The Muslim World and Politics in Transition: Creative Contributions of the Gülen Movement 9781472552693, 9781441120878, 9781441158734

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This book is dedicated to Muslims everywhere who are struggling to live a more authentic Islam in their personal lives and by working together with all others who are seeking to bring a measure of justice and peace to our common world.

Editor and Contributor Biographies Editor biographies Greg Barton is the Herb Feith Research Professor for the Study of Indonesia in the Faculty of Arts at Monash University, Australia where he is based in the Politics stream in the School of Political and Social Inquiry. He is acting director of the Centre for Islam and the Modern World (CIMOW) and Deputy UNESCO Chair in Interreligious and Intercultural Relations  – Asia Pacific. For the past 20 years, he has undertaken extensive research on Indonesian politics and society, especially on the role of Islam as both as a constructive and as a disruptive force. Since 2004 he has made a comparative study of progressive Islamic thought in Turkey and Indonesia and is hoping to extend this comparative study to India. The central axis of his research interests is the way in which religious thought, individual believers and religious communities respond to modernity and to the modern nation-state. He is an active member of the Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC) at Monash and researches Jemaah Islamiyah and other radical Islamist movements in Southeast Asia. He is involved in teaching several counterterrorism courses each year at the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu and with other several other institutions and agencies. He has also been active in interfaith dialogue initiatives and has a deep commitment to building understanding of Islam and Muslim society. He joined Monash in January 2007, prior to which he had worked for a year as an Associate Professor at the APCSS in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he continues to have an association as adjunct professor. Before that he was an Associate Professor at Deakin University where had worked since 1993. His PhD thesis at Monash in the early 1990s examined the emergence of liberal Islamic thought in the 1970s and 80s in the political context of the Suharto regime in Indonesia; and the social and political consequences of the civil society activism to which it gave rise. In particular it examined the thought and activism of Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi and anticipated their contribution to democratic transition.

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This work laid the foundations for his later studies of the Wahid presidency and of Islam and civil society which demonstrated a link between progressive, neo-modernist Islamic thought and political liberalism in Indonesia, and its typology of ‘Islamic liberalism’ has become broadly influential. Professor Barton has written or edited five books and published dozens of refereed articles and book chapters in this field, together with numerous essays. He is frequently interviewed by the Australian and international electronic and print media on Islam, Islamic and Islamist movements and on Indonesia and politics. His (2002) biography, Abdurrahman Wahid, Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President: A View from the Inside was published by the University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, and also translated and published in Indonesian in 2003. His book (2004 and 2005) Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, was published by University of New South Wales (UNSW) Press and Singapore University Press, respectively. He is currently working on two other book projects: Progressive Islamic Thought and Social Movements in Indonesia and Turkey (which returns to some of the themes and material he first addressed in his doctoral work), and Islam’s Other Nation: A Fresh Look at Indonesia. Paul Weller is Professor of Inter-Religious Relations at the University of Derby. He holds an MA in Theology from the University of Oxford; an MPhil in Social and Pastoral Theology from the University of Manchester; a PhD in Religious Studies from the University of Leeds; and a DLitt from the University of Derby in recognition of his ‘distinguished contribution to interreligious dialogue and pluralism in the changing religious landscape of the United Kingdom’. He is a visiting fellow in the Oxford Centre for Christianity and Culture at Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford and a Trustee of the Multi-Faith Centre at the University of Derby. His books include (2005) Time for Change: Reconfiguring Religion, State and Society, London: T & T Clark; (2008) Religious Diversity in the UK: Contours and Issues, London: Continuum; and (2009) A Mirror for Our Times: ‘The Rushdie Affair’ and the Future of Multiculturalism, London: Continuum. Of relevance to the proposed book, he is also author (2006) of ‘Fethullah Gülen, Religions, Globalisation and Dialogue’, in R. Hunt and Y. Aslandoğan, eds (2006), Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, Somerset, NJ: The Light Inc. and IID Press, pp. 75–88. Together with Ihsan Yilmaz, a co-editor for the current book, he is co-editor of the previously published ‘companion’ volume on the Gülen movement in Europe (2012), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life: Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement, London: Continuum. Over the past quarter of a century Professor Weller has been engaged in research and practice on related to the relationships between religion,

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state and society. He is an expert consultant to the development of the European Gold-Prize–winning training programme on Religious Diversity and Anti-Discrimination within the Belieforama Community of Practice. Until its disbandment by the United Kingdom’s present coalition government, he was a member of the Expert Panel on Faith, advising the Secretary of State for Communities, other ministers and civil servants in the Department for Communities and Local Government. He has been Principal Investigator of a three-year (2010–12) research project on ‘Religion and belief, discrimination and equality in England and Wales: Theory, policy and practice (2000–2010)’ within the Religion and Society research programme sponsored by the UK Arts and Humanities and the Economic and Social Research Councils, the outcomes of which are to be published by Bloomsbury as Paul Weller, Kingsley Purdam, Nazila Ghanea and Sariya Contractor (2013, forthcoming), Religion or Belief, Discrimination and Equality: Britain in Global Contexts. He is also co-author, with Sariya Contractor, of (2012), Learning From Experience, Leading to Engagement: For a Europe of Religion and Belief Diversity. A Policy Brief Document for the European Institutions and Civil Society Groups. Ihsan Yilmaz is Associate Professor of Political Science at Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey where he is also the director of the PhD programme in Political Science and International Relations at the university’s Institute of Social Sciences. He received his BA in Political Science and International Relations from the Bosporus University in 1994 and completed his PhD at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London in 1999. He then worked at the University of Oxford as a Fellow between 1999 and 2001 and taught Turkish government and politics, legal sociology, comparative law and Islamic law at SOAS, University of London between 2001 and 2008. He was the deputy chair of the Centre for Ethnic Minority Studies at SOAS (2003–8) and the director of the London Centre for Social Studies (2003–8). He is the author of (2005) Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States: Dynamic Legal Pluralisms in England, Turkey and Pakistan, Aldershot, Ashgate and co-editor with John L. Esposito (2010) Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives, New York: Blue Dome. Together with Paul Weller, one of the co-editors of the current book, he was also co-editor of the previously published ‘companion’ volume on the Gülen movement in Europe (2012) European Muslims, Civility and Public Life: Perspectives on and From the Gülen Movement, London: Continuum. He has been the Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of Economic and Political Studies (EJEPS) and the editor of Turkish Journal of Politics (TJP). He has published his work in international scholarly journals such as British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Journal, Journal of Ethnic and Migration

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Studies, Muslim World, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Journal for Islamic Studies, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Journal of Caucasian and Central Asian Studies, Journal of Economic and Social Research, International Law and Politics Journal, European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Turkish Journal of Politics, Journal of Research Society of Pakistan, and Insight Turkey. He is a regular columnist of Today’s Zaman, an English-language daily published in Turkey. His current research interests are Islamism in Turkey– Central Asia–the Middle East; Islam–constitutional law–human rights; and Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan.

Other contributor biographies Victoria Clement is Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs (NPS) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, United States. She received her PhD in 2005 from the Ohio State University, United States from which she also took an MA in Near Eastern Languages and Literatures and an MA in Russian History. Dr. Clement’s work has been published in the International Journal of the Sociology of Language, the edited volumes (2007) of Daily Life in Central Asia, Bloomington: Indiana University, and in Yilmaz, Barker, Barkey, Godlas, Abdul Haleem, Harris, Hussain, McMaster, Michel, Robinson, Saritoprak, Thomas, Turner, Weller, Williams and Winter (2007), The Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, as well as in several encyclopedias, and in two Central Asian journals (2003) Türkmen Dili and (1997) Owadan. She has lived in Turkmenistan, Russia and Turkey and works with primary sources in Turkmen, Turkish, Russian and Kyrgyz languages. Her research focuses on the intersection of culture, education, and power in Central Asia, Russia and Turkey. Her current manuscript, Learning to Be Turkmen, examines intersection of politics, culture and identity in among Turkmen from the Tsarist period to contemporary times. In addition to her work on Central Asian history, she is also active in analysis of contemporary Central Asia, Turkey and Russia. She has worked as a consultant for the US State Department, USAID, and Oxford Analytica in the UK. Mustafa Gürbüz received his PhD in sociology from the University of Connecticut and currently is a postdoctoral scholar in the Department of Sociology at the University of South Florida. His primary research interests are politics of race/ethnicity, social movements and culture. His doctoral dissertation, Kurdish Ethnic and Islamic Mobilizations in Turkey: A Study of Rival Movements, explores how social movement activists construct a competition culture in civic sphere after a long period of political violence. Dr. Gürbüz’s publications appeared in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, Middle East Critique, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, European

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Journal of Turkish Studies, and Research in Social Stratification and Mobility. He serves as book review co-editor for Sociology of Islam journal (Brill) and regularly contributes to Mobilizing Ideas, a scholarly blog to conceptualize collective behaviour and social movements. Paul L. Heck, Associate Professor of Islamic Studies in Georgetown University’s Department of Theology, is founding director of the Centre for the Study of Religions Across Civilizations (SORAC), the goal of which is to foster religious reasoning geared to the global age through educational programs for religious studies scholars between the Arab and American worlds. He is also the author of a number of publications on Islam and Christianity, the most recent of which is ‘The Apostle Paul and the Apostle Muhammad: The Challenge of the Convert’, in Islamochristiana 37 (2011). His scholarly interests focus on the history of scepticism in Islam, mysticism and the role of spirituality in Muslim society, views on martyrdom in the three monotheist traditions, the phenomenon of religious humanism, and questions of political theology. Some of these themes were treated in his most recent monograph publication (2009), Common Ground: Islam, Christianity and Religious Pluralism, Washington: Georgetown University Press. His work overall looks at two religions through a single if refracted lens, seeking to bring sharper insight to our knowledge of the phenomenon of religion and its role in both scholarly circles and society in general. Özcan Keleş holds an LLB (2000) and an LLM (2002) in Human Rights Law from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, United Kingdom. He took (2005) the Bar Course from Inns of Court School of Law and is a barrister and member of the Honourable Society of Gray’s Inn. Between 2006 and 2009 he was a full-time doctoral candidate in Human Rights Law at the Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex, where he held the Scholarship Award of 2006. He has currently suspended completion of his doctoral thesis. Özcan has been the executive director of the Dialogue Society since January 2008. Ramazan Kılınç is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He teaches courses on the Middle East and the Muslim world and has previously taught in James Madison College at Michigan State University. He received his doctorate in political science from Arizona State University in 2008. He also holds MA (2001) and BA (1999) degrees in International Relations from Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. His research interests are in religion and politics, particularly the relationship between Islam, secularism and democracy. His work has appeared various journals including Political Science Quarterly, Insight Turkey and Turkish Review. He is currently working on a book manuscript entitled History, Norms and State Policies toward Religious Minorities: France and Turkey. He is also working on a project entitled ‘The Role of Religious Beliefs and Institutions

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in Generosity: Catholicism and Islam’. In this project, funded by Templeton Foundation (budget $363,666) he works with Carolyn Warner (Political Science) and Adam Cohen (Psychology) of Arizona State University. Marie-Elisabeth Maigre-Branco is a Business Strategy Consultant working in a London-based management consulting firm. She holds an MA in International Studies from the University Autonoma of Barcelona, Spain, specializing in Turkish politics and Islamism. She is undertaking doctoral research in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics, United Kingdom. Her main academic research interests include: the evolution of political Islam in Turkey, the impact of globalization in the Muslim world, and Muslim approaches to business culture. Yasien Mohamed is Professor of Arabic Language and Islamic Philosophy at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. He holds an MA in Islamic Psychology from the University of Cape Town, South Africa and a PhD in Islamic Ethics from Johann-Wolfang Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany. He is author of (2006) Fitrah: The Islamic Concept of Human Nature, London: Ta-Ha Publishers, and of the pioneering study (2006) The Path to Virtue: The Ethical Philosophy of al-Raghib al-Isfahani, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization. Bandana Purkayastha is Professor and Head of Sociology and jointly appointed with Asian American Studies at the University of Connecticut, United States. She has published several books, over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters on racism/gendering/class formation, especially as these structures affect highly educated, racial (and religious) minority immigrants and their children. Her work informs scholarship on human rights, transnationalism, peace and social justice. She has won several local and national awards for teaching and leadership; she was also recognized by the Connecticut legislature for her work with immigrants. She is as a member of the Editorial Board, Journal of South Asian Diasporas, and served as the Deputy Editor of Gender and Society from 2005–11. She holds several elected positions within the International Sociological Association, the American Sociological Association, and is president elect of Sociologists for Women in Society. Mohamed Nawab Osman is a Research Fellow with the Contemporary Islam Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include the history and politics of Southeast and South Asian countries, transnational Islamic political movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic political thought. Nawab obtained his BA (Hons) in political science and history as well as his MA in history from the National University of Singapore. In 2012, he completed his doctorate in political science and international relations from the Australian National University. In October 2007, he was invited by the US State Department to attend the International Visitor Leadership

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Program on Counter-Terrorism and Foreign Policy. He has also been invited to speak at several conferences in London, Washington, New York, Jakarta, Canberra and Geneva. Nawab has written papers, book chapters and journal articles related to his research interests. He is the co-editor (with Farhan Ali) of (2009) Igniting Thought, Unleashing Youth: Analysis and Reflections on Muslim Youth and Activism in Singapore, Select Books, Singapore. Several of his articles have been featured in international referred journals including Southeast Asia Research, Indonesia and the Modern World, Journal of South Asian Studies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Journal of Islamic Studies. He is also a regular commentator on contemporary developments in Muslim countries. Some of his opinion pieces have been featured in The Straits Times (Singapore), Malaysia Today (Malaysia), Jakarta Post (Indonesia), The Nation (Thailand), The Daily Express (India), Todays Zaman (Turkey). His opinions on contemporary Muslim politics have been sought by various news agencies including Channel News Asia, Bloomberg, BBC and Al-Jazeera. Mohamed Nawab is also a social activist. He serves as a board member of the Association of Muslim Professionals in Singapore. Leonid Sykiainen is Professor and Chair of Theory of Law and Comparative Law, in the Law Faculty, State University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. From 2000 he has also been professor of the Institute of Asian and African Countries at the Moscow State University, Russia. He is a member of Dissertation Scientific Councils in the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences and State University-Higher School of Economics and is also a member of the Scientific Consultative Council of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation. He is author of more than 160 learned works in Russian on Islamic law and comparative legal studies. One of his recent publications of relevance to this book is ‘Muslime zwischen islamischen und europaischen Rechtskulturen’, in Walter Homolka, Johann Hafner, Admiel Ksman and Ercan Karakoyun (eds), (2010), Muslime Zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Die Gülen-Bewegung als Brücke zwischen den Kulturen, Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder Verlag Gmbh. Etga Ugur is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Muslim Studies Program and a Visiting Assistant Professor at James Madison College. He received his PhD in political science from the University Utah, United States, in 2011. His research interests include religion and politics; Islamic movements; religion, civil society, and social capital; Turkish politics, and comparative government. His dissertation examined religious groups in the United States and Turkey in terms of their public activism. He has studied Islam in the Turkish vernacular, and published an article entitled ‘Intellectual roots of Turkish Islam and approaches to the “Turkish model”’ in the October 2004 issue of The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, volume 24, no. 2: 327–45. His review essay on Islamic social and political movements entitled ‘Social or political Islam? A review essay on

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Islamic movements in Egypt and Turkey’ appeared in New Perspectives on Turkey, volume 30 (Spring 2004): 169–82. He has recently co-edited a book with Mohammed Ayoob (2012, forthcoming), The War on Terror: Assessments and Reflections, Boulder, Colorado: Lyne Rienner Publishers. He is currently working on his book manuscript entitled Politics of Religious Representation in the U.S. and Turkey: A Comparative Perspective. Professor Ugur has taught classes on comparative politics, international relations, Middle East politics, and religion and politics in comparative perspective.

Acknowledgements Specific permissions and acknowledgements

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he origins of this book, as of the companion volume edited by Weller and Yilmaz (2012) on European Muslims, Civility and Public Life: Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement, go back to two conferences organized by the Dialogue Society in collaboration with a range of other organizations. The first was a conference held at the House of Lords, the School of Oriental and African Studies and the London School of Economics, in London, 25–27 October 2007, under the title of ‘The Muslim World in transition: Contributions of the Gülen movement’. This was supported by the University of Birmingham, the Irish School of Ecumenics, Leeds Metropolitan University, London Middle East Institute, Middle East Institute, and the School of Oriental and African Studies and London School of Economics of the University of London. Papers prepared for that conference was published in a pre-conference volume edited by Ihsan Yilmaz, Eileen Barker, Henri Barkey, Alan Godlas, Muhammad Abdul Haleem, George Harris, Asaf Hussain, Johnston McMaster, Thomas Michel, Simon Robinson, Zeki Saritoprak, David Thomas, Colin Turner, Paul Weller, Ian Williams and Tim Winter (2007), The Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement (Conference Proceedings of a conference of the same name, held at the House of Lords, the School of Oriental and African Studies and the London School of Economics, London, 25–27 October 2007).The second conference was organized by the Dialoog Academie, Rotterdam, in collaboration with Leeds Metropolitan University, and took place at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, on 22–23 November, 2007 on the theme of ‘Peaceful co-existence: Fethullah Gűlen’s initiatives in the contemporary world’. Papers prepared for that conference were published in a pre-conference volume edited by Ihsan Yilmaz, Khalid Abou El Fadl, JeanMichel Cros, Eric Geoffrey, Andreas Kinneging, Johnston McMaster, Thomas Michel, Paolo Naso, Ton Notten, Klaus Otte, Emilio Platti, Simon Robinson, Karel Steenbrink, David Thomas, Pim Valkenberg, Paul Weller and Anton Wessels (2007), Peaceful Co-Existence: Fethullah Gűlen’s Initiatives in the Contemporary World (Conference Proceedings of an International conference of the same name, held at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 22–23 November 2007), London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.

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The papers in this book were selected according to the current book’s theme from among those presented at these two conferences. In connection with this, original copyright in these chapters was vested with the Dialogue Society, London, and the Dialoog Academie, Rotterdam, respectively, by whom permission was given to Leeds Metropolitan University Press to publish the pre-conference volumes under their copyright. The conference and copyright origins of these papers are therefore acknowledged, as is the permission of the Dialogue Society and the Dialoog Academie as primary copyright holders, for the authors and editors to draw upon their originally published pre-conference texts. At the same time, the papers as published in chapters in the present book  – while having continuity in parts of their text with their published pre-conference content  – have all been rewritten to the focus and length requirements of the present volume. Given the passage of time between original presentation of papers at these conferences in 2007 and the present book’s publication date of 2013, the papers as they appear here have also incorporated necessary substantial updates in content with regard to recent developments and to other more recently published materials. In fact, quite a number of the papers have not only been updated, but also substantially rewritten.An exception to the origin of the papers is the substantive paper by Weller on ‘Fethullah Gülen, Turkey and the European Union’. This was, in an earlier form, first presented at the Second Annual Conference on ‘Islam in the contemporary world: The Fethullah Gűlen movement in thought and practice’ held at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, United States, 3–5 November 2006; and then, in more recently revized form, at the Master’s Course on ‘Ethnicity and Mediterranean cultures’ held at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, 15 May 2012. Permission to quote at more length across the chapters of the book as a whole than is normally covered by full acknowledgement and referencing under ‘fair dealing’ provisions for the purposes of criticism and review, is acknowledged from The Light, for quotations from a key book containing the thought and teaching of Fethullah Gülen, namely Fethullah Gülen (2004), Towards a Global Civilisation of Love and Tolerance, New Jersey: The Light; as also from The Fountain for quotations from A. Ünal and A. Williams (eds) (2000), Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen, Fairfax, Virginia: The Fountain. Copyright in both these books now lies with Tughra Books, Clifton, New Jersey. In Chapter 1, in introducing aspects of the developmental history of Fethullah Gülen and the movement, Greg Barton, by agreement with Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz as authors of the introductory chapter on ‘Fethullah Gülen, the movement and this book: An introductory overview’ in their (Weller and Yilmaz, eds, 2012) edited volume, European Muslims, Civility and

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Public Life: Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement, draws on and incorporates into this chapter summary material found in its pages xxii–xxv, while in the Introduction to this volume, the editors also draw on material in Weller and Yilmaz’s edited volume.

General acknowledgements The authors and editors also wish to acknowledge the many other authors and editors of books, and the authors of journal, magazine and newspaper articles listed in the bibliography from whose work ourselves and the authors of the chapters have either quoted within the generally recognized provisions for ‘fair dealing . . . for the purposes of criticism or review’, or to whose work has been referred. Every attempt has been made to identify any copyright material appearing in this book that may go beyond the generally recognized permissions for ‘fair dealing . . . for the purposes of criticism or review’. If, in error, we have failed specifically to identify and/or acknowledge such or have by mistake inaccurately or not fully represented or referenced any material originally written by anyone than ourselves or the authors of the chapters, then we offer our sincere apologies. If any such copyright holders were to bring the matter to our attention, we are committed to rectifying any such failure in any future editions of this book that may be published.

A final word of thanks In closing these acknowledgements, the editors would like to end with some personal thanks to Lalle Pursglove (Commissioning Editor for Religious Studies at the Bloomsbury Publishing Plc for commissioning the volume); to Rachel Eisenhauer, Editorial Assistant, for her support in its completion; and to Charlotte Hoare who, at of the book’s preparation was Marketing Executive of Bloomsbury’s Academic Division. All the editors would also like wish to express their thanks for what they acknowledge as the continued patient support of their families and friends throughout their work on this book.

Fethullah Gülen, the Movement and this Book: An Introductory Overview Greg Barton, Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz

1.  The global context

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 his book is a ‘companion’ book to European Muslims, Civility and Public Life: Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement (Weller and Yilmaz, 2012). It explores the creative contributions of the Gülen movement across the Muslim world. The transitions and openings for democratic development that have emerged for Muslims and Islam in the Middle East through ‘the Arab Spring’ have led to a considerable degree of interest among the public, politicians, scholars and religious leaders in ‘the Turkish model’ of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Therefore, in contrast to the previous book which focused on a European context in which Muslims are a minority, this book mainly focuses its discussion on how the Gülen movement has positioned itself and sought to contribute within societies  – including its home country of Turkey – in which Islam forms a major part of the cultural, religious and historical inheritance and Muslims constitute the majority of their populations. Although the terminologies of ‘the Muslim world’ and ‘the West’ are themselves problematic in many ways, they are established elements of contemporary discourse and thought and as such have become part of social reality. This book seeks to examine the impact of the Gülen movement on the contemporary ‘Muslim world’ in transition and on relations between ‘the West’, ‘the Muslim world’ and Islam in general. As a leading religiously inspired

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movement in contemporary Turkey with a universal educational and interfaith agenda, the Gülen movement aims to promote creative and positive relations between the West and the Muslim world and to articulate a constructive position on such issues as democracy, multiculturalism, globalization and interfaith dialogue in the context of secular modernity. The journey of Turkish Islamists towards ‘post-Islamism’ is also a convergence towards the ideas that Fethullah Gülen has been advocating during the past three decades, notwithstanding the fact that Gülen’s cosmopolitan Islam is very different to, and goes well beyond, post-Islamism. This convergence has been possible because while Islamist movements tend to be reactionary, Islamism in Turkey has been more about social conservatism and identity politics than reactionary radicalism. Values such as democracy, loyalty to the state and a nation-state mentality were not an anathema to the Turkish Islamists of the Republic period. Nevertheless, the Islamist generation of the Republic period also borrowed, if rather artificially, from Middle Eastern Islamists whose experiences were very different, generally speaking, from the lived experiences of Turkey. The Independence War victory, the fact that the country was never colonized, and the failure of Islamic modernism to make substantial inroads into traditionalist Islamic society in Anatolia prevented Turkish Islamists from becoming truly radicalized in the manner of the Muslim Brotherhood Islamists of the Arab world. Even their anti-Western rhetoric was relatively superficial. Many Turkish Islamists had Nakhsbandi Sufi connections and respected the wider Sufi tradition and this is one of the reasons why Turkish Islamism has evolved relatively smoothly into ‘post-Islamism’. Just as important, however, has been the diffuse influence of the Gülen movement that has brought Sufism in modern guise to the emerging middle classes and the nascent new elite of Turkey’s flourishing cities. Throughout his life Fethullah Gülen has strongly opposed the ideologization and instrumentalization of religion in politics and advocated for the mutual autonomy of the state and religion. Unlike the Islamists, who conceive Islam in terms of identity, ideology and politics at the expense of an inclusive identity, Gülen argues for an inclusive faith that embraces a democratic polity. A key theme throughout this book is therefore the role of Islam in the public sphere and the potential impact of Gülen’s cosmopolitan interpretation of Islam on the wider Muslim world. This is particularly timely in the post ‘Arab-Spring’ period as countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa wrestle with political transition from authoritarian rule. More than ever, questions of the place of Islam in relation to the state and civil society; of the place and role of the ‘secular’; and of the position of other than Muslim minorities within national cultures and polities are very much matters of live debate, posing, as they do, existential political choices that are important to resolve.

FETHULLAH GÜLEN, THE MOVEMENT AND THIS BOOK

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2.  The emergence and development of the movement inspired by Fethullah Gülen Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Islamic scholar, thinker, preacher, writer and poet. He is a scholar in the classical Islamic sense of being counted among the ulema, rather than an academic or theorist in the modern sense of these terms. Significantly, however, he is a classical scholar who also seeks actively and critically to engage with the contemporary world, both through his teaching and by his inspiration of people who seek to translate this inspiration into historical practice. Gülen’s contribution is rooted in a confident Ottoman Muslim civilizational heritage, while at the same time emerging from the context of the modern history of the Turkish Republic. Thus Gülen has attempted to ‘synthesize tradition and modernity, religion and science’ (Koyuncu-Lorasdaği, 2010: 221). His approach has not been static, but has developed and matured through engagement with both ideological ‘secularism’ and political ‘Islamism’. As a result of this, it is not only shaped by a deep understanding of Islamic tradition. Rather, it is also informed by a nuanced and realistic understanding of the dynamics of the contemporary world. Greg Barton’s substantive first chapter in this book explores at length the origins of the movement and the roots of Fethullah Gülen’s approach. In short, the movement began in Turkey at the end of the 1960s when Fethullah Gülen, while working as a state imam at the Kestanepazarı Qur’anic School in Izmir (Koyuncu-Lorasdaği, 2010: 225) first began to articulate his vision for a contemporary understanding of traditional Anatolian Islam that could serve the modern world through education. It developed further through the foundation of schools  – initially in the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union and later in the Balkans and then throughout the world. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, as well as writing and teaching a small circle of students, Gülen also preached to large crowds in public places and mosques throughout Turkey (Ebaugh, 2010: v). His ideas of education, modernization and interfaith dialogue by establishing dormitories, university preparatory courses and schools gradually appealed to many Turks of different backgrounds. When the former Soviet Union collapsed, his ideas and service projects spread to the former Turkic-Soviet countries. Eventually, they also spread to Western Europe where large numbers of Turkish immigrants live, and beyond that also to North America, Asia, Africa, Australia and the Middle East. It can be argued that the schools have flourished because they preserve ‘a modern, secular curriculum, while engaging rather than threatening the state’ (Clement, 2011: 76).

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By the 2000s, the movement’s loose educational network was operating in dozens of countries across five continents. As Koyuncu-Lorasdaği (2010: 226) says: ‘The reputation and success of these schools can be explained by the high-quality education they provide and top-notch students selected on the basis of their success.’ Today, there are over one thousand schools across at least 130 countries. In Europe, the movement ‘has established tutoring centres and dormitories to support the education of the second and third-generation immigrants, and it targets the emerging middle class among Turkish immigrants to finance its activities through fundraising events and philanthropic foundations’ (Yükleyen and Yurdakul, 2011: 75). The movement inspired by Fethullah Gülen is perhaps best understood a civic movement. It is committed to educating youth, fostering interfaith and intercultural dialogue, assisting the needy in society and contributing to global peace (Ebaugh, 2010: v), all while being rooted in, and inspired by, Islam. Its schools endeavour ‘to lay the foundations for a more humane, tolerant citizenry of the world where people are expected to cultivate their own faith perspectives and also promote the well being of others’ (Kurtz, 2005: 380). Gülen’s religious discourse has developed to become, at one and the same time, both global and also adapted to local circumstances. While the actual size of the movement and the number of participants and sympathizers is not exactly known, all indicators confirm that it is, by far, the largest civil society movement in Turkey. Gülen himself regards the movement as a cultural activity, the essence of which is based on the altruistic and sacrificial voluntary co-operation of many people who may not know each other, have no organic or official ties or, in some cases, not even any mutual acquaintance, but who all share similar ideals of serving humanity. Over the past four decades the movement has developed ‘a concrete socio-economic and cultural analysis of the current spatio-temporal context and based on this analysis offers concrete solutions to tackle Muslims’ enemies rather than insisting on abstract rhetoric’ (Esposito and Yilmaz, 2010: xxviii). In Gülen’s perspective, and borrowing from Said Nursi, humanity as a whole and Muslims in particular have three major enemies: ignorance, poverty and disunity. In Gülen’s view, one of the major problem’s in today’s world ‘is lack of knowledge which includes the production and control of knowledge, as well as acquiring existing knowledge. Producing, maintaining and disseminating knowledge can only be achieved through quality education, not by politics or force’ (Ebaugh, 2010: 34). Because of this, Gülen ‘sees education as requisite for social, economic and political modernization and advocates that individuals will respect democratic law and human rights only if they receive a sound education’ and that social justice and peace ‘are achieved by intellectually enlightened people with strong moral values and a sense of altruism’ (Ebaugh, 2010: 34).

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Gülen encourages businessmen sympathetic to his cause to donate from their money as seed capital to establish schools in many different countries. This appeal is based on one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam, which is that of zakat (tithing). It is expected that Muslims who are able should donate (as zakat) at least two-and-a-half per cent of their wealth every year. Muslims traditionally donate their zakat to poor families or use it to establish mosques and schools that teach religious texts. Gülen reinterpreted this tradition, advocating that the giving of money to establish secular educational institutions and to support scholarships to students is also zakat and can therefore be considered as an act of worship. Fethullah Gülen has himself donated 90 per cent of his earnings from the over 60 bestselling books he has written to scholarship funds in the institutions inspired by him, or else for humanitarian aid (Yücel, 2010: 8). Gülen’s advocacy of secular education derives from the fact that he believes that God desires human beings to study not only God’s revealed word (in the form of the scriptures given through the prophets) but also the natural world created by God. Thus Gülen regularly reminds his readers that that universe is also a ‘book of God’ and that, as the Qur’an itself explains, studying this ‘book of God’ represents a vital element of worship. In Gülen’s view, ‘science and faith are not only compatible but complementary. He sees a faith-based world view – based on a rational creator creating a universe that obeys clearly discernable and internally consistent nature laws – as providing a sound foundation to support and give meaning to secular learning’ (Ebaugh, 2010: 35). Alongside this ‘he advocates educating the young generation in Islamic knowledge through informal publications, sermons and within the family rather than through formal curricula in schools’ (Ebaugh, 2010: 35). Gülen does not see the world in the narrow political terms or within the imaginary boundaries which people construct to order their affairs. As Klas Grinell (2010: 67) puts it Gülen is a ‘border transgressor’. Gülen’s frequently used term dar al-hizmet (country of service) reflects his ‘border transgressing’ vision (Yilmaz, 2003: 234). Indeed, those inspired by his teaching generally give the name Hizmet (service) to their activities. Gülen also employs ijtihad, or independent interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, as the basis for his border transgressing understanding on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Gülen does not divide the world into medieval Islam’s mutually exclusive concepts of dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar-al Islam (abode of Islam, peace) – concepts that have been used by modern ‘Islamists’ to justify an ideologically divided view of the world. Rather, by utilizing the concept dar al-hizmet – the abode of service to humans, and thereby also of God (Yilmaz, 2007: 35), Gülen sees the whole world as in need of continuous service. Therefore he stresses that wherever a Muslim is, even outside a Muslim majority polity; he or she has to obey the law of the land, to respect others’ rights and to be just, and disregard discussions of dar al-harb and dar al-Islam.

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Starting from the early 1990s, well before the horror of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Gülen ‘was intent on promoting dialogue and tolerance among all strata of the society in Turkey and elsewhere’ (Gözaydın, 2009: 1224). In order to facilitate this, in 1994 Gülen pioneered the establishment of the Journalists and Writers Foundation. He was perhaps the first Muslim scholar to publicly invite leaders of other faith groups in Turkey to dinners. In 1998 he was the first Turkish Muslim scholar to visit the Pope in the Vatican. His discourse on dialogue, tolerance and peaceful coexistence has been promoted by institutions around the world, including the Dialogue Society (established in London in 1999); the Rumi Forum (established in Washington, DC in 1999); the Australian Intercultural Society (founded in Melbourne in 2000) and others. There are now many dozens of such associations and charities all over the world. They engage in interfaith and intercultural dialogue with people of different faiths, backgrounds and cultures (Gözaydın, 2009: 1224) and they include not only Muslim but also non-Muslim volunteers.

3.  The approach of this book, its authors and editors The editors of the chapters in this book reflect its broad international character, coming from Turkey, the United Kingdom and Australia. As noted above, Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz edited the ‘companion’ Continuum book (2012), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life: Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement. They are joined for this book by Greg Barton who is based in Australia and generally works on Islam and Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region. As with the ‘complementary’ book on the Gülen movement in Europe, the chapters include perspectives both ‘on’ and ‘from’ the movement. This is in the sense that some of the writers, while writing here in their academic capacity, are also ‘insiders’ to the movement, while others are ‘outsiders’. But in seeking to understand and evaluate the phenomenon with which the book is concerned, all the writers also discuss other ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ perspectives, including from those who are enthusiastic ‘supporters’ of the movement; those who aspire to be neutral ‘observers’; and those who are ‘critics’. Nevertheless, while approaching their individual chapters in different ways and with different evaluative nuances, the authors in this book all share an overall assessment that Gülen’s teaching and, in general, the practice of the movement inspired by it, represent constructive and positive contributions to society. They hold out the promise of a contextualized renewal of Islam that is fully engaged with modernity and genuinely concerned to build bridges between people and serve Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

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4.  Contents of the book The book consists of four parts. Part One is on ‘The Gülen movement in the public sphere’; Part Two is titled ‘Muslim politics beyond post-Islamism’; and Part Three is ‘The contexts of the Muslim world’. Part One on ‘The Gülen movement in the public sphere’ begins with Chapter 1  – ‘Preaching by example: Understanding the Gülen movement in the context of religious philanthropy and civil religion’ by Greg Barton. In this chapter, Barton argues that the Gülen movement, or hizmet, is often misunderstood because in large measure it is unlike anything else in the Muslim world, although he notes that the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama mass-based organizations of Indonesia bear some resemblance to it. At the same time, Barton argues that one does not need to limit comparisons to the Muslim world: as a social movement motivated by religious values and the ideals of selfless service, engaged in philanthropic endeavour and active in the civil sphere, the Gülen movement deserves comparison with other such movements around the globe. This chapter therefore also looks outside the geographic and cultural context of the Muslim world to demonstrate that the Gülen movement shares much in common with many Western, Christian, philanthropic initiatives in education and public discourse of the past three centuries, particularly in North America. The value of this comparison is that it helps us better to understand aspects of the movement that cannot be easily understood in the limited context of the Muslim world alone. It also helps break down some of the ‘us and them’ barriers that divide Christians and Muslims, ‘East’ and ‘West’, by allowing us to recognize common concerns, values and shared experiences. The chapter also explores the concept of civil religion in the twenty-first century; examines ways in which religious philanthropic activity can contribute to the development of non-exclusivist civil religion; and applies these insights to the Gülen movement to argue that the hizmet models an interesting modern Islamic alternative to Islamism. In Chapter 2 on ‘From Gandhi to Gülen: The habitus of non-aggressive action’, Mustafa Gürbüz and Bandana Purkayastha, utilizing Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, explore the Gülen movement activists’ philosophy of action, popularly called hizmet in Turkish. The authors demonstrate that the notion of hizmet has remarkable similarities with the notion of satyagraha in Gandhi’s terminology. Providing a comparative outlook and drawing on experiences of both Gandhian Chipko activists and the Gülen movement activists, the article suggests that non-violent activism should be conceptualized through the cognitive worlds of social movement activists. To conclude the first part of the book, in Chapter 3  – ‘Organizing civil society: The Gülen movement’s Abant Platform’, Etga Ugur asks: ‘Under

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what conditions, does religion becomes a source of co-operation rather than conflict?’ Taking the Gülen movement as an example he argues that it represents an Islamically-inspired social movement that bases its philosophy on increasing religious consciousness at the individual level and making Islam an important social force in the public sphere. It is this intellectual and social activism, he proposes, that has made the movement a global phenomenon and the focus of socio-political analysis. The Gülen community brings different sectors of society together to facilitate ‘collective intellectual effort’ and offer ‘civil responses’ to social issues, seeing this as a more subtle and legitimate way of influencing public debate and policy. To this end, in Turkey the movement initiated a series of symposiums, known as the Abant Workshops  – the scope of which was later expanded to include a wider audience in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Ugur concludes his chapter by looking specifically at the Abant Workshops and the movement’s strategy of bridge building and problem solving. Supplemented by interviews with key organizers from the Journalists and Writers Foundation and other participants, the chapter draws upon the press releases, transcripts and audio-visual records of the past 22 Abant meetings to discuss their objectives and outcomes. The discussion aims to understand how far religiously inspired social groups can contribute to the empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state and its officially secular ideology. Beyond that, it aims to explain the role of civil society organizations in democratic governance, and the possibility of creating social capital in societies lacking a clear ‘overlapping consensus’ on issues of citizenship, morality and national identity. Part Two of the book brings together chapters around the broad theme of ‘Muslim politics beyond post-Islamism’. In Chapter 4 – ‘Beyond post-Islamism: The transformation of Turkish Islamism to non-Islamism’, Ihsan Yilmaz looks at the domestic sociocultural and religious dynamics that have shaped the normative frameworks of Turkish Islamists’ with a special focus on the country’s biggest civil society actor. After looking at the historical conditions such as the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy that influenced both the emergence and then transformation of Turkish Islamism, the chapter moves on to the present and makes the case that the physical and discursive interaction of Islamic groups has been a crucial factor in the transformation of Turkish Islamism. More specifically, the chapter argues that the Gülen movement has been a very influential factor in helping the leaders of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party (AKP) to develop a more tolerant normative framework to the point where they were finally able to jettison their Islamist convictions and replace them with a more progressive position. Chapter 5 – ‘Muslims and liberalization: The case of the Gülen movement’, by Ramazan Kılınç, examines the question of the compatibility between Islam

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and liberalism in the context of the unprecedented resurgence of religious organizations in the public sphere in recent years. This chapter looks at the Gülen movement’s response to liberalization processes in Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s. Since liberalism has radically transformed the economic and political system of the country over the last two decades, Turkey is seen as being a good case study with which to reflect on these issues. The increased influence of the Gülen movement in Turkey provides rich empirical data of an Islamic movement engaging with liberalization in civil society and politics. The chapter concludes that, while the movement’s discourse and practice are compatible with liberalism, its Islamic ethos means that at some points it must also critically engage with certain aspects of liberalism. In Chapter 6 – ‘The influence of the Gülen movement in the emergence of a Turkish cultural “Third way”’, Marie-Elisabeth Maigre-Branco sets out to understand the role of the Gülen movement in the emergence of the new Islamic culture in Turkey. In the 1990s, the movement favoured a ‘Turkish Islam’ encompassing the principles of democracy and moderation, and so rejected the more radical ideals of Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah party. After the 1997 ‘soft coup’ removed the Erbakan government, pro-Islamic businesspeople became less inclined to support a party that could threaten their business interests. A reformist branch led by Istanbul mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, began to adopt the principles of democracy and religious freedom as part of a new political argument, and eventually won the general elections of November 2002. At this point the three actors – the Islamist reformists, the businessmen and Gülen movement’s participants – converged around the common concepts of Turkish Islam, Conservative Democracy and Business to re-elaborate the cultural content of the Islamic movement with a more Western democratic and capitalist orientation. The phrase ‘Islam de marché’, or ‘Islam of the market’ coined by Patrick Haenni (L’Islam de marché, 2005) refers to the culture, born of globalization, in which business success is efficiently used to translate thinking or religious beliefs into something practical and derive some cultural influence from association with the state. Maigre-Branco concludes by arguing that Fethullah Gülen displayed remarkable insight in his anticipation of the need for Turkish people, whether secular or Islamist, to adapt to the present times. His ideas that once seems so outlandish, she argues, are now finding broad reception for reasons that he clearly anticipated. In Chapter 7 – ‘Fethullah Gülen, Turkey and the European Union’, Paul Weller explores how the issues and debates around Turkey’s possible membership in what is now the European Union have tended to act as a microcosm for a wider range of key debates issues, both within Turkey and beyond, concerning the nature of the appropriate relationships between economics and politics,

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religions and cultures, and states and societies. While some member states have supported eventual Turkish accession, others have argued that the cultural and religious differences mean that full accession is not appropriate. In Turkey itself, some supporters of EU membership have seen it as a major economic opportunity for Turkey, while others have seen it as a means through which to further development and entrench human rights and civil society over and against the continued shadow cast by Turkey’s history of military coups. Others have opposed membership on either nationalist or religious grounds. This chapter explores the ways in which the Gülen movement has been contributing to a climate in which, even  – and perhaps especially  – in the context of the current economic crisis of the European project, Turkish membership of the EU could become more thinkable, both among Turkish Muslims and in the wider Europe. It shows how, in contrast to the ‘clash of civilizations’ approach espoused either by secular or Christian new ‘cold warriors’ or by contemporary Islamists, Gülen argues the positive case that: ‘Turkey can be a bridge across the Middle East and the Far East.’ Part Three, the final section of the book shifts the focus to ‘The contexts of the Muslim world’. It begins with Chapter 8 – ‘The relevance of Fethullah Gülen’s thought for democratic reforms in the Muslim world’. In this chapter Leonid R. Sykiainen explores why political reform represents such a central public concern in the Muslim world. The author argues that Fethullah Gülen believes that the fundamentals of Islam do not contradict the demands for political reform in the contemporary Muslim world; rather, they can contribute to it. Gülen, Sykiainen argues, pays special attention to the involvement of Islam in political life and to Islamic methods of realizing political goals. While stressing the importance of law and order, he condemns absolutely violent and coercive means to attaining political ends. At the same time, he does not see a contradiction between genuine Islamic principles and democracy: he explains that the well-known principle of consultation is extremely flexible and responsive to the needs of every era. Gülen, argues Skyiainen, is an advocate of dialogue between different cultures and civilizations so as to benefit from each other’s knowledge and views. In any case he argues that people need to learn from experience, and that this position opens the way for the Muslim world to benefit from modern democratic models of governance. Not surprisingly, he does not believe in an inevitable ‘clash of cultures or civilizations’. In Chapter 9  – ‘Turkish in the language of the Qu’ran: Hira’ magazine’, Paul L. Heck explores an aspect of the Gülen movement which, overall, has received relatively little scholarly attention. In this chapter, Heck looks at the movement’s interest in connecting with the larger Muslim community and to its awareness of the need to situate itself and publish its ideas within the wider ummah.

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Hira’ magazine, which is a relatively new venture of the Gülen movement (the first issue was published in December 2005), is chiefly intra-Muslim in its aims and aspirations. It is published in Arabic and features articles written by both Turkish and Arabic writers, with a lead article by Fethullah Gülen opening and setting the tone of each issue. The magazine acts to bring the intellectual outlook of the Gülen movement to the Arab world. It serves as a cultural bridge between Turks and Arabs and as a forum in which pressing issues in contemporary Islam can be aired and treated by leading Muslim thinkers, as well as being a tool for the global Muslim community to consolidate a renewed vision of its relation to the intellectual and socio-political realities of the modern world. Heck recounts the establishment and development of the Hira’ magazine, focusing on the calibre of its themes and contributors, and also its reception in the Arab world as evidenced in local Arab media as well as by the comments of those in charge of the magazine. Finally, he offers a critical assessment of the overall vision of the magazine, its presentation style, material content, and religious perspective, as well as its potential to speak effectively to the global ummah as a leading voice for the future of Islam. In Chapter 10 – ‘Central Asia’s Hizmet schools’, Victoria Clement examines the Başkent Foundation schools in Turkmenistan. She argues that they play a vital role in offering socially conscious education grounded in science and maths and with an international focus in the wake of the Turkmenistan’s government dismantling the former Soviet educational system in the 1990s and replacing it with lower quality schooling. This case study explores the vitality of Gülen schools outside of the Turkish Republic and their vision to offer Central Asian families an important choice in secular, general education. The chapter discusses the appeal of the schools’ curriculum to parents and students, and records a decade-long success both in educating students and in laying the foundations of civil society. This is particularly striking in Turkmenistan where the Gülen movement offers the only general education available outside of the state system. In Chapter 11 – ‘The Gülen movement as a civil-Islamic force in Indonesia’, Mohamed Nawab Osman draws on the concept of ‘civil Islam’, to argue that this concept is epitomized by the Gülen movement. The chapter begins by exploring Fethullah Gülen’s understanding of secularism and democracy and seeks to elaborate on the notion of civil Islam as defined by Ihsan Yilmaz. The second part of the chapter analyzes the activities of the Gülen movement in Indonesia and specific contributions to fostering civil Islam in Indonesia. The final section of the chapter explores the factors that enable moderate civil Islam movements to be better placed to counter extremism than more aggressively progressive movements such as the Liberal Islamic Network.

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Chapter 12 – ‘A Gülen-inspired school in South Africa’, takes a brief look outside ‘the Muslim world’ at a context within which Muslims are in a minority and played a role alongside other religious groups in bringing about liberation from the oppressive apartheid system. Yasien Mohamed’s study focuses primarily on the academic progress of a private school associated with the Gülen movement: Star International School in Cape Town. Gülen-inspired schools generally have a reputation for high academic standards but prior to 2007 Star International struggled to live up to these expectations. Mohamed examines the factors that, before 2007, hampered the academic progress of the learners and the factors that improved their performance after 2007. His study touches on the moral ethos of the school, but primarily focuses on its educational challenges and achievements. In Chapter 13 – ‘The Gülen movement and promoting human rights values’, Özcan Keleş argues that human rights values are a central and inherent theme in Gülen’s teaching and the movement’s practice; that they are articulated with particular attention to their adaptability for different sociocultural contexts. He argues that the assimilation of those values in Turkish society has enabled an empowerment of the periphery vis-à-vis the centre, the shift in power from ‘elite’ to ‘people’; and that the presence of the movement in Muslim-majority societies outside Turkey has the potential to catalyze a comparable shift in power while instilling human rights values. In the first of the chapter’s three sections Keleş sets out the reasons for and extent of Gülen’s and the movement’s influence. Keleş suggests that Gülen’s approach to tajdid is readily transferable to social contexts outside of Turkey. Then, in the second part of the chapter, he examines how human rights discourse fits within Gülen’s teaching, focusing on democratic politics and freedom of belief. Finally, he sketches the activities of the movement across the Muslim world and assesses its potential to contribute to the promotion of human rights values. Keleş proposes that as the movement becomes more active in the ‘Muslim world’, its stance on human rights values will begin to influence a wider section of the grass roots of society. In the final chapter in the book the editors, Greg Barton, Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz attempt a preliminary evaluation of the movement’s contribution to promoting change within the Muslim world. Drawing on issues arising from the contributors’ chapters they identify a number of key questions for the future of both the ‘Muslim world’ and for the movement and activities that are inspired by Fethullah Gülen.

1 Preaching by Example and Learning for Life: Understanding the Gülen Movement in the Global Context of Religious Philanthropy and Civil Religion Greg Barton

1.  A new and different kind of Islamic movement

T

 he Gülen Hizmet, or movement (the word literally means ‘service’ but is also used by many within the Gülen movement to describe it) is a vast loosely connected network of autonomous schools, universities, NGOs and media and publishing enterprises and is often misunderstood (Agai, 2003: 67). This is in large measure because it is unlike anything else in the Muslim world. It looks, superficially, somewhat like a Muslim Brotherhood social movement but closer examination of its core doctrine and values soon reveals that it is in no respects an Islamist movement. Whereas Islamist movements like the Brotherhood are convinced that the application of Shari’a through radical (that is to say, root-and-branch) political and legislative transformation of the state represents a panacea for the ills of modern secular society the Gülen movement has no desire for a religious state. Speaking of Islamism, Gülen

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counters that: ‘This vision of Islam as a totalising ideology is totally against the spirit of Islam, which promotes the rule of law and openly rejects oppression against any segment of society’ (Gülen, 2005d: 452). Rejecting the coercive application of Shari’a the Gülen movement believes instead that the best way to achieve a better society is by the personal development of individuals through education and by the setting of a positive example (temsil) (see Yavuz, 2003b: 41; Özdalga, 2003: 86). Like the Muslim Brotherhood, Fethullah Gülen and the movement associated with him are openly committed to tajdid, or renewal, and to ijtihad, or the continuing interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Speaking of his own position Gülen observed that: The community members are required to obey the laws that one can identify as ‘higher principles’ as well as laws made by humans. Islam has no objection to undertaking ijtihad (independent reasoning), istinbat (deductive reasoning), and istikhraj (derivation) in the interpretation of Shari’ah principles. (Gülen, 2005: 450) In stark contrast to most radical Islamists, Gülen and his followers are deeply committed to tolerance, the embracing of pluralism and the pursuit of dialogue, and as a result are much more progressive in outlook and much more productive in ijtihad (Voll, 2003: 245–7). Indeed, as Ihsan Yilmaz (2003) has so evocatively put it, the Gülen movement achieves ijtihad and tajdid by conduct. Yilmaz explores at length the impact of this non-Islamist approach to tajdid in facilitating the emergence of post-Islamist politics in Turkey in Chapter 4 of this book. Although there really is nothing quite like the Gülen movement in the Arab ‘heartland’ of the Muslim world the giant mass-based Islamic organizations of Indonesia  – Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama  – do bear some resemblance. Like Nahdlatul Ulama the Gülen movement is a modern articulation of rural, Sufistic, traditional Islam. It is more like the urban Islamic modernist Muhammadiyah, however, in its approach to professional philanthropic endeavour, including modern non-religious education (for more on this, see Barton, 2006). Similar movements, though not so extensive, can be found elsewhere on what some might call the periphery – and others the leading edge – of Muslim world. There is no good reason, however, to limit comparisons only to the Muslim world. As a social movement motivated by religious values and the ideals of service and selflessness, engaged in philanthropic endeavour and active in the civil sphere the Gülen movement deserves comparison with other such movements around the globe, both in the present and over the past several centuries. This chapter examines the thinking of Fethullah Gülen as demonstrated in the social movement that he has inspired. In particular it examines the

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approach of Gülen and the movement to learning and to modernity. It concludes by arguing that to fully understand the movement we need to look outside the geographic and cultural context of the Muslim world. It seeks to demonstrate that the Gülen movement shares much in common with many of the Western, Christian, philanthropic initiatives in education and public discourse of the past three centuries, particularly those found in North America. Indeed, Hakan Yavuz has famously described the members of the Gülen movement as being Turkish Puritans, a term that quickly stuck with Western journalists (Yavuz, 2003a). It is easy to dismiss such phrases as being throw-away lines, especially when they are used by the media without deep insight into who the eighteenth-century New England Puritans actually were. In fact there are a number of strong parallels between the Puritans in general and the movement leaders and between Gülen and Puritan thinkers such as Jonathan Edwards, Quaker thinkers such as John Woolman and, to some extent, Anglican thinkers such as John Wesley and Samuel Johnson. There is an even stronger correlation with subsequent movements in Christian education, both Protestant and Catholic, through to the present time. The utility of this comparison is that it helps us to better understand many aspects of the Gülen movement that cannot otherwise be easily understood in the limited context of the Muslim world. It also helps break down some of the ‘us and them’ barriers of otherness that divide Christians and Muslims, and east and west, by allowing us to recognize common concerns and values and shared experiences. Therefore this chapter will briefly explore the concept of civil religion in the twenty-first century; examine ways in which religious philanthropic activity can contribute to the development of non-exclusivist civil religion; and apply these insights to the Gülen movement to argue that the movement models an interesting modern Islamic alternative to Islamism.

2.  Islam and the modern Turkish state State Islam in Turkey, the official sanctioned expression of religion that Ihsan Yilmaz has dubbed ‘Lausanian Islam’, is a direct product of the philosophy behind Turkey’s revolution (Yilmaz, 2005a: 386–90). The modern Turkish state’s approach to religion is based on the conviction of the Kemalist establishment, the inheritors of the legacy of Atatürk, that the state is able to shape and direct religious practice and belief through the comprehensive application of law and intervention of state institutions (Yilmaz, 2005a: 392–3). This means that the state feels that it needs to maintain control over religious expression in the public sphere. As the military remains a very powerful institution of state power in Turkey, and has intervened directly

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via coups (in 1960 and 1971) and less directly via ‘soft coups’ (the political upheavals in 1980 and 28 February 1997 are widely understood to be ‘soft coups’) the democratically elected government represents but one of several elements of the Turkish state (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003a: xxiv–xxv). This dynamic is sometimes alluded to by referring to a ‘deep-state’ shadowing and intimidating the elected executive and legislature. The military claims an important role for itself as protector of Turkish secularism and the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk. The secularism of modern Turkey is directly modelled on French laicism and as such is profoundly different from the secularism of the English-speaking world (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003a: xx–xxiii). Thus Turkish laicism did not simply call for a separation of ‘church’ and state but aspired to reserve for the state the right to direct all aspects of religious expression outside of the individual and the family home. Of course, it never fully achieved the degree of control to which it aspired. Nevertheless, its claim on the state’s right to direct public life gave it a powerful weapon for the repression of social movements by which it felt threatened and gave to the military a useful pretext for intervening in political affairs in the name of upholding Turkish laicism. On the one hand, certain kinds of religious organizations and social movements in the civil sphere are expressly proscribed, most notably the centuries-old Sufi tarekat, or Sufi orders. On the other hand Islamic belief and practice are actively encouraged and supported through state agencies. Religious education, through the Imam Hatip Schools is directly controlled by the state through the Department of Religious Affairs. This department oversees the training of state imams and issues the official Friday sermon which is to be read in every mosque across Turkey. It also directs an extensive programme of providing fatwa, or authoritative religious rulings, on all manner of issues relating to Islam and modern life (Yilmaz, 2005a: 390–2). Modern Turkish secularism has proven broadly popular. The overwhelming majority of modern Turks, including the majority of practicing, socially conservative, Muslims, have no desire for Turkey to become an Islamic state. Nevertheless, there are, broadly speaking, two communities that have expressed a degree of concern with, or opposition to, the state’s control of religious life. The first and largest is the broad community of traditional Sufistic Anatolian Muslims from the hundreds of villages, towns and small cities across the interior of rural Turkey. Socially conservative, deeply religious and constituting a large portion of all Turkish citizens these ‘Anatolian Muslims’ had little reason to concern themselves with disputing Turkish laicism when they were living in small rural communities. In recent decades, however, tens of millions of these people have moved to Istanbul, Turkey’s mega-metropolis, to Ankara, the capital of the republic, and to the large cities on the Mediterranean coast like Izmir, bringing with them their traditional styles of dress and ways of living

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to the burgeoning, semi-planned seas of high-density suburbs ringing the old urban centres. Inevitably, there is a degree of friction between the two cultures: the culture of cosmopolitan urbanites and the culture of the recently arrived from the Anatolian interior. The former are accustomed to religion being a largely private affair, the latter experience it as the glue that holds communities together. Many of these new settlers were previously drawn to the earlier Islamist parties, such as the Welfare Party of former prime minister, Erbakan. In recent years, and in much greater numbers, they have been attacked to the post-Islamist phenomenon of Prime Minister Erdog˘an Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP or, in English, Justice and Development Party). No doubt part of the appeal of these parties is their advocacy of a more flexible approach to secularism combined with their empathy for Anatolian Islam. A large part of their appeal, however, is likely to lie in the perception that they are advocates for the interests of the working and lower-middle classes. The second community that is uncomfortable with Turkish laicism is comprised of the very much smaller number of people who are drawn explicitly to the ideology of Islamism. Ironically, the Islamists share with the hard line Kemalists the conviction that the state can shape and direct religious practice and belief through the application of law and the control of key institutions. Like the Kemalists they not only believe that this is possible but they also believe that it is desirable (naturally, however, they have very different views of what role religion should play in public life). This means that the Islamists have focused their long-term efforts on achieving political power in order to be able to use the state mechanisms of law and institutions to create a more Islamic nation and society.

3.  Fethullah Gülen on Islam, secularism and democracy Fethullah Gülen (b. 1941), and those who lead the movement that puts his ideas into practice, is openly and consistently critical of Islamism. Gülen’s critique of Islamism is deeply rooted in a progressive understanding of Islam that emphasizes rationality and open-minded enquiry marked by tolerance of difference and pluralism and a deep love for humanity. Indeed, from the mid-1990s onwards, the emphasis on tolerance and the practice of dialogue evolved to assume central importance in the thinking of Fethullah Gülen and the work of the movement (see Agai, 2003: 64–5). Given his deeply religious, socially conservative, rural background, and the fact that he continues to faithfully hold to a conventional Hanafi/Sunni

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orthodox position in matters of theology, it is remarkable just how broad Fethullah Gülen’s vision has become (Özdalga, 2005: 441). Inspired by Said Nursi, Gülen has long been optimistic about the potential for Muslims to work together with the People of the Book – as Jews and Christians are traditionally recognized to be. Writing more recently Gülen implies a respectful appraisal of earlier prophetic books and their adherents well beyond the understanding of most conservative Islamic scholars when he remarked: Regardless of how their adherents implement their faith in their daily lives, such generally accepted values as love, respect, tolerance, forgiveness, mercy, human rights, peace, brotherhood, and freedom are all values exalted by religion. Most of these values are accorded the highest precedence in the messages brought by Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, upon them be peace, as well as in the messages of Buddha and even Zarathustra, Lao-Tzu, Confucius, and the Hindu prophets. (Gülen, 2004c: 75–6) As a progressive thinker Gülen believes that the future can be better than the past and that rather than wistfully looking back to a forever lost ‘golden age’, Muslims, together with other people of good will, should work to achieve societies that are increasingly more just, compassionate and decent. This progressive outlook lies at the heart of the movement’s focus on education and the development of individual potential through learning and discipline. For Gülen secular democracy represents the best and only appropriate approach to governance in the modern state. He argues that while the Qur’an and the Sunnah speak clearly of religious values that should be reflected and upheld in the state they do not contain a blueprint for politics: Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstances. (Gülen, 2001a: 134) While critical of the positivist aspects of Turkish laicism Gülen is very clear that secularity itself is does not present an obstacle to the practice of Islam: [I]f secularity is understood as the state not being founded on religion, hence it does not interfere with religion or religious life; and as the faithful living his religion does not disturb others; and furthermore if the state will accomplish this task in a serious neutrality, then there is no problem. (Armag˘an and Ünal, 1999: 108, quoted in Altinoglu, 1999: 103)

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Gülen contrasts the Anglo-Saxon approach to ‘passive secularism’ with the interventionist approach of hyper-secularists in Turkey acting in the name of Kemalism. The neutral or passive secularism that emerged in Britain, he argues, is in fact entirely compatible with Islam (Yilmaz, 2000: 5). The logical consequence of this is the legislative function of the state can, as is the case in Britain, draw on religious values and principles while remaining secular, and that far from such an approach being at odds with Islam it is congruent with historical Islam: In Islam, the legislative and executive institutions have always been allowed to make laws. These are based on the needs and betterment of society and within the frame of general norms of law. On domestic issues in the Islamic community and its relationship with other nations, including economic, political and cultural relations, Muslims have always developed laws. The community members are required to obey the laws that one can identify as ‘higher principles’ as well as laws made by humans. Islam has no objection to undertaking ijtihad (independent reasoning), istinbat (deductive reasoning), and istikhraj (derivation) in the interpretation of Shari’ah principles. (Gülen, 2005d: 450) While Islam speaks of clear principles and values and what is expected from the state it does not, Gülen, argues, offer a detailed prescription of how the state should be run: On the issue of Islam and democracy, one should remember that the former is a divine and heavenly religion, while the latter is a form of government developed by humans. The main purposes of religion are faith (iman), servanthood to God (ubudiyyah), knowledge of God (ma“rifah), and beautiful actions (ihsan). The Qur’an, in its hundreds of verses, invites people to the faith and worship of the True (al-Haqq). It also asks people to deepen their servanthood to God in a way that they may gain the consciousness of ihsan. ‘To believe and do good deeds,’ is among the subjects that Qur’an emphatically stresses. It also frequently reminds people that they must develop a conscious relationship with God and act as if they see God, or as if they are seen by God. (Gülen, 2005d: 451–2) Gülen argues throughout Islamic history there has been a wide range of approaches to politics. The contemporary Islamist approach to advocating a singular form of governance represents a misunderstanding of what Islam teaches about governance: In Islam it is not possible to limit the concept of governance and politics into a single paradigm, unlike the principles of faith and the pillars of

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Islam. History shows us that in the Islamic world, since the time of the Prophet, there have been many types of states. This is so even if we exclude the elections in the early period of Islam and the qualities that were exhibited in those elections. Even if one cannot see some major methodological differences among these types of governance, there are many differences in the details. Those who are not aware of the principles of these different methods of governing have understood each of them as a separate system. I have to note that these differences were the result of the aspects of religion that are open to interpretation and related to the field of independent reasoning (Ijtihad). (Gülen, 2005d: 454) In Gülen’s understanding the principles of free will and individual responsibility must inform our understanding of governance and the state: Islam considers a society to be composed of conscious individuals equipped with free will and having responsibility toward both themselves and others. Islam goes a step further by adding a cosmic dimension. It sees humanity as the ‘motor’ of history, contrary to fatalistic approaches of some of the nineteenth century Western philosophies of history such as dialectical materialism and historicism. Just as every individual’s will and behavior determine the outcome of his or her life in this world and in the hereafter, a society’s progress or decline is determined by the will, worldview, and lifestyle of its inhabitants. The Koran (13:11) says: ‘God will not change the state of a people unless they change themselves [with respect to their beliefs, worldview, and lifestyle].’ In other words, each society holds the reins of its fate in its own hands. The prophetic tradition emphasizes this idea: ‘You will be ruled according to how you are.’ This is the basic character and spirit of democracy, which does not conflict with any Islamic principle. As Islam holds individuals and societies responsible for their own fate, people must be responsible for governing themselves. (Gülen, 2006a: 16) While Gülen argues that, in this modern age, democracy represents the most appropriate form of politics he cautions against a simplistic majoritarian approach to majority rule. Conscious of the fact that some democratic Islamists aspire to using legislative power to impose their understanding of religion and personal piety on the whole of society he asserts that freedom of belief is, in fact, an Islamic concept. Throughout his public career he has consistently spoken out in defence of the religious, cultural and political rights of minorities: Members of minority communities should be allowed to live according to their beliefs. If these sorts of legislations are made within the norms of

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international law and international agreements, Islam will have no objection to any of these. No one can ignore the universal values that the Qur’an and the Sunnah have presented with regard to the rights mentioned above. (Gülen, 2005d: 451) Gülen frequently endorses democracy specifically, arguing that it is the most appropriate form of government for the modern period and one that is entirely compatible with Islam: Democracy and Islam are compatible. Ninety-five per cent of Islamic rules deal with private life and the family. Only 5 per cent deals with matters of the state, and this could be arranged only within the context of democracy. If some people are thinking of something else, such as an Islamic state, this country’s history and social conditions do not allow it . . . Democratization is an irreversible process in Turkey. (Gülen in Sabah, 27 January 1995, quoted in Yavuz, 2003a: 28) Given his support for European-style democracy it is not surprising that his critics have styled Gülen as being pro-Western. In many respects this is label that he happily accepts. In concrete policy terms he has consistently advocated in favour of Turkey’s accession to the European Union (see Ünal and Williams, 2000: 189 and Weller in Chapter 7 of this book): Gülen’s pro-Western attitude has played a key role in the domestication and softening of other Islamist groups’ anti-Europe and anti-U.S. positions. Although many Islamists eventually came closer to embracing this idea, a majority of them initially criticized Gülen for his pro-Europe views. He was one of the first Islamic leaders to embrace the idea of EU membership and at a time when Islamists in general regarded it as a threat to Turkish security and Islamic culture. (Kosebalaban, 2003: 176)

4.  Gülen’s ultimate concern Paul Tillich, the influential Protestant theologian and philosopher of religion coined the term ‘ultimate concern’  – to describe that which becomes the guiding principle, for better or worse, consciously or unconsciously, in the life of an individual and a community: ‘Whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him . . . and conversely, it means that a man can be concerned ultimately only about that which is good for him’ (Tillich, 1951: 211). Gülen’s ultimate concern revolves around the development of character, serving the public, and living with an awareness of the brevity of this life alongside the

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life to come, and seeking to please God in all that we do in the time that is given to us on earth. For Gülen, living to please God can be summed up as living to serve others. Gülen is generally seen to draw directly on the intellectual heritage of the influential and greatly loved Sufi scholar and writer Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (see Yavuz and Esposito, 2003a: xxvii–xxviii; Yavuz, 2003b: 1–18; Yavuz, 2003a: 19–47; and Kuru, 2003: 118–19). Indeed, an examination of Gülen’s writing reveals it to be substantially built upon the foundation laid by Nursi (d. 1960), who drew upon the great Anatolian Sufi Mevlana Jalal ad-Din Rumi (d. 1276) and the Indian writers Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi (1564–1624) and Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (1703–62) among others (Saritoprak and Griffith, 2005: 331–2). Members of the Gülen movement, like hundreds of thousands of other admirers of Nursi, meet regularly to read and discuss his multi-volume thematic commentary on the Qur’an, the Risale-i Nur, or Treatise of Light. For this reason the Gülen movement is often seen to represent a significant component of the broader so-called Nurcu movement. Gülen is not, however, simply a follower of Nursi. Rather he is a significant thinker, writer and leader in his own right. Much of Gülen’s work essentially takes the form of a synthesis, rearticulation or fresh application of the earlier work of Nursi and others and, like Nursi and many other Islamic scholars, Gülen frequently returns in his writing to the lived example of the Prophet Muhammad for inspiration and direction. There are, nevertheless, several significant areas where Gülen is a thinker and leader of striking originality and innovation. In general terms Gülen, like Nursi before him, can be described as a Sufi and his thinking is richly infused with Sufi imagery, values and ideas, including most notably the focus on the heart  – the inward being  – the seat of both wisdom and spirituality. Growing up in the small village of Korucuk, Gülen, however, was not a traditional Sufi and does not align with any particular Sufi order, or tarekat, rather he is, in the evocative formulation of Zeki Saritoprak, ‘a sufi in his own way’ (see Saritoprak, 2003: 156–69; Michel, 2005: 341–58). A disciplined child growing up in a pious household Gülen came to religious life at an early age. He recalls that he ‘began praying when I was four years old and never missed a prayer since.’ (Gülen in Kurtz, 2005: 375). As was the case with many village boys Gülen was first taught to recite the Qur’an by his mother, Rafi’a, and by his father, Ramiz Efendi, who taught him Persian as well as Arabic. It was only later, at the age of ten, that he sat under the tutelage of his first formal teacher, Muhammad Lufti Efendi (d.1954) who soon succeeded in helping him commit the entire Qur’an to memory (Saritoprak and Griffith, 2005: 360). Significantly, Lufti Efendi, a well-regarded Sufi poet and teacher, was a member of the Qadiri order while Ramiz Efendi was a member of the Naqshbandi order, these orthodox Shari’a-oriented Sufi orders being popular in rural Turkey at the time.

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One of the areas where Gülen has made the greatest contribution to developing Islamic thought is in his exploration of learning. Gülen is a passionate advocate of learning in the broadest sense in every field of enquiry and dialogue. This is reflected both in the movement’s direct engagement with educational initiatives and with a wide range of media and publishing initiatives designed to inform and engage. Not surprisingly, given that it is a deeply religious movement, the hizmet does undertake a significant amount of activity relating directly to religious teaching and encouragement. Indeed the movement’s origins are rooted in the regular reading group meetings focusing on Said Nursi’s Risale-i Nur referred to above. In most Nurcu communities these reading groups are known as dershane but in the Gülen community they are referred to as isik evler, or ‘lighthouses’. Fethullah Gülen trained as an official state imam in an Imam Hatip – an Islamic college run by the Department of Religious Affairs for the training of imams. His first appointment as an imam began in 1966 in the large, cosmopolitan, city of Izmir on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Gülen formally retired from the Department of Religious Affairs in 1981. In the late 1960s Gülen established several isik evler in Izmir. These grew steadily in number through the 1970s in Izmir and Istanbul and became the nucleus for the movement. In Izmir Gülen was attached to the Kestanepazari Qur’anic School. From this base he was able to build a circuit of regular talks in coffeehouses, community centres, private homes and mosques in an around Izmir (see Yavuz, 2003a: 20).

5.  The movement and education In the field of learning the Gülen movement is best known for its loosely connected network of more than 1000 modern secular private schools and dozens of universities that sprung up across Turkey and throughout Central Asia and around the world (see Agai, 2003: 48–68; Michel, 2003: 69–84; and Özdalga, 2003: 85–114) since beginning in 1983 with one school in Izmir and another in Istanbul (Kuru, 2003: 116). In addition to these schools there are also a handful of well-regarded secular colleges and a number of universities such as Fatih University in Istanbul. The schools, many of which have been deliberately established in some of the poorest and most needy parts of the word, are generally very well regarded and achieve a high standard of scholastic achievement in neighbourhoods, districts and nations not normally accustomed to excellence in education. What makes them so remarkable in the context of the Muslim world is their commitment to secular modern learning open to students of all backgrounds. Regardless of the nation in which they operate and the legislation that

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pertains to religious instruction in schools, the schools consistently adhere to a secular curriculum. Where the state mandates an hour per week of religious instruction, as is the case in Turkey, the movement schools, of course, comply, but otherwise the schools are as at least as secular in their teaching programme and formal orientation as contemporary mainstream denomination Christian schools. In this regard they are very much like modern Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist or Catholic schools and as such they do not have the overtly religious character of many independent Christian or Jewish schools. There is no shortage of Islamic leaders calling for the construction of a new mosque in their neighbourhood. There are precious few such leaders, however, who urge their supporters to build schools rather than mosques and then not necessarily in their own neighbourhood but in foreign societies, to the benefit of both non-Muslim and Muslim students. However, although the Gülen movement is becoming increasingly well known outside Turkey for its schools and passion for education these schools are only one part of the movement’s activism.

6.  The movement and the media From its earliest days the movement has been involved with writing and publishing. The movement’s first magazine was Sızıntı, a Turkish magazine which was launched in the early 1980s and is a popular publication directed towards a lay audience and intended to promote discussion and learning about science. It aims to foster interest in science and to demonstrate that rational scientific enquiry and religious faith are not incompatible. Sızıntı was joined several years later by the English language publication, Fountain, edited in Istanbul and printed in New Jersey and aimed at fostering a general interest in religion and spirituality. The articles in Fountain deal mostly, but not exclusively, with Islam and generally reflect a tolerant, Sufistic orientation and a modern articulation of traditionalist Islam. A sister publication of Fountain, Dialogue (formed in Australia, in 2004, by Dialogue Australia Asia) was established specifically to encourage inter-religious dialogue. The magazines Sızıntı, Fountain and Dialogue represent modern religious magazines in the style of many contemporary Christian publications, such as The Catholic World Report, Christianity, The Christian Century, Christianity Today, Guideposts and World. If they represented the movement’s primary ventures in journalism and media this aspect of movement’s activities would still warrant serious study but as will be seen below there is much more to the movement’s publishing activities than just ‘religious publishing’. The moderate and generally inclusive approach to discussion of spirituality and

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modern life of these religious magazines would suggest that the religious character of the movement is comparable to that of the mainstream Christian denominations in the West. These publications portray a religious movement that is socially and doctrinally conservative yet clearly not fundamentalist in the manner of America’s Christian right or its Islamist analogues in the Muslim world. The writings dealing with patterns of religious devotion and practice reveal a traditionalist orientation that shares common characteristics with traditional Catholicism in terms of reverence for places, peoples and events. At the same time the movement’s character is clearly forward looking: optimistic about the future and the opportunities presented by modernity, and keen to adapt and contribute. In these publications there is a general sense of the sort of values and principles associated with American civil religion, the humanitarianism and ‘common decency’ of America’s mid-west and the world of Norman Rockwell that is also manifested in secular magazines such as Reader’s Digest, one of America’s bestselling consumer magazines. Alongside of these religious magazines the movement has published hundreds of books with explicitly religious themes. Isik Publishing, the Istanbul-based publishing house behind Fountain magazine is responsible for most of the Gülen movement’s religious book publishing. The heart of its catalogue consists of works by Said Nursi, most notably the Risale-i Nur, and Fethullah Gülen. Together with these are studies of Gülen’s thought and devotional works dealing with the life of the Prophet Muhammad and with Ottoman religious life. In certain respects Isik Publishing is comparable to American Christian publishing houses such as Eerdmans, Intervarsity Press, Loyola Press Thomas Nelson and Zondervan. Although these religious publications, both magazines and books, represent a vitally important aspect of the movement’s in terms of broad circulation and, arguably, of influence, the movement’s wide-ranging initiatives in secular media are even more important. And it is these publications which represent some of the most remarkable aspects of the movement’s activism. Here it becomes much more difficult to make comparisons with Western Christian movements. The Gülen movement really began to ‘go public’ following the 1980 coup and the rise of the moderate, centrist, government of Turgut Ozal in 1982. Remarkably, beginning in the early 1980s, this civil sphere activism was manifested as much, or more, in secular initiatives as it was in conventional religious initiatives such as those in religious publishing noted above. Apart from the schools themselves, these secular activities were, and are, mostly defined by initiatives in intellectual inquiry and dialogue, taking the form of newspapers, current affairs magazines, television and radio stations and dialogue-orientated NGOs. Alongside these secular initiatives is another kind of activism involving the development of loose networks of businessmen and

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associated institutions in finance and banking including the business network TUSKON and the bank Bank Asya (Yavuz, 2003a: 36–7). The latter are vital in producing support for the school network but the media ventures themselves are self-financing businesses in themselves. One of the first initiatives on this front was the launching of the daily national newspaper Zaman in Istanbul (Yavuz, 2003a: 36). Zaman was founded in 1986 and quickly established a reputation for comprehensive, objective reporting directed by an editorial position that was perceived to be neutral and, unlike virtually every other major newspaper at the time, not aligned to any particular political camp or ideological position. In a market marked by overtly partisan periodicals, Zaman was welcomed by readers seeking reliable reporting of current affairs and professional journalistic standards. Some of Zaman’s writers take an overtly socially conservative stance on the issues that they write about but others are regarded as being relatively liberal and progressive. From its inception Zaman was intended to be a ‘newspaper of record’ along the lines of London’s The Times, and The Guardian, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Times of India, Karachi’s Dawn, and Indonesia’s Kompas. Apart from striving for objective and professional journalism Zaman is remarkable for its cutting-edge approach to developing the business of newspaper publishing. Zaman launched its online edition in 1996. In doing this, it placed itself in an elite group of newspapers worldwide that made the move to cyberspace when usage of the internet was only just beginning. The ‘internet’ had only began to be widely known by that name in 1996. Version 1.0 of Mosaic (the world’s first widely used web browser) had been released only in 1993 and it was only by the end of 1994 that public interest in the internet could be said to have begun to spread beyond the technical and academic communities. Within several years of its establishment in Istanbul Zaman opened operations in four other Turkish cities and began producing regional editions outside Turkey. Today regional editions are printed and distributed in Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, Kazakhstan, Kyrghizistan, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and the United States. Zaman also produces special international editions in local languages in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Zaman also employs a remarkably complete array of foreign correspondents and stringers across the world, as reflected in its extensive reporting on world affairs. Zaman is assisted in maintaining this bread of coverage though its association with its sister company CHA, one of Turkey’s largest news agencies. Both Zaman and CHA are under the control of Feza Publications Incorporated which also has within it the well-regarded weekly news magazine Aksiyon along with Sızıntı and the theological journal Yeni Umit. The CHA stable of print publications are acknowledged as being linked to the Gülen movement but are remarkable not just for their professionalism but

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also for their non-sectarian outlook. In this respect they have few parallels in the world of Christian media. In some ways Zaman could be compared, for example, with the Church of England Newspaper. But unlike Zaman the venerable Newspaper, which has been published since 1828, is largely concerned with matters relating to its particular religious community. So too, to a greater or lesser extent, is the case with the other Christian newspapers and magazines mentioned above. Contemporary Christian media in the English-speaking world, with a few notable exceptions, such as the Christian Science Monitor and some recent developments in radio and new media, tends to be inward looking and primarily concerned with explicitly religious issues. The closest parallel to Zaman is probably the Christian Science Monitor. Founded in 1879, in Boston, Massachusetts, by Mary Eddy Baker, The Church of Christ, Scientist, is a relatively small Christian denomination (its membership is thought to number no more than several hundred thousand) that sits uneasily on the outside of ‘mainstream’ Protestantism. With its unusual emphasis on spiritual healing through prayer and the ultimate ‘unreality’ of sin, disease and death the church has been viewed with suspicion by many mainstream Christians since its earliest days. It was partly because of this and related general disillusionment with mainstream media that in 1908 Baker launched the Christian Science Monitor as a daily newspaper (published Monday through Friday) intended ‘to injure no man, but to bless all mankind’. From these unlikely beginnings and despite its name the Monitor has become a highly regarded reporter of American and international affairs, winning many plaudits, including seven Pulitzer prizes. The only indications of its religious connections are a single daily religious feature page (‘The home forum’) and a general avoidance of issues relating to medicine and disease. Zaman and its sister CHA publications compare very favourably with the Christian Science Monitor in every respect, and arguably exceed it in several important respects, such as the breadth of outlook displayed by its editorial staff. Like the Monitor, Zaman was quick to take advantage of the internet, launching its first online presence before the Monitor. Unlike the Monitor, however, Zaman and its CHA stable mates have met with consistently strong commercial success. While the Monitor has struggled for years to expand circulation and turn a profit, Zaman has gone from strength to strength. It is likely that one reason for the greater success of Zaman compared with the Monitor is that the latter was merely adding one more quality newspaper to a market already well served with such publications, Zaman was filling a hitherto unmet demand for objective, professional, non-partisan reporting and analysis. It is likely that this also is the reason that the Gülen movement has succeeded, where the Monitor found it more challenging, in expanding into electronic media.

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Samanyolu Television was launched in January 1993. The initiative represented a financial gamble at a time when private television programming was dominated by tabloid reporting and entertainment with poor production values and sensationalist content. Like the CHA print publications, Samanyolu set out to provide non-sectarian, largely secular content of a high standard. The product soon found a market and the rather undercapitalized venture steadily consolidated its market position and commercial viability. Samanyolu came to achieve the sort of quality in programming for which the BBC (the British Broadcasting Commission) in Britain, PBS (the Public Broadcasting Service) in America and the ABC (the Australian Broadcasting Commission) are well regarded. Unlike the BBC, PBS and the ABC, however, Samanyolu remains an entirely commercial venture, albeit one driven by a similar philosophy of striving for quality and thoughtful programming in both current affairs and in popular entertainment, including drama production and general interest documentary and lifestyle programmes.

7.  The movement and the Abant Platforms A separate, but related aspect of the movement’s activities is found in the Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi, or JWF) established in 1994. This very influential NGO goes beyond straightforward journalistic reporting and analysis to support strategic public intellectual initiatives in the promotion of dialogue. One of the Foundation’s most important activities is the hosting of a high-level annual summer dialogue forum known as the Abant Platform (named after the lakeside location of its early annual meetings) designed to bring together disparate elements of the political and cultural elite to talk face to face about issues of pressing national importance. Each Abant Platform produces an Abant Declaration summing up the issues discussed. The first Abant Platform was held in July 1998 on the theme of ‘Islam and Secularism’. The 1998 Abant Declaration, Ihsan Yilmaz observed: attempts to redefine the meaning of laicism in accordance with the way it is practiced in Anglo- Saxon cultures. Moreover the Declaration reinterprets Islamic theology to respond to modern challenges. It was underscored in the declaration that revelation and reason do not conflict; individuals should use their reason to organize their social lives; the state should be neutral on beliefs and faiths prevalent in society; governance of the state cannot be based on the dominance of one religious tradition; secularism should expand individual freedoms and rights and should not exclude any person form the public sphere. (Yilmaz, 2005a: 400)

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Subsequent Abant Platforms dealt with the related themes of ‘Religion and State Relations’ (July 1999), ‘Islam and Democracy’ (July 2000) and ‘Pluralism’ (July 2001). In April 2004 the JWF took the Abant Platform offshore to America and held a successful forum meeting at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC around the theme of Islam and Democracy (Saritoprak, 2005: 423). Subsequently the Abant Platform has also met in Brussels, Paris and Cairo and has planning for an ongoing series of international meetings (see Chapter 3 of this book by Ugur for more details of the Abant Platform).

8.  Kimse Yok Mu Over the past decade Gülen and the movement has become increasingly aware of the need to provide practical help to those in need, particularly in a time of crisis. In 2004 the movement launched a significant new venture, the relief and development charity: Kimse Yok Mu (in Turkish this translates as ‘Is anybody there?’). Growing out of a popular programme on Samanyolu television of the same name Kimse Yok Mu has now become a major initiative of the movement around the world. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss this in detail but in Chapter 13 of this book Özcan Keleş sets out the history and philosophy behind this new venture.

9.  The movement: Parallels and distinctiveness When compared with Islamic movements across the Muslim world the Gülen movement is without equal with the possible exception of Indonesian organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. But on certain fronts – including in particular the media – even these much larger institutions are not a match for the Gülen movement. Leaving aside the movement’s unmatched endeavours in the realm of modern media, in many respects the closest parallels to the Gülen movement are found not in the civil sphere of the Muslim world but rather in the Western Hemisphere in contemporary and early modern Christian civil society movements and organizations. The reasons for this appear to be bound up with the existence of certain social needs in modern Turkish society and the opportunities to meet them that have arisen over the past three decades. Just as importantly, however, is the fact that Fethullah Gülen and his movement share a similar philosophical approach to science and learning. The statements from Gülen that follow below could just as easily have come from John Wesley or Jonathan Edwards or any

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number of Jesuit brothers. They reflect a central theme in Gülen’s thought: that spiritual development must be matched with intellectual development and the life of the mind must be partnered with that of the heart: Neglect of the intellect . . . would result in a community of poor, docile mystics. Negligence of the heart or spirit, on the other hand, would result in crude rationalism devoid of any spiritual dimension . . . It is only when the intellect, spirit and body are harmonized, and man is motivated towards activity in the illuminated way of the Divine message, that he can become a complete being and attain true humanity. (Gülen, 2001b: 105–6) For Gülen intellectual development is essential to achieving human potential but it needs to be accompanied with a generous outlook and a heart for service to society: A person is truly human who learns and teaches and inspires others. It is difficult to regard as fully human someone who is ignorant and has no desire to learn. It is also questionable whether a learned person who does not renew and reform oneself so as to set and example to others is fully human. (Gülen, 1999, quoted in Michel, 2003: 79) Gülen argues that science and religion are not rivals but rather essential partners, and a well-rounded individual needs to cultivate knowledge and understanding in both fields: Scientific knowledge without religion usually causes atheism or agnosticism, while religious knowledge without intellectual enlightenment gives rise to bigotry. When combined, they urge a student to research further and further research, deepening in both belief and knowledge. (Gülen, 1997: 302) Hakan Yavuz (2003a: 26) observes that for Gülen true religion must involve service to others. Knowledge by itself is meaningless without application: Gülen’s conception of identity and morality are interconnected but do not form a self-contained or closed system. Morality translates into identity through conduct and collective action, so acting and engaging in the public and private spheres are part of building the moral self. In short, morality and identity must be put into practice and reinterpreted on the basis of new challenges. ‘Islam by conduct’ (hizmet and himmet) and ‘Islam by product’ (eser) are the two key concepts of the Gülen movement.

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Because, for Gülen, Islam is the constitution of morality and identity, he stresses the role of education in the cultivation of the self. His education project is based on three principles: cultivation of ethics, teaching of science and self-discipline. In his faith-inspired education project, morality and discipline consist of sacrifice, responsibility to others, hard work and idealism. In fact this religiously motivated global education movement is a way of bringing God back to one’s life through the ethic of self-sacrifice and hard work. Gülen constantly reminds Muslims that avoiding sin is not enough; rather, engaging in service to a create a more human world is also required. Salvation means not only to be ‘saved from’ sinful activities but also to be engaged actively in the improvement of the world (Yavuz, 2003a: 26). Fethullah Gülen can be truly said to be ‘preaching by example’ and, on the front of social activism, and supporting the greater good through learning and the pursuit of knowledge, his example is one that speaks loudly not just to the Muslim world but also to the West in forms that all can understand.

2 From Gandhi to Gülen: The Habitus of Non-Aggressive Action Mustafa E. Gürbüz and Bandana Purkayastha

1.  Hizmet and satyagraha

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n Mohandas Gandhi’s terminology truth (satya) entails love, which should engender firmness and dedication (agraha). Gandhi’s philosophy of satyagraha refers to the ‘dedication for a good cause’. This chapter compares the Gülen movement’s philosophy of action, hizmet, with the notion of satyagraha. Both hizmet and satyagraha define collective action in a similar vein. First, they are based on the assumption that truth and love have transforming power. Thus, movement activists focus on attributes rather than a physically objectified enemy. Second, the social movement success is not defined in terms of cost-benefit calculations; rather, success is seen as cooperating with opponents to meet a just end that opponents are unwittingly obstructing. Third, both hizmet and satyagraha are based on means and ends being inseparable in collective action. Therefore, use of violent, coercive, unjust means is totally rejected. In what follows, we discuss how Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus provides useful tools to enhance social movement theory, especially in conceptualizing the link between identity and strategy. Then, drawing from

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the examples of the Gandhian Chipko movement and the Gülen movement, we explore habitus of non-aggressive collective action.

2.  Cartesian approaches to collective action and conceptualizing activist cultures A Cartesian dualism that suggests a false dichotomy imposed on reason and emotion still prevails in social movement studies. The separation of reason from emotion, however, is not value-neutral; instead, research on the emotionality of social movement participants is discredited at the expense of conceptualizing the world in alternative ways (Ferree, 1992: 41–2). Rational choice theory a priori assumes that unemotional calculation is the preferred mode of collective action, and therefore the identities and interests of social movement activists are given. This structuralist bias is most explicit in the explanation of collective identity in the rational choice perspective: ‘Collective identities function as selective incentives motivating participation’ (Friedman and McAdam, 1992: 157). Reduced to ‘incentives’, collective definitions of social actors are reified to define a set of preferences in the rational decision-making process. In this framework, the determinants of collective identity such as emotions, values, ideas, and shared meanings are considered as incentives to motivate people; they do not constitute the structure. Contrary to Cartesian theories of collective action, Polletta (1999b) argues that collective identities and shared meanings should be conceptualized as significant elements of political structures since they guide not only the actions of activist challengers but also the institutional arrangements in society. In fact, the neo-Marxist approaches have long been interested in the linkage between shared meanings and political/material structure. Yet, shared meanings have not been systematically assessed as a constitutive factor in shaping material structures in the literature. As Tarrow puts it (1992: 186): [T]he problem is wrongly posed if we begin by claiming that ideology didn’t matter to earlier students of movements and that to us it does. The real problem is not that earlier students didn’t recognize the importance of ideation but that they concentrated only on what they could see – the grievances, demands, and symbols put forward by social movement organizations in actual mobilization campaigns – and left to one side the vague and evanescent factors that link these symbols to their societies. Since mentalities and political cultures are seldom visible in the actions of collective actors, there was little attempt to study them systematically or to link them to the strategies and successes of social movements.

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Following Tarrow’s claim, we might argue that supra-rationalist attitudes of certain social movements have been discredited in the literature because there has been little research interest in linking collective identities of the actors with the strategies and successes of the movement activism. How should we understand, for example, the Gandhian Chipko movement’s commitment to non-violent resistance and/or the Gülen movement’s emphasis on altruistic action? If we explain these movements through either their humane philosophies or environmental factors, that is, political opportunity structures, we might easily fall into the trap of what Melucci (1988) calls an ‘actor without action’. Explaining these movements by pure factuality of collective action in historical retrospect, on the other hand, also misleads us to emphasize ‘action without an actor’, which refers to ‘an accidental sum of individual events’ (Melucci, 1988: 329). Therefore, we need to theorize the complex relationships and the processes in the Chipko and the Gülen movements in order to assess the ‘actor with action’. Given the idealistic views of these two social movements, we might ask how activists produce and develop the shared meanings in such a way that the identities of the actors in the movements become strategically constructed. Investigating an identity-strategy link would provide an insight into how mentalities and values are interlinked with the strategies and successes of the social movements. In the next sections, a brief overview of the social movement literature is followed by an examination of the cases of the Gandhian Chipko movement and the Gülen movement.

3.  Identities and strategies in action Recent works on social movements have criticized the long-standing tradition of classifying social movement types as ‘strategy-oriented’ versus ‘identity-oriented’ (Touraine, 1981; Cohen, 1985; Rucht, 1988) and ‘identity logic of action’ versus ‘instrumentalist logic of action’ (Duyvendak and Giugni, 1995) by regarding identities as a key element of a movement’s strategic and tactical repertoire (see Bernstein, 1997; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004). The bifurcation of identity versus strategy suggests the idea that some movements target the state and the economy, and thus, are ‘instrumental’ and ‘strategy-oriented’; whereas some other movements, so-called identity movements, challenge dominant cultural patterns and codes, and thus, are considered ‘expressive’ in content and ‘identity-oriented’. New social movement (NSM) theorists argue that identity movements try to gain recognition and respect by employing expressive strategies in which the movement itself becomes the message (Touraine, 1981; Cohen, 1985; Melucci, 1989, 1996).

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Criticizing these dualisms, some scholars indicate the possibility of different social movement behaviour in the light of different contextual factors (e.g. Bernstein, 1997; Katzenstein, 1998). Building on this emerging literature, this chapter suggests that identity-based movements such as the Gandhian Chipko and the Gülen movements are neither exclusively strategic nor exclusively expressive in content; instead, they are both strategic and expressive. In her article on strategies and identities in the protest movements during the 1960s, Polletta (1994) criticizes the dominant theories of social movements, which a priori assume unified common interests among challengers. Similarly, Jenkins (1983: 549) notes that ‘collective interests are assumed to be relatively unproblematic and to exist prior to mobilization.’ The dominant social movement theory approaches (such as the resource mobilization perspective and the political process paradigm) regard these problems as trivial because of their assumption that identities and framing processes can be the basis for interests and further collective action; however, these processes cannot change final social movement outcomes. Therefore, for the proponents of the mainstream theories, the identities of actors are formed in evolutionary processes in which social movements consciously frame their goals and produce relevant discourses; yet, these questions are not essential to explaining why collective behaviour occurs (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 2001; McAdam, 1982). This reductionist view of movement culture has been widely criticized (e.g. see Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Polletta, 1997, 1999a, 1999b). In fact, the debate over the emphases (interests vis-à-vis identities) is a reflection of the divergence between American and European sociological traditions. As Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 27) note, many American sociologists prioritize ‘the instrumentality of movement strategy formation, that is, on how movement organizations went about trying to achieve their goals’, whereas the majority of European scholars are particularly concerned with identity formation processes that try to explain ‘how movements produced new historical identities for society’. Although social movement theorists have recognized deficiencies within each approach, the attempts to synthesize these two traditions in the literature failed to address empirical problems and methodological difficulties. Despite their criticism of American mainstream theories for treating the collective identities as ‘given’, many leading European scholars fell into a similar trap by a priori assuming that the collective identities are socio-historical products rather than cognitive processes (see, for instance, Touraine, 1981). Over the last two decades NSM theory, which is an offshoot of European tradition, has been involved in the debate over ‘cognitive praxis’ (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991), ‘signs’ (Melucci, 1996), ‘identity as strategy’ (Bernstein, 1997),

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protest as ‘art’ (Jasper, 1997), ‘moral performance’ (Eyerman, 2006) and as ‘storytelling’ (Polletta, 2006). In general, these new formulations attempt to bring the cognitive structures of social actors and the symbolic nature of social action back into the study of collective behaviour. The cognitive structures of the actors should be considered seriously because they have a potential to change the social movement’s behaviours, tactics, strategies, timing, alliances and outcomes. This chapter aims to contribute to the growing literature on the cognitive worlds of social movement activists by examining the philosophies of the Gandhian Chipko movement and the Gülen movement.

4.  Moral performance, habitus, non-aggressive activism Both the Gandhian Chipko movement and the Gülen movement have actively engaged in non-aggressive strategies and moral performance. Ron Eyerman (2006: 201) explains the basic principle for moral performance in social movement activism in terms of the following: If the first step in dehumanization is to reduce an other to a simple phrase, an enemy, a parasite, or a terrorist, the first step in moral performance or empathy is attentiveness to the complexity of another’s status and situation, something which can be viewed as an attribution of subjectivity. This may involve seeing the other as an agent or victim of historical or natural forces and ‘forced’ to act in certain ways. Eyerman gives the example of diversification of the opposition movements in France against the French government policies during the war with Algeria between 1954 and 1962. There were two groups that opposed to French invasion: reformists and Marxists. According to the reformists, associated with L’Express, Algerian rebels were potential partners in a dialogue to renegotiate the relationship between France and a somewhat independent Algeria. On the other hand, Marxists associated with Les temps modernes viewed the rebels as historical agents of ‘world historical dimension ushering a new stage of development’, in which violence is accepted as a necessary means. Therefore, Marxists had a morally more tolerant view of the other: the Algerians (Eyerman, 2006). Eyerman’s account highlights significance of studying the relationship between social movement practices and the cognitive worlds of activists. In this sense, Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus is quite useful. According to Bourdieu (1977: 8, 95), habitus are ‘generative principles of distinct and

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distinctive practices’ that are directly linked with being immersed and imposed by a certain cultural and social norms, and thus, operate as a unifying force between ‘the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position’ and ‘a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices’. Developing a theory of praxis based on his ethnographic research in the Kabyle community in Algeria, Bourdieu (1977) calls attention to collective ‘embodiment’ processes. The principles, norms, and regular practices in social life that are ‘em-bodied’ go ‘beyond the grasp of consciousness’. The body as a memory is constructed in a way that is ‘capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 94). Bourdieu (1977: 86) argues that ‘the habitus could be considered as a subjective but not individual system of internalized structures’. Perhaps, what most makes Bourdieu’s theory relevant for a social movement analysis is his attempt to link micro system variables such as framing and cognitive schemes with macro power structures. In what follows, an explanation is offered for how the habitus of the Gandhian Chipko movement and the Gülen movement play significant role in their non-aggressive activisms.

5.  The habitus of the Gandhian Chipko movement and moral performance For Gandhi, any system that used violence, psychological or physical, blunted a society’s moral sensibility and rarely achieved lasting results. Every successful use of violence inured people to that level; increasingly large amounts of violence would be required to achieve the same results. As an alternative, Gandhi offered the idea of satyagraha, a process by which marginalized groups could confront the opponent by first trying to work out a mutually agreed solution; and, if that failed, by disobeying the law, refusing to carry out the opponent’s orders or cooperating with the opponent, including ‘patiently and uncomplainingly suffer[ing] whatever violence was done to him (. . .) [h]is opponent saw him as an enemy (. . .) he refused to reciprocate (. . .) since his sole concern was to evoke a moral response in his opponent’ (in Parekh, 1997: 55). Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violent resistance was based on a deep appreciation of the idea of the oneness/interconnectedness of the universe. Gandhi proposed that methods and means were integral parts of the objective, and thus, no action for a just society could be conducted by unjust/violent means. Non-violent means of conflict resolution (satyagraha) described above, represent the only ethical ways of resolving social inequalities. In promoting the idea of satyagraha, Gandhi rejected the abstract, rational, institutionalized violence that was employed centralized nation-states.

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Instead, Gandhi drew on ‘feminine’ principles for action in the public arena, particularly the ‘superior capacity for suffering and self-sacrifice rather than forceful intervention to protect self interests’ (Menon, 1999: 10). The two central symbols associated with Gandhi in his anti-imperialist struggle  – spinning khadi and making salt  – were quintessentially ‘domestic’ tasks. Gandhi effectively used these symbols to breach the symbolic dual spheres divide, legitimate the participation of women and other peripheral groups into the public political arena, and demonstrate a process by which marginalized people could resist psychological and political colonization in a non-violent manner. He popularized these ideas through mobilization of the masses, who, lacking weapons of violence or access to legal channels, would engage in non-cooperation as a means for expressing dissent and/or resolving conflict: ‘It has become disloyal, almost sacrilegious to say no to the government. This deliberate refusal to co-operate is like the necessary weeding processes that the cultivator has to resort before he sows’ (quoted in Bhattacharya, 1997: 26). According to Gandhi, by refusing to co-operate with marginalizing forces, by resisting without violence, and by becoming victims of state-sanctioned violence, the dissenters could wrest the moral power from the ruling elite and restore some dignity and power of their communities. The Chipko movement, which was developed in the Garhwal Himalayas in northern India, was triggered by the rapidly declining access to resources necessary for survival of the hill communities. Environmental degradation and withdrawal of lands from public use – both the creation of reserve forests by the state and appropriation by individuals – formed the context within which activists organized a movement against the state. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, swaraj and sarvodaya were part of the nationalist agenda. In the hill areas of India, the programmes to implement these ideals led to several environmental protest movements, some of which included protecting trees. Nevertheless, the name Chipko (‘cling’), is now most associated with a multi-pronged environmental movement that began in the early 1970s. The following account of the Chipko movement is gleaned primarily from the writings of Vandana Shiva (1993, 1999), Radha Kumar (1993) and Vimla Bahuguna (1990). In the first half of the twentieth century, the move of several disciples of Gandhi to the Garhwal Himalayas led to the initiation of a number of decentralized efforts to promote swaraj among the hill communities. Listening to the local folk songs that described forests with multiple species of trees, Gandhian activists started to draw explicit connections between floods, droughts, and shrinking resource base with deforestation and the spread of plantations in the hill areas. Colonial forest policy based on British needs for wood promoted both deforestation and the planting of species such as pine or eucalyptus which were ill-suited to provide fuel, soil conservation,

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flood control and resource needs of the local people. In addition, the British attempted to create reserve forests which excluded indigenous people from gathering forest resources. Similar trends were apparent after India’s independence, as the needs of the large urban centres and ‘the nation’ became more important than the needs of the local people. The social forestry programmes, with their focus on single species, single commodity production plantations, best served the needs of those within the sphere of formal markets and the money economy. Gandhian activists challenged and transformed the discourse: protecting forests was redefined as a sacred task rather than merely a rational economic activity. The Gandhian Chipko movement’s moral performance against commercial forestry, which destroyed forests and water resources in the hill areas began, in 1972, at Purola, the site of an earlier ‘anti reserve forest’ agitation. When some parts of the forests were auctioned off to private owners for lumbering, the women from the villages confronted contractors and guards. The women declared that they would literally embrace the trees and prevent them from being cut down. Offering an interesting analogy, some of the women explained that they would cling to the trees just as they would hug their children to protect them against a wild animal: by offering themselves as first victims. The movement spread across the Garhwal and Kumaon Himalayas as the news of non-cooperation filtered through the decentralized networks of the hill women. The activists organized padayatras (marches on foot) like Gandhi’s salt march, to mobilize public opinion against cutting of trees. For instance in 1975, in Reni, villagers heard that a portion of the local forest had been auctioned. The men in the village, already alerted by movement activists, decided to protest to the authorities in town. While they were away the contractor decided he would start cutting down some of the trees. He was confronted by a band of women chanting religious hymns. The women also tied sacred threads around the trees as a token vow of protection. When the contractors returned with armed police, each tree was being guarded by three volunteers. Through the 1970s, in village after village, the women faced down armed guards and legal authorities. This non-aggressive and yet powerful moral performance grew to include widespread protests against other ecological exploitation that destroyed the resource base of marginalized people to serve the interests of those at the centre. While contractors exercised legally sanctioned violence – through armed police or guards – local women used non-cooperation as a means of conflict resolution. Accused of not knowing the value of forest products, such as timber and resin, the women argued that they were very aware of resources the forests produced  – in other words soil, water and pure air. A crucial aspect of this conflict was focused on whose knowledge, ownership and

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expertise would count. The attempts at homogenization by the state meant that outside experts, outside knowledge and imported seeds devalued and replaced indigenous knowledge, local seed stocks and local expertise. The forces of centralization, as Tagore had predicted half a century earlier, directly impinged upon the freedom and rights of the local people (Purkayastha, 2002). Nevertheless by attempting to control the power of symbols and meaning making, the Chipko movement successfully created a terrain of resistance, a geographical area of contested control (Routledge, 1993). As Itwari Devi, a Chipko activist, stated: Shakti comes to us from these forests and grasslands, we watch them grow (. . .) all this gives us not just nourishment for the body but a moral strength, that we are our own masters we control and produce our wealth (. . .) our power against Gujral comes from these inner sources and is strengthened by his attempts to oppress and bully us (. . .) we have offered ourselves, even at the cost of our lives, for a peaceful protest to close this mine, to challenge and oppose the power Gujral represents. (quoted in Shiva, 1993: 250) Hence, the non-violent cognitive world of the Chipko movement embraced multiple issues relating to work and life. The relations between human beings and the environment, the separation of the secular and the spiritual – all became central issues in a movement striving for swaraj through non-cooperation. Their example inspired similar movements, among those without access to formal power in society, in places such as Karnataka, Santhal Parganas and Chattisgarh. Sarala Behn, one of the earliest organizers of rural upliftment in the Garhwal Himalayas, reflected on the Gandhian legacy in her seventy-fifth year. From my childhood experience I have known that all too often the law is not just; that principles that govern humanity are higher than those that govern the state, that a centralized government, indifferent to its peoples, is a cruel joke in governance, and that the split between public and private ethic is the source of misery, injustice, and exploitation in society. Each child understands that bread is not just a right to one who has money in his pocket. It is a fundamental right of one whose stomach is hungry. This concept of rights works within the family but is shed at the societal level. Then the ethics of the market reigns, and men get trapped in it. (quoted in Shiva, 1999: 49–50) The non-violent strategy and moral performance of the Chipko activism has attracted a great deal of attention within the ecofeminist movement. The theoretical perspectives of deep ecology and ecofeminism, which decry the

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frenetic plunder of ever more resources for ever more unequally distributed economic gain to dominate nature, is very similar to the indigenous knowledge of Chipko activists such as Itwari Devi. Although there are debates about the philosophical underpinnings of ecofeminism versus feminist environmentalism (Agarwal, 1999), the general nature of the conflict – about which groups have the right to define knowledge, access resources and garner power  – is becoming a common theme around the world. Ecology is being claimed as people’s concern, and in the process there is an attempt to link issues of health, resources, the rights of marginalized people, justice and peace in ways that challenge the current separation of these issues within nation-states and at the international level. Now, we turn to Gülen movement activists who also employed non-violent strategy in a quite different political context.

6.  The habitus of the Gülen movement and moral performance Similarly to the Gandhian Chipko activists, the praxis of Gülen movement activists has been closely linked to their cognitive world, or habitus. Unlike political Islamist movements in Turkey, Gülen activists who stay away from political Islam believe that their actual enemy is the ‘triple monster’, which was defined by Said Nursi as: (1) ignorance of the Muslims in religious as well as scientific terms; (2) poverty of the ummah, the Muslim community, in general; and (3) disunity among the believers. Indeed, the legacy of Said Nursi (see Mardin, 1989 and Abu-Rabi, 2003, 2008) is critical to understand the habitus of Gülen movement activists. In discussing these social problems in the Muslim world in particular and around the globe in general, Fethullah Gülen (1998a, 2005e) argues that they need to be addressed by means of providing service to people, which he calls hizmet. The notion of hizmet, or service, encompasses all good deeds for the benefit of the wider society and it summarizes both the ideational and practical universe of volunteer activists. Gülen (2005e: 22) calls these hizmet volunteers ‘the inheritors of the earth’, a cadre of physicians of the soul and reality whose hearts are open to all fields of all knowledge: perspicacity, culture, spiritual knowledge, inspirations and divine blessings, abundance and prosperity, enlightenment; from physics to metaphysics, from mathematics to ethics, from chemistry to spirituality, from astronomy to subjectivism, from fine arts to Sufism, from law to jurisprudence, from politics to special training of religious Sufi orders.

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Gülen also calls these volunteers ‘new humans’ (see Gülen, 1998a and Ergene 2005: 270) and employs ‘the inheritors of the earth’ concept interchangeably with some other concepts such as ‘golden generation’, ‘hero of thought and action’, and ‘devout’ (see Gülen, 2005e: 67–83, 91–7). Fethullah Gülen writes of there being a Divine mission in the course of history and explains that mission is accomplished by selfless actors he calls ‘the inheritors’ (and for Gülen’s philosophy of history, see Gülen, 2005e: 129–34). However, becoming an ‘inheritor’ does not refer to being ‘chosen by God’. Gülen specifically mentions the different ontological implications for the notions of ‘becoming’ and ‘being’, where he (Gülen, 1998a: 36) explains meaning of the following verse in the Qur’an which was translated by him as: ‘You became the best of people, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah’ (3: 110). Since becoming depends on conditions that should be fulfilled rather than being chosen a priori, we need to focus on attributes, duties and obligations. Thus, there are no God-favoured people; instead, there are God-favoured attributes. In Gülen’s philosophy of action, there is a clear emphasis on the characteristics and attributes of the inheritors. In an extensive description of the attributes of the inheritors Gülen (2005e: 31–42) highlights sincerity, loyalty and altruism as the chief characteristics of the inheritors and says: What we always emphasize is that it is those who live their lives in sincerity, loyalty, and altruism at the expense of their own selves in order to make others live who are the true inheritors of the historical dynamics to whom we can entrust our souls. (Gülen, 2005e: 95) True inheritors are those who live ‘at the expense of their own selves in order to make others live’ (Gülen, 2005e: 95). They neither claim that they are the inheritors nor ‘desire that the masses follow them’ (Gülen, 2005e: 95). Genuine ‘inheritors of the earth’ work away out of the public spotlight. The concept refers to attributes of ideal true believers who seek both material and spiritual development: To reach such a degree of spirituality and saintliness is dependent on being open to perception, logic, and reasoning, and hence to thoughts and inspiration from the Divine. In other words, it is very difficult for a person to reach this peak . . . unless experience has been sieved by the filter of the reason, and reason has surrendered to the greatest intellect and foresight of the prophets, and logic has turned completely into love, and finally love has evolved into love of God. (Gülen, 2005e: 62) Thus, Gülen movement activists have defined ‘friend-enemy’ relations in terms of clashes of ‘attributes’ rather than of ‘objects’. In other words, bad

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attributes such as egocentrism, deceitfulness and treachery that sustain the triple enemies of ignorance, poverty and disunity in Muslim world specifically, and around the globe in general can only be solved by the ‘new human’ attributes such as love, saintliness and perceptive reasoning. In this regard, in comparison with Confucius and Plato’s vision of the ideal human (see Carroll, 2007: 35–58), Gülen’s philosophy does not rest on a utopian vision; instead, it refers to a dualistic situation of an ideal activist, ‘whose world of thought stretches from the material to the immaterial, from physics to metaphysics, from philosophy to Sufism’ (Gülen, 2005e: 64). Sociologist Lester Kurtz (2005) calls it ‘Gülen’s paradox’. Gülen (in Ünal and Williams, 2000: 207) describes this paradox (emphases added by author) as the following: Using Rumi’s expression, such a person is like a compass with one foot well established in the center of belief and Islam and the other foot with people of many nations. If this apparently dualistic condition can be caught by a person who believes in God, it’s most desirable. So deep in his or her own inner world, so full of love . . . so much in touch with God; but at the same time an active member of society. The non-violent approach of Gülen movement activists has provided a strong base for their moral performance towards the secularist organized campaigns after the 1997 military intervention in Turkey, what is popularly called ‘the February 28 process’ (Taş, 2011). Unlike those involved in political Islamism, the Gülen movement activists have defined the secularist opposition as non-unified entity. Therefore, they have been eager to ally with secularist doves; while opposing secularist hawks. The interpretation of the secularist opposition as fuzzy should be understood within the larger cognitive world of the Gülen activists. Some of those who are ignorant about Islam and Muslims have been ‘victims of the historical forces’ (cf. Eyerman, 2006), who need to see the real, lovely face of Muslims. Therefore, the Gülen movement activists seek to find a middle way to gather secularists and Islamists in order to represent the all-encompassing nature of Anatolian Islam. One of the most striking examples of the Gülen movement’s moral performance was witnessed during aftermath of the crisis in 1999 when an elected deputy, Merve Kavakçı, was not allowed to take the oath of office due to her headscarf. The Kavakçı affair in the Turkish Parliament inflamed a furious historical debate over religious symbolism between the secularist elites and the Islamic groups and thus threatened the social contract of Turkish society (Gürbüz, 2009; Gürbüz and Bernstein, 2012). Pointing out the Gülen movement’s efforts for reconciliation and dialogue in the Kavakçı crisis, Gürbüz and Bernstein (2012: 87) coined the term strategic non-confrontation, which suggests the idea that ‘the avoidance of confrontation should not

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be understood as a withdrawal from activism or an abandonment of social change efforts’. As Gürbüz and Bernstein (2012: 87–8) argue, ‘nonviolent social movement strategies involve more than just protest and demonstration’ and what Gülen movement activists call müspet hareket, that is, positive action, is crucial to understand the movement’s civil society activism. Gülen movement activists believe that their müspet hareket, which is practiced through efforts for reconciliation, dialogue, and education, transforms people’s ‘everyday consciousness, practices, and the state’ (Gürbüz and Bernstein, 2012: 88).

7.  Conclusion The cognitive worlds of social movement activists matter greatly. Mainstream social movement theories often disregard cognitive and ideational accounts in order to avoid the simplistic explanation of complex human behaviour. Although this concern is understandable, a high price is paid for the lack of attention to the ideational universe of activists. Thus, the mainstream theories need to be revisited in order to explain the relationship between non-aggressive strategic action and identity making. The two cases analyzed in this chapter help to illuminate this multifaceted relationship. The habitus of Chipko and Gülen activists refer to both the ideational and the behavioural universes. Thus, processes of strategy making and identity making develop simultaneously and activists do not prioritize either one of these courses of action. For the Chipko activists, the challenge of non-violence is nurtured by the notion of satragyaha  – in other words, dedication through love. In turn, their strategy enabled them to acquire further commitment to their identities. Similarly, the emphasis of the Gülen movement activists on human attributes at the expense of objectification enables them to embrace the non-aggressive strategies of a moderate Islam even under extreme pressures. This contemporaneous and synchronized strategy and identity making in collective action needs to be further explored in future studies.

3 Organizing Civil Society: The Gülen Movement’s Abant Platform Etga Ugur

1.  Introduction

O

ne of the most important public initiatives of the Gülen movement is the Abant Platform. The Platform enables an annual meeting of around 50 intellectuals with sharply different ideological affiliations. Its intention is to incorporate different sectors of the society in discussing various social, economic and political issues. This chapter aims to scrutinize the Abant phenomenon in order to better demonstrate how the movement attempts to develop an inclusive language that transcends its religious foundations and develops strategies of coalition building. The organizational characteristics, the themes selected for meetings and the public communication tools utilized allude to the contours of the republican public sphere in the Turkey of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Abant Platform is important to study as one can make the case that it has had broader ramifications for Turkey’s civil society, surpassing the immediate agendas, objectives and interests of its founders and participants. There are two such key implications. First, the meetings have helped to soften the ideological tension and polarization in the society. Combined with

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the broader liberal turn in Turkish politics, this ‘outreach’ has, in turn, called into question the justification for the authoritarian reflexes of the Turkish state, which were manifested through domination of politics by the military and judicial bureaucracy. Thus, this chapter argues that the Abant Platform represents the rise of a ‘problem-solving civil society’ in Turkey. Moreover, the Platform indirectly contributed to a re-evaluation of the boundaries between the three domains of the public sphere by offering a much-needed ‘vertical’ dialogue and contact on concrete issues between politicians, the media and civil society groups. The combination of these two effects has given political society a context that facilitates the confident tackling of some of the chronic problems of the country, such as civilian-military relations, the Alevi and Kurdish issues, and relations with neighbouring countries. The Abant Platform has been part of a quiet but persistent civil society project, which started in the early 1990s when Fethullah Gülen openly met with prominent figures from government and politics, and gave interviews to some popular newspapers and magazines. He emphasized the significance of dialogue and tolerance between Turkey’s various ideological, religious, ethnic and political camps. Rather than denying differences, tensions and problems he proposed opening a new page in their relations with each other. The Abant Platform was one of the biggest steps in this process to institutionalize Gülen’s ideals and outlook. Beginning as a series of workshops it brought academics, politicians and intellectuals together to discuss some of the thorniest issues of, first, Turkey (such as secularism and pluralism) and then the broader Muslim world (such as war, globalization and modernization). The Platform is a major success for the Gülen movement in terms of its activities in the Turkish public sphere. The broader achievements of the Platform are threefold. First and foremost, Abant meetings are a successful attempt to build an effective coalition within civil society. In democratizing societies, cooperation within civil society becomes key in balancing the power of the state. This becomes even more important in countries that lack a pluralist conception of politics and society. Another unique feature of the Abant initiative is its religiously based inspiration and motivation. The Gülen movement is not unique in forming civil society organizations and using religion as a source of social capital. However, other religious groups mainly offer social services, such as health care, private education and food and clothing for the needy. When it comes to public policy, most religious groups act as interest groups. In other words, they take open positions on moral issues, such as social justice, war, abortion and drugs, among others. Many Christian churches in the United States participate in the democratic process, and some even hire registered lobbyists. And even when they form coalitions, such as the Christian Right and the Interfaith Alliance, they still

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retain their positions as distinct groups. The Gülen movement, in contrast, has not fervently pushed for a conservative agenda. Rather, the movement employs a strategy of first strengthening civil society, ensuring its autonomy, and then possibly pushing for specific reforms. The movement works from the position that in absence of a genuine democratic rule, specific democratic rights will be hard to achieve and retain even if there are short-term gains.

2.  Religion as a source of social capital in civil society In order to understand the involvement of religious groups in public life one needs to look at the three domains of the public sphere: the state, political society and civil society (Stepan, 1988 and 2001; Casanova, 1994). The state refers to the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system with institutions, regulations and enforcement. The state level primarily includes symbolic and legal functions. The constitution, civil service and judiciary are some examples of the contexts in which religion can work within the state apparatus. Political society is an arena in which societal groups contest to gain control over the state apparatus and to influence public policy. This contestation usually takes place through political parties, interest groups and lobbies. Many religious groups directly or indirectly become part of governing coalitions, political parties and interest groups. Civil society is made up of a body of associations, groups and organizations beyond the immediate reach and control of the state. Civil society is generally concerned with the public good, as opposed to pure economic market rationality and self-interest. Voluntary organizations and members of associational life in civil society offer social services in education, health care, gender equality, minority rights, and issue-based platforms. Religious groups choose to utilize a combination of these three domains. The specific domains used by a group depend on its world view and the cultural and political context. The Gülen movement primarily operates within civil society, and sometimes interacts with politicians in order to promote some of their objectives in civil society, such as dialogue, freedom of religion and democratization. Fethullah Gülen has always been critical of movements that used Islam as a source of political ideology and identity. He believes that such instrumentalization of Islam empties it of its spiritual and rich civilizational content. Accordingly, partisanship undermines the universality of Islam and makes it a source of conflict, rather than of cooperation or unity. Within this broad framework, the Gülen movement’s approach to politics has had two

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major aims. The first is to prevent ideological conflict and bloodshed. The second is to support political parties that are close to the centre (in practice this usually means centre-right). In order to pursue these specific objectives as well as the general welfare of the movement, Fethullah Gülen and his close friends developed cordial ties with politicians, exchanging opinions on salient issues on an ad hoc basis. The quality of public life and the performance of political institutions are significantly influenced by the norms and networks of civic engagement. Robert Putnam defines social capital as ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 1995: 67). Civic engagement facilitates communication and creates social bonds and social trust which, in turn, make collective action easier and opportunism and cheating less likely. Participation in voluntary civic associations advances the socialization of individuals and cultivates values and mores regarding communal life, such as reciprocity, trustworthiness and friendship. Engagement in civic life exposes citizens to politically relevant information and enhances their social skills (Putnam, 2000). Social capital and networks of civic engagement are crucial to creating a vibrant society with a meaningful level of dialogue. Social capital can be understood on two separate but interrelated levels. One is the individual level pertaining to the degree to which individuals are ‘community minded’ with a sense of the common good. The other level is more inter-subjective and structural, and relates to the degree of trust between individuals in a society. In a way, voluntary organizations in the civil society play an important role in transforming anonymous masses into communities, and trust ‘lubricates’ cooperation for mutual benefit (Smidt, 2003). Religion is an important source of social capital in many modern societies. Religion as a body of beliefs, values and norms motivates believers to volunteer in community affairs in order to provide social services such as health care, soup kitchens, education and helping the poor. Religion also provides a source of common identity to its followers and creates bonds between them. Obviously, religion is only one source of social capital or civic engagement, albeit an important one. So, is there anything unique about religion when it comes to generating social capital? In comparison with ‘secular’ sources, religion can be very effective in promoting a strong sense of reciprocity given its teachings about an after life and an all-seeing and omnipotent higher authority. This is important because the non-material basis of volunteering and self-sacrifice are key aspects of religious social capital. Additionally, most religions claim universal appeal, which in turn fosters a sense of common identity and purpose across ethnic, racial and economic

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classes. Some religious groups get involved in politics more directly while some others prefer to invoke ‘prophetic politics’, focusing on external critique and especially in ‘moral issues’. Also, the fact that most religions are more concerned with salvation and the world to come rather than strict definitions of worldly success makes it possible for them to take bold initiatives and politically risky ventures. Other than these concrete aspects, religion also provides a symbolic language enmeshed in the grammar of the society by speaking the language of the masses and utilizing ‘cultural capital’ (Smidt, 2003). So is religion primarily a source of conflict or cooperation in the civil society? The answer to this question depends on the way religion is used in the civic realm. Religious groups whose organizations are congregational tend to promote a more active and engaged laity than hierarchically structured groups (Harris, 2003). Religious teachings also play a role in enhancing or hindering social capital formation. Religions that emphasize the distinctiveness of their beliefs (especially the ones with an exclusivist approach to evangelism) are more likely to be inward-looking whereas religions that emphasize social justice and interfaith dialogue are more likely to work across faiths and socio-economic classes. The Gülen movement demonstrates elements of a congregational organizational structure. Although there is a core cadre of senior devotees around Fethullah Gülen who provide the inspiration and know-how to others for building schools, opening cultural centres and language courses, the bulk of the movement is on the periphery (Ebaugh, 2010; Ergil, 2010). The idea of volunteering and of committing one’s time and money plays a key role in the activities of the group. The movement employs an inclusive language vis-à-vis other religious, ethnic and ideological groups and claims to promote the religio-national interest of the host country. Thus, a key term used by the movement in Turkey is milli (national) which has both religious and national connotations, as distinct from ulusal, which has a more secular resonance. This has proved to be an important tool in appealing to the society at large and has helped the movement to overcome scepticism in relation to its social projects with regard to their commitment to the existing public culture and the political order, the movement having been criticized on a number of contradictory grounds. These include accusations of aiming to ‘infiltrate’ the system in order to create an Islamic state, but also cooperating with Christian missionaries and Jews through interfaith dialogue activities in order to undermine the Muslim identity and territorial integrity of Turkey. The Abant Platform is a good example of a religiously inspired social capital formation in a society with deep ideological, ethnic and religious fault lines. The Gülen movement has been broadly successful in utilizing its cultural and

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human capital in order to empower civil society and expand the democratic space available for the formally excluded periphery vis-à-vis the centre (Kücükcan, 2007).

3.  The Journalists and Writers Foundation: The coming of age of the Gülen movement In June 1994, the movement introduced the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) to the media in a much-publicized event. Fethullah Gülen, as the honorary president, made a rare media appearance and gave warm messages to the public, emphasizing dialogue, tolerance, pluralism and democracy. In subsequent years, the Foundation organized iftar (fast-breaking) dinners every year with participants from different walks of life and gave ‘tolerance awards’ to people who were seen as key contributors to social peace in Turkey. The JWF became a model for other ‘sister’ organizations of the movement around the world. Today, dialogue and friendship dinners and peace award ceremonies are commonly organized by many local Gülen movement affiliates in Europe, United States, Australia and elsewhere. One of the key challenges for the Gülen movement has been its public identity and representation. Under the watchful eye, and occasional repressive intervention of, the Kemalist state, the movement sustained a loosely connected network of private institutions in education, business, media and civil society. This kind of an organization both reflected the local nature of the movement and an organizational strategy. Critics of the movement often argued that the ‘community’ was not transparent and had sinister ulterior motives. One key question that aroused from this ‘transparency problematique’ was that of who spoke for the movement. The media organs, such as Zaman daily newspaper and Samanyolu TV Channel were presumed to reflect the movement’s preferences and opinions, sometimes subtle and sometimes not so subtle. Although one can draw certain conclusions from editorials and op-eds, for a long period no one ever claimed to represent the movement. Finally, as the ‘cemaat’ (community) was put on spot yet again after a prosecutor with alleged links to the movement indicted some intelligence officers from the National Intelligence Agency (MIT), the JWF (2011) published a comprehensive statement on its website addressing some very basic questions about the structure, goals and vision of the movement. One can safely maintain that the JWF comes closest to an official representation of the movement in the public sphere. This means that understanding the JWF is important for understanding the movement as a whole. The JWF (for its mission statement and its Board of Trustees, see

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the foundation’s official website: www.gyv.org.tr) currently has six platforms, each with a particular mission and focus: 1 The Abant Platform, which has organized annual and semi-annual

workshops on social issues in Turkey, Europe, United States and the Middle East. 2 The Intercultural Dialogue Platform, which focuses on increasing

understanding between different religious, ethnic and cultural groups and which organizes interfaith trips and meetings in Harran, Urfa (Turkey), where Prophet Abraham was believed to have spent the earlier years of his life. The concept of the ‘Abrahamic Religions’ and the commonalities between them are emphasized with Muslim, Jewish and Christian participants. The Platform also raises awareness about the tragedy of Bosnian Muslims, organizes interfaith prayer services for peace, and a celebration of the 700th anniversary of the asylum granted by the Ottoman Empire to the Jews who escaped from persecution in Spain. 3 The Dialogue Eurasia Platform, which has mostly worked with former

Soviet Republics to forge close cultural ties, and has since been publishing the DA Magazine in Turkish and Russian (with contributions from Russia, Turkic Republics of Central Asia and Turkey). 4 The Medialog, which focuses on the role of the media in promoting

the ideals of the Foundation. 5 Women’s Platform, which encourages more involvement of women

on issues that are both important for women and the rest of the society. 6 The Research centre, which functions as a documentation centre for

the activities of the Foundation and the ideas of the Gülen movement. The Abant Platform is a self-governing entity supported by the JWF. Its executive committee includes some key members of the Foundation’s Board of Trustees as well as some independent academics and public intellectuals. The executive committee addresses the themes of annual meetings, participants to be invited and other organizational issues. For a long time, the theology professor Mehmet S. Aydin  – and who served as the minister of state in charge of religious affairs in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) cabinet (2002–10)  – chaired the committee. In 2006, another academic  – professor of History, Mete Tunçay of Istanbul University  – replaced Aydin. Tuncay defines himself as agnostic and his support for the Platform gives it credibility as an inclusive and non-confessional organization. Depending on the

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topic and location, other local coordinators and academics have participated in the organizing committees of the meetings. The mission statement of the Platform mentions ‘dialogue and reconciliation in light of knowledge and expertise’ as the key principle. The Platform aims to create a ‘collective intellect’ that can define social problems, break them down into pieces and brainstorm in a collective manner to inform the public and propose policies and solutions. The challenge is finding a common ground without necessarily giving up particular beliefs and values (see Tokak, 1998). The starting point for Abant meetings was the possibility and necessity of dialogue across different beliefs, values and identities. The organizers, sponsors, participants and supporters of Abant have frequently stressed the need for dialogue, open debate, consensus building and conflict resolution. One can see references to this conviction in almost every meeting declaration. The fourth meeting was in essence an embodiment of this position with philosophical and analytical underpinnings. The main purpose of pluralism is described as the recognition of difference and achieving a societal consensus. The consensus is not defined as transformation of differences, rather as finding a social compromise (similar to the concept of ‘social contract’) to be able to live together in spite of differences. Obviously, the virtue is to live in peace with a meaningful dialogue among the constituents of the society. The document celebrates diversity and openly calls for a new constitution based on a manifestation of the new social contract. Later on, the fifteenth meeting specifically addressed the necessity of a new constitution that will meet the standards of the EU accords. The twenty-sixth meeting made some bold substantive recommendations for the new constitution on questions of citizenship, national identity, minority rights and religious freedoms. In earlier meetings, the Kemalist ideological basis of the republic was openly criticized for attempting to homogenize Turkish society in the prolonged period of nation-state building and blamed for ‘social engineering’ in the name of modernization to attain the desired ideological and political outcomes. The meetings since 2007 have been more constructive in terms of offering practical solutions and policy proposals in order to build consensus among different social actors rather than only criticizing the state ideology. The Platform chose the region of Abant, in a remote but scenic part of Northern Turkey, as the venue for the first six meetings. Since then, the notions of an ‘Abant Platform’ and an` ‘Abant spirit’ have been used to refer to the initiative. The participants can be divided into two categories. The first is the ‘core’ group of participants that include the Platform’s executive committee, most members of the JWF’s Board of Trustees, and academics who share the vision of the Platform. These include Harun Tokak, Cemal Uşşak, Hüseyin Gülerce, Mustafa Yeşil and Şerif Ali Tekalan from the JWF administration; and academics including Mehmet S. Aydın, Mete Tunçay,

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Niyazi Öktem, Durmuş Hocaoğlu and Hayreddin Karaman. With the extension of the Platform to more specific social issues, other academics and authors, such as Mümtazer Türköne, Yasin Aktay, Ali Bulaç and Naci Bostancı became frequent participants. The second group consists of academics and intellectuals who are invited based on their expertise and the theme of the particular workshop, and politicians and statesmen, depending on the political climate as well as media representatives. The academics are primarily from the social and behavioural sciences. The politicians who participated have been primarily from conservative parties and movements with the exception of some figures from the democratic left. Table 3.1 categorizes the participants in meetings from 1998 to 2012 in terms of their professional background.

Table 3.1  Meeting participants (in %) according to affiliation and professional background Academic %

Media %

Politician %

Bureaucracy %

Civil society %

1st Meeting-1998

71

6

2

1

10

2nd Meeting-1999

67

24

5

0

4

3rd Meeting-2000

61

16

8

3

12

4th Meeting-2001

55

13

16

0

16

5th Meeting-2002

69

17

5

0

9

6th Meeting-2003

63

21

0

8

8

7th Meeting-2004

64

8

8

0

20

8th Meeting-2004

68

4

10

8

10

9th Meeting-2005

85

10

0

0

5

10th Meeting-2006

36

20

0

9

35

11th Meeting-2006

51

19

7

13

10

12th Meeting-2007

55

27

0

6

12

13th Meeting-2007

47

18

7

4

24

14th Meeting-2007

36

19

1

4

41

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Table 3.1  Continued Academic %

Media %

Politician %

Bureaucracy %

Civil society %

15th Meeting- 2007

65

6

18

0

12

16th Meeting-2007

77

10

3

3

7

17th Meeting-2008

38

29

10

0

24

18th Meeting-2009

28

28

7

7

31

19th Meeting-2009

42

4

42

8

4

20th Meeting-2010

58

15

9

6

12

21st Meeting-2010

76

12

0

0

12

22nd Meeting-2010

48

23

6

2

21

23rd Meeting-2011

85

10

5

0

0

24th Meeting-2011

45

46

6

0

3

25th Meeting-2011

66

28

3

3

3

26th Meeting-2012

21

32

26

3

18

Average

56.81

17.88

3.38

13.96

7.85

Source: As based on participant lists and meeting programmes found on the JWF website and in press releases.

In the table, ‘academics’ are defined as full-time faculty members affiliated with a higher education institution; ‘media representatives’ include journalists, columnists and TV and radio programme producers; ‘politicians’ include representatives of political parties, mayors, and former members of the parliament; the ‘bureaucracy’ includes ambassadors and other foreign service staff, civil servants and others affiliated with a state institution; while ‘civil society’ consists of think tanks, human right organizations, business associations, ethnic-cultural group representatives, religious authorities and clergy, and other independent authors, researchers and intellectuals. All categories include individuals with Turkish, American, Egyptian, Iraqi, Israeli, Kurdish, Armenian, French and various other European nationalities.

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4.  Meeting format and topics The workshops start with an opening session where the executive committee introduces the topic and the participants and explains the operational aspects of the meeting. Usually, politicians and a select number of community leaders deliver speeches on the importance of the meeting and their reflections on that year’s theme. The workshops then proceed either with some specialized committee meetings or thematic panels. In the earlier phase of their development, the meetings were more in the form of workshops where different aspects of issues were debated in order to come up with some consensus conclusions  – for a press release and a concluding declaration. Later this format was criticized for having worked as a mechanism to forge consensus. Since the sixth workshop, the meetings were reorganized to be more like academic conferences with presentations and panels. This change of format is also evident in the concluding documents. The first five meeting declarations contain more specific points while later meetings were summarized with more general concluding remarks and conference proceedings. The positive reference to religion in general in the statements hints at a tacit belief that Islam can be a positive factor in social, political and economic life. The First Abant meeting tackled the challenging question of the relationship between Islam and secularism. Being the first of its kind in Turkey and organized by a faith-based civil society group, this meeting not only attracted quite a lot of attention at the beginning, but also provoked some interesting public debate afterwards. The meeting ended with the questioning of some clichés and taboos prevalent in Turkey about the position of Islam on secularism and democracy. Although the movement never claimed that it agreed or disagreed with the resulting declarations, one can argue that they were in line with the ‘middle-way’ philosophy of the movement (see Kuru, 2003). The participants in the first meeting agreed on positions (comments in parentheses are those of the author) which could be summarized as including: 1 There is no contradiction between revelation and reason according to

the prevalent position in the Islamic scholarship. 2 No person or group has a monopoly or divine authority over the

understanding and interpretation of Islam. 3 Muslims in the earlier periods of Islam engaged in more independent

judgment (ijtihad) to solve problems in accordance with the general principles of the religion and necessities of the time. (This was a direct challenge to the ‘orthodox’ position in Sunni Islam about the closing of the gates of ijtihad since the twelfth century AD.)

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THE MUSLIM WORLD AND POLITICS IN TRANSITION 4 There is not necessarily a contradiction between the sovereignty of

God in religious cosmos and sovereignty of people in politics. 5 The state is a human construct, rather than a metaphysically and

politically sacred entity (in response to the question of the existence and nature of an ‘Islamic state’). 6 Other than the universal and basic democratic rights and the rule

of law principles, Islam leaves the specifics of the regime type to societies. (Islam and democracy are compatible.) 7 Turkey should develop a more freedom-based form of secularism.

(the Anglo-Saxon version of secularism was investigated in depth during the workshop.)

(see http://en.fgulen.com/about-fethullah-gulen/the-abant-platform/1782-iabant-platform-qislam-and-secularism-symposiumq, accessed on 04 November 2012 for the full original text in English translation.)

Public reactions to these bold statements were mixed. Some Islamic intellectuals, such as Ahmet Tasgetiren (who is the JWF’s Board of Trustees) declined the invitation to participate in the first workshop and criticized its concluding document for being limited by the conditions of the 1997 indirect military intervention in politics, although he later participated in the fourth workshop. Most liberals and some conservative intellectuals, on the other hand, praised the meeting for its emphasis on sincerity and plain-speaking.

4.1. Themes The topics of twenty-six Abant meetings up until 2012 were : 1 Islam and secularism – Abant, Turkey (1998) 2 Religion, state and society – Abant, Turkey (1999) 3 Democratic state and the rule of law – Abant, Turkey (2000) 4 Pluralism and social reconciliation – Abant, Turkey (2001) 5 Globalization – Abant, Turkey (2002) 6 War and democracy – Abant, Turkey (2003) 7 Islam, secularism and democracy: The Turkish experience –

Washington, DC, United States (2004) 8 Culture, identity and religion in the process of Turkey’s EU

membership – Brussels, Belgium (2004)

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9 New pursuits in education – Erzurum, Turkey (2005) 10 Republic, multiculturalism, and Europe – Paris, France (2006) 11 Global politics and the future of the Middle East – Abant, Turkey

(2006) 12 Turkey-Egypt colloquium: Islam, West and modernization – Cairo,

Egypt (2007) 13 Historic, cultural, folkloric and contemporary dimensions of

Aleviism – Abant, Turkey (2007) 14 Turkey-French conversations II – Istanbul, Turkey (2007) 15 A new constitution [for Turkey] – Izmit, Turkey (2007) 16 Turkey: A bridge between civilizations in the EU process – Istanbul,

Turkey (2007) 17 Kurdish problem: Searching for peace and a future together – Abant,

Turkey (2008) 18 Kurdish problem: Searching for peace and a future together – Arbil,

Iraq (2009) 19 Democratization: Political parties from September 12 [1980] to the

EU – Abant, Turkey (2009) 20 Democratization for a new social contract – Ankara, Turkey (2010) 21 Egypt, Turkey and stability in the Middle East – Cairo, Egypt (2010) 22 Democracy and tutelage – Abant, Turkey (2010) 23 New era, new constitution – Abant, Turkey (2011) 24 Assessment of June 12 Parliamentary election results – Istanbul,

Turkey (2011) 25 The future of the Middle East after the Arab Spring and Turkey –

Gaziantep, Turkey (2011) 26 The framework of the new constitution – Abant, Turkey (2012)

The topics discussed in the meetings underscore two important points. First, the specific topics are chosen based on the political context. After the indirect military intervention in politics against the Islamist Welfare Party–led coalition government, between 1997 and 2002, Turkey struggled towards the normalization of civil-military relations. In this context, the first four meetings searched for consensus building on some of the intractable issues polarizing

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the country along the lines of Islamist versus Secularist and the state versus the society. The Platform assumed a similar bridging role during Turkey’s post-Kemalist transformation (2007–11). Discussions on democratization, developing a new constitution, and the Kurdish issue have been quite successful in framing the public debate during this critical juncture in Turkey’s sociopolitical history. Since 2002, the themes have also reflected more global and regional issues. For example, the 2003 meeting tackled the issue of bringing democracy by force in face of escalating US threat to intervene in Iraq. The Platform discussed the question of Islam and democracy in 2004 during the euphoria immediately after the ‘success’ of Operation Iraqi Freedom. By holding this meeting in Washington, DC, at the very birth place of the Greater Middle East Initiative, the Platform aimed to engage a Western audience. With the Greater Middle East Initiative having been introduced by the Bush administration in order to promote a democratic Middle East, Turkey’s experience with secularism and democracy as a Muslim majority nation was presented as a possible source of inspiration and lessons for other nations in the Middle East. The initiative failed to produce any significant change, thanks to its limited engagement and partnership with the regional forces. In spite of this marginal effect, the project became a centrepiece of political debates in Turkey. Rather than seeing this as an opportunity for Turkey’s influence in the region, the secular nationalists, known as ulusalci, used this initiative to blame AKP as being an instrument of the American government to promote ‘soft’ Islam in the Middle East. In essence this meant that it was being argued that the AKP was undermining the very secular and national basis of the Turkish Republic. A clear goal of such a position was to cripple the legitimacy of the AKP and its proactive Middle East policies. The Abant Platform has also been coined as an American project along the same lines of ‘guilty by association’. The two Turkey-France conversations (2004 and 2007) were more focused on Turkey’s EU membership with a broad multiculturalism outlook. France was symbolic in being one of the most vocal opponents of Turkey’s full membership of the European Union and also because of its historical influence over the Turkish intelligentsia on issues of secularism, republicanism and citizenship. In 2006, the Platform, which had been criticized for not paying enough attention to the Muslim world in comparison with its emphasis on dialogue with non-Muslims, invited intellectuals from the Middle East including Arab, Jewish and Turkish to discuss the future of the Middle East. And later in February 2007, the Platform co-organized a meeting in Egypt with the prominent Al-Ahram Institute to discuss Turkish and Egyptian experiences with democracy, modernization and secularism. These largely theoretical debates gained more meaning after the Arab Spring, and a 2011 meeting directly addressed the idea of Turkey being an inspirational case for the Arab countries.

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Another key meeting in February 2009 was held in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to discuss the question of the future of the Kurds in the region. The Gülen movement has played an important role in the development of relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds (Akyol, 2010). Thanks to its emphasis on cultural dialogue, business opportunities and education, the movement has contributed significantly to the development of the Kurdish region. The 2009 meeting offered a much-needed forum for dialogue between the Iraqi/ Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals and statesmen. Along with the Platform’s close consideration of the sociopolitical setting, the second striking point is the increased frequency of the meetings over time. At the same time, the participants and the target audience have also expanded, becoming more diverse every year. The first set of meetings probed Turkey’s chronic problems that are at the source of significant tensions in the country. Secularism, the Kurdish problem, Alevi-Sunni relations are just a few of those issues that are still at the centre of public debate. Later, the Platform looked into issues that are more global in nature but with clear implications for Turkey, such as democratization, peace, stability and globalization. The meetings in the United States, Europe and the Middle East were more focussed on bringing the Turkish perspective and Turkey’s experiences with democracy and secularism to the forefront of discussion. They also aimed to construct bridges between Turkish, Middle Eastern and the Western intellectual and policy circles.

5.  Proceedings and declarations The initial Abant workshops that had concluding declarations resulted in reports. These documents were then shared with the public with a press release either sent or presented to statesmen and members of the political society. The JWF have also published transcripts and proceedings of some of the earlier workshops. Most recently, Mehtap TV, a channel that specializes in cultural and educational programmes and is known for its ties with the Gülen movement, started to air the Abant meetings live. This was an important move to make these meetings more accessible to the general population. The public declarations demonstrate three key perspectives: 1 Belief in possibility of cooperation despite differences and tensions; 2 Commitment to a liberal-democratic framework at large; and 3 Appreciation of the crucial link between local, national, and global

issues.

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The question of Islam and modernity was at the core of the seventh Abant meeting in Johns Hopkins University, United States at which American and Turkish intellectuals scrutinized the Turkish experience with Islam, modernization, secularism and democracy. Unlike the first meeting, the seventh meeting did not produce a consensus public declaration, and the general tone was about the unique historical and contemporary dynamics in Turkey’s experience with Islam. Another characteristic of the declarations is their liberal-democratic tone, which challenge the state’s domination over the public sphere. Freedom of religion and conscience along with the right of individuals to practice their beliefs is the central thesis of the first and second meetings, which examined secularism and the social role of religion. There is also a clear liberal inclination with regard to state-society relations. By questioning the ‘sacralization’ of the state, participants portray the state in terms of service to its citizens, contrary to the traditional state dominant Turkish political culture. In that sense, the state is urged to liberate itself from totalitarian, authoritarian and top-down ideological-doctrinal tendencies. The concept of raison d’etat is rejected in favour of a full-fledged rule of law and a neutral referee state. This speaks to the fallacy of creating a police state permeated with human rights violations in the name of national security and the ‘War on Terror’. The strongest critique of laïcité also comes from this avenue: Turkish secularism is not simply a separation of religious and political authorities, but a subjugation of religion to state control, which raises serious questions about the freedom of religious practice (e.g. the headscarf ban in public schools, regulations and restrictions on minority religious community rights and status). Finally, the Platform maintains that Turkey needs more democracy (not less) to solve its ethnic, religious and social problems. Although it is hard to measure the exact role of the Abant initiative in relation to the recent liberal turn in the Turkish politics, it would be safe to argue that the Platform is considerably more than just an ad hoc meeting. It is now institutionalized and has greater resources directed to it. The Platform also organizes lecture series and seminars. The long-term success of the Abant Platform in achieving its stated objectives depends on two factors: its continued commitment to the democratic process (without getting entangled in everyday politics) and its faith in the power of civil society. The public deliberations about various aspects of social problems are important in a liberal democracy, which rely on an informed citizenry and a cohesive public. An effective and well-organized civil society is of central importance for keeping the state in check and accountable in matters of democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

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The open dialogue and reconciliation that takes place in Abant Platform meetings contributes to demystifying social problems that were hitherto seen as intractable. This in turn helps to depoliticize social problems. And paradoxically, depoliticization opens more space for political society in the face of the state bureaucracy’s reluctance to accommodate reform. This is important because a civil society mindful of its interest in balancing the coercive power of the state and a political society that can transmit societal preferences into policy and legislation are two indispensable elements of a fully functioning democracy (and for an analysis of the mutually supportive role played by the AKP and the Gülen movement, see Kuru, 2007).

6.  Conclusion A critical contribution of the Gülen movement through the Abant Platform to Turkey is the empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state. Many civil society organizations in Turkey have functioned as agents of the state, jeopardizing the autonomy of the civil society as a whole. One can see this especially in some Kemalist organizations, which are orchestrated by a number of retired army generals, and during the public demonstrations in connection with the election of an AKP affiliated president in 2007, the links between the military and ‘civil’ society organizations were hotly debated (see e.g. Radikal, 2007). Part of the reason why the Abant Platform adopts a broad civil society position as opposed to a particular interest group approach is Turkey’s strong republican tradition. Moving towards a more liberal pluralist form of democracy requires a strong attitudinal basis from the civil society, as well as a legal-institutional framework. In a way, the Abant Platform not only consolidated ‘bonding social capital’ within the Gülen movement fellowship but also created ‘bridging social capital’ across different group (see Putnam, 2000). It also made an important contribution to ‘linking social capital’, which is similar to bonding social capital but also involves more vertical relationships between unequal powers and uneven institutional access – in a way linking the state to the civil society (Woolcock, 1998). In many respects the Abant Platform is a unique enterprise. First, it is a genuine civil society initiative. It is ‘civil’ in that it is not linked with any branches of the state apparatus. It also does not directly promote the economic or political interest of any group. It is important to underline this difference from an interest group because it suggests a more civic

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and collective purpose to contribute to the public good as opposed to particular understanding of public good from an economic, political or ideological perspective. Think tanks, business associations, labour unions, environmental groups and even human rights advocates are examples of interest groups that are formed by like-minded individuals with very particular goals. The Abant Platform was initiated by the Gülen movement, but its scope and appeal quickly surpassed the more normal bounds of this movement.

4 Beyond Post-Islamism: The Transformation of Turkish Islamism to Non-Islamism Ihsan Yilmaz

1.  Introduction

T

his study examines the domestic sociocultural and religious dynamics that affected the change in the normative framework of Turkish Islamists with a special focus on the country’s biggest Islamic civil society actor. After looking at historical factors, such as the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy, that influenced both the emergence and then transformation of Turkish Islamism, the chapter moves on to the present and underlines that the physical and discursive interaction of Islamic groups has been a crucial factor in the transformation of Turkish Islamism. Drawing on the author’s earlier work (Yilmaz, 2008 and 2011) this chapter argues that the Gülen movement has been an influential factor in helping the leaders of AKP to develop a more tolerant normative framework and to eventually to jettison their Islamist ideas. Needless to say, since the chapter’s primary focus is on the sociocultural factors that have influenced the transformation of the AKP leaders’ normative frameworks, it will not examine the external factors such as global opportunity structures (see Kuru, 2005) and domestic institutional constraints imposed by the aggressively laicist establishment that have already been discussed elsewhere (see Mecham, 2004 and Çavdar, 2006).

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2.  The evolution of Turkish Islamism Throughout its history the Ottoman state was in constant contact with Europe. When its political vigour began to fade from the seventeenth century onwards, its rulers became aware that reform was vitally needed. Initially, they searched for indigenous solutions but ultimately decided to emulate the West. After establishing permanent diplomatic posts in major European capitals, the Ottoman elite also started sending students to these cities. The Young Ottomans were among the first generation of students that were sent to study in Europe in the hope that upon their return they would help to reform the state. They were trained in modern secular Ottoman bureaucratic schools, knew one or more European languages, and had lived for years in major European capitals. Reading European political writings and associating with Westerners placed them in a group of their own among the Ottoman elite. Thus, they developed a respect for Western political institutions and affirmed that the state would never be modernized unless it adopted a democratic government and a constitution (McCarthy, 1997: 302). They envisaged synthesizing modern values with traditional local values. They demanded a constitutional government, a parliamentarian regime and a political system based on human rights. They made constant references to the Anglo-Saxon system and tried to adapt it to the Ottoman state. They offered a constitutional project with an Islamic foundation (Mardin, 2005: 150). They knew that their Western ideas could not easily be accepted and that it was almost impossible to mobilize the masses against the Sultan. Thus, they had decided to try to ’Islamize’ their Western ideas and to justify Western institutions from an Islamic perspective by referring to the original sources of Islam – in other words, the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet (see in detail Türköne, 1994). For various reasons, the changes they were asking of the Ottoman rulers were not easy to implement. As a result of a clash of expectations the Young Ottomans quickly found themselves in a position of opposition. One important difference between the first generation Islamists and contemporary Islamists is that the earlier generation was ‘an intellectual elite operating as part of the establishment whereas the contemporary group is one of persons of modest origins whose position in society is less assured’ (Mardin, 2005: 160). The Young Ottomans did not come from the periphery; they were also part of the centre but made a conscious choice to oppose the establishment. As they were also part of the Ottoman elite, ‘they were democrats in theory, but not necessarily men who understood the people for whom they avowedly spoke’ (McCarthy, 1997: 303). Another unique feature of these first generation ‘Islamists’ is that in their private lives most were not observant Muslims even though they were proud

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of their Islamic culture. In this matter they differed significantly from the later generation of Islamists. Moreover, the Ottoman rulers tolerated them to a great extent and the punishments they received were either light or else they were later pardoned. These peculiarities of the ‘first generation Islamists’ are important since Turkish Islamism has never had radical overtones. The writings of the Young Ottoman appealed to two groups: those who wanted faster liberalist reforms and those who wanted a renewed Islam to take part in the system denied by the Tanzimat ruling elite (McCarthy, 1997: 302). Like the Tanzimat elite and the twentieth-century Islamists, the Young Ottomans were also social engineers: they advocated imposing a top-down reform. The Young Ottomans were also the first ‘Islamists’ who, as lay people, challenged the traditional authority of ulama in religious matters. Up until then discussion of religious matters had been regarded as being the sole prerogative of the ulama (Mardin, 2005: 151). This new utilitarian use of Islam first appeared in the 1870s, with an aim of mobilizing Muslims in order to construct a new Islamic unity and solidarity to be used against imperialism: ‘Later, in the 1890s, part of the intelligentsia promoted arguments that would allow Islam to be seen as the locus of progress and civilization.’ (Mardin, 2005: 151.) It must be noted that the rise of Islamic consciousness in the form of Islamism in the late nineteenth century and the emergence of Turkish nationalist consciousness were not entirely separate processes. Rather, they were ‘manifestations of a reaction to Ottoman disempowerment in the face of rising European imperialism’ (Gülalp, 1995: 178). The Islamists of the Republican period would always keep this nationalist consciousness as part of their Islamist discourse. The Young Ottomans had a chance to put their ideas into practice in 1876 when a junta composed of reformist statesmen, military officers and ulama took advantage of the chaos in the country and pressed for a constitutional government. The first Ottoman constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) was promulgated on 23 December 1876, which also started the period known as the First Meshrutiyet, or First Constitutional Period, a period of a liberal constitutional monarchy. The 1876 Constitution was a document that resembled written Western constitutions. It was modelled on the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and the Prussian Constitution of 1851 (Bozkurt, 1998: 285). It was the first constitution of an Islamic state in history. For the first time in Islamic history, all subjects were declared to be Ottoman regardless of their religion. All subjects were equal and all were to enjoy liberty. The basic concept in the 1876 Constitution was that, although somewhat restrictive in the exercise of powers, it recognized a legislative assembly partially elected by the people. However, Sultan Abdulhamid II dissolved the parliament in 1878 and ended this period. Nevertheless, the influence of proto-liberalism and constitutionalism

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continued and the Sultan was eventually forced to restore the constitution in 1908 and the Second Meshrutiyet period started. In 1909, the 1876 Constitution was substantially amended to the effect of increasing the power of the legislature and restricting that of the Sultan. The secularist and more nationalist successors of the Young Ottomans – the Young Turks’ or Ittihat ve Terakki (Union and Progress) Party – came into power. As a result, a truly constitutional system was established. But this system did not last long since, within a few years, the authoritarian, positivist, Young Turks transformed the system into a dictatorship of the dominant party. The Young Turks’ Republican successors, the Kemalists, also did not allow pluralism and democracy to operate until 1950. Prior to this a positivist and staunchly secularist elite ruled the country. The Ottoman Islamic identity and discourse were to a great extent delegitimized and marginalized by the Republican Kemalist elite. The role of Islam in the public sphere was radically marginalized and the state attempted to confiscate and monopolize even this marginal role, leaving no official room for private interpretations of Islam. Following their Young Turk predecessors, the Kemalists, with a Durkheimian mentality, thought of religion as a helping hand and thus did not aim to terminate it altogether but endeavoured to monopolize its interpretation and use (see in detail Yilmaz, 2005a; see also Roy, 2010: 166 and Ulutaş, 2010). Despite their staunchly laicist rhetoric, the Kemalists’ understanding of nationalism is also an imagination of a coherent society, the members of which are  – preferably non-practising and non-observant  – Turkish Sunni Muslims. The strong assumption (not officially but in practice) was that to be a Turk has to be, however nominally, a Muslim. Non-Muslim Turkish citizens are not considered as real Turks by the Kemalist state, despite the fact that some of them speak no language other than Turkish. This strong bias in favour of nominalism and aversion to religious practice meant that during the authoritarian one-party rule between 1924–50, the Islamists had to keep a very low profile. Karpat (2001) argues that there is a ‘structural, cultural and social continuity’ based on the goal of modernization in the Hamidian, Young Turk and Republican eras. Looking at the policies of the Young Turks, he documents the specific language employed in debates about the concepts and boundaries of nation, race, ethnicity and religion. The emergence of the Turkish nation-state was a ‘complex process of acculturation to modern nationhood, both through and despite Islam’ (Karpat, 2001: 329). He concludes that, despite staunch anti-Ottomanist and anti-Islamic rhetoric, ultimately, the state of modern Turkey emerged by ‘relying upon the solidarity and common identity engendered by Ottomanism and Islamism’ (Karpat, 2001: 406). It is this hybrid unofficial Turkish-Ottomanist-Islamic identity of the Turkish nation-state that helped prevent the radicalization of Turkish Islamism. And

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despite all Sufi brotherhoods and lodges being officially banned by the Turkish Republic, the Sufis did not attempt openly to challenge the state, because they held to the Sunni understanding that a bad state was preferable to anarchy, chaos and revolution. Nevertheless, neither did they simply sheepishly obey the state’s unjust law. They continued their existence unofficially without making much noise and without claiming any public or official role. In return, the officials turned a blind eye to their existence. Among them, the Nakhshbandi Order is very prominent, since all of the successful elements of modern Turkish Islamic politics have originated in later branches of the extraordinarily resilient Nakhsbandi brotherhood that remained closer to the Ottoman establishment than all the other the other brotherhoods (Mardin, 2005: 152). The Khalidi branch of the Nakhsbandi has generally been the most politically engaged of all the Sufi brotherhood groups. The Khalidi debut in national politics was led by Sheikh Mehmed Zahid Kotku (1897–1980) who preached that it was the duty of observant Muslims to take an active interest in national affairs (Smith, 2005: 316). He did not perceive the secular state as an absolute enemy and, in that sense was not held in great esteem by radical Islamists across the Muslim world (Mardin, 2005: 158). He created a new version of the ‘operational code’ of the brotherhood, synchronized with the political code promoted by the secular state – that of constitutional legitimacy (Mardin, 2005: 158). As a result, Turkish Islamist parties were not anti-systemic and agreed to work within the system unlike some other Islamist actors who denounced democracy. By the 1970s, Kotku started promoting a second layer of legitimacy, working in tandem with Islamic legitimacy, which was that of building political institution (Mardin, 2005: 158). It was an aspect of a positive view of the state as an institution and also part of the Nakhsbandi tradition from Mevlanâ Halid to Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Mardin, 2005: 158). Consequently, democratic learning through participating at the elections paved the way for moderation and transformation of Turkish Islamists. Kotku’s followers established the first prominently Turkish Islamist party that had a different rhetoric from the usual right-wing political parties. The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) (1970–1) and the National Salvation Party (Millî Selamet Partisi, MSP) (1972–81) were established through Kotku’s pro-active advice (Çakır, 1994: 22 cited in Mardin, 2005: 157). The leader of these parties, Professor Necmettin Erbakan, was a disciple of Kotku, as were most of the leading members of the MNP (Yıldırım et al., 2007: 6). Erbakan’s Islamist movement was known as Milli Görüş (National View or Outlook). It embraced a set of aspiring yet ambiguous references to the Ottoman past and directed criticism against ‘cosmopolitanism’ as opposed to the ‘national’ (Dagi, 2005: 24). Here, nationalism – a primary motif of the

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secular Turkish Republic, and promoted as religio-nationalism by Erbakan’s parties  – was not seen as an obstacle rather but as the basis for a shared feeling of pride in the sense of first ‘Ottoman’ and then ‘Turkish’, that had been built since Abdülhamid II (Mardin, 2005: 157–8). Islamic religious groups, brotherhoods and communities ‘have always had organic links with small and medium-sized businesses and have also been interested in economic activities to enlarge their social base and to finance their activities’ (Şen, 2010: 71). Erbakan’s parties were no different and they represented the interests of small and medium-sized businesses in Anatolian towns and cities (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 438; Gülalp, 1999: 29; Gülalp, 2001: 435). Erbakan’s intellectual sources and industrial connections to the Anatolian middle-sized conservative capitalists brought about ‘an interesting amalgam of traditional Sunni-based Islamic culture and Sufi worldview embedded within a developmentalist discourse’ (Yıldız, 2003: 189). The MNP was established in January 1970. It espoused a discourse of new economic and social order based on ‘national’ as opposed to ‘Western’ principles. In the view of the MNP, Turkey’s identity and future was with the Muslim world, rather than with the West. The party was shut down after a military intervention in 1971 on the ground that it was against secularism. The MSP was founded in October 1972. The MSP’s ideology was almost the same as the closed MNP. The MNP argued that Westernization had fragmented Turkish society. Erbakan envisaged that, based on Anatolian heavy industry, a stronger Turkey would loosen its ties with the West and would become the leader of the Muslim world under the umbrella of a Muslim Common Market, with the Islamic dinar as its common currency. Also, a Muslim Defence Alliance would be developed. After the military coup in 1980, the MSP was also closed down together with all other political parties. When the army returned back to its barracks in 1983, Erbakan founded a new party under a new name – the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP). The RP’s ideology was also not greatly different to that of the MSP. It steadily increased its share of the votes and, after the 1994 local elections, mayors of several major cities such as Ankara and Istanbul (current prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an became the mayor of Istanbul at that date) were the RP members. In 1996, as the bigger partner of a coalition government with the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi or DYP), Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister. One of his first acts was to invite the leaders of the – officially non-existent – Islamic brotherhoods to a Ramadan fast-breaking iftar dinner at the Prime Ministry. Not surprisingly, the secularists were quickly up in arms. He then went on to establish an economic cooperation pact with eight of the biggest Muslim nations under the name of the Developing Eight (D-8). He had few friends in the West and this attempt increased the number

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of his enemies both at home and abroad. Thus, a programme of psychological warfare accompanied by a media campaign was launched trying to prove that the country was under radical Islamist occupation even though Erbakan (these largely symbolic gestures aside) was by no means a true radical. On 28 February 1997, the military dominated National Security Council presented Erbakan with a list of ‘recommendations’ (for which, read ‘orders’) to curb the alleged anti-secular activities. Meanwhile, the generals invited the top echelons of the bureaucracy (governors, judges and all others) to a series of ‘secularism-in-danger’ briefings and mobilized the establishment against Erbakan’s RP, eventually forcing Erbakan to resign in June 1997 in what has been called a ‘post-modern coup’. In January 1998, the Constitutional Court closed down the RP and banned Erbakan from politics for five years. Being acutely aware of the pattern of history, this time Erbakan’s new party was already prepared before the closure decision was announced and so the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) continued operating under Erbakan’s close friend Recai Kutan’s leadership until it was also shut down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001. The FP was, in some regards, a ‘post-Islamist’ party, as very briefly analyzed in a separate section below. For all the other parties Erbakan formed and led, serving religion was a crucial factor. These parties used religion as the dominating parameter of ‘their political discourse that confined religious concepts and values to a certain group, while nationalizing, modernizing, secularizing and politicizing them’ (Yıldız, 2003: 200). Erbakan’s Islamism up until the post-Islamist FP experience ‘was characterized by an authoritarian and collective search for a new Islamic identity and a quest for an Islamic state, derived from a Jacobin understanding of state and revolution’ (Duran, 2010: 5). Following the pattern of the worldwide Islamist discourse, the Turkish Islamists also envisaged ‘capturing’ the state and using it to socially engineer top-down Islamist transformation in society by adopting the centralism of the state (Çınar, 2006: 478). The political parties that Erbakan founded carried a deep communitarian identity (Yıldırım et al., 2007: 6). As Yıldırım et al. (2007: 6) put it, ‘The members of Erbakan’s parties were primarily described as believers and followers, whose leader, Erbakan, naturally was their “imam.”’ Erbakan’s parties had an absolutist, monopolizing and top-down pattern of relationship with society and this was also valid for his parties’ intra-party organizations (Çınar, 2006: 477). Erbakan’s rhetoric was marked by an intolerant and exclusivist tone. His discourse justified itself by the alleged existence of a monolithic ‘other’. He constantly blamed all others as blind imitators of the West. He was upset with the many religious brotherhoods and communities, the Gülen movement being one of them, that refused to support his parties. He did not think these

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were good Muslims because he believed that politics was based on ‘truth versus error’, with him representing the truth (Çınar, 2006: 477). In fact, Erbakan’s parties were so self-obsessed with their own ‘truth’, that there was frequently a disjuncture between them and their electoral base (Çınar, 2006: 477). His followers were quick to label people as being the voice of the United States of America or even worse as CIA agents. Erbakan himself ‘was accusing those who did not vote for RP as belonging to the “religion of the potato” instead of Islam’ (Kuru, 2007: 145). He was of the opinion that the political party means the religion and that, ‘accordingly, those Muslims who have not belonged to the party or lent support to it have been warned that they may be subject to spiritual sanctions/hazards’ (Yıldız, 2003: 193). In Erbakan’s view ‘elections are the counting of Muslims in Turkey’ (Yıldız, 2003: 193). Yıldız (2003: fn. 19) notes that the ‘Muslim census’ argument was publicly voiced by Erbakan for the first time in his ‘Turkey Great Once Again’ public meeting in Konya held on 7 October 1973. The meeting was presented as ‘the greatest meeting of human history’ and gave birth to the conception of ‘the Muslim census’ by the party’s semi-official daily Milli Gazete. On 4 October 1973, Milli Gazete’s headline was ‘Not parties but beliefs are in collision in the election’ (Yıldız, 2003: fn. 19). Erbakan was not always exclusivist: ‘The Prophet Adam was Welfarist. Likewise, all the past prophets were partisans of WP, so was the Sultan Mehmet II (The Conqueror)’ (quoted in Yıldız, 2003: 193).

3.  Turkish post-Islamist party: The Virtue Party (FP) After the RP was ousted from power, many younger Islamists began thinking that the only way that they could succeed was to learn from the experience of Erbakan and avoid open confrontation with the Kemalist establishment and to reject Erbakan’s instrumentalist use of religious rhetoric in politics. This started an internal debate among the Islamists and a cleavage emerged within the movement. The ‘traditionalists’ (Gelenekçiler), centred on Erbakan and the party leader Recai Kutan opposed any serious change in approach or policy; while the younger group of ‘renewalists’ (Yenilikçiler), led by Tayyip Erdoğan, the mayor of Istanbul, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç argued that the party needed to revise and renew its approach to a number of fundamental issues, especially democracy, human rights and relations with the West. The export-oriented Anatolian businessmen who had been key supporters of the RP also weighed into this internal debate. They tried to distance themselves from Erbakan’s combative Islamism (Öniş, 1997: 750) since

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Erbakan’s ‘anti-Western and confrontational rhetoric became incompatible with the interests of this rising Islamic business elite, which preferred a market economy, a pro-Western attitude and peaceful relations with the secular state establishment’ (Başkan, 2010: 407; see also Demiralp, 2010: 138). The influence of this internal debate was reflected in the platform of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP). The FP represented a rupture with the Milli Görüş’s Islamism. It embraced Western political values and anti-Westernism was not on its agenda. The FP’s ‘new attitude and policies regarding the EU represented a dramatic change in the National View movement’s history’ (Doğan, 2005: 428). The FP ‘was essentially not a party of political Islam but a liberal-conservative party with a powerful “social state” inclination and a strong interest in nationalism’ (Yıldız, 2003: 199). In other words, the FP was a post-Islamist party. Post-Islamism is not anti-Islamic. It rather reflects a tendency to re-secularize politics-religion relations. Put differently, ‘It is marked by a call to limit the political role of religion.’ (Bayat, 1996: 45; see in detail Bayat 2007b) In this definition, ‘post-Islamism is associated with the values of democracy and aspects of modernity’ (Bayat, 1996: 45). A number of (mainly French) European writers have also employed the term, if often descriptively, to refer to what they consider a shift in the attitudes and strategies of Islamists after the so-called failure of Islamism (Roy, 1995, 1998 and 2004; Schulze, 1998; Kepel, 2002 and 2004). On the contrary, in Bayat’s (2007) formulation, post-Islamism refers to both a condition and a project, which may be embodied in a master (or multidimensional) movement. In the first instance, post-Islamism refers to a political and social condition in which after a phase of experimentation, Islamism gets exhausted even among its former supporters (Bayat, 2007a: 18). Islamism becomes compelled, both by its own internal contradictions and by societal pressure, to reinvent itself, but does so at the cost of a qualitative transformation (Bayat, 2007a: 18). It is obvious that the post-Islamist condition can only be relevant in the contexts where Islamists could come into power. Bayat (2007a: 18) further suggests that post-Islamism is also ‘an endeavour to fuse religiosity with rights, faith and freedoms, Islam and civil liberties’ and it ‘focuses on rights instead of duties, plurality instead of singular authority, historicity rather than fixed and rigid interpretation of scriptures, and the future rather than the past’ (Bayat, 2007a: 18). A perusal at the discourse of the FP shows that this party indeed was a post-Islamist party. For instance, the FP agreed that, ‘the raison d’être of a state that was based on human rights was to protect liberties’ (Yıldız, 2003: 199). The February 28 coup ‘led the members and followers of the Virtue Party to the realization that democracy and human rights were basic needs that also applied to themselves’ (Doğan, 2005: 427). They were ‘forced to reconsider

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modernity, democracy and multiculturalism as universal values rather than seeing them as extensions of Western domination’ (Alam, 2009: 21). Thus, their ‘slogans included “pluralist society”, “basic rights” and liberties, “more democracy”, “privatization”, “decentralization” and “globalization”’ (see FP, 1999: 17; Alam, 2009: 21). The FP also rejected the use of both religion and laicism as instrumental in politics and disapproved of political understandings based on the exploitation of religion (Yıldız, 2003: 199). The Yenilikçiler (renewers) began to consistently air their views on key fundamental issues while declaring the failure of Islamism. They argued that the Milli Görüş Islamists were under the influence of the Middle Eastern Islamists and had confused the conditions of Turkey with those in the Arab world. They openly criticized the RP on the grounds that it made a mistake in using religion. Tayyip Erdog˘an underlined that state could not and should not have a religion; rather it is individuals that have religious affiliations. He also emphasized the importance of democracy, free market economy and human rights. Another Yenilikçiler, Bülent, Arınç stated that respect for other people’s views and beliefs is at the core of democracy. Abdullah Gül, who stood against Erbakan and supported Recai Kutan for the chairmanship of the FP, concurred with these new ideas and underscored that their demand was religious freedom not an Islamic state, declaring that the best way of government is democracy as it is a system that does not stop in its search for good. The discourse of the young generation showed all the signs of a more sophisticated approach and they have learned to avoid the confrontational rhetoric, opting instead for a message of democracy and human rights (Yilmaz, 2000: 12). They have also developed a new and ‘tolerant normative framework’ (Kuru, 2005: 273).

4.  ‘Non-Islamism’: The AKP The renewalists of the FP continued to adhere to their renewalist discourse and as AKP leaders have frequently asserted universal values and value-based discourses such as human rights, democracy and free market principles (Yıldırım, et al., 2007: 17). As they parted ways with the Islamist wing of the FP, their new discourse is no longer a hybrid (incorporating the post-Islamism of the FP) form of Islamism and universal liberal democratic conservative values. While acknowledging the importance of religion as personal belief, they accommodated themselves within the secular constitutional framework (Mecham, 2004: 350: see also Heper and Toktaş, 2003). It must be underlined that while the post-Islamist intellectuals still base their arguments on Islamic sources and make frequent references to Islam, the AKP leaders severed their discursive ties with these sources as far as

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politics is concerned. For instance, Tayyip Erdo ğan stated very firmly just before the establishment of the AKP that Islam was not even a ‘point of reference’ for the AKP (Çakır and Çalmuk, 2001: 189). Yet, they are in no way non-Muslims despite Erbakan’s strong criticism that, from his Islamist point of view, there is no difference between non-Islamist and non-Muslim. In fact, ‘the most radical and harsh criticisms of the AKP came from the Happiness Party, which is now the single representative of the National Outlook Movement’ (Yıldırım et al., 2007: 17). Erdoğan frequently states that his party is a conservative democrat party, implying a Muslim democrat party similar to Christian Democrats in Western Europe in which an Anglo-Saxon type of ‘passive secularism’ is espoused where public visibility of religion is accepted. According to Hale (2005: 294), ‘There are sufficient similarities as well as contrasts between the AKP and the classic Christian Democrat parties of Western Europe.’ The AKP leaders have frequently stated that their position is far removed from the ideas that formed the political content of Erbakan’s Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement and that they have underlined the distance between themselves and all of Islamist references (Yıldırım et al., 2007: 9). Prime Minister Erdog˘an stated several times that the AKP is not a Muslim democrat party but rather a conservative democrat party (Yıldırım et al., 2007: 9). In the AKP’s rhetoric religion is only a cultural backdrop rather than an active part of the Islamist discourse. Unlike the Islamists, the AKP ‘rejects the possibility of a non-negotiable absolute truth in a democratic regime and recognizes the necessity of dialogue, compromise and consensus for democratic rule’ (Çınar, 2006: 478; Alam, 2009: 22). In direct contrast to the Islamists’ formulation of political identity based on opposition to the West, the AKP has emphasized Western political values. At the same time, the party has viewed the West, especially the European Union, as an important ally in the democratization of Turkey. Unlike Erbakan’s Islamist parties, the ‘AKP does not equate globalization with Western imperialism, but considers it as the changing context of politics to which Turkey should adapt by way of accelerating its integration with the EU’ (Çınar, 2006: 475). The AKP has attracted the votes of a broad constituency – cutting across class, gender and ethnic (and religious) lines – who previously had voted for mainstream right and Islamist parties. In the 3 November 2002 election, it won 34 per cent of the votes and increased its share of the votes to 47 per cent in 22 July 2007 elections, the main opposition party receiving only 21 per cent. In the 2007 elections, many Turkish-Armenians reportedly voted for the AKP as well. In 12 June 2011 general elections, the party won the elections for a third consecutive term by getting 50 per cent of the votes. The move of Turkey’s late twentieth-century Islamists to post-Islamism in the twenty-first century was not very difficult since Turkish Islamists have

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never been truly radicalized at any stage. Since the country was not colonized, their anti-Western rhetoric was, to a large extent, superficial and the AKP leaders gave it up easily. Their lifestyles, dress codes and so on had in any case always been in tune with Western ones. Moreover, long experience with democracy dating back to 1876 and the Turkish state’s hybrid identity have also helped Turkish Islamists to be pro-state at all times and thus, to avoid radical extremes. Furthermore, unlike Islamists in most other countries, the Milli Görüş movement never severed its ties with traditional expressions of Islam and did not succumb to the literalist rhetoric of the Salafist ‘reformers’. On the contrary, as discussed above, in the Republican era the Islamist parties had direct links with traditionalist Sufi brotherhood roots. This stands in stark contrast with Muslim Brotherhood ‘Ikhwani’ Islamists of the Arab world whose ‘reformist’ religious views were derived from the earlier Islamic modernist movement which turned its back on traditionalist understandings of Islam.

5.  The transformation from Islamism to non-Islamism: Influential factors Globalization, international opportunity structures and the failure of Islamist government experiences in countries such as Sudan, Pakistan and Iran coupled with the awareness of the fact that most Sunni Islamists severed their ties with both traditionalist Islamic belief and practice and with classical scholarship, bypassing fourteen centuries of learning, are some of the external or non-domestic factors that influenced Turkish Islamists to change their discourse. In the domestic context, there are two major factors that contributed to the change. The first was a desire to avoid pointless confrontation with the aggressively laicist Turkish establishment since this, as the Erbakan’s RP government experience showed, would prevent ‘Islamists’ from retaining power even after they achieved it. Constraints imposed by the laicist establishment and state ‘structure have limited Islamist actions and provided distinct opportunities for the emergence of a brand of reformist new thinking’ (Çavdar, 2006: 480; see also now Bölükbaşı, 2012). A second major factor is a tolerant normative framework that has brought about the transformation of the Turkish Islamists. As summarized in the preceding sections, there are several factors that influenced the emergence of this tolerant framework. The consistently pro-state attitude of the Turkish Islamists, which is ‘Turkish exceptionalism’, to use Şerif Mardin’s (2005) terminology, has always been a factor in the moderation of Turkish Islamism.

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Its close ties with the Nakhshbandi tradition and its pro-state approach differentiate Turkish Islamism from the majority of Islamist ideologies and movements worldwide. Turkish constitutional and democratic history starting from the Ottoman times and the fact that the country has never been colonized by the European imperialist powers have also contributed to the moderate and less than reactionary nature of the Turkish Islamism. Moreover, ‘[t]he state policies of creating the parameters for Islamist parties further moderated the already mild nature of political Islam in Turkey’ (Çavdar, 2006: 486). As Duran (2010: 14) underlines, the Islamic middle classes, the moderate positions of religious groups (e.g. the Gülen movement), the transformation of other societal groups including trade unions and businessmen associations have had a cumulative effect on the transformation of Turkish Islamism. The export-oriented, liberalizing reforms of Turgut Ozal that integrated the country to the global structures and trends also made it possible for Anatolia’s culturally conservative, religiously observant but economically liberal export-oriented businessmen to be major players in the Turkish domestic scene and they have had a moderating impact on the Islamists (see Barkey and Congar, 2007: 66). The transformation of Islamic and Islamist intellectuals is another important factor that influenced the paradigmatic shift in the minds of Turkish Islamists. After the 28 February 1997 ‘post-modern coup’ that directly aimed at terminating all Islamic activities, groups, social projects and bourgeoisie, these intellectuals also have come round to the views that Gülen has been advocating since 1960s. They stated that under the new post-28 February domestic and post-9/11 global conditions ‘the old discourse and actions of the previous parties had become “useless”, and they called for an accommodationist rather than a confrontational approach’ (Çavdar, 2006: 482). In fact, as Meeker (1991: 217) put it, these Muslim intellectuals were never ‘unwilling urban residents yearning to return to the security of the rural town or village . . . They are very much creatures of the contemporary Turkish city, like their secular counterparts’ (Meeker, 1991: 217). Moreover, as Dagi (2004: 135–6) observes, these Muslim intellectuals ‘appear to have abandoned their ideas for the construction of an alternative social and political order that in effect enabled them to seek a rapprochement with the West, Western ideas and institutions’ (Dagi, 2004: 135–6). The physical and discursive interaction of Islamic communities and movements is also a major factor in the transformation of Turkish Islamism. While it is difficult to establish a casual relationship between different social phenomena, it is still possible to highlight correlations. A number of academics, and including the present writer (Yilmaz, 2000, 2003, 2005a and 2005b; Kuru, 2007; Maigre, 2007; Duran, 2010) have argued that the Islamist

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‘transformation was not an isolated event, but part of a larger experience that several other Islamic groups took part in’ (Kuru, 2007: 141). In the words of Duran (2010: 14), ‘[t]he Gulen Movement, as the leading Islamic community in Turkey, has a very special place in the transformation of Turkish Islamism.’ By drawing attention to the links between Islam and modernity, and rejecting the idea of an inherent clash between East and West, ‘it has opposed anti-Western feelings within Islamism’ (Duran, 2010: 14). The Abant Platform and the Gülen media provided two major public fora in which the younger generation of Milli Görüş politicians and participants in the Gülen movement were able to interact discursively (Kuru, 2007: 145). Among those attending the Abant Platform meetings were several leading figures, founding members and ministers of the AKP such as Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek, Ali Coşkun and Nevzat Yalçıntaş. Moreover the chairperson of the meetings, professor of theology Mehmet Aydın, and some frequent participants, such as associate professor of political science Hüseyin Çelik and constitutional law professor Burhan Kuzu, joined the new generation of former Islamists when they founded the AKP (Kuru, 2007: 145–6). The younger generation of Islamists was aware of the fact that after the failure of the Welfare Party in power, the new middle classes would no longer vote for Islamist parties in large numbers. Several Islamic communities such as the Gülen movement had never voted for Islamist parties. Younger generation Islamist politicians realized that without getting the support of these groups and individuals, it was not be possible to come to power. These younger Islamists had always been in contact with the person in the street, the grassroots and the periphery. The people in this social base have sent their children to secular educational establishments where they could learn a European language, instead of sending them to madrassah or the state’s Imam Hatip schools. In most cases, since only the Gülen movement schools provided this opportunity, most of the new elite’s children (and thus indirectly themselves) have become acquainted with the movement and its world view. As a matter of fact, in most cases the boundaries between these new elites and the Gülen movement supporters are blurred and there are numerous cases of substantial overlap. Thus it is the members of this Anatolian bourgeoisie who actually fund and establish the Gülen schools, after seeing their success in other Anatolian towns and cities. The Gülen movement’s media was the largest in almost all Anatolian cities. Turkey’s best selling daily, Zaman was, at the time, the country’s second most circulated newspaper and the majority of the Virtue Party and AKP’s supporters, including the businessmen were regular readers (Maigre, 2007: 42). Samanyolu TV has long been one of the leading TV channels in

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the country and it is widely watched in Anatolia especially by politically and socially conservative communities. Thus, Fethullah Gülen’s competitive Islamic discourse which is deeply informed by traditional Islamic scholarship but is not anti-Western, but rather tolerant, pluralistic, politically and economically more liberal has weakened the influence of Erbakan’s bellicose Islamist rhetoric on the wider socially conservative masses of Anatolia including the nascent Anatolian elite. This social base was much larger than the base of the Milli Görüş and has become more open to Gülen’s discourse.

6.  Conclusion It can be argued that the new Anatolian elite, led by the Gülen movement, its schools and media, and the post-Islamist intellectuals have significantly influenced the former Islamists. The Gülen movement has been a dominant factor in this transformation. Compared to the other factors, it is the most influential and widespread one with its schools, dormitories, businessmen associations, charities, the media organizations and its Abant Platform. It must also be noted that, if the discourses of the all main Islamic and Islamist actors mentioned in this study are examined from an historical perspective, it will be seen that while Gülen has been advocating almost the same views on democracy, plurality, peaceful coexistence, tolerance, acceptance, non-Islamism, secularism and East-West dialogue for the last four decades, the other actors have had to adapt their views during the course of the same time span and that their views have converged to Gülen’s views. After the 28 February 1997 post-modern coup that directly aimed at terminating all Islamic activities, groups, social projects and bourgeoisie, these intellectuals also have come round to the views that Gülen had been advocating since the 1960s.

5 Muslims and Liberalization: The Case of the Gülen Movement Ramazan Kılınç

1.  Introduction

T

 o what extent are Islam and liberalism compatible? How have Islamic movements responded to liberalization trends over the last two decades? Some scholars argue that liberalism can indeed flourish in the Muslim world (Kurzman, 1998; Abou El-Fadl, 2004; Browers and Kurzman, 2004) while others contend that developing a liberal economic and political system within the Islamic tradition is almost impossible (Lewis, 2003). Many of these scholars examine the question of the compatibility of Islam and liberalism from a doctrinal or philosophical point of view. This chapter argues that there is no general answer to this question and scholars should instead analyze the Islamic movements empirically. They should consider environmental factors within which an Islamic movement is located, the organizational capabilities that the movement possesses, and the Islamic repertoire that the movement uses in mobilizing its followers. This brings us to a second question: Can an Islamic movement be liberal? In this chapter, this question is examined by looking at the Gülen movement’s response to liberalization processes in Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s. Examining the Gülen movement in this period offers many analytical opportunities. First of all, in the last two decades, liberalism has transformed the Turkish economic and political system radically. Turkey is a good case at hand to analyze the responses of Islamic movements to the liberalization

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of social and political life. Second, the Gülen movement is not a political movement; rather it is a social movement that is active in many spheres of social life. Earlier studies on Islam and liberalism have generally focused on political movements. This study aims to expand those debates to social movements in order to achieve a larger picture of the interactions between Islam and liberalism. The Gülen movement’s engagement with liberalization is analyzed in two spheres: economic liberalization and political liberalization. In analyzing the movement’s engagement with economic liberalization, the chapter examines what normative positions the movement’s participants have taken in relation to the free market economy which had expanded in Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s; and in what ways they have implemented the rules of free market economy. Although the movement has been involved in many economic activities without any serious contradiction with the liberal economic system, the followers have tried to transform it by adding some components from Islamic teachings. Under the heading of political liberalization, the movement’s response to the expansion of the civil and political liberties which strengthened the democratization process in Turkey is analyzed. In line with a liberal participatory philosophy, the movement has developed amicable relations with different segments of the society and defended a pluralist understanding in their relations with the others. However, without interfering with others’ preferences, the participants of the movement have also taken more communitarian position against the individualist emphasis of liberal philosophy. Thus, it can be argued that the Gülen movement has reinterpreted Islamic activism in a way to make it compatible with the liberalization process. This movement has made good use of the opportunities offered by the liberalization process in Turkey and abroad. Moreover, it has tried to transform liberalization processes by re-evaluating them within an Islamic perspective. Before analyzing the Gülen movement, I will briefly summarize the current discourse on Islam and liberalism.

2.  Islam and liberalism: Modernization, essentialism, structuralism and agency Scholars have analyzed Islamic groups’ engagement with liberalism from different perspectives. According to some modernization theorists, Islam and liberalism are inherently incompatible and the relationship between the two is antagonistic. In this view, the only way to liberalize the Muslim polity is to make Muslims give up their religious tradition and follow the path that the

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Western societies once followed. For example, Bassam Tibi (1998: 66) writes that Islamic modernization is impossible unless Muslims embrace cultural modernization along with instrumental modernization in the technological realm. He characterizes past modernization efforts in the Muslim world as an ‘Islamic dream of semi-modernity’, since Muslims only took the technology of the West and failed to internalize its cultural values. Scholars in this vein describe the relationship between Islam and the West as ‘the contemporary outgrowth of tensions between the secular worldview of secular modernity and the cosmological worldview of Islamic monotheism’ (Tibi, 1998: 68). This perspective, however, cannot explain the fact that some Muslims (such as the Islamic groups in Turkey and Indonesia) embrace liberalism without renouncing Islamic tradition. Some scholars, the so-called essentialists, go even further and assert that even internalizing Western cultural values is impossible because civilizations have primordial cores that cannot change over time (Huntington, 1993; 1996). According to this outlook, Islam and Muslim societies lack the necessary conditions for rational modernization. These analysts have a tendency to see history as ‘fixed’ and to neglect social interaction among the actors. As a response to the ahistorical analyses of the essentialists, some scholars suggest that environmental factors and institutional structures determine the nature of Islamic movements’ engagement with liberalism. For example, Robert Hefner (2000), in analyzing Islamic politics and democracy in Indonesia, argues that even though there is a strong associational life and liberal attitudes among many Muslim groups, the authoritarian character of the state in Indonesia during the Suharto era was an important obstacle to a working democracy emerging in this Muslim majority country. Some other scholars criticize the lack of agency in the structural analyses. For example, scholars from a ‘power-distributional’ approach focus on the power struggle between modernized secular elites and traditional religious groups. Şerif Mardin (1973), for instance, views the history of Turkish political development as a struggle between central and peripheral forces. For him, under the conditions of economic and political liberalization of the 1950s, the peripheral traditional groups in Turkey raised their position against the modernized secular elites. In this view, the standpoint of Islamist groups towards liberalization is a complex phenomenon, which requires an analysis of power struggles with the secular elite to be undertaken in an historical context. The compatibility of Islam and liberalism is not a question that can be answered only by looking at the textual sources of Islam or socio-economic structures per se. A full answer requires an empirical inquiry into how Muslim actors interpret the textual sources and how they respond to the liberalization process. In this direction, drawing on Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s (2001) effort to develop a synthetic theory of

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social movements, this chapter argues that the engagements of the Islamic movements with liberalism are shaped by economic and political structures; these movements’ own efforts to take advantage of these structures; and the normative repertoires that motivate these movements. In the case of the Gülen movement, economic and political liberalization provided the movement with the opportunities to increase its influence both in Turkey and abroad. However, this would not have been possible if the leaders of the movement had failed to mobilize followers to contribute to the movement with their money, time and energy. This mobilization would have been very difficult, if not impossible, if the movement had not revived the normative repertoires that were inherent in the Islamic resources. By normative repertoires, I mean the norms and values that Islam promotes its followers to live as virtuous individuals. These repertoires typically play a significant role in the motivation of Gülen participants. The following paragraphs examine the Gülen movement’s engagement with economic and political liberalization in Turkey, respectively. In each section, the structural liberal transformations within which the movement has operated are described. Then it is shown how the movement used these structures in increasing its sphere of influence in Turkey and abroad. Finally, an explanation is offered for how the movement used the Islamic repertoire both in organizing its participants and in reinterpreting liberalization.

3.  Economic liberalization 3.1. Structural transformations The systematic integration of the Turkish economy into the global market began in earnest after the 1983 elections when Turgut Özal became the prime minister. Being in close contact with the key international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Turkey experienced a radical structural transformation in the economic realm. Throughout the 1980s trade became liberalized, and the Turkish lira gained convertibility against the foreign currency after the removal of ban on foreign currency. Liberalization was extended to financial markets in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s (Öniş, 2004). Turkey transferred new technologies in the 1980s and 1990s, and modernized its infrastructure especially in the area of telecommunications. The government gradually privatized state-owned enterprises. In the 1990s, the number of privately owned industrial enterprises, educational institutions, radios and televisions increased tremendously.

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Economic liberalization efforts, especially in the financial realm, continued after Özal’s tenure. Thanks to its loan agreements with the IMF throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, Turkey adopted an institutional structure which was integrated into the global liberal economic system. The retreat of the state from economic life, and incentives for economic investments, allowed the emergence of new economic actors from the periphery. These actors, who felt confident enough to penetrate domestic and international markets, challenged the monopoly of mainstream businessmen who had revolved around the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association. The emergence of new social forces that constituted an alternative to the state-supported bourgeoisie opened new opportunities for the building of a new social and economic make up which constituted a more diverse and competitive social and political realm within which civil society can flourish in Turkey.

3.2. Mobilizing resources Those associated with the Gülen movement, along with many other Islamic groups, took part in this new economic transformation. Under the favourable conditions of a gradually liberalizing economic environment, they established new enterprises in different economic sectors, from finance to tourism, from media to education. Although these corporations do not belong to Fethullah Gülen himself or any organization associated with him, the owners of these corporations contribute to the funding of the activities that Fethullah Gülen encourages. In the financial sector, leading businessmen closely associated with the movement established Asya Finans in 1996, which changed its name to Bank Asya in 2006. This financial institution is not fully, or even partly, owned by the movement but many of the constituting businessmen in the bank are closely affiliated with the movement. The bank is widely visible in Gülen-affiliated media outlets. As of August 2012, it has 221 domestic branches. It was established in accordance with the principles of interest-free banking. In its constitution, Bank Asya states its two fundamental objectives (see www.bankasya.com.tr/hakkimizda/index.jsp) as being ‘to develop new interest-free banking products’ and ‘to take products that are already being offered at conventional banks and adapt them in such a way as to fit into the system of interest-free banking’. By offering services similar to those offered by conventional banks (such as internet banking, telephone banking, credit cards and ATM and POS terminals), Bank Asya competes with conventional banks. However, at the same time, it strives to offer a banking service which is congruent with Islamic law. Most of its work principles (as declared in its mission statement) are derived from Islamic ethics: honesty, respect and

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trust. Even describing ‘innovation’ as one of its work principles, Bank Asya quotes from Prophet Muhammad: ‘We feel that “two days spent in the same way” are in loss.’ Businessmen who are affiliated with the movement also have enterprises in the tourism sector. Asya Kızılcahamam Holiday Village is a five-star thermal springs facility owned by Bank Asya. It was opened in 2004 in a small town in the Ankara region. Located in 100 acres of land, the facility has a five-star thermal hotel, almost 400 luxury condominiums, a cultural and convention centre, a shopping and entertainment centre, a health and beauty centre and thermal spring pools. By June 2004, it was considered the second-best facility in the world for thermal tourism. The Asya Hotel in the ‘Village’ attracts many Turkish tourists whose socio-economic level is high enough to have an expensive vacation. Many of the customers of Asya Hotel are religious people: thus Asya Hotel offers an alternative to many other hotels in Turkey. For example, the hotel offers separate swimming pools for women and men. In my interviews, many customers of the hotel told me that they were happy to find a place where they could have a vacation without sacrificing their religious values. This is also what the managers of the facility stated as their objective in running this facility (author’s interviews, July 2005). In addition to close association with financial institutions and hotels, the Gülen movement also has direct interest in media outlets. Zaman newspaper and Samanyolu television (STV) are the two most important enterprises of the movement in the media sector. Zaman was established in 1986. It now has the largest circulation in Turkey with about 1,000,000 readers. Samanyolu TV was established in 1993. Zaman and Samanyolu TV have spread the movement’s perspectives on various social and political issues. Through many commentaries and programmes, they have validated the movement’s conciliatory rhetoric with the state and different social segments. They also aim to promote moral values. Along the same lines, Samanyolu TV produces movies that are subtly coloured with religious and spiritual values. However, these movies are not produced in the format of traditional religious sermons, which generally have transmitted the religious messages in a didactic way. This strengthens Samanyolu TV’s competitiveness against other TV stations, which in turn increases its income from commercials. Probably the most important sector for the Gülen movement is education. The movement started building educational institutions in Turkey in the 1980s. The first educational institutions were tutor centres (dershane) to prepare students for the university entrance examinations. Later on, the movement opened private schools with English as the language of instruction. Today, the movement has at least one school in almost each major city in Turkey, with larger cities generally having several. Since the 1990s, the movement has

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opened hundreds of schools abroad. These schools offer a quality education to their students; they are among the best schools in many countries. Although many of these schools require their students to pay tuition fees, they are also substantially supported by Turkish businessmen. Islam is not taught in these schools; instead the teachers seek to educate the students with universal moral and ethical values (Agai, 2003).

3.3. Normative repertoires Although the Gülen movement has benefited from the opportunities that economic liberalization offered, it has also transformed it in at least two ways so as to make it congruent with the Islamic world view. First, the movement used market forces not only for capital accumulation and profit maximization, but also to create a new social and economic environment for Muslims to practice their faith in an era of rapid globalization. For example, Bank Asya’s modern banking services are both compatible with religious doctrine and contemporary economic principles. The private hospitals established by movement members pay special attention to religious sensitivities in providing their service. The movement’s schools have focused on science and have thus contributed to bridging the gap between religion and science in Turkish society. The businessmen running these economic enterprises have found innovative ways to reconcile Islamic law and liberal market rules within the domestic legal framework. The movement has also invented new entertainment and socialization patterns that meet Islamic ethical standards. As previously noted, the Asya Hotel’s five-star facilities, for example, take into consideration the religious demands of their customers while offering a first-class vacation service. Moreover, the movement’s firms have produced new forms of TV and radio programs, drama performances, literary works and music CDs. The movement also produced an alternative social environment among university students for the purpose of reconciling modern science, religious piety and social activism. Second, the Gülen movement has embraced the capitalist system without necessarily being capitalist. Two concepts are particularly important in the movement’s effort to transform the homo economicus of capitalism: aspiration (himmet in Turkish and himmah in Arabic) and emigration (hicret in Turkish and hijrah in Arabic). From the beginning, Gülen has encouraged his audience not to be passive subjects; instead, he encouraged them to do their best to facilitate the spread of the Islamic messages such as love and tolerance. In mobilizing his readers and sympathisers in this regard,

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the concept of aspiration (himmet) played an important role. Gülen defines aspiration (himmet) as follows: Aspiration (himmet) is the attitude of a passenger of the Right (Hak yolcusu), who dedicates all the moments of his life to acquire for the sake of God. He is ready to renounce his material, even his spiritual expectations, and career goals for this aim. He thinks only of Him [God], watches for His forgiveness, and prefers His sake over all other attainments. [. . .] Aspiration (himmet) also means to strive, to endeavor, to work hard, and to struggle for the fulfillment of a duty. (Gülen, 2005c) The discourse of aspiration (see Orhan, 2008) motivated the followers to give their property, time and energy to the activities of the movement. In his speeches, Gülen weaves this concept together with examples from Islamic tradition from the first century up until modern times. Stories about the Prophet Muhammad and his companions have an important mobilizing force among the participants in the movement. Businessmen among the movement’s participants finance the establishment of the schools abroad, pay the salaries of the teachers, at least during the start-up phase, and finance the establishment of new institutions. Not only businessmen, but also other followers and even students contribute to the movement financially (Ebaugh, 2010). For participants, the motive to earn more is not to accumulate personal wealth but to give more charity in the service of God (Gülen, 2005c). The concept of ‘emigration’ (hicret) is another resource for the mobilization of the followers in transforming the image of homo economicus. Gülen has strongly recommended his followers to emigrate from one city to another or to other countries in order to serve. For him, he/she who emigrates will feel more responsibility and will arrange his/her life according to his/her spiritual principles (Gülen, 1985). He argues that emigration has historically been a precondition for the establishment of great civilizations. He reminds his followers that Islam’s early expansion became possible after early Muslims migrated from Mecca to Medina. Many followers of the movement have moved to different places around the world without knowing what would meet them there. Many of the teachers for the schools abroad are recruited from the graduates of Turkey’s most prestigious universities. Although many of these graduates could find well-paid jobs in Turkey, they often chose to migrate to other countries, including poor and undeveloped ones, working under very difficult conditions. The activities of movement participants demonstrate that they have transformed the image of the self-interested capitalist individual within the

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movement. The movement constructs a different form of rationality than the one developed within the liberal tradition, and this section has shown how the Gülen movement succeeded in forming new kinds of social and economic practices and ethics, which are compatible with economic liberalization, while at the same time being faithful to Islamic principles. The next section will do the same for political liberalization.

4.  Political liberalization 4.1. Structural transformations In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey’s liberalization reforms also penetrated into the political realm. Significantly, a number of political restrictions, which were enacted after the 1980 coup, were abolished. In the Özal years, the parliament abolished articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish penal code which forbad ideological advocacy of communism and religion. The global surge of liberalism after the Cold War had a remarkable impact on Turkey. Although Turkey returned to a period of statist politicians in the 1990s, liberalization continued. Along with other global influences, Turkey’s bid for EU membership has also promoted liberalism in the country. Under these circumstances, Turkey implemented liberalizing reforms during the 1990s: some restrictions on the use of Kurdish language were removed; private broadcasting companies ended the state monopoly over broadcasting; limitations on the political participation by trade unions, academicians and students were eased; and a Parliamentary Human Rights Commission was established (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004). Liberalizing reforms reached their culmination between 2002 and 2005 when Turkey was working strongly towards gaining candidacy status from the European Union. Finally, the reforms undertaken during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) following its election in 2002 restricted the political influence of the military and expanded the political sphere to the influence of civil society organizations. These structural changes contributed to the emergence of a vibrant civil society in Turkey in the last two decades. Up until then, civil society organizations were mostly under the control of the state. But in the 1990s and 2000s they achieved an autonomous position and represented various social groups which had not earlier been represented in the civil society. As Augustus Richard Norton (1995: 7) argues, civil society constituted a public space ‘where a mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and groups come together and provide a buffer between state and citizen’. Norton (1995: 9) states that ‘a vital and autonomous civil society

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is a necessary condition for democracy’ because it acts as a counterweight to the power of the state, dilutes state control over society and advances societal interests against the dominant elites.

4.2. Mobilizing resources The political liberalization of Turkey has offered new opportunities to the Gülen movement. The movement picked up these opportunities in at least three ways. First, the movement found a medium through which it could spread its message to the masses. Both Zaman and Samanyolu TV have been instrumental in this regard. In 1994, the movement also founded the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) to facilitate public debates (Uğur, 2006). The JWF organizes workshops in which leading intellectuals are invited to debate certain political and social issues and since 1998, it has organized a number of workshops on range of topics including Islam and secularism; religion, state, and society; pluralism and social compromise; and war and democracy (see Chapter 3 by Uğur in this book). The JWF also aims to increase interaction and dialogue between different religious groups in Turkey as well as in the world. In sum, through involvement in public debates, the Gülen movement has become popular both domestically and internationally. Second, within the democratic environment in Turkey, the Gülen movement has gained the support of certain politicians to obviate the efforts of the bureaucratic elite to repress the movement. Furthermore, the movement strongly supported the democratic reforms that the AKP implemented in the 2000s. The movement has especially supported the reforms that minimized bureaucratic control over politics. Although it has not openly supported any specific political party, the competitive nature of democratic politics since 1994 provided the Gülen movement, which has millions of supporters, an opportunity to gain the support of several political parties. Gülen himself met with a number of politicians. In his meetings with the politicians, Gülen found the opportunity to express his views and also gave the message that the movement had nothing to do with any activity that was against the state. Gülen met with all sorts of politicians who represent different views. Many of these parties have subsequently shied away from taking a hostile attitude towards Gülen and the movement. For example when, in June 1999, the secular mass media in Turkey launched a major attack on Gülen, accusing him of possessing a hidden agenda to take over the state, many politicians did not speak against the movement. Furthermore, several politicians including the president, the prime minister, several ministers and the leaders of opposition parties gave support to Gülen at a time when they were otherwise more likely to criticize him. In addition, a number of politicians supported the Gülen movement’s international

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activities, especially its schools abroad. Presidents Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel and Abdullah Gül wrote letters of credentials to the leaders of the countries abroad to facilitate the opening of new schools. Turgut Özal visited Turkish schools in Central Asian countries during his official visit (Turgut, 1998). Former prime minister Bülent Ecevit, after his visit to movement’s schools in Albania, even went so far as to say that ‘I know they [implying anti-Gülen groups within the state] will get angry at me but I would like to congratulate these schools’ (Ecevit, 2005: 25). In sum, liberal political reforms that have strengthened Turkey’s democratic structure also provided the windows of opportunity for the movement. In the absence of a liberal democratic environment, it would have been more difficult for the movement to have amicable relations with the governments. Finally, the liberalizing environment in the 1980s and 1990s provided the Gülen movement with the opportunities to expand its influence globally (Kuru, 2005). The spread of English learning in the 1990s through newly formed high schools, communication technologies, private radio and television stations facilitated international opportunities. The collapse of communism and its global effects in the 1990s also facilitated this process. The Gülen movement now is a transnational movement, which has more than 1000 high schools in over 100 countries and the movement also supports numerous interfaith dialogue activities around the world.

4.3. Normative repertoires Although the Gülen movement has embraced political liberalization, its understanding of democracy and liberty differs from the standard liberal understanding. These differences arise from the movement’s interpretation of Islam, the movement’s motive to expand the Islamic message of tolerance and morality and the socio-historical conditions of Turkey in which the movement has matured. Three of these differences deserve to be mentioned: (1) an extensive emphasis on dialogue and reconciliation, (2) the enrichment of democracy by adding a spiritual dimension, and (3) the idea of restrained individualism. First, the Gülen movement’s emphasis on dialogue and reconciliation does not fully fit with the notion of pluralism that liberal democracy suggests. Gülen’s conception of politics sees the society as an organism, and this approach aims to achieve harmony among different segments of the society. Dialogue and reconciliation are used to minimize conflict in society. While identifying the virtues of the individuals that would constitute the ideal society, Gülen writes that in an ideal society individuals would ‘treat the others so gently so that they search for the paths to the universal peace. They do not fight with

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others; rather they fight with their own flaws, their own dilemmas so that they clean themselves’ (Gülen, 2000). Gülen believes that treating others in a good manner will contribute to the minimization of conflicts: ‘Approach unbelievers so gently that their envy and hatred melt away. Like a Messiah, revive people with your breath’ (quoted in Ünal and Williams, 2000: 193). Liberal democracy has the tendency not to eliminate the conflicting issues; rather it focuses on the ways to manage these conflicts. In a pluralistic society, every individual or group has equal opportunities in their competition for the distribution of resources (Dahl, 1971). However, despite this inherent tendency, the movement’s dialogue activities since the mid-1990s suggest that the notion of reconciliation has not been perceived as one of eliminating differences. The movement gradually changed its discourse from reconciliation to tolerance, which is much more compatible with the liberal understanding of pluralism. Second, Gülen thinks that democracy should be enriched to better meet the needs of people. He makes an important distinction between religion and political regimes: ‘One should remember that the former [Islam] is divine and heavenly religion, while the latter [democracy] is a form of government developed by humans’ (Gülen, 2005d: 451). For him, the principles that are related to the state administration constitute only 5 per cent of the religion while the remaining 95 per cent are related to the articles of faith, the pillars of Islam and the moral principles of religion. Democracy, for Gülen, is the best possible system in the contemporary era (Gülen, 2001d). On the other hand, however, he contends that there are many different types of democracies such as social democracy, liberal democracy; and that Muslims should develop a kind of democracy that would support them in reaching spiritual satisfaction. Such a democracy, which he calls ‘democracy with spiritual dimensions’ (mana boyutlu demokrasi), respects human rights and freedoms, takes care of religious liberty, prepares necessary conditions for its citizens to experience their beliefs, and helps citizens to fulfil their spiritual needs. Finally, although the Gülen movement’s understanding of individual liberty approves the basic rights that are emphasized in classical liberal theory (namely: liberty, life, property), Gülen criticizes liberal individualism in two respects. First, according to Gülen, it is impossible to have an unrestricted individualism. Individualism gains a negative connotation along the lines of selfishness and lack of care for social matters. In his writings, Gülen depicts a typology of an individual who is governed by moral values (Gülen, 1998b). Gülen (2005d: 447) argues that ‘humans are either both free with no acceptance of any moral values and rebellious with no moral criteria, or they are servants who are dependent on God and seriously obedient to His

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commands.’ Individuals who are servants of God should not be enslaved by worldly belongings, considerations of selfish interests, greed for more material earnings, and different kinds of material desires that destroy morality. Although the Gülen movement criticizes absolute individualism and idealizes a moral-based individual, this attitude does not translate into limiting other individuals’ life in the society (Turam, 2003). Second, the movement does not agree with liberalism’s preference for the individual over the collectivity where this promotes the narrow pursuit of self-interest whatever the cost. Gülen has an organic view of society according to which humans should dedicate themselves to the well-being of the community. However, as Mücahit Bilici (2006) states, Gülen’s views about the state are anti-anarchist rather than statist. To Gülen (2005a): ‘The worst state is better than statelessness; because statelessness brings anarchy.’

5.  Conclusion Turkey has experienced a liberal transformation in the last two decades. The Gülen movement’s response to this liberalization process created new forms of social and political practices that are compatible with both Islam and liberalism. The Gülen movement used the opportunities offered by economic and political liberalization to raise its domestic and international sphere of influence. In this environment, the movement’s participants established businesses, media corporations and schools. They also gained the support of politicians and became involved in worldwide educational and interfaith dialogue activities. At the same time, the movement transformed liberal principles and practices in order to align them with an Islamic perspective. This transformation, by increasing the legitimate room for Muslims, increased the involvement of movement participants in social and economic life and made possible their smooth integration to liberal economic and political structures. In this process, the movement applied the normative repertoire in mobilizing its participants. In conclusion, a few points can be made to characterize the conditions under which Islamic groups are able to develop a peaceful rhetoric in relation to liberalism. First, the institutional environment is a very important factor in the response of various Islamic movements to liberalization. As institutions liberalize, Islamic movements can adapt their discourses and strategies in order to integrate into a liberalizing social, economic and political system. The Gülen movement’s liberal-friendly social and political practices cannot be explained without reference to the economic and political liberalizing reforms which Turkey has experienced in recent decades. Liberal Islamic groups are generally found in those countries where we see a liberalizing and/or liberalized

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economy and politics. The Indonesian and Turkish examples are very illustrative in this regard. The democratic practices of those Muslims living in Western liberal societies can also shed light on this argument. When judging the compatibility of Islam and democracy, it is analytically problematic to focus on Islamic movements in those countries where authoritarian institutions prevail. A nuanced analysis should compare the political behaviours of Muslims living under authoritarian and liberal regimes. Second, the institutional environment alone cannot explain the patterns of Islam and liberalism; one should also analyse whether or not liberalization is beneficial to the Islamic groups. The Gülen movement’s integration with the market economy created huge opportunities for its participants. Economic liberalization led to the emergence of a new bourgeoisie, which had been less influential in the past when the market was not competitive and the state supported only certain business groups. Political liberalization also enhanced Islamic groups’ room for manoeuvre resulting in a tremendous increase in the number of Islamic civil society organizations. A viable policy that aims to incorporate Islamic groups within the liberal economic and political system should also be attentive to the interests of Islamic groups. In order to develop a liberal-friendly discourse, the Islamic movements under authoritarian systems need to become autonomous from the state. The Islamic groups that have close links with the authoritarian state apparatus are less likely to have a liberal-friendly discourse since their interests depend on the maintenance of authoritarianism. Finally, if an Islamic group has a cooperative normative repertoire, it is more likely to develop a liberal-friendly discourse. Even when the interests of Islamic groups coincide with liberalization, it may be difficult to develop a liberal-friendly discourse if a group embraces a conflict-ridden political and social discourse. Through its moderate and reconciliatory rhetoric, the Gülen movement has contributed to Turkey’s civic life. If a movement has reconciliatory rhetoric, its involvement in public debates strengthens democracy. The Gülen movement, by entering into the public sphere, is forced to confront and come to terms with liberal normative structures, while also influencing the formation of social and political practices at large. This, as Casanova (2001) argues, activates the potential role of religious norms and institutions in the formation of civil society and the process of democratization. The rise of moderate Islamic groups in the Muslim world is, then, a good start for a democratic future.

6 The Influence of the Gülen Movement in the Emergence of a Turkish Cultural ‘Third Way’ Marie-Elisabeth Maigre-Branco

1.  Introduction

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uring the last decade, the debate on democratization in the Islamic world has been very lively. The focus of the former US president George W. Bush’s administration on promoting democracy in a ‘Greater Middle East’, maintained to some extent by his successor Barack Obama, has had a strong impact on academia and research centres that started identifying some evidence of a future ‘democratization in the Middle East’. All of a sudden, starting in December 2010, their conceptual theories came to life when the violent street manifestations in Tunisia had a domino effect in the Arab World and the Middle East in what is now known as the ‘Arab Spring’. A couple of years later, in spite of some encouraging outcomes with the first democratic elections in Tunisia (December 2011) and Egypt (May 2012), the grounding of democracy in most of the Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East remains precarious. Not only have the countries that have overthrown their authoritarian regimes a long way to go to set up and consolidate a truly democratic regime but other countries seem to have taken the opposite path as tragically demonstrated by the repression and bloodshed in Syria throughout 2012.

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In this context of democratic uncertainty, this chapter argues that Turkey still represents a unique case due to its exceptional historical opportunities. Since the 1980s, during the governments of Turgut Özal, social activities have considerably increased and diversified. Among the actors of the blooming civil society, the pro-Islamic organizations had an important influence because of their support for the cultural re-Islamization of the society within the constraints of its secular political system. At the heart of these pro-Islamic participants of the democratization process, over the last two decades the movement based on Gülen’s ideas has spread through an intellectual, educative, healthcare and media network. Articulated around the concepts of education, tolerance and inter-religious dialogue and unity, the movement aims to encourage a return to the dialogue between the religious and scientific worlds since ‘science and religion as two manifestations of the same truth’  – God’s existence and purpose (Gülen, 2004b). The notions of compassion, love and tolerance dominate the vision of the Islamic leader in every aspect of life including politics and international relations. This chapter intends to address the following question: what has been the specific role of Gülen’s movement in the emergence of a new Turkish culture? It argues that Gülen’s cultural and religious influence on both the business and the political classes within the Islamic movement has driven the moderation of political Islam and open the way towards integration into the new reality of globalization where the frontiers between religion and business are blurred and those notions are brought together within a new conception of culture. The first part of this chapter contrasts the evolution of political Islam in Turkey from radical ideas (for instance, the creation of an Islamic state) to moderate and pro-democratic ones, aligned with Gülen’s political ideas. Observing the convergence of three groups, the religious-conservative businesspeople, the followers of Gülen and the Muslim democrats of Justice and Development Party (AKP), the second part of the chapter attempts to situate the meaning of this sociocultural alliance in a broader context, beyond Turkey.

2.  Gülen’s influence on the moderation of political Islam in Turkey? The potential role of the Gülen movement in the evolution of political Islam has rarely been properly addressed. Could it be possible that the Gülen movement, especially the idea of its founder have influenced the whole political dimension of the Islamic movement? Initially this assumption may

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look odd as the link between Gülen and the political Islam is far from obvious, contrary to what many Kemalists have claimed. Instead, in the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between the Gülen movement and the Islamist Refah party were rather cold, each accusing the other of ‘secretive fanaticism’ (White, 2001: 112). Aras and Çaha (2000) reported: ‘Relations with Refah supporters are tense given that Refah supporters widely believe that the secular establishment uses Gülen’s community to obstruct their path. Necmettin Erbakan, Refah’s long-time chairman, even accused Gülen of accepting government support to threaten Refah.’ Considered as an elitist movement, the Gülen movement had ‘little recognition in rural and working-class areas’ (White, 2001: 112) while Refah had developed since the 1960s as a result of the support of voters from the eastern and central Anatolian towns. Therefore, the two groups attracted different publics and sent out different messages, one asking for compromise with the secular system and the other proposing a rupture with Kemalist principles. Furthermore, contrary to the Islamist Erbakan, Fethullah Gülen has always been against the application of the Shari’a Islamic law by the state and considers the democracy as the best kind of government, accepting ‘Western civilization as a suitable foundation for material life while considering Islamic civilization suitable for spiritual life’ (Aras and Çaha, 2000). In an interview in 1995 quoted by Kuru (2005: 265), he criticized anti-Western feelings: ‘Anti-Westernism should force us out of civilization’. The only political positions he has consistently advocated have been: first, the return to the relations of independence between the state and the religion as they were fairly maintained at the time of the Ottoman Empire – and that also exist today in most of Western Democracy; and second, the integration of Turkey with the European Union – which should secure religious freedom and an appropriate separation between the state and religion. In July 2005 the journal, The Muslim World (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 447–67), published a special issue on Fethullah Gülen and his works, including a series of academic articles and a long interview with him. In the interview, Gülen stated that the Muslim religion included a moral duty of respect for the rights and freedoms of religious minorities. Gülen rejected the necessity of establishing an Islamic state based on the principles of Shari’a since he distinguished the elements of Islamic law, such as they appear in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, from the successive historic experiences which corresponded to the appropriate needs of their times. Today, since consensus or ‘mutual contract’ between Muslims was essential in government, a ‘caliphate’ could not be imposed on the populations by force, as it would probably occur in the case of hypothetical application: ‘The revival of the Caliphate would be very difficult [today] and making Muslims accept such a revived Khilafah would be impossible’ (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 457).

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On the other hand, Islam is particularly related to democracy because ‘in a democratic society the source of law is colour-blind and free from ethnic prejudice’ favouring then the ‘development of human rights, political participation protection of minority rights’, ‘no one can ignore the universal values that the Qur’an and the Sunnah have represented with regard to the rights mentioned above’ (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 457). For the Muslims who live in democracy, ‘there is [thus] no need to seek an alternative state’ (Saritoprak & Ünal, 2005: 451). Between 1982 and 1998 (in other words during the period of the rise and decline of Refah), Gülen’s ideas had little influence on those Islamists who advocated a more aggressive stance, including the introduction of Shari’a law, the establishment of an Islamic common market and an Islamic Defence Pact. The movement became stronger when it started attracting not only the Anatolian poor and middle class and the immigrants to urban areas but also a new Islamic bourgeoisie with Anatolian origins and represented through the MÜSIAD association, which is the ‘Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen’ (MÜSİAD – Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği). This was created by five pro-Islamic businessmen on 5 May 1990 in Istanbul. The principal objectives of the association are to help the small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs of Anatolia to increase their business potential and to export. The association especially aimed to make it possible to create networks between the provincial towns and the national level. In the elections of 27 March 1994, Refah collected 19.1 per cent of the votes becoming the ruling party in the city halls of Ankara and Istanbul. But its major breakthrough was the victory at the general elections of December 1995 which caused a great surprise. Without a majority, Refah achieved a coalition with Dogru Yol (the ‘Party of the Right Way’ or DYP) that was very quickly called the Refahyol government. Under Refahyol, the high aspirations for social justice and Islamization of Turkish society were quickly passed over due to the need to cooperate with Dogu Yol in order to remain in the government. Despite the lack of real Islamist policies, the officers of the Turkish army closely supervised Refahyol. Certain initiatives, like the trips to Iran and Libya or the aim to remove the headscarf ban in universities and public administrations, worried the authorities and the most laic segment of the population. Finally, on 18 June 1997, after one year in the government as prime minister, under pressure from the military, Erbakan was constrained to resign. In the months following this ‘soft’ coup d’état, all the Islamic-oriented organizations, especially the Welfare party politicians and the pro-Islamic businessmen suffered a series of legal proceedings. Even Fethullah Gülen, who had tried to remain outside the tensions between Refah and the military, was accused of fanaticism for an interview he had undertaken on TV, criticizing certain

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aspects of the Turkish system. All of a sudden, after this wave of anti-Islamist repression, the discourse of the Islamists changed dramatically, endorsing the democratic ideal, and became very similar to the views that Gülen had always advocated. This shift surprised many observers. For example Marvine Howe stated: During a six-week visit to Istanbul the summer of 1998, I talked to a wide range about Islamic activists and found little echo of the old anti-American, anti-NATO, anti-Israel, anti-Europe rhetoric. Instead, even militant Islamists were now asking for basic American rights: freedom of religion, assembly, enterprise, speech, and dress. (Howe, 2000: 179–80) Thus, the new party which succeeded Refah, the Fazilet or ‘Virtue’ party, adopted a different ideology. In a discussion with Marvine Howe, Abdullah Gül, then appointed by the Virtue Party recommended ‘democratic moderation’. As one who formerly called Refah an ‘Islamic-oriented party’, he now described Fazilet in these words: ‘This is not a religious party; we are open to all citizens, not only religious people’ (Howe, 2000: 183). As evidence for a major change in their discourse, the Islamists now supported the accession of Turkey to the European Union. They understood that by adopting EU rights they would be able to obtain more religious freedom for themselves. At the end of July 1999, the ‘renovating’ branch of Fazilet, led by Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an and Abdullah Gül, split from the ‘old guard’ of Erbakan’s followers. The ‘Party of Justice and Development’ (or AKP) was founded in 2001 and, in the general elections of November 2002, ran against Erbakan’s Saadet (the ‘Happiness Party’) for the prime ministership. As we know, the AKP was remarkably successful, gaining 34 per cent of the votes, while Saadet gained less than 3 per cent. Once prime minister, Erdog˘an continued to promote the new discourse, advocating a ‘Muslim democracy’ or ‘conservative democracy’ which he compared with the German Christian democracy, stressing the complementarities between, rather antagonism of, Islam and democracy. This discussion about the changes that led to the emergence of the AKP was necessary in order to show how the Islamic movement shifted politically from a radical anti-Western stance to the endorsement of democracy and religious tolerance through a moderate communication and behaviour. They understood that if they wanted to promote their vision of a tolerant society where women would be able to wear headscarves in public places including administrations and universities and where private Islamic schools (Imam-Hatip) would be fully recognized as an option in the Turkish education system, moderation and the recourse to a Western-democratic rhetoric was the answer which was what Fethullah Gülen strongly believed in and had been advocating for years.

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However, is it possible to measure the influence of Gülen on the moderation of political Islam, especially knowing that the relationship between the followers of Gülen and the Islamists has been consistently very distant? At the moment, there is no clear explanation for the moderation of the Islamists. Seda Demiralp and Todd A. Eisenstadt (2006) believe that the 120-day imprisonment of Erdog˘an in 1999 for reading a provocative poem in a public meeting may have been a key factor: As Erdogan sat in the darkness of a prison cell, he must have wondered whether it had been worth it. While in jail, he met with RP party members Abdulkadir Aksu and Azmi Ates. The three talked about the future of the party and criticized its leadership for the party’s decline in share of the vote in the 1999 national parliamentary elections. . . Radical confrontation between the RP and the military-secularist establishment was not beneficial to Erdogan and its party anymore. (Demiralp and Eisenstadt, 2006: 4) For these authors, the emergent moderation would depend upon one man and his ambition. Another explanation for this moderation process has been outlined by Ziya Öniş (2006) regarding the role of the Islamic bourgeoisie in this moderation process: ‘The fact that winners of globalization are part of the broad electoral coalition [of Erdogan’s AKP] also explains, in part, why Islamist politics in Turkey has been evolving in a moderate direction in recent years since these groups, far more than the poor and underprivileged strata of society, have a lot to lose from open confrontation with the secular establishment and the state elites.’ The ‘winners of globalization’ to which he refers are the class of businessmen that emerged in the 1980s and gained significant economic power in the next decade. Coming from the interior of the Turkey, they are often referred as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ (Anadolu Kaplanlari) due their strong attachment to the provincial identity and the preservation of their traditional and religious values. Members of the MÜSIAD, an association created to represent them these entrepreneurs were proud to belong to the employers’ class and therefore aspired to a place among the elites, which had been denied to them (see Bug˘ra, 1999). The traditional Turkish elites (senior executives, staff officers and industrialists protected by the state) had generally been brought together within TÜSIAD (the Turkish Association of the Industrialists and Businessmen) and have been characterized by their determination to preserve laic, Kemalist principles. These established elites had little will to share their hegemony with the owners of mainly small- and medium-size companies who had not been raised in the city and were self-confessedly very religious. As a reaction, those businessmen assumed openly Islamist positions and benefited from the

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political rise of the Islamist party with the emergence of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) relying on the Anatolian and Islamic values in the overall context of the new economic opportunities. The ‘process of February 28’ that followed the dismissal of Erbakan in 1997 also had an impact on these businessmen as they were clearly considered to be related to political Islam. The director of the MÜSIAD and some members of various companies were prosecuted. At that point, the specific positioning of the ‘Islamist bourgeoisie’ revealed its limits: how to reconcile the aspiration for social recognition (which requires the integration in the pre-existing system) and a political identity which clashes with this established order? For the ‘other’, more intellectual Islamic bourgeoisie who followed Gülen’s principles rather than Erbakan’s, there was no dilemma. This was because their belief in a strict separation of the public and private spheres made religious commitments at home and as carried out through social, apolitical activities compatible with respect for the current institutions of the Turkish Republic. Furthermore, for middle-class observant Muslims (including businesspeople and politicians) Gülen’s background as an Islamic scholar gave his discourse a legitimate Islamic authority that Erbakan, who was an engineer by training, did not have. At the end of the 1990s, most of the Islamic businessmen had understood that keeping a low profile concerning their political views was the only way to secure their social position and, at the same time, to keep growing as key economic actors in the civil society. Simultaneously, it may still be wondered who made the greatest contribution to the emergence of this new moderate thinking: was it Erdog˘an himself after his testing experience in prison? Or was it the Islamist businessmen concerned about losing their privileged lifestyle and economic welfare? Or was it Gülen who championed the ideas that became the dominate ideas of the Islamic movement in Turkey at the beginning of the new century? Nevertheless, the contractors of MÜSIAD tried to adapt this new reality, conceiving it as an opportunity to live by the Islamic principles of economy and business. Entrepreneurship became thus an act of faith. While it is quite difficult to tell which group has had the foremost influence, researchers and academics have outlined the interconnection between the Islamic bourgeoisie, the moderate Islamists and the Gülen movement. It is noteworthy that many of these business people as well as some Virtue and later AKP politicians sent their children to Gülen’s schools. Furthermore, Zaman is one of largest daily newspapers in Turkey, the largest by far in Anatolian towns, and the majority of Virtue and AKP’s supporters, including the businessmen, are regular readers. The triangulation appears clearly in a report of the European Stability Initiative (ESI) on the recent economic development of central Anatolia (Orta Anadolu), especially in the city of Kayseri. With the

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growth of the main cities of central Anatolia in the last 15 years, traditional Anatolian society has profoundly changed. Now living mostly in urban areas, the population of central Anatolia is more educated, more industrious and infinitely more modern in its tastes and modes of consumption. All of this success is due to the multiplication of private enterprises that used their money to modernize and improve the living conditions of the local population. Surprisingly, the businessmen of Kayseri refer openly to entrepreneurial values that have been associated with the Protestants since the 1905 publication of Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: hard work, productive investment, honesty in business relations, risk-taking, charity and community service. Unexpectedly, interviews of 94 businessmen from Kayseri reveal an iterative reference to Protestantism and its values. To support its observations with theory, ESI refers to the Turkish sociologist M. Hakan Yavuz, who has done some specialist work on the Gülen movement (see Yavuz and Esposito, 2003b; Yavuz, 2003c); and one aspect is particularly underlined by the article: the impact of the Gülen movement on the ‘Muslim renewal’ (tajdid)  – similar in some ways to the protestant reform. In their speech, the search for profit and for the welfare of the Muslim community became as important as prayer and fasting. There would thus be a convergence between modern Sufi thought and the new Anatolian entrepreneurship. The Islamic capitalist discourse grew within the new industrial districts of Anatolia and a burgeoning associative life whose activities are mainly financed by the private contributions of the local businessmen. Interestingly, Abdullah Gül, the second leader of the new Muslim-democrat AKP, comes from Kayseri. It seems that a number of Islamic factions came together at some point: the Islamic bourgeoisie (symbolized by the MÜSIAD association or the companies linked to powerful brotherhoods and communities), and the Islamic intellectual elite (writing columns in Zaman or participating in the work and/or events of the Journalists’ and Writers’ Foundation (JWF)). Finally, the Abant Platform has been a strong source of inspiration and creativity for the pro- Islamic intellectual elite. Consisting of participants with very diverse opinions (atheists, agnostics, Marxists, leftists, Islamists etc.), this regular conference held all over the world (including in Washington, DC, Paris, Brussels, Moscow and Cairo) aims to discuss sensitive issues such as laïcism, democracy and Islam, globalization, diversification, education, liberalism, the Middle East and the European Union and confirmed that it was possible to reach an agreement through dialogue – as Gülen had repeatedly advocated. Many of the AKP founders, MPs and ministers attended its meetings well before they founded AKP. Through these kinds of initiatives and their associated intellectual rapprochements, the concepts of ‘Business’, ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘Conservative Democracy’ have gradually converged

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to re-elaborate the cultural content of the Islamic movement in a more Western-democratic and capitalist way. To conclude, the apparent division inside the Islamic movement between an elitist, educated minority on one hand and a more down-to-earth majority related with the Refah party one the other tended to disappear as the Islamic bourgeoisie moved away from political Islam and took over the leadership of a new pro-democratic and pro-European party at the beginning of the twenty-first century. While we cannot definitively establish the role of Gülen in this process, the cultural change in the direction of his long-claimed socio-political ideals was highly beneficial giving more significance to his movement in Turkey and abroad.

3.  Gülen’s contribution: Enlightening the cultural content of globalization Finally, it is very important to place the new Muslim culture in a broader context  – that of globalization. The intensification of transnational relations, especially in the sociocultural and economic fields can also explain the shift to a more moderate Islamic culture in Turkey since the mechanisms and media offered by globalization are huge, including better media coverage of the thinking of sociocultural actors and precious business tools to finance and implement their activities and economic power. Ahmet T. Kuru (2005: 258) sees extraordinary potential for the organizations that, in the past, were limited by strong state control: The relationship between globalization and the nation-state is not a zero-sum game. Globalization empowers the free market system at the expense of the statist regimes . . . It weakens state monopolies indifferent areas (that is, the economy, the media, and education) through a free market system and the spread of communication technologies. Referring to the Gülen movement, Kuru considers it as a perfect illustration of the success that Islamic institutions can have which are able both to benefit from ‘international opportunity structure shaped by globalization’ and to develop a ‘tolerant normative framework open to cross-cultural interactions’ can have. He especially insists on the international opportunity structures: First the movement has been very successful in English instruction, which has been in high demand in many countries . . . The second resource of the movement is that it has created a synergy based on

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cooperation between educators and businesspeople. The sympathizers of the Gülen movement have been powerful enough to establish an interest-free bank and insurance company. Without the financial donations of businesses, the movement’s schools could not have afforded to operate. (Kuru, 2005: 62) The link between business and religious communitarism appears clearly here: developing business activities seems to be only way to translate thinking or religious beliefs into something practical. In the case of Gülen, the international opportunity structure has been the need for English-speaking elitist schools in Turkey and abroad. But only what Kuru called a ‘tolerant normative framework’, which is progressive thinking, could make the vision of the community come true. This ‘recipe’ of success through moderation and opening can also explain the change brought about by the Anatolian Tigers and the political faction of Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an. To succeed in their businesses, the Anatolian Tigers needed excellent relationships with the businessmen of diverse export countries  – Europe, Russia, and some Muslim countries as well; on the other side, a friendly relationship with the European Union leading to a future membership would secure the political settlement of Erdog˘an and his followers, and avoid any ban from the military. The benefits of adaptation to the new international system, highly superior to any form of resistance, explains perfectly why these three movements have joined forces at the beginning of the twenty-first century to promote a new culture, neither Islamist nor Kemalist but ‘in-between’, and at one with globalization. The business dimension of the new pro-democratic Muslim culture is very important because it allowed its actors to bring back the benefit of globalization to the local ground and to influence the thinking of their peers through their new instruments (namely marketing and advertisement). From their broad media representation, the Muslim communities mentioned in the first part of this chapter made Islam more visible in a public field that had previously been monopolized by the Kemalists. Their advertising agencies (ISIK, Öncü and Panel Ajans) and television channels (Samanyolu TV, TGTR and Kanal 7) benefited from the growing demand of the urban, young and Islamicallyoriented generation in search of consumer goods compatible with their religious identity and their need to distinguish themselves from the prevalent laïc culture. Using inventiveness and persuasion, the Islamic companies created an alternative culture going beyond the Western ‘copy-paste’ offered by the classic media. By using a language more adapted to the lower layers of the population, these communities created a bridge between their reality and modernity, opening people’s mind to the capitalist culture but, at the

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same time, keeping control of media instruments allowing them morally and culturally to influence modernity. Therefore, gaining ‘market share’ as a media holding and gaining ‘cultural share’ as a thinking movement over concurrent philosophies in a given society are converging today and to some extent redefining the concept of culture. To describe this phenomenon in the Islamic context, the sociologist Patrick Haenni uses the concept of ‘Islam de marché’ (market Islam) which, I believe, is extremely relevant for explaining the cultural move in Turkey: At the crossroad of an Islamisation becoming more bourgeois and its separation with the Islamist matrix, a new religious configuration is being born which we will describe as Islam de marché because of its affinities with institutions of the economic field it uses as a support, and with the new business culture from which it borrows the categories of its speech. [Au croisement d’une Islamisation qui s’embourgeoise et de son découplage avec la matrice Islamiste, une nouvelle configuration religieuse est en train de naître que nous qualifierons d’Islam de marché en raison de ses affinités avec des institutions du champ économique qui lui servent de support, et avec la nouvelle culture d’entreprise à laquelle elle emprunte les catégories de son discours.’] (Haenni, 2005: 9) Basically, the market religious culture (‘religion entrepreneuriale’) trusts in private enterprise (not state interventionism) and piety. For Haenni, the globalization is allowing the market religious culture to expand in many different context, in the Muslim communities as in other groups  – as the Christian churches in the United States that have been using for years capitalist methods to build up their circle of believers. When Fethullah Gülen decided to stay in the United States and to keep promoting his ideas from there through a network of American inter-religious dialogue NGOs, he ultimately changed the fate of his movement. By mixing with the American society and people from other religions, many of them Christians, he is making his message even more universal. In this country where hundreds of different religious movements operate, his ideas are very well received, not only by the Muslim and Turkish minorities but also the Christian communities. Jill Carroll’s book, A Dialogue of Civilization: Gülen’s Islamic Ideals and Humanistic Discourse, received excellent response. Living in the United States, at what is the centre of this new religious market thinking, undeniably places Gülen and local Gülen-inspired NGOs as key interlocutors of the Muslim version of a well-established culture there.

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4.  Fethullah Gülen and the movement’s impact on the Muslim world The movement became the strong network that it is today because it has been able successfully to combine the peaceful discourse of Gülen supported by intellectual institutions and a solid media group and a network of schools where these ideas can develop and guide new generations around the world. This movement benefited from a set of opportunities that helped its influence to increase within the society and (indirectly) politics. For example, the quality of the education provided by its schools while the Imam-Hatip schools were becoming obsolete convinced many pro-Islamic businessmen and politicians to put their children in its schools and therefore they become familiar to the movement’s principles and purpose. On the other hand, the climate of hostility against the Islamic businessmen and politicians favoured, among them, new behaviours of opening to the West and the secular elites so the Gülen movement and its inter-religious dialogue gradually became a point of reference. At the end of the 1990s, more of the Islamist politicians abandoned their extremist discourse and adopted pro-democratic views very similar to those of Gülen who advocated tajdid – or Islamic renewal through social reform. By anticipating the need to adapt Islam to the present times, confident that the Turkish Republic would have to adapt too and open itself to more diversity, Gülen has been a visionary. He has unlocked the way to a new global culture that places Muslim democrats ahead of any radical thinking and he has sent a strong message to the Muslim world showing a successful way towards democratic transition and gradual adaptation to globalization without losing landmarks and religious background. To the Muslim world Gülen says that there is nothing to fear about democracy and globalization because the Qur’an teaches compassion, love and tolerance and, through these principles, nothing should prevent a Muslim from being, at one and the same time, a servant of God and a first-class citizen within a democratic country. Gülen’s social movement has been able to benefit from the capitalist globalization by efficiently using newly available marketing instruments and become a bridge between modernity and a large segment of the Turkish society. At that point, cultural influence relies on the gain of market share in the media realms. This is a new way of putting things because it means that, in the long run, only people who are able to be in command of the capitalist game will culturally triumph. So not only are the participants of the Gülen movement taking part in the emergence of a new Turkish culture but they are also contributing to a new understanding of what culture consists of.

7 Fethullah Gülen, Turkey and the European Union Paul Weller

1.  Turkey and the European Union: Setting the scene

T

 he issues and debates around Turkey’s possible membership in what is now the European Union (EU) have often acted as a microcosm for a wider range of key debates and issues, both within Turkey and beyond, concerning the nature of the appropriate relationships between economics and politics, religions and cultures, and states and societies. While some member states have supported eventual Turkish accession, others have argued that the cultural and religious differences mean that full accession is not appropriate. In Turkey itself, some supporters of EU membership have seen it as a major economic opportunity for Turkey, while others have seen it as a means through which to further develop and entrench human rights and civil society over and against the continued shadow cast by Turkey’s history of military coups. Others have opposed membership  – sometimes on nationalist, and sometimes on religious grounds. Within these debates, Fethullah Gülen has articulated a clear position in favour of membership, the rationales and contexts for which are explored within this chapter. The question of whether or not Turkey joins the European Union as a full member is arguably both a very important one for Turkey itself as well as one of the most important ones in relation to the cultural and religious self-identity of Europe and its future economic development. Of course, in the context of

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the current economic and political crises in Europe (and especially within the Eurozone), there will be some who will want to argue that active pursuit of this question is a distraction from the more substantial challenges facing the economic and political future of the European Union. However, in addition to more general considerations that have been pertinent for quite some years now, this chapter argues that it is especially at this time of economic crisis that the question of Turkish membership is precisely not a distraction, but could rather become part of a solution to a number of current issues in the European Union, including especially those of an economic and demographic kind. How important the issue may be for Turkey is perhaps open to contention given that until recently it was having economic growth rates of around 7 per cent, and even deep into the Euro crisis it has only been revised down to a 4 per cent target for 2012 (Yazar, 2011: 86) which stands in stark contrast with the economic stagnation being experienced in much of the European Union. Not surprisingly there is now some evidence of a change in attitude towards EU membership both among the Turkish population in general as well as on the part of the Turkish government as compared with around a decade ago when Turkish support for EU membership was at a high point. Nevertheless, this chapter will suggest some reasons why membership of the European Union may still be important for Turkey too.

2.  Turkey and the European Union: Historical context Until it was superseded by the ongoing impact of the banking meltdown, the relationship between Turkey and the European Union was a topic of hot debate in a number of EU member states and societies. The goal of membership was a key aim of the newly elected Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) government when it first came into power in Turkey in 2002. In that, at least, the AKP government had considerable support also from a good range of the Parliamentary opposition, although even ahead of the new questions posed by the crisis of the Eurozone, issues around the desirability of membership of, and/or exclusion from, the European Union had also been subject to considerable debate within Turkish society. Formalized relationships between Turkey and the European Union and its institutional predecessors have been long-standing, reaching back into the middle of the last century. Moreover, the relationships between the social, religious and political precursors of the modern Turkish state and the western outcrop of the Eurasian landmass are ones that reach back into history in terms of diplomacy, trade and commerce, not to mention

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military conflict. Even more significantly, through the representation of these conflicts in the popular religious, cultural and political imagination (Wheatcroft, 2004) powerful perceptual effects have been created that inform mutual distrust in relation to the interface between the territories and peoples of the predominantly Muslim former Ottoman Empire and those of the religio-political configuration historically characterized as ‘Christendom’. On one hand, the image of ‘the Turks at the gates of Vienna’ continues to be one that has a hold on popular European imagination, and not only in Austria – although in reality the historical relations between the Ottoman Empire and the realms of Western Europe were much more complex and varied than that image suggests, with alliances between the empire and various Western European countries being made according to their changing interests. On the other hand, in Turkey there remains a suspicion of Western powers that might be all too ready to exploit any lack of unity among Turks in order to bring about through a cultural and financial neocolonialism what they could not achieve by military force during the period of classical imperialism and colonialism. Within this overall context, this chapter highlights and discusses some of the key issues cited in current debates over Turkey’s full membership of the European Union. In doing so, it also considers the positions taken on this by the Turkish Muslim scholar, Fethullah Gülen, as well as aspects of the role that might be played in these debates by the Hizmet, or civil society movement, that has been inspired by his teachings.

3.  The EEC, EC, European Union and the Republic of Turkey The modern history of the relationship between Turkey and what is now the European Union has tracked the evolution of the Union itself that, of course, was originally founded by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) involving the post-Second World War countries of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. On 20 September 1959, the Republic of Turkey applied to become an associate member of what, by then (from 1957) had become the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey’s accession to associate membership was marked by the so-called Ankara Agreement, signed on 12 September 1963. In relation to this, Walter Hallstein (quoted in Patten, 2005: 70), the then president of the European Commission, stated: Turkey is part of Europe. This is the deepest possible meaning of this operation which brings, in the most appropriate way conceivable in our

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time, the confirmation of a geographical reality as well as a historical truism that has been valid for several centuries. The Ankara Agreement still provides the legal basis for relations between Turkey and what is now (through the Maastricht Treaty of 1992) the European Union. But since then the issues and debates around Turkey’s possible full membership of the European Union have gone through a number of highs and lows in matters that have often served as microcosms for what are now seen, both within Turkey and beyond, as a number of broader key issues in relationships between economics and politics, religions and cultures, and states and societies. The Ankara Agreement was added to, in 1995, by a Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union. Then, in 1999, the European Council accorded Turkey candidate status for full membership of the European Union. At their summit in December 2002, the leaders of the EU agreed that, if by the end of 2004, Turkish political reforms met the political part of the so-called Copenhagen criteria, then negotiations for full membership could start ‘without delay’. The Copenhagen political criteria stated that a prospective member must be ‘a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities’. Although economics remained a key component of the relationship between Turkey and the European Union, politics, law and culture also came more into the foreground, with religion hovering in the background. During this period, the European Union itself changed, expanding substantially from the original 6 member states, through the 12, to an ‘enlarged’ post-Communist Europe of 25 member states, with the admission of a further two candidate states – Bulgaria and Romania – raising the total number to 27 including (controversially in relation to Turkey’s historic positions and interests) the admission of the Republic of Cyprus prior to any reunification of the island. During the same period, Turkey also went through a series of domestic political, social and economic challenges and upheavals including three classical coups (1960, 1971 and 1980) in which the armed forces intervened to remove the civilian government on the grounds of seeking to restore order and stability in the context of serious social conflicts, political and ethnic violence. Under the government of Turgut Ozal, a measure of economic liberalization began to occur and many of the previously rigid structures of the state and society began to loosen. However, in 1997, in the so-called postmodern coup the Refah (Welfare) Party was manoeuvred out of office. This was on the grounds that the party’s perceived Islamic radicalism was about to cause a civil uprising, in relation to which the armed forces’ constitutional role as guarantor of Turkey’s secular, Kemalist heritage, obliged it to intervene.

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More recently there has been a period of relative political stability following the AKP’s election into government, which has also since been twice re-elected in 1997 and 2011 – on both occasions with increases in the popular vote, but decreases in the number of seats. During the period of AKP rule there have been constitutional crises, but there has not – at least so far – been a military intervention of the kinds previously experienced, even though in the febrile atmosphere of Turkish politics there has been the uncovering of an apparent network of conspiracies known by the names of Sledgehammer and Ergenekon. In fact, in many ways during this period, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government have used the goal of EU membership to initiate difficult internal legal, then constitutional, and now finally, military reforms (see Tanriverdi, 2011: 76–81) in Turkey. It is against such a general contextual background that this paper now turns to consider the specific positions of Fethullah Gülen in relation to Turkish membership of the European Union, as well as the bearing that the existence and work of the Hizmet movement that has been inspired by his teaching, might have upon these issues, as seen from both inside and outside Turkey.

4.  Fethullah Gülen and EU-Turkey issues as seen from inside Turkey In 2005, the executive summary of the Turkish country report in the Standard Eurobarometer survey of public opinion on a range of issues in EU member and candidate states reported (TNS Opinion and Social, 2005a: 5) that 59  per  cent of the Turkish population thought EU membership would be a ‘good thing’, with 12 per cent thinking it would not be good and around 17 per cent undecided. The top three ‘meanings’ of the European Union for those surveyed in Turkey were ‘economic prosperity’ (43%); ‘social protection’ (27%); and ‘freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU’ (25%), with ‘peace’ (23%), ‘democracy’ (20%) and ‘cultural diversity’ (18%) being of only secondary importance. Topping Turkish fears about EU membership at that time were that, ‘their language will be used less’ (62%); ‘organized crime and the drugs trade will increase’ (62%); and there will be a ‘loss of national identity and culture’ (58%), the latter of which compares with 37 per cent of respondents across the current EU member states as a whole expressing that fear. Reflecting on the debate as it took shape in Turkey in the middle of the 2000s, in a 2005

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article in the New Anatolian, entitled ‘Debating Turkey’s EU membership: Realists vs. Romantics’, Ayhan Şimşek (2005: 21) argued that: Discussions about the EU have become one of the main dividing lines in Turkey’s domestic politics, since after Turkey was accepted as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki European Council . . . One group strongly favors Turkey’s EU membership perspective, and sees it as a ‘magic wand’ that may solve all the nation’s problems. The other group, on the contrary, portrays the EU as a ‘great devil’ which is believed to have a hidden agenda to divide the country behind its human face. In contrast to both of these positions, which he calls ‘romantic’, Şimşek notes: ‘The romantic EU supporters are losing almost all their credibility, while the romantic opposition is going down a dangerous path, and including even some racist and xenophobic elements in its rhetoric.’ Instead of romanticism, the article argued instead for what Şimşek called a ‘realist’ position. Arguably, such a description also characterizes the stance that Fethullah Gülen has taken in relation to EU membership. Despite opposition from some Islamists Gülen has, in recent years, been clear in his support of full EU membership for Turkey. In a 2006 piece entitled ‘With Accession, Europe Would Know us Better’, Gülen (2006c: 40) said, ‘I have been in favour of EU membership for a long time’ and that, ‘In my opinion, the EU is something that the Turkish people long for.’ Furthermore, in his capacity as Honorary President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF), Gülen (2004a) sent a message to the Abant Platform meeting held on 3–4 December 2004 at the European Parliament in Brussels in which he made three key points about the developing relationships between Turkey and the European Union. These included: 1 The idea that Turkish entry into the European Union would be a

fulfilment of the so-called contemporary civilization objective of Atatürk. 2 That the historic role of the Turkish armed forces in this should not be

forgotten, even though this is sometimes seen as one of the biggest obstacles for Turkey’s full membership. 3 That Turkish membership of the EU would ‘reinforce its role as the

island of peace in the heart of the Eurasia’. This latter point was made on the grounds that ‘A Turkey in the EU will more successfully realize its function to establish a bridge between the Islamic world and the West’. Gülen’s clear position in favour of EU membership is

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especially significant given the more traditionalist historical background out of which he comes. For example, scholars such as Bekim Agai (2003: 63) argue that earlier in his life Gülen ‘used to see the solution to Turkey’s problems as raising Muslims’ consciousness in order to overcome the dominance of Westernized cognitive patterns and to restructure a shared grammar in Turkey based on Islam’. But Agai also notes that, during the 1990s, Gülen began to identify that a lot of Turkey’s problems were to be found in Turkey itself. Today, while giving appropriate recognition to the achievements of the Ottoman past, Gülen (1996: 53) has argued strongly that Muslims should not retreat from modernity into past glories since: no success or victory from the past can come to help us in our current struggle. Today our duty is to offer humanity a new message composed of vivid scenes from the past together with understanding of the needs of the present. In other words, Gülen’s fully developed vision of the contemporary world is neither nationalist with regard Turkey, nor traditionalist with regard to religion. At the same time, drawing as it does upon a strong commitment to Islamic sources and Ottoman history, his teaching is capable of connecting with both Turkish nationalist and Islamic traditionalists and can thus facilitate the possibility of dialogue in Turkey between such traditionalists and those of a more contemporary and secular outlook. As Hakan Yavuz (2003a: 29) summarises it, ‘Gülen’s views on the precepts of Islam are pragmatic and contemporary without being liberal.’ In contrast, one of the main concerns to be found among the Turkish traditionalists is that, when it comes down to it, the European Union is really a ‘Christian Club’. The fear is expressed that full membership of the Union will inevitably lead to continued and probably accelerated erosion of Islamic belief and practice in Turkey that was seen as already having been set in motion by the secularizing Kemalists. Such perceptions were, of course, reinforced when leading European politicians and personalities, as in the debates on the European Constitutional Treaty, argued for a special recognition of Christianity as a basis for the values espoused by the Union. In relation to these kinds of concerns Gülen (in Gündem, 2005) says: Some Muslims have recently published and distributed books on such grounds: ‘if they (Europeans) come, they will influence us and steal our youth from us, with the way they look, their mentality, their conception of religion, their notion of God’.

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As has been pointed out, Gülen was himself at one time not a complete stranger to perceptions of there being some external threat. However, significantly, in a 2000 interview with Hakan Yavuz (2003a: 45), Gülen said: We all change, don’t we? . . . By visiting the States and many other European countries, I realized the virtues and the role of religion in these societies. Islam flourishes in Europe and America much better than in many Muslim countries. This means freedom and the rule of law are necessary for personal Islam. In a piece on ‘Tolerance in the life of the individual and society’, Gülen (2004c: 43) points out with regard to the already very large Turkish Muslim presence in the current member states of the EU that ‘our citizens in European countries can only live in harmony in those countries by means of a vast atmosphere of tolerance’. In making such observations, Gülen is contrasting a civil society understanding of the ‘secular’ that is concerned with the participation of citizens of all religions and none in public life, as compared with an ideological form of secularism that is concerned to promote positivist philosophical positions and their philosophical consequences. It is such an approach which enables Gülen to take the important position, in contrast to a number of twentieth-century approaches often called ‘Islamism’ (and which were concerned to try to Islamize society by capturing control of the state, in terms of what might be called a kind of ‘religious Leninism’), that Islam does not need the state to survive, but rather needs educated and financially rich communities to flourish. In a way, not the state but rather community is needed under a full democratic system. (Gülen, as reported in Yavuz, 2003a: 45) Therefore, to the argument that Europe is ‘a Christian Club’ which, because of this, is alien to Turks and to Islam, Gülen refers to ‘some who have their doubts about their own religiosity’. By contrast for himself he says, ‘I could be on familiar terms with Europe. Through membership I could perhaps better explain my culture and myself to them. Perhaps they would be touched and would know us better.’ In other words, Fethullah Gülen’s position is characterized by a stance of proper confidence in his religious and cultural heritage which can help empower the approach of the Turkish government and society in relation to such matters.

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5.  Fethullah Gülen and EU-Turkey issues as seen from outside Turkey From the perspective of some existing EU states and – perhaps even more significantly  – from the perspective of many of the populations of the EU member states, the question of Turkey’s possible membership is by no means straightforward. Reflecting the concerns that exist, the same 2005 Eurobarometer survey that showed Turkish overall support for EU membership also showed (TNS Opinion and Social, 2005b: 159) that 52 per cent of EU citizens were against Turkey’s membership, although interestingly citizens from the new member states (48%) were more in favour of Turkey joining than citizens of the EU-15 (32% in favour). However, statistics such as these inevitably give only a broad ‘feel’ for general positions. Unpacking the issues in a more detailed way, the European Muslim reformer, Tariq Ramadan, addresses what he calls ‘the fundamental questions aroused by Turkey’s EU membership,’ and which he (Ramadan, 2006: 35) identifies in terms of ‘three main themes’, as follows: 1 Is Turkey really part of the European continent? 2 Does the predominantly Islamic Turkish society really participate in

the European identity? 3 Are fundamental human rights and principles of democracy suitably

respected? The geographical, cultural and religious concerns are most often (but not exclusively) expressed by governments, political parties, movements, associations of a more socially and religiously conservative and nationalist complexion. Those to do with democracy, the role of the military, and human rights are most often (but, again, not exclusively) expressed by groups with a more socialist and internationalist orientation. Those to do with migration are increasingly to be found among groups of most political and social complexions. In relation to the geographical question, there are those especially, but not only, among German and Austrian Christian Democrats (see Gow, 2006) who have argued for a clearer sense of the geographical boundaries of Europe to be established. In a way this is ironic given Czar Nicholas I’s nineteenth-century description of the Ottoman Empire as the ‘sick man of Europe’, a negative evaluation of capacity and vitality that, however, precisely identified Turkey as part of European reality! The European Union’s Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn (in Gow, 2006) responded to these German and Austrian Christian

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Democratic Party calls for a new definition of Europe’s borders by insisting that any European country respecting democratic values and the rule of law may apply: This does not mean that all European countries must apply or that the EU must accept all applications . . . But it means we should not draw in Indian ink some thick ‘faultline’ according to some notional historical borders between civilisations and thus construct a kind of velvet curtain only a few years after we got rid of the iron curtain. In relation to the issues to do with culture and religion, given Turkey’s predominantly Muslim inheritance, its Ottoman history in relation to Europe, and the current global and conflictual issues to do with ‘jihadist’ Muslims and terrorism, such concerns are almost inevitable and very challenging to overcome. From the clear positions that he has taken against the confusion of Islam and political ideology it is clear that Gülen understands the fears and concerns of non-Muslims. As Gülen (in Ünal and Williams, eds, 2000: 248) explains it, ‘The present, distorted image of Islam that has resulted from its misuse, by both Muslims and non-Muslims for their own goals, scares both Muslims and non-Muslims.’ As summarized by Sahin Alpay (1995), Gülen ‘opposes the use of Islam as a political ideology and a party philosophy, as well as polarizing society into believers and nonbelievers.’ In this perspective there is no inevitable civilizational gulf between people in Turkey and people in the historic lands of Christendom, while there are also anyway many millions of Muslims of Turkish and other ethnic and national descent, who are already citizens and/or settled members of current member states and societies of the European Union. In relation to the human rights concerns identified by Ramadan, in view of Turkey’s history of military coups and interventions and the strong continuing presence of both conspiracy-thinking as well as evidence of actual conspiracies, concerns inevitably remain about the stability of Turkish democracy. These concerns need to be taken seriously, since periods military rule generally give rise to more extensive human rights abuses, with less effective constraint from the rule of law. It should also be noted that some of the most vehement opposition to the possibility of Turkey joining the European Union has come from among the Turkish military leadership. This is because since the military understands itself as being the main guarantor of the secular Kemalist heritage and of the integrity of the Turkish state, the relativization of national sovereignty – such as that which inevitably occurs in connection with EU membership – can be seen as a potential threat.

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At the same time, it should be noted that it is possible for societies with a history of military rule to change. Thus it should be remembered that both Spain and Portugal emerged into EU membership from fascist and military dictatorships. In neither case did the wider Europe always have full confidence that these polities could maintain their fledgling democracies. Indeed, in the case of Spain, sections of the military did make attempts against the democratic order, but these attempts did not succeed due to a change in the overall popular and business orientations and expectations following integration into the European Union. In relation to issues to do with military rule and human rights in Turkey, in a number of statements Gülen made clear his support for the Turkish military as a bulwark either against what was perceived as a threat of chaos from internal radical leftists and/or during the Cold War period, externally from the Soviet Union. Thus Gülen (in Yavuz, 2003a: 27) can be found as being quoted to the effect that, ‘I am on always on the side of the state and the military. Without the state, there is anarchy and chaos.’ However, such general statements need to be understood in relation to the kind of overall approach that, from an Islamic perspective, is expected in relation to the state. In addition, as Hakan Yavuz (2003a: 30) argues, statements of these kinds also need to be understood in the context of the different ‘sociohistorical stages’ of the movement’s development in Turkey. According to Yavuz, the first period was one in which Fethullah Gülen’s emphasis was ‘to preserve his religioconservative community from active involvement in Islamic political movements’, although as a result of the polarization of Turkish society during the Cold War the movement eventually ‘embraced an anticommunist rhetoric and adopted a conservative nationalist position’ (Yavuz, 2003a: 31). This was followed by the period of what Yavuz (2003a: 35) calls ‘the education movement’ in which there was an opening to the wider civil society as well as to the Turkic world beyond Turkey itself. This era of growing influence led into a period of reaction from elements in the secular state establishment, and which resulted in charges being brought against Gülen under Turkey’s illegal organization and anti-Terror laws of which he was later acquitted (Harrington, 2011). This was the period in which Fethullah Gülen left Turkey to live in the United States, following which both his teachings and the activities of the movement became more global in their perspectives. In terms of human rights, achieving an appropriate balance between national unity and diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups remains challenging for a Turkish state that was founded on centralist principles; for the dominant Sunni Muslim tradition; and for Fethullah Gülen and the movement associated with his teaching. In relation to Turkey’s Kurdish minority and the extensive death and destruction that took place during the period of the armed conflict

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between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state, Fethullah Gülen maintained a general public silence on the substantive issues at stake, while condemning the violence of the PKK in particular. However, more recently he has advocated that the Kurdish language should be available as an elective in Turkish schools while, in an historic development, the JWF has proposed that, depending on demand, the state should offer education in Kurdish while Turkish remains the official language. In addition, since the early 1980s a number of Hizmet initiatives have tried to undertake educational and development initiatives in the south eastern regions of Turkey. In relation to another minority group in Turkish society – the Alevis – Gülen (in Ünal and Williams, 2000: 67–70) has spoken positively of the need for better Sunni-Alevi relations, affirming that the Alevis (in Ünal and Williams, 2000: 67) ‘definitely enrich Turkish culture’ and that (in Ünal and Williams, 2000: 69), ‘Alawi meeting or prayer houses should be supported.’ Although Tariq Ramadan attacked the geographical and cultural/religious arguments against Turkey’s full membership of the European Union as fallacious, in relation to the arguments concerned with human rights he argues (Ramadan, 2006: 37) that there remains a need for ‘firmly and clearly’ asking questions about matters on which ‘there remains serious work to be done and fundamental reforms to be undertaken in Turkish society’. He also identifies the human rights challenge as something in relation to which ‘Turkish citizens should grasp the opportunity’ (Ramadan, 2006: 38). For example, as Mihail Vasiliadis (2006: 47), the editor of Apoyevmatini, a Greek minority newspaper in Turkey, expresses it: It is difficult for me . . . as a member of the Greek community to say that all our problems have been solved. Decisions made by the government and even laws passed by Parliament cannot easily be implemented, the bureaucratic hindrances seem insurmountable. In this way Vasiliades highlights the difficulty and potential difference that can exist between the passing of legal reforms and their consistent implementation at all levels throughout a country. And indeed, it is likely that it is precisely this kind of issue which may prove more difficult for Turkey to deal with than enacting the original constitutional and legal changes required for EU membership for which the AKP government recently secured a majority in a constitutional referendum. One example of the challenge of translating legal reform into a human rights-informed social practice can be seen also in gender-related issues. It is well known that in Turkey, there has been a widespread issue (Amnesty International, 2004) with regard to so-called honour killings of women. While

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this is not an issue for Turkey only, it is a matter on which the European Union would expect to see considerable progress before any enlargement could include Turkey as a full member. But while Turkey has made some significant legal changes in this regard, surveys, including those from inside Turkey (see Rainsford, 2005), show how deep rooted and widespread remain the kind of underlying attitudes that can give at least tacit popular support for such practices. More generally in relation to gender and equal opportunities, Fethullah Gülen and the movement are not feminists in the Western tradition and, generally speaking within the movement, women do not occupy high positions in its network groups or media organizations. However, it should be noted, for example, that in the United Kingdom, the co-director of the Dialogue Society is a woman. And in relation to the traditionally very divisive issue in Turkish society (and now also in several EU member states, including France and Belgium, in relation to the burkah) of forms of female head covering in public, Gülen has made it clear that he sees that as not an ‘essential’ but a ‘detail’ (in Arabic, furuat) of Islam. He also underlines that its appropriate implementation differs according to the cultural context in which it is found. This should not be misunderstood as meaning that head covering is viewed by Fethullah Gülen as unimportant or as anything other than being a religious obligation for Muslim women. But what it does indicate is that Gülen employs a hermeneutic which is more in line with the classical traditions of the interpretation of Islam, and quite different from the ‘flat’ approach of modern Islamists. Because of this as Bekim Agai (2003: 50) notes in relation to Gülen, it is ‘possible to buy books from Islamic groups in Istanbul that denounce him as a non-believer (kafir) because he had said that he did not consider a female prime minister as being contrary to Islam’.

6.  Turkey’s potential as a civilizational bridge for the European Union? In addressing some of the specific issues in Turkish-EU relations, Gülen contextualizes these in a wider civilizational and global context. Thus, in contrast to the ‘clash-of-civilizations’ approach espoused by either secular advocates of an ongoing and global ‘war against terrorism’; by Christian apocalypticists; or by contemporary Islamists and ‘jihadists’, Gülen (in Gündem, 2005) argues the positive case that: ‘Turkey can be a bridge across the Middle East and the Far East. Europe is in need of Turkey’s profound and rich heritage of insight into the Middle East.’

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Particularly in the current state of global affairs, this is an inspired and inspiring vision. But in evaluating all of this, it should be recognized that there are those who argue that support for the involvement of Turkey in the European Union is part of an agenda to bring about the Islamicization of Europe. Thus, for example, the Princeton Middle Eastern historian, Bernard Lewis (2004) commented to the German conservative daily newspaper Die Welt, that Europe would be Islamic by the end of this century ‘at the very latest’. More recently part of the rationale given by the Norwegian Anders Brevik for his murderous rampage was a belief in an Islamic takeover of Europe (BBC, 2012). At one level, in response to this, it could be asked as to why, at least if it is meant in a truly religious sense of individuals and groups freely embracing Islam as a way of life, the Islamization of Europe should not legitimately be a goal of Muslims any more than evangelization should not be a legitimate goal of Christians? At least for believing people in both religions, the issue at stake in such aspirations is not such goal in itself, but the meaning of such a goal and the means by which the believers try to achieve this – in terms of whether these meanings and means are, or are not, theologically, ethically and socially respectful of the theologically grounded freedom of ‘the other’. As Gülen (2006c: 40) has put it – in a way that can have relevance both to majority Christians in the current member states of the European Union and to Muslims in Turkey: There are those who are uncomfortable with other people’s freedom of conscience and religion. While saying ‘freedom of conscience and religion,’ there are people who perceive it as only their own freedom. There are such fanatics and bigots. Historically, Muslim thinking highlighted a tension, if not an outright incompatibility, between what is identified as dar ul-harb (referring to territory that was seen as being in open hostility to Islam) and what is called dar ul-Islam (referring to those lands in which Islam has taken root). Traditionalists Muslims do not necessarily see Europe as being dar ul-harb, although ‘Jihadi’ have done so, thus justifying what they understand as defensive violent jihad. However others – of which Ihsan Yilmaz (2002) is one – sees the community associated with Gülen’s teaching as an example of what Yilmaz calls dar ul-hizmet which can, in principle, be actualized in any time or place. This reflects a movement away from an instrumentalization of religion in politics or the question of whether Muslims are or are not in a majority in a given territory, to an understanding of the contribution that can be made to public life of service based on religious motivations, but contributing to civil society as one contribution alongside others.

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Since Gülen is neither a politician or an economist, it is not surprising that there is not a large body of work in which he directly addresses questions and issues relating to Turkish membership of the European Union. However, when he does explicitly address this, his positions are fairly clear. But perhaps even more importantly for the process of enlargement than his specific statements, it is the contention of this chapter that, on balance, Gülen’s general thought and teaching contributes positively to a social, cultural and religious climate in civil society, both among Turks and in the existing European Union, in which Turkish membership of the European Union becomes more thinkable, and thus ultimately more capable of practical implementation. Within this, Gülen’s commitment to, and involvement in, inter-religious dialogue is an important part of the necessary confidence-building process leading to membership of the European Union. As Agai (2003: 65) points out: Although many Islamic leaders may talk of tolerance in Islam, it may be problematic to put it into practice. Gülen himself has shown that he has no fears of meeting leaders of other religions, including the Pope and the representative of the Jewish community in Istanbul. He also crossed the borders of Islamic discourse to meet with important people in Turkish society who are atheists. These activities were not easy from a religious perspective because Islamic discourse in Turkey has definite boundaries that do not appreciate close ties to the leaders of other religions and nonreligious persons. Also, his support for the Alevis was not very popular among most Sunni-Islamic groups. One of the so-called chapters in the confidence-building process for any candidate state of the European Union is concerned with civil society exchanges. Groups with religious inspiration are increasingly recognized to be an important part of civil society, contributing in a positive way to the development of ‘social capital’ (see Weller, 2005). Thus the readiness of Gülen and those inspired by his teaching to engage in dialogue can play a significant role in taking matters forward. The importance of this active involvement in inter-religious dialogue for the future of Turkey’s application for full membership of the EU can be seen in the positions taken up on this question by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (albeit before he was elected as Pope Benedict XVI and speaking as Pope). In 2004, the then Cardinal Ratzinger wrote to European bishops explaining the reasons for his stand against full Turkish membership of the European Union and stated that: The roots that have formed Europe, that have permitted the formation of this continent, are those of Christianity. Turkey has always represented another

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continent, in permanent contrast with Europe. There were the [old Ottoman Empire] wars against the Byzantine Empire, the fall of Constantinople, the Balkan wars, and the threat against Vienna and Austria. It would be an error to equate the two continents . . . Turkey is founded upon Islam . . . Thus the entry of Turkey into the EU would be anti-historical. In the light of this, a constructive but also robust interfaith dialogue including Catholic Christians from current EU member states and Muslim Turks, could be of great practical importance in relation to the issues surrounding the possible entry of Turkey as a full member into the European Union. That such dialogue is unlikely to be comfortable merely underlines its importance. Indeed, given the very powerful role played by ‘enemy images’ in the history of relations between Turkey and the Western outcrop of the Eurasian landmass, and the ease with which these ‘enemy images’ can all too easily be mobilized as part of contemporary political, cultural and religious conflicts, the positive and full dialogical engagement between various civil society groups is likely to be of critical importance to the possibility of full Turkish membership of the European Union. As far as Fethullah Gülen and initiatives inspired by his teaching are concerned, neither should be romanticized or idealized. As with all human beings and human organizations, they have failings and ambiguities. However it is the argument of this chapter that, in our present historical social, political and religious circumstances, engagement with Fethullah Gülen’s perspectives could make a positive contribution to getting the historical evolution of growing and positive relationships between Turkey and the European Union back on track, while the initiatives inspired by Gülen’s teaching have the potential to contribute positively to the robust, open and self-critical forms of civil society dialogue that must accompany inter-governmental negotiations if the latter are to have any chance of success. It is only in such a way that all peoples of the existing EU member states and Turkey  – whether Christian, Muslim, secular or of other religious and philosophical traditions  – can feel that they might have a positive stake in the possible future entry of Turkey into full membership of the European Union. At this juncture, therefore, the sombrely challenging (to both Turkey and the European Union) words of Tariq Ramadan (2006: 38) underscore the importance of the issues with which this chapter has been concerned: With all the Europeans  – among whom the Europeans of Muslim denomination rank first  – conscious of the stakes, the Turks have in the end this triple shared responsibility to remind and to prove that Europe is not a stifled and shrivelled geographical reality, that it cannot be a drained of a falsely imagined ‘religious and cultural homogeneity’, and that it cannot

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base the self-confidence of its identity on the opposition and dangerous rejection of the ‘identity of the other’. It is also a heaven-sent opportunity for Europe to reconcile itself to its ideals of pluralism, equality and constant renewal: Turkey is paradoxically its greatest chance.

7.  The Euro crisis, the European Union and beyond? Of course, there are those within the European Union who argue that a time rising unemployment and the breakdown of social cohesion in the wake of the austerity policies being pursued to reduce the high levels of sovereign debt is the worst possible time to consider Turkish membership of the European Union. But this chapter argues that because of Turkey’s still relatively dynamic economy and its demographically young population, it may rather be that precisely a fuller engagement between Turkey and current EU member states could provide a much-needed stimulus for economic growth, while the looming demographic time bomb that will make it impossible for EU countries to maintain an adequate welfare state provision for their ever-increasing numbers of elderly people could benefit precisely from the opposite population profile of Turkey. Nevertheless, as already noted, within Turkey both popular and governmental views and perspectives towards EU membership have been changing as compared with the high-water mark of public and political support of just over half a decade ago. Thus results of the most recent Eurobarometer survey that included a question on Turkish attitudes to membership of the European Union (TNS Opinion and Social, 2008) showed that Turkish respondents seeing this as a ‘good thing’ had dropped to 49 per cent (as compared with 59% in 2005), with 30 per cent being against EU membership (as compared with 12% in 2005). Partly in growing disillusionment with the EU accession process, but also more recently in the light of the Arab Spring and the reference by some within it to the ‘Turkish model’ for movement from military government to democracy, Turkish foreign policy has been increasing shaped by an approach taken by Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s 2001 book Strategic Depth, in which approaches focused solely on the West are replaced with a notion that what he calls Turkey’s ‘depth’, meaning that Turkey should become what he calls a ‘central’ (rather than a ‘regional’) power and should have a multidimensional foreign policy. At the same time, among the current member states of the European Union, the most recent Eurobarometer survey to ask a question about support for Turkish membership shows support by only 31 per cent of

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the respondents across Europe, including only 16 per cent in Germany and a very low 7 per cent in Austria. Against this background, the issues involved in contemplating (and even more so, in carrying through Turkish membership of the European Union) are very challenging both for Turkey and for the European Union. However, as this chapter has argued, a combination of political wisdom and boldness in both Turkey and the European Union could facilitate the undoubted difficulties involved in taking this project forward being seen, and ultimately also grasped, as historic opportunities. In the light of this, the question is whether the European Union might opt for the apparently more attractive because perhaps easier options of stability in the membership of European Union and Turkey might opt for a growing role as a ‘central’ power with an increasing orientation to the ‘Muslim’ world. However, the main body of this chapter has outlined how Fethullah Gülen has challenged Turkish misgivings in relation to membership of the European Union, while also challenging the EU member states to enlarge their understanding and see the potential benefits that Turkish membership could bring. To the current EU countries themselves Gülen (quoted in Gündem, 2005) offers the politely expressed but nevertheless challenging perspective, and with which this author also agrees, that: To date, how Turkey will benefit from this process has been discussed, generally speaking. I am not sure whether European countries are aware, but what Turkey will bring in is much more important. If they are aware of this and still resist, that means their obstinacy has dominated over sound thinking. As a matter of fact, there are many benefits out of this relationship for the reputation and future of Europe.

8 The Relevance of Fethullah Gülen’s Thought for Democratic Reforms in the Muslim World Leonid R. Sykiainen

1.  Introduction

I

n the late twentieth century Islam became a major issue within world politics. It left the realm of academic deliberations to be discussed by political scientists, publicists and journalists who normally concentrate on Islam’s attitude towards international terrorism and political extremism and the Muslim world’s future in the context of political changes and the role of Islam in the process. All these issues cannot be properly discussed outside the main trends of Islamic thought. Ideas hold a special place in the Muslim world, in which all profound changes and important national projects are scrutinized through the prism of Islamic principles. What is more, if such projects are devoid of an Islamic foundation they will never develop. This means that all positive solutions for the above-mentioned issues should be sought within Islam. That is why, when evaluating the Muslim world’s political future, Fethullah Gülen chooses to pay special attention to this problem.

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2.  Gülen on the Muslim world In a number of his publications Fethullah Gülen analyses the present situation in the Muslim world. He agrees that over a long period, Muslim societies have been witnessing a multidimensional political, social and cultural crisis. On one hand, this crisis embraces current Islamic thought and education. But on the other hand, it is itself caused by a decline of Islamic ideas and knowledge. That is why Fethullah Gülen’s teachings must be evaluated by means of their impact upon the development of the modern Islamic theory and by their contribution to overcoming the crisis of the Muslim world. Gülen points to a number of main reasons for the present weakness of modern Muslim countries. In his view, three main reasons deserve mention: 1 Prolonged and continuing political backwardness which manifests

itself in the absence of genuine democratic institutions and processes coupled with domination of the authoritarian regimes; 2 Spiritual and moral crisis which is linked to the growing influence of

Western standards of life; 3 Superficial knowledge of Islam.

When touching on the main roots of the backwardness of the Muslim world Gülen especially stresses that Islamic societies entered the twentieth century as a world of the oppressed, the wronged and the colonized. After their liberation and creation of independent states, political authorities worked for the well-being of the dynasties of which they are members rather than working for the prosperity of their countries and trying to establish a unity between the public and power. As a result, these administrations have been degraded to the position of mere oppressors, deserving of loathing in the eyes of the public (Gülen, 2004c: 239–40). Values and concepts which today are generally accepted throughout the world – such as democracy, basic human rights, the spread of knowledge and education across society, economic prosperity, equality in production, the institutionalization of consumption and income in a way that prevents class formation, the supremacy of law and justice – have never been fully realized in Islamic societies (Gülen 2004c: 240). Gülen also argues that religion and religious values, as well as the spirituality and ethics that are connected to religion, have been eroded throughout the world and that this constitutes the most important source of major social problems that threaten humanity today. The Muslim world is going through a spiritual crisis as all the essential supporting pillars of humanity have collapsed and have been destroyed (Gülen, 2004c: 241).

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To sum up, Fethullah Gülen arrives at a most important and bitter conclusion: today, in his opinion, an Islamic world does not really exist. He argues that there are places where Muslims live and that Islam has become more of a way of living or a culture and that it is not being followed as a faith. He also points out that there are Muslims who have restructured Islam in accordance with their own thoughts. By this, he is not referring to radical, extremist Muslims, but to ordinary Muslims who live Islam as it suits them. The prerequisite for Islam is that one should ‘really’ believe, and live accordingly. Muslims must assume the responsibilities inherent in Islam and it cannot be said that any such societies with this concept and philosophy exist within the geography of Islam. There are very few administrators who share this vision. Ignorance continues to envelope the Islamic world despite the measure of enlightenment that is now emerging. Today, there is an Islam of the individual. There are some Muslims in different places of the world. One by one, all have been separated from one another. It is difficult to see anyone who is a perfect Muslim. If Muslims are not able to come into contact with one another and constitute a union, to work together to solve common problems, to interpret the universe, to understand it well, to consider the universe carefully according to the Qur’an, to interpret the future well, to generate projects for the future, to determine their place in the future, then it is not possible to talk about an Islamic world. Since there is no Islamic world, every one acts individually. It could even be said that there are some Muslims with their own personal truths. It cannot be claimed that there is an Islamic understanding which has been agreed upon, approved by qualified scholars, reliably based upon the Qur’an, and repeatedly tested. It could be said that a Muslim culture is dominant, rather than Islamic culture. As a result we must realize that no Islamic country, when considered from viewpoint of administrative, legal and economic matters, exists. Today Islam is not understood properly. According to Gülen it can be said that Islam is not known at all (Gülen, 2004c: 184).

3.  Regarding Islam as a political force and an instrument for terrorism In relation to his attitudes towards politics and terrorism, Gülen sets out some key theoretical approaches, pointing out that if one wants accurately to analyse religion, democracy, or any other system or philosophy; one should focus on humanity and human life. In the light of this, Islam cannot be compared on the same basis with democracy or any other political, social or economic system. This is because it focuses primarily on the immutable aspects of life

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and existence, whereas political, social and economic systems or ideologies concern only certain variable social aspects of our worldly life. The aspects of life with which Islam is primarily concerned are as valid today as they were at the dawn of humanity and will continue to be so in the future while worldly systems change according to circumstances and so can be evaluated only according to their times (Gülen, 2004c: 219). At the same time Gülen refers to historical facts stressing that, beginning from the first half of the century, Islamic societies were engaged in wars of liberation and independence. During these decades Islam assumed the role of an important factor uniting people and spurring them to action. As these wars were waged against those who were seen as invaders, Islam, national independence and liberation came to mean the same thing. When national states were established in these parts of the world, the states were not aligned with their publics. Whereas the states should have instructed the public in Islam’s true identity and nature, they acted in a way which disregarded the public, which was way contrary to the values and traditions of Islam. In the eyes of the public, this turned Islam into a refuge from the administration. Consequently Islam has, by many, come to be regarded as a traditional political ideology. And what is more some Muslims and policymakers consider and present it as a purely political, sociological and economic ideology, rather than as a religion (Gülen, 2004c: 219, 239). In the light of this evolution of Islam as a political force, Gülen pays special attention to the political process and the methods of ensuring political goals. In particular he advocates strongly against the use of violence to attain political ends. He absolutely condemns violent and coercive means and methods and believes that the days of getting things done by brute force are over. Gülen stresses the importance of law and order in society and does not believe that respect for others can be instilled by force or that a modern world can be built by repression (Gülen, 2004c: 246–7). However, Gülen’s analysis of real circumstances leads him to recognize that in the countries where Muslims live, some religious leaders and immature Muslims have no other weapon in hand than their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. They use this to engage people in struggles that serve their own purposes. In fact, Islam is a true faith, and it should be lived truly. A Muslim cannot say, ‘I will kill a person and then go to Heaven.’ God’s approval cannot be won by killing people. One of the most important goals for a Muslim is to win the approval of God, another being making the name of Almighty God known to the universe (Gülen, 2004c: 185). This leads to Fethullah Gülen’s thoughts about the relationships between Islam and terrorism. To touch on this side of Gülen’s intellectual contribution into a proper understanding of modern Islam it could be enough to refer to Gülen’s

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conclusion that it is impossible for a person to remain a Muslim if he becomes involved in terrorism. In true Islam, terrorism does not exist (Gülen, 2004c: 184–5). Fethullah Gülen believes that any terrorist activity is a great blow to peace, democracy, humanity and religious values. Many Qur’anic verses deal with the concepts of justice and peace: ‘Deal fairly, and do not let the hatred of others for you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just, for that is next to piety; and fear Allah’ (Al-Ma’ida 5:8); ‘If the enemy inclines toward peace, you (also) incline toward peace and trust in Allah, for He is the All-Hearing, All-Knowing’ (Al-Anfal 8:61); and ‘O believers, enter into peace (Islam) wholeheartedly, and do not follow Satan’s footsteps, for he is your avowed enemy’ (Al-Baqara 2:208). At the same time Fethullah Gülen quotes the famous Hadith, stressing that non-Muslims and Muslim are safe and secure from any potential harm emanating from Muslims’ tongues and hands. In other words, those Muslims who are not known for their provision of security and trustworthiness to others must re-examine their claim to be Muslim (Gülen, 2002b). To sum up Gülen underlines: Please let me reassure you that Islam does not approve of terrorism in any form. Terrorism cannot be used to achieve any Islamic goal. No terrorist can be a Muslim, and no real Muslim can be a terrorist. Islam demands peace, and the Qur’an demands that every real Muslim be a symbol of peace and work to support the maintenance of basic human rights . . . Even though at first sight terrorist acts seem to harm the target, all terrorist activities eventually do more harm to the terrorists and their supporters. (Gülen, 2004c: 261) Gülen (2002b) firmly argues that there is no terrorism in Islam. They are sharply different from each other, and that terrorism cannot represent Islam. In connection with the above logic, Muslims must be legitimate in their intentions when it comes to their goals, thoughts and actions, for only a straight and allowed way can lead them to their exalted objective (Gülen, 2002b). In other words, Fethullah Gülen believes that Islam should not be an instrument for attaining political goals. Political decisions can be enriched by Islamic religious and ethical values, but it is wrong to deal with politics on behalf of religion. If any Muslims are part of, or associated with, terrorism and anarchy it is because they do not understand Islam correctly and because the existing realities in their countries to do not allow them to acquire a correct understanding of Islam. Gülen is convinced that this situation could be prevented by education: ‘There is a remedy for this. The remedy is to teach the truth directly’ (Gülen, 2004c: 190). Thus, in his perspective, a true understanding of Islam is connected with the political reforms which we are witnessing today in the Muslim world.

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4.  Democracy and Islam: Are they opponents or allies? The problems of democracy and human rights have recently acquired a special importance in forecasting the near future in the development of the Muslim world and, in particular, for evaluating perspectives that inform political reforms, including democratization. Today most Muslim states are developing in a rather contradictory way in the political and legal sphere where Islamic traditions coexist with universally accepted standards and Western liberal values. We should always bear in mind that politics and the principles and exercise of state power function in a very specific sphere of interaction between Islamic principles and Western patterns. Islamic thought believes that the most specific feature of this sphere is created by the fact that the traditional Muslim legal doctrine (fiqh) offers no detailed, exact, and unambiguous answers to the vast majority of specific questions. It limits itself to identifying the most general landmarks, such as consultation, fairness and equality to be realized in different, including borrowed, versions. When applied, these general principles may produce different results. The consultation principle, for example, can be put into practice in the form of a consultative council accountable to the head of state or as representative body with full legislative powers elected by universal suffrage. Today, Muslim legal postulates are invoked to prove that Western experience of parliamentarism, elections, political pluralism, the division of powers and even human rights should be drawn upon. In these spheres, however, the borrowing is limited to outward features, yet the very fact that Islamic legal thought does not issue rigid instructions about the power system in general opens up the possibility for the widest possible reliance on the experience of political democracy. What is more, today any modernization and democratization project has good prospects in most Muslim states if it is realized within the Islamic political and legal tradition, or at least if taking due account of it. The opposite is also true: no political reform stands a chance of survival if it is aimed at setting up formally democratic institutions that go against the grain of Islamic thought. Objectively, the people at the top and the public at large are interested in democratic developments if they are accompanied by political stability and security. This can be done if democratization is realized within Muslim political and legal traditions, including an Islamic interpretation of these changes. The strategy for political and legal reform in the Muslim world should aim at incorporating it into the globalization process together with Islamic values that are compatible with the universal democratic principles, remolded to fit

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contemporary reality. This can be achieved if the positive potential of Islamic political and legal thought is tapped in a very active way and if the thinkers are encouraged to work on the problems connected with new realities and Islam’s role in the globalizing world. It should also be borne in mind that the use of Islamic arguments is neither a trick nor empty talk. The present state of mind in the Muslim world has made the attitude of the Muslim political and legal doctrine towards the possibility of blending Islamic and Western principles extremely important. The latest works of those Muslim thinkers who share a moderate and balanced attitude towards the Shari’a admit, at least theoretically, that this blend can be achieved. Other aspects of the intellectual achievements of Fethullah Gülen are also of special interest and relevance for discussing these issues. First of all, there is compatibility between Western liberal and Islamic approaches to democracy and human rights. Regarding this, Gülen stresses that when comparing Islam with democracy, we must remember that on one hand democracy is a system that is being continually developed and revised. It also varies according to the places and circumstances where it is practiced. On the other hand, religion has established immutable principles related to faith, worship and morality. Thus, only Islam’s worldly aspects should be compared with democracy. Gülen argues that – despite its shortcomings – democracy is now the only viable political system, and people should strive to modernize and consolidate democratic institutions in order to build a society where individual rights and freedoms are respected and protected, where equal opportunity for all is more than a dream. According to Gülen, mankind has not yet designed a better governing system than democracy. Gülen also maintains that as a political and governing system, democracy is, at present, the only alternative left in the world (Yilmaz, 2005a: 396). As for Islam, it is characterized by immutable religious and ethical values. But it does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstances. If we approach the matter in this light and compare Islam with the modern liberal democracy of today, we will be better able to understand the position of Islam and democracy with respect to each other (Gülen, 2004c: 220). Along with this idea Fethullah Gülen refers to some fundamental Islamic principles of government: ●●

Power lies in truth, a repudiation of the common idea that truth relies upon power.

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Justice and the rule of law are essential.

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Freedom of belief and rights to life, personal property, reproduction and health cannot be violated.

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The privacy and immunity of individual life must be maintained.

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No one can be convicted of a crime without evidence, or accused and punished for someone else’s crime.

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An advisory system of administration is essential.

Fethullah Gülen does not see any contradiction between these principles and democracy. The duties entrusted to modern democratic systems are those that Islam refers to society and classifies as absolutely necessary, relatively necessary or commendable. People co-operate with one another in sharing these duties and establishing the essential foundations necessary for performing them. The government is composed of all of these foundations. Thus, Islam recommends a government based on a social contract. People elect the administrators, and establish a council to debate common issues. Also, the society as a whole participates in auditing the administration. In short, Islam addresses the whole community and assigns it almost all the rights and duties entrusted to modern democratic system. In relation to the establishment of Islamically informed forms of the state, Gülen is in favour of a bottom-up approach. His desire is to transform individuals, an ideal that cannot be fulfilled by force or from the top. Islam considers a society to be composed of conscious individuals equipped with freewill and having responsibility towards both themselves and others. The Qur’an says: ‘God will not change the state of a people unless they change themselves (with respect to their beliefs, worldview, and lifestyle)’ (Ar-Rad 13:11). So, Islamic society holds the reins of its fate in its own hands. The prophetic wording emphasizes this revelation: ‘You will be ruled according to how you are.’ This is the basic character and spirit of democracy which does not conflict with any Islamic principle (Gülen, 2004c: 222). Answering a question whether can Islam live in democracy and vice versa Fethullah Gülen said: ‘It’s wrong to see Islam and democracy as opposites’ (in Ünal and Williams, 2000: 150). Fethullah Gülen shows the main obstacle on the road leading to the establishment of a just Islamic rule: today’s world presents a situation where regimes of oppression do not have much chance to continue unchecked. Instead of these regimes he proposes the Islamic remedy  – the famous Islamic principle of consultation.

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5.  Consultation and human rights as key directions of political reforms Explaining the meaning of this principle for the modern Muslim world Fethullah Gülen states that for the Muslims of today, consultation (shura) is a vital attribute and an essential rule, just as it was for the first Islamic generations. According to the Qur’an, it is the clearest sign of a believing community. The consultation is mentioned in the Qur’an together with salat (prescribed prayers) and infaq (giving to maintain the religion and people for the sake of God): ‘Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer, who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation, who spend out of what We have bestowed upon them for sustenance’ (Shura 42:38). In this verse, there is a reminder that consultation is a type of conduct that has the same importance as prayer. That is why a society which does not consider consultation important cannot really be considered to be a fully believing one, and a community which does not apply consultation is not accepted as being Muslim in the full and perfect sense. In Islam, consultation is an absolute essential, which both the rulers and the ruled must obey. The ruler is responsible for conducting consultation about political, governance, legislative and all other affairs related to society. The ruled are responsible for expressing and conveying their views and thoughts to the ruler. The important thing which should be noted is that consultation is the first condition for the success of a decision made on any issue. Even if a person has a superior nature and outstanding intellect, if he is content with his own opinion and is not receptive and respectful of the opinions of others, then he is more prone to make more mistakes and errors than the average person. The most intelligent person is the one who most appreciates and respects mutual consultation and deliberation (mashwarat), and who benefits most from the ideas of others. Consultation is one of the prime dynamics that preserves the order in a Muslim society as a system. Consultation is an important mission and duty of resolving affairs concerning the individual and the community, the people and the state, science and knowledge and economics and sociology. Even if the head of state or the leader is seen as being confirmed by God and nurtured by revelation and inspiration, such a one is under an obligation to conduct affairs by consultation. This principle in the Qur’an is mentioned directly in two verses. The first of them was given above, and the second one, which does not require any interpretation whatsoever, is: ‘Consult them in the affairs (of moment)’

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(Al ‘Imran 3: 159). Along with these commands the Messenger of God also saw the salvation and progress of his community in mutual consultation: ‘Those who consult can never lose’, ‘One who consults will not have cause to regret’, ‘One who consults will not come to harm’, ‘One who consults is secure’, ‘There has been no community which used consultation but could not reach the right result’. After discussing the fundamentals of consultation Gülen declares that both of the revealed verses and the Prophet’s sayings related to the principle of consultation are extremely flexible and responsive to the needs of every era. They have a breadth which surpasses all ages, such that, no matter how much the world changes and no matter how the times alter, even if humans were able to build cities in the sky, they would not feel the need to add new things to these decrees. In fact, all the other rules and principles of Islam are open to similar flexibility and universality, and have always retained, and will also retain in the future, their freshness, relevance and validity, despite the passing of time (Gülen, 2005b). Gülen follows the similar approach when discussing human rights as an important aspect of political reforms in the Muslim world. He is convinced that, on this subject, Islam is balanced, broad and universal. Except for those who strive to tear down the state or the legitimate administration, or who have willingly taken someone’s life, the Qur’an teaches: Anyone who kills a person, unless it be for murder or for causing dissension and spreading corruption in the land, it would be as if he killed humankind all together; and if any one saves a life, it would be as if he saved the life of humankind all together. (Al-Ma’ida 5:27–32) Pointing out the other side of the issue the Prophet stated: ‘Whoever is killed while defending their property is a martyr. Whoever is killed while defending their blood (life) is a martyr. Whoever is killed while defending their religion is a martyr. Whoever is killed while defending their family is a martyr.’ Ibn Abbas said that a murderer will stay in Hell for eternity. This is the same punishment that is assigned to unbelievers. This means that a murderer is subjected to the same punishment as an unbeliever (Ünal and Williams, 2000: 133–4). In short, in Islam, in terms of the punishment to be dealt on the Day of Judgment, a murderer will be considered to be as low as someone who has rejected God and the Prophet (an atheist in other words). If this is a fundamental principle of religion, then it should be taught in education (Gülen, 2004c:190). For Gülen, Islam does not discriminate based on race, colour, age, nationality or physical traits. The Prophet declares that all people are equal as the teeth of a comb. He also declares: ‘You are all from Adam, and Adam is from earth. O servants of God, be brothers and sisters.’ At the same time Gülen is

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convinced that in Islam there are no minor or major rights. He underlines that ‘if a ship is carrying nine murderers and one innocent soul, that ship cannot be sunk to punish the nine murderers’ (Gülen, 2004c: 220–1, 230–1, 237). Gülen analyses different rights recognized in Islam like the freedom of religion and belief, thought and expression, to own property and the sanctity of one’s home, to marry and have children, to communicate and to travel and the right to an unimpeded education. He contends that the principles of Islamic jurisprudence are based on these and other rights, all of which have now been accepted by modern legal systems, such as the protection of life, religion, property, reproduction of humanity and intellect, as well as the basic understanding of the equality of people, which is based on the fact that all people are human beings, and subsequently, the rejection of all racial, colour and linguistic discriminations. All of these values have been protected as separate principles in modern legal systems which consider them as being ‘indispensable’. Islam approaches human rights from the angle of these basic principles which will be – and should be – indispensable in the new millennium (Gülen, 2004c: 169–170, 231).

6.  Diversity and dialogue as prerequisites for political reforms and democracy For the success of political reforms in the Muslim world, the compatibility between Islamic and modern democratic liberal values is about more than the theoretical ground for combining them. It will be possible only through the dialogue of different cultures and civilizations. In this respect Fethullah Gülen underlines that for centuries the civilizations of the East and the West existed separately from each other. In his view, this separation was based on the fact that the former paid less attention to the pursuits of intellect and science, while the latter paid less attention to spirituality, metaphysics and eternal and invariable values (Gülen, 2004c: 230). But now the whole situation has changed since the modern means of communication and transportation have transformed the world into a large global village, paving the way for interactive relations and interdependency (Gülen, 2004c: 230). More specifically, Gülen stresses that people must learn how to benefit from other people’s knowledge and views, for these can be beneficial to their own system, thought and world. In particular, they should always seek to benefit from the experiences of those who are experienced (Ünal and Williams, 2000: 149). This position opens the way for the Muslim world to benefit from modern Western democratic patterns.

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Regarding Huntington’s claim of a clash of civilizations, Gülen considers that rather than being realistic evaluations of the future, these types of claims seem to be determining new goals in an attempt to influence public opinion. As yet, conflict is something that is desired by certain power centres. The masses have been put on alarm against a frequently conjured and feared enemy. This enemy is more imaginary than real. It is in this way that the masses have been prepared for every kind of war. Islam is strictly against disorder, treachery, conflict and oppression. Islam means peace, security and well-being. Thus, in a religion based on peace, security and world harmony, war and conflict are negative aspects. In exceptional cases there is a right to self-defence but this can be done only according to certain principles. Gülen explains that Islam has always breathed peace and goodness. Islam considers war as a secondary event. Rules have been placed in order to balance and limit it. For example, Islam takes justice and world peace as a basis: ‘Let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice’ (Al-Ma’ida 5:8). In this respect, Gülen states that tolerance and dialogue should be represented everywhere in the best possible way and should be an example to the whole world. Such an example will encourage people to come together, to gather round the same basic human values and, God willing, humankind will live one more spring before seeing the end of the world (Gülen, 2004c: 257). Addressing this issue from the other side Gülen’s position is that: I don’t believe there’s going to be a clash between cultures or civilizations. If some people are planning such thing based on their current dreams and making claims on this subject, and if such a wave has risen and is on its way, then before we suffer such a clash, let’s put a bigger wave in front of it and break their wave. (Ünal and Williams, 2000: 189) At the same time Gülen sees diversity and pluralism as a natural fact (Gülen, 2004c: 250) and Gülen wants those differences to be admitted and professed explicitly. That is why he is an adamant supporter and promoter of interfaith dialogue. In his view, a believer must communicate with any kind of thought and system. Fethullah Gülen points out that dialogue has now expanded to wide regions of the world. In general, he believes that the results have been positive. At the same time he is not optimistic about the present contribution of the Muslim world to this dialogue and does not suppose that Muslims will be able to contribute much to the balance of the world in the near future. Up until now they could not solve the problems of the world, though that might be achieved in the future (Gülen, 2004c: 186). At the same time Gülen puts forward the necessary guiding principles of such dialogue. The first step

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in establishing it is to forget the past, ignore polemical arguments and give precedence to common points which far outnumber polemical ones (Ünal and Williams, 2000: 244–5).

7.  Conclusion Today, the Muslim world is torn between two contradictory trends: advancing along the road towards democratization and upsurges of radicalism. Modern Islam approaches these phenomena in quite a different way. Until recent times, balanced Islamic thought did not manifest the necessary dynamism when issues of democratization and political reforms or the possibility of the Muslim world joining the globalization process came up for discussion. In other words, even some decades ago this moderate trend of Islamic political and legal thought had not proposed definite and convincing solutions for the above-mentioned problems based on a genuine Islamic intellectual tradition. One could not help but feel that, at the ideological level, Islam had so far been unable to meet the challenges of our times. It is therefore not surprising that, in the absence of a clear Islamic strategy, most contemporary authors remained reserved, or even pessimistic, about the future of the Islamic civilization. Those who would like to detach it from the world came up with a much clearer message. There is still a widely shared opinion outside countries with predominantly Muslim populations that democracy and traditional Islamic values are incompatible. Islamic extremists share this view for different reasons: they are convinced that the contemporary developments threaten Islam. The global ‘Islamic project’, or Islamization of mankind, is seen as the only adequate answer. This leads to a question of fundamental importance: is there a formula that would bring Islamic values and the latest achievements of contemporary civilization together? When trying to answer this question, one should take account of the fact that Islamic thought abounds in various trends, three of which until recently were considered the main ones. One of them, the traditional trend, justifies conservation of sorts of Muslim society’s present state; another, the fundamentalist trend, insists that the public and state structures should undergo radical changes and return to the literally understood Shari’a. The modernist approach uses an outwardly Islamic interpretation in an attempt to justify liberal reforms patterned on the West. Until recently, another of the many trends that interprets the contemporary world along Islamic lines remained lost to the public, which has its attention riveted on the three prominent trends. That is the possibility of drawing on Islam’s internal potential, which says that reality should be measured against

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the Shari’as cornerstones, values and general principles rather than its rules related to minor things and interpreted in a narrow-minded manner. This is very close to what the Muslim reformers of the turn of the twentieth-century thought, even though they never got beyond the calls to return to ijtihad and never tried to apply the other Shari’a principles to put their purely Islamic idea of the changing world onto firmer ground. It should be added here that since the mid-twentieth century this position has been limited to the works of those scholars who preferred to concentrate on the immutable principles of the Shari’a as distinct from its particular, and never consistent, solutions. But in recent times this approach has had very little influence on political and legal practice. Now the situation is obviously changing: the formerly ignored trend has come to the fore as the most promising soil in which the strategy of contemporary Islam and the Muslim world will probably grow. Fethullah Gülen has been playing a decisive role in this evolution. As has been shown, Fethullah Gülen has his own views on all above-mentioned issues. In particular he believes that the only prospects for the Muslim world’s political development and stability depend on its democratic transformation. Democracy has developed over time. Just as it has gone through many different stages in the past, it will continue to evolve and improve in the future. Along the way, it will be shaped into a more humane and just system, one based on righteousness and reality. If human beings are considered as a whole, without disregarding the spiritual dimension of their existence and their spiritual needs, and without forgetting that human life is not limited to this mortal life and that all people have a great craving for eternity, democracy could reach the peak of perfection and bring even more happiness to humanity. Islamic principles of equality, tolerance and justice can help it do just this (Gülen, 2004c: 224). It is clear that Fethullah Gülen’s thoughts about the role that Islam can play in responding to these key questions are the most convincing ones. And what is more there is a movement inspired by him and his teaching which can implement his ideas (Yilmaz, 2003; Yilmaz, 2005b: 174–9; Yilmaz, 2005c).

9 Turkish in the Language of the Qur’an: Hira’ Magazine Paul L. Heck

1.  Introduction

I

n late 2005 the Gülen movement launched a new religious initiative, a magazine in Arabic by the name of Hira’. A quarterly magazine, it has published 34 issues through to January-February 2013 (issue no. 34) in print and online. On its website (www.hira.magazine.com), it describes its articles as being ‘concerned with the social, human, and natural sciences and in dialogue with the mysteries of the human soul and expansive horizons of the cosmos through a faith-based Qur’anic perspective in view of the mutual affinity between knowledge and faith, the mind and the heart, thought and reality’. Hira’ treats a range of topics: education, family, women, science, religion, art and culture, philosophy, civilization, history, poetry and literature, missiology (fiqh al-da‘wa), and above all the psychological and socio-spiritual formation of the human soul – all through the lens of Islam. The emphasis on the interior life makes sense of the magazine’s name, Hira’, which refers to the cave near Mecca on Jabal al-Nur – the ‘Mount of Light’ – where the Prophet Muhammad would go for meditation and contemplation and revelations from God through the mediation of the Angel Gabriel. The magazine, with offices in both Istanbul and Cairo, is published wholly in Arabic. It features art and poetry as well as thoughtful articles by various Arab and Turkish intellectuals, scholars and littérateurs. A lead article by Fethullah Gülen opens and sets the tone of each issue. It is worth noting that the Arab

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figures assembled by the magazine represents some of the most highly respected Muslim voices in the Arab world today, including the following: ‘Ali Gum‘a, Mahmud Zaqzuq, and Muhammad ‘Imara of Egypt; Wahba al-Zuhayli, Muhammad al-Ratib al-Nablusi, and Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti of Syria; Ahmad ‘Ibadi, Taha ‘Abd al-Rahman, and Farid al-Ansari (d. 2009) of Morocco; Salman al-‘Awda of Saudi Arabia; and many others. (All in all, the magazine can count well over two hundred contributors to its pages in its short history.) Here, then, is a Gülen initiative that is intra-Muslim (there are no treatments of other religions or reports on the movement’s inter-religious initiatives). It is directed to the global umma beyond the movement’s own institutions and organizations. It seeks to engage Arab society and Muslim Arabs first and foremost. When it comes to the Gülen movement, scholarly attention often focuses on its willingness and desire to engage with non-Muslims and Western intellectual and cultural life and, also, its ability to coexist with secularism. This magazine suggests that the movement also has a strong interest in creating a bridge between the Turkish and Arab spheres of the umma and that it is aware of the need to bring its outlook to the wider concerns and discussions of the global Muslim community today. Certainly, attempts have been made in the past to build bridges between Turks and Arabs. Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), for example, at one time proposed a political bridge – a post-Ottoman caliphate that would embrace Turks and Arabs in a single political framework. However, it was not feasible, even if a noble idea. In contrast, the bridge that the Gülen movement seeks to build is decidedly spiritual – and, in that sense, more likely to succeed in the long term.

2.  Hira’ in the global Muslim context The magazine’s message, emphasizing the formation of the soul and primarily addressed to Muslims, is at the same time oriented to the world in its global aspects. It is therefore appropriate to locate the magazine (which largely mirrors the thinking of the Gülen movement) alongside three other prominent forms of globalizing religiosity that have featured in contemporary Islam. The first is Wahhabism, which has the tendency to want to purify Islam of all human elements and innovations and so to guard against the possibility of Islam itself falling into error and infidelity. Modernity is here shunned as a positive source of human achievement. The second is Tablighism (Tablighi Jamaat), which is related to Deobandism, the madrasa-network in South Asia that seeks to preserve Muslim identity through exact study of hadith (the reports of the Prophet’s

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sayings, deeds and decisions as a normative model for Muslim life). Tablighism, which is quite active in the Arab context (such as Morocco) is a global revivalist movement that seeks to strengthen Muslim commitment to the ritual practices of the faith – not only prescribed daily prayers but also collective reading and identification with the lifestyle of the first Muslims. Although different from Wahhabism in many respects, Tablighism also has a largely negative view of human history, its realities and its imperfections, leading to a disconnect between Islam’s religious experience and the challenges of the current human condition. The third is Jihadism, a religiosity of conflict. Fighting infidel enemies of God, identified with today’s global powers, is seen as the highest religious virtue and Muslims who do not fight the enemies of God – or ally themselves with them – are reclassified as themselves enemies of God. This all too brief summary of globalized (or globalizing) Islam is not to overlook: (1) the many other Muslim movements that operate largely within a national or regional context; or (2) the bulk of Muslims who do not align themselves with any movement at all but simply do their best to follow the teachings of Islam as passed down by their predecessors in the faith. The point is transition in the Muslim world on a global scale. It is a precarious moment. The Gülen movement can be generally classified as a fourth form of globalizing Muslim religiosity, which I call reformed Sufism. Sufism has many sides to it and has undergone development over the centuries. Historically, as a social institution in Muslim society, it has focused on a saintly character whose function was not only to instruct his disciples in the ways of noble character (makarim al-akhlaq) and to model them himself but also to mediate heavenly mysteries to them and even intercede for them before the throne of God. Networks of this kind of Sufism still exist and even flourish regionally and trans-regionally. The Barelwi movement is one example, with origins in the shrine culture of South Asia and a significant presence in the United Kingdom. Sheikh Nazim is another example, with followers in both the Middle East and Europe. This kind of Sufism, however, has faced a degree of criticism from contemporary Muslims who look askance at its hierarchical concept of religious authority. This is not to say that Sufism in its traditional form is necessarily anti-modern in outlook but that its structure, a hierarchy of intercessory saints, has come under criticism in this democratic age. The Gülen movement – and other examples of reformed Sufism – have for the most part abandoned this hierarchical structure while retaining the spiritual knowledge (‘ilm laduni) of Sufism along with the doctrine (‘aqida) and law (Shari‘a) of Islam. The concept of human guidance (irshad) is not rejected. But suspicions have been raised about the idea of human intercession (shafa‘a) and the need for a saintly hierarchy in a formalized sense. Also,

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reformed Sufism has responded to modernist and fundamentalist charges against Sufism  – of being antiquated and anti-modern in its otherworldly preoccupations  – by refashioning itself as rational and activist but still spiritual. In other words, the essential religiosity of Sufism that operates both within and beyond the visible boundaries of Islam is still intact and seeks to convey its message to the global umma at this critical moment through media channels such as Hira’.

3.  The aims and approach of Hira’ The message of reformed Sufism, which comes out clearly in the journal, is that the world beyond the pale of Islam may be problematic but should not be condemned outright. Islam in its particular beliefs and practices is still the central departure point and central reference point, but it is not the only one or perhaps even the final one. The religious goal here is not at all the discarding of the very particular ritual and moral duties prescribed by divine law, Shari’a, but rather the attainment of insight into divine reality, haqiqa, which is unbounded and informs all existence. Thus, in contrast to Wahhabism, Tablighism and Jihadism, Sufism as advanced in its reformed expression by the Gülen movement has a positive view of the world as a whole. The internal workings of the universe (science, history, politics, philosophy, art and culture) are not something Muslims should fear or try to stuff into an Islamized box but rather engage positively in view of the spiritual insight of Islam. In line with the reformed Sufism of the Gülen movement, the approach of Hira’ is not so much to discuss the latest developments in the various branches of learning, knowledge, and science directly. Rather, it seeks to inform the Muslim mind with a spiritually enriched perspective of the world and its social and scientific realities. This perspective, in turn, can be brought to bear on the various branches of learning, knowledge and science. The Moroccan scholar Farid al-Ansari (d. 2009) sums this up in the first issue of the journal (no. 1, October-December 2005): How much we need a rereading of Islam today . . . a reading that brings the Muslim to God before a reading that leads him to criticizes himself, social injustice, and political tyranny and that makes him in his religiosity an enemy of religion whether he realizes it or not. Here, I believe, al-Ansari is referring to the other forms of globalized religiosity noted above. They all have a religiosity that demands the perfection of the world as the standard by which religion is validated. As a result, they invariably

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end with a negative view of a world that stubbornly refuses to conform perfectly to the ideals of religion. The prophetic cave of Hira’ shows that something more is needed for religion to realize its purpose: spiritual insight that rejects the notion that material reality is the final measure of the worth of religion. This reality, of course, is not ignored on the journal’s pages but is contextualized within an Islamic spiritual vision. This is not to say that religion is to have no impact on worldly life. The spiritual insight that a religious formation of the soul affords believers is to be brought to bear on all aspects of existence, in order to inform them with an otherworldly perspective that does not violate their autonomy but rather enhances an understanding of their purpose. A key idea advanced by the journal is that Islam is to touch all things human and worldly but is not reducible to them. This is in line with the Qur’anic teaching that God’s signs (ayat) are to be discerned in human souls (anfus) and worldly horizons (afaq) and not only in scriptural verses. It is about a dynamic engagement of the heavenly with the earthly realm and not the collapse of the two into a single entity. Again, the central goal of Hira’ is to move Muslims beyond defensiveness by teaching a religiosity that can confidently interact with modernity. This is what Gülen means by rabbaniyya (no. 7, April-June 2007), the engineering of the soul for the sake of its harmonious integration with others and society as a whole, effecting its salvation within the sometimes troubling specificities of modernity and endowing it with a prophetic heart that puts concern for others before self. The failure of this mission, rabbaniyya, he notes, would be a betrayal of the umma, but the furthering of its spiritual activism will permit the umma to rediscover itself, restore its global relevance and dynamism and make Muslims worthy to be God’s caliphs – in other words, His delegates on earth (Gülen, no. 4, July-September 2006). Such a mission, however, is not meta-religious but arises within the boundaries of Islam. The particulars of Islam  – Ramadan, Hajj and so on  – are not mere ceremony and ritual but occasions filled with divinely inspired sounds and images meant to awaken the spiritual consciousness of Muslims (Gülen, no. 1, October-December 2005; and no. 2, January-March 2006). Key to Muslim life is the ability not simply to undertake religious duties but to experience the foretaste (dhawq) of the hereafter that believers anticipate, ensuring existential satisfaction as opposed to dissatisfaction even amid the realities and imperfections of this world. The point is that religion is not just about divine command but also symbolic meaning, such that the duties of religion become indispensable vehicles for the spiritual transformation of the soul and the dispersal of its egoistic tendencies. Islam here is not just about Shari’a as the standard of Muslim actions but also about haqiqa as standard of Muslim souls. Indeed, the realization

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of haqiqa is a necessary preliminary to correct performance of Shari’a, lest one’s religiosity be driven by materiality instead of spirituality. It is for this purpose that Gülen dwells on the necessarily pre-existential nature of the Prophet Muhammad as revealer of haqiqa and not only conveyor of Shari’a (no. 5, October-December 2006). The fact that here the Prophet is mediator and intercessor of divinely imbued existence gives all Muslims a sense of responsibility before divine truth but also raises questions that it would seem Gülen has only begun to explore about the inherently hierarchical nature of religion. It is not only the case that divine truth must be prophetically revealed. It must also be manifestly preserved by those worthy of inheriting the heavenly mystery (warathat al-sirr) and of assuming authority (walaya) over its correct expression in this world. All of this is to suggest that the Arabo-Islamic sphere of the global umma is in need not only of spiritually oriented ideas as represented in the journal but also of a spiritual leadership that can interact positively and effectively with the current global moment. The production of this heavenly earthly dynamic is possible only with the formation of the soul. Hira’ does not therefore focus on theological disputes, which never end decisively. There are articles – for example, by the Egyptian Zaghlul al-Najjar – proposing that the latest findings of science confirm the revelations of Islam, such as the statistical improbability of the world, in all its minutely complex detail, coming into existence on its own (no. 7, April-June 2007). A very popular theme in the Arabo-Islamic context today is that of ‘the scientific inimitability of the Qur’an’ (al-i‘ jaz al-‘ilmi) as represented prominently by such figures as ‘Abdallah Muslih of Saudi Arabia. The idea is that the revelation of Islam actually confirms the latest finds of modern science. This is a potentially precarious approach to religion since it runs the risk of tying the validity of religion to the findings of modern science, which, after all, could change, but it is so popular in the Arabo-Islamic context that the editors of the journal cannot ignore it. Zaghlul al-Najjar has a number of articles, for example, ‘The scientific inimitability of the Qur’an in describing the signs of the hour in the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna’ (no. 21, December 2010). One could ask whether this theme (the hour in the article’s title refers to the end of the world and its transformation into a new post-resurrection creation) would be better framed in terms of the relation of eschatological vision to present reality rather than scientific considerations, but the author goes on to suggest that things pertaining to the end of the world as discussed in Islam’s revealed message are reflected in scientific discovery and theory (for example, the so-called Big Crunch, which he ties to the Qur’an’s declaration that the sky will fold up at the end of time). He takes this to be proof of the veracity of Islam’s revelation. One could ask whether the veracity of a revealed message comes

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from its conformity to scientific findings, and indeed the question of religion and science is front and centre in today’s world. It will be interesting to see how the journal continues to broach this theme. Again, given the popularity of the theme of the Qur’an’s scientific inimitability in (and beyond) the Arabo-Islamic context, it is impossible for the journal to ignore it, but the question is how to treat it in a way that respects the journal’s emphasis on a dynamic relation between the spiritual and material without reducing the one to the other. (See e.g. Najjar’s article in issue no. 6, January-March 2007, which comes close to collapsing religion and science into a single framework with the apparent claim that modern science is proof of the divine origin of the Qur’an.) Also, given the common allegation that Sufism did not form part of the religious heritage of the first generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih), it is important for Hira’ to communicate its message credibly across the umma – to demonstrate the place of Sufism in early Islam. Hira’ accomplishes this task convincingly with the pen of a scholar of impeccable Islamic credentials, the Syrian Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti (no. 5, October-December 2006), who links his argument for Sufism’s place in early Islam to the example of Badi‘ l-Zaman Sa‘id Nursi (d. 1960), a figure whose commitment to the cause of Islam is indisputable and who played an integral role in fostering a reformed expression of Sufism over the course of the twentieth century especially in the post-Ottoman Turkish context. Still, the approach of Hira’ is not so much to convince the mind with theological argumentation as to evoke a heavenly horizon in the human psyche (wijdan), addressing readers at the psycho-spiritual as much as the purely rational level. As suggested by Farid al-Ansari in an article on the doctrine of Islam (no. 5, October-December 2006), there is inherent deficiency in a religiosity limited to scholastic disputation and theological definition. The tendency among Muslims today, he claims, is to engage in doctrinal debate about the implications of monotheism without actually entering into a dynamic engagement with it in their hearts. Allah – monotheism – is not simply the object of rational speculation, which invariably falls short in its attempt to capture the ineffable character of divinity in human words. Rather, the monotheistic message of Allah is more fundamentally the object of passions and emotions, feelings and sentiments. It is not enough to know monotheism but rather to identify with it psychically in what al-Ansari calls a covenant of love between God and His servants. This, he says, is the secret of the hadith that states that those whose confession of monotheism is backed by a desire for the face of Allah are assured of entering paradise. It is worth noting that the magazine uses not only the content of its articles but also its stylistic presentation to appeal to the Muslim psyche and remind it of the heavenly desire within the human being that can only be fulfilled in a

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realm beyond the material one. The visual presentation (images that draw the mind into a more contemplative state) is a highly effective means of mediating spirituality in a way that words are unable to do, for the highly educated no less than for the illiterate. Hira’ devotes important space for intricate pictures that bespeak heavenly aspirations, stirring not simply intellectual rumination but psychic identification, awakening the soul to its desire for spiritual reality as reflected in the visual imagery and assisting it in the process of finding contentment and satisfaction not in material reality per se but rather in a spiritually transfigured view of it. Indeed, as Farid al-Ansari demonstrates in an article on aesthetics in Islam (no. 1, October-December 2005), this is the goal of religious art in contrast to the elitist and self-referential tendencies of modern art: to induce through calligraphic, geometric, vegetal and other forms of mosque design a sense of being in the heavenly court. As he argues elsewhere (no. 2, January-March 2006), the beauty of the world and the beauty of humanity have a place within the spectrum of religion and cannot therefore be set in opposition to it  – and that on the basis of evidence from the Book of God and Sunna of the Prophet. In this sense, things worldly and human (art and architecture, emotions, intellect and psyche) can act as sites for the manifestation of divine beauty (jamal). It is, of course, highly significant that al-Ansari and other contributors to Hira’ show the revealed basis for the place of worldly and humanly beauty in the divine economy, since it is exactly this that the other forms of globalized religiosity noted above reject – the idea that worldly existence and its forms of beauty have a positive place in Islam. Again, this is reformed Sufism, advancing not by hierarchical fiat but by ‘ilm (knowledge)-based argument – in other words, as demonstration of the validity of human scientific aspiration and the aesthetics of the cosmos as rooted in Qur’an and Sunna. There are other compelling ways in which Hira’ presents its unique religiosity by appealing to the psyche and not only the intellect. This is seen in the journal’s wide use of poetry and poetic imagery. For example, scattered across the pages of Hira’ are several poems of the Moroccan Hasan al-Amrani that speak of prophecy and love in a single breath. In a very interesting article, the Turkish Isma‘il Lutfi Joqan analyzes the different ways in which the Prophet Muhammad experienced sorrow (huzn), offering believers a model by which to link human feeling to religious experience, binding the psyche more closely to God (no. 5, October-December 2006). The Moroccan Ahmad ‘Ibadi goes so far as to suggest a science of identification (‘ilm al-ta’assi) with the Prophet, complete with rules and conditions (no. 7, April-June 2007)  – something with much significance at a moment when many Muslims seek to identify with the Prophet in a very literal sense, resulting in disconnecting with modern realities.

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4.  Critical observations on Hira’ Two critical observations: Several articles exhibit something of the obsessive antagonism towards the West that can be found in some Muslim circles. The West as a whole is characterized as a black hole of materialistic impulses with no appreciation for spirituality or religiosity of any kind. This anti-Westernism might be a strategy for Hira’ to appeal to the strongly anti-American sentiment in the Arab world, but it risks undermining the universal religiosity that the magazine claims for Islam. Why not speak simply of materialism without attributing it to the West as source, since, after all, it is no longer possible, if it ever was, to identify it exclusively with the West? The materialistic mindset has no geographical limits. There is currently a great need to get beyond reducing others to categories. Materiality is not exclusive to the West no less or more than spirituality is exclusive to the East, and one can find various forms of corruption in Eastern societies no less than in Western ones. There are materialistic and spiritualistic impulses in both East and West. It is more accurate in general to abandon tendencies to divide East and West into antagonistic categories. It is certainly permissible – even vital – to criticize the moral shortcomings of government policies, whether governments in the West or governments in the East. In this globalized age, however, Western civilization can be tagged as spiritually and ethically bankrupt no less or more than eastern civilization. Muslim attempts to locate the tyranny of the West – real or perceived – in its cultural and spiritual heritage are no less hypocritical or unfounded than non-Muslim attempts to link democratic shortcomings and terrorist activities – real or perceived – in the East in its cultural and spiritual heritage. Second, Hira’ is silent on politics. Why? Its religiosity is well grounded in the heritage of Islam and could offer a welcome contribution on Muslim understanding of the nature and purpose of politics by recovering the great insights of Islam’s tradition of political thought. By avoiding politics, Hira’ risks irrelevancy for an Arab audience that desperately seeks a way for Islam to guide it in its ongoing attempts to transition beyond authoritarian rule, sectarian conflict and Jihadist activity. It is worth noting that the journal has not changed its ‘disinterest’ in political issues in the wake of the Arab Spring (this article was first presented long before the Arab Spring came on the scene). There are good reasons for this. It is not yet entirely clear what the consequences of the Arab Spring will be, making it wise not to enter into the ongoing political debates, which could distort the magazine’s spiritual and intellectual goals. It is not one of the magazine’s stated objectives to write on the political sphere. At the same time, the magazine does include articles that even if not directly political do speak to the larger challenges inaugurated by the Arab

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Spring. For example, Su’ad al-Nasir writes on the concept of freedom from a religio-philosophical perspective (no. 25, July-August 2011): Freedom, al-Nasir argues, is a not a new phenomenon but a natural right of human beings to make choices and express ideas related to the issues of the day. It is a right that Islam granted and protects. But it is not reducible to the rights of individuals. It also has a social dimension, namely, responsibility and accountability for the good of society. Words such as these raise well-known but still significant questions for the Arab world amid its current challenges. In this vein, it is also worth mentioning the article by ‘Ali Gum‘a on the prophetic methodology for treating ills in society (no. 31, July-August 2012). There are other ways that the magazine could speak to the political situation, even if indirectly. One important element in Islam’s tradition of political thought is mercy (rahma) as a public interest (maslaha) and not only a spiritual virtue. Forgiveness, as the moral fruit of mercy, has vital import for the public welfare of Arab society today. The aim of Hira’ of speaking Turkish in Arabic, in other words the language of the Qur’an, is highly relevant in this sense. Arab society still has a strong feeling of injustices committed by Ottoman rule but also remembers its great achievements. This is not at all to connect any past Ottoman injustices towards the Arabs to the religious outlook of Hira’ but rather to suggest that backing this outlook with action would connect the magazine and its purpose more dynamically to the concerns of Arab society. Fethullah Gülen could effectively do this, devoting an issue of Hira’ to this theme, including a statement of apology and hope for forgiveness for the excesses of Ottoman rule. Or, alternatively, the magazine could devote some of its articles on history to a careful treatment of some of the problematic sides of Muslim history and the place of Ottoman rule in it. References to Ottoman history in the journal can sometimes come across as defensive or glorifying. Seeking forgiveness by exploring history is a strategy that has been used by other religious leaders, including popes, and can be an effective way to mediate a profound religiosity of the type represented by Hira’. The evidence suggests that the ideas of Nursi, especially his approach to reading the Qur’an, have been favourably received in Arab society from Morocco to Syria. It may be useful to think of a way to consolidate these ideas with concrete initiatives as heralded by the appearance of Hira’.

5.  Conclusion This has been a general overview of a new Gülen initiative. The magazine has caught the attention of the Arab press and Arab intellectual circles to a degree, but it is still too early to assess its impact on Arab society as a whole.

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It is not known how its vision impacts people’s thinking on the Arab street. Is it having effect? One hopes so – for the sake of the Arab-Islamic world it addresses but also for the entire world. It represents the type of religiosity that must succeed for the sake of global solidarity. Still, it should be remembered that Hira’ represents only an initial and limited attempt on the part of the Gülen movement to convey its vision to the rest of the umma, particularly the important Arabic sphere. In that sense, it represents only the potential of the Gülen movement in the Arabo-Islamic world, but in the wake of the Arab Spring, there will likely be more fertile ground to transform such potential into reality with more extensive projects and institutions on the ground in Arab countries. Hira’ is thus serving to set the tone for such a future possibility.

10 Central Asia’s Hizmet Schools Victoria Clement

1.  Introduction

I

n the early 1990s members of the Gülen movement began setting up schools and universities around Central Asia. Not only in Turkic-speaking regions, but also as far east as Mongolia and Southeast Asia, the so-called Turkish schools have succeeded in creating a network of private schools that offer quality education to ethnically and religiously diverse populations. The first boarding school, named after Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal, opened in Türkmenistan in 1992. The Gülen-inspired schools have prospered there despite Türkmenistan’s extreme political conditions and severely weakened social systems. On the whole, the movement has played a vital role in offering Eurasia’s youth an alternative to state-sponsored schooling. An important aspect of these schools is the Islamic values they impart. Though the schools adhere strictly to local curricula, typically teaching no classes in religion or religious culture, by living as temsil (models), teachers and administrators generally endorse a conservative way of life rooted in Islamic values (ahlak, edep, terbiýe [upbringing]). A great many parents choose to send students to the schools in part because of this unique factor. Success in Türkmenistan is especially notable due to the dramatic politicization of education under nationalistic sociocultural programmes in that Central Asian country. How did this network of foreign schools, connected to a faith-based social movement, manage to flourish in Türkmenistan? The author has been conducting interviews and recording influences of Başkent schools in Türkmenistan since she was an instructor at the International

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Turkmen-Turk University (ITTU) in 1997 and her most recent visit was in the Autumn of 2012.

2.  Making the global local: Gülen school adaptability to local contexts 2.1. School networks In each country, the movement creates a ‘network’ of schools (Mayer, 21 July 2004). This term does not imply that a singular overarching association or administration governs the members and schools around the world. Moreover, Gülen does not oversee a type of empire or any global coalition and he is not involved with the administration or ownership of the schools. Thus, it is incorrect to refer to these schools as ‘Gülen schools’ and it is more accurate to call them an expression of hizmet (service), Turkish schools, as some communities do, or Gülen-inspired. Gülen does inspire his followers. He is known affectionately as the teacher (hocaefendi) and is the author of influential writings, but there is no single formal entity to which the schools are responsible. Each school must consider local political and social conditions when creating a curriculum, admitting students, and choosing the languages of instruction. For example, in Türkmenistan the Russian language was a part of the curriculum of all Turkish schools until 2003, when Türkmenistan’s president decreed that Russian should no longer be a language of instruction in schools. According to a former teacher, President Nyýazow made an official announcement and the schools complied (Interview with Ahmet Çopursan, 7 June 2007). While the Turkish schools pride themselves on teaching foreign languages  – indeed it is a fundamental aspect of Gülen’s philosophy  – they adhered to the policy immediately. Yet in Kazakhstan, where the tone is far less nationalistic, Russian remains part of the curriculum in the Turkish schools. While a key aim of the schools and related media is to encourage the spread of English (the international language of technology) and Turkish (language of the founder and most adherents) local languages demonstrate the movement’s inclination to work within state systems. The adaptability of the methodology allows it to flourish beyond the Turkic language and Muslim worlds. Hakan Yavuz has described the ‘movement’ as a ‘loose network system’ consisting primarily of shared values as well as methods of teaching and organizing schools, for example, drawing teachers and administrators from within the core community, relying on similar texts and curricula, and the concept of a teacher living as a model. Each set of schools is organized separately within a particular country, in cooperation with that country’s

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government, and is funded through a locally established company or foundation. The sources of funding provide critical clues to demonstrating the independence of each school system. Businessmen living in Kazakhstan provide financial support to the Kazak-Türk Eğitim Vakfi which then oversees the institutions in that country. Monies from schools in the Balkans, for example, are not shared with those in Kyrgyzstan (see in detail Ebaugh, 2010). In Türkmenistan it is the Başkent Bilim Şirketi (Bashkent Educational Firm) that organizes funding, while successful businessmen (işadamı and esnaf ) fund the movement and its schools (Yavuz, 2000: 189). Donations to such foundations allow the middle class to contribute to the shaping of society, fulfil an act of piety (zakat), and aid in building an active community. Turks living abroad, in Central Asia or Africa for example, also assist in the creation of schools at which their children can receive a quality education. The firms or foundations represent the concerted efforts of teachers and sponsors to offer socially conscious education grounded in teaching modern sciences with an international focus. Yet course offerings typically do not include religious instruction. ‘Gülen’s group differentiates itself from other Islamic movements by stressing the importance of ethics in education and the business world’ (Yavuz, 2003c: 186). Bekim Agai explains that the aim of the schools is not to teach religion. But, he explains they do stress such values as community service (hizmet) and ethics (ahlak), which are seen as ‘unifying factors between different religious, ethnic, and political orientations’ (Agai, 2003: 49).

2.2. Hizmet Hizmet, or service, is at the core of the Gülen movement and the Hizmet schools. Indeed, it is foundational to their very existence. Teachers and administrators undertake the positions out of a desire to serve. While employees are not volunteers, they take on positions that do not pay a high salary but do require long hours of intense interaction. And, even when classes are over, there are meetings to be held with parents and extracurricular activities to oversee. Classroom teachers make a home visit to meet with each student’s parents twice a year. The philosophy behind this is that by visiting the homes and getting to know the whole family, the instructors, accompanied by an administrator, will gain a better sense of the child as a whole and be better informed to meet the child’s overall needs. The author was participant observer while an instructor at the ITTU in A şgabat, Türkmenistan, and it was observed that mentoring is fundamental to the teaching methodology employed in the schools wherever in the world they are located. Teachers spend hours with students outside of regular class

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hours without extra pay. Additionally, there are teachers living in the dormitories and older students assigned to act as assistants to the dormitory teacher. This methodology is not limited to teachers who are adherents of Islam or participants of the movement but applies to all teachers at Gülen-inspired schools. Hizmet is a basic way of life for everyone including graduates who are known to return to their former schools to act as tutors or to donate time at a Turkish cultural centre to mentor youth. (Aslandoğan and Çetin, 2007: 54). Indeed, the author’s own research has been made possible in such countries as Kyrgyzstan by former graduates assisting in making contact with donors, parents and making the acquaintance of administrators. The schools are concerned not only with the students’ scholastic aptitude, but also with their overall well-being and development. Moreover, parents are expected to participate to the greatest extent that they are able. Parents of course pay tuition and participate in home visits, but school administrators also anticipate that parents will attend parents’ meetings, take part in extracurricular activities with the children, assist with fund raisers, holiday celebrations and other general school events (interviews in Australia, Chicago and New York). In a way, parents are encouraged to take part in hizmet activities as well as teachers. The idea of creating a community is part and parcel of the greater idea of the movement.

2.3. Ahlak, edep, terbiýe (ethics, etiquette, upbringing) Terbiýe, or edep-terbiýe, refers to the upbringing of youth based in historically and culturally defined Islamic morality. In the Islamic world imparting edep-terbiýe (upbringing) to children was historically one of the most important responsibilities in parenting and it was a task shared with teachers. Linked to an individual’s bilim (formal education), in Central Asia, edep-terbiýe was also imbued with religious spirit and its goal was to rear a Muslim who exhibited etiquette, demonstrating that he was educated in social ways. In addition to imparting training and basic knowledge, including literacy, a mekteb education taught ways of living in accordance with a moral foundation based on Islamic values (‘Kuttab’, EI2, Vol. 2, 1986: 156). The scholar Seyyid Hosein Nasr writes, Islamic education is concerned not only with the instruction and training of the mind and the transmission of knowledge (ta’lim) but also with the education of the whole being of men and women (tarbiyah). The teacher is therefore not only a mu’alim, a ‘transmitter of knowledge’ but also a murabbi, ‘a trainer of souls and personalities’. (Nasr, 2001: 56)

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Terbiýe (character building) is critical to raising good Muslims and is the principal concept by which the schools are organized. Using the phrase ‘bilim we terbiýe’ no less than eight times in a single presentation, Seýit Embel, the chair of the Başkent Educational Centre in A şgabat wrote that ‘enlightenment and character building are the main aims’ of the combined Turkmen and Turkish efforts (Embel, 2005: 11). One basic method for imparting terbiýe in the Hizmet schools is through temsil (model living).

2.4. Temsil While an instructor at ITTU, the author lived in the on-campus dormitory with the female students and observed that the basic method for imparting terbiýe in the schools has been for the teachers to embody Islamic spiritual ideals and convey them through temsil (Özdalga, 2003: 85). Indeed, the very success of the schools has been attributed to the dedication of the teachers (Keleş, 2007; Kalyoncu, 2008). In some regions of Russia where drug use is high Tatar parents chose Hizmet schools specifically because they focus on instilling strong moral values in students (Interview with Füsun Akarsu, 2012). Fethullah Gülen has addressed this methodology when writing: Those who lead the way must set a good example for their followers. Just as they are imitated in their virtues and good morals, so do their bad and improper actions and attitudes leave indelible marks upon those who follow them. (Gülen, 2002a: 72) Teachers, administrators and sponsors follow Fethullah Gülen’s example of teaching students how to live a life rooted in Islam while engaging the modern scientific world via education (Yavuz, 2000: 193–211). Model living covers a range of moral behaviour such as restraint from smoking, drinking or gambling through to positive values such as a strong work ethic, self-respect, respect for others and service to community (Interview with Çopursan, 2007). Teachers make themselves available to students outside of school (Iinterview with teachers and students, A şgabat, Türkmenistan, 2004). Gülen has said that ‘the best way to educate people is to show a real concern for every individual, not forgetting that each individual is a different “world”’ (Ünal and Williams, 2000: 313). After school activities (sports, movies, lectures) and informal relations with staff are designed to encourage character building. Women’s reading circles meet in the homes of families to allow for congregation and study. These typically involve the mothers and older women in the Turkish community, but students and local mothers are welcome.

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3.  Post-Soviet Türkmenistan From October 1991 when Türkmenistan gained independence and came under sole rule of Saparmurat Nyýazow, until 11 February 2007 when Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedow assumed the presidency, Nyýazow’s proclivities determined the course of Türkmenistan’s educational system. Niýazow was appointed head of the Turkmen Communist Party in 1985, elected president in 1990, and named ‘President for life’ in 1999. Although he employed the title ‘president’ and the state had the trappings of a parliamentary system it was no secret that all power emanated from Nyýazow. His self-chosen title ‘Türkmenbaş y’ meant ‘leader of the Türkmen’. Instead of joining Türkmenistan with the world by building upon the antiquated yet functioning Soviet system, President Nyýazow chipped away at it until only a skeleton remained. The state cultivated policies to support the ‘Turkmenification’ of such social spheres as education, politics, media, legal venues, places of medicine and any house of bureaucracy (Bouma, 2011). The government dismantled the Soviet education system, replacing it with lower quality schools and curricula. Not unlike during the earliest years of the Soviet Union when enlightenment was bound up with Socialism, learning became tightly linked to the reconceptualization of the nation and Nyýazow’s ideology became codified with the introduction of his Ruhnama (or ‘Book of the Soul’) into the schools in 2002. This was a pseudo-philosophical-historical text that came to dominate public discourse throughout twenty-first-century Türkmenistan and supported Niýazow’s cult of personality. Rather than move away from political ideology, which had saturated education during the Soviet Union, classroom content further weakened under the weight of Nyýazow’s personality cult and state-controlled anti-Russian cultural programmes. Moreover, classrooms became sites for ethnic discrimination. Turkmen displaced Russian as a language of instruction in schools; ethnic divisions permeated school lessons as state employees who did not speak Turkmen  – including teachers  – were dismissed; and applications to institutes for higher education required students to identify their ancestry in a veiled attempt to keep non-Turkmen out of universities. Under Nyýazow’s leadership, the state-sponsored education system suffered from such acute deterioration that it threatened a whole generation of human capital in that country (Clement, 2004a). Türkmenistan’s citizens felt as if the country was regressing and feared their children might become the ‘lost generation’ rather than the ‘golden generation’, or Altyn Nesli as Nyýazow labelled the post-Soviet youth (Beýik, 2003). The origin of this moniker is unknown, but Niýazow may have borrowed it from Fethullah Gülen, who also speaks frequently of a ‘golden generation’.

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In interviews that the author conducted with parents between 2001 and 2007, one of the most frequent unsolicited comments was that families wished, at a minimum, to see Türkmenistan’s educational system restored to Soviet levels. This opinion was freely offered despite the risk of speaking critically about the state with a foreigner (Clement, 2005, chapter 5). It is both because of the extreme local conditions and the achievements of the Hizmet schools that Türkmenistan provides an illuminating study of the Gülen movement’s contributions to Central Asian societies. Participants of the of the Gülen movement offered Türkmenistan’s youth the only means of attaining a quality education within that country.

4.  Gülen schools in Türkmenistan 4.1. History of development In 1990 Türkmenistan’s Ministry of Education began formal discussions with Turkey’s Başkent Educational Firm over the possibilities of cooperation in education. This dialogue led to agreement to develop a network of Turkmen-Turkish schools in Türkmenistan (Pektaş, 1999: 10) At the beginning of the 1991/92 academic year the Turkmen-Turkish Boarding School named after Turgut Özal opened in A şgabat. Two years later, in the 1993/94 school year schools with dormitories opened in Mary, Baýramaly, Çärjew, Daşoguz, Nebitdag, Türkmenbaş y and Könýaürgenç. Later that same year the network expanded to include an economic-technical school (lise) in Ashgabat, boarding schools in Tejen, Büzmeýn and Kerki, and the ITTU in A şgabat. In 1997/98 A şgabat became home to a new Turkish Centre that offered courses in languages and computers and a school for girls (Türkmen-Türk Buýsançly, 2005). The curricula of the schools emphasized the natural sciences, mathematics and languages. Study of English, Turkish, Turkmen and Russian languages was obligatory. Special attention was given to English for which preparatory classes were organized. If a student was not ready for university-level courses in English they were enrolled in an elementary-level course. Designed to reach talented and gifted children, the schools standards were higher than in most public schools. Pektaş (1999: 11–12) explains, the pedagogy was based on the programme for private schools in Turkey in correspondence with the requirements of schools in Türkmenistan. Interviews with teachers, 1997– 2007 reveal that in the earliest years, most teachers and staff travelled from Turkey to Central Asia out of their personal interest in the Gülen movement and a sense of imparting positive universal values. Gülen had encouraged followers to go to the former Soviet Union to set up schools. He was quoted

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as saying, ‘Fly like swallows to these countries that are newly free, as an expression of our brotherhood’ (Osman, 2007). Some Turkish citizens worked in Central Asia because schools there afforded religious freedom they could not access in Turkey, such as wearing headscarves. Still others found good jobs with salaries that allowed for a comfortable life, especially considering the low-cost of living in the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. Local teachers, conducting courses in such subjects as Turkmen language, Russian language and the history of Türkmenistan, sought out work in the Turkish schools for the high-level of pay as well as for better working conditions. These instructors received salaries at least three times that of teachers in Türkmenistan’s public education system and many have maintained their positions over the decade.

4.2. Finances The schools cover expenses with monies received from Turkey, primarily Ankara, or from Turkish businesses in Türkmenistan. The school administration had initially intended to take care of costs down to the clothing of the students; each pupil receives a uniform, shoes and sports clothes (Pektaş, 1999: 13). In fact, some students receive full scholarships, some pay nominal fees, and others pay tuition in the range of $1000 per year (Silova, 2008: 179). According to Lester Kurtz (Kurtz, 2005: 381): The movement has mobilized and involved prominent intellectuals and even set up a non-interest bearing bank – with $125 million capital – Asya Finans, to promote economic development in the Turkish-speaking Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The Bashkent Educational Firm (Başkent Eğitim Şirketi) is the movement’s financial and administrative umbrella organization in Türkmenistan. The Başkent Bilim Merkezi (Başkent Educational Centre) is the Gülen community’s administrative and pedagogical centre. The Centre also houses space for youth interaction that is typically filled with young people spending free time with friends, playing table tennis or using computers  – an important offering in the days before the internet cafés of 2007. Locals refer to the Centre as ‘Başkent’ or the ‘Turkish Centre’ by association with language and identity of the teachers. Nevertheless, Başkent operates as an independent administrative and legal entity certified in Türkmenistan by that state. Funded and staffed by participants of the movement, Başkent opened a university in 1993–4 and began to build primary and secondary schools around the country. Başkent has maintained the schools, eleven departments within three colleges (fakultet) at the university, and the Centre itself, which

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offers five courses in foreign languages and computers. Since the earliest days of Türkmenistan’s independence, the Centre has offered English-language classes for a nominal fee. At that time, the office and classroom occupied a small rented space, which though located near the center of the city, was hidden behind the old Soviet Circus. It was a challenge to find. Today, Baskent offices occupy a large building to house all of the classes, administrative offices and social spaces. Located on a main street in Türkmenistan’s capital city A şgabat, its accessibility and its good reputation doubtlessly encourage the participation of the young people who drop in and of the adults attending night courses in English (Clement, 2005: 142–62). Başkent’s schools and students in have grown in number consistently. In 1997–8 there were 13 schools in Türkmenistan with 3,294 students. In 2006–7 those numbers had grown, respectively, to 16 schools and 5,250 students (Silova, 2008: 178). Moreover, the local population recognizes these schools as the best alternative form of education in Türkmenistan. Every year 9,000–10,000 students compete for 750 places. At the university 4,000 applications were submitted for 200 places. In the first ten years the elementary schools graduated 2,803 pupils, the language and computer programme awarded 10,710 certificates and more than 500 students have graduated from the ITTU (Türkmen-Türk Mekdeplery, 2005: 12). This consistent growth is due both to the administration of the institutions, as well as to the ever-increasing interest among Türkmenistan’s citizens in enrolling their children in superior schools.

4.3. Publicity and growth How has the movement been able to advertise their new schools in a country without a free press? They began by sending representatives to visit schools to announce the entrance exams. According to Ahmet Çopursan, word of mouth among families was enough to build the reputation of the schools among the populace. A few years later, the newspaper Zaman began publishing a Turkish-Turkmen language version in A şgabat. It has at times held the highest levels of subscription rates for a periodical in Türkmenistan. Members of the country’s sole Democratic Party report that this has caused them great angst as it means competition for their party’s papers. Zaman originated in Istanbul and is today printed separately in a handful of countries where participants of the movement reside. For those who cannot obtain print copies, an electronic version of the Istanbul issue is accessible via the internet. It announces local and international news, local school events and happenings within the Turkish school system, such as the scheduling of university entrance exams. A method for combining news and promoting the schools is to publish articles about such prestigious student events as a

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competition of language sponsored by Başkent and the cultural attachés of the Turkish and Afghanistani embassies. The reputation of the Turkish schools is their most powerful form of advertisement and recruitment. In conversations with graduates of the Turkmen-Turkish University I asked how Turkmen people generally perceive a graduate of a Turkish school. They explained that they encounter some envy because they have had opportunities that are available to only a handful of the young population. Knowledge of English and Turkish, as well as Russian and Turkmen, make them competitive on the job market. Graduates from state schools may have studied one or two of these languages, or may know a smattering of each, but that cannot compare with the level of acquisition that the programmes of the Turkish schools provide. Moreover, graduates reported that they are viewed as trustworthy and dependable because of the strict discipline of the Gülen schools. Any parent should be instilling a sense of terbiýe (upbringing) in their children, but it is never guaranteed that they do. Graduates of the ITTU reported in interviews that a degree from a Turkish school certifies that the individual has been introduced to the traditional concepts of adab (enlightenment, culture, etiquette) and terbiýe, in addition to having received an internationally recognized education. If there is one aspect of the Başkent schools that is foreign to Turkmen students it is the gender separation in middle schools and the university. While Turkmen do practice separation of the sexes during religious events and some family gatherings, it is not typical of their modern educational spaces. Despite this, no one with some I spoke named it as a reason to avoid Başkent schools (Clement, 2004a and 2004b). Nevertheless, there are families that will not send their children to the Turkish schools, or have even removed them from the schools, due to a perceived influence of Islam on the students. Interviews with graduates of the ITTU in A şgabat showed that some parents have complained that their children suddenly developed an interest in visiting the mosque or ‘developed a more religious attitude’. Even though there are no explicit lessons about Islam, ‘implicit cues about their Islamic orientation’ can be detected in the behaviour of teachers and in cultural programmes on campuses. (Demir et al., 2000: 147). This handful of dissatisfied families saw in the model living of teachers or in terbiýe a degree of spirituality that they could not reconcile with their expectations of secular education. Despite this minority attitude, a far greater number of families wish to enrol their children in the Turkish schools, even families who are not Muslim. Ethnic Russian families reported that they would rather have their children influenced by Turkish schools that teach international languages and business than Türkmenistan’s state schools which once spent a great deal of time on Ruhnama.

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5.  Measuring spiritual influence The Gülen schools have been successful in terms of education, but the extent of their spiritual influence is difficult to measure. Parents respect the Turkish schools for providing a broad curriculum with high standards, and they appreciate the technical advantages of these well-funded institutions and the level of discipline exhibited by committed teachers. However, discussions with Turkmen families of varied economic backgrounds over a number of years revealed that they choose to send their children to study in these schools not in search of Islamic enlightenment but primarily as a means of gaining qualifications for employment. While independence in 1991 allowed for a surge in religious practice the thirst for spiritual growth and general education did not overlap completely. Appreciative of secular, Soviet education, both citizens and the state eagerly maintained the separation between public education and Islam. Thus, in Türkmenistan, lessons with religious content were found only in a limited number of places such as the Ylahyýet fakultet or Religious Studies College at Magtumguly State University until that College closed in 2002 or in private classes that meet in mosques or the homes of Islamic scholars (mollas, ahuns). With an obvious interest in maintaining a separation between secular education and religion, how do Turkmen reconcile that view with the fact that the movement’s mission is rooted in Islam? Turkmen parents view general education not primarily as a means for spiritual development, but as a path to getting a job. They expect schools to impart knowledge that will allow citizens to function in globalized or international society. Any contradiction between this conceptualization of education and the Gülen movement’s faith-based goals is superseded by the fact that the Turkish educational institutions provide the best educational opportunity in Türkmenistan. Ultimately, Turkmen families do make allowances for an overlap between secular enlightenment and Gülen’s faith-based initiative in acknowledging that education guided by a moral framework (terbiýe) would provide their children with better material opportunities. In that regard their expectations fit well with Gülen’s belief that a good Muslim is one who is committed to the world. One of the Turkmen assistant principals asserted the practical aspect of the schools’ curricula saying: ‘We need “know how” for the development of our country. Those schools provide hope for us in achieving our purposes, because they train qualified people who are familiar with universal standards’ (Demir, Balcı and Akkok, 2000: 148). Throughout Central Asia the Gülen schools play an important role in fledgling civil societies in that they operate outside of the state. They offer opportunities for social interaction and experimentation such as student newspapers, women’s reading circles, film

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festivals (in Türkmenistan all cinemas were shut down in 2002), study-abroad programmes and use of the internet. Most importantly, these private schools offer families a choice in education. One difference between the schools in Central Asia and some other regions  – South Asia for example  – is that former Soviet regions had high literacy rates but little opportunity for civil society building (Osman, 2007). In Türkmenistan, a country with arguably the most seriously deficient education policy in the region and one of the worst records on civil society, the contributions of the Gülen movement are especially impressive. Moreover, because of deficiencies within Türkmenistan’s educational system, the graduates of the Turkish schools in Türkmenistan are the only youth in a generation to receive a high-school education that meets international standards. In Türkmenistan engaging that state has meant actually placing Turkish participants of the movement in high-level government positions. Muammer Turkyılmaz, Türkmenistan’s deputy education minister (Türkmenistanyň Bilim Ministerligiň Orunbasar) and Seýit Embel, head of the Başkent Educational Centre (Başkent Bilim Merkeziniň Baş Ugrukdyryjysy), have been critical to Başkent’s success and demonstrate the movement’s adaptability. In the initial years Turks held most administrative posts. As part of Türkmenistan’s Milli Galkynyş Hereketi (National Revival Movement) President Nyýazow mandated in 2004 that only ethnic Turkmen could be heads of schools. Today the Rector of the ITTU is an ethnic Turkmen as are the principals of the schools. Turks occupy only assistant principal or secondary administrative positions. However, Embel and Türkyılmaz remain in their positions demonstrating that there is flexibility in the relationship with the state. In fact, in March 2007 the new president of Türkmenistan, Berdymukhammedow, confirmed the state’s appreciation of Türkyılmaz’s work in Türkmenistan by reappointing him as deputy minister of education (Türkmen Milli Eğ itimi, 2007: 1). Overall, the movement’s success owes much to a long-term view of its goals and its avoidance of postures that could be interpreted by local authorities as antagonistic. As Hakan Yavuz (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) and other scholars have indicated (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003b), this modus vivendi is seen not only in Türkmenistan, but also in the movement’s approach globally. The Gülen-inspired schools in Türkmenistan flourished for all the reasons discussed above. But under the presidency of Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedow the relationship with the state changed. The schools were originally successful in Türkmenistan because a secular curriculum partnered with a strong moral framework appealed to parents and students without threatening the state. Nevertheless, by August 2011 the state had changed its attitude towards the schools.

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The state took umbrage at what it perceived to be a missionary-like quality to the school network and wanted to thoroughly secularize it. The network of schools was not ‘closed down’ as much as it was ‘localized’. That is, while individual schools were closed, the remaining schools and the university were placed under the authority of the Provincial National Ministry Directorate. About a dozen of the schools were affected; for example in Bayramaly, Tejen, Balkanabat and Kőnýaürgenç. The only high schools that will be maintained will be those located in the five provincial centres. The Turkmen state has assumed full management. First it passed a law stating that only Turkmen, not Turks, could hold the highest administrative positions; the exception remains the university. Then, the government slowly pushed the Turkish administrators and teachers out of their positions so that Turkmen are now running the remaining schools and the one university. The curriculum remains largely the same, although there is no longer a boarding option. Funding often comes from these students and donations from graduates, particularly those who work for large Turkish companies. Like the schools, the oversight and teaching has shifted a bit, with Turkmen playing a large role in the university from administration to teaching. The school also falls under the purview of the government. ITTU differs from most other universities in that it is a fee-based university ($2,000/year) and has an entrance exam separate from the rest of the state-run university system. In general, the education is still seen as offering a higher quality education than elsewhere as it has working internet and a more refined curriculum. However, as the goal of the government is to redefine the schools and ‘secularize’ them one wonders what aspects of the schools will be lost. Will the merit-based entrance exam no longer be necessary? Will home visits by teachers and administrators no longer take place? Will the moral code wrapped up in terbiýe and ahlak that includes strict rules such as no smoking or drinking be relaxed? Will temsil become irrelevant?

6.  Conclusion Scholars view the Gülen movement as part of a tradition, calling it ‘neo-ijtihad ’ or ‘search for a middle way’ (Kuru, 2003; Voll, 2003; Yilmaz, 2003; 2005a). The Gülen movement strives to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and modernity through intellectual and spiritual pursuits. Calls for aksiyon and morality-based living have encouraged followers who are motivated to actively pursue charitable roles in building successful Muslim societies. The Gülen-inspired schools are a manifestation of that motivation (Voll, 1999: 245–59). Hizmet schools have been successful in so many different countries because of their flexibility and adaptability to local conditions.

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Any contributions made by the Gülen movement must be measured not only according to the standards of the movement, but also to the relative conditions of each specific locality in which participants expand the movement, as well as within a historical context. This case study of the schools in Türkmenistan illustrates how Gülen’s philosophy plays out in situ. Türkmenistan’s parents feel that their children receive better education, through high-quality teaching, including foreign languages in addition to the local language. Yaşar Sarı’s work in Kyrgyzstan (2006) has produced similar results. Parents in both countries note in the literature and in discussions with the author (2006–8) that the Turkish schools are better equipped than state schools and have more advanced facilities (good cafeterias, access to technology) (Demir et al., 2000; Apay, 2004). Muslim and non-Muslim families want high-quality education. States want institutions to respect their authority. The government in Uzbekistan closed the 18 Gülen-inspired schools there as well as the Turkish state schools. The atmosphere in Kyrgyzstan is simply more tolerant and allows for diversity in education. The Kyrgyz-Turkish schools sponsored by the Sebat company grew from 12 to 15 between 1997 and 2007 (Demir et al., 2000: 149; Silova, 2008: 5). In Kazakhstan the schools played a role in the population’s hunger to revive a Turkic-Islamic heritage that was weakened by its Soviet experience. The foundation for Kazak-Turkish Education (Kazakh-Türk Eğitim Vakfı) acts as both a cultural centre and an organization of civil society (Turam, 2003; Silova, 2008: 5). Türkmenistan’s government kept the schools on a short leash but it nevertheless allowed them to operate as long as they pay homage to the state. This worked because Turkish administrators attend Turkmen state functions and a small percentage of the curriculum gave the obligatory nod to state demands, such as including Nyýazow’s writings in coursework. Başkent schools continue to function in Türkmenistan because the movement preserves a modern, secular curriculum content, takes an unobtrusive approach to imparting terbiýe, and does not threaten the state, but rather respects it. Because Başkent school activities have been curtailed in Türkmenistan it will be interesting to see how they survive the upcoming years. They are likely to undergo further change. As the schools adapt to their new conditions to what degree might they still be considered ‘Gülen-inspired?’

11 The Gülen Movement as a Civil-Islamic Force in Indonesia Mohamed Nawab Osman

1.  Introduction

I

n his now seminal book, Globalised Islam: A Search for a New Ummah, the prominent observer of Islam, Olivier Roy (2004) argued that many Islamist movements have abandoned Islamist ideology and have embraced the concept of post-Islamism, which he described as the privatization of Islamism. In essence he suggested that many Islamist groups have abandoned their traditional goals of forming an Islamic state, implementing Islamic laws and reviving the Caliphate. Recent political developments following the Arab Spring seem to confirm Roy’s assertion. Following democratically held elections in Tunisia and Egypt; the Islamist political parties that have won the elections have generally steered away from emphasizing their Islamist agendas preferring to emphasize their commitment to a corruption-free economy and public welfare program. In Indonesia the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) the leading Islamist party has also given indications of embracing post-Islamism. Other important groups that are increasingly becoming important are the neo-Islamist groups that have emerged to fill this space left by the former Islamists. These groups tend to reject the compromises made by Islamist groups and have called for the revival of the Islamic Caliphate and the implementation of Islamic groups. At the other end of the spectrum liberal Islamic groups advocate for the reformation of Islamic thought but have lost much credibility due to their seemingly pro-Western attitudes.

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This chapter draws on the concept of ‘Civil Islam’ arguing that the concept, as epitomized by the Gülen movement, is an important force in countering radical Islamist ideology and moderating Islamist parties. While these issues are global in nature there are also locally rooted. This chapter focuses on a local case study located in Indonesia. It begins by exploring Gülen’s understanding of secularism and democracy. This section will seek to elaborate on the notion of Civil Islam as defined by Yilmaz (2011). The second part of the chapter analyses the activities of the Gülen followers in Indonesia in fostering Civil Islam in Indonesia. The third part of the chapter will explore the factors involved in why the concept of Civil Islam offers a superior ideology in countering extremism rather than other trends such as ‘Liberal Islam’, which is currently viewed as one of the major ideological formulations serving as a bulwark against extremist interpretations of Islam.

2.  Gülen and the concept of Civil Islam Fethullah Gülen is one of the most significant Muslim religious scholars, not just in Turkey but around the Muslim world, advocating for an apolitical Islamic tradition. His Islamic credentials, immense influence and worldwide network of students and activists make his thinking important and relevant. Prior to discussing the potential influence of Gülen’s ideas, it is important to briefly consider Gülen’s views on governance. As has been explored at length in this book, Gülen, unlike many Muslim preachers, believes that Muslims can live comfortably in a secular society. Gülen defines a secular state as a state not founded on religion and thus one that does not directly interfere with religion or religious life. Gülen contends repeatedly through his writing and teaching that Muslims can live in secular countries without compromising their religious beliefs and values. While acknowledging the possible excesses of secularism, he is opposed to all attempts to replace a secular state with an Islamic state. He advocates that ‘Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstances.’ Notwithstanding his apolitical methodology, he has expressed his preference for democracy as the best form of governance. A key feature in Gülen’s thinking about the management of state affairs is his rejection of the ideology of Islamism. Gülen advocates avoiding the ideologization and instrumentalization of religion in politics. He points out that Islamic regulations generally concern the private lives of human beings. Only an insignificant portion of these regulations concerns matters of state and government.

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Gülen’s position on secularism, the role of religion in state affairs and his attitude towards democracy have been referred to by Yilmaz (2011) as representing a variant of Islamic thought which he described as ‘Civil Islam’. This notion of Civil Islam has proven important in countering radical Islamist ideas. Yilmaz has discussed the key role played by Civil Islamic groups in moderating Islamist political parties in Turkey. Yilmaz points to the important role played by the Gülen movement in influencing the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) turn to its current post-Islamist position. Yilmaz (2011) proposes that this model of Civil Islam has the potential to influence the politics of other Muslim countries. This chapter represents an attempt to test this hypothesis by applying it to the Indonesian case. Before doing this, however, it is helpful to review the different strands of Islam found in Indonesian society.

3.  The many faces of Islam in Indonesia Islam in Indonesia is known for its strongly syncretic nature. Van Leur, the Dutch historian on Indonesia noted that Islam did not significantly alter the shape of culture in Indonesia given the dominant presence of a high, Hindu-Buddhist culture in the country. While most scholars of Indonesia are of the view that Indonesian Islam is inherently moderate, more hard-line strands of Islam emerged in Indonesia as early as the seventeenth century. One example is the Padri Movement, which sought to establish a more conservative form of Islamic system in West Sumatra and had broken out in 1803 when Indonesian pilgrims coming back from Mecca sought to implement stricter Islamic laws and challenged the prevailing customary laws of the time (see Dobbin, 1983). Over the last century, two Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah have represented the two main strands of Islam in Indonesia. However, this dominance began to be challenged by newer strands of Islam following independence. NU was formed in 1926 as a reaction against modernist interpretations of Islam. NU is currently the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia with an estimated 60 million strong membership (see Fealy, 1998). Muhammadiyah was formed by reformist Muslim scholar, Ahmad Dahlan who was influenced by the ideas of Muhammad Abduh in Egypt. As was the case with NU, Muhammadiyah was from the start a socio-religious organization (see Noer, 1973). One group that emerged later to demand the establishment of an Islamic state is the Darul Islam movement. Darul Islam led a rebellion that saw the group dominating about one-third of West Java, Aceh and Southern Sulawesi. The revival of political Islam in Indonesia received fresh impetus with the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Young Muslims in Southeast Asia saw the Iranian model of Islamic governance as an example that they should

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aspire to emulate. After 1979 writings by Iranian religious thinkers such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati flooded Indonesian Islamic bookstores. The Iranian Revolution was a matter of concern to many Muslim governments around the world, which feared that the Iranian influence would incite their people to bring about similar revolutions in their own countries. Saudi Arabia was one of the countries which was most concerned by the Revolution. Reacting to fears that its Shiite population might revolt against the government, the Saudis began funding and supporting like-minded groups throughout the Muslim world, including those in Southeast Asia. Reaction to the Iranian Revolution resulted in the diffusion of a counter-idea, which also led to further political opportunity for Islamist ideas in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the impact of Saudi funding is wide ranging. Fealy and Bubalo identified three main organizations to have benefited from Saudi funding. These are the Indonesian Islamic Predication Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), The Islamic Association for Enlightenment (Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad usually known as simply al-Irsyad); and the Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam, Persis) (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005: 59). Along with the Saudi funds came the literature written by Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin, MB), a key ally of the Saudis in its effort to counter Iran. Through the network of Muhammad Natsir (see Noer, 1987), often described as the ‘grand old man of Islamism in Indonesia’, the ideas of MB became mainstream and were especially influential among Muslim students (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005: 105). The ‘success’ of the Saudi project of popularizing their Wahhabi doctrine in Southeast Asia was largely due to the free reign given to the Saudis to do so. Southeast Asian governments did not see the Saudis as a threat in comparison to the Iranians. Nevertheless, the forces of political Islam was kept under intense surveillance and control by the New Order regime making it impossible for Islamist movements to gain significant political power. The demise of the New Order regime saw the emergence of dozens of new Islamist movements, calling for the implementation of Islamic laws and the enactment of an Islamic state. These groups included more violent organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Lashkar Jihad as well as non-violent political parties such as the Justice Party (later to become the Prosperity Justice Party – PKS). Along with Islamist groups, several groups espousing for the progressive reformation of Islamic thought, loosely referred to as liberal Islamic groups, began to emerge in the public fora. Most of these ‘liberal’ groups were inspired by the teachings of the liberal Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Maajid, a student of Fazlur Rahman at the University of Chicago. Among these groups, the most prominent is the Liberal Islam Network (Jarangan Islam Liberal, JIL). JIL was initially an informal discussion group of Muslim intellectuals sponsored by Goenawan Mohammad, a senior

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journalist and editor. Subsequently, the group developed into an online mailing group (Ali, 2000: 6). In March 2001, JIL was formally established. Its stated aim was countering radical Islamist thought and promoting a pluralistic understanding of Islam. Since its inception, many of the views expressed by JIL leaders and activists have drawn criticism from mainstream Muslim organizations such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council). MUI is one of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia and is often seen as being among the more conservative groups in the country. In a 2006 edict issued by MUI, JIL was tagged as a deviant group that must be opposed (MUI, 2005: 2). More radical groups have even threatened JIL figures with violence for their ‘deviant’ teachings. The group was condemned for their seemingly lax attitude towards issues of Islamic rituals and an ultra-liberal interpretation of Islamic laws. JIL is also seen largely as an intellectual movement with very little grassroots reach and hence as having little or no support from the larger Indonesian Muslim community. This poses a serious problem in the context of Indonesia. The failure to provide a counter-narrative to extremist ideologies could result in many more young Indonesian Muslims to be drawn to Islamist groups. In this regard, the potential role that the Gülen movement in Indonesia can play is an important one.

4.  The Gülen movement in Indonesia 4.1. History The Gülen movement arrived in Indonesia in 1993 when three students inspired by the teachings of Gülen visited Indonesia to further their studies. One of these was Hakan Islamo ğ lu who has remained in Indonesia up until today. He was accompanied by Kerim Tursun and Galip Kayar. This decision was rather unusual for several reasons. First, Indonesia is not known for having a world-class educational system which attracts international students. Second, these students arrived without speaking Indonesian and without being familiar with Indonesian culture. Third, they did not have any contacts in Indonesia. Nevertheless, prior to leaving for Indonesia, the students met an Indonesian student studying in Turkey. This student gave them the contact of one Haji Alwi. Upon reaching Indonesia, Haji Alwi made the necessary arrangements for their stay and even assisted them in enrolling for programs in several Indonesian universities. One of these students, Hakan Islamo ğ lu, secured himself a place at the University of Indonesia, one of Indonesia’s most prestigious universities, in the Department of Indonesian Literature.

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In 1994, after about a year of studying in the university, Islamoğlu began introducing the ideas of Gülen to Haji Alwi. After several discussions, Haji Alwi began to understand Gülen’s philosophy more deeply. He pledged to assist Islamoğlu in his pursuit to establish the first Gülen inspired school in Indonesia (Islamoğlu, 2007). Haji Alwi obtained assistance from the governor of the Indonesian state bank, Burhanuddin Abdullah in setting up the first school in Indonesia, the Pribadi High School in Depok. Another person who was instrumental in the setting up of the school was Dr Aip Syarifuddin, an Indonesian politician (Islamoğlu, 2007). To ensure that the administration of the school was managed professionally, Islamoğlu and his friends tied up with several Indonesians, including Dr Syarifuddin and a Mr  Firman Kartiman, to start the Yenbu Indonesian Foundation (Islamoğlu, 2007). In 1997, another organization, PASIAD Indonesia, was formed to facilitate in the administration of the school. In 1996 Islamoğlu decided to further his studies at another leading university, Gadjah Mada University in Yogjakarta, in Central Java. Here, Islamoğlu befriended a prominent expert in Indonesian literature and dean of the university, Prof Siti Chamamah Soeratno. Prof. Soeratno was herself an important Muslim activist holding various key positions in the women’s wing of the second largest Indonesian Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah. She was also invited to the school in Jakarta. Upon seeing the conditions of the class as well as the superior pedagogical methods used, Prof Soeratno immediately urged Islamogulu and his friends to establish a similar school in Semarang. The support given by Prof Soeratno led to the formation of the Al-Firdaus Semarang Foundation. This foundation was set-up to oversee the establishment of the SMP-SMA Semesta Boarding School (PASIAD, 2006: 18). By 2010, three new schools were built in Bandung, Aceh and in Tangerang, on the western outskirts of Jakarta (Altun, 2007).

4.2. Building tolerance through education As noted earlier, Gülen believes that it is through education that extremism will be most effectively curbed, and tolerance, respect and acceptance promoted. It is this philosophy that motivated his followers in Indonesia to build schools there. Islamog˘lu noted that intolerance occurs between the different religious groups in Indonesia due, in part, to a lack of education. He cited an incident when he was asked by a Christian priest whether the Islamic criminal laws are applied in Turkey. This is despite the fact that Turkey is one of the most secular Muslim countries in the world (Islamog˘lu, 2007). At its initial stage, there were only 15 students in the school, many of whom being from a rural and poor background. Today, the number of students has increased to approximately three thousand and many are drawn from more

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privileged backgrounds. This does not mean that the schools are elitist. The higher fees charged to more privileged students are partly used to provide scholarships to students from poorer background to study in these schools (PASIAD, 2006: 20). The diverse backgrounds of the students allow interaction between students, who often would not meet, due to the segmented nature of different class groups in Indonesia. In principle, this allows a richer student to understand better the challenges faced by a fellow student from a less privileged background. At the same time, about 10 per cent of the student population is not Muslim, which is roughly in proportion to Indonesian society overall. PASIAD Indonesia does not discriminate in the allocation of scholarships. About 20 per cent of the non-Muslim students receive scholarships from PASIAD Indonesia. The presence of non-Muslim students allows for interaction and the building of trust and tolerance between Muslims and non-Muslims. The universal values taught to the students mean that they tend to look beyond ethnic or religious cleavages in dealing with others. At another level, these schools serve as an excellent cultural bridge between Turkey and Indonesia. The students are exposed to aspects of Turkish culture such as its food and language. Due to this exposure, the schools have become important ambassadors for Turkey in Indonesia. For many parents, the attraction of these schools lies in their high standard of education, which has produced students who have won international physics and mathematics competitions (Republica, July 2006). More importantly, many parents are aware that the teachers of these schools are good role models for their children and that the schools give the students a good education, without inducing any ideological leanings. Moreover, tolerance and an appreciation for what others do are also values advocated in these schools. In an interview one alumnus of the school echoed Gülen’s vision of peace and tolerance when he said that Muslims should cease having a mindset of ‘us’ against ‘them’. There must be a shift in their paradigm to start thinking of everyone as fellow human beings, rather then by their religious affiliations (Riaz, 2007). Mahmud Riaz is an example of the kind of educated, cultured Muslim described by Gülen who says that he will never resort to terrorism or turn to extremism to pursue his aim. The Indonesia government has acknowledged the importance of these schools in countering extremist ideologies. A government leader with whom the author spoke indicated that the Department of National Education and local governments want more such schools built in Indonesia. This is because they recognize that the Islam which Gülen advocates is an important antidote to the extremism promoted by radical groups in Indonesia. Interestingly, a great number of the school’s alumni, including many non-Muslim students, have volunteered to teach in

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the schools despite their prestigious educational attainments, which could allow them to obtain more lucrative jobs (Altun, 2007). Such support enables more schools could be built as the movement receives more staff support from its alumni.

4.3. Intra- and inter-religious dialogue Understanding the factional nature of Indonesian Islam and politics, PASIAD Indonesia has sought to maintain good relations with all Muslim groups and political parties in the country. PASIAD Indonesia has paid courtesy visits to the president, vice-president, various cabinet ministers as well as major Muslim organizations and political parties such as Muhammadiyah, NU, PKS and Golkar (PASIAD, 2006: 69–82). It is also interesting to note that despite the constant changes in the leadership of Indonesia, PASIAD Indonesia has been able to maintain warm relations with leaders from across Indonesian society. Building intra-Muslim dialogue remains an important focus for PASIAD Indonesia due to the fact that the country is overwhelmingly Muslim. PASIAD Indonesia does this by initiating various programmes such as iftar dinners and Halalbihalal functions. Halalbihalal is part of an Indonesian way of celebrating Eid ul-Fitr where Muslims will seek forgiveness from one another for mistakes committed against one another during the year. This occurs at the end of the fasting month. PASIAD Indonesia adopted this practice and has been organizing its own Halalbihalal function annually. Staff members of the different PASIAD Indonesia’s schools as well as PASIAD’s local partners are invited for the function. Interestingly, PASIAD also invites various Islamic community leaders, despite their religious and political ideological differences. The iftar dinner is another annual event organized by PASIAD Indonesia. In Indonesia, these are overwhelmingly Muslim events. The invited guests include prominent politicians and Muslim community leaders. The event is often graced by the presence of an Indonesian cabinet minister and has been attended by leaders as senior as former vice-president Jusuf Kalla. At these iftar diners one could find politicians from secular political parties such Golkar as well as those from more religious parties. Their religious orientations were also diverse ranging from the more Sufis to the puritans. Historically, non-Muslims were often not invited to iftar functions. Breaking these norms, PASIAD invites non-Muslim community leaders such as leaders of various Churches, Buddhist and Hindu temples to these events so as to bring about inter-religious harmony between the different religious communities (Islamog˘lu, 2007). For many of these non-Muslim leaders, it was the first time in their lives that they attended such a function and is important in enhancing their understanding of Islam.

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5.  Gülen movement as a counter-force to radical Islamism in Indonesia This section will discuss the prospects of the Gülen movement as a counter-force to radical Islamism in Indonesia. There are several factors that support the likelihood that Gülen’s Civil Islam can be an important counter-force to radical Islamism in Indonesia. These factors include the strong adherence of the Gülen movement to traditional Islam, the students that the Gülen inspired schools produce who are already forming the local grassroots activists for the movement and the similarities between the ideals of Gülen’s Civic Islam and that the Indonesian state ideology of Pancasila.

5.1. Intellectual Sufism as an alternative to Islamism The key failure of liberal Islam in Indonesia is the widespread perception that it neglects certain Islamic rituals and practices and questions core Islamic beliefs such as the infallibility of the Qur’an. Such perceived views have invited intense criticisms against liberal Muslim groups by even mainstream Muslim groups (Kompas, 2012). On the other hand, the Gülen movement has been known for its strong adherence to traditional Islam with a strong emphasis on spirituality (see Michel, 2005). This spirituality is, however, not dogmatic as in the form that has long been known in the Muslim world through numerous Sufi brotherhoods. While Indonesia is vastly different from Turkey the two countries share a common tradition of strong adherence to Sufism. As such, Indonesians are more likely to find the teachings of Gülen in line with the sort of traditional Islam that has long been practiced in the country. The Gülen movement’s strong emphasis on traditional Islamic practices and belief in a more intellectual form of Sufism is likely to find a larger audience within Indonesian society. This could be contrasted with the liberal Islamic groups that are seen to be a Western attempt to impose its values on Islam in Indonesia. Hence, a case can be made that Civil Islam as represented by Gülen’s teachings is more acceptable for Indonesian Muslims and hence makes a better resource for counter-radicalization than liberal Islam.

5.2. Moderating post-Islamist parties The Civil Islam that Gülen advocates is also more likely to moderate the position of the mainstream Islamist parties in Indonesia. The main Islamist party, PKS has long stated its admiration for AKP’s post-Islamist posture

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(Fealy et al., 2008: 71). PKS leaders are known to have visited Turkey on various occasions to learn from the experience of AKP. However, it would appear that the PKS has not yet managed to establish a coalition with populist credibility while simultaneously appealing to ‘rational’ and ‘modern’ values advocated by Gülen. While contacts between the Gülen movement in Indonesia and PKS have been made, PKS leaders tend to view the Gülen movement as simply a socio-educational movement. Yet, the experience of the moderation of AKP in Turkey could very well be repeated if PKS’ leaders are willing to absorb the values of Civil Islam which would result in a further moderation of its religious stance. This would make PKS as a truly humanistic political party that could form a wide-based political coalition along the lines that AKP has succeeded in doing.

5.3. The golden generation countering Islamism The most important factor which makes the idea of Civil Islam and the Gülen movement in Indonesia itself as a possible counter-force to Islamist ideologies is the movement’s strong grassroots’ network. Individuals influenced by Gülen present an alternative to extremist ideologies. While it is not the purpose of Gülen movement to specifically counter such ideologies, Gülen had consistently taught that extremism runs contrary to Islamic teachings. To counter the threat of extremism and terrorism, Gülen has proposed enhancing the reach of education and inter-religious dialogue among Muslims. In Indonesia, students of Gülen-inspired schools are constantly trying to emphasize the need for Muslims to maintain their Muslim identity while adopting an Indonesian identity. There is also a strong focus about how the two identities are not diametrically opposing. At a conference in Jakarta on the Gülen movement, the author spoke to several undergraduates who graduated from the Gülen high schools in Indonesia. These students are strongly opposed to the ideas espoused by more extreme groups in the university. Some of them have made it a point to counter these extreme ideas by trying to persuade the more extreme students to abandon their extreme ideas. This is in line with Gülen’s preferred style of dialogue to win such people over. It is believed that such efforts would prove effective in preventing individuals from turning to more extreme actions including some who nearly volunteered themselves for military actions in countries where Muslims are supposedly prosecuted. The effectiveness of the Gülen movement in effecting real change for Muslims through their engagements with the government and authorities have also convinced young Muslims that the movement presents a real vehicle for change. This is deemed as a much better strategy in securing

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the political and socio-religious rights of Muslims within a minority context than then confrontational model presented by more extreme groups.

5.4. The limitations of Civil Islam in Indonesia The case for Civil Islam in Indonesia is not without its problems. There are several limitations that the Gülen movement is likely to encounter in Indonesia. First, the Gülen movement has a relatively brief history in Indonesia. Most of the schools in Indonesia are less than a decade old and thus have yet to produce enough students to undertake the task of changing the shape of Islam in Indonesia. Second, Indonesians are known for their strong nationalist stance, proudly tracing their heritage as far back as the famed Majapahit Empire in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As such, the movement’s perceived Turkishness might prove to be an impediment to the growth of Civil Islam in Indonesia. The two limitations however are not significant enough to result in the efforts of the Gülen movement being thwarted in the longer term. The first issue about the small number of its grassroots activist is likely to change as the schools run by the movement in Indonesia graduate more students. The second limitation of the movement is also likely to change over time. While there is a strong emphasis on the Turkish culture and language, participants of the Hizmet do not view Turkish culture or language as being superior to other cultures. Gülen himself encouraged his followers to embrace different cultures and traditions. Thus, they often pride themselves for being able to integrate well within societies that they live in. This could be seen from their adoption of local customs. For instance the Gulen movement in Australia tends to organize barbeques which is a common activity organized by Australians (see Osman, 2011). The Turkishness of the movement is also likely to be diluted as Gülen’s ideas begin to influence Muslims from different ethnic backgrounds. A case in point that attests to this future trend is the composition of the movement participants in Australia. There a large number of the participants are from a non-Turkish background and are dominant in the Sydney-based Gülen inspired interfaith organization, the Affinity Inter-Cultural Organization and something similar is likely to become a future pattern in Indonesia.

6.  Conclusion The Muslim world is today undergoing transition. Historically, all major civilizations have undergone this phase where members of these civilizations are insular and weak. Yet, in the midst of these uncertainties, the ideas of

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Fethullah Gülen emerge to reverse the thinking and attitudes of Muslims. The concept of Civil Islam as represented by the Gülen movement might prove to be an inspirational concept and help to create a new paradigm in the way Muslims thinking about issues of governance. As Gülen had stressed time and again, improving educational standards in the Muslim world is likely to change the mindset and thinking of Muslims leading them to have a more enlightened approach to dealing with their co-religionists and non-Muslims. This development will be especially important in Muslim majority country such as Indonesia. The case study of the Gülen movement in Indonesia is reflective of how a small group of Gülen followers have successfully had an impact on the society in which they are living. They are also reflective of the important impact Gülen’s ideas have had for people around the world. Acting upon his vision of tolerance, respect, acceptance and dialogue, his followers in both countries began promoting this vision by encouraging Muslims and non-Muslims alike to live peacefully in their respective countries. In Indonesia, due to the overwhelming number of Muslims in the country, PASIAD Indonesia focused on the development of relations among Muslims. In the process they were not only able to lessen tensions among Muslims but also enhanced ties between Muslims and non-Muslims through the Turkish schools and their inter-religious activities. The schools in Indonesia are likely to chart a new course for Islam in Indonesia, which is moderate and tolerant. The precedence given to universal values in these schools, inherent in all religions, is important in shaping the educated, cultured Muslims who are tolerant and progressive, as envisaged by Fethullah Gülen. The civic values that the Gülen movement emphasizes are likely to serve as an important ideological counter-narrative to radical Islamist groups and moderate Islamist political parties in Indonesia. Beyond Indonesia, the idea of Civil Islam might function as an important concept that Muslims in conflict areas such as Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand, as well as in countries such as Malaysia, where political Islam has grown in magnitude can adopt to ensure that they live peacefully within the confines of secular states.

12 A Gülen-Inspired School in South Africa Yasien Mohamed

1.  Hizmet education

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eginning with its formation in 1924, the Kemalist regime in Turkey identified religion as the cause of the country’s neglect of science and general backwardness. The regime promoted science and endeavoured to keep religion out of both politics and the public education system. Religion became a private matter and public education became secular. Even if parents wanted religious instruction, only a single teaching period each week was allowed in the curriculum. The religionists, on the other hand, had little confidence in the new secular system of education and separately promoted religious education, but their graduates were marginalized and were hindered from making significant contributions to Turkish society. Said Nursi (d. 1960), an influential Turkish Islamic philosopher, tried to remedy the dichotomy between secular and religious education by harmonizing religion with science. A religious Muslim, he argued, can also be passionate about science. Fethullah Gülen’s thought is strongly influenced by Nursi’s ideas, including his views on education and science. Over the past three decades Gülen has urged his followers to invest in modern schools rather than traditional madrasas and mosques. True education, he argues, combines modern science with Islamic knowledge. Scientific knowledge without religion could lead to atheism, while religious knowledge without science could lead to fanaticism.

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When combined, Gülen contends, they increase both the student’s faith and knowledge (Kuru, 2003: 120; Yilmaz, 2005c: 203–4). With a balanced education, learners can become agents of positive change (Michel, 2003: 74). Teachers, Gülen says, should be trained in nurturing the whole person, should lead by example and should reject ‘their inner worlds of hatred, rancour, and jealousy, and adorn their outer world with all kinds of virtues’ (cited in Michel, 2003: 78). They should combine the study of science with character development. In Gülen’s view, success should be measured by scientific and moral progress. The overall aim of overcoming the dichotomy in education is to create a ‘golden generation’ armed with the tools of science and religion. By combining knowledge with human values, this new generation (yeni nesil) will solve the problems of the future (Agai, 2003: 57). For Gülen, education should prepare learners to be useful citizens and people of character. Good schools cultivate virtues and are equipped with the best technology to enhance its scientific character.

2.  Context: The South African education system During the apartheid era the South African national educational system was based on a monolithic Christian world view, but private schools took on an explicitly secular, Christian, Islamic or Jewish character. However, they conformed to a national curriculum, even when teaching subjects like Arabic or Hebrew. These were offered either as a school requirement or as a result of parental demand. With the transition to the post-apartheid era the explicitly Christian character of the national curriculum was done away with, but religious private schools continued to operate within the national curriculum. The one thousand private schools in South Africa have an average ratio of 17 pupils per teacher, while public schools have an average of 30 pupils per teacher. The provinces of the Western Cape and Gauteng, where a number of private schools are located, including the ones referred to here, are relatively affluent, and school fees high. Nevertheless, in poor areas public education is free. Education is compulsory for all children up to Grade 11. In 2010 the South African education system had 12.3 million learners, 386,000 teachers and around 48,000 schools (with eight teachers per school on average) – including 390 special needs schools and 1,000 registered private schools. Officially, primary schools comprise Grades 1–7 and high schools Grades 8–12. For university entrance, a ‘matriculation exemption’ is required, although some universities set their own additional academic requirements.

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Schools vary considerably according to character, size, quality of education and financial advantages. Only 2.8 per cent of the total school population is at private schools, amounting to 340,000 students.

3.  Hizmet education in South Africa: General approach In South Africa, Hizmet schools pride themselves on being open to all children, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The schools foster social virtues such as respect, co-operation and tolerance, and prepare learners to integrate into modern society and yet still maintain their distinct religious identities. A teacher at the Hizmet school in Cape Town said: ‘We want the Muslim learner to be a good Muslim, a Christian learner to be a good Christian and a Hindu learner to be a good Hindu’ (teacher interview, May 2012). Although secular in its approach, the Hizmet model does not conflict with learners’ religious identities and so can be an alternative to the Islamic or Christian private model. This model of education shows that it is possible for a Muslim minority to retain its distinct Islamic identity and also integrate into the broader pluralistic society. Moral values are not taught as separate subjects, but rather are integrated into classroom lessons, and most importantly, are embodied in the moral example of the teachers. Hizmet schools follow the state curriculum, but include Turkish as a language until Grade 11 (teacher interviews, 2006, 2012); they are also science oriented. Turks teach Turkish, science and technology, and South Africans teach English, Afrikaans and other social science subjects such as history and geography. About half the teachers at the Cape Town high school and all those at the primary school are South African. A key concept that teachers are expected to embody is that of service (hizmet), which requires the teacher to make all sorts of sacrifices, such as teaching extra lessons on a Saturday or migrating (hijrah) to another school. Migration after five years or so is meant to prevent boredom or complacency, and helps the teacher to cultivate a sense of detachment (zuhd) from the material world. However, if teachers leave the school too soon and too often, it can make it difficult for learners to bond with them, and for the teachers to adapt to the new culture and language of the learners. Hizmet schools are a new phenomenon in South Africa, providing an alternative to both the secular liberal and religious private schools. Although many of the students come from Muslim homes, the schools have attracted learners from various religious persuasions. In the apartheid era many public

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schools became unstable due to school boycotts and political unrest, which increased support for Islamic private schools. But since the end of the apartheid era in 1994 an increasing number of parents have chosen to send their children to Islamic private schools because of the ‘perceived breakdown of morality in townships and public schools’ (Fataar, 2005). Islamic private schools in South Africa have been supported mainly by affluent middle-class families.

4.  The Star International hizmet school in Cape Town 4.1. A ‘Turkish’ school The Star International High School was established in the suburb of Athlone, Cape Town in 1999 and was the first ‘Turkish school’ – as the Hizmet schools are commonly referred to  – in South Africa. This was followed by one in Durban (Star International) and one in Johannesburg (Horizon International School). According to the brochure of the Cape Town primary school, the ‘Turkish schools’ pride themselves in maintaining a high academic standard, having highly qualified educators, providing individual attention and maintaining close communication with parents. Special features mentioned in the brochure for this particular school are recreational opportunities; a fully equipped science laboratory; a computer room with internet access; special camps, trips and excursions; annual student shows; extra-mural and club activities; a disciplined and caring environment; a secure and safe atmosphere; and the latest educational policies and practices. From the mission statement, one can note that the school has five objectives: academic excellence, up-todate infrastructure and state-of-the-art technology, good teaching methods, the transmission of moral values and preparing the learner for responsible citizenship. The Hizmet private school in Cape Town has the advantage of a smaller student-to-teacher ratio. Smaller class sizes make for more personalized education with stronger bonds among classmates. As a result, there tend to be fewer disciplinary problems. Often, if learners stay in one private school for their entire academic careers, teachers get to know them very well and become a source of stable authority in their lives. This will, of course, also depend on how long the teacher stays at the school: if teacher turnover is too high it tends to affect the teachers’ ability to function as stable authority figures.

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One downside of private schools is that there is increased inequality, because they are allowed to refuse some students based on qualifications that the school sets. This is true of the Cape Town Hizmet school, but to the extent that the school is elitist, it is academically elitist, not elitist on the basis of class. For better or worse, the global reality of private schools is that students who graduate from them tend to be the ones admitted to the top universities around the world. The Cape Town Hizmet private school is not only focused on excellent academic outcomes, but also on excellent moral outcomes. It is explicitly committed to nurturing moral values that are universal and that are shared by people of all races and religions. It aims to build character and to help the learner integrate within a pluralist democratic society such as South Africa. Star International High School, Cape Town, attracts learners from various socio-economic backgrounds and religions, but mainly from middle-class Muslim and Christian coloured (mixed-race) learners, with a minority of black African students. A distinctive feature of the Hizmet school is the ‘implicit and transcendent method to attain a moral and social values education for students aligned with successful academic outcomes’ (Robinson, 2008: 641–2). The school’s principal claims that parents send their children to Star International because it is a value-based school and asserts that the school is open to all learners, irrespective of race or religion (principal interview, May 2012). Significantly, relatively little overt emphasis is placed on religion, with the focus instead being on providing a positive learning environment and good moral teaching models. This is a challenge for the school, especially if learners come from completely different schools. But if they come from the Hizmet primary school, the transition is smoother to the high-school level, and these learners are more likely to contribute to creating a positive learning environment. Most learners (80%) at the all-male high school now come from the co-educational primary school (principal interview, May 2012). The school is known for having excellent teaching materials and computer equipment, and for emphasizing moral values such as respect for teachers and students, hygiene, personal appearance and discipline. Although many of the Hizmet teachers are devout Muslims, they make it a point to not bring religion into their teaching and strictly observe South Africa’s secular curriculum. (Englishand Afrikaans-language teachers are usually not Muslim.) Instead, the school says that it aims to provide a good education and provide good models of moral excellence and service. In general, the Hizmet schools are more affordable than the established private schools, and have attracted learners from middle- and ­lower-middle-class families. Before 2007 the Hizmet school in Cape Town charged fees that were far below the fees in an average Model C school,

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which are the historically white public schools that during the apartheid era had better facilities, but are now open to all races. But after 2007, with increasing demand for the school, the fees went up, and fees are now almost on par with the average Model C school and the more affluent Islamic private schools in Cape Town. The school is now more selective in admitting learners, but the selection is based on academic merit, regardless of whether the learner comes from the working or the middle class. The school also provides scholarships to poor learners with good grades. Fethullah Gülen encourages teachers to remember that education should nurture both the cognitive and moral development of the child. However, from its inception in 1999, Star International High School did not produce learners with good grades in matric until 2007, but after this date, when the school moved from Athlone, a working-class area, to Sybrand Park, a middle-class area, better quality learners joined the school, and gradually the academic performance over the next five years improved, with more learners obtaining matriculation results with distinction (a mark of 80% and above).

4.2. The educational background of the teachers Turkish teachers generally graduate in the physical sciences and teach in the area of their expertise. They earn little and sacrifice much for the sake of transmitting knowledge, even teaching extra classes on Saturdays. They participate in annual teacher training workshops to discuss ways of improving their teaching. Since most of them do not have a teacher’s qualification, these workshops tend to be very beneficial. Why are pedagogic qualifications not expected from the teachers? One teacher responded by saying that Hizmet schools usually attract the best learners and so teachers have no difficulty in teaching them. However, he was frustrated when he discovered that many learners in his class were not self-motivated and that he was not achieving good results through his style of teaching. He was not trained to deal with struggling children and was happy to be transferred to another school (teacher interview, 2006). However, this trend is slowly changing, and the school is now realizing the importance of proper qualifications for its teachers (teacher interview, 2012). Turkish university graduates, who are supported by the Horizon Education Trust while they are at university, are morally obliged (but not legally compelled) to teach in a Hizmet school before working in their own area of specialization (principal interview, 2006; teacher interview, 2012). They are academically qualified in science and technology, and some of them have gained their MA and PhD degrees, but few are trained in education. But now there is an increasing realization of the importance of teachers doing an education degree or diploma, and many of them are now currently embarking

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on such qualifications. One female Turkish student completed her majors in Arabic and psychology at the University of the Western Cape and is currently doing her postgraduate diploma in education at the same university. After graduating, she will probably be placed in a Hizmet school in South Africa (her brother is one of the teachers at Star International) or in a school in Turkey. Star International offers extra tuition twice a week, but not remedial teaching.

4.3. The academic aims of the Star International school Star International says that it does not want to compete with the public schools. But before 2007 it was competing with some public schools that produced better results than it did. Therefore Star International’s main challenge was to produce better results than these public schools. The next challenge was to produce better results than the private and Model C schools. After the move to Sybrand Park parents were more convinced that their children could be receiving a better quality education. Thus, more middle-class parents began to support the school. Star International in Cape Town specializes in the sciences and technology, and so it tries its best to equip the school with the latest technology, depending on the funds available (principal interview, 31 May 2006). In 2006 the school had fitted the latest science laboratories and information technology facilities, and since then applications have increased significantly. This is not unique to Cape Town, but it is a feature of Hizmet schools internationally, including in the United States, Turkey and Africa (Williams, 2007: 588). In Cape Town, the idea is to create a positive image for the school in an average middle-class area such as Sybrand Park. Later, the plan is then to open schools in up-market areas such as the suburbs of Rondebosch and Newlands. If profitable, these schools could subsidize Turkish schools in poorer areas. The intention is not to be elitist for the sake of elitism, but to build self-sustaining schools that could help the Turkish schools in poorer areas (principal interview, May 2006). Children from affluent homes have higher aspirations because they have more opportunities, not because of innate superiority. The private school can be elitist; but not necessarily so. The Hizmet school provides bursaries for bright boys from poor backgrounds, so it cannot be classified as elitist on the grounds of economic class. This is in contrast to Turkish schools in Central Asia, which Park (2007: 54) views as elitist. Matriculation results over the last five years show that there has been an improvement in the school both in terms of number and quality of learners. Half the current matriculates are confident that they will obtain distinctions in all their subjects at the end of 2012. Teachers are also confident of learners’ potential to achieve high grades. One teacher said: ‘The improvement is due

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to the dedication of the teacher and the work ethic of the learners.’ The school sets a higher minimum standard than that set by the Western Cape Education Department. Star International expects a minimum mark of 60  per cent from its learners, and if they do not achieve this they may not be allowed to continue at the school. Poor performance also has an adverse effect on their fees. If a learner is on a 100 per cent bursary and obtains poor academic results, the bursary may be reduced to 25 per cent, and parents would have to pay the 75 per cent shortfall. As a result, parents take their children out of school if they cannot manage the shortfall. Star International Cape Town cannot yet compete with the historically well-established private schools such as Diocesan College (an independent boys’ school established in 1849), nor with established Model C schools such as Westerford High (established in 1953). The educators are aware of this, and are setting themselves realistic goals to compete with Model C schools with average performance in the areas neighbouring on Sybrand Park. Thus, their first aim was to achieve a 100 per cent pass rates in matric, which they have now achieved. Many public schools have also achieved similar rates; but Star International wants to do better than this, and is aiming at 100 per cent merit passes, that is above a university entrance requirement. Already, about 70–80 per cent of matriculates have been admitted to tertiary institutions.

4.4. Star International’s academic performance The key question that this section (which is based on interviews conducted mainly with principals and teachers at Star International High in 2006 and 2012) seeks to answer is: What are the factors that hampered good academic performance before 2007 and enhanced good academic performance after 2007? Before 2007 there were fewer matriculates and fewer passes with distinction, but after 2007 there were more of both. In 2012 there are 18 matriculates, and, based on the evidence of the past and the current results of these learners, teachers anticipate that at least half of this group will obtain distinctions in all their subjects. They are the cream of the crop of learners that started five years ago in Grade 8. Nevertheless, half the original group moved to other schools before reaching matric at Star International, and this is another question that this section will explore. South Africans traditionally measure the schools’ success through matriculation results (teacher interviews, 2006; 2012). Up until 2005 the Hizmet school in Cape Town obtained only three distinctions, which represents a poor performance for a private school, especially when even the neighbouring public schools were obtaining better results. A radical change took place in 2005, when the school moved to Sybrand Park, a leafy, middle-class area. This larger, more spacious, better-equipped school attracted quality learners

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and in the following year (2006) the school for the first time had two Grade 8 classes. In 2007 all three matriculates obtained matric exemption. In 2006 and 2007 the Grade 8 learners came from middle-class homes, and in an earlier study the author (Mohamed, 2007) predicted that five or six years later there would be a marked improvement in the academic performance of the school. Before 2007 the learners of Star International did not obtain good matric results, while at the Hizmet school in Durban the learners obtained distinctions in all their subjects several times. So, why did the Cape Town school perform so poorly? A former principal of the Cape Town school, who subsequently moved to the Durban school, provides the following reasons. First, the Durban school attracted quality learners from middle-class and upper-class families, and the school only accepted learners with good grades. Secondly, the school has a boarding facility where, under strict supervision, learners are required to do their schoolwork in the evenings. Thirdly, it has a team of dedicated teachers who teach with clarity and effectiveness, and provide extra classes over weekends and during week-long study camps, where learners revise maths and science. By contrast, the Cape Town school did not perform as well for the following reasons. First, the original school had a shabby appearance and was located in an economically poor area of the suburb of Athlone, so did not attract enough learners from middle-class families. Many parents did not turn up at school meetings, so did not show support for their children. Inadequate public transport and lack of safety at night were also factors (principal interview, August 2007). Secondly, some Turkish teachers lacked fluency in English, which undermined the effectiveness of their teaching. Some teachers were under the impression that if they taught science, then English proficiency was not required. Thirdly, the rapid rotation of Turkish teachers at the school was another cause for concern, according to one of the teachers: An average of four new teachers join the school and four teachers leave the school. Sometimes, for a particular subject the learners have to adjust afresh to perhaps four new teachers in the year. This is not good for the stability of the learner and does not allow enough time for the learner to develop a bond and affinity with the teacher. (teacher interview, May 2012) Continuity of staff is a requisite for discipline of the child and the administration of the school. Principals are also rotated relatively quickly. In 2005 a principal was transferred to another school after six months, followed by a young principal who stayed for only a year before being transferred to a school in Johannesburg. Rapid changes in management make it difficult for the school to build up a good image and persona. However, from 2007 a new principal

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took over and has stayed at the school. The impact of this management continuity can be felt, and one can see the improvement in the school, both administratively and academically. Learners have produced good results and the school is now in such demand that its enrolment for 2013 has already reached maximum numbers. The move from Athlone to Sybrand Park was a positive one. As we have seen, the Athlone school had a shabby physical appearance and attracted many learners from the lower socio-economic class, which deterred many middle-class parents from sending their children to the school. But the move to Sybrand Park in 2005 made a difference to the quantity and quality of new learners who entered the school. For the first time, the school had two Grade 8 classes in 2007. This is the first sign of demand and increasing support for the school.

4.5. Admission policy According to the principal, the lesson he has learnt is that the school will only show better academic grades if it is more selective in its admission policy. In an interview he stated: It may not be ethical, but if we do not adopt a strict admissions policy we will not be able to ensure merit and distinction passes. Olympiad competitions and medals have worked in other countries, but we have discovered that in South Africa schools are judged purely on the basis of matriculation results. (principal interview, 2006) From 2007 onwards the school adopted a stricter admission policy based on academic performance. Each learner is required to sit for a test that will decide whether he or she will be accepted by the school. Thus, it is the better learners that are admitted to the school. Once at the school, extra tuition in maths and science on Saturdays or Friday evenings is given to ensure that learners obtain excellent results. According to one teacher, moral values such as discipline, responsibility and hard work contribute to changing the mindset of the learners, making them more focused on their school work (teacher interview, May 2012). A better student will ensure better throughput up to Grade 12 (see below) and better matric results. Olympiad competitions held in various countries have contributed to the school’s internal sense of achievement, but not sufficiently to boost the image of the school. Academic performance is the primary factor that influences parental decisions, while proximity, small numbers in the class, awards and the moral ethos of the school are all important secondary factors.

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4.6. Low student throughput However, despite the stricter admissions policy and higher intake of learners at the Grade 8 level, the throughput of students from Grade 8 to matric is less than 50 per cent. The principal states: For the last four or five years we were getting two Grade 8 classes. At the end of five years they merge into one class of Grade 12. So let’s say we are accepting around 44–46 learners in Grade 8, but by the time they reach matric we have around 20 learners. (principal interview, May 2012) This brings us to the question of why there is such a high dropout rate. A teacher who joined the school in Sybrand Park in 2006 gave four reasons for the 50 per cent dropout rate since 2007. The first factor is that learners cannot cope with the school’s academic pressure. They have to attend Saturday classes, go to study camps, receive visitations from the teachers in their homes and their parents are called up to special meetings if they do not perform academically. Some learners cannot cope with such pressures and prefer to move to a school with a softer approach. A second factor is the apathy of some parents. The parents of six matriculates who were underperforming were invited to a meeting at the school. Only three parents attended, although the others lived in areas near the school. Thirdly, the global recession of 2008 onwards hit South Africa hard, resulting in increasing unemployment, while over a period of five years the price of petrol doubled. Parents who could not cope with the increased fees took their children out of the school. Before 2007, the fees were relatively low compared to other private and Model C schools, but after 2007 the fees went up and came close to those charged at other private schools. Fourthly, as mentioned above, before 2007 learners with bursaries who performed poorly had their 100 per cent bursaries reduced and parents who could not manage to pay the shortfall removed their children from the school.

5.  Conclusion From the foregoing, it can be noted that Gülen’s educational philosophy is aimed at nurturing the whole child in terms of both cognitive skills and moral values. Moral values are promoted within a secular school environment.

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Parents send their children to the Turkish schools because their graduates have been accepted in reputable colleges and universities, and because their learners are exposed to sound moral values. Star International prepares the learners to integrate into a democratic South Africa, where no discrimination exists on the basis of colour, creed or race. The Hizmet school fits into such a democratic atmosphere. There is the freedom to explore the opportunities according to one’s human and financial capacity. Democracy is about human freedom and opportunities. Parents are free to choose from the opportunities available to them. Although there is equality of opportunity in a democracy, it is constrained in terms of affordability. The Hizmet school is not the only school that is available. If a child is not accepted at this school or his parents cannot afford it, there are alternatives. The Hizmet is just providing another option; but it is a good option, as it promotes academic excellence and moral values. Since 2007 learners at Star International have demonstrated considerable academic improvement and half the current matriculates are expected to obtain distinctions in all their subjects at the end of 2012. The academic progress of the school depends on the quality of the learners and the sacrifice of the teachers. Star International is fulfilling these two conditions, and therefore holds much promise for the future.

13 The Gülen Movement and Promoting Human Rights Values Özcan Keleş

1.  Introduction

T

 his chapter argues that human rights values are a central and inherent theme in Gülen’s teaching and the movement’s practice; and that articulated with particular attention to their adaptability for different sociocultural contexts; that the assimilation of those values in Turkish society has enabled an empowerment of the periphery vis-à-vis the centre, the shift in power from ‘elite’ to ‘people’; and that the presence of the movement in Muslim-majority societies outside Turkey has the potential to catalyze a comparable shift in power while instilling human rights values. While Gülen is conspicuously an Islamic scholar he is also well versed in the Enlightenment ideas that evolved into ethico-political idioms such as democracy, pluralism and freedom of belief and expression. The reach of his influence is doubtless related to the perception among Muslims that his thinking is safely grounded in a devout attachment to the core values of the faith and its traditions. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we are not concerned with how authentically Islamic his thinking is, only with the social fact that it is perceived to be so. The argument of the chapter is constructed in three sections. The first section presents an account of the reasons for and extent of Gülen’s and the movement’s influence. It is suggested that Gülen’s influence and tajdid are transferable and adaptable outside of Turkey. The second section

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explains how human rights discourse fits within Gülen’s teaching, focusing on democratic politics and freedom of belief, and it is argued that his ideas directly and inherently promote human rights values. In the final section of the chapter the activities of the movement in the Muslim world are sketched out and their potential for the promotion of human rights values is assessed. It is proposed that, as the movement becomes more active in the Muslim world its stance on human rights values will begin to influence a wider section of the grass roots of society.

2.  How and why Gülen’s tajdid is influential 2.1. The combination of Gülen’s personal qualities Gülen combines the qualities of a pious Muslim learned in the traditional sciences or `alim (pl. ulema), the ascetic, poetic temperament associated with Sufism in Anatolia, and the qualities and concerns of a ‘public intellectual’ familiar with the Western ideas, science, history and literature that have shaped modernity. By addressing contemporary issues from these perspectives, he was able to reach people of widely different background and temperament. He helped them identify concerns they did not know they shared and ways of acting they could agree on. He persuaded them not to bemoan their problems but undertake the doing of what was possible to remove their underlying causes. Ali Bulaç (2006) was the first scholar to attribute Gülen’s popularity to the fact that he combined the training of a traditional `alim with the reading of a modern intellectual. Bulaç likened this to a pair of wings enabling the teaching to ‘take off’, whereas either alone would have confined his discourse to a narrow circle of references and alienated some of his audience. Gülen was often able to surprise the attention of those who never expected to hear, in the sermons of a classically trained Islamic scholar, allusions to readings in Western philosophy and scientific theory (see Erdog˘an, 1997) or references to Western writers as diverse as Shakespeare, Schiller, Hugo, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy (see Can, 1996). It is important to emphasize, however, that it was Gülen’s mastery of Anatolian Sufi idiom in particular that convinced listeners of the sincerity of his convictions. In theory anyone (including a non-Muslim) can become learned in the Islamic sciences, but that learning is only persuasive when it informs a practice, embodying what is theorized, in words, manners and sustained dedication to the well-being of others. Gülen has been a celibate all his life in order to fulfil his self-imposed duties as Islamic scholar and teacher, peace activist, poet and writer and mentor of a public service movement. These

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duties flow from his personal relationship with God, which has always been primary for him. Now retired from public life, he devotes his time to prayer, meditation and the spiritual training of a small circle of students. The breadth of his compassion for others and uncompromised adherence to approaches that minimize tensions and maximize trust are rooted in his understanding of what he owes to God. His speeches resonated with profound sorrow for the conditions that divide human beings from themselves and each other, and that underlie their sufferings and shortcomings. In Turkey he was widely referred to as the ‘weeping Hodja’ (teacher) because he was so often moved to tears by the weight of his anxiety that people heed the call to be of peaceful service to one another. His sincerity in matching up to his own teaching was decisive in the influence he came to enjoy. The audiences he addressed from the 1970s onwards had had enough of scholars preaching accommodation with modernity or repudiation of modernity: many were unable to live according to what they preached or teach others how to do so in ways coherent with contemporary realities and opportunities. From Gülen they heard a message that proclaims the unification of personal spiritual exertion with traditional religious learning and modern scientific understanding of the natural world and human society. They heard this message from one who ‘“began praying when he was four years old and has never missed a prayer since” . . . who chose an ascetic’s path, devoting his life to prayer and religious pursuits and owning virtually no possessions’ (Kurtz, 2005: 375). Gülen’s intellect and integrity activated in others their own reserves of compassion and concern. It is wrong to label him (as a report by RAND did) a ‘modernist’, the kind of Muslim public figure that the West would naturally support but who lacks the authenticity of ‘traditionalists’ to sway the Muslim public (Benard, 2003: 38–40). Had Gülen been (perceived as) a ‘modernist’, he could not have accrued the influence that he did in Turkey, still less outside it. His influence rests firmly on the popular perception that he is a devout `alim who appreciates the potential in modernity for good, whose religious learning is a means of informing practical, realistic, intelligent service of others. As a result, Gülen’s personal influence, and which is based on the qualities explained above is likely to be at least to some extent transferable to regions in which there is a similar concern for bridging reason and revelation, faith and modernity with a sensitivity towards the core values and spirit of the faith and religion.

2.2. The movement and tajdid The movement was founded upon and continues to be guided by Gülen’s discourse and his persona. The movement’s volunteer activists start from

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faith and move forward, through service, to stronger faith, which re-motivates them and inspires others. Within the limits of their abilities and opportunities, they strive to model the balance of qualities they admire in Gülen: Islamic learning; self-discipline and spiritual effort; appreciation of the realities and potential for good in modernity. Also, in giving the same primacy to personal relationship with God they protect the movement from being distracted – by political or religio-cultural ambitions – from the duty of caring service. In Turkey itself, and more so beyond Turkey, the discourse is projected mainly through the movement’s practice, rather than by Gülen himself or the publication and broadcasting of his words. Gülen’s discourse represents an effort of tajdid, or renewal, of the energies of Islam. Over time, especially recent centuries, those energies have dissipated and turned inward, away from the world. Although overwhelmed (to greater or lesser degree) by the powers of non-Muslims, Muslims have held on to public symbols of Islam as marks of their distinct identity and dignity as Muslims. Yet, they have been at a loss to translate attachment to Islam into competent relationship with modern socio-economic and political realities. In embodying Gülen’s teaching in local, grassroots services (conspicuously, the consistently excellent schools run by the movement), the volunteers also embody Gülen’s tajdid. This transforms it into a practice, not a theory. Ihsan Yilmaz has called this ‘tajdid by conduct’: ‘Gülen has reinterpreted Islamic understanding in tune with contemporary times and has developed and put into practice a new Muslim discourse . . . on religion, pluralism, jurisprudence, secularism, democracy, politics and international relations’ (Yilmaz, 2003: 209). Recognizing Gülen’s tajdid as practice is key to understanding its popularity. Any verbal formulation of what ought to or could be done is guided by feedback from what the movement has actually achieved on the ground. The loop connecting teaching to practice has reinforcing affects, notably: the credibility of the guidance and the success of the practice complement each other. Then, because the exertion of Islamic conscience and reasoning (ijtihad, which underpins tajdid) is informed by lived practice, it proceeds by small steps. Change is achieved, gradually and securely, without touting, through practiced consent to individual projects, disconnected from any form of ‘program’ or ‘party line’. For this reason, Gülen and the movement have been able to work across the boundaries (hard and soft) that used to plague Turkish society  – urban/rural, religious/secular, traditionalist/modernist, capitalist/communist. The movement’s contribution to Gülen’s tajdid is also a matured practice, not a theoretical idea. Its volunteers are typically well educated and widely read, trained to think critically and be analytical in their approach to problems. Gülen himself has always urged consultation (shura) – the religious obligation to engage those who will be affected by a decision in making that

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decision – and, after consultation, the discipline of collective responsibility for operations and outcomes. The practice of tajdid proceeds through a number of overlapping steps: (1) the volunteers’ interpretation of Gülen’s discourse after they hear it; (2) their reformulation of it in light of the realities of funding and other constraints; (3) their adaptation (indigenization) of it to conform to local conditions; and (4) queries arising from their experience of doing that, together with (5) ideas or plans proposed by the volunteers themselves, which are put to Gülen or others and which generate a new discourse. As a result it is possible to suggest that the tajdid is collectively constructed (and communicated) through Gülen’s views and the movement’s practice. Through the effort to implement Gülen’s teaching locally the general elements of it are refined and particularized. For example, schools run by the movement’s volunteers in Turkey are not managed in the same way nor follow the same curricula as those in, say, Türkmenistan or Germany or the United States. It is this adaptive flexibility that makes the tajdid effective and enduring, and transferable to different political and cultural environments.

2.3. The movement’s influence in Turkey The movement has been characterized as ‘one of the most influential . . . in modern Turkey’ (Özdalga, 2005: 430). It has effected major shifts in attitudes among committed Muslims. For example, in the education of women: ‘For years, Gülen publicly and privately encouraged the community to educate all their children regardless of gender. Today, there are many all-female schools and many of their graduates go on to universities’ (Yavuz, 1999: 125). Similarly, in respect of defensive attitudes to association with the United States and Europe: ‘Gülen’s pro-Western attitude has played a key role in the domestication and softening of other Islamic groups’ anti-Europe and anti-U.S. positions . . . [Gülen] was one of the first Islamic leaders to embrace the idea of EU membership . . . when Islamists in general regarded it as a threat to Turkish security and Islamic culture’ (Kösebalaban, 2003: 176; on underlying reasons for this, see Bacik, 2003: 31). A school of thought was evolving, writes Yilmaz (2003: 237), ‘with the potential to influence the whole Muslim world’ on the pattern of its transforming influence on ‘the public sphere’ in Turkey. A view echoed by Voll (2003: 247): ‘Fethullah Gülen is a force in the development of the Islamic discourse of globalized multicultural pluralism . . . his vision bridges modern and postmodern, global and local, and has a significant influence in the contemporary debates that shape the visions of the future of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.’ The centres of authority and power in Turkey had long been preserves of the militantly secular elite. As for the largely Muslim periphery, cultural and religious dogmas inhibited their engagement in public life and movement

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towards the centre. The movement’s tajdid, expressed through the practice of its education, business and media initiatives, gradually broke down those dogmas and allowed the silent majority to empower themselves. At a time when political-Islam in Turkey was characterizing democracy as a means to an end, Gülen stated publicly at a Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) meeting in 1994 that ‘there is no return from democracy’. In the charged atmosphere of the 1990s, many on the right and religious end of the political spectrum criticized Gülen for advocating dialogue instead of debate and confrontation and for his outreach to ‘others’. But the movement’s interfaith conferences, Ramadan fast-breaking dinners and so on, brought political arch-enemies to the same tables, and successfully opened routes to consensus politics (see Yilmaz, 2005a: 399–405). The Abant Platforms enabled academics, writers, journalists and politicians (some now in government) to make consensus-building policy statements, like: ‘Civil and political freedoms, headed by the freedoms of belief, thought and expression, education, and organization, are the prerequisites of pluralism’ (Journalists and Writers Foundation, 2001: 316). The personal courage of Gülen in this period is evident in his efforts to heal sectarian rifts (e.g. in attitudes to the Alevi community) and soften political hard lines (e.g. his declaration that Turkey’s Communists could not be called unpatriotic; his support for the pragmatic Anglo-Saxon tradition of secularism as distinct from the French laïcité). It allowed Muslims, once fearful that democracy, secularism, pluralism and human rights discourse threatened their religious identity, to engage with full sincerity in political life and debate.

3.  Human rights values in Gülen’s tajdid In this section I explain where human rights values stand within Gülen’s discourse.

3.1. Anatolian Muslimness Traditional Anatolian Sufi Muslimness thoroughly conditions Gülen’s being as an Islamic scholar and teacher. This ‘flavour’ is distinguished by its striving for personal relationship with God beyond formulaic affirmations of confessional identity, and beyond the obligatory observances by which religious belonging is corporately projected. The observances are practiced with yearning for more alert presence before God, more self-critical worship secured by supererogatory acts, and tested through sustained service of others. The emphasis on the person, combined with the conviction that God is one and

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the same for all, whatever their confessional or other identity, inclusive of deniers of God, has two important consequences for the theory and practice of the tajdid vis-a-vis human rights values. First, it universalizes the movement’s goals and services. Gülen’s vision is for an inclusive civilization which embraces individual and cultural diversity. This allows the volunteers to work with and work for the good of those who do not share their background assumptions, whether shaped by language, culture, economic status or political or religious persuasion. That makes for clearer focus on the care-project in hand, on conceiving and executing the tasks that constitute the project in an orderly, professional way. (As noted earlier, Gülen is celebrated for getting people to realize they share problems which they can agree to resolve without having first to agree also on everything else.) Secondly, the emphasis on the person encourages mutual acceptance within the movement and with those outside it. It embraces the individual’s right to be as they are when and where they are, without precluding their right to embrace change and go in a different direction. A person whose primary concern is their own need for forgiveness and who is aware of their dependence on the care of God more readily appreciates that sin proves itself a good insofar as, in retrospect, it has led to the good of repentance and self-reform, than which no other kind is as reliable or durable. To be patient with what one finds harmful or sinful in the speech, attitude or behaviour of an individual-other is to strive after the pattern of God’s own forbearance with His creatures. Gülen’s public and private teaching has raised a generation who know the worth, the reforming power, of such forbearance. In terms of its out-working in relations between individuals, it is analogous to respecting another’s rights to their ‘own space’. In modern Western tradition, historically, that ‘own space’ evolved in the language of property rights and reciprocal legal claims and was accompanied by indifference to what happens within the ‘own space’. In religious traditions generally, however, and markedly in Gülen’s teaching, caring for others is a vital human need, embedded in the many subtle instruments for inter-subjective awareness with which humans are especially endowed. Without care, language, culture, economic and political relations, become narrower and harsher, and the ‘own space’ hollow and insecure, the space around it alienating, anonymous. In the Western tradition, to be sure, care is ‘designed into’ professional standards and procedures to ensure quality of service in the transactions between people. However, not all transactions can be so handled. Nor for those standards uniformly enforceable within legal jurisdictions, still less beyond them. In reality, for human rights to work, human beings have to care about each other, within communities and beyond them. That is why, for Gülen and the movement’s volunteers, the starting-point has to be a religious commitment to care. Where that commitment has the Anatolian ‘flavour’, that

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is, is personal and its sincerity is tested through prayerfulness and service, it leads naturally to a commitment to universal human rights from which no individual-other may be excluded. The ‘flavour’ of Anatolian Muslimness has become familiar in the West through translations of the divine love poetry of Rumi. In populist versions of it, aesthetic aspects of Rumi’s yearning for God are separated from its roots in the Qur’an and Sunnah, as if it had no necessary connection with Islam or any formal religious tradition. Gülen did, without doubt, distinguish his preferred ‘flavour’ as more supple and accommodating than the didactic, outwardly conformist ’flavour’ of Muslimness typical of some modern Arab or Iranian practices, but he did not claim the latter or his own as more or less orthodox. Many Turks were chary of affirming their Anatolian ways of being Muslim for fear of seeming to be schismatics. Gülen assured them that the same basic tenets and teachings of Islam had emerged in variant settings in variant, canonically equally valid, ‘flavours’. He went on to affirm: ‘If we exclude certain periods and individuals, the Turks’ interpretation of what Islam allows to be interpreted is correct and positive. If we can spread globally the Islamic understanding of such heroes of love as Niyazi-i Misri, Yunus Emre, and Rumi, if we can extend their messages of love, dialogue, and tolerance to those thirsty for this message, everyone will run toward the embrace of love, peace, and tolerance that we represent’ (cited in Camcı and Ünal 1999: 196). Self-evidently, the Anatolian flavour informs what can be called Gülen’s ‘dialogue theology’. He retells stories from the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions, and from Sufi masters like Rumi, to convey the message that being Muslim necessitates dialogue and active citizenship locally and globally (see Kurucan and Erol, 2012, Dialogue in Islam: Qur’an, Sunnah and History which addresses questions about dialogue and engagement in Islam from the basis offered by Gülen’s dialogue theology). The movement’s dialogue initiatives are helping gradually to transform Muslim understanding of Islam so that it becomes, at the same time more devout and activist and more tolerant of diversity – a natural extension of Anatolian Muslimness and the basis of the explicit human rights discourse in the Gülen tajdid. Before turning to some examples of that, an aspect of Anatolian Muslimness worthy of distinct emphasis is that it is a life-way, a practice, not a ‘doctrine’ or other preformed ‘position’. This aspect of it is familiar in personal manners associated with gracious hospitality, cuisine and the like, and in aesthetic motifs in the regional architecture and domestic interior design. However, the relevance of this Muslimness in the present context is that it rejects assertive self-identification and presents through quiet practice. This accords with avoiding grand public postures or gestures and preferring to work at local projects, which lead to local achievements and establish (as well as networks

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of associates and sympathizers) a momentum consensually supported in the locality. Some observers have confused this simplicity with utilitarianism, then (if predisposed to mistrust) resorted to conjecturing ‘ulterior motives’, ‘hidden agendas’ – as if Gülen and the movement were engaged in some conspiratorial pursuit of worldly ends. It has been amply demonstrated in various forums (including courts of law) that that is not the case. Rather is it the case that this non-assertiveness is a conscientious approach that proceeds from, first of all, internalizing the Qur’anic warning (Q. 62: 2–3): ‘O believers! Why do you [plural] say that which you do not do? It is most hateful in the sight of God that you say what you do not do,’ and secondly a determination not to antagonize those who do hold and assert a ‘position’. The tajdid is not conceived or practiced as a threat to any status quo, nor promises change it cannot deliver, nor could it, given its approach, deliver any change until understood and willed by those among whom it is to be realized. That is what is meant by the movement being ‘grassroots’ and civil. While that fits the ‘flavour’ local to Anatolia, it does also fit with the temper of formative Islam: scarcely anything in Qur’an and Sunnah could sensibly be called doctrine (be it theological, philosophical, legal, political, economic or other). Rather, the ‘argument’ of original Islam is expressed through diverse, exemplary ‘stories’ about human behaviours and their consequences, from which people can derive what they need to dispose their selves and their affairs in ways that satisfy the Creator’s purpose in creating them and/or are forgivable. But they must freely will to do that – God will not coerce them.

3.2. State, society and religion The guidance that Gülen has set out on the disposition of authority and power between state, society and religion matured in line with the approach just described. It is being embedded and tested in the movement’s practice is a major factor in its transferability outside Anatolia. Gülen teaches that the highest priority of existence in this life is human responsiveness to God. Humans were created with intelligence, conscience and the freedom to choose to journey from the created to the Creator, a journey in knowledge and love. Choose to serve God, and humans may ascend higher than angels in righteousness; deny and defy God, they may sink below demons in self-righteous, self-serving barbarity (Gülen, 2005e: 15). But exercise their will and choose they must in order to fulfil their own purpose of creation but also the purpose of existence beyond them which was created for them  – so that they marvel at God’s creation and choose to find Him. This makes freedom to will and choose the bare minimum that humans must concede to each other, individually and collectively, if they are to fulfil God’s

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purpose of creation. Eliminating the capacity, ability and freedom to choose results in undermining the purpose of creation according to Gülen: Being free and enjoying freedom are a significant depth of human willpower and a mysterious door through which man may set forth into the secrets of the self. One unable to set forth into that depth and unable to pass through that door can hardly be called human. (Gülen 2005e: 38–9) Therefore, Gülen is making a significant connection between ‘choice’ as understood in the above Islamic terms (the magical switch that makes existence meaningful and purposeful) and the modern means of protecting the right and freedom to choose in the form of confessionally neutral polity that upholds human rights and the rule of law: ‘By visiting the States and [certain] European countries, I realized the virtues and the role of religion in these societies. Islam flourished in Europe and America much better than in many Muslim countries. This means freedom and the rule of law are necessary for personal Islam’ (Yavuz, 2003a: 45, footnote 39). Freedom is a condition also of individual and societal development, understood as self-improvement in all matters, not just worship: ‘True freedom is the freedom of the human mind from all shackles that hinder it from making material and spiritual progress, as long as we do not fall into indifference and heedlessness’ (Gülen, 2006b: 65). Gülen’s abiding concern to provide effective general education should be seen in the context of the imperative to liberate minds: ‘if you wish to keep the masses under control, simply starve them in the area of knowledge. They can escape such tyranny only through education’ (Ünal and Williams 2000: 22–3). Because educated people think and compare, research and reflect, argue and debate, they can challenge the cultural habits that inhibit reform: ‘it is imperative that we should . . . question the changes and transformations of the last one hundred and fifty years of our past. It is imperative because judgments and decisions are nowadays made according to certain unquestioned taboos’ (Gülen, 2005e: 39). A broad, open curriculum, encompassing the humanities and sciences is a necessity parallel to that of a confessionally neutral polity. Gülen has stated emphatically that Islam does not grant the right of authority or power arbitrarily: ‘[Under Islamic law] rule does not belong to holy and infallible spiritual leaders, as in theocracies, nor to any religious institutions under their supervision, nor to any other religious institution organized in any other way’ (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 450). Government is needed to assure the shared goods upon which all depend and from which all benefit, such as the rule of law and justice, appointments to office on merit, security of persons properties and communications channels, territorial defence, the basic freedoms of belief and thought and a role in political decision-making.

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If a state serves these functions, according to Gülen, Islam does not require any more from it: ‘Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstance’ (Gülen, 2001a: 134). ‘According to time and circumstance’ now means, if those functions of government are to be reliably served, a pluralist democratic polity where people have their say through free political association and can change government and policies in an orderly way through elections (Gülen, 2006b: 88–92). For all their clarity, such pronouncements do not amount to a political dogma or manifesto. They are ad hoc responses to questions put to Gülen, corrective guidance to counter tendencies like theocracy in neighbouring Iran or calls in the Arab world for an ‘Islamic state’: ‘Those who follow a more moderate [way] believe that it would be much better to introduce Islam as a complement to democracy instead of presenting it as an ideology’ (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 452). Similarly, his support of secularism is not ideological  – it safeguards the procedures of the state against in-built communitarian biases: ‘If secularism is understood as not basing the state on religion, not interfering in religion or in the believers’ religious life, and acting in an unbiased way, there’s no problem at all [for Muslims]’ (Gülen, 2006d). The rights of minorities should be secured according to prevailing international practice because, again, that is what will best serve justice: ‘Minority communities should be allowed to live according to their beliefs. If these sorts of legislation are made within the norms of international law and international agreements, Islam will have no objection to any of these’ (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 451). Gülen is aware of the misgovernment rife in Muslim societies and the resistance of despotic regimes to reform (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005: 453), but also of the attachment to Islam among Muslim peoples. He has condemned the instrumentalization of religion to acquire or to legitimize political power. Human rights values must, in Muslim-majority societies, simply wait on the people until they recognize their utility and can assimilate them to their local conditions. For Muslims to acknowledge the non-Muslim provenance of contemporary human rights values and strive to realize them in a secular, pluralist, democratic polity is by no means a dilution of their fidelity to their faith tradition. It is, rather, their recognition that those values represent the best available practical means of expressing their faith effectively in fuller personal responsiveness to God and in interpersonal responsibility or care. The rationale behind the linkage of religious caring and human rights values explains why Gülen extends those values in ways likely to seem, in strictly Western perspective, out of place. He views rights essentially as debts that

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the individual feels inwardly bound to repay. One readily recognizes in this formulation the reiterated Qur’anic injunction that the alms-tax (zakah) is a right of those in need upon those in surplus – a debt owed by the rich to the poor, which the Muslim community is authorized to collect and ‘return’ to its owners. But, alongside the commanded zakah, there is also the reiterated commendation of sadaqah, sheer charity. Thus we find in Gülen’s writings that he insists upon putting in the same category as the right not to be hurt by torture, the right not to be hurt by slander or backbiting (Gülen, 1995: 277), even though one’s reputation is not easily defined or defended in law: it is private individuals who must, by being caring in what they say, protect each other’s good name. The people’s need for human rights embraces more than individual relations with the state, or interpersonal relations that the state can feasibly have a role in supervising, such as formal or customary contracts. Human rights embrace the smooth and just functioning of the whole commons – the physical and social-cultural neighbourhood – which all need and benefit from at some time. So, while perhaps odd from a Western perspective, it is unsurprising that Gülen includes payment of utility bills and taxes among the rights that people owe to one another, which they should feel inwardly bound to pay, even if public agencies are unable or unwilling to enforce them (Gülen, 1995: 280). In sum: legal rules to protect human rights work best when supported by social norms that embody care and good citizenship. If internal incentives to be caring (derived from ethical/religious upbringing) are systematically excluded from the commons, human rights practice is overdependent on the availability of sufficient will and power to enforce compliance. For all the legal underpinning of rights in national and international law, political constitutions, citizens’ charters, best-practice regulations and so on, quality of implementation ultimately depends on the quality of self-supervision by the consciences of those doing the implementing. Absent conscientiousness, it is possible to appear to conform to regulations and avoid penalties for outcomes opposed to the intent of the regulations. In light of the relevance, for compliance with human rights values, of social and cultural norms, it becomes easier to understand the rationale (wisdom) of the tajdid-practice of the movement. Hurdles in the socio-legal textures of Muslim societies makes a gradualist, consensual, grassroots approach more effective in the long term than abrupt impositions of top-down reform. This prudent approach has secured major advances in the understanding of human rights values and their assimilation to the norms of Islam in Turkey. The question is whether the experience in Turkey is transferable to Muslim-majority societies with different historical and cultural trajectories.

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4.  Transferability of Gülen’s tajdid For over two decades Gülen has been working on Key Concepts of Sufism, a multi-volume collection of essays explaining how those concepts are rooted in Qur’an and Sunnah. This is one measure of his commitment to strengthen the inner dimensions of Muslim practice and may be targeted more at Muslim societies not already attuned to the Anatolian ‘flavour’. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the movement’s activities spread quickly into the Turkic states of Central Asia; and a substantial Turkish diaspora in Western Europe and North America enabled many projects to flourish there also. By contrast, there have been, until very recently, relatively few ventures into Muslim societies in the Arab world, Asia and Africa.

4.1. A brief sketch of the movement in the wider Muslim world In the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the aversion of the Shi`i and Wahhabi regimes to what they perceive as ‘Turkish Islam’ had kept the doors shut. Their narrowly politicized Islam is expressed in the public sphere in forms that systematically exclude ideas, influences and opportunities that could improve the well-being and human rights of their people. In other states, militant groups present their understanding of Islam as a political challenge to the regimes in power, who respond (predictably) with intensified repression. The suffering arising from these dynamics is further complicated by socio-economic grievances, massive deficiencies in the development of human resources, cultural inertias on issues like the rights of women and minorities, and in many places, chronic poverty worsened by acute levels of administrative malpractice and misgovernment. The tajdid-practice of piecemeal projects adjusted to local laws and practices, can respond well to these multidimensional problems by providing, for example, without any political strings attached, quality education that empowers people to improve their circumstances themselves. Such projects should, of course, be evaluated primarily in terms of the particular service they offer. Nevertheless, without threatening the status quo, they do, also, initiate gradual change in manners and mindsets, with cumulative influence on the political culture. While, in the wider Muslim world, it is very early days for the movement, it is reasonable to expect, on the basis of past experience, that its projects will multiply and in time improve assimilation of human rights values. Persistent misperceptions notwithstanding, the movement is not a centrally managed organization. It is not like, say, a supermarket chain which knows its incomings and outgoings to the cent, and can offset losses here from profits

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there, and by fiat move human resources to where they are needed. The movement is a loose inspiration-and-information-sharing network of distinct, independently funded projects, whose success or failure cannot be easily offset or duplicated in different locations. This arrangement has the merit of maximizing the number of fully responsible agents. It has the drawback that there is no central bank of data to draw upon when seeking to compare and evaluate movement projects by category or region or size. Information has to be gathered piecemeal, or anecdotally, or derived from proxy measures. Using as proxy the number of contestants from different countries entering the 10th International Turkish Olympiads of 2012 organized by the movement across Turkey, it can be calculated that movement schools exist in at least 43 of the 57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (hereafter ‘the OIC’). The newspapers reported that approximately 1,500 contestants took part in the Olympiads from over 135 different counties (Today’s Zaman, 2012). The Olympiads website lists the countries from which contestants came which is how the above number of countries with a movement presence has been calculated (Turkce Oimpiyatlari, 2012). The calculation is based on the assumption that most of the contestants come from schools in these countries run by the movement or at least from countries in which the movement is very active. In some cases (e.g. Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia) there are six or seven schools in each. Student dormitories and hostels to serve pilgrims are established in Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively; schools may yet follow. The movement’s success in ‘the West’, combined with the Muslim credentials and professionalism of those who staff and run its projects, undoubtedly gives it credibility among Muslims worldwide. The rising popularity of Turkey and the ‘Turkish brand’ overall in the Muslim and Arab world is another point to factor into the movement’s receptivity in this part of the world. Its profile is further enhanced by the distribution of published and broadcast materials. In 2005, the movement established Hira, a quarterly magazine in Arabic with an editorial by Gülen, and articles on theology, culture, science and education, by Turkish and Arab writers. The magazine is printed in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. In 2011, Hira magazine had a worldwide subscription of 40,000 distributed as follows: Saudi Arabia – 10,000; Egypt – 7,000; Morocco – 5,000; Yemen – 4,000; and Turkey – 3,000. According to an interview with Nevzat Savaş, the editor-in-chief of Hira’, the magazine is finding growing interest in Sudan, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Mauritania as well. Savaş also claims that the magazine is widely followed in Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia (Today’s Zaman, 2011). Hira’ does not engage in political reflections as such, but its discussions of faith, religion and society, necessarily convey

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to Arab intellectuals, activists and youth the scope and direction of Gülen’s thinking. In 2006, the movement owned one international TV station, Samanyolu TV. In 2007, four more came on air: Mehtap (cultural-religious programs); Samanyolu Haber (24-hour news); Ebru (US-based, with all-English programs); and Yumurcak (children’s programs). In 2006, the movement launched its first English-language daily, Today’s Zaman, now the bestselling English newspaper in Turkey; Zaman itself has the largest circulation among newspapers published in Turkish and since 2011 the movement has been publishing Turkish Review, an English-language bimonthly news magazine. Gülen’s official website is accessible in 20 languages including Arabic, Persian and Urdu. A considerable number of his books have been translated into Arabic, including work on the biography of the Prophet, the revival of Islamic thought in our time and, of course, Key Concepts of Sufism. A growing number of popular TV series produced and broadcast in Turkey including those by the movement’s production companies are being dubbed in Arabic and broadcast in the Middle East.

4.2. A new departure: Relief work A major venture for the movement was the foundation in 2004 of a relief and development charity, Kimse Yok mu? (‘Is Anybody There?’ in Turkish; hereafter ‘the Charity’). As the Charity’s website explains, it undertakes relief work all over the world and not just in Muslim countries. Its first efforts were ad hoc responses to natural disasters in Turkey and its neighbourhood; the experience gained was carried into the Charity’s work following the 2005 earthquake in the South Pacific: it collected donations which provided water sanitation equipment, clothes, food and medical aid to victims in Aceh, Indonesia. In 2006 and 2007 it provided similar aid in Pakistan and Lebanon. Today its work spans seven areas: aid for disasters, aid for health, aid for education, aid for significant religious days (Eid), individual aid campaigns, aid for Africa and sister family aids. The Charity continues running campaigns for and delivers aid and services in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Darfur, Niger, Palestine and Haiti (Kimse Yok Mu, 2012b). In each case, the movement’s volunteers working in established projects in these countries were active in coordinating delivery of the aid, which is likely to have improved their contacts and receptivity to the movement. Relief work is a significant departure for the movement. Its cultural projects naturally led to enlargement of its capacity, credibility and network of sympathizers and participants. The Charity does not directly benefit the movement in this way, indeed  – since the sources of funding for the Charity are the same sources as for the schools, dialogue initiatives and so

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on – perhaps it depletes its resources. In 2006, the Charity built three tent villages in Pakistan to house 5000 earthquake victims, with food and other support for six months; and it put up 10 pre-fabricated schools with teaching materials and equipment for 350 students each. Its commitment in Somalia is very significant including setting up and running refugee camps, providing hot meals to 90,000 people daily, restoring the Benadir hospital, providing emergency and routine health care services, providing clear water supply, and beginning the construction of a 60-bed hospital and medical institute. The Charity will also found and run two new schools in the region in the coming years (Kimse Yok Mu, 2012a). Involvement in poverty and disaster relief is an indicator of the movement’s commitment to help in the Muslim world and in the Global South more generally. However, the long-term problems are best tackled from within these societies, with the understanding and consent of their peoples. It is safe to predict that the movement’s work will gather momentum in these societies faster than was possible in Central Asia, through practiced consent in individual projects and by shifting the parameters of debate through meetings and dialogue. The main reason is that the people are painfully aware of their urgent need for the reforms in political cultural attitudes that will bring them relief from the lack of human rights and human and social development.

5.  Conclusion The Gülen movement was slow to venture into the Arab world and other Muslim societies largely because of practical (not philosophical) reasons: because it was locked out by regimes in power, or because a movement originating in modern Turkey could not have found welcome until it had the necessary credibility. Its works draw on the Anatolian ‘flavour’ of Gülen’s understanding and practice of Islam. Because this ‘flavour’ emphasizes religious believing rather than belonging, and personal relationship with God enriched by caring service to others, respect for human rights is already inherent in it. The movement has conveyed this ‘flavour’ through print and broadcast media and through practical grassroots activities. It has been resolutely apolitical and non-confrontational, adapted ungrudgingly to local conditions, and delivered professional services that meet local needs. It has achieved gradual reform of manners and mindsets by consent and participation of the people it serves. Muslims in Turkey have come to internalize human rights values, to appreciate the utility of a neutral state, democratic procedures and a pluralist culture, as the best means available to acquire the collective goods that they need or desire. They have learnt to collaborate on shared problems with civility and

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without needing unanimity. Their practice of Islam has become more devout, activist and more tolerant of diversity, and rejected the narrow politicization of faith that in reality inhibits its free and full expression. By patiently taking many small steps in the same direction, Gülen and the movement have moved Turkish Muslims a long way towards a realization that Islam’s place in the modern world is not threatened but secured by the implementation of human rights; a realization for the movement that came about over a period of time. Elsewhere in the Muslim world people have the same need to appreciate that the lack human rights, with other factors, block their human and social development. Since around 2005, the movement has felt ready to take on this challenge, through short-term relief aid combined with long-term empowerment and consensus building through education and dialogue initiatives. At time of writing the movement has functioning schools in at least 43 member states of the OIC. It has taken advantage of long-standing links between Turkey and Egypt as a way of carrying the ideas and activities of the movement to the wider Arab world. As recent events show, pressures for change in the Muslim world have been building for generations: if they are channelled into peaceful grassroots activism on the pattern of the movement (and not explosions of militancy and repression), the prospects for lasting change in the direction of democracy, rule of law and human rights are good. Then, if those prospects are realized and Muslims infuse the Western legal framing of human rights with faith-based caring, we inch closer to the inclusive civilization that is Gülen’s larger vision for this century.

Towards a Conclusion: Fethullah Gülen, the Hizmet and the Changing ‘Muslim World’ Greg Barton, Ihsan Yilmaz and Paul Weller

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 his is a very interesting time to be discussing the movement inspired by the teaching and example of Fethullah Gülen. On the one hand the movement can, in many ways, now be said to be truly coming of age, being present in significant ways right around the world and having a fully developed series of programmes and initiatives. The ‘age’ in which this ‘coming of age’ is occurring is an exciting but also uncertain post – ‘Arab Spring’ period, in which the question about what Islam, Islamic movements and predominantly Muslim societies can achieve in terms of political reform, democracy and modernization is very much at the forefront of considerations of global affairs. Recent decades have seen Islamist politics come to dominate thinking about Islam and Muslim societies. Islamist political thought, contrary to its claim to represent an ancient heritage, is a relatively recent development only emerging in the middle of the twentieth century. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement first in Egypt and then across the Arab world, and the related growth of Islamist movements in South Asia, inspired by the rhetoric of Maulana Maududi, played an important role in newly independent nation-states seeking to define their Muslim identity in a world freshly polarized by the Cold War. But up until the revolution in Iran in 1979 Islamist movements were seen largely as movements of dissent with little prospect for becoming dominant players.

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Unfortunately, the demonstration of revolutionary change in Iran gave fresh impetus to the argument that violence was a necessary part of the Islamist struggle. This was further reinforced by the success of the Afghan mujahedin against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. This laid the foundation for framing the argument  – most famously championed by Samuel Huntington  – that there would be an inevitable clash between Islamic civilization and the liberal democratic heritage of the West. Were it not for the rise of Al Qaeda this might have been overcome, but in the post-9/11 world focus has remained firmly on the question of whether Islam is truly compatible with modernity in general and specifically with secular liberal democracy. The events of the ‘Arab Spring’, which were initially at least so clearly driven by a young generation sick to the heart with authoritarianism and inspired by a deep desire for freedom and openness, created fresh confidence about the potential of predominantly Muslim societies. Inevitably, however, free elections and a free marketplace of ideas saw Islamist movements back on centre stage even though they had taken a backseat during the initial social uprisings that had bought down regime’s in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen. It is against this backdrop that the subject of this book, this global Islamically inspired movement that in many ways transcends traditional categories, is so relevant to the question of what Islam has to do with modernity, secularism and liberal democracy. It is significant that the Gülen movement is not a political movement, and specifically not an Islamist movement, but it is very much a global movement. Although critics of the Gülen movement frequently suggest that it is driven by some covert political agenda everything about the teaching of Fethullah Gülen himself, and the three decades of activism so far associated with the movement – all open to public scrutiny – speak against this proposition. One of the reasons why the Gülen movement is often misunderstood is because it operates in a unique category. It is by no means the only social movement to be inspired by traditional Islamic thought and seeking to make a progressive contribution to developing modern society. There are a number of such movements around the world. As Barton discusses in the first chapter of this book some of the best examples of such non-Islamist social movements inspired by Islamic ideals are to be found in Indonesia. What makes the Gülen movement so unique is that it is a progressive Islamically inspired movement operating on a truly global scale. It might be argued that social movements like South Asia’s Tablighi Jamaat represent a global non-Islamist Islamic movement. No one, however, would argue that Tablighi Jamaat represents a progressive social movement whatever its virtues and undeniable broad appeal. The Gülen movement represents the first progressive Islamically inspired social movement to operate in a truly transnational fashion.

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The fact that this book is about the Gülen movement rather than simply about the ideas of Gülen himself is of vital importance to understanding the relevance of the movement to the broader ‘Muslim world’. For although Islamist thinkers have captured the imaginations of Western commentators and Muslim publics alike there have been a number of significant progressive Islamic intellectuals to have emerged over the last century. Very few of them, however, have been supported by broad social movements. Without a social movement being associated with progressive Islamic ideas and aspirations the ability to translate inspiration into actual mechanisms for change remains limited. The particular genius of Fethullah Gülen is that he has taken traditional Islamic ideas and teachings and interpreted them for modern society and then has inspired a movement engaged in highly practical contributions to bettering society. As an Islamic scholar Gülen is certainly very significant but he himself would be the first to stress that he is an interpreter of tradition rather than a creator of new ideas. In this regard, Fethullah Gülen himself would prefer that his personality is not emphasized. And indeed his great original contribution is that he has found a way to involve ordinary Muslims at various levels and located throughout the world in practical initiatives of social service with truly transformative potential without need of a centralized organization. This is one of the reasons why those active in these initiatives often prefer to speak simply of the hizmet (or service) movement. The great initiatives of the movement – the schools and colleges, dialogue associations and civil society organizations  – have been readily replicated in a fractal fashion. That is to say, a simple formula has been picked up applied, inspired others and being repeated (with local inflections and emphases) over and over again. This book is not intended to be a comprehensive or definitive examination of all aspects of the movement. But it does bring together a series of carefully researched reflections on the movements by expert researchers in a way that facilitates deeper understanding of the potential implications of this movement, originating in Turkish Muslim society, for the broader ‘Muslim world’. In the first chapter of this book, Barton makes the case for understanding the Gülen movements in the global context of religious philanthropy. The evidence for reading the movement in this way is compelling and the implications profound. Conventional thinking about Islam and Islamic movements has tended to identify essentialized differences between Islam and Muslim society and Christianity and Western society. Understanding the Gülen movement as a progressive Islamically inspired movement along similar lines to Western religious philanthropy, forces us to reframe our understanding of Islam. This is indeed the position taken by Gülen himself. Gülen is very much a product of Turkish culture and society and is, in the best sense of the word, a patriot. He is also very much shaped

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by traditional Islamic thought and culture. And yet despite these very specific origins and influences he has transcended narrow nationalism and religious identity to arrive at a truly global perspective. This is even more evident in the movement associated with his ideas. One way of understanding the universal application of Gülen’s ideas is to think in terms of habitus. In Chapter 2 we are presented with the example of Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence. Gandhi was a very specific product of his Indian environment and yet his contribution to conceptualizing and inspiring peaceful activism represents a legacy that has lasted well beyond his lifetime and travelled far beyond his homeland. The example of Gandhi’s habitus provides a fresh and original way of thinking about Gülen’s very different contribution to peaceful activism and the role of habitus in the movement associated with him. Chapter 3 returns to a specific focus on the movement’s activism within the Turkish context and examines the Abant Platform dialogue programme and the work of the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) based in Istanbul. The very concrete example of what can be achieved by this very ambitious approach to dialogue has enormous relevance to the broader ‘Muslim world’, and indeed the world as a whole. Modern Turkey is a society that has, over the years, endured considerable trauma and far-reaching polarization. This might be easily overlooked given the relative prosperity of the Turkish Republic in the twenty-first century and its comparative stability in the last decade or so which, to the casual observer, might make it seem a very different place than the present context of many predominantly Muslim countries in the Arab world. Nevertheless, while it is the case that the ongoing democratization of Turkey has been able to take place over a lengthier period than the recent upheavals and continuing convulsions of a number of Arab countries suggest will be possible in those contexts, in living memory there have also been deeply violent convulsions in Turkish society. Even today there remain sharp differences of opinion, conviction and perception, along with the continuing violence related to Kurdish aspirations and movements and the response to these of the majority population, and of the state and the military. What the Abant Platform’s programme has demonstrated is that with goodwill and quiet confidence even the most disparate of political players and social commentators can engage in fruitful dialogue. Moreover, dialogue of the kind pioneered by the JWF is both deeply practical and courageous, as recent initiatives in relation to the south-east of the country and Kurdish matters more broadly have demonstrated. In the chapter on the Abant Platform (Chapter 3) we are reminded of the astonishing range of difficult issues to do with religion, ethnicity history and political conviction with which the Abant Platform discussions have successfully engaged.

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This kind of approach to dialogue has been repeated around the world by Gülen movement activists and is particularly manifested in the many dozens of dialogue societies that have been formed in the last two decades in world capitals. But the implications of the kind of dialogue demonstrated by the Abant Platform meetings go well beyond the Gülen movement itself. To the extent this example might inspire imitation in the societies of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond, this concrete programme of dialogue could open the way to confront the most difficult of issues in a spirit of mutual respect. The implications of such an approach for the newly democratizing societies of the Middle East and North Africa could be substantial, for the creation of a genuinely democratic culture without this kind of respectful dialogue is impossible. And yet in contexts that include violent confrontation, dialogue has also to be politically sophisticated and robust. The fact that such approaches have been pioneered by a movement that emerges out of a Turkish historical context of deep social and political divisions that have also taken violent forms; that is so clearly inspired by Islam and yet so ready to try to work to overcome sectarian division for the sake of the common good represents a very concrete source of inspiration for believing in the potential for democratic culture to emerge in predominantly Muslim societies. The profound political implications of this movement arising out of the very specific engagement and the Turkish context are explored especially in the second part of the book. This includes in Chapter 4, where Yilmaz writes in careful detail about the transformation of Turkish Islamism to non-Islamism and the creation of a post-Islamist position on the role of Islamic ideas and aspirations in democratic politics. Kılınç continues the exploration of these themes and specifically the contribution of the Gülen movement to social transformation and liberalization in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 Maigre-Branco reflects further on the broader implications of the kind of progressive, moderate engagements of the Gülen movements in the specific context of Turkish society. Together these three chapters lay the groundwork for exploring the universal implications of this very Turkish experience and the lasting influence of this example on the politics of the Muslim world. Istanbul, the home of the JWF, prides itself on being a city that straddles the boundary between Europe and Asia. And Turkey itself is justly proud of its long history of engagement in European society. It is understandable then that – although this has waned somewhat in more recent years – that there should be such a deep desire within Turkish society to engage with the European Union. And yet for all this there are many in Turkey who, on either religious and/or nationalist grounds feel deeply ambivalent or even antithetical about the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union. In Chapter 7, Weller explores the reasons why Turkey’s engagement with the European Union has been so strongly and consistently championed by a religious leader regarded

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by many Westernised secular Turks as representing non-Western Anatolian traditional religious culture. Weller explores these paradoxes and what they tell us about the complex relationship between the Gülen movement and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) government in Ankara. In the third and final part of the book the focus shifts outside of Turkey to explore implications of the Gülen movement for the broader ‘Muslim world’. If twentieth-century Islamism was born out of the example of the MB in Egypt then there are good reasons for arguing that the example of the Gülen movement in Turkey could point to a model for post-Islamist politics in the twenty-first century. In Chapter 8 Sykiainen engages in a thoughtful theoretical reflection on what the ideas and example of the movement mean for democratic reforms in the Middle East and beyond. This is interesting not least because of the fraught history between Turkey and its Arab neighbours. For while the nations of the Arab Spring reforms are looking very specifically at the Turkish example to seek inspiration for their own democratization it is clear that Arab societies are not easily persuaded of the direct relevance of Turkish experience to their own situation. This also applies very much to the question of Islamic thought. In Chapter 9 Heck explores the very interesting case study of Hira’ magazine, the Arab-language magazine published by the Gülen movement in Egypt. Egypt along with much of the Middle East and North Africa has been deeply influenced by Islamic modernism. This informed, in turn, the rise of Islamist political thought and a lasting approach to Islamic reform that has tended to question traditional Islamic culture and belief. Turkey, on the other hand, was largely untouched by Islamic modernism. The kind of contemporary Islamic thought articulated by Gülen represents a continuation of traditional Islamic thought. Hira’ magazine represents a practical endeavour to engage with traditional Islamic scholars in the Arab world in a way that transcends the differences between contemporary Turkish and Arab societies. As Heck explains, Hira’ is an innovative project and very much a work in progress. It boldly but sensitively engages with contentious issues and Middle Eastern society and seeks to build bridges based on mutual respect for classical Islamic scholarship. The case of Hira’ is a reminder that at the centre of Gülen’s thought and of the ideas that inform the Gülen movement as a whole is a high level of commitment to an expertise in classical Islamic scholarship. In Chapters 10, 11 and 12 Clement, Osman and Mohamed explore case studies involving movement schools in Central Asia, Indonesia and South Africa. These case studies are informed by close observation of these schools in their very specific contexts. As a result these three chapters give us unique insight into the internal working of these schools and how that the volunteer teachers associated with them overcome considerable challenges and difficulties. As Osman reminds us in Chapter 11 the implications of the

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school succeeding in these very different societies goes well beyond the field of education alone. The focus of the schools on service and the demonstration of Islam in practice represent a concrete example of what’s possible in what Osman has dubbed as ‘middle way Islam’. The middle way Islam of the Gülen movement is clearly rooted in traditional Islamic culture and classical scholarship and has arisen out of a very specifically Turkish context. Its orientation, however, is very much one that looks to the future with a quiet confidence about the potential to transform societies and steadily contribute to making the world a better place. This is a positive and forward-looking movement and for all of its association with traditional Islamic culture and values it can also be rightly described as being a progressive movement. This is seen not only in its commitment to modern education and particularly the study of science and critical thinking but also in its very active promotion of human rights. The movement is not a political one in the sense of party politics, but one of its important contributions is that through both Fethullah Gülen’s standing as an Islamic scholar and through the concrete dialogue commitments of the movement, what it contributes to are the conditions that make democratic politics possible. In the thirteenth and final chapter Keleş explores implications of the human rights activism associated with the Gülen movement for the broader ‘Muslim world’. Most religiously inspired social movements are inclined to make strong claims about their respect for others and their commitment to human rights. Such claims do not always, however, transcend the realm of rhetoric and/or can appear to be artificially grafted onto a religious tradition. Keleş contends that Fethullah Gulen’s approach is one that profoundly articulates a classical Islamic vision and understanding with contemporary understandings of human rights. He also explores the concrete example of the Gülen movement in promoting human rights and examines its potential to inspire others in following its practical example. The thirteen chapters in this book represent many years of study and observation by scholars deeply familiar with the Gülen movement. This familiarity and expertise is evidenced in the granularity of the discussion and the richness of the case studies upon which the chapters draw. The writers thus describe a movement that is ‘coming of age’ as a ‘work-in–progress’. Like all social movements it is imperfect. But a particularly encouraging aspect of its development so far is that there is substantial evidence that it constantly seeks to broaden its horizons by engagement with others. There is also evidence that it seeks to learn by undertaking critical reflection on its practice – in the light both of its engagement with the primary sources of its Islamic religious inspiration, but also with people of other religious faiths and none. It is because these studies are so grounded in reality that they can speak with confidence about the movement’s potential to inspire change around the

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world. Of course, the future is never certain or inevitable. But the evidence so far is that the Gülen movement is a very practical movement of service concerned with the betterment of society, particularly through the delivery of education. It is also concerned with fostering a culture of dialogue that engages in a very realistic fashion with the big issues of the diverse and plural societies in which it is involved. In its own quiet and down-to-earth fashion is deeply committed to peace building and to the promotion of human rights. Significantly, its commitments include that of the freedom of religion and belief, which is very important for safeguarding the rights and freedom of minority communities in Muslim majority societies, especially at a time of upheaval and change. Indeed it could be said that Fethullah Gülen’s own understanding of Islam is one that poses important critical question marks in relation to the notion of a ‘Muslim world’ – or indeed a ‘Christian world’ or a ‘secular world’. Rather, there is a world and there are societies in which people (in different combinations of majorities and minorities) of Muslim, Christian and other faiths live and must learn to live to together for the sake of the future of all. Nevertheless, this book is focused primarily on the Gülen movement rather than upon Fethullah Gülen himself. This is a very important distinction because, as was argued above, if Gülen was just another Islamic scholar or intellectual without a movement around him, then his influence would be largely limited to intellectual circles. At the same time, as Keleş’s chapter also argues, it is impossible to separate out a discussion of the movement from the thinker whose ideas have inspired it, and whose thinking continues to develop in interaction both with the classical Islamic sources in which he has been formed, and through a hermeneutical process of engagement with feedback coming from the praxis of the movement and the initiatives inspired by his teaching. In summarizing Gülen’s pioneering contribution two additional personal qualities can be identified that are also broadly reflected in the character of the movement itself. The first is that Gülen begins in the context of Turkish society and yet manages to skilfully navigate diverse cultures and ideas and to transcend narrow identities and associations while remaining very much a traditional Islamic scholar. As a skilful navigator across cultures and ideologies he is also very much a bold transgressor of boundaries. If these remained simply personal attributes they would be remarkable but not nearly as consequential as when they are embodied in the character of a movement. The Gülen movement begins with traditional Turkish Islam but transcends the normal boundaries and limits associated with such an identity to become a truly global, progressive, Islamically inspired movement engaged in transformative religious philanthropy in a way that challenges us to rethink our previous understandings of Islam in the ‘Muslim world’.

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Topic Index The index does not cover the preliminary pages of the book in terms of any material that is paginated in Roman numerals.  1980 coup  27, 90 9/11  6, 79 Abant Declaration  30 Abant meetings  8, 48, 54, 58, 61 abode of war  5 Abrahamic Religions  53 academics  48, 53–6, 79, 102, 197 accommodationist  79 adab  163 afaq  147 Afghan mujahedin  210 Afghanistan embassies  163 Afrikaans  182, 184 agnosticism  32 agnostics  103 agraha  34 ahlak  154, 156, 166 al Ma’ida  133, 138, 140 Alawi  119 al-Baqara  133 Alevi  48, 61, 119, 122, 197 Alevi-Sunni relations  61 Algerian rebels  38 Algerians  38 al-Haqq  21 alim  193–4 Allah  24, 44, 133, 149 All-Hearing, All-Knowing  133 al-salaf al-salih  149 altruism  4, 44 ambassadors  56, 174 American  27, 29, 37, 56, 60, 62, 100, 106 anarchy  71, 94, 118, 133 Anatolian  3, 18–19, 24, 45, 72, 81, 102–3, 197–9, 204, 207, 214 bourgeoisie  80 businessmen  74

cities  80 elite  81 entrepreneurship  103 interior  19 Islam  3, 19, 45 Muslimness  199 Muslims  18 poor and middle class  99 Sufi  193 Sufi Muslimness  197 Tigers  101, 105 towns and cities  80 anfus  147 Anglican  17, 26 Anglo-Saxon  21, 30, 58, 68, 77, 197 Ankara Agreement  110–11 anti-  American  151 anarchist  94 communist  118 Europe  23, 100, 196 imperialist  40 Islamic  70, 75 Islamist  100 Israel  100 modern  145–6 NATO  100 Ottomanist  70 Russian  159 secular  73 U.S.  23, 196 Western  2, 75, 78, 80–1, 98, 100 Westernism  75, 98, 151 apartheid  181–3, 185 aqida  145 Arab  1, 2, 11, 16, 59–60, 143–5, 151–3, 199, 202, 204–5, 212, 214 countries  60, 153, 212 intellectuals  206

234

TOPIC INDEX

societies  214 society  144, 152 Spring  1, 2, 59–60, 96, 124, 151, 153, 168, 209–10, 214 world  76, 78, 96, 207–9, 212, 214 Arabic  11, 24, 88, 120, 143, 152–3, 181, 186, 205–6 Arab-Islamic world  153 Arab-language magazine  214 Arabo-Islamic  148–9 Arabo-Islamic world  153 Arbil  59 armed forces  111, 113 Armenian  56 army  63, 72, 99 ascetic  194 A şgabat  156, 158, 160, 162–3 atheism  32, 180 atheists  103 Australian  6, 178 Austrian  116 authoritarian  2, 48, 62, 70, 73, 84, 95–6, 130, 151 authoritarianism  1, 95, 210 ayat  147 Azmi Ates  101 Balkan wars  123 Balkanabat  166 Barelvi  145 basic rights  76, 93 Başkent schools  154, 163, 167 beautiful actions  21 Belgian Constitution  69 Big Crunch  148 bigotry  32 bilim  157–8 Book of God  5, 150 Book of the Soul  159 border transgressor  5 Bosnian Muslims  53 British  30, 40, 41 Brotherhood  15 brotherhoods  71–3, 103 Buddhist temples  175 bursaries  186, 190 businessmen  5, 9, 27, 79–81, 86–9, 99, 101–3, 105, 156 businessmen associations  79 businesspeople  9, 102, 105 Byzantine Empire  123

Caliphate  98, 144, 168 caliphs  147 capitalist  9, 72, 88–9, 103–7, 195 Çärjew  160 Cartesian,  dualism  35 theories  35 Catholic  17, 26, 123 centralism  73 centre-right  50 character building  158 Chipko  7, 35–6, 38–9, 40, 42, 46 Christendom  110, 117 Christian  7, 10, 17, 26–9, 31, 48, 51, 53, 77, 100, 106, 114–16, 120, 123, 173, 181–2, 184 apocalypticists  120 churches  106 Club  114–15 Democrat  77, 116 denomination  29 missionaries  51 publishing houses  27 Right  27, 48 school  26 world  216 Christianity  26, 114, 122, 211 Christians  7, 17, 20, 106, 121 Churches  175 CIA agents  74 citizens’ charters  203 citizenship  8, 54, 60, 183, 199, 203 civic,  associations  50 engagement  50 life  50, 95 movement  4 values  179 civil,  Islam  11, 169–70, 176–9 Islamic groups  170 liberties  75, 83 religion  7, 17, 27 servants  56 society  2, 4, 7–11, 31, 46–52, 56–7, 62–3, 86, 90, 95, 97, 102, 108, 110, 115, 118, 121–3, 165, 167, 211 society organizations  8, 63, 90 civilizations  10, 59, 84, 89, 139, 178 civil-military relations  59

TOPIC INDEX clash of civilizations  120, 140 clash of cultures  10 class  4, 77, 88, 102, 107, 130, 157, 172, 183–6, 188–90 classical,  Islamic  37, 214–16 scholar  3 scholarship  78, 215 coffeehouses  25 cognitive structures  38 Cold War  90, 118, 209 cold warriors  10 collective,  action  32, 46, 50, 347 behaviour  37, 38 identities  35–7 colonialism  110 colonized  2, 78–9, 130 coloured  87, 184 commercial  29–30, 41 communism  90, 92 communist  195 Communists  197 communitarian  73, 83, 202 community,  centres  25 leaders  57, 175 compassion  97, 107, 194 confessional identity  197 conflict resolution  39, 41, 54 confrontational  75–6, 79, 207 congregational  51 consensus  8, 54, 57, 59, 62, 77, 98, 208 consensus-building  197 consensus politics  197 conservative  20, 27, 49, 55, 58, 72, 75–6, 116, 121, 154, 170, 172 democracy  100, 103 democrat party  77 Islamic scholars  20 nationalist  118 constitution  33, 49, 54, 59–60, 68–70, 86 constitutional,  crises  112 government  68 legitimacy  71 monarchy  69 project  68 referendum  119

235

Constitutional Court  73 consultation  10, 134, 136–8, 195, 196 contemporary civilization  141 contemporary Islamists  68 Copenhagen criteria  111 cosmopolitan  2, 19, 25 Islam  2 cosmopolitanism  71 counter extremism  11 counter-radicalization  176 country of service  5 coups  18, 111 creator  5, 211 cult of personality  159 cultural  10, 22, 39, 49, 51, 61, 70, 87, 97, 108, 110, 116, 118, 122–3, 151, 196 culturally conservative  79 culture  9, 19, 37, 43, 51, 62, 72, 104–7, 111, 117, 119, 131, 143, 146, 163, 170, 172, 174, 204–5, 213 cultures  2, 6, 10, 19, 30, 35, 108, 111, 139, 216 current affairs  27–8, 30 Customs Union  111 daily prayers  145 dar al-harb  5, 121 dar al-hizmet  5 dar ul-Islam  121, 170 Day of Judgment  138 decentralization  76 deductive reasoning  16, 21 deep-state18  dehumanization  38 deliberation  137 democracies  93, 118 democracy  1, 2, 8–11, 19–23, 31, 52, 57–63, 67, 70–1, 74–6, 78, 81, 84, 91–3, 95–6, 98–100, 103, 107, 111–12, 116–17, 124, 130–1, 130–6, 139, 141–2, 169–70, 191–2, 195, 197, 202, 208–10 democratic  1, 2, 4, 8–10, 12, 48–9, 52, 55, 58, 60–2, 68, 71, 76–7, 79, 91–2, 95–7, 100, 104, 107, 115, 117–18, 130, 134, 136, 139, 142, 145, 151, 184, 191, 202, 207, 213 culture  213 institutions  135

236

TOPIC INDEX

Islamists  22 law  4 moderation  100 politics  91, 193, 213, 215 polity  2, 202 reforms  10, 91, 214 democratization  23, 49, 59, 60, 61, 77, 83, 95, 96, 97, 134, 141, 212, 214 democrats  68 Deobandism  144 derivation  16, 21 dershane  25, 87 developmentalist discourse  72 dhawq  147 dialectical materialism  22 dialogue  2, 3, 6, 10, 16, 19, 25, 27, 30, 38, 45–6, 48, 49–52, 54, 60, 61, 63, 77, 81, 91–4, 103, 114, 122–3, 139–40, 143, 160, 175, 177, 179, 197, 199, 207–8, 212–13, 215 associations  211 initiatives  206 societies  213 dinar  72 dinners  4, 6, 52, 175, 197 discrimination  159, 191 disunity  4, 43, 45 divine reality  146 divinity  149 doctrine  15, 134, 135, 145, 149, 171, 199, 200 dormitories  3, 4, 81, 157, 160, 205 dormitory  157, 158 Durkheimian  70 Dutch  170 earthquake  206–7 East, The  7, 10, 60, 80, 81, 96, 120, 139, 151 eastern civilization  151 Eastern Europe  28 ecology  43 economic,  cooperation pact  72 crisis  10, 109 growth  109, 124 liberalization  83, 85, 90, 111 economically liberal  79 economics  9, 108, 111, 137 economic-technical school  160

edep  154, 157 edep-terbiye  157 education  3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 16–17, 20, 25–6, 33, 46, 48–50, 52, 56, 59, 61, 86–8, 97, 100, 103–4, 107, 118–19, 130, 133, 138–9, 143, 154, 156–65, 167, 173–4, 177, 182, 184, 186, 201, 204–6 educational  2, 4–5, 11–12, 25, 61, 80, 85, 87, 94, 119, 159, 160, 164–5, 172, 175, 177, 185, 190 Egyptian  56, 60, 148 Eid  206 Eid ul-Fitr  175 electoral base  74 electronic media  29 elite  12, 28, 30, 40, 68–70, 81, 91, 192, 196 elitism  186 elitist  98, 104, 105, 150, 174, 184, 186 emigration  88–9 English  18, 19, 26, 29, 58, 87, 92, 104, 105, 155, 160, 162–3, 182, 184, 188, 206 Enlargement Commissioner  116 enlightenment  32, 43, 131, 158, 159, 163, 164 entrepreneurship  102 Ergenekon  112 eser  32 esnaf  156 essentialists  84 ethical values  88 ethics  33, 42–3, 86, 90, 130, 156, 157 ethnic  48, 50–1, 53, 56, 62, 77, 117–18, 156, 159, 165, 174 ethnic prejudice  99 Ethnic Russian  163 ethnicity  70, 212 etiquette  157, 163 EU membership  10, 23, 58, 60, 90, 108–9, 112–13, 116–19, 124, 196 Eurasian  109, 123 European  1, 6, 9–10, 23, 37, 56, 68, 75, 79–80, 108–10, 115–17, 120, 124–5 bishops  122 Constitutional Treaty  114 countries  110, 201 identity  116 imperialism  69

TOPIC INDEX languages  68 Muslim  116 scholars  37 society  213 Stability Initiative  102 Eurozone  109 evangelization  121 exclusivist  7, 17, 51, 73, 74 extremism  169, 173–4, 177 extremist  107, 131, 169, 174 ideologies  172, 177 faith  4–6, 20–1, 26, 33, 57, 62, 75, 88, 93, 102, 131–2, 135, 143, 145, 164, 181, 192, 194–5, 202, 205, 208 faith-based,  caring  208 social movement  154 fakultet  161 family  5, 18, 23, 42, 138, 143, 156 fanaticism  98–9, 180 fasting  103, 175 fatwa  18 February  28 process  45 feminist environmentalism  43 fiqh  5, 134, 143 First Constitutional Period  69 first generation Islamists  68, 69 First Meshrutiyet  69 folk songs  40 foreign policy  124 foreign service  56 forgiveness  152 former Islamists  81, 168 former Soviet  53, 160, 161, 165 free market  76, 104 free political association  202 free will  22 freedom  9, 12, 20, 22, 42, 49, 58, 62, 76, 100, 112, 115, 121, 139, 152, 191, 193, 200–1, 210, 216 freedom of belief  12, 22, 192–3 freedom of religion  49, 62, 100, 139, 216 French  18, 38, 56, 59, 75, 197 government  38 laicism  18 fundamentalist  27, 132, 141, 146

237

Gandhian Chipko activists  7, 43 Gandhian Chipko movement  35–9, 41 Gelenekçiler  74 gende  49, 77, 119–20, 163, 196 German  100, 116, 121 Christian democracy  100 global opportunity structures  67 Global South  207 globalization  2, 9, 48, 58, 61, 76–8, 88, 97, 101, 103–7, 134, 141 golden age  20 golden generation  44, 159, 181 governance  8, 10, 20, 21–2, 30, 42, 137, 169–70, 179 government  9, 11, 18, 20–1, 23, 27, 40, 42, 48, 59–60, 68–9, 72, 76, 78, 85, 93, 98–9, 109, 111, 119, 124, 135–6, 151, 156, 159, 165–7, 169, 171, 197, 202 grassroots  12, 80, 172, 176–8, 193, 195, 200, 203, 207–8 Greater Middle East Initiative  60 Gujral  42 Gülen-inspired schools  80, 154, 155, 157, 163–4, 166, 177 habitus  7, 34–5, 38–9, 43, 46, 212 hadith  133, 144, 149 hajj  147 Halalbihalal functions  175 Hamidian  70 Hanafi/Sunni  19 Haqiqa  146–8 headscarf ban  45, 62, 99 headscarves  100, 161 Hebrew  181 Helsinki European Council  113 hicret  88–9 see also hijrah hidden agenda  91, 113, 200 hierarchical structure  145 hijrah  88, 182 see also hicret hill communities  40 himmet  32, 88–9 Hindu  20, 170, 175, 182 prophets  20 temples  175 historical Islam  21 historicism  22

238

TOPIC INDEX

hizmet  5, 7, 11, 15, 25, 32, 34, 43, 110, 112, 118–21, 154, 156–8, 166, 178, 182, 183, 209, 211 hizmet school  155, 158, 160, 182–8, 191 hocaefendi  155 homo economicus  88–9 honour killings  119 human,  guidance  145 intercession  145 psyche  149 rights  4, 10, 12, 20, 62, 64, 68, 74–6, 93, 99, 108, 111, 116–19, 130, 133–5, 137–9, 192–3, 197–9, 201–4, 207–8, 215–16 souls  147 humanitarian  5 hyper-secularists  21 ideal human  45 idealism  33 identity  2, 8, 32–4, 36–7, 46, 49–50, 52, 54, 58, 72, 77, 108, 124, 132, 144, 161, 195, 209 politics  2 identity movements  36 ideological  3, 28, 47–8, 50–1, 54, 62, 64, 90, 115, 141, 169, 174, 202 counter-narrative  179 ideologies  79, 132, 174, 216 ideologization  2, 169 ideology  2, 8, 19, 35, 49, 54, 72, 100, 117, 132, 159, 169, 202 iftar  52, 72, 175 ignorance  4, 43, 45 ihsan  21 ijtihad  5, 16, 21–2, 57, 142, 195 Ikhwani Islamists  78 ilm  145, 150 laduni  145 l-ta’assi  150 imam  3, 25, 73 imams  25 iman  21 immigrants  3, 4 imperialism  69, 110 imperialist powers  79 Independence War  2 independent judgment  57

independent reasoning  16, 21–2 Indian  24, 117, 212 indigenous  41–3, 68 individual responsibility  22 individualism  92–4 individualist  83 Indonesian  31, 95, 170–6 Islam  170, 175 infaq  137 instrumentalist  36, 74 instrumentality  37 instrumentalization  2, 49, 121, 169, 202 intellectual elite  68 intellectuals  47, 48, 53, 55–6, 58, 60–2, 79, 81, 91, 143, 161 intelligentsia  60, 69 intercultural dialogue  4, 6 interfaith  2, 3, 4, 6, 51, 53, 94, 178, 197 interfaith dialogue  51, 92, 123, 140 interfaith prayer  53 international  12, 85, 119, 183, 186–7, 213 institutions  85 law  23, 203 relations  97, 195 terrorism  129 Turkish Olympiads  205 internationalist  116 interpretation of Islam  2, 57, 132 inter-religious activities  179 inter-religious dialogue  26, 97, 106–7 inter-religious initiatives  144 intolerant  73 intra-Muslim dialogue  175 Iranian  170–1, 199 Iranian model  170 Iranian Revolution  170–1 Iraqi  56 Iraqi Kurds  61 irshad  145 işadamı  156 isik  25 isik evler  25 see also lighthouse Islam  1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 16–23, 26, 32–3, 43, 45, 49, 57–60, 62, 68–70, 74–8, 82–5, 88–9, 91–5, 97–9, 103, 105, 107, 114–15, 117, 120–3, 129–52, 157–8, 163–4,

TOPIC INDEX 166, 168–70, 174, 176, 178–9, 195, 199–202, 204, 209–11, 213 by product  32 de marché  9, 106 and democracy  31, 100, 135–6 and modernity  80 and secularism  57–8, 91 Islamic  2–3, 5, 7–11, 15–26, 30–1, 45, 51, 57–8, 67–9, 71–3, 75–6, 78–86, 88–90, 92, 94–107, 111, 113–14, 116, 118, 120–2, 129–37, 139, 141–2, 147–9, 153–4, 156–8, 164, 167–9, 170–3, 175–7, 180–2, 202, 206, 213, 216 activism  83 activities  79, 81 bourgeoisie  99, 101–4 brotherhoods  72 business elite  75 businessmen  102, 107 Caliphate  168 civil society  67 civilization  98, 141, 210 college  25 communities  79–80 community  21, 80, 175 conscience and reasoning  195 consciousness  69 country  131 culture  23, 69, 104, 131, 196, 214–15 Defence Pact  99 discourse  81, 122, 196 ethos  9 extremists  141 factions  103 foundation  68, 129 groups  8, 45, 67, 80–1, 83–4, 86, 94–5, 120, 122, 168, 171, 196 ideas  130, 211 identity  73, 182 inspiration  215 institutions  104 intellectual elite  103 interpretation  134, 141 jurisprudence  5, 139 law  86, 98, 201 laws  168, 170–2 leaders  23, 26, 122, 196 learning  195

239

message  92 middle classes  79 and modern democratic liberal values  139 modernism  2, 214 modernist  16, 78 monotheism  84 movement  9, 15, 82, 97, 100, 102, 104, 210 movements  31, 82, 84–5, 94–5, 156, 209, 211 nation  19 perspective  68, 83, 94, 118 principle  22, 136 principles  10, 90, 102, 129, 134–5, 142 private schools  183, 185 project  141 radicalism  111 reform  214 remedy  136 rule  136 rules  23 scholar  3, 102, 192–4, 197, 211, 215–16 scholarship  57, 81, 214 sciences  193 social movement  8 societies  130, 132 sources  76, 114 spiritual ideals  158 spiritual vision  147 state  23, 51, 58, 69, 73, 76, 97–8, 168–9 strategy  141 system  170 teachings  83, 177 terms  201 theology  30 thought  25, 129–30, 134, 141, 168, 170–1, 206, 210, 212, 214 traditionalists  114 traditions  134 understanding  131, 195, 199 unity  69 values  102, 134, 141, 154, 157 world  22, 88, 96, 131, 157 Islamically inspired movement  210–11, 216 Islamic-oriented organizations  99

240

TOPIC INDEX

Islamisation  106 Islamism  2, 3, 7, 8, 15, 17, 19, 67, 69–70, 73–6, 78–81, 115, 169, 171, 176–7, 213–14 Islamist  2, 8–9, 15, 19, 21, 23, 27, 59–60, 67, 69–81, 84, 98–9, 101–2, 105–7, 168, 171, 176, 209–10 agendas  168 bourgeoisie  102 businessmen  102 discourse  73, 77 groups  168, 171–2 ideas  171 ideologies  177 ideology  168 intellectuals  79 movements  15, 171, 209–10 parties  77–80, 169, 176 party  168 political parties  168, 170 political thought  214 politics  101 rhetoric  81 struggle  210 thinkers  211 transformation  73 Islamists  2, 5, 10, 19, 23, 45, 68, 69–71, 74–80, 99–103, 113, 120 Islamization  97, 99, 141 Islamization of Europe  121 Israeli  56 istikhraj  16, 21 Jacobin  73 jamal  150 Jesuit  32 Jewish  26, 53, 60, 122, 181 schools  26 Jews  20, 51, 53 Jihadism  145–6 jihadist/s  120, 151 journalists  56 jurisprudence  43, 195 justice  8, 19, 53, 90, 97, 100, 109, 135 kafir  120 Kavakçı affair  45 Kemalism  21

Kemalist/s  17, 19, 52, 54, 60, 63, 70, 98, 101, 105, 111, 114, 117, 180 establishment  74 khadi  40 Khalidi  71 Khilafah  98 knowledge  4, 5, 10, 21, 32–3, 41–3, 54, 130, 137, 139, 143, 146, 150, 157, 164, 180–1, 185, 200–1 Koran  22 see also Qur’an Kurdish  48, 56, 59–61, 90, 118–19, 212 Kurds  61 Kyrgyz-Turkish schools  167 laïc  99, 101, 105 laicist,  establishment  67, 78 rhetoric  70 laïcité  62, 197 Lausanian Islam  17 law  5, 10, 16–17, 19, 21, 39, 42–3, 58, 62, 80, 88–9, 111, 117, 130, 135, 145–6, 166, 200–3 law and order  10, 132 leader of the Türkmen  159 leftists  103 legislature  18, 70 liberal  28, 48, 61–3, 69, 75–6, 81–2, 84–6, 88, 90, 92–5, 114, 134–5, 141, 171 democracy  93, 135, 210 democratic  92, 210 economic system  83 environment  92 Islam  169, 176 Islamic groups  94, 168, 176 liberalism  9, 82–5, 90, 94, 95, 103 liberalist reforms  69 liberalization  8–9, 82–6, 88, 90, 92, 94–5, 213 lighthouses  25 see also isik evler lira  85 lise  160 lodges  71 lost generation  159  love  19, 20, 34, 44–6, 88, 97, 107, 149–50, 199–200 ma“rifah  21 Maastricht Treaty  111

TOPIC INDEX madrasa/s  144, 180 mainstream Christians  29 Majapahit Empire  178 majoritarian  22 majorities  216 makarim al-akhlaq  145 mana boyutlu demokrasi  93 market economy  75, 76, 83, 95 market Islam  106 martyr  138 Marxists  38, 103 mashwarat  137 maslaha  152 materialistic  151 media  11, 15, 17, 25–6, 28–9, 31, 48, 52–3, 55–6, 73, 80–1, 86–7, 91, 94, 97, 104–7, 120, 146, 155, 159, 197, 207 Medialog  53 meditation  143, 194 mekteb education  157 mercy  20, 152 Messenger of God  138 Messiah  93 metaphysics  43, 45, 139 Methodist  26 middle class/es  2, 19, 80, 156, 183, 185–9 Middle Eastern  2, 61, 121, 214 Middle Eastern Islamists  2, 76 middle way Islam  215 migration  116, 182 militant Islamists  100 military  10, 17–18, 45, 48, 58–9, 63, 69, 72–3, 90, 99, 101, 105, 108, 110, 112, 116–18, 212 coup  72 coups  10, 108, 117 dictatorships  118 intervention  72, 112 rule  117 military-secularist establishment  101 milli  51 minorities  22, 106, 202, 204, 216 minority  1, 12, 49, 54, 62, 118–19, 163, 178, 216 communities  22 rights  99 missiology  143 mixed-race  184

241

Model C school  184–7, 190 moderate Islam  46 moderate Islamist political parties  179 moderation  9, 71, 78, 97, 100–1, 105, 177 modern,  education  215 legal systems  139 scientific understanding  194 scientific world  158 values  68 world  3, 11, 132, 208 modernist  141, 146, 170, 194, 195 modernity  2, 3, 6, 17, 27, 62, 75–6, 84, 105–7, 114, 144, 147, 166, 193–5, 210 modernization  3, 4, 48, 54, 59–60, 62, 70, 83–4, 134, 209 monotheism  149 moral,  ethos  12 moral values  4, 87, 93, 158, 182–4, 189, 190–1 performance  38, 39, 41–3, 45 morality  8, 32–3, 92, 94, 135, 157, 166, 183 Moroccan  146, 150 Mosque/s  3, 5, 18, 25–6, 26, 150, 163–4, 180 MPs  103 mu’alim  157 multicultural pluralism  196 multiculturalism  2, 59–60, 76 murabbi  157 Muslim  53, 123, 133, 182 activist  173 Arabs  144 census  74 Common Market  72 community leaders  175 countries  105, 115, 130, 170, 173, 201, 206, 212 culture  105 democracy  100 democrat party  77 democrats  97, 107 identity  51, 177 intellectuals  79, 171 majority  60, 84, 179, 216 minorities  2

242

TOPIC INDEX

minority  182 polity  5, 83 renewal  103 societies  84, 130, 166, 202–4, 207, 209–10, 213 society  137, 141, 145 thinkers  11, 135 world  1, 2, 7, 10, 12, 15–17, 25, 27, 31, 33, 43, 45, 48, 60, 71–2, 82, 84, 95, 107, 125, 129–30, 133–5, 137–42, 145, 169, 171, 176, 178–9, 193, 196, 204, 207–8, 211–16 Muslim-majority countries  96 Muslim-majority societies  12, 192, 202, 203 Muslims  1, 4–8, 10, 12, 17–18, 20–1, 33, 43, 45, 57, 60, 69, 71, 74, 77, 82–4, 88–9, 93–5, 98–9, 114, 117, 121, 131–3, 137, 140, 144–50, 158, 169, 172, 174–9, 202, 208 müspet hareket  46 Nakhshbandi  2, 24, 71, 79 national identity  112 national security  62 nationalism  70–2, 75, 212 nationalist  10, 40, 69, 70, 108, 114, 116, 178, 213 nationalistic  154–5 nationhood  70 nation-state  2 neocolonialism  110 neo-Islamist groups  168 neutral secularism  21 neutral state  207 neutrality  20 new elite  2, 80 new generation  80, 181 new human  44, 45 new social movements (NSM)  36 newspaper publishing  28 newspapers  27–9, 48, 102, 164, 205, 206 NGOs  15, 27, 30, 106 nominalism  70 non-  Islamist  16, 77, 210 Muslim  6, 17, 26, 70, 77, 151, 167, 174–5, 182, 193, 202

Muslims,  117, 133, 144, 174, 179, 195–6 Turkmen  159 violent  7, 36, 39–40, 42–3, 45, 171 violent activism  7 violent resistance  36, 39 Western  214 normative frameworks  8, 67 Norwegian  121 NSM theory  37 Nurcu,  communities  25 movement  24 observant Muslims  68, 102 Olympiads  189, 205 one-party rule  70 Operation Iraqi Freedom  60 operational code  71 Ottoman  3, 8, 27, 67–9, 71–2, 79, 114, 152 disempowerment  69 elite  68 Empire  53, 98, 110, 116, 123 establishment  71 history  117, 152 Islamist identity  70 Muslim  3 rule  152 rulers  68–9 state  68 Ottomanism  70 Ottomanist-Islamist identity  70 Padri Wars  170 Pancasila  176 parliament  56, 69, 90 passive secularism  71, 77 peace  4, 5, 20, 43, 52–4, 59, 61, 92, 112–13, 133, 140, 174, 193, 199, 216 peaceful coexistence  6, 81 People of the Book  20 Persian  24, 206 personal Islam  115, 201 philanthropic  7, 16, 17 piety  22, 88, 106, 133, 156 pillars of Islam  5, 21, 93, 130 pluralism  16, 19, 31, 48, 52, 54, 58, 70, 91–4, 134, 140, 192, 195, 197

TOPIC INDEX pluralist  48, 63, 76, 83, 184, 202 culture  207 pluralist society  76 pluralistic society  93, 182 pluralistic understanding of Islam  172 poet  3, 24, 193 polemical arguments  141 political  2–5, 8–11, 15, 18–19, 21–2, 28, 30, 35–7, 39–40, 43, 47–51, 54–5, 57, 59–64, 68, 71, 73–7, 79–80, 82–7, 90–5, 97–8, 102, 109–12, 117, 123–5, 129–32, 134–5, 137–9, 141–2, 144, 151–2, 154–6, 168, 171, 175, 195–6, 197, 200, 202, 204, 209, 213 constitutions  203 extremism  129 goals  10, 132–3 ideology  159 institutions,  68 Islam  79, 97, 101–2, 104, 170–1, 179, 197 Islamism  45 Islamist  43 liberalization  83, 85, 90–1, 94 movement  83 participation  90 parties  49, 56, 59, 72, 91 reform  134, 209 structures  35, 94 thought  151–2 transition  2 tyranny  146 politicians  1, 48–50, 55–7, 80, 90–1, 94, 99, 102, 107, 197 politics  2, 4, 7–9, 12, 20–2, 43, 48–9, 51, 58–9, 62, 73–7, 84, 91–2, 95, 97, 107–8, 111–13, 121, 129, 131, 133–4, 146, 151, 159, 169–70, 195, 209, 214–15 polities  2, 118 Pope  6, 122 popes  152 positive action  46 positivist  20, 70, 115 post-  9/11  210 Communist Europe  111 Islamism  2, 8, 75, 77, 168

243

Islamist  16, 19, 73, 75, 170, 176, 213, 214 Islamist intellectuals  76, 81 Islamist party  73 Islamist politics  16 modern coup  73, 79 Ottoman  144, 149 Second World War  110 Soviet  159 postmodern  111, 196 poverty  4, 43, 45, 204, 207 prayer  24, 29, 103, 119, 137, 194 praying  24, 194 preaching by example  33 Presbyterian  26 prescribed prayers  137 president  52, 91, 96, 110, 155, 159, 165 prime minister  19, 72, 85, 91–2, 99–100, 120, 154 private life  23 private school/s  12, 87, 154, 160, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 190 privatization  76 privatized  85 progressive  8, 11, 16, 19–20, 28, 171, 179, 210–11, 213, 215–16 Islamic ideas  211 Islamic intellectuals  211 pro-Islamic,  businessmen  99, 107 intellectual elite  103 organizations  97 property  89, 93, 136, 138, 139, 198 Prophet, The  22, 24, 27, 68, 89, 138, 143, 144, 148, 150, 206 Prophet’s sayings  138 prophetic methodology  152 Prophetic traditions  199 prophets  5, 44, 74 protection of minorities  111 Protestant  17, 23 Protestantism  29, 103 proto-liberalism  69 pro-Western  23, 75, 168, 196 Prussian Constitution  69 psychology  186 psycho-spiritual  149 public education  164, 180–1 public policy  48

244

TOPIC INDEX

public schools  160, 181, 183, 185–7 public service movement  193 public sphere  2, 7–9, 17, 30, 47–9, 52, 62, 70, 95, 196, 204 publishing  15, 25–7, 53, 162, 206 Pulitzer prizes  29 puritans  17, 175 Qadiri  24 Quaker  17 Qur’an  5, 10, 16, 20–1, 23–4, 44, 68, 98–9, 107, 131, 133, 136–8, 143, 148–50, 152, 176, 199–200, 204 see also Koran Qur’anic,  perspective  143 school  25 teaching  147 rabbaniyya  147 race  70, 138, 191 radical  9, 15–16, 69, 71, 77, 85, 97, 100, 107, 141, 176 extremist Muslims  131 groups  172, 174 Islamism  176 Islamist  73, 169, 170 Islamist groups  179 Islamist ideology  169 Islamist thought  172 Islamists  16 leftists  118 radicalism  141 radicalization  70 radicalized  2, 78 rahma  152 Ramadan fast-breaking  72, 197 Rational choice theory  35 rational scientific enquiry  26 reactionary  2, 79 reactionary Islamism  2 reactionary radicalism  2 real Turks  70 reconciliation  45–6, 54, 58, 63, 92–3 reductionist  37 reformed Sufism  145–6, 150 reformist  9, 38, 69, 78, 170 religio-cultural  195 religion  15, 31, 49, 50, 58 religion and science  88

religion and state relations  31 religiosity  75, 115, 144–53 religious  1, 4, 5, 7–12, 16–22, 25–7, 29–30, 32, 43, 45, 47, 48–51, 53–4, 56, 58, 62, 67, 69–70, 72–3, 76–8, 83–4, 88, 91, 95, 97, 100–1, 105, 108–10, 116, 118–23, 132–3, 143, 145, 147, 150, 152, 156–7, 169–71, 173–5, 177, 195–7, 206, 213, 215 affiliations  76 art  150 authority  145 beliefs  9, 105, 169 believing  207 belonging  197 caring  202 culture  106, 154 doctrine  88 dynamics  8, 67 education  18, 180 experience  145 freedom  98, 100, 161 goal  146 groups  48–9, 51, 79 hymns  41 identities  182 identity  105, 197, 212 institutions  201 instruction  26, 156, 180 knowledge  180 learning  194 Leninism  115 liberty  93 life  24, 27, 202 magazines  26 minorities  98 motivations  121 movement  27 movements  106 obligation  195 organizations  9, 18 people  87, 100 persuasion  198 philanthropy  211, 216 practice  62, 164 publications  27 publishing  26 rhetoric  74 sermons  87

TOPIC INDEX state  15 tolerance  100 tradition/s  198–9 training  201 values  7, 16, 20, 87, 130 religious-conservative businesspeople  97 religiously observant  79 renewal  6, 16, 107, 124, 195 renewalist discourse  76 renewalists  74 renewed Islam  69 renewers  76 republic  18, 54 Republic  2–3, 11, 59–60, 72, 110 Republican  69–70, 78 Republican Kemalist elite  70 Republican period  69 re-secularize  75 revelation  30, 57, 136–7, 148, 194 revivalist movement  145 Risale-i Nur  24–5, 27 Ruhnama  159, 163 rule of law  58, 111, 115, 201, 208 see also law and order rural  16, 18–19, 24, 42, 79, 98, 173, 195 rural communities  18 Russian  53, 155, 159–61, 163 sacralization  62 sadaqah  203 saints  145 Salafist ‘reformers’  78 salat  137 salt  40, 41 salvation  33 sarvodaya  40 satya  34 satyagraha  7, 34, 39, 46 Saudi funding  171 Saudis  171 schismatics  199 scholarships  5, 161, 174, 185 schools  3–5, 11–12, 15, 26–7, 51, 62, 68, 80–1, 88–9, 92, 94, 100, 102, 105, 107, 119, 154–67, 174–6, 181–2, 187, 205, 208, 214 science  3, 5, 11, 26, 31–3, 80, 88, 97, 137, 139, 143, 146, 148–50,

245

180–3, 185–6, 188–9, 193, 205, 215 Scientific knowledge  32, 180 scriptural  147 scriptures  75 Second Meshrutiyet  70 sectarian  29, 30, 151, 197, 213 sectarian conflict  151 secular  2, 3, 5, 8–11, 20–1, 25, 27, 30, 42, 50–1, 68, 71–2, 76, 79–80, 84, 91, 97–8, 111, 114–15, 117, 120, 123, 163, 165, 169, 173, 175, 180–2, 184, 190, 195–6, 202, 210 countries  169 curriculum  26 elite  84 elites  84, 107 enlightenment  164 establishment  101 learning  5 liberal  182 media  27 nationalists  60 private schools  25 society  15 Soviet education  164 state  71, 75, 118, 169 state establishment  75, 118 states  179 Turks  214 world  216 secularism  3, 8, 11, 18–19, 21, 30, 48, 57–8, 60–2, 67, 72–3, 77, 81, 91, 144, 169, 170, 195, 197, 202, 210 secularist  45, 60, 70 secularists  45, 72 secularity  20 self-sacrifice  33, 40, 50 semi-modernity  84 servanthood  21 service  3, 5, 7, 15–16, 32–3, 43, 49, 62, 88–9, 121, 156, 158, 182, 184, 194–5, 197–9, 204, 207, 215–16 shafa‘a  145 Shakti  42 Shari’a/h  15, 16, 21, 24, 98, 135, 141–2, 146–8 shari’a law  99 Shiite  171

246

TOPIC INDEX

shrine culture  145 shura  137, 195 sin  29, 33, 198 Sledgehammer  112 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)  102 social,  activism  8, 33, 88 capital  8, 48, 50–1, 122 conservatism  2 contract  45, 54, 59, 136 groups  8, 90 justice  4, 48, 51, 99 movement  7, 15–16, 34–9, 46, 83, 107, 210–11 movement activism  38 movement activists  7, 35, 38, 46 movements  18, 35–7, 83, 85, 210–11, 215 reform  107 service  211 state  75 socialism  159 socialist  116 socially conservative  18 socially conservative  18–19, 28, 81 sociocultural  8, 12, 67, 97, 104, 154, 192 socio-economic  4, 51, 84, 87, 184, 189, 195, 204 sociopolitical  60–1 soft,  coup d’état  99 coups  18 Islam  60 soul  43, 139, 143–4, 147–8, 150 South Africans  182, 187 Soviet  3, 11, 159–60, 167 occupation  210 Republics  53 spiritual  29, 32, 42–3, 49, 74, 89, 92–3, 98, 142–4, 146–9, 151, 164, 166, 201 activism  147 crisis  130 development  44 effort  195 exertion  194 growth  164 influence  164 insight  147

knowledge  145 principles  89 reality  150 training  194 transformation  147 virtue  152 spiritualistic  151 spirituality  24, 26, 43–4, 130, 139, 148, 150–1, 163, 176 state  2, 3, 8–9, 11, 15, 17–23, 26, 30, 36, 40, 42, 46, 48–9, 53–4, 56, 58, 60, 62–3, 68, 70–1, 75–6, 78–80, 84, 86–7, 90–5, 98–9, 101, 104, 109, 111, 115, 117–19, 121–2, 124, 136–8, 141, 150, 155, 159–61, 163–7, 169–71, 200, 202 elites  101 imam  25 imams  18 institutions  17 monopolies  104 monopoly  90 power  17, 134 schools  167 state-owned enterprises  85 statesmen  55, 61, 69 state-sponsored schooling  154 statist  90, 94, 104 storytelling  38 strategic non-confrontation  45 structuralist  35 suburbs  19, 186 Sufi  2, 16, 18, 24, 43, 71, 78, 146, 175–6, 204 brotherhoods  71, 176 masters  199 orders  18, 24, 43 thought  103 worldview  72 Sufism  2, 45, 145–6, 149, 176, 193, 206 Sufistic  18, 26 Sultan  68, 70 Sunna/h  5, 16, 20, 23, 68, 98, 99, 148, 150, 199, 200, 204 Sunni  57, 61, 70, 71, 72, 118, 122 Sunni-Alevi  119 swaraj  40, 42 syncretic  170 Syrian  149

TOPIC INDEX Tablighism  144–6 tajdid  12, 16, 103, 107, 192–200, 203–4 ta’lim  157 tarbiyah  157 tarekat  18 temsil  16, 154, 158, 166 terbiye  154, 157–8, 163–4, 166–7 terrorism  117, 120, 131–3, 174, 177 terrorist  6, 38, 133, 151 theology  20, 53, 199, 205 tithing  5 tolerance  6, 16, 19–20, 48, 52, 81, 88, 92–3, 97, 107, 115, 122, 140, 142, 173–4, 179, 182, 199 tolerant  4, 8, 26, 38, 67, 76, 78, 81, 100, 104–5, 167, 179, 199, 208 totalising ideology  16 totalitarian  62 trade unions  79, 90 traditional  Catholicism  27 Islam  176 Islamic culture  215 Muslims  121 religious culture  214 Turkish Islam  216 traditionalists  74, 114, 194 transgressor of boundaries  216 transmitter of knowledge  157 Treatise of Light  24 triple enemies  45 triple monster  43 truth  34, 74, 77, 97, 133, 135, 148 Turkey Great Once Again  74 Turkic  3, 53, 118, 154–5, 167, 204 Turkic republics  3 Turkish  1–4, 6–12, 17–20, 23, 26, 28, 31, 45, 48, 53–4, 56, 58, 60–2, 67–72, 74, 78–9, 82, 84, 85, 87–8, 90, 92, 95–6, 99–101, 103, 106–20, 122, 123–5, 143–4, 149–50, 152, 155, 158, 160–7, 174, 178, 183, 185–6, 188, 204–6, 212–15 brand  205 culture  97, 178, 211 Islamic politics  71 Islamism  2, 8, 67–70, 78–81, 213

247

Islamist  71 Islamists  2, 8, 67, 71, 73, 77–9 laicism  18–19 model  1, 124 Muslim society  211 Muslims  208 nationalist consciousness  69 Puritans  17 Republic  71, 102, 107, 212 school  183 schools  154, 155, 161, 163, 164, 165, 179, 183, 186, 191 secularism  18 security  196 society  31, 45, 180, 192, 195, 212–13, 216 state  18, 48 Turkish-Armenians  77 Turkishness  178 Turkmen  155, 158–67 Türkmenbaş y  159–60 Turkmenification  159 Turkmen-Turkish schools  160 Turks  3, 11, 18, 70, 110, 115, 122–3, 144, 156, 165–6, 182, 199 ulama  3, 69, 193–4 ultimate concern  23 ultra-liberal  172 ulusal  51 ulusalci  60 umma/h  10–11, 43, 144, 146–9, 153 unbeliever  138 unbelievers  93, 138 universal values  23, 76, 99, 160, 174, 179 unjust law  71 upbringing  154, 157, 163 urban  16, 19, 41, 79, 103, 105, 195 urban immigrants  99 Urdu  206 utilitarian  69 utilitarianism  200 utopian vision  45 village  24, 41, 79, 139 violence  38–41, 46, 119, 132, 172, 210, 212 violent  34 virtue  73–5, 80, 100, 102

248

TOPIC INDEX

volunteering  50–1 volunteers  6, 41, 43–4, 156, 194–6, 198, 206, 214 Wahhabism  144–6 walaya  148 war against terrorism  120 War on Terror  62 warathat al-sirr  148 weeping Hodja  194 Welfarist  74 West, The  1, 2, 7, 17, 27, 33, 59, 72–4, 77, 79, 80, 81, 84, 107, 113, 124, 139, 151, 194, 199, 205, 210 Western  3, 7, 9, 17, 22–3, 27, 31, 60–1, 68, 72, 75–8, 84, 95, 100, 105, 120, 123, 130, 134–5, 139, 144, 151, 176, 202, 204, 208, 211 civilization  98, 151 constitutions  69 democracy  98 ideas  68, 79, 193 imperialism  77 institutions  68

perspective  203 philosophy  193 political values  75, 77 societies  84 society  211 tradition  198 Western-democratic  104 Westernization  72 wijdan  149 wisdom  24, 125, 203 women  40, 41, 53, 87, 100, 119–20, 143, 157–8, 164, 173, 196, 204 working-class  98 workshops  48, 53, 57, 61, 91, 185 worship  5, 135, 197, 201 yeni nesil  181 Yenilikci/ler  76 Young Ottomans  68, 69, 70 Young Turk  70 zakah  203 zakat  5, 156 zuhd  18

Authors and Editors Index Where quoted from their work and/or referred to by others in the text of the book, and specifically in these capacities.  Abou e-Fadl, K.  82 Abu-Rabi, I.  43 Agai, B.  15, 19, 25, 88, 114, 120, 122, 156, 181 Agarwal, B.  43 Akkok, F.  164 Akyol, H.  61 Alam, A.  76–7 Ali, M.  54–5, 80, 144, 152, 171–2, 193 Altun, M.  173, 175 Amnesty International  119 Apay, A.  167 Aras, B.  98 Armagan, M.  20 Aydin, M.  53 Bacik, G.  196 Bahuguna, V.  40 Balcı, A.  164 Barkey, H.  79 Barton G.  16 Bayat, A.  75 Benard, C.  194 Bernstein, M.  36–7, 45–6 Bhattacharya, S.  40 Bilici, A.  94 Bölükbaşı, M.  78 Bouma, A.  159 Bourdieu, P.  7, 34, 38–9 Bozkurt, G.  69 Bubalo, A.  171 Çaha, O.  98 Çakır, R.  77

Çalmuk, F.  77 Can, E.  82, 193 Casanova, J.  49, 95 Çınar, M.  77 Cohen, J.  36 Dagi, I.  71, 79 Dahl, D.  93 Davutog˘lu, A.  124 Demir, E.  163–4, 167 Demiralp, S.  75, 101 Dobbin, C.  170 Duran, B.  73, 79–80 Duyvendak, J.  36 Ebaugh, H.  3–5, 51, 89, 156 Ecevit, B.  92 Eisenstadt, T.  101 Erdog˘an, L.  9, 19, 72, 76–7, 100–2, 105, 193 Ergil, D.  51 Esposito, J.  4, 18, 24, 103, 165 Eyerman, R.  37–8, 45 Fataar, A.  183 Fealy, G.  170–1, 177 Ferree, M.  35 Friedman, D.  35 Giugni, M.  36 Goodwin, J.  37 Gow, D.  116 Gözaydın, I.  6 Grinell, K.  5

250

AUTHORS AND EDITORS INDEX

Gül, A.  76, 80, 92, 100, 103 Gülalp, H.  69, 72 Gülen, M. F.  1–13, 15–17, 19–29, 31–9, 43–53, 61, 63–4, 67, 73, 79–83, 85–108, 110, 112–25, 129–40, 142–8, 155–61, 163–70, 172–4, 176–81, 185, 190, 192, 193–216 Gürbüz, M.  45–6 Haenni, P.  9, 106 Harrington, J.  118 Harris, F.  51 Hefner, R.  84 Heper, M.  76 Howe, M.  100 Huntington, S.  84, 140, 210 Islamog˘lu, H.  172 Jamison, A.  37 Jasper, J.  36–8 Jenkins, J.  37 Kalyoncu, M.  158 Karpat, K.  70 Katzenstein, M.  37 Keles, I.  158 Kepel, G.  75 Kösebalaban, H.  196 Koyuncu-Lorasdag˘i, B.  3–4 Kumar, R.  40 Kurtz, L.  4, 24, 45, 161, 194 Kuru, A.  24–5, 57, 63, 67, 74, 76, 79, 80, 92, 98, 104–5, 166, 181 Leur, J.  170 Lewis, B.  82, 121 McAdam, D.  35, 37, 84 McCarthy, J.  37, 68–9 Maigre, M-E.  9, 79–80, 96, 213 Mardin, Ş.  43, 68–9, 71–2, 78, 84 Mayer, J.  155 Mecham, R.  67, 76 Meeker, M.  79 Melucci, A.  36–7 Menon, N.  40 Michel, T.  24–5, 32, 176, 181 Mohamad, Yasien  188

Nasr, S. H.  157 Niýazow, S.  159 Noer, D.  170–1 Norton, A.  90 Öniş, Z.  74, 85 Orhan, Ő.  89 Osman, M.  165, 168, 178 Özbudun, E.  90 Özdalga, E.  158 Parekh, B.  39 Park, B.  185–7, 189–90 Patten, C., Lord  110 Pektaş, Z.  160–1 Polletta, F.  35–8 Purkayastha, B.  42 Putnam, R.  50, 63 Rainsford, S.  120 Ratzinger, Jospeh  122 Riaz, M.  174 Robinson, P.  184 Routledge, P.  42 Roy, O.  70, 75, 168 Rucht, D.  36 Saritoprak, Z.  24, 31, 98–9, 201–2 Schulze, R.  75 Silova, I.  161–2, 167 Smidt, C.  50–1 Smith, T.  71 Stepan, A.  49 Sunar, I.  72 Tanriverdi, A.  112 Tarrow, S.  35–6, 84 Taş, H.  45 Taylor, V.  36 Tibi, B.  84 Tillich, P.  23 Tilly, C.  84 TNS Opinion and Social  112, 116, 124 Tokak, H.  54 Toprak, B.  72 Touraine, A.  36–7 Turam, B.  94, 167

AUTHORS AND EDITORS INDEX Turgut, H.  27, 79, 85, 92, 97, 111, 154, 160 Ugur, E.  47 Ünal, A.  23, 45, 93, 98–9, 117, 158 Uşşak, C.  54 van Dyke, N.  36 Vasiliadis, M.  119 Voll, J.  16, 166, 196 Williams, A.  23, 45, 93, 117, 119, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 158, 186, 201 Woolcock, M.  63

251

Yavuz, M. H.  16–18, 23–5, 28, 32–3, 103, 114–15, 118, 155–6, 158, 165, 196, 201 Yazar, I.  109 Yazıcı, S.  90 Yildirim, E.  71, 73, 76, 77 Yildiz, A.  72–6 Yilmaz, I.  1, 4, 5, 8, 16–18, 21, 30, 67, 70, 76, 79, 121, 135, 142, 166, 169–70, 181, 195–7 Yucel, S.  5 Yurdakul, G.  4 Zald, M.  37

Named Individuals Index Where identified in the text of the book by name or title, other than when quoted or referred to as authors or editors. This includes when quoted in newspaper articles or in other publications of which they are not the named author or editor.  Abduh, Muhammad  170 Abdulhamid II, Sultan  69, 72 Abdullah, Burhanuddin  173 Abraham, Prophet  53 Adam, Prophet  74, 78, 138 Aksu, Abdulkadir  101 Aktay, Yasin  55 Al-Amrani, Hasan  150 Al-Ansari, Farid  144, 146, 149–50 Al-‘Awda, Salman  144 Al-Buti, Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan  149 Al-Dihlawi, Shah Wali Allah  24 Al-Nablusi, Muhammad al-Ratib  144 Al-Najjar, Zaghlul  149 Al-Nasir, Su’ad  152 Al-Nur, Jabal  143 Al-Rahman, Taha ‘Abd  144 Alwi, Haji  172–3 Al-Zuhayli, Wahba  144 Arınç, Bulent  74, 76, 80 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal  17–18 Aydın, Mehmet  53–4, 80 Barton, Greg  1, 3, 6–7, 15, 209–11 Behn, Sarala  42 Benedict XVI, Pope  122 Berdymuhammedow, Gurbanguly  159, 165 Bostancı, Naci  55 Bourdieu, Pierre  7, 34, 38, 39 Breivik, Anders Behring  121 Buddha, The  20

Bulaç, Ali  55 Bush, George W.  96 Çelik, Hüseyin  80 Çiçek, Cemil  80 Clement, Victoria  3, 11, 154, 214 Confucius  20, 45 Çopursan, Ahmet  155, 158, 162 Coşkun, Ali  80 Dahlan, Ahmad  170 Davutoglu, Ahmet  124 Demirel, Süleyman  92 Dostoevsky, Fyodor  193  Ecevit, Bülent  92 Eddy Baker, Mary  29 Edwards, Jonathan  17, 31 Efendi, Muhammed Lufti  24 Efendi, Ramiz  24 Embel, Seýit  158, 165 Emre, Yunus  199 Erbakan, Necmettin  9, 19, 71–8, 81, 98–100, 102 Erdog˘an, Recep Tayyip  9, 19, 72, 74–7, 100–2, 105, 107, 112 Faruqi Sirhindi, Ahmad  24 Gabriel, The Angel  143 Gandhi, Mohandas  7, 34, 39–41, 212 Gül, Abdullah  74, 76, 80, 92, 100, 103 Gülerce, Hüseyin  54

NAMED INDIVIDUALS INDEX Gum‘a, ‘Ali  144, 152 Gurbuz, Mustafa  7, 34 Halid, Mevlanâ  71 Hallstein, Walter  110 Heck, Paul  10–11, 143, 214 Hocaog˘lu, Durmuş  55 Hugo, Victor  193 Huntington, Samuel  140 ‘Ibadi, Ahmad  144, 150 ‘Imara, Muhammad  144 Islamog˘lu, Hakan  172–3 Jesus, of Nazareth  20 Johnson, Samuel  17 Kalla, Jusuf  175 Karaman, Hayreddin  55 Kartiman, Firman  173 Kavakçı, Merve  45 Kayar, Galip  172 Keles, Ozcan  12, 31, 192, 215–16 Khomeini, The Ayatollah  171 Kilinç, Ramazan  82, 213 Kotku, Sheikh Mehmed Zahid  71 Kutan, Recai  73–4, 76 Kuzu, Burhan  80 Lao-Tzu  20 Lutfi Joqan, Isma‘il  150 Maigre-Branco, Marie-Elisabeth  9, 96, 213 Majid, Nurcholish  171 Mehmet II, (The Conqueror), Sultan  74 Misri, Niyazi-i  199 Mohamad, Goenawan  171 Mohamad, Yasien  12, 180, 214 Moses  20 Muhammad, The Prophet  20, 24, 27, 87, 89, 143, 148, 150, 180 Muslih, ‘Abdallah  148 Natsir, Mohammad  171 Nazim, Sheikh  145 Nelson, Thomas  27 Nesli, Altyn  159 Nicholas I’s, Czar  116

253

Nursi, Bediüzzaman Said  4, 20, 24–5, 27, 43, 71, 149, 152, 180 Nyýazow, President Saparmurat  155, 159, 165, 167 Obama, Barack  96 Öktem, Niyazi  55 Osman, Muhammad Nawab  11, 168, 214, 215 Özal, Turgut  27, 79, 85–6, 90, 92, 97, 111, 154, 160 Purkayastha, Badanana  7, 34 Rafi ’a  24 Rahman, Fazlur  171 Ramadan, Tariq  72, 116–17, 119, 123, 144, 147, 149, 197 Ratzinger, Joseph  122 Rehn, Olli  116 Riaz, Mahmud  174 Rida, Muhammad Rashid  144 Rockwell, Norman  27 Rumi, Mevlana Jalal ad-Din  6, 24, 45, 199 Satan  133 Savaş, Nevzat  205 Schiller, Friedrich  193 Shakespeare, William  193 Shariati, Ali  171 Shiva  40, 42 Soeratno, Siti Chamamah  173 Syarifuddin, Aip  173 Sykiainen, Leonid  10, 129, 214 Tekalan, Şerif Ali  54 Tillich, Paul  23 Tokak, Harun  54 Tolstoy, Lev Nikolayevich  193 Tunçay, Mete  53–4 Türköne, Mümtazer  55 Turkyılmaz, Muammer  165 Tursun, Kerim  172 Ugar, Etga  7, 8, 31, 91 Uşşak, Cemal  54 Van Leur, Jacob  170

254

NAMED INDIVIDUALS INDEX

Weber, Max  103 Weller, Paul  6, 9, 12, 23, 108, 209, 213, 214 Wesley, John  17, 31 Wheatcroft, Andrew  110 White, Jenny  98 Woolman, John  17

Yalçıntaş, Nevzat  80 Yeşil, Mustafa  54 Yilmaz, Ihsan  1, 6, 11–12, 16–17, 67, 209, 213 Zaqzuq, Mahmud  144 Zarathustra  20

Organization Index As referred to by name in the text of the book.  Abant Platform  7, 30–1, 47–8, 51, 53–4, 60, 62–4, 80–1, 103, 113, 212–13 ABC  30 see Australian Broadcasting Corporation Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi  8, 19, 109, 214 see AKP and Justice and Development Party  Affinity Inter-Cultural Organization  178 AKP  8, 19, 53, 60, 63, 67, 76–8, 80, 90–1, 97, 100–3, 109, 112, 119, 170, 176–7, 214 see Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi and Justice and Development Party Aksiyon  28, 166 Al-Firdaus Semarang Foundation  173 Al-Irsyad  171 see Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad and Islamic Association for Enlightenment Al Qaeda  210 Asya Finans  86, 161 Asya Kızılcahamam Holiday Village  87 Australian Broadcasting Commission  30 see ABC Australian Intercultural Society  6 Bank Asya  28, 86–8 Başkent Bilim Merkeziniň Baş Ugrukdyryjysy  161, 165 see Başkent Educational Centre Başkent Bilim Şirketi  156 see Bashkent Educational Firm Başkent Educational Centre  158, 161, 165 see Başkent Bilim Merkeziniň Baş Ugrukdyryjysy Başkent Educational Firm  156–60 see Başkent Bilim Şirketi

Başkent Foundation  11 BBC  30, 121 see British Broadcasting Corporation Benadir hospital  207 British Broadcasting Corporation  30, 121 see BBC Catholic World Report, The  26 CHA  28–30 see Cihan News Agency Christian Century, The  26 Christian Science Monitor  29 Christianity  26 Christianity Today  26 Church of Christ, Scientist, The  29 Church of England Newspaper  29 Cihan News Agency  28–30 see CHA D-8  72 see also Developing Eight DA Magazine  53 Dawn  28 DDII  171 see Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia and Indonesian Islamic Predication Council Democratic Party  117, 162 Department of National Education  174 Department of Religious Affairs  18, 25 Developing Eight  72 see D-8 Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia  171 see DDII and Indonesia Islamic Predication Council Dialogue  6, 26, 92, 106, 120, 199 Dialogue Australia Asia  26 Dialogue Eurasia Platform  53 Dialogue Society  6, 120 Die Welt  121

256

ORGANIZATION INDEX

Diocesan College (Cape Town)  187 Dogru Yol Partisi  72, 99 see DYP and Party of the Right Way DYP  72, 99 see Dogru Yol Partisi and Party of the Right Way Ebru  206 ECSC  10 see European Coal and Steel Community EEC  110 see European Economic Community Eerdmans  27 ESI  102–3 see European Stability Initiative EU  10, 23, 54, 59–60, 75, 77, 100, 108–9, 111–13, 115–17, 120, 122–5 see European Union European Coal and Steel Community  110 see ECSC European Commission  110 European Council  111 European Economic Community  110 see EEC European Parliament  113 European Security Initiative  102–3 see ESI European Union  9, 23, 60, 77, 90, 98, 100, 103, 105, 108–14, 116–25, 213 see EU Fatih University  25 Fazilet Partisi  73, 75 see FP and Virtue Party Feza Publications Incorporated  28 Foundation for Kazak-Turkish Education  156, 167 see Kazakh-Türk Eg˘itim Vakfı Fountain  26–7 FP  73–6 see Fazilet Partisi and Virtue Party Gadjah Mada University  173 Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi  30 see JWF and Journalists and Writers Foundation Golkar  175 Guardian, The  28 Guideposts  26 Happiness Party  77, 100 see Saadet Hira  10, 11, 143–4, 146–53, 205, 214

Horizon Education Trust  185 Horizon International School (Johannesburg)  183 Ikhwanul Muslimin  171 see MB and Muslim Brotherhood Imam Hatip schools  18, 25, 80, 100, 107 IMF  85, 86 see International Monetary Fund Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen  99 see Müstakil Sanayici ve İş adamları Derneg˘i and MÜSIAD Indonesian Islamic Predication Council  171 see Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia and DDII Indonesian State Bank  173 Indonesian Ulama Council  172 see Majelis Ulama Indonesia and MUI Inter Varsity Press  27 Intercultural Dialogue Platform  53 Interfaith Alliance  48 International Monetary Fund  85 see IMF International Turkmen-Turk University  154–5 see ITTU Is Anybody There?  31 see Kimse Yok Mu? Isik Publishing  27, 106 Islamic Association for Enlightenment  171 see Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad and al-Irsyad Islamic Union  171 see Persatuan Islam and Persis Ittihat ve Terakki  70 see Union and Progress Party ITTU  155–6, 158, 160, 162–3, 165–6 see International Turkmen-Turk University Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad  171 see Islamic Association for Enlightenment and al-Irsyad Jaringan Islam Liberal  171–2 see JIL and Liberal Islam Network Jemaah Islamiyah  171 JIL  171–2 see Jaringan Islam Liberal Johns Hopkins University  31, 62

ORGANIZATION INDEX Journalists and Writers Foundation  6, 8, 30, 52, 91, 103, 113, 197, 212 see JWF and Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi Justice and Development Party  8, 19, 53, 90, 97, 109, 170, 214 see Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi and AKP  Justice Party  171 see Prosperity Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera and PKS JWF  30–1, 52–4, 58, 61, 91, 103, 113, 119, 197, 212–13 see Journalists and Writers Foundation and Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi Kazakh-Türk Eg˘itim Vakfı  167 see Foundation for Kazak-Turkish Education Kestanepazarı Qur’anic School  3 Kimse Yok Mu?  31, 206–7 see Is Anybody There? Kompas  28, 176 Kurdistan Workers’ Party  119 see PKK and Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan Lashkar Jihad  171 L’Express  38 Liberal Islam Network  171 see Jaringan Islam Liberal and Liberal Islam Network Loyola Press  27 Magtumguly State University  164 Majelis Ulama Indonesia  172 see Indonesian Ulama Council and MUI MB  171, 209, 214 see Muslim Brothehood and Ikhwanul Muslimin Mehtap TV  61, 206 Milli Galkynyş Hereketi  165 see National Revival Movement Milli Gazete  74 Milli Görüş  71, 75–8, 80–1 see National Outlook Movement Milli Nizam Partisi  71 see MNP Millî Selamet Partisi  71 see National Salvation Party and MSP MIT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı)  52 see National Intelligence Agency

257

MNP  71–2 see Milli Nizam Partisi and National Order Party Muhammadiyah  7, 16, 31, 170, 173, 175 MUI  172 see Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Indonesian Ulama Council MÜSIAD  99, 101–3 see Müstakil Sanayici ve İş adamları Derneg˘i and Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen Muslim Brotherhood  2, 15–16, 78, 171, 209 see MB and Ikhwanul Muslimin Muslim Defence Alliance  72 Müstakil Sanayici ve İş adamları Derneg˘i  99 see MÜSIAD and Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessment Nahdlatul Ulama  7, 16, 31, 170 see NU Nakhshbandi Order  71 National Intelligence Agency  52 see MIT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı) National Order Party  71 see Milli Nizam Partisi and MNP National Outlook/View Movement  77 see Milli Görüş National Revival Movement  165 see Milli Galkynyş Hereketi National Salvation Party  71 see Millî Selamet Partisi and MSP National Security Council  73 New Order  171 New York Times, The  28 NU  170, 175 see Nahdlatul Ulama OIC  205, 208 see Organization of the Islamic Conference Öncü  105 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  85 Organization of the Islamic Conference  205 see OIC Panel Ajans  105 Parliamentary Human Rights Commission  90 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera  168 see PKS and Prosperity Justice Party

258

ORGANIZATION INDEX

Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan  119 see PKK and Kurdish Workers’ Party Party of the Right Way  99 see Dogru Yol and DYP PASIAD Indonesia (Pacific Countries Social and Economic Solidarity Association)  173–5, 179 PBS  30 see Public Broadcasting Service Persatuan Islam  171 see Islamic Union and Persis Persis  171 see Persatuan Islam and Islamic Union PKK  119 see Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan PKS  171, 175–7 see Prosperity Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera and Justice Party Prosperity Justice Party  168, 171 see Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS and Justice Party Provincial National Ministry Directorate  166 Public Broadcasting Service  30 see PBS Radikal  63 RAND (Corporation)  194 Refah  9, 72, 98–9, 100, 104, 111 see Welfare Party, RP and Refah Partisi Refah Partisi  72 see Refah, RP and Welfare Party Refahyol  99 Religious Studies College  164 RP  72–4, 76, 78, 101, see Refah, Refah Partisi and Welfare Party Rumi Forum 6 Saadet  100 see Happiness Party Samanyolu  30, 31, 52, 80, 87, 91, 105, 206 Samanyolu Haber  206 Samanyolu Television  30 Sebat  167 Sizinti  26, 28 SMP-SMA Semesta Boarding School  173 Star International  12, 183–8, 191

Star International (Cape Town)  183 Star International (Durban)  183 Star International (Johannesburg)  183 Tablighi Jamaat  144, 210 Times, The  28 Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen  101 see TÜSIAD Turkish Centre  160–1 Turkish Cultural Centre  157 Turkish Review  206 Turkmen Communist Party  159 Türkmen Milli Eg˘itimi  165 Türkmenistan’s Ministry of Education  160 Turkmen-Turkish Boarding School  160 TÜSIAD  101 see Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen TUSKON (Türkiye İş adamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu)  28 Union and Progress Party  70 see Ittihat ve Terakki University of Chicago  171 University of Indonesia  172 University of the Western Cape  186 Vatican, The  6 Virtue Party  73–5, 80, 100 see Fazilet Partisi and FP Welfare Party  19, 59, 72, 80, 99 see Refah, Refah Partisi and RP Westerford High (Cape Town)  187 Western Cape Education Department  187 Women’s Platform  53 World Bank  85 WP  74 see Welfare Party, Refah, Refah Partisi and RP Yenbu Indonesian Foundation  173 Yeni Umit  28 Yumurcak  206 Zaman  28–9, 52, 80, 87, 91, 102–3, 162, 205–6 Zondervan  27

Place Index Of places referred to in the text of the book.  Abant  7–8, 30, 31, 47–8, 51, 54, 57–9, 61–4, 80, 197 Aceh  170, 173, 206 Afghanistan  205 Africa  3, 12, 156, 180, 182, 186, 189, 204, 206, 213 Africa, North  2, 213–14 Albania  92 Algeria  38–9, 205 America  27, 30, 31, 115, 201 see also United States America, North  3, 7, 17, 204 Anatolia  2, 79, 81, 99, 102–3, 193, 200 Ankara  18, 25, 59, 72, 87, 99, 161, 214 Asia  3, 6, 11, 53, 144–5, 154, 165, 204, 213 Asia, Central  25, 28, 156–7, 160–1, 164–5, 186, 204, 207, 214 Asia, South  209–10 Asia, Southeast  170–1 Athlone  183, 185, 188–9 Australia  3, 6, 26, 28, 52, 157, 178 Austria  110, 123, 125 Azerbaijan  28

Cairo  31, 59, 103, 143 Cape Town  12, 182–8 Cape, Western  181 Central Asia  25, 28, 156–7, 160–1, 164–5, 186, 204, 207, 214 Central Asian  11, 92, 154, 160–1 Chattisgarh  42 Constantinople  123 Cyprus, Republic of  111 Darfur  206 Daşoguz  155, 160 Durban  183, 188 Egypt  59–60, 96, 144, 168, 170, 205, 208–10, 214 Erzurum  59 Ethiopia  206 Eurasia  53, 113, 154 Europe  3–4, 6, 8, 10, 52–3, 59, 61, 68, 77, 105, 108–10, 113, 115–18, 120–5, 145, 196, 201, 204, 213 Europe, Western  77, 110 France  38, 59–60, 110, 120

Balkans  3, 156 Bandung  173 Bangladesh  206 Başkent  161 Bayramaly  160, 166 Belgium  58, 110, 120 Boston  29 Britain  21, 30 see also United Kingdom Brussels  31, 58, 103, 113 Bulgaria  28, 111 Büzmeýn  160

Gauteng  181 Gaziantep  59 Germany  28, 110, 125, 196 Haiti  206 Himalayas  40–2 India  40 Indonesia  7, 11, 16, 28, 84, 168–78, 205–6, 210, 214 Iran  78, 99, 171, 202, 204–5, 209

260

PLACE INDEX

Iraq  59–60 Iraqi Kurdistan  61 Istanbul  9, 18, 25–8, 53, 59, 72, 74, 99, 100, 120, 122, 143, 162, 212–13 Italy  110 Izmir  3, 18, 25 Izmit  59 Jakarta  173, 177 Java  173 Java, West  170 Johannesburg  183, 188 Jordan  205 Karnataka  42 Kayseri  102–3 Kazakhstan  28, 155–6, 167 Kenya  206 Kerki  160 Kestanepazari  25 Konya  74 Korucuk  24 Kyrghizistan  28 Kyrgyzstan  156–7, 167 Könýaürgenç  160, 166 Lebanon  205–6 Libya  99, 210 London  6, 28 Luxembourg  110 Macedonia  28 Malaysia  179, 205 Mary  160 Massachusetts  29 Mauritania  205 Mecca  89, 143, 170 Medina  89 Mediterranean  18, 25 Melbourne (Australia)  6 Middle East  1–3, 8, 10, 53, 59–61, 96, 103, 120, 145, 206, 213–14 Morocco  144–5, 152, 205 Moscow  103 Mount of Light  143 Myanmar  206 Nebitdag  160 Netherlands  110 New Jersey  26

Newlands  186 Niger  206 North Africa  2, 213–14 North America  3, 7, 17, 204 Pacific  6 Pacific, South  206 Pakistan  78, 205–7 Palestine  206 Paris  9, 31, 59, 103, 110 Philippines, Southern  179 Portugal  118 Princeton  121 Republic of Cyprus  111 Romania  28, 111 Rondebosch  186 Russia  53, 105, 158 Santhal Parganas  42 Saudi Arabia  144, 148, 171, 204–5 Semarang  173 Somalia  206–7 South Africa  181–4, 186, 190–1, 214 South Asia  209–10 South East Asia  170–1 South Pacific  206 Southern Philippines  179 Southern Sulawesi  170 Southern Thailand  179 Soviet Union  3, 118, 159–61, 204 Spain  53, 118 Sudan  78, 205 Sulawesi, Southern  170 Sumatra, West  170 Sybrand Park  185–7, 189–90 Sydney  178 Syria  96, 144, 152, 205 Tangerang  173 Tejen  160, 166 Thailand, Southern  179 Tunisia  96, 168, 210 Turkey  1–4, 6, 8–10, 12, 16–18, 21, 23–6, 28, 43, 45, 47–8, 51–4, 57–63, 70, 72, 74, 76–7, 79–80, 82–7, 89–2, 94–5, 97–8, 100–2, 104–6, 108–14, 116–25, 160–1, 169–70, 172–4, 176–7, 180, 186, 192, 194–7, 203, 205–8, 212–14

PLACE INDEX Turkmenistan  11, 28, 154–6, 158–65, 167, 196 Uganda  206 United Kingdom  6, 120, 145 see also Britain United States  8, 28, 48, 52–3, 58, 60–2, 74, 106, 118, 186, 196 see also America Uzbekistan  167

Vienna  110, 123 Washington, DC  6, 31, 58, 60, 103 West Java  170 West Sumatra  170 Western Cape  181 Western Europe  77, 110 Yemen  205, 210 Yogyakarta  173

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