The Muslim Question in Assam and Northeast India 9780367429676, 9780367752941, 9781003000488

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THE MUSLIM QUESTION IN ASSAM AND NORTHEAST INDIA

This book presents a systematic study of the transformation of the specific socio-political identity of Muslims in Assam. It discusses the issues of Muslims under India’s ‘indigenous secularism’, Hindu nationalism and the rise of majoritarian politics; Muslim immigration into Assam after independence; the Assam Movement and the shift of Muslims from being a vote bank to an autonomous force in the post-Partition politics of Assam; the role of Jamiat; and the divide between the Assamese and the neo-Assamese. It explores the history and contemporary politics of the state to show how they shape the new context of Muslim identity in Assam, where previously an Assamese identity often prevailed over religious and linguistic identity. With the current debates on illegal immigration, the National Register of Citizens of India (NRC) and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019, this book will be a timely addition to the existing literature on Muslim minority politics in Assam and northeast India. This book will be useful to scholars and researchers of political science, sociology, political sociology, minority studies, northeast India studies, demography and immigration studies, and development studies. It will interest those concerned with minority politics, communal politics, identity politics, migration, citizenship issues and South Asian studies. Monoj Kumar Nath is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Dibrugarh University, Assam, India. He previously taught at Nowgong College, Nagaon, Assam (2003–19). He received his postgraduate degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and completed his PhD from Gauhati University, Assam. His publications include research papers in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Strategic Analysis, Studies in Indian Politics and Dialogue Quarterly. His areas of interest include minority politics, ethnic politics in northeast India and identity politics.

THE MUSLIM QUESTION IN ASSAM AND NORTHEAST INDIA

Monoj Kumar Nath

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Monoj Kumar Nath The right of Monoj Kumar Nath to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this book are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher. The analyses, interpretations, data and figures based on research material are intended here to serve general educational and informational purposes and not obligatory upon any party. The author has made every effort to ensure that the information presented in the book was correct at the time of press, but the author and the publisher do not assume and hereby disclaim any liability with respect to the accuracy, completeness, reliability, suitability, selection and inclusion of the contents of this book and any implied warranties or guarantees. The author and publisher make no representations or warranties of any kind to any person, product or entity for any loss, including, but not limited to special, incidental or consequential damage, or disruption alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by omissions or any other related cause. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-42967-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-75294-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-00048-8 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by SPi Global, India

To my wife Santana and daughter Saranya

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CONTENTS

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Abbreviations Acknowledgements Introduction: The Muslim question in India’s northeast 1 Muslims in Assam till independence

1 15

2 After independence: Social and political alliance of Muslims 49 3 The Assam Movement: Muslims as the issue

75

4 After Assam Movement: Muslim political mobilisation and demographic change

100

5 The divides: Electoral dominance, citizenship and the idea of ‘Assamese’

142

Conclusion: The question of identity among the Assam Muslims

166

Bibliography Index

178 187

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAMSU AASU ABVP AGP AIUDF ASS AUDF BJP BPF CAA CRPC GASS IM(DT) MLA MP NRC RSS SCs STs UMFA

All Assam Minority Students’ Union All Assam Students’ Union Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad Asom Gana Parishad All India United Democratic Front Asom Sahitya Sabha Assam United Democratic Front Bharatiya Janata Party Bodo Peoples Front Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 Citizens’ Rights Preservation Committee Ganatantrik Adhikar Sangram Samiti Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 Member of Legislative Assembly Member of Parliament National Register of Citizens Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Unisted Minority Front, Assam

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Before independence, like many other regions of British India, Assam’s politics was heavily influenced by the Muslim League because of the state’s then administrative set-up and population strength of Muslims. In the post-independence period, however, the Assam Muslims remained unique to their counterparts living in other parts of India for several reasons. The perennial controversy of Muslim immigration from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh, the issues of high population growth among Muslims, the Assam Movement, citizenship issues like Doubtful voter and recent up-gradation of NRC etc. have made the Muslims living in Assam an exception from their counterparts. The community, during this period, has even drawn the attention of the international community on several occasions. However, the Muslim issue in the politics of Assam has not received the academic attention it deserves until now. The Muslim question in Assam is peculiar. The Assamese Muslims are always considered as a community more Assamese than Muslim. The immigrant Muslims of Brahmaputra valley became the Assamese by sacrificing their language and culture. The liberal Assamese society accepted the Muslims as an integral part of Assamese nationality. Assam emerged as a place inhabited by kind and humanistic people in a secular liberal society. It became an example of Hindu-Muslim unity in South Asia. But in recent times, it has become apparent that these communities that were once fused together are now divided, disrespectful and almost hateful towards one another. It seems, in Assam, as though the Assamese people are increasingly becoming ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’ by abandoning their secular Assamese identity. This book is a modest attempt to understand the Muslim question in the politics of Assam during the post-independence period. While it shows the journey of the Assam Muslims in the politics of the state since the colonial period, at the same time it traces the growing divides between the Hindus and Muslims in recent decades. In this attempt, any error of fact or interpretations of this book remains mine alone. I must take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the people who supported and helped me in my endeavour to publish this book. I would ix

A cknowledgements

like to thank Professor Sandhya Goswami (Retired) of Gauhati University, Guwahati who supervised my PhD research. Professor Bhupen Sharma of Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development (OKDISCD), Guwahati deserves sincere gratitude for his constant inspiration and critical inputs on the initial draft of this book. I am grateful to Dr. Joydeep Baruah of OKDISCD, Dr. Chandan Kumar Sarma of Dibrugarh University, Dibrugarh, Professor Pulin Patgiri of Assam Agriculture University, Jorhat, and Dr. Ananya Hiloidari of Nowgong College, Nagaon for going through some of the manuscripts and offering valuable suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge the generous support and advice I have always received during the writing of my book from Dr. Sanjay Barbora of Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Guwahati, Dr. Rubul Patgiri of Gauhati University, Dr. Dibyajyoti Dutta, Dr. Obja Borah Hazarika and Dr. Palash Dutta of Dibrugarh University, Dr. Nabaprasad Nath, Kularanjan Bhuyan, Dr. Sangita Bora, Dr. Pallabi Goswami and Dr. Ranjit Kr. Mazindar of Nowgong College, Dr. Sonaram Nath of A.D.P College, Nagaon, Dr. Kishore Sarmah of Nowgong Girls’ College, Nagaon, and my friends Dr. Nilotpal Borooah, Dr. Mahananda Pathak and Hemanta Saikia. My deepest gratitude to my caring and supportive wife, my little daughter and close family members for sharing some of the stress and strains while writing the book. Finally, I sincerely thank Routledge for agreeing to publish my manuscript. I am thankful to Dr. Shashank S. Sinha, Antara Ray Chaudhury, Shloka Chauhan and Rimina Mohapatra at Routledge for their kind help at different stages of this work.

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INTRODUCTION The Muslim question in India’s northeast

Muslims started to settle in Assam at the beginning of the thirteenth century CE. In the seventeenth century, Shihabuddin Talish, a writer who accompanied Mir Jumlah, the governor of Bengal, on his invasion of Assam during 1662–63, wrote about the local Muslims of Assam who had been taken prisoner in former times and had chosen to marry and settle here: ‘Their descendants act exactly in the manner of the Assamese than towards association with Muslims’ (Gait 2004: 141). This indicates that Muslims living at that time in Assam were more Assamese and less Muslim. This is still the general impression of the Assamese Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley. But after two and a half centuries of this portrayal of the Assamese Muslims by Shihabuddin Talish, during the final years of India’s freedom struggle they had largely rallied behind the Muslim League for the creation of Pakistan, opposing the Assamese people. In contrast, the Muslims who had immigrated from East Bengal in huge numbers under the patronage of the colonial administration – already becoming a large community in Brahmaputra valley by the time of independence – became Assamese after independence by accepting the Assamese language as their mother tongue. This was a rare situation that a large community accepted the language and culture of the place where they had recently settled by discarding their language and culture. However, almost four decades later, they started to dissociate from the Assamese language. Consequently, since the 1991 census the number of Assamese speakers in Assam has started to decline. The aforementioned situations indicate two time periods (till independence and after independence), two groups of Muslims (Assamese and immigrants) and a process of dissociation from the idea of Assamese. In both situations, the Muslims assimilated with the Assamese language and culture and then they dissociated themselves from the idea of Assamese. The dissociation occurs despite the fact that the cultural divide between the Assamese Hindu and Muslims is not as pronounced as in many other regions of the Indian subcontinent. The pre-independence period can be considered as a different context in Hindu-Muslim relations because of the colonial policy of divide and rule. But the post-independence period also witnessed the desertion of the Assamese language by Muslims after they 1

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became an integral part of Assamese culture and nationality. Then, the question arises: is it simply the dissociation of Muslims, or, they have been compelled to dissociate? This book tries to answer the question. The Muslim question is a complex one in present-day Assam. This is evident from the media attention the community received across the world in February 1983 when thousands of Muslims were killed in one night by supporters of the Assam Movement (1979–85). They were in the spotlight again when the Supreme Court of India repealed the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) [IM(DT)] Act of 1983, calling it ‘undemocratic’. Finally, they were grabbing headlines throughout the world during 2015–19 when the process of the upgrading of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), 1951 in Assam was ongoing. These three different incidents, in a span of three and a half decades, indicate one common issue: immigration. The immigration of Muslims into Assam at different times under different circumstances has made the Muslim question in the state both special and very complex. Except for Assam, no other states in India after independence have experienced any prolonged anti-immigration movement like Assam Movement, have followed an anti-immigration law like IM (DT) Act for 22 years that was separate from the rest of the country, or have sought to update the NRC of 1951 to record genuine citizens (and identify illegal ones). Muslims have remained at the centre of all these events. This centrality posits Muslims in a very different situation in Assam from their religious counterparts living in other Indian states. This difference creates a situation in Assam that, unlike other Indian states, Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Hind (Jamiat), a religious organisation of Muslims, plays an overground political role in the state. It even formed a political party, Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF), in 2005 which has significantly influenced the politics in Assam since its formation. Very interestingly, the origin and success of AUDF have helped majoritarian politics of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to grow, even though Assam’s demographic structure and socio-cultural tradition is not favourable for the growth of BJP in the state. However, when the demography of Assam is discussed, the unfavourable atmosphere appears to be creating opportunities for majoritarianism to grow in recent years. As per the 2011 census report, Muslims account for 34.22 per cent of the total population of Assam. From 1961 to 2011, the Muslim population grew by ten per cent with a subsequent decline by nine per cent of the Hindu population. The high growth rate of the Muslim population has become the crux of the present-day Muslim problem in Assam. The non-Muslim Assamese people are now convinced that their political dominance in the state is about to be decimated by Muslims. This threat perception has become politically so attractive in Assam that in the 2016 Assembly election, the main theme of the BJP campaign was to save the community, land and base of the indigenous Assamese from the immigrant Muslims. The BJP so skilfully exploited the fault-line that it was 2

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able to register extraordinary success in the election, allowing it to form its first-ever government in Assam. The threat perception, on the other hand, has triggered a process of ‘othering’ of Muslims in Assam, both socially and politically. But what is interesting in this respect is that despite this threat perception, the Assamese people depend on the immigrant Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley for the majority status of the Assamese language in Assam. Realising this, the immigrant Muslims have recently started to dissociate from the Assamese language in response to the ‘othering’ of the community by the Assamese people. This book strives to understand the changing context and content of Muslim politics in Assam, particularly in the post-independence period. It traces the journey of the community in Assam from their first immigration to the land until they came to be seen as a threat to the indigenous population in the politics of the state. It examines, based on historical and political context, the process of ‘othering’ of Muslims as a community on religious lines in the politics of Assam. At the same time, it shows the emergence of Muslims in Assam as an autonomous political group as a result of the increasing strength of the population of the community, which, in turn, reinforces the politics of ‘othering’ in Assam. Muslims in Assam, like anywhere in the world, are not a homogenous community. In Assam, Muslims are divided based on their time of immigration into the land and language. They are divided into indigenous and immigrants depending on their arrival in the state, and Assamese, neoAssamese and Bengali based on the language they choose to speak. Between these divisions, the contemporary politics of Assam concentrates mainly on indigenous-immigrant classification. The socio-cultural divide between these two communities has remained very strong and this has, in the postindependence period, worked against the emergence of Assam Muslims as a monolithic group in the politics of the state. The opinion and concerns of these two groups of Muslims, most often, differ in the same issues. On the other hand, although not so prominent politically, the linguistic categories among Muslims also play an important role in the social dynamics of Assam. In some occasions, however, they have become sensitive political issues concerning the Assamese language, making the question of Muslims in Assam very diverse in orientation and scope. Among the states of Northeast India, this study focuses mainly on Muslims living in Assam. It is only in Assam that we find Muslims as a community which can effectively influence the politics of the Northeast region. Because of historical reasons and population growth, the Assam Muslims are larger in number; and due to perennial controversies, they particularly represent a significant political community in comparison to their counterparts living in other states of Northeast India. Assam witnessed the growth of communal politics of the Muslim League before independence. The organisation’s Muslim politics ended with the 3

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separation of Sylhet from Assam and India’s independence. Following independence, Muslims had lost political ground in Assam for about three decades. However, the Assam Movement again made Muslims an issue of contestation, and the issue has become increasingly complex over the last three and a half decades since the end of the movement. The changing political discourse vis-à-vis Muslims in Assam during the post-Assam Movement period deserves serious academic discussion. Existing literature like Assam Muslims: Politics and Cohesion by B.J. Deb and D.K. Lahiri (1985), Muslims in Assam Politics by Makhanlal Kar (1990), Planter Raj to Swaraj: Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam authored by Amalendu Guha (Reprint 2006) exclusively show the Muslim question and League politics in Assam till independence. Sanjib Baruah’s India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (1999) and Udayan Misra’s India’s North East: Identity Movements, State, and Civil Society (2014) throw light on some aspects of the Muslim question in Assam after independence, however, only partially and according to the need of their subjects. On the other hand, Monirul Hussain’s The Assam Movement: Class Ideology and Identity (1993) and Makiku Kimura’s The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters (2013) particularly discuss the Assam Muslims in the light of the Assam Movement. This book specifically explores the changing dynamics of the question of Muslims in the politics of Assam after the Assam Movement. Muslims are a religious minority group in India. In the entire world, minorities have always grappled with three types of inter-related issues: identity, security and equity. However, the concerns surrounding these issues are not identical across all minorities (SCR 2006: 3–4). The concerns of the minorities are mainly specific to the location where they live. It is heavily influenced by their social relations with the majority community and the political relations with the state. Because of India’s diverse geographical and social setting, Muslims living in different states represent specific cases. This book discusses the Muslim minority in the context of Assam. When the Muslim question in Assam is examined, it has at least four constituents: Muslims, non-Muslims, the politics of different groups, and the state. This study assesses the political strategies of each group on the issue under discussion. However, in this regard, apart from the state, Muslims, non-Muslims and the political groups cannot be considered as a single group/unit. In this situation, this study mainly follows a method of analysis of historical facts and contemporary literature. The existing literature on the Muslims of Assam, from both primary and secondary sources, has been extensively used in this analysis. My quest for understanding the Muslim politics in Assam has been enriched by the field survey that I carried out during my PhD at Gauhati University (2003–09), in which I tried to find out the role of the Muslim minority in the electoral politics of Assam. After concluding the work, I undertook a field survey among the indigenous and immigrant Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley in 2010–11 in an attempt to understand the existing 4

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socio-cultural and political barriers between the communities. The survey was carried out for a research project under the University Grants Commission. The experience and the insights I gathered from these field surveys have aided my explanation and analysis.

Muslims as a political community in India’s northeast India’s Northeast, comprising seven states – Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura – is an area of about 2.6 lakh square kilometres which accounts for less than eight per cent of India’s total geographical coverage. More than 90 per cent of the boundary of the region is an international border. The north-eastern region of India, on a smaller scale, presents itself as a replica of the subcontinent both physically and culturally. It reflects the complexities of the sub-Himalayan ranges, the Indo-Burmese hills of Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, and the eroded surfaces of the Meghalaya plateau – all encircling Brahmaputra valley (Mipun and Nayak 1999: 18). Although Northeast accounts for only four per cent of India’s total population, the region is a conglomeration of around 475 ethnic groups and sub-groups, speaking over 400 languages and dialects. Of the 635 communities in India listed as tribal, more than 200 are found in the Northeast. Of the 325 languages listed by the People of India project, 175 belonging to the Tibeto-Burman group are spoken in this region (Bhaumik 2009: 1). The religious composition of the region is also very interesting. There is a significant influence of Christianity in the Northeast. Four states of this region – Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland – are Christian majority. Although only 2.3 per cent of India’s population are Christians, the percentages of the Christian population in the north-eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh – 30.26, Meghalaya – 74.59, Mizoram – 87.16 and Nagaland – 87.93. With 30.26 per cent of the total population, Christians make up the largest religious group in Arunachal Pradesh. Against the dominance of Christianity in the hills of Northeast, Assam and Tripura – mainly plains – are Hindu dominated. In Manipur, which has substantial hill areas, Christians are almost equal to the Hindu population (Christian – 41.29 per cent; Hindu – 41.39 per cent). Christians are negligible in Assam, and they comprise less than four per cent of the total population of the state. However, in the two hill districts of the state, Christians are the majority (Dima Hasao – 70.9 per cent, Karbi Anglong – 56.3 per cent) [Census of India Report 2011]. The demographic composition of Northeast is an implication of British colonial policies. After the annexation of Assam valley in 1826, the British annexed Cachar plains in 1830, Khasi hills in 1833, Jaintia plains in 1835, present Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao in 1838 and 1854 respectively, Naga hills during 1866–1904, Garo hills in 1872–73 and Luchai hills (present Mizoram) in 1890. The British province that came to be known as 5

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Assam took shape in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and territorially, it included the entire present Northeast India except Manipur and Tripura (Sarmah 2002: 88). The kingdoms of Manipur and Tripura were made princely states and they were allowed to continue with their internal affairs as long as they paid tributes. A British political resident was stationed in these two princely states to ensure suzerainty and monitor political activities (Bhaumik 2009: 7). The British were not interested in administering the hills of Northeast. The colonial government was convinced that bringing the hills under British administration would not be financially remunerative. British officials were interested only in the Assam plains where they started ventures in tea, oil and coal, and started cultivating jute as a cash crop. They wanted the hills to be untouched, and subsequently they invented the policy of ‘least interference’ for the hills. The safeguard of the unique culture of the tribal people became the basis of this policy. The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 provided for the Inner Line system. The Inner Line marked the extent of the revenue administration beyond which British subjects or foreigners were not allowed to go without permission. The tribal people were left to manage their affairs in the areas beyond the Inner Line, provided they demonstrated good behaviour. On the other hand, a considerable part of Assam, mainly hill areas, was declared ‘backward’ areas under the Government of India Act, 1919. This gave the GovernorGeneral-in-Council the power to declare any territory in British India to be a ‘backward tract’, where the prevailing laws of the rest of India would not be applicable. Furthermore, the Government of India Act, 1935 changed the nomenclature and regrouped the backward tracts as ‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded’ areas. In this new administrative arrangement, the governor was to administer the excluded areas himself using his discretion, while the administration of the partially excluded areas was made his special responsibility. Thus, the powers of the provincial legislature were not to be extended to the excluded and semi-excluded areas. The hill areas of Northeast protected by the Inner Line and under backward tracts and excluded/partially excluded areas are now Christian majority. Under the Inner Line system, permission was required from the British administration to enter the hills for both British subjects and the people of the plains. Only Christian missionaries were allowed to enter these areas without any hindrance from British officials. At that time, a large section of tribal people did not follow any organised religion and pursued traditional rituals. The Christian missionaries exploited this situation and tried to spread Christianity among those who did not follow any organised religion. This is the story of the spread of Christianity in the hills of Northeast. The colonial administration, through its policy of least interference, left the hills to the missionaries to spread Christianity. But the story of the Assam plains, particularly of Brahmaputra valley, was different from the hills. Here, the British administration was interested in 6

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doing business and making a profit. For colonial interests, the percentage of Muslims started to grow rapidly in Assam since the beginning of the last century. The colonial administration wanted to grow jute as a cash crop in lower Assam and therefore started to encourage a huge immigration of Muslim peasants from East Bengal to Brahmaputra valley. This is how the Muslim population grew in the Assam plains despite the spread of Christianity in the state’s hill regions under colonialism. The Muslim population is negligible in four hill states of Northeast: Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. In contrast, Assam has more than 10 million Muslims, comprising 34.22 per cent of the total population of the state (2011 census). Compared to Assam, the percentage of Muslims is not very significant in Manipur and Tripura, two plain states of Northeast. According to the 2011 census report, Manipur’s total population is 28.56 lakh, of which 8.4 per cent is Muslim. The percentage of the Muslim population in Manipur declined from 8.8 in 2001 to 8.4 in 2011, although their headcount increased from 1.91 lakh in 2001 to 2.39 lakh in 2011. In the case of Tripura, according to the 2011 census, Muslims accounted for 8.6 per cent of the total 36.74 lakh population of the state. In Tripura, the Muslim population declined from 21.43 per cent in the 1951 census to 8.6 per cent in the 2011 census. Contrastingly, the Muslim population in the state rose from 1.37 lakh in 1951 to 2.39 lakh in the 2011 census. The percentage-wise high decline was due to the huge influx of Hindus to the state from East Pakistan after the partition of India and during the India-Pakistan war of 1971, which created Bangladesh. The Muslim population of Tripura declined from 21.43 per cent in 1951 to 20.14 per cent in 1961. This percentage declined further to 6.68 in the 1971 census. After that, the Muslim population grew in the state to 8.6 per cent in the 2011 census. It can be argued that Muslim growth in these two states is steady when compared with the other Northeast state with a substantial Muslim population – Assam. Colonial rules had helped Muslims to emerge as a large community in Assam until independence. In addition, after independence the number of Muslims has been rising quickly in Assam in comparison with the other states of Northeast India. Issues like illegal immigration and citizenship apply only to Muslims living in Assam. This made the question of Muslims unique in Assam among the states of the Northeast. Geographically, Assam is located between 24o3/ N and 27o58/N latitude and 89o5/ E and 96o1/E longitude. The state has an area of 78,433 sq km, representing 2.39 per cent of the total area of India. It is surrounded on its north, south and east sides by hills and mountains. To the west, it merges with the plains of West Bengal and Bangladesh. The state has two valleys: Brahmaputra valley in the northern part, bordering Arunachal Pradesh; and Barak valley in the southern part. In between these two valleys is the Karbi plateau, succeeded to the south by the North Cachar Hills. Assam is bordered by Bhutan to the north and Bangladesh to the south. It also shares a boundary with seven 7

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Indian states – West Bengal, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya.

Muslim identity: National perspective and ‘specific context’ This book ultimately leads to the question of identity among the Assam Muslims. In this respect, it is germane to know whether the issue of identity among Muslims in India is state-specific or the entire community subscribes to a common Indian Muslim identity. As discussed earlier, concerns of a minority group revolve mainly around identity, security and equity. In India’s diverse geographical, social, cultural set-up and highly competitive political discourses and activities, it is natural that issues of security and equity carry different meaning and concern for Muslims living in different states. However, in the case of Muslim identity, the religious organisations representing the community have been trying to create a pan-Indian identity based on some common issues. Although the Constituent Assembly was divided on the continuation of minority rights from the colonial era to India’s new constitution, India began its independent career by recognising the cultural rights of all communities, religions and languages. On many aspects of minority rights, independent India was well ahead of Europe. Non-discrimination and citizenship rights are the core of secularism. The Indian Constitution tried to ensure both for the Indian Muslims. However, despite the efforts of the constitution-makers to create a liberal and secular culture, Muslims as a community did not come forward to take the advantage of this. It happened because Muslims faced two serious problems just after the independence of India due to the partition. First, Muslims have remained hostage to IndiaPakistan relations in general, and Pakistan’s treatment of its minorities in particular. Second, Muslims lacked and still lack a credible middle class in India. At the time of or shortly after partition, a large number of Muslim civil servants, doctors and entrepreneurs migrated to the new Islamic state of Pakistan. The Muslims who remained were the labouring poor, the peasants, labourers and artisans (Guha 2007: 372–73). As a result, the Muslims who remained in India found themselves leaderless. The political leaders, in whom they had placed their confidence till the day before, fled to Pakistan. Those who remained, like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, were scholars with political wisdom and insight but did not possess the required political acumen in order to tackle the volatile situation. In this vacuum of leadership, a far smaller number of men came to the fore to grab the mantle and the whole field of leadership left open to communal leaders (Noorani 2003: 1). The lack of middle-class and progressive leadership still remains a major problem among Muslims in India. In this situation, after independence, the Congress-Muslim alliance emerged as a natural coalition in secular India. The Jamiat, which supported Congress in the freedom struggle, emerged as the de facto guardian of the 8

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Indian Muslims. It then urged Congress not to adopt any majoritarian policy and wanted to be assured the freedom to practise Islam, nontempering of the Muslim Personal Law etc. This suggested that the Muslim leadership in India after independence remained particularly concerned with Muslim identity and Muslim distinctiveness. During the last seven decades after independence, the concerns and demands of Muslim leaders have remained the same. The principles of equality, democracy, freedom and citizenship, which can modernise and develop a community in a secular democracy, have always been undermined by the Muslim leadership. The communal character of the Muslim leadership remained the cause of the communal character of concerns and demands. The conservative attitude of the Indian Muslim leadership harmed the progress of the Indian Muslims. This attitude is even different from Muslims from different parts of the world. In the words of Mushirul Hasan: It is hard to delineate the principal contours of Muslim conservatism, though its basic aim has remained unchanged since the advent of British rule in India: the preservation of cultural and religious identity within the defined Islamic framework. Its more tangible manifestation has been the resistance to modern education, opposition to the composite and syncretic trends in Indian Islam, and the tendency to thwart reformist initiatives. Thus, Muslim organizations and institutions have led a successful mobilization campaign centering on these issues and insulated the community from the process of social change and modernisation to resist the secularizing tendencies during and after colonial rule. This phenomenon was unique to Indian Islam, for reformist ideas and movements have been inconsequential in Muslim countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. (2002: 384–85) During the period after independence, it was observed that the Indian Muslims were prepared only to tolerate the idea of secularism, but they were not ideologically ready to strengthen its basis. The Muslim leadership, during this period, never initiated reform and successfully resisted any attempt to introduce even a modicum of liberal adjustment in matters related to the Muslim Personal Law. It even opposed the Supreme Court verdict on the Shah Bano case on the grounds that it was a violation of the principle of secularism (Alam 2007: 148). Too much communal concerns of the Muslim leaders have created a situation for the political parties in India where socio-economic concerns of the Muslim community can be ignored. On the other hand, the opposition of the Muslim leadership to any reform has strengthened the majoritarian discourse in India. As majoritarian discourse defines Muslims in narrow parameters, and the fact that Muslims remained concerned only with communal issues, Muslims feel insecure about losing their distinctive 9

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religious identity at the hands of Hindus. This insecurity has become the most useful instrument for the political parties (particularly for Congress after independence and subsequently for other political parties after Babri Masjid demolition) to manipulate the entire Muslim community during elections. The defensive communal attitude of Muslims, during the period after independence, has helped every political party to keep Muslims apart and to confine them under minority threat. The community emerged only as a vote bank to political parties whose socio-economic concerns need not require to be addressed. The situation has become such that even token socio-economic policy towards minorities started to be recognised by political parties as a big step towards addressing the concerns of Muslims (Gupta 1999: 55). The 1970s saw the consolidation of communal forces, both Muslim and Hindu. The primary objective of Muslim religious organisations, such as Tablighi Jamaat, Jammat-e-Islami and Jamiat, remained the same – the preservation of cultural and religious identity within the defined Islamic framework, and opposition to the demand for uniform civil code. In 1974, the All India Muslim Personal Board (AIMPLB) emerged as a watchdog to monitor and actively resist any change to the Muslim Personal Law. Just over a decade later, AIMPLB spearheaded a campaign on Muslim Personal Law against the backdrop of Supreme Court’s Shah Bano judgement which signified a massive fundamental upsurge, unprecedented in post-independent India (Hasan 2002: 385). On the other hand, Bharatiya Jan Sangh was gaining ground in the politics of India, aggressively opposing any move of special Muslim interests like the preservation of Muslim Personal Law, Urdu language, job reservation for Muslims and minority status for the Aligarh Muslim University etc. (Sharma 2000: 61). ‘Indian Islam’ is a product of the circumstances in which it emerged and crystallised and, in the process, it became necessary to adapt to the indigenous environment. However, for the ulemas who were primarily concerned with Islamic norms, the maintenance of Muslim identity in a secular society required an increasing emphasis on the acceptance of these norms. Adherence to Islamic law for them becomes the central symbol in the preservation of Muslim identity and an idiom for integration (Hasan 2010: 303). This remains the main problem for the common Muslims of India, due to the fact that the religious Muslim leadership concentrates mainly in Hindi heartland states which have a very narrow social base. Most often, their communal political demands are designed specifically to fulfil the interests of minuscule Muslim upper class at the cost of the overwhelming lower-class Muslims. Anwar Alam remarks: No wonder then that the Muslim leadership have played the politics of identity, veering around a few religio-cultural issues such as the protection of the Muslim Personal Law, the declaration of Urdu as the second official language, the minority character of the Aligarh Muslim 10

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University, the recognition of Muslim religious celebrations as national holidays, the eradication of Hindu religious mythology and anti-Muslim bias from the school books, the protection of mosques, idgahs, dargahs, madrasas, and so on. Worse, these demands are projected at the all India level as if they are central to the issue of Muslim identity. It is worthwhile to point out that such upper class Muslim politics have brought more harm than good – whether religious or secular. (2007: 142) The demand of the communal upper-class Muslims for a pan-Indian Muslim identity during the period after independence faced several challenges from the heterogeneous and region-specific characteristics of Indian Muslims. Muslims in India are divided into different groups and sects among themselves. They are culturally diverse and socio-economically stratified. Moreover, they live in different regions which are demographically and socio-culturally different from each other. Muslims living in different states speak different languages. Their concerns are different in different regions. In this situation, the identity concerns of Muslims from different regions can be different from the so-called national markers of identity. In the study of Muslim communities in India, it must also be acknowledged that there are neither any permanent fault-lines between Hindus and Muslims nor an eternal composite culture of peace and harmony. The nature of the relationship between the communities depends on the specific context (Jairath 2011: 9–10). The Assam Muslims can be a good example to prove how the question of identity among Muslims in India is also ‘region-specific’. In Assam, a large section of Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley became a part of Assamese nationality by sacrificing their language and culture. The national markers of Muslim identity could never influence the Assam Muslims in general in the post-independence period. Monirul Hussain points out: The problems of the Muslims of Assam are not very different from the socio-economic problems of the rest of the Indian Muslims. However, unlike the Muslims of North Indian states, who are deeply involved in the problems related to the status of the Aligarh Muslim University and the status of the Urdu language or even the Babri Masjid-Ram Janambhumi tangle, by and large, do not affect the Muslims of Assam psychologically. This signifies their level of integration with the regional society and the Asamiya nationality. (1993: 225) Considering these perspectives, this book sees the question of identity concerns among Assam Muslims in a regional context. The concerns of Muslims in Assam, because of historical factors and contemporary happenings, are different in many aspects from the Muslims living in other 11

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parts of India. Therefore, their identity concerns are also bound to be state-specific.

The structure of the book This book shows how Muslims as a community became the most sensitive issue in the politics of Assam. It argues that the rapid growth of their population has made them a sensitive topic in the society and politics of the state so much so that it has created a situation where the community, particularly the immigrant section, is emerging as the immediate threat to non-Muslims living in the state. The high growth rate of the community has always kept alive the controversy of illegal immigration of Muslims to Assam. The continuation of such controversy has made the citizenship of a large section of Muslims contentious which has led to processes like NRC upgrading in the state. Their population growth also provided an opportunity for religious organisations, like Jamiat, to play a political role in Assam which in turn has helped majoritarian politics to grow in the state. On the other hand, the communal mobilisation of Muslims under Jamiat in the politics of Assam has created controversies like separate Muslim identity among Assam Muslims. Almost all controversies and contestations related to Muslims in Assam are the consequences of the fast demographic change in favour of the community in the state. In this respect, this book argues that long-term exclusion of the immigrant Muslim community from the process of development and the vote bank politics are the main causes of the abnormal growth of the Muslim population in the state. The number of Muslims is growing fast in Assam because of the fast growth rate, particularly among the immigrant Muslim community. This is due to the underdeveloped socioeconomic condition of the community. The illegal immigration of Muslims to Assam has also contributed to this. In the post-independence period, the consecutive government at the centre never paid enough attention to secure its border with East Pakistan, and then Bangladesh, although the same central government made sincere efforts to secure India’s border with then West Pakistan. As a result of the open and porous border, both Hindus and Muslims have been continuously migrating to Assam from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh. The parties in power, mainly Congress, ignored the illegal immigration because those Muslims were becoming its support base in the state. To preserve them as vote bank, Congress always tried to safeguard the citizenship of the recently immigrated Muslims but ignored the socio-economic development of the entire Muslim community. The popular impression in Assam is that illegal immigration is the main cause of the huge increase in the Muslim population in the state. The impression, on the one hand, provided the opportunity to political parties to use the community only as a vote bank without addressing their concerns, and on the other created an environment where the entire community is 12

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projected as a ‘Bangladeshis’. This has posited the entire Muslim community in a situation where they are bound to become defensive. This situation, the present study argues, has pushed the Muslim community in Assam to the margins. Living in the margins for decades, now, however, they have started to face the situation with a community mobilisation against the Assamese – both linguistically and politically. While a section among them has started to search for an identity separate from Assamese, another section has rallied behind Jamiat and All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) for political mobilisation. It can be argued that long-term social and economic exclusion and politics of vote bank heavily contributed to the present complexities of the Muslim question in Assam. This book depicts the process of formation and transformation of Muslim identity in Assam, underlying, inter alia, the specific contexts and conditions. This is primarily how it differs from existing books on the same subject. Besides, it deals with several aspects of Muslim politics in Assam which have not been dealt with until now. First of all, it covers every relevant political issue related to Muslims since their first immigration to the state until today, focusing on the changing dynamics of Muslim politics in Assam during the post-Assam Movement period. It shows how the continuous immigration of Muslims into Assam after independence is a consequence of vote bank politics and communal considerations of consecutive central governments. And, even acknowledging the impact of illegal immigration of Muslims on the changing demography of Assam, it establishes that the underdeveloped socio-economic condition among the immigrant Muslims has also contributed heavily to the high rise of the Muslim population in Assam. It proves that the popular impression of Muslims as a vote bank of the Congress party in Assam is largely a myth. In dealing with the issue of Muslim vote bank, this book also examines the other immigrant vote banks of Congress in Assam – their formation, growth and decline. For the first time, this book elaborately shows the political role of Jamiat in determining the electoral behaviour of Muslims after the Assam Movement. Moreover, it depicts how, in the postAssam Movement period, the fast rise of the Muslim population has deepened the fear among indigenous Assamese of losing political dominance at the hands of the immigrant section of Muslims, and how this has strengthened the distrust among the indigenous Assamese towards Muslims. It also deals with the socio-psychological divides between the Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslims which has hitherto never been discussed. Finally, this book shows how the origin and success of AIUDF have communally divided the politics of Assam and created the environment for the BJP to grow. This book consists of five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 traces the origin of Muslims in Assam and their growth until India’s independence. The colonial policy and Muslim League politics of importing Muslims to Brahmaputra valley is dealt with in detail. Chapter 2 examines the issue of Muslims in Assam politics after independence till the Assam Movement. It shows the social and political moves of the community in Assam and the 13

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strategy of the governments towards the community during this period. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the Assam Movement: how it made Muslims the most controversial issue in the politics of the state. Chapter 4 explores the political mobilisation of Muslims in the post-Assam Movement period. It also shows how demographic changes in favour of Muslims during this period have led to the situation where majoritarian politics has started to gain ground in Assam. Chapter 5 looks at the growing divides between the indigenous Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslims. These are analysed from the increasing electoral dominance of Muslims, issue of citizenship, the question of the Assamese people and Assamese language perspectives. The Conclusion assesses the possibility of the formation of religious identity among Muslims in Assam against the Assamese identity.

14

1 MUSLIMS IN ASSAM TILL INDEPENDENCE

The amalgamation of three racial elements, namely, the Australoids, Mongoloids and Caucasoids are the specialty of peopling in Assam. Due to the long-term migratory flow into it, Assam in the modern period emerged as the melting pot of diverse cultural elements with the Indo-Aryans and Austro-Mongoloids being the major ones. This has also made Assam linguistically and ethnically the most diversified state in India. Even in the global context, such diversity in the composition of a population is rare. The immigration of Muslims as a religious group to Assam, however, only started at the beginning of the thirteenth century. But what remains unique in the case of Muslims is that, unlike other groups who immigrated to Assam, their immigration to the state still remains a continuous affair. Even today there is a popular impression in Assam that because of the porous India-Bangladesh border Muslims are illegally immigrating.

Immigration to Assam in pre-historic time Human skeletal, which indicates the physical features of a man of the prehistoric past of Assam, has not yet been discovered from any part of Northeast India. However, the discovery of various stone tools provides authentic shreds of evidence that pre-historic lithic culture flourished at one time in Assam as well as other parts of Northeast India. The Palaeolithic stone tools were used in the Old Stone Age lasting from about 2.5 million to 9000 BC. On the other hand, the occurrence of the Neolithic stone tools in different parts of Northeast India supports the fact that the Neolithic culture was fairly widespread in the region. This New Stone Age ranged approximately between 9000 BC and 6000 BC (Das 2009: 86). Based on fossil evidence, it can be presumed that the geographical regions like South China, Southeast Asia and Northeast India were inhabited by people called Australoid. They are considered the earliest people to reach Assam (ibid). It is assumed that their migration to the region happened in 3500 BC (Saikia 2016: 59). After this, the Mongoloids started to immigrate to present Northeast from North east China (Das 2009: 86). This immigration started around 3000 BC (Saikia 2016: 59). Successive waves of migration of 15

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Mongoloid occurred from the North, the East and the North East. The Mongoloid race are said to have had an original hearth in eastern Eurasia from where they kept migrating to different parts of Asia, some branches moving southward to the Tibetan plateau and onward to the Himalayan region, other branches taking an eastern route (Taid 2009: 91). For centuries, the immigration of Mongoloid people to Assam continued. At present, several Mongoloid groups are distributed in different parts of Assam. Most of these groups are scheduled as Tribe under the Constitution of India. Some such tribes living in Assam are Boros or Bodos, Kacharis, Deoris, Rabhas, Sonowal Kacharis, Tiwas, Mishings, Karbis, Dimasas, Meches, Garos etc. Notably, the Australoids, who were the earliest settlers of Assam, were completely absorbed or dispersed by the Mongoloid who arrived later (Das 2009: 86). Among different Mongoloid groups, the people of protoBodo origin are supposed to be autochthons of Assam (Taid 2009: 92). Different groups of people belonging to the Caucasoid race also immigrated to Assam in a later phase. It is believed that by 700 BC, the IndoAryans, a division of the Caucasoids, migrated from the west to reach North Bihar from where they moved eastwards in smaller groups at different times. They mostly settled in Brahmaputra valley plain and Barak valley. Presently, in general, the Assamese caste Hindu populations as well as Muslim are considered Caucasian in origin. As a result of these primitive waves of immigration, Brahmaputra valley turned out to be a meeting place of two major races of mankind, namely the Mongoloid and the Caucasoid (Das 2009: 87). Following this, people belonging to other major races did not enter Assam, although small groups of Mongoloid and Caucasoid races continued to immigrate to Assam at different points of time in the ancient period.

Immigration to Assam in medieval time The continuous immigration of different racial groups diversified the demography of Assam. This diverse demography became more complex in the region due to the immigration of some major ethnic groups in the medieval period. In this process, the beginning of the thirteenth century became a turning point in the history of Assam when the state witnessed two major waves of immigration – the Ahom immigration from the east and the Muslim invasions from the west. The immigration of these two groups significantly changed the society and politics of the state in subsequent centuries. The Ahoms were the offshoot of the great Tai race who constitute the most widespread population in South East Asia. A group of Tai people left Mong Mao in the Yunnan province of China in 1215 AD and moved towards Assam. After 13 years they reached Assam [CHA(II) 2007: 49–52] and ruled their new territory from 1228 AD. The conquest made by the TaiAhoms was not an invasion but a gradual and peaceful penetration without causing displacement of the local inhabitants (ibid: 53). The Ahom had 16

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their language, religion and culture. Over time, they gradually abandoned their language and accepted the Assamese language. By the seventeenth century, they became Hindu or Hinduised (Das 2009: 88). They ruled Assam for about six hundred years till the state was taken over by the British in 1826. With the beginning of Ahom rule, the Assamese nation-building process was started, and Assamese started to emerge as a common language of different communities living in Brahmaputra valley.

Muslim immigration in medieval time While the Ahoms did not enter Assam as invaders, Muslims did. Against this, while Ahom, after immigrating to Assam ruled the state for about six hundred years, Muslims could not rule Assam, with the exception of a short-lived occupation by Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb’s General Mir Jumlah, despite their repeated invasions. The soldiers that were with the Muslim invaders taken prisoner by Ahom kings formed the first group of Muslim settlers in Assam. Another three groups of Muslims immigrated to Assam during this period: artisans who were imported by the Ahom kings for different specialised work, Muslim groups immigrated to settle there when provided opportunity by historical developments of the eighteenth century, and preachers who came to spread Islam. These were the total of four groups of Muslims who immigrated to Assam during the medieval period. However, none of these groups were large in number and the Muslim population started to grow in Assam during this period mainly as a result of the conversion of the local population to Islam. Muslim invasion and beginning of Muslim settlement Assam was known as ‘Pragjyotisha’ in the Mahabharata and as ‘Kamrupa’ in Purana and Tantras (Gait 2004: 10). In the history of Assam, the firstever contact of Kamrupa with Muslim invaders was in 1206. The invader was Muhammad-Ibn-Bakhtiyar-Khilji, son of Bakhtiyar and a Turk of the Khilji dynasty. However, it was not an attack on Kamrupa. Bakhtiyar Khilji became the governor of Bihar and later invaded Bengal in 1202. Bakhtiyar’s army easily defeated the king of Bengal. Since then, the Muslim occupation in the capital city of Bengal came to be known as Gaur which is located in the present Indo-Bangladesh border. A few years later, Bakhtiyar’s army marched towards the Northeast to conquer Tibet. In this march, Bakhtiyar’s army entered Kamrupa but surged forward towards Tibet. Before the army reached Tibet, it engaged in battle with the Hindu Brahmans and Nunis in a region called Karampatan where Bakhtiyar’s army was defeated and they were forced to retreat. On his return, Bakhtiyar’s army was blocked and attacked by the king of Kamrupa. Only Bakhtiyar and a few best-mounted soldiers of his army were able to escape and reached Gaur in 1206 (Ahmed 2017: 102–03). 17

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Presumably, most of the soldiers from Bakhtiyar’s army were killed by the army of the king of Kamrupa, however, it is possible that some of the soldiers survived. These soldiers may have been left behind when Bakhtiyar fled the battlefield. In that situation, these deserted soldiers had no option but to stay in Assam. They could be considered the first batch of Muslim settlers in Assam and, their settlement preceded that of the Ahoms in the state. Some political historians believe that the Muslim soldiers were left in Assam because they did not wish to go back with their defeated general (ibid: 104). However, victory and defeat are part of an invasion or war, and it is unlikely that those soldiers would have preferred to stay behind in Assam – an unknown and enemy country – just because they were not willing to return with their defeated general. The first major conflict between Muslims and the Ahoms took place in April 1532. A Muslim commander, Turbak of Gaur, attacked the Ahom Kingdom with a large army. This attack was foiled by the Ahoms. Meanwhile, Turbak was killed in the battle. His head was buried on top of the Charaideo hill in the present Charaideo district. The Muslims who were taken prisoner in the war against Turbak settled in different parts of the country by the Ahom king. According to contemporary Assam history, they were given the task of cutting grass for the king’s elephants but found to be quite unfit for the job. Their next vocation as farmers was a failure due to their ignorance of agriculture. Left to their own devices, they took to working on brass, an occupation which their descendants, known as Moria, also followed (Gait 2004: 90). The Morias now live in different parts of the middle and upper Assam districts of Brahmaputra valley and are listed as a backward caste by the Assam government. The number of Muslims increased in Assam with every successive attack on Assam during the reign of the Mughals. Mir Jumlah, the governor of Bengal, marched towards Assam in January 1662. His attack on the Ahom Kingdom was by far the most successful from the Muslims’ perspective. On 17 March, Mir Jumlah’s army entered Gargaon, the capital city of the Ahom Kingdom, and occupied the king’s palace. But the heavy rains in Assam during the monsoon period caused great hardship to the invaders. Meanwhile, the Ahoms kept attacking the invaders to save Gargaon. Finally, a treaty was agreed upon between Mir Jumlah and the Ahom King Jayadhwaj Singha on 9 January 1663. The terms of the treaty were favourable to the Mughals, and Mir Jumlah ordered his army to return to Bengal. Mir Jumlah occupied Gargaon from March 1662 until January 1663 which was the longest occupation of Muslims over the Ahom Kingdom. As a result of the treaty, the Ahom king had to surrender vast territories to the Mughals from west of river Bharali on the north bank of Brahmaputra to the Kallang River on the south bank of Brahmaputra (ibid: 121–31). With the attack of Mir Jumlah, the Muslim population in Assam increased in large numbers. The last major battle between the Ahoms and the Mughals was fought in March 1671 at Saraighat, near Guwahati. In this battle, the Mughal army 18

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under commander Raja Ram Singh was decisively beaten by the Ahom forces under the General Lachit Borphukan. The victory brought the Ahom Kingdom a large portion of Mughal territories up to the river Manaha. Though there was another battle between these two powers in 1682 during the reign of Ahom King Gadhadhar Singha, this was not at the initiative of the Mughals (Baruah 1985: 275–76). The present lower Assam districts, which were not part of the Ahom Kingdom, have a large Muslim population in comparison to the upper Assam districts where the Ahoms ruled. The Muslim invasions played a role in the case of Muslim settlement in lower Assam too. The southern portion of the Goalpara and Kamrup districts remained under the authority of the Gaur Sultan from 1320 –21 until the Kamata King Mriganko conquered the region sometime during 1397–1407 with the help of Ahom King Sudangpha (Ahmed 2017: 62). Again, in 1498, Nawab Hussain Shah of Gaur made a successful conquest of Kamatapur, the Koch Kingdom, and appointed his son to administer Hajo in Kamrup (Rural) district of present Assam. After conquering Kamatapur, an attempt to annex the Ahom Kingdom led to the destruction of the entire Muslim army and the loss of the whole of the newly conquered country. During the attack of Hussain Shah, a colony of Muslims was established around Hajo. A prominent Muslim shrine known as Poamecca in Hajo was established by Gyasuddin Aulia who had accompanied Hussain Shah in the campaign (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 2). This was perhaps the earliest systematic Muslim settlement in Assam. Hussain Shah, for 17 years between 1502 and 1519, ruled a greater part of the Kamata Kingdom (present Goalpara and Kamrup regions) (Ahmed 2017: 62). Finally, in 1637, the Nawab of Dhaka sent an army under Mir Zainuddin to seize Goalpara from the Koch Kingdom. In this mission, the Muslim army crossed the Manas River and earned successive victories. At that time, the Koch King Balinarayana was in alliance with the Ahom Kingdom. The Muslim army occupied Ahom forts in Barpeta, Pandu, Saraighat and Kajalimukh among others. Koch King Balinarayana fled to Singri Parbat in Darrang, where the Muslim army killed him in 1637. Since then, Goalpara and a large part of lower Assam were ruled by the Muslim ruler of Dhaka through a governor for 20 years. Only in 1658, Goalpara was taken back from Muslims by Prannarayan, the king of Koch Bihar. Immediately after this, the Ahoms defeated Prannarayan and occupied Goalpara. The Ahoms ruled over Goalpara until it was conceded to Mir Jumlah as a result of the treaty between him and the Ahoms in 1663. Goalpara became a part of the Muslim dominion after it was taken by Mir Jumlah from Ahom until it was ceded to the British in 1765 with the rest of Bengal. Against this backdrop, it could be assumed that a large number of Muslims got the opportunity to migrate and settle permanently in the present Kamrup, Darrang, Dhubri and Goalpara districts during the periods these areas were occupied by Muslim rulers (ibid: 97–98). On the other hand, the present Barak valley was not much influenced by Muslim invasions. The present Karimganj district and a small south-west 19

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part of Hailakandi district were a part of the Sylhet district till it became part of India after partition in 1947. Thus, the history of the Muslim growth of this region formed a part of the history of then Bengal. The other parts of Barak valley, the present Cachar district and the major part of Hailakandi district did not experience major Muslim invasion during the medieval period (Ahmed 2012: 8–9). Other factors, which are discussed later, contributed to the growth of Muslims in this region. Assam as a whole was never part of the Muslim dominion. Furthermore, the few Muslim victories were also short-lived. Still, it is not historically correct to say that the Muslim rule did not leave lasting effects on Assam. Their invasions certainly had a lasting demographic effect on Assam’s population even long before the later Muslim immigrants began to set foot on Assam’s soil. Those places of Brahmaputra valley which were subdued and controlled by the Muslims ultimately became the important centres of Muslim population and their preponderance. Gargaon (present Sibsagar town), the capital of the Ahoms, taken over by Mir Jumlah and Hajo from Kamrup (Rural) district of lower Assam, ruled by Hussain Shah’s son for a short period after 1498 became the centre of the Muslim population at that time. At present, both Sibsagar and Hajo have a significant number of the Muslim population. On the other hand, the lower Assam district of undivided Goalpara, which remained under Muslim rule for a long time, emerged as the main centre of Muslim concentration. There are accounts of some indigenous Muslim communities living in both upper and lower Assam who came with Muslim invaders and stayed behind. The Goria and Moria are two such prominent groups from upper Assam. The Goria are those who came from Gaur with the Muslim invaders. On the other hand, the Morias came as soldiers of Turbak of Gaur. In lower Assam, the Jhulas, a weaver community, came along with the Mughal army but stayed behind in lower Assam. The Muchis also came with the Mughal army to help them in the wars against the Ahoms and settled here as cobblers (Ahmed 2014: 121–44; Boruah 2018: 77–78). Import of Muslim artisans Ahom King Rudra Singha (1696–1714) brought several Muslim artisans from neighbouring Bengal and other parts of India. They were skilled in trades like metalwork, masonry, tailoring, painting etc. His successor, King Siva Singha (1714–44) commissioned two Muslim painters, Dilbar and Dosai, to illustrate the manuscript of Hastividyarnava written by Sukumar Barkaith. Notably, Dilbar and Dosai were not very familiar with the landscape of Assam and hence the quality of the landscapes depicted by them in the manuscript was not outstanding. Observing this, one could assume they were new to Assam. It also proved that the influx of Muslims into the Ahom Kingdom remained unabated. In 1729, Queen Phuleswari Konwari released a coin embossing Persian script (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 20

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3–4). The use of Persian legends on the coin also substantiates the presence of Muslim artisans in the Ahom court. The Ahom rulers encouraged people from other parts of the country to settle in Assam provided their presence and services were advantageous to them. They included artisans, scholars and saints, both Hindus and Muslims. Many Muslims were appointed in several departments of the state for deciphering and interpreting documents in Persian – the official language of the Mughal court, carving inscriptions on copper plates and other metals, minting coins, embroidery, painting, carpentry, making swords and guns, manufacturing of gun powder, tailoring and weaving. As useful members of the community, they were recognised by the Ahoms as citizens but of a lower status. Even then, no outsiders could aspire to rise very high in the Ahom court, although several of them rose in rank due to their capabilities in different fields. The participation of Muslims in various trades and positions had indeed proved to be useful in running the administrative machinery by the Ahoms. Some Muslim leaders acquired the confidence of the Ahom kings and were given the officiating titles of Ahom administration, such as ‘Phukan’, ‘Barua’, ‘Saikia’, ‘Bora’, ‘Hazarika’, ‘Khanikar’ etc. (ibid: 2). The Ahom militia included many Muslim soldiers and officers who fought against the Mughals in several battles, including the famous battle of Saraighat in 1671. A military official known as Ismail Siddique Hazarika, alias ‘Bagh Hazarika’, distinguished himself in the Saraighat battle against the Mughals under the leadership of the Ahom general, Lachit Borphukan. The Muslim warriors of the Ahom army had the added advantage of familiarity with the Mughal war tactics and were therefore great assets to the Ahoms (Hussain 1993: 199). Thus, long before the beginning of Assam’s modern history, Muslims had formed a permanent part of Assam’s society, though their precise number cannot be determined . The Ahoms were truly secular in their governance. The Ahom kings permitted the Muslims to follow their own faith. Some of the Muslim religious leaders, known as ‘Dewans’, were granted revenue-free lands to settle on. The Ahom rulers even encouraged the Muslim preachers to spread their religion. They were granted tax-free lands to set up their religious institutions like Madrasas and Mosques. There were 12 functioning Madrasas at Guwahati and more than 20 in the Ahom capital Sibsagar (Rangpur) during the reign of Ahom King Rajeswar Sinha from 1751 to 1769 (Bhuyan 1965: 166). Some Muslim preachers were even paid expenses by the Ahom kings to go to Mecca and perform Hajj and pray for the prosperity of the kingdom and the king (Hussain 1993: 199–200). Immigration of Muslim groups A large number of Muslims migrated to Assam between1769 and 1780 from East Bengal. The Moa-Moria rebellion during 1769–1780 paralysed the Ahom power under King Lakshmi Singha, and the western frontier of 21

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the country became extremely poorly defended. The Moa-Moria rebellion was the biggest revolt of the subjects, particularly of the followers of MoaMoria satra (a Vaishnava monastery), against the king during Ahom rule which lasted for a decade. As a result of the Moa-Moria rebellion, the extensive migration of Muslims of different vocations took place to Assam from East Bengal (Ahmed 2017: 68). Even from present West Bengal, Muslims immigrated to Assam in the pre-modern period. For example, the Sandars came from neighbouring areas of present-day West Bengal and settled in present Gauripur and Mespara areas of the Goalpara district. They are mainly small traders (Zaman 2014: 4). On the other hand, such group immigration from East Bengal played a vital role in the growth of Muslims in the entire Barak valley. In 1707, the Ahoms attacked Cachar and occupied its capital Maibong. Then the King of Cachar, Tamradhaj, fled to Bengal. After winning Maibong, the Ahom army returned because of difficulties faced by the soldiers due to the spread of a virulent disease. After the Ahoms returned, the Cachar King did not return for some time. In that situation, many Hindu and Muslims from Bengal immigrated to Cachar to settle (Ahmed 2012: 20–21). This can be considered as the first large-scale immigration of Hindu and Muslim Bengalis to Cachar. After that, the process of immigration continued for a long time, and eventually, Barak valley had become a land of Hindu and Muslim Bengalis when the British occupied Assam. Immigration of preachers and conversion Shah Milan and Shah Jalal were two preachers of Islam from the Iranian plateau who significantly contributed to the spread of Islam in Brahmaputra valley and Barak valley respectively. The spread of Islam gained momentum in Brahmaputra valley with the visit of the Muslim religious saint Shah Milan, popularly known as Azan Fakir, who came to Assam around 1635 from Baghdad and acquired a legendary status in the Assamese society. He found a congenial atmosphere in Assam for strengthening the bond between the two religious groups –Hindus and Muslims. The Zikirs composed by him in the Assamese language and sung in the tune of Hindu religious hymns had attracted a large number of followers representing groups and communities who apparently were convinced of the rich secular contents in such Zikirs. Azan Fakir took the initiative to preach Islam in Assam. In fact, he started the Muslim call to prayer, Azan, among the Muslims of Assam (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 3). The unique way of propagating Islam through Zikirs suited the local conditions and helped to spread Islam among the masses. Azan Fakir and his disciples contributed significantly towards educating a portion of the non-Muslim Assamese about the spirit and significance of Islam. In Barak valley, the conversion from lower caste Hindus to Islam happened in large numbers during the visit of Sufi saints in the thirteenth 22

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century. Shah Jalal, which played a pivotal role in the spread of Islam in Bengal, also influenced the process of Islamisation in the present Barak valley. The presence of Hindu titles like ‘Chowdhury’, ‘Majumdar’, ‘Tapadar’, ‘Talukdar’, ‘Bhuyan’, ‘Borbhuyan’ etc. among a section of Muslims from Barak valley corroborates their Hindu ancestry. Two notable converted Muslim communities from the valley are Maimol and Pangal. The Maimols are a lower caste Hindu fisherman community, who embraced Islam because of the influence of Shah Jalan. Pangal is a Mongoloid Muslim community and they speak the Meiti (Manipuri) language (Zaman 2014: 4). However, it is believed that the conversion of local people to Islam in Assam started even before the arrival of the preachers of Islam. Ali Mech, a local chieftain, converted to Islam at the behest of Bakhtiar-Khilji when he entered Assam in his march towards Tibet in the first decade of the thirteenth century. After Ali Mech adopted Islam, a section of Koch and Mech tribes, who were residing in the western part of the old kingdom of Kamrupa, converted to Islam (Ahmed 2017: 56–57). There is no recorded history of conversion to Islam in Assam prior to that. Conversion is considered as the most effective mode of Islamisation in the Indian subcontinent. This is also the case in Assam, where, in addition, different accounts of conversion to Islam due to social liberalisation are available. Such accounts are available mainly in the case of the present lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley and Barak valley. There are no such accounts of conversion in present-day upper Assam of Brahmaputra valley, as the main Muslim groups living here, Goria and Moria, are not converted communities. Some important converted Muslim groups from lower Assam are Deshi, Datia, Dhuli and Tulu. The descendants of the people of the Koch and Mech tribes, who embraced Islam after Ali Mech, mainly live in the undivided Goalpara district and known as Deshi Muslims. The Datias are converted Muslims from a fisherman community. The Dhulis are a converted community from lower caste Hindus, who performed singing and related cultural activities in events like marriages. Tulu/Teli is a business community. Tulus were converted from lower Baishya Hindus. The extraction of oil from mustard seeds has been the main occupation of this community. All these communities live mainly in the undivided Goalpara district and speak different Goalpariya dialects of the Assamese language (Zaman 2014: 4). On the other hand, Muslims living in many villages of Assam can be identified as converted from Hindus. Samiruddin Ahmed records that Kanaisuba, Gohaipara, Nagarbahi, Harinkhuja, Marai and Ghopa of old Darrang district; Degali, Bhogpur, Madhabpur of Nalbari district; Dandua, Rowadhala, Pathari and Tarabari of undivided Nagaon district are a few of the examples of villages that converted from Hinduism to Islam as a consequence of the spread of Islam by preachers (Ahmed 1999: 10–11). Historian R.M. Eaton explained four conventional theories of Islamisation in India: Immigration, Sword, Patronage and Social Liberation. The immigration theory views Islamisation in India in terms of the diffusion of 23

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people, not of belief. According to this view, the bulk of India’s Muslims descended from other Muslims who had either migrated overland from the Iranian plateau or sailed across the Arabian Sea. The sword theory stresses the role of military force in the diffusion of Islam in India and elsewhere. This theory believes that Indian Muslims were forcibly converted. It was the Indo-Muslim state’s military arm to which people were said to have submitted, not the Islamic faith. The patronage theory views that Indians of the pre-modern period converted to Islam in order to receive some nonreligious favour from the Muslim ruling class – relief from taxes, promotion in bureaucracy and so forth. The last theory, social liberation, postulates that oppressed castes under the Hindu caste system, which is unchanging through time and rigidly discriminatory against its own lower orders, converted to Islam en masse for its liberating message of social equality (Eaton 1993: 113–17). However, Eaton explicitly shows that each theory is inadequate to explain the mass Islamisation in India due to insufficient historical evidence, although each theory explains some truth of Islamisation in the Indian subcontinent. In the process of origin and growth of Muslims in Assam, there is no recorded history of the migration of Muslims from the Iranian plateau except few preachers of Islam. Barak valley encountered Islam during the eighth and ninth centuries through the Arab traders who used the historic Silk Road and the ancient terrestrial and maritime trade routes connecting Asia with the Middle East and southern Europe. Barak valley was not far away from the Chittagong port of present-day Bangladesh. However, there is no recorded history that these traders were engaged in the spread of Islam. Regarding the Sword and the Patronisation theories of Islamisation in India, the opposite of what these conventional theories presumed happened in Assam. The use of sword or force as a means to convert to Islam is found nowhere in the history of Assam. The Muslim prisoners taken in the wars between the Ahoms and the Muslims were subsequently rehabilitated in different parts of Brahmaputra valley. After they were rehabilitated, the Muslim prisoners gradually assimilated into medieval Assamese society. There is a popular account in Assam that as these Muslim prisoners did not bring wives with them, they married local non-Muslim Assamese women which helped them to be accepted as an inseparable part of the Assamese society. In the course of time, they gave up their own languages and accepted Assamese as their mother tongue (Hussain 1993: 199). However, there is no clear account of the circumstances in which local Assamese women married Muslim prisoners. The medieval period, of course, indicates such possibilities. In medieval Assam, the self-immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their dead husbands, practised in other parts of India, was not followed [CHA(III) 2007: 195]. There were frequent wars during this period whereby soldiers lost their lives, many of whom were married. Lots of women became widows in the prime of their life. In this situation, it is possible that such widows got married or married off to 24

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Muslim prisoners who were rehabilitated by the king. Another possibility is that the king himself took the initiative of such marriages, to help the widows and also to secure the loyalty of the Muslim prisoners. Still the question remains: why did those Muslim soldiers not accept Hinduism given they were primarily prisoners of war and very few in number in an overwhelmingly Hindu society? According to the Patronage theory, people converted to Islam in the pre-modern period in order to receive non-religious favours from the Muslim ruling class. In the case of the growth of Muslims in Assam, although the patronage theory exists, it is totally different from what it assumes. In the case of present upper Assam, the Ahom Kingdom was occupied by Mir Jumlah for ten months. Moreover, the undivided Goalpara district from lower Assam was a Muslim dominion for a long period. But in both cases, there is no historical account of conversion to Islam to gain favour from the rulers. Opposed to this theory of conversion by means of favour from the Muslim king, the historical accounts, as has already discussed, say that the non-Muslim rulers patronised the Islam religion to spread in Assam. A large number of historians and journalists from South Asia, particularly Muslims, subscribe to social liberation as the most acceptable explanation of mass Islamisation in the Indian subcontinent. The immigration of Muslims from the Iranian plateau did not happen to Assam, and the opposite of the Sword and Patronisation theories of Islamisation happened in the state. Against this, the social liberation theory of Islamisation can be applicable in Assam, but with very limited scope. The conversion to Islam in Assam was very limited, reflected in the first-ever census conducted in Assam in 1872. In this census only 924 out of 1,78,109 Muslims in the state identified themselves as ‘Sheikhs’. Local converts from the lower caste Hindus and aboriginal tribes described themselves as ‘Sheikhs’. This implies that there was no large-scale conversion of the native people to Islam and converts did not form the bulk of the Muslim population in Assam (Ahmed 2017: 59). It can be assumed that the neo-Vaishnavism propounded by Shankardeva (1449–1568) successfully influenced a large section of the population which could explain why Assam did not witness mass conversion to Islam during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Shankardeva’s teaching itself was against caste hegemony and exploitation prevalent in the Hindu religion. There are instances of conversion to Islam in the history of Assam, but it occurred neither under force nor for social liberation. One such instance was during the Burmese attack in 1821 before the British took over Assam. In November that year, Burmese soldiers plundered and destroyed many villages under Habraghat pargana and in some other parts of lower Assam. Many people became homeless and fled indiscriminately in fear. Some of the Hindus and aboriginal tribes took shelter in Muslim families. After the restoration of peace, these people were not accepted by their families because of their close interaction and inter-dining with Muslim people. 25

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Thus, some non-Muslims became compelled to embrace the Islamic faith, which eventually led to the growth of the Muslim population in Assam (ibid: 60). The Muslim population of Assam was negligible until the state was taken over by the British. This is evident from the census report of 1872. The report enumerates that the Muslim population in Brahmaputra valley districts were: Darrang – 5.9 per cent, Kamrup – 8.2 per cent, Lakhimpur – 3.1 per cent, Nowgong – 3.9 per cent, Sibsagar – 4.3 per cent and Goalpara- 20.1 per cent. The Surma valley1 in the Cachar district had 36.3 per cent Muslims of the total population (cited in Dev and Lahiri 1985: 157–58). Looking at those numbers, it cannot be said that there was mass Islamisation in Assam before the British took over the state in 1826. By 1872, the British had already ruled Assam for four and a half decades. However, in present Assam, Muslims account for more than one-third of the total population. This indicates that the high growth of Muslims in Assam is a modern phenomenon.

Muslim immigration during colonial period The one-upmanship of the Ahom nobility resulted in three Burmese invasions on Assam between 1817 and 1826. Weakened by a series of rebellions in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Ahoms were not in a position to thwart these attacks. The Burmese, after conquering the Ahom Kingdom, started making raids into the neighbouring British controlled territories. The British, who were earlier reluctant to colonise Assam, came into direct conflict with the Burmese occupying force. Following the decisive victory in the First Anglo-Burmese War, the British annexed Assam under the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826. The administration of Assam was placed under an agent to the Governor General and Commissioner of North East Bengal. After Assam came under British rule, different groups of people immigrated to Assam mainly in search of livelihood. Some groups, particularly the tea labourers, immigrated to the state under the direct patronage of the British government. On the other hand, groups like Muslims and Hindu Bengalis were encouraged to immigrate to the state by colonial administration to fulfil their business and administrative interests. The communities like Marwaris, Beharis, Punjabis etc. also immigrated to the state during this period for trade, commerce and manual work. The immigration of people from Nepal also started during this period. Robert Bruce, a British merchant and soldier, first spotted tea in Assam in 1823. Assam was annexed (in 1826) by the British shortly after the discovery. Bruce was appointed superintendent of the government tea forest, who, in 1837, sent 46 boxes of Assam tea to the Tea Committee in England. The British administration encouraged capital investment in the tea plantation of Assam from British private companies by declaring open sesame to investors and giving them free run of the province. Large amounts of 26

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lands were allotted to these companies and investors for tea plantation. Very soon, tea emerged as a profit-making item of trade for the British in Assam. The tea gardens employed many locals during 1870–75. The growing number of tea gardens compelled the planters to look for a stable source of labour supply (Saikia 2001: 144–49). The tea planters turned their attention from Assam to other recruiting places of British India, where the population was denser, less secure and more accustomed to working for wages. The principal areas were Bihar, Orissa, Bengal, Chhotanagpur, Central Province (now Madhya Pradesh), Madras (now Tamil Nadu), Bombay (now Maharashtra) and United Province (now Uttar Pradesh) (Hazarika 2006: 32). By 1884–85, out of the total tea garden labour force in Assam, 44.7 per cent were from Chhotanagpur, 27.2 per cent were from Bengal, 21.6 per cent from the United Provinces and Bihar, 0.7 per cent from Madras, 0.2 per cent from Bombay, and only 5.5 per cent from Assam (Guha 2006: 37). The import of these labourers continued till the end of the 1930s, and more than 17 Lakh people immigrated to Assam to work as labourers in the tea gardens between 1902–03 and 1937–38 (ibid: 290). The immigration of Hindu Bengalis to Brahmaputra valley started when the British first took Assam. By then, a section of Hindu Bengalis from West Bengal was educated in the English language and were able to help the British run their administration. The colonial administration imported a section of educated Bengalis from West Bengal for administrative works in Assam. After this, a large section of Bengalis immigrated to Brahmaputra valley from West Bengal to grab the employment opportunities created by the British administration in the state. On the other hand, under colonial rule, the immigration of Bengalis from then East Bengal to Barak valley became an internal affair. During 1905–12 Assam was even made a part of East Bengal with Bengali dominated Dhaka as its capital. The 1931 census recorded 550,000 people had immigrated to Assam from Bengal (Census of India Report, 1931, Assam Part). However, the number of Hindu Bengalis among them cannot be ascertained, although they also constituted a share of these immigrants. And finally, lakhs of Bengali families took refuge in Assam and were settled in the entire state, particularly in Barak valley, after the partition at independence. For trade and commerce, Marwari and Sindhi people, although not in big numbers, immigrated to Assam under British rule. The 1931 census recorded 22,000 people as immigrants from then Rajputana (present Rajasthan and parts of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat) (ibid). The same census recorded 472,000 immigrants from Bihar and Orissa, 6,000 immigrants from Punjab and 68,000 immigrants from United Province (present Uttar Pradesh). Another significant group started to immigrate to the state during colonial administration: the Nepalis. The British imported tribal people from Nepal to work as labourers in the tea gardens in Darjeeling, West Bengal. Following which, people from Nepal immigrated in huge numbers to Darjeeling. From 27

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the beginning of the twentieth century, they started to immigrate to Assam. These immigrants were even allowed to settle in excluded areas in Assam where non-tribals were not allowed to settle. This attracted large numbers of Nepali people to immigrate to Assam and to settle there. The 1931 census reported 88,000 Nepali immigrants in Assam, one per cent of the total population of the state (ibid). The largest immigration to Assam after the state was taken over by the British, which significantly influenced the demography and politics of the state in the later period, occurred from then East Bengal – the immigration of Muslims. Among the groups immigrated to Assam under British colonial administration, besides the tea labourers who were imported by British tea planters under direct patronage of colonial administration, Muslims immigrated under some policy of colonial administration. Although the British imported some Hindu Bengalis during the initial years of its rule in Assam for administrative functioning, this process was short-lived and the number of people immigrated under this policy was very small in comparison to tea labourers and Muslims. The immigration of Hindu Bengalis after this was not a result of any immigration policy of colonial administration. In 1874, Assam was constituted into a separate province along with the two Bengal districts of Sylhet and Cachar under a Chief Commissioner.2 Some Assamese leaders at that time suggested to the first Chief Commissioner, Colonel Keatinge, that the British government would have done better to include the Assamese (Kamrupi) districts of Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar (which were also under the same British administrative division till then) in Assam instead of the Bengali districts of Sylhet and Cachar (Nath 2015b: 69). The inclusion of Sylhet in Assam under the same administrative area of British India made the migration of Muslims from East Bengal to Assam an internal affair. Till 1900, the Muslim migration to Assam was a slow process. However, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the colonial administration started to encourage Muslim peasants from East Bengal to come to Brahmaputra valley for commercial interests. With the passage of time, the migration of Muslims to Assam increased manifold. The Muslim League politics during the freedom movement period also acted as a catalyst in the process. The history of Muslim immigration into Assam during British rule can be divided into two periods. The first period covers the time from the British annexation of Assam until the formation of the first provincial government in the state in 1937. During this period, the British administration created a conducive environment for the immigration of Muslim peasants from East Bengal into Assam for their commercial interests. The second period was from 1937 to 1946 under the Muslim League Provincial government in Assam. During this period, consecutive Muslim League-led provincial government of Assam directly patronised Muslim immigration from East Bengal to make Assam a Muslim majority province so that it could be included in Pakistan. The Muslim League-led provincial government 28

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encouraged large-scale Muslim immigration into the state in the name of ‘grow more food’ and British administration remained silent on the whole affair, although it repeatedly tried to establish Muslim immigration as a threat to indigenous Assamese people. Colonial policy of Muslim immigration For the first time, Sir Charles Elliot, Chief Commissioner of Assam (1881– 85), alluded to the existence of large areas of wasteland in Brahmaputra valley to produce more crops. This attracted the attention of the government of India which subsequently began to consider settling peasants from Bengal and Bihar in those vast tracts (Kar 1990: 8). British officials considered the soil of Assam as the richest with no limit to its productiveness and millions of acres, the latter of which were still lying fallow. In this regard, they considered the immigration of that period was far below the requirement of the province. After this realisation, the British administration classified the lands into ‘waste’, ‘arable’ and ‘forest’ and initiated the project of the colonisation of wasteland, introduced in Goalpara district (Misra 2011: 96–97). In the latter half of the nineteenth century, tea had become a huge profit earner in upper Assam. The British then felt the need to cultivate commercial cash crops in Assam which would be profitable for both the cultivators and the government. In the meantime, the British government in India came under intense pressure to accelerate the production of cotton and increase its supply to Britain, as British merchants could no longer rely on the supply of cotton from America which was then reeling under civil war. Moreover, if cotton production could be increased in India, it would be available at a cheaper rate. Therefore, the British government started to grow cotton in Assam too. Cotton was cultivated in large areas of Nagaon (5,074 acres), Kamrup ((2,351 acres), Darrang and Lakhimpur (850 acres each) in 1874–75. However, cotton cultivation in Brahmaputra valley started to dwindle and within the next 20 years its cultivation in the valley as a commercial crop lost importance. This was mainly due to the fact that the centre of the cotton industry was located in Bombay which increased the transport cost and uncertainty of profit. While the local traders, mainly the Marwaris, increasingly became disinterested in the cotton trade, the necessity of an alternative commercial crop was pressing for both traders and cultivators. Then jute emerged as the alternative to cotton (Saikia 2001: 90). The jute mills already established by British businessmen in Bengal also helped in this process. The background of the emergence of jute as a cash crop has been explained by historian Rajen Saikia as: The importance of jute as a cash crop became apparent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The use of jute for various domestic purposes like making rope, twine etc., was known to Assam but it was not quite extensive. With the growing facilities of river-borne trade, the 29

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Marwaris developed interest in this article of trade. Jute was grown more or less in all the plain districts of Lower Assam. Goalpara was the largest producer of jute. Its cultivation in the western part of the district spread only after 1881. By that time Bengal had already established itself as the largest producer of jute. By 1885, twenty jute mills were set up and jute industry acquired much importance. All jute mills owners then were Englishmen and they converted either side of Ganga, from Calcutta to Chinsurah into the ‘Dundee of Bengal’. Increasing jute production in Assam helped to get the best of it. Thus, cotton failed in Upper Assam, jute triumphed in Lower Assam (ibid). The cultivation of jute marked the beginning of regional specialisation of agriculture in Assam. By 1897, 35,000 acres of land in the Goalpara district, 400 acres in Kamrup, 300 acres in Nagaon and 200 acres in Darrang were brought under jute cultivation (ibid: 88–91). Compared to rice, jute required more labour. As labour was more expensive in Assam, the cost of jute cultivation was higher than that of Bengal. The British government, ultimately, concluded that without immigration and the reclamation of wastelands, the prospect of growing jute in Assam was not promising. In view of this, the government carefully considered encouraging the immigration of Muslim farmers into Assam from the eastern districts of Bengal (ibid: 91–92). It was mostly the Muslim farmers of Bengal who had jute growing expertise. The import of farmers from East Bengal became imperative for British colonialism as Assamese farmers were unwilling to grow jute. It can be noted here that jute was also cultivated in Assam when the British administration decided to bring in Muslim peasants to grow it in the state. Tribes like the Hajongs, the Rabhas and the Kacharis produced superior quality jute. But that production was only for domestic use (Misra 2011: 111). The depopulation of the Assamese indigenous population had also created a situation whereby British colonists identified poor and laborious Muslim peasants of East Bengal indispensable for the growth of jute cultivation in Assam. The state experienced depopulation during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The variation of the population from 1891 to 1901 in different districts of Assam was as follows: Goalpara – minus 2.6, Kamrup – minus 7.8, Nagaon – minus 23.4, Sibsagar – plus 30.92, and Lakhimpur – plus 46.34 [CHA(V) 2007: 50]. The black fever (kala azar) was the cause of the depopulation in several districts of Assam. The black fever epidemic, originating in Garo Hills, appeared in Goalpara in 1883, entered Assam proper in 1888, and gradually spread throughout its length and breadth (Census of India Report 1891, 1901). The increase of the population in Sibsagar and Lakhimpur, as shown earlier, was due to large-scale immigration into tea gardens [CHA(V) 2007: 50]. Based on an exercise, listing all Hindu indigenous castes and indigenous tribes of Assam proper, and their numbers for the relevant census years, the census authorities 30

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concluded that the indigenous population actually decreased by 5.4 per cent between 1881 and 1891 and 6.4 per cent between 1891 and 1901 (Census of India Report 1891, 1901). Besides, the import of Muslim peasants from East Bengal emerged as essential for the British administration as it had already identified the Assamese as apathetic and idle [CHA(V) 2007: 50]. The British impression of the people of Assam in general was hardly flattering as John M’Cosh, in Topography of Assam published in 1837, observed about the Assamese: They are idle and indolent in their habits, childish and timid in their manners, and perfectly indifferent about providing for their future want. They work for a day or two at a time, and spend the next day or two in listlessness and intemperance… (2010: 21) Another factor that might also have influenced the British administration’s policy to import Muslim peasants from East Bengal to Brahmaputra valley was the need to overcome the shortage of food production in Assam. The state possessed an abundance of fertile cultivable land; however, the land abundant economy of Brahmaputra valley failed to grow enough food grains to feed its increasing population. The annual import of food grains into the valley increased from 0.3 million maunds in around 1872 to some 0.7 million maunds during the last five years of the nineteenth century (Guha 2006: 30). Given the situation, the British administration might have believed that the import of laborious Muslim peasants from East Bengal would also contribute to growing more food gains in the state. After Assam became part of a single province with the two Bengal districts of Sylhet and Cachar in 1874, Muslim peasants from the Bengal districts started to immigrate to Brahmaputra valley to earn their livelihood. However, they were small in number and immigration occurred particularly from Mymensingh district. It happened because of the high pressure of population over land in the district. In 1874, the total population of the district was 23,51,700 which was 4,35,707 more than the total population of all the Brahmaputra valley districts. There were four and a half million acres of land in the district of which about half was cultivated and the other half included waste and other categories of land. Conversely, in Assam, the total cultivable land was 67,79,978 acres of which only 12,58,277 acres were cultivated (Administration Report of Mymensingh 1873–84). The vast expanse of cultivable land in Assam attracted landless Muslim farmers of Mymensingh. The British administration, during the initial period, provided several incentives, including exemption of payments of land revenues for three years, to attract immigrants to the Brahmaputra valley. Still migration of Muslim peasants from East Bengal to Assam was not satisfactory for the British administration initially. It could be argued that the reason behind 31

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the low level of migration was that Muslims who migrated to Assam in large numbers in the later phase were from the neighbouring districts of Bengal and they were not under the pressure of the population which could have persuaded people to migrate. However, the situation changed in the beginning of the last century. As per the Report of Census of India, 1921, the population in rural Bengal rose by 6.5 per cent in the 1920s. Dacca experienced a density of 1,118 people per square mile and Mymensingh experienced a density of 823 people per square mile (Census of India Report 1921). This demographic pressure, the subservience of the jute cultivating class to market forces and the near constancy in the yield from cultivable areas, created conditions of impoverishment for the peasantry. A number of peasants came under a situation of indebtedness with high interest rates and inhuman exploitations of moneylenders (Misra 2011: 104–06). All these had pushed the marginal farmers to the rich alluvial tracts of Brahmaputra valley. In this regard, the availability of large expanses of rich land in Assam and the colonial government’s incentives to the agriculturists worked as magnets for those marginalised peasants in East Bengal to immigrate to Brahmaputra valley. This situation clearly states that the immigration from East Bengal into Assam at the beginning of the twentieth century was not intentional on the part of the immigrants. At that point in time, immigration was not at all voluntary. For those who migrated to Assam from East Bengal it was obligatory, and they migrated to an unfamiliar land with an uncertain future and to a life of struggle. The threat of malaria and black fever epidemics in Assam were almost a certainty for the immigrants. The colonial administration even extended rail lines to East Bengal to facilitate immigration into Assam. In 1887, the colonial administration decided to build a rail line to link upper Assam through North Cachar Hills combined with a line from Cachar to Chittagong, comprising a branch to Meghna for access to Calcutta. The construction of the line became very important for the British for bringing in labourers and peasants, besides planting and other commercial interests [CHA(IV) 2007: 317]. As a result, Assam-Bengal Railway was extended to Tinsukia in 1903 and access to sea (Chittagong) in 1904 (ibid: 321). By 1896, the Assam-Bengal Railway connected Chittagong to Badarpur, Noakhali and Chandpur. Lumding to Badarpur hill section was completed by 1903 (Goswami 2013: 190). The extension of this line to Lumding stabilised communication between Assam and Chittagong. The development of a railway network between East Bengal and Assam helped the marginalised Muslim peasants from East Bengal to come to Assam in search of a better life and livelihood. Three factors heavily contributed to the initial huge Muslim migration from East Bengal to Brahmaputra valley since the beginning of the nineteenth century. First was an interplay of economic forces in East Bengal vis-à-vis Assam valley. The extraordinary rise in the prices of food grains, acute indebtedness, pressure of population on land, oppression of zamindars (hereditary collector of revenue), high land rent etc. had created a strong 32

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desire in the minds of the agricultural labourers and other exploited classes of East Bengal to escape from such unbearable hardships. The cheap and plentiful supply of virgin land with freedom of ryotwari (ryot is a peasant whose main occupation is cultivation) settlement in Brahmaputra valley offered a promising escape to those unfortunate peasants of East Bengal. Second, when Assam had lost its separate identity as a province during the partition of Bengal in 1905 and was administratively merged with the Dacca Division of Bengal with a view to form a new province called the ‘Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam’ with headquarters at Dacca, communication channels between the people of Assam valley and those of Eastern Bengal narrowed. This also facilitated the movement of people from one region to another. Third, the unprecedented improvements in railway transport between East Bengal and Assam in the first decade of the twentieth century facilitated the easy passage of men and materials. Prior to this, the only means of transport between Assam valley and East Bengal was navigable river transport provided by Brahmaputra River. These developments in railways greatly reduced the remoteness of Assam from the rest of British India which had increased the mobility of the Bengal peasantry, and a large number of farmers from the overcrowded districts of East Bengal started pouring into the Assam valley (Gogoi and Goswami 2004: 8–10). The increasing migration of Muslim farmers started to serve the purpose of a colonial economy, where the colonial masters wanted to create an economic surplus at any cost. By the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, after two decades of the start of large-scale immigration of farmers from Eastern Bengal, a boost in the cultivation of commercial crops like jute and a huge expansion of cultivable land in the entire Brahmaputra valley were observed. In the Goalpara district alone, the area brought under cultivation had risen from 10,256 acres between 1922 and 1923 to 45,000 acres between 1933 and 1934 (Misra 2011: 114). The fast pace of immigration from East Bengal had also created an environment for the sharp increase in rent and the expansion of the land market in Brahmaputra valley. The government, after the process of immigration set in, frequently revised and increased land revenue rates in Assam. The regulations under which the land revenue rates in Assam were revised from time to time had no legislative sanction. The increasing competition among the immigrants for land created a favourable atmosphere for the government to that. It also pleased the government that the immigrants were ready to pay a much higher rent than the indigenous people. Line system and Colonisation scheme The Muslim population in Brahmaputra valley comprised of 3,65,540 individuals in 1911 which rose to 5,94,981 in 1921 and 9,53,299 in 1931 (Census of India Reports 1911, 1921, 1931). The high level of immigration from East Bengal led to a shift in the demographic balance in favour of 33

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Muslims, with an abnormal rise in their share of the total population from nine per cent in 1881 to 19 per cent in 1931. This alarming rise in the population adversely affected the rural economy of Assam. Mass migration in an organised way and the occupation of wastelands, grazing and forest reserves posed serious problems. Mass squatting as well as the occupation of whole villages at times by the immigrants through the purchase of land by offering tempting prices to the local inhabitants whose economic difficulties compelled them to part with their land seemed to threaten the survival of the indigenous inhabitants. The immigration issue was steadily assuming a serious turn (Bhuyan and De 1999: 308–09). However, it was also a fact that cultivable land was often sold at premium prices to the immigrants by the local farmers (Misra 2011: 109). To restrict the indiscriminate settlements by immigrants in the lands inhabited by indigenous people, the officials of Nowgong (present Nagaon) district in 1916 devised an administrative measure known as the ‘Line System’. The system was first put into action in 1920 in the Nagaon district and the Barpeta sub-division of the Kamrup district. Under the Line System, land was classified into the following categories: (i) those in which immigrants might settle freely; (ii) those in which they could not settle; and, (iii) where the line was drawn, they could settle only on one side of it. The ceiling of land for an immigrant family was fixed at 16 bighas (bigha is a unit of land measurement equivalent to one-third of an acre). This measure helped the government in the collection of revenue. Generally, in the villages situated on wastelands, grants were classified into four types: (i) exclusively occupied by the immigrants; (ii) exclusively reserved for Assamese; (iii) mixed villages for both groups; and, (iv) villages with a line on the Assamese side where immigrants were not allowed to acquire land (Report of the Line System Committee 1938). The Line System failed to contain the migration from East Bengal. The British administration ignored the failure of the Line System in the interest of increasing the land revenue. Later in 1928, it introduced the Colonisation Scheme, which was virtually a negation of the Line System. The Colonisation Scheme was first introduced in Nowgong district in 1928, and thereafter in the Barpeta sub-division of Kamrup district and the Mangaldoi sub-division of Darrang district. A family was required to be provided with about 20 bighas of land on payment of premium under the new scheme. The Line System and thereafter the Colonisation Scheme opened a new era of Muslim immigration to Assam. These schemes increased land revenue substantially in which the British administration was fundamentally interested. With the rise of land revenue, these schemes helped the gradual growth of Muslim population in British Assam (Hussain 1993: 205). Up to March 1933, an area of 47,636 acres of land in Nowgong district alone was allotted among 1,619 Muslim and 441 Hindu immigrant families (cited in Guha 2006: 169). Meanwhile, many immigrant families had acquired a thousand bighas of land and they brought labourers either to work on it or for the purpose of sub-letting. These new petty zamindars, locally known as 34

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matabbars (the headman of a Muslim immigrant village), thus brought vast numbers of kamlas (day-labourer) every year along with their families (Report of the Line System Committee 1938). Immigration policy and politics of divide and rule The colonial administration introduced the invisible Line System to divide the indigenous people and newly immigrated Muslim farmers. The system can be considered as the first institutional attempt by the British colonial masters to communally divide the people of Assam. Undoubtedly, it was a policy to safeguard the indigenous people from the immigrants. But it was innovated and used by the British only as a dividing instrument. The British administration did not place too much emphasis on following the Line System; rather, they encouraged the inflow of new settlers to enhance land revenue. Although the government tried to show its solidarity with the indigenous Assamese people through the Line System, it increased the amount of land to be allotted to the immigrants through the Colonisation Scheme. The British administration was successful in firmly placing the communal division in Assam through the Line System, creating a sense of identity crisis in the minds of the native people. The fear and apprehensions among the Assamese people against the large-scale immigration into Assam was aggravated after the publication of the 1931 census report. The Census of India, 1931 exposed the menace of the influx of outsiders to the indigenous population of Assam. This census estimated the figures of immigrants into Assam: persons belonging to nonindigenous tea garden population – 14,00,000, East Bengal immigrants and their descendants – 5,50,000, Nepalese – 1,40,000, and Other Classes (Marwaris, Bengali Traders etc.) – 80,000. The total number of immigrants stood at 21,70,000. C. S. Mulan, the then superintendent of the census operation in Assam, observed that the large-scale immigration would wipe out the Assamese race and culture more conclusively than the Burmese invasion did nearly one hundred years ago. He remarked: Probably the most important event in the province during the last 25 years – an event which seems likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and to destroy more surely than did the Burmese invaders of 1820, the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization – has been the invasion of a vast horde of land hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Muslims, from the districts of Eastern Bengal and in particular from Mymensingh. Mulan further commented on the ‘immigrant army’: … By 1921 the first army corps of the invaders had conquered Goalpara. The second army corps which followed them in the years 1921-31 has 35

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consolidated their position in that district and has also completed the conquest of Nowgong. The Barpeta subdivision of Kamrup has also fallen to their attack and Darrang is being invaded. Sibsagar has so far escaped completely but few thousand Mymensinghias in North Lakhimpur are an outpost which may during the next decade prove to be a valuable basis of major operations. (Census of India Report 1931,Vol. III, Part. I) The 1931 census was not the first time that the British government acknowledged the threat of Muslim immigration into Assam. In 1911 also, the census commissioner pointed to the dangers of immigration by calling it ‘… a peaceful invasion of Assam by the advancing hordes of Mymensinghia army…’ (Census of India Report 1911, Commissioner’s Remarks). However, the mystery was that even repeatedly acknowledging the danger of Muslim immigration into Assam, the British administration continued the policy of encouraging Muslim immigration from East Bengal to Assam until independence. A number of political historians believe that Mulan’s statement was part of the British government’s policy of divide and rule. They believe that the anti-colonial struggle attained momentum at that stage in India and the British administration tried to divide the Hindus and Muslims of Assam by such comments (Hussain 1993: 206). In this regard, it should be acknowledged that when the British administration itself was responsible for largescale immigration into Assam, in that situation, such a comment by a colonial officer must have some strategic relevance. Due to the economic depression of the 1930s, the stream of immigrants gained a new momentum and indiscriminate encroachments on government land and reserves continued unabated. In many cases, the Lines fixed by the district authorities were also completely ignored. It should be noted that there had never been any bar to Muslim immigrants purchasing permanently leased lands within the Lines where they existed. The growth of the Muslim population in the four lower districts of Assam valley (Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang and Nowgong) during 1911–41 was mainly due to the continuous flow of immigrants from East Bengal. During this period, the increase of the Muslim population in these districts was: Goalpara – 221 per cent, Kamrup – 568 per cent, Darrang – 595 per cent and Nowgong – 1594 per cent (based on the census reports of 1911, 1941). The increase was most noticeable in the district of Nowgong. The British, during this period, played a double role vis-à-vis Muslim immigration into Assam from East Bengal. On the one hand, it encouraged Muslim immigration into the state and on the other hand, it created the Line System to protect the indigenous population of the state from largescale Muslim immigration. In all colonies across the world, the colonial rulers played the game of divide and rule among the natives to keep their rule unchallenged. In India too, from the experience of Sepoy Mutiny (1857), the British realised that they could use religion as the most effective 36

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weapon to pit Hindus against Muslims, thereby dividing the people of India. In Assam, the colonial administration used the large-scale Muslim immigration from East Bengal to Brahmaputra valley as a weapon to divide the people of Assam along religious lines. On the one hand, it continuously encouraged Muslim immigration from East Bengal to Assam for the sake of the colonial economy,but on the other it tried to establish these immigrants as a ‘threat’ to the indigenous Assamese people, for example by introducing the Line System and bythe use of rhetorical language in the 1911 and 1931 census reports.

Muslim League politics of immigration The Government of India Act was passed in 1935, which ended the diarchy and ushered in the concept of popular government through collective responsibility and provincial autonomy. With the election to the Legislative Council held in 1937 under the Act of 1935, Assam entered into the parliamentary system. The Assam Provincial Muslim League was established at Shillong (in present Meghalaya) in 1928 by some Muslims of Barak valley to protect the rights and interests of Muslims in Assam (Ahmed 1999: 41). Abdul Matin Choudhury was the main person behind the formation of the organisation (Guha 2006: 171). However, until the election of 1937, there was no Muslim League organisation in Brahmaputra valley. In fact, there was no organised Muslim party worth mentioning. The Assam Valley Muslim Party of Md. Tayabulla was a one man show and his political activity was like an echo of the Congress tone. Likewise, Abdul Matin Choudhury was working alone for the Muslim League in Barak valley (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 60). Only after the 1937 elections, the Muslim League’s organisational structure came into being in Brahmaputra valley in a small village known as Alitangani in the Nowgong district in 1938 (Ahmed 1999: 41). The League got a new momentum in the politics of Assam after the joining of Muhammad Saadulla, an Assamese Muslim from Brahmaputra valley, after the 1937 provincial election. The Muslim League did not fare well in the 1937 elections. The party had altogether four members in the Assembly after the election. Being the single largest party in the 108-member Assam Legislative Assembly, Congress had a fair chance of forming a coalition government but did not come forward to do so. In this situation, Saadulla emerged as the chief ministerial candidate. He had an unbroken record of administrative experience of a whole decade from1924 to 1934, first as a minister and later as an executive councillor. He was a pragmatist and was moderate in his political views. Above all, he was ready to co-operate with every move of the British Raj for constitutional reforms. In this situation, Governor Sir Robert Reid came forward to install Muhammad Saadulla as Assam’s first Chief Minister/ Premier (Guha 2006: 176–78). 37

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Saadulla took office as the head of a non-Congress coalition ministry on 1 April 1937 – the inaugural day of the 1935 Constitution, backed by supporting groups of the British government. With this, a new era of Muslim politics in Assam began. During his first cabinet under the provincial autonomy, Saadulla depended on several groups and independent members belonging to the Muslim League, the STs, and SCs and the European groups. By 1938, particularly after the Lucknow session of the League, however, he was able to consolidate the Muslims under his leadership and the banner of the League whose strength soon rose from four to 25 and finally stood at 31 in Legislative Assembly (Kar 1990: 255). In the 1937 provincial election, seats won by different Muslim groups were: Muslim League – four, Assam valley Muslims Group – 13, and Surma valley United Muslim Party – 17. After becoming the premier of Assam in 1937, Saadulla started to steer the direction of Muslim politics in Assam and remained the undisputed Muslim leader in the politics of Assam till independence. Interspersed with short breaks totalling 24 months, he was the premier of Assam five times from 1937 until the election of 1946. Under the Act of 1935, a total of 34 seats were reserved for Muslims in the Assam Legislative Assembly out of 108 seats. After the 1937 elections, out of 34 the League had altogether four Muslim members in the Assembly while Congress had only one. Not a single Muslim candidate could win on a Congress ticket in the elections out of its total 32 successful candidates. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, who was elected as an independent, joined Congress after the results of the election were declared and increased Congress’s strength to 33 in the Assembly. This proves that Congress did not have any electoral foothold among Muslims at that time. It is interesting that Congress did not have any influence over the Assam Muslims when even the Muslim League did not have any presence in Assam. The Muslim League came into existence in (present) Assam only in 1938, after the elections. In this situation, it cannot be easily said that Muslims did not support Congress under communal considerations. In reality, it was the issue of the Line System that determined the voting behaviour of Muslims in the 1937 elections. While Muslims, particularly the recent immigrant Muslims, wanted the abolition of any kind of restrictions in land procurement and settlement, Congress strongly supported the Line System and opposed its abolition. The Muslims were even ready to rally behind Congress if it would concede them the right to land and new settlement. During the years 1928– 36, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, popularly known as Maulana Bhasani, used to move up and down Brahmaputra to visit riverside immigrant Muslim villages located in inaccessible areas of Assam, and he articulated their demand for land (Guha 2006: 174). Maulana Bhasani was one of the leaders behind the formation of the provincial branch of the Muslim League in Assam. He spearheaded the agitation for the abolition of the Line System and over the course of time, he became the most prominent League leader among the Muslims of Assam. Against this backdrop, it can 38

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be said that Bhasani’s mobilisation of immigrant Muslims for land rights was the reason that the community did not support Congress in the election. The strong demands raised by Muslim League members in the Assam Legislative Assembly after 1937 elections for the abolition of the Line System prove the point. Since the inauguration of provincial autonomy under the Act of 1935, political developments in Assam led to the emergence of an immigrant lobby, which, over the course of time, became a powerful force under the dynamic leadership of Maulana Bhasani. On 15 September 1937, Munawar Ali of the Surma Valley United Muslim Party passed a resolution in the Assam Legislative Assembly regarding the abolition of the Line System. While passing the resolution, he stated that ‘the immigrants had turned thickest forests of Assam into smiling paddy lands yielding all kinds of crops, bringing in prosperity, health and wealth to the province of Assam’. He characterised the Line System as arbitrary and against all principles of nation making (The Assam Gazette, Part VI, No. III, 1937). The Muslim members of the Assam Legislative Assembly played a crucial role in the politics and governance of Assam till the next Assembly election was held in 1946. In each ministry, constituted in this period, Muslims had either half or majority presence, except for the Congress-led Bardoloi ministry (1938–39). In the first-ever elected ministry formed by Muhammad Saadulla in April 1937, there were three Muslim members in a five-member ministry. In the reconstituted Saadulla ministry in February 1938, the total members of the ministry increased to six, and the number of Muslim members remained the same. In September 1938, Gopinath Bardoloi formed his first ministry and he included three Muslims in his eight-member ministry. Bardoloi’s ministry came to an end in November 1939. From then until the Assembly elections of 1946, Sir Saadulla formed a ministry in Assam three times. In all three ministries, there were five Muslim ministers out of a total of ten. Under the provincial autonomy, while the Muslim League government tried to encourage Muslim immigration to Assam from East Bengal, the Congress-led governments tried to halt this process. During 1937–46, while the Muslim League led the government in Assam for more than six years, Congress ran the government only for 14 months. From 25 March 1945 until the next Assembly election in 1946, Assam experienced a coalition government of Congress and Muslim League which was led by Saadulla. As the Muslim League ruled Assam for most of the time during 1937–46, the pro-immigrant policy of the consecutive League governments helped Muslims from East Bengal to migrate to Brahmaputra valley in large numbers. The British administration itself was not willing to do away with the Line System because it feared that unrestricted immigration might drive the indigenous inhabitants off the map completely. Under pressure from the immigrant lobby, the government in 1937 decided to constitute a committee 39

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on the prevailing situation vis-à-vis the working of the Line System. This committee consisted of eight members of the Assam Legislative Assembly representing different interests. Syed Abdur Rouf represented the immigrant interest. The committee submitted its report in February 1938, within which the committee favoured retaining ‘a certain amount of control in indicating areas’ where the immigrants could settle; ‘a large unit of restrictions should be adopted, such as the mauza (a revenue collection circle) or block of mauzas’, which were to be protected from the encroachers, and at the same time ‘artificial restrictions’ imposed on the immigrants such as acquiring land documents should be abolished; lands found to be unattractive to Assamese should be distributed among the landless immigrants; the Colonisation Scheme was to be continued, extended and to be introduced where non-existent; ‘the haphazard method of settlement by squatting must come to an end’. Almost all the members agreed that the immigrants who had already come to the province should be provided with lands if it was possible. However, some of the members thought that no further immigration to the province should be permitted and that ‘no lands should be settled with immigrants coming to the province hence forward’. At last, the committee expressed the view that ‘without firmness of administration, avoidance of unnecessary interference and an adequate and competent staff to enforce the executive orders’, the recommendations would have no value (Report of Line System Committee 1938, Chapter 9). However, the Saadulla ministry did not take any action on the recommendations of the Line System Committee – clearly for the purpose of satisfying the sentiments of the immigrant group who provided a solid support essential for his political existence (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 31–32). The Saadulla ministry resigned on 13 September 1938 and a Congress coalition ministry came into power on 19 September 1938. The new ministry published its policy concerning the Line System Committee’s Report on 4 November 1939. The policy stressed the aspect of planned settlement along with the protection of the interest of the indigenous people. It stated the government’s determination to evict immigrant settlers from forbidden places especially from village grazing grounds and professional grazing reserves. But it could not implement its policy as it resigned on 16 November of that year (ibid: 33). This declaration of the Congress-led provincial government caused widespread resentment among the immigrant leaders. Forming his new ministry after the collapse of the Congress coalition one, Saadulla, in his budget speech of 1940, enunciated a policy of inaction, a policy which was favourable to the immigrants. Saadulla opined that to stop the flow of the immigration from Bengal would be ‘most unwise’ as he felt that ‘Assam is suffering from want of population to cultivate the vast quantity of arable land which is waiting for plough’ (Assam Gazette, Part VI-B, Jan–Jun, 1940). This attitude of the Saadulla government started a new era of Muslim immigration from East Bengal to Assam. A process began whereby original group of immigrants, who had prospered because of the 40

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pro-immigrant policies of the government, brought large numbers of new immigrants. The Hindu opposition to the Saadulla government’s immigration policy brought about its downfall in December 1941. But Saadullah came back to power on 25 August 1942. During his previous government, Saadulla initiated pro-immigration policies under the banner of ‘Development Scheme’ which created an impression that the object of the government was to develop as quickly as possible all the cultivable land at their disposal and share it out among the various communities. But this time, the Saadulla ministry started to liberalise the Line System and openly took a pro-immigration stand. In the new ministry, the revenue portfolio was entrusted to Munawar Ali who was well known for his sympathy for Muslim immigrants. Under his leadership, the ‘Grow More Food’ campaign was given momentum which provided a grand opportunity to keep the Line System adhered to and arrange settlement of lands with the immigrants at an unprecedented pace. The government decided on settlement of new land with the immigrants primarily for food crops and particularly all varieties of paddy. The government even proposed to open village grazing areas for cultivation which were considered too large for the needs of local people. In 1943, grazing reserves in the districts of Kamrup, Nowgong and Darrang were regularised and new areas were offered to immigrants for settlement. The Lines had been withdrawn in a number of villages where they had previously existed, enabling immigrants to obtain settlement of land on the Assamese side of the Lines (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 38–42). The proactive role of the consecutive Muslim League ministries to increase the immigration of Muslims to Assam was clearly recorded by Lord Wavell, Governor General and Viceroy of India during 1943–47, when he visited Assam in December 1943: The native Assamese are lazy and likely to be ousted by the more pushing but less attractive Bengali Moslems. The chief political problem is the desire of the Moslem Ministers to increase this immigration into the uncultivated Government lands under the slogan of “grow more food”, but what they are really after is “grow more Moslems”. (cited in Moon 1973: 41) From the beginning of 1941, the demand for inclusion of Assam into Pakistan became stronger at the hand of the League in Assam. In the second session of the Assam Provincial Muslim League on 30–31 January 1941, Saadulla openly argued for the inclusion of Assam in Pakistan to avoid any possible conflict between Hindus and Muslims. From then, the League under the dynamic leadership of Saadulla and Bhasani, campaigned continuously to unite the Muslims of Brahmaputra valley and Sylhet to make the demand a reality. Congress, on the other hand, termed League’s claim over Assam as ‘crying for the moon’ and advocated strongly for the non-inclusion of Assam into Pakistan before the Cabinet Mission. 41

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In March 1945, a coalition cabinet headed by Saadulla with Congress support and representation through nominees came to office. This government decided to stop further encroachments by the immigrants. By then, a large number of Muslim immigrants had entered Assam because of the pro-immigration policies of the successive Saadulla governments. According to the Monthly Progress Reports of land-settlement, between 1943 and 1945, a total 1,74,548 bighas of land were directly settled with ‘new immigrants’, 26,753 bighas were settled after the regularisation of old encroachment, 25,6131 bighas were proposed to be included in colonisation area for immigrants and 1,64,995 bighas were opened in grazing reserves for settlement. Thus, the total amount of land allotted to immigrants was 6,22,427 bighas. Taking the average statutory five bighas per family of an average of five members each, M. Kar estimates the total number of immigrant families as 1,24,485 and the number added to the existing Muslim population as 6,22,427 (1990: 78).

1946 provincial election and Assam Muslims The superannuated Assam Legislature was dissolved on 1 October 1945 while the fifth and last Saadulla ministry was to continue until the general election in the second week of February 1946. In the1946 election, Congress swept the general constituencies, securing 78 per cent of the votes therein. The second Assembly constituted under the Act of 1935 consisted of 58 Congress, nine British and seven independent members, besides others. Of the 34 Muslim seats, as many as 31 were claimed by the Muslim League, only three by the Jamiat-ul-ulma-e-Hind (Jamiat). From the three constituencies won by Jamiat, two were from Sylhet and the rest was from Cachar. Out of the 34 constituencies reserved for Muslims under provincial autonomy, 16 were from present Bangladesh and 18 were from present Assam. From 18 constituencies of present Assam, only one Jamiat candidate won. This proves that the Muslim League was overwhelmingly supported by Assam Muslims in the 1946 elections. However, it must also be noted here that in this election, only 23 per cent people from Assam had the right to vote, of which Muslims constituted not more than 11 per cent (Hoque 2007: 308). Jamiat fought elections in Assam for the first time in the 1946 elections and succeeded in three constituencies. The success of the party is explained by the influence of the Deoband School of Islamic theology and of Hussain Ahmed Madani (1879–1957) – the national leader of that school (Guha 2006: 247). Jamiat was against the Muslim League’s views of dividing India on communal lines and was in favour of an undivided India. It allied with Congress in the struggle for independence. However, Jamiat’s dream of an undivided India did not materialise, and India was divided on communal lines on independence. The Muslim League could hold its footprints in Assam only after the 1937 provincial election. However, Muslim participation in the entire 42

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freedom struggle was marginal in Assam. In the period prior to the 1937 election, there was not much apparent antagonism between Hindus and Muslims, but they remained apart in their attitude to the movement and Muslim participation was negligible. Even Gandhi’s patronage to the Khilafat Movement could not attract the Muslim masses to the freedom movement. During the non-cooperation movement, in Brahmaputra valley, there were only three prominent Muslim among the leaders of the movement. They were Faiznur Ali, Md. Tayabulla and Abdul Farukki (Kar 1990: 269–78). Md. Tayabulla left his practice as a lawyer in support of the non-cooperation movement (Guha 2006: 103). From the provincial election (1937) till the independence, only Md. Tayabulla and Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed remained the prominent Muslim leaders in Congress. The nonparticipation of Assam Muslims in the freedom movement is reflected in the letter dated 18 April 1940 sent to the Congress central leadership by Assam Congress leader Gopinath Bardoloi. He wrote: You are perhaps aware that we have in Assam valley, deplorable shortage of nationalist Muslim workers. We shall be most grateful if a number of Jamiatul Ulema Maulivis could be spared to work amongst the Muslim masses on systematic basis. Of course, they will be paid a monthly salary and actual travelling expenses. (cited in Kar 1990: 288) It is interesting to understand why Assam Muslims en masse supported the Muslim League over Congress. The question of land rights is considered the main support driver for the League. While Congress was against largescale Muslim immigration to Brahmaputra valley and supported the Line System, the Muslim League encouraged large-scale Muslim immigration to Brahmaputra valley, opposed the Line System, and argued for land rights for the immigrant Muslims. Against this backdrop, it can be considered that the immigrant section of Muslims supported the Muslim League against Congress for its pro-immigrant stance. Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed, a Congress stalwart, won from Kamrup (North) constituency, reserved for Muslims, in the 1937 election as an independent candidate. He was defeated by a League candidate in the 1946 election when he contested as a Congress candidate. In both the 1937 and 1946 provincial elections, Congress could not win even from constituencies reserved for Muslims and dominated by indigenous Muslims like Sibsagar and Lakhimpur from upper Assam. Because of such a situation, prominent Assamese intellectual Hiren Gohain commented that even a large section of indigenous Muslims from upper Assam came under the influence of the League politics (Gohain 2017: 8). This is interesting as, unlike immigrant Muslims in the state, land was not a concern for the indigenous Muslims. This clearly gives the impression that a large section of Muslims, both indigenous and immigrant, supported the League on communal ground. This also explains why Jamiat could not influence the 43

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Assam Muslims much in comparison to the League although like Muslim League, Jamiat also advocated for land rights of the newly immigrated Muslims. In this situation it can be said that the Assam Muslims preferred League to Jamiat as the former advocated for a separate homeland for Muslims. However, it can also not be ignored in this regard that Jamiat did not have mass leaders in Assam who could have influenced the common Muslims. Against this, League was strengthened by the charisma and organisational activities of leaders like Bhasani. After securing an absolute majority in the 1946 election, Gopinath Bardoloi formed his seven-member Congress ministry on 1 April 1946. Abdul Matlib Majumdar from Cachar was the only Muslim in his ministry. The ministry for the first time in 1946 tried to calculate the number of encroachers in reserves. According to the Publicity and Rural Development Department Communiqué dated 14 December 1946, the government of Assam, already 30 per cent of the encroachers were ‘protected’ and would not be evicted until they were provided with alternative settlements. Total encroachers in the nine reserves (four in Darrang and five in Kamrup) had 2886 immigrants, of whom 672 were allowed undisturbed. Of the remaining, 293 were non-Muslim. Again, 646 out of the rest had no residential construction in the reserves. Thus, the allegations of the planned invasion of grazing reserves did not come to much (Kar 1990: 78). The new ministry proceeded to deal with the immigrant encroachers in professional reserves under the Resolution of 13 July 1945 passed during the League-Congress coalition ministry. As per this resolution, a landless family was redefined as one possessing less than 20 bighas of land. All grazing reserves were to be maintained intact and all encroachers were to be indiscriminately evicted therefrom as a matter of policy. Meanwhile, eviction operations were started in Darrang, Kamrup and Nowgong districts. The working committee of the Provincial Muslim League, met on 17 and 18 November 1946 recorded its ‘emphatic protest’ against the declared intention of the government of Assam to carry out the eviction of the immigrant cultivators and characterised the policy as ‘most inhuman and against all canons of justice’ (Dev and Lahiri 1985: 51). In March 1947, the president of the Assam Provincial Muslim League Working Committee, Maulana Bhasani, decided to launch the Civil Disobedience movement against the government’s eviction policy. It should be noted that the Bardoloi ministry’s eviction policy virtually brought about the end of the Muslim League’s politics on Muslim immigration. After the British government, on 3 June 1947, declared independence for India by the following August, which ultimately paved the way for the creation of Pakistan, Assam Provincial League withdrew its Civil Disobedience movement on 11 June 1947. This withdrawal signified the win of the League’s stand on the immigrant issue as the Congress ministry could not confirm any concrete policy for solving the issue before independence. With independence, controversies like the Line System came to an end. And in 1948, after independence, the Bardoloi ministry tried to 44

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protect the tribal people from already settled immigrants by creating tribal belt and blocks through The Assam Land Revenue Regulation Act. The Labour ministry in England decided to give independence to India and to divide it into communal lines. Under Viceroy Louis Mountbatten, the Sylhet referendum was held on 6 and 7 July 1947 in Sylhet to decide whether that district should remain a part of the province of Assam in India or go to Pakistan. During the Sylhet referendum, the local Jamiat leaders remained consistently opposed to the idea of Pakistan and appealed to all Muslims of the district to vote for an undivided Assam. However, of the valid votes cast in the referendum, 56.6 per cent were in favour of Sylhet’s inclusion in Pakistan. As a result, the Sylhet district was awarded to Pakistan except for three thanas (police station) of Patharkandi, Ratabari and Badarpur, and about one-half of the thana of Karimganj (Guha 2006: 261–62). With the partition, Bhasani, the main force behind the League in Assam, left for Pakistan. The Provincial League was dissolved in Assam on 30 June 1948 as its existence was considered detrimental to the cause of the nation’s interests. Very significantly, with the transfer of Muslim majority Sylhet district (60 per cent Muslims) to Pakistan at partition, the Muslim politics and equations changed drastically in Assam after independence.

Local people and Muslim immigrants The colonial rule witnessed large-scale Muslim immigration from East Bengal which ultimately led to the growth of communal politics in Assam under the Muslim League. Local people started to take Muslim immigration seriously since the beginning of the 1920s. However, this seriousness did not come from the settlement of Muslim immigrants in vast areas of land, but emerged mainly from the issue of language. The Muslim immigrants from East Bengal who were settled in lower Assam districts started to increase the number of Bengali speakers in Assam. Most of the landlords of Goalpara districts identified themselves with Bengali culture and launched a movement for the transfer of Goalpara to Bengal after World War I which continued till the early thirties of the twentieth century. It was then that Muslim immigration from East Bengal started to attract the attention of the Assamese people and demands started to be raised to limit immigration of Muslim immigrants to Brahmaputra valley (ibid: 166). Then came the Line System in 1920 which heavily contributed to establishing Muslim immigrants as a threat to the Assamese people from Brahmaputra valley. The Assamese people demanded that the Line System be strictly implemented. After the Line System was introduced, the Assamese opinion against the immigration issue was voiced through the Asamiya Samrakshini Sabha (Association for conservation of the Assamese) which was formed by Ambikagiri Raychaudhury in 1926 to propagate the Assamese cause. It pleaded for a restricted influx of people and favoured their assimilation with local language and culture. In December 1925 the Assam Association, 45

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a political organisation formed by a section of educated Assamese in 1903, in a sitting at Nowgong urged the government to stop immigration (Bhuyan and De 1999: 311). The census report of 1931, then, aggravated the threat of Assamese people to the Muslim immigrants. In the meantime, the whole issue of Muslim immigration started to take a communal turn after the Muslim League started to rule in Assam after the 1937 provincial election. The consecutive League-led Assam provincial government tried to liberalise the Line System for the sake of Muslim immigrants continuously coming from East Bengal. In this political design of League, Congress stood for the Line System and strongly opposed unabated immigration of Muslims from East Bengal. At that point in time, Assam was transformed into a battleground between League politics of Muslim immigration to make Assam a Muslim majority state and Congress opposition to Muslim immigration so that Assam could be saved from the communal design of League. During this period, Assamese public opinion was also against the anti-Line System policies of the League governments. It was voiced through the Council debates, the Ryot sabhas (association/meeting of ryots), the Asamiya Samrakshini Sabha and the Assamese press (mainly Asamia and the Dainik Batori). The North Mangaldai Ryot sabha (February 1937) and the Naduar Ryot sabha (June 1937) pressed for the continuation of the Line System. The Asamiya Samrakshini Sabha, presenting a memorandum to Jawaharlal Nehru on 24 November 1937, mentioned that a purely local question was given a communal colour by the All India Muslim League which had pleaded for unrestricted immigration as a deliberate and definite policy (ibid: 314). The Muslim immigrants from East Bengal first emerged as a threat to the Assamese people for their Bengali language. After the Line System, these immigrants started to emerge as a threat to their future existence. Then the census of 1931 and the provincial election of 1937 made the whole issue of Muslim immigration communal. In this situation, the reaction of local Muslims, who immigrated to Brahmaputra valley before the British started to rule Assam and also known as Assamese Muslims, attracts attention. The Assamese Muslims were not generally opposed to the new waves of immigration of their religious brethren under colonial administration. Amalendu Guha remarks: The wordy support that immigrants received from the Assamese Muslim leaders was politically motivated..... Despite such motivated support, many of the relatively better-off and educationally advanced Assamese Muslims were not enthusiastic enough for social intercourse with the East Bengal settlers. Despite a common religion, the two communities were wide apart from each other in culture, psychological make-up and socio-economic conditions. Unlike the immigrant Bengali Muslims, their Assamese counterpart neither practised a strict purdah for their womenfolk, nor had any professed zeal for Urdu as a status 46

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symbol. Nevertheless, the Assamese Muslims in general welcomed immigrants with the hope that they would be Assamised in the due course and numerically strengthen the base of Muslim communal politics in the province. (2006: 170) After the huge immigration of Muslims from East Bengal to Brahmaputra valley, the Muslim communal politics started to become a reality when the Assamese Muslims also rallied behind the League along with the immigrant Muslims, particularly after the 1937 provincial election. A process of Assamisation of the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley also occurred, however, only after partition and independence. Despite, it cannot be said that the Assamese Muslims became a communal bloc under the Muslim League. It seems the community was in a dilemma between the support for Pakistan and their very cordial relations with the Hindu Assamese society. Their overwhelming support for League was reflected in the 1946 provincial election. But their support to the ‘black flag day’ observed on 3 January 1947 by the Provincial League against the eviction of Muslim immigrants from grazing reserves and to offer prayer to save Muslims from Congress ‘oppression’ was very poor (ibid: 259).

Conclusion Both the Muslims and Ahoms entered Assam at the beginning of the thirteenth century. At present, Muslims constitute more than one-third of the total population of Assam, while the Ahoms consist of a small percentage of the total population of the state. There is no government data on the population strength of the Ahoms in Assam, and it has remained a small community in comparison to Muslims in present Assam. This clearly indicates a mass Islamisation in Assam since Muslims started to immigrate to the state. Huge Muslim immigration from East Bengal to Assam under colonial administration, of course, contributed heavily to this process of Islamisation. Due to the increasing strength of population, and because of the state’s inclusion with Sylhet, Assam became a playground of Muslim politics during the final phase of India’s freedom movement. However, the partition and independence changed the Muslim demography in Assam significantly. This influenced the whole Muslim question in Assam significantly after independence. The Muslims in Assam, who dreamt of living in a separate Muslim state before independence, started to live under a secular constitution after independence by forming secular political and social alliances. The most significant thing in Assam during the provincial rule was that although the state witnessed a sharp growth of Muslims and communal politics of the Muslim League for the division of India, there was no communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims during this period. It is 47

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interesting that Assam remained communally peaceful even after the state experienced Sylhet referendum and partition while states like Bihar, which was not geographically affected by partition, experienced communal conflict during partition. This signals the existence of a strong secular Assamese society at that period which could not have been broken down by communal politics. However, after two and a half years of independence, Assam experienced a major communal clash between Hindus and Muslims. This communal clash acted as the background of the social and political moves of Muslims in succeeding decades after independence, particularly till the beginning of the Assam Movement in 1979.

Notes 1 Because of inclusion of Sylhet, which is a Surma river basin, with Assam under colonial administration the present Barak valley was known also as Surma valley till independence. Near the present Indo-Bangladesh border, river Barak splits into two branches – Surma (north) and Kusiyara (south). The Surma flows past Sylhet. 2 After the 1874 reorganisation, Assam had the following districts (with present administrative districts): District in 1874

Present Administrative Districts

Lakhimpur

Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia

Sibsagar

Sibsagar, Jorhat, Golaghat

Nowgong/Nagaon

Nagaon, Morigaon, Hojai

Darrang

Darrang, Sonitpur, Udalguri

Kamrup

Kamrup(Metro), Kamrup(Rural), Barpeta, Nalbari, Baksa(Part), Chirang(Part)

Goalpara

Goalpara, Dhubri, Bangaigaon, Kokrajhar, Baksa(Part), Chirang(Part)

Cachar

Cachar, Hailakandi, Karimganj

Sylhet

Presently with Bangladesh. At Partition, three fourth of the district went to Pakistan and only one fourth of present Karimganj district (709 sq km) remained with India

Source: Mannan, Abdul. 2017. Anuprabesh: Asom Andolanar Adi Kotha. Guwahati: Ayna Prakashan, p. 17.

48

2 AFTER INDEPENDENCE Social and political alliance of Muslims

In the 1941 census, Assam province (including Sylhet district) had almost 34 per cent Muslims of the total population against 41 per cent Hindus, 24 per cent Tribal, and nearly one per cent Indian Christian and other populations (Census of India Report 1941). After Sylhet was transferred to Pakistan during independence, the demographic equations of Assam witnessed a significant change. The Sylhet district had 60 per cent Muslim population. In the 1951 census, while the Hindu population of Assam rose to 72 per cent, the Muslim population declined to 24 per cent (GoA 2012). This decline has brought about a significant change to the equations of Muslims in the politics of Assam after independence. Before independence, the British policy of ‘divide and rule’, political conflict between Congress and Muslim League, the introduction of the Line System, the communal politics of the League to include Assam in Pakistan, and the trauma of partition – all these factors created distrust between the Assamese people and Muslims in Assam. This distrust was carried forward after independence also. In such a situation, Muslims in Assam felt vulnerable and came along to make social and political alliances, which could lessen their vulnerability in a Hindu Assamese dominated state. These alliances continued until the Assam Movement raised the question of continuous illegal immigration of both Hindus and Muslims to Assam. Against this backdrop, this chapter tries to understand – first, how the political alliances between the Assamese and Muslims were formed after independence and second, how, during this period, the consecutive governments dealt with the issue of illegal immigration to Assam, which ultimately became the cause of the Assam Movement.

Categorisation of Muslims after independence During the final phase of the freedom movement, Assam Muslims behaved as almost a single community under the Muslim League. Only a small section of Muslims living in Assam was with Congress during that time. However, partition and independence brought about many changes to the Muslim community in Assam. One such change was the emergence of broad social divisions among them. After independence, two distinct groups of 49

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Muslims emerged in Assam based on the time of their immigration to the state. They were: indigenous and immigrant or of East Bengal origin. On the other hand, based on the language, three groups emerged among Muslims in Assam: Assamese, Bengali and neo-Assamese. Indigenous Muslims The colonial takeover of Assam by the British became the dividing line between the indigenous and immigrant Muslims in Assam. The Muslims who immigrated to the state until it was taken over by the British (in 1826) are categorised as indigenous Muslims. In Brahmaputra valley, the indigenous Muslims are known as Thalua or Khilanjia Musalman, meaning the local Muslims. Their mother tongue is Assamese, and their social customs and traditions, dress, food habits are virtually identical with the rest of the Assamese society (Ahmed and Yasin 1997: 143–44). However, although the indigenous Muslims living in Barak valley follow indigenous traditions, their mother tongue is Bengali. Immigrant or East Bengal origin Muslims The immigrant Muslims were considered as those who came to Assam at different phases of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries after Assam was colonised by the British, from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) and settled mostly in the ‘char’ (highland formed in a river by a deposit of silt) areas of lower and middle Assam in Brahmaputra valley and Barak valley. However, the immigrant Muslims do not consist only of those who immigrated up to independence. It is because the Assam Accord fixed a separate cut-off date for Assam to identify and deport illegal immigrants from Assam. This cutoff date for Assam was 24 March 1971, against the all Indian cut-off date of 26 January 1950 (the day the Constitution of India came into force) as per Article 5 of the Constitution of India. The separate cut-off date for Assam, as determined by the Assam Accord had been incorporated into the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, through the amendment which added Section 6A into the act. Through this amendment people who immigrated to Assam from foreign countries up to 24 March 1971 were made legal citizens of India. Under such circumstances, the immigrant Muslims in Assam consist of those Muslims who immigrated to Assam when the British took over in 1826 up to 24 March 1971. These Muslims are also known as East Bengal origin Muslims. It is because a large section of them immigrated to Assam under colonial administration from then East Bengal. However, the ‘immigrant Muslims’ is a broader term as it includes those Muslims who immigrated to Assam up to March 1971, even after East Bengal ceased to exist after independence. In this discussion, we have used both these terms as per the requirement of the discourse. When we use the term ‘immigrant Muslims’ in the present discourse, it does not in any way indicate illegal foreigners. 50

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Although the moniker of indigenous and immigrant Muslims is based on the time of immigration, both communities are also culturally different. Moreover, neither indigenous Muslims nor immigrant/East Bengal origin Muslims is a homogenous community. Indigenous Muslims of Assam consist of several distinct groups who live in both valleys of Assam. As has already been mentioned in Chapter 1, such indigenous groups are Goria, Moria, Jhula, Muchi, Sandar, Maimol, Pangal, Deshi, Datia, Dhuli, Tulu/ Teli etc. In the case of immigrant Muslims, it is not possible to distinguish separate groups among them based on culture and occupations. However, we can find few group identities among them like Dhakaya Muslims, Sylheti Muslims, Mymensinghia Muslims, Noakhalia Muslims etc. based on the places from where they migrated. The distinguishing feature among them in Assam is the dialect they speak. All these groups are primarily Bengali speakers but in different dialects. A minimal number of wealthy Dhakaya Muslim businessmen immigrated from Dhaka. Some towns in Assam, like Nagaon and Jorhat, have areas named Dhakapatti, where the Dhakaya Muslims settled to do business after migrating from Dhaka. The immigrants from Mymensingh district, Mymensinghia Muslims, were poor peasants and the largest in number. They mainly live in lower and middle Assam districts of Brahmaputra valley. Sylheti Muslims, who immigrated from Sylhet, consisted of both rich and poor Muslims. Present-day Meghalaya, particularly Shillong, has a significant number of Sylheti Muslims. In Assam, they live primarily in Barak valley and in areas like Hojai, Jamunamukh of middle Assam districts of Brahmaputra valley. The Noakhalia Muslims, very small in number in comparison to other groups, live in different places of middle and lower Assam districts. However, these distinctions based on place of origin and the dialects they use are not at all detectable in society in Assam. All these groups now are collectively identified as Miya (Urdu word meaning gentleman) Muslims. Assamese, Bengali and neo-Assamese Muslims Indigenous Muslims from Brahmaputra valley, whose mother tongue is the Assamese, are categorised as Assamese Muslims. The mother tongue of Goria and Moria Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley, particularly in upper Assam and undivided Kamrup district, is the Assamese. On the other hand, most of the indigenous Muslim groups living in the undivided Goalpara district speak different Goalpariya dialects of the Assamese language. The mother tongue of Muslims from Barak valley, of both the indigenous and immigrant groups, is Bengali. Based on the mother tongue, they are categorised as Bengali Muslims. However, all Muslims do not identify Bengali as a mother tongue from Barak valley. The mother tongue of Manipuri Muslims living in the valley is Meiti (Manipuri). These Muslims are Mongoloids who came from Manipur and settled in Cachar during the 51

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seventeenth century. A group of Manipuri people was imported to Cachar by the Kachari King Yasonarayana during the first half of the century. These Manipuri people helped Kachari king as warriors and also treated the horses who were used in war. Again, after the reign of king Pamhaibar (1714–54), Manipur became unstable because of the internal conflict among the members of the royal family. As a result, the Burmese attacked Manipur, and the Manipuris faced unprecedented suffering at the hands of the Burmese. Then a section of Manipuri people started to immigrate from their state to different places like Cachar, Bengal and Tripura (Ahmed 2012: 44). A portion of Manipuri people who entered Cachar on both occasions was Muslim. The settlement of Manipuris started in Barak valley in this way. The third major linguistic categorisation among Muslims in Assam is neo-Assamese. They are the Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley. They immigrated to the valley during the British colonial period and accepted the Assamese as their mother tongue in census enumerations after independence by abandoning their mother tongue Bengali. Becoming Assamese was the first and most significant move from the part of the immigrant Muslim community in Brahmaputra valley after independence, which significantly helped to eliminate the distrust created between them and the Assamese people before independence.

Emergence of Neo-Assamese Muslims After independence, the indigenous Muslims became politically passive. They tried to repair their centuries-old socio-cultural relations with the Hindu Assamese that was damaged by the Muslim League politics in the last phase of the freedom movement. On the other hand, the immigrant Muslims came forward to form a linguistic alliance with the Assamese people in Brahmaputra valley with the intention of wiping away the distrust created by League politics and to make them secure in their new homeland. The British colonial administration introduced Bengali as the official ­language of Assam in 1836, and it remained so till 1873. At the time when Bengali was introduced as an official language of Assam, the language of official documentation in British Bengal was Persian, not Bengali, the court language of the Mughals who ruled Bengal before the British. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, being under British rule for a long time, many Bengalis, specifically Hindus, acquired a working knowledge of both Persian and English. A group of Bengali Hindus was imported from Bengal to Assam by the British to run the colonial administration. Until then, being largely free of both Mughal and British subjugation, the Assamese people and other native residents of the erstwhile Ahom kingdom had no common language to represent their case to the colonialists. In the mid-nineteenth century, the British introduced the modern schooling system in Assam as Bengali as the medium of instruction. By then, Persian had been replaced by Bengali as the official language of both Assam and Bengal (Pisharoty 2019: 239). 52

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The newly educated Assamese considered the introduction of the Bengali language as the official language of Assam a manipulation by the Bengali officials under British administration. It was a matter of serious concern for the Assamese people to lose their linguistic identity due to the use of the Bengali language in court, office and schools. Although Assamese was made the official language of Assam in 1874 by replacing Bengali, the fear of being subordinated by the Bengali language continued among the Assamese people during the period under British colonialism. The separation of Sylhet from India in partition brought about the opportunity for Assamese to be the majority language in Assam. In the 1951 census, for the first time, Assamese became the majority language in Assam with 56.29 per cent of speakers. This percentage rose to 57.14 in the 1961 census and then 60.89 in the 1971 census (Census of India Report 1951, 1961, 1971). Indigenous Assamese were happy and felt safe with the majority status of the Assamese language. However, it became possible only with the help of immigrant Muslims from East Bengal living in Brahmaputra valley. A large section of immigrant Muslims living in lower and middle Assam of Brahmaputra valley, who were originally Bengali speakers, started to identify Assamese as their mother tongue in census enumerations since 1951. Amalendu Guha noted: The separation of Sylhet alone would not have sufficed to bring in this change. It was the census figures for the district of Goalpara that tilted the balance. In all the census operations up to 1931, Bengali was returned as the mother tongue of more than half of the district population. The figure came down to less than 18 per cent in 1951 and 12 per cent in 1961. (2006: 273) The undivided Goalpara from lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley was the bordering district of East Pakistan, and it was the district first explored by Muslim immigrants from East Bengal. The Assamese people were grateful to the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley for declaring Assamese as their mother tongue and thereby ensuring the majority status of the Assamese language in Assam. The Assamese society and socio-cultural organisations led by the indigenous Assamese started to refer to these Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley as neo-Assamese. The latter were considered a threat by the indigenous Assamese before independence because of their immigration in colossal number and their monopoly of large tracts of wasteland. Jyotiprasad Agarwala, one of the doyens of Assamese literature and culture, in his poem Asomiya Dekar Ukti (Voice of Assamese Youths) used the word na-Asomiya (neo-Assamese) for the first time. In this poem, Na-Asomiya was used to refer the Mymensinhias, people who migrated particularly from Mymensingh district of East Bengal and settled in Brahmaputra valley. It should be noted 53

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that the huge immigration of Muslim peasants to Assam initially started from Mymensingh district of East Bengal and later also, their numbers were large in comparison to Muslims from other districts of East Bengal. In society of Assam, for a long time, all Muslim immigrants from East Bengal were identified as Mymensinhias. It is fascinating that the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley accepted Assamese as their mother tongue and adopted a new group identity by shedding their distinctive linguistic-cultural heritage. However, to become Assamese by shedding their distinct identity, for immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley, was primarily a political decision. Assam had not experienced any major communal clash in the pre-independent period, although it became a playground for both Congress and Muslim League politics. But after independence, in March 1950, it experienced a major communal clash as a consequence of attacks on Hindus in East Pakistan who took refuge in Assam. Hindu Bengalis migrated in large numbers from East Pakistan to Assam because of the oppressions practised on them by East Pakistani Muslims. These Hindu Bengali refugees recounted the sufferings they faced at the hands of Muslims in East Pakistan and in retaliation expressed their anger and frustrations against the Muslim migrants living in Assam. As a consequence, Assam witnessed a communal riot, particularly in Goalpara and the adjoining part of the Barpeta subdivision. The first incident of the aforesaid communal riot occurred at the railway station of Lumding in the Nagaon district, an overwhelmingly Hindu Bengali dominated area, where Muslim passengers on their way to Pakistan were assaulted and robbed by miscreants who were not residents of Assam. Minor outbursts followed at Badarpur and Hailakandi from Barak valley. In Brahmaputra valley, there were a few sporadic cases of arson and stabbing in Guwahati town (Goswami 1997: 29). This was considered Assam’s first major riot against a religious minority community (Guha 2006: 271). Thousands of Muslim immigrants had to leave riotaffected lower Assam for East Pakistan in search of security. The communal clash of March 1950 in lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley made the immigrant Muslims of the valley realise that safety was their primary concern. On the other hand, after independence, most of the Muslim League leaders who fought for the rights of these Muslims in Assam before independence left for Pakistan, and those who remained, either joined Congress or became politically inactive. In that situation, the immigrant Muslims of Brahmaputra valley wanted to get rid of their security concerns as much as possible. The immigrant Muslims, being both a linguistic and religious minority in Brahmaputra valley, realised that they would only remain a religious minority by accepting the Assamese as their mother tongue. Breaking the language barrier would ease their security concerns considerably. They also understood the importance of accepting the Assamese language and supporting the indigenous Assamese community in Brahmaputra valley where the Assamese-Bengali linguistic divide has 54

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always remained very strong in pre-independence days. Moreover, after independence, Congress became the sole political force in Assam, and the party was Assamese dominated. In this scenario, identification with the Assamese language emerged as the most attractive way for the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley to ward off socio-cultural and political discriminations. These recently immigrated people were more concerned about their settlement and livelihood than culture and language. By accepting Assamese as their mother tongue in census enumerations, the immigrant Muslim community tried to avoid any conflict with the Assamese population in Brahmaputra valley. However, it would be wrong to label the acceptance of the Assamese language by immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley only as political opportunism. A large section of immigrant Muslims, on their part, tried to assimilate with the Assamese language and culture even before independence. They set up many Assamese medium primary and secondary schools in their areas before independence. For example, in Alitangani, an area near Nagaon town, immigrant Muslims established a primary school in 1902 and brought teachers from neighbouring Dhing to teach Assamese there. They established the Assamese medium Middle English (ME) school in 1924, which became the first high school in the entire Alitangani area in 1928. In that period when these immigrant Muslims established Assamese medium ME/high schools, many ethnic Assamese dominated areas of Nagaon districts did not even have primary schools. There are many similar cases in the entire Brahmaputra valley (Ahmed 2015: 155–56). This shows that the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley tried to become Assamese long before they were recognised as neo-Assamese. There was a widespread feeling among the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley that they should accept the language and culture of the land which has given them shelter and their livelihood. Neo-Assamese Muslims as a political group After independence, the Assamese Muslims started to adopt a passive attitude towards the politics of the state. The leading cause of this might be the community’s role during the 1946 provincial election despite its close socio-cultural relations with the Hindu Assamese people in Brahmaputra valley. The support of the indigenous Muslim community towards the communal design of the Muslim League created distrust between the Hindu Assamese communities and the indigenous Muslim communities at the time of independence. On the other hand, new indigenous-immigrant categorisation after independence started to make the indigenous Muslims numerically weak in the politics of Assam in comparison to their immigrant counterparts. The indigenous Muslim community emerged as a small group in comparison to immigrant Muslims. These Muslim communities do not live in contiguous areas; they live in remote villages within Hindu inhabited 55

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areas. A small number of them live in urban areas among Hindus. In contrast, as a consequence of the settlement policies of the colonial administration, immigrant Muslims live in contiguous areas. This had created a peculiar situation for indigenous Muslims in the politics of Assam. They, as a community, started to lose importance as a minority group in electoral politics of the state in front of their immigrant counterparts. While they do not form decisive electorates in any of the Assembly constituencies of the state, the immigrant Muslims emerged as a large community and big voting bloc after independence. The immigrant Muslims started to become decisive in several Assembly constituencies from lower and middle Assam of Brahmaputra valley and also from Barak valley. They, as a result, began to gain the importance and patronage of political parties and consecutive governments formed in Assam after independence. Muslim politics in Assam after independence started to revolve around immigrant Muslims, and consequently, indigenous Muslims began to lose political importance as a religious minority group. In Assam, after independence, a trend emerged that considered indigenous Muslims only as a socio-cultural group and treat only immigrant Muslims as a political group. Politics in Indian style democracy is all about numbers, and this has made the Muslim politics of Assam in the post-independent period immigrant Muslim centric. The 2011 census gives us an impression of the numerical strength of the neo-Assamese Muslims over other group of Muslims. Of the total Muslim population in Assam (106 lakh), only 16 per cent live in Barak valley, and 0.24 per cent lives in two hill districts. The rest live in Brahmaputra valley. In Brahmaputra valley, the neo-Assamese Muslims concentrate mainly in lower and middle Assam districts barring seven districts from upper Assam (Golaghat, Jorhat, Sibsagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Lakhimpur, Dhemaji). These lower and middle Assam district regions consist of more than 78 per cent of the total Muslim population of the state and almost 94 per cent of total Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley (based on Census of India Report 2011). Notably, not everyone from lower Assam is immigrant Muslim, but they do have an overwhelming majority over indigenous Muslims. The Assam Minority Development Board chairman Muminul Aowal estimates that Assam has around 40 lakh indigenous Muslim population (www.thehindu.com, 10 February 2010). This also shows that almost two-thirds of the total Muslim population in Assam are immigrant Muslims.

Assamese-Muslim social alliance The immigrant Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley became neo-Assamese after independence and tried to become a linguistic partner of the Assamese people. As a result of this linguistic alliance, the neo-Assamese Muslims emerged as a great help to the Assamese language during the 1960s and 1970s. 56

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The Asom Sahitya Sabha (ASS), the state’s premier socio-literary organisation representing the Assamese speaking people, demanded the Assam government make Assamese the state language of Assam by 1960 and threatened a mass movement otherwise. In response, the Congress-led Assam government brought the Assam Official Language Act, 1960, which made Assamese the state language of Assam. The Hindu Bengalis protested against the decision, and a mass movement took place in Barak valley, demanding Bengali to be accorded the status of an official language of Assam. The Hindu Bengalis living in Brahmaputra valley also came out against the official status of the Assamese language. In 1960–61, there were language riots between supporters of the Assamese and Bengali languages in Goreswar, Guwahati, Lumding, Jorhat, Sibsagar and Dibrugarh in Brahmaputra valley. On the other hand, Silchar and Hailakandi from Barak valley strongly demanded Bengali be made the second official language of Assam after the Assamese. As a result of these riots, a curfew was imposed in many places of both Brahmaputra and Barak valleys. In Hailakandi, on 19 June 1961, five people were killed and 14 injured when police opened fire at a demonstration. Consequently, the Assam government had to treat the Cachar district as a ‘disturbed’ area till 21 September 1961. The situation of Cachar became normal only after the official language status was accorded to the Bengali language in Barak valley in 1961 through an amendment to the Assam Official Language Act, 1960. The amendment of the act practically made Assam a bilingual state with Assamese the language of Brahmaputra valley and Bengali the language of Barak valley, against the demands and wishes of the indigenous Assamese of Brahmaputra valley (Goswami 1997: 49–66). In Assam, language again emerged as a cause of conflict between the Assamese and Hindu Bengalis in 1972. The University of Gauhati decided to introduce Assamese as the medium of instruction in colleges under its jurisdiction from the academic year 1972–73, with the exception of the colleges of Cachar, Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya, and North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), where Assamese was not the mother tongue. The decision meant that Assamese was made the medium of instruction only in Brahmaputra valley. However, demand rose from Bengali speaking Cachar that Bengali should also be introduced as one of the media of instruction in Assam. To address the concerns of the Bengalis from Barak valley, Gauhati University on 6 June 1972 conceded the linguistic minorities in the state that English was to be retained as the medium of instruction for a while, and students would be permitted to answer their examination questions in Assamese, English and Bengali. However, public opinion in Brahmaputra valley strongly opposed this. In response, Gauhati University, on 12 June 1972, withdrew the option of answering question papers in the Bengali language. The Bengalis of Assam in general and from Barak valley in particular vehemently opposed the decision. The Assam Assembly passed a resolution on 23 September 1972 to set up a separate university for Cachar to avert any Assamese-Bengali conflict. However, different Bengali organisations did 57

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not agree with the idea of an independent university for Cachar. They demanded the equal status of Bengali as a medium of instruction in both Gauhati University and Dibrugarh University of Assam. Assamese public opinion was also against the resolution for setting up a separate university only to satisfy the Bengalis from Barak valley. The AASU spearheaded a movement demanding only Assamese as the medium of instructions. Thereafter, Assam experienced clashes between Bengalis and supporters of the Assamese language in different places like Kharupetia, Mangaldoi, Dhing, Laharighat, Nagaon, Dabaka, Hojai, Sibsagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia etc. from Brahmaputra valley. In Barak valley, the demand for the Bengali language as the medium of instruction made the situation in Silchar, the district headquarters of Cachar, and adjacent areas volatile. One Communist Party of India (CPI) leader, Rajeswar Rao, even commented that Cachar should be made a separate state based on language. The Bengalis of Cachar and the plains tribal leaders soon formed a coalition organisation, the Minority People’s Right Committee, which called for a change in the government language policy, or the further division of Assam. A total of 33 people lost their lives in the language-related riots of 1972, including deaths caused by police firing (ibid: 69–78). After the colonial period of 1836–73, when the British administration made Bengali the official language of Assam, the Language Movement of 1960 and Medium of Instruction Movement of 1972 yet again established Bengali speakers of Assam as a threat to the Assamese language. The Indian states were reorganised by State Reorganisation Commission, 1956, which granted official language status to regional languages. The announcement worked as the basis of the official Language demand for Assamese in 1960 in Assam. Again, the Education Commission (1964–66) recommended the use of regional language as the medium of education, to facilitate conducting the business of the government, which became the basis of the decision of Gauhati University to make Assamese the medium of instruction. That meant the demand for Assamese as the official language of Assam and the decision of Gauhati University to make Assamese the medium of instruction, which affected the society and politics of Assam significantly later on, were not against the Bengali language per se. However, the Hindu Bengalis of Assam considered these decisions to be against their language and responded strongly on both occasions. While the Hindu Bengalis of Assam opposed both the 1960 and 1972 movements, the neo-Assamese Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley stood behind the Assamese language. In the 1972 movement, there were clashes between Hindu Bengalis and immigrant Muslims at different places like Dhing, Dabaka, Lahorighat, Kharupetia etc. of Brahmaputra valley (ibid: 74). On 5 October 1971, AASU called a day-long strike in support of the Assamese language. During the strike at Kaharupetia under the Mangaldoi sub-division of the then Darrang district a clash occurred between the supporters of the strike and those who opposed it. A total of 42 people were 58

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reportedly injured, and a Muslim student named Muzammil Haque died when police opened fire to control the mob fury. Haque was from the immigrant Muslim community who joined the agitation in support of the Assamese medium (Talukdar 2017: 450). The death of Muzammil Haque in support of the Assamese language became a symbol of the wholehearted support of the immigrant Muslim community living in Brahmaputra valley to the Assamese language. The immigrant Muslims of Brahmaputra valley, in both 1960 and 1972 language movements, aligned with the indigenous Assamese for the sake of the Assamese language. The Assamese society was grateful to the neo-Assamese Muslims of Brahmaputra valley during this period for their support of the Assamese language. The merger contributed heavily to the fact that the community did not emerge as an issue of contestation in Assamese society after independence despite the continuous political controversy of illegal Muslim immigration to Assam from East Pakistan.

Congress-Muslim political alliances After independence, present Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya became parts of Assam. The central government had to face a revolt from the Nagas for a sovereign state just after independence. The Indian government had to tackle the Nagas with force till Nagaland was made a separate state from Assam in 1962. In such situations, the Congress leadership in Assam was not sure of the electoral support of the tribes, which constituted a large chunk of the population of the state at that period. In 1951, Assam had 23.25 per cent Tribal of its total population (Census of India Report 1951). So, the Congress leadership in Assam, in a bid to secure future electoral benefits, tried to create political alliances with some communities of the state. These alliances could significantly help the party’s prospects in electoral battles in both Brahmaputra and Barak valleys in the state, even if the tribal population did not rally behind the party. Then, Congress identified three recently immigrated communities in Assam: the immigrant Muslims, Hindu Bengalis and tea labourers with whom such alliances could be enduring. These communities were large in number, socio-economically backward and required the support of the government in new situations created by independence and partition. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the partition of India shattered the dream of the Assam Muslims who, in the 1946 election, rallied behind the League, which projected Pakistan before the Muslim electorates. The Assam Provincial League was dissolved in June 1948 and several prominent League leaders, including Bhasani, left for Pakistan after partition. Bhasani became a minister in East Pakistan. The exit of Bhasani left the Muslims of East Bengal origin in Assam leaderless as he was by far the most prominent League leader from the community. On the other hand, the League leaders who remained in Assam after independence either joined Congress or became politically inactive. In this situation, Muslims in Assam, who overwhelmingly supported the League before independence, became 59

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leaderless and suffered from an acute sense of political alienation after independence. Despite India’s secular and democratic stand, they feared they would be subordinated as a minority community in an overwhelmingly Hindu majority state. In this backdrop, after independence, Muslims of Assam had no other option but to join Congress. Before the first general election of 1951, there were frantic moves by Muslim leaders from both Congress and the former Muslim League to form an alliance between Congress and the Muslims of Assam. While former premier and Muslim League leader Saadulla tried to create the atmosphere for en-masse joining of Muslims into Congress, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed from Congress acted as the interlocutor in the whole process. Saadulla joined Congress in 1951, and he claimed that the Muslims of Assam joined the party en masse. This was the origin of Congress-Muslim alliance in Assam, and this alliance was formed easily as it was for the mutual benefit of both Muslims and Congress. Congress needed Muslims for publicity purposes for its image as a staunch advocate of secularism. At the same time, for Congress, Muslims would serve as a vote bank for political power as the ruling party would patronise them. The alliance with Congress brought about benefits to the Muslims also. Supporting Congress would ensure them greater safeguards. This alliance would project them as accepting secularism. And most importantly, they would be sharing power in alliance with Congress (Kar 1990: 350–55). However, this alliance took place between Congress and the one-time Muslim League leaders. Congress realised that support of Saadulla alone was not enough to secure the help of the immigrant Muslims as he was an indigenous Muslim and did not have much influence among the immigrant Muslims. Given this, Congress took the help of Jamiat to influence the entire Muslim community of Assam and to garner their support for Congress. The party even imported Muslim religious leaders of Jamiat from Cachar and Uttar Pradesh to create its support base among the Muslims of Brahmaputra valley (Hoque 2007: 310). This course of action had provided Jamiat a new lease of life in the politics of Assam after independence. Before independence, as mentioned, Jamiat’s influence over Muslims in Assam was nominal in comparison to the Muslim League. Another factor that contributed significantly to create a Congress-Muslim alliance in Assam after independence was the communal clash of March 1950 in lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley. This communal clash made the entire Muslim community of Assam realise that security was their main concern. In that situation, Muslims in Assam tried to minimise their security concerns by aligning with Congress which became the sole political party in India after independence. This Congress-Muslim alliance was a strategy on Congress’s part to create a support base among the recently immigrated communities in Assam who were made vulnerable by the partition and independence. As mentioned earlier, Congress formed political alliances with two other 60

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immigrant groups in Assam: the Hindu Bengalis and the tea labourers. However, the circumstances of all these alliances formed by Congress were different. In the initial years after independence, the Bengalis of Assam, particularly from Barak valley, were not satisfied with the Assam Congress led by Assamese leaders from Brahmaputra valley. A strong impression grew among the Hindu Bengalis after independence that the Sylhet Referendum, for which Sylhet was transferred to Pakistan, had only taken place because of the Assamese Congress leadership. They believed that Gopinath Bardoloi and other Assamese Congress leaders wanted the transfer of Sylhet to Pakistan to get rid of the Muslim domination in Assam, and so they agreed to the Referendum. But the fact was that this Referendum was agreed to by the Congress Working Committee, and even the Hindu Bengali Congress leader from Sylhet like Basanta Kumar Das did not oppose it (Pisharoty 2019: 254). Although the Bengalis were not satisfied with the Congress leaders of Assam, they aligned with the party after independence because of the proactive role of its central leadership in settling the Hindu refugees in Assam after partition. There was a massive influx of Hindu Bengalis from East Pakistan to Assam during and after partition. The state shouldered the burden of lakhs of Hindu Bengali families who immigrated from East Pakistan as refugees. Then Assam Premier Bardoloi strongly opposed the immigration of both Hindus and Bengalis from East Pakistan after independence. However, the central government, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, compelled the Assam government to accept all the Hindu refugees from East Pakistan and to settle them in the state. Even after this, when Bardoloi continued to demand the expulsion of illegal immigrants living in Assam, the parliament enacted the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950. But this act was to expel only the ‘certain immigrants’ from Assam. Through the provision of ‘certain immigrants’ under this act, the central government, very tactfully, brought an end to identifying a Hindu Bengali as an illegal immigrant in Assam. All these convinced the Hindu Bengalis of Assam that the central leadership of Congress was concerned about their interests. This realisation made them rally behind the party, although they were apprehensive about the Assamese Congress leadership of the state. The role of the central government under Mr. Nehru vis-à-vis the immigration problem in Assam is discussed later in this chapter. Conversely, the entire tea community, till independence, was a disintegrated, underdeveloped and depressed class under the British tea planters. In the early years after independence, the community did not have a middle class to join the mainstream social and political lives beyond the boundaries of the tea gardens. They have remained vulnerable for political manipulation in a democratic polity where numbers count. They rallied behind Congress in elections after independence as the party emerged as the ruler after the British left. Then Congress, in an attempt to make the community aware of their labour rights under a sovereign country, tried to 61

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form a trade union for the community. The party realised that the formation of a trade union meant the unification of a fragmented community behind the party. Under such considerations, in 1958, Assam Chah Mazdoor Sangha (Assam Tea Labour Organisation) [ACMS] was formed as a subsidiary of the Indian National Trade Union Congress. During its initial stage, the ACMS was led by non-tea community Congress leaders due to a lack of leaders from the community. Gradually, an educated class, though very small in number, started to emerge from the community, and they took over the organisation. Today it is a large trade union with organisational presence in more than 800 tea estates in Assam and approximately 3,50,000 active members (www.assamchahmazdoorsangha.org, 24 June 2020). Since its formation, the ACMS has remained the strongest trade union in Assam to date. Because of the absence of any strong rival trade unions among the tea labour community, it started to determine the voting behaviour of a large section of the tea community in Assam. It worked as an agent of Congress during elections to gather tea labourers’ votes for the party.

Congress-Muslim alliance and Assam Assembly elections (1951–78) The strategic political alliance between Congress and the Muslims in Assam, which was formed before the first-ever Assam Assembly election held in 1951 after independence, continued till the end of the Assam Movement. In the 1951 Assembly election, the total members for the Assam Legislative Assembly was fixed at 108. In this election, from 94 constituencies (some constituencies had the provision of two members) a total of 105 members were elected. The election was not held in three constituencies of (then) Naga Hills. Congress had 75 from among the 105 elected members. A total of 15 Muslims were elected in the first-ever Assembly election held in Assam. The number of Congress Muslim MLAs was eight, while seven Muslims were elected as independent candidates. As mentioned, after the division of India at independence, Muslims in Assam felt vulnerable, and the community experienced the first major communal riot in the state in March 1950. Moreover, Assam Muslims were presumed to have joined Congress as a community just before the election. Even in such a situation, Congress could not win from very prominent Muslim dominated constituencies like South Salmora, West Bilasipara, Dhubri, Lahorighat etc. In 1957, elections were held in all constituencies, and 108 members were elected to Assam Assembly from 94 constituencies. A total of 71 candidates won in Congress ticket. The number of Muslims elected in this election was 15. Among these Muslim MLAs, one was Independent, three were from Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and 11 were from Congress. In this election, the number of Congress Muslim MLAs was more in comparison to the 1951 Assembly election, and the Muslims as a community started to rally behind Congress from this election. However, the win of Congress from Muslim dominated constituencies was not an exception to the general 62

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trend of the election. The party also won the overwhelming majority of seats dominated by non-Muslims in this election. Contrastingly, the opposition PSP won from two crucial Muslim dominated constituencies, viz., South Salmora and Bilasipara, and the Independent candidate won from Muslim dominated Dalgaon. In the 1962 Assam Assembly elections, all the constituencies were made single-member constituencies, and total constituencies increased from 94 to 105. In this election, Congress won from 79 constituencies. The number of Muslim MLAs elected to the Assembly was 14, of which 12 were from Congress. The number of Congress Muslim MLAs indicated that Muslims overwhelmingly supported Congress in this election. As a consequence of the declaration of Assamese as the official language of Assam, All Party Hill Leaders Conference, which opposed the official language status to Assamese, dominated the hill areas in this election. At the same time, Congress, which made Assamese the official language of Assam, swept Brahmaputra valley. The neo-Assamese Muslims supported the move of making Assamese the official language of Assam. Therefore, they overwhelmingly supported Congress in this election. In this election, the non-Congress parties won from Muslim dominated Lahorighat and Mankachar. The number of Assembly constituencies increased to 126 in the 1967 Assam Assembly elections. Congress won 73 constituencies in this election. A total of 20 Muslims were elected to the Assam Assembly, and only half of these Muslim MLAs were from Congress, proving that Congress was not the sole beneficiary of the Muslim vote bank if there was any. In this election, one Swatantrata Party candidate, two PSP, and seven Independent Muslim candidates won against Congress from Muslim dominated constituencies. Muslim dominated constituencies like Mankachar, Baghbor, Rupahihat, Dhing etc. elected Independent candidates against Congress. The number of constituencies for the Assam Legislative Assembly decreased from 126 in 1967 to 114 in 1972 due to the separation of Meghalaya and Mizoram from Assam. In the 1972 Assembly election, Congress won 95 seats out of a total 114. Twenty-one Muslims were elected in this election, of which 20 were from Congress. Congress faced almost no opposition because of India’s victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war. Indira Gandhi emerged as the tallest leader of the nation because of this win over Pakistan, and Congress fought election in Assam under Gandhi’s leadership. In this election, too, Muslim support to Congress was not different from non-Muslim support to the party. From Assam Assembly elections held during 1952–72, it becomes evident that Muslims of the state started to support the Congress party in large numbers in the 1957 election. Since then, a large section of the community has supported the party in subsequent elections till 1972. However, this continuous electoral support of Muslims to Congress failed to show the vote bank behaviour of the community. First, because Muslim massive electoral support to Congress was not continuous. For example, in the 1962 63

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and 1972 elections, Congress owned 86 and 95 per cent of total Muslim MLAs respectively elected from Muslim dominated constituencies. However, in the 1967 elections, Congress owned only 50 per cent of Muslim MLAs elected from Muslim dominated constituencies. Second, Muslim support to Congress was not different from non-Muslim support to the party in these elections. For example, in the 1972 elections, Congress consisted of 20 of the total 21 Muslim MLAs won in the election. In this election, Congress showed unprecedented success across Assam and won from 95 constituencies out of a total 114. Again in the 1967 elections, Congress owned 50 per cent of total Muslim MLAs won. In this election, Congress won 53 per cent of the total constituencies of Assam, reflecting the fact that the Muslim voting behaviour was not an exception to and different from the voting behaviour of non-Muslims during this period in Assam. Assam Assembly elections 1978 In the 1978 Assam Assembly election, for the first time, Congress lost power in Assam at the hands of an opposition alliance under the Janata Party (JNP). Thus, it becomes more crucial to understand the electoral behaviour of Muslims in this election as the community formed an electoral alliance with Congress after independence. This election was held after the internal emergency (1975–77), and Congress was divided into Indian National Congress (INC) and Indira Gandhi-led INC (I) before the 1978 Assam Assembly elections. In this election, while INC won from 26 constituencies, INC (I) won from only eight. A total of 28 Muslims were elected to the Assembly in this election. Among these 28, both fractions of Congress collectively had only ten Muslim MLAs [INC – 07, INC (I) – 03]. The numbers of Muslim MLAs elected from other political parties were: JNP – 07, Communist Parties – 3 [Communist Party of India – 1, Communist Party of India (Marxist) – 1 and Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCI) – 01] and Independent – 08. In this election, while both Congress groups owned 35 per cent of the total Muslim MLAs won, both groups won almost 27 per cent of total 126 constituencies of Assam. In such a situation, in this election too, the electoral behaviour of Muslims was not much different from the electoral behaviour of non-Muslim voters of the state. Congress faced defeat in the 1978 Assam Assembly election only because of its division just before the election. It can be said as in the parliamentary elections held in 1977, while it fared very poorly in most of the other states, it won 10 of total 14 constituencies from Assam. This shows that the party did not face many challenges in Assam because of the internal emergency (1975–77). The parallel division of the party into INC and INC(I) just before the election and the defection of a few prominent Congress leaders to the newly formed Janata Party in Assam made defeat inevitable for Congress in the 1978 elections. How division impacted on the defeat of Congress becomes clear from the election outcome. The percentage of votes 64

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polled in this election by both the fractions of Congress [INC – 23.62, INC(I) – 8.78] was higher than the winning alliance [JNP – 27.55, Plains Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA) – 2.60]. While the total seats won by both Congress fractions was 34, in total 21 constituencies where Congress was defeated, the combined vote of both fractions of the party was more than the winning candidate. Congress dominated the Assam Assembly elections between 1951 and 1972, and like other religious communities of Assam, Muslims also supported Congress largely in the elections held during this period. However, when the party was in crisis in the 1978 Assembly election for the first time in Assam in post-independent history, Muslims deserted it like the other communities. This election again proved that the support of Muslims to Congress in elections was not very different from non-Muslim electoral support to the party even though a Congress-Muslim electoral alliance was formed before the 1951 election. Interestingly, despite Congress’s defeat in this election, the outcome indicated the existence of its traditional immigrant support base in Assam, although on a minimal scale. As discussed, after independence, Congress formed political alliances in Assam with three recently immigrated communities: Muslims, Hindu Bengalis and tea labourers. Of the total 26 constituencies won by INC in the 1978 Assembly election, while one was Hindu Bengali dominated, seven were Muslim dominated, and nine were tea community dominated.1 On the other hand, among the eight INC (I) candidates who won in this election, three were Muslim, two Hindu Bengali, and three tea labourers.2 This reflection of the support base among the immigrant communities in favour of her party [INC(I)] in this election might become one of the major factors that prompted Indira Gandhi to strongly oppose the Assam Movement in succeeding years when she became Prime Minister again in 1980. While the visibility of immigrant vote banks in this election inspired Congress later to oppose the Assam Movement, the outcome of this election, on the other hand, emerged as an immediate cause of the beginning of the movement. In this election, a total of 28 Muslims were elected to the Assam Assembly, which was seven more than the previous Assembly election (1972). In the 1972 Assam Assembly election, 21 Muslims were elected, the highest number of Muslim MLAs in the Assam Assembly till then. In the 1978 election, Muslims got more representation because of the reorganisations of Assembly constituencies in Assam after Meghalaya and Mizoram became separate states in 1972. Before the 1978 election, Assembly constituencies were reorganised in Assam, and their number increased from 114 in 1972 to 126. In this situation, the increase of Muslim MLAs from 21 in 1972 to 28 in 1978 was not abnormal. However, this increase of Muslim MLAs emerged as proof of continuous large-scale illegal Muslim immigration to Assam at the hands of leaders of the Assam Movement when it began. 65

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The 1978 Assembly election, while on the one hand, proved the existence of the support base of Congress among the recent immigrant communities when it performed poorly among other indigenous communities, on the other, it became a reference point of large-scale illegal immigration to the state at the hands of Assam Movement leaders after just one year. Against this backdrop, it becomes pertinent to analyse the immigrantion policies of consecutive Congress-led central and Assam government since independence till the beginning of the Assam Movement.

Government policy on immigration The visa required for travel between India and Pakistan came into force on 15 October 1952. From June 1948, both countries issued permits to their citizens to travel to the other country. However, the whole system of the permit was very flexible, and there was large-scale immigration from Pakistan to India in the first five years of independence. On 27 June 1962, even Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted in parliament that largescale immigration from Pakistan into India continued until 1952 and suggested 1952 as the date of enquiry as it would be challenging to deal with illegal immigrants who arrived before 1952 (Deka 2010: 32–33). As already discussed, Assam experienced a major communal clash in March 1950. According to Indian official estimates, nearly a lakh Muslims had to leave riot-affected lower Assam for East Pakistan in search of security (cited in Guha 2006: 271). Notably, most of the Muslims who left Assam in 1950 due to the communal riot might have returned. The riot of March 1950 was very effectively dealt with by the government, and normalcy was restored within a couple of days. Then, on 8 April 1950, the agreement between India and Pakistan on Minorities (Nehru-Liaquat Pact) was signed between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s counterpart Liaquat Ali Khan. The agreement paved the way for the riot victims who left for East Pakistan to return to Assam by 31 December 1950. With this, a new wave of immigration of Muslims from East Pakistan to Assam started after independence. The stand of the Indian government against any communal clash convinced the Muslims of East Pakistan about the absence of any threat in India. The new wave of immigration after independence continued unnoticed, leading to a major demographic change in Assam in favour of Muslims in succeeding decades. It is the responsibility of the central government to ensure that there is no illegal immigration from foreign countries. However, illegal immigration from East Pakistan and then from Bangladesh to India in general, and to Assam in particular, has remained an ongoing and unnoticed affair after independence till the Assam Movement raised the issue of illegal immigration. However, it is not only Muslims who have been immigrating to Assam. ­A massive influx of Bengali Hindus, Buddhists and Christians to Assam from East Pakistan started after India was partitioned and Pakistan became 66

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a Muslim country. The 1951 census record revealed that persons born in Pakistan and enumerated in Assam reached a colossal total of 8,33,000, out of which the vast majority 5,59,000 were non-refugee (Muslim) and 2,74,000 were refugee (Census of India Report 1951). The number of refugees enumerated in the 1961 census increased to 6,28,000 (Census of India Report 1961). In the years after partition and independence, while the central government was very eager to grant refugee status to Hindu Bengalis, it altogether ignored the Muslim immigration. In contrast, Gopinath Bardoloi, Assam Chief Minister, wanted decisive action against any illegal migration from East Pakistan. He communicated to Nehru that independence of the country had made little difference to the influx problem of Assam. He argued that not much land was available for the wave of Hindu refugees and Muslim immigrants from East Pakistan. Nehru reacted angrily and wrote to Bardoloi that Assam was ‘getting a bad name for its narrowminded policy’ and ‘if land is not available in Assam for the refugees, the rest of India had still less land’. Nehru also threatened in the letter that ‘if Assam adopts an attitude of incapacity to help solve the refugee problem, then the claims of Assam for financial help will obviously suffer’. Bardoloi replied, ‘I am sure we are unable to do more’ and it was ‘surely due to nondevelopment of the province’. He suggested that ‘A more developed province today might have helped better in solving this problem’ (Deka 2015: 38–39). Sardar Patel, the then home minister, also supported the settlement of refugees from East Pakistan in Assam. Bishnu Ram Medhi, the revenue minister in the Bardoloi ministry, decided that the surplus wasteland of Assam would be distributed first among the indigenous landless cultivators and the tea garden labourers. The requirement of refugees would be considered as the next level of priority. This policy of the Assam government was opposed by the central government, which demanded the wasteland be distributed between the indigenous and refugees on a fifty-fifty basis (ibid: 40). On 22 June 1950, Bardoloi wrote to Sardar Patel that his government had already shouldered the responsibility of rehabilitating one lakh new refugees, in addition to 1.25 lakh, who came one and a half years ago, and some ten thousands of the earlier batch had already been allotted land. However, pressure from the Centre to provide more land to the refugees continued, leading Bardoloi to tell Patel that if the Centre sustained the pressure, he and his colleagues would not contest the next election (Pisharoty 2019: 259). Because of repeated requests and arguments from Bardoloi, the central government under Nehru enacted the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 through parliament. This act was to expel ‘certain immigrants’ from Assam. But who were those ‘certain immigrants’? It was clear from the discussions of the bill in parliament that the provisions of the bill would apply to only those immigrants staying in Assam whose stay was 67

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detrimental to the interests of India. The bill would not apply to those whose stay was not detrimental to the interests of the country, or who had migrated to Assam because of instability in Pakistan or other nations (Parliamentary Debate, Vol. I, Part III). The central government, through this act, wanted to expel only the Muslim immigrants and to grant citizenship to Hindu immigrants from East Pakistan. Initially, the central government was made solely responsible for the implementation of the act so that the Assam government could not initiate any action against the Hindu immigrants without permission from the central government. It can be said that the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, communally divided the immigrants from East Pakistan to Assam in the name of ‘certain immigrants’. Despite all these factors, the Assam government under Bardoloi started to find illegal immigrants staying in Assam, mainly Muslims, and to deport them. Pakistan strongly opposed this activity. In the meantime, on 8 April 1950, the Nehru-Liaquat Pact was signed which indirectly granted citizenship to those who had migrated to India before 31 December 1950. This act compelled Assam to accept all Hindus and Muslims who had come to Assam from East Pakistan since independence. In a sense, this agreement made the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act null and void, which came into force in March 1950. Bardoloi strongly opposed this move by the central government. However, before any further strong opposition against the move could be initiated, in August 1950, Bardoloi died. After Bardoloi’s death, the illegal immigration from East Pakistan to Assam lost the attention of the Assamese ruling class, and the central government remained indifferent towards it for some time. The illegal immigration to Assam after independence had already taken a turn for the worse in the decade after independence. Then it started to attract the central government’s attention in the beginning of 1960s. By notifications issued on 22 March 1961 and 15 March 1962, the central government under Prime Minister Nehru empowered the Superintendent of Police and Additional Superintendent of Police of every district to find and deport illegal Pakistanis staying in Assam. The Government of Assam issued the same order through Gazette notification on 6 October 1964. In June 1962, the Government of India adopted the scheme Prevention of Infiltration into India of Pakistani Nationals (PIP), which covered Kamrup, Nagaon, Darrang and Lakhimpur districts of Assam. Under these measures, the Government of Assam tried to identify and deport illegal Pakistani nationals staying in the state. The reason for the central government’s sudden interest in Assam’s illegal immigration problem became clear when the 1961 census reported that Assam had 2,20,691 illegal infiltrators (Census of India Report 1961; GoA 2012). During 1961–65, a total of 1,78,952 infiltrators were either deported, or voluntarily left the country (GoA 2012). This reflects the effectiveness of the PIP scheme. The PIP scheme

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was to establish a thorough security screen to exercise a physical check and control over the number, identity and movement of existing inhabitants in the immigrant settlements near the border, making it impossible for any new entrants to go untraced or unnoticed. The police screen was initially intended to cover the border areas in three border districts: Goalpara, Garo Hills (in present Meghalaya) and Cachar, and three interior districts: Kamrup, Nagaon and Darrang where infiltrators found shelter by mixing with older settlers. In later years, the scheme was extended to cover Lakhimpur district as well. However, a group of Congress leaders from Assam, mainly Dev Kanta Barooah, Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed and Moinul Hoque Choudhury, convinced the Congress central leadership that the Muslims of Assam had been harassed in the process of searching for illegal migrants. Moinul Hoque Choudhury was the private secretary of Md. Ali Jinnah and a leader of the Muslim League, and he reportedly told Jinnah that he would ‘present Assam to him on a silver platter’. After independence, he joined Congress and was made a minister in successive Congress governments in Assam and later inducted as a cabinet minister in Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s Cabinet. As a response to the allegations of these Congress leaders, the central government, in 1964, formed a foreigners’ tribunal in Assam for fair identification and deportation of illegal foreigners. These leaders continued their pressure on Mrs. Gandhi to stop the process of deportation of Muslims from Assam when she became Prime Minister in 1966. Succumbing to the pressure, Mrs. Gandhi, in 1969, directed the police to stop searching for foreigners in the state (Deka 2015: 66). It was interesting that the central government surrendered to a few Congress leaders from Assam in a matter like illegal immigration directly related to India’s internal security. After the liberation of Bangladesh, on 19 March 1972, Mrs. Gandhi agreed with the Prime Minister of newly independent Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which is known as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Bangladesh. India won the war against Pakistan which made the independence of Bangladesh possible. After the independence of Bangladesh, the central government under Mrs. Gandhi decided not to deport the East Pakistani immigrants from India who entered due to war of liberation for Bangladesh, and 24 March 1971 was fixed as the date after which the government would consider immigration from Bangladesh as illegal. In this regard, on 17 February 1976, during the internal state of emergency of 1975–77, Mrs. Gandhi issued a circular which stated that the persons who (had) come to India from erstwhile East Pakistan prior to 24 March 1971 were not to be sent back to Bangladesh. With this circular, the central government did two things: first, it nullified Nehru’s proposal to treat 1952 as the ‘date of enquiry’ to determine citizenship of illegal immigrants after independence; and second, it made all the pre-March 1971 foreigners permanent settlers in Assam.

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Mrs. Gandhi, after she became Prime Minister of India, made the whole process of illegal migration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh to India a matter of vote bank politics and made the situation worse for the indigenous people of Assam. Her decision to stop the police search of illegal immigrants staying in Assam under pressure of Muslim Congress leaders from the state exhibited this vote bank politics. While Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was mainly concerned with the settlement of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi was interested in settling both Hindu and Muslim immigrants to Assam from East Pakistan for electoral gains. Although Prime Minister Nehru showed his concern towards Hindu refugees by providing the clause ‘certain immigrants’ in the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, he started the PIP scheme in Assam in 1962 to drive out illegal infiltrators staying in Assam. Against this, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi decided to make all persons illegally immigrated to Assam from East Pakistan legal citizens of India.

Congress politics of immigrant vote bank While Congress-led central government used Assam to fulfil its commitments towards refugees and international agreements, the Congress leaders in Assam and consecutive Assam government led by the party, after the demise of Gopinath Bardoloi, tried to keep the immigrant communities with it through appeasement politics. National leaders of Congress began to see immigration issues in Assam from the party’s electoral benefits after Mrs. Gandhi became Prime Minister of India. After independence, the Congress party in Assam formed electoral alliances with the immigrant communities in the state and started to assume these communities as vote banks. Dev Kanta Barooah, who became the president of the INC in 1975 from Assam, publicly articulated this as ‘So long as Alis (Muslim immigrants), coolies (tea labourers) and Bengalis (Hindu refugees) are with Congress party, it did not care for anybody’ (Gokhale and Kashyap 2004: 32). This clearly shows the strategy of the party to bank on the immigrant communities to win elections. After Bishnuram Medhi became Chief Minister of Assam in 1950, a proimmigrant lobby emerged under Mr. Barooah as a result of the power struggle among the top Assam Congress leaders for the post of Chief Minister. The other two prominent leaders of this lobby were Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed and Moinul Hoque Choudhury. Mr. Barooah’s rivalry with Chief Minister Medhi became an integral affair of Congress politics in Assam during that time. This group of pro-immigrant leaders, during the chief ministership of Medhi, lobbied before the Congress High Command in New Delhi that immigrant communities were becoming apprehensive towards the party for anti-immigrant policies of the Medhi-led government. Medhi was already known to the Congress High Command as a person not so favourable for illegal immigrants in Assam. He took a strong 70

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stand in favour of indigenous Assamese people in the distribution of land when he was a revenue minister under Chief Minister Bardoloi, which made the Congress central leadership dissatisfied. Now, the lobbying against him by the pro-immigrant group of Assam Congress leaders started to get the support of the National Congress leaders. Even Nehru began to stand against Mr. Medhi. The result was that Medhi had to resign from the post of Chief Minister of Assam in December 1957 after Congress came back to power in the state under his leadership in the Assembly election held in the same year. Although Medhi resigned on health grounds, many believed that he had to resign because of the pro-immigrant lobby in Congress [Talukdar and Kalita (III) 2014: 105]. It is interesting that after Medhi resigned from chief ministership on health grounds, he was immediately appointed as the Governor of Madras, a post he held for five years This switch showed how a section of Congress leaders followed a proimmigrant policy for their political gain in the decade just after independence. Eventually, it became a policy of the Congress party in the succeeding decades. It has been mentioned earlier how this pro-immigrant Congress lobby from Assam convinced Prime Minister Mr. Gandhi in 1969 to abandon the PIP scheme. The Assam Muslims had started to support Congress after the partition. Since then, the community had been considered only as a vote bank by Congress. In a bid to keep the vote bank intact, Congress politics towards Muslims in Assam always remained that of appeasement. Bishnu Ram Medhi could not take any step against the illegal immigrants staying in Assam because of the indifferent attitude of the central government towards the issue during his chief ministership (1950–57). Due to the indifferent attitude of the Congress-led central government in the 1950s towards the continuous illegal immigration to Assam, a section of Assam Congress leaders started to view this immigration as an opportunity to strengthen their hand in elections. Several incidents during the chief ministership of Bimala Prasad Chaliha during 1957–70 also proved this assertion. The central government initiated the PIP scheme when Chaliha was the Chief Minister of Assam. During the implementation of the PIP scheme, in 1964, the home minister of India Gulzarilal Nanda proposed the issuance of identity cards to people in selected areas in the Assam-East Pakistan border as a measure to identify foreigners when he visited Assam. However, even as Nanda discussed the issue informally with the leaders of the ruling Congress party in Assam, as many as 46 Congress MLAs not only strongly opposed it but also compelled the party to shoot down the proposal immediately. These MLAs were clearly apprehensive of the lakh of foreigners being identified which would jeopardise their assured en bloc votes (Gokhale and Kashyap 2004: 32). On the other hand, when the Chalihaled Assam government was implementing the PIP scheme, under pressure of the pro-immigrant lobby in Assam Congress leaders the Congress-led central government compelled the Assam government to slow it down. 71

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Because of this, since 1967, until the scheme was abandoned by the central government in 1969, the search for illegal infiltration became almost nonfunctional (ibid: 34).

Muslim political assertion in Assam After independence, the Muslim community in Assam tried to correct its role in communal politics under the Muslim League before independence by forming a linguistic alliance with the Assamese people and a political alliance with the Congress party. They tried, through these alliances, to establish themselves as secular citizens of a secular country. However, breaking this trend of secular social and political assimilation of Muslims in Assam, in 1977, only three decades after independence, arguments for a separate Muslim political party started to gain ground. A Muslimbased political party, Eastern India Muslim Association (EIMA), emerged in 1977 to look after the political and economic interests of the Muslim in the State. In a meeting at Haji Musafirkhana in Guwahati on 8 May 1977, presided over by Amjad Ali, an MP from Dhubri and former vice president of Assam Provincial Muslim League, the EIMA was formed. The EIMA became a part of the Progressive Democratic Front, consisted of Kamata Rajya Parishad, Janata Congress, Yuva Linguistic Minority Committee, and the Citizens Democratic Front. The Front won five seats in the 1978 Assam Assembly election, out of which EIMA won from two constituencies. However, EIMA was formally dissolved and merged with the Indian Union Muslim League in October 1978 to re-emerge as the Eastern Zonal Muslim League (EZML). A youth wing named Youth League was also formed. The flag of the party was to be the Indian Tricolour with a white star on the green. The EZML was formed in partnership with the Muslim League’s Indian chapter and incorporated ‘Muslim League’ in its name, and it also had a flag with a white star on a green backdrop, similar to the flag of the Muslim League before independence. The name and flag of the party also reflected its Muslim outlook (Kar 1990: 360–64). The EIMA, for the first time after independence, showed the dissatisfaction of Muslims towards the Congress party in Assam and tried to establish the argument for a Muslim-based political party. It declared that the Muslim Congressmen were pseudo representatives, and the Muslim community had decided to part from Congress due to the party’s motives towards the community. It alleged that Muslims had been denied equal rights and privileges. It argued that Muslims needed protection and a separate entity in multicultural India. On the basis of these allegations and arguments, EIMA justified the need for a distinct Muslim platform (ibid). The formation of EIMA can be viewed as the first experience of a Muslim political party in Assam. However, the EZML was not sustainable in the politics of Assam

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because of the beginning of the Assam Movement in 1979, which made the issue of Muslims very complex in the state. The emergence of EIMA as a Muslim political party in Assam at this point in time was interesting as Congress, after independence, had always tried to appease the Muslim community for electoral benefit. In this situation, the formation of EIMA can be considered as a consequence of internal emergency imposed by Congress-led central government under Mrs. Gandhi. The EIMA came into existence in 1977, opposing Congress when it was widely disliked because of the imposition of internal emergency. Importantly, the Assam Jamiat, which worked as an agent of Congress in Assam during elections after independence, did not have any role in the formation of the party. In this situation, the formation of EIMA can be considered as an attempt from some former Muslim League leaders to create a new space for Muslim politics in Assam when Congress started to lose its popularity. Few former League members, as mentioned earlier, were actively involved in its formation.

Conclusion The alliances formed with the Assamese people by accepting Assamese as the mother tongue by the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley made them an integral part of Assamese society and culture. On the other hand, the political alliance with Congress gave them the security in a Hindu majority society and politics in Assam. Due to the political alliance Congress formed with immigrant Muslims and Hindu refugees in Assam after independence, the continuous illegal immigration from East Pakistan to Assam did not get due importance from the Congress-led consecutive central governments. Except for the PIP scheme, which was operational only during 1962–69, there was no policy from the part of the central government either to stop illegal immigration to Assam or to identify and deport those immigrants who were illegally staying in Assam. As a result, continuous illegal immigration from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh to Assam made the indigenous communities in Assam afraid of losing their dominance at the hands of illegal immigrants in the state. Against this backdrop, the Assam Movement began in 1979 which brought the Muslims in Assam into sharp social and political focus, the first time in postindependent history. This six-year-long movement brought about significant changes to the social and political alliances the immigrant Muslims formed after independence. While the communal clash of 1950 brought about the need prior to the Muslims to create new social and political alliances in Assam, the Nellie massacre in the middle of the Assam Movement compelled the community to rethink the social and political alliances it had already formed.

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Notes 1 Among the constituencies won by INC, Katlichera was Bengali dominated; Karimganj South, Katigora, Dhubri, Baghbor, Chenga, Lahorighat and Rupahihat were Muslim dominated; and Dhekiajuli, Rangapara, Behali, Bokakhat, Sarupathar, Moriani, Nazira, Lahowal and Doom Dooma were tea community dominated. 2 Of total eight elected MLAs from INC(I), Muslim: Abdus Sobhan (Jania), A.N.Akram Hussain (Chaygaon), Syeda Anwara Taimur (Dalgaon); Bengali: Nepal Chandra Das (Algapur), Sisir Ranjan Das (Dholai); and, tea community: Satya Tanti (Sonari), Joy Chandra Nagbangshi (Moran), Rameswar Dhanowar (Digboi).

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During the Muslim League rule before independence, the indigenous Assamese people faced an existential threat from the large-scale immigration of Muslims from neighbouring East Bengal. However, the inclusion of Sylhet in Pakistan at the time of independence changed the situation. After independence, the issue concerning Muslims lost its pre-independence relevance, and for three decades, Muslims did not emerge as a major issue for the Assamese people. During this period, immigrant Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley emerged as the linguistic partner of the Assamese people to establish Assamese as the majority language of Assam. The Assam Movement, for the first time after independence, again identified immigrant Muslims as a threat to the indigenous Assamese people.

Assam Movement The by-election to Mangaldoi parliamentary constituency in 1979 became the backdrop to the Assam Movement. Based on the statement of India’s then Chief Election Officer S.L. Shakdhar in October 1978 regarding the largescale inclusion of the names of foreign nationals in the electoral rolls in the North-eastern states, the AASU demanded postponing the election until the names of the illegal foreigners were deleted from the electoral rolls. In a meeting of the state election commissioners on 24 October 1978, regarding Assam, Mr. Shakdhar stated that ‘influx has become a regular feature’. Based on the growth of the population in Assam between the 1961 and 1971 censuses, which was 34.95 per cent, he assessed that ‘the increase that is likely to be recorded in 1991 census would be more than 100 per cent over the 1961 censuses’. He pointed out that the state ‘may have to reckon with foreign nationals who may all probability constitute a sizeable percentage’. He added: Another disturbing factor is the demand made by the political parties for the inclusion in the electoral rolls the names of such immigrants who are not Indian citizens, without even questioning and properly determining their citizenship status. (Memorandum, AASU, 1980) 75

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Shakdar’s statement brought illegal immigration to Assam into the spotlight after three decades of independence. After the medium of instruction movement in 1972, the AASU had already started to get increasingly involved in different social and educational issues. At the time of the Mangaldoi by-election, based on Shakdar’s statement, it demanded that the election not be held till new electoral rolls were prepared by deleting the names of illegal immigrants whose names had already been entered. In the meantime, on 8 June 1979, the AASU sponsored a 12-hour general strike, demanding the ‘detection, disenfranchisement and deportation’ of foreign nationals illegally living in Assam. In August 1979, a few political and cultural organisations, including the ASS, came together to form a coalition called Asom Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) to co-ordinate a state-wide campaign to highlight the problem of illegal migration in Assam. That was the beginning of the Assam Movement. The organisations behind the movement, the AASU and AGSP, estimated the number of illegal foreigners in Assam to be as high as 4.5–5 million, or 31–34 per cent of the total population of the state in 1971 (Baruah 2001: 118–22). Concerns for Muslims The Assam Movement started at a time when the state was going through a period of unprecedented political instability under the Janata Party coalition government formed after the 1978 Assembly election. At the national level, after the failed Janata experiment, Indira Gandhi-led Congress (I) came back to power in January 1980 with a thumping majority. The AASU submitted a written memorandum to the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 2 February 1980 where it mentioned the demands of the movement,1 which became the reference point of the entire movement and later of the Assam Accord. At the beginning of the memorandum, the student body mentioned: ‘The problem which is agitating the minds of people of the entire North East Region is the problem of foreigners from the neighbouring countries particularly Bangladesh and Nepal’. Among the seven demands of AASU, the first was: ‘Foreign national must be detected and deported from our country’. The memorandum proposed that: The National Register of Citizens (NRC) of 1951 should be made upto-date by taking into consideration the additions to the number of each family since the time of compilation of the register, and that the comparison of the NRC with the successive electoral rolls since 1952 will also be helpful in making it up to date (Memorandum, AASU, 1980) The movement leaders wanted the NRC of 1951 as the primary document to determine nationality in Assam. They strictly demanded 1951 as 76

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the cut-off year for detecting and deporting foreign nationals from Assam in their discussions with the central government. The demand for the 1951 cut-off year by the Assam Movement leaders frightened the recently migrated Muslims in Assam. A large section of them had immigrated to Assam between independence and the birth of Bangladesh. Notably, central government, since the beginning of the movement, was not in agreement with the movement leaders on the cut-off year for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam. Against the movement leaders’ demand for 1951 as the cut-off year, the central government wanted 1971 as the cut-off year. Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in the late hours of 25 March 1971 (26 March is the Independence Day of Bangladesh). India played a crucial role in liberating Bangladesh from Pakistan. Hence, the central government wanted midnight of 24 March 1971 to be the cut-off date for the identification and deportation of foreigners from Assam, so that war refugees from East Pakistan were not deported. When the Assam Movement began in 1979, the leadership identified all bohiragato (outsiders) as the enemy to the existence and identity of the indigenous Assamese people. However, the movement shifted from the issue of ‘outsiders’ to bideshi (foreigners) within a concise period, and the memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister in February 1980 only referred to illegal foreigners. The Bohiragato meant all the outsiders living in Assam, even from different states of India. In a liberal democracy like India, a democratic movement cannot sustain such an undemocratic demand, and the Assam Movement also needed to shift its position from bohiragato to bideshi soon. However, the immigrant Muslims started to believe that the movement leaders had only shifted their position in order to target them. Moreover, the movement leaders and supporters since the beginning labelled the immigrant Muslims and the Bengali Hindus as ‘Bangladeshis’, i.e., illegal foreigners from Bangladesh. In the course of the movement, however, the illegal Hindu immigration from East Pakistan/ Bangladesh took a back seat, and immigrant Muslims became the main target of the movement leaders and supporters. Communalisation of the Assam Movement After the Assam Accord was signed, AASU was immediately congratulated by the national President of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), Dr. O.P. Kohli (Nivedan swajan-cinta 2007: 12). The sharpest criticism against the Accord also came from Delhi, from an Islamic cleric, Maulana Asad Madani, National President of Jamiat and a Congress MP. On 8 October 1985 in a letter to the Prime Minister of India, he alleged that the Accord ‘encourages separatisms by treating Assam for Assamese’ and ‘such agreement will encourage people in other parts of India to start such agitations to achieve their objectives reasonable or unreasonable’ 77

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(cited in Ahmed 1999: 173). These are clear indications that both Hindutva based and Muslim religious organisations had keen interests in the Assam Movement. The influence of the religious elements, particularly of Hindutva based organisations, on the Assam Movement has always caused controversy since the days of the movement. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, the President of AASU during the period of the movement, who became the Chief Minister of Assam after the end of the movement, denied the influence of right-wing Hindutva organisations on the movement. He argued that AASU had appealed to all organisations and political parties of India to support the Assam Movement. In response, several political parties and non-political organisations supported, several others remained silent and a few political parties like Congress opposed it. Leaders like Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh etc. also supported the movement (Mahanta 2007: 94). Even Hiteswar Saikia, the Congress Chief Minister during 1983–85 who tried to control the Assam Movement with force, did not acknowledge any significant role of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in the movement. In 1984, he claimed in an interview that RSS failed to take advantage of the movement although it had tried hard (Saikia 1993: 39–40). However, the influence of Hindutva organisations on the Assam Movement and their support to its cause cannot be denied. The ABVP strongly supported the Assam Movement and organised several seminars on the issue of the movement in different places like Delhi, Hyderabad and Bhubaneswar. Even some top leaders of the movement participated in the seminar held in Hyderabad. On the day of Rakhi Bandhan in 1983, ABVP used lakhs of Assam Rakhi in the entire country and observed the occasion as ‘Save Assam’ day. A delegation of the organisation carried a Swahid Jyoti (Martyr Light) from Rajghat and handed it to the AASU leaders in Guwahati on 1 October 1983. The next day, ABVP organised a mass satyagraha in Guwahati in support of the movement in which almost a thousand members of the organisation from all over the country participated (Bhattacharya 2011: 204–05). On the other hand, during 1981, RSS convened 19 meetings and four camps in Assam. In 1982, four meetings were organised by RSS in the state. One such camp was held in B.N. College, Goalpara district between 22 May and 13 June. On 21 February 1982, the RSS called a Purvanchali Hindu Sammelan in Guwahati, where all Hindus, irrespective of caste and language, were invited to unite under the Hindu religious flag so that they could play a dominant and determining role in the entire northeast. Such appeal, amid the movement, worked as a catalyst to unite Hindus against the Muslims (Borgohain 2016: 15). Finally, many believed that the seswasevak bahini (volunteer force) formed by AASU in 1980 to mobilise the movement, was formed as per the suggestion and instruction of the RSS. The supreme commander of the seswasevak bahini, Joynath Sarma, who became a Minister under the AGP government in 1985, was known to be very close to RSS (Nath 2015a: 221). Even Biswa Hindu Parishad (BHP) 78

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started to mobilise its activities in Assam during the movement. A meeting of the BHP was held on 20 June 1981 in Naharkatiya, Dibrugarh where conversion from Hinduism to Christianity was seriously discussed [Daily Situation Report from Special Branch (Secret), Government of Assam, 21 June 1981]. Muslim religious organisations, like the Jamiat, opposed the Movement from the very beginning. In a letter dated 4 October 1980 to the Home Minister of India, the National President and Assam unit President of Jamiat, Maulana Asad Madani and Maulana Ahmed Ali strongly opposed the idea of NRC 1951 as the base year of determination of foreigners in Assam (‘Memorial in respect of Base Year of Identification & Machinery of Determination Status’ to the Home Minister of India, Dtd. 4 October 1980). The movement made Jamiat more relevant among the Muslims of Assam. On the other hand, orthodox Muslim organisations like Tablique Jamat also started to earn popularity among common Muslims. During 20–21 June 1981, Tablique Jamat organised a religious meeting of the Muslim community in Hajo [Daily Situation Report from Special Branch (Secret), Government of Assam, 22 June 1981]. The perceived notion that the RSS controlled the movement made these organisations all the more popular among a large section of Muslim. By the end of 1980, Jamiat began to advocate the cause of the minorities against the movement. It took the lead to unite all the minority organisations against the movement. It even aligned with the Citizens’ Right Preservation Committee (CRPC), which was an organisation of Hindu Bengalis, the linguistic minorities of Assam. After the partition of India, a Bengali Hindu forum, known as the Indian Citizens’ Rights Preservation Committee (ICRPC), was formed by the displaced persons from East Pakistan who had settled in Assam. During the Assam Movement, it also inducted immigrant Muslim members to its fold to fight against the movement and renamed itself as CRPC (Ahmed 1999: 149–51). During the movement, through regular publications, Jamiat tried to sway the minds of Muslim readers (Hussain 1993: 132) against the movement. Jamiat even termed the leaders of the Assam Movement ‘extremist’ and ‘secessionist’. In a resolution of the 14th conference of the Assam unit of Jamiat it said: …due to abnormal situation arising out of the result of so called foreigners movement launched by the extremist secessionist force since the last 4/5 years constantly threatening the sense of security of the people belonging to all minority communities…. (Resolution No. 3 of Jamiat-E-Ulema-E-Hind Assam, dt. 24/25.4.84) In the same resolution, it demanded the inclusion of a member from the organisation in the screening committees under every IM(DT) tribunal, which were formed for the identification of illegal foreigners living in Assam. It is astonishing that Jamiat, a religious organisation, demanded to 79

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become part of the government process of identifying illegal foreigners in Assam. In Resolution No 4 of the same conference, it expressed grave concerns at the attempt of the Central Election Commission to correct the Voters’ List based on the Voters’ List of 1971. Such demands and concerns clearly show how Jamiat, during the Assam Movement, tried to establish itself as the saviour of immigrant Muslims living in Assam. Jamiat brought religious leaders from different parts of India to campaign against the movement in the immigrant Muslim dominated areas with the objective of uniting Muslims against the movement. Birth of AAMSU and Muslim counter to Assam Movement On 29–30 March 1980, a minority convention was held in Jaleswar, Goalpara in which Muslim politicians and youths and a section of Hindu Bengali leaders participated. In this convention, the All Assam Minority Students’ Union (AAMSU) and All Assam Minority Yuva Parishad (AAMYP) were formed to protect and safeguard minority communities from the Assam Movement (Ahmed 1999: 149). Although it was formed to safeguard the interests of all minorities, the AAMSU emerged as an organisation of the immigrant Muslim and Hindu communities. It becomes clear from the fact that the indigenous Muslims of Assam opposed the formation of AAMSU. In an appeal, the Asomiya Muslim Public Relations Committee, an organisation of the indigenous Assamese Muslims, stated that the formation of AAMSU was unnecessary, and it would divide the indigenous and Muslim societies (Thakur 2014: 26–27). Notably, a large section of indigenous Muslims from Brahmaputra valley, particularly from upper Assam, were supporters of the Assam Movement. And on several occasions during the movement, the immigrant Muslims came into conflict with the indigenous Muslims. For instance, the immigrant Muslims on 27 February 1980 attacked the farmhouses of Assamese Muslims in Kurihamari Char under Mukalmua Police Station (Assam Monthly Report to the Governor, February–March, 1980, Political Department, Government of Assam). Within less than a year of the beginning of the Assam Movement, AAMSU emerged as a counterforce of AASU. The AAMSU labelled the Assam Movement communal and secessionist.2 On 12 April 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Guwahati for discussions with the leaders of the Assam Movement. AAMSU leaders also met Mrs. Gandhi and declared their readiness to accept 1971 as the cut-off year for the determination of illegal foreigners in Assam (Hussain 1993: 121). A counter-movement was launched by AAMSU against the Assam Movement on 26 May 1980 by observing ‘Demand Day’ throughout the state. On this day, in Howley town of Barpeta district, AAMSU organised a large rally where four people were killed by police fire (Ahmed 1999: 153). Since then, AAMSU has observed 26 May as Martyrs’ Day every year. After observing Demand Day, AAMSU started to oppose every agitational programme of AASU during the Assam Movement. 80

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For instance, on 14 June 1980, AAMSU made a mike announcement in and around Barpeta town to oppose AASU’s proposed Assam Bandh on 15 June (Assam Monthly Report to the Governor, February–March, 1980, Political Department, Government of Assam). The AAMSU came into existence as an antithesis to AASU and just after its emergence, it started to get the patronage of Congress against AASU. As AAMSU was ready to accept the cut-off date prescribed by Indira Gandhiled central government, it was immediately made a part of the negotiations with the leaders of the Assam Movement. By making AAMSU a party at the table of negotiations, the Congress-led central government tried to show its concerns towards the Muslim cause in Assam. However, AASU was opposed to the decision of the central government to make AAMSU a party to discussions to resolve the demands of the Assam Movement. AASU labelled the AAMSU as the agents of illegal Bangladeshis living in Assam. There were reports of frequent clashes between the supporters of AASU and AAMSU during the movement period after the latter was formed. For example, on 17 June 1981, members and supporters of AAMSU attacked a procession of AASU at Chapar, Goalpara district where at least 20 people from both groups were injured (Daily situation Report of Assam wef 1 May 1981 to 31 May 1981, Vol 2, Special Branch, Secret). The origin and growth of AAMSU significantly affected the Assam Movement and brought about a new dimension to the question of Muslim identity in Assam. The AASU, until the beginning of the Assam Movement, had a strong presence in the educational institutions located in the areas inhabited by the immigrant Muslims and was strongly supported by the students from the community. As has already been highlighted, the immigrant Muslim community of Brahmaputra valley stood behind AASU in the medium of instruction movement led by the organisation in 1972. After the Assam Movement got underway, particularly after the formation of AAMSU, immigrant Muslims as a community started to desert AASU. The community began to consider AASU a threat, and AAMSU emerged as the new platform of young leaders and students from the community. And after the central government’s patronage to the AAMSU, the Assam Movement was communally divided. The supporters of the movement began to consider AAMSU as the organisation of illegal Bangladeshis. On the other hand, AAMSU openly aligned with a religious organisation like Jamiat to oppose the movement, although it criticised AASU of being controlled by the RSS. The AAMSU actively mobilised and united the immigrant Muslim community against AASU and the movement. Taimur as Assam Chief Minister The Janata Party alliance formed the first-ever non-Congress government in Assam following the 1978 Assembly election. But, from the very beginning, the government was unstable because of internal conflicts and 81

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contradictions among the parties which formed it. In the meantime, Congress (I) returned to power at the centre under Indira Gandhi in early 1980. Assam experienced a massive defection in the politics of the state after Mrs. Gandhi assumed office in Delhi. Congress (I), which won only eight seats in the 1978 election, increased the strength of its MLAs to 45 in December 1980 as a consequence of defections. However, the party could not reach the majority number in the Assam Assembly. Then, Congress (I) formed a government in Assam on 6 December 1980 with Syeda Anwara Taimur as the Chief Minister under direct patronage of Mrs. Gandhi. Although this government lasted only six months, till 26 June 1981, Taimur’s elevation as the Chief Minister of Assam contributed significantly to making the Assam Movement communally polarised. AASU strongly opposed the formation of the Anuwara Taimur-led government. After Taimur assumed office, the Assamese press began to term the government a ‘minority government’. From the number equation, the Janata governments led by Golap Borbora and Jogen Hazarika, before Taimur took over, were also minority governments. However, the Assamese print media labelled neither the Borbora nor the Hazarika government ‘minority government’ (Hoque 2007: 301). The Taimur government was termed a minority government only because Taimur was Muslim. The Assamese press played a very partisan role in the evolution of the Assam Movement by openly supporting it. During the Movement, most often, it tried to sway people’s emotions in favour of the movement and create hatred towards those who opposed the movement or disagreed with it. The Assamese press began to spread a rumour that immigrants would be encouraged to turn against the Assam Movement, and Muslims would get the benefit of government jobs and services under the Muslim Chief Minister Anwara Taimur. As a reaction to the Muslim threat created by the press, the influence of the RSS and BJP on the Assam Movement suddenly increased (ibid). Taimur government, on the other hand, appointed several Muslim officers in the Chief Minister’s office. These officers were assigned responsibilities of important departments in the Assam secretariat, which created dissatisfaction among a section of non-Muslim officers (Nath 2015a: 115). This government, for the first time, tried to discipline ethic Assamese government employees, especially senior officials, who were known sympathisers of the movement. For many, the actions of the Taimur government, on the one hand, created a kind of legitimacy to the crisis in the state and on the other were aimed at de-Assamisation of the state bureaucracy, which again reinforced the Assamese minoritisation at the hands of immigrants (Baruah 2001: 128–29). Amidst the Assam Movement, Anwara Taimur’s selection as the Chief Minister of Assam by the Congress High Command communally divided the society of Assam. Muslim Congress stalwarts from Assam like Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Moinul Hoque Chowdhury were never considered for the post of Chief Minister by the Congress High Command 82

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before the Assam Movement. In comparison to Ahmed and Hoque Chowdhury, Taimur was not a very prominent and mass-based leader. Still, the Congress (I) High Command made her the Chief Minister of Assam, in an intention to appease the Muslims of the state. Mrs. Gandhi realised that the Muslims of Assam were in a crisis because of the Assam Movement, and if Congress could show its sympathy towards them at that point in time, the community would remain a loyal support base of the party in elections. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gandhi realised the support base of Congress among immigrant communities living in Assam in the 1978 Assembly election. She wanted to strengthen this support base by appointing a Muslim Chief Minister in Assam at that crucial time. Moreover, Mrs. Taimur represented both the indigenous and immigrant groups of Assam Muslims. She was an indigenous Muslim, although she represented the overwhelmingly immigrant Muslim dominated Dalgaon constituency. This link of Taimur with both groups of Muslims in Assam may have also worked in her favour when the Congress High Command planned to unite Assam Muslims behind the party by appointing a Muslim Chief Minister against the backdrop of the Assam Movement. A section of indigenous Muslims alienated themselves from the Assam Movement after Taimur became Chief Minister. On the other hand, the movement leaders, because of the Taimur episode, began to label Congress (I) as the friend of illegal Muslim Bangladeshis. As a whole, the chief ministership of Taimur at a critical juncture sharply divided the movement into communal lines. The birth of AAMSU, Anwara Taimur’s chief ministership, the connections of some movement leaders with Hindutva organisations, and the influence of Muslim religious organisations on anti-movement forces – all these factors started to communally divide the Assam Movement. During the movement, the growing communal clashes since mid-1981 were the consequences of this. Year 1983: unprecedented communal division in Assam In the post-independent period, 1983 became the most violent year in Assam. The Assam Assembly election held in February of that year and the Nellie massacre just after the election significantly influenced the future course of the Assam Movement and created an everlasting distrust between the indigenous Assamese and immigrant Muslims. Election 1983 The sixth Assam Legislative Assembly was dissolved prematurely on 19 March 1982 and Assam would have had to go for an election before 18 March 1983 to elect a new House as per the constitutional provisions. Mrs. Gandhi-led central government wanted to hold scheduled Assembly elections in the state. The government was sure that an election with a moderate to high turnout 83

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would weaken the claims of the movement about its representativeness and its influence on the electorate. The movement leaders, however, were adamant in their opposition to any election without the removal of the names of illegal immigrants from the electoral rolls, as they claimed that a large number of illegal foreigners had already entered their names in electoral rolls. Finally, the central government declared that Assembly elections would be held in February 1983 in three phases. The organisers of the movement called for a boycott of the election, calling it Assam’s ‘last struggle for survival’. The election was declared in three phases on 14, 17 and 20 February. The movement leaders declared non-cooperation between 7 and 22 February, and a total road blockade from 11 to 20 February. They declared every polling station a no-man’s land. Against this backdrop, the election of 1983 became the focus of a competition between the Assam Movement and the Indian state (Baruah 2001: 131). Mrs. Gandhi-led central government forcefully held the election and there were two purposes to this: first, to marginalise the Assam Movement by holding elections with existing electoral rolls, and second, to show the Congress party’s commitment to the immigrant Muslims and Hindus of the state against the Assam Movement. The boycott call given by the movement leaders was largely successful in the ethnic Assamese dominated constituencies. In 17 constituencies (out of total 126), elections had to be cancelled as there was no candidate to contest from these constituencies [Talukdar and Kalita 2014 (V): 277]. In the ethnic Assamese dominated constituencies, where elections were held, voting percentage was abnormally low. For example, voting percentages in some of the ethnic Assamese constituencies, where elections were held, were: Dharmapur – 0.39, Dhemaji – 0.4, Guwahati East – 1.68, Jorhat – 1.84, Bokakhat – 2.56. In contrast, Muslim dominated constituencies from Brahmaputra valley witnessed a massive participation of electors. Polling percentage in some of such constituencies were: Mankachar – 79.44, Salmara South – 73.49, Baghbor – 70.97, Bilasipara West – 66.96, Dalgaon – 66.55. Moreover, the hill districts and Barak valley, mostly unaffected by the Assam Movement, participated generally in the elections. As a result, despite the low voting percentage in ethnic Assamese dominated constituencies, the average voting in this election was 31.46 per cent (Election Commission of India Report). This was a victory for Mrs. Gandhi-led central government. However, the Assam Movement leaders termed the election ‘illegal’ and never recognised the Congress (I) government formed in the state after the election. From this election, the central government realised that the movement was confined to only the ethnic Assamese dominated areas of Brahmaputra valley. With this realisation, since then, the central government started to show negligence towards the demands of the movement and tried to contain it through force with the help of the Congress (I)-led Assam government. The immigrant communities participated in the election in large numbers. The Bengali Hindus and immigrant Muslims participated in the 84

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election to form an immigrant-friendly government that could protect them from the movement. Congress leaders, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, appealed to the minorities during the election campaign to vote for Congress and promised them protection. The immigrant Muslims and Hindus participated in the election and supported Congress for their safety. Consequently, the party won 91 seats out of a total of 109 constituencies where the election was held. The mass boycott of the Assembly election by most of the indigenous communities paved the way for the election of 33 Muslims to the Assam Assembly. In the 1978 Assam Assembly election, 28 Muslims were elected against 21 in the previous 1972 election. The background to this rise of Muslim MLAs in the 1978 election was discussed earlier. The rise of Muslim MLAs in the 1978 Assembly election eventually became an argument at the hands of Assam Movement leaders of the increase of illegal Muslim immigrants in Assam. The election of 33 Muslim MLAs in the 1983 election, mainly due to non-participation of several political parties and ethnic Assamese people, made the argument of the movement leaders even stronger that illegal Bangladeshi Muslims were becoming a threat to the political existence and identity of the indigenous Assamese. During the 1983 election, both the supporters and opponents of the election tried to polarise it as well as the Assam Movement communally. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi campaigned for three days consecutively from 10 February, and she addressed election meetings only in immigrant Muslim and Hindu inhabited areas of Barak valley and lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley. Two central ministers, Abdul Ghani Khan Chowdhury and Nihar Ranjan Laskar, also campaigned in the minority-dominated areas. All these Congress leaders appealed to the Bengali Hindus and immigrant Muslims to rally behind Congress to oppose the movement. There were reports that Chowdhury and Laskar made highly communal statements during their election campaigns in minority-dominated areas (Nath 2015a: 134). Abdul Ghani Khan Chowdhury, for instance, said in Neelbagan in Nagaon district during the campaign: ‘I have come to tell you that when you are in danger, you shall take blood for blood. If one person from you is killed, you must have the courage to kill two Hindus’ (Gokhale and Kashyap 2004: 23). On the other hand, BJP leaders like Atal Bihari Vajpayee campaigned against the election. Even Vajpayee said in a speech in Guwahati on 7 February 1983 that ‘a river of blood’ would flow in Assam if elections were allowed to take place (Pisharoty 2019: 111). Muslims in Assam, for the first time, behaved as a vote bank of the Congress party in the 1983 Assembly election, albeit in an extraordinary situation. The immigrant communities, particularly the immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis, who were directly targeted by the movement, stood against it from the beginning and participated in the election actively. In this election, the immigrant Muslims participated in huge numbers against the movement and behaved as a vote bank of the Congress party. As many as 85

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32 of Congress (I)’s 126 tickets had gone to Muslims. A total of 26 Muslims were elected as Congress (I) candidates. However, the vote bank behaviour of immigrant Muslims in this election cannot be considered as a result of the community’s affection towards Congress. It can be assumed that Muslims voted en masse for Congress in this election only in the interest of the community. As has been shown in Chapter 2, the electoral support of Muslims to Congress in consecutive Assembly elections was not due to affection to the party but for the mutual benefit of both Muslims and the Congress party. Even after the so-called Congress-Muslim alliance before the first-ever Assembly elections in Assam in 1951, the support of Muslims to Congress in subsequent polls in Assam was not absolute. In the 1983 election, as a significant section of Muslims living in the state felt threatened by the Assam Movement, Congress was overwhelmingly supported by the community to form a government in Assam to safeguard the interests of the community. Though it was taken for granted that all the parties that contested in that election were against the Assam Movement, Muslims voted for Congress because of the simple fact that Congress had a strong organisational set-up and experience of governance. Notably, in this election, while Janata Party, BJP, and Lok Dal did not participate in support of the boycott call of the Assam Movement leaders, Congress (I), Congress (U), Plain Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA) and left parties participated in the election. When immigrant Muslims behaved as a vote bank of the Congress party in this election in a situation created by the anti-immigration movement, it becomes pertinent to understand the voting behaviour of the other two immigrant communities in this election – the Hindu Bengalis and the tea labourers. Like the immigrant Muslims, the Hindu Bengalis also participated in the election in huge numbers and supported Congress overwhelmingly. Bengali dominated Barak valley normally voted in this election. From the Barak valley constituencies, with the exception of Dholai, where the polling percentage was 46, in all other constituencies the poll percentage was above 50, and Sonai constituency recorded the highest 75.6 per cent polling. Congress won 12 of total 15 constituencies from Barak valley. Regarding the voting behaviour of Barak valley in this election, it can also not be ignored that the Assam Movement was concentrated mainly in the districts of Brahmaputra valley. However, compared to the high participation of Muslims and the Hindu Bengalis in this election, the participation of the tea labourers was low. The polling percentage in some very important tea labourers influenced constituencies were: Sonari – 11.22, Doom Dooma – 20.41 and Tinsukia – 24.8 (Election Commission of India Report). Such a low voting percentage shows that unlike the immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis, a section of the tea community voters from Brahmaputra valley boycotted this election in response to the Assam Movement leaders. This support of the community for the movement was interesting as it was also an immigrant community like the immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis. 86

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This was able to happen as the movement did not directly target the community. As has already been argued, while a portion of both immigrant Muslims and Bengalis living in Assam are recently immigrated (from neighbouring countries) after independence, the tea community was imported to the state from different places of present north and central India before independence. Again, the tea labourers live mainly in upper Assam among the indigenous Assamese communities, which also might have influenced them not to come into direct conflict with these communities by participating in this election. However, despite a relatively low participation of the community, Congress won from all tea community influenced constituencies where the election was held. Nellie Massacre AASU not only boycotted the 1983 election but also decided to stop the election by using every means available and at any cost. It realised that if the central government were able to hold the election peacefully at that point, it would have a serious impact on the movement. This stand of the student organisation made the 1983 election a battleground between the movement supporters and the central government. The central government imposed different black laws like the Assam Special Power (Press) Act to censor the media, and imposed the Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA) on state government employees to ensure their participation in the process of the election. Assam was flooded with paramilitary forces to hold the election, and the government even imported polling personnel from Bihar to help as a large section of Assam government employees defied all dictates of the government and rallied behind the movement. The Assam Movement became leaderless during the election. All the top movement leaders were arrested and kept in jail to avoid any kind of disruption in the election process. The movement was led by second-rung leadership during this critical phase. The second-tier leaders could not prevent many untoward incidents during the election because of their lack of control over the supporters. Assam experienced an unprecedented breakdown of law and order and violence at that time. There were intelligence reports that immigrant Muslims, plain tribals, Nepalese, tea garden labourers and Bengali Hindus in some places had organised themselves to resist Assamese agitationists if they tried to create disturbances in areas predominantly inhabited by people of these communities [Special Branch Report (Secret), Government of Assam, 12 February 1983]. As a result, communal clashes occurred in different places during the election. Both election supporters and opponents had to sacrifice their lives in these clashes. For instance, on 12 February 1983, in an election-related conflict at Samaria, where police had to open fire, three Assamese Hindus, one Bengali Hindu and two immigrant Muslims lost their lives [Special Branch Report (Secret), Government of Assam, 13 February 1983]. AASU declared 130 87

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movement supporters as martyred in government violence during the election (Nath 2015a: 135). On the other hand, the Assam police informed the Commission of Inquiry on Assam Disturbance, 1983, that during the period from 1 January to 30 April of 1983 the loss of lives in different districts were: Dibrugarh – 54, Sibsagar – 88, Lakhimpur – 350, Nagaon – 1,811, Karbi Anglong – 16, Darrang – 493, Kamrup – 92 and Goalpara – 119 (Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Assam Disturbance 1984: 426). As per this, total number of people killed in election violence was 3023. While the central government used all possible force to hold the election, movement supporters also used force and resorted to violence in different places of the state to stop the election from being conducted. The election-related violence destroyed the non-violent character of the movement for good. On 18 February 1983, a large-scale massacre took place in Nellie, near Jagiroad in the Nagaon district, where between 1,600 and 2,000 people were killed (Kimura 2013: 74). In this incident, the local people, including the Assamese and tribals, attacked the immigrant Muslims living there (Kimura 2003: 227). The Nellie massacre became one of the major communal clashes India witnessed after independence. It severely affected the Gandhian ideology of the movement and significantly changed the direction of the movement. The movement leaders denied any role on their part in the massacre and placed the blame on the Tiwa tribe who inhabited nearby areas of Nellie (Nath 2013: 98). However, it was clear to everybody that the massacre was an act of revenge on the immigrant Muslims living in that area for their participation in the election. On 10 April 1983, newly elected Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia alleged that the volunteer force of AASU led the Nellie massacre (Nath 2015a: 207). Notably, just before the elections, the leaders of the volunteer force had sent a secret written appeal to all its members giving instructions for stopping the election. The appeal urged the volunteers to use all kinds of violence, such as burning government offices, cutting trees to block communication and disrupt electric supply, physically torturing the supporters of the election and using arms, to stop the election (Bora 2007b: 353–57). Alienation of Muslims from the Movement The 1983 Assembly elections and its related violence, especially that in Nellie, was the turning point of the Assam Movement vis-à-vis the entire Muslim community in Assam. After Nellie, the Assamese Muslims also started to believe that the entire Muslim community had become the target of the movement. On the other hand, the neo-Assamese Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley felt that their entire community was recognised as illegal Bangladeshis by the leaders and supporters of the movement despite the fact that a large section of them immigrated to Assam under British colonialism and had voluntarily integrated into the Assamese language and culture. After the Nellie massacre, Muslim leaders of AASU organised a special meeting among themselves on 11–12 April 1983 in Guwahati, where 88

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election-related incidences of communal violence were discussed. Among these leaders, the vice president of AASU, Nurul Hussain; the president and organisational secretary of Kamrup district AASU; and the general secretary of Bokakhat AASU were also present. Following the meeting a letter was sent to the central committee of AASU expressing their concerns about the situation post-Assembly election (1983). It demanded steps from the AASU leadership to prevent the spread of communal violence. The content of the letter showed how Muslims felt alienated from the movement after the Nellie massacre. The letter openly alleged, referring to certain reports published in national media, that the supreme commander of AASU volunteer force, Joynath Sarma, had a close association with the RSS, and they demanded the immediate expulsion of Mr. Sarma from AASU. The letter questioned AASU’s role in declaring the attackers as martyrs during communal clashes and demanded a properly formulated policy for the declaration of martyrs of the movement. It appealed to the central leadership to ask all units to be vigilant against any activities of communal organisations like the RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat etc. so that the movement could be saved from the communal conspiracy of these organisations. The letter demanded that steps be taken to stop forthwith the practice of calling any attack as an attack by Bangladeshis or Miyas by regional media (cited in Ahmed 1999: 154–57). However, the central leadership of AASU rejected the allegation that any leader of the organisation, including Joynath Sarma, had any association with the RSS. Without giving any importance to the concerns of the Muslim leaders expressed in the letter, the AASU leadership alleged that the meeting of the AASU’s Muslim leaders was Congress sponsored. On this allegation, the central leadership of AASU suspended its vice president Nurul Hussain and expelled all other leaders from AASU who had organised the meeting. The intolerance exhibited by the AASU central leadership towards the concerns of its Muslim leaders proved how the movement ignored the interests and views of the Muslims of Assam. Many consider the expulsion of the Muslim leaders as a clear indication of the strong influence of Hindu communal organisations over the movement leaders (Hussain 1993: 127). The Muslim leaders of the Assam Movement were mainly from the indigenous Muslim community. The expulsion of these leaders compelled the whole community to introspect their role in the movement. The Nellie massacre had already shown that Muslims had become the main target of the movement supporters. Gradually, a section of the community alienated itself from the movement. IM(DT) act and Congress politics of vote bank The Assam Movement raised the issue of illegal immigration to Assam from the neighbouring countries since independence. It demanded that illegal immigrants living in Assam should be immediately identified and deported. 89

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After Congress(I) came back to power at the centre in 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi categorically declared that the cut-off date for the determination of illegal foreigners in Assam could not be fixed before 1971. Despite this strong stand of the central government, the Assam Movement turned out to be a mass movement demanding 1951 to be the cut-off year for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam. Then Mrs. Gandhi-led central government tried to delegitimise the Assam Movement by forcefully holding the Assam Assembly election in 1983 based on the existing Voters’ List. The election was forcefully held at the cost of thousands of lives. Even after this, the movement did not stop, and movement leaders declared the 1983 election illegal and refused to recognise the Congress (I) government in Assam formed after the election. Such a stand of movement leaders brought about a legitimacy crisis to the newly formed Congress (I) government in Assam under Hiteswar Saikia, which ultimately made the forceful holding of the election in 1983 in Assam a futile exercise. Then Mrs. Gandhi came forward to marginalise the demands of the movement with parliamentary legislation. The Indian Parliament legislated the IM(DT) Act in 1983 and imposed it on Assam. This Act was the state’s response to the core issue of the Assam Movement: identification and deportation of foreigners on the basis of the 1951 cut-off year. The Act was meant to provide for the establishment of tribunals for the determination, fairly, of the question of whether a person was an illegal migrant to enable the central government to expel him or her from India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act set up tribunals to be presided over by retired district/additional district judges in each district (The IMDT Act 1983). Through the act, the Congress (I)-led central government intended to marginalise and weaken the Assam Movement by making the issue of illegal foreigners in Assam more complex. By implementing the act in Assam, the Congress led by Mrs. Gandhi used it also to appease the immigrant communities living in the state for future electoral benefits. The Constitution of India provides that all who immigrated to the country illegally after the implementation of the constitution would be considered foreigners in the country. The Assam Movement also demanded 1951 as the cut-off year for the identification of illegal foreigners living in Assam. However, in the newly enacted IM(DT) Act, a new date (on or before 25 March 1971) was fixed for Assam under the section 3c(i) to identify illegal foreigners. This was how the central government, through this act, nullified the demand of the Assam Movement. The IM(DT) Act was illegal and discriminatory in its functioning. A country should have a uniform immigration law, but during 1983–2005 India followed two immigration laws. During this period, while the rest of the country was treated under the Foreigners Act of 1946, Assam followed the IM(DT) Act, 1983. Moreover, the IM(DT) Act went against the equality clause of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which says, ‘The State shall not deny 90

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to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India’. The IM(DT) Act treated the foreigners in Assam especially (not equally) and protected illegal foreigners, unlike anywhere else in the world. The formulation of the IM(DT) Act and its imposition on Assam were to help illegal foreigners living in the state. The Act provided all possible opportunities to those foreigners to escape from identification and deportation. Few provisions of the Act in comparison to the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 prove this. Under Clause 3 of the Foreigners Act, the police enjoy sole authority to detect and deport illegal foreigners. But under the IM(DT) Act, the police cannot independently initiate any inquiry against any foreigners. The police can initiate an inquiry against a person in this regard only when it receives a written complaint, either from a government official, or a private citizen, questioning the nationality of a resident of a region. Again, according to sub-section 2(b) under Clause 8, somebody can complain against anybody only to the same police station. That is, if somebody knows an illegal foreigner, but not within the same police station area jurisdiction, he/she cannot complain against him in tribunals under the Act. Moreover, surprisingly, the complainant has to pay a fee of not less than ten and not more than one hundred rupees (as may be prescribed) when he/she lodges a complaint in the tribunal against any foreigner. It was astounding that the complainant had to pay a fee when he was trying to help the government identify an illegal foreigner. The most controversial provision of the IM(DT) Act, however, was the burden of proof. Under Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946, the onus of proof lies on the defendant, which is an internationally established practice. But section 11 of the IM(DT) Act puts the onus of the evidence on the prosecution, which means the state is required to prove whether a person is an illegal migrant or not. The IM(DT) Act, besides making the process of identification of illegal foreigners living in Assam almost impossible, also divided the society of Assam into communal lines. The Congress party was responsible for formulating the Act, and the party used the Act to divide the society of Assam on communal lines for political gains. The IM(DT) was an immigration act, and such an Act cannot have any relation to the majority or minority community in a country. However, since the imposition of the IM(DT) Act on Assam, Congress had been openly arguing and campaigning that the Act was to safeguard the interests of the minorities. After the Act was implemented in Assam, during the Assam Movement, it repeatedly stated that the Act was to safeguard the interests of the minorities from the movement. When the movement came to an end and the Assam Accord was signed, the party started to campaign that the Act helped safeguard the interests of the minorities from the clauses of the Accord. Such continuous campaigning of Congress in favour of the IM(DT) Act clearly proves that the party formulated it only for vote bank politics. The imposition of the Act on Assam helped the party in the state electorally as the minorities, 91

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Table 3.1  IM(DT) Cases Period

Cases referred

Cases Cases Number of disposed pending persons (cumulative) declared as foreigners

Number of declared foreigners pushed back/ deported

1985–90 1991–95 1996– 2000 2001–July 2005 Total

22,628 3,488 17,623

6,486 7,335 4,420

16,196 12,349 25,552

6,724 2,577 902

521 792 179

68,998

5,780

88,770

2,643

55

88,770

12,846

1,547

1,12,791 24,021

Source: White Paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Government of Assam, 2012, p. 18

particularly the immigrant Muslims, began to consider the party as the protector of the community in the presence of the Assam Accord. In contrast to the Congress politics of vote bank via IM(DT) Act, most of the political parties and non-political organisations of the state had demanded the repeal of the Act since its implementation. Against this backdrop, Assam politics and society were divided into pro-and anti-IM(DT) groups. The antiIM(DT) group started to label the pro-IM(DT) group as supporters of illegal Bangladeshis. In the process, all the immigrant Muslims of Assam were made identical to illegal Bangladeshis by the anti-IM(DT) group. The IM(DT) Act, as desired by the Congress-led central government, effectively made the process of the identification of illegal foreigners in Assam very complex, if not impossible. The functioning of the Act proved this. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in Assam, in a short span of five years between 1961 and 1965, a total of 1,78,952 people were identified as illegal infiltrators living in Assam under the PIP scheme when the Foreigners Act, 1946 was operative in Assam. But the IM(DT) tribunals, during 22 years of functioning in Assam, could dispose only 24,021 cases out of a total of 1,12,791 (Table 3.1). The ineffectiveness of the IM(DT) Act can be understood from the observations of the Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India & Anr judgement in 2005. Based on affidavits filed by the Union of India and the state of Assam, it observed: (39) …though inquiries were initiated in 310759 cases under the IMDT Act but out of this only 10015 persons were declared as illegal migrants and finally only 1481 illegal migrants were physically expelled up to 30th April, 2000. This comes to less than half per cent of the cases 92

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initiated. In the state of West Bengal, where the Foreigners Act is applicable, 489046 persons were actually deported between 1983 and November 1998, which is a lesser period and even this result was termed as unsatisfactory in the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India. Thus, there cannot be even a slightest doubt that the application of the IMDT Act and the Rules made there under in the State of Assam has created the biggest hurdle and is the main impediment or barrier in identification and deportation of illegal migrants… After 22 years of the IM(DT) Act in Assam, the Apex Court of India declared it illegal in its final judgement on the Writ Petition (Civil) 131 of 2000 (Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India & Anr), on 12 July 2005, and the Act was repealed. State’s attempt of communal polarisation From the beginning of the movement, the Congress-led central government, while on the one hand, tried to nullify the problem of illegal immigrants, on the other, made constant attempts to communalise the issue of foreigners in Assam. After the Assam Movement began, the Congress-led central government, on 30 October 1980, sent a secret letter to the Chief Secretaries of all state governments and union territories giving specific guidelines for controlling communal disturbances and to promote communal harmony (Confidential-No. 4/15/80-CHC, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 30 October 1980). Despite this, the central government tried to communally divide the Assam Movement. It urged the movement leadership to treat the ‘displaced persons’ from East Pakistan/Bangladesh especially. By the ‘displaced persons’, the government wanted to safeguard non-Muslims, particularly Hindus, illegally immigrated from East Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, the leadership of the movement declined to distinguish illegal foreigners based on religion. In a letter dated 13 November 1980 sent by AASU general secretary, Bhrigu Kumar Phukan, to the Home Minister of India clearly stated: In the last Delhi meeting you suggested that the ‘displaced persons’ should be given special treatment, implying thereby that religion should be a factor in the detection process. We are all opposed to it. If the Central Government adopts such an attitude, the unity of the different section of Indians residing in Assam and belonging to different religious groups will be jeopardized. (Letter of the AASU General Secretary to the Home Minister of India, dtd. 13 October 1980) This secular stand of the leadership should also be acknowledged when the Assam Movement is discussed vis-à-vis the Muslims of Assam. 93

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Muslims bounced back The participation of immigrant Muslims in the 1983 Assembly election and the attack on immigrant Muslims in Nellie as revenge for this participation by movement supporters brought significant changes to the attitude of the entire Muslim community of Assam towards the Assam Movement. Significantly, after Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi’s election campaign in immigrant Hindu and Muslim dominated areas, the immigrant Muslims started to bounce back. In Darrang district, a mob of 1000 miscreants from bordering villages attacked the Hindu villages of Silkijhar, Betna, Rejakhat, Naromar Suba etc. under Goreswar police station at the night of 17 February, and consequently at least 3000 people were forced to take shelter at the nearest railway station [Daily Situation Report from Special Branch (Secret), Government of Assam, 19 February, 1983]. Again, on the night of 18 February 1983, a violent mob of 1000 immigrant Muslims attacked the Mandanga Krishi Pam Home (Krishi Pam) under Murajhar Police Station of Nagaon District and set fire to the Pam House (ibid: February 1983). And after Nellie, the immigrant Muslims as a community came into direct conflict with the Movement supporters and Assam witnessed violent conflicts between them in different places of lower and middle Assam of Brahmaputra valley till the end of the Movement. The indigenous Muslims of Brahmaputra valley were a support base of the movement from its beginning. However, the Nellie incident made them very sceptical towards the movement, although in the Nellie massacre, only immigrant Muslims were attacked. Two factors compelled them to rethink their participation in the movement. First, both the Hindu Bengalis and immigrant Muslims participated in the 1983 Assembly election in huge numbers. But during the election and after it, movement supporters attacked mainly the immigrant Muslims for their participation in the election. Second, this attitude of the movement supporters amply proved that Hindu sentiment was determining the actions of the movement. As has been mentioned, after the Nellie massacre, several indigenous Muslim leaders of AASU were expelled from the organisation for questioning the role of some AASU leaders in communal clashes. This expulsion, for them, emerged as the proof that Hindu fundamentalist organisations were controlling the leaders of the movement. As a consequence, the participation of indigenous Muslims in the movement drastically dwindled after the Nellie massacre. However, a sizeable number of indigenous Muslims remained with the movement till the end. During the movement, its supporters tried to alienate the immigrant Muslims both socially and economically. In educational institutions dominated by the indigenous Assamese, students from the immigrant Muslim community were physically and mentally harassed and consequently a number of them had to leave the institutions. The transport system of the immigrant Muslim inhabited areas, till then, was dependent on the Assamese

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people. The buses, which were the only transport of that period in those areas, were owned by Assamese people. After the outbreak of the Assam Movement, the Assamese bus owners stopped plying their buses in those areas. At that time, the hut (weekly market) was the only institutionalised market in most of the immigrant dominated areas. Small shopkeepers from adjacent regions came to the huts to sell products. Because of the movement, these huts were abandoned as no shopkeeper wanted to be the enemy of the movement supporters by doing business at immigrant Muslim inhabited areas. All these made the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley defensive. For immigrant Muslims, the Nellie massacre was a warning call. After this incident, they came forward to face the situation created by the movement. They realised that they had to unite to defend themselves. In the meantime, the IM(DT) Act was implemented, and both the Congress-led central and Assam governments started to campaign that the Act was to safeguard the minorities from the movement. In such a situation, they tried to lessen their dependence on the Assamese people. They came forward to set up educational institutions in their areas, from primary schools to colleges, so that their children would not have to go outside for education. Few financially well-off people from among them came forward to buy vehicles for transportation in their areas. They started to set up permanent markets in their areas to minimise dependence on outside traders. It could be said that the attempt of the movement supporters to alienate the immigrant Muslims socially and economically, in reality, helped the immigrant Muslims to emerge as a united community. The Assam Movement enabled them to realise the value of education and the importance of being self-sufficient economically and socially (Nath 2015b: 172–75).

Assam Accord and Muslim opposition The Assam Accord set 24 March 1971 as the cut-off date for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam against the request of the Assam Movement for 1951 to be the cut-off year. Moreover, the IM(DT) Act, which was an obstacle to the process of the identification of illegal foreigners in the state and was considered a protector of the illegal immigrants living in Assam, was not withdrawn at the signing of the Accord despite the movement leaders’ strongly argument for its repeal. In both cases, the demands of the minority students organisations like AAMSU and Muslim religious organisation like Jamiat prevailed. Still, Muslim organisations strongly opposed the Accord. Just after the Accord was signed, on 28–29 September 1985 at Guwahati, a convention of the Minority Coordination Committee attended by CRPC, AAMSU, Jamiat, Minority Yuva Parishad, and Minority Forum of Assam strongly opposed the Accord

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and resolved that: ‘The Convention considers the Accord detrimental to the interests and safety of the minorities living in Assam. It has created a fear psychosis in the minds of the minorities’. The resolution also demanded the government of India ‘to take note of the wounded feeling of the minorities of state and scrap the accord in the greater interests of the state and the nation’. The same resolution ‘urged upon the progressive and democratic force and the minorities of the state to stand united, in this hour of crisis to face with courage and determination, the persecution that may follow the implementation of the accord’ (Resolution 1). In Resolution 3 (titled ‘Action Programme’), the convention termed the Assam Accord as ‘unconstitutional, immoral and undemocratic’, which has ‘let down the cause of the minorities’. This resolution called upon ‘all progressive forces, parties and organizations in general and religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities of Assam, in particular, to observe a protest day throughout the state to voice strong resentment against’ the Accord (Resolutions of the Convention of the Minority Coordination Committee, 28–29 September 1985). The immigrant communities had nothing to worry about regarding the Assam Accord as it fixed 1971 as the cut-off year for the identification of illegal immigrants in Assam and did not repeal the IM(DT) Act. In this situation, the opposition to the Assam Accord from the recent immigrant communities referred to Clauses 5 and 10 of the Accord. Clause 5 fixed 1 January 1966 as the base date and year for the detention and deletion of foreigners. Foreigners who came to Assam after this date (inclusive) up to 24 March 1971 shall be detected in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964. The names of foreigners so detected will be deleted from the electoral rolls in force. However, on the expiry of a period of ten years following the date of detection, the names of all such persons which have been deleted from the electoral rolls shall be restored (Assam Accord 1985). It was an ineffective clause from the point of view of the detection and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam. However, the Minority Coordination Committee convention held on 28–29 September 1985 strongly opined that this particular provision was decisively anti-minority and contrary to provisions of the Indira-Mujib Agreement, national commitments, Citizenship Act, and Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, and above all, the Constitution of India. The clause [5(8)] of the Accord said that ‘foreigners who came to Assam on or after 25 March 1971, shall be detected, deleted and expelled in accordance with law’. The above-mentioned convention strongly opposed the provisions of ‘expulsion’ instead of ‘deportation’. It condemned ‘all attempts, now being made to push so-called foreigners forcibly across the border by unilateral acts’ (ibid, Resolution 1). Clause 10 of the Accord ensured that ‘relevant laws for prevention of encroachment on government land and lands in tribal belts and blocks are 96

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strictly enforced. Unauthorized encroachment will be evicted under such laws’. Resolution 5, of the convention mentioned earlier, termed this provision as ‘inhuman process of eviction and harassment’. It is not difficult to understand why the convention opposed the clause. A major portion of tribal belts and blocks, which were reserved only for tribal communities, were occupied by recently immigrated people. Moreover, a large part of government land in Assam had been occupied by such recent immigrants. As estimated by Hiren Gohain, till 1974, at least 2000 hectares of land from tribal belts and blocks were illegally occupied by immigrants, both Hindus, and Muslims (Gohain 2013: 20). Clause 6 of the Assam Accord emerged as the main threat to the immigrant section of Muslims, although the above-mentioned convention did not mention this. Clause 6 reads: ‘Constitutional, legislative, and administrative safeguards as may be appropriate will be provided to protect the cultural, social, and linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people’. This clause threatened the entire immigrant Muslim community. They feared that the whole community might be made subordinate to Assamese people through this clause. This fear was expressed by Maulana Asad Madani when he alleged, as mentioned earlier, that the Assam Accord made Assam only for the Assamese. The Assam Movement was vehemently opposed by the minority organisations led by the immigrant section of Muslims. However, within one decade of the Accord, Muslim organisations started to support the Assam Accord. In 1994, even Assam Jamiat resolved to support the Assam Accord. During the whole process, Ganatantrik Adhikar Sangram Samiti (GASS) played a crucial role. After Congress came to power in Assam in 1991 under Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia, the state witnessed a situation where all the democratic processes were taken hostage by the army and paramilitary forces under direct patronage from the government, in the name of containing terrorism of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), an outlawed organisation. The GASS, a civil society organisation, then emerged to protect the democratic institutions and processes from becoming a pawn at the hands of armed forces. Maulana Abdul Hoque and Hafiz Rashid Chowdhury, both Assam Jamiat leaders, were among the organisers of the GASS. At that time, besides fighting to safeguard democratic rights and institutions, the GASS leadership also tried to bring a consensus among different communities and groups of Assam on the cut-off date fixed by the Assam Accord. Till then, different recent immigrant communities in Assam were opposed to the cut-off date fixed by the Accord. As a result of this attempt of the GASS leadership, the immigrant Muslim community started to accept the Assam Accord and the cut-off date fixed by it. Both Hoque and Chowdhury appealed to the immigrant Muslim community to accept the Assam Accord and actively campaigned to convince them to accept the cut-off date fixed by the Accord (ibid 2018: 8). 97

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Assam Movement and origin of Muslim consciousness The Assam Movement planted the root of increasing antagonism between Muslims and the indigenous Hindu Assamese. It created a situation whereby Muslims increasingly became defensive and communal. For many, the movement compelled Muslims of Assam to think about their own identity separate from Assamese identity (Karim 2006: 25–27). Regarding the impact of the movement on the Muslim mind, Mosudul Hoque points out: The incidents and publicity during the Assam Movement hurt the minorities of Assam who for centuries lived together with the majority and shared common culture. The orthodoxy among the Muslims of Assam, particularly of upper Assam, started from here. The first thing was that Muslims became introvert. More number of Muslims began to participate in Janaja. Use of mike for Ajan, attempt to show Muslim solidarity, emphasis on Muslim dress also started from then. The Maulavis from north India started to visit Assam frequently. With the increase of the visit of Hindutva leaders and journalists, MullahMoulanas visit to Assam also increased proportionately. Ordinary Muslims began to spend lots of time in reading Quran and religious discussions in Masjids. Communal elements began to root in Muslim mentality (2007: 302). [Translated by author] Immediately after the Assam Movement, the immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley showed resentment towards the Assamese community. Two incidents clearly explained their resentment. First was the formation of United Minority Front, Assam (UMFA) against Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) just after the signing of the Assam Accord and before the 1985 Assam Assembly election. The second was the decision of a section of neo-Assamese Muslims to abandon their Assamese identity in the 1991 census. While the politics of UMFA is discussed in Chapter 4, the issue of the Assamese language is discussed in Chapter 5.

Conclusion The Assam Accord could not bring much to the indigenous Assamese people except Clause 6, which talks about the constitutional protection of the Assamese people. Against this, the Assam Movement, for the first time after independence, polarised the society and politics of Assam on religious lines. While the movement on one hand, successfully established the threat before the indigenous Assamese from the continuous flow of illegal immigrants, on the other hand it started to alienate the entire Muslim community of Brahmaputra valley from Assamese identity. The movement brought significant changes to the political attitudes and aspirations of the Assam Muslims, particularly of the immigrant section. After the movement, this 98

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section of Muslims started to assert themselves autonomously in electoral politics of the state, who behaved as a support base of the Congress party till then. The next chapter discusses the changing nature of Muslim politics in Assam in the post-Assam Movement period.

Notes 1 AASU’s demands included in the memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister of India Mrs. Gandhi on 2 February 1980:

1. Foreign nationals must be detected and deported from our country.

2. Inclusion of foreign nationals must be removed from the concerned electoral roll before holding any election in Assam. Inclusion of foreign nationals’ names in the electoral rolls in future must be made impossible with the help of an adequate and strong election machinery. 3. Border of India with neighbouring countries must be fully protected to effectively check infiltration. 4. Indian voters residing in Assam should be issued identity cards with photograph affixed. 5. Necessary constitutional safeguards should be provided to the people of North Eastern Region for the next 15/20 years by making necessary constitutional provisions for the protection of the identity of the indigenous people in this region. 6. The Government of Assam should be free to reject any certificate issued by the district administration of West Bengal and Tripura. 7. We demand that the authority to grant citizenship certificate delegated to the State government should be withdrawn by the Central Government immediately from all State Government, so that those foreigners who are detected and deported from Assam do not come back armed with citizenship certificates issued by other states. 2 The Charter of Demands of AAMSU:   1. 25 March 1971 should be the ‘base date’ for detection of foreigners.   2. Full security to the lives and properties of all sections of the linguistic and religious minorities.   3. Prevention of harassment of the Indian citizens.   4. Immediate stop to communal and secessionist movements in the name of detection of foreigners.   5. Stay of eviction from government lands till alternative arrangements for settlement of such evictees were made.   6. Removal of restrictions to transfer of land.   7. Impartial police and administrative machineries in the state.   8. Compensation for the victims of disturbances.   9. Re-opening of all educational institutions and holding of examinations. 10. Immediate opening of academic sessions. 11. Security and safety of the students of linguistic and religious minority communities. 12. Renewal of scholarships for the students of the minority communities. 13. Appointments on the proportion of population from the sub-divisional level and upwards.

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4 AFTER ASSAM MOVEMENT Muslim political mobilisation and demographic change

The primary narrative of the Assam Movement was that, because of unabated continuous illegal immigration to the state since independence, the indigenous Assamese communities were on the verge of losing their social identity and political existence at the hands of illegal immigrants. To prove the demographic change in favour of the immigrants, the movement leaders cited how the number of Muslims was increasing in voters’ lists of different constituencies. Besides, they often cited the increase in the number of Muslim MLAs in subsequent Assembly elections since 1972. The Assam Accord, finally, brought to an end these controversies during the Assam Movement. However, the Assam Movement and the signing of the Assam Accord started a new chapter of Muslim politics in Assam. The formation of United Minority Front, Assam (UMFA) just before the 1985 Assam Assembly election marked this beginning. After this, the electoral politics of Assam has remained heavily influenced by the move of the community in subsequent Assembly elections. Moreover, the post-Assam Movement period has witnessed a higher percentage growth of Muslims in Assam than before the movement period. This chapter tries to address two issues of the post-Assam Movement period which played a major part in the origin of the Assam Movement: the political dominance and the demographic change of Muslims.

Political mobilisation of Muslims: Formation of UMFA After the signing of the Assam Accord on 15 August 1985, the leaders of the Assam Movement formed a political party, Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), in October of the same year to implement the Accord. Countering this, before the next Assam Assembly election held in December 1985, organisations like CRPC, AAMSU, All Assam Minority Front, All Assam Minority Yuva Parishad, Assam unit of Jamiat etc. which stood against the movement, formed UMFA intended to protect the minorities of Assam from the anticipated perils that might arise due to the Assam Accord. One of the most important objectives of the party was to stand behind the oppressed people and to provide them with support to fight for their causes and 100

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suffering (Constitution of UMFA 1988: 1–5). Notably, the signing of the Assam Accord by the Congress-led central government created the background for the formation of the UMFA. Congress opposed the Assam Movement, and the party-led central government forcefully held the 1983 Assam Assembly election. In this election immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis supported the party overwhelmingly to show their opposition to the Assam Movement. The immigrant Muslims even had to pay a heavy price for their participation in this election as thousands of them were killed in the Nellie massacre in retaliation. But two and half years after the 1983 election, the Congress-led central government signed the Assam Accord to end the six-year-long movement. The central government signed the Assam Accord on its terms by fixing 24 March 1971 as the cut-off date for the identification and deportation of foreign nationals from Assam. It did not even withdraw the IM (DT) Act. In this situation, organisations led by immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis of Assam, who strongly opposed the movement, had nothing to fear from the Assam Accord. However, leaders of these organisations felt betrayed by Congress when it signed the Assam Accord. These organisations were patronised by Congress-led central and Assam government against the movement till the Accord was signed. Though Jamiat was involved in the formation of UMFA, its role was marginal. The CRPC, a Hindu Bengali organisation, led the process of the formation of the UMFA. The party was a political alliance between the Hindu Bengalis, a linguistic minority of Assam, and the immigrant Muslims of the state. It can also be termed an alliance of immigrant communities against the Assam Accord. While linguistics minority leader Kalipad Sen was elected as the first president, A.M.F. Golam Osmani, an immigrant Muslim, became the Secretary-General of the UMFA. Both leaders were from Barak valley. In the 1985 Assembly election held just after its formation, the party received support from a large section of immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis of Brahmaputra valley. In this election, the party won 17 Assembly seats and got 10.85 per cent of the total votes polled. However, after the 1985 election, several prominent members of the party defected to other political parties, and during the two decades after its formation, it disintegrated several times. In the 1991 Assembly elections, UMFA failed to win even a single seat. The party gained a little ground in the 1996 Assembly election while it won two seats. However, it again drew a blank with a vote share of only 0.41 per cent in the 2001 Assembly election. In 2005 a section of UMFA merged into AUDF when the latter was formed. Breakdown of Muslim vote bank After the 1985 Assembly election, AGP came to power in Assam. The Muslim vote bank of Congress, which was formed in the 1983 election, showed a breakdown in Brahmaputra valley in this election. Both immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis from the valley, in this election, stood 101

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firmly behind UMFA and deserted Congress. The Congress candidate could not win from the Muslim dominated constituencies from the valley except Dhubri constituency. The UMFA won in 17 constituencies from the valley, of which 15 were Muslim dominated indicating a total breakdown of the Muslim vote bank in Brahmaputra valley. The Hindu Bengali dominated Hojai, and Lumding constituencies from Brahmaputra valley also backed UMFA. However, Barak valley Muslims showed a different electoral behaviour than their counterparts living in Brahmaputra valley. The newly formed AGP did not have any presence in Barak valley during this election as the Assam Movement did not have much influence in the valley, and the Assam Accord was vehemently opposed by both Hindus and Muslims from the valley. A section of both communities had recently immigrated after independence; therefore, they started to see the Accord as a threat to their citizenship. Again, Clause 6 of the Accord engendered fear in the entire Barak valley of being subordinated to the Assamese people from Brahmaputra valley. Against this backdrop, Congress won from ten of the total 15 constituencies from Barak valley in the 1985 Assembly election. Opposite to it, the party performed very poorly in Brahmaputra valley in this election and won in only 13 constituencies of a total 105 from the valley. The total tally of seats of the party in this election was 25, of which two were from hill districts. From Barak valley, even the Muslim dominated constituencies like Karimganj South, Hailakandi, Sonai and Katigora voted for Congress in this election. It was remarkable that while, in this election, immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley punished Congress for signing the Assam Accord, the Muslims from Barak valley aligned with the party and did not support UMFA. This was for two reasons; first, Barak valley was not influenced much by the Assam Movement. Second, the UMFA was formed and led mainly by Hindu Bengali leaders from the valley, which was not accepted by a large section of Muslims from the valley. The UMFA could not win a single seat from Barak valley in this election. This was significant as it was formed against the Assam Accord which emerged as a big concern for both the Hindus and Muslims of the valley. Against the electoral support to UMFA by Hindu Bengalis living in Brahmaputra valley, in this election, the Barak valley Hindu Bengalis largely supported Congress. They did not rally behind the UMFA although the party was formed mainly by the CRPC and the Hindu Bengali leaders from the valley. The Assam Movement might not have influenced Barak valley much, but the Hindu Bengalis living there were opposed to it. They were aware of the clauses (including Clause 6) of the Assam Accord, and they were displeased with Congress because of its role in signing the Accord. Despite this, the Bengalis from Barak largely voted for Congress and did not support UMFA in this election. It was because, although CRPC leaders took

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the lead of the formation of UMFA, the main constituents of the party were a few Muslim student organisations and Muslim religious organisations like Jamiat. This stopped the Bengalis from Barak valley supporting UMFA in the 1985 election. They had no alternative but to support Congress despite their strong dissatisfaction towards it. In this election, in Barak valley, while Muslims did not support UMFA because of the leading role of CRPC in the formation of the party, the Hindu Bengalis did not support it as Muslim religious, and student organisations were constituents of it. Against this backdrop, the 1985 election showed, for the first time in post-independent history, communal considerations in the voting behaviour of both Hindus and Muslims from Barak valley. For Hindu Bengalis from Barak valley, Jamiat’s alliance with the UMFA became the leading cause of their lack of support for the party. In this regard, what deserves attention is the drastic change of attitude of Hindu Bengalis from Barak valley towards Assam Jamiat. As mentioned earlier, since independence, Assam Jamiat has always silently worked for Congress in Assam and gathered Muslim votes for the party during elections. Even Barak valley has a strong presence of Jamiat. Taking this into account, why was Jamiat’s alliance with UMFA not accepted by the Hindu Bengalis from Barak valley? Because after silently working for Congress since independence the Assam Movement provided Jamiat an opportunity to play an activist role in the politics of Assam as shown in Chapter 3. Then Jamiat came forward to play an activist, political role by becoming a part of UMFA after the Assam Accord was signed. Such activism made the Hindus from the valley apprehensive towards the party. Another matter which also deserves attention in this regard is that despite the strong dissatisfaction of Hindu Bengalis towards Congress and the activism of Jamiat, in this election, the BJP could not gain the support of Hindu Bengalis from the valley. After its formation, BJP contested the Assam Assembly election for the first time in this election and fielded 37 candidates. It contested five constituencies from Barak valley but to no avail. In this election, Barak valley Hindus did not support BJP because of its role in the Assam Movement and support of the Assam Accord. Notably, BJP did not contest the 1983 Assam Assembly election in support of the boycott call by the Assam Movement leaders. The 1985 Assam Assembly election showed a contestation between those who supported and opposed the Assam Movement. Although AGP formed government after the 1985 election, it could not win the majority seats in the 126-member Assam Assembly. It won only 60 seats and formed government after four newly elected independent MLAs supported it. While on the one hand, it proved the declining political dominance of the indigenous Assamese in Assam, on the other it showed the limited influence of the Assam Movement, which remained confined only among the indigenous communities of Brahmaputra valley.

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Breakdown of other immigrant vote banks The Muslim immigrant vote bank of Congress was broken down in the 1985 election. However, the other two immigrant communities did not desert the party in this election. The Hindu Bengalis from Barak valley, like the immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley, behaved as a vote bank of Congress in the 1983 Assembly election. However, unlike the immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley, they overwhelmingly supported Congress in the 1985 Assembly election also. The party won ten of the total 15 seats from the valley in this election. However, in the next Assam Assembly election held in 1991, the Barak valley Bengalis deserted Congress and overwhelmingly supported the BJP. In this election, BJP won ten seats in Assam, nine of which were from Barak valley. The Barak valley Bengali vote bank of Congress that became visible in the 1983 and 1985 elections was broken down in the 1991 Assembly election. How and why this happened is discussed later in the chapter. On the other hand, the tea community did not take a clear stand vis-à-vis the Assam Movement, which was reflected from their very low to average participation in different constituencies in the 1983 Assembly election. They, again, remained divided between Congress and the newly formed AGP in the 1985 election. However, the community came back to Congress fold in the 1991 Assembly election. And until the 2011 Assembly elections, they remained a consistent support base of Congress in consecutive Assembly elections. Against the backdrop of Assam’s sizeable Muslim population, BJP realised the electoral importance of the tea community in its mission to spread organisation in the state. To contain the influence of the Congressbacked ACMS over the tea community, the Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangha was formed in the late 1970s under the patronage of then Jana Sangha. However, this was not sustainable. After BJP formed government at the centre in the late 1990s, different organisations of RSS started to work among the community. As a result, BJP began to gain ground among the tea community since the beginning of the present century. In the 2001 Assembly election, it won four constituencies from Brahmaputra valley, of which two were dominated by tea labourers: Behali and Duliajan. Still, the Congress support base among them could not be broken down by the BJP till the 2011 Assam Assembly election. Notably, the Assam Tea Garden Tribes Students Organisations (ATGTSO), formed in 1970, became Assam Tea Tribes Students’ Association (ATTSA) in 1984. The ATTSA became active regarding the interests of the tea community in the post-Assam Movement period. While most leaders from ATGTSO and then ATTSA migrated to Congress after leaving the student organisation, few leaders from AATSA joined BJP after it formed government at the centre in the late 1990s. Two young prominent ex-ATTSA leaders who joined BJP at this juncture were Rameswar Teli and Kamakhya Prasad Tasa. BJP won over the

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entire tea community through these two leaders in a very well-formulated strategy in the 2014 parliamentary election. Assam also witnessed a robust electoral wave in favour of BJP in the 2014 parliamentary election after Narendra Modi was designated as the prime ministerial candidate from the party. In this election, BJP very strategically fielded tea community candidates from Dibrugarh and Jorhat constituencies. While Rameswar Teli was fielded from Dibrugarh, Kamakhya Prasad Tasa was made the candidate from Jorhat. These two constituencies from upper Assam of Brahmaputra valley fall under the region where the tea community mainly concentrates. While the community absolutely determines Dibrugarh, Jorhat is strongly influenced by it. The Ahoms primarily determine Jorhat. The Congress strategy for these two constituencies had remained – Dibrugarh for tea community candidate and Jorhat for Ahom candidate. But BJP took a risk by fielding tea community candidates from both the constituencies in an attempt to steal the tea community vote bank from Congress. Under the Narendra Modi wave, both Teli and Tasa won, and this worked as the winning strategy to break down the Congress dominance over the community in the next Assam Assembly election to be held in 2016. The victory of Teli and Tasa created new opportunities for BJP to penetrate the community. After this, the migration of leaders from ATTSA and the entire tea community to Congress completely stopped, and BJP emerged as the new platform of these leaders. In the 2014 parliamentary election, BJP promised to give Schedule Tribe status to Adivasis, a major section from the tea community. The scheduling of the Adivasis as a tribe has repeatedly been promised by Congress, also in previous elections, but has never been fulfilled. Moreover, Narendra Modi, since the 2014 parliamentary election, also started to earn popularity among the tea community, like among other ethnic communities of the state. All these contributed to the shifting of the tea community votes to BJP and the breakdown of the Congress vote bank among them in the 2016 Assembly election for the first time in post-independent history. In the 2016 election, not a single constituency influenced by them from the north bank of Brahmaputra could be won by Congress. Again, only four constituencies with a heavy concentration of the community from the south bank of Brahmaputra – Sarupathar, Nazira, Doom Dooma and Mariani, were won by the party. In this election, the tea community of the entire Assam heavily rallied behind BJP and deserted Congress. In the 2016 Assam Assembly election, Congress, for the first time, fought the election without the support of any immigrant vote bank. The immigrant vote banks of Congress became visible in the 1983 Assembly election amidst the anti-immigration movement, which was first broken down by immigrant Muslims in the following 1985 election. The Hindu Bengalis deserted Congress in the 1991 Assembly election. After this, these two communities did not remain loyal to any political party like they were loyal to Congress

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before. And finally, the tea labourers deserted Congress in the 2016 Assam Assembly election that marked the completion of the breakdown of immigrant vote banks of Congress in Assam.

Jamiat’s political activism and counter growth of Hindu Nationalism (1991–2001) The Jamiat realised the strength of the Muslim vote and its bargaining power from the outcome of the 1985 election. In this election, UMFA, supported by Jamiat, became the third-largest party in the Assam Assembly, winning 17 seats, despite not being supported by Barak valley Muslims and Hindu Bengalis. The win provided the Jamiat leadership an opportunity to play a more activist role in the electoral politics of Assam in the future. However, Jamiat did not show much interest in UMFA after the 1985 election. This was because CRPC, a Hindu Bengali organisation, led the process of the formation of UMFA. On the other hand, the first-ever Bengali Hindu and immigrant Muslim political alliance through UMFA proved to be a failure in the 1985 election itself as not a single candidate from the party could win from Hindu Bengali dominated Barak valley. This failed alliance might have brought about a realisation to the Jamiat leadership that a Bengali Hindu and immigrant Muslim political coalition could not be effective in the future too. Most importantly, what made Jamiat withdraw from the UMFA was the disintegration of the party. Congress had tried to disintegrate the UMFA since it started to break down the Congress support base among the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley. As a consequence, just after the 1985 election, leaders of UMFA started to join Congress by deserting it. By the next Assam Assembly election held in 1991, UMFA disintegrated into several groups. In this situation, Jamiat decided to abandon UMFA and to play an independent role in the electoral politics of Assam. Without a political party of its own, before the 1991 Assembly election, Assam Jamiat publicly lent its electoral support to Congress (Omar 2005: 12). This was the first time in post-independent history that Jamiat publicly supported Congress in the Assam election. Although the organisation always remained with Congress till the 1983 Assembly election, it worked secretly for the party. The support of Jamiat to Congress in the 1991 election was surprising as the organisation became a part of UMFA against the Congress in the previous Assembly election. The Jamiat had no other option but to support Congress in this election after the decline of UMFA. Congress also wanted it to bring back Muslim votes to its fold in Brahmaputra valley. However, this time, Jamiat declined to work secretly for the party and publicly declared its support to Congress. Thus, Jamiat re-established its autonomous role in the electoral politics of Assam after the formation of UMFA. Congress came back to power in Assam after the 1991 Assembly election win of 66 seats. Muslim votes that deserted Congress in the 1985 106

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election at the behest of Jamiat returned to and supported the party. However, it should be noted here that in the 1985 election, Brahmaputra valley did not show any communal polarisation despite Jamiat formed UMFA, and the party showed significant success in the valley. This was because, in this election, the indigenous Assamese communities from the valley supported AGP, a secular regional party. But after Jamiat lent open support to Congress in the 1991 election, Assam started to see the rise of majoritarian politics as a counter to Jamiat’s political activism. The process started from Barak valley in this election, the valley already divided communally in the 1985 election. In the 1991 election, BJP won from nine constituencies of a total of 15 from the valley. The party won a total of ten seats in this election (the other seat was the Dhubri constituency from lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley). Congress managed to win only four seats from the valley, although it won ten seats from here in the previous Assembly election. The BJP started its political journey in Assam on the back of its stellar performance in Barak valley in this election. The party, however, managed to win from the upper Assam of Brahmaputra valley only in the 2001 Assembly election. By the 1991 election, the failure of the AGP-led government and the disintegration of the party between AGP and Natuan AGP (NAGP) significantly eroded the political importance of the Assam Accord in Barak valley. The Hindus from the valley had supported Congress in the 1985 election despite their strong reservation towards the party’s role in signing the Assam Accord, and they waited for an opportunity to punish it electorally. The BJP, by the 1991 election, started to gain ground nationally because of the Ram Temple Movement. The Barak valley Hindus, in this election, accepted BJP as an alternative to Congress. However, the factor which created a situation that was advantageous for the BJP was the Jamiat. The open support of Jamiat to Congress in this election made BJP instantly relevant in the valley. Jamiat’s over ground political activism had already been taken seriously by the Hindus from Barak valley in the 1985 election. The next Assam Assembly election was held in 1996. In this election, Jamiat lent its electoral support to the AGP-led alliance. The AGP formed a pre-poll alliance with communist parties (CPI and CPM), Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC), People’s Democratic Front (PDF) and United People’s Progressive Alliance (UPPA) for this election. After the election, the AGP-led alliance came to power, winning a total of 68 seats. A large section of immigrant Muslims voted for the AGP-led alliance in this election because of the support of Jamiat despite the fact that AGP was considered an enemy by the community just one decade prior. Even from Barak valley, the coalition led by AGP won four seats. And as a reaction to Jamiat’s support to the AGP-led coalition, in Barak valley, a significant portion of the Hindus came back from BJP to Congress’s fold with the intention of defeating the alliance supported by Jamiat. It was realised by this 107

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section of Hindus that support to BJP could help the Jamiat supported AGP in forming government in Assam, as BJP did not have much organisation in Brahmaputra valley till then. In this election, in Barak valley, Congress’s tally of seats rose to seven from four in the previous election, and BJP’s tally declined to four from nine in the last election. The electoral support of Jamiat, which opposed both the Assam Movement and the Assam Accord, to the AGP-led coalition in the 1996 election can be considered as the most visible political opportunism of the organisation in politics of Assam. This support of Jamiat was in fact a consequence of the conflict between Assam Jamiat and Congress Chief Minister (1991–96) Hiteswar Saikia. As discussed, because Jamiat supported UMFA, Muslim voters deserted Congress in the 1985 Assam Assembly election, and the party had their worst-ever performance in this election under the leadership of Saikia. In that situation, it became necessary for Congress to restrain the increasing influence of Jamiat so that it could not become the de facto guardian of Muslim votes in Assam. After the 1985 Assam Assembly election, the Congress-led central government appointed Mr. Saikia as the governor of Mizoram. Then Saikia played a significant role in disintegrating the UMFA in Assam. As a result, prominent members of UMFA started to leave the party and join Congress. By the 1991 Assam Assembly election, UMFA had become very weak. In this situation, Assam Jamiat supported Congress in the 1991 Assembly election. Hiteswar Saikia became the Chief Minister of Assam after the 1991 election. And becoming Chief Minister of Assam for the second time in 1991, he tried to marginalise the influence of Jamiat in the politics of Assam. Because of defection within the party and the departure of the Jamiat, UMFA became so weak that it could not win a single constituency in the 1991 Assembly election. That meant that when Mr. Saikia became Chief Minister in 1991, UMFA was no more a cause for concern for Congress. Then Saikia tried to marginalise Jamiat so that its increasing influence over the Muslim vote could be halted. In 1992, Chief Minister Saikia declared in the Assam Legislative Assembly that there were 30 lakh illegal Bangladeshis living in Assam. That was a strong statement by a Congress Chief Minister of the existence of large-scale illegal Bangladeshis in Assam which opposed the Assam Movement. Again in 1994, Chief Minister Saikia mentioned the increase of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan, activities in Muslim dominated areas (Karim 2017: 243). Chief Minister Saikia made these statements targeting the Jamiat. When making these statements, at the same time, he tried to appease the Muslim community by inducting eight Muslims as ministers in his ministry, the highest Muslim ministers under any government in Assam to date. Saikia even declared that 25 per cent of jobs under the government of Assam would be reserved for Muslim minority and permanent patta (land ownership document) would be issued against the lands from chars (ibid: 244). However, he did not fulfill any of these promises. Saikia’s politics vis-à-vis the Muslims of the state during 1991–96 was clear 108

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– to marginalise the Jamiat and to appease the Muslims in the state, so that the Muslim community continued to be the support base of Congress and Jamiat could not reverse the situation at any time. These have irked Assam Jamiat leaders. The then president of Assam Jamiat, Maulana Abdul Hoque, started to oppose the Congress-led Assam government. He even aligned with the newly formed GASS. As has been mentioned, the GASS was formed to safeguard human rights and democratic institutions from the atrocities of the Congress-led Assam government in the name of combating terrorism. It also genuinely tried to bring about a consensus among the Jamiat leadership and common immigrant Muslims on the cut-off date prescribed by the Assam Accord so that the psychological gap created by the Assam Movement between the indigenous Assamese and the immigrant Muslims could be bridged. The conflict between Assam Jamiat and Hiteswar Saikia and an active role of GASS in persuading Jamiat and the immigrant Muslims to accept the Assam Accord created a situation whereby in the 1996 Assam Assembly election, Assam Jamiat lent its support to the AGP-led coalition. In the 2001 Assembly election, Jamiat again supported Congress (Omar 2005: 12). The party returned to power in Assam after the 2001 Assembly election winning 70 seats. Congress formed the government in Assam under Mr. Tarun Gogoi. A large section of Muslim voters, like most of the nonMuslim voters in the state, tilted towards Congress in this election. However, electoral support of Jamiat to Congress in this election again emerged as a compulsion for the organisation like in 1991. Two factors drove Jamiat away from AGP, with whom it aligned in the previous Assembly election. The first was the provision of Doubtful (D) voter that was initiated by the Election Commission of India in 1998. The AGP-led Assam government openly supported the provision of D voter, which created fear among a section of immigrant Muslims of losing their citizenship. The issue of D voter is discussed in Chapter 5. The second was that AGP, leaving Jamiat, formed an electoral alliance with the BJP for the 2001 election. The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was ruling at the centre at that time, which prompted AGP to lean on it. Although the BJP-AGP alliance was defeated by Congress, the BJP started to gain ground in Brahmaputra valley from this election. The BJP won from only eight constituencies in this election, of which four were from Brahmaputra valley. However, despite BJP’s growing support base in Brahmaputra valley, the party could not show any significant performance in Barak valley in this election as the valley remained divided and BJP won only four constituencies from here. In this election, from Barak valley, AGP managed to win only one constituency in the absence of Jamiat’s support. At the same time, the tally of Congress seats declined to five from seven in the previous election. The remaining five seats were won by Independents (2), Samajwadi Party (SP; 1), Samata Party (SAP; 1), and All India Trinamool Congress (AITC; 1). Barak valley had not shown such a fractured mandate 109

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in the post-independence history like this election. The outcome of the election from Barak valley was interesting due to the fact that despite Jamiat’s support to Congress, BJP could not show a satisfactory success in this election in comparison to the 1991 Assembly election. This was because a section of Hindu Bengalis did not support BJP in this election because of its electoral alliance with AGP, the party with the Assamese outlook, and Assam Accord as the main agenda. The tally of Congress seats also declined in Barak valley although the party showed a significant rise in Brahmaputra valley since the previous election. This was because a section of Hindu voters again deserted Congress in this election due to the Jamiat factor. The Muslim voters from the valley also did not stand solidly behind the party despite Jamiat’s support. This was due to the decline of Jamiat’s credibility among a significant section of the Muslim voters because of its erratic electoral strategy of supporting different parties in subsequent Assembly elections. As a consequence of all these, Barak valley electorates were fragmented, and even parties like SP, SAP and AITC won from the valley in this election, which could not influence the electorates of Brahmaputra valley much. After Jamiat became politically over ground and activist in the 1985 Assam Assembly election, Assam started to show the growth of majoritarian politics as a counter in subsequent elections, particularly in Barak valley. The BJP started to grow in Barak valley since the 1991 Assembly election. In this situation, the growth of Hindu majoritarian politics in Assam can be considered as a counter to minority politics of Jamiat. Notably, although, Muslim League politics heavily influenced Assam before the independence; the state did not show the growth of majoritarian politics till Assam Jamiat started to play a politically activist role. All India Bharatiya Jana Sangha and Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha contested from three and one constituencies respectively in the 1951 Assam Assembly election. After this, Jan Sangh (JS) contested from four constituencies in the 1962 Assam Assembly election. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) contested from 20 and three constituencies in the 1967 and 1972 Assam Assembly elections, respectively. However, these parties could not show any success in these Assembly elections held in Assam. On the other hand, like the Hindus, the Muslims of Assam also did not help to grow over ground Muslim political party during this period. The EIMA, a Muslim political party that emerged in 1977, disappeared just after it contested in 1978 Assembly election. Barak valley has shown the growth of the BJP in the post-Assam Movement period as a counter to Jamiat’s political role. But interestingly, Jamiat showed the nationalist character of Muslims against the communal design of the Muslim League in the pre-independence period from the same Barak valley. Jamiat supported Congress’s view of independence and opposed the communal division of India demanded by the Muslim League. Jamiat’s stand was widely supported by a large section of Muslims from Barak valley. In the provincial election held in Assam in 1946, of a total 110

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18 seats from present Assam reserved for Muslims, only one, Hailakandi constituency from Barak valley, was won by Jamiat against 17 won by the League. In this election, while even the Muslims from upper Assam of Brahmaputra valley who lived far from East Bengal supported the League for a communal division, the Muslims from Hailakandi, adjacent to East Bengal, supported Jamiat for an undivided India. This reflects the nationalist character of Barak Muslims during the freedom movement and Jamiat’s influence over the valley. Such a nationalist expression of Muslims before independence was a major reason why that Barak valley did not experience the rise of majoritarian politics after independence despite the region being divided into religious lines at partition.

Jamiat and formation of AUDF After the 1985 Assam Assembly elections, AGP came to power and the UMFA, supported by Jamiat, became the third-largest party in the Assam Assembly winning 17 seats. In the subsequent 1991, 1996 and 2001 Assam Assembly elections, the party or formation won the election and came to power in Assam, which was electorally supported by Jamiat (1991 and 2001: Congress, 1996: AGP-led coalition), making Jamiat the ‘kingmaker’ in the politics of Assam. The Assam Jamiat leaders started to believe that they determined the politics of Assam. This gave them the confidence that they could form government in Assam with almost one-third of Muslim population of the state (Muslim population of Assam in the 2001 census was 30.92 per cent) if the community could be united under a political party. Additionally, the repeal of the IM(DT) Act allowed Jamiat leadership to become the ‘king’ from ‘kingmaker’ in the politics of Assam. In July 2005, the Supreme Court of India declared the IM(DT) Act as ‘undemocratic’ and the Act was repealed. Since its imposition on Assam, Congress had always been trying to establish the IM(DT) Act as a safeguard to the minorities of Assam. Because of this vote bank politics of Congress, the repeal of the IM(DT) Act created fear among the immigrant Muslims in Assam. The minority organisations led by this section of Muslims began to blame the Congress governments at the centre and in Assam for their inactivity in the Supreme Court to stop the repeal of the Act. The Assam unit of Jamiat came forward to address the fear of Muslims in the postIM(DT) situation, and the president of Assam unit Jamiat, Badruddin Ajmal, took the lead to form a new political outfit. In October 2005, Jamiat brought together 13 Muslim minority organisations and formed a new regional political party, Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF). Muslim religious outfits like Jamat-e-Islami, Ahle – Hadis etc. also became part of the new political outfit (Hossain 2015: 357). The state president of Jamiat, Badruddin Ajmal, became the president of AUDF. The newly formed AUDF promised to safeguard the interests of all the downtrodden in society (The Election Manifesto, AUDF, 2006: 1). 111

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The whole outlook of AUDF was concentrated on the issue of illegal foreigners in Assam. The party argued for an immediate seal of the border between India and Bangladesh, the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners staying in Assam based on the cut-off date fixed by the Assam Accord, and preparation of a National Register of Citizens based on 1971 as the cut-off year to solve the vexed foreigners’ issue in the state (The Election Manifesto, AUDF, 2006: 3–4). The party concentrated mainly on the issue of illegal foreigners because, first, it came into existence because of the repeal of the IM(DT) Act, which was linked to the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam. Second, the party was formed mainly by the leaders from the immigrant section of Assam Muslims who always lived under suspicion because of the issue of continuous illegal immigration of Muslims from Bangladesh. The AUDF was formed mainly by the leaders from the immigrant Muslim community. In the politics of Assam, because of this, the party was viewed with suspicion by the Assamese people. The Assamese people feared the party could favour the interests of the illegal immigrant Muslims in Assam. In contrast, in its election manifesto for the 2006 Assam Assembly elections, AUDF demanded the expulsion of foreigners, if any, from the state and declared that any person infiltrating Assam after 24 March 1971 would be identified, detected and deported based on the judicial process. It also demanded that the names of the foreigners, if entered in the Voters’ List must be removed. The AUDF argued for single immigration law for the whole nation (ibid). It did not argue for a separate immigration law for Assam like IM(DT), and declared its allegiance to the cut-off date fixed by Assam Accord. The AIUDF, in recent times, has vehemently opposed the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 brought about by the BJP-led central government and has been demanding that the provisions of the Assam Accord be maintained. Against this backdrop, it can be said that the AIUDF has not taken a position in favour of those who have been continuously migrating to Assam from Bangladesh after 24 March 1971. Notably, the continuous illegal immigration of Muslims from Bangladesh to Assam, through the porous Indo-Bangladesh border, has always provided an opportunity to a section of political and non-political leaders to label the whole immigrant Muslim community as illegal Bangladeshis. In this situation, the entire immigrant Muslim community in Assam wants an end to this illegal immigration issue. However, from the stand of AUDF on a single immigration act for the whole nation, its formation can be called an attempt by a section of Assam Jamiat leaders to share power by creating panic among Muslims on the issue of illegal immigration. It is because the party was formed opposing the repeal of the IM(DT) Act, an immigration act that was declared illegal by the judiciary, clearly showing how the repeal of the Act was used only as an opportunity to spread emotions and to form a political party by a section of Assam Jamiat leaders. 112

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In the case of AUDF, for the first time in the politics of India, Jamiat actively involved itself in the formation of a political party. The Jamiat’s primary political purpose has been to defend the Muslim Personal Law and oppose ‘any attempts by the state to change or interfere with it through either specific laws or through the enactment of a uniform civil code’ (Brass 2001: 236). Its constitution allows it to support any political party from outside for the cause of Muslim welfare. But in the case of AUDF, Assam Jamiat itself formed the party, and the president of the Assam Jamiat became the president of it. For many, the formation of AUDF in Assam was an experiment to form a national political party by and for Muslims. The Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Syed Ahmed Bukhari announced in 2000 that he would play a direct role in setting up a political party for Muslims to ensure that the ‘lost rights of the minorities’ are regained (Engineer 2003: 172–74). In the formation of the AUDF, Badruddin Ajmal was blessed by Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid (Bhaumik 2009: 218). Three years after its formation, AUDF relaunched itself as a national party, All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF). The relaunch of AUDF as AIUDF strengthened the argument that AUDF was an experiment to form a national political party for Muslims. However, after AUDF became AIUDF in 2009, no prominent Muslim leaders from other parts of the country joined the party. The party could not make its presence felt in the politics of the states like West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh etc. with a substantial Muslim population during the last decade. Even the Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid did not come forward to play a part in helping the party to grow nationally. The AIUDF also, since 2009, could not show any progress to be a nationwide political party, and its activities remained confined to Assam only. The Election Commission of India recognised it only as a state party in Assam till the 2016 Assam Assembly elections. From all these, AIUDF cannot be considered as part of a plan to form a national party by Muslims for Muslims. Instead, as has been argued, the formation of AUDF was the result of the attempt of a section of Assam Jamiat leaders to share power in Assam in the name of Muslims who made up more than one-third of the state’s total population. The success of AUDF in the 2006 Assam Assembly election and the political ambitions of the party Chief Mr. Ajmal led to the relaunch of AIUDF. Badruddin Ajmal, in the contemporary politics of Assam, established himself as the tallest Muslim leader in the state, which is interesting. No Muslim politician in Assam after independence could emerge as a leader of both Brahmaputra and Barak valley Muslims like Ajmal. After forming AUDF, Ajmal emerged as a leader quickly, and to date, he has remained the undisputed Muslim leader in the politics of Assam. Several factors contributed immensely to establish him as a leader in the politics of Assam. First is his standing as a religious leader. He is considered a religious leader of high stature and esteem by a large section of Muslims. He instantly became popular as a political leader because of his religious stature among 113

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the common Muslims. The illiterate and less educated Muslims started to seek his blessings in the election and public meetings. Ajmal also capitalised on this faith of the people by capturing the mass psyche through various means, which have no rational or scientific ground. He is believed to possess divine power and prepares potions on public request to be distributed in the election and public meetings. Second, he is a Deobandi educated maulana. Because of this, the Darul Ulums (Deobandi Madrassas) and local Jamiat leaders contributed significantly to build up his image among the common Muslims in every corner of the state. Third, the Ajmal family had previously made a mark in the society of Assam with charitable work (Gohain 2016: 70). The Ajmal Foundation, owned by the Badruddin Ajmal family, has been working for the improvement of the underdeveloped people of the society. The social works done by this foundation are recognised in Assam, and this recognition helped Ajmal to become familiar quickly. Fourth is his wealth. He is a rich perfume merchant based in Dubai with sizeable holdings in agar wood (fragrant dark resinous wood used in incense, perfume) plantations. He spent a lot money in forming the AUDF and to fight elections. Fifth, Ajmal represents the immigrant Muslims of both the Brahmaputra and Barak valley. He is from Hojai, a small town from the middle Assam of Brahmaputra valley. In Brahmaputra valley, he represents the neo-Assamese Muslims. In Barak valley, he is identified as a Sylheti Muslim who migrated from the Sylhet district of East Bengal. A sizeable section of immigrant Muslims in Barak valley are of Sylhet origin. This combination of identity has helped Ajmal to emerge as a leader of the entire immigrant Muslim population of Assam (Nath 2019: 38). And finally, Tarun Gogoi, Congress Chief Minister of Assam during 2001–16, also helped Badruddin Ajmal to emerge as a leader of Muslims in Assam by publicly questioning his identity, which was largely publicised by Assamese media. The jibe of Tarun Gogoi ‘Who is Badruddin?’ immensely helped Badruddin Ajmal to become familiar with all sections of people in Assam.

AIUDF and communal politics in Assam (2005–16) Congress has a strong support base among the immigrant Muslims of Assam, and this has helped the party significantly to stay in power in the state for most of the time after independence. The party opposed the Assam Movement and imposed the IM(DT) Act in Assam only to keep immigrant Hindu and Muslim communities living in the state with it. Even after the signing of the Assam Accord, a large section of immigrant Muslims has remained with Congress because of the party’s commitment to the IM(DT) Act. However, the repeal of the IM(DT) Act by the Apex Court of India in 2005 changed the situation. The newly formed AUDF started to argue that the immigrant section of people would face harassment in the name of citizenship after the IM(DT) Act was repealed, which started to attract a large section of immigrant Muslims. Congress in Assam realised the threat 114

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that immigrant Muslims were about to desert the party. In that situation, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government on 10 February 2006, made Gazette notification of the Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) order 2006. This new order incorporated the same burden of the proof clause because of which the Apex Court declared IM(DT) as unconstitutional [Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) order 2006]. This order was an attempt to bring back the IM(DT) Act through the back door. However, this order was also quashed by the Apex Court in December 2006 after it was challenged in the court. With this, Congress’s last attempt to control the damage created by the repeal of the IM(DT) act failed. The Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) order 2006 was notified in February 2006, keeping an eye open on the Assam Assembly election which was scheduled to be held in April 2006. However, after the Supreme Court repealed the IM(DT) Act, this order could not convince the immigrant Muslims before the election. Already, the newly formed AUDF had made Congress responsible for the repeal of the IM(DT) Act, which convinced a large number of Muslim voters. In this situation, Congress had no option but to unite non-Muslim votes against AUDF to win the 2006 election. The Congress Chief Minister of Assam Tarun Gogoi then became very offensive against AUDF and its leader Badruddin Ajmal by labelling both as communal. His jibe ‘Who is Badruddin?’ emerged as Congress’s central campaign theme in this election. This mobilised and united Hindu votes against AUDF. On the other hand, this jibe, which directly questioned the identity of Badruddin Ajmal, a religious leader of high esteem and a person from the immigrant Muslim community, had helped AUDF to penetrate the immigrant Muslim community (Nath 2019: 39). Till BJP emerged as a strong alternative to Congress in the 2016 Assembly election, AGP was Congress’s primary competitor in Assam since it formed in 1985. The AGP is a party with an Assamese outlook and indigenous agenda. After forming government in Assam in 2001 defeating AGP, Congress Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi during his 15-year rule had always tried to become an Assamese regional leader, with the intention of marginalising the political importance of AGP. Because of Gogoi’s initiative and leadership, in 2005, after two decades since the Assam Accord was signed, in May 2005, the Congress-led central government decided to upgrade the NRC 1951 in Assam. After this, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi declared that the Assam Accord would be implemented, and the NRC prepared in 1951 in Assam would be updated to resolve all contests over the foreigner issue. A separate directorate was established by the state government to update the NRC. This decision of upgradation of NRC 1951, which was a long-standing demand of AASU, Assam Movement and AGP, established Mr. Gogoi as an Assamese regional leader. In the meantime, in July 2005, the IM(DT) Act was repealed, and consequently, AUDF was formed. In a situation whereby the immigrant Muslims were deserting Congress, Gogoi wanted the support of both the ethnic Assamese and other Hindu 115

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votes to come back to power after the 2006 election. With the newfound identity of an Assamese regional leader, then, he questioned the identity of Ajmal, a Muslim, and a person from an immigrant community. This strategy instantly established him as the indigenous Assamese crusader against Muslim communalism. As a consequence, even after a large section of Muslims deserted Congress, the party won 53 seats (11 short of a majority) in the 2006 election. The Congress under Mr. Gogoi formed the second consecutive government in Assam after Bodo People’s Front (BPF), a Bodo ethnic political party, supported Congress after the election. AGP, in this election, got 24 seats although then AGP leader and MP Sarbananada Sonowal was widely acclaimed and became a household name in Assam because of his role in the repeal of the IM(DT) Act. Mr. Sonowal was the petitioner against the IM(DT) Act in the Supreme Court. AUDF, in this election, won ten seats by getting 9.03 per cent of the total vote polled contesting from 69 constituencies. The success of AUDF in a state with almost one-third of the Muslim population created fear among the non-Muslims of Assam of becoming politically subjugated at the hands of Muslims if they came together under it. The fear that gave birth to the Assam Movement now started to aggravate among the indigenous Assamese people. This fear turned Assam into fertile land for communal polarisation. After the 2006 election, Chief Minister Gogoi started to become more regional and aggressive against Ajmal and AIUDF. During 2006–11, the war of words between Gogoi and Ajmal even became personal on many occasions. Eventually, this started to work as a soft Hindutva for Congress in the politics of Assam against Muslim communalism under AIUDF. The growing support base of AIUDF and soft Hindutva of Gogoi made the 2011 Assam election communally polarised. The consequence was that after the 2011 election, Congress returned to power in Assam for the third consecutive term under Tarun Gogoi with an absolute majority. The party won 25 more seats than the previous Assembly election. Against this, AIUDF won 18 seats, against ten during the last election, and emerged as the main opposition party in the Assam Legislative Assembly. This outcome clearly showed a religious polarisation in the 2011 election. In this religious polarisation, however, Barak valley showed a surprising outcome in this election. BJP could not win a single seat from Barak valley where it had a strong support base and has been winning at least four seats in the subsequent Assembly elections since 1991. Congress dominated this election in the valley and won 13 seats, the highest in the post-Assam Movement period. In Barak valley, in this election, the soft Hindutva of Congress won over BJP’s hard Hindutva. To contain the growth of Muslim communalism under AIUDF, in this election, Congress was widely supported by non-Muslims from both valleys of Assam (ibid.). To help Congress contain AIUDF, the Barak valley Hindus did not rally behind BJP, which did not have much influence in the other valley. 116

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On the other hand, besides communal polarisation, the factor which helped AIUDF to show a better performance in the 2011 election than the previous election was the issue of the Doubtful (D) voter. The D voters are not allowed to vote in elections. The provision of the D voter started to create panic among the immigrant Muslim community in Assam. It emerged as a big political issue at the hands of AUDF after it was formed. Opposition to the D voter has become one of the reasons why AUDF gained popularity very quickly among the immigrant section of Muslims after its formation. Just before the 2011 Assembly election, the Gauhati High Court, in an order [in WP(C) 1334/2009] on 23 March 2011, directed the Election Commission to ensure that the D category citizens, whose names were pending in the Foreigners Tribunal, were not allowed to vote. This court order was a big concern for the immigrant Muslim community, and AIUDF exploited the situation by promising that it would go to the Supreme Court against the verdict of the Gauhati High Court. The issue of the D voter at this juncture helped AIUDF immensely in this election. Motivated by the success in the 2011 Assembly election, AIUDF chief Ajmal started divisive politics by making communally provocative statements. During the 2014 parliamentary election, Ajmal, returning from holy Mecca, declared that the Almighty wouldn’t forgive him if BJP won in Assam because of the mistakes of his party (Nath 2016: 91). This statement helped BJP significantly to unite Hindu votes against AIUDF in the 2014 parliamentary election in Assam. The emergence of Narendra Modi as the prime ministerial candidate of BJP also contributed to strengthening majoritarian politics under BJP in Assam. As a result of this communal polarisation, both BJP and AIUDF showed unprecedented success in this election. Out of a total 14 parliamentary seats in Assam, while BJP won seven, AIUDF won three, ruling Congress could win only three seats against the seven it won in the 2009 parliamentary election. The emergence of AIUDF as the main opposition party in the Assam Assembly after the 2011 election and winning three seats in the 2014 parliamentary election frightened the indigenous Assamese. In this situation, the Hindu organisations started to gain ground in Assam, which did not have much influence on the Hindus of Assam before. These organisations tried to convey the message that Hindus were in a crisis in Assam, and they were going to be dominated by Muslims under AIUDF. They tried to establish the AIUDF as the patron and protector of continuous illegal Bangladeshis Muslim immigration, which was becoming a threat to the indigenous people of Assam. After BJP’s unprecedented victory in the 2014 parliamentary election, the VHP leader Praveen Togadia visited Kokrajhar in August 2014 and urged the Assamese, Bengali Hindus, all tribes in Assam to stand together as one to fight the modern-day invasion by the Bangladeshis (Bhattacharjee 2016: 86). The success in the 2011 Assembly election and the 2014 parliamentary polls through communal polarisation inspired AIUDF and its leader Ajmal 117

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to follow the same strategy to show good performance in the 2016 Assembly election. Then Ajmal started the communal division for the 2016 election. Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed a big public meeting in Guwahati on 9 January 2016. In response, Ajmal, on 22 January 2016 in a public meeting, appealed to Muslims of Assam to unite against the Hindus. He stated that all the Hindus have united after the 19 January visit of Narendra Modi, and so Muslims should unite against the Hindus (Asomiya Pratidin, 23 January 2016). This appeal was sufficient to make the ensuing Assembly election in Assam communally polarised. Then, BJP responded very strategically and began to target the immigrant Muslims who formed the support base of AIUDF. On the one hand, it tried to unite and consolidate the Hindus behind it against the AIUDF. It started to argue that the indigenous people of the state were losing political dominance in the state because of the increasing dominance of immigrant Muslims on electoral equations. It campaigned that at least 35 Assembly constituencies were dominated by them, and they had illegally occupied a large chunk of land of vaishnavite shrines in Assam. In its ‘Assam Vision Document (2016–25)’ for the 2016 Assam Assembly election, BJP promised ‘constitutional, legislative, social and cultural safeguards as per the clause 6 of Assam Accord’ and to ‘protect the Xatra (satra- a Vaishnava monastery) and other religious, cultural and ecological land from infiltrators’ (p. 10). On the other hand, BJP tried to divide Muslim votes between Congress and AIUDF so that it could win through this division of Muslim votes. To divide Muslim votes, BJP raised different issues at different places in different phases of the election. During the first phase of the election held in indigenous Assamese dominated upper Assam, BJP talked about the implementation of the Assam Accord, its commitment to the upgradation of NRC in Assam, the formation of a government of the indigenous people etc. which attracted the indigenous Assamese. During the second phase of the election, held in Muslim influential lower and middle Assam, BJP argued that in Assam, only Citizens of Indian Origin should have the right to contest elections. Notably, BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi promised to drive away the illegal Bangladeshis living in Assam and West Bengal in his election campaigns before the 2014 Parliamentary election. During the 2016 Assam Assembly election campaign also, BJP promised to make Assam illegal immigrant-free. However, against all these issues which targeted the immigrant Muslims and attracted the indigenous Assamese, in Barak valley, dominated by Hindu Bengalis, during the election campaign for 2016 Assam Assembly election, BJP promised to grant citizenship to the Hindu Bengalis continuously immigrating from Bangladesh. The Muslim voters were confused by all these moves by BJP and remained divided (Nath 2019: 40–1). The outcome of this election was that while the BJP-led alliance won by more than two-thirds majority (86 seats), Congress declined to 25 seats from 78 in the previous Assembly election, AIUDF got only 13 seats, five 118

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less than the previous election. However, the electoral outcome in favour of BJP in this election was not only the result of communal polarisation; 15 years of consecutive Congress rule in Assam created a strong anti-incumbency feeling among the common people against the Congress party and government. And there was no alternative to Congress except the BJP alliance as the leading regional political party AGP also aligned with it. The BJP benefited substantially from its alliance with AGP as this stopped the division of votes between AGP and BJP in indigenous Assamese dominated constituencies. The alliance with AGP helped BJP even to penetrate the Muslim influential constituencies. Moreover, before the election, BJP significantly formed alliances with different ethnic groups. It made an electoral alliance with Bodo political party BPF, and Rabha and Tiwa tribal organisations. It promised to give tribal status to six ethnic groups of Assam, namely, Ahom, Chutia, Koch Rajbongshi, Matak, Moran and Adivashis (a Tea community), for which all these ethnic groups had been agitating for long. Again, it tried to attract a large section of indigenous Assamese from Brahmaputra valley through its promise to safeguard their ‘land’, ‘settlement’ and ‘nationality’ and committed that it would form an indigenous government in Assam which would never compromise the interests of the indigenous people of the state. It even talked about safeguarding the interests of indigenous Muslims. To manage the probable backlash of its slogan of indigenous government in Brahmaputra valley, in Hindu Bengali dominated Barak valley, it talked about giving citizenship to Hindu Bengalis emigrated from Bangladesh. Congress had to fight hard to counter such intelligent ethnic outbidding by the BJP (ibid.). After the 2011 Assam Assembly election, the soft Hindutva of Congress against AIUDF was taken over by hard Hindutva of BJP. The result was that BJP showed unprecedented success in the 2016 Assam Assembly elections and formed first-ever government in Assam after the election with its prepoll alliance partners AGP and BPF. BJP’s indigenous tune of Hindutva politics helped the party-led alliance to show a surprising success. At the same time the loss of the appeal of soft Hindutva of Tarun Gogoi-led Assam Congress, and the failure of AIUDF to gain against BJP in this election are also interesting. The success of Gogoi-led Congress in the consecutive 2006 and 2011 Assembly elections was a blend of soft Hindutva against AIUDF and Assamese regionalism against AGP. In this election, both soft Hindutva and the Assamese regionalism of Gogoi was taken over by BJP. The hard Hindutva of BJP against AIUDF easily took over the soft Hindutva of Mr. Gogoi-led Congress. On the other hand, by making a pre-poll electoral alliance with AGP, the BJP marginalised the stature of Gogoi as an Assamese regional leader. To take over Assamese regionalism from Gogoi, the BJP-led coalition spoke louder than Congress about the implementation of the Assam Accord, completion of NRC etc. during the election campaign. It even talked about the safeguarding of land, settlement and nationality of the indigenous people of Assam and the forming of a government of 119

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indigenous people. In the issue of Assamese regionalism, however, another factor contributed against Tarun Gogoi and Congress in this election. The speaker of the Assam Legislative Assembly, himself a Congressman, proposed a definition of ‘Assamese people’ in the House on 31 March 2015 and recommended that the year 1951 be taken as the cut-off period and that the NRC 1951 be taken as the basis for the definition of the ‘Assamese people’. This definition was required for the implementation of Clause 6 of the Assam Accord which has remained unaddressed since it was signed. This definition of the speaker was welcomed by political parties like AGP, BJP and BPF in the House and by a large section of the Assamese communities. However, Congress, along with AIUDF, strongly opposed it in the House, which immediately dented the image of Mr. Gogoi as the Assamese regional leader just before the 2016 election. On the other hand, several factors contributed to the fact that AIUDF was unable to gain from the communal polarisation in the 2016 Assam Assembly elections. First was Badruddin Ajmal’s loss of credibility. The AIUDF remained a party based on the personal charisma of Ajmal. However, after the 2011 Assembly election, Ajmal started to lose credibility. His personal defeat in the 2016 election is proof of this. After the formation of AIUDF, he talked a lot but did little for the Muslim community. He could not show any maturity as a leader after being the President of AIUDF for more than a decade. Most often, he made irresponsible statements that harmed the immigrant Muslim community. He visibly showed political opportunism. The AIUDF became a part of UPA at the centre after the 2009 parliamentary election, but he bitterly criticised Congress in the state. Second, too much communalism harmed the AIUDF. Just before the 2016 election, Ajmal appealed the Muslims of Assam to unite against the Hindus, alleging that Hindus of the state had united behind BJP. Such communal statements stopped the liberal Muslims of Assam coming to the AIUDF fold. Third, AIUDF itself showed its weakness before the 2016 election. Ajmal repeatedly claimed that his party would form the next government in Assam after the election. Ajmal even announced a few cabinet minister names of the government to be formed by him after the election. On the other hand, he repeatedly requested Congress for a pre-poll electoral alliance to stop BJP, which was publicly declined by Congress. The AIUDF’s repeated request for an electoral alliance with Congress convinced Muslim voters that the party was not in good health. Fourth, corruption charges levelled against Ajmal during electioneering in distributing party tickets by his party colleagues and sitting MLAs also acted against him and his party in the election. Fifth, the D voter issue lost its attraction in the 2016 elections. The issue of D voter helped AIUDF significantly in the 2011 Assam Assembly election when the party won from 18 constituencies. The D voter issue had been in the limelight during the campaign for the 2011 election since the Gauhati High Court, just before the election, in an order validated the decision of the Election Commission of India to debar the D 120

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voters from the right to vote. The AIUDF even appealed against this order of Gauhati High Court in the Supreme Court. However, in 2015, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Gauhati High Court order. With this, before the 2016 election, the D voter issue lost attraction, and the whole issue of citizenship of a large section of immigrant Muslims became more complicated after the process of the upgradation of NRC was started. And finally, in the 2016 election, a large section of Muslims were torn between Congress and AIUDF, and there was no agency to guide them in this situation. From the Assam Movement till the 2001 election, Jamiat decided for a large section of immigrant Muslims whom to vote. But after it formed AUDF in 2005, Jamiat lost its non-political character among these Muslims. It can be argued that after the 2014 Parliamentary election in Assam, while BJP succeeded to unite the Hindus through well-thought-out strategies, AIUDF failed to unite Muslim votes because of its weak leadership and necked communalism. From the study of Assam Assembly elections held after the Assam Movement it becomes clear that over ground political activism of Jamiat helped the origin and growth of majoritarian politics under BJP in Assam. After Jamait formed a political party (AIUDF), the Assam politics started to experience a polarisation between Hindu majoritarian politics and Muslim communalism. During this period, even Congress accepted the help of soft Hindutva to defeat the Muslim communalism of AIUDF.

Muslim vote, Congress and Jamiat There is no denying the fact that Assam Jamiat has always helped Congress to maintain its influence over the Muslim vote in Assam till the 1983 Assembly election. However, the Congress-Jamiat relationship became troublesome on several occasions in the post-Assam Movement period. The Jamiat started to play an activist and autonomous role in the electoral politics of Assam just after the Assam Movement. In this situation, two aspects of Muslim electoral behaviour in Assam, namely, alliance with Congress and obedience to Jamiat, become very interesting in the post-Assam Movement period. In the post-Assam Movement period, the political activism of Jamiat could not eliminate the Congress-Muslim electoral alliance that was formed after independence. And even after forming AIUDF, Jamiat could not attract the majority of Muslim votes to the fold of the party in the last three Assembly elections it contested. After the Assam Movement, although the Muslim community’s support to Congress weakened, still a significant portion of Muslims remained loyal to the party. In several states of India with a sizeable Muslim population like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar etc., Muslims have been shifting their support substantially from Congress to regional political parties like the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, Samajwadi Party, and Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh and 121

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Rashtriya Janata Dal and Samata Party in Bihar since the last decade of the previous century. Assam also experienced the growth of regional political parties like AGP, UMFA, AIUDF etc. since the mid-1980s. The UMFA and the AIUDF were formed mainly to safeguard the interests of the minorities. Still the support base of Congress remained very strong among the Muslims of Assam. In the 2006, 2011 and 2016 consecutive Assam Assembly elections, the AIUDF gained 9.03 per cent, 12.57 per cent and 13.05 per cent of total vote polled. It bagged 10, 18 and 13 seats in these consecutive elections (Election Commission of India Report). The AUDF showed significant growth during 2006–11, and in 2016 there was even a little bit of gain, although BJP showed incredible growth during 2011–16. In the last three Assembly elections, the AIUDF contested mainly from middle and lower Assam districts of Brahmaputra valley and Barak valley with sizeable Muslim populations. The party succeeded mostly from immigrant Muslim dominated constituencies. In Brahmaputra valley, in the last three Assembly elections, the party could not largely influence the indigenous Muslims, although a significant portion of neo-Assamese Muslims from the valley supported the party in consecutive elections. Of the total 126 Assembly constituencies in Assam, 106 were from Brahmaputra valley. In the 2006, 2011 and 2016 Assembly elections, AIUDF contested from 57, 64 and 60 constituencies respectively from the valley. And the party contested mainly from lower and middle Assam districts of the valley where neo-Assamese Muslims live. In all the three consecutive elections, it has contested from all constituencies of Dhubri district of lower Assam with 79.67 per cent Muslim population where mainly neo-Assamese Muslims live. Again from Nagaon district, a middle Assam district with a 55.36 per cent Muslim population and dominated by neo-Assamese Muslims, AIUDF contested from ten constituencies of total 11 constituencies in the 2006 and 2011 elections and contested from all the constituencies in the 2016 election. From Barak valley, the party contested from 12, 14 and 13 constituencies (of total 15) in the 2006, 2011 and 2016 elections, respectively. It won from three, one and four constituencies in consecutive elections (Census of India Report 2011, Election Commission of India Report). Against this, the party had no significant presence in the hill districts and upper Assam districts of Brahmaputra valley. From five constituencies of the hill districts (Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao), in all three elections, it contested from only one constituency (Haflong in Dima Hasao) in the 2016 elections. From seven upper Assam districts (Golaghat, Jorhat, Sibsagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Lakhimpur and Dhemaji), the party could not even find candidates to contest in many constituencies. These upper Assam districts are traditionally known as the home of Assamese Muslims, mainly of Goria and Moria groups. These seven districts have a total of 34 legislative constituencies, and from these, the AIUDF contested from only six, ten and eight constituencies respectively in the 2006, 2011 and 2016 elections. In these 122

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elections, the party won only one seat from these 34 constituencies in the 2016 election (Naoboisa from Lakhimpur District). The Naoboisa constituency had a significant number of neo-Assamese Muslim populations. All these prove that the AIUDF has remained a party of immigrant Muslims from both Brahmaputra and Barak valleys (Nath 2019: 38). In the three Assembly elections AIUDF contested, it could not get more than 13 per cent of the total vote polled even though the Assam Muslims consist of more than one-third of the total population. Moreover, in these elections, its support base was restricted to the immigrant Muslim inhabited areas. These two aspects show the limited appeal of the Jamiat among the Assam Muslims. It is observed that AIUDF, an offspring of Assam Jamiat, could not completely alienate the Muslim voters from Congress. The Assam elections 2006, 2011 and 2016 clearly show that Congress still had significant influence over Muslim voters as AIUDF could not gain more than 13 per cent of the total vote polled in these consecutive elections. Even in the communally polarised 2016 Assam Assembly election, Muslim voters remained divided between Congress and AIUDF, which significantly helped the BJP-led alliance to win comfortably. The outcome of this election from Barak valley clearly shows this. The AIUDF’s win of four constituencies from the valley, the highest in the last three elections and against just one in the previous election, was a consequence of communal polarisation. However, BJP won from three Muslim influential constituencies (Patharkandi, Sonai and Katigora) of the valley because of the division of Muslim votes between Congress and AIUDF. Congress has remained the party of choice for a significant section of immigrant Muslims since independence. Even before AIUDF was formed, in the 1985 Assembly election when UMFA showed significant success in Brahmaputra valley, a section of immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley and a large section of Barak valley Muslims supported Congress. Again in the 1996 Assembly election, when Jamiat supported the AGP-led alliance, a large section of immigrant Muslims from both Brahmaputra and Barak valley voted for Congress. The Congress-Muslim alliance that was formed after independence has remained to some extent intact till today despite Jamiat’s activist role in the politics of Assam in the post-Assam Movement period. However, during this period, Jamiat successfully marginalised Muslim electoral support to Congress to some extent on some occasions. If we observe, during this period, when Jamiat supported Congress in Assam Assembly elections (1991, 2001), the overwhelming majority of immigrant Muslims voted for the party. But whenever Jamiat supported a political party or alliance other than Congress (1985-UMFA, 1996-AGP, 20062016-AIUDF), Muslim votes remained divided. A large section of immigrant Muslims in Assam, on several occasions, defied the Jamiat and supported Congress. In this scenario, if we try to understand why and how Congress succeeded in retaining a large section of Muslims despite the formation of 123

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several regional political parties in the state and also the growth of Muslimbased political parties, several factors can be identified. First, minorities in any society always prefer to side with the political party in power. The alliance with the party in power ensures their security, as security remains the prime concern for any minority group in any society. Congress has remained in power in Assam for most of the time. Moreover, Muslims of Assam aligned with Congress before the 1951 election considering it a secular political platform. During the last seven decades after independence, Congress has always tried to maintain its secular character so that the support of the Muslims does not disappear. While Congress has remained successful in keeping the support of a large section of Muslims with it by its secular character, support to Congress has also helped these Muslims to prove their commitment to secularism. Second, Congress realises the importance of the Muslim vote, particularly of the immigrant section, in Assam for coming back to power in subsequent elections. That is why Congress in Assam has always remained concerned that Muslim interests are not compromised. The party opposed the Assam Movement, supported the IM(DT) Act and has always ignored the problem of illegal Muslim immigration from Bangladesh to Assam to avoid dissatisfying the community. Although the role of Congress vis-à-vis the IM(DT) Act and the continuous illegal immigration problem to Assam went against the greater interest of the state, the party took such stands only to show itself as the true friend of the immigrant Muslims of Assam. Third, the consecutive Congress governments in Assam since independence have done nothing unusual for the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the Muslim community. However, the Congress government and the party in the state have successfully managed the local political and religious leaders of the community. They determine the voting behaviour of the community at the grass-roots level. The immigrant Muslims mainly live in villages and char areas, and they are socio-economically backward. This section of Muslims can be easily manipulated during elections through local political and religious leaders. And finally, from time to time, the Congress central governments have made some specific institutional arrangements and policies for the security and socio-economic development of Muslims. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi issued a directive on 12 May 1983 to all the central ministries as well as the states to ensure that special consideration was given to the minorities in all aspects of governance. These directives were known as ‘Fifteen Point Scheme Plan’ and were a major step for guaranteeing the minorities security and welfare. Again on 9 March 2005 the Congress-led UPA government under Dr. Manmohan Singh formed the seven-member Sachar committee to study the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India. The committee submitted its report along with recommendations in November 2006. Such steps of the Congress-led central governments at different points in time have helped the party in Assam to claim that it only thinks and works for the Muslims. 124

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Jamiat’s relevance among Assam Muslims Unlike other states of India, Jamiat has played a crucial role in determining the electoral behaviour of Muslims in Assam. It has played an active role in the politics of Assam since the days of the freedom movement. After independence Jamiat became non-political. Then it was made relevant in the politics of Assam by the Congress party. Congress used the Jamiat to gather Muslim votes for the party who were supporters of the Muslim League till independence. The patronage of the Congress party and its government in Assam to Jamiat helped it to take the space vacated by the League among Muslims in Assam. Till the Assam Movement, Jamiat worked as an agent of the Congress party to gather Muslim votes for the party. This role significantly helped to continue Congress– Muslim alliance, formed after independence, till the 1983 Assam Assembly elections. The Assam Movement made Jamiat more relevant among the immigrant Muslims of Assam, and the organisation started to play an activist role in the politics of Assam after the Movement. It remained relevant among a significant section of Assam Muslims even after it began to play an over ground political role in the 1985 Assembly election. In Assam, Jamiat has remained relevant among the Muslims of the state as it has always remained vocal during the community’s hours of crisis. It strongly opposed the Assam Movement and supported the IM(DT) Act when it was imposed on Assam. It strongly opposed the Assam Accord and aligned with CRPC to form UMFA against the Accord and AGP. It has been vigorously campaigning against the provision of D voter since 1998 when the Election Commission introduced the provision in Assam. It emerged as a significant political issue at the hands of AUDF after Jamiat formed it. Assam Jamiat and AIUDF even approached the Supreme Court against the provision of D voter. The Jamiat showed strong dissatisfaction with the Congress-led central and Assam government when the Supreme Court repealed the IM(DT) Act. After the IM(DT) was repealed, it formed the AUDF to safeguard the interests of those at risk due to the absence of the act. Since the central government decided in 2005 to upgrade the NRC 1951 in Assam, Jamiat has always expressed its concerns with every issue related to the upgrading of NRC, which could create difficulties for the immigrant section of Muslims to enter their names in NRC. Assam Jamiat even actively took part in the proceedings at the Supreme Court in relation to the upgrading of NRC in Assam. On the other hand, in the politics of Assam, Jamiat has tried to solve the contentious issues for the immigrant Muslims. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 3, it has brought about a consensus among the immigrant Muslims living in Assam to support the Assam Accord. The immigrant Muslims in Assam is a vast community. Unlike the immigrant Muslims in Assam, Muslims of other parts of India have not faced six-year-long movements like the Assam Movement, citizenship issues 125

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like D voter, NRC upgradation etc. Above all, most often, the entire immigrant community is branded as illegal Bangladeshis. In such a peculiar situation, Jamiat has always been trying to raise the concerns of these Muslims in the politics of Assam. That is why, unlike other states with a substantial Muslim population in India, Jamiat has remained politically relevant among a large section of Muslims in Assam. Its assertion of Muslim interests in adverse situations has remained the reason why it has legitimacy and authority among a large section of Muslims in the state. The Jamiat can influence a large section of Muslims in the state also because other Islamic organisations do not have a strong base in the state. Muslim religious organisations like Jamat-e-Islami have not succeeded in influencing the Muslims in Assam in a significant way. The political patronage to Jamiat after independence to bring the support of Muslims to Congress had helped it to spread its organisational activities to Muslims in every corner of the state. Due to its growing influence over the Muslims in Assam, Deobandi thought has a widespread influence over the Muslims in the state. However, the formation of AIUDF could emerge as a challenge for Assam Jamiat itself in the near future. The Jamiat has already lost its non-political character by forming AIUDF. In this situation, if AIUDF fails in the politics of Assam in the future, it will raise questions about Jamiat’s credibility. Notably, in the last three Assembly elections, the AIUDF could not attract the majority of Muslim voters in Assam. On the other hand, the attempt to make AIUDF a national party also failed.

Assam Muslims: A divided community in elections The electoral behaviour of Muslims in the post-Assam Movement period amply proved that the community had never voted en masse for any political party. Instead the community remained divided in consecutive elections. The division of votes is a common phenomenon among the Muslims in Assam, which helped even BJP to win from Muslim dominated constituencies during this period. In the 2016 Assam Assembly elections, Muslim voters were divided between Congress and AIUDF in the whole of Assam, which helped the BJP-led alliance to win comfortably in several constituencies in both Brahmaputra and Barak valley. The division of Muslim votes becomes evident also from the fact that during this period, on several occasions, the Muslims of Assam supported different regional political parties, which are mainly concentrated in outside Assam. For instance, Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) won from Mankachar, Goalpara West and Goalpara East constituencies in the 2001 Assam Assembly elections. In the same election, Samata Party won from Sonai, and Karimganj South constituencies, and Trinamool Congress won from Badarpur Constituency. Again in the 2006 Assam Assembly elections, NCP won from Goalpara East constituency. All these Assembly constituencies are Muslim dominated. The above-mentioned

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parties failed to have any impact on the constituencies dominated by nonMuslims in these elections. After independence, there was a tendency among the Muslims in Assam to remain in the Congress fold as the party emerged as the sole political party. However, after the Assam Movement, the Muslims of Assam were not willing to remain a support base of any political party. Instead, the community tried to emerge as an autonomous political force in the election under Jamiat. The high growth of the Muslim population and, consequently, their increasing dominance in the electoral equations in the state gave the community the confidence to behave as an autonomous political entity. In fact the perennial negligence towards the concerns and needs of the community in the name of security and citizenship by successive governments created bitterness among the community towards the political parties. Moreover, the issue of continuous illegal immigration to Assam and the labelling of the whole immigrant Muslim community as ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ by so-called nationalist groups created a sense of alienation among the community, which again created a fertile ground for communal politics among the Muslims in Assam. The Muslims in Assam are emerging as an autonomous group under Jamiat in Assembly elections after the Assam Movement. This has made the Muslims in Assam a communal group in elections. However, as already discussed, the authority of Jamiat over the Muslims of Assam is also not absolute. The majority section of Assam Muslims has still not become a communal voting group of AIUDF. Against this backdrop, it can be said that in the politics of Assam, like other religious communities, Muslims are also a politically divided community. They have never behaved as a vote bank of the Congress party in post-independent history except in the 1983 Assembly election held amidst the Assam Movement, an extraordinary situation. Moreover, the absolute majority of Muslim voters declined to become a communal block under AIUDF even though soft Hindutva of Congress and Hindutva of BJP significantly influenced the 2011 and 2016 respective Assam Assembly elections.

Muslim growth and Assam’s demographic change During 1951–71, the percentage of the Muslim population of the total population in Assam remained almost stagnant. While this percentage was 24.68 per cent in 1951, it rose to 25.26 in 1961 and declined to 24.56 in 1971 (GoA 2012: 42–3; Census of India Reports 1951, 1961, 1971). In 1979 the Assam Movement began, and the census could not be held in Assam for 1981. The percentage of the Muslim population in Assam stood at 28.43 in the 1991 census (Census of India Report 1991). This percentage rose to 34.22 in the 2011 census. While the percentage of the Muslim population in the state remained almost stagnant for two decades (1951–71) before the Assam Movement, the two decades between 1991 and 2011 after the 127

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Movement showed an almost six per cent rise of the Muslim population in Assam. While the growth of immigrant Muslims became the background of the origin of the Assam Movement when census data (of 1961 and 1971) did not indicate any abnormal rise of the Muslim population, then the postAssam Movement period witnessed a real and abnormal increase in the Muslim population in Assam. In the last four decades, during 1971–2011, the Muslim population in Assam grew by almost ten per cent. This can be considered an abnormal demographic change in favour of Muslims.1 During the same four decades, the percentage of the Hindu population in Assam declined from 72.51 in 1971 to 61.46 in 2011 (GoA 2012: 42–3; Census of India Report 2011). The growth of the Muslim population in Assam becomes conspicuous when the percentage growth of Muslims in the state is compared with different states of India. From the recent census data of 2001 and 2011, it is evident that Muslim growth in Assam is the highest among all other states and union territories of India, which increased from 30.9 per cent in 2001 to 34.2 per cent in 2011. During 2001–11, barring Daman and Diu, Puducherry, Chhattisgarh and Manipur, the percentage of the Muslim population in all states and union territories has increased, which also indicates that high growth among Muslims in comparison to Hindus is an all-India India phenomenon. In the 2011 census, Muslims grew by more than one per cent in seven states over the 2001 census. The percentage growth of Muslims in these states is: Assam – 3.3, Uttaranchal –2.03, West Bengal – 1.76, Goa – 1.49, Jammu and Kashmir – 1.34, Haryana – 1.25 and Delhi – 1.14. In other states and union territories, during this period, the growth of the Muslim population is below one per cent. Daman and Diu, Puducherry and Chhattisgarh witnessed almost zero per cent Muslim growth, and only Manipur showed a negative growth (−0.4 per cent) of Muslim population during the period (Census of India Reports 2001, 2011). According to the 2011 census report, among the total 27 districts of Assam, nine districts are Muslim majority and three districts have a Muslim population of more than 35 per cent. Seven other districts have a Muslim population between ten and 35 per cent. The fast growth of Muslims in Assam in recent decades and consequent decline of the Hindu population has made the Muslim community more controversial in the society and politics of Assam than before the Assam Movement. And most often, in Assam, illegal Muslim immigration from Bangladesh is considered the cause of the abnormal growth of Muslims. The India-Bangladesh border has remained porous to date even after the Assam Accord was signed in 1985, and this has created an impression that illegal immigration has been directly contributing to the Muslim growth in the state. However, as has already been highlighted, the Muslim growth rate has remained high in comparison to Hindus in most of the states and union territories of India. Several factors are responsible for this, with the socio-economic backwardness of the community being the most critical one. The socio-economic backwardness, 128

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in general, tends to contribute to high population growth. In this situation, the socio-economic conditions of the Muslims in Assam attract attention. Socio-economic condition of Muslims and population growth In the Population and Women Empowerment Policy of Assam (PWEPA) 2017, the government of Assam acknowledged that char areas, along with the tea belts and some tribal areas, have high population growth because of underage marriage (p. 4). The policy also identified that polygamy, practised among certain communities, is a major challenge to the control of the population in Assam (p. 5). In Assam, the practice of polygamy has remained prevalent mainly among the immigrant section of Muslims living in chars and rural areas. The PWEPA, which is primarily a two-child population policy, has initially targeted 11 districts with the highest density of population as per the 2011 population census. All these districts are either Muslim majority or with substantial Muslim populations. The number of Muslims is increasing fast in Assam because of the high population growth among the immigrant Muslims. The population growth among the immigrant Muslims is high as they have remained backward, both socially and economically. To understand the situation, we can analyse some findings of the Sachar Committee Report (SCR), 2006 and the Assam Human Development Report (AHDR), 2014 (published in 2016). The SCR was a detailed government document on the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India, published in 2006. The AHDR 2014 depicted the human development condition of people of contemporary Assam, including the Muslims in the state, published almost a decade after the SCR. Both the SRC and the AHDR provide us with valuable information to understand the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in contemporary Assam. The census report of 2011 also helps us in this regard. Different government reports, including the SCR, have established the fact that Muslims have remained the most underdeveloped community in independent India. The SCR observed that while there is considerable variation in the conditions of Muslims across the states, the community is deficient and deprived in practically all dimensions of development (p. 237). Assam is not an exception to this, and here too, Muslims are the most socially and economically underdeveloped community. There is widespread illiteracy, unemployment and poverty among the community in comparison to Assam’s other socio-religious groups. The high growth rate of the population among the community has been the result of widespread illiteracy, unemployment and poverty, which again have contributed to keeping the community illiterate, unemployed and impoverished. It is, among Muslims, like the vicious cycle of poverty. The AHDR, 2014 ranked the districts of Assam (total 27) on different human development parameters. It is evident from the report that conditions 129

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for social development in most of the Muslim majority districts of Assam are backward in comparison to the Hindu majority districts. For example, Dhubri has the highest percentage of Muslims (79.67) among the districts of Assam. The district fared very poorly in human development. Among the 27 districts of Assam, its rank in health, education and living standards is 19, 26 and 26 respectively. Its rank in overall HDI is 23. Again, the Hailakandi district from Barak valley with 60.31 per cent Muslim population ranked at the bottom in overall HDI. It even ranked at the bottom in living standards. Few Muslim majority districts from lower Assam like Barpeta, Goalpara and Darrang fared better than Dhubri and Hailakandi in different parameters of human development and overall HDI rank (AHDR 2014: 193). However, it does not indicate the satisfactory socio-economic environment of these Muslim majority districts. Literacy is considered the primary condition of a healthy socio-economic environment for human development. If we compare the literacy rate of Muslim dominated districts from lower Assam with the Hindu dominated districts from upper Assam, it becomes clear that the Muslim majority districts have been lagging far behind in this respect. For example, while the literacy rate in Hindu dominated upper Assam districts like Jorhat (with 92.31 per cent Hindu population), Dibrugarh (with 90.35 per cent Hindu population), Sibsagar (with 87.5 per cent Hindu population) and Golaghat (with 85.99 per cent Hindu population) are 83.42, 76.22, 81.36 and 78.31 respectively, the literacy rate of some Muslim dominated lower Assam districts like Dhubri (with 79.67 per cent Muslim population), Barpeta (with 70.74 per cent Muslim population), Goalpara (with 57.52 per cent Muslim population) and Darrang (with 64.34 per cent Muslim population) is 59.36, 65.03, 68.67 and 64.55 respectively. The overall literacy rate in Assam is 73.18 per cent (Census of India Report, Assam, 2011). The AHDR 2014 also shows that Muslims of Assam, as a community, are at the bottom among all religious groups in literacy. In the 15+ age category, while the male literacy rate among Sikhs, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists is 95, 87.89, 79.88 and 76.54 respectively, it is only 73.91 among Muslim males. The female literacy rate in the 15+ age category among Muslims is only 61.47 while it is 88.89 among Sikhs, 77.04 among Hindus, 66.55 among Christians and 66.67 among Buddhists (AHDR 2014: 225). The backwardness in education among Muslims has made the community a casual workforce in Assam. The Muslims of Assam constitute a significant portion of the casual workforce in the state. Here, casual workers include daily wage earners only. While the percentage of casual workers among Hindus is 36.7 in Assam, this percentage among the Muslims is 47.2. Only 6.9 per cent of Muslims consists of regular salaried workers of the state. This percentage among Hindus is 16.4 (ibid: 202). The under-representation of Muslims in the salaried workers class has contributed to the perennial underdevelopment of the community. The Muslims of Assam, despite their large numbers, are not well represented in the government sector employment 130

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in proportion to their population strength. The SCR, 2006 estimated that although Assam Muslims constitute 30.9 per cent of the total population of the state (based on the 2001 census), out of total 81,261 state government employees, Muslim employees share in higher and lower positions are 10.2 and 11.4 respectively. Muslims are falling far behind in proportion to their population share in the employments of every government department (SCR 2006: 170–71). Due to widespread illiteracy and lack of employment, Muslims have remained poorer than their Hindu counterparts in Assam. According to AHDR, 2014, the poverty rate in Assam is 37.00 per cent. While the poverty rate among the Hindus of Assam is 33.4 per cent, more than three percentile below the state average, the poverty rate among Muslims is 39.7 per cent, more than two percentile above the state average. While 68.9 per cent Hindus have no agricultural assets, the figure is 72.5 per cent for Muslims. Again, while 20.4 per cent Hindus have no non-agricultural assets, 33.6 per cent Muslims are without non-agricultural assets. Nearly 20 per cent of Hindus have no transport assets, and the corresponding figure for Muslims without transport assets is 32.5 per cent. The percentage of Hindus without financial assets is 28 per cent, and Muslims without financial asset is 43 per cent (p. 58, 207). Early marriage and polygamy have remained prevalent among the Muslims in Assam. While married women in the 15–19 age group among Hindus, Christians and Buddhists are 11.1 per cent, 8.6 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively, the percentage of married women in this age group among Assam Muslims is 23.3 (ibid: 131). This high rate of early marriage among Muslims has kept the fertility rate of the community higher than other religious communities of the state. The fertility rate among Muslims is 2.9 against 1.7 for Hindus and 1.8 for Christians in the state (ibid: 129). The empowerment of women is crucial for curbing population growth. The socio-economic development among women, while on the one hand brings about gender justice, on the other hand, serves to arrest population growth. However, no governments in Assam have initiated any special policy to empower the women section of the immigrant Muslims. The socio-economic backwardness has significantly contributed to the prevalence of early marriage and polygamy among the Muslims in Assam, which has kept the growth rate among the community in the state very high. However, it must be noted that the fast growth of the population is seen only among the immigrant section of the Muslims. The practices of early marriage and polygamy are almost absent among the indigenous Muslims, particularly from upper Assam. From Brahmaputra valley, if we consider upper Assam Muslims as overwhelmingly indigenous and lower Assam Muslims as overwhelmingly immigrant, it becomes clear that Muslim growth in immigrant dominated lower Assam districts is far higher than the upper Assam districts. In districts from upper Assam, in two decades during 1991–2011, the percentage of the Muslim population grew from 4.32 to 5.00 131

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in Jorhat and from 7.11 to 8.46 in Golaghat. Against this, during the same period, from lower Assam, the Muslim population grew from 70.45 per cent to 79.67 per cent in Dhubri district and from 56.07 per cent to 70.74 per cent in Barpeta district (Census of India Reports 1991, 2001, 2011). The poor socio-economic condition among the immigrant section of Muslims contributes significantly to the high growth of the Muslim population in Assam, which is generally ignored when the issue of abnormal Muslim expansion in the state is discussed. Despite this, the growth of Muslims in Assam attracts attention if it is compared to that of Muslims in West Bengal. This comparison becomes pertinent as West Bengal, like Assam, has a sizeable Muslim population (27 per cent in the 2011 census) and shares a boundary with Bangladesh. And most importantly, West Bengal also has a large section of immigrated Muslims from East Bengal and then East Pakistan like Assam. If high growth among the immigrant section of Muslims is considered as the only cause of Muslim growth in Assam, then West Bengal should also have registered a Muslim growth similar to Assam. However, during 2001–2011, while Muslims in Assam grew by 3.3 per cent, their growth in West Bengal was only 1.76 per cent, just above half of Assam. In this situation, in comparison to West Bengal, the growth in Assam can be termed abnormal. This creates the impression that, along with the high birth rate among the immigrant section of Muslims, continuous illegal migration of Muslims from Bangladesh has contributed to the growth of Muslims in Assam. Illegal immigration The central government has always treated Assam especially in the case of illegal immigration. Several measures of the central government demonstrate how it has been dealing with the illegal immigration problem of Assam. First, within three years of independence, the Indian parliament enacted the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, to deal with the illegal immigration problem in Assam. Second, in June 1962, the central government adopted the scheme Prevention of Infiltration into India of Pakistani Nationals (PIP), which covered Kamrup, Nagaon, Darrang and Lakhimpur districts of Assam. Third, the central government, in 1964, formed the foreigners’ tribunal in Assam for fair identification and deportation of illegal foreigners. During 1964–69, the foreigners’ tribunals declared illegal foreigners in Assam, while the police did so in the rest of the country. But after 1969, the foreigners’ tribunals were rendered ineffective as the government felt they were no longer necessary as all the infiltrators were already identified and pushed back. In 1979, with the beginning of the Assam Movement, the tribunals were brought back, and ten tribunals were set up. Fourth, the IM(DT) Act was imposed on Assam in 1983, which remained operational in the state till 2005. During this period, while the rest of the country followed the Foreigners Act, Assam followed IM(DT) Act. Fifth, even after 132

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Assam came under the Foreigners’ Act in 2005, foreigners’ tribunals were functional in the state to identify illegal foreigners. Till BJP formed the firstever government in Assam in 2016, the number of tribunals in Assam was 36. The BJP-led government increased the number of tribunals from 36 to 100. And in May 2019, the central government decided to increase the tribunals to 1000. Sixth, Assam had six government-run detention camps where the government gives shelter to those who are declared illegal infiltrators by foreigners’ tribunals. And finally, the central government fixed a separate cut-off date for Assam to identify and deport illegal foreigners from the state. Under the provisions of the Assam Accord (1985), the cutoff date for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners in Assam is 24 March 1971. In contrast, the cut-off date for the rest of the country is 26 January 1951. Notably, the Assam Accord made everyone who illegally entered Assam from neighbouring countries till 24 March 1971 legal citizens of India. The above-mentioned also explains the peculiarity of the illegal immigration problem in Assam. However, what is very surprising is that even after the central government fixed a separate date for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam in the Assam Accord with the intention of solving the illegal immigration problem, the controversy of unabated illegal immigration from Bangladesh has remained. Even after the signing of the Assam Accord, where the central government committed to stopping further illegal immigration to Assam, both the central and state governments, at different points in time, have acknowledged the presence of hordes of illegal immigrants in Assam. On 10 April 1992, six years after the Assam Accord, Hiteswar Saikia, the then Chief Minister of Assam, stated that there were three million Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam. But two days later, he backtracked and declared that there were no illegal migrants in Assam (Sinha Report: 1998). Indrajit Gupta, the then Home Minister of India, stated in parliament on 6 May 1997 that ten million illegal migrants were residing in India. Quoting the Home Ministry and intelligence bureau sources, the 10 August 1998 issue of India Today magazine published a state-wise breakdown of illegal migrants: Assam – 40,00,000, Bihar – 5,00,000, Delhi –3,00,000, Maharashtra – 50,000, Rajasthan – 50,000, Tripura – 8,00,000, West Bengal – 54,00,000; total – 11.1 million (India Today, 10 August 1998). After 13 years of the signing of the Assam Accord, the Governor of Assam Lt. Gen (Retd.) S.K.Sinha submitted a detailed report on illegal immigration into Assam to the President of India in November 1998. This report (also known as the Sinha Report) elaborately showed the dangers arising from the continuing silent demographic invasion from Bangladesh to Assam. The Sinha Report began: Large scale illegal migration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh over several decades has been altering the demographic complexion of this state. It poses a grave threat both to the identity of the Assamese people 133

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and to our national security. Successive governments at the Centre and in the State have not adequately met this challenge (Sinha Report 1998). Based on census reports of India and erstwhile East Pakistan and present Bangladesh, the Sinha Report established that massive illegal immigration from Bangladesh to Assam was happening, and it has brought about significant changes to the demographic equations of the state. Based on this report, Rita Afsar, a Senior Research Fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka, estimated the relative share of Bangladeshi migrants in various states of India: West Bengal – 40 per cent, Assam – 30 per cent, Delhi – 11 per cent, Tripura – 7 per cent, Bihar – 3.7 per cent, Rajasthan – 3.7 per cent and Maharashtra – 3.7 per cent (Afsar 2008: 5). Discussing the findings of the 2001 census, the chairman of the expert committee under the National Commission of Minorities said that the high growth rates of the ten districts in Assam were due to an unabated influx from Bangladesh. These ten districts (Dhubri, Barpeta, Hailakandi, Goalpara, Karimganj, Nagaon, Morigaon, Bongaigaon, Darrang and Cachar) have witnessed a growth rate of over 51 per cent, which is above the national average (The Assam Tribune, 5 December 2004). The districts that showed a higher Muslim population growth share a border with or lie close to the border with Bangladesh, particularly Dhubri, Goalpara, Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi – giving credence to the widely held belief that illegal migration from Bangladesh is a significant source of these demographic trends. Interestingly, districts like Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong have not shown any abnormal growth of the Muslim population, although Dima Hasao shares a boundary with the Cachar district. It might be because these two are hill districts and enjoy tribal autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The Autonomous Councils of these two districts have rights on the land, and they keep a tight vigil so that other non-hill people cannot change demographic equations. Again, the Muslim growth rate in upper Assam districts dominated by the Assamese speaking indigenous Muslims, located far from the Bangladesh border, have registered marginal increases compared to areas located close to the Assam-Bangladesh border. In October 2012, the Congress-led Assam government published a white paper that highlighted the steps taken by the central as well as Assam governments to tackle the illegal foreigners’ problem in Assam. However, it did not mention anything about the number of illegal immigrants in Assam. Recently, the BJP-led Assam government informed the Assam Legislative Assembly on 13 February 2017 that 78,916 persons have been declared as illegal foreigners staying in Assam by a total of 100 foreigners’ tribunals. The Assembly was also informed that the tribunals were dealing with a total of 2,01,928 cases regarding illegal foreigners at that time. On the other hand, 1,420 persons have appealed at the Gauhati High Court against the judgement of the tribunals, and at present, Gauhati High Court is 134

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dealing with 935 such cases (Asomiya Pratidin, 14 February 2017). Notably, Assam has six detention camps at Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Silchar, Tezpur, Jorhat and Dibrugarh where the government gives shelter to those who are declared illegal immigrants by foreigners’ tribunals. The Government of India, to date, does not have an agreement with the Bangladesh government to deport anybody to that country even if she/he is proved a Bangladeshi citizen staying illegally in any part of India. On 31 July 2019, the final list of NRC in Assam was declared. The NRC 1951 was upgraded in Assam during 2016–19 to record the legal citizens of India living in Assam. The final list of NRC in Assam left out more than 19 lakh people. There was huge controversy regarding NRC after the final list was published. The issue of NRC is dealt with in Chapter 5. Both the central and Assam governments acknowledge that there are illegal immigrants in Assam. Both governments acknowledge that people are continuously entering Assam illegally from neighbouring countries. But surprisingly, no government at the centre or in Assam, even after the signing of the Assam Accord, has genuinely tried to stop the illegal immigration to Assam from neighbouring countries, mainly from Bangladesh. The question arises – why? Government policy on immigration The Assam Accord (1985) committed to sealing the Indo-Bangladesh border to prevent further immigration from neighbouring countries to Assam. The Union Home Ministry is the nodal ministry for the implementation of the Assam Accord. However, after the signing of the Accord, no government at the centre has paid sufficient attention to implement the twin main concerns of the Accord – the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners staying in Assam, and the sealing of the Indo-Bangladesh border. The successive central governments under Congress have not only wilfully neglected the illegal migration problem of Assam, they have also tried to maintain an environment in the state where illegal immigrants do not feel threatened. The IM(DT) Act, 1983, applicable only to Assam, fulfilled the interests of only the illegal immigrants staying in the state. Till the Supreme Court repealed the Act in 2005, no government at the centre came forward to withdraw it for two decades after the Assam Accord. Surprisingly, when the Supreme Court repealed the act, UPA government at the centre tried to bring back the same burden of proof clause of already repealed IM(DT) Act through the Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006. The BJP-led NDA government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee ruled India from 1998 to 2004. Vajpayee himself and the Deputy Prime Minister in his cabinet L.K. Advani were supporters of the Assam Movement, and they even campaigned in favour of the Movement nationally and Assam. However, the Vajpayee government also did not show sufficient interest to seal the India-Bangladesh border. His government even ignored the report submitted to the President of India by the then Governor of Assam, Lt. Gen. 135

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(Retd) S.K. Sinha, in 1998 on the problem of illegal migration in Assam. Again, before the 2014 Parliamentary election, the BJP promised to solve the illegal migration problem in Assam. But after coming to power at the centre, in 2016, the Narendra Modi-led central government instead tabled the Citizenship Amendment Bill in parliament, which wants to give citizenship to certain non-Muslim religious communities in India. Parliament passed this amendment in December 2019. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 sought to provide citizenship to persons belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian communities who have crossed over to India from neighbouring Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan till 31 December 2014. This amendment compels Assam to bear the burden of foreigners who entered Assam even after 24 March 1971. Despite strong public opinion against the act in Assam based on the argument that Assam has been facing a peculiar illegal immigration problem for what the state has a separate cut-off date from other states of India for the identification and deportation of illegal immigrants, the central government was not convinced to exempt the state from the jurisdiction of this legislation. This, to a great extent, explains the attitude of the BJP towards the illegal immigration problem of Assam. This shows how the BJP bears the same mindset of negligence like Congress towards the problem of illegal immigration to Assam. In recent times, against the almost indifferent attitude of the executive, the judiciary has shown deep concerns about the problem of continuous illegal immigration to Assam and its impact on the future of indigenous people of the state. The Supreme Court of India, in its judgement on the IM(DT) Act in 2005 (Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India & Anr), called the unabated influx of the Bangladeshis to Assam ‘external aggression’. The court remarked: this being the situation there can be no manner of doubt the state of Assam is facing ‘external aggression and internal disturbances’ on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals. (Para 38 of the judgment) In Para 22, the judgement reminded the union government of its foremost duty to its citizen as: the foremost duty of the Central Government is to defend the borders of the country, prevent any trespass and make the life of the citizens safe and secure. Again, in its judgement on NRC upgrading in Assam, in 2014, the Apex Court remarked: (41) we are at loss to understand why 67 years after independence the Eastern border is left porous. We have been reliably informed that the entire western border with Pakistan, being 3300 km. long, is not only 136

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properly fenced but properly manned as well and not porous at any point [Judgement on Writ Petition (civil) Nos. 562 of 2012, 274 of 2009 and 876 of 2014, dtd. 17 December, 2014] Only because of the serious concerns repeatedly shown by the judiciary, recently, the BJP-led central government, in principle, has decided to seal the entire Indo-Bangladesh border on a war footing. However, at the same time, the central government has brought about the CAA 2019 through which non-Muslims who have already illegally crossed over to India till 31 December 2014 will be granted Indian citizenship. Neglected India-Bangladesh border and illegal immigration On 2 June 2016, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared that the fencing work of the Assam-Bangladesh border would be completed within a year. He ordered the Border Security Force (BSF) to complete the halfdone work of the border fencing on a war footing within one year (Asomiya Pratidin, 3 June 2016). This was an order from the union Home Minister after 69 years of independence, and almost 31 years after the signing of the Assam Accord where the central government promised in Clause 9(1): ‘International border will be made secure against future infiltration by erecting of physical barriers such as walls, barbed fence and other obstacles at appropriate places…’ (Assam Accord, 1985). India shares a 4,056 km long international boundary with Bangladesh, of which Assam shares only 262 km. As per the provisions of the Assam Accord, in 1987, the Government of India decided to fence 857 km of the Indo-Bangladesh border, 507 km from West Bengal, 152 km from Assam and 198 km from Meghalaya (Deka 2010: 56). However, the fencing work only started in 1992, seven years after the Assam Accord was signed (Sinha Report 1998). Again in 2000, the central government decided to fence another 2,429 km Indo-Bangladesh border (West Bengal – 1021 km, Tripura – 736 km, Assam – 71 km, Meghalaya – 201 km and Mizoram – 400 km). The government decided to complete the border fencing work by 2007 (Deka 2010: 56). But most of the India-Bangladesh border remained porous till 2016, and because of low-quality work, a large part of damaged fencing had to be replaced. Again in 2016, the central government declared that the India-Bangladesh fencing work would be completed by 2017, 28 years after it was started. To date, however, there is no report on the completion of the work. India had shown an urgency to seal its international border with West Pakistan after independence. Still, it showed no interest to fence its border with the other part of Pakistan, East Pakistan. While the central government has recently decided to transform the existing fencing in the India-Pakistan border into smart fencing, the India-Bangladesh wall remains porous. There is a widespread belief that consecutive Congress-led central government 137

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neglected the fencing of the India-Bangladesh border to strengthen the Muslim vote bank in Assam, as Muslims in Assam are considered a vote bank of the party. However, it should be noted that the NDA governments under Atal Bihari Vajpayee from 1998 to 2004 and under Narendra Modi since 2014 have also not shown a different attitude to the Congress-led governments towards the border, although the BJP strongly opposes Muslim immigration from Bangladesh to Assam and promises to seal the border. In this situation, it is interesting to understand why both Congress and BJP assume the same mentality and follow the same principle of negligence towards the India-Bangladesh border. A secured border is a precondition for maintaining the sovereignty of a nation. However, the Indian state has always compromised the security of its border with East Pakistan/Bangladesh at the expense of the identity and existence of its citizens living in the states bordering Bangladesh. The central government under Prime Minister Nehru created the environment where people who migrated from East Pakistan were treated specially and were given settlement. Nehru had instructed Assam Premier Gopinath Bardoloi to accept the Hindus immigrated from East Pakistan after independence as refugees. Home Minister Sardar Patel was also in favour of giving refugee status to these Hindus. And after almost seven decades of Nehru and Patel wanting to settle Hindu East Pakistanis in Assam, the Modi-led central government brought CAA in 2019. Through the CAA, it seems, the Modi government wants to provide the last opportunity to Hindus living in Bangladesh to cross over to India and to get Indian citizenship before the Indo-Bangladesh border is finally sealed. During the period between Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister Modi, the central government has not shown any seriousness to seal and secure the India-Bangladesh border. This indicates a design from the Indian state about the illegal immigration to Assam from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh. It seems the central government has never taken the sealing of the India-Bangladesh border seriously only to provide a safe passage to Hindu Bangladeshis to India. And for that reason only, the illegal immigration problem in Assam has failed to attract due attention from the central government over the decades after independence. No doubt, Muslim Bangladeshis have also been illegally immigrating to India in huge numbers along with the Hindu Bangladeshis through the porous border. The consecutive governments at the centre and in Assam have remained almost indifferent to the effect of this continuous immigration on the indigenous population of Assam, as immigrant communities, both Hindus and Muslims, have emerged as a vote bank for the political parties they represent.

Politics of immigrant vote bank The anti-immigrant movement came to an end in Assam with the signing of the Assam Accord. But the politics of the immigrant vote bank in Assam did 138

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not come to an end with this. In the post-Assam Movement period, the immigrant vote bank politics of Congress was even followed by other political parties. Hiteswar Saikia, the Congress Chief Minister after the 1983 election, which was forcefully held by Indira Gandhi-led central government, tried to throttle the Assam Movement with force. Saikia, during the movement period, attempted to become the champion of the religious and linguistic minorities of the state who felt threatened by the movement. He became Chief Minister of Assam again in 1991. During the next five years of his tenure, he did not make any attempt to implement the Assam Accord. His government, against this, tried to safeguard the interests of illegal migrants staying in Assam through the IM(DT) Act. As has been highlighted, he stated in the state legislature on 10 April 1992 that there were 30 Lakh Bangladeshi migrants in Assam. The Assam Jamiat and AAMSU (Saamad fraction) strongly opposed this statement. A former member of AAMSU even threatened to topple the Congress-led government if Saikia did not withdraw his statement (Karim 2017: 245). In this situation, two days later, Saikia retracted his statement and declared that there were no illegal migrants in Assam. This showed how democratically elected governments in Assam become helpless before communal forces in issues related to the future of the state only for the sake of votes in elections. It also showed the dependency of Congress on the votes of the immigrant section of Muslims to win elections in Assam. The Congress Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi ruled Assam for three consecutive terms from 2001 to 16. He became the longest-serving Chief Minister of Assam. The IM(DT) Act, which became a significant hurdle in dealing with the foreigners’ problem in Assam, was repealed during the first tenure of Mr. Gogoi as Chief Minister. He remained Chief Minister of Assam for more than a decade after the Act was repealed. After the Assam Movement, he got the opportunity to activate the process of identification and deportation of illegal foreigners staying in Assam under the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the clauses of the Assam Accord. However, Gogoi did not show any inclination to rise above the vote bank politics of his party. He even asked for proof whenever he came across any estimates of illegal foreigners in Assam or when he was asked about the continuous illegal migration from Bangladesh. Even the AGP, which was formed by Assam Movement leaders, ignored the issue of illegal immigration when it was in power in the state. The party ruled Assam from 1985 to 90 and again from 1996 to 2001. Assam Movement leader, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, became the Chief Minister in both terms. During its first tenure, the government under Mahanta tried to deal with the immigration problem. But his government failed because of the existence of the IM(DT) Act. Moreover, the state government did not get any help from the central government in its attempt to address the problem. Again, the secessionist activities of the ULFA during this period compelled 139

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the AGP government to concentrate mainly on law and order. However, after the defeat in the 1991 Assam Assembly elections, the party realised the importance of the immigrant vote bank for electoral success in Assam. The party also realised that it would have to create a Muslim vote bank to remain in the politics of Assam as the party was not accepted by the Hindu Bengalis of Barak valley because of its indigenous outlook and its stand against communal division among the illegal migrants. As a result of this realisation, in the 1996 Assembly election, the AGP took the electoral support from Jamiat and aligned with UPPA. The UPPA was led by Abdul Muhim Majumdar, who was actively involved in the formulation of the controversial IM(DT) Act when he was the Advocate General of Assam and who had consistently refused all the estimates of illegal migrants from Bangladesh to Assam. Later, he was made a cabinet minister by Chief Minister Mahanta. This act of the AGP, which helped the party to penetrate into the immigrant Muslim dominant constituencies in both the valley and to create a support base among this section of Muslims, raised doubt on the sincerity and commitment of the party to solve the illegal foreigners’ problem in Assam. In Assam, in the post-Assam Movement period, Congress tried to appease both the Hindu and Muslim immigrant communities for electoral gains. Till 2005, the party used the IM(DT) Act as the instrument to appease both communities. Against this, the AGP has tried to win over the Muslim immigrant community by becoming soft on the issue of illegal immigration. However, after the emergence of the AIUDF in the politics of Assam, Muslim politics in the state has taken a new direction. As a reaction to the success of the AIUDF in the politics of Assam, the BJP gained ground in the state and formed government for the first time in 2016. After coming to power, the BJP has tried to create a Hindu immigrant vote bank by alienating them from Congress. In this attempt, the Assam BJP has consistently argued for CAA 2019 despite strong opposition to it in Assam. Through the CAA 2019, the BJP is trying to create a permanent Hindu immigrant vote bank in Assam, like Congress attempted to create a permanent immigrant vote bank through the IM(DT) Act. Against this backdrop, it can be said that the continuous illegal immigration, particularly from Bangladesh, to Assam is a consequence of indulgent negligence of the consecutive central governments right from independence, the vote bank politics of the political parties in power both at the centre and in Assam, and the communal concern of the secular Indian state towards Hindus living in East Pakistan and then Bangladesh.

Conclusion Because of the growth of the Muslim population in recent decades with the subsequent decline of the Hindu population, the Muslim community, particularly the immigrant section, has emerged as an immediate threat to 140

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non-Muslims in Assam. The emergence of AIUDF, which has shown continuous success in the last three consecutive Assembly elections, has aggravated this threat. The apprehension of being politically dominated at the hands of immigrants, mainly Muslims, gave birth to the Assam Movement in the late 1970s. After 40 years since the beginning of the Assam Movement, this apprehension is becoming a fear. And this fear is now being exploited by majoritarian politics, which is dividing the society and politics of Assam into communal lines. In recent years Assam has become a fertile playground of both minority communalism and majoritarian politics. In this situation, the social and political divides between the immigrant Muslims and indigenous Assamese are becoming sharper in Assam, particularly in Brahmaputra valley. The next chapter looks at these divides, which will also bring to light the complexities of the contemporary Muslim question in Assam.

Note 1 Percentage of Muslim and Hindu population in Assam in different censuses after independence: Muslim Population: 1951–24.68, 1961–25.26 1971–24.56, 1991–28.43, 2001–30.92, 2011–34.22. Hindu population: 1951–72.01, 1961–71.33 1971–72.51, 1991–67.13, 2001–64.89, 2011–61.46. Census was not held in Assam in 1981. (Census of India Reports)

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5 THE DIVIDES Electoral dominance, citizenship and the idea of ‘Assamese’

The fast demographic change in favour of Muslims and the communal political mobilisation among them after the Assam Movement has widened the psychological barrier between the indigenous Assamese people and the Muslims in Assam, which has created serious divides between the communities in the society and politics of Assam. Notably, these divides are emerging mainly between the indigenous Assamese and neo-Assamese Muslims of Brahmaputra valley. The Assamese Muslims, due to their close socio-cultural relation with the Hindu Assamese society, have not been viewed with suspicion by the indigenous Hindu Assamese society till now. Conversely, the number of immigrant Muslims living in Barak valley is comparatively less than the number of neo-Assamese Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley. Moreover, they are, most often, seen as a partner of neo-Assamese Muslims under the category of immigrant Muslims in political controversies. Again, the indigenous Muslims living in Barak valley are too small in number to emerge as a separate entity in these controversies. Notably, as shown in Chapter 2, the neo-Assamese Muslims determine the Muslim political equations in contemporary Assam due to their overwhelming majority over other Muslim groups living in the state. The fast growth of the Muslim population and their subsequent increasing influence over the electoral equation of Assam has created the context of the divide between the indigenous Assamese communities and the neoAssamese Muslims in contemporary Assam. While population growth and electoral dominance of immigrant Muslims have become a significant concern for the indigenous Assamese communities, the issue of citizenship has remained the biggest concern for immigrant Muslims in Assam in the postAssam Movement period. Issues like D voter, NRC upgradation etc. have made the question of citizenship of a large section of immigrant Muslims contentious during this period. Besides, the issues which have created a further divide between the communities in recent decades are: Assamese people under the clauses of the Assam Accord, and Assamese language. From the signing of the Assam Accord, the issue of ‘Assamese people’ has also remained a big concern among the neo-Assamese Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley. 142

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Rising population and electoral dominance Chapter 4 already highlighted how the fast growth of the population among the immigrant Muslims has been changing the demographic equations of Assam in favour of the Muslims. The growing numerical strength of the immigrant Muslims has contributed to the strengthening of suspicion of the indigenous Assamese community towards them. In any society, the increase in numerical growth of a minority group is considered as the increase of the bargaining power of the community. Regarding the growing numerical strength of the immigrant Muslims, Subir Bhaumik observes: Demographic change is usually followed by settler community’s demands for land rights, recognition of their language and claims to leadership. In Tripura, the migrant Bengali Hindus have completely taken over the state’s political and cultural leadership. In Assam, the immigrants, especially the Muslims of East Bengali origin, play a very decisive role in the state’s politics, essentially on the strength of the growing number of legislators from the community. In Indian-style ballot box democracy, numbers count and demographic change surely affects leadership patterns and the division of scarce resources among the competing communities. (2009: 62) The growing numerical strength of the neo-Assamese Muslims is emerging as a threat to the indigenous population of Assam for their future as they believe that their economic and political power will be taken away by Muslims. This growing threat is reflected in the writings of a reputed Assamese litterateur and reporter as: There has been a constant competition for winning the future of Assam. This competition is between the indigenous communities of Assam and the new Abhibhasi (neo-Assamese) Muslims. For several years I have been minutely observing the nature of this competition. At last, I have come to the conclusion that the neo-Assamese Muslims will win in this competition at last. (Borgohain 2013: 1) [Translated by author] The background of growing fear among the indigenous Assamese communities towards the immigrant Muslims is indicated here. This fear, in recent times, is also coupled with some communal statements from the immigrant Muslim leaders. In April 2013 a former AIUDF leader asserted that there were about 12 million Muslims in Assam, and no one could stop a Muslim leader from becoming Chief Minister of Assam after the 2016 Assembly election (Sharma 2016: 100). Such statements have aggravated 143

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the sense of fear among the indigenous Assamese to such an extent that, now, any political move of Muslim-based political parties like AIUDF or student organisations like AAMSU is viewed only with suspicion. The situation turned out to be such that during the Assam Assembly election campaign, if the AIUDF leaders claimed that their party would win the election and the party President Badruddin Ajmal would become the next Chief Minister of Assam, it would be considered a communal design. The immigrant section of Muslims is becoming more decisive in electoral equations in Assam because of their ever-increasing population. At present, no party can form a government in Assam if the community votes en-bloc against it. The community is becoming the kingmaker in the politics of Assam. Even in some constituencies reserved for SCs, Muslims are now the determining factor. It has been observed that in election after election, compared to other communities, the increase in the number of voters from this community in every constituency is much more. Assam has 126 Assembly constituencies. Out of these, eight constituencies are reserved for SCs, another 16 constituencies are reserved for STs and 102 constituencies are unreserved. Muslims are decisive in at least 31 constituencies of the 102 unreserved constituencies. Muslim voters are the overwhelming majority in at least 23 constituencies. These constituencies are: Karimganj South, Badarpur, Hailakandi, Algapur, Sonai, Mankachar, Salmara South, Dhubri, Gauripur, Bilasipara East, Abayapuri North, Goalpara West, Jaleswar, Barpeta, Jania, Baghbar, Sarukhetri, Chenga, Dalgaon, Lahorighat, Dhing, Rupahihat and Jamunamukh (Ahmed 2018: 34). In the other eight constituencies, although not the majority, Muslim voters are huge in number. These constituencies are: Karimganj North, Katlichera, Katigora, Golakganj, Bilasipara West, Goalpara East, Sarbhog and Samaguri. Muslim voters are very large in number even in three constituencies normally reserved for SCs. These are: Abhayapuri South, Bako and Raha (Nath 2015b: 144–53). All the aforementioned constituencies are from the lower and middle Assam of Brahmaputra valley and Barak valley. As Muslims constitute large voters in 34 of 126 Assembly constituencies in the state, the community can influence the results of almost 27 per cent of total constituencies, although the community consists of more than one-third of the total population of the state. In consecutive Assam Assembly elections during 1978–2016, barring the 1983 election, Muslims elected to Assam Assembly were between 24 and 28, not more than 27.45 per cent of total unreserved constituencies. In the 1983 Assembly election, which was boycotted by a large section of indigenous Assamese and several political parties, 33 Muslims were elected to the Assam Legislative Assembly.1 The continuous fast growth of population among the immigrant Muslims and their subsequent increasing domination over the electoral equations created the fear among the indigenous communities in Assam that the community would dominate the electoral equations of the state very soon. 144

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Citizenship On 30 November 2019, the Assam government informed the Assam Legislative Assembly that, at present, the state had 1,13,738 D voters. Moreover, it claimed that 1,58,554 people were fighting for their cases in Foreigners’ Tribunals to prove their Indian citizenship across Assam (The Assam Tribune, 11 December 2019). Concurrently, the central government, on 28 November 2019, informed the Upper House of parliament that there were 988 foreigners lodged in six detention centres in Assam (The Assam Tribune, 28 November 2019). Again, the final draft of NRC 2019 in Assam, which was an upgradation of NRC 1951 based on the citizenship date fixed by Assam Accord for Assam, left out 19 lakh people who applied for but could not enter their names in the NRC. These figures show how, unlike other states of India, citizenship is a big issue in Assam. All those, whether D voter or fighting cases in Foreigners’ Tribunals or left out from NRC, are mainly from recently immigrated Muslims and Hindus living in Assam. However, for our purposes, we are concentrating our discussion only on Muslims. Citizenship has remained the greatest concern for the immigrant Muslims in contemporary politics of Assam. The Assam Movement, for the first time, raised a question on the citizenships of those who immigrated to Assam from neighbouring countries after the NRC 1951 was documented. The Assam Accord, however, made everyone who immigrated to Assam from neighbouring countries till 24 March 1971 legal citizens of India. The Accord created a new category of citizens in Assam by shifting the chronological boundary of citizenship for Assam to 24 March 1971 from 26 January 1950, which was the constitutional deadline for the rest of the country. In November 1986, parliament amended the Citizenship Act, 1955, to insert Clause 6A, which incorporated the provision of the Assam Accord. The amendment made the provision that all persons of Indian origin who came to Assam before 1 January 1966 from a specified territory (meaning territories included in Bangladesh) and had been ordinarily a resident in Assam would be considered citizens of India from the date unless they chose not to be. It also added that persons of Indian origin from the specified territories who came on or after 1 January 1966 but before 25 March 1971 and had been resident in Assam since and had been detected as ‘foreigners’ in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964, upon registration would be considered citizens of India, from the date of expiry of a period of ten years from the date of detection as foreigners. In the interim period, they would enjoy all facilities, including Indian passports, but would not have the right to vote. All other persons who entered the state on or after 25 March 1971 would be identified as illegal migrants in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964 (The Citizenship Act, 1955). The Assam Accord made the issue of citizenship more complicated for the recent immigrant communities in Assam. It made a provision of

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disfranchisement for ten years for those who immigrated to Assam between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971. The disfranchisement provision created panic among the immigrant Muslims. The Muslim organisations from Assam, including Jamiat, strongly opposed this provision after the Accord was signed. However, over time, this issue lost relevance as everyone who immigrated during this period was granted citizenship. Furthermore, it also created a situation that Assam Jamiat, in 1994, accepted the Assam Accord. In the post-Assam Movement period, the first major citizenship issue faced by the immigrant Muslims was that of ‘D’ voter. D voter During the signing of the Assam Accord, it was decided to revise the electoral roll of Assam as per the clauses of the Accord. Accordingly, in 1987 during the first AGP government in Assam, a summary revision of the electoral roll of Assam was conducted based on 1985 rolls. In this revision, two lists were generated. The first was a list of voters whom the Election Commission did not feel the need for further inquiry. The second was a list of voters about whom the Commission had doubts regarding their eligibility. However, the voters from the second list also were not restricted from voting in future elections. In 1993, another revision of rolls was carried out by the Election Commission in Assam. This time too, two lists of voters were prepared. List I contained names verified to be Indians while List II contained names of those not considered Indians. The Commission allowed the publication of electoral rolls only in 86 Assembly constituencies and ordered a special revision of 40 constituencies in 1994. However, the process was suspended in April 1994 due to a special leave petition (No. 2484-85/94) filed in the Supreme Court challenging it. Finally, List II was published as supplementary draft rolls except for the names of persons declared or detected by Tribunals under IM(DT) and Foreigners’ Tribunals and those whose claims/objections had been disposed of by the Election Commission (Pisharoty 2019: 195–96). Receiving constant pressure from the AASU, the Election Commission in 1996 decided to conduct an intensive revision of electoral rolls of Assam with 1 January 1997 as the qualifying date and declared that house-to-house surveys would be conducted to include only Indian citizens on the roll. In this electoral revision, 3.7 lakh voters were identified to be Doubtful or D voters. In a letter dated 12 November 1997 to the Chief Electoral Officer, Assam, the Election Commission of India stated that 73,101 electorates had been set aside from the list of D voters and the remaining would be identified as D voters in the final list of electoral rolls. On 5 January 1998, the Election Commission debarred D voters from voting in the 1998 parliamentary election. Since then, they have been prohibited from casting their votes and also from contesting polls until they prove their citizenship at Foreigners’ Tribunals. After the Supreme Court repealed the IM(DT) Act, the Election Commission of India on 25 July 2005 made the provision that pending 146

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cases of citizenship under IM(DT) tribunals would now be dealt with by the tribunals under the provisions of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 (Election Commission of India Letters to the Chief Election Officer, Assam, Dated 12 November, 1997, and 25 July 2006). The provision of D voter emerged as a significant concern for the immigrant section of Muslims. Since the parliamentary election of 1998, the D voter became an election issue at the hands of Congress in Assam and repeatedly promised to solve the problem. When AIUDF was formed in 2005, D voter became one of the major issues for the party. The issue of D voter considerably helped AIUDF to penetrate the immigrant Muslims community of both Brahmaputra and Barak valleys. The failure of the Congress-led governments at the centre and in Assam to solve the D voter issue, despite the party’s promise in consecutive parliamentary and the 2001 Assam Assembly elections to solve it, helped AIUDF to exploit the issue. However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the Gauhati High Court, in 2011, upheld the right of the Election Commission to mark anyone as a Doubtful voter and even suggested that all those whose cases of citizenship were pending before the Foreigners’ Tribunal should be declared D voters. Since then, the issue of D voter lost political attraction to a great extent. The D voter has remained a concern among the immigrant Muslims since the provision came in 1998. A person lost his/her citizenship at once he/she becomes a D voter. Many D voters do not know why they have been declared Doubtful voters. There are many instances of D voters whose other family members are legal voters. Even sometimes, absentee voters in previous elections are marked as D in the electoral roll. In such circumstances, the immigrant Muslims started to believe that D voter is nothing more than a bureaucratic mishandling of the election officials. But the consequences of being a D voter are very troublesome. These voters have to prove their citizenship in Foreigners Tribunals, which is time-consuming and costly. The fear of being a D voter is one of the major reasons why the voting percentage among the immigrant Muslims in Assam elections has remained very high in comparison to the average voting percentage of entire Assam (Pisharoty 2019: 197–99). The provision of D voters has always remained an issue of contestation as there is no clear policy of identifying D voters. In this situation, going by some testimonials of the D voters, Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty remarks that, it won’t be wrong to deduce that, at best, an ad hoc procedure was instituted by a constitutional body that should have anyway sealed all loopholes to ensure that proper guidelines were put in place and followed too so that a genuine voter could cast his/her vote while a foreigner, obviously, couldn’t (ibid: 199). In 2015, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Gauhati High Court order of 2011, which debarred D voters from the right to vote till he/ she proves Indian citizenship in Foreigners Tribunals. With this, the political controversy regarding the D voter almost came to an end. However, the 147

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process of marking D voter by the Election Commission has continued. In the meantime, the issue of upgradation of NRC, 1951, in Assam started to emerge as a more serious issue concerning citizenship for the whole immigrant Muslim community. National Register of Citizens (NRC) When the Assam Accord was signed, it did not mention the upgradation of NRC 1951 in Assam. It was, in fact, a consequence of the Accord. The memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi on 2 February 1980 by the AASU became the basis of the Assam Movement. Even the Assam Accord starts with a referral to this memorandum. This memorandum included some recommendations also for addressing the illegal immigrant problems in Assam. Among such recommendations included in the memorandum, the first was: ‘The National Register of Citizens (NRC) of 1951 should be made up-to-date by taking into consideration the additions to the number of each family since the time of compilation of the Register’. When the Assam Accord fixed a new cut-off date for Assam, 24 March 1971, for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from the state, it became necessary to upgrade the NRC 1951 in Assam based on the new cut-off date fixed by the Assam Accord. The issue of the upgradation of NRC in Assam came into force in 2005, two decades after the Assam Accord was signed. In the 12th round of tripartite talk between the central government, the Assam government and the AASU on 5 May 2005 regarding the implementation of the Assam Accord, a decision was taken to upgrade the NRC 1951 in Assam. After that, the then Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi declared that the Assam Accord would be implemented and the NRC prepared in 1951 in Assam be updated to resolve all disputes over the foreigner issue. A separate directorate was established by the state government to update the NRC. However, it did not make any progress beyond the computation of available data, partly because the NRC 1951 for all the districts of Assam was not available with the state government (Kashyap 2007, 2015). In 2007, the Gogoi government set up a cabinet subcommittee to draw up the modalities, to finalise the procedures and structures of establishing the link of every person to the electoral roles of 1971, which could then be connected to the NRC of 1951. As per the provisions of Clause 18 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, the central government adopted the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003. Clause 3 of this Rule empowered the central government to prepare a National Register of Indian Citizens. Clause 4 of the Rule provides for the procedures of the preparation of the National Register of Indian Citizens. In 2009, the UPA-led central government amended the 2003 Rules and inserted a new Clause 4(A) exclusively for Assam. Clause 4(A) replaced house-to-house enumeration applicable in the 148

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rest of India as per Clause 4 and provided for Assam that applications from all citizens in the state would be invited and received (for upgradation of the National Register of Indian Citizens). The Assam government published the old 1951 NRC and prepared an application form. Muslim organisations from Assam, like Jamiat and AAMSU, opposed the process of the upgrading of the NRC 1951 on the basis that the copies of the 1951 NRC were not available in a few districts. They also demanded that the application form be simplified and house-tohouse enumeration be followed. However, the state government went forward and started the upgradation of NRC 1951 as a pilot project in 2010 in two revenue circles of Brahmaputra valley: Barpeta revenue circle of Barpeta district and Chaygaon revenue circle of Kamrup district. Although the upgrading of NRC was peacefully completed in Chaygaon, a violent protest in Barpeta under AAMSU on 21 July 2010, which claimed several lives, compelled the government to abandon the whole process of NRC upgradation (Talukdar 2019: 304). Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, which provides for a new deadline in Assam for the identification and deportation of illegal migrants, has been challenged in the Supreme Court by two sets of Public Interest Litigations (PIL). The first of these, brought before the Supreme Court by the Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha, Assam Public Works, and All Assam Ahom Association (in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2014) focused on the provision of Section 6A that granted Indian citizenship to those Bangladeshis who entered Assam between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971. The PIL raised anxiety over the dilution of the legal frameworks of citizenship, which, it argued, promoted indiscriminate influx and put at risk the security of Assam and its people. The second PIL filed by the non-governmental organisation Swajan and Bimalangshu Roy Foundation in 2012, which is still being heard, focused on that part of Section 6A, which treats all Bangladeshi migrants who entered Assam after 24 March 1971 as illegal migrants by the state. It lamented the clubbing of all migrants who entered India after 24 March 1971 as illegal, and asked that illegal migrants be distinguished from displaced persons (primarily Hindu and other minority groups fleeing persecution), who must be given the legal status of citizens (Kashyap 2015). In Sanmilita Mahasangha’s petition, even before the full judgement, on 17 December 2014, assuming the validity of the Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, the Supreme Court directed the government of India to start updating the NRC in Assam. It directed the state coordinator of NRC to complete the process of NRC updating within the framework of the Assam Accord by the beginning of 2016 [on Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 562 of 2012, 274 of 2009 and 876 of 2014, Dtd. 17 December 2014]. The entire process of preparation of the NRC was to be monitored by the Supreme Court. The rule of thumb for the identification of a citizen was to trace his or her history to an ancestor who had resided in Assam on or before the deadline of 24 March 149

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1971, by referring to what the NRC called and generated as ‘legacy data’. The data of the 1951 NRC and the electoral rolls published in Assam up to 24 March 1971 cumulatively comprised the legacy data. The NRC is not to identify illegal citizens living in Assam; it is only to record the names of the legal citizens of the state. In the process, those whose names are not included in the NRC will be considered illegal residents of the state. However, the non-inclusion of the name in the NRC does not mean that a person is not a legal citizen. Persons whose names are not included in the NRC can go to court for redressal. The upgrading of NRC in Assam created trepidation among both the Hindu and Muslim immigrant communities. The legacy data requires certain authentic documents until 24 March 1971. This has created problems for a section of people who do not have these documents. And the whole issue of NRC was made very sensitive by a section of political leaders, press and media, and leaders from the neo-Assamese Muslims, which created an impression among the common immigrant Muslims that NRC upgrading was meant only to test their citizenship. The process of NRC upgrading in Assam took more time than expected because of the complex procedure of legacy data verification. The final draft of NRC Assam was published on 31 August 2019. Out of 3,30,27,661 applicants, 19,06,657 could not enter their names in NRC (www.nrcassam. nic.in, 29 December 2019). Those excluded are given 120 days to go to the Foreigners Tribunals to prove their citizenship. For that matter, 200 new Foreigners Tribunals have been set up. However, both the central government and the Assam government have remained clueless about what to do with the people, among the excluded from the NRC, who cannot prove their citizenship in Foreigners Tribunals. The Assam Government has declared that special detention camps will be set up for those who will be declared illegal foreigners. And the future of these stateless people to be created by NRC has even become an international issue. Different human rights organisations raised the issue with the government of India. Even the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) expressed its concerns towards the future of the 19 Lakh stateless citizens made by the NRC upgrading in Assam in its 42nd Conference in September 2019. In response, on NRC exercise in Assam, India expressed before UNHRC that NRC was a statutory, transparent and non-discriminatory legal process mandated and monitored by the Supreme Court of India. It also expressed that any decision taken during its implementation will comply with Indian laws and will be in accordance with India’s democratic traditions (Amar Asom, 13 September 2019). The publication of the final draft of NRC created a huge controversy in Assam. The AASU termed the NRC faulty and demanded immediate rectification. It alleged that the NRC failed to include the names of many indigenous people, while including the names of many foreign national (The Assam Tribune, 15 September 2019). There is a widespread impression 150

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in Assam that there are at least 40 lakh illegal immigrants living in Assam. The basis of this impression is the statement of then Home Minister of India Indrajit Gupta in Parliament in 1997 that India had 10 million illegal immigrants. After this statement, India Today magazine, in its 10 August 1998 issue, quoting Home Ministry and Intelligence Bureau sources, estimated that Assam has at least 40 lakh illegal immigrants (p. 20). Even in the complete Draft (not the final Draft) of NRC published on 30 July 2018, more than 40 lakh people could not enter their names. When this figure came down to 19 lakh in the final draft, many started to view the NRC with suspicion. Since the announcement of the upgrading of NRC 1951 in Assam till the publication of the final draft, it remained the biggest concern among the immigrant Muslims of Assam. The NRC emerged as the most crucial occasion to prove their citizenship. And during the whole process of NRC upgrading, Muslim organisations like Jamiat, AIUDF and AAMSU have remained involved in every judicial process at the Supreme Court to safeguard the interests of the community. After the publication of the NRC, it has been observed that these Muslim organisations have least complained against it in comparison to organisations led by the indigenous Assamese. Even the national president of Jamiat, Mehmood Madani, appealed the upgrading of NRC 1951 in entire India like Assam, so that Indian Muslims can escape the allegation of being illegal immigrates (Amar Asom, 13 September 2019). Against this, BJP and its governments, both at the centre and in Assam, have been reluctant to accept the Supreme Court-monitored final draft of NRC. The Home Minister of India, Amit Shah, on 20 November 2019, declared in the Upper House of parliament that NRC 1951 would be upgraded in entire India and it would also be done in Assam (Asomiya Pratidin, 21 November 2019). The Home Minister also declared that NRC upgrading in entire India will be completed by 2024 (The Assam Tribune, 3 December 2019). The main opposition of the BJP to the final draft of NRC in Assam is that it has excluded more Hindus than Muslims. In rough estimates, of total 19 lakh left out from NRC, 11 lakh are Hindu Bengalis (Asomiya Pratidin, 21 November 2019). Against this backdrop, BJP-led central government has passed the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019 in both Houses of Parliament in the second week of December 2019, through which citizenship can be provided to non-Muslims excluded from NRC in Assam. After the citizenship amendment 2019 comes into force, only eight lakh Muslims would remain out of the NRC in Assam. And the governments at the centre and in Assam to date are not clear about what to be done with those excluded from NRC who cannot prove their citizenship in Foreigners Tribunals. Regarding this, in parliament, the central Home Minister has said that under the provisions of the Citizenship Act, the Assam Government is given the power to deport those who are declared as illegal foreigners by the Foreigners’ Tribunals (ibid). However, the question is how these illegal 151

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immigrants can be deported to Bangladesh, as India does not have any agreement with Bangladesh in this regard. As there is no provision of deportation to Bangladesh even if somebody is declared an illegal foreigner from Bangladesh by Foreigners’ Tribunals in Assam, the illegal foreigners declared by Foreigners’ Tribunals are kept in detention camps by spending public money. To date, the number kept in detention camps is either in the hundreds or a few thousand. But if lakh of people excluded from the NRC are declared illegal foreigners by Foreigners’ Tribunals, what then? Moreover, there are instances of many people who were excluded from NRC, but have been voting in elections held in Assam after 1971. They may fail to prove their citizenship even in Foreigners Tribunals. In that case, can the Government declare them illegal citizens, as they have already been given the right to vote, which is an exclusive right of legal citizens only? These issues do not have easy answers/solutions. This might be the cause that the BJP governments both at the centre and in Assam have started to dissociate from the Assam NRC and have started to talk about a nationwide NRC. If the final draft of NRC in Assam stands, it will, to a great extent, help the immigrant Muslims of Assam to escape the perennial fear of losing citizenship. It will also create an environment where they can no longer be branded illegal Bangladeshis. More importantly, it will bring an end to the vote politics in Assam in the name of illegal Bangladeshis.

Assamese people The question of indigeneity has always remained an issue in the sociopolitical discourse of Assam. During the colonial period, for the first time, the Line System established the crisis of existence and identity of the indigenous people of Assam from the new immigrants from East Bengal. After independence, the Assam Movement very strongly raised the crisis of identity and existence of the indigenous population of the state from the illegal immigrants entering the state after independence. In response to the threat of existence and identity of the indigenous Assamese communities from the recently immigrated people as raised by the Assam Movement, the Assam Accord provided for constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards to the Assamese people to protect their cultural, social and linguistic identity and heritage (Clause 6 of the Assam Accord). Although Clause 6 was the most valuable clause in the Accord for the protection of the interests of the indigenous population of Assam, some ethnic communities, particularly a few tribal groups, were not satisfied with the use of the word ‘Assamese People’ in the clause. They believed that the use of ‘Assamese People’ can mean only the Assamese speaking population of the state. They believed that ‘indigenous people of Assam’ should have been used instead of ‘Assamese People’ in this clause. Against this 152

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apprehension of the tribal people, the minority communities, mainly the immigrant Muslims and Bengali speaking Hindus, considered this clause as the threat to their survival in Assam. In response, these two communities came together against the Accord. They formed the UMFA, a political party, to safeguard the interests of minorities of Assam in the situation to be created by Assam Accord. The term ‘Assamese People’ in Clause 6 of the Assam Accord alienated a section of ethnic Assamese groups, particularly tribal, from the idea of the Assamese in the post-Accord period. In this regard, Baruah and Sharma (2019) comment that the confusion regarding the ‘Assamese People’ could have been avoided if the Government and also the AASU leaders had considered specific facts connected with interpreting the term ‘Assamese’ as used in the Accord. They further point out: The Assam Accord is an agreement with the leaders of the Assam Movement. Therefore, the term ‘Assamese people’ in the Assam Accord will have to be understood in the context of the movement. The supporters of the movement were the indigenous peoples of Assam and not only the Assamese language-speaking population, the ‘Asomiya’. All those communities, whose identities as distinct cultural communities were threatened by large scale immigration of people of non-indigenous cultures, participated in the movement. The movement came to be known as the anti-foreigner movement, yet, any attempt at assuring the grievances expressed by it cannot ignore the fact that it started as a movement against the ‘Bahiragata’ (outsiders). So these protections are to be given especially to the threatened ‘Assamese people’, meaning the indigenous communities. The term Assamese is often used to refer to the Assamese speaking people or the Asomiya. In the context of the Accord, it is a misnomer. (2019: 6) In order to get the benefits of Clause 6 of the Assam Accord, it was necessary to determine and define who the Assamese in the state are. However, to date, during the last three and a half decades after the Accord was signed, the government of Assam has failed to define ‘Assamese People’. The consecutive government in the state after the Assam Movement showed only utter negligence regarding the issue. Interestingly, Assam was ruled by AGP – the party formed by the leaders of the Assam Movement for ten years during this period. Although AASU has repeatedly demanded the definition of ‘Assamese People’, the consecutive Assam government has not done more than constituting different committees in this regard, but without any results. The speaker of the 13th Assam Legislative Assembly (2011–16), Pranab Gogoi, a Congressman, attempted to define ‘Assamese people’. In this attempt, he consulted a total of 57 student, literary and civil-society 153

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organisations; independent intellectuals, renowned personalities of the state. On 31 March 2015, in the floor of the House, the speaker recommended that the year 1951 be taken as the cut-off period and the NRC, 1951, be taken as the basis for the definition of the ‘Assamese People’ for reservation of seats and constitutional safeguards as required by the Assam Accord. He made it clear that Clause 6 of the Assam Accord sought to safeguard those indigenous people in the state who were on the verge of losing identity and existence for the changing demographic equations due to large-scale infiltration to the state. In any case, according to him, those cannot be the indigenous people of Assam who came to the state after the constitution of India was implemented. He also made it clear that for the constitutional safeguards under Clause 6 of the Assam Accord, the ‘Assamese People’ includes only the indigenous people of Assam (Gogoi 2015: 13–16). This definition of ‘Assamese People’ created a huge controversy in the politics of Assam. While political parties like AGP, BJP and BPF supported the view of the speaker in the House, the ruling Congress and opposition AIUDF strongly opposed it. Different student organisations, tribal literary organisations of Assam welcomed the definition. Still, the Congress-led government in the state was not ready to initiate any debate on the definition of the speaker, who was ironically from their own party. This definition was the first of this kind, which became the property of the Assam Legislative Assembly. And this definition, for the first time, made it clear that the immigrant population, including the neo-Assamese Muslims who immigrated to Assam during 1951–71, were not the indigenous people of Assam. Notably, the Supreme Court of India is still hearing the appeal by Asom Sanmilita Mahasangha against the amendment of the Citizenship Act, which provided a new cut-off date for foreigners in Assam as per the clauses of the Assam Accord. In December 2014, the court formed a bench of five judges to look into the matter. The AASU says that all people whose names, irrespective of caste, community or religion, were included in the 1951 NRC are Assamese and eligible to enjoy safeguards as promised by Clause 6 of the Assam Accord. It argues that in the Assam Accord, the state was compelled to bear the burden of both Hindus and Muslims who illegally migrated to Assam after independence till 1971 from the then East Pakistan. So, under no circumstances can people living in Assam who came to the state from neighbouring countries after 1951 be considered indigenous in Assam. AASU’s view is supported by the North East Students Organisation (NESO), the umbrella organisation of 26 different student unions of the entire Northeast region, including AASU. The organisations and political parties representing the neo-Assamese Muslims, however, strongly oppose the idea of the Assamese, which links its indigeneity with 1951 NRC. Instead of NRC 1951, these organisations argue that the Assamese language should be the basis of the definition of 154

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Assamese people. The AAMSU strongly opposes the position of AASU visà-vis the question of indigeneity. It said that AASU’s view on the ‘Assamese People’ was ‘irrational and confusing’. According to AAMSU, Indians who live in Assam and whose mother tongue is Assamese or any other languages of indigenous communities are Assamese (www.telegraphindia.com, 19 March 2015). The AAMSU’s view on ‘Assamese People’ also includes the portion of neo-Assamese Muslims in the indigenous people of the state who migrated to Assam during 1951–71. Its view is in line with the definition of ‘Assamese People’ by Asom Sahitya Sabha (ASS). At the beginning of 2015, the ASS had adopted a resolution to consider all those people as Assamese who, irrespective of community, language, religion and place of origin, accept the Assamese as their mother tongue or either their second or third language. It hoped that their stand would initiate broad, inclusive and modern thoughts in this regard. However, the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS), another literary organisation of the Bodo tribe of Assam, rejected the definition of ‘Assamese People’ suggested by the ASS. The BSS argued that the definition of ASS would also mean that the state would have to give safeguards to persons from countries like Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan also if they are willing to accept the Assamese as their first, second, or third language. The BSS has suggested that the word ‘Assamese People’ in Clause 6 of the Assam Accord be replaced by ‘indigenous people of Assam’ to protect the identities of indigenous people (www.telegraphindia. com, 11 March 2015). However, ULFA, the outlawed armed organisation of Assam who has been in confrontation with the Indian state over the demand for the sovereignty of Assam from Indian union since 1979, has been considering the neo-Assamese Muslims as an important component of Assamese nationality, not as a threat. The ULFA dismisses the Assam Movement as one based on populist sentiment and hails these people of Assam for producing plenty out of small areas of land (Misra 2014: 206). Regarding the use of the word ‘Assamese People’, the chairman of the organisation in an e-mail states: The ULFA is in the opinion that the word Assamese inevitably has now become a limited representative vehicle and the People of Assam deemed to be more meaningful instead. We realized that if continued use of the word Assamese to mean the whole population of Assam excludes even one indigenous group of the land, in the ULFA philosophy the word has outlived its usability. Hence we have decided to use People of Assam to represent bonafide inhabitants of Assam. However on the event of general consensus by the inhabitants the word Assamese is accepted without controversy we shall be more than happy to re-use it again. (www.timesofassam.com, 26 November 2012) 155

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After NRC 1951 was upgraded in Assam based on the cut-off date fixed by the Assam Accord, the impression grew among the neo-Assamese Muslims that the same cut-off date should be the basis of the definition of ‘Assamese People’ also, meaning all those who were residents of Assam on 24 March 1971 should be considered the indigenous people of the state. But the reality is that Clause 6 of the Assam Accord was a kind of compensatory justice to the indigenous people of Assam for bearing the burden of both Hindu and Muslim immigrants to Assam from East Pakistan till 24 March 1971. In the Accord, through this clause, the central government promised to safeguard the identity and existence of the indigenous people of Assam from those who immigrated to Assam from neighbouring counties till 24 March 1971 since NRC 1951 was documented. This clause itself, against this backdrop, considers the immigrants who entered Assam during this period between 1951 and 71 as the threat to the identity and existence of the indigenous Assamese people. Against this backdrop, if the 1951–71 immigrants are accepted as the ‘indigenous Assamese’ along with those who lived in Assam before 1951, then there was no need for Clause 6 in the Assam Accord. The Assam government, during the last three decades, failed to determine who qualifies for the safeguard against the threat of the immigrant people. Finally, in 2019, the central government formed a high-level committee under Justice (Retd) Biplab Sarma to suggest measures for the implementation of Clause 6 of the Assam Accord. The committee has officially sought opinions about the definition of indigenous tribals, indigenous Assamese, and other indigenous people of Assam. How the high-level committee defines the ‘Assamese People’ will be known only after the submission of its report.

Assamese language When it is the Assamese language vis-à-vis the Muslims, again, it is about the immigrant Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley who emerged as neoAssamese by identifying Assamese as their mother tongue in census enumerations after independence. Both indigenous and immigrant Muslims living in Barak valley are Bengali speakers. On the other hand, the indigenous Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley are Assamese speakers (although some groups from lower Assam speak Goalparia dialect of Assamese language). As has already been discussed, the entire immigrant Muslim population has been emerging as a threat to the indigenous Assamese communities due to their fast-growing population and subsequent growing dominance on electoral equations in Assam. Against this, the neo-Assamese Muslims have remained necessary for the Assamese people in Brahmaputra valley for the sake of the Assamese language. The Assamese language has remained the majority speaking language in Assam only because of the support of these 156

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Muslims. In Brahmaputra valley, an overwhelming portion of neo-Assamese Muslims have been identifying Assamese as their mother tongue in census enumerations. While the community’s counterparts living in Barak valley speak Bengali, a large section of the community in Brahmaputra valley has become bilingual, with Assamese as their official mother tongue and Bengali as the language used in interactions among them, and even a section of it speaks Assamese at home also. Since the immigrant Muslims became neo-Assamese in Brahmaputra valley, the community has remained a great support for the Assamese people to maintain the dominant status of their language. The Nagaon district can be taken as a case study in this regard with substantial immigrant Muslims and the Hindu Bengali population. In 1971, the Hindu and Muslim population of the district was 59.6 per cent and 39.2 per cent respectively, and the percentage of Assamese and Bengali speakers was 75.6 and 19.3, respectively. In 2001, Muslims became the majority in the district consisting of 51 per cent of the population, while Hindus consisted of 47.8 per cent of the population. In 2001, while 64.4 per cent of the population of the district identified themselves as Assamese speakers, 30.5 per cent of the population identified themselves as Bengali speakers (Census of India Reports). The contribution of neo-Assamese Muslims to the Assamese language is widely accepted by the Assamese society. Chandan Kumar Sharma remarks: A large section of the Muslim immigrants in the Brahmaputra valley have identified themselves as Assamese speakers in the successive censuses since 1951, which has helped Assamese retain its status as the majority language in Assam till date. Otherwise, in the event of the immigration of large linguistic groups from other parts of India and the tendency among several erstwhile ethnic groups in the state to identify themselves as the speakers of their own ethnic languages instead of Assamese in recent censuses, it would be almost impossible for Assamese to retain its majority-status in the state. (2016: 99–100) Since the days of the imposition of the Bengali language on Assam by the colonial administration, there has been a constant attempt by a section of Bengali intellectuals to prove the Assamese language as a dialect of the Bengali language. That created the antagonism between the Bengalis and the Assamese during colonial rule, and it continued even after independence. This antagonism even largely shaped Assam and Assamese politics in the decades immediately following independence (Misra 2014: 188). This antagonism was one of the reasons why Assam witnessed two language centric conflicts in 1960 and 1972. And on both the occasions, the immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley took the side of the Assamese language. The Assamese people accepted this support of the immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley to their language as a grand gesture from the 157

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community to the Assamese society and nationality. By accepting the Assamese language, the immigrant Muslims from Brahmaputra valley have become an integral component of Assamese nationality. The situation in Assam is becoming such that, now, the majority status of the Assamese language depends upon the neo-Assamese Muslims. This situation is also arising because several ethnic groups of Assam, in the postindependent period, have been leaving to identify the Assamese as their mother tongue. The Assamese is a language originating from mutual interactions among the Australoids, the Mongoloids and the Caucasoids communities of ancient Assam, which became a lingua-franca among people of all these communities. However, there was a constant attempt from a section of caste Hindu Assamese to establish it as a purely Aryan origin language by tracing its origin to the Sanskrit language. This section wants all the people of Assam, including the tribals who have their own languages, to speak Assamese and to accept Assamese as their mother tongue (Oja 2011: 174, 181–82, 199–200). This also has created animosity among different tribal groups towards the Assamese language in the postindependent period. After independence, the language movement paved the way for the neo-Assamese community to emerge as the saviour of the Assamese language. On the other hand, the decision of the Assam government to make Assamese the state language of Assam began to alienate the tribals of the state from the language. With the demand of ASS to make Assamese the state language of Assam, the All Party Hill Leaders’ Conference (APHLC) was formed in July 1960 by the leaders of hill tribes of then Assam. The APHLC opposed the idea of imposition of the Assamese language on the hill people and demanded a separate state for the hill people of Assam. Gradually, demand for separate hill states took momentum under APHLC, and hill people began to decline to identify the Assamese as their mother tongue. Again, the Plain Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), an organisation of plain tribals of the state formed in the latter part of the 1960s, termed the official status to the Assamese language an imposition on plain tribals. After the declaration of Assamese as the state language of Assam, the Assam government came under intense pressure from the Bodos, Dimasas, Mishings and other tribal groups of present Assam with demands for recognition of their respective languages as a medium of instruction in the primary and higher institutions of learning (Saikia 2011: 124). In 1960 itself, BSS, the literary organisation of Bodos, the largest plain tribe of Assam, started a mass movement demanding Bodo as the medium of instruction for the Bodo people. Later, Mishing, another plain tribe of Assam, demanded Mishing as the medium of instruction in primary and secondary education for Mishing people. Both tribal communities dissociated from the Assamese language and demanded Roman script for their respective languages (Nath 2013: 90–92). However, despite several tribal groups refusal to identify Assamese as their mother tongue after the Assamese was made the official 158

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language of Assam, in 1971, the percentage of Assamese speakers jumped from 57.14 in the 1961 census to 60.89 in the 1971 census. It became possible only because of the acceptance of the Assamese language by neoAssamese Muslims. A psychological barrier was created by the Assam Movement between the indigenous Assamese communities and the neo-Assamese Muslims. The Assamese-neo-Assamese Muslims bonhomie that started with the acceptance of the Assamese language by the immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley during the 1951 census began to wane since the beginning of the Assam Movement. After the Assam Movement, the immigrant Muslim community of Brahmaputra valley began to think differently about its relationship with and position in Assamese society. This situation prompted a section of the neo-Assamese Muslims to discard the Assamese language as their mother tongue in the 1991 census. In this regard, we can cite a public meeting organised by a section of the neo-Assamese Muslims. On the eve of the 1991 census, many of the immigrant Muslims who identified themselves with the Assamese society and language in the 1971 census, in a meeting at Hazi Musafirkhana at Guwahati, openly expressed the futility of their assimilative gestures and efforts towards consolidation of their Assamese identity. As a consequence, an insignificant minority of the neo-Assamese Muslims identified Bengali as their mother tongue in the 1991 census (Ahmed and Yasin 1997: 148). In the next census after the Assam Movement, held in 1991, the percentage of Assamese speakers declined to 57.81 per cent from 60.89 per cent in 1971. The decline of Assamese speakers during 1971–91 was around three per cent. Against this, interestingly, the speakers of the Bengali language increased by almost ten per cent during the period. This indicates that a large section of neo-Assamese Muslims left the Assamese language in the 1991 census and identified Bengali as their mother tongue. Since then, speakers of the Assamese language have been declining census after census against the subsequent rise of Bengali speakers in Assam.2 In four decades between 1971 and 2011, the percentage of Assamese speakers in Assam declined by more than 12 against the 18 per cent rise of Bengali speakers. Again in the post-Assam Movement period, during 1991–2011, Bengali speakers rose by more than eight per cent in Assam against more than ten per cent decline of Assamese speakers (based on Census of India Reports 1971, 1991, 2001, 2011). Regarding the decline of Assamese speakers in Assam in consecutive censuses, it can also not be ignored that a significant portion of the tribal population has even gone away from the language during the period after Assam witnessed the language movement in 1960. Some tribes left the Assamese language in the 1971 census after the Assamese was made the official language of Assam, and some others rejected by the 1991 census, after the medium of instruction movement in 1972 and the Assam Accord in 1985. Few tribal groups of Assam still recognise Assamese as their mother 159

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tongue. However, the tribal people, who have left the Assamese language during this period, have not recognised Bengali as their mother tongue. In this situation, it can be presumed that the decline of Assamese speakers and the consequent rise of Bengali speakers in Assam in recent decades is mainly due to the neo-Assamese Muslims. Nani Gopal Mahanta shows how the neo-Assamese Muslims have been increasingly siding with the Bengali language by leaving the Assamese language. The revenue circles selected for Table 5.1 are from Brahmaputra valley and overwhelmingly dominated by the neo-Assamese Muslims. However, it can also not be denied that along with the siding of neoAssamese Muslims with the Bengali language, the fast growth of the Hindu Bengali population in both Brahmaputra and Barak valleys of Assam in recent decades has also influenced the rapid growth of Bengali speakers in Assam. It is interesting to note that the neo-Assamese Muslims have been leaving the Assamese language in recent censuses although they deliberately accepted Assamese as their mother tongue after independence. This is happening as a result of an ongoing conspiracy, particularly in the postAssam Movement period, from a section of Muslim politicians in Assam to alienate the neo-Assamese Muslims from the Assamese language. During the post-Assam Movement period, the decline of Assamese speakers started to rise with the formation of the UMFA. The formation of UMFA in 1985, as shown in Chapter 4, can also be termed mobilisation of Bengalis, both Hindus, and Muslims, against the Assam Accord. The process of the formation of UMFA was led by CRPC, a Bengali organisation from Barak valley, and A.F. Golam Osmani, a Bengali Muslim from Silchar, Barak valley, played a crucial role to form the alliance between the immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis under UMF. However, Osmani made the lower Assam

Table 5.1  Decline of Assamese Speakers and Rise of Bengali Speakers (1991–2001) Revenue Circle (District)

No. of Assamese Speakers

No. of Bengali Speakers

1991

2001

1991

2001

Kalgachia (Barpeta) Baghbor (Barpeta) Dalgaon (Darrang)

68982

33790

55539

114345

133449

45022

111441

250091

173288

92923

115120

279120

Source: Mahanta, Nani Gopal. 2018. ‘Janasankhik Sitkalin’ aru Onagoto Praitahban’, Amar Asom, Guwahati, June 14, p. 5.

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of Brahmaputra valley his political constituency. In the 1985 Assam Assembly election, he contested from Jania constituency of Barpeta district in an UMFA ticket. He instantly established himself also as a religious leader of high esteem among the common Muslims in Brahmaputra valley through the help of a section of Baskandi Darul-Ulum Madrassa, Cachar educated Maulavis. He remained the most powerful leader of UMFA until he joined Congress in 1998. Even after entering Congress, he contested and won the parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004 from the Barpeta constituency. To increase his political influence over common neo-Assamese Muslims, he started a divisive politics in the name of language in lower Assam. On the eve of the 1991 and 2001 census enumerations, a section of Muslim political leaders under Osmani encouraged the neo-Assamese living in remote areas and chars of Brahmaputra valley to identify themselves as Bengali instead of Assamese and to record Bengali as their mother tongue in censuses instead of Assamese. Osmani even created huge controversy on Gamusa (a rectangular cloth, typically of red and white, used in a variety of ritual actions in Assamese culture) in politics of Assam. He appealed the neo-Assamese Muslims to use Bengali Gamusa instead of Assamese Gamusa (Hossain 2015: 354–56). As a consequence of such divisive politics, the 1991 census recorded a ten per cent rise of Bengali speakers compared to the previous 1971 census, and the 2001 census showed an almost six per cent rise of Bengali speakers compared to the 1991 census. After such divisive politics during the 1991 and 2001 census enumerations, on the eve of the 2011 census, a new controversy emerged in the politics of Assam in relation to the mother tongue of neo-Assamese Muslims. A Congress MLA from Jania constituency of Barpeta district, himself a neo-Assamese, claimed that he had identified Miya as the mother tongue in the census. He even proposed that Miya can be a common language of the entire immigrant Muslim community in Assam. Such a proposition created a big controversy during the census enumeration in 2011. Many argued that Miya is not a language but a dialect. However, the Miya language became an issue in immigrant Muslim dominated areas and a section of immigrant Muslims in Brahmaputra valley identified Miya as their mother tongue for the first time in the 2011 census (Nath 2015b: 282). Thus during the 2011 census, the neo-Assamese Muslims were divided into three categories concerning their mother tongue: Assamese, Bengali and Miya. The Miya language is not included among 22 scheduled and 99 non-scheduled languages in India. So, the number of people who identified Miya as their mother tongue was not available in the 2011 census records. However, from the controversy created during the 2011 census enumerations, it can be assumed that a significant number of people identified Miya as their mother tongue in this census. Notably, in Assam, as has been mentioned in Chapter 2, the entire immigrant Muslim community is loosely categorised as Miya. The immigrant Muslims in Assam also have different groups among them based on their ancestral place, and different sections among 161

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them speak different dialects. However, these dialects are not much different and now Miya is emerging as a common language among all these communities. The Miya language became an issue of great contestation in Assam again during the period of NRC upgradation in the state. In April 2016, Hafiz Ahmed, a neo-Assamese Muslim, wrote a poem in the Miya language which was posted on Facebook. The title of the poem was Likhi Lua Moi Miya (Write down I Am a Miya). The poem began with ‘Write down/I am a Miya/ NRC serial no. 200543…’. The poem became instantly popular on Facebook. Thereafter, many people started to write poems in the Miya language on Facebook. However, writing poetry in the Miya language began to emerge as a controversy in Assam, as most of these poems tried to establish the Assamese people as exploiters of the Miya people. Most of these poems were about the marginalised socio-economic conditions of the immigrant Muslim population in Assam and the hardship they were facing because of the upgradation of NRC. These poems, particularly written by Hafiz Ahmed, even became an instrument at the hands of a section of Indian and international media and human rights groups to project the process of NRC upgradation in Assam as a conspiracy against the immigrant section of Muslims in Assam to either deport them or make them stateless (Handique 2019: 15–30). However, amidst the controversy of the Miya language, a neo-Assamese researcher clarifies: There has always been allegations that the Muslims from Char-Chapori accepted Assamese in official records in the mid of the last century as a consequence of an undeclared social contract. At present, there is a need of more clarity. We are still officially accepting Assamese and will continuously do so. There is no doubt on that. Assam is our motherland and birthplace and we do not have any existence except Assam. Like other Assamese communities, Assamese is our language also. Like them, we also feel proud of using Assamese language and try to give something to the language in return. However, the reality is that we use our dialect (Miya) at home and while speaking with friends and relatives. But this is not opposite to our allegiance towards Assamese language. It will remain the same till we succeed to spread Assamese language with the spread of education and establish Assamese as the first language of neo-Assamese people….. (Hussain 2018: 312) [Translated by author] The controversy of Miya poetry became marginalised with such clarifications from a section of neo-Assamese writers and with the progress of the NRC work. But this controversy established the Miya language as an issue in Assam to be reckoned with in the future. To express one’s own opinion in their language can never be an act of condemnation. However, when such expressions are against a section of 162

THE DIVIDES

people from the same society, it creates suspicion among those against whom such expressions are made. Nobody can deny the marginalised socioeconomic conditions of the overwhelming majority of the immigrant Muslim population in Assam. These poems, written in the Miya language, which were mainly against the Assamese people, could have been written in the Assamese language also, as most of these people, including Hafiz Ahmed, are well versed in the Assamese. However, these poets used the Miya language as a medium of protest against the Assamese people and the NRC process. This even prompted a BJP central minister from Assam to comment that the neo-Assamese Muslims have started to form a new identity for themselves through the Miya language (Gohain 2018a: 4). There has always been a suspicion among a section of the indigenous Assamese towards the neo-Assamese Muslims that their acceptance of the Assamese as their mother tongue after independence was a temporary strategy of an immigrant community to avoid any conflict with the local communities. This section, with the decline of Assamese speakers in consecutive censuses, now started to believe that the neo-Assamese Muslims have been leaving the Assamese language as they no longer need any protection from the local indigenous people. By now, they have become sizeable in number, so much so that they can even influence the electoral equations in the state to a large extent. In the post-Assam Movement period, the language of the neo-Assamese Muslims has become a politics tool at the hands of a section of Muslim politicians. This politics of language has, in turn, created a situation of distrust between the indigenous communities and the neo-Assamese Muslims in Brahmaputra valley. The political class from the neo-Assamese Muslims has realised the importance of their community concerning the majority status of the Assamese language in Assam. So, they have started to use the language as a political bargaining tool in the Assamese dominated politics of Assam. However, it can also not be denied that the growing alienation of the neo-Assamese Muslims from the Assamese language in the post-Assam Movement period is a consequence of the Assam Movement and the derogatory comments and insults meted out to the community by a section of so-called mainstream Assamese politicians and a few leaders of students’ organisations. We have already mentioned the meeting at Hazi Musafirkhana on the eve of the 1991 census. This meeting clearly showed how the Assam Movement brought about, for the first time after independence, a psychological barrier between the indigenous Assamese communities and the neo-Assamese Muslims. And this barrier created by the Assam Movement has been widened in the last three decades after the Assam Movement by a section of indigenous Assamese political leaders and non-political students’ leaders. This section of leaders sometimes labels the whole neo-Assamese Muslim community ‘Bangladeshis’. As a political party, like other political parties, AIUDF had also claimed during the campaign for the 2011 and 2016 Assam Assembly elections that it would 163

THE DIVIDES

form government in Assam after the election. However, such electoral claim and strategy of AIUDF were countered by a section of Assamese political and non-political leaders that Bangladeshi would soon become the Chief Minister of Assam. Such politics of abuse from a section of so-called mainstream Assamese political and non-political leaders towards the neo-Assamese community has contributed, in the post-Assam Movement period, significantly to alienate a section of the neo-Assamese Muslims from the Assamese language. The indigenous Assamese people, since independence, have always expected the neo-Assamese Muslims to identify the Assamese as their mother tongue in census enumerations. The neo-Assamese Muslims have always tried to assimilate with the Assamese language and culture. However, it seems a section of the Assamese wants only one-way assimilation from the neo-Assamese Muslims. This section deliberately ignores the fact that assimilation cannot be a one-way process. During census, this section expects that the neo-Assamese Muslims identify Assamese as their mother tongue. However, after the census, this section, most often, tries to project the neoAssamese Muslims as the enemy of Assamese people. Such mentality of a section of Assamese people and political and non-political leaders is alienating the neo-Assamese Muslims from the Assamese language.

Conclusion The indigenous Assamese people have started to regard the entire immigrant Muslim community as a future threat and to view every political move of the community with suspicion. But the neo-Assamese Muslims have become indispensable for them to maintain the majority status of the Assamese language in Assam. The neo-Assamese Muslims, in recent decades, have contributed significantly to the Assamese literature and culture. While mainstream Assamese people increasingly distancing themselves from reading Assamese literature, readers of Assamese literature are increasing among neo-Assamese Muslims. While Assamese people in large numbers have started to send their children to English-medium schools, a significant number of Assamese-medium schools are surviving mainly because of the neo-Assamese Muslims, particularly in the districts inhabited by them. Several prominent Assamese litterateurs are emerging from among the community. The neo-Assamese Muslims have always tried to convince the indigenous Assamese people that they are not a threat to Assamese society as they are also a part of the broader Assamese identity. However, the decline of Assamese speakers in subsequent censuses after the Assam Movement, the recent issue of the Miya language etc. have created the impression that the neo-Assamese are alienating themselves from Assamese identity. The concluding chapter examines whether a new identity, separate from Assamese identity, is emerging among the neo-Assamese Muslims. It also 164

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addresses the possibility of the emergence of a cohesive Muslim identity between the Assamese Muslims and neo-Assamese Muslims in Brahmaputra valley, against the backdrop of the strengthening of majoritarian politics under BJP in Assam.

Notes 1 Number of Muslims elected in Assam Assembly elections: 1951–15, 1957–15, 1962–14, 1967–20, 1972–21, 1978–28, 1983–33, 1985–25, 1991–24, 1996– 27, 2001–26, 2006–25, 2011–28, 2016–28. (Source: Election Commission of India Reports) 2 Assamese and Bengali speakers in Assam (in percentage): Assamese Speakers: 1951–56.29, 1961–57.14, 1971–60.89, 1991–57.81, 2001–48.80, 2011–48.38 Bengali Speakers: 1951–21.2, 1961–18.5, 1971–11.7, 1991–21.7, 2001– 27.5, 2011–29.91. (Source: Census of India, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1991, 2001, 2011)

165

CONCLUSION The question of identity among the Assam Muslims

The Muslims of Assam, although a large community with significant political clout, have largely remained socio-economically backward. This book has shown the journey of the community in the politics of Assam. From the discussions in the previous chapters, we can come to a few conclusions in this regard. First, under British colonialism, the divide and rule politics of the colonial administration and communal politics of the consecutive Muslim League provincial governments, for the first time, made Muslims an issue of political contestation in Assam. Second, after independence, the controversy of continuous Muslim immigration from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh into Assam and the issue of the fast growth of the population among them have made the Muslim community the most sensitive political issue in Assam. Third, the fast growth among Muslims in the state in recent decades has become the main cause of concern for the non-Muslims of the state. The underdeveloped socio-economic condition among the immigrant section of Muslims has contributed heavily to the fast growth of the Muslim population in Assam. Fourth, the continuous illegal immigration of Muslims to Assam has remained integral to the Muslim question in Assam since the beginning of the Assam Movement. The consecutive central and Assam governments are responsible for the situation, as no genuine effort was made to secure India’s international border with East Pakistan and then Bangladesh. The communal considerations and vote bank politics of the political parties in power have worsened the situation. Fifth, the Assam Movement created an everlasting distrust between the indigenous Assamese communities and Muslims. The movement raised a genuine issue of threat to the existence and identity of indigenous Assamese communities from the unabated illegal immigration to the state. But its anti-Muslim tone significantly affected the social and psychological relations of the indigenous Assamese communities with Muslims. Sixth, the Assam Movement started a process of ‘othering’ of Muslims in the society and politics of Assam. The fast growth of the population of the community with consequent increasing dominance over electoral equations of the state has strengthened the ‘othering’ in the post-Assam Movement period. Seventh, the labelling of the entire Muslim community as the vote bank of the 166

CONCLUSION

Congress party is not justified, as the community has never behaved as an exclusive Congress vote bloc in Assam Assembly elections, except in 1983 when the election was held in an extraordinary situation amidst the Assam Movement. Rather, the community, during the period after independence, has remained largely divided in electoral politics of the state. Eighth, the community did not become a communal bloc under AIUDF after it was formed. An overwhelming majority of Muslims showed secular electoral behaviour even after the Assam Movement. The influence of the Jamiat over Muslim voters has also remained marginal. Ninth, the communal political mobilisation of Muslims by the Assam Jamiat through the AIUDF in recent times has ushered in religious polarisation to the politics and society of Assam. The existence and success of the AIUDF have paved the way for Hindutva political forces like BJP to grow in Assam. In recent years, Assam has become a playground between the Muslim minority politics of the AIUDF and the majoritarian politics of the BJP. Tenth, because of the controversy surrounding the continuous illegal immigration to Assam, the citizenship of a large section of immigrant Muslims has always remained under suspicion. Finally, the long-term exclusion of the community from the process of development and the continuous labelling of the community as ‘Bangladeshi’ by a section of political and non-political leaders has brought about a sense of alienation to the neo-Assamese Muslim community from the idea of Assamese. This sense of alienation has created the background of the question of a separate identity consciousness among the Assam Muslims. This book has highlighted that during the post-independence period while the fast growth of Muslims has become the main dividing line between the Muslims and non-Muslims of the state, this has also made the issue of citizenship complex in Assam for a large section of Muslims. It argues that the recently concluded upgrading of NRC 1951 in Assam, if it stands, can help the entire immigrant Muslim community to come out from the perennial controversy of citizenship. However, for that, the population growth among the immigrant Muslim community must also be stabilised. In this regard, the government and the immigrant Muslim community should consider the aspect seriously and act accordingly. If population growth among the community is not addressed, it is inevitable that the entire Muslim question in Assam will become more complicated going forward. When the separate identity consciousness among the Muslims in Assam is talked about, it is about the Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley and an identity separate from the Assamese identity. Barak valley does not align with the idea of Assamese. The Assam Movement, for the first time after independence, started a process of ‘othering’ the Muslim community from the idea of Assamese. This brought about a sense of isolation to the entire Muslim community. It should be noted that, among the Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley, the neo-Assamese Muslims in particular became the 167

CONCLUSION

target of the Assam Movement and as a result, the sense of alienation became stronger among them than the Assamese Muslims. However, after the Assam Movement came to an end with 1971 as the base year for the identification and deportation of illegal foreigners from Assam, the neoAssamese Muslims started to realise their importance in the society and politics of Assam because of their numbers. The success of UMFA in Brahmaputra valley in the 1985 Assembly election visibly proved the strength of the neo-Assamese Muslim votes in Assam. On the other hand, the Assamese speakers grew in Assam in the consecutive 1961 and 1971 censuses only because of their support. After such realisation, a section of the neo-Assamese Muslims dissociated from the Assamese language in the 1991 census as counter to the process of ‘othering’ started by the Assam Movement. This dissociation from the Assamese language caused controversy regarding the origin of a new identity among the neo-Assamese Muslims. Interestingly, when the question of a new identity consciousness among the neo-Assamese Muslims started to surface, the Assamese Muslims began to blame them for a crisis of identity among the Assamese Muslims.

Identity consciousness among neo-Assamese Muslims During the last seven decades after independence, Assam saw the formation of identity consciousness among different ethnic groups, who had started to assert their identity separate from Assamese identity in the society and politics of the state. Such identity formations even led to the creation of new states separate from Assam like Meghalaya and Mizoram. In the postAssam Movement period, ethnic identity consciousness among a few tribes led to the formation of autonomous councils under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution for tribes like Bodos. The politics of identity became an instrument of political bargaining in Assam during this period. However, the Muslims in Assam had never talked about any separate identity for them. The Muslims living in Brahmaputra valley have tried to assimilate with the Assamese society and culture and have never argued for any identity separate from Assamese identity. On the other hand, the Muslims living in Barak valley have been identifying themselves as Bengali. It indicates that Muslims in Assam had never tried to establish their community identity as Muslims, unlike different ethnic groups. Despite this, a tendency has grown among the neo-Assamese Muslims to abandon the Assamese language and identity they once wilfully embraced. This started with the 1991 census which showed a sharp decline of Assamese speakers. This book has shown that the decline was mainly due to a refusal to recognise the Assamese language as the mother tongue by a section of the neo-Assamese Muslims. Assamese speakers further declined in the 2001 census. The percentage of Assamese speakers remained almost the same from 2001 in the 2011 census, but the new issue of the Miya language came into prominence during the census enumerations. During the upgrading of 168

CONCLUSION

NRC 1951 in Assam, a section of neo-Assamese Muslim poets used the Miya language to express their subordinated condition in Assam in poetic form, an insinuation that Assamese people were responsible for their subordination. These developments have given the impression that the neoAssam Muslims no longer wish to associate with the Assamese language and are trying to create a new identity for themselves.

Crisis of identity among the Assamese Muslims The Assamese Muslims enjoy a privileged position in the social and cultural lives of Assam. However, the community is constantly ignored in the politics of the state. The Assamese Muslim populations do not form the majority of voters in any Assembly constituency, as they do not live in contiguous areas. On the other hand, immigrant Muslims are decisive in more than 30 constituencies in middle and lower Assam of Brahmaputra valley and in Barak valley. In Assam, while immigrant Muslims are becoming increasingly important for political parties due to the fast growth of their population and the consequent fast rise of voters, the indigenous Muslims are losing their importance as a minority community. The indigenous Muslims have started to believe that the immigrant Muslims have deprived them of the government-provided benefits. There are allegations that several central government schemes for minority welfare, tenure of which ended in 2012, were mainly implemented in lower and middle Assam districts of Brahmaputra valley and Barak valley districts, where mainly immigrant Muslims live in contiguous areas. The indigenous Muslims living in upper Assam districts have remained excluded from these schemes (Hazarika 2016: 79). The consecutive governments in Assam have always tried to provide maximum facilities to the immigrant Muslims to satisfy them as they are large in number, live in contiguous areas, are a determining factor in many Assembly constituencies and are easier to manipulate during elections. During the whole process, the needs and concerns of the indigenous Muslims have always been ignored and neglected. In Brahmaputra valley, the political and economic marginalisation of the Assamese Muslims at the hands of their neo-Assamese religious counterpart has made the community resemble a ‘minority within minority’. An impression is growing among the Assamese Muslims that even the privileged position the community enjoyed in the Assamese society has now started to erode because of the neo-Assamese Muslims. This is because the very existence of a section of neo-Assamese Muslims in Assam has always remained controversial. The continuous Muslim immigration from Bangladesh to Assam and the high growth of the population among the neo-Assamese Muslims have kept the community under suspicion. That suspicion towards the neo-Assamese Muslims has now started to spread to Assamese Muslims. 169

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However, a section of intellectuals from the neo-Assamese Muslim community claims that their community is not responsible for the sociopolitical marginalisation, if any, of the Assamese Muslims. If the Assamese Muslims are not getting what they deserve in the society and politics of Assam, the Hindu Assamese society is responsible for that, not the neoAssamese Muslims. Rejaul Karim points out: The idea of indigenous Muslims being exploited and politically discriminated is not true. The fact is that the indigenous Muslims from upper Assam are not getting the opportunity to represent in assemblies and governments. And for that, the Muslims living in char and remote areas cannot be held responsible. These chars and remote areas, where mainly the immigrant Muslims live, were completely abandoned at a time by the indigenous people, and these areas by now have become assembly constituencies. Elected representatives of these areas have never exploited the indigenous Muslims of the state. The Muslims of upper Assam have not asked for political representation until recent times. They have been enjoying the political rights with non-Muslim indigenous counterparts which is an example of deeprooted assimilation. If the indigenous Muslims now ask for separate political representation, then, it will ignore the present status of assimilation. This will also mean that the Muslims of upper Assam are neglected and exploited by their non-Muslim representatives. It will again mean that one-sided assimilation cannot be permanent. If there is a capable Muslim leader, both Muslim and non-Muslims should try for his/her candidature and should try for his/her win, which is not happening. (2007: 118) [Translated by author] It is pertinent to note here that while the Assamese Muslims consider their neo-Assamese Muslim counterparts as the cause of their socio-political marginalisation, the neo-Assamese Muslims also have some serious allegations against them. The neo-Assamese Muslims allege that the Assamese Muslims have never considered the neo-Assamese Muslims to be equal to their position and status in the society. They allege that the Assamese Muslims have never come forward to help them to assimilate with the Assamese society and culture. The Assamese Muslims have a cordial relationship with the Assamese Hindu society based upon which they could have played an active and positive role in the process of assimilation of the neo-Assamese Muslims with the Assamese society. If it had been done by the Assamese Muslims, they believe, the existing psychological barrier between the Assamese people and the neo-Assamese Muslims would not have appeared. Moreover, the neo-Assamese Muslims feel that the Assamese Muslims have always remained a silent spectator in their crisis. In support of this allegation, they talk about the days of the Assam Movement during 170

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which the neo-Assamese Muslims were branded ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ and unprecedented psychological torture was meted out to the community. The Assamese Muslims, they allege, did not come forward to stand by their religious counterparts, and an overwhelming majority of Assamese Muslims supported and joined the movement (Nath 2015b: 291–94). It must be noted here that the Assamese Muslims are culturally and linguistically Assamese. In that situation, their behaviour does not reflect anything except the behaviour of other ethnic Assamese communities. In the post-Assam Movement period, all the ethnic groups of Assam – including the Assamese Muslims – have felt increasingly politically marginalised by the fast-growing population strength of the immigrant Muslims. For the Assamese Muslims, this feeling of marginalisation is becoming more acute due to the growing impression among them of being increasingly deprived of government opportunities as religious minorities in the state because of the neo-Assamese Muslims. Despite the psychological barriers and allegations and counter-allegations between the Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslims, the question of a cohesive Muslim identity between the communities in Brahmaputra valley has begun to emerge as a possibility in recent times. The rise of BJP as a counter to the Muslim communalism of AIUDF and the strategy of the BJPled Assam government to unite Hindus of the state by alienating Muslims are creating the context of this possibility.

Context of a cohesive Muslim identity A section of the neo-Assamese Muslims has tried to dissociate from the Assamese identity in the post-Assam Movement period. However, this attempt has succeeded only on a limited scale as an overwhelming majority of them have decided to remain with the Assamese language to date. On the other hand, the recent advocacy for the Miya language has also not been subscribed to by most of the common people and leaders from the community. In that situation, a separate linguistic identity for the neo-Assamese Muslims has not emerged as a strong possibility. On the other hand, language cannot become a unifying force between the Assamese and the neoAssamese Muslims to assert a separate identity from Assamese. It is because the Assamese Muslims, living in Brahmaputra valley, are not familiar with either Bengali or the Miya language. Nonetheless, the Assam Movement and the politics in the post-Assam Movement period have created a context for the emergence of a united identity in Assam between the Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslims. Noted social scientist Udayan Misra records: With more and more immigrant Muslims joining the Assamese mainstream, the social divide between the indigenous Assamese Muslim and the one-time Bengali immigrant Muslim is bound to become thinner 171

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and thinner and a more numerous and more cohesive Muslim identity will inevitably emerge. (1999: 112–13) Misra argues that the Assam Movement not only distanced the neoAssamese Muslims from the Assamese society, but it also brought a sense of alienation and insecurity to the indigenous Assamese Muslims too for the first time in the state’s post-independence history (ibid: 111). It is clear from the preceding discussion that if a cohesive Muslim identity between the Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslims is to emerge, then, it cannot be based on language. In that situation, religion can come into view as the basis of this united identity. The formation of AIUDF and its continued success in the politics of Assam is creating the environment for a cohesive Muslim identity in Assam. As discussed in Chapter 4, the AIUDF is primarily a political mobilisation of the neo-Assamese Muslims. In the last one and a half decades, it could not influence the Assamese Muslims from upper and middle Assam. But the majoritarian response of BJP to alienate the entire Muslim community of Assam in the name of AIUDF could create a situation where both the Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslims can come together as ‘Muslims’. If it becomes a reality, it will be primarily a political move which will ultimately lead to the formation of a cohesive Muslim identity. The question is, will such a united political move be a possibility? The question is relevant because of both the communities’ longstanding allegations and counter-allegations against each other. It might become a reality because, despite allegations of the Assamese Muslims of being politically marginalised by their neo-Assamese counterparts, we notice a political alliance between the Assamese and the neoAssamese Muslims in the post-independence history. The neo-Assamese Muslims have always helped the Assamese Muslims politically. A suitable example of such collaboration is the case of Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed and Syeda Anwara Taimur. While the former was a prominent Muslim leader and minister of Assam who became the President of India (1974–77), the only President from entire Northeast till date, the latter became the Chief Minister of Assam (1980–81), the only Muslim and woman Chief Minister of Assam as of today. Both were Assamese Muslims. However, both had contested Assembly elections from neo-Assamese Muslims dominated constituencies. Fakharuddin Ali Ahmed from Golaghat district contested from Jania constituency of Barpeta district, a predominantly neo-Assamese Muslim dominated constituency. Syeda Anwara Taimur, from Jorhat district, contested Assembly elections from Dalgaon constituency of the Mangaldoi district, where the neo-Assamese Muslims play a decisive role in elections. The neo-Assamese Muslims helped and supported these indigenous Muslim politicians in elections to win (Nath 2015b: 291–92). However, in contrast, the Assamese Muslims did not align with the AIUDF in the recent elections. 172

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Now, let us turn to the present dominant political narrative in Assam visà-vis the Muslims which is about to create a background to unite both the Assamese and the neo-Assamese Muslim communities in the name of religion despite their existing socio-cultural differences. It can be said without any doubt that the BJP’s electoral success in Assam in the 2014 parliamentary and 2016 Assam Assembly elections to a great extent was the consequence of the growth and success of Muslim communal politics under the AIUDF, although anti-incumbency against the existing Congress governments, in both occasions, also played a vital role in BJP’s victory. The popularity and electoral success of AIUDF have created a platform for BJP in Assam to grow and succeed. In the 2011 Assam Assembly elections, the AIUDF won 18 constituencies and became the main opposition party in the Assam legislature. This created a fear among the Hindu Assamese of Brahmaputra valley and the Hindu Bengalis of Barak valley that the state would be ruled by a Muslim party sooner rather than later. The BJP tried to capitalise on this fear. A campaign started by different organs of the Sangh Parivar that Assam would be ruled by the Muslims if Hindus are not united. The success of Muslim communalism under AIUDF was a reaction against the long-term exclusion of the community from the process of development, the vote bank and appeasement politics of Congress-led consecutive state governments, continuous branding of the community as ‘Bangladeshi’ by few indigenous Assamese students’ organisations and political parties, politics to keep the community always under the ‘security threat’, and the growth of BJP nationally and its increasing influence in Assam, particularly in Barak valley. And, the Hindutva politics gained ground in Assam as a reaction to Muslim communal politics under AIUDF. From its origin in 2005 until the 2011 Assam Assembly election, Congress Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi played a soft Hindutva politics against the AIUDF by repeatedly questioning the identity of party chief Badruddin Ajmal in public meetings. However, after the 2011 election, the soft Hindutva of Tarun Gogoi was taken over by the hard Hindutva of BJP. And now, after forming its first government in Assam, the BJP wants AIUDF to survive in the politics of Assam so that it can continue its electoral success in the state in the future too. Muslims constitute more than one-third of the total population of Assam. BJP realises that, in such a demographic equation, only Muslim communalism can help it in the future to return to power through the consolidation of the Hindu votes against the Muslims. In the 2016 Assembly election, the BJP-led coalition proved that elections could be won in Assam even without the support of the Muslims. This was the most important message of this election to the Muslims in Assam. Moreover, in the post-independence period, the BJP-led Assam government formed in 2016 is the only government without a Muslim representation. From its formation, the BJP-led government in Assam has been trying to alienate the entire Muslim population of Assam. The purpose of this is to keep Muslim communalism alive and strengthen it. Within one year of its 173

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formation, the government celebrated ‘Namami Brahmaputra’ festival from 31 March 2017 to 4 April 2017 to glorify the river Brahmaputra. However, the government made the whole affair religious by bringing Hindu priests from Haridwar, Uttarakhand. On the other hand, the Assam government on 28 February 2017 decided to make Sanskrit compulsory in primary education till Class VIII, although it withdrew the decision because of strong protests against it. In May 2017, the government decided to disband the Madrasa Board and handed over the academic part of it to the Board of Secondary Education of Assam. In December 2016, it withdrew Friday holidays observed by the Madrasas in place of Sunday. The government even decided to eliminate the government funded Madrasa education system and to convert these institutions to primary, upper primary, high school and higher secondary schools from 1 April 2021. Although the government tried to prove that its decisions were for the welfare of the Muslim community, a large section of Muslims of Assam started to believe that the Assam government was trying to withdraw the special facilities enjoyed by the community. Moreover, the BJP-led Assam government began to take strong measures against alleged Muslim communal politics while still being indifferent towards alleged Hindu communal politics. For example, in a public meeting held in New Delhi on 13 November 2017 on ‘Updating the NRC and the Question of Citizenship’ organised by Delhi Action Committee, Arshad Madani, the national president of Jamiat, made communal comments on the issue of NRC upgrading in Assam. Madani commented that if the Muslims who have lived for centuries in Assam were excluded from the NRC, the situation would deteriorate and one might witness a condition like Myanmar (referring to the Rohingyas). Madani’s communal comments were widely condemned in Assam. The Government of Assam, in this case, even made the invited speakers of the meeting from Assam responsible for the personal and communal comments of Madani. However, the same government has remained silent when BJP’s elected representatives made highly communal comments in Assam after this incident. In response to Madani’s comments, a BJP’s lawmaker from Assam even publicly argued for open violence against Muslims in Assam and justified the Rohingya massacre in Myanmar (www. countercurrents.org/2017/11). Again, after the final list of names for NRC was published in August 2019, BJP started to criticise it on the grounds that names of illegal Muslim migrants had been included in it. The party became dissatisfied that more Hindus than Muslims had been left off the list. All these activities of the BJP-led g­ overnment started to make the entire Muslim community in Assam apprehensive of the government’s attitude towards them. BJP must keep the Hindu alliance between Brahmaputra and Barak valleys intact to continue its performance of the 2014 parliamentary and 2016 Assembly elections in Assam in the future. This is simply because Muslims constitute more than one-third of the total population of the state. If Muslims become united against BJP, and Hindu votes are divided, the party cannot win elections in Assam. Therefore, to maintain its influence over 174

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Hindus of both Brahmaputra and Barak valleys, BJP requires a common issue to bind them together. Issues like citizenship, indigeneity and language, which have always been sensitive in Assam’s politics, cannot bring the two valleys together, as they are already deeply divided on these issues. In this situation, the BJP has tried to project the Muslims as the common enemy of the Hindus of both valleys. To create a lasting alliance between the Hindus of the two valleys against the Muslims, one BJP minister of Assam even argued that Assamese people should support the move of the central government to settle Hindu Bengalis from Bangladesh in Assam through the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016, so that Asomiya Jati (Assamese nationality) can be saved from the growth of Muslims (Asomiya Pratidin, 15 November 2016). The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016 was the biggest step taken by the BJP-led central government to build an alliance of Hindus of both valleys. However, the bill could not be made an act by the Narendra Modi-led government by the time of the 2019 parliamentary elections. Just six months after the elections, the second Modi-led government revived the Bill and made it an act in December 2019. The CAA provides for giving citizenship to the persons belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian communities who had crossed over to India from neighbouring Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan by 31 December 2014. This amendment excludes Muslims. The amendment, in Assam, makes the Assam Accord invalid, as it has fixed a new cut-off date of 31 December 2014 for foreigners to get citizenship except for the Muslims against the cut-off date 24 March 1971 set by the Accord for all illegal foreigners without exception. Assam has already borne the burden of foreigners till 1971 under the Assam Accord. The amendment to the citizenship act will compel Assam to bear the burden of illegal foreigners who entered the state even after the cut-off date set by the Assam Accord. Moreover, the Accord did not make any distinction based on religion to identify illegal foreigners, unlike the recent amendment which identifies an illegal foreigner on the basis of religion. It should be noted that the indigenous communities from Brahmaputra valley have shown strong opposition to the CAA since the Bill was first introduced in the parliament in 2016. After the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was passed by the parliament in December 2019, the entire Brahmaputra valley erupted in protest, demanding the withdrawal of the Act. Before the 2014 parliamentary election, BJP promised to drive out illegal foreigners staying in Assam and solve the illegal immigration problem for good. Instead, it brought the CAA which will make all illegal immigrants (who entered the state by 31 December 2014) legal citizens, except the Muslims. The BJP believes that its attempt to favour the Hindus against the Muslims through the citizenship amendment will alienate the Muslims of Assam which will push them to rally behind the AIUDF or to remain divided between Congress and AIUDF in elections. In both situations, the BJP will be a gainer. Again, it assumes that it will only be electorally benefitted if 175

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Congress and AIUDF form an electoral alliance in future elections. It expects that the indigenous Assamese communities will never support AIUDF and in that situation, such an alliance will help only the BJP. Against such a backdrop, the party believes any opposition in Assam to the amendment would hardly hurt its electoral prospects in the state. In recent years, it has been observed that Assam is becoming a fertile ground for BJP to unite Hindus against Muslims, which again gives BJP the confidence to legislate the CAA 2019 despite strong opposition from the indigenous Assamese communities. Interestingly, the communal move of a section of Muslim politicians and organisations in recent years has provided this opportunity to BJP. Few examples will prove the case. The indigenous Assamese people have been demanding the upgrading of NRC of 1951 in Assam to solve the illegal immigrant problem in the state. When the upgrading process started, in the initial stage, the AAMSU and AIUDF strongly opposed it. As highlighted in Chapter 5, the AAMSU even organised public protests against the upgradation of NRC. The process of updating the NRC 1951 in Assam started only after the Supreme Court of India intervened. The opposition of these organisations gave the impression they wanted to offer safeguards to the illegal immigrants living in Assam. Again, on 21 October 2019, the BJP-led Assam government took a cabinet decision that no government jobs would be given to persons having more than two children after 1 January 2021. The government argues that it is an attempt to contain the high growth of population in the state. The decision of the government was welcomed by cross sections of the society of Assam. However, the AIUDF chief Badruddin Ajmal was quick to oppose it and declared that Muslims would continue to bear children and would not listen to anyone. He argued that he and his religion believe in the principle that those who want to come to the world will come and no one can stop it, and tempering with nature is not good. He even claimed that the population policy was aimed only to deprive Muslims of government jobs (www. justicenews.co.in, 30 October 2019). Such comments and steps of a section of Muslim politicians and organisations have already made the indigenous Assamese communities apprehensive about the motives of the political leadership of the community. As has been repeatedly mentioned in this book, the ethnic Assamese communities consider the high population growth of the immigrant Muslim community an immediate threat to their political supremacy. In such a situation, the opposition to population control by a politician, who belongs to the immigrant Muslim community and is the head of AIUDF, can be projected as a design of the immigrant Muslim community to wrest the power of the state with their rising strength in numbers. The aggressive politics of BJP in Assam to form a Hindu alliance against the Muslims is creating a situation favourable for the origin of a religionbased Muslim identity in Brahmaputra valley, side-lining the Assamese language. In the contemporary politics of Assam, against BJP’s aggressive 176

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communally polarised politics, the Muslims of the state have no other choice but to unite as Muslims against the BJP. This compulsion, while on the one hand is going to help BJP to consolidate its Hindu alliance in Assam, on the other has created the possibility of a cohesive Muslim identity. The growing sense of alienation and insecurity can help the indigenous Assamese Muslims and the neo-Assamese Muslims in Brahmaputra valley to come together by ignoring the existing psychological barriers and differences between them. It can be argued that the present divisive political environment is creating a context for the possibility of the emergence of a cohesive Muslim identity in Assam based on religion. Since the introduction of the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016, a section of BJP leaders has been trying to give citizenship in Assam a communal colour. These leaders have started to prove, on the basis of the cut-off date set by this proposed amendment, that the Assam Accord was a mistake on the part of AASU, which was a signatory to the Accord. After the NRC was published in Assam, the same leaders argued for a new NRC in Assam purely based on the 1951 NRC, not on the basis of the deadline set by the Assam Accord. In this regard, the CAA 2019 is a clear stand of BJP against the Assam Accord and the already concluded NRC Assam. Running parallel to the attempts of their rhetoric aimed at diluting the relevance of the Assam Accord, in 2019, the central government constituted a high-level committee for the implementation of Clause 6 of the Assam Accord and since then, has been promising constitutional safeguards to the ethnic Assamese people. After the CAA 2019 met with strong protests across Assam, the central government looked to offer some constitutional safeguards to the indigenous communities of Assam on the basis of the recommendations of the high-level committee. If this happens, then the entire issue of a united Muslim identity in Assam could take a new direction. It has been shown in this book how a section of the neo-Assamese Muslim community does not qualify to be indigenous (Assamese) people of Assam. But under all circumstances, the Assamese Muslims are indigenous people of the state. With the implementation of Clause 6, the indigenous Assamese Muslims will get the opportunity to enjoy the constitutional safeguards along with other ethnic groups which will lessen their sense of alienation and threat of losing identity. If this happens, then a unified or cohesive Muslim identity in Assam between the Assamese Muslims and the neoAssamese Muslims will again become a remote possibility. On the other hand, the implementation will become a precursor to new social and political dynamics among the section of neo-Assamese Muslims who will not be recognised as indigenous Assamese for constitutional safeguards under the provisions of the Assam Accord.

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186

INDEX

AAMSU’s demands 99 AASU’s demands 99 Abdul Hoque, Maulana 97 Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana 8 Adivashis 119 administrative districts 48 Advani, L.K. 135 AGP-led government 107 Ahle–Hadis 111 Ahmed Ali, Maulana 79 Ahmed, Fakhruddin Ali 38, 43, 60, 69, 70, 82, 172 Ahom administration 21 Ahom immigration 16 Ahom Kingdom 17–19 Ajmal, Badruddin 114, 115, 144 Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha 110 Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) 77 Alam, Anwar 10 Ali, Faiznur 43 Ali Khan, Liaquat 66 Ali, Munawar 39 All Assam Minority Front 100 All Assam Minority Students’ Union (AAMSU) 80, 81 All Assam Minority Yuva Parishad (AAMYP) 80, 100 All India Bharatiya Jana Sangha 110 All India Muslim Personal Board (AIMPLB) 10 All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) 109 All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) 13, 113 All Party Hill Leaders’ Conference (APHLC) 158 Amalendu Guha 4 Amjad Ali 72

anti-IM(DT) group 92 anti-immigration movement 2, 105 Aowal, Muminul 56 Arab traders 24 artisans 17 Asad Madani, Maulana 79 Asamiya Samrakshini Sabha 45, 46 Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) 98, 100 Asom Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) 76 Asomiya Dekar Ukti 53 Asomiya Jati 175 Asom Sahitya Sabha (ASS) 57, 155 Assam Accord (1985) 95–97, 100, 128, 133, 135, 142, 145, 152, 156, 177 Assam Assembly elections 62–66, 144, 165, 167 Assam-Bengal Railway 32–33 Assam Chah Mazdoor Sangha (ACMS) 62 Assamese and Bengali speakers 165 Assamese and neo-Assamese Muslims 13 Assamese identity 171–177 Assamese language 1, 17, 156–164, 168 Assamese medium Middle English (ME) school 55 Assamese Muslims 51, 169–171 Assamese-Muslim social alliance 56–59 Assamese people 152–156 Assam Human Development Report (AHDR) 129 Assam Jamiat 10, 12, 167 Assam Legislative Assembly, 1983 83–87 Assam Movement 2, 142, 152, 159, 166; AASU and AGSP 76; alienation of Muslims 88–89; Assam Accord 95–97; Assam Legislative Assembly,

187

INDEX

1983 83–87; communalisation of 77–80; communal polarisation 93; Congress politics of vote bank 89–93; IM(DT) Act 89–93; Muslim opposition 95–97; Muslims bounced back 94–95; Nellie massacre 87–88; origin of Muslim consciousness 98 Assam Official Language Act, 1960 57 Assam Provincial Muslim League 37, 41 Assam’s demographic change: government policy 135–137; illegal immigration 132–135, 137–138; Muslim population 127–128; neglected India-Bangladesh border 137–138; socio-economic backwardness 128; socio-economic condition 129–132 Assam Special Power (Press) Act 87 Assam Tea Garden Tribes Students Organisations (ATGTSO) 104 Assam Tea Tribes Students’ Association (ATTSA) 104–105 Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF) 2, 111 Australoids 15 Austro-Mongoloids 15 Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC) 107 Babri Masjid-Ram Janambhumi tangle 11 Bahujan Samaj Party 121 Bano, Shah 9 Bardoloi, Gopinath 44, 61, 67, 70 Barkaith, Sukumar 20 Barooah, Dev Kanta 69, 70 Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873 6 Bengali language 58 Bengali Muslims 51–52 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 2, 13, 82, 85, 86, 103–105, 107–110, 112, 115–123, 126, 127, 133–138, 140, 151, 152, 154, 163, 165, 167, 171–177 Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) 10, 110 Bhasani, Abdul Hamid Khan 38 Bhaumik, Subir 143 bideshi 77 Biplab Sarma 156 Biswa Hindu Parishad (BHP) 78–79 BJP-led Assam government 134, 173, 176

BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government 109 BJP’s hard Hindutva 116 Bodo People’s Front (BPF) 116, 119 Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS) 155 bohiragato 77 Borbora, Golap 82 Border Security Force (BSF) 137 Borphukan, Lachit 21 British annexation of Assam 28 British colonial administration 6, 27, 30, 32, 35, 52 British colonialism 166 Bruce, Robert 26 Bukhari, Syed Ahmed 113 Burmese attack 25 categorisation of Muslims: Assamese Muslims 51; Bengali Muslims 51–52; East Bengal origin Muslims 50–51; indigenous Muslims 50; neoAssamese Muslims 52 Caucasoids 15, 16 Census of India 1931, 35 Chandan Kumar Sharma 157 char 50 Choudhury, Abdul Matin 37 Choudhury, Moinul Hoque 69, 70 Chowdhury, Abdul Ghani Khan 85 Chowdhury, Hafiz Rashid 97 Chowdhury, Moinul Hoque 82 Christianity 5 Chutia 119 citizenship 145–146 Citizenship Act 1955, 148 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 112, 136, 140, 176, 177 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016 177 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2019 175 Citizens’ Right Preservation Committee (CRPC) 79 Civil Disobedience movement 44 colonial period 26–33 communal riot 66 Communist Party of India 64 Congress-Jamiat relationship 121 Congress-led Assam government 109, 134 Congress-led Bardoloi ministry 39 Congress–Muslim alliance 8, 123, 125 Congress party 13 Congress politics of immigrant vote bank 70–72

188

INDEX

Hindu population 2, 141 Hoque, Mosudul 98 Hussain, Monirul 4, 11 Hussain Shah 19, 20

Datia 23, 51 Deb, B.J. 4 ‘Demand Day,’ 80 Deshi 23, 51 Dhakaya Muslims 51 Dhuli 23, 51 doubtful (D) voter 117, 142, 146–148

Gamusa 161 Ganatantrik Adhikar Sangram Samiti (GASS) 97 Gogoi-led Congress 119 Gogoi, Pranab 153 Gogoi, Tarun 109, 114, 115, 120, 139, 148 Gohain, Hiren 43 Goria 20, 51, 122 Government of India Act 6 Government policy on immigration 66–70 ‘Grow More Food’ campaign 41

illegal Bangladeshis 126, 127 illegal immigration 12, 13, 66, 68, 166 Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) [IM(DT)] Act 1983 2, 89–93, 101, 111, 112, 114–116, 124, 125, 132, 135, 136, 139, 140, 146 Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 68, 70, 96 immigrant army 35–36 immigration theory 24 immigration to Assam: Government policy 66–70; Line system and Colonisation scheme 33–37; local people and Muslim immigrants 45–47; in medieval time 16–17; Muslim immigration see Muslim immigration; Muslim League politics 37–42; in pre-historic time 15–16; provincial election, 1946 42–45 India-Bangladesh border 128 Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 50 Indian Citizens’ Rights Preservation Committee (ICRPC) 79 Indian Constitution 8 Indian National Congress 64 India-Pakistan war 1971 7 indigenous Muslim community 55 indigenous Muslims 50 Indira Gandhi 64, 69, 76, 80, 82, 85, 90, 124 Indira-Mujib Agreement 96 Indo-Aryans 15 Indo-Bangladesh border 135, 137 Indrajit Gupta 151 Inner Line system 6 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 108

Haji Musafir Khana, 72 Haque, Muzammil 59 Hasan, Mushirul 9 Hazarika, Ismail Siddique 21 Hazarika, Jogen 82 Hindu Assamese society 47 Hindu Bengali refugees 54 Hindu Bengalis 61, 86, 103 Hindu-Muslim relations 1 Hindu Nationalism (1991–2001) 106–111

Jalal, Shah 22, 23 Jamat-e-Islami 126 Jamiat’s political activism 106–111 Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Hind (Jamiat) 2, 42, 79 Jammat-e-Islami 10 Janata Congress 72 Janata Party (JNP) 64, 76 Jaswant Singh 78 Jhulas 20, 23, 51 Joynath Sarma 89

East Bengal origin Muslims 50–51 Eastern India Muslim Association (EIMA) 72–73 Eastern Zonal Muslim League (EZML) 72 Eaton, R.M. 23 Election Commission of India 120, 146 electoral dominance 143–144 Elliot, Charles Sir 29 Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA) 87 ethnic groups 119 Fakir, Azan 22 Farukki, Abdul 43 Fifteen Point Scheme Plan 124 First Anglo-Burmese War 26 Foreigners Act 1946 90, 96, 139, 145 Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964 145, 147

189

INDEX

Kachari King Yasonarayana 52 Kalipad Sen 101 Kamata Rajya Parishad 72 ‘Kamrupa,’ 17 Karim, Rejaul 170 Khilafat Movement 43 Khilanjia Musalman 50 Koch Kingdom 19 Koch Rajbongshi 119 Kohli, O.P. 77 Kurihamari Char 80 Lahiri, D.K. 4 Lakshmi Singha 21–22 Language Movement 1960 58 language riots 57 large-scale immigration 66 Laskar, Nihar Ranjan 85 Line system and Colonisation scheme 152; collection of revenue 34; immigration policy 35–37; matabbars 35; politics of divide and rule 35–37; zamindars 34 Madani, Arshad 174 Madani, Hussain Ahmed 42 Madani, Mehmood 151 Mahanta, Nani Gopal 160 Mahanta, Prafulla Kumar 78 Maimol 51 majoritarian discourse 9 Majumdar, Abdul Muhim 140 Makhanlal Kar 4 Mangaldoi by-election 76 Manmohan Singh 124 matabbars 35 Matak 119 M’Cosh, John 31 Medhi, Bishnu Ram 67, 70, 71 Medium of Instruction Movement 1972 58 Milan, Shah 22 Minority Coordination Committee 95 Mir Jumlah 1, 17, 18 Mir Zainuddin 19 Miya language 162, 163, 168, 169, 171 Moa-Moria rebellion 21–22 modern schooling system 52 Mongoloids 15, 16 Moran 119 Moria 20, 51, 122 Mountbatten, Louis 45 Muchis 20, 23, 51 Muhammad-Ibn-Bakhtiyar-Khilji 17

Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh 69 Muslim artisans 20–21 Muslim community 12, 167 Muslim identity 8–12 Muslim immigration: colonial period 26–33; Muslim artisans, import of 20–21; Muslim groups 21–22; Muslim invasion and beginning 17–20; preachers and conversion 22–26 Muslim League Provincial government 28, 29 Muslim Personal Law 9, 113 Muslim political assertion 72–73 Muslim political mobilisation: AIUDF and communal politics 114–121; breakdown of immigrant vote banks 104–106; counter growth of Hindu Nationalism (1991–2001) 106–111; divided community in elections 126–127; formation of UMFA 100–104; Jamiat and formation of AUDF 111–114; Jamiat’s political activism 106–111; Jamiat’s relevance 125–126; Muslim vote, Congress and Jamiat 121–124; politics of immigrant vote bank 138–140 Muslim population 7, 141 Muslim prisoners 24, 25 Muslim vote bank of Congress 101 Mutiny, Sepoy 36 Mymensinghia Muslims 51 Na-Asomiya 53 Nanda, Gulzarilal 71 Narendra Modi 105, 117, 136, 138, 175 Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) 126 National Register of Citizens (NRC) 1951 2, 76, 145, 148–152, 167 Nehru, Jawaharlal 66, 70 Nehru-Liaquat Pact 66, 68 Nellie massacre 87–88, 94, 95 neo-Assamese Muslims 3, 52, 142, 143, 150, 155, 164, 168–169; emergence of 52–55; as a political group 55–56 Neolithic stone tools 15 Nepali immigrants 28 Noakhalia Muslims 51 North East Students Organisation (NESO) 154 Old Stone Age 15 Osmani, A.M.F. Golam 101

190

INDEX

Palaeolithic stone tools 15 Pangal 51 Patronage theory 25 People’s Democratic Front (PDF) 107 Phukan, Bhrigu Kumar 93 Phuleswari Konwari 20 Pisharoty, Sangeeta Barooah 147 Plain Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA) 65, 86, 158 political community 5–8 political conflict 49 Population and Women Empowerment Policy of Assam (PWEPA) 129 post-Assam Movement period 4, 13, 14 Prafulla Kumar Mahanta 139 ‘Pragjyotisha,’ 17 Praja Socialist Party (PSP) 62 Prevention of Infiltration into India of Pakistani Nationals (PIP) scheme 68 Progressive Democratic Front 72 pro-IM(DT) group 92 provincial election 1946 42–45 Public Interest Litigations (PIL) 149 Purvanchali Hindu Sammelan 78 Raja Ram Singh 19 Rajeswar Rao 58 Rajeswar Sinha 21 Rajnath Singh 137 Ram Temple Movement 107 Rashtriya Janata Dal 122 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 78 Raychaudhury, Ambikagiri 45 Reid, Robert Sir 37 Rouf, Syed Abdur 40 Rudra Singha (1696–1714) 20 Ryot sabhas 46 Saadulla government’s immigration policy 41 Saadulla, Muhammad 37–39 Sachar Committee Report (SCR) 129 Saikia, Hiteswar 88, 97, 108, 133, 139 Saikia, Rajen 29 Samajwadi Party 109, 121 Samata Party 109, 122 Sandar 22, 51 Sanjib Baruah 4 Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India & Anr 92–93 Sardar Patel 67, 138 ‘Save Assam’ day 78 seswasevak bahini 78

Shakdar’s statement 76 Shakdhar, S.L. 75 Shankardeva (1449–1568) 25 Sinha Report 133–134 Sinha, S.K. 133, 136 Siva Singha (1714–44) 20 social and political alliance: Assam Assembly elections (1951–78) 62–66; Assamese-Muslim social alliance 56–59; Congress-Muslim political alliances 59–62; Congress politics of immigrant vote bank 70–72; Muslim political assertion 72–73; neoAssamese Muslims, political group 55–56 Sword and Patronisation theories 24, 25 Sylheti Muslims 51 Sylhet referendum 45 Tablighi Jamaat 10 Tablique Jamat 79 Taimur, Syeda Anwara 82, 83, 172 Tai race 16 Talish, Shihabuddin 1 Tasa, Kamakhya Prasad 105 Tayabulla, Md. 43 tea gardens 27, 30, 35, 61 tea labourers 61, 86, 87, 104, 106 Teli, Rameswar 105 Thalua 50 threat perception 2, 3 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 69 Trinamool Congress in West Bengal 121 Tulu 23 Tulu/Teli 51 Udayan Misra 4, 171, 172 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 97 United Minority Front, Assam (UMFA) 98, 100 United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) 150 United People’s Progressive Alliance (UPPA) 107 Vaishnava monastery 118 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 78, 85, 138 vote bank 10 Yuva Linguistic Minority Committee 72 zamindars 32

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