The Multiple Realities of International Mediation 9781685858483

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The Multiple Realities of International Mediation

The Multiple Realities of International Mediation Marieke Kleiboer

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kleiboer, Marieke, 1967The multiple realities of international mediation / Marieke Kleiboer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-55587-769-9 (alk. paper) 1. Mediation, International. 2. Pacific settlement of international disputes. 3. Mediation. I. Title. KZ6045.K58 1998 341.57—dc21 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Typesetting by Letra Libre Printed and bound in the United States of America @

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

97-33555 CIP

To Paul

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Preface

ix xi

1

1

Understanding International Mediation The Twin Problems of Mediation Analysis, 1 Taking Up the Challenge: Design of the Study, 3 Mediation and Other Third-Party Methods, 5 A Preview of the Book, 7

2

(Re)Constructing International Mediation Theory

11

Taking Stock, 11 Assessing Mediation Outcomes, 12 Explaining Mediation Outcomes, 18 Toward a Metatheoretical Analysis, 23 Burrell and Morgan's Multiparadigm Model, 24 International Mediation: Four Ideal Types, 32 3

Four Realities of International Mediation Developing Mediation Theory, 39 Conventional Wisdom: Mediation as Power Brokerage, 40 The Challenge from Political Psychology: Mediation as Political Problem-Solving, 48 The Structuralist Challenge: Mediation as Domination, 57 The Humanist Challenge: Mediation as Restructuring Relationships, 67 Comparing Four Models of International Mediation, 78 vii

39

viii 4

Contents Assessing Mediation Outcomes: The Impact of Camp David

89

Evaluating Carter's Mediation, 89 On the Road to Peace, 90 A Power-Brokerage Interpretation of Carter's Mediation, 95 A Political Problem-Solving Interpretation of Carter's Mediation, 100 A Restructuring-Relationships Interpretation of Carter's Mediation, 109 Evaluating Mediation: Analytical Models as Gestalt Perspectives, 223 5

Explaining Mediation Outcomes: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict

119

Mediation Failure in the South Atlantic, 119 From Negotiations to Warfare over the Falklands, 220 A Power-Brokerage Account of Haig's Mediation, 129 A Political Problem-Solving Account of Haig's Mediation, 139 A Domination Account of Haig's Mediation, 151 A Restructuring-Relationships Account of Haig's Mediation, 160 Explaining Mediation: Analytical Models as Interpretation Schemes, 171 6

Multiple Paradigms of Mediation Analysis

181

Yugoslavia Revisited, 181 Back to the Twin Problems of Mediation Research, 183 Implications of Multimodel Analysis for Mediation Theory and Practice, 194 Multimodel Analysis: Caveats, 200

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix A: History of the Middle East Conflict Appendix B: History of the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict Appendix C: Haig's Mediation Proposals, 1982 References Index About the Book

205 207 213 219 225 243 249

Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1

Mediation in Perspective: A Comparison Between Adjudication, Arbitration, and Mediation

2.1

Explaining Mediation Outcomes: A Summary

8

of Research

20

2.2

The Regulation Versus Radical Change Dimension

26

2.3

Developing Mediation Theory: Operationalizing the Conflict Dimension

33

2.4

Developing Mediation Theory: Operationalizing the Philosophy of Science Dimension

34

3.1

Mediation as Power Brokerage

49

3.2

Mediation as Political Problem-Solving

58

3.3

Mediation as Domination

68

3.4

Mediation as Restructuring Relationships

77

3.5

Multiple Philosophies of International Mediation in Comparative Perspective

79

4.1

Four Sets of Indicators of Mediation Success

91

5.1 5.2

A Power-Brokerage Analysis A Political Problem-Solving Analysis ix

134 141

x

Tables and Figures

5.3

A Domination Analysis

155

5.4

A Restructuring-Relationships Analysis

162

5.5

Four Accounts of Haig's Mediation Failure

172

Figures 2.1

The Objective-Subjective Dimension of Social Science

29

2.2

A Model of Social Science Paradigms

31

2.3

Four Theoretical Ideal Types of International Mediation

35

3.1

Understanding International Politics: Interplay Between Systems of Decisionmaking

52

3.2

Manifest Versus Latent Conflict

63

Preface

This study began in 1992 with what seemed to be a rather straightforward question. Why is it that some disputes can apparently be (temporarily) managed peacefully and others defy solution, despite the serious attempts of highly qualified third parties? I soon found myself immersed in unresolved scholarly debates and contradictory empirical claims about the conditions for mediation success. The state of mediation research was confusing, and more empirical analysis seemed unable to bring about a better understanding of what makes international mediation succeed or fail. I became more and more interested in why academics provide so many different answers to a single question about international behavior. Now, several years down the road, I have written a book to provide more coherence to mediation theory and research. I have constructed four ideal-typical theoretical frameworks that present the necessary normative and empirical diversity but do so in a well-structured manner that allows for a more systematic debate and, hopefully, progress in our ability to analyze and improve mediation practices. As a newcomer to the field of International Relations (IR),1 with a background in public administration and an appointment at the Leiden Law Faculty, I and my project tended to puzzle colleagues and outsiders. It just did not seem to be an ideal combination. I remained a generalist when I wanted to be a specialist and was bewildered by intricate scholarly debates when I needed the broader picture. Yet ultimately, the right chemistry came about, not in the least because a diverse group of specialists and friends helped me. I am particularly grateful to Mark Bovens, Herman van Gunsteren, and Gregory Raymond, who constructively criticized the various drafts during the years of my research. Niels Blokker, Alexander George, Max Metselaar, André Nollkaemper, Fred van Staden, Eric Stern, and Bert-Jan Verbeek all in their own way xi

xii

Preface

sharpened my ideas. In my case studies, I very much benefited from Jay Rothman's comments on the Middle East chapter and Nora Femenia's suggestions on the Falklands/Malvinas chapter. Working at the Leiden Institute for Law and Public Policy was not only intellectually challenging but great fun as well. I enjoyed Nick Huls's "dialectic attitude," which was both critical and supportive. I also owe my thanks to other colleagues, in particular, Roland Bal, Marc Hertogh, Petra van Kampen, Edith van Ruyven, Helen Stout, Sasja Tempelman, Margo Trappenburg, and Bert de Vroom. Martien Brander and Debora Moolenaar made my life in the cyberspace era a lot more livable. Liesbet Heyse, my competent student assistant, helped gather and analyze material for the chapter on Camp David. Sharing an office with my friend Willem Trommel for a couple of years was stimulating—to say the least. Our debates about the world at large—and about our colleagues in particular—probably slowed down the process of completing this study, but it was worth it! The book has greatly benefited from his critical reviews. Anne-Marie Krens did a lot of library work, and both she and Thea de Beer patiently and meticulously prepared the manuscript. I owe my thanks to all of them. In addition, I would like to thank the participants of the seminar group at the Public Administration Department of Leiden University, in particular Arjen Boin and Marc Otten, who read various drafts more than once. Finally, I benefited from extensive research visits to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm in 1995 and 1996. My Swedish colleagues (Magnus Ekergren, Jakob Gustavsson, Diana Madunic, Charles Parker, Bengt Sundelius, Lisa van Well, and Michael Winnerstig) were a joy to work with. I especially enjoyed our debates during lunch in my favorite restaurant, Kryp In. A few other people were indispensable: Julie Bivin-Raadschelders made the necessary language corrections. Three of my closest friends, Dorothe Hammecher, Joske Kijne, and Lenneke Post, were willing to listen to never-ending stories about the progress of the book. I very much appreciated their continuous support. I dedicate this book to Paul't Hart. He accepted this book to be the third party in our relationship for nearly five years. We can do without it. Marieke Kleiboer

Notes 1. I capitalize International Relations (IR) when I refer to the academic discipline as opposed to the phenomenon in the real world of politics.

Understanding International Mediation

The Twin Problems of Mediation Analysis It was the spring of 1992 and post-Tito Yugoslavia was coming apart. The causes of the current crisis dated back five years when tensions between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, one of the autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia, started to build up. The Serb nationalist leader Milosovic took a hard-line position on Serb rights in Kosovo on his road to power as head of the Serbian League of Communists, carefully exploiting the deep-rooted anti-Albanian sentiments in Serbia. In 1991, ethnic tensions in Kosovo turned to war when the Serbian army intervened and restored "order." The Kosovo crisis reverberated throughout the country. Ethnic and regional nationalism, as well as fear of Serbian expansionism, prompted Slovene and Croat leaders to proclaim their republics' independence, risking an all-out confrontation with the Serbs (Silber and Little, 1995; Bennett, 1995).1 Eventually, the peaceful, multiethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina became the focal point of this ongoing crisis. Day after day, television news showed rolling tanks and fighting soldiers, mass graves, overcrowded hospitals, ruined villages, and countless numbers of refugees either expelled in acts of ethnic cleansing or seeking a safe haven from the war. Yugoslavia's death struggle has traumatized many who experienced and observed it. Yugoslav actor Boro Todorovic pointedly expressed the state of confusion and despair the crisis continues to evoke: All of us have had, now and then, a terrible, horrifying dream, a nightmare, from which we wake up in the middle of the night or at dawn bathed in sweat from the terror we have experienced. We're

2

Multiple Realities of International Mediation

overcome by joy to find that it was only a dream and not reality. Sadly, what is happening around us today, this horror, this chaos on our soil, in the heart of Europe, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this destruction, this killing, this hatred—this, alas, is no dream but a living nightmare. It is all so unreal, so inconceivable, that it is hard to grasp, at least for me. It leaves me quite unable to judge what is going on or to adopt a rational attitude towards it. (cited in Glenny, 1992: xiii; my emphasis)

The issue of how to deal with such a complex, multiparty conflict with deep and intricate historical roots, which evolves around highly charged issues such as nationalism, ethnicity, and religion, has also baffled international mediators operating on behalf of the European Union and the United Nations. Former English and U.S. foreign ministers Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance, among others, struggled to find ways of increasing their hold on the situation, wondering continuously what to aim for and how to get there. In 1992, these efforts met with little success. The agreement reached at Dayton was long years ahead. Former Yugoslavia, unfortunately, is no exception. The same questions emerge in other conflicts as well. The post-Cold War erosion of the East-West divide has not reduced the incidence of violent international and ethnopolitical conflict. The persistence of violent international conflict, after the erosion of what had been held by many as its chief cause (the East-West divide), implies a major challenge to the international community. There is more pressure on all actors in the international system to increase the system's ability to manage, if not prevent, mass violence in the conduct of state and international affairs. State leaders and international institutions can no longer hide behind the fig leaf of superpower rivalry as an excuse for their own inactivity or ineffectiveness. The search is on for more appropriate norms, institutions, attitudes, and techniques of conflict resolution, particularly through advanced forms of third-party intervention. The Yugoslav crisis has, if anything, increased the urgency of this endeavor. Studying

International

Mediation

Increasingly, mediation is viewed as one of the means for dealing with intractable conflict. The key features of mediation—its nonforceful, extra-legal (e.g., not branding parties either right or wrong), and communicative approach to international politics—seem to fit the times. The increasing use of third parties in diplomatic practice since the 1970s has been mirrored by an upsurge in scholarly interest in the topic within the field of International Relations (Mitchell and Webb, 1988b:

Understanding International Mediation

3

6-9). In their own way, mediation analysts have struggled to find an answer to the vexing questions and dilemmas that have confronted the parties and mediators involved in crises such as those in the former Yugoslavia: What can we expect from nonforceful, third-party intervention in complex, protracted, and violent multiparty conflicts? How should we judge mediator performance? What are the crucial parameters of mediation success? And what sort of behavioral guidelines can we offer to future mediators to increase their chances of making a difference? At present, we are still far from having a scholarly consensus on these issues. This book examines why this is so and offers new ways to think about mediation analysis. In particular, it addresses what I see as two key problems in the study of international mediation. One is the outcome assessment problem: by what standards do or should we measure the success of mediation attempts? The other is the process analysis problem: in seeking to learn from past successes and failures, how can we explain mediation outcomes? To seek an understanding of international mediation is to take part in a (normative) debate between competing sets of ideas, the roots of mediation research. To do so, first we need to know the terrain. We need to know to what extent current theory enables us to systematically evaluate and understand mediation efforts in international politics. Second, in order to dig beneath the surface of the existing body of knowledge, it is essential to expose the various assumptions analysts make when they evaluate and explain mediation attempts. Third, in order to elaborate on and improve what is already there, we need to start with a well-defined view of which assumptions matter most and use those to build up mediation theory more systematically than others have done before. Fourth, in order to see whether this approach is worthwhile, we should use the results of this theorizing in the analysis of real cases of mediation, such as Bosnia. The newly developed mediation theory (theories, as a matter of fact) should be able to produce a coherent, transparent, and, above all, persuasive assessment and understanding of mediation efforts. These are the challenges that inspire analysts who seek to better grasp the underlying dynamics of international mediation.

Taking Up the Challenge: Design of the Study In this book, both a meta- and a multitheoretical approach are used to gain a better understanding of international mediation. With metaanalysis, one studies and evaluates scientific theory and research by examining its underlying assumptions. These encompass both the

4

Multiple Realities of International

Mediation

substantive assumptions that analysts make about the subject matter they aim to understand and/or evaluate, as well as assumptions about the nature and scope of scientific analysis and explanation. Such an approach is common in social science at large (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hassard, 1985; 1991; Ritzer, 1992; and Young, 1994) but rarely encountered in the field of International Relations. 2 In this study, I shall use meta-analysis to elucidate the variety of existing and potential theoretical approaches for evaluating and explaining mediation. The mw/titheoretical aspect of this study stems from my belief that there is generally more than one useful way to understand social phenomena. Therefore, not one but several sets of assumptions are developed, and, accordingly, not one but several theories of international mediation are derived from them. Multitheoretical approaches are not uncommon in the field of international relations. The best-known example of how different analytical frameworks, based on different sets of assumptions, lead to miscellaneous explanations of the same historical event is Allison's study of the Cuban missile crisis. Allison (1969; 1971) demonstrates that three different models of foreign policymaking (the "rational actor" model, the "organizational process" model, and the "governmental politics" model) produce rather different explanations of what happened and why during those thirteen days of tensions in October 1962. Others have made analogous attempts at multimodel interpretations of decisionmaking in foreign and defense policy (for example, Steinbruner, 1974). Most of these multimodel analyses focus on explaining foreignpolicy decisionmaking and action, however, and do not extend into other domains of international relations. Also, these models tend to vary only in terms of their substantive assumptions and seem to share common notions about the nature and scope of scientific analysis and explanation. In other words, they do not deal with the ontological and epistemological questions that emerge when multiple explanations of one and the same episode are put forward and that, in recent years, have become such a major issue with the emergence of "postpositivism" in the social sciences (i.e., Sjolander and Cox, 1994). Nor do they touch upon questions of evaluation and the normative dimensions of international affairs. Finally, in most of these studies, the theories, models, and frameworks that analysts use seem to have been selected inductively. They are found to be amalgamations of the existing repertoire of approaches and are therefore condemned to incorporate, rather than expose, the limits and ambiguities of current theorizing. I know of no effort in International Relations that uses a multimodel analysis of complex historical cases comparing and contrasting multi-

Understanding

International Mediation

5

pie models that have been derived deductively, using an explicit metatheoretical approach. This study takes the Allisonian tradition of multitheoretical analysis as its starting point but seeks to address these shortcomings. Its focus goes beyond a purely empirical analysis and also includes normative issues of evaluation. In addition, the philosophical underpinnings of multimodel analysis will be examined. Finally, the present study seeks to provide a more deductive and heuristically strong basis for constructing the different analytical frameworks that were used. Two Case Studies To illustrate how this combined meta- and multitheoretical approach can be used in application, two case studies follow. One case deals with outcome assessment (former U.S. President Carter's mediation in the Middle East between Israel and Egypt in 1978-1979), the other with process analysis (U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's mediation efforts between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982). The case study that focuses on the dilemma of assessing mediation outcomes should produce a variety of outcome judgments generated by the four models. The other case study should, in contrast, deal with a situation in which the different models would not produce different outcome assessments (e.g., where there is intermodel agreement on the success or failure of the mediation attempt—albeit for totally different reasons) but would still generate very distinct explanations of what happened and why during the course of the mediation process. Hence, the second case study is framed to probe the explanatory range of the models. The purpose of the case analyses is to explore the plausibility of the alternative models of international mediation when applied to reallife mediation episodes. This plausibility test will assess the extent to which the models generate distinct analytical puzzles, as well as coherent and persuasive interpretations of the case events. More specifically, the application of multimodel analysis to historical cases seeks to show, first of all, that different models entail different biases and standards in determining the success or failure of mediation efforts. Secondly, the case studies seek to establish whether and how the models highlight different variables that drive the process.3

Mediation and Other Third-Party Methods This book is about international mediation in (potentially) violent political conflict involving state leaders. In practice, it is rarely useful to

6

Multiple

Realities of International

Mediation

draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international mediation. The study therefore encompasses the management of interstate conflicts but also deals with intrastate, ethnopolitical conflicts, which begin domestically yet generate major spill-over effects at the international level and thus become objects of attention in the international community. These effects may include large numbers of cross-border refugees or ethnic strife arising in one state but spilling over to another. In addition, it is presumed that mediation is an instrument of conflict management. In other words, without conflict there is no mediation. This is not to say, however, that mediation, once initiated, cannot fulfill other salient functions besides conflict management. Yet these are not included here, and I will only briefly address the multiple functions of mediation in the final chapter of the book. There are many forms of third-party intervention, so many, in fact, that it is often confusing to try to figure out which is which. Besides mediation, and often in conjunction with it, three other types of informal interventions are often distinguished: conciliation, good offices, and fact-finding. Conciliation involves a trusted third party providing an informal communication link between the antagonists for the purpose of identifying the major issues, lowering tension, and encouraging the concerned parties to move toward direct interaction, such as negotiation, in order to deal with their differences. Related forms of limited third-party intervention include good offices, where the intermediary acts simply as a go-between; and fact-finding, where a third party assesses the situation and provides a statement back to the parties (Fisher and Keashly, 1991: 33). In practice, however, these three methods highly overlap with mediation. To avoid conceptual confusion, I consider these three mechanisms as a part of mediation activities. Differences exist between mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. I focus here on arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, since other arbitrator bodies play a lesser role in the management of international political conflicts. Four main differences stand out. First of all, intervention by a judge or an arbiter relies on the conflicting parties abiding by the ruling or judgment handed down by a third party, whether they are satisfied with it or not. Whereas in mediation the decisionmaking authority remains in the hands of the disputants, in cases of adjudication or arbitration it is transferred from the disputants to the intermediary. A mediator only assists disputants in making their own decisions—although he or she may occasionally exert considerable pressure on them—and in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Second, and as a result of this transfer of decisionmaking authority, the outcome of adjudication and arbitration is binding. The outcomes of in-

Understanding International Mediation

7

termediary intervention, on the other hand, are nonbinding unless the involved parties choose to make them so. Third, adjudication and arbitration focus on the substance and legal ramifications of the conflict, whereas mediation is also applied to influence the conflict process. 4 Finally, the nature of the effects of third-party intervention differs. Court rulings and arbiter judgments tend to have a win-lose character, whereas mediation efforts generally concentrate on finding compromising or integrative solutions (known as win-win outcomes). There are also important differences between intervention by international courts, on the one hand, and both arbitration and mediation, on the other. Adjudication may be initiated unilaterally: one party alone can bring a case to court without the consent of the other disputants). Arbitration and mediation can only proceed when all parties agree on the type of intervention. 5 In addition, disputants appealing to the International Court of Justice have virtually no influence on the identity of the fifteen judges who will deal with their conflict. 6 This is not the case with ad-hoc arbitration or mediation where acceptability to the parties tends to be a crucial criterion in the selection of intervening bodies or individuals. If parties bring their case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, they can, if they so choose, select from a certain list the members of the particular tribunal/commission or appoint them from among other experts of their own choice in order to carry out the dispute settlement process they have agreed upon. 7 Parties may agree in principle to settle their conflict via one of these types of third-party intervention. Yet the question of who should arbitrate or mediate between them is often a major source of controversy. Table 1.1 summarizes the main differences between the three basic types of intervention.

A Preview of the Book Since problems in mediation analysis, rather than mediation practice, form the point of departure, it will be clear that this book is not a howto manual for practitioners in the style of Getting to Yes (1981) or its follow-up, Beyond Machiavelli (1994), written by Fisher and his Harvard colleagues. It will produce no proverbs or formulas on how to make mediation successful. To some extent, this study is therefore more appropriate for an academic audience than for practitioners. I believe, however, that the practical utility of current mediation research is severely impaired by the lack of consensus about how to deal with the evaluative and analytical complexity that cases such as Bosnia present us with. The cause of mediation is not well served when mediation

8

Multiple Realities of International Mediation

Table 1.1

Mediation in Perspective: A Comparison Between Adjudication, Arbitration, and Mediation Types of Intervention

Starting Points

Adjudication

Arbitration

Mediation

Decisionmaking authority Outcome of intervention Focus of intervention

Judge Binding Law-based outcome

Arbiter Binding Law-based outcome

Nature of outcome

Win-lose

Win-lose

Number of parties required for occurrence intervention Existence of possibilities for parties to influence the identity of the third party

One

All

Disputants Nonbinding Management and pragmatic outcome Compromise, or win-win All

No

Yes

Yes

scholars produce policy recommendations that beg important normative questions and draw on contestable empirical claims, as often happens today. As such, this study should be taken as a necessary, but far from sufficient, step toward the development of a field of study in International Relations, which, by its nature, should be both academically solid and policy-relevant. This study seeks to stimulate an ontological and normative debate among scholars in the field of international conflict management and International Relations at large. The book is particularly meant for analysts interested in learning the boundaries that define their own perspectives on international mediation but, at the same time, offer new frames of reference. The basic assumption is that by looking at how we can clarify and explain the outcomes of international mediation, we may learn more about what we expect from conflict management and from those who mediate, as well as what we expect from theorizing about international conflict management. Based on this, we may also learn more about the kinds of lessons that various observers and analysts of international mediation may draw from these outcomes. The sequence of tasks to be taken up in this study is evident in the key questions that have guided the inquiry: (1) To what extent does current mediation theory enable us to systematically evaluate and understand mediation efforts in international politics? (2) What assumptions are essential to research and theory-building on interna-

Understanding International Mediation

9

tional mediation? (3) How can we use these building blocks to construct theories of mediation? and (4) How can mediation research benefit from this approach and the newly constructed theories, and what are its implications for mediation practice? The structure of the book follows this agenda: Chapter 2 presents and critically assesses state-of-the-art research on the course and outcomes of international mediation and introduces a metatheoretical model that lays the foundation for mediation theories. These are elaborated upon in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the theoretical argument. The first case study, of Camp David, deals with the outcome assessment problem. It shows which standards the ideal-type theories use to assess the outcomes of Camp David. The second case study, the Falklands crisis, focuses on the process analysis problem. This analysis demonstrates how the four theories reconstruct and interpret this episode. Finally, in Chapter 6, the theoretical implications and possible practical lessons of multimodel research on international conflict management are discussed.

Notes 1. Of course, rival theories exist about the underlying reasons of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Rather than Serbian expansionism, Woodward (1995) argues that the collapse of Yugoslavia was caused by political disintegration that was inseparable from the more widespread process of Eastern European political fragmentation. The international community in 1991 misinterpreted the upheaval as ethnic conflict and national revolution. However, what was at stake, in Woodward's view, was that Yugoslavia suffered from economic decline in the 1980s, accentuated by diminishing support from Western governments and institutions. Moreover, the country was weakened by its loss of the critical geopolitical position it had occupied during the Cold War. Economic reforms demanded by foreign creditors undermined the Yugoslav federal authority. In a highly decentralized government, local political leaders who were unwilling to compromise initiated a quarrel over authority, resources, and ultimately, territory. 2. See, however, Hollis and Smith (1991). 3. The research objectives imply an exploratory research design. The focus is on assessing the potential relevance and differential contributions of different ways of thinking about mediation in international politics. No attempt is made to test any of the theories in a formal sense, nor to establish the "relative exploratory power" of each of the frameworks. Given the embryonic state of the models, this would be premature if it were possible at all. It is much more useful, at this point, to explore their modus operandi in greater detail by focusing in depth on a more limited number of cases. The result of such an exploratory design may be to reconsider and perhaps sharpen each of the models' assumptions and propositions, as well as to encourage reflection on the nature and limits of multimodel research on mediation.

10

Multiple Realities of International Mediation

4. Arbitration can also take into account nonlegal arguments, depending on the terms of reference agreed upon by the disputants. 5. Recourse to arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration can proceed without mutual agreement only if parties have signed a treaty or contract in the past that includes an arbitration clause. In this case, either one of the parties can take its case to arbitration. 6. The fifteen members of the court are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Article 4[1] Chapter 1, Statute of the International Court of Justice). However, Article 31(2) and 31(3), Chapter 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provide an opportunity for parties that "if the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nominated as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5" and "if the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationalities of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as provided in Paragraph 2 of this Article." 7. See Section II of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States for details about the composition of the arbitral tribune. This list consists of over 250 distinguished lawyers nominated by 80 states (in 1992, see the 92nd annual report of the Permanent Court of Arbitration) that are parties either to the convention of 1899 or the revised convention of 1907.

(Re)Constructing International Mediation Theory

Taking Stock International mediation has a much longer history in practice than in research. Although it has been used in the conduct of international affairs for hundreds of years, intermediary intervention has only been studied systematically in the past three decades, beginning with Young (1967), Burton (1969), and Stenelo (1972). In recent years, it has become a major topic in the field of International Relations, presumably because of its renewed salience in the post-Cold War era. Most of this research has had a strong policy orientation. In fact, many analysts have sought to discover "golden formulas": crucial conditions for achieving mediation success, which could be transformed into policy prescriptions. What have thirty years of research taught us about how international mediation proceeds and why it succeeds or fails? This chapter argues that current attempts at theorizing are problematic in various ways and that recourse to more empirical analysis alone is insufficient to solve these difficulties. A brief review of existing research reveals that a solid normative foundation for evaluating mediation outcomes is lacking. Also, there is a proliferation of adhoc hypotheses and contested explanations of mediation processes. To enhance theory building, a metatheoretical model mapping out multiple perspectives on international mediation is presented. Inspired by the sociological work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), it is used here as a heuristic tool for developing four ideal types of international mediation: mediation as power brokerage; mediation as political problem-solving; mediation as domination; and mediation as restructuring relationships. 11

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Mediation

Assessing Mediation Outcomes What is good mediation? When do analysts and observers of international mediation view it as successful? Mass media accounts of mediation episodes depict them as either successes or failures, assuming that the outcomes are clear-cut and their meanings easily recognizable to everyone. Also, media assessments are often formulated in black-andwhite terms: the peace process in Northern Ireland has failed (when the IRA sets off a bomb in the city center of London following a long cease-fire period); mediation by the Norwegian foreign minister Hoist has been successful (since it produced a historic agreement between the PLO and Israel that was not immediately violated). Success and failure are depicted as polar opposites: a success is a nonfailure and vice versa. Moreover, in this era of satellite news, not only the key players but also worldwide television audiences can experience the mixture of hope and frustration that is inevitably part of efforts to peacefully manage international conflict. In this way, one is led to believe that only a thin line exists between the success and failure of international mediation: often, cease-fires or agreements are announced only to be violated hours or days later, sparking new bloodshed and necessitating yet another round of talks. In sum, the results of international mediation are often presented as objective, immediate, and digital "facts." The challenge of evaluating a highly complex phenomenon such as international mediation begins with conceptualizing the phenomenon and developing standards for the assessment of mediation outcomes. A review of current research reveals that analysts have tackled this issue in four ways. Oddly enough, a first strategy has been negligence. Quite a few analysts seem to beg the normative question by avoiding the conceptualization of mediation success and failure altogether. Like most journalists, they assume the valuation of mediation outcomes to be a matter of common knowledge. For example, in his analysis of mediation in the Sudan Civil War, Assefa (1987: 29-30) used a series of hypotheses identifying conditions for successful outcomes, but he leaves the reader puzzled about what, in his view, actually constitutes success (see also Carnavale, Lim, and McLaughlin, 1989; Princen, 1992b). A second strategy has been to formulate a definition of successful intermediary intervention based on criteria that analysts themselves deem important. Some scholars have opted for idiosyncratic but parsimonious operationalizations to facilitate systematic analysis and measurement. In his frequently quoted study, Frei defines success as "a situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally

(Reconstructing

International Mediation Theory

13

accept a mediator and a mediative attempt within five days after the first attempt" (Frei, 1976: 69). Others have used various broad definitions of mediation success in which success is indicated by some measure of improvement of the premediation state of the conflict. Bercovitch, et al. (1991: 9; see also Kriesberg, 1991:19; Bercovitch 1996:19), for example, defines mediation as fully successful when it is given credit for making a great difference to or settling a dispute. It is partially successful when its efforts initiate negotiations and some dialogue between the parties. Mediation success is limited when it achieves only a cease fire or break in hostilities.

Another set of success indicators is provided by Susskind and Babbitt (1992: 31): Ideally, successful mediation can result in: the cessation of violence; agreements that allow each party to save face both internationally and domestically; good precedents in the eyes of the world community; arrangements that will insure implementation of whatever agreements have been reached; and better relationships among the disputing parties.

For Susskind and Babbitt the extent of a mediator's success may be measured by the number of objectives reached (see also Dixon, 1996: 654). A third group of analysts has equated mediation success with effectiveness, taking the mediator's (or the parties') objectives when engaging in a mediation effort to be the crucial benchmark for evaluation. In his analysis of the efforts of the Reagan administration to mediate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon in 1981-1983, Inbar (1991) evaluates the outcomes in terms of U.S. goals—a pullout of all foreign forces and the strengthening of the pro-Western Gemayel regime. Judged from this point of view, the mediation effort failed (see also Smith, 1985; and Touval and Zartman, 1985:14). Finally, a fourth group has conceptualized mediation success in terms of resolving what disputants define as the underlying roots of their conflict. In Burton's (1972a; 1988) work, for example, conflict and war are assumed to be the result of patterns of dominance in human relationships. Third-party intervention is successful if it creates institutions and practices that serve the needs of individuals and groups in society and legitimizes authority. In other words, mediation is successful when it ultimately results in a durable solution accepted and supported by all disputants. In Burton's view, this often requires a change

14

Multiple

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Mediation

in existing relationships between rulers and ruled, both within and between states. The very existence and divergent results of these four ways of assessing the outcomes of international mediation suggest that mediation literature lacks an Archimedean point from which it is possible to generate universally accepted criteria for success, regardless of time, place, and people. Success and failure are construed, rather than discovered, by analysts and observers: they are a matter of idiosyncratic and political judgments, interpretations, and labeling. Analysts use very different vantage points: some look through the eyes of the disputants to a particular mediation episode, whereas others formulate their own criteria for mediation success; some adhere to what is known in peace research as a "negative" conception of peace (the absence of physical violence and war), whereas others cling to a "positive" approach to peace (a concern for social justice and welfare) (Galtung, 1969; Carroll, 1972). This normative pluralism implies that every case of mediation may produce multiple, partially conflicting judgments. Moreover, contrary to media accounts, in the academic literature mediation success and failure are presented as analogous concepts, as extremes on some sort of continuum rather than as polar opposites. To describe the state of the art in mediation research in terms of normative pluralism paints too optimistic a picture. It is more accurate to refer to a normative vacuum: at least three of the four strategies of evaluating mediation outcomes lack a solid normative foundation (Burton and others in the fourth category are a good exception). In most current analyses of international mediation, evaluation criteria are taken for granted or else ad-hoc criteria are used. Absent such a normative debate, judgments of success and failure tend to rest on implicit biases rather than on explicit and well-argued criteria (Bovens and't Hart, 1996: 2 2 ^ 5 ) . The Time Dimension. Any evaluation of international mediation efforts depends on when one evaluates and what kind of temporal perspective one has in mind. Do we start assessing immediately after an agreement has been signed or do we take the implementation of agreements into account? How long should they hold? Consider the war between India and Pakistan over the possession of the Kashmir province. For both states, Kashmir was an issue that touched upon "the legitimizing principle of their statehood" (Zartman and Touval, 1985: 28). Briefly put, Pakistan wanted control of all predominantly Muslim areas, specifically Kashmir, while India held onto its vision of a secular state that included both Muslims and Hindus. In 1949, a cease-fire was mediated and monitored by the United Nations to stop the fighting on

(Re)Constructing

International Mediation Theory

15

the subcontinent that began in 1947. This was considered an important success. After Indian Premier Nehru died, however, the new government undertook certain actions that immediately altered the status quo with Pakistan. A new war broke out and the Soviet Union offered its services as a mediator, which led to an agreement between the parties in 1966 (Thornton, 1985). The brokerage of this agreement was also hailed as a success. Although the parties agreed to withdraw their military forces to the prewar lines, India and Pakistan continue to feel that the Kashmir issue remains unresolved, and tensions in the region often result in violent clashes and border skirmishes. It makes a substantial difference whether one chooses to evaluate mediation efforts in this case in 1949, in 1966, or at other times. Although they were initially seen as mediation successes, the long-term impact of the UN efforts, and later the Soviet efforts, was less evidently positive. Of course, the reverse sometimes holds true as well: outcomes that seem fragile at the beginning may nevertheless be considered successful in the long run. The varieties of possible time horizons and the registration of the various effects that mediation efforts have over a period of time constitute an important set of pitfalls of evaluation that are often overlooked. Judgments of the outcomes of international mediation may change over time as they are overtaken by events that render them obsolete. This may cause short-term and long-term assessments to be at odds with one another, the latter reversing or neutralizing the former. In general, the longer the time frame used for the assessment of intermediary intervention, the larger the scope for ambiguity and controversy about its accomplishments. The Spatial Dimension. Temporal intricacies in judging mediation outcomes are matched by spatial ones. Here, the delineation of the geographical or social system boundaries in estimating and assessing the outcomes is the key issue. What is the scope of a particular mediation effort? Do we only take the regional conflict arena into account or do we also look at its spill-over effects into other areas? Take, for example, the protracted conflict between the governing Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO), which started after Mozambique's independence in 1975 and lasted until the signing of a peace agreement in 1992. Our judgment of the mediator outcome will be influenced by whether we only look at the effects of mediation on the relationship between these two parties and the political stability of Mozambique or whether we also consider the implications of the conflict and its outcome on neighboring countries or on the south of Africa as a whole. Neighboring countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, experienced

16

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Mediation

major refugee problems due to this conflict and may have quite distinct views and interests concerning the preferred outcome. Similarly, the two superpowers fueled the conflict in many ways and supported opposing parties. In general, the more actors that are involved in a conflict, the more complex and politically charged the evaluation of its management is likely to be. The Actor Dimension. From whose perspective do we evaluate the outcomes of international mediation? Do we take the point of view of individual citizens? Of groups of people? Of states? Or do we judge outcomes from a transnational or world system perspective? The actor dimension is most evident if the analyst takes the objectives of the parties or the mediator as a starting point for evaluation (the third strategy discussed). Often, however, it remains implicit: the analyst formulates his or her own criteria for success, which (inadvertently) takes into account certain parties' perspectives more than others. The Expectations Dimension. The expectations dimension is twofold. First, it concerns the issue of relativity: for example, what observers expect mediation to accomplish in comparison to other modes of conflict management. Second, it encompasses judgments about the potential of mediation to stop not only the fighting or the immediate threat of escalation but to actually resolve the conflict. In the relativity dimension, assessment of international mediation requires that the analyst takes into account the actual effects or possible contributions of all relevant conflict management mechanisms. In other words, the outcome of mediation should be considered in conjunction with the outcome of alternative ways of handling conflict. This comparison may be made in both a normative and an empirical sense. Normatively, some analysts may prefer mediated forms of conflict regulation to those produced by military intervention, for example, because they involve no additional bloodshed or because they leave responsibility for conflict management in the hands of the disputants themselves, instead of forcing them to accept an externally imposed solution. Other analysts may take a more utilitarian perspective and argue that the results produced may be more important than the methods used. These normative differences affect the predisposition to assess any particular mediation attempt. Empirically, the comparison includes the issue of assessing the relative importance of different conflict management methods that are often used sequentially or simultaneously, particularly in "hot" conflicts of major geo-strategic importance. At least two counter-factual questions play a role in this respect: (1) What would have happened if, instead of mediation, other intervention techniques would have been applied? and (2) What would have happened if another type of media-

(Reconstructing

International Mediation Theory

17

tor would have been involved? Overlooking these types of comparisons comprises what Bovens a n d ' t Hart (1996: 43) have termed the "neglected alternatives bias." This concerns the lack of evaluation— even if this can only be done in retrospect and counterfactually—of the consequences of alternative options; the analyst may not fully acknowledge the ambiguities and quandaries the mediators were facing in making their decisions. If a mediation effort has not produced an agreement, this does not automatically mean that it has failed, since one should consider whether other attempts at conflict management might have resulted in consequences that were worse. Judgments of success and failure are also directly related to the expectations that analysts have of the feasibility of conflict management in general and mediation in particular. In this respect, a distinction is often made between conflict settlement (e.g., controlling conflict in such a way as to neutralize and dampen its negative, destructive consequences) and resolution (e.g., eliminating the roots of conflict). The difference between these expectations draws upon different perspectives that analysts hold about the origins of conflict. Those who think settlement is the maximum goal to be achieved by means of mediation assume that the root causes of conflict are intrinsic to the relations between the actors or to international politics as a whole. If conflict is seen to be intrinsic to society, one asserts that regardless of which people, communities, or states interact, conflict will always be present or looming. It may be due, for example, to aggressive impulses in human nature, structures of domination, or the fundamental scarcity of vital resources. This produces a satisfying, if not a fatalistic, view of the possibilities for conflict management. On the other hand, conflict may also be considered a social artifact, a result of misperception, miscommunication, and mismanagement. In this view, human nature, social structures, and scarce resources have no fixed meanings, but they are contingent upon time and place and on the eye of the beholder. This being the case, a mediator may be expected to help resolve the roots of conflict rather than just control its side effects: communication strategies and management styles are within the realm of rational argument. Assurance, explanation, and persuasion may be important means of transforming confrontational into cooperative modes of interaction. This view entails a more optimistic perspective on the feasibility of international mediation. It also tends to produce more critical judgments of historical cases. Because of these implicit dimensions in judgment, debates among mediation analysts resemble a "dialogue des sourds" (Bovens and 't Hart, 1996: 22): analysts use the same words (e.g., "settlement," "resolution," "success," "failure") but refer to (very) different things. They

18

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Mediation

may, for example, agree that a particular cease-fire or peace agreement is to be considered a success but may disagree completely on the reasons why this is so. This conceptual and normative confusion hampers the development of mediation theory and is the source of ambiguities in applying research findings to formulate policy recommendations.

Explaining Mediation Outcomes Suppose we analyze a particular historical account of international mediation, using a theoretically coherent and widely accepted set of evaluation standards. Suppose we further conclude that mediation has been successful. In that case, we would become curious to learn about the conditions and strategies that made it happen. This takes us from the question of assessing mediation outcomes to analyzing their genesis: How can these outcomes be explained? What are the crucial prerequisites for achieving mediation success? The factors believed to be crucial to successful mediation outcomes are often grouped into contextual and process variables (Frei, 1976; Raymond and Kegley, 1985; and Bercovitch, 1992). There is also consensus in the literature that contextual factors consist of variables concerning (1) the dispute, (2) the contending parties and their relationships, and (3) the mediator. Process conditions (4) focus on the nature of mediator activities, for example, the strategies that mediators may employ. Elsewhere, I presented and discussed this body of knowledge in some detail (Kleiboer, 1996). A summary of the main hypotheses and (contradictory) findings on the mediation process is presented in Table 2.1. In Search of the Holy Grail

Not surprisingly, no golden formulas for achieving mediation success have been found since the 1970s. Nevertheless, increased research on international mediation during the last two decades has undoubtedly made for important advances in developing and /or testing hypotheses that might help to explain how success comes about. The numerous case studies have provided us with a broad menu of factors that may affect the outcomes of international mediation and, in some instances, have given us insights into the conditions under which these factors play a role. For example, they have demonstrated that different types of mediators may be successful in different types of conflict situations (Princen, 1992a). The quantitative, large-n analyses, especially the work by Bercovitch and his associates, have provided us

(Re)Constructing International Mediation Theory

19

with weights for a number of key variables that are thought to affect mediation outcomes. Notwithstanding these achievements, there are a number of problems with current studies on international mediation as they stand. First of all, many international mediation studies are marred by conceptual confusion (i.e., when is a conflict ripe for resolution? when can a mediator be considered powerful?). Even if analysts use the same definitions, they seem to refer to quite different phenomena. This is also the reason why most discussions about the factors affecting mediation success have an open-ended character: analysts juxtapose different interpretations but do not really engage them. Second, the borderlines between empirical evidence and conjecture are often blurred. Most of the research is presented as evidence, but it turns out to be based primarily on conjectures, opinions, and ad-hoc observations. For example, the claim that mediator attributes increase his or her chances of gaining acceptance, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of mediation success, is plausible but not yet empirically verified. Moreover, many case studies suffer from design problems: a single case is used simultaneously to derive and test hypotheses. Third, and partly as a consequence of this, the sheer number of prerequisites for achieving mediation success is overwhelming (the fourteen discussed here are only the ones that have gained most attention in research). One may take this as a matter of fact and conclude that international mediation is an overdetermined phenomenon. However, current research has yet to try and determine which factors are more important and why this might be so, for example, to reduce the scope of inquiry (and of policy recommendations) to a more limited number of powerful variables. At times, analysts have tried to assess the relative weight of different variables and have come up with various clusters, yet often without offering a deeper understanding of their significance (Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 299-301). The task at hand is more complex that it may seem, however. At first sight, one may simply propose that analysts should try to agree on some basic definitions of mediation success and achieve greater conceptual clarity in the measurement of independent variables. Moreover, one may suggest that analysts continue to amass data and test hypotheses in a methodologically sound manner in order to develop more robust causal theories indicating which combination of variables best explains mediation outcomes. These suggestions will not suffice, however. The three difficulties of current research on international mediation mentioned previously are, in fact, caused by a more fundamental problem: the absence of more explicitly articulated theories on international conflict and its management, of which mediation theory is a

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