The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency 3319775707, 9783319775708

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The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency

Francis Grice

The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency

Francis Grice McDaniel College Westminster, MD, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-77570-8    ISBN 978-3-319-77571-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018936176 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover Image: Michael Folmer / Alamy Stock Photo Cover design by Fatima Jamadar Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

When I first proposed investigating the myth of Mao Zedong and modern insurgency back in 2010, all I had was a small collection of ideas and preliminary thoughts. None of these could have turned into the book contained within these pages without the generous help of multiple people. First, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to several people who were directly involved with this project when I worked on it during my Ph.D. studies at King’s College London. This begins with Professor Ashley Jackson whose guidance, patience, friendliness, and support during my Ph.D. and beyond have all been phenomenal and my gratitude for this cannot be overstated. I could not have asked for a better mentor and friend. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Kenneth Payne. His ever insightful comments and probing questions during the development of the project kept me on my toes and helped me to consider new dimensions to my research that otherwise might well have gone untended. He has been a truly excellent fount of guidance and support. In addition, I would like to offer a very appreciative thank you to Professor Michael Rainsborough. His wisdom and advice were instrumental for helping me to develop my project, particularly during its formative stages. Within King’s College London more broadly, I was very fortunate to benefit from the expertise of a range of different scholars in relation to this work, all of which was invaluable. In particular, I would like to emphasise my appreciation to Professor David Betz for sharing his wealth of knowledge and insights about Mao and modern insurgency with me; to Dr. Geraint Hughes for his penetrating questions and thought-provoking v

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comments; to Dr. Warren Chin for his perceptive observations and ­recommendations; to Dr. Alessio Patalano for his thoughts about Mao and East Asia; to Dr. Thomas Rid for his invaluable suggestions and ideas; to Dr. Huw Bennett for his encouragement and stimulating questions; and to Brigadier Ian Rigden for discussing insurgency and counterinsurgency with me. I would also like to stress my gratitude to Dr. Tim Benbow and Dr. Stuart Griffin for their guiding hands on the Ph.D. programme and the Defence Studies Department while I was studying there. Being associated with the department and having the opportunity to get involved with its friendly and engaging research culture was an incredible experience. I have also benefitted immensely from the altruistic help of a number of scholars from other universities. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Professor Jonathan Spence for his invaluable suggestions at the outset of the project; to Professor Frank Dikötter at the University of Hong Kong for his very kind answers to my questions about Mao; and to Dr. Karl Hack at the Open University for his very useful comments and advice about my project and its objectives. I am also very grateful to Dr. Sherman Lai from the University of Oxford for his fascinating thoughts about the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War and his encouragement of my work. Finally, I am very appreciative for the thoughts and feedback of my Ph.D. Viva examiners, Dr. Robert Johnson from the University of Oxford and Professor Peter Neumann from King’s College London. Since graduating, I have been fortunate enough to join the Department of Political Science and International Studies at McDaniel College, where I have enjoyed countless conversations and much support from the students and faculty here about my research into this field. In particular, my thanks go to my department chair, Professor Christianna Leahy, for providing such a supportive environment and fostering such a vibrant intellectual community within our department. I would also like to thank Flavia Gasbarri, Jonathan Glassman, Patricia Ivory, and Corinne Huntington for generously acting as second coders for the Qualitative Content Analysis section of the work. Their diligent and painstaking efforts in this area were absolutely essential. My conversations with Mark Braillie and his help in tracking down British counterinsurgency manuals are also very much appreciated. Finally, I would like to extend a big thank you to my mother, father, sister, and brother for their encouragement, and, of course, to Tomasina, Tabert, Tiger Lily, Polly Spike, and Tom. And to Rin for always believing in me, both on sunny days and on rainy ones.

Contents

1 Introduction   1 The Myth   1 Structure of the Book   5 References   7 2 What Mao Actually Taught  11 Methodology  11 Historical Background  14 The Four Categories  17 Potential Critiques and Comments  43 Additional Analysis  46 Summary of Teachings  48 Appendix: Expanded Methodology  50 References  56 3 The Unoriginal Mao  61 Prior Insurgencies and Theorists  61 Maccabean Revolt  62 American Revolutionary War  71 Lenin  82 Mao’s Knowledge of Earlier Events  89 Implications  93 References  93

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Contents

4 Mao and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War  99 Did Mao Influence Himself?  99 Traditional Depictions of Mao 136 Implications 138 References 139 5 The Insignificant Mao 145 Subsequent Insurgencies and Theorists 145 The Second Indochina War 151 The Shining Path Insurgency 157 Ho and Guevara 160 Other Limiting Factors 170 Why Mao Became Irrelevant 173 Implications 180 References 181 6 The Deification of Mao 187 Qui Bono? 187 References 200 7 Conclusion 203 Summary 203 Implications 206 References 210 Index 211

About the Author

Francis Grice  is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at McDaniel College in Maryland. He obtained his Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King’s College London, as well as an M.Sc. in International Public Policy from University College London and an MA in Modern History and International Relations from the University of St. Andrews. His areas of research are in the fields of International Relations and Comparative Politics, with specialisations in Asian Security Studies and Insurgent Warfare. His work has been published in a number of peer-reviewed journals and edited books and he recently co-edited both the Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy and The Future of US Warfare.

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1

Mao’s teachings on insurgency Examples of Maoist traits in pre-Mao history Mao’s limited implementations of his own teachings Mao and Modern/Cold War insurgencies

49 63 103 147

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Myth Ever since the Communists seized control of China in 1949, a myth about the importance of Mao Zedong1 and his teachings for modern insurgency has enjoyed widespread acceptance amongst many scholars and practitioners in the fields of insurgency and counterinsurgency. In its purest form, this myth is roughly as follows: Mao created a fundamentally new form of insurrectionary warfare that was more sophisticated and effective than any method used before. It was primarily as a result of these revolutionary new principles that Mao was able to lead the Communist Party of China to victory in the Revolutionary Civil War. His teachings then exerted a profound and widespread influence upon subsequent insurgencies around the world and continue to shape the strategies of guerrilla and terrorist groups today, including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The myth of Mao first emerged during the 1930s, when it was advanced by Edgar Snow and other members of the ‘China hands’ who worked in China and visited Mao and the Communists in Yan’an in 1944. They waxed lyrical about the wonders of Mao’s methods of insurgency, but did not immediately suggest its applicability for rebellions outside of China. This changed when Mao secured victory in the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War in 1949, after which Western commentators began presenting Mao as having formulated a new milestone in Communist warfare that was being used in Communist insurrections across the globe (Katzenbach and Hanrahan 1962; Osgood 1957, 55; Jordan 1962). In the late 1960s © The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5_1

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and early 1970s, this perspective was broadened into the claim that Mao had provided a wholly new and universally employable model that was being used by insurgents of all political backgrounds around the world (Griffith 1966, 3–48; Pomeroy 1969, 27–28; Pustay 1965, 40–41; Thayer 1963, 21–22). The two decades that followed saw continued support for the idea that Mao had created a highly original and globally applicable model of insurgency, as well as the emergence of two new perspectives. One of these was the claim that Maoist warfare represented one out of several options for insurgency and the other was that the era of Maoist warfare was being gradually eclipsed by a new age of ‘post-Maoist warfare’ (Woodmansee Jr. 1973; Willmott and Pimlott 1979, 54; Johnson 1973; Bell 1976, 19–30). The end of the Cold War brought with it an effort by many scholars to understand the Cold War as a single entity, including by synthesising its insurgencies into simpler categories. This led Mao to be presented once again as the defining figure for insurgencies of all political backgrounds across the world (Alexander 1995; Arreguin-Toft 2001). Finally, the events of September 11th and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reanimated the argument about whether Maoism was a timeless model that remained relevant for the current day or had been superseded by a post-Maoist model that still drew its roots from the Maoist model (Schaffer 2007; Gray 2005; Lyle 2011; Mackinlay 2009). Depictions of Mao’s influence have not been limited to generalised discussions about his originality and influence, but have also involved claims that his methods have been deployed by insurgents in specific conflicts around the globe. These have ranged from Communist rebellions in places such as Vietnam, Peru, and Malaya to non-Communist uprisings in Algeria, Kenya, Ukraine, Palestine, and Guatemala. Taking the ongoing Syrian Civil War, for example, multiple scholars have claimed that both the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic State have intentionally adopted the strategies for insurgent warfare laid out by Mao (Mulcaire 2012; Arnett 2014; Whiteside 2016; Holmes 2014; Ibish 2014). Numerous commentators have also asserted that Al-Qaeda has explicitly chosen to follow a Maoist strategy in their quest to overthrow its enemies and establish a global Islamic caliphate (Gartenstein-Ross et al. 2016; Ryan 2013, 2016). The positioning of Mao as a pivotal figure for understanding the development and character of modern insurgency has gone beyond mere academic discourse to infect the counterinsurgency doctrine that governments have used since 1949 to direct their armed forces against rebellious groups

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at home and abroad. Mao’s influence has been highly visible in most counterinsurgency doctrine documents since 1949, such as the American manuals FM31-22 U.S.  Army Counterinsurgent Forces (1963), FMFM8-2 Counterinsurgency Operations (1980) and FM90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations (1986). Each of these described insurgent warfare as involving three phases that effectively amounted to paraphrased versions of Mao’s language. The foreword of the second edition of FMFRP 12-18 Mao Zedong on Guerrilla Warfare (1989) was markedly explicit, stating that ‘it is important to understand his [Mao’s] philosophy of warfare because it is the basis of today’s guerrilla forces.’ The same Maoist contamination can be seen in other Western counterinsurgency doctrines, including the British and French. Mao’s presence in Western counterinsurgency doctrine remains widespread today. The American FM3-24: Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2006, for example, was labelled by a number of scholars at the time as adopting a predominantly Maoist conception of the nature of modern insurgencies (Hoffman 2007, 71–74; Peters 2007). An analysis of the manual itself verifies this claim because, while the document purports initially to recognise multiple modes of insurgency, many of its descriptions and the methods that it uses to counter them focus on ‘protracted people’s war,’ which appears to be essentially Maoist in character (US Army/ Marine Corps 2007, 9–15). The predominantly Maoist perspective of FM3-24 is unsurprising given that it lists numerous Cold War insurgency theorists in its acknowledgements. Most of these subscribed to the creed that Mao had created a radically new model of insurgency and had exported it across the globe. One of the names, for example, is the British military advisor Robert Thompson. Writing during the Second Indochina War, Thompson asserted that Mao had created a revolutionary new kind of warfare and that this was being used across the globe by Communist and non-Communist insurgencies alike (Thompson 1969a, 2–5). He also claimed that the counterinsurgency measures that he recommended were intended to tackle the intricacies of this new and universally applicable type of uprising (Thompson 1969b, 16 and 46–48). The US Army and Marine Corps refreshed the manual in 2014, but the new version contains many of the same Maoist-based assumptions that have plagued US counterinsurgency manuals since 1949. Mao’s prominence in academic thought and counterinsurgency doctrine would be unproblematic if he was genuinely the central figure in the development of insurgency that his devotees make out. Unfortunately,

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however, the deific portrayals of Mao by many scholars and doctrine writers are severely flawed. This book systematically examines, critiques, and ultimately rebuts the assumption that Mao created a master formula which subsequent rebel factions have used and which their adversaries can apply to understand their actions. Instead, the book demonstrates that Mao neither created nor transformed the character of modern insurgencies, that he failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and that he was uninfluential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies, including his own. Consequently, his recorded writings and speeches cannot be used to accurately generate any special insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. The myth of Mao’s significance arose, not because it was true, but because a variety of incentives led Mao and his followers, insurgent groups in other countries, other governments facing insurgencies, and the West to perpetuate the myth. Unpicking the myth of Mao is a crucially important endeavour because the belief that Mao exerted a strong influence on the nature of insurgent warfare has exerted a discernible impact on the way that insurgencies are evaluated and counterinsurgency strategies are developed. This includes analysts failing to correctly identify the existence of insurgencies because they lack Maoist features, creating ineffective or harmful counterinsurgency strategies by aiming to tackle Mao’s teachings (rather than the actual features of the insurgency they face), and inaccurately presenting the current period as ‘post-Maoist’ on the basis that the Cold War period was ‘Maoist.’ In order to more accurately understand the nature of insurgencies, past and present, and to formulate better counterinsurgency strategies, it is first necessary for scholars and policymakers to move past the idolisation of Mao as a kind of insurgent mastermind that so permeates the academic and policy worlds. This book is not the first work to critique the significance of Mao’s teachings for insurgency. Yet, while this claim has been made before, it has never been done in sufficient depth to really engage with or counter the vast body of literature that extols the contributions of Mao as highly original and influential. One recent example is Porch’s comment in 2011 that ‘Mao’s treatise offers fragmentary reflections of the state of his conflict with Chiang Kai-shek rather than a recipe book for the successful pursuit of victory through the sequencing of a strategic three-stage progression … His reputation as the father of modern insurgency was constructed in the wake of the 1949 Communist victory in China’ (Porch 2011, 245). Porch’s comments have much to commend them, but they span a mere paragraph and lack expansion.

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The extent to which Mao has been lionised within the scholarly literature on insurgencies and doctrinal works on counterinsurgency suggests that the driving claim of this book—that Mao’s originality and influence were both extremely limited—is bound to meet with at least some disagreement. It is hoped, however, that even those people who ultimately disagree with the arguments advanced may at least feel encouraged to engage in some fresh thinking about the degree to which the significance of Mao for modern insurgencies can be uncritically accepted.

Structure of the Book Chapter 2 begins by outlining the fundamental principles that comprise Mao’s viewpoints regarding insurgency, based upon a thorough and comprehensive qualitative content analysis of all of Mao’s published writings across the span of his adult lifetime. The themes identified within these writings relating to insurgency are broken into four broad categories: military, politics, population, and resources, with a number of contributing themes identified within each category. The knowledge derived from this document analysis provides a never-before-created framework that is used by subsequent chapters in the book to appraise the extent to which the traits endorsed by Mao existed in uprisings prior to his lifetime, as well as the degree to which these traits appeared in his own and subsequent insurgencies. The English translations of Mao’s writings, rather than the Mandarin originals, were used for this purpose because the versions of Mao’s texts which most insurgents outside of China would have read were in English. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that there may be occasional nuanced differences between the English translation of Mao’s works and his original words. Next, Chap. 3 demonstrates how the traits of warfare embodied within Mao’s teachings existed prior to his lifetime. It provides a list of prior conflicts and theorists for each principle, before going on to scrutinise two rebellions and one insurgency theorist—the Maccabean Revolt, the American Revolutionary War, and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin—that exhibited all of the traits endorsed by Mao, despite taking place long before Mao’s rise to prominence. As a whole, the chapter discredits the idea that Mao was either an original military thinker or the first person to tie together all of the strands of insurgency that had existed within previous conflicts and writings.

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Chapter 4 then shows that the way in which Mao fought the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War from 1926 to 1949 did not, for the most part, correspond to the principles of insurgency that he outlined in his writings. This was a 23-year-conflict that pitched the Chinese Communists against the national Guomindang Party and the outside power of Japan in a cataclysmic struggle to resolve which side would rule over China. The chapter shows how Mao betrayed his own stated principles of insurgent warfare by examining the conflict through the lens of each of these principles and shows how they were either corrupted or not adopted at all. The chapter draws upon a mixture of established sources and the most recent historical evidence about the conflict, much of which has been overlooked by scholars in the field of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Chapter 5 reveals that the impact of Mao’s teachings on subsequent insurgencies across the globe has also been greatly exaggerated. In some cases, insurgencies have borne no connection with Mao whatsoever, in others they have possessed coincidental similarities but have borne no intellectual debt to Mao, and in others still they have claimed to be inspired by his teachings but have not actually implemented them in any meaningful way within their conflict. There are a few cases where the insurgents have genuinely been partially and/or temporarily influenced by Mao, but these instances are rare and even here the extent to which the insurgents actually followed a ‘Maoist’ strategy is extremely limited. In support of its arguments, the chapter examines two conflicts and two theorists that have been most heavily associated with Mao’s teachings—the Vietnam War, the Shining Path insurgency, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevara—and exposes the weakness of the connections between them and Mao’s influence. Chapter 6 confronts the dilemma which arises from these inquiries: If the novelty and impact of Mao’s teachings on insurgencies was so limited, why has the myth of his predominance been so readily accepted? The answer lies in the fact that each of the four main actors affected by the myth—Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, numerous insurgents groups around the world, their government opponents, and the West— have benefitted from accepting and even promoting the myth. The chapter discusses the motivations of these actors to perpetuate the myth, including the desire of the Chinese to present themselves as the leader of the Communist World, the aspiration of insurgent movements to improve their credibility in the eyes of domestic and international audiences, the wish of governments fighting against insurgents to portray their enemies

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as foreign extremists, and the temptation for the West to inflate their sense of awe about Mao to fit with their fears about a snowballing threat of global Communist domination. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the core findings of the book and then unpacks the ramifications of these findings. To this end, the chapter appraises some of the negative impacts that can happen as a result of commentators attributing inflated importance to the influence of Mao on the nature of modern insurgencies. One of these is that it leads to a weakened capacity to quickly and correctly identify insurgencies when they occur and a hindered ability to respond to existing insurgencies in an accurate and appropriate manner. With the core premises of the book established and the overall structure laid out, the book now delves into the first subject for the book, which is the outline of what exactly Mao said about insurgencies within his formal writings, with the goal of creating a structured lens through which the remainder of the book can be analysed.

Note 1. This book uses the newer pinyin rather than the older Wade-Giles translations for the majority of names of Chinese people, ships, and locations, such as “Mao Zedong” instead of “Mao Tse-tung” and “Guomindang” rather than “Kuomintang.” There are two exceptions to this rule, however. First, when referring to the titles of specific books and articles, the original titles of those publications have been maintained. For example, the various writings of Mao that were published by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking are entitled “The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung” and this title has been kept unchanged. Second, the leader of the Guomindang is referred to in the book as “Chiang Kai-shek” rather than “Jiang Jieshi” because he is widely known by the former rather than latter name.

References Alexander, Bevin. 1995. The Future of Warfare. London: W.  W. Norton & Company Ltd. Arnett, Andrew. 2014. Islamic State: The New Breed of War Machine, Part 3: How ISIS Uses Chinese Military Tactics in Bid for a Caliphate. The Medium, September 13. https://medium.com/clouds-taste-metallic/islamic-state-thenew-breed-of-war-machine-part-3-dc965e4e6e1b. Accessed 22 Oct 2017. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. 2001. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. International Security 26 (1): 93–128.

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Bell, J.  Bowyer. 1976. On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation. London: Harvard University Press. Department of the Army. 1963. FM31-22: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. ———. 1986. FM90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. ———. 2014. FM3-24: MCWP 3-33.5: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, Nathaniel Barr, and Bridget More. 2016. The Islamic State vs. Al-Qaeda: The War Within the Jihadist Movement. War on the Rocks, January 13. https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-vs-alqaeda-the-war-within-the-jihadist-movement/ Gray, Colin S. 2005. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoenix. Griffith, Samuel B. 1966. Peking and People’s Wars: An Analysis of Statements by Official Spokesmen of the Chinese Communist Party on the Subject of Revolutionary Strategy. London: Frederick A. Praeger. Hoffman, Frank. 2007. Neo-classical Counterinsurgency? Parameters, Summer, pp. 72–87. Holmes, James R. 2014. In Iraq, ISIS Channels Mao. The Diplomat, June 24. https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/in-iraq-isis-channels-mao/. Accessed 20 Oct 2017. Ibish, Hussein. 2014. Implausible as It Sounds, ISIL Has Plundered Mao’s Playbook. The National, September 21. https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/implausible-as-it-sounds-isil-has-plundered-mao-s-playbook-1.239926. Accessed 20 Oct 2017. Johnson, Chalmers A. 1973. Autopsy on People’s War. London: University of California Press Ltd. Jordan, George B. 1962. Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare. In Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Warfare Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka, 399–411. London: Collier-­ Macmillan Limited. Katzenbach, Edward, and Gene Hanrahan. 1962. The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung. In Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Warfare Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka, 131–146. London: Collier-Macmillan Limited. Lyle, Stuart. 2011. Maoism Versus ‘Hybrid’ Theory  – Is the Military Being Distracted by the Latest Doctrinal Buzz-Word? UK Defence Forum. http:// www.www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/111201maoismversushybridthe ory.pdf. Accessed 24 July 2013. Mackinlay, John. 2009. The Insurgency Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden. London: C. Hurst & Co.

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Mulcaire, Jack. 2012. Chairman Mao vs. President Assad: People’s War in Syria. Small Wars Journal. November 5. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ chairman-mao-vs-president-assad-people%E2%80%99s-war-in-syria. Accessed 21 Aug 2017. Osgood, Robert E. 1957. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Peters, Ralph. 2007. Progress and Peril: New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam. Armed Forces Journal. http://www.armedforcesjournal. com/2007/02/2456854. Accessed 21 Aug 2013. Pomeroy, William J. 1969. Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Porch, Douglas. 2011. The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of Coin. Small Wars & Insurgencies 22 (2): 239–257. Pustay, John S. 1965. Counterinsurgency Warfare. London: Collier-Macmillan Limited. Ryan, Michael. 2013. ‘What Al Qaeda Learned from Mao.’ The Boston Globe, September 21 at https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/09/21/whatqaeda-learned-from-mao/E7Ga91ZVktjgiyWC90nJ6M/story.html ———. 2016. Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. New York: Columbia University Press. Schaffer, Marvin Baker. 2007. A Model of 21st Century Counterinsurgency Warfare. Journal of Defense Modelling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 4 (3): 252–261. Thayer, Charles W. 1963. Guerrilla. London: Michael Joseph Ltd. Thompson, Robert. 1969a. Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945–1969. Bristol: Western Printing Services Limited. ———. 1969b. No Exit from Vietnam. London: Chatto and Windus Ltd. US Army and Marine Corps. 2007. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S.  Army Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. US Marine Corps. 1980. FMFM8-2: Counterinsurgency Operations. Quantico: Department of the Navy. ———. 1989. FMFRP12-18: Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. Whiteside, Craig. 2016. New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002–2016). Perspectives on Terrorism, 10 (4). http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/523/html. Accessed 22 Oct 2017. Willmott, Ned, and John Pimlott. 1979. Strategy and Tactics of War. London: Marshall Cavendish Limited. Woodmansee, John W., Jr. 1973. Mao’s Protracted War: Theory vs. Practice. Parameters 3 (1): 30–45.

CHAPTER 2

What Mao Actually Taught

Methodology In order to confirm whether or not Mao was novel and influential in his teachings on insurgency, the first step must be to outline what exactly he taught. There is, unfortunately, no easy synthesis that can be turned to in order to answer this question with any great accuracy. Instead, there exists a huge diversity of perspectives regarding what Mao thought, with most authors picking one or two aspects of what Mao taught as their representation of his teachings, with little agreement between them. To generate these summaries, these sources have usually drawn from just a few of his works and have made overly synthesised generalisations from imagined common knowledge. Little attempt to analyse the full breadth and depth of what Mao actually taught about insurgent warfare in his writings, as well as how his perspectives on these topics changed across the course of his life, has been made. As a result, many of the depictions of Mao’s recommendations on insurgent warfare are truncated and unrepresentative of his real positions on this topic. The first task that needs to be undertaken to accurately analyse the significance of Mao is a comprehensive first-hand reading and analysis of Mao’s discussion of insurgency in his writings. This is a demanding task because Mao wrote extensively throughout his life, producing vast numbers of statements, manuals, commentaries, letters, reports, and other documents. These totalled over 2 million words—approximately 5000 pages of text. A sense of scale can be gleaned by comparing Mao’s output © The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5_2

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with that of other military theorists, such as T. E. Lawrence who wrote just 230,000 words in two volumes on guerrilla war. Interpreting Mao’s writings is also challenging because, unlike dedicated military theorists such as Antoine-Henri Jomini, who retained a clear set of principles throughout his life, Mao wrote for multiple purposes and adapted his positions to reflect his aims. These included consolidating political power, outmanoeuvring opponents, increasing global influence, and influencing foreign insurgent groups (Shy 1986; Friedman 1970). Mao was also influenced by differing social and cultural influences, which can be seen in the content and textual style of his writing (Ch’en 1970; Friedman 1970). In addition, unlike Carl von Clausewitz, who provided a concise statement about which of his ideas were most important at the end of his life, Mao never offered a concrete synthesis for his teachings (Paret 1986). The end result is that Mao’s works contain a vast ocean of conflicting concepts, theories, and recommendations, without any clear guiding instructions. The traditional method for circumventing the great length and complexity of Mao’s works has been to cherry-pick ideas from the Chairman’s most famous works, such as On Guerrilla War and On Protracted War, supplemented occasionally with choice selections from a few lesser known texts. This approach is ineffective because it hinges on two flawed assumptions. The first is that Mao’s messages remained consistent throughout his life, regardless of age or context. The second is that one specific period of Mao’s life—typically between the end of the Long March in 1935 and the transition of the war against Japan into an uneasy stalemate in 1941—represented the culminating point of Mao’s teachings. Mao would almost certainly not have endorsed this approach because he went to great lengths to have vast quantities of his writing from across his entire life published in both Mandarin and English. Had Mao only wanted people to heed his most famous texts or focus on just a short period of his life, he would not have gone to such lengths to have his full compendium of writings published and made available across the world. To avoid the same quagmire, the analysis in this chapter attempts to examine all of the texts that Mao wrote throughout his life. There exist two major repositories of Mao’s writings: the Selected Works of Mao Tse-­ tung and the Collected Works of Tse-tung. Between them, these multivolume compendiums cover the overwhelming majority of the documents produced by Mao and subsequently published in English from the early days of his professional career in 1917 until his death in 1976. It would have been difficult to gain intelligent insights about exactly what Mao

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taught regarding insurgency by simply reading through all of these tomes in an unstructured manner, so a qualitative content analysis methodology, which involved coding the existence of themes within each of Mao’s works, was used to provide a consistent framework for the analysis. Qualitative content analysis represents a well-established method of document analysis and this study followed the multistage process laid out by specialists in the approach such as Margaret Schreier (2012), Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), Elo and Kyngäs (2008), Kracauer (1952), and Berelson (1952). The core methods are summarised concisely below and explained in more depth in the Appendix. The first step of the qualitative content analysis was to identify the themes of insurgent warfare that would be coded in Mao’s writings. These were selected deductively by identifying those principles of warfare that have traditionally been associated with Mao’s teachings on insurgency in the scholarly literature, as well as by conducting an inductive reading of several samples of Mao’s works and identifying additional components that have not previously been highlighted by scholars. The existence and prevalence of these themes in Mao’s writings were coded using a sliding scale between −3 and +3, with −3 at one end representing an emphatic refutation of the theme, 0 representing the absence of a theme altogether, and +3 at the other end representing an emphatic endorsement of the theme. Each of the works that Mao wrote, such as ‘On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party’ (Mao 1965a, 105–116) and ‘Question of Opposing Rich Peasants’ (Mao 1975b, 302–304), were analysed as individual unit with a score being generated for each theme present and the pertinent text recorded. Negative and positive scores were recorded separately because in some works Mao both embraced and rejected one or more themes. Prior to coding all of Mao’s works in full, two different checks were undertaken in order to ensure the reliability of the analysis. For the first check, the author coded a random sample of text using the coding scheme outlined above, waited two weeks, conducted a clean recoding of the same sample of text, and then compared the results to see if they were sufficiently similar to one another. The results were considered close enough to continue with the coding process. The second check entailed the author coding a different random sample of text and enlisting the help of four other people who possessed no ties to the study to perform their own coding of the text, using the coding scheme provided to them by the author. The coding outcomes from each coder were compared with the author’s

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own coding and the results were considered sufficiently similar to continue with the process. Finally, once the codings for all of Mao’s writings were completed, a post-test consistency check was undertaken, which involved the author returning to a random sample of the text, performing a clean recoding of the text, and comparing it to the original results. Again, the results were sufficiently similar for the process to be considered reliable. Broadly, the qualitative content analysis found that, within Mao’s writings on insurgency, four distinct categories existed—Military, Political, Population, and Resources—each of which contained multiple contributing themes. It also traced the historical evolution of his ideas on these topics. While a mixture of complementary textual and numerical data was generated as a result of this analysis, the textual components possess more analytical benefits for understanding the details of Mao’s teachings on insurgency, so it is these that are presented within this chapter. Before supplying the written account of the four categories and their themes and how these manifested within Mao’s writings, however, it is beneficial to provide a brief historical description of the period in order to provide the context in which Mao made his comments and recommendations about insurgent warfare.

Historical Background Mao wrote in turbulent times. During the periods in which he wrote, the world experienced the end of one world war, suffered the entirety of another, and witnessed the start of a protracted Cold War. China itself underwent massive changes and these were both reflected in and shaped by the writings and actions of Mao himself. Several distinct periods seem to have been most closely linked with Mao’s writings, namely, Mao’s earliest days as a left-wing advocate (1917–1925), the Hunan Peasant Uprisings (1925–1927), Mao’s time in the Jinggang Mountains (1928–1929), the Jiangxi Soviet (1929–1934), the Long March and arrival at Yan’an (1935–1936), the war against Japan (1937–1945), the final civil war with the Guomindang (1945–1949), and the post-war period (1949–1976). Mao’s professional career started during the dark period of Chinese history that followed the collapse of the last imperial dynasty in 1908 and which involved multiple strips of Chinese territory falling under the semi-­ colonial dominion of the Western powers and Japan. He started out as a broadly defined left-wing advocate while he finished at a teacher training college and took on various jobs. He joined the Chinese Communist Party

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in 1921 and, in the mid-1920s, was dispatched by the Party to his home county of Hunan. Here, he was tasked with investigating the violent peasant insurrections that had erupted against the local landlords and offering them guidance for their campaigns. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek launched his Northern Expeditions that led him to loosely reunify the country under his rule and, at this stage, the Guomindang and the Communists were allied as part of the First United Front. In April 1927, however, Chiang Kai-shek turned on the Communists and conducted a whole-scale purge of their ranks that devastated much of their infrastructure across the cities of China and decimated their hierarchy. The Communists attempted to launch a wave of urban uprisings in response, targeting vital cities such as Nanchang. Mao was involved in these attempts at insurrection, but when they failed to achieve their intended goals, he retreated with a small contingent of Communists into the nearby Jinggang Mountains. In the mountains, Mao joined his remaining forces with some bandit groups that were already based there and established a bastion of Red power within the crags. After rebuffing some minor efforts by local Guomindang forces to oust him from this new hideout, Mao expanded his fiefdom and in 1931 formally established it as the Jiangxi Soviet. Unhappy about the ongoing presence of this pseudo-state within his newly unified China, Chiang Kai-shek launched five encirclement and suppression campaigns against Mao. The first four were repelled, but the fifth proved too much for the Communists to defend against and on October 10, 1934, they abandoned their stronghold and attempted to escape through the enemy’s surrounding lines to safety in the north. The resulting year ‘Long March’ retreat covered over 600,000 miles and led to the depletion of the Red Army from roughly 100,000 soldiers to somewhere between 5000 and 35,000. During this period, the Japanese began encroaching on Chinese territory, including invading and annexing Manchuria and launching a naval attack against Shanghai. Upon reaching relative safety in the northern Chinese province of Yan’an, Mao formed a new Soviet Republic. Chiang Kai-shek set about attacking him with a sixth encirclement and suppression campaign, but Mao convinced two local Guomindang generals—both former warlords— about the strength of his anti-Japanese credentials. Consequently, these two strongmen not only refused to follow Chiang’s orders to attack Mao’s Communists, but actually kidnapped the Generalissimo, in what came to be known as ‘the Xi’an Incident.’ During the months that followed, the

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Generals both demanded and begged Chiang to call off his war against the Communists and fight against the Japanese, which eventually he agreed to do. After his release, Chiang followed through on his promise and an agreement was struck between the Guomindang and the Communists to form a Second United Front against the impending Japanese invasion, which followed on July 7, 1937. Initially, this coalition of Nationalists and Communists fared poorly against the relentless onslaught of the Japanese and countless cities were lost, including Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan. The Japanese then became bogged down and distracted by other fronts, with the result that the war slowed into an uneasy stalemate, interrupted occasionally by major pushes by one side or the other. These included the short-lived Hundred Regiments offensive by the Communists in 1940, the retaliatory Japanese ‘Three Alls’ campaign, and the wildly successful Japanese Operation Ichigo in 1944. The period also witnessed another breakdown in relations between the Guomindang and Communists, particularly after the Anhui incident in 1941, where Guomindang forces annihilated the Communist Fourth Army who they claimed had been acting against both the letter and the spirit of the agreement struck in 1937. After Japan was defeated by the United States and surrendered in 1945, Mao and Chiang Kai-shek negotiated with varying degrees of intensity, ostensibly to secure a peaceful resolution to their differences. As they talked, however, both sides raced to move their forces into the vacuums left by the surrendering Japanese. Both factions were aided by their respective superpower friends for this purpose. In July 1946, full-scale civil war erupted, focusing on Manchuria. Initially, the Guomindang appeared to secure the upper hand, even driving the Communists out of their base in Yan’an and making it seem viable that they might have to flee over the border to the Soviet Union. The situation soon reversed, however, and by the end of 1948 the Communists had smashed numerous Guomindang armies, conquered Manchuria, and stood poised to invade southern China. Over the next year, the Communists poured southwards, captured all of the country’s major cities and routed or destroyed almost all of the remaining Guomindang armies. Chiang fled with his remaining forces to Formosa and on October 1, 1949, Mao hailed the end of the war and declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China (Mao 1977, 15–18). Over the next year, Mao encouraged his forces to mop up the remaining Guomindang forces, made movements towards Formosa, and conquered Tibet. That same year, North Korea invaded South Korea, an act which

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spiralled into a wider three-year confrontation that ended up with China fighting against an American-dominated United Nations task force. During this period, the Soviet Union provided considerable military and economic support. Towards the end of the 1950s and throughout the decades that followed, however, relations with the Soviet Union weakened and then collapsed. This led to China competing for the leadership of the Communist World on the international stage and caused a major military border clash with the Russians along the Ussuri River in 1962. Domestically, Mao suppressed dissent against his rule, including crushing an uprising in Tibet in 1959, while also launching such initiatives as the short-lived guarantee of intellectual freedoms known as ‘Letting a Hundred Flowers Bloom’ and the abortive economic programme dubbed ‘The Great Leap Forward.’ During the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese supported the Communist insurgents in Vietnam and, in the midst of this, also began a period of rapprochement with the United States, culminating in the visit of Nixon to Beijing in 1972. At the same time, China was subjected to Mao’s war against capitalist influences in China through the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ Mao’s rule ended in 1977, when he died in bed at the age of 82.

The Four Categories Military Evolution Over Time Mao first began talking about the military aspects of an insurgency in a meaningful way during the Hunan Peasant Uprisings of the late 1920s. Putting pen to paper while visiting the peasant groups who were behind the revolution, Mao argued that an insurgency should be finished quickly, rather than over an extended period of time. Most dramatically, he prophesied that a revolution in China would only be won when the peasant masses ‘rise like a mighty storm’ to ‘sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves’ (Mao 1965a, 23–24). Yet, this perspective changed radically after the uprisings collapsed and Mao was forced to beat a hasty retreat to the Jinggang Mountains. Disenchanted by the failure of the peasants, he now fixated on the importance of possessing a regular Red Army because irregular Red Guard units could neither resist nearby landlord forces nor maintain political cohesion (Mao 1965a, 66). Recognising that his men were ­

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s­ urrounded by hostile forces, Mao defended his situation by arguing that isolated groups of insurgents could endure when encircled on all sides by hostile territory, before waxing eloquently about the strategic advantages of rugged terrain for ensuring the survival of his followers (Mao 1965a, 64–69, 73, 87, 95, and 118). Although Mao briefly dabbled with the notion that a protracted struggle might be necessary upon first arriving in the mountains, when his forces became more secure he reverted to the view that a ‘revolutionary upsurge’ would quickly become a ‘high tide of revolution’ that drowned the ruling classes (Mao 1965a, 119; 1975b, 199–202; 1975c, 37). He continued at first to support a rural uprising as the primary conduit for a rebellion, but then engaged in a dramatic volteface following his orders from the Central Committee to assault Changsha City as part of the 1927 Autumn Harvest Uprising. Prior to the attack, he commented that ‘only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying cities can we arouse the masses on a large-scale and build up a unified political power’ (Mao 1975b, 202–203). The assault failed and Mao retreated back to the mountains, a move that he attempted to vindicate by articulating the doctrine of when ‘The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue’ (Mao 1975b, 203). Upon settling his forces in that rural location and founding the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao embraced the countryside by announcing numerous agricultural laws and reforms (Mao 1975b, 238; 1975c, 27–30). He also relegated the role of irregular forces to subsidiary elements that should be used to merely supplement rather than overshadow the regular army (Mao 1975c, 62). After rebuffing the initial few assaults upon his position by Guomindang forces, Mao became more confident and doubled-back on his earlier support himself of trading space for time. Instead, he ordered the Communists in the area to expand actively outwards and forbade the abandonment or even consolidation of any bases (Mao 1975c, 82). Several major towns were now under his control and this led him to view the peasantry more critically, including condemning them for being too disorganised and undisciplined (Mao 1975c, 124). As the Guomindang attacks continued, Mao became ever more dogged in his determination to not yield any ground. Just months before the beginning of the Long March, Mao demanded that fixed positions such as the city of Foochow be defended and vowed that ‘We will definitely not abandon the revolutionary anti-­imperialist bases that have been created’ (Mao 1975d, 151; 1990c, Work #19). The following year, as cities were recaptured by the

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Guomindang and the Communist position became more tenuous, Mao reverted to a rural focus once more by indicating that the countryside was the primary front for the conflict and that the war was really a peasant– landlord struggle (Mao 1975c, 187). After the Jiangxi Soviet collapsed and his troops endured the rigours of the Long March, Mao still retained his devotion towards conventional warfare, stating from their new home in Yan’an that ‘to bring about victory or defeat a decisive battle is necessary. Only a decisive battle can settle the question as to which army is the victor and which the vanquished’ (Mao 1965a, 224). He appeared uncertain about his beliefs regarding the notion of trading space for time, however, with conflicting positions advanced. In an attempt to justify the earlier Communist flight from the Guomindang, for example, he commented that ‘the object of strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the counter-­ offensive. Retreat is necessary because not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong enemy inevitably means to jeopardise the preservation of one’s own forces’ (Mao 1965a, 215). The following year, however, as the threat of an invasion of China by the Japanese grew, Mao reverted to his previous tenacity regarding defending territory to the bitter end. This included demanding that the Communists ‘make the soviet territory impregnable’ and criticising the Guomindang for letting the Japanese ‘march straight in, taking a foot after gaining an inch’ (Mao 1975e, 20 and 47). He also asserted that ‘positional warfare should be employed for the tenacious defence of particular key points in a containing action during the strategic defensive’ (Mao 1965a 204 and 242). At the same time, Mao became reanimated about the idea of conducting guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines as a means to disrupt their supply lines and bases (Mao 1965b, 52). Yet, he abjured the idea of actually building bases there and indicated that zones behind the enemy lines should be abandoned when attacked (Mao 1965a, 216 and 238). During this period, Mao also tried to find a middle ground on the question of whether the cities or the countryside should form the keystone of the insurgency by claiming that the efforts of both urban workers and rural peasants were essential for overcoming Japanese imperialism (Mao 1975e, 21). When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, Mao spelled out the methods through which irregular warfare should be waged. Even in these guides, however, he caveated that the method could not be decisive by itself. The preamble in On Guerrilla Warfare, for example, warned that ‘guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of

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warfare … We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle’ (Mao 1990c, Work #29, chapter 1). Mao also came out forcefully in favour of protracted warfare at this juncture. This included outlining a three-stage plan for guerrilla warfare, which should go through the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, and mobile warfare stages (Mao 1965b, 102–109). During the first phase, the guerrillas pin down the enemy’s forces and launch counterattacks. Retreating from one base area to another would be disallowed unless repeated attempts to defeat the enemy were thwarted. In the second phase, the guerrillas attack weaker components of the enemy’s forces, while expanding the size of the territory held. In the final phase, the guerrilla forces evolve into regular armies that conduct mobile warfare (Mao 1965b 102–109). Separately, he outlined a three-phase strategy for the war as a whole (Mao 1965b, 136–145). During the strategic defensive stage, mobile warfare would be undertaken, supported by positional and guerrilla warfare. During the strategic stalemate stage, guerrilla warfare would be used most, supplemented by mobile warfare. In the counteroffensive stage, mobile warfare would dominate, supported by positional warfare and less substantially by guerrilla warfare (Mao 1965b, 136–145). Mao allowed some flexibility in the implementation of these strategies, asserting, for example, that an army should pursue mobile war when a favourable opportunity presents itself, even when guerrilla warfare is the primary approach (Mao 1965b, 116). There were two massive caveats to Mao’s teachings that are often overlooked, however. The first is that Mao stated explicitly that a quick war would be ideal and that he was recommending that the policy of a protracted struggle be carried out because there was no other choice (Mao 1965b, 107 and 133–134). Should this change, he seemed to imply, then quick warfare should be used instead. The second is that Mao himself rebutted the idea that his three-stage approach was either particularly new or profound, noting that numerous wars in Europe, North America, and China had gone through three stages and saying clearly that the Sino-Japanese war represented just another example of this type of war (Mao 1975f, 143). Despite his embrace of protracted warfare at this stage, Mao was in two minds about the benefits of trading space for time. On the one hand, he argued that ‘the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory, including

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the recovery of lost territory.’ He also held that China’s vast rural hinterland was too large for the Japanese to ‘gobble up’ entirely, so instead they would become bogged down in a protracted war against China’s peasantry who would use the rugged terrain to their advantage (Mao 1965b, 366; 1975e, 110; 1990c, Work #28). On the other hand, he lauded the Spanish Republicans for their tenacious defence of Madrid and avowed that China should have her own ‘Madrids.’ He remarked that defensive positional warfare was equally important to guerrilla warfare and demanded that the Chinese should protect fixed positions, such as Peking and Shansi, and should ‘not allow the Japanese to occupy an inch of our country’s territory’ (Mao 1965b, 54, 119, 137, 171, 187, and 268; 1975e, 88; 1990c, Work #23). Throughout the war with Japan, Mao vacillated about whether the countryside or the cities should serve as the primary venue for the insurgency. At first, following the Japanese conquest of the major cities on the coast of China, he stressed the importance of the agricultural revolution for victory and proposed ‘forcing the enemy into the extremely narrow confines of the cities and main communication lines, tightly surrounding it and completely expelling it’ (Mao 1975i, 181). An essential part of this strategy should involve the building of bases behind the enemy’s lines in order to compel them to fight on multiple fronts (Mao 1990c, Work #29, chapter 4). As the war continued, however, Mao argued that the cities must be the ultimate objective of the insurgency and that these could not be taken without significant urban work being carried out far in advance (Mao 1965b, 316). Eventually, it became apparent that the Japanese would be compelled by the Americans to withdraw from the cities in China, including Manchuria. Mao now lamented that insufficient urban work had been done and argued that without a swift rectification of this oversight the Japanese could not be driven out of China (Mao 1965c, 172–173). Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Mao argued that the impending hostilities with the Guomindang would be protracted, but spoke only occasionally and in passing about a three-phase plan (Mao 1961, 115). Mao also endorsed irregular warfare as being the decisive arm of an insurgency by claiming that the Communists had used the methodology successfully as the mainstay of their fighting against the Japanese and condemning the Guomindang for allegedly employing only defensive positional warfare. At the same time, however, he embraced the use of regular warfare and insisted that the Communists ‘stand our ground’

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against the Guomindang and ‘persevere in the struggle until victory, never slackening and never retreating’ (Mao 1961, 81; 1975j, 247). This position again changed after the Communists were forced to flee from Yan’an, which Mao tried to justify by arguing that ‘the temporary abandonment of certain places or cities is not only unavoidable but also necessary’ (Mao 1961, 89). Even then, however, he instructed that ‘we must hold or seize territory wherever the relative strength of the enemy and our own forces makes this possible or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns or battles’ (Mao 1961, 106). Once his forces regained the advantage, Mao claimed somewhat dubiously that his withdrawals had been planned all along and gloated that the Guomindang had overextended themselves in their pursuit, and maintained this position in the years that followed (Mao 1961, 137; 1975j, 256). He appeared to endorse the use of both regular and irregular forces as the decisive arm of an insurgency, asserting, for example, that spontaneous uprisings of the people had been beneficial, but these had been closely co-ordinated with the actions of the regular Communist forces (Mao 1975j, 267). Mao’s approach to the question of whether the countryside or cities should be the fulcrum of the war effort again embraced both sides of the spectrum during this period. Immediately following Japan’s surrender, Mao predicted that the Guomindang would successfully seize the big cities and that the Communists could only expect to occupy the countryside (Mao 1961, 17). At the same time, however, he assumed the opposite position by demanding that Communist forces seize all of the small, medium, and big cities that had been under Japanese occupation and deny these to the Guomindang (Mao 1961, 17 and 43). When the Guomindang appeared initially to be winning, Mao instructed the Communists to hide in the countryside, but then instructed them to assault the cities directly in 1948 once his forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand (Mao 1961, 13 and 265). After the Guomindang repulsed these attacks, Mao reverted to advocating for the encirclement of the cities from the countryside and maintained this position for the remainder of the war (Mao 1961, 290–291). Notably, however, despite his earlier devotion towards building bases in the rear of the enemy, Mao baulked at the idea of employing a strategy of building bases behind Guomindang lines because he indicated that this would involve a colossal investment of time and energy. Instead, he suggested the building of these bases would be incredibly difficult until after the enemy had been repeatedly defeated using mobile warfare and the areas had already been effectively placed under Communist rule (Mao 1961, 142).

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Summary Five major themes can be identified across Mao’s works regarding the military aspects of insurgency. The first of these was that Mao recommended fairly consistently that regular forces should be used as the primary arm of an insurgency. While he also stated that guerrilla and other irregular forces should play an important role, and spelled out in some depth during the 1930s exactly how they should be used, he was always clear that they could never be used independently and that regular warfare must be the dominant arm. This finding disproves the popular myth on this issue that Mao argued that irregular warfare could win an insurgency all by itself (Rooney 2004, 144–145). It also contravenes the other widely held belief that Mao taught that an insurgency should undergo a gradual evolution from irregular to regular warfare, with the latter only coming into play during the final portion of the conflict (Rees 1981, 5; van Creveld 2000, 204). Instead, the analysis showed that Mao believed that regular forces should be the main component of an insurgency throughout the entire conflict. Mao also argued regularly in favour of protracted warfare and outlined quite comprehensively how this should be broken into three phases. This confirms the traditional scholarly thought on the subject (Smith 2007, 170–171; Katzenbach and Hanrahan 1962, 138–141; Katzenbach 1962, 11–21). There were two surprising addendums to this confirmation, however. The first was that Mao did on multiple occasions contradict himself by advocating for a quick and decisive outcome for his insurgency. Yet, every time a quicker solution to the struggle was pursued, the Communist forces were defeated and Mao returned to recommending a lengthier struggle. The second was quite how rarely Mao discussed his three-phase model. During the late 1930s, he did outline in some depth not one but two blueprints for three-phase warfare—one for general war and one for guerrilla warfare specifically—and these exhibited noteworthy differences from one another. Both before and after this couple of years, however, he made virtually no references to the approach, limiting himself to only occasionally making passing references for the remainder of his life. This is quite surprising given how central the three-stage model has become amongst scholars when talking about Mao’s teachings on insurgency. A third military component was that Mao supported holding on to territory in his writings, even against enemies of superior strength, for as long as possible and only retreating when absolutely necessary. He frequently demanded that his forces seize enemy territory, stand their ground when attacked, and hold on to as much territory as possible. Mao bemoaned the

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loss of strategic hubs and held up the Republican defence of Madrid in 1937 as an example for how his forces should conduct themselves. While he did occasionally assert that the Communists should only fight battles that they could win, and conceded that some territory could be ceded to his opponents in the short term, this line of thinking was expressed far fewer times than his demands that the insurgents in his own and other forces must hold their ground. This finding contradicts the traditional scholarly belief that Mao advocated for insurgents to retreat from stronger enemies and cede them large tracts of territory in order to purchase the time needed for the insurgency to build its infrastructure and for the enemy to exhaust itself fruitlessly (Katzenbach and Hanrahan 1962, 134–135 and 141–142; Alexander 1995, 129–147; McCormick 1999, 25–26; O’Neill 1990, 35–39). Mao also stated recurrently that his insurgency should be fought predominantly in the countryside, with an emphasis upon his forces occupying the countryside in order to surround the cities and cut them off from their communication and supply lines. This aligns with the standard academic perspectives (Marks 2004, 118). This is not the full story, however, because Mao also supported the notion that the cities should be focused upon, albeit with fewer mentions than his recommendations regarding the countryside. This was not, as is sometimes indicated by scholars, because Mao wanted the cities captured as the final phase of his insurgency, but rather because Mao talked about seizing the cities whenever they seemed within reach, throughout the entire lifespan of the insurgency. This parallel, albeit slightly less emphasised, eagerness to focus on the cities as well as the countryside, which manifested itself across the breadth of Mao’s teachings, has generally been omitted from traditional portrayals of his teachings. A final defining element for the military side of affairs was the emphasis that Mao placed upon building bases behind enemy lines during the major part of his life. In particular, he suggested that rural bases should be built in the mountains, forests, and plains. These could then be expanded out to cover large areas of territory, eventually contributing to the envelopment of the cities. This aligns with the traditional depiction of this facet of military strategy within the scholarly literature (Tanham 1962, 23–25; Harkavy and Neuman, 2001, 194; Laqueur 1976, 252–254 and 261; Pelli 1990, 1–6). One major caveat is that, during the final civil war, Mao indicated that setting up new bases in the rear of the Guomindang forces would be overly time-consuming and should be deprioritised against other military efforts.

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Politics  volution Over Time E One of Mao’s earliest statements regarding his support for left-wing values came in 1919, when he called for the overthrow of the existing order by the masses in the name of ‘popularism’ (Mao 1975a, 15–17). At this stage, he embraced peaceful methods and rejected violent action as ‘contradictory’ and ‘ineffective’ (Mao 1975a, 15–17). He detoured briefly from the hard left in 1923, when he commented that ‘the role of merchants in a national revolution is more urgent and important than that of others,’ but returned to a more Communist vision soon after (Mao 1990c, Work #19). During his involvement with the Hunan Peasant Uprisings, Mao portrayed the conflict as a class-based struggle and observed that ‘under the political and economic oppression of imperialism and feudalism, the life of the peasants grows worse day by day’ (Mao 1975a, 109). He further indicated that the local peasant organisations possessed the raw energy needed to fight and that these institutions could overthrow and replace the existing bastions of feudal power in the region (Mao 1965a, 25–56; 1975a. 110). At the same time, however, Mao criticised the absence of a centralised leadership amongst the rural workers and asserted that a revolutionary government was essential for providing the political guidance needed for victory (Mao 1975a, 108–113). This was something that he believed the Communists could supply and he praised their efforts to undertake propaganda work amongst the peasants (Mao 1975a, 80). Yet, despite advocating for a more structured leadership hierarchy within Hunan itself, Mao had long displayed a dislike for taking orders from central bodies, noting as early as 1921 that ‘to respect human dignity, nobody should be “administered” by others’ (Mao 1975a, 34). This insubordinate streak re-­emerged in Hunan and in a letter to the Communist Central Committee in Nanjing he explained that he had overridden several of their direct orders because of their ‘ignorance about conditions here’ (Mao 1975b, 128). In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Hunan Peasant Uprisings and his retreat to the Jinggang Mountains, Mao blamed the class status of the country for the defeat, stating that ‘China is still at the stage of bourgeoisie-democratic revolution’ (Mao 1975b, 154). He also lambasted his own fighters for the defeat, declaring that insufficient political understanding existed amongst their ranks and stating that in the future political and economic elements must be grafted on to the struggle

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(Mao 1965a, 81–84 and 98; 1975b, 135). When he first arrived in the mountains, he had been forced into an accommodation with some bandit groups who were already based in the hills, a state of affairs that Mao found most tedious. He immediately set about trying to bolster his position vis-à-vis the leaders of these groups by complaining about the need for a strong local Communist party under his command (Mao 1975b, 131 and 142). His statements on this topic cannot be read as a full endorsement of a centralised command structure, however, because Mao simultaneously demanded that the Nanjing Central Committee keep their noses out of his affairs so as to ‘avoid the Guomindang’s mistake of interfering with the government directly’ (Mao 1975b, 149–150). After establishing the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao reaffirmed his commitment towards class struggle and infusing politics into the insurgency, noting, for example, that ‘Marxism is correct … We need Marxism in our struggle’ (Mao 1990c, Work #11). He declared that the landlords, imperialism, and the Guomindang were the enemy, and later added Japan to this list as well. He also outlined his plans for a Communist agricultural programme, including the redistribution of land, improvement of worker rights, intensification of class struggle, nationalisation of foreign enterprises, and worker supervision of domestic businesses (Mao 1975c 25–30). As a further aid, he promoted the creation and development of new organs of government, such as Communist banks, taxation offices, and political committees, in order to create a comprehensive new government system that would replace the now dismantled landlord system (Mao 1975b, 132–137, 149–153, and 158). In addition to these elements, Mao appeared to embrace a centralised command system by condemning the idea of breaking up the army into excessively small units, reserving and frequently exercising the right to make, rescind, or revise local government decisions, and threatening to punish anyone who failed to comply with his directives (Mao 1975b, 202; 1975c, 58, 132, 149, and 203; 1975d, 65–70). Yet, probably as an attempt to justify his past disobedience to his own superiors, he also declared that ‘to carry out a directive of a higher organ blindly, and seemingly without any disagreement, is not really to carry it out at all but is the most artful way of opposing or sabotaging it’ (Mao 1990c, Work #11). When the Jiangxi Soviet came under attack, Mao became convinced that the answer was to further politicise the military. Some of the measures he described including giving his forces political training, establishing dedicated political education institutes such as Red Army University, and purging ‘bad elements’ from their ranks (Mao 1975c, 109; 1975d, 74).

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He also advocated using propaganda to recruit and fundraise from the local population, as well as encourage enemy desertions (Mao 1975d, 130, 138, and 281). Yet, as the noose tightened yet further, Mao fretted that he had forsaken the military side of affairs and he recorded that the army’s military prowess urgently needed improvement (Mao 1975d, 163 and 197). He remained committed to a centralised power structure, but blamed the increasingly dire situation upon others for failing to share power properly. One example was his castigating two members of the military committee, who he claimed had acted erroneously by allegedly monopolising power within the committee, overruling their colleagues, and stifling the creativity of their subordinates (Mao 1965a, 291; 1975b, 293; 1975d, 300; 1990c, Work #18). After the Soviet collapsed and the Communists fled to Yan’an, Mao theorised that despite all of the Communists’ political work, they had been beaten because they failed to apply correct military strategy and tactics (Mao 1975d, 288 and 300). He also appeared to question whether he had taken the class struggle too far in the short term and, with the Japanese threat becoming ever more real, stated that ‘the policy of confiscating the land of landlords will be discontinued’ (Mao 1975e, 65–68). He remained wedded to the creation and operation of a Communist government structure that would rival and undermine the political system of his enemy, but now indicated that bastions of Communist rule should adopt an anti-­ Japanese rather than anti-Guomindang orientation (Mao 1975e, 15). Once war with Japan broke out, Mao highlighted in no uncertain terms the need to conduct political mobilisation and build links between the populace and the military in order to rally support and fundraise for the war (Mao 1965b 145 and 154–155). He also endorsed propaganda domestically to demoralise the enemy and encourage defections and political agitation internationally to convince other countries to help China (Mao 1965b, 145 and 176–177; 1975f, 123; 1975g, 20–21). His adherence to a strict Communist doctrine slipped yet further, however, as he changed his position to welcoming all strata of Chinese society in the quest to oppose Japanese aggression, rather than perpetuating class war (Mao 1965b, 16–18 and 27). Mao even adopted the goal of pursuing ‘a democratic republic based on the alliance of all classes in place of a worker– peasant democratic dictatorship’ (Mao 1965b, 39–42). Yet, his conversion was far from complete and he continued to promote the purging of the upper classes and emphasised that the worker–peasant masses remained the centrepiece of the revolution (Mao 1965b, 131, 244–247, 423, and

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428). He also praised the Soviet Union for its progressive orientation and sneered at ‘the so-called democratic states of England, America and France’ for their inaction and reactionary nature (Mao 1990c, Work #33). This period also saw Mao lean both towards and against a centralisation of power. On the one hand, he denounced people who disobeyed orders and demanded that the central authority check and correct the work of all of its operatives (Mao 1965b, 31 and 203). In 1938, he was emphatic that: (1) the individual is subordinate to the organisation; (2) the minority is subordinate to the majority; (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and (4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee. Whoever violates these articles of discipline disrupts Party unity. (Mao 1965b, 204)

Yet, he also called on party members to ‘raise questions, voice opinions and criticize defects,’ indicated that that guerrilla forces should be mostly autonomous, and remarked that military disputes should be resolved at the lowest levels of command (Mao 1965b, 204; 1990c, Work #29; 1975h, 119–121). As the war progressed, Mao continued to emphasise the importance of politically educating his forces and expressed pride in his Anti-Japanese Military and Political College (Mao 1975i, 174; 1990c, Work #32). Following the entry of Britain into the war and the increased participation of the United States, Mao altered his conceptions of his friends and enemies at both home and abroad. Domestically, he indicated that the pro-­ British and pro-American upper and middle classes ought to be treated better than the pro-Japanese upper and middle classes, although the former could still not be viewed as long-term friends (Mao 1965b, 443–444). Similarly, on the international front, he drew a distinction between the aggressive imperialism of the Japanese and the more neutral imperialism of Britain and the United States (Mao 1965b, 443–444). He appeared to reach a middle ground in regard to the degree to which power should be centralised or spread out, at least in regard to economics, when he described the Communist economic system as having ‘centralised leadership and dispersed operation’ (Mao 1990c, Work #35, chapter 7). Following Japan’s surrender and the resumption of civil war with the Guomindang, Mao maintained that the Communists were leading a democratic alliance from the majority of classes and maintained that the shadow government institutions he had created were nationalist rather than

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Communist in orientation (Mao 1961, 78–79 and 89). Yet, he began to shift left again and pushed for the Party to resolve the land problem and depend upon the lower and middle peasantry (Mao 1961, 89). He remained animated by the importance of fusing together the political and military dimensions of war, arguing repeatedly that victory could best be achieved by undertaking political and education work amongst the Red Army and undermining the enemy’s willingness to fight with propaganda (Mao 1961, 75–79 and 160–162). He felt that the Party needed, in particular, to exert strong leadership in this area towards those forces that operated relatively independently during the struggle against Japan, as he fretted these had become disorganised and weak due to their remoteness from the party leadership (Mao 1961, 116). As the Red Army gained the upper hand, Mao credited their success upon their ideological education (Mao 1961, 211–215 and 241). He veered further to the left in his rhetoric, asserting now that the revolution must be led exclusively by the lower classes and demanded the confiscation of rich peasant land and bureaucrat capital (Mao 1961, 164–169 and 235). Initially, he decried the idea of returning to ‘ultra-Left policies’ and encouraged the development of some private industry and commerce (Mao 1961, 168, 183–184, and 197). But as the war drew towards a close, Mao disparaged the use of non-Communist ideologies and suggested that the use of such ‘bankrupt’ creeds had caused previous uprisings in China to fail (Mao 1961, 456). The vision he now articulated involved ‘a people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat and with the worker–peasant alliance as its main body’ (Mao 1961, 302). He further advocated a ‘remoulding’ of the reactionary classes and looked ahead to ‘the socialization of agriculture’ and a robust state industry (Mao 1961, 419). He altered his positions regarding the orientation of the shadow organs of government that the Communists were creating as well, giving increased primacy to class-based organisations, such as the poor peasant leagues, over more nationalist institutions (Mao 1961, 201). He condemned American aid to the Guomindang as imperialist and proclaimed, as a chilling precursor to the future, that ‘classes struggle, some classes triumph, others are eliminated. Such is history, such is the history of civilization for thousands of years’ (Mao 1961, 428; 1975j, 264–265). In lockstep with his increasingly totalitarian vision for the future, Mao’s comments about the need to centralise power increased accordingly. In 1948, for example, he stated that all organisations should be subject to

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oversight, guidance, and corrections from the centre (Mao 1961, 177–179). Yet, his desire for a chaotic dispersal of power remained, as demonstrated by his pledge that same year that ‘the masses not only have the right to criticize [errant political figures] freely, but also have the right to dismiss them from their posts … and even to hand over the worst elements to the people’s courts for trial and punishment’ (Mao 1961, 186). Summary Four further themes can be seen within Mao’s writings relating to the political dimensions of an insurgency. One of these was that Mao argued for the fusing together of the military facets of insurgency with politics and ideology. This included providing clear political goals for the insurgency and imbuing the insurgents and their supporters with political perspectives, including through the use of political education, political committees, and political commissars. Mao explicitly rejected the notion that an insurgency could be waged as a purely military action as well, although with the fall of Jiangxi he stressed that the military side of the insurgency could not be entirely forgotten. The emphasis that Mao placed upon political warfare represents one of the best-known aspects of Mao’s teachings, with the slogan ‘political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ being very well known. It is quite unsurprising then that this finding has generally been well represented in prior scholarly writings on Mao and insurgency (Kiras 2008, 255; Marks 2009, 18; Katzenbach and Hanrahan 1962, 136–137; Hammes 2006; Willmott and Pimlott 1979, 54–58; Alexander 1995, 134). The second theme of class warfare being integral to insurgency has been much less well represented within the scholarly literature. Throughout his writings, Mao argued in favour of class warfare, which would involve the lower classes rising up and overthrowing the upper classes, and staunchly opposed foreign imperialism. He supported these viewpoints with instructions on land redistribution, developing the public economy and suppressing rich landlords and capitalists. Following Japan’s invasion, Mao tempered his position by proposing that the journey to Communism in China should pass through a period of republican democracy, reaching out to non-fascist Western powers, and diluting his instructions on class rectification. Yet, towards the end of the civil war with Guomindang, he focused on class warfare again, presaging the future horrors of the regime he would found. This finding fits with some authors, predominantly political theorists, who hold that Mao felt that an insurgency must centre on a

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lower-class revolution that overthrows and replaces conservative forces such as rich landlords and merchants (Townshend 1988, 258). Yet, it contravenes the perspectives of many other scholars, particularly in the field of security studies, who have suggested that class warfare can be readily pared off from Mao’s teachings on insurgency. In fact, Mao was emphatic that this could not be done, going so far as to claim that China’s past insurgencies had failed not from a lack of political dimensions, but rather because they had not adopted the ideology of Marxist class warfare specifically. A third theme is that Mao indicated that an insurgency should build its own political and statutory agencies, such as banks, tax offices, and political committees, which would supplant prior political institutions within occupied territories. They could also rival the organs of government in enemy-controlled regions. The exact functions that Mao claimed these entities would carry out changed throughout his writings. Both before the mid-late 1930s and during the final years of civil war against the Guomindang, Mao promoted those political agencies that could help to implement radical class change, such as peasant associations and land reform institutions. During the Sino-Japanese War itself, however, his discourse changed to endorsing shadow government institutions of all political function and orientation, as long as they opposed the Japanese. This scholarly literature generally confirms this perspective, although it has tended to focus more on the military outcomes of shadow government, such as the ability to curtail the enemy’s ability to gather intelligence and draw support from the population, as well as increase the ability of the insurgents to enjoy reliable sources of food, sanctuary, intelligence, and funding (Pustay 1965, 34–35; Kilcullen 2009, 52; Krishna 1997). Mao alluded to these military dimensions, but his primary goal for these entities was often more political in nature. A fourth theme was that Mao embraced both the centralisation and decentralisation of power within an insurgency. Throughout the conflict, he issued countless imperious commands to subordinate agencies and chastised any subordinates who deviated from his directives. At the same time, however, he periodically emphasised the importance of individual initiative at all levels of the military and political hierarchies. He also ­criticised his superiors and documented his disobedience towards them during the early stages of his career. This suggests that Mao believed in a complex structuring of power within an insurgency, with some degree of centralisation but also a notable amount of devolution of power down the hierarchy. The finding somewhat confirms and rebuts the conventional

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viewpoints regarding where power should sit according to Mao. Prior scholars have tended to suggest that Mao endorsed the use of a centralised strategic command, discouraged local initiatives, and stressed the need for absolute obedience by everyone towards the centre (Joes 1986, 101; O’Neill 1990, 98; Marks 2004, 118). This is all true, but he also contradicted himself by arguing the opposite as well. Population  volution Over Time E Mao endorsed popular mobilisation as early as 1919 when he stated that ‘the greatest force is that of the union of the popular masses’ (Mao 1990c, Work #3). During this period, he exhibited a fairly broad interpretation of who exactly constituted the masses, as he excluded only ‘the aristocracy, the capitalists and the other holders of power in society’ (Mao 1990c, Work #4). This broad interpretation led him in 1923 to call ‘upon the merchants, the workers, the peasants, the students, and the teachers of the whole country, as well as the others who constitute our nation and who suffer under a common oppression … to establish a closely knit United Front’ (Mao 1990c, Work #7). As he became increasingly involved with the Communist Party, he continued to support the need to mobilise the masses behind the insurgency, but his viewpoint shifted gradually leftwards towards emphasising that the lower classes were the core of the people (Mao 1975b, 135; 1975c, 122). During the Hunan Peasant Uprisings, Mao claimed that the non-­ peasant classes—such as the petty bourgeoisie and even the small landlords—would ally with the peasantry as the revolution progressed (Mao 1975a, 86–88 and 96). Yet, he continued to debar the rich landlords and big business merchants from being considered friends of the people. During this period, Mao exalted about the benefits for the peasants that were being garnered by the peasant associations, including the elimination of banditry, abolition of unfair levies, and the undertaking of social construction projects. He also demonstrated a penchant for mass violence against civilians, when he conceded that peasant efforts to ‘liquidate the local despots and evil gentry’ were illegal, but sanctioned them because ‘these are methods which must be adopted in the course of revolutionary struggle’ (Mao 1975a, 112 and 125). He tried to justify these actions in part by claiming that the peasants kept accounts of who had been good or

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bad, and checked these prior to meting out punishments (Mao 1965a, 28). After moving to the Jinggang Mountains, Mao wrote about the need to treat the local peasants kindly, but also stated that taxes should be imposed, albeit at lower rates than those imposed by their former landlords (Mao 1975b, 137, 148, and 152). He encouraged unrestrained violence against the landlords, but banned it against the middle classes and vacillating peasants and forbade indiscriminate burning and killing as a whole (Mao 1975b, 132, 147, 152, 155, 161). Following the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao outlined a radical programme intended to support the lower classes. This included the redistribution of land, property, and money to the poorest farmers, the allocation of surplus cattle and tools to those who lacked them, and the provision of social assistance (Mao 1975b, 172; 1975c, 27 and 172). Yet, he also supported the imposition of land taxes on the peasantry and outlined preferential treatment for Red Army soldiers, including tax exemptions and demands for other villagers to farm their land (Mao 1975b, 241; 1975c, 62–66). Mao’s calls for violence against civilian wrongdoers were usually selective at this stage, such as his order for the capture and destruction’ of an alleged traitor in 1931 (Mao 1975c, 35–37). As Jiangxi came under attack, however, he worried that ‘there are still alien class elements hidden in some of [the soviet governments]’ and told local governments to draw worker activists into their ranks to reinforce their worker composition (Mao 1975c, 99–101). His treatment of the lower classes worsened, including orders for the peasants to be agitated into purchasing revolutionary war bonds, the instituting of strict travel regulations, and the imposition of rationing (Mao 1975c, 107, 116, 134–135, and 149). He further determined to ‘intensify the suppression of counterrevolutionaries—so that not a single counterrevolutionary will remain in the soviet areas’ (Mao 1975d, 76). To carry this out as quickly as possible, he allowed for ‘on the spot’ summary executions to be carried out for crimes such as deserting with a rifle, fraud, and inciting counterrevolutionary activities (Mao 1975c, 155; 1975d, 86, 88, 242–249). Mao still advocated for the necessity of public trials, but the procedures he described sounded closer to kangaroo courts than fair trials (Mao 1975c, 199–200, 258; 1975d, 86, 88, 242–249). Yet, when the situation became more desperate, Mao claimed that the Communists would win out by ‘rallying millions upon millions of people round the revolutionary government’ (Mao 1965a, 150).

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Upon settling in Yan’an, Mao unveiled a raft of welfare pledges to help the population, especially the lower classes, including raising wages, providing education, supplying disaster relief, and abolishing exorbitant taxes (Mao 1975e, 16 and 81). His discussion on the use of violence also dwindled. As the threat of a Japanese invasion loomed larger, Mao became an effusive supporter of welding together all of the patriotic population, regardless of class, in the defence of China (Mao 1975e, 12–13). This manifested itself partially through his support of creating a United Front, including ‘people of the entire nation, regardless of the political factions, armed units, social organisations, or individual classes’ (Mao 1975e, 1–2). At first, he wished to exclude Chiang Kai-shek from this alliance, but after the United Front was formalised between the two leaders in 1936, his disposition towards both him and the Guomindang improved (Mao 1975e, 30). After Japan invaded, Mao opined that co-operation between the Guomindang and the Communists would be permanent and reaffirmed his call for ‘all the people of the whole country to throw their strength behind the sacred war of self-defence against Japan’ (Mao 1965b, 13; 1975e, 107). This included ‘the workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people’ (Mao 1965b, 98). To this end, he insisted that the population be treated benevolently and, most notably, wrote the famous Three Rules and Eight Remarks as instructions for how Communist fighters should treat civilians: Rules: All actions are subject to command. Do not steal from the people. Be neither selfish nor unjust. Remarks: Replace the door when you leave the house. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. Be courteous. Be honest in your transactions. Return what you borrow. Replace what you break. Do not bathe in the presence of women. Do not without authority search those you arrest. (Mao 1990c, Work #29, chapter 6)

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At the same time, however, Mao also became a stronger proponent of widespread anti-civilian violence. He instructed that guerrillas should ‘seize and kill all traitors and reactionaries,’ that prisoners should be dispersed or executed, and that civilians in enemy areas should be intimidated (Mao 1990c, Work #28; 1990c, Work #29, chapters 5 and 7). Initially, his targets were pro-Japanese traitors, but this shifted later to anyone who was ‘guilty of oppressive activities against the people’ (Mao 1975e, 115; 1975g, 8–10). As the war continued, Mao became gradually more critical of the United Front with the Guomindang, particularly after the annihilation of the Communist Fourth Army in 1941 (Mao 1965b, 452). Finding himself based predominantly in the countryside, Mao also became less enamoured by the notion of a popular movement backed by a broad spectrum of classes and instead reverted to portraying peasants as the heart of the people (Mao 1965c, 132). He continued to articulate that the population under his control should be treated well, including that they ‘should enjoy freedom of the person, the right to take part in political activity, and the right to protection of property … they should have clothes to wear, food to eat, work to do and schools to attend’ (Mao 1965c, 32). He even directed that enemy prisoners should be freed without recriminations, even if they did not want to join the Communist movement or had been captured before (Mao 1965b, 447). He did, however, promote intimidation, arrests, and detentions when dealing with hostile enemy populations (Mao 1990c, Work #28). He also acknowledged that some people were forced to pay taxes to both the Communists and the Japanese, but made no mention of special concessions for them and seemed unconcerned by the idea that these individuals would face the burden of double taxation (Mao 1965c, 167–168). This laxer approach changed towards the end of the war, when Mao embraced higher levels of violence against the population, including ‘the purging of all anti-democratic elements’ and ‘all thieves who sell out their country, capitulationists, defeatists, dictators and fascist elements’ (Mao 1975i, 177 and 173). Yet, possibly enamoured by the idea of seizing power in China from the Guomindang once the Japanese had surrendered, he began talking once again about the need to represent the entire population, informing his commanders that ‘you represent 90 million people in your bases, and you also represent the 450 million people all over China … our hearts must be closely linked with the hearts of all people of China’ (Mao 1975i, 165).

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Mao’s stated desire to unite the entire population behind him increased following the Japanese surrender and resumption of the civil war with the Guomindang. This would involve the Communists uniting with the lower and middle classes, while also acting leniently towards all but the most reactionary or traitorous upper classes (Mao 1961, 89–90). To assist with this objective, he described measures to ‘reduce the people’s burden’ including tax cuts, rent reductions, land reform, disaster relief, and encouragement for private enterprise (Mao 1961, 71–73; 1975i, 215). Mao also remarked that the Communists needed to ‘bring tangible material benefits to the people’ because otherwise they ‘may be taken in for a time by deceitful Guomindang propaganda and may even turn against our Party’ (Mao 1961, 82–83). When the Guomindang began to falter, Mao expressed magnanimity towards the body of the opposing side, commenting that ‘our army does not reject all Chiang Kai-shek’s personnel, but adopts a policy of dealing with each case on its merits. That is the chief criminals shall be punished without fail, those that are accomplices under duress shall go unpunished’ (Mao 1961, 150–151). He appeared reticent about the popular dissent that might arise from land reforms being implemented too quickly and argued that ‘we must insist on killing less and must strictly forbid killing without discrimination … Our task is to abolish the feudal system, to wipe out the landlords as a class, not as individuals’ (Mao 1961, 186). Yet, Mao also expressed a desire to maintain the purity of the insurrection by preventing bad elements from joining and displayed a violent attitude towards saboteurs, embezzlers, and other traitors to the insurrection (Mao 1961, 305 and 399). As victory became entirely certain, he began hinting at a non-inclusive vision of ‘a state which is a people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants’ (Mao 1961, 415–417). This presaged the horrors of the regime that he was soon to found. S ummary Four themes relating to the population can be identified within Mao’s writings. The first is that throughout the insurgency, Mao advocated unswervingly in favour of rallying the masses and harnessing their sheer numbers as a weapon in the war. The variations that occurred within this theme related not to whether or not he supported it, but rather to how he defined ‘the people.’ Generally, whenever Mao felt threatened by powerful

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adversaries, he portrayed this group as including everyone except for the uppermost of classes. During lulls in fighting, however, he provided a much narrower depiction that centred on the worker–peasant masses. Some years after his victory over the Guomindang, Mao acknowledged that his portrayals of ‘the people’ had changed according to circumstances and claimed that this approach was correct for insurgencies. This finding generally aligns with the traditional thought on the issue, with Mao frequently attributed as being keen on mobilising the masses for his insurgency (Kiras 2008, 256; Mackinlay 2009, 16; Stubbs 2010, 116; Deady 2005, 58; McCormick 1999, 30–31). A second theme is that Mao expressed eagerness to bring together a wide-reaching coalition as United Fronts to oppose communal opponents. This included both those who shared political–economic similarities with his insurgents and those who held different values, as long as they shared the same enemies. The goal is for the worst enemies to be defeated first, after which reform initiatives can be launched to rectify the errors of the non-working classes and help them to reform. Mao often articulated his support for this position, with two main exceptions. These came during the late 1920s and early 1930s, when his writings talked frequently about disenfranchising and punishing all but the lower and lower-middle classes, and during the final year of the civil war, when he hinted at future hostility towards everyone except the working class. This finding predominantly confirms traditional perspectives on the topic (Marks 2004, 118; Rooney 2004, 134–135; Harkavy and Neuman 2001, 194). Treating civilians benevolently represents a third theme in this category. Mao outlined a range of positive measures for the population living under his rule and described codes of conduct for the Communist armed forces to follow when interacting with civilians. There were a few caveats, including Mao’s support for favourable treatment of the Red Army and the imposition of revolutionary taxes upon the population—even if this meant them being double taxed by both the Communists and their enemies. Nevertheless, Mao’s thoughts on this issue do mostly confirm the popular belief that Mao recommended the courteous treatment of civilians in his writings (Haswell 1973, 176–177; Alexander 1995, 134). Yet, despite his embracing of courteous treatment for civilians, Mao was more mixed when it came to anti-civilian violence. It is clear that in his texts he forbade untargeted violence, indiscriminate killing, and wanton terrorism. Yet, he quite often encouraged violence that was broadly

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t­argeted at entire groups rather than individuals, as well as selective violence against specific individuals. This was particularly true during heated periods of fighting, when he effectively extended unchecked power of execution over so-called class enemies and traitors to the lower echelons of government and urged them to be proactive in this respect. He did recommend the use of trials in other cases, but the court procedures he described sounded closer to kangaroo courts than impartial hearings. This suggests that the traditional academic perspective that Mao only endorsed limited violence in his texts is overly optimistic—it is true that he did not support indiscriminate terrorism, but he did approve of violence at a large scale against groups who were seen as opposing the insurgency (Martin 2013, 74; Garthoff 1962, 573; Marks 2004, 118–122). Resources  volution Over Time E One of the first references that Mao made towards how to gather resources for an insurgency came during the Hunan Peasant Uprisings, when he recorded the capture of enemy rifles, machine guns, and cannons by the peasants, as well as mass defections by enemy soldiers (Mao 1965a, 40; 1975a, 116). Upon being pushed back into the Jinggang Mountains, Mao articulated less interest in stealing weapons from the enemy, claiming that his forces had more rifles than men and that ‘rifles are not easily lost’ (Mao 1965a, 81 and 85). As a result, he remained keen on converting enemy fighters, noting that there would be a manpower shortage without these converts and encouraging the use of propaganda, preferential treatment, and a waiver of background checks to facilitate this outcome (Mao 1965a 81 and 85; 1975a, 144, 161, and 185–186). He also worried about the impact of the blockade of his position by the surrounding white forces and proposed a doctrine of ‘economic power for self-sustenance’ as the solution (Mao 1965a, 89; 1975b, 131). During the Guomindang encirclement of Jiangxi several years later, Mao issued further calls for Guomindang soldiers to defect to his side and expressed enthusiasm about capturing enemy weapons (Mao 1975b, 160; 1990c, Work #13). He also talked about his hope for beating the quarantine by creating co-operatives and developing the economy (Mao 1975c, 202). Just one month later, however, he was forced to reverse course by instructing the masses to work on ‘promoting external trade to smash the

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enemy’s economic blockade.’ In 1935, Mao leaned yet further away from supporting a doctrine of economic self-reliance by expressing a belief in the willingness and necessity of the Soviet Union to provide aid for the Chinese Communists (Mao 1965a, 171). It was in Jiangxi that Mao first became interested in how the actions of foreign states could be manipulated into helping China more directly than simply supplying aid and trade. Noting with growing concern the incursions of Japan to the north, he opined that the imperialist powers (particularly Japan) might try to partition China between them (Mao 1975c, 79–80). He predicted that this would be a positive development because it would push China to the foreground of the world revolution and ensure that ‘China’s revolution is no longer isolated as in the past’ (Mao 1975e, 12; 1990c, Work #18). He further added that, if the Japanese could be so tempted into invade, the Soviet Union would act as a saviour who would intercede to stop any undesirable fate (Mao 1975c, 39 and 250). Yet his ambitions did not stop with Russia and he sought to influence other powers into intervening to help the Chinese against Japan by proposing ‘that the five countries of China, Britain, the United States, France and Russia set up an allied Pacific Front’ (Mao 1965a, 286; 1975e, 22). In 1936, Mao made an astonishing reversal from his previous postion of endorsing the stealing of men and materials from the enemy. While trying to pressure the Guomindang out of unleashing a new wave of attacks against the Communists, Mao pledged that in exchange for an alliance against Japan, the Red Army would abandon any ‘intention to capture the personnel and weaponry of any unit of the National Revolutionary Army’ (Mao 1975e, 60). More shockingly still, he indicated that ‘all the personnel and weaponry of the National Revolutionary Army captured by us when it attacked will be returned.’ This deviation was short-lived as, probably feeling snubbed by Chiang Kai-shek’s disinterest, Mao quickly re-­endorsed the practice of feeding off the enemy, commenting that ‘our basic policy is to rely on the war industries of the imperialist countries and our domestic enemy. We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as Hanyang, and what is more, it is delivered by the enemy’s transport corps’ (Mao 1965a, 249). During the war against Japan, Mao continued to go back and forth between talking about the benefits of achieving self-reliance and discussing the gains that could be made through foreign aid and trade. At one extreme, he lambasted those people who ‘pinned their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign aid and argued that the Communists needed to build towards economic, financial and industrial

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self-sufficiency’ (Mao 1965b, 116; 1975h, 126). At the other extreme, he indicated that ‘we need outside aid’ and that ‘China’s strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces … otherwise we shall not be able to win’ (Mao 1965b, 140; 1990c, Work #31). Mao gave the example of Abyssinia, stating that the country was conquered because ‘she was unable to hold out and wait for international assistance and had to fight her war in isolation’ (Mao 1965b, 127). He was also emphatic that ‘Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China’s final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance and the revolution will fail’ (Mao 1965b, 335). Mao continued to approve of the practice of feeding off the enemy at first, providing comprehensive instructions for guerrillas on this topic in 1937 (Mao 1990c, Works #28 and #29, chapters 5–6). Yet, the following year, Mao diluted this message by suggesting that instead of relying on the enemy’s weapons, ‘we must build a national defence industry, and manufacture heavy and advanced weapons ourselves’ (Mao 1975e, 106). In relation to hoping to benefit from outside powers being drawn into the war, Mao asserted in 1937 that ‘we have sympathy in many foreign countries including even Japan itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and China will win’ (Mao 1990c, Work #29, chapter 4). Even the mere threat of foreign intervention against Japan, Mao argued, was beneficial because ‘Japan is unable to employ her entire strength in the attack on China; she cannot, at most, spare more than a million men for this purpose, as she must hold any in excess of that number for use against other possible opponents.’ America’s entry into the war after Pearl Harbor caused Mao to predict that victory in China would be won soon because ‘the short legs of the Japanese bandits have been stretched too far’ (Mao 1975h, 110). Mao even saw benefits from the Japanese blockade of China, claiming that this had ‘brought about a positive side, which was to encourage us to be determined to set-to ­ [achieving self-sufficiency] ourselves. As a result we achieved our goal of overcoming difficulties and trained experience in running economic enterprises’ (Mao 1990c, Work #35, chapter 7). As the war wore on, Mao again promoted a self-sustaining economy, including the need for Communist forces behind enemy lines to grow and manufacture their own resources (Mao 1965c, 154; 1975g, 8). He also stated that he wanted to avoid foreign ties that were too constricting and commented that ‘the solution of China’s problems relies upon the efforts of the Chinese people themselves’ (Mao 1975i, 157–160). Yet, he

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contradicted himself again by talking multiple times about the need for external trade and spending the final few months of the war singing the praises of the Soviet Union, presumably with the hope of securing their support in the looming civil war with the Guomindang (Mao 1965c, 153–154, 257–259, and 307; 1990c, Work #35, chapter 6). He made little mention of feeding off the enemy, possibly because the Japanese were proving less easy to rob than Mao had originally hoped. This changed when Japan’s surrender seemed imminent, with Mao becoming suddenly keen for his forces to seize Japanese assets before the Guomindang could intercede. To this end, he directed his forces to capture Japanese ‘arms and matériel’ and stated that both captured and deserting enemy soldiers should be welcomed and spared from any abusive behaviour (Mao 1965c, 265 and 339). When the civil war broke out, Mao claimed that the Communists were fighting the Guomindang unaided from outside sources and said that this was the correct approach to follow (Mao 1961, 89–91). Despite this, he also remained a strong advocate of support from the Soviet Union, which he hoped would include not only aid and trade but also some kind of intervention (Mao 1961, 25). He hoped that this would go beyond simple aid and trade to include a seismic intervention. He also asserted that the Guomindang would provide ‘not only the main source of our arms and ammunition, but also an important source of our manpower’ and instructed the Red Army to only fight when the personnel and weapons gained would outweigh those lost (Mao 1961, 104 and 145). He made repeated calls were made to Guomindang personnel to desert and congratulated those who did so (Mao 1961, 295–296; 1990b, Work #2). His support of local manufacturing continued, but this now ran parallel to stealing from the enemy (Mao 1961, 123). In relation to manipulation of external forces during the final civil war, Mao proclaimed that people from all over the world would rally against American imperialism and that this would benefit his forces in China (Mao 1975j, 253). He further theorised that, while Soviet Union did not formally intervene, their contributions had, nevertheless, been instrumental in preventing the United States from invading for fear of a retaliatory Soviet response (Mao 1961, 436–437). Mao spoke about benefits of the actions of hostile powers too during this period, commenting that American and Japanese imperialism had united the people and given them both the class awareness and moral strength needed to triumph over the Japanese, the Guomindang, and imperialist domination (Mao 1961, 136 and 425–427; 1990a, 9).

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Summary One of the most notable findings about Mao’s recommendations about acquiring resources during a rebellion is that he favoured three main conduits, despite several major conflictions between these mediums. While Mao often stated explicitly that one means of resource of acquisition was superior over the others, the fact that he made this assertion for each of the three main conduits available—feeding off the enemy, seeking aid and trade from foreign powers, and building up self-sufficiency—suggests that he actually valued all three in equal measure. His support for the each of the three options is briefly summarised below. Mao expressed a clear desire for his insurgents to achieve self-sufficiency and to eschew dependence upon foreign countries for the weapons and materials that they needed to survive and flourish. This was particularly true during periods when prospects of foreign aid seemed remote, such as during the Hunan Peasant Uprisings or halfway through the Sino-Japanese War. Yet when the possibility of tapping into foreign support seemed high—such as following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and during the final year of the war when victory seemed imminent—he seemed much more keen on the idea.  During these occasions, he commented with equal vigour and emphasis that foreign aid and support were essential for victory and without them his insurgency would perish. He seemed particularly keen on securing aid from the Soviet Union, but also expressed interest in tapping into support from sympathisers and other governments as well. His statements in favour of this course rose and fell in exact opposition to his desire for self-sufficiency, with him articulating more excitement towards the idea at times when foreign aid seemed most likely and rejecting the idea most fervently when the possibility of achieving foreign aid appeared remote. This finding, therefore, both confirms and refutes the commonly held notion that Mao valued self-sufficiency (Marks 2004, 118; Potgieter 2000, 255; Elek 1994, 20–21). Mao also appeared to want his forces to steal resources from the enemy and convince their personnel to defect to the Communists when he was facing the Guomindang, both during the 1920s to 1930s and during the final civil war of 1946 to 1949. He initially appeared interested in this approach against the Japanese as well, but this waned in favour of other forms of resource acquisition, potentially because the Japanese were more effective than the Guomindang at denying the Communists the plunder they needed to sustain themselves. This finding generally fits solidly with

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the academic perspectives on the issue, which stress that Mao wanted to use clever paramilitary and psychological operations to prevent men and resources from defecting, surrendering, and fleeing enemy soldiers (de Lee 1985, 45; Fuller 1958, 139–145). Finally, Mao expressed an eagerness for his insurgents to benefit from the actions of external forces and to use the activities of these outside powers to their advantage whenever possible. While this theme was fairly dormant during the early stages of Mao’s career, it came alive in the 1930s, when Mao argued that the aggressive movements of the Japanese against China could be used to rally support for the Communists, and continued during the final civil war period in relation to the Soviet Union and the United States. This finding mostly confirms past scholarly perspectives regarding Mao’s viewpoint on this issue, with authors highlighting particularly Mao’s enthusiasm for Japan’s incursions into China as an aid to helping the Communists triumph over the Guomindang (Cogley 1977; Fuller 1958, 139–145).

Potential Critiques and Comments Several critiques could be raised regarding this method of identifying Mao’s main teachings on insurgency. One critique could be to query whether Mao can be viewed as the author of a text when his name is listed as one amongst several contributors, or his authorship is implied through membership in a committee that published the work. The clearest response is that it does not entirely matter whether Mao was lead author. The fact that Mao was willing to sign—or allow a group of which he was a member to sign—the document demonstrates that he formally endorsed the perspectives in the work. It is reasonable to assume, for example, that a document issued by the Central Committee in Jiangxi, while Mao was its chairman, accurately represents Mao’s official views. If Mao had disagreed with the document’s views, he could have refused permission for it to be issued. Moreover, all of the texts examined have been taken from formally published and widely available compendiums of Mao’s texts, meaning that they are all fairly universally recognised as being either written or endorsed by Mao. A second critique could be to challenge the extent to which a thematic endorsement by Mao can be reliably viewed as representing his actual ­perspective (rather than serving as a comment made for political reasons, for example). There are several answers to this concern. The first answer

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is that it does not entirely matter why Mao endorsed a viewpoint, only that he did so. Anyone reading his work would be exposed to the stated rather than actual motive. The second answer is that this same critique could be applied to all of Mao’s works, even the most famous pieces which have received such widespread acceptance in mainstream insurgency scholarship. There is no reliable way to identify which of Mao’s works may have been written for political reasons and which contain his truthful beliefs. The third answer is that it is never possible to truly understand what factors motivate an individual to endorse a particular position and that accurately second-guessing why Mao adopted one view or another would be impossible. A third critique could be to point out that the teachings of Mao did not always correlate with his real-life actions. The use of terror is one example. Mao frequently condemned the use of indiscriminate violence in his writings, but, nevertheless, oversaw the killing of millions of people by the Communist forces under his command during the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War (Valentino 2004, 88; Rummel 1991, 17). This concern has validity, but would be slightly misdirected here. Regardless of what Mao did in reality, the arguments he advanced in his writings are still the arguments that he advanced. An appraisal of what Mao taught in his formal writings must focus upon his writings, and not be distracted by his actions, even when they contradict his written words. An explanation about how most of Mao’s actions did not actually correlate with his teachings is provided in Chap. 3. A fourth critique could be to suggest that some of the translations of Mao’s texts may have altered the exact meaning of the language used by Mao. One example occurs in Volume VI of the Selected Works. The English translation of one passage uses an expletive as an adjective for the Guomindang government. Next to this phrase, the translator has provided the Wade–Giles transliteration of the original Chinese, potentially as an attempt to justify this singular use of profane language in the book (it is the only use of an expletive in any of the 19 volumes of Mao’s works covered in this book’s analysis). The translation reads: ‘Guomindang ti tao cheng-fu’ (which would be ‘Guó mín dǎng Di dao zhèng fǔ’ in Pinyin or 國民黨 地道 政府 in traditional Mandarin), but in fact, a literal translation of the Mandarin would be closer to ‘the typical Guomindang government’ (presumably intended sarcastically) (Mao 1990c, Work #13). The translator has attempted to capture the intended meaning of Mao’s statement,

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but in doing so has deviated from the precise meaning of Mao’s exact words. There are two answers to this concern. The first is that most of Mao’s readers outside of China would have read the English rather than Mandarin translations of his works, meaning that everyone—insurgents, incumbents, and scholars—would have been exposed to the same material. Consequently, it is the English translations of Mao’s works, flaws and all, which have come to characterise most of the world’s perspectives about Mao’s principles. The second is that, while some minor fluctuations from the original Mandarin may have occurred, there is a limit to how much a translator could unintentionally deviate from the real meaning. It is true that the Mandarin symbol 戰 (‘Zhàn’ in pinyin) could be translated as ‘to fight’, ‘fight’, ‘war’, or ‘battle’, but it could not be translated as ‘to laugh.’ Even allowing for some minor variances between how translators converted Mao’s Mandarin into English, the core meaning of his teachings cannot have been changed beyond a certain point. A fifth critique could be to point out that some of Mao’s works were more widely read than others and should be given a higher priority when assessed. Some of Mao’s works were indeed more broadly read, such as his 1937 treatise Basic Tactics, which enjoyed widespread circulation in the West (Greene 1962, vii). There are several responses to this. The first is that Mao’s most prominent works have included in the analysis—indeed, many have been cited quite regularly because of their connection with insurgency themes—and have themselves yielded new insights. The extent to which Mao regarded guerrilla warfare as secondary to regular warfare within works such as On Guerrilla War has, for example, often been overlooked. The second response is that all of the works examined in this analysis, regardless of their fame (or lack thereof), have enjoyed ­widespread circulation. Volumes I to V of the Selected Works were published from 1960 to 1977, the Collected Works were all published in 1978 and volumes VI to IX of the Selected Works were published in the 1990s. Many of the works were previously available as parts of other compilations. All 19 volumes analysed here are now available for free on the Internet. A third response is that the lesser known works of Mao have previously been used by scholars when describing Mao’s teachings, but hitherto this has been done in an arbitrary and unrepresentative fashion. The analysis in this chapter is actually rectifying the problem by appraising every work in an equal, representative, and impartial way. A fourth response is that the works are self-selecting: Those with many strong insurgency themes will

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feature frequently in the analysis, those which have few will not. Finally, the inclusion of lesser known works is actually one of the rationales behind this book: The overdependence of scholars on the better-known works has contributed to erroneous perceptions about Mao’s true beliefs about insurgent warfare. Only by studying the full range of Mao’s recorded writings, speeches, conference proceedings, and other documents, not simply the most famous texts, is it possible to truly understand Mao’s teachings on this topic.

Additional Analysis The analysis raises two challenging questions. The first question is, why did Mao sometimes present varied and contrasting opinions for some of these themes? Was he really insufficiently intelligent to maintain a clear and consistent line when writing his thoughts and recommendations? There may be some truth in such a claim: Mao was certainly not the military genius that many of his admirers suggest. But the real answer probably draws from the fact that, unlike Clausewitz or Lawrence, Mao was not writing his treatises purely to improve our understanding of war or record the lessons of earlier campaigns. He may have entertained these objectives, but they were parallel and probably subordinate to waging an insurgency. Furthermore, Mao was engaged in an internal power struggle with other Communist Party members as they jostled for position in the party (Montefiore 2008, 228). To outmanoeuvre them, he was incredibly flexible in his writings, tailoring his line to fit whichever perspective would best advance his rise within the Party. In this respect, his behaviour mirrored that of the other great Communist acrobat, Stalin, who leapt from one side of the political spectrum to the other in order to outmanoeuvre political opponents such as Trotsky and Zinoviev (Montefiore 2008, 204). One example of Mao shifting his position for political ends can be seen by looking at his arguments on the urban versus rural dilemma in the late 1920s and 1930s. Both the Soviet Union and his domestic party superiors advocated urban assaults and Mao must have known it would be political suicide to oppose them. Consequently, he endorsed the idea. Later, when these attempts failed, he played up his support for rural rebellion instead. When viewed through this lens, the fact that Mao changed direction so many times on some themes while hardly moving on others makes more sense. On politically contentious issues, Mao changed his perspectives

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r­apidly whenever an opportunity arose to raise his own position in the party and criticise his opponents. On less contentious issues, he felt no need to change his stance. Claiming to have the majority of the population on your side was, for instance, always going to be a good idea in a Communist movement, and so Mao never needed to change his position on the topic. For those themes with little relevance for his power struggle, such as the use of a three-phase military strategy, Mao saw little political gain in giving them much attention, so they featured less heavily than the more contentious themes. To what extent does this political fluidity challenge Mao’s credibility as a theorist? On one level, it does not. As a political actor operating in a callous and competitive environment, Mao can hardly be blamed for bending his theories to meet his political purposes. On another level, it does dilute his value. By failing to provide a clear set of teachings, Mao failed to create a lucid formula for insurrection that could be easily applied by later rebels. While it is possible to discern, as this chapter has done, the ways in which his contradictory comments combine together to create broadly defined recommendations, gaining this understanding has been no simple task. The difficulty of comprehending exactly what Mao intended his teachings on insurgency to be may have contributed to why his influence upon the character of future rebellions was limited. The second question which arises from the qualitative content analysis is, why do discrepancies exist between some of the academic perceptions about Mao’s teachings and the actual principles in his words? One explanation could be that the longitudinal stances Mao adopted over the duration of his life have been overshadowed by those adopted in his most famous works. This rationale is flawed, however, because the same discrepancies identified across Mao’s lifetime are also found in his most famous writings. In On Guerrilla Warfare, for example, Mao stresses that ‘regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare secondary’ and yet this has been generally overlooked by scholars (Mao 1965b, 79 and 229). A further explanation for the discrepancies could be that scholars have merged Mao’s teachings with his actions when developing their viewpoints regarding his beliefs about insurgency. But even a cursory comparison of established historical facts shows that this rationale would be problematic. It has been reasonably well established, for example, that the Communists were responsible for causing between 1.8 and 11.7 million civilian casualties in China from 1927 to 1949 (Valentino 2004, 88;

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Rummel 1991, 17). If the academic perspective regarding Mao’s teachings genuinely merged historical data with Mao’s own words, then it would be reasonable to expect that scholars would present Mao’s teachings as encouraging widespread killings. This has not been the case. A third explanation could be that scholars have not scrutinised the works of Mao to the same degree that they have probed the works of other major philosophers of war, such as Clausewitz and Lawrence. Instead, they have tended to accept hastily founded assumptions, forged during the early Cold War by scholars such as Katzenbach and Hanrahan, who had little access to historical resources on the topic and worked within a society where fear of Communism was paramount. Of the possible explanations this last seems most likely to be accurate.

Summary of Teachings This analysis has shown that there is no one single characteristic of insurgent warfare that can be used to define Mao’s recommendations for insurgent warfare. Instead, his formula must be understood as containing all of the categories and their contributing themes identified within this chapter (Table 2.1). This analysis has provided, for the first time, a comprehensive model of which principles of war can truly be considered as comprising Mao’s teachings on insurgency. This is in itself a significant achievement. The analysis has also helped to reshape assumptions about the extent to which Mao really endorsed or failed to support varying principles of insurgent warfare that have previously been connected with him. Understanding what Mao really said is important for efforts to gauge the extent to which he truly represented a new phenomenon in insurgent warfare and how much he really influenced subsequent insurgencies across the world. The net result of this chapter has been the creation of a clearer framework through which it will be possible to identify whether or not various insurgencies and theorists of insurgency—including those before Mao, Mao’s own insurgency and those which followed—exhibit tendencies that are similar to those formally endorsed by Mao. The next chapter begins this task by scrutinising past insurgencies and theorists to ascertain the extent to which the strategies later endorsed by Mao were already being used long before his rise to prominence.

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Table 2.1  Mao’s teachings on insurgency Category

Themes

Military

Regular warfare supported by irregular warfare Protracted warfare and three-phase strategy

Teaching

Regular warfare should be the primary arm of an insurgency, supplemented by irregular warfare An insurgency should be protracted and should use a three-stage strategy, but quick victories should be pursued whenever feasible Holding on to territory Territory should be held for as long as possible and retreats should only be sanctioned when no other options remain War in the countryside The countryside should be the primary focus of with urban elements the insurgency, but efforts to capture the cities should be made whenever possible Bases behind enemy lines Bases should be built behind enemy lines to force the enemy to fight on multiple fronts Politics Class warfare The overthrow of the upper classes by the lower classes is integral to an insurgency and is essential for its success Politicised warfare Political goals should be pursued, troops should be politically educated, and propaganda should be used against the enemy Centralised command and Power should mostly be centralised, but some some dispersed power dispersion of authority to lower ranks should be allowed as well Shadow government Rival political and statutory institutions should be built both in insurgent held territories and behind enemy lines Population Popular mobilisation The masses should be rallied behind the insurgency, but which groups are included should vary according to circumstances United Front Broad coalitions across the lower and middle classes should be crafted to combat common foes Courteous conduct Civilians should be treated benevolently, but revolutionary taxes and favourable treatment for insurgent fighters are acceptable Moderate violence Both individual and groups of civilian wrongdoers should be targeted by violence, but indiscriminate terrorism is prohibited Resources Feeding off the enemy Arms, equipment, supplies, other war materials, and personnel should be stolen from the enemy Self-reliance and foreign Domestic industry and agriculture should be aid built up in order to obtain self-sufficiency, but foreign should also be sought External forces The actions of external forces should be manipulated for domestic benefit

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Appendix: Expanded Methodology In order to carry out a reliable, valid, and rigorous quantitative content analysis, the book adopted the eight-stage process outlined by Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), as follows: . Prepare the data. 1 2. Define the unit of analysis. 3. Develop categories and a coding scheme. 4. Test the coding scheme on a sample of text. 5. Code all of the text. 6. Assess coding consistency. 7. Draw conclusions from the coded data. 8. Report methods and findings. Prepare the Data The data selected will be the Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung and the Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. These volumes have been selected because they contain the largest collections of works by Mao available and comprise the overwhelming majority of his writing on insurgencies. Volumes I to V of the Selected Works were published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking. Volumes VI to IX were published by Kranti Publications, Secunderabad, and Sramikavarga Prachuranalu, Hyderabad. The entire Collected Works were published by the US Government’s Joint Publications Research Service. Define the Unit of Analysis The units of analysis (the portions of text that will be considered during the qualitative content analysis and from which the units of coding will be drawn) will be the individual works contained within each of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung and the Collected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. The units of coding (the portion of each unit of analysis that will be examined for categories and subcategories) will also be the individual works within these two collections. This represents an academically recognised approach that has been adopted here in order to trace the differences that exist between the different works themselves and trace the development of Mao’s ­positions throughout his writings (Schreier 2012, 131–132). Units of context (those elements of surrounding portions of text within the data

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being used and/or general background knowledge) will be unlimited— Mao was widely read, able to receive news through radio transmissions and had many spies in enemy camps—and would have been familiar with his own work. The only exception is that only those texts or events that occurred prior to each work may be included: Mao could not see into the future. The footnotes in each volume represent later annotations made by party officials to supply additional context, further commentary, and ‘correct’ previous positions. These portions of the text have been disregarded because they are typically written many years after the original works and are influenced by hindsight and later policy changes. To include them would detract from the ability of the content analysis to identify which changes occurred with Mao’s written positions regarding insurgency throughout his life. Develop Categories and a Coding Scheme Categories and subcategories have been developed deductively, drawing from a range of established perceptions of what characterises and defines Mao within the academic literature, as outlined in Chap. 2. Through these two processes, 32 separate categories were generated. Each theme of Maoism has been broken into separate positive and negative categories. This is because it is possible for Mao to have made both positive and negative references to a particular element of warfare within a text, so that positive and negative references cannot be seen as mutually exclusive. The full list of categories and subcategories for the analysis are listed further down in this section of the appendix. For each category, there exist three subcategories: mild, firm, and instructional. These levels are differentiated by the following rules: • Mild: brief or implicit references are made to support the category or refute its anti-thesis. This includes passing references or short statements with little explanation. Example 1: Mildly in Favour of Popular Mobilisation With the support of the masses, we have issued economic construction bonds to the value of three million Yuan in order to develop state enterprise and assist the co-operatives. Such reliance on the strength of the masses is the only possible way to solve the problem of funds for economic construction at this time. (Mao 1965a, 144)

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Example 2: Mildly in Favour of a United Front If Chiang can clean up the dirt created by the Kuomintang’s reactionary policy over the past ten years, thoroughly correct his fundamental errors of compromise in foreign affairs and of civil war and oppression at home, immediately join the anti-Japanese front uniting all parties and groups and really take the military and political measures that can save the nation, then of course the Communist Party will support him. (Mao 1965a, 257–258)

• Firm: strong reference, overt endorsement or repeated mentions are made to support this category or refute its anti-thesis. Example 1: Firmly in Favour of Popular Mobilisation First, we have decided on the line of our Party, which is boldly to mobilise the masses and expand the people’s forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-democratic China. (Mao 1965c, 238)

Example 2: Firmly in Favour of Politicised Military We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory. (Mao 1965c, 238)

• Instructional: specific instructions or in-depth explanations are offered regarding the implementation of this category or the refutation of its anti-thesis. Example 1: Instructions in Favour of a United Front China’s democratic revolution depends on definite social forces for its accomplishment. These social forces are the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the progressive section of the bourgeoisie, that is, the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen, with the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary forces and the workers as the class which leads the revolution. It is impossible to accomplish the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution without these basic revolutionary forces and without the leadership of the

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­ orking class. Today, the principal enemies of the revolution are the Japanese w imperialists and the Chinese traitors, and the fundamental policy in the revolution is the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, consisting of all workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen who are against Japanese aggression. Final victory in the War of Resistance will be won when this united front is greatly consolidated and developed. (Mao 1965b, 238)

Example 2: Instructions in Favour of Courteous Conduct I earnestly suggest to this congress that we pay close attention to the well-­ being of the masses, from the problems of land and labour to those of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt. The women want to learn ploughing and harrowing. Whom can we get to teach them? The children want to go to school. Have we set up primary schools? The wooden bridge over there is too narrow and people may fall off. Should we not repair it? Many people suffer from boils and other ailments. What are we going to do about it? All such problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed on our agenda. We should discuss them, adopt and carry out decisions and check up on the results. We should convince the masses that we represent their interests, that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs … we must be with them, arouse their enthusiasm and initiative, be concerned with their well-being, work earnestly and sincerely in their interests and solve all their problems of production and everyday life—the problems of salt, rice, housing, clothing, childbirth, etc. (Mao 1965b, 147)

Test the Coding Scheme on a Sample of Text In order to ensure the reliability of the coding framework, two complementary methods were employed (Schreier 2012, 166–167). A sample of text was coded by the author as primary coder, and then two weeks later recoded from a fresh start. The two coding results were compared and any differences identified and reconciled. After this had been carried out, a group of second coders—independent to the project—with appropriate skill sets and analytical knowledge were asked to code selected portions of text, using the same coding rules. The coding results were again compared and any differences identified and reconciled. As these reliability tests showed that the coding results were within acceptably close proximity to one another, it was deemed that consistency was sufficiently high for the coding scheme to be considered scientifically reliable.

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Code All of the Text The code was then systematically and comprehensively applied to all of the texts. The coding framework will be referred to consistently throughout to ensure that the meanings of the codes are applied appropriately and accurately throughout, without losing sight of their meaning. The data was captured by annotations written in the margins of the text each time a theme was identified, with the summary scores annotated on the title page of each work. The summary scores were then inputted into a coding sheet, which has been included in the Results section. Assess the Coding Consistency Randomly selected samples from different parts of the text were recoded to confirm consistency of coding. This process confirmed that coding consistency had indeed been applied appropriately throughout. Draw Conclusions from the Data Conclusions were drawn based on the coding completed. These have been recorded in the main body of this thesis. Report the Methods and Findings The method and findings have been reported in the main body of this thesis. A number of potential critiques exist regarding the use of qualitative content analysis as a technique. The book briefly outlines and rebuts three of these critiques here. One critique of qualitative content analysis suggests that quantitative content analysis can, through its complex statistical analysis of bodies of text, more systematically and reliably describe the meaning of a text than qualitative content analysis. This makes the use of qualitative content analysis unnecessary and comparatively unproductive. Kracauer (1952, 631) provides three rebuttals to this point of view: 1. One-sided reliance on quantitative content analysis may lead to a neglect of qualitative explorations, thus reducing the accuracy of analysis.

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2. The assumptions underlying quantitative analysis tend to preclude a judicious appraisal of the important role which qualitative considerations may play in communications research. Hence the need for theoretical reorientation. 3. The potentialities of communications research can be developed only if, as the result of such a reorientation, the emphasis is shifted from quantitative to qualitative procedures. A second critique of qualitative content analysis argues that, because coding is conducted by a human researcher rather than computer software, the potential for problems with reliability is greater. This critique has some merit to it, as it is possible a human may be prone to subjectivity when reading through a text, including bringing pre-existing biases with them into the process that skew their reading of the text in a way that a computer would not. In order to mitigate this problem, the field of qualitative content analysis has stressed the importance of using multiple coders for test portions of text (Schreier 2012, 16). By ensuring that the methods being used to derive meaning from the text, as well as the interpretation of this meaning, are replicated by more than one coder, it is possible to create a considerably higher level of reliability than would be generated if no portions of the text were double coded. For this qualitative content analysis of Mao’s works, a substantial portion of text was coded by both the primary researcher and four secondary coders. The closeness between the results generated by the primary researcher and secondary coders was sufficiently high to demonstrate strong levels of reliability in the text, thus alleviating this potential challenge. A third critique asserts that, because qualitative content analysis often generates numerical data, it is really a quantitative rather than qualitative research method. However, while it is true that qualitative content analysis does often produce numerical data—and in the appraisal of Mao conducted here it has generated considerable numerical data—this numerical data can be used as much or as little as is appropriate for reporting the results. This differentiates the method from quantitative research techniques, which tend to require the numerical information to act as the driving force for the entire analysis, including when reporting the results (Schreier 2012, 36). Qualitative content analysis gives the power to the researcher to decide how to best report the findings of their research in appropriate and meaningful ways. In contrast, quantitative content a­ nalysis

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demands a more pre-set, less flexible reporting structure, in which the numbers rather than the researcher decide on how the results will be presented. References Kracauer, Sigfried. 1952. The Challenge of Quantitative Analysis. The Public Opinion Quarterly 16(4): 631–642. Mao Tse-tung. 1965a. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. I.  Peking: Foreign Languages Press. Mao Tse-tung. 1965b. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. II.  Peking: Foreign Languages Press. Mao Tse-tung. 1965c. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. III.  Peking: Foreign Languages Press. Schreier, Margrit. 2012. Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Zhang, Yan, and Barbara Wildemuth. 2009. Qualitative analysis of content. In Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library, ed. Barbara Wildemuth, 308–319. Westport: Libraries Unlimited.

References Alexander, Bevin. 1995. The Future of Warfare. London: W.  W. Norton & Company Ltd. Berelson, Bernard. 1952. Content Analysis in Communication Research. New York: Hafner Press. Ch’en, Jerome. 1970. Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography. London: Oxford University Press. Cogley, William L. 1977. A New Look at People’s War. Air University Review, July–August. http://airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1977/ jul-aug/cogley.html. Accessed 21 Aug 2013. de Lee, Nigel. 1985. Southeast Asia: The Impact of Mao Tse-tung. In Guerrilla Warfare, ed. John Pimlott, 30–65. London: Bison Books Ltd. Deady, Timothy K. 2005. Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1898–1902. Parameters 35 (1): 53–68. Elek, Deborah E. 1994. Unconventional Warfare and Principles of War. Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Elo, Satu, and Helvi Kyngäs. 2008. The Qualitative Content Analysis Process. Journal of Advanced Nursing 62 (1): 107–115.

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Friedman, Edward. 1970. Neither Mao Nor Che: The Practical Evolution of Revolutionary Theory. A Comment on J. Moreno’s ‘Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 12 (2): 134–139. Fuller, Francis. 1958. Mao Tse-tung: Military Thinker. Military Affairs 22 (3): 139–145. Garthoff, Raymond L. 1962. Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy. Foreign Affairs 40 (4): 566. Greene, T.N. 1962. Introduction. In The Guerrilla – And How to Fight Him, ed. T.N. Greene, v–vii. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Hammes, Thomas X. 2006. Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks. Military Review 86 (4): 18–26. Harkavy, Robert E., and Stephanie Neuman. 2001. Warfare and the Third World. New York: Palgrave. Haswell, Jock. 1973. Citizen Armies. London: Peter Davies Ltd. Joes, Anthony James. 1986. From the Barrel of a Gun. London: Pergamon-­ Brassey’s International Defence. Katzenbach, Edward, and Gene Hanrahan. 1962. The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung. In Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Warfare Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka, 131–146. London: Collier-Macmillan Limited. Katzenbach, E.L., Jr. 1962. Time, Space and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung. In The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him: Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette, ed. T.N. Greene, 11–21. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Publisher. Kilcullen, David. 2009. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kiras, James. 2008. Irregular Warfare. In Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. David Jordan, James Kiras, David Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck, and C. Dale Walton, 224–291. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kracauer, Sigfried. 1952. The Challenge of Quantitative Analysis. The Public Opinion Quarterly 16 (4): 631–642. Krishna, Ashok. 1997. Insurgency in the Contemporary World Some Theoretical Aspects (Part II). Strategic Analysis 21 (9): 1317–1340. http://www.idsaindia.org/an-dec-6.html. Accessed 10 Sept 2013. Laqueur, Walter. 1976. Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Mackinlay, John. 2009. The Insurgency Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden. London: C. Hurst & Co. Mao Tse-tung. 1961. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. IV.  Peking: Foreign Languages Press. ———. 1965a. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. I. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

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———. 1965b. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. II. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. ———. 1965c. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. III. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. ———. 1975a. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. I.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975b. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. II.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975c. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. III.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975d. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. IV.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975e. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. V.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975f. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. VI.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975g. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. VII. Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975h. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. VIII. Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975i. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. IX.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975j. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. X.  Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1977. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. V. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. ———. 1990a. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. VIII.  Secunderabad/ Hyderabad: Kranti Publications and Sramikavarga. ———. 1990b. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. VII.  Secunderabad/ Hyderabad: Kranti Publications and Sramikavarga. ———. 1990c. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. VI. Secunderabad/Hyderabad: Kranti Publications and Sramikavarga. Marks, Thomas A. 2004. Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions? Small Wars & Insurgencies 15 (1): 107–126. ———. 2009. Mao Tse-tung and the Search for 21st Century Counterinsurgency. CTC Sentinel 2 (10): 17–20. Martin, Gus. 2013. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues. London: Sage. McCormick, Gordon H. 1999. People’s Wars. In Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II, ed. James Ciment and Kenneth Hill, 23–34. New York: Sharpe Reference. Montefiore, Simon Sebag. 2008. Monsters: History’s Most Evil Men and Women. London: Quercus.

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O’Neill, Bard E. 1990. Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Dulles: Brassey’s Inc. Paret, Peter. 1986. Clausewitz. In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 186–216. Englewood Cliffs: Princeton University Press. Pelli, Frank D. 1990. Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in Vietnam. Unpublished paper Quantico: USMC Command and Staff College. Potgieter, Jakkie. 2000. Taking Aid from the Devil himself’ UNITA’s Support Structures. In Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, 255–273. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Pustay, John S. 1965. Counterinsurgency Warfare. London: Collier-Macmillan Limited. Rees, David. 1981. China 1946–49: Red Star in the East. In War in Peace: An Analysis of Warfare since 1945, ed. Robert Thompson, 1–15. London: Orbis Publishing. Rooney, David. 2004. Guerrilla: Insurgents, Patriots and Terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden. London: Brasseys. Rummel, R.J. 1991. China’s Bloody Century. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Schreier, Margrit. 2012. Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Shy, John. 1986. Jomini. In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 143–185. Englewood Cliffs: Princeton University Press. Smith, Rupert. 2007. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Stubbs, Richard. 2010. From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948–1960. In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, 101–118. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. Tanham, George. 1962. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Townshend, Charles. 1988. Guerrilla War. In The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations That Changed the Course of History, ed. Richard Holmes, 250–265. London: The Penguin Group. Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. London: Cornell University Press. van Creveld, Martin. 2000. The Art of War: War and Military Thought. London: Cassell & Co. Willmott, Ned, and John Pimlott. 1979. Strategy and Tactics of War. London: Marshall Cavendish Limited. Zhang, Yan, and Barbara Wildemuth. 2009. Qualitative Analysis of Content. In Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library, ed. Barbara Wildemuth, 308–319. Westport: Libraries Unlimited.

CHAPTER 3

The Unoriginal Mao

Prior Insurgencies and Theorists Mao has often been associated as either creating modern insurgency or transforming past methods of rebellion into a virulent new model. Yet, this attribution has no basis in reality. The teachings of Mao were not only used countless times before him, but also recorded in highly influential and widely read texts. Part of the reason for this is that many of the approaches to waging an insurgency that Mao recommended were ideas that had always been readily apparent as options with clear appeal for rebel groups to adopt, regardless of when in history and where in the world they were fighting their insurrection. The benefits of rallying the population behind an insurrection are, for example, not desperately challenging to realise and have proved obvious for past insurgent leaders as a result. Some of these include an awareness that a larger support base leads to more potential recruits, an increased ability to generate and obtain resources, and a sympathetic human environment in which they can hide and draw intelligence, as well as the ability to deprive the enemy from these benefits. They may also possess a basic desire to be popular and, in some cases, have adopted a cause that resonates with the public as a whole. It is unsurprising, therefore, that many uprisings in history, including those in China such as the Taiping Rebellion, have been popularly supported. Similarly, the merits of waging a protracted war have obvious benefits and these were evident to prior rebel leaders as well. These include the fact that a rebellious movement is © The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5_3

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often weaker than their enemy at the outset of the insurrection, making the idea of a fast confrontation against their opponent both unwise and unappealing. Even the use of a three-phase plan, of the kind that Mao mapped out, is fairly intuitive and had been figured out by past insurgent leaders as well. In his uprising against England, for example, the Scottish rebel Robert the Bruce began his campaign by rallying troops to his cause, continued by conducting a prolonged hybrid campaign of guerrilla and regular warfare, and culminated with a major conventional battle at Bannockburn (Ellis 1995, 47–49). Some scholars have argued that the significance of these and other prior conflicts can be rebutted on the basis that Mao was the first to combine all of these aspects of warfare in a single coherent plan of action. This claim is flawed, however, because multiple insurgencies before Mao in history contained every single thread of insurgency that Mao later outlined in his teachings. Two examples are discussed in this chapter: the Maccabean Revolt and the American Revolutionary War. Similarly, a range of other writers have outlined all of the methods of rebellion discussed by Mao in his works, including Vladimir Lenin who is also discussed in this chapter. Finally, other scholars have claimed that Mao’s novelty lay not in the principles of insurgency that he described, but rather from his allegedly unique status as a joint theoretician and practitioner of insurgency. Yet, this too is incorrect because again there have been numerous such characters in the history of rebellion, including Vladimir Lenin; Giuseppe Garibaldi, the colourful Italian who penned several autobiographical accounts of his life as a freedom fighter across the world; Michael Collins, the Irish revolutionary hero who wrote copiously about his experiences of leading a rebellion against the English; and T. E. Lawrence, the eccentric British officer who organised a resistance movement in the Middle East against the Ottoman Turks and who provided an account of his actions in several best-selling books (Table 3.1).



Maccabean Revolt

The Maccabean Revolt included all the same elements and methods of insurgency that Mao outlined in his teachings over 2000 years later. This uprising, which lasted between 168 B.C. and 142 B.C. in Judea (roughly modern Israel), pitched the forces of the occupying Seleucid Empire against indigenous rebels led by Judah Maccabee and his brothers. In 175 B.C., the Seleucid ruler Antiochus IV decided to guarantee the loy-

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Table 3.1  Examples of Maoist traits in pre-Mao history Category

Themes

Military

Regular warfare supported by irregular warfare Protracted warfare and three-phase strategy

Politics

Joan of Arc’s rebellion (fifteenth century) American Civil War The Wars of King David Rebellion of Robert the Bruce Holding on to territory Jewish Revolt against Rome Dutch Revolt War in the countryside with urban elements Bases behind enemy lines

Flanders Peasant Revolt Boer War Welsh Rebellion Caste War of Yucatán

Class warfare

Spartacus Rebellion Mexican Revolution

Politicised warfare

French Revolution Taiping Rebellion Russian resistance to Napoleon Russian Civil War Revolutions of 1848–1849 Irish War of Independence

Centralised command and some dispersed power Shadow government

Population

Popular mobilisation

United Front

Resources

Conflict examples

Vendee Uprising Spanish Resistance against Napoleon Vendee Uprising Irish War of Independence Vendee Uprising Ming Dynasty uprising Jacquerie Uprising English Peasant Revolt Taiping Rebellion East African front

Theorist examples Denis Davidov J. B. Schels Ludwik Mieroslawski Jean Jaures Titus Flavius Josephus Friedrich Schiller T. H. C. Frankland Charles Callwell Wojciech Chrzanowski T. E. Lawrence Louis Auguste Blanqui Karl Marx Johann von Ewald Enrico Gentilini Captain Devaureix Carlo Bianco Charles Arkoll Boulton Michael Collins J. M. Rudolph Karol Stolzman

Michael Collins Guglielmo Pepe Courteous conduct Robin Hood Karl von Decker Moderate violence Carlo Bianco Karl Marx Feeding off the enemy Gerhard Scharhorst Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck Self-reliance and foreign Easter Rising Sun Yat-sen aid Rif Rebellion Abd-el-Krim External forces Vendee Uprising Herodotus Greek War of Independence Aguinaldo

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alty of the province by imposing Greek rites on to the population. This caused widespread unhappiness and led to a revolt in Jerusalem. Enraged by this defiance, Antiochus ordered the rebellion suppressed, resulting in the occupation of Jerusalem and desecration of its temple, a prohibition on Jewish religion and culture, and the deployment of troops to the countryside to impose the new laws (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 265–267). The uprising broke out when a rural Jewish priest called Mattathias refused orders to sacrifice a pig and led the local villagers into the hills. Here they organised as a guerrilla group, while planning their revolt. Over the next few years—during which time Mattathias was replaced by his son, Judah— the rebels gradually increased the scale of their guerrilla activities, until they had effectively gained control over the entire countryside. This brought about a succession of large-scale invasions by Seleucid conventional forces; each was allowed to penetrate deep into the province before being ambushed and repulsed (Szabo 1997, 16–20). An alliance signed between the Maccabees and the Romans brought about an even larger-­ scale invasion by the Seleucids and led to Judah’s death. His place was taken by his brother Jonathan, who again rallied the Judean people to his side. After a further 14 years of insurgency, a switch of leadership to Simeon, and several major conventional victories, the Maccabees forced the Seleucids to cede the region to them. Although none of the leaders of the Maccabean Revolt wrote about the conflict directly, it was documented within the Biblical books 1 Maccabees and 2 Maccabees. These books were labelled as apocryphal by the Protestants, but were retained by the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. This meant that hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people would have been exposed to writings about the conflict throughout history and many would have viewed the descriptions as the sacred word of God. A stronger endorsement of the methods outlined could scarcely have been forthcoming. Nor were these sparse accounts, as shown by the battle of Emmaus. In the words of one scholar, ‘an account of the battle was preserved in 1 Maccabees, containing information so detailed that modern scholars have speculated that the author may have participated in the battle’ (van Creveld 2008, 155). The events of the campaign were also written about later in the ancient era, with Flavius Josephus’s Jewish Antiquities delving particularly intensely into the details of the war. Classical works such as this remained the mainstay of Western military thought throughout medieval and renaissance history and beyond, providing a further outlet for the Maccabean Revolt to have exerted influence upon later rebellions. This

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case study will go through the different Maoist traits and explain how each manifested itself within this conflict. Military Even though Judah’s followers began their existence as an irregular force, Judah increasingly moulded them into a regular force as the rebellion continued, although he continued to maintain irregular forces. This showed the same kind of commitment to the use of regular warfare as the primary method of warfare, supported by irregular fighting, that Mao would later describe. As two recent modern historians note, after defeating two Seleucid armies in 166 and 165 B.C., the Maccabee leader ‘began to organise his army into sub-units, which bear a remarkable resemblance to those used in modern armies. He divided his force into units equivalent to battalions, numbering 1000 men each. These in turn were sub-divided into company-like units of 100 men each. Each of these was divided into platoon-­like units of 50 men each, while each platoon was divided into five section-like units of 10 men each’ (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 277). The belief in the ultimate centrality of regular warfare was demonstrated at the Battle of Beth-Zechariah where the Maccabees chose to confront another invading Seleucid army using an army that ‘was composed mainly of heavy and semi-heavy infantry, forming a Jewish phalanx’ in a single decisive battle, which they lost (Healy 1989, 176; Keller 1957, 319). Although regular warfare was always viewed with the highest regard, particularly once the insurgency had become well established, the Maccabees continued to use guerrilla warfare throughout the conflict (Szabo 1997, 14–29). A quote from Maccabees 2, is illustrative: ‘He [Judas] attacked the quarters of the king by night, with the strongest chosen young men, and he slew four thousand men in the camp, and the greatest of the elephants, along with those who would have been positioned on them. And so, having filled the camp of his enemies with the greatest fear and disturbance, they went away with good success’ (2 Macc. 13:15–17). The Maccabean Revolt was a protracted affair that lasted many decades. It also underwent three phases, which bore remarkable similarities with the models that Mao suggested over two millennia later. During the first phase, the Maccabean central core retreated into the countryside to train, recruit new members, and organise their bases. Once their forces had grown large enough in number and disciplined enough in military tactics, they embarked upon a campaign of incrementally more aggressive guer-

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rilla offensives, which targeted and ambushed Seleucid military patrols. When these activities instigated retaliatory invasions, Judah continued to utilise guerrilla tactics, albeit on a larger scale, to first weaken and then defeat these incursions. Towards the end of the conflict, first Judah and then Jonathan engaged in larger, conventional battles. When these failed, the Maccabees did not allow their uprising to collapse, but returned to the guerrilla-centric approach that they had followed earlier (Szabo 1997, 1 and 23). The escalation to mobile warfare was in the end fully achieved, with significant conventional victories being secured. The conflict was extremely protracted, spanning 25  years from 167  B.C. to 142 B.C., a length of time that was nearly identical to Mao’s 23-year insurgency from 1926 to 1949 (Keller 1957, 315–317). While the Maccabees used hit-and-run tactics during their war, like Mao they also valued the defence of fixed positions. One example happened in 162  B.C. when Judah placed a large force in Jerusalem with instructions to hold the city against an invading Seleucid army. They were so determined to defend this position that they hung on until the bitter end and were only saved from starvation or surrender because the Seleucid leader was obliged to break the siege to deal with a rival contender to his throne (Rooney 2004, 17; Ellis 1995, 19). Another example occurred two years later when, after being confronted by a massive Seleucid horde, Judah decided it would be better to stand and fight against impossible odds than withdraw, because the former would inspire his countrymen to resist the Romans whereas the latter would undermine their morale. This he did, resulting in his own death and the destruction of his army (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 295–296). In a similar way to Mao, the Maccabees favoured the countryside as the dominant arena for their conflict, but maintained a definite secondary interest in the cities. After initiating their insurrection, the Maccabees retreated into the countryside in order to develop their insurgent organisation within relative safety, away from Seleucid strongholds in the cities. Once they began expanding their operations, they maintained their rural focus by avoiding major cities and enticing Seleucid patrols deep into rugged terrain and ambushing them there (Szabo 1997). The extent of this focus was shown particularly well after the first round of successes during the conflict, in which the Maccabees managed to secure possession of the entire country, with the exception of Jerusalem, which they encircled. Recognising that they had been surrounded, the Seleucid garrison within the city was compelled to send for help (Rooney 2004, 11–12). Despite

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this predominantly rural focus, the Maccabees never forgot the cities and, when opportunities presented themselves, they made efforts to capture or harass them (Ellis 1995, 19). During the early days of the insurrection, the Maccabees established bases in the hills behind the enemy lines. These provided rugged defensive terrain while also allowing for easy access to the villages under the nominal control of the Seleucid forces (Ellis 1995, 15). As time passed, the territory controlled by the insurgents was expanded outwards, until their enemies were the ones encircled, not the other way around (Ellis 1995, 16). This kind of approach, which was returned to and repeated throughout the rebellion, represented the same kind of strategy of building bases behind enemy lines that Mao would advocate in his twentieth-century treatises. Politics While the insurgency was fought primarily between the Maccabees and the Seleucids, there nonetheless existed within Jewish society significant cleavages between classes. The upper echelons of society had, for the large part, accepted Hellenistic laws and customs, and were at the forefront of those Jews who collaborated with the Seleucids (Szabo 1997, 8). The larger, and often impoverished, peasantry on the other hand, were generally in favour of the insurgents and provided them with passive and active support (Ellis 1995, 20). This led the conflict to take on a distinctly class warfare flavour, similar to that promoted in Mao’s later writings. The Maccabees solidified this phenomenon by providing aid to the less fortunate and impoverished people within Jewish society (2 Macc. 8:28–30). The Maccabees pursued a clear political goal from the outset: to rid the country of its Seleucid occupiers, as well as to restore the rights of the Jewish people to practise their religion and enjoy their culture (Healy 1989, 155–156; Macc. 2:27; Keller 1957, 316). Yet, the political aspects of the conflict went further than just these two goals and throughout the insurgency the movement’s leaders indoctrinated both the forces who served under them and the wider population. The creed of Judaism was reinforced prior to major battles, with the leaders reassuring their troops that the outcome of the conflict was based on the support of God (Josephus 2006, 517). Consequently, Maccabean fighters went into battle with an almost fanatical belief in the ideology for which they fought (Szabo 1997, 18). Similarly, the Maccabees made sure that the population were always made aware of their political goals and used the allure of their cause to

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help rally popular support (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 267–269). This all echoed Mao’s future recommendations about the benefits of politicising insurgent warfare at both strategic and tactical levels. Like Mao, the Maccabees adopted a command system that was heavily centralised but also devolved power down the hierarchy. At the top of the system, power was tightly controlled by Mattathias and his sons, which created a unified command centre that could be relied upon due to the familial bonds and shared devotion to the cause. Each of the sons who formed part of this command group was placed in charge of key elements of the insurgent machinery (Szabo 1997, 20). Succession of the leadership was handled fluidly from father to son and then brother to brother, a system which prevented the breakdown of order when important figures were killed. The effectiveness of this command structure was demonstrated by the sophistication of Judah’s operations to liberate Jewish communities within the outskirts of Judea and neighbouring areas. During these campaigns, the insurgents conducted simultaneous operations, with multiple forces operating autonomously, but all reporting to the central leadership (Szabo 1997, 20–21). The command structure was not, however, limited to an efficient mechanism at the top ranks of the insurgency, but also devolved power to the lower levels of the system, without losing overall control. Rooney (2004, 11) explains how during the early days of the rebellion the rebels operated with a strong central command that also devolved some power to its lower ranks: The wild hill country of Gophna proved an ideal base, and hundreds of young men were trained there, and then returned to their own villages, where a cell would be established under a commander. Every volunteer became a trained observer and passed details of all enemy troop movements to the headquarters in Gophna.

From the earliest days of the rebellion, the Maccabees also set about establishing their own government, foretelling Mao’s teachings on shadow governance. This included developing the basic tendrils of their regime, placing at its heart the values of Judaism and creating such elements of governmental power as intelligence networks and systems for village militia (Ellis 1995, 10). As the insurgents expanded their territory, they were able to place more areas of the countryside under their effective control, and provide these new areas with their conceptions of law and justice (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 269). Following the major

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defeats of the Seleucid generals Nicanor and Timothy, the Maccabees liberated all of the major population hubs across the country and even reoccupied Jerusalem (except for its citadel). While in Jerusalem, they demolished the bastions of foreign rule, including pagan altars and shrines, and established their own altars in their place. At a national level, they threw out the anti-Jewish edicts of Antiochus IV, restored Mosaic Law across the country, and proclaimed Judah as the leader of the Jewish nation (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 273). Population Popular mobilisation of the kind that Mao subsequently recommended formed a central plank of the Maccabee strategy, a fact that multiple modern historians have noted in their own analyses of the conflict (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 269; Szabo 1997, 15–16). While establishing their base in the hills, the Maccabees worked proactively to build contacts amongst the villages scattered across the countryside and to spread news of the revolt. Fighters were recruited from these villages, intelligence networks were set up, and generally the population was mobilised in a unified manner to opposing Seleucid forces (Rooney 2004, 11). This was part of a deliberate plan to cultivate and mobilise the population, an intention outlined by the initial leader of the rebellion, Mattathias, in his final instructions to his sons: ‘Let him [Judah] be the leader of your militia, and he will manage the war of the people. And you shall add to yourselves all who observe the law, and you shall claim the vindication of your people’ (1 Macc. 2:66–68). These practices were maintained throughout the insurgency, buttressed by propaganda that demonised the enemy and advertised Maccabean successes (Szabo 1997, 19). The bonds they built with the people provided them with a benevolent population who were willing to both hide their presence from the enemy and supply copious reporting about the movements and capabilities of the enemy forces in their midst (Rooney 2004, 17). As part of their efforts to rally as broad a support based as possible, the Maccabees embraced all segments of Jewish society that were willing to fight, regardless of class or tribe. The only real conditions for joining appear to have been a commitment to fight against those who opposed the Maccabee cause—including the Seleucids and their Jewish supporters— and a devotion to God. Given the political disunity present between the different groups within Judea at the time, this was central to the uprising. This policy was shown at the start of the conflict, when the Maccabees

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embraced the rival Hasidim group as members of their movement (1 Macc. 2:42; Szabo 1997, 13). While this process never took on a formal name, it still resembled Mao’s United Front approach. To further enhance their popular appeal, the Maccabees cultivated the population throughout the course of the uprising through the kind of courteous conduct that Mao would endorse two millennia later. Rooney explains how ‘the groups would visit a village by night, destroy any pagan altars, kill any collaborators, take on volunteers and arrange circumcisions when needed. These actions appear to have kept the solid support of the people in the villages’ (Rooney 2004, 11). They supplemented these actions with other benevolent activities. After winning a battle, for example, ‘they divided many spoils, making equal portions for the disabled, the fatherless, and the widows, and even the aged’ (2 Macc. 8:30). At first glance, the Maccabees appeared to have been fairly indiscriminate with their use of anti-civilian violence. Numerous references are made in the books of the Maccabees to the victorious insurgents putting the civilian populations of captured enemy towns to the sword. However, there is evidence to suggest that this may have been done on a partially discerning basis. This is best shown by the example of the treatment of three cities, described in 2 Maccabees. The book relates how the inhabitants of the enemy cities of Carnion and Ephron were struck down by the Maccabean forces, while the inhabitants of the city of Scythia were spared because the Jews who lived amongst its population testified that they had always treated them kindly. (2 Macc. 12:30–31). This emphasis on committing severe violence against selected groups, but minimising it against others, is reminiscent of the recommendations that Mao made about using broadly targeted violence to punish identified groups of wrongdoers but avoiding indiscriminate terrorism. Resources At the beginning of the conflict, the Maccabees possessed essentially no weapons at all. To rectify this situation, they tried to capture and steal arms and resources from their Seleucid foes. During the earlier phases of the conflict, the Maccabees achieved this by ambushing small Seleucid patrols seizing their arms (Rooney 2004, 11). Later in the conflict, major stocks of weapons were obtained after significant victories over larger Seleucid forces. The importance of this kind of activity for the rebellion is recorded in 1 Maccabees, which explains how the defeat of a large Seleucid force brought about a situation where the Jews were ‘strengthened by the weap-

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ons, and resources, and many spoils which they seized’ (1 Macc. 6:6). This represented a kind of ‘Maoist’ effort to feed off the enemy, 2000 years before Mao’s birth. The Maccabees made other efforts to achieve self-sustainability, including capturing weapon production industries, creating new sources of arms production, and using ersatz substitutes (Healy 1989, 165–166; Ellis 1995, 18; 1 Macc. 6:6). At the same time, they reached out repeatedly to foreign powers such as the Romans and the Spartans for outside support towards their cause (Josephus 2006, 529). During their campaign to liberate Galilee, the Maccabees also benefited from external aid and sanctuary from the Nabatean Arabs who lived east of the Transjordan (Szabo 1997, 20–21). The fact that the Maccabees built up their own infrastructure while also seeking external aid means that the Maccabees fit readily with the combined approach of self-sufficiency and foreign aid later outlined by Mao. In a similar fashion to Mao’s future teachings about manipulating external forces, the Maccabees were proactive in generating and exploiting external events during their struggle. They took advantage of the civil strife that accompanied successions between Seleucid monarchs several times, for example, by seizing temporary control over the entire country while the Seleucid armies withdrew to help one faction or another to pursue the dynastic crown (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 291–293; Szabo 1997, 29–31). They also approached the growing Roman republic and secured both diplomatic recognition and a peace treaty that threatened the power of the Seleucids (Herzog and Gichon 2006, 294). A similar effort to manipulate external forces was undertaken when the third leader of the revolt, Jonathan, accepted an alliance with Alexander Balas, who had risen as a rival ruler within the Seleucid dynasty. This alliance not only helped to remove the threat posed by the current ruler of Seleucia, but also enabled the Maccabees to wrangle numerous concessions from Alexander in exchange for their support (Szabo 1997, 29–30).

American Revolutionary War A second case example of a pre-Mao ‘Maoist insurgency’ is the American Revolutionary War, which ran from 1775 to 1783 and pitched insurgents from the Thirteen Colonies against the British government. A series of crises, including the Boston Tea Party in 1773 and the British Coercive Acts in 1774, culminated in a formal opening of hostilities between British soldiers and the Massachusetts militia at Lexington and Concord, followed

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by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Both sides secured some victories, but in 1777 the British suffered a major loss when one of their armies was forced to surrender at Saratoga. This American success helped persuade the French, Spanish, and Dutch to join the war in their favour, which led the British to jettison the north of the country and focus on the southern colonies instead. Initially, their forces fared well in this theatre of war, but after the French defeated a British fleet in the Atlantic, a combined American and French land force encircled another British Army at Yorktown and forced its surrender. The war continued for two more years, but with less vigour by the British, and culminated in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris. The American Revolutionary War has been one of the most celebrated conflicts in history and, like the Maccabean Uprising, involved the use of all of the strategies that Mao would later outline in his writings. A rich historiography addresses every aspect of the conflict, covering social, political, biographical, economic, military, and cultural angles. Noteworthy elements of the conflict have also been enshrined within the documents that underpin America’s political and legal systems (Castleden 2008, 266). The impact of the conflict for future rebellions was felt almost immediately, with the French Revolution ten years later being heavily influenced by the American one (Haswell 1973, 64–66; Millett et al. 2012, 79–80). This was as a result of the influence of American ideals upon those French soldiers who served as American allies in the latter part of the conflict; the upsurge of public opinion in France during the conflict in favour of the insurgency; and the plethora of American theoretical works that echoed the same sort of Republican and Liberal ideas as those suggested by European intellectuals such as Rousseau that were already being heatedly debated across Europe. The spread of American imperialism and influence over the next two centuries brought with it the ideals and history of their country, so that future insurgents abroad were often taught the same legends about the American Revolutionary War at school as American pupils in the United States. As one scholar summarises: Throughout the twentieth century—just as in Europe and Latin America in the nineteenth century—those seeking independence and revolutionary change have spoken of the American precedent and been influenced by it. Early in this century this element of American influence played its role in the formation of the Chinese Republic under Sun Yat-sen, in the rise of Indian nationalism under Gandhi and Nehru, and it indeed may not be amiss to

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recall that in 1920 a young Chinese named Mao Tse-tung wandered the countryside, carrying in his pocket a history of the American War of Independence. In the postwar period this use of the American precedent was intensified across the globe. Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian indebtedness to the American example in the revolt against the Dutch, Castro in Cuba quoted extensively from the declaration of independence to justify his rebellion from the Sierra Maestra, Cypriot rebels widely distributed in the United States a pamphlet comparing line by line the American Revolution with their own conflict against the British Empire, and a young African leader, in reference to the inspiration of the American precedent of revolution and nationalism, described America as ‘my second home’ (Lillibridge 2007, 179).

Military Despite the efforts of some recent scholars to portray the Revolutionary War as a predominantly irregular affair, in fact the insurgents focused foremost on creating and maintaining a regular army that carried out conventional activities (Tierney 2007, 50; Boot 2013, 68). Washington’s Continental Army was the most prominent but certainly not the only regular force. Most strikingly, the war was effectively ended following the surrender of a regular British Army to a regular American army at Yorktown (Kennedy 1988, 118). This is not to say that guerrilla activities did not play an important role: They undoubtedly did, particularly in the southern colonies, where irregular activities occurred on a large scale (Tierney 2007, 39–49; Boot 2013, 70–74. But even in the south, the most decisive battles—such as Cowpens and Guildford—were primarily conventional affairs waged between opposing regular forces (Laqueur 1976, 22). This presaged Mao’s writings about the primacy of regular warfare, supplemented by irregular warfare. Washington may have favoured regular warfare, in part because he hoped to create a conventional state, mirroring many of the characteristics of the British state against whom he fought, albeit with a radically different form of government from the norm of the time. This was resoundingly similar to Mao, who also sought to establish an independent state that bore many of the same trappings as those of more established countries, again with a radically different type of government. The American insurgency was also extended in length and followed a broadly three-phase structure of the kind Mao subsequently espoused. During the first phase, which ran from roughly 1765 to 1775, the insur-

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gent leaders organised themselves politically, while subverting the government’s authority through a mixture of propaganda, terrorism, and other means (Millett et al. 2012, 49). The second phase, which spanned from 1775 to 1776, was characterised by a surge of popularity by the people for the insurgency, including both the founding of the regular Continental Army and a number of militia actions (Millett et al. 2012, 61–62). The third phase, which lasted from 1776 to 1777 in the north and 1776 to 1781 in the south, involved the rebels fielding their own regular army in a series of engagements with the British, along with supporting irregular actions across the two conflict theatres (Millett et al. 2012, 63). This ultimately led to major victories over the Redcoats at first Saratoga and ultimately Yorktown (Smelser 1973, 321–330). Washington and his sub-commanders regularly held on to fixed positions, only withdrawing when there was no other choice, an approach that foretold Mao’s later writings on this issue. In 1776, for instance, the insurgents fortified and rigorously defended the city of Charleston (Peckham 1979, 34–36). When the insurgent armies did retreat, it was rarely because of cunning strategic planning, but instead because enemy attacks had escalated until the only options were retreat or surrender. Another example was the defence of New York in 1776, which Washington began by defending the city determinedly, losing 1500 men in exchange for just 300 enemy soldiers (Rose 2007, 74). He refused to retreat until the last minute and was only spared from encirclement because the British ­commander Sir William Howe chose to prepare for a siege rather than attack the shaken rebels directly (Gruber 1986, 23–26; Peckham 1979, 43; Rose 2007, 74). There were, of course, exceptions, with American militia regularly trading space for time on a tactical level while Nathanael Greene ran Cornwallis on a merry chase around the Carolinas and Virginia in 1780 (Brumwell 2009, 122–123; Rose 2007, 177–182). The norm, however, was for the rebels to hold territory whenever possible and only abandon this when forced. The rural regions of North America played a major role in the conflict because the uprising was spread across the principally rural countryside rather than one specific area (Alden 1969, 259–260). The impact of the British holding major cities and fortified positions such as New York and Ticonderoga was consequently negligible in the minds of insurgents operating in often rugged terrain in the non-urbanised regions outside of these hubs (Joes 2000, 11). This is not to say that the cities were overlooked by the insurgents—Washington was often keen to contest the

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British for control of the cities, including notably New  York, which he fought to hold for as long as possible (Conway 1995, 82; Peckham 1979, 43). But the rebels were willing and able to exploit the countryside in a way that eluded the British. After retreating from New York, for example, Washington regrouped his men in the country area of Valley Forge for the winter, from which they emerged the next season as a better trained force with high morale (Millett et al. 2012, 68). The British, in contrast, refused to leave the city to pursue the rebels, thus passing up a prime opportunity and handing the initiative back to Washington (Peckham 1979, 93–94; Rose 2007, 133). Furthermore, the rebels were willing to wage their campaign all across the countryside, ‘campaigning as far away as the Ohio River and the central Carolinas’ (Keegan 1993, 347). By operating across this broad and mostly rural space, the insurgents compelled the British to leave their coastal strongholds and engage in terrain where they could not benefit from superior naval and artillery assets (Keegan 1993, 348). A rural approach was particularly evident in the south. In 1781, General Nathanael Greene baited the British under Cornwallis away from the urbanised coastal region of South Carolina into the depths of the countryside where he was able to outmanoeuvre and damage his forces with impunity, until Cornwallis finally withdrew, tailed tucked between his legs (Rose 2007, 176–181). As one scholar concludes, ‘Although they controlled Boston, New York, Newport, Philadelphia, and Charleston, the British never subdued the countryside, where nine out of their fourteen well-equipped forces were entirely captured or destroyed’ (Schweikart and Allen 2007, 86). Mao’s writings in the twentieth century would describe a similar approach to the rural versus urban dilemma. The practice of building bases behind enemy lines and using these as staging posts for harassing the enemy was also practised during the war, in a fashion that mirrored Mao’s subsequent instructions on the subject. One instance happened after the British occupied New Jersey in 1776. While lacking formal bases, militia forces hid their weapons in secret locations and then seized them to strike at unsuspecting patrols when the time was right (Boot 2013, 69). This strategy was undertaken most prolifically by irregular fighters in the southern states during the final three years of the war (Ellis 1995, 64). Francis Marion earned his epithet of ‘the Swamp Fox’ because he built his bases in areas of unsavoury terrain near the British lines and used these for launching raids against the British (Ellis 1995, 64–65; Boot 2013, 73).

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Politics The American Revolutionary War exhibited many class warfare elements that Mao would eventually describe. One of these was that many of the rebels and their supporters viewed the conflict as a struggle against the tyranny of monarchical oppression which deprived them of human rights and treated them as slaves. As John Hancock announced, ‘We are reduced to the alternative of choosing an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers or resistance by force. The latter is our choice. We have counted the cost of this contest, and find nothing so dreadful as voluntary slavery (Hancock 1961, 144). The Declaration of Independence outlined how equality and enfranchisement were at the heart of the movement, including the declaration that ‘all men are created equal.’ A second element was the social composition of the armed forces. The majority of the rebel ranks were filled with people from the lowest strata of society, including indentured servants, farm labourers, apprentices, slaves, vagrants, and newly arrived immigrants. This represented a composition similar to the British Army, but these men had not joined because they had been drafted or felt that they had no other options available, but because they believed that fighting would help them to create a better society in which they could prosper. As one scholar notes, ‘Appeals to freedom and liberty—and the vision of a better future that these conveyed—could strike an intense chord in men of humble means and origins’ (Millett et al. 2012, 56). The belief that they were fighting to secure a better life for themselves and their descendants helps to explain why these men were willing to tolerate countless demoralising defeats, as well as the prolonged deprivation imposed upon them during the Long Winter (Millett et  al. 2012, 57). Clear political goals underpinned the insurgency and were shared by the insurgent commanders, their soldiers, and the militia and their supporters: patriotism towards their country or home state and the forging of a better life for themselves and their compatriots (Peckham 1979, 204). Initially, there was some uncertainty regarding the exact outcome desired, with some insurgents and their followers wishing for full independence and others wanting concessions from the British government (Millett et al. 2012, 61). The former desire quickly overwhelmed the latter, so that when the British proffered possible autonomy but not independence in 1778, the idea was unanimously ridiculed and ignored (Alden 1969, 384–388). There was also an ideological core inside the movement, who

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impressed upon their compatriots the political goals of the uprising (Alden 1969, 203). Prior to his defence of New York in 1776, for example, Washington had the Declaration of Independence read to his forces to imbue them with a sense of political purpose (Castleden 2008, 259). Similarly, the future President’s defence of Philadelphia in 1777 was undertaken because Washington recognised the political blow that would be suffered if the new capital was captured without even so much as a fight (Washington 1890a, b, c). Furthermore, the army itself was politically active, with officers chosen by the holding of elections within the unit that the officer would subsequently lead, rather than by an individual purchasing their promotion as was the norm in the British and other European armies (Peckham 1979, 206–207). Finally, the insurgents made adept use of political propaganda. One example happened at the outset of the war when the insurgents rapidly disseminated their version of the first clash between Redcoats and rebels at Lexington and Concord across the Thirteen Colonies and Britain. Consequently, their side of the story, which painted the Redcoats as savages and exaggerated the achievements of the rebels, was heard first in both countries, arriving in Britain 12 days before the British Army account (Peckham 1979, 20). The way in which politics was infused throughout the rebellion foretold the emphasis that Mao would place upon the benefits of politicising insurgent warfare over a century later. In a fashion similar to Mao’s later prescriptions, the American revolutionary movement exhibited a strong central core, but also devolved power in a way that embraced and empowered the population. At the centre of the insurrection, a strong centrifugal force existed in the form of George Washington and the Continental Army. Washington’s sway over his men was top-down, and he demanded that they follow his directives absolutely, threatening flogging and even execution for disobedient soldiers (Boot 2013, 68; Schweikart and Allen 2007, 74–75). Furthermore, Washington and Nathanael Green ‘labored to discourage’ what they called ‘all kinds of local attachments and distinctions’ in the central army and argued that ‘all the force in America should be under one Commander raised and appointed by the same Authority, subjected to the same Regulations and be ready to be despatch[ed] where ever Occasion may require’ (Pearlman 2002, 14). They expressly rejected the ideas of Major General Charles Lee, who argued in favour of a ‘small war’ strategy where small units would nip at the heels of the enemy until they were worn down into exhaustion, preferring instead a centralised regular army (Boot 2013, 68). Yet at the

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same time, they operated within a system that allowed for considerable elements of devolved power, including the exercise of power through independent state governments and state militia forces across the Thirteen Colonies (Castleden 2008, 257; Millett et  al. 2012, 53). The push and pull between the central and local government that occurred throughout the war was illustrated by the issue of levying troops. At the outset of the conflict, Congress was compelled to ‘request’—not ‘demand’—that individual states raise a set number of soldiers and hand these over to Congress for assembly into a Continental Army, under the control of Congress (US Congress 2013, 197–198). Similarly, while Washington constructed a single centralised navy, 11 of the 13 colonial governments also built their own separate state navies (Millett et al. 2012, 76). During the decade prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the insurgents developed roughly the same sort of pervasive shadow government that Mao subsequently endorsed. At the national level, this included the Stamp Act Congress and two Continental Congresses, the second of which continued throughout the war—until 1781 when it became the Congress of the Confederation (Millett et  al. 2012, 49). Political organisation went further than just the top level, however, with Sons of Liberty groups across the country evolving into a network of anti-British hubs that co-ordinated opposition against the British, added organisational cohesion to local resistance movements, and intimidated anyone who voiced support for Britain (Millett et al. 2012, 49). Moreover, when hostilities erupted, there already existed governing bodies in each of the states, primarily the elected legislative bodies that existed within 11 of the colonies (Schweikart and Allen 2007, 48–49). These institutions had previously wrested most decision-­ making powers away from the King’s governors, so that they were in a very real sense the governing agencies for each state. They were either overwhelmingly sympathetic to the rebel cause or actual co-­instigators of the uprising (Schweikart and Allen 2007, 49). As the insurgency grew, the scale of the rebels’ shadow government grew as well, evolving through a series of conventions and committees that took on tasks such as raising troops and requisitioning supplies (Bonwick 1991, 102–103). Population Generally, the colonial rebellion was popular. One scholar estimates that over half of the population supported the movement, and less than 20 per cent favoured the British (Oliver 1961). This enabled the rebels to

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rapidly recruit new militia units, even in areas where they lacked a significant armed presence. This happened in 1777 when a British force advanced towards Albany, only to be stalled when a local leader raised 850 armed locals to oppose them in just several hours (Rose 2007, 108–111). The commander of the campaign, Burgoyne, complained: ‘Wherever the King’s forces point, militia to the amount of three to four thousand assemble in twenty-four hours’ (Millett et al. 2012, 67). Popular support also meant that, while the British could control whichever territory their troops occupied for most of the war, whenever their units moved elsewhere, an upsurge of rebel activity would return the area to insurgent territory (Kennedy 1988, 117; Rose 2007, 168). It also meant that the rebels could gain vital intelligence about the enemy from the population (Rose 2007, 116). Finally, while the British were limited in the numbers of troops available to them, the rebels were able to bolster their forces regularly by accepting recruits from the local population. During the runup to Saratoga, for example, the American force burgeoned rapidly as volunteers rushed to join the insurgent forces (Rose 2007, 116–127). To attain and acquire this popular backing, the insurgents formed a popular coalition against the British which spanned spatial distance and social divides, and which resembled the kind of United Front that Mao would later describe. While the rebellion was initially led by people in the urban areas of New England, it rapidly reached out to embrace people from more rural areas. As one scholar summarises: ‘Massachusetts attorney and New Jersey minister; Virginia farmer and Pennsylvania sage; South Carolina slaveholder and New York politician all found themselves increasingly aligned against the English monarch’ (Schweikart and Allen 2007, 65). The insurgents also worked to court popular support by acting benevolently towards the civilian population. When Washington retreated from New York, for example, he chose Valley Forge for his winter quarters in part because it was relatively remote and would avoid disturbing civilian settlements (Cooke 1973, 114; Peckham 1979, 83). Despite his forces suffering from biting cold, malnutrition, disease, and starvation, Washington refused Congress’s directive that his soldiers should commandeer food and supplies from local farmers (Peckham 1979, 83). Washington himself explained in a letter to Congress in 1980 that if the Continental Army treated the population poorly then this would ‘alienate their minds from the Army and insensibly the cause’ (Washington 2013, 226). Other rebel commanders gave IOU notes to farmers they obtained food from for similar reasons (Schweikart and Allen 2007, 82).

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Courteous conduct was exhibited in other ways too, with the actions of George Clark being particularly illuminating. Authorised by the governor of Virginia to approach the French settlement of Vicennes in the Illinois region about joining the rebellion, Clark dispatched envoys with the message that their property would not be pilfered nor would their people be harmed. Reassured by this benevolence, the townspeople agreed to join both the rebellion and the state of Virginia (Peckham 1979, 107). These and many other examples were emblematic of the need for rebels to demonstrate courteous conduct towards the population that Mao later articulated. Throughout the insurgency coercive violence was used on a somewhat selective basis against civilians who would not back the rebels. This approach closely resembled Mao’s twentieth-century teachings on pursuing moderately selective anti-civilian violence. One of the first instances happened as early as 1774, when rebel supporters in Massachusetts established ‘the Continental Association,’ which required colonists to embargo British goods. ‘The names of those who refused or broke their word were published in local newspapers and the offenders were ostracised or punished. If the recalcitrant still refused to obey then brutality was employed’ and this kind of activity spread over the years that followed (Tierney 2007, 29–35). As one scholar notes, ‘All colonies passed at least one law requiring an oath of allegiance to the Revolution’ and punishments—formal and informal—were meted out to those who refused to pledge themselves (Tierney 2007, 35). Punishments included fines, political disenfranchisement, interrogation, banishment, imprisonment, or worse (Tierney 2007, 35). One description of brutality against a pro-British colonist, written by one of his fellows, is notable both for the cruelty of the violence and for the fact that it was selectively targeted against someone who had identified himself as an enemy supporter: [He] spoke very freely in Favor of Government; for which he was assaulted by a Mob, stripped naked, & hot Pitch was poured upon him, which blistered his Skin. He was then carried to an Hog Sty & rubbed over with Hogs Dung. They threw the Hog’s Dung in his Face, & rammed some of it down his Throat; & in that Condition exposed to a Company of Women. His House was at-tacked, his Windows broke, when one of his Children was sick, & a Child of his went into Distraction upon this Treatment. His Grist-­ mill was broke, & Persons prevented from grinding at it, & from having any Connections with him. (Oliver 1961, 157)

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Resources While some Americans owned arms at the start of the conflict, these were not always in abundance and the gap between what was owned already and what was needed had to be bridged in order for the Americans to fight the war effectively. One way that both the Continental Army and the militias pursued this goal was to requisition British assets when they seized strongholds or armament hubs from the enemy. The rebel capture of Fort Ticonderoga in 1775, for example, yielded considerable weaponry and ammunition (Castleden 2008, 49–50). Another way was to steal weapons and ammunition via small raiding party actions and men like Francis Marion obtained many guns, cartridges, and supplies from the enemy that they killed on their raids (Laqueur 1976, 20). A third was through the capture of enemy ships and booty by hastily constructed federal and state navies, as well as independently operated privateers, which led to 800 merchant ships and other prizes being seized by the nascent American fleet during the war, providing invaluable weaponry, ammunition, and other supplies for the rebels (Millett et al. 2012, 76; Overy and Gannon, 2007, 19). A fourth was the encouragement or coercion of supporters of the British crown to defect to the rebellion, which brought new recruits over to the rebellion, along with the weapons and ammunition that they owned (Millett et al. 2012, 56; Rose 2007, 166). These methods all resonated closely with Mao’s future teachings about feeding off the enemy. At the outset of the conflict, John Hancock stated that the insurgents expected to be able to rely upon both internal and external supplies to support their rebellion (Hancock 1961, 144). This demonstrated clear parallels with Mao’s later writings. Internally, efforts were made to create a supporting infrastructure for the armies under Washington and other commanders. One example was the creation of ‘strategically placed supply depots’ by Nathanael Greene during the Continental Army’s furlough in Valley Forge from 1777 to 1778 (Brumwell 2009, 120). Local armaments industry, including ironworks, foundries, forges, gunsmiths, carpentry shops, and other manufacturing facilities, were all leveraged and subjected to ‘stimulating pressure’ (Millis 1981, 38–39). As one scholar comments, the American colonists had ‘started with an overwhelmingly agricultural community; they had emerged with the beginnings of a metallurgical industry, fostered by the demands of war (Millis 1981, 38). Supplementing this, a good proportion of the small arms used were already owned by the insurgents prior to the uprising (Cooke 1973, 109). At the same time, a dedicated effort was made under the stewardship of Benjamin Franklin to

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secure foreign aid, which ultimately secured French financial capital, sanctuary for insurgent ships in French harbours, an agreement for French officers to serve in the America army, the loaning or gifting of military assets such as ships, and, eventually, a combined land and naval contingent (Peckham 1979, 89–93, 118, 122, 139, and 202). An indication of the importance of French aid can be seen by the fact that 90 per cent of all gunpowder used by the rebels prior to 1780 came from France (Boot 2013, 78; Schweikart and Allen 2007, 83). From the earliest days of the war, the Americans tried to manipulate external forces in a ‘Maoist’ manner by stoking the enmity between Britain and other European powers, particularly France (Raphael 2004, 217; Peckham 1979, 89). When France vacillated about committing, the Americans used cunning ruses to manipulate them. One such manoeuvre was to suggest in 1777 that without French assistance, the resolution of the Colonials to fight against might buckle (Franklin et al. 2013, 201). Another was to pretend that the Americans were considering either jettisoning the idea of allying with any foreign power whatsoever or even negotiating some kind of settled peace with Britain, both of which would presumptorily remove the ability to take advantage of the British embroilment in North America to advance their own position vis-à-vis their long-­ standing rival (Peckham 1979, 90–91). These efforts bore fruit when the French allied themselves with the rebels after their victory at Saratoga in December 1777 and the Spanish and the Dutch joined soon after (Raphael 2004, 218–219). The three European powers then assaulted Britain’s positions in the West Indies, attacked the British in Florida and on the Mississippi, and besieged Gibraltar. Worse still, a combined French and Spanish armada cruised through the English Channel in 1779, causing great alarm. These and other global problems—rarely caused but certainly inflamed by American exhortations—curtailed the number of troops that Britain could spare to combat the insurgency in America (Peckham 1979, 89 and 125–126; Pratt 1956, 241–249; Raphael 2004, 219–220).

Lenin Mao’s teachings were precursored not only by the actions of past insurrections, but also by the teachings of a wide variety of theorists on insurgent warfare. One of the most notable was renowned Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, who articulated essentially of the same principles of insurgent warfare that were later outlined by Mao, despite writing a decade or more before Mao began to lay down his ideas about the topic.

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Military Like Mao, Lenin endorsed the use of regular warfare as the primary mechanism of insurgency. (Lenin 1972b). He was emphatic on this requirement, noting that ‘in order to defend the power of the workers and peasants from the bandits, that is, from the landowners and capitalists, we need a powerful Red Army … With a strong Red Army we shall be invincible. Without a strong army we shall inevitably fall victim to Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich’ (Lenin 1972b). At the same time, however, he also preached about the importance of guerrilla warfare for bringing about victory for a revolutionary force. This was packaged as part of a refutation of the failed methods of past rebellions in Europe, which had attempted such tactics as opposing artillery by hiding behind barricades or thronging together in aimless mobs (Lenin 1969b, 82). Again, in a fashion reminiscent of Mao, Lenin was at pains to qualify this assertion with the caveat that, while guerrilla warfare was important, ‘the party of the proletariat can never regard guerrilla warfare as the only, or even as the chief, method of struggle … this method must be subordinated to other methods’ (Lenin 1969c, 92). Lenin also argued that a revolutionary insurrection must be protracted. In 1906, he commented that ‘an uprising cannot assume the old form of individual acts restricted to a very short time and to a very small area. It is absolutely natural and inevitable that the uprising should assume the higher and more complex form of a prolonged civil war embracing the whole country’ (Lenin 1969c, 93). He also allowed for the notion that different forms of armed struggle might occur within different parts of the country at different stages (Lenin 1969c, 93–94). Although he did not go so far as to identify the same three-stage strategy that Mao would later promote, Lenin did articulate his support for a phased uprising on multiple occasions. As one example, he outlined how the Moscow Uprising in 1905 evolved from unco-ordinated urban protests into co-ordinated mass street fighting against the government and was in the process of evolving into a third stage of generalised uprising of the masses when it was sabotaged by its own leaders who lacked the vision to see how the revolution was progressing (Lenin 1969b, 78–82). Presaging Mao’s later writings, Lenin was adamant about the need to hold on to positions for as long as possible, with retreat only acceptable as a last resort. In 1918, for example, he ordered that ‘all Soviets and revolutionary organizations are ordered to defend every position to the last drop of blood’ (Lenin 1972d). Earlier in his career, Lenin had articulated a firm

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belief in the need for revolutionaries to reject the temptations of abandoning their positions or seeking peaceful means for lessening imperialist oppression and resolving class schisms (Lenin 1969b, 83–84). Contrary to popular perspectives, Lenin believed in the importance of rallying the peasantry to the revolutionary cause and of waging warfare in the countryside. He referred multiple times to the importance of the workers and peasants operating together for the success of the Russian Revolution and accompanying civil war (Lenin 1969a, 75; 1969f, 116; 1972c). He also indicated that the insurrection was only able to go ahead when it became clear that: We have the following of the majority of the people because [Minister of Agriculture] Chernov’s resignation, while by no means the only symptom, is the most striking and obvious symptom that the peasants will not receive land from the Socialist-Revolutionaries’ bloc (or from the S ­ ocialist-­Revolutionaries themselves). And that is the chief reason for the popular character of the revolution. (Lenin 1969e, 112)

He was even more emphatic about the issue when addressing China and its neighbours. For the left-wing radicals in these countries, he specifically preached that ‘relying upon the general theory and practice of communism, you must adapt yourselves to specific conditions such as do not exist in European conditions; you must be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants’ (Lenin 1969f, 118). While Lenin never formally articulated Mao’s idea of building bases behind enemy lines, he insinuated the approach on several occasions. In Marxism and Insurrection, for example, he indicated that an uprising was only now permissible because Soviet power had sprung up in  localities across the country, which would undermine the ability of the enemy to frontally attack Communist forces in Moscow and Petrograd (Lenin 1969f, 111). In 1919, he talked excitedly about how the peasants were rising behind the advancing counterrevolutionary army of General Denikin to hinder his offensive (Lenin 1965b). Politics Lenin advocated class warfare before Mao. In Two Tactics of Social-­ Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, for example, Lenin discussed the need ‘to develop the class struggle of the proletariat to the point where the

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latter will take the leading part in the popular Russian revolution, i.e., will lead this revolution to a the democratic-dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry’ (Lenin 1962). Equally, he noted in Socialism and War that ‘We fully regard civil wars, i.e., wars waged by the oppressed class against the oppressing class, slaves against slave-owners, serfs against land-owners, and wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as legitimate, progressive and necessary’ (Lenin 1970). Lenin was committed to the notion of combining politics and warfare. In addition to his famous statement that ‘without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement,’ Lenin also wrote about the importance of providing a clear political strategy and tactics for the movement (Lenin 1940, 1961, 150). This included politically educating his party’s followers. He asserted that ‘we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favor of an armed uprising’ (Lenin 1969b, 79). He also held that the insurgents must ‘explain to the broadest masses of the proletariat and the peasantry the nation-wide significance of a revolutionary army in the struggle for freedom’ (Lenin 1969a, 75). Furthermore, he endorsed inserting political commissars into insurgent military units, and encouraged them to report to the central leadership when they had complaints about the conduct of these forces (Lenin 1975). These statements about politicising warfare were similar to those of Mao, but written earlier. Like Mao, Lenin stressed the importance of providing a strong central leadership for the masses. During the Russian Civil War, he was blunt: ‘The strictest revolutionary order must be maintained, the laws and instructions of the government must be faithfully observed, and care must be taken that they are obeyed by all’ (Lenin 1972b). He also claimed that ‘the Bolsheviks could not have retained power for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years, without the most rigorous and truly iron discipline in our Party’ (Lenin 1940). He also praised local initiative, however, as long as it benefitted rather than hindered the war effort. He remarked, for example, that ‘the communist subbotniks organised by the workers on their own initiative are really of enormous significance’ (Lenin 1972e). When writing about guerrilla warfare, he commented that it was not guerrilla warfare itself which led to disorganisation but ‘the weakness of a party which is incapable of taking such actions under its control’ (Lenin 1969c, 90). Lenin was also keen to devolve some decision-making abilities for guerrillas, commenting that rather than ‘deciding from our armchair what part any particular form of guerrilla warfare should play’ this decision should be made by the lower classes fighting on the ground (Lenin 1969c, 93).

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Like Mao, Lenin expressed his belief in shadow government. In 1906, for example, he argued that a ‘revolutionary government is needed for the political leadership of the masses … the political unification and the political organization of the insurgent section of the people’ (Lenin 1969a, 76) He believed that this shadow government must be established concurrently to the military side of the rebellion itself, as shown his argument that ‘the work of the organization must immediately, and it must be indissolubly combined with every successful step of the uprising … Immediate political leadership of the insurgent people is no less essential for the complete victory of the people over tsarism than the military leadership of its forces’ (Lenin 1969a, 76). Also, like Mao, he issued numerous missives related to shadow governance during his insurgency, such as his i­ nstructions to party organisations to increase fuel production in the regions under their control (Lenin 1965c). Population The necessity of rallying the masses behind the insurgency was embraced by Lenin throughout many of his writings. In Left Wing Communism— An Infantile Disorder, for example, he discussed the need for the party to ‘link up, maintain the closest contact, and—if you wish—merge, in certain measure, with the broadest masses of the working people—primarily with the proletariat, but also with the non-proletarian masses of working people’ (Lenin 1940). This built on his earlier belief, articulated in What Is To Be Done?, that the Bolshevik Party must engage with all classes, not merely the working class, in order to develop a mass movement (Lenin 1961, 159–164). Lenin was also a strong advocate of United Front tactics during an insurgency, and set forward his position on this point many years prior to Mao’s rise to prominence. He noted, for example, that capitalism had created a plethora of lower and lower-middle classes, and that, in order to overcome the repression of the upper and upper-middle classes, the Communist Party must ‘resort to changes of tack, to conciliation and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters’ (Lenin 1940). He derided those political opponents who disagreed with this position by asserting that:

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To carry out a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to renounce in advance any change of tack, or any utilisation of a conflict of interests (even if temporary) among one’s enemies, or any conciliation or compromise with possible allies (even if they are temporary, unstable, vacillating or conditional allies)—is that not ridiculous in the extreme? (Lenin 1940, 52)

Although less explicit about the need for chivalrous conduct than Mao, Lenin, nevertheless, embraced the approach, both as a means to cultivate a popular base and as the right thing to do. One example came in 1918, when he recounted a comment made to him by a Finnish woman about the Red Army as indicative of the good behaviour of his forces: ‘Formerly the poor man had to pay heavily for every stick of wood he took without permission … But when you meet a soldier in the woods nowadays he’ll even give you a hand with your bundle of sticks. You don’t have to fear the man with the gun anymore’ (Lenin 1974). Twelve years earlier, he had challenged critics who suggested that guerrilla warfare would demoralise and disorganise the revolution by indicating that it was ‘unorganized irregular, non-party guerrilla acts’ that would have this effect (Lenin 1969c, 90). By providing a firm leadership for the masses and ensuring that their guerrilla methods were ‘ennobled by the enlightening and organizing influence of socialism,’ Lenin believed that the Bolshevik Party would decrease the scale of the disorder, demoralisation, and other deleterious effects of this inevitable component of revolutionary warfare (Lenin 1969c, 90–92). Mao’s teachings about using moderate violence in an insurgency were predated by Lenin’s writings. In 1917, for example, Lenin argued that the sweeping away of the violent capitalist society must be done through the imposition of a dictatorship of the proletariat, which needed to use selectively targeted violence against those who resisted the transition. He supported his perspective by pointing out that Marx and Engels reproached the 1870–1871 Paris Commune ‘for what they considered to be one of the causes of its downfall, namely, that the Commune had not used its armed force with sufficient vigour to suppress the resistance of the exploiters’ (Lenin 1972a). In 1918 he indicated that mass violence should be unleashed upon the Kulaks, but that the middle peasants should be treated well. ‘Ruthless war on the Kulaks! Death to them! … But there is no reason why the working class should quarrel with the middle peasants … concessions to and agreement with the middle peasants; ruthless suppression of the kulaks … That is the policy of the working class’ (Lenin 1965a).

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Resources Lenin advocated feeding off the enemy prior to Mao. In The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution, Lenin described how members of the lower class should accept weapons and training from the Tsarist military, but should do so purely in order to be able to take the martial prowess and arms that they acquire and turn these against the state (Lenin 1964). In The Revolutionary Army, for example, Lenin wrote about how during the Odessa uprising of 1905, propaganda had led to ‘the siding of part of the army with the uprising’ and had led the battleship Potemkin to defect to the revolution (Lenin 1965a, 74–75). Lenin viewed this activity as momentous, remarking that ‘the first step has been taken. The Rubicon has been crossed. The siding of the army with the revolution has impressed itself as a fact upon the whole of Russia and the entire world. The events in the Black Sea Fleet will inevitably be followed by further and still more energetic attempts to form a revolutionary army’ (Lenin 1965a, 75). Mao’s endorsement of insurgencies seeking to both gain foreign aid and build up their own resources was also foretold by Lenin. As part of his devotion to world revolution (rather than socialism in one country), Lenin endorsed the provision of mutual support by the lower classes in each country to their colleagues in other countries, including those outside Europe (Lenin 1940). In Emancipation of the Peoples of the East, for example, he commented that ‘our Soviet Republic must now muster all the awakening peoples of the East and, together with them, wage a struggle against international imperialism’ (Lenin 1969f, 119). At the same time, however, he was adamant that the burden of translating the lessons of the Russian Revolution fell firmly on the shoulders of each country’s Communists (Lenin 1969f, 119). The notion of exploiting external forces was central to Lenin’s theses on uprisings long before Mao wrote about this topic. Lenin’s commitment to this idea revolved around the notion that the Great War of 1914–1918 represented an exploitable crisis of imperialism. He argued that ‘out of the universal ruin caused by the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which, however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot end otherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its victory’ (Lenin 2010, 191). Lenin conceived the fight against imperialism as a global struggle, and believed that individual uprisings should each be encouraged and used to weaken the imperialist grip over the world. One comment about the 1916 Irish Rebellion, is illuminating: ‘We would be

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very poor revolutionaries if, in the proletariat’s great war of liberation for socialism, we did not know how to utilize every popular movement against every single disaster imperialism brings in order to intensify and expand the crisis’ (Lenin 1969d, 105–106). Given Lenin’s endorsement of the same aspects of warfare that would later be preached about by Mao, it might be surprising that academic opinion has typically indicated otherwise. The most likely reason for this stems from the power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, which marked the aftermath of Lenin’s death in 1924, and which led to Lenin’s perspectives on the insurgent warfare being skewed or downplayed. Between them, Trotsky and Stalin enunciated very different ideas about how an insurgency in China should be carried out, and it seems likely that it was these views, rather than the ‘Maoist’ elements of Lenin’s earlier teachings, which Western scholars have subsequently taken to represent Bolshevik views on insurgency. Trotsky argued, for example, that allowing the peasantry to play an equal role in a rebellion ran counter to Marxism, and opposed aligning the Chinese Communists with the Guomindang. Stalin opposed Trotsky on these points, but after Chiang’s purge of 1927, Stalin’s embarrassment led him to demand that the Chinese Communists sever all remaining ties with the Guomindang, and launch a series of urban insurrections (Trotsky; Zarrow 2005, 233; Furuya 1981, 234). This undermined his previous endorsements of the Chinese peasantry and allying with the Guomindang.

Mao’s Knowledge of Earlier Events It is clear that the Maccabean Revolt and the American Revolutionary War exhibited essentially all of the attributes of major tenets of insurgent warfare which have so often been presented as creations of Mao, despite happening a substantial period of time before Mao was even born. Similarly, despite writing a good number of years prior to Mao, Lenin’s teachings on the best methods of insurgency also foretold the principles that Mao would spell out during the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War. Although Lenin certainly discussed other issues in his writings, all of the tenets of supposedly novel methods of insurgent warfare later outlined by Mao could have easily been found by those who wanted to find them, especially budding left-wing revolutionaries who studied Lenin’s writings in great depth, such as Mao and Ho Chi Minh. This pours cold water on the idea that Mao founded a new brand of warfare.

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Defenders of Mao’s originality might still claim that he was unaware about these earlier examples and so, at least in his own mind, he was genuinely a creator. Indeed, on more than one occasion, Mao denied the existence of links between his own ideas and prior methods of rebellion. In 1936, for example, he announced that ‘the tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign’ (Mao 1965a, 124). Yet, this position does not stand up to scrutiny because Mao invested considerable study of earlier conflicts and theoreticians, and even linked a number of his attitudes towards insurgent warfare with past exemplars. There appear to have been three main sources of history and military heritage that Mao drew upon while formulating his ideas about insurgency: China’s past, Marxism, and Western history. On the Chinese side, from an early age, Mao was an avid reader of Chinese classic novels ‘through which he learned traditional Chinese military ideas and military history,’ with particular emphasis upon The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, The Water Margin, and Journey to West (Tien 1992, 211–212; Schram 1966, 43–44; Clements 2006, 9). Sun Tzu also represented a major source of information, either directly or through the infiltration of these philosophies into the novels that Mao read (Tien 1992, 211–212; Schram 1966, 43–44; Clements 2006, 9). He also revered the first emperor of the Han dynasty, Liu Bang, and it was said that he dreamed of imitating his feats (Braun 1982, 261). Liu had risen from humble peasant origins to become a rebel leader against the Qin dynasty, and subsequently reunify the splintered fragments after the empire collapsed in 206 B.C. (Braun 1982, 261). The parallels between the China of his day—torn apart by the collapse of an empire—and the China which Liu Bang unified was probably very apparent to Mao. More broadly, Mao acknowledged the recurrence of ‘hundreds of uprisings, great and small, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary wars’ throughout Chinese history, against both domestic and foreign opponents (such as the British in the Opium Wars), and asserted that ‘these constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese feudal society. For each of the major peasant uprisings and wars dealt a blow to the feudal regime of the time, and hence more or less furthered the growth of the social productive forces’ (Mao 1965b, 308). As one author comments, ‘In [Mao’s] rendering, the Boxers and other peasant movements, did the hard and dirty work of preparing China for a true, Marxist revolution. They were the “great and tragic prologue” for Mao’s own revolution, resisting the foreign capitalist interlopers’ (Silbey 2012, 235).

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Mao felt particularly strongly about the Taiping and Boxer Rebellions, which he viewed as manifestations of simmering class discontent that subsequently remained latent within China’s villages after each insurrection was suppressed by ‘reactionary’ and ‘imperialist’ forces (Mao 1975a, 110). As one scholar asserts, ‘Mao emphasized the anti-Manchu and anti-­foreign spirit of the Taiping Rebellion and viewed its leader Hong xiuquan as [his] predecessor’ (Xiaorong 2005, 13). He was aware that the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion espoused a clear set of principles about treating the population kindly, and partially attributed the failure of their movement to its inability to sustain these principles. He was also intimate with the ­counterinsurgency methods used to counter the uprising, and commented in a letter in 1917 that ‘he was ‘bowled over’ by the way a commander called Tseng Kuo-fan had ‘finished off’ the biggest peasant uprising in Chinese history, the Taiping Rebellion’ (Chang and Halliday 2006, 9). Mao’s knowledge of Chinese history had a visible impact upon his approaches to insurgent warfare. Otto Braun records that in conversations with himself and other Communists, Mao ‘was fond of drawing on images from folklore and quotations by philosophers, military men, and statesmen of Chinese history’ (Braun 1982, 55). Subsequently, many scholars have noted that the language used by Mao to describe his tactics bore remarkable semblance with the language used by Sun Tzu (Tien 1992, 212–213; Schram 1966, 43–44). One practical example of Mao’s applying his knowledge about Chinese traditions of irregular warfare occurred when he occupied the Jinggang Mountains in 1928. He explained this action to his followers by telling them that they were about to become ‘Mountain Lords’ (the colloquial name for bandits in Chinese history) on the basis that ‘Mountain Lords have never been wiped out, let alone us’ (Chang and Halliday 2006, 53). On the Marxist side, Mao identified many parallels between Russia and China, and studied Marx and Lenin extensively, not to gain insights into purely theoretical nuances, but for practical methodologies for overthrowing and seizing control of the state through violent revolution (Clements 2006, 26; Tien 1992, 212–213). As one scholar notes, Mao ‘integrated Marx and Lenin’s theory of guerrilla warfare and their militia system into his military thought’ (Tien 1992, 214). Another points out that Mao’s perspectives regarding the importance of the countryside and rural working classes were directly informed from Lenin’s postulation that a vanguard of revolutionary intellectuals should ally with the peasantry (Xiaorong 2005, 149). Mao’s deference to the Russian model was shown clearly in 1928, when he sent a request to the Central Committee asking

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for information about how the Bolsheviks treated the rich peasant classes during the Russian Civil War (Mao 1975b, 148). In 1949, Mao reaffirmed this intellectual debt when he commented that the basic conditions had been the same in both Russia and China, and that their struggles had followed identical paths of Marxist struggle (Mao 1961, 412 and 428). A further source used by Mao when forming his thoughts about insurgency was Western history. As one scholar observes, ‘Mao consistently accepted Clausewitz’s definition of war, that is, the relationship between war and politics’ (Tien 1992, 214). Mao’s deference to Western military traditions went considerably further, however. From an early age, he studied numerous historical generals and theoreticians, such as Washington, Lincoln, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Napoleon, Wellington, Gladstone, and Clausewitz (Heuser 2002, 138–142; Payne 1950, 35–36; Slavicek 2004, 21). Washington was a particular favourite, to the extent that ‘throughout his life, in speeches to his inner circle and in talks with foreign guests, irrespective of whether the United States was currently an enemy or a friend, Mao frequently mentioned Washington’s name in a positive fashion’ (Hawes 1996, 7; He 1994, 145). In particular, he used the example of the American Revolutionary War as an example of a progressive force fighting against an oppressive one, and an example of how the weak can overcome the strong through protracted fighting (Payne 1950, 35–36; Mao 2003). He also paid close attention to the conduct of Rif Rebellion and studied the works of both Michael Collins and T. E. Lawrence (Military History Magazine 2006; Majendie 1990; Aboul-Enein and Aboul-Enein 2011). He was further accepting of the mainstream Marxist perspective that characters such as Makhno and Blanqui were bandits and adventurers who failed in their uprisings because they lacked a Marxist political vision and commitment to the masses (Laqueur 1976, 138 and 163). The impact of these military traditions evidentially shaped Mao’s thinking about insurgent warfare. During the 1920s, for example, Mao cited previous popular-­ based uprisings and revolutionary struggles in France, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, and indicated that the Communists should imitate their methods (Mao 1990, Work #4). Similarly, in the 1930s Mao linked his three-stage strategy with past conflicts between the European powers, such as the global war between Britain and France, which included North America (‘the Seven Years’ War’), the Medieval War between England and France (‘the Hundred Years’ War’), and the First World War, particularly the Western Front (Mao 1975b, 143).

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Implications This chapter has demonstrated that Mao’s recommendations for insurgent warfare contained within Mao’s teachings were new neither in practice nor in theory. Numerous prior rebellions had exhibited the same elements of warfare described by Mao and multiple theorists had encapsulated these same principles in their writings, many of which remained in widespread circulation long after their own eras had passed. Moreover, Mao was well studied and would have been acutely aware of most, if not all, of the past conflicts and theoretical writings that encapsulated, in part or in whole, his subsequent teachings. Not only was Mao not novel in what he preached, but he must also have been fully cognizant of his unoriginality. This is important for a number of reasons. First, the fact that conflicts and theorists before Mao had exhibited similar traits means that it is possible that any insurgencies with similar characteristics that occurred after Mao may, in fact, have been influenced by these other conflicts and theorists, rather than Mao. Second, it undermines the popular conception of Mao as a visionary prophet of warfare who devised from his own genius a new and sophisticated model of warfare. Instead, his writings were just replications of past ideas and actions. Third, it suggests that some of the leading scholarly perspectives about Mao and his contributions to insurgent warfare contain serious flaws, which calls into question some of the other analyses that are attached to this premise, including discussions about ‘Maoist’ and ‘post-Maoist’ insurgencies. Having identified that Mao’s ideas were not new but had instead been employed in prior insurgencies and espoused by prior theoreticians, the next logical step is to identify the extent to which Mao actually used his own teachings within the primary insurgency that he fought during his life: the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War.

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CHAPTER 4

Mao and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War

Did Mao Influence Himself? The victory of the Chinese Communists over the Guomindang at the end of the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War in 1949 is typically attributed to the adoption by Mao of the philosophies of warfare outlined in his teachings. Mao and his followers are presented, for example, as being politically adept, popular, self-reliant, adept, courteous towards civilians, averse to employing terrorism, and effective at manipulating external forces. Yet, over the past several decades, authors such as Jay Taylor (2011), Frank Dikötter (2011), Sun (2007), Jonathan Fenby (2008), Sarah Paine (2012), Erik Durschmied (2008), Anthony Joes (2010), Daniel Moran (2001), Max Boot (2013), Rummel and Margolin (1999) and Margolin (2010), and Benjamin Valentino (2004) have undertaken an array of archival research, interviews, and critical analyses regarding the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War. These have generated extensive new findings that challenge many of the commonly held preconceptions about the extent to which Mao actually fought his insurgency in the way that he claimed. Yet, scholars of insurgency have not kept up-to-date with these investigations and instead continue to hold on to the much longer-­lived, yet increasingly questionable perspectives regarding how Mao fought his insurgency. This has resulted in the appearance of a major gap between the history of the conflict as it is now known to have happened and the ways that insurgency scholars depict it. To rectify this situation, this chapter draws upon a mixture of the latest historical research and established © The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5_4

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sources that have not been superseded by new material to analyse whether Mao genuinely fought his rebellion using the methods that he preached or whether he adopted different approaches instead. In effect, the chapter aims to answer the question: Did Mao manage to influence himself? Before beginning this analysis, it is worth discussing several of the factors that have skewed some assessments of Mao’s activities. The first is a tendency for scholars to believe Mao’s realignment of history to present himself as infallible. Whenever something went right during the insurgency, Mao swept in to take the credit and to defame his rivals for supposedly adopting opposing views. Whenever something went wrong, Mao claimed that he had been sidelined from power and that the decision had been made by his colleagues. His goal was to create a narrative in which Mao was portrayed as a visionary leader without whom the insurgency would die. To a large extent he succeeded, even amongst his own forces (Sun 2007, 160). This picture of Mao the irreproachable leader is extremely suspicious and should be viewed sceptically. As Harris remarks: Retrospectively, it has been suggested that he [Mao] fashioned an alternative strategy to that of the official party leadership which, after 1935, led to victory. However, this is not at all evident from the record. Most of his writing—for example as editor of the Guomindang journal Political Weekly—has disappeared or been heavily edited … if Mao had a separate political strategy, it cannot be detected in these years. His actions conformed to a combination of Comintern policy and the tactics of its implementation in small, isolated and backward districts of rural China. (Harris 1978, 20)

Otto Braun also commented on this, citing multiple historical incidents where Mao engaged in ‘extravagant falsification of historical truth’ (Braun 1982, 101). This included the Fukien incident, where ‘Mao simply inverted the facts.’ After the Fukien People’s Government had fallen to the Guomindang, he berated others for refusing to lend effective and timely assistance to Fukien, even though Mao had adamantly opposed such a move (Braun 1982, 101). More broadly, he reported that: Mao tried to redefine matters as if there was a dispute involving two fundamentally different military strategies: his correct one and the false one advocated by Po Ku, Chou En Lia, myself, and others … But it was Mao Tse-tung, in his Chingkangshan mountain base, who alternated between a truly passive defence and a ‘vagabond war’ in the forms of strikes and raids. Later, in line with the adventurist offensive theory of Li Li-san, he had

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attacked enemy cities and fortified centres. Then in the 1930s, he espoused the policy of retreats to the mountains … It must be noted that this military ideas were in no way distinguished by logical consistency nor had they anything in common with that ‘one correct’ strategy he ascribed to himself. (Braun 1982, 99–100)

One example of the reality and impact of this distortion can be seen in relation to the Long March. Mao presented himself as the far-sighted leader who made the decision to lead his followers northwards, in order to trade space for time against the Guomindang, sow the seeds of Communism amongst the population, and bring the Communists closer to Japan in order to defend the country against their attack. New research has shown, however, that Mao had no input into the decision to embark upon the Long March, and did not find out about the initiative until four months after planning had begun (Durschmied 2008, 189). Given the totalitarian nature of the regime that Mao built, buttressed by extensive thought control, torture, and the creation of a god cult, it is hardly surprising that the narrative advanced by Mao was also espoused by his inner party colleagues. The second factor which has helped to skew historical analyses is a bias amongst many of the primary source writers of the time. It has been fairly well established by recent Sinologists that some of the most enthusiastic commentators on the Communist situation had been either actively or passively duped. Edgar Snow, in particular, appears to have been misled and used by the very Communists he observed and interviewed (Sun 2007, 824–841). Other reporters, such as Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong, appear to have been similar hoodwinked (Furuya 1981, 750). The impact of Stilwell and his advocates in demonising Mao’s chief opponent Chiang and suggesting that the Communists were far more competent has also helped to distort perspectives. Again, several recent studies, including that of van de Ven, have suggested that Stilwell’s criticisms were often unfair and that he himself bore the blame for many of the problems that the Nationalists encountered against the Japanese (van de Ven 2003, 19–63). The distortions put forward by these writers heavily shaped impressions of Mao for many years, and still do. The third factor is that for the Chinese government the myth of Mao is not simply a historical curiosity, but instead forms a central component of their justification for ruling the country. Unlike other countries which have experienced totalitarian regimes, such as Germany and Russia, the current

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government remains totalitarian (Margolin and Rigoulot 1999, 459). This has made them resistant to critical appraisals of the rise of Mao and the Communist Party, a reality demonstrated only too clearly by the ban they imposed upon Chang and Halliday’s Mao the Unknown Story in mainland China (Wong and Paik 2010). Consequently, they continue to limit the archival materials and other research resources that are available to historians, encourage pro-Mao historical depictions, and discourage anti-Mao portrayals (Margolin and Rigoulot 1999, 459; Sun 2007, 134–135). This has helped to embed a pro-Mao bias and to limit the material available for those who wish to look at his life more critically. Only recently has this ethos begun to be challenged by Chinese historians. It is also worth discussing some of the criticisms made about Chang and Halliday’s work Mao: The Unknown Story. These have generally revolved around two main points, the author’s occasional use of vague or unverifiable sources and the characterisation of high-profile historical figures in radically new ways. In some places, this criticism has even manifested itself in the threat of legal law suits, including by the son of General Hu Zongnan in Taiwan (Fenby 2008, 337). Nevertheless, these authors provide a wealth of new valuable primary research that cannot wisely be dismissed. Accordingly, this chapter has included relevant assertions, but only where the findings fit logically with other more firmly established events and motivations. The fact that Mao believed that a full-scale intervention by the Soviet Union was essential for achieving victory over the Japanese is verified, for example, in Mao’s own writings. The near total absence of heavy weaponry on the part of the Chinese Communists prior to 1945 has also been highlighted in other studies (Paine 2012, 246). Chang and Halliday’s assertion that Mao did not intend to win the war against the Japanese by an escalation into a large-scale regular war waged by indigenous forces but instead hoped to survive and grow until the Soviet Union could be coaxed into invading therefore seems logical and has been included. Many of the findings of this appraisal may come as a surprise to scholars and analysts of insurgency. Within the field, deference to the notion that Mao implemented a whole range of insurgency practices has become commonplace amongst scholars. But, as this section will demonstrate, the historical reality does not for the most part uphold the myths. In fact, the extent to which Mao was influenced by his own teachings was much more limited than is usually asserted. A summary table is provided here, followed by more in-depth explanations for each theme in turn (Table 4.1).

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Table 4.1  Mao’s limited implementations of his own teachings Category

Themes

Accuracy

What Mao actually did

Military

Regular warfare supported by irregular warfare

Mixed

Protracted warfare and three-phase strategy Holding on to territory

Inaccurate

Regular warfare was the primary mechanism for the insurgency, but military inaction superseded irregular warfare as the secondary form of approach The war was not fought according to a three-phase strategy and Mao tried for quick resolutions to the war whenever possible Territory was usually held for as long as possible and only ceded when no other choice was available Cities were important, but rarely successfully seized. Periods of rural focus existed, but were forced upon rather than chosen by Mao Bases were built, but tended to be a few large bastions in remote regions, rather than many small bases behind enemy lines Class warfare was central to the conflict Mao provided political goals, but these changed constantly. His armies had a mixed level of political indoctrination. Propaganda was generally managed very well, with a few setbacks Mao was heavily in favour of centralisation when in power, but against it when not. When in power, he opposed the devolution of power to and freedom of action of the lower tiers of the part and population Shadow governments were created within Communist-held territories, but not outside of them Most of the people were hostile or indifferent towards the Communists Mao opposed both United Fronts, accepted them only under duress, and undermined them constantly The Communists ruthlessly exploited the population they ruled over Large groups of civilians were targeted with violence

Accurate

War in the Mixed countryside with urban elements

Politics

Population

Bases behind enemy lines

Mixed

Class warfare Politicised warfare

Mixed Mixed

Centralised command and some dispersed power

Mixed

Shadow government

Accurate

Popular mobilisation United Front

Inaccurate

Courteous conduct Moderate violence

Limited

Inaccurate Inaccurate

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Category

Themes

Accuracy

What Mao actually did

Resources

Feeding off the enemy

Limited

Self-reliance and foreign aid

Accurate

External forces

Mixed

The number of weapons captured was exaggerated, leaving the Communists often poorly armed Efforts were made towards self-sufficiency while masses of external aid were sought and secured External events benefitted the insurgency, but these were not influenced by Mao

Military  egular Warfare Supported by Irregular Warfare: Mixed R The existence of a regular Red Army was important to Mao from the beginning of the uprising until final victory in 1949. While some guerrilla warfare was employed, the predominant form of warfare used to supplement conventional efforts was military inactivity. When expanding his domain across Jiangxi in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mao and his followers adopted methods that were not actually irregular, but were instead ‘professional and conventional’ (Whitson 1973, 43). During the encirclement campaigns, guerrilla operations did occur, but conventional warfare still predominated and even in the subsequent Long March, the Communists engaged in an essentially orthodox military retreat, with its columns at some stages snaking out for roughly 50 miles (Whitson 1973, 50–59; de Lee 1985, 34; Laqueur 1976, 249). During the war against Japan, Mao maintained its regular forces, with the result that, by June 1944, roughly three-quarters of the combined Communist forces of 475,000 men were regular forces and only a quarter were guerrillas (Cheng 2005, 74; Gittings 1981, 59). Much has been made of the claim by Mao at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 that the Communists were supported by 2.2 million militia (Guillermaz 1968, 369). Yet, this figure was almost certainly exaggerated and anyway included large numbers of collaborationist soldiers, who had sensed the way the wind was blowing when the Japanese evacuated their positions, and defected en masse (Johnson 1962, 74). Some scholars assert that Communist guerrilla warfare wore the Guomindang down during these years, but this is inaccurate. While the

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Guomindang were weakened considerably during the war, this happened because the Japanese focused their attacks on them, rather than because of Communist guerrilla activities. In fact, the largest guerrilla contest between the Guomindang and the Communists during the war ended in the annihilation of the Communist Fourth Army, which had been threatening Chiang and his armies in central China (Fenby 2008, 298). Communist guerrilla efforts met an even more unfortunate outcome when challenged by the Japanese. The Japanese retaliated against the Communists’ Hundred Regiments offensive with their Three Alls campaign, which caused an estimated 100,000 casualties, out of a starting total of 300,000 to 400,000 Communist fighters. It slashed the size of the population they ruled from 80 to 50 million, caused a crisis regarding food and supplies, and generally brought the insurgents to the point of extinction (O’Ballance 1962, 137). The Communists were only saved because the Japanese were forced to divert their efforts and resources away to fight the Americans who were making significant inroads against the Japanese in the Pacific War (Griffith 1966, 71–75). In the aftermath of the campaign, the Communists moved from a lukewarm engagement with guerrilla warfare to a near total abandonment of the method. The approach adopted after 1942 was to keep a low profile and avoid all fighting, using guerrilla methods or otherwise (Sherman 2011, xvi; Haswell 1973, 188). As one American in China at the time observed: [The Communists] do not have the strength to fight the Japanese army because their armaments are very poor and they will not waste the arms they already have … The Japanese do not want to attack them either because their areas are of little military value. The CCP tries to avoid attacking the Japanese army for fear of reprisals. It probably goes too far to say they have an agreement, but neither side really wants to fight.’ (van de Ven 2003, 59)

Immediately after the war against Japan, there remained a very sizable Red Army contingent. During the first two years of the final civil war, ‘Mao and his associates adopted a strategy … that emphasized the short and decisive battle, a fire-power-intensive forward defense, and positional warfare—the antithesis of the conventional image of the CPP’s military strategy’ (Cheng 2005, 75). The plan of defence for the Communist-held city of Sipingjie that Mao ultimately settled on was, for example, designed to wear down the Guomindang’s forces as they attacked the city (Cheng 2005, 75). Moreover, the final two years of the war were marked not by

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escalating guerrilla actions but instead by large conventional armies facing each other (Levine 1987, 128; Joes 2010, 55). The battle for Manchuria was indicative: In May 1947, the Communists launched a major offensive against the Guomindang, involving a staggering 400,000 Communist soldiers supported by 200 heavy guns against 250,000 Nationalist troops supported by 130 P-51 fighters and a few B-25 bombers. As Taylor describes: ‘The battle for Manchuria, which would decide the fate of China, was not a guerrilla war but a conflict of mammoth, multicorps forces clashes in conventional style with the outcome to be determined by leadership, air support, weapons, ammunition, logistics, intelligence, and troop morale’ (Taylor 2011, 373).  rotracted Warfare and a Three-Phase Strategy: Inaccurate P The Communists failed to follow a three-phase strategy and, indeed, never made any real attempt to pursue this approach. Instead, they engaged in whichever form of warfare they felt like, depending upon their own preferences, the context of the situation, and the demands of foreign supporters. During the Hunan Peasant Uprisings, the peasants and their Communist agitators—including Mao—engaged in scattered and uncontrolled violence against White landlords and warlords (Womack 2010, 75). The assaults undertaken by Mao and other prominent Chinese Communists in the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in 1927 were similarly ‘sporadic’ and ‘isolated’ revolts (Schwartz 1952, 100–101). The approach adopted in the uprisings of 1930 differed little, with Mao’s decision to bide his time rather than attack first Nanchang and then Changsha motivated by rivalry with other Party members rather than a commitment to protracted warfare (Whitson 1973, 47). At Jiangxi, Mao again demonstrated an absence of long-term planning: Each time one of the Nationalists’ encirclement campaigns was repulsed, the Communists simply sat and waited for the next one, until finally they were beaten and forced to flee. The absence of a three-phase strategy in these early military efforts may be unsurprising, given that Mao did not articulate his ideas on the concept until the mid-late 1930s. However, even after Mao had communicated this platform in great depth, he failed to adhere to it. During the war against Japan, for example, Mao did not envision winning the conflict through a multistaged strategy, culminating in a campaign of mobile warfare by indigenous forces, but intended instead to bide his time in North

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China until the Soviet Union could be coaxed into invading (Chang and Halliday 2006, 201). This point is confirmed by three pieces of evidence. First, during the eight years of struggle against the Japanese, the Communists launched just two attacks against them and Mao opposed both of these (T’ien-Wei 1992b, 88; Chang and Halliday 2006, 202, 220–221, and 264). This suggests that the Communists had no serious intention of undermining the Japanese fighting capacity, but instead expected to leave it for others to tackle. Second, the Communists received aid from the Soviet Union throughout the war (discussed below) and, as shown earlier, Mao himself proclaimed the need for the Soviet Union to intercede in the conflict in order for victory to be attained. This affirmed Mao’s belief that the Soviet Union, not the Chinese Communist Party, would drive the Japanese out of China. Third, Mao never demonstrated, nor even explained, how his forces would obtain the training or the heavy equipment needed for the massive campaign of conventional warfare on the scale envisaged (Paine 2012, 246). Without naval weaponry, for example, the Communists would have lacked the means to oust the Japanese from the coastal cities, even if they won everywhere else in the country (Grice 2014). It was only good fortune that prevented Mao from needing the Soviet Union to step in, as Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 brought the Americans into the war and they neutralised the Japanese (Mauchline 1970, 54). The final stage of the three-phase plan that Mao outlined in the 1930s involved an escalation to mobile warfare and many scholars have pointed to the large-scale regular warfare that broke out between the Communists and Guomindang after 1945 as evidence that Mao had followed this plan. They also suggest that this outcome came about as a result of deliberate and ongoing efforts by the Communists in the years running up to 1945 to sap the strength of the Guomindang to the point where conventional warfare against them was possible. Yet, none of this is true. First, it was not the Communists who weakened the Guomindang at all, but actually the Japanese, who focused exclusively upon Chiang Kai-shek’s forces during the war and shattered their military, economy, and social standing (Moran 2001, 52–54). Second, the Communists were in no way ready for waging a mobile war against the Guomindang in 1945, but only became able to do so once the Soviet Union, which had occupied Manchuria during the final month of the war, transferred massive amounts of small arms, heavy weaponry, and ammunition by the Soviet Union in late 1945 and early

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1946. This is discussed later in this chapter. Without these two factors— both of which occurred without significant input from Mao and his followers—the Chinese Communists would not have been in a position to consider a campaign of regular war. Rather than following a co-ordinated three-phase strategy, Mao had generally just hidden from all enemies, hoping that the Communists could survive until foreign intervention won the day for them (Taylor 2011, 214; de Lee 1979, 23–24). Mao may have finally triumphed in 1949, but this victory was brought about by numerous factors beyond Mao’s control, rather than by his following a cohesive three-phase strategy.  olding on to Territory: Accurate H Mao repeatedly defended fixed locations during his rise to power. This began as early as 1928, when he led a small Communist contingent into the inaccessible Jinggang Mountains and tried to hold on to the territory against local landlord militias and the Guomindang who opposed him (Boot 2013, 332–333). This approach was repeated on a wider scale a couple of years later when Mao founded the nearby Jiangxi Soviet and went on to resist, with varying success, four Guomindang encirclement campaigns, before finally succumbing to the fifth (de Lee 1979, 22). It was only once all had been lost on all fronts and annihilation seemed imminent that the Communists finally conceded that they must abandon this fixed area of land and attempted a breakout (Laqueur 1976, 247). Their success in breaking free has often been depicted as evidence of a strategy of trading space for time rather than holding territory, but really the Communists were just reacting in the same way as any other besieged force facing surrender or retreat. Moreover, it was not actually Mao but the Comintern agent Otto Braun who made the fateful decision to abandon Jiangxi and begin the Long March (Durschmeid 2008, 189). Mao was not even informed about the decision, which was made in May 1934, until August (Sun 2007, 161–162). No element of the decision to flee can be attributed to Mao and, in fact, it seems likely he would have opposed such a move if given the option. The extent to which Mao rejected the notion of abandoning a base even in the face of extreme enemy pressure had been demonstrated two years earlier, when he condemned the leader of the neighbouring Fourth Red Army for ‘warlordism and flightism’ after he broke out of a Guomindang encirclement operation and headed for the safer area of Sichuan to the north (Fenby 2008, 243).

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Once the Long March had been completed, Mao again embedded his forces within a fixed base, this time in Yan’an. Mao remained there for over a decade, through the entire war against Japan, until he was forcibly ejected in early 1947 (Wilson 1971, 247). Again, his retreat was not by choice, but a result of the overwhelming force of the Guomindang attack, which caught his forces off guard and overwhelmed them (Paine 2012, 250). Mao’s emotional attachment to Yan’an was so great that one of his first counteroffensives after losing the area was directed at the nearby city of Sipingjie. As one historian notes, this ‘was a tactical blunder by the PLA, brought on by Mao’s insistence on some form of revenge for the loss of Yan’an’ (Westad 2003, 157). War in the Countryside with Urban Elements: Mixed In his teachings, Mao articulated a position that embraced the countryside as the primary front of an insurgency, with the caveat that the cities were also somewhat important. In reality, Mao repeatedly demonstrated that he was more interested in the cities and the countryside. Of course, for the majority of the conflict the Communists were based in the countryside, but this was not a decision made willingly by the Communists, but rather an outcome that was forced upon him (Esherick 2010, 53–54). During the early 1920s, the Communist movement had revolved around the cities in China, especially sea ports such as Nanjing, Wuhan, and Shanghai, but when Chiang succeeded to the leadership of the Guomindang, he acted decisively to smash the Communist infrastructure within these and other cities. This killed off many advocates of urban rebellion and drove them into the countryside (Spence 1990, 272–273; Fenby 2004, 196; Lieberthal 1995, 43). Without this impetus, it is doubtful that the Communists would have shifted their centre of gravity away to rural rather than urban China during the decades that followed, but would instead have continued to focus their efforts within the cities. Mao himself acted in ways that demonstrated a stronger positivity towards the cities than is usually claimed. He first began to articulate pro-­ rural views after his posting to Hunan in the mid-1920s, yet in reality he was fairly disgruntled by this posting, which he viewed as insignificant. His protestations in favour of rural uprising should be understood more as a political statement to try to increase his own importance rather than a genuine conviction that a rural peasant uprising was the best form of insurrection for the Communists to pursue. This fact was confirmed by

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Mao’s attitude towards the 1927 and 1930 Communist urban uprisings, for which Mao was tasked with assaulting and capturing the city of Changsha and Nanchang. Contrary to popular belief, Mao agreed to participate voluntarily and led his forces to carry out the task assigned to them, albeit incompetently—at one stage Mao’s forces even ended up fighting one another (Onate 1979, 136–137). In fact, Mao was quite excited about the opportunity, because he was convinced that the fall of Changsha would lead to a nationwide revolution, like that experienced in Russia in 1917, but also felt that until these key cities were taken there was no point in attempting a broader insurrection across the rest of the country (T’ien-Wei 1992b, 228; Gasster 1972 82; Onate 1979, 141–142). During the Jiangxi era, Mao did eschew attacking large cities as a result of the small size and ill-prepared forces, but he was eager to seize and absorb small and medium-sized towns and cities within the area, including Tingzhou, Gutian, Ganzhou, and Ruijin, the latter of which became the Red capital (Chang and Halliday 2006, 65, 73, 91, 98–100, and 110; Sun 2007, 24–26). It is true that the Communists did not spend much time in the cities during the Sino-Japanese War, but this was not a voluntary choice, but rather a necessity that was forced upon them. Between them, the Japanese and the Guomindang maintained a tight grip over all of the major cities, so there was little the Communists could do to take the cities, even had they wanted them (Joes 2010, 16). When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the Communists immediately attempted to seize urban areas across northeast Manchuria (Levine 1987; Tanner 2003). As one historian describes, Mao hoped ‘to defeat the Nationalists in a swift and final showdown in the metropolitan centers of Manchuria and to occupy the entire region’ (Cheng 2005, 82). When the Guomindang attacked, the Chinese Communists were bidden by Mao to defend these cities, primarily with static defensive warfare, even when this seemed hopeless (Tanner 2003). Particular importance was attributed to defending the strategically important Shenyang-Jinzhou railway line and the city of Shanhaigua (Tanner 2003, 1201–1202). Mao envisaged that a decisive victory could be achieved and overruled Lin Biao’s ‘hit-and-run plan’ for the city’s defence, instead exhorting his commanders to ‘fight out the problem in one battle’ (Cheng 2005, 82–84). When the Communists were forced to retreat, Mao was so upset that he retired to hospital claiming sickness for the next five months (Cheng 2005, 85–88). Even then, the Communists continued their efforts to hold on to small and medium cities, as well as railway branch lines, while also continuing to

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pay attention towards the major cities by leaving behind Communist cadres to keep up political agitation within these population hubs (Tanner 2003, 1203–1204). Further interest in the cities was demonstrated when the Soviets retreated from Manchuria in March 1946, at which point the Communists lunged to take over the cities they left, including Harbin, Qiqihaer, and Sipingjie (Tanner 2003, 1207). When the Nationalists moved to capture the latter of these, Mao insisted that ‘a heroic positional defense of the city could achieve a decisive victory’ and demanded that his forces view the city as being ‘China’s Madrid’ (Cheng 2005, 75 and 96). He then ‘almost single-handedly directed his armed forces with the aim of holding Sipingjie with large-scale positional warfare. To this end, Mao instructed Lin Biao to defend the city at all costs and stated that a death toll of tens of thousands of people was the price they had to be prepared to pay to stop the Nationalists’ (Cheng 2005, 93). As a result, a bitter static defence was made that lasted 31 days and caused nearly 10,000 casualties on each side (Tanner 2003, 1208–11; Cheng 2005, 97). A similar chain of events occurred regarding the defence of Changchun, which Mao also labelled as ‘China’s Madrid’ (Cheng 2005, 94). Even at the lowest ebbs of their fortune in mid-1946, the Communists continued to hold on to the major cities of Harbin, Qiqihaer, and Jiamusi (Tanner 2003, 1214). The end result was that, when the Communists surrounded and captured all of the cities in first Manchuria and then mainland China after 1947, this did not represent a new focus upon the cities following a deliberately chosen rural strategy for the earlier periods of the Revolutionary Civil War. Instead, it stood merely as a perpetuation of the urban fixation that Mao had demonstrated repeatedly throughout the conflict, but which had been blunted previously by the strength of his adversaries rather than because of any great desire by Mao to fight first in the countryside and later in the cities.  ases Behind Enemy Lines: Mixed B Mao displayed little real interest in forming bases behind enemy lines for most of the Revolutionary Civil War. The exception to this was the Sino-­ Japanese War, during which Mao did make noteworthy efforts to implement this strategy. Mao’s activities during the Hunan Peasant Uprisings in the late 1920s concentrated on stoking the local peasants into a nationwide uprising that tore down the existing political and social order and replaced it with a

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Communist regime. While Mao interacted with various peasant organisations, his goal was not to convince them to gradually build a network of bases behind the enemy, but to band together and engage in a whirlwind of violence that culminated rapidly in a nationwide insurrection. During his time in both Jiangxi and Yan’an, Mao’s energies were more focused on the embedding of a singular impenetrable stronghold far away from enemy control than on creating many small bases behind enemy lines (Joes 2010, 22). In each location, he hoped that this remote bastion could form the central hub of a distinct kingdom rather just one of a network of bases behind the enemy. During the Jiangxi era, a number of other soviet areas did spring up—eight in total—but Mao tended to see these as potential rivals, and limited his efforts to co-ordinate with them (Whitson 1973, 47). This was shown during Chiang’s fourth encirclement campaign, when Mao was instructed by Moscow to assist two fellow soviets, but instead he mostly sat idly while they were destroyed (Chang and Halliday 2006, 113). Even combined together, the scale of these enterprises remained small— just 10 million people across 160,000 square kilometres out of a population of 400–500 million spread across 4 million square miles—and were all clustered in or around the Jiangxi region (Chang and Halliday 2006, 98). It is true that soldiers and camp followers were left in  locations across China during the Long March, but these departures were unwanted desertions, not deliberate seeding efforts (Sun 2007, 254–266, 302–311, 462–466, and 538). Furthermore, these left behind people seldom managed to establish anything as productive as building and maintaining a base of operations against Communist foes, but instead they were often persecuted or killed by the local population (Sun 2007, 747). After the start of the war against Japan, there was a growth of bases behind enemy lines, but even at this stage, when the population was rife for cultivation, the scale of these efforts remained mixed. By the end of the war, there existed 19 bases, concentrated primarily in North China and northern Central China (O’Ballance 1962, 142; Whitson 1973, 80–81; Johnson 1962, 71–72). Vast swathes of the country remained untouched. This geographic distribution represented, for the most part, the fact that the Communists were only able to expand into the areas behind the Japanese lines, with little headway made into Guomindang zones (Yang 2011, 318). Expanding behind Japanese lines was generally easy to achieve because the Japanese were mostly disinterested in the Communists and made no effort to check their expansion. When the Japanese did resist, the

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Communists crumpled, as shown during the Japanese Three Alls campaign in which the Japanese reduced the Communist base areas from 80 to 50 million people (O’Ballance 1962, 137). It was only once the Japanese diverted their troops elsewhere that the Communists could expand (O’Ballance 1962, 145). Expanding behind Guomindang lines was more difficult, because Chiang had blockaded the main Communist forces in the north with 150,000–200,000 of his best troops (Liu 1956, 205; O’Ballance 1962, 139). When the Fourth Army pushed their luck too extensively in 1940–1941 outside of their agreed area of action, the Guomindang annihilated their headquarters detachment (Furuya 1981 675–677; Yang 2011, 317–318). During the final civil war, the Communists focused more on the seizure of territory from the enemy via invasion using conventional forces than through the injection of cadres into potential base areas behind enemy lines. In fact, most work teams only moved into villages that the Communists had already captured (Westad 2003, 130). Politics  lass Warfare: Mixed C Class warfare certainly played a role in how Mao conducted himself during the Revolutionary Civil War. During his work as an observer during the Hunan Peasant Uprisings, for example, Mao encouraged the peasants in the area to undertake aggressive acts against rich landlords, local enforcers, rich peasants, and other feudal or capitalist individuals. This included meting out violent punishments and disenfranchising all but the lowest classes. Similarly, while his later purges in Jiangxi affected a broad cross section of society, their stated justification remained the rooting out of hidden landowners and merchants (Sun 2007, 224–226). Occasional lulls in efforts to mobilise the poorest peasants against the richer ones did occur during the final two years of the civil war, but these were minor aberrations, rather than generalised policy (Harris 1978, 28). Mao did not seek to win power and then, once he was in control, to set about constructing a new social and political order. Instead, he sought to do to both at the same time. Much has been made of Johnson’s claim that the Chinese Communists secured power by portraying themselves as nationalists rather than Marxists, particularly during the war against Japan (Johnson 1962, ix).

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This may have some truth to it. However, as Johnson alludes, many elements of nationalist feeling in China were bound up with the notion of the rectification of inequalities between classes through violence. For example, many of the secret societies co-opted by the Communists, such as the Red Spears and the Big Swords and United Village Associations, were already committed to the goal of improving the peasant’s lot in relation to landlords and other repressive forces (Johnson 1962, 88). While the Communists did to some extent depict themselves as nationalists, this supplemented rather than replaced their depiction of themselves as champions of class change. As Johnson himself notes, ‘Communism and nationalism were fused in wartime China’ (Johnson 1962, 8). Yet, it is worth noting that there were also aspects of the conflict that clashed with the notion of a genuine class war. One of these was the hierarchy that Mao instituted within the military forces over which he presided, which operated on a ranking basis that did not fit easily with the idea of a classless society. Mao’s response when criticised about this exact issue was not to deny the hierarchical structure of the military, but instead to claim that ‘absolute equalitarianism is a mere illusion of peasants and small proprietors… even under socialism there can be no equality’ (Mao 1965, 111). This contrasted heavily with the American Revolutionary War, for example, where units in both the Continental Army and rebel militia elected their commanders rather than having them installed for them by an unelected political party. Moreover, he was happy for the upper echelons of the Communist Party to live a life of luxury while the lower echelons of the movement were left to struggle in much more difficult conditions. During the Long March, for example, Mao and the other members of the Communist hierarchy did not share the same burdens as the other members of the retreating Red Army, with Mao doing no marching or walking whatsoever during the journey (Nicholson 2008, 250; Chang and Halliday 2006, 137). Similarly, after being based in Yan’an for long enough to be sure that the Communists were safe from attack by the Guomindang or Japanese, Mao apprehended the abandoned house of a rich merchant and lived there for the next five years in relative luxury (visit to Yan’an by the author). These elements somewhat undermined the degree to which Mao can be seen as having genuinely pursued class warfare.

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 oliticised Warfare: Mixed P The notion that Mao, during his rise to power, acted as a political mastermind is wrong. In fact, Mao changed his political vision multiple times and achieved only mixed results in relation to politically motivating his forces. The bright spot for Mao was his propaganda efforts, towards which he exerted considerable energy and which he generally handled deftly. While it is true that Mao always provided a political goal to his forces, he changed his mind repeatedly about what this goal should be. In the 1920s and early 1930s he wanted to defeat the White landlords and the Guomindang and portrayed Chiang as a tyrant (Harris 1978, 22). From 1937 to 1941, however, he inverted his position entirely to one of praising the patriotism and leadership of Chiang and the Guomindang, while declaring his hostility towards the Japanese (Harris 1978, 22). From 1941 to 1945 he maintained his opposition to the Japanese, but flipped his position regarding the Guomindang, and referred to the Americans in positive terms (Paine 2012, 228 and 234). During the final civil war, he reaffirmed his hatred towards the Guomindang, but now attacked the United States for imperialist meddling in Chinese affairs (Rees 1981, 5). These changes, usually undertaken to reflect changes in the context of the struggle or because of directives from the Comintern, prevented the presentation of an overarching political vision and instead created a tapestry of contradictory and fluctuating objectives. The same applied for social reform. Initially, Mao pushed ahead with radical social reforms that punished the upper and middle classes, redistributed land and wealth, and pushed peasants towards collective working (McAleavy 1967, 284–285; Rooney 2004, 138). During the war against Japan and the early final civil war, he advocated gradual social reforms that embraced all but the richest segments of society and allowed peasants of all economic levels to carry out private farming (Harris 1978, 24–27; Lieberthal 1995). Halfway through the civil war, he again pushed for radical social reforms, before swinging right again and curbing attacks on rich peasants (Harris 1978, 27–28). This confusing to-ing and fro-ing prevented the delivery of a clear message: Peasants living under Communist rule would have found themselves required to oppose rich peasants and the Guomindang in 1936, to embrace rich peasants and the Guomindang in 1938, to oppose the Guomindang again but not rich peasants in 1941, to oppose rich peasants again in 1947, and to tolerate them again in 1948.

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The extent to which Mao succeeded in infusing his armies with a political dimension was mixed. On the one hand, Mao employed the use of Communist cadres and political commissars to indoctrinate the Communist armed forces with a belief in the cause and devotion to Mao (Joes 1986, 101). The cause adopted was one that spoke to the hearts of the peasants, particularly the very poor or destitute (Westad 2003, 107). Sun interviewed several veterans of the Long March who cited their belief in the values and vision of the Red Army as underpinning their commitment to the movement. This was further supported with the use of political outreach workers, who staged plays, composed songs, and wrote slogans (Sun 2007,  23, 91, 382–383, 421, 522–525, and 610–611). On the other hand, the Communist armies often consisted of large numbers of hastily drafted or even kidnapped peasants, who often felt little attachment to the Communist cause (Sun 2007, 36–66, 106, 297, and 365; Chang and Halliday 2006, 308). The difficulties experienced with achieving a strong political ethos were demonstrated by the sheer number of desertions that plagued the Red Army for much of its existence (Sun 2007, 127–130, 231–233, 255–266, 303–310, 463–464, 459, 759, and 787; Chang and Halliday 2006, 282). Political propaganda was an area in which Mao invested considerable effort, mostly with positive results—some intended, some not. One masterstroke of propaganda was the arranged visit of Edgar Snow to the Communists in Yan’an (Sun 2007, 828). During his visit, the Communists pampered Snow with luxuries such as coffee, milk, and cigarettes, which were unavailable to normal Communists, and he was allowed to spend his time doing such activities as riding, playing tennis, and gambling (Sun 2007, 828–834). They created a glorified illusion of life in the camp, ensured that their movement came across as mildly socially democratic rather than purebred Marxist, and fed him a rich diet of lies and half-truths during personal interviews with senior Communists (Sun 2007, 826–837). Not content even with this, Mao repeatedly vetted and revised Snow’s finished work before its publication as Red Star Over China in 1937 (Sun 2007, 832–833). This hard work paid off handsomely. The book was an international sensation, changing overnight the way that the Western world viewed Mao and the Communists, indicating that not only were they benevolent democrats with socialist tendencies, but they were also the central force in the fight against the Japanese (both of which were untrue). It also helped to remould Chinese perspectives internally about

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‘the bandits of Jiangxi’ and inspired a number of young radicals to flock to the Communist flag in the mistaken belief that they offered a progressive rule and opposition to the Japanese (Sun 2007, 837–841; Boot 2013, 338–339). Some areas of propaganda did not progress so well. The fallout from being associated with the Soviets when they allied with the Nazis in 1939 and again when they occupied Manchuria in 1945 was detrimental to the Communist image (Taylor 2011, 344; Goldstein 1992, 110; Chang and Halliday 2006, 285). Mao was also adept at nurturing his own cult of personality, through a mixture of violent thought control (described later), invidious psychological work, and ceaseless political manoeuvring. This helped to cement his authority within the party and reduce the chances for the kind of disobedience which periodically challenged Chiang’s leadership of the Guomindang. Mao’s success here was not complete, as shown by his occasional disagreements with other members of the Communist Party. This included a virulent spat with Lin Biao in 1945–1946 about the methods that the Communists should use to defend their cities in Manchuria against Guomindang attacks (Tanner 2003, 1208–1211; Cheng 2005, 97).  entralised Command and Some Dispersed Power: Mixed C During his early career, Mao was frequently insubordinate. One example of disobedience to the Central Committee occurred when, after abandoning a Communist Party-mandated attack on the Hunan city of Changsha in 1927, he retreated into the Jinggang Mountains, an act for which he was repeatedly condemned by the Party and deprived of all his posts (Carter 1976, 68). A further example happened in 1929, when he defied party orders by withdrawing his forces from the battle for several cities in Hupei province during the Autumn Harvest Uprising (Ellis 1995, 179; Carter 1976, 75; Gasster 1972, 83). Ultimately, ‘Mao’s actions certainly suggest that he had no qualms about disregarding directives with which he disagreed … When Mao did not want to do something, he simply refused’ (Lynch 2017, chapter 2). When he was in a position of dominance, however, Mao expected absolute obedience from his subordinates. Whenever his orders were questioned, he punished the offenders and forced them to engage in ‘self-criticism,’ a process through which they were forced to admit their mistakes and praise Mao at length in front of a range of observers. One example is Chou En’lai who was made to undertake five days of abject

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self-­criticism in front of the party, while also praising Mao (Chang and Halliday 2006, 257). The public nature of these proclamations reinforced the cult of leadership which increasingly surrounded Mao. Mao’s requirement for absolute obedience extended past the Party’s leadership to the lower ranks of the Party and the general population, all of whom were encouraged and coerced into viewing Mao as a godlike figure. The purges that Mao carried out in Jiangxi and Yan’an, discussed later, demonstrated that he would not tolerate dissent or independent thought from anyone (Chang and Halliday 2006, 87–99 and 232–245). Mao also interfered constantly in the affairs of lower levels, demanding repeatedly in both Jiangxi and Yan’an, for example, that categorisations of rich peasants and landlords be changed according to his specifications, even to the point of isolating individual cases (Mao 1975a, 70; 1975b, 112 and 135). He also imposed endless top-down laws, required unconditional obedience, and reserved the right to alter or rescind any decision by any organ (Mao 1975b, 58; Guillermaz 1968, 336–339). These two contrasting approaches suggest that Mao employed the use of a centralised command model if, and only if, he was in command. Whenever this was the case, Mao demanded absolute obedience to his will from all tiers of the party and population under Communist rule, allowed for little devolution of power—and even then only when it undermined potential rivals or subordinates about whom he cared little—and frequently micromanaged local issues. When he was not in overall control, however, Mao adopted a decentralised model because this empowered him to reject, ignore, or reinterpret the orders from his superiors. As a result, Mao’s application of both centralised and decentralised models of command appears to have been less motivated by any great strategic or political intent, but rather by a personal drive for power that made him lean to one side or the other of this equation in order to maximise his own power at every juncture. S hadow Government: Accurate Generally, the Communists under Mao did pursue the development of shadow government institutions within the areas they controlled, although there were a few exceptions, caveats, and limitations that impacted upon the strength of these efforts. At the beginning of his career, Mao’s forays with this aspect of insurgent warfare was restricted to being an observer as many of the Poor Peasant Associations that were formed as part of the Hunan Peasant Uprisings were established by the peasants themselves some

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time prior to the arrival of Mao. Mao’s role was limited to liaising with these organisations, propagandising Communist Party views, and writing reports (Spence 1990, 355–356). During the Jiangxi period, the soviet governments formed by Mao and the surrounding Communist ­fiefdoms included the core rudiments of administration, including government offices, schools, and medical facilities (Dreyer 2010, 71). During the Sino-Japanese War, the Communists built up even more political agencies in the areas they controlled (Guillermaz 1968, 336–343). The Communists were scarcely alone in pursuing this end though as both the Guomindang and the Japanese also worked to create governing bodies in the areas they controlled. The former had begun this process prior to the war, particularly during the so-called Nanjing decade, and continued this process throughout the conflict years (Bedeski 1992, 33–48). As one scholar notes, ‘When the Communists won the final civil war with the Guomindang in 1949, they inherited an agenda for state-building that the Nationalists had already drawn up and partially implemented’ (Bedeski 1992, 48). The latter attempted to do so by promoting the collaborationist regime under Wang Jingwei (Furuya 1981, 623–624; T’ien-Wei 1992b, 68–72; van de Ven 2003, 249 and 269). In some ways, the scene resembled a civil war scenario in which three rival factions attempted to embed their own governing bodies over areas that they controlled, almost as a method of creating independent fiefdoms. This was different to the scenario encountered in many earlier insurgencies, where the building of shadow agencies occurred under the jurisdiction of an established incumbent power, often running parallel, as per the development of workers’ soviets in Moscow and Petrograd by Russian revolutionaries in 1917 (DeFronzo 1991, 38–42; Hobsbawm 1995, 62). The government building undertaken by the Chinese Communists still fits into the grouping of shadow governance, but should be recognised as one strand of the theme, rather than the entire category. The Communists did attempt to build shadow agencies in areas outside of their control, but usually with limited results. Nationalist espionage was particularly effective at suppressing these attempts. In 1942, for example, the Guomindang captured the Communist Jiangxi Provincial Committee, which in turn enabled them to capture the Southern Work Committee and eliminate the Communist Party apparatus from Jiangxi, Guangxi, Fujian, and Zhejiang (van de Ven 2003, 285–286). During the final civil war, shadow agency efforts stalled. The mass enlistment of the militia forces from Communist-controlled provinces

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must have undermined the existence of shadow governments by removing many of the people who provided the infrastructure of these institutions. Furthermore, when the Guomindang captured the bulk of Communist territory during the first two years of the conflict, they destroyed whatever governmental infrastructure had been developed. As Westad explains: In the villages that the Communists left, the traditional order returned with a vengeance. Those peasants who had taken advantage of the land confiscations were punished and sometimes killed by the returning landlords. The local cadres were caught, ran away or renounced the CCP. The defections were particularly troubling to the CCP leadership. They testified in all too obvious ways to the fickleness of its position in the countryside. As long as the Communist armies were there, local cadres would carry out land reform and instigate political campaigns. But with military protection gone, the new adherents to the cause—those who had been recruited during the last phase of the war against Japan and during the post-war years—often switched allegiance. While in most cases in the ‘old’ Communist areas—base areas set up during the first years of the anti-Japanese war—escaped into the mountains or marches when their areas were overrun by the GMD, the CCP organizations in the ‘new’ areas were simply wiped out. (Westad 2003, 61–62)

When the Communists expanded their territory rapidly after 1947, efforts to install Communist governments struggled due to a shortage of qualified cadres (Harris 1978, 27). Population  opular Mobilisation: Inaccurate P Rather than building a massive popular base and cresting on this wave to victory, the Chinese Communists secured only limited backing from the population. What support they did achieve was usually gained through either coercion or weary acceptance by fatigued peasants who just wanted to be left alone. For most of their early existence, the Communists were an unknown force that commanded little attention. The population of China as a whole numbered from 400 million to 500 million, yet the number of people ruled over by the Communists represented a mere fraction of this until the very final years of the conflict. During the Jiangxi era, Mao ruled over just 10 million people and upon arrival in Yan’an this number shrunk yet fur-

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ther to just 1.42 million (Guillermaz 1968, 251; Joes 2010, 63; T’ien-Wei 1992b, 81). Even when Japanese brutalities caused more of the ­population of North China to become more sympathetic to the Communists, a platform of support in other parts of China simply did not materialise (Joes 2010, 38–39). While their territory had expanded to encompass 65 million people by 1945, the Communists had few opportunities to implement serious social land reforms because they lacked the depth of control that this would have required (Mitter 2009, 81). When the Communists finally triumphed over the Guomindang, it was through a large-scale conventional campaign with a regular army that was recruited via oppressive drafting methods, rather than as a result of an explosive upsurge of popular violence by the people that overwhelmed the government (Moran 2001, 58). In fact, the majority of peasants were observers rather than participators of the revolution, and most of those peasants who obeyed the orders of the Communists who ruled over them did so because they were punished if they did not (Priestland 2009, 263; Margolin 1999, 473). Those people over whom the Communists did govern felt little affection for their rulers. Appalling purges and high taxes in Jiangxi led to mass dissatisfaction, to the extent that ‘peasants rebelled in district after district,’ with some calling for Mao’s death and one segment of the Red Army even staged a mutiny against the repression (Margolin 1999, 472; Chang and Halliday 2006, 89; Fenby 2008, 223). The exploitation and purges of the population by the Communists led hundreds of thousands of people to flee for Nationalist-held territories, including even Communist fighters and officials (Sun 2007, 230–234). ‘Some people came back with the advancing Nationalist troops as scouts, guides, and spies … Whatever support the Communists still enjoyed they had squandered’ (Sun 2007, 232–233). The abandonment of the peasantry of Jiangxi was a blow for the reputation of the Communists and, rather than sowing the seeds of future Communist support, the Long March squandered its recruitment and goodwill-generating potential by antagonising rather than embracing the inhabitants of the regions they passed through (Guillermaz 1968, 251). A French missionary in the area described how the Communists upset the population: The arrival of the Red troops was greeted joyfully by the common people, who had suffered so much from government soldiery. Little by little, however, massive executions of the wealthy, and then of the proletariat suspected

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of being lukewarm towards the new regime, damped people’s enthusiasm. The initial joy was succeeded by a general uneasiness. Finally, the people greeted the departure of the Red Army with the same feeling of relief as they had welcomed its arrival. (Pelissier 1967, 336–338)

Other groups of peasants were even more hostile, including the Tibetans, who conducted guerrilla raids against the Communists as they traversed their territory (Spence 1990, 408; Chang and Halliday 2006, 157; Haswell 1973, 183; Wright 1989, 21). Part of the unhappiness occurred because the areas that the Communists passed through lacked the resources to bear an armed force of that size. The very presence of the army led to a massive depletion of crops, cattle, and other necessities, which led to deprivation and starvation, a problem which continued even after the Communists reached Yan’an (Sun 2007, 694–695, 730–743, 783–784, and 883–884). This alienation was so deep that the wounded soldiers and cadres that they left behind in the villages that they passed through were often slaughtered by the people living in those areas once the Communists departed (Fenby 2004, 262; Sun 2007, 750–751). Horrifying purges in Yan’an were equally unpopular, leading to a culture of fear rather than positivity, with one scholar noting that ‘what Mao lost in popularity, he gained in fear’ (Margolin 1999, 475). Adding to the unpopularity of the Chinese Communists was their connections with the Soviet Union and their defence of unpopular Russian actions, such as the invasion of Poland and Finland, which undermined their nationalist credentials (Goldstein 1992, 110). Even at the start of the final civil war, when the Communists were supposedly at the peak of their popularity, both active support and passive sympathy were lower than has been assumed. Within their own territory, the movement was rocked by an uprising of discontented peasants under the leadership of the Yellow Rifles secret society, which had to be violently suppressed (Fenby 2008, 334). Across China more generally, they suffered other backlashes against their association with the Soviet Union, for example, as a result of the Soviet plundering occupation of Manchuria (Chang and Halliday 2006, 285; Taylor 2011, 344). They were also resented for their eagerness to resume fighting against the Guomindang at a time when most Chinese wanted peace and believed that, because the Guomindang was the central government, the Communists should not be fighting against them (Chang and Halliday 2006, 285).

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Peasants outside of the Communist-controlled areas were rarely inclined to rise up in their favour either. During Mao’s attempts to rally the peasantry in Hunan during the 1927 Autumn Harvest Uprisings, the peasants mostly ignored him (Furuya 1981, 230). Attempts to rally support for the movement outside of Communist territory during the Jiangxi era similarly failed. Indeed, in the fourth and fifth encirclement campaigns the Guomindang were able to mobilise the population surrounding the Soviet area against the Communists, increasing the pressure on them yet further (Moran 2001, 46). During the entire Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, there was not a single spontaneous uprising, rural or urban, which broke out to support the Communists outside of the territory they controlled (Chang and Halliday 2006, 314). Even towards the end of the war, urban workers—traditionally the bread and butter supporters of Marxism— remained sceptical of the Communists (Chang and Halliday 2006, 314; Levine 1987, 126). Similarly, despite a general weariness shown towards the Nationalist government, only one of the political parties—the insignificantly sized Democratic League, which according to one author was anyway ‘a Communist front organization’— jettisoned the regime to join the Communists (Furuya 1981, 891). Little changed during the final civil war, with those peasants that were conquered by the Communists accepting their fate rather than rejoicing in it. Few, if any, rallied to support their new overlords, but instead, ‘in most areas the large majority of peasants remained spectators, treating the Communists no differently than other power holders who had controlled their villages over the past decades’ (Westad 2003, 69 and 108). As Levine notes, ‘In the countryside, most peasants looked suspiciously upon the Communists as outsiders, while in the cities pervasive doubt existed as to the CCP prospect’s for survival, let alone victory’ (Levine 1987, 186). Chang and Halliday confirm this appraisal, giving an example from 1946: One Red Army officer illustrated the lack of popular good will that existed towards the Communists when he recollected the different attitudes displayed towards the Reds and Whites when they fought over [the city of] Jilin in 1946: ‘we were hungry and thirsty when we got to Jilin … There was not a soul in the street … But when the enemy entered the city; somehow the folks all appeared, waving little flags and cheering … Imagine our anger!’ (Chang and Halliday 2006, 285)

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It is worth mentioning briefly here that the Guomindang, particularly Chiang, possessed a huge following. When he was imprisoned in Xi’an, ‘profound agony and concern’ swept the country and when he was released people across the country rejoiced in spontaneous celebrations (Taylor 2011, 128 and 135; Furuya 1981, 521–524). As one scholar notes, ‘The nationwide celebration of his release showed only too clearly that he was indeed a national leader enjoying immense popular support’ (Furuya 1981, 523). Towards the end of the war against Japan and throughout the final civil war, Chiang addressed the nation via radio broadcasts on a regular basis (Furuya 1981, 774, 820, 830, 884, 886), in a manner not dissimilar to Roosevelt’s ‘fireside chats.’ His support base remained larger than that of the Communists until the last two years of the final civil war. When Chu Teh claimed in 1945 that the Chinese Communists ruled over 100 million people in North China with a membership of 1.2 million, he neglected to mention that the Guomindang were supported by over 350 million people across three-quarters of China and had 3 million members, which in itself represented a doubling of party membership since 1937 (T’ien-Wei 1992b, 102). Even if the Communists had succeeded in achieving some degree of popular support, the impact of this was muted because of the far greater popularity that Chiang and his followers enjoyed. This fact has been edited out by historians, with Edgar Snow being a particularly egregious offender in this regard. In the original edition of Red Star Over China, Snow reported, for example, that Chiang’s return to Nanjing in 1937 (after being released from imprisonment in Xi’an) led to a ‘tremendous popular demonstration,’ which confirmed his standing across the nation as being ‘higher than that of any leader in modern history’ (Snow 1944, 471). He quietly deleted this observation from later versions of the same work, which represents a shocking effort to rewrite history (Snow 1972). The contest between the Guomindang and the Communists was not, therefore, one of a reviled government overwhelmed by beloved rebels, but rather a bitter struggle in which for the majority of the conflict the incumbent enjoyed a far broader and more extensive platform of support than the insurgent.  nited Front: Limited U From 1922 to 1949, the Communists participated in two United Fronts that allied them with the Guomindang against shared enemies. Yet, this decision was not made willingly by the Communists but was rather forced upon by the Soviet Union who did not believe that the Communists had

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the strength to win the war by themselves (Boot 2013, 331). It was the Soviet Union that first instructed the Communists to ally themselves with the Guomindang for the First United Front in 1922 and then, as part of the political struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, the former insisted that the Chinese Communists remain part of the union, even when signs of an impending Guomindang crackdown multiplied (Onate 1979, 132–137; Joes 2010, 14; Lieberthal 1995, 43). After the Communists managed to wrangle free from the White Terror that marked the end of the First United Front, they made no significant further attempts to form another. In fact, recent research suggests that the Guomindang offered a new United Front against the Japanese to the Chinese Communists as early as in 1931, only to be rebuffed (Chang and Halliday 2006, 98). Braun makes a similar claim, although he suggests a date of the summer of 1936 (Braun 1982, 172). It was only when Stalin insisted that the Chinese Communists form a United Front again with the Guomindang, this time to help buttress the Soviet Union’s prospects against the looming threats of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, that Mao acquiesced to the idea (Asprey 1994, 252). Even at this stage, they were reluctant. When Chiang was captured at Xi’an in December 1936 by two disobedient provincial governors and former warlords, Mao was thrilled by the possibility of trying the Generalissimo in front of a ‘People’s Tribunal’ and executing him (Fenby 2008, 270; Furuya 1981, 517; Taylor 2011, 129). It was only at Stalin’s insistence that the Communists agreed to work for his release, so that Stalin could use a unified China as a bulwark against Japanese aggression against Siberia (Furuya 1981, 518; Taylor 2011, 129). Chang and Halliday report, that after Stalin told Mao to get Chiang released in exchange for a coalition with the Guomindang, Mao flew into a rage and refused to acknowledge the communication for several days, before finally caving in to the Soviet dictator’s demand (Chang and Halliday 2006, 185). During the war against Japan, Mao tried repeatedly to undermine and even attack the Guomindang. Braun catalogues numerous occasions after 1937 when Mao endeavoured to undermine the United Front, an approach which continued after his departure in 1939 (Braun 1982, 133–134, 154, 165–172, 183–262). At least several times in 1940, Mao proposed to Stalin that the Chinese Communists should launch an all-out attack upon their Nationalist partners (Braun 1982, 221–226). At around the same time, the Communist Fourth Army was directed to limit its attention to the Japanese and concentrate on undermining the

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Guomindang (Furuya 1981, 675). This included forcibly disarming all non-Communist militias and guerrilla forces in their vicinity and forcing them to join their own ranks (Furuya 1981, 675). After the Nationalists responded to these repeated provocations in 1941 by destroying the Communist Fourth Army, Mao wanted to break off the United Front and only stayed within the coalition because Stalin insisted that the Chinese Communists remain (Paine 2012, 156; Fenby 2004, 365). After the war ended, Mao tore apart the domestic United Front by actions such as the seizure of land and assets from everyone but the poorest of peasants, creating compulsory communes and forcing urban intellectuals to go out into the countryside to learn from the peasantry. At an international level, he aspired to create a global United Front against capitalism and imperialism. Initially, he was content for China to be the junior partner, but as relations with the Soviet Union soured, he aimed instead for China to lead the movement. A mixture of misfortune and crass diplomacy hindered this ambition, and by the second half of the 1960s China was virtually isolated on the international stage (Zhai 2000, 175). To some extent, Mao’s cynical approach towards the notion of a United Front is not dissimilar to that used by other Marxist groups towards this kind of alliance. Nevertheless, his actions were distinctly at odds with his teachings on the topic, and so this represents another area where Mao was not ‘Maoist.’  ourteous Conduct: Inaccurate C Much has been made of Mao’s supposedly benign attitude towards civilians, but the reality was markedly different. It is no secret that Mao could be very aggressive in his approach towards landlords and heads of industry and these groups were treated poorly. Moving down the scale, rich peasants enjoyed—at least in theory—occasional respite from violent punishments, but were, nonetheless, treated badly, enduring measures such as the confiscation of large tracts of good land in exchange for tiny parcels of poor land. Life for members of these two classes who lived in Communist-­ held territory was, unsurprisingly, unpleasant. For the general mass of the peasants, Communist propaganda brought with it the promise of a better life and a good number of this group were drawn towards the movement as a result (Sun 2007, 22–23). However, it was not merely the rich peasants who suffered ill treatment because the Communists subjected the entire population to a range of burdens. The first was a demanding policy of taxes, extracted in money, grain, salt, and

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other resources. In Jiangxi, vast amounts of food were taken from the peasants to feed the Communist war effort, which led to unhappiness, starvation, and, ultimately, massive depopulation (Chang and Halliday 2006, 103–107). As Chang and Halliday note: Although peasants now got their own land, and ground rent was abolished, they were in general worse off than before. Prior to this, most people had some possessions beyond those needed for sheer survival; now those extras were taken away, under various ruses. One way was to coerce people to buy ‘revolutionary war bonds.’ To pay for these, women were made to cut their hair so that they would hand over their silver hairpins, together with their last bit of jewelry—traditionally their life savings. The fact that people had such jewelry in pre-Communist days was a telling indication that their standard of living had been higher then. After people brought the war bonds, there would be ‘return bonds campaigns,’ to browbeat purchases to give back the bonds for nothing. The upshot was, as some daring inhabitants bemoaned, that ‘the Communists’ bonds are worse than the Nationalists’ taxes.’ The method was the same with food. (Chang and Halliday 2006, 104)

When the Nationalists returned, they were met with relief. As Furuya explains: ‘The Communists had been marauding the province of Jiangxi for the past six or seven years. Countless people had been murdered, rendered homeless or driven into exile. With the recovery of the Communist areas by government troops, the refugees gradually drifted back’ (Furuya 1981, 433). No improvements were made over the following years, with the result that by 1937 links between the Chinese Communists and the peasantry were virtually non-existent (Joes 2010, 39). One scholar has calculated that in 1941, the Communists requisitioned four times as much grain per person from their population than the Guomindang (Margolin 1999, 472). In response to Japanese campaigns that captured considerable Communist-held territory, ‘the Communists increased their demands from the farmers and peasants to support the diminished base. Harsh manual labour was imposed and campaigns launched against anybody suspected of less than complete loyalty’ (Fenby 2008, 301). A second burden on the well-being of the general peasantry was forced conscription. During the Jiangxi period and the Long March, Mao utilised a bullying system in which males were required to join the Red Army or have their families punished or killed (Sun 2007, 45–66, 105–106, 297; Chang and Halliday 2006, 104 and 107; Boot 2013, 337). During

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the war against Japan, peasants were similarly impressed (Furuya 1981, 675). By the time of the final civil war, the majority of the Communist’s armies were filled not by altruistic volunteers who felt passionate about the cause but instead by uninspired peasant masses who had been forced to join (Chang and Halliday 2006, 308–309). The implementation of military strategies that facilitated considerable harm to the population represented a third onus upon the peasantry. During the Jiangxi era, for example, the Communists allowed the Guomindang to advance deep into their territory during each of their encirclement campaigns, before retaking it, multiple times if necessary. This exposed the population to the misery of living perpetually in the path of advancing armies, each of whom caused considerable incidental damage and inflicted horrifying retributive justice upon them each time they covered the territory in question (Fenby 2008, 223; de Lee 1985, 36–37). Nastier still, the Communists frequently imposed a scorched earth policy whenever they retreated from an area and forced the depopulation of local communities (de Lee 1988, 132–133). A fourth hardship for the peasantry was the overzealous application of land reform initiatives. Theoretically these reforms were meant to disenfranchise and punish rich landowners to the benefit of poorer peasants, but the reality was far messier. The classifications given to the peasants were often wrong, so that peasants without significant wealth were often punished. Worse still, those peasants who benefitted initially from Communist expropriations found themselves the victims of subsequent rounds, when they were perceived as landowners (Paine 2012, 230–231). Adding yet further to peasant uneasiness about supporting Communist land reforms was a fear that the landlords would return and punish them (Paine 2012, 230–231). A fifth burden came from the Communist desire to obtain military equipment from the Soviet Union through two-way trade with their northern ally. The problem for the Communists was that they had little to offer in exchange for the weapons, ammunition, and other military aid that they so desperately wanted and needed. Consequently, the decision was made to offer food and a bargain was struck in 1946 that led to the export of 1 million tons of food every year from the Communist-held territories to the Soviet Union. This left insufficient food for the peasantry and contributed to a massive famine that killed 10,000 people in Yan’an in 1947 alone (Chang and Halliday 2006, 292–292).

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Much has been made of the fact that Communist forces always gave money in exchange for the food and goods that they took from the peasantry. This may be true, although it is probably exaggerated. More importantly, this money was not normally particularly welcome because the amount of food available was often limited in the regions from which the Communists pilfered them. What use was Communist money to a peasant looking to feed his family if there was no food to spend the money that they were given on? (Sun 2007, 739–740). Communist money also had negative connotations. As Griffiths notes, during the war against Japan, ‘One need scarcely wonder why this “money” was not too popular—a peasant caught by the Japanese with “liberation” currency on him carried a death warrant in his pocketbook’ (Griffith 1968, 76). Moderate Violence: Inaccurate Mao and his followers engaged in mass violence against the population that went well beyond the moderate level of violence embraced in Mao’s teachings. The exact number of civilians killed by the Communists during their rise to power remains unclear, but most recent historians who have studied the topic agree that the total is extremely high, with estimates ranging from 1.8 million to 11.7 million (Valentino 2004, 88; Rummel 1991, 17). Anti-civilian violence manifested itself in a variety of ways, including massacres, assassinations, executions, mass imprisonment, and forced labour (Margolin 1999, 474). As Moran poignantly summarises, ‘Brutality towards recalcitrant civilians was also part of the Maoist method. The revolutionary fish swimming in the sea of the people was, in real life, a piranha’ (Moran 2001, 49). There were numerous instances of deliberately inflicted mass violence by the Communist Party during the period. One was an aggressive purge, undertaken on Mao’s orders, within the Jiangxi Soviet. This spate of anti-­ civilian killing, which caused between 186,000 and 700,000 civilian deaths, predated Stalin’s Great Purges of 1936–1938 by over half a decade (Carter 1976, 76; Montefiore 2008, 228; Margolin 1999, 472; Chang and Halliday 2006, 108; Sun 2007, 218). It included horrifying torture, such as that inflicted on the provincial Communist Committee in Jiangxi in December 1930: ‘Their flesh were burned with incense sticks, they were hung by the hands and beaten with split bamboo, bamboo splinters were forced under their fingernails, their hands were nailed on tables, burning rods were pushed up their backsides’ (Sun 2007, 202–203). Mao’s role in

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promoting these horrific activities was so acute that he was censured and temporarily removed from his position in late 1931 for alienating the population with terrorist excesses (Margolin 1999, 472). Notably, the purge was not limited to the upper classes, but struck throughout the entire breadth of the population with little differentiation. Some peasants and party members were accused of being members of the so-called Anti-­ Bolshevik League and purged accordingly. These allegations were so ­fictitious that even the official History of the Communist Party was forced to concede in 1991 that ‘there was never an AB clique in the Communist Party, and the so-called AB members were the result of torture’ (Sun 2007, 221). Other peasants were labelled as rich peasants or landlords and purged accordingly, again without any grounds. Three survivors confirmed this to Sun in an interview: After Mao’s cleansing were there any landlords left? I asked the three wise men sitting with me in front of the shrine hall. ‘Maybe the ghosts of the landlords,’ one said. ‘They were all killed. Even their children were gone.’ ‘They did come up with more,’ the second man corrected him. ‘You call those landlords?’ the third one almost shouted. ‘None of them had more than ten dan of rice, barely enough for a family to scrape by on. But then anything could turn a man into a landlord, a pig in the pigsty, a farm hand, some extra cash, or a better harvest by hard work. It was a farce.’ (Sun 2007, 225–226)

Otto Braun, who was in Jiangxi while the purges were under way, confirmed the existence of this terror, commenting critically about the existence of ‘a reign of terror, directed against potential allies and even dissenting Communists … Prisoners-of-war, Party cadres, and Red Army soldiers fell victim to mass arrests and executions’ (Braun 1982, 9 and 15). A further purge took place in Yan’an from 1942 to 1943 under Mao’s direction, which included torture, round-the-clock interrogations, forced denunciations, and terrifying mass ‘struggle’ meetings (Margolin 1999, 474; Priestland 2009, 259–261; T’ien-Wei 1992b, 93). Many tens of thousands of people were killed and, again, the victims were not limited to the upper classes (Furuya 1981, 747–748). As one scholar notes, ‘at Resistance Japan University, 602 people were ferreted out on suspicion of being KMT spies. This was 57.2 per cent of cadres of platoon level at the university’ (T’ien-Wei 1992b, 93). One former Communist leader later pointed out to a number of similarities between the violence in Yan’an and

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the later Cultural Revolution (T’ien-Wei 1992b, 93). Further anti-­civilian violence against the population occurred during the final civil war, a continuation that was well typified by the terrible massacre of 500 inhabitants of the Manchurian town of Siwanze after its capture by the Communists (Margolin 1999, 476). The scope and severity of the Communists anti-civilian terrorism has often been glossed over in part because more deaths were caused by the Guomindang and because Communist Party violence after 1949 dwarfed its formative years. Neither of these facts undermine, however, the reality that the Chinese Communists deliberately killed or severely harmed huge numbers of civilians during its rise to power. The ratio of killings conducted by the Communists in relation to the size of the population that they ruled over was very similar to that of the Guomindang and, during the years prior to the Sino-Japanese War, the ratio was actually higher (Rummel 1991, 17 and 33–39). When the Communists expanded their territory massively during the last years of the final civil war, the numbers of mass civilian killings that they carried out rose accordingly, leading them to rapidly catch up with and then overtake the numbers killed by Guomindang per year in absolute terms as well (Rummel 1991, 33–39). The use of mass imprisonment and forced labour became particularly prolific after 1948 too, when the tide had turned irrevocably in favour of the Communists, because the need to convert captured personnel had diminished (Margolin 1999, 476). Resources  eeding Off the Enemy: Limited F While the Communists boasted regularly about stealing masses of resources from the enemy, most of their claims were hyperbolic and the numbers of weapons seized were fairly insignificant for most of the conflict. During the first four encirclement campaigns, for example, Mao claimed to have seized roughly 100,000 rifles from his Nationalist opponents (Mao 1975a, 71). Interviews with veterans, however, reveal that the Red Army remained almost weapon-less. One veteran reported that during the fifth encirclement campaign, he could ‘have done with a better rifle, although he knew many soldiers did not even have one or, worse, a whole platoon shared one. His was a locally made hunting gun, quite temperamental’ (Sun 2007, 113). Given that most estimates of the Red Army’s

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strength at the time suggest the presence of around 100,000 to 150,000 personnel, it seems bizarre that so few had rifles, contradicting the Communists’ claims about the number of weapons they had looted from the enemy (Whitson 1973, 280; Furuya 1981, 422; Rodzinski 1985, 337; Paine 2012, 74). This is especially true given the fact that they already had some weapons in their possession prior to the outbreak of the fighting and had purchased others using Soviet funds. Regardless, even the few weapons they did ­capture were almost entirely lost during the Long March that followed (Zierer 1978, 101). During the war against Japan, the Communists struggled to steal arms and ammunition from the martially superior Japanese, and failed to attain necessary quantities of either. In 1940, a large number of Communist units were unable to meet the Party’s stated requirement that their troops have basic firearms (Yang 2011, 319). By 1945, Mao’s forces was still massively deficient in even small arms and supplies, let alone heavy weapons such as tanks, armoured cars, artillery, and aircraft (Asprey 1994, 457). This problem was so acute that when an army from the Soviet Union encountered the main military body of the Chinese Communists in 1945 they were so confused by the hodgepodge of often pre-industrial weapons being carried that they initially mistook them as bandits and disarmed them at gunpoint (Yang 2011, 325). One scholar summed up the state of the Communist military at the end of the war: ‘The equipment of the Eighth Route Army was primitive. It had many sorts of weapons, and many soldiers had no weapons at all. The vast majority of units behind enemy lines had no heavy weapons. Gunpowder was produced locally and was of low quality’ (Yang 2011, 325). Given that the Communists were also receiving aid from abroad and manufacturing items locally, this suggests that the numbers of weapons stolen from the enemy must have been negligible. Despite much hyperbole about the role of American weapons stolen from the Guomindang during the final civil war, it was actually the weapons given to the Communists by the Soviets during their occupation of Manchuria, described below, that defined the outcome of the conflict. These arms provided the overwhelming majority of the equipment used by the Communists for the first two years after the war (Westad 2003, 112). It was only after the Nationalist armies had already begun crumbling in Manchuria that captured arms began to pour in with any degree of quantity (Westad 2003, 112; Levine 1987, 131; Taylor 2011, 384;

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McAleavy 1967, 324). The influx of these arms was symptomatic of, not causational for, the Guomindang collapse. While the eventual acquisition of these weapons from the Guomindang undoubtedly helped to accelerate the regime’s demise, this came after the turning point in the conflict had arrived. S elf-Reliance and Foreign Aid: Accurate Throughout their Revolutionary War, the Communists received substantial  external assistance, including material support and military guidance, while also developing their own economy and industry. This meant that they did, in fact, implement the approach recommended in Mao’s teachings. The fact that they made significant efforts to develop their economy and boost internal production is fairly well known and so needs lesser attention. Efforts to build up the internal economy of Communist-­controlled areas and within Communist units included the creation of a small war industry of their own to supply light weapons, mines, grenades, ammunition, radios, telephones, and batteries (Rees 1981, 9; O’Ballance 1962, 139). Particularly during the final years of the war against Japan, both the armed forces and civilian agencies were expected to work the land and engage in production work (O’Ballance 1962, 140–141). It is clear, however, that this work always proceeded parallel to rather than replaced the attainment of massive quantities of foreign aid. From a very early stage, outside guidance was provided to the Communists by advisers from the Comintern (Spence 1990, 272). Chang and Halliday claim that Soviet aid went beyond this, and that a large monetary stipend was provided to fund the operations of the Chinese Communists. They assert that from October 1921 to June 1922 the Soviet Union donated over 94 per cent of the 17,655 yuan used by the Communists as expenditure (Chang and Halliday 2006, 27). This support continued over the years that followed: Russia’s top priority now was to establish a Red Army. A huge secret military advice and support system for the Chinese Communists was set up in Russia. The GRU had men in all the main Chinese cities, providing arms, funds and medicine, in addition to intelligence that was often critical to the CCP’s survival. Moscow also sent top-level advisers to China to guide the Party’s military operations, while greatly expanding military training for CCP cadres in Russia. (Chang and Halliday 2006, 49)

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This aid continued during the late 1920s (Taylor 2011, 88). When the Communists were under siege by the Guomindang in Jiangxi, the Soviets again supplied them with funds for purchasing military equipment (Taylor 2011, 101). It is telling that the destination ultimately chosen for the terminus of the Long March was near the border with the Soviet Union, a decision which was made at least partially to facilitate the resumption of Soviet aid and offer an external sanctuary if the Guomindang attacked again (Sun 2007, 663 and 763; Paine 2012, 116; Braun 1982, 133, 152, 157, and 177). Upon the Communists’ arrival in Yan’an, aid again flowed freely, with Mao receiving US $200,000, 15,000–20,000 guns, 8 cannons, 10 mortars, and ample foreign ammunition in 1936, and a further US $1.6 million the subsequent year (Taylor 2011, 122 and 143). Between 1937 and 1940, the Soviet Union provided 71 per cent of the Chinese Communists’ income and further support was provided during the war with Japan (Paine 2012, 157; Burleigh 2013, 20). The most significant influx of Soviet aid came during the final civil war. After declaring war against Japan in August 1945, the Soviet Union occupied Manchuria and held the region until the end of May, during which time they refused the Guomindang entry into Manchurian ports and denied them use of the main railway line (Paine 2012, 240–244; Taylor 2011, 321–345; Furuya 1981, lx and 875). They also transported 20,000 cadres and 100,000 soldiers from the Chinese Communist Party into the region and handed over their positions to these forces as they withdrew (Moran 2001, 54). In total, 90 per cent of Manchuria was placed in Communist hands before the Guomindang had a chance to do anything about it (Furuya 1981, 874). As one scholar summed up, the ‘delay gave the Communists time to move deep into Manchuria and to acquire Japanese arms from stocks left about by Soviet forces. It allowed them to set up propaganda machinery and take over local administrations. The time lost thus proved crucial in the contest for the control of Manchuria. Indeed, it decided the fate of China’ (Furuya 1981, lx). The Soviets also provided a supply of military advisers who provided crucial military expertise (Paine 2012, 246). They also helped by taking possession of enough Japanese arms to equip 600,000 thousand men and turning these, along with captured armament factories and gunners, over to the Chinese Communists (Moran 2001, 54; Taylor 2011, 318; Furuya 1981, 873). Figures suggest that 300,000–900,000 rifles, 1200–1800 pieces of field artillery, 4800–14,000 machine guns, and numerous other pieces of military equipment were handed over (Rees 1981, 9; Paine 2012,

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245; Fenby 2008, 337). The transformative scale of the aid comes across most fully when it is considered that the Communists owned just 282,000 rifles in July 1945 (Dreyer 1995, 296). This meant that the number of rifles given to them by the Soviet Union represented an increase of between 106 and 319 per cent. Further supplies were delivered from the Soviet Union itself by train (Boot 2013, 344). One scholar claims that the Soviets even lined up 200,000 North Korean soldiers to be used in the conflict, offered the use of North Korean territory as an external sanctuary, and provided captured Japanese aircraft instructors to help build a Chinese Communist air force (Burleigh 2013, 111). The Soviets continued to provide aid over the following years via Manchuria and through North Korea, supplied doctors to help manage a series of plagues that struck Chinese Communist camps, employed several naval freighters to ferry Communist troops and weapons into good strategic positions, and helped to rebuild broken railway tracks and bridges to maximise the mobility of the Chinese Communist forces (Taylor 2011, 356, 372, and 384; Paine 2012, 242). The impact of this aid cannot be understated. While Mao’s forces were later able to steal equipment from the Guomindang forces they defeated, they needed at least some modern equipment to be able to beat them in the first place (Paine 2012, 246).  xternal Force: Mixed E While external forces often acted in ways that benefitted the Chinese Communists, the actions of these outside actors were not motivated by anything that Mao said or did to influence them. Instead, they were driven by their own agendas that paid little if any attention to the Communists. On the rare occasions that these forces did claim that a course of action they had embarked upon was prompted by the Communists, these statements were made purely for propaganda reasons and possessed scant connection with reality. Japanese actions in China are often portrayed by insurgency scholars as epitomising Mao’s ability to manipulate external forces for his advantage, specifically to help destroy the strength of the Guomindang regime and so ripen it for takeover by the Communists. Yet, rather than being influenced by Mao, the Japanese invasion of China was driven by a range of strategic, political, social and demographic impetuses that were entirely unrelated to the Chinese Communists. One impetus was the determination of the militants who had risen to the top of Japan’s armed forces and government to thrust their country on to the world stage as a great power (Willmott

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1999, 30). They believed that the Japanese would significantly enhance their military potential and great power standing by bringing the massive economic and human resources of China under their control. Another was a belief amongst these same politically important individuals that the Japanese people needed to expand into China in order to solve overpopulation, economic depression, and unemployment (Peattie 2011, 64–64; Willmott 1999, 31). The Japanese state acted upon this conviction when they occupied Manchuria, established it as a puppet state under the name of Manchukuo, and extolled this new entity as a paradise to its citizens so emphatically that roughly a million Japanese settled there within a decade of its conquest (Fenby 2008, 230–241). A third was a belief that occupying China would provide Japan with a land border within East Asia, which would reduce their dependence upon maritime transportation for their both military and commercial activities, as well as provide them directly with forces and supply them with a platform for either attacking or defending against the Soviet Union directly (Willmott 1999, 31). The Japanese did repeatedly state that their incursions into northern China were motivated by a desire to rid the country of Communism and a disbelief in the ability of the Guomindang government to achieve this task. But this proclamation was never more than a pre-text, generated to justify the implementation of otherwise unprovoked aggression; it was also only one of multiple complaints directed against the Nationalist government (Furuya 1981, 274–478 and 493–496). Actions such as Mao’s declaration of war against the Japanese in 1932 should not be seen as provoking an otherwise unlikely Japanese invasion, but as mere costume play along the periphery of the Japanese decision-making process that exerted no influence on the outcome. Japan invaded China because it wanted to, not because of any clever manipulation by Mao. Similarly, the Russians ignored all of Mao’s entreaties to intervene, and only became involved in the war with Japan in 1945 to seize valuable territory for themselves from a rapidly crumbling rival (Furuya 1981, 825–827).

Traditional Depictions of Mao Traditional narratives about Mao tend to paint two pictures of the man. The first is the Mao of the Revolutionary War, who worked tirelessly to raise the living standards of the people and who eschewed anti-civilian

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violence, with the exception of big landlords and bad gentry (Gasster 1972, 89–95). The second is the Mao of the People’s Republic of China, who was an uncaring and out-of-touch overlord and who ruined the lives of millions of Chinese people through the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and other tyrannical schemes (Dikötter 2011). This is a hugely problematic dichotomy: The notion that a single man could morph nearly overnight from someone who had been caring and devoted into a callous megalomaniac who let tens of millions of innocent people be killed as a result of his policies is absurd: The gulf is just too large. One explanation provided for this improbable transformation has been that Mao was unaware of the full extent of the chaos his policies in China caused after 1949 because his subordinates concealed vital information from him (Rooney 2004, 152–154). This is unsatisfactory as an answer because, in the same way that it seems dubious that Stalin was unaware of the killings being conducted during the great purges in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, it appears infeasible that Mao was unaware of the massive numbers of deaths being caused by his policies. Chang and Halliday suggest instead that Mao was always a bloodthirsty opportunist who delighted in violence and cared nothing for the people around him (Chang and Halliday 2006, 40–42). It was just less obvious to the outside world before 1949 because, as a seemingly insignificant rebel leader of an insurgency that no one ever really believed would be successful, Mao received considerably less scrutiny than he would when he ruled over a state containing hundreds of millions of people. In many ways, Chang and Halliday’s portrayal makes sense. Recent investigations in China have suggested that mass atrocities were indeed committed by the Communists during the Revolutionary War (Margolin 2010, 441). Given Mao’s high pre-eminent position for much of this period, it seems impossible that he did not play a significant role in promoting, encouraging, and probably even ordering the implementation of widespread anti-civilian violence. Their depiction resonates with one of the few observers of Mao’s behaviour who could not be easily censored through torture or thought control (Otto Braun). Writing many years later, Braun criticised Mao for being ‘obsessed with the idea that he alone was called to lead the revolution, as he knew it, to victory, he could justify anything that brought him closer to his goal: complete personal power’ (Braun 1982, 56).

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Implications This chapter has shown that Mao did not apply most of the principles of war described in his teachings during the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War. This leads to the inevitable question: If Mao did not triumph by implementing his teachings, why did he win? The most plausible explanation is that Mao was ultimately successful because the Guomindang were savaged repeatedly by other forces while the Communists were spared. Warlord rebellions during the 1920s and 1930s weakened and distracted the Guomindang (van de Ven 2003, 272–286). Japanese incursions in the early-mid 1930s damaged the Guomindang and foiled Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts to destroy the Communists (Furuya 1981, 94–131, 293–296, 377–385; Taylor 2011, 92; Paine 2012, 73). During the Sino-Japanese War, the Guomindang took a horrendous beating from the Japanese, which the Communists—squirrelled away in Yan’an—were mostly able to avoid (Taylor 2011, 150–154; Joes 2010, 43 and 50; Fenby 2008, 194; White and Jacoby 1980, 56; Joes 2004, 203–204). By the time of the final civil war, the Guomindang were so weakened that Mao and the Communists were able to overwhelm them without much effort or finesse. This was not a case of a genius David outmanoeuvring a lumbering Goliath, but a struggle between two weak powers in a bitter contest. Mao’s teachings played little role in determining the outcome. Another finding that emerges from this scrutiny of Mao’s contribution to the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War is a lack of consistency in some, although not all, of his actions. We have seen, for example, that Mao flittered between concentrating on the cities and the countryside, changed his political goals regularly, and altered his views on centralising or decentralising power. This undermines the notion that Mao was a strategic genius with a clear vision that he followed from start to finish. Instead, he spent much of the war reacting to events on the ground in a fashion that suggested a reactive and short-sighted approach to waging insurgency. It also adds yet further evidence that Mao was not particularly original in his approach to rebellion. Insurgent leaders throughout history have adapted their strategies as they went for reasons of political and military expedience, and Mao’s fluctuating methods represent merely another incarnation of this tradition. This leads us to a related point. When the real-life career of Mao is examined, it raises the question: Was Mao really an insurgent at all, in the sense that most modern scholars interpret the term? He failed to provide

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or firmly pursue clear political goals, made little effort to rally the population, and used mostly regular rather than irregular warfare. Mao’s depiction of himself as the ideal insurgent was probably not motivated by truth, but other considerations, which are discussed in Chap. 7. After establishing that Mao did not apply the majority of his own teachings during his own insurgency, the next logical issue that needs to be addressed is the question of whether or not Mao influenced other conflicts and theorists of insurgency around the world that occurred after the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War. This topic is addressed in the next chapter.

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Joes, Anthony James. 1986. From the Barrel of a Gun. London: Pergamon-­ Brassey’s International Defence Publishers. ———. 2004. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. ———. 2010. Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions that Shaped our World. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. Johnson, Chalmers A. 1962. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937–1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Laqueur, Walter. 1976. Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Levine, Steven I. 1987. Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948. New York: Columbia University Press. Lieberthal, Kenneth. 1995. Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. London: W. W. Norton and Company Inc. Liu, F.F.A. 1956. Military History of Modern China 1924–1949. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lynch, Michael. 2017. Mao. Oxon: Routledge. Mao Tse-tung. 1965. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume I. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. ———. 1975a. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV. Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. ———. 1975b. Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume III. Hong Kong: Maoist Internationalist Movement. Margolin, Jean-Louis. 1999. China: A Long March into Night. In The Big Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, ed. Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Adrrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, 459–546. Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer. London: Harvard University Press. Margolin, Jean-Louse. 2010. Mao’s China: The Worst Non-Genocidal Regime? In The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone, 438–467. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Margolin, Jean-Louis, and Pierre Rigoulot. 1999. Introduction. In The Big Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, ed. Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Adrrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, 459–546. Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer. London: Harvard University Press. Mauchline, Roberts E. 1970. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Revolution. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. McAleavy, Henry. 1967. The Modern History of China. London: The Praeger Asia-­ Africa Series. Mitter, Rana. 2009. Modern China. New York: Sterling Publishing Co. Inc.

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Montefiore, Simon Sebag. 2008. Monsters: History’s Most Evil Men and Women. London: Quercus. Moran, Daniel. 2001. Wars of National Liberation. London: Cassell Wellington House. Nicholson, Geoff. 2008. The Lost Art of Walking: The History, Science, Philosophy, and Literature of Pedestrianism. New York: Riverhead Books. O’Ballance, Edgar. 1962. The Red Army of China: A Short History. London: Faber and Faber. Onate, Andres D. 1979. Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., Publishers. Paine, S.C.M. 2012. The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peattie, Mark R. 2011. The Dragon’s Seed: Origins of the War. In The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945, ed. Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans Van de Ven, 48–78. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pelissier, Robert. 1967. The Awakening of China. London: Secker & Warburg. Priestland, David. 2009. The Red Flag: A History of Communism. New  York: Grove Press. Rees, David. 1981. China 1946–49: Red Star in the East. In War in Peace: An Analysis of Warfare Since 1945, ed. Robert Thompson, 1–15. London: Orbis Publishing. Rodzinski, Witold. 1985. The Walled Kingdom: A History of China from 2000 B.C. to the Present. London: Fontana Paperbacks. Rooney, David. 2004. Guerrilla: Insurgents, Patriots and Terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden. London: Brasseys. Rummel, R.J. 1991. China’s Bloody Century. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Schwartz, Benjamin I. 1952. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. London: Oxford University Press. Sherman, Xiaogang Lai. 2011. A Springboard to Victory: Shangdong Province and Chinese Communist Military and Financial Strength, 1937–1945. Leiden: Brill. Snow, Edgar. 1944. Red Star Over China. New  York: Random House Modern Library. ———. 1972. Red Star Over China. Middlesex: Pelican Books. Spence, Jonathan D. 1990. The Search for Modern China. London: W. W. Norton & Company. Sun Shuyun. 2007. The Long March: The True History of Communist China’s Founding Myth. New York: Anchor Books. T’ien-Wei, Wu. 1992a. Contending Political Forces During the War of Resistance. In China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan 1937–1945, ed. James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, 51–78. London: East Gate Book.

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———. 1992b. The Chinese Communist Movement. In China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan 1937–1945, ed. James C.  Hsiung and Steven I.  Levine, 79–106. London: East Gate Book. Tanner, Harold M.  Guerrilla. 2003. Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945–1947. The Journal of Military History 67 (4): 1177–1222. Taylor, Jay. 2011. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China. London: Harvard University Press. Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. London: Cornell University Press. van de Ven, Hans J. 2003. War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945. London: Routledge. Westad, Odd Arne. 2003. Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950. Stanford: Stanford University Press. White, Theodore H., and Annalee Jacoby. 1980. Thunder Out of China. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc. Whitson, William W. 1973. The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. Willmott, H.P. 1999. The Second World War in the East. London: Cassell. Wilson, Dick. 1971. The Long March 1935: The Epic of Chinese Communism’s Survival. Middlesex: Penguin Books. Womack, Brantly. 2010. From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary: Mao from the 1920s to 1937. In A Critical Introduction to Mao, ed. Timothy Creek, 61–86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wong, Grace, and Susannah Paik. 2010. China’s “Wild Swan” on Mao and Memoir. CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/07/china. jung.chang/index.html. Accessed 23 Aug 2013. Wright, Elizabeth. 1989. The Chinese People Stand Up. London: BBC. Yang Kuisong. 2011. Nationalist and Communist Guerrilla Warfare in North China. In The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945, ed. Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans Van de Ven, 308–327. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Zhai, Qiang. 2000. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. London: The University of North Carolina Press. Zierer, Otto. 1978. Concise History of Great Nations: History of China. New York: Leon Amiel Publisher.

CHAPTER 5

The Insignificant Mao

Subsequent Insurgencies and Theorists Numerous scholars have suggested that Mao exerted a profound influence upon an abundance of post-Second World War insurgencies. The renowned insurgency scholar Ian Beckett suggests, for example, that Mao influenced the insurgents in Malaya from 1948 to 1960, the Philippines from 1946 to 1954 and 1968 to 1993, Vietnam from 1946 to 1954 and 1963 to 1975, Algeria from 1954 to 1962, Portuguese Africa from 1961 to 1974, Rhodesia from 1972 to 1980, Dhofar from 1966 to 1975, Thailand in the 1960s–1970s, Peru from 1980 onwards, and Sri Lanka from 1971 onwards (Beckett 2001, 79–84). Other insurgencies often associated by scholars with Mao include Nepal, India, Cambodia, Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Recently, there has been a spate of scholars who have drawn parallels between Mao’s teachings and the Islamic State. Yet, this is simply untrue. The triumph of Mao and the Chinese Communists in the Revolutionary Civil War certainly gave hope to a range of insurgent groups around the world, both during the immediate aftermath of their victory and over the decades that followed. Yet, there has not been a single insurgency that can legitimately claim to have implemented Mao’s teachings at a systematic level. This chapter shows how insurgencies since Mao fall into four broad categories: (i) those in which there is no link between Mao’s teachings and their insurgency whatsoever, (ii) those in which Mao may have helped to inspire but not to shape the character of the insurgency, (iii) those in which similar tactics were used by the insur© The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5_5

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gents but this was not as a result of Mao’s influence, and (iv) those in which some partial influence by Mao can be identified. There is also, theoretically at least, a fifth category of insurgencies that were both inspired and shaped by Mao’s teachings, but there are no examples of insurgencies that fall into this category to date. To illustrate the full extent of the failure of Mao’s teachings to influence the character of subsequent insurgencies, this chapter examines two of the rebellions that have been most associated with his name: the Second Indochina War from 1963 to 1975 and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru from 1980 to 1992. By showing how the influence of Mao was extremely limited in these two insurgencies, this chapter highlights how the teachings of Mao have not generally affected insurgencies, even those with which he is mostly closely connected. The chapter also brings up the issue of timing to show how some rebellions and theorists cannot have been affected by Mao. Inspiration, Coincidence, and Influence For an insurgency to demonstrate that it has been influenced by a prior model, two criteria must be met. The first is that the insurgent group must have studied that model and claimed to have implemented it. The second is that the character of their group and the conflict that they wage must manifest very similar tendencies to the model that is supposed to have exerted influence upon them. If the first criterion is met but the second is not, then the group has only been inspired by the earlier model. If the second is met but the first is not, then the group has adopted a similar approach out of mere coincidence. If neither is met then the insurgency has not been in any way affected. It is only if both have been met that the insurgent group and the war it fights can accurately be labelled as having been influenced. Even here, however, the story is not quite complete. There exists another category: Insurgent groups who have both studied the model and demonstrated a limited number of traits for a temporary period of time (Table 5.1). Little or No Relation Insurgencies that were neither inspired by Mao nor resembled the kind of insurgency he endorsed fall into this category. One example is the Cuban Revolution, which erupted quickly rather than following a protracted

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Table 5.1  Mao and Modern/Cold War insurgencies Studied?

Similar?

Relation

Examples

✕

✕

Little or no relation

✓

✕

Inspiration

✕

✓

Coincidence

✓

✓ and ✕

Limited and temporary influence

✓

✓

Full influence

Mau Mau Rebellion (1952–1960) Tuparamaros (1960s–1970s) Cuban Revolution (1953–1959) Hungarian Uprising (1956) Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989) Palestinian fedayeen (c1948–c1980) Eritrean War of Independence (1961–1991) Guevara in Bolivia (1966–1967) Guatemalan Civil War (1960–1996) Rote Arme Fraktion (1970–1998) Guinea-Bissau war (1963–1974) Ukrainian insurgent army (1942–1956) Lithuanian Forest Brothers (1940–1956) Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946–1954) First Chechen War (1994–1996) Shining Path insurgency (1980–1992) Vietnam War (1956–1975) Nepalese Civil War (1996–2006) Philippines New People’s Army (1968–present) Naxalite insurgency (1967–present) None

three-phase strategy, relied upon military successes and government repression rather than patient political education to rally the people to the insurgency, and operated in a topography that was radically different to that of China. Castro and his lieutenants drew their inspiration from the example of the nineteenth-century Cuban patriot Jose Martí, Marxist writings, and Western literature, and had no knowledge about the treatises of Mao. In fact, the Cuban insurgents specifically stated that they did not receive a copy of Mao’s work until after their summer offensive in 1958, by which time their strategies and tactics had already been firmly established (Debray 1967, 20fn). The Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros provides a second example. Drawing their inspiration loosely from Guevara rather than Mao, the movement embarked upon a series of practices that were radically ­different to those endorsed by Mao. This included conducting ‘armed propaganda’ that embraced bank robberies, terrorism, and kidnappings;

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operating in disparate cell structures; making no real attempt to engage with the population; eschewing any notion of a regular army; and failing to provide or follow any clear political goals (Clutterbuck 1973, 227–230; Moss 1972, 210–239). Inspiration It has become commonplace for scholars to suggest that Maoist principles of war have informed the character of insurgencies across the world. While it is true that many have been inspired by Mao, none have actually been influenced to any great degree. Before going further, it is necessary to first outline the difference between ‘inspiration’ and ‘influence.’ Paret provides a useful explanation, albeit with specific reference to the impact of Napoleon upon later German thought. His arguments can be expanded more broadly to encompass the impact of any supposed military role model on future conflicts. His statement is worth quoting here: We should distinguish between inspiration and influence. Inspiration derives from the suggestive quality of the past, which may stimulate, strengthen, and extend our thinking about the present. Influence on the other hand, if it is to mean anything at all, must connote a degree of specificity, in this case a link between Napoleon’s strategy and the strategies of later generations … What Schlieffen did … was to put himself as best he could in the position of soldiers of another age, and to work through the problems they faced and the solutions they reached. These intellectual and psychological exercises probably afforded him some distance from the strategic problems and solutions of his own time, which he might even have come to see in a somewhat different perspective: by being for a time diverted to the past, his mind might have recognised new possibilities in the present, or found confirmation for ideas already held. But that is very different from the crude cause and effect, and the repetition of strategic patterns. (Paret 1986, 140)

This is an important distinction. There is no shortage of evidence available that Mao was an inspirational figure for many insurgencies. Many insurgent groups across the world have read Mao’s teachings, have referred to their organisations using Maoist sounding terms, and taught their members to parrot out Maoist sound bites. It is not the intent of this book to suggest otherwise. However, if we extend Paret’s argument to Mao, it is possible to assert that later insurgencies could have been inspired by Mao because his teachings may have provided useful thinking points for

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the leaders of these insurrections. But that is something different entirely to being influenced in such a way that strategic patterns were repeated. One example of an insurgent group that was inspired but not influenced by Mao was the Palestinian fedayeen. Many of the leaders of this movement read copies of Mao’s most famous works, but failed to heed his points and ended up adopting very different methods of warfare. They became convinced, for example, that their war would be won exclusively using guerrilla warfare rather than through a three-stage approach that would culminate in a large-scale conventional conflict (Schiff and Rothenstein 1972, 49 and 122). It was not merely misinterpretations that contributed towards Maoist principles failing to appear. The population among which they operated exhibited radically different social characteristics to those in which the Chinese Communists operated. This meant that the kinds of appeal that might have been appropriate for the Chinese Communists—promises of land reform and the rectification of gaping social schisms—were of little interest to the local population. Half-hearted attempts to promote these were met with indifference, suspicion, and hostility (Schiff and Rothenstein 1972, 77). Similarly, the fedayeen failed to establish bases within Israeli occupied territory and were forced to build their bases in Jordan instead (Schiff and Rothenstein 1972, 79 and 85). The fedayeen were reasonably successful at securing material aid from China, but this did not translate into a shaping influence in terms of the character of the warfare waged. As Schiff and Rothstein note, ‘Every time an Israeli army unit attacked a fedayeen base, pamphlets and other materials printed in China were found in abundance. But in all probability it was superior weaponry rather than thoughts of Chairman Mao that most impressed the fedayeen’ (Schiff and Rothenstein 1972, 214). Coincidence One of the most common ways in which scholars end up labelling insurgencies as being Maoist is to work backwards in their labelling: a teleological approach. This begins by identifying a trait of warfare that is linked with Mao, and then inferring back that the conflict must have been influenced by Mao. But the existence of Maoist traits of war within an insurgent group or the conflict they waged is not necessarily indicative of the influence of Mao. As shown earlier, most if not all the principles associated with Mao have existed within prior insurgencies, such as the American Revolutionary War and the Maccabean Revolt. Obviously, these earlier

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insurgencies can have owed nothing to Mao, as they predated him. The fact that insurgencies that happened after the beginning of the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War could theoretically have drawn upon Mao does not necessarily mean that they actually did. If it was possible for insurgencies to develop ‘Maoist’ traits prior to this time independently (as they did), then it stands to reason that later insurgencies could do too. In fact, many of the pre-Mao insurgencies that exhibited ‘Maoist’ traits were high-­ profile conflicts and have been cited by modern insurgent groups as helping to inspire their efforts. Insurgencies that display Maoist traits but which lack clear evidence of inspiration by Mao may instead have evolved these characteristics independently, or have been inspired by earlier insurgencies or theorists instead. One example of an insurgent organisation that displayed coincidental similarities with Mao’s teachings was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which fought first Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1956 (Zhukov 2007, 439–466). This insurgency cannot have been influenced by Mao—not only was the movement based geographically a long way away from Mao and the Communists in China, but during the fight against Germany there would have been neither reason nor time for the Ukrainians to liaise with the Chinese and during the struggle against the USSR there is no way that Stalin would have allowed the two forces to meet. They also had closer theoretical models of resistances available: the Bolshevik Revolution and the methods of the Ukrainian anarchist who fought the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War and ‘who displayed a modern understanding of the political and socio-economic potential of insurgency’ (Beckett 1988, 6). There is certainly no historical evidence that suggests the two had any meaningful contact or that the commanders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army studied Mao. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian insurgents fought a remarkably similar-sounding protracted popular war (Zhukov 2007, 439–466). It included many seemingly Maoist traits such as feeding off the enemy, accepting foreign support while building up internal resources, exploiting external events, pursuing territorial ambitions, attempting to build shadow agencies, politicising warfare, treating civilians positively, and using rural terrain (Smith 1985, 14–20). The Guinea-Bissau War of Independence provides another example. Despite sharing some superficial similarities with Maoist principles of war— including a period of rural orientation, Marxist origins, and courteous conduct towards civilians—it is clear that the influences which shaped these outcomes were not Maoist (Ciment 1999, 683–687; Moran 2001, 147–149).

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In fact, the future leader of the insurgency changed his orientation from Marxism to ‘re-Africanization’ (a movement in favour of replacing the trappings of European civilisation with traditional African values) prior to the formal outbreak of armed conflict and it was this ideology, not Marxism, that underpinned the insurgency. Similarly, the decision to move to the countryside was not undertaken because of any study of Mao, but because the Portuguese authorities were effective at stamping out political mobilisation in the cities and forced the insurgents to look at the countryside for support. Limited and Temporary Influence Some groups veered closer to following a Maoist model of warfare. Many of these allegedly ‘Maoist’ insurgencies exhibited less Maoist influence than some scholars would like to believe, however. In some cases, only parts of Mao’s teachings were adopted and in others Maoist traits were only put into practice for a short period before the realities of their conflict forced them away from these ill-fitting precepts. This failure to fully implement Maoist principles, use of them for a short period of time only, or both, often happened because the leadership realised that the physical terrain and social environment in which they were fighting was unsuited for Maoist methods. Once this realisation was made, the insurgents often decided to abandon Maoist approaches in favour of methods more suited for their own unique circumstances and environment. This chapter examines two cases which have been described as Maoist—the Second Indochina War and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru—and shows how, in each case, the influence of Mao was limited.

The Second Indochina War The insurgents in Vietnam from 1963 to 1975 have often been associated with Maoist principles of war. Some traits, such as benefitting from the Cold War as an external force, did resemble Mao’s teachings. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the insurgency suggests limitations to the extent that the rebels were really influenced. One of the biggest problems with depicting the Vietnam War as Maoist influence revolves around the principle of a three-stage uprising. As shown earlier, the Maoist model endorses an insurgency beginning as a small-scale movement that grows until the insurgents possess more military strength than the incumbent, at which point the war changes into a conventional war.

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The model adopted by the Vietnamese insurgents, however, depended on enduring while whittling down the political endurance—rather than military might—of the enemy, until such time as the enemy is persuaded to withdraw because the political cost of fighting has become too great (Thompson 1981, 190–191). Some analysts have attempted to explain the difference between these two positions by substituting the mobile warfare phase of Mao’s model with a phase of demoralising the enemy (Hammes 2004, 56). Such a substitution is neat and efficient, but it is also wrong; the two strategies are poles apart. The end state of each requires radically different inputs during the preceding phases, with the result that all the phases become altered, not just the third. Specifically, Mao’s three phases requires an ongoing effort to destroy the enemy’s forces and build up the insurgents’ forces until military parity is reached, so that the insurgents can triumph through superior numbers and military strength. The Vietnamese strategy, in contrast, requires the insurgents to make ongoing efforts to demoralise the enemy without direct regard to the military balance of power. As long as the political fatigue of the opponent continues to rise and the insurgency survives, there is no need to worry about the scale of the military damage done to the enemy or the military damage suffered by the insurgency. In 1962, long before America had escalated their military efforts, the Vietnamese insurgent Vo Nguyen Giap argued that ‘political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda’ (Giap 1962, 79). This showed that Giap viewed military actions as a way to demoralise the enemy, not to seek military parity. Further evidence that the Vietnamese insurgents were pursuing a different path can be gleaned from the different perspectives adopted by Mao and the North Vietnamese regarding negotiations with America, which Mao opposed and the North Vietnamese embraced (Zhai 2000, 168–173). Mao saw discussions with the enemy as militarily pointless and thought that it would be impossible to get the United States to withdraw using this approach (Zhai 2000, 173). In contrast, the North Vietnamese believed that they would provide an ideal method for heightening domestic unrest in the United States (Zhai 2000, 168). As Herring points out: The technique itself was deeply rooted in Vietnamese history, an approach to war ‘refined over centuries of confrontation’ with more powerful enemies. The approach closely coordinated military, diplomatic, and political moves with the overall objective of stimulating the enemy’s internal contradictions and, in the case of the United States in particular, weaken its internal support. The aim of talking was not necessarily to reach a settlement but

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to feed the enemy’s hopes for peace and heighten divisions in the enemy camp. The goal of fighting was to maintain or even intensify the pressure that had brought the adversary to the conference table in the first place. (Herring 1995, 176)

The Tet Uprising of 1968 would be seen as a colossal failure according to a Maoist three-stage model because they crippled the Vietcong’s military strength without inflicting any lasting damage to American military strength (Joes 2000, 230–231). The Vietnamese never intended, however, for the offensive to achieve this outcome. Instead, they ‘hoped that the uprising would set in train a motion of developments that could bring about the complete withdrawal of American troops’ (Zhai 2000, 178). Their rationale drew from the lessons they learned while fighting the French in the late 1940s and 1950s: The Vietnamese realized that the First Indochina War did not end in the cities. The French lost the war at Dien Bien Phu not because of any military ineptness on the part of the French but because the people and government of France had become convinced that they could not win. The Vietnamese called this phenomenon a ‘decisive military victory’. (Ford 1995, 10–11)

This experience led the insurgents to believe that ‘if we were to rise up and carry out a truly risky and forceful, decisive strategic pummelling, we could force the American imperialists to accept defeat according to our strategic plan and sooner or later withdrawn American expeditionary forces from the war of invasion in Vietnam’ (Ford 1995, 66). In this light, the Tet Offensive would have been seen as an outstanding success by the insurgents. It dealt a tremendous blow to American political morale, particularly amongst their own population, and thus contributed to their goal of winning by compelling the Americans to withdraw (Zhai 2000, 179). Critics of this position suggest that the Tet Uprising provided evidence that the Vietnamese insurgents hoped to win the war through decisive military battles, and that it was only after the Tet Uprising had been militarily defeated that the Vietnamese insurgents changed course and sought to end the war by political means (Palmer 1982, 189–210; Karnow 1994, 557–558). This perspective is flawed. In addition to the explanations already advanced, the notion that the Vietnamese insurgents hoped to be able to win their war militarily makes little sense. They knew that they were fighting against a global superpower, with incredibly powerful military strength. The notion that they could ever overcome their opponents

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in absolute military terms, as the Chinese Communists had done against the Guomindang, would have seemed farcical, even to the most ideologically driven of insurgent strategists. That is not to say that the insurgents did not believe that they could achieve temporary local superiority over the Americans; this they almost certainly did. But they would have known that this was as far as they could hope to reach in military terms. Independent of other considerations, the Americans could have continued to channel military resources into the theatre indefinitely, preventing the insurgents from gaining permanent military parity. Consequently, the strategy of the insurgents must either have been completely irrational or have contained the goal of raising the political cost of the Americans committing further military resources into the conflict, until hostile domestic public opinion forced them to withdraw. Military offensives may have been intended to contribute towards this political goal, but the notion that the Vietnamese insurgents believed that they could develop their military to the point where they could destroy America’s military, rather than its political willpower, is far-fetched. Another major difference was the level of emphasis placed upon the cities. Throughout the conflict, the Vietnamese insurgents remembered the role of the cities in their seizure of power in 1945, and continued to push hard for the incorporation of an urban component as a crucial part of their strategy from an early stage. The Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an attempt to include the cities as part of the conflict at an early stage, rather than ignoring them for the mainstay of the conflict and attacking them only during the final stages of the war, as recommended by Mao (Zhai 2000, 176–177). A further variance was that the Vietnamese insurgents used terrorism and intimidation extensively, while doing relatively little to cultivate the population (Beckett 2001, 81; Johnson 1968, 445–447). As Joes notes, ‘wherever the Vietcong had achieved control, they committed atrocities against civilians. The massacres at Hue were especially horrific: survivors and relatives in that city exhumed the bodies of thousands of students, priests, and government workers and their families, many of whom had been buried alive. These events alarmed the Southern population and steeled its determination to resist conquest by the North’ (Joes 2000, 230–231). Chivalrous conduct was in short supply too. One well-known story in Vietnam illustrates the high-handed and arrogant way that the people were often treated:

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A Hanoi peasant was recruited to carry two artillery shells along the [Ho Chi Minh] trail’s 500-mile length. As he walked south with his cargo, he slept with the shells next to his head every night, dreaming that his two shells would be the things that broke the Americans’ back. Finally, after a month of walking—slogging across rice paddies and mountains, through mud and heat and rain—the peasant arrived at the DMZ, where he watched his shells fired in a matter of seconds. Then, as a subsequent peasant’s cargo was slid into the breech [sic], the peasant began to sob, seeing his month-long effort already forgotten. ‘Go back to Hanoi and get more shells,’ a commander barked at the peasant, leveling [sic] his pistol towards the peasant’s head for inspiration. The peasant walked back to Hanoi in tears, then gathered up another pair of shells and started south again. (Webster 1997, 171)

This links fluidly with the issue of popular support, which Mao taught was a necessity for fighting and insurgency. Despite claims to the contrary by American reports and Communist propagandists, the level of support for the Communists in the country was far from widespread. Indeed, even in North Vietnam, the Communists had suffered a popular revolt against their rule as early as 1956 (Thompson 1981, 188). In South Vietnam, the Communists failed to achieve any popular support in the cities. The abortive Tet Uprising in 1968 demonstrated this fact: There was simply no mass urban uprising as had been expected by the Party politburo (Sharp 1979, 214). One estimate suggests that in 1974, of the 2.5 million people living in Saigon, just 5400 were insurgent activists (Joes 2000, 243). Support for the Communists in the countryside was higher, but by the early 1970s this declined sharply after the Communists increased the scale of their forced conscription drives and the Saigon government undertook comprehensive land reforms (Joes 2000, 243). Estimates of Communists in the mid-1970s suggested that less than a third of the South Vietnamese population supported the Communists (Joes 2000, 243). Even as the North Vietnamese marched towards Saigon in 1975, there was still no popular uprising against the South Vietnamese government (Joes 2000, 230). While the Vietcong did steal some weapons and resources from the enemy, as recommended by Mao in his teachings, they were for the most part armed with foreign-supplied weapons (Asprey 1994, 753; Thompson 1981, 200). From an early stage, both the Soviet Union and China supplied masses of equipment, both to the North Vietnamese Army and, through them, to the Vietcong (Zhai 2000, 116). As one scholar explained, ‘the Communist bloc as a whole was going to do what it could to prop up the North Vietnamese, and thus the Vietcong, with financial and material

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aid. This they most certainly did: it has been estimated that the $600 million of damage caused by US bombing was offset by some $26 billion in foreign aid. Much of this was military’ (Ellis 1995, 228). The Chinese supplied huge quantities of military aid throughout the war, including roughly 2 million guns, 1 billion bullets, 65,000 artillery pieces, 18 million artillery shells, 600 tanks, 200 aircraft, 150 ships, 16,000 other vehicles, 30,000 radio transmitters, 50,000 telephone sets, and 9 million uniforms (Zhai 2000, 136). The Soviet Union provided arms on a mass scale as well (Thompson 1981, 202). In fact, the quantity and quality of the arms and equipment was so great that Thompson concluded that ‘a war which had begun by ill-equipped guerrillas was finally won by an army which was technologically superior to its enemies’ (Thompson 1981, 202). While the Chinese were keen for the Vietnamese insurgents to embark on a course of self-reliance, the insurgents expressed little interest in this idea. The Chinese attempt to enforce such a policy in 1968 and 1969, by massively reducing the aid they supplied, backfired when the Vietnamese simply applied for more aid from the Soviet Union to cover the shortfall, stoking the rivalry between the two world powers to achieve this end (Zhai 2000, 179–180). Recognising the danger of losing Vietnam to the Soviet camp, the Chinese quickly abandoned their attempt and reverted to providing aid, in fact rather more than they had before. With such an abundance of supplies, it is scarcely surprising that the insurgents felt that they could marginalise self-reliance and feeding off the enemy: Why would any group feel the need to create its own clothes factories or scavenge second-hand uniforms, for example, when it had been supplied with 9 million new ones by the Chinese? Ultimately, in April 1975 it was neither a North Vietnamese nor an American-made tank, but a Soviet-made T-54 that smashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon (Sea Power Center 2005, 1). Some scholars suggest a somewhat contentious argument—that in 1968 the insurgency in South Vietnam was effectively crushed. According to this perspective, the period after 1968 was not marked by a further bout of insurgent struggle, but instead represented a traditional invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam (Thompson 1981, 184–187, 214, and 220; Joes 2000, 230 and 251–252). Based upon this logic, this portion of the conflict can bear few similarities with the Maoist model of insurgency because it was now a conventional war rather than an insurgency. This was not, coincidentally, the manifestation of the third stage of an insurgency, because there was no longer any insurgency remaining; merely, one conventional power attacking another.

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It is clear, therefore, that despite some superficial similarities, the approaches used by the Vietnamese insurgents did not draw in any meaningful way from Mao’s teachings. They may have been inspired by Mao, but the influence he exerted upon them was limited at best.

The Shining Path Insurgency Sendero Luminoso—translated as the Shining Path—was an insurgency group in Peru led by Abimael Guzman, which waged a militant campaign against the Peruvian government from 1980 to 1992, preceded by a decade of planning and organisation (technically, the group continued to exist after 1992, but this was the year that Guzman and the entire Central Committee was captured by the Peruvian government in Lima, an event which heralded the dramatic and rapid collapse of the movement into a mere shadow of its former self). This group has traditionally been viewed as Maoist in orientation, and indeed its own leader titled himself ‘the fourth sword of Marxism,’ following on the tails of Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Degregori 1992, 55). Repeated interactions occurred between the insurgents and Mao during the formative years of the movement, to the extent that ‘between 1969 and 1974, it is now known, virtually every Central Committee member made at least one extended trip to the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. Guzman made three’ (Marks and Palmer 2005, 97). The movement did exhibit some similarities with Mao’s teachings, including a strong rural focus and a three-phase approach (although Guzman himself referred to five rather than three such stages) (Marks 2003, 128; Beckett 2001, 83). The movement also made some efforts to feed off the enemy by raiding police stations for small arms, although the yields from these efforts remained low (Niksch and Sullivan 1993, 19; Marks 1996, 268). Yet a host of differences existed, and these are sufficient in both number and magnitude for this movement to be considered, at most, as only partially and temporarily influenced by Mao. On the military front, most of the military activities and forces under Guzman’s control retained a distinctly small-scale irregular character. Unlike Mao, who waxed about the importance of building up regular forces, ‘no battalions or even companies existed’ within the Shining Path’s military infrastructure (Marks 2003, 128). Politically, while the movement did adopt a centralised command structure, it took this considerably beyond that described by Mao and allowed for no real devolution of power. The extreme extent of this was demonstrated when Guzman and

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his Central Committee were captured by the Peruvian government in 1992. As Marks remarks, ‘so centralised had Sendero become that cutting off the head dealt the movement a body blow. Hundreds of guerrillas surrendered, and insurgent incidents nationwide dropped markedly’ (Marks 2004, 121). While the central core of the movement—primarily composed of middle class students—possessed a near fanatical devotion to its ideological goals, the movement failed to imbue those outside of this tiny group with any sense of political purpose or ideological attachment (Kent 1993, 450; Marks 2004, 122). As one author points out, Sendero ‘rejected the leading role of the masses in favour of the leading role of the party; the party decides everything. It rejected the primacy of politics in favour of the primacy of violence’ (Degregori 1992, 55). This was, if anything, closer to the philosophies of Guevara than Mao. Half-hearted attempts were made to create liberated areas with Sendero institutions in the early 1980s, as advocated for by Mao in his writings, but these efforts were weakly implemented and became expensive failures (Asprey 1994, 1114; Kent 1993, 445). The shallowness of other efforts to create shadow governments was exposed by how quickly and how completely the movement collapsed after its central leadership was captured in 1992. Indeed, the people who were supposedly being ruled quickly turned on the weak administrative structures and threw the insurgents out (Marks 2004, 122). Sendero built most of their bases in remote locations that were all but inaccessible to the government and had formerly experienced little or no government oversight (Lucero 2008, Kent 1993, 445). This was not a case of building bases behind enemy lines, as advocated by Mao, however, but of building them as far away as possible. While the movement began with a strong rural orientation, it never abandoned the urban space and its focus on the countryside was short-lived, with a steady reorientation towards the cities occurring from the mid-1980s on (Asprey 1994, 1114; Marks 2003, 130). This shift was probably caused in part because of a recognition by the group that nearly 40 per cent of Peru’s population lived in Lima, but also, as one scholar notes, ‘The focus on Lima may have resulted from the failure of the Shining Path to establish extensive liberated zones in the countryside and from the relative success of the military in combating the rural insurgency’ (Marks 2003, 130; Kent 1993, 452). The totality of the shift was shown by the fact that Guzman and his entire Central Committee were captured not in the rural fringes of the country, but in Lima itself, where they had been residing since 1990 (Marks 2003, 130).

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Sendero also treated civilians poorly and employed widespread anti-­ civilian violence, as outlined below, which indicated that it did not want to rally the population to its cause and ensured that they would not have wanted to be a part of the movement even if it did (Lucero 2008). The lack of popularity was demonstrated by the fact that ‘membership in the party probably never exceeded more than a few thousand even in the late 1980s’ out of a population of 20 million people (Starn 1995, 411; Marks 2003, 129). In fact, in some areas the movement was so despised that— even without government backing—when the insurgents arrived at their villages the ‘peasants began to take matters into their own hands. Instances were recorded of entire communities seizing whatever they could, from knives to sharpened stakes to bricks, and attacking Sendero columns entering their villages’ (Marks 2003, 131). Guzman also expressed no real interest in pursuing a United Front, with ‘other Marxists being dismissed as “cretins” and the Soviet Union, Cuba and sometimes even China classed with the United States as fascist states’ (Marks 1996, 254; Beckett 2001, 254). Contravening Mao’s emphasis on acting courteously towards civilians, the people living in areas occupied by Sendero were treated terribly. As one scholar explains, ‘Shining Path singled out the poor, indigenous populations, whose interests it disingenuously claimed to have at heart. It forced farmers to slash production to subsistence levels and to destroy whatever modern farm equipment the campesinos [peasants] possessed. In addition, Shining Path imposed puritanical regulations that outlawed fiestas and prohibited drinking as part of a strategy of strong-arming local populations into submission and self-abnegation’ (Lucero 2008). These were not the actions of a chivalrous movement intending to cultivate positive relationships. Adding to this malicious approach, the group deliberately adopted the use of terror as a coercive tool, well beyond the level that Mao sanctioned, including deliberate acts of terrorism, which Mao expressly forbade (Lucero 2008). In 1992, for example, the movement undertook terrorist attacks in the capital city of Lima, beginning with the explosion of a ‘car bomb—six hundred kilograms of dynamite—in a prosperous Lima suburb killing over twenty people and wounding some 150’ (Asprey 1994, 1117). This represented just one example in a general campaign of terrorism which over a twelve-year period caused more than $22 billion dollars in property damage and deliberately targeted innocent civilians (Niksch and Sullivan, 1–6). The scale and nature of even the more selectively targeted

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violence went well beyond that which was advocated for by Mao. While Mao’s teachings focused on the use of selective targeting to punish and remove the upper classes from power, Sendero’s selection of targets suggested a radically different goal: intimidating the lower classes into supporting the movement through coercion or punishment of those who resisted (Stavans 1993, 30). Self-reliance was applied on an extreme scale that went far beyond Mao’s teachings, which, as we have seen, endorsed a combined approach of seeking foreign aid while also aiming to attain self-sufficiency (Marks 2004, 118). Moreover, the interpretation of self-reliance that the Shining Path adopted represented almost the inverse of Mao’s teachings. While Mao had advocated building up agriculture and industry to reach a state of self-sufficiency, Guzman and his followers demanded and forcefully implemented the reverse: the destruction of any and all capacity that went above the lowest levels of subsistence (Lucero 2008; Kent 1993, 450). Mao never countenanced such a notion anywhere in his works. Ultimately, the Shining Path was a niche movement led by a tiny elite, which lacked popular backing, secured no real political devotion from the few followers it did have, and used terrorism and mass violence as an end unto itself. While it began in the countryside, its failure to embed there, combined with the country’s urban dominance, forced the movement into the capital, where its leadership was captured. Its similarities to Maoism were demonstrably limited.

Ho and Guevara This book does not intend to dwell too excessively on Mao’s influence upon later theorists, because the recommendations of theorists have not always translated into methodologies within the insurgencies they waged. Nevertheless, Mao has regularly been credited with having two very prominent disciples—the Vietnamese insurgent Ho Chi Minh and the Cuban guerrilla Che Ernesto Guevara—and there is some value to be had in demonstrating that Mao’s influence upon both was limited. Traditionally, scholars have suggested a linear intellectual history between Mao and Ho, in which Mao first developed his theories about insurgent warfare in China and Ho then either mimicked or adapted these for use against their adversaries in Vietnam (Girling 1969; Hammes 2004, 56; Alexander 1995, 161). Despite the appeal of such a seemingly efficient process, the sequence described is chronologically impossible. An analysis of the writings of the two authors shows that Ho actually developed and

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articulated the mainstay of his theories about insurgency during the 1920s and 1930s, either before or concurrently to Mao.1 Moreover, it was only after Ho had formulated his own thoughts about insurgency that he was really exposed to the Chinese Communists. To demonstrate this fact, this chapter will first show how the thoughts of Ho on insurgency mirrored those of Mao, despite being written earlier than him, before going to highlight how the opportunities for a transference of ideas from Mao to Ho were later and less meaningful than is often imagined. From a very early age, Ho was exposed to insurgent warfare by his uncle who supported a nationalist guerrilla group, and his eldest sister, who stole weapons for a resistance movement (Beals 1970, 176). At age 18, he was allegedly involved in the 1908 peasant insurrections which briefly shook central Vietnam (although this seems rather fanciful) (Beals 1970, 176). Ho’s earliest major contribution to the military component of insurgency, entitled The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants, was written in 1927–1928, as part of a 12-chapter volume produced by the Soviet Union on Armed Insurrection (Wollenberg 1970, 23). This work is fascinating because it contains almost all of the core facets of Mao’s later works, despite being written roughly a decade before him. Other works that he wrote at around the same time corresponded and added to his opinions on the topic, reinforcing the reality that Ho possessed a clear vision regarding how he believed an insurgency should be thought that clearly mirrored those of Mao, despite being written before Mao set down many of his core ideas during the 1930s and 1940s. Military Like Mao, Ho indicated that he valued guerrilla and irregular warfare, but also expressed the conviction that regular rather than irregular armed forces should act as the deciding arm in a successful insurgency. In The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants, he described how peasant guerrillas supported the regular revolutionary army of Canton during the Northern Expedition, and contributed to, rather than usurped, the army’s victory over the warlords (Nguyen 1970, 262). One interesting deviation from Mao’s later teachings was that Ho also argued that ‘guerrilla movements play the role of an auxiliary factor’ but to a mass popular uprising led by the proletariat, rather than a conventional army (Nguyen 1970, 264–265). 1  Ho changed his name at least eight times during his life—most notably spending most of his early life as Nguyen Ai Quoc—but for ease of comprehension, he will be referred to here exclusively as Ho (Duiker 2002, 62 and 263).

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Ho also articulated the need for a protracted rather than quick overthrow of the existing order in Vietnam, commenting as early as 1921 that ‘it is wrong to say that this country, inhabited by 20 million exploited people, is now ripe for revolution; but it is even wronger [sic] to say that it doesn’t want a revolution and is satisfied with the regime’ (Nguyen 2005). In The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants, he described how a small insurgent force would begin by undertaking small local engagements, then grow into a larger force that undertook multiple guerrilla actions, and culminate as a ‘serious force’ that could undertake larger-scale operations (Nguyen 1970, 261–262). This bore remarkable similarity to Mao’s later three-phase approach. Although Ho endorsed guerrilla movements as an important component of insurgency, he repeatedly stressed the importance of guerrilla power being expanded over an ever widening body of territory, and made no mention of a strategy of giving up territory as part of a strategy for trading space for time (Nguyen 1970, 255–271). Again, this prefigured Mao’s later comments regarding the desirability of holding on to territory for as long as possible and only retreating when no other options remained. As early as 1923, Ho indicated in a report to the Comintern that his insurrection in Vietnam should be rural focused, with the peasantry ­playing a pivotal role (Duiker 2002, 91). Here again, his writings predated by several years Mao’s first concrete instructions on the topic. He spoke again in favour of the peasantry at a meeting of the Comintern in 1924, contributed to the party’s decision to ‘focus on issues central to rural concerns, such as opposing oppressive taxes, reducing land rents, and eliminating monopolies’ in 1929, and wrote letters to colleagues in 1935 about ‘the land revolution and the cause of anti-imperialism were linked together’ (Duiker 2002, 98, 188, and 222). So great was Ho’s commitment to a rural uprising at this time that in 1928 the Soviet Politburo member Nikolai Bukharin dubbed him a ‘peasant-visionary’ (Wollenberg 1970, 22). In The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants, Ho further described the importance of peasants in villages behind the enemy’s lines acting to harass the enemy’s forces (Nguyen 1970, 257–265). He also advocated the building of peasant forces within a limited number of areas, centred around administrative and political hubs, and expanding outwards from these locations (Nguyen 1970, 260 and 265). These ideas resemble in proto-form Mao’s later teachings on the importance of building bases behind enemy lines.

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Political Given Ho’s Communist background, it is unsurprising that, like Mao, he placed great value upon class warfare. His hatred for imperialism pervaded his earlier works, which covered topics that ranged from French colonial abuses to condemnations of the unequal treatment of African-Americans and other minorities win the United States (Nguyen 1960a, b, c). He also stressed the theme of class warfare throughout The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants and further indicated that a rebel group should seek to heighten ‘class antagonisms’ because this task was essential for progressing an insurgency from being a purely sporadic and limited explosion of energy into a major rebellion that has the potential to defeat and overthrow the government (Nguyen 1970, 261–262, 1969). Ho was focused upon the political aspects of insurrection early on, noting in 1922, for example, that the way to overcome French repression in the colonies was to ‘intensify propaganda to overcome them’ (Nguyen 1960d). The Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League, which he founded in 1925, ‘served as the forerunner of Vietnamese communism and provided much of the movement’s top leadership and its ideological orientation over the rest of the century’ (Brocheux 2007, 36; Bradley 2009, 25). In 1926, Ho taught briefly at the Special Political Institute for the Vietnamese Revolution in Canton, which aimed to infuse future Vietnamese revolutionaries with Communist ideology for their future military struggles (Duiker 2002, 129–130). This interest in combining the military and political elements of warfare mirrored the same notions that Ma would advance in his own writings a few years later. In 1925, Ho aspired to found the same kind of tightly knit revolutionary organisation that Mao would separately endorse, while also placing this cohesive central core as part of a wider and umbrella structure that could connect with the broad masses in the country (Duiker 2002, 120–121). In The Revolutionary Path, he cited Lenin’s principle that there cannot be a revolutionary movement without a revolutionary theory, and that there can be no revolutionary theory without a party to carry it out (Brocheux 2007, 38–39). Writing three years later, he again stressed the need for a firm party leadership to guide the peasants against their imperialist oppressors, and blamed the absence of strong revolutionary command for the failure and collapse of the Bulgarian insurrections in 1924 (Nguyen 1970, 256–271).

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Ho also advocated the establishment of shadow governance as a central part of fighting a rebellion against the state. Efforts towards this goal should include the establishment of a ‘worker–peasant–soldier government’ and the confiscation and reallocation of both private and state enterprises to support this rival government (Nguyen 1960b). In The Party’s Work among the Peasants, Ho added that revolutionary parties must gain control of mass peasant organisations where they exist, and create them where they do not (Nguyen 1970, 265–268). Like Mao, Ho also endorsed the notion of forming a United Front that bound together the lower and middle classes against imperialist and reactionary forces throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Duiker 2002, 114, 133–134, 140, 166, 186, 190). Population In The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants, Ho repeated multiple times the importance of rallying the popular masses behind the party, as Mao would later do, and asserted that victory without such a popular base—which consisted overwhelmingly of the peasantry in rural and semi-­ rural countries—was impossible (Nguyen 1970, 255–265). The use of selective terrorism can hardly have been new to the young Vietnamese theorist either, as his compatriots had adopted the method of attempting to assassinate senior French officials in Vietnam as early as 1924 (Duiker 2002, 117–119). However, in one difference to Mao, he was reluctant about its use, and in 1929, he prohibited terrorism and selective assassinations as revolutionary tools (Duiker 2002, 186). While working at the Special Political Institute for the Vietnamese Revolution, ‘[Ho] taught his charges how to talk and behave in a morally upright manner (so as to do credit to the revolutionary cause), how to speak in public, how to address gatherings of workers, peasants, children, and women, how to emphasise the national cause as well as the need for a social revolution, how to behave without condescension to the poor and illiterate’ (Duiker 2002, 130). In The Revolutionary Path, Ho further laid out guidelines for the behaviour of revolutionaries, including to ‘be thrifty, be friendly but impartial, resolutely correct errors, be prudent, respect learning, study and observe, avoid arrogance and conceit, and be generous’ (Duiker 2002, 135). He also placed the improvement of conditions for Vietnamese peasants and workers at the centre of his political programme, proclaiming in 1930 for example that the Indochinese Communist Party should aim to ‘implement the 8-hour working day …

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abolish the forced buying of government bonds, the poll-tax and all unjust taxes hitting the poor … bring democratic freedoms to the masses … dispense education to all the people … realise equality between man and woman’ (Nguyen 1960b). This appeared to be remarkably ‘Maoist’ in approach, despite occurring prior to Mao outlining his own thoughts on this topic. Resources Ho advocated strongly for a strategy of feeding off the enemy, asserting in 1928, for example, that ‘the main source of the guerrillas’ armament will be raids on arms depots and the disarming of police and groups of soldiers—all this will be carried out with the primitive weapons available initially’ (Nguyen 1970, 269). He gave the example of a peasant guerrilla force in the Russian Civil War, who managed on the night of 27/28 July to capture ‘2 cannon, 4 machine-guns, 300 rifles, 60,000 rounds of ammunition and 150 horses with all their harnesses’ (Nguyen 1970, 270). Like Mao in later years, Ho’s perspectives about the value of building up self-sustainability in an insurgency versus seeking foreign aid appeared mixed. On the one hand, he travelled widely and participated in agencies such as the Comintern, which promoted transnational support for Communist movements across the world (Woddis 1969, 8–10). On the other, his thoughts on resource-gathering in The Party’s Military Work among the Peasants focused on drawing upon prior assets, stealing from the enemy, and occasionally purchasing weapons (Nguyen 1970, 269). This suggested that Ho valued a mixed approach, similar to that of Mao later on. Ho also expressed interest in manipulating external forces. In The Revolutionary Path, he stated that the Vietnamese people would be able to rely on the revolutionary masses of the world in their own struggle for liberation (Duiker 2002, 126). Ho and the China Connection Much has been made of Ho’s visits to China in the early 1920s and the late 1930s. According to popular portrayals, it was during these sojourns that Ho became a disciple of Mao. There are several problems with this depiction. First, while Ho did meet with Peng and other Communist figures during his visit in the 1920s, he did not meet with Mao, nor was Mao at that stage either a prominent figure in the party or an established

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theoretician on insurgency (Duiker 2002, 142). Second, by the time that Ho visited the Communists in 1938, he had already formed the majority of his thoughts about insurrection. He also did not meet with Mao, but was pawned off to lower rung officials in the party hierarchy and left ‘performing relatively menial jobs’ (Duiker 2002, 230; Asprey 1994, 395). These visits may have helped confirm his existing impressions about the subject, but they certainly did not result in any new impetus in his thinking. Ho did not stay at Mao’s headquarters for more than a few weeks; he then moved south to Guomindang-occupied territory, where he helped to train Guomindang guerrillas and set up a liaison office for Indochinese Communist Party members in the region (Zhai 2000, 11; Asprey 1994, 395). He stayed here, until returning to Vietnam in late 1940. Ho also spent considerable time in other locations, including France, Russia, Britain, Thailand, and America, where he interacted regularly with other left-wing radicals (Joes 2010, 74–75; Asprey 1994, 393–394). In France, he joined the French Socialist Party and helped found the French Communist Party (Biography of Ho Chi Minh, 1980). In Russia he studied and taught at a variety of Communist training institutions, including the Lenin School, the National and Colonial Research Questions Institute, and the University of Peoples of the East (Woddis 1969, 10; Beals 1970, 176–179; O’Neil 1969, 19). These experiences probably had as great, if not greater, an influence upon Ho as his trips to China. Finally, Ho existed within a culture which had a long history of enmity towards China. As Duiker points out: ‘The heroic figures of traditional Vietnam history—rebel leaders such as the Trung sisters (who resisted Chinese rule in the first century A.D.), and the emperor Le Loi and his brilliant strategist Nguyen Trai, who fought against the Ming dynasty 1400 years later—were all closely identified with resistance to Chinese domination’ (Duiker 2002, 10). This probably limited the degree to which Ho was willing to accept Chinese influence. The impact of these past figures upon Ho was demonstrated in 1942 when he named the new Vietnamese Communist Headquarters ‘Lam Som, in memory of a guerrilla base established by the fifteenth-century Vietnamese patriot Le Loi in his struggle against Chinese occupation forces’ (Duiker 2002, 10). This all leads to the question that if Ho developed his own ideas on insurgency prior or concurrently to Mao, why has Mao rather than Ho been identified by academics as the originator of these approaches? There are three possible reasons. The first reason could be that Mao’s victory in the Chinese Civil War predated Ho’s victory against the French, which

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meant that the world paid attention to Mao’s theories before those of Ho. The second reason could be that, while the French loss of Indochina was seen as serious, its impact was perhaps less scarring to the West than the loss of China due to the larger population, geographical size, and (arguably) strategic value of the latter, as well as the fact that Indochina was purely a French colony, while China had been under partial occupation by a multitude of Western powers until the Japanese invasion in 1937. The final reason could be that Ho was coy about both his accomplishments and early life. In fact, for years Ho denied that he was the same person as Nguyen Ai Quoc, who founded the Indonesian Communist Party and wrote the overwhelming majority of the articles mentioned above (Duiker 2002, 4). On the contrary, as discussed in the next chapter, Mao was an avid self-promoter and constantly expounded his alleged genius in leading the Chinese Communist Party to victory in China. The irony of this revelation is that the Vietnamese Communists have previously said that their methods were their own, not Mao’s. This has been dismissed by Western scholars as nationalist nonsense (Perret 2009, 422–423). In fact, it would appear that the Vietnamese were being honest: Ho developed his ideas for insurgency separately to Mao, and owed him little or no intellectual debt. The other theorist who is regularly portrayed as a disciple of Mao’s teachings is Ernesto Che Guevara. It is true that the writings of Guevara on rebellion bear similarities with those of Mao. Communal themes include an emphasis upon gaining popular support, using selective rather than indiscriminate terrorism, linking social reformation with effective resistance, adopting a rural focus, pursuing multistage approaches, and several other areas (Guevara 1998). Nevertheless, a detailed look at Guevara’s works demonstrates that the similarities between the Cuban theorist and Mao are undermined by fundamental differences. One major difference between the two was that Guevara presupposed the primacy of guerrilla warfare as the decisive arm of an insurgency (Guevara 1998, 14–18). This was different to Mao’s belief in the instrumentality of regular warfare throughout the entire insurgency, especially as the final deciding arm. There is also a romantic undertone enshrined in Guevara’s writings and a sort of boyish excitement about the unsavoury conditions which dedicated revolutionaries must endure together. This sense of bravado and adventure is absent from the more didactic, matter-­ of-­fact, and sporadically crude works of Mao. Most notably, though, was that while Mao argued that an insurgency should be inseparable from the masses and that popular support should be

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built up slowly, Guevara advocated the development of a ‘steeled nucleus that could serve as an example’ and which through aggressive military and political activity could spark an explosion of popular support for the movement (Guevara 1998, 7; 2000, 108). As one scholar remarks: In Marxist-Leninist thought, as in Maoism, the political party is the leading force and there is a heavy emphasis on ideology and indoctrination. In the Castroist-Guevarist concept the political party does not play the central role, and there is no such emphasis on ideology and political education. True, according to Guevara the guerrilla must be a social reformer (above all an agrarian revolutionary), because this is what distinguishes him from a bandit. But the revolutionary spirit is somehow taken for granted, and so is support by the people. (Laqueur 1976, 331)

The extent to which Guevara did not believe in the need to cultivate the population is made clear in his Bolivian Diary, in which he noted multiple instances where he ordered local peasants to be captured and interrogated (Guevara 2000, 167–295). He also periodically stole provisions and cattle, forced peasants to provide accommodation, and pilfered from houses when their tenants were out (Guevara 2000, 175, 220, 265). He promoted the use of terror against the local people, including assertions that ‘Our peasant base still needs to be developed, although it appears that through planned terror we can obtain the neutrality of most; support will come later’ and ‘Now comes a stage in which the peasants will feel terror from both sides’ (Guevara 2000, 186 and 205). It is certainly possible that Guevara was inspired by Mao. In fact, he mentions Mao and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War explicitly within his works, and even met the Chinese leader in person (Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, 1960). Nevertheless, Guevara was clearly not influenced by Mao. As we saw earlier, his experience of winning an insurgency in Cuba occurred before he came into contact with Mao’s writings (Debray 1967, 20fn). Finally, when he eventually wrote down his theories on insurgency, there existed fundamental differences between his own works and those of Mao. The question of whether Guevara influenced subsequent theorists is complex and could involve another book in itself. The important thing to note here, however, is that those aspects of Guevara’s teachings which may have influenced subsequent insurgencies are the same aspects of his works that differ from Mao’s. The two Latin American theorists who followed

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him most immediately, Regis Debray and Carlos Marighella, are best known for their development of that part of Guevara’s philosophies most at odds with Mao’s: the revolutionary foco (Debray 1967, 76 and 106; Marighella 1969, 3–37). As one scholar explains: Debray expressed contempt for all the normal forms of political agitation … He expanded the familiar argument that a guerrilla group can help to create the conditions for revolution by disrupting the existing social order and proving the vulnerability of the regime. He also developed the elitist theory that revolution can be built from the apex down, rather than from the base upwards. (Moss 1972, 146–147)

Marighella was also determined to shift the location of insurgencies from the countryside to the cities, and embraced terrorism as a noble tool for insurgent revolutionaries (Marighella 1969, 3–37). More recent theorists of insurgency may also have paid attention to Guevara’s works, but again they drew lessons from them that were different to those of Mao. Payne argues that some prominent Al-Qaeda theorists on insurgency were influenced by Guevara, but suggests that they concentrated on Guevara’s teachings about the use of the un-Maoist revolutionary foco (Payne 2011). The extent to which Guevara’s writings influenced subsequent insurgent conflicts is less controversial. After his failures in the Congo and Bolivia, other insurgent leaders became reluctant about following his teachings (Beckett 1988, xii–xiii). The next insurgencies that broke out in Latin America concentrated on urban rather than rural rebellion. Despite the positioning of Ho and Che as devoted Maoist acolytes, it becomes clear that in fact neither of them had drawn any real influence from Mao, but instead had developed their ideas independently. In Ho’s case, he landed on many of the same principles that Mao would soon afterwards present as his own, but he reached these ideas on his own steam, with no tangible input from Mao. Che also created his own ideas about insurgency before coming into contact with Mao’s works, but unlike Ho did in fact make an effort to study and incorporate Mao’s strategies into his own philosophies of warfare. While doing this, however, he changed or abandoned so many of Mao’s recommendations that the model of warfare he created could no longer be viewed as having been shaped by Mao: It was an entirely new entity. This finding is important because, if even Mao’s supposedly most committed devotees owed no influence to Mao, then it is extremely unlikely that other theorists of insurgency would have done so either.

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Other Limiting Factors Alternative Influences It is worth noting at this stage that numerous other factors may influence the nature of an insurgency beyond simply the teachings of Mao. Three are briefly touched upon here: alternative inspirations, social drivers, and geographical terrain. Regarding the first, many of the claims about the influence of Mao ignore the impact of other historical figures upon the thoughts and values of insurgent groups. It is commonplace for insurgent leaders to cite numerous different characters upon whose authority they draw, often including prominent individuals within their own nation’s history or highprofile individuals from other countries. Even in those insurgencies where Mao was one of the figures cited as being an important role model, the leaders who made such pronouncements often cited the significance of other historical leaders, both domestic and international, for their efforts. The Shining Path movement, for example, drew its inspiration not only from Mao, but also from the so-called father of Peruvian Communism, Jose Carlos Mariategui, who established the Socialist Party of Peru in the 1920s (Niksch and Sullivan 1993, 3–8). Other Communist icons such as Marx, Lenin, and Stalin provided inspiration as well. Some authors claim Guzman and his followers also drew from ‘the glories of the Inca empire— especially its last hero, Atahualpa’ (Stavans 1993, 406; Starn 1995, 406). Other inspirations abounded too. One scholar described how at meetings and conventions, in addition to reading out passages from Mao, Guzman would read out ‘segments of Washington Irving’s now forgotten Life of Mahomet (to demonstrate “how when men are unified by a common cause they act together hand-in-hand”) and Shakespeare’s Macbeth (“to show how treason can poison the human mind”)’ (Stavans 1993, 28–29). Further inspirational figures included Kant and Thomas Mann (Starn 1995, 414). The head of the military side of the Vietnamese insurgents, Giap, was also heavily influenced by Napoleon—quite unsurprising given that Vietnam had experienced decades of French imperial rule—as well as obscure Vietnamese revolutionaries from the past (Perret 2009, 422–423). Napoleon’s influence in particular, rather than Mao’s, may help to explain the movement’s early obsession with forcing a decisive battle. Claims about Mao’s importance for insurgency also tend to ignore the fact that there were numerous high-profile insurgencies that broke out in the late 1930s and early 1940s as a result of the expansions of Japan, Italy,

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and Germany that culminated in the Second World War. Overrun by the seemingly unstoppable conventional might of the Axis powers, the populations of conquered countries found themselves with no options for effective resistance other than terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Not only were their struggles entirely independent of Maoist influence (except obviously in China), but they also acted as an important model for subsequent post-­ war uprisings (Hobsbawn 1995, 77–78). In many cases, these insurgencies had greater relevance and closer resemblance to later insurgencies, with the Warsaw Uprisings of 1943 and 1944 being, for example, urban in a way that would be closer to the later more city-oriented insurgencies of the post-war years. Moreover, insurgencies do not occur within a social and cultural vacuum. Each and every conflict region has its own history, its own culture, and its own social norms and values. These combine together to create a rich human environment that cannot easily be replicated within other countries. Each human tapestry casts its own influence upon the ­insurgency being fought and the thoughts and actions of the insurgents themselves. Other influences included the personalities of the people involved in the insurgency, popular trends within the country and its neighbours, and other such impetuses upon the consciousness of the insurgents and their followers. There may sometimes have been social, cultural, and historical similarities between Mao’s insurgency and those in other places; this was not the norm. So, for example, while it is true that some social similarities existed between China—with its vast schism between lower and upper classes—and Peru; this was not the case in Guinea-Bissau. As Laqueur notes, ‘the slogan “the land to him who works it” could not be applied to Guinea-Bissau, as [Cabral] admitted, because there the land did belong to the peasants; neither were there big land holdings—the land was village property’ (Laqueur 1976, 361). There was also a marked absence of concentrated groups of foreign settlers, as there had been in China (Laqueur 1976, 361). This had an inevitable impact on the nature of any efforts to rally the peasantry that Cabral might attempt. Geographical terrain too has an impact. The physical size of a conflict theatre, the proportion of land that is rugged or open, proximity to water, the number of countries with shared borders, and many other factors all impact upon the nature of any conflict. A war fought in the small territory of Holland, with its lowlands, dykes, and close access to the sea is always going to be different to a conflict in Chad, with its comparatively larger size, its abundance of desert, mountains, and arid plains, and its absence

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of a coastline. While some countries may share a similar geography with China, most do not. In fact, most of the countries that have experienced insurgencies since the victory of Mao in the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War have not only been considerably smaller than China, but have also exhibited radically different topographies. The Cuban Uprising was, for example, carried out in a comparatively tiny territory that was surrounded on all sides by water, which contrasted with China’s gigantic land mass, much of which is landlocked. Timing One of the major problems relating to the attribution of Maoist influence upon insurgencies relates to timing. While it is true that the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War began in the mid-late 1920s, Mao’s model lacked international credibility as a method of insurgency until the insurrection was won in 1949 (Joes 2010, 51). This was because, although the Chinese Communists had secured some successes during the earlier periods of war, these were always mitigated by other factors, such as subsequent defeats by their enemies, having to share the limelight of their accomplishments with other actors, and a general disinterest in East Asia compared to European affairs, particularly in the West. For example, while the Communists gained some prestige from their victories over the first four Guomindang encirclement campaigns in the early 1930s, these successes were more than invalidated by the crushing defeat inflicted upon them during the fifth campaign. Subsequently, perceived successes during the war against Japan would have been shared with the Guomindang, which continued to be viewed as the cockpit of Chinese resistance throughout the majority of the war. Even when Japan was defeated, few people—in or out of China—believed that the Communists would triumph. As late as 1948, Mao himself predicted that the Communists could not finish the conflict for years; such was the scale of the challenge that still seemed to confront his forces in taking on the Guomindang (Mao 1961, 261). Understanding that Mao’s model did not become viewed as a possible recipe for success until 1949 is important because at least some of the insurgencies with which his influence has most commonly been attributed were far enough under way by this date to have developed up their own characteristics independently. The Huk Uprising in the Philippines provides a good example. It is possible to note the exact point at which the Huks really became inspired by Mao’s model because they marked that

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event by changing the name of their movement from Hukbo ng bayan Laban sa Hapon (The People’s Anti-Japanese Army) to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s Liberation Army), an act which occurred in 1950 (Hammer 1962, 177–178 and 194). The Huk movement had begun eight years earlier, however, in response to the Japanese occupation of the archipelago. Interactions between the two movements at this dark hour of the war, when the Japanese were everywhere ascendant, would have been extremely limited. The reality was that the form and methods of the Huk movement had already been firmly established many years before any influence from Mao could have infiltrated it. Indeed, Luis Taruc—one of the supreme commanders of the movement—noted that in 1948 ‘the Chinese themselves were still much too busy completing the last stages of their own revolutionary war to be making its lessons available in handy published form to foreign Communist parties’ (Hyde 1968, 12). The Huk movement was never a Maoist insurgency; it was a home-grown movement that had been influenced by Marxism at a broad level. It only assumed a Maoist label after 1949—long after its core character had already been established—as a method of enhancing credibility by trying to associate with a movement that had already been successful.

Why Mao Became Irrelevant Two questions flow logically from this appraisal. The first is, if Mao exerted no influence upon those insurgencies which have been categorised as ‘coincidental,’ then how did these conflicts end up exhibiting similar features? This happened because at least some of the traits of insurgent warfare that have been associated with Mao are so inherently obvious or integral to the goals of an insurgent group that they have been adopted without the need for any influence from Mao. In Chap. 3, many prior insurgencies were identified that exhibited one or more of the tenets of insurgent warfare that were subsequently advanced in Mao’s teachings. This demonstrated that the natural appearance and use of these principles both can and did happen independent of any stimuli from the Chinese Communists. There are, however, a few areas where the changing world situation has diminished the ability of even mainstream insurgencies to act in ways which resembled Mao’s teachings, such as increasing levels of urbanisation across the globe. These changing features, discussed in more depth shortly, help to explain why most of the insurgencies that are coincidentally similar to what Mao recommended (such as the Ukrainian

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Insurgency Army, the Philippine Huks, and the Guinea-Bissau insurgents) occurred during the 1940s and 1950s and became far fewer in number in more recent history. The second question is, if there were at least a few insurgencies that were genuinely inspired by Mao and claimed to mimic him, why did they not end up doing so? There are two answers. First, some of Mao’s alleged disciples may have misread the Chinese leader’s teachings on rebellion, may have been lazy in applying them, may have adapted them so extensively that they lost all resemblance to Mao’s teachings, or may never really have attempted to implement them properly to start with. To provide an analogy: If a person says that he or she going to bake a cake using a recipe, but then misreads the recipe, cannot be bothered to purchase the correct ingredients, or sets about cooking a stir fry instead, it is scarcely surprising when the end product turns out not be a cake. The same is true for insurgencies who fail to apply Mao, intentionally or otherwise. The motivations behind why insurgents may have claimed to be implementing Mao’s teachings, when in reality they were doing something completely different, are explored in the next chapter. Second, those insurgent movements that have authentically tried to ape Mao’s teachings have typically been those which have been least suitable to do so. The structure and character of these movements have skewed and distorted any and all attempts to implement Mao’s recommendations for insurgency, particularly his suggestions regarding rallying popular support, minimising violence, and allowing for at least some devolution of power. The first problem for those insurgencies which have purported to mimic Mao most fanatically is that they have tended to be Marxist in ideology, which matters because Marxism is inherently violent in its perspectives on revolution (Finley 2006, 373–397). Marx himself declared that ‘there is only one way in which the murderous death agonies of the old society and the bloody throes of the new society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, and that way is revolutionary terror’ (Marx 1948). The end goal for the ideology is the overthrow of the existing order and its replacement with another, entirely different one, but ‘this kind of revolution, however, requires a violent overthrow of the ruling class because the ruling class has at its disposal legalised methods of social coercion’ (Bondi 1974, 65–69). The language used within the core creeds of Marxism thus creates dichotomies of ‘good people’ and ‘bad people,’ the former of whom should be encouraged to take up arms, while the latter should be suppressed. This creates a natural tendency for Marxist move-

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ments to veer towards extreme levels of persecution and violence, particularly towards so-called class enemies and those peasants and workers who oppose the revolution. This fundamental ideological commitment to persecution and violence makes it challenging for Marxist insurgents to be courteous in their conduct and to moderate their levels of violence, even when they claim to be doing so. This was not necessarily the case for earlier insurgencies that did not follow Marxist creeds. The values contained within the American Revolutionary War, for example, also emphasised equality, but the focus of the insurrection was on protecting the freedoms of the individual rather than subordinating it to the greater good in the way that Marxism does. The Declaration of Independence, for example, focuses generally on the intention of the colonists to ‘dissolve’ their ties with the British monarch and to ‘alter’ their government. The closest it comes to espousing violence is a single reference to the ‘right’ and ‘duty’ of man to ‘throw off’ an abusive government. It ends with the harmonious assertion that ‘we mutually pledge each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.’ It lacks the undercurrents of punishment and violence that flourish within Marxist doctrines. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Americans were able to keep violence within reasonable limits, whereas most Communist insurgencies—including Mao’s own war and those which claimed to have followed his teachings—instead inflicted extensive death and suffering upon the civilian population. This also helps to explain, to some extent, why insurgencies following other ideologies that embrace violence—such as some branches of Islamic extremism—have often deployed techniques that firmly breached Mao’s principles. Some examples of the ways that Islamic terrorism has gone against Mao’s core principles of insurgency include the deliberate use of indiscriminate terrorism and the adoption of often high-handed and superior attitudes towards civilians in conflict areas (Gastal 2008). They further  failed to adhere to Mao’s teachings by marginalising the need for building popular support and placing emphasis instead upon the development of ‘Focoist’ structures that resembled the teachings of Guevara, not Mao (Payne 2011, 124–140). The second factor is that many of the insurgencies mostly closely associated with Mao started their existence as tiny covert bands that used a heavily centralised structure and frowned on outsiders as potential spies or government infiltrators. These origins helped to shape the nature of the insurgency that they waged, even when it grew in scope and scale. For the

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bulk of the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, for example, the Communists were led by Mao and a miniscule elite leadership that included such personages as Lin Biao and Chou En’Lai, while the Shining Path movement was run exclusively by Abimael Guzman and a tiny group of student converts from his university days. The history and nature of these groups made them resistant to the notion of actually devolving power, even if they subscribed to it in theory. This prevented them from having any real hope of engaging in many strategies endorsed by Mao in his writings, including partially devolving power from the centre to the periphery of the movement, making their insurgencies truly popular, creating widespread shadow governments, or forming genuine United Fronts. This tendency away from devolving power was reinforced by the Marxist notion of a ‘vanguard party’ which Mao had incorporated into his understanding of how to wage an insurgency (Stockwell 2008). This helped to suggest to the Communists leading their various insurgencies that they both were and should be set apart as the unquestionable leaders of their revolution. This was different to the centralisation adopted in previous insurgencies. In the American Revolutionary War, for example, George Washington and Congress viewed themselves as part of a democratic tradition that embodied the people, rather than as a separate entity that was rightfully set apart. So entrenched was this democratic perspective that when the war was finally won, Washington resigned his post and returned—albeit temporarily as it later transpired—to his former life as a farmer (Peckham 1979, 196). The fact is that a centralised movement formed on the Marxist notion of a vanguard party inherently lacks the ability to devolve power in the way needed to truly rally a popular base, establish shadow institutions, and create a genuine United Front, as espoused by Mao in his writings. As mentioned above, there have also been some factors in the post-­ Second World War era which have affected the character of all insurgencies, regardless of the extent of their similarity to Mao or the intensity of their claims to be following his teachings. One of these factors has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of people living in cities versus the countryside. Some statistics illustrate the extent of this change: In 1950, roughly 30 per cent of the world’s population lived in cities, while by the end of 2014 this number had increased to 54 per cent (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2015, xxi). This has changed the centre of gravity for the population and political power within most states away from the countryside and into the cities. Insurgent groups operating in this changed environment have faced two options:

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either shift their own centre of gravity to the cities or become sidelined. The Shining Path movement in Peru was, for example, forced to move the focus of its efforts into the shanty towns in the outskirts of Lima in order to stay relevant because by the early 1990s over 40 per cent of the country’s population lived in the capital alone (Marks 2003, 130). This precluded the possibility of them waging a rural insurgency as envisaged within Mao’s teachings. In comparison, the American War of Independence operated in an environment where the weight of the country’s population lived predominantly in the countryside. Some further figures illustrate this point: The 1790 census of the United States lists 201,655 people living in urban settlements of over 2500 people out of an overall population for the country of 3,893,635—a total of just 5 per cent (Gibson 1998). The rebels were consequently able to wage an insurgency that flourished primarily within the countryside and left the cities to the incumbent (Schweikart and Allen 2007, 86). This has inevitably made it considerably more challenging for post-Mao insurgents to adhere to Mao’s teachings about adopting a rural focus. Engaging in urban rather than rural warfare has, in itself, forced insurgents to shape their rebellion in yet different ways to the methods described by Mao. As one scholar describes: The so-called urban guerrilla specializes in terrorism, in kidnapping, in bank robberies, all to serve the purposes of ‘armed propaganda.’ In this way he hopes to raise funds, arouse support, unnerve the government, scare its adherents, win international publicity, discourage investment and generally create a revolutionary situation culminating not in mobile warfare but in the kind of governmental abdication characteristic of the nineteenth-century street revolutions. (Martin 2013, 153)

A second factor has been an exponential increase in the ability of governments to project force that has taken place since the end of the Second World War. Prior to the rise of air forces, particularly air transportation, armed contingents had to travel by typically sluggish transportation methods—railway, ship, and even by foot. This slowed down their ability to react to events quickly and also meant that they had to traipse from A to B with no real means of leapfrogging obstructions such as terrain features or enemy defences. Another change which occurred during the latter half of the twentieth century was a dramatic improvement in the ability of incumbents to conduct surveillance. The use of first aircraft and later satel-

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lites to conduct surveillance greatly improved the ability of an incumbent to quickly and accurately discover large concentrations of insurgent forces or insurgent strongholds. This reduced the ability of insurgents to establish large base areas and use them to contain and conceal large concentrations of their followers without fear of incumbent reprisals. It was possible for the Maccabees to build their bases in hills that were near to the centre of gravity of the population of Judea, relatively free from fear of detection by Seleucid forces and safe in the knowledge that even if they were detected, it would take considerable time for any Seleucid army to reach them. This has not been the case for insurgencies in the past seven decades. It has been comparatively much easier for an incumbent to identify an insurgent base and, once identified, to swiftly apply overwhelming force to crush it. This has forced insurgents to shy away from building bases near or behind enemy lines, to avoid defending fixed positions, and to eschew fielding large concentrations of regular forces. Such attempts as have been made to build and defend fixed bases near to the enemy have come to considerable harm, as shown in the Philippines where an attempt to establish fixed rebel bases in the populous Isabela region was quickly identified and subsequently crushed by the government of Ferdinand Marcos (Jones 1989, 54–57 and 95–96). Instead, insurgents have been forced, as was the case in the Shining Path insurgency in Peru, to only build fixed bases in the fringe of the country, far away from the population’s centre of gravity, or not to build bases at all (Lucero 2008; Kent 1993, 445). It is noteworthy that Mao’s early attempts to build fixed bases—first in the Jinggang Mountains and subsequently in Jiangxi—were discovered, repeatedly attacked, and ultimately crushed by the Guomindang. His next base, in Yan’an, was only saved by the actions of the Japanese and the directly related Xi’an Incident. The increased ability of an incumbent to accurately detect and rapidly assault fixed insurgent bases, fortified positions, and large concentrations of insurgent forces has made it much tougher for insurgents to adhere to three of Mao’s teachings: building bases behind enemy lines, holding territory for as long as possible, and placing a primacy on regular warfare with irregular warfare as secondary. Two further changes have combined to offer a more attractive route to victory for post-Second World War insurgencies against foreign powers that did not really exist prior to 1945. The first change was an exponential increase in the speed, accessibility, availability, prevalence, and impact of communications (Taylor 1997, 27–52). While in the first half of the twen-

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tieth century, news could take days or even weeks to be communicated from one location to another, the invention or increase in use of the telephone, television and—most recently—the Internet reduced this transit speed to a time span of hours, minutes, or even seconds. The second was an increased sensitivity and aversion to negative fallout of waging counterinsurgent war amongst incumbent populations—particularly in the West— including military casualties, spiralling costs, and human rights abuses amongst the theatre’s own population (Mueller 2005, 44–54; Merom 2003, 79–80). These changes combined together to provide an insurgent with an easier opportunity for victory than defeating the enemy through regular combat, which was to demoralise their domestic population until they eventually forced their government to concede. In order to win their insurgencies, the American and Maccabean insurgents had to painstakingly build up armies of sufficient size and power that could confront and defeat the British and Seleucid regular forces in multiple decisive pitched battles. In contrast, the Vietnamese insurgents were able to shortcut this laborious process by inflicting an unending number of small cuts upon the American forces, causing a continuous drip of American military casualties and generating incessant negative media footage for the population back in the United States. The speed and impact of the media upon the American public, combined with a societal rejection of military casualties being acceptable, anger about the ever-mounting war costs, and a popular aversion to occupying a foreign country, allowed the insurgents to triumph without ever needing to go through the rigmarole of building up a regular army and using it to win through force of might. While a force of some size was still needed to defeat the South Vietnamese government, this scarcely represented a ‘third stage’ given that the North Vietnamese who ultimately invaded and defeated the South were already stronger than the South Vietnamese at the start of the conflict. In a nutshell, these two changes provided insurgencies with an easier avenue for winning conflicts: Rather than having to build up their forces until finally achieving military parity and then triumphing through force of arms (i.e., a three-stage plan), the insurgent could now simply use harassment tactics and media propaganda and endure the enemy’s attacks (without needing to grow) in order to achieve victory. The need to use the kind of three-stage strategy described by Mao against a foreign power, or to place a primacy on regular warfare, was no longer mandatory. Nor, given the increasing ability of incumbents to project force quickly and effectively, was it preferable.

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Of course, the potential of insurgents using propaganda to force governments into abandoning power within domestic insurgencies is more limited, as there is nowhere for the government to retreat if it abandons the conflict. Nevertheless, insurgents have endeavoured to use this approach against them, even if it has failed to yield success. Hamas’s ongoing efforts to overthrow a domestic authority using harassment and propaganda is a good example of an insurgency that has pursued these methods, even though it has limited prospects for forcing the Lebanese government to abdicate from power. Some reasons for the use of the method by insurgents fighting against domestic rather than foreign governments may include that it can help to deter possible interference by foreign powers, that it is easier to wage insurgency in this manner (even if it cannot obviously offer a clear path to victory), and that it may help persuade well-positioned domestic stakeholders or foreign governments to put pressure on the government to abdicate. Finally, an increase in the constraints on the actions of international actors has reduced the likelihood of an insurgency being able to manipulate external forces. One constraint has been the creation of norms and laws against unprovoked aggression by one country against another, along with the enforcement—at least nominally—of these precepts by the United Nations. Another has been the existence of nuclear weapons, which have limited the potential for nuclear weapon states to become engaged in military activities against other nuclear weapon states. While it was mostly unproblematic for the Romans to throw their lot in with the Maccabees against the Seleucids during the Maccabean Revolt and for the French to ally with the Americans against the British during the American War of Independence, the great powers of the post-Second World War period have found their hands considerably more tied. This has reduced the potential avenues for insurgents to manipulate external forces. Such avenues still exist, particularly for crafty insurgents (such as the Kosovo Liberation Army, who arguably encouraged the Serbians to commit atrocities against the population in order to trigger a military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999), but they are considerably more limited in availability and impact (Kuperman 2008, 224–226).

Implications To conclude this section, several different reasons exist as to why post-­ Mao insurgencies have failed to exhibit the same features of warfare that he described in his teachings. The first is that a good number of insurgents

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have either never really intended to try to implement his teachings or made no real effort to do so in any meaningful way, despite protestations of faithfulness to the Maoist model of warfare. The second is that the core Marxist ideology and typical character of the kinds of insurgencies that really have tried to mimic Mao’s teachings, including Mao and his followers during the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, have incurably impeded their efforts in this direction. The third is that certain factors of the post-­ Second World War era have reduced the applicability of some of Mao’s teachings, including a reduction in the relevance of a rural approach in a world which has grown ever more urbanised. This leads us to another question. If, by choice or by necessity, neither the overwhelming majority of insurgencies nor theorists of insurgency after the Second World War were influenced by Maoist methods, then why has it been so widely reported by Western scholars that they were? This thorny dilemma is the subject of the next chapter.

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Mueller, John. 2005. The Iraq Syndrome. Foreign Affairs 84 (6): 44–54. Nguyen Ai Quoc. 1960a. Racial Hatred. In Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh Vol. 1. Trans. Roland Ferguson and Christian Liebl. Ho Chi Minh City: Foreign Languages Publishing House. www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chiminh/works/1922/07/01.htm. Accessed 25 Nov 2013. ———. 1960b. Appeal Made on the Occasion of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party. In Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh Vol. 1. Trans. Roland Ferguson and Christian Liebl. Ho Chi Minh City: Foreign Languages Publishing House. www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chi-minh/works/ 1930/02/18.htm. Accessed 25 Nov 2013. ———. 1960c. Equality!. In Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh Vol. 1. Trans. Roland Ferguson and Christian Liebl. Ho Chi Minh City: Foreign Languages Publishing House. www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chi-minh/works/ 1922/06/01.htm. Accessed 25 Nov 2013. ———. 1960d. Some Considerations on the Colonial Question. In Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh Vol. 1. Trans. Roland Ferguson and Christian Liebl. Ho Chi Minh City: Foreign Languages Publishing House. www.marxists. org/reference/archive/ho-chiminh/works/1922/06/01.htm. Accessed 25 Nov 2013. ———. 1969. Lynching: A Little Known Aspect of American Civilization. In Ho Chi Minh Selected Articles and Speeches 1920–1967, ed. Jack Woddis, 20–25. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd. ———. 1970. The Party’s Military Work Among the Peasants. In Armed Insurrection, ed. A. Neuberg, 255–271. London: NLB. ———. 2005. Indochina. In Ho Chi Minh Selected Writings, Made Available by Communist Party of Vietnam Online Newspaper. Ho Chi Minh City: The Gioi Publishers. http://dangcongsan.vn/cpv/Modules/News_English/News_ Detail_E.aspx?CN_ID=150893&CO_ID=30035. Accessed 25 Nov 2013. Niksch, Larry A., and Mark P. Sullivan. 1993. Peru’s Shining Path: Background on the Movement, Counterinsurgency Strategy and U.S.  Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. O’Neil, Robert. 1969. General Giap: Politician and Strategist. Sydney: Cassell Australia Ltd. Palmer, Dave. 1982. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.–Vietnam in Perspective. Novato: Presidio Press. Paret, Peter. 1986. Napoleon and the Revolution in War. In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 123–142. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Payne, Kenneth. 2011. Building the Base: Al Qaeda’s Focoist Strategy. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2): 123–143. Peckham, Howard H. 1979. The War for Independence: A Military History. London: The University of Chicago Press.

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Perret, Geoffrey. 2009. Vo Nguyen Giap, 1911. In The Art of War: Great Commanders of the Modern World, ed. Andrew Roberts, 420–427. London: Quercus. Schiff, Zeev, and Raphael Rothstein. 1972. Fedayeen: The Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas. London: Valentine, Mitchell & Co. Ltd. Schweikart, Larry, and Michael Allen. 2007. A Patriot’s History of the United States: From Columbus’s Great Discovery to the War on Terror. London: Penguin Books. Sea Power Centre. 2005. The RAN Fleet Air Arm – Ashore in Vietnam. Semaphore: News Letter of the Sea Power Centre – Australia 8: 1–2. Sharp, U.S.  Grant. 1979. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. London: Presidio Press. Smith, Frederic. 1985. The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against Soviet Power. In Combat on Communist Territory, ed. Charles Moser, 2–21. Lake Bluff: Regnery Gateway Inc. Starn, Orin. 1995. Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History. Journal of Latin American Studies 27: 399–421. Stavans, Ilan. 1993. Two Peruvians. Transitions 61: 18–39. Stockwell, Robert. 2008. Socialism and Communism: After Marx. http://faculty. deanza.edu/stockwellbob/stories/storyReader$117. Accessed 21 Aug 2013. Taylor, Philip M. 1997. Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945. London: Routledge. Thompson, Robert. 1981. Indochina 1954–75: Vietnam. In War in Peace: An Analysis of Warfare Since 1945, ed. Robert Thompson, 181–220. London: Orbis Publishing. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2015. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. New York: United Nations. Webster, Donovan. 1997. Aftermath: The Remnants of War. London: Constable and Constance Limited. Woddis, Jack. 1969. Introduction. In Ho Chi Minh: Selected Articles & Speeches 1920–1967, ed. Jack Woddis, 7–12. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd. Wollenberg, Erich. 1970. How We Wrote Armed Insurrection. In Armed Insurrection, ed. A. Neuberg, 9–23. London: NLB. Zhai, Qiang. 2000. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. London: The University of North Carolina Press. Zhukov, Yuri M. 2007. Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-­ Insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Small Wars and Insurgencies 18 (3): 439–466.

CHAPTER 6

The Deification of Mao

Qui Bono? As earlier chapters have shown, the extent to which Mao was an original thinker and the degree to which he influenced the character of subsequent insurgencies, including his own, has been exaggerated. In fact, Mao’s principles of rebellion existed long before him and many of the insurgencies that he allegedly influenced displayed few of the relevant traits. This raises two connected questions: Why has Mao’s importance been so inflated and how has this happened? The answer can be gleaned by looking through the Ciceran lens of ‘Qui Bono?’ (Who Benefits?). Seen through the lens of this question, it becomes clear that all of the main stakeholders who interacted with Mao’s model of insurgency possessed both the motivation and the means to support the fiction that Mao’s teachings were crucial for modern insurgency. These stakeholders include Mao himself, the insurgents group who claimed to be using his methods, governments fighting against insurgencies, and the West. Intentionally distorting the truth and perpetuating false myths for self-benefit is scarcely a new or unusual occurrence; political actors have often used historical myths to improve the rapidity and thoroughness with which they can convince about people about their ideas (Heuser and Buffet 1998, 265–273). The deliberate cultivation of the insurgent myth of Mao by these actors, despite it being untrue, represents a continuation of this long tradition.

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The first stakeholder is Mao who, like many dictators, possessed a gargantuan ego (Montefiore 2008, 228; Fenby 2008, 398). This led him to promote himself as the hero of the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War and foster the idea that it was his genius—and only his genius—that had caused the overthrow of the Guomindang and establishment of the People’s Republic. Mao also continued to be involved in political infighting amongst the Chinese Communist Party throughout the decades that followed the war (Barmé 1969). By claiming that he was the architect of the original victory of the revolution, Mao could inject an extra layer of authority to his position and undermine the attacks of his rivals (Harris 1976, 266–269). Furthermore, when challenges to his rule did occur, Mao knew that he might need to depend upon the armed forces to back him up and so felt that cultivating a myth about his martial genius would be an effective way of bolstering his credentials in the eyes of the military for this purpose (Lieberthal 1995, 110–115). Placing the military at the centre of the regime’s revolutionary heritage, while depicting himself as their glorious leader and strategist in chief, also enabled Mao to justify calling upon the military when his political position was threatened. The logic he cultivated for these occasions was that the armed forces were the true heart of the revolution and that this group should be reverted to whenever other groups deviated from the correct path by challenging Mao’s position. During the 1950s and 1960s, Mao decided that he wanted to cultivate and maintain a revolutionary fervour domestically within China to help transform its economy and culture. He believed that this goal could be accomplished in part by depicting China as the backbone of global revolutionary activity, particularly in Southeast Asia (Dumbrell 2004, 94). This portrayal would be well served by playing up the myth that Mao’s theories of insurgent warfare were the engine driving the rebellions across the region. Mao also became convinced that China would benefit from militarising the civilian aspects of society as a means of completing economic tasks, including by dividing civilians into brigades and other military-­sounding formations and demanding that they wage a war against economic problems (Dikötter 2011, 92–100, 124, and 151–152). Mao felt that re-emphasising the military origins of the Communist state and endlessly stressing his supposed role as beloved rebel leader and revolutionary mastermind would help to underpin his authority on this matter. There were also international dimensions to Mao’s desire to promote himself as a mastermind of modern insurgency. From the mid-late 1950s until his death, Mao’s China jostled with the Soviet Union for the prestige

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of being viewed as the leader of the Communist World (Priestland 2009, 376; Dikötter 2011, 27). This led Mao to downplay the role played by the Soviet Union in the rise of the Communist Party in China and accentuate the notion that the Chinese people pulled themselves up by their bootstraps without help from the outside world. It also led Mao to play up the importance and sophistication of the so-called Maoist People’s War in comparison to the Soviet model of insurgency. This enabled him to brand the Soviet method as irrelevant, capitulationist, and imperialist, while labelling the Maoist method as representing the true will of the world’s oppressed peoples. Mao’s determination for China to challenge both the Soviet Union and—to a lesser extent—the United States for premier position on the global stage also led it into an initially intractable problem: Both the USSR and America possessed nuclear weapons, whereas until 1964 China did not (and even then the numbers of weapons owned were considerably fewer than its rivals). To circumvent this difficulty, Mao suggested that his principles of insurgency were so strong that they would enable the Chinese to ride out any nuclear attack and still triumph over its adversaries (Mao 1961, 100; Freedman 1981, 276–282). Chinese leaders after Mao have also been incentivised to continue perpetuating the myth of Mao because the justification behind the modern Chinese state is underpinned by the popular belief that the original rebellion that installed the regime was righteous, benevolent, and represented the needs and wants of the Chinese people (Chang and Halliday 2006, 617). To revisit the history of Mao’s rise to power and admit that the man behind the legend was anything less than perfect would risk shaking the foundations of the oneparty state which continues to rule. For this reason, party historians and media representatives are pressured into representing Mao in an exclusively positive light (Sun 2007, 134–135). Sun’s conversation with a television crew filming a celebration of the Long March’s 70th anniversary is revealing: ‘You see that old man?’…‘He complained to us about the Red Army cutting down their precious trees for firewood in the cold winter, making Zhidan even more uninhabitable. It is an interesting point—I often wonder how the Red Army survived here. But it won’t make it into the final film. Although it is true, and it did happen seventy years ago, it reflects badly on the Red Army, especially now when people are more conscious of the environment.’ I asked him about the mystery of Liu Zhidan’s death…‘Officially it was Mao who saved Liu Zhidan and the Shaanxi Red base from the purge. In fact, they saved Mao and the Red Army. The local Party historian told us in private he did not believe Liu’s death was accidental. He may have had a point.’

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‘You know the song “East Is Red”?’ he continued. Of course, the song was more famous than the national anthem when I was growing up. I sang or heard it every day for over a decade—in praise of the Great Leader Chairman Mao … ‘That was a Shaanxi folk song originally, dedicated to Liu Zhidan … After his death, Mao’s name appeared … I only learned that during my interviews. But the story won’t make it into the film either.’ So he could not mention the purge, the maybe-not-so-accidental death of Liu Zhidan, the origin of ‘East Is Red,’ the desertions, the power struggle, the battle for food, and of course the real reasons for the Long March. ‘Absolutely not … television is the voice of the Party. On such an important event we have to follow the line it lays down’. (Sun 2007, 783–787)

Mao had the means to promote the myth about the novelty and influence of his model of insurgency. Within China, he possessed the status of a nearly godlike leader who enjoyed the brainwashed adoration of hundreds of millions of people (Klein 2004, 67). This gave him the ability to broadcast the importance of his role as the one and only true guide of the Revolutionary Civil War to the entire population of China with little or no opposition to contest or even just critique his claims. He used devices such as the Little Red Book of Chairman Mao’s Quotations, of which many hundreds of millions were made and circulated, to further indoctrinate the people regarding his significance (Chang and Halliday 2006, 503; Klein 2004, 67). As Margolin notes, Mao suppressed anyone who dared to disagree with him: Those who dared to criticize Mao’s policies were invariably crushed to pieces, stripped of their titles, expelled from the Communist party, sometimes persecuted till death. That was the fate of the prestigious commander of the Chinese ‘volunteers’ in Korea, Marshal Peng Dehuai, and of the President of the Republic and one time heir apparent, Liu Shaoqi. (Margolin 2010, 440)

Sun gives another example of this when discussing the annihilation of the Western Legion during the Long March, which Mao blamed on the cowardice of the formation’s leader: ‘For the next fifty years anyone who questioned this would have been challenging Mao—an unthinkable crime. The few memoirs that referred to it were suppressed; veterans of the Legion were treated as traitors, scholars who dared to ask questions were warned by the Party and followed by police’ (Sun 2007, 907–908). Much of the internal rhetoric and literature produced was followed and believed by external audiences in other parts of the world too (Chang and Halliday 2006, 555–558).

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At an international level, Mao promoted his viewpoints regarding his pivotal role in the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War through an incessant litany of forums and conferences between Chinese officials and representatives from other countries, either abroad (which Mao did not attend) or in China (where he mostly did) (Priestland 2009, 376). His message at these meetings was reinforced by the prestige he enjoyed as the leader of the largest Communist state on Earth and by the willingness of China to provide aid and favoured trading to any country or insurgent movement which accepted Chinese leadership (Chang and Halliday 2006, 453). The current Communist Party continues to possess several mechanisms to maintain the myth of Mao, including physical control over all of the main party documents—which remain heavily censored and restricted—and political control over the country’s universities and research institutions. Those insurgent groups across the globe who have claimed to be closely following Mao’s teachings have also had multiple reasons for promoting the fictional centrality of Mao’s model of warfare to the character of their rebellions, even though there was no truth to these claims. One reason was that perpetuating this fiction provided an opportunity to raise their credibility in the eyes of the population amongst who they fought. Their goals were not necessarily to rally the masses in a mighty homogenous wave, as suggested in the myth itself, but many groups possessed an urge to garner at least some support from the people and to use this to their advantage. Given that the population is often most inclined to support the side in an insurgency which they think is going to win, the ability for insurgent groups to claim that they were using a proven foreign formula that all but guaranteed victory, rather than untested and uncertain domestic methods, helped them to suggest to the population that they would win. Mao’s so-called People’s War provided a formula that they could cite. A second reason that insurgent groups falsely claimed to be using Mao’s model of insurgency was that many of them wanted to access foreign aid from China in order to wage their rebellion. They believed that claiming their movement was following a Maoist methodology, even if it was not, would help to leverage aid from the Chinese. As Chang and Halliday note: ‘African radicals rather astutely took Mao’s money, as one Chinese diplomat put it, with a big smile, but his instructions with a deaf ear’ (Chang and Halliday 2006, 559). One good example of this happened in the Philippines, where the New People’s Army (NPA) claimed to be using Mao’s model of insurgency to fight against the corrupt dictator Ferdinand Marcos. When it became clear that tangible aid from China was never going to rise above a

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paltry drip, Jose Maria Sison—the leader of the insurrection—was far from amused (Ware 1988, 143; Mediansky 1986, 2). After recognising that aid would never be forthcoming, he revealed in a strategy document entitled ‘Specific Characteristics of Our People’s War’ that their campaign was in fact being fought using radically different methods than those that Mao outlined in his teachings (Sison 1974). The third was that many insurgents saw the world in the same polarised terms of the Cold War as did the superpowers (Priestland 2009, 376). They genuinely believed that their struggles represented a part of the greater whole that pitched the predominantly Western democratic powers against the mostly Eastern Communist states. Many of the insurgent groups were themselves Communist movements who were fighting to deliver regime change within their country or were anti-imperialist groups that were intent on overthrowing Western colonial domination. The fact that Mao’s insurgency had been both Communist and anti-colonial led at least some insurgent groups to feel as though they should align themselves with the Maoist vision of insurgency in name, even when they were unable or unwilling to mimic his model in substance. As a fourth reason, many insurgents believed that claiming to use a Maoist formula of insurgency would be an effective way to intimidate foreign incumbents and their populations. As happened in the case of Vietnam, some insurgent groups adopted a strategy of trying to wear down the political will of their opponent as the means of achieving victory. In order to do this, the rebels aimed to convince multiple key actors within the government’s coalition that the war was unwinnable, including the general population, the rank and file of the armed forces, the senior hierarchy of the military, the political elites who support the government, and even the government itself (Zhai 2000, 178–179). Suggesting that their rebellion was using the supposedly terrifying and unstoppable method of Mao was a good way to spook these key actors into thinking that the conflict was indeed a lost cause and that they should pressure the government to retreat. A fifth reason was that many insurgent leaders emerged within parties that contained intensive political rivalry and jockeying for position. For these individuals, it was beneficial to their career prospects to position themselves as forward-looking Maoist thinkers while branding their opponents as old-fashioned Stalinists. Guzman’s Sendero Luminoso in Peru, for example, was spawned out of a bitter struggle between rival Communist parties. His creation of the movement represented the culmination of

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nearly a decade of political struggles with other members of the Communist movements. By defining the movement as Maoist, he was able to differentiate it from the other Communist factions that already existed in Peru (Stavans 1993, 25–26). Similarly, Jose Maria Sison was born into a Communist movement that had existed in the Philippines for many decades and possessed multiple respected leaders who were viewed as heroes of the Huk Insurrection of the 1940s and 1950s. In order to differentiate himself from the existing party leadership, Sison decried these veterans as being old-fashioned Stalinists and painted himself as leading a new Maoist insurrection that would succeed where the previous rebellion had failed. In these and other cases, the insurgent leaders foresaw that claiming to adopt a fresh new conflict strategy would draw a substantial number of members of the existing insurgent group into the new offshoot that they were founding. This, in turn, would enable them to rapidly acquire the following they needed to either take over the existing insurgent apparatus or splinter off into an entirely new rebel group. Like Mao, the insurgents who have claimed to use his strategy have typically been strongly positioned to disseminate the falsehood that this is what they were doing. One major reason for this is that outsiders who study insurgent groups often take the claims made by the insurgents at face value, rather than subjecting them to critical analysis. Scholars of the Vietnam War, for example, have been wont to study the works of Giap and Ho in a fairly uncritical fashion in their pursuit of understanding the organisation and methodologies adopted by the Vietnamese insurgents. The fact that these two strategists may have had rationales for describing their movement and its goals beyond purely telling the truth has usually been glossed over or ignored altogether. If a movement has claimed to be Maoist, this has been accepted prima facie, with little consideration given to potential biases or alternative motivations. The deliberate and intricate duping of Edgar Snow by the Communists in Yan’an serves as an example of the kind of intentional lies that can be spun by insurgents to advance a hidden agenda (Sun 2007, 826–837). Governments confronted by a rebellion have often been highly motivated to present their opponents as following a Maoist path as well. One driver has been the awareness that painting the insurgents they oppose as being Maoist allows them to twist the public view of the conflict from being a virtuous rebellion by the people to overthrow an oppressive tyranny into a valiant struggle by the patriotic government against the outside invader. The Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, for example,

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suggested that the strength and intensity of the Communist movement he faced (the ‘NPA’) was as much connected with ‘the strategy of world Communism’ as it was with local circumstances and consistently referred to Sison and his followers as ‘Maoist’ (Marcos 1973, 8). The following quote from one of the books he published during his reign illustrates how he tried to paint the conflict as being between the people of the Philippines and a malicious alien entity: I rushed back to Manila obsessed with one thought and that was the need to unite the people of the Philippines against the common enemy, the subversives, especially those who proclaimed themselves to be Maoist Communists. (Marcos 1973, 29)

This perversion of the facts allows the government greater leeway to impose or maintain existing oppression, such as martial law, the suspension of habeas corpus, and the imposition of curfews. This can again be seen in the example of the Marcos government in the Philippines, where Marcos cited the foreign nature of the insurgency he faced as justification for all of these items (Marcos 1971, xvi–xxii). Finally, such a representation enabled the governments to claim to be on the red-hot edge of the Cold War between the Capitalist West and the Communist East. Whereas the act of fighting against a domestic insurgency was likely to earn no aid (and probably a fair bit of criticism from the West), the act of fighting against a Communist insurgency was far more likely to yield foreign sympathy and support. Marcos again serves as a useful example because he was able to access American sympathy and support for his regime and its fight against the NPA for far longer than he should have been able because of the American desire to resist the Maoist menace that they believed was growing in their own backyard. While governments have often lacked the same aura of impartiality allocated to insurgent groups by scholars, claims by these incumbents, nonetheless, added to the weight of evidence used by Western scholars in their quest to create coherent pictures of the struggles between government and insurgent forces across time and space. In particular, the accounts of soldiers and politicians on the side of the government have often provided rare primary sources from environments where information was often scarce and hard to find. Governments have also possessed three advantages that the insurgents lacked. The first is that their status as power holder within the country often gave them nearly complete access to—or even

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control of—their state’s main communications and broadcasting machinery. Until the recent rise of Internet news, social media, and satellite television, this often gave the incumbent a near monopoly on the media viewed by their people. The second was that, as the internationally recognised government of their country, they had the opportunity to participate in formal meetings with other countries and international organisations, which provided a platform to disseminate their position. The third is that their position as the formal government often made it easier for journalists, scholars, and other interested parties—both domestic and foreign—to meet with them and record their viewpoints. As one example, we can consider the large number of accounts based on testimony and interviews with the American government and military regarding the nature of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. While meeting with a representative of an insurgent group could be time-consuming to arrange and dangerous to undertake (with the danger coming from both the government who might view such an action as criminal and the insurgents who might view the venture as an insidious ploy to betray them) setting up and carrying out interviews with members of the armed forces and politicians in the government usually carried a far lower risk. The final stakeholder who promoted the falsehood of Mao is the Western world. There are multiple reasons for the West’s involvement in perpetuating the legend, the first of which stems from the personality clash that emerged between Joseph Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek following the former’s assignment to China as the ranking American military representative in the region. Recent scholarship on their relationship has revealed that Stilwell acted in an often arrogant, unintelligent, and self-serving manner (Taylor 2011, 199–295; Furuya 1981, 731–814; Fenby 2004, 378–383 and 425–429). After enduring years of Stillwell’s hostility and defiance, accompanied by his poor strategic decision-making, Chiang finally demanded that Stilwell be replaced in 1945 (Taylor 2011, 285–294). Stilwell then went on a media offensive, presenting himself as the hero of China—a role which the patriotically minded American media of the time was only too happy to propagate—and Chiang as an incompetent and self-­ serving villain who ran a corpulent and corrupt regime (Taylor 2011, 295; Furuya 1981, 814–815; Fenby 2004, 429–431; van de Ven 2003, 60). In Stillwell’s narrative, the Guomindang lost not because it had received a horrendous hammering at the hands of the Japanese but because it collapsed under the weight of its own corruption, arrogance, unpopularity, and lack of political vision. The Communists, on the other hand, were

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depicted as superior, not because they conserved their resources by avoiding fighting the Japanese, but because they represented the polar opposite of Chiang’s regime by being efficient, chivalrous, popular, and politically focused (Furuya 1981, 755–765; van de Ven 2003, 60). Such a portrayal was predominantly untrue, but it served the interests of Stilwell by presenting himself as the valiant American hero struggling to nursemaid a stupid, stubborn, and corrupt Chinese despot and it became popular with most of the leading newspapers (Furuya 1981, 815). Prior to his removal, Stilwell had even dallied with the notion of supporting the Communists because he believed their propaganda that they were fighting against the Japanese and would increase their efforts if supplied with American aid, which fed into his post-dismissal claims that the Communists were popular, heroic, and politically savvy (Taylor 2011, 235, 242 and 291; Furuya 1981, 764–765 and 798–799). Stilwell’s account was supported by the so-called China Hands’—members of the US State Department and journalists working in China that included John Service, David Barrett, John Patton Davies, and Theodore White. For one reason or another, these individuals became sympathetic to Communists and were not shy about saying so to Stillwell, the American government, the American media, and anyone else who would listen (Taylor 2011, 220–221 and 265; Furuya 1981, 769–773 and 798–799; van de Ven 2003, 60). These individuals promoted the depiction of an incompetent, corrupt, and unpopular Guomindang regime fighting against an adept, virtuous, and popular Communist insurgent (van de Ven 2003, 3–4). Much of the responsibility for the inaccurate representation of the Communists lies with the American journalist Edgar Snow. First invited to visit the Communists in Yan’an in 1937, Snow was duped by a carefully orchestrated charade in which Mao and his followers presented a facade of a rural peasant utopia, with the Communist Party serving as beloved leaders who guided rather than ruled, while the peasants were respected and empowered (Sun 2007, 824–841). The harsh realities of Mao’s ­unpopularity with many of the local people and the horrifying purges he oversaw were hidden, while the party members and peasants with whom he came into contact were vetted and required to respond to his questions in certain ways, for fear of punishment. Mao’s task may have been made easier by a proclivity on the American journalist’s part to believe in the purity of the Communist ideals. Whatever the cause, Snow reported a mountain of falsehoods about the benevolence of the Communists towards

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the peasantry, their popularity amongst the people, and the visionary genius of Mao as a humble leader who shared the tribulations of his comrades. Snow’s most famous work, Red Star over China, arguably did more to shape Western perspectives about Mao and the Chinese Communist Party than any other work, before or after. All told, the combined influence of Stillwell ‘the China Hands,’ and Snow helped to create a lasting impression in Western imaginations that the genius and benevolence of Mao was the root cause behind the fall of the Guomindang, rather than the true reason: the damage done by the Japanese. A further reason is that the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 came as a shock to many in the West. For decades afterwards, the United States wrestled with the question of ‘who lost China?’ (Fine and Bin 2011, 601). At the same, the United States became increasingly concerned that they would not be able to contain Communism, leading them to overexaggerate the threat posed to them by militant Communist movements, including the Maoist model (Priestland 2009, 377–378; Logevall 2012, 222). Heightening Cold War tensions, the fall of multiple colonial governments to Communist governments, and involvement in the Vietnam War culminated in the creation of the infamous ‘Domino Theory.’ This held that the fall of one or more states at the peripheral edge of Western influence would lead to a cascade of other states falling, until the Western states were themselves surrounded and assaulted by Communist aggression (Calvocoressi 2001, 534). Counterinsurgency specialists of the time such as Robert Thompson believed that Mao’s formula was contributing to the Communist advance by providing the motor for anti-Western insurgencies, both Communist and non-Communist, in many parts of the world (Thompson 1969, 169). The belief that the Maoist model represented a sophisticated and near unstoppable approach to insurgency further fuelled fears: Analysts became so terrified about the prospect of an unstoppable surge of Maoist insurgencies that they began to see his influence everywhere, when really it was nearly nowhere. When relations thawed with China in the early 1970s and Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, a wave of adoration for Mao sprang up in the West (Fenby 2008, 506). Mao was again depicted as a popular leader who had led his forces to victory over the Guomindang through acute political vision, benevolence towards the people, and a cunning protracted approach. This positive perspective not only infected scholarly writings and policy discourse, but also pervaded the popular press and other mainstream mediums. This adoration for Mao was reinforced by the fact that he was viewed

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as representing an alternative face of Communism to the much-feared Soviet Union. The strategic advantages that could be gleaned by a geopolitical realignment of the world away from a vast Communist monolithic across the bulk of Asia into a world where the Soviet Union was surrounded by anti-Soviet powers led to considerable positive feeling towards Mao within the West. This further increased the propensity of Westerners to accept and even propagate the myths of the Communists’ supposedly pioneering, popular, and virtuous rise to power. Other less historical reasons also explain why the West has eagerly believed in the insurgent myth of Mao. One of these is that by accepting such a model, it simplifies the task for students of insurgency to imagine that they can quickly and easily understand any insurgency at any place in the world. As mentioned in the introduction, many scholars continue to suggest that the insurgency they are writing about is Maoist and apply, without much substantiation, one or more of his real or imagined teachings to explain the conflict. Another driver stems from society’s enduring obsession with great men or women who decide the outcome of history. There is no shortage of books on this theme, be they catalogues of great military commanders, prolific mass murderers, insurgency leaders, or other categories. While many of these works advance useful and insightful points, their core orientation, nevertheless, begins with the premise that great men or women do exist and that Mao numbers amongst their ranks. This provides a bias towards the belief that Mao’s influence upon the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War was that of a titanic figure who towered above colleagues and followers alike as leader and visionary. Societal predilections towards romantic folk heroes also played a role in increasing the susceptibility of the West to believe in the myth of Mao. The allure of the rugged rogue, who defies corrupt authority and wealthy magnates in a clever, yet indirect fashion, has always resonated with populations across the world, and the West is no exception. When presented with Mao’s sympathetic self-depiction of his rise to power, through the works of writers such as Snow and Smedley, as being the tale of an uncouth, yet well-meaning man of the people, it was easy and appealing for Westerners to place him in this category, alongside other iconic anti-­ establishment rascals such as Spartacus, Robin Hood, William Tell, Spartacus, William Wallace, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. An inability to conceive the depths of deception that totalitarian leaders are able and willing to employ has also contributed to Western acceptance of the Maoist myth. When Western televisions and newspapers showed

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thousands of Chinese people waving Little Red Books and proclaiming the genius of Mao, it was difficult for Westerners to believe that the feelings they saw were anything but genuine. To some extent they were, as many Chinese people had genuinely been politically educated (or re-­ educated) into believing in the greatness of Mao, but at the same time many of these demonstrations were carefully orchestrated by Communist Party officials who coaxed and coerced the parades into forming and shouting out their lines correctly. Of course, similar demonstrations had been employed previously by both Hitler and Stalin, but both dictators have been denounced by their successors. Mao never was, and indeed, the myth of his allegedly valiant and ingenious rise to power remains firmly at the heart of the current regime (Chang and Halliday 2006, 617). Westerners have tended, therefore, to accept that the popularity of Stalin and Hitler was politically indoctrinated or faked, but feel less certain about querying the status of Mao. Mao’s ability to position himself as a daring rebel, beloved by the people and hated by the establishment, as well as his avoidance of a formal denunciation by subsequent Chinese leaders, helps to explain why he became and remains a popular icon in the West, while Stalin is not. Finally, throughout much of history there has existed in the West a predilection amongst some people towards a belief in ‘Orientalism’—the notion that West and East are fundamentally different to one another. Followers of this perspective draw distinctions between Western warfare, which is depicted as conventional and heroic, and Eastern warfare, which is portrayed as primarily indirect, with an emphasis upon ambushes, archery, and hit-and-run tactics (O’Connell 1989). According to one proponent, this tradition exists because, unlike Westerners, ‘Asians are indirect, “little picture” thinkers’ (Poole 2005, xvii). Maoism, from this perspective, is just another example of millennia-old Eastern trickery. Adherence to this viewpoint can be found in mainstream counterinsurgent thought: The 2006 US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, for example, states that insurgents may resort to guerrilla actions and terrorism as a result of ‘a cultural disposition to an indirect approach to conflict’ (The US Army/Marine Corps 2007, 18). This theory made it easier for at least some scholars and military planners to embrace the idea that Mao was new, at least in the West, and represented something fearsome and alien, which they could never fully comprehend. This, in turn, helped them to gain an overinflated fear about the potency, significance, and potential spread of this mysterious new approach. Of course, such a

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perspective is historically inaccurate. As this book has shown, the kind of insurgency which Mao envisaged had existed across numerous parts of the globe, including the West, for many millennia. Nevertheless, the attraction of Orientalism amongst some Western scholars has certainly helped to feed into the insurgent myth of Mao. It is possible to see, therefore, that there are multiple stakeholders who have been invested in supporting the myth of Mao for their own motives. These actors were effectively positioned and sufficiently resourced to be able to push forward their misrepresentations of Mao’s importance in ways that have helped to embed their belief as established fact amongst scholarly, policy, military, and broader public communities. This adds the final piece to the puzzle and lays the groundwork for the final conclusion to the book, which is supplied in the next chapter.

References Barmé, Geremie R. 2009. 1969 April Fool’s Day. China Heritage Quarterly 18. http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=018_1969a prilfoolsday.inc&issue=018. Accessed 18 Aug 2013. Calvocoressi, Peter. 2001. World Politics 1945–2000. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. 2006. Mao: The Unknown Story. New  York: Anchor Books. Dikötter, Frank. 2011. Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962. New York: Walker & Co. Dumbrell, John. 2004. President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Fenby, Jonathan. 2004. Chiang Kai-Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers. ———. 2008. The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850–2008. London: Penguin Books Ltd. Fine, Gary A., and Xu Bin. 2011. Honest Brokers: The Politics of Expertise in the “Who Lost China” Debate. Social Problems 58 (4): 593–614. Freedman, Lawrence. 1981. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New  York: St. Martin’s Press. Furuya, Keiji. 1981. Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times. New York: St John’s University. Harris, Peter. 1976. Foundations of Political Science. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. Heuser, Beatrice, and Cyril Buffet. 1998. Conclusions: Historical Myths and the Denial of Change. In Haunted by History, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, 259–274. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

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Klein, Shelley. 2004. The Most Evil Dictators in History. New  York: Barnes & Noble Inc. Lieberthal, Kenneth. 1995. Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. London: W. W. Norton and Company Inc. Logevall, Frederick. 2012. Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House. Mao Tse-tung. 1961. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume IV. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. Marcos, Ferdinand E. 1971. Today’s Revolution: Democracy. Philippines (Private Edition). ———. 1973. Notes on the New Society of the Philippines. Manila: The Marcos Foundation Inc. Margolin, Jean-Louse. 2010. Mao’s China: The Worst Non-genocidal Regime? In The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone, 438–467. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mediansky, F.A. 1986. The New People’s Army: A Nation-Wide Insurgency in the Philippines. Contemporary South East Asia 8 (1): 1–17. Montefiore, Simon Sebag. 2008. Monsters: History’s Most Evil Men and Women. London: Quercus. O’Connell, Robert. 1989. Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression. New York: Oxford University Press. Poole, John H. 2005. Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent. Emerald Isle: Posterity Press. Priestland, David. 2009. The Red Flag: A History of Communism. New  York: Grove Press. Sison, Jose Maria. 1974. Specific Characteristics of Our People’s War. Philippines: Revolutionary School of Mao Zedong Thought. Stavans, Ilan. 1993. Two Peruvians. Transitions 61: 18–39. Sun Shuyun. 2007. The Long March: The True History of Communist China’s Founding Myth. New York: Anchor Books. Taylor, Jay. 2011. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China. London: Harvard University Press. Thompson, Robert. 1969. Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945–1969. Bristol: Western Printing Services Limited. US Army and Marine Corps. 2007. The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Army Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. van de Ven, Hans J. 2003. War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945. London: Routledge. Ware, Lewis B. 1988. Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press. Zhai, Qiang. 2000. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975. London: The University of North Carolina Press.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Summary The strategies of insurgent warfare that Mao endorsed changed throughout his life dependent upon the circumstances in which he found himself. Nevertheless, a number of principles of warfare can be identified within his writings regarding the military, political, population, and resource acquisition dimensions of insurgency. In Chap. 2 of this book, the ways in which each of these four categories manifested within the writings of Mao across his entire political and military career were uncovered through a comprehensive qualitative content analysis. While caveats and contradicting statements regarding the nature of each theme do pervade Mao’s teachings, the general flow of his arguments regarding each theme were, nevertheless, obtained and used to construct a roadmap of Mao’s teachings regarding insurgent warfare. A brief summary of each category and its themes is provided here below: • Within the military category, Mao espoused that regular warfare should serve as the pre-eminent mechanism of war during all stages of the insurgency, with irregular warfare used as a secondary method, the need for insurgents to hold their ground for as long as possible and only retreat when no other options remain, the benefits of using a three-phase strategy of protracted warfare, the importance of focusing predominantly upon the countryside during the war but also investing notable efforts towards capturing the cities whenever in the © The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5_7

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conflict they become available, and the usefulness of the insurgents building bases in the rear of the enemy’s position. • At a political level, the themes that Mao endorsed included the need for an insurgency to be involve class warfare, for political and military dimensions of the rebellion to be fused together, an approach to the centralisation of power that places a premium upon having a strong central authority but also acknowledges the need for some decentralisation of power, and the requirement to build a shadow government that creates bastions of political power within regions of insurgent activity that either rival or supplant the government’s own agencies. • Regarding the population, Mao articulated that an insurgency should rally the whole of the general population behind its banner, which should involve the building of a United Front that embraces not only the lower classes but other groups that could be considered allies against mutual domestic and foreign enemies, the use of courteous treatment towards civilians, and the deployment of a moderate degree of violence towards broad groups of people who are class enemies or are opposing the efforts of the insurgency, and the exclusion of indiscriminate terrorism as a method of warfare. • In terms of resources acquisition, Mao indicated that insurgents should feed off the enemy by stealing their weapons, personnel, equipment, and supplies; that they should aim to build up their ability to support themselves without recourse to external aid while also seeking to obtain substantial support from foreign states, and that they should aim to create or leverage external opportunities that allow them to improve their own position and weaken that of the opposing government as much as possible. This is the first time that a systematic exposition of Mao’s principles of insurgent warfare has ever been provided based upon a complete reading of all of his works across the span of his political and military career. The findings from this analysis are crucial for providing an understanding about the broad diversity of approaches that Mao recommended as forming an effective strategy of insurgency. Scholars who are attempting to discuss Mao’s vision of insurgency or the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War should move away from the rather problematic approach of imagining that one or two aspects of warfare can be used to summarise Mao’s perspectives on this topic. Instead, they must embrace the broader and

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­ ultidimensional framework for insurgent warfare that he actually recomm mended in his writings. One of the reasons that understanding Mao’s perspectives on how to wage an effective insurgency are so important is that he has been regularly posited by scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and the general public as being a transformative figure within the development of insurgency who either created an entirely new form of insurrectionary warfare or fundamentally transformed existing practices. He is also frequently lauded for being a highly influential individual who helped to directly shape the character and strategies of many subsequent insurgencies, ranging from Marxist revolutionary movements such as the Shining Path insurgency in Peru and the New People’s Army in the Philippines to other secular and ideological initiatives such as the Chechen rebellions and the Islamic State. Yet, despite the widespread adherence to these two viewpoints regarding the significance of Mao for the evolution of insurgency, they are both untrue. Regarding the novelty of Mao’s teachings, Chap. 3 exposed how the principles of insurgency enunciated by Mao are in no way original, but instead have featured in numerous insurgencies throughout history. This includes a number of insurgencies in which all of the strategies outlined by Mao have featured, with the Maccabean Revolt and the American Revolutionary War provided as examples. Mao’s ideas on insurgency have also all been described on multiple occasions by a variety of theorists on rebellion, including many prominent and respected figures in history. Lenin, in particular, outlined all of the same principles of insurgency that Mao did despite making his comments many years in advance of Mao’s own expositions on the topic. There is no chance that Mao had not encountered the myriad of past conflicts and theorists that exhibited his subsequent teachings on insurgency because he was very widely read when it came to past rebellions and theorists. Indeed, he made frequent reference to the military strategies of major figures in this field such as George Washington and Vladimir Lenin to his colleagues and followers throughout his life. Not only was Mao not transformative in his approaches to insurgency, but, as Chaps. 4 and 5 showed, he also had little or no real impact on the nature of subsequent insurgencies, including his own. The majority of insurgencies after 1949 possessed no ties to Mao, displayed evidence of inspiration but not influence, or exhibited similar characteristics but no intellectual link to Mao or his writings. In a few cases, insurgencies have

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displayed some degree of Maoist influence, but this was always limited and temporary in nature at best. Changes in the international context and conflict circumstances after the end of the Second World War, along with the fundamental incompatibility of Mao’s teachings with the violent undertones of the Marxist ideology that were subscribed to by most of the insurgencies that have been most associated with Maoist methods of warfare, help to explain why the traits of warfare described by Mao existed before his rise to power but were notably absent in many of those which followed. The myths regarding the originality and significance of Mao as a transformative figure in the development of insurgency arose not because these myths were true but rather, as Chap. 6 discussed, because every stakeholder affected was incentivised to maintain and perpetuate the myth. One of these was Mao himself, who was keen on the myth because of an inflated ego and because it served as a tool for him to jostle for leadership within both China and the Communist World. Another was the insurgents who lied about using Mao’s methods, who were eager to proclaim themselves as Maoist because this helped to increase the size of their support base, scare their opponents, and access foreign aid from China. A third were the governments fighting against insurgencies who liked to portray the rebels as Maoist as a means to paint them as being foreign aggressors rather than domestic heroes and to pursue foreign aid from the United States. The fourth was the Western World as a whole, which allowed a mixture of biased and incomplete reporting, fear of the Communist menace, and a desire to simplify insurgencies into broad categories for analysis to colour its perspectives regarding the relative importance of Mao.

Implications The findings from this book fundamentally challenge many commonly held conceptions about the origins and character of insurgencies throughout history. Most obviously, those insurgencies which occurred during the Cold War cannot, as so many scholars have previously suggested, be accurately labelled as forming an era of Maoist insurgencies. As this book has shown, the overwhelming majority of insurgencies since the end of the Second World War have owed little or no intellectual debt to Mao. This also means that the current age of insurgencies cannot be branded as representing either the continuation of a Maoist period or a post-Maoist era. As the Cold War period was not Maoist, the post-Cold War period cannot

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logically be either a continued Maoist or a post-Maoist age. There is, however, an irony buried in the findings of this book: The nature of insurgencies has indeed changed since the end of the Second World War, and so in many ways the approximate time period in which Mao was fighting can indeed be viewed as a dividing line between past and modern insurgencies. The absolutely vital caveat to this point, however, is that Mao’s teachings do not correctly foretell the characteristics of insurgencies in the post-war world. Insurgencies were indeed different after Mao, but not because of Mao and not in the ways that Mao described. This has important consequences for how scholars approach analysing the nature of recent and current insurgencies. The regular practice of using a Maoist lens to describe, explain, and predict the actions of insurgency movements in the past, present, and future must be rejected as a method of analysis. Continuing with such an approach could cause significant harm to many of the people caught up in the fighting during an insurgency. One risk occurs when an analyst who is looking to identify whether a particular region is being affected by an insurgency—or whether some other kind of activity is going on—decides to search for Maoist traits as their method of detection. In this scenario, there is a risk that the analyst will miss the existence of an insurgency because it does not fit with the Maoist principles that they are seeking to detect. This can prevent the ability of a government to respond quickly to extinguish the movement before it can blossom into something more durable and dangerous. This is not a hypothetical scenario. During the 2003–2010 Gulf War, the military and political analysts of the United States and their allies scrutinised the Iraqi population for potential opposition groups. Yet, they looked exclusively for the traits of insurgency associated with Mao and failed to look for other signs of insurgent resistance (Hammes 2006, 18–26). Consequently they missed identifying the existence of an insurgency until long after the various factions had established themselves and made the coalition’s belated counterinsurgency efforts significantly more difficult (Mackinlay 2009, 12 and 165–166). At a more general level, the forced fitting of a particular insurgency into a Maoist framework in order to analyse it creates a distorted perspective about that conflict, which in turn hinders the ability of policymakers to respond in an informed and appropriate fashion. This includes the risk that a counterinsurgent may adopt ineffective or even harmful counterinsurgency strategies, with the aim of countering an insurgency strategy that simply does not exist. At its least detrimental level, this may result in the

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counterinsurgent struggling to maximise the effectiveness of their efforts because they are using the wrong tools for the job. In its most harmful form, this may result in unnecessary casualties amongst both the counterinsurgent’s forces and the civilians in the conflict theatre. This is again not a hypothetical example. Counterinsurgent leaders, such as the Guatemalan President Efrain Rios Montt fighting against internal insurgents, the Ethiopian government battling against Tigrean rebels, and the Soviet Union fighting against the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, deliberately developed and used counterinsurgent strategies that aimed to tackle Mao’s dictum that the ‘guerrillas should be to the people as fish are to the sea’ by ‘draining the sea’ (Valentino 2004, 196–233; Dick 2002, 6; Jalali and Grau 1995, xiv and xix). This involved the deliberate depletion of the population by killing them en masse, with the hope that by killing the population the insurgents would have nowhere to hide or that the insurgents will all have been slain in the process. As a result, when analysing past, present, and future insurgencies, we must purge ourselves of the practice of using a Maoist lens as a shortcut to understand their character and predict their actions. This will lead only to false understandings, error-filled predictions, and ill-fitting responses. Instead, this book suggests that scholars should always undertake full and thorough investigations whenever they examine a new conflict. While this might be more time-consuming, it will undoubtedly yield a more accurate and less hazardous understanding. This applies as much for those insurgencies which have traditionally been labelled as Maoist—such as the recent insurrections in Nepal and India—as it does for more generalised insurgencies such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and Syria. The same sort of recommendation applies for writers of counterinsurgency doctrine—the practice of using Mao’s teachings as a benchmark against which to generate doctrine should be abandoned. At a more specific level, the use of the teachings of Mao—real and imagined—as a model against which counterinsurgency doctrine manuals can be fully or partially tailored represents a discredited approach and this should cease. Using Mao as a straw man in this fashion must inevitably lead to the pursuit of flawed and inaccurate strategies and tactics on the ground, which in turn increases the likelihood of negative outcomes. These could include elevated levels of military casualties on the side of the government, high numbers of civilian deaths amongst the population within the insurgent conflict region, increased length of the conflict, heightened monetary and resource costs on both sides, and less

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e­ ffectiveness with pacifying the rebellion more broadly. Work to cut Mao out of Western counterinsurgency thinking must go beyond simply omitting his name and quotations from the next rotation of counterinsurgency manuals, however, because the overwhelming majority of past manuals, from which new manuals are typically rooted, have been heavily contaminated by a conviction about the importance of the methods taught by Mao that simply cutting his name out is not enough. We must systematically weed out the tendrils of his influence when identifying which principles to extend forward from past Maoist-oriented counterinsurgency manuals when creating Mao-free manuals in the future. The book also suggests that more research can usefully be conducted into the character of pre-modern insurgencies, as these have often been significantly less primitive and unguided than is often assumed. The Wars of King David, the Maccabean Revolt, the struggles of Robert the Bruce, the Welsh Rebellions, the American Revolutionary War, the Vendee Uprising, the Taiping Rebellion, and many others exhibit clear symptoms of sophistication that have frequently been overlooked during studies of the history of insurgencies. Finally, the book raises an intriguing challenge to one of the central foundations underpinning Communist Party rule in China today. While Mao’s reign over the country has been at least formally partially critiqued by the party, his career as a rebel up until 1949 has remained sacrosanct (Fallaci 1980). As mentioned in Chap. 6, a notable reason for this is that the Chinese Communist Party draws at least part of its legitimacy from its claim that it was placed into power by a popular revolution, led by a political genius who fused together Communist Party leadership with the will of the people. According to this logic, the Communist Party does not need to hold regular elections because it draws its popular mandate from its revolutionary roots. Challenging the heroification of Mao and his rebellion goes beyond simply critiquing his importance for insurgency and counterinsurgency strategists, therefore, and ends up questioning the historical legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. The overall conclusion of this book, then, is that the features of insurgent warfare described by Mao in his writings existed before his time, but were present in neither his own rebellion nor those that followed. This suggests that Mao had a very good knowledge of the past, but lacked much foresight about the future. As discussed in Chap. 3, Mao possessed an extensive knowledge of the history of insurgencies, including high-­ profile rebel heroes and theorists of war. The fact that Mao was able to

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recreate and synthesise their works is therefore scarcely surprising. Nor, given his appalling record when undertaking other supposedly ‘visionary’ initiatives, such as the Great Leap Forward, the Blooming of One Hundred Flowers, the Sparrow Killing campaign, and the Cultural Revolution, all of which misfired with catastrophic results for the country, is it surprising that his claim that insurgencies in the future would resemble those of the past was similarly misguided. This suggests that scholars of insurgency can look at Mao’s teachings as a useful way to understand the kinds of insurgencies that preceded him, but should expect few if any insights about the insurgencies that followed him. They were never—nor ever really could have been—influenced by Mao’s teachings to any real degree. In the end, Mao’s teachings looked back to an era of insurgencies that had already passed, rather than forward to those that lay ahead. He was not a visionary prophet of the future but merely a self-promoting historian with delusions of grandeur.

References Dick, C.J. 2002. Muhjahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre. Fallaci, Oriana. 1980. Deng: Cleaning Up Mao’s Feudal Mistakes. Washington Post, August 31. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/­opinions/1980/08/31/ deng-cleaning-up-maos-feudal-mistakes/4e684a74-8083-4e43-80e4c8d519d8b772/?utm_term=.e41b4520e0c4. Accessed 1 Dec 2017. Hammes, Thomas X. 2006. Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks. Military Review 86: 18–26. Jalali, Ali A., and Lester W. Grau. 1995. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico: The United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. Mackinlay, John. 2009. The Insurgency Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden. London: C. Hurst & Co. Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. London: Cornell University Press.

Index

A Afghanistan Wars, 2, 147, 195, 208 Algerian War, 2, 145 Al-Qaeda, 1, 2, 169 American Revolutionary War, 5, 20, 62, 71–82, 89, 114, 149, 175, 176, 205, 209 American War of Independence, see American Revolutionary War Anhui incident, 16 Anti-Bolshevik League, 130 Antiochus IV, 62, 69 Autumn Harvest Uprising, 106, 117, 123 B Balas, Alexander, 71 Bannockburn, Battle of, 62 Barrett, David, 196 Bases behind enemy lines strategy American Revolutionary War, 76, 89 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 99, 112–113 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 162 Maccabean Revolt, 64–67

Mao’s teachings, 19, 21–24, 35, 49, 204 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63 relevance after Mao, 178 Shining Path Insurgency, 151, 159 Beth-Zechariah, Battle of, 65 Big Swords secret society, 114 Black Sea Fleet, 88 Blanqui, Louis Auguste, 63, 92 Bolivia, 147, 169 Bolsheviks, 85–92, 150 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 63, 92, 148, 170 Boston, 75 Boston Tea Party, 71 Boxer Uprising, The, 90, 91 Britain, 3, 62, 90 American Revolutionary War, 71, 175, 179, 180 Bruce, Robert the, 62, 63, 209 Bukharin, Nikolai, 162 C Callwell, Charles, 63 Cambodia, 145 Castro, Fidel, 73, 147

© The Author(s) 2019 F. Grice, The Myth of Mao Zedong and Modern Insurgency, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5

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INDEX

Centralised command strategy American Revolutionary War, 77 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 103, 118, 138 Maccabean Revolt, 68 Mao’s teachings, 25–32, 49, 203 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63 relevance after Mao, 175 Shining Path Insurgency, 158 Changsha Uprising, 18, 106, 109–110, 117 Charleston, 74, 75 Chechen Wars, 147, 205 Chiang Kai-shek, 4 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 15, 89, 101, 105, 107, 109, 112, 113, 115, 117, 124, 125, 138 Mao’s teachings, 15, 16, 34, 36, 39, 52 China hands, 1, 196, 197 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1, 6, 89, 93, 150, 168, 172, 176, 181, 188, 190, 191, 198, 204 historical events, 99–139, 145 Mao’s teachings, 17–48 Chou En’lai, 100, 117, 176 Cold War, 2–4, 14, 48, 147, 151, 192, 194, 197, 206 Collins, Michael, 62, 63, 92 Comintern, 100, 108, 115, 133, 162, 165 Communism, 163, 170, 194, 197, 198 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 101, 114, 136 Lenin’s writings, 84, 86 Mao’s teachings, 25–30, 48 Communist bloc, 1, 3, 6, 17, 155, 165, 166, 173, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 206

Communist insurgency, 1–4, 17, 105, 175, 191, 192, 194, 197 Communist Party of China, 1, 6, 14, 26, 32, 46, 52, 102, 107, 111, 114, 117, 119–121, 129–131, 134, 167, 188–191, 196, 197, 199, 209 Communist Party of other states, 87, 165, 167, 173, 192 Concord, Battle of, 71 Congo, 169 Continental Army, 73, 74, 77–79, 81, 114 Cornwallis, Charles, 74, 75 Cuba, 73, 146, 147, 159, 160, 167, 168, 172 Cypriot rebels, 73 D David, Wars of King, 63, 138, 209 Debray, Regis, 168, 169 Declaration of Independence, 72, 73, 76, 77, 175 Democratic League, 123 Dhofar Insurgency, 145 Dien Bien Phu, 153 Domino Theory, 197 E Eighth Route Army, Communist, 132 Emmaus, Battle of, 64 Encirclement and suppression campaigns, 15, 38, 104, 106, 108, 112, 123, 128, 131, 132, 172 Engels, Friedrich, 87 England, 28, 62, 92 English language, 5, 12, 44, 45 External force manipulation strategy American Revolutionary War, 88

 INDEX    

Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 99, 135 Maccabean Revolt, 62 Mao’s teachings, 41, 43, 49, 205 post-Mao insurgencies, 150 pre-Mao insurgencies, 64 relevance after Mao, 180 Second Indochina War, 151 F Fedayeen, Palestinian, 147, 149 Feeding off the enemy strategy American Revolutionary War, 81 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 104, 131, 132, 135 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 165 Lenin’s writings, 88 Maccabean Revolt, 71 Mao’s teachings, 27, 39–43, 49, 204 pre-Mao insurgencies, 62 Second Indochina War, 156 Shining Path Insurgency, 157 Ukrainian People’s Army, 150 Finland, USSR invasion of, 122 First World War, 92 Foco, revolutionary, 169, 175 Formosa, 16 Fourth Route Army, Communist, 16, 35, 105, 113, 125, 126 France, 3, 28, 39, 92, 121 American Revolutionary War, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 180 Indochina, 153, 163, 164, 166, 167, 170, 180 Franklin, Benjamin, 81 Free Syrian Army, 2 French Revolution, 63, 72 Fujian, 119 Fujian People’s Government, 100

213

G Gandhi, Mahatma, 72 Ganzhou, 110 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 62, 198 Gladstone, William, 92 Great Leap Forward, 17, 137, 210 Greene, Nathanael, 74, 75, 77, 81 Guangxi, 119 Guatemalan Civil War, 2, 147, 208 Guerrilla warfare, 1, 3, 12, 171, 199, 208 American Revolutionary War, 73 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 104, 106, 122, 123, 126 Guevara’s writings, 167, 169 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 161, 166 Lenin’s writings, 83, 85, 87 Maccabean Revolt, 62 Mao’s teachings, 19, 20, 23, 28, 40, 45–48 post-Mao insurgencies, 149 pre-Mao insurgencies, 61, 62, 91 relevance after Mao, 177 Second Indochina War, 156 Shining Path Insurgency, 157–160 Guevara, Che Ernesto, 6, 147, 158, 160, 167–169, 175 Guinea-Bissau War of Independence, 147, 150, 171, 174 Guomindang Party, 6, 89, 154, 166, 172, 178, 188, 195–197 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 14, 16, 99–139 Mao’s teachings, 18, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36–38, 41–44, 51 Gutian, 110 Guzman, Abimael, 157–160, 170, 176, 192 H Hancock, John, 76, 81 Hanoi, 155

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INDEX

Harbin, 111 Hitler, Adolf, 199 Ho Chi Minh, 6, 89, 155, 160–169 Holding onto territory strategy American Revolutionary War, 76 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 103, 108, 111 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 162 Lenin’s writings, 83 Maccabean Revolt, 67 Mao’s teachings, 24, 48, 203 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63 relevance after Mao, 178 Hood, Robin, 63, 198 Hue massacres, 154 Hukbalahap Rebellion, 147, 174, 192, 193 Hunan Peasant Uprising, 14, 17, 25, 32, 38, 42, 106, 109, 111, 113, 118, 123 Hundred Regiments Campaign, 16, 105 Hundred Years War, 92

Mao’s teachings, 19–22, 27, 34–36, 39, 43, 52, 53 Jerusalem, 64, 66, 69 Jewish Revolt, 63 Jiamusi, 111 Jiangxi Soviet, 178 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 14, 16, 105–108, 110–113, 116, 118–121, 123, 126–131, 133, 134 Mao’s teachings, 18, 19, 26–28, 30, 33, 38–43 Jilin, 123 Jinggang Mountains, 14, 15, 17, 25, 33, 38, 91, 100, 108, 117, 178 Jomini, Antoine-Henri, 12

I India, 145, 208 Iraq Wars, 2, 203, 207 Irish Rebellions, 62, 64 Islamic extremism, 175 Islamic State, 1, 2, 205 Israel, 62, 149

L Lam Som, 166 Lawrence, T.E., 12, 46, 48, 62, 63, 92 Lee, Charles, 77 Le Loi, 166 Lenin, Vladimir Illyich, 5, 62, 82–92, 157, 163, 166, 170, 205 Lexington, Battle of, 71, 77 Li Li-san, 100 Lima, 157–159, 177 Lin Biao, 110, 111, 117, 176 Lincoln, Abraham, 92 Little Red Book, 190, 199 Liu Bang, 90 Liu Shaoqi, 190 Liu Zhidan, 189, 190

J Japan, 6, 125, 167, 170, 173, 178, 195–197 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 14, 16, 100, 102, 104–107, 110–113, 115–117, 119, 120, 125, 128, 131–138

K Kenyan Emergency, 2 Korean War, 17, 190 Kosovo Liberation Army, 180 Kulaks, 87

 INDEX    

Long March, The, 12, 14, 15, 189, 190 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 14, 16, 101, 104, 107–109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 121, 127, 132, 134 Mao’s teachings, 18, 19 M Maccabean Revolt, 5, 62–72, 89, 149, 178–180, 205, 209 Maccabee, Jonathan, 62, 64, 65, 70, 71 Maccabee, Mattathias, 62, 64, 67–70 Maccabee, Simeon, 62, 64 Madrid defence, 21, 24, 111 Makhno, Nestor, 92 Malayan Emergency, 2, 145 Mali Insurgency, 208 Manchukuo, 136 Manchuria, 131, 134 Battle for, 106, 110–111 Japanese Annexation of, 15, 21 Soviet Occupation of, 107, 117, 122, 132, 134, 135 Mandarin, 5, 12, 44, 45 Manila, 194 Mao Zedong deification of, 187–200 historical background, 14–17 impact of the insurgent myth, 203–210 lack of impact on post-Mao insurgencies, 145–181 pre-dated by past insurgencies, 61–93 prevalence of the insurgent myth, 1–5 teachings on insurgency, 17 weak application of his own theories, 99–139

215

Marcos, Ferdinand, 178, 191, 193, 194 Mariategui, Carlos Jose, 170 Marighella, Carlos, 169 Marion, Francis, 75, 81 Martí, Jose, 147 Marx, Karl, 63, 87, 91, 157, 170, 174 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, 92 Montt, Efrain Rios, 208 Moscow, 84, 112, 119, 133 Moscow Uprising, 83 Mountain Lords, 91 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-­Tupamaros, 147 N Nanchang, 15, 106, 110 Nanjing, 16, 25, 26, 109, 119, 124 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nazi Germany, 117, 125, 150 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 72 Nepalese Insurgency, 145, 208 New People’s Army (NPA), 147, 191, 194, 205 Newport, 75 New York, 74, 75, 77, 79 Nguyen Ai Quoc, see Ho Chi Minh Nguyen Trai, 166 Nixon, Richard, 17, 197 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 180 North Korea, 16, 135, 190 Northern Expeditions, 15, 161 O Odessa Uprising, 88 Orientalism, 199, 200

216  

INDEX

P Pacific War, 105 Palestine, 2 Paris Commune, 72, 87 Patton, John, 196 Pearl Harbor, 40, 42, 107 Peking, 21 Peng Dehaui, 165, 190 Philadelphia, 75, 77 Philippines, 145, 147, 172, 174, 178, 191, 193, 194, 205 Poland, USSR invasion of, 122 Politicization of warfare strategy American Revolutionary War, 76–77 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 99, 103, 111, 115–117, 120, 138 Guevara’s writings, 167 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 163 Lenin’s writings, 85, 86, 91 Maccabean Revolt, 67 Mao’s teachings, 25–31, 49, 51, 52, 203 post-Mao insurgencies, 146, 151 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63, 92 Second Indochina War, 151–155 Shining Path Insurgency, 157 Popular mobilization strategy, 208 American Revolutionary War, 73, 78–80 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 99, 100, 103, 113, 120–127, 129, 138 deification of Mao, 191, 192, 195–199 Guevara’s writings, 167 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 161–165 Lenin’s writings, 83, 85, 86, 89 Maccabean Revolt, 67, 69 Mao’s teachings, 25, 27, 32–37, 41–43, 47, 48, 51, 90–92, 203

post-Mao insurgencies, 146, 148–150 pre-Mao insurgencies, 61, 63 relevance after Mao, 174–176, 179 Second Indochina War, 155, 156 Shining Path Insurgency, 158–160 Propaganda American Revolutionary War, 74, 77 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 103, 115–117, 119, 126, 134, 135 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 163 Lenin’s writings, 88 Maccabean Revolt, 69 Mao’s teachings, 25, 27, 29, 36, 38, 49, 196 post-Mao insurgencies, 147 relevance after Mao, 177, 179, 180 Second Indochina War, 151–157 Protracted warfare strategy, 3, 12 American Revolutionary War, 74, 92 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 18, 103, 106 deification of Mao, 197 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 162 Lenin’s writings, 83, 87 Maccabean Revolt, 65, 66 Mao’s teachings, 20, 23, 49, 203 post-Mao insurgencies, 146, 150 pre-Mao insurgencies, 61, 63 Purges Chiang, 15, 89 Mao, 129, 130, 190 Q Qiqihaer, 111 Qualitative content analysis, 5 application to Mao’s writings, 17–35, 47, 50, 54, 55, 203 methodology, 13, 14, 50–56

 INDEX    

R Red Army, Chinese Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 15, 104, 105, 108, 114, 116, 121–123, 128, 130, 132, 133 deification of Mao, 189 Mao’s teachings, 17, 26, 27, 29, 33, 37, 39, 41 Red Army, Soviet, 83, 87 Red Guard, 17 Red Star Over China, 116, 124, 197 Regular versus irregular warfare strategy American Revolutionary War, 74, 75, 77 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 102–104, 106, 107, 113, 121, 139 Guevara’s writings, 167 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 83, 87, 161 Maccabean Revolt, 62, 65 Mao’s teachings, 17–19, 21, 23, 45, 47, 49, 203 post-Mao insurgencies, 147, 149 pre-Mao insurgencies, 62, 63, 91 relevance after Mao, 172, 178, 200 Second Indochina War, 152, 156 Shining Path Insurgency, 157 Rhodesian Insurgency, 145 Rif Rebellion, 63, 92 Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 90 Romans, The, 64, 66, 71, 180 Roosevelt, Franklin, 124 Ruijin, 110 Rural versus urban dilemma American Revolutionary War, 71, 76, 80 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 17, 99, 100, 109–111, 116, 119, 123, 126, 127, 138 deification, 196

217

discussed by Ho Chin Minh, 162, 164, 165 Guevara’s writings, 167 Lenin’s writings, 83, 84, 89 Maccabean Revolt, 62, 64–67, 69, 70 Mao’s teachings, 16–26, 34, 35, 45–49, 203 other limiting factors, 170–172 post-Mao insurgencies, 150, 151 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63, 92 relevance after Mao, 145, 146, 175–177, 181 Second Indochina War, 151–155 Shining path insurgency, 157–160 Russia, 39, 88, 91, 92, 101, 110, 133, 166 Russian Civil War, 63, 85, 92, 150, 165 Russian Revolution, 84, 85, 88 S Saigon, 155, 156 Saratoga, 72, 74, 79, 82 Second Indochina War, 146, 151 Seleucid Empire, 62, 65–67, 69–71, 178–180 Self-reliance versus foreign aid dilemma American Revolutionary War, 81 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 99, 104, 133–136 deification of Mao, 191, 192 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 165 Maccabean Revolt, 70 Mao’s teachings, 39, 49, 205 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63 Second Indochina War, 156 Shining path insurgency, 160 Sendero Luminoso, see Shining Path September 11th, 2

218  

INDEX

Service, John, 196 Seven Years War, 92 Seventh Party Congress, 104 Shaanxi 16, 189, 190 Shadow Government American Revolutionary War, 78 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 103, 118–120 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 164 Lenin’s writings, 86 Maccabean Revolt, 68 Mao’s teachings, 28, 29, 31, 49, 204 post-Mao insurgencies, 150 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63 Shining Path Insurgency, 157, 158 Shanghai, 15, 16, 109 Shenyang-Jinzhou railway, 110 Shining Path, 6, 146, 147, 151, 157–160, 170, 176–178, 205 Siberia, 125 Similarities, 150 Sipingjie, 105, 109, 111 Siwanze, 131 Smedley, Agnes, 101, 198 Snow, Edgar, 1, 101, 116, 124, 193, 196–198 South Korea, 16 Soviet Union, 150, 155, 156, 159, 161, 188, 189, 198, 208 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 16, 17, 99, 102, 107, 122, 124–126, 128, 132–137 Mao’s teachings, 28, 39, 41–43, 46 Sparrow Killing campaign, 210 Spartacus, 63, 198 Spartans, 71 Sri Lankan insurgency, 145 Stalin, Joseph, 46, 89, 125, 126, 129, 137, 150, 170, 199 Stalinists, 192, 193 Stillwell, Joseph, 101, 195–197

Strong, Anna Louise, 101 Sukarno, 73 Sun Tzu, 90, 91 Syrian Civil War, 2, 208 T Taiping Rebellion, 61, 63, 91, 209 Taiwan, 102 Tell, William, 198 Terrorism, 1, 171, 175, 199 American Revolutionary War, 74 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 130, 131 discussed by Che Guevara, 167–169 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 164 Maccabean Revolt, 70 Mao’s teachings, 37–38, 44, 49, 204 post-Mao insurgencies, 147 Second Indochina War, 154 Shining Path Insurgency, 157–160 Usage after Mao, 177 Tet Uprising, 153, 155 Thailand, 145, 166 Thompson, Robert, 3, 197 Three Alls campaign, 16, 105, 113 Three Phased Strategy, 3, 4 American Revolutionary War, 73, 103 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 106–108 during prior insurgencies, 62, 63, 93 Ho Chi Minh’s writings, 162 Lenin’s writings, 83 Maccabean Revolt, 65 Mao’s teachings, 20, 21, 23, 47, 49, 203 post-Mao insurgencies, 146, 149 relevance after Mao, 179

 INDEX    

Second Indochina War, 151–153 Shining Path insurgency, 157 Tibet, 16, 17, 122 Ticonderoga, 74, 81 Tingzhou, 110 Treaty of Paris, 72, 87 Trotsky, Leon, 46, 89, 125 U United Front American Revolutionary War, 79 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 15, 16, 103, 124, 126 First United Front, 15, 103, 125 Lenin’s writings, 86 Maccabean Revolt, 70 Mao’s teachings, 32, 35, 37, 49, 52, 53, 204 pre-Mao insurgencies, 63, 176 Second United Front, 16, 34, 52, 53, 103, 124, 126 Shining Path Insurgency, 159 United Nations, 17, 180 United States, 16, 17, 28, 39, 41, 43, 72, 73, 92, 115, 152, 159, 163, 177, 179, 189, 197, 206 United Village secret society, 114 Ussuri River Border Skirmish, 17 V Valley Forge, 75, 79, 81 Vanguard Party, 52, 91, 176 Vendee Uprising, 63, 209 Vietnam War, see Second Indochina War Von Clausewitz, Carl, 12 Vo Nguyen Giap, 152

219

W Wallace, William, 198 Wang Jingwei, 119 War against Japan, 12, 172 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 14, 104–106, 109, 112–115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 128–130, 133, 134, 136, 138 Mao’s teachings, 14, 19–22, 26–29, 31, 34, 39, 41 Warsaw Uprisings, 171 Washington, George, 77, 205 Water Margin, The, 90 Wellington, Duke of, 92 White, Theodore, 196 Whites, 38, 106, 115, 123, 125 Wuhan, 16, 109 X Xi’an Incident, 15, 124, 125, 178 Y Yan’an, 1, 178, 193, 196 Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 14, 16, 109, 111, 114, 116, 118, 121, 122, 128, 130, 134, 138 discussion by Mao, 1, 22, 27, 34 Yat-sen, 63, 72 Yellow Rifles secret society, 122 Yorktown, Battle of, 72–74 Z Zhejiang, 119 Zinoviev, Grigory, 46