset whatever advantages it hoped to obtain or to seek directly to deny the enemy the attainment of its goals.16 The retaliatory response would depend on the nature of the attack and the political objectives of the aggressor. Available options would therefore accordingly include target sets from a broad spectrum of target categories, from hard and soft military targets to economic targets not necessarily co-located with urban populations.17 No matter which approach the United States chose to pursue in responding, a wouldbe adversary would be confronted with the prospect that it would not be able to obtain any advantage from its aggression.18 The administration was concerned about deterrence of aggression directed against its overseas allies and, in particular, Western Europe. The official view was that, "threats against allied forces, to the extent that they could be deterred by the prospect of nuclear retaliation, demand both more limited responses than destroying cities and advanced planning tailored to such lesser responses/'19 This view was underscored by declining to assert what level of aggression would actually provoke a response.20 Officials believed, however, that the United States neither could nor need rely on only strategic nuclear forces to effect deterrence. Schlesinger contended that it was incumbent on the United States and its allies to maintain strong conventional forces adequate to dissuade attack by nonnuclear means and to blunt successfully any undeterred belligerents.21 On another level, the role of the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal in the array of responses available to national authorities would be to promote deterrence at the low end of the spectrum of conflict and to couple U.S. strategic forces to the defense of American allies.22 The utility of conventional 15 DoD 16

Report, FY 1975, p. 42. Ibid.; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 9. 17 Schlesinger, testimony, US. Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1:43 (hereafter cited as SCA, DoD Appropriations, FY 1975). 18 DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 42; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 9. 19 DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 38. 20 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 174. 21 DoD Report, FY 1975, pp. 7-8; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 42. 22 Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 35; and Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 160.

[5]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

and tactical nuclear forces in fostering deterrence was discussed largely in terms of Western Europe. But it held as well for areas outside Europe, where the United States had to "maintain a worldwide military equilibrium" to remove any propensity the Soviet Union might have to exploit perceived American vulnerabilities in areas peripheral to the central superpower confrontation.23 Escalation Control Administration officials recognized that deterrence could not be guaranteed absolutely. Deterrence, it was posited, might fail as a consequence of accident, unauthorized acts, escalation from conventional conflicts, miscalculation, or even a massive surprise attack.24 Given such a possibility, Schlesinger contended that it was only prudent for the United States to plan to minimize the resultant damage by attempting to control escalation, while acknowledging that the country might not be able to do so. Nonetheless, he argued that the prospect of enormous fatalities as a result of nuclear war provided strong incentive for an attempt to be made to halt the conflict short of attacks against each other's cities, however dubious the prospect of success, rather than accept unconstrained escalation as inevitable.25 Schlesinger argued that appropriate planning could help to ensure that any nuclear conflict of limited scale could conceivably be brought to an end without necessarily increasing the level of destruction. Minimizing collateral destruction, particularly civilian deaths, by retaliating in a discriminate manner against small target sets would serve to signal the limited nature of the U.S. counterattack. Such a signal would hopefully reduce the possibility of inciting the Soviet Union to escalate to a counter retaliatory strike against U.S. cities. To provide further incentive to the Soviet Union not to strike back at American cities, the United States would withhold a portion of its strategic nuclear weapons as a reserve force capable of inflicting assured destruction in order to hold Soviet cities hostage.26 It was hoped that 23 Schlesinger was of the opinion that any such Soviet activity could undermine detente. See DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 2. 24 DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 38. 25 Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 27-28 and 37-38. 26 James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropria-

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The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

recourse to limited nuclear options, coupled with an assured destruction reserve force, would "establish a framework within which conflict, if it comes, would be fought at a low level, in terms of the violence of the weapons involved/'27 At the same time, the United States would attempt to communicate to the Soviet leadership the limited scale and scope of American actions to convince them that it was not intent on attacking their urban population centers. In such a circumstance, Schlesinger believed it not unreasonable that leaders on both sides could be expected to behave in a "rational and prudent" way.28 The nuclear framework erected to establish intrawar deterrence would provide an environment in which intrawar bargaining over the termination of the conflict and the restoration of deterrence could take place. The U.S. objective, in the event war should break out, was "to terminate the conflict at the lowest level possible consistent with U.S. objectives."29 This aspect of selective response was little discussed, and just what the American "objectives" might be, not mentioned. But the stated intent of a U.S. response was to strike Soviet targets pertinent to the conflict in a manner designed to minimize unintended damage.30 So presumably the United States, targeting its nuclear forces in a manner designed not to provoke a massive response, would seek to frustrate an attempt by the Soviet Union to achieve its goals by military means and thereby furnish it with incentive to negotiate a halt to hostilities. Intrawar deterrence and bargaining would be promoted by the temporary withdrawal of certain target sets, such as Soviet military and political leadership and command and control targets, which could later be destroyed if deemed desirable.31 Political guidance set down in NSDM-242 also provided turns for Fiscal Year 1975, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1:14 (hereafter cited as HCAS, Hearings on Military Posture, FY 1975). 27 James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 4 March 1974, p. 7 (sanitized and made public on 4 April 1974). Hereafter cited as U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies. ^U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 13. 29 Taken from slide presented by Schlesinger; see Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 8. ^DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 5; and HCAS, Hearings on Militar]/ Posture, FY 1975, 1:54. As an example of such an attack, Schlesinger suggested that the United States might strike the Soviet Union's oil production facilities to hamper its ability to prosecute a war against Europe. See U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 12-13. 31 Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 19.

[7]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

for the "maintenance of survivable strategic forces in reserve for protection and coercion during and after major nuclear conflict/'32 General Nuclear War Ultimately, no one could deny the possibility that escalation control might elude American efforts. Should this happen and general nuclear war result, the objective of U.S. forces was "to obtain the best possible outcome for the U.S. and its allies."33 Schlesinger, however, did not publicly elaborate this objective of selective response. Nonetheless, the implication was hard to mistake: rather than engage in a spasm of mindless nuclear devastation, the United States intended to prosecute an all-out exchange with some objective in mind. Indeed, political guidance relevant to this phase of a conflict directed that U.S. strategic forces should be targeted to effect the "destruction of the political, economic, and military resources critical to the enemy's postwar power, influence, and ability to recover at an early time as a major power." NSDM-242 further called for the "limitation of damage to those political, economic, and military resources critical to the continued power and influence of the United States and its allies."34 Simply put, in the event of general nuclear war the United States would endeavor to maximize its postwar power with respect to the Soviet Union and to impede the Soviet Union's capability to reconstitute itself more rapidly than the United States in the aftermath of a massive nuclear exchange.35 MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE Schlesinger offered a number of justifications for the need to change the way the United States targeted its nuclear weapons. The «Ibid, p. 3533

Schlesinger, testimony SCA, DoD Appropriations, FY 975, 1:239. "National Security Decision Memorandum 242," pp. 487-89. See also Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 19. 35 This aspect of the new strategy was made public in 1977 by Schlesinger's successor, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget, Fiscal Year 1979 Authorization Request and Fiscal Years 1978-19^2 Defense Programs, 17 January 1977, pp. 68-69; and DoD statement for the record, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, hearings, 95th Cong., ist sess., 1977, p. 839. 34

[8]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

buildup of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, he argued, had created a situation of strategic parity, which had two critical implications for U.S. security: first, the existence of a secure Soviet counterdeterrent undermined the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO Europe; and second, with its buildup of strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union had the capacity to engage in limited nuclear attacks. The fundamental reason behind the administration's desire to revise U.S. employment policy, according to Schlesinger, was the perception that the credibility of assured destruction as a deterrent had significantly declined. The doctrine of assured destruction, as publicly stated, stressed the threat to destroy the Soviet Union's urban industrial base in retaliation to Soviet aggression. This threat had been undermined as the Soviet Union had acquired through its strategic buildup a secure counterdeterrent force that could no longer be threatened by U.S. strategic forces.36 Even should it absorb a massive retaliatory attack, the Soviet Union would retain sufficient forces to fire back against the urban industrial centers of the United States in reprisal. Further, the Soviet Union had built up its nuclear forces beyond levels that were perceived necessary for a secure assured destruction deterrent,37 thus providing the Soviets a capability to engage in limited strikes should they so desire.38 Schlesinger cautioned, however, that the diminished credibility of assured destruction should not be construed to mean that the likelihood of nuclear war was high. He argued, rather, that under most circumstances deterrence generally remained effective and the possibility of a nuclear war erupting would still be remote.39 If nuclear war were to occur, it was more, though still not very, likely to result from miscalculation in a situation of intense confrontation.40 Calculating that U.S. leadership would be self-deterred, the Soviet leadership might decide in a crisis that it could hazard the risk of first resort to arms to achieve its goals, particularly if it did so in a limited fashion. Schlesinger argued that to prevent such a miscalculation being made, to dissuade the Soviet Union from believing that a first strike was a 36 Schlesinger argued that the Soviet Union had had an effective counterdeterrent since about 1966-1967. See DoD Report, FY 1975, pp. 3-4. 37 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 194. 38 Department of Defense written answer for the record, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 53. 39 See, for example, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 19, and 20-21. Ajames R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197!, 5 February 1975, 1:11 and 2:1 (hereafter cited as DoD Report, FY 1976).

[9]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

viable option, the United States needed to show that it was willing and able to implement a response no matter what the level of conflict.41 The questionable credibility of assured destruction to deter attack was most pronounced with respect to the many overseas security commitments of the United States.42 Most important among these was its commitment to extend deterrence to Western Europe to discourage nuclear or massive nonnuclear attacks and to inhibit nuclear coercion or blackmail.43 When asked where the sort of strategic miscalculation that would lead to a nuclear war might occur, Schlesinger invariably replied the European theater.44 An equally, if not more, important consideration, he said, was that Europeans had long been skeptical that the United States would in fact be willing to sacrifice its own cities to defend its European allies, suspicions that were currently adding to other stresses present within the alliance.45 Consequently, the United States needed to revise its nuclear strategy to ensure that its strategic forces were coupled to the defense of Europe and, perhaps more important, were seen as being so coupled by all concerned.46 To the administration, the extensive Soviet force buildup had profound implications for U.S. security. If the Soviet Union were to launch less than an all-out attack against the United States, the president was seen as being confronted with the agonizing choice of having either to launch an assured destruction attack in the full knowledge that it would result in the mass slaughter of American citizens or to do nothing. Should the Soviet Union launch a limited attack, Schlesinger contended that the president would have no real alternative except to renege on the promised threat to retaliate.47 The 41

Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 44. ^DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 35. 43 Ibid, p. 28. "Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 41. ^U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 8 and 13. See also ibid., pp. 8, 41-42, and 44. 46 In response to a query, Schlesinger suggested that an attack against NATO might provoke an American strategic response. He went on to say that "I don't know what we would do under those circumstances in terms of the strategic forces, but I believe that it is necessary for our strategic forces to continue to be locked into the defense of Europe in the minds of the Europeans and of the Soviet Union": see U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 12. See also U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 8 and 36; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 41-42 and 44. 47 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 8-9.

[10]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

conclusion reached was "that there are many ways, other than a massive surprise attack, in which an enemy might be tempted to use, or threaten to use, his strategic forces to gain a major advantage or concession. It follows that our own strategic forces and doctrine must take a wide range of possibilities into account if they are successfully to perform their deterrent function."48 Given the diversity of threats envisioned, assured destruction was considered too rigid to secure deterrence adequately. Schlesinger argued in particular that in the future the Soviet Union had the potential to acquire an even greater capability to undertake limited attacks.49 Since the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement, the Soviet Union had brought forth four new land-based ballistic missiles and a new sea-based ballistic missile. Three of the land-based missiles—the 88-17, SS-i8, and 88-19—had been tested with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and represented a substantial increase in throw weight over their predecessors. Schlesinger claimed that should these high-throwweight missiles be deployed up to the limits allowed under the SALT I agreement and MIRV technology applied to them to the fullest extent, the Soviet Union could add to its strategic forces some seven thousand warheads in the one- to two-megaton range by the late 19705 or early 19808. Combined with improved accuracies, which it was sure to develop, such a force would provide the Soviet Union with a clear superiority in counterforce capability which would imperil the survivability of U.S. land-based missiles.50 Although the United States could not be sure of Soviet intentions, "it is certainly conceivable that they foresee both political and military advantage, not only in the growing numerical weight of their forces, but also in their potential to bring major portions of our own strategic arsenal into jeopardy"51 Schlesinger argued that even though the likelihood of a controlled Soviet attack against the United States was not very probable, the United States needed to deter the entire range of options available to the Soviet Union if only to forestall miscalculation.52 48

DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 27. on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 9-10. See, for example, DoD Report, FY 1975, pp. 5-6; and DoD Report, FY 1976 2:12-14. 51 DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 30. See also U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategk Policies, p. 51. 52 See, for example, Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 21, 27, and 34; and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 9 and 23. 49 Briefing 50

[11]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence Schlesinger's defense of the new doctrine fits within the theoretical framework of extended deterrence. A central proposition is that stable nuclear deterrence at the superpower level—represented by the situation of mutual assured destruction—weakens extended deterrence, as mutual deterrence removes the credibility of threats to employ nuclear weapons for interests considered less than vital to continued survival. In other words, stability at the center engenders instability on the periphery.53 This problem is most intense with respect to NATO, which relies on the threat of first nuclear use. How best to strengthen the persuasiveness of the deterrent that the United States extends to its NATO allies has been the subject of many debates and much analysis. An assumption exists that developments in U.S. nuclear strategy are a function of the need to devise means to make extended deterrence credible,54 much as suggested by Schlesinger. Much as stability at the core leads to instability at the periphery, instability at the center is assumed to generate strategic, and hence political, instability at the periphery.55 If one superpower holds a clear advantage at the strategic level, it might believe that the other would be less willing to run the risk of nuclear war, thus emboldening it to challenge this other at the nonstrategic level on the periphery. The potential acquisition by the Soviet Union of a persuasive counterforce capability could provide it with such a strategic advantage. Schlesinger's argument was not that a counterforce advantage would lead the Soviet Union to attack the United States but rather that the Soviet Union might seek to make gains outside the strategic center under the cover of the threat of counterforce attacks against the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Even in Senate hearings regarding limited counterforce attacks against the United States, Schlesinger maintained that nuclear 53 See Robert Jervis, The lllogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (London: Macmillan, 1988); and Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: The Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960, 1961), esp. pp. 14-15. For a critical discussion of this dilemma, see Lawrence Freedman, "The Evolution and Future of Extended Deterrence," in The Changing Strategic Landscape (London: IISS Adelphi Paper 236, 1989), pp. 18-31. 54 For example, Lawrence Freedman, in his compendious examination of the development of nuclear strategy since the end of the Second World War, observes that "if there is an underlying theme it is the attempt to develop a convincing strategy for extended deterrence, to make the United States' nuclear guarantee to Europe intellectuaDy credible rather than just an act of faith/' Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), p. xvi. 55 See Freedman, "Extended Deterrence/' p. 19.

[12]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence war was more likely to arise out of a failure of deterrence in Europe than out a direct attack against the United States.56 His defense of the new strategy therefore boils down to the contention that the revision of U.S. targeting doctrine was a response to a crisis in extended deterrence, with his constant referral to Western Europe implying that it was the deterrence the United States extended to this region that was of primary concern. Schlesinger's announcement and elaboration of the change in U.S. targeting practices generated some debate within the Congress, where the new doctrine was closely questioned, whereas in the broader public realm, the new doctrine produced only sparse debate. Those critical of the new strategy made three main points: the probability that nuclear war could be controlled was remote; the belief that nuclear war could be controlled at tolerable levels of damage could increase the risk that nuclear weapons might be used; and the renewed emphasis on counterforce options could create the impression that the United States harbored first-strike ambitions, which could provoke an arms race and jeopardize SALT.57 The critics' central argument was that the new targeting policy seemed to be about fighting a nuclear war, not deterring one, and that these two objectives were in tension with each other. Despite the criticism of the new doctrine, Schlesinger's explanation for why the new policy was developed went largely unquestioned. As Barry Carter, a former National Security Council (NSC) staff member and critic of the new policy, wrote in 1974, "There is general agreement among strategic analysts that the U.S. should have a variety of response options other than massive retaliation against cities."58 Schlesinger's claim that a central motivation for the new doctrine was a perceived requirement to bolster the credibility of the United States' nuclear commitment to the defense of Western Europe in particular was generally embraced. A dilemma for the United States was to reconcile the obligation to employ nuclear weapons, including in the event of conventional attack, with its own vulnerabil56

See Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 8, 41-42, and 44. For critiques of the Schlesinger Doctrine, see Herbert Scoville, "Flexible Madness/' Foreign Policy 14 (Spring 1974); and Barry Carter, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons/' in Nuclear Strategy and National Security: Points of View, ed. Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977). For a good overview of the debate, see Ted Greenwood and Michael Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense," Foreign Affairs 52 (July 1974). 58 Carter, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons," p. 232. 57

[13]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence ity to nuclear attack, and many analysts of that period and later accepted Schlesinger's assertion that the revision of U.S. targeting practices was an attempt to solve this dilemma.59 Somewhat more controversial was Schlesinger's claim that another motivating factor was the prospect that the Soviet Union might engage in controlled nuclear strikes. No real evidence of Soviet interest in limited nuclear attacks was found by those who investigated this aspect of the strategy.60 Yet despite some skepticism, this particular explanation was not widely disputed. On the whole, the justifications for the new doctrine have been assumed to reflect the reasons the Nixon administration sought to revise U.S. targeting practices. Schlesinger's primary justification for the new targeting doctrine was that the United States needed to shore up the nuclear deterrence it extended to protect Western Europe. I contend, however, that the explanation for the innovation of U.S. nuclear doctrine by the Nixon administration is more complex and quite different than that suggested by Schlesinger. INNOVATING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE Military doctrine establishes how military forces should be structured and employed to achieve the ends of the state. Determining an appropriate military doctrine depends on a state's appraisal of its interests, the political-military environment in which those interests are pursued, and the military means available. States generally tend to change their doctrines for the application of military force when existing strategies no longer serve national purposes. Why would 99 See, for example, Laurence Martin, "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Interpretation," Survival 16 (July-August 1974): 162-63; Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma," Orbis 19 (Summer 1975): 472-73; Lawrence Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 383; Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, pp. 75-91; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 42-45. 60 Benjamin S. Lambeth and William Van Cleave, who supported the development of limited nuclear options for deterrent purposes, examined Soviet military thought for indications that the Soviet Union might subscribe to limited nuclear strikes. Lambeth found no evidence of Soviet interest in limited nuclear attacks, pointing out that any U.S. effort to limit nuclear conflict was therefore quite unlikely to succeed; Van Cleave strained to find evidence for such an interest. See Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Paper 5506, September 1975); and Van Cleave, "Soviet Doctrine and Strategy," in The Future of Soviet Military Power, ed. Lawrence Whetton (New York: Crane Russack, 1976).

[14]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence states question the utility of the prevailing doctrine and develop another? First, states may renovate their strategy because the politicalmilitary environment, one they share with opponents and allies alike, has been transformed in some way that renders prevailing doctrines inadequate to secure national interests. Second, states may change their strategy simply because it has not been effective in achieving national interests, even though the political-military environment has not changed. And, third, states may reinterpret their interests, thus making the then-current strategy inappropriate. The reasons Schlesinger articulated for innovation fit comfortably within this spectrum of strategic appraisal. The necessity of maintaining the means-ends linkage provides a powerful incentive for innovation in military strategy. An inappropriate doctrine may have grave consequences for the security of a state. Yet to suggest that strategic calculation is the sole cause of innovation is to oversimplify the issue of why states choose to refashion their strategic doctrines and why they choose particular strategies.61 Often there is more involved in the decision to innovate and in the process of innovation than purely strategic considerations. Any government policy developed is the product of a number of factors, which is no less true in the formulation of strategic nuclear policy. Strategic thought undoubtedly plays a significant role in the development of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. Along with strategic calculation, however, budgetary, bureaucratic, political, and technological factors may exert an influence on both the impetus to innovate and the content of the resulting policy.62 Enough latitude exists for these diverse elements and their various permutations so as to give U.S. policymakers reason to innovate nuclear strategy. Such inducements add considerably to the strategic calculations that may motivate a desire for change, determine the objectives to be achieved, and inform the substance of the resultant policy. Each of these factors figures in the innovation of the Schlesinger Doctrine. Another consideration that cannot be ignored is that no government constitutes a single set of unitary actors, which has been well 61

See, for example, Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. pp. i3-io; and Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). 62 Robert E. Osgood, The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 3; and Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 7.

[15]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence demonstrated in the case of the United States by numerous studies pertaining to weapons procurement. Different policy actors tend to bring different concerns and objectives to the process of policy formulation, which is no less true in the case of the innovation of U.S. strategic nuclear policy than of any other policy. Lynn Etheridge Davis, in an early and incisive paper on the Schlesinger Doctrine, identifies four different bureaucratic actors as being involved in reforming U.S. nuclear strategy in the early 19705: the White House or NSC staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. military, and the Department of State. Each had a different objective that they hoped to achieve through the innovation of nuclear strategy.63 Integrating these different viewpoints exerted a strong influence on how the strategy took shape and on the outcome of the innovation process. This integration was a matter of process, an understanding of which is important to understanding the result. This book examines the innovation of U.S. strategic nuclear policy during the Nixon administrations with three main questions in mind: Why did U.S. policy actors believe it necessary to reform U.S. strategic nuclear policy? What objectives did they seek to achieve through doing so? And how did they go about innovating this policy? Consideration of these leads to the central question. Was the desire to couple the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent to the defense of Western Europe the motivating factor for (as claimed by Schlesinger) or the major objective of the innovation of U.S. strategic nuclear policy in the Nixon administrations? I argue that concern about extended deterrence was a source of the innovation, at least for some of the actors involved, but this concern was neither narrowly focused on Western Europe nor about coupling the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of the European allies. Schlesinger's assertion that U.S. targeting practices needed to be revised to offset the growing counterforce potential of the Soviet strategic forces was especially misleading, for concern about limited Soviet nuclear attacks, particularly counterforce attacks against U.S. landbased strategic systems, was neither a motivating factor behind the innovation process nor an influence on the shape of the final strategy. Schlesinger's statements about the need for and the objectives of the new strategy were declaratory statements specifically designed to 63

Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 121, 1975/1976).

[16]

The Schlesinger Doctrine and Extended Deterrence

conform strategic nuclear policy with U.S. policy objectives and the prevailing political climate. Concerns other than those set forth by Schlesinger were central in providing the impetus for the innovation undertaken, influencing the form of the targeting guidance ultimately devised.

[17]

[2] The Changing Strategic Environment

In the 19505 and the first half of the 19605, the United States deployed an increasingly large, diversified strategic nuclear arsenal that provided a distinct advantage over the Soviet Union. This margin of strategic nuclear superiority, overwhelming in its dimensions, was widely thought to be of crucial importance for both military and political purposes. A preponderant military position in the strategic nuclear balance was seen as a necessary requirement if the United States was to deter and contain the perceived expansionistic ambitions of the Soviet Union successfully. Nuclear superiority was further perceived by U.S. policymakers as ensuring that the widespread interests of the United States were not undermined through a failed confidence in U.S. security guarantees. Even the growing recognition in the late 19505 that the United States was becoming steadily more vulnerable to Soviet strategic attack did little to temper the compelling nature of this dictum of U.S. national security policy.1 As McGeorge Bundy asserted in 1964, all postwar presidents believed that U.S. nuclear superiority was important and so aimed to preserve it.2 It had become a virtual article of faith in American policy-making circles that the United States should maintain a nuclear position superior to that of the Soviet Union. Yet by the time Richard Nixon became president in 1969, the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR was shifting 1 See, for example, Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 184-85. 2 McGeorge Bundy, "The Presidency and the Peace," Foreign Affairs 42 (April 1964): 355-

[18]

The Changing Strategic Environment

rapidly from one of American superiority to parity. The United States had ceased its buildup of strategic nuclear forces by 1967, when the numbers of U.S. launchers reached predetermined levels of 1052 landbased ballistic missiles and 656 sea-launched ballistic missiles, while planned reductions were to cut back the U.S. strategic bomber force to some 450 by 1969.3 The Soviet Union, for its part, had in the mid1960s started to develop and deploy a new generation of missiles. By mid-1968 the Soviet Union had built up its land-based ballistic missile force to 896 and had deployed its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.4 Thus after a rapid, though somewhat uneven, expansion of its strategic forces, by 1969 the Soviet Union was approaching an equal numerical level in land-based ballistic missiles with the United States, with the momentum of its program continuing unabated. As Nixon took office, concerned observers saw the era of unchallenged American nuclear supremacy was coming to a close. Both the United States and USSR now possessed a strategic deterrent force that could not be entirely removed in a disarming attack, exposing each to the prospect of a retaliatory attack should it use nuclear weapons first. The Shifting Strategic Environment Despite some early indications that Nixon and a number of his officials5 might prefer to reassert a clear margin of U.S. strategic ad3

For an exemplary account of the U.S. strategic buildup in the 19605, see Ball, Politics and Force Levels, esp. pp. 268-76. 4 The land-based missiles included some 156 of the new heavy 88-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 520 of the new light SS-n ICBMs. See Statement of Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford: The Fiscal Year 1970-74 Defense Program and 1970 Defense Budget, 13 January 1969 (declassified under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], no date) p. 77 (hereafter cited as Classified Posture Statement, FY 1970). Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford publicly claimed that the Soviet Union was expected to construct four to eight nuclear submarines per year. See Classified Posture Statement, FY 1970, p. 81. It was estimated that the Soviets could "place [only] approximately 100 bombers over U.S. territory on two-way missions/' so this aspect of their threat was characterized as "limited" (Classified Posture Statement, FY 1970, pp. 82-83). 5 During his presidential campaign, Nixon maintained that strategic superiority conveyed certain advantages, and he pledged to reestablish the American margin of advantage. See "Nixon on Security Issues/' Air Force Magazine, January 1969, p. 18; Claude Witze, "The Richard Nixon Team Takes Over," Aerospace International, JanuaryFebruary 1969, p. 38; and Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 144. For administration officials with this view, see the statements made by Secretary of Defense

[19]

The Changing Strategic Environment

vantage over the Soviet Union, a number of considerations forced the Nixon administration to conclude that an effort to regain a measure of superiority was not a tenable option. Central was the administration's recognition that the prevailing environment of mutual vulnerability was a strategic reality that the United States had to accept as a fact of life. Reasserting U.S. strategic superiority could not alter the fact that each side now possessed secure nuclear forces capable of inflicting massive retaliatory damage on the other. As Henry Kissinger subsequently pointed out in 1975, "strategic equality" meant that "whoever may be ahead in the damage they can inflict on the other, the damage to the other in a general nuclear war will be of a catastrophic nature."6 The administration was persuaded that, with the advent of mutual vulnerability, there were limits to the practical military utility that could be derived from adding ever-increasing numbers of strategic nuclear weapons to the U.S. arsenal.7 The Nixon administration's decision to forgo strategic superiority was based on more than strict military calculus. Administration studies pointed out that a posture of superiority was unattainable over the long haul, for the Soviet Union would inevitably feel compelled to counteract any U.S. attempt to achieve such a strategic position.8 If the United States sought to restore its former position of superiority, the renewal of the strategic arms race would serve only to undercut the possibility of successful arms limitations talks.9 Nixon and Kissinger, however, saw SALT as the crucial first step toward shifting United States-Soviet relations from an "era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation." If SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union were Melvin Laird and General Earl Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in, respectively, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of Laird, Packard, and Darden, hearings, 9ist Cong., ist sess., 14 January 1969, p. 10; and U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal 'Year 1971, hearings, 9ist Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 88. 6 "Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 23 December 1975," United States Information Service (US.I.S.) Official Text, 24 December 1975. See also Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978), p. 415. 7 See, for example, Brent Scowcroft, "Deterrence and Strategic Superiority/' Orbis 13 (Summer 1969); and interview with NSC staff member. 8 Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 19705; Building for Peace, A Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971 (Washington, DC.: GPO, 1971), p. 171; and interview with NSC staff member. The study that examined and rejected the feasibility of regaining a posture of strategic superiority reportedly was National Security Study Memorandum 3 (NSSM-3). See "The Nixon Strategy," Los Angeles Times, 11 May 1972. 9 Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 19705: A New Policy for Peace, A Report to the Congress, 18 February 1970 (Washington, DC.: GPO, 1970), pp. 92-93; and Gerard

[20]

The Changing Strategic Environment

to go ahead and superpower detente become a reality, the administration had to accept some measure of strategic parity.10 Public discontent with the war in Vietnam provided further political as well as economic reasons to refrain from striving for superiority. A consequence of the growing antiwar sentiment in the late 19605 was a questioning of the legitimacy of U.S. military expenditures and the rise of strong domestic pressures to decrease defense spending. Nixon sought to preempt this political opposition by setting defense expenditures at levels below those requested by his predecessor and by setting forth a budget agenda that reordered U.S. spending priorities.11 Nonetheless, Congress further reduced administration requests for defense funding by an average of six percent per annum from fiscal year 1970 through fiscal year 1975. Thus the annual U.S. defense budget fell from $78 billion in fiscal year 1968 to $74 billion in fiscal year 1974. Measured in constant fiscal year 1974 dollars, this change represented a 37.2 percent decrease in buying power. With rising inflation, increasing costs for high technology, and soaring personnel costs that rose from 41.8 to 55.2 percent of the defense budget, the Pentagon was hard pressed to make ends meet.12 To push for superiority and thereby compete with the Soviet Union in an arms buildup would be prohibitively expensive. If nothing else, budget constraints drove home the point that a reacquisition of U.S. superiority was not a plausible policy option.13 The Political Significance of Parity Although the Nixon administration effectively renounced the pursuit of superiority, U.S. officials were uncomfortable with a strategic relationship of parity. Mutual vulnerability was not only a condition that had to be accounted for when considering the merits of seeking superiority but also one that prevailed in an environment of strategic Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980), p. 22. 10 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 57. 11 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), pp. 212-13. 12 For a closer examination of the reduced defense budget, see Lawrence J. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 19705 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 26-37 an^ 37~5O. 13 Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, p. 143; and interview with NSC staff member.

[21]

The Changing Strategic Environment

parity. As Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff QCS), testified in 1970, "We do think today, now that we have this situation of approximate parity, that a mutual deterrent exists."14 Strategic parity drove home the crucial point that threats to employ nuclear weapons were increasingly unthinkable to implement, for to do so would be to invite nuclear ruin on oneself. Parity implied a strategic stalemate that promised to pose difficult problems for the United States. To some in the United States, strategic superiority had buttressed the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives with vigor. Assured of the adequacy of its strategic forces, U.S. leadership had had no need to fear the Soviet Union. There was some apprehension that a corollary of the loss of strategic superiority would be a collapse of American confidence which would harm the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign and security policy objectives.15 No longer fortified by an overwhelming nuclear posture, the United States might behave in a more cautious, or even timid, manner in seeking to secure its interests in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Concern also existed about the impact of parity on third-party perceptions of U.S. nuclear strength and political resolve. In an era of mutual vulnerability, allies and other interested states might conclude that the United States would not have the will in the face of Soviet challenges to fulfill its nuclear deterrent threats for fear of retaliation.16 Widespread perceptions of American weakness could result in the United States' allies being more susceptible to political pressure applied by the Soviet Union, creating tensions within the various U.S. alliance systems, while nonallied countries might be inclined to lean closer to the Soviet Union, thus leading to shifts in the overall balance between the two superpowers. Of further concern for some officials was the realistic prospect that the U.S. retreat from Southeast Asia would strongly reinforce third-party perception that American security guarantees lacked credibility in an environment of mutual deterrence.17 Administration officials worried that the end of U.S. strategic 14

US. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971, hearings, 9ist Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 204. 15 Walter B. Slocombe, The Implications of Strategic Parity (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 77, 1971), pp. 13-14. 16 Ibid. 17 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 228.

[22]

The Changing Strategic Environment

superiority, especially when coupled with the process of retrenchment overseas, might undermine the credibility of American security commitments, in the eyes both of allies and of the Soviet leadership. Thus how the Soviet Union would react to the advent of strategic parity was a matter of considerable concern. Troubling was that the Soviet Union, with its newfound strategic strength, might be inspired to greater activism. At the moment when U.S. nuclear predominance was waning, the need for budgetary restraint and the political backlash to the Vietnam War were eroding America's conventional force strengths. To keep defense expenditures in line with diminished budgets, military personnel were decreased from 3,436 thousand in 1968 to 2,218 thousand in 1974, while total equipment levels were cut back. Army strength decreased from 19 to 13 divisions; U.S. Marine strength, from 4 to 3 divisions; U.S. Air Force fighter attack strength, from 103 to 75 squadrons; and conventional naval strength, from 976 to 495 ships. The result was a substantial reduction of the overall conventional military capability of the United States to meet its wideranging defense commitments.18 At the same time, virulent domestic antimilitarism, combined with congressional efforts to constrain presidential authority to commit American troops to combat, called into question the will of the United States to oppose any Soviet transgressions of the international status quo. The Soviet Union, perceiving that the United States would be unable or unwilling to commit conventional forces while also being deterred from nuclear use, might be emboldened to embark on more-aggressive foreign policy enterprises that directly challenged U.S. security interests. The prospect that under the cover of mutual deterrence the Soviet Union might test U.S. resolve, possibly even through the application, or the threatened application, of its preponderant nonnuclear advantage, deeply troubled officials in the Nixon administration.19 Soviet Strategic Advantage Another source of chronic anxiety for the Nixon administration was the momentum of the Soviet strategic building program. The Soviet 18 Korb, Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, pp. 39 and 41-45. Secretary of Defense Laird noted in 1971 that because of budget constraints the United States would have to demobilize almost one million troops in the early 19705. Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, before the House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 1971, p. 14. 19 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982) pp. 292 and 1176.

[23]

The Changing Strategic Environment

Union might be content to halt deployment of strategic forces at a level of parity with the United States but the administration could not arbitrarily rule out the possibility that it might be intent on forging ahead with its force expansion to achieve a perceptible level of superiority over the United States. Although a measurable degree of advantage in nuclear weaponry might not readily translate into usable military advantage, the Nixon administration clearly believed that nuclear weapons had a political significance that transcended their military application. The perception of inequality was believed to have a profound influence on the behavior of the two superpowers or on that of interested third parties.20 Admiral Moorer encapsulated the administration's view when he testified in early 1972 that "the mere appearance of Soviet strategic superiority could have a debilitating effect on our foreign policy and our negotiating posture . . . even if that superiority would have no practical effect on the outcome of an all-out nuclear exchange."21 Thus, from a political perspective, the Nixon administration did not believe it could allow the Soviet Union to be viewed, either domestically or internationally, to have a measure of superiority in strategic nuclear force capability. In his first annual report to Congress, Nixon was most emphatic that any significant alterations in the strategic balance which gave the Soviet Union a clear margin of superiority could not be tolerated. He contended that to allow the Soviet Union to obtain an ascendant strategic position would call into question the reliability of the U.S. strategic deterrent, undermine the confidence of U.S. allies in American security guarantees, and reduce the Soviet Union's incentive for arms control. Nixon stressed that the United States would feel compelled to counteract any Soviet effort to effect a convincing shift in the strategic balance.22 A Soviet posture of strategic superiority might 20

See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, "Foreign Policy and National Security/' speech made before the World Affairs Council and Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 22 March 1976, excerpted in International Security i (Summer 1976): 186. 21 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Military Posture for FY 1973, hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess, 15 February 1972, p. 505-6. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made much the same point in seeking to convince the Senate of the need to accelerate the Trident program, arguing that "it would be diplomatically and politically unacceptable for the United States to allow the Soviets to achieve a large numerical superiority in both land-based and sea-based strategic missiles/' Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program, 15 February 1972, p. 69. 22 See Nixon, New Policy for Peace, p. 93; and Final Report to the Congress of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird (January, 1909-January 1973), before the House Committee on Armed Services, 8 January 1973, p. 5.

[24]

The Changing Strategic Environment

undermine the plausibility of the U.S. pledge to use nuclear weapons in the defense of its allies, possibly imparting some political advantage to the Soviet Union which it could profitably wield to the detriment of U.S. security interests. An element of the Soviet buildup that particularly disturbed the Nixon administration was the possibility that the Soviet Union might be seeking to develop a capability to posture a first-strike threat against U.S. land-based nuclear deterrent forces. The question of Minuteman vulnerability was first publicly evoked in the spring of 1969 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in a bid to provide a rationale for the administration's Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) program. This early concern was overdrawn and, in part, politically motivated.23 Nonetheless, there was a growing recognition within the administration that the strategic environment would be radically transformed by the advent of MIRV technology and improved accuracy technologies. For the first time in the nuclear era, counterforce attacks against an opponent's nuclear deterrent without the need to resort to a massive attack would become a feasible option.24 The perceived threat lay not so much in the burgeoning numbers of the Soviet ballistic missile force as it did in the use to which its component parts might be put. Concern over the Soviet Union's firststrike potential was reserved mainly for the latent capability of the large Soviet ballistic missile, the SS-g. Expectations that the Soviet Union would soon perfect MIRV technology transformed the highthrow-weight capability of the 88-9 booster into a serious threat to the survivability of the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force.25 The question was not whether the Soviet Union would master MIRV and enhanced accuracy technologies but when it would do so. Should the Soviet Union develop an effective, prompt counterforce capability, it could launch partial attacks against the U.S. land-based deterrent force while withholding a secure and substantial reserve. Devastation of the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force would leave the American leadership with no real strategic retaliatory capability except to attack Soviet cities, a response which would be suicidal in 23 For a detailed discussion of the question of Minuteman vulnerability during the Nixon administration, see Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 2d Ed. (London: Macmillan, 1986). 24 William G. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Understanding the Hidden Pattern of Soviet-American Relations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 42. 25 See, for example, Nixon, Building for Peace, p. 168.

[25]

The Changing Strategic Environment

the face of the secure Soviet counterdeterrent. Some officials were apprehensive that the temptation to exploit the vulnerability of the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos by striking first might prove to be too strong for the Soviet Union to resist in a superpower confrontation.26 But the most prominent and abiding concern was over a crisis in stability if and when the Soviet Union acquired a convincing capability to threaten the survival of U.S. land-based systems.27 A persuasive Soviet first-strike capability might undermine the U.S. will to resist in a crisis while also providing the Soviet Union with the assurance to stand firm against the United States in a confrontational situation. More worrisome was the prospect that the Soviet Union might be emboldened to translate the possession of a credible first-strike capability into substantial political or military gain, leading it to challenge U.S. security interests.28 The Nixon administration recognized early on that the Soviet Union would likely not attempt a counterforce attack with a portion of its strategic forces,29 for the United States would still retain an impressive retaliatory capability that would make such an initiative an extremely high-risk venture. Rather, officials worried that from such a capability the Soviet Union might obtain, or might believe it had obtained, a significant political advantage on which it might try to act. The perception of such a threat, however overstated it might have been, exacerbated the potential strategic and political problems administration officials foresaw being presented by the advent of parity. The Soviet Union would gain even more confidence in its ability to challenge U.S. interests, while the United States would lose even more confidence in its ability to stand up to such challenges. The confluence of these two trends at some future point boded little good for the capability of the United States to secure its interests. U.S. POLICY RESPONSE The response of the Nixon administration to the changing nature of the strategic environment and to the problems this posed for the ^Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 42. Interview with NSC staff member. 28 Schlesinger hinted at this argument in 1974. See James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975, hearings, 4 March 1974, pp. 2-3. 29 Interview with NSC staff member. 27

[26]

The Changing Strategic Environment

United States was twofold. First, the administration developed a strategic policy to meet the challenges of strategic parity. And, second, it agreed to enter into talks with the Soviet Union regarding the limitation of strategic arms. Strategic

Sufficiency

In his first press conference, Nixon had maintained that the United States needed "sufficient military power" to defend American interests and uphold American commitments.30 Although he seemed to imply an acceptance of strategic parity, however tentatively put, the administration did not present its interpretation of the concept of "sufficiency" until it set forth the policy of "strategic sufficiency" in early 1971. In his second foreign policy statement, Nixon claimed that "strategic sufficiency" had two meanings: in a "narrow military sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking"; and in a "broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated."31 "Strategic sufficiency," as defined by Nixon, expressed the administration's desire to maintain "sufficient" military power to ensure that the military and political initiative did not shift to the Soviet Union's favor. Nixon constantly maintained that the United States, despite its pull-back from Vietnam, would honor the security commitments made to its various allies. This pledge was the heart of what was known as the Nixon Doctrine, which, though originally articulated in 1969, was integrated into the policy of "strategic sufficiency" under the rubric of "realistic deterrence." Under the Nixon Doctrine the United States promised to continue to furnish a nuclear shield at the strategic and tactical level of possible nuclear conflict to protect its allies from political and military coercion. The United States expected its allies to provide for their own defense at the nonnuclear level of conflict, however, particularly in terms of personnel, assisted only by 30 "President Nixon's News Conference of January 27," Department of State Bulletin 60 (17 February 1969): 143. 31 Nixon, Building for Peace, pp. 170-71.

[27]

The Changing Strategic Environment

U.S. economic and military aid.32 In other words, in the post-Vietnam period the United States would be willing, or perhaps only able, to support its allies with American money and material, but not American blood, should they became embroiled in a conflict. This policy reflected domestic realities. The current antimilitary temper of the American body politic made it improbable that the United States would have the political will or the military capabilities to intervene in foreign conflicts. For the allies that relied on the United States for their security, especially those which felt exposed to potential Soviet political or military designs, this doctrine placed a great premium on the dependability of the U.S. extended deterrent. The administration set forth a number of planning criteria that defined the substance of "strategic sufficiency" and informed U.S. strategic weapons acquisition: (i) "maintaining an adequate secondstrike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces; (2) providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis; (3) preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war; and (4) defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches."33 Two other key considerations, though not explicitly set forth as official criteria, also effectively constituted requirements of "strategic sufficiency." One consideration, stated a year later by Laird, was that although the United States was willing to accept a condition of strategic parity, it neither could nor would accept a position of strategic inferiority.34 The other, which Nixon implicitly linked to the political definition of strategic sufficiency, was that the United States should have the forces and plans to provide for retaliatory options appropriate to the character and level of any attack.35 Taken together, these prescriptions if fulfilled would ostensibly support the maintenance of strategic sufficiency in both its military and its political senses. Strategic Arms Limitation: Halting the Soviet Buildup From the outset of his presidency Nixon was beset by pressure from the Congress and from within the ranks of his administration to 32

Regarding the Nixon Doctrine, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 222-25. See also Robert Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), esp. pp. 117-26. 33 Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, p. 62. 34 Final Report to the Congress, p. 5. 35 Nixon, Building for Peace, p. 171.

[28]

The Changing Strategic Environment

start negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms.36 Nevertheless, administration officials generally recognized that, effectively constrained by political and economic considerations from attempting to match the Soviet buildup, the United States would have to rely on successful strategic arms limitations talks to ensure that the Soviet Union did not acquire a measure of superiority or a competent first-strike capability37 The primary objectives of negotiation for the United States were to achieve both the reality and the appearance of equality in the levels of strategic offensive weapons permitted each side and to obtain limitations that would help to maintain crisis stability in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.38 The fundamental basis of the U.S. position was to negotiate relatively equal levels of strategic delivery vehicles, with subceilings and technical constraints to be placed on heavy missiles so as to minimize the Soviet capacity to develop a strong counter force capability.39 Placing restrictions on Soviet heavy missiles to reduce the future vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs was seen as the most pressing problem facing the administration at the outset of negotiations.40 In the spring of 1970, when the first negotiating session began, the total number of Soviet missiles equaled that of the United States. The Nixon administration initially sought to negotiate relatively equal aggregate levels of strategic delivery vehicles. A quick and successful outcome, however, was precluded as a stalemate developed over the U.S. condition that any agreement to limit ABM's be tied to the Soviet acceptance of a freeze on offensive weapons and over Soviet insistence that U.S. nuclear systems forward-based in Europe be included in the talks.41 This impasse allowed the Soviet Union to continue to expand its strategic forces unabated through the fall of 1970.42 36 Nixon and Kissinger believed that the United States should not be pushed precipitously into arms control talks by domestic pressure so as not to squander the bargaining leverage SALT provided to obtain political concessions from the Soviet Union in other areas. See Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 127-28. 37 Interview with NSC staff member. 38 A third, though lower-priority, objective was to de-escalate the arms race. Paul H. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance between Hope and Skepticism," Foreign Policy, no. 5 (Winter 1974-75): *38-3939 Nixon and Kissinger, however, approached SALT largely with the anticipated diplomatic and domestic political benefits in mind rather than with the possible security advantages it might provide. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 184-85. ^Kissinger, White House Years, p. 543. 41 Ibid., p. 548. 42 Intelligence estimates presented by Laird in his 1971 posture statement set the number of operational Soviet ICBM launchers at the end of 1970 at 1,440, with some 288 SS-9 silos operational or under construction. Statement of Secretary of Defense Mel-

[29]

The Changing Strategic Environment

The persistence of the Soviet strategic buildup, even after a level of parity had been reached, resulted in considerable anxiety within the administration that the Soviet Union might be seeking to achieve a position of superiority.43 Particularly disconcerting was the continuing growth of the prospective threat that Soviet heavy missiles posed to the survivability of the U.S. land-based deterrent. Faced with heavy pressure being applied by hawks in the Pentagon and the Congress, the administration perceived that its most urgent concern was to obtain constraints as soon as possible on the expansion of Soviet ICBMs, especially the heavy-throw-weight 88-9. ** The Nixon administration thus found itself driven by the Soviet buildup to jettison its initial objective of obtaining a level of equality with the Soviet Union and to concentrate simply on stopping the Soviet momentum at the earliest possible moment. The Nixon administration decided it had to settle for a freeze in the ballistic missile forces each possessed at levels each had deployed unilaterally. An agreement to freeze land-based ballistic missiles was reached in May 1971, but because of a negotiating blunder by Kissinger in his back-channel negotiations, official agreement to freeze sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) was not forthcoming until the Moscow summit in May 1972.45 As a consequence, under the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, the Soviet Union was permitted 1408 ICBMs with a sublimit of 313 heavy missiles, and 950 SLBMs, against which the United States was allowed 1052 ICBMs, with no heavy missiles, and 710 SLBMs. The main objectives of the United States in SALT had been to vin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 920! Cong., 2d sess., 9 March 1971, p. 45. For a critical discussion of the figures presented by Laird, see Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, pp. 158-59. 43 Gerard Smith, a skeptic of much of the hard-line analysis, admitted in his account of SALT I that "the relative numbers in the strategic forces were changing and I never stopped worrying during SALT about the Soviets possibly using the negotiations to mask deployment of a much larger missile force than [that of] the United States" (Doubletalk, p. 105). ^Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 159. Such was the concern that David Packard, deputy secretary of defense, as early as the summer of 1970, had advocated a freeze on offensive weapons "to keep the existing numerical gap against [the United States] from growing." Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1232-33. 45 At the request of Nixon, Kissinger had by-passed the official strategic arms limitation talks and secretly negotiated through the Soviet ambassador to Washington with Moscow on resolving the impasse that had developed in 1970. In these personal negotiations Kissinger unwisely agreed to a Soviet proposal that would freeze ICBM levels

[30]

The Changing Strategic Environment

achieve equality in the levels of strategic offensive weapons and to impose constraints on Soviet heavy ballistic missiles. The terms of SALT constrained neither strategic bombers nor MIRVs, strategic systems in which the United States enjoyed a significant edge. As a consequence, the overall balance between the two forces was not as unequal as the asymmetry in ballistic missile numbers suggested. But the interim agreement did little to constrain qualitative missile improvements. The United States managed to place a cap on the Soviet buildup, but it did not attain either of the two primary objectives it had originally sought at the outset of the negotiations. The Soviet Union was permitted a numerical advantage in ballistic missile launchers, and in heavy-missile launchers in particular, which through modernization could potentially be transformed into a formidable counterforce threat to the U.S. land-based deterrent. Essential Equivalence Although the SALT agreements were met with widespread domestic and international praise, many criticized the administration for conceding too much to the Soviet Union. The asymmetry in ballistic missiles suggested to conservatives in Congress that the administration, which had argued for a situation of parity while warning against Soviet superiority, had settled for an inferior strategic position. Instead of obviating the constantly propounded counterforce threat against the Minuteman force, critics argued that the interim agreement ceded 50 percent more ballistic missiles to the Soviet Union as well as a four-to-one superiority in overall throw weight.46 From the critics' point of view, Nixon and his administration had made concessions that jeopardized U.S. security in order to expedite an arms agreement with the Soviet Union. The dispute over the unequal levels in the interim agreement was, at bottom, about what constituted a strategic relationship of parity. Debate about parity during the SALT negotiations had focused attention on its content rather than its meaning or value. Reinforcing this but leave SLBMs unconstrained. For a discussion of this curious affair, see Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 157-68. 46 See, for example, US. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 22 June, 1972. (hereafter cited as Military Implications of the Treaty).

[31]

The Changing Strategic Environment

was the quid pro quo basis on which the actual negotiations were conducted, with the coin of bargaining being those instruments of military power central to the security of the nations involved. Consequently accentuated was the importance of easily quantifiable factors, such as numbers of ballistic missiles and throw weight, whereas other militarily relevant measures were overlooked or discounted, which in turn, fostered a widespread view that parity meant equal numerical levels and rough symmetry in the major measures of strategic power. Describing the strategic balance in such relatively simple terms greatly facilitated the development of an acceptable definition of parity, but it also begat a perception that parity depended on the addition and subtraction of the relative advantages and disadvantages in weapons systems.47 Thus, arguments regarding equality or parity tended to stress equal numerical levels in the major strategic factors affecting the strategic relationship. Inherent to such an approach to explaining parity was an image of symmetry between the force postures of the United States and the Soviet Union, in both numbers and capabilities. Disenchanted hardline conservatives concerned with the inequality in ballistic missiles and throw weight were determined that the United States should not accept anything less than equality with the Soviet Union. Senator Henry Jackson, who had long been convinced of the threat that the greater throw-weight capacity of the Soviet strategic forces posed to the survivability of U.S. land-based strategic forces, was very skeptical of testimony by military and civilian officials during the ratification hearings that the threat was not as severe as had been claimed.48 Jackson could not stop Senate endorsement of the interim agreement, but in consultation with Nixon, he did successfully amend the ratifying legislation.49 The amendment "urged and requested" the president "to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." 47 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1981, 1983), p. 356. See also Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 80; and Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, p. 163. 48 For Henry Jackson's views on the situation, see, for example, Military Implications of the Treaty, pp. 272-73; Henry Jackson and John S. Foster, testimony, ibid., p. 235; and Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975) pp. 88-90. 49 See Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969-1977 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 26-29.

[32]

The Changing Strategic Environment

Any Soviet deployment that threatened the survivability of the U.S. deterrent would be considered contrary to U.S. "supreme" national security interests,50 a warning that the United States would not tolerate the Soviet Union's perfecting of a hard-target MIRV for its heavy missiles. Jackson's amendment, approved by joint resolution of the Congress, clearly signaled the administration that to settle for anything less than strict equality in force levels and throw-weight capability with the Soviet Union in the forthcoming SALT II negotiations would be unacceptable in the domestic political arena. The administration recognized that asymmetries in force structure and capabilities did not have significant military value when each side maintained a secure capacity to destroy the other. Nixon, in his 1973 annual foreign policy message, nevertheless stated that the negotiating principle of the United States thus: "there obviously can be no agreement that creates or preserves strategic advantages." The objective of the United States therefore, would be to reach an agreement that established essential equivalence, which "involves the numerical levels of major systems, the capabilities of individual systems, and the overall potential of the entire strategic arsenal that each side can develop."51 Nixon's formulation of essential equivalence, though appearing broader in scope than Jackson's conception, nonetheless encompassed the assumption that relatively equal levels were a necessary requirement of any equitable arms limitation agreement. Those concerned about the strategic balance were given even more to worry about when in the spring of 1973 the Soviet Union, whose lead in these had been affirmed in the SALT agreement, unveiled an across-the-board modernization program for its land-based ballistic missile force. This program, which included the SS-17, SS-i8, and SS-19 ICBMs, each with a demonstrable MIRV capability, persuaded some administration officials that the U.S. advantage in qualitative capabilities and warhead numbers was likely a wasting asset.52 James 50 "Public Law 92-448, Requiring the U.S. Government to Seek Strategic Equality between the United States and the Soviet Union/' United States Statutes at Large, yzd Cong., 2d sess., 1972, vol. 86, reprinted in P. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly, and Jack Merritt, eds., Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 246. 51 Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 19705; Shaping a Durable Peace: A Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973), p. 202. 52 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 134. See also James R. Schlesinger, testimony, US. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of James R. Schlesinger, to Be Secretary of Defense, hearings, 93d Cong., ist sess., 18 June 1973, pp. 63 and 100 (hereafter cited as SCAS, Nomination Hearings).

[33]

The Changing Strategic Environment

Schlesinger, testifying during Senate hearings into his nomination as secretary of defense, reflected the concern of many when he argued that if the Soviet Union obtained a strategic posture that placed U.S. land-based nuclear forces in jeopardy, the Soviet leadership might be inclined to take risks in the belief that such a capability conferred to them some political or military advantage.53 Essential equivalence, although vague, was in part an expression of the administration's conviction that a level of parity needed to be sustained with respect to the broad characteristics of the strategic balance to temper possible adverse perceptions both domestically and internationally. As Kissinger made plain in September 1974, "The appearance of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences."54 Schlesinger subsequently defined essential equivalence as being a situation in which neither superpower should be able to derive unilateral strategic advantage from its force structure. Equivalence in strategic capabilities was necessary, he argued, for "symbolic purposes, in large part because the strategic offensive forces have come to be seen by many . . . as important to the status and stature of a major power." Strategic asymmetries, he suggested, could "become a source of serious diplomatic and military miscalculation. Opponents may feel that they can exploit a favorable imbalance by means of political pressure. . . . Friends may believe that a lack of willingness on our part to accept less than equality indicates a lack of resolve to uphold our end of the competition and a certain deficiency of staying power. Our own citizens may doubt our capacity to guard the nation's interests."55 Essential equivalence clearly reflected the administration's long-standing conviction that the United States should not be perceived as being at a disadvantage in the strategic relationship because of possible adverse international political repercussions.56 At the same time, as Schlesinger hinted, the administration in part also felt compelled to pursue a posture of relative equality in order to placate conservative domestic opponents, ^SCAS, Nomination Hearings, p. 78. Henry Kissinger, "The Process of Detente: Statement Delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 September 1974," reprinted in Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 160, emphasis in original. Ajames R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, 5 February 1975, 2:7. See also James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975, 4 March 1974, pp. 43-44. 56 Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 19705: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity/' International Security 1 (Fall 1981): 66. 54

[34]

The Changing Strategic Environment

such as Jackson, who demanded strict strategic parity with the Soviet Union in the central measures of strategic power.57 The problem confronting the administration was how to convince interested foreign governments and domestic critics that a state of relative strategic equality did exist, in light of the modernization of the Soviet landbased ballistic missile force and the potential counterforce threat this posed to the U.S. land-based deterrent. IMPLEMENTING NATO's STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE The Nixon administration's analysis of the strategic and political implications of the evolving strategic nuclear environment influenced its evaluation of the appropriate military strategy NATO should pursue to defend Western Europe. The formal adoption of flexible response on i January 1968 had provided an agreed overall strategic concept to guide NATO defense planning. But agreement on general strategic principles had not resolved the differences that existed between the United States and its European allies over how to implement flexible response. During its first year the new administration undertook six national security studies that dealt with a range of alliance military issues.58 What eventually emerged would be a strategic view of how to defend Western Europe consistent with that of the previous administration.59 There were two strands to the Nixon administration's policy on implementing flexible response: first, to develop practical plans for the initial and follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons; and second, to convince the European allies that NATO should develop a plausible conventional deterrent capability. The Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons A critical decision confronting the Nixon administration in its first year was what its policy position would be on the employment of 57

58

Platt, U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, p. 27.

The six studies related to NATO or European security in 1969 were NSSM-6 (21 January), NSSM-43 (15 April), NSSM-44 (19 April), NSSM-Ó5 (8 July), NSSM-83 (21 November), and NSSM-84 (21 November). NSSM-84 dealt specifically with U.S. troops in Europe. John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," foreign Policy, no. 5 (Winter 197172): 25. 59 For a discussion of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations7 preferred version of flexible response, see Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 19605 (London: Macmillan, 1988).

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The Changing Strategic Environment

nuclear weapons. Deliberations by NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) regarding guidelines for the initial use of nuclear weapons were well underway when Nixon took office on 20 January 1969. Key disputes between the United States and its European allies concerned when and where nuclear weapons were to be used and what purpose their employment was to serve.60 West European views on the initial use of nuclear weapons were embodied in an Anglo-German study (known as the HealeySchroeder Paper after the two countries' defense ministers), which was presented to the NPG in May 1969.61 A crucial aspect of the Healey-Schroeder Paper was insistence that NATO had to rely on the relatively early employment of nuclear weapons to assure its security. This proposal was based in part on the conviction of the European allies that the state of the alliance's conventional forces was such that NATO would be forced to resort to nuclear weapons within a "few days" to two weeks subsequent to a massive conventional Warsaw Pact invasion to avoid outright capitulation.62 At the same time, however, the West German defense minister, Gerhard Schroeder, made clear in a speech before the Western European Union (WEU) in October 1968 that it was "in the European interest that, should the necessity arise, tactical weapons be used in good time."63 A conventional conflict in Europe of any real scale would result in the vast devastation of areas of the Continent, particularly in West Germany where the main battle most likely would occur. Rather than run the risk of conventional conflict breaking out, Europeans preferred to threaten the early use of nuclear weapons, with the attendant though more remote risk of even greater catastrophic consequences should the threat need 60 Considerable disagreement also existed over which weapons systems were to be used and who should decide and be consulted about nuclear employment if necessary. Although these questions were of crucial importance to the allies, they are of peripheral concern herein and so shall only be dealt with as they impinge directly on the three main questions dealt with here. 61 For more on this study, see J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1983), pp. 18-19. 62 Britain's defense minister, Denis Healey, in particular held this view. See 'The Strategist's Dilemma," Times (London), 3 February 1969; Denis Healey, "On European Defence," Survival 11, no. 4 (1969): 111; and Andrew Wilson, "Healey's Alternative to a Nuclear War," Observer (London), i March 1970. 63 Gerhard Schroeder, "Speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union," Proceedings of the Assembly of the Western European Union, Fourteenth Ordinary Session, First Part, II, Minutes and Official Report of Debates, October 1968, p. 200, cited in Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 73.

[36]

The Changing Strategic Environment

to be carried out, to fortify the deterrence of more plausible nonnuclear aggression.64 The Healey-Schroeder study did not establish formal guidance for when initial employment should occur. Instead, the paper set forth a range of possible responses, to be used by military commanders to devise alternative plans and from which a specific choice could be made should the need ever arise.65 This approach derived in part from the widespread recognition that a decision to employ nuclear weapons would depend on the specific circumstances at the time.66 But it also reflected European ideas of deterrence. As Schroeder stated in his WEU speech, "In our view there is an inseparable interdependence between conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons."67 In essence, Europeans rejected the concept of thresholds, a notion suggesting the existence of a barrier, albeit a psychological one, between the employment of conventional force and nuclear force. To define such a nuclear-use barrier might serve to indicate a reluctance to employ nuclear weapons, undermining the deterrent effect of the threat of early use. Another crucial issue addressed by the Healey-Schroeder Paper was the scale of any initial use of nuclear weapons. Kissinger notes in his memoirs that Europeans favored "the use of a very small number of tactical weapons" to demonstrate to the Soviet Union the determination of the allies to resist.68 The European allies believed that only such limited employment would be necessary to display to the Soviet leadership that the alliance would be willing to escalate the intensity of the conflict, conceivably to the level of strategic attacks against the territory of the Soviet Union.69 European preference for a small, demonstrative first use came from concern about the potential 64 See "Strategist's Dilemma"; Healey, "On European Defence/' p. in; and Wilson, "Healey's Alternative." 65 See William Beecher, "NATO Planners Move toward Greater Stress on Atom Weapons," New York Times, 13 November 1969. 66 Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, i965-19^0 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 91. 67 Schroeder, "Speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union," p. 201, cited in Daalder, Flexible Response, p. 74. 68 Kissinger claims that Europeans suggested "setting off a nuclear weapon in some remote location, which did not involve many casualties—in the air over the Mediterranean, for example—as a signal of more drastic use if the warning failed" (White House Years, p. 219). 69 See "Nuclear Group Hears Anglo-German Ideas," Times (London), 30 May 1969; and Charles Douglas-Home, "Nuclear Plan Put to NATO," Times (London), 31 May 1969.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

consequences of employing substantial numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. As Manlio Brosio, the secretary general of NATO, pointed out in October 1968: "The employment of hundreds of [tactical nuclear] weapons in Europe . . . would inflict intolerable devastation and losses to our countries. At that level of destruction the very distinction between tactical and strategic weapons would be lost/'70 Concern about this prospect led the European allies to maintain that any first use should have a political rather than military objective to help keep to an absolute minimum the number of nuclear weapons exploded on their soil.71 A closely related consideration was whether NATO should confine the employment of nuclear weapons to its own soil or direct its nuclear forces against targets deep within Warsaw Pact-Soviet territory. To confine nuclear use to NATO territory in effect meant detonating nuclear weapons on West German soil. Not surprising, therefore, was the West German preference for any use of nuclear weapons to be deep in Warsaw Pact-Soviet territory so as to reduce the potential for collateral damage to allied populations while positively communicating the risk of escalation.72 Optimal would be for NATO to strike targets located in the Soviet Union. But such a tactic was as unacceptable to the United States as confining nuclear use to NATO territory was to West Germany. The Healey-Schroeder Paper thus sought to reconcile these two discrepant views by suggesting that nuclear weapons be employed against non-Soviet-Warsaw Pact targets located outside NATO Europe.73 At the time of the May 1969 NPG meeting at which the HealeySchroeder Paper was first discussed, the Nixon administration had yet to work out fully its position on flexible response. As a consequence, U.S. officials initially concurred with the broad outlines of the paper.74 But what emerged from the ongoing administration studies regarding NATO military strategy was a policy position on tactical nuclear employment that was at odds with European views. Many U.S. officials appreciated that the existence of a secure Soviet 70 Manlio Brosio, "Speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union," Proceedings of the Assembly of the Western European Union, Fourteenth Ordinary Session, First Part, II, Minutes and Official Report of Debates, October 1968, p. 206. n

Legge, NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, p. 20.

72

See Beecher, "NATO Planners." See "Nuclear Group Hears Anglo-German Ideas." 74 Ibid. 73

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The Changing Strategic Environment

second-strike capability at both the strategic and theater levels created an environment in which nuclear use would be catastrophic for Europe and, through the agency of escalation, potentially suicidal for the United States.75 Some administration officials, notably civilian analysts in the State Department and the Pentagon, felt that tactical nuclear weapons blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear war, increasing the possibility that a conflict might escalate to the level of general nuclear war.76 They believed that once theater nuclear weapons were used, escalation would be difficult, if not impossible, to control. Kissinger summed up the general view when he "warned" the president on 17 June 1969: There seems to be a strongly held view in the Government that there is very little relationship between our strategic posture (and our tactical nuclear posture as well) and deterring or coping with conventional war. This view seems to be based on two conclusions: (a) our strategic forces can contribute to the deterrence of conventional war only if we have a credible first strike capability, which it is not possible to attain, and (b) tactical nuclear war in Europe would probably end in our defeat, so we have no incentive to rely on tactical nuclear weapons as a hedge against weakness in our conventional posture.77

With the erosion of United States strategic superiority and the arrival of mutual vulnerability, U.S. officials seemingly had little faith in the utility of, threatening strategic or theater nuclear war to deter conventional attacks. The preferred strategy was for NATO to create an unmistakable firebreak between conventional and nuclear conflict to forestall nuclear escalation. Most agreed with Kissinger's conviction that "under conditions of strategic parity, . . . the democracies would have to build up their conventional strength if they wanted to avoid political blackmail."78 The Nixon administration thus rejected a NATO strategy of early first use of nuclear weapons, preferring that the alliance develop a conventional deterrent capable of deferring for as long as possible any military need to employ nuclear weapons. The United States further differed with its European allies about the purpose and scale of any putative initial use. The Nixon adminis75

Clark Clifford, NATO Strategy and Force Structure, Draft Presidential Memorandum to the President, 7 January 1969, p. 3 (FOIA). 76 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 218. 77 Ibid., p. 391. 78 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1009.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

tration believed that any nuclear use would have an inherent political connotation that signified NATO's will to resist and the need for the Soviet Union to rethink the desirability of pursuing the conflict. Thus it agreed that any initial use would have to be selective.79 The United States, however, rejected the idea of a demonstration, or political, use of nuclear weapons on the grounds that such an action, being militarily ineffective, was more likely to promote than dissuade continued Soviet aggression.80 Prevailing American dogma was that to apply nuclear weapons so as to impact directly on the course and, if possible, the outcome of the conflict was the best way to force the Soviet Union to come to a political accommodation. To achieve a decisive military effect meant using nuclear weapons more extensively than the Europeans proposed. Therefore the U.S. position was that NATO could not discount outright an initial response consisting of up to hundreds of nuclear weapons directed against military targets.81 Congruent with this "war-fighting" strategy was America's lack of enthusiasm about striking targets located in the Soviet Union or even in the territories of its Warsaw Pac allies.82 Clark Clifford, the outgoing secretary of defense, in his final draft memorandum for the president, had advocated "a new concept—the initial defensive use of nuclear weapons restricted to NATO territory." The thinking underlying this concept was that if the Warsaw Pact attacked NATO forces with conventional weapons and NATO could not hold, "as a minimum level of limited nuclear war we might consider using nuclear weapons in NATO territory alone. Restricting the use of nuclear weapons to friendly territory might be less likely to lead to escalation than attacking targets in East Germany or other Pact countries."83 Should the nuclear firebreak need to be breached, the United States favored a strategy that attempted to shock the Soviet leadership into reconsidering their actions through the use of nuclear weapons in a constrained manner that would not immediately or necessarily provoke a nuclear riposte. Despite the divergent preferences of the Nixon administration and the NATO European allies on the initial use of nuclear weapons, the ^Legge, NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, p. 20. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 219. 81 See Legge, NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, p. 20. 82 See Beecher, "NATO Planners." 83 Clark Clifford, Theater Nuclear Forces, Draft Memorandum for the President, 15 January 1969, p. 6. 80

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The Changing Strategic Environment

NATO defense ministers at the meeting of the NPG in November 1969 agreed to accept the "Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO" (known as the PPGs). U.S. officials apparently attended this meeting ready to press the case for improving NATO's conventional force posture, but their effort failed. After the meeting, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird reportedly conceded that the European allies could probably not be convinced to upgrade their conventional forces.84 Indeed, as Laird reportedly informed the president subsequent to the meeting, "The longer term problems of divergence between American and European views on strategy remain."85 The Nixon administration, in agreeing to the PPGs without a commitment to bolster NATO's conventional defenses, would see the United States faced with the specter of the very situation it wanted to avoid—the need to use nuclear weapons early in the event of a Soviet conventional attack. Such was the concern that Nixon, in his first foreign policy statement in February 1970, publicly threw open the whole issue of what form of flexible response the alliance should adopt.86 Differences between the United States and Europe over the role of nuclear weapons proved to be a source of frustration for the United States as NATO moved on to consider how it should follow on in the event first use failed to attain the desired effect. The issue of how NATO should use nuclear weapons remained unresolved when Schlesinger announced in 1974 that the United States was revising the way it targeted nuclear weapons. Conventional Deterrence and Burden Sharing The Nixon administration's internal analysis suggested that the advent of nuclear parity at both the strategic and the tactical levels undermined the plausibility of the U.S. pledge to use nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet conventional threat against Europe. Many administration officials were convinced that the only way to deter conventional hostilities was for NATO to have the nonnuclear force capabilities to contain any Soviet incursion short of an all-out attack.87 In a briefing paper, Kissinger summed up the administration's view, 84

See Buteux, Politics of Nuclear Consultation, p. 102. Cited in Kissinger, White House Years, p. 220. 86 Nixon, New Policy for Peace, p. 33. 87 See William Beecher, "Over the Threshold/' Army Quly 1972): 20. 85

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The Changing Strategic Environment

arguing that the United States and its allies "must maintain strong enough conventional forces to be able to meet Soviet aggression or the threat of it implicit in their substantial forces. Unless we and our Allies rework our NATO strategy and forces so that they can provide this capability, we will soon experience the gradual 'neutralization' of Western Europe/'88 As matters stood in 1969, NATO's nonnuclear defenses could not be expected to hold out against a Soviet conventional attack for any meaningful length of time because of previous neglect.89 After reviewing a range of options regarding NATO's conventional defenses, the administration decided in the fall of 1969 to affirm the NATO policy of providing the nonnuclear capability to defend Western Europe for ninety days.90 Although this capability would significantly delay the need to resort to nuclear weapons to a juncture much later than that preferred by the Europeans, it would at the same time hopefully avoid politically alarming them. Administration studies made clear, however, that NATO did not have adequate stockpiles of equipment and munitions to support such a policy.91 Thus administration policy was that NATO should bolster its nonnuclear defenses to meet the ninety-day standard. But achieving this goal was to prove a difficult task. A key problem in effecting this policy was that for domestic reasons the United States was not in a position to contribute significantly to improving NATO's conventional defenses. Fiscally, the need to exercise restraint required that the administration substantially reduce the size of the U.S. conventional force structure. Although a significant amount of the downsizing could be achieved through the withdrawal and decommissioning of U.S. forces in Vietnam, reduced defense budgets and force structure meant that the United States would be hard pressed to meet its defense commitments. Politically, the administration also confronted persistent pressure from the Democrat-dominated Senate, where there was a substantial lobby willing to challenge the Nixon administration's domestic and foreign policies. A central issue in the Senate challenge was the belief that the United States was militarily overcommitted worldwide, 88 Cited in Kissinger, White House Years, p. 402. 89 See ibid., p. 218; and William Beecher, "NATO Planners/' 90 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 392-93; and Nixon, Building 91

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 393.

for Peace, pp. 34-35.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

which contributed measurably to its being increasingly overburdened financially, both internally and externally. To redress this situation, many Senators argued that the United States had to reposition itself worldwide.92 Although all foreign commitments came under Senate scrutiny, Europe was singled out for special attention.93 A substantial constituency within the Senate, spearheaded by Senator Michael Mansfield, maintained that the burgeoning economies of the European countries were quite able to sustain defense levels that had been unattainable when the United States had first made its security commitment, yet the European allies were not allocating resources to the common defense commensurate with their new capability. Thus the United States was devoting a disproportionate effort to NATO and needed to work out with the European allies a more equitable defense arrangement to reflect the new economic realities. The sharp end of the Senate's effort to rectify the perceived imbalance was political pressure to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe, made manifest from 1969 to 1973 by recurring attempts by Senator Mansfield to append to government bills amendments that would force the United States to draw down the number of American troops stationed in Europe.94 The pressure by the Senate served not only as a constraint on administration efforts to enhance US. force capabilities in Europe but also created the prospect that the administration could be hard put to maintain current U.S. force levels there. Confronted with domestic pressure both to cut defense spending and to reduce the American presence in Europe, the Nixon administration concluded that the best it could contribute to rectifying the current deficiencies in NATO's conventional posture would be to maintain current U.S. troop levels and improve U.S. force capabilities in Europe.95Administration officials believed that the European allies had the economic and personnel wherewithal to match the Soviet 92 For an excellent analysis of the development of this view within the Senate, see Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1985) pp. 143-59. 93 See Stephan Barber, "Foreign Bases Torce US. into Police Role/" Daily Telegraph (London), 21 December 1970. 94 For a detailed examination of the Senate's actions, see Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, pp. 160-224. 95 See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 204; Joseph Harch, "U.S. Mends Its European Fence," Christian Science Monitor, 3 December 1970; William Beecher, "Kissinger and Nixon Decide Most U.S. Defense Issues," International Herald Tribune (London), 7 December 1970; and Lloyd Norman, "Mr. Laird and the No War Strategy for the 19705," Army (February 1971): 17.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

Union and its allies in nonnuclear arms and could therefore furnish the additional means needed to develop a viable conventional deterrent.96 Thus the Nixon administration sought, much as its predecessor, to persuade the European allies to commit more resources to improving NATO's general-purpose forces.97 The European allies, however, were reluctant to raise their defense expenditures in order to bolster NATO's conventional deterrent and many were already concerned about their heavy defense costs. With negotiations on arms limitations starting and East-West tensions easing, popular support for NATO was ebbing, and European governments felt they were going to be subjected to their own domestic pressures to reduce defense spending.98 Moreover, the Europeans generally had a more sanguine view of the Soviet threat than did the US. administration. As Denis Healey said with respect to the supposed lack of credibility in the American strategic deterrent to dissuade conventional attack, "There is no sign that those whom we seek to deter share the view that it is well nigh incredible."99 The European allies believed that the increasingly conflictual nature of Sino-Soviet relations and the U.S. nuclear deterrent would continue to ensure peace in Europe. As a consequence, the U.S. call for greater defense efforts was neither popular nor accepted by the majority of the European allies.100 What did make the European allies anxious was the possibility that the Senate might succeed in its effort to reduce the size of U.S. contingents based in Europe. If a major pullback of U.S. troops should occur, some Europeans felt that the Soviet Union's military posture in Europe could come to assume much greater significance.101 Prospective troop withdrawals also aroused latent doubts about the 96

See Norman, "Mr. Laird and the No War Strategy/' p. 23. ^Kissinger, White House Years, p. 393. 98 See Helmut Schmidt, "Bonn and U.S. Pressure/' Washington Post, 2 April 1970; Vincent Ryder, "What Failure for NATO?" Daily Telegraph (London), 2 April 1969; and Drew Middleton, "Third Decade of NATO/' International Herald Tribune (London), 11 April 1969, and Middleton, "Drop Seen in Support for NATO," International Herald Tribune (London), i December 1969. 99 Quoted in Charles Douglas-Home, "Healey Attacks Critics of NATO Nuclear Role," Times (London), 20 February 1970. 100 See James Reston, "What the Nixon Maxi Hides/' Times (London), 20 February 1970. 101 Ibid. Helmut Schmidt took a somewhat contrary position, arguing that there was no need to panic about the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawals after mid-i97i; see "Bonn and U.S. Pressure."

[44]

The Changing Strategic Environment

firmness of the U.S. strategic guarantee. According to Manlio Brosio, the U.S. troops in Europe were politically and psychologically perceived as providing "the necessary links between the strategic nuclear deterrence, the U.S. and defence against possible aggression in Europe."102 Any U.S. effort to draw down the number of troops stationed in Europe would indicate to the Europeans a weakening of American willingness to honor its defense commitment. The Nixon administration, recognizing that the European allies were unlikely to be convinced of the need to upgrade their conventional forces, sought to play on European fears in order to extract increased contributions. Administration officials such as Secretary of Defense Laird linked the U.S. commitment to maintain the current levels of American forces in Europe to the willingness of the Europeans to maintain and improve their forces.103 For the Europeans, such linkage raised the disturbing prospect that if they did not upgrade their contributions to NATO's nonnuclear defenses, the United States might withdraw a portion of its forces in Europe. The persistent pressure being mounted by the Senate, coupled with that from the administration to fortify NATO's conventional deterrent, convinced the European allies in 1970 and 1971 to commit additional finances to upgrade NATO's conventional defenses.104 The Nixon administration, however, continued to believe that the allies were too complacent about the threat and that much more needed to be done to redress the perceived deficiencies in the alliance's nonnuclear force structure.105 The contention between the U.S. and its European allies over this issue contributed to growing transatlantic strains during Nixon's first term. By early 1973, when the U.S. had finally extricated itself from Indochina, relations between the United States and its European al102 Manlio Brosio, quoted in Nesta Roberts, "Danger in U.S. Withdrawals/' Guardian (London), 18 November 1970. 103 See, for example, Melvin Laird, press conference, 9 July 1970, U.S.I.S. Official Text, 10 July 1970, and Laird, news conference, Pentagon, 15 December 1970, U.S.I.S. Official Text, 16 December 1970; and Nixon, Building for Peace, p. 61. 104 Roger L. L. Facer, Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response: Issues and Approaches (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1985), p. 33; Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, p. 165; and William Rogers, press conference, 23 December 1971, U.S.I.S. Official Text, 24 December 1971. 105 See "American Strategic Fears Not Shared at NATO/' Times (London), 28 October 1971; Henry Stanhope, "NATO Urged to Retain Force Levels/' Times (London), 28 October 1972; and "Laird Tells Allies a Buildup of Forces Would Help SALT," International Herald Tribune (London), 28 October 1972.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

lies had become so divisive that the Nixon administration launched a special initiative, "The Year of Europe/' in an attempt to heal the widening rift.106 One of the central disputes that the administration wanted to resolve was the question of NATO's military strategy.107 In his speech announcing the initiative, Kissinger indicated the administration's discontent with the lack of progress in reworking NATO's military strategy and force posture,108 heralding a renewed drive to energize the European allies to help rectify perceived shortcomings. For the Nixon administration, the revision of NATO's strategy was becoming an urgent matter. According to Schlesinger, testing of the 88-17, SS-i8, and 88-19 ICBMs implied that "in today's conditions, our strategic forces will reliably deter a narrower range of contingencies than was previously the case, and our deterrent is made most credible by demonstrating our ability to resist at every level of force." Europe was singled out by Schlesinger as an area of particular concern. Any weakening of NATO's conventional defense, such as would result from a reduction of U.S. troops, he argued, might tempt the Warsaw Pact "to exploit its clear advantage through political pressures, crisis manipulation, and perhaps military adventurism."109 As a consequence, Schlesinger maintained, "What the NATO alliance should be striving for is an impressive conventional deterrence in addition to the other deterrence [nuclear] that would give pause to the leadership of the Soviet pact should they turn to adventuresomeness. "no The Nixon administration, concerned about the evolving strategic situation, pressed the European allies hard in 1973. At the Brussels meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee in June 1973, James Schlesinger, acting as a special representative for the president, presented the conclusions of a study begun two years earlier on the relative fighting capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.111 According to Michael Getler, who leaked the contents of the study just before the NATO meeting, the conclusion reached "sharply chal106 On the need for and origins of this initiative, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, PP.107131-53. See Henry A. Kissinger, 'The Year of Europe/' Department of State Bulletin 68, no. 1768 (14 May 1973). 108 See Kissinger, "Year of Europe/' pp. 596-97. 109 SCAS, Nomination Hearings, p. 78. 110 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 111 This study would appear to be NSSM-121, issued on 13 April 1971, which was generically entitled "NATO." See Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," p. 27.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

lenge[d] a common view that NATO would be routed by a massive Warsaw Pact ground attack in Europe and would be forced to escalate the battle to nuclear warfare/'112 At the meeting, Schlesinger appears to have contended that the conventional gap in Europe was not as wide as was generally supposed and that the United States wanted NATO to rely on a strong conventional capability rather than on nuclear weapons to deter nonnuclear aggression.113 Schlesinger's blunt presentation reinforced European apprehensions that the U.S. emphasis on developing a capable conventional deterrent implied a backing away from its nuclear commitment and indicated that the United States expected the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for meeting NATO's defense needs.114 Such European concerns seemed borne out as Schlesinger forcefully argued that the Warsaw Pact had an ongoing program to improve its conventional capability, so although gains had been made, NATO still needed to make improvements in its nonnuclear forces to meet the objectives set.115 Nixon administration officials further made clear that the allies should help to offset the balance of payments costs incurred by the United States as a result of the stationing of American troops in Europe.116 Intensifying European concern was the Senate's spirited campaign in 1973 to force the administration to scale back U.S. forces in Europe. This time the Senate lobby was able to pass a compromise amendment that mandated the withdrawal of a number of troops proportionate to the accumulated deficit if the United States did not receive financial offsets for the balance of payments shortfall attributable to the costs of sustaining U.S. troops in Europe.117 These pressures evoked considerable European anxiety. Many European governments were convinced that they were in no 112 Michael Getler, "Pentagon Study Insists NATO Can Defend Itself/' Washington Post, 7 June 1973, reprinted in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in Europe, hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., March-April 1974, pp.113243-47. See ibid.; and Jeffrey Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 55. 114 See Schlesinger, testimony, SCAS, Nomination Hearings, pp. 86-87; and Getler, "Pentagon Study/' pp. 243-47. 115 See Lorelies Oslager, "U.S. Forces in Europe: 'Share the Burden' Call," Financial Times, 7 June 1973, and "U.S. Says Europe Must Pay," Washington Post, 8 June 1973. 116 The balance of payments shortfall for 1972 was estimated to be $1.5 billion and was expected to rise in future years. See Oslager, "U.S. Forces in Europe," "U.S. Says Europe Must Pay"; and Richard Buston, "U.S. Move on Changes in NATO," Daily Telegraph (London), 17 August 1973. 117

See Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, pp. 219-34.

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The Changing Strategic Environment

position to pay more, for they also faced domestic pressures to cut back defense spending; thus the prospect of a future pullback of U.S. contingents seemed all too conceivable. Should such reductions come about, they feared a corollary waning of the American nuclear guarantee.118 By the end of 1973 no real progress had been made in resolving transatlantic differences on NATO's strategy and burden sharing. Each side of the Atlantic continued to see the other as pursuing its own self-interest at the expense of the other. The Nixon administration was concerned about the inability of the alliance to reach an agreement on the substance of flexible response and about the allies' intransigent attitude toward committing to provide the resources to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. As Kissinger noted during Senate hearings on his appointment as secretary of state, the Europeans remained insistent that the United States should not reduce its troop levels because these served as the symbolic link with the U.S. strategic deterrent; but in spite of the administration's pressure, they were equally steadfast in their unwillingness to upgrade NATO conventional capabilities to a degree adequate to combat most Soviet incursions lest doing so undermine deterrence.119 To the Nixon administration, the Europeans appeared to be demanding the benefits of U.S. security without being willing to contribute to their own self-defense. The consequence of the unresolved differences between the United States and the European allies was that transatlantic military relations at the close of 1973 were in a state of disrepair, beset, as Schlesinger had put it, by "mutual suspicion."120 The Nixon administration faced a strategic environment radically different from that which had existed five years previously. The Soviet Union had acquired a strategic nuclear force secure from disarming attack which nearly equaled the size of the U.S. deterrent. Not only had the United States lost the margin of superiority on which it had come to depend but, even more troubling, it was now also vulnerable to Soviet counterretaliatory attacks. The advent of strategic parity, 118 See Craig R. Whitney, "West Germany and NATO Allies Seeking to Dissuade U.S. from Sudden Cut in Troops/' New York Times, 13 June 1973. 119 Henry A. Kissinger, testimony, confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S.LS. Official Text (17 September 1973). 120 See SCAS, Nomination Hearings, p. 87.

U8]

The Changing Strategic Environment

and the attendant situation of mutual vulnerability in particular, implied strategic stalemate, with each side able to deter the other from the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of its security interests. Politically, stalemate could affect the confidence of the U.S. leadership to act forcefully in a crisis, and it could create apprehensions among U.S. allies about the surety of American nuclear security assurances. Moreover, administration officials believed that the state of mutual deterrence could well embolden the Soviet Union to probe Western defenses at the nonnuclear level, where it held a preponderant advantage. Strategic parity had undermined the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent threat and promised to constrict the capability of the U.S. to act firmly and forcibly to counteract an increasingly strong and active Soviet Union. The Nixon administration further believed that the United States could not be perceived as being inferior to the Soviet Union, for this would have political repercussions that would exacerbate the prospective problems created by strategic parity. Thus, the administration was persuaded that the United States needed to develop a military posture adequate to calm any political fears that could flow from a widespread impression that the Soviet Union possessed a superior strategic position. Political and fiscal realities, however, militated against a strictly technical solution at the strategic level, at the same time fomenting domestic pressures to reduce U.S. nonnuclear capabilities when administration officials were convinced that the United States needed to increase its conventional strength to meet potential Soviet challenges. An effort to negotiate relatively equal levels of strategic offensive missile forces was unsuccessful because the SALT I accords permitted the Soviet Union half again as many ballistic missiles as the United States and an overall advantage in throw-weight capacity which could potentially be transformed through permissible modernization into an impressive counterforce capability. The revelation that the Soviet Union was proceeding to develop three new landbased ballistic missiles with a MIRV capability, which could be interpreted as giving it a strategic advantage over the United States, served to heighten the political complications that the Nixon administration foresaw arising from parity. The perceived strategic and political problems posed by strategic parity influenced the Nixon administration's policy on implementing NATO's strategy of flexible response. The preferred policy was that tactical nuclear weapons should be employed later rather than sooner,

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The Changing Strategic Environment

and then only in a militarily effective manner within NATO territory on the premise that this would help to reduce the possibility of escalation. Central to the policy on flexible response was that NATO should and could realize a competent conventional deterrent. Administration officials believed that a strong conventional defense posture was necessary to deter a nonnuclear Warsaw Pact attack. And should it fail to do so, such a policy also offered the prospect of putting off for as long as possible the military necessity of having to combat aggression with nuclear weapons in order to provide time to negotiate an end to hostilities short of nuclear war. Thus the administration rejected the European allies' preference that nuclear weapons be used early and in a manner that raised the real risk of quick escalation to the strategic level, and it pressed them to contribute more to the development of NATO's conventional force posture. The U.S. position on implementing flexible response served to undermine West European confidence in the U.S. nuclear guarantee. One source of unease for the Europeans was the Nixon administration's argument that NATO could and should defend itself with a convincing conventional deterrent. The implication was that the United States might not be willing to defend Western Europe with nuclear weapons; the U.S. preference for nuclear war-fighting strategies suggested that if willing, it would do so only so long as its own sovereignty was at a distinct remove from the risks involved. Another source of anxiety was the U.S. insistence that the European allies do more to address U.S. concerns about burden sharing or the administration might have to acquiesce to domestic pressures to draw down its conventional forces based in Europe. The European allies were concerned that the United States would expect them to do more for their own defense in future, which might signify a weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe from Soviet aggression. Seeing these developments as being contrary to their security interests, the European allies resisted U.S. pressure to accept its preferred interpretation of flexible response. These opposing views resulted in growing transatlantic tensions, which culminated in 1973, with each suspicious of the other's motives.

[50]

[3l Disquiet with Assured Destruction

When President Richard Nixon took office on 20 January 1969, he faced several security issues held over from the previous administration which required early decision. Wanting to create the foundation for his own policies, Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, moved quickly once in office to set in train the studies necessary to determine U.S. security requirements. Among seven national security study memorandums (NSSMs) issued the day after Nixon's inauguration was NSSM-3, entitled "Military Posture/' NSSM-3 called for a review of the U.S. "military posture and balance of power" and the delineation of the criteria upon which U.S. forces were to be measured.1 It was to be a sweeping reexamination of U.S. strategic and military policy, although it soon would be separated into two studies, one examining U.S. nuclear forces, and the other, U.S. conventional forces. The effort to reform U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy originated with the National Security Council (NSC) staff, where Kissinger provided the driving force for the NSC-endeavor. As a consequence, Kissinger and his reasons for wanting a change in targeting policy are my focus of analysis. Attention to the issue of reformulating U.S. strategic nuclear policy was periodic through the first four years of Nixon's tenure as president. This chapter examines each effort, delineating in each instance what impelled interest in 1 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (Exeter, England: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1989), p. 149. Quotation from Memorandum, Henry Kissinger to Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of Central Intelligence, 23 January 1969, cited in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 366.

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Disquiet with Assured Destruction

revising U.S. nuclear strategy and what resulted. The chapter concludes in the summer of 1972, when the NSC attempt to refashion U.S. nuclear targeting practices was politically derailed and Kissinger subsequently became involved with a parallel effort within the Department of Defense.2

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 3 NSSM-3 was an interagency study monitored by Kissinger and his newly formed NSC staff, but the design and conduct of the study was largely the responsibility of the Office of Systems Analysis (OSA) in the Department of Defense (DoD).3 Completed on 8 May 1969, the NSSM-3 study determined that strategic superiority was not a viable long-term policy option.4 NSSM-3 further determined that under the aegis of assured destruction, the primary criterion by which U.S. forces were currently judged was whether they served to dissuade the Soviet Union from launching an all-out attack on the United States.5 The study concluded that this might not be adequate. It was conceivable that a strategic war "may develop as a series of steps in an escalating crisis in which both sides want to avoid attacking cities, neither side can afford unilaterally to stop the exchange, and the situation is dominated by uncertainty." The study further suggested that in a crisis situation it was possible that the Soviet Union, fearing the United States was about to launch a nuclear attack, "might consider using a portion of its strategic forces to strike U.S. forces in order to improve its relative military position." The study cautioned, however, that such a scenario was very unlikely, as neither Soviet military doctrine nor military tradition indicated that the Soviet Union would launch such an attack. Notwithstanding this caveat, the study reasoned that a U.S. capability for early "war termination, avoiding attacks on cities, and selective response capabilities might provide ways of limiting damage if deterrence fails."6 The conclusions set forth a number of considerations that threw into question the 2 For an examination of Kissinger's cooperation with and contribution to the DoD effort, see Chapter 5, the section titled "Kissinger and Regional Nuclear Options." 3 Laurence E. Lynn Jr., "Arm Waving at the Arms Race: A Review: The Price of Defense, by the Boston Study Group," International Security 4 (Summer 1979): 117. 4 "The Nixon Strategy," Los Angeles Times, 11 May 1972. 5 See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 366. 6 NSSM-3, revised version, 8 May 1969, cited in Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 366.

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suitability of assured destruction to serve as the basis of U.S. security in the evolving strategic environment. Although the NSSM-3 study indicated that U.S. nuclear doctrine needed to be reformulated, it did not directly broach alternative ways in which the United States might employ its nuclear weapons. The question of other strategies, however, had not been entirely passed over. During Robert McNamara's seven-year tenure as secretary of defense, the OSA, headed by Alain Enthoven, had been instrumental in formulating U.S. strategic policies. In the later years of the Johnson administrations, a number of OSA officials had been very concerned about the character of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), believing that the few, very massive attack options available in the nuclear war plans rendered U.S. nuclear strategy inflexible. Some effort had been made to break down the massive attacks into smaller, more-appropriate targeting options, but McNamara had been unwilling to expend the political capital needed to force through the required policy changes.7 Under the leadership of Ivan Selin, who had replaced Enthoven as deputy assistant secretary for systems analysis, in the summer of 1968 the OSA had drafted a proposal for revising U.S. nuclear strategy to present to the forthcoming administration.8 OSA officials working on the portion of the NSSM-3 review that examined U.S. strategic doctrine had referred back to papers written by Selin regarding the desirability of improving the flexibility of U.S. targeting plans. The general conceptual case for limited options put forward in these papers was found to be very persuasive. As a consequence, OSA officials supported the development of limited nuclear options in a series of summary papers that probed a range of problems not addressed by the more general conclusions of the NSSM-3 study.9 This study did not set forth a distinct argument favoring the introduction of more-limited nuclear options into U.S. targeting plans, but the notion of limited nuclear options was raised, thus preparing the ground for the reconsideration of U.S. nuclear strategy. HENRY KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY Kissinger proved to be a ready convert to the theme of limited nuclear options set forth in the NSSM-3 summary papers. Within the 7

Interviews with Johnson administration NSC staff members. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 366-67. Interview with OSA official. 8

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first week in office the JCS presented to Nixon and Kissinger a briefing on the state of the strategic balance which was traditionally given to an incoming president. The military assessments were deeply pessimistic about the evolving strategic balance. The Soviet strategic buildup of launchers was rapidly approaching and might soon exceed in number U.S. levels. Considerable uncertainty surrounded the question of whether the Soviet Union would settle for parity or might be striving for superiority. Although the military's threat assessment was likely somewhat overblown so as to impress the two men with the need for U.S. strategic programs, both the president and Kissinger came away genuinely alarmed about the future prospects of U.S. security.10 As an academic, Kissinger had written extensively about nuclear strategy, questioning the suitability of U.S. strategies based on massive retaliatory attacks as a means to support U.S. foreign policy. He had argued that strategies of limited war and limited nuclear war would be more useful, more pertinent, both for deterrence and for diplomacy in an era of mutual vulnerability.11 Discussion during the JCS briefing about the need to develop more options left Kissinger dissatisfied.12 The evolving state of the strategic balance troubled him. Even with equality, or a slight superiority, any new Administration would face an unprecedented challenge. Our defense strategies formed in the period of our superiority had to be reexamined in the harsh light of the new realities. Before too long an all-out nuclear exchange could inflict casualties on the United States amounting to tens of millions. A balance of destructiveness would then exist; and even if for a while our capacity to inflict casualties should exceed that of our adversaries, our reluctance to resort to nuclear war was certain to mount dramatically. The credibility of American pledges to risk Armageddon in defense of allies was bound to come into question. This raised critical issues: How could we maintain the independence and self-confidence of allied countries under the shadow of the Soviet Union's land armies (also growing) as well as its expanding nuclear arsenal? What should be our strategy for the use of our nuclear forces? If all-out thermonuclear war became too dangerous, would limited applications of nuclear forces still be feasible?13 10

Interview with NSC staff member. See Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1957); and Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961). 12 Interview with NSC staff member. 13 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), p. 198, emphasis in original. 11

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The impending shift in the strategic balance promised by the momentum of the Soviet buildup convinced Kissinger that the United States needed to rethink its strategic approach to deterrence.14 The implications of the NSSM-3 study, with its underlying theme of limited nuclear options, thus fell on fertile ground. From the study, Kissinger was particularly struck by the stated possibility that "as strategic equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union approached, strategic forces might be used in less than an all-out attack."15 A Soviet capability that could threaten the credibility of U.S. land-based nuclear power would pose a terrible dilemma for the United States if it continued to adhere to the prevailing declared guidance of "assured destruction." U.S. targeting plans did furnish a small number of counterforce options, but these involved the use of so many nuclear weapons as to be virtually indistinguishable from attacks against civilian and industrial targets. Should deterrence fail, the president would then be confronted with the portentous choice of either capitulating or authorizing a massive retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union, undoubtedly thus engendering a reciprocal strike against the United States. Some officials were concerned that the Soviet Union, understanding the paralyzing dilemma that would confront a U.S. president, might be emboldened to launch a constrained attack against U.S. strategic forces. Kissinger, however, seemed primarily concerned that assured deterrence would be even more incredible in terms of the deterrent extended by the United States to protect its overseas allies and interests. The undermining of American extended deterrence by a credible limited Soviet counterforce capability would make it more difficult for the United States to maintain its alliances or to respond to conventional attacks should the Soviet Union prove undeterred. As he lamented in his memoirs: "How could the United States hold its allies together as the credibility of its strategy eroded? How would we deal with Soviet conventional forces once the Soviets believed that we meant what we said about basing strategy on the extermination of civilians?"16 Kissinger's main worry was that if and when the Soviet Union developed the capability to threaten U.S. land-based systems credibly, a concomitant crisis in strategic, and hence geopolitical, stability would result.17 14

Inter view with NSC staff member. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 216. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., p. 198; and interview with NSC staff member. 15

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Kissinger was perhaps most interested in managing the political and military threat posed by the growing military power of the Soviet Union. Like many other analysts, he recognized that the advent of strategic parity had several political implications. Many analysts perceived parity to mean that the United States could no longer rely on its superiority in strategic military strength to persuade the Soviet Union to back down when their respective interests clashed. Kissinger felt that in time the loss of the U.S. counterforce capacity and the growing vulnerability of its own land-based deterrent force "was as likely to inhibit resistance as to discourage aggression/'18 He was concerned that American policymakers, no longer secure in the belief that U.S. nuclear forces could adequately support foreign policy endeavors, would not have the confidence and thus the resolve to stand up to a belligerent Soviet Union as the United States had done in the past.19 By the same token, the United States could no longer anticipate that the Soviet Union would act with the same restraint as it had given the possibility that the United States might unleash its military might.20 Over a decade earlier, Kissinger had argued that "'avoidable' war [arising out of miscalculation] may break out if the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally and that our threats of all-out war are bluff. If that should happen, the Soviet bloc may then decide, as its nuclear arsenal grows, to absorb the peripheral areas of Eurasia by means short of all-out war and to confront us with the choice of yielding or facing the destruction of American cities."21 Although mutual vulnerability did not make it any more likely that the Soviet Union would lightly risk war with the United States, Kissinger believed that parity confronted U.S. strategic planners in the 19705 with the prospect that the Soviet Union might be more willing to use its superiority in conventional forces to intervene in regional conflicts.22 A more aggressive Soviet Union meant crises were more likely to occur, with the United States potentially self18

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 999; see also p. 259. 19 Walter B. Slocombe, The Political Implications of Strategic Parity (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 77, 1971), p. 14. 20 Whether U.S. strategic superiority had ever really conferred a distinct and usable advantage in past years is most questionable. See Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987). 21 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 116. ^Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 292 and 1176.

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deterred from acting forcefully because of the inappropriate nature of its strategic doctrine. Added to this was Kissinger's concern that the retreat of the United States from Southeast Asia would strongly reinforce the propensity of others to doubt the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. Kissinger believed that the will of U.S. allies and other like-minded states to resist the sway of the Soviet Union depended on their confidence in the United States to stand by them in a time of need. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam would, he feared, raise serious questions about the willingness of the United States to fulfill its security commitments to protect them from Soviet coercion and aggression.23 Another worry for Kissinger was the growing extension of domestic criticism of U.S. involvement in Vietnam to encompass American security commitments overseas and military programs in general. Widespread internal discord about U.S. involvement overseas might well deleteriously affect perceptions of the character of U.S. determination, for it suggested a waning of the public consensus that had supported forceful U.S. international engagement in the postwar era.24 Should the Soviet Union be persuaded that the United States lacked the resolve to act, it might be more inclined to test the will of the United States and its allies. Kissinger was persuaded that the only real solution to the decline in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent was to strengthen U.S. and allied conventional forces. He argued that "there was . . . no more urgent task for American defense policy than to increase substantially the capacity for local resistance."25 The growing political backlash from the failing Vietnam War, however, impelled the Nixon administration to trim the U.S. defense budget, which Congress cut even further. Thus, at a time when Kissinger believed that the United States needed to build up its conventional force capabilities, the Nixon administration was being compelled to reduce the overall size and capability of American general-purpose forces. Kissinger was apprehensive about this: "I feared the long-term diplomatic impact of the persistent reduction of our forces at the very time that we were losing our relative strategic superiority, while we were visibly retrenching in Southeast Asia, and while the Soviet military expendi23

See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 226-30. Ibid., pp. 195-96. 25 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1000; see also pp. 259, 1003, 1O°9/ 1010, and 1176. 24

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tures were increasing steadily/'26 His concern was that the Soviet Union, perceiving the United States to be without adequate conventional forces, might under the cover of mutual deterrence be emboldened to challenge directly U.S. security interests at nonnuclear levels. It was the convergence of the U.S. pullout from Southeast Asia and the decline in U.S. nonnuclear capability, along with the Soviet strategic buildup, rather than just the loss of strategic nuclear superiority, that made the future prospects of U.S. security appear bleak to Kissinger. Even if the risks to the Soviet Union of an attempt to attack the United States would always seem exorbitant, an eroding strategic equilibrium was bound to have geopolitical consequences. It would accentuate our known inferiority in forces capable of regional defense. The countries around the Soviet periphery would be more and more tempted to seek security in accommodation. Nor were our dangers exhausted by deliberate acts of Soviet military pressure. In a revolutionary period, many crises were conceivable that were not sought by either side; Soviet willingness to run risks was bound to grow as the strategic balance shifted against us. This could not fail to demoralize countries looking to us for protection, whether they were allied or technically non-aligned.27

Kissinger viewed Soviet policy as one of "ruthless opportunism," seeking to make incremental gains in preference to the much riskier approach of attempting to achieve major gains. And he felt that the Soviet Union could not be expected to forgo exploiting U.S. weakness.28 Kissinger believed that the resolve and capacity of the United States to resist would be most questionable "in the vital so-called grey areas not protected by alliances, such as the Middle East."29 Therefore it was on the periphery of the main superpower confrontation, not in Europe, where the United States and its allies deployed considerable military power, that a cautious but opportunistic Soviet Union was most likely to challenge U.S. strategic interests. Indeed, Kissinger was extremely concerned that the cumulative impact of a series of political or military gains by the Soviet Union on the periphery could seriously undermine global stability.30 The 26

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 536. Ibid., pp. 203-4. Ibid., pp. 118-19. 29 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 999. 30 Interview with NSC staff member. 27 28

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failure to maintain regional balances on the periphery, he argued, could "rapidly turn into geopolitical shifts that jeopardize our fundamental interests and those of our allies/' Moreover, "under conditions of nuclear parity, world peace is more likely to be threatened by shifts in local balances . . . than by strategic nuclear attack/'31 In the absence of the commanding strategic superiority it had previously enjoyed, Kissinger was convinced the United States needed a capability to meet limited political challenges, as well as limited military threats, on the margins of the main arena of superpower confrontation in Europe. With the strategic balance evolving toward parity, possibly even to the benefit of the Soviet Union, continued adherence to the declared policy of assured destruction meant that for anything less than a threat to the continued survival of the United States, the president would undoubtedly be self-deterred from retaliating.32 Lack of real alternatives would artificially restrict the ability of the United States to maneuver, while in a crisis the likely result would be paralysis of the U.S. government. U.S. foreign policy would suffer as a result. Thus to Kissinger the real issue was the need for the United States to find a plausible method of supporting U.S. foreign policy initiatives if the Soviet Union was to be contained. A convincing threat that the United States could use nuclear weapons in a constrained fashion appeared to provide the only available means to counter the Soviet advantage in conventional forces. If the United States was not to be paralyzed in the face of Soviet challenges on the periphery, it needed to develop a broader range of moreappropriate nuclear options to provide the flexibility necessary to manage crises. As an academic, Kissinger had argued: The more we rely for deterrence on nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland, the more exposed the other countries of the free world will be to Communist pressures threatening fait accomplis. In the missile age, the side which can add another increment of power without resorting to all-out war—or which can threaten to do so—will gain perhaps a decisive advantage over an opponent who does not have this ability. 31 Henry A. Kissinger, "Foreign Policy and National Security/' Speech before the World Affairs Council and Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 22 March 1976, excerpted in International Security i (Summer 1976): 188-89. 32 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 215-16; and Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 258.

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Flexibility in both diplomacy and strategy requires that a maximum number of stages be created between surrender and Armageddon.33

A strategy constructed from an array of limited nuclear options would introduce more intermediate steps, adding some needed flexibility. This flexibility would enhance deterrence and provide the United States with a key instrument to support its foreign policy, particularly in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Kissinger desired a credible strategic capability to threaten nuclear use which did not automatically mean total war. Limited nuclear options appeared to offer a strategic approach that would enable the United States to use nuclear weapons for crisis diplomacy and foreign policy purposes, much as military force had been used traditionally. Plausible nuclear use would make the threat of war more persuasive, thereby making diplomacy more efficacious. What Kissinger wanted from a change in U.S. nuclear strategy was a capability to effect active deterrence on a global scale, to facilitate crisis management in the expectation of increasing Soviet challenges on the strategic periphery as the 19705 progressed. THE NSSM-3 FOLLOW-ON STUDY Kissinger judged the NSSM-3 study to be largely a failure, for it provided no alternative approaches to the protection of U.S. security interests.34 He therefore approached Nixon in June 1969 to argue that a revision of U.S. strategic doctrine was needed. Nixon found the dilemma of suicide or surrender which Kissinger set before him equally disturbing, so he authorized an effort to recast U.S. strategy. Kissinger initiated within the NSC a follow-on study to NSSM-3 to examine limited nuclear options,35 while Nixon issued orders requesting that the Pentagon develop response options appropriate to the current strategic environment.36 The Pentagon Response The NSSM-3 follow-on review of possible alternatives to current U.S. nuclear strategy was to be an interagency study conducted under ^Kissinger, Necessity for Choice, p. 57; emphasis in original. Inter view with OSA official. Interview with NSC staff member. 36 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 216. 34

35

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the auspices of the NSC, with the military to provide the relevant information and analysis. Kissinger made a concerted effort to gain access to military targeting activities to see exactly what targeting options did in fact exist. He found, however, that the effort to implement Nixon's executive order ran up against the extreme reluctance of the military establishment to consider an alternative strategy. Instead of complying, the JCS stonewalled the White House on the issue.37 Even Kissinger's initial efforts to intervene directly failed because they met with procedural obstructions.38 The military was indisposed to open up targeting practices, the most sacred of Strategic Air Command (SAC) activities, to the intercession of civilians. The White House sought to pressure the JCS in order to exact compliance with the president's direction.39 But even with Nixon's backing, Kissinger was not in a position to press the JCS on the question of the war plans. The military establishment was already perturbed by the prospect of arms limitation talks, the possibility that U.S. forces in Europe might be reduced, and the general worldwide decline of the U.S. force posture. As it was necessary to keep the JCS in line, particularly with regard to SALT, it was not politically prudent to push the JCS too hard on this particular issue.40 Nevertheless, by February 1970 the JCS and the White House were able to reach an agreement on the criterion for the strategic policy termed strategic sufficiency,41 which included a brief to develop the plans and capabilities to target U.S. forces more flexibly and selectively. The JCS was willing to cooperate with the White House largely because of the pressure exerted by the executive branch. But, according to Kissinger, this cooperation also stemmed from "a growing perception in the JCS that continued adherence to assured destruc37

Ibid., p. 217.

^Interview with NSC staff member. 39 Interview with NSC staff member. 40 David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (London: Robson Books, 1974), p. 151. Roger Morris, in his account of Kissinger in the White House, mentions that in the early months of the administration, Kissinger and Nixon sought to steer clear of any bureaucratic conflicts with the military; he did not indicate how long their reticence persisted. Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (London: Quartet Books, 1977), p. 155. 41 Richard Scott, "Charting a New Course," Guardian (London), 19 February 1970; and Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 143 n. 44. These criteria were to be promulgated the following year under the "new" doctrine of strategic sufficiency.

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tion could well lead to politically imposed limitations, and possibly even reductions, in their force improvement programs."42 Thus the JCS, though strongly disinclined to diverge from past targeting practices, agreed to take part in reexamining U.S. war plans for ulterior motives. Nonetheless, the military remained wary of revealing the closely held information on nuclear targeting to civilian analysts, so much so, in fact, that Kissinger was ultimately unable to get the military bureaucracy to provide the studies he requested. Military strategic planners apparently engaged in bureaucratic foot-dragging that Kissinger characterized as being just short of "insubordinate."43 As a consequence, although the JCS staff were given access to the SIOP, studies requested of the military bureaucracy were not forthcoming. Kissinger also submitted a request to the OSA in the DoD to examine the potential of limited nuclear options. Those officials familiar with U.S. targeting plans felt that the United States needed to have attack options other than the very massive ones available to counter the possibility of deterrence failure.44 A key characteristic of any options developed had to be that if executed they should not automatically provoke the Soviet Union to retaliate against U.S. cities. In accordance with this requirement, OSA officials sought to define targeting options that would minimize collateral damage much more than had been the case in the past. They assumed that the options could be carried out using the full range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of the United States. The ultimate proposal included options made up of sets of military targets, each designed to achieve a specific military objective through the destruction of the military assets of the enemy. To have an effective impact on the military situation meant that each attack had to be relatively extensive in scope. As a consequence, the options were intermediate in size, being smaller than those available before but still consisting of strikes that each involved several hundred nuclear weapons applied against military targets. OSA officials were dissatisfied with what they had wrought, being convinced that the execution of any one of these still sizable nuclear strikes ran the grave risk of provoking a massive Soviet response. The imbalance in the utility of using nuclear weapons to achieve military 42

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 217. «Ibid. ^Interviews with NSC staff members and OSA official.

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goals versus the acute danger that the Soviet Union would respond with a massive counterattack made the prospect of having to carry out these intermediate options quite disagreeable. Yet in spite of its belief that the intermediate responses developed were not sensible in terms of conceivable real-world situations, the OSA submitted the targeting options to the NSC for consideration.45 Kissinger, keenly interested in the exercise, was profoundly and vehemently dissatisfied with the options put forward. Like the OSA officials, Kissinger thought the options developed were still too massive and did little to alleviate the dilemma posed by reliance on massive responses. As an academic, Kissinger had maintained that the "distinguishing feature [of limited war] is that it has no 'purely' military solution/'46 Rather, he argued: A limited war . . . is fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponent's will, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not complete annihilation.47

Kissinger was therefore quite unsympathetic to the idea that the achievement of specific military objectives determined the size of the options.48 Thus, unlike the OSA staff, he maintained that even smaller options could and should be devised.49 The ends of foreign policy went beyond mere consideration of military objectives. Kissinger evidently felt that foreign policy aims could be attained using far fewer nuclear weapons than the several hundred in the recommended options. But though he seems to have been convinced that an appropriately fashioned doctrine promoting the credible, constrained use of nuclear weapons offered a means of backing U.S. foreign policy, he himself did not have any distinct ideas regarding how nuclear weapons might be employed to achieve the more refined 45

Interview with NSC staff member.

^Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 121.

47 Ibid., p. 120, emphasis in original. The contrast he discusses is that between allout war and limited war, but it certainly applies as well to limited war conducted with nuclear weapons. 48 For a discussion of why Kissinger believed that the military would " devise plans for limited war which insensibly approach the level of all-out conflict/' see Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 120-21. 49 Inter view with OSA official.

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objectives of foreign policy without running an unacceptable risk of escalation. As he had written with respect to limited war, "Planning becomes much more conjectural, much more subtle, and much more indeterminate, if only because a war against a major enemy can be kept limited only if both parties so desire, and this desire in itself tends to introduce a factor which is outside the control of planning officers."50 The conjectural and indeterminate nature of limited war was to be an abiding problem that confronted Kissinger in his efforts to spur the NSC staff and bureaucracy to renovate U.S. nuclear strategy. The NSC and the NSSM-j Follow-on Study The mandate of the NSC study was to look at "less than all-out attacks/'51 Many of the NSC staff officials had entered the administration believing that despite the rhetoric of assured destruction, a legacy of the Kennedy administration's shift from massive retaliation to counter force targeting was that U.S. targeting plans furnished a variety of options. Examination of the current SIOP revealed that strategic planning relied on a limited number of massive attacks. The smallest preplanned option was the ultimate deterrent threat, a full strike against Soviet industrial and economic targets. The rest, directed against Soviet military targets, were so large as to make unlikely that the Soviet Union would interpret them as anything but all-out attacks and react accordingly. NSC staff officials involved in the study believed that the massive planned responses would be useful only in deterring a full-scale attack against the United States. Few, however, believed that the Soviet Union would launch an immediate, direct attack against the United States, except perhaps in the most dire of circumstances.52 As long as the United States had a secure deterrent force capable of exacting devastating punishment in reply, it was widely accepted that the possibility of such a Soviet attack was remote. NSC officials recognized that the real risk of superpower conflict resided in the foreign interests of the United States. Western Europe was a clear case in point, one that deserved considerable attention. But the concern of the study was much broader, for conflict appeared 50 51 52

Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 121. Interview with NSC staff member. Interview with NSC staff member.

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more probable at other areas on the periphery of this main arena of superpower confrontation. The U.S. reevaluation of its foreign interests promised a process of withdrawal from a number of such peripheral sites, a retrenchment that would culminate in the U.S. presence on the perimeter being increasingly relegated to an offshore position. It was in these regions, such as Southeast Asia, where the Soviet Union would most likely be politically or militarily aggressive. Some staff officials recognized that the United States would probably be unwilling to use nuclear weapons first in such peripheral areas because its interests were not sufficiently engaged. Only in the European theater were U.S. interests of enough significance to make compelling the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression. Nevertheless, these officials felt that the United States needed a convincing deterrent threat to impart a degree of caution to the Soviet Union in these perimeter regions.53 The United States could not simply stand by and allow the Soviet Union to act with impunity. In the prevailing domestic political and military climate, the only solution available to the administration was to maintain a deterrent threat so as to instill an element of uncertainty about U.S. intentions into Soviet risk calculations. The continuing prospect that the United States might respond with massive attacks to even the limited use of force by the Soviet Union was seen as useful because it would make Soviet planners unsure of how the United States would react. But in the face of the secure counterdeterrent maintained by the Soviet Union, a threat of societal devastation was seen to have only minimal utility in deterring limited Soviet ventures. To prevent the erosion of the strategic periphery by the Soviet Union, the NSC staff members concurred with Kissinger's assessment that the United States needed something of a lesser nature to respond to less than an all-out attack. The prospect that the United States could use nuclear weapons in a limited manner would hopefully impart a degree of uncertainty sufficient to restrain Soviet activities on the margin.54 Beyond this universal concern with extended deterrence, the objectives to be achieved with limited options tended to be conjectural rather than specific in nature. Part of the problem was that Kissinger's directions for the development of limited options were vague. He 53 54

Interview with NSC staff member. Interview with NSC staff member.

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wanted the NSC staff to develop a strategy that made nuclear weapons seem to be at least a little usable, which meant that their employment had to be functional. Nuclear use, he felt, had to have substantive military value if it was to deliver an adequate political signal to the Soviet Union of U.S. intentions and resolve. But just which targets and how many would need to be destroyed to achieve the desired political effect was unclear. Kissinger apparently calculated that the application of several hundred nuclear weapons would be bound to prompt a major Soviet response, whereas to employ too few "would show more hesitation than determination/'55 The extent of nuclear use fell somewhere between, contingent on the prevailing situation and the political objectives that the United States sought to attain. Kissinger, however, was unable to articulate with any precision the function that limited nuclear options were to serve in a crisis. Thus it was difficult to establish just what the options should be tailored to accomplish and hence for the NSC staff to translate his directions into concrete plans.56 To devise appropriate options, the NSC staff had to know the political and military objectives. Barring foreknowledge of the political context and particular circumstances of the range of possible contingencies, these objectives could not be predetermined. Consequently, the NSC study proceeded without a clearly defined objective. Progress on the study was sporadic through 1969. Discussions on the subject apparently tended to focus on deterrent strategies rather than on war-fighting, or pure counterforce, strategies.57 But the development of a strategy of limited options was not given a high priority because it had no immediate operational implications. As a consequence, the bureaucracy tended to forgo work on the study, favoring other, more pressing matters, such as Vietnam and the forthcoming SALT negotiations. Although a widespread belief developed that options other than massive attacks would be a "good thing" to have,58 55

Kissinger makes this point with respect to flexible response, but it applies as well to his thinking on strategic nuclear weapons. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 219; and interviews with NSC staff members. ^Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic 1989), pp. 114-15. 57 Interview with NSC staff member. 58 Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 121, 1975/76), p. 3; and interview with NSC staff member.

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NSC staff officials apparently did not feel that a lack of such options posed an immediate danger to the security of the United States or its allies. The general impetus within the NSC to develop options that would serve to shore up the U.S. extended deterrent stemmed largely from the need to preserve overseas interests where the United States was pulling back from direct involvement. Indeed, there was a greater requirement for this need to be fulfilled than there was to bolster the nuclear pledge to Western Europe, where the United States maintained a substantial conventional and nuclear presence to protect its interests. Concern in the NSC about the credibility of the American extended deterrent was thus motivated mainly by the general question of what the United States should do to forestall Soviet political and military advances against the full range of U.S. interests overseas rather than by a specific concern about the persuasiveness of the nuclear commitment extended to Western Europe. "Should a President . . . 1"

That any progress was made came about only because Kissinger would on occasion stimulate the bureaucracy to finish the study.59 The first public pronouncement in early 1970 that indicated a possible change by the Nixon administration to U.S. nuclear strategy appears to have been one such endeavor. In his first report to Congress, Nixon asked rhetorically: Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?60

The message from the president was clear: in the changing strategic environment, the administration's general assessment was that the United States could no longer place its confidence in assured destruction to deter possible Soviet aggression.61 59

Interview with NSC staff member. Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign for the 19705; A New Policy for Peace, A Report to the Congress, 18 February 1970 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970), p. 92. 61 Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 4. 60

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But the president's statement did more than inform the public of the administration's unease with this doctrine. Although the report was written by the NSC staff,62 Kissinger personally included the president's rhetorical query.63 And while it would send a message to the Soviet Union, Kissinger plainly also hoped to use the statement to signal unequivocally to the bureaucracy that the executive branch was most serious about devising more-selective, limited options to be introduced into U.S. war plans. In raising the question in Nixon's foreign policy report, he heightened the political profile of the issue to a level that the bureaucracy would find harder to ignore. The NSC review investigating alternatives to assured destruction continued into the spring of 1970.w But as time wore on, the executive increasingly ran into stiff opposition to the review from elements in the State Department,65 many officials of which were worried that the ready availability of plausible limited nuclear options made recourse to the employment of nuclear weapons seem much more likely. Strong opposition also derived from concerns that a strategy based on limited options would generate pressures from the military for more weapons systems.66 With the first set of negotiating sessions on limiting superpower stockpiles about to start that April, arms control proponents sought to block the development of limited nuclear options lest their advent torpedo progress in SALT. Confronted with this opposition, and with Nixon hoping for a quick success for political reasons, the White House was compelled to put the strategic review on the back burner.67 There were other issues of far greater and more immediate importance to the executive than renovating U.S. nuclear strategy to provide an answer to Nixon's rhetorical questions. THE AUTUMN OF CRISES By mid-August 1970, the second round of the SALT negotiations had reached a stalemate, with little of substance achieved. The failure 62 Kaplan says that it was Laurence Lynn of the NSC who largely wrote Nixon's speech. See Wizards of Armageddon, p. 367. 63 Interview with NSC staff member. 64 This information was purportedly supplied by Kissinger in an interview. Michael Getler, "On the Other Hand, Mr. President?" Armed Forces Management, April 1970, p. 23. 65 William G. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Understanding the Hidden Pattern of Soviet-American Relations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 42. 66 Interview with NSC staff member. 67 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 42.

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to reach a quick agreement on limiting strategic launchers was critical to the United States. That summer, the Soviet Union had reached a point in its strategic expansion where its total inventory of delivery vehicles equaled that of the United States, yet it was still pressing on with the buildup of its ballistic missile forces.68 During an NSC meeting held on 19 August, immediately following the end of the first round of arms negotiations, the discussion reportedly centered on the nature of the current strategic balance and how it compared with that during the 1962 Cuban crisis. According to John Prados, Kissinger was "forced to admit that the Soviets were aiming for superiority, with arms limitation (SALT) if they could get it, but regardless of the outcome of the talks." The possibility that superiority might be the Soviet goal brought to the fore in NSC staff discussions the prospect that U.S. land-based missiles might soon be vulnerable to attack. Concurrent with a study of ICBM vulnerability undertaken by the OSA, the NSC endeavored again to examine alternative targeting doctrines constructed with more and varied limited nuclear options.69 Kissinger provided the impetus for the revived interest in U.S. nuclear strategy and limited nuclear options. His concern about the extended deterrent was most stimulated by the impact of parity. That the USSR might be striving to achieve at least a measure of superiority undoubtedly made the search for viable limited nuclear options seem even more imperative to Kissinger, leading him to prod the NSC and bureaucracy to examine the question. But events that unfolded on the international front in late August and September appear to have been equally if not more important. Kissinger in his memoirs refers to the fall of 1970 as "the Autumn of Crises." The Jordanian insurrection, one of the three essentially concurrent crises that Kissinger includes under this somewhat melodramatic phrase,70 would have a decided impact on his perceptions and thinking regarding limited nuclear options. Superpower Crisis in Jordan The Jordan-Syria crisis was the result of fighting that broke out between the royal forces of Jordan and fedayeen guerrillas of the 68 See 69

Chapter 2, pp. 29-30. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 194. 70 The other two ''crises" were the election of Salvador Allende Gossens as president of Chile and the attempt by the USSR to establish a forward base for its ballistic missile submarines at Cienfuegos, Cuba. The latter incident undoubtedly reinforced

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Palestinian Liberation Organization, Iraqi threats to intervene in the civil war, and, ultimately bringing events to a head, what appeared to be limited armored incursions by Syria into Jordan in support of the insurrectionary forces. Nixon and Kissinger viewed the developing crisis in a most ominous light, believing that the United States could not afford to let what they saw as a Soviet-backed rebellion succeed. Both perceived that the most serious aspect of the crisis was the possibility that the Soviet Union might indirectly or, more remote, directly intervene in the region, which would force the United States to respond. Nixon claimed in his memoirs that "the possibility of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation was uncomfortably high. It was like a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end."71 Although Nixon and Kissinger's reading of the crisis is questionable, U.S. policy during the crisis was very much a product of their perceptions.72 The essential objective of U.S. policy in the crisis was to maintain King Hussein of Jordan in power, which meant that the United States had to dissuade the king's immediate adversaries from their hostile activities. There were two aspects to this in the administration's thinking. First, it had to convince those adversaries immediately engaged, or threatening to become engaged, against the Jordanian government that the United States would be willing to intervene rather than see them successful. A continued buildup of U.S. forces in and around the Mediterranean was intended in part to impress local opponents of King Hussein of the steadiness of American purpose. The policy was designed to deter local actors from entering the Jordanian civil war and, once Syria intervened, to force Syria to desist. Kissinger and Nixon were convinced that the Soviet Union was the power behind the degenerating situation, so the crisis was very much a superpower confrontation.73 Thus a second component of the U.S. Kissinger's growing belief that a repercussion of parity was a greater inclination toward adventuresome behavior on the part of the Soviet Union. Raymond Garthoff essentially agrees with Kissinger's view of the Cienfuegos incident. See Detente and Confrontation, P. 7177Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978), p. 483. ^William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970," in Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 266-67. ^Interview with NSC staff member.

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strategy was to persuade the Soviet Union to exert its authority to restrain its clients that opposed Jordan. At the same time, the United States had to discourage the Soviet Union from directly interceding to support those clients. Much of the signaling and military maneuvering was therefore oriented to influence the Soviet Union in order to accomplish these two objectives. Given the perception held by Kissinger and Nixon that Moscow likely instigated, or was at least urging on, the hostilities, the former was a policy of coercion, whereas the latter was one of deterrence. In his memoirs Kissinger discussed the Jordanian crisis by intertwining his perceptions of the situation with his views on how a crisis should be managed. Kissinger thought the crisis was "a test of our capacity to control events in the region." He explains that the uncertain dynamics of a crisis necessitates that leaders have maximum flexibility in responding to events so as to counter, and ultimately "dominate," the changing tactical situation. As he further observed, "Ideally this should occur without the use of force; however, sometimes one can avoid the use of force only by threatening it."74 Simply put, Kissinger believed that a key, if not the primary, instrument of crisis diplomacy so as to attain dominance was the one traditionally used by national leaders: the threat to employ military force. Not surprisingly, then, the primary approach Nixon and Kissinger decided on was to cultivate the perception of U.S. resolve by engendering "maximum fear of a possible American move."75 One principle of crisis diplomacy that Kissinger discusses with respect to the Jordanian crisis is the utility of seizing the initiative. The side that has the initiative can occupy its opponent's energies in analysis. And since the opponent will always assume the worst contingency, even relatively minor moves can have a major cautionary effect, unless they are so palpably bluffing as to encourage contempt. For maximum effectiveness one's actions must be sustained; they must appear relentless, inexorable; hesitation or gradualism invites an attempt to test one's resolution by matching the commitment.76

Simply put, one applies steady and mounting pressure to convince the opponent of one's will to act with force if necessary. The policy 74

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 597. Ibid., p. 627; see also pp. 611 and 622. 76 Ibid., p. 604. 75

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pursued was to send diplomatic signals of American concern, both publicly and privately, intimating that the United States might be forced to take appropriate action to safeguard its interests, while forces were gathered and readied so that by the time the crisis peaked they would be threateningly poised to intervene.77 A crucial aspect of such a tactic to which Kissinger only alludes is that the United States might be forced to follow through on the implied threat. This contingency had to be seriously considered, for to falter on the brink would reveal the U.S. threat to be a bluff. Such planning was undertaken, including "a study of the operational consequences of protracted American military engagement in Jordan; the forces required for each of the contingencies; and the related deployment needed to deter Soviet intervention." Most important was an examination of "whether and how the United States could sustain military operations in Jordan" if the decision made was for the United States to proceed unilaterally.78 Robert Pursley, military assistant to Melvin Laird, subsequently pointed out a crucial problem facing the administration in the crisis: "What are you going to use if you get involved in a big war? Where are the forces going to come from if the other side, such as the Soviets and the Egyptians, decides to go to the aid of the Syrians?"79 Given the relative proximity of the Soviet Union to the prospective zone of conflict and its abundant reserves of general-purpose forces, there were no satisfactory answers forthcoming from the administration to these questions. Indeed, with the United States still deeply involved in Vietnam, no one in the administration was seriously disposed to consider another war.80 The best use of U.S. forces was to deter a Soviet intervention or reaction against Israel and to dissuade the enemies of Jordan from acting. Despite the favorable balance of forces both "locally and overall" that would result from the inclusion of Israel's armed forces in the military equation,81 the outcome of a U.S. intervention would be 77 Ibid., pp. 605, 614, and 622. See also Seymour Hersh, Kissinger: The Price of Power: Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), pp. 238-39. In his memoirs Nixon provides only a cursory discussion of the crisis; see Nixon, RN, pp. 483-85^Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 605 and 607. That the United States should act unilaterally was Nixon's expressed preference through most of the crisis. ^Quoted in Hersh, Kissinger, p. 243. 80 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 605. 81 Ibid., p. 619.

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questionable, especially if the Soviet Union decided to enter the fray directly. Against such a contingency, Kissinger "requested that the existing plans for 'deterring Soviet intervention' be adapted to the evolving situation." Precisely what those plans included and how far they were taken is not known,82 but in the least they entailed consideration of having "to match and overwhelm a Soviet response (including if necessary military intervention)."83 Whether the United States could accomplish this latter objective short of nuclear use would be questionable. Both Kissinger and Nixon believed that the withdrawal of the Syrian armored forces resulted from the Soviet Union calling off its client state. Although at the time and in his memoirs Kissinger expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the incident, the lesson he took away was that U.S. actions had less of an influence on Soviet behavior than he desired. Subsequently, he is reported to have complained, "We put everything on the line with the Soviet Union, and they didn't blink until the last day."84 That Moscow had been willing to continue in its adventuresome policy, despite indication through U.S. signals and military maneuvers that the situation was intolerable, perturbed Kissinger.85 To him, the failure of the United States to convince the USSR to rein in much earlier the fedayeen guerrillas and Syria demonstrated the political impotence of U.S. nuclear planning.86 Kissinger's interpretation of the Jordanian crisis reflects a belief that the Soviet Union's apparent unwillingness to curb its clients until the last minute stemmed from its perception that the United States could not convincingly intervene with conventional forces and that the U.S. 82 Ibid., p. 612. Kissinger, consistent with his dictate that the United States be able to respond in a flexible manner, had a range of policy options developed in each of the crises, large or small, that the administration confronted during his tenure as adviser to the president on national security affairs. All these studies were filed against possible future need. In many instances the application of nuclear weapons was one of the many options. Thus it is likely that the possibility or the threat of nuclear employment was considered as a means of deterring Soviet intercession. Interview with Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) official. 83 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 611. 84 Cited in Hersh, Kissinger, p. 246. 85 Interview with participant in DoD targeting review. Hersh makes a good case in arguing that the Soviet Union did not have the degree of control over Syria needed to get it to desist from its actions. Thus Kissinger's complaint and analysis of the situation may have been based on a misunderstanding of the ability of the Soviet Union to control its clients. See Hersh, Kissinger, pp. 244-49. 86 Interview with participant in DoD targeting review. Kaplan notes that "in the 1970 Jordan crisis, [Kissinger] had been particularly frustrated that the SAC [Strategic Air

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strategic arsenal, whose publicly stated mission was to execute massive attacks against the USSR, was effectively neutralized by the secure Soviet strategic counterdeterrent. Kissinger was convinced that the Soviet Union had been emboldened to go to the brink because of the recognizable inability of the United States to threaten credibly the worst-case contingency, nuclear use. But the Soviet Union had ultimately backed down, so the problem was not immediate. The Soviet Union, however, was pushing ahead with its strategic buildup and could be expected to upgrade the technical capability of its forces. As the Soviet strategic arsenal grew, the political leverage that the United States could still extract from its strategic nuclear forces would dwindle accordingly. Lacking both the capability and the political will to interject its general-purpose forces into such distant theaters, the eventual emasculation of the U.S. nuclear deterrent would put the United States at a distinct disadvantage in the global superpower competition. Kissinger worried that once that future point had been reached and the U.S. nuclear arsenal rendered ineffectual, the United States would be incapable of managing future crises because it felt powerless to act. Unable to posture a worst-case contingency of credible nuclear use, the United States would find it difficult to convey persuasively the implacable certainty of its willingness and resolve to counter Soviet challenges with force if necessary. Confident in the capacity of Soviet strategic forces to deter U.S. intervention, nuclear or nonnuclear, Moscow might calculate that it could persist in its opportunistic policies irrespective of U.S. messages and military posturing, leaving it to the United States to blink at the brink. If U.S. security and foreign policy interests were not to be undermined, this situation needed to be remedied; a means had to be found to restore the forcefulness of U.S. military threats so as to protect the peripheral areas. The only prospective solution was to develop a doctrine based on some notion of limited nuclear options. As an academic, Kissinger had believed that the correct approach was to devise a doctrine for limited nuclear use which minimized the risks of progression to allout war.87 The Jordanian crisis persuaded him that the United States Command] war plan contained nothing with which the U.S. might threaten the Soviets in some limited fashion" (Wizards of Armageddon, p. 370). 87 Kissinger had earlier pointed out that " success in limited war requires . . . that the opponent be persuaded that national survival is not at stake and that a settlement is possible on reasonable terms" (Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 140-41).

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needed the capability to engage in "non-central campaigns/' that is, a campaign of nuclear attacks that did not include strikes against the Soviet Union.88 A plausible doctrine for localized nuclear conflict would imply that the United States believed nuclear weapons could be used without necessarily provoking a Soviet counterattack on the United States. Such a capability would endow nuclear weapons with at least the appearance of usability, thereby refurbishing the credibility of U.S. threats to employ them. An ostensible capability to use nuclear weapons in such a fashion would permit the United States to bring its strategic nuclear forces to bear politically on confrontations on the periphery, to serve a coercive (as is suggested by the Jordanian incident) as well as a deterrent purpose. The lessons that Kissinger ultimately seemed to draw from the Jordanian crisis revitalized his interest in limited nuclear options. He pessimistically believed that at some, possibly not too distant, point, the United States would find it increasingly difficult to stand up and prevail over the USSR in a confrontation. He perceived that having nuclear options other than massive strikes against the Soviet Union would be a necessary prerequisite if the United States was not to be paralyzed in future crises. Limited nuclear options could provide the United States with appropriate diplomatic instruments for crisis management. The appearance that the United States thought nuclear weapons usable could furnish the necessary leverage either to deter or to coerce both the Soviet Union or involved nonnuclear third parties. With this in mind, in the fall of 1970 Kissinger sought to motivate the NSC to investigate doctrines for the limited use of nuclear weapons. He was hoping that administration officials, if they thought hard enough and long enough, would find a way to use nuclear weapons, much as military force had traditionally been used, to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY The effort generated by the crisis in Jordan, however, proved to be transitory and unfruitful. Kissinger, having prodded his staff, turned his attention to more-pressing matters. The administration was desperate to reach some sort of arms limitation agreement in order to ^Hersh, Kissinger, p. 248 n.

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halt the Soviet strategic buildup, while the search for a graceful exit from the Vietnam War continued. Without Kissinger's driving force, altering strategic doctrine became of low priority as the time and efforts of the NSC staff were taken up by a host of other, moreimmediate problems. Nixon set forth the basic propositions of strategic sufficiency, which had been agreed on by the executive and the military almost a year before, in his 1971 foreign policy report to Congress. He explained that strategic sufficiency had two meanings: in a "narrow military sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking." [In a] broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated. I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when that response involves the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population. It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning solely on some finite—and theoretical—capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.89

He went on to say that strategic sufficiency meant that the United States needed both forces and plans that would "provide alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation."90 Strategic sufficiency thus predicated a broad and flexible strategic posture such that the United States would have sufficient strategic power to ensure that any aggressor would be deterred from attacking it, while having the strategic capability to support and sustain the active pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives overseas. Nixon's political definition, along with the criteria for maintaining a position of strategic sufficiency, made evident that the policy of assured destruction was considered an inadequate approach to safeguarding U.S. security interests. The official explanation was that a 89

Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970$: Building for Peace, A Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), pp. 170-71. 90 Ibid, p. 171.

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new policy was needed given the changed strategic environment. Confronted with an expanding Soviet military capability and growing technological momentum, the United States no longer maintained an unambiguous superiority in strategic nuclear weapons.91 Early in his 1970 report to the Congress, Nixon had said "that the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines."92 The administration's contention was that assured destruction lacked credibility in view of the Soviet buildup and the potential future threats that this posed.93 What the United States was seeking through doctrinal change, Nixon said, was the flexibility to respond at a level appropriate to the level of provocation. Flexibility was deemed necessary for the preservation of strategic sufficiency,94 both in its narrow military meaning and in its broader political sense. In spite of his on-again, off-again interest in devising more-useful nuclear options, Kissinger remained sufficiently concerned to enshrine the notion of greater flexibility into U.S. strategic policy early in 1971. Including a requirement to revise U.S. nuclear strategy under the rubric of strategic sufficiency publicly elevated it to a prominent element of official U.S. national security policy, leaving no uncertainty as to the importance that Kissinger, and ostensibly Nixon, attached to developing an alternative strategy to assured destruction. The "Strategic Objectives" Study Despite the transformation of the issue from one of internal unease to one of high political visibility, the NSC staff turned back to the issue of fashioning a new strategy only because it impinged on SALT. In early 1971, studies being undertaken on the "survivability" of U.S. strategic forces could not be satisfactorily completed because American second-strike requirements could not be delineated. Before the White House could determine what the U.S. force posture should be 91 Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony, U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 3818 (H.R. 8687), Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, 92d Cong., ist sess., 1971, pp. 2,328, 2,437, an¿ 3/818. See also Final Report to the Congress of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 0anuary i969-January 1973) before the House Committee on Armed Services, 8 January 1973, p. 13. 92 Nixon, New Policy for Peace, p. 11. 93 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1973 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 2:547. 94 The other two criteria Nixon delineated were the survivability and the mix of U.S. forces.

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and what it could accept in a SALT agreement, it needed to establish a new U.S. targeting strategy to replace assured destruction. Thus in April a "Strategic Objectives" study was instituted in the NSC to explore possible alternative strategies95 and their implications for the U.S. force posture. To make SALT politically palatable, the administration needed to develop an efficacious nuclear strategy to demonstrate that U.S. security and global stability would not be endangered by the growing Soviet lead in ballistic missile launchers. Because of a number of staff resignations stemming from the administration's bombing policy in Southeast Asia and the generally difficult working atmosphere, most officials delegated to work on the study had their first exposure to the SIOP at this time. Much as was the case earlier, the examination of U.S. targeting plans convinced most that limited nuclear options were necessary to improve the flexibility of the United States to respond to crises. Nevertheless, some NSC officials were at best ambivalent about the efficacy of limited nuclear options, while others harbored doubts about whether the United States should actually adopt the sort of strategies being theoretically contemplated.96 Agreed was the lack of a "clear and specific rationale" for introducing greater flexibility to U.S. targeting plans. There being no compelling requirement for such improvement of the plans and deeply preoccupied with SALT, the NSC staff allowed the study to fall dormant.97

FURTHER IMPETUS The effort to revise U.S. nuclear strategy received a distinct boost in early 1972 when Kissinger again sought to energize the bureaucracy to address the question.98 At this juncture Kissinger devoted the most attention to pondering limited nuclear options, the result of which was a concerted effort by the NSC to answer his questions. What drove Kissinger were growing concerns about the potential impact of the impending SALT agreement on superpower relations and 95

Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's 1983), p. 376. 96 Interview with NSC staff member. 97 Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 4. "William Beecher, "Major-War Plans Are Being Revised by White House/' New York Times, 5 August 1972; and Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 376.

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about how the United States should react in the event of a SinoSoviet war." SALT and Limited Nuclear Options Despite the agreement reached in the spring of 1971 to freeze ICBM deployment, by that fall many officials within the administration were becoming quite alarmed by the continued expansion of Soviet strategic forces. In 1971 the Soviet Union began to construct an additional ninety silos, seemingly designed to house an advanced version of its large ICBMs, which under the freeze would give it some six hundred more ICBMs than the United States. At the same time, Soviet negotiators were obstinate in their refusal to agree to limits on SLBMs, even as the Soviet Union speeded up production of ballistic missile submarines. The rapid increase in Soviet strategic forces was quickly eroding the relative advantage retained by the United States. Officials were apprehensive that the Soviet Union was seeking a clear-cut measure of quantitative superiority in ballistic missiles to enable it to force the United States to back down in future confrontations. Equally worrisome was that Soviet vigor in building heavy missiles, each of which would be capable of being fitted to carry a large number of accurate MIRV warheads, potentially signified a desire to posture a warfighting, war-winning nuclear capability. The shape of the future strategic balance increasingly seemed likely to favor the Soviet Union, which was an ominous prospect to the administration, for Soviet leadership might seek to exploit this advantage in political-military confrontations.100 Kissinger found the shifting strategic balance particularly disturbing. The ongoing change in the strategic balance, combined with the attacks on U.S. defense spending,101 the relative decline in U.S. power, and the expected adverse impact of the Vietnam War on U.S. prestige, led Kissinger to be quite pessimistic about the capability of the United States to manage the Soviet Union as the decade wore on 102 with t^ growth of the Soviet arsenal, the ability of the United 99

Interview with NSC staff member. 100 William Beecher, "Nuclear Build-Up in Soviet Worrying US. Strategists/' New York Times, 20 October 1971. 101 For Kissinger's views on the strategic balance and on the adverse impact of these attacks on US. security policy, see White House Years, pp. 193-98 and 199-215, respectively. 102 Inter view with NSC staff member.

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States to threaten the use of nuclear weapons convincingly was becoming ever more doubtful. Especially questionable was the credibility of the U.S. strategic arsenal to support extended deterrence.103 The United States, lacking the military means to promote its crisis diplomacy, would find it increasingly difficult to counter Soviet challenges on the periphery successfully. Kissinger was convinced that halting the Soviet strategic buildup had to be the overriding U.S. objective in SALT, for if no agreement was reached, the strategic situation could only worsen. Nonetheless, the impending SALT agreement, the outlines of which were becoming evident by late 1971 and early 1972, served only to reinforce his sense of despair about the long-range prospects of the United States to manage a more strategically assertive Soviet Union. Despite being the key architect of the agreement, Kissinger was very concerned that the limited agreement permitted the Soviet Union a ballistic missile force structure numerically superior to that of the United States. Soviet strategic forces under SALT were so configured that through modernization it could posture the numbers and kinds of weapons that could support a capability to fight and win a nuclear war.104 Not only would the benefits derived by the United States from its strategic forces erode as the USSR mastered advanced technologies such as MIRV, but it now also seemed plausible that even with a successful arms limitation agreement, the overall balance of power could well shift to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Kissinger feared that the impact of this shift on the perceptions and behavior of the Soviet Union and third countries could have only an adverse effect on U.S. security interests overseas in the coming years.105 Kissinger had come to believe that the United States would find itself increasingly on the defensive in trying to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The Soviet Union had already demonstrated a clear willingness to challenge U.S. interests on the periphery. An arms control agreement that legitimized the current strategic imbalance might provide the Soviet Union with even greater confidence to challenge U.S. interests than it had already demonstrated.106 Revising U.S. 103

Interview with NSC staff member. Interview with NSC staff member. This view was apparently shared by others within the government. See Beecher, "Nuclear Build-Up in Soviet Worrying US. Strategists/' 105 Interviews with NSC staff members. 106 Inter view with NSC staff member. 104

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targeting doctrine to make any threatened American use of nuclear weapons more credible appeared to offer the only solution to the dilemmas Kissinger foresaw. The outcome of SALT and the possible future shape of the nuclear balance it foreshadowed made the development of such a capability even more essential. But as had been the case just over a year earlier, it was a superpower confrontation on the strategic perimeter which stimulated Kissinger's renewed disquiet about the future prospects of U.S. security. Crisis on the Indian Subcontinent Open conflict erupted between India and Pakistan in late November 1971 after many months of steadily deteriorating relations over the issue of East Pakistan. As was the case in the Jordanian crisis, Kissinger believed there was more at stake than peace on the Indian subcontinent. With the conflict coming in the wake of a Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Kissinger perceived the machinations of the Soviet Union lurking behind the crisis. The Soviet aim in the wake of our China initiative was to humiliate Peking and to demonstrate the futility of reliance on either China or the United States as an ally. Furthermore, if India got away with such tactics, these might well spread to the Middle East, where Egypt, which also had a friendship treaty with Moscow, was threatening in a so-called year of decision to settle its grievances by war. For the Soviets to be able to point to South Asia as evidence of the efficacy of war and the impotence of the United States opened, I thought, ominous prospects for the Middle East.107

Nixon and Kissinger surmised that the Soviet Union was brazenly attempting to exploit the India-Pakistan conflict to garner strategic gains at the expense of U.S. security interests around the periphery of Eurasia and that the United States had to react accordingly.108 The focus of Nixon and Kissinger's concern was not East Pakistan, where they both thought independence was inevitable. Rather, they worried that India, backed by the Soviet Union, was intent on dis107

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 876. For an alternative assessment of this crisis, particularly with regard to Soviet and Indian objectives, see David K. Hall, "The Laotian War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971," in Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, ed. Blechman and Kaplan, pp. 175-217. 108

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membering West Pakistan. Their immediate goal was to preserve the territorial integrity and independence of West Pakistan, but the real objective was to frustrate Soviet strategic designs. As Kissinger explained in his memoirs: We sought to prevent a demonstration that Soviet aims and diplomatic support were inevitably decisive in crises. On December 4 I told Nixon that precisely because we were retreating from Vietnam we could not permit the impression to be created that all issues could be settled by naked force. Though it was now too late to prevent war, we still had an opportunity—through the intensity of our reaction—to make the Soviets pause before they undertook another adventure somewhere else. As I told Nixon on December 5, we had to become sufficiently threatening to discourage similar moves by Soviet friends in other areas, especially the Middle East. And if we acted with enough daring, we might stop the Indian onslaught before it engulfed and shattered West Pakistan.109

Nixon and Kissinger believed that their coercive diplomacy worked. India offered an unconditional cease-fire in the West, removing the threat there. Kissinger was convinced "that it was a reluctant decision resulting from Soviet pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistence/'110 The impact of the crisis on the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an important consideration in Nixon and Kissinger's calculations. Kissinger's assessment was that Moscow "encouraged India to exploit Pakistan's travail to deliver a blow to our systems of alliances, in even greater measure to demonstrate Chinese impotence."111 With the administration moving toward developing ties with Beijing, they believed that an important objective of U.S. policy had to be to avert the humiliation of China. By intervening in the crisis, Kissinger and Nixon apparently felt they were risking war because the United States might have to intercede on behalf of the PRC should it be attacked by the Soviet Union.112 Intelligence sources close to the Indian cabinet indicated that should Beijing attempt to succor Pakistan in any way, 109

Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 886-87. In his memoirs Nixon states that at the time he felt it "important to discourage both Indian aggression and Soviet adventurism" (RN, p. 527). 110 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 913. 111 Ibid., p. 886; see also p. 899. 112 Ibid., p. 909.

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the Soviet Union might mount a diversionary attack against China in Sianking.113 Giving credence to this was that the Soviet Union had massed troops close to the Sino-Soviet border in an apparent effort to dissuade Beijing from going to the aid of Pakistan.114 That the Soviet Union might in fact counterintervene against China, leading to a full-scale Sino-Soviet conflict, thus seemed quite possible.115 Nixon and Kissinger had long felt that it was not in the strategic interest of the United States to stand by and allow the Soviet Union to defeat China in the event of such a war. If open and general warfare were to erupt between the USSR and the PRC as a result of the IndiaPakistan war, the United States would have no real alternative but to assist China in order to preclude a debilitating setback to American strategic interests in Eurasia,116 Although there is no direct evidence that it was this conflict that led Kissinger to take up in early 1972 the reforming of U.S. nuclear strategy, that subsequent to this crisis Kissinger again devoted considerable attention to nuclear strategy is strongly reminiscent of the Jordanian crisis and its aftermath. Once again Kissinger perceived the United States as confronting a bold Soviet Union in a region where the United States had no real conventional military capability to intervene to support its interests. The United States had to act with sufficient determination to suggest that it was willing to risk a superpower clash, with the implied attendant risk that nuclear weapons might be used. Even more compelling is that a particular focus of Kissinger's revived interest in nuclear strategy was to develop nuclear contingency plans against the possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict. The India-Pakistan crisis was the probable immediate source of Kissinger's disquiet about the future stability of the strategic balance. The seeming effect of the crisis on the Indian subcontinent was to reinforce Kissinger's perception that the shift in the strategic balance was bolstering the confidence of the Soviet leadership, making them more willing to pursue aggressive policies on the periphery of the US.-Soviet geopolitical competition where the U.S. military presence 113

Ibid., pp. 901-2.

114 Nixon, 115

RN, p. 526. Kissinger was briefly convinced that China was going to intervene militarily, thus opening the distinct possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict, but this turned out to be a misunderstanding of Beijing's intentions. See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 906-7. 116 Ibid., p. 911.

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was sharply constrained. The India-Pakistan conflict also brought to the fore the question of how the United States would, or could, respond to a major Soviet attack against the PRC. Limited Nuclear Options for China Kissinger's endeavor in early 1972 to refashion U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine was motivated in part because he felt that the United States needed to think through how it should react to a full-scale Sino-Soviet war.117 Kissinger's interest in China at this time stemmed directly from the triangular great-power confrontation he perceived to exist behind the India-Pakistan crisis. But since 1969 Kissinger had believed it necessary for the United States to be able to execute a strategy of limited nuclear use to back U.S. policy in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict. In many respects, the Soviet-China confrontation scenario was the only case in which Kissinger demonstrated a conviction that it was relatively exigent for the United States to devise appropriate nuclear responses. As such, his concern about a Sino-Soviet conflict forms a subtheme to his intermittent campaign to convince the administration to innovate U.S. strategic doctrine to make the extended deterrent more persuasive. Kissinger's initial interest in developing limited nuclear options to support China arose from the outbreak of limited hostilities between the Soviet Union and the PRC in 1969. From early March through mid-August 1969, Soviet and Chinese troops engaged in a series of armed clashes along stretches of the frontier shared by the two countries. Kissinger's concern about how the United States should react to Sino-Soviet war stemmed from his fear that "a full-scale Soviet invasion of China might tip not only the geopolitical but also the psychological equilibrium in the world; it would create a momentum of irresistible ruthlessness."118 A decisive military victory over China, he felt, would permit the Soviet Union to dominate Asia, placing U.S. interests in Japan and elsewhere in the region in jeopardy. Intimations that an all-out war might be in the offing did not fully coalesce until August 1969. After a hiatus in the sporadic fighting that followed the opening of talks between the two countries, a new round of clashes occurred along the border between Sianking and 117 118

Inter view with NSC staff member. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 177.

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Kazakhstan. Nixon was sufficiently exercised about the new outbreak of fighting to inform the NSC that it was not in the interest of the United States to allow the Soviet Union to "smash" China in a fullfledged Sino-Soviet war. More ominous to the administration were hints that the Soviet Union might be seriously contemplating a preemptive strike against China's nascent nuclear capabilities. Believing that the United States had to support China to preserve its strategic interests in Asia, Kissinger requested the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) to develop contingency plans in case of war.119 Although the prospect of war seemed to recede with the announcement in early October that the two disputants had agreed to open talks, Kissinger characterized the contingency planning undertaken by the WSAG to be "inadequate." As he put it: The prospect of military conflict along the Sino-Soviet border faced us with nightmarish choices. Any improvised response to such a dire event was bound to be erratic and probably inadequate. Throughout 1969 I had sought to elicit contingency plans from the interagency machinery. But the departments and agencies considered our choices too awful to contemplate, and so produced only careful evasions: their ingenious catalogue of eventualities seemed more insurance against lack of foresight than a set of practical choices for the President.120

Kissinger does not say as much but it is clear that the nuclear options available to the United States were analyzed. Indeed, the United States had no means other than nuclear weapons to project its power into a Sino-Soviet conflict. But for the United States to extend the influence of its strategic deterrent, the president needed some policy alternatives to the unhelpful options of mutual mass destruction or inaction. Kissinger was so dissatisfied by the failure of the interagency study to develop practical alternatives that in early 1970 he had the NSC staff secretly draw up contingency plans that incorporated options for the employment of nuclear weapons.121 Kissinger describes the study produced as "cold-bloodedly analyzing our potential for either preventing a war or influencing its outcome."122 Put otherwise, the 119

Ibid., pp. 182^83. Ibid, pp. 182^83 and 693. Ibid., p. 693; and Morris, Uncertain Greatness, p. 97. 122 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 693. 120 121

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study developed a range of options, including nuclear employment, that could be applied for deterrence or coercive purposes. The "China Options" paper developed in early 1970 served as the foundation of administration planning until 1972. Throughout the intervening period the prospect of a Sino-Soviet conflict was of abiding concern to Kissinger. Fueling his apprehensions was the quick progress the Soviet Union made in building up its military capabilities along the Sino-Soviet frontier.123 Subsequent to the spring clashes, the Soviet Union had quickly augmented its military presence along its border east of Lake Baikal, supplementing the fifteen regular divisions already deployed with a further five by the end of 1969. By 1971, the Soviet Union had raised its divisional strength to thirty, deploying several hundred tactical nuclear missiles along the eastern sectors of the Sino-Soviet boundary. Although China's military forces outnumbered those of the Soviets, this edge was heavily outweighed by the superior weapons capabilities and clear-cut nuclear advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union. In a major confrontation, the Soviet Union had to be favored to prevail.124 U.S. intelligence regarding the situation between the USSR and the PRC was soft, so the military strength and disposition of Soviet forces along the frontier made the prospect of a Sino-Soviet conflict in 1971 most worrisome.125 In the wake of the scare of an Asian war which accompanied the India-Pakistan conflict, it appears that Kissinger no longer considered the "China Options" paper workable. The crisis on the Indian subcontinent generated the second instance during the first three years of the administration that Kissinger thought a SinoSoviet war to be more than a hypothetical proposition. Kissinger believed that the United States could not permit the Soviet Union to defeat China in a test of arms, for such would allow the USSR to dominate Asia. Yet should a Soviet-Chinese war materialize, it would do so in a region of the world where U.S. conventional might was powerless to influence the outcome. Kissinger's expression of concern in early 1972 about whether nuclear weapons could be used to back up the PRC was a matter of strategic practicality; with relations between the two Asian powers continuing to be inimical, the prospect 123

Inter view with NSC staff member. Tsien-hua Tsui, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute in the 1970's (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1983), pp. 43-45. 125 Interview with NSC staff member. 124

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of naked Soviet aggression against China undoubtedly appeared far more plausible than did Soviet military action in any other region. THE DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE STUDY In January 1972, Kissinger's anxiety over the long-term implications of SALT and the possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict led him to request that Nixon transform the "Strategic Objectives" study into an official interdepartmental panel to examine limited nuclear options.126 The mandate for this study, which was conducted under the auspices of the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), was to develop more nuclear options so as to increase the president's flexibility to respond to an attack, or the threat of attack, in order to enhance deterrence and to provide the means to minimize the cataclysmic consequences of a nuclear exchange.127 The study was also to consider the effect of a successful Soviet counterforce attack against American land-based ballistic missiles on the capability of the United States to retaliate.128 In his capacity as chairman of the study, Kissinger asked that some very difficult questions be considered: Is there a broader role for nuclear weapons with respect to foreign policy beyond deterring the use of nuclear weapons by an opponent? and, more direct, Is there a way to use nuclear weapons to achieve American political objectives?129 These questions, Kissinger argued, needed to be addressed if the United States was in the future to manage the Soviet threat to its global interests, whether Europe or areas on the margins of this main arena of superpower competition. Kissinger also directed the interagency panel to explore the question of what the United States should do if the Soviet Union and the PRC engaged in a shooting war. The United States had no real viable means to intervene successfully on behalf of China, short of threatening to employ its arsenal of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, he desired to know whether nuclear weapons could be used to back up the PRC and whether the threat of such use would be sufficiently credible to deter the Soviet Union in a conflict situation. Harking back 126 William Beecher, "Major-War Plans/' and Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 376. 127 Beecher, "Major-War Plans/7 128 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 376-77. 129 Interview with NSC staff member.

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to events in 1969, he evinced the specific concern that the Soviet Union might be seriously tempted to execute a preemptive, or even a preventive, attack against the Chinese nuclear capability, and he wanted to know whether limited nuclear options had the potential to deter such actions.130 Thus much as was the case with his more general concern about refashioning U.S. nuclear strategy to fortify extended deterrence and to support U.S. policy in crises, Kissinger sought to determine whether limited nuclear options could be devised which were sufficiently compelling to persuade the Soviet Union to halt hostilities after the onset of conflict, as well as whether they could serve simply to deter Soviet aggression against the PRC. Creating limited nuclear options designed to achieve the desired effect proved to be an extremely formidable proposition. Staff members working on the study found it difficult to determine precisely how and to what end the United States would use a limited nuclear option. Trying to construct applicable limited nuclear options was not possible unless the political context was known.131 Although they could conjecture as to the prevailing context in which the use of nuclear weapons might be considered and the political objectives that the United States might wish to achieve, the uncertainties involved were interminable. Therefore any options devised were likely to be inappropriate with respect to any real-world situation that might develop. Another, equally elusive problem was that no matter how limited, employment of any nuclear weapons could lead to escalation of a conflict.132 Irrespective of the objective sought, the intent would be to influence the thinking and behavior of enemy leadership. Just as uncertainty confounded any attempt to identify the specific objectives that U.S. leaders might seek to achieve in an unknown situation, so, too, the uncertainties regarding the reaction of the opposing leadership to the employment of even a few nuclear weapons were incalculable. Any options developed had to be reasonable if they were to be effective, but the imponderable nature of the problem made such a determination impossible. The awesome and destructive nature of nuclear weapons set them apart from other weapons of war, bringing into question whether they could be used, as Kissinger hoped, in the way that force had traditionally been used to achieve political aims. 130 Interview with 131

NSC staff member. Interview with NSC staff member. 132 Interview with NSC staff member.

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Kissinger again pushed the NSC staff to consider the issue of limited nuclear options seriously and thoroughly, while at the same time probing the bureaucracy, in the hope that an answer might be forthcoming to the problems he anticipated. His hope was in vain, however. Although a number of interdepartmental studies on limited nuclear options were completed, including on various targeting approaches that the United States might pursue in the event of major war in Asia, no substantive headway was made in devising actual workable options.133 Only nominal progress was made toward the development of a new targeting doctrine that addressed the questions posed by Kissinger. The Technical Requirements of Limited Nuclear Options Although the DPRC study failed to devise the sorts of limited nuclear options which Kissinger desired, it did manage to establish the broad weapons capabilities that would be necessary to implement such options. A question that arose during the DPRC deliberations was, What delivery systems would the United States use to implement a limited nuclear attack? The United States would not necessarily want to use strategic nuclear weapons, because it was vulnerable to counterattack. Sea-launched ballistic missiles were especially inappropriate because of the number of warheads each carried. On the other hand, to use tactical nuclear weapons based overseas could be troublesome politically, especially with respect to those located in Western Europe, for it was believed the NATO allies would never agree to such use except in the case of a direct Soviet attack against the alliance. Although unable to determine which weapons systems should or could be used,134 the DPRC in its deliberations did precipitate a prevailing judgment that any new strategy incorporating more alternative responses would demand qualitative improvements in U.S. force capabilities. One requirement was for a more sophisticated command and control system to manage the multiplicity of options to be added to targeting plans. Another was to improve weapons capabilities, primarily the hard target kill capability of U.S. strategic systems.135 133

The OSA prepared a number of papers for the "Strategic Objectives" interdepartmental study. Interview with official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 134 Inter view with NSC staff member. 135 Beecher, "Major-War Plans."

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Two concerns lay behind the perceived need for improving the counter force capability of the U.S. force posture. An important consideration was that the United States would need to have a flexible capability to strike the complete spectrum of possible targets successfully. The targets to be destroyed would depend in large part on the prevailing political situation and the objectives to be achieved. Not knowing the political situation, the objectives to be achieved, or the signal to be sent, the United States needed to have great flexibility in its targeting capacity, which depended on it having a sure capability to strike very hard targets, as well as other targets of interest. Some measure of enhanced accuracy was necessary to implement successfully a flexible strategy based on limited nuclear options.136 Improving the capacity of U.S. strategic forces to execute counterforce attacks had further strategic value. Enhanced weapons accuracy would permit the United States to respond in kind to a Soviet attack against American land-based ballistic missiles and strategic bomber bases, while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum.137 Having a residual hard-target kill capability would provide the United States with options other than to yield or to strike Soviet cities.138 Refining the accuracies of U.S. strategic systems, moreover, would add another dimension to the extended deterrent. A discernible counterforce capability could serve to temper any Soviet inclination to take greater politico-military risks in peripheral areas which might stem from the numerical advantage in land-based missiles.139 Kissinger in particular appears to have believed that developing a hardtarget kill capability would let the United States sustain a credible threat to attack the Soviet land-based strategic deterrent. This threat would confront the Soviet Union with the prospect of a possible counterforce strike against the bulk of its warheads and total throw weight in response to any aggression, whether against Europe or any other region where the United States perceived it had strategic interests. Faced with such a capability, the Soviet leadership would have to consider an attack against not only the target state but also the U.S. land-based forces lest they lose a substantial proportion of their re136

Interview with NSC staff member. Michael Getler, "A New Tack for the Arms Race?" Washington Post, 13 August 1972; and William Beecher, "The Shift in Strategic War Plans/' Army (November 1972):!!. 138 Ibid. 139 Beecher, "Shift in Strategic War Plans/' p. 11; and interview with NSC staff member. 137

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taliatory capability in an American riposte. The probable cost of initiating an attack against the United States to ensure the success of some marginal gain on the strategic periphery would be prohibitive, making it doubtful that the Soviet leadership would be willing to embark on such a course.140 Therefore, the acquisition of a counterforce capability that could credibly threaten Soviet land-based strategic nuclear systems would engender a degree of uncertainty in Soviet risk calculations, giving pause to a Soviet leadership that might contemplate undertaking ventures adverse to U.S. interests. A convincing first-strike counterforce capability against Soviet land-based strategic nuclear systems potentially created the global deterrent, in both a passive and an active function, sought by Kissinger. Political and diplomatic reasons also played a role in the decision to develop enhanced accuracies. Some officials felt that the United States needed to push ahead with at least qualitative improvements to its strategic forces to prove to the various allied governments that it would not concede any strategic advantage to the Soviet Union. Any perception by the European allies that the U.S. had acquiesced to Soviet superiority could undermine NATO cohesion, while other American allies, such as Japan, might decide it preferable to pursue an independent nuclear capability rather than continue to depend solely on the American extended deterrent.141 A more roundabout line of thinking held that the development of a hard-target kill capability would give the United States some bargaining leverage in the upcoming SALT II negotiations with which to press the case for reducing the number of ICBMs in order to diminish the threat of attacks against American silo-based ballistic missiles.142 The move to develop counterforce-capable weapons systems, however, was met with some resistance within the government. Opponents expressed concern that a new strategy would lead to increased pressures for more weapons systems and make the use of nuclear weapons more plausible and, thus, likely. In addition, a number of defense planners throughout the administration argued that there was no clear rationale for a strategy of limited counterforce options. They pointed out that American planners could conceive of no circumstance in which the Soviet Union would be willing to risk any140

Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 999. Beecher, "Shift in Strategic War Plans/' p. 12. 142 Beecher, "Major-War Plans/' 141

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thing less than an all-out attack against the United States. Moreover, some officials maintained that open discussion of limited retaliatory options was counterproductive because it tended to undermine the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent.143 Some opponents further argued that the decision to develop a hard-target kill capability would merely stimulate the Soviet Union to acquire a similar capability for its current heavy missiles and for future modernized versions.144 Although the debate centered on the desirability of procuring enhanced accuracy weapons, the more fundamental question was whether the United States should revise its nuclear strategy. The internal opposition was overruled, but more formidable opposition was to be encountered in the Senate, where it was widely believed that the acquisition of a counterforce capability would serve only to spur the arms race. The Senate had been instrumental in restraining previous efforts by the Department of Defense to procure funding for the development of warhead accuracies that would improve the hard-target kill capability of American missiles. In so doing, it had pressured Nixon to state unequivocally that the United States would not endeavor to obtain a disarming first-strike capability.145 In recognition of the broad-based opposition it was likely to face in the Congress, the executive attempted to obtain authorization for the development of an enhanced accuracy reentry vehicle without explanation or debate by including it among several other supplemental weapons funding requests made by the Pentagon within days of the signing of the SALT I agreements.146 Despite this subterfuge, the Senate recognized the request for what it was. After several months of sometimes heated debate in the Senate, the funding request was voted down in August. The basis for the Senate's denial of funding was that a counterforce capability was contrary to Nixon's prior assurance, would undermine any future attempt to restrict counterforce-capable weapons systems, and had no persuasive military requirement.147 143

Getler, "A New Tack for the Arms Race?" Beecher, "Major-War Plans/7 For a full account of the Senate's effort, see Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 67-95. 146 See Beecher, "Shift in Strategic War Plans"; and Getler, "A New Tack for the Arms Race?" 147 Alton Frye's account of the Senate's efforts to veto the initiative attributes the funding request largely to the Pentagon and suggests that Nixon and the White House had overlooked the implications of the weapons system in question because of the 144 145

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The public revelation of the executive's plans came at a most inopportune time, as Nixon was campaigning for reelection largely on the merit of his SALT achievement. Rather than become embroiled in a public dispute with the Senate over the politically controversial issue of developing a hard-target kill capability, a decision was made not to proceed with the review until the election was over.148 Confronted with opposition to the introduction of greater flexibility into U.S. targeting practices, Kissinger's worries about the future security of the United States were sacrificed for Nixon's near-term political health. In the late hours of 24 October 1973, the United States heightened the alert status of its military forces to Defense Condition III. The purpose of this move was to deter what was perceived as an impending move by the Soviet Union to introduce its troops into the Middle East.149 If the Soviet Union had indeed been bent on shuttling troops there, then the threat of war implied by the U.S. action succeeded in forcing the Soviet Union to reassess the risks inherent to its intended operation. Kissinger, however, was convinced that this was the last time the United States would be able to count on its advantage in strategic nuclear forces to dissuade hostile Soviet activity.150 The Soviet Union had just that summer initiated the testing of three new land-based ballistic missiles, each of which had demonstrated a MIRV capability. Whatever remnant strategic advantage the United States derived from its numerical superiority in warheads would be increasingly eroded as the decade wore on. From the outset of his tenure in the Nixon administrations, Kissinger had been concerned about the impact that the loss of U.S. strategic superiority would have on the superpower competition. In an era of mutual vulnerability, the threat of nuclear use, on which the United States had relied for so long to contain the Soviet Union, was losing credibility. Soviet acquisition of a secure counterdeterrent would dissuade the United States from actual nuclear use. Kissinger was convinced that the Soviet Union, understanding the impotence of the U.S. nuclear threat, would be emboldened to challenge U.S. interests overseas. Adding to this concern was his belief that the pressure surrounding the conclusion of SALT I negotiations. See Frye "Of Senators and 'Silo-Killers/" Washington Post, 29 August 1972. 148 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 377. 149 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 587-88. 150 Interview with NSC staff member.

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American pullback from Vietnam would further undermine the credibility of U.S. efforts to protect overseas interests. Primarily endangered were U.S. interests on the periphery of the main superpower contest, where the United States was powerless to act effectively with general-purpose forces and where the value of its interests were not worth the grave risks that attended strategic nuclear use. Kissinger feared that the Soviet Union would seek to gain military and political advantage along the periphery and through a process of incrementalism attempt to shift the balance of power against the United States. The United States, he believed, could not idly stand by while a more aggressive Soviet Union sought to undermine its global position. Confrontations were sure to occur, and the United States needed to have the means at hand to make forceful its crisis diplomacy if it was to fend off the Soviet Union successfully. Recurring Soviet challenges in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia, where U.S. interests were not protected by an in-place capability, either conventional or nuclear, reinforced his belief that the Soviet Union was intent on undermining American peripheral interests. As a consequence, Kissinger was interested in appropriating means to deal with circumstances in which the Soviet Union challenged such vulnerable interests. His first preference appears to have been for the United States to develop the conventional capability necessary to deal with the problems he foresaw, but this option was effectively precluded by the domestic political backlash to the war in Vietnam. Because of domestic pressure to decrease U.S. defense spending, American conventional forces were being reduced. It also seemed unlikely that the American public would tolerate another U.S. military intervention to protect a foreign country. The only remaining alternative if the United States was to manage such situations was to refurbish its capability to effect immediate nuclear deterrence in any region along the strategic perimeter. Although reviving nuclear strategy proved to be of abiding concern for Kissinger, it was far from being a major issue. After his initial effort in 1969, Kissinger's sporadic attempts to get U.S. targeting doctrine revised were motivated by crises that accentuated his disquiet over the future prospects of the United States to manage superpower confrontations on the periphery. Kissinger's search for a viable method to use nuclear weapons was episodic in nature because SALT and Vietnam were the high-priority issues for the administration, commanding the bulk of the time and effort of his staff. But also

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debilitating was that the issues involved in transforming such destructive weapons into practical instruments of diplomatic persuasion proved inordinately complex and largely intractable. Kissinger had proceeded on the assumption that nuclear weapons could be used for political purposes, much as conventional force had traditionally been used. With the benefit of hindsight, Kissinger observed in his memoirs: Henceforth, the major nuclear powers would be able to devastate one another. But they would also have great difficulty in bringing their power to bear on the issues most likely to arise. They might be able to deter direct challenges to their own survival; they could not necessarily use this power to impose their will. The capacity to destroy proved difficult to translate into a plausible threat even against countries with no capacity for retaliation.151

Kissinger's pursuit of a workable strategy for the use of nuclear weapons was not motivated by any particular concern regarding a need to reconstitute the deterrent extended to cover Europe. What Kissinger sought was a strategy that would be universally convincing to the Soviet Union, as well as to states allied with the Soviet Union or those engaging in activities inimical to U.S. interests. Soviet challenges to U.S. interests occurred on the periphery of the main arena of strategic confrontation, not in Europe. Although Europe was still the central focus of superpower competition, the clash there was political in nature. The Soviet Union was seeking to expand its influence in Western Europe through the peaceful diplomacy of detente. Engaging the Soviet Union in detente and arms control was therefore the means of ensuring that Europe did not lean closer to the East. Administration concern regarding the military situation in Western Europe was reserved for the character of flexible response and the condition of NATO's conventional defense. Prospects of confrontation in Europe were remote, whereas on the periphery, it appeared all too imminent to Kissinger. In thinking about nuclear strategy, Kissinger and his staff clearly devoted considerable attention to the question of Europe. But there is no evidence that concern about the quality of the deterrent extended to Europe furnished a particular impulse to innovate nuclear strategy. If Kissinger did have an overriding concern about one spe151

Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 66-67.

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cific theater of possible conflict, it was over the region where the PRC confronted the Soviet Union. On at least two occasions, he appears to have been motivated to stimulate a renovation of U.S. nuclear targeting plans by his conviction that the United States should have the capability to provide strategic cover for the People's Republic of China. In the early 19708, war between the two major communist states seemed quite conceivable, and would have serious consequences for U.S. security. That this should be the strategic region for which Kissinger most sought to develop credible nuclear options, instead of Europe, is therefore not surprising. Kissinger's reservations about current U.S. nuclear strategy arose from the global nature of the superpower competition, leading him to seek through limited nuclear options a strategy that would revitalize the quality of the extended deterrent in regions peripheral to the central arena of confrontation. The problem perceived by Kissinger was the very essence of the dilemma posed by extended deterrence. Mutual deterrence exposed U.S. foreign interests to Soviet military and political predations, but to protect them through nuclear use exposed the U.S. homeland; preferable was the protection of U.S. foreign interests through greater efforts in conventional and regional defense. The United States was constrained from developing such capabilities, however, because of the antimilitary, anti-interventionist attitude engendered by the domestic political backlash to the Vietnam War. Kissinger perceived that the United States had little recourse but to develop some means that would imbue nuclear weapons with at least the appearance of being usable in order to induce the Soviet Union to exercise restraint.

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[4] The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel

Henry Kissinger's periodic attempts to energize the Nixon administration to reform U.S. nuclear strategy indirectly bore fruit in 1972. In July of that year he was informed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that the Department of Defense had recently completed a study of U.S. nuclear targeting policy. This DoD review, conducted without Kissinger's knowledge, had produced a well-thought-out proposal for revising the policy guidance for the targeting of nuclear weapons. The proposed revisions presented to Kissinger were eventually to be transformed, with some modification, into National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242), the official guidance for the strategy promulgated publicly by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1974. The DoD study, officially called the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review (NSTAP Review),1 managed to avoid the bureaucratic pitfalls that had plagued Kissinger's endeavors to effect change. At its inception and through its initial work, the NSTAP Review Panel was solely a creature of the DoD. Only after a draft had been produced were other, outside bureaucratic actors such as Kissinger asked for their input to ensure widespread support. As a result, the policy guidance developed was largely the conception of two bureaucratic actors within the DoD: analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), including military strategic planners situated in relevant offices and agen1 Fred Kaplan referred to the NSTAP Review Panel as the "Foster panel" in his Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

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ties such as the Strategic Air Command and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. THE ORIGINS OF THE NSTAP REVIEW PANEL The Office of Systems Analysis The civilian and uniformed strategic analysts in the Office of Systems Analysis in the Department of Defense had a sustained involvement in reformulating U.S. strategic doctrine. The interest of OSA officials in changing U.S. strategic policy during the Nixon administrations had antecedents in the previous Democratic administrations. In the later years of the Johnson administrations, some effort had been made to break down the massive attacks into smaller, moreappropriate targeting options, but McNamara had been unwilling to expend the political capital needed to force through the required policy changes.2 Several of these analysts, including Ivan Selin, who was acting deputy assistant secretary of systems analysis, stayed on with the OSA despite the change in administrations, which provided a degree of continuity in thinking about strategic nuclear policy.3 This continuity was reflected in the work of OSA analysts in the first year of the Nixon presidency, when they put together the analysis of U.S. strategic requirements for the NSSM-3 study of the U.S. military posture and balance of power and developed some limited nuclear options in response to the NSSM-3 follow-on study initiated by Kissinger.4 Subsequent to Nixon's publicly questioning in 1970 the desirability of relying on assured destruction, two OSA analysts, on their own initiative, took up the issue. One was Commander James Martin, USN. Martin had become convinced by his work on the nuclear targeting portion of the NSSM-3 study that the principles of the 1962 "no cities" strategy and the notion of limited nuclear options provided an appropriate approach to U.S. nuclear deterrence.5 The other analyst 2

See Chapter 3, the section titled "National Security Study Memorandum 3," and interviews with Johnson administration NSC staff members. 3 Laurence E. Lynn Jr., "Arm Waving at the Arms Race: A Review: The Price of Defense, by the Boston Study Group/' International Security 4 (Summer 1979): 117. 4 See Chapter 3, the section titled "National Security Study Memorandum 3 and The Pentagon Response/' 5 Martin had been one of the officials who had incorporated the theme of limited nuclear options into the summary papers of the NSSM-3 study. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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was Archie Wood, a retired Air Force officer who had only just recently joined the OSA. From 1965 to 1968 Wood had been attached to the OSA and had been one of those convinced that the large options available in the SIOP needed to be broken down.6 Both men shared the opinion that the SIOP, having only a few large-scale options, lacked real flexibility. They agreed with the president's assessment that should deterrence fail, to acquiesce to the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union would be politically unpalatable, while the execution of any of the massive options available would be disastrous for the United States now that its nuclear-armed adversary had acquired a secure strategic deterrent force. Some middle way needed to be devised to ensure that if deterrence ever failed the United States would not slide into nuclear holocaust. Martin and Wood believed it extremely important that U.S. nuclear strategy be revised to make it more responsive. That the task would be an interesting intellectual challenge was an added attraction.7 So they chose to interpret Nixon's rhetorical statement as a de facto mandate for the reexamination of U.S. targeting practices. Martin and Wood presented the rationale for exploring possible alternatives to the current SIOP to the new head of the OSA, Dr. Gardner Tucker,8 who, despite being unschooled in the concepts of nuclear strategy, was convinced by their argument and agreed that the issue should be examined. Over the next year and a half, Martin, Wood, and Tucker conducted an unofficial investigation into various approaches to revising U.S. targeting practices.9 Although the three analysts recognized the need for more limited options, more problematic was what form a revamped strategy should take and what it should achieve. During this period, two outside sources provided them with ideas to mull over. One source was Albert Wohlstetter. In the course of occasional informal discussions with Martin, Wohlstetter stressed that the United States should have recourse to a broad spectrum of options short of city strikes, which should be reserved as the ultimate deterrent sanction.10 The other 6

Inter view with participant in NSTAP Review. See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 367; and interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 8 Ivan Selin's appointment as acting head of the OSA was a temporary measure, as many incoming officials thought his views incompatible with a Nixon administration. He was asked to submit his resignation to be effective in early 1970. 9 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 366-67. 10 Ibid., pp. 367-68. 7

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source of ideas was a RAND study commissioned in late 1968 by a group of Air Force officers disgruntled with the budget restrictions and anticounterforce inclinations of McNamara. They believed that new strategic concepts needed to be expounded to effect a reversal in the service's fortunes.11 Martin, Wood, and Tucker carefully scrutinized the ideas set forth in the RAND memorandum regarding this study, known as "Nuclear Options" (NU OPTS). The principles described appeared to provide a potential solution to the problem of how the United States might conduct a nuclear war with the lowest possible level of damage.12 By the end of 1971, however, the OSA analysts concluded that it was necessary to conduct a far more reaching review of U.S. nuclear strategy than was feasible with their extracurricular study. Precipitating this decision was a briefing by SAC on nuclear targeting, which some of these OSA officials attended. During the first Nixon administration, all planning activities in the DoD were directed in accordance with a document known as the "Strategic Guidance/' issued annually by the secretary of defense. Production of this guidance occurred through a process of participatory decision making, involving the JCS, the services and agencies, and all the various staffs of the OSD, with final authority over outstanding issues falling to the secretary. As part of the process, the "Strategic Guidance" was forwarded to Henry Kissinger for review and concurrence and subsequently to the president for approval. By the second year of the administration, Laird had firmly established the "Strategic Guidance" as the basis by which he judged DoD policy and budgetary decisions. An element of strategic sufficiency, which had been publicly promulgated as official strategic policy in early 1971, was that the United States needed to have alternative targeting responses to those provided under assured destruction.13 The content of the SAC briefing suggested that U.S. targeting guidance had not been recently revised in any substantial manner. The implication was that U.S. targeting "James Schlesinger, then director of RAND's strategic studies division, responded with a memorandum outlining a strategy predicated on the intrawar bargaining concepts developed by Thomas Schelling. A follow-up study conducted jointly by RAND staff members and Air Force personnel examined what objectives such a strategy should have and how it could be operationalized. After months of analysis the project foundered due to unresolved conceptual and operational problems and was shelved in early 1970. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 357-60. 12 Ibid., p. 368. 13 See Chapter 2, the section titled "Strategic Sufficiency/'

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practices did not conform with the current strategic thinking inherent in the "Strategic Guidance."14 The apparent disjunction between strategic policy, including global policy, and targeting policy elicited the uneasy feeling that the military was not providing targeting guidance responsive to policy set by its civilian leaders.15 Concerned by the implications of this, OSA officials wanted to be sure that the military was responsible to civilian political control,16 which the three analysts felt could be accomplished by a comprehensive review of U.S. strategy and targeting practices. Strategic sufficiency had been developed as a policy response to the loss of U.S. strategic superiority. The advent of relative parity had brought about a situation of mutual vulnerability. This situation made questionable whether it was wise for the United States to continue to rely on the threat of large-scale attacks if to execute such a retaliatory measure in response to aggression was likely to invite a massive Soviet nuclear reply that the United States could not prevent. Under such circumstances, enemies skeptical of U.S. resolve might be willing to test its willingness to jeopardize its own security, indeed survival, to safeguard its far-flung interests. Should the U.S. deterrent threat be drastically challenged, the U.S. leadership might unintentionally stumble into massive nuclear use for want of better alternatives.17 The enormity of the consequences should this happen convinced the OSA officials that the administration, being vested with the responsibility to ensure the security and welfare of the country, was obligated to explore what the United States could do to manage a breakdown of deterrence. The impending treaty limiting ABM systems provided a further impetus for Martin, Wood, and Tucker to push for a more expansive review of U.S. targeting. A key rationale behind the development and deployment of MIRVs by the United States had been to furnish a capability to penetrate what had earlier been estimated to be an extensive Soviet ABM system. By late 1971 it was obvious that a SALT agreement would strictly constrain Soviet ABM levels, to the point where the United States would have no need to target warheads redundantly to overcome anticipated losses to Soviet strategic de14

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 16 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 17 Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 121, Winter 1975/76), p. 4. 15

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Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. See, for example, Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), p. 233; and Seymour Hersh, Kissinger: The Price of Power: Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House (London: Faber and Faber, 1983). Also, interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 19

20

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suicidal response or to capitulation. By resolving the strategic dilemma voiced by Nixon in his foreign policy reports, the DoD would steal a march on Kissinger and assert the independence of the department in the face of Kissinger's efforts to impose his will on the military bureaucracy. Laird understood that even a DoD-sponsored undertaking to alter U.S. targeting would run up against the same bureaucratic impediments that were stymieing Kissinger's various attempts. There was absolutely no question of a targeting study moving forward successfully under the auspices of the OSA. Endemic distrust and animosity within the uniformed military establishment toward that office and its civilian analysts made it improbable that an OSA-directed study would receive the cooperation of the JCS. Although he possessed the political authority to do so, an attempt by Laird to impose internal discipline to force compliance would serve only to antagonize the JCS needlessly. Laird was very sensitive to the gulf that had opened up between the JCS and the OSD during McNamara's tenure as secretary of defense.21 Since assuming office he had strived to heal the breach through "participatory decision making,"22 and did not want to jeopardize the climate of improving relations between the OSD and the JCS. Instituting a review of U.S. nuclear targeting would involve some delicate internal political maneuvering. If the review was to be successful, it would have to be headed by a DoD official acceptable to the military. Laird asked Dr. John S. Foster, director of Defense Research and Engineering (DR&E), to take up the work. Among the civilian officials in the DoD, Foster was widely seen as being the most sympathetic to the concerns of the uniformed military. DR&E was closely tied to intelligence and tended to take a more worrisome view of the threat posed by the Soviet Union than did many other agencies and departments in the OSD. Foster in particular was a keen advocate for developing a range of new weapons systems he believed necessary to offset potential future Soviet threats. His reputation would render unlikely a military perception of him as a civilian official who wanted to push for cuts in military spending.23 Foster's appointment was designed to reassure the JCS that the effort 21

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. See Lawrence J. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 19705 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 85-92. 23 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 22

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to alter nuclear strategy was not a ploy to curtail the development and procurement of strategic weapons as had been the case when McNamara had set forth the doctrine of assured destruction. But even with Foster in charge, the upper echelons of the military would need to lend their support to obtain the active cooperation of the military. The idea of initiating a review of U.S. strategic doctrine and targeting practices was thus initially broached with Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the JCS, in an effort to secure his backing. Moorer, like many of his uniformed colleagues, had many doubts about the practicality of implementing a strategy of limited nuclear options.24 Nevertheless, Moorer proved willing to give the review his full endorsement.25 His active patronage provided JCS authority for the initiative, effectively opening doors previously closed to the OSA analysts. Another major consideration deserving careful thought was the composition of the panel established to review U.S. targeting practices. A panel of midlevel officials was seen as optimal, for they would be able to devote the time necessary to craft a fully developed product that could be submitted for cabinet approval.26 Staffing the review with midlevel people had the added advantage of giving the study a low profile. The relative obscurity of the targeting review would diminish the prospect that it would attract unwanted attention from elsewhere in the government. Therefore the panel convened to conduct the review included the heads (or their representatives) of each of the relevant agencies within the OSD as well as a representative of the JCS. Each member of the review panel appointed representatives to a working group, whose charge was to conduct the studies required for the review in conjunction with the military.27 Foster was concerned that his being a civilian and effectively illiterate regarding the minutiae of nuclear targeting would not endear him to the military. So he asked Air Force General Jasper Welch, his deputy for strategic systems and a former weapons designer from Livermore National Labo24 Moorer was not the only military official to harbor such doubts. For an examination of the US. military's concerns about any review of U.S. targeting strategy and about limited nuclear options, see the next section. ^Interviews with uniformed JCS staff member and with participant in NSTAP Review. 26 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 27 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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ratory, to direct the working group.28 Having an active military officer such as Welch in charge of the working group would facilitate smoother relations between the panel and the military.29 Serving as the primary interlocutor, Welch would reassure the military that the largely civilian panel would not ask them "to do things they couldn't do/'30 Welch's appointment was calculated to ease the working group's ability to gain access to the information and resources that could be furnished only by the military. Active cooperation of the JCS representative to the group further facilitated its efforts. General Ted Seith, director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), and subsequently his successor, General John Voight, proved to be sympathetic to the idea of introducing more flexibility into U.S. war plans.31 Their supportive efforts expedited access to information that had hitherto been denied. Members of the working group, key among whom were Welch and Martin, would conduct most of the actual work on revising U.S. targeting. As a consequence, they were well positioned to have a significant impact on the thinking of the panel and thereby on the substance of the new targeting guidance. Other departments and agencies within the government would also have a keen interest in any revision of U.S. nuclear strategy. The review panel members understood that they would eventually need to consult these bureaucratic actors in order to realize a new strategy as official policy. But some of the agencies to be consulted were seen as being likely to disagree with a shift in U.S. nuclear strategy. To avoid such potential bureaucratic obstacles, the review would have to proceed in a manner that ensured that no one could take exceptions to the strategy eventually derived and so block its official acceptance. The process ultimately had to be an interactive one, with the panel bringing in selected officials from other departments and agencies so as to fully consider their views and address their concerns.32 Simply put, the panel would have to cultivate a bureaucratic environment favorable to limited nuclear options to assure that the targeting guidance developed by the DoD became official policy. ^Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic, 1989), p. 108. ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. ^Jasper Welch, cited in Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal p- 104. 31 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 32 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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Kissinger and his distinctly liberal NSC staff were one such bureaucratic hurdle.33 Kissinger had thought long on this subject and was attempting to stimulate new thinking within the bureaucracy on nuclear strategy. Most assuredly he would want his views to be taken into consideration and incorporated into the final product.34 Moreover, Kissinger's close relationship with Nixon meant that he would have to be consulted at some stage of the exercise, for any change in nuclear strategy required the president's authorization. Kissinger's support for a revised targeting guidance would therefore be crucial. Members of the OSA, having put together a number of studies in response to Kissinger's sporadic prodding on the issue, were generally aware of what he was attempting to accomplish and felt that, within limits, they could address Kissinger's concerns. So they were not overly concerned that Kissinger might block the product generated by the review. But to include Kissinger directly in the review was not seen as a politically wise move. On the one hand, his direct participation would not be welcomed by the uniformed military, while on the other, Laird was personally concerned that Kissinger, with the help of his powerful backer, might seize control of the study to serve his own ends if presented with only a concept.35 And should Kissinger gain control of the formulation of a new strategy, the issue would take on a high profile and become highly politicized, which would virtually ensure that the review process would come to a bureaucratic standstill. As a consequence, it was decided that Kissinger (and the NSC staff) should be excluded from the review until he could be presented with concrete policy guidance for the revision of U.S. targeting practices. Officials from relevant agencies within the State Department constituted another critical bureaucratic constituency that would penultimately have to be brought into the process. Doing so would require some care, however, for it was understood that the JCS would look very unfavorably on any participation by officials from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) or other agencies in the de33 For one NSC staff member's subsequent critical view of the strategic policy developed by the OSA, see Barry Carter, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons/7 Scientific American 230 (May 1974): 20-31. 34 Inter view with OSD official. 35 See discussion by Seymour Weiss and Philip Odeen, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options: Session II (NHP Oral History Transcript No. 4: Nuclear History Program, University of Maryland, 1994) p. 11; and interview with OSD official.

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partment.36 Moreover, proponents of arms control in the State Department, having already acted to derail temporarily Kissinger's effort to modify U.S. targeting strategy in the spring of 1970,37 could be expected to resist a DoD-supported endeavor to shift U.S. nuclear strategy substantively away from assured destruction.38 Thus to include State officials in the review from the outset was to invite the political stonewalling of the whole issue of reformulating nuclear strategy. Considering the possible political obstacles, the OSD had to maneuver very carefully through the bureaucratic maze if the review was to be successful. To manage this, the OSD decided to reveal the existence of the targeting review only when it had substantive proposals to change U.S. targeting guidance. A working rule to which the panel rigorously adhered, therefore, was that the study had to be kept a closely held secret within the DoD, restricted only to those with a need to know.39 Confining the review to the DoD would help prevent premature leaks or its being perceived as impinging adversely on SALT. This rule would hopefully preclude political meddling by the executive branch which would kill the initiative or unwanted interference from the ACDA and other agencies in the Department of State "on political and diplomatic grounds/'40 Only when a guidance document had been produced that was acceptable to all involved military and civilian agencies in the DoD would outsiders be consulted. Building a bureaucratic consensus in support of the strategy had to be a prime objective for the panel members if they were to succeed in changing U.S. strategic targeting policy. Laird's direct involvement with the panel was brief, focusing mainly on the basic questions of organizing the panel and getting it started. Although he had a certain interest in seeing the panel succeed, as secretary of defense he had wide-ranging responsibilities, including Vietnam and SALT, with which to deal on a day-to-day basis. Captain Beau Collins, USN, the military assistant to the special assistant to 36

Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 4. See Chapter 3, the section titled "Should a President . . . ?". According to Seymour Weiss, the concern was that "all those people in State would act against [the revision of U.S. nuclear strategy], actively lobby against it out of a concern that our NATO allies wouldn't like it and I think Defense was basically right to be concerned." See Weiss in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, pp. 11-12. 39 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. ^Anthony H. Cordesman, Deterrence in the igSos: Part i, American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 175, 1982) p. 14. 37

38

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the secretary of defense, was designated to act as the liaison between the panel and the secretary of defense. Working with panel members, Collins wrote the authorizing memo that set forth the objectives Laird wanted the study group to achieve.41 The official task of the panel was straightforward: to develop new targeting guidance that introduced more flexibility and a greater number of limited options into the war plans.42 This exceptionally broad mandate allowed the participating officials, some of whom had thought about this topic before, the freedom to define the objectives and to formulate the appropriate targeting guidance without interference from higher-level officials. Called the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel (NSTAP Review Panel), the group derived its name from the document which provided instructions from the secretary of defense to the JCS regarding nuclear strategy and which served as guidance to the JSTPS for the targeting of nuclear weapons. The official objective of the panel was to sort out the missions of the U.S. nuclear force structure. But a second, informal goal was to nurture a bureaucratic consensus in order to manage the potential political obstacles to the implementation of the revised strategy.43 Much of this latter objective had been achieved in forming the panel, but it required continuing attention.44 The Joint Chiefs of Staff The uniformed military were the bureaucratic keystone in the innovation process. No revision of U.S. targeting strategy was likely to be successful unless the constituency that had direct control over the operational end of targeting at least acceded to the changes desired. Although it would be grossly unfair to characterize all military personnel in the same way, a pervasive antipathy existed within the military establishment to civilian efforts to develop more limited options. Late in 1968 and possibly into 1969, the Pentagon was examining methods to improve the ability of the United States to execute less than all-out nuclear strikes. Under investigation was "providing pre41

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 44 The efforts of the NSTAP Review to forge a consensus of support for the policy guidance they developed is discussed in the following chapter. 42

43

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planned options for the National Command Authority (NCA) for additional selected responses against military and industrial targets (for example, strategic strikes for support of NATO)."45 Indeed, some recognized that the old guidance promulgated by McNamara allowed for more alternative targeting options than were present in the SIOP. By 1972 the JSTPS had reached a stage where it was starting to make some changes to the SIOP consistent with the McNamara-era guidance.46 Yet the JCS resisted Nixon's June 1969 request that the military develop more-limited nuclear options. Uniformed strategic planners resented what they perceived as civilian intrusion into a purely military domain.47 In the United States the history of civilian control over nuclear weapons has been one of a continuous battle between the civilian leadership and the military over the degree to which civilians exercise control over nuclear operations. The military prefers to be delegated the freedom to determine nuclear operations, a preference motivated in part by a bureaucratic desire to preserve its autonomy in this area for which it has special expertise. The military's preference for delegative control also reflects a real concern that if involved in the details of nuclear planning, civilian leadership might behave in a reckless manner in a crisis or, being ignorant of the complexities of nuclear operations, might intervene in nuclear operations during a crisis, with debilitating and potentially disastrous consequences.48 In the early 19705 the military was especially sensitive to the intrusion of the civilian leadership into nuclear operations. During the 19605, civilian analysts backed by McNamara had successfully intervened in the military's strategic planning and force acquisition process, determining U.S. nuclear strategy for deterrence and imposing limits on the levels of U.S. strategic weapons systems which were far below those desired by the military.49 Nixon's request of 1969, issued at the behest of Kissinger, was 45 DoD, Draft Memorandum for the President, 9 January 1969, on strategic offensive and defensive forces, p. 12. (FOIA). ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 47 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph), p. 217. 48 For a thorough examination of this view, see Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992). 49 For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

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perceived as yet another attempt by civilian analysts to dictate policy that had traditionally been the prerogative of the military. Given past experience, the military saw a new formulation of strategic policy as a potentially effective brake on its plans to develop new weapons systems in future years.50 Rather than submit to the executive on this matter, which might well open the door for ever greater civilian intrusions into military planning, the uniformed military stalled in fulfilling orders, even if backed by the authority and prestige of the president. Strategic considerations underpinned the reluctance of the military to move forward with developing limited options. Many military strategic planners felt that civilians tended to confuse the objective of a strategy with the strategy itself, that is, approaching deterrence as being a strategy rather than being the objective to be achieved by strategy.51 Deterrence was psychological, its effectiveness dependent on the uncertainty engendered in the minds of the enemy regarding how the United States would respond to aggression. And this doubt required the United States to have the certain capability to carry out the deterrent threat.52 Threatening massive counter force retaliatory attacks, with the aim of ensuring that the United States finished the conflict with the relative advantage,53 was perceived by the military as creating the greatest degree of uncertainty in the minds of an opponent. The military believed such massive attacks to be the most credible threat that the United States could confidently pose and therefore the best approach to deterring Soviet aggression. Military strategic planners had distinct concerns about the potential repercussions of incorporating limited nuclear options into the SIOP. To execute one or more of them could leave the United States incapable of implementing the major attack options that formed the foundation of U.S. deterrence.54 To build the large-scale attacks in the SIOP, planners delineate each target to be destroyed and the amount of damage to be inflicted on that target, allocate the best weapon available to attack the target, and establish the timing with relation to the overall attack in which that particular target is to be destroyed. A crucial aspect of target planning is to integrate attacks against each 50

Kissinger, White House Years, p. 217. Interviews with uniformed JCS staff members. 52 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. 53 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. 54 Interviews with NSC staff members. 51

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individual target grouped in an option, such that the individual or coordinated series of attacks do not conflict with one another.55 Military strategic planners feared that the execution of only a selected portion of the target structure would severely disrupt the carefully orchestrated attack planning. The subsequent implementation of one of the large attack options would probably result in a very ragged attack, the timing thrown off, redundantly targeted systems conflicting, targets left intact because their assigned weapons had been used previously, weapons left unfired, and weapons uselessly fired at assigned targets that had already been destroyed. The implementation would be so chaotic that the attack would probably not achieve the damage levels or the effect established by targeting guidance. Military officials were also quite dubious about the premises that underlay the notion of limited nuclear options. They were not at all convinced that the Soviet Union would react to a small nuclear attack with reciprocal restraint. In their view, nuclear weapons were immensely destructive instruments of war, a fact that no strategy could alter.56 If the United States executed a limited nuclear option, the Soviet response was just as likely to be a full counterforce attack against the U.S. strategic deterrent. Such a Soviet riposte would severely degrade the capability of the United States to respond and, in view of the vulnerable nature of U.S. command and control,57 possibly even leave it unable to respond. These prospects deeply concerned many military strategic planners. They believed that implementation and execution of a strategy of limited nuclear options might leave them in the untenable position of being unable to guarantee to the president that the United States could execute an assured destruction strike.58 From their perspective, limited nuclear options would likely erode the capability of the United States to carry out the major attacks effectively. Deterrence would 55 For discussion of the process of target planning, see Vice Admiral F. H. Michaelis, 'Targets for Today/' Ordnance 55 (1970): 151-54; Captain Mark D. Mariska, "The Single Integrated Operational Plan," Military Review 52 (March 1972): 33-39; and Major General Jerome F. O'Malley, "JSTPS: The Link between Strategy and Execution," Air University Review 28 (1977): 38-46. With specific reference to limited nuclear options, see Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, pp. 14-21. 56 Inter view with uniformed JCS staff member. 57 Inter view with uniformed JCS staff member. For a discussion of the state of U.S. command and control in the early 19705, see Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 127-81. 58 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member.

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thereby be seriously weakened, a professionally and politically unacceptable situation. The military's close adherence to the principle of implementing deterrence through the threat of major attacks was reinforced by the complicated nature of operationalizing limited nuclear options. Military strategic planners generally found the concept of limited nuclear options, as propounded by civilian analysts, to be an abstraction that could not be translated into realistic targeting plans.59 To develop smaller, more-specific targeting options structured to achieve particular objectives proved to be impractical from a technological, tactical, and political point of view. Answers to important queries made by the military—about what targets should be destroyed, which weapon systems should be used, what objective was to be accomplished, the political context in which nuclear weapons are to be used, along with a host of other pertinent questions that needed specific explanation— were never forthcoming from the civilian analysts. The lack of answers precluded development of a clearly defined limited nuclear option. In the view of the military, Kissinger's push for limited options would ultimately be nothing more than a futile exercise that would consume scarce time and resources.60 These various bureaucratic and strategic misgivings led the JCS to balk at the initial efforts by Kissinger61 and, subsequently, officials in the OSA to develop limited nuclear options. Late in 1971, however, the JCS strongly associated itself with the review of U.S. targeting practices being put together under the authorization of Secretary of Defense Laird. Central to this change of heart was a growing perception that the military would be politically ill-advised to continue to stonewall change. The Nixon/Kissinger statements in the 1970 and 1971 presidential foreign policy reports which questioned the appropriateness of assured destruction had given the issue a high public profile.62 Inquiries made by senators visiting the JSTPS facility in Omaha as to whether the military was moving to address the presidential unease about assured destruction reinforced the political importance of the issue.63 With Laird's unequivocal backing of the NSTAP Review Panel, the JCS could no longer afford to ignore the 59

Inter views with uniformed JCS staff members. Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. 61 See Chapter 3, the section titled "The Pentagon Response/' 62 Inter view with uniformed participant in NSTAP Review. 63 Interview with uniformed participant in NSTAP Review. 60

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fact that a significant political constituency supported a renovation of U.S. nuclear strategy. Proponents of change were unlikely to be deflected indefinitely. To avoid any political backlash that might result if the military establishment remained obstinate in its refusal to take the issue seriously, the JCS had to be seen as being actively involved in any real attempt to address the question. The concurrence of the JCS to participate fully in the DoD review was quite calculated. If a reassessment of U.S. strategic doctrine could not be forestalled, the JCS preferred to comply with the one headed by John Foster than to accede to Kissinger, who was not entirely trusted.64 Participation in the DoD-sponsored review would allow the JCS to safeguard what it perceived as the military's interests and to assure that any plans developed would be practical. Another point in favor of cooperating was its composition of midlevel DoD officials, which suggested to senior military officers that revising U.S. strategy was not a priority issue for high-level decision makers in the DoD.65 Conversely, should the JCS actively oppose participation, the bureaucratic infighting sure to result could well raise the importance of the issue sufficiently for the secretary of defense or, worse, the president to take a direct hand in the matter. The political costs for the JCS should this happen would probably be much higher than the issue was worth, given its apparent low priority. Attendant to these considerations was a fairly widespread belief within the military strategic planning community that the problems involved in trying to implement limited nuclear options along the lines desired by Kissinger would prove intractable. Moreover, the military ultimately controlled the process of translating the political guidance into actual targeting plans, which assured that it would be content with the practical outcome. As a consequence, many top-level military officers concluded that the NSTAP panel's review would likely not result in the SIOP being greatly altered.66 Far preferable, therefore, to acquiesce than to waste political capital that could be better spent on more important issues. For many high-level military personnel, the NSTAP Panel Review would be merely an exercise that could be tolerated, for it would at any rate be doomed to fail. 64

On Foster, see Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 368. For a more detailed look at the JCS view of and relationship with Kissinger, see Hersh, Kissinger, pp. 465-79; and Perry, Four Stars, pp. 205-43. 65 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. ^Interview with uniformed JCS staff member.

["3i

The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel Some military officials also appeared to have supported the revision of US. targeting policy in the hope that the change might further the military's own preferences in improving the U.S. strategic force posture.67 Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that "there was a growing perception in the JCS that continued adherence to assured destruction could well lead to politically imposed limitations, and possibly even reductions, in their force improvement programs."68 Some of the strategic programs wanted by the military were proceeding, albeit more slowly than desired because of the vigorous opposition of Congress.69 But Congress had used the logic of assured destruction, or rather that of its corollary, mutual assured destruction, to stifle the development of the U.S. antiballistic missile system and to mount a belated and unsuccessful challenge to the deployment of MIRVs. And since 1969 the Senate had denied annual appropriation requests to develop enhanced accuracy for U.S. ballistic missiles,70 a capability the military saw as useful in strengthening deterrence. Nixon had made clear in his 1971 report that the United States needed not only the plans but also the capabilities to permit greater flexibility and selectivity in responding to aggression with its strategic forces.71 Shifting U.S. strategic nuclear policy away from assured destruction could alter the terms of the domestic strategic debate and thereby provide an opportunity for the military to put forward more67 A small group of Air Force officers had provided the inspiration for the NU-OPTS study which was conducted by Schlesinger at RAND and which Martin, Woods, and Tucker had taken up. The group consisted of General Richard Ellis, director of plans; General Russell Dougherty, assistant director of plans; General Leslie Bray, a member of the war plans office; and General Richard Yudkin, director of Air Force policy. Yudkin in particular felt frustrated by the budget cutting and anticounterforce sentiments of McNamara. To overcome these obstacles, he recognized the need for the Air Force to develop new concepts that would justify both a credible nuclear war-fighting capability and the procurement of more weapons systems and capabilities. This group most sought to delimit an operational doctrine that would serve to justify the new B-i bomber. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 356-58. 68 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 217. 69 Both the B-i strategic bomber and the Trident submarine programs were severely questioned by Congress on both economic and military grounds. See Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 154-56. 70 See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (Exeter, England: PergamonBrassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), p. 158; and Desmond Ball, Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration (Los Angeles: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1975), p. 22. 71 Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970$: Building for Peace, A Report to Congress, 25 February 1971 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), p. 171.

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cogent arguments to justify the development of improved warhead accuracies. Not all military personnel were opposed to the incorporation of more-limited options into the SIOP. In some quarters of the military establishment, an appreciation existed of the macabre logic of mutual thermonuclear annihilation intrinsic to the current U.S. strategy. Some military officials were becoming convinced that should nuclear war break out, it would be in the best interest of the United States to try to terminate the conflict at the lowest levels of damage possible. Among the converts were a number of upper-echelon officers in the JSTPS, where it was believed that the SIOP-Ó3 guidance allowed for greater flexibility in U.S. war plans than was currently available. The time was now ripe to expand the menu of alternative attack plans in order to provide the United States with greater flexibility in responding to nuclear attack. A powerful caveat, however, was that any options added had to be practical,72 and the major attack options, preserved. Although military officials still doubted the applicability of much of the conceptual thinking about limited nuclear options, the strategic thinking of some military planners began to converge with that of the civilian strategic planners. Seeming to underlie the nascent acceptance of limited nuclear options was the deployment of MIRVs. Despite some vocal opposition to the introduction of MIRVed warheads into the United States strategic posture, in 1970 the administration moved ahead to equip U.S. ballistic missiles with the new warhead technology. Putting MIRVs on U.S. land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles would result in a vast expansion of the nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal, creating additional reserves beyond those needed to effect the major-strike options in SIOP-Ó3. This excess would provide the United States with sufficient capability to support the development of more and varied targeting options.73 MIRVs probably eased some of the concern felt by the JCS that a strategy of limited nuclear options would undermine the capacity of the United States to execute large-scale attacks. ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 73 Leon Sloss and More Dean Millot have said that MIRVs were "an important factor that influenced the Nixon Administration's consideration of limited nuclear options/' See Sloss and Millot, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution/' Strategic Review 12 (Winter 1984): 26. In a somewhat similar fashion, Anthony Cordesman has argued that MIRV permitted the development of more limited nuclear options with respect to the options' utility in extending deterrence (Deterrence in the 19808, p. 13).

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Through most of the first three years of the Nixon administration, the JCS were extremely wary of introducing more limited nuclear options in US. war plans. Planners also had specific concerns about the impact of introducing limited nuclear options into the SIOP, believing that they might have a detrimental, rather than positive, effect on the U.S. deterrent. Despite these reservations, the JCS agreed to endorse the NSTAP panel. JCS support, however, was based more on political calculation than on a real conviction that limited nuclear options were essential for deterrence. Faced with growing political pressure for reform, members of the JCS saw little alternative but to be perceived as backing the development of a targeting policy congruent with political-strategic guidance. Military jurisdiction over the translation of policy guidance into operational targeting plans would permit the JCS to mitigate aspects deemed objectionable. From a political perspective, the JCS had much more to lose by continuing to obstruct the renovation of U.S. nuclear strategy than by acquiescing to what increasingly seemed inevitable. THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGETING AND ATTACK POLICY REVIEW PANEL The NSTAP Review Panel formally convened on 27 February 1972. All meetings were closely guarded, being conducted only in the offices of either John Foster, Gardner Tucker, or Jasper Welch, to prevent premature disclosure.74 In almost four months of intensive work, the NSTAP Review Panel developed a draft document that set forth new policy guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons. This initial draft proved to be acceptable to the JCS as a corporate body and to the secretary of defense.75 Although there were some subsequent additions and amendments, the principles elaborated in this policy guidance would emerge largely intact in NSDM-242. Objective of the NSTAP Review Panel The first-order question that governed the panel's planning was what U.S. nuclear forces should be organized to accomplish.76 Nixon's 74 So closely held were the meetings of the review panel that meeting notes were kept in locked safes in only those offices. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 75 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 76 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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foreign policy statements in 1970 and 1971, which expressed the need for the United States to find alternatives to the disturbing choices of either capitulation or holocaust, served as the basis of the review. The top-level direction, provided by Nixon, was that the policy of strategic sufficiency required the United States to have the plans and capabilities to use its nuclear forces in a more flexible and selective manner. To develop such plans was the concern of the NSTAP Review Panel. No one questioned that these desired characteristics depended on the United States being able to execute a wide range of less than allout options, much as had been directed by Laird and implied by Nixon's statements. The guidance provided by Laird, however, did not specify the precise end toward which the strategy developed should be directed, other than that it should serve U.S. security interests. Inherent to Nixon's statements was the question of what could and should the United States do if deterrence ceased to work and conflict erupted.77 The basis of the panel's work was that no one could guarantee that deterrence would not fail. According to Lynn Davis, members of the NSTAP Review Panel "did not assume that deterrence was certain to fail or had suddenly become more precarious, rather they worried about the possibility (however small) that it might; if it did, they feared that political leaders might slide into the massive use of nuclear weapons, since their only plans involved high levels of destruction on military and urban/industrial targets."78 To deal with a breakdown in deterrence, the United States needed more modest, plausible response options as an alternative to the major attacks that currently made up the SIOP. Having such a capability would bolster deterrence, a point well appreciated by the officials involved, but the objective of the panel was not strictly to maximize deterrence. The primary goal of the NSTAP Review Panel's work was to provide rational, pragmatic retaliatory alternatives so the United States would be able to cope more effectively with a possible failure of deterrence and a consequent outbreak of war. Panel members recognized that just having a capacity to retaliate with less than all-out nuclear strikes begged the question of why the United States would respond at all. If the United States were to use ^Richard Nixon, U.S. foreign Policy for the 1970$: A New Polio/ for Peace, A Report to the Congress, 18 February 1970 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970), p. 92. 78 Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 4.

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nuclear weapons in response to the breakdown of deterrence, it would clearly do so only if it had some political objective in mind— why would it risk nuclear Armageddon otherwise?79 But to decide the exact political and military objectives that the United States would seek to achieve through the use of nuclear weapons would be hard to predetermine. Lacking foreknowledge of how and in what circumstances deterrence might fail, the panel could not specify with any degree of assurance the contingencies that the United States should be prepared to meet. Thus the panel needed to develop a spectrum of options which would be pertinent across a range of situations.80 A key question, then, was what sort of options a president might want in the event of war between the United States and the USSR. Much of the panel's time was spent discussing the pros and cons of limited nuclear options.81 From these discussions the panel increasingly felt that if limited nuclear options were to be used, the question of whether and how escalation could be controlled had to be addressed first.82 A compelling a priori condition to any retaliation was whether some assurance could be provided that escalation could be controlled and war terminated before the devastation rose to unacceptable levels. Thus the main objection driving the work of the NSTAP panel was to define a plausible way in which the United States could use nuclear weapons to achieve limited American aims, without propelling the conflict to the level of mutual nuclear destruction, should deterrence ever fail. The result of the panel's work, to be practical, had to offer at least an acceptable likelihood that the United States would be able to contain and terminate nuclear hostilities short of all-out strategic war.83 Fred Charles Ikle has argued that nations often give a great deal of thought to initial military operations before deciding for war, but seldom if ever is much attention directed to how the war is to be ended. In the past a state entering into war could pin its hope on the ambiguous prospect of subduing the enemy by simply overwhelming 79 Paul Bracken, "War Termination/' in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 200; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 80 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 81 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 82 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 83 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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it.84 The NSTAP Review Panel understood that such an approach was neither realistic nor prudent, for both the United States and the USSR possessed secure deterrents capable of destroying the other as a functioning society. Anyone contemplating the use of nuclear weapons had to think through how a war could be terminated. If deterrence failed and war erupted, panel members believed that the one overriding question any president would want answered was, Can we stop it?85 No responsible president was likely to authorize a nuclear response, however limited, unless convinced that the conflict would not ineluctably escalate to general nuclear war. To meet this requirement, a retaliatory strategy had to be devised which would allow the United States to pursue its objectives in the event of war, without sacrificing its own society in the process. No other approach to the prospective employment of nuclear weapons could serve as a rational policy alternative in a strategic environment governed by a situation of mutual assured destruction. The NSTAP Review Panel Extended Deterrence, and Europe Panel members, in common with most strategic planners within the administration, did not believe that deterrence would collapse with an immediate, direct Soviet attack against the United States. Bolt-out-of-the-blue scenarios were seen as no more than useful planning devices, the extreme end of possible contingencies against which to test U.S. capabilities. U.S. strategic nuclear forces were sufficiently robust to make direct attack against the United States unlikely. All the members understood that the Soviet Union would eventually manage to deploy accurate MIRVs on its ballistic missiles, thus jeopardizing the survivability of the U.S. Minuteman force. The issue of Minuteman vulnerability, however, was only briefly discussed by the panel in one meeting.86 Although Minuteman vulnerability was a potentially serious problem, devising a new targeting doctrine was not the appropriate way to address it. The issue, rather, was improve84 Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 2-8. On the need to plan for war termination, see also Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 204-8. 85 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 86 See John Edwards, Superweapon: The Making of MX (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 67.

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ment of the survivability of the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force, and those who were keenly concerned about Minuteman vulnerability had other, more appropriate forums than the NSTAP Review Panel in which to pursue possible solutions, such as hard-point strategic defense.87 Panel members were convinced that any outbreak of war would more likely materialize overseas initially. It was such a possible occurrence, then, that the United States most had to address. As a consequence, the NSTAP Review Panel planned retaliatory responses from the forward defense line of the United States.88 In practice, though not by conscious design,89 the panel therefore dealt largely with contingencies involving the deterrent extended by the United States to protect its various overseas allies and interests. The panel was concerned with the broad question of providing adequate responses to the contingency that deterrence might fail. The aim was to furnish guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons to contain aggression anywhere overseas. The foreign interests of the United States were widespread and varied, so it had to be able to respond to a spectrum of possible situations. U.S. targeting plans now had to be more ecumenical than in the past.90 But the region in which the United States would be most likely to respond to Soviet aggression was Europe.91 Defending NATO Europe was a primary objective of U.S. strategy. In developing and testing the revised targeting guidance, the examples used were mostly European ones. Indeed, so central was NATO in U.S. strategic thinking that the NSTAP Review Panel felt the principal function and test of the guidance being devised was its effectiveness in defending Western Europe.92 But, for the most part, panel members did not consider European concerns about U.S. targeting policy or how the European allies might react to the strategy fashioned.93 Rather than a matter of deliberate neglect, panel members mostly viewed the exercise of reforming U.S. nuclear targeting strategy in a strictly bilateral, superpower context. Attention focused on the Soviet Union partly because of the concen87

Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Inter views with participants in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 90 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 91 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 92 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 93 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 88

89

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The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel tration that U.S. strategic planners gave to the issue of SALT, a bilateral discussion that excluded the allies.94 With the administration deeply occupied with issues such as Vietnam, SALT, and detente, only scant attention was generally paid to NATO affairs.95 Panel members were also not overly conversant with the political and strategic subtleties of the transatlantic security relationship.96 The group understood that the European allies would eventually have to be included in the planning pertinent to Western Europe. Nonetheless, it deliberately chose not to deal with such strategic and political issues, preferring that the European allies be informed by the relevant agencies in the State Department and the DoD after the new guidance was complete.97 The expectation was that the policy guidance could be further modified if subsequent discussions with the NATO allies produced persuasive reasons for doing so.98 Many of the earliest devised targeting options pertained to conflict in Europe. These options were accorded a high-priority status within the array of options that were formulated.99 But though the panel believed that Europe was the region where the United States was most likely to consider using nuclear weapons should deterrence ever fail, it did not approach the exercise from a desire to ensure that the U.S. strategic deterrent was coupled to the security of Europe.100 Panel members were neither seeking to devise a strategy that would make the first use of nuclear weapons plausible nor motivated by any particular concern that the United States needed to reinvigorate the deterrent extended to Europe.101 The NSTAP Review Panel sought to answer the broad question, If deterrence fails, what are our options? A breakdown in deterrence was seen as more likely to happen overseas than through direct attack against the United States. Thus such a possibility was what the panel largely developed the targeting guidance to address. Europe, where U.S. interests were most unequivocally engaged, was the most relevant and the most crucial overseas region where deterrence might ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 95 Cordesman, Deterrence in the 19805, p. 14; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 96 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. ^Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 98 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. "Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 100 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 101 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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fail. It consequently deserved and was given special consideration by the NSTAP Review Panel in reforming U.S. targeting practices. The objective was not to provide a strategy that coupled the security of Europe to the U.S. strategic deterrent but to furnish the U.S. leadership with the flexibility to retaliate with nuclear weapons in a range of unspecified contingencies on a worldwide basis. The driving force for the NSTAP Review Panel was a belief that the United States, to provide against the possibility that deterrence might fail, needed to be able to retaliate against Soviet aggression in a manner designed to contain and stop a central war between the United States and the USSR as rapidly and at as low a level of violence as possible—wherever such a contingency might arise—to mitigate the potential catastrophic consequences sure to follow. Weapons Acquisition The NSTAP Review Panel needed to clarify whether the exercise should seek to delineate the forces required to implement a new doctrine based on limited options or be confined to developing a new strategy to be implemented with the current arsenal. This question was critical, for the possibility that the modified doctrine would be used to justify new weapons systems was politically sensitive. The strategic guidance fashioned would likely generate pressures for the development of weapons with the accuracy-yield ratios to give the United States a hard-target counterforce capability. But panel members believed that such capabilities would be necessary only if the objective of the strategy was to win a superpower conflict. That the intention of the guidance was to stop conflict, not win it, could be used to argue against the acquisition of a hard-target kill capability. What was important was the flexibility and survivability of U.S. forces, not the numbers or accuracy of U.S. warheads.102 To ensure flexibility in the use of its forces, the United States needed improved target programming capabilities to permit the National Command Authorities (NCA) to select alternative targeting options on short notice, as well as enhanced command and control so the NCA could adequately monitor and direct the course of the conflict.103 The OSA officials were concerned that the military would endeavor 102 103

Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 4. Inter views with participants in NSTAP Review.

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to link new weapons requirements to the new doctrine. They worried that should the new targeting strategy be encumbered with demands for more and better weapons, the DoD would lose control over the implementation process. Acquisition of new weapons systems in the prevailing political environment would probably be contentious, and the budget agencies and Congress could be expected to work over the weapons requests.104 If particular weapons requirements were tied to the implementation of the strategy, sharp cutbacks or outright denial in funding requests could well lead to the strategy being perceived as unworkable. Moreover, at attempt to establish weapons requirements would affect the SALT negotiations, giving the State Department, especially the ACDA, grounds to reject the strategy developed. In such circumstances, the revised strategy would become politically untenable. Not every panel participant could be expected to agree that the panel could ultimately separate questions of force sizing from force targeting. Foster and Welch, being situated in the DR&E and therefore advocates of weapons development, were likely candidates to push for linking force improvements to the revised targeting policy But according to Welch: "In order to get the systems analysis crowd [to participate] . . . I had to say we couldn't build forces. I maneuvered it so [they] could see it as a big concession. Johnny [Foster] and I had plenty of other places to work strategic modernization/'105 Welch and Foster, like the others, were sensitive to the fact that the guidance would need to be free of any vestige of bureaucratic selfinterest if it was to survive political scrutiny. They further understood that it would not be advisable to pursue the question of weapons improvements at this time because the OSA analysts might balk if they pressed the issue. As Welch's statement indicated, he and Foster could work systems acquisition through other avenues if they so desired.106 They also fully appreciated that the logic of the guidance, once it was official policy, would probably create a climate that would lead to the procurement of the appropriate force capabilities.107 Aside from the political aspects of the question, panel members also recognized that trying to establish force requirements was a 104

Inter views with participants in NSTAP Review. Cited in Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal p. 105. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 107 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 105 106

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large, extremely difficult problem, one they were not anxious to take on. Laird was working closely with the JCS on this issue, and the panel did not want to intrude.108 The panel preferred to disassociate questions of force procurement from the strategy being developed. Whether additional or improved forces were needed was an issue that could be dealt with at a later date, in another forum. The explicit decision was that the purpose of the review was not to determine weapons or other force requirements. For the immediate purpose of the panel's evaluation, the strict working rule of the panel was that the strategy developed had to be accomplishable with the force structure anticipated as being available in 1974.109 REFASHIONING U.S. NUCLEAR TARGETING POLICY The NSTAP Review Panel convened officially on 27 February 1972. Its purpose was to reform U.S. targeting practices to provide a capability to stop conflict as early and at as low a level as feasible should deterrence fail. During the next four months the panel members met often to explore and debate possible answers to the myriad questions involved. In June they produced a new policy guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons which the JCS and the secretary of defense found acceptable. Bureaucratic Tactfulness Officials of the JCS were duly constituted members of the NSTAP Review Panel, regularly participating in the panel's deliberations but reportedly remaining "aloof" from the discussions.110 Military participants were for the most part unimpressed with the panel's consideration of such notions as demonstration shots, signaling, and intrawar bargaining, believing them to be impractical.111 The JCS representatives were insistent that any new targeting guidance have provisions for the formation of reserve forces.112 Military advocacy of the ability 108

Inter views with participants in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Wizards of Armageddon, p. 368. Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. 112 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

109

110 Kaplan, 111

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to withhold a portion of the strategic posture seems to have been designed to ensure that even should limited nuclear use occur, sufficient relatively survivable forces would remain accessible to fulfill the massive strikes. For the most part, however, military officials participating in the panel's deliberations contributed little with respect to the conceptual foundations of the strategy being devised. The process of innovating U.S. targeting practices did involve considerable interaction with military strategic planners in SAC and the JSTPS.113 The panel itself worked the issues involved on a conceptual level, whereas the military furnished the various detailed planning studies required and generated the targeting options needed to meet the objectives set.114 Operational planning was an area of military expertise, one in which military strategic planners were not about to let civilian planners meddle. As a consequence, close cooperation between the NSTAP Review Panel and the military agencies and commands that dealt with issues related to strategic targeting was a necessary aspect of the review. Coordinating between the military agencies and commands and the NSTAP Review Panel was the working group headed by General Jasper Welch. So central was the work of the military to the success of the review that the panel had to be sensitive to the concerns of the military, which meant that in searching for an appropriate strategy, the panel operated under some constraints.115 A key complaint made by the military about past attempts to modify U.S. strategy was that the options desired by civilian planners could often not be operationalized. Welch, a serving military officer, understood that if the military was to accept the new strategy, the guidance developed by the panel needed to be presented in such a manner "that if it appeared verbatim in Omaha, it would be understandable, actionable, useful/7116 Working on the interface between the panel and the military, Welch frequently discussed nuclear targeting with SAC and JSTPS personnel to determine their views on what could be done.117 Conceptual abstractions that military strategic planners would perceive as impractical had to be avoided. Possible targeting alternatives deemed useful by the NSTAP Review Panel had to be judged executable by military strategic planners. In developing 113

Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal p. 108. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 116 Welch, cited in Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal p. 108. 117 Ibid.; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 114

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the new targeting guidance, therefore, the panel had to consider what options were feasible and, hence, available.118 The military wanted to preserve the major attack options extant in the SIOR Military strategic planners were convinced that deterrence was most strongly founded on the credible capability of the United States to execute these attacks. Limited nuclear options, if not appropriately constructed, could severely undermine this capability. Any limited use of nuclear weapons had to be carried out in a manner that conserved a capacity to effect the major attack options favored by the military.119 Thus the interaction between limited nuclear options and the major attack options required careful management. Because construction of the desired strategy was a complex problem, the initial discussions, according to one participant, were "ethereal," having no real focus or practical basis.120 Something was needed to force the panel to concentrate its deliberations on developing practical targeting guidance. To remedy this state of affairs, several members of the working group undertook a review of the current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP). From the current NSTAP document they developed a guidance document that incorporated many of the ideas under discussion by the panel. Presented to the panel in May as a revision in principle, the document served as a focal point for the NSTAP Review Panel's discussions on the hard questions requiring its attention.121 The working-group members accepted that bureaucratic considerations rendered impolitic a too radical departure from past practices. They therefore based the new document on the guiding principles of the current NSTAP to minimize possible bureaucratic dissent from within the military establishment.122 A degree of continuity in policy guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons would help ensure that the modified guidance was at least partially grounded on practical considerations. Moreover, smaller options would have to be added to the SIOP in a fashion that did not undermine the capability of SAC to fulfill the massive counterforce options. The large-scale, major attack options would therefore remain the predominant feature of U.S. war plans, giving them the patina of being high-priority. 118

Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. with participant in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 122 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

119

120 Interview 121

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The NSTAP Review Panel operated under some constraints in recognition of the need to keep military support. The process of formulating a new nuclear strategy was thus not completely open. These considerations, however, were not so onerous as to restrict severely the types and form of alternative approaches that could be contemplated; rather, they served to establish certain acceptable bounds within which the NSTAP Review Panel had significant latitude of choice.123 War Termination The NSTAP Review Panel was to make the SIOP consistent with notions of halting a conflict. In seeking an answer to how this could be accomplished, the panel covered many of the prominent features of the strategic conceptual terrain, examining such past practices as damage limitation and even a "splendid first strike." The panel saw neither of these as a practical approach to the problem, however. The United States no longer had the capability to remove the capacity of the Soviet Union to strike back with devastating results. Thus these alternatives were judged strategically unsound and fundamentally incompatible with the central thrust of the NSTAP Review Panel's work. Nevertheless, rather than arbitrarily restrict the choices available to the U.S. leadership in a crisis, the panel included both as peripheral elements of the option spectrum.124 The strategy had to provide for the termination of conflict at as low a level of damage as would be consistent with meeting national objectives, which in effect meant having the capability to wage a limited nuclear war. The panel did not view the problem from the perspective that the United States should seek victory as traditionally defined—they understood that war could be ended only through negotiation.125 Strategic theorists such as Kissinger, Robert Osgood, and William Kaufmann, among others, had recognized by the latter half of the 19505 that the United States would have to circumscribe its war aims to limit a war.126 Bernard Brodie made the point most succinctly, 123

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 125 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 126 See William Kaufmann, Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956); Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); and Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). 124

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saying, "Limited war must mean limited objectives."127 The Soviet Union would be likely to concede to the end of hostilities on terms compatible with U.S. aims only if it perceived the concessions to be made as tolerable. If U.S. war aims were thought by the Soviet Union to be unfavorable and therefore unacceptable, it might conclude that it would be preferable to increase the intensity and/or scope of hostilities in the hope of securing more satisfactory terms. Thus U.S. political and military war aims had to be sufficiently moderate to allow for a negotiated settlement. The NSTAP Review Panel, while appreciating this aspect of its work, was not intent on defining U.S. war aims. Not only did it not have a mandate to do so but it also had no real way to determine what the U.S. leadership might want to accomplish should deterrence break down. So the panel confined itself to shaping means appropriate to the ends that the United States might seek to pursue. Whatever the U.S. war aims, a fundamental and overriding requirement for the United States had to be a capacity to end a war begun by someone else, before hostilities reached the level of strategic nuclear exchanges. U.S. strategy therefore had to be designed not to gain a military victory in the customary sense, for this was an improbable outcome, but to facilitate a satisfactory political settlement. One possible approach was for initial retaliation to consist of a demonstration, or warning shot, designed to convey the political determination of the United States to resist Soviet aggression. The intent would be not to affect the tactical situation on the ground but to communicate the imminent risk that the conflict could escalate out of control. Confronted with the manifest resolve of the United States to oppose aggression, to the extent that the United States was willing to risk mutual destruction, the Soviet leadership would be forced to reconsider their estimation of the value of their goal in view of the probable costs. But nuclear demonstration shots were, according to Welch, "explicitly, severely, and categorically thought to be sheer nonsense by everybody involved."128 Demonstrative use seemed as likely as any other form of nuclear use to invite a massive attack in retaliation, the difference being that in the case of demonstrative use, the United States would have employed nuclear weapons totally without 127 Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War/' Reporter, i November 1954, cited in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), p. 103. 128 Jasper Welch, cited in Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 262.

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The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel avail. Moreover, it seemed improbable that the Soviet leadership would decide for war without some expectation that the United States might respond with nuclear weapons. Thus a "warning shot" would be perceived by the Soviet leadership as indicating a lack of U.S. resolve, leading the Soviet Union to press the attack in the belief that the United States lacked the courage to respond again.129 If the risk inherent to any form of nuclear use was more or less equal, the NSTAP Review Panel believed it preferable that any resort to nuclear weapons had to make a difference to the developing situation in a way that furthered U.S. goals.130 Unlike demonstrative use, the purposive use of nuclear weapons was seen as conveying an unequivocal signal of U.S. resolve and intention. The general war aim of the United States, whatever the circumstance, would be to terminate the conflict at the lowest possible level of damage consistent with national objectives.131 To be purposive, therefore, nuclear use had to expedite a negotiated political settlement of the armed dispute. Leon Sloss has argued that "to persuade the enemy to change his mind and to terminate the conflict short of achieving his original objectives . . . he must be forced to reassess either the cost of pursuing the war or the prospects for success."132 The former approach works on the principle of deterrence by punishment, whereas the latter is based on deterrence by denial.133 The NSTAP Review Panel believed that for the use of nuclear weapons to be meaningful in terms of U.S. objectives, they had to be employed in a manner designed to halt a Soviet attack without prompting unrestrained escalation.134 The involved officials calculated that a political settlement would be more likely to come about if the United States could convince the Soviet Union that its expectations of military suc129

See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 219. Also, interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 130 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 131 See James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 4 March 1974, p. 7 (hereafter cited as U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies). 132 Leon Sloss, "Flexible Targeting, Escalation Control, and U.S. Options/7 in Ending a Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Prepared? ed. Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass Jr. (Exeter, England: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 2. 133 For a discussion of the distinction between these two approaches, see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 8-9. 134 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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cess were grossly misplaced, that it could not achieve its objectives through the continued use of military force. Proposed was a hierarchy of controlled strikes to be executed in a systematic, purposive manner until hostilities were ended. If a first limited use did not cause the Soviet Union to stop, then the United States would proceed to the next stage. This cycle would be repeated until the Soviet Union was convinced of the need for a political settlement.135 The targets of these attacks were to be military assets, with each subsequent stage designed to degrade Soviet military effectiveness further.136 Presumably, the cycle of limited volleys could be carried out in a steady, proportional fashion, or the series of strikes could be used to increase the intensity or scope of damage inflicted on Soviet military capabilities.137 Such a targeting scheme served not only to reduce the capability of the Soviet Union to prosecute the war but also to impose increasing costs. The strategy thus incorporated elements of both denial and punishment. Each component effectively reinforced the other, providing the Soviet Union with convincing evidence of U.S. determination and a potent incentive to rethink the practicality as well as the value of persisting with its aggression. The strategy's success required that any use of U.S. nuclear weapons not engender inescapable escalation. U.S. objectives had to be limited, with such strategy communicable to the Soviet Union in an unmistakable manner. Some framework was necessary to provide bounds within which conflict could be fought. Escalation control is a fundamental component of war termination and therefore a central function of the strategy. Before examining the NSTAP Review Panel's approach to escalation control, however, I will first look at how the panel proceeded to fashion limited nuclear options. Fashioning Limited Nuclear Options The approach to terminating a conflict as proposed by the NSTAP Review Panel demanded that the United States be able to employ its 135 A poll of past senior decision makers, both civilian and military, reportedly suggested that the United States should be willing and able to repeat the cycle anywhere from six to twenty times. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 136 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 137 Schlesinger testified that the Soviet Union had to consider that in responding, the United States could well escalate the conflict either in intensity or scope. Although Schlesinger's point was seemingly made with respect to an initial retaliation, by implication it would apply at any stage through the cycle of strikes envisioned. James R.

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nuclear systems in a deliberate and controlled manner in support of a step-by-step targeting process designed to inflict gradations of destruction on enemy military forces. Moreover, the panel had to contemplate and develop guidance capable of dealing with the wide range of contingencies that the United States might face. According to Walter Slocombe, "To give decisionmakers a broad, purpose-oriented choice in a crisis, target planners must develop options ranging in size from all-out strikes by all available forces, to strikes using a few hundred weapons, to highly precise attacks using only a handful of weapons."138 Panel members understood that the development of practicable guidance involved a multitude of intractable uncertainties that made difficult the establishment of a series of preplanned options adequate to meet the various possible situations that the United States might confront. As Slocombe has also pointed out, "Preplanned attacks, by definition, cover targets whose location is well known in advance and cannot be changed."139 Any options developed to cope with specific scenarios or situations, no matter how well thought out, were unlikely to be suited exactly to the context of an actual failure of deterrence. Preplanned operations tailored to specific situations or scenarios would only perpetuate the inflexible nature of current U.S. targeting plans.140 Preplanned target packages did little to introduce real flexibility and selectivity into the SIOP. Panel members believed that it would be preferable to be able to deal with the question of what and what not to target to achieve U.S. objectives in an ad hoc fashion as a crisis developed.141 Such an ability would be necessary to furnish the flexibility required to meet a wide range of indeterminate contingenSchlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on Counter force Attacks, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 11 September 1974, p. 26 (hereafter cited as Briefing on Counterforce Attacks). IBS Walter Slocombe, "Preplanned Operations/' in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, p. 129. Slocombe was a member of Kissinger's NSC staff in 1969 and an assistant secretary of defense in the Carter administration, the thinking of which his work on U.S. nuclear strategy tends to reflect. Nevertheless, the policy guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons developed by the Carter administration—embodied in Presidential Directive 59—was based largely on the principles developed by the NSTAP Review Panel, and much of Slocombe's analysis is highly relevant to its work. Also, interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 139 Slocombe, "Preplanned Operations/' p. 127. 140 Inter view with participant in NSTAP Review. 141 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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cies. But a capability to improvise appropriate retaliatory responses during a crisis could only flow from preplanning. As Schlesinger subsequently testified, "In order to have that kind of capacity [to improvise a response] one has to do the indoctrination and the planning in anticipation of the difficulties involved. It is ill-advised to attempt to do that under the press of circumstances. Rather one should think through the problems in advance and put together relevant, small packages which a President could choose under the circumstances in which they might be required."142 Schlesinger further maintained that to have flexibility in response meant "you have to have a different mental approach. That mental approach is not built into the targeting programs, which are presently the basis of our attack plans."143 Flexibility was as much a way of thinking as it was a matter of planning. The panel hoped that the guidance would force military target planners to develop the appropriate mind-set with which to approach the problem of applying nuclear weapons to achieve U.S. objectives in a more adaptable and open manner.144 In essence, the panel sought as much to develop flexibility in the planning system as it did on actual preplanned retaliatory targeting options. To provide the planning foundations needed to develop flexibility and discrimination in U.S. targeting plans, the panel proceeded on the basis that there were identifiable elements common to various contingencies and scenarios. General principles derived from targeting strategies that applied in a NATO context, for example, could be utilized to develop strategic targeting guidance to deal with a range of other contingencies, such as central nuclear exchanges between the United States and the USSR and other scenarios of prospective nuclear use.145 The panel could use these common characteristics to describe an array of applicable options, with each package being devised on the basis of a particular class of targets or target systems to be destroyed.146 The approach of the NSTAP Review Panel was to delineate a set of general principles, derived from analysis of prospec142 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 9. By "indoctrination," Schlesinger is referring to getting US. target planners to think in a more flexible manner. See also U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. n. 143 Ibid., p. 18. 144 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 145 Bracken, "War Termination," p. 200; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 146 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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tive scenarios, to guide the development of a spectrum of generic actions that would allow the United States to cope with the range of possible contingencies. Preplanning response options, even if based on general principles instead of situation-specific, necessarily restricts target choices to fixed targets.147 Although this somewhat limits the menu of available options, a wide range of possibilities still exist. Fixed targets can be grouped into four principal classes: Soviet nuclear forces; other military targets (including Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces and their command and control systems); political and military leadership; and key economic targets.148 Each of these classes of fixed targets comprises a range of target types,149 which allow for further, more-refined option packages. Which target sets within these various classes would be designated for destruction in response to a breakdown in deterrence would be highly dependent on a host of indeterminate variables, including the circumstance of deterrence failure, Soviet motivations and objectives, type and level of hostilities, and U.S. objectives, among many others. A major factor in the NSTAP Review Panel's effort to develop an extensive mixture of applicable options was the proliferation of warheads resulting from the deployment of the MIRVed Minuteman III and Poseidon ballistic missiles. Adding MIRVs to the U.S. strategic arsenal meant there would soon be a profusion of warheads in excess of those needed to fulfill the major attack options against Soviet strategic forces and key economic facilities.150 A plenitude of warheads permitted the development of more-differentiated options in terms of size, weapons used, and mixture of desired aim points assigned on the basis of target category and effect wanted. Such a wide spectrum of target packages could be produced to permit relatively complex patterns of interacting options to be implemented on the basis of executing one or more options on command, while withholding others, in order to respond appropriately to Soviet acts of aggression. 147

Inter view with participants in NSTAP Review. See US. House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1980, hearings, 96th Cong., ist sess., 1979, 3:878; U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture & H.R. 1872,hearings, 96th Cong., ist sess., 1979, 3:186; and Slocombe, "Preplanned Operations/' p. 127-29. 149 See U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 1981, hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, 5:2,721; and Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 185, Summer 1983), p. 23. 150 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 148

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New opportunities existed in particular to target the vast array of targets classed as "other military targets/'151 The NSTAP Review Panel provided direction for the development of options that for the first time explicitly and extensively targeted Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) conventional forces. Attack packages were constructed to permit the United States to target Soviet conventional forces located anywhere in the world.152 As Slocombe has argued, "The objective of striking at conventional military forces would be to ensure that a limited nuclear exchange would not end in an improved Soviet conventional military balance or battlefield position."153 The high mobility of modern general-purpose forces makes it most difficult through preplanned operations to target actual combat forces during the course of a conflict. But the complex support structure necessary to sustain Soviet fighting units at the forward edge of battle is extremely vulnerable to destruction and disruption.154 Targeting the Soviet conventional structure was consistent with the proposed approach to war termination, for a series of carefully aimed strikes could undermine the Soviet capacity to continue to fight while exacting a high cost on a central instrument of Soviet power. An important guiding parameter of the analysis undertaken was that the strategy should "take into account the change in the international political situation since McNamara created the SIOP."155 Proposed targeting approaches had to take into consideration Nixon's opening to China156 and the recognition that the Soviet Union and its East European allies were not one and the same. A logical extension explored by the NSTAP Review Panel was whether the United States could selectively target ethnic groups and whether to do so would be a useful mission.157 The conclusion was that such an approach had 151 In SIOP-Ó3 most other military targets assigned coverage were generally related to the mission of suppressing Soviet air defense systems in order to facilitate bomber penetration to target. See Ball, Deja Vu, p. 12. 152 See Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, p. no; and Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 261. 153 Slocombe, "Preplanned Operations," p. 128. 154 This structure includes targets such as supply and repair facilities, support bases, airfields, naval bases, communication centers, logistics support installations, repair and maintenance depots, and the home bases of forces not yet deployed. Ibid. 155 Jasper Welch, cited in Herken, Counsels of War, p. 261. 156 For a discussion of the efforts to develop targeting options relevant to the SinoSoviet split, see Chapter 3, "Limited Nuclear Options for China," and Chapter 5, pp. 168-169. 157 Inter view with participant in NSTAP Review.

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some value. Plans were provided for the selective targeting of Soviet conventional (and nuclear) forces located in East European and other countries allied to the Soviet Union. The intent, according to Welch, was "if [the plans] leaked, the East Europeans would have every reason to revolt."158 To place in jeopardy the capability of the Soviet Union to maintain control over its allies was seen as an effective means of dramatically raising the costs it might suffer should it seek to acquire its objectives through the use of force. The NSTAP Review Panel used common characteristics drawn from studies of various scenarios and situations to define organizing principles around which to develop possible targeting options that could be meaningful in a range of situations. From the derived principles, members generated highly variegated options on the basis of classes of target systems. Implementation of the desired strategy was to be guided by fairly elaborate plans based on executing particular strike options when authorized, while withholding others. In effect, the NSTAP Review Panel produced guidance that envisioned an array of target options that were to serve as building blocks from which the U.S. command authorities could fashion a relatively dynamic strategy responsive to the particular contingency they faced. The availability of such a spectrum of highly differentiated options had the obvious drawback of making any implementation of a retaliatory response more complex. But such options also provided greater opportunities for targeting nuclear weapons so as to achieve U.S. objectives. Escalation Control For nuclear use to be rational, the question of whether and how escalation could be controlled required an answer.159 Escalation generally refers to an increase in the intensity or scope of hostilities.160 The theory of escalation control, and hence war termination,161 is based 158

Cited in Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, p. 87. Also, interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 159 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 160 Lawrence Freedman, "On the Tiger's Back: The Development of the Concept of Escalation," in The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 109. 161 In U.S. strategic thought, notions of war termination are based largely on insights drawn from deterrence theory, in general, and escalation theory (escalation control), in specific. In a sense, in discussing war termination strategy before escalation control, I put the cart before the horse.

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on choices and thresholds. Thresholds, essentially stopping places or dividing lines,162 can hypothetically be used to define limits to a conflict. A crucial criterion is that these limits, to be effective, must be both understood and accepted by both sides. But how in the midst of war one conveys one's limited intentions to an adversary with whom one has little or no communications is problematic. The NSTAP Review Panel devoted serious consideration and much discussion to the general notion that one could use nuclear weapons to signal U.S. intentions through the course of a war.163 Thomas Schelling has argued that establishing limits tends to be a form a "tacit bargaining": "Communication is by deed rather than by word."164 That is, one attempts to define limits to the conflict by one's actions, by what one does and does not destroy. Creating barriers to escalation is largely a matter of reestablishing deterrence for particular actions. Bernard Brodie maintained that once war had broken out, "we try to deter [the adversary] from enlarging it, or even from continuing it. Deterrence, at any level, thus naturally means inducing the enemy to confine his military actions to levels far below those delimited by his capabilities."165 Limits in war, then, are thresholds or bounds to acceptable activity which, predicated by a threat of punishment if exceeded, encourage the opponent to act with reciprocal restraint. Careful targeting could theoretically be used to delineate particular actions, or categories of actions, that were and were not acceptable. Discussions regarding the use of nuclear weapons to communicate intent revealed how difficult this would be to put into practice.166 A wide number of questions had to be taken into consideration in determining the signal to be sent: What weapon would be used? From where would it be fired? Where would it impact? What was it to hit, and what was it not to hit? What good would it do? Panel members found the principles involved in trying to develop the precise signal desired to be extremely challenging.167 But if sufficiently 162

Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 135. Herken, Counsels of War, p. 263; and interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 137. 165 Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 88. 166 See, for example, Herken, Counsels of War, p. 263; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 167 See Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 143-44; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 163 164

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mastered, use of the principles might allow the United States to distinguish intrawar barriers, with transgressions to result in punitive reprisals. The NSTAP Review Panel managed to develop a targeting structure based on the idea of withholds. Withholds are targets, or classes of targets, that the United States directly threatens to destroy but are preserved for the purpose of intrawar deterrence and bargaining.168 Crucial to making restraint work in the midst of nuclear war was that the Soviet Union had to be deterred from firing at U.S. urban areas. To accomplish this, the United States would have to refrain from striking Soviet cities while continuing to place them in jeopardy to hold them hostage. Schlesinger, in promulgating the new strategy, pointed out that the United States would hold in reserve a secure "assured destruction" capability to persuade "through intrawar deterrence, any potential foe not to attack cities."169 The Soviet leadership and command and control system would necessarily also have to be preserved from destruction if the United States were to be able to negotiate a political settlement to the war. This withhold category would be covered by a secure reserve force as well, to be destroyed only if and when it became quite apparent that a negotiated end was impossible. In separating out this latter grouping of targets, the NSTAP Review Panel also sought to refine further the notion of preconflict and intrawar deterrence. For the purpose of enhancing deterrence, the panel tried to determine what the Soviet Union valued most, from which emerged a consensus that the United States did not really know the answer to this question. Moreover, the United States did not have a comprehensive understanding of the Soviet decision-making process or the line of authority within the Soviet hierarchy. And even if this could be determined, the panel further realized that the United States had no way of knowing who the leadership would be or what these leaders might value most in ten years time. Yet it was the Soviet leadership and their decision making that the United States most had to affect. The solution was to target the Soviet decision-making apparatus directly, from the political and military leadership down through the KGB to the apparatchiks throughout the Soviet Union. 168

Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 19. See James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975, 4 March 1974, p. 38 (hereafter cited as DoD Report, FY 1975). 169

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The intent, according to Welch, would be to "make sure each of these groups finds itself directly vulnerable down to and including the Oblast Communist Party Headquarters/'170 Singling out and elaborating the range of targets within this category for special targeting consideration would presumably provide the Soviet leadership with the most forceful possible incentive not to start a war or, failing this, not to escalate the conflict to levels unacceptable to the United States. To withhold yet threaten the Soviet cities, along with Soviet leadership and Soviet command and control facilities, provided a primary intrawar deterrent to all-out central war. In essence, this action furnished the uppermost boundary used to delimit the scope and scale of a conflict. Attacks against the other two classes of targets—Soviet strategic forces and other military targets—constitute actions that are less than all-out and, hence, considered limited. For example, a majorattack option in the SIOP aimed against Soviet strategic nuclear forces, though being at the extreme end of the options array, would intellectually still be considered short of all-out war.171 Thus Soviet targets grouped within these two classes were, in effect, "fair game." Nevertheless, to keep conflict at as low a level of violence as possible, restrictions also need to be observed with attacking military targets. One obvious criterion for the choice of Soviet military forces to be destroyed would be proximity to urban areas, for the United States would desire to minimize collateral damage that could precipitously incite the Soviet Union to strike Western urban centers. Another criterion would be not to put the Soviet Union in a "use them or lose them" situation that could impel unwanted escalation. At least during the initial cycle of responses, provision had to be made to avoid highly specialized target sets such as military assets located near urban areas, regional command and control facilities, and strategic forces.172 The NSTAP Review Panel worked on the basis that careful consideration had to be given to the choice of all target sets to ensure that the United States did not unwittingly provoke the Soviet Union to escalate the conflict. 170

Cited in Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, pp. 109-10. Also, interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 171 Perhaps the most common, and probably overused, "limited" attack scenario is that of a Soviet counter force strike against U.S. strategic offensive systems which avoids U.S. urban centers. See, for example, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 4. Also, interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 172 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel The working premise of the NSTAP Review Panel was that the United States had to get and stay on top of the dynamics of the hostilities. Any strategy devised had to establish a framework of intrawar deterrence that would effectively confine the conflict in terms of intensity, area, and time.173 Within these parameters, pertinent Soviet military targets would be attacked to force at least a pause in hostilities, during which negotiations might be carried out.174 The choice of the initial option and the ordering of options to follow would depend on the particular provocation and, more important, on the objective of the retaliation. The Soviet Union and Escalation Control Defining constraints by the way the United States targeted its nuclear weapons during the course of hostilities seemed intellectually sound, but the panel members had no confidence that it would work in practice.175 The success of an effort to manage escalation would be highly dependent on how the Soviet Union would respond to limited U.S. strikes. One question was whether the limits of engagement which the United States would be attempting to signal would be understood by the Soviet leadership. Another was whether and how limited nuclear use fit into Soviet strategic planning. Panel members had grave doubts about whether the United States could convey limits to a conflict in a manner that would be understood by the Soviet Union. A request to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to evaluate the ability of Soviet command and control systems to distinguish the nature and scale of attacks returned the answer that the state of Soviet capabilities was so poor as to make this unlikely. Soviet capabilities lacked the technical sophistication to differentiate between what had and had not been hit, the minimum level of sensitivity needed to be able to delimit the nature and scale of a U.S. attack. The studies suggested it might take the Soviet leadership up to several days to confirm reliably that the United States had 173

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 7. Schlesinger, in his testimony before various congressional committees, almost invariably qualified his discussion of limiting conflict with the caveat that no one could give assurances that escalation control would work. See, for example, DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 38; and Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 27-28 and 37-38. For an interesting expression of the doubts held by members of the NSTAP panel, see Herken, Counsels of War, p. 262. Also, interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 174

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used a low-yield tactical weapon on or near the forward edge of battle. Moreover, a nuclear environment would probably substantially degrade the already meager capability of the Soviet command and control systems. Indeed, there was some doubt about whether Soviet communication systems would even stand up sufficiently well in a nuclear environment to allow the United States to communicate and negotiate with the Soviet leadership during the course of a war.176 Given the capability of the Soviet command and control system, not only was it likely that the Soviet leadership would not understand the U.S. signal but also that the leadership would not adequately discriminate the discrete nature of U.S. limited nuclear options. An abiding question for the NSTAP Review Panel throughout its deliberations was whether the Soviet Union might move toward limited nuclear options. Should it do so, the United States had to be prepared to meet any prospective threats. So a request was forwarded to the CIA for a study on the state of Soviet thinking and activities regarding limited nuclear use.177 The conclusion of the study left unclear whether the Soviet Union might be thinking about limited nuclear strikes with strategic systems, for a high degree of uncertainty existed as to what calculations informed Soviet strategic planning.178 Interest therefore increasingly turned to what the Soviet Union might do based on its evolving capabilities.179 The growth and composition of the Soviet strategic arsenal seemed to provide the Soviet Union with an inherent degree of flexibility that would allow it, should it so desire, to introduce concepts of limited use into its strategy.180 The prospect that the Soviet Union might, in time, incorporate limited strikes into its strategic planning had to be taken into account but, 176

Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Soviet specialists Notra Truelock III and Nathan Leites were both with the CIA at about this time and thus were probably responsible for conducting the study requested by the NSTAP panel. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 178 See U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 10-11 and 36. Subsequent public studies of Soviet military thought found no real evidence of Soviet interest in limited strategic nuclear operations. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Paper 5506, September 1975); Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND R-2O34-DDRE, December 1976); and William Van Cleave, "Soviet Doctrine and Strategy/' in The Future of Soviet Military Power, ed. Lawrence Whetton (New York: Crane Russack, 1976). 179 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 180 See "Secretary Schlesinger's Responses to Additional Questions for the Record/' Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 53. 177

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as Lynn Davis has stated, "American doctrine was not predicated on this/'181 Rather than being a threatening prospect, Soviet strategic thought that encompassed limited nuclear attacks would be necessary for escalation control to succeed. The crucial aspect of the NSTAP Review Panel's inquiry into Soviet strategic thought stemmed from concern about how the Soviet Union would respond to U.S. limited options. Evidence regarding whether the Soviet Union thought nuclear war could be kept limited proved contradictory. On the one hand, although the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces possessed the control necessary to implement a strategy of limited nuclear options, great uncertainty existed about whether these forces were so oriented or whether the Soviet command authorities would even be inclined to execute limited strategic strikes in reciprocation for U.S. restraint.182 On the other hand, an in-house analysis indicated that the Soviet Union was thinking about, and even planning for, the application of limited options with regard to theater nuclear operations.183 The Soviet conception of limited nuclear options, however, was quite different from that of the United States. In Soviet military thought, limited regional nuclear options were much more massive than the ones being contemplated by the NSTAP Review Panel, being in the range of several hundred weapons.184 Thus, the retaliatory use by the United States of a small number of nuclear weapons, even if restricted to the zone of engagement, would probably provoke a fairly massive response. The review of Soviet command and control capabilities and Soviet strategic thinking cast into doubt the viability of managing escalation. No one had any confidence that the United States could exert deliberate control over the intensity and scope of hostilities once nuclear weapons were used. Although it appeared possible that an attempt to impose constraints on an engagement through a sophisticated targeting approach appeared workable in theory, it was too rarified to work in practice. The Soviet Union had neither the technological ca181 Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, pp. 7-8; and interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 182 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 183 See James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in Europe, hearings, 93d Cong., zd sess., March-April 1974, pp. 160 and 183 (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy). 184 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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parity needed to evaluate and direct a limited conflict nor strategic thought that embraced such ideas.185 Nevertheless, as Schlesinger was to argue: "Just because you reach that pessimistic conclusion at the outset does not mean that you must go and bash up the urban industrial base of your opponent, knowing full well that he will do the same thing to you. That is making a certainty of what would otherwise be an uncertainty/'186 If war were to erupt, it was widely felt that the United States had to make at least some effort, however futile it might be in reality, to control escalation and stop hostilities as soon as possible. There was at least some hope that the Soviet leadership might exercise due restraint in preference to the frightful alternative of a massive strategic response.

Regional Nuclear Options Attempting to signal restraint was problematic in that the Soviet leadership would likely not comprehend any subtler bounds to violence which the United States might wish to establish, such that reciprocity would probably not be forthcoming. Grosser distinctions, such as that between striking military targets and hitting cities, lay plausibly within the capability of the Soviet Union to perceive (barring, of course, the massive disruption of its command and control systems). As Schelling has argued, "The [limits to hostilities] have to be simple; they must form a recognizable pattern; they must rely on conspicuous landmarks; and they must take advantage of whatever distinctions are known to appeal to both sides." Limits, he suggested, are saliencies whose quality or prominence is so obvious as to make "them stand out as candidates for simultaneous choice."187 The discrete nature of such saliencies makes them relatively easy for both sides to distinguish. The most noticeable and critical of the various possible demarcations that could be used to impose limits on hostilities is the conventional/nuclear threshold. Because of the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons, this threshold provides the strongest possible 185

Deficient command and control and the Soviet strategic mindset, of course, are not the only problems conceivably attendant to any effort to manage the complex interactions that nuclear operation would entail. See, for example, Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 382. 186 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 183. 187 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 137.

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psychological barrier to escalation. Virtually all the officials working directly with the NSTAP Review Panel appreciated the efficacy of the conventional/nuclear distinction as the most compelling impediment to escalation.188 The seemingly dim prospects of being able to contain escalation once this barrier had been crossed convinced panel members that, where possible, it would be preferable and in the interest of the United States and its allies to establish a conventional deterrent to forestall the hard question of whether to resort to nuclear weapons.189 Underpinning this conviction were the implications of a separate, ongoing interagency study of the capacity of NATO to mount a credible conventional defense of Western Europe. The study, which was being cochaired by Gardner Tucker, indicated that the disparities between NATO and Warsaw Pact general-purpose forces were not so great as generally believed.190 To administration officials, it was clear that NATO, with a relatively modest allocation of additional resources, could posture a strong conventional deterrent force competent to hold off any likely Soviet nonnuclear attack for up to ninety days, possibly even longer. Such a capability was considered more than adequate to persuade the Soviet Union that it could not achieve its goals without great cost, thereby setting up a negotiating pause below the nuclear threshold.191 Although a capable conventional deterrent was practical in Europe—and indeed was the administration's policy—the paucity of general-force capability in most other regions around the Eurasian periphery meant that the United States had to rely on nuclear weapons to deter. Although the panel stressed the utility of a strong conventional defense, its work was not concerned with the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces. Strategic thinking within the admin188

Inter views with participants in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. The study was conducted in the DoD under the direction of Robert F. Froehlike, army secretary, and Dr. Gardner Tucker, assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis. Most of the work was done by army officers, supported by CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) specialists brought in to review the assumptions and the data used to evaluate the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. See Michael Getler, "Pentagon Study Insists NATO Can Defend Itself/' Washington Post, 7 June 1973, reprinted in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 243-47. The authorizing memorandum for the study would appear to be NSSM-121, issued on 13 April 1971, which was generically entitled "NATO/' See John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," Foreign Policy, 5 (Winter 1971/72) p. 27. 191 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 189

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istration tended to focus separately on the roles of nuclear and conventional forces in U.S. strategic policy. This partitioning stemmed from the NSSM-3 study in which the two were split as the administration speeded up the nuclear aspect to facilitate the development of its negotiating position for the upcoming SALT.192 As a result of this emphasis on the nuclear aspect as well as the mandate of the NSTAP Review, the panel in its deliberations did not consider in any way the interaction between U.S. nuclear forces and conventional forces on the battlefield.193 Awareness of the role of conventional forces as an important safeguard to escalation, however, exerted a strong influence on the thinking of the officials.194 The work of the NSTAP Review Panel made manifest that once the conventional/nuclear threshold had been transgressed, few if any effective barriers to escalation existed, shy of the prominent difference between military and urban targets.195 But should escalation in the scale and scope of homeland strategic exchanges occur, even this distinction would become increasingly shaky as a result of growing collateral damage. At some point the amount of secondary damage inflicted on urban centers would reach levels that would make the distinction between military and urban targets moot, and this barrier could be expected to collapse entirely. Schlesinger pointed out essentially this problem with respect to the large counterforce options in SIOP-63, arguing that the prospect of widespread collateral damage from such a strike was what made it, logically, an incredible deterrent threat.196 Whether the United States reached that stage in one major attack or through a series of escalatory steps would make no difference to the outcome. Some intermediate salient between limited nuclear use and city destruction had to be found to serve as a further barrier to escalation. The most obvious and relevant barrier was that between nuclear strikes which hit targets within the territory of the Soviet Union and those which landed on targets outside the confines of Soviet borders.197 This distinction the Soviet Union had made clear from the 192

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 195 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 196 See testimony, US. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1:214. 197 Inter views with participants in NSTAP Review. 193 194

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very outset of the SALT negotiations. The Soviet Union argued that because U.S. Forward Based Systems, specifically air-delivered systems, had a capability to hit targets within the Soviet Union, they should be defined as strategic systems and included in any SALT limitations. Most officials felt that this was in part a transparent ploy by the Soviets to get a hold of U.S. Forward Based Systems located in Europe, Asia, and on aircraft carriers patrolling regional waterways adjacent to the Soviet Union,198 but they also believed it reflected an element of Soviet strategic thinking.199 The position of the Soviet Union was that any nuclear weapons detonated on its territory, no matter what type of weapons systems were used or from where they were launched, would be considered strategic and so elicit a Soviet strategic reply against the territory of the United States. Implicit to this statement of deterrent intent was that nuclear weapons used on targets outside Soviet territory, no matter what type of weapon systems used or from where they were launched, would be considered nonstrategic, to which the Soviet Union would respond in a commensurate manner. The apparent discrimination by the Soviet Union between strategic and regional nuclear use paralleled the differing attitudes toward limited nuclear operations that seemed to exist in Soviet thought about the employment of strategic and theater nuclear forces. Limited regional nuclear options therefore appeared to offer a prospective stage in a conflict which both sides could distinguish and agree on. The panel undertook to evaluate the utility of regional nuclear options and whether such options would enhance or undermine the implementation of U.S. strategy. Limited regional nuclear options that could be executed before or apart from larger exchanges did appear to have some advantages. Particularly persuasive was the possible use of limited regional nuclear operations in instances where conventional defense was unsuccessful and major losses were imminent. Such operations offered a reasonable prospect that the United States might be able to terminate hostilities on relatively favorable terms without extensive escalation.200 Limited nuclear options and regional nuclear options were generally distinguished by their character. Limited nuclear options essen198 See 199 200

Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 174-75. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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tially included strategic strikes against the Soviet homeland, whereas regional nuclear options identified operations confined solely to a non-Soviet theater or region.201 The distinction between the two types of nuclear operations was more blurred with respect to the classes of weapons to be used. Limited nuclear options, being strategic in character, were to be implemented with strategic systems (though some theater nuclear systems in certain circumstances might also be used for attacks on Soviet soil). Regional nuclear options could combine both tactical and strategic systems. As conceived by the NSTAP Review Panel, regional nuclear options worked through the use of tactical nuclear weapons, grading to the use of strategic weapons within the theater of operations, against military targets or militaryapplicable targets.202 The United States would rely primarily on tactical systems where available, to be supplemented and supported by strategic systems if necessary. For example, strategic systems would be used to implement regional nuclear options in areas where tactical systems were lacking or inappropriate to the mission profile. Thus, whether the limited regional nuclear options were executed with tactical/theater forces or with strategic forces would be contingent on logistical factors and circumstances. Confining nuclear use to a region potentially interposed an obvious barrier to unrestrained escalation between conventional conflict and strategic war. Resort to regional nuclear options, however, was not seen as a plausible action unless the United States was prepared to escalate. Limited regional options were perceived as integral to a series of calibrated options that ran the gamut from a few weapons used locally to major attacks against the Soviet Union.203 The intent was not that the United States should confine nuclear hostilities to the region of conflict per se but rather to constrain the conflict at the source of its occurrence—in terms of scope, intensity, and duration— to facilitate the termination of hostilities at the lowest level of damage possible. To do so was as much to the benefit of the region in question as it was to the United States.204 The earlier a nuclear conflict was ended, the less damage all concerned would sustain. Termination of nuclear conflict at the lowest possible level of dam201

Interviews with Interviews with ^Interviews with 204 Interviews with 202

participants in participants in participants in participants in

NSTAP Review. NSTAP Review. NSTAP Review. NSTAP Review.

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age was seen as very germane with respect to Western Europe. The potential deaths that would result there from an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR, even if only through radioactive fallout, would be enormous. And it was improbable that Western Europe would be spared from large-scale Soviet nuclear attacks in the event of all-out war.205 Limited regional nuclear options at least offered the possibility of terminating hostilities on "favorable terms" without the concomitant destruction of much of Europe.206 But limited regional nuclear options offered only a possibility that escalation could be controlled and war terminated. Limited nuclear use in Soviet theater operations was not so similar to what the NSTAP Review Panel envisioned so as to assure the successful containment of and halt to hostilities by the United States. Any use of nuclear weapons would be fraught with unknowns, with any one of a number of unforeseen things occurring to undermine the chances for success. No one could say that recourse to regional nuclear operations would work, only that it seemed to offer the best prospect for stopping nuclear hostilities short of full-scale war. Development of regional nuclear options was not a particular focus of the panel's deliberations during the four-month period that led to the draft targeting guidance finalized early in the summer of 1972. Rather, they were merely one component in the spectrum of options being developed, for use in a potential early phase of conflict in which the Soviet Union remained a sanctuary. Work on the concept of regional nuclear options resulted in part from doubts harbored by panel members that the United States could contain escalatory pressures once nuclear weapons had been used. Should they be used, however, limited regional nuclear operations seemed to offer the best chance to terminate war on favorable terms and at levels of damage consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, a pervasive belief among panel members was that the United States and its allies should posture an effective conventional deterrent. This belief underscored the widespread skepticism about the prospects for 205 Soviet attacks against West Europe would occur despite what limited, if any, truth there lay in Kissinger's claim that a secret dream of Europeans was "if there had to be a nuclear war, to have it conducted over their heads by the strategic forces for the United States and the Soviet Union/' Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years," speech at Brussels Conference on the Future of NATO, i September 1979, reprinted in Survival 21 (November/December 1979): 266. 206 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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being able to contain nuclear conflict below the level of mutual societal destruction. Support for the buildup of an effective conventional deterrent seems strongly indicative of a perception that the United States (and its allies) would be better off if never in a position where it would be forced to resort to nuclear weapons. Political Control of Theater Nuclear Forces Limited regional nuclear operations, as conceived by the NSTAP Review Panel, would be conducted with tactical or, more proper, theater nuclear systems if these weapons could be applied in a timely and applicable fashion. If the necessary theater forces were not appropriately positioned, then the regional nuclear options could be carried out with strategic weapons, as would likely be the case in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict. The only conspicuous distinction between regional nuclear options and limited nuclear options was that the latter included strikes against the Soviet Union whereas the former would consist of strikes confined to a particular region. It was not the intention of the panel to incorporate limited regional nuclear options into the SIOP. Rather, regional nuclear operations would exist outside the strategic war plans, to be executed on an ad hoc basis before, or possibly even separate from, limited strategic nuclear attacks.207 The NSTAP Review Panel found that it was not possible to distinguish between theater weapons and strategic weapons. Indeed, they were not convinced that the Soviet Union would do so.208 Whatever differences had previously existed between weapons classed by the United States as tactical and as strategic, however real or artificial,209such categories were blurred by the way in which the NSTAP Review Panel envisioned the implementation of regional nuclear options. Strategic and theater systems could no longer be depicted as different types of weapons on the basis of the ends to which they would be used. Both were to be employed to further U.S. strategic political aims—the early termination of conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. The doctrine developed by the NSTAP Review Panel predicated 207

Inter view with participant in NSTAP Review. ^Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 209 For a discussion of the artificiality of this distinction, see Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 117-19.

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the selective release of tailored packages designed to achieve specific objectives. Important to the attainment of U.S. objectives were the form and scale of nuclear use, whether the weapons used were theater or strategic. Inclusion of theater nuclear systems in the continuum of possible responses designed to achieve U.S. strategic political aims raised an acute problem. U.S. doctrine for the employment of nuclear weapons was based on the principle that theater nuclear weapons were devices to be employed to support combat operations at the tactical level of conflict. U.S. Army guidance for the use of tactical weapons, for example, was that once the release order had been given, theater commanders could use their nuclear weapons for operations directed to secure immediate military objectives at the battlefield or theater level.210 Military planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons presumed general release, with U.S. forces to use them as necessary and at will. Such employment of theater nuclear weapons to achieve tactical aims almost certainly would be performed without reference to the overall strategic goals of the United States. The strategy of escalation control and war termination was based on the controlled and measured use of nuclear weapons. Current U.S. Army guidance for theater nuclear use suggested that up to hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons might well be detonated in an almost random fashion on and around the battlefield in the early stages of conflict, thus making it improbable that the Soviet leadership would be convinced of the U.S. desire to exercise restraint. Indeed, the panel recognized that even the use of a single tactical nuclear weapon, as in the case of a beleaguered field commander seeking respite from being overrun in an area such as the southern central front in Europe, had the undeniable potential to provoke a substantial Soviet response, conceivably propelling the conflict out of control.211 The prevailing principles guiding the conduct of theater nuclear operations were the antithesis of the strategic doctrine fashioned by the NSTAP Review Panel. If the U.S. attempt to control escalation and terminate the conflict as soon as feasible was to succeed, the three military services could no longer be allowed to request and automatically receive permission 210 For authoritative discussions of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine and how it evolved, see John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980); and John J. Midgley Jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield (Boulder: Colo.: Westview Press, 1986). 211 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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to use theater nuclear weapons for combat purposes. Political constraints had to govern the employment of these weapons in the same way that such considerations guided the use of strategic systems. The panel believed that the military needed to be able to demonstrate that it had options responsive to the objectives set by the National Command Authority (NCA).212 As was the case for the strategic options developed, these regional options had to be preplanned, designed so that tactical nuclear employment would minimize the possibility of escalation while contributing to the overall goals of the United States. Thus a key objective of the NSTAP Review Panel was to have the Pentagon redefine the release procedures and target planning for theater nuclear weapons so that their use would be compatible with U.S. strategic policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons. Direction to the U.S. Army and other relevant commands to change the release and targeting policies for theater nuclear weapons ultimately came from the JCS, which concurred with the assessment of the NSTAP Review Panel. Beginning in 1973 the U.S. Army set about reformulating the policies guiding theater use in order to bring them into line with strategic guidance.213 The revision of U.S. Army tactical nuclear doctrine was complete by the end of 1974. The new guidance established the objective of battlefield nuclear employment as being "to prove an ultimate resolve to resist aggression and to exploit a tactical advantage gained through the use of nuclear weapons by seeking to obtain a quick termination of hostilities under conditions acceptable to the United States and her allies."214 Thus, spurred by the concerns of the NSTAP Review Panel, the U.S. Army and other theater nuclear commands developed operating doctrines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons consistent with the principles and objectives set forth in the policy guidance for the targeting of U.S. strategic nuclear systems.215 Consideration of the role of battlefield and theater nuclear weapons was a logical outgrowth of the NSTAP Review Panel's work on regional nuclear options. For the panel's strategy to have a chance to 212

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, Deployment of Nuclear Weapons by the U.S. Army, 12 December 1974 (secret), cited in Midgley, Deadly Illusions, p. 144. 215 For an account of the shift in 1973 in the U.S. Army's release procedures and fire planning, see Midgley, Deadly Illusions, pp. 144-46. 213

214

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work, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons after release had to be under the explicit direction of the NCA, in a fashion compatible with the employment of strategic systems.216 To do otherwise would result only in far too many tactical nuclear weapons being used in a nondirected way on the battlefront. In effect, any use of tactical nuclear weapons had to be oriented to the achievement of the regional or geostrategic objectives of the United States, not the battlefield tasks of a field commander. Officials within the Department of Defense were stimulated to pursue strategic change by a number of disparate concerns, a reflection of their various organizational and strategic perspectives. Nonetheless, the fundamental impetus driving the process was the rigid structure of U.S. war plans such that should deterrence ever fail, the U.S. political leadership might slide into large-scale use and the consequent devastation sure to follow. Widespread agreement existed among officials in the OSA that the targeting plans should be reworked to provide the U.S. leadership with the reasonable prospect of managing a collapse of deterrence without necessarily engendering unacceptable levels of destruction to the United States or its allies. In a sense, the motivating desire was to minimize the damage that a failure of deterrence seemed likely to entail. At issue was not whether or how the United States should act in such a contingency but that the U.S. leadership should have rational alternatives to large-scale options, because of the probable consequences should they ever be executed. Officials in the OSD, contrary to what the extended deterrent dilemma would suggest, were not prompted by an abiding concern that the U.S. extended deterrent had been undermined by the advent of U.S. vulnerability and needed to be fortified. Their apprehension, rather, was that deterrence in general might fail no matter what the United States did to keep it strong. Therefore it was only prudent for the United States to be prepared to minimize the consequences to itself and its allies. Few officials believed, however, that deterrence would give out with a direct aggression against the United States, in part because the Soviet Union had no reason to attack the United States directly and in part because of the persuasiveness of the U.S. central deterrent. Deterrence was far more likely to fail overseas 216

Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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where U.S. forward interests were exposed to possible Soviet aggression. This view conforms with Lawrence Freedman's conception that the primary need for the U.S. deterrent stemmed from its extended interests that brought it into conflict with the interests of the Soviet Union.217 Thus, though the dilemma posed by extended deterrence did not provide the stimulus for OSD officials to reform U.S. targeting practices, it did inform the formulation of the strategic problem and the fashioning of the solution. Several factors served to reinforce the OSD officials' desire to reform U.S. nuclear strategy. Official policy, set by the political leadership, required the United States to be able to employ its nuclear arsenal in a flexible and selective manner. OSD officials took upon themselves the task for instituting a formal DoD review of U.S. war plans in part out of concern that this policy direction was not being met by the uniformed military. The origins of this formal policy requirement flowed from Kissinger's specific concern about the strategic ramifications that mutual vulnerability held for the U.S. extended deterrent. OSD officials were aware of what Kissinger was attempting to do, but in taking up the issue, the OSD did not directly take up Kissinger's particular analysis of and concerns about the strategic situation. Instead, they pursued the issue from the perspective of their own apprehensions about the prevailing U.S. war plans. It appears that formal policy was coincident and concordant with the OSD officials' strategic preferences as much as it was a matter of them being directly responsive to the precise concerns of higher authority. Official political directives for revising U.S. targeting plans provided an added impetus to the OSD effort rather than being the primary stimulus. Technological considerations furnished an added reason for the OSD officials to push for a review of U.S. targeting practices. Deployment of MIRVs on U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs would greatly proliferate the numbers of warheads that had to be targeted. Rationalizing the way this wealth of new warheads would be applied made a revision of U.S. targeting plans, if the United States was to derive maximum benefit from the novel targeting opportunities created by their availability, a matter of simple pragmatism. Even taken together, these technological and political considerations in and of themselves seem 217

Lawrence Freedman, "The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence/' in The Changing Strategic Landscape (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 236, 1989), pp. 24-25.

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unlikely to have provided sufficient incentive to induce the OSD officials to push for change as energetically as they did. Rather, these considerations were subsidiary factors that gave added force to their perception that U.S. nuclear targeting practices needed to be made more flexible. Political considerations encouraged the military to participate in the innovation process. The strategic perspective of most military planners was that current targeting practices were the most effective means of assuring deterrence. Incorporation of a plethora of varied limited nuclear options into U.S. war plans was widely seen as impractical and, worse, potentially quite dangerous. But confronted with the growing momentum for the reformation of U.S. nuclear strategy, JCS officials believed that the military would be politically illadvised not to support official policy. It also made political sense to participate in order to ensure that preferred strategic precepts were not undermined. In addition, some upper-echelon military officials seemed to have felt that a refashioned nuclear strategy could transform the character of the domestic strategic dialogue, thereby creating an environment more conducive to acquiring force capabilities that would enhance their deterrence strategies of choice. Such political inducements furnish incentives to support strategic change but are quite insufficient to prompt successful innovation in the first place. Concordant with the main concern motivating the reformulation of U.S. nuclear targeting practices, the foremost objective of the NSTAP Review Panel was to provide practical means for stopping conflict should deterrence ever break down. Most strongly emphasized in the policy guidance recommended by the NSTAP Review Panel was the concept of escalation control, with the concomitant aim of terminating any conflict at levels of damage consistent with the objectives of the United States and its allies. To meet the demands of the war termination objective, the panel formulated a hierarchy of graduated options that ranged from a small number of nuclear weapons employed within a region to full-scale attacks against Soviet territory. These employment options would be directed to force the Soviet Union to reconsider its actions by forestalling its aggression. Military targets chosen for destruction would be dependent on how the war started, its character, and what ends the United States was seeking to achieve. The objective of U.S. retaliation would not be to subdue the enemy on the field of battle. Because it maintained a vast stockpile of secure nuclear forces, the Soviet Union would probably not submit to com-

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píete surrender or to losses it considered unacceptable. The involved officials fully appreciated that the termination of hostilities would have to come through negotiation. U.S. officials hoped that the targeting approach chosen would give the Soviet Union every reason to reconsider its position and the value of the goals it sought. If the United States could create a pause in the nuclear battle, some prospect existed that communications could be established and an end to the war negotiated on mutually acceptable terms. So the NSTAP Review Panel concentrated on trying to determine how the United States could establish a framework that defined the limited scope of an ongoing nuclear conflict and in which it could convince the Soviet Union to negotiate an end to the war. Once nuclear weapons had been used, a crucial parameter in any effort to manage escalation would be to confine the conflict directly at its source, in terms of time, intensity, and area. The United States would need to act with a measure of restraint, for only if it did so could the Soviet Union be expected to do so as well. Imposing clearly discernable limits to the use of nuclear weapons held some promise that pauses in the fighting might occur. Such pauses would provide opportunities for the two combatants to come to their senses and negotiate a permanent halt to hostilities, before one side or the other succumbed to escalatory pressures. The targeting strategy devised— with some target packages to be committed, others to be withheld in a hierarchically ordered manner—would provide the United States with a capability to engage in limited strikes throughout a nuclear exchange and allow for the possible termination of the conflict short of general nuclear war. What the NSTAP Review Panel proposed was a targeting structure and dynamic designed to facilitate, first and foremost, intrawar bargaining through which a conflict might be terminated at as low a level as possible. But involved administration officials were generally skeptical about the capacity of the Soviet Union to recognize the limitations that the United States might seek to establish through the judicious application of its nuclear arsenal. One apparent distinction that both sides might be able to identify and to accept was that between the employment of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and the use of nuclear weapons confined within a region. The difference appeared sufficiently distinctive qualitatively to provide the last clearly definable and mutually acceptable barrier to mutual assured destruction. The NSTAP Review Panel believed that the Soviet leadership would

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be more likely to recognize and agree to such a limitation than to other, more subtle limitations the United States might seek to establish. As long as the Soviet Union had not been directly attacked, there would be a reasonable chance that a regional war might be concluded short of all-out war. Thus the guidance set forth a requirement for the United States to be able to use nuclear weapons repeatedly against a series of regional military targets, without necessarily striking the USSR, in order to avoid precipitating general nuclear war. Western Europe did feature predominantly in the strategic deliberations of the DoD officials. Initial response options were specifically tailored to serve U.S. decision makers in the event of deterrence failure in Europe. The options devised, however, were not to make credible the first use of strategic systems against the Soviet Union as is implied by the notion of coupling. Coupling is generally assumed to be best achieved either by having the capability and will to strike the Soviet Union or by using nuclear weapons to raise the risk of escalation getting out of control. The policy guidance developed did provide a wide range of modest strategic attacks against target systems in the Soviet Union. But the purpose of the policy, and hence the attacks, was to provide practical, rational retaliatory options that would permit the early termination of conflict. This objective might best be met not through the execution of modest strikes against the Soviet Union but with limited regional nuclear operations that initially left the Soviet Union unscathed. In the spectrum of available options, the presence of these operations, which seemed to but did not necessarily take precedence in the hierarchy of graduated retaliatory measures that the United States might take, could be seen, rightly or wrongly, to imply that the United States might not resort even to limited nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union. This situation does nothing to create the impression that the U.S. strategic deterrent is coupled to the security of American allies and does even less to reassure the allies of U.S. good faith. American allies—especially the European allies—dependent on the deterrent effect of the U.S. strategic arsenal might understandably be anxious about the import of limited regional nuclear options, which suggest that the United States might be willing to wage war in defense of the allies only so long as it was convinced it could remain inviolate from nuclear attack. The concept of limited regional nuclear options as fully developed conformed to the strategy advocated by the United States in the ongoing NATO debate over first

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nuclear use and follow-on use. The United States preferred to employ tactical systems against Warsaw Pact military targets to achieve a military effect and to confine such use to targets located outside the borders of the Soviet Union. Europeans strongly rejected the U.S. position, favoring the threat of early and deep use, with U.S. strategic systems unequivocally postured to jeopardize Soviet territory if Warsaw Pact aggression continued despite the application of tactical nuclear forces.218 The incorporation of limited regional nuclear options into U.S. strategic nuclear guidance could be construed by the European allies as meaning that the United States might be unwilling to escalate the conflict to homeland attacks. Thus although the innovation process was not prompted by a perceived need to convince the European allies that U.S. security was coupled to their defense, the United States would have to reassure the West Europeans that the substance of the revised targeting practices was not indicative of a weakening of its security guarantee. The strategy developed by the NSTAP Review Panel was designed to minimize any impetus for the conflict to escalate and to force the Soviet Union to reevaluate its intentions. Yet panel members recognized the uncertainties attending any nuclear use and efforts to control escalation, which resulted in widespread skepticism about the prospects of being able to terminate conflict at acceptable levels of violence. Thomas Schelling has argued that should the United States and the USSR ever become engaged in any limited war, never mind a limited nuclear war, the dire prospect would be raised that the conflict might escalate out of control to general war.219 This prospect would be all the more probable given that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would be able to discern limitations the United States sought to communicate or that it would necessarily choose to abide by such limitations. The distinct lack of faith evinced by panel members regarding the prospects of success in controlling escalation reflects a belief that any use of nuclear weapons carried the risk that events might get out of hand. And this risk would probably multiply each time the United States felt compelled by continued Soviet intransigence to reprise its initial strikes. There being no assurance the strategy would work effectively meant that in resorting to nuclear employment, the United States would be setting itself onto a slippery 218 See 219

Chapter 2, the section titled "The Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons/' Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 105.

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The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel slope toward nuclear destruction. At best the strategy promised to furnish a few precarious handholds that might be used to halt the descent. Limited, regional nuclear options, existing near the top of the slope, appeared to provide the best handhold the United States and its allies might grab onto before the momentum of events precluded being able to seize on another before being propelled into the nuclear abyss. And even this was at best only tentatively secure, for it might equally break away as hold. By default, any U.S. nuclear response to Soviet aggression would resemble what Schelling calls the "last clear chance" to avert the impending catastrophe.220 In effect, the "last clear chance" confronts the opponent with the threat of increasing levels of destruction which might ultimately progress to societal annihilation should it decide to continue its aggression. Unable to predict the consequences of its actions with any surety, in resorting to nuclear use the United States would seem to be engaged as much in an unpremeditated, Schellingesque policy of risk manipulation221 as it would be in a calculated, controlled policy of denying the enemy its goals while seeking to convey limits to the conflict. Although this was not the interpretation contemplated by U.S. planners, such a reading of the new strategy cast it in a mold analogous to the European preference for escalatory strategies. As a consequence, an argument could be made that the security of the United States was indeed linked to that of Western Europe and deterrence thereby reinforced. If the new targeting guidance was properly presented, the contingent nature of the newly developed targeting practices might be used to reassure the European allies that the United States was not trying to uncouple its security from that of Western Europe. Yet this selfsame quality of the strategy, to the degree that it might reassure the allies, reinforced the growing conviction of NSTAP Review Panel members that the United States and its allies should maintain conventional capabilities sufficient to counter potential nonnuclear Soviet aggression. These members understood that the most decisive barrier to the escalation of conflict to general nuclear war would be the conventional/nuclear firebreak. Despite having formulated a strategy with some prospect that escalation might be con220 221

For Schelling's discussion of the "last clear chance" ibid., see pp. 43-49. See ibid., pp. 92-125.

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[158]

[5] Developing a Policy Consensus The NSTAP Review Panel, along with its working group and relevant military agencies, produced a policy guidance document in June 1972 that ultimately served as the basis of NSDM-242. The primary task of the panel was to develop practical targeting alternatives such that should deterrence ever fail, the United States would not slide into massive nuclear exchanges for want of options better than suicide or surrender. The policy guidance called for nuclear employment to effect the earliest possible termination of war at the lowest feasible level of conflict. Achievement of this objective required the planning of limited nuclear employment options that could be used to control escalation. A second, informal aim of the panel was to guide the policy through the administration bureaucracy to the point it became official U.S. policy. Once a policy guidance had been drawn up that all involved parties within the DoD could agree on, other concerned bureaucratic actors needed to be consulted in order to build a consensus of support for the official revision of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. Initially the NSTAP Review Panel approached a number of bureaucratic actors informally. The two main sets of actors—officials from the State Department and Henry Kissinger—were asked to join the deliberations of the panel at this time. Once an informal consensus had been developed, an interagency review was the first major step in the bureaucratic process toward transforming the recommendations of the panel into official U.S. policy. BROADENING THE CONSENSUS By the end of June 1972 the NSTAP Review Panel had produced a policy guidance document that embodied the concepts of war termi-

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nation and escalation control. Drafts of the policy guidance were forwarded to Secretary of Defense Laird and the JCS for review and approval. Laird concurred with the policy guidance proposed. Within the military, however, many harbored misgivings about introducing limited nuclear options into the SIOP. Nevertheless, the JCS as a corporate body also signed off on the new policy guidance. With the relevant departmental agencies behind the new strategy, preparatory to submitting its recommendations to interdepartmental review, the NSTAP Review Panel moved to develop a broader consensus of support in the administration for its work. Key among those invited to join the NSTAP Review Panel were two officials from the Department of State and Henry Kissinger. The Department of State The NSTAP Review Panel believed that the most resistance to the contemplated shift in nuclear targeting practices would probably emanate from the State Department. Secretary of State William Rogers was not perceived as posing a major obstacle to implementation of the new strategy; in taking control over U.S. foreign policy, Nixon and Kissinger had effectively isolated Rogers, leaving him with little political clout within the government. Rather, it was Roger's subordinates and other officials in State that were seen as most likely to attempt to scuttle the official revision of U.S. nuclear strategy. In the State Department, the view of the Soviet Union was generally quite positive. Euphoria over the signing of the ABM Treaty in May 1972 had greatly strengthened this perception, effectively precluding any real consideration that the Soviet Union might still be seeking exploitable military and political advantage. Furthermore, many officials in the Department of State who dealt with issues involving nuclear weapons supported arms control and the idea of mutual assured destruction. As a consequence, the DoD proposal that the United States move away from the doctrine of assured destruction could expect strong opposition from the State Department.1 Nevertheless, within this bastion of opposition were some officials who supported a revision of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine. In the State Department, officials working on the European desk were sympathetic to the concerns and needs of their clients, particularly over 1

Interview with State Department official.

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the politically touchy issue of coupling. Europeans generally still believed that the strategic balance continued to favor the United States, but a few were privately expressing some concern that this advantage might be a wasting asset. Should the Soviet Union acquire a measurable advantage, some worried that the U.S. nuclear guarantee might decline accordingly.2 Equally sensitive to the question of coupling were officials in the political-military bureau (P/M), which serves as a bridge between the regional desks and the Pentagon. The continued growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal beyond levels equal with those of the United States, along with the improving capabilities of the Soviet Union in conventional forces and tactical/theater nuclear forces,3 presented a bleak picture that led P/M officials to be more suspicious of Soviet intentions than were most other State officials.4 This grouping of State officials, situated largely on the European desk and in the P/M, believed that the shifting strategic balance required the United States to revamp its strategic targeting practices in order to shore up the credibility of its nuclear commitments to its overseas allies.5 To create a consensus in support of the proposed change in targeting policy, the NSTAP Review Panel had to bring into the fold at least some State officials. The official first approached was Seymour Weiss, the deputy head of the P/M, a key task of whose was to serve as the direct liaison between agencies in the Pentagon and those in State. In the Johnson administration, draft presidential memorandums had been passed to the P/M at State as a matter of course so that the implications of strategic policy for foreign policy could be worked through. Thus Weiss had developed a good working relationship with many DoD officials.6 During the Nixon administration, however, the practice of consulting with the P/M fell into disfavor, so relevant State agencies no longer had any significant input into decisions on defense policy. Weiss nevertheless maintained some contacts within the DoD in the early 19705. He was known to members of the NSTAP Review Panel as being sympathetic to what they were 2

Interviews with State Department officials. For discussions of the changing balance of theater nuclear forces in Europe, see Walter F. Hahn, "Nuclear Balance in Europe/' Foreign Affairs 50 (April 1972); and S. T. Cohen and W. C. Lyons, "A Comparison of U.S.-Allied and Soviet Tactical Nuclear Force Capabilities and Policies/' Orbis 19 (Spring 1975). 4 Interview with State Department official. 5 Interview with State Department official. 6 Interviews with State Department officials. 3

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attempting to accomplish7 and was therefore a natural choice to represent State views on U.S. strategy. Subsequent to the completion of the draft guidance document in June, the panel asked Weiss to participate in the review and lend his political perspective on nuclear targeting matters, particularly with respect to NATO.8 Soon after Weiss joined the panel, he recognized that another person familiar with NATO was needed and recommended that Leon Sloss, another official in the P/M, be asked to join.9 Sensitive to the bureaucratic divisions between the Department of State and the DoD, the panel cleared the participation of Weiss and Sloss with both Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers. Rogers agreed on the condition that Weiss and Sloss were not representatives of his department; they were to be involved only as interested individuals who were willing to contribute their expertise on the subject.10 By the time Weiss and Sloss joined the NSTAP Review, the option structure for the new targeting strategy had sufficiently crystallized to constitute a nuclear weapons employment plan that was being negotiated with SAC and the JSTPS.11 Weiss and Sloss found the proposed strategy generally consonant with State thinking on the subject. Concerned State officials believed that the United States had to ensure the coupling of its strategic forces to the security of Europe, which required the United States to have the forces and plans to make persuasive the threat to use nuclear weapons first in the event of Soviet aggression. These officials were convinced that some form of escalation control, much along the lines of that devised by the NSTAP Review Panel, was necessary if the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe was to be perceived as credible.12 Despite this apparent convergence in thinking, an important, though subtle, distinction existed between the position of the State officials and that of the NSTAP Review Panel. State officials saw escalation control as a means to make convincing the threat of the first 7

Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 368-69. Seymour Weiss, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options: Session II (Oral History Transcript 4; Nuclear History Program, University of Maryland, 1944), p. 11; and Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 369. 9 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 10 Weiss, Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 11; and interviews with State Department officials. 11 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 12 See Weiss, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, pp. 8-9; and interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 8

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use of nuclear weapons in Europe, whereas the NSTAP Review Panel viewed escalation control as necessary if the president was to be provided with reasonable retaliatory options.13 The distinction is ultrafine, being one solely of intent. But it is not a distinction without a difference. On the one hand, State officials were prompted to pursue doctrinal change to ensure that the U.S. strategic deterrent was coupled, and was seen to be coupled, firmly to the defense of Western Europe. On the other hand, the NSTAP Review Panel was motivated to refashion U.S. targeting policies in order to furnish the United States with a capability to manage deterrence failure. This difference had certain ramifications when considering the policy guidance developed by the NSTAP Review Panel. Coupling is an exercise of organizing and targeting one's forces to maximize deterrence. What the NSTAP Review Panel sought to provide was guidance to meet an actual failure of deterrence, the critical objective of which was generally agreed to be to stop the war at the lowest possible level of conflict. Maximizing deterrence and managing deterrence failure are two separate things, and the targeting requirements for the two objectives tend to be quite different.14 Both Weiss and Sloss recognized that the proposal would have significant political connotations for the European allies which the panel had inadequately addressed. As Seymour Weiss explained, "We recognized at the time that the revised strategy involving limited options had intrinsic merit, that we could convince ourselves it was in the interests of our Allies as well as the United States. It wasn't an inconsistency, quite to the contrary; it was a good way to tie the United States more closely to Europe. That didn't mean, however, the Europeans were going to see it that way and understand it that way."15 The limited, regional nuclear options, aimed against military targets in order to affect the course of the conflict, gave the impression of being a strategy of war fighting and war winning, which was a potential problem. The European allies had firmly rejected strategies of war fighting in the ongoing debate in NATO about the initial and follow-on use of nuclear weapons. The European allies generally preferred that nuclear weapons be employed to demonstrate the will13

Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 121, 1975/76), pp. 15-16. 15 Weiss, Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, pp. 8-9. 14

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ingness of NATO to pursue a course that carried the grave risk of uncontrolled escalation to strategic nuclear exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union.16 As a consequence, the European allies were bound to have some misgivings about the reformed strategy. Extremely problematic, however, was the objective of escalation control, which was to confine any conflict in terms of duration, intensity, and area. Limited, regional nuclear options were intended to contain the conflict to the region in which war broke out, with the Soviet Union initially exempt from attack. European allies had long worried that the U.S. inclination to apply nuclear weapons to achieve military purposes could result in a tactical nuclear war confined to European soil, with the United States and the Soviet Union remaining unscathed by the conflict. The prospect that the United States would probably first respond with limited, regional nuclear options could be interpreted as uncoupling the U.S. strategic deterrent and U.S. security from the defense of Western Europe.17 It was not a matter of what the NSTAP Review Panel intended, for the purpose of the regional nuclear options was not to uncouple the United States from the security of Europe. Rather, it was a question of how the Europeans would likely interpret the intention behind this aspect of U.S. retaliatory strategy. The State officials believed that this aspect of the proposed strategy, whatever the intentions behind it, was likely to inflame the allies' fear that the United States would seek to contain a nuclear conflict to the European continent to ensure that its own territory would remain immune from attack. The inclusion of Weiss and Sloss in the review resulted in these concerns about NATO coming more to the fore. Well informed on the military and political nuances of transatlantic relations, they recognized that although the NSTAP Review Panel had brought considerable technical expertise to bear on devising a new targeting strategy, it had failed to appreciate the political ramifications.18 Precisely how the European allies would react to the new strategy had not been cause for much reflection on the part of the NSTAP Review Panel. The two officials made clear that the panel had to consider seriously and thoroughly the impact of the policy guidance for NATO.19 16

See Chapter 2, pp. 36-38. For an examination of this debate, see J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1983). 18 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 19 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 17

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Neither of the officials sought to promote any particular ideas for revising the policy guidance in order to solve the potential problem posed by the notion of regional nuclear options. Weiss and Sloss saw no need to alter the proposed strategy to mitigate the political implications of the regional nuclear options. They were convinced that the revised strategy could be seen as coupling the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Western Europe. The great uncertainty about whether escalation could be controlled, even if the United States adhered to the proposed targeting strategy, meant that any use of nuclear weapons by the United States embodied Thomas Schelling's threat that leaves something to chance.20 Thus it could be argued, they believed, that whatever the United States might intend, the employment of nuclear weapons raised the risk of uncontrolled escalation and so served to couple the U.S. deterrent to the security of Western Europe. Weiss and Sloss concluded that to avoid transatlantic acrimony the panel needed to think carefully on how the United States could present the targeting strategy to the European allies in the most favorable light. If the strategy was suitably presented, it would be wellreceived.21 Weiss and Sloss preferred that limited, regional nuclear options be removed from discussion or be glossed over to forestall adverse allied reaction.22 Proper management of the issue required that emphasis be placed on those aspects of the refashioned targeting guidance which would serve to reinforce European security.23 Although Weiss and Sloss found the proposed change generally in line with the thinking in the State Department, they believed that the allies would not welcome the proposed change. The very nature of the strategy developed meant its introduction, unless very carefully presented, would create severe political problems for the United States in its relations with the NATO allies.24 Kissinger and Regional Nuclear Operations Being reasonably happy with the policy guidance, Laird concluded that it was time to inform Kissinger about the study and its recom20

For an examination of this aspect of the proposed targeting strategy, see Chapter 4/ 21P. 157See Weiss, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 8. ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 23 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 24 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 27 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 28 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 29 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 26

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superpower crises that had occurred during the administrations' first term in office. He was convinced that the United States needed an array of regional targeting options to permit it to threaten the use of nuclear weapons on the periphery of the superpower conflict. Specifically citing the Jordanian crisis of the fall of 1970, Kissinger requested the DoD group to elaborate their ideas on the regional employment of nuclear weapons in a range of "non-central campaigns." According to one participant, Kissinger wanted "to be sure that America's strategic forces really did cast a shadow on peripheral situations." As the participant went on to note, "Kissinger's point was that even if the military situation on the ground is not interesting for nuclear use, the Def Con [Defense Condition] has a different impact on the Russians if they know we have flexible options."31 Kissinger was advocating options in which nuclear weapons would be employed against military and other targets only within a specific region, thereby delineating the Soviet Union as a sanctuary from U.S. nuclear strikes. Confining the use of nuclear weapons to the region would decrease the chances of the Soviet leadership feeling compelled to escalate the conflict to general nuclear war. If the United States could be seen to be able to achieve its objectives on the margins with only a minimal risk that its own survival would be jeopardized, to threaten resort to such regional nuclear options would be more credible, and hence more effective, for both deterrent and coercive purposes. In contrast to the officials in the State Department, Kissinger appears to have believed that the concept of limited, regional nuclear options, as developed by the NSTAP Review Panel, were admirably suited for the purposes he desired. To explore their usefulness more thoroughly, he instructed the panel to amplify the concept of regional nuclear options and apply it to a range of relevant areas on the strategic periphery where prospective superpower crises might arise.32 The task of elaborating the notion of limited regional nuclear operations was delegated to the working group of the NSTAP Review Panel and representatives of the major offices and agencies in the DoD. Kissinger's participation in this process was confined mainly to designating a region or possible crisis in which he felt nuclear weapons might 31 Cited in Seymour M. Hersh, Kissinger: The Price of Power: Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), p. 246. 32 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review.

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be used. Different offices and agencies within the DoD were allocated the task of working through particular elements of the scenarios: the International Security Agency established the political stage for the crisis; the OSA built up the character of the war to the point of contemplated nuclear employment; the OSD set the objectives to be achieved; the JCS devised pertinent nuclear targeting packages; and, finally, all involved officials together worked out modifications to the proposed nuclear attacks.33 Included in the range of scenarios in which limited regional nuclear operations were deemed applicable were an invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Treaty Organization,34 Soviet aggression in the Middle East (Iran),35 an India-Pakistan war, and a Sino-Soviet conflict.36 These operations were to be implemented apart from, or antecedent to, limited strategic attacks against the Soviet Union. As had been the case in the NSTAP Review Panel's initial formulation, the involved officials recognized that the military-political objectives would be highly dependent on the circumstances, so the intent of these exercises was not to establish preplanned targeting options germane to each region for inclusion in the SIOP. Each exercise, rather, served as a basis for the development of specific guidance for the selection of targets or classes of targets, the destruction of which would be conducive to the furtherance of possible U.S. political-military objectives. This development exercise was carried out separately for each region considered.37 Logically, though not necessarily, these lists likely included some description of the weapons systems that might be used to implement a command authority decision to retaliate. Such planning for each region would serve to circumvent somewhat the troublesome problem that the unpredictable nature of contingencies posed to the construction of appropriate preplanned nuclear options—a problem that had plagued Kissinger's previous efforts to reform U.S. targeting practices. Prior identification of possible relevant targets or target systems would greatly facilitate the capability of the NCA to improvise appropriate nuclear plans if and when a contingency arose in the region in question. Kissinger recognized that the targeting guidance developed by the 33

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Ajames R. Schlesinger, testimony before Congress, March 1974, cited in Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 5 n. 16. 35 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 36 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 37 Inter view with participant in NSTAP Review.

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NSTAP Review Panel could be adapted to provide a solution to his long-running concern that the United States lacked pertinent responses to a Sino-Soviet conflict. In late 1972, he requested the NSTAP group to formulate a specific nuclear strategy for Asia consonant with the basic principles of the policy guidance which they had developed for U.S. nuclear targeting. Officials from the OSA who were part of the panel had earlier in the year conducted a number of analyses for the DPRC study on the question of strategic alternatives toward the PRC. Thus they were familiar with Kissinger's concerns and the problems encountered previously. By late March 1973 they had produced a draft guidance for regional nuclear operations in Asia. "U.S. Nuclear Strategy for Asia/' some fifty pages in length exclusive of annexes, was ultimately incorporated into NSSM-iyi, "Study of U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia."38 Presumably the study set forth guidance for the selection of targets appropriate to the furtherance of whatever political-strategic aims the United States might have in any given contingency in Asia, furnishing a menu of targets from which such choices could be made.39 Noteworthy is that "U.S. Nuclear Strategy for Asia" apparently provided policy guidance for nuclear utilization either in support of or against the PRC.40 Kissinger's search for nuclear options appropriate to U.S. objectives in the event of a Sino-Soviet war was thus realized in a somewhat modified form. Allowance was seemingly made for the possibility that the United States might decide that its strategic interests were best served by siding with the Soviet Union or the possibility of the PRC challenging another U.S. ally in the region. As well as promoting the development of regional nuclear options, Kissinger emphasized that all options had to be practical and readily executable from a logistical standpoint.41 Nixon and Kissinger's experience in instances where they had directed that military force be used as an instrument of crisis diplomacy had brought home the point that the U.S. bureaucracy, if it disagreed with the policy decision, was likely to try to obstruct the implementation of executive orders by arguing that the necessary operation was not possible or that to mount the operation took time. In the case of the shooting 38 The study's number, NSSM-i/i, suggests that it was issued sometime in late February or in March 1973. 39 The annexes to the study likely included lists of possible targets. ^Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 41 Interview with participant in NSTAP Review; and Major General Jasper Welch, cited in Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 261.

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down of the EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft by North Korea in 1969, the situation had been politically defused by the time a decision to retaliate had been settled on and the required forces put in place, which made any retaliation or even a show of strength gratuitous.42 Similarly, the aircraft carrier task force sent into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan arrived far too late to have the intended impact on the situation.43 Careful attention to the logistics needed to support timely execution would preempt bureaucratic prevarication and deliberate sabotage of policy implementation through foot-dragging.44 Detailing the logistical side of implementation could also help to highlight for the Soviet leadership and involved third parties that the United States seriously believed nuclear weapons were usable. Logistical credibility could enhance the utility of U.S. threats of nuclear use as instruments of crisis diplomacy, whether for deterrent or coercive purposes. Kissinger pushed the NSTAP Review Panel to explore more thoroughly how the concept of regional nuclear options could be satisfactorily applied to a range of areas on the strategic periphery. The result of this work was the description of a target list, broken down by category of target or target systems much as were the limited nuclear options, for each region examined. Accompanying each list was policy guidance that would, as best as was possible, provide direction for selecting target types from the available menu to achieve the particular ends desired by the United States in each region examined. Kissinger further instilled a greater awareness within the NSTAP working group of the requirement to work through the logistics of the revision of U.S. nuclear targeting. Kissinger's main contribution to the NSTAP Review was to heighten the importance of limited, regional nuclear options and to broaden the regions to which they might be applied. NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 169 After the policy guidance had been completed in June 1972, the NSTAP Review Panel became less involved in further work on the Herken erroneously places this directive from Kissinger as occurring before the initiation of the study by the NSTAP panel, which he refers to as the "Foster panel." 42 For a discussion of this crisis and the internal politics attending it, see Hersh, Kissinger, pp. 54-65.

«ibid., pp. 444-65Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 44

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review. Most of the subsequent effort was performed by the working group of the panel. Through the summer and fall of 1972, these officials, along with representatives from pertinent DoD offices and agencies, worked at Kissinger's request to develop a broader range of regional nuclear options. They also devoted considerable time looking to innumerable technical details to ensure that the proposed limited nuclear options and regional nuclear options would be credible from a political, military, and logistical perspective.45 By early in 1973, all the involved civilian and military officials were satisfied with the final product.46 The policy guidance was passed to the JCS, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state for official review and approval. All concerned endorsed the suggested revision to U.S. targeting policy.47 The panel's recommendations were then officially submitted to the White House, accompanied by a petition that the revised targeting policy be formally evaluated by an interagency panel. Bureaucratic Politics Sometime in late January or early February 1973, Secretary of Defense Laird conveyed to the White House the completed document setting forth new guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear weapons. Subsequent to an official briefing on the panel's recommendations, Kissinger agreed to convene an interagency panel to consider the suitability of the policy guidance to serve as the basis of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. A minor bureaucratic squabble marred the initiation of the review, however. In dispute was which agency should head this new panel, with Kissinger claiming the priority of the NSC, while the DoD asserted its prerogative. Kissinger's attempt to place the review process under the auspices of the NSC was underlain by a somewhat odd bureaucratic maneuver on his part. When the DoD officials had first informed Kissinger about their work in mid-June 1972, they had been concerned that he might insist on the inclusion of one or more of his staff members in the study. Contrary to their expectations, however, Kissinger had not ^Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. 46 See Herken, Counsels of War, p. 262; Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 73; Anthony H. Cordesman, Deterrence in the 1980$: Part i, American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 175, 1982), p. 14; and Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, p. 4. 47 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review.

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only been quite agreeable to the suggestion that the ongoing review process continue to be conducted internal to the DoD but had also not pressed the question of having one of his staff participate in the review.48 Indeed, unknown to the DoD officials, Kissinger subsequently did not mention to any of his staff who were working on the DPRC review that the DoD was engaged in an effort that paralleled their own work.49 As a consequence, the submission of the new targeting guidance document caught the NSC staff completely by surprise.50 Its sudden and unexpected arrival made many of the NSC staff suspicious of the military's intentions. NSC staff members involved in military affairs had long been wary of DoD views on weapons procurement and nuclear strategy. They viewed members of the military as stolid adherents to the concept of U.S. superiority in strategic weapons who constantly wanted more weapons. With respect to nuclear strategy, the military was seen as being wedded to notions of war fighting and war winning, concepts that the moderate NSC staff considered to be outmoded and indeed dangerous in an era of parity. To the NSC staff, the DoD appeared to be attempting to execute a bureaucratic end run to implement its own interpretation of U.S. nuclear strategy. The perceptions of the NSC staff underpinned their support for Kissinger's attempt to take control over official review. This support resulted in part from their belief that Kissinger was motivated by a desire to forestall the military from preemptively imposing its preferred nuclear strategy as the basis for U.S. security. Some NSC members also doubted the wisdom of limited nuclear options and supported Kissinger in the belief that he was acting from a desire to ensure that his vision of what objectives the United States should achieve with its strategic doctrine was what emerged from the interagency review. NSC leadership of the review would permit him to reshape the guidance in a manner more to his liking, excerpting elements that fit his notions of nuclear strategy and discarding those that did not.51 Kissinger seems to have done nothing to dispel these ideas. Un48

Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. Interviews with NSC staff members. 50 A standard public account is that Kissinger "found out about the Foster panel" sometime in 1973. From the perspective of NSC staff members, this did indeed appear to be the situation. See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 369. 51 Interviews with NSC staff members. 49

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Developing a Policy Consensus doubtedly he was sincere in his desire to wrest control of the targeting study from the Pentagon, if only to expand his bureaucratic influence into the DoD if not also to place his own strategic interpretation and name firmly on the guidance. Kissinger had been collaborating with the NSTAP Review Panel since the middle of 1972, however, during which time he had plenty of opportunity to block the DoD's effort, to seize control of the initiative, or to have the policy guidance modified more to his liking. His withholding from his staff the information that a nuclear targeting proposal would be forthcoming from the DoD may have come from his perception that his staff posed a potential obstacle to the implementation of the targeting guidance. He may have feared that if the staff knew about the closely held NSTAP Review, they might expose it, which in an election year would surely derail it. Kissinger may have hoped that by not informing his staff of the study and his participation, he could create a situation in which they believed that he was seeking to arrest the implementation of the targeting guidance document, thereby preempting their active opposition. Given the political controversy that his most recent attempt to effect a change in strategy had aroused, Kissinger may also have felt it advisable not to be seen as having provided the DoD proposal with his imprimatur through his earlier support of its work. By placing some bureaucratic distance between himself and the study, he would be in a position to shed responsibility for the new guidance should that become necessary politically. Whatever Kissinger's motivations may have been, the DoD contended that the revision of nuclear targeting was a military concern, so the review should be conducted under its aegis.52 The Pentagon was not about to turn over management of the issue to Kissinger after having so judiciously maneuvered to acquire the necessary bureaucratic support. Moreover, there was still some concern that the JCS might yet balk at supporting the strategy. The JCS was not likely to welcome having Kissinger in control, for he might seek to use his authority to interject the NSC into the jealously guarded operational side of planning. In the end, this bureaucratic tempest was settled in favor of the DoD.53 National Security Study Memorandum 169 was issued by Kissinger with the authority of the president on 13 February 1973. 52 53

Interview with NSC staff member. Interview with NSC staff member.

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NSSM-1Ó9 called for an ad hoc committee to conduct a formal review of "existing U.S. nuclear policy." Membership of the NSSM-iog panel was to consist of one representative from the DoD, the Department of State, the CIA, and the NSC staff.54 John Foster, who had chaired the NSTAP Review Panel, was designated by Secretary of Defense Laird to serve as chair of the new panel, and Seymour Weiss, another NSTAP Review alumnus, was chosen to represent the Department of State. New to the panel were Philip Odeen, the NSC representative, and Carl Duckett, deputy director for science and technology in the CIA. Odeen had worked on the DPRC study of U.S. nuclear strategy which was instigated by Kissinger in early 1972.K Duckett, on the other hand, had no previous experience with the issue of strategic targeting. He was, however, quite knowledgeable about Soviet capabilities, having often served as spokesperson for the agency on intelligence estimates of the Soviet threat, and he had the necessary assets at his command to carry out the type of analysis required to evaluate the viability of the proposed guidance. Duckett was therefore considered a natural choice to represent the CIA. The task of conducting the numerous analyses for the NSSM-log review fell once again largely on the shoulders of Jasper Welch, James Martin, and Archie Wood, the core of the NSTAP Review Panel's working group, along with the pertinent military offices and agencies.56 Thus, although NSSM-1Ó9 was to be an interagency review of the recommendations of the NSTAP Review Panel, a majority of the key officials involved were those who had developed the proposed guidance in the first place. And the others were either sympathetic to the issue or a disinterested party with views of the Soviet threat which were most unlikely to be positive. Thus, the prospect that the NSSM-1Ó9 study would reach a favorable assessment was virtually a foregone conclusion. The NSSM-1Ó9 Review NSSM-log called for the interagency committee to conduct a review to consider "all U.S. nuclear forces, including strategic, theater, and tactical." The committee's evaluation was to be made on the basis of 54 National Security Study Memorandum 169, "US. Nuclear Policy 13 February 1973," declassified on 26 January 1981 (hereafter cited as NSSM-1Ó9). 55 See Chapter 3, the section titled "The Defense Program Review Committee Study." 56 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants.

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Developing a Policy Consensus "desirability of the recommended changes as related to basic national policy; the impact on relations with allies (particularly NATO) and potential adversaries; the implications of any changes for SALT planning; the relationship and effect on U.S. weapons acquisition policy; the validity of the supporting assumptions; and the question of declaratory statements of policy and implementing procedures should these changes be adopted."57 The essence of the NSSM-1Ó9 study was exploration of the military, political, and force structure problems raised by the policy guidance produced by the NSTAP Review Panel. Defining the possible weapons requirements for the new policy and determining the potential impact on SALT were perceived as being the most troublesome issues. The panel was uncertain about how to deal with them and, as had been the case with the NSTAP Review, were not keen to become enmeshed in the tricky political and analytical problems posed by this issue. Therefore, a ground rule for the review was that the strategy had to be executable with the forces available to the United States as of i January 1974.M Establishing this guideline at the outset of the panel's deliberations deftly finessed the issues of weapons requirements and SALT, leaving the panel free to concentrate on other aspects of the proposed targeting guidance. The NSSM-1Ó9 panel undertook an extensive number of studies of the proposed strategy. On the whole, members found the recommendations well-thought-out, though it was felt that much follow-on work was required. Critical reexamination focused on what was wrong with the policy guidance, what could go wrong, and what the risks were.59 The most questionable aspect of the policy guidance was the targeting formula developed for controlling escalation. All agreed that the best approach to expressing U.S. resolve was to target nuclear weapons to produce a substantive military impact. But the twin problems of how the Soviet Union would perceive the message conveyed and how it was likely to respond to U.S. restraint persisted. Determining the proper scale of the strikes was also seen as problematic. Signaling worked both ways: employing too many weapons would send the wrong message just as would using too few. The officials came away from the exercise believing, much as had those involved 57

NSSM-i69, p. i. Interview with NSSM-1Ó9 review participant. 59 Interview with NSSM-1Ó9 review participant. 58

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in the NSTAP Review, that the United States could not be confident that escalation control would work.60 Some changes were made to the policy guidance which reflected the various concerns of the participants, but these pertained to minor elements. Only a few slight modifications to the panel's recommendations were considered necessary.61 Bureaucratic concerns were thus assuaged without changing the central intent and principles of the policy put forth by the NSTAP Review Panel. One clear exception existed to the general acceptance accorded the panel's recommendations. That is, on the issue of what objective the United States should try to achieve in the event of all-out nuclear war. Held over from the publicly announced policy of strategic sufficiency was the requirement for the United States to be able to inflict greater casualties on the Soviet population than the Soviet Union could cause to the American population. The intent of this direction was that the United States should not be worse off than the Soviet Union in the wake of a strategic exchange.62 All agreed that this objective had to be changed. To replace it, the panel formulated political guidance dictating that the United States should target the Soviet Union's economic, military, and political structure to impede its capability to reconstitute itself in the aftermath of a general war.63 A variety of concerns led to a consensus in favor of this shift.64 Studies undertaken by the panel indicated that the objective set forth by strategic sufficiency could not be met. Some members were concerned that if the previous objective was not achievable with current forces, this shortfall could be used to exert pressure for ever more weapons systems. By specifying which critical industries, resources, 60

Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 369. Also, interview with NSSM-1Ó9 review participant. 62 See Chapter 2, the section titled "Strategic Sufficiency." See also Statement ofMelvin A. Laird on the FY 1972-76 Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 1971, 92d Cong., ist session, p. 62; Melvin Laird, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1973, 15 February 1972 (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1972) p. 65; and Laird, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1973 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, hearings, 92 Cong., 2nd session, 1972, p. 361. 63 Interviews with uniformed JCS staff member, NSC staff member, and NSSM-1Ó9 review participant. 64 Thomas Powers has argued that this direction, which he interprets as an attempt by the United States to try to limit damage to itself in the event of an all-out war, "has all the signs of representing a bureaucratic compromise." Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," Atlantic Monthly, November 1982, p. 108. 61

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Developing a Policy Consensus leadership, and military targets should be attacked, a definable limit could be placed on the number of targets which needed to be destroyed, ostensibly placing a cap on the quantity of weapons required. Some officials further hoped the direction would force target planners to clarify target categorization. Clear identification of the most vital targets to be destroyed would reduce the number of weapons to be withheld through a conflict and free up more weapons to be used to target Soviet conventional forces in more modest attack options. To this end, the relevant guidance was written in such a way as not to expend too many weapons.65 The new direction would also appeal to the military, whose strategic planners adhered to the notion that deterrence was best effected by ensuring that the United States would come out best in a nuclear clash with the enemy.66 Targeting the Soviet Union in order to delay its capability to recover as a military, economic, and political power promised just such an outcome and so could be expected to find favor with the JCS. More widespread was the view that the deliberate killing of civilians was morally repugnant and not a policy that the United States should be seen to be pursuing. Nixon's foreign policy statements on the subject had made clear that the killing of civilians was not seen as acceptable. To continue to state publicly that the United States would seek to ensure the death of a certain percentage of the Soviet population would be distinctly at variance with presidential pronouncements. Decisive, however, was the growing body of public opinion in agreement with the president's assertion. A number of forceful arguments against retaining assured destruction had been made by defense analysts, largely on the basis of morality.67 The most eloquent of these was Fred Ikle, who in arguing the case for a strategy based on counterforce as opposed to countervalue targeting had scathingly pointed out that "our method for preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages—the mass killings of hostages."68 Many members of Congress 65

Interview with NSSM-1Ó9 review participant. Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. See, for example, Arthur Lee Burns, Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear Balance without Hostage Cities? (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 69, 1970); Michael M. May, "Some Advantages of a Counterforce Deterrence/' Orbis 14 (Summer 1970): 271-83; and Bruce M. Russett, "A Countercombatant Deterrent? Feasibility, Morality, and Arms Control," in The Military Industrial Complex: A Reassessment, ed. Samuel C. Sarkesian (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1972), pp. 201-42. 68 Fred Charles Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" Foreign Affairs 51 (January 1973): 281. 66

67

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agreed with Ikle's assessment and were concerned that U.S. policy continued to be based on the calculated slaughter of civilians.69 In this environment the Congress might resist the new doctrine if it were seen to preserve the emphasis on killing civilians. Therefore it was politically desirable to be perceived to shift the focus of U.S. targeting away from anything that could be construed as deliberately causing population casualties. Though the new formulation of impeding Soviet recovery was no more than a "distinction without a difference," for the United States would continue to target economic and industrial assets located in cities and so hold enemy civilians hostage, its wording would suggest otherwise. The objective was the same as before—that the United States not be worse off than the USSR subsequent to a general war—but the new approach removed the burden of the United States being seen to be deliberately targeting its nuclear weapons against cities with the intent to kill civilians. Another central issue not previously addressed which the panel looked at closely was how well the targeting policy would serve the United States in a crisis. This question was driven by Kissinger, who felt the issue had not been adequately examined by the NSTAP Review Panel. He remained convinced, even after the policy of detente had been firmly launched, that the relative decline of U.S. power with respect to the USSR would lead at some point to a serious superpower confrontation.70 An underlying assumption of the NSSM-1Ó9 panel, therefore, was that the United States would be faced with a major crisis in the next five to ten years in which it would be forced to contemplate nuclear use. Explored were such questions as what situations were likely to arise, what role nuclear weapons should play, and whether the options made sense with respect to possible U.S. objectives. The focus of deliberation was the Soviet Union, the state most likely to challenge the United States. But the panel also looked at the question from the perspective that the adversary need not be the USSR.71 U.S. nuclear targeting policy had to be functional in situations of confrontation with one of the other nuclear powers, or perhaps a neonuclear power, or even in circumstances in which the United States was faced with a defiant nonnuclear power. Nuclear 69 See, for example, U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Cosí Escalation in Defense Procurement Contracts and Military Posture and H.R. 6722, Fiscal Year 1974, hearings, 93d Cong., ist sess., 1973, 1:499. 70 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants. 71 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants.

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Developing a Policy Consensus weapons, if perceived by opponents as usable, might be effective in a crisis in deterring or coercing third parties, as well as the Soviet Union. The key to making nuclear weapons capable instruments of crisis diplomacy was seen to reside in the United States having comprehensively worked out how its force posture related to its targeting plans and how it would conduct a war should that prove necessary. Perhaps most critical was whether the revision of U.S. targeting guidance would induce a strong degree of caution in Soviet strategic risk calculations and whether it would provide adequate courses of action such that the United States would be sufficiently prepared to enter a crisis situation with the confidence and determination needed to stand firm in the face of Soviet intransigence. To achieve these effects, the United States needed to be prepared beforehand to deal with a crisis and, more important, to be perceived as being prepared before a crisis occurred. The United States would have to cultivate the perception that it was eminently ready to enter into a crisis confident and determined to have its way, while the Soviet Union had to be very clear as to what the United States could and might do with its nuclear posture in order to reduce miscalculation. But how should the United States convey to the Soviet Union what it was doing so that the USSR would know what to expect in a crisis?72 Clear statements about what the United States could do with its nuclear arsenal, coupled with the real capability to execute such a course of action, would impress upon the Soviet Union and third countries that the United States would seriously consider engaging in limited nuclear war to achieve its objectives. Therefore, declaratory statements of policy not only had to be much more explicit than in the past but also contrived to foster the appropriate message. A careful, calculated, public presentation of the new policy was imperative if it was to provide the instrument of foreign policy desired by Kissinger. A side issue addressed with respect to crisis management was the question of targeting conventional forces. The NSTAP Review Panel had expanded the targeting of conventional forces, but the guidance developed had still focused on Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces. More emphasis was now placed on having the target packages available to permit the United States to strike Soviet conventional 72

Interview with NSSM-1Ó9 review participant.

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forces located anywhere in the world.73 Discussion centered on the feasibility of holding Soviet conventional forces at risk. One aspect was whether the United States had the weapons systems with the requisite characteristics to do so. And equally pertinent was whether the United States had the surveillance capabilities to locate Soviet forces.74 Adequate surveillance would also be required to monitor the activities of the Soviet general-purpose forces, as well as, should the need ever arise, the impact of U.S. strikes against them. Although these issues were important, they involved questions of force requirements in which panel members did not want to become mired; thus they were ultimately left aside on the premise that if the OSD set the needed requirements, they would be developed.75 Immediately important was to have available the plans to target Soviet nonnuclear forces around the globe and to let the Soviet Union know that its conventional forces would be in jeopardy. The requirement for fashioning limited, regional nuclear options for peripheral campaigns did not feature prominently in panel discussions.76 Nevertheless, a significant amount of development work was accomplished on such options for noncentral campaigns, seemingly without the knowledge of the panel. Instigated by Kissinger, this work was performed by the working group and relevant military offices. Studies were done on seven major regions around the containment periphery to test the feasibility of limited, regional nuclear options. The group examined various contingencies, with critical attention being given to working through the practicalities of implementation and to detailing the necessary logistics.77 Kissinger was intent on ensuring that the United States would be properly prepared to manage a crisis on the margins of the superpower competition. NATO was the subject of some discussion in the NSSM-1Ó9 review. Both the United States and the USSR had strong interests in Europe, so panel members believed that the United States was mostly likely to use nuclear weapons there. Consequently, members examined the efficacy of the policy guidance for crisis management in the event of ^Herken, Counsels of War, p. 261; and Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic, 1989), p. no. Also, interviews with NSSM169 review participants. 74 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants. ^Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants. 76 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants. 77 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants.

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Developing a Policy Consensus a superpower confrontation in Europe. Studies included what sort of signals should be sent and how they should be conveyed. The NSSM169 panel also deliberated on how best to change the SIOP to force people to think flexibly about nuclear use in a NATO context and to think through the particular targeting problems that Europe posed.78 Some consideration was also given to the demanding question of how the United States should present the policy to the NATO allies. Minimization of the political repercussions to the formal introduction of the policy by the United States required meticulous groundwork. The process decided on was one of diligent and discrete prior consultation with selected European officials,79 to be followed with a carefully argued formal presentation before an official announcement. For all that the NSSM-1Ó9 officials were conscientious in addressing the question of NATO, the nature of the policy still confronted them with the challenging exercise of trying to square the circle in introducing it to the allies. A critical objective of the NSTAP Review Panel was to develop a bureaucratic consensus in favor of the targeting guidance to insure that it was not ultimately derailed. To accomplish this goal, panel members brought selected bureaucratic actors into the DoD process to solicit and, if necessary, incorporate their views. Consultations with State Department officials and Kissinger had two major impacts. First, the inclusion of the State Department officials, who were schooled in the nuances of transatlantic military and political relations and saw a need to refurbish the coupling of the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe, resulted in NATO becoming a central consideration late in the innovation process. Second, the inclusion of Kissinger, who had been concerned with making nuclear weapons useful in supporting U.S. efforts to contain possible Soviet advances on the periphery of the central superpower competition, resulted in the elaboration of the concept of limited, regional nuclear options and its application to a wider range of regional situations. Once the concerns of the State Department officials and Kissinger had been accommodated, the NSTAP Review Panel was able to propose that the policy guidance be considered by the White House for implementation as official U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy. 78 Interviews with NSSM-1Ó9 review participants. For example, one problem that had to be managed with respect to Europe was its extremely high population density. ^Interview with NSSM-1Ó9 review participant.

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Developing a Policy Consensus Transforming the NSTAP Review Panel's policy proposals into official U.S. policy took under a year. One major change was the reorientation of the U.S. objective away from the idea of targeting population directly to targeting the Soviet Union so as to impede its ability to recover as a major world power. This modification was made for a number of reasons and carried with it a strong undertone of political calculation. Several other adjustments were made during the NSSM169 interagency review, though these apparently occurred at the margins of the proposed targeting policy. An objective of the NSTAP Review Panel had been to orchestrate a consensus for its policy proposals. That the policy emerged relatively intact as official guidance, albeit somewhat rewritten, attests to the members' success. Although the DoD managed to maneuver the policy guidance through the bureaucratic maze with considerable dexterity, it was less successful in managing two crucial political constituencies: the Congress and U.S. allies. For the most part, the NSTAP Review Panel tended to neglect these two important players. Officials from the Department of State found that the policy guidance generally conformed with their ideas regarding how nuclear strategy should be revised to couple the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent more closely to the defense of Western Europe. Although the policy guidance had not been constructed with the intention of making first use more credible, it could be interpreted as making first use plausible. But the State officials believed that the notion of limited, regional nuclear options would not be welcomed by the European allies. Regional nuclear options were contrary to the allies' strategic preference for linking their security to that of the United States, through escalatory strategies that raised the prospect that any theater nuclear use would quickly become strategic in character. But regional nuclear options, designed to control escalation and facilitate war termination below the strategic level, were likely to be interpreted by the allies as an attempt by the United States to qualify its nuclear pledge significantly. Such a targeting approach raised the possibility of a nuclear war confined to Europe, with both the United States and the USSR remaining as sanctuaries from attack. From the perspective of the State officials, promulgation of the reformed targeting guidance would have political repercussions that would harm alliance relations. Emerging from this was a clear view that an objective of the United States had to be to manage the presentation of the new targeting policy to the Europeans very carefully so as not to disrupt NATO harmony severely.

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This theme was to be subsequently restated by the NSSM-1Ó9 interagency review. Recognizing that the European allies were bound to misinterpret the policy from what was intended, consideration was given in the NSSM-1Ó9 review as to how the United States should approach the European allies in order to soften the impact of the policy guidance. Whether this process would have worked is moot, for as the next chapter details, it was derailed when Schlesinger inadvertently let slip that the United States was going to change its nuclear targeting policy.

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[6] The Politics of Strategic Nuclear Policy By mid-April 1973 the interagency panel's effort had produced a broad consensus in support of a revision of U.S. nuclear strategy substantially as presented by the NSTAP Review Panel. The interagency group drafted a single-spaced, twenty-page document that provided detailed targeting guidance to the JCS and a shorter, more general memorandum for the White House which set forth new political guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear forces. These were forwarded as the official response to NSSM-1Ó9 for the consideration of the president in the fall of 1973.l Nixon initialed a draft memorandum late in 1973, thus signifying approval in principle with the conclusions of the interagency panel.2 The subsequent process of announcing and explicating the revision of U.S. nuclear strategic policy was infused with politics. ANNOUNCING NSDM-242 The political memorandum produced by the NSSM-iog panel was given to the NSC for further review before being presented to the president for his official signature. Although Kissinger appeared to have had no reservations regarding the political guidance for the targeting of U.S. strategic forces as set forth in NSDM-242,3 his view was 1 See Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 369. Also, interviews with participant in NSTAP Review and with NSC staff member. 2 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 185, 1983), p. 18. 3 See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, press conference, 21 March 1974, U.S.IS. Official Text, 22 March 1974. Also, interview with NSC staff member.

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not widely shared by the NSC staff. Once at the NSC (Kissinger was now secretary of state as well as the president's national security adviser), the memorandum languished. Many staff members were genuinely uninterested in the issue, but others were not convinced that limited nuclear options were a good idea.4 A few staff members were specifically worried that the highestpriority options advocated in the guidance consisted of counterforce strikes against Soviet silos, air bases, and other pertinent nuclear facilities, including command and control centers.5 The proposed guidance appeared to be a war-fighting or a counterforce, damagelimiting strategy6 One staff member believed this to be truly provocative. The staff member's assessment of the Soviet "triad" of strategic nuclear delivery systems was that each leg was relatively susceptible to attack. The Soviet bomber force was small, and Soviet submarines, carrying only single-warhead ballistic missiles, were so noisy that they were easily detectable. In such a milieu the staff member believed that the apparent counterforce, countersilo emphasis set forth in the guidance could easily be construed by the Soviet Union as posing a disarming first-strike threat against its deterrent. Based on this belief, the staff member, without authority, made some subtle alterations to the memorandum, shifting the nuance of the direction while adhering to its basic premises.7 It was this version of the NSSM-1Ó9 memorandum that first went to Nixon for consideration. Though Kissinger was seemingly unconcerned about the strategic implications of the new targeting doctrine, he appeared less sanguine about its potential political implications. Kissinger and NSC staff members David Aaron and Jan Lodal8 were worried that no study had been conducted in conjunction with the other studies to deter4 Inter view 5

with NSC staff member. For an explanation of why counterforce options appeared to have high priority, see Chapter 4, p. 126. That these strikes were assigned a high priority did not mean that they were to be executed first but that the United States had to ensure that it maintained the capacity to implement these strikes even if executing other nuclear options. 6 Interviews with NSC staff members. 7 Interviews with NSC staff members. The alteration reportedly involved the change of only a few words. See Philip Odeen, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options: Session II (NHP Oral History Transcript no. 4: Nuclear History Program, University of Maryland, 1994) p. 12. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 372, who suggested that David Aaron made some changes to the document. It is not clear whether Kissinger was ever aware that this change was made. 8 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 372.

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mine the weapons requirements needed to implement the revised strategy. Their concern stemmed in part from the particular political direction in the memorandum that, in line with the high-priority status assigned to counter force options, U.S. forces should have the capacity to attack all Soviet missile silos in a second strike.9 This requirement imposed a severe operational burden on U.S. strategic forces. The capability of the current force posture to carry out this directive with a degree of effectiveness after absorbing a Soviet first strike was questionable. As a result, the memorandum could effectively provide official justification for increasing demands by the Pentagon for greater force levels and more improved hard-target, killcapable weapons. Kissinger, Aaron, and Lodal recognized this aspect of the memorandum and were disturbed by the implications for future weapons acquisitions.10 On 22 January 1974, Kissinger had warned that "if the strategic arms race continues unchecked, it is inevitable that both sides will refine the number of their weapons, multiply their warheads, increase their accuracies, and develop strategies which will sooner or later, create the threat of a gap between the first and second strike capability . . . which would put a premium on striking first and therefore contribute to the danger of the outbreak of war/'11 Their concern seems to have been that new initiatives to build up American forces, even if only qualitatively, which might stem from internal pressure could jeopardize the SALT II negotiations and potentially stimulate a new phase in the arms race, undermining the carefully constructed framework of detente. As a consequence, they were reluctant to pass the memorandum on to the president for official authorization and sought to withhold it on the pretext that it needed more study.12 The attempt to bury the memorandum could not hope to succeed because of the consensus that had developed in support of the new strategy. The actual challenge to the NSC ploy came from James 9

Interview with NSC staff member. Interview with NSC staff member. 11 Henry A. Kissinger, press conference, 22 January 1974, U.S.I.S. Official Text, 23 January 1974. For other expressions of this thesis, see Kissinger, press conference, Brussels, 26 June 1974, U.S.IS. Official Text, 27 June 1974; and Kissinger, press conference, Moscow, 3 July 1974, U.S.I.S. Official Text, 4 July 1974. 12 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 372; and interview with NSC staff member. 10

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Schlesinger, who had been confirmed as secretary of defense in June 1973. Schlesinger had been a critic of nuclear doctrines based on massive attacks since his days at RAND in the 19605. He believed that because the United States was vulnerable to nuclear attack, it needed to have recourse to more-limited options in the event of aggression against its allies.13 Schlesinger in his confirmation hearings had testified that assured destruction was no longer a satisfactory strategy on which to base American security interests.14 When he took over the post of secretary of defense in July 1973, the NSSM169 study had been completed and was ostensibly moving toward implementation.15 The guidance that had been generated contained many elements that agreed with his thinking on nuclear strategy. Schlesinger was keen to move forward with the implementation of the new strategic targeting policy so he could concentrate on other issues that he strongly believed needed to be addressed. Several times in late 1973 he publicly hinted that the United States was going to promulgate a new strategic doctrine.16 These near revelations appear to reflect an increasing impatience with the lack of action on implementation.17 On 10 January 1974, during a question-and-answer period following a luncheon speech at the National Press Club in Washington, Schlesinger, in replying to a reporter's query about the difficulties of coordinating the administration's new position on SALT II, observed There is in prospect—or there has taken place, to be more precise—a change in the strategies of the United States with regard to the hypothetical employment of central strategic forces. A change in targeting strategy as it were.18 13 See, for example, James R. Schlesinger, Arms Interaction and Arms Control (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, P-388i, September 1968). 14 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of James R. Schlesinger, to Be Secretary of Defense, hearings, 93d Cong., ist sess., 18 June 1973, pp. 103-4 (hereafter cited as SCAS, Nomination Hearings). 15 Schlesinger, as head of the CIA, had known about the NSSM-1Ó9 study but had played no role in the development of the policy guidance. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 358-59 and 369. 16 See, for example, James Schlesinger, press conference, Washington, D.C., 30 November 1973, U.S.l.S. Official Text, i December 1974; and Juan Cameron, "The Rethinking of U.S. Defense/' Fortune, December 1973. 17 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 373. 18 "Flexible Strategic Options and Deterrence/' excerpts from the press conference of secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger, 10 January 1974, at the National Press Club, Washington, DC. reprinted in Survival 16 (March-April 1974): 86.

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The curious manner and choice of language used by Schlesinger to reveal a major change in security policy reflects the unintended nature of the announcement. Instead of a well-prepared, deliberate policy statement, Schlesinger unwittingly blurted out what was as yet a "prospective" change.19 Under further questioning, he compounded his mistake by indicating that the United States would pay more attention to targeting Soviet military targets and that the administration wanted to initiate the development of hard-target, kill-capable weapons systems.20 The improvised manner in which the new targeting doctrine was presented created a widespread impression that the United States was going to implement a counterforce, warfighting strategy. Schlesinger's blundered exposition of the new doctrine was met with considerable dismay within the administration. Kissinger was reportedly "infuriated."21 Although he did have some concerns about the new policy, Kissinger seems to have been incensed largely because it was Schlesinger who had made the announcement. Kissinger had labored to effect a change for five years, yet the revised strategic nuclear policy was subsequently dubbed the "Schlesinger Doctrine" after a man who had not played a part in its innovation.22 Knowledgeable officials in the NSC and in the OSD, however, were appalled not by the revelation itself but because Schlesinger had so erroneously misrepresented the new strategy in public. Schlesinger had to remedy the situation as soon as possible by making public a more comprehensive and suitable interpretation of the new policy.23 To set right the misunderstanding he had created, Schlesinger presented a carefully scripted briefing on 24 January that set forth more clearly the fundamentals and intent of the new strategy.24 Although this improved somewhat the general understanding of the new strategy, it did little 19 Inter view with OSD official. Some administration officials believed that Schlesinger's unofficial announcement was deliberate. 20 See "Flexible Strategic Options and Deterrence/' 21 Kaplan notes that Kissinger was "infuriated" but does not explain why. See Wizards of Armageddon, p. 373. 22 Much as his president had his "Nixon Doctrine/7 Kissinger seems to have had aspirations of having his own doctrine. See Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic, 1989), p. 118. 23 William Kaufmann was rushed back to Washington from Cambridge, where he taught, to help set forth a better exposition of the doctrine. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 373-7424 James R. Schlesinger, press conference, Washington, DC., 24 January 1974, U.S.IS. Official Text, 25 January 1974.

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The Politics of Strategic Nuclear Policy to ameliorate the political repercussions from the unanticipated nature of the announcement. The normal procedure for promulgating a major shift in defense policy would be for the government to notify and brief select members of Congress and NATO in advance of the public announcement so as to facilitate understanding and minimize the potential political backlash from two critical constituencies affected by such changes. But officials within the administration were caught completely unprepared by Schlesinger's announcement, so neither had been given advanced briefings on the impending change to U.S. nuclear security policy.25 To head off at least some of the Congressional ire and concerns, a more detailed exposition of the strategy was hurriedly written for inclusion in the Department of Defense's annual report for fiscal year 1975, due to be submitted to Congress that February.26 Schlesinger's precipitant announcement forced Kissinger and the NSC staff to act on the NSSM-iog political guidance memorandum despite their concerns. They had redrafted the memorandum for the president's authorization to include specific direction for a separate follow-on study to be carried out to determine the weapons requirements of the new targeting doctrine. As a consequence, NSDM-242 provided presidential direction for a study to develop guidelines for the implementation of an employment policy based on the political guidance, separately tasking an interagency panel to evaluate and set down the weapons requirements in an NSSM for the president's consideration within a set period of time.27 By mandating a study on the weapons requirements, Kissinger and his NSC staff were in effect attempting to interject the NSC into the early stages of the DoD's decision-making process for weapons procurement in order to exert immediate influence on the military's strategic hardware requests. Not only would this allow the NSC to restrain increased demands for more weapons, but it would also give Kissinger a degree of control over the DoD which he had hitherto been unable to gain. The study set to analyze the weapons requirements of NSDM-242 was NSSM-191. The interagency group convened to examine the 25

See Leon Sloss, Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, pp. 6-7. The section of the DoD report dealing with the new strategy was written by William Kaufmann, who was serving as an adviser to Schlesinger. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 373-7427 See Appendix, "National Security Decision Memorandum 242." Also, interviews with NSC staff members. 26

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The Politics of Strategic Nuclear Policy question was nominally chaired by Schlesinger, though this role was carried out largely by his designated representative, General Jasper Welch. Schlesinger recognized the study as being an instrument of Kissinger's bureaucratic machinations, which he was determined to frustrate. Schlesinger was well aware that the military would likely seek to use the new strategy to justify the procurement of more weapons, but he believed that this problem could be dealt with internal to the DoD.28 He was more concerned by what he saw as an attempt by the NSC to intervene in what he believed to be the DoD's institutional prerogative of determining its weapons acquisition needs.29 Schlesinger's resolve to block the NSC's incursion into the DoD's weapons acquisition process was reinforced because it was Kissinger, with whom he had an antipathetic relationship, who was behind the attempt.30 Schlesinger therefore instructed Welch to hinder progress on the NSSM-191 study. The interagency group did manage to put some recommendations down in a draft, but the study was quietly allowed to lapse that summer with its mandate unfulfilled.31 Right to the end of the innovation process, the issue of the force posture requirements to implement the revision to U.S. targeting policy proved to be too politically charged to be successfully addressed. Two events facilitated Schlesinger's ability to thwart Kissinger. First, the deepening Watergate scandal increasingly implicated the president as it unfolded through 1973 and 1974. As the congressional investigations progressed, the embattled Nixon became extremely preoccupied with the affair, almost to the exclusion of all else. As a result, Nixon suffered a distinct loss in his political authority to sustain his and Kissinger's policies. The second important event was the Arab-Israeli War in October. The crisis absorbed Kissinger in his attempt to conclude a Middle East peace settlement successfully, leaving him little time for domestic bureaucratic battles.32 The combina28 Schlesinger appears to have been convinced that he could resist bureaucratic pressures, and he made clear to the military that the strategy was not to be used to push for more weapons. James R. Schlesinger, interview, 'The Nuclear Age/7 Central TV, 20 February 1989. 29 Inter view with NSC staff member. 30 There appears to have been a renewed determination throughout the Pentagon not to let Kissinger continue to impose on U.S. arms policies. See Fred Emery, "Pentagon Puts Up Its Own Rival to Dr. Kissinger/' Times (London), 7 February 1974. 31 Interview with NSC staff member. 32 See Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 419.

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tion of Nixon's lack of interest and waning authority and Kissinger's Middle East shuttle diplomacy provided Schlesinger with the opportunity to derail the NSSM-191 study and, ultimately, to push through his conception of American security policy.

DECLARATORY STATEMENTS OF U.S. TARGETING POLICY Nixon's political troubles furnished Schlesinger with a degree of independence seldom enjoyed by most secretaries of defense in setting the defense agenda. Schlesinger appreciated the fortuitous nature of his circumstance and used to good advantage the freedom to maneuver which it gave him. Although he was generally happy with the targeting guidance as developed, he disagreed with some aspects. What he preferred was to expound publicly his preferred version of U.S. nuclear policy. Having gone public with the strategy of selective response caused unnecessary political problems with the Congress and the allies, but it also presented a golden opportunity. If he had prepared a speech to announce the shift, the various agencies interested in nuclear matters would probably have forced changes to be made at least to the margins of the message he wanted to put across. Once it was public, however, Schlesinger was in a position to continue to articulate his version of the strategy, leaving the various constituencies within the administration which favored doctrinal change with no alternative but to fall in behind his interpretation.33 Schlesinger was essentially free to interpret publicly the NSDM-242 guidance as he saw fit, which is exactly what he proceeded to do.34 One of the primary objectives Schlesinger hoped to accomplish during his tenure was to shift the focus of U.S. security efforts back to NATO. He had testified that "we have tended, because our attention has really been on South East Asia, to devote less thought to the NATO problem than perhaps it's deserved in terms of total U.S. responsibilities, commitments, and interests."35 Schlesinger was a confirmed Atlanticist and believed that Western Europe was the main 33

Interview with OSD official. Interview with OSD official. The most fundamental example of this was the notion of retardation. In publicly promulgating the policy of selective response, Schlesinger made no reference at any time to the notion of targeting the Soviet Union to impede its postwar recovery. Clearly he did not agree with this aspect of NSDM-242. ^SCAS, Nomination Hearings, p. 96; See also pp. 36-37. 34

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pillar of U.S. foreign interests, beside which all other overseas interests receded in significance.36 Schlesinger did not hold with Kissinger's geopolitical approach to nuclear strategy. When asked by Congress under what circumstances he felt the United States might need to resort to nuclear weapons, he consistently referred to NATO. Having done so in one instance, he continued: "It is very hard for me . . . to think of other circumstances in which the advantages involved in the use of nuclear weapons could in any way be commensurate with the risks. We are talking about a very low probability about an extremely great horror and, therefore, I cannot think of many circumstances in which this would be an appropriate response."37 Schlesinger was convinced that only in Western Europe, because of the cultural, economic, and political ties, and to a much lesser extent in the Middle East, because of the importance of oil, was it plausible for the United States to threaten to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of its interests.38 Schlesinger was also motivated to focus on Europe from the more purely practical point of view of selling the new strategy. The antimilitary, anti-interventionist mood of the country in the aftermath of the Vietnam War made it seem improbable that the American public would support U.S. defense efforts anywhere except in Europe.39 Schlesinger therefore added a heavy emphasis on NATO which was not present in the new policy guidance.40 This wasn't difficult, for all he had to do was add a strong political overtone to the declaratory aspect of what was a technical, politically indistinct guidance document for the targeting of U.S. strategic weapons. Politically, it made eminent sense to emphasize Europe in articulating the new policy, as this would direct America's attention back to Western Europe where Schlesinger thought it belonged and also make the policy much more salable to the domestic audience. Schlesinger had other reasons for focusing on Europe. He had an36

Interview with OSD official. James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, hearings, 93d Cong., zd sess., 4 March 1974, p. 12 (hereafter cited as U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies). See also Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in Europe, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., March-April 1974, p. 174 (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy). 38 Inter views with OSD officials. ^Interviews with OSD officials. 40 Inter views with OSD officials. 37

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The Politics of Strategic Nuclear Policy nounced the change to U.S. targeting practices before the political foundations seen as necessary to facilitate the European allies' acceptance of the new policy had been fully laid. Only a few allied officials had been consulted beforehand.41 According to Leon Sloss: "We had carefully prepared a scenario and an old-style statement to send off. . . .We were going to brief the NATO Allies . . . the Australians and the Canadians and the New Zealanders and the Japanese and the whole schedule got thrown off by [the] Schlesinger press conference/'42 The European allies were upset with the lack of prior consultation and about some of the implications of the strategy for their security. Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, had to be put through a hurried, intense briefing session on specific aspects of the strategy so that he could address the various concerns being expressed in Europe.43 Schlesinger, having started off on the wrong foot, had to make a concerted effort to restore the confidence of the allies in the probity of U.S. intentions. Schlesinger was also convinced that the allies needed to be reassured of the U.S. intent not to pull back from its defense commitment to Western Europe. In hearings held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Schlesinger testified that "for a variety of reasons associated with the U.S. doctrine or what was perceived as the U.S. doctrine, there have been those that have taken the credibility of the linkage between U.S. strategic forces and the security of West Europe to be waning."44 Schlesinger was referring in this instance to the effect of the Soviet achievement of relative strategic parity on West European perceptions with respect to the credibility of the U.S. determination to defend Europe through the resort to nuclear weapons.45 Although this issue did concern some Europeans, fears about the durability of the U.S. commitment stemmed as much, if not more, from other factors. Some European allies harbored such anxieties in part because of Schlesinger's poor handling the previous year of the issue of building a conventional deterrent for NATO.46 In the spring of 1971 the administration had initiated a sweeping study to examine the relative fighting capabilities of NATO and the 41

Interview with participant in NSTAP Review. Selective Nuclear Options, p. 7. Sloss, in ibid., pp. 7-8; and interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. 44 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 195. ^Schlesinger, testimony, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 13. 46 Inter view with OSD official.

42 Evolution of 43

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that had fostered West European anxieties over a possible pullback by the United States from its nuclear guarantee.52 Schlesinger's unheralded announcement about changing U.S. nuclear strategy once again caught the allies totally by surprise. Having not been forewarned, the European allies reacted warily to the announced adjustment in U.S. targeting policy. In part they were distressed that the United States had failed to consult with them about the impending change before making it public, for it appeared that the United States was foisting its strategic preferences on them. West Europeans also had some reservations about the potential implications of the actual substance of the promulgated doctrine. To the allies, Schlesinger's badly handled announcement strongly suggested a shift in U.S. nuclear strategy toward nuclear war fighting, which raised concerns about the American commitment to defend Europe with strategic forces.53 Schlesinger's impetuous announcement served to worsen already difficult transatlantic relations, which required that the allies be reassured about U.S. intentions if Schlesinger was to succeed in implementing his policy agenda. A discriminating depiction of selective response would hopefully calm European worries and restore confidence in the United States.54 Schlesinger therefore sought to represent publicly the change in U.S. nuclear policy to European audiences as more firmly coupling the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Western Europe.55 Schlesinger went so far as to suggest to Europeans that a desire to recouple the U.S. strategic deterrent to Europe had been an important consideration behind the development of selective response. In answer to a question by Laurence Martin on BBC Radio in October 1974, he claimed that the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent "is certainly still coupled to the security of Western Europe; that is a major reason behind the change in our targeting doctrine during the last year."56 While in Ramstein, Germany, in April 1974, Schlesinger had similarly noted 52 See 53

Chapter 2, pp. 44-48. For a discussion of European reactions, see Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 121, 1975/76), pp. 11-13. 54 Inter view with OSD official. ^See, for example, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 35; and U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 11 September 1974, pp. 41 and 44 (hereafter cited as Briefing on Counterforce Attacks). Ajames R. Schlesinger, interview by Laurence Martin, "Analysis," BBC Radio 4, 24 October 1974, reprinted in Public Statements by the Secretaries of Defense, Part 4: The

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that "one of the earlier objectives [of the new doctrine] was to reestablish confidence in Europe in the American strategic commitment to the defense of Europe. I don't know whether that was the most important one or to make clear to the Soviets that, do not assume that we will be self-deterred from employing our strategic forces."57 Through such messages, Schlesinger clearly hoped to reassure the West European allies about the intentions of the United States and to reinvigórate their flagging confidence.58 Publicly interpreting NSDM-242 as flexible response further allowed Schlesinger to incorporate his other major concern—beefing up NATO's conventional forces—into the strategic renewal.59 Schlesinger had long believed that far too much attention had been paid to nuclear weapons and their role in the defense of NATO and that the development of its conventional forces had suffered as a consequence.60 Testifying before a Senate hearing on his confirmation, he had maintained that NATO should aspire to posture an effective conventional deterrent.61 But he was under pressure from Congress to draw down U.S. troops in Europe, which led the European allies to question the willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons in their defense. Schlesinger needed to convince both the Congress and the NATO allies of the need to devote more resources to develop the alliance's nonnuclear capabilities. Some members of Congress worried that the introduction of limited nuclear options materially lowered the nuclear threshold, making the resort to nuclear weapons more likely. Schlesinger endeavored to curb congressional support for pulling back U.S. forces from Europe by arguing that the best means to ensure that the nuclear threshold remained high was for NATO to have a strong nonnuclear deterrent.62 Schlesinger believed that the allies had to improve their contributions to NATO's general-purpose forces,63 but Nixon and Ford Administrations: James R. Schlesinger, 1974 (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1982), 9:2,894 (hereafter cited as PSSD, 1974). 57 James R. Schlesinger, background press conference with German editors (NATO backgrounder), Ramstein, Germany, 20 April 1974, in PSSD, 1974, 6:2,017. 58 Inter view with OSD official. 59 Interview with OSD official. 60 Interviews with OSD officials. 61 SCAS, Nomination Hearings, pp. 36-37. 62 See, for example, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, p. 7; and Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 179. 63 See, for example, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 166.

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his experience of the year before had demonstrated just how sensitive this issue was with them. If not handled correctly, pushing for a conventional deterrent could widen instead of narrow the gap between the allies and the United States. In part with this in mind, Schlesinger sought to interpret selective response publicly as flexible response writ large. Schlesinger introduced the idea of the "NATO triad," arguing that its three components—conventional forces, tactical nuclear forces, and the U.S. strategic forces—interacted to deter Soviet aggression.64 He propounded this notion to reassure the allies that an effective conventional deterrent would still be unequivocally backed by both the U.S. theater deterrent and the strategic deterrent. Restoring European confidence in the reliability of the U.S. nuclear commitment would hopefully lessen the reluctance of the allies to the strengthening of NATO's conventional defense capabilities. Making this claim would also help to allay European concerns about the U.S. effort to implement a strategy of limited, regional nuclear options in Europe. Schlesinger supported the integration of such options as part of the overall U.S. strategic doctrine.65 He left no doubt that theater nuclear weapons were considered an integral part of the doctrine of selective response. In a written reply for the record for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Schlesinger pointed out that theater nuclear weapons "not only comprise a significant part of the NATO triad and deterrent posture, but also provide us with a range of options other than the use of strategic weapons should conventional defense fail."66 But in a written answer to a question regarding whether theater nuclear systems connected the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe, he was most uncompromising: "We do not view . . . that theater nuclear forces are the logical stepping-stone to all-out nuclear war. Rather, we view theater nuclear forces as helping to deter both conventional and nuclear attacks, and at the same time giving the Alliance appropriate options with which to respond to various levels of aggression without resorting to all-out nuclear war."67 Inherent was the idea that the United States would seek to contain any conflict to the region of origin, in terms of level, scope, and duration, whether this be in Europe or elsewhere. 64 See, for example, James R. Schlesinger, Annual Department of Defense Report, Fiscal Year 1975, 4 March 1974, p. 8 (hereafter cited as DoD Report, FY1975); and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 8. 65 Interviews with OSD officials. ^Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 158. 67 Ibid., p. 204.

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Schlesinger exercised considerable tact in discussing this issue, generally cautioning, as he did in his interview with Martin on BBC Radio, that theater nuclear forces were not necessarily the option of first resort.68 He obviously could not publicly explicate the entire foundation of strategic thought that underlay the notion of limited, regional nuclear options. A sustained effort to do so would serve only to alarm West Europeans that the United States was attempting to uncouple itself from Europe. Moreover, it was not necessarily a message that the United States would want to send to the USSR, for it might undermine deterrence. So the idea that the United States might attempt to confine the use of its nuclear weapons to the region in which a conflict erupted tended, in U.S. declaratory statements of policy, to be a latent and glossed-over facet of escalation control. In other forums, however, Schlesinger expounded a somewhat different view of the connection between the development of the new U.S. strategy and the requirement to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe. Responding to a query from Senator Edmund Muskie about whether "the principal stimulus for developing this strategy arises out of the European problem," Schlesinger testified: No, Sir, I think it is much broader than Europe. It is external at this time to the United States because the Soviet capabilities have not come along so rapidly as we expected some years ago. The timing of this relates less to the United States than to the external obligations, but in the longer run it relates to the United States as well. We might have postponed this public discussion if we were thinking exclusively in terms of the U.S. Zone of Interior—USZI—because the Soviets would not, until they had deployed these improved forces, contemplate such an attack upon the USZI. It is the external obligations that have given force to the timing as well as the need . . . to lay before the American public as well as the world public the fundamental calculus on which we base our strategies.69

In this instance, Schlesinger quite plainly indicated that it was the desire to deter attacks against the United States, as well as to refurbish the general deterrent that the United States extended to protect ^PSSD, 1974, 9:2,894. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 196.

69

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its overseas interests, which had motivated strategic innovation.70 Implicit to this statement was that a desire to couple U.S. strategic forces to the defense of Europe had not been a driving factor. Schlesinger clearly tended to tailor his message to the audience he was addressing. When speaking mainly for domestic consumption, he tended to be more forthright about the equivocal role that a perceived need to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Europe played in stimulating the innovation process and more forceful about the need to deter attack against the United States. Schlesinger had to fashion his presentation to create the right impression in dealing with congressional audiences as much as he did with his European audience. An essential element of the security guarantee extended by the United States to its allies was its pledge to use nuclear weapons first if necessary. Although the new doctrine had not been devised with this in mind,71 the spectrum of escalating response options lent itself to first use should the United States so desire. But to make such a case publicly, which would reassure the allies, would antagonize the Congress.72 Since 1969 many members of Congress had been concerned that the Nixon administration appeared to be seeking to acquire a first-strike capability.73 Indeed, a central concern expressed by members of the Congress was that the new doctrine seemed to make the use of nuclear weapons much easier to contemplate, which for some senators was a most troublesome prospect.74 To tell them bluntly that the United States would seriously consider employing nuclear weapons first to protect Western Europe would be an act of political folly. Schlesinger therefore sought to justify limited nuclear options by arguing that they were needed to deter prospective limited strikes by the Soviet Union against the United States.75 He had to strain to make his case, however, for he had to admit that Soviet strategic thinking or doctrine evidenced no interest in such controlled strategic attacks.76 70 Earlier in the year Schlesinger had more ambiguously stated that "the new targeting doctrine is designed in part with this requirement in mind/' U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1:44. 71 Interviews with participants in NSTAP Review. ^Interview with OSD official. 73 See Chapter 3, p. 92. 74 See, for example, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 14 and 29; and Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 179.

^Interview with OSD official. 76

See Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 193; Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, p. 52; and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 5.

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Nonetheless, he maintained that the growth of Soviet strategic forces did provide the capability to engage in constrained strikes against targets in the United States other than cities, such as the U.S. landbased deterrent force, and that this capability would grow as the Soviet Union proceeded to modernize its force with new generations of MIRVed ICBMs.77 The basis of his argument was that because the United States could not know the intentions of its opponent, it had to guard against the possibility that the Soviet Union might choose to employ limited strikes. As he argued, "If our only option were to be able to launch massive strikes against the Soviet urban industrial base, the Soviets in these hypothetical circumstances . . . might believe that the United States would be self-deterred and that, therefore, they could with relatively low risk selectively attack the interior of the United States/'78 If the United States was to deter such limited nuclear attacks against its deterrent force or to forestall the Soviet Union from believing it could extract political-military gains by being able to threaten such attacks, it needed a capability to retaliate in kind or in proportion.79 In spite of the stress he put on this threat, Schlesinger did not actually believe a disarming first strike likely80 or even feasible.81 Rather, he believed that war, if it occurred, would happen in Europe, and it was there that the United States most needed to deter a Soviet invasion.82 In emphasizing the prospective threat of limited strategic attacks by the Soviet Union, Schlesinger sought to divert close attention away from the politically unpalatable question of first use.83 Propagating this threat also served to placate those defense conservatives, such as Senator Henry Jackson, who had been arguing since the SALT I ratification hearings that the United States should accept nothing less than equality with the Soviet Union in numbers and capabilities, on the premise that force matching would neutralize the threat.84 These legislators focused on bolt-from-the-blue scenarios 77 See, for example, DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 4; and Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 19 and 53. 78 Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, p. 9. 79 See, for example, DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 27; Schlesinger, testimony, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 8-9, 13, and 17; and Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 9 and 53. 80 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 374-76; Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 268; and interview with OSD official. 81 See U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 15-17, 19, and 49. 82 Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, p. 41. 83 Inter view with OSD official. 84 See Chapter 2, the section titled "Essential Equivalence."

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rather than the more likely possibility that war would first erupt overseas without directly involving the continental United States.85 Their primary concern stemmed from worry that as the Soviet Union applied MIRV technology to its higher-throw-weight ICBM force, the U.S. Minuteman force would become increasingly vulnerable to attack. A successful strike against the land-based deterrent force would severely cripple the capability of the United States to retaliate against most target sets except soft targets, the most notable being urban industrial centers. The emphasis these conservative legislators placed on equality created a climate largely receptive only to solutions based on matching or proportional capabilities. Schlesinger, seeking to accommodate their concerns, pointed out that "nuclear threats to our strategic forces, whether limited or large scale, might well call for an option to respond in kind against the attacker's military forces."86 His attempt was to reassure them by indicating that the availability of limited nuclear options furnished the United States with a capability that would serve to offset any such prospective Soviet counterforce capacity,87 thereby maintaining a relative symmetrical balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities. In essence, he provided a political response to obviate the expected Soviet threat to the Minuteman force. By highlighting the theoretical threat of limited Soviet strategic strikes, Schlesinger hoped to establish an appropriate political context that would facilitate congressional acceptance of the revised targeting strategy. Schlesinger distinctly tailored the declaratory statements to further his political agenda of concentrating U.S. defense efforts on NATO. At the same time, he couched his articulation of NSDM-242 in a manner designed to account for the political sensibilities of both his European and American audiences. Thus he created the impression that the revision of U.S. targeting policy had been undertaken, at least in part, because of a perceived need to ensure that the United States strategic deterrent was solidly coupled to the security of Europe. For the purpose of ameliorating congressional concerns, Schlesinger tended to stress the possibility that the USSR might seek to move toward strategies based on limited strategic counterforce strikes 85

Interview with OSD official. ^DoD Report, FY 1975, p. 38. 87 See, for example, Briefings on Counterforce Attacks, pp. 21, 27, and 34; and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, pp. 9 and 23.

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and that the United States needed a similar capability to deter this prospective threat. Neither Kissinger nor the NSTAP Review Panel, however, had been motivated to renovate U.S. targeting practices with either of these two objectives in mind. In propagating these rationales for innovating U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine, Schlesinger did not compromise the basic principles of the guidance policy.88 Nor was his presentation entirely misleading, for the new policy could serve these ends. What Schlesinger did, rather, was recast an essentially technical policy document so that the declaratory statements of policy conformed with current political realities and furthered the political objectives of the United States. The failure to manage the introduction of NSDM-242 to Congress and the European allies greatly complicated the problem of gaining their acceptance for the change in policy. At the same time, however, it allowed Schlesinger to act as virtually the sole public articulator of NSDM-242 and so control the declaratory statements of policy. The operating principles of the nuclear strategy enunciated by Schlesinger were consistent with those set forth in the memorandum. Nevertheless, his exposition of why the United States had undertaken to renovate its nuclear targeting practices diverged from the reasons that had in fact motivated administration officials to do so. To reassure the allies of the surety of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and to reorient U.S. attention to questions of European security, Schlesinger expounded the notion that a key objective of the new policy had been to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Western Europe. This had several consequences. First, it created a central political objective for the policy which had not been a driving consideration in its development. Second, a pivotal feature of the concept of escalation control—limited, regional nuclear options—was downplayed, seemingly to temper the apparent contradiction it posed to the contention that selective response coupled U.S. security to that of Europe. At the same time, Schlesinger tailored his exposition to the sensitivities and concerns of the Congress. In justifying the change in policy, he asserted a need for a strategy based on limited nuclear options in order to deter a prospective Soviet capability to engage in less than all-out attacks against the United States. Yet such a Soviet 88

Interviews with OSD officials.

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capability had not been a significant concern to the officials who had formulated the targeting policy. In essence, Schlesinger propagated the possible threat of limited Soviet strategic attacks, which he and most other strategic planners in the administration believed to be exceedingly remote, to set the right political tone to facilitate congressional acceptance of the change in strategy. In doing so, however, he provided an inadvertent impetus to the controversial question of Minuteman vulnerability, which was to plague U.S. security politics in the years ahead.89 Thus Schlesinger's convictions and political sensitivity led him to attribute to the innovation process objectives that had not in fact had any practical influence on the development of the reformulated targeting guidance. Schlesinger neither misrepresented NSDM-242 nor made claims for its function which it could not serve. Its creators had embodied in it sufficient flexibility through limited nuclear options to provide a means either to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the protection of Western Europe or to deter possible limited Soviet nuclear attacks if the U.S. leadership so desired. Yet Schlesinger's emphasis on NATO and on Soviet counterforce attacks ultimately did serve to mask the two main strategic objectives that had impelled the revision of U.S. strategic nuclear policy: to support U.S. foreign policy on the periphery of the superpower competition and to terminate any nuclear conflict at the lowest level of damage consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies. 89 Reportedly, Schlesinger was later to lament this effect of his presentation. See Herken, Counsels of War, p. 268.

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[7] Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance The final phase of the innovation process was to translate NSDM242 into actual plans for the targeting of U.S. weapons. Implementing NSDM-242 essentially had two aspects. First, an array of targeting plans for the employment of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons had to be constructed and incorporated into the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Second, limited, regional nuclear options, which were not to be included in the SIOP, had to be worked through. Implementing limited, regional nuclear options was complicated by the need, particularly in the case of targeting alternatives for Europe, to consult fully with U.S. allies. THE SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN The first step in the implementation process was to transform the political guidance set forth in NSDM-242 into concrete policy for the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Conducted by civilian and military staff in the Pentagon, this study moved ahead fairly rapidly Two policy documents, the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons and the associated Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), were produced in just over two months. Signed by Schlesinger on 4 April 1974, the NUWEP document provided the "planning assumptions, attack options, targeting objectives and the damage levels needed to satisfy the political guidance."1 1 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper 185, 1983), p. 19.

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The process of implementing the NUWEP was managed under the auspices of an ad hoc committee on nuclear policy, headed by Don Cotter, the deputy secretary of defense for atomic energy and one of Schlesinger's confidants. One of the committee's tasks was to monitor the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) to ensure that policy guidance was met.2 The JCS, however, made absolutely clear that the direct involvement of civilian officials from the Office of Systems Analysis, the State Department, or the National Security Council staff in the generation of operational employment plans would not be tolerated. To circumvent this problem and assure the cooperation of the JCS, Commander James Martin, USN, and General Jasper Welch, USAF, both of whom had been deeply involved in the NSTAP Review as members of its working group, and Colonel Jack Ohlsteen, U.S. Army, were assigned to join Cotter on the ad hoc panel to serve as interlocutors for the civilian leadership with the military target planners. The JCS found this acceptable because these three were serving military officers and therefore viewed as being controllable.3 Even having agreed to the change in U.S. targeting practices, the military remained wary about the possibility that the exercise might be used by the civilians to intrude into the detailed operational aspects of nuclear targeting. Military officials also remained skeptical of the practicality of incorporating limited nuclear options into the SIOP. According to General Russell Dougherty, many members of the JSTPS had an "inherent subjective feeling that you could not control the use of nuclear weapons, and if you could not control them you could not have limited nuclear options/'4 Such a view stemmed in part from a recognition that current command and control capabilities were likely not adequate to manage the complexity involved in the execution of a wide range of limited nuclear options in a war situation. Target planners also tended to be resistant to the concept of limited nuclear options because of concern that their execution would disrupt the SIOP as a whole. The preference was to keep the target planning simple, on the basis that the more complicated the plans were, the more likely it was that something would go wrong. Other officers, however, took 2

Inter view with OSD official. with OSD officials. General Russell Dougherty, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options: Session II (Nuclear History Program Oral History Transcript no. 4: Nuclear History Program, University of Maryland, 1994), p. 16. 3 Inter views 4

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the position that even if no one was convinced that nuclear use could be kept limited, it made sense at least to try to construct some limited options. Moreover, regardless of the doubts harbored by some of the target planners, the political authorities required that the JSTPS develop limited nuclear options. Still, it took some initial pushing by political authorities such as Schlesinger before the target planners began in the summer of 1974 to construct limited nuclear options.5 Translating the NUWEP guidance into practical operational target plans proved less than straightforward. U.S. war plans had to be reoriented to reflect the concepts of escalation control and a strategic reserve force.6 Military strategic target planners found converting conceptual policy guidance into practical target plans a complicated business. First they had to specify the objective to be achieved and then determine the type or types, number, and location of the targets to be destroyed. Damage expectancy and acceptable levels of collateral damage then had to be accounted for in each instance. Once the individual packages had been developed, they had to be structured into an STOP, which meant establishing rates of fire, timing of attacks, and weapons to be used, among other factors, in such a way that the execution of limited nuclear options did not disrupt the capability to implement the plan in its entirety. Although the nuclear planners learned with practice that they could develop such limited nuclear options, correlating target packages to be destroyed with the required political objectives proved to be extremely challenging, if not impossible, to accomplish. Military planners had difficulty in deciphering what the guidance meant and, moreover, what the purpose would be of employing nuclear weapons.7 Schlesinger and other involved civilian analysts were constantly queried about how targeting plans were to be related to the political objectives as called for in the guidance.8 Eliciting a firm answer turned out to be impossible, for no one could say with confidence just what the context for nuclear use might be.9 OSD officials, aware of the uncertainties involved in predetermining objectives, nevertheless 5 See discussion among Don Cotter, General Russell Dougherty, Philip Odeen, and Leon Sloss, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, Session II, pp. 16-17. 6 See Don Cotter, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options: Session II, p. 5. 7 See General Russell Dougherty and Leon Sloss, in The Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options: Session //, p. 33. 8 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. 9 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member.

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sought to engender a degree of flexible, innovative thinking in the approach to formulating options by the JSTPS planners. But Nixon's travails over Watergate and the subsequent demise of his administration impinged adversely on the implementation process. As policymakers at the "highest levels'7 came to be increasingly preoccupied with the scandal, less and less attention was paid to developing the details of the plan.10 Lacking clear policy direction, military strategic planners remained, for the most part, convinced that a strategy of limited nuclear options as described in the policy guidance was not workable. Still, pressed by the ad hoc committee on nuclear policy, the development of target packages did proceed. The military would draw up and present a plan to the political overseers, then would return to the drawing board to refine it more before resubmitting it for further consideration.11 Each option therefore tended to go through a number of iterations before an acceptable and practical option was completed.12 The process of developing acceptable limited options was a learning experience, and progress was slow, but an SIOP was eventually worked out. SIOP-5, as the final product was called, was approved in December 1975 and took effect on i January 1976.13 For the JSTPS planners, in developing the war plan the "one overriding concept on all the Limited Nuclear Options . . . was [that] they were a piece of the fabric of the whole and when you pulled them out you didn't destroy the whole."14 SIOP-5 was based on four main classes of targets: Soviet nuclear forces; other military (conventional) targets; military and political leadership targets; and economic and industrial targets. Each of these were broken down into a wide range of target types.15 Available were four general categories of attack options: Major Attack Options (MAOs); Selective Attack Options (SAOs); Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs); and Regional Attack Options (RAOs).16 Each of 10

See Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot, "U.S. Strategy in Evolution/' Strategic Review 12 (Winter 1984): 23. 11 See General Russell Dougherty, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, pp. 17 and 33. 12 General Russell Dougherty, in ibid., pp. 14 and 33. 13 Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 19. 14 General Russell Dougherty, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 16. 15 See US. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1981, hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, p. 2,721. 16 Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, pp. 23-24. Also, interviews with OSD official and uniformed JCS staff member.

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these categories of options encompassed a range of further options, including withholds, such as "population centres, national command and control centres, particular countries targeted in the SIOP, and 'allied and neutral territory/"17 The MAOs were essentially massive, preplanned options aimed to destroy the spectrum of fixed targets from all four main target categories. These options could include virtually the entire U.S. strategic arsenal but could also be implemented in smaller sets of several hundred. SAOs consisted of a small number (between ten and twenty) of relatively large-scale, preplanned attacks to be implemented with strategic weapons. These options, which ranged in size up to a thousand weapons,18 were mission-oriented strikes designed to attack specified fixed Soviet capabilities. Each was based on a particular, preestablished political consideration that required the destruction of the fixed targets included in the package. One example of an SAO would be the suppression of Soviet air defense systems to facilitate U.S. bomber penetration;19 another would be prepared plans to attack Soviet military facilities near Iran so as "to degrade Soviet capabilities to project military power in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region for a period of at least 30 days."20 Despite being constructed to fulfill particular missions and meet specific political considerations, SAOs were designed to contribute positively to the objective of the full execution of the SIOP as well.21 Both the MAOs and SAOs were the only preplanned actions to be executed with U.S. strategic nuclear forces and therefore the only targeting alternatives actually incorporated into SIOP-5. The LNOs and RAOs were part of U.S. strategic planning but existed separately from the SIOP-5. LNOs consisted of small packages of about ten to twenty fixed targets that were to be attacked with U.S. strategic forces. An important characteristic of these modest options was that they were not preplanned and were therefore not incorporated into the SIOP. Rather, LNOs were to be purpose-oriented, selec17

Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 24. See Don Cotter, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 19. 19 Don Cotter, in ibid.; and interview with OSD official. 20 Jack Anderson, "U.S. Said to Prepare Mideast Options," Washington Post, 24 December 1980, cited in Ball, Targeting for Strategk Deterrence, p. 24. 21 See Don Cotter and General Russell Dougherty, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 19. 18

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tive strikes that would be fashioned in an ad hoc manner in light of the prevailing political and military situation and the objective desired.22 RAOs included both preplanned and non-preplanned nuclear options aimed at fixed and mobile targets, respectively. Generally being in the range of several hundred weapons each, these regional attacks were to be implemented with theater nuclear forces or, in the case of NATO, with theater nuclear weapons in conjunction with the American and British SLBMs allocated to the defense of the alliance. In instances where timeliness would be important or a theater nuclear weapon could not be placed on the requisite targets, strategic forces (in essence an LNO) could be used to execute the attack.23 In addition to these categories of options, a certain number of strategic forces, selected from the most survivable systems in each leg of the strategic triad, were to provide a strategic reserve force that existed outside of the SIOP.24 This strategic reserve force, not being allocated to cover any preplanned attacks, would presumably be used to execute LNOs as required. The operationalization of NSDM-242 appears to have been affected by the lack of thorough and ongoing political oversight and, more important, the intractable nature of determining under what circumstances and to what purpose nuclear weapons might be employed. The preplanned SIOP-5 consisted of a range of large-scale attacks, the smallest entailing the detonation of at least several hundred weapons. Seemingly dominant were the MAOs, which would include the largescale counterforce attacks in SIOP-63 but reorganized so they could be implemented in smaller allotments. New in the context of the MAOs was the requirement to impede the recovery of the Soviet Union as a military, economic, and political power. Contrary to the expectations of some strategic planners,25 this requirement resulted in a very generous expansion of possible targets to be destroyed. Thus, in some respects the preset targeting plans of SIOP-5 differed little from the preceding SIOP-63. Nevertheless, SIOP-5 provided a much fuller menu of targeting options than had previously been available. ^Interviews with OSD officials and uniformed JCS staff member. 23 See Leon Sloss, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 15; and interview with OSD official. 24 Interview with uniformed JCS staff member. 25 See Chapter 5, pp. 176-77. [209]

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The graduated, limited nuclear options that the NSTAP Review Panel recommended appear not to have survived the process of implementation. In their stead were the SAOs, which were still relatively large in scale and scope. Although they were oriented to achieve some particular objective or to deal with a likely scenario, their appropriateness in any particular situation was undermined by the fact that they were preplanned. Target planners provided, in the form of LNOs, for the National Command Authority to be able to improvise some small retaliatory responses tailored to specific circumstances. But should a conflict ever proceed to a point where RAOs or LNOs were no longer useful, the apparent size and preplanned nature of the remaining SIOP options would appear to make the likelihood of controlling escalation and terminating war early increasingly improbable. NATO AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NSDM-242 Limited, regional nuclear options were never intended to be incorporated into the SIOP. Target planners had to develop pertinent limited options for each of the many theaters of operations, such as Korea and East Asia, where a considered U.S. response to aggression might include nuclear use.26 These options were to be implemented mainly with theater nuclear forces, and where appropriate, they were to be worked up in conjunction with U.S. allies. The promulgation of the strategy of selective response, with the included concept of limited, regional nuclear options, therefore intersected with the debate with NATO on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the strategy of flexible response. Divisions between the United States and its European allies on how tactical nuclear weapons were to be employed remained unresolved in 1974.27 Schlesinger bluntly explained that the reason NATO had yet to devise a workable doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons was because of "differences in judgment about the suitability of tactical nuclear weapons and their employment in Western Europe."28 26

See, for example, Don Cotter in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 16. See Chapter 2, the section titled "The Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons/' James Schlesinger, testimony, US. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in Europe, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., March-April 1974, p. 159 (hereafter cited as Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy). 27 28

[210]

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See Michael J. Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1983), p. 19. 30 Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 219-20. 31 Legge, NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, p. 21. 32 Ibid., p. 26-27.

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Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance In May 1972 the United States, Britain, and West Germany commenced a Phase II study to compare and then synthesize the conclusions of the Phase I studies into a workable policy. According to Michael Legge, the study was "irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that if the initial signal failed adequately to convey the twin messages of NATO's determination to resist and the risks thereby involved in continuing the conflict, then the signal would have to be repeated in a more peremptory manner."33 Moreover, it was recognized that to present NATO's will to resist most strongly, follow on use should be directed against Warsaw Pact forces in a manner designed to achieve maximum military effect. But even such large-scale employment of nuclear weapons was not expected to lead to the defeat of the Warsaw Pact. The only sure result, the study found, would be unacceptable levels of damage to NATO territory.34 Any prolongation of a war at the theater nuclear level would be disastrous for Europe, while the outlook for being able to constrain escalation and to halt the war appeared dim. As implied by the study, recourse to tactical nuclear weapons could work only to increase the grave risk that hostilities would escalate to all-out nuclear war. The conclusions of the studies reinforced the differences between the United States and the European allies on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. For the Europeans, the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons would result in the devastation of a considerable portion of Europe confirmed their worst fears. In their view, a far better alternative was avoidance of conflict, whatever the level, by making clear to the Warsaw Pact through the threat of early first use that hostilities would quickly escalate out of control, which for many meant that NATO should be prepared to turn quickly to strategic weapons to escalate the conflict.35 For the United States, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons appeared destined only to generate irresistible escalatory pressures that could quickly eventuate in the devastation of the United States as well as Europe. Lacking reasonable plans for terminating any conflict in Europe, the United States would in effect be faced with the 33

34

Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid. See, for example, Laurence Martin, "Military Issues: Strategic Parity and Its Implications/' in Retreat from Empire: The First Nixon Administration, Robert E. Osgood et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 167; Paul Buteux, Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 35

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dilemma of surrender or suicide, neither of which was politically palatable. To forestall escalatory impulses at the theater nuclear level required targeting procedures that offered the prospect of controlling escalation while convincing the Warsaw Pact of the futility of continuing its aggression. From the perspective of the United States, NATO thus had to devise a credible operational capability to intensify the conflict through a militarily effective and geographically circumscribed application of tactical nuclear weapons which would not automatically propel the conflict to the strategic level. Despite continued prodding from the increasingly frustrated United States to settle the debate over NATO doctrine for tactical use, the Nixon administrations failed to make concrete progress. Indeed, such was the disparity of views on NATO's nuclear strategy that one Pentagon official summed up the situation in 1974 thus: "NATO can agree philosophically on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons under certain theoretical situations, but they're not about to agree on when to fire them. No one is going to rush into using nuclear weapons early. We would scrape every piece of conventional force we could find before we would go nuclear."36 Faced with the prospect that actual nuclear use would leave Europe a ruin, European NATO officials were reportedly increasingly reluctant to consider seriously operational planning for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. U.S. officials working on operational planning were becoming frustrated with their European colleagues' unwillingness to think through the myriad issues attendant to nuclear use.37 From the U.S. point of view, a strategy for terminating any NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict short of strategic nuclear war had to be developed against the possibility that first deterrence, then conventional defense, failed in Europe.38 Operational planning was necessary if only to support the psychological perspective of deterrence, which required that NATO be prepared, and be seen to be prepared, to use tactical nuclear weapons reiteratively. pp. 134-36; and Paul Lewis, ''US. Orders New Shells for N-Weapons in Europe/' Financial Times, 11 May 1973. 36 Official quoted in Lloyd Norman, "The Reluctant Dragons: NATO's Fears and the Need for New Nuclear Weapons," Army (February 1974), reprinted in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 300. 37 Inter view with OSD official. 38 For a public expression of this view, see Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 19705; The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to Congress, 9 February 1972 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), p. 49.

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Schlesinger indicated that it was his intention to try to conclude the debate, saying, "The main point that I would stress is that the changes in our tactical nuclear doctrine should fit in ... with the changes in the strategic doctrine so that we can have a seamless web."39 He was fairly explicit about what this meant, arguing that "NATO still needs improved doctrines for the tactical use of nuclear weapons. This includes the ability to control escalation if the Alliance must resort to the use of nuclear weapons/'40 European strategic prescriptions for tactical nuclear use were not acceptable to the United States, being incompatible with the new U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine. If selective response was to provide some possibility that escalation could be controlled and conflict terminated below the threshold of strategic exchanges, the U.S. conception of theater nuclear employment had to prevail in the NATO debate over the use of nuclear weapons. A preeminent question for the European allies would be whether the change in U.S. nuclear doctrine meant something different about American intentions toward NATO. To convince the European allies that it did not, the United States had to persuade them of the strategic virtues of selective response and, more important, of limited, regional nuclear options. This entailed demonstrating that the United States, in promoting these options, was not attempting to disengage its security from that of Europe. The U.S. argument followed from its perspective that a deterrent threat, to be credible to an opponent, had to be one that the United States was prepared and was perceived as being prepared to implement.41 The first-order question regarding the U.S. nuclear guarantee was whether nuclear use would be authorized if a president thought a positive decision would place U.S. society in extreme jeopardy. Limited, regional nuclear options, which predicated escalation control and early war termination, enhanced the likelihood that a president would give the release order for nuclear use in Europe should such events ever come to pass. Although the strategy was oriented to constrain conflict, the great uncertainties involved in nuclear use meant that no one could be confident that escalation could be controlled.42 The implication was that even though ^Schlesinger, testimony, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 153. 40 Schlesinger, written statement for the record, in ibid., p. 155. 41 James R. Schlesinger, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on Counter force Attacks, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 11 September 1974, p. 44. 42 Interviews with NSTAP panel members.

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the United States would likely resort to nuclear weapons only if it believed the risk to itself was acceptable, in using nuclear weapons it placed itself at great risk regardless of its original intentions. The impact of any nuclear use would be to raise the risk of escalation, the preferred European approach to deterrence. Not surprisingly, Europeans found this line of reasoning somewhat convoluted and difficult to comprehend.43 Schlesinger felt that the concept of limited, regional nuclear options, as part of official U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine, could be used to force the allies to think more carefully about nuclear use and how conflict would evolve once nuclear weapons had been employed.44 From the U.S. perspective, European nuclear planners tended to be reluctant to think through operational planning for tactical weapons because in so doing they would have to face the inescapable prospect that nuclear use could eventuate in the nuclear devastation of Europe. Schlesinger apparently believed that if the European allies examined the U.S. notion of limited, regional nuclear options, they would be compelled to think through the implications of nuclear employment and stop clinging to their notions of initial use while ignoring the potential consequences. In seeking to persuade the allies to consider these consequences, the United States hoped that the Europeans would come to see the logic of a strategy of constrained use and escalation control, which offered at least some possibility of early war termination at as low a level of damage as feasible. To give force to his maneuver, Schlesinger negotiated with Senator Sam Nunn what is now called the Nunn Amendment.45 The amendment established as U.S. public law the requirement for the secretary of defense to examine how tactical nuclear use related to deterrence and conventional defense.46 This served to force military planners in the Pentagon to respond, while furnishing the United States a strong lever with which to get the NATO allies to contemplate the implications of nuclear use.47 The DoD response to the Nunn Amendment was the report The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe (TNF report), 43

Interview with State Department official. with OSD officials. Don Cotter, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 22. Ajames R. Schlesinger, The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe, a Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365, i April 1975, (Washington, DC.: GPO, 1975), p. i. 47 Interviews with OSD official and State Department official. 44 Interviews 45

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submitted to Congress on i April 1975. The TNF report argued that NATO should conduct its nuclear operations to deny the Warsaw Pact any military gains in order to prompt Warsaw Pact leaders to reconsider their actions and negotiate an end to hostilities.48 Moreover, NATO should attempt To accomplish the above while trying to avoid escalation to general nuclear war. Such escalation would not be in the interest of either the United States or its European allies, nor the WP [Warsaw Pact] for that matter. Efforts would be made to control escalation in such desperate circumstances by a combination of clearly perceivable limits on the NATO nuclear response and the threat of more extensive strikes with theater and strategic forces if the WP chooses to escalate.49

Drawn up by Martin, Welch, and Ohlsteen, members of the ad hoc committee on nuclear policy, the TNF report gave more substance to the ideas of the NSTAP Review Panel on limited, regional nuclear options.50 Presented with a sophisticated elaboration of the concept, the European allies would hopefully appreciate its positive attributes in comparison with the ghastly alternative of unconstrained nuclear war. Nevertheless, limited, regional nuclear options were not an attractive alternative for the Europeans, conjuring as they did a vision of Europe as a nuclear battlefield for the two immune superpowers. In part, U.S. officials sought to manage the political difficulties involved with the concept of regional nuclear options by downplaying this aspect of the new strategy.51 U.S. planners also sought to allay European concerns by making some concessions to their preference for deterring through the threat of escalation. The TNF report recognized and allowed for U.S. and European differences: "We [the United States] would prefer where possible to deter through provision of direct defense and denial of WP gains (e.g., seizure of territory), rather than deterrence only through the threat of escalation and allout retaliatory attacks on WP resources—though these latter options will be maintained/'52 Both U.S. and European preferences could easily be accommodated in the array of responses developed, which 48

Schlesinger, Theater Nuclear Force Posture, pp. 2 and 13-14. Ibid., p. 14. 50 Inter view with OSD official. 51 See Don Cotter, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 13. 52 Schlesinger, Theater Nuclear Force Posture, p. 12. 49

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would permit any decision regarding how NATO would respond to be put off until such a time as political and military events forced a decision. The realization of the portentous consequences to follow any use of nuclear weapons would make far more compelling a strategy for escalation control and the minimization of damage through early war termination. A number of factors facilitated West European acceptance of selective response. The administration sought to minimize the impact of introducing selective response by judiciously placing a number of officials who had been involved in the innovation process in NATO positions to explain US. thinking and to persuade the Europeans of the integrity of US. intentions.53 Because of a study on tactical nuclear use which was instigated in 1972 by General Andrew Goodpaster, the supreme allied commander in Europe, a certain amount of groundwork had been propitiously prepared. Carried out by US. nuclear planners, this study was to impose a coherent structure on NATO's nuclear options;54 already underway for two years, it facilitated a positive reception of the new targeting policy by the U.S. nuclear planners in NATO.55 Subsequent to the promulgation of NSDM-242, the study was broadened to include Europeans.56 Goodpaster, however, was sensitive to European perspectives and so was concerned, according to Leon Sloss, "that the category or options used in theater weapons ought to be developed in the NATO context and not developed by the U.S."57 Apparently he was apprehensive, as were some State officials, that the European allies might perceive the concept of limited, regional nuclear options to be only a U.S. strategy and thus an attempt by the United States to confine nuclear usage to the European region. So Goodpaster urged that the wording "limited, regional nuclear options" not be used; rather, he insisted that they be called Selective Employment Plans (SEPs), consistent with NATO terminology.58 U.S. officials also made clear that the devel53 Richard Shearer, who had been on the NSTAP Review Panel as head of the International Security Agency, and Gardner Tucker were among those posted to NATO in the 1973-74 period. Interviews with OSD officials and State Department official. 54 See, for example, General Andrew Goodpaster, testimony, U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Military Implications of Nuclear Technology: Part 2, hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Applications, 93d Cong., ist sess., May-June 1973, 2, p. 112. 55 Interview with State Department official. 56 Interviews with State Department official and uniformed JCS staff member. 57 Leon Sloss, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, p. 20. 58 Don Cotter and Seymour Weiss, in ibid., pp. 5 and 13.

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opment of policy guidance for SEPs and the translation of it into targeting plans was to be a participatory exercise involving the NATO allies, thereby enabling the United States to modify its policy should the Europeans produce compelling reasons to do so.59 The administration, orchestrating its presentation and evincing its willingness to consider alterations, sought to smooth as much as possible the introduction of a policy that the European allies would obviously not readily welcome. Under the direction of General Goodpaster and then his successor, General Al Haig, NATO nuclear planners worked to revise the alliance's nuclear employment plans. A number of issues had to be considered in developing the new employment plans: Did employment plans reflect the concept of escalation control? How were the weapons to be deployed "in relation to their ability to execute" the options constructed? Of particular importance was the ability of theater nuclear weapons to survive, even if they needed to be redeployed. Were the weapons and the command control "adequate to these tasks"? What would be the declaratory policy that would describe what NATO was trying to do with the new employment plans? "How was this policy compatible with arms control options, various proposals for reductions in forces and so on"?60 After development of the SEPs, U.S. target planners at the JSTPS examined them to ensure that U.S. nuclear planning did not conflict with the NATO nuclear plans and that continuity existed between them.61 There was another side to selective response and U.S. policy regarding NATO. In developing the policy guidance that became NSDM-242, neither the NSTAP Review Panel or the NSSM-1Ó9 panel had analyzed the interaction of conventional forces with the use of nuclear weapons.62 Schlesinger was determined to fill this gap and to address the issue of the nonnuclear defense of Western Europe. A constant in Schlesinger's articulation of selective response and theater nuclear use was that the nuclear threshold had to be raised. Indeed, on one occasion he went so far as to claim that "to the extent that we have to rely on early recourse to nuclear weapons, we are in trouble."63 Schlesinger understood that a credible strategy for the use of 59

Interview with US. NATO official. Don Cotter, in Evolution of Selective Nuclear Options, pp. 5-6. 61 General Russell Dougherty, in ibid., p. 15. 62 See Chapter 4, pp. 143-44. 63 Testimony, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 179. 60

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strategic and theater nuclear weapons was necessary for deterrence.64 But while an effort to control escalation did offer some promise that war could be kept limited and was therefore worth planning for, such strategies were contingent on great uncertainties and fraught with enormous risk. Much more preferable was to try to keep hostilities at as low a level as possible by bolstering NATO's conventional capabilities.65 Schlesinger was most emphatic on this point: "I must stress that our tactical nuclear systems do not now and will not in the future be an effective substitute for a stalwart non-nuclear defense. Accordingly, we and our allies must maintain strong conventional forces/'66 Schlesinger, along with many other officials throughout the administration, was persuaded that the imbalance in general-purpose forces which favored the Warsaw Pact was not so great that it could not be overcome with a little effort.67 The severe limitations and horrific implications of nuclear use convinced Schlesinger that the role of conventional deterrence had to brought to the fore in NATO discussions.68 In enunciating selective response as flexible response amplified, he effectively linked conventional forces to the change of U.S. strategic doctrine. Schlesinger's effort to shift attention away from nuclear weapons to conventional defenses went somewhat beyond simple demonstrations of the probity of the U.S. position and rational persuasion. The wording of the Nunn Amendment, which connected the role of tactical nuclear weapons to the question of a strong conventional capability, was designed to alleviate congressional pressure for reducing U.S. troop levels and tactical nuclear weapons levels in Europe. Combining these two issues allowed the administration to put some pressure on the allies to raise their contributions to NATO's conventional posture. According to Schlesinger, "We are emphasizing to our allies at the present time that to the extent that we talk about an immediate and early recourse to nuclear weapons, that can be accomplished with a much smaller American presence than exists today."69 Plainly, this 64

See, for example, James R. Schlesinger, Annual Department of Defense Report, Fiscal Year 1975, 4 March 1974, pp. 7-8. 65 Testimony, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 161. 66 Ibid, p. 156. 67 Testimony, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 168. See also William Beecher, "Over the Threshold/' Army (July 1972): 19-20; and Michael Getler, "Pentagon Study Insists NATO Can Defend Itself/' Washington Post, 7 June 1973, reprinted in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 234-47. 68 Interviews with OSD officials. 69 Testimony, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 165.

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Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance statement was a warning that if the European allies insisted that NATO rely on early nuclear use, then U.S. troop levels could, and might, be drawn down. Schlesinger also implied that U.S. troops might possibly be withdrawn if the allies proved unwilling to make a reasonable contribution to developing "a stalwart conventional capability/'70 In the perspective of most Europeans, any pullback of troops would indicate a diminution of the U.S. commitment to their security. The implied threats, backed by the Nunn Amendment, therefore placed them in an awkward dilemma: if they did not back away from early first use and put a greater effort into building up NATO's conventional defense, both of which suggested an unwelcome qualification of the U.S. pledge to use nuclear weapons in their defense, the United States might withdraw a proportion of the general-purpose forces it based in Europe. Selective response had been developed with the objective of providing rational nuclear responses to prepare the United States for the remote event that deterrence might fail. Central to the conceptualization of the policy guidance developed was that no president would likely undertake nuclear operations without the confidence that risk to the United States was not incommensurate to the stakes involved. Limited, regional nuclear operations, which were designed to confine conflict at its point of origin in terms of intensity, extent, and duration, offered the best prospect that the United States would not be overly endangered. For selective response to be practical, it had to apply with respect to the one region where the United States would most seriously consider using nuclear weapons if deterrence broke down. In attempting to implement this aspect of NSDM-242 in conjunction with NATO allies, the Nixon (and subsequently Ford) administrations sought to make clear to the Europeans that theater nuclear use would be plausible only if it was restrained and directed to controlling escalation in Europe. But a strategy asserting the containment of nuclear use to Europe through the initial phases of war would not be readily endorsed by the European allies. The United States sought to assuage their concerns by pointing out that no one could be sure that escalation control would work and that there was a grave risk of conflict expanding to strategic nuclear exchanges. Such an outcome would be devastating to all the allies, so NATO had to 70

US. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 4 March 1974, p. 31.

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Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance think through the implications of nuclear use and plan accordingly. At the same time, however, the United States attempted to emphasize that reliance on nuclear weapons was too dangerous should deterrence fail to be seriously acceptable to the allies. The position of the United States was that the alliance should pursue the development of an effective nonnuclear defense. Implementing the NSDM-242 policy guidance proved to be troublesome. Military planners found it difficult to transform the concepts involved into practical targeting plans. Many uncertainties were involved in determining the context in which nuclear use might be considered and the purpose to which they would be put. This problem had pervaded Kissinger's attempts to reform U.S. targeting policy along lines more conducive to supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives. More problematic was implementation of the limited, regional nuclear options that NSDM-242 called for in the European setting. If the revised policy guidance for escalation control was to have any chance of being workable and therefore credible to a president and other interested parties, it had to apply to the central region of superpower competition, where if deterrence failed, the United States would consider resorting to nuclear weapons. Although the United States was seeking to standardize flexible response with NSDM-242, the implied consequence of Europe becoming a nuclear battlefield for the superpowers troubled the NATO allies. The administration therefore sought to assuage European doubts while attempting to maneuver the allies into a position where U.S. officials, such as Schlesinger, believed they would see the logic of the U.S. targeting guidance. U.S. officials did so with the best of intentions; in their perspective, a theater nuclear strategy fashioned to control escalation in Europe and to end war at the lowest possible level of damage was as much in the interest of the allies as it was of the United States. War that escalated to strategic exchanges would devastate Europe equally as much as it would the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, U.S. officials saw the strategy they were promoting as the only one that offered any real possibility that a president might contemplate fulfilling the U.S. obligation to use nuclear weapons. Intruding into this effort was Schlesinger's desire for NATO to address the issue of its building up a respectable conventional defense. His argument here was consistent with U.S. policy throughout [221]

Implementing the New Nuclear Targeting Guidance Nixon's tenure as president. Much as had Kissinger and Laird earlier, Schlesinger sought to manipulate, through the vehicle of the Nunn Amendment, the issue of U.S. troop reductions in order to spur the Europeans to contribute more to NATO's nonnuclear defenses. Linking the need to fortify NATO's general-purpose forces to the desirability of raising the nuclear threshold tied conventional forces to the notion of keeping active hostilities at the lowest possible level—a central feature of selective response. During the Nixon administrations, considerations of the role of nonnuclear forces in U.S. strategic policy had been divorced from those of the role to be played by nuclear forces. As a consequence, conventional forces and their role had not been calculated by U.S. nuclear policymakers in reforming U.S. nuclear strategy. In effect, Schlesinger sought to close the circle by consolidating conventional defenses into the overall strategic framework predicated by NSDM-242. Interest in developing a conventional deterrent was prevalent among U.S. strategic planners, reflecting a belief that for the United States and its allies to place their reliance on nuclear weapons was, should deterrence ever break down, to chance an unprecedented catastrophe. Appreciation of the utility of conventional forces by these strategic policymakers was in part a function of their recognition of the disutility of nuclear weapons. That they would ascribe to undertaking whatever possible means, such as an effective conventional deterrent, in order to avoid such an outcome was entirely consistent with a dominant rationale that informed the innovation of U.S. nuclear targeting policy.

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My primary objective in this book has been to examine the motivations that led officials in the Nixon administrations to innovate U.S. strategic nuclear policy. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in propagating the strategy that bears his name, identified two critical considerations stemming from the advent of strategic parity as being behind the revision of U.S. nuclear targeting doctrine: first, a perceived need to ensure that U.S. strategic nuclear forces were coupled, and were seen to be coupled, to the defense of the West European allies; and second, a perceived need to have the targeting capability to deter constrained Soviet nuclear attacks against the United States itself. I have argued that, contrary to common perception, the new targeting guidance was fashioned largely without reference to the considerations claimed by Schlesinger. Strategic calculations were the primary stimulus for the revision of U.S. targeting practices. Four different constituencies, however, were involved in the innovation process in one manner or another, and each approached the issue with its own strategic perspective and desired objective. The study also makes clear that strategic calculations were not the sole influence; budgetary, technological, bureaucratic, and political considerations influenced these calculations and conditioned the course and outcome of the innovation process. The constituencies that promoted strategic innovation—Henry Kissinger and the NSC staff, officials in the OSD, and officials in the State Department—were each galvanized by specific concerns related, directly or indirectly, to the problem of extending U.S. nuclear deterrence in an era of strategic parity. Of these, the most forceful

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concern was that current war plans, based on extensive strategic attacks, made it all too probable that should deterrence fail, the U.S. leadership might stumble into massive strategic nuclear use and the conflagration sure to ensue. Dominating the strategic calculations that informed the resultant targeting policy was a desire to develop targeting plans that offered the U.S. political leadership some chance to manage deterrence failure. The primary objective was to fashion employment options that could be used to control escalation and stop conflict short of recourse to large-scale attacks that would result only in vast devastation to the United States and its allies. The targeting guidance produced stressed the termination of conflict by confining it in level, scope, and duration. The approach offering the most plausible prospect for early war termination was believed to be a resort to limited, regional nuclear operations, incorporated within a hierarchy of graduated retaliatory options. Yet such regional nuclear operations were quite antithetical to the strategic views of the European allies. Instead of providing reassurance, the new policy was bound to be interpreted by the Europeans as an attempt by the United States to sacrifice Western Europe in the event of war rather than risk its own continued existence. Many of the officials involved in the two main strands of the innovation process perceived the growing Soviet potential for constrained nuclear attacks against the United States as a concern. Nonetheless, most appeared to believe it implausible that conflict with the Soviet Union would open with a direct counterforce attack against the United States, for the United States would still retain a capability to strike back with devastating effect. Thus few actually approached the innovation process with the specific objective of addressing this possible threat through a revision of U.S. targeting practices. At best, this particular concern was a secondary strategic influence that contributed to, but did not animate, the innovation of U.S. doctrine. The policymaker probably most responsible for stimulating the revision of U.S. strategic nuclear policy was Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's primary concern was that in an era of mutual vulnerability, the loss of U.S. strategic superiority would render incredible any threat by the United States to use nuclear weapons to protect its interests. Kissinger, like most policymakers, appeared not to be overly worried about the possibility of the Soviet Union launching direct attacks against the United States at the outbreak of war. Rather, he felt there was a decided requirement for the United States to deter potential

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limited Soviet advances on the margins of the superpower competition. He believed that the Soviet Union, convinced that its possession of a secure counterdeterrent would dissuade the United States from any actual nuclear employment, would be emboldened to challenge U.S. interests overseas. Reinforcing this concern was his belief that the U.S. retreat from Southeast Asia would call into question the credibility of the U.S. resolve to defend its overseas interests. Primarily endangered were interests on the periphery of the main superpower contest, where the United States was powerless to act effectively with conventional forces and where the value of its interests were not worth the grave risks that attended nuclear use. Kissinger feared that the Soviet Union might aspire to garner military and political advantage along the periphery and, through a process of incrementalism, seek to shift the balance of power against the United States. Kissinger believed that confrontations were sure to occur and the United States, if it was to stand up to the Soviet Union, had to have the means to make more forceful its crisis diplomacy. Kissinger's preferred solution to this problem was for the United States to bolster its conventional force capabilities in order to manage Soviet challenges on the periphery. Growing public opposition to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, however, created a domestic environment that made relying on conventional forces politically impossible. The Nixon administration was confronted with strong domestic pressure to reduce defense spending, which not only constrained it from building up U.S. conventional forces but was forcing it to reduce American general-purpose forces. This situation aggravated the strategic problem that Kissinger perceived the United States as potentially facing. Underscoring the problem was a public sentiment that would likely not tolerate any administration initiatives to react to Soviet transgressions on the periphery with a commitment of American conventional forces. These domestic political considerations persuaded Kissinger that if the Soviet Union was to be contained in an era of strategic parity and U.S. retrenchment overseas, the only recourse was for the United States to make convincing the projection of its nuclear deterrent to cover regions on the periphery. Kissinger recognized that parity, or mutual deterrence, undermined the U.S. nuclear pledge to Western Europe. But his interest in bolstering the capability of the United States to extend deterrence was not motivated out of a specific concern to reassure the European allies. He was a central player in formulating the U.S. policy toward

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NATO, which called for a strong conventional deterrent backed by a strategy for the use of theater nuclear weapons predicated on being pertinent to the military situation. He further firmly embraced and sought to expand the NSTAP Review Panel's idea of limited, regional nuclear options, a notion that would horrify most allies. Appealing to Kissinger was that such operations would give the United States a capability to intervene overseas without necessarily resorting to attacks against the Soviet Union, which were more likely to prompt escalation. Though Kissinger sought to change U.S. strategic nuclear policy to create a more plausible extended deterrent, he did so to provide support for U.S. foreign policy interests and initiatives, which would include those in the European theater, rather than to ensure that the U.S. strategic deterrent was coupled to the security of Western Europe. Plausible regional use would imbue nuclear weapons with at least some measure of apparent usability, enhancing their value for the purposes Kissinger desired. Kissinger was concerned primarily about the utility of nuclear weapons in confrontations on the periphery of the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, which suggests a focus on immediate deterrence. But he was thinking in much more ambitious terms than merely deterring an enemy in a crisis. Kissinger was seeking a means by which nuclear weapons could be used to further diplomacy, much as military power had traditionally been used. In one sense, he wanted a capability simply to deter Soviet military advances on the margins so as to protect the status quo. In another sense, his quest for a credible strategy derived from a perceived need to be able to forestall limited political gains on the periphery by being able to bring to bear the threat of nuclear weapons in a coercive manner against the Soviet Union or other hostile third-party states. A credible capability to employ nuclear weapons anywhere could serve to impress a third-party state with the military prowess of the United States, giving it good reason to consider the relative advantages of moving into the Soviet political sphere, as opposed to remaining neutral or siding politically with the United States. Thus, what Kissinger appears to have sought was a strategy that would deter the Soviet Union from attempting to make political or military gains on the margins, while at the same time providing strong support for the furtherance of U.S. interests abroad through diplomacy. OSA analysts made up the second major group that propelled change. These officials were initially stimulated by the apparent offi-

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cial policy of the administration, as had been articulated by Nixon in his foreign policy reports to Congress. Nevertheless, these officials represented only the most recent aspect of a relative continuity of opinion among officials in the DoD who, since the preceding administration, had concerns about the consequences of relying on targeting alternatives of the size and scale established in the SIOP-63 war plans. They believed that deterrence could not be guaranteed to succeed forever—nuclear war could occur. They worried that should deterrence ever fail, the U.S. leadership, lacking other alternatives, might slide into the large-scale use of nuclear weapons, which was sure to result in monstrous levels of destruction. Although these officials were conversant with the concerns of others, they did not perceive that deterrence was precarious, only that a possible breakdown in deterrence made it prudent to plan to mitigate the horrendous consequences. The desire of these officials to investigate alternative approaches to how the United States might target its strategic nuclear arsenal was bolstered by nonstrategic considerations. The development of alternative targeting responses was official administration policy, and they were concerned that the uniformed military was not being responsive to this higher political direction. They further recognized that for bureaucratic reasons the uniformed military jealously guarded the planning for nuclear operations from interference by civilian officials. A sanctioned policy review would not only require the uniformed military to respond to official policy direction but would also override the uniformed military's bureaucratic inclination to resist civilian intrusion into policy areas it considered its sole responsibility. Another important influence was their conviction that to obtain maximum utility from the expansion of warheads in the U.S. strategic arsenal which would result from the deployment of MIRVed land-based and sea-based missiles, the United States needed to rethink how it could use them. These bureaucratic and technological factors supported and reinforced the determination of the OSA officials to examine U.S. targeting practices, leading them to request that the DoD undertake a departmental review. The policymakers who formed the resultant National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel proceeded without continuing guidance from the political leadership, so they were in a position to rework U.S. strategy in a manner largely of their own choosing. The panel concluded that the fundamental objective of the United States

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in the event of deterrence failure would be to terminate the conflict at the lowest level of conflict possible, whatever American political and military goals might be—a conclusion generally consistent with the main concern of the OSA officials. The members of the NSTAP Review Panel recognized that war would be more likely to originate overseas than to open with a Soviet strike against the heartland of the United States. The guidance developed was constructed so that the United States could respond to aggression at the forward edge of its extended defense perimeter by attacking military targets pertinent to the conflict. In effect, the NSTAP Review Panel sought to develop the means for managing and terminating conflict resulting from a breakdown of U.S. extended deterrence. Because the defense of NATO Europe was the most likely situation in which the United States might contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, the panel placed some emphasis on Western Europe in developing and testing the new targeting guidance. Despite this emphasis, the NSTAP Review Panel was not aiming to formulate a targeting regime designed to couple the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent to the security of NATO Europe. Limited employment options were designed to deny the Soviet Union military gains while making quite evident the political commitment of the United States to secure its interests. Limited, regional nuclear operations were seen as providing the best possible chance to stop hostilities early. Although Soviet forces outside the Soviet Union would be legitimate targets, the United States could at the outset of conflict refrain from attacking targets located within the confines of the Soviet Union. With both superpowers still sanctuaries from nuclear attack, it was hoped that an end could be negotiated below the strategic threshold. Implicit in the targeting scheme developed is that all interests are secondary to the fundamental responsibility of decision makers: the continued survival of the nation.1 Officials in the Department of State made up a third constituency (in which Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger might be included) that encouraged the revision of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine. With the acquisition by the Soviet Union of an invulnerable counterdeterrent, the concern of these officials was that the credibility of the U.S. 1 This compelling theme runs through Fred Charles Ikle's discussion of the necessity of being able to terminate a conflict. Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

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guarantee to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe would be perceived by the European allies to be declining. Being sensitive to the concerns of the Europeans and the political ramifications of such a perception, they were convinced that the United States needed to renovate its nuclear targeting practices in a manner that would be seen as persuasively coupling the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Europe. These officials were not the only ones who recognized that strategic parity called into question the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe, for other officials did as well, most notably Henry Kissinger and members of the NSC staff. What sets this constituency apart from the others was that its principal objective in encouraging the innovation process was to couple U.S. strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe. Members of this constituency and their strategic perspective exerted only minimal influence on the content of the targeting guidance, in part because they were not included in the innovation process until the substance of the guidance had been agreed on within the DoD. It was also a function of their conviction that an American threat to employ nuclear weapons to protect Western Europe would be convincing only if some reasonable expectation existed that it could be executed without automatically exposing the United States to nuclear attack. As a consequence, they saw the general principles for targeting U.S. nuclear weapons developed by the NSTAP Review Panel as being the best method of coupling the U.S. strategic deterrent to European security. But the participation of the State Department officials did have a significant impact on the innovation process. These officials contributed to the deliberations their knowledge of the particular problems associated with the commitment by the United States to its NATO allies, especially political issues, which brought to the fore the need to manage carefully the introduction of the new targeting guidance to the European allies. Thus as the innovation process progressed toward completion, greater emphasis was placed on Western Europe than had been the case earlier in the process. Another critical constituency was the JCS and the military bureaucracy. The military generally adhered to an assessment of how deterrence should be achieved which was at odds with the notion of limited nuclear options. Military strategic planners believed that deterrence was best actualized by the threat of massive counterforce attacks. They did not welcome the notion of limited nuclear options, for they worried that employment of a limited number of weapons

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repeatedly could erode the capacity of the United States to perform its massive attack options effectively. Deterrence would thereby be undermined, potentially inviting attack against the United States. Further, military planners thought that recourse to limited nuclear attacks would be a dangerous course of action because the use of even a few nuclear weapons, particularly if against targets in the USSR, risked inciting the full retaliatory power of the Soviet Union. These concerns belie a certain focus in the thinking of military strategic planners on the deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States. Implicit is the notion of preserving the capability to implement the massive strike options and the inherent deterrent effect, even through a conflict. Simply put, the central feature in their strategic approach was to deter attack against the United States. Extended deterrence appears to have been merely an effect associated with the vitality of the central deterrent rather than a specific condition needing continuing maintenance. Despite strong reservations about and initial resistance to modifying U.S. targeting practices, the military recognized that it would be politically imprudent not to support change, and such support might even be beneficial. Thus, for strategic reasons the JCS did not act as a motive force behind the innovation process but for political reasons at least participated and, finally endorsed the policy product. Bureaucratic perspectives were a pervasive influence that shaped how the innovation process proceeded from origination to implementation. Most notable is that NSTAP Review Panel members succeeded where Kissinger failed because they consciously set out to orchestrate a bureaucratic consensus in support of the new policy guidance. From the start, the OSD officials recognized that bureaucratic pitfalls had to be avoided if they were to complete successfully the task they had set themselves. The manner in which the NSTAP Review Panel carefully shepherded the development of a new targeting guidance through the competing bureaucratic interests to facilitate its acceptance definitely affected the course of the innovation process. More important, if the problems encountered by Kissinger and the NSC are any indication, the panel's careful attention to bureaucratic considerations was probably essential to the eventual success of the process. Political considerations and concerns exerted an influence on the outcome of the innovation process. The decision to reject the assured destruction targeting criteria in the event of general nuclear war in favor of targeting the Soviet Union to impede its capacity to reconsti-

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tute faster than the United States was not inspired by strategic considerations. Although the participants of the NSSM-1Ó9 study obviously found the morality of deliberately exterminating civilians unpalatable, a number of different political considerations—not the least of which was the desire to forestall congressional and public criticism—were motivating factors that shaped the substance of this specific element of the policy guidance. The political element is most clearly exemplified with respect to consideration of the U.S. allies, particularly the European allies. To couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to European security may not have furnished an incentive for the innovation of U.S. strategic doctrine, but some U.S. policymakers were unquestionably sensitive to potential European apprehensions. They recognized that the new strategic policy would clash with the strategic views of the West Europeans, thus creating a disruptive political situation that could damage transatlantic alliance relations. Despite this recognition, neither the State officials nor Secretary of Defense Schlesinger made an attempt to modify the substance of the revised policy guidance to address NATO concerns. Reassuring the allies of the continued security of the U.S. nuclear guarantee was a matter of presentation. This burden fell largely to Schlesinger, who tailored his public presentation of the revised nuclear doctrine to meet his own agenda and to conform with prevailing political realities. On the one hand, Schlesinger highlighted the importance of NATO in articulating the new strategic policy. This, he hoped, would serve both to reassure the European allies that the United States was not degrading its security commitment and to refocus U.S. attention on NATO in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. The revised policy guidance was not specifically directed to address the question of linking U.S. nuclear forces to the security of Europe, but the idea of such linkage as an objective of the innovation of U.S. targeting practices resided in Schlesinger's declaratory statements (as well as subsequent military briefings) crafted for the benefit of the European allies. Schlesinger thus introduced the coupling of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent to the security of Western Europe as an expression of U.S. declaratory policy when it was not an aspect of targeting policy. On the other hand, Schlesinger presented the new strategy to the U.S. Congress as being a political response to the potential Soviet counterforce threat. Not to have done so would have invited severe criticism from hawkish members of Congress who were already dis-

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mayed by the administration's strategic response to the problem. Simply put, the substance of the declaratory statements of policy, which dictates the public understanding of the new strategy, was significantly shaped by political concerns. The innovation process proceeded in three phases: formulation of the problem, development of a new targeting guidance, and the building of a bureaucratic consensus and the promulgation of the new strategy. In the initial phase, how the United States could secure its political and strategic objectives in the changing strategic environment provided the problem, whereas domestic political realities shaped the available strategic approaches that the administration could pursue to ensure achievement of those goals. In the second phase, the development of a new targeting guidance proceeded on the basis of the need for a strategy that provided for the termination of war no matter what objectives the United States might be seeking through the application of nuclear weapons. This entailed developing the appropriate mechanisms for using nuclear weapons, a largely technical, apolitical exercise. In the third phase, the domestic and intra-alliance political climate enveloping the administration swept off course the intent of the technical exercise. Public rhetoric attributed motivations and objectives to the innovation process which in reality had not been present. In some respects, the outcome of the process, though not necessarily the actual substance developed, may be said to be the sum of the political considerations brought to bear. But although technological, bureaucratic, budgetary, and political matters added some impetus to the main decisions to innovate, they were distinctly subsidiary to strategic considerations as a motive force behind the process. Directly or indirectly, the strategic dilemma posed by extended deterrence was, How could the United States protect its less-thanvital overseas interests through the threat of nuclear use when it was vulnerable to destructive counterattack? Kissinger so viewed the situation in his search for a way to use nuclear weapons to support the objectives of foreign policy. In the instance of the OSA officials and the NSTAP Review Panel, however, this essential dilemma is less clear-cut. They were generally concerned with a possible failure of deterrence. Starting from this perspective, they focused on the forward interests of the United States because they saw little likelihood that the Soviet Union or anyone else would have reason to attack the United States directly. In a sense, rather than approach the question

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Determinants of U.S. Nuclear Strategy as being a problem with extended as opposed to central deterrence, they addressed it in a manner that more reflected the distinction made by Lawrence Freedman between deterrence and contracted deterrence.2 War might occur because the United States had extended interests that brought it into conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies. Although their formulation of the strategic problem took an oblique approach, it was in essence the problem posed by extended deterrence. State Department officials were sensitive to the issue of coupling and felt that the strategy formulated should have this effect, but they came to the process after policy guidance had been developed. Nevertheless, though linking U.S. security to that of Europe was not an objective that served to activate the renovation of U.S. nuclear strategy, a pervasive conviction existed that Western Europe was one of the few regions of the world, if not the only region, whose protection would cause the United States to contemplate engaging in nuclear war. European security thus figured centrally in the calculations of the policymakers in reshaping U.S. targeting practices, although the strategy was neither initially designed nor subsequently altered to achieve coupling. A core element of continuity between each of the constituent strategic perspectives involved in the innovation process was a clear appreciation of the vulnerability of the United States and the awesome destructive potential of nuclear conflict. This, more than anything else, explains the consensus that did form around the proposals of the NSTAP Review Panel (excepting the JCS and the military, whose dissent flowed from a different interpretation of this vulnerability). Fundamental to the strategy being contrived by the NSTAP Review Panel was that nuclear use had to appear feasible without generating inescapable escalation. Any president confronted with the failure of deterrence would authorize the employment of even a modest number of nuclear weapons only if at least relatively confident that the conflict could be halted short of general nuclear exchanges between the United States and the USSR. Without reasonable assurances that such a step would not result in uncontrolled escalation leading to the destruction of U.S. society, a president would in effect be left in the situation of suicide or surrender which Nixon had said was intoler2 Lawrence Freedman, "The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence/' in The Changing Strategic Landscape (London: IISS Adelphi Paper 236, 1989), pp. 24-25.

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able. Lacking a plausible approach to terminating a nuclear war, it would be unreasonable to expect a president to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Surrender might be considered politically unpalatable, but national suicide would be unconscionable. Whether a president would be willing to resort to nuclear weapons would depend to a great degree on the circumstances of deterrence breakdown. Few doubted that a Soviet strategic nuclear strike against the continental United States would trigger a nuclear response.3 Less clear-cut would be a case of deterrence failure with aggression occurring against U.S. allies or other U.S. strategic interests situated overseas. Fred Charles Ikle has contended that leaders are most unwise to place their obligations to allies ahead of their obligations to defend the interests of their country.4 No higher interest exists for any country than to preserve its population, society, and government from destruction. All other interests pale in significance to that of a nation's fundamental survival. Not to put too fine a point on it, the United States has no interests overseas so valuable as to be worth its own utter destruction. Yet it was overseas, on the U.S. forward line of defense, where American strategic planners generally felt deterrence was most likely to fail. The commitment made by the United States to defend its European allies exemplifies the problem stemming from reliance on its nuclear deterrent to protect its overseas interests, for this region is one where the United States would most likely have seriously contemplated nuclear use in the event of Soviet aggression. But whether a rational and responsible president would be willing to defend Europe with nuclear weapons if to do so meant reduction of the United States to radioactive ruins is a question with an incalculable answer. Schlesinger, questioned about what circumstances might lead the United States to resort to nuclear weapons, essentially admitted as much: One circumstance I can think of is the possibility of the overrunning of Western Europe. This would be a major defeat for the NATO alliance and for the United States. I don't know what we would do under those 3 A president might exercise restraint in the case of extremely small strikes against the United States which did not debilitate the U.S. strategic capability or cause widespread death and destruction. Such an attack would be an exceptionally risky venture on the part of the Soviet Union, however. 4 Ikle, Every War Must End, pp. 62-63.

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Determinants of U.S. Nuclear Strategy circumstances in terms of our strategic forces, but I believe that it is necessary for our strategic forces to continue to be locked into the defense of Europe in the minds of the Europeans and of the Soviet Union.5

Schlesinger was suggesting that although the United States might be willing to posture its strategic forces to defend Europe in order to deter Soviet aggression, whether it would actually employ them should the moment of truth arrive cannot really be known. That the United States would look first to securing its most fundamental security interest—its continued survival—instead of selflessly coupling its security to that of its allies should not occasion surprise. To think that it would do otherwise is to ignore the fundamental reality of the nuclear age. There is a clear tension between he Clausewitzian notion of imposing one's will on an enemy and being involved in a war in which no serious objective could be worth the consequences. It is this tension that fundamentally drove the innovation process. If deterrence ever collapsed and war then occurred, the United States would be remiss not to have plans to avert the potentially catastrophic outcome. Yet, at the same time, a belief by the United States that it would, or at least that it could reasonably expect to, survive a war is a clear precondition to it actually entering into a conflict to defend its allies. If the United States believes that its own survival is not overly jeopardized, then it is more likely that it will act to save its allies. What the NSTAP Review Panel devised were principles for targeting U.S. nuclear weapons which offered at least some prospect that the United States could respond with nuclear weapons without incurring nuclear devastation. As a general approach, it provided a solution to the perceived need to contain Soviet advances on the periphery of the main superpower competition and to have the capability to terminate nuclear use at the lowest possible level. Ironically, it also provided a solution to the dilemma posed by the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons first to defend Europe and to the political need to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Western Europe. Even should the United States adhere to the targeting guidance, the realistic possibility that nuclear war might still escalate out of control was an aspect of the new guidance that, though perceived as being unde5

Testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 4 March 1974, p. 12 (emphasis added).

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sirable, would serve to couple the security of the United States to that of Western Europe equally as well as would the deliberate targeting of the USSR in response to Soviet aggression against the NATO allies. Policy guidance for the targeting of U.S. nuclear forces is just that— guidance. Precisely how the United States would respond is not set in stone and is not knowable in advance. The coupling of the U.S. strategic deterrent to the security of Western Europe, or of any other U.S. allies or interests, is ultimately not a technical but a political question. If the political leadership had the will to respond with nuclear weapons, the strategy developed at least held out some hope that the result would not be nuclear Armageddon. But the NSTAP Review Panel's deliberations convinced members that the complex and uncertain dynamics of nuclear conflict made the prospect of controlling escalation a most dubious proposition—an opinion seemingly shared by most other policy officials involved in the process. Almost all the officials involved concluded that it would be far more preferable for the United States, along with its allies, to procure the conventional force capabilities to contest any Soviet aggression successfully. This preference was predicated on the conviction that the strongest barrier to nuclear escalation was the conventional/nuclear threshold. Because of these concerns held by the participating policymakers, it is but a short step to the certainty that nuclear weapons should not be used, that their only realistic utility is to deter their use by an opponent. To the extent that there is among the various constituencies involved in the innovation process undertaken by the Nixon administrations one common unifying theme regarding nuclear use, it can be found in the trenchant statement made by Henry Kissinger in 1979: I would say, which I might not say in office, the European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization.6 6 Henry Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years/' Survival 21 (November-December 1979): 266.

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Appendix: National Security Decision Memorandum 242

The following is the complete text of National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242), issued on 17 January 1974.l

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM 242: PLANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT FOR DETERRENCE The fundamental mission of US. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear war, and plans for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces should support this mission. Our deterrence objectives are: 1. To deter nuclear attacks against the United States, its forces, and its bases overseas. 2. In conjunction with other U.S. and allied forces, to deter attacks— conventional and nuclear—by nuclear powers against U.S. allies and those other nations whose security is deemed important to U.S. interests. 3. To inhibit coercion of the United States by nuclear powers and, in conjunction with other U.S. and allied forces, help inhibit coercion of U.S. allies by such powers.

The United States will rely primarily on U.S. and allied conventional forces to deter conventional aggression by both nuclear and non! The text is taken from William M. Arkin et al., eds., The Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 487-89.

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National Security Decision Memorandum 242 nuclear powers. Nevertheless, this does not preclude U.S. use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. Planning Limited Nuclear Employment Options Should conflict occur, the most critical objective is to seek early war termination, on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies, at the lowest level of conflict feasible. This objective requires planning a wide range of limited nuclear employment options which could be used in conjunction with supporting political and military measures (including conventional forces) to control escalation. Plans should be developed for limited employment options which enable the United States to conduct selected nuclear operations, in concert with conventional forces, which protect vital U.S. interests and limit enemy capabilities to continue aggression. In addition, these options should enable the United States to communicate to the enemy a determination to resist aggression, coupled with a desire to exercise restraint. Thus, options should be developed in which the level, scope, and duration of violence is limited in a manner which can be clearly and credibly communicated to the enemy. The options should (a) hold some vital enemy targets hostage to subsequent destruction by survivable nuclear forces, and (b) permit control over the timing and pace of attack execution, in order to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider his actions. Planning for General War In the event that escalation cannot be controlled, the objective for employment of nuclear forces is to obtain the best possible outcome for the United States and its allies. To achieve this objective, employment plans should be developed which provide to the degree practicable with available strategic forces for the following: 1. Maintenance of survivable strategic forces in reserve for protection and coercion during and after major conflict. 2. Destruction of the political, economic, and military resources critical to the enemy's postwar power, influence, and ability to recover at an early time as a major power. 3. Limitation of damage to those political, economic, and military re-

[238]

National Security Decision Memorandum 242

sources critical to the continued power and influence of the United States and its allies. Further Guidance and Presidential Review of Employment Plans The Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance consistent with this NSDM to serve as the basis for the revision of operational plans for the employment of nuclear forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An information copy of this guidance should be provided to the President and Secretary of State. Within three months, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review an initial set of limited employment options. At quarterly intervals thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review a summary of available options and an analysis of any additional recommended options. Each presentation should include illustrative scenarios for each limited employment option. Within six months the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President an analysis of the political, economic, and selected military targets considered critical to potential enemy's post war power, influence, and recovery as a major power. Appropriate aspects of this analysis should be coordinated with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President an evaluation of the effectiveness, limitations, and risks of the resultant operational plans. Interim results of this evaluation should be reported approximately every six months at significant points in the process of revision. Command, Control and Crisis Management To insure that nuclear forces are responsive to the national command authorities, employment planning for the command, control, communications and surveillance must support decision-making and force execution, taking into account U.S. nuclear employment objectives and options, the survivability of the forces themselves, and the consequences of direct attack on the command control systems. At a minimum this planning should provide for: i. Essential support to decision-making and execution of retaliatory strikes in the event of large attacks on the United States.

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National Security Decision Memorandum 242 2. Adequate support for decision-making and flexible use of nuclear forces in attempts to control escalation in local conflict. Employment planning for this function may assume that the national level command, control, and communications systems and associated sensors supporting the National Command Authorities are not subject to direct attack. With regard to crisis management procedures: 1. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall refine their crisis management procedures to provide timely political-military assessments and recommendations to the National Command Authority to support potential nuclear employment decisions. The revised procedures should be submitted to the President for review by 31 March 1974. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall in addition submit to the President by March 31, 1974, detailed recommendations on the desirability, composition, operations, facilities, and physical location of a senior level staff to provide prompt military advice to the National Command Authority on the possible use of nuclear forces in a crisis. 3. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall conduct a continuing evaluation of the national level crisis management procedures. Within six months, the Defense Program Review Committee shall prepare an initial report on the adequacy of present interagency organizational arrangements for Presidential review. Future annual reports shall contain evaluations of appropriate tests and exercises of these procedures. Additional Actions The Secretary of State shall prepare an analysis of any necessary actions related to informing the NATO alliance and other states, including the Soviet Union and the PRC, of changes in U.S. nuclear policy. The analysis should include a discussion of the extent to which we need to inform other states and the key considerations in making decisions on these issues. This study should identify for each alliance and, as applicable, on a nation-by-nation basis, those aspects whose disclosures should be avoided. In support of this effort the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a special assessment of likely Soviet and PRC reactions to the new policies, and how these might be influenced by U.S. statements and actions.

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National Security Decision Memorandum 242

The Secretary of Defense should prepare an analysis, from the point of view of military preparedness, of the desirability of any changes in current arrangements for allied participation in NATO nuclear planning. The results of these additional actions should be submitted for review by the Verification Panel by 31 March 1974.

NI]

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Index

Aaron, David, 185, 186 accidental nuclear war/launches, 28, 56 accuracy, improved (enhanced, etc.), 25, 90-92, 114 and Congress, 92 and Kissinger, 90-91 and the Senate, 92, 114 antiballistic missile (ABM), 25, 29, 101, 114, 160 Arab-Israeli War, 190 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 106, 107, 123 arms race, 92, 186 Asia, 84-86, 145, 169 assured destruction, i, 6-7, 9-11, 51-53, 55, 59, 61-62, 64, 67, 68, 76, 78, 98, 100, 104, 107, 111, 112, 114, 137, 160, 177, 187, 230 balance of power, 51, 94, 98, 225 battlefield nuclear weapons, (see also theater nuclear weapons) and U.S. Army, 149-150 Bay of Bengal, 170 Brodie, Bernard, 127-128 Brosio, Manlio, 38, 45 Brussels, 46, 194 Bundy, McGeorge, 18 bureaucratic politics, 97, 102-108, 112-114, 116, 123, 125-127, 159-162, 166, 168, 171-174, 176, 181-182, 184-191, 227, 229-230, 232

[243]

Carter, Barry, 13 central deterrence, 233 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 139-140, 174 central nuclear exchanges, 132 China and "China Option" paper, 86 nuclear capabilities, 85, 88 nuclear options for, 84-87, 134, 169 and Soviet Union (see also IndiaPakistan Conflict, 1971; and China), 44, 79, 81-87, 96 Clausewitz, Carl von, 235 Clifford, Clark, 40 coercive diplomacy, 82 collateral damage, 3, 62, 90, 138, 144, 146-147, 206 Collins, Captain Beau, 107-108 Congress (see also Senate), 13, 21, 23-24, 28, 30-31, 57, 67, 76, 92, 114, 123, 177-178, 182, 189, 191-192, 194, 196, 199, 201-202, 219, 227, 231 containment, 220 contracted deterrence, 233 conventional defense/deterrent flexible response, 5, 35, 39-40, 42, 44, 46-48, 50, 196, 219 and Kissinger, 39-41, 48, 57, 83, 94, 225-226 NATO, 27, 36, 39-42, 44-48, 50, 95/ 143, 147-148, 157, 194, 196-197, 213, 215, 218-221, 226, 236 nuclear/conventional threshold, 37,

Index conventional defense/deterrent (cont.) 39-40, 42, 142-143, 145, 157, 196, 225 and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 143-145, 147-148, 157-158, 236 and Schlesinger, 46-47, 194, 196-197, 215, 218-222 U.S. preference for, 39, 42, 47, 54, 143, 158, 194, 213, 219-222, 225, 236 Cotter, Don, 205 counterforce attacks, 13, 25, 90, 100, no, 122, 126, 144, 177, 185, 201, 224, 229 counterforce capability and Congress, 231 and capability of U.S., 90-92, 122, 126, 188, 201 and limited options, 91, 144, 201 and McNamara, 100 and NSDM 242, 185-186, 188 and Senate, 92 coupling flexible response, 122 and NSDM 242, 193-195, 197-199, 201-203, 231 and Schlesinger, 193-195, 197-199, 201-202, 231, 234-235 State Department, 163-164, 229, 233 crisis diplomacy credibility, 60, 75, 80, 94, 170, 226 and Kissinger, 60, 75, 80, 82, 94, 225, 226 and nuclear weapons, 60, 75, 80, 170, 179, 226 Davis, Lynn Etheridge, 16, 117, 141 defense budget (U.S.) and pressures to decrease defense spending, 43, 94, 100, 123, 219 Defense Program Review Committee, 87-^6 and Kissinger, 87, 89, 169, 172, 174 Defense Research and Engineering (DR&E), 103, 123 Department of Defense (DoD), 52, 62, 92, 97-98, 100, 102-103, 105, 107, 113, 121, 123, 151-152, 155, 159-162, 166-168, 171-174, 181-182, 189-190, 215, 227, 229 detente, 95, 121, 178, 186 deterrence/deterrent, 1-7, 9, 12-13, !4, 27, 37/ 39, 41-48, 52, 54-55, 59~6o, 62, 71, 86^87, 92, 94-95, 98-99,

101, 109-112, 114-115, 117-121, 126, 128-131, 133, 136-137, 143, 145, 147-148, 151-153/ 155, 157, 159, 163, 165, 167, 177, 179, 182, 185, 194, 197-201, 211, 213-216, 218, 220-230, 232-235 Dougherty, General Russell, 205 Duckett, Carl, 174 East Asia, 210 East Germany, 40 East Pakistan, 81 Egypt, 72, 81 enhanced deterrence, 137, 153 Enthoven, Alain, 53 escalation concerns about, 6, 13, 38-40, 52, 64, 88, 118-119, 128, 135-136, 138, 141, 149, 164, 214, 220, 235-236 and flexible response, 38-40, 50, 212 and limited nuclear options, 6-7, 88, 118-119, 129-130, 136, 139-141, 146-147, 159, 205 escalation control, 135-139 Bernard Brodie, 136 cities, 6-7, 38, 52 command and control, 6, 7, 39, 131, 139-141, 205 conventional forces, 39, 143-144, 218-219 conventional/nuclear threshold, 143, 146, 149, 154, 157, 214, 218-219 coupling, 155, 156, 164, 235-236 European (NATO) views, 38, 156-157, 163-165, 212, 215-216 intrawar deterrence, 6-7, 38-40, 128, 136-137, 139 Henry Kissinger, 39, 52, 64, 226 limits, 6, 136, 139, 141, 216 leadership targets, 7, 133, 137-138 National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 118, 128-131, 139-143, 146-147/ 149, 153-154, 156-160, 162-163, 165, 175-176, 228, 233, 235-236 regional nuclear options, 141, 142, 144, 146-148, 154-158, 164-165, 167, 182, 197-198, 202, 214-217, 220-221, 226

selective response, 211, 214, 215, 217, 220 signaling, 6, 136, 139-142, 175, 212-213 Soviet strategic forces, 141 target withholds, 6, 137-138

[244]

Index theater nuclear weapons, 211-215, 220-221 thresholds, 136 essential equivalence, 33, 34 Eurasia, 81, 83, 143 extended deterrence credibility, 80, 84, 90, 151-152, 198-199, 226, 232-233 NATO, 13, 14, 28, 67, 198-199, 225-226 impact of loss of U.S. strategic superiority, 91, 151, 232 impact of parity, 223, 225 and Kissinger, 55, 65, 69, 84, 88, 96, 152, 225-226, 232 and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 119, 120-121, 232-233 first use/strike American views on, 25-26, 28, 40-41, 50, 52, 91, 92, 149, 155, 185, l86, 199-2OO, 2Í1, 213, 215,

233

and Congress, 199 European views on, 36-38, 40-41, 50, 156, 163-164, 194, 211-215, 220 and flexible response, 36, 39, 199, 211 National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 121, 127, 149, 155, 163, 182, 233, 235 State Department, 162-163, 229 Senate, 92 flexible response (MCi4/3), 35-50, 77, 95, 131-133/ 152 Anglo-German Study (HealyShroeder Paper), 36-38 burden sharing, 41-48 demonstrative (warning) use, 36 conventional deterrence, 5, 35, 39-40, 42, 44, 46-48, 50, 196, 219 credibility, 3-4, 37, 39, 44, 221 early first use, 36-39 escalation, 38-40, 50, 212 first use, 36, 39, 199, 211 follow-on use, 41, 163, 211-212 forward defense, 145, 228, 232 general nuclear war, 154, 155 Henry Kissinger, 37, 46, 77, 93, 167 Mansfield, Senator Michael, 43 political blackmail, 39 political purposes, 38, 40 selective response, 195, 197, 210, 219

[245]

theater nuclear weapons, 35, 37, 39, 210-212 U.S. troops, 28, 44-48, 50 U.S.-European tensions, 35-38, 41, 45-48, 50, 210-213 West Germany, 36, 38 "Year of Europe/' 46 Ford Administration, 220 Foster, Dr. John S., 103, 113, 116, 123, 174 Freedman, Lawrence, 152, 233 Getler, Michael, 46 global deterrent, 91 Goodpaster, General Andrew, 217-218 Haig, General Al, 218 hard target, 89-93, ^2, 186, 188 Healey, Denis, 44 Hussein, King, 70 Ikle, Fred Charles, 118, 177, 234 India-Pakistan Conflict, 1971 and China, 81-84, 86 Kissinger's interpretation of, 81-84 and limited nuclear options, 84 risk of nuclear war, 81, 83-84, 168 and Soviet Union, 81-84 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 26, 29, 30, 33, 46, 69, 79, 91, 152, 200-201 Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, 30-32 International Security Agency, 168 Iran, 168, 208 Iraq, 70 Israel, 72 Jackson, Senator Henry, 32, 35, 200 Japan, 84, 91 Johnson, President Lyndon B., 98, 161 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 100 deterrence, 22, 229-230 and Kissinger, 54, 61-62, 173 limited nuclear options, 112, 153, 229-230 and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 97, 102-106, 108-116, 124, 150, 160, 168, 171, 173, 229-230 NUWEP, 205 and SALT, 61 SIOP, 62 target planning, 61-62, 150, 160, 177, 184

Index Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff QSTPS), 98, 105, 108-109, 112, 115, 125, 162, 205-207, 218 Jordan Crisis, 1970 and crisis diplomacy, 71-72 impact on Kissinger, 69-71, 73-75, 83, 167 and nuclear weapons, 70, 73 and Soviet Union, 70-73 U.S. response to, 70-73, 75

KGB, 137 Kaufmann, William, 127 Kazakhstan, 85 Kissinger, Henry A. China/Sino-Soviet concerns, 82-86,

96

conventional defense, 39-41, 48, 57, 83, 94, 225-226 crisis diplomacy, 60, 75, 80, 82, 94, 225-226 and DPRC, 87, 89 escalation, 39, 52, 64, 226 extended deterrence, 55, 65, 69, 84, 88, 96, 152, 225-226, 232 flexible response, 37, 46, 77, 93, 167 foreign policy and nuclear weapons, 53-60, 63, 68, 86, 88, 166-167, 221, 224-226, 232 India-Pakistan crisis, 1971, 81-84 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 54, 61-62, 173 and Jordan Crisis, 69-71, 73-75, 83, 167 limited war, 54, 60, 63-66 ,127 and U.S. military, 57, 61-62 Minuteman vulnerability, 55 and NATO, 48, 57, 236 and NSDM-242, 184-186, 188-192 and NSSM-3, 51-53, 55, 60, 67, 98 and NSSM-169, 178, 180, 181 participation in National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 97, 106, 113-114, 159, 160, 165-174, 226 regional nuclear options, 165-170, 171, 226 and SALT, 20, 30, 78, 80, 94, 186 Soviet Union, views of, 41-42, 52, 54-59/ 69, 73-75, 80-84, 86, 93-94, 225 strategic balance, 20, 54-56, 58-59, 79-80, 83, 94, 152, 178, 225 and "Strategic Guidance/' 100

strategic periphery, 56, 58-59, 75, 80, 94-96, 167, 225 and theater nuclear weapons, 226 and Vietnam, 57, 225 "Year of Europe" speech, 46 Korea, 170, 210 Laird, Melvin and conventional forces, 41, 45 and Minuteman vulnerability, 25 and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 97, 102-103, 106-108, 112, 117, 124, 160, 162, 165-166, 171 and review of U.S. targeting practices, 112, 160, 166, 171 and "Strategic Guidance," 100 and strategic parity and strategic inferiority, 28 Lake Baikal, 86 Legge, Michael, 211 Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs), 84-87, 89-96, 130-135, 207-210, definition of, 145-146, linkage, 231 Lodal, Jan, 185-186 Major Attack Options (MAOs), 115, 126, 133, 138, 207-209 Mansfield, Senator Michael, 43 Martin, James, 98-99, 101-102, 105, 174, 205 Martin, Laurence, 195, 198 massive retaliation, 54-55, 64-65, 99, 101-103, no, 117, 125, 128, 141-142, 159, 216, 230 McNamara, Robert, 53, 98, 100, 103-104, 109, 134 Mediterranean, 70 Middle East, 58, 81-82, 93-94, 168, 190-192, 208 Minuteman (ICBM) vulnerability and Kissinger, 55 and Laird, 25 and NSTAP panel, 119-120, 133 and Schlesinger, 201, 203 strategic implications of, 25, 31, 119-120 Moorer, Admiral Thomas, 22, 24, 104 Moscow, 73, 81 multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV), n, 25, 31, 33, 49, 79-8o, 93, 101, 114-115, 119, 133, 152, 200-201, 227 Muskie, Senator Edmund, 198

[246]

Index mutual assured destruction (MAD), 85, 114-115, 118, 148, 154, 160 mutual deterrence, 12, 22-23, 49, 58, 96,225 mutual vulnerability, 20-22, 39, 49, 54, 93, 101-102, 152, 224, 233 National Command Authority (NCA), 109, 122, 150-151, 168, 210 National Security Council (NSC), 13, 16, 51-52, 61, 63-69, 75-78, 85, 89, 106, 166, 171-172, 174, 184-186, 188-190, 205, 229, 230 National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242) (see also NSTAP Review Panel) allied response, 189, 192-198, 202, 231 announcement of, 1-2, 13, 97, 184-191, 202, 217 bureaucratic politics, 184-191, 232 counterforce, 185-186, 188 coupling, 193-195, 197-199, 201-203, 231 declaratory statements of, 7-8, 201-202, 231-232 document, 237-241 escalation control, 13, 197, 202 first use, 13 flexible response, 196 implementation, 49-50, 204-222 and Henry Kissinger, 184-186, 188-192 limited nuclear options, 1-14, 203 Minuteman vulnerability, 201, 203 National Security Council, 184-186, 188-190 Richard M. Nixon, 1-2, 14, 184, 190-191, 220 objectives, 196, 202 October, 1973, Arab-Israeli War, 190 political implications, 185-186, 231 presentation of, 184, 231-232 regional nuclear options, 197-198, 202, 221 James Schlesinger, 1-2, 97, 186-203, 231-232 targeting, 184-185, 204, 221 theater nuclear weapons, 197-198 war fighting, 7-8, 185 war termination, 203 weapons requirements, 189-191 National Security Study Memorandum 3 (NSSM-3), 51, 53, 144 follow-on study, 51, 53, 60-68, 98

[247]

and Kissinger, 51-53, 55, 60, 67, 98 and limited nuclear options, 53 and Office of Systems Analysis, 52-53, 98 National Security Study Memorandum 169 (NSSM-169) bureaucratic politics, 171-174, 176, 181, 187 declaratory statements, 179 and escalation control, 175-176 formation of, 174 mandate, 174-175 and NATO allies, 180-181, 183 and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 174-175, 182 and regional nuclear options, 180 and SALT, 175 signaling, 181 and targeting, 176-179, 181-182 and targeting civilians, 177-178, 182, 231 and U.S. war aims, 176, 179 and weapons acquisition, 175, 185-186 National Security Study Memorandum 171 (NSSM-171), 169 National Security Study Memorandum 191 (NSSM-191) (see also NSDM 242, weapons requirements), 189-191 National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel (NSTAP Review Panel) battlefield weapons, 149-150 bureaucratic politics, 97, 102-108, 112—114, 116, 123, 125—127, 159-162, 166, 168, 171-174, 181-182, 227, 229-230, 232 China options, 169 command and control, 111, 122, 130, 138-140, 151 conventional defense/deterrent, 143-145, 147-148, 157-158, 236 conventional forces, 133-134, 157, 179 conventional/nuclear threshold, 143-146, 157 counterforce attacks, 100, no, 122, 126, 144, 119-122 damage limitation, 127, 146-147 defending Europe, 120, 228 demonstration (warning) shots, 124, 128-129 deterrence, 98-99, 101, 109-112,

Index National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel (cont.) 114-115, 117-121, 126, 128-131, 136-137, 143, 145, 147-148, 153, 155/ i57/ 159. 163, 228, 232, 233 deterrence-by-denial, 129-130 draft targeting guidance, 179, 181-182, 192, 202-203, 206-207, 218, 220-221, 223, 228-233, 235-236 escalation control, 118, 128-131, 139-143, 146-147, 149, 153-154/ 156-160, 162-163, l65/ i75-i76> 228, 233, 235-236 European/Allied/NATO response, 163-165, 181-182, 229, 231 extended deterrence, 119-121, 232-233 extended deterrence and Europe, 119-121 first use/first strike, 121, 127, 149, 155, 163, 182, 233, 235 formation of, 116, 124, 168, 227 guidance for, 123, 125, 131, 168, 227 intrawar negotiations, 124, 137-138, 140, 143, 154, 228 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 97, 102-106, 108, 109, 112-116, 124, 150, 160, 168, 171, 173, 229-230 and Henry Kissinger, 97, 106, 113-114, 159-160, 165-174, 181, 202, 226, 230 and Melvin Laird, 97, 102-103, 106-108, 112, 117, 124, 160, 162, 165-166, 171 "last clear chance," 157 limited nuclear options, designing, 122, 126-127, 130-135, 138-141, 145-148, 159, 171 Minuteman vulnerabilty, 119-120 nuclear options and Western Europe (NATO), 147, 228 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 97-104, 107, 168 Office of Systems Analysis, 98-100, 103, 106, 122, 166, 168-169, 226-228 origins, 98-116 panel objectives, 108, 116-119, 122, 124, 127, 129-130, 153, 159, 168, 181-182, 202 regional nuclear options, 141-142, 145-148, 150, 154, 156-157, 164, 171, 216, 226, 228 risk manipulation, 157

Thomas Schelling, 136, 142, 156-157 signaling, 124, 136, 139-140, 142,

156

Soviet strategic thinking, 129, 133, 139-142, 145-146, 153-154 State Department, 106-107, 121, 123, 159-163, 165, 167, 182, 228-229 targeting flexibility, 122, 131-133, 137 targeting options/alternatives 125, 127, 170 theater nuclear weapons, 148-150 U.S. war aims, 131, 139, 149, 151, 153, 163, 176, 227-228, 232 war termination, 118-119, 127-130, 134-135, 145-150, 153-156, 159-160, 163, 182, 228, 232, 235 weapons acquisition, 122-124 withholds, 125, 137-138, 154 Nixon, President Richard M. and China, 134 conventional versus nuclear force, 222, 225 and India-Pakistan crisis, 81-83 and Jordan crisis, 70-71, 73 and NSDM-242, 1-2, 14, 184, 190-191, 220

and Sino-Soviet clashes, 85 and SALT, 93 targeting, 177, 184 and Watergate, 190, 207 Nixon Doctrine, 27-28 North Atlantic Treaty Organization American nuclear guarantee, 9, 13-14, 16, 24-25, 27, 41-45, 47-50, 54-55, 57/ 67, 89, 91, 95, 109, 120, 155-157, 161, 164, 182, 193-197, 199, 231,

202, 212-214, 22O, 228-229, 234, 235

burden sharing, 41-48, 50, 194, 219-220 conventional defense, 27, 36, 39-42, 44-48, 50, 95, 143, 147-148, 157/ 194, 196-197, 213, 215, 218-221, 226, 236 coupling, 10, 121-122, 155-158, 160, 162-165, 181, 193-195, 197-199, 201-202, 214, 223, 228-229, 231-232, 234-236 Defense Planning Committee, 46, 194 escalation control, 50, 155, 212-214, 216-217, 22i extended deterrence, 13-14, 28, 67, 198-199, 225-226

[248]

Index and implementation of NSDM-242, 50, 189, 210-222 theater nuclear weapons, 89, 197, 209-215, 217, 219, 226 triad, 197 U.S./European tensions, 210-215, 217-219 U.S. strategic nuclear forces, 197 U.S. troop levels, 43, 194, 196, 219-220 war fighting, 193-194 nuclear/conventional threshold, 35-42, 142-146, 149, 154, 157, 196, 214, 218-219, 222,

225,

236

Nuclear Options (NU-OPTS), 100 Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 36, 38, 41, 211 nuclear war by miscalculation, 10 Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP), 204-206 Nunn Amendment, 215, 219-220, 222 Nunn, Senator Sam, 215 Odeen, Philip, 174 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 16, 97, 100, 103-104, 107, 151-153, 168, 171, 180, 187-188, 206, 230 Office of Systems Analysis (OSA) 100-102, 226-228 China options, 169 civilian control, 100-101 and Alain Enthoven, 53 and extended deterrence, 232-233 and formation of National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 106, 122, 168, 227 and ICBMs, 69 and Kissinger, 52, 62-63, *66/ ^9 limited nuclear options, 62, 112 and McNamara, 53 and military, 227 and MIRVs, 227 NUWEP, 205 NSSM-3, 52-53, 98 and targeting, 62-63, 151, 166, 227 Ohlsteen, Colonel Jack, 205, 216 Osgood, Robert, 127 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 70 parity (see strategic parity) Pentagon, 21, 30, 39, 92, 108, 150, 161, 173, 186, 194, 204, 213, 215 People's Republic of China (PRC) (see also China), 82, 86-88, 96, 169

[249]

Persian Gulf, 208 Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, 204 Political-Military Bureau (P/M), 161-162 Prados, John, 69 pre-emptive strike, 85, 88 proliferation, 133, 152 "Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO" (PPGs), 41, 211 Pursley, Robert, 72 Ramstein, Germany, 195 Regional Attack Options (RAOs), 207-210 Regional nuclear options conventional defense, 144-145, 157 definition, 142-148, 150, 155-156,

i67

escalation control, 141, 142, 144, 145-148, 150, 154-158, 164-165, 165-170, 167, 171, 182, 197-198, 202, 214-217, 220-221, 226, 228, European response, 155-156, 164-165, 182, 197, 214, 216-217, 224 Henry Kissinger, 165-170, 171, 181, 226 limited nuclear options, 141-142, 145-147, 155, 163, 167, 180-182, 197-198, 202, 204, 210, 214, 216-217, 220-221, 224, 226, 228 National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 141-142, 144, 147, 150, 154-157, 163-165, 167, 216, 226 nuclear/conventional threshold, 142, 144-146, 157 scenarios/contingencies, 168, 180 James Schlesinger, 202, 215 and Soviet Union, 141, 145-147, 154-156, 164, 167 U.S. intentions, 141, 146, 156, 163, 214, 217 war termination, 145-149, 155, 182, 214, 216-217, 224, 228 Rogers, William, 160, 162 Rumsfeld, Donald, 193 Safeguard (antiballistic missile system), 25 Schelling, Thomas, 136, 142, 156-157,

i65

Index Schlesinger, James announcement of NSDM-242, 1-2, 41, 186-191 and conventional defense, 46-47, 194, 196-197, 215, 218-222 counterforce capability, 16, 44, 201, 203 coupling, 193-195, 197-199, 201-202, 231, 234-235 escalation control, 6, 137, 142, 144, 197, 214, 218-219 essential equivalence, 34 general nuclear war, 8-17 and Kissinger, 188-192 limited nuclear options, 11, 16, 137, 142, 196, 199-202, 206 Minuteman vulnerability, 201, 203 NATO, 46-47, 191-197, 199, 203, 214, 218-221, 231, 234-235 and NSDM-242, 1-2, 97, 186-203, 231-232 and NSSM-121, 46 and NSSM-i69, 183, 187 and NSSM-191, 190 and NUWEP, 204-205 and regional nuclear options, 202, 215 and selective response, 191, 195, 197, 202, 218^219 and SIOP-63, 144 theater nuclear weapons, 197-198, 214, 218-219 and U.S. troop levels, 222 Schlesinger Doctrine, 188, 223 Schroeder, Gerhard, 36-37 sea launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 30/ 79/ 89, 115, 133, 152, 209 second strike, 28, 39, 186 Seith, General Ted, 105 Selective Attack Options (SAO), 207-208, 210 Selective Employment Plans (SEPs), 217-218 selective response (selective targeting) 3-5, 7, 40/ 52, 131, i35/ 152, 191, 195,

197, 202, 210-211, 214-215,

217-22O, 222

Selin, Ivan, 53, 98 Senate, 34, 42-43 burden sharing, 44-45, 48 Committee on Foreign Relations, i93/ 197 and counterforce, 92 and enhanced accuracy, 114 and Minuteman vulnerability, 201

NATO, 48, 196 and SALT, 32, 200 US. troops in Europe, 43, 47-48 Sianking, 83-84 Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 102, 181 classes of targets, 53, 64, 99, no, 168, 207-209 conventional forces/targets, 207 economic and industrial targets, 64, 207 implementation of, in, 204-210 leadership targets, 207 Limited Nuclear Options, 207-210 Major Attack Options, 115, 126, 133, 138, 207-209 other military targets, 64, 138, 207 planning uncertainties, 205-207 Regional Attack Options, 207-210 Selective Attack Options, 207-208, 210 selectivity, 131, 207-208, 210 Soviet nuclear forces, 64, 207 strategic reserve force, 206, 209 targeting options, 109, 115, 117, 125-126, 209, 227 U.S. objectives, 64, 78 Single Integrated Operational Plan 5 (SIOP-5), 207-209 Single Integrated Operational Plan 63 (SIOP-63), "5/ *44/ 209, 227 Sino-Soviet War, 82-87, 9*>, 148, 168-169 Slocombe, Walter, 131, 134 Sloss, Leon, 129, 162-165, 193, 217 soft targets, 201 Southeast Asia, 22, 57-58, 65, 78, 91, 94/ 225 Soviet Union and China, 82-87, 9*>/ 14^ command and control (leadership), *33> 137-142, 185 conventional capability/forces, 23, 41, 49, 54-56, 58, 133-135/ 161, 179-180, 207 counterforce capability, 11-12, 16, 25-26, 29, 31, 35, 55, 74, 87, 201, 203, 231 Kissinger's views on, 41-42, 52, 54-59/ 69, 73-75, 80-84, 86, 93-94, 225 and limited nuclear options, 2, 9, n, 14, 16, in, 128, 139-141, 145, 148 and SALT, n, 20-21, 27, 29-31, 69, 79, 101, 144-145

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Index strategic buildup, 8-10, 16, 18-19, 23-26, 29-31, 48, 54-56, 58, 69, 74, 76-80, 140, 161, 193, 224 strategic forces, 26, 52, 54, 74, 99, 133, 135, 138, 140-141, 179, 185, 207 and strategic periphery, 12, 56, 58-60, 65, 80, 83, 90-91, 94-95/ 145, 167, 181, 225-226, 235 strategic superiority, 23-26, 30-31, 54/ 59/ ¿9/ 79-8o, 90-91, 211 State Department, 16, 107, 159, 160-162 coupling, 163-164, 229, 233 escalation control, 39, 162-163, 165 first use, 162-163, 229 and limited nuclear options, 68 and NATO, 217, 229, 231 and NSSM-i69, 174 and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 106-107, 121, 123, 159-163, 165, 167, 181-182, 228-229 and NUWEP, 205 Political-Military Bureau, 161 and SALT Strategic Air Command (SAC), 61, 98, 100, 125-126, 162 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and ABM, 101 Kissinger, 20, 30, 78, 80, 94, 186 and limited nuclear options, 66, 68, 79-81, 123 and Nixon, 93 and Soviet Union, 27, 29-31, 33, 49, 69, 80, 101, 144-145 U.S. objectives, 20-21, 29-31, 77-78, 80, 91 strategic arms race (competition), Kissinger's concerns about, 186 strategic arms talks, 27-31, 61 strategic balance asymmetries in, 24, 33, 54, 58, 79-80, 161, 178 Congress, 24 Kissinger's concerns about, 20, 54-55, 58-59, 79-80, 83, 94, 152, 178, 225 strategic deterrent, 48, 85 "Strategic Guidance/' 100-102, 122, 156 strategic inferiority, 28, 31, 34, 49, 58 strategic parity, 2, 9, 19, 21-24, 26-28, 30-32, 34-35/ 39/ 4i/ 48-49/ 54-5¿, 59, 69, 101, 172, 193, 223, 225, 229

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strategic periphery, 56, 58-59, 65, 75, 80-81, 83, 90-91, 94-96, 143, 167, 170, 180-181, 203, 225-226, 235 strategic reserve force, 206, 209 strategic stalemate, 22, 49 strategic sufficiency, policy of, 27-28, 6i/ 75~77/ 100-101, 117, 176 strategic superiority Nixon's statements on, 24 Soviet Union and, 23-26, 30-31, 54, 59, 69, 79-80, 90-91, 161, 211 U.S. loss of, 18-23, 39/ 48/ 52, 54, 56-59, 61, 77, 79, 91, 93, 101, 127, 151, 161, 178, 224, 232 Syria, 69-70, 72-73 tactical nuclear weapons based in West Europe, 89 tactical nuclear weapons (see also battlefield nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons) first use of, 36-38, 49-50 flexible response, 35-39, 49-50 targeting China, 134 cities, i, 3, 5-6, 25-26, 28, 55-56, 62, 90, 98-99> «7/ 137-138* 142, 144/ 178, 200, 208 civilians, morality of, 55, 76, 177-178, 231 classes (choices/alternatives), 53, 64, 99, no, 132-135, 137-138, 168, 170, 177, 204, 207-209, 227 conventional forces, 134, 177, 179-180 deterrence, 1-3, 64, 151, 163, 224 economic and industrial targets, 5, 9, 28, 55, 64, 109, 117, 133, 142, 176, 178, 200, 207 escalation control, 131, 135-139, 213, 218 implementation of NSDM-242, 204-222 leadership, 7, 133, 137, 140, 177, 185, 207 Limited Nuclear Options, 130-135, 130, 145-146, 207-210 Major Attack Options, 115, 126, 133, 138, 207-209 non-central campaigns, 75, 167, 180 other military forces/targets, 62, 64, 130, 133-134, 138, 144, 185, 188, 207 process, 61-66, 90,108, 110-112, 130-131, 153, 204-210

Index targeting (ami.) Regional Attack Options, 207-208, 210 Regional Nuclear Options, 141-142, 144-146, 156, 163 Selective Attack Options, 207-208, 210 Selective Employment Plans, 217-218 signaling, 6, 66, 124, 136, 139-142, 156, 175, 181, 212-213 Soviet nuclear forces, 133, 138, 179, 185-186, 207 thresholds, 136 war termination, 131 Warsaw Pact, 156 Western Europe (NATO), 38 withholds, 125, 137-138, 154, 177, 207 targeting plans (see also Single Integrated Operational Plan), 151, 204-222 targeting policy and Kissinger, 51-52, 61-63, 66, 93 "The Theater Nuclear Force Posture In Europe" Report (TNF report), 215-216 theater nuclear weapons command and control of, 39, 139-140, 148-151, 213 coupling, 197 employment of, 39, 62, 146, 149-151, 156, 209-213, 215, 218, 220, 226 and escalation, 211-215, 220-221 European views on, 210-215 flexible response, 35, 37, 39, 210-212 follow-on use, 211-212 National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel 139-140, 148, 150, 156, 179 role, 146, 149-150, 197-198, 210-212 selective response, 197, 210-211, 214, 220 and signaling, 212-213 and Schlesinger, 214 and Soviet Union, 141, 146, 156, 161, 179, 211-212 survivability, 218

U.S. Army, 149-150 U.S. views on, 210-215, 220 Tucker, Dr. Gardner, 99, 101-102, 116, 143 U.S. Army, 23 U.S. Air Force, 23 U.S. Marines, 23 Vietnam War, 21, 23, 27-28, 42, 45, 57, 66, 72, 76, 79, 82, 94, 96, 102, 107, 121, 192, 225, 231 Voight, General John, 105 war termination and National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 118-119, 127-130, 134-135, 145-150, 153-156, 159-160, 163, 182, 235 and Schlesinger, 3, 203 and targeting 224 and theater nuclear weapons 212-216, 221 warheads, 133 Warsaw Pact (WP, WTO), 38, 40, 47, 50, 133-134/ 143, 168, 194, 211-213, 216 Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) and China, 85 Watergate, 190, 207 Weiss, Seymour, 161-165, *74 Welch, General Jasper, 104—105, 116, 123, 125, 128, 135, 138, 174, 190, 205, 216 West Germany, 36, 38, 194, 211 West Pakistan, 82 Western Europe, 2, 5, 6, 10, 13, 43, 64, 89-90, 94, 143, 147, 155, 163-165, 168, 182, 191-193, 195, 203, 217, 225, 231-232, 234-236 Western European Union (WEU), 36, 37 White House, 61, 68, 77, 166, 181, 184 Wohlstetter, Albert, 99 Wood, Archie, 99, 101-102, 174 Zone of engagement, 141

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CORNELL STUDIES IN SECURITY AFFAIRS edited by Robert}. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars, by Deborah D. Avant Strategic Nuclear Targeting, edited by Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941, by Michael A. Barnhart The German Nuclear Dilemma, by Jeffrey Boutwell Plying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program, by Michael L. Brown Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service, by Eliot A. Cohen Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955, by Audrey Kurth Cronin Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services, by Chris C. Demchak Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debate, edited by Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe, by Richard C. Eichenberg Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies, by Matthew Evangelista Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, by Yair Evron Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States, by Peter Douglas Feaver Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1919-1926, by John Robert Ferris A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacekeeping at the Korean Armistice Talks, by Rosemary Foot The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 19501953, by Rosemary Foot The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 19505 to the 19909, by David Goldfischer House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Pail, by Colin S. Gray The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1987, by Jonathan Haslam The Soviet Union and the failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938, by Jiri Hochman The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? edited by David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, by Robert Jervis The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, by Robert Jervis The Vulnerability of Empire, by Charles A. Kupchan Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion, by Richard Ned Lebow Cooperation under Pire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II, by Jeffrey W. Legro

The Search for Security in Space, edited by Kenneth N. Luongo and W. Thomas Wander The Nuclear future, by Michael Mandelbaum Conventional Deterrence, by John J. Mearsheimer Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, by John J. Mearsheimer The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992, by Thomas M. Nichols Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, by Barry R. Posen The Sources of Military Doctrine: Prance, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, by Barry R. Posen Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937, by Gaines Post, Jr. The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, edited by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, by Stephen Peter Rosen Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970, by Jonathan Shimshoni fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945, by Leon V. Sigal The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters 0/1914, by Jack Snyder Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, by Jack Snyder The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984, by Paul B. Stares The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, by Terry Terriff Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe, by Gregory F. Treverton The Origins of Alliances, by Stephen M. Walt The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939, by Wesley K. Wark The Tet Offensive: Intelligence failure in War, by James J. Wirtz The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, by William Curti Wohlforth Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958, by Shu Guang Zhang