The Nien Army and their guerrilla warfare 1851–1868 [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9783112329849, 9783112329832

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The Nien Army and Their Guerrilla Warfare 1851-1868

ÉCOLE

PRATIQUE

SIXIÈME

SECTION.

DES

HAUTES

SCIENCES

ÉTUDES

ÉCONOMIQUES

—

SORBONNE ET

SOCIALES

LE MONDE D'OUTRE-MER PASSÉ ET PRÉSENT PREMIÈRE

SÉRIE

ETUDES XÏII

S. Y. T E N G

THE N I E N ARMY AND THEIR GUERRILLA WARFARE 1851 — 1868

GREENWOOD PRESS, PUBLISHERS WEST PORT

CONNECTICUT

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Teng, Ssu-yii, 1906The Nien army and their guerrilla warfare, 1Ô51-1868. Reprint. Originally published: Paris : Mouton, 1961. (Le Monde d'outre-mer, passé et présent , 1. sér., Etudes, 13) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. C h i n a — H i s t o r y — N i e n Rebellion, 1853-1868. I. Title. DS759.5.TU3 198U 951'.03 eit-15871* ISBN 0-313-2U386-7 (lib. bdg.)

Copyright 1961 by Mouton & Co., Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands All rights reserved Reprinted with the permission of Mouton Publishers Reprinted in 1984 by Greenwood Press A division of Congressional Information Service, Inc. 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881 Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To My Parents whose struggles enabled me to gain a higher education

Preface

If one is to understand the recent developments in China, he can do so only through a careful scrutiny of Chinese society, of the forces and traditions interacting within its structure. The present undertaking is a step toward this goal. It is a study of a Chinese rebellion, traditionally known as the Nien-fei or Nien-bandits movement; now these rebels are called the Nien-chiin, or the Nien army. Although the new term is preferable to the old, the historical name is also used occasionally. The members of this movement were active in central and northern China for nearly two decades in the middle of the nineteenth century. The subject is a major social and military phenomenon, of which a thorough examination will help us get a clearer picture of the decline and fall of China in the late nineteenth century. Undoubtedly, as we shall see, the Nien army accelerated the political disintegration of the Manchu empire and served as one of the forerunners of the 1911 revolution. The research work on this topic started in 1950 with the attempt to collect as many original sources as possible, and to analyze or interpret them as far as facts permit. The first version was completed and accepted for publication in 1953. A few months later, the publication of the sixvolume collection of source material entitled the Nien-chiin, compiled by a number of scholars in Peking, made it necessary for me to take the manuscript out of the publisher's hands for a thorough revision. This revision work, in the midst of other duties, took many months to complete. When I finally returned the manuscript to the publisher who had accepted it before, I had lost the priority of publication. The appearance of my work would have been postponed until other monographs which had been accepted during the meantime could be published, and that would have taken several years for the small press to accomplish. During the long delay, a few books about the Nien appeared in the English and Chinese languages. The University of Washington, Seattle, published in 1954 Siang-tseh Chiang's The Nien Rebellion, which is a good Ph.D. dissertation, but certainly not without shortcomings and

8

PREFACE 1

errors. Because of the publication of this book, the publisher refused to issue my manuscript. But no book on the French revolution, for example, or the American Civil War, is final. There are already about a dozen books dealing with Chinese Communism or Sino-Soviet relations around the 1920's. No new publication contains entirely new facts, ideas, and interpretations. Nor is it possible to avoid duplications or overlapping entirely. Furthermore, there is no point to cavil at earlier works in order to justify a new one. Suffice it to say that I used the six-volume source material; Dr. Chiang had no chance to use it. I emphasized the guerrilla warfare of the Nien army; Dr. Chiang did not. I have covered different facets of the Nien and offered varied emphases and interpretations, which sometimes I briefly pointed out in a footnote and often times not, because I do not intend to criticize others unnecessarily. Then Lo Erh-kang published a revised edition of his Nien-chiin ti yiin-t'ung chart2 (The Mobile Warfare of the Nien Army) with a new title called Tai-p'ing T'ien-kuo hsin-chün ti yiin-tung chart (The Mobile Warfare of the New Army of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) (Shanghai, 1955). The tide of this booklet sounds wonderful. Its contents, however, are the same as the original except that a new preface has been added and all references to the Nien before 1857 have been omitted. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lo ignores Nien's existence of almost half a century before the beginning of the Taiping movement. He makes mistakes such as in his assertion that the Nien and the Taipings had no contact until 1856; I found that they had contact in 1853 during the Taiping northern expedition through Anhwei, Honan and Chihli. He claims that the Nien had no organization; yet I have a chapter dealing with Nien's organization. Mr. Lo admitted that the "great defect in his little book is lack of source material," which is true, for he used but a small fraction of the sources I have quoted. After the fall of Nanking, the Taipings fled southward to Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung where they were wiped out in 1866. The Taiping column on its way from North China to rescue Nanking was intercepted and harassed by the government soldiers. It was the Nien army which saved the Taipings from meeting the same fate in the south. To be sure, Lai Wen-kuang did try to reorganize the Taipings and the Niens, but the name of the long-lived "Nien" should not be entirely erased from all documents by Lo Erh-kang. The new Nien-Taiping 1

See my review of this book in the Far Eastern Quarterly, XIV, 3 (May, 1955), 412-413. Although I hinted the shortcomings in this study, I did not bother to point out the minor errors such as mislocation of footnotes, references, typographical errors, unfinished words (p. 155). - For Chinese characters please see the bibliography.

PREFACE

9

allies, as we may call, lasted more than two years (July 1864Oct. 1867). Thereafter they were split into two separate groups, about which Lo Erh-kang seems to have ignored the fact that while the Eastern Nien, with more Taiping remnants, were under the general command of Lai Wen-kuang, the Western Nien, including mainly Nien veterans, were under the original Nien leader, Chang Tsung-yii. Beginning in October 1866, the two divisions of the Nien forces fought separately; they never met again. Lai Wen-kuang's Eastern Nien were annihilated by government troops in January 1868; Chang's Western Nien survived seven months longer. They might have lived longer in Shensi had they not been urged to return to Shantung to help Lai's Eastern Nien. Thus the Nien rebellion cannot be neglected. A third publication is Chiang Ti's Nien-chiin shih ch'u-t'an (A preliminary investigation of the history of the Nien army) (Peking, 1956). In Chiang's general survey of the Nien history, with emphasis on the last several years and on the Nien-Moslem relations, he quotes Lo's revised book mentioned above; but he does not follow Lo's new terms and interpretation. Two 1957 publications also ignore Lo's fancy title (see bibliography under Chiang Shih-jung and Ch'en Po-ch'en). This means that Lo's thesis is not accepted by Communist scholars in China working on the Nien rebellion. It is regrettable that I am obliged to engage in some mental swordplay with my old friend Mr. Lo and other co-workers in the same field. Nevertheless, I am grateful for the study of the Nien by Lo Erh-kang, Chiang Siang-tseh, Chiang Ti and others. In referring to their works I have benefited by the gathering of information, by cross-checking, and by clarification of many doubtful points. A Chinese proverb says that he who goes aboard a small boat first lands last. I am sure this book will not be the last on the Nien army; there will be more to come. From the enormous amount of collected material, only a brief outline can be presented in the following pages. In tracing the major facets of the Nien army, I have sought to keep a number of questions in mind. What, for example, was the significance of the Nien army to modern Chinese history? Were they merely local gangsters or did they operate as a nationalist movement? If they were the latter, to what extent can they be considered as such a movement? Was theirs a peculiar rebellion, or was it one of many other rebellions in Chinese history? Was it caused by economic depression alone, or by political and social collapse as well? And what was the effect of the Nien army on the fate of the Ch'ing dynasty? This essay attempts to find answers to these questions. A number of suggestions and interpretations concerning the social, economic,

10

PREFACE

and geographical surroundings of the Nien army are also offered. This study of the Nien movement — including its background, activities, and influence — may thus be of some help in obtaining a better understanding of modern China from backstage, since every society always has long roots in the past which can neither decay nor be changed overnight. I do not presume to predict the course of Chinese rebellion or revolution. However, in the following pages I shall observe some general tendencies. Perhaps such a small work as this may be of some assistance not only to students of Far Eastern history and of the political and social sciences, but also — because of the importance of guerrilla warfare in the Nien movement — to correspondents or military observers in present-day China. The military tactics of the Nien army, including the surprise raid, the ambuscade, the night attack, and notably the feint, are still largely used today. The biographies of Chang Tsung-yii, Lai Wen-kuang, and Jen Chu may justifiably be included among those of the principal guerrilla leaders of the world. This study is prepared for both experts and nonexperts to read. A Sinologist may prefer first to read the conclusion, in which there are some ideas which hitherto seem not to have been expressed by other workers on the Nien army and modern Chinese history. He may then like to skip to chapters V and VII before proceeding to the beginning. At any rate, the material is presented in a simple and yet comprehensive way (as a whole fish is served on a Chinese dinner table); the reader is at liberty to start from any part he likes. I gratefully acknowledge my many sources of assistance: the American Philosophical Society and Indiana University for grants-in-aid for research; Dr. Charles S. Gardner for his generosity in lending me his valuable collection of very rare illustrations concerning the warfare against the Nien army, some of which are inserted in this volume; Professors Harry Elmer Barnes, Derk Bodde, John K. Fairbank, Chao-ying Fang, Robert H. Ferrell, L. Carrington Goodrich, George Humphrey, Jeremy Ingalls, Ralph L. Powell, G. Nye Steiger, Mary C. Wright, L. S. Yang and others for reading the manuscript and making valuable suggestions. I am indebted to Dr. K'ai-ming Ch'iu and his colleague, Zunvair Yue; Dr. K. T. Woo and his associates; Mr. Howard P. Linton, and especially Mr. Hsu Chia-pi, in the Libraries of Chinese and Japanese at Harvard University, the Library of Congress, and Columbia University, respectively, for their kindness in opening their collections to the writer for his research; and to Nancy Adams, Norma Burns, Marilyn Gibson, Ervin Kapos, Roger

PREFACE

11

Stemen, and Thomas Tucker, for their assistance in preparing the manuscript. Finally, I must acknowledge a debt to my wife and Mr. Pradyumna Prasad Karan for preparing the index and the maps. It goes without saying that the author alone is responsible for all shortcomings. August, 1960

S. Y. T.

Contents

Preface I.

7 INTRODUCTION

1. 2. 3. 4. II.

III.

. .

. .

. .

16 17 26 37 46

1. The Early Nien History from 1797 to 1851 . 2. The Opportunities and Methods of the Nien Development 3. The Nien Methods for Enlarging their Membership .

46

T H E N I E N ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

72

.

.

.

The Early Nien Organization The Later Nien Organization The Sources of Influence over the Nien Organization Sources of Supply The Nien Leadership The Role of the Gentry in the Nien Rebellion . .

RELATIONS OF THE N I E N WITH OTHER R E B E L S .

55 69 72 76 86 90 93 100

.

113

. . .

113 120 126 132

A HISTORY OF THE N I E N MOVEMENT AND ITS SUPPRESSION

134

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

135 144 152 158 162

1. 2. 3. 4. V.

. .

T H E DEVELOPMENT OF THE N I E N

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. IV.

A Bird's-eye View of the Nien Army The Meaning and Nature of "Nien" Historical Background Geographical Background

15

The Nien Relations with the Taipings . The Relations of the Nien with Secret Societies Nien's Cooperation with Local Forces . . Nien Relations with the Moslem Rebels .

. . . .

The First Phase of the Nien Movement, 1851-1865 Tseng Kuo-fan's Policy Against the Nien . . The Second Phase of Nien Movement, 1865-1866 The Eastern Nien, Oct. 1866-Jan. 1868 . The Western Nien, Oct. 1866-Aug. 1868 . .

. . . . .

14

CONTENTS

VI.

VII.

VIII.

THE WEAPONS OF THE N I E N A R M Y AND THEIR GUERRILLA TACTICS

170

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The Weapons of the Nien Army The Cavalry of the Nien Army The Guerrilla Tactics of the Nien Army . . Patterns of the Nien Guerrilla Warfare . Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Guerrilla Warfare

170 173 174 180 188

CAUSES OF THE PROLONGED W A R AGAINST THE N I E N A R M Y

195

1. An Estimate of the Number of the Two Belligerents 2. Causes of the Prolonged War 3. Reasons for the Failure of the Nien Army

195 202 213

CONCLUSION:

.

The Effect of the Nien Rebellion on the Fate

of the Manchu Dynasty

218

Bibliography

233

Index

250

List of Maps and Illustrations MAPS:

1. A Sketch-Map of the Yellow and Huai Rivers and the Grand Canal

38

2. Panoramic Map Showing the Activities of the Nien Army 1851-1868 opp.

136

3. Tseng Kuo-fan's Military Plan against the Nien

146

.

4. The Blockade in 1867-1868

165

ILLUSTRATIONS:

Plate 1. Battle against the Army in Shantung

opp.

.

.

.

.

81

Plate 2. A War picture showing the Examination of the Nien Leader Chang Lo-hsing

96

Plate 3. A Picture showing the Campaign against Miao P'eilin of Men-ch'eng, Anhwei

106

Plate 4. A War to capture the Nien leader Lai Wen-kuang alive, near Yang-chou, Kiangsu

161

I. Introduction

Although nineteenth-century Europe enjoyed a period of outstanding peace, nineteenth-century China was convulsed with prolonged and savage warfare. The most widely known of these Chinese conflicts are: the "Opium," or first Anglo-Chinese, war (1839-1842); the second Anglo-Chinese war (1858-1860); the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895); and the Boxer Uprising (1900). In addition, there occurred the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864); the Nien Rebellion (1851-1868); the Southwest Moslem Rebellion in Yunnan (1855-1873); the Northwest Moslem Rebellion in Shensi and Kansu (1862-1878); and the Miao Rebellion in Kweichow and Hunan (1855-1873). There were many other uprisings led by secret societies and by poverty-stricken peasants. The "Opium war" and other international wars, as well as the Taiping Rebellion, have been studied by Chinese and Western scholars.1 The other wars listed here have been largely or entirely neglected. Of these various wars, the Nien Rebellion has long been over-shadowed by the Taiping movement. Nevertheless, it is important, and a treatise on the Nien can shed considerable light on the Taiping revolt; the two movements were closely associated, and stemmed from the same sociopolitical background. All these wars and rebellions contributed signally, of course, to the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. A survey of the background and an analysis of the causes of the Nien movement can help social scientists in tracing the pattern of Chinese rebellion or revolution for the purpose of comparison with similar movements in such other parts of the world as Poland and France.2 And since 1 See the bibliography of Eugene P. Boardman's Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion (Madison, Wise., 1952), pp. 155-170. 1 Some similarities may be found between Polish and Chinese peasants. In the famous work of William Isaac Thomas, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (New York, 1927), I find the following statement: "The Polish peasant community has developed during many centuries complicated systems of beliefs and rules of behavior sufficient to control social life under ordinary circumstances." (vol. I, p. 2). This may be applied to Chinese society, too. The French Revolution showed "traces of having originated at a time when the land was almost the only form of wealth and when the possessors of the land were the masters of those who needed it to work and to live." Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution (Princeton,

16

INTRODUCTION

the Nien army were guerrilla fighters, and their fame spread quickly into north China,3 their history may also interest those who wish to know a little of the forerunners of present-day guerrilla tactics. 1. A Bird's-eye

View of the Nien

Army

The "Nien-fei" or the Nien army is also referred to in other books as the "Nien Party" (Nien-t'ang), the "mounted bandits" or "troops of mounted robbers." 4 In the nineteenth century, they overran several provinces in Central and Northern China, causing anarchy for seventeen years. Though they were considered to have no higher aim than brigandage, they defeated more than twenty imperial commanders, including those of very substantial military reputation at the time. For a short period, they became a real source of danger to the Manchu regime. The Nien army owed their strength and endurance principally to their mobility and to their guerrilla tactics. They seldom fought a pitched battle, but retreated before an imperial army until its soldiers were worn out with fatigue; then they turned upon their pursuers and dealt them severe blows. The Nien army made alliances not only with the Taipings but also with other local bandits and members of secret societies to combat the imperial army and the local militia. The Manchu government tried various means to suppress them: it sent imperial troops, to no avail; it trained local militia, again to no avail, since many of the militia became bandits and turned against the imperial government. 1947), p. 1. "Before the eve of 1789, the great majority of Frenchmen — from 20 to 22 million out of 26 million — were engaged in agriculture. There was a disgruntled but ineffective minority of farmer nobles and other privileged people, a mass of landhungry and ignorant peasants with no definite political aims. The wheat crop of 1788 had been poor." C. Crane Brinton, A Decade of Revolution (New York, 1934), 8-9, 22, and 29. 3 Having wrought such great havoc in North China, the Nien army left an indelible impression on the people. Some of the Nien documents entitled Ch'iung-chia hang, or Poor Families' Songs, were recently discovered by Jung Meng-yiian during his investigations in Shantung, and the new materials thus obtained are now kept in the Division of Modern History Studies in Chung-kuo ko-hsueh yen-chiu yuan, the Research Institute of Science, in China. See T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ko-ming yiin-tung lun-wen-chi, 121 and 127. 4 The term, "Nien-t'ang," is used in Li Ting-sheng's Chung-kuo chin-tai shih, and in Chang Wen-ch'ing's Nien-t'ang ch'i-i, a popular account of the Nien movement. The first mention of "Nien-fei" and "Nien-t'ang" in an official source was in the years 1832 and 1851, respectively (CSL-TK 222.19 and HF 36.16). "Nien-ping" (Nien soldiers or army) was used in Han Shih-shih's Man-ch'ing hsing-wang shih (Shanghai, 1913), 2.8b. — Complete titles for CSL and other abbreviations are given in the bibliography.

A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE NIEN ARMY

17

After the Nien army killed the famous Mongolian general, Seng-ko-linch'in, in 1865, no other outstanding Manchu or Mongolian soldier comparable to Seng appeared during the rest of the dynasty. The Manchu emperor again had to rely on the Chinese forces of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, the great Chinese generals who had already crushed the Taiping Rebellion, to suppress the Nien army. It thus was during the fighting against the Nien that military power in China shifted from the hands of the Manchus to the hands of the Chinese. The good leadership of Tseng and Li, and the better pay and superior arms of their troops, compelled the Nien army to split into two parts and to develop in different directions. One part was known as Tung-nien, or the Nien army of the East (i.e., Shantung, etc.), while the other part, known as Hsi-nien, or the Nien army of the West, was active in Shensi. The Eastern Nien were suppressed in January, 1868, and the Western Nien in August of the same year. According to official sources,5 this long campaign cost the central government 17,972,000 taels of silver, 8,491,000 strings of cash and 700,009,000 taels of paper currency, while the cost to the local people in defense measures, militia, and devastation was incalculable. Certainly a rebellion of this magnitude, which made such demands on financial and untold human resources, merits careful examination. 2.

The Meaning and Nature of "Nien"

Let us start, then, with four problems. What is the meaning of nien? When did the Nien-fei arise? Where did they first appear? And what was the nature of the Nien movement? The Chinese character for nien or nieh has two or three interchangeable forms.6 Nien, as a verb, means to nip with the fingers, to take up, to take a pinch, to pursue or to chase; as a noun, it means a twist of paper, a group of people, a band, or a horde. When it is applied to Nien-fei, it has half a dozen meanings according to different interpretations. The word fei means bandits or rebels. In the first place, nien — "to light an oiled spill" — was originally a game. From many gazetteers7 of Honan and Anhwei, we know that there 5

Chiao-p'ing Nien-fei fang-liieh, 320.42b. This will hereafter be cited as Fangliieh. • For the Chinese characters, see the index. 1 Such as Shou-kuang hsien-chih (Shantung), 15-20; Ch'ien-shan hsien-chih, 8.11b; Wo-yang feng-t'u chi (Anhwei), 15.8; Lai-yang hsien-chih (Shantung), the last chapter, p. 6.

18

INTRODUCTION

was a game called "nien," which consisted of twisting paper into spills, or of burning twists of oiled paper as a kind of "dragon dance." According to the famous work Hsiang-chiin chih (An Account of the Hunan Army) written by Wang K'ai-yiin, the Nien-fei plundered people by holding torchlights which were made of twisted oiled paper.8 This statement is too terse, and the same paragraph was revised and explained by Wang Ting-an in a book with a similar title, Hsiang-chun chi, in which he says: "We do not know when the trouble of the Nien-fei began. Some say that the countryfolk twisted oiled paper rolls, burned them for dragon processions for the purpose of exercising demons and for driving away pestilence, and this kind of parade was called nien. Later on, these people took violent revenges, or threatened others for their money, or kidnapped people to compel ransom; they gradually became robbers. . .."» Although Wang Ting-an's Hsiang-chun chi is inferior to Wang K'ai-yiin's Hsiang-chiin chih in faithful historiography and lucid style, the former's explanation of the meaning of nien is, because more cautious, perhaps more trustworthy. Secondly, Nien-fei may be interpreted as meaning "turban bandits." A source book compiled in 1874 supplies us the information that the boatmen and porters along the Grand Canal used fu, or turbans to cover their heads. They had organizations and chieftains, and they robbed people in years of dearth. Thus they were called Fu-fei, or "turban bandits," and were usually referred to together with the Nien-fei.10 This account shows that there is obviously a difference between the Fu-fei and Nien-fei. One early English editor, however, in 1883, combined the two into one by saying the term Nien-fei is derived from "greased turbans worn by the rebels as a distinctive mark." 11 This interpretation also appears in Giles' Chinese-English Dictionary for the Nien-fei. The Chinese scholar, Wang K'ai-yiin, said approximately the same in 1885, that "The Nien-fei probably began with gatherings of the vagrants and the unemployed of Shantung, where some of these people united themselves by wearing turbans as a symbol and some by holding torchlight [processions]."12 Thirdly, nien means "stuck together like quickly mustered vagabond fighters", like something grasped quickly in a hand, and they disperse quickly, too, as one looses his hand and whatever is held drops and breaks into pieces. This delineation is made by the compilers of the General * Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin-chih, 14.1. 9 Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 16.1. 10 Shan-tung chiin-hsing chi-liieh, 17.1 ff. 11 See "Notes and inquiries" in China Review, XII, no. 3 (1883), 207. 12 See note 8.

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF " N I E N "

19

13

Gazetteer of Hupeh, which also reveals something of the nature of the Nien-fei, though it is full of imagination. Fourthly, Nien-fei may mean "Ku-fei." A modern historian, Kuo T'ing-i, said that the Nien-fei were similar to the Ku-fei, who were bands of robbers during the 1920's.14 This remark describes the nature of the Nien-fei, and perhaps also indicates the fundamental meaning of the word. Since the Nien were subdivided into ku, as seen from frequent reports to the throne mentioning several ku or bands of Nien, the Nienfei and the Ku-fei were, indeed, somewhat similar though not identical. A semantic or etymological approach to the word nien bears little fruit. Further attempts have been made to search for its meaning in local gazetteers, in which some descriptions are not entirely applicable. For instance, one source indicates that the Nien-fei were named after their smuggling of salt by "taking up" (nien) small carts;15 and another one says that since they twisted (nien) incense and burned it to gather a crowd of followers, they were called Nien.16 Such definitions, which may cover one shade of the meaning, are perhaps not comprehensive enough to be useful. One further proposed meaning of nien seems to be that of a band, group, or horde. As Wang Ting-an says: "Sometimes a few persons formed one "nien" [a band], sometimes several dozen or even hundreds formed one. They robbed people in daylight." 17 That is why these were nien-fei. This exposition appears often in Chinese source material.18 Fortunately, however, we may discover the fundamental meaning of nien from the important government source, Ch'ing shih-lu (Veritable Records of the Ch'ing Dynasty), in which one of the early references to this term is made in Censor T'ao Chu's memorial to the throne on January 1, 18 v 5. And whereas the resume of this memorial in the Ch'ing shihlu does noi supply a full explanation, we were further fortunate to locate a copy of a collection of T'ao Chu's memorials under the Chinese title, T'ao Yun-t'ing hsien-sheng tsou-kao, in which the original document throws much light on the meaning and nature of the Nien. In this document, T'ao said that in Ju-nan and Kuang-chou, Honan, and Ying-chou, Anhwei, there were Red-beard bandits (Hung-hu-fei). The Red-beard bandits were former members of the White Lotus Society who 13

Hu-p'ei tung-chih, 73.1. K u o Ting-i, T'ai-ping T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, II, Supplement, 120. 15 San-hsii yeh-hsien-chih, 3.4. 18 Nien-chun, III. 470. 17 W a n g Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 16.1. 18 Ch'ing shih-lu, Chia-ch'ing, 299, 21-22; and T'ao yun-t'ing hsien-sheng tsou-kao, 8.15, 17, 18, 22b-23. See also Shan-tung chin-tai shih tzu-liao, 209. 14

20

INTRODUCTION

had escaped government punishment. Occasionally they w e n t out to rob, carrying small knives for self-protection. Because of their fierce manners, people called t h e m the Red-beards, after the fierce-looking m e n o n the stage w h o w o r e red beards and liked to challenge others. A t first the bandits were enraged w h e n they heard this nickname, but n o w [ 1 8 1 5 ] they accept it as their proper n a m e without hesitation.

They formed groups and acted in daylight. Each group of such bandits was called a nien-tzu and consisted of a few men or of several score; a large nien-tzu might even comprise over two hundred men. They pillaged openly, seizing property and taking other people's wives and daughters, and their actions were directed by chieftains.19 This report supports a new thesis that the nien-tzu was a branch of the Red-beard bandits, who were former members of the White Lotus Society. In other words, the Nien was a branch of the secret White Lotus Society. This information is confirmed by two other authors whose works are collected in the publication, Nien Army.20 According to the latter source, the Red-beard bandits were so called because of the fact that at first the timid robbers painted their beards red and faces black in order to hide their identities from their local people. This seems to be a more plausible interpretation. It is to be noted that the government documents do not stress the idea of twisted rolls of oil-paper, and that nien was first referred to as nientzu in the sense of a group, a band, or a unit. The first active Nien movement is dated 1851, but Nien had existed in North China long before. The question of their earliest appearance has been answered by Wang K'ai-yun as follows: "They probably appeared during the K'ang-hsi period (1662-1722);" and, by Wang Ting-an, as in the Chia-ch'ing period (1796-1820). The editors of the General Gazetteer of Anhwei" frankly admitted that no one knew the exact date of their origin.21 In a number of local gazetteers and government documents, such as Ch'ing shih-lu and Tung-hua-lu, no reference to the Nien-fei has yet been found in the K'ang-hsi period.22 Probably nobody tried to keep "

T'ao Yun-ting hsien-sheng tsou-kao, 8.15. CSL-CC., 164.3. The Red-beard-bandits were also referred to in CSL-CC, 310.19, 319.15, 325.9b, etc. Their connection with the White Lotus Society is confirmed in Nien-chun, 1. 309, 377-78. 21 An-hui t'ung-chih kao, the section on great events, 1.1. " The K'ang hsi period was relatively peaceful. The rebellion of Wu San-kuei and others (1674-1681) was suppressed in seven years. After that rebellion, the Chinese on the whole enjoyed peace until 1717, when bandits inspired by members of the White Lotus Society, appeared in Honan, but they were soon suppressed (CSL-KH, 274.15; 275.3; 278.28). In 1721, there was a revolt, led by Chu I-kuei, in Formosa — an obvious attempt to restore the imperial Chu family of the Ming dynasty — but this was also ruthlessly suppressed (Ibid., 293.1b, 21b; 295.6; 296.15b-16 and passim). !0

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF " N I E N "

21

a record of their existence until after they had caused serious trouble, and it may therefore be difficult to find a source which dates their inception precisely. Nor are the Nien mentioned in the 1806 edition of the Ta-ch'ing lii-li (The Laws and Precedents of the Ch'ing Dynasty).23 This also indicates that, about the year 1800, the Nien did not cause the government enough anxiety to elicit special laws to control them. We are inclined to think that Wang K'ai-yiin's speculation of the commencement of the Nien in the K'ang-hsi period may not be true; Wang Ting-an's dating in the Chiach'ing period is probably more reliable. January 1, 1815, of the Chiach'ing reign is the first occasion when Nien-tzu was reported by Censor T'ao Chu as mentioned above. A private source stated that from 1814 on, the Nien actions continued.24 A Japanese scholar, Sano Manabu, also reached the same conclusion, that Nien began in 1814. Sano Manabu based his argument on the Sacred Instruction [Sheng-hsiin].25 One might be satisfied with this date. Further research, however, puts the date still earlier. In September, 1815, the emperor noted that Ju-ning and Kuang-chou, Honan, were infested with the Red-beard bandits. In April, more than a hundred Nien-tzu-shou had carried long spears through markets and towns, and the people had to dodge along byways. The Nien-tzu-shou killed many people, but the government paid no attention to them.26 In 1811, it was again reported that the Red-beard bandits were claiming to "rob the rich in order to help the poor."27 That seems to betoken some slight tinge of social revolution. En-ch'ang reported to the throne in 1809, saying that on the border between Hupeh and Honan there were Red-beards, and Bare-fist-fighters (Pai-ch'uan-shou), and on the frontier between Anhwei and Shantung there was a Sword-wielders' society (I-tao-hui).28 In the same year a censor memorialized that the Red-beard had been intercepting travelers in Honan for "a long time."29 In the preceding year a supervising censor, Chou Ting-shen, also memorialized that in Ying-chou, Po-chou, and

83 There is no mention of the Nien-fei in the "Ta Tsing Leu Lee," tr. by George Thomas Staunton (London, 1810). But in the Ta-Ch'ing lii-li an-yii, by Huang En-t'ung, 1870 edition, the Nien were mentioned in chiian 23, pp. 21-22. " Nien-chun, I. 376. 15 See Sano Manabu, Seicho shakai shi (A History of Chinese Society), Part III, 56. 88 CSL-CC, 308.16. » Ibid., 246-lb-2. 88 Ibid., 218.22. » Ibid., 217. 35-36.

22

INTRODUCTION

Hsu-chou of Kiangnan, in Kuei-te of Honan, Ts'ao-chou, I-chou of Shantung, there were many loafers or rascals who carried knives and gathered together in establishing various clubs, as Boxers (I-ho ch'uan), the Eight Diagram sect (Pa-kua-chiao), the Tiger-tail-whip (Hu-wei-pien), etc. They behaved outrageously in the countryside in oppressing the honest people. They engaged in public gambling for which they bribed government officials to serve as their "eyes and ears." The name, Boxers, so familiar in 1900, had already appeared in a Chinese document of 1808.30 The Red-beard bandits had been mentioned in 1806, when Emperor Chia-ch'ing pointed out that such bandits were on the increase in Honan. At first only a few score such people had gathered to gamble and fight, but the local government had connived at their existence, and they gradually became more numerous.31 In the Communist publication concerning the Nien Army, there is cited an incontestable source which says explicitly that the Nien-fei began in 1797.32 Although the reference to Nien cannot be found in the Veritable Records for the same year, the latter source supplies the information that whenever the Religious bandits (Chiao-fei) entered a village in Honan, they coerced the robust peasants to join and forced them to fight in the front against government forces.38 This may be used as additional evidence to support the preceding version. Thus documentary materials help trace the beginnings of the Nien from 1814 back to 1797. It appears safe to say, then, that this horde of bandits originated near the end of the eighteenth century. Although Wang K'ai-yun and Wang Ting-an failed to mention the connections between the Nien and the White Lotus Society, the revolutionary activities of the latter help to elucidate the initial stage of the Nien movement. From 1793 for more than a decade, the members of the secret societies, especially the White Lotus Society, had been engaged in revolutionary efforts to extinguish the Manchu regime, whose political domination had already entered a stage of troubled decline. In 1803 there was an attempt to assassinate Emperor Chia-ch'ing.34 At the same time, the emperor warned his officials against corrupt local administration which began by irritating the people, then antagonizing them and finally 30

Ibid., 198.1b. Professor G. N y e Steiger, in a letter to this writer, courteously granted that he did not know the existence of the Boxers in 1808, while working on the Boxer Uprising in relation to his China and the Occident; otherwise his conclusion must have been different. « Ibid., 164.3. 32 Nien-chun, I. 309. 13 CSC-CC 22.17b; 91.7b. 34 CSC-CC 109.12b-14b; 110.24-29b.

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF " N I E N "

23

causing them to refuse to pay the land tax. Economic pressure also impelled many groups of people to fight among themselves.35 Emperor Chia-ch'ing was deeply concerned about the activities of the secret religious organizations, especially the White Lotus Society.36 The rebellion of the so-called "Religious bandits" had broken out in 1796 in Hupeh and had spread to Honan, Szechwan, Shensi, and Kansu, and it was not suppressed until eight years later. In 1813 another secret religious society, T'ien-li chiao, started a rebellion from Hua-hsien, Honan, where the leader, Li Wen-ch'ing, allied himself with Lin Ch'ing, a villager from near Peking. Suddenly, on October 8, 1813, an abortive attempt was made by Lin's group to take the life of the emperor and to overthrow the Manchu government. Assisted by eunuchs they managed to get inside the palace grounds of the Forbidden City, but two of the rebels were cut down by Prince Min-nin, who later became Emperor Tao-kuang. 37 Against this background, the Nien thus appeared in 1797, when many militia had been recruited from famine areas of Ying-chou, Anhwei and Ju-ning, Honan, to suppress the riots of the White Lotus Society in Hupeh and other provinces. After the campaign the disbanded militiamen, who had been spoiled by undisciplined life in the service and were probably also affected by the ideas of their erstwhile enemies — members of secret societies — did not resume farm work. They devoted their time to drinking and gambling and were joined by many local idlers. In daytime they were rowdy in markets and towns; at night they robbed people in rural regions. The local officials ignored the reports of their victims. Encouraged by official connivance, these rowdies with torches and weapons ransacked villages, killing men, raping women, and doing all sorts of evil.38 They were still sufficiently wary to act at night; moreover, they painted their faces black and beards red to conceal their identities. Hence they were given the nickname, "Red-beard." 39 Each band or gang of them formed a nien, and gradually the local people called them nientzu. They were not called Nien-fei in the early stage, and did not cause the empire any great trouble until the 1850's. The early home of the Nien-tzu is uncertain. Some sources indicate that they started in the area between Anhwei and Honan. Some locate their beginning in the area between Kiangsu and Honan, and others in the province of Shantung. Wang Ting-an gives the most detailed des35

Ibid., 117.18.

•'•'« Ibid., 91.1 ff.

37

Ibid., 107.1b; 273.14b-15 and passim. For a detailed record, see P'ing-ting chiao-

fei chih-liieh, compiled by Ying-ho and others and published in 1818. 38 CSL-CC 274.1b, 8 and passim.

Nien-chun 1, 309.

24

INTRODUCTION

cription of their early homes: "In Yen-chou, I-chou, and Ts'ao-chou of Shantung, in Nan-yang, Ju-ning, Kuang-shan, and Kuei-te of Honan, in Hsii-chou and Huai-an of Kiangsu, in Ta-ming of Chihli, and in Lu-chou, Feng-yang, Ying-chou, and Shou-chou of Anhwei, the Nien existed everywhere, even during peacetime." 40 Obviously, the activities of the Nien at first occurred in Anhwei, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, and Chihli — an area between the Yellow River and the Huai River. Combining this information with the two books of the Wangs, together with the various government documents, we may state that the Nien probably began as small groups of people carrying out a ceremony by lighting oiled paper rolls for a dragon or lion dance, usually in winter after the harvest, to exorcise evil spirits or to drive away pestilence. At first they were harmless players, and nobody paid much attention to them. These young players, however, could easily have become hoodlums when they were not welcomed, or when their processions were barred by the people of another district or clan. Feuds from such causes have ever been common in China. Once fighting has begun between the people of two villages or clans, hatred continues, and each side seizes any opportunity to avenge itself on its enemies. In time, groups or bands originally formed for drinking, gambling, or playing together, or for fighting against others, become adherents or sympathizers of secret organizations. Especially in years of famine and under corrupt governments, these adventurous young people could easily be inspired to become robbers by members of secret societies like the White Lotus. This seems the probable sequence of events out of which arose a branch of the Red-beard bandits called nien-tzu or nien-tzu-shou, which are frequently mentioned along with the Bare-fist fighters and the Swordwielders. In this case, nien-tzu-shou may mean kidnappers who hold people for ransom. Finally, probably for the sake of brevity, nien-tzu-shou was called Nien-fei or Nien-bandits. The final functional meaning of Nien seems to be simply "group of bandits," or the "Nien" horde of bandits. At first Nien may have been the name of a secret society, with its various possible meanings as traced above, but later on they took open actions. Whether the Nien were bandits, rebels, or revolutionaries, we must have agreement as to the general significance to be allowed to the words rebellion and revolution. The words are here taken to mean a concerted movement of the ruled against the rulers or against the forces representing the rulers. Revolution usually refers to an armed struggle for the changing of principles. Rebellion is an uprising of the people against particular authorities. For simplicity, one may say that revolutions are against 40

Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin-chi, 14.1.

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF " N I E N "

25

principles and rebellions are against personalities. Insurrections are simply local rebellions.41 The natives of China tend toward rebellion because rebellion or tyrannicide was approved by the Chinese sage, Mencius, and because the individualistic Chinese cannot always meekly obey those in authority. The classification of the Nien army seems to be unsuited to either revolution or rebellion, according to available material describing it. These guerrilla fighters and food hunters had no definite political program. Because of their plundering, they were called bandits. Since they later had horses, they were conventionally, though inadequately, called "mounted bandits" in English sources. Since some of them were porters and smugglers who wore turbans, they were also occasionally referred to as "turban bandits." For three reasons, however, we are inclined to think that the Nien were rebels. The first reason is the most obvious of Nien's objections to the existing government. The Manchus had required all subjects to shave their foreheads as a token of loyalty. The Nien, influenced by the Taipings, kept their hair long — an outward display of their rebellious characteristics. Secondly, the Nien chief, Chang Lo-hsing, was elected Leader of the League of the Great Han (Ta Han meng-chu). "Han" was the name of a former native Chinese dynasty, and was used for this league as a means of reminiscence of native rule; there is a direct implication of hatred for the alien Manchu dynasty. Our last reason for believing the Nien to be rebels is that they almost habitually sacked government buildings and treasuries and private pawnshops; this is an indication of rebellion against the government and also the moneyed class which charged an exorbitant rate of interest from the penniless people.42 A military force which could overrun part of eight provinces for seventeen years should certainly be distinguished from common bandits. Furthermore, there is a proverb in Chinese history: "He who is successful is a king; he who fails, a bandit." Herein we find another distinction between revolution and rebellion: a revolution is a successful rebellion. The word "fei," or bandits, has been overused and applied variously to enemy countries, political enemies, groups of people, etc. This word should be read with caution when found in Chinese records. We shall doubtless have to classify the Nien as rebels because of their size and their threat to the government. 41

Dale Yoder, "Current definition of revolution," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (1926), 433-441. See also the various terms in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. 41 For documentation of this statement, please see ch. Ill, "The Nien Organization and Leadership."

26

INTRODUCTION

In order to have an adequate understanding of the cause and effect of the Nien rebellion, and to see whether their movement was peculiar or much the same as other rebellions in Chinese history, we must necessarily make a brief survey of major rebellions in China before the nineteenth century and also the general political, economic, and social background. It is my tentative thesis that these cyclical Chinese rebellions and revolutions were usually caused primarily by corrupt government. Corrupt government implies a loss of its original soundness, integrity, or purity. Instead of working for the welfare of the people, security of the nation, etc., the government neglects its duties, abuses public funds, accepts bribies, weakens the security measures of the nation, causes the people trouble, increases their financial burden, and makes their lives unbearable. Any extreme cases of these examples may result in a disaster. Many people tend to insist upon an economic interpretation of history, but we have observed that an efficient government and good leadership may assist people to overcome economic and other difficulties and galvanize a country into vigorous action; on the other hand, a corrupt government with bad leadership always abuses natural and human resources, and, consequently, is more likely to irritate the people eventually into subversive action. Under this thesis, which is scarcely a novel one, we shall now proceed to investigate the background of the Nien Army from historical, political, and other points of view.

3. Historical Background Rebellions and revolutions in Chinese history, according to Mencius, followed a definite cycle. Mencius had a saying, "Now a period of good order and now a period of confusion," which reflected, even in the third century B.C., a developed theory of evolution. A revolution represents, inter alia, the political failure of a government or the general failure of a social system. A revolution cannot actually occur unless the state has become a barrier to change; it may become such a barrier if its own form fails in some way to adjust to the society it is supposed to serve. The period leading up to a revolution is marked by increasing inability at the top to maintain the status quo and by a growing unwillingness at the bottom to tolerate it. Revolutions are often preceded by public calamities, such as famine and wars, which serve to spread and to intensify revolutionary tendencies. The approach of a revolution is heralded by the growing restiveness of the masses and by in-

H I S T O R I C A L BACKGROUND

27

creasingly frequent outbursts of violence on a local scale. Lack of food is one cause of such riots. Threats to survival, such as arbitrary executions, mass murders, and wars, form another. Restrictions of the people's freedom through political and military pressure lead to outbursts of violence when the government becomes corrupt and its military force disloyal.43 The characteristic pattern of Chinese revolution may be illustrated by a number of historical cases from early times. To begin with, the pattern may be seen in one particular attack upon the government of the tyrannical Emperor Ch'in Shih-huang and his son Erh-shih. This revolution in 209-206 B.C. is always associated with three heroes: Ch'en She, a farmer of southern Honan; Liu Pang, a minor government officer in northern Kiangsu; and Hsiang Yii, a nobleman of K'uai-chi in modern Chekiang. Agitated by these courageous men, the great masses of pauperized peasants killed the local officials of the Ch'in dynasty. When Liu Pang became the founder of the Han dynasty, he and his associates had completed the first successful plebeian revolution in Chinese history. The causes of the revolt, vividly described by the famous classical historians Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan Ku, were despotic government, unjust laws, excessive taxation, and incessant corvée.44 The above uprising was the prototype for a comparable action in or before A.D. 18 when, after a long period of peace and prosperity, the "Red-Eyebrowed bandits" became active in Shantung and eventually caused the death of Wang Mang, a usurper of the Chinese empire from A.D. 9 to 23. The reason for the Red Eyebrows' rebellion or for Wang Mang's fall has been variously analyzed.45 The newest theory is painstakingly formed by Hans Bielenstein, who concludes that "the ultimate 43

The Works of Mencius (tr. by James Legge), Bk. 3, 9.2; Pitirim A Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (Philadelphia, 1925), 368-369, 412 and passim-, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences; Harry E. Barnes, Sociology and Political Theory, 179-180; Frank Rawlinson, "A Study of the Rebellions in China," Chinese Recorder, 26 (1905); 107-117; J. J. Saunders, The Age of Revolution (1947), 15; Robert Hunter, Revolution, Why, How, When, p. X; Charles P. Fitzgerald, Revolution in China, 1-32. 44 Shih-chi, Ch. 6, especially pp. 38-44; and Han-shu, Ch. 1. (In this article quotations of the Twenty-four Dynastic Histories are from the Wu-chou t'ung-wen shuchii lithographic edition of 1903). Both Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan Ku quoted Chia I's (B.C. 200-168) famous essay, "To Blame the Ch'in" as their basis. 15 Such as by the modern historian, Lei Hai-tsung, who thinks that overpopulation and the oppression of the people by the local governments were responsible for the revolt of the Red Eyebrows (China Year Book, 1936-1937, p. 82), and Wolfram Eberhard who views this movement as "a genuine revolutionary rising of the peasants, whose distress had grown beyond bearing through Wang Mang's ill-judged measures." (A History of China [University of California Press, Berkeley, 1950], p. 96).

28

INTRODUCTION

reason for the fall of Wang Mang was the change of the course of the Yellow River." 46 Hans Bielenstein's careful study, "The Restoration of the Han Dynasty" is remarkable; his conclusion, however, deserves reexamination and reconsideration. This case study may serve as an illustration of a political interpretation of Chinese rebellion. From primary sources47 Wang Mang's failure can be clearly seen through his political actions. A few months after he became acting emperor, in 6 A.D., a member of the imperial family, Liu Ch'ung, rebelled against him, because he was going to take the throne from the Liu family. In the following year Governor Chai rebelled against him and made Liu Hsin emperor. After suppressing the two rebellions, Wang Mang made himself emperor in 9 A.D. A few months later Marquis Liu K'uai of Hsii-hsiang in modern Shantung made an attempt, with several thousand followers, to get rid of Wang Mang, but again this attempt was abortive. Wang Mang initiated a series of reforms. He declared the abolition of slavery, and nationalization of land and gold. The land confiscated by the state was to be divided into equal lots. Peasants were allowed to work on it and to borrow capital from the government at a low interest. He reinforced the imperial monopolies on salt, iron, wine, coinage, and products of mountains and marshes. He reorganized the currency and introduced new currencies. These well-intended reforms were poorly executed by local officials. Heavy penalties were imposed upon objectors to Wang Mang's reform measures. Many of the gentry class were thus punished, merchants suffered from the depressed currency, and peasants were impoverished by avaricious government executives. In addition, Wang Mang started a foreign war against the Hsiung-nu. The officers on the Chinese frontiers were particularly unprincipled. They took this war as an opportunity to draft the people and collect taxes and provisions so harshly that many residents deserted their cities or towns to become bandits.48 At this time (A.D. 11) the Yellow River broke its dikes in the Wei commandery and flowed into the Huai River. This catastrophe was at least partly caused by the government's negligence in not repairing the dikes. Formerly Wang Mang was afraid that a dike might break at the spot where his ancestral tombs would be submerged. When that spot was 46

The Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Bulletin No. 26 (Stockholm, 1954) (206 pp.), p. 145. Hans Bielenstein spent more than twenty pages (141-165) in building up his thesis. 47 Such as Wang Mang's biography in Han-shu, ch. 99A, 99B, and 99C, various references to the Red Eyebrows in the Hou Han-shu, especially Ch. 41, 52; and Ssu-ma Kuang, Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, Ch. 36-39 (Ku-wu Ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1956). « Han-shu, 99B. 2C.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

29

out of danger he paid no more attention to dike repairing.49 This great event, the changing of the Yellow River course, is briefly narrated in the dynastic histories.50 If the change of the river course were the chief reason for Wang Mang's fall, as Hans Bielenstein tried to prove, he should have had serious trouble with the displaced people in the several years following the break in 11 A.D. Curiously enough stability and peace prevailed, as Hans Bielenstein says, "From 10 to 19 A.D. not a single attempt was undertaken to overthrow him" (p. 155). In the meantime Wang Mang paid litte attention to the urgent needs of the people, whom he allowed to be preyed upon by avaricious officials. An example of direct reaction against severe government punishment is found in 17 A.D. when Mrs. Lii of Lang-ya in Shantung started an uprising. Formerly her son, a petty district official, was unjustly executed by a magistrate for a minor offense. The mother liquidated her large properties, by means of which she gathered more than a hundred men, attacked the city, Haich'ü, and killed the magistrate. She then led her soldiers to the sea coast, and soon after her followers numbered about ten thousand.51 Similar rebellions also broke out in Honan and Hupeh. Some of the rebels were arrested and questioned as to why they became bandits. They answered: "We are sick and tired of severe laws and minute prohibitions which forbid us from doing anything; our earnings from hard work were insufficient for paying tributes and taxes." 52 Under these conditions the bandits in A.D. 18 painted their eyebrows red to consolidate and distinguish themselves from government troops, and carried on an open struggle against governmental misrule. Instead of working to lessen the hardships of the people, Wang Mang, in A.D. 20, abused his financial and human resources to build temples and palaces, decorating them with gold, silver, and precious stones, and exhausting all treasuries. Such work cost several million ounces of gold and lives of more than ten thousand forced laborers.53 The hard-driven people were even more determined to join the bandits. Finally Wang Mang realized his mistakes; he rescinded all his administrative orders which were "inconvenient to the people," in A.D. 22.54 Unfortunately it was too late, "

Ibid., 21b; and Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, p. 1197. Han-shu, 99B, 31, 32, 34. 51 Han-shu, 99C, 2b; and Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, ch. 38, p. 1214. This event was put in A.D. 14, according to biography of Liu P'en-tzu in the Hou Han-shu, Ch. 41.9. a Han-shu, 99C, 2b. which is criticised by Yü Ying-shih, "The Establishment of the Political Power of the Later Han Dynasty and its relations with the Distinguished Clans and Notable Families," Hsin-Ya Hsiieh-pao (The New Asia Journal) 1.2 (Feb. 1956) 209-280, especially 272 ff. 53 Han-shu, 99C. 11. M Ibid., 22. M

30

INTRODUCTION

for he was killed by the rebels in the following year. In view of the above facts the fall of Wang Mang was evidently caused by his corrupt government and poorly executed laws, which incurred objection from the gentry and merchant classes, who led the hungry people in getting rid of him. Wang's usurpation of the throne from the Liu family hurt the feelings, security, and pride of the members of the imperial clan. His attempt at the abolition of large land and slave holding antagonized the gentry. His currency reforms were disastrous to merchants. The foreign warfare, the floods, famines, and the change of the course of the Yellow River undoubtedly aggravated the political and economic situations and worsened the lives of the people; but the change of the river course is not "the ultimate reason for the fall of Wang Mang." 55 If so, the other major changes of the river course may be inferred as the ultimate reason for the fall of five other dynasties. The historical facts cannot attest to the inference. The Red Eyebrows were led by Fan Ch'ung, a native of Shantung, and Wang Lang, a disappointed scholar of Honan. They failed, too, because of a great famine which left the people without food; and the rebels led by the descendants of the Han Dynasty secured better leadership and support of the gentry class. Finally Liu Hsiu became the emperor in A.D. 24 of the Later Han Dynasty. Within a few years he suppressed the Red Eyebrows, and China enjoyed peace for a number of years. In the Sui dynasty (589-618) Emperor Yang built a new capital at Loyang, Honan; and another capital at Yangchow, Kiangsu. He developed the Grand Canal to link communications between the north and south. He strengthened the Great Wall for frontier fortifications. For these public works, the government is said to have employed on a single day over a million men and women workers.56 The oppression of the people involved in these works as described in the dynastic history appears terrible. For intsance, in one day during 607 "more than a million men were sent out to build the Great Wall." The cost in human life was tremendous; "five or six out of every ten died." 57 Rare objects were used to decorate the imperial courts and were brought in through special requisitions. The lavish equipment of Emperor Yang's chariots, banners, and other decorative contrivances taxed the whole empire. Three high officials, including Kao Kung, who advised the emperor not to undertake 55 For a more detailed survey of Chinese rebellions, see S. Y. Teng's article, "A Political Interpretation of Chinese Rebellions and Revolution", Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, N S 1.3 (Sept. 1958), 91-119. 56 Sui-shu, ch. 3, 5b. 57 Ibid., 3.11a.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

31 58

these unnecessary works and abuse natural resources, were executed. In 610 about a hundred bandits, claiming that the advent of the Maitrey a Buddha (Mi-lo-fo) had opened a new era, broke into the imperial palace of Loyang to start an insurrection. All of them were killed on the spot. A great search in the capital for the Mi-lo-fo party members involved more than a thousand families, the members of which were imprisoned.59 Emperor Yang was not alarmed by this insurrection. He continued his territorial expansion for his empire. He sent three disastrous expeditions to Koguryo, or, roughly speaking, Korea. To carry on these expeditions the government demanded forced labor, troops, and contributions of goods and money. These levies and the collection of taxes are said to have been exacted in an arbitrary and oppressive manner, the result being that "those who were strong assembled and became robbers, while those who were weak sold themselves as slaves."60 As early as 611 leaders like Wang Po of Tsou-p'ing, and Tou Chien-te of Chang-nan, both in Shantung, attracted many dissenters from the Korean expeditionary force and many displaced people from a catastrophic flood which submerged the houses of more than thirty districts in Shantung and Honan. In 612 a large army claimed to number two million men, actually 1,113,800, excluding twice as many porters, rushed to Korea. The army suffered a great defeat; only 2,700 men returned to the Chinese side of the Liao River.81 Emperor Yang did not know how to call a stop. He insisted on instituting a second campaign immediately. In June, 613, a serious rebellion broke out near Loyang under the leadership of the Minister of Rites, Yang Hsuan-kan who declared that the unprincipled emperor cared nothing for the people, but caused great disaster for the empire, and so Yang revolted against him.62 Yang was joined by his friend, Li Mi, also an official of the Sui dynasty. This revolt diverted the attention of the emperor's personal command of an attack on the city of Liao-tung, and the second expedition also ended in failure. The emperor managed to defeat Yang Hsiian-kan's rebels and mercilessly killed thirty thousand of Yang's alleged party. More rebel leaders emerged, each followed by a large number of army dissenters.83 Ignoring the discontented people, 69

Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, 607, ch. 180, pp. 5632-5633. Ibid., 181. 5648. Sui-shu, 24.19a. 61 Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, ch. 181, p. 5660. It goes without saying that the statistical figures given here may be considered at most as an estimate. « Ibid., 182.5673. 63 Ibid., 182.5686. 58

32

INTRODUCTION

the emperor launched a third Korean expedition in 614. At this moment the Koreans were themselves "suffering from exhaustion" and sent envoys to offer their allegiance.64 The emperor's face was somewhat saved; his third expeditionary force was withdrawn. He then went to subdue the Turks in Shansi where he was besieged for a month by his enemies at Yen-men. It was a severe blow to his prestige.65 Finally out of more than a hundred thirty rebel leaders, a high official of the Sui dynasty, Li Yiian, and his son, Li Shih-min, were successful in founding the T'ang dynasty in 618. The various factors leading to the fall of the Sui dynasty are based on the official source, the Sui History and the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, or Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government. These are usually exaggerated, particularly in describing notorious emperors. Sui Yang-ti is one of them. He is described as an extravagant emperor, deceitful, suspicious, with too much time given to the pleasures of the palaces. He is said to have been vindictive towards any officials who did not agree with his views. Under his rule, officialdom became demoralized through bribery and unjust punishment. 66 Professor Woodbridge Bingham has made a very careful study in redressing many exaggerated or unfair statements in Chinese sources about Emperor Yang.67 But the rebellion against the Sui is still due mainly to misrule. After more than a hundred and thirty subsequent years of peace and prosperity, however, T'ang Hsiian-tsung was challenged by the rebellion of An Lu-shan which infested a large part of North China for a period of eight years (755-763). This catastrophe was a great turning point in the political and social history of the T'ang dynasty. An Lu-shan was born in Jehol, son of a Turkish mother and a Sogdian father. He mastered six frontier languages and built up a reputation as a capable warrior. Hopei was then a special frontier zone protecting the empire from the barbarian invasions from Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Emperor Hsiian-tsung hence appointed this experienced fighter from that area to govern the frontier by the usual combination of diplomacy and force. An Lu-shan was so diplomatic that he won the full confidence of the emperor through the beautiful imperial concubine, Yang Kuei-fei, 94

Sui-shu, 81.5b. Ibid., 4.11; and 24.20. «« Ibid., 4.15-18. 6 ' The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty, The Fall of Sui and Rise of T'ang (Baltimore, Waverly Press, 1941), 25.58.116. See also Teng Chih-ch'eng, Chung-hua erh-ch'ien nien shih (The two thousand year history of China), vol. 3, pp. 62-73; and Suzuki Shun, "Zuimatsu no ran to Tocho no seiritsu" (Rebellion at the end of the Sui and the establishment of the T'ang dynasty), Shien, 53 (July 1952), pp. 53-70. 85

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

33

and eventually he was authorized to command the best troops of the rich and vast empire. Starting from modern Peking, An Lu-shan and his followers overran some of the provinces in Northern China. Soldiers as well as civilians, having seen no warfare for many decades, fled before the dust-clouds raised by his marching force. But after triumphing over the rich capital, Ch'ang-an, the rebel emperor An Lu-shan also had domestic trouble. He was assassinated (757) by a eunuch who conspired with An Lu-shan's son, An Ch'ing-hsii. The latter in turn was murdered by the general, Shih Ssu-ming. The T'ang force then quickly retook the capital with the help of Uighur and Arab troops from Central Asia. After Shih Ssu-ming was killed by his own son, peace was finally restored in 763.68 Since the rebellion occurred at the prosperous age of the T'ang dynasty an economic interpretation of An's revolt would seem to be inadequate. Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o, the greatest living authority on T'ang, who had many revolutionary ideas, again placed the blame on "political and court corruption of the T'ien-p'ao period (742-755)", which was one of the reasons for the An Lu-shan rebellion. The other reason was An's overwhelming military might, which enabled him to take such action. This political and court corruption includes the short-sighted abolition of the fu-ping militia system, permission of eunuchs to grasp political power, and of foreign generals to guard strategic regions. All these took place during the reign of Hsiian-tsung.69 Professor Ch'en's mastery of source material and his deep penetration into the T'ang period are commendable, but the brief presentation of his points in writing usually makes necessary a little illustration. It goes without saying that the famous eunuch, Kao Li-shih, began to play a prominent role in T'ang history and literature. In the declining age of Emperor Hsiian-tsung, who enjoyed the prevailing peace and "thought that there was nothing for him to worry about under the heaven, he then lived in the forbidden palace, devoted his time to music and sex for selfamusement, and left all political affairs to Li Lin-fu who was a virtual dictator. During his eighteen-year premiership (734-752) he brought on 68

See the biography of An Lu-shan in Chiu Tang-shu 200A and B; and T'ang-shu, 225A, B, and C; Fu An-hua, "T'ang-tai An-Shih-chih-luan ti fa-tung yu k'uo-ta" (The Beginning and Expansion of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming in the T'ang dynasty), Ta-kung-pao, October 4, 1935, "The History and Geography Supplement." 69 T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao (A draft account and discussion of T'ang political history) (The Commercial Press, Chungking, 1944), p. 21 and 36.37. Cf. also Ch'en Yin-k'o's discussion of the fu-ping system in Sui-T'ang chih-tu yuan-yuan lueh-lun kao (A brief draft discussion on the beginning and evolution of various systems of the Sui and T'ang periods) (The Commercial Press, Chungking, 1944).

34

INTRODUCTION

the great disaster for the empire, and yet the emperor was unaware of the fact." 70 The principal reason for the great rebellion (755-763) was anything but political corruption. Professor Edwin G. Pulleyblank, who spent several years studying An Lu-shan, says: "The Chinese historians are probably not altogether wrong in emphasizing the very harmful, corrupting influence on the emperor and his entourage." 71 The rebellion of An Lu-shan marked the decline of the T'ang but the dynasty's fate was not wholly sealed until another great rebellion — that of Huang Ch'ao — flared up near the end of the ninth century. Its causes, given in the two dynastic histories of the T'ang,72 are analyzed by Professor Shih Yu-chung as "a result of famine, government corruption, heavy taxation, and failure on the part of the government to give just reward and punishment." 73 Floods and droughts appeared in Honan, Shantung, and other provinces for a number of years in succession, but these were not reported to the emperor by the local magistrates; and the hungry people were loafing around with no one to whom they could report their hardships. Thus they formed armed bands.74 Much the same conclusion is reached by Howard S. Levy, who says in the introduction to his 1955 translation of The Biography of Huang Ch'ao that "[The Huang Ch'ao rebellion] seemed to be a spontaneous uprising on the part of the people who were driven to despair by extreme abuses that they had suffered throughout the waning years of the T'ang dynasty . . . When the central government proved incapable of initiating positive measures for the alleviation of the starving masses, bands of 70

Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, ch. 216, p. 6914. The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan (London Oriental Series, volume 4) (Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 24. 38. See also E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Political Background of An Lu-shan's Rebellion", Toyo Gakuho, vol. 35, no. 2 (1952), pp. 92-111 and Nos. 3-4 (Mar. 1953), pp. 122-145; and Hori Toshidazu, "Tomatsu shohanran no seikaku" (On the Rebellion in the later period of the T'ang Dynasty, Toyo Bunka, VII (1951), 52-94. 72 Chiu T'ang-shu, ch. 19B, ch. 200B; and Tang-shu, ch. 225C; and Tzu-chih t'ungchien, ch. 252. See also Li Wen-chih, "Huang Ch'ao pao-tung ti she-hui pei-ching" (The Social Background of the Huang Ch'ao Rebellion), Shih-ta yueh-k'an, no. 22 (1935), 294-305; and Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, Social Forces in Medieval China, chapter 3, has a good discussion of Huang Ch'ao's rebellion. The latter part of Hori Toshikazu's article, "Tomatsu Shohanran no seikaku" op. cit., also deals with Huang Ch'ao. 73 Vincent Y. C. Shih, "Some Chinese Rebel Ideologies," T'oung-pao, vol. XLIV, pp. 150-226, 171. The summary is based on Chiu T'ang-shu, 200B.7b, and T'ang-shu, 225C.la, 2b. Professor Shih's emphasis is on the ideology of Chinese major rebellions; this article stresses the cause. 74 Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, ch. 252, p. 8174. 71

H I S T O R I C A L BACKGROUND

35

75

desperadoes arose in the north . . . " This interpretation, from Levy's careful study of Huang Ch'ao, coincides with my thesis of political interpretation of rebellions. In 874 a peasant leader, Wang Hsien-chih, gathered several thousand people and started a great uprising at Ta-ming in southern Hopei. When Wang was slain in 878, his able lieutenant, Huang Ch'ao, a native of Ts'ao-chou in Shantung, took over. Born into the family of a rich salt merchant, Huang was well-educated, but like the Taiping leader, Hung Hsiu-ch'iian in the nineteenth century, he also had failed several times in the civil service examinations. He had had military experience, and he was an able organizer who knew how to stir up mobs to fanatical action. He quickly ravaged the provinces of Southern China, including Kwangtung, and made himself emperor. This rebellion lasted ten years (874884) and affected all provinces in China proper except Szechwan. Finally Huang Ch'ao also faced internal dissension. Because of unsatisfactory distribution of new posts, one leader after another left him, either accepting a government offer or becoming an indépendant gang-leader. While Huang Ch'ao weakened himself, the Sha-t'o cavalry in his native province of Shantung ruthlessly crushed his force by superior weapons. Although Huang Ch'ao's rebellion did not immediately overthrow the T'ang dynasty, his follower, Chu Ch'uan-chung, deserted the imperial side and proved a successful fighter against the Sha-t'o force. When the T'ang empire began to disintegrate rapidly, Chu killed the entire entourage of the emperor and in 907 made himself son-of-heaven of the Later Liang Dynasty. 78 These several cases may be sufficient to show the pattern of Chinese rebellion or revolution: political corruption, social insecurity, economic bankruptcy, widespread unrest and ruthless suppression. Then the exhausted government is either usurped by an official or overthrown by a revolution. This pattern of course applies to the political and social conditions of the Ch'ing dynasty. The first several emperors of the Manchu dynasty were capable and enlightened rulers who several times exempted the people from paying income tax in order to win their hearts. These emperors were hard working, and they gave untiring attention to maintaining order, peace, and river conservation. As a result of good administration, the Chinese population increased, territory expanded, and internal peace was general until the middle of the nineteenth century. ?5

University of California Press, Berkeley, and Los Angeles, 1955, p. 2. The rebellions of the Sung dynasty require a special study. Yu Chia-hsi's Sung Chiang san-shili liu-jen kao-shih (A study of Sung Chiang and his other thirty-five members) (Hsin-hua shu-tien. Peking, 1955), 80 pp., seems to be too fragmentary. 76

36

INTRODUCTION

In the latter part of the reign of the conceited but able emperor Ch'ienlung (1736-1795), with the collusion of the notorious minister Ho-shen and others, bribery began to dictate the policies of the government. The rich and strong Manchu dynasty began to show signs of decline. Secret societies became active again. In the 1770's Ch'ien-lung issued edicts against the White Lotus and other societies. But as Lao-tzu said, the more laws and ordinances, the more thieves, and robbers there would be. Secret agents existed in all principal cities in Honan and the neighboring provinces. They preached sedition and enrolled new members. Thousands upon thousands of men and women were thus gathered, and were bound together by all sorts of ceremonies, solemn vows, and pledges to divulge no secrets to their enemies. Their purpose was the final expulsion of the Manchus. On October 3, 1774, a White Lotus chief, Wang Lun, led his adherents in taking three cities in Shantung, ransacking government treasuries, and releasing prisoners. After further successes, they attacked a large city, Lin-ch'ing. Because the Ch'ing regime was still strong, the insurrection was suppressed within two months by the bannermen dispatched from Peking and elsewhere. Wang Lun's family members and his eighteen adopted sons were killed. The secret society revolt, however, was carried on. In the year 1775 a leader of the White Lotus, Liu Sung, revived its activities. Soon Liu was arrested by the Honan authorities and banished to the border of Kansu.77 Liu's disciples, Liu Chih-hsieh and others, continued to agitate among the people in Honan, Hupeh, Shensi, and Szechwan. In 1793 their new plot to claim a youth supposedly a descendant of the Ming emperors as the legal ruler of China was detected. Many plotters were arrested, but Liu Chih-hsieh managed to escape. A general search was ordered for the fugitive. Taking this opportunity, the local officials of Hupeh blackmailed many well-to-do innocent farmers, who had to take armed resistance with the slogan, "Officials have forced the people to rebel." They joined the conspirators of the White Lotus Society and within a few months in 1796 the rebellion spread from Hupeh to Honan, Shensi, and Szechwan, and lasted for nearly ten years.78 In the middle of the nineteenth century, the seeds of dissatisfaction sprang everywhere from the misrule of the Ch'ing monarchy. The outmoded government neglected its duties of looking after the welfare of its people, failing to protect them with an effective army, provide them with 77

This statement is not recorded under 1775 in the Ch'ing Shih-lu, but in retrospect, the case was traced in 1794. Ch'ing shih-lu, 1462.13. 7fi Suzuki Chusei, Shincho chukishi kenkyu (A study of mid-Ch'ing history) (Toyahashi, Aichi University, 1952), 225 pp.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

37

adequate means of living, or nurture them with an inspiring ideology. The whole system of ethics was breaking down. Neo-Confucianism lost its grip upon the minds of modern Chinese. The Mandate of Heaven was apparently exhausted. The invulnerable military power of the alien rulers was revealed to be a mere "paper tiger" during the Opium War with the British. Under such socio-political conditions, the famous Taiping rebels, inspired by some incomplete and inaccurate Christian ideas, and accelerated by uncontrolled famine and chronic poverty, started a revolution in the south,79 while the Nien rebels, springing from a secret society, took concurrent action in the North. The two big movements terrorized the whole empire for nearly two decades. 4.

Geographical

Background

The Huai-ho, itself a large river flowing through east-central China, rises in the Tungpeh mountains on the Honan-Hupeh border. It runs eastward about 600 miles, traversing the province of Anhwei to the Hung-tse-hu. From this lake it finally enters the Yellow Sea through the Grand Canal of the alluvial r orth Kiangsu lowland. Among its numerous tributaries are the Sha-ho, Ying, Fei, and Wo rivers watering an agricultural region of about 50,000 square miles, and supporting a population of some 60,000,000 people. The Huai-ho is from 500 to 1300 feet wide and it is navigable as far as Hsin-yang, Honan.80 It is subject to violent floods which frequently inundate the countryside. A general geographic term, Liang-huai, comprises Huai-nan and Huaipei, meaning south and north of the Huai river, respectively. Huai-nan, closer to the Yangtze climate, is richer than Huai-pei, the soil of which is made of alluvium, good for millet and other dry field grain. Lianghuai traditionally includes the whole province of Kiangsu (except four prefectures south of the Yangtze), and by far the greater part of Anhwei, southern Honan, and northern Hupeh. Most parts of this area were densely populated and possessed a network of rivers, lakes, and canals unrivaled elsewhere in the empire. Across the Huai in the east of the Hung-tse lake is the Grand Canal, which furnishes an inland water route from Hangchow to Peking, a distance of some 900 miles, cutting through the flat alluvial plains and 79

For a more detailed analysis, see Ssu-yu Teng, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion (Harvard University Press, 1950), 20-49. 80 Ku Tsu-ytt, Tu-shih fang-yu chi-yao, 19,46, 127; and Fujita Motoharu, "Shina Dai unga no chirigakuteki kosatsu" (A geographic survey of the grand canal of China), Shir in 11.3 (July 1926), 35-59.

38

INTRODUCTION

intersecting the provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, Shantung and Chihli. Both the Huai and the Grand Canal were frequently invaded by the unruly Yellow River. Since ancient times the Huai valley has been important economically, politically, and militarily. It is broad and calm in the lower reaches where it flows through one of the most fertile valleys in China. Here the climate is temperate, and produces large crops of wheat and rice. The Huai has been not only an important thoroughfare for grain transportation from the south to the north, but also a leading salt-producing area in

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

39

China. Such commercial and strategic centers as Chou-chia-k'ou, Chengyang-kuan, Pang-pu, and Lin-huai-kuan commanded good water and land communications, and carried on interstate trade between Honan and Anhwei. Furthermore, politically the Huai River has usually been regarded as the boundary between southern and northern China. The salt administration office at Yangchow, Kiangsu, was so lucrative that it was usually occupied by a member of the imperial family with a huge staff of inspectors, treasury keepers, and clerks.81 Militarily, it has been a bone of contention since the Ch'in and Han times. From the southerner's point of view, the first defense line was always the Huai and the second line, the Yangtze. Even during the Sino-Japanese war, the two parties for a long time fought along this river and the Grand Canal, and the Japanese suffered a critical failure at Tai-erh-chuang in 1938. Among several other reasons for many occurrences of rebellions along the Huai valley, one crucial reason may have been that the political centers or capitals of most of the Chinese dynasties were themselves in northern China. A contingent situation, however, is the topography in the North China plain. The river system here frequently creates, around the villages, marshy, muddy spots and lagoon areas, which can harbor bandits but appear as tricky labyrinths to strangers. While the native bandits could gallop on horseback, a strong point of the Nien, government troops could not move so freely. There are also several hills and mountains where government troops or police were loathe to go to surprise bandits. Furthermore, the larger villages, surrounded by earthen or brick walls for protection against inter-clan feuds, were easily converted into forts for military actions. Both grain transportation and frequent floods and droughts in this area gave rise to trouble. After hundreds of years of continuous intensive cultivation, the soil was less productive and North China could no longer support a large population. Grain had to be transported from the south to the north mainly through the Grand Canal, which linked the Yangtze River and the Yellow River82 — that is, southern and northern China; the maintenance of uninterrupted transportation on the Grand Canal has been considered a barometer of the prosperity and decline of the Sui, T'ang, and Sung dynasties, and to some extent of the Ch'ing dynasty, too. 81

H o Ping-ti, "The Salt Merchant of Yangchow," HJAS, 17, nos. 1-2 (June 1954), p. 131. 82 Ch'iian Han-sheng, T'ang-Sung ti-kuo yii Yiin-ho (The T'ang-Sung Empire and the Grand Canal); Harold C. Hinton, "Grain Transport via the Grand Canal," Papers on China, from the Regional Studies Seminars, Harvard University, vol. 4 (1950), p. 24.

40

INTRODUCTION

More destructive to political stability were the frequent breaks of dikes and the change of the course of the Yellow River, unless the central government was capable enough to stand the catastrophe and take care of the aftermath. The Yellow River overflowed in 1658 at a number of points along its old bed and took a course southeast of Kaifeng, met the Grand Canal, shared the canal's bed and debouched northeastward to the sea. Since the Manchu conquerors were strong in the 1650's, no insurrection was reported at this time. Finally, the change of the river course in the 1850's speeded the activities of the Nien and other rebels.83 In 1853 the waters of the Yellow River burst through the dikes and flooded the Grand Canal, causing the suspension of grain transportation.84 In 1855 the Yellow River again changed its course. It left its bed near Kaifeng, Honan, and running from the district of Lan-i turned to the province of Hopei, passing through part of the Grand Canal to the Tach'ing River, and thence to the sea. At this juncture a number of bandits approached a huge group of flood victims to persuade them to turn to banditry for a living. The floods had created many new refugees for the bandits, and government troops could reach them through the swamps only when the local people led the way. If the government forces were strong, the local people joined them to make a living; if the bandits came again, the poor people joined the bandits for the same reason. They had to strive for existence. In some districts during the mid-nineteenth century, especially in Ts'ao-chou and Yün-ch'eng, Shantung, it was hard to tell who were bandits and who were ordinary citizens.85 Is is scarcely surprising that the Nien as well as many secret societies flourished in this area. Salt-smuggling was another reason for rebellion and revolution in this area. Huang Ch'ao and Chang Lo-hsing were salt smugglers. Salt is a 83

The Yellow River had changed course six times before the twentieth century. The first change was in 602 B.C., resulting in its outlet near Tientsin: the second in 11 A.D. with its outlet near Pinhsin, Shantung. The third change was in 1048 and the fourth in 1194, when it took the south Huai River in Kiangsu. The fifth time occured in 1494, when it moved to the north Ta-ch'ing River, emptying into the sea in Shantung. The sixth one took place in 1855 (see Cheng Chao-chin, Chung-kuo shui-li shih, p. 161). Small breaks of dikes and inundations occurred much oftener. For a general account of the Yellow River, the Grand Canal, and the Huai-ho, see Ch'ing-shih kao, ch. 132-134. For a brief discussion of the importance of the Yellow River in Chinese history, see H. Chatley's "The Yellow River as a Factor in the Development of China." Chatley observed that "the important breaches in the dikes (of the Yellow River) have generally occurred during periods of political instability" (p. 7). 84 Ting Wen-ch'eng-kung tsou-kao, 9.42b-43; and Fang-liieh, 138. 12b-13; Liao-ch'eng hsien-chih (1910 ed.), 11.11. 85 STCHCL, 11.16b.

41

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

necessity for all people, rich or poor, but under the Manchus, as during several previous dynasties, salt was under the strictest government control and was taxed at every stage: when manufactured, when sold in bulk, when transported, and when retailed. The high salt gabelle, and strict government supervision, were meant to assure a definite government income; but they also produced many salt smugglers, known as "Yenhsiao." Hsiao means hawks or birds of prey, and the name "Yen-hsiao" indicates that the salt smugglers were mostly brave and aggressive men who were always prepared to flout the authority of the government. Of the eleven salt-producing centers in China, five were in the areas frequented by the Nien and other rebels.88 These areas included especially the places where the people had to consume the salt from the Huai districts. The reason was excellently explained by T'ao Chu, one of the earliest officials who called the emperor's attention to the Red-beard bandits in 1815. According to T'ao, To clean up the bandits, it is first necessary to standardize the price of salt. I have learned that in the area of Ying-chou and Po-chou, of Anhwei province, and in Ju-ning and Kuang-chou in Honan, the people, as a rule, use the salt from the Huai districts. The price is now forty or fifty coins per catty [ca. 40 or 50 cents per pound], and this is more than twice the price of the salt smuggled in from Chang-lu [long reed, or sea salt in Ts'ang-hsien, Hopei]. For this reason, it is more economical for the people to buy the smuggled salt. There are many secret dealers and salt smugglers who are escorted by the Red-beard bandits, who levy two hundred coins from every cart-load of salt smuggled under their protection. No less than a hundred cartloads of salt are thus smuggled daily, and all of the bandits' money for drinking, eating, and gambling comes from this source. If it is not enough, they go out to plunder.87

It may be remembered that the Red-beard bandits were the forerunners of the Nien, and that Wo-yang, the headquarters of the Nien, was one of the places where, according to the local gazetteer, the compulsory sale of government salt at extortionate prices did the people much harm.88 Thus Chou T'ien-chiieh, the governor of Anhwei, reported in 1853 that the Nien and the salt smugglers had been waiting for the chance to start uprisings along the Huai River.88 The social background of some people in this area may be considered as another source of frequent rebellion. The people to the north of the Yangtze River and in Shantung were regarded by Ch'ing officials to be fierce and hard to govern. A grand Secretary, Mao Ch'ang-hsi, remarked: 86 B7

«e *9

H. B. Morse, The Trade and Administration T'ao Yiin-ting hsien-sheng tsou-kao, 1.18. WYFTC, 15.23. Fang-liieh, 3.4b.

of the Chinese Empire,

100-102.

42

INTRODUCTION

". . . The Nien-fei are mostly from north of the Yangtze River where the people are very strong and obstinate. They are accustomed to fighting." Other officials made similar reports.90 Were these reports merely fabricated to excuse their own failure to handle official responsibilities, or did the reports contain some truth? The question may be answered partly by the historical development of this area under discussion which was in the frontier between northern and southern China, and partly by the Mohammedan residents who frequently had trouble with the Chinese. Many inhabitants were descendants of soldiers stationed at the frontier. In the twelfth century when the Sung was weak, the districts along the lower Yellow River and the Huai-ho were conquered first by the Juchens, then by the Mongols, and then by the Manchus. During the prolonged fighting and under the conquerors' hands, the local people suffered tremendously. In general the heavier the political and military pressure, the stronger would be the desire of the people to get rid of it. As a camouflage they organized secret societies. Because the Mongols honored Buddhism, the Maitreya Buddha was widely used by the White Lotus society, the branches of which were established in north China to foment rebellion first against the Mongols and then against the Manchus. More than one million Mohammedans lived in the area haunted by the Nien, and there were two mosques in the city of Shou-chou, Anhwei. The Chinese people and the Mohammedans usually could not get along very well; they had frequent conflicts over religious, political, and commercial interests. There were, for instance, Chinese salt smugglers and Mohammedan salt smugglers, each with his own sphere of activities guarded by military force against transgression. The Mohammedan minority was surrounded by a majority of Chinese; the former had to carry arms to protect themselves. Unavoidably the Mohammedans had some sort of feeling of inferiority, so that they were said to be provocative, challenging, belligerent, and fierce. Undoubtedly, too, many of their poorer Chinese neighbors must have also been challenging and provocative. Armed fighting between the two groups was so common that special laws were proclaimed to curb it.91 One law reads that in any murder 90

The reports about the bad character of the people are in CSL-TK, 6.11, 250.12 and Fang-liieh 127.16b. For additional information, we may add a statement which was made in 1834. In Po-chou, Meng-ch'eng of Fang-yang-fu, and in Ho-fei, and other districts of Lu-chou-fu, Anhwei, the people were ferocious and quarrelsome; they liked to muster their friends and relatives to fight with weapons against tax collectors or over disputes (CSL-TK, 250.12). 91 According to Marshall Broomhall's Islam in China (pp. 211, 215), the Mohammedan population in the Nien-affected areas was as follows:

43

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

case involving three or more Mohammedan fighters against Chinese, the chief murderer should receive capital punishment, while the cofighters should be exiled to the extreme border of Yunnan and Kweichow. Obviously this law was in favor of the Chinese. But a precedent modified the law to the effect that in Nan-yang, Ju-ning, Ch'en-chou, and Kuangchou, Honan, and in Ying-chou, Shou-chou, and other districts in Anhwei, for all Chinese and Mohammedans engaged in armed fighting with three or more persons on each side, the two parties should be punished according to the law governing the Mohammedans. The legal commentator explained that the more severe punishment was warranted because both the Mohammedans and the Chinese in the area were tyrannical and proud and fond of group fighting regardless of the consequences. Thus government reports of the bad character of the people were not entirely groundless. Moreover, many heroes of earlier history were produced in Shantung, Anhwei, and Honan, as we have briefly noted above. A distressed people, inspired by religious enthusiasm or by heroes of historical fiction, as in The Romances of the Three Kingdoms and All Men Are Brothers, and attracted by an easy way of making a living, such as salt smuggling, were Mohammedan

Population

Minimum

Shensi Shansi Chihli Shantung Honan Kiangsu Hupeh Anhwei

26,000 25,000 500,000 100,000 200,000 250,000 10,000 40,000

Maximum

500,000 30,000 1,000,000 200,000 250,000 250,000 10,000 40,000

Total 1,151,000 2,280,000 The separate markets for Chinese salt smugglers and Mohammedan smugglers are described in CSL-TK, 125.25. The law and the precedent followed against Mohammedan and Chinese fighters was reinforced in 1821 (CSL-TK, 23.20b). But the war between them continued. In 1830, it was recorded that in Shensi, there were Chinese rascals who practiced boxing and swordcraft in order to resist Mohammedans. Making friends with policemen, they roamed about almost waiting for a chance to fight. A simple whisper could gather scores of such people to challenge the Mohammedans (CSL-TK, 166, 8-9). A great feud took place in August 1830, when both parties, Chinese and Mohammedans, used guns, causing the destruction of a mosque in Hoch'iu in the prefecture of Ying-chou, Honan. Four Chinese were killed and six were seriously wounded (CSL-TK, 167.26b-28). Other big feuds on fixed dates are recorded in 1852 in Feng-yang, Ying-chou, and Shou-chou, with several hundred people engaged on each side. During the dogged fighting, robberies were committed (CSL-HF, 53.12b-13). These illustrations suffice to show that the truculent habit of a few million Chinese and Mohammedans in this area may have a share in bringing about frequent rebellions.

44

INTRODUCTION

easily tempted to insurrection when their hardships became intolerable. Through the workings of mass psychology, or just through curiosity, headstrong fellows, rich and poor, joined the bandit leaders for more money, for adventures, or for fun.92 Finally, the fact that each local governor only took care of his own area and paid no attention to trouble outside of the district under his jurisdiction facilitated the spread of banditry. Censor T'ao Chu pointed out that for the purpose of cleaning up the Red-beard bandits, the authorities of neighboring provinces or districts should cooperate with one another. The bandits ran from the corner of one province or district into another with no definite destination; when they were harassed by the authorities of one locality, they fled to another. They frequently gathered at points where two or three districts met, and such corners were called "San-pu-kuan," or "the three [district or provincial authorities] where no one took care.

Each local authority always tried to shift the responsibility for anything that happened to the authority of the other districts in order to avoid punishment from the emperor, and the bandits used these spots as hideouts.93 When a breach of the Yellow River dikes occurred in Honan, the Honan authorities had to attend to it. Salt smugglers on the border between Kiangsu and Chekiang then had a merry time dodging back and forth across the border. The headquarters of the Nien were at Wo-yang and Shou-chou to the south of the Huai River, Meng-ch'eng to the northwest of Shou-chou, and Po-chou about two hundred li northwest of Mengch'eng. Further west of Po-chou is the territory of Honan. Su-chou, another city frequented by the Nien, lay in the extreme northeast of Anhwei, near the border of Kiangsu. In 1851 the natives of Po-chou crossed the boundary of their district to plunder the people of Shangch'iu and Yung-ch'eng, the natives of the two cities having carried on a feud for several years which the magistrates had not been able to settle. In 1853 when the Taipings came to Meng-ch'eng, the Nien leaders took the opportunity to start a riot. The families of those who joined the Nien received protection, but those who rejected them were cruelly mistreated. It is possible to say that in the area of Po-chou, Meng-ch'eng and Shou92

About the same time, Lin Tse-hsii reported the same working of mass psychology in Canton where there were also bandits; whenever the farmers heard the voice at night saying, "Let's go to make a fortune," they joyfully joined the bandits, and even the youngsters of rich and aristocratic families were eager to join in the pillage. See Ko Shih-chun, Hucntt-chao ching-shih wen hsii-pien, 81.1. M T'ao Yiin-ting hsien-sheng tsou-kao, 1.17.

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

45

chou, there was not a single family, or individual, who could avoid being involved in the affairs of the Nien.94 While these areas to the south of the river were having a hard time with the Nien, the government troops which were encamped to the north of the river were having a very good time indeed. They considered themselves so well protected by the river that civilians and soldiers alike enjoyed themselves as unconcernedly as though the riots had occurred in some locality entirely beyond their ken.85 The unfortunate administrative set-up that restricted the authority of the magistrates to their own districts thus aided the spread of the riots. Under these various conditions as traced above, it is no wonder that many rebellions and revolutions broke out in the area between the lower valleys of the Yangtze and the Yellow River.

84

«5

S T C H C L , 2.1b. Ibid., 2.2.

II. The Development of the Nien

The official dates of the Nien Rebellion are 1851 to 1868; government documents concerning the Nien began with March 1851.1 Since their activities in the first two years were still not very extensive, the formal commencement of the rebellion is also given as 1853.2 Either of the two dates may be accepted without making substantial difference to the movement. Personally, I adopt the year 1851 in order to show that the Nien movement started simultaneously with the Taipings. As a matter of fact, the seeds of the Nien rebellion were sown near the end of the eighteenth century, as we have seen earlier in this study. As the Ch'ing empire was declining, the Nien grew slowly, like tuberculosis in the lungs of a weak person, and then after 1851, they developed rapidly in northern and central China. It is rather difficult to write an early history of the Nien. For a clearer understanding of the whole movement, it is, nonetheless, necessary to work out the obscure period of the rebels. 1.

The Early Nien History from 1797 to 1851

The Nien movement underwent three stages of development: first as remnants or small branches of the White Lotus Society in the 1790's; then as Red-beard bandits from 1806 to 1815; and finally as Nien. Some account of the forerunners of the Nien from 1797 to 1815 — the White Lotus Society and the Red-beard bandits — has been given above. In 1797 the White Lotus rebels progressed from Hupeh to Ying-chou and 1 The official compilation of reports and directives issued during the suppression of the Nien army is the Chiao-p'ing Nien-fei fang-liieh, compiled under the imperial auspices and published in 1872. (For detailed bibliographic data, see bibliography). The material in this work begins with March 16, 1851, and ends at January 25, 1869. In the preface and elsewhere, the government states that from the beginning to the end, the Nien have spread to seven or eight provinces and that their organization lasted seventeen years (1851-1868). 2 See "Nien Fei" in The Encyclopaedia Sinica, by Samuel Couling (Shanghai, 1917), p. 398; and Chiang Ti, "Kuan-yu Nien-chun shih fen-ch'i wen-ti" (Concerning the problem of dividing the periods of the Nien Army), Kuang-ming Jih-pao, July 15 (1956), p. 3.

THE EARLY NIEN HISTORY FROM 1 7 9 7 TO

1851

47

Po-chou, the early homes of the Nien in Anhwei, where innocent farmers were compelled to fight as vanguards the government forces. In 1806 several scores of Red-beard bandits were gambling and fighting against other groups in Kuang-chou and Ju-ning, Honan. Two years later, Boxers, Tiger-tail-whips, members of the Eight-diagram and other societies were openly gambling in Ying-chou, Po-chou, Anhwei; Hsii-chou, Kiangsu; Kuei-te, Honan; and Ts'ao-chou, I-chou, and Yen-chou, Shantung. In the following year the Red-beards were robbing travelers in Ju-ning, Ch'iieh-shan, Hsin-yang, Honan; and Hsiao-kan, Ma-ch'eng, Hupeh. By 1812 the number of Red-beards was definitely increasing.3 The Red-beard bandits continued to endanger the properties and lives of travelers, and the actions of the Shun-tao-hui (literally, Following-thewill-of-sword society) in Shantung caused the issuance of an imperial decree forbidding people to form such societies. It provided that those who beat drums and gongs to call for mass worship for their society should be arrested, and that leaders of the White Lotus, Eight Diagram, and other societies should be punished by strangulation. On January 1, 1815, there appeared the first official mention of the Nien as a unit and successor of the Red-beard bandits.4 The latter name was seldom mentioned in official sources after 1831, presumably because the Red-beard bandits had been replaced by the Nien. A detailed report of the growing seriousness of the Nien was made on October 26, 1815, stating that the Red-beards were plundering, raping, and murdering people along the border of Honan, Anhwei, and Hupeh. They were still, of course, known by such names as the Red-beards, Barefist-fighters (Pai-chuang-shou), Sword-wielders (I-tao-shou), and, in some cases, chiefs of Nien (Nien-tzu-tou). When soldiers were sent from one province to arrest them, they fled to other provinces. The authorities of three provinces were ordered by the emperor to suppress them simultaneously and during the last two months, the report of October 1815 added, fifty-nine bandits had been caught in Honan. 5 The emperor remarked that among the governors of the three provinces, the one of Honan was most serious in suppressing bandits; that of Anhwei, second; and the governor of Hupeh was the least effective. After some months the Honan governor informed the throne that he had severely punished more than 700 Red-beard bandits, and that his people were again enjoying peace.4 3

CSL-CC, 217.35-36; 264.3. ¡bid., 268.8; 273.14b-15, 19; 280.13, 281.5; 299.21b. 5 Ibid., 310.19-20. » Ibid., 329.9b. 4

48

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

In 1818 a censor memorialized the throne that the bad people in Yenchou, I-chou, and Ts'ao-chou carried arms in intercepting travelers at night. Each group of such people, he said, was called a Nien; a small Nien consisted of ten to twenty persons, and a large one of thirty or forty. In Chii-yeh, Shantung, there were five or six Nien bands, which also appeared in Chin-hsiang, Ch'eng-wu, Ytin-ch'eng, Ting-tao, and Hotse of the same province; there were also Nien in Hsia-i, Honan, and Feng-hsien, Kiangsu.7 In 1822 a leader of the White Lotus Society, Chu Mao-tzu, went from Honan to Feng-yang, Anhwei, where he set up an independent flag, under which he killed his own son as a sacrifice.8 A small town, Ai-ting-chi, 160 li southwest of Feng-yang, was thronged with Nien. Fifteen li north of Ai-ting-chi was Ma-chia-tien, where Maerh was the Nien chief. About a hundred li southwest of Feng-yang was Ti-li-ch'eng, where the Nien and salt smugglers joined together in harassing the natives. At the border of Hsi-hsien and Hsin-ts'ai, Honan, there were great lairs harboring many thieves who, together with the Nien, were freely preying upon the people without any interference from the government. The inns in Nan-yang, Ju-ning, and Kuang-chou dared not let travelers go outside in the early morning and evening.9 The belt between the provinces of Honan and Anhwei had many Nien and salt smugglers, who joined forces against the people. The number of Sword-wielders had grown from several score to more than one thousand in 1823.10 They, too, interrupted the travel of merchants and pillaged stores and markets. The magistrates were so terrified by them that they refused to go to the countryside to investigate the condition of the victims.11 Because so many people fought among themselves with swords, a cruel punishment was adopted in 1826: an iron bar nearly fifty pounds in weight was to be tied to the body of a sword fighter for a year. All trouble makers in the border between Kiangsu and Shantung, in Ju-ning, Ch'en-chou, and Kuang-chou of Honan and in Ying-chou, Feng-yang of Anhwei, were subject to such punishment. In 1827 the victims of the Nien in Honan would not report crimes to the government, for fear of the Nien's retaliation.12 7

Ibid., 344.13b-14. CSL-TK, 39.18-19. « Ibid., 41.7-9, 35b-37. 10 Sword-wielder (l-tao-shou). Literally, a man tucks a sword under his armpit, presumably ready to use it at any moment. The characters (see index) here are written differently from the previous appearance of this term, but the pronunciation is the same. 11 CSL-TK, 60.9. 12 Ibid., 96.22-23; 127.2. 8

THE EARLY NIEN HISTORY FROM 1 7 9 7 TO 1 8 5 1

49

In 1829 no government officials dared attempt to arrest the 110 members of the White Lotus Society in Ting-t'ao, Shantung. Along this border the secret society members and salt smugglers also cooperated readily in their advantageous pursuits.13 There was a great famine in 1831 and salt smugglers and secret society members in Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Hupeh took this opportunity to fan the restless and hungry people into an uprising; the emperor directed the provincial authorities to take precautionary measures. Many people in T'ang-yin, Honan, who believed in a heretic religion, also became restless (1832).14 In November, the Nien in T'ang-hsien, Hupeh, opened fire and wounded three government soldiers. Nien also appeared in Sui-chou and Tsao-yang, Hupeh. Their leaders, Liu Erh-ts'ui and Chang Erh-hsii, moved here and there in the mountainous region between Honan and Hupeh. Liu Erh-ts'ui was arrested. He managed to escape, but meanwhile his followers were incorporated into the Nien of Chang Erh-hsii.15 The Nien continually robbed people in Kuei-te, Honan, and in 1836 they attempted to murder a government officer. The law that pertained to a murderer and his cohorts stated that the chief criminal should receive capital punishment, and that his accomplice should be exiled to the farthest border, more than 4,000 li away. This law was restated by the emperor, but again the effect was negligible. At this time there were really three kinds of people involved: secret society members, robbers, and the gamblers who lived in villages, towns, and cities. Sometimes ten or more families of such people, and sometimes even several scores of families, settled in one locality. They had well-guarded retreats which government police and soldiers, who had been generously bribed, usually avoided. If a neighbor revealed such a place to the government, he was punished by some false accusation.16 In 1837 there were local chiefs who offered Nien retreats in Nanyang, Kuang-chou and other places in Honan and Shantung.17 These retreats were well-surrounded and protected by their sympathizers. Take, for example, the typical bandit retreat in Te-p'ing, Shantung, which was virtually guarded by all the villages in the vicinity. Whenever government police or soldiers approached, nearby villagers delivered the alarm to the bandit chief and cooperated in fighting off the assault. Why did the 13 14 16 18 17

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

155.16b-17. 192.21, and 215.28. 222, 19-20. 283.7; 284.21; 287.4b-7. 287.10-11.

50

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

villagers do so? They had to contribute money in advance to the chief to secure his protection, and after this the villagers had to cooperate with the bandits. In the 1840's some bandits began to ride horseback, pillaging people even in the daytime.18 In 1842 more than a hundred Nien marched from Pi-yang, Honan, to Tsao-yang, Hupeh, where they killed a few subordinate government officials. In the same year bandits were raiding people in Shantung and Honan. A Nien leader, Tsung Hung of Hsiichou, moved freely on the borders of Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Honan, and killed a number of officers and soldiers.19 Another leader, Ma Tsung-yii, had little more than a hundred adherents, and yet he overran parts of several provinces and utterly frustrated the government forces. Moreover, wherever he went, the people were obliged to present him with money and clothes. "Where are the soldiers of all the districts?" a censor wondered; and "why could not they control the hundred-odd Nien-fei?" 20 A lieutenant of Po-chou was ordered to battle Tsung Hung's column, but his force collapsed before meeting the enemy. For such lack of opposition Tsung's small force could plunder, seize prisoners, and kill government soldiers at will. Before long, however, Hung and Ma were said to have been captured in Kiangsu. Yet in April of 1843 Ma Tsungyii surrounded the city of Chia-hsiang, Shantung; his alleged capture was only a ruse to fool the emperor for a while.21 The elimination of one or two Nien chiefs could not, of course, have checked the Nien's movement in other provinces. In December 1842, a contingent of Honan Nien advanced to Huang-an, Hupeh. In the following year, the lake, Ch'ao-hu, in Anhwei became a principal retreat for the Niens and salt smugglers. In May Hsu Ying-ch'ing and other Nien of Pi-yang, Honan, killed a second lieutenant, Li Ch'ang-shan.22 Likewise the seven districts of Ta-ming-fu, Chihli, along the border of Shantung and Honan were haunted by Nien, who were perhaps two or three hundred strong by 1845. They acted in a disorderly fashion in the daytime, and plundered violently at night. They also pillaged the people at Ting-tao, Ts'ao-hsien, Kuan-hsien, P'u-chou, Shantung, Hua-hsien, Fengch'iu, Honan, where they were closely assoicated with the members of secret societies. A new technique developed in July 1845, when the Nien in Ts'ao18

Ibid.,

18

Ibid., 380.1, 381.13b, and 382.23. Ibid., 383.3b. Ibid., 383.6, 24; 384.5, 19b; 387.3b; and 390.37. Ibid., 385.2, 389.28b, and 391.1b.

20 21 22

309.2b.

THE EARLY NIEN HISTORY FROM 1 7 9 7 TO

1851

51

chou, Shantung, began to fight together to resist government attack. Their weapons were plentiful and their membership extended to several neighboring districts. They actually used gun volleys to repulse government troops, although the latter boasted of having killed forty-six Nien chieftains. One leader, Liu Hsiang, was captured, but when he was presumably being escorted to the governor, was rescued by his adherents.23 Because of the serious nature of the Nien, specific laws to punish them were enacted in 1845. It was announced that any chieftains of the Shantung and Anhwei Nien-fei and Fu-fei (Turban bandits) leading more than forty persons in extorting money with arms should be sentenced to immediate strangulation, no matter how much booty they had seized. If the number of followers was between ten and forty, the chief should be sentenced to strangulation, while the followers in both cases should be banished to Sinkiang. The chief of more than five persons should receive the same sentence as in the above cases, while his followers should be exiled to the national frontier more than 4,000 li from Peking. If the number of the Nien was more than forty, but the attempted extortion failed, the chiefs should be exiled and the followers tortured with a hundred lashes of heavy flogging, in addition to a three-year imprisonment.24 The Nien were not frightened by such severe and detailed laws, and on October 16, 1847, the emperor ordered the provincial authorities of Chihli, Shantung, and Honan to suppress them simultaneously. Apparently the order was again not enforced, for in the winter a censor memorialized the throne that police and government runners let the bandits plague the people. The secret societies, the Nien and the "I-fei" (Sword-wielders) were overrunnning several provinces where the local officials did not bother to interfere or to report the truth to the emperor. Even the murder or injury of government officials was not reported.23 The Nien liked to seize government treasuries and pawnshops,26 and were fond of setting prisoners free. Their numbers thus were steadily increasing and by July 1851 the Nien leader of the prefecture of Nanyang had more than 2,000 men. He held a strong position on a hill in Pi-yang, where he kidnapped people and held them for ransom, instead of taking cattle and horses as the Nien had done before. On a single day in May 1851, more than ten families were ravaged and seven family heads killed. More than a thousand Nien in Nan-yang, Honan, sacked a 23 24 25 2e

Ibid., 416.9b; 418.6b-7, 14b-16; and 419.22. C S L - H F , 52.4b-5. CSL-TK, 447.12-14; 448.4, and 13b. Ibid., 448.8b, 16.

52

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

Ch'en family, raping and killing. The local magistrate usually was too timid to act when he received complaints from victims. A t this time a force of more than one thousand N i e n in T'ang-hsien, Hupeh, looted and burned houses and almost went o n to take the city. Numerous Nien lairs existed in Teng-chou, T'ung-pei, Hsin-yeh, and other districts. 27 The Nien were also active in Shou-chou and Ho-fei, Anhwei. 2 8 Furthermore the N i e n adopted big flags, one of which was inscribed with the characters "Grand Marshall Wei" (Wei Ta-yüan-shuai), and another with "Great General Chang" (Chang Ta-chiang-chün). Some leaders were carried in sedan chairs. 29 Their followers had swords, spears and fowling pieces. In short, by 1851 the N i e n were considerably different in size and character from their obscure and humble beginnings of a half century before. A t the same time, of course, the secret societies, especially the White Lotus, were also functioning under various names and in various ways. The societies seem to have been the nerve centers for exploiting opportunities for insurrection or rebellion. 30 The salt smugglers, too, were at least as active as the Nien during the period between the 1820's and "

CSL-TK, 15.16; 36.15-16. The leader of the Shou-chou Nien was Ch'eng Liu-ma-tzu, and in Ho-fei, Kao Ssu-pa-tzu. CSL-HF, 36.19b-20. 29 CSL-HF, 40.19. 30 The secret societies were always restless and exploiting opportunities. In 1824, the chief of the Ch'ien Diagram took over the city of Lin-ch'ing, Shantung, where official titles were bestowed and costumes made, as if they had imperial ambition. More than three hundred of them were arrested (CSL-TK, 64.12). In 1829, no one dared arrest the 110-odd White Lotus Society members in Ting-tao, Shantung (CSL-TK, 155.16b-17). The secret society members and salt smugglers were then cooperating in preying upon the people and adopting divergent names such as T'ien-tao-hui (Increasing Sword Society) and Ch'ien-tao-hui (One Thousand Sword Society) (CSLTK, 158.37b.). A precedent was set up in 1832. The leaders of the White Lotus, Eight Diagrams, the Pai-yang, Hung-yang, and other secret societies would be banished to the extreme frontiers, and no amnesty would be extended to them. No sooner had this precedent been written than Yin Lao-hsü, a leader of the Li Diagram Society claiming to be Buddha himself, influenced several thousand people covering three provinces. Hsiao Lao-yu spread a sect of Mahayana Buddhism (Ta-ch'eng chiao) in 1832, and forged imperial seals to stamp his public announcements (CSL-TK, 204.31 and 211.19.). A "religious bandit" (chiao-fei) and secret society leader, Chu Mao-li, was making connections in 1827 with his fellow believers in Shantung, Honan, and Anhwei, in preparation for an uprising. After five years, the plot was carried out in Ying-chou, Anhwei, but was soon quelled by government forces and Chu Mao-li fled (CSL-TK, 229.14). Along the frontier between Shansi and Chihli, people were spreading a heretical religion called Wu-hun-tao, a branch of the White Lotus Society. The adherents gathered at night to burn incense and read Buddhist sutra, and would not disperse until dawn. They had secret languages, and bestowed titles and ranks to members (CSL-TK, 284.21). In 1837, a secret society leader, Ma Kang of Wei-hsien, Shantung, 28

THE EARLY NIEN HISTORY FROM 1 7 9 7 TO 1 8 5 1

53

1850's.31 The Nien, the secret societies, and the salt smugglers thus were led his followers to the district office to murder the officials and release the prisoners (CSL-TK, 293.16-17). In Ts'ao-chou, Te-chou, Tung-chang, and other cities of Shantung, there were also many secret societies humming songs and spreading their religions under various sects. Each religious chief directed a banner governing one or several hundred members. A banner director could have an income large enough to support a large family. Sometimes a licentiate served as a banner director (CSL-TK, 293.24b). Where did the money come from? These religious addicts were not only respected by their own followers, but also by the ordinary plebeians. Few people knew that they were bandits. The more people they lured to their religion, the more money they could collect. Thus, they perpetuated their organization. Obviously, this comment was made from the government point of view. Some of the characteristics of secret society men may be seen from these notes. 31 In 1821, for instance, salt smugglers of Hai-chou, Su-ch'ien, and Pei-chou in the province of Kiangsu united to total more than one thousand persons; they were divided into twenty-four tranships (Po), under the leadership of Liu San-mao. They were even presumptuous enough to adopt a flag with the inscription "Ti-T'ien hsing-tao," which translated means "performing the proper way of government according to heaven's will" (CSL-TK, 13.7). In 1825, a censor said that the Hung-tse lake had become a thoroughfare for the salt smugglers, each group of whom comprised a hundred to several hundred members. On the water, many scores of their boats sailed together, and on the land, vehicles traveled in groups. They opposed interception by severe fighting. They formed societies or made themselves sworn brothers (CSL-TK, 92.9). The profitable salt smuggling, encouraged perhaps by the poor administrative system, attracted many adventurous people. In Ch'en-chou and Kuei-te, Honan, the natives were obliged to consume the long reed salt made in Ts'ang-chou near Tientsin, while the natives in the neighboring districts of Ju-ning and Kuang-chou had to take the Huai-salt. The price of salt from these two sources differed greatly. From a few days' journey, the smugglers could make a great profit. They transported salt by donkeys or wheelbarrows, escorted by several dozen or a few hundred fighters holding in their hands swords and spears, which they were ready to use at any moment. They had local agents to serve as leaders in all towns and cities along their way to protect the safety of the salt transportation. To save trouble, the imperial local officials maintained a lofty attitude toward such transactions. In Hsi-hsien, Honan, there was a powerful local chieftain (t'u-kun) who was not only a salt smuggler but also a manager of a harbor for bandits who were sent to work anywhere in his vicinity. People's cows and horses were taken away during farming time and kept until the owners paid a ransom. This chieftain's arrest was repeatedly ordered by high officials but he still managed to enjoy freedom. Similar chieftains existed in many other districts. From these harbors, the Sword Wielders, Red Beards, and Nien came (CSL-TK, 165.12). Another great salt smuggling leader in the Liang-huai region, Huang Yii-lin, had headquarters at I-cheng, Kiangsu, with a branch office and depot in Hupeh and another one in Kiangsi. His large fleet could carry several thousand tons of salt; his small fleet consisted of more than a hundred boats each of which carried about a hundred piculs (one picul equalling 133 pounds). The two fleets were convoyed by numerous men with heavy weapons. For a distance of several hundred li in the Yangtze, Huang Yii-lin had so many henchmen that they could almost relay a verbal message from one person to another. They could even seize salt from a government carrier, since all official guards against salt smuggling were blackmailed by Huang so that he could transport salt openly, day and night, without restriction (CSL-TK, 168.3-5). A campaign against salt smugglers was carried on in 1830. Many of them were

54

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

closely related, though they were not identical, and they cooperated freely in harassing the government. The preceding information helps us to further understand that prior to 1851 the N i e n were already in existence in parts of six provinces — Anhwei, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Chihli, and Hupeh. The N i e n leaders seem to have traveled around in spreading their influence and establishing local units. The districts they frequented are tabulated below: The Existence of Nien-fei before 1851 Anhwei Ch'ao-hu Feng-yang Ho-fei Po-chou Shou-chou Ying-chou

Honan Chang-te Ch'iien-shan Feng-ch'iu Hsia-i Hsin-yang Hsi-ping Hsi-yeh Hua-hsien Ju-nan Kuang-chou Kuei-te Pi-yang Teng-chou T'ung-pei Wei-hui

Shantung Ch'eng-wu Chi-hsiang Chin-hsiang Chii-yeh Ho-tse I-chou Pu-chou Ting-t'ao Ts'ao-chou Yen-chou Yiin-ch'eng

Kiangsu Feng-hsien Hsii-chou

Chihli Kai-chou Ta-ming

Hupeh Hsiao-kan Huang-an Ma-ch'eng T'ang-hsien Tsao-yang Sui-chou

Moreover, while at first the number of the Nien was very small and their activities took place at night (being local people they often had to paint their faces to hide their identities), gradually their operations changed from night to daytime, from taking cattle to kidnapping people for ransom, from marauding rich families to robbing government treasuries, from running away for safety to making open armed resistance against government forces. The number of the Nien multiplied to hundreds and thousands. After 1853 their ranks further increased by leaps and bounds. arrested in Kiangsi, but none in Hupeh. A number of high officials were demoted on account of their small contribution in the campaign (CSL-TK, 170.5; 175.1b-2). Such a halfhearted, uncoordinated campaign was certainly ineffective. When the emperor took the matter seriously, the great smuggler, Huang Yii-lin, surrendered himself to the government. Oddly enough, the governor-general of Liang-chiang, Chiang Yu-t'ien, made a plea on Huang's behalf to try to excuse Huang from punishment (CSL-TK, 175.1b). What was the source of salt for the smugglers? Did they buy salt or get it by other means? At least some of the smuggled salt was seized from salt factories in Shantung. The salt manufacturers had little protection, because the magistrates thought that they had many other duties to attend to besides salt, and the Salt Controller, Ho Hsttehchuan (who collected heavy taxes from the manufacturers) also gave them no protection. During his eight year service, the salt bandits and smugglers multiplied (CSL-TK. 188.14b-17).

THE EARLY NIEN HISTORY FROM 1 7 9 7 TO 1 8 5 1

55

Perhaps, then, this rapid development may be better understood by analyzing their opportunities and methods. 2.

The Opportunities

and Methods

of the Nien

Development

The first method which the Nien and other secret societies used was to perpetuate their organizational units. The White Lotus society, for instance, enjoyed a long existence from the end of Sui to the close of Ch'ing — a period of well-nigh thirteen hundred years; its name appeared in each of the Sui, T'ang, Sung, Yuan, Ming, and Ch'ing dynasties. The Boxers' organization (I-ho ch'iian), a branch of the White Lotus, was merely mentioned in government sources in 1727 and in 1808, but by 1900 the Boxers' Rebellion had shaken the world.32 Under favorable conditions such organizations could live in obscurity for generations, or even centuries. The method of perpetuating secret societies is, generally speaking, like the continuation of a family tree or a guild organization.33 The "secret" of a society was mainly carried verbally from a father to his sons and grandsons, or from a teacher to disciples and then to disciples of disciples. The custom of worshipping ancestors and respecting teachers was carefully observed by the secret societies. Equally honored by them was the Confucian principle of loyalty and fidelity. Since a majority of Chinese farmers were not very strong in making independent decisions, they relied on the judgment of family heads or on that of teachers. In the community the heads and teachers, who had gained their knowledge from books, experience or such mystic sources as magic, occupied positions of high prestige among unlettered men. The majority of Chinese farmers were usually led by a minority of the so-called scholar-official class, consisting of lettered men, officers, and clan or community heads. The farmers tended to follow blindly the actions and beliefs of the minority. Thus Tung Chi-sheng of the Tung clan village in the district of Shang-ho, Shantung, founded the I-chu-hsiang Society (literally, "one stick of incense," or "Incense Burning Society"); it was handed down from one descendant to another for more than two hundred years. One of Tung Chi-sheng's descendants, Tung T'an, frequently traveled between Shantung and Chihli, spreading certain religious beliefs in the 32

In 1727, Emperor Yung-cheng forbade pugilists from teaching boxing and fencing, because young students of pugilism were given to drinking, gambling, and turning hoodlum (CSL-YC, 63.30b-31). See also Lao Nai-hsiian, I-ho ch'iian cliiao-men yiianliu k'ao reproduced in l-ho-t'uan, vol. 4, 433 ff. 33 CSL-HF, 7.9-10.

56

THE DEVELOPMENT* OF THE NIEN

1830's.34 Wang Ping-heng, a leading Boxer, confessed that for several generations his ancestors had been spreading a "heterodoxy" in Shantung, Chihli, and other provinces. Another characteristic of the Nien — apart from their methods of perpetuation — was their tendency to family action. If a father was a Nien, his wife, sons, nephews and other family members adopted the same trade and went together to pillage and they did this even if they were not compelled to do so by poverty. As a matter of fact, many of them were earning an adequate living. Yet they were reluctant to pay taxes, and while the Manchu generals were busy fighting the Taipings, many family heads led their whole families, or even whole villages, to become Nien. People, rich and poor, followed the crowd; and after joining the Nien, the rich could secure Nien protection and preserve their property, while the poor could make a living, at least temporarily.35 This group action, which made the expansion of the Nien so easy, was perhaps partly due to the importance of the familiy and its head in the Chinese social structure, and partly denoted a type of mass psychology and mutual influence. Tseng Kuo-fan, a great commander against the Nien army, noticed that most of the chiefs led their relatives and clan folk, both male and female, and drilled them to be strong and clever. If a father or elder brother died, his son or younger brother took over. The family stubbornly stuck to their Nien from one generation to another as a matter of family pride.38 Another feature of the Nien was the seasonal nature of their activities. During the spring and autumn they displayed flags, summoning their followers to plunder and burn the houses of other people, first in their own vicinity, and then farther and farther afield. They played havoc with many towns and cities, returning from these expeditions loaded with booty of edibles and other valuable things. Then they ate, drank, gambled, and sang happily until the food was exhausted before they went out on another expedition. This they did as regularly as ordinary merchants follow the monsoons. The above important statement is found in the Shantung chiin-hsing chi-liieh (Military Actions against the Nien-fei in Shantung), one of the best sources on the subject.37 Similar accounts are given in the Veritable Records of the Ch'ing Dynasty, in which one finds the following queer situation described. CSL-TK, 279.1-6; Chien Po-tsan, I-ho ch'iian 4, 423-24. Fang-lueh, 4.26b. 36 As late as March 1868, Tseng said that the Nien leader, Chang Tsung-yii, and his brothers and nephews led troops to become diehards; it was not easy to annihilate them. See Nien-chiin, VI, 50 and 55. 37 Ch. 2, p. 1. 34 35

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

57

Every autumn and winter in the 1810's, many people from the north of the Yangtze and along the Huai River formed groups containing one hundred or even more persons. Traveling to Hangchow, Soochow, and other rich cities in Chekiang and Kiangsu by boat or cart or on foot, they claimed to be hungry vagrants and demanded food and money from the villagers and townspeople. But judging from their neat clothes they were not beggars at all; their demands were met because both the people and the local governments were afraid of them. They made such profitable trips every year after the harvest, often being joined by rascals and salt smugglers along the way.38 In the areas where the Nien prevailed, group actions of this type became much more formidable in subsequent years. One can find herein another reason — government negligence and connivance — for the Nien's continuation and development. Had the local governments been strict in maintaining order and peace, such group actions for making a living without labor would have been stopped. The perpetuation of the Nien from one generation to another could hardly have escaped the vigilant eyes of policemen. Although local officials were blamed for neglecting their duties in weeding out robbers, Emperor Ch'ien-lung was responsible for initiating a laissez-faire administrative policy in the later part of his long reign. In 1793 he decreed that ordinary robbery and murder cases should not be reported to him, because he could not read so many. This precedent set up by the powerful emperor was immediately utilized by Ho-shen, his favorite minister, and Pi Yuan, governor-general of Hu-kuang, who at first belittled the rebellion of the White Lotus Society and later prolonged the campaign to use huge military funds for their own gain.39 The corrupt administration of Ch'ien-lung and Ho-shen indelibly marked the subsequent years of the Manchu regime. In 1803 the Chia-ch'ing emperor said that since avaricious officials took advantage of people's legal disputes and feuds for the purpose of blackmail, the people first resented, then hated, and finally fought against the officials. "Are the people to be blamed for their conduct?" the emperor queried. "They were actually incited by local officials." The emperor noticed that, because robberies in a district would bring disgrace and penalty to the magistrate, many local officials in recent years had ignored important robbery cases. This was especially true in Shantung (1818), where the daring actions of bandits were inspired by bad officials. Three 38

Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chun chi, 11.1b, 10 and 13.9b. CSL-CL, 1437.3, and Arthur Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Dynasty, pp. 223 and 623. A thorough study of the White Lotus Rebellion is Suzuki Chusei's Shincho chukishi kenkyu. 39

58

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

years later a censor added that the prevalence of burglaries in Shantung was due to the fact that local rowdies protected the bandits and served as receivers of their stolen goods, which were stored in cellars. Even people's cattle and horses were taken away, and the thieves left an address for paying a ransom.40 The lawlessness of the Nien and other brigands in Shantung, as pointed out by a contemporary observer in 1847, was fostered by high officials who liked to gloss over trouble and were loath to hear reports of pillaging.41 The people of Honan had no better luck than those of Shantung. By tradition, there were watchmen patrolling cities and towns. Many officials charged the local residents for night watching, but failed to provide it. Consequently, robberies were even committed in daytime, and the robbers openly declared that they were under the protection of officials. A magistrate of Lin-ying did not dare bother a powerful bandit protector for more than a year, because many government runners had been bribed by him.42 A shocking example was the great bandit, Chang K'ai-yiin, who had a large lair for more than one thousand men in the border region between Nan-yang, Honan, and Hsiang-yang, Hupeh, in 1837. Besides this, he commanded several smaller hiding places in various districts, each of which could accommodate several hundred men. He established clandestine connections with the local governments and constables. Whenever a high official set a date for an investigation of an important robbery or murder case, the magistrate ordered the policemen to handle the case; the police in turn discovered with ease which member of a certain den of robbers had done the work, and then they discussed terms with the robber leader as to how many should be beheaded, and how many strangled. After an agreement was reached the men to be executed or strangled could buy as substitutes disabled beggars, who had been fed by the leaders for just such emergency use. Chang's lair was in a deep mountain valley where it was difficult for any government force to approach. Small wonder the Nien in Nan-yang, Teng-chou, and other cities had been meeting government attacks for years; with this geographical advantage they could never be wiped out. In 1845, the emperor was advised that the police and government runners supported gangsters, from whom a police chief named Chou, of Kuai-chi, and another named Shen, of Shan-yin, Chekiang, received annual gifts ranging from 600 to 1000 taels of silver. Two years later, a censor memorialized that local government 40 41 42

CSL-CC, 117.18; 347, 17-18, and CSL-TK, 16.7. Nien-chiin, 1.328. CSL-TK, 163.23 and 287.4b-7.

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

59

workers encouraged gangsters to do people harm, so that secret society members (Nien and others) were spreading unchecked to several provinces. The Nien chiefs, Ma Ming-k'ang and others in Shantung, had clear understandings with soldiers and government runners, who informed them in advance of any "mopping-up" action about to be taken against the Nien at the occasional urging of high officials.43 Although both the Emperors Chia-ch'ing and Tao-kuang did give strong orders to local officials in 1820 and 1829, respectively, to take severe measures against secret societies and bandits, the officials memorialized that an investigation of the territory under their jurisdictions found everything quiet, and they labeled the censor's reports as "groundless." 44 The Governor of Anhwei, Chou T'ien-chiieh, memorializing in 1853, stated that the Nien and the corrupt government officials cooperated in raiding the people in the southwest of Fou-yang. Most of their leaders belonged to powerful clans, and in time of peace they relied on government workers for protection. It was therefore very difficult to arrest them. Numerous similar accounts need not be piled up here.45 Not all the governors, however, were lenient with the bandits. On one occasion in 1854, Chu K'ai, a commissioner of militia of Kuei-te, Honan, massacred the inhabitants in the border region of Yung-ch'eng, regardless of whether they were Nien; this drove many innocent people to seek protection from the Nien leader, Chang Lo-hsing. On another occasion in 1856 a Manchu commander came to believe that the activities of the Nien were tolerated, and even fostered, by the gentry, whom he accused of having secret connections with the Nien; as a result, several thousand of the gentry were said to have been maltreated and killed.46 In the district of Shang-shui, Honan, the people killed five government soldiers by mistake; for this, the Manchu magistrate considered the people insurgents and had more than eighty innocent men killed, the rest of the residents of the area being saved only by the prefect's pleas for mercy.47 It was not uncommon for the government troops to massacre people and burn their houses without asking whether they were bandits. This forced many people either to join the Nien or to organize themselves to fight against the government troops.48 «

Ibid., 287.10-11; 297.28; 417.24b; 448.4; and 449.3b-40. CSL-CC, 6.10-11, 12.43b, and CSL-TK, 162.15. 45 Fang-lueh, 3.26b. See Nien-chiin, III. 296; V. 148, 153. 158, 231, 258; VI. 155, 172, 198, 208, 275, 294, and 299. 46 WYFTC, 15.1 lb-12, and Fang-lueh, 7.7-8. 47 Shang-shui hsien-chih, 24.11. 48 Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin chih, 14.16. 44

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

An experienced commander against the Nien, Yüan Chia-san, candidly summarized the Nien development as follows: At the very beginning, the Nien were neither rebels nor hostile bandits, but carefree rowdies who were emotional and fond of struggle for mastery. For this reason, they summoned other fellows, who were without definite means of livelihood, as their claws and teeth. By and by, impoverished people began to join them and utilize their newly acquired power as members of the Nien to steal things from the rich or to avenge their private grievances. They acted outrageously, step by step, without any consideration. Helplessly, local officials ordered troops to exert official pressure. If the government force was defeated, their overbearing conduct was heightened. If the government handled them improperly by excessive slaughter, the bandits realized that their crime could never be pardoned and that they should fight to the end rather than wait for death by capital punishment. Whenever they won a war against the government force, they gained more followers; whenever they were defeated, their die-hard party was more consolidated. When the down-trodden villages were ruined and their citizens starving, the bandits had to move to a richer spot to plunder and burn, so that their members could profit. 49

Yet occasionally an official rendered good service to his locality. For instance, Chou T'ien-chüeh was so strict in maintaining order and peace, and in dealing out reward and punishment to the people that the bandits dared not cause trouble while he was there.50 Another example was Brigadier General Wu Chün-chi, who was sent to Su-chou in 1865 with only four hundred soldiers. Being honest and sincere, he did not even take a single piece of wood from the people. His soldiers got along harmoniously with the civilians, and because of their close cooperation, the Nien did not enter the area under his command.51 In spite of occasional strict administrators, the perfunctory officials still constituted a large proportion of the government of that period. The preceding facts indicate that government negligence and connivance gave the Nien a good opportunity to survive and to grow. How could the Nien and secret societies secure official connivance? The answer, as already mentioned, lay partly in low wages, and partly in the work of Nien and others in bribing police and government runners. Their method was quite modern. Perhaps a good example was the clever Ch'en Hsiao-lung, a bandit-rascal (fei-kun) who lived for many years in the city of Hui-chou, Anhwei. He rented rooms in the neighborhood of the government buildings, and hired girls to entertain secretaries, clerks, 49

Yüan Tuan-min-kimg chi, memorials, 7.6, written in 1857. YCCL, 6.2b. Another example was magistrate Cheng Sung-feng, who ruled Kuang-chou for several years. His honest and efficient administration eliminated much Nien trouble. Cf. Nien-chiin, IV, 78. 51 Su-chou chih, 10.39b-40. 59

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

61

janitors, assistants, servants, and policemen, who were welcome either to take meals or to live there, using these apartments as their clubs or dormitories. Through his close associations with these workers of all levels, he could influence legal disputes and blackmail people. His power also extended to the countryside. In the area of Ho-chou and Wu-weichou, Anhwei, there were also such rascals who protected bandits and salt smugglers in blackmailing well-to-do families. If the results of their extortion were unsatisfactory, they caused all sorts of trouble.52 After two decades, a censor requested the dismissal or removal in all provinces of bad licentiates, rapacious underlings, and professional litigators.53 Undoubtedly, such characters were easily approached by secret societies and gangster organizations for protection or for information. The lax policy of the government toward the bandits was noticed by a censor who informed the throne in July, 1851, that in recent years bandits had been prevalent in Honan, especially around the districts of Nan-yang and T'ung-po, where travelers were plundered and people kidnapped for ransom, and where many bandit retreats had been established. Yet neither the governor of Honan nor any of the military and civil officials made any effort to arrest them. The officials carried on their routine work, ignoring the emergency and concealing the trouble from the throne. The famous scholar and general, Hu Lin-i, observed that wherever in Honan the Nien went, they were unopposed.54 The Nien relied upon the government employees and runners as powerful protectors, and the latter considered the Nien a source of income; this practice had become so ingrained that it was beyond the control of the law. Even if the magistrate heard of the Niens and was about to arrest them, the runners would inform them beforehand so that they could either collect a crowd to resist arrest or scatter for the time being. This was a common practice of government employees who secretly helped the bandits cause trouble for the local people. In some districts the Nien were able by bribery to secure jobs as servants or government runners.55 In this way, the Nien were able to develop until they became a formidable threat to the whole province. Of course, famine and economic depression were also factors facilitating the Nien's development. The 1853 drought in Anhwei, for instance, compelled many helpless people to turn to banditry. The inflation of silver, the devaluation of coins, and the rapid increase of prices for daily 52 53 54 55

CSL-TK, 191.30b-31. CSL-HF, 7.7b. Fang-lueh, 2.7; 8.14-15, and Ching-shih-wen iisii-pien, 82.8b. Fang-lueh, 2.7; Meng-ch'eng hsien-chih shu, 6.5b.

62

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

commodities affected the Nien area, too. Officials complained that the territory was large and bandits were innumerable, and thai both soldiers and rations were insufficient.56 During the widespread famine of 1851 and 1852, the Nien, led by such men as Kung Te, simply overran the countryside. Chang Yangtseng, a distant relative of Chang Lo-hsing, led eighteen members of his group to Yung-ch'eng and took one hundred sheep. The bandits were apprehended and put into prison, but returning from smuggling salt in the northern region of the Yellow River, Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te surrounded the city of Yung-ch'eng with over ten thousand men and released the prisoners. Thereafter the people supported Chang Lo-hsing as their protector.57 The government attempted to arrest Chang, but he escaped, and no further direct action was taken against the instigators of such large-scale riots. After the Taipings had come to Anhwei in 1853, and local bandits had appeared to the north and south of the Huai River, the emperor ordered a vice-minister of public works, Lii Hsien-chi, to supervise the militia in Anhwei, with the assistance of Censor Yuan Chia-san. The officers reached the front with neither soldiers nor money. What they had received was simply an order to win the hearts of the people with such highsounding words as "loyalty" and "sincerity." In November of 1853, Lii Hsien-chi was killed in action, and shortly thereafter Chou T'ien-chueh died, both having perhaps demonstrated their loyalty and sincerity to the emperor. Meanwhile, as a remedy for the lack of soldiers and funds Chou proclaimed an amnesty for the brigand leaders Feng Ch'ui-shou, Chang Feng-shan and several others, with the intention of encouraging them to fight against other bandits. Feng and Chang had been sought by a prefect of Yang-chou, so they surrendered to Chou T'ien-chiieh.58 Chang Lo-hsing and his force also came to join Chou, who commissioned Chang and others to suppress the bandits, and issued them official buttons and uniforms. Because there was nothing with which to pay them, their followers were soon disbanded and sent home to resume their profession of banditry. By then, however, Chang's followers had increased considerably.58 Feng Ch'ui-shou and Chang Feng-shan went to Meng-ch'eng with over one thousand men to persuade Chang Lo-hsing to become their leader. Chang Lo-hsing immediately assembled the various chiefs at Chih-ho-chi, Anhwei, where he conducted a religious ceremony, offering sacrifices to the flag to mark the formal insurrection of 1853. 58

57

Nien-chiin, V. 89-90, 128, 149, 150, 151; and Fang-lueli, 22.30. WYFTC, 15.8b. AHTC, 102.10. =» WYFTC, 15.9.

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

63

About this time the town of Chih-ho became the main headquarters of the Nien. It is located between the four districts of Fou-yang, Pochou, Meng-ch'eng, and Su-chou, and was under the jurisdiction of Meng-ch'eng, but near the border of Po-chou. That was the spot where a rebel leader had started his revolt against the Ch'in dynasty in the third century B.C.; it had also been the center of revolution against the Yuan dynasty. Chih-ho is about a hundred li from the main cities of Po-chou and Meng-ch'eng, and it was beyond the reach of the two magistrates. The Nien leader,Chang Lo-hsing, was from the village of Chang-lao-chia, about twelve li from Chih-ho. Chang allied himself with the various villages surrounding his main headquarters. When the villagers stayed at home, they were ordinary people; when they went out, they were bandits. From time to time they took long trips, much like merchants, but wherever they went, bad people served as their guides.60 The headquarters of the Nien could easily have been permanently destroyed had the government been efficient, but unfortunately it was not. The Nien were, in this sense, given a chance to develop by the government. Apparently other former Nien units in various provinces cooperated with the headquarters at Chih-ho. In the early years most of their units encountered little trouble from the government, because the policy of cultivating good relations with local governments was continued. In 1854 a great Nien chieftain, Li Shih-lin of Ho-ch'iu, Anhwei, was on very good terms as sworn brothers with the magistrate, Ch'en T'ang of Hsihsien, and Magistrate Ch'ao Teng-chiin of Kuang-chou, and also had a close relationship with the provincial commander-in-chief, Po-shan. He presented Po-shan with seven thousand taels of silver, Ch'ao Teng-chiin with three thousand, and Ch'en T'ang with two thousand. Moreover, he regarded the chief detective, Chu Ming-i, as his step-father, and had frequent correspondence with many police and government runners. The arrest of Li Shih-lin was repeatedly ordered, but in vain. He was informed in advance of any government campaign against his force. When "war" was begun, twice Po-shan did not allow his men to fight, but instead let the Nien move elsewhere so that he could claim a great victory. Li Shih-lin's case was not unique, for the Lo-shan magistrate, Lei Yiianchao, was also a sworn brother of a Nien chieftain, Ch'ao Teng-chiin, and regarded Ch'ao as his elder brother.61 It was under such lax circumstances that the Nien developed rapidly. They plundered the people in the vicinity of their lairs, especially around 80

Ibid., 1.1 and 15.8; Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh-chai ti-tzu chi, 12.18b-19. Fang-liieh, 6.24b-30. Nien's connection with government runners had been frequently reported before this time. See Fang-liieh, 1.19-20; and 2.6-7. 61

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

their headquarters. Their power and influence grew day by day. The local governments around the area launched a joint campaign against Chih-ho, and the Nien were defeated. But they were invited to surrender to the magistrate at Lin-huai,62 and in the three years from 1853 to 1856 Chang Lo-hsing surrendered to the government and then rebelled against it repeatedly, so that he was "in and out" without much embarrassment. The so-called great commanders of the Ch'ing government shortsightedly thought that the Nien could never spread north of Anhwei. Their officers and soldiers performed their duties perfunctorily, loafing on the banks of the river and claiming skirmishes with the Nien, when they actually did not fight hard at all. The provinces of Honan, Anhwei, and Shantung were ablaze with rebellion, and as the citizens simultaneously suffered so greatly from the imperial troops, they actually began to think that it might be better to live under the Nien.63 Another opportunity for the development of the Nien was the Taiping Rebellion. The Nien existed before the Taipings but received much inspiration from them. When the Taipings advanced from Kwangsi through Hunan to Hupeh, the governor of Honan, Ch'i-shan, was made imperial commissioner in command of a division of cavalry and infantry some ten thousand strong, encamped at Hsin-yang-chou in order to bar the way of the rebels to the north. After Nanking was taken, Ch'i-shan was ordered to pursue the Taipings, and he encamped in a city across the river from the Celestial Capital. Honan was very sparsely garrisoned, and when the Nien and other bandits heard of the victories of the Taipings, they acted quickly. The Taipings' northern expedition, launched in 1853, forced its way from Hsii-chou, Feng-yang, Lin-huai, and Pochou to Honan, Shansi, and Hopei. Their actions brought quick response from local rebels. In March the governor of Anhwei submitted a memorial to the throne, saying: "Since the Taipings have been rampant and have taken the provincial capitals of Hupeh and Anhwei, all the people in the area north of the Yangtze and on both banks of the Yellow River who heard the news have responded by forming large bands of Nien numbering as many as over a thousand each. They are plundering at will, setting houses on fire, and taking lives." In December of the same year the Honan commissioner of education, Chang Chih-wan, also memorialized that "Since the Taipings invaded Honan, the Nien-fei have arisen everywhere and their numbers are increasing daily." 84 In the local gazetteers it was reported that as soon as the Taipings took An-ch'ing, «2

WYFTC, 15.8b-9.

64

Ibid., 15.10b-ll. Fang-liieh, 3.2b-3, and 4.26b.

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

65

rumors were spread among the people of Shou-chou to the effect that the Taipings were coming immediately. The local people plundered pawn-shops, opened public granaries, robbed rich houses, etc.65 Having heard of the Taipings, the Nien leaders Chang Lo-hsing, Kung Te, and others joined them about this time and marched bravely to the center of Honan.66 These stories may help to show how much inspiration the Taipings gave the Nien. The Nien leaders were not mere opportunists; they carefully exploited all available factors to advance their interests. Along this line, one method was to make use of group feuds. The armed feuds between members oi different groups of clans and those between the Chinese and the Moslems seem to have helped the expansion of the Nien. This type of feud was common in China, and after a clash, each side tried to expand its forces and consolidate its organization so that it might take revenge the next time. At first neither side seemed to have any hatred against the government. Later on, as forces grew, motives became more complicated. A good description of the early history of the Nien appears in a memorial from the Censorate (Tu-ch'a-yiian) in 1851. Briefly, the long document stated that the Nien cooperated with other brigands in kidnapping people for ransom. In order to threaten people and extort money, they sometimes posed as officials; at other times they plundered for booty. They belonged to the big Wang and Kuo clans, which had settled close to each other in the province of Honan. The Kuo were the more numerous and powerful, and they offered shelter to bandits and thieves. Beginning in 1844 the bandit chief Kuo So and others frequently gathered an armed crowd to plunder and to kidnap people for ransom. In June, 1847, the crop yield of about one acre of wheat belonging to the Wang clan was harvested and stolen by Kuo So and his followers. The Wang family reported the Kuo to the district magistrate, who arrested two of them. The bandits thenceforth cherished a grudge against the Wang clan. In 1850 one of the Kuo who had been imprisoned by the magistrate escaped and returned home. He again stole the crop yield of millet from the Wangs' farm, and was reported to the magistrate who prepared to arrest him. Hearing of the magistrate's intentions, the Kuo gathered more than a hundred members, armed with guns, swords and other weapons, and in the ensuing fight with the Wang clan, both sides suffered casualties. On the night of December 10, 1851 a government employee led Kuo So and others, disguised as officials, into the Wang's village, which they plundered, injuring many people. The case was re"5 B6

Shou-chou chih, 11.14. Kung-hsien chih, 5.54b.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

ported to the throne, and the authorities of Honan were ordered to conduct a strict investigation.07 This is one of the earliest reports about the Nien in the official source Chiao-p'ing Nieiv-fei fang-liieh, or "Plans and Tactics for the Suppression of the Nien-fei." From this source we can see that at first the Nien used their forces to fight not against the government, but against different families or clans, and that they gradually expanded for self-protection. The government utterly failed to give the people protection; some government officials even participated in the crimes of the bandits. Such cases occurred not only in Honan but also in Anhwei, where hatred flourished between the people of the city of Yung-ch'eng and those of Po-chou. Using as a pretext the search for the bandit leader, Su T'ien-fu, they frequently fought, plundered, and killed each other.68 The people of Po-chou, who were presumably Nien, allied themselves with hundreds of people in neighboring districts and constantly guarded against possible attack by the natives of Shang-ch'iu and Yung-ch'eng.69 Thus in 1854 the main headquarters of the Nien at Chih-ho-chi, near Po-chou in Anhwei, was well protected. The Nien had to be on guard not against the government forces, but against the people of those neighboring cities with which they had clashed. The people in the area of Feng-yang, Ying-chou, and Po-chou in the province of Anhwei frequently carried swords and called themselve "Itao-shou," or "Sword-wielders." The Chinese and the Moslems among them engaged in hereditary feuds and frequently renewed their fights over minor matters. They secretly made their own swords and firearms. We have mentioned a few of their armed feuds in the 1820's. In May, 1851, a dispute arose between the Chinese and the Moslems and at a designated time each side collected several hundred armed supporters in an open field for a fight which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.70 The Chinese and the Moslems of Ying-chou, Anhwei, had another severe fight in 1853, which was carried even to the seat of the prefecture.71 The Nien were thus further strengthened because these feuds occupied some of the attention of the local authorities, while many of the participants were at the same time members of the Nien and were thus trained to fight. The government forces failed to curb these feuds, and gradually the brawlers so expanded their power as to become a formidable foe of the imperial government. 67

•8 69 70 71

Fang-liieh, 1.1-2. AHTC, 102.14. STCHCL, 2.1b. For other feuds, see Fang-liieh, Fang-liieh, 2.4-5. AHTC, 102.14.

7.15-16.

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

67

Another traditional method used by the Nien was to work on drought and flood victims, since these two catastrophes produced many destitute people. An example of this was the great famine of 1831 and 1832, when hungry crowds frequently caused trouble. Salt smugglers, secret society members, and Nien quickly availed themselves of such chances to engender uprisings in Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhwei, Hupeh, and the lower Yangtze valley. Several scores or even hundreds of fishing boats, gathered together presumably to make a better stand against waves and floods, were employed by the salt smugglers to ship salt from the Yangtze to the Grand Canal, and to fight against Moslem smugglers.72 About the same time many impoverished people rowed in boats to seek food, and occasionally carried a little salt to sell for cash. The salt smugglers hired these boats and loaded them with salt, but camouflaged the decks by placing refugees on them in order to avoid the investigation of customs officers.73 Other hordes utilized these wretched people for their various ends, too. Generally the so-called bandits infiltrated big groups of refugees wandering from place to place. Nominally begging for food (usually with unsatisfactory results), they actually seized all edible and valuable things. The Honan drought in 1857 attracted many Shantung Nien to enlist the help of the starving people. A government observer said that at first the Nien and others pretended to be drought or flood victims, but later many real victims joined their societies. Two thousand men suddenly enlisted in the Nien in 1856 because they were helpless in facing a severe drought in Honan.74 Inundations from the Yellow and Huai Rivers were frequent in the mid-nineteenth century: the change in the course of the Yellow River in 1856 was certainly a great event, with masses of water cascading over a large area. Badly harrassed by the Taiping Rebellion, the central government was too impecunious and incompetent to deal with the aftermath. The helpless people had no alternative but to turn to vagrancy and brigandage. This could never escape the attention of veteran Nien and other secret society members who had been breeding trouble, turmoil, discontent, and disturbance. It was during these years, therefore, that the Nien became unusually active in consolidating their headquarters and enlarging their following.75 The leading elements of the Nien army thus were peasants, salt 72 73 74 75

CSL-TK, 202.27-28. Ibid., 207.8b-9. CSL-TK, 372.13; 447.12; 470.20b; and Fang-lueh, STCHCL, 17.1, 2.2, Fang-lueh, 122.4.

22.32.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIEN

smugglers, disbanded soldiers or deserters, flood victims, militiamen, remnants of the Taipings in north China, and some educated men. At first there were only a few Nien agitators, but they were followed by some volunteers and by some individuals who were compelled by poverty to join them; still others were coerced by earlier members. After the Taipings took Nanking, much of the land along the lower Yangtze valley was laid waste, so that food was very scarce. Many of the starving people followed the Nien. They sought food wherever they could find it, were joined here and there by vagrants and disbanded soldiers, and became stronger day by day.76 Many salt smugglers joined the Nien. One group of over a thousand, under the leadership of Ch'en Yii-piao, went from Hai-chou to Lii-chou in 1854 to cooperate with the Nien. In 1868 Tso Tsung-t'ang memorialized: "Now the Nien-fei have attempted to invade Tientsin because so many salt smugglers have joined their group that their numbers have been greatly augmented." 77 The governor of Shantung also reported to the emperor that the three prefectures of Wu-ting, Tung-ch'ang, and Linch'ing, which were close to the border of Chihli where the salt smugglers and secret societies had their headquarters, should be carefully watched. A number of Nien leaders who were salt smugglers had no regular jobs. During times of dearth they made alliances and frightened the people into supplying them with food. Many deserters from the poorly paid government troops and militia also entered into the company of the Nien and so did the Taipings in north China after the fall of Nanking in 1864.78 A number of scholars with their first or second academic degrees also served the Nien. A conglomeration of so many elements, the Nien gradually became a very large and formidable force. A militia was organized to fight the rebels, but the imperial government only ordered its organization in the turbulent districts. The local gentry had to raise funds, prepare weapons, and enlist volunteers from the people. This extra burden was frequently aggravated by the arrival of imperial troops who behaved worse than the Nien. When the latter 76

Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 11.1b, 10, and 13.9b. Tso Tsung-t'ang also memorialized that each time when the imperial troops were defeated, the soldiers were compelled to join Nien-fei in order to save their lives; fearing the ruthless punishment by their government, they dared not return to their original camp. Consequently, the Nien rebels organized a Northern division which comprised not only many natives of Ho-pei, but even many cavalry men from Manchuria. Fang-liieh, 273.4. Cf. Tso Wen-hsiang kung tsou-kao, 21.56; 27.4b-7. 78 Shou-kuang hsien chih, 15-20; Chung-hsiu Lu-chih, 3.11b; Fang-liieh, 309.14; and YCCL, 3.10, 22. The Taiping leader, Lai Wen-kuang, became a Nien leader and changed his infantry into cavalry. The role played by the scholar-official class in the Nien will be discussed later. 77

THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE METHODS OF THE NIEN DEVELOPMENT

69

passed a place, they raked booty from the residents in the way of a coarse comb; the imperial troops in turn did the same as if with a very fine comb.79 Of the two evils, the Nien were in cases preferable to imperial troops, and many militia, therefore, shifted their allegiance to the Nien for better protection of their own interests, including fighting off heavy tax collection during the days of civil war. 3. The Nien Methods for Enlarging their Membership The Nien method of recruiting seemed to follow the tradition of the White Lotus Society, attracting volunteers and compelling others to join. Under the latter method, the faces of some prisoners of war in 1804 were inscribed with "Pai-lien-chiao" (White Lotus Society), so that they had to maintain their allegiance if they did not wish to be killed by the government.80 The Nien also forced young men to fight for them. According to a local gazetteer, Shou-kuang hsien-chih, "Wherever the Nien-fei went, they set houses on fire and forced men into their service." 81 In Hsu Tsung-kan's diary (1856) there is a moving story of the Nien's method of forcing the farmers in Shantung to join them. The farmers' provisions were seized, implements destroyed, wives and children captured. Knives were put to the necks of the captured and the women were in danger of rape, until the farmers consented to go with the Nien, taking along their families. By and by, they became accustomed to the Nien life.82 Numerous accounts in government sources tell us that the Nien used generous distributions of money and food to the plebeians in order to enlist new members. For many years the Nien and other secret society members sacked government treasuries and private pawnshops, which were invariably owned by the moneyed class and extracted a very high interest rate from the poor people. Part of the booty was distributed to 78

This was Tseng Kuo-fan's observation in Shantung; see STCHCL, 4.26. CSL-CC, 134.14. M Shou-kuang hsien-chih, 15.20. In 1830, a secret society leader in the south of Kiangsi forced law-abiding people to join his organization by seizing their cattle, destroying their rice plants, and kidnapping their children. The innocent people first refused to associate with him, but then, for the sake of their families and properties, they had to enlist themselves and pay duties. They feared the wrath of secret societies more than the law of the government. As soon as government soldiers were sent to attack them, the involuntary members were easily caught, while the real members escaped (CSL-TK, 168.24). Although this report does not refer to the Nien, it has the value of correlated reference. 88 Nien-chiin, 111.15. For more examples of forced membership, see Nien-chiin, V.198, and Yuan Tuan-min-kung chi, memorials, 2.33 and 3.9. ?0

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the people and part used for purchasing swords and spears. A great salt smuggler in Lu-chou, Feng-yang, and Ying-chou, Anhwei, levied a heavy toll from small salt dealers, in 1833, but he immediately used his money lavishly to win the hearts of the people, with the result that his adherents increased constantly. In 1847 the Shantung Nien threw their money, food, and other possessions on the sides of the highway, summoning impoverished people to pick them up, and they called this deed "relief to the distressed." There is no mention of any strings attached to such generous gifts, yet the response from those benefited was gratifying, for in the summer and autumn of 1847 Shantung achieved a new record for cases of pillaging. Moreover, in the wild countryside many people prepared food nominally to sell to travelers, but actually for feeding bandits, including Nien-fei, Fu-fei, salt smugglers, and Sword-wielders ( I - f e i ) . The Nien seized carloads of rice in 1853 and distributed it to the poor people.83 An eyewitness recorded that when, in 1856, the Nien came to the villages in the east of Chihli, they did not rob the villagers but gave them money and other objects, whereupon the villagers were delighted to follow them.84 It is no wonder that in many regions the Nien and the people were reported to be getting along harmoniously. According to government sources, "Most of the villages in Honan were burned to ashes and the government troops found no place to stay, but in the region around Pochou and Chih-ho the people followed the Nien in plundering and in burning houses, resuming their farm work after their return. Both sides were satisfied with each other." Government officers and soldiers, on the other hand, dared not leave their camps in groups of less than ten, for fear of being killed by civilians. Thus, as a government reporter worried, "The magnitude of the future disaster would be unimaginable." 85 Moreover, the struggle for survival or, in the later years, the fight against a common foe — the government — was perhaps another factor in bringing together the Taipings, the Nien, and the secret societies. Let us, then, sum up the methods and opportunities of the Nien development. Their first method clearly was to perpetuate their organizations by family and guild traditions. Their first opportunity was government negligence and connivance, which helped them in this. Their second method was to work on local police and government runners, so that during their early period the Nien could enjoy the second opportunity of seldom-disturbed lairs. Their third opportunity was the Taiping rebellion, which inspired the Nien to positive and extensive actions; this "4 F5

CSL-TK, 12.12b-13; 247.22; 448.17b-18; 449.24-25; and Fang-lueh, Nien-chun, I, 391. Fang-lueh, 14.6; and Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-ciiiin chili, 14-16.

3.4.

THE NIEN METHODS FOR ENLARGING THEIR MEMBERSHIP

71

was followed by Nien's third method of making use of armed group feuds, drought, flood, and other difficulties of economic depression. In addition to generous offers of food and money to needy people, the Nien were a menace to all those individuals who did not work with them. Consequently the small Nien units were not only perpetuated, but developed in size from scores of members, in the early nineteenth century, to hundreds of thousands of members by the 1860's.

III. The Nien Organization and Leadership

The Nien had a flexible organization to suit the needs of their times and circumstances. Roughly speaking, from 1800 to the early 1850's their organization was decentralized, scattered and local in nature, and consisting of small units. Thereafter, it was gradually enlarged and consolidated, with a broader and clearer political point of view, and it reflected some of the influence of the Taipings. 1. The Early Nien Organization For the earlier period of the Nien organization, a résumé of a competent eyewitness account by Ma Hsing-i presented below may prove informative and useful. A strong and rich man made himself a minor chief, and found as many as several dozen men to gamble with in a market-place. They played around a large table or desk covered by a tent which was surrounded by a ring of swords, spears, and guns. Such gambling tents appeared in many markets where, once every three days, the country folk came to barter or buy their daily commodities. The minor chief was at first called "the table head" (icho-chu), but later changed his title to Nien chief (Nienshou). The Nien chief, dressed in fancy clothes, usually rode on a horse and was protected by armed guards. Before he entered a market or town, a few gun-shots were fired. The village headman (ti-pao) or the town chief (chi-shou), and occasionally a scholar, rushed out in full dress to welcome and feast him. In the course of their conversation, they addressed each other familiarly as Uncle or Brother So-and-so. They considered themselves members of "mixed families" (Hun-chia-tzu), presumably consisting of men with different family names living in the same locality. The entertainers felt honored to be able to converse with the Nien chief, while young people watched the ceremony with great curiosity and admiration. Whenever there was a Nien in a village, the village was peaceful; whenever there was a Nien in a clan, the clan was fortunate. A village

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with a Nien would not be intruded on by another Nien, for the latter would be informed by the villagers that the Nien chief and they were mixed-family members. A clan that had a Nien would not be bothered by another Nien, because the prospective intruder would be told that a certain Nien chief was already a member of their clan, and indeed was their uncle or elder brother. Violation of this understanding would cause hatred, and the two Nien concerned would consider each other enemy-family members (Ch'iuchia-tzu). One of them had to gather a big crowd to attack the other. If the attack were resisted, the dead on both sides were cremated; if repelled, it would be renewed; if successful, the village was burned and many villagers were put at the mercy of the victors' swords. Sometimes other village headmen and town chiefs solicited a compromise, on behalf of a village under attack, by entertaining the attackers at a big banquet and paying them a large sum of money. Woe betide those villages or clans which did not have a Nien. Their family members were kidnapped and tortured, and then held for as large a ransom as possible. After their release, their fellow-villagers were so horrified to learn of their treatment that they set out to persuade some strong and violent-tempered man to fraternize with a Nien chief and form a Nien organization in their village or clan in order to prevent repeated kidnappings. Many villagers naturally volunteered to enroll in a Nien organization because they were attracted by the booty and animals brought back from the Nien's "expeditions." Half of the booty went to the Nien chief, and a Nien secretary (Chiang-chi) divided the other half equally among the members. Animals were killed for big meals and carnivals, and the proceedings were watched by neighboring villagers with watering mouths and envious eyes. Soon these neighbors, too, were grasping weapons to join the Nien's next "expedition" and to do everything they could in order to profit themselves. The number one Nien chief was called Ling-nien, or Nien commander, and the second in command, Erh-nien-tow, those who could read, write and plan were called Nien secretaries. A small Nien incorporated into a larger one was called an auxiliary Nien. A band of a few score individuals who belonged neither to a clan nor to a village, but moved about and looted, were called wandering-nien (yu-nien), or flying-nien (feinien). There were also other names for the old and new bands of Nien which for several decades had been in existence everywhere along the Huai River.1 '

Nien-chiin,

1, 309-311. The account was written before 1858 by Ma Hsing-i, who

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The term "Ling-men" was applied to Nien chiefs whose adherents bore a family name different from their own. Another term, T'ang-chu or ancestral hall leader, may have been applied to Nien leaders whose adherents were of the same clan. In agricultural China many families of the same surname lived in one community with a large ancestral temple called t'ang or tz'u-t'ang in which the members worshipped their ancestors, performed wedding and funeral ceremonies, and held public assemblies. There were also small, or branch, ancestral halls in large families. Since many Nien leaders came from big clans and were followed by members of their clan (as Chang Lo-hsing from the village Chang-lao-chia, Chiang T'ai-lin from Chiang-lao-chia, Sun Ku'ei-hsin from Sun-lao-chia, Kung Te from Kun-chi-shih, and Chao Hao-jan from Chao-chuang), the T'angchu seemed to refer to such men with large followings from their own clans.2 As mentioned in the preceding section, family or group action was one of the chief characteristics of the Nien. A young scholar, Liu T'ang, was captured in Anhwei (1858) and spent about eighty days in the Nien army. In a vivid account of this episode of his life, Liu said that his unit leader was called T'ang-chu. A t'ang was divided into two levels, great and small, according to area of jurisdiction and number of adherents. The head of a large flag of a certain color was called "great t'ang-chu"; and commanded up to more than a hundred small flags of the same color. The head of a small flag was called "small t'ang-chu." Each flag had three to five cavalrymen and ten-odd infantrymen. Part of the booty was presented to the great and small t'ang-chu, and part of it was divided by the cavalrymen, at two shares each, and the infantrymen, at one share each. The great t'ang-chu that Liu knew were Chang Lo-hsing, Sun Ku'ei-hsin, and others. He was captured by a small t'ang-chu, Yao Feng-ch'un, whose uncle was a great t'ang-chu. In Liu's account he said that he was captured by ch'i-chu, or flag chief, Yao Feng-ch'un, but on another line, the same name was entitled small t'ang-chu,3 Apparently ch'i-chu and t'ang-chu were thus interchangeable. Ma Hsing-i concludes that the reason the Nien caused such great trouble was that they were supported by their clans, protected by their neighbors, encouraged by the gentry, feared by the local headmen (tipao) who were recognized by the government, and connived with by the must have been an eyewitness of the Nien movement, as one can see from the intrinsic evidence. 2 Fifty-five Nien leaders coming from villages dominated by their clans are listed by Siang-tseh Chiang in The Nien Rebellion, pp. 46-47. 1 Nien-chün, I. 350.

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magistrates.4 The great Hsien clan had more than one thousand families who lived in a cluster of more than ten villages. They chose the Old Tiger Hsieh Number Four (Hsieh Ssu lao-hu) as the clan leader. Other Nien chiefs in the southwest of Fou-yang were mostly great clan heads who had intrigues with government runners. The government commander, Yuan Chia-san, also worried that the Nien were mostly protected by great clans and rich gentry.5 This phenomenon may be taken to indicate a general resentment of the declining Manchu dynasty. The criterion for the selection of a Nien leader was neither old age nor seniority, as was usually the case in choosing family heads; rather it was physical strength, a fierce nature, cleverness, and the financial means to open a gambling tent and attract a number of followers.6 The larger the following a man could attract, the greater the leader he would become. The old and senior family heads, who were unable to fight, might remain at home as supporters or sympathizers, and at the same time serve as a sort of third force to negotiate with the government for the protection of their clan members if the government carried out a successful campaign against the Nien. 7 The T'u nien-tou, great Nien chief, may be synonymous with Ta-t'angchu and tsung-nien-tou or tsung-nien-shou, general Nien chief; Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te were referred to by these varied titles in different sources at about the same time.8 The varied terms may suggest either 4

Ibid., 1.311. Fang-liieh 3.15b and 26b; and TMKC-memorials 3.16. fi In honor of their fierce nature, a number of Nien leaders were called "old tigers" (lao-hu), such as Hsieh Ssu lao-hu, Ma lao-hu, and Wang Ssu lao-hu (Fang-liieh 1.24, 413.23b, and 8.19b). 7 Chiang Siang-tseh believes that the term T'ang-chu, or "lodgemaster," was "obviously borrowed from the Society of Heaven and Earth, which prevailed in southern China," and he quoted Hirayama Amane's explanation about "shan-t'ang" or mountains and halls from which the t'ang-chu is derived (The Nien Rebellion, p. 19). Our interpretation here is different from Dr. Chiang's, because in the Nien dominion there are not many mountains and hills, and there is no source material mentioning t'ang-chu in the sense that he tries to interpret. On the other hand, ancestral halls existed almost in every large village and family. The chief of a large village ancestral hall became a large t'ang-chu, while those of a family ancestral hall, a small t'ang-chu. Each t'ang-chu may be independent in time of peace but small t'ang-chu were bound together by their family or clan ties. As Wang Hui-weng well explained, "To live together in a community with the same clan members is fortunate for these families, because government workers could not arrest a member from such a large clan community. It is, however, unfortunate for the state. In a mild way the clan members refused to pay taxes and they beat tax collectors; in a serious way they attempted revolution on account of their numerical strength and identical minds." (I-ping jih-chi, 3.19b). Thus t'ang-chu, ancestral-hall leader, or clan leader, could be the chief of a Nien unit. s Nien-chun, III, 6-7; Fang-liieli, 4.9, 15; and TMKC, 6.31. s

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that the Nien did not have a unified organization until 1856, or that the government intelligence service did not have a clear understanding of the Nien hierarchy. Some truth may be found in both of these suppositions. Before 1851 the organization of the Nien lay in the family and secret society relationships of its members, who operated as a small unit under a leader. There was little subdivision or rank, 9 although some local leaders claimed the title of great general (ta chiang-chiin), great marshal (fa yiian-shuai), great king (ta-wang), or hell king (yen-wang). This decentralized organization led to a variety of titles.10 The governors made no effort to study the Nien, and therefore in their memorials they used a common title such as Nien chief or great Nien leader, resulting in such synonyms as those mentioned above.

2. The Later Nien Organization The advance of the Taipings from Hupeh through Anking to Nanking and their northern expedition in 1853, passing Feng-yang (May 28), Pochou (June 10) in Anhwei, and Kuei-te (June 13) in Honan, galvanized the Nien and other secret society members into rapid action. The first result was organization of more and larger Nien units. A Honan official memorialized that before 1853 there were not many large hordes of bandits — that is, hordes consisting of a thousand or more men. After the Taipings took Anking (February 26, 1853), the Nien in Suchou, Men-ch'eng, Po-chou, and Shou-chou immediately formed some twenty or thirty bands. Responding like echoes, large bands of at least several hundred Nien formed along the valleys of the Huai and the lower Yellow River. 11 The second result of the early success of the Taiping rebellion was the increased daring of the secret societies, whose leaders and members were mostly Nien at the same time.12 Some such Nien leaders put their » Nien-chün, I, 418. 10 Fang-liieh, 1.17b, 18, 24, 26, and 27; TMKC 3.28. Some of these applications may be nicknames given by local people, such as Yen-wang, which suggests cruelty, and ta-wang, which means "robber chief," according to H. A. Giles' Chinese-English Dictionary. 11 Fang-liieh, 3.3-4; 4.20b and 26b. 12 For instance, the Chang clan in T'ieh-li-ying near Chih-ho formed Nien for many years; at the same time a heretical religion had been spreading among its members. Its leader, Chang Ta-yu, commanded some three or four thousand members in early 1854 to lure a government force into their ambushes. (Fang-liieh, 5.9-10). Hsü Ssu and his two sons used to travel from Shantung to Honan and Anhwei to organize Nien;

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77

political platforms on big flags with the inscriptions "Son of Heaven to Found a New Nation" (Hsing-kuo t'ien-tzu), "To Perform the Proper Way of Government Representing Heaven's Will" (T'i-t'ien hsing-tao), or "King Who Follows Heaven's Will" (Shun-t'ien wang), or "The Great Sage Equal to Heaven" (Ch'i-t'ien ta-sheng). "King of Great Peace" (T'ai-p'ing wang) was claimed by Li Kuang-chao near Po-chou, while four others claimed "Four Great Heavenly Kings" (Ssu-ta t'ien-wang).13 All of these were executed by the imperial government in 1853-54. A more modest and realistic title, "King of the Western Huai Region" CHuai-hsi-wang), was taken by Chang Mao, who for a long time had been forming Nien units at Huai-yiian and Men-ch'eng, and had gradually collected several dozen villages and seven or eight thousand adherents under his command. He had his left Nien chieftain (tso-pien Nien-shou) and right Nien chieftain, and several score bodyguards. He raised a black banner in 1853. He was slightly wounded in an alleged defeat by the imperial forces, and escaped, though a number of his subordinates were killed.14 The third result of the new conditions of the early 1850's was an attempt for united action by incorporating numerous small Nien into a few large units, and also an effort to establish a systematic organization with strong headquarters. At first a famous Nien leader, Li Shih-lin, tried to set up headquarters in Honan at the juncture of Ku-shih, Kuang-chou and Hsin-hsien. His organization had the following dignitaries: The Supreme Chief of the Alliance (Meng-chu), Li Shih-lin The Chief Adviser (Mou-chu), Jen Shun-hsiieh Marshal (Yiian-shuai) of the Eastern Route Army Marshal of the Southern Route Army they had no definite address. Hsu Ssu was versed in boxing, and in handling clubs or long staffs. He was known as "General Hsu." Hsu and thirty-six other leaders were arrested and executed in 1852 (Fang-liieh, 2.9). 13 The Four Great Heavenly Kings (Ssu-ta t'ien-wang) were translated in William E. Soothill's Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms as the four deva kings of the four quarters — guardians in a monastery. They are known as the east deva who keeps his kingdom, the south deva of increase and growth, the west broad-eyed deva, and the north deva who hears much and is well-versed; their names were Vaisravana, Dhritastra, Virudhka, and Virupaksa, respectively. It is doubtful that the Nien or other secret society members, most of whom were uneducated, could have had time and patience to follow such complicated Buddhist tradition. At the same time, it is probable that they might have heard of the four kings of the Taiping kingdom under Hung Hsiu-ch'iian. 14 Lu-chou fu-chih, 22.4b; TMKC-ch. A, 21b, 3.7, 10-11, and Fang-liieh, 18.4. It seems strange that the government sources do not give the complete story of a number of Nien leaders as to whether they were dead, had surrendered, or had simply disappeared.

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Marshal of the Western Route Army Marshal of the Northern Route Army Li Shih-lin hoisted banners and offered sacrifice to his big guns. His force was said to have been more than ten thousand strong. After some engagements with government forces, however, some of Li's followers went to the border of Honan and Hupeh, and Li himself seems to have surrendered to the government or disappeared for the following two years; there is a gap in information concerning him in official sources.15 Meanwhile the Nien in Anhwei also tried hard to build up their headquarters with a united, systematic organization. Fifty-eight bands combined into a single Nien in November 1853, despite the fact that one organizational conference was broken into by imperial troops. Some Nien leaders attempted to imitate the organization of the Taiping rebels by using a large flag inscribed with the characters "General Chin Ssu of the Taiping Kingdom" (Tai-p'ing T'ien-kuo Chin Ssu chiang-chiin) much as Chang Chieh-san was titled King Shun-t'ien of Taiping. The center of operations of these leaders was at I-men-chi in Po-chou, and their forces were routed on April 8, 1854, by Yuan Chia-san, who found imperial ambitions in the rebels' public announcements. Their organization included the following titles: Minister (Ta-tu-tu) of the Board of War (Ping-pu) Grand Guardian (Tai-po) General of the Front Battalion (Ch'ien-ying Chiang-chiin) Chief Commander (Tsung-ping) of the Eastern Route Army Chief Commander of the Southern Route Army Chief Commander of the Western Route Army Chief Commander of the Northern Route Army Chief Commander of the Central Route Army Having learned a lesson from the failure at I-men-chi, Chang Lo-hsing and his comrades tried to establish a better and firmer organization. A strong contingent under Su T'ien-fu went from Anhwei to Honan to fetch provisions, and returned to Yung-ch'eng and Po-chou in December 1854, heavily loaded with booty. The expedition was repeated the next year. Meanwhile Chang Lo-hsing spent most of his time consolidating his headquarters, and most of the villages within forty li became Nien lairs. His Nien reorganization was completed in the fourth month (May 16-June 13) 15

Fang-lueh,

6.15-16, and 19b-20; and YCCL, 6, 3-5.

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of 1855, and the presumptuous titles of "Kings," as well as the flags, were largely the same as those of the Taiping rebels.16 A great Nien alliance was made, consisting of five main bands under the leadership of Chang Lo-hsing, Su T'ien-fu, Kung Te, Wang Kuansan, and Hou Shih-wei, brought together from numerous small units. Chang Lo-hsing was elected Supreme Chief of the Alliance (Meng-chu). A five-color flag was adopted to represent the league. Each of the five band chiefs had his own banner distinguished by color, such as the yellow banner for the Supreme Chief, Chang Lo-hsing, who was concurrently the banner commander; the white banner for Kung Te; the blue banner for Su T'ien-fu; the black banner for Wang Kuan-san; and the red for Hou Shih-wei. There were some twenty thousand men under each banner. There were other ranks such as general (chiang-chun), and other groups such as vanguards (hsien-jeng). 17 In addition to military ranks, there were political titles such as "King of Great Han with Heavenly Mandate" (Ta-Han Ming-ming Wang) for Chang Lo-hsing, and "King of Heaven's Will" (Shun-t'ien Wang) for Su T'ien-fu. 18 An inauguration ceremony probably took place on the Chinese New Year's Day (February 6, 1856), when the supreme chief, Chang Lohsing, conceivably in full dress, was taken by an elaborately decorated sedan chair from his home in Chang-lao-chia to the headquarters at Chih-ho, where he solemnly offered a sacrifice to heaven and earth and announced his principles and organization including the division into banners. 19 It must have been a very serious and dignified matter to the Nien leader, who was striving for united action in avowed opposition to the imperial government. In order to attract followers, public declarations 18

The date of the completion of the Nien reorganization is given in Meng-ch'eng hsien-chih, 6.5. See also YCCL, 6.1-3; Fang-lueh, 5.16; 7.3, 13; 9.10-11, 18, 23, and 10.5, 15-16. YCCL, 6. (Anhwei Nien 2) 5, and Fang-lueh, 12.34. According to the latter source, each banner had approximately twenty to thirty thousand men. Since government reports were not free from exaggeration, the conservative figure, 20,000 for each banner, seems to be closer to truth, but even that is dubious, for in the early part of 1856, the Nien in Anhwei were reported to have approximately 100,000 souls! One may wish to know a little more about these leaders. Chang Lo-hsing and Su T'ien-fu will be discussed later. Hou Shih-wei, a member of Hou-lao-ying-tzu, north of Chih-ho, was obviously a clan leader. Wang Kuan-san, a member of Wang-lou, was killed in action near Chih-ho in August, 1856 (TMKC, 1A.28). Su T'ien-fu was executed by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in in March, 1863 (Nien-chiin, 111.20). 16 YCCL, 6 (Anhwei Nien 2) 7-9. The Ta-Han Kingdom of the Nien was also recorded by Wang Shih-t'o who was then a refugee in Nanking. See Wang Hui-weng I-ping jih-chi, 3.32. 19 WYFTC, 15.11.

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were posted on walls to let the people know what the Nien planned to do. Presumptuous public notices, seals, and stationery were used to show the offices and ranks of the Nien organization. Moreover, many Nien leaders and ordinary members imitated the Taipings in keeping their hair long — a definite sign of rebellion against the Manchu regime. The Manchu emperor was informed on March 7, 1857, by an official at the front: "The Nien chief Chang Lo-hsing and others have kept their hair long." There are frequent reports of a "Longhaired Nien," or a Nien leader's son who kept his hair long. There are also records of long-haired people in walled communities or within a radius of ten li around a Nien center. A government commander declared that those who shaved their foreheads in the areas where imperial troops passed would be considered an obedient subject — otherwise, a rebel or Nien. 20 Judging from their organization and such other facts as the above, it seems safe to say that the Nien attempted to carry on a political revolution against the Manchu government. The elaborate Nien banner system also merits some attention. Unlike the Eight Banner system of the military organization of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Nien had twelve or even more banners. They were divided into the Yellow, Blue, White, Red, and Black Banners, and five more combinations of these colors with borders of different colors, as the Yellow Banner with Red Border, etc. In addition, there was the Eight Diagram Banner (Pa-kua-ch'i) and the Flowery Banner (Hua-ch'i). 21 The five-color flag representing the Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, etc., for the Chinese Republic from 1912 to 1928 is familiar, but it is interesting to note that the Nien also adopted a five-color banner made of five horizontal stripes to represent the five major bands. The order of these colors seems to be yellow, red, black, white and blue, as one can approximately tell from the illustration inserted in this study. In the Yiichiin chi-liieh a reference appears about "planting a five-color banner" 20

T h e memorial to the M a n c h u emperor is in Fang-liieh, 24.11. See also T M K C . 3.7; 4.42-44; 5.14b, 16; 7.8, 15, 16b, 18b, 21b, 31, 34b; 8.17, 25b; 9.21b, 37b, 50; 19.26b; T M K C - correspondence, 2.32b; Nien-chun, 1, 352; Fang-liieh, 41.9b-10, 51.18; 64.1; 68.4b; 239.8b; and passim. There is a question that the long-haired N i e n m a y have pretended to b e Taipings for military prestige as in the case of 1 8 5 4 w h e n the local bandits of Feng-yang, Ying-chou, in A n h w e i , disguised themselves as Taipings to enter the city of Men-ch'eng ( Y C C L , 6 [Anhwei N i e n ] 2). Moreover, the long-haired N i e n m a y actually have been Taipings w h o collaborated with the N i e n . But even the above short list of page references definitely shows that many local N i e n leaders, including their family members and numerous villagers under the N i e n jurisdiction, kept their hair long and refused to shave it as a symbol of changing their allegiance to the imperial government. si W Y F T C , 15.11; Y C C L , 3.10, 9.35b; Fang-liieh, 17.7, 76.13, 208.1b; and A H T C , 103.7.

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but this phrase is usually misunderstood to mean five banners with different colors. Actually the five-color flag was a symbol of the League, while the other banners denoted its units. Professor Charles S. Gardner possesses a rare photographic reproduction containing illustrations and explanations of the campaigns against the Nien. A few of these eighteen beautiful and realistic paintings, each of which is accompanied by a memorial from a field commander describing the battle scene, are reproduced with Dr. Gardner's permission in this monograph. This valuable material may be given the title "P'ing Nien t'u-lu" (Illustrations and reports of the Nien suppression). From this source one can also see what the "flowery banner" looks like. It is a rectangular black flag, with seven or eight round white spots geometrically arranged and with lines linking the spots; it might be described as a flag dotted with dice (see Plate I). One can also see the Eight Diagram flag, which incidentally is the present-day national flag of Korea. In the source material Miao P'ei-lin is said to have used square and triangular flags, which can also be seen in the illustrations.23 A rectangular flag, not mentioned in the source material, consisting of four rectangles or squares, also appears in the illustration. The outside rectangle was white; within it was a black rectangle; inside that was a white rectangle and a center of some light color. These shades can clearly be seen in the illustration. Such banners were symbols not only of the various units, but also of their nature; for example, the most dignified Yellow Banner was headed by Chang Lo-hsing. Jen Chu used the Eight Diagram banner, probably because he was one of the old secret society members.24 Later, when more bandits or other groups joined the Nien their original flag was used or a new one was made. A banner was also a symbol of the influence of the Nien. For example, when Chang Lo-hsing attacked Hsia-ts'ai, he forced each village and town in the northwest of Honan to accept a flag from him. When a (shu-li

22

wu-se

ch'i),22

6 (Anhwei Nien 2), 5b. TMKC, 1937. The White Lotus Society had also five banners which were adopted by Sung Ching-shih. See Ch'en Po-ch'en, Sung Ching-shih li-shih t'iao-ch'a chi, 5-6. 24 Sun K'uei-hsin used a white banner with red border; Wang Huai-i, a red banner with yellow border; Chou Lao-ming, a blue banner with yellow border; Han Lao-wan, a yellow square banner; Chang Hsiao-ming, a black square banner; and Sun Lao-wei, a triangular white banner (Fang-liieh, 157.23b-24). Jen Chu raised the Eight Diagram banner and Lai Wen-kuang, the Flowery Banner (Nien-chiin, 1.138 and TMKC, 18.2b). For more information about the more than fifty names and leaders of banners, see WYFTC, 15.29b-31; YCCL, 6 (Anhwei Nien 2), 8-10; and Chiang Siang-tseh, 25-26. The White Lotus Society also used five color flags; see Ch'en Po-ch'en, op. cit. pp. 59, 79. 23

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village had such a banner hung in some conspicuous spot, it showed that the village belonged to his sphere of influence or was friendly to him; otherwise it was deemed hostile. 25 The banner organization applied in peacetime as well as in war. The Nien were somewhat like Chinese military colonists. That is, when the time came for campaigns, the Nien were fighters; but upon returning from their bi-annual campaigns with booty of grain and other valuables, they lived peacefully as ordinary farmers. Therefore, at least during their first several years, the Nien could not be considered roving bands of robbers, as they are generally thought to have been. They loved their homes and their headquarters. Every time the headquarters was sacked by stronger opponents and the members driven away, they returned to their home area at the first opportunity. The organization of the Nien included three types of units. One was counted by the number of banners, or ch'i, one by yii, forts or walled communities, and one by ku, or bands. The Nien in Honan were reported in 1861 as having more than ten banners, more than one hundred ku, and over a thousand yii.26 Every village counted as a yii (walled community), and some of these were very large. On one occasion fiftyeight ku were combined into one nien.27 On another occasion more than forty ku were summoned from Honan to Anhwei. 28 A local gazetteer preserves some material on the organization of the Nien which deserves to be quoted in full. In 1867, Jen Chu, Lai Wen-kuang, and others again led a multitude of more than 200,000 in a flight eastward. Their troops were divided into banners of five colors. Sometimes one banner went ahead and another remained a little behind. There were altogether twelve great banner units [as listed above]. Each great banner had fifty small banners; each small banner commanded five hundred soldiers, and these five hundred were further divided into ten kuan, or camps. Each kuan consisted of about fifty persons, but the number was very flexible. 29

This is perhaps the most detailed description of the organization of the Nien from the meager sources now available. It appears that the banners were flexible campaign organizations, formed from detachments sent by the various yii. The yii were local defense units, not campaign units. The ku were quite large (occasionally having 2,000 or 3,000 horses), and usually larger than the yii, for every »

20 27 28 28

AHTC, 103.8. Hsin-yang hsien-chih, 18.14b; and Fang-liieh, 127.16b. Fang-liieh, 4.17b. AHTC, 103.8b. Lai-yang hsien-chih, the last chapter, p. 67.

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village counted as a yii and, since the average village was not large, most of these units could not have been big groups. Normally, however, several yii formed one ku or band. Large guerrilla units were frequently referred to as columns, which varied greatly in size and organization. The structure of the Nien was not, on the whole, very rigid, and it may have undergone changes to suit the needs of different times and circumstances. The Nien held conferences to determine their military policies. The leaders of the Nien, protected by more than three hundred of their bodyguards, held such a conference in 1853 in a mansion not far from Chih-ho.30 Before embarking on any military campaign, they also had to hold a preparatory conference, called "Chuang-ch'i", to discuss the formation of the banners, including the number of men, horses, and weapons to be supplied by each unit. On such occasions they had a dramatic performance, probably partly to entertain the participants and to enhance their morale by stories of heroes, and partly for religious rituals to entreat the gods to bring the Nien better luck. Then the representatives of each yii, or walled community, and the other leaders conferred and decided how many persons and horses each yii should contribute, and when and where they should gather to start the campaign. These preparations usually took more than ten days, and spots were chosen in each province for the concentration of the expeditionary force.31 When a campaign had been prepared, the troops were split up among the different banners; they were then sometimes organized into three to five columns to attack the enemy simultaneously from many different directions. Each column was further divided into many ku or bands. This type of formation was a great threat to the government forces. If they split up to stem the advance of all the columns, the government forces would be spread too thinly; yet if they concentrated on defending one route, the enemy could deal them a heavy blow from the other directions.82 In peacetime the chief of each ku maintained only two or three thousand men and horses. Other members living within the walled communities did their normal farm work. Not only were there no conferences of any kind, but even the leader and other small chiefs within each ku were scattered.33 The rebels did not set up permanent camps after a successful campaign, but continued to live as before.34 Thus, like most 30 31 32 33 34

Fang-lueh, 4.22b. Hsin-yang hsien-chih, 14.19. Fang-lueh, 127.17, 19. Ibid., 127.19. Nien-chun, 111.16.

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guerrilla fighters, the Nien were usually not concentrated when there was no combat. The Nien had symbols, seals, and secret terms. Their chiefs appear to have worn brown or red jackets, as the government generals reported having arrested or killed brown or red-clothed bandit chiefs on many occasions. Their soldiers seemed to have had uniforms and to have covered their heads with red or yellow turbans; these can be seen in the illustrations inserted in this monograph. It was very doubtful, however, if all of the Nien had uniforms.35 Documents of 1847 mention that the Nien were distinguished by a secret symbol: they plaited a small queue at the side of the main queue and tied it with a red ribbon. By coincidence, this was reported by two different witnesses.36 The duration and significance of this symbol cannot be ascertained. The Nien also had seals indicating various authorities. One was inscribed with the characters Kuan-ping wan-hu-fu, meaning "Commander of the troops of ten thousand families"; other seals were inscribed with such tides as "heavenly general" (T'ien-chiang) and "commanders of battalions." Most of the seals were cast in bronze, suggesting constant and permanent use. Embroidered yellow dragon robes and yellow sedan chair curtains were also captured.37 The Nien used some secrets terms to keep information from their enemies. For example, an expedition to seize food from a distant area was called "Ta-shao," meaning roughly, "bringing something back"; the extortion of money from the people of a certain village was called "Mowan", or "grinding the village." The preparations for an "expedition" after the harvest were called "Chuang-ch'i" — "decorating or strengthening the banners." The cavalry vanguards that went ahead of the other forces and burned down houses were called "Pien-ma," meaning "frontier horses" or "frontier horsemen." 38 The Nien sometimes adopted a traditional ceremony to become bloodbrothers by pricking their fingers to allow a little drop of blood to mingle with a cup of wine, drinking it, and swearing to the gods to fight to the end. In 1853, Yuan Chia-san memorialized that the Nien leader Teng Ta-wang has fled back to Chih-ho. He had been defeated by government soldiers and he summoned the heads of various bands, including Teng T'ien-erh and more 35

STCHCL, 14.17; TMKC, 2.32 and 40b; 3.7, 10-11; 9.21b, 37b. One by Li Mei, CSL-TK, 447.13; and the other by Wang Tung-huai, Nien-chun, I, 327. Nien-chun, 1.37; and YCCL, 15.12. 38 Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 11.1; and WYFTC, 15.12, 19. 36

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than thirty others, to come to a hamlet... where they pricked their fingers for blood and took an oath each to collect one hundred men to fight to the death against government troops.39

This was a common practice of secret society members, and the ceremony was frequently used to bolster the morale of the rebels. On the eve of a war or a revenge expedition they usually drank wine with a little blood from the tips of their fingers, and swore to heaven that they would have identical minds and would fight to the end. They would neither surrender nor reveal any secret to their enemies.40 This psychological preparation and spiritual discipline was secondary only to the offering of sacrifices to their banners and guns — a solemn and rare ceremony to usher in a militant effort and to arouse fighting spirit among their soldiers. Was there any other important discipline within the Nien ranks? The Nien seemd to be governed largely by their conferences. In January 1859, Yuan Chia-san reported that all the Nien chiefs had decided in a conference that for the time being no more permission was to be given to repair the forts, and each yii must contribute men and horses to strengthen the banner units for plundering expeditions in the first month of the year.41 Apparently a strong order from such a conference had to be obeyed. If not, punishment followed, as in the case of Liu Kou, a chief commander of the Southern Route Army who was left to guard the provisions and treasuries housed at I-men. As soon as he heard that his comrades had been defeated at the front, he hastily took all the money and valuables and fled. Upon returning to I-men and discovering what Liu Kou had done, his colleagues immediately chased him, and he was killed during a very bloody fight.42 Another instance of discipline concerned foraging for food. The Nien chiefs had the privilege of eating first, and sometimes their followers had no chance to eat before the imperial troops appeared in pursuit. But if a hungry follower showed any sign of complaint, he was immediately executed, and his head exposed as a warning to other starving members.43 This type of punishment may have been used only under extreme circumstances, when the Nien were having bad luck; nonetheless, such was their discipline. In normal times the family or clan basis of their organization and the established division of the booty (half for chiefs and half for the others) may have taken care of many disciplinary problems. This family loyalty 39 40 41 42 43

Fang-lueh, 4.21b. TMKC, 2.39; 4.37; 8.10b; and 11.33. STCHCL, 2.14. Fang-lueh, 5.16b. Nien-chun, 1.418.

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provided the Nien with an esprit de corps to make up for the shortcomings of their loose organization. It was largely the family and community bond that held the Nien together. Disagreements and non-cooperation also existed among Nien leaders. Sun K'uei-hsin, who tried to forbid his men to slaughter people and burn houses, was at odds with Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te. So dismayed was Sun that he went home to Po-chou and attempted to set up an independent banner in the fall of 1858. The supreme chief (meng-chu), Li Shih-lin, who attempted to establish headquarters in Honan, seemed to have little cooperation with Chang Lo-hsing, who had the same plan in Anhwei. Also, Li Chao-shou, a Nien chief of Ku-shih, Honan, who later shaved his long hair and surrendered to the imperial government, seems on occasion to have taken independent action.44 It is conceivable that the Nien lacked close cooperation in the early years because they did not have a commander-in-chief; they were united only by exigencies or expediencies, and they scattered in ordinary times. Clinging to their home base, one Nien unit had little regard for another. Sometimes they even fought against one another, fleeing when the imperial troops came. Since the imperial troops could not stay long in the countryside, the Nien could hurry back, following in the footsteps of the withdrawing troops.45 Therefore, on the basis of presently available material, one may conclude that although the Nien did have an organization, it was not very solid or systematic. Nor was the Nien army a professional one, being composed mainly of peasants commanded by the big clan leaders in their respective communities. 3. The Sources of Influence over the Nien Organization Was the Nien party a secret society from beginning to end and its organization also of that type? Or was it later mixed with other elements and did it receive influence from other sources? The Nien titles and banners seem to have derived from two main sources: secret societies and the Taiping Rebellion. The information concerning secret societies was gathered largely from 44

TMKC, 8.50, and Nien-chun, V.198. The relation between Li Shih-lin and Li Chao-shou deserves further examination from local gazetteers and family genealogies. Both were natives of Ku-shih, Honan. It would make good sense in the Nien history to say that the two Li were closely related or the same person, but I dare not say this for lack of support from source material. 45 Ko Shih-chUn, Ching-shih wen hsu-pien, 71.4; STCHCL, 11.13; 13.10; Nien-chun, 111.64; IV.50; V.79; VI.195-196.

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popular novels which were read or heard about by Nien members. The terms "Shun-t'ien wang," "Chin-kang," and "T'i-t'ien hsing-tao" were obviously derived from All Men are Brothers (Shui-hu-chuan).M "Ch'it'ien ta-sheng," translated by H. A. Giles as "the holy one equal to God," referring to Sun Wu-k'ung, comes from the Feng-shen yen-i. The practice of sworn brotherhood has been dramatically described in the Romances of the Three Kingdoms (San-kuo-chih yen-i). The Eight Diagram flag and the practice of sworn brotherhood — the drinking of wine tinctured by a little blood — and the offering of sacrifices to guns and flags, all used by the Nien, are also traits of secret societies. At the same time, the Nien must have been influenced somewhat by the Taipings. It was well known that under the Heavenly King (T'ienwang) the Taipings had four other kings or princes: the East, South, West, and North. Similarly, in the two attempted Nien alliances, there were eastern, southern, western, and northern route armies under the supreme chief of the alliance (Meng-chu). This alleged imitation sounds a little far-fetched and it may be inaccurate or unreliable. Eye-witness reports from imperial officials, however, asserted that the Nien were imitating the Taipings in their imperial ambitions. For instance, the Honan educational commissioner, Chang Chih-wan, said that "The Nien chief, Su T'ien-fu, and others . . . wrapped their heads with red turbans, adopted presumptuous titles of kings and symbols of flags which have been approximately the same as the Kwangtung rebels [the Taipings]." Yuan Chia-san reported (March 5, 1854) that the flags and uniforms of the Nien in Feng-yang and Ying-chou, Anhwei, were largely imitations in color and style of the Taipings' flags and uniforms; obviously these local bandits pretended to be the Kwangtung rebels.47 He added that one Nien chief put the characters on his flag, "General Chin Ssu of the Taiping Kingdom." Why did the Nien like to do such things? It was probably because the Taipings had greater power and prestige than did the Nien organization; the latter tried to copy the Taipings' appearance in order to overcome their timid governmental opponents. Another motive for imitation may have stemmed from the good reputation and propaganda of the Taiping northern expedition, which inspired numerous rebels and affected the reshaping of the Nien organization from small to larger units, " The term "chin-kang" is mentioned in Fang-liieli, 1.18. See Lo Erh-kang, "Shuihu-chuan yu T'ien-t'i hui," T'ien-t'i-luii wen-hsien lu, pp. 78-82.

"

Fang-liieh, 4.17b; 5.13; 7.3; and TMKC, 3.49.

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from individual to relatively coordinated actions, from local to interprovincial campaigns against the imperial government, and from brigandage to open rebellion.48 The Taipings were anxious to get to Peking, so they did not spend too much time in Honan indoctrinating and reorganizing the Nien. Consequently it sometimes looked as though the Nien imitation of the Taiping organization was superficial and inexact. If such was the case, it is probable that the term "t'ien wang" or "the four great t'ien wang" was a crude imitation of the four wang under the Heavenly King, Hung Hsiu-ch'iian. The fact that one Nien chief called himself "eight thousand sui," or years,49 may have been a humble confession of a junior position in the revolutionary movement, because the Taiping Heavenly Emperor claimed ten thousand sui, the Eastern king, nine thousand sui, and the Nien leader, only eight thousand. No matter how superficial the Nien imitation of the Taipings may have been, the simple fact remains that the long hair, and the title, ssu-ma, were definitely copied from the Taipings.50 The designation, "King following the will of heaven of the Taiping kingdom" (Tai-p'ing shun-t'ien wang), is certainly a crude combination of a secret society appellation and the Taiping, and it may suffice to show the existence of Taiping influence on the Nien. Moreover, the Taipings conferred titles of "prince" on Nien leaders in 1860 or 1861. Chang Tsung-yii was made Prince of Liang; Jen Chu, Prince of Lu; Li Yung, Prince of Wei, etc.51 Several Taiping leaders, notably Lai Wen-kuang, Ch'iu Yuan-ts'ai, and Fan Ju-tseng, joined the Nien after the fall of their celestial capital at Nanking, and they played a significant role in the Nien movement.

48

Nien-chiin, 11.97, and Hsieh Hsing-yao, "A History of the Taiping Northern Expedition Force," in the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ts'ung-shu shih-san chung, ts'e 1, 13-20. 48 YCCL, 6 (Anhwei Nien 2), 9. 50 The term ssu-ma is mentioned in YCCL, 6 (Anhwei Nien), 7, and in the following page there are two names who served as the "left ssu-ma" and another two persons who served as "right ssu-ma." The origin of ssu-ma comes from the Chou-li, one of the thirteen Confucian classics. The Taipings used the term "ssu-ma" or "vexillary" (as translated by W. H. Medhurst). T o my understanding, the function of the Hang ssu-ma in the Taiping army was actually as a quasi-pastor, teacher, and judge (see T'ai-p'ing chun-mu, pp. 10-11 and passim-, and Teng Ssu-yii, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, 83). Of course, the Nien imitator did not bother to learn the term thoroughly. 51 For a longer list of names upon whom the Taiping conferred the title wang or prince, see Kuo T'ing-i, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, II, appendix p. 121; and Lo Erh-kang, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-kao, 59-60. Kuo T'ing-i assigned the date of bestowing the title to approximately 1860, and Lo, 1861.

THE SOURCES OF INFLUENCE OVER THE NIEN ORGANIZATION

89

These various facts demonstrate substantial Taiping influence over the Nien rebels. As for the origin of the Nien banner system, it is difficult to trace. In the early nineteenth century the small local Nien units seldom used a banner in robbing people, except for a few occasions in the years 1832, 1847, 1851, and 1853, when flags were carried.52 Thereafter the Nien worked out a variegated banner system, probably during the years 18531856 when they had heard about, or had more contacts with, the Taipings, and their small units were incorporated into large bands. A comparison of Nien banners, as shown in the "P'ing-nien t'u-lu" and reproduced in the ¡lustrations in this work, with those of secret societies reveals that they are not the same. Most flags of secret societies are decorated with charms or spells; no such symbols can be deciphered from Nien banners. Although the Eight Diagram flag of the Heaven and Earth Society was unmistakably a secret society banner it was different from that of the Nien in design.53 Nor were Nien's banners similar to those of the Manchu, for they must have been different from those of their enemies in order to avoid confusion on the battlefields. Yet the Nien also had dragon banners to show their imperial ambition. It is then to be inferred that the Nien banners must also have been influenced by the Taipings, and this influence can be supported by facts. In the Taiping military organization, their banners are described as being divided into five colors (ch'i fen wu-se); the same phrase was used for Nien's flags. The military significance of the five-color flags is delineated below, based on the Taiping source book, General and Essential Guides for Military Movements (Hsing-chun tsung yao). In the defense of cities and barracks it was necessary to set up big five-color banners at the cardinal points in order to show the direction of the enemy. The east was represented by a great blue banner; the west, white; the south, red; the north, black; and the central, yellow. With each of these banners were five small banners in different colors. The central one had five large banners in five colors with small triangular banners in different colors. The four cardinal points were under the direction of the central banner. If the enemy came from the east, the big blue banner of the east was waved and the watch tower conveyed the alarm to the central post; the latter quickly hoisted the great blue banner for the west, south, and north to see, and this action was interpreted as "

C S L - T K , 39.18-19; 449.24-25; C S L - H F , 40.19, and Fang-lueh, 1.17b; 3.29. C o m p a r e the flags in the Thian Ti Hwui, by Gustave Schlegel, and Pang Wei-ta fa-shih. 53

by

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THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

an order to get ready for the onslaught. If soldiers in the west had to be rushed to succor the east, a small triangular white flag would be hoisted on the big blue banner, and the officers and soldiers would hurry to the east to meet the enemy. If the soldiers of the south had to be summoned, a small red flag was added to the top of the big blue banner and then the officers of the south immediately commanded their soldiers to join the battle in the east. If the soldiers of the central force were needed, then the big blue banner was supplemented by a small yellow flag in the east. If enemies came from both east and south, the blue and red banners were raised, and the central post also raised the two banners to notify the troops in other posts.54 Thus the five-color flags had the function of signal calls. In a time when there were neither telephones nor radios, these signal calls were certainly clever and useful. The officials of the Ch'ing dynasty praised the Taiping military organization as being highly efficient, and it was practical and logical for the Nien to pattern their central organization after the Taipings whom they had heard of or seen. Moreover the Nien actually used their banners for military commands, as shown in the section on their military tactics. In addition to these main sources of Nien's military organization and banner system, the imperial dynasty to a small extent supplied the Nien with tsung-ping and chiang chiin for military titles, the dragon symbol and the yellow banners for royal dignity, and the Grand Guardian (Taipad) and the War Ministry (Ping-pu) for high government positions. Common folklore gave the Nien such general terms as Hsien-feng (vanguards) and Chun shih (military adviser or chief of staff), which were also used by the Taipings.55 Some of the banners, like the narcissus banner, may have been invented by the Nien themselves to accommodate different units. Thus the sources of influence on the organization and banner system may be said to have been four: the secret societies, the Taiping rebellion, the imperial government, and the Nien's own creative efforts. 4. Sources of Supply From the beginning the Nien army paid careful attention to food supply. 54

T h e phrase "ch'i fen wu-se" is in T'ai-p'ing chun-mu, p. 2; the résumé is m a d e f r o m Hsing-chiin tsung-yao, 9-10; both are in Hsiao I-shan's photolithographic edition of T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ts'ung-shu. 55 F o r hsien-feng, see Hsing-chiin tsung-yao, 2.7b; f o r chun-shih, see Ying-chieh kuei-chen, 1,5.6, and passim.

SOURCES OF SUPPLY

91

As previously stated, farm work in the Nien domain was continued as much as possible. At the same time extra provisions were secured by various methods. Under favorable conditions food was purchased by Nien leaders, as during July 1853, when the Nien of Ying-chou, Anhwei, sent agencies to buy food from Chou-chia-k'ou, Honan, a center of trade.56 On many occasions the people supplied the Nien with rations. According to government sources, the people of the walled villages were afraid of bandits and some of these villagers secretly contributed money and food to the Nien. When imperial troops passed through a district, the walled communities refused to open their gates, and even the magistrates could not compel them to do so. But when bandits went by the same locality, the walled communities gave grain which they had saved, in hope that their generosity would be appreciated and their villages would not be raided or burned. Some walled communities not only closed their gates to the imperial soldiers, but even opened fire on them. Sometimes the Nien subdued a walled community in order to empty its store of food. There were occasions when the imperial officers and soldiers could not buy anything to eat, while the Nien were fairly adequately furnished with food, which was efficiently transported from one spot to another.57 Were the villagers really forced to contribute to the Nien, or did they do so more or less voluntarily? If the Nien used compulsion, the imperial troops should not have been hungry, since they would not have avoided the use of force to obtain food if the people failed to feed them. Nonetheless the government officers frequently complained of shortages or of the impossibility of securing rations. Their predicament suggests that the people supplied the Nien with provisions voluntarily, but were reluctant to present the same commodity to the government forces. In other words, the Nien were more popular among the people than were their opponents. Under difficult circumstances the Nien rebels did not hesitate to harvest grain like wheat in peasant fields. After the grain was cut and taken away by the hundreds of rebels, the hungry people were compelled to join them. As a counter strategy, the government sometimes burned the wheat. Such a measure, perhaps, only gave the people a bad impression, and meanwhile the Nien could still go elsewhere to gather a harvest. When they went to Hupeh, more than twenty thousand people were said to have been pressed to carry rice, fuel and cooking utensils for them. Between Feng-yang and Ting-yuan, Chang Lo-hsing ordered his numerous 57

YCCL, 6.1. Nien-chun, III.lll; V.320; VI.168, and 221.

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THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

followers, in 1860, to transport food and fuel day and night, like a column of ants. This practice worried Tseng Kuo-fan, who said that wherever the rebels went, they captured men and food; once scattered, they quickly regrouped elsewhere, and their numerical strength was not diminished; they were the most stubborn enemy for him to deal with. Moreover the Nien even salted beef and ham for future use.58 A piece of great luck for the Nien was to intercept a transport of government grain, and they never missed a chance to do this. On the other side, the imperial force also relished seizing the Nien's provisions, as occurred one night in 1860 when more than 130 piculs of rice were captured.59 The weapons and ammunition of the Nien were obtained by purchase, manufacturing, intercepting government supplies, and picking up the government's discarded equipment. For example, as soon as Hsu Kuangchin met the rebels he fled with his soldiers for more than thirty li, and all their weapons and ammunition fell into the possession of their foes.90 In addition some powder was manufactured locally, for saltpeter and sulphur were available in Honan. Such means of supply could not have amounted to much, but they sufficed for the Nien's method of hit-andskip fighting. The hit-and-run tactics used by the Nien in the North China plain naturally required horses. As early as 1853 they were reported to have had more than one thousand such animals, and a Nien leader, Chang Mou, used more than a hundred cavalry men as his vanguards. Five years later their cavalry became very active.61 High prices were offered by Nien leaders for horses in 1860, and they secured the cooperation of army officers and militia heads to allow the horse traders to deliver their animals safely from a long distance through government lines. Consequently the number of Nien horses reached twenty thousand, which was three or four times the size of the government mounted force. The government force, however, was better drilled than the rebels. The cream of the imperial cavalry was under the command of the Mongol general, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. Unfortunately for the Manchu emperor, more than five thousand steeds were captured by the Nien rebels who killed the Mongol general in a great battle in 1865. In the following 6

" TMKC, 7.24; 8.18, 46b; 11.28; Nien-chun, 111.91, 235; V.239, 300; VI.26; and STCHCL, 19.6. 54 Fang-lueh, 173.25; and TMKC, 7.24, and 11.29. oo Fang-lueh, 2.4-5, and 7.2. Bl Nien-chun, 1.1; and TMKC, 9.18.

SOURCES OF SUPPLY

93

year, another eight to nine thousand cavalry, as well as a small infantry force, fell into the rebels' hands after a victory over the Manchu army at Pa-ch'iao, Shensi.82 Meanwhile the Nien procured horses wherever they looted. They forced their captives to give horses instead of money for ransom. They also took mules, donkeys, and camels. Because of a steady supply of horses from these various sources, the Nien handled their animals more roughly than the government, for they did not care whether the animals were overworked, sick, or dead. Consequently the government commanders admitted that the Nien could cover distance faster than their own soldiers.83 5. The Nien Leadership Success or failure of a rebellion is largely determined by its leadership. A special study of the Nien rebellion would be incomplete without an examination of its leaders. Unfortunately, the Nien had numerous chiefs, but no single commander-in-chief to lead the movement from beginning to end. Generally speaking, they had four main leaders, whose backgrounds will be briefly traced. In addition to these, two colorful characters, Miao P'ei-lin and Li Chao-shou, who occupied numerous pages in Nien sources, should have their dramatic actions presented here. The first of the four main leaders was Chang Lo-hsing, who was born in a village near Chih-ho in the present Wo-yang, Anhwei.84 He was the youngest of three sons; the eldest died young, and the second was Chang Min-hsing. The family owned several hundred Chinese acres of fertile land, which was, of course, considered a great estate in China. Yet all the members of the family, including Chang Lo-hsing's son and his nephews, became Nien.85 81

TMKC, 13.4 and correspondence 1.25; and Fang-lueh, 274.20-21. Hsiang-ch'eng hsien-chih, 31.15-16; and Nien-chiin, VI, 93, 153. 1,4 The original characters of the name of Chang Lo-hsing mean "fond of deeds or actions." When he became a Nien, his name was variously written in official documents in a derogatory sense as "falling to punishment," "fond of punishment." — Legends revolve around most Chinese rebel chiefs and Chang is no exception. It is said that in his family, there was a snake spirit which frequently came out to eat pullets. One day when a great storm darkened the sky, a thunderbolt struck a willow tree in front of his house, killing a huge snake. Chang Lo-hsing was born at that very moment and the room was filled with a sulphuric smell. His mother considered that a good omen and gave him a "milk-name," Hsiang-erh, meaning "the fragrant child" or "child with the smell." 65 Such as Chang Lo-hsing, his brother Chang Min-hsing, his son Chang Hsi, his nephews Chang Tsung-tao, Tsung-hsien, Wu-hai, and Tsung-yu, and the last-named son K'uei-erh, and nephew, Cheng-chiang, etc. See WYFTC, 15.8, 29b-30. 83

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THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Chang Lo-hsing grew up quarrelsome and hotheaded. He made many friends among absconders and adventurers. The property of his family gradually diminished, and he engaged in salt smuggling, but the weak government failed to arrest him. In cooperation with Kung Te and others, Chang Lo-hsing surrounded the city of Yung-ch'eng in 1852, and freed eighteen prisoners, one of whom was Chang's cousin. Chang was made Nien chief in the winter. When the Taipings advanced to Anhwei, Chang Lo-hsing gathered several thousand men and proceeded to plunder the area between the Wo and Fei Rivers. He was elected supreme chief of Nien in August, 1853, by Feng Ch'ui-shou and others, and they offered a sacrifice to a flag. Then the Anhwei militia commissioner, Chou T'ien-chiieh, was persuaded by a prefect to send his son to invite Chang and others to serve the government. Thus Chang Lo-hsing was employed by the government as chief of several hundred men to garrison Chih-ho. But he remained disobedient and continued his vicious life. It is said that Chang once saw a beautifully decorated sedan chair carrying a girl to her wedding; he kidnapped the bride and took her to his camp. The truth of this story is very dubious; at most it may serve to indicate that Chang Lo-hsing was an unprincipled person. When the militia at Chih-ho was disbanded for lack of funds, Chang resumed his banditry in the late summer of 1853.66 He again entered the government service in the winter of the same year in the city of Meng-ch'eng although he and his colleague, Liu Hung-li, were by then so notorious that the people of the city were afraid of them. After a few months the two leaders fomented an uprising with the purpose of seizing the city government. In this attempt, Liu was arrested and beheaded. Closely pursued by government soldiers, Chang fled toward Chih-ho, finally escaping by swimming across a river. The Nien bribed the magistrate of Mengch'eng in the autumn of 1854 to employ many of them as government runners and soldiers. In May or June, 1855, Chang Lo-hsing gathered such rascals in the neighboring districts as Blind Kung (Kung Te), Wolf Han (Han Lang-tzu), Su T'ien-fu, and Hou Shih-wei with five banners to start an insurrection. They attacked Meng-ch'eng in August and eventually occupied the city for a few days and looted it.67 Chang Lo-hsing must have been an astute and able organizer, for others like Li Shih-lin failed in making an alliance, and still others were killed by imperial forces. Chang ran here and there, avoided major war 66

Chang Jui-ch'ih, Liang-huai k'an-luan-chi, p. 1, Nien-chiin, III, 18.22; and WYFTC, 15.8b-9. 67 Meng-ch'eng hsien-chih shu, 6.4-5.

THE NIEN LEADERSHIP

95

with the government, and eventually formed the Nien into a general league. Chang Lo-hsing affiliated himself with the Taipings, who conferred on him the title of Wo-wang, or Prince of Wo-yang, in 1861. A great flood in 1856 left the people in the Huai River valley so destitute that some of them were said to have turned to cannibalism. Chang Lo-hsing took advantage of this dire situation to recruit the hunger-stricken souls; it was said that several thousand joined him within ten days. Then he proclaimed himself "King of the Great Han with Heavenly Mandate," a title close to that of emperor. He then suggested a racial movement against the alien Manchu for the restoration of the "Han" Chinese. Chang Lo-hsing was illiterate, and the idea of his becoming a king was initiated by a few educated men. Chang went to Chih-ho by sedan chair; there he worshipped the God of Heaven and Earth, proclaimed some regulations, and organized his followers into banner units, as has already been described. The chiefs of all the banners were under Chang's control."8 They planned to cooperate with the Taipings and embark on large scale activities the following spring. The main force of the Nien crossed the Huai River in 1857 and ransacked many cities and towns. Chang Lo-hsing was said by imperial officials to have been strong in compelling the masses to follow him to increase his forces. He usually traveled by sedan chair, wearing costumes embroidered with gilded dragons and phoenixes, while two persons carried an incense-burner filled with fragrant sandalwood in front of the procession, possibly to show Chang's dignity as well as to drive away evil spirits. All military affairs were assigned to the care of Kung Te who was described as blind from birth and was nicknamed "Blind Kung," though the Nien called him Mr. Kung.69 Kung may have had eye trouble, but he could have been blind, for he often took personal command of fighting. The combined force of the Taipings under Ch'en Yli-ch'eng and the Nien under Chang Lo-hsing took Feng-yang, Ting-yiian, and many other cities in Anhwei and Kiangsu in 1858. In the following year this combined force was considerably curbed by an imperial commissioner, Yiian Chiasan, but by the next year Chang was overrunning Honan and his force was augmented by an alliance with Miao P'ei-lin, a former head of the militia who had turned bandit. Miao P'ei-lin again went over to the es WYFTC, 15.11. Some of the instructions of the Taiping general, Li Hsiu-ch'eng, to Chang Lo-hsing are collected in the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kito wen-shu. n Meng-ch'eng hsien-chih shu, 6.5-6.

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THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

government in 1862 and attacked Chang Lo-hsing, who was forced to withdraw to Chih-ho. Kung Te, his military advisor, had already died on the battlefield, and Seng-ko-lin-ch'in led such a strong assault on the main headquarters of the Nien that Chang Lo-hsing would have fled but for the encouragement of his wife. He rallied the heads of the banners to engage Seng-ko-lin-ch'in in a great and bloody battle. Chang was so badly defeated that only he and one son managed to escape to Su-chou where they sought refuge with the family of a friend, Li Chia-ying. Li treated them to a good banquet, at the same time reporting them to the prefect who arrested them. At the trial Seng-ko-lin-ch'in asked Chang why he had rebelled against the government. Chang replied: "I am not fond of rebellion but the government forced me to it." 70 Chang Lo-hsing, his wife, and his son and daughter were executed in March, 1863. His nephew, or to be exact, second cousin, Chang Tsung-yii, who was nicknamed "Small King of Hell" to indicate his prowess and cruelty, was elected by Nien chiefs at Po-chou to succeed him as the Nien commanderin-chief. The second great Nien leader was Chang Tsung-yii. The meaning of this name was, literally, "a follower of the famous General Chang Yii of the Han dynasty," but it was purposely written in government documents by homonyms to mean "The Head of Big Fools." Both Chang Lo-hsing and Chang Tsung-yii were opium addicts.71 Unable to read and write, Tsung-yii was nevertheless regarded as one of the ablest warriors of the Nien, and even such generals as Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang were afraid of him. Li Hung-chang considered Chang Tsung-yii to be as wise as Liu Pang, the founder of the Han dynasty.72 Under Chang's leadership, the Nien were active in several provinces from 1863 to 1868. He led the western Nien to Shensi, Hopei, and Shantung, and was usually in the thick of the fighting.73 On one occasion in 1858 he captured the headquarters of the governor-general of the river conservation at Ch'ingchiang-p'u, and took so much valuable booty home to Chih-ho that several merchants made big fortunes from selling it.74 Yet this was just one of the many victories won by this courageous fighter. Chang Tsung-yii went to Shensi in 1867 to make an alliance with the Mohammedan insurgents. Their combined force was so strong that a 70

Chang Jui-ch'ih, op. cit., 3b, Ch'ueh-shan hsien-chih, 20.8, and Nien-chiin, VI, 145. Ch'ing-pei lei-ch'ao, 7.166; Nien-chiin, VI, 97 and 100. 72 Fang-liieh, 305.13; Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'iieh . . . , 11.19b; and Lo Erh-kang, Nien-chiin ti yiin-tung chan, 18. 73 HCPNC, 10.3. 74 WYFTC, 15.14. 71

THE NIEN LEADERSHIP

97

general of the Hunan army, Liu Sung-shan, was killed in battle against them. In the following year Chang Tsung-yii led his force from the province of Shansi along the Tai-hang mountain range to the province of Hopei, threatening even the safety of Peking.75 He reached the Marco Polo Bridge, and then was driven to the vicinity of Tientsin and thence to Shantung. During the continued fighting, most of his followers, except his relatives, were killed or arrested by the government forces. Chang Tsung-yii himself was wounded on July 26, and he probably drowned himself in the T'u-hsieh River on August 16, 1868. His death brought the Nien movement to an end.76 The third great Nien leader was Jen Chu, or Jen Hua-pang. Born into a very rich family of Po-chou, he was reckless and uncontrollable during his boyhood. He liked to associate with the Nien chiefs, despite his father's repeated warnings and commands to the contrary. When his father called the family leaders to whip him, he cried: "My body was given me by my father, who can control it, but my nature was given me by heaven; how can you control that?" At an early age he left home, and followed the Nien until his death.77 Jen Chu defeated the cavalry recruited from Manchuria and Mongolia. He also dealt a severe blow to the famous Hunan and Anhwei troops under Pao Ch'ao and Liu Ming-ch'uan, and was generally reputed to be the most valiant soldier of the Nien army. He was considered an even fiercer and better fighter than Chang Tsung-yii. Jen Chu was accounted a marvellous performer in battle but no strategist, so he had to rely on others to plan the campaigns. He later allied himself with the Taipings, who conferred on him the title of Lu-wang, or Prince of Shantung. He fought beside the Taiping general, Lai Wenkuang, who laid the plans for one victory after another. Jen was finally killed on a battlefield on November 19, 1867, by a subordinate who had gone over to the imperialist side.78 The fourth great Nien leader, Lai Wen-kuang, a native of Kwangsi, joined the Taiping Rebellion in 1850. He was an educated man, brave, persistent, and full of wisdom. At first he undertook only civilian duties, but after the internal dissensions of 1856 he began to do military duties under Ch'en Yii-ch'eng. After the fall of Anking in 1861, Lai Wen-kuang suggested to Ch'en Yii-ch'eng that they make an alliance with the Nien 75

Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 13.22b; Fang-lueh, 299.1. Li Wen-chung kung tsou-su, 14.19; YCCL, 9.16b-20; Fang-lueh, 300.28b-29, 318. 76-9. See also chap. V, note 72. 77 Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 13.17b. 78 Wang Ting-an, ibid., 11.19b, and Hsiang-chiin chi, 16.24. 78

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in the north in order to be able to engage in mobile as well as pitched warfare. Instead, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng withdrew his strong army to the city of Lu-chou, and ordered Lai Wen-kuang and Ch'en Te-ts'ai to conduct an expedition to the northwest to recruit more soldiers and horses. Lai Wen-kuang obeyed the order reluctantly and left Lu-chou near the end of the year. Crossing the Huai River, he said with a sigh: "I know I will never return here." In spite of his gloomy outlook, he encouraged his men to fight their way to the north.78 After many battles the expedition reached the city of Han-chung, Shensi. In the spring of 1864, Lai Wenkuang was summoned to the rescue of the Celestial Capital, Nanking. He was closely pursued by government forces, and the city fell before he could reach it. This obliged him to merge his force with the Nien. This was a much-needed and very welcome addition to the Nien who had been routed from their headquarters in Chih-ho, Meng-ch'eng, and Po-chou in 1863, and had suffered other severe setbacks at the hands of the Mongol general, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. The Nien were now not only numerically reinforced but also supplied with educated and experienced leaders like Lai Wen-kuang. Lai tried to help the Nien by introducing a solid organization and political ideas patterned after those of the Taipings. He further introduced to the Nien the military methods of the Taipings. It was also Lai who relied on the guerrilla tactics of using cavalry to wear out the imperialist troops. The reorganization was so effective that the government military commanders immediately sensed the difference. The governor of Shantung, Yen Ching-ming, reported: "The Taiping and Nien chiefs are mostly hard fighters. They are brave, fierce, and skilled in tactics . . . and entirely different from the earlier Nien who were only interested in plunder.80 Li Hung-chang also reported: The Nien bandits in Meng-ch'eng and Po-chou used to make a living of brigandage and they were mostly stupid and obstinate, lacking any great ambition.. . . Since the Taiping rebel, Lai Wen-kuang, joined them, introducing the military organization and cunning of the Taipings to reorganize the masses, they have been falsely claiming to be princes of Lu, Wei, Chin, and Liang, and they have divided their force into eastern and western branches, causing us so much trouble as to almost threaten the safety of our capital. 81

These two reports from government field commanders fully attest the strengthening of the Nien movement by the Taiping influx into its ranks in 1864. 79

Fang-liieh, 288.22; Nien-chun, 1.65; and Lo-Erh-kang, T'ai-p'ing kao, 247-248. e » CSL-TC, 138.57-59. 81 Li Wen-chung-kung tsou-su, 11.74.

T'ien-kuo

shih-

THE NIEN LEADERSHIP

99

Lai Wen-kuang and others inflicted many defeats on the Ch'ing government, and in 1865 they killed its famous general, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. Lai Wen-kuang fought bravely, because it was his avowed purpose to avenge the Taiping movement which had been terminated by the government. The Nien under Lai Wen-kuang and Jen Hua-pang appeared in Hupeh in 1867, causing the declaration of martial law in Wu-ch'ang.82 Finally, however, both Lai and Jen were driven to the province of Shantung, and the latter, hungry and weary, was defeated by the government forces armed with modern imported arms.88 After the death of Jen Chu, Lai Wen-kuang fled to Yang-chou where, on January 5, 1868, he surrendered to the local governor, Wu Yii-lan.84 He wrote a confession of more than one thousand words, sharply criticizing the government. This confession was said to have been read by some soldiers and considered very emotional and convincing. It was similar to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's statement and was presented to the throne.85 Lai Wen-kuang died at the age of forty-one.86 He had cooperated with Jen Chu for several years in harrying the government forces. Both Lai and Jen liked to travel in yellow sedan chairs with attractive, long retinues.87 This suggests that they could also enjoy such imperial dignity. Other less famous but by no means unimportant leaders, such as Sun Kuei-hsin, Kung Te, Niu Lo-hung, Chiang T'ai-ling, and Ch'ao Hao-jan, also played a significant role in the Nien movement, especially in its early years. A large number of such leaders became martyrs for the Nien cause.88 One may ask what degree of initiative was tolerated or encouraged at the various Nien echelons, what sort of spirit prevailed among the Nien leaders. The Nien chiefs before 1856 seemed, in their expeditions, to have taken a large degree of initiative. Since the small Nien units were scattered, each chief had to make decisions according to the conditions in his locality. In later years the Nien rebels were split into eastern and western parts, each of which again had to make military decisions according to the exigencies of the moment; their leaders could not easily «a

Wang-Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh 12.27b. Chung-hsiu Lu-chih, 34.13. 84 Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . . 13.20. 85 Li Wen-chung-kung tsou-su, 11.74, 12.65-68 and 73. This emotionally and beautifully written document is now available in the source material series entitled T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, II., 862-63. 86 Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chun chih, 16.25. 87 Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . .., 13.20; and Nien-chun, III., 495. 88 A list of these chiefs is in YCCL, 6.8-10; and WYFTC, 15.29b-31. 83

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THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

consult each other from the front lines for lack of communication facilities. An occasional general conference of the supreme leaders decided the policy; the commanders had to take initiative to modify the policy during its execution. The spirit which prevailed among the Nien leaders seems to have been one of heroic bravery. A Nien chief, Teng Ta-chun, was being examined by the imperial commander, Yuan Chia-san, and was guarded by an overwhelming force. Instead of trembling with fear, Teng suddenly jumped up and swore at the government. He tipped over the candles on the desk and almost injured the judge. While the soldiers present rushed to tie him up, he vigorously kicked and bit them. Yiian said that he had never seen such a fierce culprit. Teng was immediately executed by the cruel, lingering process. In the years after Yiian received an imperial decree to suppress the Nien bandits, he frequently saw their chiefs receive capital punishment without any sign of fear. In another memorial to the throne, Yiian elaborated on the heroic Nien spirit, saying that the power of the Nien leaders was determined by their ability to amass a huge following, and that their honor was their indifference to death. They frequently laughed, talked, sang, and danced before execution; they did not stand in awe before the law of the imperial court, nor had they any concern for the fate of even their close relatives.89 In his last statement Lai Wen-kuang concluded that he had done his best for his nation and the court, that his failure was brought forth by heaven; therefore he had nothing to regret. He only requested his early execution!90 With the great initiative of the Nien chiefs, who had the spirit to fight to the end, and a strong family and community tie with their followers, the Nien became a stubborn foe of the imperial government during a prolonged warfare. 6.

The Role

of the Gentry

in the Nien

Rebellion

The principal Nien leaders, Chang Lo-hsing, Chang Tsung-yii, and Jen Chu, were illiterates, and many other Nien chiefs were also uneducated. Bravery was essential for fighting but brains were needed for planning. This need was filled by a number of "half-baked" scholars, some of whom had received the first degree through civil service examination, while others had served as military heads or leaders of walled communi89 90

TMKC, 2.39b-40, and 5.31b. T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, II, 863.

THE ROLE OF THE GENTRY IN THE NIEN REBELLION

101

ties. They commanded great prestige and honor from the commoners. Unemployment, government pressure, heavy taxation, or illicit fees drove such scholars to serve the Nien rebels. A notable example of the work of these scholars was Chang Lohsing's proclamation as Meng-chu, or supreme chief, which was planned by two licentiates, Li Shih-hsien and Cheng Ching-hua, and a bachelor (hsiu-ts'ai), Miao P'ei-lin. They helped Chang perform the ceremony by sacrificing to heaven and earth; they drew up regulations and formed the banner system. Most important of all, they coined for Chang the title "King of Great Han with Heavenly Mandate." These political advisers changed the nature of Nien from bandits to rebels. The military adviser of a Nien chief in Fei-hsien, Shantung, was a stipendiary (Lin-sheng), Li Tsung-t'ang, who had served his superior in that capacity for many years. A military provincial graduate (wu-chu), Hu Hao-shan, massed several thousand men to cooperate with the Nien chief, Liu Erh-lao-yiian. 91 In the list of Nien leaders given in the Yiichiin chi-liieh, there are also several who held government decrees. Other lettered men who worked for the Nien in a secretarial capacity (chiangchi) may not have been noted by government intelligence. Theoretically these intellectuals should have been loyal to the imperial dynasty, but in fact, a small number of them broke the moral bonds which had been weakening since the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time the weakness and corruption of the Manchu empire was being uncovered by Westerners and by the Taipings. Some alert and educated men began to wonder at the subtle distinctions between obedience and rebellion. Others such as Li Chan, a retired magistrate of Honan, and Liu Te-p'ei, a dismissed licentiate of Shantung, took independent rebellious action.92 Some were Nien leaders for a while and then switched to the imperial government or to the Taipings, but they were no longer willing to be enslaved by the Manchus. Two such turncoats, Miao P'ei-lin and Li Chao-shou, occupy considerable importance in the history of the Nien movement. Miao P'ei-lin alternated between being a Nien, a commander of government militia, and a perfectly ordinary bandit He was extremely rich and lived an unusually luxurious life. He was undoubtedly an outstanding figure of the 1850's. »1 WYFTC, 15.11; Fang-lueh, 282.24b; and YCCL, 2.5b. 82 Li Chan claimed Prince Chan in 1862. On the pretext of training militia, both Li and Liu forced the people to pay them heavy tax, which was used for feeding unlawful deserters and rascals to fight against their local government. See Fang-lueh, 148.10-11 and STCHCL, 20.1, respectively.

102

THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Miao P'ei-lin was bom in Feng-t'ai, near Shou-chou, to the north of the Huai River and in the southwest of Meng-ch'eng and Ying-chou. His native district was in the center of the Nien territory. With a bachelor's (hsiu-ts'ai) degree, he was boastful and cruel, suspicious and unpredictable by nature. Yet he was a man of considerable talent, quick of thought and decision. He wrote good prose and verse, some of which is preserved in the Palace Museum of Peking. Had he stuck loyally by the Nien, his ability might have affected the movement greatly. Unfortunately for the Nien, Miao P'ei-lin's relations with them underwent many changes. He was first associated with Chang Lo-hsing, for whom he made many military plans, and he was called Mr. Miao, the Strategic Adviser of the Nien Army.93 The reason for Miao's changing from adviser to the Nien to leader of a militia band to fight against them is obscure and well worth tracing. A local history recounts that Miao's family was robbed by the Nien, and that he built a fortress to protect himself and scored many triumphs over them.94 There seems to be a contradiction here, because if Miao was an adviser of the Nien, his family should not have been robbed by his subordinates. The loose organization and discipline of the Nien might nevertheless account for such an incident. Because Miao's family was robbed, and because he had the prestige of being an educated man in his native town, he trained the militia and in 1856 compelled neighboring villages and towns to build yii (walls and moats) to protect themselves. He organized his militia into five banners, with more than one thousand men under his command. But his men plundered the people, raped women, burned houses, and generally behaved even worse than the Nien. The Nien and Miao's militia became rivals in robbing people, and Miao acquired a reputation that terrified the people along the Huai River.95 His relation with the Nien continued to vary according to the exigencies of the moment. Deputy Lieutenant General Sheng-pao, commander of a Manchu force in northern Anhwei, heard of Miao P'ei-lin and to win him to the imperialist side offered him a government position of the fifth rank in 1857, 93

Wen-hsien ts'ung-pien, no. 2.6b-8b, and WYFTC, 15.12b. There seems to be a different story about Miao P'ei-lin in the Ch'ing-pei lei-ch'ao (7.158) in which Miao is said to have gone away from Hsia-ts'ai, where Chang Lo-hsing attacked in February, 1856, to Shou-chou. This story may mean that Miao did not serve as Chang's adviser. But a careful examination of the time sequence reveals that Miao assisted Chang before February, a fact which is not mentioned in the very brief statement about Miao in Ch'ing-pei lei-ch'ao. Moreover, WYFTC must have basis for making the important statement about the early relation between Chang and Miao. Intrinsic evidence in support of the relationship is that Miao's militia was also divided into five banners. 94 Feng-t'ai hsien-chih, 7.9; Nien-chiin, 11.134. »5 WYFTC, 15.12b.

THE ROLE OF THE GENTRY IN THE NIEN REBELLION

103

with the privilege of wearing the single-eyed peacock feather. When Miao P'ei-lin presented the general with a galaxy of beautiful entertaining girls, Sheng-pao expressed regret at having met Miao so late. Sheng-pao considered him his pupil, and before long Miao was made commanderin-chief of the militia in the area north of the Huai River. He ordered the people under his jurisdiction to build yii patterned after his own; those who disobeyed his order were punished according to his military law, which meant death. Under the pretext of fighting the Nien he frequently conferred with the local gentry. At one such meeting, held in the house of Wang Jung-chia in Chih-ho, Miao saw many valuable curios which he simply took away with him. Chih-ho was the headquarters of the Nien and Wang could have been a member or a sympathizer of the Nien. Thereafter Miao P'ei-lin and Chang Lo-hsing went their separate ways.98 Miao P'ei-lin was persuaded by Sheng-pao to serve the Manchu government in wiping out the Nien, but he always hated to use official costumes and government stationery. He preferred "Mister Miao" at all times to any other title. As a leader of the militia, he oppressed the populace, usurped the people's land, collected taxes, and decided judicial cases in all the areas under the influence of his militia, disregarding the jurisdiction and authority of the government officials. He was a good fighter and he frequently defeated the Nien, occupying many of their fortresses.97 As a reward for his contribution, he was made an expectant tao-t'ai of Szechwan in 1860. He became so unruly that Yuan Chia-san, a government leader in the struggle to suppress the Nien, wanted to attack him, failing to do so only because of limited forces. Miao's protector, Shengpao, let him do as he pleased in order to weaken the power of Chang Lo-hsing.98 While the British and the French were attacking Tientsin and Peking in the autumn of 1860, Miao P'ei-lin took the opportunity to try to further his ambitions. Not satisfied by his recent promotion to the rank of Provincial Lieutenant Governor, and irritated by Yuan Chia-san's intentions of curbing him, he made an alliance with the Taipings at Nanking, and was offered a title of "Prince." He was reluctant to accept it, but at the same time disobeyed Sheng-pao's orders, and instead of helping the Peking government against the allied powers, he made an eloquent speech to persuade his followers to support him in an attempt to make himself emperor. Miao realized that his audience was not enthusiastic, 87

Ibid.,

15.13.

Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 9.3.

•8 Fang-lueh,

49.4; 60.11; and WYFTC, 15.14b.

104

THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

and he refrained from further action." Obviously he was a shrewd politician who knew how to gauge the feelings of the people. Near the end of 1860 he actually rebelled against the government. First, on account of some private grudge against the associate director of the militia, Colonel Hsii Li-chuang, he burned Hsii's house, ransacked his properties, arrested the whole family, and dug up their ancestral tombs.104 By then both Yiian Chia-san and the governor of Anhwei, Weng T'ung-shu, wanted to use force to control Miao, but Sheng-pao still protected him. These disagreements among government authorities at the battle front are clearly shown in their reports to the Grand Council, and have been collected in the Wen-hsien

ts'ung-pien.101

As the imperial authorities remained undecided regarding Miao P'eilin, he surrounded Shou-chou in June, 1861. When he again allied himself with Chang Lo-hsing and the Taipings to attack Ying-chou and other cities, the governor of Anhwei memorialized: "If the government officials are to retain any authority, we must completely disband Miao's militia organizations; if we wish the people to cherish no resentment against the government, we must severely forbid all forts to accept the flag of Miao."102 This memorial indicates that the organization of Miao was much the same as that of the Nien, since the latter also had the system of banner's and demanded that the people accept their flag. Tseng Kuo-fan likewise noted that Miao P'ei-lin was very cunning and well informed. He had copies of all of the local governor's secret charges against him and of Sheng-pao's criticism of the Hunan army; he even had copies of the memorials of the censors accusing him, and of all the imperial plans for controlling him. He knew ahead of time that Chiang I-hsiieh and others wanted to control him while they sought an alliance with him, and that Seng-ko-lin-ch'in planned to order him away from his headquarters so that the Hunan army could devote itself to suppressing the Nien.103 89

The exact title conferred by the Taipings on Miao P'ei-lin is divergent: (1) Saopei-wang, or "Prince to Wipe Out the Government Force in the North" (Wang K'aiyiin, Hsiang-chiin chih, 9.3); (2) P'ing-pei-wang, the same idea as above (Hsiieh Fuch'eng, Yung-an hsii-pien B.7); (3) Tsou-wang, which does not make much sense (Kuo T'ing-i, TPTKSHJC, II, appendix, 33). The first one makes good sense. See also TMKC, 14.22, about Miao P'ei-lin's reluctance to accept the offer. ">» AHTCK, B.21; Fang-liieh, 90.20. 101 No. 2, in which there is a memorial by Yiian Chia-san requesting the immediate execution of the Taiping leader, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng, and a close watch on Miao P'ei-lin, while Sheng-pao pledged the loyalty of the latter. There is also some correspondence between Miao and Sheng, indicating their close relationship. 102 Fang-liieh, 92.18. 103 Tseng Wen-cheng-kung tsou-kao, 20.25. The memorial was submitted on October 20, 1862.

THE ROLE OF THE GENTRY IN THE NIEN REBELLION

105

Miao P'ei-lin had been running afoul of the Hunan army for a long time. He had allied himself with Sheng-pao and Seng-ko-lin-ch'in against Tseng Kuo-fan, the commander of the Hunan army, whose force could do no more than guard against Miao. Utilizing the disagreements among the imperial commanders, Miao played them off against one another in order to strengthen his own position. Availing himself of the rift between Sheng-pao and Yiian Chia-san, he took over the customs offices along the Huai to strip Yiian's financial resources. Afraid of Tseng Kuo-fan's power, he cleverly appealed to Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, who intervened and insisted that the Hunan army should withdraw from Shou-chou and Cheng-yang-kuan, a peripheral zone of Miao's dominion. For Seng's prestige, Tseng had to yield some ground.104 Then Miao attacked Shou-chou, which was the provisional capital of Anhwei, and after a long siege it fell in November, 1861. Thereafter the combined forces of Miao P'ei-lin, Chang Lo-hsing, and a branch of the Taipings under Ma Yung-ho surrounded the prefecture of Ying-chou, the residence of the governor of Anhwei, but the city survived a siege of over three months. Meanwhile Chang Lo-hsing's soldiers were being entirely provisioned by Miao P'ei-lin.105 In April, 1862, Sheng-pao became the government commander in the area north of the Huai River, and because of their close personal relations, as well as the government's victories over the Taipings in Anhwei, Miao again sided with the government. Having suddenly lost Miao's support, Chang Lo-hsing was forced to return to his headquarters at Chih-ho. While Miao P'ei-lin kept up his correspondence with the famous Taiping general, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, and others (they addressed each other as brothers), Sheng-pao repeatedly vouched for Miao's loyalty to the government in Peking.108 Sheng-pao suggested to Miao that he send some tribute to the court in order to cover up his earlier rebellions against the Manchu government. Through Shengpao's urging, Miao betrayed the Taipings. Miao P'ei-lin attacked the Taipings at Ying-chou and assisted in the recovery of Lu-chou, Anhwei, on May 13, 1862. The Taiping general, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng, went from Lu-chou to Shou-chou to ask Miao's help. 104

See Tseng's letter to Kuan-wen in Tseng Wen-cheng-kung situ ch'a, 9.24 and 33b; and Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi, 52.19, in which Li Hung-chang also told his friend that Miao P'ei-Lin was afraid of the Hunan army so that he secretly showed good favor to General Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and slandered the Hunan army. This letter was written on November 6, 1862. It indicates that Li Hung-chang also hated Miao P'ei-lin. ics WYFTC, 15.14b-15. loe Some of their correspondence is photolithographically reproduced in the T'aip'ing T'ien-kuo wen-shu (no indication of page number).

106

THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Afraid that Ch'en Yii-ch'eng might take away some of his followers, and that the imperial force pursuing the rebels toward his headquarters might be a threat to him, Miao played a favorite trick. He invited Ch'en Yiich'eng to his headquarters, saying that the strategic districts of Feng-yang and Ying-chou were defensible and that his well-trained militia was at Ch'en's disposal. Suspecting nothing, Ch'en went to see Miao and was cordially received. Once Ch'en was within the city, however, Miao arrested him and escorted him to Sheng-pao as a great token of loyalty. Miao also reorganized Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's three thousand bodyguards,107 and reinforced with these Taiping veterans he defeated Chang Lo-hsing in the north of Ying-chou. Chang was ambushed and arrested by Miao's soldiers.108 The treacherous arrests of Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and Chang Lo-hsing were Miao P'ei-lin's great contributions to the suppression of the rebellion. He was so proud of these arrests that he expected a great reward from the Ch'ing court. Unfortunately the reward was limited to restoration of the official titles of which he had been deprived when he had rebelled against the government. Miao was so disappointed that he revolted again, and he occupied Shou-chou (July 19, 1863) and Huai-yiian, severing the supply lines of the government headquarters. Fearing the power of the Hunan army, he developed his force in Honan, collecting the Nien under his command and occupying a large area in that province. But this time Miao had so disturbed the government that it determined to get rid of him. During a savage battle on December 6, 1863, Miao was killed by some of his own soldiers who had been Ch'en Yii-ch'eng's bodyguards, and his followers were disbanded. Miao P'ei-lin, in retrospect, appears to have been a peculiar individualist who did not like to be ordered by anyone. Perhaps in his mind he recognized no real existing authority; he may by nature have been a revolutionist. He craftily played politics between the Nien, the Taipings, and the government forces. While on the imperialist side, he also played politics between the Chinese and Manchu commanders. Had Miao not been so blindly protected by Sheng-pao, he would certainly not have grown so powerful. Another peculiar leader was Li Chao-shou, who may be suspected of having had some relations with Li Shih-lin, an early independent Nien leader of Ku-shih, Honan. '»'

AHTCK, 2.26. See Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng's essay concerning the arrest of Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and Chang Lo-hsing in Yung-an hsii-pien, 2.7-9, and AHTCK, 2.26. See also Po-chouchih, 8.34; and Su-chou-chih, 10.38b. 108

THE ROLE OF THE GENTRY IN THE NIEN REBELLION

107

While the governors general and the soldiers at the front were greatly distressed by the lack of provisions, Li Chao-shou was unusually rich.109 Li was a Nien converted to the government side by Sheng-pao, as had been the case with Miao P'ei-lin. He was born into a large family in Ku-shih, and was unprincipled in his youth. He received some village schooling, but he frequently played truant and was fond of hiding on the roofs when his mother looked for him. Even in childhood he liked to steal, and the people of his village frequently lost money and chickens. After a few such years, he was said to be able to run on roofs and to climb up poles very quickly. Despised by the villagers, and cruel and wily by nature, he once killed a man on the road in broad daylight, but the government dared not arrest him. Ku-shih was close to the headquarters of the Nien, and Li Chao-shou joined them. He gathered several hundred people and looted neighboring districts, taking many lives. Jailed several times by the local government, he freed himself each time by bribing his jailers.110 When the Taipings came to Anhwei, Li Chao-shou gathered several thousand men to support them. The tao-t'ai, Ho Kuei-chen, invited Li to submit to the government. That was his first surrender. Soon after the invitation, the governor of Anhwei secretly ordered Ho to get rid of Li because of his questionable reputation, and Ho replied that he would try to carry out the order. The secret report fell into the hands of Li's followers but did not reach him until after his surrender. Li was so enraged that he immediately rushed to the office of the tao-t'ai and slaughtered the official (November, 1855). He then merged his Nien with the Taipings in Anking.111 Sheng-pao again invited Li Chao-shou to surrender for the second time to the government in 1858. Li was obliged to agree because his mother and other family members were being held as hostages by Shengpao.112 In surrendering to Sheng-pao, he also betrayed the Taipings. After Li's second surrender to the government, his name was changed from Li Chao-shou to Li Shih-chung, meaning "Loyal for Generations." 109 Wang K'ai-yun, Hsiang-chiin chih, 9.1. For the relation of Li Shih-lin and Li Chao-shou, see note 44 in the same chapter. 110 Shen Shou-chih, "Chieh-ch'ao pi-chi," in Jen-wen monthly, 7.8 (October, 1936), 25; and Chang Jui-ch'ih, op. cit., 12. 111 Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin chih, 9.1b. Ho Kuei-chen's biography is in Ch'ingshih kao, chiian, 406, and Nien-chiin, VI.291-93. He was a good Confucian scholar whose murder by Li Chao-shou seems to have been partly due to Li's cruelty and partly to mishandling of the case by the Anhwei governor, Fu-chi, who did not supply Ho with the necessary provisions, nor did he comply with Ho's request to grant Li an official rank. 112 Shen Shou-chih, op. cit., 25.

108

THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

His followers, some seventeen thousand of them, were reorganized under the unit called Yu-sheng-ying, or "The Victorious Battalion in Honan". According to a letter written by Yuan Chia-san, Li Shih-chung was very covetous.113 Yet this was due to the lack of funds for the Yii-sheng-ying, which received no government provisions at all. He was only permitted to sell salt and to transport rice to support his own troops, another illustration of the poor administrative and financial system. On Li's behalf, Sheng-pao requested that all commodities transported for Li Shihchung be exempted from customs duties. Granted this privilege, Li amassed enough money within a few years to cover the expenses of his troops and to provide a tidy fortune for himself. Li Shih-chung and others attacked the Taipings in 1859 at P'u-k'ou, across the river from Nanking, and they won the day. As a reward for his victories Li was given the title of lieutenant colonel, and before long he was further promoted to the rank of provincial commander-in-chief of Chiang-nan. With this high rank he controlled many cities in the rich area between Kiangsu and Anhwei. He accumulated provisions, set up customs houses, and generally acted as if he were the ruler of the area. Then Li's protector, Sheng-pao, was removed from command and replaced by Yuan Chia-san, who had been ordered to control Li.114 Though Yuan knew that Li was greedy and haughty, he was impressed by his loyalty, sincerity, and courage. Yuan's confidence in Li made Tseng Kua-fan quite unhappy, as we can see from Tseng's diary.115 Tseng Kuo-fan was determined to get rid of Li Shih-chung and to work against his protector, Sheng-pao. Early in 1862 the government refused to supply Li's troops with the necessary provisions, and this upset him considerably. In September Tseng submitted a memorial to the throne saying that Li Shih-chung was occupying cities and governing them according to his own wishes, that he had established several customs houses in various districts, and that he transported and sold salt for his own profit.116 Early in 1863 Tseng Kuo-fan again reported to the throne that Li Shih-chung was so overbearing and unprincipled that the other government forces were having trouble with him, and it was proving increasingly difficult to tolerate him. The imperial court, however, still believed that Li Shih-chung was a victim of his bad subordinates and would sooner or later realize his mistakes and improve his conduct.117 113

Yuan-shih chia-shu, 1.14b. Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 14.3b-4. 115 Tseng Wen-cheng-kung shou-shu jih-chi, Aug. 9, 1861, in ts'e, 11 (the page is not numbered). 116 Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 14.6. »' Ibid., 14.10b-l 1. 114

THE ROLE OF THE GENTRY IN THE NIEN REBELLION

109

Li remained loyal and grateful to his protector, Sheng-pao. When the latter was arrested and tried in February, 1863, Li Shih-chung rhapsodized in a carefully worded letter pleading for Sheng-pao's life.118 He begged Tseng Kuo-fan to submit it to the throne on his behalf. The court blamed Tseng for doing so, and punished Li by depriving of his official titles, though he was allowed to remain on duty. Li Shih-chung was intelligent enough to recognize the usefulness of Western guns and ships. He had a battalion equipped with foreign guns and he purchased several gunboats. Instead of using these modern weapons to fight the Taipings, he used them to prevent the smuggling of salt from the area under his jurisdiction and to guard his personal properties. He frequently clashed with the salt-transporting ships of Miao P'ei-lin,119 and this indicates that leaders like Miao and Li were less interested in political principles than in looting and fighting for their own selfish ends. After the loss of P'u-k'ou the Peking court in April, 1863, wanted to discharge Li Shih-chung. Tseng Kuo-fan, however, requested that Li be allowed to keep his position for the time being. During that summer, Li Shih-chung fought against Miao P'ei-lin, and his titles, of which he had been stripped earlier, were restored.120 Suddenly, on the Chinese New Year's Day of 1864, he petitioned Governor-general Tseng Kuo-fan that he be allowed to relinquish the six cities occupied by him and that government troops be sent to take over the garrison; he also disbanded his fleet, turning the ships over to the government and either sending his soldiers back to their farms or transferring them elsewhere to fight against the Taipings. His actions were certainly unusual, but there were reasons behind them. Apparently Tseng Kuo-fan had reported to the throne that Li Shih-chung was an infamous and unpredictable man. Seng-ko-lin ch'in had been ordered to investigate Tseng's report, and he had advised Li Shih-chung to disband his followers, return the cities, and give up the collecting of taxes in order to protect his life. Strong though he was, Li Shih-chung could obviously not oppose both Tseng Kuo-fan and Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, the two greatest military leaders of the time, so he made his New Year's Day petition. Having accumulated a big fortune from effective tax collection and other sources, Li Shih-chung became very generous in giving away his money for political and philanthropical purposes, a rather unexpected 118 119 120

Ibid., 14.11-12. Ibid., 14.13b-14. Fang-lueh, 28.10.

110

THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

trait which he had in common with leaders of secret societies in Shanghai. When the governor of Anhwei, T'ang Hsiin-fang, requested the establishment of a new district government at Wo-yang in the winter of 1863, to control the main headquarters of the Nien, Li contributed a hundred million cash to build the city wall. He used his personal property to pay some thirty thousand soldiers and send them home with ample traveling allowances. He contributed five hundred million cash to buy seeds and animals for the military colony in the district of Ch'u-chou. In addition he gave the government more than 3,250 ounces of gold, which was worth 45,940 taels of silver, and much salt, which was sold for 113,785 taels of silver.121 Although Li Shih-chung spent his money in this way, he was still very rich. After his retirement from the army he traveled with a galaxy of beauties and actresses to Hankow, Yang-chou, Shanghai, and other places. He had three troupes, each consisting of more than a hundred beauties, all of whom wore embroidered silk dresses. He also had thirty beautiful concubines, with more than a hundred attractive maid-servants. His extravagance and magnificent mansions were said to have surpassed those of a prince. The members of his family also enjoyed wealth and nobility, with five members holding high official positions and with real estate worth millions of dollars even after two generations. He opened free public schools to educate his clan members, and he frequently associated with the peasantry.122 Finally on February 4, 1882, Li Shih-chung was executed by the Anhwei governor, Yii-lu, on the pretext that he had illegally arrested a local scholar; but actually his death was caused by his whimsical nature, colorful personality, and arrogant attitude toward high authorities.123 Heroes and villains usually emerge in time of chaos. Miao and Li may fall into one or the other of these categories. Moreover, both men were well-educated, members of a scholar class which ordinarily did not bear arms. During the Nien rebellion the intelligentsia were active not only behind the scenes, but in the front lines as well. Good leadership is vital to the success of any political or social movement. Unfortunately, it is obvious from the preceding account that the Nien lacked able leadership. Their own leaders, Chang Lo-hsing, Chang Tsung-yii, and Jen Chu were brave fighters but illiterate. Lai Wen121

Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin chih, 9.10; and Wang Ting-an, Ch'in-ch'iieh . . ., 14.30. 122 Wang K'ai-yiin, op. cit., 9.10b. 123 For more stories about Li Chao-shou, see Nien-chiin, 1.295-99; for Li's execution, see CSL-KH, 139.13b-14; Fang-lueh, 66.6; 76.16b, 22; 77.1, 15b; 87.17b and passim.

THE ROLE OF THE GENTRY IN THE NIEN REBELLION

111

kuang, a veteran political and military leader, was not on the top level among the Taipings; he was not so famous as Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, Li Hsiuch'eng, and others. Miao P'ei-lin was perhaps the most capable of this echelon of guiding heads; he knew how to play politics and how to make public speeches. Both Miao and Li Chao-shou started their careers as Nien, but they changed readily to the imperialist side, to the Taiping side, or back to the Nien side. The reason for their frequent changes was perhaps utilitarian: to maintain their power. To increase his own influence Sheng-pao always liked to make use of Nien chiefs who were willing to surrender. Tseng Kuo-fan disliked Miao and Li, although he allowed them to exist for practical reasons. He fought for the Manchu dynasty and saved its life; on the other hand he struggled against the Manchus and Mongols to increase the power of the Chinese. His dual purpose, to save the life of the Manchu regime and to expand the political and military power of the Chinese, was accomplished. No leader of the Nien was Tseng's equal. Most of the Nien chiefs, however, had one common characteristic: a fierce and violent nature. They could not tolerate being restricted to conventional ways of thought and action. It is apparent from the above discussion that the six leaders were all quite wealthy, except for Lai Wen-kuang. Wealth and clan influence supported their leadership. Since the leaders were rich, their motives for rebellion seem to have been more political than economic. Even though allowance should be made for the fact that they had to seek food for their followers, most of whom were poverty-stricken peasants, the immediate and direct objective of their rebellion was the overthrow of the corrupt Manchu government. Anti-Manchu sentiment was common among the Nien leaders. Not only Chang Lo-hsing, Chang Tsung-yii, Jen Chu, and Lai Wen-kuang hated the imperial government and rebelled against it, but even Miao P'ei-lin refused to accept official titles and costumes from the Manchu government; Li Chao-shou honored the assassin (who had been a Taiping rebel) of the Liang-chiang governor-general, Ma Hsin-i. Instead of taking a government point of view and condemning the culprit, Li Chao-shou set up a tombstone eulogizing him as a hero. Moreover, the followers of both Miao and Li kept their hair long.124 Obviously they were against the Manchu dynasty. In spite of these facts, the Nien leadership was still unquestionably 124

Nien-chun, and 140.7b.

1.369; Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent

Chinese, 555; Fang-lueh,

51.48

112

THE NIEN ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

poor, and the problem arises of how the Nien movement could grow to such extent. The answer lies principally in the fact that even granting poor Nien leadership, the imperial forces were weak and inefficient. Territory held by powerless military and civil authorities was an inviting field for the activities of the Nien. The opportunist Sheng-pao always tried to invite Nien to the government side, even though there were no provisions to feed the newly acquired soldiers. Miao P'ei-lin and Li Shih-chung were thus compelled to raise funds themselves from the people in the areas under their jurisdiction. Through vigilant collection, enforced by shooting tax-evaders on the spot, Li Chih-chung raised a large sum of money, signifying, incidentally, that nineteenth-century China need not have been so poor if all taxes had been collected effectively from the rich and poor alike throughout the empire. Furthermore, a rebellion or revolution can occur even without able leaders if the political, economic, and social situation is ripe for it. Under favorable conditions the Taiping and the Nien rebellions could have occurred even without Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and Chang Lo-hsing as leaders. At first the Nien actually existed in various parts of northern China without any publicly recognized, outstanding chieftain.

IV. Relations of the Nien with Other Rebels

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, North China entered a stage of chaos. Besides the Nien there were numerous other rebels whose activities were not mentioned even in detailed textbooks on Chinese history. Government expeditions against the Nien were usually enmeshed with other hostile groups; there were so many that official reports sometimes seem to have been confused as to whether the rebels and bandits were Nien or other forces. In order to present a complete picture of the confused conditions, Nien's connection with other local forces is sketched; this correlated information may help us to understand more clearly that the Manchu regime finally ceased functioning without much attack from the revolutionary party. An understanding of the Nien relations with other rebels will also make clearer how the Nien rebellion could be so widely spread, and why it failed. Did all the rebels cooperate with each other? And if so, was cooperation generally close or loose? based on principles, or a matter of expediency?

1.

The Nien Relations

with the

Taipings

The "Long-haired Bandits" and the Nien were usually mentioned together during the Chinese civil war of the mid-nineteenth century. They shielded each other against government attacks. Without the Nien, more imperial troops could have been spared to assault Nanking; and without the Taipings the Nien might have been suppressed much earlier. Again without the great numerical strength of the Nien army, the Taiping remnants in North China under the command of Lai Wen-kuang would have been wiped out sooner without creating any further publicity of the movement. Since they fought together on many occasions and shared so many characteristics, it may be well to compare the two movements briefly, so that one may understand the nature of their relationship. Both groups were able fighters in the eyes of the imperial government, and they were the products of the same general political and social conditions. They both caused the Manchu dynasty a great deal of trouble,

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RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

and both dealt it near-fatal blows. Both groups made alliances with secret societies and other local forces for varied lengths of time, either on principle or as a matter of convenience. A majority of the Chinese people were directly or indirectly affected by these two great movements. Yet the differences between the Taipings and the Nien were manifold. The former movement arose only a few years before 1850; the latter had existed nearly half a century. The Nien political and military organizations nevertheless were less mature than those of the younger rebels whose educated leader, Hung Hsiu-ch'iian, had received some Western influence and was perhaps of a caliber superior to the uneducated Nien chief, Chang Lo-hsing. The Taipings thus had a political, economic, social, and religious ideology.1 The Nien left few writings so that students cannot trace their ideas, and public announcements in which their tenets were said to have been expressed are no longer available. Where the Taipings intended a revolution against the Manchu rulers, the Nien's objective was less clear, for they had more complicated components whose frequent plundering overshadowed their political movement. The Taipings exercised political and military control over a definite territory, but after 1865 the Nien simply sought food and safety. Hence, while the former tried to occupy more territory, the latter were accused of being interested mainly in looting. The strength of the Taipings lay in their stubborn defense of cities against the government, but that was also their great weakness, since they could have moved their capital from Nanking, averting a concentrated assault and possibly prolonging the life of their movement. The Nien army roved about, seldom making a firm stand to defend any city. To occupy a large area the Taipings split their forces, but until the last few years the Nien usually stuck to their native districts, striking at the weak spots in the government's defenses. Whereas the Taipings excelled in offensive and pitched warfare, the Nien were adept at mobile struggle and at rapid troop movements on horseback, wearing out the government forces. Although the former frequently dug tunnels to attack a city, the latter seldom resorted to that. 2 Despite the fact that the Nien rebellion was on a smaller scale than the Taiping uprising, the Nien guerrilla tactics were more difficult for the government to cope with. Finally, the Taipings were anti-opium; the Nien, on the contrary, searched everywhere for opium and horses — both much1

For a brief summary, see Vincent Y. C. Shih, "The Ideology of the Taiping T'ien-kuo," Sinologica, 3, no. 1 (1951), 1-15; Ssu-yii Teng, New Light on the History shih-kao, of the Taiping Rebellion, 35-92; and Lo Erh-kang, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chapters 7-15. 2 Occasionally, however, the Nien also dug a tunnel to take a city. See YCCL, 8.1.

THE NIEN RELATIONS WITH THE TAIPINGS

115

needed supplies. Two of the four great Nien commanders were definitely known to be fond of opium, and a large number of Nien followers were also victims of the drug, without which they could not fight energetically.3 With so many differences existing between the Nien and the Taipings, was the success of their united actions fore-doomed as I-shih thought? 4 The answer must be: Not exactly, for the two forces did cooperate for more than ten years. The beginning of the Nien-Taiping relationship is somewhat uncertain. According to Lo Erh-kang, "the alliance between the Nien force and the Taipings began in 1856 or 1857," 5 but there is evidence to indicate that their cooperation commenced in 1853. The Taiping northern expedition was divided into two groups: one crossed the Yellow River northward, and the other, a small contingent, moved southward, probably to prevent a government force from pursuing the northern expedition. About 80,000 Nien were recorded as having joined the Taipings, when the latter crossed the Yellow River. It is claimed that the remaining Taipings and the Nien on the south bank of the river were defeated by a government force. Then the allies went to Hupeh through the well-known Nien rendezvous in Lo-shan and Cheng-yang in southern Honan. They took Huang-an (August 1, 1853) and Ma-ch'eng (August 3), both in Hupeh, and thence moved to Tai-hu (August 12), Anhwei.® Confronted with many frustrations the Taiping northern expeditionary force appealed to Nanking for reinforcement. In response, Huang Shengts'ai and others sent fifteen Taiping army divisions to the north in March, 1854. Their way to Anhwei and Honan was guided by a deserting government soldier, Li San-nao, who had gathered two or three thousand fellow rebels. Soon a Nien chief, Chang Chieh-san, incorporated his force with 3

A large number of the Nien were opium smokers (Nien-chiin, III. 16). They searched for opium (Nien-chiin, III.106). They demanded horses and opium to pay ransom for the persons they captured (Nien-chiin, III. 170). If their demands for such materials were not met, the captives were killed (Nien-chiin, III.138). Most of Li Chao-shou's Nien were definitely opium smokers (Nien-chiin, 1, 29b). See also III, 482, IV. 84, 96-97, and passim. 4 I-shih, a scholar versed in anecdotes and history of the Late Ch'ing, thought that the Taipings and the Nien could hardly have had united action, because while the former tried to set up a new kingdom, the latter could not be confined by principle; since their natures were far apart, they could not take coordinated steps. "T'ao-yiian sui-pi," Chung-ho, 4.1 (January, 1943), 95. 5 NCTYTC, 15. In Lo's revised edition of the same work, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo hsin-chiin ti yiin-tung chan, he says the alliance started in 1857 (p. 13); that is also wrong. 6 CSL-HF, 98.50b; Hsiang Ta et al., T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, TV. 390, and Kuo T'ing-i, TPTKSHJC, 263-264.

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RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

the Taipings. They chose I-men-chi as their headquarters and carried the Taiping flag in their expeditions. They met a strong opponent, Yiian Chia-san, who captured I-men-chi; and Chang Chieh-san was killed by artillery fire. About half of the Taiping force was driven back to the south, and the other half was reported to be on its way toward Lin-ch'ing, Shantung. About the same time the Taipings seemed to have made an effort to ally with other local rebels, for in the stronghold of a Nien chieftain, Ch'en Yii, at Ho-ch'iu, the government force captured seals and a great deal of correspondence between the Nien and Taipings. The latter also made an alliance with another Ho-ch'iu Nien chief, Li Chaoshou, whose five or six thousand adherents, all with long hair, attacked Lo-t'ien, Hupeh, in January, 1856.7 That was the initial relationship between the two great rebellious forces. The second phase of their extensive formal cooperation was accelerated by the internal conflict at Nanking in September, 1856, when two of the five outstanding Taiping leaders were killed and another, Shih Ta-k'ai, left with many crack troops to develop independently in southwestern China. Thus the weakened Celestial King, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, had to look for new allies and for able generals from his subordinates. Two able army officers, Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Ch'en Yii-ch'eng, were put into commanding positions. Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who was guarding the city of T'ungch'eng, Anhwei, collaborated with the Nien chief, Li Chao-shou; the latter joined Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te and claimed to have one million comrades. Through Li Chao-shou, Li Hsiu-ch'eng invited Chang and Kung to join him, laying the foundation for broad cooperation between the Nien and the Taipings.8 As a reward for recruiting so much manpower, Li Hsiu-ch'eng was given a raise in rank. As a token of allegiance Chang Lo-hsing ordered his men to keep their hair long, and he was given seals and stationery by the Celestial King, who also bestowed on him the title of "Prince Wo" (Wo-wang).9 The imperial government's intelligence service was well aware of the alliance and of the contemplated joint onslaught on P'uk'ou, across the river from Nanking. Although the Nien army accepted the titles from the Celestial King, they were not very obedient. Their main purpose was still plunder, and 7

Nien-chiin, II. I l l , 122; STCHCL, 1 (The Kwangtung Rebels II), 11; Fang-lueh, 6.11-12; and AHTC, 102.19b. 8 Shou-chou chili, 8.23; Chung-wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-ch'uan yiian-kao chien-cheng, 61; and NCTYTC, 15. • WYFTC, 15.12.

THE NIEN RELATIONS W I T H THE TAIPINGS

117

their actions were beyond the control of the Taipings. The Taiping leader, Li Hsiu-ch'eng, regretted the alliance, saying that he treated Li Chaoshou much better than his own subordinates and yet Li's soldiers were very harmful to the people. He never criticized Li, and yet the latter felt ashamed to go and see him because of his misconduct; thus he surrendered to the imperial government. The Taiping leader added that: "The worst elements of the Heavenly Kingdom were (1) Li Chao-shou, (2) Chang Lo-hsing, and (3) the members of the Heaven and Earth Society from Kwangtung." According to Lo Erh-kang, the Taiping soldiers had behaved well before 1858, and it was mainly their Nien allies who spoiled their good reputation.10 Instead of being influenced by the Taipings, the Nien sometimes controlled them. In September, 1856, for instance, the Taipings welcomed the Nien into the city of Liu-an, Anhwei, but they could not tolerate the oppression of the numerous newcomers, and had to abandon the city.11 In spite of such minor friction between the two allies, joint action continued. The valiant Taiping general, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, led a combined force over a hundred thousand strong in an invasion of Tseng Kuofan's district.12 In February, 1858, this army attacked Ho-ch'iu, Anhwei, and laid siege to Ku-shih, Honan,13 taking both cities. In May, more than forty thousand veteran Long-haired Nien were reported to have withdrawn from Liu-an and Ku-shih to their own headquarters, protected by Meng-ch'eng, Po-chou, and other cities.14 Apparently they could not be persuaded by the Taipings to venture too far from their headquarters. In the summer of 1858, the allied Nien and Taiping forces overwhelmed the government forces along the Huai River.15 The governor of Anhwei, Li Hsu-pin, who was a Hunan general under Tseng Kuo-fan, attacked the Taiping base at San-ho on November 7. Ch'en Yii-ch'eng came to the rescue from Liu-ho and Chang Lo-hsing from Lu-chou, making a combined reinforcement claimed to have been a hundred thousand strong. Li Hsu-pin and many other generals died in the ensuing battle, and the government admitted losing over six thousand soldiers.16 In the winter of the same year the tide turned for a short time in favor of the government. Chang Lo-hsing was surrounded in the city of Ting10

Chung-wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng 25-26; and NCTYTC, 15. Liu-an-chou chili, quoted in AHTC, 103.26b. 12 Tseng Wen-cheng-kung sliu-ch'a, 21.16b. 13 YCCL, 8.1. 14 Fang-liieh, 41.9b-10. >'• Ibid., 49.13; and AHTC, 104.8b. AHTC, 104.13-14. 11

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RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

yiian by Miao P'ei-lin with the government forces, and the city fell to them. But when the Taipings came to the rescue,17 Sheng-pao with less than two thousand soldiers and some three hundred cavalry, was hard pressed by the more numerous rebels.18 In the summer of 1859 the city of Ting-yiian again fell to the joint forces of the Taipings and the Nien. Sheng-pao and the government forces could only retreat, leaving the area between Hsii-chou and the Huai River to the allies of his enemies.19 Tseng Kuo-fan worried because the combined force of the Taipings and the Nien in the north of Anhwei was continually expanding and threatening Wu-hu and Anking to the south, and Shantung and Honan to the north. Within a thousand li of Anking and Po-chou and other districts, the land and houses of the people were reported by Tseng Kuofan to have been leveled, depriving the people of employment.20 Even granting some exaggeration in this statement, there must have been truth in it. In the winter of 1859 the Taiping general, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, united with the Nien chiefs, Kung Te and Chang Lo-hsing, to attack T'ai-hu from different directions.21 The government forces suffered greatly from their frequent attacks and from a shortage of provisions and soldiers.22 The situation of the imperialists was slightly improved by the surrender of a Nien chief, Teng Cheng-ming, on February 12, 1860, and the city of Feng-yang, the main entrance to Lu-chou, was recovered.23 In August, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and Chang Lo-hsing went to the aid of the city of T'ung-ch'eng with a force of some three hundred thousand.24 The Taipings and the Nien struck in a different direction in March, 1861. From Huo-shan they launched an attack on Huang-pei, only a hundred li from Wuchang, the capital of Hupeh.25 The attack was repulsed and two of the fierce Nien chieftains, Sun K'uei-hsin and Kung Te, were killed.26 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was placed in charge of the suppression of the Nien in Shantung and Honan (1862). That winter Chang Lo-hsing was driven from Hsii-chou to his own headquarters in Chih-ho, where he was arrested and killed. In December the allies were forced back from Hupeh to Honan by government troops.27 17

WYFTC, 15.4.

16

Fang-lueh, 52.1b-2. Ibid., 62.14b, 17b-18; 65.1. Tseng Wen-cheng-kung tsou-kao, 13.29-30. AHTCK, Records of Great Events, 2.18. Fang-lueh, 61.11-12 and 72.8-9. Ibid., 74.1, 3-5. AHTCK, 2.20. Fang-lueh, 94.25. Ibid., 96.8, 10. Ibid., 170.1.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

THE NIEN RELATIONS WITH THE TAIPINGS

119

The third phase of the Nien-Taiping cooperation was necessitated by the general attack at Nanking under the command of Tseng Kuo-fan, in 1862 and 1863. Li Hsiu-ch'eng ordered Prince Fu (Ch'en Te-ts'ai), Prince Tuan (Lan Ch'eng-ch'u), Prince Tsun (Lai Wen-kuang), and others, altogether commanding some thirty thousand soldiers, to ally themselves with the various units of Nien in Anhwei and Honan for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Hunan army from its concentrated attack on Nanking. This northwestern expedition force made some progress in Shensi.28 Unluckily for the Nien-Taiping allies, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was decoyed by Miao P'ei-lin and killed. Nanking was so badly pressed by the Hunan army that the Taipings in Shensi had to hurry back to its rescue. About half way toward this goal, their celestial capital was lost to Tseng Kuo-fan in June 1864.29 Thereafter, the Nien were greatly strengthened by the incorporation into their numbers of the Taiping forces in northern China. All the Taiping forces going from Shensi to raise the siege of Nanking were intercepted by the government troops on the border between Honan and Hupeh, and were compelled to shift their loyalty from the Celestial King to the Nien in order to avenge the cruel treatment of their brethren by the Hunan soldiers. The veteran Taiping generals reorganized the Nien by introducing some political ideals and by converting their infantry into cavalry, and Honan was soon overrun by the newly organized force.30 The government forces continued to press them hard and pursue them constantly. The rebel chiefs were invited to surrender to the government and some Taiping leaders, like Wang Shih-ti, responded, while Prince Fu, Ch'en Te-ts'ai, committed suicide. Lai Wen-kuang and other Taiping and Nien leaders led their followers from Honan to Anhwei, where they were closely pursued by General Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. By this time most of their forces had been converted from infantry to cavalry to deal with the Mongolian cavalry.31 The untiring General Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was killed in Ts'ao-chou, Shantung, in 1865. Having achieved that great victory, the remnants of the combined forces of the Nien and the Taipings became guerrillas, drifting about over several provinces. From then on, the cooperation between the Nien and the Taipings seems to have been closer than ever, because they had to struggle for their lives. Their swift cavalry traveled light and 26

For details of the military development, see T'ai-ping-chiin HAN-chung chancheng shih-shih chieh ch'ao, compiled by Wu Po-lun (Shensi Museum, 1957). 29 YCCL, 6.18; and STCHCL, 4.4. 30 AHTCK, 2.37-38. 31 YCCL, 1.26.

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RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

caused the government forces plenty of headaches. Even Tseng Kuo-fan was unable to combat them. In spite of the fact that the Taiping-Nien cooperation scored many victories over the imperialists, the relationship was built on convenience, not on principle. The Taipings tried but failed to indoctrinate thoroughly the Nien with their ideas and to change the Nien's conduct from plundering to pure political revolution. As Li Hsiu-ch'eng said, "Even though we have invited the mass of Chang Lo-hsing's men to join us, we cannot order them for our use." 32 Consequently, their joint actions were confined to sporadic military struggles, and there was no cooperation on a persistent political movement. The unprincipled elements in the Nien were a hindrance to their solid cooperation with the Taipings.

2. The Relations of the Nien with Secret Societies The Nien fought not only alongside the Taipings but also in alliance with other secret societies and local bandit groups. Secret societies in northern China were generally branches of the White Lotus Society with special names in different localities, perhaps for hiding their identities. Their organizations, such as in divisions and banners, and their conduct, such as the sacking of government buildings and treasuries, were similar to those of the Nien — possibly because they were the same socio-political products and they influenced one another. Several of these societies connected with the Nien were referred to in government sources simply as "Chiao-fei," or "religiously inspired bandits," and they were active in Shantung and Honan. Sometimes they acted independently and sometimes they cooperated with the Nien and other forces. One of these religiously inspired groups appeared in Ch'iu-hsien and Hsin-hsien, Shantung. The organization had long been in existence and its members became active in the early 1850's, but they were ignored by the local government. When higher officials urged the magistrate to investigate their activities, a number of innocent people were falsely implicated. In 1861 several hundred secret society members attacked the city of Ch'iu-hsien, but they were repulsed, and they abandoned flags, 32

The Taipings did bring their propaganda literature to northern China, and they required those who cooperated with them to keep their hair long. Hung Hsiu-ch'uan treated the Nien chiefs nicely by generously conferring on them titles of "prince." One who particularly did this was Li Hsiu-ch'eng; he tried his best to win the hearts of Li Chao-shou, Miao P'ei-lin, and Chang Lo-hsing by virtue. See Li's confession, collected by Lo Erh-kang, op. cit., 83-85, 90-92.

THE RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH SECRET SOCIETIES

121

33

arrows, society books, and other documents. From these pieces of evidence, one knows that they had some regulations and a secret language. After their defeat at Ch'iu-hsien they advanced on the neighboring district of Kuan-hsien. The magistrate heard of their activities, but he fled instead of preparing to defend the city. The city hall was burned and the prisoners freed from the municipal jail. Hsin-hsien was attacked at the same time and many houses were burned.84 The members of these societies at first sought lighter taxes and a reduction of the labor service for grain transportation in the Grand Canal. When their requests were ignored by the local officials, the secret society members and salt smugglers took the opportunity to agitate against the government. In particular, they chose to soothe their wrath by killing government officials and their families.35 Strangely enough, their leaders also were rich. They were descendants either of the White Lotus Society or of the Eight Diagram Society,36 and had been spreading their religion for many decades. They accumulated great wealth without plundering because their followers sent them tribute from all districts. When the lower Yangtze valley was disturbed by the Taipings, these leaders trained militia, dug moats, and built forts, some of which measured as much as fifteen li around and resembled large cities.37 The importance of these secret societies must not be ignored. They were organized into several groups, including the Red Turbans and the Yellow Turbans. These two were subsequently combined, and each unit of one thousand men had a colored flag. Whenever they went out, they searched for horses, wine, and food; they also compelled young peasants to join them on pain of death.38 Some of their leaders wore yellow uniforms and some wore red. They all had seals, and they captured enough guns and cannon from the government to supply and arm their forces. When they were at war with the government, the secret society leaders unbraided their hair and appeared in red uniforms to read prayers at an 33

If Sheng-pao's memorial is reliable, the supreme chief of the White Lotus Society was Chang Shan-chi, w h o headed the Yellow banners, while Yang T'ai-lei, Sung Ching-shih, and others were chiefs of other colored banners, among which was a green banner. Each banner chief commanded from three to five hundred men, and each member had a small square flag as a badge. See STCHCL. 12.9, 11-12 and passim. 34 STCHCL, 12.1. 35 Ibid., 12.1b-2. 36 According to the Shan-tung t'ung-chih (117.47b), "the Hsin-ch'iu bandits" were members of the Eight Diagram Society. But according to STCHCL (13.11), some of them seem to be followers of the White Lotus, and others, the Eight Diagram. 37 Ibid., 13.12. 38 Tung-a-hsien hsiang-t'u chih, 3.3lb-35.

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RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

altar; then all the guns were fired simultaneously from the holes in the city wall so that the enemy might be repulsed by their artillery and magic power.39 A similar religiously inspired organization existed in Huang-yai, Shantung, under Chang Chi-chung, a descendant of an aristocratic family of Yang-chou, who had received many years of schooling but couldnever pass the civil service examinations. In the 1820's, Yang-chou was very prosperous and full of entertainers. One magician was versed in the principles of yin and yang, and good at breath control and at avoiding bad luck. It was claimed that he could also summon ghosts by spells and charms, and that he could make himself invisible. Chang Chi-chung learned much from this magician, and after a long apprenticeship he too acquired many disciples. Near the end of the Tao-kuang period (1821-1850), the salt monopoly was strictly enforced by the government, forcing many salt smugglers to become disciples of Chang Chi-chung in order to take joint action against the government. Chang and his disciples were driven from Kiangsu to Huang-yai„ Shantung, in 1856, by the warfare in the lower Yangtze region. There they founded a religious sect called "Huang-yai chiao," and built forts for self-protection. The Huang-yai religion prohibited smoking, drinking, gambling, and adultery. Its members wished to spend honest and puritan lives around the secluded spot, Huang-yai. They intended to reform society by their exemplary conduct. Booklets were written and public lectures given. Many people were said to have sold their real estate in order to move their families and follow the popular founder Chang Chi-chung, who not only had magic power but was also a scholar and a man of integrity. By and by the religious sect spread from Shantung to Honan and Chihli. Each disciple was required to pay a certain amount of dues, and from these dues much wealth accumulated. Because numerous people flocked to Huang-yai, the government suspected sedition. Some of Chang's devotees started a revolt against the government in 1866, and occupied Chi-nan and Ching-chou. The governor of Shantung urged Chang and his followers to surrender, but they declined, because they had an agreement with the Nien whereby each would help the other to the end. Synchronized with the activity of the Huang-yai chiao, the Nien invaded the south of Ts'ao-chou in order to relieve the pressure on the secret society. The governor of Shantung was ready to fight the Nien with modern weapons — guns with explosive shells — but both the secret society and the Nien planned to fight it out with him. The secret society :9

'

STCHCL, 13.1b-2b.

THE RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH SECRET SOCIETIES

123

was finally defeated in October, 1866, but all the members, inspired by their religious beliefs or superstitions, preferred death to surrender. Many families of Chang's adherents were recorded to have burned themselves to ashes. The remnants of the Huang-yai religion in other areas adopted a new name — "Tsai-li chiao" — keeping the same tenets. The members of the Tsai-li chiao still survive in northern China.40 Another secret society, "Wen-hsien chiao," in Tsou-hsien, Shantung, was also a branch of the White Lotus. Its leader, Sung Chi-p'eng, a man with some schooling, summoned a number of followers as a "militia for self-protection." After a few months Sung gathered several thousand men, still calling themselves a militia, and made guns and spears out of agricultural implements. They held mass meetings at night, burned incense, and prayed, dispersing again at dawn. They had no religious books or symbols, but they troubled the local people considerably.41 Within three years the members of this White Lotus Society in Tsouhsien were acting much like the Nien, kidnapping children of rich families for ransom and killing them when their demands were not met.42 In Yiian Chia-san's private correspondence, he viewed the secret society Wen-hsien-chiao with an opinion different from that of the preceding statement, which was based on an official source. Yiian said that the religiously inspired bandits of Tsou-hsien were, after all, not bandits, but objectors against the government; because the heavy taxation and corvée hurt the feelings of the populace, they assembled together to oppose the government officials. Customarily the natives of Tsou-hsien were fond of burning incense; the local officials, therefore, accused them of being religiously-inspired bandits. Many were indiscriminately killed, and the majority of the populace was driven to form a diehard party under a standard.43 Thus the responsibility for the local uprising should be largely laid on the regional officials. The uprising, which started in 1853, spread to mountainous areas and to several adjacent districts of Tsou-hsien, and was not suppressed by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in until August, 1864.44 Seng was engaged by the Tsou-hsien and other rebels on many occasions while he was suppressing the Nien army. Another secret society leader, Sung Ching-shih, was so famous that scholars in present-day Communist China have made special field surJ(l

Ibid., 21.2-6. A special article on this religious sect is written by Hsieh Hsingyao, entitled, "Tao-Hsien shih-tai Pei-fang ti Huang-yai chiao," I-ching, no. 3, 120-124. 41 Fang-lueh, 84.23b, and STCHCL, 19.1. 42 Hsin-t'ai-hsien hsiang-t'u-chih, 1.11. 43 TMKC-correspondence, 1.33b. » Nien-chun, III.405-406.

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RELATIONS OF THE N1EN WITH OTHER REBELS

veys and recently published monographs dealing with his movement.45 Sung Ching-shih was a native of T'ang-i, Shantung. He was a master of boxing, a Chinese form of calisthenics for personal defense, and he was very skillful in handling clubs and swords. According to old government sources, he was employed as a tutor of boxing in a rich man's family in Kuan-hsien for some time, and then in 1854 he served as a militia officer under the Shantung governor. His soldiers learned boxing from him. He was, at first, merely a sympathizer of a secret society, but the local government accused him of being a regular member. His friend, Wang Chan-chi, was arrested and jailed in 1861. Sung Ching-shih and his eighteen diehard comrades freed him by force. Fleeing from arrest, Sung gathered many rascals around him and became a bandit chief. At first he only took provisions from the people; then he demanded weapons and horses; and finally he gathered a large number of followers under a "black flag." « The field investigators, however, learned a different story about Sung's revolt. They found that Sung was a hawker of beancurd. Though poor, he thoroughly learned the skill of boxing and of handling clubs and swords. For opposing heavy taxation on poor land which was good only for millet and sorghum, he became a peasant chief. Soon he was put into a jail in the district of Kuan-hsien; other peasants found eighteen braves to take him out. By this deed, therefore, they had formally rebelled against the local government.47 A more sensible statement seems to be given in the local history of Ch'ing-p'ing, which informs us that Sung Ch'ing-shih excelled in physical strength and boxing, and was hired as a steward by a rich man of T'ang-i. Attempting to blackmail the rich man, the district magistrate arrested 45

Sung Ching-shih shili-liao, compiled by Sun Yiieh and others of the College of Arts, Peking University. A number of students went to the native town of Sung Ching-shih to interview the old people in that area. The best result was in discovering the good impression Sung left with his fellow countrymen. Other documentary materials concerning Sung Ching-shih are also collected in this monograph. Another field study of Sung Ching-shih was made by the famous playwrite Ch'en Po-ch'en and a number of others in 1952. They interviewed 724 very old people in 163 villages, 8 hsien or districts in Shantung. They intended to collect material about Sung Ching-shih for plays and movies. A long report of the results of the field study is made by Ch'en Po-ch'en, Sung Ching-shih li-shih t'iao-ch'a chi (Peking, 1957), 260 pp. with illustrations. 46 This paragraph is based on official sources such as Fang-liieh, 19.9; Lin-ch'ing hsien-chih, 1.15b-16; and YCCL, 13.4. 47 Sung Ching-shih sliih-liao, 3. The value of this field study is undoubtedly great. However, it should be received with some caution, for the information supplied by old inhabitants was mostly hearsay through vague memory. A large part of the book containing a reproduction of source materials from gazetteers and government publications is very useful.

THE RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH SECRET SOCIETIES

125

and jailed him on the grounds that he harbored bandits. Sung broke into the jail with a number of his friends and freed his master and other prisoners. The magistrate dared not report his disgraceful failure to his superior, and the bandits' success made the rebels even more active.48 Sung Ching-shih's revolt lasted three years (1860-1863) and the remnants of his command were not wiped out until 1871. His revolt began in T'ang-i, Shantung (March, 1860), and was soon helped by a secret society leader. After burning many villages in several districts and courageously defeating many local forces, Sung Ching-shih was faced by the Manchu general, Sheng-pao, who claimed several victories over Sung in order to receive credit from the imperial court. But he invited Sung to surrender to him instead of putting him to the sword. The real truth is found by the field investigators who stated that Shenpao was not victorious but was defeated by Sung Ching-shih. For his own interests, Sheng-pao made a temporary compromise with Sung under the guise of an invited surrender, and he recommended that Sung receive official rank from the Ch'ing government. Although he nominally surrendered, Sung Ching-shih still kept on good terms with the White Lotus Society. Sung and his troops were sent to Honan and Anhwei (February-May, 1862) to battle against the Nien, and to Shensi (fall and winter, 1862) to fight the Mohammedan rebels. On these fronts Sung's stout-hearted Shantung fighters became impotent because they were very friendly to their opponents, avoiding conflict and supplying them with government ammunition. Sheng-pao still submitted reports of victory to Peking. In the early part of 1863, however, Sung Ching-shih was not so hypocritical; he openly revolted against the imperial government. His well-drilled cavalry marched in good order from Shensi to Chihli. No government force dared to impede Sung's advance until he reached the eastern part of Chihli where he made allies with other secret societies and threatened the safety of the capital. Finally he returned to his home base in Shantung (January-June). He claimed to be one branch of the Nien, once again dominating the districts of T'ang-i, Lin-ch'ing, and Ch'ing-p'ing. He also raided the border along Shantung and Chihli. So formidable was Sung Ching-shih that the great General Seng-kolin-ch'in, assisted by the Chihli Governor-General, Liu Ch'ang-yu's new battalion equipped with foreign weapons, was ordered in September, 1864, to suppress him. Clever, valiant, and experienced, Sung lured the imperialists to his ambushes and gave them several bitter lessons. After a few weeks of hard fighting, Sung's force was defeated and scattered, 48

Ch'ing-p'ing

hsien-chih,

quoted in Nien-chiin,

III. 519.

126

RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

but it roamed through Shantung, Chihli, and Honan for several more years.49 The fate of Sung Ching-shih has developed several myths. Some sources intimate that his friends finally intoxicated him and turned him over to Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, who had him executed.50 Another source states that after having been defeated by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, Sung Ching-shih at first joined Miao P'ei-lin and then followed the Nien at Po-chou. After the annihilation of the Nien in 1868, he changed his name to Hsu Lien-sheng and made a living by teaching boxing and treating patients with magic power. He frequented Kuei-te, Hsii-chou, and Po-chou. He was finally arrested and executed in March, 1871, by the Anhwei governor, Yinghan, an expert in gaining favor of the imperial court.51 But the truth of the story has been discovered by the field investigators who were informed by the survivors of Sung's fellow-villagers and sons of his subordinates that Sung Ching-shih, about forty years old in 1864, was neither arrested nor killed. He visited his home town in 1900 and lived with the family of an important general, Wen Lien-ko, under the black banner. Wen's son still recalls Sung Ching-shih's appearance (Sung was then about seventy-five years old), and other villagers also attested to the visit.52 Thus the Anhwei governor's report of the execution of Hsu Lien-sheng as Sung Ching-shih, in 1871, was simply designed to relieve the mind of the Manchu court, which after the suppression of the Nien was interested in Sung's whereabouts. 3. Nien's Cooperation with Local Forces Numerous local forces frequently referred to in official sources along with the Nien, were the "Fu-fei," or "Turban bandits." The Fu-fei were mostly sailors and porters on a part of the Grand Canal. Grain was transported from the Yangtze to the Huai River and thence to the artificial channel, and every year hundreds of ships were used for this purpose and thousands of people along the channel made a living from this transportation work. The sailors and porters usually used their turbans as hats to protect themselves from the sunshine, wind, and cold, or as convenient towels. After a time this towel was considered a symbol of their 49

Sung Ching-shih shih-liao, introduction, 31, 36-38, 41, 43-44, 45-48, 81-86, and 88-93. Cf. Ch'en Po-ch'en, pp. 85-95, which contain the same story. 50 Lin-ch'ing hsien-chih, 1.16; and Fang-Iueh 19.9. 61 CSL-KH, 306.4 and STCHCL, 16.14. 52 Sung Ching-shih shih-liao, introduction, 7-8; Cf. Ch'en Po-ch'en. pp. 221-25.

127

NIEN'S COOPERATION WITH LOCAL FORCES 53

association, and hence they were called "Turban bandits" in some districts of southern Shantung and northern Kiangsu. In other places along the channel such as T'eng-hsien and I-shan, they were called Kunfei, or "Club bandits." These men obviously used clubs or sticks as their weapons. The Club Bandits hid themselves in the daytime and acted at night, but they dared not oppose the government overtly. Like the Nien, the Fu-fei also had a long history. Even during the peaceful time of Chia-ch'ing (1796-1820) and Tao-kuang (1821-1850), the Grand Canal was troubled with banditry, and every year the government forces arrested and killed a number of such bandits. The Fu-fei of I-chou in 1849 fought off a government force which attempted to arrest them.54 Beginning in 1851 the "Turban bandits" multiplied rapidly, and when grain transportation in the Grand Canal was interrupted by the Taipings in the spring of 1853, thousands of the transportation workers lost their jobs. Their hardships were aggravated in successive years by the flooding of the Yellow River, a disaster which rendered thousands of people destitute and homeless. The old died and the young became bandits. The "Turban bandits" plundered the people and spread to many districts, fighting the militia everywhere. When the Taipings in 1854 staged a large-scale invasion of Shantung, the activities of the "Turban bandits" were ignored by the local government until the following year, when some government troops tried to suppress them. The "Club bandits" and the "Turban bandits" joined hands to give the harassed government forces much trouble. The bandits were soon too strong to be suppressed easily. Again like the Nien, the Fu-fei also had some loose organizations. They had a banner system and yii — forts or walled villages. In addition they cherished some imperial ambitions, as was shown by the practice of keeping their hair long, offering sacrifice to their flags, issuing public announcements with presumptuous seals, and claiming their leaders to be "King of the East of the Yellow Sea (Hai-tung-wang) and "King of Nine Hills" ( C h i u - s h a n wang).55 They were said to have imitated very closely 55

There is such an expression as "chieh-nien" or "chieh-fu," which may be interpreted as "to form a nien," "to form a fu," or "to associate with the Nien people," "to associate with the turban workers." Thus the definition of the Fu-fei given in the original source Shan-tung chun-hsing chi-liieh (17.1) and translated as "Turban bandits," makes good sense. See also Shan-tung chin-tai-phih tzu-liao, 205-218. M CSL-TK, 466.12b-13. 56 A Fu leader, Ch'iao Feng-nien, assumed the title, Tung-hai wang. When he was wounded in the battlefield, he stabbed himself to death rather than allow himself to be captured by his enemies. Anohter Fu chieftain, Ch'iu Ch'un, made himself "King of Nine Hills" in Shantung in 1861 (STCHCL, 17.2 and 16b).

128

RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

the Nien of Anhwei. Their leaders liked to call themselves "Tigers" — a suggestion of their physical strength and fierce nature. To make up for the deficiency of the Fu leaders' knowledge, some licentiates or "halfbaked" scholars served as their advisers or assistants.56 Their methods of operation were similar to those of the Nien. Many of their strong young men enrolled en masse in government troops or local corps, waiting for propitious moments to fight for their own ends; this infiltration resulted in frequent mutinies in Shantung. Then they impelled other young people to fight for their cause. On a couple of occasions each chieftain managed to command a multitude said to be nearly ten thousand strong.57 Hence the force of the Fu-fei was also formidable. Their momentum increased by cooperation with the Nien and with religiously inspired bandits. Following in the footsteps of the Anhwei Nien on the latter's invasion of Shantung, the Fu-fei attacked and burned the suburb of T'eng-hsien. While Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was chasing the Nien from Tai-erh-chuang to P'ei-hsien, Kiangsu, he became entangled with the Fu-fei both at the front and the rear of his lines. Then in 1862 the Fu allied with the Nien in P'ei-hsien to recover their domain in the north. The Fu of Lan-shan and Fei-hsien, Shantung, joined the religiously inspired bandits and the Nien of Anhwei in combating the combined force of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and the local corps. They were eventually defeated by the imperialists, however, in 1863, after playing havoc with the country for twelve years.58 One may presume that the "Turban," "Club," and religiously inspired bandits, as well as the Nien, must have cooperated well in order to last so many years, but actually their cooperation was loose. The "Turban bandits" of Lan-shan and Fei-hsien even competed with each other for supremacy. Their relations were cemented only by ruthless pressure from the imperialists.59 The Nien also cooperated with the well-known "Long-spear Society" (Ch'ang-ch'iang-hui), which was also called I-hsin-t'uan, or the "Onemind Organization." 60 Its original purpose was to suppress the Nien, but it later turned also to rebellion. This "Long-spear Society" had a far56

Such as the Old Tigers, Cheng Ssu Iao-hu and Pi Ssu lao-hu, (STCHCL, 17.16b and 20); the four Chin brothers were called the four tigers. The licentiates Chou Ch'ing-p'ing, Kung Pao-t'ing, and Wang Wen-feng perhaps served in the capacities as mentioned in the text (STCHCL, 17.20b, 18.2b, and 4b.). 51 STCHCL, 17.18 and 18.3b. «8 Ibid., 17.16, 17.20, 18.6, 13b-14, 19; and Nien-chun, III. 417. 56 STCHCL, 18.14-15. «a- STCHCL, 10.19.

NIEN'S COOPERATION WITH LOCAL FORCES

129

reaching influence even as late as the 1920's, when its members were still active in Honan and Hopei. The government began to recruit militia in 1855, ordering the men to secure long spears at their own cost, and naming them the "Long-spear Militia." They were maintained by regular tax funds, and since much money had already been spent on the militia the government had to reduce their number sharply in order to meet other urgent needs. The "Long-spear Militia" felt that they had made contributions in suppressing the Nien, and they resented having their support cut off, so they raised money themselves. Soon some of the leaders of the "Long-spear Militia" began to work off personal grudges against other militia chiefs, and the local magistrates could not stop them. The "Long-spear Society" was first organized in Ts'ao-chou, Shantung, and it gradually spread to some districts in Honan. The members fought against Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and other government forces, and when defeated, joined the Nien in Anhwei and other areas. Thus two erstwhile enemies became allies.61 Without the protection of soldiers and officials, many good people in Shantung were compelled to join one unit or other of the local bandits. The anarchy in the area was such that no one could tell whether his neighbors were members of secret societies, or whether they were salt smugglers or local bandits.62 The "village union" (Lien-chuang-hui) was another organization designed to remedy the helpless situation. It, too, had strong revolutionary feelings against the incompetent government that neglected the people. The village unions were started in 1844 to protect themselves against attacks by bandits and to fight against the increasing taxation. A decade later they were still active. Ever since the price of silver had gone up in the nineteenth century, the tax, which had to be paid in cash converted according to the prevailing price of silver, had remained nominally the same, while its actual value had increased greatly. In addition to this hardship, the flooding of the Yellow River near K'ai-feng, Honan, created other problems. The people were required to contribute lumber and other materials for building defenses against the river, and the magistrate would deduct the cash value of these materials from their regular taxes. Since the tax was heavy and harshly levied, a villager, Yo Ch'ao-fan, started a revolt against the government. He persuaded other peasants to form more village unions. A typical public meeting was attended by several thousand people carrying their agricultural implements. When they proceeded to the city the frightened magistrate promised the demon"

62

Ho-tse hsien-chih, STCHCL, 11.2b.

18.12-15b; and Fang-lueh,

142.2.

130

RELATIONS OF THE NIEN W I T H OTHER REBELS

strators that half of the tax could be paid in silver and half in copper in order to reduce the burden. 43 This is one account of the trouble caused by the village unions. Another statement is somewhat different. It says that when the Taipings came to Honan in 1853, and the government ordered the people to raise a militia, the gentry and the villagers hurriedly organized village unions. In the district of Yii-chou, Honan, there was a bad man named Liu Hua-chen who was the head of a village union in the eastern part of the district. He invited other able men to equip themselves with swords and guns at their own cost. Since taxes were then being collected, and members of the village unions were having difficulties in meeting their obligations, Liu wanted to gather a large crowd to request the reduction of taxes. He called a hundred and sixty-five persons to see the magistrate of the city, but thirty-one of them were reluctant to follow him and escaped on the way. Liu Hua-chen and his followers entered the city and asked to see the magistrate about the reduction of taxes, but their real purpose was to free one of Liu's relatives from jail. In the ensuing battle, the rioters were defeated, and they scattered to the mountainous areas to plunder travelers. Another large-scale riot occurred in February, 1855, in the neighbouring district of Mi-hsien.64 Though the other account differs slightly, both claim that the rejection of the heavy taxes was the motive for the disturbance. Apparently the original purpose of the Lien-chuang-hui, or village unions, was a means of defense against the bandits. Such organizations were necessary because local bandits appeared everywhere after the Taipings passed through Honan. Unexpectedly, no sooner had the unions been formed than they were utilized by some leaders to rebel against the heavy taxes and especially against the troublesome government runners who maltreated the people while collecting the taxes. In 1854 and 1855, the village unions rioted not only in the districts just mentioned but also in many other places, such as Huai-ch'ing and Wei-hui. The provincial director of education in Honan, Chang Chih-wan, reported in a memorial to the throne that during the previous year (1854), there had been numerous cases of mobs refusing to pay taxes and killing the government runners in Honan. This was because the continued military activity of the past few years had necessitated the help and the contribution of money and manpower by the people; yet the people of all the areas which were overrun by bandits were greatly worried and there was little commerce even though the harvest was not bad. While the price of silver M M

Liti-hsien chih, Y C C L , 2.1-3.

14.11.

NIEN'S COOPERATION WITH LOCAL FORCES

131

had gone up daily, the price of grain had been going down, and the people had suffered a great deal.85 This clearly indicates that there was good economic reason for the actions of the village unions. An imperial decree to the governor of Honan, dated June 24, 1855, reads: T h e local militia was originally intended, for the protection of the villages and towns. Recently, however, refusals to pay taxes and other troubles appeared in Chang-te, Wei-hui, Huai-ch'ing, K'ai-feng, and other districts of H o n a n . All were caused by the 'village unions' w h o , under the n a m e of a militia, had gathered a multitude c f people in a revolt against the government w h i c h had taken g o o d care of the people in peaceful times but h a d lacked g o o d m e t h o d s to save the situation in time of emergency; they thus encouraged others to revolt also. 8 6

Government forces were sent to Honan to disband the village unions, and this was accomplished. The same organizations, however, soon appeared in Shansi and Anhwei in 1858, and in Honan in 1861.87 It was in Shantung and Honan that the members of the village unions adopted some superstitions to strengthen the minds of their followers, and it was also there that they made alliances with the Nien. In the district of Fou-yang in Anhwei, Wang T'ing-chen practiced some sort of religion and taught his disciples to fool the rural people. At first he had only two hundred followers. They persuaded some Nien members to join the group, and also made a secret alliance with the Taipings. They compelled the villagers in 1859 to fight against the government forces. They claimed official titles and posted public notices; they claimed, too, that they had magic powers and could make their spears fly to kill people. Seeing their mystic and colorful garb, the government militia were frightened and usually fled before them, so that the activities of the "village unions" lasted for a few more years.88 Some of the leaders of the village unions, like K'ao Yung-ch'ing, were descendants of the White Lotus Society, and some of his followers were heads of the Nien. The chief of the Eight Diagram banner of the Nien, Liu Kou, visited K'ao Yung-ch'ing, and thus the Nien had connections with the superstitious secret societies.69 «5

Ibid., 2.8. Ibid., 9.11. 67 The "village unions" in Chihli not only refused to pay government tax and to supply labor services, but also set up tribunals exercising judicial authority over the people. If anyone tried to appeal to higher court against their decision, the man would be executed and his house burned. See Nien-chiin, V. 188. See also YCCL, 2.14b. 68 Ibid., 2.18-20 and 24. 68 Ibid., 2.28b-29. en

132

RELATIONS OF THE NIEN WITH OTHER REBELS

4. Nien Relations

with the Moslem

Rebels

There were many other local groups too small and unimportant for us to mention here specifically. The Moslem Rebellion, inspired by the Taiping movement, had some relations with the Nien, who tried to make an alliance with those rebels, too.70 Chang Tsung-yii and Ch'en Te-ts'ai (a Taiping leader) marched with their adherents to Shensi in 1862, for the purpose of diverting the concentrated attack on Nanking by government forces. The Mohammedan Rebellion lasted for fifteen years — from 1862 to 1877. The result of the alliance was, however, unsatisfactory. The Moslems' alliance with the Nien was based on their confidence in the power of the Nien to fight against the government force in Shensi in order to stamp out Chinese economic and racial prejudice. The Nien, on the other hand, tried to utilize the Moslems to divide the government force, so that they themselves could freely overrun a larger area. The Moslems wanted to occupy Shensi; the Nien hoped to return to Honan without government troops in pursuit. Each group thus had its own interest.71 Misunderstanding and mistrust soon split this alliance which had been entered into for the sake of convenience. Having examined the relations of the Nien with other groups, one finds that the secret societies, the local bandits, and other similar forces existed at the same time in Honan, Shantung, and Anhwei. Some of the local bandits were perhaps exaggeratedly reported to be formidable bands of Nien; magnified reports were made to alleviate the responsibility of the local governors who should have been able to suppress small disturbances but who might be excused for their failure to stamp out a foe against whom many famous generals had failed. That was probably why the Nien army endured so long and appeared to have been so numerous. Sometimes it was really difficult to distinguish whether rebels were "Nien-fei," "Chiao-fei," or even something else, since these groups often mixed and wore no distinctive uniforms.72 These various rebellious units, often appearing simultaneously but seldom coordinated, indicate the general background of political and economic discontent in nineteenth-century China. These units, the ac70

According to M a Hsiao-shih, the Taipings, somewhat like the Third International, sent Sha Ch'ien t o Yunnan to encourage and plan for T u Wen-hsiu's M o h a m m e d a n Rebellion. T h e M o s l e m Revolt in the Northwest was also inspired and participated in by Taiping leaders. See Ma's Hsi-pei hui-tsu ko-ming chien-shih ( A Brief History of M o h a m m e d a n Revolution in the Northwest), pp. 1-3, and passim. 71 Tso Wen-hsiang-kung tson-kao, 22.26. "2 Y C C L , 6.2b and 10.5.

NIEN RELATIONS W I T H THE MOSLEM

REBELS

133

counts of which are far from being complete,73 lacked formal political ideas, and their cooperation depended on the exigencies of circumstances. Though they did not refuse to take unified action, they had no solid basis for cooperation, nor had they a strong, outstanding leader to goad them to fight for a high ideal. The Taipings did help the Nien militarily after 1864, but they were not very successful in actual political and ideological influence on the Nien's allies. To indoctrinate a huge mass of mostly illiterate peasants requires a great deal of time and a large number of trained cadres; the Taipings possessed neither of these elements, especially after the fall of their capital at Nanking.

•3 For instance, no attempt has been made to mention the Lakeside Communities (Hu-t'uan) in the text. These communities were formed during the inundation from the Yellow River in 1854 and 1855 when many displaced people under the leadership of T'ang Shou-chung and others moved to live near the bank of the Hui-shan Lake, east of Hung-tse in the province of Shantung. The fertile land near the lake was ownerless and consequently numerous refugees moved to live there; they covered a long strip of land around the lake for more than a hundred li with more than ten thousand inhabitants. At that time, the local officials could not drive these people away because they were homeless; instead, they were permitted to remain there temporarily, but they had to pay a tax for the new land which they had opened for agricultural purposes. Jealous of the rich yields, the original natives near the lake accused the newcomers of having usurped their properties; these accusations resulted in frequent feuds between the old residents and the newcomers in that area. Helplessly, the leaders of the Lake Communities invited the Nien army in November, 1865, to live in their communities under such famous leaders as Jen Chu, Lai Wen-kuang, and others. Immediately, the old residents reported the fact to the government, hoping that the government would wipe out all these newcomers as Nien bandits. F o r selfdefense, the refugee settlers were compelled to take arms to fight against both the local force as well as the imperial troops. The feud carried on for quite a few years. But no attempt has been made in this study to make a complete account of all such groups of local forces (Nien-chiin, 1.126-127).

V. A History of the Nien Movement and Its Suppression

After discussing the Nien organization, leadership and relations with other rebels, it is now easy to look at the history of the whole movement without much digression, and at the government leaders and the tactics they used in coping with it. The Nien rebels were suppressed with the concentration of the best minds and troops of the nation. More than twenty high officials, approximately half Chinese and half Manchu, failed in their campaigns against the insurgents. The number of generals engaged in the long conflict varies in different sources,1 and obviously one cannot discuss the roles of any but the few most important men who were deeply involved in the operations against the Nien army. The Nien movement may be divided into three phases besides the long initial stage, 1797-1851, which has been traced in chapter II. The first phase covers its development from 1851 to 1865, when government officials of inferior caliber failed to make a determined effort to exterminate the rebels, preferring to try to get along with the Nien in order to maintain their own positions. Taking advantage of such favorable conditions, the Nien grew rapidly, expanding from headquarters in the north of Anhwei to an area covering seven provinces in northern China. The second phase of the Nien movement, lasting from October, 1865, to January, 1866, saw it grow even larger and stronger, because the Nien were joined by the remnants of the Taipings after Nanking was taken. The Nien infantry was converted into cavalry, greatly increasing its mobility. The famous Mongolian general, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, was killed in battle and none of the remaining generals among the Mongols and the Manchus was able to replace him. The court then had to order Tseng Kuo-fan, who had suppressed the Taiping Rebellion, to fight against the 1 In Wo-yang feng-t'u chi (15.29), twenty-four generals are listed; in Liang Ch'ich'ao's "Biography of Li Hung-chang" in Y in-ping-shih-ho-chi (an alternative title is Ssu-shih-nien-lai ta-shih-ch, or "Great Events During the Last Forty Years," lithographic edition, undated), twenty-two generals are listed: and in K u o T'ing-i's T'aip'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih (appendix, 153-58), a detailed list of thirty-one generals is given; if the ranking subordinates of the Huai and other armies are not excluded, the total list may exceed sixty generals. A small number of these generals is tabulated in Siang-tseh Chiang, op. cit., 78-80.

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE MOVEMENT,

1851-1865

135

Nien army. Despite his prestige and skill, Tseng Kuo-fan could do nothing but resort to elaborate defensive measures, such as building dikes and digging ditches to encircle the Nien. These methods were so inadequate that Tseng was compelled by public opinion among other reasons to resign, recommending Li Hung-chang to succeed him. The third phase of the Nien movement, from 1866 to 1868, was a period of decline for the rebels, even though they once briefly menaced the safety of Peking. They were divided into two groups — the eastern Nien and the western Nien — which were suppressed within seven months of each other by the concentrated efforts of the best generals with the most modern equipment then available in China.2 1.

The First Phase of the Nien Movement,

1851-1865

The Nien as we have seen at the infant stage comprised numerous bands with which the leaders thought to satisfy their followers' desires for material gain or vengeance. The rebel bands were scattered in seven provinces, and any small unit could claim to be a Nien. These units did not cause serious trouble in time of peace, but, inspired by the Taipings and distressed by the repeated inundations from the Yellow River and by the other factors given above, the Nien emerged into the open in 1851. A year after this, they felt that they needed a closer organization under unified leadership. They attempted to set up headquarters at Chih-ho, Anhwei. They had a checkered life, for Chih-ho was broken into by the magistrate of Su-chou in September, 1852; it was again routed by Yiian Chia-san's troops in December, 1853, and June, 1856.3 The government soldiers in occupation were a pitiful lot; they dared not stay long at Chihho lest the rebels and their sympathizers should fight back at the earliest opportunity, for the latter had not offered stubborn resistance, but fled before the advent of imperial troops. Therefore they soon had to abandon the captured stronghold to their occupants. Meanwhile, the Nien worked hard to build up a strong headquarters surrounded by a large number of satellites at Chih-ho. They consolidated 2

This division of stages of the Nien movement is merely for the convenience of treatment. Chiang Ti divides the Nien movement into five stages: 1. The Nien Party (Nien T'ang) period 1814-1853. 2. The First Nien Army Period 1853-1855. 3. The Middle Nien Army Period 1855-1864. 4. The Late Nien Army Period 1864-1866. 5. The Last Nien Army Period 1866-1868. Kuang-ming jih-pao. July 5, 1956. P. 3. 3 Fang-lueh, 4.2-3; TMKC, 1A.22, and 2.46-48.

136

A HISTORY OF THE NIEN MOVEMENT AND ITS SUPPRESSION

their central domain along the Huai Basin in Anhwei by converting or impressing the populace to their standards. They had such good luck that they could move unopposed into a large area which may be called "no soldiers land," because all available fighters had been sent to combat or to prevent the blitzkrieg of the Taipings. This area covered the points from Lu-chou, Anhwei, to Hsii-chou, Kiangsu; to Kuei-te, Honan; and to the Hung-tse lake in the east — a radius of six hundred li or approximately two hundred miles.4 The grand counselors noted in 1858 that all party members of the bandits were in a radius of three or four hundred li around Chih-ho. Brigadier General Chiu Lien-en's soldiers had to inch forward very cautiously in order to avoid a sneak attack from the rear by the Nien army.5 The Nien domain was subsequently well established in the years 1857 to 1863. To strengthen their control, numerous yu or walled villages6 had been constructed or conquered by 1857. Thereafter the Nien gained 4

TMKC, 3.6b. Fang-lueh, 16.25. 6 Originally "yu" meant an embankment or dike to protect the rice fields in the area between the Yangtze and Huai Rivers where the fields were lower than the river-beds. Later on the word for these dikes to protect rice-fields, in the southern dialect, and the term for the forts to curtail the activities of bandits, in the northern, became homonyms; both were pronounced as "wei," which literally means a circle, and the character was written as "yu"; thus, yu came to be used to denote the idea of a fortified wall or dike to resist the advance of bandits. Some of the yii were huge structures. For instance, the Chin-pao-yii in Anhwei had a circumference of more than a hundred li and included several districts, like Tang-t'u and Wu-hu (Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, Yung-art hsiipien, 2.22). It was very common for the local people in the provinces where the Nien prevailed to build yii for self-protection. As early as 1852 when the Nien plundered Fengtai, Anhwei, Miao P'ei-Iin suggested the construction of a yii to resist the depredations of the invaders. He dug a moat, using the soil to build a wall to protect his own village. The Nien came before it was completed, but all the people fought bravely and turned them back to their headquarters at Chih-ho. Miao P'ei-lin then assembled more than one thousand men, and a large number of horses and weapons for the use of the new force which he was training. He was given the title of head of the militia, and he asked the local government to order other villages to make the same construction as he had built (Feng-t'ai hsien-chih, 7.9). In Honan there was the long wall of the Teng clan which was more than ten feet high and had three rows of loopholes (YCCL, 7.3). There was another wall more than seventy thousand feet (about twenty li) in circumference, which had a moat ten to fifteen feet deep and twenty feet wide at the surface and ten feet wide at the bottom. The wall had been built with the earth removed from the moat and had many loopholes (Fang-lueh, 99.19b-20). A large number of such walls and moats were built in Honan, Shantung, and other provinces. There were more than eighty yii in Meng-ch'eng and Po-chou in 1863, which gives some idea of the popularity of that type of defense work (Po-chou-chih, 8.34). Note: Yii is also translated by Siang-tseh Chiang as "earthwall communities," or "earthwall." Since some of the walls were made of stone or brick as one still can see them surrounding large villages in Honan, Shantung, and Anhwei, Chiang's translation is not adopted in this study. 5

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more momentum. A flood in the Wo and Fei Rivers submerged many Nien walled communities. Chiang T'ai-ling led the Nien and their families of several hundred yii, and Chang Min-hsing, Chang Lo-hsing's brother, coerced the starving masses at Po-chou to serve as a vanguard. The five banners of the Nien rebels in 1860 totaled more than 100,000 members.7 This force sufficiently safeguarded the headquarters of the Anhwei Nien army, centered at Chih-ho. The nucleus covered such cities as Wo-yang, Meng-ch'eng, Po-chou, Su-chou, and Lin-pi. From Chuh-ho to the Wo Basin, the Nien first advanced to the Fei River, and then to the Sha River on the west, and the Hui River on the east.8 In short, it is safe to say that Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te dominated the whole Huai River valley from 1858 to 1863. It may be a mistake, however, to think that that was the only Nien domain. The Nien armies in Honan, Shantung, Chihli, and Hupeh were also active simultaneously, and infested many cities. Then how large was the total Nien domain in 1863? If government reports of the rebels' domain may be used as a rough basis, the occupied area was more than one thousand li from east to west and from south to north. This area is slightly larger than the area of Korea and a little smaller than that of the United Kingdom. This conservative estimate can be supported by Wang K'ai-yiin's Hsiang-chiin-chih, and by the map prepared by Kuo T'ing-i.9 What was the government policy in dealing with the Nien in the early period? Local officials before 1853 were traditionally expected to handle bandits within their bailiwicks. Thereafter high officials were commissioned to stamp out the Nien army, but they fought against the inveterate foe only half-heartedly. Unprepared for the task, they only attempted to smoke away the bees from one spot for a while. The relief of five commanders in 1853 reveals their incompetence and the nervousness of 7

Ibid., 83.2-3. Y T M K C , 8.7 and correspondence, 1.34; Fang-liieh, 129.18b. See the beautifully prepared map in Siang-tseh Chiang's book, facing page 74. 9 Wang K'ai-yiin's rough estimate of Nien's domain or field of activity in 1857-58 was nearly two thousand li from west to east and north to south; that is about 435,600 square miles (Hsiang-chiin chili, 14.2). Being a Hunan essayist and classical scholar, his estimate may not be very accurate. Yuan Chia-san's more conservative estimation of the area where the Nien army were omnipresent in 1859 was more than 1,000 li from the four cardinal points and that was about 108,900 square miles (TMKC, 10.39). The Nien power reached its height after Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's death in 1865 when many Taipings joined them. The domain can be measured from Ko T'ing-i's map in T'aip'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, II, appendix before p. 149. According to this map the area from north to south is about 950 kilometres, and from west to east, 1,000 kilometres, making a total of 366,390 square miles, an area which would cover France, Germany, and Belgium combined.

8

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A HISTORY OF THE NIEN MOVEMENT AND ITS SUPPRESSION

the Peking court.10 The emperor became worried that the Taipings and the Nien might make an alliance, and he ordered Chou T'ien-chueh, a native of Shantung and former governor of Anhwei, to encamp at Hsiichou on the border between Shantung and Kiangsu to block the advance of the Taipings. So Chou became the third commander to fight against the Nien army. Chou T'ien-chueh had been a famous and experienced official in Anhwei, where he had organized the militia. Although over eighty years old, he had a reputation for strictness in dealing with bandits. He died on October 17, 1853, having served the emperor for only eight months in fighting the Nien army.11 Meanwhile the Nien army in Honan had invaded the neighboring provinces in 1850, while those Nien in Shantung descended on Kiangsu in 1852. Chang Lo-hsing's name was first mentioned in government sources on November 12, 1852, and it was on that day that he launched his gigantic rebellion at Po-chou, Anhwei, severing the lines of communications between Anhwei and Honan. 12 Soon Li Chao-shou started an uprising at Huo-ch'iu, Anhwei; he attacked Shang-ch'eng and gathered a great number of followers. In July, 1854, Chang Lo-hsing and others invaded Yung-ch'eng, Honan, where the commander, Hsu Kuang-chin, fled without offering much resistance and left all his weapons behind. Chou T'ien-chiieh's successor was Yuan Chia-san, an uncle of Yuan Shih-k'ai who later became the first president of the Republic of China. Yuan was ordered in March, 1853, to take command of the militia of Anhwei, making his headquarters first at Ying-chou and then moving eastward to Lin-huai, where he failed in an attempt to recover Lu-chou. Criticized by the governor of Anhwei for making false reports, illegally seizing government funds for military provisions, having reported a larger number of soldiers than he actually had, having diverted the funds for their provisions to his personal use, and not cooperating with the other generals, he was temporarily suspended in April, 1855.18 The governor of Honan, Ying-kuei, was placed in charge of suppressing the bandits in 10 Nien-chun, V.220. The five commanders were: Shan-lu, "Tatar-general" of Honan; Lti Hsien-chi, Vice-minister of Public Works; Chou T'ien-chueh, Imperial Commissioner to train militia in Honan; Lu Ying-ku, Governor of Honan and Shu-hsing-a, Governor-general of Shensi and Kansu. See Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's list mentioned in V , footnote 1. 11 See Chou's biography in CSK, 399.2a. 15 There are many reports about the Nien actions in 1852-54. See Fang-liieh, 4.11b; and AHTCK, 102.13; CSL-TK, 447.12, 449.6, 458.10; HF, 16.11b, 27.23-24, 36.15, 37.12, 38.6, 40.19, 42.18, 57.14b. 18 Fang-liieh, 8.21-24, 11.6; Yuan Chia-san's biography in TMKC, 1A.26-27. See also, Arthur Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 949.

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139

Anhwei, Honan, and Shantung from 1856 to 1858. Yuan Chia-san was recalled (March, 1856) to assist Ying-kuei in military affairs in Honan and Anhwei. But the cooperation between the Manchu and Chinese officials was not very satisfactory. Before long (February, 1858), Yiian was again dismissed for making little progress in the Nien suppression. He was replaced by the Imperial Commissioner, Sheng-pao, who had been fighting in Honan since 1853 and whose duty it now was to fight the Nien in Shantung, Anhwei, and Honan. In August, however, Yiian Chia-san was again given command of troops for fighting the Nien rebels. He seems to have been a fairly good soldier — better, at any rate, than his Manchu colleagues. He attacked Chang Lo-hsing at Chih-ho in June, 1856, and forced the Nien chief to flee to Ying-chou. Two years later, Yuan went to Hsu-chou in northern Kiangsu to ward off an eastward thrust by the Nien army. In and out of the army four times between 1853 and 1862, each time making some little contribution and leaving with some accusation against him, Yiian Chia-san finally requested sick leave in August, 1862, and died a year later.14 Yiian Chia-san's policy against the Nien was focused on "safety." Very prudent in military matters, he neither gained spectacular victories nor suffered major defeats. He did not get along very well with Shengpao, a Manchu general of the White Banner who accused him of overcautiousness and of having missed many chances for victories, or with Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. While Yiian tried to preserve his forces, Seng-ko-linch'in aimed at a quick victory through his ebullient loyalty and sheer courage, and Sheng-pao wished to gain merit in the campaign, not by fighting but by using all kinds of tricks and promises of lenient treatment to induce the Nien chiefs to surrender to him. He seemed to be a cunning fellow who preferred appeasement to fighting.15 The Nien chief, Li Chao-shou, surrendered to Sheng-pao in 1854, but he continued his plundering and changed sides again in 1855, surrendering to Sheng-pao once again in 1858. The other leader, Chang Lo-hsing, changed sides several times between 1853 and 1856, each time surrendering to the government and then returning to his headquarters. He cooperated with Li Hsiu-ch'eng in attacking many cities in Anhwei. Those around his headquarters at Chih-ho who assisted the government in any way were killed and their houses burned. Failing to get adequate 14

See Yiian's biography, CSK, 424.1a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 949-54; and Fang-lueh, 194.18. 15 Fang-liieh, 64.1, 3; 150.32-33. See also Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 16.2b; and Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin chih, ch.2.

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protection from the government, the people had to raise funds and train a militia to protect themselves. Unfortunately for the people, this poor, weak force had to side with the Nien when they came and be loyal to the government when the locality was retaken. Strong and clever landlords and scholar-officials like Miao P'ei-lin found the training of the militia a lucrative proposition. Miao therefore broke with the Nien to become a chief of the militia, but continued to act as he pleased; he was actually like a king within the area under his jurisdiction. Sheng-pao invited him to surrender to the government, but there was no money to feed the surrendered soldiers, and they were left to their own resources. Chang Lo-hsing sent his comrade, Chiang T'ai-ling and others to ransack Honan in April, 1860; all houses, cities, and towns within a distance of a thousand li were said to have been razed. In the following two years the Nien force reached a high pitch of success. Enjoying security and consolidation around their headquarters, the Nien leaders tried hard to expand their influence. The triple alliance of Hung Hsiuch'iian, Miao P'ei-lin, and Chang Lo-hsing was very formidable. Tseng Kuo-fan was frightened lest the Nien rebels and their allies raise the siege of Nanking after their occupation of Shou-chou.16 Luckily for Tseng, Miao P'ei-lin surrendered to Sheng-pao again. In the late spring, 1862, Chang Lo-hsing was weakened. Before long, Chang met a strong rival in Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. At this moment, Shengpao's incompetence and corruptness had provoked numerous complaints from the emperor, who finally ordered him, in August, 1863, to commit suicide, in spite of the fact that two years before he had offered military support to the court to get rid of the eight co-regents. This background may be accountable for Sheng-pao's arrogance and his poor relations with Yuan Chia-san, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, and other generals.17 Then Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was made Imperial Commissioner to suppress the Nien army. S. W. Williams has written that in 1858 the Mongol general, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, opposed the advance of the Europeans upon Peking and begged the emperor not to make peace with them. The general surveyed European aims, politics, and religion from a conservative Chinese standpoint, and ended by supplying the emperor with the historical precedents in support of his plea.18 Indeed, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in had wiped out the Taiping northern expedition in 1855, and dealt the Western is ,7

W Y F T C , 15.14-15; and Tseng Wen-cheng-kung

nien-p'ii,

8.22b.

Concerning the impeachment, examination, and refutations of Sheng-pao, see Fang-liieh, 150.32-33, 162.1-2, 165.9-10, and 194.27-30. See also the biography of Sheng-pao in CSK, 409.1-2, and that of Hsiao-ch'in in Hummel, I, 296. 18 Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, N.S. 42 (1911), 212-217.

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fleet a blow in 1859 near Taku, Tientsin. After the Treaty of Peking was signed, the Manchu dynasty, as almost its last resort, ordered him, its most famous and capable general, to suppress the Nien army. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in commanded the strongest army the government had ever dispatched to combat the Nien rebels. His force comprised four or five thousand cavalry from Mongolia and Manchuria, and more than ten thousand infantrymen from both the Manchu banners and the army of the Green Standards or Chinese provincial forces. He was assured by the court that he would have a steady supply of rations and ammunition. 19 In spite of his great strength, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was for two years after his appointment involved in warfare with secret societies and various other rebel units in Shantung. Gradually, however, he scored victories over the Nien and other secret societies in that province near the end of 1862. He then proceeded to Huai-pei, and smashed the Nien headquarters at Chih-ho in February 1863. It was a great victory in the war against the Nien. Chih-ho was subsequently made a new city called Wo-yang, and garrisoned by the Honan governor. The defeated Chang Lo-hsing was arrested by his own friends and sent to Seng-ko-lin-ch'in on March 23, 1863. Chang was promptly executed; and his second cousin, Chang Tsung-yii, succeeded to the command of the Nien army. The execution of Chang Lo-hsing was soon followed by the death of Miao P'ei-lin, who had disobeyed Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's orders to disband his "militia" (which is said to have comprised a million individuals at one time), and who was killed in battle on December 6, 1863. So these two formidable Nien leaders died in the same year, and it looked as though the Nien army was soon to be annihilated. The Nien army, however, was still strong under the leadership of the able warrior, Chang Tsung-yii. The Nien soon returned to Chih-ho and plundered the neighboring districts as usual. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in again defeated them. As Chang Tsung-yii fled from T'ai-ho, Anhwei, to Honan, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in followed through several provinces. In June, 1864, Chang Tsung-yii, Lai Wen-kuang, and others went to Ma-ch'eng, Hupeh, thence to Su-sung, Anhwei, to Ying-shan, Hupeh, and again to Tengchou, Honan, with Seng-ko-lin-ch'in in dogged pursuit all the way. Seng was defeated in clashes at Teng-chou and Ch'ueh-shan. The Nien army appeared in March, 1865, in Ts'ao-chou and other districts of Shantung. Despite repeated small defeats, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in kept up the pursuit day and night, even forging ahead of his soldiers and going without regular meals and sleep. Avoiding a battle with the Mongol prince, who was 19

Fang-Iiieh,

87.10; 88.25; 89.3; 98.8; and 233.3.

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reprimanded by imperial decree for his slow progress in annihilating the rebels, the Nien concentrated at Ts'ao-chou and Chi-ning, where they crossed the Grand Canal to a stream called Li-hsia-ho. Finally, Sengko-lin-ch'in was surrounded by the Nien and other rebels at a spot about fifteen li northwest of Ts'ao-chou, Shantung, where he was killed on May 18, 1865, while the survivors of his veteran cavalry surrendered to the Nien army.20 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's policy was different from that of his Chinese and Manchu predecessors in that he tried to bring the rebellion to a speedy end by his enthusiasm and courage. Yet he failed. One of the reasons for his failure was his harsh treatment of the enemy. After Nanking was taken, a Taiping leader, Ma Yung-ho, tried to surrender to him, offering also to persuade many other Taiping chiefs, whose advance to Nanking was blocked in Hupeh, to surrender to him. The request was made through Ch'en Kuo-jui, the prince's leading subordinate, who made arrangements for the Taiping generals to surrender. The Nien sent two chiefs to interview Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, who ordered them beheaded before they had even finished speaking. Learning of this harsh treatment, the Taiping leaders and the Nien saw no choice but to fight to the very end; otherwise the rebellion might have been concluded earlier. Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in felt that surrender was too cheap a way out for these "bandits" who had rebelled against the emperor for more than ten years.21 A second reason for the prince's defeat was his strictness in recommending his subordinates and other generals for promotions and rewards. This earned him the fear of his subordinates but not their love. A third reason for his failure was his arrogance. He looked down on all other provincial authorities and generals. Even when a governor-general went to see Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, he was not allowed to sit down. He actually exacted a fee ranging from one hundred to four hundred taels of silver for an interview, depending on the financial condition of the prospective visitor.22 He had great confidence in his own ability and disregarded that of others. He would not consult other generals concerning military strategy, nor would he bother himself to answer letters from others, because his Chinese was poor; he could not speak or write well. He reported to the throne that the Hunan Braves and the Huai army were 20

See Hstteh Fu-ch'eng, "Ko-erh-ch'ih chung-ch'in wang ssu-shih-liieh," in Yung-an ..., wen-pien, 4.1-2; Ch'ing-pai lei-ch'ao, tse, 7.149-150; W a n g Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'iieh 11.2; and K u o Ting-i, T P S H J C , 1127; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, 634; and Huaichiin p'ing-nien chi, 1.4. 21 "Shou-hsiang chung-pien chi-liieh," quoted in Chung-ho monthly, 4.1; 97 and 99. 22 W a n g K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chun chih, 14.7.

M a p 2. P a n o r a m i c M a p s h o w i n g t h e Activitie

Activities of t h e N i e n A r m y ,

1851-1868

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143

poor fighters. On the other hand he rated the Anhwei militia the best, the Honan militia second, with the Huai army last,23 because he did not like Tseng Kuo-fan. Tseng, however, did not admire him either. Sengko-lin-ch'in's failure was also due to the lack of provisions which were to have been supplied by the governor of Shantung, Yen Ching-ming, whom he had once treated quite badly.24 Moreover Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was overwhelmed by a combined general attack of the Nien, secret society members including Sung Ching-shih, and other local elements in Shantung, whose comrades had suffered heavily from his ruthless oppression. The Nien under the command of Chang Tsung-yii were the main force, while the Taiping remnants played an insignificant role in the epochmaking onslaught.25 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's career is summarized in Ch'en Kuo-jui's memorial and in his biography in Eminent

Chinese of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Ac-

cording to traditional standards, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was second to none of his time in the Manchu army as a warrior, and his death was an irreplaceable loss and a fatal blow to the Manchu dynasty.26 During the first phase of military action against the Nien, one may have noted that the Nien gained momentum in 1856 or 1857. Commandersin-chief like Sheng-pao and Yuan-Chia-san wavered between a policy of suppression and one of inviting the rebels to surrender. Seng-ko-linch'in overran the Nien with his superb cavalry, aiming at an annihilation of his adversaries by force. To kill a few ranking leaders, which is like the removal of several outstanding weeds, was not a fundamental solution of the Nien problem. Nor could such a goal be achieved without due politico-economic measures accompanying the military approach. The fundamental solution of the Nien problem was worked out by Tseng Kuo-fan. 23

Ibid., 14.7b; and TMKC, 15.12b. Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 16.10. 25 Cf. the field study by Ch'en Po-ch'en, pp. 218-19. 26 According to Ch'en Kuo-jui's memorial, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in began to suppress the Nien and local bandits in Shantung in 1860. He fought in Teng-chou, Lai-chou, Ching-chou, and other cities in Shantung and part of Chihli (1861). He then went to suppress the Nien and religious bandits in Ch'i-hsien, Yu-shih, and Chin-lou, Honan, and he reported to have killed 50,000 bandits. Reorganizing his army to attack the Nien headquarters in Anhwei, he slaughtered more than a hundred thousand rebels, including Chang Lo-hsing, Su T'ien-fu, and others. Returning to Shantung, he crushed the religious bandits at Chou-hsien and defeated Sung Ching-shih. He again marched southward and raised the siege of Meng-ch'eng where he killed Miao P'ei-lin and cleared the northern Huai region (1863). In 1864 Seng chased the Nien from Hupeh to Honan for more than 1,000 li. In the spring of 1865 he intended to annihilate the Nien in Shantung but he was killed in action (Fang-Iiieh, 237.15b-18). 24

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2. Tseng Kuo-fan's

Policy Against the Nien

The news of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's death shook the imperial court. The Peking Field Force (Shen-chi-ying) was mobilized to guard the approaches to the capital, lest the Nien army should cross the Yellow River to disturb the dragon throne. 27 The prevailing fear was aggravated by the alarming victories of the Nien army in Shantung, southern Chihli, and northern Kiangsu. Li Hung-chang used steamers to rush ten battalions of the Huai-chun (Anhwei army), comprising soldiers of the Huai River Valley, under the command of P'an Ting-hsin, to Tientsin to strengthen the garrison of the capital. 28 Learning of these strong defensive measures, the Nien leaders marched toward their former headquarters in Anhwei. After the death of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, the emperor was forced to order the famous Tseng Kuo-fan, who had suppressed the Taiping Rebellion, to take command of the imperial forces in Shantung, Honan, and Chihli. While Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was a simple-minded, poorly educated warrior who trusted his physical strength more than anything else, Tseng Kuo-fan relied on brains to eradicate the Nien army. Tseng Kuo-fan, who was then governor-general of Liang-chiang, imperial commissioner, and assistant grand secretary, was summoned by hurried mandate on May 27, 1865, to leave Nanking for Shantung to command troops against the Nien army. Tseng was reluctant to accept the imperial appointment because he well understood the difficult task before him; he had neither much money nor many soldiers at his disposal, for a majority of his "Hunan Braves" or Hunan army had been disbanded about a month after the recovery of Nanking. But after some persuasion and hesitation, he decided to shoulder the responsibility. His position as governor-general was temporarily taken over by Li Hung-chang, who could support Tseng with the Huai army and rich financial resources from the area covering Shanghai. Tseng Kuo-fan left Nanking on June 18, reaching Po-chou, near the front, on June 30.29 After a careful study of his assignment, and extensive traveling along the front line, Tseng Kuo-fan learned that the Nien were roving bandits, 80 iT

North China Herald, May 27, 1865. Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'iieh . . ., 11.5b-7. 26 HCPNC, 1.4; Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh 11.1; and Lo Erh-kang, Hsiangchiin hsin-chih, 193-94. 30 Siang-tseh Chiang's Nien Rebellion seems to have made a mistake by saying that Tseng Kuo-fan first "discovered that the Nien were not roaming bandits as his contemporaries presumed", (p. 101). The basis for this statement is a secondary source, Yii-chiin chi-lueh, in which part of Tseng's statement, that "these bandits seem to be not exceedingly like roaming bandits for they still like their old lairs in Meng-ch'eng 28

TSENG KUO-FAN'S POLICY AGAINST THE NIEN

145

that they were less numerous and ambitious than the Taipings, and also that they were more cunning and had more horses. He noticed, too, that the people and provisions in Honan were so exhausted that it was twice as hard to maintain troops there as in the lower valley of the Yangtze. All the provinces where the Nien had spread carnage since 1851, were war-torn, and the peasants there had been misled by bad people or pressed by poverty. Tseng discovered many maladministrations both military and political, in the Nien infected areas. The militia or local corps was the main combat force, because the military organization of the Eight Banners and the Green Standards had decayed long before the mid-nineteenth century. The militia in North China was organized in the 1850's. Soon the leaders of the local corps began to be disobedient. They either refused to pay the land tax or feuded with other clans to avenge personal grudges. Sometimes the leader of the local corps established an office to collect likin and other taxes, ostensibly to maintain his soldiers, but actually for his own profit. He would often pad the payroll of his soldiers to justify the heavy taxes, but he would flee when the bandits came, leaving his men and their weapons to the mercy of the bandits.31 The militia had been trained to ward off the bandits, but they often actually assisted or joined them. They even interrupted commercial and government transportation of such staples as grain and salt on the Grand Canal, and similar malpractices were quite common in Honan and Shantung,32 where the chiefs killed people wantonly, controlled judicial proceedings, and compelled the people to pay taxes to them.33 The pressure of the Nien and other rebels necessitated the continuation of the local corps elsewhere, although the people were so irritated that they killed government soldiers when they had the chance, and distressed the militia by refusing to supply them with food.34 Tseng saw that the government had lost the political and economic and Po-chou," is also used by Chiang, while the other part, where Tseng emphatically said, "The Nien have become roaming bandits," is ignored. This same statement — that "Nien have become roaming bandits" — has been repeatedly made by Tseng as we can see in the "Complete Collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's Writings," the sections of his Nien-p'u, in memorials, great events, and correspondence. Tseng's whole military strategy was built on the presumption that the Nien had been roving bandits; hence he was trying to prevent their ways of roving — not merely keep pursuing them, but trying to surround and annihilate them. See also Tseng Kuo-fan's letter to Wu Nanp'ing in Tseng Wen-cheng kung shu-ch'a, 13.21. HCPNC, 1.4; and Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . ., 11.1. 31 Hsin-yang hsiert-chih, 18.15b. 32 STCHCL, 22.9-11; and YCCL, 2.4b and 10.4b. 33 Kung-hsien chih, 5.5b. 34 Wang Ting-an, Chiu-chueh . . . , 11.27b.

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initiative to the Nien army. The cost of training militia was an extra burden to the peasants in addition to the regular taxes they had to pay to the government and landlords. The misadministration and abuse of the local force had a disheartening effect on the peasant militiamen. The peasants had nothing to gain — neither effective protection from Nien raids nor government promise to improve their livelihood — but everything to lose, through looting by imperial troops, the devastation of war, and the "scorched earth" policy. The Nien apparently extorted much less from the peasants than did the government. They could give the populace better protection. A n area of approximately two thousand

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square miles around Chih-ho was not disturbed by imperial troops from 1857 to 1863. No wonder the young assistant commander, Yuan Paoheng, son of Yuan Chia-san, memoralized the throne in 1863, suggesting among other things that the government should select capable and honest men for local administration in order to restore the dignity and authority which had been lost during the rebellion and also advising that more public schools should be opened to tame the rebellious Huai people, and that ownerless land resulting from the devastation of the war should be reclaimed by garrison troops.35 These points obviously were raised for winning the war and for bolstering the morale of the fighting force. Yiian's words did not bear fruit until Tseng Kuo-fan reached a similar conclusion. Tseng formulated a long-range policy accordingly. His two-pronged policy — military and political — made up for the deficiencies of his predecessors and opened a new era in the history of the Nien. On the basis of his field observation, Tseng Kuo-fan reinforced his military policy. He relied more on his own force — the Anhwei and Hunan soldiers — than on the strictly local corps of Honan and Shantung. He abandoned the policy of pursuing the Nien army in favor of seeking pitched battles by frontal attack. To enable the government troops to cope with their highly mobile enemies, he planned four provincial bases, similar to the four key "men" in his favorite game, chess: Lin-huai for Anhwei, Hsii-chou for Kiangsu, Chi-ning for Shantung, and Chou-chiak'ou for Honan. All these four points commanded river transportation facilities to assure military supply.36 The Nien headquarters at Chih-hochi or at the new city of Wo-yang was virtually girdled by three of Tseng's four bases. The garrisons at these four bases were to cooperate closely, so that government troops would be awaiting the Nien army everywhere; heretofore they had been chasing the Nien with no good prospect of ending the pursuit. Tseng insisted that strong garrisons be maintained at the four provincial bases; he examined the topography of the Yellow River and the Grand Canal, and intended to accept the proposal of a general to build a great dike several hundred miles in length along the Grand Canal, which was to be carefully guarded by soldiers. It was hoped that the stable government troops would be able to curb the ranging rebels. Tseng desired to localize the Nien army, and he expressed this strategy 35

Y T M K C , 1.1-7. It is curious to note that Tseng Kuo-fan, almost a daily player of "surrounding chess," as seen from his diary, is obviously applying the chess technique by placing four "men" at the key points from which he expected to make enclosures of his enemy. For the selection of the four bases, see Tseng Wen-cheng-kung nien-p'u, 10.14a. 38

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by his slogan: "Hua-ho ch'uan-ti" (To encircle the Nien by means of rivers and dikes). 37 This implied utilizing the Yellow River and the Grand Canal, and building new dikes to check the wide expansion of the Nien army. This strategy was approved by the emperor. A whole year was consumed in effecting an organization strong enough to draw a net about the elusive rebels. Men of ability in the Huai army were assigned to the four key positions mentioned above. Generals who achieved fame in the Taiping Rebellion were recalled to Tseng's side, among them Pao Ch'ao, Kuo Sung-lin, and Tseng's younger brother, Tseng Kuo-ch'iian. Thus the two brothers and Li Hung-chang were able to cooperate once more. 38 Tseng Kuo-fan's political policy against the Nien was a careful reorganization of the people, and direct control by the supreme commander of the walled villages and militia. The theory that the people of Po-chou, Meng-ch'eng, Yung-ch'eng, and other such areas were pugnacious by nature and should be wiped out entirely, if possible, was condemned by Tseng as an erroneous conception of most of his predecessors. Through his investigation of many villages in that area, Tseng found that the disposition of many of the local people was straightforward, and that there were many innocent persons. The ringleaders of the rebellion were few; the voluntary followers were also limited, while a large number of the Nien were either victims of extreme poverty or had been forced into service by the rebels. Even though they were Nien members, they were not subject to severe punishment. Tseng suggested that the census should be retaken. The people in every yii or walled village should be thoroughly investigated and judiciously registered. Those who led the rebellion and those who faithfully adhered to these leaders should have their names put on the list as seditionists, their whereabouts should be carefully traced, and they should be executed when they were arrested. Those who never joined the Nien and those who joined for a short time or by compulsion should be registered in the list as loyal subjects. Tseng advocated that five families of such subjects should be organized as a unit, guaranteeing each other's good behavior and promising the chief of the village to share group responsibility should any one family misbehave. The chief of a 37

"Hua-ho ch'uan-ti." See STCHCL, 4.26-27; Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh 16.5, 8, and 26; and Lo Erh-kang, NCTYTC, 50-58. 38 The garrisons were under the command of Liu Ming-ch'iian at Chou-chia-k'ou, Liu Sung-shan at Lin-huai, Chang Shu-sheng at Hsii-chou, and P'an Ting-hsin at Chi-ning. His brother, Tseng Kuo-ch'iian, was summoned from his retirement, first with a commission as governor of Shansi, but afterwards he was designated to Hupeh. Fang-liieh, 239.11, and William James Hail, Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion, 299.

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walled village had to present a similar guarantee to the local magistrate and he was held responsible for the whole village. Tseng Kuo-fan tried to create new leaders, and to have the villagers detached from their old leaders. He ordered that the chiefs of all walled villages, no matter whether they were old or new, must be re-elected by a majority of the people. The successful candidates must be reported to the magistrates who would examine their backgrounds and report the acceptable ones to Tseng, who, in turn, would give them special certificates, seals, and stationery. A yii fort with its militia was required by Tseng to withhold any Nien attack for half a month until his force could come to the rescue. Thus the supreme commander had direct control of the leaders of the yii forts and their militia. Any people within a wall who overtly obeyed the government but covertly communicated with the Nien should be arrested by the yii chief and sent to the government for punishment. False accusations of bona-fide citizens and any menace to neighboring villagers by force should be carefully studied by the yii chiefs concerned and they should jointly advise the government. Rewards and penalties to the yii chiefs should be very judiciously administered according to merits and demerits.39 In creating this new force Tseng sought men of ability in the Nien area to assist him in the war by offering them high stipends or ranks. He also encouraged suggestions from the local elders about the whereabouts of his adversaries, and about methods to obtain a quick conclusion of the rebellion. Tseng's subordinates executed his political plans so thoroughly that out of 587 walled communities in Fou-yang, Anhwei, 307 were destroyed, and only 280 survived. Tseng himself criticized his subordinates for the ruthless reorganization of the yii people. But during the process of reregistration of the yii villagers, a number of questionable characters were weeded out.40 At the same time, the policy of "Chien-pi ch'ing-yeh," or "Strengthen the walls and clean up the countryside," was vigorously executed with the help of the local militia. This policy permitted no grain to be left in 39

T h e more bandits were sent, or whose names were revealed, to the government, the m o r e rewards were given to the yii chiefs. T h e yii chiefs w h o maintained g o o d farm work in time of peace and opposed the N i e n bravely in time of war w o u l d also be rewarded. If the chiefs harbored bandits or misappropriated public funds, they could be accused by the villages at large and be punished or dismissed according to the nature of their crimes. Nien-chiin, 1.20-21. 40 T h e number of experienced rebels executed was, for example, 59 in Meng-ch'eng, 46 in Po-chou, and 5 in Fou-yang. F r o m September, 1866, to May, 1867, a total of 153 rebels had been wiped out. Nien-chiin, 1.46 and 59. Tseng Wen-cheng kitng ch'iian-chi, C o m m e n t s o n official reports, p. 40; and H C P N C , 4.15b-17.

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the field, and no citizen to travel or to live in a walled village unless his loyalty was absolutely assured, and hence it deprived the Nien of easy prey and of food and cut off the Nien's contact with the people.41 More yii were built. Thus Tseng's military plan — the four operational bases — was to prevent the Nien's flight, and his political plan was to cut off the Nien's source of supply — manpower as well as material. To facilitate his military plans, Tseng insisted from the very beginning on a strong cavalry. He eliminated the old horses from the remnants of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's force and brought good steeds from Mongolia and elsewhere. Consequently he had a carefully selected unit of approximately 3,000 cavalrymen.42 Still more important was the Huai-chiin or the Huai army which was instrumental in bringing the Nien movement to an end. To use the Huai army against the Huai rebels, according to Siang-tseh Chiang, was a very effective tool. As they were natives, the Huai soldiers were familiar with the topographic and social conditions of the area; they had no difficulty in living and associating with their native people. Their better pay, organization, commandership, and more rigid control than before heightened their spirit to beat the native rebels. Most of Tseng Kuofan's Hunan Braves were disbanded after the liquidation of the Taiping Rebellion in 1864. He had to rely on the Huai army of about fifty thousand strong to combat the Nien-Taiping allies in northern China.43 Although the Huai army was derived from the Hunan army44 and Li Hung-chang was a student of Tseng Kuo-fan, the latter was unable to lead Li's Huai-chiin against the Nien army successfully. Tseng begged Li to replace him. In a personal letter, Tseng said, "We should consider the suppression of the Nien-fei to be a personal duty of the Li and Tseng 41

Pao-chou chih, 8.34, and Chiang Ti, Nien-chiin shih ch'u-t'an, 61. Tseng Kuo-fan paid great attention to cavalry and frequently complained that his cavalry was inferior to that of the Nien rebels. Nien-chiin I, 24-25. 4 » HCPNC, 1.2. 44 The Huai-chiin was formed during the Taiping rebellion. When in 1861 Tseng Kuo-fan was fighting against the Taipings along the lower valley of the Yangtze River, the people of Shanghai repeatedly requested that he send soldiers to protect their city. Unfortunately Tseng had no troops to spare. At that critical moment he thought of Li Hung-chang, who had once fought with a small militia of Lu-chou against the Nien in 1853 (Lu-chou fu-chih, 22.3). Li was instructed to raise an army of volunteers, patterned after the Hunan Braves, in his native province of Anhwei. In February, 1862, he brought to Shanghai his newly-recruited soldiers from the Huai Valley (they were called the Huai-chiin or, roughly speaking, the Anhwei Army), who were ready to share the laurels with the Hunan Braves. The Huai Army organization was patterned after that of the Hunan; several battalions of Tseng's troops were detailed to train them, and several officers, such as Kuo Sung-lin, were assigned to command the new soldiers. Thus, we may say that the Huai-chiin was derived from the Hunan Army. See Lo Erh-kang. Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih, pp. 218-19. 42

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families; without the Huai-chiin, the Nien-fei cannot be exterminated, and without you the Anhwei soldiers cannot be commanded." 45 The officers of the Hunan Army were mostly neo-Confucian scholars who stressed loyalty, integrity, etc., but the officers of the Huai-chiin such as Liu Ming-ch'uan, who had been a salt smuggler, and Ch'eng Hsiieh-ch'i, a former Taiping leader, received little education. They were loyal only to their direct superiors, and had little regard for the emperor and other men in authority, except Li Hung-chang; that was why Tseng Kuo-fan could not command Li's Huai-chiin with much success. The Huai-chiin were better paid than other Chinese armies. The money was raised through the powerful positions held by Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. Formerly there had been a division of power between the governor-general, who was mainly in charge of military affairs; the governor, who handled civil affairs; and the lieutenant-governor, who controlled financial matters. Now, however, a man like Tseng Kuo-fan or Li Hung-chang could combine the three functions — military, civil, and financial — and raise money from the likin tax and other sources. The monthly pay of an infantry officer of the Huai army was fifty taels of silver, plus about one hundred and fifty taels for administrative expenses. A sentry could receive a daily wage of about one-third of a tael of silver.46 Such pay was very high for the 1860's; it was much better than that of other troops, and served to raise the morale and fighting spirit of the new army far above that of its predecessors. The soldiers of the Huai army were, at first, mostly peasants from the south bank of the Huai River. After the recovery of many cities in Kiangsu and Chekiang, some Taipings surrendered to Li Hung-chang, and, after 1865, when the army was fighting against the Nien, recruiting was carried on constantly. Thus, the name "Anhwei Army" is but a conventional, rough translation of Huai-chiin. The Huai-chiin had superior weapons and equipment. As Li Hungchang said: The weapons and equipment of the various battalions are much heavier and more numerous than those of the other armies. In the military system of the Hunan Army, set up by Tseng Kuo-fan, each battalion of five hundred soldiers had only a hundred and twenty-odd rifles and gingals, or two-man muskets, but there are more than four hundred foreign rifles in each battalion of my army, or at any rate more than three hundred. In every battle we use up several hundred thousand catties of foreign ammunition. The clumsy heavy artillery, with the explosive shells and various other necessary pieces of 45 46

Tseng Wen-cheng-kung shu-ch'a, 13.24b-25. F o r details, see the Huai-chiin p'ing-nien chi, 11.10-11.

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equipment, requires several ships to transport for a single battle, and no other province can supply these items.47

When the army was ordered north to fight the Nien in 1865, it also had 276 horses in each cavalry battalion, and the total number of horses was almost seven thousand.48 The new guns and the cavalry ultimately caused the destruction of the Nien army. Moreover, a "naval force" on the Yellow River was first used in 1862 by Lieutenant Chang Ta-fu, who built some new gunboats and tried them out on certain sections of the Yellow River in Shantung. After a few years, the governor of Shantung and the governor-general of grain transportation built gun-sampans to sail the Grand Canal, as well as some sections of the Yellow River. Ch'ung-hou, whose position as superintendent of trade for the three ports or Tientsin, Chefoo, and Newchwang, enabled him to buy new weapons and train new troops, also participated in the plan to put guns on various types of boats. In June, 1866, the governor of Shantung ordered fifty new gunboats from the Shanghai Arsenal, purchased one thousand foreign rifles, and trained four battalions of the Huai army to handle these new weapons.48 This new fleet defeated a detachment of the Nien force at the junction of the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. Obviously the rebels could not cope with the government's "naval force," and in the last two years of the Nien's existence this force had great influence in keeping the Nien from secretly crossing the Yellow River or the Grand Canal. With such careful preparation and superior force, Tseng Kuo-fan should have been able to stamp out the Nien with ease. Unfortunately for Tseng, he achieved no immediate success because each provincial government preferred to protect its own territory, neglecting the duty of suppressing the rebels as a whole. This lack of military coordination cost Tseng many defeats. Now follows a brief sketch of the struggle between Tseng and the Nien. 3. The Second Phase of the Nien Movement, 1865—1866 The Nien were still very active when Tseng Kuo-fan was at the wheel of the government military machine. They struggled hard to return to their headquarters at Chih-ho, which had been taken by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in in 1863 and held by government forces ever since. The Nien surrounded "

48

"

Fang-lueh, 234.2b-3b.

HCPNC, 11.2b-3; and 11.10. See also Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-t'ai-shih, 206-212. STCHCL, 4.24, 5.7b, and 11.16b.

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Chih-ho for forty days, and the siege was not raised by the Huai army and the Honan troops until July 25, 1865. Then the Nien divided into two bands and went westward. One band led by Chang Tsung-yii and Jen Chu went west from Shang-ch'iu, T'ai-k'ang, Che-ch'eng, and Suichou (all cities in Honan), and the other under Lai Wen-kuang and Niu Lo-hung went southwest toward Ch'en-chou and Chou-chia-k'ou, apparently for the purpose of attacking the newly established base. Tseng contended that for lack of a good cavalry his forces could not proceed as rapidly as those of his enemies. He re-emphasized his plan of utilizing the four bases of stationary armies against the mobile bandits. The Nien commanded by Chang Tsung-yii and Jen Chu advanced in September, 1865, from Lu-shan, Nan-ch'ao (both in Honan) toward Hupeh; those under Lai Wen-kuang and Niu Lo-hung withdrew westward from Ch'en-chou, and Hsi-hua, Wu-yang (also in Honan), as if to join Chang Tsung-yii and to proceed to the same destination. Chang Tsung-yii and Jen Chu then went to Teng-chou and thence to Chen-p'ing near Nan-yang; Lai Wen-kuang returned to the central part of Honan and broke many walled villages. The two forces combined, then proceeded from Hsiang-ch'eng to Ying-chou, a city not very far from Wo-yang; but here they were defeated by Liu Ming-ch'uan and others on October 9. Lai Wen-kuang, Niu Lo-hung, and Jen Chu, with their infantrymen and cavalrymen numbering between sixty and seventy thousand, continued to be active in Ho-tse, Ts'ao-chou, and Ting-tao, Shantung. They spent some time in November in the Lakeshore communities (Hu-t'uan) and recruited new members. They then divided once more into two columns, one advancing toward Hsu-chou and the other toward Chi-ning. Poised to cross the Grand Canal to the east, the two columns were driven away by the Huai army after several days' combat. The Nien went westward from Hsiao-hsien, Kiangsu, wishing to return to their old headquarters at Meng-ch'eng and Po-chou. But this plan was frustrated by Tseng's troops who blockaded the Nien path to the West. Suffering a great defeat north of Feng-hsien, Shantung, the Nien forces hurried to Honan instead of returning home to Anhwei. Still afraid of the Nien, the Honan governor, Wu Ch'ang-shou said: Facing ten thousand Nien steeds charging like a thunderbolt would change the complexion of even the bravest general. For more than a year most of the combats (in Honan) were conducted in pursuit, rarely in frontal engagements. If the pursuers were far behind the Nien, the people helplessly suffered from being plundered and their houses were burned; if the pursuit was close, the Nien suddenly offered a very fierce reverse challenge causing the pursuers heavy casualties. To help the homeless peasants, the government built barracks

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for their self-protection. whereabouts. 5 0

But before their completion, they lost the N i e n ' s

This complaint made to the throne presented a true picture of the front and to handle this grim task Tseng Kuo-fan had modified his military plan considerably. He adopted Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's method by ordering Liu Ming-ch'uan to chase the Nien wherever they went, because the rebels avoided frontal engagement with the government forces. The four bases were still maintained, awaiting the Nien's approach. The Nien leaders, on the other hand, also felt the effect of restrictions inflicted on them by Tseng's four bases, together with the power of foreign guns, the fighting spirit of the Huai army, the forthcoming new government cavalry which had long been in preparation, and the "navy" activity in the Yellow River under Liu Ch'ang-yu. Therefore the Nien decided to invade a weak spot, Hupeh, in February and March, 1866. Meanwhile the other band under Chang Tsung-yxi had occupied Nanyang, Honan, as an interim base and operated freely in southern Honan and northern Hupeh. The provincial garrisons were too weak to harness Chang's movement. The two bands under the guidance of Lai Wenkuang and Chang Tsung-yii joined hands again in Honan near the end of 1865 for their expedition.51 The mutiny of Ch'eng Ta-chi's soldiers on January 18, 1866, climaxed an act of the Nien's military plan. Ch'eng Ta-chi's government troops, on the grounds of demanding their payment in arrears, were incited to a great mutiny by Nien's agents. Synchronized with this mutiny the Nien marched to Huang-an, Hsiao-kan, and other cities near the provincial capital, Wuchang, where martial law was declared. The city was so full of rumor and contradictory reports that the English and French authorities in the trade port, Hankow, had to go out of the city to find the truth for themselves.52 Liu Ming-ch'uan rushed to the government's aid, and in February 50

Nien-chun, 1.30-31. The sources of the preceding pages are mainly taken from Wang Ting-an, Ch'iuch'ueh-chai ti-tzu-chi, and Chou Shih-ch'en, Huai-chiin p'ing Nien chi; both are reproduced in Nien-chun, 1, 13-53, and 111-125. 52 The British consul, along with a French naval commander, went to the front and found much exaggeration in government reports about the Nien. However, the British consul reported to his government, saying that the Nien came to Hupeh in five bodies "numbering at the very lowest estimate 30,000, but some say 80,000." They opened fire and tried to stop a few Nien rebels. The latter escaped but left the bundles they carried. The bundles were filled with food and kidnapped children, suggesting that the Nien were then eager to obtain rice and money, which they could get in the form of ransom for the children. See the documents in the Public Record Office, London, F. O. 17, vol. 456, British Consul, Hankow, 12 February 1866. See also a long article from the Hankow Times preprinted in N C H , May 6, 1867. 51

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he recovered a few cities from the Nien's hold. To reinforce the garrison, Tseng Kuo-ch'iian, conqueror of the Taiping capital, Nanking, was made governor of Hupeh. He disbanded a number of old and weak troops and replaced them with 6,000 veteran Hunan soldiers. Having confronted too strong a foe, the Nien returned again to Honan from the border of Hupeh and Anhwei. They raided Shen-ch'iu, Hsiang-ch'eng, T'ai-k'ang, and other districts on their way, and then advanced to Hsi-hua, Ch'en-liu, and Yii-shih with hopes of getting to Woyang. The Honan plain was ideal for their rapid advance. They could not, however, stay long at any one spot because they were being pursued by Liu Ming-ch'uan and the Honan army under Sung Ch'ing. Driven from Chi-hsien, Sui-chou, and K'ao-ch'eng (all in Honan), they entered Shantung for the second time within a year. Showing signs of fatigue and defeat from their numerous skirmishes and long retreat, they were less fierce than before. Lai Wen-kuang, Chang Tsung-yU, and others of their leaders repeatedly attacked the Grand Canal without success. Forced by Liu Ming-ch'uan, they went from Honan, to Kiangsu, still hoping to get to Meng-ch'eng and Po-chou. In June, 1866, Lai Wen-kuang and Jen Chu maintained a hold on the territory along the border of Kiangsu and Anhwei so as to collect the early wheat crop to feed their men. Two great additional efforts were made to cross the Grand Canal, once at Yun-ch'eng, Shantung, and another time at Su-ch'ien, Kiangsu, to get into the rich area east of the canal in the two provinces. Both efforts were in vain. Through the summer the Nien tried to achieve this goal but their attempts were foiled — not entirely by military force but also by a big flood in July which submerged many houses. Faced with these difficulties, they divided into bands and went to Honan and Anhwei. Chang Tsung-yii and Lai Wen-kuang were reported to have differing opinions with regard to military tactics, and in June 1866, they again took separate actions. Jen and Lai crossed the Hui and Wo rivers to Huai-yiian, Feng-t'ai, and Meng-ch'eng. The government forces hurried to the front and in early August drove the rebels to T'ai-ho, Anhwei. Chang Tsung-yii progressed in a zigzag manner from Sui-chou, Ch'enchou, to the neighborhood of Chou-chia-k'ou, and crossed the Sha and Wo rivers to Sui-p'ing and Ch'iieh-san in the southern part of Honan. With Chang Tsung-yii fleeing south of the Sha River and Jen and Lai also passing the Huai to the south, it was essential for Tseng Kuo-fan to adopt new military tactics. Tseng submitted a plan to the throne in July: by building a defense chain utilizing the existing rivers, digging new trenches, and constructing walls, he hoped to control the Nien's move-

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ment. He accepted Liu Ming-ch'uan's proposal made a year previously to raise a defense line along the Sha River, a tributary of the Huai-ho. From Chou-chia-k'ou southward to Huai-tien, the Sha River was a natural line of defense, and from the same spot northward to Chu-hsien-chen the Chia-lu River, a branch of the Sha-ho opened by Chia Lu of the Yuan dynasty, was to be a barrier. From Chu-hsien-chen north to K'ai-feng, a distance of 40 li, and another 30 li further north to the south bank of the Yellow River, a dike and wall were to be prepared by the Honan governor, Li Ho-nien. The area from Huai-tien to Cheng-yang-kuan in the south along the Sha River was to be watched by Chao Sung-nien. South of Cheng-yang-kuan the Huai River was to be patrolled by Tseng Kuo-fan's "navy" in cooperation with Anhwei troops. It was expected that the Nien would be confined to a spot in the southwest of Honan and Anhwei where there were more hills and less rice fields. Liu Ming-ch'uan was transferred from Hsu-chou to Sha-ho to supervise construction of the dike in collaboration with P'an Ting-hsin and Chang Shu-shan. Many people were drafted for the construction of the line, the length of which measured more than 700 li.53 The Nien under Lai and Jen on August 7, 1866, crossed the Chia-lu River. At that time a big flood was inundating the Hui-shan Lake and the Grand Canal. Soaked and strained by flood waters, many of the newly constructed walls and dikes were crushed, but Tseng ordered his army officers and civilian heads to continue the construction. The flood, however, increased the Nien's power ephemerally, for many of the starving masses joined them. While Tseng's forces were busy mending the broken dikes, the Nien took advantage of the situation. Chang, Lai, Jen, and Niu combined their forces and advanced from Chung-mou and Yii-shih. They scored a great success on September 24, 1866, by crossing the moat near K'aifeng, which was guarded by Honan troops. Although the poor construction and defense of the moat by the half-hearted Honan governor, Li Ho-nien, was one cause of the failure, the determined and concentrated attack of the enemy was also instrumental. Tseng Kuo-fan's discouragement at the ineffectiveness of this defense line was matched by the glee of the censors and high officials who were jealous of Tseng and had opposed his plan of building dikes. When Tseng was stationed at Hsiichou, Kiangsu, from September, 1865, to March, 1866, people who had known Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's way of fighting were already criticizing Tseng's leisurely manner. Fortunately, however, Tseng was staunchly supported by Li Hung-chang, who memorialized the throne stating that it was 5:1

Nien-chiin,

1.41.

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difficult to pursue the Nien army on the North China plain where they could cover three or four hundred li in a day and night; their horses might die of exhaustion, but they could confiscate mounts and food everywhere, while the government forces were short of horses and had to buy food from the people. But criticism grew sharper and Tseng's blunder of losing control at the K'ai-feng moat now appeared so big that it was very difficult to gloss over. The government defense line had been broken and the Nien army was once again running rampant in North China. Because of poor health and old age, and partly because of this severe criticism, Tseng Kuo-fan begged for sick leave in October, 1866.54 He was granted one month's sick leave, and this was renewed once. In early 1867 he requested permanent leave and recommended Li Hung-chang to take his place as commander-in-chief in the campaign against the Nien. In his memorial he said that the Nien had "now spread to Shensi, overrunning an area of six provinces, more than three thousand square //; where Li Hung-chang is not able to deal with them adequately, I will do my best to assist him." 55 After breaking the defense line, the Nien marched on to Shantung where within ten days they occupied Ho-tse, Ts'ao-hsien, Chu-yeh, and Yiin-ch'eng. They still desired to cross the Grand Canal. Thus in the first phase of the Nien's movement, they caused the death of the Mongol Prince, and in the second phase, the dismissal of Tseng Kuo-fan. Formerly they had had a headquarters, but after 1863 they were forced to move around between Hupeh and Shantung, passing through Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsu several times without having a chance to settle down. They roamed about and fought, sometimes in separate columns and sometimes in concentration, keeping themselves beyond the reach of the government forces most of the time. Although Tseng Kuo-fan was unsuccessful in his campaigns, he should receive credit for laying down the basic plan which was finally effective against the Nien army. Even during Tseng's commandership the Nien could neither restore their old headquarters, nor set up a new one, nor were they able to accumulate much food. The reorganization of the people and the strengthening of the forts sharply reduced the Nien's material and manpower supply and greatly hobbled their movements. Therefore Tseng's improved military and political policy against the Nien, though achieving no immediate success, was by no means a failure. 54 Tseng had been reprimanded by the court seven times and accused by censors five times. Nien-chiin, V, 327. » Fang-lueh, 260.21; and 267.1-3.

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4. The Eastern Nien, October 1866-January

1868

After a vigorous but unsuccessful assault on the Grand Canal in Shantung, the Nien were driven back to Honan. For diverting government forces, expanding their sphere of activities, and making an alliance with the Moslem rebels, their forces were divided on October 23 into two parts —the eastern and the western—during the third phase of their movement. Lai Wen-kuang, Jen Chu, Fan Ju-tseng,56 and others led the eastern Nien. Failing in their attempt to flood the city of K'ai-feng by breaking a part of the Yellow River bank, the Tung-Nien, or eastern Nien, went back to Shantung. The other division, the Hsi-Nien, or western Nien, commanded by Chang Tsung-yii, Ch'iu Yuan-ts'ai (a Taiping chieftain), and others, proceeded from Honan to join the Moslems in Shensi. This separation of the eastern and western Nien was final, because the Nien were exterminated by the government forces before they had another chance to combine. To cope with the new development of the Nien rebels, Tseng Kuo-fan assigned Liu Ming-ch'uan, P'an Ting-hsin, and Chang Shu-shan to battle the eastern Nien; he ordered Liu Sung-shan, Pao Ch'ao et al to deal with the western Nien. When Tseng's command was taken over by Li Hung-chang in November 1866, Li followed Tseng's political and military policy.67 Lai Wen-kuang and Jen Chu invaded Shantung in November 1866. They repeatedly assailed the bulwark along the Grand Canal. Repelled each time, they roamed around several districts in western Shantung for about one month. They had twenty engagements with the imperial forces, but the latter claimed victory each time. Unable to make much headway, they returned to Honan on December 1, possibly for the purpose of joining the other part of the Nien in the northwest. The Nien went from Honan to Hupeh (December 22). From Hupeh they planned to go to Shensi with one division and to Szechwan with another and thus to enlarge their sphere of activity and break government encirclement. They intended to set up a kingdom in Szechwan. This ambitious attempt of the Nien army was well understood by their 5e A former Taiping hero, who had some negotiations and warfare against Western powers in Ningpao in 1861-62, joined Lai Wen-kuang after the fall of Nanking. See Fan's biography in Lo Erh-kang, T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-kao, 238-240. 57 The main sources of the eastern and western Nien in the following pages are Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'iieh-chai ti-tzu chi and Chou Shih-ch'eng, Huai-chun p'ing Nien chi\ both are now collected in the Nien-chun, vol. 1.

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enemy commander, Li Hung-chang, who ordered all government forces to drive the rebels and to prevent their advance from the other side. Perceiving the concentration of government troops attempting to surround them, the Nien extended their forces to Hsiao-kan, Ying-shan, and several districts in Hupeh. They still had a multitude several hundred thousand strong and their procession was described as stretching out for more than 100 li. But their way to Shensi to join the western Nien was barred by the Huai army. After a long, dogged pursuit in which a trap of the imperial forces was avoided, Lai Wen-kuang and others determined to fight a major war against the government troops. Indeed they scored several victories. In the first one, December 27, six battalions of the Huai army were routed, and the brave Huai commander, Chang Shu-shan, was killed. In the second victory on January 11,1867, another great general, Kuo Sung-lin,58 was wounded and his younger brother was killed. A third great victory over Liu Ming-ch'uan and Pao Ch'ao was won by the rebels on February 11, at Ying-lung-ho [or Yung-lung-ho] at An-lu, Hupeh; Liu's army suffered tremendous losses. General Pao Ch'ao, who arrived on the scene a little later, gave the Nien a severe beating, although his own casualties were also heavy. After these victories the Nien, who had also suffered heavily, reorganized themselves and marched from Hupeh to Honan, but they were driven back by the imperial forces. They then became active along the border between Hupeh and Anhwei. They again defeated the Hunan army on March 23, 1867, in Ch'i-shui in the eastern part of Hupeh. Having remained in this province for a period of more than one month, the Nien were anxious to go elsewhere. They attempted to harvest the early spring wheat in Honan in the first part of May. Eventually they learned that many small streams and canals were dry because of a long drought, and this weather condition greatly facilitated their cavalry movement. Accordingly they dashed eastward from central Honan, after accumulating a large amount of provisions, to Ts'ao-chou, Shantung, on June 9. The distance they covered was several hundred li in one day and night. The wearied Huai army in pursuit was left far behind. The Nien hurried to Shantung because they were urged to go there by the local bandits at Yiin-ch'eng and Liang-shan, who informed them 58

Kuo Sung-lin, an able and experienced general, was at first in the Hunan army and later in the Huai army. According to Hsiang-chun chih, he was arrested by the Nien, but because he could not walk (on account of seven wounds), he was abandoned at the side of a road. His subordinates found him and took him back. Nien-chun, I, 52.

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that the drought had caused the water in the Grand Canal to go so low that some sections could be crossed on foot; they were also told that the part guarded by Shantung troops was very weak, because the local force had neglected their garrison duties while the Nien had been far away in Hupeh. Thus the Nien scored their fourth great victory on June 13, 1867, by breaking the defense of the Grand Canal at the spot of Tai-miao near Chi-ning. The Shantung garrison was routed by the combined force of the Nien and the local bandits. All weapons and provisions of the headquarters of the Shantung commander, Wang Hsin-an, were captured by the rebels. It was not only a great material loss, but also a huge psychological blow to the government and to the people, for the hardprepared defense measures along the Canal had never been broken before under numerous Nien assaults. A shower of criticism fell on Li Hungchang, who put the blame on the commander of the Shantung troops. 59 The Nien then occupied T'ai-an about a hundred li east of the Canal. They went farther and farther toward the east of Shantung. The alarming military situation called most of the generals of the nation to the front. Li Hung-chang, after a fashion, welcomed the Nien to the Shantung peninsula, for it is bounded on the northwest by the Yellow River, on the southwest by the Grand Canal, on the east by the sea, and on the southeast by walls and ditches, according to topography. Li Hung-chang accepted Liu Ming-ch'uan's proposal to use the Grand Canal as a reverse barricade to block Nien's return to Honan and Anhwei. For caution's sake, the Chiao-lai Canal, which had been dug in the Yuan dynasty, was made 20 feet wide and 15 feet deep and used as a first defense line to bar the Nien's return to the west. Thus the coastal lines and the two canals were made first and second defense lines, an inner and outer cordon to trap the Nien. Imperial troops were posted at various places on the Grand Canal, and arrangements made for the complete destruction of the band of marauders. Foreign vessels guarded the coast of Shantung; "The Confucius and the Plato have been ordered from Shanghai to cruise along the coast [to] prevent all communication with the Nien-fei from the sea, and the Elfin has likewise been sent for to move on the Grand Canal and prevent supplies from reaching them by that canal." 6 0 s9 The Shantung troops could not stand against Nien's attack even for a single day without collapsing. A militia chief at Tai-miao even accused the commander of the Shantung troops of having previous conspiracy with the Nien rebels. For detail, see Li Hung-chang's letters to Tseng Kuo-fan and others in Li Wen-chung-kung chiian-chi, correspondence 7, 5-9; or Nien-chun, VI, 27, 29, 31, and 42. eo See U. S. Consular dispatch from Chefoo, no. 33, August 24, 1867, Robert Hart's

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The Nien army, on the other hand, thought that they could secure food in Shantung and then flee to the ocean.61 They did not know that Li Hung-chang, a diplomat, had previously made arrangements that the Western powers should have no communication with them. The Westerners, too, wished for peace in China so that they could carry on their trade with the new privileges they had acquired through the treaties of Tientsin and Peking in 1858 and 1860. Ignorant of Li Hung-chang's diplomatic means, the Nien, following their plan in exploiting Shantung, caused some concern among the Americans, British, and French at Yen-t'ai, or Chefoo, Shantung, a trade port and summer resort for foreigners, Chefoo had been attacked in October, 1861, by several thousand Nien troops who had been harassed by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, but they had been driven away by British and French frigates. Now in 1867, the summer trade was blocked by the Nien rebels. Near the end of June, knowing that Chefoo was filled with foreign goods without the protection of city walls, they rushed to secure. the booty. According to American consular dispatches from Chefoo, "the Chinese authorities were in great fear as they had no soldiers to defejnd the place." "To make matters worse, local insurrections sprang up all around till they became a formidable force." Fortunately foreign troops helped the local Chinese force in driving off the rebels.02 Utilizing this advantage the imperial soldiers forced the rebels farther to Tengchou and Lai-chou (July 2), and reached Kiaochou on July 18. Suddenly on August 19, 1867, the Nien broke the inner cordon by concentrated assault at a spot in Lai-chou, under the garrison of the Shantung Army. This was a severe blow to Li Hung-chang, and another great victory for the Nien. The latter proceeded to occupy territory between Kan-yii (Kiangsu) and Lan-shan (Shantung). The Peking government had no confidence in the second defense line along the Grand Canal, but Li Hung-chang adamantly maintained the policy of Tseng Kuo-fan. In a memorial, Li argued that if there was any strategy other than the defensive dike along the Grand Canal to ward off the bandits, he would adopt it. If not, he was inclined to defend the Grand Canal whenever he had a chance to do so.63 letter to G. Hughes, dated May 25, 1868, as quoted ; n Morse, 11.114; see also Morse, 11.207, and Nien-chun, IV.136. 61 According to the report of the governor of Shantung, the Nien cut down large trees to make rafts in which they could sail to the ocean for safety. Fang-liieh, 281.18-19. 62 Consul Morrison to Bruce, Chefoo, October 24, 1861. Further Papers relating to Rebellion in China (1862), p. 1; Consular dispatch from Chefoo, no. 30, July 6, 1867; Tung-mou shou-ch'eng chi-lueh, 22.25b, 29b, and 30; and Teng-chou fu-chih, 13.23b. 6S HCPNC, 5.8.

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Now he had a good opportunity to execute his long-range plan. A new cavalry and a foreign-gun corps (yang-ch'iang t'ui) was trained by Ch'ung-hou, Li Hung-chang, and Ting Pao-chen to encounter the roaming enemy, who tried to break the defense at the Grand Canal in September and October, but failed. Liu Ming-ch'uan defeated Lai Wen-kuang and others in Wei-hsien, Shantung, on November 12, and the crack troops of the eastern Nien suffered tremendous casualties. This was the first round in knocking down the Nien. Liu pursued the enemy to Jih-chao, Shantung, near the sea-coast, and after a couple of days, the Nien fled from Jih-chao to Kan-yii, Kiangsu, where Jen Chu was murdered by one of his own subordinates on November 19. This was the second round in subduing the Nien. Jen's brothers, Jen Ting and Jen San, succeeded to the command of the Nien force, which moved back again to Shantung. Obviously Lai Wen-kuang and his soldiers were panic-stricken. They fled here and there blindly without any particular aim. Formerly the Nien mobile force moved a great deal in a large area with great freedom of action, but fought few battles; now they could move a little only in a small area with restricted passive actions, but fight many battles. After more than a month the Nien force on December 24, 1867, was knocked down for the third round by virtually all the government forces in the Shantung front. A crushing blow was dealt at the junction of two small rivers called the Yang-ho and Mi-ho near Shou-kuang. Fan Jutseng and Jen Chu's two brothers were killed on the battlefield, and more than ten thousand rebels appear to have been slaughtered. The remnants were finally hemmed in at the spot where Tseng and Li had long expected them to be, and their skill in guerrilla tactics and mobile warfare was of little use. They had to face superior weapons and better-paid troops. Lai Wen-kuang was compelled to flee to Yang-chou, and his death there on January 5, 1868, marked the end of the eastern Nien.64

5. The Western Nien, October 1866-August

1868

While the eastern Nien were being liquidated, the western Nien were still active in Shensi and other provinces. Shensi had been overrun by the Nien-Taiping allies in 1862 and 1863, and the rebels had not retreated 84

For a detailed description of Jen Chu's death, see STCHCL, 7.8, and for the rest see CSL-TC, 173.25b-26, CSL-TC, 219.1-2, 5-6b, 12b-14, 19-20b, 26b-28b, 30-32, 220.2b-5; and N C H , Feb. 15, 1868. For an impressive description of the battles against the Eastern Nien, see Chiang Ti, Nien-chun shih ch'u-t'an, 85-94.

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until the government forces besieged Nanking. As the philosopher, Lao Tzu had said, a great war must be followed by a famine, and that was what happened in Shensi in 1865. The great famine gave rise to a large number of local bandits, and the Moslems killed some Chinese during the constant feuding between the two groups. The unbearably heavy taxes imposed by the government, and the political and racial prejudice against the minority group compelled the Moslems to start a rebellion, following their co-religionists who had been rebelling in Yunnan and Kansu for many years.65 In order to make an alliance with the Moslem rebels and to divert the imperial forces, Chang Tsung-yii led approximately 50,000 Nien troops from Honan to Shensi in November 1866. In only five weeks they progreised so far as to attack Sian, the capital of Shensi, cutting all its supply lines and smashing the government defenses. Tso Tsung-t'ang, a very able administrator and fighter, had been appointed governor-general of Shensi and Kansu on September 25, 1866, and had left Foochow in December for Hankow to prepare for his northwestern campaign. But on his way to Shensi he received an imperial order commanding him to fight the Nien first.66 Meanwhile Tseng Kuo-fan requested the throne to approve his order dispatching the famous Generals Pao Ch'ao and Liu Sung-shan to Shensi. Pao Ch'ao was already involved in hard fighting with the eastern Nien army in Hupeh, but Liu Sung-shan alone led seventeen battalions to the outskirts of Sian on the Chinese New Year's Eve to raise the siege on the old capital. It was not until March 20, after the government troops had suffered several set-backs, that Liu Sung-shan managed to force the Nien to leave Sian. Liu further defeated a combined force of the Nien and Moslems at Mei-hsien, about 60 li west of Sian, on April 5. After a fortnight the Nien-Moslem allies resumed their onset on Sian. Temporarily rebuffed, Chang Tsung-yii occupied several districts, including Chao-i in the east. Then in May the rebels bombarded Sian for the third time. Failing again they crossed the Wei River and advanced beyond the famous city of Yenan in the north of Shensi. In November the 05

The Moslem Rebellion in the northwestern provinces broke out in 1862. A collection of detailed official documents dealing with this rebellion is the P'ing-ting Shen, Kan, Hsin-chiang Hui-fei fang-liieh. Two recent publications on the Moslem Rebellion, Hui-min ch'i-i, compiled by Pai Shou-i, four volumes (see II, 23-25; III, 257, 321-325); and Ma Hsiao-shih, Hsi-p'ei Hui-tsu ko-ming chieh-shih, op. cit., are basic sources. See also Cheng-hsi chi-lueh, 1. 1-7; and Fang-liieh, 157.28. 68 Tso Tsung-t'ang's biography in CSK, 418.2; and in Hummel, Eminent Chinese; and Cheng-hsi chi-lueh, 1.7b.

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Moslem and Nien allies took Sui-te in the far north of Shensi. This city, however, was recovered by Liu Sung-shan on December 5. Thereafter the western Nien encountered bad omens. A part of their members did not wish to follow Chang Tsung-yii to the far north of Shensi. Instead they fought their way back to Honan. Worse still was the failure of the Nien-Moslem alliance. The Moslem chief, Ma Yenk'uei, thought that the Chinese and the Moslems could not stand together, and that since Chang Tsung-yii was a Chinese he was not trustworthy. Pretending to be Chang's ally and requesting him to fight against the imperial troops, the Moslem leader made an attack on the Nien from the rear. Chang Tsung-yii was so provoked that he sided with some Chinese militia to retaliate against the Moslems, and he destroyed many of their strongholds. He also ordered his followers to plunder only the Moslems and not the Chinese. The local people now thought that they were adequately protected by the Nien chief whose strength was sufficient to overcome the Moslems. They therefore shunned the government forces and offered their allegiance to Chang Tsung-yii, greatly increasing the power of the Nien army. This time the Nien army spent thirteen months in Shensi, overrunnning many districts until the eastern Nien in December, 1867, asked for Chang's help.67 Chang Tsung-yii planned to relax the pressure on the eastern Nien by launching an expedition to Peking, which would draw off all the imperial forces then attacking them. Tso Tsung-t'ang intended to surround the Nien in Shensi but he found that they were a different breed of rebel from the Taipings. They moved so fast that they had crossed the icy Yellow River near I-ch'iian to Shansi and Honan almost before Tso got started. Soon they reached the environs of Pao-ting, and Hsien-hsien, Chihli, in February, 1868, when a French missionary, Père Leboucq was nearly killed by the Nien. Pao-ting was only eighty miles south of Peking, and the court was greatly disturbed. Governors-general Kuan-wen of Chihli and Tso Tsung-t'ang of Shen-Kan, as well as many other officials, were reprimanded and punished by the emperor for failing to check the advance of the Nien toward Peking.68 Every measure was taken to defend the old capital. Li Hung-chang and Ting Pao-chen were summoned to Chihli to fight against the western Nien, while Tso Tsung-t'ang, who had followed the rebels to Pao-ting, was placed in command of the troops in Chihli, and Prince Kung was entrusted with the garrison of the capital. Martial law was declared, and « Hui-min ch'i-i, 111.29-30; WYFTC, 15-20-21; Nien-chiin, Tso Wen-hsiang-kung tsou-kao, 21.8b-9. 68 CSL-TC, 221.24-27; 222, 2b-4; and Morse, 11.224.

V.352, and VI.321; and

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all people passing through the city gates were closely examined. Li requested that Prince Kung be appointed supreme commander over Tso Tsung-t'ang and himself, for improved efficiency in military affairs, but this was not done because the emperor wished to encourage the Chinese generals.69 A probing attack on Pao-ting convinced Chang Tsung-yii that the defenses of the city were quite strong, so he led his force south to Po-yeh and Shen-chou. After the Nien entered Tung-ch'ang, Shantung, Li Hungchang was made commander-in-chief in this front. But near the end of April the Nien crossed the Grand Canal to Nan-p'i to invade Tientsin. About 3,000 mounted veteran salt smugglers, most of whom were equipped with foreign guns, joined the Nien army near Tientsin. An imperial decree ordered soldiers from Hunan, Hupeh, Shantung, Honan, and Manchuria to come to the rescue.70 But the military situation soon turned in the emperor's favor. On May 16, his majesty gave Li Hung-chang one month to exterminate the Nien army. Li immediately renewed his policy of "strengthening the walls and cleaning up the countryside" and of using the Yellow River and the Grand Canal to bar the constant movement of the rebels, and to deprive them of food. All the imperial forces were concentrated to fight against the Nien, who, before finally being halted, got within about four miles of Tientsin. The one-month time limit set by the emperor was reached and the rebels were still strong; Li and Tso were to be punished. The military governor of Mukden, Tu-hsing-a, was ordered to take command of the Peking Field Force (Shen-chi-ying), and he was to be assisted by Ch'unghou's new army, equipped with foreign weapons. This order implied a threat to the Chinese generals, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang, that they might be replaced by the Manchu commanders, Tu-hsing-a and Ch'ung-hou, if they could not suppress the Nien army. Victories began to be reported soon thereafter. Liu Sung-shan, Ch'en Kuo-jui, Chang Yao, Sung Ch'ing and others launched a general attack against the Nien army at the Chihli-Shantung border, and defeated them several times. In their flight toward the district of Wu-ch'iao in Ho-chien, Chihli, Chang Tsung-yii and others ran into an ambush and suffered heavy losses, including the death of Chang Erh-piao, Chang Tsung-yu's nephew.71 The government forces relentlessly pursued the Nien army to Shantung and scored more victories. Many rebel chiefs surrendered to the im«• 70

Ibid., 222.32-33; 223.23b-25, 224.10b-12b, 15-16, 18-19, 39b-41. Tso Wen-hsiang-kung tsou-kao, 27, 4-5, and WYFTC, 15.21b. CSL-TC, 232.26; 235.6.

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perialists. Early in August government troops concentrated to deal the Nien a lethal blow in a battle northeast of the Yellow River and the T'uhsieh River in Shantung, and many of the chiefs were killed. Chang Tsung-yii tried to cross the Grand Canal, but was repelled by both land and water forces. Why should Chang Tsung-yii have wished to go to Shantung again, where the northern expedition of the Taipings and the eastern Nien had come to grief, and where before long the western Nien, too, would meet the same fate? He had planned to combine all the eastern Nien with his western Nien again, and it was not until he reached the vicinity of Tientsin that he found out that the eastern Nien had already been annihilated. Dismayed, he went to Wu-ting, where the luxuriantly growing grain cheered him with the thought that recovery would be easy with plenty of food for his soldiers and fodder for his horses.72 Unluckily for the Nien rebels the great summer inundations of the Yellow River increased the water level in the Grand Canal by several feet. The concentration of the government naval forces was greatly facilitated by the high water, and they rushed to defend the crucial area as Chang struggled to cross the Canal. Moreover, while drizzling rains, which had lasted for nearly a month, made the muddy swamps and roads almost impassable for his horses, the residents of the area fled with all their food. Chang Tsung-yii faced extreme difficulties; his soldiers, wearied and hungry, were being continuously pursued by the government forces. In a great battle on July 31 several thousand Nien rebels were claimed to have been killed, and more than ten thousand mules and horses abandoned. In the first part of August, Chang's co-commander, Ch'iu Yuan-ts'ai, surrendered to Ch'en Kuo-jui with eight hundred cavalries men, while Chang Tsung-yii's nephews died of small-pox. Chang fled to Ts'ang-chou and Kao-t'ang, heading toward the Grand Canal, where he met government reinforcements under Liu Ming-ch'uan, who had just had several months' rest. Confronting this stout opponent, Chang Tsung-yii faced a difficult struggle near the end of the Nien movement. His remaining followers were mostly clan members and relatives who were experienced fighters. But they had been continuously tormented by government forces day and night for two weeks without getting much chance to sleep and eat. Day after day, hundreds of Chang's followers were killed, lost, or surrendered.73 Western gunfire on land and gunboats on the water were too 72 73

WYFTC, 15.22, and STCHCL, 9.19.

W. L. Bales, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Soldier and Statesman, of Old China, 207. Bales' statement that "many of the Nien were 'enlisted' by both Tso Tsung-t'ang and Li Hung-

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much for the Nien to withstand, and even Chang Tsung-yii was reported to have been seriously wounded. Under such circumstances the only reasonable course for Chang to take was to yield to the government. He preferred to fight to the end, and goaded his diehard adherents to do the same. He managed to flee to the T'u-hsieh River in Jen-p'ing, Shantung, to the east of the Grand Canal and north of the Yellow River. He attempted once to swim over the flooded stream under a shower of bullets from Liu Ming-ch'uan and Kuo Sung-lin's troops; he was dragged out to safety by his relatives. At last he had only eight followers, to whom, according to official sources, he bid goodby and good luck. Alone he dashed into the river, and probably drowned on August 16, 1868. This marked the end of the western Nien movement.74 Red-flag messengers rushed to Peking to announce the final triumph. A majority of the long-haired Nien were ruthlessly executed; a minority enlisted in the army of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Li Hung-chang. Needless to say, Li, Tso, and other generals were duly rewarded. On August 27, 1868, sacrifice was made in the ancestral temples and in the temple of the God of War to mark the official ending of the great rebellion, which had lasted seventeen years and afflicted eight provinces.75 The tactics and policies employed by the government in combating the Nien have been well summed up by Li Hung-chang, who said that the Nien could easily have been disbanded by one severe campaign in 18561857 when they consisted of a few hundred thousand bare-handed men. chang" is based on what "Mesny says"; Mesny was an eyewitness in Tso's camp. Judging f r o m the memorials of both Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang, his word is reliable; both Li and Tso did not consider it wise to kill every one of the Nien; instead they frequently took those w h o surrendered into their camps. 74 T h e official sources are Huai-chiin p'ing Nien chi and Shan-tung t'ung-chih, 117.29b. T h a t C h a n g Tsung-yii preferred death to surrender when he could not help it was m a d e known to Li Hung-chang and other commanders (see Li Wen-clumg-kung ch'uan-chi, tsou-kao, 14.21, and passim). But a different story about C h a n g Tsungyii's end is insinuated in Tso Tsung-t'ang's private letter to Li Hung-chang in which he says, "According to Chin Pen-li's affidavit who had been with the Nien for eleven years, besides Chang Tsung-yii, there were not a few other Nien chiefs and members who also escaped." F o r saving trouble "we should not report the full truth to the throne" — T s o added (Nien-chiin, VI.149-150). Obviously the remnants of the Nien either surrendered or escaped but not all were put to the sword. Whether Chang Tsung-yii was drowned in trying to escape across the T'u-hsieh River, whether he committed suicide by jumping into the water, or whether he simply disappeared, since his body was never found, is hard to ascertain. N o r is it very important to delve into the m a n n e r of his death or disappearance. A t any rate it was better for Chang to take such action than to fall into the hands of his enemies. 75 T h e eight provinces were Anhwei, Honan, Shantung, Hupeh, Kiangsu, Chihli, Shensi, and Shansi. T h e last several pages were mainly based on Nien-chiin, I, 73-78, 203-225. It is needless to say that a large number of details have been omitted f r o m the original sources except for a bare skeleton which is presented in the text.

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Unfortunately, Generals Sheng-pao, Yuan Chia-san, and others sometimes fought against them and sometimes invited them to surrender, with no intention of solving the problem fundamentally. Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in succeeded them, and he stamped out a few branches of the Nien-fei with his strong Manchurian and Mongolian cavalry, earning the awe of the Nien-fei. But he failed to take good care of the remnants of the Nien-fei and the Taipings, and the chiefs, Lai Wen-kuang, Chang Tsung-yu, and Jen Chu determined to fight to the end rather than surrender. Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was repeatedly defeated and eventually killed south of Ts'ao-chou. The experienced Nien-fei captured many horses from the government, thus strengthening their own forces. When Tseng Kuo-fan assumed command to suppress the Nien-fei, he initiated a plan establishing four bases . . . for defensive rather than offensive purposes. The Nien-fei went to Hupeh and Shensi to keep away from his four bases, and our troops had to run after t h e m . . . while they moved as freely as mercury. Even though there were many able fighters among the provincial authorities, none could stem Nien's advance into his province . . .76 Li Hung-chang insisted on "strengthening the defense line and cleaning up the countryside"; hunger, fatigue, and constant government pressure compelled many of the Nien to surrender. Apparently the rebels did not know that the government troops had little to eat either, and that even the best-paid troops of the Huai army had not received their pay for three months, since the financial resources of the Liang-chiang provinces were almost exhausted. 77 It was thus with almost the last drop of energy and might that the government exterminated the Nien rebels.

76 P'eng-liao han-kao, 7.1-2 and 8.4. In the latter reference, he clearly stated that the Nien-fei were suppressed only by sheer luck, because when he first assumed his duties, he was not at all certain that he would have the good fortune to accomplish that. " Fang-lueh, 290.25-27.

VI. The Weapons of the Nien Army and Their Guerrilla Tactics

Weapons and tactics are vital in any war. China's modernization was slow, but her use of Western guns and ships in suppressing the rebellions of the 1860's was quick and effective. The Taipings were subdued by superior weapons, and so were the Nien, the Moslems, and other insurgents. What weapons did the Nien have? Did they have modern weapons. How strong was their cavalry? What were their tactics? Did they fight as guerrillas all the time? An attempt is made in the following pages to answer such questions.

1. The Weapons of the Nien

Army

An inquiry about the weapons used by the Nien for fighting should be preceded by a word about the arms of the imperial forces. The government used every available type of weapon to combat the Nien. At first, cannon weighing five or six thousand catties or roughly more than two tons were employed.1 Such medieval weapons as spears, torches, and stone catapults were also used. After the suppression of the Taipings, the Hunan and Anhwei armies were equipped with foreign guns with which they were able to deal lethal blows to the rebels. There is a fallacy in the common belief that the Nien had only swords and spears made of bamboo and steel; they, too, had big cannon from the very beginning. When more than four thousand Nien attacked Shench'iu, Honan, in 1853, they used cannon and scaling ladders on four sides of the city, while the government used cannon and rockets to repel them. The Nien also set up cannon to defend their headquarters at Chihho.2 Their guns weighed as much as more than five hundred catties.8 For instance one camion weighing three thousand catties was captured by the government in the area of Po-chou, and three two- thousand-catty 1

Each catty equals one and a quarter pound. Few of these big cannon remain today, possibly because the badly needed iron was used to make tools after the rebellion. STCHCL, 1.20-22, 3.12b, 13, 14b, and YCCL, 5.24.

2 3

Fang-liieh, 4.1, 17, and 18b.

YCCL, 3.5b.

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171

cannon were also lost to the government force.4 On one occasion in 1854 the government reported capture of four cannon, some of bronze and some of steel, and seventy-six gingals (t'ai-ch'iang),5 which were twoman rifles of large caliber. The Nien army were reported in 1856 to have lost two hundred and twenty-five guns, varying in weight from two hundred to nine hundred catties, in the north suburb of Po-chou. 9 We can see that the Nien were supplied with heavy weapons, even allowing for exaggeration in these reports. In the White Dragon Temple, near the Wo River and Chih-ho, the government captured nineteen cannon ranging from four hundred to more than four thousand catties in weight, together with seven hundred gingals and six hundred flags. According to official reports, when several thousand Nien attacked a government military camp "their bullets fell as heavily as rain." 7 Some of these huge guns, made and left by the Jesuits in the early seventeenth century, 8 had been dug up; others had presumably been captured from the government. They were gigantic, but probably cumbersome and inefficent in warfare. Since they used so many large cannon in the defense of their headquarters, the Nien were obviously determined to stay at one place from the beginning. Especially during the period from 1851 to 1863, the Nien tried with all the resources at their disposal to defend their headquarters around Chih-ho. Gradually the Nien army switched from big guns to swords, spears, and bamboo weapons after 1861, possibly because the old heavy guns had been worn out or had run out of ammunition, and also because the heavy guns would have reduced their speed and mobility after they became mounted guerrillas. A censor memorialized the throne (1861) that the Nien in Shantung were searching for bronze and iron to make weapons.9 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and other high officials were ordered to investigate and to have anyone who supplied ammunition to the Nien executed instantly.10 This implied that the Nien had probably lost most of their weapons by 1861 and had to make new ones; there is also an implication that some of their weapons were purchased secretly from government sources or from merchants. The government captured more than two thousand swords, spears, and flags during one battle in 1862, 4

Fang-lueh, 7.15b, 16b-17. Ibid., 8.14. I am indebted to Dr. Ralph L. Powell who helped me greatly in rendering terms of weapons and military ranks. « YCCL, 6.32. 7 Ibid., 6.33, and 46. 8 The cannon were referred to as "Fo-liang-chi ta-p'ao," meaning cannon made by the "Frank" people, i.e., Portuguese and Spanish. See Fang-liieh, 9.21 and passim. » STCHCL, 2.16, 17b. 10 Fang-lueh, 121.16. 5

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

but no mention was made of guns. In the summer of 1866 the Nien had to cut down bamboo along the way to make weapons as they fled from Hsin-yang, Honan, to Liu-an, Anhwei,11 indicating that constant warfare in their later years had left them very short of weapons — mainly swords and spears. But during their last two years the Nien also had modern Western guns, and even foreigners were alleged to have assisted them in the fighting. When the Nien pressed forward to cross the Grand Canal in Shantung in 1867, the government garrison attacked with modern guns, but according to the report of the governor of Shantung the Nien, four or five thousand strong, also carried foreign firearms on horseback and handled them with ease. Soon after more cavalry and infantry, all equipped with foreign rifles, were rushed up. About the same time the Nien attacked a river called the Chiao-ho. They used several hundred cavalry to advance to the east bank of the river, and modern foreign artillery to bombard the dike. A Nien chief, Li Ming-shan, was captured in this battle, and he said that there were two foreigners with the Nien army, who had persuaded more than one hundred other foreigners to have interviews with Jen Chu and Lai Wen-kuang at Lao-shan-k'ou, near Chefoo, after which these people were ordered to go back secretly to buy foreign artillery for the Nien army.12 The reliability of this government information should be checked with a neutral source. According to Consul Edwin T. Sandford's dispatch from Chefoo, One of the attendants of the Rebel chief was captured a few days ago and stated a body of 400 mounted men, armed with foreign muskets, were always the first to engage with the Imperialists. They had brass cannon which they had obtained from Europeans.... A few days since a Chinaman w h o . . . made his escape after having been with them [Nien] 13 days or so, states.. . he saw four Europeans belonging to the Army. They were well dressed and riding on fine mules. He was told that there were a large number of Europeans attached to the Rebel Army. Many of this man's statements have been corroborated by others who have been prisoners and escaped.13

This unpublished document helps to ascertain that the government in" STCHCL, 3.18, and HCPNC, 2.7b. According to the Wu-ho hsien-chih (7.13), the Nien sometimes employed several thousand boats to sail some ten or fifteen miles along the Huai River, gathering grain and leaving the refugees hungry. This shows a little of Nien logistics. 12 Ting Pao-chen, Ting Wen-ch'eng-kung tsou-kao, 2.21, 48b-49. In this work there are several other important references to the Nien. 13 No. 33, U.S. Consulate, August 24, 1867. Earlier, on May 4, 1863, the British consulate at Tientsin also reported that the Nien were "armed with spears, gingals, and light field guns."

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173

formation is not entirely exaggerated and inaccurate. Sandford's report was not groundless; it is supported by the report of other contemporary Western observers at the scene. The Nien rebels had foreign guns, muskets, and possibly some ephemeral contacts with a few Europeans. It is probable, too, that when they drew near to Chefoo, they intended to get more Western weapons. In a melee on March 11, 1868, Chang Tsung-yii lost four explosiveshell guns (k'ai-hua p'ao) and six heavy artillery pieces (p'i-shan p'ao).1* It seems safe to say that from the beginning to the end, the Nien had a number of cannon and guns. 2.

The Cavalry of the Nien

Army

When the Nien army lost many of their cumbersome cannon, they began to use horses in 1856, and this innovation is frequently noticed in government sources. After several years spent in training and developing a mounted force, the Nien cavalry became really formidable, especially in the eyes of imperial commanders. Although the government was very slow in organizing a cavalry force, the mobile power of the enemy made the Grand Council realize that the government could not prevent their overrunning Shantung unless it had a strong cavalry of its own.15 Tseng Kuo-fan also memorialized that the bandits dominated a very large area, and it was impossible to overcome them without cavalry. He also defended his own position that he could not force his infantry to face the Nien cavalry, which ranged over the central plain.16 Tseng Kuo-fan's memorial met with the hearty approval of the Grand Council,17 but the government was very slow in purchasing horses from northwestern China. An imperial decree, to Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang dated September 19,1867, referred to their repeated requests for nearly eight thousand horses and one thousand camels, and inquired as to how many were actually available in the army camps. Li summarized the whole situation in a memorial, part of which reads: The prerequisite to suppressing the N i e n - f e i is e f f e c t i v e cavalry. T h e N i e n - f e i are extremely cunning and ferocious. T h e y usually use ten thousand cavalry with several hundred thousand infantry to surround us. Since they advance toward us with both cavalry and infantry, w e , too, should rely o n both t o protect our bases adequately. If w e use infantry alone, w e cannot m o v e fast. If w e use only cavalry, ours will prove m u c h inferior to theirs. T h e rebel chief, 14

Tso Wen-hsiang-kung tsou-kao, 25.56. "P'i-shan p'ao," literally, "splitting-hill artillery," is hard to translate exactly. 15 Fang-lueh, 19.6; and YCCL, 6.16, 28b, 32, and 230.35. 16 Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . .., 11.4-9. 17 Fang-lueh, 242.1.

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

Jen Hua-pang has numerous diehards in his cavalry. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in at first achieved good results using only cavalry to suppress the Nien-fei, but the officers of his cavalry did not fight hard in later years, while the bandits were extremely truculent, and he had to rely on both infantry and cavalry to cope with the bandits, veterans of more than ten years.

Li went on to report that only three hundred and twenty horsemen had been left by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, while the cavalry reinforcements from Chahar numbered only three hundred and ninety, and there were no cavalry officers at all.18 This reveals not only the government's inefficiency in recruiting and training cavalry, but also the great losses suffered by the cavalry which had already existed under Seng-ko-lin-ch'in; many horses were captured or killed by the Nien army after Seng's death, and many were sold or killed for meat. When the Nien heard that the government force had very few horses, they frequently compelled one peasant to contribute as many as five horses1» to save himself from being drafted to join them in the fighting. So after 1865 with the help of the Taiping leaders, the Nien had horses not only for their cavalry but even for the infantry. Unlike the government forces who had to carry cannon, the Nien carried light weapons and equipment, such as long spears, and secured their food by plundering, so that they could travel light. All this gave the Nien a great advantage in mobility. More fighting occurred on the run than in pitched battles, and more time was spent in pursuit than in combat.20 Their highly mobile force overran many provinces, and this condition gave rise to complaints to the throne about their difficult task by Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang.

3.

The Guerrilla

Tactics of the Nien

Army

The Nien army used many different tactics to combat their enemies. They underwent many vicissitudes, and had to adjust to a variety of situations. It was, therefore, through long experience that they developed certain fighting methods. In their cavalry assaults the Nien army used psychological warfare to aid the sheer weight of their advance. They blew bugles, shouted, and set fire to houses as their cavalry followed by the infantry rushed on. The militia were usually trampled by the horses. As the cavalry rode about killing people with their spears, their enemies generally fled as fast as 18 18

2

HCPNC, 5.10b-ll; and Nien-chun, 1.166-167. Shou-kuang

hsien-chih,

15.51.

» Yang Chi-chung, Hsu Yu-k'ou liieh, 3.18.

THE GUERRILLA TACTICS OF THE NIEN ARMY

175

possible.21 Sometimes the cavalry of the Nien army was divided into three columns. The central one made a frontal attack on the government force, while the left and right wings tried to surround the enemy.22 Sometimes the Nien army used wave after wave of cavalry in a continuous assault.23 They organized their cavalry and infantry into several dozen and sometimes over a hundred groups to attack in quick succession and engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting; this often resulted in a confused mass of struggling rebels and government soldiers. The technical term for such tactics was "t'uan-chen" or roughly, small-group-battle arrangement.24 Each group consisted of several score of cavalrymen, and such tactics must have given the government forces many hard lessons, as we can see from Tseng Kuo-ch'iian's letter to General Pao Ch'ao telling the latter of an important method in battling the Nien army. Tseng said: T h e fierce N i e n - f e i are entirely different f r o m the Taipings. W h e n o n e goes to battle them, o n e must use the "chieh-to chen" or "stick-together method" to oppose them. "Chieh-to-chen" meant that e a c h battalion must stand close t o g e t h e r . . . to face the enemy. If one's soldiers are slightly scattered, they are easily dashed to pieces by the m o u n t e d bandits, and w h e n one's array is in disorder, the f i a s c o will be irreparable. 2 5

The Nien seemed to have an unwritten law that a Nien chief had to carry a great flag ahead of the vanguard in order to encourage his followers. The chiefs had to be very brave, so that even though their dead and wounded littered the battleground, they could still rush into the hail of bullets without fear.26 Frequently, as we have mentioned, the Nien challenged their enemies frontally and dispatched strong units of cavalry to attack them from the rear.27 Whenever the Nien learned that government troops were coming, they would withdraw so quickly that the government force would lose sight of them for days on end. One of their tricks was to avoid contacts with government troops and to reduce warfare as much as possible; but if pursuers tried to get close and appeared to be wearied from the pursuit, the Nien would find a vantage ground to meet the challenge with grim 21

Teng-chou fu-chih, 13.24. HCPNC, 2.5b. 23 Ibid., 8.1. 24 Apparently the "t'uan-chen" was very common during the period of the Nien, for the government sources frequently spoke of it. Nien-chiin, 1.126, 200, 202, 212. 25 The letter was written in 1867 and is reproduced in Nien-chiin, V.390; see also V.379. 28 STCHCL, 5.3b-5; and HCPNC, 6.1. 27 Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, "Shu T'ing-chun, Ming-chun Yin-lung-ho shih-i," in Yung-an hai-wai wen-pien, 4.25. 22

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

determination and striking ferocity. They liked to divide their strong cavalry into two wings to encircle the pursuers, while their frontal attack consisted of both cavalry and infantry. The cavalry used big swords and long spears to break into the government line and their infantry soldiers rushed in under heavy smoke from government gunfire to charge their enemies like mad dogs. Horses neighed and men shouted; attacking at a gallop, they frequently surrounded government troops so completely that they could hardly fight their way out.28 According to Tseng Kuo-fan, the strong points of the Nien army were (1) their long-spear infantrymen, who could rush ahead under a thick smokescreen and a shower of bullets from their opponents; (2) their cavalrymen, who could encircle their enemy quickly and completely, leaving no gap for them to escape; (3) their combatant ability, which was great but seldom used unless challenged; and (4) their movement, which was very fast — they sometimes proceeded several days in succession, covering a distance of 1,000 li, and sometimes they made circles within a radius of a hundred li in order to wear out their enemies (including Seng-ko-lin-ch'in). The effect of these Nien tactics was, however, greatly reduced when Tseng and Li learned their habits of war and began using Western guns in the new army; these guns took a far heavier toll of rebel lives than the bandits, with their swords and spears, inflicted on the government forces.29 The Nien army was particularly adept at using spears about twenty feet long. When the government used artillery, the Nien would overrun the artillery emplacements with their horses.80 Sometimes the Nien ranged themselves in five columns, waiting for a skirmish, and at the same time sent their cavalry to attack and capture the government's supplies. For instance, when Lai Wen-kuang's force suffered a set-back in 1867, Jen Chu led a crack cavalry force of several thousand in an attack on the Anhwei Army, then under the command of Chang Shu-sheng. Jen split off a part of his force to attack the left wing, 2S Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 11.1. For the purpose of safety, a "military mandarin of the province [of Shantung] is following the Rebels about 30 miles in their rear. When they halt, he halts; when they march, he marches." U.S. Consulate dispatch from Chefoo, dated July 6, 1867. 29 Tseng Kuo-fan told his younger brother, Kuo-ch'iian, the Nien tactics and asked the latter to warn other army officers. Nien-chiln, V.341 and 345. In the latter source, Tseng Kuo-fan pointed out three Nien weaknesses: (1) lack of firearms, so that they could not take strongholds; (2) lack of military camps, forcing them to spend nights in villages of the people; and (3) use of too many donkeys and mules to carry the Nien family members and provisions. ao Wang Ting-an, Ch'iu-ch'ueh . . . , 11.1b.

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177

and, while Lai made a firm stand at the center of the front, the rest of the cavalry detoured and attacked the government force from the rear. The infantry followed close behind, and swords and speare were used in the battle. They fought very courageously, with no regard for casualties.31 Such tactics helped the Nien to win a great number of victories, including the one which cost Seng-ko-lin-ch'in his life. Closely related to the encircling tactics of the Nien army was their favorite practice of exhausting the manpower and supplies of their enemies. War of attrition, and refusal to attack unless the odds are greatly in their favor, are of course characteristics of all guerrillas. The Nien would either run from the enemy or try to challenge without engaging in a frontal attack. As a result of such tactics, the Nien were able to preserve their own strength, while the government forces weakened at each encounter. The government's provisions and financial resources also constantly ran low, and the prolonged warfare worried the high authorities. The Nien soldiers kept continually on the move, avoiding full-scale battles unless they knew the government force was weak and isolated. In 1868, Tso Tsung-t'ang wrote a memorial that very ably summarized their war of attrition. He said that they habitually sought out the weak spots of the government force, avoiding the main strength of their enemy. They usually attacked the government force at the very moment when it was preparing for marching, or when it had stopped after a long journey. If the contingent of troops which they challenged proved strong, they fled very rapidly and would veer around to exhaust their chasers. "If their intention was to go the east, they first ran a distance toward the west; if their destination was to be in the north, they pretended to go down to the south in order to confuse us." 32 A Manchu general, Ch'ung-en, also reported that, while the Nien were fresh, his force was very tired. If attacked, the Nien would withdraw to their forts and sit there in safety, but as soon as the attack was stopped they would launch a big counter-attack. In short, the Nien always tried to hit the enemy at its weakest spot to win the day.33 In their war of attrition the Nien liked to make sneak attacks at dawn. They chose the hours between four and six to begin their bombardments or rushes across moats and dikes, because they knew that the sleepy soldiers would be stupefied by a sudden attack at that moment.34 The Nien used positional warfare only when they could not avoid it. 31 32 33 34

HCPNC, 3.2b and 4.5; and Nien-chiin, V, 344-345. Tso Wen-hsiang-kung tsou-kao, 25.26-27. YCCL, 2.14b and 4.9. Pao-chai shou-yu t'iao-kuan, p. 5.

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

In 1858 a branch of the Nien army retreated from Shantung to Honan, where they were forced to dig moats and build forts to try to stem the advance of the government forces for an extended time.35 In 1861 they established positions for pitched warfare in the mountains of Shantung and maintained their strategy in the face of the strongest government attacks.36 In the wars of 1867 there were often several dozen Nien chiefs directing such pitched battles from horseback. They swung their flags to order their soldiers ahead, and they continued to resist even when the battlefield was piled high with their dead and wounded.37 To conserve their strength the Nien army often turned to ruses de guerre to tax the manpower and supplies of the government forces, while using only a small force of their own. One of their favorite tricks was ambuscade. They sometimes set and ambush and waited until the procession of a government convoy corps passed their position half way; then they suddenly raided the middle portion, and cut the procession into two parts. After seizing what they wanted, they ran away quickly. This tactic was called "Heng-ch'ieh-fa" — literally, to cut a horizontal line into two parts.38 Another one of Nien's favorite tricks was infiltration. They either pretended to be government troops to gain entrance to villages and plunder and burn houses,39 or they disguised themselves as militia, as in 1854 when more than ten thousand men with three thousand horses divided into white, green, blue, and mixed-color banners to cross the Yellow River from Pu-chou, Shantung. Both the people and the government thought that they actually were militia.40 Chang Lo-hsing and Kung Te secretly ordered more than a thousand of their followers in 1859 to shave their heads and infiltrate Ying-chou and other cities, disguised as merchants and militiamen, in order to attack the enemy from within while the rest of the Nien attacked from the outside.41 Even the early Nien had many bands around Chih-ho disguised as militia to cooperate with the rest of the Nien rebels.42 Weapons were hidden in piles of lumber, Fang-liieh, 53.4. STCHCL, 3.12b. 37 HCPNC, 5.7b. Yang Chi-chung also says that whenever the Nien were in battle with the government forces, their furious leaders rushed ahead against the big flag of the government commanders. Needless to say, they were very courageous. (Hsii yii-k'ou liieh, B.5b). 38 Nien-chun, III, 523. 39 Fang-liieh, 154.18; and Niett-chiin, III, 319 and V, 355. According to the latter source, several dozen or several hundred Nien adopted government uniforms and flags to penetrate the weak sections of government lines without fighting. 40 Tung-o-hsien hsiang-t'u chili, 3.35. 41 YCCL, 8.19. 12 Fang-liieh, 4.19. 36

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179

and transported by lumber traders through government lines to their destination, where the secret Nien members received and used them for a sudden attack on a government post.43 To overcome government sentries Nien also sent out men dressed as beggars, carrying small daggers and grenades concealed in their clothes.44 These ruses are similar to those used in twentieth century guerrilla warfare. Scorched-earth tactics were also used by the Nien army. As early as 1856 a censor reported that the Nien bandits in Meng-ch'eng and Pochou had been as numerous as bees during the previous autumn, and that their leader, Chang Lo-hsing, had allied himself with Su T'ien-fu, Kung Te, and others to attack the people. "Wherever they went, they left scorched land behind them." All good citizens had fled from the area north of Meng-ch'eng and Po-chou, and east of Kuei-te, and there was scarcely a farmer or an inhabited house left in that area of several hundred squari li, although there were small groups of bandits.45 This wanton devastation was one type of scorched-earth policy. Another type, closer to the modern sense of the term, was faced by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in who tried to attack the headquarters of the Nien army. He found all the wells within a hundred miles filled with stone and earth, and the land completely laid waste. His cavalry had to carry food and water. When his troops were compelled to withdraw, they were so closely pursued by the Nien that they had to abandon all their equipment.46 When the Nien army withdrew from T'ien-ch'ang, Anhwei, they burned more than a hundred rafts which they had made, and they also sent groups to clear all houses, trees, and bushes on both banks of the river to deprive their enemies of all possible cover.47 This was another type of scorched-earth policy for military purposes. The government adopted the same policy against the Nien army, under the name of "cleaning up the countryside," which at least sounds better than "scorched-earth." In Honan, Anhwei, and Shantung, the yii forts and other strongholds were built not only as protection for the people but also to serve as storehouses for food, fodder, and fuel. Small bands of Nien could not plunder the yii, outside of which there was nothing left in the bleak earth, especially during the long winters. In early 1868 many Nien soldiers were so hungry and weary that they surrendered to the government. This would seem to show that this terrible scorchedearth policy accomplished something. 43 44 45 44 47

Nien-chun, III, 521. Ch'i-hsia hsien hsii-chih, 8.5b. Fang-lueh, 15.6b-7. Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin chih, 16.4. Fang-lueh, 53.28.

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

Finally, feinting was often used to inveigle the Nien's opponents to pursue them. Sometimes the Nien threw weapons and valuables on the ground to beguile the imperial soldiers to pick them up; enchanted with their gain, the government soldiers were caught off-guard when the Nien grimly counterattacked. As a defensive method, the Nien frequently kept beacons in the vicinity where they encamped for the night, while the location of their real camp was under strict "black-out" control; no smoke or fire could be seen from a distance. 48 This lighted area was used as a decoy to confuse the government forces as to the rebels' whereabouts. 4. Patterns of the Nien Guerrilla

Warfare

Since the tactics of the Nien army have already been described, perhaps a few examples will illustrate the effectiveness of their strategy. That there are not many detailed official accounts of Nien's victories should not come as a surprise, because field commanders usually did not tell their emperor the truth unless the failure was so grave that an important general was killed and it could no longer be concealed; the commanders were afraid that a frank report would reveal their incompetence or neglect of duty. Even in such a case the memorial writer would carefully gloss everything over in order to avoid implication of self-inefficiency and subsequent punishment. In reading the collection of writings of Yuan Chia-san, Ting Pao-chen, and others, one would have thought that they were commanders of ever-victorious armies. One of the most famous battles of the Nien army was at Kao-chuangchi, Shantung, where Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was killed. The troops under the command of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in were crack cavalry from Mongolia and Manchuria, and infantry recruited from the several provinces of China's northwest. His horses were all carefully selected and his men well trained, so that his cavalry was undoubtedly the finest in the nation at that time. His weapons were inferior to those of the newly organized Huai army, but superior to those of the Nien army. How then could the Nien army survive against such a formidable enemy, to say nothing of defeating him? The Nien army spent almost four months in early 1865 in exhausting Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's troops. Their commanders, Lai Wen-kuang, the valiant Taiping strategist, and Jen Chu, the daring fighter, led Seng's troops to Honan, with Seng in pursuit from city to city. He pursued them all the 48

Examples of Nien's feigned retreat are too numerous to be quoted from Fang-

liieh, Huai-chun p'ing Nien-chi, etc. See also Nien-chiin, I, 279, and III, 15.

PATTERNS OF THE NIEN GUERRILLA WARFARE

181

way to Yen-ling in western Honan, intending to take a rest there. Noticing that they were not being pursued, the Nien army continued south and southeast, pretending to attack a city and spreading rumors that they were about to go on to Hupeh. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was fooled, and on March 5 he ordered his troops from Yen-ling to pursue the Nien army, who soon learned that their enemy was on the way. They went southeastward, then southwest, and finally east to Hsin-yang and north to Ch'iieh-shan, leaving a small unit at this last city, lest the enemy should lose track of them. A fortnight later Seng's force caught up with the Nien army. The latter returned to central Honan, and after a brief battle continued eastward until they crossed the Yellow River on March 27. Advancing day and night, they rushed directly to Shantung, overrunning Ts'ao-chou and Chi-ning within a few days. The Nien crossed the Grand Canal in the district of Wen-shang on April 2. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's force pursued them to Wen-shang, but the Nien fighters were in Ning-yang two days later, and then turned southeastward. Pursued to Ch'u-fou, the birthplace of Confucius, the Nien engaged in a skirmish with the government force, feigned defeat, and fled northward. They crossed the river, Wen-ho, on the outskirts of Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, while Seng's force did not cross the river until a few days later. For two months the Nien army alternately proceeded day and night, covering a long distance in a short time, or circled around within a radius of a hundred li. Wherever they went, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's troops followed two or more days later, rushing here and there, forward and backward, for over three thousand li without much rest. So worn out was the entire force that it was virtually at the mercy of the rebels. But the Nien army still feared that Seng's force, though very tired, might yet be too strong to defeat. So they continued their favorite strategy for another month, returning to the river Wen-ho, and running southward to Tsou-hsien, the birthplace of Mencius, then turning eastward and crossing the border to the province of Kiangsu, where they overran several districts before returning to Tsou-hsien again. Although defensive measures were being taken by the authorities of Chihli, Shantung, Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsu, only Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's troops were used to pursue the Nien army. After this additional month of pursuit, both his infantry and his cavalry were worn out to the point of being unable to walk or ride. Even Seng's fingers were too sore to hold the reins any longer. Knowing that their enemy was completely exhausted, the Nien returned to Wen-shang in the middle of May, and decided that it was time for a decisive battle. They crossed the Grand Canal and

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

assembled several hundred thousand of their cavalry and infantry as well as local forces to await their pursuers.49 The huge sanguinary battle took place on May 18, 1865, in Kaochuang-chi in the northwest of Ts'ao-chou, Shantung. When Seng-ko-linch'in's cavalry and infantry reached Kao-chuang-chi, the Nien army was ready for them. Three small columns of cavalry and infantry were left in front of the big village to lure the imperialists to a forest outside the village, where the main Nien force lay in ambush. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in attacked as soon as he arrived. After some skirmishing the Nien army fled to the forest and pretended defeat. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in gave chase and promptly ran into the ambush, suffering a crushing defeat. He finally managed to withdraw to a village, which the Nien army quickly surrounded. The Nien immediately dug a long moat and assembled a large force to prevent the escape of the imperialists. Late that night Seng-kolin-ch'in led a desperate attempt to break out of the village. Although surrounded more than once, his forces cut their way out; they were confused, however, by the darkness and ran into more of the omnipresent Nien rebels and other local force. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was wounded eight times, and was finally killed at Wu-chia-tien,50 after an all-night battle in which he lost most of his troops, his best generals, and more than 5,000 horses. This typifies the guerrilla warfare of the Nien army. They maneuvered in all directions for more than five months in the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Kiangsu, using their highly mobile force to wear out the enemy. When the time seemed ripe they ambushed the enemy, surrounded them, and defeated them in a pitched battle. The battlefield at Ts'ao-chou, now Ho-tse, Shantung, deserves some 49

Sources of this battle are Fang-lueh, 231, 5b-6 (very brief); Lo Erh-kang, NCTYTC, 37-41; Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chiin chili, 14.7; Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi, 16.10; Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng's account of Seng's death, op. cit.; HCPNC, 1.3-4; and Seng's biography in Chung-hsing chiang-shuai pieh-chuan, 16A.1-5; and Hummel's Eminent Chinese, 632-34. 50 The name of the place where Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was killed varies. (1) Li Chiachuang, see Seng's biography in CSK, 410.1; (2) Kao-chuang, or Kao-chuang-chi, or Kao-lou-chi, see Fang-lueh, 237.15b-18, and Lo Erh-kang, NCTYTC, 39; (3) Wuchia-tien, see the memorial of Ch'en Kuo-jui, a right-hand man who fought at the spot with Seng-ko-lin-ch'in; see also Fang-lueh, 237.15b-18, and STCHCL, 4.14, and Kuo Ting-i, 1127. There are other diversified names. The discrepancy seems to come from a number of small villages covered by the great battle, and the pronunciations of the names of these villages being heard or transliterated differently. It is certain, however, that the distance has been invariably given as 15 li west or northwest of Ts'ao-chou. Ch'en Kuo-jui's report should be considered the primary source, and the compiler of the Shan-tung chiin-hsing chi-liieh also had first-hand information from Shantung.

PATTERNS OF THE NIEN GUERRILLA WARFARE

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attention. Ts'ao-chou had been a turbulent prefecture almost since classical times. It was the home of the great rebel leader, Huang Ch'ao, of the T'ang dynasty. Lying about 120 li west of the Grand Canal and 45 li southeast of the Yellow River, it is near the the borders of Chihli, Anhwei, and Kiangsu. A plain prefecture, it was frequently afflicted by bandits. The famous gangster hideout, Liang-shan-po, was not far away. Moreover it was a rendezvous for local marauders and members of secret societies, and an ideal district for the maneuver of cavalry. This latter reason was probably why the Nien chose Ts'ao-chou for the great onslaught. There are two more things to be noted in this great battle between the Nien and the imperial forces: first, that all of the able leaders among the Nien, the local bandits, and the secret societies participated in the attack on Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, who had killed many of their comrades in previous years; and secondly, that one of Seng's officers, a Major Kuei Hsi-chen, secretly supplied military information to Chang Tsung-yii.51 These two points may lead us to speculate that successful guerrilla warfare depends, inter alia, on the support of the local people, familiarity with the geography arid topography, and a good intelligence service. The Nien's eventual victory in crossing the Grand Canal at Tai-miao, Shantung, as we recall, was also helped by the "bandits" at Yiin-ch'eng, who supplied the information of the weak spot in the defense line and urged the Nien to attack there. Now let us investigate briefly another pattern of Nien strategy against the best troops of that time — the Hunan and Anhwei Braves, who were equipped with Western weapons. The great battle of Yung-lung-ho, Hupeh, of course was preceded by a few other campaigns. In the winter of 1866, Jen Chu, Lai Wen-kuang, Niu Hung, and the other Nien leaders redeployed their crack cavalry and infantry from Honan to Hupeh. They ravaged the area of An-lu, planning to send one branch of their force across the river, Hsiang-ho, to take the territory of Szechwan, to keep one branch in Hupeh to support the Szechwan expedition, and to send another group across the Wu-shengkuan pass to make connections with the western Nien under Chang Tsung-yii.52 Obviously the Nien did not move around aimlessly but according to precise plans. The governor of Hupeh, Tseng Kuo-ch'iian, took steps to deal with the attempted invasion of the Nien army from Honan. He summoned the Kuo T'ing-i, op. cit., p. 1127; and l-shan chih, 16.6. Other reasons for Seng's failure have been discussed before. 52 T'ing chiin chi-liieh in Nien-chiin, I, 250-57. 51

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famous general, Kuo Sung-lin, from the border of Honan to bar the Nien entrance to the south; he also called for the best troops of the Anhwei army for the forthcoming war. He requested his brother, Tseng Kuo-fan, to send a strong force to Honan, ond ordered the brave general, Pao Ch'ao, to move southward from Honan to Hupeh. His plan was to surround the Nien and annihilate them on the mountainous border between Hupeh and Honan. Perceiving the government's strategy and finding their southward route barred, the Nien determined to dispose of the crack government troops before the rest of the government forces could gather. As usual the Nien tried to wear out their enemy, and at the same time they accumulated provisions. The whole fast-moving army of the Nien was divided into four columns, each of which had a vanguard and a rearguard. When they met enemies, the vanguards advanced while the rearguards foraged; when they were being chased by the enemy, the rearguards would stay to fight while the vanguards could run for safety. When there was no enemy near, they searched for food and other booty at their leisure. They kept the government forces guessing their destinations and vainly pursuing them here and there. Chang Shu-shan caught the Nien in Te-an, Hupeh, on December 27, 1866. He was eager to fight the rebels after this long hunt. He beat his drums and ordered the six battalions of his cavalry and infantry to rush ahead. They killed and wounded an uncounted number of enemies. Chang Shu-shan urged his soldiers to chase the defeated Nien persistently. But the Nien knew that General Chang's troops had been fighting and marching continually for a whole day without reinforcements. Therefore, near dusk, the pursuers were broken into two parts and each was encircled by the retreaters in ambush. Then the Nien cavalrymen showed themselves to be real butchers. In the deep of night several hundreds of Chang's bodyguards were killed, and finally Chang Shu-shan lost his life. Chang since 1854 had been an able general under Li Hung-chang and had built a good reputation during numerous combats against the Taipings.53 Yet this was still a minor victory leading to the great battle at Yunglung-ho or Yin-lung-ho. On January 11, 1867, General Kuo Sung-lin of the Huai army challenged the Nien at Lo-chia-chi, east of An-lu, Hupeh. The Nien cavalry was hidden in a forest, and only a few hundred infantrymen appeared around the small town. Kuo divided his five battalions into three columns for destroying the rebels. After a decoy force retreated before government troops to a hilly and forested area, the concealed Nien 5:1

Ibid.,

1.142-43.

PATTERNS OF THE NIEN GUERRILLA WARFARE

185

attacked the pursuing army from all directions. Kuo was surrounded, wounded, and his young brother was killed. Four of his five battalions suffered heavy casualties. The remnants of these battalions and provincial troops were reorganized to pursue the Nien, who continued to move in circles, confusing and wearying their pursuers to the extreme. A small rearguard of Nien was assigned daily to entice the enemy on, lest they should lose the track. In the middle of February government reinforcements under Pao Ch'ao and Liu Ming-ch'uan reached the front. Pao Ch'ao's force, the T'ingchiin (a part of the Hunan army), consisted of approximately sixteen thousand men who were ordered to cooperate with Liu Ming-ch'uan's Ming-chun, which numbered about ten thousand. These two units formed the best forces of the Chinese army. The two leaders agreed to launch an all-out attack on the Nien at a fixed hour in the early morning of February 19, 1867. Unfortunately Liu Ming-ch'uan and Pao Ch'ao were jealous of each other. Liu Ming-ch'uan personally led his cavalry and infantry across the Yung-lung-ho about two hours before the agreed time to attack the Nien. After a brief contact the Nien pretended to be defeated and ran away. While Liu was chasing the Nien about a mile or two away, shock troops came near Liu's provisions and ammunition which had been left at the other bank of the river. Liu realized that undoubtedly the attackers must be a concealed Nien force. He quickly ordered six battalions of half infantry and half cavalry to hurry back to the rear. Seeing that the Huai army was about to cross the river, the Nien launched a strong counterattack. Jen Chu ordered his cavalry to attack the left wing of Liu's forces; Niu Hung engaged the right wing; Lai Wen-kuang and Li Yiin struck at the center. Liu's crack troops were badly routed, his assistant commanders were killed, and his soldiers fled at top speed, greatly encouraging the Nien. The latter crossed the river in pursuit of the broken government force, and Liu Ming-ch'uan suffered a crushing defeat, losing several hundred of his European-made rifles, and even the red button and peacock feathers from his official uniform. The Nien army again gained success by the famous tactics of keeping the enemy on the move until exhausted, and then attacking with all their might. On this occasion, however, the Nien did not have the luck that they had had in cleaning up Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's force. While they were pursuing the enemy, Pao Ch'ao's T'ing-chtin came to the front, in keeping with the pre-arranged time-table. His rapidly advancing force and the remnants of Liu's defeated troops made a pincer attack on the Nien that

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

cost the latter over one thousand veterans captured, "more than ten thousand killed, and over five thousand horses and mules lost" (according to governments reports). Official sources added that Jen Chu was seriously wounded, and Lai Wen-kuang had disappeared. In the official account of Pao Ch'ao's T'ing-chiin (T'ing-chiin chiliieh), no casualties were mentioned at all. Instead Pao Ch'ao killed "more than ten thousand and arrested four thousand Nien-fei" in a few days' pursuit toward Honan. But later in the T'ing-chiin chi-liieh, General Pao begged leave to recover from his wounds. These wounds were said to have been received during previous fighting. After a ten day leave, which had been granted, he asked permanent leave. The emperor's kind words of "loyalty" and "filial piety" failed to persuade him to resume his duty and be sent to Shensi, or to pursue the Nien continually at Honan. The inside story of Pao's retirement was not simply illness from wounds, but rather the result of a great quarrel with Liu Ming-ch'iian. The guns and official costumes which had been captured by the Nien from Liu Ming-ch'uan's force were recaptured by Pao Ch'ao and sent to Liu's headquarters the next morning, the day of the battle at Yung-lung-ho. Liu was so embarrassed by the victory of his rival, General Pao Ch'ao, that he falsely reported to Li Hung-chang that Pao Ch'ao had failed to keep the time designated for the general attack on the bandits, and that it was later suddenly reported that a strong bandit unit was active in the rear of Liu's army and this affected the morale of his force. It was actually Pao Ch'ao's force, and not the Nien's. Thus, Pao Ch'ao was blamed for the failure, although he had been victorious. Dismayed by severe criticism from the court, he became ill and insisted on retiring from the army, despite the mediation of Tseng Kuo-fan, who was the superior of both Pao Ch'ao and Li Hung-chang. Pao Ch'ao retired and died at his home in 1886. Liu Ming-ch'uan, however, continued to fight against the Nien until the very end,54 but his stubborn and courageous fighting may have been stimulated by the necessity of keeping up his reputation as a fighter after he sent in that report in which he whitewashed himself and shifted the blame to Pao Ch'ao. Pao Ch'ao's report of victory was greatly exaggerated, for before long (March 23, 1867), the Nien were able to win another great battle, in which Tseng Kuo-ch'iian's relative, P'eng Yii-chu, was killed. P'eng was 54

T'ing-chiin chi-liieh reproduced in Nien-chiin, I, 250-268; see Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng's description of the Yin-lung-ho battle in his Yung-an hai-wai wen-pien, 4.25-27; Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cheng-kung tsou-i, 1 & 2; Wang K'ai-yiin, Hsiang-chun chili, 14.12; Huai-chun p'ing Nien chi, 3.9b; Nien-chiin ti yiin-tung chan, 42-44; and Pao Ch'ao's biography in Hummel, op. cit. 610. Note Yung-lung-ho is also written in some sources as Yin-lung-ho.

PATTERNS OF THE NIEN GUERRILLA WARFARE

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a lieutenant governor of Hupeh and deputy commander of Tseng Kuoch'iian; he and Tseng had fought side by side in recovering Nanking. The Nien were compelled to return from T'ai-hu, Anhwei, to Te-an, Hupeh. To combat them P'eng — it was recorded — commanded more than ten thousand troops of the army in Hupeh. After losing about 300 lives, the Nien ran away and crossed a river. P'eng very proudly chased them for more than ten li, in order to uphold his glorious record in fighting the Taipings. Suddenly he found his force trapped by the Nien's cavalry. He was killed, and his force crushed. The local authority of Te-an buried 2,812 of P'eng's officers and soldiers in the battlefield. This great failure was also a blow to the prestige of the governor of Hupeh, Tseng Kuoch'iian, who said the total mortality of his men in this battle was more than 3,000, including perhaps subsequent deaths from wounds.55 Another illustration was a battle at Shih-tzu-p'o near Sian, Shensi. The main force of about 14,000 government troops originally posted in that province to fight the Moslem rebels was commanded by Liu Jung, one of the top generals in Tseng Kuo-fan's Hunan Army. General Liu's poorlyfed and ill-clad troops marched in biting cold winter weather for several hundred li from the west toward the provincial capital. Before they drew near to the destination, the Nien excited them to a chase, moving from Hua-yin to Wei-nan, Lan-t'ien, and Pa-ch'ao; this lasted for nearly a month. Since Liu's governorship of Shensi had been taken by another man, he was in a low mood; his troops were commanded by a deputy, and their morale was also very low. When Liu's army reached the suburb of Sian on January 22, a general attack against the Nien was ordered on the following day. Knowing the condition of the exhausted and starving government soldiers, the Nien sent 30,000 cavalry to lie in ambush at Shih-li-p'o near the bridge, Pa-ch'iao, 25 li east of Sian, with a vanguard to lure the enemy to the spot. The Hunan army was then encircled many times and was cut into small groups. While confused hand-to-hand fighting was going on, a heavy snow was falling. Because the firearms were affected by the wet weather, the shivering and starving soldiers could hardly fire their guns. Within half a day, Liu Jung's whole army of more than thirty battalions, about 15,000 soldiers, and a squadron of Mongolian cavalry were "almost annihilated," as reported by official sources; two provincial commanders and a large number of officers were killed.58 55

Nien-chiin, I, 56, and V, 326, 348, 356-57. The two provincial commanders-in-chief (t'i-tu) were Hsiao Te-yang and Yang Te-shen. See Liu Jung, Yang-hui-t'ang wen-chi, reproduced in Nien-chiin, VI, 157-160. See also Nien-chiin, I, 53; and Lo Erh-kang, Nien-chiin te yiin-tung chan, 45-46.

56

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THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

From these illustrations one can perhaps see the pattern of the Nien's guerrilla tactics. Cleverly using all the above-mentioned tricks, they kept running to weary their opponents, then selected a good time and place to battle them, and finally ambushed, surrounded, and annihilated them. They counterattacked only when their enemies were worn out; they seldom challenged well-rested soldiers in military camps. The Nien's final attack was very vehement but short, lasting not more than one day and night. They either won a great victory or retreated quickly for safety. Thus with poor weapons they could defeat the experienced and wellequipped government troops whose proud generals — until they had learned bitter lessons — usually despised the Nien's military efficiency. Liu Jung admitted this failing in a private letter to Tso Tsung-t'ang; Tso, as well as Liu Ming-ch'uan, et al, had the same attitude toward the rebels.57 5. Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Guerrilla Warfare When When When When

the the the the

enemy enemy enemy enemy

advances, we retreat; encamps, we harass; is tired, we attack; retreats, we pursue. 58

As we examine the guerrilla warfare of the Nien in the mid-nineteenth century, we cannot but think that the same tactics, called "yii-chi-chan" (literally, "roving-attack warfare"), were used by the Chinese Communists in the 1940's, and their early methods are partly summed up in the short verse quoted above. Mao Tse-tung has written a great deal about "The Chinese revolutionary war and the problems of tactics," and "Strategic problems of guerrilla warfare in resistance against Japan." 5 9 In these 57

Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's death may have been caused by his contempt of the Nien; hence he kept chasing them daringly and ceaselessly. See Nien-chiin, VI, 160. Tso Tsung-t'ang "thought the Nien-fei would not amount to much" — Beal, op. cit., p. 199. 58 Mao Tse-tung hsiian-chi (1952 ed.) I, 203-204. 59 Mao Tse-tung, Chung-kuo ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-liieh wen-t'i; "Kang-Jih yu-chi chan-cheng ti chan-lueh wen-ti"; Shen-ma shih yu-chi chan; Lun yu chi chan; "Lun ch'ih-chiu chan" in Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsiian-chi, pp. 73-158. Most of these pamphlets are now collected in Mao Tse-tung hsiian-chi. — There are a number of writings on guerrilla warfare by other Communist leaders: Chang Yun-i, "Yu-chi chan yu min-chung yun-tung"; Chu Te, K'ang-lih yu-chi chan-cheng; Lin Piao, "Lun Huapei cheng-kuei chun ti ken-pen chiao-hsiin yii yu-chi chan-cheng fa-chan ti t'iao-chien" in Cliien-fang, no. 43 (July, 1938), 54-59; Liu Po-ch'eng, "Kuan-yii p'ing-yiian yu-chi chan chu wen-t'i" in Ch'un-chung, III, no. 11 (August, 1939), 299-302; P'eng Te-huai, "Yu-chi chan shu" (Guerrilla tactics) in Pai-lu-chiin-ti chan-lueh ho chan-shu; and Yeh Chien-ying, "Yu-chi-chan shang mu-chien chun-shih wen-t'i" in Ch'un-chung, III. 10 (July, 1939), 276-277.

NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY

WARFARE

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works Mao discusses such tactics as guerrilla warfare, laying a siege and countersiege, mobile warfare, quick and decisive warfare, and war of attrition. He repeatedly taught his comrades how to cheat, decoy, confuse, and wear out their enemies, and how to maneuver at night, always moving secretly. According to Mao, guerrilla war is chiefly fluidity and mobility; it is maneuver on a grand scale and not simply trench warfare. In the early years of the Chinese Communist movement — Mao recalls — "we spent more time running than fighting, and it was considered good if we had the chance to fight one battle a month." 8 0 Mao taught that guerrillas should avoid superior forces, by methods such as "when the enemy advances, we retreat." Guerrillas should make surprise attacks, which must be carefully planned. They should withdraw and disperse quickly if conditions are unfavorable. They should always keep their enemy guessing their motives. While the real advance was in the west, they should appear suddenly in the south, and then come out of the north. They should have the advantage of superior intelligence; every peasant should be a member of the intelligence staff. Mao Tse-tung also saw the necessity for the policy of "strengthening the walls" (chien-pi) so that "fifth-columnists" could not infiltrate his lines, and he saw value in the policy of "cleaning up the countryside" 0ch'ing yeh) so that the enemy could not obtain provision. 61 Mao particularly stressed mobile warfare, through which the famous "Long Expedition" of 25,000 li (about eight thousand miles) came about. The same tactics were also extensively used during the last Sino-Japanese War and the Korean War. 62 The first Chinese victory at T'ai-er-chuang in Shantung (March 1938), over the Japanese who had considered themselves invincible until then, was almost a repetition of the battle with Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, which had occurred about a hundred li west in the same province. The principles of Nien's tactics were also in accordance with those used by Mao's followers in discussing guerrilla warfare. For example, Yeh Chien-ying discussed such important tactics as running in circles to wear out the enemy, marching at night and attacking at dawn, concentrated attack from different directions, pretending to carry out a long expedition, feigning defeat and withdrawal, seizing food and weapons, dividing the main force into small parts and recombining the small parts 60

Mao Tse-tung, Chung-kuo ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-liieh wen-t'i, p. 59. Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi, I, 206; II, 374-276. 62 Concerning Chinese guerrillas in Korea, see Robert B. Rigg, Red China's Fighting Hordes, p. 214; Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, Communist Guerilla Warfare, p. 193. 61

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into a body, etc.63 General P'eng Teh-huai, who served as commanderin-chief of Chinese "volunteers" in the later part of the Korean War, has listed six minimum essentials of a successful guerrilla operation: "fearlessness, swiftness, intelligent planning, mobility, secrecy in movement, and suddenness and determination in action." 64 From the observations of such foreigners in China as Edgar Snow, the Communists' guerrillas frequently raided Japanese fortified positions at night. Snow says In pouncing upon enemy troops in movement, they attempt to separate the column by a variety of diversionist tactics, by allurement and decoy. Then they attack the weakest point in the divided echelon from a position wellprepared in advance. 65

Another able student of modern Chinese army, Evans Carlson, also states that Pitched battles with strong enemy forces are avoided. When a strong Japanese column invades a certain area, the guerrilla forces move to the sides of the line of advance, attack the flanks and rear of the enemy, and cut off his line of communication. At night the camps of the enemy are subjected to constant rapier-like thrusts, designed to disturb his rest and wear him out. Food is removed from the countryside ahead of his advance. Every device is employed which will reduce his strength and efficiency without undue cost to the guerrillas.66

Keeping in mind the Chinese Communists' strategy in their irregular war let us now consider in retrospect the Nien's guerrilla warfare, concerning which a number of rules may be drawn from the preceding pages dealing with their tactics and patterns of fighting. 1. Wear out the enemy by every available means. 2. Master the art of decoy and allurement. 3. Infiltrate the enemy's lines, by wearing enemy uniforms or disguising as militia, refugees or beggars. 4. Feign defeat to entice pursuit. 5. Ambush the enemy. 6. Harass the enemy just when he settles down (as Nien frequently did at Chou-chia-k'ou and Chi-ning). 7. Maneuver in a large space. 8. Take the initiative to choose a place to give the exhausted enemy a surprise attack. 63

Ch'un-chung, 3.10, pp. 276-277.

64

Pai-lu-chun-ti

95 66

chart-lueh

ho chan-shu,

pp. 53-56.

Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia, p. 344.

Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese ciency, p. 40.

Army,

Its Organization

and Military

Effi-

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9. Explore the enemy's weak spot and deliver a concentrated attack at dawn or at night. 10. Make a violent, lightning attack and seek for a quick decision. 11. Encircle the enemy with fast cavalry and then annihilate him with both cavalry and infantry. 12. Split the guerrilla force into parts and columns to divert the enemy's attention; concentrate the forces to give or withstand an attack; if a strong foe is confronted, disperse and shift immediately. 13. Build up close cooperation, including espionage and intelligence services, with the local people so as to know the movements and strength of the enemy. (The Nien were invited to Hupeh by mutinous soldiers of Ch'eng Ta-chi, and to bombard the Grand Canal bulwark at Tai-miao by a request from local rebels). 14. Travel light and seek provisions from the people. 15. Apply a scorched-earth policy, so that pursuers must carry everything, including water, or otherwise face thirst and starvation. 16. Confuse the enemy in every way: if his movement is toward the south, pretend to march northward at first; challenge the enemy in the east while giving a major blow in the west. Set camp in one spot and beacons in other spots to mislead the enemy into attacking the decoy camp. From these rules one easily sees that the principles and tactics of the guerrilla warfare conducted by the Nien in the mid-nineteenth century and by the Communists in recent decades are largely the same. A special study of the Nien's guerrilla tactics was made by Lo Erhkang, first published in 1939, so that the strategy of the Nien army in fighting against superior weapons might be helpful to Chinese resistance against Japan.67 The author's adoption of Mao's terminology of guerrilla war as a basis of analyzing the Nien military activities indicates his recognition of the similarities between the two movements. In an article entitled "The Nien Army," a Communist author, Ch'ien Hung, exhibits the same trend of thought; after describing the tactics of the Nien army he discusses modern tactics. He quotes Mao Tse-tung's words in criticizing the negligence of the Nien army in protecting their headquarters: Although the tactics of the Nien army were adequate to overcome the Manchu troops, yet they had a very strong tinge of "roving-bandit principles" in their strategy. The result was just as Chairman Mao said: 'The roving-bandit principle came into existence among , the homeless and jobless peasants, and their intentions and needs affected the leaders of the guerrilla warfare, resulting 67

The title is Nien-chun ti yiin-tung-chan, cited above.

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in the neglect of the defense of their headquarters.' The Nien army ran east and west, sometimes south and sometimes north, and frequently won victories in isolated battles, but they failed, from the beginning to the end, to develop and consolidate their strength to prepare a final and complete defeat for their enemies. Instead, they were gradually forced into a passive role by the merciless policy of the Manchu troops in 'strengthening the walls and cleaning up the countryside.'68

It is curious to note the immediate association of the Nien army and modern tactics, and Mao Tse-tung's objection to the "roving-bandit principle." While the criticism that the Nien did not "develop and consolidate their headquarters" may not be justified by the facts — since in the first several years the Nien always tried to go back to Chih-ho — the Reds have obviously studied Nien tactics and remember them. Moreover, despite their talk, the Communists in accordance with guerrilla tactics evacuated their capital at Yenan in 1947, to overextend the Kuomintang armies, rather than suffer unnecessary losses. Mao Tse-tung's objection to the roving bandits' way of thinking (liuk'ou ssu-hsiang) was caused by the fact that many of his own partisans thought in this manner, and he had to correct them. An important document, written by Mao in December, 1929, when the Communists were frustrated, is entitled "Concerning the correction of erroneous thinking in the party," and includes treatment of individualism, requests for absolute equality between generals and soldiers, and roving-bandit thinking. Concerning this last item, Mao says that the roving-bandit principle existed because the Red Army contained a large percentage of vagrants, and their principles were expressed in reluctance to build up a headquarters and in preference for using mobile and guerrilla tactics to extend political influence. Mao Tse-tung, who is well versed in Chinese history, cited historical events readily to convince his comrades that the roving bandits' tactics were impracticable in modern times. He says: The large-scale actions of the roving bandits of Huang Ch'ao, Li Ch'uang [Li Tzu-ch'eng] and Hung Hsiu-ch'uan have been proved impracticable in modern China, which is controlled by the imperialists with their advanced weapons (hand-grenades, guns, and machine-guns, etc.), advanced communication methods (field telephones and radios), and advanced means of transportation (steamships, railroads, and automobiles). Therefore, the way of thinking of the roving bandits naturally cannot become the guide of the actions of the Red Army.«» 68

Ch'ien Hung, "Nien-chiin—T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-ch'i pei-fang-ti nung-min yiin-

tung," in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ko-ming yiin-tung lun-wen chi, p. 130. 09 Mao Tse-tung hsiian-chi, I, 99; II, 595, and passim.

NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY WARFARE

193

As a matter of fact, Mao has no doubt about the usefulness of guerrilla tactics even in modern times, because he used such tactics as late as the Korean War.70 The sphere of activities of the Nien was also that of the Red Army and especially the New Fourth Route Army. In Shantung, the town of T'aierh-chuang — where Chinese troops won a victory over the Japanese invaders — was haunted by the Nien. In Shensi, the Nien conquest was farther north than Yenan. Inquisitive Communists could hear from the local people the folklore concerning the Nien; field investigators of the National Peking University, and of Ch'en Po-ch'en's group, for example, found much new information about Sung Ching-shih, a Nien leader of Shantung. It is therefore pertinent to examine nineteenth and twentieth-century guerrilla warfare in China since the guerrilla tactics of the Nien rebels and the Communists are so similar. Moreover, many early Communists had roving-bandits' ways of thinking; the two forces shared the same geographical background; and both faced stronger adversaries with better equipment. Two recent students, Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, believe that Stalin learned guerrilla warfare from Mao Tse-tung, who should "be considered today as the foremost strategist" of such tactics, and that "the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in that history that has no precedent." 71 The great Nien leaders, Chang Tsung-yii and Lai Wen-kuang, might be jealous of such statements, for they should share some honor as forerunners of guerrilla warfare. Coincidentally the Kuomintang made an effort to learn lessons from the campaigns against the Nien army. As Mary Wright 72 has noticed, Chiang Kai-shek in 1930 ordered a compilation of proclamations, reports and "even troop songs" of Tseng Kuo-fan's campaign against the Nien, resulting in a little book compiled by Lu Ti-p'ing73 for the purpose of advocating similar government methods against the Communists who were being surrounded in Kiangsi. The Ministry of National Defense in 1947 was still conducting research on the strategy used against the 70

See note 62. Communist Guerilla Warfare, XV, 30-31, and passim. 72 The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 310. 73 Lu Ti-p'ing, comp. Tseng Kuo-fan chiao-Nien shili-lu (Veritable records of Tseng Kuo-fan's campaigns against the Nien) [Nanchang, Kiangsi Provincial Kuomintang Party Headquarters, 1930], The book itself is insignificant, because the title is misleading, the content is fragmentary selections of a number of Tseng's famous sayings and a few memorials. The compiler, General Lu Ti-p'ing, seems to have not thumbed all the pages of Tseng's writings. It is, however, significant in its demonstration of Chiang Kai-shek's interest in the Nien campaigns. 71

194

THE WEAPONS OF THE NIEN AND THEIR TACTICS

Nien, and published the outcome in a short article by Ch'en Shu-hua, whose conclusion gives more credit to Tseng Kuo-fan's leadership than to superior weapons.74 Thus it is clear that not only the Communist leaders paid close attention to the Nien movement, but the Kuomintang commanders also made special studies of the methods which the government took against the Nien rebellion. The new 1960 publication, Nien-chiin ko-yao,75 consisting of more than two hundred folksongs of the Nien army, collected from the memory of the local people in the Nien affected areas in recent years fully attest to the fact that the influence of the Nien still exists in northern and central China.

74

Ch'en Shu-hua, "Ch'ing-tai p'ing-Nien tso-chan chih chien-t'ao," Shih-cheng chi-kan, No. 1 (1948) 23-25. 75 The book is collected and compiled by Li Tung-shan and others, and published by Wen-i ch'u-pan she (Shanghai, 1960).

VII. Causes of the Prolonged War against the Nien Army

There must have been some reason why the Nien army could survive for so long and spread over so wide an area, even though it had neither solid organization nor good weapons. The Nien undoubtedly had many fanatical and valiant fighters and a strong cavalry; moreover, they used many tricky tactics; but this alone would not have sufficed to develop and maintain their power. Was it because of overwhelming numerical strength? The Nien were reported in three different sources to be several millions, a million and a half, and a million, respectively.1 Or were there only, as another source has it, ten thousand Nien at most? 2 Between these two extremes there is great variation. It is proper, therefore, to tackle this difficult problem of establishing the Nien's numerical strength before analyzing the reasons for the long duration of their rebellion.

1. An Estimate of the Number of the Two Belligerents It is hard to calculate the number of participants in a war, especially in a Chinese rebellion. The rebel leaders could not tell the exact number of their followers; nor could the government's chief commanders know the strength of their soldiers, who came from various units — central, provincial, and local. Contemporary chroniclers were impressed by the length of the rebels' marching line, which was often more than a hundred li, or by their camps, which mushroomed over an area of a hundred or several hundred li. The chroniclers' estimates of Nien strength ranged from tens of thousand (shu-wan) to a million or more rebels. They liked to use round figures such as a hundred thousand (shih-wan), thus leaving 1

The number of the Nien, several millions, is given in a local gazetteer, Mu-p'ing hsien chih, Shantung, and is reproduced in Nien-chiin, III, 470; the figure of one and a half million is in Chou-chih hsien-chih (Nien-chiin, III, 322), and that of a million, in Lan-shan hsien-chih {ibid., Ill, 231). Undoubtedly these figures are gross exaggerations. 2 A n ex-magistrate of Anhwei said, "The Nien bandits, usually claiming to have 400,000 or 500,000 members, actually had only ten thousand men." This number is obviously too conservative, and since the author talked a great deal about superstitions and magic power, it should be accepted with caution. His writing is reproduced in Nien-chiin, I, 418.

196

CAUSES OF THE PROLONGED WAR AGAINST THE NIEN

ample leeway for details.3 Later historians, who took documentary files and local gazetteers as a basis for their work, could hardly make much improvement. Yet these figures were not entirely meaningless — if two or three different sources made the same large estimate of a group of rebels appearing at the same place and time, we must recognize and have respect for their mutual impressions of Nien's numerical figures. The reported Nien strength is frequently larger than it actually was, for two reasons. In the first place, the Nien purposely massed their men to impress and frighten their enemies — a sort of psychological warfare. Secondly, in their reports to the throne, the government agents usually exaggerated Nien strength, either as a means of whitewashing failure in battle, or for exalting success.4 In a study of the Nien army one should make an effort to estimate the approximate number of belligerents. Some information about the number of the Nien is tabulated below as a rate. Estimates Time

Number

July 1851

2,000

March 1853

Several hundred thousand 7,000 or 8,000 3,000 or 4,000 3,000 Several tens of thousands 5,000 or 6,000

Dec. Feb. June Oct.

1853 1854 1854 1854

Oct. 1855 3

of the Number

of the

Nien

Place Chiao-tzu-shan, Honan Anhwei

Leader (if mentioned) Chao Chien-te

Huai-yiian, Anhwei Chih-ho Ts'ao-chou Honan

Chang Mou-yuan Chang Ta-yu

Ying-chou, Anhwei

Chang Lo-hsing

If it is more than 100,000, the expression "shih-yii-wan" is used, and in the following table it is indicated by a plus sign. Worse still is the expression "not less than several tens of myriad" (Pu-hsia shu-shih wan), which may mean not less than several hundred thousand, covering an approximate range from 200,000 to 800,000. 4 For example, in 1858, 5,000 Nien in Honan claimed to be 25,000 strong (Nienchiin, II, 500). Sometimes little more than 100 Nien would order the villagers in advance to prepare food for them on 70, 80, or 100 tables. Each table normally accommodated eight persons to eat, and thus they gave the impression of having seven or eight times their actual strength (Nien-chiin, I, 312). They used the villagers as a sounding board for their propaganda of huge numbers. The government spies were too timid to contact the Nien, and instead, they collected rumors f r o m a distance about the Nien's fast speed and huge numbers to fulfill their duties (Nien-chiin, VI, 165-166). I-hsing-o commanded 1500 cavalry to battle more than 20,000 Nien in Honan (1859). In his report he stated that he had counted the bodies of 23,000 [sic] killed, and that more than 30,000 [sic] captives were set free. Yet not a single one of his soldiers was killed or wounded! (Fang-liieh, 58.14-15). Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's subordinates also had a severe encounter with the Nien in Yingshan, Hupeh, on May 20, 1864. They claimed that only 1,000 out of 100,000 Nien survived (Nien-chiin, III, 231). Obviously such government intelligence and victory reports are not very reliable.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS

Time

Number

Place Ying-shan, Hupeh Chih-ho, Anhwei Meng-ch'eng and Po-chou, Anhwei

1860 March 1861 March 1861

50,000 or 60,000 Ca. 20,000 or 30,000 Several tens of "myriad" 5 (600,000 or 700,000) Several tens of myriad Several tens of thousands 20,000 (cavalry) 100,000 + 100,000 +

Sept. 1861 1862 Sept. 1862

100,000 + 200,000 + 100,000 +

S. Chihli Shensi Hupeh

Sept. 1862

Several tens of myriad Several tens of myriad 1,000,000

Hupeh

Several tens of myriad 100,000 + Several tens of myriad 60,000 or 70,000 30,000 or 40,000 20,000 + 100,000 + 100,000 (Cav. and Inf.) Several tens of myriad 100,000 (incl. ca. 10,000 horses) 30,000 (Cav. 7,000 or 8,000) 1,500,000 200,000 + Several tens of myriad 100,000 + 100,000 +

Ma., Huang., Hupeh

Jan. 1856 March 1856 1857 Nov. 1858 1860

Nov. 1862 April 1864 May 1864 1864 June 1865 Oct. 1865 Nov. 1865 Nov. 1865 Dec. 1865 1866 Dec. 1866 Jan. 1867 Feb. 1867 March 1867 Nov. 1867 Nov. 1867 Nov. 1867 Jan. 1868 5

197

Leader (if mentioned) Li Chao-shou Chang Lo-hsing

Ying-chou and Po-chou, Anhwei Shantung

Chang Lo-hsing

Honan and Anhwei Hupeh Hupeh

Chang Lo-hsing Kung Te Kung Te and Ch'en Yu-ch'eng

Chang Lo-hsing

Chang Tsung-yii Ch'en Te-ts'ai and Others

Hsiao-kan, Hupeh Ying-shan, Hupeh

Huang., Hupeh Wo-yang Shantung Honan Honan Unknown Shantung and Honan

Ch'en Te-ts'ai, Lai Wen-kuang

Chang Tsung-yii Chang Tsung-yii Lai Wen-kuang Chang Tsung-yii

Hupeh

Lai Wen-kuang and Chang Tsung-yii Lai Wen-kuang

Hupeh

Lai Wen-kuang

Hupeh

Lai Wen-kuang

Shensi Shantung Shantung

Chang Tsung-yii Lai Wen-kuang Lai Wen-kuang

Kiangsu Shensi

Lai Wen-kuang Chang Tsung-yii

"Wan" is given in the dictionary as "a myriad"; several tens of "wan" means "several hundred thousand." The source above this column is from the Fang-lueh, 1.6; 3.2, 22; 4.10b, 23, 32; 5.9; 6.3, 16; 7.15; 11.3b; 12.5, 12b, and 34; and Nien-chun, I, 13. Before 1858, some miscellaneous and isolated information about the Nien in a province or a district is omitted.

198

CAUSES OF THE PROLONGED WAR AGAINST THE NIEN

Time Jan. Jan. Jan. Feb. Feb. May

1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868

Number 40,000 or 50,000 100,000 + 100,000 + 10,000 (horses) 100,000 + Several tens of myriad

Place Shensi Honan Chihli Chihli Chihli Shantung

Leader (if mentioned) Chang Tsung-yii Chang Tsung-yii Chang Tsung-yii Chang Tsung-yii Chang Tsung-yii Chang Tsung-yii

From the inflated numbers in the table* there still remains a mystery shrouding Nien's numerical strength. In order to achieve some more concrete results it is perhaps better to seek an answer about different periods or branches of Nien's movement. Our broad estimation and general impression is that 1,000 to 2,000 Nien might have existed in 1851 and 1852. This number may have grown by 1860 to nearly 20,000, including infantry and cavalry, when Yüan Chia-san gave an over-all report to Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, who was taking over general command of the Nien suppression.7 The Eastern Nien in Hupeh in the winter of 1866 were estimated in four different sources, including an English consular dispatch from Hankow. The last source indicates that the Nien "came to Hupeh . . . numbering at the very lowest estimate 30,000, but some say 80,000." 8 Among these sources, Governor Tseng Kuoch'iian's conclusion, that the Eastern Nien had more than 30,000 infantry and 7,000 or 8,000 cavalry, is relatively trustworthy, because he had given consideration to variant figures.9 The Western Nien received several estimates, among which General Liu Jung's private letter to Tso Tsung-t'ang seems to have told the truth. Liu says that "Although the rebel multitudes claimed to have forty or fifty thousand, their able fighters were no more than 6,000 or 7,000, all of whom were mounted." This number is verified by Sir Robert Hart's letter, written about the same time, in which he said that "The fighting 6 Sources for the above entries are official records, eyewitness accounts, and local histories, all of which, fortunately, have been reproduced in the Nien-chiin. This monumental collection of source material helps us tremendously in shortening this footnote. The indication of volume and page numbers accords with the order of the entries in the table beginning from 1857. Nien-chiin, 1.13; VI.355; III.132; 1.3; V.203; III.204, 239; VI.309, 310; III.140; 223, 229, 193, 231, 258, 240; 11.96; V.351; 1.27, 32, 124, 367; 143; V.377, 383, 390; III.322, 479, 531; VI.159; III. 165, 345; 1.282; VI.309; and III.518. 7 Note that this figure, ca. 20,000, which is much smaller than others, is reported by Yüan Chia-san to Seng-ko-lin-ch'in about the total Nien strength. Since the purpose of the report was to give a little briefing to the forthcoming commander-inchief about the whole Nien situation, it should be more reliable than some other accounts. 8 Dated 12 February. F. O. 17, vol. 456. 9 Nien-chiin, V.390.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS

199

men, taking the largest estimate, do not exceed ten thousand in number and although many of them carry guns and pistols, they were almost entirely without percussion caps and powder." 10 Thus we may say that the Nien warriors were between 30,000 to 50,000. The exaggerated figures in the table, apart from what has been said, may have included the Nien family members, the captive young men for transportation or potential members, the women and children held for ransom, and the vehicles for provisions and booty. Let us inquire then into the number of government soldiers engaged in subduing the Nien army. Local officials frequently complained that the Nien were more numerous than government soldiers.11 In government reports one can frequently see such phrases as "the bandits were numerous, while our soldiers were much fewer", or, "our military force was so weak that there were not enough troops for either defensive or offensive war", or "our soldiers became weaker and weaker after having been split up to meet the numerous bandits running around." 12 The truth of these reports has to be attested. In the early years of the Nien movement each magistrate was obliged to maintain order and peace in the locality under his jurisdiction. The number of garrisons was seldom mentioned in detail. To assist the regular troops, militia were gradually organized, but the exact number of such local forces is a knotty problem, which can hardly be solved because of incomplete information. In 1854 and 1855, Honan was reported to have exceeded ten thousand militia, and Shantung, fifty thousand. If these figures were true, the numerical strength was considerable. As Yiian Chia-san said in 1856, the Honan governor, Ying-kuei, had more than twenty thousand infantry and cavalry, the troops sent from Anhwei and Kiangsu to join the Honan onslaught exceeded ten thousand, and Yiian himself had several thousand at his disposal.13 This strength certainly was not small, even allowing for some exaggeration in these figures. Generally speaking, a government commander of a large force, who was not able to win a war, would be criticized by censors and by his jealous colleagues. Seng-ko-lin-ch'in with "only twelve thousand men" 14 harried the Nien in five provinces for nearly five years. He did not complain of insuf10 Ibid., VI.80 and 159. Liu's letter was written on May 30, 1868. R. Hart to G. Hughes [commissioner at Tientsin], dated May 25, 1868, quoted in H. B. Morse, op. cit., II.114n. 11 YCCL, 6 (Anhwei Nien 2) 5b, and 6 (Anhwei Nien 3) lb; and STCHCL, 2.9b. 12 Fang-lueh, 47.11-12; 49.32; 53.21b; 63.5-6; 86.5 and passim. 13 STCHCL, 2.13b. 14 Nien-chiin, 1.3.

200

CAUSES OF THE PROLONGED WAR AGAINST THE NIEN

ficiency of men and horses; instead he had full confidence that he could annihilate the rebels with his army. When Tseng Kuo-fan took over the general command of the Nien suppression, he said that he brought 9,000 Hunan Braves and 22,000 Anhwei soldiers to Shantung, in addition to 5,000 troops of the Huai army under P'an Ting-hsin which had been sent to protect Peking — a total of 35,000 men. He added that the infantry was enough, but that he still had to train more cavalry.15 Li Hung-chang continued the command and mustered a huge force of 80,000. On April 20, 1868, Li said that "The total number of Anhwei, Hunan, Shensi, and Honan troops joining the general attack was no more than 80,000." He expected 100,000 soldiers for garrison and 20,000 or 30,000 for combatant duty against the Nien army.16 This figure was confirmed by Wang K'ai-yiin, who wrote that Li Hung-chang employed fifty thousand garrison troops for the Chiao-lai Canal, about 300 li long, and forty thousand fighters. He had summoned 5,000 from Chihli, 5,000 from Chekiang, and 12,000 from Hupeh. He planned to order all the Shantung troops, 16,000 men, to build a wall along the Wei River. Governor Ting Pao-chen of Shantung yielded only 7,000 to Li Hungchang; Li was displeased at this.17 Thus it seems safe to say that near the end of the Nien movement, the government force in Shantung totaled 80,000 or 90,000, including "between 30,000 and 40,000" Western guns and several dozen gunboats manned by two or three battalions of marines.18 Therefore, a contemporary writer concluded, "In reality there were no less than a hundred thousand government troops" battling the Nien army. Prince Kung also said in April, 1868, that "more than a hundred thousand government troops" could not bar Nien's free movement from one province to another.19 This statement can be substantiated by the information gathered in the table below. Army Units The Huai army The Hunan army: Tseng Kuo-fan Pao Ch'ao Liu Jung Liu Ch'ang-yu Tso Tsung-t'ang 15

Number 40,000 9,000 8,000 15,000 8,700 19,000

Sources Nien-chun,

IV. 163

Nien-chiin, V.336 Nien-chiin, V.335 Nien-chiin, 1.53 Nien-chun, VI.151 Nien-chiin, VI. 147

Tseng Kuo-fan's letter to his younger brothers, dated June 8, 1865. The information contained in this letter should be reliable. See Nien-chiin, V.336. 16 Li Hung-chang's letter to Tso Tsung-t'ang and others in Nien-chiin, V.66, 67. 17 Nien-chun, 1.8-9. p f ^ -lb "ii fll (A history of the Taiping northern expedition) in T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ts'ung-shu shih-san ckung, ts'e 1 , pp. 1 3 - 2 0 . Hsieh Hsing-yao, "Tao-Hsien shih-tai pei-fang-ti Huang-yai chiao" Uvf-It J l fti ffi $k (The Huang-yai society in northern China during the Tao-kuang and Hsien-feng periods) I-ching, no. 3, pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 4 . Hsin-t'ai hsien-chih ^ ^ (Shantung). Compiled b y H s i i Chih-yu ^ BC f§ii and others. Block-print edition of 1891. 6 ts'e. Hsin-t'ai hsien hsiang-t'u chih. Same as Hsin-t'ai hsien-chih. Hsin-yang hsien-chih Si iu? (Honan). Compiled b y Ch'en Shan-t'ung ^fe [p] and others. Movable-type edition of 1936. 8 ts'e. Chiian 1 8 - 1 9 , military affairs. Hsu Chi-yii ||| Sung-k'an hsien-sheng tsou-su -fii it£ ^fc ''li i&ft (Memorials of Hsii Chi-yii.) 1 9 1 5 edition. Hsii-i hsien-chih kao |ff lift f^j (Anhwei). Compiled by Wang Hsi-yiian and others. Block-print edition of 1 8 9 1 . 8 ts'e. Chiian 16, military affairs. Hsii K ' o JpJ, Ch'ing-pei lei-ch'ao ^ |(j (A classified collection of the unorthodox histories of the Ch'ing Dynasty). The Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1928, 48 ts'e. Hsii Yung-yang hsien-chih ¡5|J S|i 7uJ (Honan). Compiled by Lu I-hsia J|( J^Jl f g and others. Movable-type edition of 1924. 6 ts'e. Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng j^jj jpg jjg, "Hsiang-Huai ho-chiin p'ing Nien-chi" ffg ® ^P ^ f £ (The suppression of the Nien b y the combined forces of the Hunan and Anhwei Armies). In Tso Shun-sheng, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nienshih tzu-liao, Vol. 1, pp. 2 0 1 - 2 2 7 . This work is exactly the same as Wang Ting-an's Hsiang-chiin chi, and there is no such title in the complete collection of Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng's work. Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, "Hsii t'uan-lien ta-ch'en" ¡¡j] fife ^ g (An introduction to the high officials in charge of the local corps). Hai-wai wen-pien, 4.10b—12. Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, "Ko-erh-sin chung-chin-wang ssu-shih liieh" jf-J. |f| «J> ^ I i f t ^ Bft (A brief account of the death of the loyal Prince Korchin, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in), Yimg-an wen-pien, 4 . 1 - 2 . Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, " S h u Ch'en Yii-ch'eng, Miao P'ei-lin erh-tsei fu-chu shih" * 5 1& I S ffi S ~ M ft f f c * ( A l » account of the killing of the two bandits, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and Miao P'ei-lin), Yung-an wen hsii-pien, chiian hsia, 7-9. Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, " S h u Chin-pao-yii t'uan-lien yii-tsei shih" jfc- ^ Jff- [g] ¡Bfi I^K M Jp- (An account of the persistence of bandits by the Chin-pao forts.), Yung-an-wen hsii-pien, chiian hsia, p. 22. Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, " S h u T'ing-chiin, Ming-chiin, Yin-lung-ho shih-i" J jg f t JnJ (A description of the battle along the Yin-lung R i v e r engaged by Pao Ch'ao's T'ing army and Liu Ming-ch'uan's Ming army), Yung-an hai-wai wen-pien.

238

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239

Kung-hsien chih j g ± (Honan). Compiled b y Liu Lien-ch'ing gij ^ and others. Movable-type edition. 20 ts'e. Chiian 5, an account of great events. K u o T'ing-i ipj$ T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih ^ ¿Ji ^ ¡H] Jfe if|. H I S ( day by day record of the historical events of the Kingdom of Great Peace). Published b y the Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1947. 2 vols. A very useful reference work for the period dealt with. Lai-yang hsien-chih ¿ft ffi jjUji ^ (Shantung). Compiled b y Wang P'ei-hsii ^p ^ jfcj and others. Movable-type edition of 1935. 12 ts'e. L a o Nai-hsiian Ijfc Tj I-ho ch'iian chiao-men yuan-liu k'ao ^ ^ fife ^5* (O n the origin and evolution of the secret society, I-ho ch'iian) in I-ho t'uan, vol. 4, collected by Chien Pai-tsan et al. Lei Hai-tsung j g j f j "Chung-kuo ti-ping" fJj [jg fftj J £ (Chinese soldier), in She-hui ko-hsueh, Vol. I , No. 1 (October, 1935), pp. 1 - 4 7 . Lei Hai-tsung, "Wu-ping ti wen-hua" -Ec ffJi (\',j yji fjjj S^ (The mobile warfare of t h e Nien army). Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1939, 59 p. Lo E r h - k a n g , Shih-mev jou-chiao chi gjj) p^ ilti (Instructions R e v e r e n t l y Received f r o m m y teacher [Hu Shih]), Kueilin, 1944. 67 p. Lo E r h - k a n g , " S h u i - h u c h u a n yii T'ien-t'i h u i " 7]C iif H illl Hf 0 h p Shui-hu-chuan and H e a v e n - E a r t h Society), T'ien-t'i hui wen-hsien lu J^Jj f t 3C i^r (Documents concerning t h e H e a v e n - E a r t h Society). Chengchung shu-chii, Shanghai, 1947. 98 p. Lo E r h - k a n g , T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo hsin-chiin ti yiin-tung chan -Jfc ¿p ^f 'i|i f^J fj!) 5pJ( (The mobile w a r f a r e of the New A r m y of t h e T a i p i n g Kingdom). Shanghai, t h e Commercial Press, 1955. 48 p. This is a revision of Lo E r h - k a n g ' s Nien-chiin ti yiin-tung chan (op. cit.). T h e t w o books are exactly t h e same except a new preface, omissions of t h e early history of t h e Nien a r m y , replacement of "Nien c h u n " b y " T ' a i - p ' i n g t'ien-kuo hsin-chiin". Lo E r h - k a n g , T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo-shih kao -fc ¿Ji ^ [jg ^ (A d r a f t history of t h e T ' a i - p ' i n g T'ien-kuo). K ' a i - m i n g shu-tien, Peking, 1 9 5 1 . 285 p. and the 1955 edition, Chung-hua shu-chu, Shanghai, 393 pp. Lu-i hsien-chih fig gi (Honan). Compiled b y Yii Tsang-lan - f ^ and others. Block-print edition of 1896. 6 ts'e. Chiian 8, military affairs. Lu-chiang hsien-chih j g j f ^ (Anhwei). Compiled b y Lu Yii ¡{¡jf^ a n d others. Movable wood-block edition of 1885. 16 ts'e. Chiian 55, m i l i t a r y affairs. Lu-chou fu-chih .J'|>| fff ^ (Anhwei). Compiled b y W a n g Tsung-i ^f ^ flja n d others. Block-print edition of 1885. 48 ts'e. Chiian 9 6 - 1 0 0 , m i l i t a r y affairs of t h e Huai-chiin, which is actually t h e same as t h e Huai-chiin p'ing Nien-chi. Lu Ti-p'ing ;j l e t y p e edition [Nanchang, 1930] 56 pp. This is a collection of poems a n d m o t t o e s f r o m Tseng K u o - f a n ' s w o r k ; m a n y of t h e selections are irrelevant t o t h e Nien.

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241

Lii-chih, chung-hsiu (Gazetteer of Lii-hsien, Shantung, revised). Compiled by Chuang Kai-lan ¡{J: [||j and others. Movable-type edition of 1936. 20 ts'e. Chiian 34, military affairs. Ma Hsiao-shih JjJ| ^ ¿ft, Hsi-pei hni-tsu ko-ming chien-shih [ft} -jtl PQ ^¡t fil" j f l j I t (A brief history of the Mohammedan Revolution in the Northwest). Tung-fang shu-tien, Shanghai, 1951. 150 p. Mao Tse-tung j|f, Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsuan-chi ^C Hfe ji§| ^ (A collection of Mao Tse-tung's writings on national salvation). Chungking, Hsin-hua shu-tien, 1939. Mao Tse-tung, Chung-kuo ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-liieh wen-ti rf» jij» ^ ¥ i iK frl ¥Jc B& pSJ | g (Strategic problems of China's revolutionary war). Hsin-min ch'u-pan she, Hong Kong, 1949. 73 p. Mno Tse-tung, K'ang Jih yu-chi chan-cheng ti chan-liieh wen-ti |] ffi ^¡jj 'Jf ^ pjj | g (Strategic problems of guerrilla warfare to resist Japan). Hsin-hua she. No place of publication. 1939. 172 p. Mao Tse-tung, " L u n ch'ih-chiu chan" ^ ^ ¡j^ (On prolonged warfare). In Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsiian-chi, pp. 73-158. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi ^ Jjp (A Selection of Mao Tse-tung's writings). Tung-pei shu-tien, 1948. 999. p Jen-min ch'u-pan she, Peking, 1952, 2 vols. Mao Tse-tung, "Shen-mo shih yu-chi chan?" ^ fig ffi. jjjt ijjiJJ (What is guerrilla warfare ?). In Hua-mei ijt- ^ (Shanghai), Vol. I, no. 34 (December, I938)Meng-ch'eng hsien-chih shu ^ ^ ^ ^ (Anhwei). Compiled by Yii Chenchiang ^J 1 { J a n c ' others. Movable-type edition of 1915. 8 ts'e. Chiian 6, military affairs. "Miao P'ei-lin shih-chien" J|[ ^ -fji (Concerning the Miao P'ei-lin affair). Wen-shien ts'ung-pien, no. 22. Ming-chi pei-shih hui-pien pjj ¿^e ^ {J^ j g (A collection of unorthodox histories of the Ming Dynasty). Compiled by Ch'ing Liu-yiin chu-shih J j i j ^ jJC -[-•. Peking, movabletype edition. 20 ts'e. Mo Tung-yin ^ ^ g j , "T'i-t'ing ch'ien-liang k'ao" Jflj y ^ (A study of land and poll taxes). In Chung-ho Monthly, vol. 4, no. 1. (1943), 27-64. Nan-yang hsien-chih PU ¿¿J (Honan). Compiled by P'an Shou-lien jijg tjand others. Block-print edition of 1904. Chiian 8, military affairs. Nashimoto Yiihei ^ i f i 'T^, Taihei Tengoku kakumei ^ ^ [g ^ (The Taiping Revolution), Tokyo, 1942, 440 p. pp. 138-143 deal with the "Nien-party." Nien-chiin, see Fan Wen-Ian. Pai Shou-i ^ 1 et al, Hui-min ch'i-i [a] K ¿y ^ (The Mohammedan Rebellion). Shen-chou kuo-kuang she, Shanghai, 1952. 4 vols. Pan Ku Jff and others, Han-shu (History of the Han Dynasty). T'ungwen shu-chii edition, Shanghai, 1884. Pao-chai shou-yii t'iao-k'uan g j '41 ^ (Regulations regarding the defense of forts). No place and date of publication. A reproduction of a public announcement in Honan. P'eng Te-huai "Yu-chi chan-shu" itffr jj^ (Guerrilla tactics). In Pai-lu-chun ti chan-liieh ho chan-shu A lift ">F ft'j fJc B& i l l ?Jc Wf (Shanghai, 1938). pp. 33-56.

242

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P'ing Nien t'u-lu 2p ^ |gj (Illustrations and reports of the Nien suppression). The names of compiler and publisher are unknown. I t is in the private library of Dr. Charles S. Gardner, who bought it from Peking. The collection contains 17 illustrations of battle scenes from 1857 to 1868; each illustration is accompanied b y a memorial of a field commander. Po-chou chih ^ (Anhwei). Compiled by Tsung Neng-cheng ^ fjb Hfc a n f ' others. Movable-type edition of 1894. 14 ts'e. Chiian 8, military affairs. Pulleyblank, E. G.: " T h e Political Background of the An Lu-shan Rebellion" (In Japanese). The Toyd Gakuhd # ^ Vol. X X X V , no. 2, (Nov., J 952) PP- 9 2 - 1 1 1 , and nos. 3-4 (March 1953) PP- 122-145. Sano Manabu g f i^t, Shincho shakai shi fpf J^fl frfc ^ S i (Social history of the Ch'ing Dynasty), Tokyo, 1947. Part I I I , vols. 1 and 2. A relatively comprehensive treatment of the Nien movement. Shan-tung chiin-hsing chi-liieh, see under Kuan Y e n . Shang-shui hsien-chih 7jt ¡u? (Honan). Compiled b y Hsii Chia-lin Ife and others. Block-print edition of 1918. 10 ts'e. Chiian 24, an account of military catastrophe. She-hui k'o-hsiieh Jt^l (The social sciences). Peiping, National Tsing-Hua University, 1935-37. Shen Shou-chih '-"P ¿ > "Chieh-ch'ao pi-chi" f a j j | f £ Jen-wen, vol. 7, no. 8 (October, 1936), 25-27. A detailed account of L i Chao-shou or Li Shih-chung. Shigematsu, Shunsho " S h o k i no Byakuren K y o k a i ni tsuite" ^fl & i l l tfc # — M J ? ( T h e White Lotus Society at Its Beginning Stage), Ichimwa hakushi kokn kinen Toyoshi ronso i f j t t til d r t^i ^ ffc jf^ (Collected essays in Oriental history to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Dr. Ichimura). Fuzambo, 1933, 1214 pp. Shih-huo pan-yiieh k'an flf ^ j:j (Food and commodities fortnightly). Compiled b y T'ao Hsi-sheng. Shanghai, 1934-37. Shih-hsiieh nien-pao f f . ip Compiled by the History Club, Yenching University, Peiping, 1929. Shou-chou chih :§| | ^ (Anhwei). Compiled b y Tseng Tao-wei jit and others. Movable-type edition of 1890. 16 ts'e. Chiien 11, military affairs. "Shou-hsiang chung-pien chi-liieh" ££ HI jjC Bft (A brief account of the sudden change of the arrangements for surrender). Quoted in Chung-ho Monthly, vol. 4, no. 1. Shou-kuang hsien-chih ^ igjji Compiled by Sung Hsien-chang 5J5 jy; and others. Movable-type edition of 1936. 12 ts'e. Chiian 15, great events about the Nien-fei and others. Su-chou chih jfg ^ (Anhwei). Compiled by Ting Hsiin-chih J $ and others. Block-print edition of 1889. 16 ts'e. Chiian 10, military affairs. Suzuki, Chusei >fc IE Shincho chukishi kenkyu fpj ^J] r f Jfe i^f ^ Study of mid-Ch'ing history, [the White Lotus Rebellion of 1796-1804]). Toyohashi: Aichi Daigaku Kokusai Mondai K e n k y u j o (Aichi University Research Institute on International Problems). 1952. 255 pp. Suzuki Shun v|c "Zuimatsu no ran to Tocho no seiritsu" pjf (7) fJL M © fi£ j t (Rebellion at the end of the Sui and the Establishment of the T'ang Dynasty), Shien j[> (July, 1952) pp. 53-70.

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243

Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu f n I S ^fl W M (The Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Ch'ing Dynasty). 4485 chiian. Compiled under imperial auspices by officials especially appointed during the successive reigns and published in a photolithographic edition b y the "Manchukuo" in 1937. Ta-Ch'ing lil-li ^ fpf (Laws and precedents of the Ch'ing Dynasty). Translated b y G. T. Staunton, London, 1810. Ta-Ch'ing lil-li an-yii -fc ^ ^J t S ii'n (Commentaries on the Ta-Ch'ing lii-li). Compiled b y Huang En-t'ung ^ Jg, Block-print edition, 1870. Tai-Hsieh-yiian ^ Tung-mou shou-ch'eng chi-lueh jfi if5- t F 3il Bft (A short narration of the defense of Tungmou). Block-print edition of 1869. About Chang Tsung-yii's attack on Teng-chou, Hai-chou, etc., of Shantung. T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo, see under Hsiang Ta. T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ko-ming yiin-tung lun-wen chi (A collection of treatises on the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo revolutionary movement.) Compiled by the Office for History Research of the North China (Hua-pei) University. Published b y the Three Joint Bookstores of Sheng-huo, T'u-shu and Hsin-chih, Peking, 1950. 165 pp. T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo wen-shu -jfc. EH # (Documents of the Taipings). Photolithographic edition of 1933, by the Peiping Palace Museum. T ' a n g Hsiin-fang 0 p | Jj, Tsung-cheng t'u-chi ^ ^¡E p j ^ (An account of T'ang's part in the campaign, with illustrations). Block-print edition of 1867. T'ang-shu 0 :j§: (History of the T'ang Dynasty). Compiled by Ou-yang Hsiu ^ {If- T'ung-wen shu-chii edition, Shanghai, 1884. T'ao Chu |$}j Jgj-, T'ao Yiin-t'ing hsien-sheng tsou-kao ffi fX ^t^^Wi (Memorials of Mr. T'ao Chu). Blockprint edition of 1828. T'ao Hsi-sheng [ify ^ Jg, translator, "Ch'u-chi ti Pai-lien-chiao-hui" Jfy] ftfj fi i f (The White Lotus Society at Its Beginning Stage). Shih-huo 1-4 (!935) I43-I5IT ' a o Hsi-sheng, "Ming-tai Mi-lo, Pai-lien chiao chi-ch'i t ' a " yao-tsei 3ft ft i t & it & M (The Mi-lo, Pai-lien Society in the Ming D y n a s t y and other bewitching bandits), Shih-huo semimonthly, vol. I, no. 9 ( ^ I S ) , PP- 402-403. T ' a o Hsi-sheng, "Sung-tai-ti ko-chung pao-tung" M M ^ W] (Social uprisings during the Sung Dynasty). In Chung-shan wen-hua chiao-yii kuan chi-k'an, f J j |Jj ft ^ ^ f l j Vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter, 1934), pp. 671-681. T ' a o Hsi-sheng, "Yiian-tai Mi-lo Pai-lien chiao-hui ti pao-tung" SJ W) fi i l l H" ffi H W) ( T h e r i o t o f the White Lotus Society inspired b y the reincarnation of the Milo Buddha in the Y u a n dynasty), Shih-huo, vol. 1, no- 4 (1935), 152-155Teng Chih-ch'eng Chung-hua erh-ch'ien-nien shih r(n ~ ]J« (A history of China for two thousand years). The Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1934. T w o volumes. Teng Chih-ch'eng, " T ' a n Chiin-chi ch'u >jr ^ ^ (A lecture on the Chiin-chi ch'u). Shih-hsueh nien-pao, vol. 2, no. 4 (December, 1937), i93~!98. Teng-chou fu-chih ^ 'Jtj jff ¡ ^ (Shantung). Compiled b y Chou Yiieh-jang Jg] fg; U and others. Block-print edition of 1881. 24 ts'e. Chiian 13, military affairs.

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Teng Ssu-yii j§jj) "Ming Ta-kao yii Ming-ch'u chih cheng-chih she-hui" Bfl ^C ^ ^fl ^ J j V n S t ^ ( T h e political and social conditions of the early Ming Dynasty, as seen from t h e Ming Ta-kao). I n Yen-ching hsiieh-pao ^BE Jji I f i no. 20 (December, 1936), 455-483. Ting Pao-chen "J" ^ Ting Wen-ch'eng-kung i-chi T IS i l l ife (A. posthumous collection of Ting Pao-chen's works). Peking, block-print edition of 1893. I t contains Ting's memorials and important first-hand material about t h e Nien suppression in Shantung. Ting Pao-chen, Ting Wen-ch'eng hung tsou-kao "J" M ^ M (Memorials of Ting Pao-chen). Peking, block-print edition, 1893. Ting Yiin-shu "J* jig Chang-kung hsiang-li chun-wu chi-lueh ijH fe jjj| fjjl WBlock-print edition of 1910. 6 ts'e. Military operation in the area of Tientsin in 1853-1861, based on Ting's diaries. Ts'ai Hsiieh-ts'un tgL g^ ^J- Chung-kuo li-shih shang-ti Nung-min chan-cheng rji (¡Si M i t - t f f i j M R history of peasants war in Chinese history) Shanghai, 1933. Tseng Kuo-fan pg Tseng Wen-cheng-kung ch'uan-chi ]E (A complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's works). Block-print edition, H u n a n , 1876. 134 ts'e. Tseng's memorials, correspondence, endorsements on official dispatches, etc., are included in the complete work. Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cheng-kung shou-shu jih-chi ^ ^ 11 (An autographic diary of Tseng Kuo-fan). Photolithographically reproduced b y the Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1909. 40 ts'e. Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cheng-kung shu-ch'a sg: ^ ^ (Correspondence of Tseng Kuo-fan). In Tseng Wen-cheng-kung ch'uan-chi. Tseng Kuo-fan, "Tseng Wen-cheng kung tsou-kao" ^ (Memorials of Tseng Kuo-fan). In Tseng Wen-cheng-kung ch'uan-chi. Tseng Yii-yu -g- {fjg Cheng-hsi chi-lueh ® BS (A- brief account of the Shensi expedition). 4 chiian. Peking, movable-type edition, 1894. Tso Shun-sheng ^ ^ Chung-kuo chin-pai nien-shih tzu-liao 41 [!s| iS ft jfi, 'ff £j- (Historical material relating to Chinese history during t h e last hundred years.) Shanghai, 1926. 2 ts'e. Tso Tsung-t'ang fe^'jg, " T s o Wen-hsiang kung tsou-kao",^-- ^ j g fe ^ (Memorials of Tso Tsung-t'ang). 64 chiian. In Tso Wen-hsiang-kung ch'iian chi. (The complete collection of Tso's works). Block-print edition 1888-97. Tsou-hsien hsii-chih £gf ± (Shantung). Compiled b y Wu Yo-hao ^ ^ jgg. Block-print edition of 1892. 4 ts'e. Chiian 9, military affairs. Tu Wen-Ian jfj|, P'ing-ting yiieh-k'ou chi-lueh ¿ p > t rtl i £ Bft ( A brief account of the suppression of t h e Kwangtung bandits). Block-print edition, 1875. 18 chiian. Tung-mou shou-ch'eng chi-lueh. See Tai Hsieh-yiian. Tung-o-hsien hsiang-t'u chih jff |gj ^¡fl -J- ± (Shantung). Compiled b y Chou Chu-sheng Yi ^ a n f l others. Movable-type edition, 1934. 4 Chiian 3, military affairs. Wang Hsien-chien J g|g, et al, Shih-i-ch'ao Tung-hua lu —• Ts'un-ku-chai Yf- ifc ft? movabletype edition, 1911. Wang Hui-weng (or S h i h - f o ) Bf ^ ( ± M) J-Ping iih-chi• W H tt (Diaries of 1855-56), Compiled and published by Teng Chih-ch'eng. [Yenching University, Peiping] 1935. 1 ts'e.

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245

Wang K'ai-yiin "Hsiang-chiin chili" jijfl 'r{{ ^ (An account of the Hunan Army). Hsiang-i-lou ch'iian-shu ftg ^ chiian 57-60. One of the most frank accounts of the Nien army. Wang Ting-an J^ Ch'iu-ch'iieh-chai ti-tzu chi ^ ^ t& (A chronological account of the events about Tseng Kuo-fan and his disciple). 32 chiian. Block-print edition of 1876. Wang Ting-an, Hsiang-chiin chi -j^g "ifi (An account of the Hunan Army). Chiang-nan shu-chii, block-print edition of 1889. 20 chiian. 12 ts'e. One of the best sources on the Nien-army, more detailed than Wang K'ai-yiin's Hsiang-chiin chih. Wei Cheng and others, | J | |§j;, Sui-shu jfc (History of the Sui Dynasty). T'ung-wen shu-chii edition, Shanghai, 1884. Wei Ta-fa-shih | J | ^ fj- ({¡]j [Wei Chu-hsien j f ] , Chung-kuo ti pang-hui e|j jgj fpij ^ (Chinese secret societies), Chungking, 1949. Wen-hsien Is'ung-pien Oik Compiled by the Palace Museum, Peiping, 1920-1937. Wen-shih tsa-chih ^ (A magazine of history and literature). Compiled and published by the Central University, Nanking. Wo-yang feng-t'u chi ^ ¡^ )%[ -j^ §£ (Anhwei). Compiled by Huang P'ei-lan £ {K, j||j and others. Movable-type edition of 1924. A very succinct description of the Nien whose headquarters was in Wo-yang. Wo-yang hsien-chih liieh y j ^ ¡^ Compiled by Chu ICuo-hcng >fc t S f^i and others. Movable-type edition, 1936. 1 ts'e. Wu Han ^ J-^-, Chu Yuan-chang 7C ^ (A biography of Chu Yuan-chang). Chungking, 1940. Wu-ho hsien-chih 3 J fnj ^ (Anhwei). Compiled by Yii Tsung-cli'eng ^J» and others. Block-print edition of 1894. 8 ts'e. Chiian 7, military affairs. Wu Hsiang-hsiang ^ ^fj -j^, Wan Ch'ing Kung-t'ing shih-chi flfc ^ ftf jjig (A veritable record of the late Ch'ing court). Cheng-chung shu-chii, Taiwan, 1952. 258 p. This is a valuable account of the politics played in the Peking government from the i86o's to 1900's. It is mainly based on documents of the Palace Museum in Peiping. Wu Po-lun jj^ i S fiffi comp., T'ai-p'ing-chiin Han-chung chan-cheng shih-shih chieh-ch'ao -jfc 2p ijf jj}. Hf 'gjj (An abridged reproduction of the Taiping army's war in Shensi). Published by the Museum of Shensi Province, 1957. 78 pp. The abridgement is made from the Hsing-hsiu feng-yang hsien-chih, ch'u kao (fft ^ M, &s§