The Mosul Incident of 1909: Its Sociopolitical, Judicial and Military Consequences 9783110796001, 9783110795837

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Nurkan Sever The Mosul Incident of 1909

Islamkundliche Untersuchungen

Volume 351

Nurkan Sever

The Mosul Incident of 1909 Its Sociopolitical, Judicial and Military Consequences

ISBN 978-3-11-079583-7 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-079600-1 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-079610-0 ISSN 0939-1940 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022946312 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Underwood & Underwood, Publisher. The Market Place, Mosul. Iraq, None. [Between 1860 and 1930] Photograph. https://www.loc.gov/item/2020681895/ Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

To my mother, Gülşen Sever For her unconditional love and support

Preface The book you hold in your hands is the improved version of my thesis entitled ’The Mosul Incident of 1909 and Its Sociopolitical, Judicial and Military Consequences’ with the latest updates, editing and additions. This comprehensive study which is based on a long-term archival research was conducted, defended and submitted in a 1-year period between September 2020 and September 2021. The next 15-months process, on the other hand, was devoted to some certain updates, improvements, proofreading and corrections at the stage of converting from thesis to a monograph. As it is almost entirely an archive-based work, the detection, transcription, and interpretation of documents has been a laborious and time-consuming process. Since the bureaucratic language and technical format used by Ottoman state institutions in their official correspondence is particularly my area of interest, it was a pleasure for me to analyze these documents. However, I must admit that the lexiphanic and grandiloquent language in the messages from the quarters such as religious cliques, tribal formations, notables, merchants, and shopkeepers challenged my perception and vocabulary. In particular, interpreting the rhetoric of Sâdât’s messages, which includes praise (methiye), glorification (tâzim) and blessing (takdis), required a serious dictionary search. After all, I still think that my deep interest in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, Institutions and Provincial Authorities encouraged and gave meaning to this work as a driving force behind. While my initial aim was to investigate facts such as corruption, misconduct and administrative violations in administrative authorities and law enforcement agencies, I discovered and completely focused on the Mosul Incident. The fact that many different conflicts, cliques, or authorities were somehow related to the Mosul Incident, and the incident has some consequences that extend to the present day, makes the case a laboratory in itself. Researching this incident gave me the chance to take a closer look at the Post-Constitutional Mosul and to observe the power struggle between the religious cliques inherited from the Hamidian regime and the Unionist (İttihâdçı) clique that began to influence the administration.¹ In addition, this incident has been a unique opportunity to see the historical codes of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute which is also inherited by today’s Iraq. In this way, I hope that the study will make a worthwhile contribution to the Post-Constitutional Ottoman Iraq and Modern Iraq literatures.

 The expression “Post-Constitutional”, which will be used frequently throughout the study, characterizes the “Second Constitutional Era” that started by the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-001

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Preface

This monograph examines the Post-Constitutional provincial history through an incident of public disorder that took place in Ottoman Mosul in 1909. The primary objective of the study is to bring the Mosul Incident to the literature, which has not attracted the necessary attention in neither the Ottoman nor Iraqi historiography until now. The banishment and murder of Sheikh Said Barzanji (Şeyh Said Berzenci) who was the family head of Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya (Sâdât-ı Berzenciyye) as the most influential religious organization of region, created a critical threshold in the history of Mosul. This catastrophic incident had revolted Sâdât (Sayyids), Kurdish tribes (Aşâir-i Ekrâd) and sufi orders (tariqah) against the state authority, almost sparked a civil war in the province and eventually deepened the ethnic discrimination between the Kurdish Sayyids and Arab Ulema. After the incident, some local administrators were also polarized as Anti-Sâdât and Pro-Sâdât, the provincial tension reached its peak and the allegations and accusations of the administrators against each other left their mark on the process. In this respect, the study aims to analyze the Post-Constitutional power shifts, the sociopolitical conflicts between different cliques, administrations and ethnicities, provincial security policies and how the state authority managed the crisis after such a catastrophic incident. The study approaches the Mosul Incident from a micro-historical perspective and provides an utterly detailed narrative. Since the subject is covered in an extremely limited scope within the existing literature, the largest part of the research is based on the Ottoman State Archives. For this reason, the incident has been analyzed on a multilayered level through the administrative, judicial, and military archival documents and parliamentary minutes. Some personal accounts related to the incident, such as memoirs and travel books, were partially utilized as well. Eventually, the study demonstrated us that how the tension accumulated among different sociopolitical groups turned into a minor civil war after an ordinary street incident. The fact that Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya is a socioeconomic class or a supra identity that can organize mass movements by incorporating sub-religious and tribal elements, played a major role in the expansion of the crisis. However, it was also evident that the allegations and suspicions on the local administrators pushed the process into a vicious circle. As the study indicated, the state authority chose to carry out small-scale military and judicial reforms in order to cope with the crisis and keep down the repercussions of the incident. As a result of the long investigation and trial process, 11 of the 291 detainees were executed, 127 were convicted of major and minor crimes, and 153 were acquitted. Finally, I would like to commemorate the people whose support I have seen during this difficult process. I am grateful to my thesis advisor Associate Profes-

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sor M. Talha Çiçek, for his valuable guidance, advice, and revisions. I am delighted to have gained my first professional experience in historiography under the supervision of an academician like him, who has a great command of Middle Eastern History and has a great reputation in this discipline. In order to be able to utilize extensively from the archive and to read handwritten (riqa) documents, I took online lessons for two months from Ottoman Archive Expert Orhan Sakin who teaches at the Kubbealtı Foundation. I would like to express my gratitude to him as these lessons and his command of his discipline have helped me a lot at this point. I am also grateful for SALT Research’s contribution in providing rare and valuable photographs of the period. Their collections constitute one of the most prominent visual references for researchers studying on Ottoman History. The professional contributions of Sophie Wagenhofer and Katharina Zühlke from De Gruyter in transforming the thesis into a monograph were just like a Publishing 101 class for a fresh author like me. Thanks to these two ladies, I had a good grasp of the differences between the mentalities, technical qualities and reader expectations of the thesis and the book. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother for her unconditional love and support, even though I sometimes weakened, lost my focus, and even almost gave up during this long research. Without my mother’s encouragement, faith and empathy in me, this book would probably have been incomplete or failed.

Contents Notes on Transliteration List of Abbreviations List of Diagrams List of Tables

XIII XV

XVII XIX

List of Illustrations

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

Introduction: Unearthing and Historicizing the Mosul Incident



The State Authority and Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya in the Second Constitutional Era 18 18 Repercussions of the Young Turk Revolution in Mosul Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya as a Social Class Against Shia Expansionism 22 Transition from Hamidian Regime to the Constitutional 29 Monarchy Deep-rooted Dispute Between Sâdât and Ağavât 32 Allegations Against Sheikh Said and his ‘Society of Unionist Charity’ 36 (Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye) Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul 42 Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate as a Controversial Place of Duty 49 CUP’s Problematic Entity in Mosul 77

. . . . . . . .

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89  The Mosul Incident in the Context of Organized Violence . The Transformation of an Individual Violation into the Province-wide Chaos 89 . The Transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk 106 . The Mosul Incident Through Different Narratives 113 . The Mosul Incident Through the Eyes of Ottoman Military Officers 134  Reflections of the Mosul Incident on the Parliament . Parliamentary Disaccord Regarding the Incident

148 148

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. . .

Shifting Views Between Executive and Legislative Powers 168 175 Categorization of Motions The Criminal Complaint Filed by Mufti Abdülaziz Against Sâdât 177

 Deepening and Expansion of the Crisis 185 185 . Sâdât’s Seek of Justice . Sâdât’s Seek of Revenge 199 . Appointment of Ahmed Reşid Pasha as the Governor of Mosul . Prosecution of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik 256

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 Judgement and Sentencing 282 . Post-incident Configuration of the Mosul’s Judicial Organization 282 296 . Investigation, Arrests and Trial . Amnesty Requests by Reshid al-Omari 314 . Convictions 334 

Conclusion: Tracing the Origins of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute in the Mosul Incident 344

Chronological Course of Events Bibliography 368  Archival Sources  Published Sources  Internet Sources Index

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368 368 372

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Notes on Transliteration It is quite challenging to ensure grammatical, phonetic and etymological consistency when transliterating a study that contains Ottoman Turkish as well as Kurdish and Arabic words. Linguistic multiplicity, mutual resemblances and cross-cultural interactions are, of course, inevitable in a structure such as the Ottoman Empire, which includes many different and intertwined cultures, ethnicities and geographies. Although all archival documents used in the study were written in Ottoman Turkish, the etymological diversity precludes the application of a uniform transliteration method. Therefore, at this point, a multiform transliteration is applied, and typologies are taken as basis rather than etymologies. Proper names of Kurdish and Arabic origin such as tribes, tariqahs and families are transliterated in accordance with the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). Ottoman Turkish versions of these proper names are given next to them in Latinized and sometimes in Arabicized formats on their first appearance in the text. Hamawand (Hemavend – ‫)ﻫﻤﻮﻧﺪ‬ Khalidiyya (Hâlidiyye) Barzanji (Berzenci – ‫) ﺑﺮﺯﻧﺠﯽ‬

When referring to the names of individuals, a distinction is made as follows in order not to confuse the reader and to create a more understandable text: In case names of Arabic, Persian or Kurdish origin have a common transliteration in Ottoman Turkish, I use the latter. However, the names of local Arab and Kurdish figures such as the tariqah leaders are referred to in their transliterated versions, which are adopted and widely used in international literature. Abdülhamid instead of Abdel Hameed, Abdul Hameed or Abdulhamid Tevfik instead of Tawfiq or Tewfik Reşid instead of Reshid or Rashid Reshid al-Omari instead of Reşid el-Ömeri Abdulqadir al-Ghailani instead of Abdülkadir Geylânî Baba Rasul al-Barzanji instead of Baba Resûl el-Berzenci

All topographic names outside the boundaries of Turkey are written in English as they are adopted in the modern international literature. While referring to the locations within the geography of modern Turkey, the Ottoman versions were adhered to in order to preserve and reflect their historical and administrative authenticity. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-002

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Notes on Transliteration

Sulaymaniyah instead of Süleymaniye Qaratughan instead of Karadoğan Gjirokastra instead or Ergiri or Argyrocastro Kırkkilise instead of Kirk Kilise or Kırklareli Diyarbekir or Diyâr-ı Bekr instead of Diyar Bakr or Diyarbakır Karahisar-ı Şarki instead of Shebin-Karahisar or Şebinkarahisar

Ottoman and Islamic titles, positions, offices and honorifics were used in their commonly adopted forms in English. Sayyid instead of Seyyid or Seyyit Agha instead of Ağa Sheikh-ul-Islam instead of Şeyhülislâm

Instead of Latinizing the names of the institutions, common or appropriate English equivalents are preferred. Society of Unionist Charity for the Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye instead of ‘Jamiyyat alKhayriyya al-Ittihadiyya’ Council of State for the Şûrâ-yı Devlet instead of ‘Shura-yi Dawlat’

In the Turkish transcriptions of the Ottoman texts, I tried to be as faithful to the original Ottoman Turkish orthography as possible. In order to provide a more accurate reading, I preferred â instead of a, and û instead of u, especially in frequently referred words. The original Ottoman versions of the consonants b, c, d and g, which are adopted as p, ç, t and k in modern Turkish, have also been preserved. mahkûmiyet instead of mahkumiyet Nezâret instead of Nezaret teb’id instead of tebit gasb instead of gasp

Apart from these, all the Ottoman archival documents referenced and textualized in the footnotes have been transcribed into Turkish orthography and translated into English, by myself. The translation of direct quotations from Turkish sources into English (including the parliamentary minutes) is entirely my own. However, in direct quotations from both English and Turkish sources, I adhered to the original version in the source. The dates of the archive documents were converted from Rumi Calendar to the Gregorian, and both dates have been preserved in the footnotes. Except for direct quotations from English, all archival transcriptions, textual translations and transliterations in the book are my own.

List of Abbreviations BEO BOA / COA CUP DH.İD DH.MKT DH.MUİ DH.ŞFR DH.TMIK HR.SFR.4 İ.AS İ.DUİT İ.MF İ.ML İ.TAL JTF KNMAP KSMAP QRF SMU SUC ŞD Y.A.HUS Y.A.RES Y.PRK.ASK Y.PRK.HR Y.EE.KP

Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası Başbakanlık / Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi Committee of Union and Progress Dahiliye Nezareti İdare Evrakı Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi Dahiliye Muhaberat-ı Umumiye İdaresi Evrakı Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Evrakı Dahiliye Nezareti Tesri-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu Hariciye Nezareti Paris Sefareti Belgeleri İrade Askeri İrade Dosya Usulü İrade Maarif İrade Maliye İrade Taltifat Joint Task Force Kurdish Newspaper for Mutual Aid and Progress Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress Quick Reaction Force Society of Mohammedan Union Society of Unionist Charity Şura-yı Devlet Evrakı Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askeri Maruzat Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Hariciye Nezareti Maruzatı Yıldız Sadrazam Kamil Paşa Evrakı

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List of Diagrams Diagram 1: Schematic analysis of Unionist, Kurdist and Arabist Blocs Diagram 2: The concept of Nativeness through the origins, operations, and garrisons of military forces Diagram 3: The parties, motivations and determining factors of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute on different grounds of the Mosul Incident

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List of Tables Table 1: The parliamentary composition over the legitimacy of the Executive Power and the authority of the Legislative Power regarding the Sheikh Said’s case Table 2: Most voiced motions by the deputies Table 3: Less voiced motions by the deputies Table 4: Ringleaders who coordinated and commanded the Siege of Sulaymaniyah Table 5: Appointments made to the Mosul’s Judicial Organization Table 6: Convictions rendered after the Mosul Incident trial

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List of Illustrations Illustration 1: Illustration 2: Illustration 3: Illustration 4:

Illustration 5: Illustration 6:

Illustration 7:

Illustration 8:

Illustration 9: Illustration 10: Illustration 11:

Illustration 12:

Illustration 13:

Illustration 14: Illustration 15:

Illustration 16: Illustration 17:

Illustration 18:

Mosul Deputy Mehmed Ali Fâzıl Effendi Mosul Deputy Dâvud Yusufâni Effendi Former Mosul Governor Zeki Pasha. As one of the Western Army Commanders (Garb Ordusu Kumandanlarından) during the Balkan Wars BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326 – 16 September 1908 The complaint submitted by the Ağavât (Landlords) of Sulaymaniyah to the Prosecutor’s Office regarding Sheikh Said and his affiliates BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324 – 25 February 1909 The 6 pages Manifest of Sâdât BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324 – 10 January 1909 The letter sent by Major Reşid of Erbil Reserve Battalion (Redif Taburu) to the Ministry of War, including his observations, concerns and allegations regarding the Mosul Incident BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324 – 18 January 1909 The letter sent by First Lieutenant (Mülâzım-ı Evvel) Mehmed Sâlim who was stationed in Mosul, to his friend İbrahim Edhem in the 2nd Army, including his witnessing, observations, concerns and allegations regarding the Mosul Incident. BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324 – 08 February 1909 The cover letter sent by İbrahim Edhem from the 2nd Army to the Ministry of Interior regarding Mehmed Sâlim’s letter. Zor Deputy Hızır Lütfi Bey Diyarbekir Deputy Pirinççizâde Ârif Effendi BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10 attached to Lef 11 (26 January 1909) The Petition of Sulaymaniyah Mufti Abdülaziz, which disclosed the alleged crimes of Sheikh Said and aroused discussion at the Parliament. BOA, DH.MKT.2776/89/Lef 3, 24 Kânûnusâni 1324 – 06 February 1909 The telegram sent by Naqshbandiyya, Khalidiyya and Qadiriyya Sheikhs in Erbil to the Sultan and the Parliament regarding the Mosul Incident BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324 – 23 February 1909 The telegram sent to the Grand Vizirate by more than 100 Notables from Sulaymaniyah under the leadership of Deputy Accountant Mârûf. Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said Effendi BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909 Serious accusations by the Former Head Clerk of the Shariah Court of Sulaymaniyah (Sâbık Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkâtibi) Abdülfettah against the Governor Reşid Reşid Pasha, the New Governor (Vâli-i Cedid) of Erzurum BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325 – 17 April 1909 The encrypted telegram sent by Governor Reşid to the Ministry of Interior regarding the prosecution and indictment of Sub-Governor Tevfik BOA, MV.124/19, 05 Muharrem 1327 – 27 January 1909 The Decree by the Council of Ministers on the reorganization of the Mosul’s

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List of Illustrations

Illustration 19:

Illustration 20: Illustration 21: Illustration 22:

Illustration 23: Illustration 24:

Illustration 25:

Judicial Organization before the prosecution and trials regarding the Mosul Incident BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324 – 16 February 1909 The memorandum sent by the Minister of Justice, Manyasizâde Refik Bey, to the Grand Viziership regarding the appointments made to the Mosul’s Judiciary. 4th Army Commander Marshall (Müşir) İbrâhim Pasha The request for amnesty in which Reshid al-Omari emphasized Arabism BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 19, 27 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 10 December 1909 The request for amnesty sent by Reshid al-Omari directly to the Minister of Interior Talât Pasha BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326 – 12 June 1910 The Second Manifest of Sâdât sent to the Sheikh-ul-Islam BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 5, 4 Temmuz 1326 – 17 July 1910 The telegram from the Acting Governor Mirlivâ Tevfik reporting the convictions of the Mosul Incident trial. DH.MUİ.1/40/ Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326 – 01 August 1910 The declaration demanding the amnesty of those convicted in the Mosul Incident, sent to the Mosul Deputies and the Mosul Governorate by nearly 300 Mosuli Craftsmen, Shopkeepers and Merchants

XXIII

The visual materials referenced and utilized in the creation of this map can be viewed in the Internet Sources section of the Bibliography. As the provincial borders and administrative divisions were based on the 1892 Cuinet and 1899 Huber maps, they may not reflect the actual boundary lines of 1909. Since it would be extremely difficult and confusing to fit all locations, settlements, tribal formations and demographic facts on the same map, only those mentioned in the book and those necessary for reference were included.

1 Introduction: Unearthing and Historicizing the Mosul Incident Although some incidents have shaped the course of history, they remain buried where they are because they have not been investigated enough. In this respect, unearthing the Mosul Incident and placing it in a historical narrative means much more than closing the chronological gaps within the history of Post-Constitutional Mosul. Because the preferences, policies and practices associated with this particular incident have not been closely examined and interpreted until now. This book identifies the various facts, notions and arguments that a collective violence incident introduced, and develops a contextual framework. Because the Mosul Incident is an extremely important case in terms of associating the origins and motivations of collective violence in modern Iraq with PostConstitutional Iraq. By overcoming the historical rupture between Ottoman Mosul and Modern Iraq, the book eventually questions the continuity, legacy and causality of violence in Iraqi history. The actual motivation behind this book is the deep interest towards Mosul’s domestic security conditions and the provincial law enforcement agencies during the Second Constitutional era. As an Ottoman province hosted by ancient Mesopotamia, known as the cradle of civilizations and comprised of fertile lands between the Euphrates and Tigris, Mosul deserves a chief interest on the historical scene of Iraq. Since the modern Iraq inherited the sociocultural codes of Ottoman bureaucracy, understanding the Ottoman provincial authorities becomes relevant and vital for a better understanding of today’s Iraq. Fewness of studies on the Middle East of the Second Constitutional era always pushed me to study on provincial histories for closing the gaps and contribute to building modern histories. Besides, particularly Mosul had always drawn my attention as a province of clashing interests and as a center of gravity between Anatolian heartlands and Mesopotamia. Multiplicity of Muslim and Non-Muslim elements, their networks with other countries and exposedness to the power focuses make this province remarkably strategic as well. Tribal mobility is also a key element to understand the Iranian border disputes, British and Russian provocations, and domestic conflicts. In fact, my primary purpose when starting this study was to take a closer look at the public order incidents in Mosul. I was planning to examine the corruption, misconduct, administrative violation, and resort to violence facts in the Provincial Administration and law enforcement units. However, the archival records that I came across at the very beginning of my study took me to a much bigger incident. The document was titled as “Necessary measures were taken https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-008

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1 Introduction: Unearthing and Historicizing the Mosul Incident

to end the incident that occurred when a soldier of the Kirkuk mule cavalry harassed the Muslim women while he was drunk”.¹ The major incident triggered by this individual violation mentioned in this document would cost the province several years and occupy the Central Authority for a long time. The incident, which started with the harassment of a Muslim woman by a drunken mule cavalry in a downtown square of Mosul, quickly escalated between Arab and Kurdish elements and later almost turned into a provincial civil war. Therefore, it was directly or indirectly linked to many unexpected developments happening throughout the Mosul province during that period. These developments had left provincial administrators under heavy imputation, even caused their dismissals, and triggered the Siege of Sulaymaniyah by Sâdât-backed irregular forces. Due to public order and security concerns, a Joint Task Force (Müretteb Kuvvet or Kuvve-i Mürettebe) was formed, and the process was closely monitored by the Ministries of Interior, Justice and War. The investigation and trial process of the Mosul Incident had also serious repercussions and resulted in the rebuilding of Mosul’s judicial infrastructure. In short, the Mosul Incident, one of the most critical thresholds of Mosul after the declaration of the Constitution in 1908, was in front of me and was waiting to be solved like a puzzle. The main objective of this book is to analyze the tensions created by the shifting power balances in Post-Constitutional Mosul through different contexts. The Mosul Incident, which occupied even the parliament for a while, is very contributive in terms of understanding the power shift from the religious cliques inherited from the Hamidian period to the Post-Constitutional administrative cadres. The polarization between the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate (Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı) and Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya was allegedly resulted in the conspiracy, banishment (teb’id ~ ‫)ﺗﺒﻌﻴﺪ‬, and murder of Sheikh Said, according to the Sâdât’s point of view.² The banishment and murder of Sheikh Said, an iconic legacy of the Hamidian regime, first provoked religious and tribal groups against the state authority and then resurrected the mutual dislike between Arabs and Kurds, ancient in the Iraqi Lands (Hıtta-i Irâkîye). The study closely examines the claims, complaints, and accusations of both Sulaymaniyah Notables (Ashraf / Eşrâf) and Sâdât as opposing parties. Later, these two opposing parties were articulated with different elements and turned into two separate

 BOA; DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 05 January 1909 “Kerkük Nizamiye ester-süvarlarından bir neferin sarhoş olduğu halde Müslüman kadınlara sarkıntılığıyla çıkan vukuatın sona erdirilmesi için gereken tedbirlerin alındığı. (Musul)”  For a categorical analysis of the distinction between the concepts of Teb’id (Banishment) and Nefy (Exile) in the context of Ottoman Law, see: 2.6 Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul

1 Introduction: Unearthing and Historicizing the Mosul Incident

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blocs or fronts. In the study, it is seen that the Notables of Sulaymaniyah, who received the support of the CUP branch and Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate against the persecution of Sheikh Said, formed a bloc. Sâdât, who formed an alliance with Kurdish tribes, sufi orders, associations and villagers after the banishment and murder of Sheikh Said, seemed to form the other bloc. However, the study indicates that the Arab Ulema from Mosul, who was later involved in the equation and actively participated in the Mosul Incident formed a third bloc with Mosul Notables and changed the course of events at all costs. This bloc, whose spokesman was Reshid al-Omari (Reşid el-Ömeri - ‫ )ﺭﺷﻴﺪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﺮﻱ‬as the founder of the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union (Cemiyet-i İttihâdiye-i Muhammediye), claimed that they were unjustly stigmatized and criminalized after the incident. The intention and solidarity of the Mosuli Ulema and Notables in this incident is an extremely valuable example to have a grasp of the genetics of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute that has reached presentday Iraq. Therefore, the study traces an incident that occurred with the involvement of these three parties, tries to understand the strategic backgrounds of each party, and shows what a multi-layered public disorder incident in the Ottoman locality might cost. At this point, the different views and dissensus of bureaucrats and Governors towards Sheikh Said and the Mosul Incident are also observed in the study. For instance, in front of the Unionist Governor Zeki, who was thought to be Anti-Sâdât from his critical discourse; we see Governor Reşid, who was thought to be Pro-Sâdât from his sympathetic discourse and whom he was alleged to protect and favor Sâdât through different alliances. While Zeki was alleged of being a spectator or even favoring in the alleged conspiracy against Sâdât, Reşid was seen as the bureaucrat who exposed the conspiracy network and justified Sâdât. The fact that both Governors were subjected to such contrast and contradictory allegations shows how different the attitudes of local bureaucrats can be in the face of such a large-scale public incident. However, this dissensus was not only among local bureaucrats. As we will see in some inter-Ministerial correspondence, the Minister of War Ali Rızâ Pasha had adopted a more cautious, objective and even moderate attitude towards Sheikh Said after his banishment. Despite allegations from the Ministry of Interior (Dâhiliye Nezâreti), he argued that Said should not be accused without a detailed investigation and even praised Said’s symbolic position in the entire Kurdish community. Of course, these can be perceived as the views of a pragmatic statesman who does not attempt to confront and provoke the Kurdish community in the region. Consequently, the ultimate aim of studying Mosul Incident is to shed light on Post-Constitutional bureaucracy on Mosul, to observe the Provincial Administra-

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1 Introduction: Unearthing and Historicizing the Mosul Incident

tion shifts closely, and to analyze the power struggle between Sâdât and the state authority after the Hamidian regime. The study focuses especially on two Governors, the Governorship of Zeki, when the incident broke out, and the Governorship of Reşid, when the investigations intensified. In the first part of the study, it will be examined how the network of relations between Sulaymaniyah authorities and Sâdât caused Sheikh Said to be banished from Sulaymaniyah. Here, the Society of Unionist Charity (Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye), which was established under the leadership of Sheikh Said and perceived as a rival to the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti) Sulaymaniyah branch, gains additional importance. In addition, the duality of the CUP Mosul branch and their intervention in the function of the Provincial Administration will be examined under a separate chapter and will shed light on the Post-Constitutional atmosphere in Mosul. The second part, on the other hand, analyzes how the Mosul Incident occurred in general and how provincial administrators were unable to manage the crisis. Different personal narratives revealing the brutality experienced and the allegations of negligence and conspiracy were also reviewed within the framework of this incident. The reflections of the incident in the existing literature are also studied from different aspects. The third part takes a closer look at the parliamentary reflections of the incident through the opinions of the deputies. In particular, the questioning of the legitimacy of the Local Administration, which is the representative of the executive power, is deeply analyzed. In addition, the issue of whether the chamber of deputies has the authority and jurisdiction over the incident, is also noticeable in the discussions. Fourth part is important in terms of showing how the crisis deepened and spread throughout the province. Sâdât’s siege of Sulaymaniyah with the motive of seeking justice and revenge, provincial transformation between Zeki’s and Reşid’s administrations and the accusations against the Sub-Governor (Mutasarrıf) Tevfik of Sulaymaniyah form the building blocks of the post-incident period. The allegations of Reşid’s patronage over Sâdât, and his controversial dismissal are also critical in terms of seeing the pace of administrative transformation in Mosul. The last part focuses on the judiciary system and examines the impact of the Mosul Incident on the judicial structure of Mosul. The functioning of the trial, how the authorities managed the judicial process, the requests for amnesty by the detainees during their detention and the insistence of the Mosul Notables on the innocence of the convicts are also reviewed in this context.

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Literature Review and Primary Sources When the modern literature on Ottoman Mosul is scanned, it is seen that the most researched topics are the Mosul Question that marked the 1922 – 23 Lausanne Conference, economic ambitions based on oil reserves, the Ottoman-Iranian border conflicts and the Post-World War Kurdish revolts. As the literature on the Post-Constitutional Mosul is quite scarce, the sources referring the Mosul Incident consists of a few particular studies zoomed in to the 19th century Iraq through a sociocultural prism. However, some preliminary readings may be helpful before analyzing the incident and placing it in its rightful place in the historical narrative. At the first stage, it will be much more rewarding to approach from the general to the specific and to view the repercussions of the Constitutional Monarchy in the Arab provinces from a macro perspective. Although not specific to Iraq, Elie Kedourie’s analysis on the gradual alteration from the Absolutism to Constitutionalism within the Arab provinces offers a good grasp of the sociopolitical tensions after the Young Turk Revolution.³ Hasan Kayalı’s study, which considers the Arab political awakening as a ‘Sociopolitical Reflex’ against the Young Turk secularism and displays the political panorama of the CUP within Arab provinces, can also be considered as a crucial prereading.⁴ In studies specific to Ottoman Iraq, it will be stimulating not to ignore the social basis of the Mosul Incident and to concentrate on sociopolitical and sociocultural narratives rather than mainstream political history. At this point, Stephen Hemsley Longrigg’s both classical books which regarded as the precursors of modern sociocultural studies on Iraq, still remain as the most cited works on Iraqi historiography.⁵ By creating an analytical framework on the profiles and policies of the Hamidian Governors, Gökhan Çetinsaya profoundly scrutinizes how the Ottoman authority was configured within the Iraqi provinces and interacted with other provincial actors.⁶ Focusing on the impacts of Tanzimat modernization and Hamidian centralization in Iraq, Ebubekir Ceylan’s book is a tremendous contribution to see the prior stages and backgrounds of the Post-

 Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies, (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1974)  Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908 – 1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)  Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925); Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953)  Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, (Oxford: SOAS Routledge,2006)

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Constitutional political awareness in Iraqi provinces.⁷ The book which covers the introduction, implementation and reflections of reforms such as the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and the Provincial Law of 1864 in Iraq, stands out as a highly innovative one.⁸ Sinan Marufoğlu’s study addressing a long time span such as 1834– 1914 renders a geographic, demographic and statistical guide on the tribes and minorities that make up the Northern Iraq communities.⁹ Burcu Kurt’s book which suggested that there was both a continuity and a rupture between the Hamidian and Constitutional periods in Basrah and particularly focused on the position of the local elite within the centralization policies, received great appreciation.¹⁰ In the third group, there are rare studies focused entirely on Ottoman Mosul and they are quite necessary to grasp the political, economic and human geographies of the province. I must note that Davud Hut’s dissertation focused on the administrative, sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformation of Mosul between Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet eras, was one of the major resources that guided me many times throughout my study.¹¹ Sarah Shield’s book which can be regarded as a study of social and urban history to a great extent, is a great contribution to see the larger geographical, economic, and political boundaries that intersect with Mosul.¹² The coverage of sociopolitical tensions, crises and public incidents that the Post-Constitutional Governors experienced, makes this work an incredibly unique piece of material. In the last group, the studies on the identity politics, proto-nationalism and social status of the Kurdish entities within the Ottoman Empire, will be very informative. Wadie Jwaideh’s book is a great contribution to grasp the imperialist drives and tribal dynamics behind the Kurdish Nationalism which was triggered against the Ottoman authorities in Northern Iraq after the Young Turk Revolu-

 Ebubekir Ceylan, The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2011)  While referring to the Ottoman land reforms in Iraq, we should note that the most important study on this subject is Keiko Kiyotaki’s 1997 doctoral thesis titled Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad. This work was also published as a book in 2019: Keiko Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Reform in the Province of Baghdad (Leiden: Brill, 2019)  Sinan Marufoğlu, Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak (1831 – 1914), (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1998)  Burcu Kurt, Osmanlı Basra’sında Devlet ve Toplum 1908 – 1914 (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2015)  Davud Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, İktisadi ve Sosyal Yapısı 1864 – 1909, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Marmara University, 2006)  Sarah D. Shields, Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000)

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tion.¹³ In order to recognize the sociopolitical positions, hierarchical structures and successions of Shaikhly Families within Kurdish geography, and to comprehend the historical legacy of the Barzanji family in the Qadiriyya (Kadiriyye) network in particular, Martin Van Bruinessen’s classical study is a masterpiece.¹⁴ Deniz Ekici’s innovative book, on the other hand, traces the Ottoman-Kurdish identity which oscillated between Sunni doctrine and ethnocentric consciousness, by probing into the Kurdish journalism and Kurdish intellectual discourse.¹⁵ Although the course and reflections of the Mosul Incident are superficially found in the works of Kedourie, Shields ad Jwaideh, five personal accounts come to the fore for more detailed narratives. The first is Gertrude Lowthian Bell’s travel book which presented the Mosul Incident and the background of Sheikh Said in a very detailed narrative, praised and heroized Sheikh Said in a biased manner and criticized the CUP administration harshly.¹⁶ Another prominent travel book was written by Ely Bannister Soane who was a British military officer, linguist and intelligence agent.¹⁷ His work unfolds some rare details such as the attack on Tevfik Pasha’s caravan which I have only encountered in archival documents. The third personal account is an official report prepared by Soane again and submitted to the Indian Government confidentially in 1910.¹⁸ Under the title of Sheikh Families in Southern Kurdistan, Sheikh Said and the Mosul Incident are particularly focused and the power struggle between the Sheikhs and the Ottoman authorities is mentioned. Horace Edward Wilkie Young, the British Consul in Mosul, who is mentioned in many studies such as Kedourie, Shields, Kansu and Hut and had many correspondence and reports in the catalogue of

 Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development (1960) International Relations, Dissertations 8, Syracuse University, New York ; Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006)  Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1992) The term Shaikhly Families which belongs to Bruinessen, here defines the socio-familistic structures that have a higher religious identity apart from Kurdish Tribes and Sunni Orders and are connected to each other by blood ties. The term will be discussed and elaborated in the section of 2.2 Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya as a Social Class Against Shia Expansionism.  Deniz Ekici, Kurdish Identity, Islamism, and Ottomanism: The Making of a Nation in Kurdish Journalistic Discourse (1898 – 1914), (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021)  Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Amurath to Amurath, (London: William Heinemann, 1911)  Ely Bannister Soane, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, (Boston: Small Maynard and Company Publishers, 1912)  Ely Bannister Soane, Report on the Sulaimania district of Kurdistan, Calcutta: [Govt of India – Foreign Dept], 1910

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British Foreign Office (FO), is a remarkable personality in Mosul history.¹⁹ His 6 pages report titled Mosul in 1909 includes a short but a striking section on the Mosul Incident beyond its valuable contribution to the geographic, sociocultural, ethnoreligious, and administrative chronicles of late Ottoman Mosul. Unfortunately, as there was no chance to visit the British Archives during the study process, Young’s other correspondence regarding the incident could not be reached. Some of his correspondences in the existing literature have been added to the study by quoting from Hut’s dissertation or from Kedourie’s and Shields’ interpretations. The fifth personal account on the incident is the memoirs of Refik Hilmi who was one of the revolutionist leaders of Mahmud Barzanji movement and who was also a member of the Sulaymaniyah Kurdish cabinet in the 1920s.²⁰Hilmi mentions Sheikh Said’s relations with the palace and narrates the Mosul Incident by heroizing the victims and accusing the Governor. However, since Bell, Soane, Young and Hilmi’s works were built on personal opinions, they were far from giving the Ottoman authorities’ views on the subject. Ottoman archival sources were properly processed to analyze Ottoman policies and stance in the face of incident, to see how the state authority coped with the crisis, and to understand the reactions of local administrators to such a large-scale public disorder incident. In this respect, it can be thought that the study will also contribute to the history of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the context of Mosul. Ultimately, the background of this incident in front of us gives clues of the transition from the Hamidian bureaucracy to the Unionist bureaucracy and proves how a large-scale public security incident can cause a fluctuation and transformation in the administrative, judicial and military cadres.

Methodology Since this monograph is built on the history of provincial administration, law enforcement and bureaucracy, the impressions left by the incident on the state authorities are of the greatest importance. Thus, the book mainly uses the Ottoman sources as archival material and sets out to observe the policies, strategies and reactions of both the Ottoman authorities and Sâdât to the incident. Before nar-

 Horace Edward Wilkie Young (bef. 1877– 1914), https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Young-27030, Access Date: 17.10. 2021 H. E. Wilkie Young and E. K. “Mosul in 1909”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 229 – 235  Refik Hilmi, Anılar: Tanığının Dilinden Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2010)

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rowing the scope, more than 1300 archive files were listed between 1886 – 1918; and of these, an average of 500 documents were viewed, transcribed, and studied between 1899 – 1910. Since most of it is an archive-based work, various data from different authorities have been synthesized and integrity has been tried to be achieved. The different sub-processes within the incidents and, in some cases, contradictory claims have also been preserved in order to ensure integrity. Turkish transcribed versions of many archival statements are given in footnotes and Turkish terminology such as ranks, titles and departments are also presented intertextually as an alternative. Civil, military, and judicial cadres and authorities were added to the study in order to guide and contribute to the further research. The movements, deployments and amounts of military units are also included in the text in order to show the tactical assessment and magnitude of the incidents. Arabic lettered versions of authentic names such as villages, tribes and Shaikhly Families are also given along with their Turkish transcription. In other words, all names, places, titles, facts and figures in the archival materials were synthesized and included in the study to create a guide for further research. A chapter is also devoted to the reflections of the incident in the newly established Constitutional Parliament (Meclis-i Mebûsân) and the political confusion it created among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers. This chapter is based on the parliamentary minutes accessed from the online database of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. In addition, by adding a chronological course of events at the end of the text, it was aimed to avoid the confusion created by the events that were intertwined especially in the same time periods. Events in this chronology were listed in the order of the dates they were referred in the correspondence or the dates the telegrams were sent and naturally the exact dates of the events could be different. However, if there was an exact date in the correspondence regarding the date of the event, it was taken as the basis instead of the date of correspondence. The incident has been referred to by many different names in archive documents such as the Mosul Incident (Musul Vukuatı), the Feast Incident (Bayram Vukuatı – Vak’ası), the Mosul Massacre (Musul Katliamı), the Second Karbala Incident (Vak’a-i Kerbelâ’nın Sânisi – İkinci Vak’a-i Kerbelâ), the Known Incident (Hâdise-i Mâlûme), the Disastrous Incident (Hâdise-i Fecia), the Feast of Sacrifice Incident (Kurban Bayramı Hâdisesi – Meselesi), the Mosul Disaster (Musul Fâciası – Musul Vak’a-i Feciası), and the Sheikh Said Incident (Şeyh Said Vukuatı). However, it cannot be said that this incident, which is considered as a historical marker or even a threshold in Mosul history, finds itself in a detailed place in the late Ottoman or modern Iraqi histography. Particularly in academic studies on Iraqi political history or on the last period of Ottoman Mosul; it is not possible to find comprehensive information on the Mosul Incident. The fact that the most

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detailed accounts on the incident consist of personal memoirs instead of archival studies and the lack of academic studies on Post-Constitutional Mosul can be considered as the main reasons for this. This incident, with its intricate pattern and all background details, has remained in the archive and has not been studied.

An Analytical Framework Mosul Incident is particularly remarkable in terms of analyzing the bureaucratic transformation between the provincial administrators and the power shift between the Monarchist and Unionist cliques which appeared in Post-Constitutional Mosul. These cliques formed different blocs among themselves, clashed with each other and tried to influence the provincial politics and administration. The study also zooms in the facts such as corruption, misconduct, forgery, and administrative violations in the provincial administration through certain conspiracy allegations against administrators and authorities. Allegations that the Mosul Incident was based on a conspiracy by the Anti-Sâdât administration, and the Sheikhs were protected by the succeeding Pro-Sâdât administration in a partisan fashion were at the center of these conspiracies. This remarkable contrast between two Unionist administrations has been contextually analyzed through the allegations and accusations by both the state and nonstate actors. In this section, the key arguments, facts, concepts and characters that shaped the study will be elaborated through an analytical framework. The argument of Power Shift (Güç Kayması), which is elaborated on different cases throughout the study, approaches the transition between the two regimes through various cliques and characters. The power that had been concentrated and shared between the Shaikhly Families, Sunni Tariqahs, and Kurdish Tribes during the Hamidian regime would now be taken over by extensions of the CUP. The political, economic and ideological power that Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya had accumulated during the Hamidian regime suffered a major break with the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy. Afterwards, it is clearly observed that this power vacuum in Sulaymaniyah was largely filled by the Unionist clique and Jaf Chief (Caf Aşireti Reisi) Mahmud Pasha. It is quite possible that the landlords of Sulaymaniyah (Aghawat / Ağavât), who has an ancient enmity with Sâdât, also turned this power vacuum into an opportunity, and particularly those who had affiliations with the CUP branch gained power with the Constitutional Monarchy. The fact of Banishment (Teb’id), which is analyzed in depth in the study, has an extremely symbolic and strategic importance as it paves the way for a social

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disaster such as the Mosul Incident. The Unionist authority had both proven its power by interfering with a 700-year-old dynasty blessed in Iran and Iraq territories and displayed that it could destroy the legacy of Despotism regime in Sulaymaniyah. It was expected that the displacement of these Sheikhs from their homelands (deterritorialization) and their separation from their families would turn into a symbol of supremacy and victory for the Unionist regime. The provincial administration which expulsed the supreme leaders of Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul, dealt a major blow to the SUC, the sociopolitical organization and lobbying instrument of Sâdât in Sulaymaniyah. The Unionist authority, which banished the decision makers of Sâdât to Mosul, separated the congregation from their Sheikh in theological respect and separated the affiliates from their leader in organizational respect. Furthermore, their connections with Kurdish tribes such as Hamawand, and Sunni orders such as Qadiriyya, which were their major collaborators, were severely interrupted. Strategic importance was based on the dissolution of this organization and its disconnection from other elements. The concept of Misconduct (Memûriyeti Su-i istimâl), which was my initial motivation for the research, and the fact of Conspiracy Allegation (Komplo İddiası) that sprouted on it, constitute the Administrative History-oriented parts of the study. All four prominent conspiracy allegations in the study were directed against the provincial administrators. The Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy, which is alleged to be organized with the aim of banishing Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah, and the Mosul Conspiracy, which is alleged to be organized with the aim of raiding Said’s mansion and murdering him; can be considered as two stages of the same plot. The driving forces behind a conspiracy to banish Said from Sulaymaniyah can be listed as the concessions and powers that Barzanjiyya gained in the Hamidian regime, their persecution on the community and Notables of Sulaymaniyah; and their uncontrollable Anti-Constitutionalism, which began to threaten even the Unionists in Sulaymaniyah. The driving force behind the Mosul Conspiracy was the further provocation of an isolated incident between Arab-Kurdish military elements through manipulating the Arab-Kurdish Schism within the Mosul’s Ulema and Military. While the Sulaymaniyah stage of the conspiracy was alleged to be organized by the tripartite alliance consisting of Sub-Governor Tevfik, Commander Mustafa and Jaf Chief Mahmud; the Mosul stage was alleged to be organized by his relative, Major Ali Said and the Mosuli Ulema. The other two conspiracy allegations were both attributed to Governor Reşid, who was known to be Pro-Sâdât and allegedly served the purposes of patronizing and justifying Sâdât. At a certain point, Governor Reşid seemed to have taken it as a mission to defend Sâdât’s rights and liberties and to ensure the manifestation of justice on behalf of Sâdât. The first allegation of conspiracy against

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Governor Reşid was brought forward by Sub-Governor Tevfik, who was in the spotlight after a promissory note (sened) revealing his connection to the Mosul Incident was seized. Although it is not clear from the correspondence whether he meant this particular promissory note, Sub-Governor Tevfik accused Governor Reşid of forging documents against him. Could Reşid have resorted to such a forgery to secure the conviction of Tevfik, whom he considers responsible for the Mosul Incident? The allegations that Reşid covered up Sâdât’s criminal records and that he met with Commander İzzet Pasha and the Sheikhs in Kirkuk in order to facilitate their return to Sulaymaniyah can also be considered as a component of Reşid’s favoritism and patronage towards Sâdât. The second major allegation of conspiracy was brought by Reshid al-Omari, the prime suspect and detainee of the Mosul Incident. Al-Omari claimed that Governor Reşid had unfoundedly incriminated him just because of his hate for the vision, mission, and achievement of the Society of Mohammedan Union. The common point of both conspiracy allegations against Reşid was ‘the unfoundedness’ and they both likely made his civil service in Mosul controversial and paved the way for his premature dismissal. Although these allegations have been analyzed in depth in the study; no warning, investigation, lawsuit or suspension could be found against Governor Reşid in the archival records. We do not have any evidence that Reşid who has taken the manifestation of justice in the name of Sâdât as a mission, could go this far. Another pillar which the narrative of the thesis built on is the argument of Bloc (Blok), which depicts the strategic partnerships involved in various conflicts of interest with each other (see Diagram 1). When the entire study is regarded, three major blocs which we can consider as the Sulaymaniyah based Unionist Bloc, the Sulaymaniyah based Kurdist Bloc and the Mosul based Arabist Bloc, stand out. These blocs powered by different political, socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic actors, have navigated the course of events from beginning to the end and represented the urban and rural layers of Post-Constitutional Mosul society. The first observed conflict over the intricate relations between the blocs is the ideological one between the Unionist and Monarchist cliques. The second observed conflict is the ethnoreligious one between the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah and the Arabs of Mosul, although they are both Sultanist and Sunni. Although, the reference of ethnoreligious here does not qualify a sectarian conflict, qualifies an ethnic-based (Kurdish-Arab) conflict over two religious’ leaderships (Sâdât-Ulemâ) of two different localities (Sulaymaniyah-Mosul). However, it is not known whether the Mosuli Ulema have any tariqah affiliation in the face of the Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk Sheikhs who belong to the Naqshbandiyya- Qadiriyya orders, and if there is any inter-tariqah rivalry between them.

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SUC Sadaat alBarzanjiyya

Diagram 1: Schematic analysis of Unionist, Kurdist and Arabist Blocs

The concept of Duality (İkilik) appears in many different platforms throughout the study. What is meant by duality here is a distinction based on contrasted variables, visions, mentalities, and origins appeared within different elements. While this duality was embodied as the First and Second Societies within the same CUP formation in Mosul, it was embodied in Sulaymaniyah as two opposing societies, the branches of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Society of Unionist Charity. In the Mosul Governorate, this duality was shaped on the axis of sympathy and affinity to Barzanjiyya Clan and was concretized in the administrations of two Governors who were Anti-Sâdât and Pro-Sâdât. The army also had its share of this duality, and the Kurdish-origin Kirkuk mule cavalry and the Arab-origin Mosul cavalry fought each other as different elements of

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the very same Ottoman Army.²¹ Within the Sunni-Monarchist platform, the duality finds its place in the opposition of Kurdish Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah and Arab Ulemâ of Mosul. The last example we will give is based on the parliamentary debate of the deputies regarding the practice of Sheikh Said’s banishment. While one group of deputies argued that the decision of banishment is within the jurisdiction of the Legislative and Judicial Powers, the other group of deputies defended the initiative of the Executive Power and found the Governor to be fully justified. At some point, the two opposing components in this distinction might need each other to be a meaningful whole as much as they are mutually exclusive. For example, the Governors may have benefited the opposition to each other to legitimize their own administrative moves and policies in their tenures. Or, in the case of Sulaymaniyah, the CUP may have used SUC’s policy as an ultimate goal to overcome and a motivation tool to consolidate its own organizational base. Going through these examples, it can be discussed whether this Duality can be a Dichotomy. However, this is the subject of a completely different research which can be produced through different theories and approaches. The concept of Nativeness (Yerlilik), which was frequently mentioned by the Governor Zeki Pasha especially after the Mosul Incident, was employed for depicting the unreliability of the local elements and perceived in this sense by the state authority (see Diagram 2). The concept covers the unreliability of both native soldiers in the army units and native officials in the judicial organization. Governor Zeki trusts neither the Kurdish-origin mule cavalry of the 48th Regiment of 12th Division stationed in Chamchamal (Çemçemal), nor the Araborigin soldiers of the 33rd Cavalry Regiment (33. Süvâri Alayı) and 46th Regular Army Regiment (46. Nizâmiye Alayı) both stationed in Mosul. It could not be detected in the Ottoman State Archive whether these soldiers had any affiliation to a tribe or a sufi order. However, if any, this may have been one of the major reasons for the state’s distrust of these local forces. At this point, the Ministry of War activated the 4th Army stationed outside Mosul (headquartered in Erzincan) and handed over the public order of urban area and the security of investigation and judicial process to the troops from the 4th Army garrisons. The argument of Nativeness (Yerlilik), on the other hand, constitutes one of the main pillars on which the study is based. This document, which consists of four main notions, can be read as a joint declaration prepared by the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs to legitimize and justify themselves after the Mosul Incident. This document dated February 25, 1909, which is one of the most important turning points

 Mule Cavalry (Ester Süvâr): A unit of cavalry riding mules other than Horses (Esb Süvâr) or Camels (Hecin Süvâr)

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rd

Diagram 2: The concept of Nativeness through the origins, operations, and garrisons of military forces

in Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya’s seek for justice, also serves as a warning against the state. The text glorifying the holiness of Sâdât through different religious motivations, analogies, and symbols, also stood out as a cry for victimization. This rhetoric which allegedly revealed the conspiracy networks against Sâdât, also revealed what strategic partnerships, interests, intentions, and conditions that these networks were relied on. The Sheikhs, who vehemently denied the Caravan Attack attributed to them, claimed that there were others who were fed up with Sub-Governor Tevfik’s persecution and that these might have set up the ambush. Naturally, in this text, Sheikh Said’s holy personality was considered above the blame, his absolute innocence was emphasized, and his honor and dignity were valued above all. But the most crucial part of this rhetoric was the fourth notion, a veiled threat. Barzanjiyya Sheikhs signaled that their collective strength based on different social strata will now emerge and they also argued that this would be far beyond their control.

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It is easily noticed that the fact of Seek of Justice (Adâlet Arayışı) appeared after the Mosul Incident has gradually dominated the entire network of relations between Sâdât and the State Authority. Demands for the Central Authority from different Kurdish social circles, tribes and Kurdish congregations of Sunni orders soon turned into diplomatic pressure through lobbying channels such as the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress (Kürd Teâvün ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in İstanbul. However, according to Sâdât, justice delayed was the justice denied, and after a point this anxious wait turned into the Seek of Revenge (İntikam Arayışı). The Barzanjiyya Sheikhs, who intended to murder Sub-Governor Tevfik with the motivation of revenge, organized the Caravan Ambush with the armed support of the local assets such as Hamawand, and acted to be the masters of the rural. But most importantly, they exhibited that they could easily harm an official local administrator through a vulgar display of power as the most effective means of intimidation. Using a strategic language in the Manifest they sent a few days later, the Sheikhs flatly denied the Caravan Ambush, and claimed that they were with their guests in their own mansions during the attack. Already in official correspondence, there were allegations that the Sheikhs had organized the Hamawand tribesmen remotely, with verbal and written instructions without leaving Kirkuk. On the other hand, the Siege of Sulaymaniyah (Süleymaniye Kuşatması) was the ultimate demonstration of Sâdât’s full defiance. The irregular forces under the command of the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs had blockaded an Ottoman town, disrupted daily life, and proved that they could seize control in the face of authority anytime. One of the most prominent arguments of the study is the post-incident ethnic division between the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah and the Arabs of Mosul despite belonging to the same Islamic sect and doctrine (see Diagram 3). Focusing on the period, there is a general opinion that the consciousness of ethnocentric nationalism has not yet emerged among the Kurds and Arabs in that region. However, some certain emphases, concerns and inspirations particularly reflected in the correspondence after the Mosul Incident suggest that the incident may have originated the codes of ethnic awareness in Mosul at an earlier period. Moreover, the full certainty of this argument depends on proving that the non-sectarian conflict between these two ethnic elements is non-tribal and non-tariqah as well. As no inter-tribal or inter-tariqah rivalry could be detected between these two ethnic elements of Mosul in the Ottoman State Archives, further research based on foreign archives would certainly be eye-opening. In particular, it could not be determined whether the Ulema of Mosul had any tariqah affiliation, and if there was, whether there was a rivalry or conflict between them and the Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, who were affiliated with the Naqshbandiyya- Qadiriyya orders. It is also unknown whether the Kirkuk mule cavalry

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and the Mosuli cavalry have links with rival sufi orders. In this study, the subject is analyzed through the Military, Religion and Judiciary, as the three main platforms where the Arab-Kurdish Dispute is thought to be experienced.

Nativeness

detained Detention, Trial

Diagram 3: The parties, motivations and determining factors of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute on different grounds of the Mosul Incident

2 The State Authority and Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya in the Second Constitutional Era 2.1 Repercussions of the Young Turk Revolution in Mosul The Constitutional Monarchy, which was declared on 23 July 1908, faced different reactions in different provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The pains of the transition from the despotic Hamidian regime that based on Sunni doctrine to the Unionist regime which initially came to power with the claim of embracing other religions, was felt more in the Arab provinces. Considering this, at the first glance, it can be thought that the Mosul Incident (January 05, 1909), which took place between two Muslim (even both Sunni) communities, was not one of the repercussions of the Young Turkish Revolution. However, that would be a very naive assumption, as the revolution so drastically altered many different balances, dynamics, and recognitions where it penetrated. As this book suggested, the alteration and the radicalism behind the Mosul Incident were more than meets the eye. On the other hand, it would be eye opening to review the first impressions of the revolution in the Mosul Province before scrutinizing the incident. Elie Kedourie, based on the British Consulate reports, quotes that the Mosul community initially reacted non-committal to the Young Turk Revolution.²² Since they were not aware of how people reacted and what was changed in the other provinces, they preferred to remain silent and unresponsive. Reports also highlighted that the revival of the constitution was received with bad grace instead of being welcomed. Instead of being enthusiastic over the prospects of liberty, fraternity and parliament; the majority of Mosul strongly opposed to these values which they have taken as a threat to Muslim supremacy. According to Kedourie’s interpretations, the Muslim majority who adopted values such as the Sultan and the Caliph with their whole being, were irritated by the attitudes of those who introduced the Constitutional Monarchy in Mosul. Aykut Kansu, relying on Kedourie and British Consular reports as well, adds that the people of Mosul preferred not to demonstrate in the favor or against the

 Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs, p. 129, 142 “The lmpact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire” F.O. 195/2275, despatch from Ramsay Baghdad no.757/81 of 17 August; F.O. 195/2275/333 and 363, Wilkie Young’s Mosul diaries for 14 and 20 October https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-009

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new regime until the situation was clarified.²³ According to Kansu, the population might not be able to grasp the importance of the political change around them due to their unfamiliarity with the newly introduced principles such as justice, equality and fraternity. However, he inserts a better reason at this point and refers to the Mosul Governor Mustafa Yümnî, who was the brother of notorious monarchist Arab İzzet Pasha.²⁴ As we will see in more detail in the sections 2.3 and 2.8, Kansu argues that the Governor blocked the active propaganda of the CUP and the perception of Constitutional Monarchy in Mosul to a great extent. Relying on the British Consular reports, Kansu quoted that the Governor attempted to stir up animosity between Muslims and Christians and in return, the CUP threatened to dismiss him immediately. On the other hand, these reports asserted that the CUP delegation who arrived in Mosul for the election campaign in midOctober only helped to trigger an overt activism and a stiff reactionaryism against the Unionist ideology. As the anti-Jewish and anti-Christian sentiments of the community were aroused, the delegates had to leave Mosul without having achieved anything. Independent candidates Mehmed Ali Fâzıl and Dâvud Yusufâni Effendis won the 1908 elections in Mosul eventually. However, although Yusufâni had Assyrian ethnicity and was a member of the Chaldean Church in Mosul, he was designated as an Arab deputy in the Parliament.²⁵ Unlike the political figures of Christian origin such as Armenians and Greeks, Assyrians did not want to bring their ethnicity to the forefront.

 Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1997) p. 111, 112, 235; Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995) p. 255, 256; F.O. 195/2275, dispatch from Ramsay Baghdad no.757/81 of 17 August; FO. 424/216, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908, Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia, No.9480, p. 112; Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 11, 1908, “Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908,” Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p. 56; Extract from Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908, “Enclosure in dispatch from Sir Gerard Lowther”, No.105 of February 17, 1909 G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (Eds. ), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898 – 1914, 5: The Near East, p. 302 F.O. 195/2275/333 and 363, Wilkie Young’s Mosul diaries for 14 and 20 October; Kansu’s book successfully scans the imperial repercussions of the 1908 Revolution on a provincial basis and provides a pre-revolutionary prelude by covering the topics such as the Tax Revolts of 1906 – 1907.  The Arab İzzet Pasha referred to here is the Secretary of the Imperial Chamberlain and should not be confused with Kirkuk Commander Brigadier General İzzet Pasha.  David Gaunt, Failed Identity and the Assyrian Genocide in Omer Bartov, Eric D. Weitz (Eds), Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013) p. 322

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Illustration 1: Mosul Deputy Mehmed Ali Fâzıl Effendi Source: SALT Research, Mehmed Ali Fazıl EfendiMusul – Mehmed Ali Fazıl Ef.-Moussoul Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, https://ar chives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/19763, Access Date: 03. 06. 2021

Illustration 2: Mosul Deputy Dâvud Yusufâni Effendi Source: SALT Research, Musul Mebusu Davut Yusufani Efendi, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, https://archives.sal tresearch.org/handle/123456789/23219, Access Date: 03. 06. 2021

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Wadie Jwaideh, on the other hand, argues that the Young Turk Revolution largely politicized the Kurdish Sheikhs, intellectuals, and elites while encouraging them to build an ethnoreligious identity.²⁶ He aptly characterizes this ethnoreligious identity over the reforms requested by the Kurdish Sheikhs and Notables in Bahdinan region (today in the borders of Duhok Province) after the revolution. These reforms prescribed officializing Kurdish language in the education and administration of Bahdinan district. Besides, it was demanded that taxation, law and justice be conducted through the Shariah code, and its enforcers (qadis and muftis) be filled by adherents of the Shafi school of law. Jwaideh particularly remarks to the fact that the sectarian emphasis in the appointment of judicial cadres serves to the fusion of nationalist and religious elements. According to him, recognizing the supremacy of the Shafi school, to which the majority of Kurds belonged, would ultimately mean the establishment of a Kurdish national church. Jwaideh underlines that the Young Turks’ attitudes towards the caliph and religion broke the strongest bond between the Kurds and the Ottoman state. As their policies of centralization and Turkification contradicted the basic values of the Kurdish community, Unionists faced great resistance in Kurdish-populated areas. At this point, Jwaideh crucially notes that: The Young Turk Revolution, which had the effect of awakening the national aspirations of the various non-Turkish Ottoman peoples, failed to live up to its early promise. The corruption and misrule, coupled with a policy that vacillated between high-handedness and weakness, served only to exasperate the Kurds and goad them into rebellion.

Based on British Consular reports, Sarah Shields also dedicates a passage regarding the initial repercussions of the Young Turk Revolution in Mosul.²⁷ Stating that the whole Mosul population greeted the new constitution with little enthusiasm, Shields points out that the major expectation of the community from the new government was to get rid of the unpopular governor (Mustafa Yümnî Bey). The widespread approval elicited by the dismissal of the governor was reflected in the reports as follows: The news of its accomplishment called forth considerable enthusiasm: prayers and thanksgivings were said in the mosques and many people made a pilgrimage to the shrine at Nabi Yunus for the same purpose. There was display of flags in the city, and at night there were fireworks and illuminations.

 Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006) p. 104– 108  Shields, Mosul Before Iraq, p. 60

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Quoting from the British representative in Mosul, Shields remarks that there was no general interest in further change and that many people were opposed to a new system that might lead to foreign or non-Muslim supremacy. Apparently, the Mosul people’s enthusiasm for the Constitutional Monarchy was limited to the dismissal of the governor whom they had bitter experiences.

2.2 Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya as a Social Class Against Shia Expansionism Throughout history, Prophet Muhammad’s family and close relatives, especially descendants of his two grandsons Hassan and Hussein, had an exceptional position in their society and it is accepted as a religious duty to respect and love them.²⁸ The titles of Sayyid and Sharif were used for these people who were descended from Muhammad’s daughter Fatima and continued the lineage of the Prophet of Islam, and they were highly respected both in the state and society.²⁹ Although the terms of Sayyid and Sharif are used to qualify the glorification and affiliation to ‘the pure generation of Muhammad’ (nesl-i pâk-ı Muhammedî), the etymological origins of the words define broader social titles.³⁰ Küçükaşçı states that, although they did not constitute a socioeconomic class in Ottoman society, they were exempted from certain customary taxes and equipped with various privileges.³¹ During the Abbasid period, the institution of Naqib al-Ashraf (Nakibü’l Eşrâf or Nekâbet) was established in order to keep the records of the descendants of Muhammad and to protect the privileges of the Sayyids and Sharifs.³² Sayyids and Sharifs also undertook the administration of Hejaz under the titles of Mecca Sharifate or Emirate and these institutions and privileges contin-

 Mustafa S. Küçükaşçı, Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif Kavramlarının Kullanımı, Prof. Dr. Muammer Kemal Özergin Hatıra Sayısı- I, THE JOURNAL OF OTTOMAN STUDIES XXXIII, (İstanbul: 2009), 87– 129, p. 87  Küçükaşçı, Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif, p. 87 Seyyid was derived from the root ‘Siyâdet ’ which means “to be a ruler and a pioneer, to lead, to rule, to be supreme” in the Arabic language. And used for the persons who have assumed the titles and qualities such as ‘master, lord, leader, supreme, virtuous, generous and gentle’. Şerif was derived from the root ‘Şerâfet’ which means ‘to be honorable and noble’ and used for those who has the qualities and titles such as ‘honorable, noble, respected, supreme, dignified, holy and blessed’ However, as the title of Sheikh Said, the term of Seyyid completely qualifies the descendants of Hz. Muhammad.  Küçükaşçı, Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif, p. 87, 88  Küçükaşçı, Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif, p. 108, 109  Küçükaşçı, Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif, p. 101, 102

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ued until the fall of the Ottoman Empire.³³ Sâdât, which will be used as it is taken from archive sources throughout this book, is the plural of the word Seyyid, and describes a religious group and a social class led by Sheikh Said Barzanji. Before moving further, it would be useful to look deeply into the sectarian roots of Barzanjiyya and to understand its strategic position and function in the Hamidian regime. Bruinessen wrote that two Sayyid brothers, Sayyid Musa and Sayyid Isa, who came from Hamadan (Hemedan) to Shahrizor (Şehrizor) in 1360, settled in Barzinj (Berzenc) and were said to have introduced the Qadiriyya order to Southern Kurdistan.³⁴ Bruinessen also emphasizes that Sayyid Musa had not a child, that the Barzanjis came from the lineage (silsile) of Sayyid Isa, and that they were the most prominent of the Qadiri families in the Kurdish geography.³⁵ However, as Abdulcebbar Kavak argued in his 2015 article, it should not be thought that the Barzanjis were members of the Qadiriyya order from the very beginning.³⁶ Because the ancestors of the family, Sayyid Isa (d. 1353) and Sayyid Musa al-Barzanji (d. 1297) who first settled in the Shahrizor region, have promulgated the Hamadaniyya (Hemedaniyye) and the Nurbahshiyya (Nurbahşiyye)

 Küçükaşçı, Tarihi Süreçte Seyyid ve Şerif, p. 111– 129  Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1992) p. 216 For the strategic position of the Barzanjis within the Qadiriyya order, their dynasty and genealogy, their sociopolitical and socioeconomic status in Sulaymaniyah, and their historical background as a social class: please see the Chapter 4. Shaikhs: mystics, saints and politicians in Bruinessen, p. 205 – 264 To see the Barzanji genealogy as a diagram: please see Bruinessen, p. 320 To see the rank of the Barzanji family in the succession line of Qadiriyya order and their affiliation to the Siyâdet (Sayyid Institution): please see. Bruinessen, p. 216 – 221 One of the most comprehensive sources on the genealogy of the Barzanjiyya Sayyids is the work of Cecil John Edmonds, who held many different political and administrative positions in the region, consisting of his observations, research, and memoirs. C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919 – 1925 (London: OUP, 1957) see the chapter of ‘Shaikhs and Saiyids’ For the sociopolitical influence and the power struggle of the Barzanjis within the region, please see Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 319 – 323  Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 216  For a comprehensive research elaborating on how the Baghdad based Sunni orders were promulgated in the Sanjak of Shahrizor and discussing the sectarian origins of the Barzanji and Talabani families, please see: Abdulcebbar Kavak, Kadiriyye’nin Şehrizor Bölgesinde Yayılışı [The Spread of Qadiriyya Order in the Region of Shahrizor] , Tasavvuf İlmi ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi, 36 [2015/2], pp. 51– 71

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branches of the Kubrawiyya (Kübreviyye) order.³⁷ Sayyid Ali al-Venderini (Seyyid Ali el-Venderînî), the son of Baba Rasul al-Barzanji (Baba Resûl Berzencî), took the Qadiri caliphate from the Qadiri postnish in Baghdad in the 17th century, initiated the first serious Qadiri activity in Shahrizor and became the first representative of the Qadiri Order in Kurdistan.³⁸ However, it is also seen that the Barzanjis, who started to promulgate Qadiriyya from the 17th century onwards, partially switched to Naqshbandiyya (Nakşibendiyye) as of the first quarter of the 19th century.³⁹ In a more recent article published in 2016, Kavak updated the existing arguments regarding the spread of Qadiriyya in Northern Iraq and found Bruinessen to be erroneous and misleading on two important issues.⁴⁰ Kavak argues that Qadiriyya started its activities in Mosul in the last quarter of the 12th century, not in the 17th century as the members of the tariqah stated, and has propagated in the northeast and northwest directions of Mosul over the 13th-17th centuries. He points out that the most prominent name in the propagation of the order in this region is Sheikh Abu Bakr Abdulaziz as-Sinjari (Şeyh Ebûbekir Abdülaziz es-Sincârî) (d. 602/1206), the son of Abdulqadir al-Ghailani (Abdülkadir Geylânî), and his children. In addition, Kavak considers this opinion of Bruinessen, who is suspicious of as-Sinjari’s arrival in Mosul to propagate Qadiriyya, as misleading. According to Kavak, Bruinessen’s second erroneous determination is that he connected all succeeding Qadiri Sheikhs to Sayyid Musa and Isa brothers and included the Barzanjis before Sayyid Ali al-Venderini into the succession of Qadiriyya. In line with this, Kavak underlined once again that the first mystic (mutasavvıf) who introduced the Qadiri affiliation to the Barzanji family was al-Venderini, the son of the Baba Rasul al-Barzanji. Kavak finds it quite natural that the brothers Isa and Musa, who first settled in the village of Barzinj, are included in the Barzanji genealogy as the first ancestors of the family. However, he remarks that it is not possible for them to take place in the succession of Qadiriyya tariqah. Abdulcebbar Kavak’s unique article titled “The Featured Barzanji Scholars in Anatolia’s Science and Sufi Life”, published in 2018, examines the positions, activities and contributions of the Barzanji Ulema, originally from Iraq, within

 Kavak, Kadiriyye’nin Şehrizor, pp. 51– 71 Hamadaniyya branch was attributed to Sayyid Ali al-Hamadani, the father of Seyyid Isa and Musa al-Barzanji.  Kavak, Kadiriyye’nin Şehrizor, pp. 51– 71  Kavak, Kadiriyye’nin Şehrizor, pp. 51– 71  Abdulcebbar Kavak, Şeyh Ebûbekir Abdülaziz es-Sincârî (ö. 602/1205) ve Kâdiriyye Tarikatının Kuzey Irak’taki Erken Dönem Faaliyetleri [Sheikh Abûbakir Abdulaziz as-Sincârî (d. 602/1205) and Activities of Qadiriyya Sufi Order in Northern Iraq in the Early Period] , Akademik Bakış Dergisi, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları Sayı:54, Mart-Nisan 2016, pp.147– 160

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the religious-mystical movement in Anatolia.⁴¹ In his studies, Kavak asserts that the Barzanjis, although not as long and rooted as they have in Kubrawiyya and Qadiriyya, have become affiliated with the Khalvatiyya (Halvetiyye) tariqah for a while and they have promulgated the Khalvatism (Halvetilik) in the Shahrizor region.⁴² He qualifies the Naqshbandiyya as the last sufi order which the Barzanjiyya family affiliated in the first quarter of the 19th century. However, the most striking point is that Kavak determined that the mystical identities of the Barzanjis were not limited to Sunni orders and that they took an active role in heterodox formations such as Kakaiyya (Kâkâiyye) and Barzanjiyya (Berzenciyye). Although it is the subject of another research entirely, it can be assumed that the word Kâk or Kâke (‫ )ﮔﺎﻙ‬that precedes the name of Sheikh Ahmed Effendi, the grandfather of Sheikh Said Barzanji, is an abbreviated version of Kâkâiyye. At this point, Kavak also mentions that Kâke Sheikh Ahmed Barzanji (d. 1305/1888), whom he counts as one of the pioneers of Qadiriyya in the Shahrizor region, was invited to İstanbul by the Sultan himself. The mission of fortifying the Sunni doctrine against the Shiite expansionism from Iran was previously undertaken by the Baban Emirate (16 – 19th cent.) in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk territory and by the Jalili Dynasty (18 – 19th cent.) throughout the Mosul Province. Afterwards, it can be said that Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya took over this mission and was integrated into the Hamidian regime as an apparatus of propagating and maintaining the Sunni Orthodoxy on the Iranian border.⁴³ The functional merge of a Sunni Order and a Kurdish Clan in a Kurdish-do-

 Abdulcebbar Kavak, “Anadolu’nun İlim ve Tasavvuf Hayatında Öne Çıkan Berzencî Ulemâsı” [The Featured Barzanji Scholars in Anatolia’s Science and Sufi Life]. Şırnak Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 9/2 (Ağustos 2018): 421– 430  Kavak, “Anadolu’nun İlim; Kavak, Kadiriyye’nin Şehrizor  BOA, BEO.413/ 30919, 21 Mayıs 1310 – 02 June 1894; İ..ML..10/61, 19 Mayıs 1310 – 31 May 1894 “Mektûbi-i Sadr-ı Âli Kalemi Müsveddâtına Mahsûs Varakadır / Mâliye Nezâret-i ve Musul Vilâyet-i Celilelerine Hıtta-i Irâkîye’de intişâra başlayan Mezheb-i Şia’nın men-i tevsii ve intişârı bu mezhebe sâlik olanların akaid-i bâtılelerinin tashihi ile kendilerine irâe-i hakk ve savâb eylemesi için de bazı Ulemâ-yı Mahalliyenin tavzif ve ikdârı lâzıme-i hâl ve maslahattan bulunmasına mebni Süleymaniyeli Kâk Ahmed Efendi hafidi Said Efendi’nin birâderleri Seyyid Mustafa ve Seyyid Mârûf ve Seyyid Hasan ve Seyyid Ömer ve Seyyid Ali ve mahdûmu Seyyid Muhammed Efendilerle mûmâileyh Şeyh Said Efendi’nin Dayızâdesi olup Kazankaya Tekkesi’nde bulunan Seyyid Mârûf Efendi’ye İkişer Yüz ve Süleymaniye Medresesinde bulunan On Üç Müderrise Yüzer kuruş ve mûmâileyh Said Efendinin ceddesi olup şâyân-ı merhamet ve âtıfet-i ulyâ bulunan Ayşe Hanıma Üç Yüz kuruş maaş tahsisi şerefsâdır olan İrâde-i Seniyye Cenâb-ı Hilâfetpenâhi iktizâ-yı celilesinden olarak icrâ-yı îcâbı Mâliye Nezâret-i Celilelerine iş’âr kılınmış olunduğu Vilâyet-i Celilerine de […] îfâ-yı muktezâ-yı maslahata himmet bulunduğu Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun Baş-

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minated geography created a social class through dynastic structure within the Shaikhly Family of Barzanjiyya. This intermingled formation, nourished by the Sunni and Kurdish common values system, also served pragmatic politics and became a game changer during the Hamidian regime. Abdülhamid had positioned the Barzanjiyya Family as an outpost or as an ideological device against the Shiite threat spreading from Iran’s borders. According to the Hamidian regime which was adhered to the Hanafi-Sunni doctrine, issues such as preventing the expansion of the Shiite Sectarianism (Mezheb-i Şia) that started to penetrate along the Iraqi Realm, correcting the superstitious beliefs (akaid-i bâtılelerinin tashihi) of those who belonged to this sect, and leading to the right path (irâei hakk ve savâb) for these misguided people were extremely important. Therefore, in order to achieve these objectives, the assignment and reinforcement of the local Ulema was a necessity. At this point, the Hamidian regime supported the Barzanjis financially and morally, and almost put all of Sheikh Said’s family members and professors of the Sulaymaniyah Madrasah on a payroll. The real estate, land and sheep belonging to the dervish lodge, of which Sheikh Said was the Postnish, were also exempted from tax (vergi ve rüsûmdan istisnâ) through an Imperial Decree.⁴⁴ Naturally, Sheikh Said himself as a member of Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya and as the Sheikh of Qadiriyya order, was allocated a suitable salary due to his necessity.⁴⁵ At this point, it is possible to multiply examples. In 1900, the former Mosul Governor Sâlih Pasha has demanded a salary allocation of 150 qurush to Sayyid and Hafiz Hassan and his brother Muhammad, who were from the Sulaymaniyah Town and Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya.⁴⁶ In 1904, a monthly food allowance (taamiye kitâbet-i Celilesinden […] tebliğ olunmuş ve Musul Vilâyetine mâlûmat verilmiş olmakla […] emr ü fermân-ı hümâyuna icâbâtın icrâsına himmet.”  BOA, İ..ML..11/6/Lef 4, 22 Haziran 1310 – 4 July 1894 ” Devletlü Efendim Hazretleri Süleymaniyeli Kâk Ahmed Efendi hafidi Şeyh Said Efendi’nin postnişini olduğu dergâh-ı şerife mahsûs emlâk, arazi ve ağnâmın vergi ve rüsûmdan istisnâsı mahalinden vürûd eden mahâzırda istidâ kılınması üzerine şerefsâdır olan İrâde-i Seniyye… Dâire-i Sadâret Âmedi – i Divan-ı Hümâyun“  BOA, BEO 444/33240, 24 Muharrem 1312– 28 July 1894 “Mektûbi-i Sadr-ı Âli Kalemi Müsveddâtına Mahsûs Varakadır / Mâliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Sâdât-ı Berzenciyye’den ve Tarikat-ı Aliyye-i Kadiriyye Meşâyihinden Şeyh Said Efendi’ye zaruret-i hâline mebni münâsib mikdâr maaş tahsisi hakkında Musul Vilâyet-i Celilesinden meb’us tahrirat”  BOA, BEO 1542/115582, 14 Ağustos 1316 – 27 August 1900 “Mâliye Nezâret-i Aliyyesine Süleymaniye Kasabası ahâlisinden ve Sâdât-ı Berzenciyye’den Seyyid ve Hâfız Hasan ve birâderleri Mehmed/Muhammed Efendilere Yüz Ellişer kuruş maaş tahsisi hakkında Musul Vâli-i Esbakı

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tahsisi) of 300 qurush was allocated to Ahmed Effendi’s dervish lodge and madrasah (dergâh ve medresesine), located close to the Iranian border.⁴⁷ According to the Hamidian policy, the sanctuary of Ahmed Effendi, who was both a member of Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya and the former Naqib al-Ashraf Qaimaqam of Sulaymaniyah, would probably act as a shield against the Shiite threat from Iran.⁴⁸ Apparently, Abdülhamid’s rule cherished and encouraged the Kurdish clans belonging to the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya orders in order to consolidate the Sunni doctrine against the Shiite propaganda. However, this patronage, exemption and privilege enjoyed by the Barzanjiyya during the Hamidian era would quickly leave their place to marginalization, dissipation, and antagonism after the Constitutional Monarchy. In other respects, issues such as how the PostConstitutional CUP government saw the Shiite threat and expansionism from Iran, whether it prioritized it and, if did so, which actors it engaged in, stand in front of us as different research topics. Eventually, the question of why the function of Barzanjiyya, which was seen as an advantage by the state authority against Shiite influence and propaganda in the Hamidian era, lost its importance after the Constitutional Monarchy can be explored in depth. Bruinessen examines the Kurdish families such as Barzanjiyya in a separate or a supra category under the name of ’Shaikhly Families’ apart from sufi orders or tribes.⁴⁹ He states that Shaikhly Families such as the Barzanjiyya Family, derive their congregations and political power from regions where tribalism is in-

Saadetli Sâlih Paşa Hazretlerinden gelen tezkire melfûfuyla beraber […] savb-ı atufetlerine irsâl kılınmış olmakla… Sadâret Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, İ..ML..58/11, 25 Mart 1320 – 07 April 1904 “Mâruz-u Çâkeri Kemineleridir ki Süleymaniye Nakibü’l Eşrâf Kaimakamı Esbak Sâdât-ı Berzenciyye’den Ahmed Efendinin hududu İran karibinde vâki dergâh ve medresesine şehrî Üç Yüz kuruş taamiye tahsisi ve itâsı şerefsüdur buyurulan İrâde-i Seniyye-i Cenâb-ı Hilâfetpenâhi iktizâ-i aliyyesinden olmakla… Yıldız Saray-ı Hümâyunu Başkitâbet Dâiresi “  BOA, İ..ML..58/11, 25 Mart 1320 – 07 April 1904; Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, Nakîbüleşraf: Seyyid ve şeriflerle ilgili işlere bakan yetkili; https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/nakibulesraf; Access Date: 11.08. 2022 “While the Ottoman Naqib al-Ashraf resided and served in Istanbul, his provincial duties were carried out by the Naqib al-Ashraf Qaimaqams, who were elected for a certain period from among the Sâdât in the provinces and served as their representatives.”  For the appearance, formation, and advancement of Shaikhly Families in the 19th century, please see the part of “Sociopolitical changes in Kurdistan in the early nineteenth century” in Bruinessen, p. 228 – 234 For the family trees of the prominent Shaikhly Families please see the part of “Appendix: The Major Shaikhly Families of Kurdistan”: Bruinessen, p. 319 – 340

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tense, inhabited by small tribes and which these tribes has blood feuds and constant conflict with each other.⁵⁰ Stating that ‘land registration’ (tapu) and ‘pious foundations’ (waqf / vakf) constitute the biggest financial background of these Shaikhly Families, Bruinessen underlines that the family that gains its power and congregation can use this network for other purposes, including classbased movements.⁵¹ In the context of anti-Shiism, Barzanjiyya can be described as a hybrid social element with an ultimate mission, serving a specific purpose, and consisting of a functional combination of a Sunni Order and a Kurdish Clan. In addition, the fact that this class which lost power rapidly after the Constitutional Monarchy, regained its influence in the post-colonial context after the British Invasion, is also inspiring for further research. In this respect, analyzing the power graph of Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya between the Constitutional Monarchy and the British Occupation may be a further research question in order to expand and advance the scope of this study. Although it is stated in Küçükaşçı’s study that the Sayyids did not constitute a socioeconomic class in the Ottoman Empire, Bruinessen’s approach seems convincing that the Shaikhly Family was a separate class powered by socioeconomic paradigms. In this respect, we can verify and summarize the qualities of Sâdât as a socioeconomic entity through different parameters. First of all, Sâdât is a supra-identity/category above a tribe or a sufi order. Because as we will see throughout the study, it can incorporate, motivate, guide and control different tribes and sufi orders and most importantly, can engage in social class-based movements. Secondly, it may seem like a Clique or a Group of Interest, Influence or Pressure, but it is beyond them. Because Sâdât’s gravity is originated of an aristocratic power based on his descent from the Prophet, of a political power based on governmental privileges and of an economic power based on land ownership. However, as Bruinessen points out, Shaikhly Families did not have great influence and control in the areas dominated by the large tribes such as Jaf, which has strong leadership, territorial influence, and land ownership.⁵² As we will see throughout the study, the eternal rivalry and hostility between Sheikh Said Barzanji and Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha probably stemmed from these factors.

 Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 232, 233  Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 232, 233  Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 232

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2.3 Transition from Hamidian Regime to the Constitutional Monarchy Accordingly, Sheikh Said Barzanji was a very influential figure in nineteenth century Mosul due to his family origins. Since the Barzanjis (Berzenci – ‫ )ﺑﺮﺯﻧﺠﯽ‬were coming from a Sayyid family, Abdülhamid II was always cautious and tactical towards their leaders and he always avoided of violent action against them.⁵³ Barzanjis’ struggle with another Kurdish shaikhly family Talabanis (Talabâni– ‫ )ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎﻧﯽ‬was one of the major disputes in the region and the Ottoman authorities have been trying to mediate these two groups for a stabilized province.⁵⁴ This mediation politics continued for a long period since the Talabani Sheikhs were also cherished by Abdülhamid; and this tolerance towards both families was a determinant factor in shaping center-periphery relations of Mosul.⁵⁵ However, Sheikh Said was a special personality for Abdülhamid II since their relationship started when Sheikh Said was invited to İstanbul and allegedly cured Abdülhamid’s sick son with his intercessory prayer.⁵⁶ After that incident the whole Barzanji family was taken under direct protection by the Sultan.⁵⁷ However, after 1908 social and political dynamics of Mosul started to change radically as Çetinsaya elaborated in his article.⁵⁸ When the Second Constitution was declared, there was already an ongoing turmoil bred by Hamawands (Hemavend – ‫ )ﻫﻤﻮﻧﺪ‬and Barzanjis (connected to each other somehow) and the situation got worsened after the revolution. Hamawand rose a rebellion partially by the provocation of Sheikh Said and partially by the opportunism of power vacuum. Said fueled the rebellion since he was aware that the benefits of “Notable/Islam” politics were going to be disappeared by the termination of Abdülhamid regime and the new regime had a completely different prospect towards him. In the post-revolutionary period, Hamawand attacks on local population and merchants reached to an unbearable level. Regional trade and transportation almost

 Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, (Oxford: SOAS Routledge, 2006) p. 77 ; For a more detailed perspective on Hamidian background of Kurdish tribes in Mosul please see Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, p. 74– 86 and Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 306 – 332  BOA Y..PRK.ASK. 36/20, 17 Safer 1304– 15 November 1886 ; DH.ŞFR.141/11, 09 Haziran 1305 – 21 August 1889; Y..PRK.HR..13/32, 25 Zilkade 1307– 13 July 1890  Davud Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, İktisadi ve Sosyal Yapısı 1864 – 1909, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Marmara University, 2006), p. 375  Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Amurath to Amurath, (London: William Heinemann, 1911) p. 249  Bell, Amurath to Amurath, p. 249  Gökhan Çetinsaya, II. Abdülhamid döneminde Kuzey Irak’da tarikat, aşiret ve siyaset, Dîvân İlmî Araştırmalar, Sayı:7 (1999/2) p. 167

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came to a halt since all the roads connecting Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad were blocked. Some of provincial administrators in the region also had their share of the Post-Constitutional transformation. Mustafa Yümnî Bey, who has been serving as the Governor of Mosul since 1905, was going to leave his office to Zeki Pasha, whose name will appear frequently in my study. Mustafa Yümnî, who was appointed as the Governor of Mosul in September 1905 from the Karak (Kerek) Sub-Governorate of Damascus Province, was seen as a legacy of the Despotism regime (İstibdâd) by the Unionists due to his despotic connections he developed with local elements in Mosul during the Hamidian era.⁵⁹ Mustafa Yümnî was always perceived as a threat by the Unionists, as he was the brother of Arab İzzet Holo Pasha, one of the most prominent statesmen of Abdülhamid regime.⁶⁰According to the allegations of the Unionists, Mustafa Bey had kept the CUP’s regional activity under constant pressure and concealed and postponed the announcement of the Constitution until the 28th of July, the day he left Mosul.⁶¹ Zeki Pasha (Kolaç, Baraz or Kılıçoğlu), also known as Aleppine (Halepli) since he was born in Aleppo, is a particularly important figure in terms of Ottoman military, diplomatic, and administrative history.⁶² His background in Mosul

 BOA, BEO.2669/200106, 6 Eylül 1321– 19 September 1905; DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324– 13 September 1908 For an overview of Mustafa Yümnî Bey’s Mosul Governorate, please see Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 155 – 159  Emre Gör, Sultan II. Abdülhamid’in Mabeyn İkinci Kâtibi Arap İzzet Paşa : Şam’dan Yıldız Sarayı’na Uzanan Bir Yaşamın Öyküsü (1852 – 1924), (İstanbul: DBY Yayınları, 2020) p. 84 Arab İzzet (Holo) Pasha was ‘Secretary of the Imperial Chamberlain’ (Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun Başkâtibi) and the ‘Chief of The Espionage Agency’ (Hafiyelik Teşkilatı Reisi) of Abdülhamid II.  BOA, DH.MKT.2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324– 13 September 1908 For the transcribed text of the document, please see the subsection: Interventionism and Uncontrolled Branching under the section of 2.8 CUP’s Problematic Entity in Mosul.  Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839 – 1922), (İstanbul: İsis Ltd, 1999) p. 127 For a well-established and comprehensive chronology of Zeki’s military and diplomatic career please see: Volkan Marttin, Halepli Zeki Paşa’nın Almanya’daki Görevi Üzerine [On the Mission of Aleppoean Zeki Pasha in Germany], Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 24 December 2018, (40), 313 – 338 For an overview of Zeki Pasha’s Mosul Governorate please see: Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 168 – 174 Particularly for the missions and achievements of Zeki Pasha in the Balkan War please see:

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dates back to a few years ago, and therefore both his familiarity with the region and his Unionist character played a major role in his appointment. After the suicide of Major General (Ferik) Vâcid Pasha, the ‘Head of the Committee of Investigation’ (Heyet-i Tahkikiye Reisi) at the Iranian border, in 1906, General StaffBrigadier General (Erkân-ı Harbiye Mirlivâsı) Zeki Pasha, who was the ‘Director of the Imperial School of Medicine’ (Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şâhâne Müdiri) at that time, had replaced him.⁶³ Zeki, who had been on active duty in the region since that year and was promoted to the rank of Major General (Ferik), was to replace the Mosul Governor Mustafa Yümnî in August 1908, when he was stationed in Baghdad.⁶⁴

Illustration 3: Former Mosul Governor Zeki Pasha. As one of the Western Army Commanders (Garb Ordusu Kumandanlarından) during the Balkan Wars Source: SALT Research, Garp Ordusu kumandanlarından Zeki Paşa, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, https://ar chives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/19785 Access Date: 02. 06. 2021. For Zeki Pasha’s command of the Vardar Army during the Balkan Wars please see Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912 – 1913: Prelude to the First World War, (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 47 – 51

Sema Demirtaş (ed), Zeki Paşa’nın Balkan Savaşı Hatıratı /Korgeneral Zeki Kolaç (1862 – 1943), (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım, 2012)  BOA, Y..PRK.ASK.239/81, 11 Mayıs 1322– 24 May 1906; BEO.2835/212577, 11 Mayıs 1322– 24 May 1906  BOA, DH.MKT.1279/11, 28 Temmuz 1324– 10 August 1908; BOA, BEO.3374/253011, 30 Temmuz 1324– 12 August 1908

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2.4 Deep-rooted Dispute Between Sâdât and Ağavât In September 1908, a telegram including some statements and complains regarding the crimes allegedly committed by Sheikh Said, his sons and his brother Naqib al-Ashraf Maarouf al-Barzanji (Mârûf el-Berzenci) in Sulaymaniyah was echoed in state authorities (see Illustration 4).⁶⁵ The document was written by ‘land owners’ (Aghawat) of Sulaymaniyah and included serious allegations on Sâdât such as that they caused more than 15.000 lira financial loss, killed eight individuals from their relatives and looted, assaulted and destroyed ten of their villages so far.⁶⁶ They had been reporting these banditry incidents to the higher authorities for the last 11 months, but their damages and grievances increased gradually since they could not get any response.⁶⁷ In fact, these problems between the Aghawat which was consisted of the prominent Landlords and Notables of Sulaymaniyah, and Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya, dated back to the beginning of 1904. In April 1904, Governor Mustafa Nûri reported that in the skirmish between Sâdât and Ağavât, two people from both sides were killed and several were injured.⁶⁸ Mustafa Nûri also stated that both

 BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326 – 16 September 1908 This letter of complaint was transmitted from ‘Public Prosecutor of Court of Appeal’ (İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği) to ‘Deputy Public Prosecutor of Sulaymaniyah’ (Süleymaniye Müdde-i Umûmiliği Muâvinliği) and eventually escalated to the ‘Council of State’ (Şûrâ-yı Devlet). (!) Although he is only referred to as Naqib or Naqib al-Ashraf in correspondence and in our book, Maarouf was originally the Naqib al-Ashraf Qaimaqam of Sulaymaniyah, and his jurisdiction and authority were limited to that region. As mentioned above, the Imperial Naqib al-Ashraf of the Ottoman State was stationed in the Ottoman capital, İstanbul.  BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326 – 16 September 1908 “Hafid Şeyh Said ve mahdûmları, birâderi Mârûf Efendiler tarafından Süleymaniye’nin nefs-i merkezinde ve hükûmetin gözü önünde Ağavât’ın başına getirdikleri bunca vak’alarıyla On Beş Bin liradan mütecâviz hasârât, sekiz nefer akrabâlarımızı […] […] katl ve on adet kurâmızı nehb, tahrib ve tecâvüz ettikleri […] muhâberât-ı resmiyece de tahakkuk etmiştir.”  BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326 – 16 September 1908  BOA, BEO.2311/173277/Lef 3, 27 Mart 1320 – 9 April 1904 “Makam-ı Sadâret -i Uzmâya Süleymaniye’de Sâdât ile Ağavât beynindeki mücadelede tarafeynden ikişer maktûl ve birkaç mecrûh vuku bulmasından nâşi yekdiğerinden ahz-ı sâr için cemiyet tedârik eylemekte bulundukları cihetle bilmuhâbere Kerkük’ten ve Mâmuret-ül Hamidiye’den ancak 60 kadar süvâri sevk edilebilmiş ve Bazyan’da piyâde müfrezesinin Süleymaniye’ye azimetine Nizâmiye Kumandanlığından emir verilmiş ise de bu kadar kuvvetle teskin-i fesâda imkân olmayıp civarda başka Asâkir-i Şâhâne bulunmadığı ve umûm zabtiyeler de Tâdâd-ı Ağnâm için dağınık bir hâlde olarak cem ve sevki kabil olamadığı cihetle bugün sabahtan beri makine başında Mutasarrıf Vekili ve Şeyh Said Efendi hazretleri vesâire îcâb edenlerle […] vesâyâ ve tebligat-ı mukteziye icrâ kılınmakla netâyic-i hâsıla bâdehu arz olunacak ise de Sâdât’ın en ziyâde şikâyet eylediği Belediye

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Illustration 4: BOA, ŞD.2191/15, 19 Şaban 1326 – 16 September 1908 The complaint submitted by the Ağavât (Landlords) of Sulaymaniyah to the Prosecutor’s Office regarding Sheikh Said and his affiliates

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sides were gathering crowds to revenge each other and that in case of possible turmoil, the available military forces would not be enough to suppress the incident. Only 60 cavalry from Kirkuk and Mamurat al- Hamidiyah (Mâmuret-ül Hamidiye) could be dispatched and although the Regular Army Command (Nizâmiye Kumandanlığı) ordered the infantry detachment (piyâde müfrezesi) in Bazian (Bazyan) to depart for Sulaymaniyah, this force was not enough to suppress the disorder. Since the entire gendarmerie force (Zabtiye) was dispersed for the duty of counting sheep and goats (tâdâd-ı ağnâm) before collecting the Sheep Tax (Resm-i Ağnâm or Ağnâm Rüsûmu), they were not able to be regrouped and dispatched. The Governor also informed that the necessary recommendations and notifications (vesâyâ ve tebligat-ı mukteziye) were made to the necessary parties through the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate. It was also requested from the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate to expulse the Mayor Abdurrahman Agha, the person whom Sâdât complained most, and send him to the provincial center. Since the local judicial committee will not be eligible for the investigation and prosecution of the incident, Public Prosecutor in Mosul provincial center was asked to be swiftly sent to Sulaymaniyah. When it came to June 1904, the hostility between Sadaat and Aghawat had not ended, and the skirmish started again. Although detachments were dispatched under the command of Colonel (Miralay) Tevfik Bey and a 30-person gendarme force was sent from the provincial center under the command of a mule cavalry (ester süvâr) officer, this was not enough to maintain order in Sulaymaniyah and neutralize the perpetrators.⁶⁹ According to the message of GovReisi Abdurrahman Ağa’nın bir tagrible Merkez-i Vilâyete i’zâmı Mutasarrıflığa iş’âr kılınmış olup fakat vukuatın esâsının tahkik ve tetkikiyle tâkibât-ı kanuniye icrâsına mahallî heyet-i adliyesinin muvâfık olması ihtimâlden baid bulunduğundan bahisle Mutasarrıf Vekâleti ve Kumandanlığıyla Kerkük Fırka Kumandanlığınca da tasdik ve izbâr olunduğu veçhile Vilâyet İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden Süleymaniye’ye azimetle lüzûmu […] gönderildiğinden hemen hareketi zımnında Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine emr-i seria îtâ buyrulması ehemmiyetle… Musul Vâlisi Nûri”  BOA, DH.ŞFR.329/58, 2 Haziran 1320 – 15 June 1904 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, […] Süleymaniye’de Sâdât ile Ağavât arasında âhiren tekrâr eden vukuat üzerine cehd-i askeriyyeden Miralay Tevfik Bey refâkatindeki müfrezeler derhâl sevk olunduğu gibi Merkez-i Vilâyet mevcûdundan bir ester süvâr zâbitiyle 30 nefer jandarma kuvvetin dahi gönderilmiş ise de bu Süleymaniye’ce mültezim olan sükûn ve rahatı tevsika ve maznûn ve mütecâsir-i vak’a olanları derdest ve tevkife adem-i kifâyeti mâlûm olduğu hâlde Şeyh Said Efendinin oğlu Mahmud ile refik-i habâseti Seyyid Ahmed’in sûretâ askerin muvasalatından […] ederek firâr eyledikleri Mutasarrıflıktan bâ-telgraf bildirilmiştir. Hakikatte yed-i tagallüblerinde bulunan köylere gidip ihtifâ etmekten ibâret […] işbu firârileri Şeyh Said’in […] istihzârı veçhiyle şikâyâta mebni olup […] mahkemece matlûb olan maznûn ve […] satvet-i askeriyyeden bil-istifâde derdest ve tev-

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ernor Mustafa Nûri, Sheikh Said’s son Mahmud and his accomplice Sayyid Ahmed had fled before the military force reached, and hid in one of the villages they dominated. The Governor suggested on taking effective measures and attempting severe practices, such as the expulsion and banishment of several of Sâdât and Ağavât, particularly Sheikh Said, from Sulaymaniyah. Mustafa Nûri claimed that if these were not implemented, the dispute would not end, the people would not be free from persecution and atrocities, the administration and order of the sanjak would gradually disappear, and even the annual tax revenues such as ağnâm and öşür (Vâridât-ı Öşriyye) would be endangered. Endangerment of the collection of agricultural taxes was a highly anticipated risk, as hostility was mostly based on land issues. When it came to the beginning of 1905, Sheikh Said’s request for amnesty, who had regretted his actions and had asked for mercy, was approved and granted by the Sultan.⁷⁰ However, in such a situation, if Aghawat was not pardoned as well, it would lead to bigger problems and in a short time the amnesty of Aghas was also questioned by the Public Prosecution of Mosul.⁷¹ The Council of State (Şûrâ-yı Devlet), which reached a consensus on the fact that the Sheikhs were the attacking and the Aghas were the defending and victimized parties in the issue kifleri emrinde Mutasarrıflığa tebligat kılınmakta ise de bu kuvvet kâfi olmadıktan başka Süleymaniye Kumandanı Mirlivâ Hüseyin Paşa […] iktizâsınca Asâkir-i Şâhâneye hüsn-i istimâli ile muâvenet-i […] Meşâyih ve Rüesâ-yı Sâdât ve Ağavât’ın Merkez-i Vilâyete celb ve teb’idi gibi tedâbir-i müessire ve icrâât-ı şedideye teşebbüs edilmediğinden bahisle fırka ve […] vâsıtasıyla şikâyât ve târizâtta bulunmasına ve […] ilm-i ali olduğu üzere başta Şeyh Said Efendi olduğu hâlde Meşâyih ve Sâdât ve Ağavât’tan bir kaçı Süleymaniye’den ihrâc ve teb’id edilmedikçe münâzaâta nihâyet verilemeyeceği gibi umûm ahâli taaddiyât ve mezâlim-i takat-fersâdan kurtulamayacak, livânın muamelât ve âsâyişi güçleştikçe fenâpezir olacağından ve sâl-i hâli Ağnâm Rüsûmu kısmen […] külliyeye olacağından uğradığı misüllü Vâridât-ı Öşriyyenin de bu sûretle heder ve telef olacağı […] bu babda ittihâz buyurulacak tedbirin tesrii lüzûmunun kemâl-i ehemmiyetle […] Vâli Nûri”  BOA, DH.TMIK.M..190/35/Lef 2, 1 Kânûnusâni 1320 – 14 January 1905 “Hareket-i vâkıâlarından dolayı izhâr-ı nedâmet ve arz-ı dehâlet ettikleri beyânıyla afv-ı âliye mazhariyetleri leffen savb-ı devletlerine irsâl olunan telgrafnâmede istidâ edilen Süleymaniye Meşâyihi hakkında afv-ı celile merâhim-i delil-i hazret-i Hilâfetpenâhiye şâyân buyurulmuş olduğu Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun-u Mülûkâne Başkitâbet Celilesi’nden beyâna göre…”  BOA, Y..A...RES.133/7/Lef 2, 14 Mayıs 1321– 27 May 1905 “işbu Afv-ı Âli-i Cenâb-ı Pâdişâhinin Şeyhlerin şerik-i cürmü bulunan Ağalara şümûlü olup olmadığı Musul İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden iş’ârına atfen Süleymaniye mesele-i mâlûmunda Şeyhler mütecâviz ve Ağalar müdâfii ve […] mağdûr olduklarından Afv-ı Âlinin yalnız Şeyhlere […] Ağavât’ın muâheze ve muhâkemesi fesâdın tekrâr ve temâdisini ve Şeyhlerin tagallüblerinin bir kat daha tezâyidini mûcib olacağı cihetle buna mahal kalmamak için Afv-ı Âliden Ağaların dahi […] edilmeleri muvâfık-ı hâl ve maslahat olacağı izbâr olunduğu beyân”

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of Sulaymaniyah, ruled that the Aghas were also included in the scope of amnesty. Because, according to the members of the Council of State, criticizing and judging only Aghas would cause the repetition and continuity of the dispute and would increase the atrocities of the Sheikhs even more. When it came to 1906, peace was established between Sâdât and Ağavât and even the subpoenas (celb ve ihzâr müzekkereleri) issued for their previous criminal records (cerâim-i sâbıkaları) were suspended to avoid further excitement.⁷² However, it seems like nothing was resolved up to that point as of 1908, since Sheikh Said was accustomed to enjoying his privileges and liberties provided by Abdülhamid II.

2.5 Allegations Against Sheikh Said and his ‘Society of Unionist Charity’ (Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye) In a short while, Ministry of Interior discussed a different telegram, this time from Sub-province Commander (Sancak / Livâ Kumandanı) Brigadier General (Mirlivâ) Mustafa Pasha and Jaf Tribe Chief Mahmud Pasha regarding the banishment of Sheikh Said, his sons and his brother Sheikh Maarouf from Sulaymaniyah.⁷³ Grand Vizirate (Sadâret) instructed the Ministry of Interior to investigate the issue and dispatch inspectors to Sulaymaniyah regarding the complaints received from Mustafa, Mahmud and their 44 companions.⁷⁴ Mustafa and Mahmud were the two names led the opposition against the Sheikh Said in Sulaymaniyah and they were the major actors through the petitioning process as we will see. Mufti Abdülaziz, Mayor Abdülgafur and Councilman Abdurrahman, who formed the core staff of the CUP Sulaymaniyah branch, also took an active part in the Anti-Sâdât bloc. Mahmud, who was the chief of the Jaf tribe, took the title of Pasha during the reign of Abdülhamid II, was brought to the District Governorship of Gulanbar (Gülanber Kaimakamlığı) and he was given the authority to collect taxes.⁷⁵ As we will see later, it was to be alleged that he had collaborated with the Sub-Governor Tevfik for the purpose of a tax collection embezzlement.

 BOA, BEO.2757/206707, 24 Kânûnusâni 1321– 06 February 1906 “Adliye ve Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilelerine Beynleri telif edilmiş olan Süleymaniye’deki Sâdât and Ağavât ile adamlarının cerâim-i sâbıkalarından dolayı haklarında mahkemece sâdır olan celb ve ihzâr müzekkerelerinin […] ahkâmı mûcib-i heyecân olacağı cihetle bunların şimdilik hükûmetçe aranılmamaları lüzûmu”  BOA, BEO.3412/255869 , 15 Ramazan 1326 – 11 October 1908  BOA, BEO.3412/255869 , 15 Ramazan 1326 – 11 October 1908  For Mahmud Pasha’s tribal background, position and function in the Abdülhamid II regime, please see: Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, p. 75 – 82

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Mahmud Pasha, who had shown loyalty to the state authority until 1888, started to cause troubles and he was appointed as the Sub-Governor of Urfa to be distanced from the settlement area of his tribe.⁷⁶ However, as it was understood that this appointment would not solve the problem, the decision was canceled and he was summoned to İstanbul where he had compulsorily resided until his to return to Mosul in 1894.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, Sayyid Muhammad Barzanji, the Former Mufti (Müfti-i Esbak) of Sulaymaniyah, was also subjected to compulsory residence in İstanbul and he was allowed to return to his homeland with Mahmud Pasha in 1894.⁷⁸ The simultaneous return of these two problematic characters to the locality caused a power struggle between Jaf and Barzanjiyya, and worsened the situation in Sulaymaniyah.⁷⁹ Their second telegram on 11th of October included a major allegation on Sheikh Said which was that his congregation has been forming a political opposition against the Constitutional regime. In the telegram directly transmitted to the Grand Vizier (Sadrâzam), Mustafa and Mahmud Pashas reported that Sheikh Said and his congregation have been causing disorder under a society called the ‘Society of Unionist Charity’ and have been provoking the community against the Constitution (Kanûn-i Esâsi).⁸⁰ While the real ruler of the lands of Kurdistan with

 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, p. 78 – 80  Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, p. 78 – 80  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 321, 322, footnote 1525 For the sociocultural background of the Barzanjis and the problems they have created, please see: Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 319 – 323  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 321, 322, footnote 1525  BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324– 11 October 1908 “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhiye Takriben üç milyon nüfûsu hâvi Kürdistan kıtasının reis-i hakikisi Pâdişâh efendimiz hazretleri iken beş altı hâne halktan ibâret olup milletin mahvı sûretiyle menfaat-ı […] arayan takımdan Şeyh Said ve akrabâsının Kürdistan Riyâseti nâmı altında Selânik Heyet-i İttihâdiyemize keşide ettikleri telgraf Cemiyet-i Muhteremece sencîde-i mîzâna dikkat edilmeyerek ciddiyetine kanaat hâsıl eylemiş […] yine o nâm ile cevâb verilmiş. Halbuki Devr-i Sâbıkta bâ-şikâyet Tahsin ve İzzet hâinlerinin sâyesinde bilâ-istihkak aldıkları rütbeler kaptıkları maaşlar elde ettikleri Mâbeyn şifresinin kuvvet ve tesiriyle kaptıkları taaddiyâttan yeni kurtarılmış ve hürriyet lezaizini tatmak üzere bulunmuş olan bîçâre ahâliye rağmen ve şimdilik yirmi bin nüfûsu raddesindeki İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyetini takliden bir takım adamı […] tulumbacı makulesinden cem ettikleri fesâd komitesine taktıkları Cemiyet-i Hayriyye nâmı altında mestur envâ-i habâsetlerin icrâsına âlet olmak üzere gayr-i meşrû ve kabih bir sûrette toplayabildikleri birkaç lirayı kabûl ve haklarında iltifâtı ettirir ve ahvâllerinden bî-haber olan Selânik Heyet-i Muhteremesinden aldıkları telgrafı sû-i tefsirle Kanûn-i Esâsi aleyhindeki bilumûm ahâli ve aşâirin heyecânını müstelzim olmuş olduğundan evvel emirde bunların vaktiyle makamâtı ve vilâyeti işgal eden ahvâllerin tahkikiyle tezâhür edecek neticesine kadar haklarındaki fikrin […] ve mütehassıl heyecânın te-

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a population of about three million was the Sultan, Said and his affiliates, consisting of five or six households, claimed a title such as the ‘Presidency of Kurdistan’ (Kürdistan Riyâseti) and sought benefits by destroying the nation. According to the allegations of Mustafa and Mahmud, Sheikh Said and his affiliates contacted the CUP headquarters of Salonika under the title of Presidency of Kurdistan and were able to obtain a positive opinion to establish their own society. Since the CUP headquarters (Selânik Heyet-i İttihâdiyesi / Muhteremesi) did not have the insight of their true background, it had not acted very carefully and was convinced of the seriousness and sincerity of the applicants. However, Mustafa and Mahmud labelled Said’s clique as deceptive and attributed their tyranny to the undeserved titles, salaries and communication channels they have grabbed from the Ancien Régime. ⁸¹ They claimed that the Sheikhs, who acted under the auspices of traitors such as Tahsin and İzzet Pashas, managed to achieve these opportunities thanks to this patronage. It is highly probable that they were referring to the Secretaries of the Imperial Chamberlain (Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun Başkâtibi), Hasan Tahsin and Arab İzzet Holo Pashas, who were the most prominent figures of the Hamidian bureaucracy. Sheikh’s exclusive opportunity of dispatching telegrams directly to the Imperial Chamberlain (Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun) through a telegram codebook (şifre miftâhı) was also mentioned.⁸² His privilege and opportunity of direct communication with the palace meant that he was exclusively favored by the imperial authority especially after his close relation with Abdülhamid II. However, the codebook was going to be retrieved from his grandson and sent back from Mosul to İstanbul in couple of months.⁸³ In the correspondence, the Society of Unionist Charity was referred to as “ the committee of mischief” (fesâd komitesi), and allegedly, this committee was desperately imitating the Committee of Union and Progress, which had 20 thousand member at that time.⁸⁴ They also claimed that the money they have collected was going to be an instrument of all kinds of evil disguised under a name like “charity” (hayriyye) and their entity meant nothing but pure anti Conskini ehemmiyetle mâruzdur. Süleymaniye Kumandanı Mirlivâ Mustafa / Caf Aşireti Reisi Mahmud “  The expression ’Ancien Régime’, which will appear many times throughout the study, refers to the Previous or Old Regime (Devr-i Sâbık) before the Constitutional Monarchy and the Era of Despotism (Devr-i İstibdâd) under the Hamidian rule. This term, which characterized the period before the French Revolution in the literature of World History, underwent a semantic shift in the literature of Ottoman History and was frequently used to characterize the period before the Young Turkish Revolution.  BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324– 11 October 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2694/16, 04 Zilhicce 1326 – 28 December 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2636/48/Lef 1, 28 Eylül 1324– 11 October 1908

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stitutionalism. According to the message, Sheikh Said and his affiliates have managed to deceive the CUP headquarters, which was unaware of their real characters, have recruited unqualified men to establish their organization, and have begun to raise money illegally. Mustafa and Mahmud reported that the public agitation had severely increased, and they wanted an investigation to be conducted against them as soon as possible to reveal their true faces and to calm the agitation. As we will see the example of Mosul in the section of ‘CUP’s Problematic Entity in Mosul’, it is obvious that after the Constitutional monarchy, Sulaymaniyah also had its share from the uncontrolled branching and multitude of CUP formations. The next telegram of Mustafa and Mahmud was also signed by major Administrative Bureaucrats, Notables and Military Officers of the town and was directly transmitted to Ministry of Interior on 4th of November.⁸⁵ It was a collective petition by both officials and community of Sulaymaniyah requesting the banishment of Sheikh Said with his relatives of six households from Sulaymaniyah because of their oppression and numerous atrocities.⁸⁶ According to the message, after the promulgation of constitution they hoped that the thirty years of Despotism would be defeated finally. However, they claimed that their applica-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324– 04 November 1908 Petitioners were Brigadier General Mustafa, Jaf Chief Mahmud, Müfti Abdülaziz, Administrative Council Members (İdâre Âzâları) Abdurrahman, Said, Sâlih and the other Abdurrahman, the Official of Imperial Estates (Emlâk-ı Seniyye Memûru) Abdullah, Head of Penal Chamber (Cezâ Reisi) Refet, Regular Army Battalion Commander Senior Captain (Nizâmiye Tabur Kumandanı Kolağası) Sâlih, Registrar (Nüfûs Memûru) İzzet, Reserve Major (Redif Binbaşı) Mahmud, Notable (Vücûhdan) Abdülfettah, Batallion Commander (Tabur Ağası) Fehmi, Notable Fettah, Merchants (Tüccârdan) Hacı Ahmed Çâder, Hacı Fettah, Medical Senior Captain (Tabib Kolağası) Ziyâ, Bank Clerk (Bank Memûru) Abdurrahman and many others as well.  BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 2, 22 Teşrinievvel 1324– 04 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Otuz sene zarfındaki istibdâdı Kanûn-i Esâsinin neşriyle def edileceği me’mûl iken hakkında makamât-ı aliyye ile Nezâret-i celilelerine tevâli iden mâruzât ve mürâcaatımız akim kalmasından dolayı kalem ile tâdâda gelmez zulüm, gadr, i’tisâfı kat-ender-kat […] tezyid eyleyen Hafid Şeyh Said ve altı hâneden akrabâsı livâdan aldırılmak sûretiyle vuku bulan teskine ve istirâhatimize ehemmiyet verilmezse evvelce de arz olunduğu veçhile memleketin Ulemâ ve Meşâyih, Memûrîn-i Mülkiye , Ümerâ ve Zâbitân-ı Askeriyye, Vücûh, Esnâf ve Aşâir Rüesâsı ile Milel-i Muhtelifeden yirmi bin kişiden mürekkeb teşkil eden ve mûmâileyhle itbâ’at-ı denâet nâmûsşikenâne ahvâl-i gayr-i meşrûlarına tahammül edemeyen cemiyetimiz hukuk-u şahsiye ve milliyelerini muhâfaza etmek maksadıyla her ne sûretle olursa olsun bu livâdan ihrâcları için âmâde bulunduğunu ihbâr ve Rızâ-i Âliye Kanûn-i Esâsiye zamânında […] olan işbu hâlin nazar-ı dikkate ahzıyla bu babda hükûmetçe yapılması îcâb eder muâmelenin şimdi makine başında bulunan binlerce ahâliye tefhim olunmak üzere irâdeleri intizâr olunur.”

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tions to the imperial authorities and ministries for the banishment of Sheikh Said were eventually failed. In addition, the level of cruelty, hatred and corruption of Sheikh Said, whom they refrained from even writing (kalem ile tâdâda gelmez zulüm, gadr, i’tisâf), had increased so much more rather than ended. They had also sent an ultimatum on behalf of their ‘Society’ (Cemiyet) of 20 thousand people consisting of the Ulema, Sheikhs, Administrative Officials, Military Commanders and Officers, Notables, Tribal Chiefs and Various Nations.⁸⁷ In case they were not paid attention or ignored by authorities, they were not going to tolerate the flagrant, dishonorable (itbâ’at-ı denâet nâmûsşikenâne) and illegitimate practices (ahvâl-i gayr-i meşrûa) of Said and his congregation. They clearly stated that, in order to protect their own civil and national rights, they would all be willing and ready to banish Said and his despicable affiliates, on their own. Ministry of Interior was going to take this message serious and was going to decide to banish Sheikh Said mostly relying on this telegram.⁸⁸ While the Government contemplated and practiced Said’s banishment, complaints continued to be raised against him during the process. One of these complaints, led by the Mufti of Sulaymaniyah Abdülaziz, Mayor Abdülgafur and Naqshbandi Sheikh Emin (Hulefâ-yı Nakşibendiyye), is quite remarkable.⁸⁹ The

 The term ‘Cemiyet’ here probably refers to the Committee of Union and Progress  BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324– 09 November 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2660/62/Lef 1, 31 Teşrinievvel 1324– 13 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Devr-i Sâbık hafiyelerinden Süleymaniyeli Hafid Şeyh Said, birâderi, mahâdimi ve taallukatları elindeki mazlûmin, mâsûminin hûn-u nahakkıyla ruy-i zemini müdhiş bir şekl-i hamrâya vaz’ ve defaâtle ihrâk ettikleri çarşı hânelerin devriyle ufk-ı semâyı bir sehâb-ı kesif rengine kalb ettikleri gibi gasb ettikleri emlâk ve emvâli az görerek ahâli-i muti hakkında revâ gördükleri mezâlim ve i’tisâfat-ı nâ-meşrûalarından dolayı ayyuka çıkan feryâd figanımız idâre-i zâilenin […] hoşnudiyetlerinde ahengden başka bir semere […] etmediğinden bilgurur hayâtımıza hatme çekilmenin azm-i katisinde bulunduğumuz bir sırada Kanûn-i Esâsinin, nimet-i hürriyetin îlânından müstefid olmak üzere Hükûmet-i Seniyyede edilen ahd ü peymânına ne Şeyh-i mûmâileyh dahi itbâ’-i ıslâh-ı nefsle iştirâkleri hakkındaki teklifâtımıza zâten meslek-i nâ-marzîyelerine tevafuk etmediğinden nâşi adem-i itâatla iktifâ etmeyerek İstibdâd vak’alarını muhâfaza fikr-i fâsidiyle bir tarafta Kanûn-i Esâsinin şeriat […] Pâdişâhiye mugayeretinden bahisle efkâr-ı umûmiyeyi teheyyüc, diğer tarafta İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyetini teşkil eden ahâli-i muti hakkında bir kat daha husumeti teşdid, kendilerini hârici nâmıyla tekfir, katllerine bile fetvâ vererek fedâiler tâyin eylemiş, hayâtımızdan nâ-ümid bırakması üzerine tevâli iden şikâyât, istirhâmâtımızın esbâb ve ledünniyyâtı, Makamât-ı Aliyye, Vilâyet-i Celile, Hükûmet-i Mahalliyece lâyıkıyla tahkik etmesine mebni mûmâileyhin buradan teb’idleri memleketin istikrâr-ı âsâyiş ile hayâtımızın temini emrinde sahaif-i […] tezyin edecek icrâât-ı âdilâne ve reâyânüvâzâneye karşı ekserine […] beraber izdiyâd-ı ömür ve âfiyet, Hazret-i Pâdişâhi duâi mâruz […] tekrâr ve müsakkafât-ı ulyâya dahi memnûniyyet ve teşekküratımızı memleketin dâhili ve hârici Ulemâ ve Eşrâf,

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telegram bearing the signatures of persons such as Mazloum (Mazlûm), Emin, Omar (Ömer), Muhammad, Mahmud and Maarouf from the Sulaymaniyah Ulema, was additionally signed as “with their 89 companions” (seksen dokuz rüfekası) at the end. The message reported that Sheikh Said, who was the ‘informant of Ancien Régime’ (Devr-i Sâbık hafiyelerinden), had been tyrannizing the community and actively opposing to the Constitutional Monarchy. According to Abdülaziz and his companions, Said’s affiliates had burnt the market and houses multiple times and had seized the properties and merchandizes of people. After a point, the rhetoric of the message was quite literary, while its style was quite grandiloquent. The blood they have spilled unjustly so far painted the earth red, and the bazaar shops they burned many times turned the sky into a pile of dense clouds. They complained that their cries and moans of Said’s oppression and illegitimate practices were heard everywhere so far, but not at the state. According to their allegations, Sheikh Said did not obey the Government’s oath (ahd ü peymân) after the proclamation of the constitution and rejected the invitations to adopt the Constitutionalism regime since it contradicted with his own doctrine. According to them, it was a known fact that Said was already disobedient to Constitutionalism due to his attitude and doctrine. However, after a certain point, Said was not content with only an ideological opposition and attempted a threatening activism against Constitutionalism. They alleged that Said has been agitating public opinion against Constitutionalism to revive Despotism and he had been constantly emphasizing the new regime’s contradiction (mugayeret) with Shariah (Religious Law) and Sultanate. They also accused him with aggravating the hate towards the Committee of Union and Progress through declaring its members infidels (hârici nâmıyla tekfir) and even issuing a fatwa for murdering them (katllerine bile fetvâ). They even claimed that Said had encouraged some ruffians (fedâiler) to have them killed and stated that they had abandoned hope on the lives of these targeted members. His banishment following a proper investigation conducted by imperial and provincial authorities meant restoring public order of their hometown and maintaining their lives. They were all grateful to ‘just and gracious practices’ (icrâât-ı âdilâne ve reâyânüvâzâneye) of Sultan and finished the message with their prayers to Sultan, justice, nation and fraternity. The most interesting point about this telegram is that it is also signed by Emin, a Naqshi Sheikh as well. It is well known that after the murder of Sheikh Said, local tariqahs completely took the side of the

Ahâli, Aşâiri nâmına arz ve Kanûn-i Esâsi’nin şaşaa […] envârıyla kesb-i […] eyleriz. Yaşasın Pâdişâhımız, yaşasın adâlet, yaşasın millet, yaşasın uhuvvet”

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Barzanjis and sent telegrams to İstanbul praising Said and seeking justice.⁹⁰ Considering this adoption, devotion and endorsement towards the Barzanjis, the fact that this telegram was signed by a local tariqah sheikh is quite remarkable and contradictory. This makes us think that Sheikh Emin may have had a personal problem or enmity with Sheikh Said beyond the relations between tariqahs and clans.

2.6 Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul As the complaints keep incoming, Mosul Governor Major General (Vâli Ferik) Zeki Pasha had already asked for a military support to banish Said Effendi with some of his relatives and affiliates (akrabâ ve taallukatı) from Sulaymaniyah to the provincial center.⁹¹ Because as Said’s congregation and society were increased in

 For the telegram sent by the Tariqah Sheikhs to the central authorities in response to the murder of Sheikh Said, please see the section of 5.1 Sâdât’s Seek of Justice  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/108, 2 Teşrinievvel 1324– 15 October 1908 In the archival materials used for the study, it can be said that the most frequently referred term for the ‘penalized exclusion’ of Said and affiliates from Sulaymaniyah, is ‘banishment’ (teb’id: uzaklaştırma). Other frequent expressions in the archive can be listed as ‘to be taken’ (aldırılmak, götürülmek), ‘to be removed’ (çıkarılmak , kaldırılmak) , ‘to be sent’ (i’zâm edilmek, i’zâm kılınmak , gönderilmek), ‘to deport’ (ihrâc etmek), ‘to be drawn away/ to be summoned’ (celb edilmek, celb olunmak, çekilmek) and ‘to be forwarded / redirected / routed’ (sevk edilmek , sevk olunmak). Thus, the terms of ‘exile’ (nefy: sürgün) or ‘expulsion’ (tagrib: gurbete gönderme/kovma) were found only in parliamentary minutes questioning the judicial and bureaucratic dimensions of the Sheikh Said’s case. According to their dictionary meanings, [even both words are alternatives to each other in some cases], ‘banish’ means ‘being forced to reside elsewhere or being relocated by the force of authority’ while the ‘exile’ literally means ‘being expulsed from native land’. In this book, the facts ‘banish’ and ‘banishment’ correspond to the Ottoman term teb’id which literally means ’to expulse a person away from a location and restrain in another by state authority’ In her study, Deniz Dölek Sever discusses the difference between ‘banishment’ and ‘exile’ according to the dynamics of İstanbul’s public order during the Great War years. From Sever’s point of view, suspects or criminals who were removed from İstanbul during the Great War years were not ‘exiled’ in practice because they were generally not natives of İstanbul. According to Sever, people who were expulsed from a city like İstanbul, which had elements from all over the empire, were technically banished (teb’id edilmiş) from a place to another because they were not in their hometown anyway. Although Sulaymaniyah is Said’s hometown, his situation seems controversial in this respect. Because, despite the pending decree for his removal to Basrah Province in case of Recidivism (Cürm-i İtiyâd: tendency to commit the same crime again), it was not implemented and Said eventually, was not taken out of Mosul Province borders. Although the word ‘exile’(nefy) is men-

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number and as they kept staying in Sulaymaniyah, the situation became crucial and the disorder became inevitable.⁹² The transfer operation was so critical that Zeki did not find the 100 mounted troops (kuvve-i râkibe) assigned for the escort mission sufficient and requested that higher number of soldiers be dispatched from the 6th Army. However, at this point, provincial authorities agreed that

tioned in parliamentary minutes, it seems much more correct to call Said’s case as a ‘banishment’ (teb’id), as the word ‘exile’ was not referred in any relevant correspondence between state authorities and technically he was no not even taken outside the province. However, if the term ‘exile’ was not used in correspondence for political or strategic reasons, or if exile is technically a term that can be used even in expulsions within the same province, this debate is in a completely vicious circle. Then, the other option we might have that the ‘fact of exile’ consists of two parts and the first part ‘nefy’ means ’to expulse someone from a location’, and the second part ‘teb’id’ means ’to force someone to live in another location and keep distant’. Sibel Kavaklı Kundakçı mentions that, in a 19th century Kalebend Register used as the main source of her study, the term nefy is mostly not used as a single word term and is used in compound ways such as “nefy ü iclâ”, nefy ü tağrîb, “nefy ü irsâl’ and ”nefy ü te’dîb”. Although this last one is referred to as ’nefy ü teb’id’ in many sources, Kundakçı employed this term in his work as ’nefy ü te’dib’ which means ‘the punishment of exile as a disciplinary regulation’. Even though such a use is rarely mentioned in some certain sources, Biray Tugay gives the actual usage of this version as “li-ecli’t-te’dib nefyi”. This expression literally means that ‘the prisoner was sent into exile in order to be disciplined’. For a better understanding of the concepts such as nefy-i ebed, nefy-i muvakkat, nefy ve teb’id, nefy ü tard, nefy ve tagrib, teb’id, tagrib, iclâ, tard, ikamete memûr and li-ecli’t-te’dib nefy see Tugay’s comprehensive study on the fact of exile. Deniz Dölek Sever, War and Imperial Capital: Public Order, Crime and Punishment in İstanbul, 1914 – 1918 (Ph.D Dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2015) p. 148 Sibel Kavaklı Kundakçı, An Assessment on Exile (Nefy) Penalty, Gazi University Journal of Social Sciences, Vol:4, No:11, 2017, pp. 595 – 613 Biray Tugay, Aydın Vilayeti’nde Sürgün: Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e / Exile in the Province of Aydın: From Tanzimat to Republic (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Ege University, 2013)  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/108, 2 Teşrinievvel 1324– 15 October 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Hafid Şeyh Said Efendi ile akrabâ ve taallukatı gittikçe cemiyetlerini arttırmakta olduklarından meselenin kesb-i ehemmiyet ve nezâket etmekte olduğu ve bunların Süleymaniye’de kalmaları iğtişâşa sebebiyet vereceği cihetle 100 mevcûdlu kuvve-i râkibe i’zâmıyla […] Musul’a aldırılması Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından iş’âr olunuyorsa da bunların gönderilen kuvvetle isâl ve Süleymaniye’den ihrâcları mümkün olamayacağından âsâyişin muhâfazasıyla men-i mazarratları zımnında Zâbıtaya müzâheret etmek üzere 100 mevcûdlu bir kuvve-i râkibenin livâ-i mezkûra i’zâmı Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun ve 12. Nizâmiye Fırka Kumandanlığına yazılmış ve tedâbir-i hâkimâne ittihâzıyla bir gûnâ vukuata meydan verilmemesi ve muhâfaza-i âsâyişe tebaiyyet itinâ olunması cevâben Mutasarrıflığa tebliğ kılınmış ise de Şeyh-i mûmâileyh ile taallukatından îcâb edenlerin Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırılması münâsib olduğu hâlde mikdâr-ı kâfi asker sevki için Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığına emr itâsıyla keyfiyetin inbâ buyurulması mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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the custody of Sheikh Said in the provincial center would be highly unfavorable.⁹³ Governor Zeki suggested to relocate them temporarily in İstanbul (Dersaadet) or Aleppo since they could pose a bigger threat in Mosul.⁹⁴ He then proposed that Said be transferred to Aleppo or to a more distant province such as Syria or Hejaz in order to avoid the possible damage that his entourage might inflict upon the community.⁹⁵ According to Zeki, the milieu of Sheikh consisted of numerous corrupt and dangerous figures (erbâb-ı mefsedeti pek ziyâde olan). However, it was not that easy to force a strong figure like Sheikh Said to live in a place without his consent. In the first place, it was planned to invite him to Mosul as a guest for an interview rather than escorting him since it might ignite an armed conflict or a public incident.⁹⁶ However, Governor Zeki reported that Sulaymaniyah merchants had closed their stores, armed together and sworn an oath to kill Sheikh Said and his sons.⁹⁷ For maintaining public peace and avoiding a possible incident, Zeki highlighted that the official priority was to transfer them to the provincial center before Sulaymaniyah community would possibly lynch them. He also urged for a military deployment from the adjacent Kirkuk Division (Kerkük Fırkası) to secure the transfer conditions. Since the tele-

 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/117, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324– 17 October 1908 “Süleymaniye’deki ekarib ve taallukatlarıyla bil-muhâbere yine bir gaile çıkarmaları melhûz olmasına ve Zâbitân vâsıtasıyla nezâret ve muhâfazaları Zâbitânın ekseri hemşehrileri olmak cihetiyle kendilerine emniyet edilemeyeceğine”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/117, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324– 17 October 1908  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 406/11, 9 Teşrinievvel 1324– 22 October 1908  BOA, DH.MKT. 2641/48/Lef 4, 16 Teşrinievvel 1324– 29 October 1908  BOA, DH.ŞFR.406/71, 21 Teşrinievvel 1324– 03 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine / Musul Vilâyetinden Mevrûd Şifre Telgrafnâmedir Süleymaniye ahâlisi dükkânlarını kapatarak Şeyh Said ile oğullarını telef etmek üzere ahd ü peymân ettiklerinden silaha sarıldıkları cihetle ahâlinin teskini için mûmâileyhin oğullarıyla mensûbiyetinden iki adamı bil-mecbûriye vukuatsızca celb ve taht-ı nezârete aldırıldığı, ahâlinin dağıtılması için her ne kadar vesâyâ ve ikdâmât icrâ olunmuş ise de bu familya Süleymaniye’den çıkarılmadıkça dağıtılmaları imkân hâricinde bulunduğu […] ifâde ettiklerinden büyük bir fenâlığa mahal kalmamak için Şeyhin behemehâl vilâyete aldırılması Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından iş’âr olunması üzerine âsâyiş-i mahalliyenin ve Şeyhin muhâfaza-i hayâtının teminiyle vukuatın tevsiine meydan bırakılmamasına âid olan tedâbir ve icrââta me’zûn olduğu cevâben Mutasarrıflığa yazıldığı gibi heyecân-ı ahâlinin teskini ve icâbât-ı mahalliyeye göre Şeyh Said’in merkeze isâli muktezi ise harekât-ı hükûmet ve esnâ-yı azimette ahâlinin tecâvüzâtına mahal kalmamak üzere mikdâr-ı kâfi müfreze sevki lüzûmu da Süleymaniye’ye civar bulunan Kerkük Fırkasına yazılmış ve işbu muhâbere esnâsında Süleymaniye ile muhâbere olunan telgraf hattı kırılmış olduğu cihetle başkaca mâlûmat alınamadığı berây-ı mâlûmat mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki “

2.6 Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul

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gram lines were broken probably by the tribesmen during the communication, no further information could be obtained. On 7th of November Zeki sent a telegram to Ministry that the caravan of Said and his retinue including his family and affiliates, was departed under the supervision of Mule Cavalry Battalion (Ester Süvâr Taburu) without any incident.⁹⁸ It was time to be much more decisive and cautious especially after the 4th of November telegram that pushed the Government to decide his banishment without hesitation.⁹⁹ While instructed his banishment, the Ministry of Interior reminded that the priority was to avoid any scene during his departure since his removal from Sulaymaniyah was especially desired by both state officials and public.¹⁰⁰ The next week, Minister of War (Harbiye Nâzırı) Ali Rızâ Pasha informed the Government that a deployment of a hundred soldiers from the 1st Battalion of 48th Regiment (48. Alay 1. Tabur) stationed in Chamchamal, was dispatched to Tashlica (Taşlıca).¹⁰¹ Obviously, the military had attempted to secure the transport route before setting off Sheikh Said’s convoy, in line with the Government’s concerns and demands. In addition, 140 soldiers from the Mule Cavalry Battalion

 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 406/91, 25 Teşrinievvel 1324– 07 November 1908 However, in his ciphered telegram which he dispatched 10 days later (BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/ Lef1, 4 Teşrinisâni 1324– 17 November 1908), Zeki was mentioning that Sheikh and his retinue were brought to Mosul on 5 November 1908 (23 Teşrinievvel 1324). Even Zeki might have reported the departure with a 2 day delay in his first message, it’s quite improbable that the group arrived Mosul on such an early date as 5 November.  BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 1– 3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324– 09 November 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2651/62/Lef 1– 3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324– 09 November 1908 “Musul Vilâyetine Telgrafnâme. Şeyh Said ile akrabâsının Süleymaniye’den kaldırılması Mirlivâ Mustafa Paşa ve Caf Reisi ve memûrîn ve ahâli tarafından Süleymaniye’den çekilen telgrafnâmede istidâ olunmakla 22 Teşrinievvel 1324 telgrafnâme mûcibince mûmâileyh […] ve bu yüzden bir gaile hudûsuna meydan verilmemesi ihtâr ve cevâba intizâr olunur. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2647/71/Lef 3, 02 Teşrinisâni 1324– 15 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Aliyyesine / Atûfetlü Efendim Hazretleri Akdemce Musul Vilâyetiyle cereyân eden muhâbere üzerine 48. Alayın Çemcemal’deki Birinci Taburundan 100 nefer Taşlıca ve Kerkük’teki Ester Süvâr taburundan 140 nefer Çemçemal mevkilerine gönderilmiş ve Hafid Şeyh Said Efendiyle mahdûmlarından Şeyh Muhammed ve Ahmed ve Nakib Şeyh Mârûf, Baba Resûlzâde Seyyid Ahmed ve Müfti-i Esbak Seyyid Muhammed Efendizâde Şeyh Sâlih Efendilerin Çemçemal’e i’zâm olunan ester süvâr müfrezesine teslim edilmek üzere Ester Süvâr Yüzbaşısı İbrâhim Efendi’ye terfikan leylen Süleymaniye’den i’zâm edildikleri Süleymaniye Kumandanlığının iş’ârına atfen 12. Fırka Kumandanlığı Vekâletinden bildirildiği Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığı Vekâletinden mevrûd telgrafnâmede izbâr kılınmış olmakla ol babda emr ve irâde efendim hazretlerinindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ”

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stationed in Kirkuk were dispatched to Chamchamal and this platoon was assigned to perform the transfer mission. 12th Division Command (12. Fırka Kumandanlığı) stationed in Kirkuk and attached to the 6th Army (Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığı) in Baghdad, was in the command of this critical operation. The kafila was consisted of Sheikh Said Effendi, his sons Muhammad (or Mahmud) and Ahmed, his brother Naqib Sheikh Maarouf, Sayyid Ahmed who was the son of Baba Rasul (Baba Resûlzâde) and Sheikh Salih who was the son of Former Mufti Sayyid Muhammad (Müfti-i Esbak Seyyid Muhammed Efendizâde). ¹⁰² It was also reported that the kafila escorted by Mule Cavalry Captain İbrâhim Effendi was departed from Sulaymaniyah to Chamchamal at night. After the 140-man detachment there had joined them enroute, they were all planned to be routed via Chamchamal to Mosul. After they arrived in Mosul, Zeki reported that there was not a legitimate reason to take them into custody; but their freedom in such a populated location with many tribes, clans and communities could facilitate their escape (firâr).¹⁰³ They could also make bigger troubles by communicating with their relatives and affiliates staying in Sulaymaniyah and the gendarme officers watching them were not reliable since they were mostly their fellow townsmen (hemşehrileri). It seems that Zeki did not trust on Kirkuk mule cavalries from Sheikh’s

 BOA, DH.MKT.2647/71/Lef 3, 02 Teşrinisâni 1324– 15 November 1908 Although in some documents accidentally written Muhammed or Mehmed, Said’s sons who were banished to Mosul with him are referred as Ahmed and Mahmud in many sources and documents. Because the Arabic versions of the names Mahmud (‫ )ﻣﺤﻤﻮﺩ‬and Muhammed-Mehmed (‫ )ﻣﺤﻤﺪ‬are very close to each other, it is thought that they can be written incorrectly in handwriting. However, Kedourie identifies Said’s sons who were involved in the harassment incident as Muhammed and Mahmud and gives the name of Said’s murdered son as Muhammed, although he is referred to as Ahmed in all other accounts. Apart from Mahmud, Ahmed, and his youngest son (10 years) whom he took with him to Mosul to enroll in school, it could not be determined whether Sheikh Said had a fourth son, named Mehmed or Muhammed.  BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 1, 04 Teşrinisâni 1324– 17 November 1908 “Musul Vilâyetinden Mevrûd Şifre Telgrafnâmedir, Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Said ve birâderi Mârûf ve oğullarıyla dâmâdı Baba Resûlzâde Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Sâlih nâm şahıslar Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırılmış ise de taht-ı tevkife alınmalarını mûcib şimdilik elde bir şey olmadığına ve aşâir ve kabâil ve ahâli kesretli olan böyle bir mevkide serbest bırakılmaları firârlarını veya Süleymaniye’deki ekarib ve taallukatlarıyla bil-muhâbere yine bir gaile çıkarmaları melhûz olmasına ve Zâbıta vâsıtasıyla Nezâret ve muhâfızları Zâbitânın ekseri hemşehrileri olmak cihetiyle kendilerine emniyet edilemeyeceğine mebni bunların ibkalarına vukuu mahsûs olan mahâzire mahal kalmamak üzere muvakkaten olsun Dersaadet’e yâhûd Haleb’de ikamet etmek üzere i’zâmlarına emr-i seria itâsı lüzûmu îcâb-ı hâl ve maslahata binâen müsterhamdır Vâli Ferik Zeki”

2.6 Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul

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hometown even they were authorized Ottoman officers. He also reiterated his recommendation that the Sheikh and his relatives to be relocated to a remote location such as İstanbul or Aleppo to avoid potential threats. However, this proposal was not approved by the Ministry of Interior since relocating these individuals out of the Province of Mosul was legally impossible for now.¹⁰⁴ As we will see below, an Imperial Decree (İrâde-i Seniyye) issued by the Sultan was required for such a level of practice. After the disapproval of his recommendation, Vali Zeki notified the Ministry that the security measures were to be tightened and Regiment Command with Police Commiserate were to be severely alerted to prevent their possible escape.¹⁰⁵ Zeki might be right in his suspicions about the possible escape of Sheikh Said. In a short while, Mosuli local authorities received an intelligence that Said and his retinue were planning to escape from Mosul back to Sulaymaniyah.¹⁰⁶ That was a telegram signed by almost 40 Officials, Merchants, and No-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 5, 13 Teşrinisâni 1324– 26 November 1908 “Musul Vilâyetine Telgrafnâme Şeyh Said ile akrabâsının Haleb’de yâhûd Dersaadet’te ikamete icbârları kanunen gayr-i mümkün olduğundan Merkez-i Vilâyette hüsn-i muhâfazası zarûrîdir. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 2, 15 Teşrinisâni 1324– 28 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, İrade buyurulan telgrafi kopyası ahz olundu. Buraya aldırılan Hafid Şeyh Said Efendiyle akrabâsının firârına meydan verilmemesine dikkat olunması Alay Kumandanlığıyla Polis Komiserliğine şediden tavsiye olunmuş ve icrâ olunacak tahkikatın iktirân edeceği neticeye göre muâmele-i lâzımenin îfâsı tabii bulunmuş olunacağı mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT.2667/33/Lef 1, 7 Teşrinisâni 1324– 20 November 1908 Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırılan Şeyh Said, birâderi, mahâdimi, akrabâlarının burada kalan diğer mahâdimi taallukatlarının tetebbu edilen ahvâl ve şerâitlerinin ve hempaları olan […] vuku bulduğu hiss olunan tebligatlarına nazaran vilâyetçe serbest bir hâlde bırakılan Şeyh-i mûmâileyhle rüfekasından bir kaç kişi firâren buraya avdet edecekleri tahakkuk etmiştir ki cerâimlerine mebni şimdiye kadar haklarında toplanan evrak takriben 160 takımdan ibâret ve bahusus cerâimlerinin tekrârı takdirde Basra’ya sevkleri İrâde-i Seniyye-i Hazret-i Pâdişâhi iktizâsından bulunan mûmâileyhin zulüm, gadr, istibdâdından kurtulmak ümidiyle teb’idleri hakkındaki mürâcaatları adâlete iktirân iden ahâliden intikam almak için idüğü [sic] muamelât ve iğtişâşlarıyla kıyâs kabûl etmez bir raddede ettirecekleri emsâliyle müsebbet bulunan kanlar meftûru bulundukları Cemiyet îcâbınca irtikâb edecekleri cinâyetleri, memleketin dâhili ve hâricine çıkaracakları ihtilâlin derecesini ve bu ahvâlin umûma îrâs edecek […] takdir iden memleketin ahâlisiyle menfaatleri olan ve min heyet-ül mecmua yekûn bin hâneden ibâret bulunan Caf ve aşâir-i sâire tekrâr heyecâna gelen mesûliyeti müsebbiblerine ait olmak üzere tahammüle mümkün olmayan bu hâlde her ne sûretle olursa olsun nihâyet itâsı zımnında tedârikat-ı lâzı-

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tables of Sulaymaniyah; such as Mustafa and Mahmud Pashas, Mufti Abdülaziz, the Official of Imperial Estates (Emlâk-ı Seniyye Memûru) Abdullah, Senior Captain (Kolağası) Sâlih, Merchant (Tüccâr) Hacı Fethullah, Head of Penal Chamber (Cezâ Reisi) Ahmed and Army Reserve Major (Redif Binbaşısı) Mahmud.¹⁰⁷ This collective petition warned that the Sheikh who was released to live free by Mosul province through the attempts of his other sons, relatives and affiliates in Sulaymaniyah, was about to escape back to his hometown. These petitioners also reminded that the criminal record of Sheikhs reached almost 160 documents until now and there was a pending Imperial Decree to exile them to Basrah in case of repeating crimes (Recidivism – Cürm-i İtiyâdi). In their opinion, Sheikh has been planning to take a revenge from the people who filed complaints against his tyranny and Despotism and sought justice through his banishment. According to their observations, Jaf and other tribes which were made up of more than thousand families were also very concerned about the possible return of Said which might trigger bigger conflicts. That was why he should be kept in custody away from Sulaymaniyah with his relatives, and his remaining affiliates in town should have adjoined him as well. Otherwise, they were afraid that the danger and evil posed by his Cemiyet will increasingly continue in Sulaymaniyah and this was clearly against to the justice and equality rendered by the Constitution. Of course, it would not have been appropriate for the petitioners to tolerate a situation that would not befit the purpose of the Government (Hükûmet-i Seniyye), the vulnerability of the period, the Islam and humanity. Besides if they did, the possible outcome of this situation would tremendously occupy the government. They were all grateful to the Constitution that had fortunately

mede bulunmak huzûru mecbûrî bulunmuştur. Âmâl ve arzuları Kanûn-i Esâsinin bahs eylediği adâlet, müsâvatın […] buyrulmak, otuz seneden beri Müteşeyyihler tarafından ayaklarına takılan zincir esâretinden kurtulmak, rahat ve emniyet dâiresinde yaşamak esâsına mebni olan bunca ahâlinin Hükûmet-i Seniyyenin maksadına, zamânın nezâketine, İslâmiyet’e, beşeriyete yakışmayacak ve neticesi hükûmeti fevkalâde işgal edecek bir hâli müsâmaha etmeleri elbet muvâfık-ı maslahat olamaz. Memleketimizde ve dolayısıyla merbût kazâ ve nâhiyelerde tevâli edegelen heyecânın teskin ve âsâyiş-i umûmiyenin istikrârı ol babdaki İrâde-i Seniyye ahkâmına ve vaktiyle kendilerinden olup vilâyetçe mahfûz bulunan senedin mündericâtına tevfikan mûmâileyh Şeyh Said ile akrabâsının ahrâ bir mahale nakilleriyle beraber hemîşe Zâbıta nezâreti altında bulundurulmak ve buradaki beş on kişi taallukatların da onlara iltihak ettirilmekle husûl aksi takdirde hilâf-ı me’mûl tehlikeler fenâlıklar vâki olacağından tafsilât-ı mesrûdeye Süleymaniye’nin mevkiyen hâiz olduğu ehemmiyet, ahâli ve aşâirin son derecedeki tâkiblerine göre iktizâ-yı hâlin îfâ ve işbu keşmekeşe hâtime îtâ buyrulması bilumûm ahâli ve aşâir nâmına arz ve istirhâm olunur. Ferman.”  Head of Penal Chamber Ahmed here must be referring to the Head of Penal Chamber Refet Bey, whose name is mentioned in another telegram as Ahmed Refet.

2.7 Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate as a Controversial Place of Duty

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liberated the community to live under comfort and security by unchaining them after 30 years of Despotism. Long message ended with urgency notifications, requests of preventive measures and a number of signatures by almost 40 names. The banishment of Sheikh Said to Mosul had both symbolic and strategic importance in the eyes of the Unionist government. The symbolic importance lays in the fact that the Unionist government had demonstrated its power and displayed that it was able to intervene in a dynasty that had ruled in Iran, Iraq and Kurdistan for 700 years. By displacing Sâdât from their homeland and separating them from their families, the Unionist authority also wanted to display that it could eliminate the traces of the Despotism regime. However, the pressure practices applied on the Sâdât families left behind in Sulaymaniyah had put the provincial administration and military command in an exceedingly difficult situation. The strategic importance lay in the weakening of the Sulaymaniyah-based Society of Unionist Charity. The state authority, who drove Sâdât’s executive team to Mosul, intended to leave their organization in Sulaymaniyah headless. In this way, Sheikh Said was disengaged from the rest of Sâdât, the Hamawand tribe, and the Sunni tariqahs which meant a severe damage on their organizational network. Nevertheless, provincial administration persistently tried to legitimize the action through claiming that the banishment was carried out for Sâdât’s own safety and to prevent further incidents in Sulaymaniyah.

2.7 Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate as a Controversial Place of Duty It was not only the Sâdât front that was complained and that the allegations were brought against. Sulaymaniyah administrative authorities and officials were also constantly being complained to the superior authorities in İstanbul by different elements in the Sâdât bloc. In fact, the most serious of these allegations was that a conspiracy was set up against Sheikh Said under the leadership of the Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha, and that Said was banished and murdered as a result of this conspiracy. In this section, both the controversial position of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate vis-à-vis the Central Authority will be examined, and the allegations made by the Sâdât bloc against the Sulaymaniyah administration will be exemplified. However, before moving on to these further interpretations, it is useful to render a brief background of the Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha whose name will be mentioned continuously throughout the work since he was one of the major suspects in Sâdât’s allegations.

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The previous Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Sâlih Vasfi Effendi had resigned from his office in November 1906, when he could not adapt to the local climatic conditions and suffered a dangerous disease.¹⁰⁸ In February 1907, Tevfik Bey, the District Governor (Kaimakam) of Nevşehir District (Nevşehir Kazâsı) in Konya Province, who was deemed appropriate due to the importance of the position, was appointed to Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, although his name is referred in a few studies such as Hut’s, no detailed content or a comprehensive literature is available on Çerkes Tevfik Pasha, who was to serve until his dismissal in February 1909. It is interesting that Tevfik Pasha, who allegedly played a key role in the Mosul Incident and who left deep traces in the history of Sulaymaniyah, has been overlooked by this time. Although he was one of the civil administrators who were inherited from the Abdülhamid II period, he was contrasted with the Islamic clique in the region and his name was allegedly involved in the Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy against Sâdât. It can be thought that the archive-based information about Tevfik Pasha that will be given in this book will contribute to the literature and be a guide for future research on the Post-Constitutional transformation of Mosul. On 15 November 1908, the Ministry of War reported to the Ministry of Interior that the existing situation of Sulaymaniyah was pathetic due to the mismanagement of the Sub-Governor Tevfik.¹¹⁰ Tevfik should have been well known by İstanbul authorities as he performed the task of District Governor of Prince Islands (Adalar Kaimakamlığı) for many years. The Mosul Command notified the Ministry that there was a severe need for skilled, diligent and competent officials in order to conduct a provincial reform and reconstitution (vilâyetin ıslâh-ı ahvâli) across the entire Mosul. Because after the Former Governor, Mustafa Yümnî, who managed to escape with impunity despite all his corruption (irtikâbât-ı külliye), his successor had literally inherited a wreck. However, Zeki stated in his reply to

 BOA, DH.MKT.1228/58/Lef 3, 10 Teşrinisâni 1324– 23 November 1906  BOA, BEO.2989/224116, 22 Kânûnusâni 1322– 4 February 1907; DH.MKT.1228/58/Lef 3, 10 Teşrinisâni 1324– 23 November 1906  BOA, DH.MKT. 2666/57/Lef 1, 2 Teşrinisâni 1324– 15 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine / Âtıfetli Efendim Hazretleri, Vilâyetçe idâre-i sâbıka berdevâm olduğu ve Vâli-i sâbık leylen kaçırılarak irtikâbât-ı külliye yanına bırakıldığı gibi Süleymaniye Sancağı dahi acınacak bir hâlde olup Mutasarrıfı senelerce Adalar Kaimakamlığında kullanıldığından ahvâli Dersaadetçe mâlûm olacağı beyânıyla şu sırada vilâyetin ıslâh-ı ahvâli gayurkârgüzâr ve tehdidini icrâya ve dâire-i Vilâyetlerini bizzat teftişle icrâât-ı lâzımeyi îfâya muktedir memûrînin vücûduna mütevakkıf olunduğu Musul Kumandanlığından mevrûd telgrafnâmenin bir fıkrasında izbâr kılınmış olmakla sûret-i iş’âra nazaran iktizâsının îfâ buyurulması beyânında emr ve irâde efendim hazretlerinindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ”

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the Ministry that Tevfik did not show any mismanagement (idâresizliği) and that the condition of the sanjak was better than before.¹¹¹ According to Zeki, only Sheikh Said complained about Tevfik. On the other hand, Zeki emphasized that the people of Kirkuk also dissatisfied with their Sub-Governor and suggested that Tevfik be appointed to that sanjak, where an active and capable (faal ve muktedir) Sub-Governor was needed. He wanted an active person, who knew the conditions, mentalities and temperaments of the tribes well, to be appointed instead of Tevfik. If not, he specifically suggested the appointment of the ‘Chief Secretary of the Province’ (Mektûb-i Vilâyet) Ahmed Münir Effendi, a person known as a merit holder (liyâkati mûcib).¹¹² Although the complaints about Tevfik increased, Zeki’s suggestion of appointing him to the Kirkuk Sub-Governorate could be seen as a move of distancing him from Sheikh Said and relocating him to a relatively less problematic sanjak. The important point here was that he could have made this suggestion just to prevent Tevfik from being dismissed and remained idle. After the banishment of Sheikh Said took place in early November 1908, tension and disagreement between the central authority and the provincial administration already began to escalate. According to the message by Zeki, Sheikh Said had claimed that Sub-Governor Tevfik was provoked by the Jaf Chief Mahmud who had been bearing a long-time hostility towards Said.¹¹³ In addition,

 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 407/47, 19 Teşrinisâni 1324– 02 December 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Paşanın idâresizliği görülmemiş ve sancağın ahvâli sâbıkına nisbeten daha iyi bulunmuştur. Müşârünileyhi yalnız Şeyh şikâyet ediyor ve Kerkük Mutasarrıfını da ahâli mütevâli istemiyor. Binâenaleyh şu aralık faal ve muktedir bir Mutasarrıfa ihtiyâcı derkâr olan Kerkük Mutasarrıflığına Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının nakli ve iffet ve istikameti kabil-i inkâr olmayan Kerkük Mutasarrıfının da sehl-ül idâre bir livâya tahviliyle Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığına ahvâl ve emzice-i aşirete vâkıf ve faal birinin tâyin ve i’zâmı ve yâhûd liyâkati mûcib olan Mektûb-i Vilâyet Ahmed Münir Efendinin tâyini vâbeste-i rey-i Âli-i Nezâretpenâhileridir. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”  Chief Secretary of the Province (Mektûb-i Vilâyet): The secretary who is in charge of conducting provincial correspondence.  BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 5, 9 Teşrinisâni 1324– 22 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Şeyh Said Efendinin telgrafı mütâlâa olundu. Kendisi ile taallukatından beş zâtın ahâlinin şikâyeti üzerine Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından gösterilen lüzûm üzerine bir müfreze askeriyye mârifetiyle Merkez-i Vilâyete celb olundukları cevâben arz olunmuş idi. Şeyh-i mûmâileyh tarafından verilen arz-ı hâlde haklarında ahâli tarafından bir gûnâ şikâyât vâki olmayıp öteden beri miyânelerinde olan Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşanın ilkaat ve tahrikâtına kapılan Mutasarrıf Paşanın hilâf-ı hakikat işârâtı üzerine bu sûretle celb edilmeleri muvâfık-ı muâdelet olamayacağından

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Said had added that Tevfik had taken the Sâdât into custody on unfounded accusations, although no complaints were filed by the people of Sulaymaniyah. Zeki also stated that the Provincial Administrative Council (Meclis-i İdâre-i Vilâyet) has fulfilled its function regarding the investigation and that the decision-making process was still in progress (derdest-i arz). However, complaints and allegations from the Sâdât front increased and allegation of an illegal cooperation between Sub-Governor Tevfik and Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha regarding a tax-collection fraud was exposed. Almost a month later, Zeki reported that allegations that Sheikh Said and his retinue were falsely accused and banished, were still on the agenda. While the investigation was deepened and his statement was taken, Sheikh Said had renewed his claim that there were no complaints or accusations against them by the Sulaymaniyah community.¹¹⁴According to the Sheikh, they were banished to Sulaymaniyah by the unfounded accusations of Jaf Chief Mahmud, Sub-Governor Tevfik and Commander Mustafa. Moreover, Said had expressed Mahmud Pasha’s involvement into this tripartite plan as some factions of Jaf tribe were excluded from Mahmud Pasha’s domain of influence (taht-ı nüfûz) and that situation caused a raise in their tax rates to be collected (tezyid-i tahsil). In other words, while the amount of tax that Mahmud Pasha had to collect and compensate for the state were the same, the population that he had to collect was now decreased and the per capita rates increased. While this meant more pressure and difficulty in paying for the population included in the taxation area, it meant operational risk and collection difficulties for Mahmud Pasha. This was bahisle bittahkik muktezâ-yı muâdeletin îfâsı istidâ olunmakla meclis-i idâre karârı derdest-i arz bulunmuş olduğu mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 2, 30 Teşrinisâni 1324– 13 December 1908 “Musul Vilâyetinden Gelen Şifre Şeyh Said Efendi ile rüfekasının mezâliminden bahisle Süleymaniye’den kaldırılmaları için ahâli tarafından ısrâr olunduğu Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı Kumandanlığından bildirilmesi üzerine sebk eden işârâta cevâben mûmâileyhin Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırılması emr ve iş’âr buyurulmasına mebni mahfûzen celb edilmiştir. Muhâberât-ı câriyeyle Şeyh Said Efendinin ifâdesine nazaran haklarında ahâli tarafından bir gûnâ şikâyet ve mürâcaat vâki olmayıp bu hâl mukaddemâ Caf Aşiretinden bazı fırkaların Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşa’nın taht-ı nüfûzundan çıkarıp vergilerinin tezyid-i tahsiline tavassut eylemesinden müteessir olan Mahmud Paşayla Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik ve Kumandanı Mustafa Paşaların bil-ittifak hilâf-ı hakikat işârâtıyla Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırıldıkları iddia olunuyor. Gerçi Şeyhlerin de Süleymaniye’ce mûcib-i muahaze ahvâlleri yok değil ise de hakikatin zâhire ihracı 22 Teşrinisâni 1324 târihli telgrafla arz olduğu veçhile cihet-i Mülkiye ve Adliye ve Askeriyyeden mahalline bir heyetin gönderilmesine mütevakkıf bulunduğundan icâbâtın icrâsı merhûn-u müsâade-i dâverileridir. Vâli Zeki”

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quite probable that Mahmud Pasha was trying to get rid of Barzanji penetration to achieve his freedom of movement and to maintain a full-scale rule on his own tax domain. Zeki also mentioned that the conduct of the Sheikhs in Sulaymaniyah was not entirely innocent and that there were aspects that required investigation. According to Zeki, a deeper investigation was needed to uncover the truth in Sulaymaniyah. For this, it was expected to form a committee consisting of administrative, judicial and military members. In the middle of December, Ministry of Interior notified Mosul Governorate that a new Sub-Governor for Sulaymaniyah was to be appointed and sent.¹¹⁵ Meantime, if the Tevfik Pasha’s stay in Sulaymaniyah was not approved by the Mosul Governor, he was going to be summoned to Mosul and a deputy was recommended to substitute him until the arrival of his successor. Obviously, Central Government considered the risk of remaining him there until a new Sub-Governor arrives but left the initiative and decision to his superior Zeki Pasha in any case. Next day Governor Zeki Pasha telegrammed a ciphered message to Ministry of Interior including a short summary of events up to that point.¹¹⁶ Despite his previous message, which he mentioned the allegations of a triple alliance against Said, this time Zeki justified and defended Sheikh Said’s banishment. He reminded that during the era of Despotism, the Sulaymaniyah community was in really poor conditions and the town’s incomes had fallen to one-fifth (vâridâtı hums derecesine tenzil) because of the oppression by Said’s affiliates.

 BOA, DH.MKT.2686/36, 5 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 18 December 1908  BOA, DH.ŞFR.407/116, 6 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 19 December 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Devr-i İstibdâdda Hafid Şeyh Said Efendi ve taallukatı yüzünden Süleymaniye […] ahâlisi zebûn ve vâridâtı hums derecesine tenzil eylemiş idi. Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa iktidâr ve haysiyyetle sancağı her vakitten iyi idâre etmiş, Îlân-ı Meşrûtiyetle beraber Şeyh Said efendinin Cemiyet-i Hayriyye nâmıyla uygunsuz bir cemiyet teşkil ve avenesini tezyid ettiğini gören ahâli Sâdât’ın kesb-i kuvvet istidâdını gösteren zincir-i esâretini kesr için ittifak ve Mütegallib Sâdât’ın mevkii hemen müşkilât kesbetmiş ve Mutasarrıf tarafından muhâfaza-ı hayâtları için ikdâmât-ı ciddiye sarf edilmiş ise de Süleymaniye’de kalmaları tezyid-i heyecânı bais olacağı anlaşıldığından makam-ı devletle bilmuhâbere mezkûr vilâyete aldırılmış idi. Ol babdaki irâdeleri üzerine cihet-i mülkiye ve askeriyyeden mürekkeb bir heyet-i tahkikiye tesellüm-i derdest-i i’zâmları icrâ, Mirlivâ Mustafa Paşa aleyhine gerek buradaki Şeyhler ve gerekse orada kalan bakıyye-yi Sâdât şikâyât-ı mütevellide bulunmaları üzerine mesele cihet-i adliyeye tevdi edilmekle beraber ahâli işine lüzûmundan ziyâde müdâhale eden Kumandan Mustafa Paşanın tebdili için Ordu Kumandanlığına yazılmış olduğundan cânib-i devletlerinin de Harbiye Nezâretine tebligat icrâsına ve Îlân-ı Hürriyet’te her memûra takaddüm iden Mutasarrıfın şikâyâta bilâ-tahkik fedâ edilmesi Memûrîn-i Vilâyet ve Süleymaniye Ahâlisine sû-i tesiri mûcib olacağından mutlaka kaldırılması lâzım ise münâsib bir mahale nakli mâruzdur. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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In addition, Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha had administered the sub-province better than ever with his power and dignity. However, after the declaration of Constitutional Monarchy, the community had observed that Sheikh Said has been enhancing his power and his mass through the Society of Unionist Charity. According to Zeki, since the people were now allied for breaking the chains of captivity, the critical position of tyrant (mütegallib) Sâdât could raise difficulties and their stay in Sulaymaniyah could generate a public agitation at any moment. Zeki reminded as these circumstances could endanger the lives of Sheikhs, Tevfik Pasha had appropriately transferred them to Mosul provincial center under state protection. In addition, the Sheikhs were handed over to an investigative committee composed of military and administrative elements, which undertook the investigation. On the other hand, both the Sheikhs in Mosul and Sheikhs remained in Sulaymaniyah have continuously been filing complaints about the Commander Mustafa Pasha. Zeki remarked that the case was referred to the judicial authorities. Besides, the Army Command was already notified to relocate Mustafa’s station of duty regarding his excessive level of intervention in the matters of civil society (ahâli işine lüzûmundan ziyâde müdâhale eden). Eventually, Ministry of War was the state organ which was expected to declare his reassignment since he was a military officer. However, unlike his neutral attitude towards Mustafa, Zeki kept paying tribute to Tevfik and praised him as “the Sub-Governor who preceded and pioneered all other civil servants during the proclamation of liberty” (Îlân-ı Hürriyet’te her memûra takaddüm iden Mutasarrıfın). If Tevfik was sacrificed without an investigation, that would leave a bad impression in the eyes of provincial officials and community. Zeki also suggested that would be better to appoint him to a convenient location if his replacement was inevitable. After Ministry received these interpretations which caused a hesitation in İstanbul, Zeki was instructed to clarify the reason of his favoring messages on Tevfik.¹¹⁷ Why did Zeki, who had reported on Said’s allegations that he was wrongfully accused by the tripartite alliance and demanded that an investigation committee be sent, suddenly take a stand in favor of Tevfik? The Ministry natu-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 5, 13 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 26 December 1908 “Musul Vilâyet-i Behiyyesine Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı ile Kumandanı hakkında tevâli eden şikâyâtın tetkik-i mahiyeti için cihet-i mülkiye ve askeriyyeden birer zâtın Süleymaniye’ye gönderileceği evvelce bildirilmiş iken şimdi Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyhin lehinde idâre-i kelâm edilmesi mûcib-i tereddi olmakla evvel-be-evvel yekdiğeriyle gayrikabil-i telif olan şu iki iş’âr beynindeki mübâyenet esbâbının serian ve muvazzahan inbâsı muntazırdır. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”

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rally questioned why Zeki changed his mind after he was notified that the military and administrative investigators were arranged to come for these officials who were continuously complained. First of all, it was imperative him to specify the reasons behind his two mismatching statements which created a pure contradiction in the eyes of the Ministry. Soon afterwards Zeki dispatched another long message to Ministry of Interior clarifying the prior conditions. He reminded that there was founded an “imitative” (takliden) Committee of Union and Progress in Sulaymaniyah as in many other places after the proclamation of constitution.¹¹⁸ Afterwards, the Sheikhs in there had attempted to found another association called Society of Unionist Charity with the participation of tribes for protecting their concessions (tâvizlerini muhâfaza) acquired in former era. After the second one’s attempt of establishment, the members of first society (birinci cemiyet) got worried and anxious, and  BOA, DH.MKT.2692/36/Lef 4, 15 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 28 December 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, 13 Kânûnuevvel 1324 Meşrûtiyetin îlânından biraz sonra başka yerlerde olduğu gibi Süleymaniye’de de takliden bir İttihâd ve Terakki cemiyeti teşkil etmiş, oradaki Şeyhler de Devr-i Sâbıktaki tâvizlerini muhâfaza için Cemiyet-i Hayriyye nâmı altında daha […] aşâirlerle vücûda getirmek istemelerinden birinci cemiyet ürkerek heyecâna gelen ve Devr-i Sâbık zamânındaki ahvâllerinde bahisle Şeyhler aleyhinde şikâyetler yağdırmaya başlamışlar idi. Vilâyetçe her iki cemiyetin tanınmaması ve dağıttırılmaları Mutasarrıflığa yazılmış ve aşâir rüesâsına da vesâyâ-ı müessire îfâ ve mezkûr büyük cemiyetin vücûda gelmesine mümanaat olunmuş idi. Muahharen Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından gelen müteaddid telgrafnâmelerde kazâ ahâlisinin ve Caf Rüesâsının önüne durmak mümkün olamadığından ve Şeyhlerin hayâtları tehlikede kalacağından ve her hâlde bunların mezkûr vilâyete aldırılmaları lüzûmundan bahsedilmesi üzerine teskin-i heyecân ile ahvâl-i nâ-marzîye vukuata meydan verilmemek için vukuatsızca bunlar merkeze celb edilmiş idi. Buraya gelen Şeyhler ahâlinin bu işte iştirâki olmayıp Mutasarrıf ve Kumandanın ve orada memûrların eser-i tasni olduğu ve cüz’i mikdâr halkın da onların tesvilâtına kapıldıklarını iddiaya ve makamât-ı aliyyeye şikâyâta koyulmaları üzerine bir heyet-i tahkikiyenin i’zâmı Nezâret-i celilerine istîzân edilmiş ve cevâb-ı muvâfık dahi alınmış idi. Şu sırada Süleymaniye Kumandanı tahsîlât bahânesiyle Şeyhlerin oradaki taallukatını tazyik ettiğinden Kumandan-ı mûmâileyh aleyhine Süleymaniye’de ve buradaki Şeyhler tarafından dâvâya kıyâm olunması üzerine iş mehâkim-i âidesine tevdi edilmiş, vuku bulan mürâcaat-ı mütevelliyeleri üzerine de Nezâret-i celilelerine bu mesele hakkında mütâlâa-i çâkerânem ve îcâba isti’lâm buyrulması üzerine Kumandanın oradan kaldırılması ve Şeyhlerin hedef-i ağrâzlarından biri olan Mutasarrıfın tahvili sûretiyle meseleye nihâyet verilmek istenmiş idi. Ancak Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının yerine başka birisinin tâyini ve müşârünileyhin Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırılması mâzûliyet gibi mağdûriyetini mûcib ahvâlden bulunduğundan lehlerinde idâre-i kelâm olunmuş ve heyet-i tahkikiyenin vereceği rapor üzerine hakkında muâmele-i lâzıme icrâsı istirhâm edilmiş idi. Sâdât hakkındaki muamelât ve iş’ârât-ı çâkerânem mâruzât-ı sâbıkadan ibâret olup bir heyet-i tahkikiye de gönderilmekte ise de îfâ-yı muktezâsı vâbeste-i rey-i fahimâneleridir. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki“

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they started raining complaints to the authorities reminding the privileged status of these Sheikhs in ancien régime. Apparently, a fraudulent CUP branch was established outside the legal and registered Sulaymaniyah branch, and they were disturbed by Sheikh Said’s organization. As the Provincial Administration, Governor Zeki had instructed the Sub-Governorate of Sulaymaniyah not to recognize both societies officially and to abolish them (tanınmaması ve dağıttırılmaları). In addition, the growth of Society of Unionist Charity was trying to be prevented by giving effective advice to tribal chiefs and deterring them. Although he did not express it clearly, Zeki seemed to base his reasons of justifying Tevfik on the risks that Sâdât’s associational organization in Sulaymaniyah might bring. Above all, perhaps Zeki thought that the state authority should have displayed an image of unity in the face of such a deep crisis. In addition, although nonGovernmental organizations and their members were officially supported and encouraged in terms of Constitutional civil liberties, tribal participation to the society of Sâdât was being prevented by some back-channel administrative efforts. As Zeki mentioned above, after their removal to Mosul provincial center, Sâdât continuously filed complaints on Sub-governor Tevfik and Commander Mustafa to the Government authorities. According to Zeki’s message, the Sheikhs claimed that the public did not have a hand in this plan. According to the Sheikhs, the plan was entirely the work of the Sub-Governor, the Commander and some administrative officials of Sulaymaniyah. However, some ordinary people were also deceived by these instigators. Zeki also reminded that after Mustafa Pasha had pressured the relatives and families of Sâdât in Sulaymaniyah on the pretext of tax collection, Sheikhs in Mosul and Sulaymaniyah attempted to sue him. Mustafa Pasha had allegedly interfered with the families of Sâdât on behalf of state authority and this violation was their red line that should not be crossed. The case was conveyed to the relevant court, and the situation of the Commander was reported to the Ministry of War to ensure the necessary supervision and control over him. In Zeki’s opinion, replacement of Commander and Sub-Governor was the last resort since an investigation through a committee was not enough to satisfy and pacify these people anymore. Zeki also asserted that summoning Tevfik to the provincial center obviously meant his dismissal and victimization; and justified his prior statement in favor of Tevfik by arguing this. However, he particularly reminded that eventually the report of the committee investigating Tevfik will be decisive and imperative in determining his official status. As it is clearly seen, Zeki was still expecting a comforting solution for the rest of Tevfik’s career and invoking to decision makers for his relocation rather than a full dismissal. However, it is not understood from the archival materials whether the relationship between Zeki and Tevfik is a personal friendship or the

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solidarity and unity of the two local administrators in the face of such a crisis challenging the state authority.

Allegations Against Sulaymaniyah Authorities In this section, we will look at the telegrams from the Sheikhs, tribes and organizations within the Sâdât bloc, which contain striking allegations against the authorities of Sulaymaniyah. While the internal disagreement and indecision within the state regarding the Sub-Governor Tevfik continued, harsh statements started to reach from the opposing party. These statements revealed the names of the officials, their connections to each other, and even alleged an illegal association of a provincial administrator with a tribal chief. Grandson (Hafid) Sayyid Said, in his message directly dispatched to the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam (Dâire-i Meşihat-ı İslâmiye), appreciated the constitution and cherished the liberty (hürriyet) and equality (müsâvat) which were the blessings bestowed by his majesty.¹¹⁹ As all Sâdât, Ulemâ, Rüesâ-yı Aşâir (Tribal Chiefs) and Ahâli (Community), they have convened around the tomb (merkad) of their ancestor Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Effendi to declare, appreciate and glorify the blessings of Constitution. In their prospect, the Society of Unionist Charity was founded for protection and appreciation of the Constitution in the name of pursuing Sultan’s invitation of individual rights and liberties. However, Said

 BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 1, 13 Teşrinievvel 1324– 26 October 1908 The title ‘Hafid’ means grandson in Arabic, and since Said is the grandson of Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Efendi, it has been specifically attributed to him. “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Meşihatpenâhiye Netice-i âmâl-i mükâreme […] Millet-i Osmâniye’nin istihsâl-i saadet ve refâhına mâtuf zât-ı akdesi hazret-i Hilâfetpenâhinin eltâf-ı mâlânihâye-i tebaaperverilerine hamid olarak tesis-i celil-i Hilâfetpenâhilerinden olan Kanûn-i Esâsi îlânıyla millete hürriyet ve müsâvat gibi bir Nimet-i Uzmâ ihsân buyurduklarına takdis ve tahdis için ceddim Kâk Şeyh Efendilerin merkadında bilumûm Sâdât, Ulemâ ve Rüesâ-yı Aşâir ve Ahâli ictimâ ederek, devâm-ı ömr ve şevket-i Pâdişâhın davet-i hürriyesine terdifen […] hazret-i risâletpenâh efendimiz hazretlerinin şerifiyle medd-i yed olan Kanûn-i Esâsinin muhâfaza ve takrir-i ahkâmı yolunda akdedilmiş İttihâd Cemiyet-i Hayriyye’si dâima menâfi-i gayr-i meşrûlarına hâdim oldukları evrak-ı resmiyeyle sâbit Mutasarrıf ve Kumandan Paşalarla Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi, Nizâmiye Kolağası Sâlih Efendilerin hedef-i garez ve ağrâz olarak efrâd-ı cemiyet tasniât ve tehdidât icrâsıyla tahdiş-i ezhân-ı ahâliye müteşebbis oldukları ve bu da Zât-ı Meşihatpenâhilerince rehin-i tecviz görülmeyeceği meczum bulunduğu cihetle Sâdât-ı Ulemâya revâ-yı hakaret ve şeriat-ı garraya karşı mürevvic-i muharremât olan mûmâileyhin hakkında icâbât-ı nizâmiyenin icrâsına delâlet-i aliyye-i Fetvâpenâhileri müsterhamdır. Ferman Sâdât ve Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye Reisi Hafid Es-Seyyid Said”

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noted that Kanûn-i Esâsi was now threatened and violated by some state officials such as Sub-Governor Çerkes Tevfik Pasha, Commander Mustafa Pasha, Deputy Battalion Commander (Tabur Ağası Vekili) Fehmi and Regular Army Senior Captain (Nizâmiye Kolağası) Sâlih Effendi who had been serving own illegitimate interests (menâfi-i gayr-i meşrû). According to Said, these officials had attempted to form a public opinion against the Cemiyet-i Hayriyye and threatened its members through some certain allegations in order to conceal their own aggression in the face of authorities (tasniât ve tehdidât). In short, these officials filed unfounded claims against the Society by using their authority, fabricated false documents, and thus both violated the law and misguided the public. Said was seeking justice through the requirements of law and order against these people who defamed the Sâdât-ı Ulemâ and breached the laws of Shariah. After the message was viewed by Sheikh-ul-Islam Mehmed Cemâleddin Effendi, it was forwarded to the Grand Vizier Mehmed Kâmil Pasha with the remarks of Sheikh-ulIslam.¹²⁰ Obviously, the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam was monitoring the developments closely since the case was particularly related to a religious group. Ministry of Interior extended the case to Vali Zeki, reminded not to allow any circumstance caused by factiousness and hypocrisy (nifak ve şikak) and instructed him to reveal the truth immediately.¹²¹ Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Ahmed, Muftizadeh As-Sayyid Salih, Hafidzadeh Sayyid Mahmud and Hafidzadeh Sayyid Ahmed’s complaints on Mustafa, Fehmi and Sâlih were quite noteworthy as well.¹²² As Mahmud and Ahmed

 BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 3, 27 Teşrinievvel 1324– 09 November 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2661/86/Lef 4, 5 Teşrinisâni 1324– 18 November 1908 “Musul Vilâyetine Telgraf. Şeyh Said Efendi imzâsıyla Kerkük’ten Makam-ı Meşihatpenâhiye çekilen 13 Teşrinievvel 324 telgrafnâme kopyasının celb ve mütâlâasıyla mündericâta ve işârât-ı sâbıkaya nazaran dâhil-i Vilâyette nifak ve şikaka mûcib ahvâle meydan verilmemesi ve hakikat-ı hâlin inbâsı muntazırdır. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2655/9/Lef 1, 23 Teşrinievvel 1324– 05 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Âmâl ve efkâr-ı menfaatcûyânelerinin temini yolunda ilkaat-ı mefsedetle me’lûf Kumandan Mustafa Paşa, Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi, Nizâmiye Kolağası Sâlih Efendilerin hakkımızdaki teşebbüsât-ı mefsedetkârilerine bir hakikat süsü vermek fikriyle vuku bulan tecâvüzât-ı şahsiyelerini makamât-ı âidine arz ve istirhâm-ı muâdeletten başka bir mefâil görmediklerinden hakkımızdaki isnâdlarının kendi tahakkuk edeceğini teemmülle Mutasarrıfı fikirlerine uydurarak sebükmağz bir takım eşhâsı tahris, itma’ ederek planda ihtilâl çıkarmak, bu sûretle nâil-i maksad olmağa teşebbüs ve elyevm dâîlerinizi taht-ı tevkif-i ahz ve vâsıta-i mefsedetle el altından haber vererek bir velvele berpâ etmişlerdir. Hiçbir cünha ve cinâyetimiz, hükûmete adem-i itâatımız vuku bulmadan bilâ-sebeb-i kanun tevkifimizi kanun ve adâletle kabil-i tatbik ve ülfet göremiyoruz. İlkaatın bânîsi olan memûrîn-i mûmâileyhin biri müddei diğeri şâhid sıfatıyla

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were the sons of Grandson (Hafid) Sheikh Said Barzanji, they preferred the cognomen of Hafidzadeh along the honorific form of Sayyid in this telegram. They invoked to the Ministry of Interior and accused those names with conducting a fictious and unfair judicial investigation on Sâdât. They claimed that those names were fabricating some allegations, provoking some individuals, and making a public fuss for intimidating Sâdât. According to these Sheiks, Sâdât had never disobeyed the government, never violated law and never committed a minor or major crime (cünha ve cinâyet). Being taken into custody on such baseless allegations was a completely unlawful, unjust and unacceptable practice. They also stated that this investigation was a conspiracy entirely concocted by these officers, in which one of the officers played the role of the plaintiff and the other the witness. Sheikhs took refuge in the state for the manifestation of justice, and if these allegations against them were proven in court, they were willing to accept the punishment. Sheikh Said himself also corresponded to Grand Vizier directly.¹²³ He accused Tevfik Pasha of being an informant of ancien régime, building his career

vuku bulan iş’âr-ı kâzibeleri üzerine mağdûriyet her bir kalb-i selim erbâbına müessirdir. İhkak-ı hakk için zât-ı sâmilerine kanun ve adâlet nâmına ilticâ ediyoruz. Hakkımızdaki isnâd muhâkemece ba’del-isbât cezâya râzıyız. Mazhar-ı adâlet olmadığımız hâlde Divân-ı ahkâm-ül hâkimin de […] ceddimiz Resûlullah huzûrunda girîbân-ı dâverilerine sarılmak üzere bu mağdûriyeti kabûlü zarûrî olduğundan levâzım-ı muâdelete sabırsızlıkla muntazırız. Ferman Baba Resûlzâde Es-Seyyid Ahmed, Müftizâde Es-Seyyid Sâlih, Hafidzâde Seyyid Mahmud, Hafidzâde Seyyid Ahmed”  BOA, DH.MKT.2664/104, 8 Teşrinisâni 1324– 21 November 1908; He transmitted the same message to the Ministry of Interior as well DH.MKT.2669/97/Lef 2 “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhiye Mukaddes vatanımızı mavh ve inkırâza yaklaştıran Devr-i İstibdâd zâlimlerinin en dehşetlilerine intisab ederek hafiyelik meslek-i mezburesini bir hidmet-i fâhire olmak üzere kabûl etmiş ve îtâ ettiği jurnaller üzerine […] birçoklarının teb’id ve tağyirlerine sebeb -i müstakil olmuş olduğunu tercüme-i hâlinden ve memûriyet-i sâbıkalarının tedkikinden anlaşılacak olan Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Çerkez Tevfik Paşa binlerce Sâdât, Ulemâ, Aşâir-i Şeciiden mürekkeb teşkil ettiğim Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye’mizin bâdema fikri istibdâdkârânesine meydan vermeyeceğini anlaması üzerine hilâf-ı hakikat sebk eden iş’âr ve istihsâl ettiği emre binâen üç yüz süvâri piyâde ile yetmiş yaşını tecâvüz eyleyen dâîleriyle, birâder, evlâd, emmizâdelerimden altı zâtı kaç gün evvel câniler gibi muhâfaza altında Merkez-i Vilâyete sevk eyledi. Şu hâl Devr-i İstibdâdda bile bizim gibi nesl-i pâk olan Sâdât’a revâ görülür ahvâlden olmadığı cihetle erbâb-ı nâmûstan müteşekkil bir heyet-i âdile mârifetiyle tahkikat icrâsıyla mâsûmiyetimiz tebeyyün ettiği hâlde […] ve İttihâd-ı millet ve selâmet, vatana hizmetimiz tezâhür eylediği takdirde Devr-i İstibdâd yâdigârı olan hâin Tevfik ve refik-i habâseti Süleymaniye Kumandanı Mirlivâ Mustafa Paşalar hakkında muktezâ-yı muâdeletin icrâsını Kanûn-i Esâsi ve Adâlet-i Osmâni nâmına arz ve istirhâm eylerim. Ferman Reis-i Sâdât Hafid Es-Seyyid Said”

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on espionage and showing his obedience on ‘snitching tip offs’ (jurnallemek). According to Said, Tevfik was the root cause of banishment and alienation (teb’id ve tagyir) of many innocent people until now. And such administrative violations committed by him would be uncovered through a detailed investigation on his former tenure of office. Said argued that Tevfik Pasha was quite aware of that his own despotic rule would be restricted by the SUC as an organization consisting of thousands Sâdât, Ulemâ and Aşâir-i Şecii (Heroic Tribes). That’s why he had asserted these unfounded claims and had them taken into custody through a fraudulent warrant. Said also complained about their transfer conditions as a man older than 70 years old. Although they were a group of six harmless men, they were escorted by 300 cavalry and transported to the provincial center like notorious murderers (câniler gibi). These six Sayyids claimed to be treated with a completely unjust, undeserved and inappropriate practice that was not witnessed even in the period of Despotism. They expected their innocence to be proven through an investigation by a committee of honorable officials (erbâb-ı nâmûstan müteşekkil bir heyet-i âdile) and their service to the motherland to be revealed. Finally, Said demanded the justice to be served for Tevfik the ‘traitor’ (hâin), who was the ‘relic of the era of Despotism’ (Devr-i İstibdâd yâdigârı) and for Mustafa, who was the ‘accomplice of evil’ (refik-i habâseti). Said and his five comrades who were banished to Mosul also shared their complaints with Sheikh Abdulqadir ‘Obaidullah Effendizadeh’ who was the founder and president of the KSMAP in İstanbul and the member of Ottoman Senate (Meclis-i Âyân).¹²⁴ Sayyid Abdulqadir was the son of rebellious Sheikh  BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 1, 10 Teşrinisâni 1324– 23 November 1908 “Şeyh Ubeydullah Efendizâde Şeyh Abdülkadir Efendi Hazretlerine, Kanûn-i Esâsinin muhâfazası vatanın selâmetini temin maksadıyla müteşekkil Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye’mizin Devr-i İstibdâd zulümlerinin en dehşetlilerine mensûb hafiyelik meslek-i mezmûmesini hidmet-i fahri olarak kabûl, ahrâr imtidâdınca mâsûmların hânmânını virana sebeb Süleymaniye’deki muamelât-ı i’tisâfkârânesi teracim-i ahvâliyle tedkikat-ı sâireden anlaşılacak Mutasarrıf Çerkez Tevfik ve refik-i habâseti ahvâli mâlûm Mirlivâ Paşaların bâdema efkâr-ı istibdâdkârlarına meydan vermeyeceğini anlamaları üzerine kendi müşterilerinin ve Caf tahsîlâtında sâbıkta yaptıkları ihtilasâtı bu sene de icrâ, Caflıların İran’dan ettikleri menhûbâta karşı istirdâd olunan mebâliğden hisse çıkarmak fikriyle ahvâli Bâb-ı Âli’ce Sâdât hakkındaki adâvetinde infiham eden mahdûm-u emmizâdelerinin kısmen aşiretinin cemiyetimizle ittifak ittihâdından, mezâlim-i gaddarânesinden aşiretinin bîzâr, bu sene tahsîlâtının Altı Bin liraya iblâğı yolundaki mûmâileyhin taahhüdâtından menkul Caflı Mahmud Paşayı celb, kendileriyle karâbet-i sıhriyyesi, ticâreti bulunan meclis âzâları, mürevvic-i efkârları Kolağası Sâlih, Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi Efendilerle müteffikan yaptıkları tezvirâta, tahkirâta itâat-i kanuniyemiz hasebiyle mütehammil iken ifsâdatlarını gittikçe i’zâm iderek cümle-i muhâberât-ı desâiskârâneleri neticesinden Merkez Vilâyetine sevk edildik. Nesl-i pâk Sâdât hakkında Devr-i İstibdâd‘da bile görülmeyen şu taaddiyât-ı zâlimanenin izâlesiyle, mûmâileyhin hakkında muktezâ-yı

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Obaidullah Nahri (Ubeydullah Nehrî) who had led an uprising against Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire in 1880.¹²⁵ According to their explanation, ‘Society of Unionist Charity’ which was founded to maintain constitution and peace of motherland, was a victim of conspiracy by Tevfik and Mustafa Pashas. They remarked that Tevfik, out of these two malicious names, inherited and cherished the ‘whistleblowing’ as the most terrible and damned profession of the period of Despotism (Devr-i İstibdâd zulümlerinin en dehşetlilerine mensûb hafiyelik meslek-i mezmûmesi). Said alleged Çerkes Tevfik Pasha of treating them despotically and underlined that a further investigation regarding his prior career might uncover his administrative misconducts in Sulaymaniyah. Said also emphasized that these state officials were in an illegal alliance with Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha in order to embezzle some of the tax collection flowing from the Jaf territory. The content of the message, which pointed to a very complex network of relations, was about a plundering on Iranian soil, an increase in the tax collection volume of 6,000 lira, and a relationship based on mutual interests including even the provincial councilmen. These councilmen were alleged to be relatives in law (karâbet-i sıhriyye) and to have commercial bonds with Mahmud Pasha. He wrote that even some factions of the Jaf tribe were persecuted by their own chieftain Mahmud Pasha, and these factions including the son of Mahmud’s own cousin (mahdûm-u emmizâde), became affiliated with Said’s society, SUC. For this reason, he claimed that Mahmud’s hatred towards Barzanjiyya increased even more. He added that Sâlih and Fehmi were actively involved into this alliance for their mutual interests as well and all of them have been tyrannizing Said and his congregation. Minister of War Ali Rızâ Pasha was also notified about these telegrams and on 30th of November he instructed the 6th Army of Baghdad to conduct a military investigation.¹²⁶ While Ali Rızâ Pasha was depicting Sheikh Said to the Ministry

kanun ve muâdeletin icrâsına delâlet-i gayret-i hâşimileri ehemmiyetle muntazırdır efendim. Hafid Es-Seyyid Said, Nakib Seyyid Mârûf, Baba Resûlzâde Es-Seyyid Ahmed, Hafidzâde EsSeyyid Mahmud, Hafidzâde Es-Seyyid Ahmed, Müftizâde Es-Seyyid Sâlih  For a satisfactory analysis of whether the revolt of Naqshbandi Sheikh Obaidullah was secessionist and/or nationalist, please see: Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004) pp.72– 77. For a detailed background of the influential role and leadership of Sayyid Abdulqadir in early Kurdish Nationalism, please see: Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, pp.88 – 95  BOA, DH.MKT.2681/14/ Lef 1, 17 Teşrinisâni 1324– 30 November 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Aliyyesine. Nezâret-i Alilerinin tensibi üzerine âhiren Musul’a aldırılan Şeyh Said ile Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Sâlih’in Kanûn-i Esâsi’nin îlânından sonra nazar-ı istihâne ile görülecek mugayir-i marzi bir

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of Interior, he surprisingly used very positive expressions such as ‘a man who is obedient to the law’, and ‘quite revered in the eyes of the Kurdish population of 20 – 30 thousand’. After the proclamation of the Constitution, it was not heard that Sheikh Said, Sayyid Ahmed and Sheikh Salih were involved in an illegal activity or behaved in a condemnable manner (nazar-ı istihâne). However, the Martial Law practice (Örfî muâmele) implemented on these Sheikhs who were regarded as extremely sacred in the eyes of the Kurds, was considered disrespectful (hürmetsizliği) and inappropriate (gayr-i câiz) by the Kurdish population. Ali Rızâ Pasha declared that he had assigned the 6th Army to investigate the allegations that those responsible for this situation were Commander Mustafa, Battalion Commander Fehmi and Senior Captain Sâlih. He also underlined the necessity of conducting a civil investigation as well as a military investigation. As can be seen from his lines, Ali Rızâ Pasha was not in favor of accusing Said before the process was fully understood as a result of a detailed investigation by both military and administrative authorities. Presumably, allegations about military authorities and officers may have made Said’s investigation and banishment even more suspicious and unreliable in Ali Rızâ’s eyes. At this point, it can be said that Ali Rızâ Pasha approached Sheikh Said more objectively or cautiously, and even more moderately in some ways. However, his insistence for a deeper administrative-military investigation on the accusations against Said can also be read as a pragmatic move in order not to confront the military forces in the region with the entire Kurdish community. Consequently, instead of a hawkish policy of opposing the entire Kurdish community in the region, Ali Rızâ might have been making dove moves to appease the other side. We do not know whether Sâdât was aware of Ali Rızâ Pasha’s objective approach towards Sheikh Said. However, on December 5th, Ali Rızâ Pasha received another message from Sâdât directly. A group of more than 40 Sayyids and Sheikhs, led by Müfti-i Esbak Hafid Sayyid Muhammad reached him and reported that Mustafa Pasha was pursuing his personal interests in social disputes and

gûnâ hâlleri mesmu’ olmadığı hâlde Sâdât-ı mûmâileyhim haklarında Örfî olarak muâmele îfâsı 20 – 30 bin nüfûsça pek muhterem tanılan, Ekrâd nazarında Hânedân-ı Celil-i Muhammedî’ye bir nevi hürmetsizliği mutazammın ve binâberin gayr-i câiz idüğü [sic] ve bu hâlin müsebbibleri Süleymaniye Kumandanı Mustafa Paşa ile Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Sâlih Efendiler oldukları beyânıyla iştikâ’ ve mürâcaat olunması ve Altıncı Ordu’yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığına istifsâr-ı muâmele edilmiş olmakla cihet-i mülkiyece de tahkikat-ı lâzıme îfâsıyla 21 Teşrinievvel 1324 târihi ve 5 numerolu tezkire-i âcizi ile de iş’âr kılındığı cihetle netice-i hâlin inbâ buyurulması bâbında emr ve irâde efendim hazretlerinindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ”

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was betraying to the peace of tribes.¹²⁷ Allegedly, Mustafa had started her conspirative operations by imprisoning four individuals from Sâdât without a notice or a verdict. These people were insulted harshly and victimized fiercely while they were being sent to Mosul and now their families remained in Sulaymaniyah were in peril of Mustafa. According to his striking claims, the children and women (etfâline nisvânına) of Sâdât were also threatened and insulted (hakarettahkirât) by Mustafa Pasha’s outlaw practices which were averse to both Constitution and Shariah. Sayyid Muhammad remarked that, this was pure treason to create this much aggression and agitation through these revengeful policies in such a time of solidarity and peace empowered by Kanûn-i Esâsi. Thereupon, Ali Rızâ Pasha re-informed the Minister of Interior, that he had ordered the 6th Army in Baghdad for a prompt military investigation, and he began to pressurize him on the administrative investigation as well. Repeated correspondence be BOA, DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 2, 22 Teşrinisâni 1324– 05 December 1908; DH.MKT.2683/71, Lef 4, 24 Teşrinisâni 1324– 07 December 1908 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Menâfi-i şahsiyesini ihtilâf-ı millette arayan müstebidândan Kumandan Mustafa Paşa aşâir-i mülhakayı ihanet etmiş, tertibât-ı mefsedetkârilerine habersiz hükümsüz […] Sâdât’tan dört zâtı habse ilka ile başlamış, zevât-ı mûmâileyhim Şeyh-ül müşârünileyhe ve Nakibü’l Eşrâf Mârûf Efendiye hakarete gönderilmiştir. Memûrîn-i mûmâileyhim evvelce mâruz tecâvüzâtıyla muâmele-i kanunşikenâne-i âhireleri hakkındaki levâzım-ı muâdelet makam-ı âidinin tedkikat-ı âidelerinden muntazır idi. Buna […] mağdûren muhakkaran Musul’a gönderilen Eşrâf-ı Sâdât etfâline nisvânına hakaret ediliyor. Şiâr-ı İslâmiyet’e, kanuna, adâlete mugayir olan bu muâmelenin hiss-i teessürâtından mahrûm olanların […] nazarında Vak’a-i Müessife-i Kerbelâ tecessüm ediyor. Heyecân-ı efkâr […] sükûn ve îtidâlinden bu hürriyet, müsâvat, adâlet ve uhuvveti kâfil Kanûn-i Esâsi […] lillah vererek yekdiğeri derâguş etmek zamânı iken Millet-i Osmâniyeyi teştit-i intikama uğratacak kadar vatana ihanet edenler cezâlandırılmıyor… Müfti-i Esbak Hafid Seyyid Muhammed , Nakibzâde Seyyid Ahmed, Hafid Seyyid Hasan, Hafid Seyyid Ömer” (!) Hafid Sayyid Hasan referred here must be the same person as Hafiz Hassan, who was allocated a salary by the state to prevent the expansion of Shiism. For more detailed information, please see: 2.2 Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya as a Social Class Against Shia Expansionism. “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Süleymaniye’den Musul’a kaldırılan Şeyh Said Efendi Kanûn-i Esâsinin idâme-i ahkâmına sâmi’ edenlerden bulunduğu hâlde Kumandan Mustafa Paşa’nın menâfi-i şahsiyesine hedef olduğu ve Eşrâf-ı Sâdât’ın etfâli nisvânı Şiâr-ı İslâmiye ve adâlet mugayire sûretiyle tahkirâtta bulunduğu beyânıyla icrâât-ı âdilâneye intizâr eylemekte olduklarına dâir bu kere de müteaddid imzâlarla Kerkük merkezinden keşide olunan telgrafnâme aynen ve leffen taraf-ı Âli-i Nezâretpenâhilerine irsâl kılınmış ve bu babda tahkikat-ı seria icrâsı hususu te’kiden Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına tebliğ edilmiş olmakla cihet-i mülkiyece de tedkikat-ı lâzımede bulunularak işârât-ı sâbıka-ı âcizânem vechiyle netice-i hâlin inbâ buyrulması bâbında emr ve ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ”

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tween the Ministries of War and Interior regarding the investigation of these military officers might be relevant to the recent appointment of Ministry of Interior Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Since Hüseyin Hilmi was appointed to the newly structured Kâmil Pasha cabinet on 27 November 1908, Ali Rızâ Pasha probably kept the fresh Minister posted of the developments during the ongoing process of this extremely critical investigation.¹²⁸ However, Ministry of Interior had already received a direct telegram from Sâdât reporting even their children and women were under threat and swiftly forwarded this remarkable and urgent message to Mosul Governorate.¹²⁹ Seemingly, Sâdât captured the attention and urgency of both Ministries after disclosing the circumstances of their children and women and eventually triggered the authorities to take action. Sheikh Sayyid Salih with some other Sâdât dispatched a telegram to the Ministry of Interior including similar allegations on the same officials.¹³⁰ He  Mahir Aydın, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa (1855 – 1923)- Osmanlı Sadrazamı, https://islamansikloped isi.org.tr/huseyin-hilmi-pasa, Access Date: 21.10. 2020  BOA, DH.MKT.2676/86, Lef 2, 24 Teşrinisâni 1324– 07 December 1908 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine /Musul Vilâyetine Telgraf Kerkük Kumandanı Mustafa Paşa Sâdât’tan dört zâtı bi-gayr-i hakkın habse ilka ve muhakkaren ve mağdûren Musul’a i’zâm ve isrâ’ eylediğinden ve etfâl ve nisvân-ı Sâdât dahi dûçâr-ı hakaret olmakta bulunduğundan bahs ve şikâyetle istidâ-yı muâdeleti mutazammın Kerkük’ten Müfti-i Esbak Hafidi Seyyid Muhammed ve rüfekası imzâsıyla çekilen telgrafnâmenin sûreti […] Âli -i Dâverilerine tisyâr… Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2677/79, 22 Teşrinisâni 1324– 5 December 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Saltanat-ı Osmâniye’nin şu hâl-i esef iştimaline başlıca sebeb-i mürettib-i müstebidleriyle menâfi-i şahsiyelerinin temini için hafiyelik meslek-i merdûdesinde bulunan alçaklar olduğu derkârdır. Kanûn-i Esâsinin îlânı üzerine hâin-i din ü devlet, tahrib-i vatan ve memleket olan menfaatperest birçokları sâye-i adâlet ve hürriyette cezâ-yı sezâlarını görmüş ve görmekte bulunmuş ise de o gibi ef’al-i mezmûma […] bazılarına mücerred ahlâk-ı umûmiyeyi ifsâd ve ihtilas, irtikâb maksadıyla taşralara yayılmıştı. İşte bu cümleden Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığında bulunan, tercüme-i hâlinden müdhiş hafiye olduğu anlaşılacak olan Çerkes Tevfik Paşanın taaddiyât seyyiatı sâiresi şöyle dursun bir senelik Caf tahsîlâtının Reisi Mahmud Paşa ile müştereken irtikâb ettikleri binlerce lira kayden sâbit iken her ne esbâba mebni ise hâlen istihdâm olunuyor. Sâye-i Meşrûtiyetin bundan böyle mürtekib hâinlerin hidemât-ı devlet, reis-i hükûmette istihdâmıyla mukaddes vatanımızın daha ziyâde tahrîbâtına meydan verilmeyeceği hükûmetçe ittihâz ve tâkib buyurulan meslek-i sadâkatkâri îcâbından ise de İran hududu üzerinde olup ehemmiyet ve nezâket-i mevkisi müstağni-i izâh bulunan Süleymaniye Sancağının Devr-i İstibdâdın en müdhiş ve muarrız hafiyelerinden mürtekib Tevfik Paşa ile kuvve-i zâhiriye ve fikriyesi olan Kumandan Mustafa Paşa’nın daha ziyâde devâm-ı memûriyetleri muvâfık-ı nısfet muâdelet olamayağından haklarında muâmele-i lâzıme […] umûm nâmına müsterham ve müsted’âdır. Ferman Es-Seyyid Sâlih, Es-Seyyid Mahmud, Es-Seyyid Ahmed, Muhammed Ârif, Abdülkadir”

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had written that it was obvious there were some self-interested lowlifes who had adopted the espionage as a rejected profession (hafiyelik meslek-i merdûdesi). According to Salih, they were self-seekers as being the traitors of religion and state (hâin-i din ü devlet), while being the destructors of motherland and hometown as well (tahrib-i vatan ve memleket). After the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, many of them were given the punishments they deserve, but some of them had the chance to spread immorality, malversation and embezzlement to the provinces. He expressed that shameful acts like corruption, immorality, embezzlement and extortion of former era were embodied in the profile of Çerkes Tevfik Pasha and a further investigation will reveal that he was a terrific informant. Salih particularly indicated that, apart from his evil and tyranny, Tevfik had embezzled the yearly tax income of the Jaf tribe by the cooperation of Chief Mahmud Pasha. He claimed that although thousands of liras they have embezzled could be inspected and determined through the records, they were still being employed by state authorities. From Salih’s perspective, these corrupted (mürtekib) traitors who were employed in state service and Sub-Governorate were supposed to be prevented by the Unionist Government for disallowing a further destruction of the holy motherland. He concluded his message as; they were supposed to be dismissed from office since they were not eligible and reliable to govern such an important and vulnerable (ehemmiyet ve nezâket-i mevkii) sub-province like Sulaymaniyah regarding its strategic location on Iran borderline. Meanwhile, a news article about Fehmi, the Deputy Commander of the Sulaymaniyah Gendarmerie, published in the issue of Sabah Newspaper on November 21, 1908, was being explained to the Grand Vizirate by the Sulaymaniyah CUP branch.¹³¹ According to the article, Fehmi had been organizing some officers and

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2680/85 /Lef 1, 23 Teşrinisâni 1324– 06 December 1908 “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhilerine Sabah Gazetesinin 8 Teşrinisâni 1324 târihi ve 6852 numerolu nüshasında Musul’da teşkil edilmiş 12 bini mütecâviz Cemiyet-i İttihâdiye aleyhinde Jandarma Binbaşısı Vekili tarafından zabtiyeler vâsıtasıyla bir takım tehdidât ve tahkirât icrâ ettirilmekte olduğundan umûm Kürdistan’da azim bir ihtilâl-i muhâtarasını […] olunacağı beyân olunmuştur ki mesele Musul’a âid olmayıp vilâyet-i mezkûreye mülhak Süleymaniye Sancağına taalluku hasebiyle hakikat-ı hâle ibtidâr olunur. Şöyle ki burada teşekkül eden ve 20 bin kişiden ibâret bulunan İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti tarafından böyle bir iş’âr vâki olmadığı ve mevzû bahis olan telgraf dahi cemiyetimizi takliden Devr-i Sâbık hafiyelerinden müstebid […] Hafid Şeyh Said Efendi delâletiyle bir takım erâzilden mürekkeb toplanan fesâd komitesi tarafından ve Süleymaniye’den gayri makineden keşide bulunduğunu ve bu da dolab-ı mefsedetlerinin tedvirâtına mâni olan Jandarma Binbaşısı Vekili Fehmi Efendi hakkında besledikleri garez ve nefsâniyetten ileri geldiği anlaşılmış ve hakikatten âri olarak komite-i mezkûrenin makamâta ve mahal-i sâireye yazdığı bu gibi telgraflarda ahvâl-i sâirelerinden dolayı haklarında edilen mürâcaat üzerine Şeyh-i mûmâileyh ile akrabâ

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had been making threats and insults against the Society of Unionist Charity (Cemiyet-i İttihâdiye) whose number of members exceeded 12 thousands in Mosul. And because of this behavior of Fehmi, a strong revolution was being prepared throughout the entire Kurdistan. However, CUP members declared that the issue was not related to entire Mosul but only to Sulaymaniyah and stated that the truth was not in that way. They also stated that, the complaints constitute the source of the article were transmitted from a telegraph machine outside of Sulaymaniyah by the ‘mischief committee’ (referring and scorning the Cemiyet-i Hayriyye). This committee which was founded against the CUP under the guidance of Sheikh Said (Hafid Şeyh Said Efendi delâletiyle), assembled of certain disgraced individuals (bir takım erâzilden mürekkeb). According to CUP, they were spreading these news because of the grudge and hostility they nurtured about Fehmi, who prevented their intrigue and plans from functioning (dolab-ı mefsedetlerinin tedvirâtına mâni olan). In fact, authorities were even asked to promote Fehmi and appoint him to another location because of his sacrifices and successes about the arrest of bandits, the stability of the security and the preservation of Constitution. Contrary to the groundless news, CUP branch reported that in Sulaymaniyah, which means the spirit of today’s Kurdistan, the public order and safety were perfectly ensured in general, thanks to justice. As can be seen, the CUP branch stood behind its member Fehmi in every way by emphasizing his achievements and flatly denied the spreading news of the public disorder in Sulaymaniyah. Other telegram of Sâdât had the autograph of Salima (Selime) Hanım, the wife of Sheikh Maarouf was also destined to Ministry of Interior.¹³² Apparently,

ve taalukkatı hükûmet tarafından Musul’a teb’idlerini icrâ edildiğine mebni bu babdaki iş’ârları esâsı ve maddeten ehemmiyeti kalmamıştır. Mâmâfih mûmâileyh Fehmi Efendilerin eşkıyâ derdesti, âsâyişin istikrârı, Kanûn-i Esâsinin muhâfazası ahkâmı yolundaki fedâkârlığına karşı aslında tâyini için vaktiyle cemiyetimizi ve hükûmet tarafından merciine arz ve istirhâm edildiğinden sâye-i adâlette bugünkü günde Kürdistan’ın ruhu demek olan nefs-i Süleymaniye’de emniyet-i rahat-ı umûmi berkemâl bulunduğunu vatan ve millet nâmına arz eyleriz. Ferman. Süleymaniye İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti” (!) The society referred to in this telegram with the phrase Cemiyet-i İttihâdiye is SUC, not SMU.  BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/Lef 2, 29 Teşrinisâni 1324– 12 December 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Tekâlif-i emiriye-i hükûmetin muvazzaf tahsildarları, memûrları tarafından nizâmat-ı mevzûaya tevfikan istîfâsı lâbüdd Askeri Kumandanlarında bu sıfat-ı salâhiyyet mefkuddur. Musul’da bulunan birâderlerim Şeyh Ârif Kadir’in arsalarındaki mukataat taksiti kurâ ahâlisinin […] tekâlifi için şerik alâkadâr olmayan esir-i firâş birâderim Şeyh Ali, zevcim Musul’da başka mahrem yok iken câriyeleri hânelerine Şiâr-ı İslâmiye mugayir olarak Kumandan Mustafa Paşa ve Kolağası Sâlih Efendi emirleriyle iki defa süngülü müsellâh askerin muhâcemesinde müteessiren hâmile

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she had been subjected to a military intervention on the pretext of a tax collection issue. She particularly remarked that the tax collection authority was entitled to the state officials according to the regulations and military officers did not have such an authority. Even her brothers and husband were exiled in Mosul, she alleged that she was disturbed for two times by the armed troops (süngülü müsellâh) under the command of Mustafa Pasha and Senior Captain Sâlih regarding a land tenure (muqataah) issue of his brother’s land. She was crying out that her pregnant daughter had miscarried her baby (ıskat-ı cenin) for her fear and stress of this armed enforcement. That’s why she was questioning which article of the Constitution prescribes such a brutal practice (Bu hâl Kanûn-i Esâsinin hangi maddesine tatbik olabiliyor?). Salima Hanım also reminded as the women and kids of Sâdât they never deserved this, claimed that such a practice could only occur during the period of Despotism, and she sought justice through the dismissals of these officers. Ministry of Interior instructed Zeki Pasha to perform an objective and duly investigation since such an armed practice involves misconduct and requires criminal liability.¹³³ Zeki Pasha, in response, stated that the Sulaymaniyah Administration had eliminated all possible threats to the Sheikh’s relatives and that they were in the stage of fulfilling the investigation.¹³⁴ İbrâhim Agha, the Chief of the Dodukan (Dudikan – ‫ ) ﺩﻭﺩﮔﺎﻥ‬tribe residing in the town of Sardasht (Serdeşt) in Iran also complained about the same names.¹³⁵

kerimem ıskat-ı cenin etmiştir […] ömürden almak müsellâh askerleri Sülâle-i Tâhire’den olan muhadderâta hücûm ettirmek, Devr-i İstibdâd muâmelesidir. Bu hâl Kanûn-i Esâsinin hangi maddesine tatbik olabiliyor? […] Evlâd-ı Resûlün […] nisvânına bu hakaret ihanetin cevaz-ı kabûlü meşrû ise itâat değilse mûmâileyhadan Kumandan ve Kolağasının muâmele-i kanunşikenâneleri neden menedilmiyor? İstibdâd, mezâlim-i vâkıâya nihâyet verilerek mütecâsirlerin hakkında icâbât-ı nizâmiyenin icrâsı şeriat, kanun, adâlet, cemiyet nâmına kemâl-i sûzişle müsterhamdır. Süleymaniye Nakibü’l Eşrâf Kaimakamı Şeyh Mârûf Efendinin Zevcesi Selime “  BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/ Lef 3, 6 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 19 December 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2687/31/ Lef 1, 15 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 28 December 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.2670/101/Lef 3, 2 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 15 December 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Rabıta-yı ubudiyetkâriye, vezâif-i […] Mesai-i Usûl-ü Müşavere ve Meşrûtiyeti kabûl yolunda vuku bulan mevaız vesâyânın hüsn-ü tesiriyle efrâd-ı aşâirimizle beraber Süleymaniyeli Hafid Şeyh Said Efendinin davetine îcâbet maksad Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye’ye dâhil olmak üzere Süleymaniye’ye azimetimizde tesâdüf olunan tecâvüzât hakkındaki mâruzâtımızın semere-i muntazırasına bedel Kanûn-i Esâsiyi kabûl ve idâme-i hükmü maksadıyla Tavâif-i Ekrâdı ittihâd ve ictimâa davet eden Şeyh-i müşârünileyhle erkân ve taallukatı hakkında Mutasarrıf Çerkez Tevfik ve Kumandan Mustafa Paşalarla, Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi, Kolağası Sâlih, Emlâk Memûru Abdullah Efendiler tarafından tekrâr eden hakaret ihanet ve vuku bulan ilkaat, tasniât neticesi

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However, this time they mentioned the name of Abdullah, the Official of Imperial Estates as well. On their way to Sulaymaniyah for joining the Society of Unionist Charity with the spirit of Constitutionalism and democracy, they were exposed to an aggression by some groups provoked by these names. He also mentioned that Sheikh and his congregation were victimized for unfair reasons and these allegations were based on nothing but slander and defamation. In their opinion, these tyrannic treatments were totally in contrary with the liberty and equality principles of Constitutionalism and had a very negative impression on all Kurdish circles. Because, according to İbrâhim, Sheikh Said had invited all Kurdish Factions (Tavâif-i Ekrâd) to unity and solidarity in order to have the Constitution accepted, adopted and operated (kabûl ve idâme-i hükmü). In fact, this was not the first telegram of İbrâhim Agha containing allegations of unfair treatment they were subjected to. In his previous message to the Ministry of Interior he had expressed that they rushed to Sulaymaniyah to affiliate (iltihak ve duhûl) the Society of Unionist Charity on behalf of their tribe with a population of four thousand people.¹³⁶ However, after their attempt towards Said’s Society, they had witnessed grudge of army and administration instead of appreciation and respect. They were publicly humiliated, scolded and insulted by certain individuals in the bazaar, in front of both their friends and foes (yâr u agyâra karşı). Ministry had taken it seriously and forwarded the case to the Mosul Governorate with a note of “not to allow an extralegal enforcement”.¹³⁷ Within a few

olarak müşârünileyhin cürüm ve cinâyeti, cünha kabahati sübût bulmaksızın bir muhâkemenin hükm ve karârına istinâd ve iktirân etmeksizin Musul’a i’zâm edilmişlerdir. Serdeşt Kazâsı Dâhilinde Dudikan Aşireti Reisi İbrâhim Ağa”  BOA, DH.MKT.2639/92/Lef 1, 6 Teşrinievvel 1324– 19 October 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Kanun-u mezkûrun tamâm-ı ahkâmını muhâfaza ve […] ve selâmet-i vatan, saadet-i milleti temin efkâr-ı hayriyyesiyle umûm Kürdistan ve Sâdât Reisi Hafid Şeyh Said Efendi hazretlerinin riyâsetinde müteşekkil Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye’ye dört bin nüfûslu aşiretimiz halkıyla iltihak ve duhul zımnında Süleymaniye’ye hemen şitâbân olduk. Böyle bir niyet ve gayret-i hayriyyemize karşı cihet-i askeriyyeden mülkiyeden mazhar-ı takdir ve ihtiram yerine buğz, menfaatperest İstibdâd tarafdârânı sû-i te’vil ile yâr u agyâra karşı […] çarşılarda mahal-i nâmûsu ve haysiyyeti envâ-i tekdirlere ihanetlere ve bazılarımızın bilâ-esbâb-ı kanuniye habse ilka ve […] olunmak gibi tahkirâta hedef olmaklığımız [sic] Kanûn-i Esâsi’ye, adâlet, müsâvat, hürriyet, uhuvvete revâ mıdır? Bizim ve emsâlimizin ve aşâir ahâlinin Kanûn-i Esâsinin bütün […] mûcib ahvâle kanun-u mezkûr ve hürriyet kaim midir? Binlerce aşâir-i cesime ve ahâlinin bir iki hâin habis müstebideye fedâsı neye tatbik olunuyor? Ahvâl-i mâruzanın men’i, kanun ve umûm nâmına müsted’âdır ve hatt-ı hareketimizin iş’ârı müsterhamdır. Reis İbrâhim Ağa”  BOA, DH.MKT.2639/92/Lef 2, 12 Teşrinievvel 1324– 25 October 1908 “Musul Vilâyetine Telgraf. İbrâhim Ağa ve rüfekası imzâlarıyla Çemçemal merkezden çekilen 4

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days, Zeki Pasha in his reply to the Ministry, stated that the other petitioners had been motivated by İbrâhim and it was turned out to be a baseless complaint.¹³⁸

The Manifest of Sâdât On 25th February 1909, (50 days after the Mosul Incident) a five pages long manifest signed and sealed by principal Sheikhs Maarouf, Mahmud, Ahmed and Salih reached to the Ministry of Interior and signaled an imminent peril in the eyes of the state. This lengthy message, elaborated the complicated networks between tribal chiefs and state officials, alleged the local administrators of being involved in a conspiracy against Sheikh Said and attempted to voice the justification and victimization of the Sâdât in the face of this organized crime.¹³⁹ Teşrinievvel 324 telgrafnâme kopyasının bil-mütâlâa tebligat-ı sâbıka […] hilâf-ı kanun muâmeleye meydan verilmemesi. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2641/34/Lef 1, 15 Teşrinievvel 1324– 28 October 1908  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Âmâl-i müstebide-i menfurelerinin tervici uğurunda memleketi bir düşman eline teslim etmekten ziyâde mutazarrır ve perîşân eyleyen Devr-i Sâbık havenesinin muamelât ve harekât-ı denâetkârâneleri sâyesinde on bin hâneden mürekkeb Caf kabile-i azimesi halkının bütün memâlikine ve hatta ırz ve nâmûsuna musallat olan ve bu yüzden gerçekten milyarder denecek mertebe-i servet ve sâmâna malik bulunan Caflı Mahmud Paşanın eski derebeylerine mahsûs mezâlim ruz-u efruzundan artık câri kalmayan binlerce hâne efrâdı bundan kaç sene akdem Hafid Şeyh Said Efendiye mürâcaatla fi-mâba’d vergilerinin Salyâne Hükûmeti tarafından doğrudan doğruya alınması ve Mahmud Paşa tasallutunun üzerlerinden def-i hususuna delâlet eylemesini taleb eylemişlerdi. Asırlardan beri ehl-i beyt-i nübüvvetin bu hıtta-ı mübâreke sekenesinde yâdigâr-ı kıymettarı ve maşrık-ı irşâdın hâver-i şaşaa […] her Sâdât Berzenciyye’nin dahi mabih-il iftiharı olan Kâk Ahmet Şeyh hazretlerinin hafidi müşârünileyh Şeyh Said Efendi hazretleri kâbiran an kâbir Hilâfet-i Kübra-i İslâmiye ve Saltanat-ı Seniyye-i Osmâniye’ye karşı mütehassis oldukları fart-ı sadâkat ve merbûtiyet iktizâsınca efrâd-ı merkumenin zâten mütehakkık olan mağdûriyet-i fâcialarına nihâyet vermek ve dâima onda dokuzu ceyb-i menfaat-i habiseye girerek ekil ve bel’ idilen hukuk-u hazineyi sıyânet etmek üzere îcâb iden tedâbir-i kanuniyeye tevessül etmiş ve işte bu hâl Mahmud Paşa’nın bittabi Şeyh-i müşârünileyh ve bittabi ekarib ve müteallikatı olan Sâdât’a ağrâz-ı intikamkârını müteheyyic ve mânende-i sermâ-dîde maksad-ı hâinânesine husûlu istidâdını hâiz bir zamân-ı fırsata dide davz intizâr eylemiştir. Süleymaniye Mutassarrıf-ı sâbıkı Tevfik, Kumandan-ı sâbıkı Mustafa Paşa’ların muvasalatları akabinde aralarında münâferet zuhûr ve Nakibü’l Eşrâf Kaimakamı Hafid Şeyh Mârûf Efendinin Mutasarrıfı o mesâilde haklı görerek müzâherete temâyül etmiş, mûmâileyh Mustafa Paşa’nın dahi hissiyât-ı gayz nefsâniyetini tahrik ve Mahmud Paşa’ya temâyülünü tevlid ve müteâkiben Mutasarrıfın Caf tahsîlâtına azimetinde Mahmud Paşa’nın dâm-ı iğfâlât-ı telbiskârânesine tutulduğundan akd-i peyvende muvafakat ve mürafakat etmesini ve Mustafa Paşa ile aralarındaki münâfereti def’ ve her üçünün ittihâdını teshil ettirmiştir. Hükûmet-i mahalliyeyi arzu ve key-

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Throughout the study, we will refer to this material as ‘The Manifest of Sâdât’ and discuss its different parts in different chapters since it has a very long-term and detailed narrative regarding the alleged administrative conspiracy (see Illustration 5).

fiyetinin bir hidmetkâr-ı icrâiyesi gibi kullanan ve makasıd-ı mel’ûnâne ve menâfi-i reziliye-i denâetkârânesinin tervici için bütün vesâit-i sefileye mürâcaat etmekten çekinmeyen Mahmud Paşa kendisinin fıtrat […] ve kendisine hempa olmak üzere bilcümle efkâr ve mişvar-ı hasisenin mecmu olarak bir olmuş bulunan Mutasarrıf ve Kumandanı makasıd-ı leimesine hâdim edecek vesailin kâffesine mürâcaatla hakikaten muvaffakiyet-i matlûbeye mazhar olmuştur. Kumandan ile Mutasarrıf nâmûsunu vicdânını ayaklar altına alacak kadar alçak tıynette bulunan Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Sâlih ve Doktor Ziyâ ve Serçınar Şûbe Memûru Hâsibi Abdullah ve Cezâ Reisi Efendilerle Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşılığından ve Mutasarrıfın en yakın ekaribinden Ali Said Beyefendiyi âlet-i muafat olmak üzere maiyyetlerinde bulundurmuş ve aleyhimizde azim bir plan yapmakla müştagil bulunmuşlar iken Kanûn-u Celil-i Esâsinin mevki tatbike ve […] mübeşşir İttihâd Cemiyetleri nâmına peyderpey gelen telgrafnâmeler planlarının ikmâlini , planlarının, iftirâlarının, âmâl-i habâset-i istihâllerinin tervicine büyük, pek büyük yardımı olmuştur. Şöyle ki […] alimi zâhiren itimâda, ittifaka ve fakat hakikatte îka’-i tefrike ve nifaka davet ve bu mebani-i mel’ûnâtın mîmâr-ı denâetkârdarı olan Mahmud Paşayı dahi Süleymaniye’ye celb etmişlerdir. Mîmâr-ı habâset sâr-ı muvasalatla beraber kendine muâvin olacak […] ırgatları kendisinin sermâyedârı ve yekdiğerinin ekarib-i akar-ı miş’ârı olan Meclis-i İdâre-i Livâ âzâsından ve tüccârândan Hacı Said ve Aziz, Mutasarrıf hafidi Abdurrahman ve Başçavuşzâde diğer Abdurrahman ve Hacı Sâlih ve Belediye Reisi Abdülgafur Ağalarla Hacı Ahmed Çelebi ve Müfti Aziz Efendi nâm eşhâs-ı mel’anet […] intihâb etmiş ve bunlar ise bir minval […] Mahmud Paşa’nın sermâyesiyle ticâretlerine, Mutasarrıflarla Kumandanlara yaltaklanmakla idârelerine düzen vermiş, İslâmiyet’in hasâil-i esâsiyesinde insâniyetin hissiyât-ı merdânesinden mahrûm ve her nûrâniyetten âri zulmette ve her ulviyetten berây-ı safiliyyette yaşamağa fıtraten mahkûm bulunan bu haşerât la ya’lemun kendileri gibi kani murdar eşrarı dâiren cemiyetlerine almışlardır. Ve fakat her ne kadar çalışmışlar ise de Selânik Merkez-i Umûmisinden resmiliklerini tasdik ettirememeklerine karşı hafid Şeyh Said Efendi merhûmun tebaa-i sâdıkadan olmak üzere on ikibinden ziyâdeye ulaştırdığı cemiyetin resmiyeti kemâl-i şükran ile tasdik edilmiş ve işte bu husus erbâb-ı nifakın fikr-i şikakını büsbütün heyecâna götürdüğünün satırları, noktaları efkâr-ı mel’anetkâriden taşan çirk-âb -ı denâet ve tezvirden müteşekkil iftirânâmelerinde ar ve hayâdan, nâmûs ve vicdândan külliyen bî-nasîb kalmalarıyla fazilet-i denâet […] cinâyet sûretinde göstermişler ve Kanûn-i Esâsinin dokuzuncu maddesine muhâlefetle hukukumuza tecâvüz ve onuncu maddesinin hilâfı olarak hürriyet-i şahsiyemize taarruzla pâyimal ettirmişler ve yirmi ikinci maddesi hükmünce mesken ve menzilimizin taarruzdan mahviyetini derkâr iki günde bir bahâne ile hânelerimize müfrezeler sevk ve harem-i dâirelerimize kadar tahatti ve tahkirâta ve ne kadar büyük olursa olsun bir kimseye edilen isnâd mehâkime-i âidesinde bir hükme iktirân etmedikçe ke-en lem yekün tanıyacağı bedihi bulunduğu hâlde kat’iyyet kesbetmiş bir hükmü infâz edercesine fikriyyâtlarını icrâya ve bir kimsenin me’vâ ve beldesinden teb’idi velev İdâre-i Örfî’ce de karârgîr olsa bile yine İrâde-i Seniyyeye muhtâc iken hükmüne, irâdesine bizleri yurdumuzdan beldemizden çıkarmakla beraber hakaretten rezâletten hatra hayâle gelmeyen iştâtı […] îfâya mütecâsir eylemiş ve Musul’a teb’id ettirmişlerdir”

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Manifest begun with explaining the background of the Jaf tribe chief Mahmud Pasha as a character inherited from the era of Despotism. According to the Sheikhs, in the name of appreciating the desires of sordid Despotism, the traitors of ancien régime had damaged and devastated the Ottoman realm even worse than surrendering it to the enemy. They have particularly emphasized that the community of the grand Jaf tribe, as almost 10 thousand households, was exploited and even dishonorably violated by Mahmud Pasha since he was backed by the despicable practices of the ancien régime traitors. Mahmud Pasha not only inflicted material damage, but also threatened their chastity and honor. They have remarked that he had gained such a big wealth, at a level of being a real billionaire (milyarder denecek mertebe-i servet ve sâmâna), through this system of exploitation. However, thousands of Jaf households who were aware of his feudal tyranny, which was not respected anymore, consulted to Sheikh Said couple of years ago and asked for his guidance. Sheikhs have reminded that these Jaf people asked for Said’s help in the name of ensuring the collection of taxes directly by the Provincial Government (Salyâne Hükûmeti) and eliminating the disturbance caused by Mahmud Pasha. The manifest praised Sheikh Said as the grandson of Kâk Ahmed, who was the precious heirloom inherited from the prophethood family to the residents of these blessed lands. Sheikhs elaborated as, in the name of ending the tragic victimization of these people and protecting the laws of local treasury, Said had resorted to justice eventually. Because according to their claims, the nine tenths of the treasury was devoured by getting into the pockets of persons with evil intents so far (dâima onda dokuzu ceyb-i menfaat- i habiseye girerek ekil ve bel’ idilen hukuku hazine). From the Sheikhs’ perspective, Sheikh Said’s extreme loyalty and devotion to the four great Islamic caliphs and Ottoman sultanate already required him to resort to law. Naturally, Said’s positive attitude towards the Jaf people had aroused the traitorous intentions of Mahmud Pasha and stimulated him to nurse a grudge and look for revenge against the Sheikh, his relatives and affiliates. The manifest also claimed to explain how the tripartite alliance between Mahmud, Tevfik and Mustafa Pashas was formed. According to the allegations by Sheikhs, right after the appointments of former Sub-Governor Tevfik and former Commander Mustafa to Sulaymaniyah, a hatred (münâferet) arose between these two. The fact that Naqib Maarouf had justified Tevfik and tended to stand by him on this dispute (müzâherete temâyül), had arisen the hatred and grudge of Mustafa and this situation pushed Mustafa toward Mahmud. Thereafter, during his tax collection visit to Jaf territory, Sub-governor Tevfik was deceived by Chief Mahmud’s cunning traps and eventually he agreed and adhered to the agreement that would be reached among these three. From their point of view, this process eventually eliminated the hatred between Mustafa and Tevfik and

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Illustration 5.1: BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324 – 25 February 1909 The 6 pages Manifest of Sâdât

facilitated the unity of all three with Mahmud’s involvement (her üçünün ittihâdını teshil). According to this narrative, when Tevfik got closer to Mahmud for some of the advantages he would gain, he automatically got close to Mustafa and the alliance of the trio with overlapping interests was established.

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Illustration 5.2: See Illustration 5.1.

In Sâdât’s viewpoint, Mahmud Pasha has been manipulating the Local Administration like a servant fulfilling his personal desires and enjoyment. Besides, he was not hesitant to resort to any miserable means in order to pursue his wicked intents and vile interests. Sâdât discredited the Sub-Governor and Commander by depicting them as ‘the embodied alliance of all evil thoughts and attitudes

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Illustration 5.3: See Illustration 5.1.

fit to be their cohorts’. They have also put forward that Mahmud had resorted to all means for the sake of making them as the servants of his villainous intentions and had truly achieved the desired success. Sâdât had also observed that, SubGovernor Tevfik and Commander Mustafa had absorbed Fehmi, Sâlih, Doctor Ziyâ, Sarchinar Accounting Officer Abdullah (Serçınar Şûbe Memûr-u Hâsibi),

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Head of Penal Chamber (Cezâ Reisi) and General Staff Major Ali Said ( Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı) who was one of the closest relatives of Tevfik, into their entourage in order to gain immunity from different authorities of the state. According to the narrative of the Sheikhs, there was a solidarity against Sâdât among the different departments of Local Government and these officials have managed to be exempted from responsibility through their authority. Manifest stated that, when these officials were all engaged to work on a major plan against Sâdât, telegrams were gradually received from Unionist society in the name of upholding the Kanûn-i Esâsi. In this way, these conspirators were able to find a common platform to facilitate and fulfill their plan, spread their slanders and perform their evil intentions. The faith of the Sheikhs in the inclusiveness, unity and reconciliation of the Constitutional Monarchy seemed to have been destroyed. In their vision, these telegrams proclaiming Constitutionalism seemingly had invited the Ulema to the confidence and alliance but practically to factionism and discord. The Sheikhs obviously claimed that the libertarian atmosphere of the Constitutional Monarchy and the branching of the CUP made these conspirators’ work easier. And according to Sâdât, they had summoned Mahmud Pasha to Sulaymaniyah eventually, who was the despicable architect of these damned formations. Allegedly, right after the architect of evil (mîmâr-ı habâset) had arrived to Sulaymaniyah, he had selected laborers to be his assistants and incorporated them into his capital (wealth). These assistants mentioned by Sâdât were chosen from among some ’malicious personalities’ (eşhâs-ı mel’anet) and are listed as follows. Hacı Said and Aziz who were the members of Sub-Provincial Administrative Council (Meclis-i İdâre-i Livâ) and the merchants of Sulaymaniyah, Abdurrahman the grandson of Sub-Governor (Mutasarrıf Hafidi), another Abdurrahman the son of Sergeant Major (Başçavuşzâde), Hacı Sâlih, Abdülgafur Agha the Mayor (Belediye Reisi), Hacı Ahmed Çelebi and Mufti Aziz (Abdülaziz) Effendi. Thus, Sâdât made interpretations such as these people had managed their businesses by enjoying the capital of Mahmud Pasha and schemed their administration by fawning on Sub-Governors and commanders (Mahmud Paşa’nın sermâyesiyle ticâretlerine, Mutasarrıflarla Kumandanlara yaltaklanmakla idârelerine düzen vermiş). The manifest referred them as ‘insects’ (haşerât) , which were innately deprived from humane bravery as one of the good manners of Islam, compelled to live in a darkness far from any light and in a despicableness far from any sublimity. Moreover, they had managed in persuading some other filthy evildoers and gathering them around their own society as well. The Jaf Tribe which spread over a wide geography, had always remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire and raised many important and valuable personal-

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ities such as pashas, artists and intellectuals.¹⁴⁰ Perhaps it was based on the ongoing animosity between Barzanjiyya and Jaf that such harsh and extreme allegations were made against Mahmud Pasha. However, in any case, the reverence displayed by the Jaf people to Said Barzanji and the allegation that they came to the Sheikh’s presence to ask for his help suggest that there was a discord between Mahmud and his own tribe. If this allegation was true, the intimacy between the people of Jaf and Sheikh Said may naturally have fueled Mahmud’s jealousy and grudge against Sâdât. Otherwise, these statements of Sâdât who were so burdened with Mahmud Pasha, who had served the Ottoman government faithfully for many years, do not go beyond just a false claim. Sâdât also referred CUP’s local branch anonymously and degraded them as they could not get their official status confirmed from the Salonika Headquarters despite to their hard attempts. On the other hand, they asserted that Sheikh Said’s Society which consisted of a loyal mass to the Sultanate, reached to more than 12 thousands faithful members and its official status was confirmed with full appreciation. With Sâdât’s rhetoric, this development had totally shaken the factionist ideology of hatemongers. According to Sâdât, this situation was clearly seen in the lines in their slanderous letters intended to deceive the state, and these lines resembled the abominable and dirty waters overflowing from their accursed minds (efkâr-ı mel’anetkâriden taşan çirk-âb -ı denâet ve tezvirden). The Sheikhs kept humiliating these people, whom they described as completely devoid of shame, humility, honor and conscience, and claimed that they could finally degrade to the point of committing murder. The Manifest also referred to the Kanûn-i Esâsi and began enumerating the offenses of the aforementioned state officials with the claim of that “by violating the 9th article, they violated the rights of Sâdât” (hukukumuza tecâvüz).¹⁴¹ Through violating the 10th article, they had violated and crushed the individual

 Faik Bulut, Paşalar, sanatçılar ve aydınların baba ocağı Caf aşireti, Independent Türkçe, www.indyturk.com, 07 Şubat 2021, https://www.indyturk.com/node/311971/t%C3%BCrki%CC% 87yeden-sesler/pa%C5%9Falar-sanat%C3%A7%C4%B1lar-ve-ayd%C4%B1nlar%C4%B1n-babaoca%C4%9F%C4%B1-caf-a%C5%9Fireti Access Date: 10.10. 2021  A.Şeref Gözübüyük, Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri 1839 – 1980, (Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982) pp.27– 42 Madde 9.– Osmanlıların kâffesi hürriyeti şahsiyelerine malik ve aherin hukuku hürriyetine tecavüz etmemekle mükelleftir. Art. 9. All the Ottomans enjoy individual liberty on condition of not attacking the liberty of other people.

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liberties of the Sheikhs (hürriyet-i şahsiyemize taarruzla pâyimal).¹⁴² Through violating the 22nd article, they frequently assaulted and devastated their households and residences on alleged pretexts (mesken ve menzilimizin taarruzdan mahviyeti), sent detachments to their homes, defied and insulted their families.¹⁴³ In addition, the document reproached the state, recalling the law’s principle that ‘any allegation against a person, no matter how big, is considered unrealized or null and void (ke-en lem yekün) unless pronounced as a verdict in the respective court’. More importantly, they argued that even if the banishment of an individual from his/her hometown was reached by a verdict under the Martial Law (İdâre-i Örfiyye), the finalization of such a critical sentence would depend on an Imperial Decree issued by the ultimate authority. However, the Sheikhs emphasized that these conspirators had fulfilled their plans just like executing a final judgement approved by the Sultan and they had managed to banish Sâdât from their hometown to Mosul.

2.8 CUP’s Problematic Entity in Mosul In this section, the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress in Mosul, its dual branching over two contradictory ideologies and its interventions on local government will be examined. As we have seen throughout the study, the CUP Sulaymaniyah branch assumed an interventionist attitude and followed an insistent policy, especially in matters concerning Sheikh Said. It should not be forgotten that this branch is an extension of the first central branch established in Mosul and this vision is a continuation of this very same culture. In order to understand this continuity, the history of the Mosul central branch will be briefly examined, and the confusing duality of this entity will be discussed. However, prior to this, an ultimatum message reached from the Sulaymaniyah branch

 Gözübüyük, Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri 1839 – 1980, pp.27– 42 Madde 10.– Hürriyeti şahsiye her türlü taarruzdan masundur. Hiç kimse kanunun tâyin ettiği sebeb ve suretten maada bir bahane ile mücazat olunamaz. Art. 10. Individual liberty is absolutely inviolable. Nobody can under any pretence suffer any penalty whatever except in the cases determined by law and according to the forms prescribed by it.  Gözübüyük, Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri 1839 – 1980, pp.27– 42 Madde 22.– Memaliki Osmaniyede herkesin mesken ve menzili taarruzdan masundur. Kanunun tâyin eylediği ahvalden maada bir sebeble hükûmet tarafından cebren hiç kimsenin mesken ve menziline girilemez. Art. 22. The domicile is inviolable. The authorities cannot forcibly enter the domicile of any person what- ever except in cases determined by the law.

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will be examined in order to see the pressure and impact that CUP branches can create on provincial administration and central authorities.

Interventionism and Uncontrolled Branching A few days before the Mosul Incident, an interesting and remarkable telegram from the Sulaymaniyah branch of the CUP reached the Grand Vizirate. According to this anonymous message, Said and his affiliates in Mosul have been lobbying the central authorities in İstanbul through their relative Sheikh Qadir Nouri of Sulaymaniyah who the member of the KSMAP.¹⁴⁴ Although not specified in the message, this person should be Barzanjizadeh Abdulqadir Nouri Effendi (Berzencizâde Abdülkadir Nûri Efendi) , who was the grandson of Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Effendi. Abdulqadir Nouri was assigned as the member of the Commission for Inspection and Examination (Encümen-i Teftiş ve Muâyene) in 1894, which functioned as a censorship committee under the Ministry of Education (Maârif Nezâreti) during the Hamidian regime.¹⁴⁵ The message mentioned a sum of 2.000 lira sent via Sayyid Abdulqadir Nouri Effendi, but it was not specified whether the money was funneled to the KSMAP’s İstanbul headquarters or to some Government officials. However, according to the message, the ultimate goal of this money transfer was clear, and the banished Sheikhs in Mosul

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2711/83 /Lef 2, 19 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 01 January 1909 “Makam-ı Sadâretpenâhiye, Mütekaddim 29 Eylül 1324 telgrafnâmede zulm-ü istibdâdları arz olunan ve ahâlinin mürâcaatı üzerine hükûmet-i seniyye tarafından Musul’a teb’id edilen mütegallib Hafid Said ve rüfekasının Kürd Teâvün Cemiyeti âzâsından bulunan akrabâları Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Kadir Nûri vâsıtasıyla gönderdikleri tevâtüren anlaşılan İki Bin liradan dolayı tekrâr Süleymaniye’ye iâdeleri için makamât-ı aliyyece fevkalâde bir teşebbüs icrâ edilmekte olduğu tahakkuk etmiş ve ellerindeki Mâbeyn şifresi ve Tahsin ve Hâin İzzet’in kuvvetiyle öteden beri ahâli hakkında revâ gördükleri ve Musul, Süleymaniye mahkemelerinde mevcûd yüz elli takım evrakları müsebbit bulunduğu envâ-ı fecai kâfi değilmiş de büsbütün livânın mahvını müstelzim bulunan avdetlerine bu sûretle vâki olan teşebbüs ve muâvenet bilumûm memleket ahâlisini heyecâna getirmek ve bunların avdetleri dâhilen ve hâricen yirmi bin hâneden ibâret olan ahâlinin hicret etmelerine mütevakkıf bulunduğuna burasının sencîde-i mîzân-ı muâdelet buyurulması ile bir maksada mebni olan teşebbüs-ü mezkûrun bırakılması millete rağmen iâdeleri yoluna gidilecek ise arada bir hûn ve dimâ’ın sefkine mahal kalmamak üzere evvel emirde mâruz yirmi bin hâne halkı için bir mahal tâyini ve nakillerine müteallik muamelât ve icâbâtın icrâ buyurulması bilumûm ahâli nâmına sûret-i katiyyede olarak mâruzdur. Ferman. Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti Süleymaniye Merkezi”  BOA, İ.MF.2/49, 08 Eylül 1310 – 20 September 1894; BEO 749/56170/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1311– 27 February 1896

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have been trying to secure their return to Sulaymaniyah through their connections in İstanbul. More importantly, as the possibility of their return was rumored and heard, it created great panic in Sulaymaniyah. And if these Sheikhs returned, the sanjak community consisting of twenty thousand households inside and outside, were ready to migrate to another place. In other words, this attempt of the Sheikhs who had a clear purpose had to be left unfinished, but if they still had to be returned eventually, possible bloodshed should be prevented by taking measures. Ultimately, CUP branch stated in a clear and concise manner that a suitable location for 20 thousand households to immigrate should be determined and the necessary procedures should be performed for their transfer. At this point, Davut Hut necessarily highlights the particular interventions by local branches and clubs of CUP towards the provincial administration mechanisms after the proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy.¹⁴⁶ According to Hut, CUP adopted and operated those practices as a fundamental way of enhancing central penetration and efficiency on the provincial administrations. There were usually no problems experienced as long as the civil-military administrators in the provinces were also members or partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress. Otherwise, there could be a total dispute between the CUP representatives and provincial administrations. Hut, by referring to Zeki’s report sent to Grand Vizierate on October 1908, attributed the establishment of the “Secondary CUP” in Mosul to partially impracticable obligations and demands imposed on provincial administration by the “Primary CUP”.¹⁴⁷ According to the report, even though it was founded by Notables (Vücûh), Sheikhs (Meşâyih) and Sayyids (Sâdât) to restrict the interventionist moves of the first one, this second society (ikinci cemiyet) also shared the same opinion with the first in maintaining the provisions of Kanûn-i Esâsi and assisting the Unionist Government. However, the first society went beyond its limits and insistently requested that Sabuncuzâde Muhammed Pasha be dismissed from the membership of the Provincial Administrative Council.¹⁴⁸ Thereupon, although the necessary investigation was conducted by the governorship, the members of the first society displayed an in-

 Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 169 footnote 850  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 169 footnote 851, Hut refers to this second society as ‘The Second Committee of Ottoman Union and Progress’ as quoted from Zeki’s report BOA, BEO.3409/ 255622/Lef 2, 18 Eylül 1324– 01 October 1908  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 69 footnote 340 “According to British sources, Sabuncu Muhammed Pasha, who was repeatedly elected to the Mosul Administrative Council, was in a stronger position than many governors sent by the central authorities between 1895 and 1911. In fact, it is possible to say that the Mosul Administrative Council was under his indirect rule.”

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sistent and imperative attitude such as that ‘There is no need for this, remove the Pasha from the membership immediately!’. Zeki had reported that after their requests were denied, hundreds of people stormed the telegraph offices, violated the public order, and threatened the telegraph officials. However, the second society was against such interventionist requests and practices according to Governor Zeki Pasha¹⁴⁹. As a matter of fact, the duality of the CUP’s branching in Mosul attracted the attention of both the Sublime Porte and the CUP headquarters in Salonika and kept these two offices busy for a while. According to the message Zeki sent in September 1908, during the office of his predecessor Mustafa Yümnî, a branch that was not affiliated with the Salonika center was independently established in Mosul and made demands (mütâlebe) from the provincial government by submitting its member list and seal.¹⁵⁰ However, Zeki also reported that while the members of this existing Society have been increasing rapidly, other Notables of the province who did not share the same ideal and interests with them, established another society under the same name. According to Zeki, it was obvious that both Societies would make some demands from the local administration, and he stated that these demands would be evaluated as long as they were in line with Constitutionalism. However, Zeki was worried that the conflict of inter-

 Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 169 footnote 851  BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 4, 26 Ağustos 1324– 08 September 1908 “Musul Vilâyetinden Mebûs Şifreli Telgrafnâme Hâlidir Merkezi Selânik’te olan Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile evvelce hiçbir münâsebeti olmadığı hâlde selefim zamânında burada o nâm altında bir cemiyet teşkil ettiğini ve mikdârıyla belli ve başlılarının esâmisini ve muahharen bir de cemiyet mührüyle hükûmete bir takım tekâlife dermeyân edildiğini arz etmiştim. Cemiyet-i mezkûre gittikçe teksir ettiği gibi bunlardan hâric kalan memleketin vücûh vesâireden ibâret ve menfaat-i husûsiyyeleri icâbâtından olarak evvelkilerle birleşemeyenlerden mürekkeb Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti nâmı altında bir ikincisi daha teşkil etti. Bunların her biri hükûmete karşı bir takım mütâlebede bulunacakları bedihi ve Hükûmet-i Seniyyenin Kanûn-i Esâsi ahkâmını muhâfaza etmek şartıyla iktizâ-yı hâle tevessül edeceği tabii ise de her iki cemiyet arasında mevcûd olan menfaat-i husûsiyyeden dolayı bir vukuat zuhûruna meydan verilmemesine çalışılacak ise de makam-ı vilâyeti iştigal etmezden evvel buradaki Zâbitânın bir kısm-ı mühiminin mezkûr cemiyete dâhil olmasından nâşi hükmünce her iki cemiyet idâresini telife ve bir vukuata meydan verilmemek için icrâ-yı nasâyihden başka bir çare yoktur. Binâberin, naib-ül vilâyet ve ileri gelenlerle bil-ittihâd her iki cemiyetin telif-i beynlerinde alâ-kadr-il-istitaa gayret olunacaktır. Mâmâfih Selânik Merkez Cemiyetinden bunlara nasâyih ve ihtârât-ı lâzıme icrâ olunduğu hâlde tesirât-ı hüsnisi görüleceği vârid-i hatır olmaktadır. Diğer cihetin de Zâbitânın vezâif-i asliyeleriyle bil-iştigal bu gibi mesâil-i siyâsiyeye müdâhaleleri câiz olamayacağı hakkında Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesinden tebligat icrâsı elzem olduğundan arzına ictisâr olunur. Ferman Vâli Zeki “

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est between these two entities would cause further incidents and he had no other choice but to give advice to both parties. Because a major part of the military officers in Mosul were already members of the aforementioned Society, before they occupied the provincial offices and cadres. Therefore, the conflict between the two Societies could have resulted in the provincial authorities getting involved unnecessarily and taking sides improperly. This would mean duality and partisanship in local governments which must be totally impartial and nonpolitical. He stated that he would try his best to reconcile these two entities, but he particularly demanded the necessary advice and warnings to be directly given from the headquarters in Salonika to these branches for a more constructive influence. In addition, according to Zeki, the Ministry of War had to make a notification so that the military officers would not interfere in political affairs (mesâil-i siyâsiye) and only fulfill their essential duties (vezâif-i asliye). Although himself a member of the CUP, Zeki may have considered the party members in the local administrative cadres as risky. Because, at this juncture, too much political influence in the provincial administration could relegate Zeki’s position in the decision-making mechanism and tarnish his image vis-à-vis the central authority. As if this were not enough, the number of CUP branches increased to two and these two branches came into conflict with each other. This meant a bigger problem, and so much political confusion within the province could not be resolved without the guidance of the CUP headquarters. Governor Zeki had already reported that his predecessor Mustafa Yümnî did not accept and did not publicly announce the telegraphs sent to Mosul by the CUP headquarters for the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy at the beginning of the revolution.¹⁵¹ He had written that, the first formation in Mosul was

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 3, 20 Ağustos 1324– 02 September 1908 “Musul Vilâyetinden alınan şifre telgrafnâme. 30 Temmuz 1324 Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti tarafından umûm sırasında buraya da keşide olunan telgrafların Vâli-i sâbık tarafından kabûl ve îlân edilmemesinden dolayı kendilerine cemiyet süsü vererek nâmlarına hakk ettirdikleri mühr altında mütâlebede bulundukları evvelce arz olunan kesânın esâmisi zire derç olundu. Bunların adedi gittikçe tezâyid ederek elyevm efrâdının 400’e karib bulunduğu tahkikat-ı vâkıâ üzerine arz olunur. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki“ Major applicants named were the following: ” From Chief of Notables (Reis-i Vücûhadan) Ömerizâde Mecid Efendi, Member (Âzâ) Ömeri Reşid Efendi, Celili Emin and Süleyman Beyzâde Fuad and his brother Abdullah and Şerif Beyzâde Neşait Bey, Head of Indictment Committee (Heyet-i İthâmiye Reisi) Abdurrahman Efendi and from officers, Chief Magistrate (Sermüstantık) Abdülgani and Gendarmerie Clerk (Zabtiye Kâtibi) Reşid and his brother Accounting Clerk (Muhasebe Ketebesinden) Hikmet and Accountant (Muhasebeden) Aziz and Senior Captain Nûri of Mosul Reserve Army (Musul Redif Kolağaların-

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triggered and established as a reaction to this, entitled itself as the CUP, engraved a seal, requested recognition from the Provincial Government and its members rapidly reached 400. Zeki had also shared the names of the applicants who applied for the establishment of the branch and Omari Reshid Effendi (Ömeri Reşid Efendi) of Mosuli Notables was particularly noteworthy among these names. However, it is not understood whether this Omari Reshid was the same person who was going to found the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union and was going to be accused and judged as one of the chief instigators of the Mosul Incident. Could it have been possible that Omari Reshid, one of prominent Ulema of Mosul, had applied to an organization such as CUP, his application had been rejected, and therefore he displayed his reaction by establishing an organization with an oppositional viewpoint? Zeki had particularly reported that these applicants were not affiliated with the Original Committee (Cemiyet-i Esâsiye) and established the Society on their own initiative.¹⁵² These persons were consisted of partly indigenous people and partly civil servants and made demands from the provincial government on behalf of the CUP. Zeki had also stated that a deputy delegation was sent to İstanbul by the CUP headquarters, that delegation met with the government and ministries for taking nec-

dan) and Clerk of Navkur Reserve Army (Navkur Redif Kâtibi) Rüşdi, 4th Army Captain Tahsin on Duty of Tax Collection in Mosul (Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyuna mensûb Tahsil Memûriyetiyle burada bulunan Yüzbaşı), and the Clerk of Rawandiz Battalion (Revandiz Tabur Kâtibi) Hüseyin and 2nd Company Captain Sırrı of the 3rd Mosul Reserve Battalion (Üçüncü Musul Redif Taburunun İkinci Bölük Yüzbaşısı), 1st Battalion Captain (Birinci Tabur Yüzbaşısı) Fehmi and Navkur Battalion Captain (Navkur Taburundan Yüzbaşı) Tevfik and Clerk of Mosul Regie (Musul Rejisi Kâtibi) Ahmed and Court Member (Muhâkeme Âzâsından) Fethullah […] and Pharmacist (Eczacı) Cercisi Efendi“  BOA, DH.ŞFR.404/65, 15 Ağustos 1324– 28 August 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti Selânik’teki Merkez-i Umûmisi tarafından Dersaadet’e gönderilen Heyet-i Mebûsân’ın hükûmete ve Nezâretlere mürâcaatla temin-i selâmeti memlekete […] mülâhazat dermeyân ederek devletçe îcâbına bakılmakta olduğundan herkesin Cemiyet nâmına serd-i müdâhaleye hakkı olmadığı ve teferruâtı hakkındaki 30 Temmuz 1324 târihli telgrafnâme-i Nezâretpenâhileri herkese îlân […] Kanûn-i Esâsinin îlânı üzerine cemiyetler tarafından umûm sırasında buraya da gelen telgraflar üzerine evvelce Cemiyet-i Esâsiyeye hiçbir münâsebetleri olmadıkları hâlde kendi kendilerine kısmen yerli ahâli ve kısmen memûrînden teşekkül eden ve cemiyet nâmı taşıyan bazı adamlar hükûmete mürâcaatla bir takım mütâlebede bulunuyorlar. İhlal-i âsâyişe meydan vermemek için kendi irâde olunmakta ise de bunların hâllerinden me’mûl olan harekât-ı tahakkümaneye cüretle vazife-i memûriyete müdâhale eyledikleri hâlde haklarında olunacak muâmelenin emr ve inbâ buyurulması bâbında ferman. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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essary precautions and had been trying to prevent uncontrolled branching and arbitrary interventions on behalf of CUP. Zeki was worried that this situation would lead to disorder and questioned what he would have to do if these people interfered with the duties of civil servants through their domineering actions. The issue had already crossed the provincial borders and the CUP took over the situation by sending a delegation of its own deputies to the Sublime Porte. Therefore, the first society in Mosul saw the second as a product of Despotism and never regarded it as a legitimate entity. After the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, a CUP branch in Mosul was established by its own initiative on July 24, 1908, as in every quarter of the empire, and it started serving the country and nation in coordination with the local administration.¹⁵³ However, according to this first branch of CUP in Mosul, although their services had won the appreciation of the local government and the community, they had been pressured by some local despots (müstebidân-ı mahalliye) who allied with the pro-despotic former Governor Mustafa Yümnî Bey. They particularly claimed that Mustafa Yümnî deliberately delayed the declaration of Constitutionalism (mektûm kalmasına) until he left his office (infisâl) and created a suitable environment for the pro-Abdülhamid despots in the province. Now these supporters of Despotism, as existed among state officials, united in the same ideal and established a second CUP branch to cover up their secret agenda. According to this claim, the second branch had a distinctive ideology of its own

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 2, 31 Ağustos 1324– 13 September 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine, İstibdâd boyunduruğu altında ezilmiş olan Osmanlılar […] hazret-i Pâdişâhi ile mevki-i icrâya konulan Kanûn-i Esâsiden hissedar-ı adâlet ve hürriyet olmak üzere Memâlik-i Mahrûsenin her köşesinde tesis edildiği gibi buraca dahi 11 Temmuz 1324 târihinde teşkil etmiş ve devlet ve millet ve vatanlarına karşı hidemât-ı hükûmet-i mahalliyenin nazar-ı tahsinini kazanmış ve cemiyet-i muhteremelerine irtibat ve iltihakıyla müftehir bulunmuş olan Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyet-i Âcizânemizi istibdâdlarına muvâfık görmeyen bazı müstebidân-ı mahalliye meşhur İzzet’in kardaşı ve yâdigârı olan Vâli-i Esbak Mustafa Yümnî Bey’le bil-ittihâd el birliğiyle ve hükûmetin nüfûz ve kuvve-i müessiresinin inzimâmiyle cemiyet-i âcizânemizin tazyikine, Kanûn-i Esâsinin îlânına dâir İrâde-i Seniyyeyi de Mustafa Yümnî Bey’in infisâli gününe müsadif Temmuzun 28. Gününe kadar mektûm kalmasına sırf mâzeret etmişlerdi. Âhiren îlân olunan Kanûn-i Esâsiyi de sû-i tağyir ile ilkaat ve ifsâdâtta bulunmalarının efkâr-ı umûmiyede görünmeyen heyecân isti’dâdı ayân […] ve ehâdîs-i şerifeyi hâvi Cemiyet-i Âcizânemizden gayet müessir nutuklar îrâdıyla mahv ve izâle edilerek memleketçe istirâhat-ı umûmiyeyi mûcib hidemâtta sırf mâzeret edilmiştir. Ancak şimdi bu müstebidler memûrînden bulundukları tarafıyla bil-ittifak bir noktada ve aynı maksadda ictimâ ise de efkâr-ı desâiskârâneleri diğer bir cemiyet-i […] teşkiline çevirmiş ve beyn-el ahâli muhtell âsâyiş ahvâlin vukuuna mahal kalmamak üzere eşrâf-ı mahalliye ve Zâbıtadan müteşekkil bine karib heyetimize iltihak için hükûmeti mahalliyeye vuku bulan…”

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rather than the original ideology of the CUP. Thus, despite having the same label, it was referred to as the ‘second society’ or ‘other society’, not as the ‘second branch’ in most correspondence. However, the major problem was that these formations, which were spontaneously established (kendiliklerinden teşekkül eden) and proliferated everywhere after the Constitutionalism proclaimed, interfered with the governmental affairs, and started to tarnish the name of the CUP.¹⁵⁴ All provincial administrations were warned not to abide by the interventions of these branches (şuabât) and to continue fulfilling their duties as before (kemâkân îfâ-yı vazifeye devâm). In addition, in order to prevent the undesired interventions of these CUP formations, the Ministry of War was notified for arranging military support from the local commands when necessary. As a matter of fact, the problem was not only specific to Mosul and all provinces across the empire were at risk. This dominant character of the CUP, which had such a wide and professional organization throughout the empire, started to pose a disadvantage for the provincial administrations. The last thing to ask for was a dichotomy between the central government and the ruling political party that would arise over the provinces.

Political, Administrative and Social Tensions Between Two CUP Branches in Mosul General Staff Major Ali Said Bey, whom we frequently encountered throughout the study and who was alleged to be one of the collaborators of the Mosul Incident, was also involved in this process. A group led by Ali Said had reported that the first entity, instead of maintaining provincial harmony and sobriety and serving the Constitutional government, pursued specific and factionalized interests and left the government in a difficult position.¹⁵⁵ According to their allegations,

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 5, 3 Eylül 1324– 16 September 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Devâm eylediği İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyetimizi takliden taşralarda kendiliklerinden teşekkül eden şuabâtın umûr-u hükûmete müdâhalelerini redd ile her tarafı kemâkân îfâ-yı vazifeye devâm ve men-i müdâhalât için ledel hâce cihet-i askeriyyeden muâvenet îfâsı için Kumandanlıklara tâlimât itâsı Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine iş’âr olunduğundan inzibât ve intizâm-ı idâreye itinâ olunması hakkında Sadâret-i Uzmâdan Vülât-ı Âzama tebliğ olunan telgrafnâme mündericâtı Devr-i Sâbık için yol açmıştır.”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 7– 8, 3 Eylül 1324– 16 September 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Hürriyet ve Müsâvattan mütelezziz umûm Musul ahâlisinin Kanûn-i Esâsiyi kemâl-i meserretle kabûl ve ahkâm-ı celilesini muhâfaza edeceklerine mâ-memûrîn yekdiğerini bittahlif umûr-u hü-

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these were a few individuals who were devoid of social consciousness, selfishly pursued individualization and personal benefits (teferrüd ve temin-i menâfi-i zâtiye) and who were unable to perceive the delicate situation that the state and religion were subjected internally and externally. Ali Said claimed that these individuals even collaborated with some suspected military officers who had ongoing judicial files in the Court Martial, in order to establish this organization. Allegedly, this organization was interfering in administrative affairs in line with some particular purposes and interests, instead of helping the provincial administration by explaining and adopting the Constitutional system to the Kurdish and Arab tribes (Aşâir-i Ekrâd ve Urbâna hüsn-i tefhim). The Military Officers, Civil Servants, Local Notables and Ulema of the opposing view, who did not want to give opportunity to such self-interested thoughts (efkâr-ı menfaatcûyâne) that can tarnish the name of the homeland and cause disorder, had to constitute the second society. According to Ali Said, it was proposed to unite

kûmetin yolunda cereyân eylediği hâlde teferrüd ve temin-i menâfi-i zâtiye ehlinden ve şu sırada devlet ve vatanımızın dâhilen ve hâricen mâruz bulunduğu ahvâli teferrüsten âciz olan birkaç zât-ı […] evrakları Divân-ı Harbe me’hul bazı Zâbitânla bil-iştirâk İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti nâmı tahtında zuhûr ve Kanûn-i Esâsiyi ahâliye, Aşâir-i Ekrâd ve Urbâna hüsn-i tefhim ve muhâfaza-i îtidâl ile hükûmete muâvenet-i ciddiye ibrâz ve takrir-i Meşrûtiyete hizmet edecek yerde içlerinde birkaç kişinin tahrikiyle efkâr ve meserret-i umûmiye tahallüfe ağrâz-ı şahsiye ve makasıd-ı husûsiyye tâkib ve müdâhalât ile hükûmeti müşkil mevkide bıraktıkları ve bir tefrika ihdâsıyla memleketimizin nâmını lekedâr ve âsâyiş-i mahaliyeyi ihlâl fikrinde oldukları görüldüğünden bu hâllin […] ve aşâir ve kabâile sû-i sirâyetle gaile ihdâsında ve […] ihtirâzen Ümerâ ve Zâbitân, Ulemâ ve Sâdât ve Eşrâf ve Milel-i Muhtelife ve Mûteberân-ı Memleketle diğer ahâlinin kısm-i azimi bittecmi ve Kanûn-i Esâsiye ve âsâyiş-i memleketine muhâfaza ve hükûmete ezher-i cihet-i itâat ve muâvenetle efkâr-ı menfaatcûyâneye meydan vermemek üzere tekrâr-ı âmm ettekrâr-ı beyn ederek ayn-ı nâm-ı mukaddesle ikinci bir cemiyet teşkil edilmiş ve maksadları her türlü ağrâz-ı husûsiyyeden âzâde olarak vatanımıza ve hükûmetimize hizmet ve hürriyetimizi muhâfaza altında bulunması lâzım gelen iki cemiyetin ittihâdı teklif edilmiş ise de kabûl etmeyip Makam-i Vilâyetle Cemiyetimiz de aleyhinde ihbârât ve şikâyât-ı kâzibeye teşebbüsle efkâr-ı umûmiyeyi tahdişe başlamak olduklarından her memlekette bulunabilen bu gibiler ara-i vekâlet-i umûmiyeyi hâiz oldukları cihetle bu babda enzâr-ı dikkat-i hamiyyetperverâneyi celble beraber Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyet-i Hayriyyesinin kariben vusûl-ü me’mûl Heyet-i Mebûsân vürûduna intizâr edilmekte bulunduğunu mâlûm buyurulmak ve cemiyet-i mezkûrenin hilâf-ı hakikat iş’ârları nazar-ı […] bakılmak üzere beyân-ı hakikata ictisâr kılınmakla ferman.” Those who signed the telegram were: Chief of Staff Major (Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı) Ali Said, Şerif Beyzâde Mahmud, Kasım Ağazâde nâmık, Kasım Ağazâde Said, Müftizâde Muhammed, Mütevellizâde Asaf, Ömerizâde Mahmud, Sâdât Habib, Sâdât Ali Fâzıl, […]zâde Mehmed, İbadağazâde Ali, Regiment Head Clerk (Alay Başkâtibi) Mehmed, Chaldean (Keldâni) Süleyman […], Chaldean (Keldâni) Yusuf Ağazâde Dâvud, from Jewish Community (Musevi Milletinden) Sâlih, from Armenian Community (Ermeni Milletinden) Aleksan Kapucuyan.

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the two entities that were expected to serve the homeland and the nation and to protect the freedom, regardless of any specific purpose. However, this proposal was not accepted by the first society, and they started to disturb the public opinion by making false denunciations and complaints against the governorate and the second society. Ali Said stated that they were expecting a Delegation of Deputies (Heyet-i Mebûsân) to be sent to Mosul by the CUP headquarters for inspection. Although it is not known under which title, duty or office he filed a report on the branching of the CUP, the statements in this message suggest that Ali Said may have been one of the founders of the second society. His message can be read as an attempt by some military officers to approach the central CUP authority by displaying a patriotic image. Another possibility is that the CUP could have made some reliable and partisan military officers responsible for monitoring and reporting the political situation in the provinces. However, alongside Ali Said, the telegram signers were consisted of Mosuli Eşrâf, Ulemâ and Sâdât and interestingly non-Muslim community leaders such as Chaldean, Jewish and Armenian. Dâvud Yusufâni, who will get into the Parliament as an independent deputy in December 1908, also had signed the petition as Keldâni Yusuf Ağazâde Dâvud. This notion of embracing diversity makes us think that those who dispatched this telegram were the founders of the second society. In his following comment, Governor Zeki endorsed Ali Said and wrote that the selfish, unsubmissive and strategic moves (âmil-i hodserâne) of the first society were restricted by the establishment of the second society.¹⁵⁶ This restriction and proposal to unite both societies disturbed the first society and caused them to produce false denunciations and complaints in order not to lose tactical superiority. In addition, Zeki regarded the first society as incompatible with the Constitutional regime due to its specific objectives and ambitions (âmâl-i husûsiyye) and thought that the second society was established with a purpose of balance. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interior had contacted Mosul and Baghdad Provinces and stated that the CUP headquarters issued the necessary warnings

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 12, 12 Eylül 1324– 25 September 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Cemiyet-i mezkûre efrâdı âmâl-i husûsiyye tâkib eylemelerinden dolayı Kanûn-i Esâsinin ahkâmına mugayir ve bilâhare münakaşat-ı münâfîyi müstelzim ahvâle mahal kalmamak ve hükûmeti müşkilâta düşürmemek maksadıyla Sâdât ve Vücûh ve Zâbitân ve Memûrînden mürekkeb olarak muahharen teşekkül eden ikinci cemiyet evvelki cemiyetin âmil-i hodserânelerine mâni olduklarından ve âhiren […] eylediğim İrâde-i Nezâretpenâhileri üzerine maksad-ı husûsi tâkib cemiyetin hareketleri tahdid ve ittihâdları teklif olunmasından mütehassıl infiâl âsârı olarak cemiyet-i mezkûre hilâf-ı hakikat işârât ve şikâyâta başlamışlardır. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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in order to prevent uncontrolled branches that performed unfair interventions and attempts.¹⁵⁷ On the other hand, the Grand Vizier’s office requested the Ministry of War to send additional forces to Mosul in order to make the necessary arrests and to impose the punishments regarding the interventionism displayed by this CUP formation.¹⁵⁸ Grand Vizier emphasized that this entity which was formed under the title of CUP attempted to provoke some undesirable dignitaries (erkân -ı gayri marziye) and the community against the system. For this reason, it was inevitable to arrest and sentence those who performed, encouraged, or instigated harmful attempts such as interfering with the government’s affairs and disturbing the public order. It was requested that these individuals, whose names were listed in the telegram sent from the Mosul Governorate, be referred to the court as soon as possible. And a sufficient force had to be temporarily dispatched from the nearest garrison to handle the necessary detentions smoothly and to ensure the public security. The incident had now gone beyond the dimension of a political polemic and had become a threat to public security. From the message Zeki sent in mid-October, we understand that two officials with the title of Deputy (Mebûs) were sent to Mosul by the Salonika CUP headquarters.¹⁵⁹ However, it cannot be understood from archive records whether these  BOA, DH.MKT. 2620/84/Lef 11, 8 Eylül 1324– 21 September 1908 “Musul ve Bağdad Vilâyetlerine Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti nâmına her tarafça muhtelif cemiyetler teşkiliyle katiyen müdâhaleye hakları olmayan mesâil için mütâlebede ve cemiyetin nâmını lekedâr edecek yolda teşebbüsâta kıyâmları câiz olamayacağı cemiyetin merkez-i umûmisi tarafından lâzım gelenlere tebliğ edildiği ifâde kılınmış ve bu yolda teşebbüsâtta bulunan Zâbitân için Harbiye Nezâretinden îcâbı veçhiyle icrâ-i tebligat olunacağı anlaşılmış olmakla… Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, BEO.3409/255623, 19 Eylül 1324– 02 October 1908 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine Musul Terakki ve İttihâd Cemiyeti nâmıyla teşekkül bir heyetin umûr-u hükûmete medhale ve ihlâl-i âsâyişe tasaddi ederek bazı erkân-ı gayri marziyeyi ve ahâliyi teşvikat-ı […] bulunmakta olduğundan ve bu hâlin devâmı mehâzirinden bahisle müşevvik ve muharriklerden ön ayak olan muharrer-ül esâmi-i kesânın te’dibleri lüzûmunu hâvi Musul Vilâyetinden alınan telgrafnâmenin sûreti leffen savb-ı Âlinize irsâl kılınan ve öyle cemiyet tertibiyle teşebbüsât-ı muzırrada bulunanların mücâzâtı lâbüdd olunduğunun eşhâs-ı merkumenin bittevkif muhâkemeye tevdileri cevâben Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhe yazılmış olunmakla temin-i ve teyid-i inzibât için en yakın mevzi-i askeriyyeden muvakkaten oraya kuvve-i kâfiye sevki zımnında iktizâsının îfâsına… Sadâret -i Uzmâ Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 405/119, 4 Teşrinievvel 1324– 17 October 1908 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Selânik İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti merkez-i umûmisi tarafından Mebûs sıfatıyla buraya iki zât gönderildiğini arz etmiştim. Heyet-i mezkûrenin Musul’ca merkez-i umûmiye merbût olmak üzere bir şûbe teşkiliyle hatt-ı hareketlerini […] program tanzim ve ita-i azim ve tasavvurunda

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were the same people as the delegation in İstanbul or a separate delegation sent directly from Salonika. Zeki stated that these people wanted to establish a genuine branch affiliated to the CUP headquarters, prepared an activity program and requested an official seal from the headquarters. Moreover, it was understood that branching would gradually include subdivisional units of the province. However, Zeki also added that although the people of this region were pleased with the Constitutional Monarchy, establishing branches and arranging a program by means of a special delegation were not something that the local people pleased with. It seems that the CUP eventually took over the issue and sent representatives directly from the center in order to prevent uncontrolled branching and endless interventions in Mosul. However, after this move, the above message suggests that Zeki may have a different concern rather than the proliferation of branches or their uncontrolled interventions. Perhaps Zeki regarded this delegation sent by Salonika as a de-facto partner to the provincial administration and was concerned that a second administration backed by the political party would take office. In any case, it was the CUP Government that appointed Zeki as the governor of the province. However, an alternative administration consisting of party members other than the appointed Governor Zeki could cause confusion in a province like Mosul which stands on delicate balances.

bulundukları şûbe nâmına merkez-i umûmiden mühr-ü resmiye istedikleri tedricen şûbenin mülhakata da teşmil edebileceği anlaşılmıştır. Bu havâli ahâlisinin Kanûn-i Esâsinin îlânından memnûn ve mûcibince amel edecekleri derkâr ise de ahvâl-i memleket îcâbı böyle heyet-i husûsiyye mârifetiyle şûbeler teşkili ve program tanzimi ahâlinin pek de memnûn olmadıkları hissedilen olunabilecek ahvâl-i bihûşe hakkında vilâyetçe yapılacak bir muâmele var ise emr ve iş’ârı mâruzdur. Vâli Zeki”

3 The Mosul Incident in the Context of Organized Violence 3.1 The Transformation of an Individual Violation into the Province-wide Chaos This section, which includes a more technical analysis, will focus on how the provincial administration managed this crisis, the problematic background of the military structure in the province, and other public security threats that appeared throughout the province during the Mosul Incident. The critical point here is how an individual violation escalated into a province-wide violence incident on such a large scale. For this reason, many technical details such as facts and figures are not omitted as much as possible while describing the course of events. In addition, some influence groups that try to mobilize regional elements ideologically will be mentioned.

From Street Harassment to Urban Shootout On the 5th of January, Zeki Pasha reported a crime case to Ministry of Interior that will become a critical threshold in terms of public security, peace and future of Mosul. During the occasion of ‘The Feast of Sacrifice’ (Eid al-Adha), an intoxicated soldier had violated a ‘veiled-honorable Muslim woman’ (Muhadderât-ı İslâmiyeden) walking in the sightseeing place of Mosul and then literally all hell broke loose.¹⁶¹ The assailant was one of the Kurdish mule cavalrymen of Kir BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/53, 23 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 05 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Iyd-i Edhâ münâsebetiyle el-yevm teferrüc mahallinde dolaşan Muhadderât-ı İslâmiyeden birine berây-ı memûriyet merkezde bulunan Kerkük Nizâmiye Ester Süvârlarından bir nefer sekr-i hâl olarak taarruz etmesiyle kasaba içinde dolaşan devriye kolu taarruz eden neferi derdest ile Karakolhâneye getirdikleri sırada nefer-i merkumun mahal-i vukuata civar bulunan tavladaki elli kadar arkadaşları devriye kolu üzerine hücûm ve ateş etmeleriyle ahâli de câhilâne vukuata iştirâk eylediğinden mesele kesb-i ehemmiyet eylemiş ve bu sırada ester süvâr efrâdı kârgir tavla derûnuna tahassun ederek ateşe devâm eyledikleri haber alınmayla Kumandan Paşa hazretleriyle bizzat mahal-i vukuata gidilerek vesâyâ-i lâzıme îfâ edilmiş ise de tesiri görülmediğinden tavlanın etrâfı asker mârifetiyle abluka altına alınmış ve tahassün eden efrâdın endaht eyledikleri mermilerden ahâli ve askerden on kadar maktûlün beş on kadar da mecrûh olup ahâlice heyecân vâki olmuş ise de tedbirât-ı lâzımeye müsâraat olunarak ahâli dağıttırılmış olduğu ve neticenin başkaca bildirileceği mâruzdur. Ferman https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-010

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kuk Regular Army Battalion (Kerkük Nizâmiye Ester Süvârlarından), who escorted and ensured the security of Sheikh Said’s retinue coming from Sulaymaniyah. Despite being on a mission (berây-ı memûriyet) in the downtown of Mosul, the soldier was heavily intoxicated and was involved in a disgraceful crime under the influence of alcohol (sekr-i hâl). This incident sparked a series of outrage in the town which will breed unpredictable consequences and shift all urban dynamics. Although the cavalryman harassed the woman was apprehended by the downtown patrol squad to be taken to the Police Station (Karakolhâne), almost 50 of his friends who gathered around, fired upon the squad. Zeki additionally emphasized that the issue gained vital importance since the ignorant public which was exposed to manipulation was also involved into this incident (ahâli de câhilâne vukuata iştirâk eylediğinden). Zeki detailed that the cavalries had frightened and retreated from the angry crowd, had taken cover in their stables but had kept firing around. Even the Provincial Commander had visited the crime scene and given necessary advice to the perpetrators, but he had failed to impress them. Afterwards, the stable was surrounded by dispatched soldiers, but ten army soldiers and civilians were killed and five to ten were wounded by the bullets fired by the sheltered cavalries during the engagement. Zeki’s final statement from the scene shown that although the agitation of the crowd continued, necessary precautions were taken, and people were gradually dispersed. However, that was a hush before the storm and things were going to get much more complicated than this. In the same day Zeki sent another telegram reporting that the mule cavalries sheltered in their stables were removed from there at 5 o’clock in the night and sent back to their barracks under custody.¹⁶² The angry Vâli Zeki” The Arabic word of ‘Muhadder’ (‫ )ﻣﺨﺪﺭ‬has a dual meaning as ‘covered-veiled’ and ‘honorable Muslim woman’ http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=Muhadder&t=@ Access Date: 01.11. 2020  BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/54, 23 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 05 January 1909 Since the hours in the telegrams were given according to the ‘Alla Turca’ (Ezani or Gurubi) timekeeping system, they do not comply with today’s time standards. According to this system, which was used in the Ottoman Empire until 1912, a day consists of two periods called ruz (day) and şeb (night), both of which are divided into 12 units. The clocks are manually set to show 12:00 every single day at sunset (gurub), and according to this scheme, high noon is always 6 o’clock and sunset is always 12 o’clock. In a day based on a 24-hour cycle, the daytime hours were counted from sunrise to sunset and night hours from sunset to sunrise. As the length of these periods change throughout the year, the system is also categorized as seasonal or temporal. For a comprehensive research on the culture and perception of time in the late Ottoman Empire and the contradiction between the Alla Turca and Alla Franga timekeeping systems, please see: Avner Wishnitzer, Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015)p.xi, 14, 32, 92

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crowd was pacified, and the exact number of casualties was going to be reported after the final information obtained next day. Next day, the first instructions given by the Ministry of Interior to the Mosul Governor were the effective enforcement of the law (muâmele-i müessire-i kanuniye) on the soldiers who perpetrated the incident and the restoration of a prompt order.¹⁶³ Kurdish soldiers and civilians who dared to violate public order and commit murder were ordered to be severely punished. Ministry was also urging that the foreign consulates and institutions (konsoloshânelerle müessesât-ı ecnebiye) in the city were supposed to be protected with maximum care in case of possible assaults.¹⁶⁴ In addition, it was particularly requested that the Central Prison (Habshâne) be guarded with a sufficient military force since the angry crowd would attempt to evacuate the detainees and prisoners according to the intelligence received (ahâli tarafından mahbûsînin tahliyeleri). The number of available military force in Mosul was also questioned at the end of the message.

 BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 3, 24 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 06 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Îfâ-yı cinâyete mütecâsir olan efrâd-ı askeriyye haklarında muâmele-i müessire-i kanuniyenin îfâsına ve zât-ı vâlâlarıyla bil-ittihâd iâde-i sükûna müsâraat ve itinâ edilmesinin Musul Kumandanlığına hemen tebliği Harbiye Nezâretine yazılmıştır. Kürd askerden ve Kürd efrâd-ı ahâliden âsâyişi ihlâle ve îfâ-yı cinâyete mütecâsir olanların şedid te’dibleriyle beraber konsoloshânelerle müessesât-ı ecnebiyenin muhâfazasına ve ahâli tarafından mahbûsînin tahliyeleri gibi teşebbüsâtta bulunduğu yolda işârâta […] olmakla Habshânenin de kuvve-i kâfiyeyle taht-ı muhâfazaya alınmasına himmet buyurulması ve Musul’da bulunan kuvve-i askeriyyenin mikdârının bildirilmesi mütemennâdır. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/ Lef 4, 24 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 06 January 1909 “Sadâret -i Uzmâya / Harbiye Nezâreti-i Celilesine Kerkük’ten Musul’a giden elli nefer ester süvâr piyâde askerinin Musul’da îfâğına mütecâsir oldukları tecâvüzât-ı cinâyetkârâneye dâir Musul Vilâyetinden altı telgrafın sûreti leffen takdim kılınmış ve mahallî Fransa Konsolosundan Fransız Sefâretine vürûd eden telgrafta maktûllerin adedi yirmiye karib olduğu ve Habshânedeki mahbûsîn ve mevkufîn tahliyesi için ahâli tarafından Habshâneye de taarruz edilmek üzere bulunulduğu iş’âr edilmekle mahbûsînin ve ale-l husûs konsoloshânelerle müessesât-ı ecnebiyenin muhâfazasına […] pek ziyâde itinâ olunması vilâyete ve efrâd-ı askeriyye haklarında muâmele-i müessire-i kanuniyenin îfâsı için Musul Kumandanlığına ve Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine tebliğ kılındığı arz olunur. Ol babda. -Harbiye Nezâretine tebliğ olunsun- Vâli Paşa Hazretleriyle bil-ittihâd iâde-i sükûna ve âfiyete ve işbu cinâyete mütecâsir olan efrâd-ı askeriyye haklarındaki muâmele-i müessire-i kanuniyenin îfâsına itinâ etmek Musul Kumandanlığına emir ve iş’âr buyrulması bâbında Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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On the same day Zeki Pasha reported in a shocking telegram that Sheikh Said’s son was also among those who violated the women the day before.¹⁶⁵ The house they resided was sieged by thousands of armed people at 6 o’clock today and Said with one or two of his sons were killed. In order to quell the excessive public rage which got out of control, Zeki urgently requested one cavalry regiment (süvâri alayı), three regular army battalions (nizâmiye taburu) made up 500 soldiers each and a regular army field cannon (nizâmiye sahrâ topu) from the nearest location of the 4th Army. Meanwhile, the governorate was instructed to maintain security through the available military force of the province until the requested force deployed.¹⁶⁶ Besides, the governor was also reminded to take necessary measures since the killing of Sheikh Said with his sons would have a serious impact on Kurdish community and could trigger them to make further troubles. According to Zeki’s following message the next day, the available force was not sufficient and competent to neutralize the individuals who violated the order and were involved in the murders.¹⁶⁷ In the center of Mosul, there was a regular

 BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 5, 24 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 06 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Gelen Şifre – Fevkalâde Müstâceldir Dünkü telgrafnâmeye zeyldir. Maktûl ve mecrûhların adedi henüz tâyin etmedi. Kadınlara tecâvüz edenler miyanında Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Said’in mahdûmu da bulunduğundan ikamet ettikleri hâne bugün saat altıda müsellâh binlerce ahâli tarafından abluka edilerek kendisiyle mahdûmlarından bir ikisi […] katl edilmiştir. Buradaki asker yerli ahâliden bulundukları cihetle vücûdlarından asla istifâde edilemedi. Ahâlinin derece-i nihâyeye gelmiş olan heyecânının teskini için süvâri alayı ile beş yüz mevcûdlu üç tabur nizâmiye askeri ile bir nizâmiye sahrâ topunun Dördüncü Ordunun en yakın noktasından alâ-cenâhil-isticâl yetiştirilmesi fevkalâde bir ehemmiyetle müsted’â ve müsterhamdır. Ferman Vâli Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT.2700/79/Lef 6 – 8, 24 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 06 January 1909 “Sadâret -i Uzmâya İşar olunduğu gibi askerin vürûduna kadar kuvve-i mevcûde-i mahalliye ile muhâfaza-i inzibâta ve Şeyh Said ile mahdûmlarının katli Kürdler üzerinde bir teessür hâsıl etmesi melhûz olduğundan bu cihetin dahi nazar-ı dikkate alınarak… Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi” “Musul Vilâyetine Şeyh Said ile mahdûmlarının katllerine Kürdlerin pek ziyâde müteessir olmaları ve bundan dolayı tecâvüze kıyâm etmeleri muhtemel olduğundan… Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/67, 25 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 07 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine / Gayet Müstâceldir Îfâ-yı cinâyete mütecâsir olan efrâdın kışlabend edildiği arz olunmuş idi. Âsâyişi ihlâl ve ihdas-ı cinâyete mütecâsir olan ahâlinin te’dibleri için elde kuvvet yoktur. Burada dört yüz elli mevcûdlu bir tabur-u nizâmiye ile iki yüz mevcûdlu bir süvâri kuvveti var ise de nizâmiye taburunda

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army battalion of 450 and a cavalry force of 200. The problem, however, is that some of the soldiers were those with a shortened military service for a payment (bedel-i nakdi), many were reservists (efrâd-ı redif bakayası) , and especially all were natives (bâ-husûs cümlesi yerli). For this reason, armed conflicts continued until the evening, as their existence was unhelpful and, on the contrary, their disobedience was seen. In two days, four Kurdish soldiers of the mule cavalry were killed and seven were injured. On the Barzanjiyya side, 14 people were killed and 11 injured except Sheikh Said and his son Ahmed. However, the total casualties of the gendarmerie soldiers and civilian population were not yet known. Said’s brother Maarouf, Said’s two sons and a few of his servants were rescued with minor injuries and were guarded in the military barracks.¹⁶⁸ Sheikh’s other son was hosted in another house with Sheikh Salih and Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Ahmed during the raid.¹⁶⁹ Zeki reported that these three escaped during the in-

bulunan efrâdın bazıları bedel-i nakdi îtâ eden takımdan ve bir çokları da efrâd-ı redif bakayasından bulunduklarından ve bâ-husûs cümlesi yerli olduklarından mevcûdlarından istifâde olunamadığı ve bilakis itâatsizlikleri görüldüğü cihetle dün akşama kadar ateş devâm eylemiş ve iki gün zarfında ester süvârdan dört maktûl ve yedi mecrûh ve Şeyh Said ile bir mahdûmu ve itbâ’ından on dört kişi katl ve on biri mecrûh olduğu gibi jandarma askeri ve ahâliden ne kadar maktûl ve mecrûh bulunduğu henüz tâyin etmemiş ve ateş içerisinde Şeyh Said’in birâderi Nakib Şeyh Mârûf ile iki oğlu ve birkaç da hizmetkârı hafifçe cerihadâr oldukları hâlde kurtarılarak kışlada muhâfaza altına alınmış ve diğer bir hânede bulunan Şeyhin mahdûmu, Şeyh Sâlih ile Baba Resûl Seyyid Ahmed firâr eylemiştir. Son bir tedbir olmak üzere Ferik Paşa ile bil-müzâkere buranın faal Meşâyihinden Rıdvânizâde Hacı Abdullah Efendi celb olunarak o vâsıta ile ahâlinin ateşi kestirilip mehmâ-emken dağıtılabilmiş iseler de esnâ-yı şûrişde Ümerâ-yı Askeriyye ve Memûrîn-i Mülkiyeden bazılarının hânelerine de tecâvüz olunarak yağma edilmiş olduğundan bütün ahâli ve memûrîn büyük bir havf ve telâş içinde ve hükûmet de elde kuvvet olmadığından mahsûr ve me’yûs bir hâlde bulunduğu cihetle Kerkük ve Süleymaniye Zâbitânıyla Memûrîn ve Ahâli hânelerinden dışarı çıkamadıkları gibi evleri derûnunda da bir havf ve haşyet içinde bulunduklarından bi-z-zarure Kerkük Fırkasından imdâd taleb edilmiş ve binâenaleyh Şeyh Said ve mahdûmunun katlinden dolayı Kürdlerin muhâcemeleri vârid-i hatır olduğundan o gibi ahvâle meydan verilmemesi içinse Kerkük Kumandanlığına tebligat îfâ olunmuştu. Bir mikdâr ester süvâr ile süvâri mevcûdunun yarın yola çıkarılacağı cevâben bildirilmiş ise de ve (tedâbir-i ihtiyâtiyyeye tevessül olunacağı) bildirilmiş ise de bu […] temin-i emn ve âsâyiş kabil olamayacağından Dördüncü Ordudan hareket ettirilecek kuvvet ve topların gece gündüz demeyerek hareket ettirilmesi esbâbının istikmâli ehemmiyetle müsterhamdır. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki “  (!) We know from further correspondence that one of his sons, Sheikh Ahmed Barzanji, was killed.  (!) According to some sources (such as Gulami Hodja) cited by Refik Hilmi, it is thought that Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji was also a guest at Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa’s house during the raid. The person Zeki reports to have fled with Sheikh Salih and Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Ahmed must be Sheikh Mahmud, who survived the incident.

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cident. As a last measure, Zeki had met with Commander Ferik Zühdü Pasha and engaged Ridwanizadeh Haji Abdullah Effendi (Rıdvânizâde Hacı Abdullah Efendi), one of the active Sheikhs of Mosul, to give advice to the people and to disperse them as much as possible. During the chaos, the homes of high-ranking military officers and civil servants were looted, all military officers, civil servants and the public experienced great panic and everyone was locked in their homes in fear of death. Although the Kirkuk Division was asked for reinforcement, the Division Command was specifically warned about the possibility of an imminent counterattack by the Kurds after the assassination of Sheikh Said (Kürdlerin muhâcemeleri vârid-i hatır olduğundan). The Kirkuk Command had announced that it would set off some of the cavalry units tomorrow, but Zeki found this insufficient and specifically demanded that the dispatch of the heavily armed units expected from the 4th Army be accelerated. Zeki’s next message stated that things had settled down a bit and that the people were returning to their daily lives gradually.¹⁷⁰ However, the agitation was temporarily and partially quelled by the advisory committee which gave advice (nasâyih), rather than the operational support of the native Mosuli soldiers. According to Zeki, Mosulis who dared to do such a thing were completely spoiled after this incident, since they were not disciplined and penalized at all. Zeki emphasized that the confidential investigation had already begun but the full establishment of public security was dependent on the timely arrival of the expected force and sentencing death penalty (i’dâm ile mücâzât) for those who initiated the incident. Zeki, who made the necessary notifications to the military and civil officials in order to prevent the incident from spreading to other parts of the province, persistently reminded the expected support from the 4th Army.

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/89/Lef 2, 25 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 07 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Gelen Şifre. Bugün bir vukuat zuhûr etmemiştir. Ahâli işleriyle meşgul olmuşlardır. Askeri yerli olan Musul kuvvetinin muâvenetiyle değil belki edilen nasâyih ile teskin-i heyecâna şimdilik muvaffakiyet olunabilmiştir. Fakat âsâyiş tamâmıyla temin edilmiştir denilemez. Birkaç kere bu gibi ahvâle mütecâsir olan Musullular bir terbiyye görmediklerinden bu vukuatla büsbütün şımarmıştır. Şimdiki hâlde tahkikat-ı hafiye olunmaktadır. İnzibâtın tamâmıyla takriri iş’âr buyurulan kuvvet-i askeriyyenin vakt-i zamânıyla yetişmesine mütevakkıf ve vukuata ön ayak olanların i’dâm ile mücâzât edilmeleri de lâzımdır. Merkezdeki vukuatın vilâyetin mahal-i sâiresine men-i sirâyeti için tedâbir-i lâzımeye tevessül olunması hakkında askeri ve mülki memûrlarına tebligat îfâ kılınmıştır. Dördüncü Ordudan kuvvet-i mâruzanın bilâ-tehir yetiştirilmesi husûsunu tekrâr eylerim. Vâli Zeki”

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Governor Zeki’s Premature Resignation and the Assignment of the ‘Joint Task Force’ (Kuvve-i Mürettebe) Unfortunately, chaos escalated really quick and collective violence ran rampant. Zeki Pasha was under so much pressure that he submitted his resignation on the very same day that he was instructed to maintain security and to take necessary measures.¹⁷¹ He justified his decision by declaring that it had become impossible to perform his duty in the face of such public agitation and proposed Commander Zühdü Pasha to take over his office as the Acting Governor. While Zeki expected his premature resignation to be accepted by the Ministry of Interior, Minister of War Ali Rızâ Pasha ordered to organize a ‘Joint Task Force’ (Müretteb Kuvvet) under the command of a capable person (muktedir bir zâtın taht-ı kumandasında) for suppressing the turmoil.¹⁷² Both the Ottoman official correspondence and the French Consulate intelligence based on reliable sources indicated that there were almost 50 casualties and the angry crowd was expected to assault the Central Prison of Mosul. Prevention of further crimes that could be committed after the illegal evacuation of the prison and protection of foreign institutions against

 BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/58, 24 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 06 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Ahâlinin galeyânına karşı bendeniz için îfâ-i vazife gayr-i mümkün olduğundan bir Vâli tâyin edilinceye değin vekâleten Kumandan Zühdü Paşaya tevdiiyle çâkerlerinin afvı ilca-yı maslahat üzerine arz ve istirhâm olunur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki. “  BOA, DH.MKT. 2701/24/Lef 1, 25 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 07 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine / Devletlü Efendim Hazretleri, Kerkük’ten Musul’a giden ester süvâr piyâde efrâdının îfâğına mütecâsir oldukları tecâvüz-i cinâyetkâri üzerinde tahaddüs eden fâciaya dâir vilâyetten gelen telgrafnâmenin […] ve Fransız Konsolosunun iş’ârına nazaran elli maktûlün ve mecrûhun olduğu ve ahâlinin Habshâneye de taarruz etmek üzere bulundukları anlaşılması üzerine vukuatın önü alınması ve müessesât-ı ecnebiyenin taarruzdan vikayesine pek ziyâde itinâ olunması husûsu […] vilâyete yazıldığından işler Vâli Paşa ile bil-ittihâd idâmen sükûna akdem edilmesi ve mütecâsirlerin derdestiyle muâmele-i müessire-i kanuniyeye dûçâr edilmeleri esbâbının istikmâli husûsunun mahallî kumandanlığa yazılması izbâr kılınmasıyla vukuatın tevsiğ eylemeden evvel bastırılmasındaki vücub ve ehemmiyet âzâde-i beyân olunduğunun emirden muktedir bir zâtın taht-ı kumandasında olarak Diyarbekir’den âcilen iki tabur ve Viranşehir’den süvâri alayının üç bölüğüyle en yakın bir mahalden bir cebel bataryasının Musul’a yetiştirilmesi ve Diyarbekir’e de Harput’tan bir taburun gönderilmesi bâ-telgrafnâme Dördüncü Ordu Müşiriyeti Vekâletine yazılmış olmakla bu babda iktizâ-yı hâllin îfâsı ve beyhûde tâzîrâta meydan verilmemek üzere kısmen müretteb masâriften her masrafa tercihan sür’at-i mensûbesi için memûriyet-i mülkiyeye tebligat-ı müessire icrâ buyrulması ve neticesinin inbâsı bâbında emr ü ferman hazret-i menlehül emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali”

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possible attacks in the city were particularly prioritized by the Ottoman Government. Therefore, provincial army command was particularly instructed to work in full coordination with the governor for an operation that required greater coordination such as restoring order, neutralizing perpetrators, and enforcing the law. Meanwhile, 4th Army Deputy Command (Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyun Müşiriyeti Vekâleti) which was responsible for forming the Kuvve-i Mürettebe, was ordered to immediately deploy two battalions from Diyarbekir (Diyâr-ı Bekr), three companies of the Cavalry Regiment in Viranşehir and a mountain artillery battery from the nearest location to Mosul. Zeki’s untimely resignation reason was neither considered reasonable nor welcomed by the Ministry of Interior. According to the statement made by the Ministry, it was not an understandable necessity to hand over his office to the provincial commander in such a vulnerable time when pacification measures should be taken against the agitation and public order should be restored.¹⁷³ As the governor of Mosul, he had to keep fulfilling his duty and had to ensure the public security, as the cause of this civil turmoil was obviously not himself. Next day Ministry instructed Zeki Pasha to quell the public agitation and prevent the recurrence of incidents by operating the available forces at hand.¹⁷⁴ He should have taken all possible measures until the expected force was deployed. He was also expected to apprehend the ringleaders and perpetrators of the incident at the arrival of military force. Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice was expected to be particularly notified as these detainees had to be judged as soon as possible. For the swift trials of the detainees by the provincial judicial authorities, he was also instructed to report the precise number and names of the de BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 3, 25 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 07 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Heyecâna karşı tedâbir-i teskiniyenin ittihâzıyla âsâyişin takririne himmet buyurulması lâzım gelir iken vazife-yi vilâyetin Kumandan Paşaya tevdiine lüzûm gösterilmesi sebebi anlaşılamamış ve ahâlinin galeyânı şahs-ı âlilerine âid olamayacağı derkâr bulunmuş olduğundan îfâ-yı vazifeye ve teyid-i inzibâta akdem buyurulması îcâb eder. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 6, 26 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 08 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Askerin vürûduna kadar kuvve-i mevcûde ve tedâbir-i mümkine-i hüsniyle teskin-i heyecâna ve hâdisâtın adem-i tekrârına ve askerin vusûlüne bad-i şer ve vak’ada zi-medhal olanların derdestlerine ve mahkemelerinin sür’at-i kâmile ile icrâsı Adliye Nezâretine, Memûrîn-i Adliyeye tebliğ ettirilmek üzere derdest olunanların adediyle isimlerinin iş’ârına itinâ ve ihtimâm olunması mütemennâdır. Kürd ahâliden ve Kürd askerden ihlâl-i âsâyişe ve katl-i nüfûsa mütecâsir olanlar aleyhlerine sudûr edecek ahkâm-ı şedidenin bilâ-tehir icrâsı esbâbı da istikmâl olunacaktır efendim. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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tainees. Perpetrators within the Kurdish soldiers and community, who violated public order (ihlâl-i âsâyiş) and committed murders (katl-i nüfûs) were particularly mentioned and their severe punishment was expected without any delay. Zeki crucially admitted that no attempt was made to apprehend any individual as a perpetrator or instigator (mütecâsir ve müşevvik) of the murder case since such an attempt would trigger further incidents that hard to recover from.¹⁷⁵ Even if there were some attempts already made, they would have been remained inconclusive according to him. For this reason, the governor requested that a Public Prosecutor and his Assistant (Müdde-i Umûmi ile Muâvenetinin) be sent immediately so that judicial proceedings (tâkibât-ı kanuniye) could be conducted against the suspects and their trials could be heard. It is understood that Zeki was hesitant to initiate the arrests, prosecutions and trials without strengthening the military and judicial infrastructure. The central authorities, who was well aware of Zeki’s anxiety and panic during the events, his inability to act according to his position and situation, and his inability to remain calm, was considering all the options, although they did not accept his resignation.¹⁷⁶ However, even if Zeki’s replacement seemed appropri-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 5, 27 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 09 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Gelen Şifre. Kuvve-i mezkûre gelmedikçe bâdi-i şer ve vak’ada zi-medhal olanların derdestine tevessül telâfisi müşkil hâdisâtın tekrârına sebeb olacağı derkâr bulunduğundan şimdiye kadar vak’a-i cinaiyyenin mütecâsir ve müşevviklerinden hiçbir ferdin derdestine teşebbüs olunmamış ve teşebbüs edilse de fâide-i husûlü gayri me’mûldür. Bi-mennihi teâlâ kuvve-i askeriyyenin vürûduna iktizâ edilerek tâkib ve derdestlerine tereddüd olunamayacağından cihet-i adliyece muhâkemelerinin icrâ ve tâkibât-ı kanuniyesinin îfâsı için diğer telgrafla arz olunduğu üzere Müdde-i Umûmi ile Muâvenetinin yetiştirilmeleri lüzûmu tekrâr müsterhamdır. Ferman. Vâli Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2708/91/Lef 5 – 2, 3 Kânûnusâni 1324– 16 January 1909 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki Paşa hazretleri esnâ-yı hâdisede endişe ve telâşa dûçâr olarak ehemmiyet-i mevkiye ve maslahatla mütenâsib sûrette ibrâz-ı metânet edemediği istîfâ etmesinden dahi istidlâl olunabiliyorsa da şu sırada tebdili muvâfık-ı maslahat olsa bile halefinin vusûlü laakall bir aya tevakkuf olacağından vazife-i vilâyet […] devâm ve muhâfaza-i inzibâta ikdâm etmesi müşârünileyhe tavsiye edilmiş idi. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının azli ve yerine diğerinin tâyini hâdiseden evvel takarrür ettiği gibi Kerkük Mutasarrıfı da diğer mahale nakli mukarrerdir.” “Ferik Muhlis Paşa hazretlerinin hâl ve kifâyeti Musul Vilâyetinin umûr-u mülkiye ve askeriyyesini deruhte etmeye kâfi olamayacağı hakkındaki zann-ı âcizenin nezd-i Âli-i Dâverilerinde dahi karin-i tasdik olması mümkündür. Dördüncü Ordu-yu Osmâni Müşiri Devletlü Abdullah Paşa hazretlerinin şu aralık Musul’a azimet ve vazife-i vilâyeti dahi […] deruhte ederek âsâyişi takrir etmesi mûcib ve muvâfık-ı maslahat ise de müşârünileyh hazretlerinin muvafakatleri himmet-i celile-i Nezâretpenâhilerine müsted’âdır. Bu sûret mümkün olmadığı takdirde Musul Vâliliğine cihet-i mülkiyeden münâsib bir zâtın tâyinine ve oraya vusûlüne kadar hem vazife-i vilâyeti

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ate at the moment, it was crucial for him to remain in his post for now, and to work for ensuring safety and order, as his successor’s arrival at the place of duty would take at least one month. From this correspondence between the Ministries of Interior and War, we notice that the names of Major General (Ferik) Muhlis Pasha and the 4th Army Commander, Marshall (Müşir) Abdullah Pasha were proposed for the administration of Mosul Vilayet. However, Muhlis Pasha’s condition and competence were thought to be insufficient to undertake the civil and military affairs (umûr-u mülkiye ve askeriyye) of a critical province such as Mosul. Since it was more convenient and possible for a strong figure like Abdullah Pasha to come to Mosul, seize the situation and restore order, his appointment was especially requested by the Ministry of Interior. However, at this point, the Ministry of Interior offered a third option and, if a military administrator could not be appointed to the Governorship of Mosul, it suggested that a suitable person be appointed from the civilian staff. Until this civilian administrator was appointed and reached there, Lieutenant General (Birinci Ferik) Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha from Baghdad would temporarily take over the provincial affairs and would carry out the necessary investigation in the accompaniment of some judicial and administrative officers.¹⁷⁷ Again, in the same correspondence, we read that the dismissal of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor and the appointment of a new one instead was already decided before the Mosul Incident. Besides, the transfer of the Kirkuk Sub-Governor to another district was also decided. Apparently, the crisis in Mosul alarmed the Central Authority and all possibilities were discussed for the new roadmap of the provincial administration. While the vulnerability grew throughout the province, it was not possible to raise troops everywhere due to the prosecution process and excessive sensitivity in the center of Mosul. A telegram reached the parliament by Fuad and his comrades, it was expressed that the fugitive convicts and bandits violated the public

îfâ ve hem de cihet-i adliyeden ve mülkiyeden terfik olacak zevât ile birlikte tahkikat-ı mukteziyeyi icrâ etmek üzere Bağdad’dan Birinci Ferik Fâzıl Paşa hazretlerinin Musul’a i’zâmı muktezâsı muvâfık görülüyor ve tensib buyuruluyorsa Nezâreti-i âcizeme de iktizâsı îfâ edilmek üzere keyfiyetin iş’ârına ve Dördüncü Ordudan müretteb kuvvetin tesri-i hareketine müsâade-i aliyye-i dâverilerine […] buyurulmak bâbında. Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Mektûbi Kalemi “  Gokhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, p. 22, 77, 89, 90, 95, 96, 97 Muhammed Fazıl Pasha Dagestani was of Circassian origin and was also a relative of the legendary Sheikh Şamil. He was exiled to Baghdad in 1880 and since that year he has taken many positions in the 6th Army, commanded many operations against the tribes in different territories and became one of the prominent Notables of Baghdad.

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order throughout the Mosul Province as they had not yet been neutralized.¹⁷⁸ On the other, in the response from the governor’s office, it was stated that it would be possible to deal with the issues concerning the whole of the province only after the public order of the provincial center was stabilized. In addition, in the following message that reached the parliament from the Interior, it was stated that the gendarmerie force of the province was unavailable and insufficient for the pursuit and suppression (tâkib ve tenkîl) of the fugitives. Ultimately, ensuring the order and security in the center of Mosul, bringing the involved parties to justice and capturing the fugitives across the province all depended on the Joint Task Force (Kuvve-i Mürettebe) expected from the 4th Army. In a few days, the expected news came from the Ministry of War. To form the JTF in Mosul, a mountain artillery battery (cebel bataryası), two regular army battalions (nizâmiye taburu) and three cavalry companies (süvâri bölüğü) were dispatched from Van, Bitlis, Midyat and Mardin between January 22 and 25.¹⁷⁹ However, the financing, supply and maintenance of the soldiers were also a big problem at such a critical period. Although Zeki had to ensure the subsistence of soldiers before the expected force arrived, the 3.000 liras allocated by the Ministry for necessary expenses and unavoidable costs (masârif-i zarûrîye

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2721/62, Lef 2, 15 Kânûnusâni 1324– 28 January 1909 “Meclis-i Mebûsân Riyâsetine Musul Vilâyetinde hâl-i firârda olup âsâyiş-i memleketi ihlâle tasaddi etmekte bulunan mahkûmin ile eşkıyânın tenkîlleri cihetine gidilmediği hakkında Fuad ve refikası imzâlarıyla çekilip sûreti irsâl bulunan telgrafnâme üzerine sebk eden tebliğe Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhten gelen cevâbda Merkez-i Vilâyetin âsâyişi istikrâr olunduktan sonra bu gibi işlere bakılması mukarrer bulunduğu bildirilmiştir. Filhakika firâr eden mahkûmin ile eşkıyânın tâkib ve tenkîline hâlen imkân yoktur. Çünkü vilâyetin Jandarma kuvveti bu gibi tâkibâtı icrâya müsâid derecede olmadığı Musul Vak’asından dolayı muhâfaza-i âsâyiş ve inzibât için Dördüncü Ordu-yu Osmâniye’den kuvve-i kâfiye sevki ihtiyaç görülmesiyle de Kuvve-i Mürettebe’nin Musul’a vusûlünde vak’a-i mezkûrede zi-medhal eşhâsın ahz-u girift edilerek cihet-i adliyeye teslimleri mukarrer ve bunda bu kuvvetin mevzû bahis olan mahkûmin ve eşkıyânın tâkibât ve tenkîlâtında istihdâmları mutasavver bulunmakla ol babda. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2729/42/Lef 1, 18 Kânûnusâni 1324– 31 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine / Mâruz-u Çâkeri Kemineleridir ki Dördüncü Ordudan Musul’a sevki kararlaştırılmış olan kıtaat-ı askeriyyeyi teşkil etmek üzere Van’dan bir cebel bataryasının 9 Kânûnusâni 1324 ve Bitlis’ten bir nizâmiye taburunun 10 Kânûnusâni 1324 ve Midyat’tan diğer bir nizâmiye taburuyla Mardin’den üç süvâri bölüğünün 12 Kânûnusâni 1324 târihlerinde hareket eyledikleri Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyun Müşiriyeti Vekâletinin iki kıta telgrafnâmesi […] anlaşılmış olmakla. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ”

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ve mübreme) had not yet reached Mosul.¹⁸⁰ In addition, Zeki reported that the monthly cost of the present military force in Kirkuk reached 1.500 lira, that their supplies were exhausted, that their animals had no food left, and even the shoemakers stopped delivering boots to the soldiers because they were not paid. Since it was the end of the year, no financial resources could be allocated from elsewhere and under these conditions neither the settled army nor the expected extra force could be subsidized. The Ministry of Interior requested the Ministry of Finance to immediately send the aforementioned 3.000 lira of allowance so that the JTF from the 4th Army would not be in a difficult situation when they reached Mosul. However, the eventual response from the Ministry of Interior to Mosul was that there was no need for such a fuss before the force arrived there.¹⁸¹ Besides, the Ministry advised the governorate not to wait for the entire required amount to be sent from İstanbul. Instead, the governorate was asked to pay more attention to the collection of its receivables and to obtain this required amount gradually from local sources (vilâyetçe tahsîlâta bil-itinâ). It was interesting that the central authority provided the necessary military support in the face of such a crisis but imputed its financial infrastructure to the provincial budget. At this point, some law enforcement officers have also had their shares from the paradigm shift after the Mosul Incident. Replacing Edhem Bey, Gendarmerie Regiment Commander of Mosul, was one of the most strategic moves made by Zeki, who did not trust the local army elements and entrusted the security of Mosul to the 4th Army. Zeki particularly requested the replacement of Edhem, whom he had not seen eligible and capable enough to ensure the order and se BOA, DH.MKT. 2720/98/Lef 1, 10 Kânûnusâni 1324– 23 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Masârif-i zarûrîye ve mübreme için şehrî poliçe-i telgrafiye ile yetiştirilmesi istirhâm olunan Üç Bin lira hakkında henüz bir emr-i şerif telâkki olunamadı. Yolda bulunduğu haber alınan taburların vürûdundan evvel idârelerinin temini zarûrî olmakla beraber Kerkük’te mevcûd olup idâre-i şehriyeleri Bin Beş Yüz liraya mütevakkıf bulunan askerin erzâkı ve hayvanlarının yem ve yiyeceği kalmamak ve sene nihâyeti olmak îtibâriyle mümkün-et tahsil emvâl bulunmadığı ve kunduratçılar da para alamadıklarından erzâkı kestiği cihetle mugayir-i marzi bir hâl vukuuna mahal kalmamak üzere para yetiştirilmesi şimdi makine başına gelmiş olan Kerkük Mutasarrıf ve Kumandanlığından kemâl-i ehemmiyetle iş’âr olunmasına… Vâli Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2720/98/Lef 2, 14 Kânûnusâni 1324– 27 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine telgrafnâme. Masârif-i askeriyye için istenilen para hakkında Mâliye Nezâret-i Celilesine teyiden tebligat icrâ olunmak için asker henüz vâsıl olmadığı cihetle el yevm bu kadar telâşa mahal olmadığı gibi îcâb eden mebâliğin kâmilen buradan gönderilmesine intizâr olunmayıp vilâyetçe tahsîlâta bil-itinâ mebâliğ-i lâzımenin istîfâ ve istihzârına gayret edilmesi muktezidir. Ol babda. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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curity of a critical location like Mosul.¹⁸² It was immediately reported to the Ministry of War that Edhem Bey had a limited capacity and did not have the qualifications adequate with the importance of locality. In addition, it was requested from the Ministry that Edhem be transferred to a location where is easier to administer (sehl-ül idâre) and that a powerful and active (muktedir ve faal) commander fit for the existing conditions of Mosul, should be appointed instead of him quickly. Edhem was relocated to Diyarbekir Gendarmerie Regiment within a few days and Said Bey, one of the commanders of the İstanbul Gendarmerie Regiment, was appointed in his place.¹⁸³ However, afterwards, Said Bey’s appointment was to be canceled and Sâlih Bey, the Bitlis Gendarmerie Regiment Commander, was to be appointed instead.¹⁸⁴ The new Governor Reşid Pasha had particularly requested the appointment of Commander Sâlih, with whom he served in Bitlis together. Before this reassignment, there were also some allegations that Edhem Bey broke the banners and tambourines of some tariqah dervishes decorated with the verses of the Qur’an (Âyât-ı Kur’âniyye ile müzeyyen alemleriyle defleri şakk) and insulted and arrested them (dervişânın tahkir ve tevkif edildiği).¹⁸⁵ However, the Governorate of Mosul stated that the allegations were baseless and that the complaints were based on personal grudge and hatred against Edhem. İbrâhim Edhem, who served in Van until 1907, achieved great success in suppressing the Armenian Revolts between 1903-1905 and was entitled to the rank of Regimental

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2723/39/Lef 1, 14 Kânûnusâni 1324– 27 January 1909; Lef 2, 17 Kânûnusâni 1324– 30 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Jandarma Alayı Kumandanı Edhem Bey’in evvelce de arz olunduğu veçhile irtikâbı yoksa da mahdûd ve hâiz-i ehemmiyet olan buranın temin-i inzibât ve irâdesiyle gayri münâsib bulunduğundan mûmâileyhin sehl-ül idâre bir mahale nakliyle Vilâyet Jandarma Alayı Kumandanlığına muktedir ve faal bir zâtın tâyin ve i’zâmı delâlet ve müsâade buyurulması müsterhamdır. Ferman. Vâli Zeki “  BOA, DH.MKT. 2734/71/Lef 1, 22 Kânûnusâni 1324– 04 February 1909  BOA, DH.MKT. 1303/30/Lef 1, 05 Mart 1325 – 18 March 1909  BOA, DH.MKT. 2737/65/ Lef 1, 1 Kânûnusâni 1324– 14 January 1909; Lef 2, 31 Kânûnusâni 1324– 13 February 1909; DH.MKT.2844/82, 31 Mayıs 1325-13 June 1909; DH.İD..68/4/Lef 3, 09 Temmuz 1327-22 July 1911 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Aliyyesine Musul Vilâyeti Jandarma Alayı Kumandanı Edhem Bey tarafından ahâlinin Âyât-ı Kur’âniyye ile müzeyyen alemleriyle defleri şakk ve dervişânın tahkir ve tevkif edildiğinin asıl ve esâsı olmadığı ve şikâyât-ı vâkiyenin ağrâz-ı şahsiyeden münbais bulunduğu bil-muhâbere Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhden alınan tahriratta izbâr. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”

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Commander there. Although he did not have any proven misconduct during his command of Mosul, he was promptly sent to Diyarbekir Regiment as a guest and later appointed to the Midyat District Governorate. The timing suggests that he was dismissed due to his imprudence and failure in the Mosul Incident.

Post Incident Influence and Mobility of Kurdish Circles At this point, it would be helpful to look at the post-incident reflexes and approaches of other Kurdish circles throughout the province since the state authority was not coping only with the Barzanjis. Turning the crisis into an opportunity in this process, some kingpins held strategic meetings, some tribes launched attacks and revolts, and some associations tried to gain influence. Because the sphere of influence created by the Mosul Incident on Kurdish circles triggered both the ideology of Kurdism and the provincial Anti-Constitutionalism. Sayyid Taha, the grandson of the deceased Sheikh Obaidullah (Nahri) Effendi and the nephew of Ottoman Senator Sayyid Abdulqadir, was rapidly on the way to becoming a prominent figure in the region.¹⁸⁶ According to the encrypted message from Governor Zeki, Sayyid Taha had invited the influential Scholars, Sheikhs, and Chiefs of Kurdistan to his lodge (tekke) which was his residence, and the intelligence of this invitation reached the authorities with its evidential documents.¹⁸⁷ However, the timing of the invitation was noteworthy and this

 “Taha, who had a serious influence on the tribal elements in the region due to his origins, was going to cause disturbances in the region within a few years, he was to be judged in İstanbul and the dispute between him and his uncle Abdülkadir was going to be the subject of an investigation in İstanbul. As part of a Russian-controlled insurrection plan, Taha was going to be appointed to rule a region from Başkale to Mosul, by the Russian Emperor. Receiving Russian patronage and weapon support, he was going to revolt many Kurdish tribes in Eastern Anatolia against the state and engage the Ottoman authorities until the years of the First World War.” Fatih Ünal, “Rusların Kürt Aşiretlerini Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Kullanma Çabaları”, Türk Yurdu, 7. Devre, Cilt 28 (60), Sayı 254 (615)., Ekim 2008., pp. 31– 41 Taha is named after the famous religious scholar Sayyid Taha, who was the father of his grandfather Obaidullah and descended from Abdulqadir Ghailani. For this reason, Özoğlu names Taha, the grandson of Obaidullah, as Taha II. For the pedigree of the Şemdinan Family, from which Taha is descended, please see: Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, p. 89  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/40, 10 Kânûnusâni 1324– 23 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Şeyh Ubeydullah Efendi merhûmun hafidi Seyyid Taha Efendi Kürdistan Ulemâ ve Meşâyih ve Rüesâsıyla bil-mükâtebe îcâb eden Müteneffizânı ikametgâhı olan tekkesine davet eylemekte olduğu mevsûkan istihbâr kılınmış ve bu ise Şeyh Said Efendi ile daha bir çok bî-günâhilerin Musul’da katl ve cerh olunmasından müstahsil tesirâta karşı bir tedâbir ittihâzı maksadına müb-

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meeting was thought to be about the measures to be taken against the extreme sensitivity emerged and possible reactions expected in the province after the Mosul incident. Apparently, Taha had felt the expected turmoil in the region and tried to take control of the process even before the crisis broke out, using his influence on the Kurdish elements. However, Zeki’s expressions and attitude in the same message were ambivalent. Because although it was not explicitly stated, Taha could use this influence to pacify the Kurds and stand by the state, or, on the contrary, to make the Kurds revolt against the state. For this reason, the state should not let go of its control and, as Zeki warned the necessary authorities; actions and attitudes that would disrupt the public order should not be allowed. Zeki was a cautious and prudent administrator who was aware of the superior influence of some Kurdish actors in the region over ordinary Kurdish people. In this way, he might have felt that Taha’s movements could be directed or restrained through his uncle Sayyid Abdulqadir in İstanbul. As Zeki clearly remarked in his message, it would ultimately be a beneficial and auspicious duty for the state authority if Taha, through the influence of Abdulqadir, notified and advised the influential leaders in the region not to act on their own. Abdulqadir had a voice in both the central government and Kurdish civil society, as he was a member of the Ottoman Senate and the president of KSMAP. However, this policy may have stalled afterwards, because there was not found any other documents in the state archives showing Taha’s influence or involvement in the events after the Mosul incident. But most importantly, the chaos was extremely prone to deepen, and Mosul was not the only location exposed to threats. The French Consulate had been providing crucial intelligence regarding the possible tribal activities conducted in the northern highlands.¹⁸⁸ According to the intelligence, Anti-Constitutionalist

teni olduğu melhûz bulunmuş olduğundan icrâât-ı hükûmete intizârla, muhtell-i emniyet-i ahvâle meydan verilmemesi îcâb edenlere yazılmıştır. Mûmâileyh Seyyid Taha Efendinin Dersaadet’te bulunan amcası Şeyh Abdülkadir Efendi’nin Kürdistan’ca mâlûm olan nüfûzu hasebiyle bir gûnâ harekâtta bulunmaması hakkında îcâb eden müteneffizân ve rüesâya tebliğ ve vesâyâda bulunması fevâid ve muhassenâttan hâli olmayacağından icrâ-yı îcâbı ve gailenin tevsiine mahal kalmamak üzere Musul Vukuatından dolayı îcâb eden te’dibleri zımnında Dördüncü Ordudan sevki kararlaştırılmış olan nizâmiye taburlarının bir an evvel yetiştirilmesi esbâbının istikmâli müsterhamdır. Ferman. Vâli Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 9, 10 Kânûnusâni 1324– 23 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine. Şeyh Said’in katlinden müteheyyic olan ve Meşrûtiyet aleyhinde bulunan Kürd kabilelerinin cibâlde sâkin ahâliyi gayrimüslime aleyhine bir katliam tertib etmekte oldukları mevsûkan haber

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Kurdish tribes agitated after the killing of Sheikh Said were expected to carry out a massacre against the non-Muslim communities settled in the mountains. Landlord (Agha) Soranoğlu had attempted to revolt some natives (yerliler) against the Zakho community (Zaholular) and landlords of İnade and Akre (Akra) made a similar attempt in coordination with some Sheikhs and congregations.¹⁸⁹ According to the French Consulate intelligence, immediate dispatch of troops was vital for protecting the threatened settlements. However, Zeki’s message the next day stated that there was no information or feeling that the Kurds had any Anti-Constitutionalist activity in that area.¹⁹⁰ Of course, this did not mean that no action would be taken. Because it was a possibility confirmed by different sources that some mischief makers could increase agitation throughout Kurdistan and direct their vengeful feelings towards Christians after the Mosul Incident (efkâr-ı intikamcûyâneyi Hristiyanlara da teşmil etmek). Zeki reported that all ‘subdivisional administrators and officials’ (mülhakat memûrları) of the province were instructed and the necessary tribal chiefs were also advised. However, just in case, he had asked the 6th Army to form two mountain artillery units (cebel topu) and an infantry battalion to maintain public order in the towns of Zakho, Duhok, Amadiya and Akre and quickly deploy them to the aforementioned positions.

alındığı ve Ağa Soranoğlu yerlileri Zaholular aleyhine kıyâm ettirmek teşebbüsünde bulunduğu ve İnade ve Akra Ağalarının da […] Şeyhleri ve Satitiyle aynı teşebbüsâtta bulundukları ve taht-ı tehditte bulunan kazâlara âcilen asker sevki muktezâ olduğu Fransız Konsolosluğunun iş’ârına atfen Sefâretten ifâde olunmasına nazaran mâlûmat-ı âlilerinin ve bittahkik istihsâl olunacak mâlûmatın âcilen ve hemen inbâsıyla beraber îcâb iden tedâbirin ittihâzıyla muhtell-i âsâyiş bir hâl ve hareket vukuatına meydan verilmemesi esbâbının istikmâli mütemennâdır. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  This landlord named as Soranoğlu (‫ )ﺻﻮﺭﻙ ﺍﻭﻏﻠﯽ‬could not be verified from a different source. A settlement named İnade (‫ )ﻏﻨﺎﺩﺓ‬could not be spotted in the available sources.  BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/49, 11 Kânûnusâni 1324– 24 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Bu havâlice Kürdlerin Meşrûtiyet aleyhinde bulunduklarına dâir mâlûmat ve hissiyât yoktur. Musul’daki vak’a-i mâlûmeden dolayı bazı müfsidlerin teşvikine kapılmış olarak Kürdistan’ca heyecâna müstelzim ahvâl vücûda getirmeleri melhûz olmasından ve efkâr-ı intikamcûyâneyi Hristiyanlara da teşmil etmek istedikleri buraca istihbâr olunmasından nâşi mülhakat memûrlarının ve îcâb iden rüesâ-yı aşâire vesâyâ-i lâzıme îfâ kılınmış ise de her ihtimâle karşı Zaho, Duhok, İmadiye, Akra kazâlarının hâl-i sükûnda bulundurulması için iki cebel topu ile bir piyâde taburunun tertibiyle îcâb eden mevakiide ikamesi için Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına mürâcaat edildiğinden bütün ve Dördüncü Ordudan Musul’a sevki kararlaştırılmış olan tabur ve bataryaların sür’at-i sevki esbâbının istikmâli müsterhamdır. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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Meanwhile, Zeki reported that the Mosul branch of the İstanbul-based KSMAP could engage in activities that would awaken the ideology of nationalism (kavmiyyet) among the Kurds.¹⁹¹ This was only a risk for the time being, but if it became reality, the already vulnerable region could raise a second disaster. The Society (KSMAP) would be asked to advise and remind the Kurdish community that the aim of the Constitutional Monarchy was not to disrupt the unity and solidarity of the Ottoman people. In the contrary, this regime aimed to support and glorify the harmony of the people through an appropriate language and social intercourse (hüsn-ü lügat ve muâşeret). Zeki wrote that the necessary advice was given to the necessary people in Mosul, but the major notification should have been made to the KSMAP center in İstanbul. Next day, the Ministry of Interior stated that the necessary people affiliated with the KSMAP association in İstanbul were immediately advised.¹⁹² Seemingly the Governor was concerned that the Kurds would take a threatful action with a nationalist and separatist awakening after the Mosul Incident. Towards the end of February, the tribal activity in the province reached a higher level and it was expected that five regular battalions and 600 cavalries from the 6th Army would be deployed to suppress Kurdish tribes such as Hamawand, Talabani and Dawda (Davda – ‫)ﺩﺍﻭﺩە‬.¹⁹³ However, heavily populated Arab

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2718/36/Lef 2, 11 Kânûnusâni 1324– 24 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Dersaadet’teki Kürd Teâvün ve Terakki Cemiyetinin her tarafta olduğu gibi burada dahi bir şûbesi mevcûd olup bunların umûm Kürdlerde kavmiyyet iddiası uyandırmağa […] hidmet etmekte olması melhûz olup bu hâlin devâmı ittibâen bir takım mahâziri müstelzim olacağı derkâr bulunduğundan muvâfık-ı rey-i fahimâneleri olur ise Kanûn-i Esâsi ve Meşrûtiyet-i idâreden mâkud iddia-yı kavmiyyet ile aheng-i ittihâd ve ittifakı ihlâl olmayıp hüsn-ü lügat ve muâşeretin takviyesiyle vatan ve milletin saadet ve selâmetine hidmet olduğunun cemiyet-i mezkûre tarafından tavsiye ve ihtâr ettirilmesi fâideden hâli olmayacağı vârid-i hatr-ı çâkeri olmuş olmakla ferman. Vâli Zeki – Bu dâirede vesâyâ îfâsı buraca lâzım gelenlere tebliğ etmiştir.”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2718/36/Lef 3, 12 Kânûnusâni 1324– 25 January 1909  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/65, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Musul vak’asını […] tecâvüz ittihâz iden ve zâten öteden beri vilâyetin âsâyişini ihlâl etmekte bulunan Hemavend, Talabâni ve Davdalılarla sâire eşkıyâ-yı aşâirin bir hâdise çıkaracakları revân-ı hâlden anlaşıldığına göre göre aşâir-i merkumenin te’dib ve terbiyyeleri lâzım ve lâbüdd olduğundan ve bunların […] te’dib ve tenkîlleri altı tabur Asâkir-i Osmâniyenin vücûduna vâbeste bulunduğundan icrâ-yi îcâbı Altıncı Ordu-yu Osmâni Kumandanlığına yazılmıştı. Cevâbı hâvi alınan telgrafnâme Hemavendliler ile aşâir-i sâirenin te’dibleri için beş nizâmiye taburu ile altı yüz kuvve-i râkibeye lüzûm görülerek keyfiyetin Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine yazıldığı bildirilmesi ve aşâir-i mâruza ile Şemmer ve Es-Sayeh gibi kesir-ül nüfûs ve muhtâc-ı tenkîl olan Aşâir-i Urbânın dahi ihlâl ve terbiyyeleri hakkında 4. ve 5. Ordulardan mikdâr-ı kâfi asâkir-i şâhânenin sevki

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tribes such as Shammar (Şemmer – ‫ )ﺷﻤﺮ‬and As-Sayeh (Es-Sayeh – ‫ )ﺍﻟﺼﯿﺢ‬also had to be suppressed, and therefore additional forces would be sent from the 4th and 5th Armies. Both Kurdish and Arab tribes took the Mosul Incident as an excuse to attack and tried to turn the situation into an advantage. As the deployment was delayed, Zeki had to specifically remind that Hamawand posed the greatest danger and the mounted troops should be dispatched as soon as possible.¹⁹⁴ Naturally, mounted units were essential for the pursuit and suppression of such irregular forces in mountainous areas.

3.2 The Transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk The provincial administration also struggled with taking the Sheikhs from Mosul to a safer location during this period of crisis. This transfer was essential both for the safety of the Sheikhs and for the tranquility of the provincial center. However, the return of the Sheikhs to their hometown Sulaymaniyah or to a nearby location would have had great drawbacks. Because while the Sâdât bloc persistently demanded the return of the Sheikhs to their homeland, the Notables of Sulaymaniyah definitely wanted them to be sent to a distant neighborhood since their return would cause further troubles. In this section, the tensions, concerns, negotiations and the judicial follow-up experienced during the transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk will be examined. Zeki had been questioning what kind of a procedure would be followed regarding the survived brother and son of Sheikh Said.¹⁹⁵ His brother Sheikh Maarouf and his son were both taken under protection after they were rescued from the assault. However, Zeki reminded that their residence in Mosul was now posing a danger. On the other hand, if they were sent back to Sulaymaniyah, they could make a trouble through establishing a Society as they did before. In short, Zeki was undecided on what procedure he should follow regarding emr-i itâsı için Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine tebligat îfâsı ve neticesinin irâdesi müsterhamdır. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2758/28/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909  BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/69, 25 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 07 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Tahlis edilerek muhâfaza altına alındıkları diğer telgrafta arz olunan Şeyh Said’in birâderi Şeyh Mârûf ile mahdûmunun bâdema Musul’da ikametleri mahzûrdan sâlim olamayacağından Kerkük ve Süleymaniye’ye gönderilecek olurlar ise oralarda Cemiyet teşkiliyle bir gaile çıkarmaları da ihtimâlden baid bulunmadığından bunlar hakkında olunacak muâmelenin irâde buyurulması bâbında ferman. Vâli Zeki”

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these Sheikhs, as both their presence and absence posed different threats. Next day Ministry instructed Zeki to keep them in Mosul for another while since their transfer to another place beyond Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah would be perceived as a second banishment and would have a double impact on Kurdish community.¹⁹⁶ Meanwhile, another interesting development took place. Kirkuki Sâdât, Ulemâ, Eşrâf (Notables) and Müfti-i Belde (the Mufti of Town) all visited the Kirkuk Sanjak Administration together, expressed their sorrow over the incident and also thanked the government for ensuring the peace and security.¹⁹⁷ The delegation demanded that the son, brother and other relatives of Said who were still residing in Mosul be allowed to come to Kirkuk. In addition, they all assured the government and vouched for (mütekeffil ve müteahhid) that these Sheikhs would not engage in any undesirable attitude or action (muhâlif-i / mugayir-i marzi bir hâl ve harekât) as long as they stayed in Kirkuk. The Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah also requested that Said’s 10-year-old son, who went to Mosul with his father to enroll in school and stayed in Mosul after the incident, should be allowed to return to Sulaymaniyah in order to relieve his longing (teskin-i iştiyak).¹⁹⁸ We knew that Said had his grown-up sons Mahmud and Ahmed with him during his banishment to Mosul. However, as understood from this telegram, Said had a third son at the age of 10 and he was taken to Mosul by Said’s own choice.

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 4, 26 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 08 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine telgraf. […] ve başka bir mahale izam-ı vâkıâları hâlinde bu muâmelenin bir nevi teb’id sûretinde telâkki edilmesi ve Ekrâdın bundan bir kat daha müteessir olmaları da […] ihtimâlâttan olmakla mûmâileyhin daha bir müddet Musul’da müreffeh ve […] olarak kalmaları esbâbının istikmâliyle iş’ârı mütemennâdır. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/79, 27 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 09 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Şeyh Said Efendi ile mahdûmunun ve adamlarının katlinden dolayı Kerkük’ün Sâdât ve Ulemâ ve Eşrâfı, Müfti-i Belde ile beraber hükûmete gelerek bu hâdiseden dolayı ne kadar müteessir ve mükedder iseler sükûn ve emniyetin iâdesine karşı o mertebe müteşekkir ve mesrûr olduklarını ve merhûmun berhayât olup Musul’da bulunan mahdûm ve birâderleriyle sâir taallukatının Kerkük’e azimetlerine müsâade olunmasına istirhâm ettikleri gibi bunların Kerkük’te bulundukları müddetçe muhâlif-i marzi bir hâl ve harekete bulunmayacaklarına mütekeffil ve müteahhid olduklarını dermeyân ettikleri Mutasarrıflıktan bildirildiğinden bu babda […] olacak mütâlâa-i dâverlerinin emr ve inbâsı müsterhamdır. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/91, 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 10 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Şeyh Said Efendi merhûm Musul’a aldırıldığı sırada on yaşında bulunan bir oğlunu da mektebe vermek üzere beraberce getirmiş idi. Bu çocuğun olsun teskin-i iştiyakları için Süleymaniye’ye iâdesine müsâade-i itâsı Sâdât tarafından istirhâm olunuyor. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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Post-incident messages from the Sâdât front continued to pour down on the authorities. In a telegram from Simele (Simil / Sumail), Sheikh Maarouf complained that they have not received any response to their demands for three months.¹⁹⁹ He asked for permission to receive the bodies of Sâdât members martyred in Mosul (şühedâmız naaşlarının), at least as a souvenir or an heirloom to the Sâdât family and to entire Kurdistan (ailemize, umûm Kürdistan’a bir hediye ve yâdigâr). Apparently, Mosul authorities had not handed over the bodies, considering the excitement and confusion that an eventful funeral ceremony could create. Under such tense circumstances, the funeral of a character like Sheikh Said could be expected to be as eventful as his death. In the same days, the Ministry of Interior was reported that Said’s son and his brothers were still in Mosul and that they were threatened and insulted.²⁰⁰ The Ministry also stated that it would be more appropriate for them to be sent to Kirkuk rather than to be returned to Sulaymaniyah and clearly ordered that they be sent to Kirkuk under certain conditions. Next day Zeki reported that Said’s younger son was transferred from Mosul to Sulaymaniyah, with the consent and approval of the SubGovernorate.²⁰¹ The salary paid to Sheikh Said by the state until that day has also become a policy-making issue among the central authorities after his death. The Grand Vizier was consulted about the allocation of Said’s remaining salary (münhal maaş) to his eldest son, and even before this request was concluded, it left a good impression as a move to sooth the sadness in the Sâdât front.²⁰² According

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2716/48/Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 “Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun Başkitâbet-i Celilesinden Hazret-i Hilâfetpenâhiye Üç aydan beri makamâta mesbûk feryâdımıza hiçbir muâmele-i adâletkâri göremedik. Hiç olmazsa ailemize, umûm Kürdistan’a bir hediye ve yâdigâr olmak için şühedâmız naaşlarının bil-teslim tahlisine müsâadeleri muntazırdır. Musul’ca telgrafnâmelerimizin adem-i kabûlüne mebni Simele makinesinden feryâda mecbûr olduk. Süleymaniye Nakibi Es-Seyyid Mârûf / Seyyidzâde Es-Seyyid Mahmud”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2712/76, 7 Kânûnusâni 1324– 20 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Şeyh Said Efendinin mahdûmu ile birâderlerinin hâlâ orada ve tehdid ve hakaret altında bulundukları ve bunların Süleymaniye’ye iâdelerinden ise Kerkük’e i’zâmları daha münâsib olacağı haber veriliyor. İşar-ı sâbıkın mutazammın olduğu kayd-u şart tahtında olarak bunların Kerkük’e i’zâmları ve tehir-i vak’a esbâbının inbâsı muntazırdır. Ol babda. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/29, 8 Kânûnusâni 1324– 21 January 1909  BOA, DH.MKT. 2714/11/Lef 1, 6 Kânûnusâni 1324– 19 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden gelen şifre. Merhûm Şeyh Said efendiden münhal maaşın büyük mahdûmuna tahsisi husûsunun Sadrâzamdan istîzân buyurulduğu Sâdât’a tebliğ olunmuş idi. Bu hâl teessürlerinin teskinine medâr

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to Zeki, the Barzanjis welcomed this first step with great pleasure and gratitude. In addition, they demanded that the salary of 500 qurush of Said’s son Sheikh Ahmed, who was killed in the incident, be allocated to his son Sheikh Jalal Effendi (Şeyh Celâl Efendi). The positive atmosphere regarding the salary allocation and Zeki’s conviction that the second allocation would be appropriate to the situation were brought to the attention and approval of the Grand Vizier.²⁰³ The central authority aimed to pacify Sâdât by allocating their remaining salaries to their family members, rather than completely abolishing such a practice inherited from the Abdülhamid II era. Naqib Maarouf, who always acted as the spokesman of Sâdât, continued to pressurize the state authorities for their transfer to Kirkuk.²⁰⁴ He stated that they did not feel safe and peaceful even for a single minute of their stay in Mosul for interrogation purposes and he asked to be transferred to Kirkuk under the vital and legal guarantees as soon as possible. According to the ongoing correspondence, Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor’s office had already declared that transferring these Sheikhs back to Kirkuk was not considered risky.²⁰⁵ In line with this, Kir-

olmuş ve hüsn-i tesir hâsıl etmiş olduğundan kemâl-i şükranla beraber esnâ-yı vak’ada maktûl olan Şeyh-i mûmâileyhin mahdûmu Şeyh Ahmed Efendiden münhal kalan beş yüz kuruşun da mahdûmu Şeyh Celâl Efendiye tahsisi istidâ olunduğundan is’af-ı istidâlarıyla tatyib-i hatırına inâyetleri menût-u re’yi Nezâretpenâhileridir. Vâli Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2714/11/Lef 2, 8 Kânûnusâni 1324– 21 January 1909  BOA, DH.MKT. 2722/37/Lef 3, 14 Kânûnusâni 1324– 27 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Musul’ca isticvâbımızdan bir dakika olsun canımızdan emniyetimiz münselibdir. İleride hukukumuzun tâkibi canımızın tahlisi için verilen temînât dâiresinde bir an evvel Kerkük’e i’zâmımıza emr-ü katisinde itâsı ehemmiyetle müsterhamdır. Ferman. Süleymaniye Nakibi Seyyid Mârûf”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kânûnusâni 1324– 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/ Lef 12, 21 Kânûnusâni 1324– 03 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden alınan şifre. Vak’a-i mâlûmede hayâtları muhâfaza olunan Sâdât, Süleymaniye ve yâhûd Kerkük’e i’zâmları istirhâmında bulunmalarına mebni Mutasarrıflıklarıyla bil-muhâbere Kerkük’e i’zâmlarında beis görülmediği Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından ve mûmâileyhin Kerkük’e i’zâmları hâlinde icrâât-ı hükûmete intizâren mugayir-i marzi bir harekette bulunmayacaklarına Kerkük Ulemâ ve Sâdât ve Eşrâfının tekeffül eyledikleri de Kerkük Mutasarrıflığından bildirilmesiyle muhâfaza altında olarak Kerkük’e i’zâmları kararlaştırılmış ise de kable-l isticvâb gönderilmeleri muvâfık olmayacağı Vilâyet İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden ifâde olunmakta ve kendileri de askerin vürûduna değin ifâde veremeyeceklerini ve tahkikata mübâşeret olununcaya kadar burada kalamayacaklarını beyân ve Kerkük’te dahi ifâdelerinin ora muhâkemesinden alınması veya Hükûmet-i Seniyye cidden icrâaata başladığı anda Musul’a avdet edeceklerini dermeyân ettiklerine mebni burada kalmaları mahzûrdan sâlim olamayacağından Kerkük’e gönderilip gönderilmemeleri

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kuk Sub-Governor’s office had already assured that the Kirkuki Ulemâ, Sâdât and Eşrâf vouched for these Sheikhs, that they will not take any action adverse to the governmental practices in case they were sent back to Kirkuk. What was the problem then and why were they still being held in Mosul provincial center? Even if it was decided to transfer these Sheikhs to Kirkuk under the supervision of guards, the Public Prosecution Office of Court of Appeal (Vilâyet İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği) in Mosul had notified that it was not appropriate to send these individuals before they were interrogated (kable-l isticvâb). On the other hand, Sheikhs also declared that they would not testify until the expected force was deployed and that they would not stay in Mosul provincial center until the major investigation begun. Obviously, the Governor’s office which was obviously torn between the Prosecutor’s Office and Sâdât, did not want to take the risk and responsibility of transferring the Sheikhs to Kirkuk before the investigation and trial began. In such a case, Zeki offered an alternative option to the Ministry such as taking the testimonies of the Sheikhs by the Kirkuk courthouse. Of course, the Sheikhs had committed to return to Mosul sooner or later when the government started the procedures of principal investigation, prosecution and judgement. Despite of such drawbacks, Mosul Governorate had admitted that it was not unfavorable to transfer them to Kirkuk since they were not ‘defendants’ (maznûn-u aleyh) but ‘plaintiffs’ (müddei).²⁰⁶ Thus, when the principal investigation launched in the central town of Mosul, pursuing their judicial control and proceedings in Kirkuk would be legally possible and legitimate, albeit remotely. More importantly, the Sheikhs had already consented to return to Mosul to testify when necessary and personally participate in the investigation and court proceedings. The dismissal of Tevfik and the appointment of Ziyâ as the Sub-Governor at the beginning of February was expected to calm the atmosphere of Sulaymaniyah even a little. However, organized violence spread more and more to the subdivisions of the province and the issue was frequently brought to the agenda of the parliament. But more importantly, patience of Sâdât who persistently

istîzân onur ferman. Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2722/37/Lef 1, 14 Kânûnusâni 1324– 27 January 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/ Lef 12, 21 Kânûnusâni 1324– 03 February 1909 “Musul’da bulunan Süleymaniyeli Seyyidler maznûn-u aleyh olmayıp müddei bulundukları ve tahkikat-ı adliyeye ibtidâr olduğu sırada kendilerinin Kerkük’te havale tarikiyle ifâde ve iddialarının zabtı kanunen mümkün ve câiz olduğu ve lede-l îcâb Musul’da ifâdelerinin zabtı […] avdete de muvafakat edecekleri bildirildiğine ve orada kalmaları mahzûrdan sâlim olmayacağı teyid edildiğine nazaran Kerkük’e gönderilmeleri münâsibtir.”

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sought justice, was running out. Although a month had passed since the incident, the transfer of Said’s brother, other son, and relatives from Mosul to Kirkuk still occupied the agenda of the Chamber of Deputies. According to a letter sent from the Chamber to the Ministry of Interior on February 7, the people in Kirkuk had still been asking when the murderers would be brought to justice and when the Sheikh’s relatives would be sent to Kirkuk.²⁰⁷ However, as Zeki stated in his telegram dated January 28, the transfer order had already been officially issued and the ‘letter of guarantee’ (kefâletnâme) that signed by all the guarantors in Kirkuk was mailed to the necessary authorities.²⁰⁸ In short, it was quite certain that the Sheikhs would be transferred to Kirkuk the next day. In order not to interrupt the judicial process in case they could not come to Mosul, the Kirkuk departments were even given the authority to conduct their interrogations, to take their testimonies and to draw up their reports (isticvâbnâme). However, despite the fulfillment of all the conditions and the approval of all authorities, it is unknown why their transfer to Kirkuk was delayed so long. Could this process have been deliberately delayed by some back-channel policies of certain bureaucrats who had foreseen the risks? The ongoing telegrams sent from the Sulaymaniyah branch of the CUP to the Ministry of Interior proved that the local sensitivity and concern regarding the return of the Sheikhs still continued.²⁰⁹ The branch was concerned that the

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2735/63/Lef 1, 25 Kânûnusâni 1324– 07 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine. Reis-ül Sâdât Hafid Şeyh Said Efendinin katilleriyle müsebbiblerinin pençe-i adâlete teslimleriyle müteveffânın Musul’da bulundurulan birâderi ve mahdûm ve ekaribinin Kerkük’e iâdeleri istirhâmına dâir müteaddid imzâ ile Kerkük’ten keşide kılınan telgrafnâmenin taraf-ı Âli-i Nezâretpenâhilerine tebliğine Arz-ı hâl Encümenince karâr verilmiş ve zikredilen telgrafnâme ba’de iâde kılınmak üzere leffen takdim edilmiş olmakla iktizâsının îfâ ve neticesinin inbâ buyurulması bâbında emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehül emrindir. Meclis-i Mebûsân Reisi Ahmed Rızâ”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/85, 15 Kânûnusâni 1324– 28 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Vak’a-i mâlûmeden dolayı icrââtı tabii olan tahkikat-ı adliyeye mübâşeret olacağı zamân Musul’da bulunan Sâdâtın buraya celblerini veya Kerkük’çe isticvâbnâmenin tanzimi kabil olmasına mebni Kerkük’e azimete muhtâr bulundukları İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden resmen beyân olunmuş ve mûmâileyhin Kerkük’te bulundukları müddetçe mugayir-i marzi hâl ve harekette bulunmayacakları Kerkük Ulemâ ve Sâdâtı tarafından tekeffül edilerek ol babdaki kefâletnâmenin posta ile derdest […] bulunduğu Mutasarrıflığından iş’âr kılınması üzerine mûmâileyhin […] kuvvet […] ile yarın Kerkük’e i’zâm olunacakları mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2725/23, Lef 1, 18 Kânûnusâni 1324– 31 January 1909; Lef 2, 19 Kânûnusâni 1324– 01 February 1909

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transfer of these Sheikhs with their high crime potential to Kirkuk, where is close enough to be regarded as a district of Sulaymaniyah, eventually would cause incidents. People were not sure of their lives and property, and they expected the government to take certain measures to prevent the defeatist activities of Sheikhs in Kirkuk. However, their previous telegram of complaint (feryâdnâme-i telgrafi) bearing hundreds of seals was not even taken into account. This time, the Ministry asked the Mosul Governorate who the Sulaymaniyah CUP branch consists of. According to Zeki’s answer, the people who formed the branch consisted of ordinary people who were not good with the Sheikhs since the past, and personalities such as Brigadier General Mustafa, Jaf Chief Mahmud, Deputy Battalion Commander Captain Fehmi, Senior Captain Sâlih, Head of Penal Chamber and the telegraph officers.²¹⁰ He particularly added that Tevfik Pasha was also likely to be included in the branch. Apparently, the branch had done its best to attract the attention of the ministry and managed to reflect their concern to the higher authorities. Finally, we understand that Zeki had convinced the Ministry and therefore the Parliament about the option he proposed. Accordingly, the Sheikhs were transferred to Kirkuk on the condition of returning to Mosul when the investigation started. However, despite the initial reservations of the Governor’s Office, the delaying efforts of some bureaucrats and the objections of the CUP branch, their transfer to Kirkuk would be the main reason for them to organize the Siege of Sulaymaniyah so comfortably and effectively. The Sheikhs would plan and organize the siege from Kirkuk and mobilize the necessary forces by using the advantage of vicinity to Sulaymaniyah.

“Deraliyye’de Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Can ve mallarından me’yûs millet nâmına yüzlerce mühürden ibâret feryâdnâme-i telgrafimize adem-i iltifâtlar, Şeyhlerin bunca cerâimle iâdeleri yüzünden tevlid-i tabii-i vukuat ve firârilerinin ve Süleymaniye’nin bir mahallesi olan Kerkük’te îfâ-i ilka-i fesâdâtlarının men-i zımnında tedâbir-i sâye-i hükûmeti […] bekleriz. Osmanlı İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti Süleymaniye Merkezi” “Sûretin ahz ve mütâlâası ve bu cemiyet kimlerden teşkil olunduğu ve iş’âr-ı vak’a hakkında vilâyetçe olan mâlûmat ve mülâhazanın inbâsına dâir Musul Vilâyetine telgraf”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/162, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Cemiyeti teşkil edenler Şeyhlerle öteden beri araları olmayan yerli ahâli ile Süleymaniye Kumandanlığından geçenlerde Kerkük Fırkasına nakil olunan Mirlivâ Mustafa ve Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşalar ile Tabur Ağası Vekili Süleymaniyeli Yüzbaşı Fehmi ve Kolağası Sâlih ve Cezâ Reisi ve Telgraf memûrlarından ibâret olup Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşanın da cemiyet-i mezkûreye dâhil bulunması da muhtemeldir. Vâli Ferik Zeki”

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3.3 The Mosul Incident Through Different Narratives In this section, the place the Mosul Incident occupied in the literature will be examined and different sources will be compared to each other. The incident is mentioned in very few sources and the course of events is described in a slightly different way in each source. Although different details stand out in different narratives, it can be thought that the Mosul Incident consists of the following stages in general terms: A drunk Kirkuk mule cavalry (ester süvâr) [According to some accounts, a man called Baha Bey or an employee of the tobacco régie at Mosul] harasses a woman in Bab al-Toub Square on the third day of Feast of Sacrifice and he gets beaten by the crowd afterwards. Later, his friends come to help him, and the incident escalates. The incident that started as an ordinary fight turns into an armed conflict and both sides suffer casualties. Kirkuk cavalries retreat to their stables, but the armed conflict continues and the cavalries surrender. Next morning, the angry crowd asks the Governor to surrender the cavalries to them, but the Governor hesitates and the whole town gets mixed up. Of course, meanwhile, the people learned that Said’s son was also involved in the harassment incident on the day before. The angry crowd led by Mosuli Ulema breaks into Sheikh Said’s house, and brutally kills Said, his son Sheikh Ahmed and major part of his men. His brother Maarouf and his other son Mahmud survive. Afterwards, almost a civil war between Arabs and Kurds takes place in the provincial center of Mosul and hundreds of people are brutally killed.²¹¹

In his study, Hut gives remarkable details of the day that Sheikh Said was killed by quoting from the political diary of British Consulate H. E. Wilkie Young and

 For very detailed narratives of the Mosul Incident from different witnesses: Alan de Lacy Rush, Jane Priestland, Records of Iraq, 1914 – 1966. Volume 1. 1914 – 1918: Ottoman Iraq (Mesopotamia) and The first World War (Cambridge: East View Information Services / Archive Editions, 2001) pp. 68 – 93 Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 174– 178 cited from “PRO, FO 195/2308, “Political Diary of the Baghdad Residency for the week ending 11th January 1909” H. E. Wilkie Young and E. K. “Mosul in 1909”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 229 – 235 Refik Hilmi, Anılar: Tanığının Dilinden Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2010),p. 26 Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Amurath to Amurath, (London: William Heinemann, 1911) p. 249, 250 Ely Bannister Soane, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, (Boston: Small Maynard and Company Publishers, 1912) pp. 189 – 195 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 10 January 1909 BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909

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Young’s correspondence with Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador in İstanbul.²¹² At noon on January 5, Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji (son of Sheikh Said) and two other individuals called Ahmed Bey and Baha were sitting by the window of Said’s mansion. Meanwhile, a crowd of women were walking in the square in front of the house. This was one of the most populated areas of the city. Meanwhile, Baha noticed a prostitute (fâhişe) in the crowd and sent a soldier from the Kirkuk units to invite her to the house. However, when she refused to come, the soldier tried to bring her by dragging. An angry crowd soon gathered as the woman screamed and the other women did the same. The soldier beaten by crowd was injured. As the patrols arrived on the scene, the men at the window opened fire towards the crowd and a wild uproar broke out. At that moment, the crowd headed by Muhammad Abu Jasim (Muhammed Ebû Câsim) of the Ulema and some prominent Notables slaughtered Sheikh Said along with his son and 16 members of his family. Other Kirkuk soldiers arrived at the scene to help their friends and the crowd started to grow. Kirkuk soldiers, on the other hand, returned to their positions and started to set up barricades. The angry crowd of Mosuli soldiers and civilians got on rooftops and fired upon the Kirkuk mule cavalry unit. The engagement lasted three hours and, in this atmosphere where authority was completely lost, many gendarmes of Kurdish origin were also killed in action. Towards the night, surviving Kirkuk soldiers surrendered. Around 60 people including women and children were killed at the incident ²¹³

However, Young’s narrative whose Turkish translation was quoted in Davud Hut’s work, is different from Ottoman official correspondence. While the violated woman was depicted as a ‘veiled-honorable Muslim’ (Muhadderât) in official telegrams, in Young’s diary she was identified as a ‘prostitute’ (fâhişe) with inappropriate language. Besides, his expression as ‘the men at the window opened fire towards the crowd’ and the presence of a ringleader named Muhammad Abu Jasim are such details not covered in the official telegrams of the Ottoman authorities.²¹⁴ The person named ‘Ahmed’, who was quoted only with the honorific of Bey after Sheikh Mahmud Berzenci in the text, must have been ‘Sheikh Ahmed’, Said’s son who was killed in the incident. However, for some reason, the title of Sheikh was not used, and he took his place in the story as if he

 Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 174– 178  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 177, 178 footnote 893, quoted from the report of Young titled as PRO, FO 195/2308, “Political Diary of the Baghdad Residency for the week ending 11th January 1909” (PRO, FO 195/2308, nr.2: from W. Young to Lowther, 14 January 1909).  After the Mosul Incident, the name Abu Jasim appears only a few times among the detainees who signed the telegrams for the requests of amnesty that reached the authorities. However, it is unknown whether this person is the same person in Young’s narrative. In any case, Abu Jasim’s name is not mentioned as one of the ringleaders in any official correspondence.

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was not a member of the family. In addition, in official records and many other accounts, it was reported that the street harassment committed in Bab al-Toub Square and the shootout followed the harassment took place on January 5. However, it was reported that Sheikh Said’s mansion was raided the next day on January 6, and he was murdered by a lynching mob. Young, on the other hand, presented the raid on Sheikh Said’s house and his assassination as the same as the day of harassment and shootout. However, according to official documents and many narratives, the course of events spanned two long days. The 6-page consular report of the British Consul Young, titled ‘Mosul in 1909’, whose name is mentioned and whose correspondence is referenced in many sources on Mosul, contains harsh and even offensive allegations against the native people, Notables, and Ottoman authorities: The murder of Sheikh Said (a ’member of the Family of the Prophet’) and his entourage three weeks ago is another instance of the little respect in which traditions, which count for much elsewhere, are held by the ’fanatical’ inhabitants of Mosul. These points are in such striking contrast with the attitude of pious Moslems in other districts that it would almost seem that the ’fanaticism’ of this population is directed merely against what happens not to suit them and bears little relation to the tenets of their faith. It seems to be a perverse and demoralized race from which little good is to be expected and which only an impressive display of force will restrain from positive evil.²¹⁵

Criticizing the local people of Mosul with an extremely harsh tone, Young accuses them of fanaticism and distinguishes them from other Muslim groups. In addition, he remarkably argues that their motivation was not related to the principles of religious belief but to class differences. Although Young does not lay any emphasis on the Arab-Kurdish Dispute, it should be noted that the majority of the local population of Mosul consisted of Muslim and Sunni Arabs. Considering this point, what Young wrote might suggest that he based the incident on ethnocentric motives and that he sympathized the Kurds, like some other British state officials and travelers in the region. He narrates the involvement of local Notables and Ulema in the conspiracy with the following expressions: The recent disturbances offered a striking illustration of the traditional methods by which the Begs and local Ulema coerce and trifle with the Government: A plan of campaign is arranged at a ’mejliss’(assembly) in one of the great houses the night before; and Abu Jassim or some such ruffian is instructed to carry it out, being promised no doubt a new cloak or a few liras for his trouble. Needless to say, neither Ulema nor Notables show themselves when once the mischief has begun. When it is all over, they emerge and go in a body to

 H. E. Wilkie Young and E. K. “Mosul in 1909”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 229 – 235, p. 233

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visit the Vali or perhaps to the Telegraph Office- with plausible expressions of regret for the occurrence and excuses for the mob, ’which’, they say, ’is deplorably ignorant and unreasoning and will not be restrained when its feelings are strongly moved’, sic, the fact being that the mob’s ’feelings’ are never moved unless by one of themselves. Successive Valis have learnt this and have compromised accordingly. It is said, however, that the Government has never suffered such ignominious defeat as on January 6 last.

Young’s narrative highlights the Ulema connection just like the others but suggests that the Notables of Mosul also had a hand in the conspiracy. The expression ‘a mejliss in one of the great houses’ probably refers to the house of one of the Notables of Mosul. Young belittles the provincial administration and shows it extremely helpless in the face of this conspiracy as in the narratives of other British officials. The report also continues with highly offensive statements that Mosul’s Muslim underclass is ignorant, lazy and brutal, driven like a flock of sheep by the Ulema and the Notables, and that the men of Mosul are always ready for mischief and plunder without thinking of the consequences. This biased text, which can be taken as one of the concrete examples of British Orientalism, contains striking claims targeting the Porte. According to Young, if the central government was determined and given a sufficient display of force, authority could have been easily established so far. He argued that the conditions that make up the current situation should be sought in the performances of three weak governors succumbed to local intrigues in the last five years. Along with Young’s, the most comprehensive and detailed official account of the Mosul Incident still belongs to the British. The reports of the British authorities, who had a strong intelligence network, consular organization and commercial infrastructure in Mosul, reveal very specific and remarkable details regarding the incident. These official chronicles of the period are covered in the 15volume Records of Iraq : 1914 – 1966 series based on the British Government archives and compiled by the archivists Alan de Lacy Rush and Jane Priestland. ²¹⁶ Volume 1, covering the 1914– 1918 period of Ottoman Iraq, devotes a detailed section to the Mosul Incident. It is stated in the official correspondences of the Ottoman authorities that the unit that assumed the escort duty and transferred Said’s convoy to the center of Mosul was the 1st Battalion of the 48th Regiment stationed in Chamchamal. However, in the British archives, this unit is referred to as the 4th Battalion of the 45th Regiment. The unit the British refer to is most likely the 45th

 Alan de Lacy Rush, Jane Priestland, Records of Iraq, 1914 – 1966. Volume 1. 1914 – 1918: Ottoman Iraq (Mesopotamia) and The first World War (Cambridge: East View Information Services / Archive Editions, 2001) pp. 68 – 78, 80, 86, 93

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Reserve Brigade stationed in Kirkuk (Kerkuk Redif Livâlığı). The British archive states that the person who harassed the woman in Bab al-Toub square was a soldier from this battalion. […] one of the Ester Suars 4th. Batt. 45th. Regt. lately arrived from Kerkuk (v. Journal to Baghdad Dec.3) – to invite her into the house. The woman refused and, when the soldier tried to drag her by force, screamed. Other women probably did the same, […]

The British authorities report that although there are 850 soldiers under the command of the Provincial Commander (must be referring Zühdü Pasha), he remains incapable to take the necessary precautions. The person referred to as Cavalry Commander Anis Beg is Colonel Enis Bey, who will be accused of drunkenness and imprudence during the command of the operation, as we will see in the following sections. Major Rasikh Beg (Binbaşı Râsih Bey) and Captain Natik Effendi (Yüzbaşı Nâtık Efendi), the other two commanders apart from Bimbashi Said Beg (General Staff Major Ali Said), are the characters that never appear in Ottoman correspondence. […] going on when I returned from visiting the Vali and my French Colleague soon after sunset but had apparently ceased when I reached this house an hour later. In the course of the evening the Ester Suars surrendered and were conducted to the Barracks under arrest. The number of killed on this, the first day is variously estimated between thirty and fifty, including several women and children. Early in the afternoon the Vali and Commandant appear to have made some sort of effort at intervention. What passed between his Excellency and the Commandant is not known, but it does not appear that the latter, who had about 850 troops under his orders, took any serious measures. At all events, whatever efforts their Excellency […] at the Barracks firing was almost continuous, and it was necessary to make a considerable detour in order to avoid it. I found the Vali, the Commandant, the Kadi, Miralai Anis Beg (Commanding the Cavalry), Bimbashi Rasikh Beg, Bimbashi Said Beg (Chief Staff Officer), Yuzbashi Natik Effendi and several of the most important Ulema and Notables- in fact all those who might […]

The efforts of the British authorities to express their concerns for the safety of their own citizens and their expectations from the higher authorities during the incident are also included in the lines. It was especially demanded to protect the premises of the Lynch Company, which had become a monopoly in the Euphrates and Tigris river transportation with the concessions granted by the Ottoman Government, and which had so far attracted the reaction of the Iraqi Deputies.²¹⁷

 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 14, 100 – 102

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[…] were keeping guard at the door. N.B. The Quarters occupied by the Ester Suars, which was the scene of the fighting referred to, are about 400 yards away from the Barracks. After listening for some minutes to an apparently futile discussion, I begged his Excellency to take whatever measures by considered necessary for the security of the houses of the English ladies and of Messrs. Lynch’s premises and their Manager’s house. There was no apparent reason for thinking that these were in any immediate danger, but the mob were obviously out of hand, and it seemed desirable to impress upon the local authorities the necessity of protecting British lives and […]

The unresponsiveness of the Governor Zeki Pasha in the face of incidents, which is also covered in some other narratives, and the decisive leadership of Abu Jasim over the lynching mob come to the fore in these reports as well. Rituals such as waving the green flag, drumming and dancing performed by the crowd led by Abu Jasim before the mass violence begun, are details that I have not encountered in any other narrative. […] on Wednesday morning the 6th, it became known that the Kerkuk Suars had surrendered during the night and were under arrest in the Barracks. This was followed by news that the Ulema had gone in a body to the Vali to demand that the imprisoned soldiers, who -they said- had insulted Mosul women, should be handed over to them. It appears that the Vali refused this demand and shut himself in the Konak. Thereupon, the disappointed mob, which had accompanied the Ulema, turned back towards the city and, under the leadership of a certain Abu Jasim v. below, proceeded to attack certain houses- amongst them that occupied by Sheikh Said of Suleimanieh (Journal to Baghdad Nov. 16 and Telegrams Nov.16 and Dec.7) […] house, his son Ahmed was clubbed or stabbed to death within a few yards of the door, the Sheikh himself, an old man of eighty appeared with a Koran in his hands and made towards the Konak – it is said that Zaptiehs , whom the Vali had sent to his […], at the Konak were with him. He had just reached the outer door when he was struck down and killed. […] Sheikh Said’s house is separated from the Government Konak by about a hundred yards of wide, straight , level road. What took place there must have been in view of the windows of the Government Building. A green banner was produced , “ dauls “ (native drums) were beaten and Abu Jasim led the attack. A wild scene followed – a savage mob from the dregs of the city dancing round their leader , brandishing clubs and knives and shouting […]

Racist sentiments in the city, the worrying level of civilian armament, and the inadequacy of civil and military authorities are other claims in the report. The rest followed naturally in a wild place where racial feelings run high and where ninetenths of the population carry arms. The blame attaches to the Authorities, civil and military, for withdrawing to the Barracks after one feeble and ineffective protest and allowing the affair to assume such serious dimensions. It is said that when the Vali intervened the Kerkuk […]

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[…]demanded in cold blood that the imprisoned soldiers should be handed over to them. There would […] to have been no reason whatever for thus attempting to anticipate official inquiry or for meddling with the ordinary course of military discipline. By their action the Ulema and those Notables and others who supported them were wantonly, and after ample time for reflections, stirring up fresh trouble. When their demand was refused or evaded, a green flag was produced, the “dauls” were beaten and the waiting mob, duly excited, under the leadership of Abu Jasim proceeded to the attack. The above appears to be in brief the main lines of what led up to the violent acts of the second day culminating in the savage butchery in the house of Sheikh Said. At present it is impossible to speak with confidence with regard to […]

British emissaries note that the reason for Sheikh Said’s murder is still ’obscure’ and remark that it is even more astounding that such a holy man descended from the family of the Prophet was killed in a religiously fanatical place like Mosul. However, between the lines, the intolerable tyranny of Said and his sons on the people of Sulaymaniyah is also mentioned. According to the British, despite the 850 troops at its disposal, the local administration had failed to manage the crisis and quell the disturbance. The reason for the attack upon Sheikh Said is still obscure. Expelled for his, and his sons’ intolerable tyranny by the people of Suleimanieh, he has been living at Mosul in great state for the past two months , pending the decision of his case at Constantinople ( v. Tels. Nov.16 and Dec .[…] […] until he reached the entrance gate-way that he was struck down and killed. The cold-blooded murder of so famous and holy man- a member of the family of the Prophetwith the Koran in his hands is there more astounding is so fanatical a place as Mosul. The circumstances seem rather to suggest that the […] The significance of the events of January 5 and 6 consists in the fact that the Government, with 850 troops at its disposal, failed on two successive days to stop disturbances lasting […]

In any case, the British note that the brutal killing of Sheikh Said could cause discomfort and anxiety among all respected Muslims as well as among Christians. The documents providing the casualty reports by the British sources, remark that many innocent people were imprisoned during the investigation process, but that those who were responsible would not escape with impunity as well. The fact that a Moslem mob has triumphantly massacred with circumstances of savage cruelty a “Sayed” household suggests unpleasant possibilities for allrespectable Moslem as well as Christian. It is not yet possible to speak of […] […] periodic disturbances, by means of which the ulema and notables are in the habit of embarrassing the Government, the whole party were butchered (only about half-a-dozen escaping out of thirty) by the mob on the 6th January last. Upwards of fifty other persons are supposed to have been killed.

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29. After long delay enquiries were begun, and over a 100 people (many of them probably innocent) thrown into prison. The enquiry is still dragging on, and there seems no prospect of its termination. It is not improbable that the more important of those responsible for this affair have hitherto escaped scot-free; and that much of the recent trouble in the Kerkuk – Suleimanieh district may be attributed to the vindictive fury of […]

The reports, which create a profile for the Sheikh Said family, portrays the Barzanjiyya clan as the absolute rulers and the largest landowners of Sulaymaniyah, also claim that they are a source of threat terrorizing the entire region. Sheikh Said Clan . – The town and surrounding country – with practically all the officials , civil and military – had been for years under the thumb of the Sheikh Said and his disreputable sons , of whose vices and tyranny endless […] In short, the Sheikh Said clan are still the terror of Suleimanieh , and their authority is absolutely unchallenged. A great part of the town belongs to them , and they own numerous villages in the neighbourhood , and also in the […]

Beyond the formal ones, it is also useful to look at casual and personal narratives such as memoirs and diaries. In the memoirs of the Kurdish writer Refik Hilmi, the details of the incident are narrated through a different flow of events: On the second day of the Feast of Sacrifice in 1908, Sheikh Mahmud, his brother Sheikh Ahmed and their friends Baha Effendi were hosted by Lieutenant Colonel (Kaimakam) Mustafa Bey in Mosul. After leaving Mustafa Bey’s house, they went to Bab u Kop Square, which was a festive promenade. Rumor has it that when Baha Effendi is drunk, he teases a woman passing by, and the woman begins to shout in anger. The people of Mosul around there want to intervene and to kill Baha Effendi. When Sheikh Ahmed and his friends had to protect Baha Effendi, a fight breaks out with pistols and daggers and as a result several people are injured. With the crowd coming from around, the situation gets bigger, and Sheikh Ahmed and his friends get stuck in there. Meanwhile, the Kurdish gendarmerie and cavalry who are close to the incident, come to the rescue of Sheikh Ahmed and his friends. The conflict grows and both sides suffer casualties. With more Mosul residents gathering, Sheikh Ahmed and the gendarmes took refuge in the Government Hall. The next day, armed Mosul residents come to the Government Hall and ask Governor Zeki Pasha to hand over the gendarmes. (The Governor of Mosul at that time was Zeki Pasha from Aleppo and he was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress). When the Governor does not hand over the gendarmes, the armed people want Sheikh Ahmed and his friends. To appease the armed people, the Governor says that Sheikh Ahmed and his friends are not in the Hall, and they can go and find themselves. Then the armed group attacks Sheikh Said’s house. The Governor caused the events to grow even more. He chooses three well known individuals from the Mosul people to calm down the incident and summons Sheikh Said to the Government Hall in order to protect. Sheikh Said believes that and goes to the Hall, but as soon as they arrive, on the order of the Battalion Commander (Tabur Ağası), the hall gate closes and Said remains outside. A person from the crowd there hits a large stone on Sheikh Said’s head and Said dies right there. After the crowd also kills the person es-

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corted Said, they attack Sheikh Said’s house again. Those in the house resist these attacks bravely, but Sheikh Ahmed is eventually killed as well. The crowd then goes to another house with Sheikh Said’s men and kills them all.²¹⁸

Both stories by the Young and Hilmi indicate a common personality called ‘Baha Effendi’ as the provoker of this harassment incident. However, someone called Baha Effendi was not found in the official correspondence. Refik Hilmi adds that Baha Effendi, whom he claims to have caused the events, hid from the very first day and saved himself. Moreover, the incident referred as a ‘violation’ (tecâvüz) or ‘harassment’ (tâciz) in the official correspondence and depicted as an explicit ‘violation’ in Young’s narrative as well, was degraded to a ‘verbal abuse’ such as tease (sataşma) or catcall (laf atma) in Refik Hilmi’s book. More interestingly, while all official documents and some narratives state that Sheikh Said was killed during the raid on his mansion, some certain accounts such as Hilmi’s argued that Said was killed in front of the Government Hall (Hükûmet Sarayı / Konağı).²¹⁹ The person referred to as Ahmed Bey in the Young’s report and as Sheikh Ahmed in Hilmi’s book, in its original form, should be the son of Sheikh Said. Hilmi also quotes from the book ‘Three Sacrifices’ (Üç Kurban) by a person named Gulami Hodja and states that although Sheikh Mahmud was a guest in the house of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Bey at that time, he did not get involved in the Bab al-Toub Incident (street harassment) or any of the incidents which his father and brother were killed. But the interesting thing is that Sheikh Mahmud’s name is not mentioned in these incidents. I heard from him that he was not involved in these incidents. So how did this happen? In his book The Three Sacrifices, Gulami writes that: ‘Sheikh Mahmud was also at Mustafa Bey’s house. But he was not involved in the ’Baba û Kop’ Incident, nor in the incident in the Government Hall where his father Sheikh Said was killed, nor in the incident where the crowd attacked Sheikh Said’s house and killed his brother Sheikh Ahmed.’ This shows us that Sheikh Mahmud was not involved in the incidents.

 Refik Hilmi, Anılar: Tanığının Dilinden Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2010) p. 26, 27 (!) In official correspondence, the day of the incident is mentioned as the third day of the Feast of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha) or 5 February 1909. (!) As we will see in the letter of First Lieutenant Mehmed Sâlim, the correct name of this promenade is Bâb-ı Tub (Bab al-Toub). In the memoirs of Refik Hilmi translated into Turkish, it is inadvertently referred as Bab-u Kop and Baba û Kop  In the telegram sent by the KSCP from Simil and analyzed by Denizi Ekici, it was written that Sheikh Said was killed in front of the Government Hall.

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Hilmi also tries to refute the allegations that Sheikh Mahmud hid in the house of Khidir Hamawandi (Hıdır Hemavendi) to protect himself during the incident, by praising and glorifying Mahmud: According to Gulami Hodja, Sheikh Mahmud may have gone to Khidir Hamawandi’s house before the incident. He probably could not or was not allowed to go to his brothers during the incidents. However, as some people think, the allegation that Sheikh Mahmud hid in Khidir Hamawandi’s house to protect himself during the incident is an allegation that will never come to mind. Because Sheikh Mahmud was famous for his bravery and courage all his life. The way things happened and the killing of these innocent people in the town of Mosul was a black mark that cannot be forgotten for the town of Mosul.

According to Hilmi’s narrative which shows the Barzanjis as completely innocent, heroic and glorified, Said’s son Sheikh Ahmed hides in the Government Hall with the Kirkuk gendarmes and the angry crowd asks Governor Zeki to surrender them. However, at this point Hilmi brings a serious accusation against the Governor. Because instead of stopping the attackers, the Governor pointed Sheikh Ahmed as a target and said that they can go and find him themselves. In fact, Hilmi indirectly claims that Zeki summoned Said to the Government Hall on the pretext of protecting him, but actually lured him into a trap. It is not known what kind and level of relationship there was between Lieutenant Colonel (Kaimakam) Mustafa Bey who was stationed in 33rd Cavalry Regiment of the 6th Army, and Sheikh Said.²²⁰ However, the house where Mustafa Bey lived with his brother Gendarmerie Captain Ali Bey was raided by aggressors  BOA, DH.MKT.2801/7, 13 Rebiülahir 1327– 04 May 1909; DH.MKT.2887/3/Lef 2, 10 Receb 1327– 28 July 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.2841/50/Lef 1, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1327– 06 June 1909 “Musul Vilâyet-i Behiyyesine Merhûm Şeyh Said’in oğlunu hânesinde ihfa eylediği zannıyla binlerce eşhâs kendisiyle birâderinin hânelerine […] mallarını yağma ve meskenlerini tahrib etmelerinden dolayı dûçâr-ı zarûrîyyat olduklarından bahisle emvâl-i menhûbenin tazmin ve hânelerinin tamir ettirilmesi istidâsına dâir Altıncı Ordu-yu Osmâni Otuz Üçüncü Süvâri Alayı Kaimakamı Mustafa Bey tarafından Makam-ı Sâmi-i Sadâret -i Uzmâya bit-takdim tevdi buyurulan arz-ı hâl… Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi” “Musul Vilâyet-i Behiyyesine Birâderi Jandarma Yüzbaşısı Ali Bey’in de eşyâsı ve nukûdu nehb edildiğinden… Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi” “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine 324 senesi Iyd-i Edhâsında zuhûr eden hâdise esnâsında kendi ve birâderinin hâneleri tahrib ve eşyâsı da yağma edildiğinden ve menhûbât-ı mezkûrenin iâdesi için vuku bulan mürâcaatın dahi neticesiz kaldığından bahis ile ve dûçâr oldukları zarûretin def’ ve izâlesi zımnında eşyâsının aynen ve yahut nakden iâdesi ve hânelerinin tamiri istidâsını mutazammın… Meclis-i Mebûsân Reisi Ahmed Rızâ“

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who thought that they were harboring Sheikh Said’s son during the turmoil. As their property was destroyed and household items were looted during the assault , months later they would file a petition to state authorities for a compensation of their loss and for the punishment of aggressors. In her work Amurath to Amurath, Gertrude Bell claimed that the Governor remained ineffective and passive during the incident, with following statements: In an instant arms were out, the Arab soldiery attacked the Kerkuki sowwars, a fight ensued that lasted many hours, and in the confusion several Mohammadan women, holiday-makers, who had not had time to seek refuge in their houses, were killed and wounded, a most unusual disaster. Meantime, the Vali sat trembling in the serai and lifted not a finger to restore order.²²¹

Bell also told how this conflict turned into a civil war and how was the CUP was helpless in the face of events. The entity which she qualified as the reactionary party and a counterblast to the CUP, and identified as the League of Mohammad (Muhammedî Cemiyeti) should be the Mosul crew of the Society of Mohammedan Union (İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti) which will be officially established on April 5, 1909: If the leaders of the reactionary party had wished to embarrass the Government and to show up its weakness, they were more than commonly successful. During the six weeks that elapsed before the arrival of troops from Diyarbekr and elsewhere, Mosul was in a state of complete anarchy. Christians were openly insulted in the streets, the civil and military authorities were helpless, and no less helpless was the local committee of Union and Progress. When the troops came some degree of order was restored, but the reactionary movement was not arrested. The formation of the League of Mohammad, which was designed as a counterblast to the Committee of Union and Progress, went on apace.

E.B. Soane depicts the post-incident atmosphere in Mosul as follows and accuses the leader of the KSMAP in İstanbul, Sheikh Abdulqadir of warmongering: This was the signal for redoubled anarchy in southern Kurdistan. Shaikh Sa’id had, as has been shown, acquired a reputation for unusual sanctity, and this, coupled with his power, gave reason for loudly expressed indignation on all sides. The representative in Constantinople, Shaikh Qadir, made a series of inflammatory speeches demanding in the name of all the laws of Islam, summary and awful vengeance upon the murderers.²²²

Mourning in Sulaymaniyah finds its place in these expressions:

 Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Amurath to Amurath, (London: William Heinemann, 1911) p. 249  Ely Bannister Soane, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, (Boston: Small Maynard and Company Publishers, 1912) p. 192

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The town of Sulaimania was forced to go into the deepest mourning. All gramophones and musical instruments were taken by force from their owners and destroyed, and any celebration at weddings was brought to an abrupt and melancholy termination.

Elie Kedourie’s distinctive study, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies, also provides remarkable details about the Mosul Incident: The riot seems to have been instigated by notables and ulamas in furtherance of obscure intrigues and tenebrous ambitions. Its immediate pretext was an allegation that a Kurdish employee of the tobacco régie at Mosul, strolling through the city on the second day of ‘id al-adha-04 January 1909- together with Muhammad and Mahmud, the sons of Shaykh Said, the head of the Naqshbandi tariqa at Sulaymaniyya (who was then living in Mosul) molested or made improper advances to a local woman. An altercation ensued, and on that and the following two days, a mob led by a local bravo, Muhammad abu Jasim, attacked and murdered the eighty-year-old Shaykh Said himself, his son Muhammad and sixteen others of his descendants, together with a large number of Kurdish gendarmes stationed in Mosul. In consequence of this riot, Wilkie Young wrote, ‘the unfortunate impression’ seemed to be gaining ground ‘that the old landmarks of authority have disappeared and that as yet nothing stable has replaced them’. ²²³

However, contrary to all other accounts, Kedourie writes that the one who harassed the Muslim woman was not a Kirkuk mule cavalry, but an employee of the Mosul Tobacco Régie. It is highly probable that this employee was Baha Effendi who is also mentioned in the report of Consul Young, in the study of Hut who utilized Young’s report and in the memoirs of Hilmi. Kedourie who utilized of Consul Young’s reports just like Shields and Hut, also notes that the person who led the mob that killed Sheikh Said was Muhammad Abu Jasim. A very interesting point, however, is that Hut based on Young’s reports, uses both the attributions ’contracted ruffian’ (taşeron kabadayı) and ’from the ulema’ (ulemadan) for Jasim.²²⁴ These two contradictory characterizations attributed to the same person, suggest that Jasim might be a ruffian carrying out his activities under the guise of the Ulema. Another important inconsistency is that Kedourie identifies Said’s sons who were involved in the harassment incident as Muhammad and Mahmud and gives the name of Said’s murdered son as Muhammad, although he is referred to as Ahmed in all other accounts.²²⁵ The arguments in Çetinsaya’s article, in which he successfully examined the complex power relations between sufi orders, tribes and central authorities in

 Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies, (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1974), p. 143  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 176, 177, 180  Please see the section 2.6 Banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul

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Northern Iraq during the reign of Abdülhamid II, are also critical at this point. Çetinsaya argues that the new regime was decisive to ‘eliminate’ or ‘eradicate’ the rooted problem arose by the Hamawand-Barzanjiyya cooperation.²²⁶ According to Çetinsaya, the Government that viewed the legitimate instruments as incapable, probably invoked to a ‘typical Unionist tactic’. However, what Çetinsaya might not have taken into account was the possibility that this conspiracy, which he called “a typical Unionist tactic”, might have been orchestrated without the knowledge of the central government (the Unionist regime). Inasmuch as this conspiracy could be based on a past fueled by personal enmity and the clash of interests between the local bureaucrats and the Barzanjiyya Family. In addition, even though it was orchestrated with the provocation of the Unionists, another important indicator was that this incident got out of control with the involvement of Mosul’s Arab-origin Ulema and Community and spread throughout the entire province. The question to be asked at this point may be: Could the Unionist regime risk a crisis of this scale, which could set fire to an entire province, spread to other provinces, fuel anti-regime Kurdish rebellions or Arab-Kurdish Dispute, and occupy the parliament for a long time? Davud Hut, on the other hand, characterizes the assassination of such a powerful figure, whom Abdülhamid II counted on and cherished in provincial politics, as a mystery (muamma).²²⁷ He states that it is really unlikely that Said was killed coincidentally, and he mounts his argument that Said might have been targeted by some powers (including the Unionists) aiming to prevent his possible interference with the local administration. Plus, based on Young’s remarks, Hut adds that it was probable that the lynching mob was consisted of some people who suffered from Sheikh Said’s tyranny and were encouraged by the Constitutionalist regime. Here, he mounts a striking argument and states that if the Unionists were involved in this affair, ‘the Unionist ideal of enforcing the law against the influentials (müteneffizân)’ who were decisive in Hamidian era provincial politics, may have triggered their motivation. On the other hand, Hut reviews Consulate Young’s suspicions about some of the remarkable contradictions within the incident which was allegedly committed by fanatic Ulema and Notables. As Hut underlined, Young finds it interesting that the Ulema performed such a move against a religious figure descended from the prophet’s lineage. But what Young and therefore Hut overlooked was that perhaps the ArabKurdish Dislike in Iraqi Territories (Hıtta-i Iraqiyah) could be much deeper than a

 Çetinsaya, II. Abdülhamid döneminde Kuzey Irak’da tarikat, aşiret ve siyaset, p. 167  Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 175, 176

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religious alliance within Sunnism or than a Pan-Islamist view such as Ummahism and that this conflict could flare up very easily. Again, based on Young’s reports, Hut highlights that the lynching plot was designed at the meeting the night before and some ruffians such as Muhammad Abu Jasim were hired and instructed for the assassination. The Ulema and Notables who disappeared when the incident started, reappeared when everything was over and visited the Governor as a delegation. Sarah Shields, relied on Young’s correspondence with Ambassador Lowther, mentions that the demonstrations of January 1909 were coordinated by the Mosul elites to demonstrate the weakness of the new provincial administration and Unionist central government.²²⁸ According to Shields’ quotations, the massacre was probably not one of the objectives or phases of this plan, as some of these elites were linked to Sheikh Said’s family. But the popular forces encouraged by the elite was so enraged that the plan got out of control and the target they chose to attack was neither religious minorities nor government officials, but the Kurdish leader and congregation of a Sunni Sufi order. Again, through Young-Lowther correspondence, Shields mentions that as a result of the incident, 24 individuals from the Barzanjiyya group and about 50 individuals from the Mosul people were killed. Deniz Ekici’s innovative and original work, which was published in March 2021 while this study was still being conducted, approaches the Mosul Incident from a completely different perspective by devoting a separate title.²²⁹ The book which looks at the reflections of the incident within the internal correspondence of the KSMAP and in the Kurdish Newspaper of Mutual Aid and Progress (Kürd Teâvün ve Terakki Gazetesi), the media organ of the Society, is a first in terms of the context it focuses on. Subjects such as the reconstruction of the incident through the rhetoric in the press and how it was positioned in the face of the Unionist regime and the Kurdish people are analyzed through certain telegrams, articles and news reports. The study examines how the rhetoric and context in news reports and articles help to comprehend various and actual backgrounds such as social, political and economic. In this way, the functionality of the press in power struggles is analyzed through the history of the Kurdish press and journalism. One of the correspondence Ekici studied is the following:

 Sarah D. Shields, Mosul before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000) p. 61, 62  Deniz Ekici, Kurdish Identity, Islamism, and Ottomanism: The Making of a Nation in Kurdish Journalistic Discourse (1898 – 1914), (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021) The Murder of Sheikh Said Barzanji, pp. 133 – 136

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From Simil, 31 December 324 (13 January 1909): To the İstanbul Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress: 16 cavalrymen were killed during a heated argument between the (local) people, joined by the local soldiers, and cavalry soldiers [state troops] coming from Kirkuk. The next day it was decided to collaborate in a holy war against the Kurds [cihad-i Ekrad] and they attacked the residence of the Sheikh. The Sheikh, who was holding the glorious Qur’an in his hands to disperse them, begged the soldiers to no avail; the holy Qur’an was trampled to pieces underfoot and [the Sheikh] was killed in front of the government. Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress, Mosul Branch

According to Ekici’s interpretation, the telegram stated that local (most probably Kurdish) soldiers sided with the local Kurdish people against the government forces. However, as there is no clear statement on this subject in the text, it is highly probable that the telegram attributed the adjective of ‘local’ to the Arab People and Cavalry, who the natives of Mosul. ²³⁰ What Ekici attempted to explain with the expression of ‘local soldiers sided with the local Kurdish people against the government forces’ should be the unity between the Sulaymaniyah Sheikhs and the Kirkuk Cavalry. Ekici also comes up with an interpretation such as ‘Sheikh Said Barzanji’s uprising against the new regime and his murder by the Ottoman-Turkish forces’ and gives the impression that the Sheikh was killed as a result of an official state operation. However, this problematic and generalizing statement completely ignores the possibility of particular bureaucrats, whether Unionist or not, of nurturing personal enmity and organizing a conspiracy towards the Sheikh. Moreover, Ekici seems to have ignored the deep-rooted and persistent Barzanjiyya antipathy lasted in the region since the Hamidian era and the involvement of the Mosuli Arabs in the incident. On the other hand, Ekici criticizes the Kurdish Newspaper of Mutual Aid and Progress for isolating this politically motivated incident from its social, political and historical contexts. According to Ekici, KNMAP ignored the Sheikh’s current stance and oppositional background against the Young Turk regime and presented his murder as a mere incident (hâdise). In his opinion, the newspaper degraded the incident into a legal, criminal or personal matter between the Sheikh and a local government official. Terrible Incident in Mosul Upon the bitter news of the martyrdom of Sheikh Said Efendi, the grandson of Ahmed Efendi from the house of the Barzinji Sayyids, may he rest in peace, we immediately appealed to

 At this point, what I refer to as ‘Mosul’ is, of course not the entire Mosul Province, but the Central Town of Mosul (Merkez-i Vilâyet) where the Arab population is predominant.

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His Excellency the Paşa, the interior minister, to investigate the matter and seek justice; it is clear that, aware of the gravity of the situation, His Excellency the minister attaches great importance to this tragedy, as he has given orders to the authorities and promised to find out the perpetrators along with possible instigators, and to punish them severely. Accordingly, thanks to the justice system, it is obvious that the perpetrators of this sad incident will be captured and the just government will restore the rights of individuals; our association has advised the concerned parties [the Kurds] not to arouse excitement, to stay away from any form of provocation, and also to strictly prevent any situation and behaviour that might disturb the public order and instead wait for the solution and the deliverance of justice by the government.²³¹

According to Ekici, the terminology of this particular news, the codes affirming the bureaucracy of justice between the lines and the mission of mediation undertaken between the Ottoman Government and the local Kurdish people, served to reconstruct the incident in the eyes of the public. However, at this point, Ekici claims that the newspaper actually sided with the Unionist government. He attributes this situation to the fact that it is not an unusual practice for the media discourse to give place to dissident voices in a controlled and moderate manner. According to Ekici’s argument, as long as these dissident voices do not pose a serious threat to the dominant power, the media pursues this strategy in order to display the image of being on the side of the disadvantaged. In summary, Ekici finds the constructive cooperation process KSMAP conducted with the Unionist state authority and their joint discourse aimed at soothing the Kurdish people, insincere and pragmatic. The last example Ekici studied is an anonymous article published in the KNMAP, implying that Sheikh Said, his family and his associates ‘provoked’ the Mosul Incident: We cannot think of anything that could go against the rightful defense of the person in question [Sheikh Barzinji] by his Excellency Sayyid Abdulkadir Efendi, the president of our association. However, as a consequence of the weak and abusive administration in the region, the associates and the relatives of the Sheikh have lately been spoiled; we find the bothersome behaviours and actions of the Sheikh’s brother and son worthy of complaint, and in this regard, we acknowledge the truth of the matter.²³²

According to Ekici, this article legitimized the actions of local authorities to some extent. However, in terms of favoring the Unionist government and adopting the

 Ekici, Kurdish Identity, Islamism, and Ottomanism, pp. 133 – 134 ‘Musul Hâdise-i Fecîasi’ [Terrible Incident in Mosul], KTTG, No. 7, January 16, 1909.  Ekici, Kurdish Identity, Islamism, and Ottomanism, pp. 134– 135, Anonymous, ‘Şüûnat: Teessüf-i azim’ [Happenings: Great Sorrow], KTTG, No. 6, January 9, 1909.

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Constitutional Monarchy, the provincial branches of the KSMAP were likely to experience a rupture and incoordination with the İstanbul headquarters. Because at this point, Ekici emphasizes that the KSMAP branches in the Kurdish-dominated provinces should not be seen as a direct extension of the İstanbul headquarters due to the different socio-political backgrounds of their members and the different agendas they pursue. He also remarks that the local (Mosul) KSMAP branch which introduces a hardline expression such as ‘the anti-Kurdish holy war’ (Cihâd-ı Ekrâd) in its message, adopted a more radical discourse compared to the headquarters in İstanbul. I agree with this statement which indirectly supports my argument that the transcultural, sociopolitical and ethnoreligious origins of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute in Iraq can be identified in the Mosul Incident. The local Mosul branch had obviously perceived and interpreted the Mosul Incident as an ethnically motivated attack fueled by Arab-Kurdish Dispute. However, İstanbul headquarters of the KSMAP which pursued pragmatic strategies and avoided pressure from the Unionist government may have had to introduce the Mosul Incident as an isolated attack specific to the Barzanjiyya. The blunt and direct tone of the message sent from Mosul branch were now replaced by diplomatic concerns and political reservations displayed by the headquarters. In any case, the point that I consider as problematic and generalizing is the direct and absolute placement of Ottoman state authority against Sheikh Said Barzanji. Before making such an observation, I think some other decisive parameters such as the following should also be taken into account: ‒ Complex power relations of the Barzanjiyya Family with other actors throughout the province since the Hamidian regime ‒ The possibility of Sheikh Ahmed Barzanji actually involved in the harassment incident in Bab al-Toub Square and irritated the Mosulites. ‒ The viewpoint of the Arab People and Ulema residing in the central district of Mosul towards the Barzanjiyya Family.

The Mosul Incident in the Manifest of Sâdât Although considered to be biased, the most detailed account of the murder of Sheikh Said can be reviewed in the Manifest of Sâdât dated February 25.²³³ While the authors of the manifest disclosed all details regarding the murder of the Sheikh, they claimed that General Staff Major Ali Said Bey was in the tactical command of the assassination and accused Governor Zeki of being a bystander

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909

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to the incident. The text claiming that Ali Said Bey coordinated the angry crowd in Mosul, also included some Military Officers, Civil Servants and Notables into the conspiracy who were not mentioned in official correspondence until now. Following the murder of the Sheikh, how the brutality in the city got out of control, what this brutality was capable of and how the event was trivialized by the provincial administrators in the eyes of the imperial authorities were also elaborated in the text. The relevant part of the manifest begins by discrediting Major Ali Said and disclosing his affiliation with the illegal elements in Mosul: General Staff Major Ali Said Bey, as one of the notable mischief-makers, had come to Mosul aspiringly since he was basically more harmful than predators and poisonous greedy creatures. Ali Said himself and his accursed cohorts in Mosul had attempted to banish Sâdât to a further location but they had failed eventually. Thus, when they lost hope of this, they had convinced and subjugated the infamous bloodthirsty monsters of Mosul and had poisoned their minds with some malicious intentions against Sâdât.²³⁴

In the sequel, there were remarkable details about the day of the murder: On the third day of Eid al-Adha, a common violation by an intoxicated soldier in the promenade which could be seen everywhere maybe for hundred times and easily disregarded under normal circumstances, spread like a fire between the community and military, and this disaster was manipulated by someone to achieve their ultimate intentions. For lighting the fuse of the ‘mischief bomb which was already planted’ (metaphorically), they had convened at that night, made a joint decision for a covert operation and the next morning they began to implement their decision in a disguised fashion. Their first step was going into the presence of Governor for asking him to surrender the accused soldier for execution. Governor had naturally denied such a request even lunatics would not accept, and they had responded as “then we will do it in our own way!” in a threatening form. Then they arrived at the house of Sheikh Said where was sixty meters away from Government Hall at most. Captain Arab Nouri of Sulaymaniyah, Cavalry Senior Captain Davud of Mosul, Captain Cemil, an escorting regular army unit and some irregulars from Mosul waited in ambush behind. Omari Reshid from the Mosul Notables, Ali Effendi the Preacher of Prophet Sheeth Mosque and couple of their companions knocked the door and said that they would like to talk about some important issues. As the door opened, they had asked to take Sheikh Said to the presence of Governor in the name of taking necessary measures for avoiding further mischief. However, Sheikh had refrained from coming and tried to convince them that he cannot get involved into this issue since he was not a native resident of Mosul or had

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Müfsidin pişegânının erkânından olan Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey esâsen yırtıcı hayvan ve azur-ı zehrefşandan beter muzır bir mahlûk olmak cihetle Musul’a can atarak kendisi ve orada bulunduğu rüfeka-yı mel’aneti daha uzaklara defimizi ve sâirine teşebbüs etmiş ve bundan me’yûs kalınca Musul’un meşhûr ve hatta hûnhâr canavarları ıtmah ve kendilerine itbâ’ya iknâ ve fikirlerini semûm mefâsid-i müdhişeyle işbâ ederek”

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not have such an official authority. Eventually he was not able to convince them and desperately surrendered himself to be taken to the Government Hall after he gave his Koran to his servant. At the gate of Government Hall, Omari Reshid, Ali and their companions walked away from Sheikh Said. The servant of Major Ali Said approached first, insulted and trampled on the Koran and they killed Sheikh Said in such a brutal way which can make the angels cry and make the spirits of martyrs tremble (Sâkinân-ı Melekûtu ağlatacak ve Ervâh-ı Şühedâyı titretecek sûret-i vahşiyânede katl). Meanwhile the Mosul Governor and Commander were watching the incident twenty thousand steps away from the crime scene just like onlookers. Then the aggressors had intruded Sheikh’s house, had killed his noble son Sheikh Ahmed with his relatives and affiliates of 42 individuals, had extorted livestock animals and cash worth of more than 5.000 lira and had looted from household items to clothes on the martyrs. These wild monsters with their eyes full of looting, acquisition and blood, had randomly killed or injured poor people from Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. They had shot people by firearms or killed barehandedly, had thrown the wounded to Tigris (Dicle) river and even burnt people alive in furnaces. The impact of the tragedy they had created was more severe than the horror of judgment day (sû-i tesiri dehşet-i mahşerden eşedd bir Fâcia-yı Kerb ü Belâ).²³⁵

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Iyd-i Edhâ’nın üçüncü günü sâika-yı bedmesti ile askerden bir neferin seyrangâhda her yerde yevmiyye belki yüzlerce emsâli görüldüğü hâlde nazar-ı ehemmiyete alınmayan âdî bir tecâvüzü asker ve ahâli arasında büyük bir yangın gibi iktisab-ı tevsi ve fecaat eylemesini tam husûl-u maksadlarına uygun bir fırsat ittihâzıyla müstahzırları olan fesâd bombasına ateş vermek hatta hareketi de o günün gecesi zarfında bilmüzekkere karârgîr olduğunun sabahıyla karârın tatbikatına mübâşeretle ihtiba ve evvel emirde Vâli nezdine azimet ve dün günkü vak’ada bulunan efrâd-ı askeriyyeyi li-ecli i’dâm ellerine teslim olunmasını teklif misilli divanelerin dahi kabûl edemeyeceği mütâlebeyi […] etmiş ve bittabi Vâli tarafından vuku bulan red üzerine “Öyleyse biz de bildiğimizi yaparız!” diyerek Hükûmetten nihâyet 60 metre uzakta olan Şeyh Said efendinin hânesine gelmişler ve Süleymaniyeli Nûri Arab nâm Yüzbaşı ve Süvâri Kolağası Musullu Dâvud, Yüzbaşı Cemil Efendiler refâkatlerindeki efrâd-ı nizâmiye ve Musullu başıbozuktan mürekkeb itbâ’ileriyle pusuya bırakarak Musul Mûteberânından Ömeri Reşid ve Nebî Şît Aleyhisselam Hazretlerinin Hatibi Ali efendilerle birkaç refikleri Şeyhlerin kapısını çalarak bazı husûsat-ı mühime için görüşmek istediklerini beyân ve iknâ etmeleri üzerine kapı açılmış ve bu işin fesâdı teskin tedâbirini ittihâz zımnında behemehâl Vâli nezdine azimetini teklif ve Şeyh tarafından her ne kadar Musullu olmamak ve memûriyetinin bulunmamak cihetle böyle bir işe medhal edemeyeceğini dermeyân ve imtinâ etmiş ise de kârgir olmadığından Şeyh Efendi nâçâr ‘İnnallâh’ diyerek nefsini anlara teslim ve Hazret-i Kur’ânı üstünce kaldırmak üzere hizmetçisine vermiş ve saraya doğrulmuştur. Saray kapısı önünde merkumun Ömeri Reşid ve Ali ve refikaları Şeyhten uzaklaşarak en ibtida Ali Said Bey’in hizmetçisi takrib ve Hazret-i Kur’ânı zir-i pay hakarete alarak Musul Vâli ve Kumandanının seyirci gibi durdukları mahalden nihâyet yirmi bin hatve uzaktan Sâkinân-ı Melekûtu ağlatacak ve Ervâh-ı Şühedâyı titretecek sûret-i vahşiyânede katl ve ondan sonra da hânesinde mahdûm-u necibi Şeyh Ahmed Efendiyi kırk iki nefer ekarib ve müteallikatıyla itlâf ve Beş Bin liradan ziyâde değeri olan mevâşi ve sâir nukûdu ve eşyâyı şühedâ üzerindeki elbiseye kadar nehb ve gasb edilmesine ve gözlerini yağmagirlik ve tama’ ve kan bürümüş şu vahşi canavar-

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Sâdât accepts the harassment of Kirkuk mule cavalry but trivializes it by presenting as an event that can be seen anytime, anywhere and would not be taken into account under normal circumstances (nazar-ı ehemmiyete alınmayan âdî bir tecâvüz). Moreover, despite being an Islamic clique, Sâdât admits that the soldier committed the crime under the influence of alcohol (sâika-yı bedmesti) and tries to normalize the soldier’s behavior relying on this argument. On the other hand, as we will see in later chapters, it was claimed that the people leading the crowd were Reshid al-Omari and Imam Ali from the Ulema. At this point, Sâdât condemns these lynchers and argues that they pose a clear and present threat to the Constitutional regime. The manifest also underlines how the Sâdât constitutes a center of gravity in the eyes of the people from an Islamic point of view: These scoundrels, who violate the Supreme Constitutional Monarchy in every way, put the province in a new danger every day, mislead and deceive the public on every occasion. Although this is perceived as the Second Karbala Incident in the eyes of the public, the bad impression of this incident on the clansmen, tribesmen and on the inhabitants of the villages and towns will never destroy their love toward Sâdât. Because the divine love of so many people for nearly one hundred thousand Sadaat al-Kiram / Sâdât-ı Kirâm [all Sayyids who have ever lived] was acknowledged as a religious duty by the verses of the Qur’an. And all these communities were full of love and friendship towards these Sheikhs who were considered as the last heirlooms of the prophets.²³⁶

According to Sâdât, the strategic extent of the incident also disclosed how the senior staff were involved in the conspiracy and how they managed to conceal it from the superior authorities in İstanbul: Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha, Former Sub-Governor Tevfik and Former Commander Mustafa Pashas were the major architects and promoters of this huge tragedy on many levels. In addition to them, the gradual involvements and participations of General Staff Major Ali

ların artık nereli oldukları aranılmayarak Kerküklü, Süleymaniyeli, Erbilli ve sâireli gurebâdan tesâdüf edebildiklerini kurşun ve elle cerh ile katl ve mecrûhan Dicle Nehrine ilka ve hatta diri diri külhanlarda ateşe ihrâk gibi sû-i tesiri dehşet-i mahşerden eşedd bir Fâcia-yı Kerb ü Belânın vâki olmasına sebebiyet vermişlerdir.”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Meşrûtiyet-i Celileyi her sûretle ihlâl ,vilâyeti her gün yeni bir tehlikeye ilka, efkâr-ı umûmiyyeyi her vesileyle taglit ve iğfâl eden bu alçaklar, enzâr-ı âmmede Vak’a-yı Kerbelâ’nın Sânisi olarak telâkki edilmesi cihetiyle yüz bine karib Sâdât-ı Kirâm ile muhabbetleri nass-ı celil-i Kur’anıyla farz ve vedian hazret-i hâtemü’n-nebiyyin olan ehl-i nübüvvete karşı hissiyât-ı hâlise-i meveddetkârâne ile mütehassis kabâil ve aşâir efrâdıyla kurâ ve kasabât sekenesi ve bunlara mensûb ahâli üzerinde hâsıl eylediği sû-i tesir sâikasıyla asla sönmez söndürülmesi kat’a mümkün olamaz.”

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Said, Sulaymaniyah Deputy Batallion Commander Fehmi and Senior Captain Sâlih, were undeniable. Former Mosul Governor Zeki and Commander Major General (Ferik) Zühdü were undeniably involved since they had favored and appreciated the despicable deceptions by Ali Said, Fehmi and Sâlih without regarding any formal allegation or a judicial verdict. Even the entire provincial community was impartially convinced in the innocence of Sâdât, these names acted in such infidelity and shamelessness that would even disgust the demons. Through these abilities, they were able to disguise their fields of evil, degrade and downplay the issue into a very common incident in the eyes of imperial authorities. It was noticed with a great sorrow and astonishment that they had sent fake-sealed defamation letters to the press and had misguided the superior authorities through falsifying the incident as insignificant and minor. In addition to all the atrocities they have committed so far, they have now intended to tarnish the reputation and crush the personal liberties of Sâdât.²³⁷

In the manifest, it is perceived that the gap between Sâdât and the state has widened, the social polarization has intensified, and as it will be seen in the following sections, Sâdât could mobilize some elements from the public. However, a month before that, the state had to reduce the tension in Mosul, ensure the public order and adopt a calming attitude towards the Kurdish community. After this assassination, which was allegedly involved some state elements as well, chaos would spread throughout the province and the state would resort to different tactical maneuvers to pacify the region.

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Fecayi-i azimenin her lahza berpâ olmasına müstaid ve bu meselede Caflı Mahmud Paşa ve Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı ve Kumandan-ı sâbıkı Tevfik ve Mustafa Paşalarla avenelerinin esâmileri bâlâda mâruz eşhâs ve alelhusûs Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey ve Süleymaniye Taburu Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Sâlih Efendilerin ve bunların tezvirât-ı danaetkârânelerini bilâhükm bilâ-müstenid tervic eyleyen Musul Vâli-i Sâbıkı Zeki ve Kumandanı Ferik Zühdü Paşaların işbu muamelât-ı câniyanede derece derece medhal ve müşâreketleri gayri münker ve bizim mâsûmiyetimize bir vilâyetin bitaraf bütün ahâlisi kani bulunduğu hâlde şeytanları bile nefrete mecbûr edecek dinsizliği, arsızlığı irtikâbla fazâyih-i şenâatkârilerini setre medâr olmakla beraber Makamât-ı Aliyyece de meseleyi pek âdî göstererek ehemmiyetin düşürmek ve bunca mezâlime ilâveten bizi lekedâr ve hukuk-u hürriyemizi pâyimal eylemek fikriyle sahte mühürle matbûâta iftirânâmeler yollamakta ve Makamât-ı Celileye de ise esâsından tahrif edecek sûrette hafif ve ehemmiyetsiz olarak resmen bildirmekte oldukları kemâl-i istigrab ve tesirle görülmüş ve anlaşılmıştır.”

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3.4 The Mosul Incident Through the Eyes of Ottoman Military Officers Different comments and evaluations from the Ottoman military officers regarding the Mosul Incident also reached to the central authorities. In this section, three different letters from three Ottoman army officers reached to the central authorities will be analyzed. The most striking point here was the harsh criticism of the officers against their commanders in the army which they belonged and the provincial administration in the face of the incident. The embarrassment and anger they felt over the failure of their own comrades in arms to manage this crisis had found its place in the lines. In addition, there were shocking allegations and criticisms against the governor in these lines. The officers also shared their post-incident concerns and regional experiences that could provide guidance for further stages. The letter sent by Major Reşid from the Erbil Reserve Battalion (Redif Taburu) to the Ministry of War on January 10 is quite interesting in terms of seeing the diversity of perspectives on the incident within the army (see Illustration 6). As an Ottoman officer who knew the region well, Major Reşid reported that alarming thoughts and opinions prevailed in the region.²³⁸ As a result of the

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 10 January 1909; Lef 4, 30 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 12 January 1909 “Umûm Erkân-ı Harbiye Dâiresi / Üçüncü Şûbesi 27 vusûlü 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324 evvelki mâruzâtıma zeyldir. Kari vesâire kıyâfetlerle Musul’dan gelen Erbilli Kerküklü Süleymaniyeliler vak’ayı dehşetli sûrette söylemekte ve buradan ahâli tarafından Musul’a çekilen telgraflara gelen cevâblar dahi bunu teyid etmekte ve Musul ahâlisinden buradaki Musullulara gelen telgraflar da tahaffuz üzere bulundu ihtâr olunmakta. Bu havâlinin vahşet-i mizâc ve taassub-u diyânetleri nokta-i nazarından buraca endişeler ve husûsuyla Süleymaniye’de İyd Vak’asının hudusu ihtimâlât-ı […] karşı netâyic-i vahime husûsuna mülâhazalar hükümfermâ olmakta olduğu ve bir jandarma neferine varıncaya kadar hükûmetin tasavvur ve icrââtına maddi ve mânevi ve sürekli tesirleri mûcib olan bu vak’a-i müdhişenin esnâ-yı vukuunda Mülâzımdan Fırka Kumandanına ve Vâlisine gelinceye kadar hiçbirinin bir parmağı bile acımayarak yalnız asker ve ahâli arasında bu kıtâlin ve Süleymaniye Sâdât’ının rivâyet sahih ise Kerbelâ Vak’asından daha dil-sûz olan fâcialarının böylece vukuu her vatanperveri ve husûsiyle her askeri cidden dağdâr-ı tesir etti. Esnâ-yı vak’ada Zâbitân ve Ümerâ ve Erkânın kari gibi bir tarafa saklandıklarına ve hayâtlarını muazzez tuttuklarına hükmediliyor ki hakikaten târih-i askerimize ve İnkılâb-ı Mes’ûdu istihsâl eden kahramanların destanlarına bir leke koymuştur ki işte bu kadarla arz ve tasvir edebiliyorum. Zât-ı Sâmileri burada olmalıydınız da ahvâl ve heyecânı rey’ül ayn görmeliydiniz. Sâdât’tan Seyyid Ahmed’in ve dünkü gün buralardan o cihetlere geçmesi ve bu ahbâr-ı felâketin henüz Süleymaniye’ye aksetmesi üzerinde ne gibi hâdiseler vukua geleceği kestirilemez ise de vak’anın esâsı îtibâriyle her hâlin Bâb-ı Âli’ce ehemmiyetle bakılacak ve hatta Meclis-i Mebûsân’ın en akdes

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statements of those who returned from Mosul to Erbil after the incident and the telegraph correspondence with Mosul, the terror created by the incident quickly resonated in the region. He pointed out that the incident could have dire consequences especially in Sulaymaniyah, due to the wild temperament and religious fanaticism of the local community (bu havâlinin vahşet-i mizâc ve taassub-u diyânetleri). These were legitimate concerns, and Major Reşid, like any patriotic soldier, was performing his duty by sharing his local experiences and observations. However, in the following part of the letter, the style changed considerably, and serious criticisms were directed against both the provincial administration and the local military formation. Reşid wrote that at the time of this dreadful incident, from the Lieutenant to the Division Commander or even the Governor, none of them suffered the slightest damage (hiçbirinin bir parmağı bile acımayarak), and that the fighting took place only between the common soldier and the people. According to Reşid, this disaster which was compared with the Karbala Incident, seriously affected every patriot and every soldier in the Ottoman army. Reşid strikingly claimed that the regular, senior, and top-rank Ottoman military officers (Zâbitân ve Ümerâ ve Erkânın) ran and hid aside to protect their own lives during the incident. And for him, this had overwhelmingly tainted the Ottoman military history and the epic of the heroes who carried out the Constitutionalist Revolution. Major Reşid also reported the extraordinary activity on the Sâdât front such as Sayyid Ahmed’s (Baba Rasulzadeh) departure for the direction of Sulaymaniyah the day before and noted that and this move could lead to unpredictable threats. According to him, assessing the unpredictable consequences of a disaster of this scale was the most sacred and important duty of both Sublime Porte and Ottoman Parliament. Major Reşid’s views on the Commanders who were considered to be appointed as the Military Governor of Mosul were also notewor-

ve ehemm vezâifinden mâdud olacak bir mikyasta görüyorum. Bazı esbâb dolayısıyla dahi evvelce de arz ettiğim veçhiyle diğer bir mevkiiden daha büyük mikyasta vatanıma milletime ibrâz-i fedâkâri ve hidmet ve arz-ı sadâkat edeceğimden şimdilik bu kadarla iktifâ ile ve buralara Müşir Abdullah Paşa gibi mücessem-i hamiyyet, Basra Vâli-i Esbakı, Ferikan-ı Kirâmdan Muhlis Paşa gibi istihkar-ı hayât ve menfaatde şöhret olan ricâl-i askeriyye ve bu […] Memûrîn-i Mülkiye ve Adliyeden bir Heyet-i Tahkikiyenin seyr-ü seri ile i’zâmını ehemmiyet tahtında görüyorum. Buralara taburlardan daha müessir iş görecek vatanperver muktedir faal cesur kumandanlarla iffet mücessemi sâhib-i akil ve zekâ memûrînin vücûduna eşedd-i ihtiyâc bulunduğu dahi âzâde-i arzdır. Telgraflarımın resmen kabûlü için bura Telgraf Müdirliğine emr-i îtâ ettirilmesi dahi müsterhamdır. Ey sâhib-i hamiyyet Nâzır […] Paşa hazretleri. Neme lâzım demeyen ve menâfi-i vatan ve milleti dâima tâkib eden: Binbaşı Reşid”

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thy. In Reşid’s opinion, it would be much more appropriate to appoint Marshal (Müşir) Abdullah Pasha who is well known for his patriotism and honor (mücessem-i hamiyyet) or Major General (Ferikan-ı Kirâmdan) Muhlis Pasha, a former Governor of Basrah and who is famous for sacrificing his own life and interests for his duty (istihkar-ı hayât ve menfaatde şöhret olan). It was also essential that an Investigative Committee (Heyet-i Tahkikiye) composed of Judicial and Civil Officials be dispatched expeditiously. Reşid also underlined the acute need for more active, patriotic, capable, and brave commanders with honorable, sane and intelligent state officials in Mosul. The Minister of War Ali Rızâ Pasha, who thoroughly examined Reşid’s letter from a military perspective, shared it with the Ministry of Interior and drew particular attention to the regional need for competent, qualified and intelligent officials in the region. Although it is not naturally seen in the correspondence whether Major Reşid is of Kurdish origin or not, what he wrote can be evaluated in terms of the ethnic or religious sensitivities of an ordinary Ottoman officer at first glance. However, considering the extent of the negligence, misconduct and atrocity described, it may seem more plausible that this reflex should include the views of a Constitutionalist officer who was ‘responsible’ towards his homeland. What Major Reşid wrote should have been an idealistic and humane reflex of an Ottoman officer who began to worry about the embracive and inclusive principles of new regime rather than whether the victim was such a prominent Kurdish leader or religious figure such as Said. Because similar sensitivities were observed in some other letters sent by different army members. However, it was remarkable that an ordinary Major like Reşid made comments on matters such as nominating the Military Governor to be appointed, that were far beyond his authority and responsibility. More interestingly, almost a week after Reşid’s message, the Ministries of Interior and War were to discuss the nomination of the very same names (see footnote 176). However, at this point, we do not understand whether these names were discussed just because Major Reşid’s suggestions were taken into account at the ministerial level. Because, another possibility was that Reşid probably brought the nominated names to the agenda since he already knew them. Either way, his access to the decision mechanisms at this level makes us think that Major Reşid may have connections in supreme military or civilian offices. The letter sent by First Lieutenant (Mülâzım-ı Evvel) Mehmed Sâlim, who served in Mosul, to İbrâhim Edhem, one of the 2nd Army officers, and which attracted the attention of the higher authorities is really worth a close look.²³⁹ The

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909

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Illustration 6: BOA, DH.MKT.2708/91/Lef 3, 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324 – 10 January 1909 The letter sent by Major Reşid of Erbil Reserve Battalion (Redif Taburu) to the Ministry of War, including his observations, concerns and allegations regarding the Mosul Incident

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letter, written in a very friendly manner between two sincere friends, told the pain and anxiety of the days through the eyes of an officer who personally witnessed the events (see Illustration 7). Mehmed Sâlim depicts the outbreak of the gunfight as follows: That is to say, at about 8 o’clock on the third day of the feast, a drunk soldier of the mule cavalry unit somehow catcalls [verbally abuses] a woman at Bab al-Toub locality. Not to mention the neatness and cleanliness of this place what they call a first-class promenade. When the people of Mosul in the vicinity begin to beat this soldier, a few of his friends get involved with the idea of saving him. The fight which started with a slap before, continues with wood [probably means a stick or baton] when the people of Mosul see them. As the mule cavalries saw them gathering, they said, “This infidel community will kill us!” (Bu kâfir millet bizi öldürecek!) and they pulled their handguns for intimidating the crowd. As soon as the crowd saw this move, thousands of people attacked them and packed them into the mule cavalry stables with their revolvers and pistols.²⁴⁰

As in Refik Hilmi’s account, Mehmed Sâlim does not mention about any physical harassment and reflects the reason for the incident as verbal abuse (lakırdı atmak) only. Failure in the management of the crisis is stated in different expressions in the letter: Our pashas who heard the gunshots, that ‘lowlife’ Zeki Pasha who is the Governor of Mosul today, sent a company of cavalry under the command of Colonel Enis Bey to the scene and then they all retreated. Although the people calmed down when they saw the incoming soldiers, Enis Bey, under the influence of intoxication, ordered the soldier to attack and fire on the mule cavalry. As the incoming cavalry was of Mosul origin, they immediately started shooting at mule cavalries. When the people of Mosul saw this, they came to assist their own soldiers and they, too, started shooting at the mule cavalry. Oh brother, this is happening right around the mansion where I live. At that moment, our Governor came and gave advice to the people, regretting his order, but they drove him away by throwing stones.

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 “İhbârâta nazaran Süleymaniye tarafından yirmi bin aşâir Musul’a hücûm edecekler. Allah muinimiz olsun. Huzûr-u Birâderime / İki Gözüm Kardaşım […] İşte yukarıda beyân ettiğim […] muhtasar bir sûrette beyân edeceğim. Şöyle ki bayramın üçüncü günü saat sekiz raddelerinde ester süvâr askerinden bir sarhoş nefer; Bâb-ı Tub mevkiinde ve kendilerinin birinci mesire tabir ettikleri mahaldeki nezâfet ve tahâreti beyâna hâcet yok anlarsınız, her nasılsa kadının birine lakırdı atar. Civarda bulunan Musul ahâlisi bu askeri dövmeye başlayınca arkadaşlarından birkaç kişi kurtarmak fikriyle ahâli arasına girer. Evvelce tokatla olan kavga bunları görünce ağaçla başladı. Efrâd bunu görünce ‘Bu kâfir millet bizi öldürecek!’ diye tehdid için tabancalarını çektiler. Bunu görür görmez binlerce ahâli üzerlerine hücûm edip revolver ve tabancalar ile bunları ester süvâr tavlasına doldurdular”

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The incident lasted until 2 o’clock in the middle of the night and although it was stopped afterwards, both sides suffered too many casualties.²⁴¹

In the letter, Governor Zeki was depicted as a ‘lowlife’ (alçak) in an insulting manner. How could it possibly be that a young Ottoman officer hated the Governor of his own state so much? In addition, it is claimed that Colonel Enis Bey who ordered fire on the Kirkuk cavalry taken cover in the stables, was intoxicated (sarhoşluk sâikasıyla). A false move such as the engagement of Mosul’s horseback cavalry (esb süvâr) of Arab origin with the Kirkuk’s mule cavalry (ester süvâr) of Kurdish origin may have fueled the ancient dispute between the two ethnicities and escalated the events. Mehmed Sâlim also writes that the fuse of the next day’s incident was ignited by the Ulema, just like in other accounts. In the morning, a few Sheikhs and Ulema go to the Governor and demand the murder of famous Sheikh Said who had been exiled from Sulaymaniyah, with his aides and the surviving mule cavalry. And although the Governor refuses this demand, he orders these Sheikhs and Ulema to ’Take your weapons and come and do whatever you want!’ (Silahlarınızı alıp geliniz, istediğinizi yapınız!). Thereupon, the Ulema called criers to the market, made them to announce, ’It is permissible to kill them!’ (Bunların katlleri câizdir!) and everyone took their weapons and came.²⁴²

The killing of Sheikh Said is quite dramatized in the letter: First of all, they plundered the mansion of Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Bey. After plundering a few more households, they attacked Sheikh Said’s mansion. After firing

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 “Silah sadâsını işiten paşalarımız, o alçak Zeki Paşa ki bugün Musul’da Vâli bulunur, Miralay Enis Bey saffında olarak bir bölük süvârı mahal-i vak’aya gönderdi ve kendileri de birlik de çekildiler. Evvelce ahâli askeri görünce ibrâz-ı sükûnet ettiler ise de Enis Bey sarhoşluk sâikasıyla askere ester süvâr üzerine hücûm ve ateş emrini verdi. Zâten süvâri askerleri de Musullu olmak münâsebetiyle derhâl üzerlerinde ateş etmeye başladı. Musul ahâlisi bu hâli görünce […] askerine imdat için gelmiş, bunlar da süvârilere birlikte ateş etmeye başladılar. Ah kardaşım tam bu vukuat benim oturduğum konak civarında cereyân ediyor. O sırada […] Vâlimiz geldi verdiği emre pişman olarak ahâliye nasihat etti ise de kendisini taş ile kovdular ki bu vukuat gece saat iki […] kadar devâm edip hitâm verdiler ise de tarafeynden birçok maktûl ve mecrûh oldu.”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 “Sabahleyin Şeyh ve Ulemâlardan birkaç kişi […] Vâli yanına giderek evvelce Süleymaniye’den menfî gelen meşhûr Şeyh Said ki […] dir, avenesiyle mütebâkî kalan ester süvârların katlini talep eder […] ve almasa da kendilerine ‘Silahlarınızı alıp geliniz, istediğinizi yapınız!’ emrini verir. Bunun üzerine Ulemâlar da ‘Bunların katlleri câizdir!’ diye alenen çarşıda tellal çağırdı. Bunun üzerine herkes silahlarını alıp geldiler.”

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many bullets, they started breaking the door. This man, a descendant of the Prophet, took the Quran in his hand with a wretched cry and wished for mercy. This savage crowd slaughtered this man like a sheep after that monstrous creature smashed the Quran into pieces. Then they slaughtered his sons, then his servants, and finally his visitors, and then they plundered all of their property, close to 10.000 lira. Of these, only the Baba Rasul Sheikh Ahmed, Said’s two sons and a few of his men survived. According to his son’s testimony, 44 of 62 people were killed.²⁴³

The looted amount, which was previously stated as 5.000 lira in Sâdât ’s statement, was now strangely stated as almost 10.000 lira. In addition, Mehmed Sâlim claimed that both of Said’s sons were survived. This makes us think that Sheikh Ahmed Barzanji may have survived the incident seriously injured, but later deceased. The brutality and chaos experienced in Mosul after the incident is narrated with horrible expressions: This incident continued until the evening. Public life is in great danger. What I mean by this public life is all the miserable people of Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk who are away from their homes. Not even contented with this, they [Mosulites] claim that they don’t want any of the nonlocal military officers and civil servants around. Let’s see what God will do. The number of bullets fired so far has reached 10 thousand. Although the authorities keep the number of death and wounded confidential, we know that there are about 150 individuals, mostly ordinary people and soldiers, and even more estimated. Because they throw many of them into the river after they have killed them, three or four corpses are found from the forest and the river every day. They committed a wide variety of evil deeds, such as burning a few men alive in a furnace, throwing many into wells, cutting off the nose and ears of a few before killing, and skinning some alive. They claim that even if there are soldiers coming from around, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah will not let their soldiers go. In fact, three days after the incident, 100 mule cavalries were coming from Kirkuk. Upon hearing this, the people closed their shops and attempted to revolt, but the Governor ensured that no soldiers would come. And now these soldiers are being held in Erbil. Although soldiers are expected to come here from Damascus, Aleppo and Erzurum, there is no news yet. Now the ordinary people usually walk with guns. Nobody is sure about his life. Let’s see what the order of

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 “Evvela Süvâri Kaimakamı Mustafa Bey’in konağını yağma ettiler. Sonra diğer bir hâne daha sonra da birkaç […] hânelerini yağma ettiler. Sonra yukarıca arz olunan Şeyh Said’in konağına hücûm ettiler. Birçok kurşun endahtından sonra da kapıyı kırmaya başladılar. Bîçâre bir vâveylâda Resûlden olan şu adam Kur’ân-ı Kerimi alarak dehâlete geldi. Bu vahşi millet bu canavar mahlûk Kur’ân-ı Kerimi parça parça ettikten sonra koyun gibi bu adamı kestiler. Sonra da evlatlarını ba’de hidmetlilerini en sonra da yanlarına ziyâret için gelmiş olanları katl ve umûm malları ki On Bin liraya yakın idi cümlesini nehbettiler. Bunların içlerinden yalnız Şeyh Ahmed Baba Resûl ile iki oğlu ve birkaç adamı halâs oldular ki oğlunun ifâdesine nazaran altmış iki kişiden kırk dört kişi katl olunmuş.”

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Illustration 7.1: BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324 – 18 January 1909 The letter sent by First Lieutenant (Mülâzım-ı Evvel) Mehmed Sâlim who was stationed in Mosul, to his friend İbrâhim Edhem in the 2nd Army, including his witnessing, observations, concerns and allegations regarding the Mosul Incident. God is. I ask you to give your blessing of our brotherhood rights (hukuk-u ihvân), as none of us will survive if there is any public agitation once again. I will not be able to give any more details because I would disturb you very much. Your Brother First Lieutenant Mehmed Sâlim²⁴⁴

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 1, 5 Kânûnusâni 1324– 18 January 1909 “Bu vukuat akşama kadar devâm etti. Hayât-ı umûmiye büyük bir tehlike içerisinde bulunur. Bu

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Illustration 7.2: See Illustration 7.1

hayât-ı umûmiyeden maksadım ne kadar garib ve Süleymaniye Kerkük ahâlisi var ise bunlardır. Bununla da iktifâ etmeyip ne kadar garib Zâbitân ve Mülkiye Memûrları var ise hiçbirini istemeyiz diye iddia ediyorlar. Bakalım Cenâb-ı Hakk ne yapar? Şimdi endaht olunan kurşunların adedi on bine bâliğ oldu. Maktûl ve Mecrûhların adedini her ne kadar hafi tutuyorlarsa da ekserisi garib ve asker olmak üzere yüz elli kadar var belki de fazladır bilmiyoruz. Zira birçoğunu katlettikten sonra nehre atmış […] her gün nehir ve ormandan üç dört kişi buluyorlar ve birkaç adamı sağ olarak külhanda yaktıkları ve birçoklarını kuyulara atmak ve birkaç kişinin burun ve kulağını keserek sonra öldürmek, derisini yüzmek gibi envâ-ı türlü hakaret yaptılar. Etrâftan asker geliyor ise de Kerkük Süleymaniye askerini bırakmaz diye iddia ediyorlar. Hatta vukuattan üç gün sonra Kerkük’ten yüz ester süvâr geliyordu. Bunu işitince ahâli dükkânları kapayıp isyan yapmak istedilerse de Vâli askerin gelmemesi için temin etti. Ve şimdi Erbil’de bulunuyorlar.

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The letter was truly remarkable, both for its content, its emotion, and its urgency. Mehmed Sâlim had added an expression ‘According to the reports, twenty thousand tribesmen will attack Mosul from the direction of Sulaymaniyah. God help us!’, at the beginning of the letter. Although he is thought to be a loyal soldier to his homeland, it can be thought that Mehmed Sâlim exaggerated the events by including his personal feelings. However, it does not seem appropriate for İbrâhim Edhem, to whom such a critical letter was sent, to remain it in his personal possession and to conceal it from the higher authorities. After reading the letter, he added a cover letter containing his comments and sent both letters directly to the Ministry of Interior by-passing the 2nd Army Command or the Ministry of War that in his chain of command. The third letter we will examine is this cover letter by İbrâhim Edhem (see Illustration 8). In his cover letter, Edhem mentioned the letter he received from his friend in Mosul Province, which has turned into a ‘human slaughterhouse’ (mezbaha-i beşer) through the ongoing skirmishes and killings in the last few months.²⁴⁵

Buraya Şam, Haleb, Erzurum’dan asker gelecek ise de daha bir haber yoktur. Şimdi ahâli umûmiyetle silahlı geziniyorlar. Hiç kimse hayâtından emin değil. Bakalım Cenâb-ı Hakkın emri ne yoldadır. Eğer bir defa daha heyecân yaparlarsa hiçbirimiz halâs olamayacağı, bunun için de eğer böyle bir şey olursa hukuk-u ihvânınızı helâl etmenizi rica ederim. Daha ziyâde tafsilât veremeyeceğim zira sizi çok tasdi’ ederim. Mülâzım-ı Evvel Birâderiniz Mehmed Sâlim”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 2, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909 Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesi Pişgâh-ı Sâmisine “Mâruz-u Bendeleridir. Bir seneden beri […] birkaç aydan beri adeta mukatele ve mezbaha-i beşer hâli kesb eden Musul Vilâyetinden , orada bulunan arkadaşımdan bu hafta aldığım mektûbu – mündericât-ı müessifesinin kısm-i azimi mesûliyet-i devletleriyle daha ziyâde münâsebetdâr olmak hasebiyle – sevki himmetiyle leffen inzar-ı devletlerine arz etmeği vicdânım […] emretti. Evet, mesleğime, vazife-i mesûliyetime , kat’en temâsı olmak değil, Makam-ı Âli-i âidenize, usûl ve kanuna mugayir ve gayri resmi bir sûrette beyânatta bulunmak , dâima mücâzât-ı şedide olduğunu ayn-el yakin […] ettiğim hâlde bu yüzden tertib edecek kâffe-i mesûliyete ağmaz-ul ayn ederek hâl-i ihtizarda bulunan vatan ve milletin tahlis-i girîbânına şitâb edecek ricâl-i devletin teyakkuzunu taleb edebilirim ümidiyle mürâcaat-ı vâkıâya cüret-yâb oldum. Vukuu yirmi beş, otuz günü mütecâviz olan vak’a-i dilhıraşı zât-ı devletlerinin hemen o anda istihbâr eylediğinizce bî-irtiyâbdır. Fakat bu husûsta istihsâl buyrulan mâlûmat şüphesiz ki bir refik-i sâdıkım Sâlim Efendinin mektûbunda musavver harekât-ı sibâ’nenin fail-i müştereği sayılan Vâli Paşa tarafından resmen makam-ı devletlerine arz olunmuş ve müşârünileyhin iş’ârı vermiş olduğu emr-i hâinânesinden mütevellid netice-i muzırranın mesûliyetini beri […] kalmak fikr-i hâmıyla işi ehemmiyetini dûn, daha ehven bir zeminde beyân etmiş olduğu vârid-i hatr olduğu cihetle – zehâbım kulunuzu hatâya düşürmemiş ise – tahkik ve tâyin-i keyfiyet buyurulmasını ve istirâhat ve hayâtları her an mâruz-u tehlike bulunan vatan kurbanlarının istihsâl-i refâhetlerinin temini, eyyâm-ı İstibdâdda bile icrâât-ı hükûmette hak ve adâleti rehber-i harekât ittihâz etmiş bulunan Zât-ı Sâmi-i Cenâb-ı

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As most of the tragic content of the letter was related to the Ministry of Interior, he listened to the voice of his conscience and sent the letter directly to that Ministry. He began by reminding that he was aware of his profession, responsibility and sense of duty. And as an army member, he had personally witnessed that making an unofficial statement to the Ministerial office, in violation of law and conditions, always entailed severe punishment (mücâzât -ı şedide). Nevertheless, his patriotism prevailed, and he took all the risks and all the responsibility that could arise. He dared to send this letter, hoping to alarm the statesmen for the swift rescue of this homeland and nation dying in agony. Apparently, İbrâhim Edhem was well aware that he was violating the hierarchy and bureaucratic tendencies as he by-passed the 2nd Army and the Ministry of War to which he was affiliated. But according to him he had to take risks, especially since the issue was tied on Governor Zeki. Based on the letter from Mehmed Sâlim, Edhem claimed that Governor Zeki did not report the events as they were, he distorted them and misguided the Ministry. According to Edhem, Governor Zeki, who is considered as a co-perpetrator of a monstrous operation (harekât-ı sibâ’nenin fail-i müştereği), portrayed the incident as trivial and ordinary (ehemmiyetini dûn, daha ehven bir zeminde beyân etmiş) to avoid the responsibility of the harmful consequences that may arise from the treacherous orders he gave (emr-i hâinânesinden). From his perspective, Zeki wanted to keep Sublime Porte’s attention away from Mosul. Because, he had allegedly abused his office, had involved irregularities in a state-run operation and his misconduct had resulted in consequences that he had to conceal from İstanbul. At the end of the letter, Edhem asked the Minister, who did not make concession on rights and justice even during the Despotism regime, to investigate the case and to ensure the welfare of the people whose lives were in constant danger. The Minister of Interior Hüseyin Hilmi, was going to deliver the letter to the Ministry of War in a few days, due to its urgency and importance. In his statement, he summarized the content of the letter as the course of events during the Mosul Incident, the attitudes of some high-ranking officers towards the incident, and the treatment of the people towards the soldiers.²⁴⁶ The Minister did

Nezâretpenâhileri ki […] Nâzırların […] vatanperverânesinden ümid ve temenni eyleriz. Ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. İkinci Ordu-yu Osmâni Zâbitânından Vatan ve Milletine Sâdık, İbrâhim Edhem”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2736/66 /Lef 3, 29 Kânûnusâni 1324– 11 Şubat 1909 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Musul Vak’asının sûret-i cereyânına ve bazı Ümerâ-yı Askeriyyenin ahvâline ve ahâlinin askere karşı olan muamelâtına dâir Musul’dan bir zâbit tarafından İkinci Ordu Zâbitânından birine

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Illustration 8: BOA, DH.MKT.2736/66/Lef 2, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324 – 08 February 1909 The cover letter sent by İbrâhim Edhem from the 2nd Army to the Ministry of Interior regarding Mehmed Sâlim’s letter.

gönderilip taraf-ı âcizâneme tisyâr olunan mektûbun mündericâtı hâiz-i ehemmiyet görünmesiyle sûreti leffen savb-ı Âli-i Nezâretpenâhilerine irsâl kılındı. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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not add any statement or comment regarding the part of the letter directed at Governor Zeki, because the issue was within his own jurisdiction as the Minister of Interior, not within the Minister of War. However, just in those days, the political crisis between the Unionists and the Monarchists (Sultanists) intensified in İstanbul, unexpected developments took place and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha resigned from the ministry on February 12.²⁴⁷ On February 13, Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha would be dismissed with 198 votes of no confidence against 8 votes of confidence during the interpellation held in the Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebûsân) and the cabinet would be brought down. Although Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha resigned and transferred his duty to the Ministry of Education as his agent, he would assume the duties of both the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Interior in the new government cabinet established on 14 February. While there was such a busy agenda in İstanbul and Hüseyin Hilmi undertook these two extremely critical tasks, it is debatable how effective İbrâhim Edhem’s letter was in the higher authorities. Consequently, these allegations about Zeki’s failure in crisis management and misconduct in office created great unrest in the army and occupied the central authorities in İstanbul for a while. Another possibility was that the military officers like these petitioners would form the core of the Ententist clique that would stand against the Unionist officers in the Ottoman army. The Unionist-Ententist (İttihâdçı- Îtilâfçı) factionalism that would rise in the Ottoman army especially during the Balkan Wars, would bring the Post-Constitutional political split into the military arena. In other words, these officers who were inwardly opposed to the Unionist ideology, might have turned the Mosul Incident into an opportunity to tarnish the name of a military governor who was known for his Unionist background. Perhaps this is why they were able to criticize the Governor Zeki Pasha in such a reckless and offensive way when reporting him to the central authorities. Of course, considering that the central authority and the regime were also Unionist, this seems to be a possibility or an argument that needs to be justified and elaborated. Because it would be naive to think that these opponent officers had the luxury of complaining about a Unionist military governor to the Unionist central government. In any case, not the slightest statement could be found in the archive records that Ferik Zeki Pasha was the subject of any investigation or prosecution regarding the Mosul Incident. Considering his successful military, diplomatic and bureaucratic career, Zeki Pasha was seen as a respected and distinguished statesman in every way. Although he did not as-

 BOA, Y..EE..KP..34/3367, 31 Kânûnusâni 1324– 13 Şubat 1909; HR.SFR.04..833/25, 1 Şubat 1324– 14 Şubat 1909; BEO.3490/261729, 31 Kânûnusâni 1324– 12 Şubat 1909

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sume another governorship after leaving Mosul, he served as a commander in various fronts and armies, an inspector in strategic garrisons and an emissary in certain international delegations. Although the fate of the officers who wrote the letters is unknown, they may have faced personal enmity from the Mosul governor or commander if these letters heard afterwards. In any case, to conduct such correspondence directly at the ministerial level was a risky initiative for ordinary military personnel and a move that would endanger their careers. On the other hand, the fact that they were able to take this risk and displayed the courage to take this initiative could be a sign that the situation in Mosul has reached an unbearable level.

4 Reflections of the Mosul Incident on the Parliament 4.1 Parliamentary Disaccord Regarding the Incident This section will focus on the disaccord and disagreement that the Mosul Incident raised in the parliament. Particularly, the discussions on the jurisdiction between the executive and the legislative power and on the legitimacy of the banishment practice marked the sessions. It was also discussed in terms of hierarchy, procedure and customary practices that the Sheikhs bypassing the Governor and submitting their complaint directly to the parliament. In this section and in following two sections, all parliamentary minutes relevant with the Mosul Incident have been examined. In this direction, all the relevant opinions and motions by the deputies, except the ones for the technical functioning of the parliamentary regulations, are included. Although the original versions of all the relevant statements in the minutes are given in the footnotes, the texts have been simplified in contemporary English for easier understanding. Those who would like to examine the full text of the minutes and the course of the sessions can easily access the Latinized versions of all the Ottoman Parliamentary Minutes (Meclis-i Mebûsân Zabıt Ceridesi) after 1908 on the website of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The issue now went beyond a provincial scope and took an imperial perspective that would even occupy the parliament of the state. 15th session of Ottoman Chamber of Deputies dated 20th of January is worth of analyze in terms of showing how the parliament is divided over the political attitude, bureaucratic procedure and judicial method to be followed towards Sheikh Said Barzanji.²⁴⁸

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, “Devre 1, Cilt 1, İçtima senesi 1, İnikad 15, 7 Kânûnusâni 1324 Çarşamba/20 January 1909, Birinci Celse, “ p. 251– 261 https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MECMEB/mmbd01ic01c001/mmbd01ic01 c001ink015.pdf Unfortunately, in the parliamentary minutes, typographical errors can be encountered due to erroneous readings of archive materials, name similarities and confusion of topographical names. For this reason, the electoral districts, names and surnames of the deputies were doublechecked from different sources in the literature [please see below], these details were added to the study and possible errors were also analyzed and tried to be corrected. Kansu, The Revolution of 1908; Kansu, 1908 Devrimi; Aykut Kansu, Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908 – 1913 (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Aykut Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908 – 1913 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016); Fevzi Demir, Osmanlı Devleti’nde II. Meşrutiyet https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-011

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The relevant agenda item in the parliamentary minutes was: “The Memorandum of Grand Vizirate (Sadâret Tezkiresi) regarding the telegram (2 January 1909 / 20 Kânûnuevvel 1324) received from Sulaymaniyah including the crimes such as killings, lootings, oppression and banditry committed by Sheikh Said and his affiliates resided there.”²⁴⁹ The first to speak was the Diyarbekir Deputy Ârif Bey [Pirinççizâde] and he told that: First of all, Sheikh Said was the closest member of Sâdât (Sâdâtın en akrebidir) and was unfairly banished to Mosul through the ambitions of Sub-Governor and Commander. During the Despotism regime Governors and Sub-Governors had always defamed and scandalized such individuals of religious background and even after the promulgation of Constitutional Monarchy this attitude still continued. I demand that the Sub-Governor and the Commander be taken to the court upon their dismissal.²⁵⁰

Next deputy was Hızır Lütfi Bey from Zor (Deir ez-Zor / Deyr-i Zor) and he was a bureaucrat who knew Mosul very well. He had served in Mosul as ‘Correspondence Secretary Examining Clerk’ (Mektûbi Mümeyyizi) before 1900 and also took a temporary duty in the retinue of Governor Mustafa Yümnî between November 1905 and March 1906.²⁵¹ He stated that: As I had already served ex-officio in Mosul, I knew these Sheikhs and their cohorts very well and the accusations regarding their crimes were undeniable. Governor and provincial officers were extremely busy of corresponding and telegramming with higher authorities in order to prevent the oppression and banditry by these Sheikhs. Communications with Porte

Dönemi Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri 1908 – 1914 (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2007); George W. Gawrych, The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874 – 1913 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006)  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 249 “Süleymaniye’de meskûn Şeyh Said ve avenesinin katli nüfus, nehbi emval, icrâ-yı teaddi ve şekavet gibi cerâim irtikâp ettiklerine dair mahallinden mevrut telgraf hakkında Sadâret tezkiresi.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 252 “ARİF BEY (Diyarbekir) – Süleymaniye’de meskûn olan Sâdatı Berzenciyeden Şeyh Sait [sic] Efendi, en evvel, Sâdattandır. Sâdâttan Sait Efendi, Sâdâtın en akrebidir. Bu adamın haksız olarak Musul’a celbedildiği [sic] ve mutasarrıf ve kumandanın ihtirasatından münbais olduğu ve İstibdadı İdare zamanında valilerin, mutasarrıfların, bu gibi eşhas ve Sâdât hakkında daima iftiralar ve fezayih vücuda getirdikleri gibi, bu hâl, Usulü Meşrutiyetin teessüsünden sonra da vuku buluyor. Mutasarrıf ve kumandanlar, yalnız kaldırılmasıyla iktifa edilmeyip, muhakemelerinin icrasını talep ederim.”  BOA, DH.MKT. 1012/31/Lef 1, 29 Ağustos 1315 – 10 Eylül 1899 ; Lef 18, 25 Nisan 1323 – 08 May 1907

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and Imperial Chamberlain also confirm the accuracy of my statements. Their actions reached a countless level and went beyond their intentions now.

Illustration 9: Zor Deputy Hızır Lütfi Bey Source: SALT Research, Zor Mebusu Hızır Lütfi Bey, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi/Envelopes, https:// archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/17891, Access Date: 27. 06. 2021

According to Hızır Lütfi: The major violators of the provincial public order are these Sheikhs, and the order will not be restored as long as they resided there. Although the necessity of banishing them to a distant province was submitted to the Governorate, Sublime Porte and Imperial Chamberlain, these efforts had produced no effect so far and the ancien régime had facilitated their ability to oppress community. It is an undeniable and documented fact that they took shelter in caves, besieged the government building, opened fire on the public, government officials and each other. I suggest a severe punishment on these Sheikhs in order to protect the province from complete chaos and destruction.²⁵²

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 252 “HIZIR LÜTFİ BEY (Zor) – Şeyh Sait ve avenesinin katli nüfus (İşitilmiyor sedaları). Bendeniz hasbelme’muriye Musul’da birkaç seneler bulunduğum için, bu meşayih ve aveneleri hakkında malumatı tâmmem vardır. Sahibi telgraf Şeyh Sait ve avenesi hakkında dermeyan olunan mevad [sic], katli nüfus nehbi emval ve sair şeyler öteden beri bunların bu ahvali irtikâp [sic] edegelmekte oldukları gayri münkerdir. Hattâ Vilayet Valisi ve memurini, sabahlara kadar makine başında bunların men’i taaddî ve şekavetleri hakkında birçok muhaberat ile uğraşmakta oldukları kabili inkâr değildir. Babı Âlî ve Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun ile olan muhaberat dahi sıtkı [sic] ifadatımı müeyyittir. Bunların icrâ ettikleri afâl [sic] kabili ta’dat [sic] değildir, sadetten [sic] aşmıştır. Vi-

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Yusuf Kemâl Bey [Tengirşenk] from Sinop mentioned the bureaucratic procedure of the petition and brought a technical comment to the submitting process. From what I understand so far, complaints are made directly against the Sub-Governor. Whereas, acceptance of this petition was already disallowed by the Constitution and Parliamentary Regulations since a complaint against the Sub-provincial Governor had to be reported to the Governor first, who was his superior. Besides, the principle of ‘Separation of Powers’ (Tefrik-i Kuvva) as the essence of Constitutionalism should always be remembered. If the Legislative Power (Kuvve-i Kanuniye) interferes in the functions of Executive (Kuvve-i İcrâiye) and Judiciary Powers (Kuvve-i Adliye), it means that it has exceeded its authority. If an individual was expulsed from a location without appearing before a judge, exiled to another location and arrested, the designated authority to apply should be the Judicial Courts not the Chamber of Deputies. In short, what I am submitting and offering is that if this particular petition is about a complaint against the Sub-Governor, it is not appropriate to accept it since no application has been made to the Governor in the first place, who was his superior.²⁵³

Kırkkilise Deputy Mustafa Ârif Bey [Kocabaş] who agreed with Yusuf Kemâl Bey, was involved in the discussion by questioning a detail:

lâyetin başlıca âsâyişini ihlâl eden bu meşayihtir. Bunlar orada durdukça ahvalin ıslahı kabil olamayarak behemahal bunların vilâyatı baîdeye tebitleri [sic] lüzumu biddefâat gerek Vilâyete, gerek Bâbıâlîye, gerek Mabeyini [sic] Hümâyuna yazıldığı halde, hiçbir tesir hâsıl etmemiştir. Bilâkis, Devri Sâbık, bunlara türlü türlü vaitler [sic] icrâsı ile her suretle sair ahaliyi ezecek surette bir meydan vermiştir. Devri Sâbık, bunların dedikleri gibi değil, hattâ bilâkis mağaralara tahassun ederek, hattâ Hükümeti tahtı muhasaraya aldıkları vakidir. Biddefât [sic] bunlar tahassun ederek ahaliye, Hükümete, yekdiğerine silah atmaları da kabili inkâr değildir. Muhaberat ile sabit bir kaziyedir. Bunlar orada durdukça, Vilâyetin ıslahı katiyyen kabil değildir ve bunların şu harekatı fesâdiyeleri öyle devam edecek olursa, doğrusu, Vilâyet hercümerç olacaktır. Bunların hakkında eşeddi mücavat [sic] ile ceza tertip olunması kat’î olduğunu arz ederim.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 253 “YUSUF KEMAL BEY (Sinop) – Benim anladığıma göre, doğrudan doğruya Mutasarrıftan şikâyet ediliyor. Halbuki Kanuni Esasi ve Nizamnamei Dahili [sic] bu istidanın kabulüne manidir. Çünkü, mafevkine müracaat edilmemiştir. Ondan sonra bir de herhalde bir Meşrutiyetin esası, “tefrik-i kuvâ” [sic] olduğunu hiçbir vakit hatırdan çıkartmayalım. Kuvvei Kanuniye, Kuvvei İcraiyenin, Kuvvei Adliyenin işine müdahale ederse, şüphesiz vazifesini tecavüz etmiş olur. Bir kimse bir mahkeme Hâkimine iktiran ettirilmeksizin bir yerden kaldırılmış, öbür mahalle nefy ve tagrip [sic] ve tevkif edilmiş ise, ayrı ayrı maddei nizamiye ve oranın mahalli müracaatı, zannedersem, doğrudan doğruya Mahkemei Adliyedir, Meclisi Mebusan [sic] değil. Meclisi Mebusana vukubulacak [sic] şikâyetlerin mahiyeti başka türlüdür. Binaenaleyh, hulasaten şunu arz ederim ve bunu teklif ederim ki, istida bir defa Mutasarrıftan şikâyet ise, Valiye, yani mavefkine [sic] mercilerine müracaat vuku bulmaksızın bize geldiği İçin şâyânı kabul değildir.”

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Let a point be explored and explained. Did the exile and expulsion (nefy ve tagrib) procedures were applied after they were brought to the provincial center and returned, or while they were in still in the provincial center.²⁵⁴

Mustafa Ârif Bey, who received the answer ’while they were in the provincial center’, continued as follows: In that case, I will say a few words against Hızır Lütfi Bey. Even if it is admitted that they were indeed involved in such crimes, the governorate has no authority to remove a person without the order by a judicial authority. It was understood that the case was not prosecuted within the limits of law since the governorate was in a judicial misconduct. Then, the designated authority to apply was the Justice (and Judicial Courts), and the Chamber of Deputies had nothing to do but to entrust the investigation to the designated authority.²⁵⁵

İsmâil Pasha [Hattatzâde] from Tokat strongly disagreed with them and responded as: The opinions of my colleagues that this issue does not belong to the Parliament and that it should be applied to the designated authority is not in accordance with the situation, affairs, law and fairness. There are two types of crimes as is known. One is ordinary crimes (cerâim-i âdiye), and the other is political crimes (cerâim-i siyâsiye). Code of Criminal Procedures (Usûl-ü Muhâkemat-ı Cezâiyye Kanunu) is adequate and appropriate in terms of prosecuting the ordinary crimes. The crime is caught in the act (cürm-ü meşhûd) or not (gayr-i meşhûd). If not, the suspect is summoned and interrogated. Public prosecutor prosecutes and the trial is heard in court. There are also political crimes which the Governors should take responsibility and are fully liable of taking an instant action both conscientiously and judicially. If Governors would prefer corresponding with designated authorities and receiving their response, the Provincial Administration becomes a mess when the telegraph communication is broken down by disconnections, disorders, or weather conditions. That is why the Governors are liable to take full responsibility according to the ‘Procedures of Civilian Administration’ (Usûl-ü İdâre-i Mülkiye). However, since the Chamber of Deputies is superior to all judicial courts and composed of deputies representing the approval of en-

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 253 “MUSTAFA ARİF BEY (Kırkkilise) – Bir nokta tetkik ve izah edilsin. Kendilerinin Vilâyete celbedilip avdetten sonra mı nefy ve tagrip [sic] vukua gelmiş, yoksa sonra mı, yoksa Vilâyette mi vukua gelmiş.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 253 “MUSTAFA ARİF BEY (Devamla) – Şu halde Hızır Lütfi Beyefendiye karşı birkaç söz söyleyeceğim. Hakikaten böyle Seyyiât İle âlûde oldukları kabul edilse bile, Yusuf Kemal Beyefendinin buyurdukları gibi, bir mercii kanunînin emri olmaksızın vilâyetin hakkı celbi yoktur. Vilâyet bu nüfuzu kanûnîsini suiistimal etmiş, binaenaleyh vukuata sebebiyet vermek meselesinin, kanun dairesinde cereyan etmemiş olduğu anlaşılır. Şu halde bunun merci-i heyeti Adliyedir, Mehâkimi Adliyedir. Tahkikatı orada icra etmek lâzımgelir [sic]. Meclisi Mebusan’ın bunu Merciine tevdi’den başka yapacak hiçbir muamelesi yoktur.”

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tire society, it is appropriate and wise to submit all affairs to the Chamber of Deputies before submitting to any organ. The Chamber of Deputies should issue a decision for resolving the case and serve the notice to the Porte before enforcing the law.²⁵⁶

Müfid Bey [Libohove] from Gjirokastra (Ergiri / Argyrocastro), on the other hand, was speaking from the rostrum of the assembly with the following words: Because of the fact that Sheikh Said and his friends have been engaged in banditry in Sulaymaniyah for a long time and gain hatred of the community, there was a high possibility of an incident there. Thus, the Provincial Authority have them removed and banished in order to protect their own lives and properties since the Sulaymaniyah community may inflict a damage on them. Then, they had victimized themselves by the turmoil they had caused at the feast and the Divine Justice (Adâlet-i İlâhiyye) was served. As the Government had suppressed the turmoil, had issued a decision to dismiss the Sub-Governor and a decision to appoint the Commander to another location; no further Governmental action was needed.²⁵⁷

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 253 “İSMAİL PAŞA (Tokat) – Rüfekam efendilerin bu iş Meclisi Mebusana ait olmayıp merciine müracaat etmek lâzımgeleceğine [sic] dair olan mütalaaları muvafıkı hâl ve maslahat ve kanun ve nasafet değildir. Malumdur ki, iki cihetle cerâim vardır; birisi cerâimi âdiye, diğeri de cerâimi siyasiyedir. Cerâimi âdiyede Usulü Muhâkematı Cezaiye [sic] Kanunu kâfi ve vâfîdir [sic]. Cürüm, ya cürümü meşhut olur, ya gayri meşhut olur. Celp olunup istimtak [sic] olunur, Müddeî Umumî dâvâ eder, mahkeme fasl eder. Bir tane de cerâimi siyasiye vardır ki, Valiler mesuliyeti üzerlerine alarak, ânı vahitte icap edecek şeyi icra ile mükelleftirler. Hem vicdanen hem kanunen. Eğer ki merciine yazayım, merciinden, cevap alayım, telgrafhane bozulmuş, teller kesilmiş, buhran olmuş, rüzgâr olmuş; bu gibi bir şeye de tesadüf edilecek olursa taşra vilâyâtı hercümerç olur. Bunun için Valiler, Usûlü İdarei Mülkiye [sic] noktai nazarından mesuliyeti üzerlerine almakla mükelleftir. Meclisi Mebusan ise cümle mehakimin fevkinde ve bütün cemiyeti beşeriyenin tahtı tasdikinde olan vekillerin mecmai olduğundan kâffei umûrun herkesten evvel Millet Meclisine arz ve beyan olunması muvafıkı hâl ve şanı hikmettir. İcabı halinde hemen icabı kanunu icrâ etmeli, binaenaleyh rüfekanın bu bapta [sic] mütalaaları nabemahal olduğundan, Meclisçe Bab-ı Âliye ne denilecek ise denilmesi hakkında bir karar verilmesi işin bir an evvel tahtı karara alınmasını ihvaniyet namına, vatan namına istirham ederim.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 254 Although he is mistakenly referred to as the Ioannina (Yanya – Janina) Deputy in some parts of the parliamentary minutes, Müfid Libohove’s main electoral district was the Gjirokastra Sanjak (Ergiri) affiliated to the Ioannina Province, and he was the Deputy of Gjirokastra. The deputies of the central sanjak of Ioannina at that time were independent candidates Dimitraki Kingos and Constantine Sourlas. [See Footnote 248] “MÜFİT BEY (Yanya) – Şeyh Sait ve rüfekasının öteden beri Süleymaniye’de şekavet ika etmekte oldukları ve Süleymaniye ahalisinin bunları istemedikleri ve orada vukuat çıkaracakları cihetle Makamı Vilayet onları Musul’a aldırmış olduğu anlaşılıyor. Süleymaniye’de bulunanları nefy ve tagrip [sic] etmek için değil, bilâkis onların canlarını, mallarını muhafaza etmek içindir. Hükümet o maksatla onları celbetti. Sonra bayramda kendileri tarafından çıkarılan şuriş üzerine yine

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İsmâil Hakkı Bey from Komotini (Gümülcine) finds the issue extremely important and underlines Sheikh Said’s personal rights and liberties in following statements: On the contrary, the issue is highly important. This is a complaint by a man who attempts to defend his individual rights and liberty before the parliament for the first time. It was objected by Yusuf Kemâl Bey and his colleagues, and it was stated that the issue belonged to the Judiciary or the relevant authorities, not to the Parliament. However, the issue that really concerns the legal authority of the Chamber of Deputies is to severely defend and protect the public and private law. For instance, if a man who is oppressed by a Sub-Governor files a complaint to the Governor as his superior and gets rejected, now the designated authority for him to apply is the Chamber of Deputies. Because if he complains about the Governor after informing him, it is not a remote possibility for him to be oppressed by the Governor as well. As this man was removed to the provincial center by the will of the Governor and was not heard after his numerous complains, now it is his Constitutional right to file a complaint to the Chamber of Deputies. And the responsibility of Chamber of Deputies is to decide if he was right in his case, hear and defend his rights and punish the ones who broke the law.²⁵⁸

Yorgi Honeos Effendi from Salonika (Selânik) approached the issue from the following aspects:

kendileri mağlup olmuşlar, bu suretle de adaleti ilahiye [sic] yerini bulmuş oluyor. Hükümete gelince, çıkarılan şurişi asker celbiyle men etmiş, Mutasarrıfın da oradan kaldırılmasını ve Kumandanın da başka yere tahvilini Harbiye Nezaretine yazmıştık. Artık Meclisçe de bu bapta [sic] cereyan eden ahvalden malumatı kâfiye hâsıl olmuştur. Buna diyecek bir şey kalmamıştır.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 254 “İSMAİL BEY (Gümülcine) – Bilâkis, mesele pek mühimdir. Yani birinci defa olmak üzere hukuku şahsiyesini, hukuku hürriyesini, Meclisi Mebusan’a karşı müdafaa etmek isteyen bir adamın şikâyetidir. Bu noktai nazardan pek mühimdir. Yusuf Kemal Bey ve rüfekası tarafından itiraz serdedildi ve denildi ki, bu, Meclisi Mebusana ait değildir, ya Adliyeye veya devairi müteallikasına aittir denildi. Halbuki Meclisi Mebusanın hakkı kanunisinin asıl taalluk ettiği mesele, hukuku umumiyeyi ve hukuku hususiyeyi şiddetle muhafaza etmektir. Mesela, bir mutasarrıftan zulüm gören bir adamın Valiye şikâyeti üzerine Validen cevabı red alırsa, bunun müracaat edeceği daire, Meclisi Mebusan’dır. Mafevki haberdar edilip mafevkinden şikâyet edilir. Mafevkinden de bu adamın zulüm görmesi müsteb’ad değildir. İşte o halde Meclisi Mebusana iltica eder. Şimdi bu da şu yolda bir fenalık görmüştür. Şu halde Vali tarafından merkez Vilayete aldırılmış ve telgrafnâmede beyan edildiği veçhile müteaddit defalar şikâyette bulunduğu halde ısga ettirememiş, şimdi Meclisi Mebusana bu adam şikâyet ediyor. Bigayrihak bana şu muameleyi yaptılar diyor. Meclis buna karar vermelidir. Bu adam şu şikâyette, şu istidada haklı ise, bunun hakkını istima etmelidir, müdafaa etmelidir. Hilâfı kanun olarak buna sebebiyet verenler mücazaat görmelidir. Çünkü mesele gayet mühimdir.”

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Gentlemen, the issue in question is highly important and has drawn the attention of our Assembly. The part to be investigated is the question of what level of an Executive custom or practice may harm or abolish the individual liberty of a citizen entitled by the constitution? And there are two points to investigate for answering this question. In the first place, the issue of whether to submit the case to the Parliament or not. The other one is the legitimacy of the practice employed by the Executive Power at this point. As the petition was duly forwarded to the Parliamentary Commission in the first place; the necessary information was received from the Ministry and presented to the Parliament accordingly. As the case was duly brought to the Parliament, the Parliament has an authority to conduct negotiations and take a resolution. In the second place, these individuals were banished from Sulaymaniyah in the name of restoring public order by the Executive Power, without invoking law or a judicial authority. These individuals were deprived of their civil liberties and were banished to another location under the pretext of ‘protecting their own lives’. In my opinion, this reason is not enough for our Parliament to accept such a practice since the Executive Power should already be capable of protecting the lives, honors, and wealth of the citizens. I suppose, our parliament will not allow the Executive Power to sacrifice individual liberty, the most precious right granted, defended, and limited by the Constitution. However, as the banishment of these men from their hometown through such customary practices and tricks is a clear act against to the Constitution; our parliament should refuse the act and reprimand the perpetrating officials.²⁵⁹

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 255 “HONEOS EFENDİ (Selanik) – Efendiler, mevzubahis olan mesele, gayet ehemmiyetlidir ve Meclisimizin dikkatini calip bir meseledir. Bu şikâyet üzerine tetkik olunacak cihet, Kuvvei İcraiyenin Kanuni Esasimizin efradı millete bahşetmiş olduğu hürriyeti şahsiyesi ne derece bir örf, bir muamele ile imha ve izale edebilir olması meselesidir ve bunu tetkik için zuhur eden mesail, ikiye inkisam [sic] eder. Evvelemirde bu meselenin, usulü dairesinde Meclisimize tevdi edilip edilmemesi ciheti, diğeri de esasa taalluk eden Kuvvei İcraiyenin bu baptaki [sic] muamelesi. Muvafıkı kanun olup olmaması cihetidir. Evvelemirde bu şikâyetname, usulü dairesinde Encümene havale edilerek, o yolda görülen lüzum üzerine bu mesele hakkında mensup olduğu Nezaretten İktiza eden malumat bilistihsal Meclisimize tevdi edilmiştir. Şimdi bunun üzerine Nezaretten gelmiş olan malumat üzerine Meclisimiz bittezekkür Kuvvei İcraiyenin usulü dairesinde cereyan edip etmemiş olduğu cihetini tetkik etmektir. Şu suretle Meclisimize mesele, usulü dairesinde ithal edilmiş ve bu meseleyi de şimdi Meclisimiz tezekkür ederek bir karara isâl etmeye selahiyeti vardır. Sâniyen Kuvvei İcraiye, gûya Süleymaniye’de asayişin muhafazası için her halde bu şikâyet eden zevatın oradan teb’idi lüzumu kendilerince karargir olarak bunlar hakkında olacak muameleyi hiçbir karar ve kanuna iktiran ettirmeksizin aynı idarei müstebidede icrâ edilmiş olan bir muamele ile bu zevatı hürriyeti şahsiyelerinden mahrum ederek başka merkezi vilayete teb’id etmiştir. Bunun da esbabını şu yolda dermeyan ediyor ki, bunlar Süleymaniye’de kalacak olsalardı, hayatları bir tehlikeye maruz kalacaktı. Bu sebep, zannımca Meclisimizin bir muamele ittihazını kâfi görülmez. Çünkü, Kuvvei İcraiye yeniden efrad-ı milletin, ahalinin hayatını, namusunu, servetini muhafaza etmeye muktedir olmalıdır ve buna muvaffak olmak için Kanuni Esasimizin bahşetmiş olduğu zikıymet hürriyeti şahsiyesini feda eden Kuvvei İcraiyenin muvaffak olmasına Meclisimiz hiçbir vakitte mesağ görmez zannederim. Kanuni Esasi Hürriyeti Şahsiyeyi her gûna taarruzdan masûn tuttuğu halde ve maddei sarihasında bir neferin hürriyeti şahsiyesi ne surette izale olunabilir olduğunu göstermiş olduğu halde, örfî bir muamele ile Kuvvei İcraiye-

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4 Reflections of the Mosul Incident on the Parliament

Pirinççizâde Ârif Effendi from Diyarbekir once again emphasized Said’s innocence and said: Sheikh Said Effendi who was brought to Mosul from Sulaymaniyah unjustly, was a humble and decent person. It is possible that there are some evildoers among his relatives, but this is not our subject. Sub-Governor and Commander who bear a grudge against Said, had been allied, and slandered him. And the Governor had accepted their slander.²⁶⁰

From Zor, Hızır Lütfi Bey took the floor again: The interpretation that the accusations against these Sheikhs stem from grudge is not true. Their criminal activities and profiles are well known. Judicial investigation regarding the grudge of the Sub-Governor was necessitated by my colleague. I already mentioned that they were used to many types of banditry, and these were specified in the registries of Imperial Chamberlain. How the despotic regime particularly favored them? Imperial Chamberlain disallowed to prosecute them despite numerous prosecutions were attempted by the Provincial Government. Hence, it is not appropriate to say that the Sub-Governor has a grudge against him. The necessity of their suppression is not about one single Sub-Governor and Governor. Each appointed Governor and Sub-Governor gave other reasons by themselves. As for what our brother Müfid Bey from Ioannina said, he stated that they were taken from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul for protection purposes and there was no need for another action to be taken. It is true, they were hit by Divine Justice as a result of the incident and received the punishment they deserved. As Komotini Deputy İsmâil Bey said, these are criteria that should be taken into consideration and thought through. If the necessary precautions are not taken against them, I can absolutely assure you that there will be a great skirmish between the Province and the people of Sulaymaniyah. Because I cannot describe the ‘insects’ (haşerât) behind them, but it is officially determined and documented. Provincial officials are messaging all day along to impose the necessary punishments against their crimes and to suppress them (muâmele-i te’dibiye ve tenkiliye).²⁶¹

nin ve böyle desaisle bu adamları memleketlerinden teb’id etmesi Kanuni Esasi ahkâmına mualif [sic] bir taarruzdan ibaret bir fiildir ve bunu Meclisimiz hiçbir vakitte kabul etmemelidir ve bundan dolayı da bunu tensip eden memurinin muaheze edilmesi lazım gelir.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 255; ‘In his second turn of speech his family name is referred as ‘Pirinççizade’ in the parliamentary minutes.’ “PİRİNÇÇİZADE ARİF EFENDİ— Haksız yere Süleymaniye’den Musul’a celp olunan Şeyh Sait Efendi sade ve müstakim bir zat idi. İhtimaldir ki, ekaribi içinde fenalık edenler de vardır. İş, orada değildir. Şeyh Sait Efendiye Mutasarrıf bigarezin Kumandanla birleşerek bir iftira atmış ve elbette o iftiraları… REİS – Demin söylediğinizi tekrar etmeyiniz. PİRİNÇÇİZADE ARİF EFENDİ (Devamla) – Bundan dolayı Vali bu iftirayı kabul etmiş. Mutasarrıf ve bunların mesuliyetine dair Gümülcine Mebusu İsmail Beyin beyanatına iştirak ve tastik [sic] ederim. (“Doğrudur, doğrudur” sadaları)”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 255 “HIZIR LÜTFİ BEY (Zop) [sic] – Bu meşâyihin eseri garaz olarak tecrimi mütalaası doğru değildir.

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The next deputy who took the floor was Nasuhizâde Mustafa Âsım Effendi [Yörük] from İstanbul who started to his speech by stating his disagreement with Müfid Bey. He was saying: I will participate in the legal clarification of the issue, but I regret that I cannot agree with Müfid Bey’s statement that ’it is a treatment performed in good faith’. As Martial Law has not yet been proclaimed and is not enforced anywhere, this practice was not a nice move eventually. Besides, I cannot directly confirm the statements of my colleagues that the crimes of these men are well known, are infamous and are undeniable. Because how much of the records in the Ancien Régime (Devr-i Sâbık) can be put forward as evidence? Even though these men are admitted being real murderers, insurgents, and mischief-makers, I have the excuse not to respect, favor and approve such a practice resembling Martial Law, performed in the first period of Constitutionalism.²⁶²

Bunların seyyiâtı ahvali herkesçe malumdur. Mutasarrıfın eseri garazı olarak mesele hakkında takibatı kanuniye icrasına refikim tarafından lüzum görülmüştür. Onlar öteden beri envaı şekavetle me’lûf olduklarını evvelce arz etmiştim. Bu, Mabeyni Hûmayun kuyudatiyle [sic] sabittir. Devri istibdat [sic] onlara nasıl yüz vermiştir? Vilâyetçe, biddefaat haklarında takibatı kanuniye icra olunduğu halde… REİS – Tekrar buyurmayın efendim. HIZIR LÜTFİ BEY (Devamla) – Tavzih edeceğim tamamen. Mabeyni Hümayunca [sic] takibat icrasına müsaade edilmemiş olduğu halde, şu suretle Mutasarrıf garaz hâsıl etmiştir, demek muvafık olamaz. Bunların tenkilâtı hakkında gösterilen lüzum, bir Mutasarrıf ile bir Validen değildir. Her giden vali, her giden mutasarrıf tarafından başka başka lüzum gösterilmiştir. Müfit Beyefendi biraderimizin dediklerine gelince; bunların nefislerini muhafaza için Süleymaniye’ den Musul’a geldikleri beyan buyuruluyor ve ahiren icrâ edilen harekâttan dolayı başka muamele icrasına hacet kalmadığını beyan ediyor. Doğrudur, bunlar vâkıâ adaleti ilâhiyeye [sic] çarpılmışlardır, cezayı sezalarını görmüşlerdir. Gümülcine Mebusu İsmail Bey’in dedikleri gibi, bunlar gayet nazarı dikkat ve teemmüle alınacak bir cihettir. Bunlar böyle ihtiyatsız kalacak olursa, Vilâyet ile Süleymaniye halkı arasında büyük bir mukatele olacağını katiyyen temin ederim. Zira, onların arkasındaki haşeratı bir türlü tarif edemem, resmen sabittir. Bendeniz muhabere içinde bulunmuşum, bunların sabahlara kadar ef’al ve cinayetlerinden dolayı haklarında muamelei te’dibiye ve tenkiliye icrasını talep etmekle onların meşgul kaldığını arz ediyorum. Arif Bey biraderimizin bilatahkik [sic] talebine mukabil de sorunuz.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 255 “MUSTAFA ASIM EFENDİ (İstanbul) – Bendeniz pek uzatmak istemiyorum. Meselenin teşrihatı kanuniyesine iştirak edeceğim, sonra Müfit Beyefendinin hüsnüniyetle “icra olunmuş bir muameledir” demesine maatteessüf iştirak edemem. Çünkü, henüz hiçbir yerde idarei örfiye [sic] ilan edilmemiştir, muamele pek güzel hareket olunmamıştır. Sonra, bu zatın ifadatına gelince, bu adamların seyiâtı ahvali maruftur, meşhurdur, hiçbir kimsenin inkârına mahal yoktur, bunu da doğrudan doğruya tasdik edemem. Çünkü, delili Devri Sâbıktaki [sic] kuyudun ne dereceye kadar şayanı [sic] istişhad olması lazımgelir [sic]? Bu adamlar ihtimal ki, hakikaten mücrimdir, canidir, erbabı ihtilâldir, müfsiddir. Terviç ve tasdik ve tasvip etmemekte bendeniz mazurum. Kanunu Esasinin [sic] ilk devrei hayatında şu gibi idarei örfiye [sic] ilân olunmuşçasına yapılan bir muameleyi tervic [sic] ve tasdik etmemekte mazurum.”

158

4 Reflections of the Mosul Incident on the Parliament

Mehmed Rıza Effendi [?] from Erzurum gave some specifics about the bureaucratic process and approved the way the Government managed it: There were ongoing investigations regarding the hostility and dispute between the families of Sheikh Said and Sheikh Nouri Effendis and their crimes were repeated over and over. They are well known for being determined and daring enough to attack some government officials and even to fire upon the Government Hall. In addition to this, according to the memorandum and telegram received from the Ministry of Interior, their transfer to Mosul was solely based on protecting their lives. Although it is claimed that they were removed from Sulaymaniyah to the provincial center by the conspiracy of Sub-Governor and Commander Mustafa Pasha, there is no such a Governmental conspiracy or bad intention, and the crimes committed in Mosul [Referring to the Mosul Incident] have no connection with this expulsion. Whereas the decision of their removal and transfer is based on the correspondence between Mosul Province and the Ministry of Interior as its designated authority. Then, it is obviously understood out of communication that the Ministry of Police (Zabtiye Nezâreti) attempted to implement the procedure on the Sub-Governor and Commander, and the Ministry of War was also contacted accordingly. I suggest archiving the document as there is no relevancy with the Chamber of Deputies.²⁶³

The president of the assembly gave the floor to Aristidi Pasha [Yorgandjioglu] from İzmir, and Aristidi approached the issue in terms of the influence of imperial law in the provinces:

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 256 [?] There is no one named Mehmed Rıza Effendi among the Erzurum Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies. In fact, no other speech, statement or motion of his own was found in the parliamentary minutes. The only Mehmed Rıza found in the literature is Mehmed Rıza Bey, who was elected independently from Konya in the 1912 elections. Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim, p. 555 “MEHMET RIZA EFENDİ (Erzurum) – Süleymaniye meşâyihinden bulunan Şeyh Sait Efendi ile Nuri Efendi aileleri beyninde cereyan eden muhasama ve münakaşa üzerine birçok tahkikat icra etmiş ve bunların ika ettikleri ceraim tekerrür ederek Hükümet memurlarından bazılarına taarruz ettikleri, Hükümet konağına silah endaht etmek derecelerinde ikrarı cerâim eyledikleri müteariftir. Bununla beraber, şimdi Dahiliye Nezaretinden gelen tezkirei cevabiyeden ve okunan telgrafnâmeden anlaşıldığı üzere Şeyh Sait Efendi ile akrabasının Musul’a celbedilmeleri [sic], mücerret muhafazai hayatları maksadına müstenittir [sic]. Bu da Musul vilayetiyle mercii kanunisi olan Dahiliye Nezareti celilesi [sic] arasında cereyan eden muharebeye [sic] müstenit [sic] olup, bunda Hükümetin asla bir su-i kasdı olmadıktan başka, Musul’ca vukuu bulan ceraimin esasen celbolunmalarına [sic] katiyen taalluku olmayıp, ahiren vaki olan ceraimden dolayı da haklarında takibatı kanuniye icra olunduğu evraktan anlaşılmaktadır. Şikâyatı vâkıa ise, esasen bunların Mutasarrıfla Kumandan Mustafa Paşa taraflarından merkezi vilâyete sevkolunmalarına [sic] müstenittir. Halbuki bunları celbedebilmeleri [sic], Dahiliye Nezaretiyle cereyan eden muhabere neticesinde verilen karara müstenit olduğu anlaşılıyor. Şu halde, Mutasarrıfla Kumandan hakkında yapılacak muameleye Zaptiye Nezaretince [sic] teşebbüs olunduğu, Harbiye Nezaretiyle de muhabere cereyan etmiş bulunduğu muhaberei vakıadan anlaşılmaktadır. O halde, Meclisi Mebusana [sic] taalluku olmadığından, evrakın hıfsına [sic] karar verilmesi reyindeyim.”

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In the age of Despotism, our law was not able to be enforced or penetrated in Kurdistan, like it was not able to be elsewhere. If we assume that the order expected from the Constitutional Monarchy will be established all over the state from the very beginning, we would be deceiving ourselves. Sheikh Said Effendi from the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs is a well-known despotic oppressor in Sulaymaniyah, and their banishment was deemed necessary by the Government as their presence after an incident would cause a skirmish in there. I wonder if, as they say, if the Sheikh and his affiliates had remained in Sulaymaniyah, would the skirmish have been occurred, or it would not have been occurred? There is no doubt about this, because despite their expulsion, this skirmish took place in the provincial center where they were banished and held. If they are still insistent that their relatives who were killed in Mosul were expelled unjustly from their homeland, there are designated authorities where they can report the aggression and the violation of their rights. Besides, there are judicial authorities they can file a lawsuit to compensate their damages. I propose to return the document, as it has no relation with the parliament.²⁶⁴

After the opinions were generally deemed adequate, the written motions started to be submitted. The variety of the motions regarding the case is important in understanding the composition of the parliament and the dimensions of the freedom of speech provided by the Constitutionalist environment. Salonika Deputy Yorgi Honeos Effendi proposed that the practice of the Executive Power to be

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 256 “ARİSTİDİ PAŞA (İzmir) – Bendenizce mesele pek basit görünüyor. Rüfakayı Kiramdan [sic] Honeus [sic] Efendi ile Mustafa Asım Efendi’nin bu meselenin mahiyeti kanuniyesi hakkında temhit [sic] ettikleri mütalaa pek doğrudur, fakat zannediyorum ki, hususiyeti hali, mahallince cereyanı muameleyi pek iyi bilmiyorlar. Şimdi efendi, orada İstibdat [sic] zamanında kavanini mevcudemiz tamamiyle hiçbir yerde icrayı ahkâm [sic] edememiştir, hiçbir yerde etmediği gibi, Kürdistan’da hiç etmemiştir, oraya asla duhûl etmemiştir. Meşrutiyetimizin iptidası [sic] ile de farz edemeyiz ki, Meşrutiyetten tevellüt edecek olan intizam hemen mülkün her tarafında cereyan etmiş. Öyle farz edersek kendimizi aldatmış oluruz. Meşayihi Berzenciyeden [sic] Süleymaniye’de Şeyh Sait Efendi, bendenizce malûm bir zattır. Bunların gerek kendisi gerek emsali mahallinde mütegallibeden, mütahakkimedendirler. Bunların oraca hâdis olan bir vaka üzerine ipkaları [sic], mukateleyi mucibolacağı [sic] Hükümetçe anlaşılmakla, oradan teb’itlerine [sic] lüzum görüldü. Acaba onların dedikleri gibi, Şeyh Efendi ile avenesi orada kalsaydı mukatelat vaki olacak mıydı, olmayacak mıydı? Burada şüpheye mahal yok, çünkü kendileri oradan teb’it edilmiştir ve bu mukatele mevkuf bulundukları yerde ika edilmiş, yani kendi memleketlerinin gayri bir mahalde bir merkezi Vilâyette [sic] ika edilmiştir. Binaenaleyh, buna şüphe kalmamıştır. O halde şimdi kendileri ne diyorlar? Bizim memleketimizden yahut kendileri değil de akrabası, ki mağdur imiş, bizim maktul olan akrabamızı memleketimizden bigayri hak, cebir suretiyle tardettiler [sic], gönderdiler diyorlar. Eğer böyle ise, mademki biz okunan evrakı resmiyede bunun böyle olduğuna kanaat hâsıl ediyoruz, eğer bunda musir [sic] iseler, merciiyyet vardır efendim, kendilerine taarruz olunmuş, hukukları gasbedilmiş [sic] mağdur olmuşlar. Onun tazmini için de devairi mahsusa vardır, oraya müracaat ederler, dava ederler. Buraya hiçbir ciheti taalluku yoktur. Binaenaleh [sic], iadesini teklif ederim.”

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voted on whether it is in accordance with the constitution or not.²⁶⁵ Bolu Deputies Ahmed Şerâfeddin Bey, Taşhancızâde Mustafa Zeki Effendi, Hacı Abdülvahab Ömer Effendi and Peja (Peć / İpek) Deputy Mahmud Bedri proposed the documents to be forwarded to the Justice Department for prosecuting the criminals.²⁶⁶ Monastir (Manastır / Bitola) Deputy Mehmed Vâsıf Bey and İzmit Deputy Ahmed Müfid Bey [Saner] were convinced that the abovementioned practice was in accordance with the situation and cannot be categorized a Martial Law practice (Örfî bir muâmele) as the victims were brought to Mosul solely for the protection of their own lives. In line with this, they proposed the case to be forwarded to the Ministry of Interior for prosecuting these insurgents (bağîler) and restoring public order.²⁶⁷ Salonika Deputy Yorgaki Artas Effendi requested that these people, who were expulsed from their residences and transferred to Sulaymaniyah without a court decision, should not be restrained in exile (menfâda) and should immediately be taken to the court.²⁶⁸ Yozgat (Bozok) Deputy Hayrullah Effendi argued that the issue belongs to the Executive Power and suggested that the Ministry of Interior should be liberated within the framework of law to be able to fulfill its duty.²⁶⁹ Deputy Muhiddin Effendi from Niğde justified and defended the Governmental practice. He claimed that if the Government had acted imprudently by announcing ‘Let the victims apply to the court’ and had not intervened in the inci-

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 257 “Riyaseti Celileye. Kuvvei İcraiyenin bu baptaki muamelesinin Kanunu Esasiye [sic] muvafık olup olmadığının re’ye müracaat olunmasını talep ederim. Selanik Mebusu Homeos [sic]”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 257 “Riyaseti Celileye. Caniler hakkında kanun dairesinde takibatı kanuniye icra olunmak üzere evrakın ciheti Adliyeye tevdi, olunmasını teklif ederiz. Bolu Mebusu Şerafettin, Bolu Mebusu Abdülvahap, Bolu Mebusu Mustafa Zeki, İpek Mebusu Bedri”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 257 “Riyaseti Celileye. Maktullerin Musul’a celpleri, mücerret kendilerini muhafaza maksadına müstenit [sic] olduğu anlaşıldığına ve bu muamelenin örfî bir muamele addolunamayacağına binaen muamelei vâkıa, muvâfıkı maslahat olmakla, âsâyişi memleketi muhafaza, bu gibi bağîler haklarında tâkibatı lâzimede [sic] bulunulmasının Dahiliye Nezaretine tebliğine karar verildi. Manastır Mebusu Vasıf, İzmit Mebusu Ahmet Müfit”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaseti Celileye. İkâmetgâhlarından kaldırılıp Süleymaniye’ye naklettirilen kimselerin bilâ hüküm menfâda bulundurulmayıp hemen muhakemeye sevklerini talep ederim. Selânik Mebusu Artas”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaseti Celileye. Bu mesele Kuvvei İcraiyeye aittir. Dahiliye Nezâreti vazifesini kanun dairesinde ifa etmek üzere serbest bırakılmalıdır. Yozgat Mebusu Hayrullah”

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dents, the Government would now be held responsible for what would have happened.²⁷⁰ He added that it is now time for the victims’ allegations to be heard by the relevant authorities. Ârif Bey as the Diyarbekir Deputy suggested that the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor, Commander and the Mosul Governor to be judged by the ‘Supreme Administrative Court of the Council of State’ (Şûrâ-yı Devlet Muhâkemat Dâiresi), since their practice was contrary to the constitution and meant a violation of civil rights and liberties.²⁷¹ Deputy Mehmed Ârif Bey from Komotini and Hacı Âdil Bey [Arda] from Tekfurdağı (now Tekirdağ) stated that the practice by Sub-Governor and Governor carried on Sheikh Said is ‘nonlegalistic’ (kanunşikenâne) and they proposed to forward the documents to the Ministry of Interior for judicial investigations and prosecutions.²⁷² According to them, unless Martial Law is declared on a well-founded and clear ground, civil liberty and right of habitation protected by law cannot be violated in any respect. Sivas Deputy Ahmed Şükrü Effendi argued that this issue was a total misconduct of civil service and particularly stated that a lawsuit should be filed against the Sub-Governor in the Provincial Administrative Court (Vilâyet İdâre Mahkemesi) and against the Governor in the Council of State (Şûrâ-yı Devlet). ²⁷³ Deputy Seyfullah Effendi from Erzurum stated that the liberties of the Sheikhs were not violated, on the  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaseti Celileye. Eşya, zıddıyla keşfolunur [sic]. Eğer Hükümet, mutazarrır olanlar mehakime müracaat etsin deyip de nazarı basiretten dûr tutulsa idi, şimdi Hükümet mâhaze [sic] olunacak idi. Hükümetin muamelesi muvafıktır. Şimdi mutazarrır olanların iddiası dairei âidesince istimâ’ olunmak lâzım gelir. Niğde Mebusu Muhittin”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaseti Celileye. Sâdâttan Şeyh Sait Efendi ve evlâd ve tevâbiinin Musul’a Kanunu Esasi [sic] hilafında teb’it [sic] suretiyle celbedilmesi [sic], hürriyeti şahsiyeye taarruz demek olduğundan, mutasarrıf ve Süleymaniye kumandanının, Musul Valisiyle beraber Valinin tâbi olduğu Şurayı Devlet [sic] Muhakemat Dairesinde icrayı muhakemelerine karar verilmesini arz ve teklif ve Kanunu Esasi ve hürriyetin badema temin buyurulmasını teklif ederim. Ferman. Diyarbekir Mebusu Arif”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaseti Celileye. Kıraat edilen evrak ve cereyan eden müzakereye nazaran Mutasarrıf ve Valinin Şeyh Sait Efendi vesaire hakkında icra eyledikleri muamele, kanunşikenânedir. Bir lüzûm-u sahiha müsteniden İdarei Örfiye ilân edilmedikçe, kanûnen mahfuz bulunan hürriyeti şahsiye ve ikâmet hiçbir veçhile ihlâl edilemez. Binaenaleyh, müsebbibleri hakkında tâkibat ve tahkikat-ı kanuniye icrası için evrakın mercii mahsusu olan Dahiliye Nezaretine havalesi karargîr oldu. Gümülcüne Mebusu Arif, Tekfurdağı Mebusu Adil”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaseti Celileye. Bu mesele, sırf memuriyeti suiistimal demek olduğundan, Mutasarrıfın aleyhinde Vilâyet İdare Mahkemesinde ve Vali aleyhinde Şurayı Devlette [sic] ikamei dâvâ olunmak lâzım gelir. Sivas Mebusu Şükrü”

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contrary, they were expelled from Sulaymaniyah in order to be avoided from the possible atrocities by the people there, that is, to protect their lives.²⁷⁴ According to Seyfullah Effendi, there was no need to deepen the situation by the parliament, as the freedom of the people of Sulaymaniyah was preserved by this means and the Sheikhs were subjected to Divine Justice for their own inappropriate actions (harekât-ı gayr-i lâyikalarının). He was of the opinion that it would be sufficient for those who were harmed in the incident to apply to the relevant authorities Nâfi Pasha [Jabirizadeh Abd al-Nafi] from Aleppo stated that this issue was not about Said Effendi being a good or a bad man.²⁷⁵ According to him, the issue was about the Governor, who relied on a police tip-off and violated ‘Said’s individual liberty assured by the Constitution’ (Kanûn-i Esâsi ile mekfûl hürriyet-i şahsiyesine). He said that the Governors could act above the law by taking all kinds of responsibilities when they see a sign of revolution, God forbid. However, if it is understood that these practices are based on personal enmity and comes out to be unfounded, the responsibility naturally belongs to them, he added. Therefore, Nâfi Pasha suggested that the Council of State and the relevant legal authorities should file a lawsuit against the Governor and the Sub-Governor. He concluded by saying that if these administrators could not prove before the law that they had banished the Sheikhs under obligation, they should be punished for violating the Constitution. Aristidi Pasha also suggested that the injured party apply to the Council of State and stated that if the verdict by the Council indicated ‘the act of injustice’ (haksız muâmele) by the governor, then his sentence would be deter Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 258 “Riyaset-i Celileye. Beyan olunan şeyhler hakkında hürriyetlerine tecavüz suretiyle Musul’a celbolunmayıp [sic], bilâkis hayâtlarını muhafazaten Şeyh Sait ve avenesi, efradı ahali haklarında icra edegelmekte oldukları mezalimin önünü almak maksadıyla icra edilmiş ve Süleymaniye ahalisinin de hürriyetleri muhafaza olunmuş, kendileri de harekâtı gayri lâyikalarının adli ilâhîsine [sic] dûçar bulunmuş olduklarından, Meclisçe ta’mîki keyfiyete mahal olmadığından, mutazarrırların, mercii âidine müracaat eylemeleri lâzım olduğu zannındayım. Erzurum Mebusu Seyfullah”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaseti Celileye. Bu mesele bugün dahi Meclisimizi beyhude yere it’âb ediyor. Halbuki haddizâtında gayet basittir. Sait Efendi iyi adam olsun, fena bulunsun, polisin jurnaliyle Valinin iş’ariyle [sic] Kanunu Esasi [sic] ile mekfûl hürriyeti şahsiyesine taarruz eden, validir. Vülât, maâzallah, âsârı ihtilâl gördükleri zamanda, her türlü mesuliyeti deruhde [sic] ederek fevkalkanun muamele eder. Lâkin bu muameleleri aynı garaz görünür ve nabemehal olduğu anlaşılırsa, mesuliyetleri tabiidir. Binaenaleyh,Valinin veya Mutasarrıfın aleyhinde Şurâyı Devletçe [sic] ve mercii kanunisince ikamei dâvâ etsinler. Bilmecburiye teb’îd ettiklerini ispat edemezlerse, Kanuni Esasiyi ihlâl noktasından ceza görmelidirler. İşin evvel ve âhiri ve ciheti kanuniyesi budur zannındayım. Halep Mebusu Nafi Paşa”

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mined.²⁷⁶ Ahmed Nesimi Bey [Sayman] from İstanbul suggested that the investigation carried out on this important issue should be deepened, a ’report’ (mazbata) containing a summary of the necessary reasons should be prepared, and a special commission should be selected and appointed in accordance.²⁷⁷ Abdulhamid Zahrawi from Hama reminded that this issue has two different aspects.²⁷⁸ The first was the exile and expulsion (hodbehod ettiği nefy ve tagribler) carried out by the government on its own initiative, and the other was the government’s failure to prevent the mass attack (hücûm-u âmm) against those who were murdered in Mosul.²⁷⁹ According to him, as the government was wrong on both counts and deserves to be reprimanded, should have been strongly warned by the parliament not to engage in such nonlegalistic and irregular practices again. Mustafa Ârif from Kırkkilise stated that the province violated individual liberty unlawfully, transferred a person to another location without a legal decision, and eventually caused the person to be killed due to the delayed intervention.²⁸⁰ He suggested that the issue be referred to the Ministry of Justice for a judicial investigation and prosecution.

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaseti Celileye. Mutazarrır, ikamei dâvâ etmesinden men’etmez. Bu cihetle Valinin bu muamelesi haksızsa, Şûrâyı Devlete müracaat etsin. O babta Şûrâyı Devlette verilecek karar, Valinin haksızlığını tazammun ederse, o vakit cezası taayyün eder. Zira, Vilâyet… (Kâtip: oraları çizilmiş efendim) Bu işle alâkadar olanların diledikleri halde takibatı kanuniyede bulunmak üzere dâirei âidesine havalesi tahtı karara alınarak, ruznamede münderiç olmayan hususatın müzakeresine geçilmesini teklif ederim. Aristidi Paşa”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaseti Celileye. Bu meseleyi mühimime hakkında icra olunan tetkikatın tamîkıyle esbabı mucibei mücmelesini [sic] havi bir mazbatanın tanzimi emrinde ayrıca bir komisyonun intihap ve tayini hakkı. İstanbul Mebusu Ahmet Nesimî”  It was mistakenly written as ‘Abdülmecit’ instead of ‘Abdülhamid’ in the parliamentary minutes.  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaseti Celileye. Bu meselenin iki ciheti vardır. Hükümetin, birisi, hodbehud [sic] ettiği nefy ve tağripleri [sic], diğeri de Musul’da maktul olanlar aleyhine hücumu âm [sic] gibi bir hücum vuku bulduğu zaman Hükümetin mümânaat etmemesidir. Hükümet, iki cihet hakkında iki cihette hatâ edip şâyânı muahaze olduğu gibi, bundan böyle bu gibi kanunşikenâne bir intizamsız muamelatta bulunmamaları Meclis tarafından şediden ihtar edilmelidir. Hama Mebusu Abdülmecit [sic] Zehrâvî”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaset-i Celileye. Muamelâtı câriyeye nazaran Vilâyetçe muhalifi kanun olarak hürriyeti şahsiyeye taarruz ve bilâ hüküm bir şahsın mahalli âhara nakl ve neticede de katl gibi bir fiilin hu-

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Amasya Deputy İbrâhim Cudi Effendi reminded that the parliament is not a court where the cases are heard. He added that ‘the relevant courts’ can determine whether such practices are carried out within the framework of the law and who bears the responsibility, and only the courts can judge those responsible.²⁸¹ Therefore, he suggested that the issue be referred to the Ministry of Interior later to be referred to the Ministry of Justice. Cudi Effendi also raised a question by stating that an inconsistency was felt in the memorandum of the Ministry of Interior. If the Sub-Governor, Governor and Commander communicated with the Ministries first and acted upon the orders they received, why these Ministries attempted to replace them now? he was asking. Mahmud Mazhar Bey [Haznedarzâde] from Trabzon stated that it was appropriate to temporarily summon Sheikh Said and his companions to Mosul at such a time when the public order and security were down.²⁸² Aleppo Deputy Ali Cenani Bey highlighted that Sheikh Said had blatantly declared a rebellion against the proclamation of Constitution.²⁸³ According to Cenani, since Said was connected to the Imperial Chamberlain protocol via the ciphered telegram, Said’s rebellion movement was based on their provocation. Ali Cenani Bey defended the provincial administration and added that it was the most necessary and important measure for the government to take this person from there to the center of

sûlüne sebebiyet verildiği ecilden, muamelâtı kanuniye ve takibatı adliye icraası emrinde Adliye Nezaretine havalesini teklif ederim. Kırkkilise Mebusu Mustafa Arif”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaset-i Celileye. Malûmuâlîleri olduğu üzere. Meclisimiz, faslı Deâvî için bir mahkeme değildir. Bu müsillu [sic] mesainin mecrâyi kanunîsinde cereyan edip etmediğini, âit olduğu mehâkim meydana çıkarır ve mesuliyetin kimlere ait olduğunu tayin ve tahkim eyler. Binaenaleyh, Adliye Nezaretine havale olunmak üzere Dahiliyeye gönderilmesi lâzım gelir. Zeyl: Dahiliye Nezaretinin tezkiresinde bir tenakkuz [sic] hissolunuyor. Mutasarrıf ve Vali ve Kumandan, Dahiliye ile bilmuhabere, aldıkları emir üzerine hareket etmişler ise, ne için şimdi tebdillerine Dahiliye ve Hariciye Nezaretlerinde teşebbüs olunduğu beyan olunuyor. Amasya Mebusu Cudi Efendi”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 259 “Riyaset-i Celileye. Âsâyiş ve inzibatın muhtell olduğu bir zamanda Şeyh Sait ve rüfekasının Musul’a muvakkaten celbi muvafık olduğu reyindeyim talebiyle Trabzon Mebusu Mahmut Mazhar imzasıyla Verilen rey pusulası kıraat olunur.”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260 “Riyaset-i Celileye. Şeyh Sait, Kanunu Esasinin [sic] ilânına karşı ilânı isyan etmiştir. Kendisi şifreli telgrafla Mâbeyn erkânına merbut olduğundan, harekâtı isyaniyesi, onların tahrikâtına matuftur. Hükümetin, merkumu oradan Musul’a aldırması, en lâzım tedâbiri mühimme cümlesindendir. Mamafih, bunlar Süleymaniye’de tasmim ettikleri cürmü Musul’da ika etmiş ve âdetâ Musul vakasına sebep olmuştur. Keyfiyet mahallince usulü dairesinde derdesti tahkiktir. Şu tahkikat neticesine intizaren evrakın hıfzı lâzımdır. Halep Mebusu Ali Cenani”

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Mosul. From Cenani’s point of view, these individuals committed the crime in Mosul, which they had decided and designed in Sulaymaniyah and caused the Mosul Incident in fact. Cenani stated that the situation was duly investigated at its location and suggested that the documents be archived until the investigation is concluded. Mahmud Mâhir Effendi from Kırşehir tried to strike a balance between petitioners and the government officials by paying attention to both parties. The petitioners declared that they were subjected to disloyalty and oppression undeservedly and the government officials declared that they had fulfilled their duties and responsibilities in the name of maintaining security.²⁸⁴ However, since the statements of both parties remain verbal, those who claim victimization should have been informed to apply to the judicial authorities, that were put in service thanks to the Constitutional liberty. On the other hand, Mahmud Mâhir mentioned that the situation should be reported to the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office should be activated in order to prosecute the allegations of crime and take necessary measures. Berat (Avlona) Deputies İsmâil Kemâl Bey and Aziz Pasha [Vrione] , Dibra (Debre / Debar) Deputy Necib Bey [Draga] [?] and Gjirokastra Deputy Müfid Bey declared that if an aggression occurs against a person or family for any reason and from any party, it is one of the duties of the local administration to defeat the threat and to preserve the freedom of individuals.²⁸⁵ In this case, these

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260 “BİR MEBUS – Eshâbı arzuhal [sic] bigayri hak gadr ve zulme uğradıklarını iddia ve memurîni Hükümet, muhafazai inzibat hususundaki vazifei mükellefelerini ifa etmiş olduklarım beyan ve ifade etmelerine nazaran, her iki tarafın da ifadesi kavli mücerrette kaldığı derkâr olup, mağduriyetini iddia edenlerin sâye-i hürriyette meftuh olan mercii kanûnîsine müracaat eylemeleri lüzumunun tefhimine ve bir cürüm vukuundan bahs ile şikâyet vukuuna mebnî bu bapta Müddeî-i Umumîlikçe [sic] takibatı kanuniye ifası zımnında tedâbiri lâzime ittihaz için bir taraftan da keyfiyetin Adliye Nezaretine ihbarına karar itası icap eder. Kırşehir Mebusu Mahmut Mahir”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260 [?] Although the Dibra (Debre) Deputy is inadvertently mentioned as ‘Necip’ in the parliamentary minutes, ‘Necib Bey [Draga]’ is originally a deputy from Skopje (Üsküp). The Dibra Deputy at that parliamentary session was ‘Mustafa Basri Bey [Dukagjinzadeh / Dukacınzâde /Dukakinzâde]’. In this direction, it was either the Dibra Deputy ’Dukakinzâde Mustafa Basri’ or the Skopje Deputy ’Necib Draga’ who submitted the motion. However, we are unfortunately unable to verify this, as we cannot double check the contents of parliamentary minutes from any other source. “Riyaseti Celileye. Bir şahıs veya aile hakkında her ne taraftan ve her ne sebepten olursa olsun, bir taarruz vuku bulursa, onun defi ile hürriyetlerinin muhafazası idare-i mahalliyeye terekküp eden vezaiften olup, Şeyh Sait Efendi ile rüfekası ve ailesi hakkında Musul Valisi ve Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının irtikâp [sic] ettikleri muamele-i sıyânet yüzünden bunların hürriyet-i şahsiyelerinden mahrumiyetlerini ve kanun haricinde bir muamele-i keyfiyeye dûçar olmalarını intac eyle-

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individuals were deprived of their individual liberty and were subjected to an unlawful and arbitrary practice on the pretext of being protected (muâmele-i sıyânet) by the Governor of Mosul and the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah. The deputies demanded that the administrators and those who respected and endorsed their instructions to be brought to the court. The interesting thing here is the inconsistency of the Gjirokastra Deputy Müfid Bey’s previous speech at the parliamentary platform and the written motion he submitted afterwards. Müfid Bey, who stated that the reassignments of the Sub-Governor and the Commander to another location was already requested from the Ministry of War, argued that this measure was sufficient. The Deputy, who said in his speech at the rostrum that there is no need to take any action anymore, was now proposing that the Governors be brought to court in the joint motion he submitted with his colleagues. Why did Müfid Bey, who evaluated the administrative practice as legitimate and the governors as well-intentioned in his speech, propose such a measure now? He might have thought that such a practice, which was started with legitimate and positive motives, later got out of control due to the imprudence of the Governors. At this point, Müfid Libohove has been categorized in dissenting opinion groups due to his ambiguous statements on legitimacy of the practice and the measures to be taken. Deputies Mustafa Sabri Effendi from Tokat, Hacı Şevket Effendi from Erzurum, Ömer Fevzi Effendi from Karahisar-ı Şarki (today Şebinkarahisar) and Mehmed Vehbi Effendi [Çelik] from Konya stated that if the claim of Said and his affiliates was true, it meant both a blow to the constitution and an actual crime.²⁸⁶ They noted that since it is imperative that this case be investigated by the court and a judgement be rendered, it should be entrusted to the judicial authorities. Deputy Serdarzâde Mustafa Sırrı Effendi [Atay] from Karahisar-ı Şarki noted that the responsibility of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor in the incident was understood from the evidence and indications such as the complaint filed against him, his own partial confession, some catastrophic murders in the

diğinden, bunların ve iş’arlarının tervicine müsaade edenlerin muhakemelerini talep ederiz. Berat Mebusu İsmail Kemal, Berat Mebusu Aziz, Debre Mebusu Necip, Ergiri Mebusu Müfit”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260 “Riyaseti Celileye. Süleymaniye’li Şeyh Sait ve Rüfekası taraftarlarından vuku bulan şikâyet vaki ise, hem Kanun-i Esasiye bir darbe vurulmuş, hem de fi’li vâki cürüm teşkil etmekte bulunmuş olduğundan, her halde meselenin mahkeme-i nizamiyece tahkik ve hükme raptı elzem idiğinden [sic], keyfiyetin cihet-i Adliyeye tevdiine karar verilerek ruznamei müzakerata avdet olunur. Tokat Mustafa, Erzurum Şevket, Karahisarı Şarki [sic] Fevzi, Konya Vehbi”

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form of an uprising and the request for his dismissal.²⁸⁷ He stated that since the matter would not be settled by relocating the administrator to another place of duty, it should be requested from the Ministry of Interior to bring him to court. Deputy Rıza Tevfik Bey [Bölükbaşı] from Edirne summarized the debate in his motion recommending common sense and stated that the views of his esteemed colleagues about these men had reached two contradictory conclusions.²⁸⁸ According to Rıza Tevfik, the majority of the assembly knew neither these men nor the origin of this matter. “One-way thinking always leads us and the public opinion to error”, he mentioned. Tevfik also compared the argument that “Governors cannot take an absolute action against those who violate the public order through their influence” as ‘a very detrimental paralysis’ that the administration can experience (çok muzır bir felc-i idâredir). He claimed that no result could be reached with these contradictory claims raised in the assembly and that the verdict to be given would not be fair even with the majority of votes. In this direction, he suggested that the situation should be thoroughly investigated, and further information should be obtained from the Interior. Deputy Ali Haydar Bey from Manisa (Saruhan), on the other hand, wrote that they were not elected as the advocates of public and private law (hukuk-u umûmiye ve şahsiyenin vekîl-i müdâfii) by the people and they were not sent to the parliament for this purpose.²⁸⁹ He noted that the law has appointed courts for

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260 “Riyaseti Celileye. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının mesuliyeti, şikâyet, kendilerinin kısmen itirafı ve birtakım cinâyâtı fecianın bir tarzı ihtilâlkârânede hudûsu ve kendisinin oradan kaldırılmasının Dahiliye Nezareti celilesine [sic] iş’ar kılınması gibi delâil ve emârâtın vücûdu ile anlaşılıyor. Mutasarrıfı müşarünileyhin diğer mahalle nakli memuriyetle [sic] işin kapatılması caiz olamayacağından, taht-ı muhakemeye alınması hususunun Dahiliye Nezareti celilesine iş’arına karar itası lâzım gelir. Karahisarı Şarki [sic] Mustafa”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260 “Riyaseti Celileye. Muhterem arkadaşların bu adamlar hakkında fikri iki mütenakız hükme peyveste oldu. Ekseriyet-i Mebusan ne bu adamları, ne de bu meselenin hüviyetini bilebilirler. Yek cihet düşünmek ise, daima bizi ve efkâr-ı umumiyeyi hatâya sevk eder. Ve bir memlekette nüfuzu ile ihlâli âsâyişe sebebiyet verenler hakkında Valiler, hiçbir hareketi kat’iyyede bulunamazlar. Bu ise çok muzir [sic] bir felci idaredir. Binaelayen [sic], bir kere keyfiyeti tahkik etmeli, Dahiliyeden sormalı, bu mütenâkız iddialarla hiçbir hükme yatamayız. Ekseriyeti ârâ ile hüküm dahi âdilâne olmaz biliriz. Dahiliyeden bir kere soralım da, sonra. Edirne Rıza Tevfik”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 260, 261 “Riyaseti Celileye. (Biz millet tarafından hukukû umumiye ve şahsiyenin vekîl-i müdafii olmak üzere gönderilmedik. Kanun bu gibi deâvî için mahkemeler tayin etmiştir. Şu halde ya mahkemeleri sed [sic] ile hukuku umumiye ve şahsiyeden dolayı milletin Meclisi Mebusana müracat etmelerini ilân veyahut hukuku umumiyeye taâlluk eden bu gibi mesail ile izâa-i evkat etmeyer-

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such cases. He suggested a rather ironic proposal such as “So, let us either close the courts and declare that the nation should apply to the Chamber of Deputies in matters related to public and private law or let us reject such matters related to public law without wasting our time.” He said that there is no doubt that the second option is reasonable and legal. Deputy Halil Bey from Menteşe (today Muğla) made it clear that the decision to summon Sheikh Said to the provincial center was based on the order given by the Ministry of Interior upon the local conditions and necessities.²⁹⁰ If the clarification were not sufficient, he proposed that an ‘Interpellation’ (İstîzâh) to be given against to the respective Minister. The last motion belonged to Hakkâri Deputy Sayyid Taha Effendi [Arvâsizâde] and requested that a particular Investigation Committee (Heyet-i Tahkikiye) be formed in the parliament and sent to the scene.²⁹¹ As a result of the negotiations and motions, the opinions on the subject were divided into two. However, since the ‘Commission Report’ (Encümen Mazbatası) was not yet prepared, the majority of the parliament decided to return the issue to the ‘Commission on Petitions’ (Arz-ı hâl Encümeni) as it was.

4.2 Shifting Views Between Executive and Legislative Powers Apart from the operational procedure of the banishment practice, there was a parliamentary composition divided into two main camps around two main issues. The first main discussion questioned the rightfulness and legitimacy of the executive power on the decision of the banishment of Sheikh Said. In fact, the Central Government [and particularly Ministry of Interior] itself has been criticized here, over the responsibility of the provincial administration. The second main discussion was over whether the case concerns the parliament and

ek red etmeliyiz ki, şıkkı sânînin makul ve muvâfıkı kanun olduğunda şüphe yoktur.) Manisa Ali Haydar  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 261 “Riyaseti Celileye. Şeyh Sait Efendinin Vilâyete celbi mahallinin gösterdiği lüzum üzerine Dahiliye Nezaretinin verdiği emre mübtenîdir. İzahat kâfi değilse, istizaha karar verilecek. Ruznameye geçmeli ibaresini muhtevidir. Menteşe Halil”  Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, p. 261 “Riyaseti Celileye. Bu mesele tevessül kabildir. Bu bapta buradan bir heyeti tahkikiyenin gönderilmesini talep ederim. Hâkkari [sic] Taha” (!) Not to be confused with Sayyid Taha II, who was from the Şemdinan Family and was the grandson of Obaidullah. İhsan Güneş, Türk Parlamento Tarihi (Meşrutiyete Geçiş Süreci: I. ve II. Meşrutiyet, Ayân ve Mebûsân Meclisleri Üyelerinin Özgeçmişleri), C.II, (Ankara: TBMM Vakfı Yayınları, 1997) p. 583

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whether the parliament had the authority over the case. How appropriate and how legitimate was the petition submitted by the Sheikhs directly to the parliament, bypassing the governorship, ministry, and judicial authorities? In this section, the different opinions of the deputies are categorized and tabulated. Table 1 below shows us which deputies consider the executive power to be legitimate and illegitimate, and which deputies consider the case as appropriate or inappropriate for a resolution in the parliamentary platform. At this point, the number of deputies who think that the provincial administration has conducted an illegitimate operation cannot be underestimated. Because the emphasis on individual liberty and rights, which started to find a political and social base after the promulgation of Constitutional Monarchy, naturally had a great impact on some deputies and gained importance for the majority of the parliament. For this reason, many deputies in the parliament considered the banishment of Sheikh Said as an arbitrary decision by the provincial government and clearly expressed it as a wrong initiative taken by the executive power. Even though the decision of banishment was taken with the knowledge and approval of the Ministry of Interior, the majority of the deputies reacted negatively. On the other hand, the number of those who reacted positively was not few and they argued that Governors should take the initiative in such situations without wasting time. In this regard, we see that the greatest sensitivity towards Sâdât’s religious background was displayed by Pirinççizâde Ârif Bey from Diyarbekir. In fact, by claiming that it is a common practice for local administrators to defame such powerful actors coming from a religious base, he put other local administrators under a great imputation. In his second turn of speech, he praised Said’s modesty and honesty and openly declared that Said was victimized by an administrative conspiracy based on hatred. It is useful to briefly take a look at the background of Pirinççizâde, as he is the only name in the parliament who defended Said unhesitatingly and accused the administrators directly. Ârif Pirinççizâde (1853 – 1909), a landowner and notable of Kurdish origin, was one of the leading representatives of the Unionist elite in the region, as well as he took the leadership of a group that was classified as nationalist or proto-nationalist. ²⁹² After his editorial career in Diyarbekir Newspaper, he had focused on agriculture and had become one of the richest and most influential  Joost Jongerden, Elite Encounters of a Violent Kind: Milli İbrahim Paşa, Ziya Gökalp and Political Struggle in Diyarbekir at the Turn of the 20th Century in Joost Jongerden, Jelle Verheij (eds.), Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870 – 1915, (Leiden: Brill, 2012),p. 55, 66 Joost Jongerden, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 247, 248

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Table 1: The parliamentary composition over the legitimacy of the Executive Power and the authority of the Legislative Power regarding the Sheikh Said’s case. The Provincial Administration’s Practice (Executive Power) is Legitimate

The Provincial Administration’s Practice (Executive Power) is Illegitimate

Hızır Lütfi/Zor İsmâil Pasha/Tokat Müfid/Gjirokastra

Ârif/Diyarbekir Mustafa Ârif/Kırkkilise İsmâil Hakkı/Komotini

The Case Should Be Discussed and Resolved In The Parliament

The Case is Not Relevant with The Parliament

İsmâil Pasha/Tokat Yusuf Kemâl/Sinop İsmâil Hakkı/Komotini Aristidi Pasha/İzmir Yorgi Honeos/Salonika Mehmed Rıza/Erzurum [?] Mehmed Rıza/Erzurum Yorgi Honeos/Salonika Cudi/Amasya [?] Aristidi Pasha/İzmir Mustafa Âsım/İstanbul Ali Haydar/Manisa Mehmed Vâsıf/ Yorgaki Artas/Salonika Monastir Ahmed Müfid/İzmit Mehmed Ârif/Komotini Muhiddin /Niğde Hacı Âdil/Tekfurdağı Seyfullah/Erzurum Ahmed Şükrü/Sivas Mahmud Mazhar/ Nâfi Pasha/Aleppo Trabzon Ali Cenani/Aleppo Abdulhamid Zahrawi/ Hama Halil/Menteşe İsmâil Kemâl/Berat Hayrullah/Yozgat Aziz Pasha/Berat Rıza Tevfik/Edirne Necib/Dibra [?] Müfid/Gjirokastra Mustafa Sabri/Tokat Hacı Şevket/Erzurum Ömer Fevzi/Karahisar-ı Şarki Mehmed Vehbi/Konya Mustafa Sırrı/Karahisar-ı Şarki Yusuf Kemâl/Sinop    

landowners in the province, possessing almost thirty villages. İbrâhim Pasha, the Chief of Milli Tribe and the Commander of Hamidiye Regiments, shook the authority of Pirinççizâde in Diyarbekir, by taking control of trade routes, putting pressure on land and villages, and urbanizing Viranşehir. When he was elected to the parliament as an independent candidate from the Diyarbekir district in 1908, he had been conducting a military operation against İbrâhim Pasha. Ârif Bey, who served in different bureaucratic and judicial positions such as

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Member of the ‘Provincial Council’ (Meclis-i İdâre-i Vilâyet), Chairman of the ‘Diyarbekir Chamber of Public Works and Trade’ (Nâfıa ve Ticâret Odası Riyâsetleri) and the provincial ‘Court of Appeal’ (İstînâf Mahkemesi) before becoming the Mayor and Deputy of Diyarbakır (1908), was also Ziya Gökalp’s maternal uncle. However, Ârif Bey’s duty in the Chamber of Deputies lasted less than a year, his obituary was declared in the parliament and his official funeral was organized with the cooperation of the Kurdish Club (KSMAP).²⁹³

Illustration 10: Diyarbekir Deputy Pirinççizâde Ârif Effendi Source: SALT Research, Diyarbakır Mebusu Arif Efendi – Arif Effendi, député de Diarbékir, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi/Press Cuttings and Documents, https://archives.sal tresearch.org/handle/123456789/19194?locale= en Access Date: 27. 06. 2021

The dichotomy of Ârif Pirinççizâde, which is based on being both from a Kurdish origin and a Unionist background, makes him really worth of studying. Having a common ethnic identity with Said Barzanji could be a major factor in supporting him against Zeki Pasha, a Unionist Governor representing the state authority. However, the Islamic references in his speech and the compliments of Said’s character suggest a personal relationship between them rather than coming from the same ethnic background. Even so, it is still controversial why Ârif, who does not hesitate to fight with the Kurdish tribes when it comes to his

 Meclisi Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, “Devre 1, Cilt 2, İçtima senesi 1, İnikad 41, 2 Mart 1325 Pazartesi / 15 March 1909, Birinci Celse, “ p. 294 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MECMEB/mmbd01ic01c002/mmbd01ic01 c002ink041.pdf

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own regional influence, as we see in the example of the Milli tribe, favors the Barzanjiyya Clan in Mosul, which challenges both state authority and local Notables. Although not as much as Pirinççizâde Ârif, there were also deputies who found the practice illegitimate and defended Said’s rights against the state authority. Yorgi Honeos Effendi from Salonika also found the exercise of executive power illegitimate and questioned its Constitutionality. In addition, stating that the duty of the executive power is to protect the lives, property, and honor of individuals, he evaluated the practice of banishment for protection purposes as arbitrary, customary, and tricky. Mustafa Ârif Bey from Kırkkilise also had displayed the same tendency and stated that even if they were guilty indeed, the local administration cannot remove these persons from anywhere without prosecution and decision by a judicial authority. On the other hand, Mustafa Âsım Effendi from İstanbul compared the practice to the Martial Law regime and argued that people cannot be accused by relying on the information reflected in the ancien régime’s records. Moreover, even if these people were guilty indeed, such a Martial Law practice in the Constitutional Monarchy period is unacceptable. Abdulhamid Zahrawi from Hama saw the government as unfair in two aspects and accused the local authority of both making the decision of banishment on its own and not taking the necessary measures against the mass attack in Mosul. The common platform where these views are based on, which make Said look innocent in the eyes of the state authority, may be the lack of a legal basis and the harshness of the practice. The reaction of some deputies towards the banishment of Said without a proper trial includes references to the content of the constitution in terms of individual freedoms and rights, rather than whether Said is guilty or right. In short, according to some of the views that justify Said, even if those who exercised executive power were right in their own case, the illegality of their method would put them in an unfair position. Among the rest, there may be those who have considered the possibility of a conspiracy with ulterior motives, especially among those who demand the prosecution of administrators. However, there was no member other than Ârif Bey who dared to declare that Said was the victim of a conspiracy with a completely ulterior motive or a different agenda. On the opposite side of Pirinççizâde Ârif, there are the Deputy of Gjirokastra Müfid Bey and Deputy of Erzurum Seyfullah Effendi, who emphasize the concept of ‘Divine Justice’. These two deputies, who defended that Sheikh Said fell victim to the manifestation of Divine Justice because of his own fault, did not make long statements. However, their antipathy towards Said was evident from their fatalism towards justice and their unwillingness to take action. Both have considered

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the operation of the local administration legitimate and reasonable and did not seek any ulterior motives. The Zor Deputy Hızır Lütfi Bey, on the other hand, justified the expulsion of these elements, which the ancien régime favored and directly tolerated through the Imperial Chamberlain channel. Based on his official experience in the province, Hızır Lütfi affirmed that these Sheikhs have consistently violated the public order and he attributed the restoration of security to their removal. He also defended the legitimacy of the operation conducted by the local government in every aspect and strongly opposed the notion that it was based on personal grudge. By calling for an urgent action towards the province, he marginalized the mass behind Said as ‘insects that he cannot describe’. İsmâil Pasha from Tokat justified the local administrators by arguing that the local administration cannot waste time with the bureaucracy and that the governor should take initiative in accordance with the procedures if necessary. Aleppo Deputy Ali Cenani confronted us with a completely different claim, voicing that Said’s rebellion against Constitutionalism was supported by the Imperial Chamberlain and was organized from there. Mehmed Rıza Effendi from Erzurum argued that the local government’s practice was definitely not based on a conspiracy, reminding that these individuals were so extreme and reckless that they could fire on government officials and buildings. Aristidi Pasha from İzmir reminded that Said was a well-known despotic oppressor and argued that if he had not been banished, there would have been a great conflict in Sulaymaniyah. According to Aristidi, the strongest evidence for this was that this conflict took place in the center of Mosul where Said was banished to, that is Said brought trouble wherever he went. He added that if they still had allegations of victimization, they could forward their complaints to the designated authorities. The common point of these names, who found the practice against Sheikh Said completely justified, was that they did not tolerate the threat posed to internal security by a character like Said, despite the libertarian atmosphere of the Constitutional era. According to them, even though Constitutionalism laid the foundations of freedom, the provincial influence of state authority in the face of such a character had to appear firm. The conflict which was tried to be prevented from happening in Sulaymaniyah, took place in the center of Mosul province, where Said was banished to. As a result of this, Said became an element that carried the trouble to wherever he went, in the eyes of the state authority. The second major controversy was over whether such an issue, based on the function of the executive power, the way it was exercised, and the limits of its jurisdiction, had a relevance with the parliament. While the principle of ‘separation of powers’ (tefrik-i kuvva), as one of the pillars of the Constitutional doctrine, was emphasized in the discussions, the jurisdiction and functionality of the parliament was also a matter of another debate. Emphasizing the separation

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of powers, Yusuf Kemâl Bey argued that such a problem based on the executive power should be resolved through the judicial authorities and argued that this petition could not be accepted by the parliament. According to İsmâil Hakkı Bey of Komotini, it was quite natural for an individual whose complaint originated from the local administration to seek his justice in the parliament. As this complaint could not be resolved by the superior local authority (governorate), ‘the Majliss’ had to resolve the case both by protecting the victim’s rights and by punishing the perpetrators. According to Honeos Effendi, the issue was very suitable for discussion in the parliament as it brought before the parliament through following the correct procedures. İsmâil Pasha from Tokat also reminded that the parliament was above all courts, and it was quite appropriate to present the case to the parliament before submitting it to another state organ. In response to this, Cudi Effendi from Amasya confronts us with a harsh rhetoric such as ‘the parliament is not a courtroom’. According to him, the legitimacy and justice of the practice and those responsible for the incident should be determined only by the courts. Ali Haydar Bey from Manisa also argued that they were not sent to the parliament to defend public and private law. If so, he made an ironic statement such as “let’s close the courts and lead the people into the parliament for their cases.” Mehmed Rıza Effendi from Erzurum added that this issue had nothing to do with the parliament, as the local administration made this decision by contacting the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministries of War and Security (Harbiye ve Zabtiye Nezâretleri) followed the process. It would not be wrong to say that those who wanted the issue to be resolved under the roof of the parliament were also those who found the practice of the local administration towards Said unfair, unjust and illegitimate. However, İsmâil Pasha from Tokat created an interesting contrast right at this point. He argued that the local administration has the right to take any initiative as long as it complies with the procedure but the parliament, which is both the ultimate authority and the supreme court, should resolve the issue. While in some opinions it was emphasized that the parliament was an inclusive structure above all courts, in some opinions we see that the parliament completely abstracted itself from the judicial power. In some opinions, the parliament was called to warn or give a vote of confidence over the relevant ministries or authorities, and the intervention power of the parliament was reduced to a control mechanism rather than the judiciary. Although the majority of the parliament was in favor of escalating the issue to the necessary authorities, active participation was witnessed in the relevant session. In any case, it is certain that the number of deputies who wanted to be involved in the decision to be taken in one way or another, was more than those who completely isolated themselves from the debate.

4.3 Categorization of Motions

175

4.3 Categorization of Motions When we look at the diversity of the measures to be taken, the number of deputies who considered the operation unlawful and requested that it be referred to the judicial authorities was quite high (see Table 2). However, the preferences for the issue to be brought to justice were divided into two main groups: those who wanted the issue to be referred to the Ministry of Justice and those who wanted the local administrators to be tried directly in the superior courts. Among those who wanted a lawsuit to be filed against the local administrators, there were those who sympathized with Said, such as Ârif Pirinççizâde. On the other hand, there were names such as Nâfi Pasha, who approached the issue in terms of constitutional violations rather than whether Said was guilty or not and accused the governor of acting by relying on a police force tip off. A considerable part of the deputies, referring to the advantages and opportunities of the current regime, suggested that the complainants could apply to the designated authorities introduced by the Constitutional Monarchy. Some of these suggestions may have been sincerely made with an emphasis on Constitutionalism. However, it was also possible that some of these deputies were unwilling to extend the helping hand of the parliament to a controversial figure like Sheikh Said Barzanji. When we look at the Table 3, we see the motions voiced or written by a smaller number of deputies. Parliamentarians in this group tended to be more cautious and to delve deeper into the issue. In particular, the establishment of a special commission or an investigative committee, the parliamentary vote on the executive power, and the motions of no-confidence against the Minister of Interior put the regulatory and supervisory principle of the parliament in the foreground. At this point, Menteşe Deputy Halil Bey defended the administrators by stating that they only obeyed the instructions of the Ministry of Interior, and he suggested an Interpellation (İstîzâh) against the Minister. In the parliamentary group, the only motion of no-confidence against the Minister came from Halil Bey. The motion of Yorgi Honeos, who wanted to open the practice of the Executive Power to the parliamentary vote, was at least as unique as Halil’s. Honeos was definitely in favor of resolving the case within parliament without forwarding it elsewhere and believed in the supervisory power of the legislature versus the executive power, that is, parliamentary activism. While Rıza Tevfik was in favor of resolving the issue in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, Hayrullah Effendi from Yozgat claimed that the Ministry of Interior must be freed completely in its decision since the issue was a matter of executive power. However, while Rıza Tevfik Bey did this with a supervisory motive and acted with the aim of receiving feedback from the Ministry, Hayrullah

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Table 2: Most voiced motions by the deputies The Issue Should Be The Issue Should Be Escalated to the Min- Escalated to the istry of Justice and/or Ministry of Interior Judicial Authorities Mustafa Ârif/Kırkkilise Ahmed Şerâfeddin/ Bolu Mustafa Zeki/Bolu Hacı Abdülvahab/Bolu Mahmud Bedri/Peja Mahmud Mâhir/Kırşehir Mustafa Sabri/Tokat Hacı Şevket/Erzurum Ömer Fevzi/Karahisar-ı Şarki Mehmed Vehbi/Konya 

The Governors Should Face a Trial

Mehmed Vâsıf/Monas- Ârif/Diyarbekir tir Ahmed Müfid/İzmit Ahmed Şükrü/Sivas Mehmed Ârif/Komotini Nâfi Pasha/Aleppo Hacı Âdil/Tekfurdağı Cudi/Amasya Rıza Tevfik/Edirne

Aristidi Pasha/İzmir İsmâil Kemâl/Berat Aziz Pasha/Berat

The Complainants Should Apply to the Designated Authorities Muhiddin/Niğde Seyfullah/Erzurum Mahmud Mâhir/ Kırşehir Ali Haydar/Manisa Yusuf Kemâl/Sinop Aristidi Pasha/İzmir

Necib/Dibra [?] Müfid/Gjirokastra Mustafa Sırrı/ Karahisar-ı Şarki 





Table 3: Less voiced motions by the deputies The Complainants Should Be Brought to Court and Judged

The Governors Should The Practice of the be Warned by the Executive Power Parliament Should Be Voted

Interpellation for the Ministry (İstîzâh)

Yorgaki Artas/Salonika Abdulhamid Zahrawi/ Yorgi Honeos/Salonika Halil/Menteşe Hama Hızır Lütfi/Zor Yorgi Honeos/Salonika     The Ministry of Interior Should Be Released to Fulfill Its Duty

Investigation Commit- Necessary Precautions No Further Action tee/Special CommisShould Be Taken in the Required sion/Further InvestiScene gation

Hayrullah/Yozgat

Ahmed Nesimi/ İstanbul Ali Cenani/Aleppo



Sayyid Taha/Hakkâri 

Hızır Lütfi/Zor

Müfid/Gjirokastra Mehmed Rıza/Erzurum [?]





4.4 The Criminal Complaint Filed by Mufti Abdülaziz Against Sâdât

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Effendi leaved the authority completely to the Ministry. There were also deputies who argued that the parliament should bypass the Ministries and warn or reprimand the administrators directly. The direct pressure of parliamentary activism on the executive power was also encountered here, and this pressure placed the representatives of the nation above all powers. Interestingly, a small number of deputies such as Yorgaki Artas Effendi from Salonika and Hızır Lütfi Bey from Zor wanted the complainants to be judged as well. However, we see that they also differed and contradict each other at this point. Because while Artas demanded that the Sheikhs be brought to court in order for the banishment decision to be legally finalized and justified [albeit retrospectively], Hızır Lütfi demanded that they be tried and severely punished in order not to cause bigger events.

4.4 The Criminal Complaint Filed by Mufti Abdülaziz Against Sâdât A week after the January 20 session, the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies was to negotiate an extremely vital and extensive petition reached from Mufti of Sulaymaniyah, Abdülaziz and his companions. The document did not only disclose the damages Sheikh Said inflicted on the Sub-province, but also ended with a striking proposal from the Mufti to the Government (see Illustration 11). They addressed Said as the affiliate of İzzet and Tahsin Pashas who were ‘the inventors of Inauspicious Era’ (Devr-i Menhûsun mûcidi) and ‘the treacherous informants of the realm and nation’ (mülk ve milletin muhbiri hâin İzzet ve Tahsin).²⁹⁴ According

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10; Although there is no date on this telegram copy, it has been attached to the document numbered DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 11 and dated 13 Kânûnusâni 1324– 26 January 1909 which was transmitted to the Ministry of Interior. BOA, DH.MKT.2711/83/Lef 1; The same telegram was to be sent to the Grand Vizirate by the same petitioners such as Mufti Abdülaziz, Mayor Abdülgafur and Notables Sâlih Paşa and Tevfik on 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909 “Meclis-i Mebûsân / Telgraf Sûretidir Devri-i Menhûsun mûcidi, mülk ve milletin muhbiri hâin İzzet ve Tahsin’in mensûbu olup senevî Üç Bin lira raddesinde maaş ve muâfiyyâta nâiliyyet ve ali rütbe ve nişanlar ihrâzına muvaffakiyetle yedlerindeki Mâbeyn Şifresi vâsıtasıyla ve hafiyelik vazife-i nâ-meşrûasıyla, dâire-i itâatlarına aldıkları bir takım mahkûmin, firâri, sebükmağzân kuvvetiyle Talabâni ve Köysancak hâdise-i müdhişelerine ve birçok mâsumların katline ve müteaddid Kur’ânın ihrâkına ve emvâl ve eşyânın yağmasına sebebiyet vermiş ve kendi beynlerinde vukua getirdikleri katl ve ihrâk, nehb gibi mevâdd-ı cinâiyyeye dâir birçok evrâk-ı tahkikiyeleri mahkeme-i temyizin îlâmıyla evvelce Kerkük, Diyarbekir, Musul Mahkemelerine nakledilmiş ve âhiren Hemavend ve Ağavât-ı

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to the petition, Said was not only allocated an annual allowance of 3.000 lira, but also was cherished, highly praised and constantly appreciated by the ancien régime. Said and his affiliates had caused some terrific incidents such as the Talabani and Koysanjaq Incidents (Talabâni ve Köysancak hâdise-i müdhişelerine) by exploiting the strength of some fugitive convicts who were in obedience to

Mahalliye üzerine hücûmla itlâf-ı nüfus, nehb ve ihrâk gibi fazâyihe ictisâr, Fettah Bey, Hacı Hüseyin, Mülâzım Cemil Efendilerin emlâklarını zabt , mahdûm ve akrabâlarını cerh, defaâtle Süleymaniye Çarşısını ihrâk, Eşrâf-ı Beldeden Fidye-i Necât nâmıyla kilitli mebâliği cebren ahz ve hatta âmâl-i müstebidânelerinin adem-i is’afından nâşi Mutasarrıf-ı Esbak Osman Paşayla Hükûmet Konağında ve bazı Eşrâf ve Memûrînin hânelerine katl kasdıyla biddefaât yaylım ateşle icrâ ve makam-ı resmiyede Belediye, Mülkiye Memûrlarını tahkir ve depodan Altmış Yetmiş binlik Martin Tüfengi […] sirkat ve kalemin yazmaya hayâ edeceği envâ-i cerâimi irtikâb ve Habshâneden mahbûs çıkarmak ve hânelerinde adam habsetmek sûretiyle dâhilen hâricen emniyet ve âsâyişi ihlâl, senevî Elli Bin raddesinde olan vâridât-ı hazineyi On Dokuz Bin lira raddesine tenzil ve i’sal ve fenâlıklarının tekrârı hâlinde Basra’ya teb’idlerine Meclis-i Hass-ı Vükelâ karârıyla İrâde-i Seniyye […] ettiği kayden sâbit olan Süleymaniye Müteşeyyihleri Hafid Said ve Birâderi Mârûf ve Mahdûmları Mahmud ve Ahmed ve Akrabâsı Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Sâlih’in müddet-i medide ve beter ve takat-fersâ mezâlim ve taaddiyâtlarından irtika-i bîzâr olan ahâli umûmiyetle canlarına hâtime çekerek heyecâna geldikleri cihetle Hükûmet-i Seniyye geçende merkumânı Musul’a aldırmak sûretiyle istikrâr-ı âsâyiş teskin-i şûrişe muvâfık olmuş ve haklarında tutulan sâlif-üz zikr mevâdd-ı mâlûme hakkındaki evrâk-ı cinâiyye Musul, Süleymaniye Mahkeme ve İstintak Dâirelerinde eyâdî-i mehâkim ve tahkikatta bulunmuş olduğu maa-tteessüf işitilmiştir. Bu zâlimlerin Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırıldıklarından beri istirâhat-ı umûmiye bihakkın istikmâl olunduğuna ve ahâli son derecede merkum Şeyhlerden müteneffir ve binâberin bir daha bu livâya iâdelerinde birçok sefk-i dimâ ile Devr-i Sâbıkın müdhiş bir sûrette avdeti bedihi ve bu ise İslâmiyet ve Diyânete ve Kanûn-i Esâsiye bilvücûh münâfî olduğuna mebni umûm sekenesi bu yüzden me’yûs ve muztarib kalmış ve bu hûnhârların sahte mühürleriyle mâsûmiyetlerine dâir makamâta çektikleri telgraf ve ettikleri ilkaat ve teşebbüsât üzerine Dersaadet’teki Kürd Teâvün Cemiyeti Reisi, Âyândan Şeyh Ubeydullah Efendizâde Şeyh Kadir Efendi hazretleri tarafından Makam-ı Sadâret -i Uzmâya takdim ettirilip gazetede münderiç arizada mezkûr Müteşeyyihlerin bilakis hüsn-i hâllerinin bast ve beyân edilmiş olmasının esbâbı ve ledünniyâtı merkuminin ahvâllerinin hakaikine adem-i vukufundan idüğülmüşdür [sic]. Velhâsıl defaâtle Sadâret -i Uzmâya, Dâhiliyeye, Musul Vilâyetine, Selânik Merkez-i Umûmisiyle Matbûât-ı Osmâniyeye maddeten ve medlûlen arzedildiği veçhile merkum Şeyhlerin tâdâd olunan cerâim-i vâkilerinden dolayı Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun Kalemi ve Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesiyle Taşra Mehâkimi Kuyud Reisine müracaat buyurulduğunun, ahâlinin bunca nâle ve figanına devr-i sâbıkta olduğu gibi iltifât olunmuyorsa, bâdi-i fesâd ve ihtilâl azim olan merkumu […] sahâbete Süleymaniye’ye iâdeleri hâlinde artık mâ-mülhakat terk-i evtâna mecbûriyetimiz muhakkak olmasına mebni ya merkumlar hakkında kanunen eşeddi cezâ tertibiyle mahall-i âhara teb’idleri yâhûd umûmiyetle terk edeceğimiz emlâka mukabil diğer vilâyette emlâkın ihsânıyla naklimize müsâade ve teskin-i heyecân emrinde bir karâr-ı âcil ittihâz ve tebliğ buyrulmasını Yirmi nüfûstan ibâret Eşrâf ve Vücûh-u Belde, Rüesâ-yı Rûhâniye ve Umûm Aşâir ve Ahâli nâmına kemâl-i me’yûsiyetle ile arz eyleriz. Ferman. Müfti-i Belde Abdülaziz ve Rüfekası”

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them. From their perspective, Said’s cohorts were the principle and definitive cause of the massacre of many innocent individuals, the arson of numerous villages and the looting of properties and households. The investigation files regarding their criminal activities such as murder, arson and looting were referred to Kirkuk, Diyarbekir and Mosul Courthouses through the verdict of the Court of Cassation (Mahkeme-i Temyiz). The Court of Cassation which was located at the Ministry of Justice in İstanbul, was in charge of reviewing and resolving the legality of the decisions appealed from provincial judicial authorities.²⁹⁵ In other words, even if the provincial courts had appealed the decisions given against the Sheikhs, the Court of Cassation in İstanbul had upheld their sentences and had served the final verdicts to the provincial courts. Unfortunately, the crimes committed by the Sulaymaniyah Sheikhs up to that time were not limited to these above and Abdülaziz’s petition submitted an exceedingly long list: ‒ They have recently attacked the Hamawand Tribe and Local Landlords (Ağavât-ı Mahalliye) and dared to commit such atrocities like slaughtering their population, looting and arsonism of their property.²⁹⁶ ‒ They have usurped the properties of local Notables such as Fettah Bey, Hacı Hüseyin, Lieutenant (Mülâzım) Cemil and have injured their sons and relatives. ‒ They have set the Sulaymaniyah Market on fire many times. ‒ They have grabbed the money which was saved as the ‘Salvation Ransom’ (Fidye-i Necât) in a safe box by the local Notables.²⁹⁷ ‒ Since their despotic desires were not satisfied, they have opened fire on the Government Hall while the former Sub-Governor Osman Pasha was in the building, and they have repeatedly fired on the houses of some certain Notables and officials with intent to kill.

 Avi Rubin, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p. 36  This statement about the Hamawands may seem quite problematic since the relations between the Barzanjiyya Family and Hamawand Tribe are known to be quite good. However, relations between Barzanjiyya and Hamawand were not always as good as in the Post-Constitutional Mosul. In 1905, Sheikh Said and his affiliates had attacked the Hamawand villages, and the situation was reported to the Sultan. Although the local authorities wanted to use force against Sheikh Said and the Council of Ministers approved it, Abdülhamid refused to do so. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq…,p. 85  Fidye-i Necât: It is a term used for the money etc. which is forcibly given by oneself or by someone else, in order to get rid of a person from captivity or a trouble that has befallen him. The meaning of the term is ‘Salvation Ransom’. https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=fidye-i+necat&t=%40%40 Access Date: 19.04. 2022

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They have insulted municipal and administrative officials in their official posts. They have stolen Martin Rifles worth of 60 or 70.000 lira from the army arsenal. They have violated public order and security both internally and externally by arbitrarily releasing prisoners from the prison and imprisoning some individuals in their own property. They have reduced the annual revenue of the Sanjak Treasury from 50.000 to 19.000 lira.

Abdülaziz and his companions particularly emphasized that The Council of Ministers (Meclis-i Hass-ı Vükelâ) issued an imperial edict to banish the Sheikhs to Basrah in case of recidivism but even this ultimatum could not resolve the problem in the last instance. According to the petition, the people were excessively tired and disgusted with the long-time oppression and tyranny by the Sheikhs. They also expressed that the public peace was restored as these tyrants were banished to the provincial center, but the community was still full of hate towards these exiles. At this point, the main purpose of the petition began to be understood more clearly. The petitioners were extremely disturbed over the possibility of Sheikh Said being sent back to Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah and wanted to rule this possibility out from the very beginning. Accordingly, the return of these Sheikhs to Sulaymaniyah would bring many deaths and would mean a terrific comeback of the ancien régime (devr-i sâbıkın müdhiş bir sûrette avdeti). The petition taking the pulse of public opinion, interpreted that all the residents of the sub-province felt desperate and anxious because of this frustrating possibility which was against to the Islamism and Constitutionalism in every respect. In addition, they accused these ‘bloodthirsty Sheikhs’ (bu hûnhârların) of sending fake sealed telegrams regarding their so-called innocence, misleading the official authorities and creating a public perception. Allegedly, these attempts encouraged Sheikh Abdulqadir, the founder and president of the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress in İstanbul, to take some actions in line with the consent, expectations and objectives of these Sheikhs. Petitioners argued that Sheikh Abdulqadir had undertaken the representation and spokesmanship of these ‘So-called Sheikhs’ (Müteşeyyihler) in İstanbul in order to exert a top-down influence on the provincial administration.²⁹⁸ According to this allegation, Abdulqadir had pre-

 In some official correspondence and even in the Parliamentary Minutes, the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs are called as Müteşeyyih (‫ )ﻣﺘﺸﻴﺦ‬instead of Meşâyih (‫)ﻣﺸﺎﻳﺦ‬. While the Meşâyih means the plural of the word of ‘Sheikh’, the word Müteşeyyih (‫ )ﻣﺘﺸﻴﺦ‬has negative and insulting

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sented the demands of the Barzanjiyya Sheiks to the Grand Vizier and had declared their good intentions on behalf of them. At the same time, Abdulqadir had fake news published in the newspapers about the so-called good wills and conducts of the Sheikhs in order to conceal their true attitudes and identities. In other words, the Sheikhs in Sulaymaniyah have been lobbying in political circles and conducting press campaigns, thanks to Abdulqadir’s access to different political offices, authorities and media channels in İstanbul. Abdülaziz and his comrades have also filed a criminal complaint against the Sheikhs on behalf of the people of Sulaymaniyah, to the Imperial Chamberlain, Ministry of Justice and the Chief of Provincial Court Records (Taşra Mehâkimi Kuyud Reisi). Moreover, they reminded that they have shared the documents of these criminal complaints with the Grand Vizirate, Ministry of Interior, Mosul Governorate, CUP Headquarters in Salonika and even the Ottoman Press. ‘What if all the moans and screams of the people will not be paid attention as in the ancien régime?’ they asked in an anxious tone. As a matter of fact, if these instigators of strife and mutiny were sent back to Sulaymaniyah, they would have to leave their positions, services and jobs as all the Notables of entire sub-province. At this point, the petitioners offered two options to the Government. The first option was for the Sheikhs to face severe punishment by the law and banished to a more suitable location without being returned to Sulaymaniyah. Otherwise, all the Notables of Sulaymaniyah were willing to leave their homes and migrate to another province on the condition that property and residence be provided by the state. By declaring the second option, they have displayed their determination to get rid of those Sheikhs and they have dared to challenge the state author-

means such as ‘those who pretend to be or masquerade as Sheikhs’ or ‘So-called, Fake, Phony or Artificial Sheikhs’. http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=me%C5%9Fayih&t=%40 http://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=m%C3%BCte%C5%9Feyyih&t=%40 Access Date: 31.12. 2020 https://www.osmanice.com/osmanlica-24145-nedir-ne-demek.html Access Date: 28.10. 2021 Mehmet Çetin, Dine zarar gelmesin diye diye…Şeyhlik Taslamanın Zararları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme (1), Yeni Asya, 03 October 2020, https://www.yeniasya.com.tr/mehmet-cetin/dine-zarargelmesin-diye-diye_529173 Access Date:28.10. 2021 Müteşeyyih: A dishonest person who, although not a Sheikh or a Saint, tries to display the state and attitudes of those persons in an artificial and forged way. [Şeyh veya velî olmadığı hâlde o zâtlara âit hâl ve tavırları sun’î ve göstermelik bir sûrette sergilemeye çalışan sahtekâr kimse] Osman Nûri Topbaş, Hak Dostlarından Hikmetler: Abdülkâdir Geylânî-1- Altınoluk Dergisi, Issue 383, January 2018, p. 37, Footnotes:4

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Illustration 11: BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 10 attached to Lef 11 (26 January 1909) The Petition of Sulaymaniyah Mufti Abdülaziz, which disclosed the alleged crimes of Sheikh Said and aroused discussion at the Parliament.

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ity for this purpose even if it would practically change their entire lives. The fact that they wanted to move to a different province instead of moving to another sanjak of Mosul showed how determined they were to get rid of the Sheikhs and move away. The petition was signed by a group of twenty people made up of Mufti Abdülaziz and his comrades (Müfti-i Belde Abdülaziz ve Rüfekası) on behalf of All Tribes, Communities, Notables and Spiritual Leaders of the town. President of the Parliament Ahmed Rızâ Bey conveyed the original copy of the document to the Ministry of Interior together with the ‘Memorandum 9’ (9 numaralı tezkire) which stated the vital content of the telegram and demanded action.²⁹⁹ The following week, the Ministry of Interior responded to the Parliament with a message explaining how the government took the decision to return the Sheikhs to Kirkuk and which bureaucratic steps and legal obstacles the decision has been through, instead of mentioning local sensitivities.³⁰⁰ Clearly, state authority was much more concerned with properly administering and maintaining the judicial procedures rather than solving the problems of Sulaymaniyah people. We understand this from the fact that the Sheikhs were transferred to Kirkuk in any case, although all these petitions and complaints rejected the return of the Sheikhs. The option for the Sheikhs to keep residing in Kirkuk or Sulaymaniyah after the Mosul Incident was considered in terms of ’how the Sheikhs could be included in the investigation’ rather than ’the harm they inflicted on the people might increase with the motive of revenge’. There was an ongoing investigation in the provincial center of Mosul and a litigation process scheduled to begin soon. Therefore, the state authority did not want to send the Sheikhs to a distant province, relying only on the concerns and demands of the Notables of Sulaymaniyah. Because this ‘second banishment’ could not only endanger the safety of the investigation and litigation but also incite the Kurdish tribes and tariqahs in the region, thus fueling bigger events. The new parliament was also in a dilemma, oscillating between the motto of listening to the voice of the public opinion encouraged by the liberal Constitutional atmosphere, and the needs of controlling a troubled province like Mosul. The fact that the Unionist government has the final word at this point shows that the strategic concerns and local dynamics in troubled provinces such as Mosul outweighed the principles of polyphony and populism within the parliamentary democracy even at the very beginning of the Constitutional Monarchy.  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 11, 13 Kânûnusâni 1324– 26 January 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 12, 21 Kânûnusâni 1324– 03 February 1909 For the content of this telegram, please see the section 3.2 The Transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk

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However, the state which ignored the concerns of the Notables and made concessions for Sâdât to return to Kirkuk, was not yet aware that it paved the way for their regrouping in their hometown and ignited the Siege of Sulaymaniyah.

5 Deepening and Expansion of the Crisis 5.1 Sâdât’s Seek of Justice This section will examine the pressure policy of the Sâdât bloc in the tense environment immediately after the Mosul Incident and how the state authority responded to this pressure. Dismissal of Sub-Governor Tevfik and relegation of Commander Mustafa, in order to reduce the pressure were the primary precautions taken by the state. However, the crisis was to be deepened and expanded as the seek for justice was voiced by other sufi orders and tribal groups beside Sâdât. During this process leading to the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, the state could not re-establish authority and the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs who were transferred to Kirkuk were consolidated with these sufi orders and tribal elements. February was to be more difficult than ever in every way. While the central government pushed the provincial administration to restore the public order and pacify the community, Sâdât still expected justice to be served after the killing of Sheikh Said. The first and most important move of the central authority was to dismiss Tevfik, which was already consulted with the Mosul Governorate in December but who was endorsed by the positive reference of Governor Zeki. According to Zeki, as Tevfik did not adopt any bad attitude and did not take any improper action, his dismissal was unfair.³⁰¹ However, due to the existing conditions and sensitivities after the incident, it would be a right decision to be assigned to a different location, as his stay in Sulaymaniyah poses a danger. Because, after the Mosul Incident, the public opinion of Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk completely turned against Tevfik due to the pressure and victimization Sâdât was subjected to. According to Zeki, as long as the people thought that Tevfik had a hand in the Mosul Incident, it was not possible for him to serve there. As a result, Zeki now waited for a suitable sub-Governor to be appointed and sent to Sulaymaniyah.

 BOA, DH.ŞFR.409/80, 15 Kânûnusâni 1324– 28 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik Paşa’nın iş’ârı üzerine Sâdât’ın vak’a-i mâlûmeden […] kalmalarından dolayı Süleymaniye ve Kerkük havâlisi ahâlisinin efkâr-ı umûmisi Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyhin aleyhine dönmüş ve mûmâileyh bir gûnâ sû-i hâli ve hareketi görülmediğine mebni azli muvâfık-ı adâlet değilse de ahvâl-i hâzıraya nazaran bekası da mahzûrdan sâlim olmayacağı anlaşılmış olduğundan başka bir mahale tahviliyle Süleymaniye’ye münâsib bir Mutasarrıfın tâyini ve i’zâmı menût-u rey ve İrâde-i Celile-i Nezâretpenâhileridir. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki” https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-012

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In the meantime, Sâdât had increased the pressure as well. A telegram dispatched by some Sâdât affiliates such as Ali, Dervish (Derviş), Mufti Hassan, the Servant of Prayer Rugs (Hâdim-üs Seccâde) Emin, Walid (Velid) and Sheikh Abdullah from Kirkuk, accused Brigadier General Mustafa being the number one conspirator while cursing his personality.³⁰² According to the message, Mustafa was the representative of the most ruthless segment of the society, and the cruelty he had inflicted on Sâdât was more brutal than of the notorious Nimrod, Shaddad and Hajjaj (Nemrûd, Şeddâd, Haccâc) who were referred in the pages of history.³⁰³ They claimed that Mustafa’s opposition to Sâdât had been known for a long time and that his real intention was to completely destroy the obedience of these vast land to Sâdât. Commander Mustafa was appointed to his new post in Kirkuk after Sulaymaniyah. However, those who sent the telegram were worried that Mustafa might disturb the peace and order and might harm the Bar-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2732/13, Lef 3, no date mentioned “Umûm Erkân-ı Harbiye Dâiresi / Merkez Şûbesi Cemiyet-i beşeriyenin en gaddar tâifesinden olup zulümleriyle tevârih sahifelerini lânetle işgal eden Nemrûd, Şeddâd, Haccâc’ın revâ görmediği bir sûret, Sülâle-i Sahiha-i Nebevviyeden Şeyh Said Efendiyle evlâd ve ahfâd ve ekaribinin me’vâ-i asliyelerinden Musul’a aldırılmasına başlıca sebebiyet veren Süleymaniye Nizâmiye Kumandanı Mirlivâ Mustafa Paşa ile ismi ileride arz olunacak kesânın […] eser-i tahrik ve tedâbir eylemiş pesendâneleriyle Sâdât-ı mûmâileyhimizden Şeyh Said Efendiyle oğulları Şeyh Ahmed ve yirmi beş kadar adamları zulmen mezkûr Musul ahâlisi tarafından katl edilmiş ve bu hâl […] Hıtta-i Irâkîye-i İslâmlarında umûmiyetle kan ağlatmıştır. Bir hıtta-i azimenin şîrâze-i itâat ve intizâmını toptan tahribe bais ve efkâr-ı reddiyesi vaktiyle memleketimizce de anlaşılan ve bu kerre de livâmıza iâde ettirilen Paşa-yı mûmâileyhin emniyet-i umûmiyi münselib ve devâmı gaile-i mâruzanın aynen zuhûrunu bâdi olacağına diğer mahale aldırılması selâmet-i vatan nâmına katiyyen matlûbdur. Ali, Derviş , Müfti Hasan, Hâdim-üs Seccâde Emin, Velid, […] Şeyh Abdullah, Vücûh Tevfik, Vücûh Mehmed, Vücûh Sadik, Vücûh Abdülkerim, Meşâyihten Sâlih, Civanmerdzâde Abbas, Meşâyihten Mehmed Habib, Meşâyihten Mehmed Revak, Sâdât Ahmed, Sâdât İbrâhim, Sâdât Fethullah, Sâdât Rüstem, Sâdât Mârûf… “  Al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf [al-Ḥakam bin Akīl al-Thakafī Abū Muḥammad]: The most famous and most able governor of the Umayyads known for his stern and pitiless character. He was born in Taif about 661 and died in Wasit in 714. A. Dietrich, AL-Hadjdjadj B. Yusuf, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Edited by: B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, CH. Pellat and J. Schacht, Volume III H-IRAM (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986) pp. 39 – 43 Shaddād ibn ʽĀd: It was believed that Shaddad, who was rumored to have lived for hundreds of years in different sources, was a king famous for his cruelty, arrogance and impiety. It was narrated that Shaddad, who was also mentioned in the 89th Sura Al-Fajr of the Qur’an, built the city named Iram of the Pillars as an imitation of heaven on earth. Mohammed Hamdouni Alami, Art and Architecture in the Islamic Tradition: Aesthetics, Politics and Desire in Early Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011) p. 148 – 156

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zanjiyya Family at such a close distance. That’s why they demanded that he be assigned to a farther place for the sake of the safety of their homeland. It was known that there had been complaints about Mustafa in the Sulaymaniyah district for a long time, but it was not known why the Ministry of War still assigned him in the immediate vicinity such as Kirkuk. Upon the ongoing complaints about him, the 6th Army Command had removed Mustafa from his post in Sulaymaniyah but had appointed him as the Deputy Commander of a close unit like the 23rd Reserve Division (23. Redif Fırkası) in Kirkuk.³⁰⁴ However, the Minister of War Ali Rızâ Pasha, who was overwhelmed by Sâdât’s continuous demands and complaints, did not want to hear about Mustafa anymore. He was expecting for the completion of investigation which the 12th Division had initiated against Mustafa Pasha, but which had been suspended due to the rising tension in Sulaymaniyah after the Mosul incident. While the calm was restored and the conditions were favorable, Minister Ali ordered Mustafa to be sent to the 6th Army Headquarters in Baghdad and the investigation to be concluded swiftly by cooperating with the civil administration. Apparently, although this investigation was conducted by the 12th Division in Kirkuk, the 6th Army Command also needed to be involved in the process, as the case would probably be heard by the Court Martial in Baghdad. Because, like all the brigades, divisions and corps in the region, the 12th Division of Kirkuk was subject to the 6th Army based in Baghdad. In addition, since the accusations against Mustafa and the incidents he was involved in, were entirely related to the civilian population, Ali Rızâ Pasha especially sought the cooperation of the civilian administration. On 6th of February 1909, under the leadership of the Naqshbandiyya Sheikh Abu Bakr (Ebû Bekir), Khalidiyya Sheikh Abdurrahman and Qadiriyya Sheikh Salih in Erbil, all leading Ulemâ, Sâdât and Eşrâf sent a signed telegram directly

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2732/13, Lef 4, 19 Kânûnusâni 1324– 01 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Mustafa Paşa hakkında mukaddemâ vuku bulan şikâyât üzerine Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığı Vekâletine sebk iden tebligata cevâben vârid olan telgrafnâmede Redif 23. Fırka Kumandanlığı Vekâletini îfâ eylemek üzere âhiren Kerkük’e aldırılmış olan mûmâileyh Mustafa Paşa’nın oradan dahi kaldırılması Kerkük Meşâyihi ve Sâdâtı tarafından sûret-i katiyyede taleb edilmekte olduğundan Bağdad’a celbi istîzân ve Musul Hâdisesinin Süleymaniye’ce mûcib olduğu sû-i tesir ve heyecân sebebiyle şimdiye kadar tehir etmiş olan tahkikatın bu günlerde avdet etmiş olan sükûnetten bil-istifâde cihet-i mülkiye ile müttehiden sür’at-i icrâ ve ikmâli için 12. Fırka Kumandanlığı Vekâletine emir verildiği ilâveten dermeyân edilmiş ve Mustafa Paşa’nın Bağdad‘a celbi muvâfık olmakla ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ”

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to the Sultan and the Parliament.³⁰⁵ They depicted the Sheikh Said Barzanji Incident in all disturbing details and sought justice in the compassion of the Sultan (see Illustration 12). They portrayed the grandfather of Said, Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Effendi as the member of ‘Pure Dynasty of Prophethood’ (Sülâle-i Tâhire-i Nebeviyye) and the chief of all Iraqi Sâdât (Umûm Sâdât-i Irâkîye) and glorified him as a ‘monument of religious fortitude’ (Salâbet-i Diniyye). More than 30 of Said’s men and many from Kirkuk, Erbil, Akre and Rawandiz (Revandiz) were killed by thousands of coordinated and prepared aggressors of Mosul in ‘such a brutality similar to a second Karbala’ (ikinci defa Kerbelâ’ya müşâbih bir sûret-i gaddarânede). Sheikh Said himself who resided in his house close to the Government Hall, was tragically and savagely killed by these aggressors with no mercy and no remorse. According to the allegations in the telegram, these aggressors were so hateful and unsatisfied that they went so far as to partially burn the dead bodies (kısmen ihrâk-ı binnâr) or throw them into the river (nehre ilka) after all. According to those religious leaders, this assault in the Mosul province generated an extraordinary importance and caused a deep sorrow among the

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 13, 24 Kânûnusâni 1324– 06 Şubat 1909; DH.MKT.2776/89/Lef 3, 24 Kânûnusâni 1324– 06 Şubat 1909 “Atebe-i Hazret – i Şehriyâriye / Meclis-i Mebûsân Riyâset-i Celilesine, Geçen Iyd-i Edhâ günlerinde Şeâir-i İslâmiye ve […] sâbıkaya ittibâen bilumûm ehl-ül İslâm […] karâbin etmeleri mûtâd iken bilakis o eyyâm-ı mübârekte vilâyet merkezi olan Musul’da Sülâle-i Tâhire-i Nebeviyye’ye mensûb Süleymaniye Sâdâtından ve umûm Sâdât-ı Irâkîyenin reisi Salâbet-i Diniyye ile meşhûr ve mârûf merhûm Kâk Şeyh Ahmed Kudsi […] hazretlerinin hafidi Şeyh Said Efendilerle oğlu Şeyh Ahmed Efendi ve Otuzdan mütecâviz adamı ve yine Kerkük Erbil Akra’da ve Revandiz Köysancak ahâlilerinden bî-günâh birçok adamları İkinci Vak’a-i Kerbelâ’ya müşâbih bir sûret-i gaddarânede Musullulardan binlerce eşhâsı rezâil-i câniler sözleşerek tedbirleşerek Hükûmet Konağına karib ve mûmâileyh Şeyh Said Efendinin sâkin olduğu hânesine hücûm ile bir sûret-i feciâne-i vahşiyânede bunları cellâd-ı bi-îmân gibi katl ve buna da kanaat edilmeyerek cenâzelerinin kısmen ihrâk-ı binnâr ve nehre ilka etmekle mugayir-i rızâ-yı bâri ve Peygamberleri iğfâl-i gadrâneleri Hıtta-i Irâkîyede mütemekkin umûm Elli Binden mütecâviz Türk ve Kürd kavimlerince bir ehemmiyet-i fevkalâdeyi ihrâz ve bu yüzden bir beis-i azim […] dide-i dindarâneleri eşk-i teessür yağdırmakta ve her bir vicdân-ı insâniyetle ihkak-ı hakk için Hükûmet-i Seniyyenin icrâât-ı adâletkârânesinin tesrii cidden intizâr ve arzu etmekte bulundukları muhakkak ve zâten o hâin cânilerin irtikâb ettikleri cinâyet-i azime ve vahşiyânelerine değil efrâd-ı insan gökte Melâike-i Kirâm bin kan dökse ehemmiyet-i vâkıâsıyla münâsib ettiğine maâzallah ihkak-ı hakk emründe [sic] ihmâl ve terâhi herhalde bir çok fenâlığı müstelzim bulunacağında ihtimâlât-ı kaviyyeden bulunmuştur. Merhamet-i Şeriat […] hâlinde icrâ-yı adâletle te’dib etmelerine […] umûmun kalbinde melhûz tevehhümât-ı hâzıranın tâdil buyurulması selâmet-i umûmiye nâmına arz ve ifâdeye ictisâr olunur. Ferman Tarik-i Nakşibendiyye Hülefasından Ebû Bekir Tarikat-ı Hâlidiyye Hülefasından Abdurrahman Tarikat-ı Kadiriyye Hülefasından Sâlih”

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more than 50 thousands Turkish and Kurdish communities living on the Iraqi Domains. According to the telegram, everyone conscientiously waited for these faithless murderers to be punished and for justice to be served (ihkak-ı hakk), because the neglect of justice would most likely cause even greater evils. Immediately afterwards, this message of the Tariqah Sheikhs was to be conveyed to the Mosul Governorate in order to take further action on the issue and speed up the relevant investigation.³⁰⁶ In a correspondence regarding the Sulaymaniyah CUP branch, Governor Zeki stated that after the incident, the tribal chiefs in Sulaymaniyah approached and tended towards the Sheikhs and eventually the townspeople were left alone against the Sheikhs.³⁰⁷ At such a point when the branch was questioned by the superior authorities, it was quite possible that Zeki thought that the Sulaymaniyah cadres of the CUP were the guardians of the balance of power in the town. Because when the Tribes took the side of the Sheikhs (temâyül), the balance of power and local dynamics have changed considerably and the struggle between the provincial cliques and the Unionist authority had surfaced obviously. In order to relieve the authorities tensed up by the intelligence from the French Consulate, Zeki reported that “there is nothing to worry about in here” (Buraca mûcib-i endişe bir hâl yoktur), referring to the entire province.³⁰⁸ However, again in the same message, Zeki admitted that the false rumors about that ‘Mosulites in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah would be killed’, caused a little panic. Zeki added that due to these rumours, foreigners and officials across the prov-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 17, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/162, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909 Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Vak’a-i mâlûmeden sonra Aşâir Şeyhler tarafına temâyül ederek muhâlifleri kasaba ahâlisine münhasır kaldığı cihetle müşârünileyhin îtilâfına çalışmakta olup istihsâl olacak neticenin arz-ı tabiisi ise Süleymaniye’deki memûrların beder eylemiştir. […] husûsen maksadı temin edeceği vârid-i hatır olmakla icrâ-yı îcâbı merhûn-u rey-i sâmileridir. Ferman Vâli Ferik Zeki“  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 409/161, 26 Kânûnusâni 1324– 08 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Buraca mûcib-i endişe bir hâl yoktur. Kerkük ve Süleymaniye’de bulunan Musulluların katl olacağı şâyiâ-i kâzibesi üzerine biraz heyecân hâsıl olmuş ve buradaki memûrîn ve yabancılar da korkmuş iseler de mülhakatlara cereyân eden muhâbere ve icrâ kılınan vesâyâ-i müessire üzerine heyecân teskin edilmiş ve askerin de bir kısmı gelmiş ise de her taraf icrâât-ı hükûmet intizâr etmekte olup Meclis-i Mahsûs-u Vükelâ karârıyla tebliğ buyurulan teşkîlât-ı adliye de henüz icrâ buyurulmamış ve icrâât-ı hükûmetin uzaması mahzûrdan gayri sâlim bulunmuş olduğu ve muhâl-i âsâyiş ahvâl vukuuna meydan verilmemesi için tedâbir ittihâzının kusur olunmamakta bulunduğu mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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Illustration 12.1: BOA, DH.MKT.2776/89/Lef 3, 24 Kânûnusâni 1324 – 06 February 1909 The telegram sent by Naqshbandiyya, Khalidiyya and Qadiriyya Sheikhs in Erbil to the Sultan and the Parliament regarding the Mosul Incident

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Illustration 12.2: See Illustration 12.1

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ince were also frightened. However, effective advice was given by communicating with all the settlement areas of the province and the excitement was calmed. Although he gave the message “no need to worry” between the lines, this ambivalent attitude of Zeki was a signal that great troubles could arise, especially in sub-settlements connected to the provincial center. The fact that the partial deployment of Joint Task Force still did not relieve and reassure Zeki could be explained by his concerns towards other sanjaks and districts which were out of sight and which he tried to monitor remotely. Because the judicial infrastructure had not been established yet and unscheduled delays in the government’s action plan increased the concerns. Upon Zeki’s hesitant reply, the information flow between the Grand Vizirate, Ministries of Interior and Justice resumed and accelerated.³⁰⁹ Although serious measures were taken and a constant effort was made by the provincial administration, the people wanted to see action and results. According to the letter of the Ministry of Interior, these actions and results depended on the establishment and activation of the judicial organization in Mosul as soon as possible, which was decided by the Council of Ministers. In addition to religious formations such as sufi orders, other Shaikhly Families such as Talabâni started to put pressure on İstanbul. The Talabani chiefs Sheikh Abdulhamid, Abdulqadir and Muhammad gave a tacit ultimatum in the telegram they sent to the Chamber of Deputies.³¹⁰ They have declared that

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2735/98/Lef 2, 29 Kânûnusâni 1324– 11 February 1909 “Huzûr-u Âli-i Hazret-i Sadâretpenâhiye / Adliye Nezâret-i Behiyyesine Gerçi tedâbir-i ciddiye ve takayyüdât-ı mütemâdiye icrâsıyla muhâl-i âsâyiş ve inzibât ahvâline meydan verilmemek esbâbının temini Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhin […] ve ihtâr kılınmak ise de ahâli icrââta intizâr etmekte olmalarına ve oraya müretteb askerin de peyderpey vâsıl olmakta bulunduğunun anlaşılmasına nazaran tahkikat ve muamelât-ı mukteziyeye bir gün evvel teşebbüs eylemek üzere Meclis-i Mahsûs-u Vükelâca bilittihâd Nezâret-i Adliyenin de tebliğ kılındığı anlaşılan karâra tevfikan Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhce icrâsı muktezi teşkîlât-ı adliyenin hemen mevki-i tatbike vaz’ı neticesinin inbâsı himmet-i aliyyeleri mârûf buyurulacak 20 Kânûnusâni 1324 târihli ve 3382 numerolu Tezkire-i Seniyye-i Sadâretpenâhileriyle tebliğ buyurulmak Meclis-i Mahsûs-u Vükelâ karârına tevfikan icrâ olunacak teşkîlât-ı adliyenin hemen mevki-i tatbike vaz’ı zımnında adliye Nezâret-i […] emr-ü seria itâsı menût-u […] aliyye-i fahimânelerdir. Ol babda Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 59, 31 Kânûnusâni 1324– 13 February 1909 “Mebûsân Riyâset-i Celilesine. Umûmumuzun mâbihi’l-iftiharı Şeyh Said ve mahdûm ve itbâ’i iki aya karib bilâ-esbâb Musul […] tarafından katl olunduğu hâlde hâlâ müsebbibler hakkında hükûmette bir icrâât görülmedi. Bütün Âlem-i İslâmiyet’i dağdâr eden böyle bir mesele-i fâciada bu derece iltizâm-ı […] bâdi-i esefdar bu babda hükûmetçe bir mülâhaza ve tereddüd var ise muharrik ve fâillerin te’dib ve mücâzâtını itada […] temin ederiz ki bu madde hiçbir vakit sükût ile geçiştirilemez. Mâmâfih

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this issue could not be passed in silence (bu madde hiçbir vakit sükût ile geçiştirilemez) if the provocateurs and perpetrators of such a disaster that plagued the whole Islamic world are not found and punished. Leaders stated that almost two months have passed since the incident, no action has been taken against the perpetrators by the government and they have been waiting for a quick justice from the Parliament. In these days when an historical breaking point was expected for Sulaymaniyah, the message traffic between the sanjak and İstanbul was again accelerated. The wives and daughters of the Sâdât Sheikhs, organized under the leadership of Aisha (Ayşe) and Aminah (Emine), sent a complaint to the Grand Vizirate and mentioned Tevfik Pasha’s grudge, false allegations, provocations and bloody practices (tezvirât, tahrikât, muamelât-ı hûn-rizânesi).³¹¹ Aisha was the wife of deceased Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Effendi, and Aminah was the wife of his recently killed grandson, Sheikh Said Barzanji. According to the message, Tevfik was trying to destroy the Institution of Siyadat and the Dynasty of Ulema (Hânedân-ı Ulemâ ve Siyâdet) which had been respected for 700 years in Iran, Iraq and Kurdistan. Also, there was no need to explain how dangerous the consequences would be in terms of religion and politics and administration. Even if the news of Tevfik’s dismissal had relieved them partially, they were literally begging for his removal from the town as soon as possible and for a deputy be appointed in his place until the arrival of his successor. So that the bloody tragedies (sefk-i dimâ-i muhâtara-i azime) that occurred as a result of Tevfik’s ongoing falsifications would be stopped, and innocent orphans and women (eytâm icrâ-yı muâdelet muhâfaza-i hukuklarını evvela her hâlde […] adâlet icrâsından Vükelâ-yı milletin gayretinden ister ve izhâr eyleriz. Talabâni Rüesâsından Şeyh Abdülhamid, Bu dahi Şeyh Abdülkadir, Bu dahi Şeyh Muhammed”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2747/94/ Lef 1, 5 Şubat 1324– 18 February 1909 “Huzûr-u Sadâretpenâhiye, Kan içinde askerimiz püryân, tasviri nâ-kabil kalbimizin perîşân olduğuna, teskin-i garez etmeyen Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa, tezvirât, tahrikât, muamelât-ı hûn-rizânesi her anda tecdid-i hatim, tezyid-i azâb ve elem etmektedir. Telgraflarla mübelliğ teselli-i hazret-i fahametpenâhileri mazlûm Sâdât’ın eytâm ve nisvânlarının vah çekmelerine merhem ise de Yedi Yüz seneden beri İran, Kürdistan, Irâk’da müştehir Hânedân-ı Ulemâ ve Siyâdet’in imhâsı yolundaki tasaddiyâtına karşı diyâneten, hükûmeten ne derecelerde tesirât vereceği müstağni-i izâhtır. Mûmâileyhin tezvirât-ı mütevâliyesinden melhûz bulunan birçok sefk-i dimâ-i muhâtara-i azimenin itfâsı, eytâm ve nisvân-ı mâsûmenin yorulmakta olan elem-i müdhişten rehâ buyurulmaları tarikiyle âcilen vürûduna değin bir vekilin tâyin ve Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyhin harekât-ı azâbından istihlâsımızı kemâl-i tazarru’ ve sabırsızlıkla istirhâm eyleriz. Ferman Merhûm Şeyh Kâk Ahmed Efendinin Halilesi Ayşe, Şeyh Said’in Halilesi Emine, Diğer Ayşe, Fatıma, Habibe, Hatice, Halime, Nakibin Halilesi Selime, Şehid Şeyh Ahmed’in Haremi Ayşe, Kerimeleri Halime, Fatıma”

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ve nisvân-ı mâsûme) would be saved from these terrible pains. Apparently, although Tevfik was dismissed at the beginning of the February and Ziyâ Pasha was appointed in his place, the change of duty did not take place yet and Sâdât’s wives had run out of patience. The ongoing messages and applications have finally achieved their purpose and the Ministry asked the Mosul Province to quickly appoint a deputy in place of Tevfik Pasha until his successor arrives.³¹² As the events unfolded, the tribal chiefs in Sulaymaniyah began to grow restless and sent a telegram containing threats to the Ministries of War and Interior. The message dispatched from Chamchamal was signed by five chieftains including the Chief of Tribe Sheikh Tabrizi (Tebrizi) Yusuf , Chief of Tribe Reshid, Chief Hamza, Chief of Faction (Reis-i Fırka) Tawfiq and Chief (other) Reshid.³¹³ That was a clear message voicing that they were not going to tolerate or respond humanely (Üslûb-u Hâkiyâne) to such a heinous crime against Sheikh Said, his family, his congregation and Kurdish community. In addition to his virtue, piety, righteousness, sheikhdom and devotion (saadet, fazilet, şeyhûhet, salâh ve zühd), Said had memorized the entire Qur’an and had become the Prophet’s intercessor (hâfızı bulunduğu Kur’ân’ı şefi’ etmiş). It was directly expressed that their tragic martyrdom which shattered the hearts of entire humanity was not going to be tolerated. If the perpetrators were not to be severely punished

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2747/94/ Lef 8, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 Şubat 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 36, 9 Şubat 1324– 22 February 1909 Although it’s written as Teberini or Tebrini (‫)ﺗﺒﺮﯾﻨﯽ‬, no tribe, location or family with this name has been found in the existing sources. This suggests us that Sheikh Yusuf was perhaps born in the Iranian city of Tabriz and therefore his nickname was Tabrizi (‫ – ﺗﺒﺮﻳﺰﻯ‬Tebrizi). Although their tribal names were not mentioned in the message, these chieftains were probably affiliated to the Chamchamal-based Hamawand Confederacy. “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine Hafid Şeyh Said birâder mahâdim akrabâlarının garez ve menfaatlerine mağlub Süleymaniye memûrîni tarafından bilâ-esbâb-ı kanun münhasıran Musul’a i’zâm kılınmalarındaki haksızlığı sükûnet ile geçiştiren hükûmetimiz İblis ve Yezid’in bile nefretine lâyık Musullular tarafından saadet, fazilet, şeyhûhet, salâh ve zühdüne ilâveten hâfızı bulunduğu Kur’ân’ı şefi’ etmiş olan Şeyh Said ve Oğlu Ahmed ve kırktan mütecâviz mürid ve itbâ’atın ve iki yüz […] mahal-i muhtelifeden Kürd gurebânın katilleri ve Beş Bin liralık eşyâ ve nukûd ve mevâşilarinin nehbi fecayiinden galiba Üslûb-u Hâkiyâne ile savuşturacak değiliz. Kâffe-i beşeri dilhûn eden fâcia-ı şehâdetlerini bir türlü hazım edemeyeceğimizden [sic] müsebbibleri hakkında kariben mücâzât-ı şedide icrâ olunmazsa ihkak-ı hukukları emrinde anâsır ve kavmiyyetimize olan mecbûriyetten başka Sultân-ül Müslimin […] Celileye vedi’ olan bu Hânedân-ı Müzâhir hakkında vuku bulan tecâvüz ve hakaret uğrunda kanımızın son katresini akıtmak sûretiyle rûh-u pürfütûh-u Seyyid-ül Kevneyn’i şâd edeceğimize […] billâhi arz ederiz. Reis-i Aşiret Şeyh Tebrizi Yusuf, Reis-i Aşiret Reşid, Reis Hamza, Reis-i Fırka Tevfik, […] Aşireti Reşid”

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soon, they were sworn to fight to the last drop of blood in the name of revenging the souls of this ‘Custodian Dynasty’ (Hânedân-ı Müzâhir) and blessing the soul of Muhammad who the Glorious Prophet of Both Universes (rûh-u pür-fütûh-u Seyyid-ül Kevneyn). That day, another assertive message with a similar content also dispatched by different tribal chiefs such as Hamawand Karim (Kerim) of Begzada (Begzade – ‫)ﺑﮕﺰﺍﺩﺓ‬, Chief Mahmud of Rashwand (Reşvend – ‫)ﺭﺷﻮﻧﺪ‬, Chief Ahmed of Khizirvand (Hızırvend – ‫)ﺧﻀﺮﻭﻧﺪ‬, Chief Mahmud of Ramawand (Remavend – ‫ )ﺭﻣﻮﻧﺪ‬and Chief Ali of Hamail (Hemail – ‫ )ﻫﻤﺎﯾﻞ‬from Chamchamal.³¹⁴ As Yusuf did, they claimed that Said fell victim to the personal interests and am-

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2747/94/ Lef 5 – 6, 09 Şubat 1324– 22 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Kutb-ül Ârifin Şeyh Ahmed Kâk hazretlerinin hafid ve cânişini Şeyh Said Efendi hazretleriyle birâder, mahâdim, akrabâlarının, memûriyet ve menfaatlerini temin fikrinden başka bir esbâb-ı kanunu olmayan Süleymaniye memûrları tarafından Musul’a teb’idlerinde haksızlığa sükûn eden hükûmetimiz iblisin bile lânetine lâyık Musullular cânibinden Siyâdet fazilet salâhiyyete ilâveten şefi’ ittihâz ettiği Kur’ân-ı Şerifi pâreledikten sonra müşârünileyhle oğlu Ahmed Efendi, kırktan ziyâde itbâ’alarının, iki yüzden mütecâviz Kürd gurebânın da bilâ-sebeb katl, ihrâk, iğrak ile Beş Altı Bin liralık emvâllerinin nehb yağması gibi fâciayı Üslûb-u Hâkiyâne ile geçiştirmek hazım ve tahammül-ü beşer hâricindedir. Müsebbibleri hakkında örfen mücâzât-ı şedide ve seria icrâ olunmazsa sebeb-i hilkatımız olan Sultân-ül Mürselinin […] mevdu’ bu Hânedân-ı Müzâhir hakkındaki zulm ve taaddiyâtın ahz-ı intikamı için kanımızın son katresini akıtmaya müheyyâ bulunduğumuzu ahd ü peymân eylediğimiz mâruzdur. Begzade Aşireti Hemavend Kerim, Reis-i Reşvend Mahmud ,Reis-i Hızırvend Ahmed, Reis-i Remavend Mahmud, Reis-i Hemail Ali.” All of these tribes, except Khizirvand, belonged to the Hamawand Confederacy, while the Khizirvand belonged to the Pahla (Fayli) Confederacy. For a successful categorization of Arabian, Kurdish and Assyrian tribes in Iraq please see: Charlotte Hille, Clans and Democratization: Chechnya, Albania, Afghanistan and Iraq, International Comparative Social Studies, Volume: 43 (Leiden: Brill, 2020) p. 238 – 243 On the other hand, David Neil MacKenzie states that the Hamawand Tribe, which consists of an average of 10,000 members and is mainly settled in the Chamchamal and Bazian districts, is divided into four chief branches as Ramawand, Safarwand, Rashawand and Bagzada. MacKenzie also writes that the entire tribe is supposed to have migrated from the Kirmanshah region of Persia in 1770, except for one branch which went to Shiraz. D.N. MacKenzie, ‘Hamawand’, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Edited by: B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, CH. Pellat and J. Schacht, Volume III H-IRAM (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986) p. 121 In the Provincial Yearbooks of Mosul (Osmanlı Vilâyet Salnâmeleri) dated 1894/1895 (1312 A.H.), it is stated that the famous clans of the Hamawand tribe were Beyzade, Safravend, Reşevend, Remavend, Hilesuri, Timavend and Hemail-i Fatmavend. According to the same Salnâme, eveybody knew that they were an embarassing community. As they had ceased their troublesome behavior in 1889/1890 (1307 A.H.), six of their leaders were granted special salaries and others were donated land, by the state. Cengiz Eroğlu, Murat Babuçoğlu, Orhan Özdil (eds.), Mosul in the Ottoman Vilâyet Salnâmes (Ankara: ORSAM, 2012) p. 213

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bitions of the Sulaymaniyah authorities and officials, and that the government remained silent after the incident. According to the chiefs, the brutality of the Mosulites was far beyond Yezid or even Demon (İblis ve Yezid’in bile nefretine lâyık Musullular), and if the state did not secure the justice, they were prepared to do it themselves. On the same day, another telegram sent by the prominent Sheikhs who were headed by As-Sayyid Muhammad, the son of Martyred Sheikh Said (Şehid Şeyh Said Efendizâde), again sought justice, but this time the target was clear.³¹⁵ In the message they stated that the dismissed Sub-Governor Tevfik was ready to leave the town, but simply dismissing him would not be a sufficient and fair punishment for Tevfik. As Tevfik victimized not only Sâdât but the entire Islamic world, they requested him to be judged in the Kirkuk courthouse and that justice to be served. According to Sâdât, before Tevfik could escape via another route (başka tarikle hareket) and managed to cover up his crimes (ihtifâ-yı müfsid), he had to be brought to Kirkuk and held there until the trial was concluded. The message arrived a few days after the caravan attack, but it seems from the content that it was written before Tevfik departed. With this last move, it can be thought that Sheikhs tried to punish Tevfik through legal means without the need for illegal and fatal means such as the caravan attack. Perhaps sheiks evaded responsibility for the caravan attack by showing that they tried all legal ways to get justice. In any case, it was obvious that Sâdât would try to take revenge on Tevfik somehow, whether legal or not. Because, even though Tevfik was dismissed of his duty, he was still seen as one of the major responsible for the Mosul Conspiracy, and all the steps he took were closely followed by both the Sheikhs and the tribes.

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2747/94/ Lef 4, 09 Şubat 1324– 22 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Bilcümle Sâdât-ı Kirâm ve umûm ehl-i îmânın ciğerlerinden kan akıttıran Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyh munfasılan müteheyyi-i harekettir. Mücerred infisâliyle Sâdât değil bilumûm Millet-i İslâmiyeye tesir eden mağdûriyetimize karşı Kerkük Sancağı mehâkimesi [sic] huzûrunda icrâ-yı muhâkememizle ihkak-ı hakkımız zımnında mûmâileyhin başka tarikle hareket ve ihtifâ-yı müfside meydan verilmemesiyle muhâkeme neticesine kadar Kerkük’e aldırılmasıyla muhâkemenin icrâsına ve bu yüzden bilcümle ehl-i beyt reis-i şâd ve şeyhi olan efkâr-ı umûmiyeye sükûnet verdirilmesi esbâbının istikmâli delâlet-i fahimânelerinden ehemiyyetle müsterhamdır. Ferman. Şehid Şeyh Said Efendizâde Es-Seyyid Muhammed – Esbak Müfti Hafid Es-Seyyid Muhammed – Hafid Es-Seyyid Hasan – Hafid Es-Seyyid Ömer – Nakibzâde Es-Seyyid Nûri – Merhûm Müftizâde Es-Seyyid Muhammed – Müftizâde Es-Seyyid Kadir” Here too, although it is written almost like Muhammed or Mehmed, it is also possible that the signer is Said’s son Mahmud.

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Seek of Justice in the Manifest of Sâdât In the February Manifest, Sâdât wrote that they could no longer control the power and mass that adhered to their doctrine and that if justice was not served, different results might occur. According to the manifest, even they were in a complete obedience to the Constitutional authority and governmental ordinance, they were expulsed from their hometown and families in contrary to the current laws and practices (ahkâm-ı kavânin-i adliye ve usûl-u mer’iyyeye muhâlif olarak).³¹⁶ Some of those who were miraculously escaped from the Mosul tragedy and coincidentally survived by the grace of god (kaderin hârika-i Samedâniyyesinin mûcize-i bâhiresiyle), were forced to reside in Kirkuk by a subsequent order of governor. This obedience could not be denied, and this virtue could not be tainted with any disgrace, as they strictly obeyed the instructions of the state and kept their composure strictly. Consequently, they summarized that they were unfairly expulsed from their hometown, forced to live in Mosul, and their Sheikh, his sons, 42 relatives and affiliates were slaughtered in a massacre resembling Genghis Khan’s era (Mezâlim-i Cengizâne).³¹⁷ Moreover, they have suffered a fi-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Bizlere Kanûn-i Esâsi ahkâmına ve evâmir-i sadariye kemâl-i itâatimizi evvelen : ahkâm-ı kavânin-i adliye ve usûl-u mer’iyyeye muhâlif olarak hânmânmızdan, ehl ü ıyâlimizden derbeder ve teb’id edildiğimiz bir zamânda sâniyen: bazımızın kaderin hârika-i Samedâniyyesinin mûcize-i bâhiresiyle Musul Fâciasından firâr sûretiyle tahlis-i cana muvaffak olduktan sonra ve yine o mûcize-i vâkiye ile fâcia-i mezkûre içerisinde katlden masûn kalanlarımız vilâyetten bir emir ile Kerkük’te ikamete gerdendâde olmakla inkârı nâ-kabil bir sûrette isbât ve fevkinde tasavvur olunamayacak bu mutavaat ve sekinetin intâc ve istilzâm eyleyeceği fazileti hiçbir rezâletiyle telvis etmeyeceğini her şüpheden âzâde bir sûrette tezâhür etmişken”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “imdi [sic] hânelerimizden beldemizden bi gayri hak teb’id edilmek, Musul’da serverimizle oğlunun ve kırk iki nefer ekarib ve müteallikatımız Mezâlim-i Cengizâneyi aratmayacak bir sûrette katliam, Beş Bin liralıktan ziyâde mutazarrır olmak, Kerkük’te bilâ-hükm ve sebeb bir sûret-i esirânede ikamete mecbûr bulunmak, hükûmet-i âdileyle idâre olunur hiçbir yerde hiçbir kimse hakkında îka’ olunamaz üç sûretle dağdâr-ı mezâlim, hâne harâb istibdâd ve i’tisâf bulunduğumuza […] olmak üzere bir de iftirâ olduğu güneşten izhâr bir sûrette müsbet bulunan bir husûs içinde Süleymaniye’de kalan evlâd ve ekaribimizin terk-i hânmâna mecbûr kalacak muamelâta mâruz bulundurulmuş ve bu yüzden mahâzir-i müdhişe-i mütenevvianın serzeden hudus olmasına sebebiyet verilmesini Meşrûtiyet ve adâletle ne yolda kabil-i telife ve tevfik görüldüğünü tecviz edilmekte bulunduğunu bir türlü anlayamıyoruz. Hâl-i heyecânda bulunan ve intikam uğrunda fedâ-yı mal ve cana ahd ü peymân eyleyen binlerce efrâdı, havf bari ve kanun ve hükmüne karşı beslediğimiz hüsn-i itâatkarı sâikasıyla her türlü harekât-ı gayr-i mâkuleden bütün kuvvetimizin harfiyle men’ ettik de ise […] ancak vukuat üzerinden aylarca müddet geçtiği hâlde icrââttan bir eser görülemediğini ve ol babda bir ümid bile hâsıl olamadığını ve bir taraftan husûlen hayır ve tahammülü yakacak , metânet ve sükûnet-i hârikayı eşecek

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nancial loss more than 5.000 lira and some of them were forced to reside in Kirkuk in captivity without a legal provision (bilâ-hükm ve sebeb bir sûret-i esirânede). From their point of view, they were subjected to three different oppressions and tragedies [banishment, massacre, looting] (üç sûretle dağdâr-ı mezâlim) that could not be practiced on anyone in anywhere ruled by a fair government. In addition to their houses and families despotically and unjustly devastated, their remaining sons and relatives in Sulaymaniyah were forced to abandon their houses as a result of an obvious slander. They could not understand how such terrible incidents which were absolutely incompatible with the constitution and justice, were allowed to take place in such a regime. At the end of the manifest, there was the crucial part where Sâdât wrote about the mass that they could no longer control. They particularly remarked that they have hardly restrained thousands of agitated and revengeful people who were sworn an oath to sacrifice their lives and properties (Hâl-i heyecânda bulunan ve intikam uğrunda fedâ-yı mal ve cana ahd ü peymân eyleyen binlerce efrâd). Sâdât Sheikhs claimed that they have used all their strength to prevent their mass from taking all kinds of unreasonable acts, as they have considered themselves fully obedient to law and justice. However, although months had passed since the incident, hopelessly no actions were taken and agitative events that disturbed the grace, patience, steadiness and peace were not ceased. They expected to be regarded by the authorities and they claimed that each article of their manifest (her fıkrası) was based on numerous official documents, reliable evidence and witnesses (müteaddid vesâik-i resmiyeye, berâhin ve delâil-i mûtebereye müstenid). As can be seen, the Manifest of Sâdât was built on some notions and conveyed its messages very clearly through these notions. The first notion was holiness. A dynasty of hundreds of years was rhetorically glorified, sanctified, and idolized before the state authority. The second notion was victimization. Sâdât claimed they had been the victims of a conspiracy, their constitutional rights had been violated, and they had suffered intense persecution. The third notion was innocence, and Sheikh Said, who was praised in the manifest was an absolutely innocent, sinless man according to the discourse. They manifested that as innocent people, they were subjected to grossly unfair sanctions, unfounded ac-

hâdisât-ı şenia ve teheyyüce ardı arkası kesilemediğine mebni […] mesûliyeti vebâli dâî-yi keyfiyyât-ı müessife ve elimeye azimetin tahdisi kaviyyen melhûz ettiğinden her fıkrası müteaddid vesâik-i resmiyeye , berâhin ve delâil-i mûtebereye müstenid bulunan mâruzâtımızın nazar-ı itinâ ve ehemmiyet alınmasıyla işbu ahvâl-ı esefe istihal-i nihâyet verecek ve icâbât-ı hakkaniyetin husûlüyle teessürât-ı mazlûmiyyetimizi ve heyecân-ı umûmiyeyi teskin ve tatmin edebilecek icrâât-ı adâletkârânenin […] akdem teşrii istirhâmına müsâraat eyleriz. Ol babda ferman”

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cusations, and unlawful practices. The fourth notion, however, was different from all of them and showed how Sâdât’s power would turn into a weapon against state authority. This notion was a veiled threat. Sâdât declared that if justice was not served, they would no longer be able to control the mass devoted to them and would no longer be able to stop thousands of individuals motivated by revenge. This would be the breaking point where the seek for justice turned into a seek for revenge.

5.2 Sâdât’s Seek of Revenge Having lost hope in the pursuit of justice, Sâdât would now turn to different paths, or violence in its full expression. Sâdât’s seek for revenge caused a serious devastation that is rare in the history of Sulaymaniyah and left the region in complete chaos for a certain period of time. The process that started with the ambush and attack on Tevfik Pasha’s caravan was to be resulted in the siege of the whole town. But how did the chaos created by the Sâdât bloc in Sulaymaniyah almost turned into a civil war? What were the weaknesses and mistakes of the local administration at this point? And most importantly, how true were the allegations that army weapons were distributed to the civilian population by the local administration? The next three sections will first examine the caravan’s ambush and try to give tactical details and results of this attack. The operational response of the local administration and military units towards the ambush will also be observed. Sâdât’s objection to the accusations made against them regarding the caravan ambush and their attempts to assert their innocence will also be covered in this section. Then, issues such as the tactical configuration of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, the leaders of the tariqahs and tribes who coordinated and conducted the operation, and the villages where the irregular forces were mobilized will be analyzed. The measures taken by the local administration in the face of the siege, the tactical details of the defense operation and the view of İstanbul on the developments will also be examined. In the final part, the 6th Army’s course of action in the face of siege, its supervision over the Sulaymaniyah Mutasarrıfate and the staff changes in the local commanderies will be covered.

Ambush on Tevfik’s Caravan On February 19, the fear came true and the caravan of Tevfik, who left Sulaymaniyah after his dismissal, was ambushed by Hamawand horsemen at a close dis-

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tance. Three hours away from Sulaymaniyah, a Kurdish force of 700 people made up of individuals from the Sulaymaniyah Sâdât and tribes such as Hamawand have intercepted caravan’s way.³¹⁸ According to the messages by Governor Zeki, the force consisting of approximately 300 cavalry and 400 infantrymen, stormed the caravan suddenly and opened fire on the passengers with the intention of killing them. According to initial reports, four soldiers and Tevfik’s servant Hasan were injured in the armed conflict between the aggressors and the Nizâmiye and Gendarmerie platoons. Two military mules, two Mausers and three

 BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/62, 07 Şubat 1324– 20 February 1909; DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Dünkü telgrafla Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın Ekrâd tarafından yolunun kesildiği haber alınmasıyla tedâbir-i maniaya tevessül edileceği arz olunmuştu. Süleymaniye’den üç saat kadar ayrıldıktan sonra 700 kadar süvâri piyâde müsellâh Ekrâd müşârünileyhin katl kasdıyla kurşuna tuttukları ve muhâfızları asker-i şâhâne de mukabelede bulunmalarıyla asker ve jandarmadan bir iki nefer ile Mutasarrıfın bir adamının mecrûh olduğu, Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı Vekâletinden haber alınarak imdâdlarına gönderilen müfreze-i askerinin muâvenetiyle Mutasarrıf sâlimen Süleymaniye’ye avdet edebilmiş ise de bütün eşyâ ve emvâlinin muhâcimler tarafından yağma olunduğu 12. Fırka Kumandanlığından bildirilmesiyle mütecâsirlerin derdest ve te’dibleriyle Mutasarrıfın selâmet-i imrârıyla eşyâ-yı magsûbenin istirdâdı ve bu sebeble Süleymaniye etrâfında heyecâna gelen ahâlinin teskini için Çemçemal ve mahal-i sâireden müfrezeler tertibi alınmasını Ordu Kumandanlığıyla kararlaştırılarak mahalleri Kumandanlığına tebligat îfâ edilmesi ve tedâbir-i lâzımenin ittihâz ve icrâsıyla muhâl-i âsâyiş ahvâlin tekrârına meydan verilmemesi için de Kerkük ve Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflıklarıyla îcâb eden aşâire ve Kerkük’te bulundurulan Şeyhlere de tebligat-ı müessire icrâ kılınması ve Süleymaniye telgraf hututu bozuk olduğundan oradan alınacak mâlûmâtın da arzı tabii bulunmuş olduğu mâruzdur. Ferman Veli Vekili Ferik Zeki” “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye’ye üç saatlik mesafede Süleymaniye Sâdâtı’na mensûb bulunan kesân ile Hemavend vesâire aşâirden mürekkeb 300 atlı ve 400 kadar piyâde üzerlerine hücûmla beraberinde bulunan Nizâmiye ve Jandarma müfrezeleriyle aralarında vuku bulan müsâdemede müfrezelerden 4 neferle hizmetçisi Hasan nam kimesne cerh ve askerin rükûba mahsûs esterlerden iki resle ve iki Mavzer ve üç Martini Tüfeng ve kendileriyle refâkatinde bulunan Doktor Kolağası Ziyâ ve Yüzbaşı Fehmi Efendilerin nukûd ve eşyâ ve elbiselerini nehb ü gâret olunduğu cihetle Süleymaniye’den gönderilen 60 mevcûdlu müfrezenin muâvenetiyle Süleymaniye’ye avdetle vekâleten îfâ-yı vazifeye mübâşeret olunduğu Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa’dan alınan telgrafnâmede iş’âr olunur. Evvelce Kumandanlıktan verilen mâlûmât üzerine Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığıyla bilmuhâbere îcâbı kadar kuvvet sevk ve i’zâm olunmuştur. Emniyet ve âsâyişin iâde ve temin-i zâbıtası da Ordu Kumandanlığıyla bilmuhâbere Mutasarrıflık Vekâleti Miralay Zeki Beye tevdi olunmuş iken Tevfik Paşa Süleymaniye’ye avdetle vekâleten îfâ-yı vazifeye devâm etmesi câiz olup olmayacağının emir buyurulması müsterhamdır. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Vekili Ferik Zeki”

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Martin rifles, and the cash, belongings and clothes of Medical Senior Captain (Doktor Kolağası) Ziyâ and Captain Fehmi Effendi, who were among the passengers, were looted (nehb ü gâret). Thanks to the 60-man detachment sent from Sulaymaniyah to their aid, the Sub-Governor was rescued, sent back to Sulaymaniyah safely and was able to start his duty. However, all his belongings and possessions were plundered by the attackers (muhâcimler). The primary objectives were to arrest and punish the perpetrators, to ensure a safe restitution of the Sub-Governor in his office, to recover his seized items and to calm the agitation around Sulaymaniyah. Governor Zeki asked the Army Command to be contacted and reinforcing detachments to be sent from Chamchamal and other adjacent garrisons. It was extremely necessary to take some measures in order to prevent possible events that could disrupt the order again. In addition, the Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorates should be contacted, and effective advice should be given to the necessary tribal chiefs and Sheikhs in Kirkuk. In the meantime, after Tevfik left the town, Lieutenant Colonel (Kaimakam) Zeki took his office as the Acting Sub-Governor.³¹⁹ On the other hand, Governor Zeki questioned whether it was permissible to reinstate Tevfik as the Acting Sub-Governor, who was forced to return to the town after the caravan attack. As a result, the Ministry gave approval for Tevfik to continue his duty for now, until his successor Ziyâ Pasha arrived at his post.³²⁰ Meanwhile, the issue had risen to the inter-ministerial level, the Ministry of War was informed in detail about the ambush and attack, and the necessary military reinforcement was requested for the capture (ahz ü girift) and punishment of the Hamawands who were involved in the crime.³²¹  BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 2, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909 Although the rank of Acting Sub-Governor Zeki is stated as Miralay (Colonel) in this telegram, he is referred to as Kaimakam (Lieutenant Colonel) in all other correspondences. In this telegram, it was changed to the Kaimakam since it is highly likely that Miralay was written inadvertently.  BOA, DH.MKT.2749/72/Lef 3, 11 Şubat 1324– 24 Şubat 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Vuku bulan tecâvüze mebni Süleymaniye’ye avdete mecbûr olan Tevfik Paşanın şimdilik îfâ-yı vazife etmesi münâsib olacağı gibi tecâvüze cesâret eden eşkıyânın serian ve şediden tâkibleriyle ahz ü giriftleri muktezi olduğundan derdestlerine müsâraat ve itinâ ettirilmesi matlûbdur. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2751/29/Lef 4, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine Hemavendlilerin te’dibi için Nezâret-i Celilelerine mezkûr Kumandanlığa evâmir-i lâzıme îtâ ettirilmesi Musul Vilâyeti Vekâletinden alınan telgrafnâmelerde dermeyân kılınmış ve Hemavendlilerin te’dibi için mukaddemâ kuvve-i kâfiye tertib ve ihzâr edilmiş olmasına nazaran merkumların tesri-i te’dibleri esbâbının istikmâli ve keyfiyetin inbâsı husûsuna. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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A telegram containing the signatures of more than one hundred Sulaymaniyah Notables and led by the Deputy Accountant (Muhasebeci Vekili) Mârûf, is important both in terms of presenting the details of the Caravan Ambush and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah and showing the endorsement of the Notables for Sub-Governor Tevfik.³²² This comprehensive text will appear at several different points in the following sections and will be referred to as the message/telegram of Deputy Accountant Mârûf (see Illustration 13). The biggest reason why the telegram was valuable was that it covered some specific details about the Caravan Ambush which were not included in the Governor’s correspondence. Three hours after their sad farewell to Tevfik Pasha, his caravan enroute to Bagh-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 The telegram was dispatched to the Grand Vizirate directly, signed by more than a hundred Sulaymaniyah Notables headed by Deputy Accountant (Muhasebeci Vekili) Mârûf and included the names such as: Deputy Mufti (Müfti Vekili / Vekil-i Müfti) Mahmud, Correspondence Director (Müdir-i Tahrirat) Nureddin, Mayor (Belediye Reisi / Reis-i Belediye) Abdülgafur, Councilman (Âzâ) Abdurrahman, Councilman (Âzâ) Said, Administrative Councilman (Meclis-i İdâre Âzâsı) Abdurrahman, Court Clerk / Court Head Clerk (Zabıt Kâtibi / Mahkeme Başkâtibi) Ahmed, Accountance Expense Clerk (Muhasebe Masraf Kâtibi) Emin, Councilman (Âzâ) Fettah, Councilman (Âzâ) Ahmed, Court Bailiff (İcra Memûru) Necib, Accountance Head Clerk (Muhasebe Baş Kâtibi) Derviş, Court Clerk (Zabıt Kâtibi) Mehmed, Clerk (Kâtib) Emin, Head of Penal Chamber (Cezâ Reisi) Refet, Councilman (Âzâ) Kerim, Councilman Assistant (Âzâ Mülâzımı) Abdullah, Collection Officer (Tahsîlât Memûru) Tâhir, Bank Clerk (Bank Kâtibi) Abdurrahman, Taxation Head Clerk (Vergi Baş Kâtibi) Ali, Registrar (Nüfûs Memûru) Azmi and Quarantine Clerk (Karantina Kâtibi) Reşid, his Colleague (Refiki) Mehmed, his Colleague (Refiki) Hüseyin, Director of Official Documents ( Merkez Evrâk Müdiri) Şekib, his Colleague (Refiki) İzzet, Head Clerk (Başkâtib) İsmâil, Director of Telegraphs (Telgraf Müdiri) Edib, Telegraphic Superintendent (Muhâbere Memûru) Ahmed, Subdistrict Administrator of Gawarah (Gavare Müdiri) Tevfik, Acting District Governor of Gulanbar (Gülanber Kaimakam Vekili) Senior Captain (Kolağası) Abdülvahab, Central Clerk (Merkez Kâtibi) Kadir, Head Clerk of the Customs Administration (Rüsûmât Baş Kâtibi) Yakub, Public Debt Administration Officer (Düyûn-ı Umûmiye Memûru) Ali, 46th Regiment 1st Battalion Senior Captain (Alay 46 Birinci Tabur Kolağası) Sâlih, Land Registry Clerk (Defter-i Hâkani Kâtibi) Kadir, 4th Company Captain (Bölük 4 Yüzbaşı) İzzet, 1st Company First Lieutenant (Bölük 1 Mülâzım-ı Evvel) Mecid, Qaradagh Reserve Army Major (Karadağ Redif Binbaşısı) Said, First Lieutenants (Mülâzım-ı Evvel) Said, Mehdi, Ahmed, Mârûf, Hilmi, Ahmed and Second Lieutenants (Mülâzım-ı Sâni) Ahmed, İsmâil, Tevfik, Ali, Ahmed, Osman, Said, Fevzi; Captains (Yüzbaşı) Reşid, Kerim, Mehmed, Ahmed; Deputy Battalion Commander (Tabur Ağası Vekili) Fehmi, Medical Senior Captain (Tabib Kolağası) Ziyâ, 2nd Company Captain (Bölük 2 Yüzbaşı) Abdülkadir, Senior Captain (Kolağası) Rızâ, Regie Clerk (Reji Kâtibi) Ahmed, Notable (Eşrâftan) Abdülfettah, Lieutenant (Mülâzım) Fettah, Battalion Clerk (Tabur Kâtibi) Halil, Notable (Vücûh) Said, Merchant (Tüccâr) Abdülkadir, Tailor (Terzi) Mustafa, Draper (Bezzâz) Said

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dad was ambushed around the village of Kozaraqa (Kozereka / ‫)ﮔﻮﺯەﺭﻗﻪ‬.³²³ The ambushers were a group of bandits whom the Sheikhs in Kirkuk summoned to their presence by correspondence and organized by giving verbal instructions and tactics. The passengers were Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha, Senior Captain (Kolağası) Abdülvahab who was routed to his new office as the Acting District Governor of Gulanbar (Gülanber Kaimakam Vekili), Medical Senior Captain (Tabib Kolağası) Ziyâ, Deputy Battalion Commander (Tabur Ağası Vekili) Fehmi and the School Teacher Captain (Mekteb Muallimi Yüzbaşı) Said.³²⁴ The caravan

 BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 “Makam-ı Sadâretpenâhiye Bugün hüzün ve teessüfle bitteşyi kasabaya avdetimizden üç saat sonra o müddet baid mesafede kâin Kozereka karyesi karibinde Musul Vak’asından sonra Kerkük’e iâde kılınan Müteşeyyihlerin tahriren nezdlerine celb ettirdikleri adamlara şifâhen verdikleri tâlimât ve tertibi üzerine Şakî-i meşhûr Cişaneli/Çişaneli Baba Resûl, Göktepeli Şeyh Said, birâderi Abdülkadir, Şerzel Karyeli (Serzel / Sarzal Karyeli) Şeyh Reşid, Seyyid Ahmed, Baba Resûlzâde (Seyyid) Kerim, Müftizâde Şeyh Kadir ve Ahmed, Sâbık Müftizâde Seyyid Muhammed, Nakibzâde Gözi (Seyyid Nûri) ve Derehmiyanlı (Rehmiyanlı, Dermaneli, Remiyanlı) Şeyh Ali , Hemavend Eşkıyâ-yı Meşhûrasından Zehrab ve Rahim Ahmed Nevres (Şerşi / Sürşi) kumandalarıyla üç yüz süvâri ve Müteşeyyihlerin vakt-i İstibdâdda şekavet ve hûnhârânelerine mükâfâten tahsis edilen Kozereka, Haracyan, Haraba, Arbat, Viledar/Viyareden, Cihanlık / Cehanlık, Karadoğan ve Yahimali ve sâir kurâlardan cem-i celb ettikleri beş altı yüz süvâri ve piyâde tüfenglisiyle Mutasarrıf-ı müşârünileyh ve mahal-i memûriyetine i’zâm olunan Gülanber Kaimakam Vekili Kolağası Abdülvahab ve Doktor Ziyâ ve Mekteb/Mekâtib Muallimlerinden Yüzbaşı Said, Mülâzım-ı Evvel Mârûf Efendilerin muhâfazasıyla ve Jandarma Kumandan ve Ester Süvâr Zâbitân Osman Ağa ve Ali Efendinin maiyyetinde kırk beş nefer efrâd-ı Müslüm bulunduğu hâlde yollarında pusuya yatarak üzerlerine defa’ten yaylım ateş icrâsıyla Paşa-yı müşârünileyhin hizmetçilerinden Hasan ve Jandarma efrâdından üç ve ester süvârdan bir ki cem’en beş neferi mühlik sûrette cerh ve beş on hayvanlarını itlâf ve iki Mavzer üç Martin ile müşâr ve mûmâileyhin üzerlerindeki elbiselerinden başka nukûd ve eşyâ-yı zâtilerinin umûmunu/tamâmını gasb ve nehb ettikleri vuku bulan istihbâr üzerine merkezden gönderilen imdâdın muâvenetiyle ancak nefsleri kurtarabilmiş olduğundan”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909 – Major signers of this telegram were: Deputy Mufti (Vekil-i Müfti-i Belde) Mahmud, Deputy Accountant (Muhasebeci Vekili) Mârûf, Administrative Councilman (Meclis-i İdâre Âzâsından) Abdurrahman, Said, Councilman (Âzâ) Abdurrahman, Mayor (Belediye Reisi) Abdülgafur, Clerk (Kâtib) Emin, Councilman (Âzâ) Cemil , Abdülfettah, Notable (Eşrâftan) Abdurrahman, Ahmed, Abdurrahman and 31 Notables and Merchants “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Yüz seneden beri hâl-i şekavette bulunan Hemavend eşkıyâlarına tahriren ve şifâhen verdikleri parola üzerine kendilerini yağmagirliğe ıtma’ ve iğfâl ile Süleymaniye’den Bağdad’a gönderilen kârbânımızda [kervanımızda] […] hareket eden Mutasarrıf Sâbık-ı Tevfik Paşa, Gülanber Kaimakam Vekili Kolağası Abdülvahab ve Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Doktor Kolağası Ziyâ Efendilerin katl kasdıyla üzerlerine çıkarak üç saat devâm eden müsâdemede müfrezenin kalanı ve atların

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which was guarded by First Lieutenant (Mülâzım-ı Evvel) Mârûf, was escorted by a force of 45 Muslim privates under the command of Gendarmerie Commanders and Mule Cavalry Officers Osman Agha and Ali Effendi. After being ambushed and suddenly fired upon on the way, a total of five including Hasan, the Aide of Tevfik Pasha, three gendarmes and one mule cavalry, were injured to death (mühlik derecede cerh). Five to ten animals were perished (or looted), two Mauser and three Martin rifles were looted and all personal belongings of the passengers including their clothes and cash were extorted. The passengers were barely rescued by the timely arrival of reinforcement squads (kuvve-i imdâdiye) dispatched from the town center. Although slightly different casualty reports reached from different sources, the truth was that the caravan was badly damaged, and the passengers barely saved their lives. In their next message, Sulaymaniyah Notables remarked that the Sheikhs in Kirkuk had provoked, seduced and mobilized the Hamawand bandits by granting them written and oral passwords (tahriren ve şifâhen verdikleri parola). Hamawands who were in banditry for the last hundred years were encouraged to ambush, attack and loot their caravan. Notables particularly emphasized that attackers stormed the caravan with the intention of killing and the gunfight (müsâdeme) took three hours almost. However, in the Sâdât Manifest of February, the connection of the Sayyids with the caravan attack was evidently denied, and it was claimed that these accusations were completely relied on the setup of Tevfik Pasha: However, shameless, evil minded and despicable Tevfik Pasha has attributed the caravan attack which happened on his way from Sulaymaniyah to Baghdad, to Sâdât. It was possible that the attackers were someone who were necessarily obliged to do so just because of they had suffered so long under the tyranny of Tevfik and his cohorts. Even he has accused Sayyid Abdulkarim the son of Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Ahmed and Sayyid Muhammad in Sulaymaniyah, it was evidently proven and testified that these two men were in their residence with hundreds of their guests including Notables, Administrative and Military Officers on the day of incident. In addition to this, Fehmi and Sâlih Effendis have closed down the market by force on purpose of deceiving and irritating public opinion, confusing and agitating public minds. On the other hand, after they have apprehended Sayyid Abdulkarim and Muhammad, they have deployed platoons in their houses for pushing them into a

nekz-i kuvveti vâsıtasıyla umûmlarını selb ve kitlü [kilitli] emvâl ve eşyâ ve hayvanımızı nehb ve […] dört beş nefer ester süvâr ve zabtiyeyi mühlik derecede cerh ve beş adet Mavzer ve Martin tüfenglerini nehb ederek yetiştirilen kuvve-i imdâdiye sâyesinde Mutasarrıf Paşa ve memûr ve asker-i mûmâileyh ile bakıyye-yi hayvan ve emvâlimizi ellerinden kurtarıp memlekete götürülmeleri ve “

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Illustration 13.1: BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324 – 23 February 1909 The telegram sent to the Grand Vizirate by more than 100 Notables from Sulaymaniyah under the leadership of Deputy Accountant Mârûf.

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Illustration 13.2: See Illustration 13.1

5.2 Sâdât’s Seek of Revenge

Illustration 13.3: See Illustration 13.1

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Illustration 13.4: See Illustration 13.1

5.2 Sâdât’s Seek of Revenge

Illustration 13.5: See Illustration 13.1

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maelstrom of calamities and disasters. Eventually, they [referring the Sheikhs] were obliged to leave their hometown to preserve their pride.³²⁵

Except Soane’s travel book, no information has been found in any of the sources in the literature regarding the ambush laid on Tevfik’s caravan. Soane approaches the case from a completely different angle and makes the following claims on the caravan ambush: The Vali of Mosul was now ordered to proceed to Sulaimania [sic] for two reasons. To attempt an investigation of the troubles there, was one; and to punish the robbers of the Mutasarrıf, who had left the town and had been assaulted by the shaikhs’ [sic] horsemen, nearly losing his life, was the other. The shaikhs were, of course, the delinquents; but there was no possibility of fixing the crime upon them, for the people were too much intimidated to utter any complaint openly, and the few Government officials remaining in the town were bought.³²⁶

According to Soane, the Sheikhs were absolutely guilty, but these accusations could not be articulated since the people were intimidated and a few government officials were silenced by bribery. However, no details were found in the archival sources regarding these bribery allegations.

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 31, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 Sayyid Muhammad here evokes the feeling of being the second son of Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Ahmed Effendi, as he is mentioned right after his first son Sayyid Abdulkarim Effendi. However, it is highly probable that Sayyid Muhammad here is the son of the Former Mufti (Sâbık Müftizâde), who is also mentioned among the ringleaders of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah. “dünyada hiçbir şeyden utanmak şânlarından olmayan bedhâhâne ve leâmet-şiarân Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın Bağdad’a gitmek üzere Süleymaniye’den hareketle esnâ-yı rahda, belki yine müşârünileyhin ve avenesinin mezâliminden herçi-bad-âbâd azmine mecbûr edilen mazlûmin tarafından hakkında vuku bulan taarruz meselesini Baba Resûlzâde Seyyid Ahmed Efendinin Süleymaniye’deki mahdûmu Seyyid Abdülkerim ve Seyyid Muhammed Efendiye atfetmişler ise de mûmâileyhânın vak’a günü hânelerinde Eşrâf-ı Belde ve Müteneffizân, Memûrîn ve Zâbitân-ı Askeriyyeden yüzlerce misafirlerle bulundukları o zevât-ı mûtemedenin şahâdetiyle sâbit bulunmuş ve şu hâlle beraber merkum Fehmi ve Sâlih efendiler efkâr-ı umûmiyeyi taglit ve tahdiş ve ezhânı teşevvüş ve teheyyüc etmek fikriyle bir taraftan çarşıyı cebren kapatmış, bir cânibden mûmâileyhâ Seyyid Kerim ve Seyyid Muhammed Efendileri derdest ve bizim gibi girdâb-ı mesâib ve felâkete ilka etmek üzere hânelerine müfrezeler sevk eylediklerinden bilgurur onlar dahi terk-i me’vâya mecbûr olmuşlardır.”  Ely Bannister Soane, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, p. 193

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The Siege of Sulaymaniyah The ambush laid on the caravan was only the first part of Sâdât’s operation plan. As it is clearly seen in the telegrams sent from Sulaymaniyah, a very intense and coordinated force had been gathering around the town. The Sâdât Sheikhs in Kirkuk mobilized the tribes loyal to them such as Hamawand, the Sunni tariqahs affiliated with their doctrine, the villages under their domination and accumulated all these elements around the town. When different data from different telegrams are compiled (see Table 4), it is thought that the ringleaders who coordinated and commanded the siege process that started with the caravan attack consisted of the following names: Baba Rasul of Jeshana (1), Sheikh Said of Goktappa, his brother Abdulqadir, Sheikh Reshid of Sarzal / Sherzel (2), Sayyid Ahmed, Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Karim (3), Muftizadeh Sheikh Qadir and Ahmed, Saabiq Muftizadeh Sayyid Muhammad (4), Naqibzadeh Gozi / Guzi [or Nouri] (5), Sheikh Ali of Dermane / Remiyan / Reh Miyane (6), Sheikh Muhammad Gharib (7), infamous Hamawand bandits (8) Zehrab / Zorab (9), Rahim Ahmed Nawras, Rahim Ahmed Shershi / Sershi (10), Dawlatyar and Hama Haidar (11). ³²⁷

 BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/1/ Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909; Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 Cişaneli/Çişaneli Baba Resûl, Göktepeli Şeyh Said, birâderi Abdülkadir, Serzelli/Sarzallı/Şerzelli Şeyh Reşid, Seyyid Ahmed, Baba Resûlzâde Seyyid Kerim, Müftizâde Şeyh Kadir ve Ahmed, Sâbık Müftizâde Seyyid Muhammed, Gözi/Güzi (veya Nûri), Dermaneli/Reh Miyaneli/Remiyanlı/ Dereh Miyanlı Şeyh Ali, Şeyh Muhammed Garib, meşhûr Hemavend eşkıyâsından Zehrab / Zorab , Rahim Ahmed Nevres, Rahim Ahmed Şerşi/Serşi, Devletyar ve Hama Haydar. Although there are complicated statements in different sources, it is thought that Sheikh Mahmud was also one of the ringleaders commanded the Siege of Sulaymaniyah. His name would also be referred in some messages regarding the siege. (1) Since Sayyid Ahmed’s cognomen was Baba Rasulzadeh, it suggests us that he may be the son of Baba Rasul of Jeshana, one of the Sulaymaniyah Besiegers. This cognomen have been attributed to first Baba Rasul, the 17th Century ancestor of the lineage and father of Ali al-Venderini. It was possible that Baba Rasulzadeh Sayyid Ahmed, who was banished to Mosul with Sheikh Said Barzanji, survived the Mosul Incident and then allowed to return to Kirkuk, participated in the siege with his father Baba Rasul of Jeshana and his son Abdulkarim. Whichever is true, it was not very common for the Ottoman authority to call a member of Sâdât as ’infamous bandit’ (şakîi meşhûr). The fact that many members of Sâdât are given similar names and that their fathers’ names are mentioned together in many places makes it very difficult to position these personalities. in Deputy Accountant (2) This person, who was identified as ‘Serzlikliyeli Sheikh Reşid’ Mârûf’s telegram sent on February 25, was written as ‘Şerzel Karyeli Sheikh Reşid’ (‫ )ﺷﺮﺯﻝ ﻗﺮﻳﻪ ﻟﻰ‬in his telegram sent on February 23. In Tevfik’s telegram sent on February 27, the same person was referred as ‘Serzi Sheikh Reşid’ (‫)ﺳﺮﺯﯼ‬. Although not known for sure, this place may be the village

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Table 4: Ringleaders who coordinated and commanded the Siege of Sulaymaniyah Ringleader Baba Rasul Sheikh Said Abdulqadir Sheikh Reshid Sayyid Ahmed Sayyid Karim Sheikh Qadir and Ahmed Sayyid Muhammad Gozi/Guzi (‫ )ﮔﻮﺯﯼ‬or Nouri (‫)ﻧﻮﺭﯼ‬ Sheikh Ali with his brother and his son Sheikh Muhammad Gharib

Affiliation or Domain ‘Infamous bandit’ (şakî-i meşhûr) of Jeshana Village (Cişane / Çişane Köyü – ‫)ﺟﯿﺸﺎﻧﺔ‬ Goktappa Sub-district (Göktepe Nâhiyesi / ‫)ﮔﻮﻙﺗﭙﺔ‬ Brother of Sheikh Said from Goktappa Of Sarzal/Sherzel Village (‫ ﺷﺭﺯﻝ ﻗﺭﻳﻪﻟﯽ‬/ ‫) ﺳﺭﺯﻟﻘﻠﻳﻪﻟﯽ‬ The son of Baba Rasul of Jeshana The son of Baba Rasulzadeh Ahmed The sons of Mufti (Müftizâde) The son of Former Mufti (Sâbık Müftizâde) The son of Naqib (Nakibzâde) Dermane (‫ – )ﺩﺭﻣﺎﻧﺔﻟﯽ‬Reh Miyane (‫)ﺭەﻣﯿﺎﻧﺔﻟﯽ‬ Remiyan/Rehiyan (‫ ﺭﻣﯿﺎﻧﻠﯽ‬/‫)ﺭﻫﯿﺎﻧﻠﯽ‬ Dereh Miyan (‫)ﺩﺭە ﻣﯿﺎﻧﻠﯽ‬ He was the son-in-law of deceased Sheikh Said Barzanji and he was appointed as Qaradagh Sub-District Administrator (Karadağ Nâhiyesi Müdiri / ‫ ) ﻗﺮەﻃﺎﻍ‬by an Imperial Decree

Zehrab / Zorab (‫ ﺯﻫﺮﺍﺏ‬/‫) ﺯﻭﺭﺍﺏ‬, Rahim Ahmed Nawras (‫)ﻧﻮﺭﺱ‬, Rahim Ahmed Shershi / Ser- Infamous Hamawand bandits (Hemavend eşkıyâ-yı shi (‫ ﺷﺮﺷﯽ‬/ ‫)ﺛﺮﺷﯽ‬ meşhûrasından) Dawlatyar (‫ )ﺩﻭﻟﺘﯿﺎﺭ‬and Hama Haidar (‫)ﺣﯿﺪﺭ ﺧﻤﻪ‬ of Serzel (Sarzal) in Sulaymaniyah. The other two possibilities are ‘Sarzal’ village of Firuzabad District or ‘Sarzal-e Vali Nazeri’ village of Serpol Zehab District , both of which are in Kermanshah Province of Iran. (3) The name of Sayyid Kerim/Abdülkerim Effendi, the son of Baba Rasul, who was mentioned in the Sâdât Manifest and alleged to have been in his house with the guests during the siege, is also mentioned among the ringleaders. (4) It is highly probable that the person named as Sayyid Muhammad, the Son of Former Mufti (Sâbık Müftizâde) among the ringleaders is the same person mentioned in the Sâdât Manifest and alleged to have been in his household during the siege. (5) This person, referred to as Gözi or Güzi (‫ )ﮔﻮﺯﯼ‬in other telegrams, is referred to as ‘Nouri (‫)ﻧﻮﺭﯼ‬ as the son of Naqib’ (Nakibzâde Nûri) in the February 23 version of the Mârûf’s telegram. (6) This place is mentioned as Dereh Miyan (‫ )ﺩﺭە ﻣﯿﺎﻧﻠﯽ‬in Mârûf’s February 23 telegram, while in the February 25 version of same telegram it is mentioned as Dermane (‫)ﺩﺭﻣﺎﻧﺔﻟﯽ‬. While it is mentioned as Reh Miyane (‫ )ﺭەﻣﯿﺎﻧﺔﻟﯽ‬in Tevfik’s February 27 telegram, it was written as Remiyan/Rehiyan (‫ﺭﻣﯿﺎﻧﻠﯽ‬ / ‫ )ﺭﻫﯿﺎﻧﻠﯽ‬in Zeki’s February 27 telegram. Although not certain, it may be the Daraman Village (‫ﺩﺍﺭﻣﺎﻥ‬ /‫ )ﺩﺍﺭەﻣﺎﻥ‬of Kirkuk. Other possibilities might be Rummana in Hawija, Rahmaniya in Mosul, Rahmaniya near Duhok and Ruhaiya in Tilkaef. However, another possibility is the Darmian County of Iran (Dermiyan Şehristanı – ‫ )ﺷﻬﺮﺳﺘﺎﻥ ﺩﺭﻣﯿﺎﻥ‬from which the Sheikh’s elders might have migrated. (7) Qaradagh Sub-District Administrator (Karadağ Nâhiyesi Müdiri) Seyyid Muhammed /Mehmed

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According to the petitioners, these ringleaders commanded a force consisting of 300 cavalries plus a 500 – 600 cavalries and riflemen mobilized from the villages such as Kozaraqa (Kozereka / ‫)ﮔﻮﺯەﺭﻗﻪ‬, Kharajyan (Haracyan / ‫)ﺣﺮﺍﺟﯿﺎﻥ‬, Kharaba (Haraba / ‫)ﺣﺮﺍﺑﺔ‬, Arbat (Arbat / ‫)ﻏﺮﺑﺖ‬, Weladar (Viledar / )1, Jehanliq (Cihanlık / ‫)ﺟﻬﺎﻧﻠﻖ‬2, Qaratughan (Karadoğan / ‫ )ﻗﺮەﻃﻮﻏﺎﻥ‬and Yakhimali (Yahimali / ‫)ﯾﺨﯽﻣﺎﻟﯽ‬.³²⁸ Allegedly, the land tenures of these villages were allocated to these So-called Sheikhs as a reward in return for their banditry and bloody actions during the Despotism regime (Müteşeyyihlerin vakt-i İstibdâdda şekavet ve hûnhârânelerine mükâfâten tahsis edilen). It seems that the Sheikhs could easily mobilize warriors from these villages thanks to the feudal relations Efendi was promoted to the bureaucratic degree of the third rank ( rütbe – i sâlise) by the Hamidian regime in 1901. BOA, İ..TAL.262/1, 24 Eylül 1317– 07 October 1901 (8) For the Hamawand tribesmen, the terms ‘bandit’ (şakî, eşkıyâ) or ‘bandit gangs’ are very common in state correspondence, in reference to the damage they have inflicted on state and society. (9) Although this person, a known member of Hamawand, was written as Zehrab (‫ )ﺯﻫﺮﺍﺏ‬in all other telegrams, it was written as Zorab / Zurab (‫ )ﺯﻭﺭﺍﺏ‬in Mârûf’s telegraph dated February 23. (10) It is not known whether Rahim Ahmed Nevres (‫ )ﻧﻮﺭﺱ‬in Mârûf’s telegram and Rahim Ahmed Şerşi / Serşi (‫ ﺷﺮﺷﯽ‬/ ‫ )ﺛﺮﺷﯽ‬in Zeki’s telegram are the same person. If he is the same person, one may have his name and the other his nickname. (11) The adjective Hama (‫ )ﺧﻤﻪ‬which describes Haidar here, has no connection with the Syrian city of Hama (‫)ﺣﻤﺎﺓ‬. This is the shortened form of the word ’Hamawand’, used as a title or an agnomen to distinguish some certain chieftains in the confederacy. David Neil MacKenzie remarkably underlines that although Hama is the normal hypocoristic form of the name Muḥammad, the word Hamawand is generally Arabicized as Ahmadwand. D.N. MacKenzie, ‘Hamawand’, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, p. 121. The name of Hama Haidar is mentioned in a few archival documents dated 1887– 1888 as the chief of one of the tribes affiliated to the Hamawand Confederacy. After obeying and cooperating with the government, he was sent to Benghazi with his family by the state authorities. BOA,Y..A...HUS.202/7/Lef 1, 15 Nisan 1303– 27 April 1887; DH.MKT.1498/ 8, 17 Mart 1304– 29 March 1888; DH.MKT.1499/52/24 Mart 1304– 05 April 1888  BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909; DH.MKT.1303/01/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 All villages and districts (except Jehanliq), are spotted in the maps below: (1) Map of IRAQ: Kurdistan Region, UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 2020 (2) Map of Northern Iraq Sulaymaniyah Area SHS01, JHIC- United Nations Joint Humanitarian Information Centre, UNOHCI, Erbil, Northern Iraq, August 2002 (3) Map of Sulaymaniyah Humanitarian Programme Sector, JHIC- United Nations Joint Humanitarian Information Centre, UNOHCI, Erbil, Northern Iraq, October 2002 1 It was written as Viyareden (‫ )ﻭﯾﺎﺭەﺩﻥ‬in Mârûf’s other (February 23) telegram. No such place could be found in the Ottoman or Modern Iraqi geography. However, the use of Viledar (/ ) in his other telegram (February 25) evokes the village of Weladar in Sulaymaniyah. 2 It is written as Jehartan/Cehartan (‫ )ﺟﻬﺎﺭﻃﺎﻥ‬in Deputy Accountant Mârûf’s other telegram. However, neither Cihanlık /Cihatlık, nor Cehartan has been found anywhere in the Ottoman or Modern Iraqi geography. It may be a village whose name has been changed later, or a settlement with a different name in the official geographical records.

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they developed over the lands allocated to them by the previous regime as muqataa (tax collection unit). However, the caravan attack was just at the beginning of this painful process, and much darker days awaited the people of Sulaymaniyah. The irregular forces that started to accumulate outside the town began to worry both the state authorities and the community. February 27 would be a rather unfortunate day when extremely urgent telegrams from Sulaymaniyah and Mosul reached and alarmed the Ministry of Interior. The first telegram sent by Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha reported the Siege of Sulaymaniyah and gave the names of the ‘real besiegers’ (Muhasırîn-ı Hakikiye).³²⁹ According to Tevfik, although the prin-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 29, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Gece saat üç buçukta alınmıştır. ‘Muhasırîn-i Hakikiye’ nâmı verilecek eşhâs Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesi’nin emriyle Musul’a aldırılan ve Musul Vak’asında maktûl […] Şeyh Said’in taallukat ve mensûbiyetinde zamân-ı İstibdâdda müteveffânın himâyesi tahtında şekavetle temin-i maişet edegelen ve cerâim-i müteaddide ile maznûn ve mahkûm bulunan Cişaneli Baba Resûl, Göktepeli Şeyh Said ve birâderi Abdülkadir, Serzi Şeyh Reşid ve Reh Miyaneli (?) Şeyh Ali ve merhûm Şeyh Said’in dâmâdı olup bâ-İrâde-i Seniyye Karadağ Müdirliğine tâyin olunan Şeyh Muhammed Garib nâm kimselerin taht-ı kumandasında üç nihâyet dört yüz raddesinde eşkıyâ çetelerinden ibâret ise de Musul Vak’ası akabinde her nasılsa Kerkük Sancağına iâde olunan müteveffânın birâderi Şeyh Mârûf, oğlu Şeyh Mahmud akrabâlarından Baba Resûlzâde Seyyid Ahmed ve Şeyh Sâlih nâmların bâlâda eşhâs Kerkük’e celbiyle verdikleri tâlimât ve Süleymaniye’de bulunan akrabâ ve taallukat-ı sâireleriyle bilmuhâbere kararlaştırılan tertibât üzerine Sâdât ve Şeyhlere âid kurâ ile kurâ-yı sâire ve Hemavend eşkıyâlarının cebren ve kerhen bâlâda arz olunan üç dört yüz raddesindeki atlı ve avenelerinin ilhak ettiklerinden bin kişi kadar bir kuvvet tahyil olunmaktadır. Maksadları Şeyh Said’in Musul’daki maktûliyetinin müsebbibleri olan Süleymaniye Memûrîn-i Mülkiye ve Askeriyyesiyle Tüccârân ve Mûteberânını katl ve mallarını gasb ve çarşıyı yağma, memleketi ihrâkla tehdid edilip bu yolda bir iki vukuatı yaparak memûrîni dağıtıp Kerkük’te bulunan Sâdâtı Süleymaniye’ye celb ve İstibdâd-ı Sâbıkı iâde ve Kanûn-i Esâsinin hükmünü mahvetmekten ibârettir. Hâl-i hâzırdaki kuvve-i mevcûde-i nizâmiyeden üç yüz piyâde, iki top, yüz yirmi râkibe, otuz jandarma süvârisi, yirmi kadar piyâde jandarmasından ibârettir. Askerin katli ve kasabanın her bir tarafı tecâvüze mâruz ve müsâid bulunması ve ahâlinin umûmu heyecâna geldiğinden bilmecbûriyet Nizâmiye Kumandanıyla müttefikan Jandarma ve Redif depolarından mevcûd olan yüz kadar Martin, beş yüz kadar Şnayderle teslih ve askerle beraber hâl-i tedâfüide bulundurulmuş ve ihtiyâta riâyeten Caf ve Pişder Aşâiri rüesâsına mikdâr-ı kâfi kuvvetlerle şitâb eylemeleri bildirilmiş ise de henüz gelememiştir. Telgraf hattı iki de bir de eşkıyâ tarafından bozulmakta olduğundan henüz vilâyetle muhâbere cereyân edememekte idi. Bu gece vilâyetten şimdi aldığım telgraf […] nazaran Kerkük’ten iki yüz elli mevcûdlu bir tabur piyâde ile dört top ve yüz kadar râkibe tahrik ettirildiği anlaşıldığından yarından sonra buraya muvasalatları me’mûldür. Mezkûr kuvvetlerin muvasalatında muktedir bir Kumandanın tâyin buyrulmasıyla bi’avnillahi teâlâ eşkıyâ-yı mâruza def’ ve tenkîl ve âsâyişin takriri kaviyyen me’mûldür. Telgraf hattı bozulmazsa her harekâtın akabinde netice-i müstahsile dakika fevt edilmeksizin arz kılınacağı mâruzdur. İşbu telgrafnâme gece saat dört buçuk-

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cipal force under the command of those leaders was consisted of ‘bandit gangs’ of 300 or maximum 400 men, their number reached to a thousand men after the additional forces were adjoined. These additional forces consisted of the 300 – 400 horsemen forcibly gathered from the mountains by the ‘Hamawand bandits’ and the elements organized by the Sheikhs in Kirkuk from the mountains and villages under their influence. According to Tevfik’s report, the Sheikhs first gave instructions to the elements in the highlands and driven them into Kirkuk. (bâlâda eşhâs Kerkük’e celbiyle verdikleri tâlimât). Afterwards, coordination was ensured between the Sheikhs in Kirkuk, who have managed to return to locality after the Mosul Incident and still formed the brain team of Sâdât, and their relatives and affiliates in Sulaymaniyah. After they were all coordinated, a force was arranged both from the Sâdât-controlled villages and some other villages as well. It is possible that the people of these villages, which are also mentioned in the telegram of the Accountant Mârûf, have feudal ties with the Sâdât Sheikhs over land and taxation, as well as kinship based on blood ties (Karâbet-i Nesebiyye) or intermarriage (Karâbet-i Sıhriyye).³³⁰ These loyal elements, who obeyed both social and religious affiliation without questioning, were subordinate to the Barzanjiyya Family with divine submission, even if they were against the state authority and the law. The Sheikhs seemed to quickly coordinate and subordinate any groups that they could religiously influence and tactically mobilize. Other telegram of the day was received from Governor Zeki and was classified as extremely urgent (gayet müstâceldir) as provided valuable information regarding the Sulaymaniyah Siege (see Table 4).³³¹ In fact, Zeki had conveyed a ta telgrafhâneye verilmiştir. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Nâmına Tevfik”  Karâbet-i Nesebiyye: Original kinship by descent from the same lineage. Karâbet-i Sıhriyye: Kinship through the matrimonial relations such as intermarriage between different families or clans. https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=Nesebiyye&t=%40%40 https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=s%C4%B1hriyye&t=%40%40 Access Date: 01.11. 2021  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 “Sûrettir. Süleymaniye etrâfında tecmi eden Aşâir-i Hemavendlilerden Zehrab, Rahim Ahmed Serşi ve Devletyar ve Hama Haydar ve elli altmış kadar aveneleri ve Müteşeyyihlerden Baba Resûl vesâire isimleri evvelce arz kılınan eşkıyâlar, Sâdâta müntesib kurâ ahâlisi ve cebren diğer kurâdan iltihak ettirdikleri fukarâ-i ahâliden ve Berzenciyye ve Karadağ Şeyhleriyle kezâ kerhen ve cebren köylerden topladıkları ahâli ve Remiyanlı/Rehiyanlı (?) Şeyh Ali ve mahdûmu ve birâderiyle beraber Berzenciyye [… ] karyesi ahâlisinden mürekkeb takriben bin kişi kadar tahmin olunmaktadır. Ancak bir faal Kumandanın idâresinde bir kuvve-i mükemmele tâkibâta başlarsa köylüler bittabi ayrılacaklar ve ancak bütün […] ve aveneleriyle iki yüz kişiye karib kuvvetler kalacağı muhakkaktır. Şimdiki hâlde icrâ-yı fesâddan katiyen geri kalmıyorlar. Ve bir taraftan da köylüleri

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new message reached from Tevfik as it was and added his own comments at the end. The Hamawand chieftains Zehrab, Rahim Ahmed Shershi, Dawlatyar and Hama Haidar, Baba Rasul (of Jeshana) from the Müteşeyyihs, the other Barzanjiyya and Qaradagh Sheikhs, and Sheikh Ali from Remiyan/Rehiyan with his son and brother, were the first identified ringleaders (see Footnote 327). The Hamawand chiefs were representing and controlling a symbolic force of 50 – 60 tribesmen in total. However, after the villagers obedient to Sâdât (Sâdâta müntesib kurâ ahâlisi) volunteered and the poor villagers (fukarâ-i ahâli) were involuntarily or forcibly mobilized (kezâ kerhen ve cebren) from the miscellaneous villages, the force gathered on the outskirts of Sulaymaniyah reached nearly a thousand people. Tevfik stated that if a military force under the command of an active commander begins to pursue, the villagers will disperse in fear, and a mass of 200 people at the most will remain with the Sheikh and his cohorts. However, under the current conditions, they did not hesitate to make mischief and tried to mobilize the villagers by force. According to Tevfik’s previous message, their ultimate intention was to kill and usurp the properties of the Administrative and Military Officials, Merchants and Dignitaries of Sulaymaniyah (Süleymaniye Memûrîn-i Mülkiye ve Askeriyyesiyle Tüccârân ve Mûteberânı), who were known as the promoters of Sheikh Said’s murder in Mosul. The besiegers have threatened to loot the market and set the town on fire to intimidate and disperse the administrators and officials. Thus, they would be able to bring Sâdât

cebren toplamağa çalışıyorlar. Çemçemal’deki ester süvâr geldi. Caf tahsîlâtındaki kuvvetin Süleymaniye’de bulunan tabura ait piyâde ve otuz ester süvâr geldi. Ve Bağdad’dan avdet iden kervan Caf’dan avdet iden askerin muhâfazasıyla dönüyor idi. Çünkü vukuat bunlarla vuku bulduğu ve Çemçemal’den gelen ester süvâr imdatlarına yetişmemiş olsa idi biteviye mahvolacaklardı. Kerkük’ten ve Salâhiye’den tahrik ettirilen kuvvet henüz gelmedi. Gelmesiyle emir ve kumanda burada bulunan Kumandan Kaimakam Zeki Beye tevdi olunacak ise de bir icrâât olunamaz. Bilakis bu yüzden de fenâlık çıkacaktır zira. Ne ahâlinin ve ne de askerin emniyeti kalmamıştır. Toplanacak olan bu kuvvet faalen bir Kumandana hakkıyla verilir ise kâfidir. Ahâlinin heyecânı gittikçe teşeddüd ediyorsa ve bil-mecbûriye verilen eslihadan başka daha silah istiyorsa ve hakikatte ahâliye ve asâkire söz anlatamayacak bir hâle gelmiştir. Bendeniz her ne kadar îtidâlin muhâfazasına cehdediyor isem de hâli pek vahim görüyorum. Binâenaleyh hakikat bu merkezdedir. —–-—–-—–-—–-—–-—–Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine 14 Şubat 324 târihli telgrafnâme-i âcizime zeyldir. Makine başında Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı Vekâletinden alınan telgrafnâme sûreti aynen bâlâya alınmış ve Süleymaniye’de tahaşşüd edecek kuvvete faal bir Kumandanın tâyiniyle i’zâmı için Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına kemâl-i ehemmiyetle yazılmıştır. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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back from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah, re-establish the Despotism regime and abolish the rule of the Constitution. Tevfik has reported that the existing military force consisted of 300 infantry from the regular army, two cannons, 120 riders, 30 gendarmerie cavalry and almost 20 gendarmerie infantry. Military casualties were expected, each side of the town was exposed to attack and major part of the community was agitated. Upon the necessity, the Nizâmiye Command cooperated with the Sub-Governor’s Office and armed the civilian population with 100 Martin and 500 Snider rifles distributed from the Gendarmerie and Reserve (Redif) Army depots. The army sought to recover its casualties with civilians which it had equipped with official rifles registered in its inventory and which it had actively deployed in defense line alongside the regular forces (teslih ve askerle beraber hâl-i tedâfüide). In addition, the chiefs of the Jaf and Pishder (Pişder) tribes were asked to form a sufficient number of reserve force and dispatch them quickly, but these elements had not yet arrived. On the other hand, communication with the provincial center was often disconnected due to the frequent interruption of the telegraph line by bandits. According to the telegram Tevfik had received at midnight, an infantry battalion of 250 men, four cannons and about 100 riders prompted from Kirkuk, were expected to arrive the day after tomorrow. With the appointment of a capable commander to the command of the deployed forces, it was strongly expected that these bandits would be crushed and destroyed, and the order would be restored. If the telegraph line was not broken again, the results of all operations would be reported without losing a minute. Tevfik’s messages also contained valuable information on military maneuvers and tactical mobility. Tevfik first reported that the mule cavalries in Chamchamal had arrived. The infantry and 30 mule cavalry, which were originally attached to the Sulaymaniyah battalion and supported the force in charge of tax collection in the territory of Jaf, also returned. The caravan returning from Baghdad was guarded and escorted by the unit returned from the collection mission in Jaf. When the caravan was attacked, both the passengers and the escort force would have been utterly destroyed if the Chamcamal mule cavalry had not been able to respond to their distress call. The forces dispatched from Kirkuk and Salahiyah (Salâhiye) had not yet arrived. According to the Mutasarrıf Tevfik, if the order and command of the force to be assembled in Sulaymaniyah was granted to Lieutenant Colonel (Kaimakam) Zeki Bey, no action could be taken under his command and no positive results could be obtained. Because, according to him, the command of Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Bey would lead to bad results contrary to expectations. For this reason, both the Governor and the Sub-Governor were demanding the appointment of a much more skilled and active commander to lead this critical operation. It was interesting that both the Governor and the

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Sub-Governor had the same distrust of Lt. Col. Zeki. The phrase “an active commander” which was constantly emphasized in the messages, was also noteworthy because it suggests that Lt. Col. Zeki might be passive or incompetent. Both administrators insisted that another officer take over the command, and Governor Zeki particularly reported the vital importance of the situation to the 6th Army and personally demanded the appointment. The gravity of the situation was seen in the following statements of Sub-Governor Tevfik: Neither the people nor the soldiers are safe. This force to be assembled will be sufficient if the command is duly given to an active commander. If the agitation of the people is secretly elevating and they want more weapons other than the ones delivered of necessity, the truth has come to a point where we cannot persuade the people and the soldiers. Even though I strive hard to maintain moderation, I find the situation very dire.³³²

From this statement, we understand that weapons were distributed even to civilians due to the size of the threat, and even the amount distributed was insufficient. However, the helpless Sub-Governor seemed unable to control the people and the soldiers, despite his efforts to maintain order. According to Governor Zeki, the perpetrators of the caravan attack were the relatives of Sâdât living in villages around Sulaymaniyah and the Hamawand tribesmen, who had always taken up banditry as a profession.³³³ However, the

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 20, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 30, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkının esnâ-yı rahda eşkıyâya mâruz kalarak Süleymaniye’ye avdet etmesi ve Segirme tarikinde Süleymaniye Kervanının teslib edilmesi husûsları evvelce arz edilmişti. Mütecâsir-i vukuat olanlar Süleymaniye civârındaki köylerde sâkin Sâdât’ın taallukatıyla öteden beri icrâ-yı şekaveti kendilerine sanat ittihâz eden Hemavendlilerin bir kısmı olduğu, esbâbı ise Şeyhlerle kasaba ahâlisinin beynlerindeki ihtilâftan ileri geldiği ve maksadları kasaba ahâlisini tehdid ve Şeyhlerin Süleymaniye’den çıkarılmalarına karşı ahz-ı sârdan ibâret olduğu anlaşılması üzerine Ordu ve Fırka Kumandanlıklarıyla bil-muhâbere tedâbir-i lâzım ittihâz ve icrâsıyla muhtell-i emn ve âsâyiş ahvâlin tekrârına meydan verilmemesi için Süleymaniye’de mevcûd bir tabur-u nizâmiyeye ilâveten Salâhiye ve Bazyan kazâlarıyla Caf tahsîlâtında bulunan nizâmiye müfrezeleriyle 200’ü mütecâviz ester süvârın ve Erbil’de bulunan piyâde taburuyla bir cebel bataryasının Süleymaniye’ye kemâl-i sür’atle sevklerine ibtidâr olunmuş idi. Bunlardan Erbil taburu henüz oraya vâsıl olamadı. Salâhiye’deki 100 mevcûdlu râkibe de varmak üzeredir. Süleymaniye hatt-ı telgrafının bozukluğu cihetiyle Süleymaniye’nin ahvâl-i hâzırasından hiçbir mâlûmât alınamamakta idi. Tebligat-ı mükerrere üzerine iki saat evvel hattın ıslâh ve muhâberâta başlandığı haber alınmış idi. Makine başında muhâbere üzerinde iken bu mesele hakkında Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesinin Süleymaniye Kumandan ve Zâbitânıyla doğrudan doğruya icrâ kılınan muhâberâtı ahz-ı mâlûmâta mâni olmuştur. Muhâberât-ı mâruzanın hitâmından sonra is-

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main reason for this siege process which started with the caravan attack, was based on the dispute (ihtilâf) between the Sheikhs and the townspeople. Their main purpose was to threaten the townspeople and to take revenge (ahz-ı sâr) on them for the expulsion of the Sheikhs from Sulaymaniyah. Necessary measures would be taken and implemented by establishing contact with the Army and Division Commands, order and security would be ensured, and events would be prevented from escalating. In addition to the current regular army battalion in Sulaymaniyah, it was instructed to the districts of Salahiyah and Bazian to dispatch reinforcements promptly. The regular army detachments in charge of the Jaf tax collection and more than 200 mule cavalry were also mobilized. An infantry battalion and a mountain artillery battery from Erbil were also expected to be dispatched to Sulaymaniyah as soon as possible. The Erbil battalion had not yet arrived, but 100 horsemen expected from Salahiyah were about to arrive. The previous message sent by the Notables of Sulaymaniyah also contained critical information about the siege.³³⁴ Sulaymaniyah Town was under siege for six days. The lives of the people were endangered as the entrances and exits to the town were blocked and commercial activities were stopped (memleketi abluka ile ubûr ve mürûr kat’ı ve ticâretimizi sedd). After two thousand rifles were distihsâl olunacak mâlûmâtın arzına müsâraat kılınacağı mâruzdur. Bu gece saat dörtte telgrafhâneye verilmiştir. Musul Vâlisi Vekili Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909 “Altı günden beri mütevâliyen memleketi abluka ile ubûr ve mürûr kat’ı ve ticâretimizi sedd ile hayâtımızın tehlikeye ilkası ve diğer taraftan dahi memlekette kuvve-i cünûdiyenin kalanı ve akılları güçlerinde olan bir takım sebükmağzânın onlara iltihakıyla dâire-i şekavetlerinin gittikçe tevsi hiss olunması üzerine umûm ahâliye hâsıl olan heyecân ve havf-ı canından dolayı çarşı dükkânlarımızı kapatan hükûmet-i seniyyenin îcâb-ı maslahatı ve ahâlinin bil-mecbûriye vuku mürâcaatı üzerine tedâbir-i müessire olmak üzere ahâliye tevzi edilen iki bin beylik tüfeng ile kuvve-i cünûdiyeye kuvve-i ensar kesilerek geceli gündüzlü silah […] muhâfaza-i can ve mal olmuş ve elyevm Bağdad’dan Süleymaniye’ye gelen diğer kârbânımıza da hücûm ve on nefer asker-i nizâmiyeye ve beş altı nefer ahâli cerh ve katl ve yedlerindeki Mavzer tüfengleriyle kırk yüklü hayvanlarımızı nehb ü gâret etmeleri ve yarın daha başımıza ne gibi felâket getirecekleri hakkındaki […] re’s-i hududdaki hemcivârımızı adeta dilhûn ve Tebriz vak’asını feramuş ettirmeleri gibi cerâim-i mütenevvialarını isbât-ı müddeaya ve seyyiât-ı ahvâllerine kifâyet edeceği şâyân bunlar inşâallah delil-i kâfi görüldüğü ve bunca ahâli-i mu’ti ve asker-i nizâmiyenin muhâfaza-i hukuku bi hakkın matlûb buyrulduğu takdirde muahharen mahal-i teb’idleri tâyin buyrulmak üzere evvel emirde hâl-i firârideki hempalarına iltihak etmemek için Kerkük’teki Müteşeyyihlerin zinhar […] bi hakkın […] mâ-aile diyâr-ı âhere nakilleri ve memleket-i abluka eden eşkıyâların […] ve tenkîlleriyle, emvâl-i magsûbenin istirdâdı zımnında faal bir Kumandanın tâyiniyle, mikdâr-ı kâfi asker-i nizâmiyenin sür’at-i i’zâmı umûm ahâli nâmına kemâl-i me’yûsiyet ve sabırsızlıkla makine başında intizâr ederiz. Ferman Vekil-i Müfti-i Belde Mahmud, Muhasebeci Vekili Mârûf, Meclis-i İdâre Âzâsından Abdürrahim”

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tributed to the civilian population as an active countermeasure, regular military forces (kuvve-i cünûdiye) were reinforced to ensure the safety of life and property day and night. Fortunately, the armed civilians functioned as a support force alongside the regular army and were quite successful. However, the transport and shipping route was still insecure and another caravan arriving from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah was attacked as well. Ten soldiers and five or six civilians were wounded, some of them were killed, their Mauser rifles were seized, and 40 loaded animals were stolen. The Notables specifically warned the government to prevent the possible escape of these So-called Sheikhs from Kirkuk and thus not to join their cohorts in Sulaymaniyah. In fact, transferring them with their families to another (farther) location would be much better for the safety of the obedient population and soldiers. The telegram also contained some warnings that the Sheikhs endangered security in the frontier zone and could affect relations with Iran. Just like the Vali and Mutasarrıf, the Notables of Sulaymaniyah demanded the appointment of an ‘active commander’ to neutralize the bandits who besieged the town and to retrieve the stolen goods from the caravans (eşyâ-yı / emvâl-i magsûbenin istirdâdı). The telegram sent by Sulaymaniyah Deputy (Mebûs) Said from Baghdad to the Grand Vizirate on 28 February, raised the level of alarm more than ever.³³⁵ Deputy Said wrote that the Sheikhs who somehow managed to get themselves into Kirkuk, did not remain calm in there, and they made the tribes revolt with the urge of revenge and plunder. In Sulaymaniyah, which was subjected to a deadly attack, people were shot dead, property was looted, and the people began to migrate from the town (Memleket muhâcerettedir). Deputy Said definitely did not find it appropriate for the Sheikhs to be left in Kirkuk from now on and called for the executive power to ensure the security. Apparently, the difference of opinion between the parliament and the government on this issue grew more and more and the legislative body would now have to warn the executive power. Deputy Said was not the only person who thought this way about the threat

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2754/40/Lef 1, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909 “Sadâret-i Uzmâya Vaktiyle Süleymaniye dâhilinde Şeyh Said ve avenesi tarafından ikâ’ı melhûz olan heyecânın önü alınması için nâmûskâran ahâlinin feryâdları tesir ederek merkumlar Musul’a aldırılmış idi. Orada dahi rahat durmadılar ve her nasılsa Kerkük’e iâdelerinde intikam sevdasıyla buğz […] dolan aşâiri yağma tamağıyla ayaklandırıp Süleymaniye etrâfına saldırdılar. Fukarâlar vuruldu, canlar telef , emvâl nehb olundu. Memleket muhâcerettedir. Bunların Kerkük’te bekaları mahzûrdan sâlim olamadığı gibi kuvve-i icrâiye faâliyet göstermedikçe takrir-i âsâyiş dahi mümkün olamayacağı mâruzdur. Süleymaniye Mebûsu Said”

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posed by the transfer of Sheikhs to Kirkuk. There were similar statements in the telegram dated 28 February signed by the 31 prominent Officials, Notables and Merchants of Sulaymaniyah.³³⁶ All the sins and crimes of the So-called Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah, despite the countless homes and families they have destroyed so far, were concealed by a veil of false aggrievement (mazlûmiyyet perdesi). Unfortunately, their baseless complaints and false statements continued to be published and favored in the newspapers and created a public hesitation despite their revealed and proven crimes. According to the Notables, through the misleading perception and image created by this advocacy journalism and through the patronage of some traitors, they have managed to be transferred from Mosul to Kirkuk. Also, taking advantage of this immediate vicinity, they have contacted some of their relatives who were convicted bandits and fugitives. From Kirkuk, which is as close as a suburb to Sulaymaniyah, they have smoothly organized the caravan ambush and the siege of Sulaymaniyah. The state was skeptical of the size of the threat and the number of the aggressor group, that it had followed through telegrams.³³⁷Although it was clearly

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 41, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 Şubat 1909 “Mezâlim-i Cengizâneleri hakkında telgrafnâmeler arz kılınan Süleymaniye Müteşeyyihlerinin yakdırdıkları evler, söndürdükleri ocakların tâdâdı kalemin iktidârı hâricinde olduğu hâlde hâlâ mazlûmiyyet perdesi altındaki cem-i şikâyetlerine sahte mazbatalarına himmet nazarıyla bakılarak henüz takdir ve taayyün-ü seyyiâtlarına bazıları tarafından tereddüd olunmakta olduğu maatteessüf gazetelerde görülmektedir. Acaba bunca feryâd ve figanımızın sıdkına Musul’da îfâ eyledikleri vak’a-i müdhişe delil-i kâfi olmaz mı? Şâyet adem-i kifâyeti husûsunda yine ibrâz ediliyorsa bazı hâinlerin eser-i himâyeti ve sahte mazbatalarının aks-i te’sirleri üzerine Süleymaniye’nin bir mahallesi demek olan Kerkük’e gönderilmelerinden bil-istifâde burada şakî ve mahkûm firâri akrabâlarıyla”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 34, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine- Gayet müstâceldir. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığı Vekâletinden alınan telgrafnâmede orada toplanan aşâirin müctemian bin kişi kadar olduğu beyân olunmakta ise de bu mikdâr biraz mübalâğalı görülmüştür. Mâhâzâ Süleymaniye’de bulunan ve sevk edildiği bildirilmiş kuvvet bunları def’ ve tenkîle maaziyâdetin kâfi olmak îcâb eder. Ancak Mutasarrıf Vekili, orada bulunan Kumandan Kaimakam Zeki Beye karşı adem-i itimâd göstermekte olmasına nazaran Kumandanlıkla ve Mutasarrıf Vekâletiyle ve lede-l îcâb Ordu Kumandanlığıyla bil-muhâbere tâkibât ve tenkîlâtın hüsn-i icrâsı için cihet-i askeriyyenin celb-i nazar-ı dikkati şâyân-ı ehemmiyettir. Bir de bu babda ale-ddevâm mâlûmât itâsı tavsiye edilmiş olduğu hâlde Kuvve-i Mürettebenin vâsıl olup olmadığına ve mahalliyle cereyân eden muhâberâtın neticesine dâir intizâr olunan haber henüz alınamadığından şimdiye kadar Süleymaniye’ye nerelerden tertip olunan hangi kuvvetlerin vâsıl olduklarının ve diğerleri ne vakit vâsıl olabileceğinin ve Süleymaniye’den âhiren alınan mâlûmât neden ibâret bulunduğunun muvazzahan ve serian iş’ârı ve bundan böyle alınacak mâlûmâtın da peyderpey derhâl izbârı mütemennâdır. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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Illustration 14: Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said Effendi Source: SALT Research, Said Efendi-Süleymaniye – Saïd effendi député de Suleïmanié, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, https://ar chives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/18788, Access Date: 28. 06. 2021

stated in the message of the governorship that the number of tribes gathered around Sulaymaniyah reached about a thousand people, this figure was found a bit exaggerated (biraz mübalâğalı) by the Ministry of Interior. At the same time, the current force deployed in Sulaymaniyah should have been more than enough to defeat and suppress them. However, since both administrators had a distrust (adem-i itimâd) of Lt. Col. Zeki Bey, the Governor was instructed to monitor the incidents by keeping in constant contact with the regional command, the Mutasarrıfate and even the army command when necessary. In order to properly defeat these bandits, it was of great importance to direct the attention of the army to the region. The ministry also requested the reports on whether the JTF was fully deployed, ’which forces from where’ had been deployed in Sulaymaniyah so far, and when the remaining elements would arrive. The Ministry questioned the status of the JTF from the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate with a second telegram, right after these issues and demands were dispatched to the province.³³⁸ İstanbul expected a prompt reply from Sulaymaniyah

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 35, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909

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on issues such as whether the tribal formation was dispersed and what measures were taken against the siege. In a few days, Sub-Governor Tevfik reported to İstanbul on the tactical status of the deployment and the measures taken to ensure public order. With an infantry battalion of 240 men, two artillery units and 30 riders joining the existing force, the total number of soldiers stationed in Sulaymaniyah reached the level of 800.³³⁹ The 12th Division Command dispatched a reinforcement force from Salahiyah, and the crew assigned to Jaf tax collection was ordered to return to Sulaymaniyah. This reinforcement force reported from the Division Command, consisted of 120 riders and infantry (râkibe ve râcile), but they had not reached yet. The bandits, on the other hand, retreated to the vicinity of the Hamawand villages located in Bazian (Bazyan). Public agitation was quelled as much as possible, the market and bazaar were re-opened, and everyone was busy with their business and earnings (kâr ü kesb). Moreover, all the people of Sulaymaniyah were announced and warned not to join the bandits through all the settlements and municipalities affiliated to the sanjak. While this announcement was quite comprehensive and clear on aiding and abetting bandits, it also acknowledged that banditry activities in the region could not be neutralized without the support of the community. According to the announcement, the military pursuit and operation launched by the regular army against the banditry activities, especially in positions such as Jabal Sagirmah (Segirme Dağı), Kharajyan (Haracyan) and Kahriz (Kehriz), frightened the community.³⁴⁰ Above all, Tevfik assured that the civilian population, who had  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 45, 17 Şubat 1324– 02 March 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, 16 Şubat târihli ariza ile arz olunduğu veçhile muvasalat eden iki yüz kırk mevcûdlu bir tabur piyâde, iki top, otuz râkibe ile mevcûd-u hâzır mevcûd-u sâbıkla beraber sekiz yüz raddesine bâliğ olmuştur. Salâhiye’den hareket ve Caf tahsîlâtı mürettebâtının avdetine emir verildiği Onikinci Fırka Kumandanlığından bildirilen yüz yirmi mevcûdlu râkibe ve râcile henüz muvasalat etmemiştir. Eşkıyâ Bazyan’da meskûn Hemavend kurâları civârına çekilmiştir. Heyecân-ı umûmi mehmâ-emken teskin olunarak çarşı ve pazar açtırılmış ve herkes kâr ü kesb ile meşgul olup eşkıyâya iltihak etmemeleri için de kazâ ve livâ hatt-ı mülhakaya tebligat ve belediye vâsıtasıyla îlân ettirilmiştir. Henüz başka bir icrâât yoktur. Mutasarrıf Vekili Tevfik”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 46, 17 Şubat 1324– 02 March 1909 [It is an attachment to the telegram dated 01 March 1909 sent by Tevfik to the Ministry of Interior.] “Bugünlerde Segirme, Haracyan, Kehriz nâm mevkilerde serzede-i zuhûr olan vukuat fâilleri ile sâir erbâb-ı cerâim ve cinâyet hükûmetçe tahkik ve teşhis edildiğinden derdest-i icrâ bulunan tâkibât te’dibât münhasıran onlara âid olacağı hâlde bazı ahâlinin de dûçâr-ı havf oldukları anlaşıldığı ve halbuki mezkûr vukuatlarda zi medhal olmayanların hiçbir sûretle rencide olunamayacakları derkâr, şu kadar ki esnâ-yı tâkibde mütecâsirin ve esbâb-ı cerâimi barın-

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not been involved in the said bandit-oriented activities until that time, would not be offended in any way. However, some civilians who aided and abetted the bandits and harbored them in their homes during the military pursuit (esnâ-yı tâkibde mütecâsirin ve esbâb-ı cerâimi barındırmak ve ihfa etmek), have challenged, endangered, and even hindered the state’s actions until now (azm ve icrâât-ı hükûmeti işkâl). Tevfik therefore gave these civilians a chance to correct their mistakes and urged them to come to court to have their statements and information on banditry activities sought. However, from now on, those who insisted on not coming to court to conceal what they knew (ketm-i mâlûmât), hesitated or rejected to testify (istinkâf ve adem-i itâat), and continued to help the bandits by supplying food and necessities, would be accused of disobeying government orders and the law. Until now, those who were compulsorily involved in the above-mentioned activities for fear of the bandits would be exempted from this as long as they came to judicial authorities and cooperated with the state. Tevfik Pasha also declared that he guarantees the freedom of travel and safety of those who do not get involved in such activities (kemâl-i emn ve serbesti ile her tarafa âmed ü şüd edilmek) and envisaged to minimize the involvement of the people in banditry activities. As he stated at the end of the announcement, the principal and general purpose of the state was to ensure the welfare and safety of obedient people (ehl-i muti). Thus, by neutralizing this mob of crime, the ordinary people would be protected from all kinds of damage, violence and attack. Tevfik Pasha displayed his determination to suppress the banditry activities triggered by the Sheikhs, by taking his 800-men military force, all the people of the districts and sub-districts of the sanjak, and even the tribal chiefs with him. Although he was to serve as the Acting Sub-Governor until the arrival of Ziyâ Pasha, he seemed to want to portray an administrator who was at peace with his soldiers,

dırmak ve ihfa etmek isteyenleri azm ve icrâât-ı hükûmeti işkâl edeceklerinden bu gibi hâllere cesâret edenlere ve hükûmetçe mâlûmâtlarına mürâcaat olunmak üzere mahkemece alel-usul celbnâme ile taleb olundukları hâlde ketm-i mâlûmât maksadıyla gelmeyen ve gelmekte istinkâf ve adem-i itâat gösterenlere ve eşkıyâya yem ve yiyecek ihsâsı sûretiyle cezâi ve külli muâvenet edenlere evâmir-i hükûmet ve kanuna itâat etmemiş nazarıyla bakılıp ancak bundan evvelleri eşkıyâdan korkarak zarûrî ve mecbûrî olarak ahvâl-i mesrudede bulunanlar, […] mezkûr iki vak’ada bulunmayanlar tahkik ve tefrik edildikten sonra sâirleri hakkında icâbât-ı nizâmiyenin icrâ ve işbu cezâya çarptırılmaları mukarrer bulunacağı cihetle bu gibi ahvâlden zinhar tevakki ve mücânebet olunmasına ve medhaldâr olmayan kurâ ahâlisinin kemâkân kemâl-i emn ve serbesti ile her tarafa âmed ü şüd edilmek hiçbir tarafta kendilerine taarruzât vukuuna meydan verilmeyeceğine ve zâten maksad-ı aslı ve umûmisi “ehl-i mutinin” istihsâl-ı refâhı ve selâmeti için eşkıyâ […] gürûhun te’dibiyle reâyânın her hâlde her türlü zarar ve ziyândan vikayesi ve tecâvüz ve taarruzdan masûn olunmasının lüzûmu veçhiyle bilumûm ahâli ve kurâya tâlîm ve îlânı lüzûmu tavsiye olunur.”

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people and local elements before the Ministry, and to make people forget the complaints about him. Although the Ministry of Interior found the local administration’s statement that “the bandit force gathered around Sulaymaniyah estimated to have reached a thousand people” a bit exaggerated, it still approached the situation carefully and cautiously.³⁴¹ Because it was highly probable that other elements would soon join these bandit forces and their numbers would increase rapidly. Even when this possibility is taken into account, the existing military units could still be sufficient to pursue and destroy the targeted bandits. However, other tribes should definitely not be allowed to join (iltihak) the battle alongside these bandits and engage in conflict with the Ottoman troops. On the other hand, telegrams were sent from İstanbul to some local tribal chiefs through Senator Sayyid Abdulqadir Effendi, and some of them gave good results. Apparently, the Ottoman Government engaged in lobbying activities that could have a positive impact on the Kurds in the region and tried to activate prominent Kurdish figures. Minister Ali Rızâ Pasha, aware of the loyalty of some tribes to the Hamawands, was also in favor of the effective use of important figures in the region, such as the head of Jaf tribe Mahmud Pasha. At this point, the Minister of War continued with the same diplomatic attitude he had displayed towards Sâdât from the beginning and favored the negotiation rather than the use of excessive force.

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324– 02 March 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Süleymaniye’ye gelince Mutasarrıf Vekilinden dün akşam alınan telgrafnâmede elyevm orada mevcûd kuvve-i askeriyyenin sekiz yüze bâliğ olduğu ve yüz yirmi mevcûdlu bir müfrezenin de yolda bulunduğu ve eşkıyânın Bazyan’daki Hemavend kurâlarına çekildikleri bildiriliyor. Tecmi eden eşkıyânın tahminen bin kişi raddesini bulduğu evvelce iş’âr olundu ve bu tahminin biraz mübalâğalı olması menût bulunmasına nazaran mahallinde mevcûd bulunan ve bunlara kariben iltihak edecek olan kuvve-i eşkıyâyı tâkib ve tenkîle kâfi demek ise de eşkıyâ-yı merkumeye diğer bazı aşâirin iltihak etmelerine meydan verilmemesi şâyân-ı ehemmiyettir. Toplanan eşhâsın dağıtılması zımnında Âyândan Seyyid Abdülkadir Efendi tarafından bazı rüesâya telgraflar çektirilmiş idi. Bunlardan tesirât-ı hüsne hâsıl olmuş olduğu ve bazı aşâirin Hemavendlere iltihak-ı menût bulunduğu hâlin Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşa ve sâir îcâb edenlere […] büyük vesâyâ îfâ ettirilebilir. Kerkük Sancağının ahvâli de bil-müzâkere Merkez-i Vilâyetin temin-i âsâyişi ve tâkibâtın temini hüsn-ü icrâsı için îcâb iden tedâbirin biletrâf kararlaştırılması ve diğer taraftan Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf Vekiliyle ve ledel îcâb cihet-i askeriyye ile bil-müzâkere eşkıyâya karşı hâlen ittihâz olacak tedâbir hakkında kendisine tâlimât-ı mufassala itâsı lâzımdır. Gerek Merkez-i Vilâyete gerek Süleymaniye’ye ve Kerkük’e âid tedâbir ve icrââttan peyderpey etrâflıca mâlûmât itâsı ve bir müddetten beri pek ziyâde muhtell olan âsâyiş-i vilâyetin her tarafta bir an evvel takrir ve […] istikmâli mütemennâdır. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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Sâdât, who obviously intended to intimidate the central authority with the Caravan Attack and attempted against the life of a Sub-Governor and his entourage vindictively, denied the responsibility for the Caravan Attack in the Manifest. Nevertheless, the Sheikhs continued to create a perception of implicit threat by making hints in the Manifest and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah had maximized the extent of this threat. It was a clear challenge to the state authority when a town was besieged and disconnected from the outside world, the local administration was abolished, and life was interrupted in all aspects. The Sheikhs, who could not achieve results with their diplomatic efforts in the pursuit of justice, wanted to show the central authority that they could take control at any time and at any place. In addition, the Ministry which approached the incidents from a strategic perspective, knew very well the loyalty and devotion of some tribes to the Hamawand Confederacy. At this point, the Ministry was in favor of the effective use of important figures in the region, such as Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha, in order to bring these tribes over the side of the state. On the other hand, the Ministry closely followed the situation in Kirkuk Sanjak and tried to establish a tactical harmony and strategic integrity between the Mosul, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk in order to ensure and establish security throughout the province. Although the governments in İstanbul changed frequently during this turbulent period, the Ministry of Interior maintained its diplomatic attitude towards Sâdât from the beginning and preferred negotiation rather than excessive use of force. Sâdât, who aimed to intimidate the central authority publicly with the Caravan Attack and attempted against the lives of a governor and his entourage with a vengeance motive, flatly denied responsibility for the attack in the Manifest. Nevertheless, the Sheikhs continued to create a perception of implicit (veiled) threat by making some allusions in the Manifest, and they maximized the extent of this threat with the Siege of Sulaymaniyah. Besieging a town and cutting it off from the outside world, leaving local government helpless and interrupting every aspect of life was a clear challenge (full defiance) to state authority. The Sheikhs, who could not get results with their diplomatic efforts during their seek of justice, wanted to show the central authority that they could take control anytime and anywhere.

6th Army’s Supervision Over Sulaymaniyah All military units located in the Mosul territory were subordinate to the 6th Army headquartered in Baghdad and under the command of Lieutenant General (Birinci Ferik) Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha. Hierarchical reasons aside, the supervision of the 6th Army over Sulaymaniyah was extremely critical due to Mehmed Fâzıl Pa-

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sha’s personal experiences with the tribes in Iraqi lands since 1880. Following the moderate policy of the Ministry of War, Fâzıl Pasha tried to maintain the same diplomatic attitude towards Sâdât. However, when he could not get effective results through diplomatic channels, he would turn to military solutions. The 6th Army’s report over the region stated that the necessary and sufficient units were dispatched to Sulaymaniyah in the fastest way to suppress the existing disorder (iğtişâşın teskini).³⁴² In addition, all Tariqah Sheikhs and Tribal  BOA, DH.MKT. 2763/13/Lef 2, 18 Şubat 1324– 03 March 1909 “Altıncı Ordu Kumandan Vekili Birinci Ferik Fâzıl Paşa hazretlerinden mevrûd 18 Şubat 1324 târihli şifreli telgrafnâme sûretidir. 8 vusûlü 12 Şubat 1324 –Süleymaniye cihetindeki iğtişâşın teskini zımnında dakika fevt edilmeyerek meselenin ehemmiyetine münâsib kuvve-i lâzıme sevk ve tertib edilmiş ve icrâât-ı hükûmete intizâra bir gûnâ hâdisenin tekrâr ve îfâından mücânebet olunması hakkında bilcümle Meşâyih ve Aşâire vesâyâ-i müessire îfâ ve her türlü tedâbir-i askeriyye icrâ edildiği evvelce arz olunmuş ve gerek Postnişinden cevâben gelen telgrafnâme aynen zire nakledilmiştir. Gerçi birkaç günden beri sükûnet berdevâm olmakta ve sûret-i mütemâdide iğtişâş ve heyecân teskini esbâbına tevessül etmekten dahi geri durulmakta ise de tâkibât ve icrâât-ı hükûmetin […] müddet tehiri yeniden bir fenâlığın zuhûrunu intâc edeceğinden ve Kerkük’teki Sâdât ile Kerkük civârındaki aşâir ve Meşâyihin kıyâmı, Sâdât’ın tekrâr Süleymaniye’ye iâdeleri değil hatta Kerkük’te bulundurulmaları maksadına mübteni bulunmuş ve cihet-i askeriyyeye tevcih eden vazife vaktiyle hakkıyla îfâ edilmiştir. Süleymaniye Jandarma Binbaşılığı Vekâletinde bulunup Binbaşının vürûdundan dolayı bundan akdem kıtasına sevki tebliğ olunan Yüzbaşı Fehmi Efendinin de Kerkük’e celbi ve Kolağası Sâlih Efendinin de Bağdad’a i’zâmı mahalline bildirilmiş ve Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbık Tevfik Paşa hakkında da îcâb-ı hâlin icrâsı için de Musul Vilâyetine ve hükûmetin bu babda vereceği karâr dâiresinde îfâ-yı muâmele edilmek üzere şimdilik yalnız sükûnet ve âsâyişin muhâfazasına son derece dikkat ve itinâ olunması husûsunda Süleymaniye Kumandanlığı Vekâletine yazılmış olmakla ehemmiyeti müstağni-i arz ve tasvir bulunan bu meselenin daha ziyâde tevessüüne meydan ve imkân bırakılmamak için bu babda lâzım gelen tedâbir ve icrââtın bir an evvel ittihâz ve îfâsı için Musul’a muvasalat ettiği anlaşılan Vâli-i Lâhıka emr-i seri-i itâsı esbâbının istikmâline müsâade buyurulması kemâl-i ehemmiyetle mâruz ve müsterhamdır. Ferman Sûret – 14 Şubat 1324 Her günden ziyâde mâlûm-u devletleri buyurulduğu üzere […] Cedd-i Sâdâta karşı muhabbet-i şedide besleyen ve icrâât-ı faideden gayrisine o kadar akıl erdiremeyen aşâir ve kurâ ahâlisinin fecia-ı vâkıâ üzerine kesb edildikleri galeyân her tasavvurun fevkinde ve bu babda herçi-bad-âbâd hazmına katlanmayı intâc edecek […] olduğu şüphesizdir. Mâmâfih emr-i telgraf-ı devletlerine imtisâlen Kerkük Livâsına âid Talabâni ve Şivan ve sâir aşâire vesâit-i seria ile nehhâc-ı müessire icrâ kılınmış ve faalen mukteziyyât-ı muâdelet şu iki aylık tehirden kurtarılıyor. Mehmâ-emken tesri buyurulur ise hâl-i hükûmet az müddet daha nakl [nakil] olmayacağına buraca ehemmiyet hâsıl olmuştur. Süleymaniye ahvâline gelince gerek Kerkük’teki Sâdâta gelen emr-i telgrafileri ve gerek cânib-i dâiyânemden vuku bulan mürâcaat üzerine bu kerre de muharrerât-ı mahsûsa ile her türlü nehhâc ve ihtârât îfâ kılınmış ve ancak burada aşâirden pek ziyâde hâlât-ı mühimmeye mâruz bulunan kabâil ve sâireye atfedilen isnâdâtın pek çoğu müftereyât-ı masnû’adan olmasına ihtimâl verilen […] Hükûmet-i Mahalliyenin muamelât ve harekâtına iftirâlarından ve bekalarında mahâzir-i mütenevvia-ı müdhişe isbât edilen ve Sü-

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Chiefs were advised in order not to repeat the events, and the Kirkuk Postnishin was also contacted due to its influence over sectarian and tribal formations.³⁴³ Postnishin’s correspondence dated 27 February was also attached to the telegram sent by Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha; however, no sect, tariqah or sheikh name was specified. Postnishin reported that he immediately gave necessary and effective advice (vesâit-i seria ile nehhâc-ı müessire) to many tribes settled in Kirkuk such as Talabani and Shiwan (Şivan), in line with the state orders. He even tried to persuade the Sâdât in Kirkuk with many different advice and warnings. However, according to the close contacts Postnishin established, the regional tribes and clans complained of the slanderous accusations (müftereyât-ı masnû’a) and mistreatment of the local government against them. He considered it extremely risky for Fehmi, Sâlih and Doctor Ziyâ to remain in Sulaymaniyah and stated that it would pose many dire inconveniences. Why were these individuals still not wanted by the authorities, despite numerous warrants being issued for them to be removed from Sulaymaniyah? Postnishin claimed that these people were the major collaborator of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik. And Tevfik made the office he had occupied an instrument to realize their malicious intentions and to derive personal benefits (makamını tagallüb ve istilâya). According to Fâzıl Pasha, the uprising of the local tribes and tariqahs was based on the policy followed by Sâdât, who were transferred to a such a close settlement as Kirkuk. Although the army had fulfilled its duty properly, the government had to maintain the calm with its actions as well. On the other hand, the successor of Captain Fehmi who served as the Acting Gendarmerie Commander of Sulaymaniyah at that moment, had arrived at his station of duty. And Fehmi

leymaniye’den aldırılmaları evâmir-i müteaddide iktizâsından iken hâlâ aranılmayan Tabur Ağası Vekili Fehmi ve Kolağası Sâlih ve Doktor Ziyâ Efendilerin fesâd ve mel’anetlerine cevelângâh bir âlemden ve bahusûs azl edilmiş olan Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkın adeta makamını tagallüb ve istilâya almaya kadar cüret-yâb olması gibi keyfiyetten ileri geldiği cihetle ol babda îcâb iden muamelât-ı icrâiyye-i muâdelet ve hakkaniyetperverânenin bir an akdem icrâsı selâmet-i umûmiye nâmına arz olunur.”  Post-nişîn (‫) ﭘﻮﺳﺖ ﻧﺸﻴﻦ‬: The Persian word “post”, which means “skin, shell, leather” in the dictionary, is used in the sense of “animal skin” in Turkish. Cushions and prayer rugs, especially made of small and large animal skins, are called Post or Pösteki (Püsteki). Post, which was widely used in houses and especially in lodges in the past, has been associated with a meaning that expresses the position of Sheikh in addition to its real meaning in Sufism. The post on which the sheikh sits is the seat of the founder of the tariqah (Pir) to which he is affiliated, and by sitting on the post, the sheikh represents the founder of the tariqah. Post-nishîn (Post-sitting) means ‘the sheikh of the lodge’, to sit on the post means ‘to be a sheikh to a lodge’. Sâfi Arpaguş, Post: Şeyhlik makamını ifâde eden terim. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/post , Access Date: 27.04. 2022

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was being summoned to Kirkuk to be dispatched to his next unit. Senior Captain Sâlih was also ordered to be sent to Baghdad. Fâzıl Pasha also reminded that the decision regarding Mutasarrıf Tevfik was already followed by the provincial administration and the central government. Because according to Fâzıl, the most important thing was to maintain the peace and order and to show the utmost care in order not to spread this disorder further (daha ziyâde tevessüüne). And in line with these priorities, it was necessary to immediately contact both the Sulaymaniyah Command and the Current Governor (Vâli-i Lâhık) who had just arrived in Mosul. The next telegram reached from the 6th Army Command addressed doubts, allegations and dangers regarding Mutasarrıf Tevfik.³⁴⁴ Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha was watching the situation in Sulaymaniyah with great concern and considered Tevfik, who still continues to serve his duty arbitrarily, as extremely dangerous for the peace and order of the town. According to the intelligence received from Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk Commands, Tevfik has re-established an alliance with some civilians and officers to take revenge on Sâdât and has re-started to occupy the state authorities with false statements (makamâtı tasdi ve işgal). Al-

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2761/83/Lef1, 20 Şubat 1324– 5 March 1909 “Bağdad’da Altıncı Ordu Kumandan Vekâletinden mevrûd 20 Şubat 1324 târihli şifreli telgrafnâmenin sûretidir. Süleymaniye ve Kerkük Kumandanlıkları Vekâletinden mevrûd telgrafnâmelerde mâzûl olduğu hâlde hodbehod Mutasarrıflık vazifesini îfâ etmekte olan Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa ahz-ı intikam sevdasıyla Süleymaniye ahâlisiyle oradaki Zâbitânı dâireten ittifakına alarak Süleymaniye vukuatının tekrâr ve tecdidini mûcib bir takım ahvâlin zuhûruna sebebiyet vermekte, ve dâireten ittifakına aldığı arz olunan Zâbitân ve ahâli vâsıtasıyla hilâf-ı hakikat mâruzât ile makamâtı tasdi ve işgal ettirmekte olduğu iş’âr olunmuş ve Vâli-i Lâhıkın vürûduna değin tebeyyün edecek hâl ve hakikata göre her gûnâ tedâbir-i lâzıme ve seria îfâsı îcâb ve zamânıyla Süleymaniye’ye sevk edildiği hâlde mûmâileyh Tevfik Paşa’nın temâdi etmekte olan teşvikat ve harekât-ı nâ-becâsının önü alınmadığı takdirde âtiyen telâfisi gayrikabil ahvâlin ve vak’a-i müteessife zuhûru melhûz olduğu cihetle bu işin bir an evvel neticelenmesi her neye mütevakkıf ise îcâbının icrâsı lüzûmu Kerkük’te bulunan Musul Vâlisine yazılmış ve oralar âsâyişinin tamâmıyla temin-i muhâfazasına ve Vâli-i müşârünileyhin def-i şûriş ve fesâd için ittihâz buyuracakları tedâbire nazaran tevlid-i mahzûr etmeyecek sûretin tertibât-ı askeriyye icrâsı lüzûmu da Fırka Kumandanlığı Vekâletine bildirilmiş ve ahâliyle Sâdâtı yekdiğerine tasalluttan hâli kalmadığı cihetle Merkez-i Orduya aldırılması hakkında emr-i telgraf-ı Nezâretpenâhileri bulunan Kolağası Sâlih Efendi ile Doktor Kolağası Ziyâ, Yüzbaşı Fehmi ve Redif Yüzbaşılarından Reşid Efendilerin bir mahzûr yok ise serian Bağdad’a i’zâmları îcâb edenlere tebliğ kılınmıştır. Gelen işârâta nazaran ahâliyi yekdiğerine saldırmakla iktifâ etmeyen ve adeta Süleymaniye’de bir İsyan Cemiyeti teşkil eyleyen mûmâileyh Tevfik Paşa’nın artık Süleymaniye’de bekası câiz olmadığından mûmâileyhin hemen oradan aldırılması esbâb-ı seriasının istikmâline müsâade buyurulması ehemmiyetle mâruz ve müsterhamdır Umûm Erkân-ı Harbiye Dâiresi”

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though all precautions were taken against the critical situation in Sulaymaniyah and all the necessary elements were quickly dispatched, Tevfik’s ongoing provocative and unwarranted actions (teşvikat ve harekât-ı nâ-becâsı) could have caused irreparable problems in the future. The Governor who was in Kirkuk temporarily, was asked to do whatever it takes to end this situation, to ensure and maintain the order in the region completely. It was expected from the Governor to take the necessary measures to suppress the turmoil, and from the Division Command to carry out the necessary military operations without any problems, in line with the Governor’s precautions and supervision. In addition, Senior Captain Sâlih, Medical Captain Ziyâ, Captain Fehmi and Reserve Captain Reşid, who allegedly turned the people and Sâdât against each other, were requested to be sent to the 6th Army headquarters in Baghdad immediately. Apparently, Fehmi, who was previously summoned to Kirkuk to be transferred to his new place of duty, would also be sent to Baghdad for investigation. According to Fâzıl Pasha, it was definitely not permissible for Tevfik, who was not content to make people of Sulaymaniyah hurt each other and had founded ‘a Society of Rebellion’ (İsyan Cemiyeti) [metaphorically], to stay there anymore. On the other hand, the Siege of Sulaymaniyah also paved the way for new appointments and exchanges of offices in the military command staff in the region. The next day, Fâzıl Pasha announced that Brigadier General (Mirlivâ) Zeki Pasha, who has served as the Chief of General Staff of 6th Army (Altıncı Ordu Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umûmiye Reisi), was assigned to the 45th Kirkuk Reserve Brigade (Kerkük Redif Livâlığı) and he was ready to depart.³⁴⁵ Major General (Ferik) Yusuf Pasha, who was summoned to Baghdad from Basra after he was appointed to the Command of 12th Division, was to be sent to Kirkuk without delay. On the other hand, Brigadier General (Mirlivâ) İzzet Pasha was quickly summoned to the post of Kirkuk Commander’s Deputy. However, İzzet Pasha would soon be the addressee of some complaints and allegations, such as favoring and patronizing the sheiks in the region. It seems that although the Ministry of War preferred to renew the top commanders of the Kirkuk Division due to the increasing tension in the region, the problems with the cadres would continue. In the meantime, 6th

 BOA, İ..AS..81/4/Lef 1, 07 Şubat 1324– 20 Şubat 1909; DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef2, 21 Şubat 1324– 6 March 1909; DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909 “Bağdad’da Altıncı Ordu Kumandan Vekili Birinci Ferik Mehmed Fâzıl Paşa hazretlerinden mevrûd 21 Şubat 1324 târihli şifreli telgrafnâmedir. ”Kerkük Redif Livâlığına tâyin buyurulan Zeki Paşa müteheyyi-i azimet olduğu misüllü, Onikinci Fırka Kumandanlığını deruhte eylemek üzere Basra’dan celbi evvelce arz olunan ve Bağdad’a gelmek üzere bulunan Ferik Yusuf Paşanın bilâ-ifâte-i vakit Kerkük’e i’zâmına ve İzzet Paşanın da celbine müsâraat kılınacağı mâruzdur. Ferman“

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Army’s report on Tevfik reached the relevant Ministries and the Mosul Governorate was asked to remove Tevfik from there immediately, on the grounds that his presence in Sulaymaniyah would again cause sad events.³⁴⁶

5.3 Appointment of Ahmed Reşid Pasha as the Governor of Mosul In this section, Ahmed Reşid Pasha’s takeover of the governorship, the serious allegations he made against the previous local administration, the current situation in Sulaymaniyah and his relations with Sâdât will be examined. In the next subsection, the striking allegations made against Governor Reşid and the process leading to his dismissal will be detailed. It was quite remarkable that Governor Reşid’s short 8-month tenure in Mosul between February and September 1909 was so eventful, complex and turbulent. Appointed immediately after the Mosul Incident, Reşid had chosen to calm and pacify Sâdât by displaying an image and policy which was the contrast of the previous administration. However, he could not be said to have been successful in this policy, as he was dismissed in a short time and under controversial circumstances. At the end of January, a Fortress Commander (Kal’a Kumandanı) with the necessary qualifications and conditions had to be appointed to Edirne.³⁴⁷ According to the message by Ministry of War, it was thought that Major General Zeki from the General Staff (Erkân-ı Harb Feriki) had both the qualifications of a fortress commander and was capable of such a task based on his previous experience (istinâs). Therefore, the Ministry of Interior was asked to quickly appoint

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2761/83/Lef 3, 22 Şubat 1324– 7 March 1909; DH.MKT.2761/83/Lef 4, 24 Şubat 1324– 9 March 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 1, 15 Kânûnusâni 1324– 28 January 1909 Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Edirne’ye evsâfı ve şerâit-i lâzımeyi hâiz bir Kal’a Kumandanı intihâb edilmesi îcâb edildiğinden Musul Vâlisi Erkân-ı Harb Feriki Zeki Paşa hazretlerinin mezkûr Kal’a Kumandanlığına icrâ-yı memûriyeti münâsib görülmüş ve bir Kal’a Kumandanı evsâfı câmi’ olan Paşa-yı müşârünileyhin hidmet-i askeriyyede istihdâmı hâl ve maslahata muvâfık olacağı derkâr bulunmuş olmasına ve Kal’a Kumandanının lede-l hâce îfâ edeceği vazife ile daha evvelce istinâs hâsıl eylemesi pek mühim bir keyfiyet bulunmasına binâen müşârünileyhin yerine Musul Vilâyetine diğer bir zâtın serian intihâbı ve Vâli-i Cedidin muvasalatına değin umûr-u vilâyetin vekâleten idâre ve […] esbâbının istikmâli ile beraber Zeki Paşanın îfâ-yı vazifeye mübâşeret etmek üzere azimeti zımnında kendisine tebligat icrâsı husûsunda […] celile-i Nezâretpenâhileri mâruz buyurulmak bâbında emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ “

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another person in place of Zeki and to run the provincial affairs by a deputy until the new Governor arrived. At this point, Zeki’s position which became controversial after his resignation due to the Mosul Incident, seems to have been more influential rather than the urgent need in Edirne. It seems that Zeki eventually got what he wanted and somehow managed to free himself from a troublesome office such as the Governorship of Mosul. However, the Ministry of Interior would not allow Zeki to leave Mosul immediately. In the statement sent to the Grand Vizirate, it was written that the order and security had not yet been established in Mosul.³⁴⁸ Sâdât was constantly making applications to the higher authorities, was spreading unfounded rumors (rivâyât-ı kâzibe) from time to time and those involved in the Mosul Incident could not be captured because the expected force had not yet reached. Therefore, it was not a good time for Zeki to transfer his office to one of the local officials as an acting governor and leave Mosul. Until the new governor was elected and appointed, it was absolutely necessary for Zeki to continue his duty. In the meantime, a very positive response was received from the Governor of Bitlis, Reşid Pasha, regarding his next assignment as the Governor of Mosul. Reşid Pasha, being aware of his civil service notion (vâcibe-i zimmet-i memûriyet), declared that he was ready for duty wherever he was and at the order of the Sublime Porte.³⁴⁹ The Ministry of Interior also stated that Reşid was

 BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 3, 19 Kânûnusâni 1324– 01 February 1909 “Huzûr-u Âli-i Hazret-i Sadâretpenâhiye Musul’da vukua gelen hâdise-i mâlûmeyi müteâkiben Vâli-i müşârünileyh istîfâ etmiş ise de o sırada infikakı muvâfık-ı maslahat görülmeyerek îfâ-yı vazifeye devâm ve ihtimâm etmesi kendisine tavsiye kılınmıştır. Musulca el-hâletü’l hâzihi emn ve âsâyiş sûret-i katide takarrür etmiş addolunamayıp Sâdât-ı mahalliye mütemâdiyen mürâcaat etmekte ve ara sıra bir takım rivâyât-ı kâzibe intişâr etmekte […] ve Kuvve-i Mürettebe Musul’a henüz vâsıl olmayarak vak’a-i mezkûrede zi medhal olanlar da ele geçirilememesine nazaran Paşa-yı müşârünileyhin memûrîn-i mahalliyeden birine tevdi-i vekâlet ile oradan infikak etmesi gayr-i câiz bulunduğundan Vâliliğe intihâb ve tâyin olacak zâtın vusûlüne kadar Paşa-yı müşârünileyhin îfâ-yı vazifeye devâm etmesi lâbüdd bulunduğu Nezâret-i müşârünileyhe […] iş’âr edilmiştir. Vilâyet-i mezkûrenin husûsen şu sırada kesbettiği ehemmiyete nazaran Vâliliğe ahvâl ve iktidâr-ı mûcib bir zâtın tâyini muktezi olup Bitlis Vâlisi Saadetli Reşid Paşa hazretleri mukaddemâ Zor Mutasarrıflığında bulunduğu cihetle ahvâl-i mahalliyeye, emzice-i aşâire vâkıf olduğu gibi muhâberât-ı câriyeye nazaran Bitlis’te hüsn-i idâreye muvâfık-ı maslahat bulunduğundan müşârünileyhin Musul Vilâyetine nakliyle Bitlis Vilâyeti Vâliliğine de erbâb-ı iktidâr ve reviyyetten olan Serfice Mutasarrıfı Saadetli Hüsnü Beyefendinin icrâ-yı memûriyeti menût-u rey-i sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhileridir. Ol babda. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.2725/35/Lef 2, 4 Kânûnusâni 1324– 17 January 1909 “Bitlis Vilâyetinden Gelen Şifre. Her nerede olsa hizmeti vâcibe-i zimmet-i memûriyet bildiğimden bu babdaki mütâlâa-i nâçizâ-

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well aware of the regional conditions (ahvâl-i mahalliye) and the characters of the tribes (emzice-i aşâir), as he had previously served as the Sub-Governor of Zor. In addition, according to existing reports, Reşid had been exhibiting a very successful provincial administration in Bitlis, which was in line with expectations. From a telegram sent by Mosul Commander Zühdü Pasha on March 6, we understand that Governor Reşid went to Sulaymaniyah for a while to resolve the crisis with Sâdât, shortly after he arrived in Mosul.³⁵⁰ In one of his later messages, Reşid would base this decision on two reasons.³⁵¹ First, it was thought that the planning and preparation of the Mosul Incident (mukatele-i hûnhârânenin tertibâtının) was carried out in Sulaymaniyah. Secondly, at the beginning of the incident, it was understood that the courthouse, police and gendarmerie officers in Mosul did not fulfill their duties of preliminary investigation and prosecution and left the job to its own devices (işin meskûn-u anh bırakıldığı). Under these

nem Bâb-ı Âli’nin emrine itâattır. Vâli Reşid”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 410/120, 21 Şubat 1324– 06 March 1909 Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Onikinci Fırka Kumandanlığından zeylen tebliğ olunan Süleymaniye Kumandanlığının 17 Şubat 1324 târihli telgrafnâmesine Berzenci-i Sâdâtın kuvveti 1500 atlı ve piyâde raddesinde bulunduğu Şehirpazar’dan çekilen telgrafnâmede beyân olunuyor. Müfreze Kumandanı Ömer Bey’den gelen telgrafnâmede hiç pazarın muhâsara edilmediği ve 5 Şubat târihinden îtibâren 3 gün kadar Süleymaniye Çarşısı kapandı ise de muahharen kısmen ve bugünlerde kâmilen açık bulunduğu, Süleymaniye kasabası abluka altında bulunmayıp Şeyhlerin münselib-i havfından etrâfı tamâmıyla emniyet tahtında bulunduğu, ve Şubatın Altıncı gecesi hükûmet-i mahalliye tarafından vuku bulan ihbâr üzerine askeriyyece istihzârât-ı lâzıme icrâ ve sabaha kadar intizâr edildiği, ahâli de ol vakit heyecâna gelerek kuvvetin kalanına binâen Meclis-i İdâre-i Livâdan verilen mazbatalar üzerine bizzarure Mutasarrıfla beraber Süleymaniye ve Karadağ Redif Taburlarından 400 Şnayder tüfeng ve tabancasının tevzii olunduğu ve şimdiki hâlde kasaba ve civârı emniyette , harekât-ı askeriyye […] te’dib ve derdestleri, Meclis-i İdâre-i Livâ mazbatası üzerine derdest-i icrâ bulunduğu iş’âr olunmasına ve zâten bu Sâdât meselesinin tesviyesi için Vâli Paşa hazretleri bizzat o cihetlere azimet etmiş oldukları berây-ı mâlûmât mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Nâmına Ferik Zühdü“  BOA, DH.MKT. 2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325 – 02 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, 17 Mayıs 1325 irâde buyurulan mazbata kopyası mütâlâa olundu. Geçen sene Kurban Bayramı Musul’da Süleymaniye Sâdâtından Şeyh Said Efendi ile tevabiinden 50 – 60 nüfûsun katl ve cerh olunmasını müteâkib Bitlis’ten Musul Vâliliğine tahvil-i çâkerânem buyurulmasıyla Musul’a muvasalatımda mukatele-i hûnhârânenin tertibâtının Süleymaniye’de yapıldığı ve bidâyet-i meselede Musul Adliye ve Polis ve Zâbıta memûrları vazifelerine âid tahkikat ve muamelâtı îfâ etmeyerek işin meskûn-u anh bırakıldığı anlaşılmasıyla bizzat Süleymaniye’ye azimet olunarak oraca tahkikata bil-ibtidâr”

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circumstances, it seemed more logical and efficient to Reşid to go to Sulaymaniyah and conduct the investigation from there. The Siege of Sulaymaniyah, which started during the tenure of Governor Zeki, continued during the tenure of Reşid as well. In the telegram he sent to the Ministry of Interior as the Acting Governor, Zühdü Pasha shared the latest developments from the Sulaymaniyah Command regarding the siege and public order. The number of thousand, which was previously given regarding the irregular forces gathered around Sulaymaniyah, was seen as an exaggeration by İstanbul, but the figures now reached were much more frightening. In the telegram sent by Sulaymaniyah Platoon Commander Ömer Bey from Sharbazher (Şehirpazar) on March 2, it was reported that the force under the control of the ‘Sâdât of Barzanjiyya’ (Berzenci Sâdâtı) had reached 1500 horsemen and infantry. The bazaar was never besieged, and although the Sulaymaniyah Market was closed for three days after February 18, it was later partially and now fully open. The town was no longer besieged but was guarded by the security forces for fear of the threat posed by the Sheikhs (Şeyhlerin münselib-i havfından). On the night of February 19, the necessary preparations were made by the army upon the notification of the local administration and the military forces were kept on alert until the morning. When the agitation of the people elevated, the Local Administrative Council (Meclis-i İdâre-i Livâ) had to issue a decision and 400 Snider rifles (Şnayder tüfeng) and pistols from the Reserve Battalions of Sulaymaniyah and Qaradagh, were distributed to the public. Fortunately, the town and its environs were now safe and military action was launched to catch and punish the perpetrators. It was understood from previous messages that the Siege of Sulaymaniyah took place a few days after the Caravan Ambush on February 19. Because the provincial administration reported the Caravan Attack on February 20 and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah on February 27. However, it is understood from Commander Ömer’s message that the town was already besieged on 18 February and that weapons were distributed to the civilian population on 19 February. This means that either the Siege of Sulaymaniyah had already begun when Tevfik’s Caravan was ambushed or there were inconsistencies or delays in correspondence. Another low possibility could be that the provincial administration deliberately delayed reporting the incident and tried to buy time. Most importantly, although the figures are different from previous correspondence, we see that the information that the weapons registered in the inventory were distributed to civilians by the Ottoman army is also confirmed by military sources. However, the decision was not taken arbitrarily and was based on a memorandum issued by the local administrative council due to an extraordinary security concern.

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Right after taking office in Mosul, Governor Reşid Pasha claimed that there was hostility between Sâdât and local administrators and sent a detailed report to the Ministry of Interior explaining how the current crisis had developed.³⁵² Re-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 62, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye’ce Sâdât hakkında hiçbir sûretle efkâr-ı umûmiyede galeyân ve hayâtlarına taarruza meyelân olmadığı bir sırada 25 Şubat 324 târihli telgrafnâme-i çâkerânemde arz olunan Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey’in mektûbu mündericâtına tevfikan Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa Sâdâta şiddetli buğzu bulunan Süleymaniye Kumandan-ı Sâbıkı Mirlivâ Mustafa Paşa ile müttefikan icrâ-yı agraza teşebbüs ederek ahâliyi müteheyyiç bir hâlde ve cemiyetlice hükûmete mürâcaatla Şeyhlerin Süleymaniye’den çıkarılması ısrârında ve aksi hâlde nefslerine taarruz kasdında göstermeleri ve şâyet bunlar aldırılmazsa kendileri terk-i memûriyetle Merkez-i Vilâyete geleceklerinden bahisle bâzen Mustafa Paşa ile müştereken ve bâzen de münferiden işârât-ı kâzibeyle vilâyeti iğfâl ve nihâyet Merkez-i Vilâyete gönderilmeleri emrini istihsâl ettikten sonra Şeyhlerden dört beş zâtı tahsîlât bahânesiyle hükûmete celb ve taht-ı nezârete alarak asker-i nizâmiyeyle hükûmetin etrâfı muhâfazaya aldırılması üzerine seyirci sûretiyle gelmiş olan ahâliye Mutasarrıf ve Kumandanın hemfikirlerinden Jandarma Taburu Kumandanı Vekili Redif Yüzbaşısı Fehmi Efendi ile diğer hempaları çarşı ve pazarda dağılıp ahâliye cebren dükkânlarını kapattırıp hükûmet pişgâhına celb ve cem’ ettikten sonra Şeyhlerin muhâlifi olup evvelce merkez-i livâya getirmiş oldukları Caf Reisi Mahmud Paşa da beraber olduğu hâlde müctemian telgrafhâneye gidip ahâli hâl-i ictimâ ve isyanda olarak ve Şeyhlerin herhalde Süleymaniye’den çıkarılması fikrinde musırr ve aksi hâlde sû-i kasde hâzır oldukları sûretini îmâ ederek işârât-ı kâzibeyle vilâyetin muvazene-yi fikriyesini bil-ihlâl âmâl-i garazkârânelerine temine muvâfık olarak Şeyhleri Musul’a sevk ettikten sonra ağrâz-ı nefsâniyelerini ilerlettikçe ilerletip nihâyet Musul’da ester süvâr neferleriyle yerli asker ve ahâli arasında vukua gelen arbede cedel-i mukatele olduğu hengâmede ahâli arasında dolaşmakta olan Şeyh Said Efendinin mahdûmlarıyla adamlarını hiç bir kimse tarafından taarruz değil idnâ’-yı mertebe-i hürmetsizlik bile îka’ edilmediği hâlde ertesi günü Sâdâtın umûmuna sû-i kasda tasaddi ve Şeyh Said Efendiyle mahdûmu ve on yedi adamlarını katl ve birkaç adamların cerh ve elbiselerine varıncaya kadar emvâl ve eşyâlarının gasb ve gâret edilmesi, mûmâileyh Ali Said Bey’in telkinât-ı hafiye-i mefsedetkârânesi eseri olduğu ve Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa ile yüzbaşı Fehmi Efendi’nin mukatelenin vukua geleceğine mâlûmâtları lâhik olduğu bazı ahvâl ve delâletiyle anlaşılmaktadır. Mutasarrıfın mübalâğakârâne […] esâs-ı işârâtı Bâb-ı Âli’nin nazar-ı dikkatini celb etmiş olduğundan Merkez-i Vilâyete aldırılması gerçi 5 Kanuni Evvel 1324 telgrafla tebliğ buyrulmuş ise de her nasılsa infâzında […] edilmesi, Mutasarrıfı daha ziyâde şımartarak nihâyet azl-i emrinin tebliğinde Süleymaniye Kumandan Vekili Kaimakam Zeki Beyi bit-tevkil hareketi şifre ile kendisine tebliğ ve ihtiyâtlı bulunması telkin edilmiş olduğu hâlde kayd-ı ihtirâza hâcet görmeyip umûr-u livâyı Zeki Bey’e terk ile azimet eylemiş ise de esnâ-yı rahda Sâdâta mensûb kurâ ahâlisinden bulunanlar ile Hemavend ve Caf Aşiretinden bazı eşhâsı cemiyetlice kervanın önüne çıkıp eşyâ ve emvâlini nehb ve muhâfızlarının birkaçını cerh fazahatlarında bulunduklarını geride haber alan Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyh Süleymaniye’ye avdetle bilâ-salâhiyyet ve hodbehod Zeki Bey’den vekâleti alıp icrâ-yı vazifeye başlamış ve sâbıkına inzimâm eden tesirât-ı sâikasıyla livâyı herc-ü merc edecek esbâb-ı muzırraya hempalarıyla beraber çalışıp memûrîn-i mevcûdeye varıncaya kadar umûmunu tehdiden yalan yanlış işârâtla makamât-ı aliyyeyi iz’aç ve memleketi bir muhâtara-i azime içinde göster-

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şid’s allegation was partially based on the seized letters of Major Ali Said and began with the striking statement that ‘the people of Sulaymaniyah neither did have any agitation against Sâdât nor any inclination to attempt the lives of the Sheikhs, in their minds’.³⁵³ According to the content of Ali Said’s letter, Tevfik Pasha formed an alliance with Former Commander Mustafa Pasha, who was known for his intense hatred towards Sâdât, and provoked the people to expel the Sheikhs from Sulaymaniyah. If the Government did not expel the Sheikhs from Sulaymaniyah, these conspirators had a two-stage plan to follow. First, they would make the people of Sulaymaniyah appear as if they intended to attack Sâdât in the eyes of the government, and second, they would leave their duties and offices (terk-i memûriyet) and come to the center of Mosul. According to Reşid’s report, Tevfik misguided the provincial administration by making false denunciations (işârât-ı kâzibe) both individually and jointly (with Mustafa Pasha), and ultimately succeeded in having the Sheikhs banished from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul. However, the rest of the report turned into an increasingly disturbing shape and allegedly showed how the expulsion process of the Sheikhs evolved into a complete chaos. According to the report, in the first place, four or five of the Sheikhs were summoned to the Government Hall under the pretext of tax collection and taken into custody (taht-ı nezâret). As the Sheikhs were being interned, the building was taken under guard by armed soldiers. Immedi-

erek topçu askeri celbi ve topları hemfikiri bulunan Zâbitânın vâsıtasıyla Sâdât’ın mahalle ve hânelerine doğru vaz’ ve ahâliye de depodan Esliha-yı Âmire ve cephane tevzi’ ettirmek gibi ihtilâlcûyâne muamelâta tasaddi ve Mutasarrıflıkta ibkası için müretteb telgraflar ve sâir iş’ârlar ile makamâtı tâcize devâmla her hâlde Süleymaniye’de bir vukuat çıkarmağa ramak kalmış iken 24 Şubat 324 târihli telgrafnâme-i dâverileri ve Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığının iş’ârı üzerine kendisiyle âlet-i ağrâz olan Zâbitânın tâlil ve temerrüdlerine bakılmayarak Süleymaniye’den çıkarılmaları üzerine efkâr-ı umûmiye li-elhamd bir sükûn ve Şeyh Said’in katlinden dolayı Musul ahâlisine karşı hiddetleri tahrik edilmiş olan bu havâli aşâirinde mekinet hâsıl olduğunun, Musul fâciasından kurtarılıp Kerkük’te ikamet ettirilmekte bulunmuş olan Sâdât ile hânelerine karşı topların vaz’ından havf ile terk-i büyût iden ve peyderpey avdet etmekte bulunan Sâdât’ın muârızlarıyla miyâneleri tesâluh ve Kerkük Mutasarrıfı Hüseyin Bey Efendi ve cihet-i askeriyyeden Süvâri Otuz Birinci Alayın Binbaşısı İbrâhim Efendi mârifetiyle icrâ edilmekte olan tahkikat tekmil ve istirâhat-ı umûmiye tamâmen takarrür ettikten sonra Musul’ca icrâ olunmakta bulunan tahkikat-ı adliyeye pek büyük esâsı olan evrâk-ı tahkikiyeyi bi-l-istishâb avdet edileceği 28 Şubat 324 , 2 Mart 325 târihli telgrafnâme-i fahimânelerine beyân buyrulan telgrafnâmeler kopyaları alınarak icrâ-yı tahkikatın […] Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyh bir takım Zâbitânın tehdidâtına […] edilmelerinden dolayı yazdıkları imzâ sâhiblerinin ekserisi söylemiş oldukları ve binâberin tahkikatın hitâmında neticenin biletrâf bildirileceği mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  For the letters of Major Ali Said, please see the section 5.4 Prosecution of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik

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ately after, Reserve Captain Fehmi Effendi, one of Mustafa Pasha’s allies, wandered the bazaar and market, forced the shopkeepers to close their shops and gathered the people as spectators in front of the Government Hall.³⁵⁴ Just then, the known dissident of the Sheikhs, Jaf Chief Mahmud Pasha, also joined the crowd and they all went to the telegraph office together. A telegram was sent to the Mosul Governorate, and it was reported that the people of Sulaymaniyah were in a state of mass uprising (hâl-i ictimâ ve isyanda). They were so persistent that they even hinted that there would be an assassination attempt (sû-i kasde hâzır) against the Sheikhs if they were not expelled from Sulaymaniyah. According to the report, with their false denunciations, they had violated the principles and functioning of the provincial administration, made it deviated from its line and managed to send the Sheikhs to Mosul in line with their vindictive ambitions. However, according to Reşid’s narrative, the crucial part began after that. Because, after the Sheikhs were transferred to Mosul, these administrators intensified their personal enmity and hatred even more, and turned the conflict between the mule cavalry and the people of Mosul, into an opportunity for their own interests. Sheikh Said, who had not seen even the slightest disrespect from the people until now, was brutally murdered with 17 of his men, some of his other men were injured and all their goods and belongings were plundered.³⁵⁵ Based on certain conditions and evidence, Governor Reşid argued that the incident was a product of Ali Said’s insidious and provocative suggestions (telkinât-ı hafiye-i mefsedetkârânesi). Moreover, it is alleged that Sub-Governor Tevfik and Captain Fehmi learned about the armed conflict later (mukatelenin vukua geleceğine mâlûmâtları lâhik olduğu). This allegation makes us think that if there was a conspiracy plan, Major Ali Said may have deviated from this plan and gotten out of the control of Mutasarrıf Tevfik. Reşid’s report also gave information about the dismissal of Tevfik, the interim administration of Lt. Col. Zeki, and the possible reasons for the caravan ambush that took place during that time. Although Tevfik’s exaggerated denunciations and actions attracted the attention of the Sublime Porte and he was

 In the report signed by the Acting Governor on August 22, his full identification was stated as the Deputy Commander of the Gendarmerie Battalion, Reserve Captain (Jandarma Tabur Kumandan Vekili Redif Yüzbaşısı) Fehmi Efendi. DH.MKT.2876/57, 09 Ağustos 1325 – 22 Ağustos 1909  In the threatening telegram sent by the tribal leaders in Sulaymaniyah on February 22, in the Manifest of Sâdât dated February 25 and, in the report signed by the Acting Governor on August 22, it was stated that the livestock (mevâşi) of the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs were also plundered during the incident.

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summoned to the provincial center, the execution of the decision to dismiss him was delayed and the Mutasarrıf was pampered even more. During the implementation of the decision of dismissal and the transfer of duty, Tevfik transferred the administrative affairs to the Deputy Commander of Sulaymaniyah Lt. Col. Zeki. However, he has done it without complying with the confidentiality and precautionary measures specifically stated in the encrypted messages of the provincial center. Therefore, since his departure from the town was no longer a secret, the moment he left Sulaymaniyah, he became vulnerable to threats and was attacked by the tribes on his route. Tevfik, who survived the attack and returned to Sulaymaniyah, took back his office from Acting Sub-Governor Zeki Bey arbitrarily and unauthorizedly, and resumed his duty. According to Reşid, after returning to his office, Tevfik continued to stir up the sanjak with his defeatist actions, to threaten the local authorities by uniting with his cohorts, and to disturb the higher authorities with unfounded denunciations. By showing the town as in great danger, he has summoned the artillery units to the town and has deployed these cannons in positions aiming the Sâdât resided district and homes, through to the cooperation of like-minded officers. And by distributing official weapons and ammunition (Esliha-yı Âmire) from the army depots to the public, he almost started a civil war. When they were so close to make a scene in Sulaymaniyah, the Ministry of Interior and the 6th Army Command seized the situation and removed the officers who cooperated with Tevfik from Sulaymaniyah, regardless of their excuses or resistance. Thankfully, the public opinion had relieved, and a solemnity prevailed in the local tribes who were filled with anger against the people of Mosul after the murder of Sheikh Said. The members of Sâdât, who survived the Mosul disaster and had been residing in Kirkuk for a while, were now returning to Sulaymaniyah. In addition, the members of Sâdât who left Sulaymaniyah, afraid of the cannons positioned towards their homes, were returning to the town gradually, and peace was established (tesâluh) between Sâdât and their opponents. After the investigation conducted by the Kirkuk Sub-Governor Hüseyin Bey and the Major of the 31st Cavalry Regiment, İbrâhim Effendi was completed and peace was fully prevailed, the results would be added to the current judicial investigation in Mosul and possibly determine its fate. One month after the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, the Grand Vizier surprisingly bypassed the Ministry of Interior and requested a report directly from the Mosul Province.³⁵⁶ The Grand Vizier questioned the Governor’s attempts and ac-

 BOA, BEO.3516/263667, 08 Mart 1325 – 21 March 1909 “Musul Vâlisi Paşa Hazretlerine Süleymaniye ile Kerkük Sancaklarında vuku bulan teşebbüsât ve icrâât-ı vâlâlarının derecâtıyla

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tions in the Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk Sanjaks until now and wanted to learn about their stages and results. The Porte was now waiting for precise and direct information from the Governor’s office at periodic intervals. A week after this message, the information that Sheikhs were allowed to return from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah would appear in inter-Ministerial correspondence.³⁵⁷ Mosul Governor’s Office had notified the Kirkuk Sub-Governorate regarding the granted permission for Sâdât to return to their hometown. And immediately after, the 12th Division Command reported that the Sâdât’s caravan was on its way to Sulaymaniyah. Meanwhile, serious allegations and accusations were brought against the Mosul provincial administration. The most important of these were the allegations against Reşid, which will be explored in detail in the next subsection. However, in addition to Reşid, some serious accusations against Zühdü Pasha, who had been the Provincial Commander of Mosul since the time of Governor Zeki, also reached the Grand Vizirate.³⁵⁸ Said, who was a member of the Rawandiz Notables and known for his loyal services to the state, accused Zühdü Pasha of har-

netâyicinden ve âsâyişin hâl-i hâzırda Bâb-ı Âli’ye peyderpey mâlûmât-ı katiyye itâsı ve Musul’daki erbâb-ı cürümden de şimdiye kadar kaç kişi derdest olunup haklarında ne gibi muâmele cereyân ettiğinin iş’ârı. Sadâret -i Uzmâ Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2783/29/Lef 1, 15 Mart 1325 – 28 March 1909 Hulâsa: Kerkük’deki Süleymaniye Sâdâtı avdete muhtâr bırakılmakla Süleymaniye’ye hareket ettikleri Mâruz-u Çâker-i Kemineleridir ki, Kerkük’de bulunan Süleymaniye Sâdâtının Süleymaniye’ye avdete muhtâr oldukları Musul Vilâyetinden Kerkük Mutasarrıflığına iş’âr kılınmasına […] Sâdât-ı mûmâileyhin Süleymaniye’ye hareket ettikleri Onikinci Fırka Kumandanlığı Vekâletinin iş’ârına atfen Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığı Vekâletinden mevrûd 8 Mart 1325 târihli telgrafnâmede bildirilmiş olduğundan berây-ı mâlûmât arzına mücaseret kılındı. Ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i lehül emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ“  BOA, DH.MKT. 2800/21/Lef 2, 4 Nisan 1325 – 17 April 1909 “Makamı Sadâretpenâhiye. Trablus’tan Receb Paşaya rağmen Rızâ Fehim Paşaların çifte maaşla taltîfen Musul Kumandanlığına musallat ettiği Zühdü Paşa’nın uhde ve hıyânetlerine metruk fırkadan mâadâ hiçbir vazife ile mükellef olmaksızın tahsîlât-ı nizâmiye içinde hazine-i milletten yağma ettiği Altı Yüz Bin kuruştan mütecâviz me’hûzâtın ve tahrir-i nüfûs, Şeyh Said meselelerinde ahâli ile hükûmeti yekdiğeri aleyhinde tahrik, fesâd-ı ahlâkı tâmim, Peşve havâlisinde karlı yağmurlar altında sürünen Asâkir-i Osmâniye nâmına Musul’dan fâhiş fiyatla mübâyaa ettirdiği erzâk-ı mağşûşa mukabil kunduratçılardan [sic] menâfi-i rezilesini temin, ma’ret-i şahsiye ile eşhâs-ı şedideyi iltizâm etmek gibi seyyiâtla vilâyet vekâletinin de uhdesine terkinden mütevellid mahzûratın tedkikini arz ve ihbâr eylerim. Ferman. Revandiz Eşrâfından Said”

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boring a grudge against him, of slandering him and of manipulating his duty as the Acting Governor of Mosul. He also accused Zühdü of embezzling 600.000 qurush from the state treasury, inciting the government and the people against each other in the case of Sheikh Said, making financial irregularities in purchasing supplies for the army and favoring violent individuals for his own interests. Although the issue was quickly conveyed to the Governor’s office from the Ministry, Said of Rawandiz had to send the messages to the Chamber of Deputies as no results could be obtained so far.³⁵⁹ Zühdü Pasha’s bad behavior, irregular actions and the risk of harming the provincial administration were reported to both the Ministries of Interior and War. However, no correspondence was found in the state archives regarding and investigation or prosecution against Zühdü Pasha. İsmâil Zühdü Pasha, who was appointed from Tripoli to Mosul and assumed the command of the 24th Redif Division of the 6th Army, would retire from the military on 5 October 1909, shortly after these allegations.³⁶⁰ A few months later, Former Akre District Governor (Akra Kaimakam-ı Sâbıkı) Fuad sent a very assertive message to the Ministry of Interior and demanded the execution of former Governor Zeki Pasha.³⁶¹ He accused Zeki Pasha of mismanaging the crisis in Mosul,

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2800/21/Lef 3, 20 Nisan 1325 – 03 May 1909; DH.MKT.2841/59/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 – 06 June 1909; Lef 2, 30 Mayıs 1325 – 12 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Musul Kumandanı Zühdü Paşanın mesâvi-i ahvâlinden ve Vâli Vekâletine tâyininden tahaddüs edecek mazarrattan bahs ve şikâyeti hâvi Revandiz Eşrâfından Said imzâsıyla Şemdinan’dan çekilen telgrafnâmenin Nezâret-i Celilelerine tebliğine. Meclis-i Mebûsân Reisi Ahmed Rızâ” “Harbiye Nezâretine Musul Kumandanı Zühdü Paşanın mesâvi-i ahvâlinden bahs olarak Meclis-i Mebûsân Riyâset-i Celilesine keşide olunup bâ-tezkire tevdi edilen telgrafnâme leffen savb-ı Âlilerine tisyâr kılındı. İcabın icrâ ve neticesinin inbâsı himmet […] Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, İ..AS..93/19/Lef 1, 20 Ramazan 1327– 05 Ekim 1909 Belge Özeti : Altıncı Ordu Redif Yirmibirinci Bağdad ve Yirmidördüncü Musul Fırkaları Kumandanları Ferik Tahir ve İsmail Zühdü Paşalar ile Mirliva Yusuf Ziya Paşa’nın emekli edilmesi. (1327N-130)  BOA, DH.MKT. 2886/63/Lef 1, 12 Temmuz 1325 – 25 July 1909; Lef 2, 15 Temmuz 1325 – 28 July 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Ahali arasında mütehaddis ihtilâftan vilâyetin iş’ârı üzerine azil diğer mahale […] tercümenin irsâline mütevakkıf bulunduğu Mebûsânın 1736 numerolu karârında gösterilmiştir. Bir vesikaya müstenid olmayan şu mühim isimlerin azli intâc edildiğine kıyâsen bu yolda iş’ârda bulunan Vâli-i Sâbık Zeki Paşanın sû-i idâresinde Musul’da tahaddüs eden ve mevkiiden vilâyete sirâyet eden âsâyişi ihlâle sebebiyet vermiş hâdise-i mâlûmenin devlet ve milleti îrâs ettiği mazarrat-ı maddiye ve mâneviyeye binâen müşârünileyhin i’dâmı lâzım gelir. Mâmâfih tercümem 20 Haz-

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causing the incident to escalate throughout the province, and causing material and moral damage (mazarrat-ı maddiye ve mâneviye) to both the state and the nation. According to Fuad, as many important personalities under his command could be dismissed without any documentation, Zeki Pasha should have been executed for the damages he had inflicted on the province. Although the content of the message was questioned from the Mosul Governorate, no further correspondence on the subject was found in the archives. It should be kept in mind that some messages of allegations and complaints against state officials may have been written with motives such as personal enmity, ambition or revenge. As we will see in the next subsection, although Governor Reşid has allegedly protected and favored Sâdât, the Sâdât bloc’s pursuit of justice and complaints against administration did not end during Reşid’s tenure as well. As the manifestation of justice was delayed, vitriolic statements continued to come from the Sâdât front. In the words of Said’s brother Naqib Maarouf, in order to fractionize the state and the nation (mülk ü milleti tahzib), the trio of Sub-Governor Tevfik, Commander Mustafa and Jaf Chief Mahmud have resorted to tricks and plans that would even amaze the devil (şeytanları mütehayyir eyleyecek desâise hileye mebni planlar).³⁶² Due to the vile, fabricated, and false accusations of this clique, the Sheikhs were humiliated and separated from their families in an unlawful and unjust way. Not only did they experience this terrible pain, but also local tribes and clans, full of feelings of love and protection for the prophet’s dynasty, had their share of this pain. The manifestation of justice iran 1325 takdim , mağdûriyetten vikayem müsted’âdır. Akra Kaimakam-ı Sâbıkı Fuad”  BOA, DH.MKT.2813/91, 29 Nisan 1325 – 12 May 1909 “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhiye Mülk ü milleti tahzib için şeytanları mütehayyir eyleyecek desâise hileye mebni planlar tertib eden Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf ve Kumandan-ı Sâbıkları ile Caflı Mahmud Paşa ve avenelerinin isnâdât müftereyâta mertebe-i ekâzib, sefile-i masnû’aları ile hilâf-ı kanun ve adâlet mahzûlen münhasıran yavrumuzdan teb’idimizi […] ve tahrikleri ile Musul Fâcia-ı Hâilesi vuku buldurularak” “Başımıza getirilen mesâib-i müdhişeye karşı ibrâz-ı metânet kabil değilse de islâ’ımızdan ekâbir-i fihâmın garâm-ı hârikalarındaki teskin-i mûciz-nümâlarından bil-istifâde tesirât-ı feciayı iktisâm bizce mümkün olsa, Hânedân-ı Server-i Enbiyâya sıyânetleriyle, kıvâm-ber olmuş lâyıkın bir muhabbetle mütehassis aşâir ve kabâil-i mahalliye olacağından bu kadar mazlûminlere ilâveten diğer bir gadr-ı azîmin tesirât-ı maddiye ve mâneviyesine giriftâr olmamak zımnında bunca cinâyâtın cerâimin mütecâsirleri hakkında mücâzât-ı lâzımenin icrâsına irâde buyurulmasına istimâ’ aksi hâlde bütün mesûliyet-i lâzıme-i muâdeletin infâzını tehire bâdi olanlara tahmil eyleriz. Süleymaniye Nakibü’l Eşrâf Kaimakamı Mârûf “

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was essential in order not to be exposed to the material and moral effects of this pain anymore, not to create more victims, more hatred and a greater suffering. Maarouf strikingly emphasized that if the perpetrators of so many murders and crimes are not punished properly, all responsibility will fall on those who delay the execution of justice. It seems that although Reşid disclosed the alleged involvement and conspiracy of the former administration in the Mosul Incident, since none of the perpetrators of the incident were convicted, Sâdât continued to put pressure on him after Zeki. While the investigation continued, the state of disorder which had been evident for a long time in the Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah Sanjaks and has now become almost usual, re-emerged more strongly. The merchants of Baghdad complained that they could not transport goods to these sanjaks due to the disorder created by the local despots and the fear spread by the bandits.³⁶³ Commercial transportation was completely interrupted (muvâredât-ı ticâret münkatı’), and the merchants have demanded the restoration of order in these sanjaks. The Minister of War, Sâlih Hulûsi Pasha, quickly coordinated with the Minister of Interior and assigned the 6th Army to take the necessary measures to ensure order and security. According to Reşid, security and order were excellent all over the province, but the Hamawands who have always adopted and practiced banditry, occasionally harmed the passersby (mârrin ü âbirîn) within the rural of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah.³⁶⁴ He expressed that the threat was specific to the unsettled and

 BOA, DH.MKT.2826/40/Lef 1, 12 Mayıs 1325 – 25 May 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesi Cânib-i Alisine, Süleymaniye ve Kerkük Sancaklarının müstebidleri vâsıtasıyla muhtell olan âsâyiş dolayısıyla muvâredât-ı ticâret münkatı’ bulunduğundan ve eşkıyânın tasallutu havfıyla Süleymaniye’ye mal gönderemediklerinden bahisle mezkûr sancakların iâde-i âsâyiş esbâbının istihsâli Bağdad tüccârlarından bir çoğunun imzâsıyla Bağdad merkezinden keşide kılınan telgrafnâmede bildirilmesi üzerine cihet-i mülkiye ile bil-müzâkere oralarda takrir-i âsâyişe müteallik tedâbir-i müessire ittihâzı Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığı Vekâletine iş’âr kılınmış olmakla taraf […] Nezâretpenâhilerinden dahi îcâb edenlere tebligat-ı mukteziye îfâ buyrulması merhûn-u rey-i dâverileridir. Ol babda emru ferman hazreti men lehul emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Sâlih Hulûsi Paşa”  BOA, BEO.3561/267060/Lef 2, 17 Mayıs 1325 – 30 May 1909 “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhileri, Vilâyetin her tarafında emn ve âsâyiş pek mükemmel olup yalnız öteden beri şekaveti itiyâd edinmiş olan Hemavendlerin ara sıra Kerkük ve Süleymaniye Sancakları dâhilinde mârrin ü âbirîne isâl-i dest-i hasâr ettikleri vâki ise de bunların te’dib ve terbiyyeleri için cereyân eden muhâbere üzerine beş tabur nizâmiye ve bir mikdâr süvâri askeri sevki Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığı ile bil muhâbere kararlaştırılarak tedârikata kemâl-i germi ile çalışılmakta bulunduğumuzu kariben onların defi ve tenkîlleriyle âsâyiş ve istirâhat […] tamâmen temin edileceği

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undisciplined Hamawands rather than the tribes in general.³⁶⁵ The Hamawands who had not been properly regulated and disciplined (te’dib ve terbiyye) by the state until then, were particularly targeting and attacking the travelers passing through the region (ebnâ-yı sebil). However, after the 6th Army decided to dispatch five battalions of regular soldiers and as much cavalry as necessary, the button was already pushed for an operation of destruction against these malicious elements (eşirrâ-yı merkume). Sâdât’s messages, whose scope expanded over time and included new ultimatums, continued to reach the Grand Vizier.³⁶⁶ According to Sheikh Maarouf

eltâf-ı sübhâniyeden me’mûldür. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, DH.MKT.2832/31/Lef 1, 20 Mayıs 1325 – 02 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Kerkük ve Süleymaniye Sancaklarında öteden beri rû-nümûn olan muhâl-i âsâyiş ahvâlin dahl-i Vilâyetteki aşâirin umûmundan ziyâde ebnâ-yı sebile taarruz ve tecâvüzden hâli kalmayan Hemavend eşkıyâsının lâyık-ı veçhiyle te’dib ve terbiyye edilememelerinden münbais olduğu bunların kuvve-i askeriyye sevkiyle kolları kırılmadıkça oraların âsâyişinin hiçbir vakitte temin ve emvâl-i devletin matlûb veçhile tahsil olunamayacağı anlaşılması üzerine Süleymaniye’de iken 25 Mayıs târihli makam-ı sâmi-i fahimânelerine sebk iden mâruzât-ı mütevâliye-i tedârikatım neticesinin aşâir-i mezkûrenin def-i ve tenkîlleri için harekât-ı askeriyyenin icrâsı emrinin Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına tebliğ ettirildiği tebşir buyurulmasına binâen ordu-yu mezkûr ile bil-muhâbere beş tabur nizâmiye ve lüzûmu kadar süvârinin sevki kararlaştırılarak tedârikata kemâl-i germi ile çalışılmakta bulunulduğundan acûl-i teâlî kariben eşirrâ-yı merkumenin defi ve tenkîliyle âsâyiş ve istirâhat-ı âmmenin tamâmen temin edileceği ve kuvve-i askeriyyenin tâkibâta ibtidârında lüzûm ve îcâb görülüyorsa yine bizzat Süleymaniye ve Kerkük cihetlerine azimet olunacağı mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, DH.MKT.2835/91/Lef 1, 22 Mayıs 1325 – 04 June 1909 “Makam-ı Sadâretpenâhiye, Nüfûz-u memûriyet ve sıfat-ı beşeriyelerini icrâ-yı mezâlim ve taaddiyâta îfâ-i fesâda şenâata hasr için her türlü tesvilât-ı iğfâlkârâne, desâis-i mel’anet-şiârane icrâsına ittifak etmiş olan ve biddefaât ihmâlleri bildirilen Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı ve Kumandan-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik ve Mustafa ve Caflı Mahmud Paşalar ile Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey ve rüfeka-i sâirelerinden mürekkeb bir cemiyet-i şerirenin teşebbüsât-ı hâinâneleriyle bütün kâinatın sürûra neşâta müstagrık bulunduğu Devr-i Mes’ûdun fâtihasında hiçbir sâbıka-ı cürme kabahatimiz olmaksızın bilcümle Şerâyi’-i Semâviyyeye muhâlif olarak hânmânımızdan ihrâc, Musul’a teb’id ile de teskin-i ateş etmedikleri cihetle Süleymaniye’den toplayıp Musul’a gönderdikleri İki Bine karib lira kuvvetiyle Ali Said Bey ve rüfekası tarafından itma’ iknâ edilen Engizisyon Cellâdları, Vahşileri canımızın, bütün Kürdistan’ın Reis-ül Sâdâtı Serverimizi Kerbelâ’yı andıracak sûrette şehid, Beş Bin liralıktan ziyâde mal mülkümüzü nehb ü gâret edildiği Musul Vâlisinin tahkikatıyla serair-ül ziyân, derecât-ı ahvâl tezâhür tahakkuk etmiş, aradan bu kadar müddet geçmiş iken hâlâ ihkak-ı hakk edilmemesinden cesâret alan Bağdad’daki erkân-ı müfsidin, Zâbitân-ı mücrimin hakaik-i müsbeteyi ihtifâ, hakkaniyet tarafdârını bil-ihâfe mağdûriyetimizi

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and his comrades, the people whom Major Ali Said persuaded and motivated by funneling 2.000 lira sent from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul were the “Executioners of the Inquisition” (Engizisyon Cellâdları).³⁶⁷ They claimed that some evil circles in Baghdad, consisting of defeatist and guilty officers (Erkân-ı Müfsidin, Zâbitân-ı Mücrimin), were even more emboldened because justice was still not served.³⁶⁸ These personalities allegedly covered up the positive truth and invalidated the grievance of Sâdât by intimidating the supporters of the justice. According to Sheikh Maarouf, these people have provoked some circles of Sulaymaniyah against Sâdât by influencing and manipulating some newspapers such as Baghdad and Al-Rashad (Bağdad ve El-Reşad nâm cerideler). And these circles consisted of those who were ignorant of the truth, some figures known for their factionalism and some state officials who had gained influence through their authorities. If they had the chance to fulfill their purpose, it would have meant that Sâdât was completely destroyed and buried alive. At the end of the message, they demanded either to be saved from this terrible end by the manifestation of justice or to be allowed to migrate to another land with their family consisting of nearly thousands households.

Allegations Against Reşid and His Dismissal The first collective allegation in the process that led to Reşid’s dismissal, came from the circles of Sulaymaniyah and it was claimed that Reşid formed an alliance with Sâdât, neglected the people of Sulaymaniyah and favored Sâdât against the people. At the end of March, merchants, clergy and military officers

redd, bilâ-haysiyyet ve şeref , zâtı ve hanümanımızı pâyimal ve hakaik-i ahvâlden bi-haber olanların efkârını ezhânı aleyhimize imâle etmek üzere her nasılsa Bağdad ve El-Reşad nâm cerideleri elde ederek evsah-ı dimâğlarıyla mayalanmış isnâdât fikriyyât-ı şu’m müteheyyice neşretmekte ve meftuh-ül amel hevâ heşker iclâsına bu hâllerine Süleymaniye ahâlisinden hırs-ı nifak ve şikakla mâlûm olanları yine fesâd kavmiyeleri teşkiline, hasb-el memûriyet nâfiz-ül emr olanları igvâya, teşebbüsâta ferhatyâb ile mertebeye ulaştırması mahvımızı iftâmızı [fetvâ], diri diri mezara defnimizi istilzâm edeceği de şüphe bırakmamış olduğundan ya hakkımızda muktezâ-yı adâletin hakkaniyetin îfâsıyla mazlûmin-i mütenevvia-i fecia-i teessürât eylemesinden vikayemize, tedâbir-i müessire-i seriasının ittihâzı yâhûd binlerce hâne ekarib müteallikatımızla diyâr-ı âhere hicrete terhisimizi istirhâma müsâraat ederiz. Ferman. Süleymaniye Nakibü’l Eşrâf Kaimakamı Hafid Mârûf, Hafid Seyyid Hüseyin, Hafid Ömer, Baba Resûlzâde Seyyid Ahmed, Hafidzâde Seyyid Mahmud, Hafidzâde Seyyid Abdülkadir”  The original amount written on the promissory note was 1500 lira.  By this expression, the Sheikhs must have meant Brigadier General Mustafa, Captain Fehmi and Senior Captain Sâlih, who were sent to Baghdad for investigation.

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from Sulaymaniyah sent a telegram to the Grand Vizier from Baghdad and complained about Governor Reşid.³⁶⁹ The Governor who was sent to Mosul on a sacred mission by the Constitutional Monarchy government, allegedly went to Kirkuk and took a lesson of politics from Commander İzzet Pasha and had a pleasant conversation with the Sheikhs.³⁷⁰ After Reşid arrived to Sulaymaniyah, he did not even find it necessary to investigate the reasons of the incident and to listen to the grievances of those who had been moaning under Sâdât’s yoke for years. Petitioners claimed that the Governor made some promises to Sâdât during his visit to Kirkuk and then fulfilled these promises by allowing the Sheikhs to return to Sulaymaniyah. A pompous welcoming ceremony (parlak bir resm-i istikbâl) was even held on the Sheiks’ arrival to Sulaymaniyah. Allegedly, Reşid had informed the Army and the Porte that the public order and security of Mosul was intact, but the real situation was not like this. It was still unclear whether the Sheikhs, whose numerous criminal acts could be attested both in official correspondence and in the eyes of public, delivered to the grip of justice.

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909 Signers of the telegram were: Ali, Hasan, Abdülkerim, Çâder, Abdülrahim, İbrâhim, Abdülfettah, Mustafa, Mehmed, Reşid from merchants; Abdullah and Said from Ulema; and Major Ahmed, Senior Captain Zeki, Lieutenant Reşid, Lieutenant Osman from the Army.  BOA, DH.MKT. 2787/32/Lef 1, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 March 1909 “Makam-ı Sadâretpenâhiye, (Bağdad’dan) Süleymaniye sekene-i mazlûmesi aylardan beri son nefeslerini sarf ederek Dâr-üI Hilâfetin hüsn ve merhametini tahrike çalışıyorlar. Son akçelerini kanlı yaşlarıyla telvin ederek makine başında telgraf memûruna teslim ettiler. Fakat heyhat Memâlik-i Osmâniye’nin Aksa-i Şarktaki şu bedbaht livânın mahvı […] ve evliya-i umûrca matlûb ise Hükûmet-i Meşrûta-i Osmâniye tarafından mukaddes bir vazife ile Musul’a gönderilen Vâli, Kerkük’te İzzet Paşadan ders-i siyâseti ve Şeyhlerle tatlı bir görüşmenin lezzetini alarak, Süleymaniye’ye hareket ve muvasalatını müteâkib vukuatın esbâbını araştırmağa […] Sâdât’ın boyunduruğu altında senelerce inleyen zuafânın derdini dinlemeye katiyen lüzûm görmeksizin Kerkük’teki vaadlerini incâzen hemen mütegallibeye avdet telgrafını îtâ ve vusûllerinde parlak bir resm-i istikbâl icrâ eyledi. Ordu-yu Hümâyuna yazıldığı gibi takrir-i âsâyişe muvaffakiyetini şüphesiz Makamât-ı Aliyyeye de arz eylemiştir. Fakat bizzat Sâdât ve aveneleri tarafından îka’ edildiği muharrerât-ı resmiyece sâbit ve âlemce musaddık olan sefk-i dimâ’ ve nehb-i emvâl müsebbiblerinin pençe-i adâlete teslim olup olmadığı Vâli tarafından izâh ve makamâtça istîzâh olunmak lâzımdır. Yoksa siyâseti iltizâm-ı mütegallibeden icrââtı göz boyanmaktan ibâret olan Vâlilerimiz ve Devr-i Sâbık gibi yine makamâtı iğfâl edip duracaklar ve devleti dâhili gailelerden milleti hûnhâr mütegallibelerden asla kurtaramayacaklardır. Ey itimâd-ı milleti kazanmakla re’sikârı işgal edenler! İşte müstebid bir Vâlinin şeref iltizâmına nâil olarak biz zavallıları büsbütün mahvetmeğe me’zûniyeti olan Müteşeyyihler feryatlarımıza rağmen bu kerre yine bize tasallut ettiler. Vedîatullah olan bizi himâye ediniz. […] halk olan havzayı artık iltizâm etmeyiniz veya bize bir melce göstererek hicretimizi teshil ediniz. Binlerce mazlûmini tegafüllüğünüze kurban etmeyiniz! Yarın Huzûr-u Hak’ta kanlı kefenleriyle karşınıza dikilecek mazlûmlara cevâb vereceksiniz.”

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In other words, the stage of the criminal prosecution for the crimes committed by Sâdât and their cohorts should have been announced by the Governor and also should have been questioned by the higher authorities in İstanbul. Otherwise, some governors whose political views consisted of favoring the despots and whose actions consisted of deceiving the people, would arise and they would mislead the central authorities, as in the period of Despotism. After all, because of these governors, the state would never be able to get rid of its internal troubles and the nation would never be able to get rid of cruel despots. According to the petitioners, allowing these So-called Sheikhs to return to Sulaymaniyah, who enjoyed the support and patronage of a despotic (müstebid) governor, was the same as allowing them to completely destroy the people of Sulaymaniyah. At the end of the telegram, the complainants appealed to those who came to power by gaining the trust of the people (Ey itimâd-ı milleti kazanmakla re’sikârı işgal edenler!) and stated that Sâdât still posed a major threat to them. As the subjects who were Entrusted by God (Vedîatullah), they have demanded the government to protect them or show them another place (melce) where they could easily migrate. Otherwise, these oppressed people would fall victim to the government’s willful neglect (tegafül), and on the Day of Judgment (Huzûr-u Hak’ta) they would stand before them with their bloody shrouds (kanlı kefenleriyle) and ask them to account for their grievances. They were not the only ones who complained that Reşid has been protecting and patronizing Sâdât. Former Head Clerk of the Shariah Court of Sulaymaniyah (Sâbık Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkâtibi) Abdülfettah had also made serious accusations against the local authorities (see Illustration 15).³⁷¹ According  BOA, DH.MKT. 1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909 “Makamı Sadâretpenâhiye, / Adliye Nezâreti Celilesine / Meclis-i Mebûsân Âsâyiş-i mahalliyemizi ihlâl eden cerâim-i meşhûde-i sâbıka ve lâhikayla gıyâben mahkûm ve maznûn olup hâlâ da naaşları dağlarda kalan Asâkir-i Şâhâne efrâdının katlinden, kervanlarımızın nehbinden dolayı mahkemece haklarında ihzâr ve tevkif müzekkereleri verilerek şimdiye kadar vâdî-yi firârda bulunan Şeyhler ile eşkıyâ aveneleri icrââta memûr Musul Vâlisi Reşid, Kerkük Kumandanı İzzet Paşaların ikdâmâtları sâyesinde kemâl-i sürûr ve serbestiyle memleket derûnuna avdet ve lisan-ı hâl ile ‘Yaşasın İstibdâd’ diyerek çarşı sokaklarda gezmeye başladılar. Müşârünileyh Vâli Paşa her bir icrââtını var kuvvetini mütegallibe-i müstebide-i şakîlerin himâyesine hasr ile ahvâl-i sâbıkanın ihyâsını deruhte etmişçesine kendi refâkatinde götürdüğü eşkıyâ hâmîsi bazı istibdâdları vâsıtasıyla bilakis mücrimlerin haklarında evvelce tutulan bütün cürümlerine medâr-ı tahkikat evrâk-ı merbûteyi çürütmek ile fukarâ-i milleti bir daha açılmayacak sûrette zincir-i esârete bağlamak fikriyle müşteki-aleyh cânilerin bile cüretleri fevkinde olarak ihlâl, vak’a-i müsebbibleri hânelerinde müdde-i aleyhlerin taallukatlarında eşkıyâ […] ile hâil edeceği hürriyet, masnû’ tahkikata müsteniden hatâlarını setre ve bunca hukuk-u şahsiye ve umûmiyeyi imtihâ’ ve lâ-siyemmâ şühedâ-yı askeriyye ve ahâlinin kanlarını hedere alenen çalışmakta bulunmuş olması büsbütün ahâli-i muti-i mazlûmenin me’yûsiyetine sebebiyet verdi.

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to Abdülfettah, the Sheikhs and the bandits collaborated with them, were responsible for the murder of the Ottoman soldiers (Asâkir-i Şâhâne), whose bodies were still waiting in the mountains, for the attacks on the caravans and for the looting of passengers. However, these perpetrators for whom court summons and arrest warrants were issued for many crimes such as above, were still fugitives. Besides, they have returned to Sulaymaniyah with complete enthusiasm and liberty (kemâl-i sürûr ve serbestiyle) thanks to the effort and support of Mosul Governor Reşid and Kirkuk Commander İzzet and have begun wandering the streets shouting as “Long Live Despotism!” (Yaşasın İstibdâd!). According to Abdülfettah, Governor Reşid had devoted all his strength, time and actions to the protection of these despotic bandits and tried to revive the ancien régime. At this point, Abdülfettah increased the dose of his accusations. He claimed that Reşid and his despotic affiliates tried to refute all the investigation documents regarding the crimes these perpetrators had committed (bütün cürümlerine medâr-ı tahkikat evrâk-ı merbûteyi çürütmek), enslaved the innocent people and misled the justice, in order to protect the Sheikhs. Abdülfettah overtly claimed that Governor Reşid has been trying to cover up the criminal record of Sâdât through a sham investigation (masnû’ tahkikata müsteniden hatâlarını setre). Therefore, the violation of private and public law to such extent (bunca hukuk-u şahsiye ve umûmiyeyi imtihâ’) and the betrayal of the trust of martyred soldiers and the innocent people who shed blood for this cause, caused a deep sorrow in Sulaymaniyah. Based on his legal background and career, the Head Clerk warned that this situation would lead to a major disorder and reminded that necessary measures should be taken as soon as possible. Abdülfettah sent this telegram to the Grand Vizirate, the Ministry of Justice and the Chamber of Deputies, and the issue occupied the agendas of these authorities for a while. However, Reşid’s plead regarding these allegations was written in a very short and calm fashion. According to Reşid’s investigation, Abdülfettah had left his office due to his own malicious acts (mesâvi-i ahvâlinden) and his complaints stemmed from the provocations of the Sâdât’s opponents before their reconciliation with Sâdât.³⁷² In other words, ac-

Bu ahvâl bütün bir fesâdın tevlidini intâc edeceğini […] bildirmekten hukuk-u hâlim dolayısıyla îcâbının tesri-i icrâsı ehemmiyetle arzına mütecâsirim. Ferman Sâbık Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkâtibi Abdülfettah”  BOA, DH.MKT. 1308/8/Lef 12, 3 Nisan 1325 – 16 April 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâreti 30 Mart 1325 Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkâtibi Abdülfettah Efendi mesâvi-i ahvâlinden nâşi memûriyetinden infisâl eylemiş ve Sâdât hakkındaki […] şikâyâtın da teliflerinden evvel Sâdâtın muhâliflerinin tahrikâtıyla vuku bulduğu ind-et tahkik anlaşılmıştır. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Reşid”

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cording to Reşid, Abdülfettah’s problem was completely personal and his complaints were invalid, as the Sheikhs and their opponents were now reconciled. However, this short text by Reşid seemed more like a circumlocution or a diversion rather than a satisfying explanation. During this period, rumors about Reşid’s patronage over Sâdât even appeared in Baghdad newspapers. At the end of March, a grave telegram from the Baghdad-based newspaper al-Irshad (İrşâd), reached the parliament. The message particularly stated that the lives of Basrah, Amarah and Sulaymaniyah peoples were in great danger since the Governors of Basrah and Mosul misguided the Central Authority with false information.³⁷³ According to the message, the Governor of Mosul had deviated from his policy during his visit to Kirkuk and caused an unavoidable trouble by allowing the Sheikhs to return (ircâ) to Sulaymaniyah. Irshad also reported the incidents of collective violence such as the murders in Basrah and the ship attacks in Amarah. The people of Basrah were losing five or six casualties a day, and Sheikh Ghadban (Gadban) was holding the riverway in Amarah and firing at Ottoman and foreign-flagged steamboats.³⁷⁴ At such a critical time, the Basrah Governor left his office without waiting for his successor and Irshad was worried that the events in Basrah would escalate to Baghdad at any moment. As can be seen, the south of Iraq was in disorder as well as the north. Upon this notification by Irshad, the Provinces of Basrah

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2808/60/Lef 1, 14 Mart 1325 – 27 March 1909 “Mebûsân Riyâset-i Celilesine, Bir muhit-i katillerin merkezinde bulunduğumuzdan artık feryâd ediyoruz. Basra ahâlisi günde beş-altı kurban veriyor. Amare’de Şeyh Gadban nehir yolunu tutarak Osmanlı Ecnebi vapurlarına kurşun atıyor. Kalbura dönen Bağdad vapuru 3 Maktûl 18 Mecrûh fidye-i necât verdi. Basra, Amare, Süleymaniye ahâlisi muhâfaza-i hayât edemiyor. Emniyet mefkud Musul Vâlisi Musul’dan yazdığı hakikatı Kerkük’ten tekzib ile […] tedâbir-i mâkulesine rağmen mazhar-ı hayâtı olan Müteşeyyihleri ircâ sûretiyle önü alınması müşkil-i fitne katl esbâbını ihzâr etti. Neticeyi anlayan Basra Vâlisi halefini beklemeden kaçtı. Musul, Basra Vâlileri işârât-ı kâzibe ile merkezi iğfâl mesleğinden ferâgat etmeyerek hâkimiyet-i milliyeyi ihlâle cüretleriyle bildiğimiz neticeyi merkezin anlamadığına zâhib oluyoruz. Sadâret fikr-i ıslâhı makine başında bîçâre Basralılardan alıyor. Şu hâlin esâsen emniyetsiz Bağdadımıza sirâyeti muhakkak kesbeder. Vilâyette derde şifâ vermeyen reçetelerini tedkike zamân müsâid değildir. Marazı teşhise muktedir Millet Meclisinin tedâviye çare-sâz tedâbirini kemâl-i sûzişle intizâr eyleriz. İrşâd Gazetesi”  Sheikh Ghadban was the chief of the Banu Lam tribe (‫) ﺑﻨﻮ ﻻﻡ‬, largely composed of Bedouin and Shia Arabs and inhabited the northern part of Basrah Province. For more detailed information on the threats posed by Ghadban in the region during the Hamidian period, see: Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, pp. 93 – 97

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and Mosul were particularly warned by the Ministry against potential incidents that could endanger the public order and security.³⁷⁵ Other allegations against Governor Reşid were made by Reshid al-Omari, who was judged as one of the main suspects and instigators of the Mosul Incident (see Footnotes 446 and 451).³⁷⁶ As we will see in the section of ‘Investigation, Arrests and Trial’ in the sixth chapter, al-Omari contacted the 3rd Action Army (3. Hareket Ordusu) and complained about Governor Reşid to Commander Mahmud Şevket Pasha. He also contacted the parliament and accused the Governor of his despotic practices, partisan viewpoints (fikr-i müstebidâne ve tarafgirânesinden) and baseless charges he brought against him. According to alOmari, the Courthouse Officials under the despotic administration and domination of Governor Reşid (Vâlinin esir-i tagallübü), have unjustly charged and arrested him for an unfounded crime (manâsız bir cürm atf ile bi-gayr-i hakkın tevkif). Ultimately, he attributed his victimization to the fact that the success of the Mosul branch of SMU of which he was the founder, attracted the attention of the administration, and disturbed the Governor. It was a possible expectation that Governor Reşid, who was thought to be a Pro-Sâdât bureaucrat, wanted to severely punish al-Omari who was alleged to be one of the major instigators of such an incident. However, ‘the wrongful incrimination of an innocent individual’ was a very serious allegation for a governor, and it was more or less predictable what kind of impression it left on the central authority. Nevertheless, even after these striking allegations by al-Omari, no correspondence was found in the archive documents indicating that an official investigation or prosecution was carried out against Reşid. It was also possible that al-Omari, who was well aware of the Pro-Sâdât attitude and reputation of Governor Reşid, had manipulated this in order to justify himself and show himself as a victim. In a short time, Governor Reşid would contact legal authorities and justify the accusations against Omari based on certain evidence and denunciations (see Footnote 447). At the end of June, the Ministry took a new decision regarding the Mosul Governorate and decided to dismiss Reşid Pasha. His successor would be Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha, the Acting Governor of Baghdad and the Commander of the 6th Army.³⁷⁷ In the message sent to Mehmed Fâzıl from the Ministry on 22

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2808/60/Lef 3, 27 Nisan 1325 – 10 May 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 1, 14 Mayıs 1325 – 27 May 1909; DH.MKT.2837/39/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 – 06 June 1909; DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325 – 08 June 1909  BOA, BEO.3625/271853/Lef 1, 9 Haziran 1325 – 22 June 1909 “Bağdad Vâli Vekili Birinci Ferik Mehmed Fâzıl Paşa Hazretlerine Şifre – Çend mah evvel Musul şehrinde zuhûr eden hâdise üzerine mütecâsirler hakkında henüz bir gûnâ muamelât-ı cezâiyye icrâ olunamamasından ve âhiren Hemavend eşkıyâsının tüccâr kafi-

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Illustration 15.1: BOA, DH.MKT.1308/8/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1325 – 20 March 1909 Serious accusations by the Former Head Clerk of the Shariah Court of Sulaymaniyah (Sâbık Süleymaniye Mahkeme-i Şeriyye Başkâtibi) Abdülfettah against the Governor Reşid

5.3 Appointment of Ahmed Reşid Pasha as the Governor of Mosul

Illustration 15.2: See Illustration 15.1.

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of June, it was stated that the perpetrators of the Mosul Incident were still not subject to criminal proceedings. The security of the province, on the other hand, was damaged at an alarming rate by the Hamawand bandits, who attacked merchant convoys and the elements of the Ottoman Army at every opportunity. The restoration of public order and security in Mosul depended on the presence of a heroic and competent person (şeci’ ve sâhib-i kifâyet) such as Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha, in there. Accordingly, the Mosul Provincial Command and the Governorship would be combined, and this critical task would be delegated to Mehmed Fâzıl. The Dagestani General was expected to make the necessary preparations until the succeeding Baghdad Governor and 6th Army Commander arrived their posts. However, since the immediate announcement of the appointment might cause Reşid to become complacent in the affairs of the province (tedvir-i umûrca rehâvetkârâne hareketine bâdi), Mehmed Fâzıl was expected to keep this information confidential for the time being. The appointment decision, which would not take place until August, was planned to be kept secret from Reşid until then. However, after a while, the rumors about the appointment reached Reşid’s ears and an official statement became necessary.³⁷⁸ Reşid, on the other hand, lelerine ve Asâkir-i Şâhâneye mükerreren taarruz etmelerinden dolayı âsâyiş-i vilâyet mûcib-i endişe olacak sûrette haleldâr olmuştur. Vilâyet-i mezkûrede inzibâtın iâdesiyle ciddi bir intizâmın husûlü zât-ı vâlâları gibi şeci’ ve sâhib-i kifâyet bir zâtın Musul’da bulunmasına mütevakkıf olduğundan Musul ve Havâlisi Kumandanlığı inzimâmıyla Musul Vâliliği uhde-i vâlâlarına tevcih buyurulmuştur. Bağdad Vâlisi ile Altıncı Ordu Kumandanı Paşaların oraya vusûllerine Musul’a hareket buyurulmak üzere esbâb-ı seferîyyenin istihzârı ve memûriyet-i cedidenin vâlâlarına şimdiden îlânı, Musul Vâli-i Sâbıkı Reşid Paşanın tedvir-i umûrca rehâvetkârâne hareketine bâdi olabileceğinden keyfiyet-i tevcihenin şu aralık iş’âr buyurulmaması tavsiye olunur. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 1– 2, 26 Temmuz 1325 – 08 August 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Telgrafnâme, Âcizlerinin bu vilâyete olan hidemâtı hazretullah ve muâmelesi şahid ve herkez de vâkıfdır. Ancak Hemavendlilerin şekaveti ise asırlarca devâm eden bir şey olup bidâyet-i memûriyet-i âcizânemde nazar-ı dikkatimi celb eylemiş olduğundan te’dibi husûsu kirâren Bâb-ı Âli ve Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığına yazmaktan ve tahkikat talebinden hâli kalmadım. Bunlar Kerkük ve Süleymaniye arasında olup her iki Mutasarrıfın bu babda ciddi teşebbüsü lâzım ve oldukça asker mevcûd iken işi bütün bütün vilâyete tahmil ederek ve avâm-pesendâne ahâlinin önüne de düşerek âmiyâne ahvâle tecâsürleri ve telâşlı telâşlı iş’ârları vilâyetin şimdiye kadar diğer taraflarda zuhûr edip teskine muvâfık olduğu fenâlıklar hakkındaki ikdâmı hiç sayarak nihâyet azlim husûsunda birçok aydır şâyiânın deverânına sebeb olmuştur. Esâsen Musul Hâdisesinin esâslarını teşkil eden Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın mührüyle elde edilen Bin Beş Yüz liralık senette isimleri muharrer eşhâsı ile Musul Hâdisesine mümâsil Süleymaniye’de bir hâdise daha çıkarmaya yeltenenlerden birkaç zâbitin oradan çıkarılması aleyhimde kîl ü kallerini arttırmış olmuştur. Ve dünkü gün Musul Vâliliğine tâyin olunan Fâzıl Paşanın Perşembe

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would try to justify himself in a message in which he questioned whether the appointment was real or not. His services in the province were known to everyone and he had taken all necessary measures and informed all authorities in order to suppress hundreds of years of Hamawand banditry. According to Reşid, as the main location of the Hamawand groups was the basin between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, the main responsibility and initiative should belong to the Sub-Governors and Commanders of these two sanjaks. However, Reşid claimed that these officials, on the contrary, put all the responsibility on the Mosul Governor’s Office and engaged in inappropriate behavior (âmiyâne ahvâle tecâsür) for the sake of populist (avâm-pesendâne) policies. In addition, they have disregarded Reşid’s successful efforts to calm the incidents in other parts of the province, raised panic among the people and spread rumors that he would be dismissed. Reşid thought that the expulsion of the individuals mentioned in the promissory note of Tevfik Pasha and of the military officers who attempted to cause a second incident in Sulaymaniyah, strengthened the opposition to him (aleyhimde kîl ü kallerini arttırmış). At the end of the same message, Reşid questioned the accuracy of the rumors (şâyiâ-i mevsûka) that Fâzıl Pasha was appointed as the Governor of Mosul the day before and departed from Baghdad on Thursday. In short, Governor Reşid demanded that if his dismissal or transfer was true, there should left no room for doubt and hesitation, and of course an official notification should be served to him. The following week, Reşid stated that he had read the news of the appointment in the Baghdad Newspaper on August 3 and complained that there was still no official statement on the issue.³⁷⁹ He was left in a strange dilemma as he had not been notified of the appointment decision which had been floating around for a while, and he was asking the Ministry of Interior what to do. Finally, the next day, Ahmed Reşid Pasha was officially notified that Fâzıl Pasha was appointed to Mosul, and he was asked to continue his

günü Bağdad’dan Musul’a müteveccihen hareketine dâir bir şâyiâ-i mevsûka da zuhûr etti. El hâsıl, azil veya naklimin aslı var ise âcizime de iş’ârını ve tereddüd ve şüpheden istihlâsımı istirhâm ederim. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 4, 2 Ağustos 1325 – 15 August 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Musul Vâli ve Kumandanlığına Ferik Fâzıl Paşa’nın tâyin buyurulduğu bugünkü posta ile gelen 21 Temmuz 1325 târihli Bağdad Gazetesinde muharrer olduğu ve müşârünileyh de dünkü gün Bağdad’dan hareket ettiği haber alınmıştır. Ve bu babda tebliğ-i resmi bulunmamasına nazaran hatt-ı hareket-i çâkerânem hakkındaki İrâde-i Celile-i Nezâretpenâhileri müsterhamdır. Ferman Vâli Reşid”

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duty as before, until his successor arrived in Mosul.³⁸⁰ After Mehmed Fâzıl reached Mosul, Reşid continued to serve as a Deputy Governor in the provincial center for about a month and assisted the new governor who was busy with important works throughout the province.³⁸¹ In this message, Reşid stated that his presence there was putting Fâzıl in a loss in terms of salary and asked for permission to leave Mosul as soon as possible. As it is understood from the archive records, Ahmed Reşid (Tokçaer) Pasha would not take another official duty until he was appointed as the Governor of Erzurum on 22 August 1912.³⁸²

 BOA, DH.MKT.2902/21/Lef 5, 3 Ağustos 1325 – 16 August 1909 “Musul Vâli-i Sâbıkı Reşid Paşa Hazretlerine. Musul Vâliliğine Mehmed Fâzıl Paşa hazretlerinin tâyin buyurulduğu tebliğ ve müşârünileyhin vusûlüne kadar kemâkân îfâ-i vezâife devâm ve ihtimâm edilmesi tavsiye olunur. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MUİ.8/49/Lef 3, 01 Eylül 1325 – 14 September 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Vâli Fâzıl Paşa Hazretleri Yirmi gündür dâhil-i Vilâyette umûr-u mühimme ile meşgul olup âcizlerinin vekâleten merkezde bulunması maaşça müşârünileyhin ızrarını mûcib olmakta bulunduğundan hareket-i âcizâneme müsâade buyurulması müsterhamdır. Ferman. Musul Vâli Vekili Reşid” Davud Hut also states that Reşid served in Mosul until October. Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 179 For an overview of Reşid Pasha’s Mosul Governorate please see: Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 178 – 184  BOA, İ..DH..1494/85, 09 Ağustos 1328 – 22 August 1912; Document Summary: Appointment of Mosul Governor Ahmed Reşid Pasha to Erzurum Governorship. (1330N-35) For the civil administration career of Ahmed Reşid (Tokçaer) Pasha, see: Dr. Kazım Kartal, Serpil Sevim Kartal, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Geçişte Bir Devlet Adamı: Tokatlı Ahmet Reşid (Tokçaer) Paşa -Türk Tarihine Yenilikçi Yaklaşımlar (Ankara: İksad Publishing House, 2019) pp. 3 – 16 In many ways, this study may be the most detailed source available on Ahmet Reşid Tokçaer. However, 21 June 1909, which is given as the date of dismissal of Reşid from his office as the Governor of Mosul in this source, is actually the date when Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha was first offered the duty. The dismissal and replacement were going to be officially notified to Reşid almost two months later on August 16, 1909. Kuneralp, on the other hand, stated that Ahmed Reşid Pasha remained in office in Mosul from January 1909 to August 1912, and Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha took over the office as of that date. However, this is an erroneous statement because after September 1909 Reşid would no longer have any relations with Mosul Province. Moreover, we can see from archive records that Fâzıl Pasha was officially appointed as the Governor and Commander of Mosul as of August 1909 and started his active duty. Kuneralp also stated that Ahmet Reşid Pasha was appointed as the Governor of Mosul for the second time between December 1914 and March 1915. However, it is just a name resemblance. Because the person appointed as the Governor of Mosul in December 1914 was Reşid Bey, who was the Deputy Governor of Baghdad and recommended by Basrah Governor and Command-

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Illustration 16: Reşid Pasha, the New Governor (Vâli-i Cedid) of Erzurum Source: SALT Research, Erzurum Vali-i Cedidi Reşid Paşa – Rechid Pacha Le nouveau gouverneur général d’Erzouroum. Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes https://ar chives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/25154 Access Date: 26. 11. 2021

er Süleyman Askeri. The same Reşid Bey was going to be appointed as the Governor of Diyarbekir in 1915, but Kuneralp again fell into the mistake of this name resemblance and wrote that Ahmet Reşid Pasha served as the Diyarbekir Governor between 1915 – 1917 instead of Reşid Bey. It can be accepted that the expression “Reşid Bey, the Governor of Mosul, to be appointed to the Governorship of Diyarbekir” in the archive records is misleading. However, the particular use of the honorific form of Bey instead of Pasha indicates that the person mentioned is Reşid Bey who was the Former Deputy Governor of Baghdad. Hut, referring to Kuneralp, made the same mistake and stated that Ahmed Reşid was appointed as the Governor of Mosul for the second time. He even named the section he devoted to Reşid Pasha as “The First Governorship of Ahmet Reşid (Tokçaer) Pasha and the Reflections of the 31 March Incident in Mosul”. However, as far as we understand from the archive records, Ahmed Reşid Pasha who served as the Governor of Erzurum between August 1912 and July 1914, did not assume another governorship until he was appointed as the Governor of Erzurum again in July 1919. Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839 – 1922),p. 36, 60 Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 178, 179 footnote 901 BOA, DH.ŞFR.454/128, 9 Kânûnuevvel 1330 – 22 December 1914; MV. 237/210, 15 Kânûnuevvel 1330 – 28 December 1914; Document Summary: Appointment of Mosul Governor Süleyman Nazif Bey to Baghdad and Baghdad Deputy Governor Raşid Bey to Mosul Governorship. BOA, DH.ŞFR. 50 – 72, 10 Şubat 1330 – 23 February 1915; Document Summary : Telegram sent to Mosul Governor Reşid Bey about the appointment of Hamid Bey as Civil Inspector and Mosul Governor Reşid Bey as Diyarbekir Governor. Kartal,Kartal, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Geçişte…p. 12, 13

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The fact that Reşid’s dismissal was concealed from him until the last minute could perhaps be perceived as the Ministry no longer trusted him and could be explained on this ground. However, under any circumstances, it was both an unusual and unprofessional situation for the Ottoman government that the official governor of the state to hear from rumors or read from newspapers that someone else was appointed in his place. In addition, despite all these allegations against him, no information or details were found in the archive that Reşid had undergone any investigation or prosecution, or that he had been suspended, even temporarily, from the civil service. On the other hand, if he was a Governor who had completely lost the trust of the state, he would not have been asked to assist Fâzıl Pasha during his transfer of duty and he would not have been given the governorship of an important province like Erzurum within a few years.

5.4 Prosecution of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik In this section, the allegations of Tevfik’s involvement in the Mosul Conspiracy, other allegations regarding his misconduct and improper connections, and his administrative and judicial prosecution process will be examined. In addition, his efforts to retrieve his goods and belongings seized in the Caravan Ambush, the accusations he made against Reşid and his application for unemployment stipend after his dismissal will also be covered in this context. The next subsection is quite remarkable in terms of showing that there are those who endorse Tevfik as well as those who accuse him. In brief, the section will scrutinize the period before and after the dismissal of a local administrator accused of irregularity and misconduct. The dispute between the Sheikhs residing in Sulaymaniyah and Sub-Governor Tevfik resulted in his dismissal at the end of January.³⁸³ The Governorate, the Ministry of Interior and the Grand Vizier eventually all agreed at this point, and

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2724/54/Lef 1, 15 Kânûnusâni 1324– 28 January 1909; Lef 2 18 Kânûnusâni 1324– 31 January 1909 “Huzûr-u Âli-i Sadâretpenâhiye. Sâdât ve Meşâyih ile beynlerinde mütehaddis ihtilâfâttan dolayı Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik Paşa’nın devâm-ı memûriyeti câiz olamayacağından bahisle lüzûm-u tebdili Musul Vilâyetinden izbâr olunmasına binâen müşârünileyhin bervech-i iş’âr-ı azliyle mezkûr Mutasarrıflığa erbâb-ı ehliyet Dersim Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Ziyâ Paşa’nın tâyini Sicill-i Ahvâl-i Memûrîn Komisyonundan mazbatası üzerine tensib kılınmış olmakla icrâ-yı îcâb menût-u müsâade-i aliyye-i Sadâretpenâhilerindir. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”

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they took action before this deepened conflict had any worse consequences. The person considered to replace Tevfik was Ziyâ Pasha, the Former Sub-Governor of Dersim and was described as ’competent’ (erbâb-ı ehliyyet) by the authorities. Finally, Ziyâ Pasha was approved by all decision makers and was officially appointed as the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah on February 3, 1909.³⁸⁴ However, in this long February, unexpected incidents such as the Caravan Attack and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah would break out and it would take March for Ziyâ Pasha to reach his office.³⁸⁵ The Sanjak which was administered by an acting sub-governor up to that time, would continue to worry the superior authorities. In the meantime, Tevfik’s dismissal also meant the beginning of his prosecution process, and this process would be quite controversial and turbulent.

The Letters of Major Ali Said In order to grasp the indictment, prosecution and judicial process against Tevfik Pasha, it is necessary to review the first accusation levelled by Sâdât against Major Ali Said who was a close relative of Tevfik. At the beginning of February, a telegram signed by Naqib Maarouf and Sayyid Mahmud claimed that Ali Said was the sole instigator and promoter of the disaster from beginning to end (evvel ve âhir yegâne muharriki ve müsebbibi).³⁸⁶ According to the message, the incident took place under the pressure and provocation (netice-i tazyikat ve tahrikâtında) of Ali Said. The Ministry of Interior took the message into consideration immediately and asked the Mosul Governor for further information and opinion on the

 BOA, DH.MKT. 2732/70/Lef 3, 25 Kânûnusâni 1324– 07 February 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.2757/102/Lef 2, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 Şubat 1909; Lef 3, 18 Şubat 1324– 03 Mart 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Ehemmiyeti derkâr olan Süleymaniye Sancağının tûl-u müddet vekâletle idâresi müşkil bulunduğundan Mutasarrıflığa tâyin buyurulan Ziyâ Paşanın sür’at-i i’zâmı müsterhamdır. Ferman. Vâli Vekili Ferik Zeki.” “Musul Vilâyetine. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Ziyâ Paşa mahal-i memûriyetine müteveccihen on gün evvel hareket etmiştir.”  BOA, DH.MKT. 2733/42/Lef 1, 22 Kânûnusâni 1324– 04 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Hâdise-i fecianın evvel ve âhir yegâne muharriki ve müsebbibi olan Binbaşı Ali Said Bey’in netice-i tazyikat ve tahrikâtında Musul’da îka’sı kanun nâmına müsted’âdır. Ferman. Süleymaniye Nakibi Seyyid Mârûf – Hafidzâde Seyyid Mahmud Binbaşı hakkında vilâyetçe olan mâlûmât ve muâmeleyle bu iş’âra nazaran mütâlâa-i mahalliye beyân olunmak üzere vilâyete telgraf”

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Major. However, Zeki argued that Ali Said had nothing to do with the transfer of the Sheikhs to Mosul or the conspiracy that led to the Mosul Incident.³⁸⁷ Governor Zeki expressed the banishment of the Sheikhs to Mosul as a purely legitimate act based on the needs of the local administration and the approval of the Ministry. According to him, Major Ali Said was in Mosul coincidentally when the incident took place, and the incident took place suddenly and unexpectedly (nâgehâni). In his statement to the Commands of Mosul and 6th Army, Zeki declared that Ali Said had no involvement in this issue from the beginning to the end but reminded that the court gates are always wide open if there is an allegation. According to Zeki, Ali Said was a Victim of Politics (Mağdûrîn-i Siyâsiye), and like other political victims he was temporarily discharged from the army and sent to İstanbul. The bad suspicions and misconceptions of the complainants about the Major were probably based on Ali Said’s being a relative of the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor. Eventually, the Mosul Command notified the complainants that they had the right to apply to the judicial courts, and in line with this, there was nothing more to be done for the Governor’s Office. In March 1909, a shocking telegram asserting that Major Ali Said Bey had a direct involvement in the Mosul Incident, even he had masterminded (tertib ve tasni’) the entire plot, reached to Ministry of Interior.³⁸⁸ According to the telegram

 BOA; DH.MKT.2733/42/Lef 2, 1 Şubat 1324– 14 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifredir, Şeyhlerin Musul’a aldırılmaları Süleymaniye ahâlisinin bunlar aleyhindeki heyecânı üzerine hükûmet-i mahalliyece gösterilen îcâb ve Nezâret-i Celilelerinin ol babdaki me’zûniyetine müstenid idi. Ol vakit Binbaşı Said Bey Musul’da idi. Vak’a-i mâlûme ise nâgehâni zuhûr etmiştir. Mûmâileyh Binbaşının evvel ve âhir bu meselede bir medhali olmadığı ve ebvâb-ı mehâkimin dâima küşâde bulunduğu vâki olan isti’lâma cevâben Ordu Kumandanlığı Musul Kumandanlığıyla müştereken yazılmıştır ve Mağdûrîn-i Siyâsiyeden olduğu mebni emsâli misüllü Dersaadet’e terhis edilmiştir Müştekilerin sû-i zan ve zehâbları Said Bey’in Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfının akrabâsı olmasından münbais olması muhtemeldir. Mâhâzâ mûmâileyhin buraya da vuku bulan mürâcaatları üzerine Mehâkim-i Adliyeye mürâcaatta muhtâr oldukları Musul Kumandanlığından kendilerine tebliğ edilmiştir. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 56, 26 Şubat 1324– 11 March 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Telgrafnâme Süleymaniye Sâdâtının Musul’a aldırılmasını ve makatile-i fecianın kendisi tarafından tertib ve tasni’ edildiğini musavver Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa’nın taallukatından olup 18 Şubat 1324 târihinde me’zûnen Musul’dan İstanbul’a azimet etmiş olan Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey’in hatt-ı destiyle muharrer imzâlı re’sen ve cevâben Mutasarrıf-ı mûmâileyhin nezdinde bulunan yeğeni Nuh Beye hitâben yazılmış iki mektûb elde edilmiş ve mûmâileyh Ali Said Bey’in nezdinde de izhâr-ı hakka medâr olacak muhâbere evrâkı bulunması kaviyyen

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sent by the Governor Reşid, two letters written by Ali Said and addressed to Nuh Bey, the nephew of Sub-governor Tevfik, were seized. These letters, handwritten and signed (hatt-ı destiyle muharrer imzalı) by Ali Said who was one of the close relatives of Tevfik Bey, included his plans for the banishment of Sheikhs to Mosul and for the designation of the site where the massacre would take place (makatile-i fecianın). According to Governor Reşid, it was highly probable that Ali Said Bey, who was on leave in İstanbul at the time, might have other critical documents with him that could reveal the truth. Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice was also informed on the grounds that the issue might contain solid evidence especially regarding the motives of the Mosul Incident.³⁸⁹

The Promissory Note Sealed by Tevfik Towards the end of March, a document that was allegedly stamped with the official seal of Tevfik Pasha (mühr-i resmiyesiyle mahtûm bir varaka) and allegedly proving his involvement in the Mosul Incident, was seized.³⁹⁰ This shocking news soon resonated with all the higher authorities and the Ministry of Interior immediately started to pursue Tevfik. Because the evidence linking him to the Mosul Incident were no longer limited to Major Ali Said’s handwritten letters. As we will see later in the content of the indictment against Tevfik, this was a promissory note issued on December 4, 1908 and secured a large sum of money as 1.500 lira (21 Teşrinisâni 1324 târihli Bin Beş Yüz lirayı nâtık bir kıta senedi).³⁹¹ According to Reşid, this evidence left no room for doubt that these people were the masterminds and organizers of the incident.

melhûz bulunmuş olmakla icrâ-yı îcâbı menût-u müsâade-i celileleri. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 57, 3 Mart 1325 – 16 March 1909  BOA, DH.MKT. 2779/14, 15 Mart 1325 – 28 March 1909 “Bağdad Vilâyet-i Celilesine. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın Musul Vak’asında zi-medhal bulunduğunu gösterir mühr-i resmiyesiyle mahtûm bir varaka elde edilmiştir. Müşârünileyhe Süleymaniye’den hareketinde eşkıyâ taarruz etmiş ve bazı eşyâsı gasbedilmiş olmasıyla mühr-i resmiyesinin bu eşkıyâ eline geçip öyle bir varakanın bilâhare tasni edilmiş olduğunu iddia etmesine mahal kalmamak üzere müşârünileyhin Bağdad’a vusûlünde bir münâsebet devşirilerek mühr-i resmiyenin nezdinde olup olmadığının anlaşılması ve mümkünse mührün görülmesi ve neticenin inbâsı mütemennâdır. Ol babda Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 411/83, 15 Mart 1325 – 28 March 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine,

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However, Tevfik was in Baghdad for a while and Ministry of Interior tried to reach him through the Baghdad Governorate. The development of the document allegedly proving Tevfik’s involvement in the Mosul Incident was also shared with the Baghdad Governorate. When Tevfik arrived in Baghdad, the Governor was asked to create a suitable excuse to check whether Tevfik had his seal with him, to see the seal himself if possible, and to report the result. The central authority aimed to compare the seal in the alleged promissory note with the existing seal that Tevfik carried with him and tried to find out whether the document really belonged to him. Because the existence of such a document was accepted as solid evidence. However, since some of his belongings were looted or lost during the caravan attack in February, Tevfik could claim that his official seal was seized by the bandits and that such a document was later fabricated. The Governor of Baghdad should have checked the seal with an appropriate method and occasion and reported the result quickly without allowing claims of document forgery that may come from Tevfik. However, Baghdad Governor Necmeddin reported that Tevfik had departed for Aleppo four days ago and suggested that the Ministry contact the Sub-Governorate of Zor on Tevfik’s route or the Governorate of Aleppo, which was his final destination.³⁹² Thereupon, the Ministry of Interior shared the same developments with the Sub-Governor of Zor within a few days and made the same demands before Tevfik Pasha reached there.³⁹³ Another important directive given to the Sub-Governor of Zor was to hold (tevakkuf) Tevfik there for a few days.³⁹⁴ As Tevfik was fully aware of the incidents Musul’da vuku bulan mukatelenin Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey’in tertibâtıyla vukua geldiği, tahkikata devâm olunmakta bulunulduğu arz edilmiştir. Bu kerre de Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın Mutasarrıf-ı Livâ Mehmed Tevfik nâmına muharrer büyük mührüyle memhûr elde edilen bâlâsı defterli ve 21 Teşrinisâni 1324 târihli Bin Beş Yüz lirayı nâtık bir kıta senedinin mündericâtı pek ziyâde şâyân-ı dikkat olmakla beraber mukatele-i mâlûmenin müsebbib ve de mürettibleri bunlar olduğuna iştibâh kalmamak olduğundan zikrolunan sened […] ber-vech-i zir mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 1, 17 Mart 1325 – 30 March 1909 Bagdad Governor Necmeddin was the same person as Necmeddin Mullah (Kocataş), who served as the Minister of Justice between May 1909 and October 1911. Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839 – 1922), p. 113  BOA, DH.MKT.2780/83/Lef 2, 17 Mart 1325 – 30 Mart 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 16, 18 Mart 1325 – 31 Mart 1909 “Zor Mutasarrıflığına. Süleymaniye Hâdisesinden dolayı Musul Vilâyetiyle muhâbere edilmekte olup vukufu hasebiyle Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa’nın mâlûmât ve mütâlâatına mürâcaat edilmek lâzım geldiğinden tehirâta mahal kalmamak üzere mûmâileyhin Zor’a muvasalatında keyfiyetin

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and developments, it was extremely necessary to refer to his information and opinions in terms of investigation. For this reason, Tevfik’s arrival should be reported to the Ministry immediately and it should be explained to Tevfik himself that he should stay in Zor until the correspondence between the Ministry and the Mosul Governorate is completed. The central authorities in İstanbul were concerned about losing sight of Tevfik as the evidence against him was seen as solid and important, and they reflected this concern to the Governor of Mosul. Because in case of his possible escape, it would be difficult to recapture him, and the substantiation of the crime elements would be delayed due to the incomplete interrogation of Tevfik (âsâr-ı cürmün bilâhare kabil-i isbât olacak bir şekle girmesi). In order to avoid such drawbacks, the Governor of Mosul who was in Sulaymaniyah at that time, was asked to take advantage of the few days that Tevfik would stay in Zor and deliver the relevant documents immediately to the Ministry of Justice.³⁹⁵ It seems that Tevfik’s knowledge and testimony was very important for a good grasp of the Sulaymaniyah phase of the Mosul Incident and for the overall investigation. Accordingly, the Ministry was in constant communication with Zor and requested to be notified as soon as Tevfik reached there. Because, if a warrant of arrest or bail (tevkifi yâhûd kefâlete rabtı) was issued for him by law, a decree (karârnâme) would be issued against Tevfik by the judicial authorities and this decree would be served to the Sub-Governor of Zor within a few days. The Ministry had added to the end of the telegram that the necessary notifications regarding the allegations against Major Ali Said were also delivered to the Ministry of Justice. After taking Tevfik under surveillance, the Ministry of Interior added the arrest warrant to the options on the table and did not neglect the process regarding the allegations against Ali Said.

iş’ârı ve bu babda vesatet-i beynleriyle cereyân edecek muhâberâtın neticesine kadar birkaç gün orada tevakkuf etmesi lüzûmunun kendisine tefhimi […]” “Süleymaniye’de Musul Vâlisi Paşa Hazretlerine. Mûmâileyh aleyhinde […] olunan delâil şâyân-ı ehemmiyet göründüğünden kendisi delâil-i mezkûrenin ele geçtiği hissiyle şâyet savuşacak olursa ele geçmesinin müşkilâta tesâdüf edilmesi belki âsâr-ı cürmün bilâhare kabil-i isbât olacak bir şekle girmesi melhûz bulunduğundan bu gibi mahzûrlara mahal kalmamak üzere mûmâileyhin Zor’da tevakkuf edeceği birkaç günden bil-istifâde bu babdaki evrâkın hemen cihet-i adliyeye tevdiiyle kanunen kendisinin tevkifi yâhûd kefâlete rabtı lâzım geldiği hâlde cihet-i adliyece bu babda tanzim olacak karârnâmenin şu bir iki gün zarfında telgrafla Zor Mutasarrıflığına tebliğ ettirilmesi ve keyfiyetin Nezârete de bildirilmesi […] Binbaşı Ali Said Bey’in hakkında da Adliye Nezâretine tebligat-ı lâzıme icrâ edilmiştir. Ol babda Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  The expression of ‘relevant documents’ must have implied the ‘promissory note’.

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On April 6, the Zor Sub-Governor Mahmud reported that Tevfik had arrived there and that the telegram ordering his hold in Zor by the Ministry was shown to him.³⁹⁶ However, Tevfik Pasha had stated to Mahmud that he did not have time to wait there because all his goods and belongings were seized during the caravan attack. In addition, Tevfik declared that he would personally convey the information and explanations requested from him to the higher authorities (nebâil) in İstanbul. According to Mahmud’s messages, Tevfik would definitely set out tomorrow morning. Because the possible means (telegram from the Ministry) employed to hold him there for a while were not effective and he could not be persuaded to stay. In his following telegram, Mahmud reported that Tevfik’s official seal was checked without being noticed by him and that an official seal with the engraving of his name and office (Mutasarrıf-ı Livâ Mehmed Tevfik ibâresiyle mahkûk) was seen in his possession.³⁹⁷ In fact, the seal was secretly applied to a piece of paper for comparison and verification, and the printed sample was taken and stored in a way that would not make him suspicious. Mahmud stated that Tevfik Pasha was planning to quickly go to İstanbul via the routes of Aleppo and Beirut. However, according to Mahmud, there was no feeling, indication or evidence that Tevfik would attempt to escape. The next day, the Ministry informed the Mosul Governor that Tevfik Pasha had departed from Zor with his seal and asked for an immediate response by questioning what kind of judicial decision had been taken about him.³⁹⁸

 BOA, DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 3, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Tevfik Paşa bu akşam vâsıl oldu. Telgrafnâme-i sâmileri kendisine irâe edildi. Emvâl ve eşyâsı tamâmıyla gasb edildiği cihetle yolda tevkif-i hâli müsâade olmadığını ve nebâile istenilen mâlûmât ve izâhâtı İstanbul’da vermek üzere yarın ale’s sabah buradan hareket edeceğini beyân ettiği mâruzdur. Ferman Mutasarrıf Mahmud”  BOA, DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 2, 24 Mart 1325 – 6 April 1909 “Zor Mutasarrıflığından alınan şifrenin hâlidir. Kendisine asla sezdirilmeksizin Tevfik Paşanın Mutasarrıf-ı Livâ Mehmed Tevfik ibâresiyle mahkûk, nezdinde mahfûz bir kıta mühr-i resmiyesi görüldü. Ve an’il iktizâ tatbik edilmek üzere bir sûret-i numunesi de yine kendisini şüphelendirmeyecek sûrette hafiyen ahz-u hıfz olundu. Müşârünileyh sür’atle Haleb Beyrut tarikiyle Dersaadet’e gitmek niyetinde olduğu ifâde ediliyor. Firâra tasdi eylemesi gibi bir hiss ve istidlâl edilemediği mâruzdur. Ferman Mutasarrıf Mahmud”  BOA, DH.MKT.2789/31/Lef 4, 25 Mart 1325 – 7 April 1909

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Allegations of Nepotism and Misconduct The disclosure of Major Ali Said’s connection with Tevfik Pasha’s nephew Nuh Bey put the former sub-governor in a very difficult situation at a time when all eyes were on him. Moreover, it was inevitable that an investigation would be launched against Tevfik when his signature was detected on the promissory note regarding the amount allegedly collected and transferred for the plotting of the Mosul Incident. On the other hand, different allegations against Tevfik reached the central authorities before, but they were not investigated in depth. The Sub-district Administrator of West Sarchinar (Müdir-i Serçınar-ı Garbi) Mehmed Said, claimed that Tevfik made arbitrary appointments to the sub-districts (nâhiye) of Sulaymaniyah in line with his personal interests and his network of nepotism.³⁹⁹ According to the accusation, Tevfik appointed his brother’s son, Nuh Bey, whom he used as an intermediary in bribery activities (vâsıta-i irtişa) during his duty, as the Administrator of the Sangaw Sub-district (Sengav Nâhiyesi) of Bazian. However, it was widely known that although Nuh Bey did not see his office in Sangaw during his tenure, he received his salary regularly. According to Mehmed Said, Tevfik had recently made another arbitrary appointment to please the Councilman Abdurrahman Agha, who was one of the products the Despotism regime (Devr-i İstibdâdın mahsûlünden) and a witness of his corruptions (Mutasarrıfın irtikâb-ı hıyânetine vâkıf). According to the allegation, Tevfik rewarded one of Abdurrahman’s despotic men Mehmed Agha, by exchanging of offices with Mehmed Said. He appointed Mehmed Agha to the Administration of West Sarchinar and Mehmed Said to the Administration of Sangaw. Favoring (latîfe-i mahsûs) Abdurrahman Agha and promoting his man (taltîfen), Tevfik Pasha had obviously attempted to silence (fidye-i necât) a Local Councilman who had witnessed his corruption. Mehmed Said, whose office was exchanged unjustly and for no reason, sought refuge in law and justice and looked for a remedy of this unjust treatment. Although the Ministry of Interior

 BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 1, 11 Şubat 1324– 24 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Sû-i tedbir ve irtikâbından dolayı infisâl eden Mutasarrıf Tevfik Paşa zamân-ı memûriyetinde vâsıta-i irtişası olan birâderzâdesi Nuh Beyi Sengav Müdirliğine tâyin etmiş ise de katiyyen nâhiye yüzünü görmeyerek maaş almakla […] çıktığı cümlece mâlûmdur. Mutasarrıfın irtikâb-ı hıyânetine vâkıf, Devr-i İstibdâdın mahsûlünden İdâre Âzâsı Abdurrahman Ağaya bir latîfe-i mahsûs ve fidye-i necât olarak ayağı üzengide olduğu hâlde […] müstebidi adamı Mehmed Ağayı taltîfen yerime Müdir tâyin, çâkerlerinin Sengav’a tahvil karârını vermiş olduğundan istinâdgâh-ı umûm olan kanun-u adâlete ilticâen mağdûriyetten vikayeme müsterhamdır. Ferman Müdir-i Serçınar-ı Garbi Mehmed Said.”

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quickly questioned the issue from the Mosul Province, no further correspondence was found in the archive regarding the nepotism accusation that Mehmed Said brought against Tevfik.⁴⁰⁰

Submittal and Admission of the Indictment On April 4, 1909, a very detailed report prepared by Governor Reşid on the prosecution process of Sub-Governor Tevfik reached the Ministry (see Illustration 17). The indictment containing the charges against Tevfik was prepared by the Examining Magistrate (Müstantık) of Central Mosul Court of First Instance (Merkez-i Vilâyet Bidâyet Mahkemesi) after the preliminary investigation.⁴⁰¹ However, since the place where the alleged crimes were committed was Sulaymaniyah, judicial  BOA, DH.MKT.2753/14/Lef 2, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325 – 17 April 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden alınan şifre telgrafnâme hâlidir. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa ile rüfekasının: 1-Süleymaniyeli Sâdât’tan merhûm Şeyh Said Efendi ile rüfekası hakkında hilâf-ı hakikat bir takım işârât ile vilâyeti iğfâl ederek Süleymaniye’den bil-ihrâc Musul’a i’zâm ve 2- Bu esnâda ahâlinin cebren dükkânlarını kapattırıp Hükûmet Konağına sevk ile mûmâileyh Said Efendi ile rüfekası aleyhlerinde nümâyiş vukua getirmelerine delâlet ve ihtimâm gibi ahvâl ile beraber 3- Aşâir-i Ekrâdın bil-ihtiba’ Süleymaniye üzerine duhûl ve hücûm ile nehb-i emvâl ve katl-i nüfûsa cüret edecekleri yolunda bir şâyiâ-i kâzibe tertib edip ve ahâliyi galeyâna getirip 4- Asker ve jandarma depolarındaki esliha ve tabancayı bazı eşhâsa tevzi etmek ve 5- Geceleyin Kışla-i Hümâyundaki topları mahfûz bulundukları mahalden çıkararak mûmâileyh Said Efendiyle akrabâ ve taallukatının hânelerinin kâin olduğu mahalleye hâkim bir noktaya vech ile mûmâileyh Said Efendinin akrabâ ve taallukatının Süleymaniye’den gaybubet ve firârlarına bais olmak ve 6- Musul’da bulunmuş olan Erkân-ı Harbiye Binbaşısı Ali Said Bey ile Musul Hâdisesinin vukuundan evvel mezkûreye müteallik yeğeni Nuh Beyi bit-tevsit muhâberede bulunmak ve 7- Süleymaniye ahâlisinden mûmâileyh Said Efendiyle rüfekası aleyhlerinde husûl-u maksad için Bin Beş Yüz Lira-i Osmâni gibi cesim bir meblağı elde edilip 11 Mart 325 târihli şifre ile arz olunan sened mûcibince mûmâileyh Said Efendi akrabâ ve taallukatının muhâliflerinden toplamak cürmlerinden dolayı ettirilen tahkikat-ı ibtidâiyyeyi hâvi evrâk Merkez-i Vilâyet Bidâyet Mahkemesi Müstantıklığına alelusul lede’l tevdi cerâim-i mezkûrenin mahall-i vukuu îtibâriyle tahkikat ve muamelât-ı kanuniyenin îfâsı Süleymaniye Bidâyet Mahkemesi Müstantıklığına âid olduğuna karâr verildiği haber alınmış ve mezkûr deâvî tahkikatının Zât-ı Sâmi-i Cenâb-ı Nezâretpenâhileri dahi mâlûm olan ahvâle nazaran Süleymaniye Müstantıklığınca icrâsında bilvücûh mahzûr olmakla esâsen mesâil-i mâruzanın hâdise-i mezkûreye taalluk ve irtibâtından dolayı tahkikatın Merkez-i Vilâyet Müstantıklığınca icrâsı esbâbının istikmâline müsâade-i âsafâneleri mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”

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investigation and proceedings were entrusted to the Examining Magistrate of Sulaymaniyah Court of First Instance (Süleymaniye Bidâyet Mahkemesi Müstantıklığı). Nonetheless, Governor Reşid warned that due to the existing conditions in Sulaymaniyah, it would be inconvenient for the investigation to be conducted and the case to be heard in there. In addition, since the issues related to Tevfik’s prosecution were directly linked to the Mosul Incident trial, it was requested that his investigation be transferred to the Examining Magistrate of Central Mosul Court. Therefore, on May 15, the Ministry of Justice would refer the investigation and prosecution of Tevfik to the Examining Magistrate’s Office of Provincial Center (Merkez-i Vilâyet İstintak Dâiresi).⁴⁰² Reşid listed the charges in Tevfik’s indictment as follows: 1) Deceiving and misguiding the Governorate with false statements in order to have Sheikh Said and his companions expulsed from Sulaymaniyah. 2) Forcing the community to close their shops, directing the crowd in front of the Government Hall, and encouraging them to demonstrate against Sheikh Said and his companions. 3) Provoking the people with false rumors that the Kurdish tribes would secretly enter Sulaymaniyah, attack the town, dare looting and massacre. 4) Distributing the rifles and pistols in the Army and Gendarmerie depots to some certain civilians. 5) Removing the cannons from their hidden positions in the army barracks at night, pointing the cannons towards the neighborhood where Sheikh Said’s relatives and affiliates resided, and causing Said’s relatives and affiliates to flee from Sulaymaniyah. 6) Before the outbreak of Mosul Incident, communicating with General Staff Major Ali Said who was in Mosul, through the intermediacy of his nephew Nuh Bey. 7) Collecting a large sum of 1.500 lira from the opponents of Sheikh Said in Sulaymaniyah to mastermind the incident in Mosul and issuing and signing a promissory note vouching the collected amount.

 BOA, DH.MKT.2817/53/Lef 1, 2 Mayıs 1325 – 15 May 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesi Cânib-i Aliyyesine Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa ile rüfekasının Musul Hâdisesinin ika’ında medhalleri olmasından dolayı haklarında Livâ-i Mezbur Müstantıklığınca derdest-i icrâ olan tahkikat-ı adliyenin Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhâ Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden gösterilen lüzûm üzerine Mahkeme-i Temyiz İstidâ Dâiresi karârıyla Merkez-i Vilâyet İstintak Dâiresine nakline karâr verilerek mahalline telgrafla icrâ-i tebligat edildiği […] bais Müdde-i Umûmilik dâiresinden bâ-derkenâr ifâde kılınmış olmakla ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Adliye Nezâreti Vekili Müsteşar-ül Dâimî”

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Illustration 17.1: BOA, DH.MKT.2796/16/Lef 1, 04 Nisan 1325 – 17 April 1909 The encrypted telegram sent by Governor Reşid to the Ministry of Interior regarding the prosecution and indictment of Sub-Governor Tevfik

5.4 Prosecution of Former Sub-Governor Tevfik

Illustration 17.2: See Illustration 17.1.

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The investigation file against Mutasarrıf Tevfik and his affiliates consisting of local officials and Notables, was sent from the Mosul Governorate to the Ministry of Justice.⁴⁰³ In addition, the notice (ihbârnâme) submitted to the Grand Vizier with the petition (arz-ı hâl) written and given by Tevfik were attached to this file and all of them were submitted to the Ministry of Justice. Since it was claimed that Tevfik had too many accomplices among the townspeople (efrâd-ı ahâliden birçok şerik-i cürmü bulunmasına nazaran), it was found more appropriate that his case be heard in the Civil Court (Mehâkim-i Nizâmiye). Due to the importance and urgency of the issue, the Ministry of Justice was expected to initiate and pursue the necessary procedures swiftly.

Tevfik’s Allegations Against Reşid: Document Forgery and Confiscation of Property Something very unexpected happened while the prosecution was still in progress, and it was revealed that Sub-Governor Tevfik made some accusations against Governor Reşid in his defense petition.⁴⁰⁴ He accused Governor Reşid  BOA, DH.MKT.2816/46, 05 Mayıs 1325 – 18 May 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Vekâlet-i Celilesine, Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa ve diğer bazı Memûrîn ve Eşrâf-ı Mahalliye haklarında vuku bulan ihbârât ve isnâdât üzerine icrâ ettirilen tahkikatı hâvi Musul Vilâyetinden gönderilen evrâk, Mutasarrıf-ı müşârünileyh tarafından verilen arz-ı hâl ve Makam-ı Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhilerine bittakdim tevdi buyurulan ihbârnâme ile birlikte Savb-ı Âlilerine tisyâr kılındı. Mutasarrıf-ı müşârünileyhin efrâd-ı ahâliden birçok şerik-i cürmü bulunmasına nazaran mahkemesinin Mehâkim-i Nizâmiyece rü’yeti tabii ve meselenin ehemmiyet ve müstâceleti izâhtan müstağni bulunmakla muktezâsının tesri-i îfâsı zımnında lüzûm […] tebligat icrâ buyurulacağı babda. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.2828/36, 20 Mayıs 1325 – 02 June 1909; DH.MKT.2873/52, 29 Haziran 1325 – 12 July 1909 “Adliye Nezâreti Vekâlet-i Celilesine. Aleyhinde evrâk-ı müzevvere tasni’ etmesinden ve eşkıyâ yedine geçen emvâlini istirdâd edeceği hâlde iâde etmeyip zamânını geçirmesinden dolayı Musul Vâlisi Reşid Paşa hazretleriyle muhâkeme talebini ve evvelce vuku bulan mürâcaatı üzerine Süleymaniye Bidâyet Mahkemesince kayd ve tahrir edilmiş olan nukûd ve eşyâ-yı magsûbesinin kendisine irsâl ve teslimi istidâsına dâir Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa tarafından verilen arz-ı hâl-ı âidine cihetiyle leffen Savb-ı Âlilerine irsâl kılınan mündericâtına nazaran îfâ-yı muktezâsı husûsuna […] masruf buyurulmak bâbında Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi” “Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Süleymaniye’den hin-i hareketinde eşkıyâ tarafından gasb edilmiş olan, nukûd ve eşyâsını ahz

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of forging documents against him (aleyhinde evrâk-ı müzevvere tasni’ / hakkında evrâk-ı müzevvere tertib ve tasni’) and not returning his belongings taken back from the bandits who ambushed his caravan. Tevfik had publicly accused Reşid of forgery of documents and confiscation of his property, but no record of a possible investigation against Reşid could be found in the archive regarding these allegations. Somehow, in a detailed report sent by the new Mosul Governor Mehmed Fâzıl in August 1909, it was stated that a forged document regarding Tevfik’s prosecution process might have been prepared during Reşid’s governorship. At this point, it will be useful to look at the motivation and content of this report in some detail. Since July, the Ministry of Interior had been investigating some certain allegations against the Mosul Governorate.⁴⁰⁵ Among these allegations, there were some striking statements such as the Sheikhs who were brought to the provincial center, were taken under the protection of some state officials (bazı memûrînin himâye-i sahâbetkârâneleriyle), their crimes were covered up (setr-i seyyiâtları) and no legal action was taken against them. Mehmed Fâzıl who took over Reşid’s duty within a month, sent a very detailed report describing the processes of Mosul Incident from beginning to end.⁴⁰⁶ Major part of the report was nearly ile yed-i ketminde bırakmasından ve hakkında evrâk-ı müzevvere tertib ve tasni etmesinden dolayı Musul Vâlisi Reşid Paşa ile muhâkemesinin icrâsını müsted’â Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Mehmed Tevfik Paşa tarafından bu kerre Sadâret-i Uzmâya bit-takdim ve tevdi buyurulan arz-ı hâl dahi leffen savb-ı vâlâ-i […] irsâl kılınmakla cânib-i dikkat olan meselenin ve iş’âr-ı sâbıka nazaran muâmele-i lâzımenin îfâsına himmet Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 2, 2 Temmuz 1325 – 15 July 1909 “Musul Vilâyet-i Behiyyesine. Otuz seneden beri Süleymaniye Sancağı ahâlisini mezâlim ve taaddiyâtı ile bîzâr eden Altmış hâneden mütecâviz Meşâyihin cerâim-i müsbetesinden dolayı Merkez-i Vilâyete celb edilmiş oldukları hâlde bazı memûrînin himâye-i sahâbetkârâneleriyle setr-i seyyiâtları cihetine gidilerek haklarında bir gûnâ muâmele-i kanuniye icrâ olunmadığından bahis ile istidâ-yi muâdeleti hâvi mâruzalarıyla Sadâret-i Fahimâneye bit-takdim tevdi buyurulan arz-ı hâl leffen Savb-ı Sâmilerine irsâl kılınan mündericâtına icrâ olunacak ve tahkikat neticesinin muktezâ-yı muâdeleti îfâsıyla mûcib-i mağdûriyet ve bahs-i şikâyet ahvâl ve vukuata meydan verilmemesi husûsunda himmet. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  BOA, DH.MKT.2876/57/Lef 1, 09 Ağustos 1325 – 22 August 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, …ve bu babda Kerkük Mutasarrıfı vâsıtasıyla tutulan evrâk-ı tahkikatın sûretleri 4 Şubat 1325 târihli ve 12 numerolu ariza ile takdim edildiği gibi tâkibât icrâsı zımnında bu evrâk ile Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın elde edilmiş senedin bâlâsında muharrer zevâtın bazısı Gülanber Kazâsına gönderilerek mersul varakayı tertib ve tasni’ ettikleri anlaşılan, târihi ve numeroları arz olunan arizalar ile telgrafnâmeler meşmûl-u nigâh-ı devletleri buyurulduğu hâlde

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identical to the previous narratives and included details of the alleged conspiracy against Sâdât. However, at the end of the report, there were some interesting details that a particular document had been forged. Relied on some correspondence, Fâzıl Pasha stated that some of the individuals whose names were written on the promissory note of Tevfik were driven to Gulanbar and that the sent document was turned out to be forged (mersul varakayı tertib ve tasni’ ettikleri). According to Fâzıl, the content of this document was far from reality and originated from hate (varaka mündericâtı hakikatten âri ve ağrâzdan mâli olduğu). Could it be that some individuals manipulated by Reşid were sent to Gulanbar, forged and signed a promissory note in there, and then had it fall into the hands of the state authorities? Although the aforementioned document reminds of Tevfik’s signed promissory note, it is not clearly understood from the expressions that which document it was, who prepared it and for what purpose it was prepared. Another possibility is that these people who were sent to Gulanbar can be thought to be the same people who Reşid expelled from Sulaymaniyah.⁴⁰⁷ Perhaps the forged document Fâzıl Pasha mentioned was arranged in order to legitimize this arbitrary process after these people were taken to Gulanbar without any justification. However, although these do not go beyond assumptions, no further document or evidence regarding the alleged forgery has been found in the archive records. On the other hand, Tevfik also accused Reşid of arbitrarily confiscating (ahz ile yed-i ketm) his belongings which were taken back from the Hamawand bandits.⁴⁰⁸ Former Sub-Governor Tevfik had the details of the goods and cash seized (nukûd ve eşyâ-yı magsûbe) during the caravan attack, registered with the Sulaymaniyah Courthouse. However, since he could not get these goods and cash back under normal conditions, he wanted to appear in court with Governor Reşid. We see that the issue of the recovery of Tevfik’s belongings continued for a long time and was not easily resolved. Although one year had passed since his request, Tevfik Pasha was going to write another petition. He was going to declare that

varaka mündericâtı hakikatten âri ve ağrâzdan mâli olduğu bedihi bulunmuş olmakla ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Musul Vâli Vekili”  “Reşid thought that the expulsion of the persons named in Tevfik Pasha’s promissory note and the officers who attempted to cause a second incident in Sulaymaniyah strengthened the opposition against him.” Please see the subsection of ‘Allegations Against Reşid and His Dismissal’ under the section of 5.3 Appointment of Ahmed Reşid Pasha as the Governor of Mosul  BOA, DH.MKT.2828/36, 20 Mayıs 1325 – 02 June 1909; DH.MKT.2873/52, 29 Haziran 1325 – 12 July 1909; DH.MUİ.79/43, 18 Mart 1326 – 31 March 1910; DH.MUİ.2/8/Lef 1, 26 Teşrinievvel 1325 – 08 November 1909; Lef 2, 9 Kânûnusâni 1325 – 22 January 1910

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although the bandits who usurped his goods and cash were deservedly sentenced in Sulaymaniyah, he still could not get his stuff back. In addition, Tevfik still had not given up his request to prosecute the former Governor Reşid, and his applications were now followed by the new Governor Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha. In August 1910, Tevfik sent a petition to the Ministry of Interior stating that his goods and cash worth more than 1.000 lira, which were registered with the Local Administration and the Court Martial, had not yet been compensated.⁴⁰⁹ Tevfik had received the information that the horses belonging to the bandits arrested after the caravan attack were confiscated, that these animals were sold, and that the injured parties would be compensated through this allowance. He claimed that the greatest damage belonged to him and demanded his compensation be delivered to him through the Baghdad Provincial Officials.⁴¹⁰ A month after this correspondence, The Governor and Commander of Baghdad, Nâzım Pasha informed the Ministry that the cost of the animals confiscated

 BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 2, 20 Temmuz 1326 – 02 August 1910 Dâhiliye Nezâretine. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığım hengâmında idâre-i sâbıkanın şımartmış olduğu Meşâyih ve Hemavend eşirrâsının harekât ve ef’all-i zâlimanelerine müsâid bulunmadığımdan, muğberr olarak infisâl-i Dersaadet’e avdetim esnâsında katl kasdıyla yolumu kat’ eylemişlerse de mücerred Cenâb-ı Hakkın inâyetiyle bu arzularına muvaffak olamamışlar ve fakat evvelce mahallî hükûmete verilip elyevm mevcûd defter mûcibince Bin küsür liralık eşyâ ve nukûdumu gasb eyledikleri Hükûmet ve Divân-ı Harb-i Örfî’ce tahakkuk eylediğinden ve sâye-i adâlette eşkıyâ-yı merkumenin hemen ekserisi derdest ve cezâ-yı sezâları verildiği gibi atlardan müsâdere olunub füruht olunan mevâşi ve sâir esmânından mutazarrır olanlara verilmek üzere Süleymaniye’de mahfûz ve hatta bazı kimselere te’dibât icrâ kılındığı bildirildikten ve zararın da en büyüğü de âcizlerine âid olduğu her kimsece mâlûm olunduğundan, mebâliğ-i mahfûze-i mezkûreden eşyâ-yı magsûbe-i çâkerâneme mahsûben defter-i mâruza nisbetinde taraf-ı çâkeriye irsâl olunmak üzere Bağdad Vilâyeti Celilesi Makam-ı Yâverî Kolağası Mehmed Ali Beyle, Telgraf Muhâbere Memûrlarından Ahmed Efendiye teslimi husûsunun Vilâyet-i müşârünileyhe bâ-telgraf emir ve iş’ârıyla sadâkat yüzünden dûçâr olduğum şu mağdûriyet ve zaruretten halâs ve ihkak-ı hakk buyurulmasına müsâade-i celile-i Nezâretpenâhilerinden niyaz ve istidâ ile ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Mehmed Tevfik  BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 2, 20 Temmuz 1326 – 02 August 1910 Tevfik had specifically mentioned these officials as ‘Baghdad Provincial Aide Senior Captain Mehmed Ali’ (Bağdad Vilâyet-i Celilesi Makam-ı Yâverî Kolağası) and ‘Telegraph Officer Ahmed’ (Telgraf Muhâbere Memûru), but we do not know why he specifically asked for the compensation to be handed over to these names. It is possible that they were civil servants who had personal relationships with Tevfik. Perhaps they were officers who would go to İstanbul on a mission at that time, and they would be asked to hand over the money to Tevfik.

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from the Hamawands and sold, had reached 84.000 qurush.⁴¹¹ According to the information from the Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governorate, Tevfik Pasha could benefit from this allowance if he could prove his damage in court, like the other injured parties. No further correspondence on this subject was found in the later period. However, after many different accusations and a prosecution against him, it was clear that Tevfik Pasha would not easily indemnify his loss. In addition, his allegations against Reşid Pasha did not yield any results, and no investigation or prosecution was carried out regarding these allegations We understand from the correspondence between the Civil Service Pension Fund (Mülkiye Tekaüd Sandığı) and the Ministry of Interior on 28 June that it was requested to allocate an ‘unemployment stipend’ (Mâzûliyet Maaşı) to Tevfik.⁴¹² Tevfik Pasha who was appointed as the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah on February 3, 1907, was dismissed from his office on February 4, 1909, due to the dispute between him and the Sâdât Sheikhs. His name was still on the ‘waiting list’ (mülâzımın defteri) so he could be reassigned to another post. However, during this time he had requested unemployment stipend in order to maintain his life. The Commission of Personnel Records (Sicill-i Ahvâl Komisyonu) found

 BOA, DH.MUİ.118/50/Lef 3, 22 Ağustos 1326 – 04 September 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâretine, Hemavendlilerden bil-müsâdere satılan mevâşi vesâire esmânı Seksen Dört Bin küsür kuruşa bâliğ olup sâire-i müddiler gibi Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Esbakı Tevfik Paşanın da asâlet-i veya vekâlet-i mahkeme-i şeriada isbâtı hukukla mebâliğ-i mezkûrdan para alabileceği Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığından iş’ârı üzerine mâruzdur. Bağdad Vâli ve Kumandanı Nâzım”  BOA, DH.MKT.2859/4/Lef 2, 15 Haziran 1325 – 28 June 1909; BEO.3605/270356, 12 Temmuz 1325 – 25 July 1909 Unemployment Stipend (Mâzûliyet Maaşı): In the Post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire, the salary paid by the state to the civil servants who were dismissed from office or left unemployed because their position was abolished. Kubbealtı Lugatı, http://www.lugatim.com/s/mazuliyet Access Date: 09.11. 2021 “Mülkiye Tekaüd Sandığı Nezâret-i Aliyyesine. Mâzûliyet maaşı tahsisi istidâsında bulunan […] Tevfik Paşa hazretlerinin 21 Kânûnusâni 1322 târihinde Süleymaniye Sancağı Mutasarrıflığına bâ-tâyin, Sâdât ve Meşâyih ile beynlerinde tahaddüs eden ihtilâfâttan dolayı lüzûm-u tebdili Musul Vilâyetinden iş’âr olunması üzerine 22 Kânûnusâni 1324 târihinde azledilerek yerine diğerinin tâyin edildiği anlaşılmasına ve kendisi yine bir Mutasarrıflığa intihâb olunmak üzere ismi mülâzımın defterine kaydedilmesine nazaran müşârünileyhe mâzûliyet maaşı tahsis lâzım geleceği Sicill-i Ahvâl-i Memûrîn Komisyonundan ifâde kılınmakla alel-ahvâl îfâsı muktezâsına himmet. Dâhiliye Nezâreti” “Dâhiliye Nezâretine Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa hazretlerine karârnâme husûsu ahkâmına tevfikan şehrî İki Bin İki Yüz Elli kuruş Mâzûliyet Maaşı tahsis husûsuna Şûrâ-yı Devlet karârıyla […] 9 Temmuz 1325 târihinde İrâde-i Seniyye…Sadâret -i Uzmâ”

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Tevfik’s demand justified and on July 22, 1909, Tevfik was allocated a monthly unemployment stipend of 2.250 qurush with the decision of the Council of State.⁴¹³ Tevfik’s prosecution was in progress, but he flatly denied the allegations against him. He categorically denied that he had received 1.500 lira from the Merchants and Notables of Sulaymaniyah for the murder of Sheikh Said.⁴¹⁴ He also claimed that he was always ready to prove that the promissory note and the seal on it were forged. Moreover, he stated that the investigation carried out by the courthouse officials under the influence and pressure (taht-ı nüfûz ve tazyik) of the Mosul Governor would not be straight and reliable (şâyân-ı vüsûk ve itimâd). For this reason, Tevfik Pasha demanded that his file be sent to İstanbul for the safety of the investigation and that his prosecution would continue there. However, no other documents were found in the archive regarding the aftermath of the prosecution and whether Tevfik was tried or convicted afterwards. Since Tevfik was entitled to have his name written in the waiting list and to receive an unemployment stipend, it is highly probable that Tevfik was not suspended or removed from the civil service. In this respect, it is quite reasonable to assume that Tevfik was acquitted as a result of the pre-trial prosecution.

Endorsement of Tevfik by the Sulaymaniyah Notables In addition to the telegrams that disgraced Tevfik Pasha while criticizing him, telegrams praising him and demanding his ‘reinstatement’ (ibka-yı memûriyet) were also reaching the central authorities. The telegram dated February 23,

 The Commission of Personnel Records (Sicill-i Ahvâl-i Memûrîn Komisyonu) : The office that keeps the personnel records of the civil servants in the Ottoman State organization. Kubbealtı Lugatı, http://www.lugatim.com/s/sicil Access Date: 09.11. 2021  BOA, DH.MKT.2877/32, 02 Temmuz 1325 – 15 July 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. 29 Haziran 1325 târihli tezkireye zeyldir. Şeyh Said’in Musul’da esbâb-ı katlini ihzâr ettirmek için Süleymaniye Tüccâr ve Mûteberânından Bin Beş Yüz lira ahz eylediğine dâir olan senedle mevzû’-yu mührün sahteliğini her zamân isbâta hâzır bulunduğunu ve Vâli-i Vilâyetin taht-ı nüfûz ve tazyikinde bulunan memûrîn-i adliyenin oraca icrâ eyleyecekleri tahkikat şâyân-ı vüsûk ve itimâd olamayacağından bahs ile muamelâtın selâmet-i cereyânı temin edilmiş olmak için bu babdaki evrâk-ı tahkikatın Dersaadet-i Celileye ve tedkikat-ı lâzımenin buraca icrâsı istidâsına dâir bazı tafsilât ve izâhâtı hâvi Süleymaniye Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşa tarafından bu kerre verilen arz-ı hâl dahi leffen savb-ı vâlâ-i […] tisyâr kılınmakla mündericâtına ve işârâtı-ı sâbıka nazaran icrâ ve îcâb-ı husûsu… Dâhiliye Nezâreti”

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which was signed by more than hundred Notables led by the Deputy Accountant Mârûf, was one of these, and it defended, justified and exonerated Tevfik Pasha to the end.⁴¹⁵ According to the telegram, Tevfik Pasha, who had done nothing but render good services with complete loyalty and integrity (kemâl-i sadâkat ve istikamet) for two years, protected and strengthened the treasury, contrary to the claims. He heard the cries for help of all the oppressed and poor in Sulaymaniyah, became their protector, and by sending Sheikh Said who had been oppressing the people for 32 years, to Mosul, he had fulfilled their prayers. Despite being unlawfully dismissed (hilâf-ı kanun azl) during the era of Constitutional Monarchy, he still showed full obedience (itâat ve inkıyâd) to the government until the last minute and left Sulaymaniyah in line with the government’s orders. The petitioners now hoped that the attack on Tevfik’s caravan would provide strong proof of the veracity of their cries, which had hitherto been ignored. At the end of the message, it was requested that the instigators and perpetrators of the attack be found and neutralized. The So-called Sheikhs who were returned to Kirkuk, on the other hand, should have been sent to a place outside the Mosul Province in order to be protected from their calamity and curse (musibet ve mel’-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2751/29/Lef 3, 10 Şubat 1324– 23 February 1909; BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 42, 12 Şubat 1324– 25 February 1909 For the list of petitioners, please see the subsection of ‘Ambush on Tevfik’s Caravan’ under the section of 5.2 Sâdât’s Seek of Revenge “Makam-ı Sadâret-i Uzmâya Meşrûtiyet-i İdâre aleyhindeki kıyâmları üzerine Musul’a aldırılıp hâdise-i mâlûmeye sebebiyet veren ve Şeyh nâm-ı müsteârıyla Otuz İki seneden beri livâmızın ahâli-i mazlûmesine katl-i nüfûs, hetk-i nâmûs ve kalemin tahrir ve târiften hayâ edeceği tecâvüzlerden dolayı tevârih-i muhtelifede mütekaddim bunca feryâdnâmelerimize her neye haml olmuş ise şimdiye kadar akim kalmış ve Kerkük’e i’zâmları Musul fâciasının burada dahi tecdid-i hudusuna sebeb-i müstakil olarak umûm mazlûmin ve fukarânın isticlâb-ı davet-ı hayriyyesine hizmet eden ve iki seneden beri kemâl-i sadâkat ve istikametle hidemât-ı hüsnünde ve hukuk-u hazine ve âbâdın muhâfazasından başka zerre kadar bir kabahati olmayan Mutasarrıf-ı Livâ Tevfik Paşa’nın bu Zamân-ı Meşrûtiyette hilâf-ı kanun azline de hükûmete itâat ve inkıyâden hareket eylemesiyle” “şu ahvâl-i müessife-i mâruzu şimdiye kadar nazar-ı îtibâra alınmayan, feryâd-ı mazlûmânemizin sıdkına delil-i kavi olacağına ümidvar olduğumuz cihetle muharrik ve mütecâsirlerin âcilen te’dibleri ve Musul Vak’asından sonra Kerkük’e iâde edilen Müteşeyyihlerin emsâl-i musibet ve mel’anetlerine mahal kalmamak üzere vilâyet hâricinde bir yere kaldırılmaları çare-i müstahsenesiyle yirmi bin hâne ahâlinin beş hâneye fedâ edilmemesi ve Mutasarrıf-ı müşârünileyhin ikayı devâm-ı memûriyetini son defa olarak adâlet nâmına istirhâm ve istidâ eder ve medâr-ı arz olan şu ifâdemizi de diğer ifâdelerimiz gibi müsmir olmadığı hâlde sadâkat ve inkıyâddan başka bir fikir beslemeyen ahâli ve Caf aşâir-i mutisinin tabiiyet-i Osmâniye’den mağdûr olmadığı ihsâs edilmiş olacağından mal ve canımızı ayaklar altına alarak yeis-i hâl ve fütûr ile diğer bir sûrette çare-i necâtımıza teşebbüs olunacağı arz ve cevâb-ı âcilâneyi makine başında muntazırız. Ferman”

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anet). The people of 20 thousand households should not have been sacrificed to the 5 households of So-called Sheikhs and the Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha should have been reinstated. The message conveyed to the Ministry of Interior by 24 Notables of Sulaymaniyah during the siege, is also worth zooming in. It was signed by Mayor Abdülgafur at first, Sub-provincial Administrative Councilman Abdurrahman, other Councilmen Abdurrahman and Said, major Notables and Merchants like Azmi, Sâdır, Fethullah, Said and Şerif.⁴¹⁶ According to these names, Tevfik Pasha, who had been serving as the Sub-Governor for the last two years, had been fully successful in restoring security (iâde-i inzibât), defeating oppression (def-i mezâlim), protecting the treasury laws and strengthening its volume (muhâfaza-i hukuk-u beyt-ül mâl ve âbâd). In particular, he had displayed the progressive and creative endeavor required in the promulgation of the constitution and the preservation and implementation of public order. He had also proved that he had the qualities expected of an official, such as honor, integrity, and activity (iffet ve istikamet ve faâliyet). Therefore, every social class that appreciated justice and freedom in Sulaymaniyah was satisfied with the prudent and fair administration of Tevfik Pasha and was grateful to the law and justice. In addition, Tevfik re-established the foundations of public order throughout the Sanjak and increased the treasury revenues (vâridât-ı hazine) more than demanded. Just

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 39, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine İki seneden beri livâmız Mutasarrıflığında bulunan Tevfik Paşa hazretlerinin iâde-i inzibât, def-i mezâlim, muhâfaza-i hukuk-u beyt-ül mâl ve âbâd ve bahusûs Kanûn-i Esâsinin îlânında […] idâme-i âsâyiş ve tatbikatındaki sa’y ve ikdâm cihetlerinde velhâsıl bir memûrdan matlûb ve muntazır olan iffet ve istikamet ve faâliyet misüllü evsâfı hâiz bulunmasıyla meftûn-u adâlet ve hürriyet olan bilumûm sunûf-u muhtelife-i ahâlisi icrâ-yı adâletkârîsinden hoşnut ve kanun-u adâlete minnettar ve livâda âsâyiş-i umûmiye esâsını takrir eylemiş ve vâridât-ı hazineyi fevk-i matlûb mikdârda tezyid ettirmiş olduğu bir sırada zamân-ı İstibdâdın kendilerine verdiği müsâadeyi büsbütün sû-i istimâl ile ahâliyi ezmiş, vâridât-ı devleti tahrib ve meâkil eylemiş olan üç bin hâne halkından ibâret mütesellih şakîlerin bir şerzime-i kalil teşkil iden câni avenelerinin sahte mahzûrlar tertibiyle mürâcaat-ı kâzibeleri ve Kürd Teâvün Cemiyeti Reisi Şeyh Abdülkadir Efendinin delâletiyle Meşrûtiyet-i İdâreye muhâlif olarak bilâ-tahkik azliyle mağdûr edildiği müteâkiben diğer mâruzâtımızda arz olunduğu üzere ahvâl-i esef iştimalleri ve hâlet-i tecâvüzkârâneleri yüzünden el yevm silah ve dest olarak mukavemet-i eşkıyâ ile meşgul bulunduğumuzdan ve âmed ü şüd münkatı’ cebren ve tav’an başlarına biriktirmiş oldukları bir takım sebükmağzân üserâ ile kasabamıza mahsûr olduğumuzdan iâde-i âsâyişin ve temini selâmet-i umûmiye için Mutasarrıf-ı müşârünileyhin ibka-yı memûriyeti ile kuvve-i kâfiyenin imdâda yetiştirilmesi sevk cem’ maslahat ve adâlet nâmına te’kiden istidâ eyleriz. Reis-i Belediye Abdülgafur, İdâre Âzâsı Abdurrahman, İdâre Âzâsı Said, Âzâ Abdurrahman, Vücûh Azmi, Eşrâftan Sâdır, Tüccâr Fethullah, Tüccâr Said, Tüccâr Şerif…”

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then, a murderous gang consisting of three thousand households of armed bandits who abused the privileges they obtained during the Despotism, oppressed the people and devoured the state treasury, emerged with their baseless and fabricated statements. According to the claims of the Sulaymaniyah Notables, Tevfik was discharged in violation of the Constitutional regime and was victimized. Another claim at this point was quite grave and alarming. The Notables claimed that Tevfik was dismissed without any investigation and only with the direction and attestation of KSMAP President Sheikh Abdulqadir. However, they wrote that the people of Sulaymaniyah were now taking action and that they were taking the initiative even though they were civilians. They were in both an armed and unarmed resistance against the bandits (silah ve dest olarak mukavemet-i eşkıyâ) in order to protect themselves from possible distressing situations and aggressive attitudes that could be caused by the siege. These bandits had blocked the entrances and exits of the city, forcibly or voluntarily gathered some fools (sebükmağzân üserâ) around them and left the civilians stranded in the town. At the end of the telegram, the Notables demanded the reinstatement of Tevfik Pasha and the dispatch of a sufficient military force to ensure the peace and security of the people. Abdülgafur’s next telegram, which he sent on the same day, was very short, functional and result oriented. He reported that the town of Sulaymaniyah was besieged, the entrances and exits of the town were blocked, the administrative and commercial activities were suspended, the market was closed, and the community was in fear for their lives.⁴¹⁷ It seems that the Notables of Sulaymaniyah, some of whom were CUP members, defended and supported Tevfik under all circumstances and demanded his reinstatement. It is noticed that this support increased, and this demand was expressed more, especially when the Siege of Sulaymaniyah started. These Notables, who formed the core staff of the CUP Sulaymaniyah branch, considered the dismissal of Tevfik and the transfer of Sheikhs to Kirkuk as two separate stages of a cooperation plan developed with the KSMAP. Although it was not explicitly stated in these messages, there was also a reproach against the government about the dismissal of Tevfik without even conducting an investigation and the transfer of the Sheikhs to Kirkuk despite all the risks. According to the impli-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 40, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Süleymaniye kasabasının etrâfı mahsûrdur. Hâricte âmed ü şüd mesdûd, hükûmet ticâret tâtildir. Çarşı kapanmıştır. Ahâli heyecân havf-ı can içindedir. Mâruzâtımızın makine başında telâkkisi için […] selâmet-i umûmiye nâmıyla kemâl-i müstâcelesiyle umûm nâmına müsterhamdır. Süleymaniye Belediye Reisi Abdülgafur”

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cations of the Unionist Bloc in Sulaymaniyah, the wishes of the Sheikhs were fulfilled by favor of the government and the town of Sulaymaniyah was eventually besieged due to the government’s negligence and imprudence. However, although they were civilians, now they also joined the armed and unarmed resistance and declared war against the Sâdât front. They also needed the reinstatement of a governor like Tevfik, whose loyalty, dedication, and integrity were claimed to be unquestionable. Somehow, the tendency of the members of the Sulaymaniyah CUP to adopt and endorse their local administrators continued afterwards. The names who signed another message in May 1909, as the members of the CUP, have firmly displayed this notion.⁴¹⁸ The CUP members mentioned a governor who has been trying to rehabilitate (ıslâh) the Sulaymaniyah Sanjak from the very first days of his appointment, with perseverance and fortitude. And that Sulaymaniyah was such a place that the public order was broken beyond words. This Sub-Governor had worked day and night in order to suppress banditry and rebellion even during his one and a half month of service. In order to ensure the welfare of the homeland (vatanın istihzâr-ı esbâb-ı refâhı), he spared no effort and overtime (ibzâl-i himmet ve mesâî) and preferred working instead of resting. However, the mem-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2822/51/Lef 1, 6 Mayıs 1325 – 19 May 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Daha ilk muvasalatlarında hâlen istikbâlen nâ-kabil-i tasvir-i esefengiz bir sûrette muhtell bulunduğu Süleymaniye Livâsında cidden bir azm-i metin […] perverâne ile ıslâhına ve Cengizlere, Haccâclara rahmet okutan mezâlim-i hûn-rizâneleri bîçâre […] ciğergahına kadar işleyen vatan hâinlerinin, erbâb-ı şekavet ve isyanın, henüz bir buçuk aylık zamân-ı âdile-i memûresinde def’ ve tenkîline ibzâl-i himmet ve mesâîyi her türlü istirâhata tercih ederek geceli gündüzlü vatanın istihzâr-ı esbâb-ı refâhına çalışmaktan hâli kalmayan Mutasarrıfımız gibi bir fedâkâr-ı millete karşı bugün okuduğumuz Bağdad Gazetesinin 28 numerolu 22 Nisan 325 târihli nüshasında Mutasarrıf-ı müşârünileyh hakkında bazı neşriyyât-ı gayr-i vukufkâri bulunduğu ve hatta tebdili için bir mütetebbi teşkil edileceği alel istiğrab görülen bu hâl müşârünileyhin tâkibât-ı mütemâdiye ve işârât-ı mütevâliyesi üzerine Süleymaniye’nin ıslâhı emeliyle sevk edileceği bildirilen kuvve-i tenkîliyenin tehiri devâm-ı iğtişâşâta bais olmakta olduğundan şu Devr-i Hürriyet ve Adâlette maksad-ı hükûmet, milletin selâmeti , hukuk-u âbâdın temini, memleketin câniler elinde tahlisi noktasına mâtuf ile buraya sevki mukarrer olan mezkûr kuvvetin bir an evvel i’zâmını selâmet-i mülk ve millet nâmına muntazırâne ve kemâl-i ihlâsla istirhâm ve […] adâlete şiddetle muntazır bulunduğumuzu arza cesâret eyleriz. Petitioners included the names such as Members of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti Âzâsından) Müfti Abdülaziz, Mayor (Reis-i Belediye) Abdülgafur, Administrative Member of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti İdâre Âzâsı) Abdurrahman and Financier (Mâliyeci) Sâlim, Director of Correspondence (Tahrirat Müdiri) Nureddin, Gendarmerie Commander (Jandarma Kumandanı) Mirza, Head of Penal Chamber (Cezâ Reisi) Refet”

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bers of the CUP were very surprised and upset by the unfounded news (neşriyyâtı gayr-i vukufkâri) about the Mutasarrıf, published in the Baghdad Newspaper dated 05 May 1909. As a matter of fact, it was written in the news that an investigator (mütettebi) would be assigned in order to investigate and replace the subgovernor. They reminded the constant effort and follow-up (tâkibât-ı mütemâdiye ve işârât-ı mütevâliye) displayed by the Sub-Governor, who had demanded a suppressive force (kuvve-i tenkîliye) necessary for the rehabilitation of Sulaymaniyah, and they expected this force to be dispatched as soon as possible. However, the interesting point about this message is that it cannot be understood whether the endorsed Mutasarrıf was Tevfik Pasha’s successor, Ziyâ Pasha. From a periodical point of view, it must have been him, because on 19 May 1909, Tevfik Pasha had already handed over his duties to Ziyâ Pasha, the former Sub-Governor of Dersim. However, as we will see in the next subsection, Ziyâ Pasha would come into conflict with many Bureaucrats, Notables and Tradesmen, especially Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said Effendi and Mayor Abdülgafur Agha, would be subjected to extremely critical accusations and be dismissed in September 1909. Indeed, it is quite interesting that the members of the CUP praised a new Mutasarrif with whom they would have so much conflict, although Tevfik Pasha whom they have admired was dismissed from office only a few months ago. Of course, another possibility is that the relations between Ziyâ Pasha and the Notables of Sulaymaniyah started very well at first, but gradually deteriorated in the following period.

Allegations Against Sub-Governor Ziyâ Pasha Former Dersim Sub-Governor Ziyâ Pasha who was appointed to Sulaymaniyah on February 3, would experience a 6-month tenure as controversial and turbulent as Tevfik’s.⁴¹⁹ Ziyâ was finally to be dismissed by Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha on  BOA, DH.MUİ.9/35/Lef 1, 01 Eylül 1325 – 14 Eylül 1909; Lef 3 26 Ağustos 1325 – 08 Eylül 1909 “Zibar’da Musul Vâlisi Paşa Hazretlerine. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Ziyâ Paşa azliyle yerine Bayburd Kaimakamı Rüşdi Bey tâyini buyurulmuştur. Dâhiliye Nezâreti” “Musul Vâlisi ve Havâlisi Kumandanlığından Alınan Şifre. Süleymaniye Mutasarrıfı Ziyâ Paşanın ahvâl-i husûsiyesinden dolayı bu havâliye elvermeyeceği gibi eşkıyâ tâkibine sekte vermekte olduğundan mûmâileyhin diğer mahale tahvil-i memûriyetle beraber yerine Kuvve-i Tâkibiye Kumandanlığı kemâkân uhdesinde bâkî kalmak üzere Miralay Mazhar Beyin veya hod emsâli birisinin Süleymaniye Mutasarrıflığına tâyin buyurulması lüzûmu mâruzdur. Zibar’da Musul Vâlisi ve Havâlisi Kumandanı Birinci Ferik Fâzıl”

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September 14, on the grounds that his particular conditions were not eligible for the region and he failed in bandit pursuit operations. While the repercussions of the Mosul Incident and the Siege of Sulaymaniyah were still continuing, Ziyâ Pasha was accused of causing administrative weakness, commercial collapse, corruption, instability and disorder during his tenure.⁴²⁰ On top of that, he allegedly dismissed the Constitutionalist Mayor Abdülgafur, who was elected by the votes of the people and whose services were appreciated, without a trial and without an election, and entrusted this office to one of his partisans. However, instead of all the allegations against Ziyâ Pasha, only one related to former Sub-Governor Tevfik will be examined closely in this subsection. This telegram was sent by nearly 100 merchants, drapers (bezzâz) and shopkeepers of Sulaymaniyah to the Ottoman Senate on July 17, 1909.⁴²¹ Although his  DH.MKT.2875/69/Lef 1, 28 Haziran 1325 – 11 Temmuz 1909; DH.MKT.2902/3/Lef 1, 25 Temmuz 1325 – 07 Ağustos 1909; DH.MKT.2884/100/Lef 2, 5 Temmuz 1325 – 18 Temmuz 1909 “Huzûr-u Celil-i Sadâretpenâhiye /Meclis-i Mebûsâna. Livâmızın muhâsara-i hâzırası, derûn-u memleketteki mevâşinin gözü önünde yağması , katl-i nüfûs , sirkat-i emvâl ile yüz vukuat-ı fecianın devâmı , kârbânın nehbi, bunca asker ve ahâlinin katli, 130 kadar askerden kangısının alınması, sedd-i turuk, kat-ı ticâretin müsebbib-i hakikisi hâin, mürtekib Mutasarrıf Ziyâ Paşa olduğu muhâkemeten isbât kılınmak üzere nereye emir olunur ise olunsun mîsâk-ı seferîyesi hamiyyeten ihtiyâr ile Kanûn-i Esâsinin ahkâmını ve selâmet-i memleket nâmına emr-i muhâkemesini Adâlet-i Meşrûtadan müsterhaman intizâr eylerim .Ferman. Süleymaniye Ticâret Odası Reisi Abdülgafur”  BOA, DH.MKT.2884/100/Lef 1, 4 Temmuz 1325 – 17 Temmuz 1909 Document Summary : Investigation of the complaints of Sulaymaniyah Mayor Abdülgafur Bey and the community against Sub-Governor Ziyâ Pasha. “Meclis-i Âyân Riyâset-i Celilesine, Kanûn-i Esâsi îcâbınca İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti livâmızda teşkil etti. Umûm ahâlinin intihâbıyla tensib edilen Belediye Reisi Gafur Ağayla âzâ-yı dâimenin fedâkârlığı ve âsâyişin iâdesi ile umrân-ı memlekete dâir mürâcaatları hakkıyla îfâ edildi. Ne çare ki vilâyetin adem-i müsâadesi ve husûsiyle Mutasarrıf-ı Sâbıkı Tevfik Paşanın nâhibi olan eşkıyâların sırtında menhûb kürkü ve başka eşyâları rey-ül ayn müşâhede edip iğmâz ve eşyâsı içinde bulunup nâhib tarafından hediye makamında takdim edilen bir aded mühr-i resmiyesini bir âlet-i menfaat ittihâz etmek fikriyle Belediye Reisi ile müttehiden memleketimizden ibâret nâmûslu âzâlarımızın isimleriyle sahte bir varaka tasni ve tertib ve Zamân-ı Meşrûtiyette muâmele-i cebriye memnu’ iken mezkûr sahte varakayı kerhen Mukavelât Dâiresine sümme-t-tedârik olarak tasdik ettirmekle müşârünileyhin bu yoldaki gidiş ve muamelâtı ve evvel zamânda aldığı programı icâbâtı irticâ’-yi İstibdâd için ayrıca bir tertib vaz’ ettiği için o târihten evvel sahte varakayı mevki-i resmiye bıraktığı gibi âzâlarımıza tahkir ve envâ-ı tehdidâtla ihâka ve hatta bîçâre ahâlimize karşı eşkıyâları kasabaya getirmekle emir verdiği ve bu muamelât-ı müstebidâne ve zâlimesi yüzünden kârbânlarımıza umûmiyetle nehb ve beraberindeki ahâli ve muhâfaza-i askerleri katl ve cerh ve Esliha-yı Âmireyi gasb ve ahz ve tarik-i ticâret ve ubûr ve mürûr katiyyen sedd ve adeta bir muhâsara şeklini kesbeden livâmız halkı hayâtlarından bir dakika bile emniyetli kalmadığı ve muamelât-ı cebbar-

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name is not mentioned in the text, both the content, title and archival classification suggest that the allegations in question were directed against Ziyâ Pasha. The telegram mentioned someone who saw Tevfik’s fur and belongings on one of the bandits who attacked and plundered the caravan but turned a blind eye to it. According to the message, an official seal was found in Tevfik Pasha’s belongings and that this official seal was presented to someone in office as a gift by the plunderer. Afterwards, it was claimed that this seal was used to issue a forged document in the name of deriving some particular interests. It was stated that this forged document (sahte varaka), on which the names of the Mayor and the honorable members of the municipality were on it, was forcibly and postfacto (sümme-t-tedârik) certified by the Contracting Office (Mukavelât Dâiresi). The term ‘forged document’ here may refer to Tevfik’s 1.500 lira promissory note, and the term ‘post facto’ may refer to the period after the Mosul Incident. According to the other allegations of the tradesmen and merchants, this person insulted and threatened the Municipal Councilmen and put the blame on them. It was even alleged that he ordered the bandits to be brought into town to intimidate the helpless people. Because of his despotic and cruel practices, caravans were frequently looted, people and guardsmen in convoys were killed and injured, and army weapons were seized. The Sanjak was almost besieged as the commercial shipping routes and the entrances and exits of the town were completely blocked. The community was not sure of their life even for a moment, but no one could dare to complain (müştekiyâta cesâret) because everyone was afraid of his tyrannic treatments (muamelât-ı cebbarâne-i vâkisinden). Allegedly, this person had sent this forged document incriminating the Municipal Councilmen, to the Sulaymaniyah Court and began to pressure them every day through the courthouse officials with whom he was allied. Since these councilmen were elected by the votes of the people they represented the entire population, and no

âne-i vâkisinden dolayı müştekiyâta cesâret kılınmamakta iken İstibdâd gününü çıkaran Adâleti Meşrûtiyet îlânını gördüğümüz ile cesâret bularak feryâdlarımızın cüretine sebeb kesilen işbu devr-i adâlette bile fikr-i irticâyı unutamayarak âzâlarımızın tehdid ve feryâdlarının kesilmesi için hayâ etmeyerek mârifetiyle tertib edilen o sahte varakayı bura muhâkemesine ib’as ve hemfikri bulunan gaddar mahallî adliye memûrîni ile her gün bir sûretle mezkûr âzâları tazyik ve mürâcaatlarında ferâgat edilmez ise umûmun intihâbıyla müntehib bulundukları için umûm bir livâ milleti denileceğinden bir livânın da mahv ve harâbiyyetini hiçbir adâlet, husûsiyle Zamân-ı Meşrûtiyet kabûl buyurmayacaktır. Tertib edilen varakanın sahteliğini resmen tahkik etmek üzere […] taleb buyurulmasıyla ve terakkiyât uğradığı fedâkârlıkları resmen müşâhede kılınan âzâ-i mezkûrenin iftirâat-ı vâkıâdan adâletle muhâfazaları ve ayrıca taltîf buyurulmaları umûm millet nâmına istirhâm olunur. Ferman From Sulaymaniyah Merchants Sâlih, Mehmed, Abdülhâkim, Ahmed, Mustafa (Nearly 100 merchants, drapers and shopkeepers)

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justice, and especially the Constitutional Monarchy regime, would never accept the destruction of an entire sanjak because of such a fake document. At the end of the message, tradesmen and merchants demanded on behalf of the entire people that the forgery of the document be formally investigated, that the members of the council be protected from these slanders and that they be rewarded. Although there is no mention of Sub-Governor or Ziyâ Pasha in the message, considering the long-standing complaints about him, the conflict he had with Mayor Abdülgafur Agha and Deputy Said Effendi and the satisfaction displayed by the tradesmen and merchants when he was dismissed, it was possible that these allegations were brought against him.⁴²² Although the Grand Vizier had sent him a message at the end of June praising his services and that he would not change his place of duty, Ziyâ was to be dismissed from Sulaymaniyah in the middle of September. However, it is not understood from these messages why Ziyâ Pasha needed a forged document issued against her predecessor, whether he had an enmity with Sub-Governor Tevfik or whether he had an alliance with Governor Reşid. This allegation remains a mystery, as there is no other allegation implicating Ziyâ Pasha regarding the forged document, and even Tevfik Pasha himself accused only Reşid Pasha. The only investigation found in the archive against Ziyâ Pasha is in two documents dated 1913 and 1916 and concerns municipal revenues and the treasury.⁴²³

 BOA, DH.MUİ.10/28/Lef 2, 27 Ağustos 1325 – 09 Eylül 1909; DH.MUİ.13/30/ Lef 2, 7/8 Eylül 1325 – 20/21 Eylül 1909; BEO 3586/268900, Lef 1– 15 Haziran 1325 – 28 Haziran 1909  BOA, BEO 4191/314301/Lef 1– 19 Haziran 1329 – 02 Temmuz 1913; ŞD.2204/10/Lef 1, 13 Haziran 1332– 26 Haziran 1916

6 Judgement and Sentencing 6.1 Post-incident Configuration of the Mosul’s Judicial Organization The establishment of the judicial infrastructure in Mosul after the Mosul Incident was an issue that had both civilian and military dimensions. While the renewal of the judicial staff constituted one aspect of the issue, the security of the trial, the control of the detainees and the preparation for the worst-case scenarios after the trial constituted the other aspects of the issue. In this section, it will be examined how the judicial infrastructure of the province was configured after the Mosul Incident and how the right candidates for the courthouse cadres were determined and appointed. In addition, it will be covered how the security infrastructure, which is necessary for the proper conduct of the investigation, prosecution, and judgement stages of the case, was formed by the Ottoman military. At this point, we observe that the Governors made a lot of effort especially for the deployment and the permanence of the Joint Task Force in Mosul. Because this was not an ordinary case and, as we shall see, security concerns were at an extreme level.

Accurate and Reliable Staff Selection for the Prosecution Post-incident correspondence traffic had increased and accelerated considerably. While the primary investigation was in progress and the developments were reported on a regular basis, Governor Zeki also assessed the clues regarding the perpetrators, identified possible suspects and focused on the judicial infrastructure. According to Zeki, it was a conceivable possibility at first that Sheikh Said and his affiliates might have been murdered by the men of Mahmud Pasha, who were in the center of Mosul at the same time.⁴²⁴ However, according to the pre-

 BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/78, 27 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 09 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Şeyh Said Efendi ile taallukatının katli Mahmud Paşa’nın buradaki adamları tarafından vuku bulmak ihmâli de vârid-i hatır olur ise müşârünileyhin ikamet ettiği hâneyi saatlerce şiddetli ateşe tutarak kendilerini katl cerh ve elbiselerine kadar nehb ve yağma edenlerin Musullu olmasına ve bizzat Şeyhi katl eden şahsın da Evlâd-ı Arabiden ve Musul ahâlisinden bulunduğu ifâde olunmasına nazaran hakikatin zâhire ihrâcı herhalde tahkikat […] îfâ ve muntazır olan kuvvetin vürûduyla tâkibât-ı şedide icrâsına vâbeste bulunduğu ve mâhâzâ elyevm Merkez-i Vilâyetin https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-013

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liminary findings, it was stated that the perpetrators were originally from Mosul and that the person who killed the Sheikh himself was of Arab origin and a native of Mosul. Yet the emergence of the truth depended on the outcome of the investigation and prosecution, which would deepen with the arrival of the expected military force. However, the absence of a Public Prosecutor (Müdde-i Umûmi) and his Assistant (Muâvini) appointed in the provincial center for the time being, and the fact that their deputies were natives, threatened the impartiality and veracity of the prosecution. According to Zeki, this situation would prevent the truth from being revealed (hakikatin zâhire ihrâcı) and, on the contrary, would serve to cover it up (ketm-i hakikat). Zeki requested the appointment of a highly capable prosecutor to Mosul due to the magnitude and severity of the case, and reminded that the assistant prosecutor, who had been appointed to the post but had not yet arrived, should be sent swiftly. In the meantime, suitable candidates for the Prosecutor’s Office of Appeal (İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmisi) and his assistant were determined by the Ministry of Justice and appointees were selected.⁴²⁵ However, since it will take time for them to reach Mosul, it was a more practical solution for now to select and assign a Prosecutor of Appeal and an Examining Magistrate (Müstantık) suitable for Mosul from among the available courthouse officers in adjacent localities. At this point, the central authorities asked the Governor’s office to conduct a quick research and identify suitable candidates from the surrounding settlements. Accordingly, Governor Zeki nominated Abdullah Hilmi, Baghdad Prosecutor of Appeal with Şevket Effendi, Bitlis Assistant Prosecutor and also requested two competent Examining Magistrates from the Diyarbakir and Mâmuret-ül Aziz

Müdde-i Umûmi ve Muâvini olmayıp vekillerinin yerli bulunmasıyla ketm-i hakikate hizmet edileceği cihetle vukuatın cesâmet ve ehemmiyeti nisbetinde tâkibât-ı kanuniye îfâsı için gayet muktedir bir Müdde-i Umûmi ile Muâvinliğe tâyin olunup henüz gelmemiş olan zâtın sür’at-i i’zâmları esbâbının istikmâli kemâl-i ehemmiyetiyle müsterhamdır. Ferman Musul Vâlisi Feriki Zeki”  DH.MKT.2703/76/Lef 3, 28 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 10 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği ile Muâvinliğine Adliye Nezâretince münâsibleri intihâb olunmuş ise de bunların oraya vusûlleri vakte muhtâc olduğundan civar mahallerdeki Memûrîn-i Adliye meyânında Müdde-i Umûmilerle Müstantıklardan münâsiblerinin Musul’a celb ve istihdâm edilmeleri sûreti tasvib ve Nezâret-i müşârünileyhden Vilâyet Memûrîn-i Adliyesine tebliğ edilmekle vilâyetçe de tahkikat-ı lâzıme heman icrâ edilerek nerelerdeki Memûrîn-i Adliyeden kimlerin celb edilmeleri muvâfık görülüyor ise isimlerinin âcilen iş’âr buyurulması tavsiye olunur. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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Provinces.⁴²⁶ However, the Grand Vizirate did not leave this critical appointment to Zeki’s initiative and started to negotiate other competent and appropriate candidates in consultation with the Ministry of Justice.⁴²⁷ During this process, as the expected appointments for the judicial staff were delayed, the pressure on the Governor’s office was increasing day by day. Under those circumstances Governor Zeki was often obliged to articulate that it was a vital and urgent need to sentence those who caused, encouraged, and perpetrated this disastrous crime.⁴²⁸ According to Zeki, although the Kurds were in a temporary state of calm for the time being, this calm could suddenly be broken after the court decisions

 BOA, DH.ŞFR.408/101, 29 Kânûnuevvel 1324– 11 January 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Buraca […] bir hâli bulunan muamelât-ı adliyenin icrâsı için Bağdad İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmisi Abdullah Hilmi, Bitlis Merkez Müdde-i Umûmi Muâvini Şevket Efendilerle Diyarbekir ve Mâmuret-ül Aziz Vilâyetlerinden iki muktedir Müstantıkın celbleri temin-i maksada kâfi olacağı bittahkik anlaşılmasına mebni mûmâileyhin sür’at-i hareketleri için Nezâret-i âidesinden kendülerine tebligat-ı […] îtâ ettirilmesi kemâl-i ehemmiyetle mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Feriki Zeki”  BOA, BEO.3471/260307/Lef 1, 03 Kânûnusâni 1324– 16 January 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Aliyyesine. Musul Vilâyetinin açık olan İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğine Musul Merkez Bidâyet Mahkemesi Cezâ Dâiresi Reisi Ömer Lütfi ve mezkûr Cezâ Dâiresi Riyâsetine Bağdad Vilâyeti Merkez Müdde-i Umûmi Muâvini Mustafa Nûri… Sadâret-i Uzmâ Mektûbi kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.2719/85/Lef 1, 11 Kânûnusâni 1324– 24 January 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre Vak’a-ı fâcia-i mâlûmenin müsebbib ve mütecâsirleri hakkında muktezi muâmelenin icrâsına hâlen ve mevkiyen ihtiyâc pek şediddir. Zira galeyâna gelmiş olan umûm Kürdler icrâât-ı hükûmete intizâren şimdilik her ne kadar bir sükûn-u muvakkat içinde bulunuyorlar ise de icrâât-ı hükûmet derecât-ı mehâkimin netice-i karârına taalluk edilecek olursa bu sükûn birdenbire halelpezir olarak bu havâlice Adliye ile Kürdler arasında pek büyük sefk-i dimâyı intâc edeceği ve hükûmet de müşkil bir mevkide kalacağı muhakkaktır. Bu meselenin bura adliye heyetiyle rü’yeti farz olunsa bile dâvâ-yı adliyenin mehâkim kısmında bulunan âzâlarıyla memûrînin kısm-i küllisi yerli olduklarından muâmelenin selâmet-i cereyânı gayri mümkün ve rüesâ-yı adliyenin dahi hükm-i kanunun icrâ ve tatbikatında dûçâr-ı müşkilât olacakları bedihi olduğundan, Diyarbekir Mardin’de oldukları cereyân-ı muhâbereden anlaşılan müstantıkların vürûduyla da Musul’ca işe mübâşereti muvâfık-ı hâl ve maslahat olacağı anlaşıldığından Dördüncü Ordudan gelmekte bulunan kuvve-i askeriyyenin vürûduna kadar ya Dersaadet’ten ve yâhûd başka vilâyetten bir ‘Heyet-i Mahsûsa-ı Adliye’ i’zâmıyla buradaki rüesâ-yı adliye dahi dâhil oldukları hâlde tâkibât-ı kanuniye icrâ ettirilerek istihsâl olacak neticeye göre emsâllerine gayret-i müessire olmak üzere müşevvik ve müsebbib olanların i’dâm cezâsıyla tecrim ettirilmesi lüzûmu selâmet-i vatan ve memleket için lâzım ve lâbüdd olacağı cihetle iktizâsının îfâ ve neticesinin irâde ve inbâsı müsted’âdır. Ferman Vâli Zeki”

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were announced. Worse still, bloody incidents could have happened between the Kurds in the region and the judicial authorities, which could put the government in a difficult position. If the local judicial committee were to hear the case, it would not have been possible for the process to proceed in a healthy manner (selâmet-i cereyân) since the committee consisted entirely of native officials and members. Moreover, it would be really difficult for the judges under the pressure, influence or guidance of their fellow townsmen, to reach a verdict and execute the sentences. Therefore, instead of waiting for the appointments, Zeki proposed a quick and interim solution and demanded that a ‘Special Judicial Committee’ (Heyet-i Mahsûsa-i Adliye) be formed and sent from İstanbul or another province. According to Zeki’s proposal, this special committee would undertake the prosecution and reach a verdict in cooperation with the local courthouse chiefs. Finally, Zeki suggested that instigators and perpetrators be sentenced with the death penalty in order to set a deterrent precedent for the sake and safety of the homeland. The decree of the Council of Ministers (Meclis-i Vükelâ) of January 27 ruled that transferring the trial to another court (nakl-i muhâkeme) would bring difficulties and that sending a special judicial committee to Mosul would not be in accordance with the customary practices.⁴²⁹ A staff arrangement was envisaged

 BOA, MV.124/19, 05 Muharrem 1327– 27 January 1909 “Meclis-i Vükelâ Müzâkerâtına Mahsûs Zabıt Vesikasıdır. Hâzır bulunan Zevât-ı Fehamın Esâmisi Musul Vak’a-i Fâciasının aşâir ve kabâil beyninde hâsıl ettiği tesirâtın izâlesi zımnında müsebbib ve mütecâsirleri haklarında tâkibât ve muhâkemât-ı kanuniye icrâ olunmak ve vilâyet-i rüesâ-yı adliyesi dahi iştirâk etmek üzere Dersaadet’ten yâhûd diğer bir vilâyetten bir Heyet-i Mahsûsa-i Adliyenin i’zâmı lüzûmu Musul Vilâyetince iş’âr kılındığına dâir Dâhiliye Nezâretinden 3 Muharrem 1327 târihli tezkiresi kıraat olundu. Bu husûsta nakl-i muhâkemesi cihetine gidilmesi müşkilâtı mûcib ve mahaline bir Heyet-i Mahsûsa-i Adliye i’zâmı da gayr-i münâsib olduğundan ve taşra mehâkimi âzâsının taraf-ı devlete mensûb ve muvazzaf olmak üzere tensiki mutasavver olup bu tasavvurun mevki-i faale iktirânı hâline tâkibât ve muhâkemâtın yerliden bulunan âzâ ve memûrîn-i mahalliye mârifetiyle icrâsında vilâyetçe mülâhaza olunan mahzûra mahal kalmayacağından tensikat-ı adliyenin şimdiden Musul Vilâyetince merkeze tatbike vazife ibtidâr olunarak Şeyh Said Efendi ve mahdûmunun katlinde medhaldâr olanların tâkib ve tertibi mücâzât-ı kanuniyeleriyle vezâif-i hükûmetin bir an evvel iâdelerine îfâsı esbâbının istihsâli zımnında Adliye Nezâretine tebligat icrâsı ve keyfiyetin cevâben Dâhiliye Nezâretine iş’ârı tezkir kılındı” The Ministers who signed the Cabinet Decree were: Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha, Sheikh-ul-Islam Cemâleddin Efendi, Minister of War Ali Rızâ Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Chairman of the Council of State Hasan Fehmi Pasha, Minister of Interior Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, Minister of Finance Mehmed Ziyâ Pasha, Minister of Justice Manyasizâde Refik Bey, President of the Chamber of Deputies Ahmed Rızâ

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upon the selection and appointments of the members of existing provincial courts from among the pro-state (taraf-ı devlete mensûb ve muvazzaf) civil servants (see Illustration 18). If this envisagement was implemented, there would be no drawbacks in the prosecution and judgment being carried out by native judicial officials and court members. Notifying the Council of Ministers’ decision to the relevant Ministries within a few days, the Grand Vizier would demand that the judicial organization in Mosul be reorganized quickly and that a prosecution and lawsuit be filed against those involved in the Mosul Incident.⁴³⁰ In short, the Porte had planned to solve the problem by reorganizing the existing local cadres (tensikat-ı adliye) instead of transferring the court to another location or establishing a mobile committee. The negative impacts of the Mosul disaster on the tribes and clans had to be eliminated as soon as possible. As stated earlier, the prosecution and judgement of this case could not be started in the Mosul courts, where native court officials were serving.⁴³¹ Because this situation could create distrust, clearly violate the principle of impartiality of the case, and ultimately lead to a decision and judgment in favor of one party. For this reason, the existing courthouse officers could not get to work and start the investigation. Apparently, Zeki was expecting an impartial justice department to be activated in Mosul provincial center for this investigation, prosecution and trial to proceed properly. Under these circumstances, he questioned from the Ministry whether it would be appropriate to postpone the investigation and prosecution until such a justice department became operational. If there was no time to delay, he demanded that the existing courthouse officials, even native, be informed and instructed so that the investigation could be initiated expeditiously. Because the waste of time in such a critical case regarding such a devastating incident was against them in every way. Finally, the Ministry of Justice nominated the suitable candidates, and the expected appointments for the judicial organization within the Mosul Province took place (see Illustration 19). According to the memorandum signed by the

 BOA, BEO.3483/261159/Lef 1, 20 Kânûnusâni 1324– 02 February 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324– 15 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden vürûd şifre telgrafnâme Evvelce de arz olunduğu veçhiyle yerli Memûrîn-i Adliyenin mevcûd olduğu Musul mehâkiminde bu meselenin rü’yeti gayrimümkün bulunduğundan Memûrîn-i Adliye olan tahkikata ibtidâr edememiştir. hâl bu merkezde iken teşkilat-ı adliyeye intizâren tahkikat ve tâkibât-ı kanuniyenin tehiri muvâfık ise o yolda değil ise tahkikat ibtidâr idilmek [sic] için Memûrîn-i Adliyeye tebligat-ı îfâ olunmak üzere muktezâ-yı hâlin emir buyrulması. Vâli Zeki”

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Illustration 18: BOA, MV.124/19, 05 Muharrem 1327 – 27 January 1909 The Decree by the Council of Ministers on the reorganization of the Mosul’s Judicial Organization before the prosecution and trials regarding the Mosul Incident.

Minister of Justice Manyasizâde Refik, the names appointed and the positions they filled were as shown in Table 5.⁴³²

 BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324– 16 February 1909

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Table 5: Appointments made to the Mosul’s Judicial Organization Appointee

Former Office

Appointed Office

Ömer Lütfi Effendi

Head of the Penal Chamber of the Court of First Instance in Provincial Center (Merkez-i Vilâyet Bidâyet Mahkemesi Cezâ Reisi) Assistant Public Prosecutor of Provincial Center of Baghdad (Bağdad Merkez Müdde-i Umûmi Muâvini) Head of the Penal Chamber of Hama Sanjak (Hama Cezâ Reisi)

Public Prosecutor of the Mosul Provincial Court of Appeal (Musul Vilâyeti İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği) Head of the Penal Chamber of Provincial Center of Mosul (Merkez Cezâ Riyâseti) Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Mosul Province (Musul Vilâyeti Müdde-i Umûmi Muâvinliği)

Mustafa Nûri Effendi Edib Effendi

The newly appointed officers were instructed to go to their posts and start their duties immediately. In addition, the Examining Magistrates of Central Diyarbekir and Mardin (Diyarbekir Merkez Müstantıkıyla Mardin Müstantıkı) were expected to reach Mosul in two to three days via the riverway to assist the interrogation process (tahkikat-ı istintâkıyye). However, these appointments consisted only the bureaucratic part of the investigation and prosecution processes before the judgement. In addition, it was necessary to ensure the security of the trial process of this critical case and to pacify the groups that could cause incidents. For this purpose, it was planned to bring neutral troops from the 4th Army garrisons to replace the local military organization consisting mostly of Arab origin natives of Mosul.

“Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhiye, Vilâyetten evvelce bu babda keşide olup Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesinden tevdi edilen 29 Kânûnusâni 1324 târihli telgrafnâme üzerine vilâyet-i mezkûre İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğine Merkez-i Vilâyet Bidâyet Mahkemesi Cezâ Reisi Ömer Lütfi ve Merkez Cezâ Riyâsetiyle Müdde-i Umûmi Muâvinliğine Bağdad Merkez Müdde-i Umûmi Muâvini Mustafa ve Hama Cezâ Reisi Edib Efendilerin memûriyetleri tasdik-i aliyye iktidâ’ ederek hemen işe mübâşereti Ömer Lütfi Efendiye ve mahal-i mezkûra sür’at-i azimetleri mûmâileyh Mustafa ve Edib Efendilere bildirildiği gibi tahkikat-ı istintâkıyyeye muâvenet etmek üzere Diyarbekir’den nehr tarikiyle iki üç gün zarfında Musul’a azimeti mümkün olacağı anlaşılmasına binâen Diyarbekir Merkez Müstantıkıyla Mardin Müstantıkının serian Musul’a i’zâmları lüzûmu da Diyarbekir Vilâyetiyle İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğine tebliğ olunarak cümlesinin Musul’a müteveccihen hareket ettikleri Adliye Nâzırı Manyasizâde Refik “

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Illustration 19: BOA, BEO.3495/262087/Lef 2, 03 Şubat 1324 – 16 February 1909 The memorandum sent by the Minister of Justice, Manyasizâde Refik Bey, to the Grand Viziership regarding the appointments made to the Mosul’s Judiciary.

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Ensuring the Tactical Security of the Judicial Process While the Acting Governor Zeki tried to eliminate the Siege of Sulaymaniyah on the one hand, he tried to establish the judicial and military infrastructure for the Mosul Incident trial on the other. In a short while, he reported that the infantry and cavalry units of the 4th Army were partially deployed in Mosul.⁴³³ A field artillery battery sent from the 6th Army was expected to arrive in a few days as well. After the JTF composed of three different branches, was mustered and activated in the provincial center, the investigation and prosecution of the instigators and perpetrators of the incident could not be delayed any longer. Unless legal action was taken against these murderers as soon as possible, it was only a matter of time before the Kurds would take advantage of this to seek revenge and organize an attack (harekât-ı tecâvüzkârâne). Because for the Kurds who had been waiting for the government’s action in a temporary calm for a while, there would be no more obstacles for the manifestation of justice. In short, Governor Zeki stated that delay in justice despite the deployment of military force would increase the tension and trigger a possible retaliation by the Kurds. Because the aggrieved party, who witnessed military activities around but still could not get results, would think that the delay was intentional and would resort to different methods. However, the justice department which was instructed to be established in Mosul by the Council of Ministers, was not yet active and operational. The demographic structure of the province was expected to raise major problems. Zeki gradually transformed the city into a garrison as strong opposition was expected from the Arab residents of Mosul, especially during the trials.⁴³⁴  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 18, 02 Şubat 1324– 15 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden vürûd şifre telgrafnâme Dördüncü Ordudan sevk olunan piyâde ve süvâri Asâkir-i Osmâniye’nin kısmen geldiğini arz ederim. Altıncı Ordudan gönderilen bir batarya sahrâ topu da birkaç güne kadar Musul’a vâsıl olur. Sunûf-u Sülâseden mürekkeb kuvva-yi askeriyye merkezde cem’ ve tahaşşüd edildikten sonra vak’a-i mâlûmenin müsebbib ve mütecâsirleri haklarında tahkikat ve tâkibâtın taviki muvâfık olamayacağı derkâr olup icrâât-ı hükûmete intizâren bir sükûnet-i muvakkat tahtında bulunan Kürdlerde muktezâ-yı adâletin icrâsına artık bir mâni kalmadığından müsebbib ve mütecâsir-i katl olanlar hakkında bir an evvel muâmele-i muktezi icrâ olunmadığı takdirde bil-istifâde ahz-ı sâra kıyâm edecekleri her-bâr beyân ve iş’âr ve harekât-ı tecâvüzkârâneye ihtiyâr edecekleri bedidârdır. 22 Kânûnusâni 324 telgrafnâme-i fahimânelerinde tebliğ buyurulan adliye teşkilatı buraca henüz icrâ buyrulmamıştır. Vâli Zeki”  BOA, DH.ŞFR.410/70, 9 Şubat 1324– 22 Şubat 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Vak’a-i mâlûmenin tahkikine ibtidâr edilecekse de ahâliden rûy-u muhâlefet me’mûl bulunduğundan bir gaile zuhûru hâlinde âsâyişin teminiyle mütecâsirinin te’dibi için kuvvet-i askeriyye-

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According to Zeki’s telegram dated February 22 regarding the state of the military deployment, two understrength battalions dispatched from the 4th Army had arrived in Mosul. As the strength of these two battalions was greatly reduced enroute due to illness, it was expected that either two additional battalions would be sent, or they would be raised to their full strength. A mountain artillery battery, three cavalry companies totaling 150 soldiers including their officers, and a field battery consisting of 140 regular mule cavalry from Baghdad were still expected to arrive. In addition to the 4th Army units, the 6th Army elements were also located in the provincial center. The 3rd Battalion of the 46th Regiment and two companies of the 33rd Cavalry Regiment were in the center of Mosul, but as Zeki had previously stated, they had done more harm than good during the Mosul Incident (vukuat esnâsında kendilerinden zerre kadar istifâde olunamayıp bilakis mazarratları görüldüğü). Since these elements consisted of native soldiers of Mosul origin, Zeki was worried that if an incident occurred during the investigation and trial, these forces would most likely attack the Kurds. Zeki who was afraid of things getting out of control, wrote as ‘God forbid, if such an attack occurs, it is obvious that the force at hand would be insufficient!’. That’s exactly why the 6th Army units had to be moved to another location and the 4th Army units had to be brought to their full capacity and strength quickly. Unfortunately, the investigation and prosecution procedures could not be initiated under the supervision of the existing military elements, while the judicial organization was expected to be configured. The discomfort of the central authorities with this uncertainty was evident in the correspondence. Although the Governor’s office had previously stated that it was possible to initiate the innin kifâyet edip etmeyeceği Musul Kumandanlığından istifsâr olunmuştu. Cevâben alınan tezkirede Dördüncü Ordudan gönderilen iki taburun dört tabura ilâvesi veyahut mevcûdlarının tam tertib-i seferîye iblâğı Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesiyle Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına yazılmış ise de henüz cevâbın alınamadığı ve elyevm Merkez-i Vilâyetin mevcûd Dördüncü Ordunun iki taburuyla yolda bulunan cebel bataryası ve mâ-Zâbitân mevcûdları 150 nefer raddesinde bulunan üç bölük süvâri ve Bağdad’dan gelmekte bulunan sahrâ bataryasının efrâdı da 140 nizâmiye ester süvârından ibâret olup gerçi bunlardan başka Altıncı Orduya mensûb 46. Alayın 3. Taburuyla 33. Süvâri Alayının iki bölük kadar efrâdı var ise de vukuat esnâsında kendilerinden zerre kadar istifâde olunamayıp bilakis mazarratları görüldüğü, tahkikat icrâsı sırasında bir hâdise zuhûr edecek olur ise nazarlarını Musul’a dikmiş olan Ekrâda karşı hücûm etmeleri baid-ül ihtimâl olduğu, maâzallahu teâlâ öyle bir muhâceme vukuatında eldeki kuvvetin adem-i kifâyesi derkâr bulunduğu dermeyân olunmuş ve sûret-i iş’âr muvâfık-ı hâl ve maslahat görünmüş olmakla sâlif-ül arz Altıncı Ordu tabur ve bölüklerinin âher mahale kaldırılmasıyla beraber Dördüncü Ordudan iki taburun daha tesri-i i’zâmı ve şâyet bu cihet mümkün olamadığı sûrette mevcut taburların tam tertibe iblâğı için Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine tebligat ikası lüzûmu mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Ferik Zeki”

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vestigation with the deployed part of the JTF, right after that, insufficiency of force was mentioned and two additional battalions were requested.⁴³⁵ However, reorganization and redeployment of a new force required extra time and could delay the investigation. On the other hand, since this delay may raise permanent damages, the Governor was instructed to think thoroughly (biletrâf teemmül) on how to handle the situation, but no response was received yet. The Ministry also questioned how much of the Joint Task Force was deployed in Mosul to date, where the remaining part was that day and when they would arrive. Finally, the Ministry directly asked whether the existing force was sufficient to proceed with the investigation and sought a prompt and detailed response. According to Zeki’s response, out of four infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment and one mountain artillery unit which were expected to be organized and dispatched from the 4th Army, only two infantry battalions and three cavalry companies had reached Mosul at full strength (tam tertib-i seferriyede).⁴³⁶ The mountain and field artillery batteries (cebel ve sahrâ bataryaları), which were

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 23, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyeti Vekâletine, Kuvve-i Mürettebenin Musul’a vâsıl olan kısmıyla tahkikata başlanmak imkânı izhâr buyrulmuş iken müteâkiben […] Kuvve-i Mürettebenin adem-i kifâyetinden ve iki taburun daha ilâve sevki bahs olunmasına ve yeniden kuvvet tertib ve sevki vakte muhtâc ve tahkikatın tehiri mahzûru dâimî olacağına nazaran el-hâletü’l hâzihi ne yapmak lâzım geleceğinin biletrâf teemmül ve inbâsı tebliğ kılınacağı hâlde henüz cevâb alınamadı. […] uzadıkça müşkilât ve mesâil […] olduğundan bu babdaki mülâhazatın yarına kadar muvazzahan iş’ârı ve Kuvve-i Mürettebenin ne kadarı vâsıl olduğunun ve bakıyyesi elyevm nerelerde olup ne vakit vâsıl olacaklarının ilâveten […] bâbında kuvve-i mezkûre tahkikatın temin-i icrâsına kâfi midir serian ve mevzûan iş’ârı te’kîden beyân olunur. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 47, 15 Şubat 1324– 28 February 1909 “Musul Vilâyetinden vârid olan şifre hâlidir Vak’a-i fecia-i mâlûmenin ehemmiyeti dâiresinde icrâât-ı mukteziye icrâsı için bidâyet emirde dört tabur piyâde ve bir alay süvâri ile bir cebel bataryasının Dördüncü Ordudan tertib ve sevki lüzûmu arz edilmişti. Gelen iki tabur ile üç bölük süvâri tam tertib-i seferriyede olduğu ve Dördüncü ve Altıncı Ordulardan cebel ve sahrâ bataryalarının efrâdı da o tesbitte bulunduğunu zannıyla müsebbib ve mütecâsir-i vukuat olanlar haklarında artık tahkikat ve tâkibât icrâsına mâni kalmadığı arz kılınmış ise de halbuki Sunûf-u Sülâsenin mâruz mevcûd-u hâzıranın her türlü ihtimâle karşı kifâyetsizliği âhiren Kumandanla bil-müzâkere anlaşılması üzerine iki taburun daha sevki lüzûmu Kumandanlıkla müştereken Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına yazılarak henüz cevâb alınamamıştır. İşte irâde buyurulan mübâyenet bu cihetten ileri gelmiştir. Mâmâfih bir iki güne kadar mahale muvasalatı me’mûl olan Vâli-i Lâhık’dan bu babda istifsâr-ı mütâlaa buyurulmak faideden hâli olmayacağı derkâr ise de icrâ-yı îcâbı menût-u re’y-i ulyâlarıdır. Ferman Veli Vekili Ferik Zeki”

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dispatched from the 4th and 6th Armies, were also reported as full strength upon their arrival. Based on this deployed force, Zeki Pasha had previously assumed and reported that there was no longer any obstacle to the conduct of the investigation and prosecution. However, as he later agreed with the Mosul Commander, this existing alert force consisting of ‘three classes’ (Sunûf-u Sülâse), could have been insufficient in the worst-case scenario. The Governor and Commander had already requested two extra battalions from the 6th Army that might be required at this point but had yet to receive a response. Zeki stated that the inconsistency (mübâyenet) in the messages was due to this last-minute change and reminded that it would be useful to get an opinion from the new Governor who is expected to arrive in Mosul in a few days. It seems that Zeki Pasha made the preliminary assessment of the military shipment on his own initiative. However, after discussing measures to be taken with the Provincial Commander in line with the anticipated social violence, the plans have changed. Meanwhile, correspondence regarding the establishment of public security in Mosul and the conduct of the judicial investigation continued at the inter-ministerial level. Minister of War Ali Rızâ reported that the artillery battery, which was expected to be dispatched from Bitlis, could only move on February 1 due to seasonal conditions (mevsimin müsâadesizliğinden).⁴³⁷ In addition, many sol-

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 48, 14 Şubat 1324– 27 February 1909 “Mâruz-ı Çâkeri Kemineleridir ki, Musul Vak’asından dolayı âsâyişin takrir ve tahkikat-ı adliyenin temini maksadıyla evvelce Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyundan oraya tertib ve tesrib edilen kuvvetlerin topçu bataryası mevsimin müsâadesizliğinden dolayı ancak Şubatın birinde Bitlis’ten hareket edebilmiş ve Musul’a vâsıl olan iki nizâmiye taburunun birçok efrâdı da hastalık ve diğer gûnâ avarız sebebiyle yollarda perâkende bir hâlde kalmış olmasından tahkikatın kemâliyle icrâsı […] mezkûr iki taburun tezyid-i mevcûdu Musul Kumandanlığından iş’âr edilmiş ise de şu sırada tezyid-i mevcûd için efrâd-ı ihtiyâtiye celb ve sevki zamâna muhtâc olduğundan en yakın mevkiden bir nizâmiye taburunun daha Musul’a sevki Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyun Müşiriyeti Vekâletine iş’âr edilmişti. Bu kere alınan telgrafnâme-i cevâbiyeye Bitlis’teki 32. Alayın Birinci Taburunun Musul’a hareketine emir verildiği izbâr ve diğer taburlardan yolda kalan efrâdın da peyderpey sevkine gayret edilmekte olunduğundan evvelce mevrûd diğer telgrafnâmede dermeyân edilmiş olması üzerine bunlardan bahisle mezkûr taburun vürûdunda tahkikat ve icrâât-ı adliyeye germi verilerek buhrân-ı hâzırın izâle ve âsâyişin teyidine sarf-ı makderet edilmesi lüzûmu bu kere bâ-telgrafnâme Musul Kumandanlığına iş’âr kılınmış olmakla mezkûr taburun Bitlis’ten hareketi için tabi-ül lüzûm olan masârifin âcilen itâsı ve Süleymaniye ve Kerkük’deki Meşâyih ve Aşâirden vârid olup tevârih-i muhtelifede bâ-tezâkir […] Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine takdim edilmiş olan telgrafnâmelerde münderiç şikâyât-ı mütevâliyeye karşı bunların tatmin-i ezhânını mûcib tedbir ve icrâât-ı kanuniyenin bir an evvel îfâsı husûsunda îcâb edenlere emir ve iş’ârına müsâade buyrulmak bâbında emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyyül emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Ali Rızâ “

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diers of the two regular army battalions that reached Mosul were devastated on the roads due to the problems such as disease (hastalık ve diğer gûnâ avarız) and the integrity of the forces was disrupted (yollarda perâkende bir hâlde). However, it would take a long time to dispatch the reserve troops demanded to increase the strength of these two battalions stationed in Mosul. For this reason, the dispatch of an additional regular army battalion to Mosul from the nearest position was requested from the 4th Army Command. The 1st battalion of the 32nd Regiment in Bitlis was ordered to move to Mosul, and the soldiers of the other battalions who were stranded enroute due to health conditions, were tried to be transferred to Mosul gradually (peyderpey sevkine gayret). The Ministry of War was in constant communication with both the Ministries of Justice and Interior and the Mosul Command in order to eliminate the current crisis and re-establish security. Ali Rızâ Pasha had instructed the necessary authorities to immediately pay the necessary expenses for the battalion departing from Bitlis and to speed up the investigation and prosecution as this battalion reached Mosul. In addition, he specifically reminded the ongoing complaints from the Sheikhs and tribes in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, emphasizing that it was essential to initiate the legal process to calm these circles. On the other hand, the Ministry of Interior was also concerned about the negative outcomes arose in Sulaymaniyah due to the delay in the judicial prosecution.⁴³⁸ The ministry was not wrong either, as the Siege of Sulaymaniyah (Süleymaniye Vak’ası) was apparently one of the consequences of this detrimental effect (sû-i tesirâtın müstetbeâtındandır). The constant demand for additional forces by the province and the complications experienced during the financing,

 BOA, DH.MKT.1303/1/Lef 49, 17 Şubat 1324– 2 March 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine. Bitlis’teki taburun tesri’-i hareketi için tebligat akide-i icrâ kılınmıştır. Musul Vak’asının mütecâsirleri hakkında lâzım gelen tâkibât-ı kanuniyenin tehiri oralarca pek ziyâde sû-i tesirâtı müstelzim olmakta bulunduğu işârât-ı vâkıâdan anlaşılmaktadır. Hatta Süleymaniye Vak’ası da bu sû-i tesirâtın müstetbeâtındandır. Binâenaleyh […] tâkibât-ı kanuniyenin tesri’ selef-i vâlâlarına evvel ve âhir tevcih edilmiş idi. Geçende alınan bir telgrafnâmede tâkibât-ı kanuniyeye başlanması istîzân edilmiş iken âhiren vârid olan diğer telgrafnâmede iki taburun daha sevkine lüzûm gösterildi. Bu iki iş’âr beynindeki mübâyenet istîzâh edilmesi üzerine vâsıl olan kuvve-i askeriyyenin tam tertib-i seferîde olmadığı beyân ve muvasalat-ı aliyyelerinin mütâlaât-ı vâlâlarının da istifsârı lüzûmu dermeyân olunmuş idi. Sûret-i iş’âr-ı aliyyelerine nazaran kuvve-i mevcûde temin-i âsâyişe kâfi görülmüş ve tahkikata başlanmış olduğundan el-yevm şâyân-ı ehemmiyet ve itinâ olan cihet-i mütecâsirler hakkında îcâb eden muamelât-ı kanuniyenin îfâsının iltizâmı faâliyet ve irâe-i adâlet ile sû-i tesirât-ı sâbıkayı izâle ve bu meseleden dolayı dûçâr-ı heyecân ve endişe olan ahâliyi tatmin ve irâhe etmekten ibârettir. Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”

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mobilization and deployment of these forces have also put the Ministry in a difficult position. The Ministry insisted that the current military force in Mosul was sufficient to maintain order and conduct a judicial investigation. Therefore, there was no obstacle in front of the perpetrators being tried and convicted, the satisfaction of the people on this occasion and the restoration of peace as soon as possible. However, the situation was not quite as it seemed from İstanbul. Because the sensitivity and vulnerability in the provincial center had increased so much that even the Ottoman Bank (Bank-ı Osmâni) branch was serving under the guarding of the gendarmerie.⁴³⁹ At the end of March, Governor Reşid stated that the sentencing of the criminals (erbâb-ı cerâimin tertib-i mücâzâtı) in Mosul depended on the completion of the investigation which was continuing at full speed in Sulaymaniyah.⁴⁴⁰ The Sulaymaniyah investigation was to be completed within a week, and then all the findings and conclusions would be integrated into the major case heard in the provincial center. The scope of the case and investigation regarding the Mosul Incident was expanded to include provincial subdivisions. As the alleged conspiracy was staged in Sulaymaniyah and the incident took place in Mosul, the investigation could not be expected to be confined to a single location. The higher authorities in İstanbul were under severe pressure due to the unrest and tension in the region and the possible dire consequences expected to occur after the delay in the judicial process.⁴⁴¹ The Chamber of Deputies had been subjected to

 BOA, İ..ML..84/8/Lef 1, 17 Şubat 1324– 02 March 1909  BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 1, 17 Mart 1325 30 March 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, Musulca erbâb-ı cerâimin tertib-i mücâzâtı Süleymaniye’de kemâl-i germi ile icrâ edilmekte bulunan tahkikatın ikmâline vâbeste olup bu da bir haftaya kadar hatm bularak Merkez-i Vilâyete avdet edileceğinden evvelce îcâb-ı hallin sür’at-i îfâsına ibtidâr olunacağı ve peyderpey mâlûmat verileceği mâruz. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, DH.MKT.2782/99/Lef 2, 19 Mart 1325 – 01 April 1909 “Meclis-i Mebûsân Riyâset-i Cânib-i Aliyyesine. Şeyh Said’in katli ahâli ve aşâir arasında fevkalâde mûcib-i heyecân olduğu hâlde bu işe bu hâle hükûmet-i mahalliyece ehemmiyet verilmediğinden ve tehirât-ı vâkıâdan bilâhare netâyic-i vahime zuhûru muhtemel bulunduğundan bahisle vak’a-i mezkûre mütecâsir ve müsebbiblerinin bir an evvel te’dibleriyle efkâr-ı umûmiyenin teskini lüzûmu Kerkük ve Köprü merkezlerinden müteaddid imzâlarla makam-ı âlilerine çekilip tevcib buyurulan iki kıta telgrafnâmede gösterilmiş ve bu babda evvelce vuku bulan tebligatı teyiden tahkikat ve tâkibât-ı kanuniyenin tesrii hakkında elyevm bu iş için de Süleymaniye’de bulunan Musul Vâlisi Paşa hazretlerine sebk eden vesâyâ üzerine alınan 12 Mart 1325 târihli telgrafnâmesinde mevzû bahis olan Musul vak’asında zi medhal olan erbâb-ı cerâimin tertib-i mücâzâtı Süleymaniye’de kemâl-i germiyle icrâ edilmekte bulunan tahkikatın ikmâline vâbeste olup bu da bir haftaya kadar hitâm bularak Mer-

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many demands, complaints and criticisms from centers such as Kirkuk and Altun Kupri (Altunköprü) demanding that the perpetrators be punished as soon as possible, and the public opinion be appeased. Naturally, this pressure was reflected to the Ministry of Interior through the Parliament. The Governor’s Office was frequently warned that if the investigation and prosecution were delayed further, it would lead to inevitable consequences and even cause new incidents.

6.2 Investigation, Arrests and Trial In this section, the initial arrests regarding the incident, the expansion of the investigation and the effects of the trial process on both the Mosuli Ulemâ and the Sulaymaniyah Sâdât will be examined. The organizational background and strategic moves of Reshid al-Omari, who was alleged to be one of the instigators and ringleaders of the incident, will particularly be covered. The concerns caused by the decision of the 4th Army to withdraw from Mosul, the ongoing allegations about Governor Reşid and the relations of Mosuli judicial officials with the central authorities will also be mentioned. This section is of great importance in terms of understanding the conjuncture and evolution of the trial regarding the Mosul Incident. Before moving on to the arrests, it would be useful to clarify the distinction between some legal terms and concepts. Although the arrests began in April 1909, the trial began to be heard in February 1910 and was concluded in July 1910. During this long 15-month period, despite being in prison, the detainees seem to be in the status of suspect (maznûn), detainee (mevkuf) or accused/defendant (müttehem/ müddeâaleyh) as they have not been convicted yet. However, on 14 July 1910, after the trial concluded and the guilts (mücrimiyet) and convictions (mahkûmiyet) were announced, they were transferred to the status of guilty (mücrim), convicted (mahkûm), and imprisoned (mahbûs). Even so, since the term mahbûs is also referred for the pre-conviction detention in archival materials, although technically incorrect, it was employed in the parts covering this process. In many archival correspondences, it is noticed the term maznûn or maznûnu aleyh, which is etymologically derived from the origin of ‘suspicion’ (zann- ‫)ﻇﻦ‬ and literally means ‘suspect’, is referred both for the investigation and trial prockez-i Vilâyete avdet edileceğinden o vakit îcâb-ı hâlin bilâ-tehiri îfâsına ibtidâr olunacağı ve peyderpey mâlûmat verileceği iş’âr kılındığı ve […] telgrafnâme iâdeten savb-ı […] Nezâretpenâhileri […] beyânıyla tezkire-i senâveri terkim kılındı. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”

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esses. However, it should be noted that in the Ottoman Legal System, this term also may correspond to the terms ‘accused’ (müttehem) or ‘defendant’ (müddeâaleyh) employed during the entire litigation process. In order to avoid possible confusion, a distinction was made here and the term ‘suspect’ was preferred for pre-trial and the term ‘defendant’ for the trial process.

Reshid al-Omari as a Prime Suspect and His Political Affiliations While İstanbul was in an atmosphere of complete turmoil with the outbreak of the ‘31 March Incident’ (13 April 1909), the news of the first arrests regarding the Mosul Incident reached from Mosul on the very same day. On the other hand, a political crisis broke out that day and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha submitted his resignation from his first Grand Vizirate, which lasted nearly two months.⁴⁴² On April 14, the cabinet was reshuffled under the Grand Vizirate of Ahmed Tevfik (Okday) Pasha, and the Ministry of Interior was handed over to the Undersecretary (Dâhiliye Müsteşarı) Âdil Bey. However, the situation in İstanbul was so dire that the government of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha would be brought down on May 5, and a new cabinet would be established under the second Grand Viziership of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, that very day. The Council of Ministers also got its share from this turbulent policy, and in the 21-day period between the two governments, the Minister of Interior changed three times and the Minister of War twice.⁴⁴³ While there was such a busy, turbulent and tense political agenda in İstanbul and the cabinet was constantly reshuffled, the local authorities in Mosul continued the process and made the initial arrests. According to the telegram from Governor Reşid, 14 individuals who were among the leading perpetrators of the Mosul Incident had been arrested by the judicial authorities.⁴⁴⁴ Among them, a

 BOA, İ..DUİT.8/1, 23 Rebîülevvel 1327– 14 April 1909; BEO 3534/264994, 23 Rebîülevvel 1327– 14 April 1909; DH.MKT.2794/99, Lef 1, 03 Nisan 1325 – 16 April 1909; , İ..DUİT.8/4, 08 Rebîülâhir 1327– 29 April 1909; BEO 3542/265601, 15 Rebîülâhir 1327– 06 May 1909; BOA, İ..DUİT.8/6, 15 Rebîülâhir 1327– 06 May 1909  The Ministry of Interior, which was entrusted to Âdil Bey on April 14, transferred to Rauf Pasha on April 16, to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha on April 29, and to Mehmed Ferid Pasha of Avlona with the new cabinet established on May 6. On the other hand, the Ministry of War was transferred from Ali Rızâ Pasha to Marshall (Müşir) Edhem Pasha on April 14 and Major General (Ferik) Sâlih Hulûsi (Kezrak) Pasha on April 29.  BOA, DH.MKT.2794/67/Lef 1, 31 Mart 1325 – 13 April 1909; Lef 3, 02 Nisan 1325 – 15 April 1909 “Musul vilâyetinden gelen şifrenin hâlidir. Musul hâdise-i feciasını îka’ edenlerin ileri gelenlerinden 14 şahsın bugün cihet-i adliyece taht-ı tevkife alınmak ve bunların içinde âhiren bir karışıklık emeliyle Cemiyet-i Muhammediye nâmıy-

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particular name stood out and kept the authorities busy for a long time afterwards. This person was Reshid al-Omari, the founder of the Mosul branch of the İstanbul based ‘Society/Party of Mohammedan Union’ (İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti/Fırkası or Cemiyet-i/Fırka-i Muhammediye), and he was to be accused of instigating the crowd involved in the incident through his organization.⁴⁴⁵ AlOmari is the same person who was referred as “Omari Reshid, one of the Mosul’s dignitaries” (Musul mûteberânından Ömeri Reşid) and accused of leading the crowd that raided Sheikh Said’s house, in the narrative of Sâdât’s manifest. While the investigation was continuing at full swing, the Ministry asked Governor Reşid to pay great attention to the work and expected him to make more efforts to ensure public order. At the end of May, Reshid al-Omari was to send a telegram from prison to the Command of 3rd Action Army (3. Hareket Ordusu) in İstanbul, complaining about the despotic persecution of the Governor (Vâlimizin zulümâtı-ı istibdâdında).⁴⁴⁶ While addressing the Commandership, he referred to and glorified the 3rd Action

la bir cemiyet teşkil etmiş olan Reşid Efendi Ömeri nâm şahıs da dâhil bulunmuş ve tahkikata germi-i tam ve bahs olduğu mâruzdur. Vâli Reşid” “Musul Vilâyetine Şifre Takayyüdâta bil’itinâ âsâyişin muhâfazası esbâbının istikmâline bir kat daha gayret olunması mütemennâdır. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  Hut mentions two different Cemiyet-i Muhammediye based in Mosul and states that the first was an independent organization established against CUP in Mosul in August 1908. He also states that the second one was established in Mosul at the very beginning of April 1909, a few days before the society of “İttihâd-ı Muhammediye” founded by Derviş Vahdetî in İstanbul (5 April 1909). However, Hut also underlines that the second one was not a brand-new society but an extension of one of the existing societies in İstanbul. Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 171, 172 For the most comprehensive research available on the İttihâd-ı Muhammediye Fırkası / Cemiyeti (Fırka-i/ Cemiyet-i Muhammediye) and its affiliated formations, please see: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler Cilt 1: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988) p. 182– 205 Tunaya points out Reshid al-Omari as a prominent character in the general organization of the İttihâd-ı Muhammediye and its branching in Mosul. He even refers to a telegram of al-Omari published in Volkan Newspaper on 31 March. Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler…p. 195, footnote 48  BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 1, 14 Mayıs 1325 – 27 May 1909 “Dersaaddet’te Sebeb-i Necât-ı Hürriyet Osmâniyan Üçüncü Hareket Ordusu Kumandan-ı Aliyyesine. Vâlimizin zulümâtı-ı istibdâdında necât-ı âbidânem hakkında 7 Mayıs 1325 târihli istirhâm-ı telgrafnâmeden eser görünmediğinden me’yûsiyetim tahaccümdedir. Mâruzâtım hilâf-ı hakikat tebeyyün ediliyor ise ibret-i lil-kâzibin i’dâmlar dahi olacağını din ve mezheb ve nâmûsla temin eylerim. Reşid el-Ömeri”

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Army as ‘the Reason of Salvation and Freedom’ (Sebeb-i Necât-ı Hürriyet). He mentioned that his despair increased due to the inconclusiveness of applications he had made to the relevant authorities. He also warned that if his statement was considered untrue and disregarded, executions would take place for no reason in Mosul due to unfounded accusations, and he swore for the sake of his faith and honor. After being informed of this telegram, Governor Reşid Pasha immediately contacted the Prosecutor’s Office of Appeal and wanted to learn about the accusations against al-Omari.⁴⁴⁷ Within a few days, the Governor informed the Ministry that al-Omari’s involvement in the Mosul Incident and his disruptive actions were based on solid evidence and reliable denunciations (delâil-i kanuniye ve ihbârât-ı muknia), and that the person was indefinitely detained (gayr-i muvakkit tevkif) for this reason. In addition, al-Omari received some instructions from the SMU in İstanbul, established a society with the same name in Mosul, had an official seal engraved and started its activities. Of course, establishing and operating a society in the liberal and democratic atmosphere of the Constitutional Monarchy was not a crime, on the contrary, it was one of the legal rights offered by the new regime. However, the main accusation against al-Omari was that he invited the Ulema and Spiritual Leaders (Rüesâ-yı Rûhâniye) to his society and put up some posters on the street corners (köşe başlarına yaftalar yapıştırılmak) in order to provoke the people and disturb the peace. Based on the reports of Consul Young, Davud Hut also mentions an invitation letter sent by the ‘Second’ Mohammedan Union (‘İkinci’ Cemiyet-i Muhammediyye) on 9 April, addressed to

 BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325 – 08 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine, 20 Mayıs 1325 Reşid el-Ömeri imzâsıyla Hareket Ordusu Kumandanlığına çekilen telgraf kopyası mütâlaa edilerek bil-havale sebeb-i mevkufiyeti İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden suâl olunmuştur. Ser-Müstantıklığın ifâdesine atfen yazılan derkenârda mevkuf Reşid’in geçen bayramda zuhûr edip kemâl-i ehemmiyetle tahkik edilmekte bulunan Musul Hâdiselerinde zi-medhal ve muhtell-i âsâyiş-i harekâtta bulunduğu delâil-i kanuniye ve ihbârât-ı muknia mevcûd olmasından dolayı gayr-i muvakkit sûretiyle tevkif edildiği ve bundan başka merkumun İstanbul’daki Cemiyet-i Muhammediye ile bilmuhâbere aldığı tâlimât üzerine de mevkufiyetinden evvel buradaki o nâm altında bir cemiyet teşkil ederek mührü altında makam-ı vilâyete tebliğ-i keyfiyet edildiği cihet-i adliyeye […] tezkiresi mündericâtından anlaşılmakla beraber, cemiyetine Ulemâ ve Rüesâ-yı Rûhâniyeyi davet ettiği ve köşe başlarına yaftalar yapıştırılmak sûretiyle de ahâliyi ihlâl ve sükûn-u umûmiyi ihlâle çalıştığı cihetle bundan dolayı maznûn bulunduğu dermeyân edildiği ve merkumun ne cihet tarafdârı bir şahıs olduğu 6 Nisan 1325 târihinde Hâkan-ı Mahlû’ ile Sadâret-i Uzmâya ve Cemiyet-i Muhammediye’ye keşide edildiği sûreti zirde muharrer telgrafta mütâlaasından anlaşıldığı mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”

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all Muslims, Christians and Jews in Mosul.⁴⁴⁸ According to Hut’s quotations from Consul Young’s statements, this movement was instigated by Reshid Effendi who was a notorious intriguer within the Notables of Mosul. Young also states that this movement was endorsed by Yusuf and Osman Effendis of the Ulema, Abu Jasim, and many others who were directly or indirectly involved in the Mosul Incident. Kedourie also mentions a notice signed and posted by Reshid al-Omari in early April 1909, quoting Young’s description of al-Omari as ’One of the most intriguing of Notables’.⁴⁴⁹ He underlines that despite the major riots experience in Mosul in January 1909, the enthusiasm for the Mohammedan Union did not fall behind other localities. Kedourie also notes that the governor returning from a provincial tour, took stern measures against the movement, arrested al-Omari and Abu Jasim with eleven others, and maintained the tranquility of the city. On the other hand, a message sent by al-Omari to the dethroned Sultan Abdülhamid, the Grand Vizirate and the İstanbul headquarters of SMU on 19 April 1909 was attached to the correspondence of Governor Reşid.⁴⁵⁰ In this message, al-Omari stated that he obtained the official permission (me’zûniyet) of the İstanbul headquarters of SMU before engaging in political activity, and he was able to found the Mosul branch after he advised and inspired (nasâyih ve tergibât) certain people to affiliate. However, al-Omari claimed that their joy and success regarding the Society drew some backlash from the provincial administration and gained its antipathy. As a result of the governor’s threats and insistence on the court officials assigned to the case, the members of the society were subjected to unwarranted accusations about disturbing the peace. Al-Omari was overtly accusing Governor Reşid Pasha of misleading and obstructing the justice. Accord Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 180  Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs, p. 149  BOA, DH.MKT.2829/22/Lef 3, 26 Mayıs 1325 – 08 June 1909; Sûret – 6 Nisan 1325 – 19 April 1909 “Sâye-i Hazret-i Risâletpenâhide ve hüsn-ü tevcihat-ı Hilâfetpenâhide Dersaadet’te teşkil olunan İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyet-i Muazzamasında Musul’ca şûbe teşkili hakkında 16 Mart 1325 târihli aldığım me’zûniyet telgrafları üzerine ettiğim nasâyih ve tergibâta karşı cism-i cemiyeti teşkil ettim. Tebessüm ettikçe hükûmetin infiâlini mûcib olup, Vâlinin mahkeme-i memûriyetlerine edilen tehdidât ve ısrâr üzerine ihlâl-i âsâyiş diye kullarına ve efrâd-ı cemiyetin bazılarına isnâd ettirip, Hilâfet, Şeriat ve Kanun olarak ihtilatta […] Habshânedeyiz. Maksadları cemiyetimizi tehdid ile dağıtmakta bu günkü 2 Nisan 1325 târihli makamâttan gelen telgrafların mündericâtında kavain-i ahkâm-ı şer’iyeye tatbik olunacağı gibi Hukuk-u Meşrûtiyetin devâmını dahi mübeşşer-i avâtıf-ı Pâdişâhi bulunduğum Habshânede bulunan milel-i sâireden mevcûd mahbûslara bâ-tercüme kendilerine tefhim ettikçe Allah’un-Nasr-ı Saltanata, Abdülhamid’e duâlarını üç a’lâya kadar isâl ile devâm-ı ömr-ü Hilâfetpenâha tezkâr etmişlerdir. Mağdûr kullarının afvlarını husûsunun Şeriat-ı Mutahhara-i Ahmediyye şerefi nâmına muntazırdır. İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti Rehberi Reşid el-Ömeri”

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ing to al-Omari, the ultimate purpose of the local administration was to threaten and dissolve their society. However, al-Omari wrote that he did not sit idle even in prison, translated and told the real nature of the events to the prisoners of different nationalities (milel-i sâireden mevcûd mahbûslara bâ-tercüme kendilerine tefhim). In other words, he claimed to be the harbinger of Constitutional Law and the Sultan’s grace in prison (mübeşşer-i avâtıf-ı Pâdişâhi). The prisoners who learned the truth, have been praying to Allah, the helper and protector of the Sultanate (Allah’un-Nasr-ı Saltanata) and to the holy life of the deposed Sultan and Caliph Abdulhamid (Abdülhamid’e duâlarını üç a’lâya kadar isâl ile devâm-ı ömr-ü Hilâfetpenâha tezkâr). In the name of protecting the taintless honor of the Shariah provisions (Şeriat-ı Mutahhara-i Ahmediyye şerefi nâmına), the aggrieved subjects were expecting to be pardoned. It seems that al-Omari’s unconditional loyalty to Abdülhamid II was revived after the 31 March Incident, and he continued to praise him even in his messages during the Constitutional era. It is also noteworthy that al-Omari attributes his prayers to Abdülhamid for his society, which he was able to establish freely thanks to the rights brought by the Constitutional Monarchy. This unconditional devotion embodied in the messages naturally caught the attention of the Unionist government and probably facilitated the accusation of al-Omari. Al-Omari’s next telegram was dispatched to the parliament and again included direct accusations against the governor.⁴⁵¹ He explained that he was charged and arrested of an unfounded crime due to the despotic and partisan views of the Governor and his dominance over the Courthouse Officials. Although al-Omari’s allegations against Governor Reşid did not trigger any investigation, it can be thought that it increased suspicions about the Governor who had such a controversial tenure and accelerated the process of his dismissal. Since the beginning of the Mosul Incident, conspiracy allegations from different fronts have been frequently voiced. However, this time it was Reshid al-Omari, one of the primary suspects of the incident, who claimed that a conspiracy had been set up against him. In the meantime, the transfer of al-Omari’s trial from the Mosul Court to the ‘Second Court Martial’ (İkinci Divân-ı Örfî) was a matter of debate and the rele-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2837/39/Lef 1, 24 Mayıs 1325 – 06 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Vâlinin fikr-i müstebidâne ve tarafgirânesinden ve Adliye Memûrlarının da Vâlinin esir-i tagallübü olmalarından dolayı kendisine manâsız bir cürm atf ile bi-gayr-i hakkın tevkif edildiğinden ve ifâdât-ı sâireden bahs ile istidâ-i muâdeleti mutazammın Musul’dan Reşid el-Ömeri imzâsıyla çekilen telgrafnâmenin taraf-ı Âli-i Nezâretpenâhilerine tebliğine… Meclis-i Mebûsân Reisi Ahmed Rızâ”

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vant authorities were asked to cover his travel expenses.⁴⁵² However, apart from the charge of disturbing the peace (muhtell-i âsâyiş harekât), his involvement in the reactionary movement (harekât-ı irticâiyye) was also taken into account, and it was decided to continue his investigation in local courts (mehâkim-i mahalliye). Naturally, an on-site prosecution was much more appropriate and productive in terms of investigating al-Omari’s local connections and the SMU’s extension in Mosul. Unfortunately, no details were found in the archive documents regarding the motives for the transfer of the al-Omari’s trial to the Second Court Martial. However, this failed transfer attempt may have had a connection with the Martial Law declared throughout İstanbul after the March 31 Incident and the Court Martials (Divân-ı Harb-i Örfîler) established for the trials of the 31 March defendants.⁴⁵³ Perhaps the Ministry of Justice wanted to combine a critical case such as the al-Omari’s with the principal trial in İstanbul and planned to have him tried in the Court Martial together with the leading suspects of the 31 March Incident. Considered an expert on Yezidi history, John S. Guest interestingly mentions Reshid al-Omari in his prominent work Survival Among the Kurds: A History of

 BOA, DH.MKT.2850/4/Lef 1, 6 Haziran 1325 – 19 June 1909; Lef 2, 7 Haziran 1325 – 20 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine 3 Haziran 1325 taleb olunan Reşid el-Ömeri’nin gönderilmek üzere masârif-i seferîyesinin sûret-i tesviyesi için emir verdirilmesi İkinci Divân-ı Örfî’ye cevâben yazılmış ve keyfiyeti de Nezâret-i celilelerinden istîzân kılınmış ve muhtell-i âsâyiş harekâtta bulunmak maddelerinden dolayı maznûn ve mevkuf bulunan merkumatın harekât-ı irticâiyyeye olan dahl ve iştirâki nazar-ı îtibâra alınarak tahkikata mehâkim-i mahalliyece devâm olunması iş’âr buyurulduğundan şu hâle göre i’zâmı îcâb edip etmeyeceğinin inbâ buyurulması mâruzdur. Musul Vâlisi Reşid” “Musul Vilâyetine Reşid-ül Ömer’in mahalce tahkikat ve muhâkemesine devâm olunması münâsibtir. Dâhiliye Nezâreti”  Zekeriya Türkmen gives valuable information on this subject in the article Dîvânıharp in the Encyclopedia of Islam. “Accordingly, with the decision of the Council of Ministers , Martial Law was declared in İstanbul, Three Towns (Bilâd-ı Selâse) as Üsküdar, Galata and Eyüp, Çatalca and İzmit Sanjaks, Kartal, Beykoz, Çekmece Districts and the Prince Islands. Minister of Imperial Ordnance (Tophane Nâzırı) Hurşid Pasha was appointed as the Chief Justice of the Court Martial. After the cabinet reshuffle, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha had three Court Martials established, the first under the chief justiceship of Tophane Nâzırı Hurşid Pasha, the second under the chief justiceship of Artillery Brigadier General (Topçu Mirlivâsı) Hasan Rızâ Pasha, and the third under the chief justiceship of Brigadier General (Mirlivâ) Nazif Pasha.” Zekeriya Türkmen, Dîvânıharp, Osmanlılar’da XIX. yüzyılda kurulan askerî cezâ mahkemelerinin genel adı, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/divaniharp Access Date: 29.05. 2021

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the Yezidis. ⁴⁵⁴ Guest writes that Ömer Vehbi Pasha, who was tasked with solving the Yezidi problem and converting the Yezidis to Islam, sent a punitive expedition to Sheikhan (Şeyhân) in 1892.⁴⁵⁵ As he quoted from M. N. Siouffi, the commanders of the expedition were Asım Bey, who was the Pasha’s 25-yearold inexperienced and hot-blooded son, and Reshid Omari, who was a few years older than him and the black sheep of an old Mosul family. Noting that this force consisted of several hundred regular army soldiers, Guest makes no further reference to al-Omari’s name. The expression black sheep here suggest that al-Omari might be the unwanted, unloved or delinquent son of his family. In addition, his assignment with the strategic task of converting Yezidis to Islam indicates that al-Omari may have had Islamist and Arabist motives as early as 1892. It was possible that the Hamidian government may have recognized the ethnoreligious sentiments within the region long before the Mosul Incident and employed al-Omari in such conversion (ihtidâ) missions aiming nonMuslim minorities.

The Anti-Constitutional Tendency in the 4th Army Some of the Ottoman Army units also had their share from the empire-wide repercussions of the March 31 Incident. An unfortunate incident took place in a 4th Army garrison located in immediate vicinity of Mosul provincial borders, has shown how insidious the threat from inside was. Although this isolated incident did not take place within the borders of the Mosul Province, it raised the level of alarm throughout the entire Iraqi geography. Because Mosul was now included into the 4th Army precinct since all the public security and policing were entrusted to 4th Army units after the Mosul Incident. Thus, this kind of an Anti-Constitutionalist mutiny within the same Army could easily spill over to other garrisons. In addition to the 4th Army which was of critical importance due to the ongoing Mosul Incident investigation, the condition of 6th Army which controlled the entire Iraqi geography, was even more critical. According to the report of the 4th Army Commander Marshall İbrâhim Pasha, the religious feelings of some soldiers were provoked, the idea of reactionism (fikr-i irticâ) was awakened and some units revolted against the Constitutional  John S. Guest, Survival Among the Kurds: A History of the Yezidis (Oxford: Routledge, 2010) p. 136  For an overview on Ömer Vehbi Pasha who was assigned as the Commander of the “Reform Force” (Kuvve-i Islahiye)in Mosul in 1892, please see. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890 – 1908, p. 55, 79, 80

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Illustration 20: 4th Army Commander Marshall (Müşir) İbrâhim Pasha Source: SALT Research, Mirliva İbrahim Paşa. Dördüncü Ordu müşiri İbrahim Paşa – Ibrahim Pacha, Général Brigade. Ibrahim Pacha, commandant du 4me, corps d’armée Ottoman, Collection of Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi / Envelopes, https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/ 123456789/23132, Access Date: 28. 06. 2021

Monarchy.⁴⁵⁶ The 2nd Battalion of the 30th Regular Army Regiment stationed on the Iranian border, was in a state of uprising (kıyâm). The mutinous unit was lo-

 BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 1, 18 Nisan 1325 – 01 May 1909 “Harbiye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Bertafsil arz ve tefsir kılındığı veçhile askeri iğfâl sûretiyle bir fikr-i irticâ uyandırmak ve fetret ve buhrân tevlid eylemek husûsunda […] dermeyân olan muğfilât ve müfsidât şimdi dahi göçte ve ücrâ mevâki ve nikatda bulunan kitâat-i askeriyye varıncaya kadar teşmil-i tesvilâtla efrâdın hissiyât-ı diniyyelerini tahrik ve Meşrûtiyet-i Meşrûa aleyhinde kıyâma teşvik sûretiyle iğfâlât-ı fetretkârâneye başlamıştır. Ezcümle Van Vilâyetinin Hakkâri Sancağına muzâf ve İran hududuna karib ve sahilden 180 saat baid olan Saray mevkiinde muhteşid Nizâmiye 30. Alayın 2. Taburu efrâdının dahi tesvilât-ı mümâseleye kapılarak ve müsellehan telgrafhânede ictimâ ederek bir vaz’-ı itâatşikenâne ile müddeayât-ı mesrûde bir kıyâmları ve Ermenilerin Kıraathanesine giderek evrak-ı matbuayı şakk ve İttihâd ve Terakki Kulübüne hücûm ederek cam ve eşyâ-yı mevcûdeyi şikest eylemeleri telkinât-ı lâinâne-i mâruzanın derece-i şümûl ve tevsiini göstermiştir. Gerçi müsâraaten ittihâz olunan tedâbir semeresiyle oraca da teskin-i buhrân ve galeyân dâire-i imkâna idhâl edildi. Ancak tesvilât-ı vâkıânın […] mütevâliye gibi sür’at-i sirâyetine ve erbâb-ı eşirrânın telkinât-ı şifâhiden başka bezl-i nukûd ve […] husûsunda da fedâkârlık gösterdikleri anlaşılmasına binâen zâten inzibâtı pek yolunda olmayan Altıncı Orduca ve Havâli-i Irâ-

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cated in Saray (Mahmûdî), a strategic border position attached to the Hakkâri Sanjak of Van Province and was 180 hours from the coast. Provoked soldiers had mustered in the telegraph office in an armed but insubordinate fashion (vaz’-ı itâatşikenâne), stormed the Armenian Coffeehouse (Ermenilerin Kıraathânesi) and torn up the printed materials. Later, the soldiers attacking the CUP club broke its windows, destroyed the furniture, and badly damaged the venue. In particular, the attack on the CUP club displayed that the movement was certainly carried out with Anti-Constitutional or reactionary motivations. Marshall İbrâhim asserted that some guidance, indoctrination and preaching were effective on these soldiers and that these influences led to the expansion of the movement. It was even claimed that in addition to verbal inspiration and indoctrination (telkinât-ı şifâhi), large sums of money were funneled (bezl-i nukûd) to motivate certain individuals. Despite everything, the necessary measures were taken quickly, the agitation was calmed, and the growth of events was prevented (teskin-i buhrân ve galeyân). However, İbrâhim Pasha was worried that the events would spread to the 6th Army which had been experiencing discipline issues for a while, and to the wider Iraqi geography. Because it was not far off that some people disguised as Ulema would insidiously provoke the religious feelings of the 6th Army officers and soldiers and cause a much wider turmoil. According to İbrâhim Pasha, preventive measures should have been taken in this direction already and some of these provocateurs should have been caught by local administrations and punished in a way that would set a precedent (ibret-i müessire). This was an extremely necessary move for the welfare of both the Constitutional regime and the Iraqi geography. Minister of War Sâlih Hulûsi Pasha, taking the matter into consideration immediately, issued a communiqué addressing all civil administrations and civil servants in the 6th Army zones.⁴⁵⁷ Likewise, a call

kîyece müşkil-ül iftihâm bir iğtişâş vahim-ül encâm husûle getirmeleri istib’ad olunamamakta ve bu babda şimdiden tedâbir-i mani’a ittihâzı ve müfsidin ve muğfilin men’i mefâsidiyle beraber Ulemâ zi-kıyâfetinde olacağı şüphesiz bulunan eşhâs-ı merkumeden bir kaçının olsun hükûmetlerce ele geçirilerek emsâline ibret-i müessire gösterilmesi selâmet-i atebe-i Meşrûtiyet ve memleket için mukteziyât-ı umûrdan zannedilmekte bulunduğu mâruzdur. 4. Ordu Kumandanı Müşir İbrâhim”  BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 2, 21 Nisan 1325 – 04 May 1909 “Hulâsa: bazı müfsidînin Meşrûtiyet aleyhindeki tesvilâtının önü alınmak için Altıncı Ordu mıntıkasındaki Memûrîn-i Mülkiyeye tebligat icrâ buyurulmasına dâir. Mâruz-u Çâker-i Kemineleridir ki Bazı müfsidin efrâdın hissiyât-ı diniyyelerini tahrik ile Meşrûtiyet-i Meşrûa aleyhinde kıyâma teşvik ettikleri ve bâ-husûs İran hududlarına karib Saray mevkiinde muhteşid 30. Alayın 2. Taburu efrâdını bit-tevessül müsellehan telgrafhâneye ictimâ ve Ermeni Kıraathanesiyle İttihâd ve Terakki Kulübünü bil-hücûm evrak-ı matbuayı şakk ve camları şikeste ettirdikleri ve lil-hamd it-

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was issued to the 6th Army Command to work in cooperation and harmony with the civil administrations on this issue. On May 6, the necessary warnings and instructions were conveyed to the Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Zor Administrations by the Ministry of Interior.⁴⁵⁸ After the March 31 incident, the geography of Iraq was also affected by the provocations within the army, and a new risk emerged for the Mosul Command, which could not erase the traces of the Mosul Incident yet. However, what was expected did not happen and the soldiers serving within the borders of Mosul were not seen to be involved in such disturbances and uprisings.

The Expanding Investigation and the Withdrawing 4th Army According to the messages sent by Governor Reşid Pasha to the Grand Viziership and the Ministry of Interior, as of June 1, 1909, the investigation had expanded considerably and 92 people, 80 men and 12 women, had been arrested.⁴⁵⁹ Gov-

tihâz olunan tedâbir semeresiyle teskin-i buhrân ve galeyân dâire-i imkâna idhâl edilmiş ise de eşirrâ-yı merkumenin Altıncı Ordu Havâli-i Irâkîyece de müşkil-il iftihâm bir iğtişâş vahim-ül encâm husûle getirmeleri istib’ad olunamamakta olduğu beyânıyla icrâ-yı lüzûmuna dâir Dördüncü Ordu Müşiriyetinden mevrûd telgrafnâme manzûr-u sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhileri buyurulmak üzere leffen takdim kılınmış ve bu babda Memûrîn-i Mülkiye ile müttehiden ve serian tedâbir-i lâzımenin ititihazı o cihetlerde de o gibi eşirrânın mefâsidine meydan verilmemesi zımnında Altıncı Ordu Kumandanlığına bâ-telgraf tebligat icrâ edilmiş olmakla husûs-u mâruza dâir ehemmiyetle lâzım gelenlere taraf-ı sâmi-i fahimânelerinin de tebligat-ı seria icrâsı rey-i sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhileridir. Ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i veliyy-ül emrindir. Harbiye Nâzırı Sâlih Hulûsi “  BOA, DH.MKT.2803/76/Lef 3, 23 Nisan 1325 – 06 May 1909 “Bağdad, Basra, Musul Vilâyetlerine, Zor Mutasarrıflığına Cihet-i askeriyye ile bil-müzâkere müttehiden ittihâz-ı tedâbir ve takayyüdât-ı müsâraatle teşebbüsât-ı lâinâneye meydan verilmemesi ve bu gibi mefâside cüret edenler olur ise hemen derdest edilerek haklarında tahkikat ve tâkibât-ı kanuniye icrâsı lüzûmu kemâl-i ehemmiyetle tebliğ olunur Dâhiliye Mektûbi Kalemi”  BOA, DH.ŞFR. 414/49, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909; BEO.3570/267697/Lef 2, 19 Mayıs 1325 – 01 June 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. 13 Mayıs 1325 ve dünkü telgrafnâme-i çâkerânemle arz olunduğu veçhile Musul Hâdisesinin tahkikatına Dördüncü Ordu taburlarının vürûdundan sonra başlanılabilinmiş ve şimdiye kadar erkek kadın 92 şahıs taht-ı tevkife alınmış ise de tahkikat-ı hâzıra günbegün tevsi ve maznûnlar da tâyin eylediğinden satvet ve mehâbet-i askeriyyeden bil-istifâde eşhâs-ı matlûbenin peyderpey derdest edilmekte oldukları bir sırada askerin Musul’dan kaldırılması bunca emek sarfıyla ileri götürülmüş olan tahkikatın akim kalmasını intâc edeceği Vilâyet İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmili-

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ernor Reşid reported that the investigation was conducted according to the existing situation, temporal and spatial conditions, and the Prosecutor’s Office of Appeal could not determine when the investigation would conclude. Governor Reşid was also concerned about the withdrawal of the 4th Army from Mosul and that such an untimely withdrawal would endanger both the investigation and public order. He specifically stated that the current investigation had been conducted and expanded thanks to the strength and size of the 4th Army (satvet ve mehâbet-i askeriyye). Moreover, the presence of the 4th Army was sorely needed at such a critical time when the active investigation was expanding day by day (tahkikat-ı hâzıra günbegün tevsi) and the number of suspects and detainees was increasing in line with this (eşhâs-ı matlûbenin peyderpey derdest edilmekte oldukları). Moreover, the Prosecutor’s Office had previously stated that the withdrawal of the troops from Mosul would fail the investigation, which was brought to this level with so much effort. The Governor was also concerned that even the partial withdrawal of the army would lead to a re-violation of the order in the province, which had not yet been fully established. Reşid Pasha particularly and strongly demanded that the cavalry and infantry in Mosul not be shifted to another side until the investigation, prosecution and trial were concluded. The worried Governor drew attention to the vital need for the JTF’s presence in Mosul and emphasized that withdrawing the troops at this point would be a major strategic mistake. However, the Grand Vizier warned the Governor that delaying the investigation for excuses such as the current situation (hâl), temporal (zamân) and spatial conditions (isti’dâd-ı mekân) entails a great responsibility.⁴⁶⁰ Stating that such

ğinden ifâde olunmuş ve fil-hakika asâkir-i mevcûdenin velev bir kısm-ı cüz’iyyesinin de olsun buradan kaldırılmasını henüz Polis kuvvetiyle […] olan vilâyet ve mülhakatı âsâyişinin de yeniden ihlâli gibi ahvâl-i müessife vukuuna bais olacağı müstağni-i arz ve îfâ bulunmuş olduğundan her hâlde tahkikatın neticesine kadar buradaki süvâri ve piyâde asker-i şâhânenin bir tarafa sevk edilmemesi îcâb edenlere emr-ü îtâ buyurulması ehemmiyetle istirhâm olunur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid” “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhiye. Hâdise-i mâlûmeden dolayı şimdiye kadar 80 zükûr 12 inâs taht-ı tevkife alındığı ve tahkikatın ikmâli için hâl ve zamân ve isti’dâd-ı mevkii ve mekâna göre çalışılmakta ise de tahkikat-ı mezkûrenin hitâmı için şimdilik tâyin-i müddet edilemeyeceği lede-l istifsâr İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliğinden ifâde olunduğu mâruzdur. Ferman. Musul Vâlisi Reşid”  BOA, BEO.3570/267697/Lef 1, 21 Mayıs 1325 – 03 June 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine. 19 Mayıs 1325 Musul hâdisesinden maznûn-aleyh olanlar haklarındaki tahkikatın hâl ve zamân ve isti’dâd-ı mekân özrüyle şimdiye kadar ikmâl edilmemesi mûcib-i mesûliyettir. Hâl ve zamân

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reasons could never hinder the implementation of laws (ahkâm-ı kanuniyenin tamâm-ı cereyânı), the Grand Vizier added that those who hinder the functioning of the legal process should be punished in the most severe way. A sufficient force had been sent for the security of the investigation on an ad hoc basis, but this force could not be left idle for a long time in Mosul and should now be returned to its original position. The Grand Vizier ordered the prosecution and the trial to be concluded swiftly and warned that, if necessary, Martial Law (İdâre-i Örfiyye) could be declared in Mosul and extraordinary measures (tedâbir-i fevkalâde) could be taken. This harsh reaction of the Grand Vizier is very important in terms of showing the determination and direction of the Sublime Porte. Because now İstanbul began to grow impatient and even included the declaration of Martial Law in Mosul among its options. By July 1909, two of the three infantry battalions deployed by the 4th Army in Mosul, and all mounted units including the gendarmerie and mule cavalry, were assigned to the pursuit and suppression of the Hamawand bandits.⁴⁶¹ Governor Reşid reported that only one battalion remained in the central district of Mosul and 120 soldiers from this battalion were sent to Akre to suppress the tribal attacks. With the few remaining troops, it would be very difficult to control the prisons where serious offenders such as the Mosul Incident detainees were held, and to maintain internal and external security. For this purpose, Reşid Pasha agreed with the Mosul Command to recruit one of the Mosul Reserve Bat-

ve mekân ahkâm-ı kanuniyenin tamâm-ı cereyânına katiyyen mâni olamaz. Ahkâm-ı kanuniyenin cereyânına hail olacaklar hakkında en şiddetli mücâzâtın icrâsı lâzım gelir. Vaktiyle kuvve-i kâfiye gönderilmiş idiyse bu kuvvetin tûl-i müddet hâl-i atâlette bırakılması tecviz olamayıp mevki-i asliyelerine iâde edilecektir. Tâkibât ve muhâkemâtın da serian ikmâli lüzûmu te’kid ve lede’l-icab orada dahi İdâre-i Örfiyye îlânıyla tedâbir-i fevkalâde ittihâz olunacağı ihtâr olunur. Sadâret-i Uzmâ Mektûbi Kalemi.”  BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 1, 1 Temmuz 1325 – 14 July 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Musul Hâdisesi üzerine 4. Ordu-yu Hümâyun buraya muvasalatından üç tabur piyâdenin iki taburuyla kuvve-i râkibenin umûmu ve jandarma süvâri ve ester süvârı Hemavendlilerin tâkibine memûr edilerek Merkez-i Vilâyette yalnız bir piyâde taburu kalmış idi. Akra Kazâsı dâhilinde bazı aşâirin kasaba ahâlisine tecâvüzleri vâki olduğu ve bunların men’i zımnında askere ihtiyâc bulunması Kaimakamlıktan bildirilmesi cihetle mezkûr bir taburdan 120 neferi oraya sevk edilmiş ve bakıyye-yi mevcûdla Musul Hâdisesi mevkufîninin vesâir erbâb-ı cinâyâtın bulundukları Habshânelerin ve alel-husûs dâhil ve hâric intizâm altında bulunan âsâyişin idâmesi müşkil görülmüş olmakla Musul Kumandanlığıyla bil-müzâkere Musul Redif taburlarından birinin silah altına alınması münâsib görülerek keyfiyyet Ordu-yu Hümâyun Kumandanlığına yazılmış ve oraca da münâsib görülmüş olduğu berây-ı muamelât mâruzdur. Vâli Reşid “

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talions and the request was approved by the Army Command. Within a few days, the Ministry of Interior reported the situation to the Grand Vizier and stated that even if such a measure was necessary, it would be more appropriate for the new Governor Fâzıl Pasha to convey this request when he arrived at his office.⁴⁶² It might have been thought that a governor with a military career, such as Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha, would have made a more accurate decision regarding the dispatch of soldiers, instead of a governor of civilian origin such as Governor Reşid Pasha. However, in line with the course of events, degree of urgency and the Governor’s opinion, the initiative was taken by the Army Command and an ex officio (re’sen) order was given to prevent a possible crisis. In other words, the Governor’s Office and the Army Command formalized the decision they had taken without obtaining the approval of the Ministry of War as a fait accompli (emr-i vâki). For this reason, the Minister of Interior was asking the Grand Vizier not to put any pressure on the Ministry of War in this regard. Apparently, during the transition period of the Governorship from Reşid to Mehmed Fâzıl, Reşid’s decisions and initiative were under the constant surveillance of İstanbul. Naturally, the central authority’s trust in Governor Reşid Pasha may have eroded considerably after the allegations brought against him. Although İstanbul made an exception in the above example due to the urgency of the situation, it was clear that the Porte wanted to leave such critical decisions to the new Governor Mehmed Fâzıl. During this transition period, the Ministry of Interior continued to persistently ask the Governor’s office about the aftermath of the investigation. When Mehmed Fâzıl arrived at her office in Mosul in August, he immediately contacted the Prosecutor of Appeal and received the reply that the investigation which was continuing at full speed, would soon be concluded and adjudicated by the Office of Examining Magistrate (İstintak Dâiresi).⁴⁶³ But the

 BOA, DH.MKT.2879/27/Lef 2, 5 Temmuz 1325 – 18 July 1909 “Huzûr-u Âli-i Sadâretpenâhiye. Musul’daki taburlar Hemavend eşkıyâsının tâkibât ve te’dibâtı zımnında îcâb eden mevâkiye sevk edildiği için Musul’da mevkufîn ve mahbûsînin ve âsâyişin muhâfazası zımnında Musul Redif taburlarından birinin silah altına alınmasına vilâyetçe lüzûm görülerek bu sûret bil-muhâbere Ordu-yu Hümâyunca tasvib olunduğu cihetle îcâbı icrâ kılındığı Musul Vilâyetinden alınan telgrafnâmede görülmüş ve böyle bir tedbirin ittihâzı muktezi ise Musul Vâli-i Lâhıkı Fâzıl Paşa hazretlerinin Merkez-i Vilâyete muvasalatında vuku bulacak mürâcaat üzerine icrâ-i îcâbı daha muvâfık olacağı derkâr ise de siyâk-ı iş’âra nazaran mezkûr taburun cem’ ve teslihi Ordu-yu Hümâyunda […] iktidâr etmiş bir emr-i vâki hükmünü aldığı cihetle Nezâretpenâha karşı bittabii bir şey denilmemesi olduğunun berây-ı mâlûmat arz […] ibtidâr kılındı. Ol babda.”  BOA, DH.MUİ.1/25/Lef 2, 31 Temmuz 1325 – 13 August 1909; Lef 1, 25 Ağustos 1325 – 07 September 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâretine.

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Ministry would have to remind once again in September that the investigation should be expedited and concluded as soon as possible.

The Telegram from the Mosul Prosecutor Ömer Lütfi Although the investigation seemed to be progressing, the complaints of some local courthouse officials began to reach İstanbul. Lütfi, the Prosecutor of the Mosul Court of Appeal, sent a lengthy and remarkable message to the Ministry of Justice in October 1909.⁴⁶⁴ He started his message by stating that they had been dealing with the Mosul Incident for almost a year and therefore the central authorities in İstanbul were also in a very difficult situation. He claimed that on the occasion of the religious feast, some dangerous men and women grouped around (hazele-i zükûr inâsın ictimâ), situations that would provoke the feelings

Mâruz-u çâkerleridir. […] tanzim olan 10 Haziran 1325 târihi ve 177 numerolu tahrirat-ı aliyye Nezâretpenâhilerine arıza-i cevâbdır. Musul hâdise-i mâlûmesinden dolayı kemâl-i germi ile icrâ olunmakta olan tahkikatın İstintak Dâiresince karâr-ı kanuniye rabt edebilecek zamânı takrib etmekte olduğu bil-havale […] İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği ifâdesiyle arz olunur. Ol babda emrü ferman… Musul Vâlisi Mehmed Fâzıl”  Ömer Lütfi, who was appointed as the Public Prosecutor of the Mosul Provincial Court of Appeal on February 16, 1909, previously served as the Head of the Penal Chamber of the Court of First Instance in Provincial Center. BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 2, 30 Eylül 1325 – 13 October 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine – Gayet Müstâceldir. Geçen Kurban Bayramı hâdise-i mâlûmesi ile bir seneye karibdir uğraşıyoruz. Makamât-ı Aliyye de bu yüzden iyice müşkilâta uğradığı cihetle ve hazele-i zükûr inâsın ictimâ ve bu vesileyle yekdiğeri hakkında kavlen ve fiilen envâ-i cerâim ve fazâyih ika’ında cevelângâh açmak adeta sâbıkı tanzire kalkışmak demek olan dolaplar, salıncaklar daha bilmem neler. Beledi ve Zâbıta ve Polis re’y-i mütâlâaları hilâfında şimdiden yine fırıldaklar çevrilmeye başladığını görerek eski yaraların acısı henüz unutulmamış bir zamân ve böyle bir mevkiide bunların men’ini ve Vâli Vekili Naib Efendiye etrâfıyla her bir dakaikle anlatayım diyerek sıyâm hâlinde çok nefes sarf ettim. Muvaffak olamadığıma teessüf eyledim. Böyle umûm erbâb vicdânında fikr-i Hilâfette göz göre göre üzerimize gelen kazânın ta içine atılmaktan ise imtinâ veçhiyle ân-ı nâgehânı zuhûru melhûz olan bir hâdise-i fevkalâdenin kabl-el vuku önünü almak esbâbının istikmâli husûs-u inzibât noktasından bakılınca vazife-i müştereke-i kanuniyemden mâdud isem de hâl ve zamân îcâbı daha ileri varmadım. Taşralarda bizim ahvâlimize hep böyle noksân-ı teemmül ve tedbirden ve sû-i idâre-i mülkiyeden âsâyişi ihlâl ettikten sonra gel bu pirincin taşını ayıklayarak tepsiyi önümüze sürmektedirler. Âcilen bu dolapların men’i için taraf-ı Sâmi-i Nezâretpenâhilerinden , diğer Nezâret-i Celilelerden telgrafla vekâlete emr istihsâli ve hangilerince ne derece müdâhale lâzım ise ferman. İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmisi Lütfi”

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of people against each other were allowed and the potential crime rate reached its peak (yekdiğeri hakkında kavlen ve fiilen envâ-i cerâim ve fazâyih ika’ında cevelângâh açmak). As if this was not enough, some circles were intriguing (dolaplar, salıncaklar, fırıldaklar) against the municipal authorities, the police and the gendarmerie. Lütfi seemed to be referring to a reactionary and conspiratorial movement trying to revive the old regime (sâbıkı tanzire kalkışmak). He had tried so hard to explain this situation to the Acting Governor Naib Effendi, but unfortunately, he was not successful. Instead of facing a disaster waiting to happen at any moment, he took the initiative and used all his legal duties, powers and responsibilities in order to prevent this danger. Naturally, he could not have done more than that under these conditions and in this period. According to Lütfi, such problems have always been experienced in the provinces due to the negligence, thoughtlessness (noksân-ı teemmül ve tedbirden) and abuse of the administrators (sû-i idâre-i mülkiyeden). However, in the end, the responsibility, duty and solution have always been placed on the prosecution offices. Ömer Lütfi demanded that the issue be brought to the inter-ministerial level and the necessary measured be taken before it was too late. However, the Ministry of Interior, which quickly questioned the issue from the Governor’s office, stated that the allegations consisted of the prosecutor’s anxiety and imagination (evhâm ve hayâlât).⁴⁶⁵ For this reason, the Ministry of Justice was asked to warn the prosecutor not to interfere in administrative and civil affairs beyond his duty and authority. It was remarkable and disturbing for the Sublime Porte that a Provincial Prosecutor bypassed the Governor and was directly involved in the inter-ministerial dialogue in such a turbulent period. Judging by his comments, Prosecutor Ömer Lütfi seemed to emphasize a conspiracy to which all official agencies affiliated the local administration were exposed. In fact, he implied that all the provincial authorities were deceived, and he could not show them the truth even though he tried so hard to reveal this illusion. Although it was not clear what kind of a conspiracy there was from these

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/79/Lef 3, 19 Teşrinievvel 1325 – 01 November 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Bayram münâsebetiyle halkın hissiyâtını tahrik edecek ahvâle meydan verilmekte olduğuna dâir Musul İstînâf Müddei-Umûmiliği’nden Nezâret-i Celilelerine çekilip mazrûfen tevdi buyurulan telgrafnâme üzerine Musul Vilâyet-i Aliyyesine isti’lâm-ı keyfiyet olunmuştu. Cevâbı alınıp leffen savb-ı Âlilerine tisyâr kılınan telgrafnâmede İstînâf Müddei-Umûmiliğinin mütâlâatı evhâm ve hayâlâttan ibâret olduğu ve vazife ve salâhiyyeti hâricinde işlere medhal etmekte bulunduğu beyânıyla kendisine tebligat îfâsını muktezâsının icrâ buyurulması bâbında lüzûmu dermeyân olunmasına nazaran… Dâhiliye Nezâreti”

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vague statements, we see in the archive that Lütfi’s allegations drew the negative reaction of the authorities rather than their attention. Although it is not known how much of Prosecutor Lütfi’s concerns were true and justified, it is understood that the internal unrest among the authorities in Mosul did not come to an end even after Mehmed Fâzıl took office.

Sâdât’s Request for the Change of Venue By November 1909, the Former Mufti of Sulaymaniyah Sayyid Muhammad, Sayyid Maarouf and their comrades declared that neither they nor the witnesses could dare to go to the Court of Appeal in Mosul.⁴⁶⁶ In addition, they were informed that some attempts were being made in favor of the criminals, and based on these two grounds, they demanded that the trial be transferred to another court. In another message they sent to the Grand Viziership, they complained that the perpetrators of such a terrible massacre had still not been convicted after almost a year (10 months).⁴⁶⁷ The extent to which they had been

 BOA, DH.MUİ.30/8/Lef 1, 24 Teşrinievvel 1325 – 06 November 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Geçen sene mağdûren Musul’a teb’id olunan Hafid Şeyh Said Efendi ile mahdûmu Şeyh Ahmed Efendiyi ve Kırkı mütecâviz müteallikatını katleden eşhâs hakkındaki muhâkeme elyevm Musul İstînâf Mahkemesinde derdest-i icrâ ise de ne kendileri ne de şâhidler mahkemeye gitmeye cesâret edemediklerinden ve mücrimin lehinde bazı teşebbüsâtın bulunduğunu istihbâr eylediğinden bahisle dâvânın Musul ve Süleymaniye’den mâadâ bir mahale nakli istidâsını mutazammın Süleymaniye Müfti-i Esbakı Hafid Seyyid Muhammed ve rüfekası imzâlarıyla çekilen telgrafnâme leffen Savb-ı Âli-i […] irsâl kılınmakla câlib-i dikkat olan mündericâtına nazaran îfâ-yı muktezâsı ve atebe-i rey-i ve takdir-i Nezâretpenâhileridir. Ol babda Dâhiliye Nezâreti Muhâberât-ı Umûmiye Dâiresi”  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 14, 21 Teşrinievvel 1325 – 03 November 1909 “Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Sadâretpenâhiye, Vâli-i Sâbıkın Süleymaniye’de icrâ edildiği tahkikatında ne dereceye kadar mağdûr edildiğine tezâhür etmiş ise de aradan bir sene geçtiği hâlde henüz o cinâyet-i müdhişe-i azime fâilleri hakkında bir gûnâ icrâât-ı fâile görülmediği mesele Musul İstînâfında rü’yet edilmekte olduğundan ne dâîleri ve ne de şâhidleri gelmeye cesâret edememek yüzünden mağdûr ve icrââtın tehirinden dolayı Süleymaniye erbâb-ı fesâdı tecâvüzâtını, müftereyâtını, harekât-ı ifsâdiyesini arındırmakta, mahvımıza iknâmıza yürümekte olmaları cihetinde tehlike-i azimeye mâruz bulunmaktayız. Binâenaleyh ihkak-ı hakk olmamaktan dilhûn ve müfsidinin ahvâl-i mâruzasından hâlimiz zebûn iken Musul Katliamını îka’ edenlerin afvına teşebbüs olunmakta bulunulduğu istihbâr olunuyor. Vak’a-i Kerbelâ’dan sonra Memâlik-i İslâmiyenin hiç birisinde İslâm tarafında Ehl-i Beyt-i Server-i Enbiyâ hakkında bilâ-sebeb icrâ olunmayan bu misli mağdûriyet-i fazihanın fâilleri hakkında afva teşebbüs mesbûk olduğu gibi bu hâl diğer müfsid-i hasmânemizi taltîf ve aleyhimize tergib ve […] külliyen imhâmızı tecviz demek olduğu şüphesizdir. Devr-i Menhûs-u

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victimized was revealed in the preliminary investigation conducted by the Former Governor (referring to Reşid) in Sulaymaniyah, but there was still no verdict or conviction. In addition, since the members of Sâdât and their witnesses did not dare to come to the Mosul courthouse, they could not testify in order to prove their claims and defend their cause. For this reason, justice was delayed, and as justice was delayed, the circles of evil (erbâb-ı fesâd) in Sulaymaniyah had the opportunity to vindicate their attacks (tecâvüzâtını), slanders (müftereyâtını) and disruptive actions (harekât-ı ifsâdiyesini) and to gain strength. While they were exposed to so much injustice and victimization, they also heard the rumor that the perpetrators of the massacre would be pardoned. According to the Sheikhs, an attempt to pardon the perpetrators of such a vile massacre would have been to reward (taltîf) and encourage (tergib) Sâdât’s enemies and allow a 1300-year-old dynasty consisting of thousands households to perish. In order to avoid such dangers, to eliminate the slanders in the trial in absentia, and to expose the oppressor and the oppressed in a fair way, they demanded that the case be heard in a neutral place other than Mosul or Sulaymaniyah. We know from archive records that the case was heard between 28 February and 14 July 1910 and lasted an average of 5 months. However, the interesting thing is although the date was November 1909, there were requests from the Sâdât front for the change of venue. In the message of Acting Governor Mirlivâ Muhiddin Pasha on March 29, it was reported that the ‘public hearing’ (muhâkeme-i aleniyye) was already initiated and still in progress.⁴⁶⁸ Although there is no technical detail about the stages of the trial in the archive, it was possible for the case to consist of two stages as private and public hearings. This statement of Muhiddin Pasha and the Sâdât’s request for the change of venue suggest that the previous stage of the case may have been heard as private sessions be-

İstibdâdın inkırâzı feyz-i Meşrûtiyete hurşid-i adâletin şeref […] zamânında bu mertebe-i mazlûmin-i fazihanın mâruziyeti yüzünden binlerce hâneden mürekkeb 1300 senelik bir hânedânın teessürât-ı zulmle hânelerini garib, efrâdını tagrib ve tağrik, şân ve medlûl-u adâletle kabil-i telif olacağından mâruzu bulunduğumuz tehlike-i […] iftirâdan vikayemizi ve mâ-adâlet Meşrûtiyete mazhariyetimize ve zâlimle mazlûmun tezâhürleri zımnında Musul’dan Süleymaniye’den başka bî-taraf bir mahalde mağdûriyet-i mâruzamızın müsebbib ve fâilleriyle icrâ-yı muhâkememize müsâade buyurulması müsterhamdır. Ferman. Süleymaniye Müfti-i Esbakı Hafid Seyyid Muhammed / Heyet-ül Eşrâf Kaimakamı Seyyid Mârûf”  BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 3, 16 Mart 1326 – 29 March 1910 “Musul Vilâyetinden vârid olan şifre Musul Hâdisesine âid muhâkeme-i aleniyyeye bir an evvel başlanarak cihet-i adliyece kanun dâiresinde devâm olunmaktadır. Mâhâzâ tesrii esbâbının istikmâli lüzûmu da İstînâf Müddei Umûmiliğine tebliğ olunduğu mâruzdur. Vekil-i Vâli Mirlivâ Muhiddin”

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fore February. Otherwise, Sâdât’s reservations about coming to the courtroom in November 1909 and their request for the trial be transferred to another court at that time would be meaningless. However, Reshid al-Omari, in a message he sent a week before the start of the trial on February 21, interestingly complained that the court had not yet been established.⁴⁶⁹ This makes us think that what Sâdât requested to transfer to another court in November might be the investigation not the trial. Perhaps Sâdât meant their contribution to the ‘ongoing investigation’ by the expressions of ‘to appear in court’ and ‘to testify’. However, in any case, it should be noted that the terms of case/trial (dâvâ /muhâkeme) referred in the November correspondence were used in the forms of ‘to stand trial’ (icrâ-yı muhâkeme), ‘to appear in court/ to go to court’ (muhâkemeye çıkmak /gitmek), ‘ongoing trial / pending a case’ (derdest-i icrâ) and ‘to hear the case / to conduct a hearing / to hold a hearing’ (rü’yet). Considering that the case consists of investigation, prosecution and trial phases and that these expressions are used interchangeably in some messages, the technical process of the case remains unclear.

6.3 Amnesty Requests by Reshid al-Omari In October 1909, as the investigation continued at full speed, the detainees’ requests for amnesty began to reach the Ottoman authorities. As we will see in the messages below, the spokesperson for these detainees was Reshid alOmari and he often spearheaded these demands. Al-Omari based his request on many different arguments, such as the inclusiveness of the Constitutional Monarchy, the victimization of Arabs against Kurds, and previous amnesties that even included crimes of banditry. In other words, al-Omari used many different sensitivities such as the embracive character of the regime, ethnic marginalization and the comparison of different crimes to establish an amnesty dialogue with the state. These amnesty requests occupied the central authorities for a while, became the subject of discussion between the Ministries of Justice and Interior, and although they were not accepted in the end, they exceedingly disturbed the Sâdât front. In his first message to the Grand Viziership, the Ministry of Interior and the Sheikh-ul-Islam on October 17, al-Omari congratulated the ‘23 July National Day’ (10 Temmuz Iyd-i Milli) which was the first anniversary of the Constitutional Mon-

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325 – 21 February 1910 Please see the section of 6.3 Amnesty Requests by Reshid al-Omari for the content of the message

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archy and demanded that they be included in the scope of the General Amnesty (Afv-ı Âli) declared in honor of that day.⁴⁷⁰ Because, according to them, this pardon would be a very appropriate move for the embracive, forgiving and fair character of the Constitutional Monarchy, which delighted all Ottoman nations. Obviously, a general amnesty was declared in honor of the Constitutional Monarchy, but those detained within the scope of the Mosul Incident investigation were not included in this amnesty. The exclusion (adem-i şümûl) of these detainees from the general amnesty can be explained with the great importance that the state attaches to ethnic, territorial and political sensitivities and balances. Because the case had not been heard yet and pardoning the untried suspects of a collective crime of this scale would most likely spark a more violent conflict between the two ethnic elements. On November 9, al-Omari’s group sent a longer message to the Grand Vi⁴⁷¹ zier. They stated that more than a thousand people from both sides were

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 4, 4 Teşrinievvel 1325 – 17 October 1909 “Sadâret-i Uzmâya / Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine /Meşihat-ı İslâmiyeye Yevm-i eman, mağfirete nişan olan Iyd-i […] hakk-ı azim-i Hilâfetpenâh ve bütün millet-i necibeye bahş ve mes’ûd buyurulmasına ve Meşrûtiyet-i Mukaddesemizin târih-i teyidi îtibârıyla ilk bayramı olması münâsebetiyle atebe-i felekmertebe-i şehriyârîyi arz-ı tebrik ve bu vesileyle lisan-ı sadâkat ve […] tebrik eyleriz. 10 Temmuz 1324 Iyd-i Millinin şerefine ihsân buyurulan afv-ı âlinin mazlûm olan kullarına adem-i şümûlünün mütehassıl-ı me’yûsiyet işbu ıyd-i mukaddes-i revhanimizin şerefine de Afv-ı Âli-i Hilâfetpenâhiye mazhar buyurulmaklığımızı [sic] ve bu vâsıtayla bilumûm millet-i Osmâniyeye tâlîm-i meserret ve teyid-i erkân-ı Meşrûtiyet için yekzeban ile dâvet-ı hayriyyenin isticlâbına erzân-ı merhamet buyurulması […] inkisâr ve ihtâr ile Diyânet ve Adâlet ve Müsâvat nâmına müsterhamdır.” The signatories of the telegram consisted of: Reşid el-Ömeri, Şeyh İbrâhim, Ed-Dai Ömer, Bahaeddin, Nûri, Abdullah, Ali, Muhammed, Latîf, Süleyman, Hamid, Câsim , Hasan, Mehmed, Câsim , Yunus, Necmi, Said and Eyüb. It is probable that one of the two Jasims (Câsim) mentioned here is Abu Jasim, who is mentioned as the ringleader in Consul Young’s reports and thus in the works of Hut, Shields, and Kedourie. However, it should be noted that Abu Jasim is not mentioned as the ringleader in any official correspondence. Please see: 3.3.The Mosul Incident Through Different Narratives; Hut, Musul Vilayeti’nin İdari, p. 176, 177, 180  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 13, 27 Teşrinievvel 1325 – 09 November 1909 “Dersaadet’te Sadâret-i Uzmâya. Evvelce de mükerreren istirhâm olunduğu üzere hükûmet-i sâbıkanın kusurundan nâşi Arab ile Ekrâd arasında vukua gelen Bayram Vukuatında tarafeynde bin kişiyi mütecâviz maznûn bulunarak bunların kısm-i azimi ve fâil ve müsebbibleri kanuna itâat etmeyip iddiâ-yı karârda kalmış ve yalnız muti olarak yüz yirmi kişiden ibâret olan zükûr ve inâs çâkerleriniz katiyen bir cürüm yok iken mâhâzâ kanuna gerdendâde bulunduğumuz hasebiyle taarruz, isnâdât-ı bâtıle ve müzevvirâne ile yedi mahdan beri mevkuf ve perîşânlığımız son dereceye vardığından tevâli eden

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under suspicion in the Feast Incident (Bayram Vukuatı), which broke out between the Arab and Kurdish elements due to the mismanagement of the previous local administration. According to al-Omari, most of these suspects, including the perpetrators and instigators of the incident, have insisted on disobeying the law. However, al-Omari’s group of 120, consisting only of men and women obedient to the state (tebaa-i muti), was different from these suspects. Because they claimed that they had been detained for seven months unnecessarily due to groundless allegations (isnâdât-ı bâtıle ve müzevvirâne) such as disobeying the law, even though they had committed absolutely no crime. In desperation, they constantly renewed their request for amnesty and waited for the Governorate to respond to the Ministry’s inquiry into their eligibility for the amnesty. According to their claims, the expected response was deliberately delayed by the intervention of some vindictive individuals that brought them into this situation. In other words, al-Omari overtly stated that their demand for the inclusion in the amnesty was sabotaged by someone with influence over the local administration. Even the preliminary investigation (tahkikat-ı ibtidâiyye) of such a wideranging case developed between two ethnicities and involved such a large number of suspects took almost a year. If the investigation took this long, naturally

mürâcaatımız üzerine şâyân-ı afv olup olmadığımızın isti’lâmını hâvi Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesinden vilâyete gelen telgrafnâmenin sür’at-i cevâbı lâzım edilirken yine evvelce mağdûriyetimize sebeb olan bazı garezlerin ilkaatıyla cevâbın tehirine sebebiyet verilmekte olduğu anlaşılıyor. Madde-i mezkûre iki anâsır arasında tekevvün ederek tarafeynde maznûnların kesreti hasebiyle tahkikat-ı ibtidâiyyesi bir seneye karib sürdüğü gibi muhâkemesi dahi tûl-u zamâna ihtiyâc-ı tabiisi bulunmakla bu yüzden çok mağdûrların binlerce ıyâl ü etfâlleri beraber imtidâd-ı mevkufiyetten mahv-ı perîşâniyetlerimizi müstelzim olup bu vâsıtayla yekdiğeriyle kat-ı alaka ve münâsebâtı gayr-i kabil olan Kerkük Süleymaniye ve Musul ahâlisinin aralarında lâyenkati bir adâvetin devâmına bâdi olacağı ve bu ise bütün memleketin harâbiyyetini müeddi bulunacağı tabiidir. Böyle bir madde ancak afv-ı umûmi ile halledilmesi ve beyne-l anâsır mevcûd bulunan adâvetin bu vâsıtayla def ve izâlesiyle umûm memleket ahâlisinin telif-i beyn ve ihyâsı siyâset-i lâzımeden bulunduğu ve zâten şu mevkuflar mücrim olmasalar bile maslahat-ı afva şâyân oldukları, halbuki kısm-i azimi mağdûr iseler de bil-muhâkeme de mağdûriyetlerimiz tâyin edince tûl-u zamân ve perîşânlarını mûcib olacağından bu kimselerin afva şâyân bulunduklarına dâir Eşrâf ve Ulemâ-yı Mahalliyeden vilâyete takdim kılınan mazbatada beyân edildiği hâlde yine henüz cevâb yazılmadığı anlaşıldığından me’yûsiyet-i mücessememiz artık derecesini tecâvüz etmiştir. Tebaa-i mutinin kesr-i kulûbleriyle bu sûretle tazyik ve mahvlarına ısrâr etmek , Meşrûtiyet ve adâletin bil-mevcûde ahkâmına mugayir idiğinden [sic] başka türlü mürâcaata mahal kalmamak üzere afv ile hemen tahliyemizle umûm memleketin ihyâsı ve bu yüzden teyid-i Meşrûtiyete rağbet ve dâvet-i hayriyyenin isticlâbına müsâade buyurulması ehemmiyetle müsterhamdır. Ferman. Mehmed, İbrâhim, Reşid el-Ömeri , Yunus, Süleyman, Ali, Ahmed, Abdulrahman, Mehmed, Câsim , Hamid, Eyüb , Ahmed, Mustafa “

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more time was needed for the case to be heard in court and for a verdict to be reached. The suspects were separated from their families for a long time due to the prolongation of the pre-trial detention period, and therefore their spouses and children (ıyâl ü etfâlleri) were also victimized. In addition, according to alOmari, this situation would fuel and perpetuate the ancient enmity between the community of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah and the community of Mosul, with whom it was impossible to break off their relations. The continuation of this hostility (lâ-yenkati bir adâvet) naturally meant the destruction of the whole land. Therefore, it was an absolutely necessary policy to eliminate this enmity between the regional elements (beyn-el anâsır) and to reconcile all the peoples of the region with each other. According to al-Omari, although the majority of these detainees were not guilty, they would have been victimized anyway because of the time they would spend in prison until the court concluded and they were acquitted. Even though the local Notables and Ulema declared that these detainees were eligible for amnesty in an affidavit they have submitted to the Governor’s Office, the lack of any response brought their despair (me’yûsiyet-i mücesseme) to the highest level. At the end of his message, Reshid al-Omari stated that insisting on destroying so many people was against all existing constitutional and judicial provisions. In the name of the revival of the whole motherland and the validity of the Constitutional Monarchy as a system of government, they had been waiting for immediate pardon and release without the need for any further application. Apparently, al-Omari thought that this amnesty would make a great contribution to the reconciliation of the regional elements, but what he overlooked was what would be the reactions of the Kurdish-origin Sâdât after the amnesty. In another message he sent he Grand Vizier on November 27, al-Omari stated that their misery, grievance and victimization exceeded even the Cretan Muslims (Girit Müslimleri).⁴⁷² According to Omari, accused, detainees or even convicts of

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 5, 14 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 27 November 1909 Cretan Muslims: Presumably, this expression was written in reference to the massacres committed against the Turks on the island during the Cretan Revolts of 1897. “Makam-ı Celil-i Cânib-i Sadâretpenâhiye 3 Teşrinievvel 1325 târihli Sadâret-i Uzmâya çekilen ariza-ı telgrafnâmeye lâhikadır. Ey evliyâ-yı umûr-u emn ey muhâfızin-i hukuk-u millet. […] İstibdâd’da iştigal eden mağdûriyete iltifât buyurunuz. Mükerreren feryâdımızı dinleyen yok mu? Muhâfaza-i hukukumuza memûr […] maa-t-teessüf sahte intihâb kılındıklarına dâir evrak-ı tahkikiyeleri el-yevm Musul İstintak Dâiresinde mevcûd bulunmakla zâten çıplak fikirli bulundukları mâlûmdur. Girit Müslimlerinin mağdûriyet ve sefaletlerini geçen mağdûriyetimizden bahsetmek artık tadı kalmamış ve perîşâniyetimiz haddini tecâvüz etmiştir. Katl-i nüfûs, hetk-i arâz, gasb-ı emvâl, fiil-i şenî, ihrâk gibi fazâyih-i mütenevvia, cinâyât-ı müsbite ile müttehem mevkuf ve mahkûm olup da kanuna

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all kinds of serious crimes (cinâyât-ı müsbite) such as murder (katl-i nüfûs), sexual assault and rape (fiil-i şenî, hetk-i arâz), extortion (gasb-ı emvâl) and arson (ihrâk), and who insisted on disobeying the law were pardoned without hesitation. Al-Omari also claimed that no inquiries were requested from the local authorities about whether these criminals were eligible for amnesty. In that case, according to al-Omari, these people who enjoyed this privilege were certainly pardoned ex officio. However, people like al-Omari were crushed and victimized just because they obeyed the law, and they had been detained for eight months for nothing because of the false statements (ilkaat-ı müzevvere) given about the Feast Incident. They were worried that their trial would not be concluded for years, and they could not even get a response to their appeals as to whether they were eligible for amnesty. Al-Omari also claimed that some of their opponents, who had paved the way for their arrests, were sabotaging their inclusion in the scope of amnesty. Allegedly, these individuals were trying to have the result delayed or to have the request rejected (aksi cevâbın itâsıyla işimizi tehire uğratmakla). These saboteurs were determined to destroy them by taking actions incompatible with the justice and the Constitutional Monarchy. According to alOmari, the new Governor (Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha) could be excused for his lack of knowledge of the incident. However, some focal points were trying to mislead the governor from the very beginning in order to prevent them to be included in the scope of amnesty and they were getting result. As a result, they were

adem-i itâatle karârda kalanlar tereddütsüz afv olundukları hâlde, acaba bunlar afva şâyân olup olmadıklarına bir vilâyet veya livâ ve kazâdan isti’lâm olunmuş mudur? Yoksa re’sen afv olunmuşlardır. Re’sen afv olundukları muhakkaktır. Ya bizim gibi mâhâzâ kanuna itâatimizden dolayı mağdûr, mazlûm, ilkaat-ı müzevvere ile Bayram Vukuatından dolayı Sekiz Mahdan beri mevkuf ve muhâkemeleri senelerce neticelenmeyeceği tabii bulunan mazlûmlarımızın tekrârdan mürâcaatımız üzerine en nihâyet afva şâyân olup olmadığımıza dâir bundan akdem Dâhiliye Nezâretinden telgrafiyen vilâyetten isti’lâm edilmiş iken henüz cevâb verilmediği gibi mevkufiyetimize sebeb olan mûterizlerin de ilkaatiyle yine aksi cevâb verileceği me’mûl ve ihtimâline verilmiştir. Vâlimiz yeni geldiği ve ahvâl-i umûmiyemize adem-i vukufu hasebiyle bu husûstan […] etse bile mâzûrdur. Fakat evvelce şu mağdûriyet-i azimemize tasaddi iden müfsidler vâsıtasıyla aksi cevâbın itâsıyla işimizi tehire uğratmakla, iş’âr ve istişara ve yandırılması hilâf-ı adâlet ve Meşrûtiyet ve müstelzim-i mavh ve perîşâniyetimizdir. El hâsıl afv olunan asi mücrimlerin de afvları […] Osmâni ve hükûmete asi bulunmalarından ise birçok zükûr ve inâs-ı mâsum çâkerleriniz dahi kanuna itâat etmeyen […] mücrimlerin kanunlarına ilâveten tereddütsüz affımızla Adâlet-i Meşrûtiyetin isbâtı yâhûd mazlûmen mahbûsta olmadık ise îlân-ı mazlûmin-i Osmâniyan için i’dâmımıza emr-i itâsı, yoksa hangi devlete tabi isek evvel ve âhir çektiğimiz ahvâl-i müessifemizi umûm-u îcâziye arz etmek ve hiçbir türlü Devlet-i İstibdâdda emsâli nâ-mesbûk şu zulüm ve i’tisâfdan istihlâsımıza çare bulmak üzere bir saniye akdem tefehhümümüz kemâl-i ciddiyet ve ilcâ-yı zarûriyyetle müsted’âdır. Ferman. Reşid el-Ömeri”

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still waiting to be pardoned without hesitation in the name of the manifestation of justice, which was one of the principles of the Constitutional regime. However, if they were not believed to have been unjustly imprisoned, they demanded a death sentence in order to avoid this cruelty and injustice, which had no precedent in any despotic regime. Al-Omari’s next message on December 7 was dispatched to both the Ministry of Interior and Sultan himself, and in its content, some certain sentiments about Arabism and the victimization of the Arabs were emphasized (see Illustration 21).⁴⁷³ According to al-Omari, the Ministry had been waiting for an opinion and suggestion from the Governor’s Office for about two months on whether the detainees were eligible for an amnesty. However, allegedly, due to the longstanding influence that their opponents had on the Governor’s Office, the necessary response could not be given. Al-Omari claimed that the regional hatred and insult towards Arab elements (menfûr olan Arab anâsır-ı müstahkar) were fueled, and Arabs were deliberately deprived of their constitutional rights and pushed into despair. He also underlined that this situation was totally against the principal of Constitutional Justice (hilâf-ı Adâlet-i Meşrûtiyet). Emphasizing Muhammad’s inclusiveness and justice towards the Arab, Persian and Turkish Communities (Fahr-i Kâinat beni’l Arab ve’l Acem ve’l-Etrâk), al-Omari particularly referred to the Hadith al Sharif (Hadis-i Şerif) ‘If the Arabs are humiliated Islam will be humiliated’ (İzâ zelleti’l Arabu zelle’l İslâmu). ⁴⁷⁴ For the sake of this hadith, he

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 07 December 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine / Deraliyye’de Halife-i Resûl Rabb’ul Âlemin Efendimiz Hazretlerine Teşrinievvel ve Teşrinisâni 1325 mükerreren istirhâm olunduğu üzere mazlûmen imtidâd-ı mevkufiyetten perîşâniyetimiz haddini tecâvüz etmiştir. Cürümleri sâbit şakîler afv buyruldukları hâlde mağdûr ve kanuna muti çâkerleriniz afva şâyân olup olmadığımıza dâir iki maha karib Nezâretpenâhilerinden telgrafnâme-i Dâhiliyeden telgrafen Vilâyetten sorulduğu hâlde muârızların bâkî kalan müstebidâne nüfûzlarıyla henüz cevâb-ı lâzıme verilmemiştir. Bu ise mâhâzâ şimdilik menfûr olan Arab anâsır-ı müstahkar ile icrâ-yı garaz edilmekte ise de hilâf-ı Adâlet-i Meşrûtiyettir. Zavallı Arablar Adâlet-i Meşrûtiyetten mahrûmiyetleri müstelzim-i me’yûsiyettir. Halbuki Fahr-i Kâinat beni’l Arab ve’l Acem ve’l-Etrâk efendimiz hazretleri buyurmuşlar ki ’İzâ zelleti’l Arabu zelle’l İslâmu’. Şu Hadis-i Şerifin meâl-i mânâına riâyeten ve müsâvat ve telif-i beyn nokta-i nazarından önümüzdeki Iyd-i Kebirin şerefine afvımızla beyne’l anâsırın mütekevvin-i sâire-i ihtilâfın itfâsıyla erkân-ı Meşrûtiyetin […] intizârında bulunduğumuza adâletin tesrii te’kiden müsterhamdır. Ferman Şeyh Said Mukatelesinden Reşid el-Ömeri , Mevkufîn Ali, Mehmed…”  According to what is reported from Jabir, the Prophet stated the following: ‘If the Arabs are humiliated Islam will be humiliated.’ ‘Araplar zelil olduğu zamân İslâm da zelil olur. ‫ ( ﺇﺫﺍ ﺫﻟﺖ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺏ ﺫﻝ ﺇﻻﺳﻼﻡ‬İbn Ebî Hâtim, İlel, c.2, s.376) : Abu Hâtim is confined with saying, “It is a superstitious hadith, it has no origins” for this narration. Undoubtedly, the reason

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demanded to be pardoned in the name of equality, reconciliation and peace and in the honor of the expected Eid-al-Adha (Iyd-i Kebir). He hoped that this pardon would settle the dispute that had aroused between the different ethnicities. As can be clearly seen, al-Omari asserted the embracive character of the Constitutional Monarchy and claimed that the Arab sub-identity under the Ottoman supra-identity was marginalized. However, the use of the hadith which presents Islam and Arabs as an inseparable whole, is somewhat confusing at this point. Because it is felt here that al-Omari glorifies the Arabs among other Islamic communities and discriminates against the Kurds by not including them among the Islamic communities he counts. Considering the reactionary and monarchist profile of al-Omari in the eyes of the state, it is quite confusing that he attacked a clique like Sâdât, which is extremely prestigious, respected and decisive in Islamic doctrine. However, this conflict can also be read as the struggle of Kurdish Sayyids and Arab Ulema to seize the religious leadership in the region, and in this respect, the Mosul Incident can be associated with an anti-Kurdish opposition shaped by Arab elements through religious motives. Although such a sentiment in the Islamic context contradicts the tradition of Ummahism, the emphasis on religious leadership may have been decisive here and triggered ethnic discrimination within the same religion. However, the ethnic conflict between these two elements went beyond the struggle for religious leadership after the First World War, spread all over the country and continued until the recognition of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government in 2005. The telegram on December 10 was signed as Omarizadeh Reshid (Reshid, the son of Omaris), Imam Ali of the Prophet Sheeth Mosque (İmâm-ı Nebî Şît) and Mullah Muhammad and was sent directly to the Minister of Interior Talât Pasha (see Illustration 22).⁴⁷⁵ Imam Ali, who stated his name only as Ali or ‘Ali the Detainee’ (Mevkufîn Ali) in the previous requests of amnesty, was one of leaders of the group that stormed Sheikh Said’s house in the Sâdât’s narrative.

that led Abu Hâtim to this opinion is that Islam is not dependent on the honor or humiliation of the Arabs. Muhittin Düzenli, Metin Tenkidi Açısından İlel Eserleri : İbn Ebî Hâtim’in İlel Adlı Eseri Özelinde [The Hidden Defect Works from Point of Text Critique in the Context of Ibn Ebi Hatim’s İlâl], Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 2010, Issue:29, pp. 225 – 250  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 19, 27 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 10 December 1909 “Dâhiliye Nâzırı Talât Bey Efendi Hazretlerine. 24 Teşrinisâni 1325 telgraf-ı müşterekemiz neticesinin intizârındayız. İs’âf-ı müsted’âyâtımızla icrâ-yı müsâvat muhâl ise telgraf-ı âhirinlerine verilecek akçe ile mahbûsta mazlûma tâyin etmek ve bâd-ı hevâ tasdi etmeden ise el-ye’sü ihda’r-râhateyn (yeis iki râhattan biridir) olmak üzere başkaları gibi tefehhümsüz müsterhamdır. Ferman. Ömerizâde Reşid, İmâm-ı Nebî Şît Ali, Molla Muhammed”

6.3 Amnesty Requests by Reshid al-Omari

Illustration 21: BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 17, 24 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 07 December 1909 The request for amnesty in which Reshid al-Omari emphasized Arabism

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The detainees stated that if it would not be possible to meet the demands for amnesty and ensure the justice and equality, they would no longer waste their money on telegraph service and instead allocate that amount to the oppressed in prison. Rather than constantly complaining to the official authorities and disturbing them unnecessarily, they were willing to accept their fate like the others, by adopting the word ‘despair is one of the two comforts’ (el-ye’sü ihda’r-râhateyn) as a principle. Telegraphing was a costly service in the conditions of that time. Besides, it must have been even more difficult for the detainees to telegraph frequently to the authorities, as they had no regular income. However, it is also possible that they deliberately wrote it to gain the sympathy of the authorities. The next day, al-Omari’s group wrote that the new Governor had responded negatively to the central authority’s inquiry (isti’lâm) into whether the detainees were eligible for amnesty (afva şâyân).⁴⁷⁶ However, they argued that the inquiry, which was referred to the Provincial Administrative Council, had not yet been officially resolved and concluded. Thus, the situation had to be formally clarified and confirmed through the sealed approval of the council. Apparently, the Governor took the initiative and gave an arbitrary response before the information request referred to the local council was finalized. At this point, we observe that al-Omari successfully followed the administrative and legal process even during his detention. The fact that he specifically questions the opinion of the local council and follows the official decision to be issued can also be interpreted as a maneuver to get support from the possible personal connections of alOmari among the local councilmen. Al-Omari sent his next message to the Ministry, the Grand Vizier and the Palace on December 21 and signed it as ‘Reshid al-Omari on behalf of 150 suspects’.⁴⁷⁷ Noting that everyone will have a good time with their families on the

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 20, 28 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 11 December 1909 “Dersaadet Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Afva şâyân olup olmadığımıza dâir sebk iden İsti’lâm-ı Meşrûtiyetperverilerine Vâli-i Cedid’den hodbehod aksi cevâb yazıldığı anlaşılmıştır. Halbuki isti’lâmları Meclis-i İdâreye bil-havale henüz taht-ı karâra aldırılamadığından meclisin zât-ı mührüyle te’kiden keyfiyetin istizâası müsterhamdır. Reşid el-Ömeri, Nebî Şît İmâmı Ali, Molla Muhammed”  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 22– 23, 8 Kânûnuevvel 1325 – 21 December 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine / Sadâret -i Uzmâya / Şevketmeab Efendimize Yarın Bayramdır. Herkes ehl ü ıyâliyle mes’ûd olacaktır. Kürdlere riâyeten bizim gibi garip Arab mazlûmları böyle günlerde mes’ûd buyurulmadığımız takdirde adâlet ve vicdân-ı devletleri kanaati gününe saklayacağımızın li-ecl-it-tesliye irâdesi. Ferman 150 Maznûn nâmına Reşid el-Ömeri”

6.3 Amnesty Requests by Reshid al-Omari

Illustration 22: BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 19, 27 Teşrinisâni 1325 – 10 December 1909 The request for amnesty sent by Reshid al-Omari directly to the Minister of Interior Talât Pasha

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occasion of the Eid next day, al-Omari demanded that the Arab detainees not be deprived of this opportunity for the sake of the Kurds. However, it is not clear whether this message is about the visiting conditions in prison or the happiness of people who can celebrate the Eid outside. As the detainees of the Mosul Incident, did al-Omari demand that their families be allowed to visit them in prison or that they could be released and spend the Eid outside with their loved ones? In any case, the most important thing to note is that the ethnic emphasis in al-Omari’s messages was getting stronger day by day. On behalf of all Arab detainees, he openly claimed that they were deprived of some certain rights and discriminated in order to please the Kurds.

The Reluctant Attitude of the Minister of Justice towards Amnesty From the correspondence between the Ministries of Interior and Justice on 20 December, it is understood that the Mosuli Ulema, Sheikhs and Notables also applied for the pardon of the detainees and put pressure on the authorities.⁴⁷⁸ The Ministry of Interior concluded that both the community of Mosul and the Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah were collectively involved in this incident and found it problematic to blame only one side. However, since the amnesty of both parties could cause the repetition of events, the Ministry brought a new proposal. It would have been a solution if the accused in pre-trial detention were pardoned under Public Law (Hukuk-u Umûmiye) but continued to be prosecuted in terms of Private Law (Hukuk-u Şahsiye). Obviously, at this point, the Ministry of Interior thought that instead of the defendants being tried, convicted and sentenced en masse for a social act of violence, some of them should be selected, tried and convicted individually. In this way, the reactions caused by a total conviction and the pressure created by the demands for amnesty could be avoided to a certain extent.

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 25, 7 Kânûnuevvel 1325 – 20 December 1909 “Adliye Nezâret-i Celilesine 29 Teşrinevvel 1325 târihli telgrafa zeyldir. Musul’da vuku bulan hâdise-i mâlûmeden dolayı müttehem olanların afv-ı âliye mazhariyetleri için umûm Musul Ulemâ ve Meşâyih ve Eşrâfı mürâcaattan hâli kalmadıklarına ve bu işte Musul ahâlisiyle Süleymaniye Sâdât’ı müşterek bulunduklarına ve tarafeynin afvı aynen fenâlığın men-i zuhûruna medâr olacağı mülâhazasına mebni Hukuk-u Şahsiye bâkî kalmak üzere Hukuk-u Umûmiyeden afvları hakkında Musul Vilâyetine bugün cevâben çekilen telgrafnâme dahi leffen savb-ı Âlilerine tisyâr kılınmakla mealine ve işârât-ı sâbıkaya nazaran vâki olacak mütâlaa-i aliyye-i […] inbâ ve […] buyurulması bâbında”

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The Minister of Justice Necmeddin Mullah replied that the general amnesty was created and announced on the basis of personal reasons and political needs (esbâb-ı şahsiye ve icâbât-ı siyâsiye).⁴⁷⁹ Since it was an extraordinary legal remedy (fevkalâde bir tarik-i kanuni), even the perpetrators of this incident could have benefited from the amnesty for such a reasonable and precise reason. Because the general amnesty was already an exceptional practice that included everyone, and therefore it was appropriate to include these people in the scope of amnesty according to both the situation and the circumstances. However, the issue was now referred to the relevant court by the Ministry of Justice and was not at the discretion of local political needs and interests. Thus, the issue would be shaped exclusively through the outcome of the investigation and trial. Minister Necmeddin Mullah stated that he could not express an opinion after this point, could not interfere with the ongoing judicial process and left the matter to the discretion and decision of the state. The attitude of the Minister of Justice on this issue is important in terms of showing the sensitivity of the Constitutional regime to the independence of judiciary and the supremacy of law. Even if he was the Minister of Justice, he did not intervene in a process that was referred to the court and kept the judicial independence above regional or political priorities. Thereafter, the Ministry of Interior informed the Mosul Province that these individuals, who were still under criminal prosecution, were not eligible for amnesty since they did not have a material or political reason (sebeb-i maddi veya siyâsi) that would require them to be pardoned.⁴⁸⁰ In addition, the Ministry asked

 BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 27, 9 Kânûnuevvel 1325 – 22 December 1909 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine / Nâzır Bey Efendi Hazretleri, Afv-ı Âli esbâb-ı şahsiye ve icâbât-ı siyâsiyeye mebni vaz’ ve tesis edilmiştir. Fevkalâde bir tarik-i kanuni olmasına göre işbu hâdise fâillerinin dahi böyle bir sebeb-i mâkul ve muhakkaktan dolayı Afv-ı Âliye mazhariyetleri muvâfık-ı hâl ve maslahat olabilir ise de husûs-u […] dolayı Nezâret-i âcizâneye mevcut mâlûmat-ı tahkikat-ı istintâkıyyenin bil-ikmâl-i keyfiyet berây-ı muhâkeme-i âidesine tevdi edildiğine münhasır ve binâenaleyh icâbât-ı siyâsiye-i mahalliyenin takdirine gayri müsâid edildiğinden ol babda Nezâret-i âcizânem tarafından beyân-ı mütâlaaya imkân olamayıp […] devletçe îcâbı takdir ve tâyin edilmek lâzım gelineceği mülâhaza olunmakta ise de ol babda emr ü ferman hazret-i men lehül emrindir. Adliye Nâzırı Necmeddin Molla – Umûr-u Cezâiyye Müdiri Nâmına Mazhar”  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 26, 16 Kânûnuevvel 1325 – 29 December 1909 “Musul Vilâyetine Eşhâs-ı mâlûmenin geçen sene irtikâb ettikleri cinâyâttan dolayı el-yevm haklarında cihet-i adliyece tâkibât-ı kanuniye icrâ edilmekte iken bunların mazhar-ı afva olmalarını îcâb ettirecek ortada bir sebeb-i maddi veya siyâsi mevcûd olmamasına göre afv-ı âliye mazhariyetleri muvâfık görülmemiştir. Tâkibât-ı adliyesiz vâreste kalmaları mülken ve siyâseten lüzûm gösterecek

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to be notified if there was a strong and real reason in terms of civil, administrative and political terms, that would require them to be released without prosecution. However, a few weeks later, the Ministry would demand that the judicial process be expedited, stating that the amnesty of these people would depend on the finalization of the judgments to be given by the court (derecât-ı muhâkeme).⁴⁸¹ Apparently, the Ministry of Interior which did not receive a positive response from the Ministry of Justice regarding the amnesty, emphasized the supremacy of law to the Governorate and sought a solid basis for the decision of amnesty. In this respect, it is understood that the Ministry still leaves the door open as a political maneuver and does not completely remove the option of amnesty until the court concludes. As a result, the Ministry of Interior fully complied with the legal regulations and bureaucratic guidelines, entrusted the justification process of the amnesty to the provincial administration and at one point abdicated its responsibility. The expected reaction from the Reshid al-Omari front reached both the Ministry of Interior and the parliament on the same day without any delay⁴⁸² The fact that the pardon of 150 detainees was linked to the outcome of litigation and based on a political justification, was adopted in both provincial and imperial level. However, the fact that the Ministry of Justice, which is the ultimate decision maker, did not express a positive and favorable opinion towards the amnesty, caused great sadness to these people. They warned that the current situation could lead to the general destruction of their homeland and demanded that

esbâb-ı hakikiye bir lüzûm-u kavi var ise inbâsı lâzım gelir. Dâhiliye Nezâreti Muhâberât-ı Umûmiye Dâiresi”  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 28, 30 Kânûnuevvel 1325 – 12 January 1910 “Musul Vilâyetine Musul vak’asından dolayı mevkuf bulunan eşhâs hakkında afv-ı âli istihsâl edilebilmesi haklarında mahkemede sâdır olacak hükümlerin derecât-ı muhâkemeden geçerek kesb-i katiyyet etmesine vâbeste olduğundan muamelât-ı adliyenin tesriiyle neticesinin inbâsı lâzım gelir. Dâhiliye Nezâreti Muhâberât-ı Umûmiye Dâiresi”  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 30 – 31, 30 Kânûnuevvel 1325 – 12 January 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine / Mebûsân Riyâset-i Celilesine. Hükûmet-i sâbıkanın kusurundan münbais Bayram Hâdisesinden dolayı 150 kişi kadar zükûr ve inâs mâlûm mevkufînin maddeleri bil-muhâkeme neticeleneceği ve böyle bir madde-i muhtelifenin ancak afv ile kabil-i hâl ve mevâdd-ı siyâsiyeden bulunduğu gerek Makamât-ı Aliyyece gerek memleket ve vilâyetçe tensib buyurulmuş iken Adliye Nezâreti tarafından tervicine mesâğ gösterilmemesini müstelzim mağdûriyet-i azimemiz bulunmakla beraber memleketin harâbiyyet-i umûmiyete bâdi olacağından lütfen ve merhamet-i Nezâret-i celilerince mevcûd bulunan mükerrer ve muvazzih istirhâmnâmelerimizin mütâlaasına, şu buhrân-ı azâbdan halâsımıza memleketin ihyâsına delâlet buyurulmasına umûm nâmına müsterhamdır. Ferman. Ed-dai Mevkuf Nebî Şît Ali, Bahaddin, Yunus, İsmâil, Süleyman, Câsim , Eyüb, Ali, Molla Ali”

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the petitions (istirhâmnâme) they sent repeatedly be now taken into account. The disappearance of the option of the Ministry of Justice, which was considered as a last resort, was a major disappointment for al-Omari. In his next telegram sent to the Grand Vizier, al-Omari complained that he was tired of applying to the authorities and yet could not make his problem heard.⁴⁸³ Now he was begging for God’s sake, demanding either to be released as a remedy against his trouble or a death sentence issued for him to get rid of this pain (ya derdime derman ya katlime ferman). Al-Omari seemed to be running out of patience and he was beginning to lose hope enough to choose to be executed rather than remain imprisoned. In another message he sent to the Grand Vizier on January 22, al-Omari once again emphasized the conciliatory and unifying effect of the Constitutional Monarchy on the Ottoman nations.⁴⁸⁴ The Çırağan Palace, the birthplace of the deposed Sultan Abdülhamid and his despotic ideology (Hâkan-ı Mahlû’un maskat-ı re’s-i müstebid olan Çırağan Sarayı), had burned down a few days ago (19 January 1910). Still, it was unnecessary to worry about it, because as long as the Ottoman Nation was committed to Constitutionalism, many more decent institutions could have been built. However, the unjust detention of innocent people without showing mercy to their cries had damaged the spirit of the Constitutionalism, and this situation could have fractionized the elements within the Ottoman society. The emphasis on the inclusiveness of the Constitutional Monarchy was a phenomenon that we saw even in Sâdât’s messages, and it reflected the spirit of the period in a full sense. Because all the elements in the Ottoman  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 39, 4 Kânûnusâni 1325 – 17 January 1910 “Sadâret-i Uzmâya. Makamâta müraacaattan usanarak derdimi anlattıramadım. Allah aşkına sâdırdaki hakkımı vilâyet vâsıtasıyla bendenizden sorulsun da ol vakit ya derdime derman ya katlime ferman buyurulup memnûn olurum. Zira hakkı müstahakkına verildiği hâlde şâyân-ı tebrik teşekkürât […] Reşid el-Ömeri”  BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 38, 9 Kânûnusâni 1325 – 22 January 1910 “Sadâret -i Uzmâya Hâkan-ı Mahlû’un maskat-ı re’s-i müstebid olan Çırağan Sarayının yanması mûcib-i teessüf değildir. Zira Millet-i Osmâniye Meşrûtiyetperver […] iken ondan muntazam dâireler küşâd olunabilir. Ancak bizim gibi bî-günâh mağdûrinin feryâdlarına acınmayıp çâkerlerinin yandırılmasıyla mahvları ve Meşrûtiyet ruhu olan tefrik-i anâsıra mûcib ahvâle teessüf azim-i elzemdir. Meşrûtiyet zamânı olduğu hâlde 4 Kânûnusâni 1325 târihli telgraf neticesiz kaldığından bu […] arzına mecbûr olduk. Reşid el-Ömeri” Selda Kalfazade, Çırağan Sahilsarayı, İstanbul’da Beşiktaş ile Ortaköy arasında Sultan Abdülaziz tarafından yaptırılan saray. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/ciragan-sahilsarayi , Access Date:03.12. 2022

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society referred to the embracing side of the Constitutionalism when the time came, and they wanted to benefit from its blessings such as equality and justice. Either way, it was quite pragmatic that Omari, who had previously shown unconditional devotion to Abdülhamid, praised him and even encouraged the prisoners to pray for him, now expresses that he is not upset about the fire in the Çırağan Palace. Omari may have attempted such maneuvers in order to look nice and sympathehic to the Unionist bureaucracy and have the amnesty decision issued. However, the case was still not concluded, and al-Omari’s messages were still not over. The fact that he has recently sent telegrams signed only under his own name suggests that he either lost the support of other detainees at some point or communicated with the central authorities without their knowledge. On February 21, he sent a long message to both the Ministry of Interior and the Grand Vizirate and stated that the opinion requested from the province regarding the amnesty demands resulted in the decision to expedite the trial (tesri-i muhâkeme).⁴⁸⁵ However, al-Omari was extremely hopeless as he did not consider this development as a success. He wrote that “if the court could not be established yet, this pretrial detention issue will not end for another 20 years.” The case, on the other hand, was to begin to be heard by the court on February 28, 1910, exactly one week after this telegram. Al-Omari stated that the amnesty decision regarding a case between two elements of the inhabitants of a province was not at the disposal of the Sultan, according to the Kanûn-i Esâsi. Besides, he reiterated that the Governor’s positive opinion on their inclusion to the amnesty was prevented by some opposition groups (mûterizler). Al BOA, DH.MUİ.24/6/Lef 46, 8 Şubat 1325 – 21 February 1910 “Makam-ı Sadâret-i Uzmâya / Dâhiliye Nezâretine […] istirhâmâtımıza cevâben 28 Kânûnusâni 1325 Dâhiliyeden afvımız hakında vilâyetten sorulan mütâlâa tesri-i muhâkemeye tevil olunmaktadır. Muhâkeme şimdiye kadar teşkil ettirilemedi ise bile 20 sene de bitmez bu mesele-i mahbûsedir. Bir vilâyet sekenesinin iki anâsırı beyninde vâki afvlar zât-ı şâhânenin bil-hassa hukuk-u mukaddese-i husûsiyyesinden olmadığı Kanûn-i Esâsiyece musarrahdır. Mûterizler afvımız için Vâliye yazdırmazlar. Bilakis mahvımıza çalışıyorlar. Mezâlim tahammülümüze kaldı. Âlemi mahveden eşkıyâlar bile affolunuyorlar. Meşrûtiyetperver muti olduğumuzdan mahvımıza kadar yürümeye sebeb nedir? Ve kanaati vicdân, nâmûs, adâlet tecviz eder. Mükerreren istirhâm ettiğimiz mürâcaatımızca meselemiz afv ile neticelenmez ise halâs muhâlâttandır. Meşrûtiyet ruhu olan telif-i beyn noktasından siyâseten, mürüvveten, hamiyyeten her iki tarafın afvı billâhi maslahaten ensebdir. Af buyurulan eşkıyâlar kadar şakî isek yine müsâvaten afvımız îcâb etmez mi? Muhâkemede berâetimiz muhakkak ise de teferruâtının çokluğundan, şühûdun tefrikasından muhâkemece hitâmı mümkün olamayacağından afvımızın irâdesini re’sen istihsâl mağdûriyet-i mücessemeden istihlâsımızı merhamet-i âsafânelerinden tekrâr-ı aliyül tekrâr müsterhamdır. Reşid el-Ömeri”

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Omari stated that they could do nothing but endure the atrocities by these dissidents who tried to destroy them completely. While even the bandits who had ravaged the realm were forgiven, why were they so pressured as people who were Pro-Constitutional and obedient to the state? According to al-Omari, although it seemed certain that they would be acquitted at the end of the trial, the case was unlikely to be finalized due to the abundance of details (teferruâtının çokluğundan) and the schism of the witnesses (şühûdun tefrikasından). Pardoning of both sides was the most appropriate solution, both in terms of reconciliation (telif-i beyn) which is the spirit of the Constitutional Monarchy, and in terms of politics, humanity, patriotism and honor (siyâseten, mürüvveten, hamiyyeten). According to al-Omari, even if they were as guilty as the bandits who were deemed worthy of pardon, wouldn’t they also need to be forgiven in accordance with the principle of equality? He added that if their case does not result in the amnesty, their salvation would be impossible. In this process, a change also took place in the Mosul provincial administration. On February 26, 1910, Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha handed over his duties to Brigadier General (Mirlivâ) Muhiddin Pasha, who has been serving as the Deputy Commander of the 24th Reserve Division (24. Redif Fırkası).⁴⁸⁶ While the Mirlivâ Muhiddin served as the Acting Governor and Commander of the Mosul Province, Fâzıl Pasha would command the pursuit and suppression of the rebellious Dulaim Tribe (Duleym Aşâir-i Bagiyesi). While the trial was still in progress in March 1910, another request of amnesty reached the authorities by the mothers and wives of the detainees.⁴⁸⁷ Khadija

 BOA, DH.MUİ.41/16/Lef 2, 13 Şubat 1325 – 26 Şubat 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâretine. Duleym Aşâir-i Bagiyesinin darb ve tenkîli zımnında Mütevekkil-Alellah muktezi kuvvetle bugün hareket edileceği ve Musul Vilâyeti ve Havâlisi Kumandanlığı Vekâletine 24. Redif Fırkası Kumandanı Vekili Mirlivâ Muhiddin Paşa tevkil edildiği mâruzdur. Musul Vâli ve Havâlisi Kumandanı Fâzıl.”  BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 2, 7 Mart 1326 – 20 March 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. Süleymaniyeli Şeyh Said Vukuatının asıl müsebbib ve muharriki olan, kanuna itâat etmeyip firârda bulunan Ekrâdı tevkifden bil-istisnâ bilhassa muti’ olan evlâdlarımız Arab olduklarından […] bir seneden beri mazlûmen tevkiflerinden büsbütün perîşân olduk. Yataklarımıza varıncaya kadar satıp maişetlerine verdik. Yalnız nâmûsumuz kaldı. O nokta-i mühimmenin muhâfazası dahi emin-ül müminin ve’l müminat ile Vükelâ-i millettir. Nâmûsumuzu […] lekeden vikaye buyurulmak üzere afvlarının şeref […] husûsunda Âb-ı Zehrâ‘nın delâlet-i mukaddesesinin şeref-i itâsı nâmına dehâlet eyleriz. Ferman 14 Wives and Mothers such as Hatice, Meryem, Cemile, Âdile, Azime, Hatice, Zekiye, Halime, Ayşe, Fatıma…”

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(Hatice) and her friends claimed that the Kurds, who were the leading motive and instigator of Sheikh Said’s murder, disobeyed the law and fled, and their obedient and innocent sons were arrested instead of them simply because they were Arabs. For this reason, their lives have become completely miserable for the last year and even had to sell their houseware such as beds in order to provide for their sons and husbands in prison (Yataklarımıza varıncaya kadar satıp maişetlerine verdik). Now the only thing they had was their pudicity (Yalnız nâmûsumuz kaldı) and these 14 women were demanding the pardoning of their sons and husbands in order to defend their pudicity. Khadija’s request addressing the Ministry of Interior, was also conveyed to the Ministry of Justice and the Mosul Governorate, and the necessary authorities were specifically asked to speed up the trial process.⁴⁸⁸ In a short time, Acting Governor Muhiddin Pasha would announce that the public hearing had begun, that the proceedings were continuing within the framework of the law, and that the Prosecutor’s Office was requested to speed up the process.

Sâdât’s Determination to Secure the Convictions Sâdât, who was aware of these requests for amnesty during the trial process, particularly insisted on securing the convictions until the last moment. At this point, the Sheikhs were worried that the perpetrators would escape with impunity and that they would get away with what they had done. As the trial was nearing its end after nearly four months, Sulaymaniyah Sâdât sent a second signed and sealed manifest to the Sheikh-ul-Islam on June 12, 1910.⁴⁸⁹ They explained

 BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 1, 13 Mart 1326 – 26 March 1910; Lef 3, 16 Mart 1326 – 29 March 1910  BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326 – 12 June 1910 “Huzûr-u […] Meşihatpenâhiye / Mâruz-u Dâîleridir ki Hıtta-i Irâkîye denildiği zamân mahiyette gayet âlî terakkiyât ve tekâmülü tecessüm eder. Irâk’ımızın yâr u agyâra gıbta-âver olan medeniyyet ve mâmûriyyetine bedel sekenede cehl, mülkte harâbiyyet gibi ahvâl -i esef iştimâli gören erbâb-ı basiret bittabi esbâb-ı mûcibeyi taharri ile işgal edince idâre-i umûr edenlerin adl ve müsâvat dâiresinde umûru tedvir etmedikleri ve gaiyye-i efkâr ve teşebbüsleri sırf kendi menâfi-i mahsûsaları nokta-i nazarına mâtuf ettiği zihine tebâdür ider. Bu hâlde muhabbet-i vataniye ve milliyesi olan her bir erbâb-ı vicdân müteessir olur. İdâre-i müstebide-i sâbıkanın siyâkı yüzünden artık buraları bütün bütüne istilâ eden cehlin beyn-el anâsır müzmin bir hâl kesb eden nâire-i şer ve nifakın inkılâb-ı âhir-i mes’ûdumuz sâyesiyle zevâlpezir olması me’mûl idi. Zimâm-ı idâreyi ele alanlar gene menâfi-i mahsûsalarını, devâm-ı memûriyetlerini temin için beyn-el anâsır ilka-i münâferet ve mazarrat ettiklerinden seyyiât-ı sâbıka olanca kuvvetiyle […] olarak teessürât-ı muzırrası herkesi dilhûn eylemiştir. Bu kadar mesâib ve felâketimizin nâire-i cânhırâşıyla dilhûn ve hükûmetin adâletine

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how the administration in the Iraqi geography deteriorated day by day (mülkte harâbiyyet), to what extent the political degeneration reached, and how the scope of the conspiracy framed against them expanded (see Illustration 23). The ignorance (sekenede cehl) that prevailed in the region during the Despotism regime had devastated all patriots, this notion of imprudence was also inherited by Post-Constitutional cadres, and the pursuit of personal interests by civilian administrations increased the factionalism in the region (beyn-el anâsır ilka-i münâferet ve mazarrat). According to the manifest, as the verdict of the case was delayed, the opponents of Sâdât managed the cover up their crimes and resumed their cruelty, lawlessness and slander by including the new Sub-Governor Rüşdi and Head of Penal Chamber Ahmed Refet into the alliance. In this respect, it was obvious how much certain people violated the internal and external security. The Sheikhs included Acting Mayor Abdurrahman Agha and his comrades in these serious accusations and claimed that their confidential correspondence ex-

muntazır iken müfsidin merkumların fıtraten müsâid-i şer ve nifak oldukları cihetle Cezâ Reisi Ahmed Refet ve Livâ Mutasarrıfı Rüşdi Beyleri iğfâl-i dâire-i ittifaklarına alıp onların muâvenet ve müzâheretleriyle seyyiât-ı mühimme-i vak’alarını setr ve vâkıâ-yı sâbıkayı tekrâr ve tecdide sa’y ederek etrâf ve taallukat ve akrabâlarımıza cerâim icad ve tertib ve envâ-ı ilkaat-ı mefsedetkârâneye tevessül ile dâhilen ve hâricen ihlâl-i âsâyiş eylemekte bulundukları meydandadır. Ve Belediye Reisi Vekili Abdurrahman Ağayla rüfekası Livâ Tahrirat Müdiriyetinde , Mutasarrıflık Vekâletinde bulunduğu sırada Hemavendlilerle gizli muhâbere evrakları derdest ve el-yevm Divân-ı Harb-i Örfî Heyet-i Tahkikiyesinde mevcûd ve Musul Feciasını ilka’ için Bin Beş Yüz lira para sarf ederek bizzat ve bil vâsıta müdâhaleleri Musul muhâkemesindeki evrak-ı meşiyyet ve şühûd-u müteaddide ile müsbet iken şimdiye kadar haklarında tâkibât-ı kanuniye icrâ edilmemesinden cesâretlenerek efkâr-ı gayrimarziyye ve âsâyiş-şikenânelerinde gittikçe ibrâz-ı faâliyet ediyorlar. Başımıza gelen mesâib […] ve felâket eylemesinde hüsn-i tesirinden mahrûm olan hükûmet-i mahalliye müfsidin merkumların müttefik ve mürevvic-i efkârıdır. Her bir hukukun muhâfazasını Hükûmet-i Âdile-i Meşrûtaya tevdi eden biz zavallıların isti’taf-ı adâlet ve merhameti mutazammın mürâcaatımız akim kalıyor. Herhangi nokta-i nazardan tetkik edilirse sırf adâletsizlik, müsâvatsızlık neticesi olan mağdûriyetimizin bu hallin devâmı me’yûsiyet câlib ve gayet vahimdir. Âlem-i İslâmiyet’te Sâdât, Ulemâ, Edyân-ı Muhtelifede Ruhbanlar Hukukuna şahsına riâyet vâcib, alel-husûs icrâ-yı adâlet farz-ı ayndır. Zât-ı fetvâpenâhileri Şeriat-ı […] Muhammedî ve Ahkâm-ı Kanûn-i Esâsiyeyi bir sûret-i müsâvatkârânede tatbik ve icrâya memûr ve tavzif buyurulmuşsanız ahvâl-i mesrûde-i mazarattın da men’i hakkındaki îcâbı şimdiden icrâ buyurulmaz ve Kürde müfsidinin ilka-i tahazzur ettikleri vukuat-ı elime önü alınmazsa vuku bulacak fenâlığın mesûliyeti […] fetvâpenâhilerinin hukuk ve râhatımızı muhâfaza ve temin etmek için mefsedet ve mel’anetleri ke’ş-şems zâhir ve bâhir merkumunla […] Cezâ Reisinin çare-i def’leri ve mürtekib oldukları cerâim ve kabâihin cezâ-yı sezâlarının tertib ve […] adâletin icrâsı ve olmadığı hâlde on bin hâneyi teşkil eden bilumûm Sâdât ve taallukatı vatanımızı göz yaşları dökerek vedâya mecbûr olduğumuzu arz ve kemâl-i sabırsızlıkla levâzım-ı muâdeletin icrâsını intizâr eyleriz. Ferman. Nakibü’l Eşrâf Kaimakamı”

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changed with the Hamawands through the offices of the Director of Correspondence (Tahrirat Müdiriyeti) and the Acting Sub-Governor (Mutasarrıflık Vekâleti), was exposed. According to their claims, these exposed correspondence were now in the possession of the Investigation Board of the Court Martial (Divân-ı Harb-i Örfî Heyet-i Tahkikiyesi). According to the Sheikhs, the local administration which did not take any precautions against the disaster that befell them and was not helpful at any point, on the contrary, was an accomplice and promoter of this action. Despite the large number of documents and witnesses revealing how the disaster was financed and managed, these conspirators were still not prosecuted. Naturally, this delay in justice encouraged their opponents, stimulated their disruptive ideas and activities, and thus endangered the lives of Sâdât. The Sheikhs stated that in various religions, observance of the rights of the clergy (ruhbanlar hukuku) was Wajib (‫ )ﻭﺍﺟﺐ‬and especially the execution of justice was Fard al-Ayn (‫)ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍﻟﻌﻴﻦ‬.⁴⁹⁰ What happened to them was just injustice and discrimination no matter how they look at it and the continuation of this situation could push the entire Islamic world into despair. At the end of the message, the Sheikhs emphasized that if justice did not prevail, all Sâdât congregation consisting of 10 thousand households, had to leave their homeland in tears. In another message at the end of June, Naqib Maarouf stated that as justice was delayed, the persecution on them increased and the patience inherited from their ancestors was now exhausted.⁴⁹¹ According to Maarouf, their opponents

 Fard al-Ayn (Farz-ı Ayn): It is an obligation that every Muslim must follow. Such as believing in Allah, performing the salaat, not lying, and fasting in Ramadan. Wajib (Vâcib) : The orders of Allah, whose fulfillment is necessary for every Muslim and is a great sin if not done. It is not permissible to abandon. Such as Salat al Eid and Witr. https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=farz&t=%40%40 https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=Vacib&t=%40%40 Date of Access: 21.05. 2022  BOA, DH.MKT.110/11/Lef 2, 17 Haziran 1326 – 30 June 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Vak’a-i Kerbelâ kadar ciğer-sûz olan Musul Fâciasından dolayı iki seneden beri binlerle vuku bulan mürâcaatın neticesi Sâdâtımızın Seyyidi Şeyh Kâk Ahmed Efendinin Hafidi Şehid Merhûm Şeyh Said Efendinin yâdigâr-ı hayâtı olup […] altında canını kurtaran Şeyh Mahmud dâîlerinin bi-gayr-i hakkın cinâyetle ithâmı dâr-ı me’vâdan mehcuriyyeti oldu. Mâlûm-u sâmileridir ki Vak’a-i Kerbelâ’dan sonra mesâib-zedegân Âl-i Beyt’e Yezid gibi bir hasm-ı câhid bile hürmet etti. Yezidden daha anûd daha hûnhâr husemâmız bakıyye–yi süyûf olan hânedânımızdan kimseyi bırakmamak fikriyle hâlen ittibâ-yı mefsedet etmekte , hükûmet-i mahalliyeden müzâheret görmektedir. Ecdâdından mevrûs mesâibe tahammül, hakkımızdaki mezâlime karşı Hükûmet-i Meşrûtanın adâletine intizâr iken Sâdâtımızdan mâadâ , takat-ı beşer fevkinde olan yar-ı zulm gittikçe tezâyid tezâuf eylediğinden artık bizim de dûş-u tahammülümüz mütekessir oldu. Şimdiye kadar hiçbir eser-i adâlet göremediğimizden vâdi-i yeisle bulunan bilumûm Sâdât, ekser-i kariben bi-gayr-i hakkın Şeyh Mahmud dâîleri şânına sürülen leke, nazar-ı afv ve âtıfetle

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Illustration 23: BOA, DH.MUİ.117/23/Lef 4, 30 Mayıs 1326 – 12 June 1910 The Second Manifest of Sâdât sent to the Sheikh-ul-Islam

who were more stubborn and ruthless than Yezid, would continue their actions until there was not a single member of Sâdât left in Sulaymaniyah, and unfortunately these people were supported by the local government.⁴⁹² The wrongful accusations brought against Sheikh Said’s son, Sheikh Mahmud, who barely survived from the Mosul Incident, had caused him to stay away from his hometown. Almost all of Sâdât would leave their homeland in tears if the reputation of Sheikh Mahmud besmirched by these false allegations is not cleaned

izâle buyurulmaz, mezâlim-i vâkıânın Musul’da Süleymaniye’deki fâil müsebbibleri pençe-i adâlete çarptırılmazsa göz yaşları dökerek vatanı vedâ mecbûriyetindedir. Cebr-i sükûnetle müellif bulunan Sâdât vatandan hicret gibi acı bir harekete ihtiyârdan evvel Hükûmet-i Âdilei Meşrûtaya feryâd-ı mazlûmanesi tekrâr ve mezâlim-i vak’a-i müteesifeden dolayı levâzım-ı muâdeletin icrâsını delâlet-i inâyetlerinin son ve şiddetli bir ümidle istirhâm eylerim. Ferman. Ed-dai Nakib Mârûf”  Yezid ibn Mu’awiya (Yezid bin Muâviye) from the Umayyad Caliphate (Emeviler Hilâfeti)

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(bi-gayr-i hakkın Şeyh Mahmud dâîleri şânına sürülen leke) and the real perpetrators of the Mosul Incident are not convicted. Before making a painful move such as emigrating from their homeland, they were crying out to the Constitutional government and demanding justice with a last and fierce hope. Sâdât’s determination and persistence in securing the convictions would continue until the trial was concluded on July 14, 1910. Among the archive documents related to the Mosul Incident trial, no accusations, detainments or convictions were found against the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs or the Kirkuk Cavalry escorting them. The possibility that none of the Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk Kurds was tried and convicted despite the large number of Arab defendants and convicts, might have further provoked the Arab Ulema of Mosul and fueled the Arab-Kurdish Dispute (see Diagram 3). However, what is particularly striking about this message above is that it refers to some accusations brought against Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji. Could Mahmud, who barely survived the Mosul Incident, have been accused and prosecuted for his involvement in the Siege of Sulaymaniyah organized in February 1909? Although it seems like a plausible possibility, no other documents or clues have been found to support this argument. If there is an independent case regarding the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, it should be investigated separately. If not, and if the trial of the besiegers was incorporated into the Mosul Incident case, it must be confirmed from different sources other than the Ottoman Archives.

6.4 Convictions Although the convictions eventually relieved the Sâdât bloc, they caused even greater sadness on the Mosuli Ulema and caused objections from Mosuli Notables, Merchants and Shopkeepers. These prominent representatives of the people of Mosul had backed for the convicts until the last moment and had evaluated the safety of the investigation and the reliability of the verdicts as questionable. This was the third bloc mentioned in the introduction part of the study and whose involvement in the Mosul Incident changed the whole equation considerably. This bloc was sprouted during the involvement of the Arab Ulema in the Mosul Incident, was rapidly flourished during pretrial detentions, and was fully consolidated and manifested itself after the verdicts. Considering that the first arrests were made in April 1909 and the trial begun in February 1910 and concluded in July 1910, it is seen that the period of pre-conviction detention (which was not based on any judgment) covers a very long span of time such as 15 months. In this process, the people of Mosul united and literally turned into a single front against Sâdât, used all the means at their disposal for this

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cause and exerted pressure on both the Chamber of Deputies and the Porte through the Mosul deputies. On June 2, Governor Fâzıl Pasha transferred his duty to Brigadier General Tevfik Pasha, the Regular Army Commander of Mosul, due to an ear disease (emrâz-ı üzniye ve vücûdiye) and went to Baghdad for 20 days.⁴⁹³ However, within a month, he would demand his full retirement on health grounds (icrâ-yı muâyene ve tekaüd). The trial of Mosul Incident which lasted about 5 months, started on February 28, 1910, and ended on July 14, 1910 (see Illustration 24).⁴⁹⁴ According to the telegram sent by Acting Governor Mirlivâ Tevfik on 17 July, the verdicts reached at the end of the trial regarding the defendants who were accused and suspected (eşhâs-ı mütteheme ve maznûne), were as displayed in Table 6.⁴⁹⁵

 BOA, DH.MUİ.1/15/Lef 3 – 19 Haziran 1326 – 02 July 1910; Lef 9 – 20 Mayıs 1326 – 02 June 1910 “Bağdad Vilâyetinden Alınan Şifre 30 Mayıs 326 Telgrafnâme-i Nezâretpenâhilerinde tensib buyurulduğu üzere Fâzıl Paşa hazretleri Vilâyet Vekâletini Mirlivâ Tevfik Paşaya bâ-tevdi buraya gelmiştir. Müşârünileyh hazretleri emrâz-ı üzniye ve vücûdiyesinden bahisle icrâ-yı muâyene ve tekaüdünü bâ-istidâ beyân ve icâbının tesriini dermeyân etmekte olduğu cihetle memûriyetine bit-tabi muâvedet etmeyeceği ve Musul’daki kuvvetin Kumandanlığını da ânif-ül beyân Tevfik Paşa tâyin edilmiş olduğundan iş’âr-ı sâbık-ı âcizi veçhile vilâyet umûruna bir münâsibin müsâraat-ı tâyin ve i’zâm buyurulması Bağdad Vâli ve Kumandanı Nâzım”  BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 5, 4 Temmuz 1326 – 17 July 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâretine. Musul Hâdisesi muhâkemesine 15 Şubat 1325’de başlanılarak 1 Temmuz 1326 târihine kadar icrâ kılınan muhâkemât neticesinde eşhâs-ı mütteheme ve maznûneden yüz elli üçünün berâetine ve seksen dördünün cinâyet ve elli dördünün cünha derecesinde mücrimiyetlerine, on birine i’dâm ve birine on beş sene ve sekizine beşer ve beşine dörder ve dördüne üçer buçuk ve elli beşine üçer sene kürek ve cünha erbâbının on dördüne üçer sene ve on altısına altışar, yirmi üçüne üçer ve birine bir mah habs cezâsı hüküm verilip dünkü gün resmi tefhimi icrâ olunduğu İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği ifâdesiyle mâruzdur. Vâli Vekili Mirlivâ Tevfik”  Due to the need for oarsmen in the Ottoman navy in the 16th century, Penal Servitude in the Galleys (called Kürek, i.e Oar) became a very common punishment. However, with the decline of naval warfare in the later period, Prisoners of Galleys (Kürek Mahkûmları) were either held in land prisons like other prisoners or used as Hard Labor in ships and shipyards. This penal servitude of galley imposed in the Mosul Incident trial can be thought to be a different type of imprisonment or hard labor. Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century. Themes in Islamic Law.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 99 Sevcan Öztürk, XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Ceza Sisteminde Dönüşüm: Zindandan Hapishaneye Geçiş, Master’s Thesis Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, 2014, p. 76, 77

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Table 6: Convictions rendered after the Mosul Incident trial Conviction Acquittal (Berâet)

Number of Convicts 

 Convictions Felony/Serious Offense (Cinâyet)

Death Sentence  Years Galley Servitude  Years Galley Servitude  Years Galley Servitude , Years Galley Servitude  Years Galley Servitude

     

 Convictions Lesser Offense (Cünha)

   

   

Years Imprisonment Months Imprisonment Months Imprisonment Month Imprisonment

Total



During the trial, we see that a total of 291 people were tried in the court, 153 of them were acquitted of the charges (berâet), 84 of them were convicted for serious crimes (cinâyet) and 54 of them for lesser crimes (cünha).⁴⁹⁶ Obtaining the names of those who have been sentenced to death and penal servitude (hard labor) would make a great and particular contribution to this study. Because we do not know whether the defendants who were tried as instigators or ringleaders, such as Reshid al-Omari or Imam Ali, were executed. However, unfortunately, no record was found in the Ottoman archive documents about who received which sentence at the end of the trial.

 According to the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 (Cezâ Kanûnnâme-yi Hümâyunu), crimes were divided into 3 categories as Jinayet (Felony/Serious Offense), Junha (Lesser Offense) and Qabahat (Misdemeanor), and this categorization was shaped according to the duration and type of punishment rather than the type of crimes. At this point : Jinayet [Cinâyet]: Crimes punishable by death penalty, life sentence, hard labor, exile, deprivation of civil service, and dismissal from civil law. Junha [Cünha]: Crimes punishable by imprisonment between 24 hours and 3 years, exile between 3 months and 3 years, and dismissal from civil service between 3 months and 6 years. Qabahat [Kabahat]: It characterizes the crimes that require imprisonment from 24 hours to 1 week and a fine of up to 100 qurush, which are determined as warning penalties. Fatih Öztop, Suç Cetvellerine Göre Osmanlı Devletinde “Kız Kaçırmak” Suçu: Aydın Vilayeti Örneği (1908 – 1916) [According to Crime Schedules “Abduction” in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of Aydın Province (1908 – 1916)], TİDSAD (Türk ve İslam Dünyası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi / The Journal of Turk and Islam World Social Studies) Year: 2, Issue: 2, March 2015, pp. 288 – 298 Kent F. Schull, Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) p. 26, 28, 45, 84– 87, 174

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Illustration 24: BOA, DH.MUİ.77/21/Lef 5, 4 Temmuz 1326 – 17 July 1910 The telegram from the Acting Governor Mirlivâ Tevfik reporting the convictions of the Mosul Incident trial.

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Post-Conviction Amnesty Requests by Mosuli Merchants, Shopkeepers and Ulema The trial was over, but the requests for amnesty of the convicts had not yet ended. Nearly 300 craftsmen, shopkeepers, and merchants (Esnâf-ı Ahâli) from Mosul came together, wrote and sealed a statement in the name of justifying and acquitting the convicts in the eyes of state authorities (see Illustration 25).⁴⁹⁷ They sent this document to the Mosul deputies in the Chamber of Deputies on 31 July and to the Mosul Governorate on 1 August. These Mosul residents stated that the unity and solidarity between the Arab, Turkish and Kurdish elements inhabiting the provincial center and the Sanjaks of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah was shaken (lerzenâk) after the Feast Incident. As a result of the trial, many defendants were acquitted and released, but according to them, the status of the convicts was still doubtful. The authors of the statement believed that some defendants blamed each other (isnâd-ı cürm) just to save themselves, and that the preliminary investigation which constituted the source and basis of the trial, was conducted unlawfully by incompetent persons. They did not believe that the investigation was carried out in a sound manner due to such faults, suspicions,

 DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 11, 18 Temmuz 1326 – 31 July 1910; Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326 – 01 August 1910 Evvelen Meclis-i İdâreye (26 Temmuz 1326): Musul Vak’a-i Mâlûmesinden dolayı mahkûm olanların afvlarına delâlet olunması hakkında ahâli-i kasaba tarafından verilen işbu arz-ı hâlin leffiyle keyfiyetin Dâhiliye Nezâreti Celilesine iş’ârına karâr verildi. Musul Mebûsları Huzûr-u Âlilerine / Huzûr-u Sâmi-i Cenâb-ı Vilâyetpenâhiye “Mâruz-u Çâkerleridir. Merkez-i Vilâyet ile mülhak Kerkük ve Süleymaniye Sancaklarını teşkil eden Arab ve Türk ve Kürd unsurları arasına min-el kadim mevcûd ve hiçbir zamân halel-pezir olmayan ittihâd ve muvâhât-ı esâsi bu üç unsura mensûb eşhâsı miyânesinde vâki olan Bayram Vak’asının teessürleri bit-tabi lerzenâk olmuş idi. Bu vak’anın muhâkemesi neticesinde birçok maznûnların berâetleri tahakkuk ve tahliyeleri icrâ kılınmış ise de diğerlerinin müdâfaaten yekdiğere isnâd-ı cürm etmeleri ve muhâkemenin me’haz ve esâsı olan tahkikat-ı ibtidâiyye evvelce dahi makamâta arz olunduğu üzere zimâmdârân-ı idârâtta tesir ve nüfûzlarından ve şevâib, ağrâz ve tezvirden sâlim kalmaması esbâbıyla takrir eden, mahkûmiyetleri her üç unsurun bütün efrâdına azim bir teessür ve me’yûsiyet îrâs etmiştir. Vukuu için Mukadderât-ı İlâhiyyeden mâadâ sebeb-i hakiki katiyyen olmayan bu vak’adan dolayı hasb-el beşeriye anâsır-ı mezkûreye vaktiyle ilka ve bu mahkûmiyetin tecdid eylediği, buğz ve adâvetin bütün bütün izâlesi mahkûmların affından mâadâ bir sûret ile kabil olmayacağı vilâyetin her bir köşesinde muhtelit ve karışık bir sûrette yaşayan anâsır-ı mezkûrenin efrâdı sıyânesinde istirâhat-ı umûmiyeyi temine kâfil olan rabıtaı ittihâd ve uhuvvetin tecdidi vücûbu vâreste-i îfâ olduğuna binâen mahkûmların da afvlarına dâir îcâb eden makamâta iş’âr-ı keyfiyet buyurulmasıyla mağdûriyetten istihlâsları umûm nâmına müsterhamdır. Ol babda emrü ferman hazreti men lehul emrindir. Esnâf-ı Ahâliden “

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false statements and personal enmity (şevâib, ağrâz ve tezvir), and they did not consider the trial and the judgments rendered in this direction to be credible. Moreover, according to their claims, rendering these convictions have caused great sadness and despair in the people of all these three elements. And these convictions merely fueled the grudge and enmity between these three elements which have been living in every corner of the province in an intertwined and homogeneous fashion (muhtelit ve karışık bir sûrette). Besides, they asserted that the Mosul Incident had no real cause other than the Divine Providence (Mukadderât-ı İlâhiyye). According to the statement, ensuring the peace and security of these communities depended on the re-establishment of this unity and brotherhood, and the only condition for this was the pardon of the convicts. Mosul Deputies Mehmed Ali Fâzıl and Dâvud Yusufâni took this statement into consideration and immediately contacted the Ministry of Interior.⁴⁹⁸ The deputies were concerned about allegations that personal enmity was involved in the initial investigation of the Mosul Incident, thereby some innocent people were convicted as a result. However, they specifically noted that the issue was outside of their jurisdiction and their responsibility was limited to escalating the issue to the executive power. There were other messages advocating the convicts of the Mosul Incident and based on the cooperation of Mosulites from different categories. A group of approximately 20 Ulema and Merchants led by Naqib Qaimaqam Abdulghani (Kaimakam-ı Nakib Abdülgani), Shiarzadeh Muhammad (Şiârzâde Muhammed) and Fatwa Aminzadeh Muhammad (Fetvâ Eminizâde Muhammed), was one of them.⁴⁹⁹ They claimed that their fellow townsmen were taken to court simply be-

 DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 10, 31 Temmuz 1326 – 13 August 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesi Huzûr-u Aliyyesine / Nâzır Beyefendi Hazretleri Vaktiyle Musul’da vuku bulan Bayram Hâdise-i Mâlûmesinin tahkikat-ı evveliyesinde bir takım ağrâz sarf edildiğinden neticesinde bazı bi-günâhilerin mahkûm edilmiş oldukları ahâlice mütevâtir olmakla husûs-u mezkûr bir gûnâ vazife-i âcizânemize taalluk etmeyip Kuvve-i İcrâiyeye ait bulunmuş olduğu hasebiyle husûs-u mezkûra dâir ahâli tarafından âcizlerine hitâben yazılan bir kıta mahâzırın âidine cihetle leffen Nezâret-i Celilelerine takdim kılınmıştır. Musul Mebûsu Fâzıl, Musul Mebûsu Dâvud Yusufâni”  DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 8, 14 Ağustos 1326 – 27 August 1910 “Dersaadet’de Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine Muhâkeme neticesinin keşf ve ibka ettiği veçhile tahakkudât ve temhîdât-ı şahsiyeden vâreste olup Mukadderât-ı İlâhiyyeden mâadâ bir sebeb-i hakikiye iktirân etmeyen Bayram Vak’asından dolayı bir takım hemşehrilerimiz delâil-i hafife ve ifâdât-ı mukni’ üzerine muhâkemede mağdûr edildiğinden vilâyetin her bir köşesinde sûret-i muhtelitte yaşamakta olan Kürd ile Arab unsurları arasında şûriş […] ve infiâlin mahvıyla itihad-ı […] tecdid ve idâmesi için her iki cihet mahkûmlarının afvları biddefaat istirhâm olunmuş ve istirâhat-ı umûmiyenin temini nokta-i

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Illustration 25: DH.MUİ.1/40/ Lef 3, 19 Temmuz 1326 – 01 August 1910 The declaration demanding the amnesty of those convicted in the Mosul Incident, sent to the Mosul Deputies and the Mosul Governorate by nearly 300 Mosuli Craftsmen, Shopkeepers and Merchants.

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cause they were victims of circumstances, prosecuted for a case built on personal enmity and partial statements (tahakkudât ve temhîdât-ı şahsiye), and victimized as a result of insubstantial evidence and persuasive testimonies (delâil-i hafife ve ifâdât-ı mukni’). According to them, both sides had to be pardoned in order to prevent a greater turmoil that might arise between the Kurdish and Arab elements throughout the province and to re-establish unity and solidarity. While many criminals had been pardoned so far in order to ensure peace and tranquility, the rejection of their demands was pushing the people of Mosul into enormous despair. In another message by Shiarzadeh Muhammad and Dewedjizadeh (Devecizâde) Osman from the Mosuli Ulema, the allegation that the convictions were based on personal enmity and that the imprisonments should not continue, were reiterated.⁵⁰⁰ In the messages sent from the Sâdât front to İstanbul after the delivered convictions, there was great satisfaction and consolation from justice. The telegram sent by Khidirzadeh (Hıdırzâde) Mahmud to the Ottoman Senator and KSMAP President Sheikh Abdulqadir was one of them and heralded the end of the grievances that have been felt since the Mosul Disaster (Musul Vak’a-i Feciası).⁵⁰¹ After

nazarından bir çok mücrimlerin afvlarına müsâade buyurulmuş iken istirhâmımızın adem-i is’âfı bais-i me’yûsiyet-i umûmiye olmakla afvlarına delâlet ve inâyet-i Nezâretpenâhileri tekrâr istirhâm olunur. Ferman. Kaimakam-ı Nakib Abdülgani, Ulemâdan Şiârzâde Muhammed, Fetvâ Eminizâde Ulemâdan Muhammed” “Fatwa Aminzadeh means the son of Fatwa-Amin (Fetvâ Emini). Fatwa Amin was the authority responsible for announcing the ruling of the Sharia regarding to a case or a practice, responding to inquiries and requests about the Sharia Law, preparing the fatwa documents and inspecting the verdicts given by the Sharia Courts. He was the head of the Fatwa Department (Fetvâhâne) which was attached to the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam.” https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=fetva+emini&t=%40%40 , Access Date: 11.08. 2022  DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 5, 25 Eylül 1326 – 08 October 1910 “Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine. İki unsur beyninde vukuundan mütehaddis mukateleden dolayı mahkûmiyetlerinin istilzâm ettiği esbâb ve delâilin gareze müstenid olmasından bahisle afvları istidâ kılınan eşhâsın devâm-ı mahbûsiyetleri bütün mağdûriyet ve mazlûmiyyetleri bais olacağı hakkında 7 Temmuz 1326 târihinde mütekaddim ariza-i telgrafiyemizin tesrî-i muktezâsı umûm nâmına müsted’â ve müsterhamdır. Ferman. Ulemâdan Ed-Dai Şiârzâde Muhammed, Ed-Dai Ulemâdan Devecizâde Osman”  DH.MUİ.128/21/Lef 2, 15 Ağustos 1326 – 28 August 1910 “Dersaadet’te Âyân-ı Kirâmdan Şeyh Abdülkadir Efendi Hazretlerine. Hiçbir akvâm-ı vahşiyede vukuu gayri mesbûk Musul Vak’a-i Feciasından mütehassıl mağdûriyet-i felâkete […] nihâyet veriliyor. Sabr-ı tahammülgüzâr ahvâl-i muztaribeye ihkak-ı hakk, izhâr-ı adâletle teselli bulabiliyoruz. Erbâb-ı ağrâz nasıl Siyâdet’e adâvet beslemekte ve müntehi olmaklığımıza çalışmakta iseler de Hükûmet-i Meşrûtanın temin buyurduğu adâlet bu misüllü

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experiencing a disaster that even unprecedented in savage societies (akvâm-ı vahşiye) and enduring so much pain and suffering, they were finally consoled by the manifestation of justice. Although there were those who harbored enmity against them and tried to abolish (müntehi) the institution of Siyâdet , fortunately there was an institution of justice provided by the Constitutional Government against such defeatist aims. Obviously, the Sâdât bloc seemed quite pleased with the outcome of the trial as the perpetrators were convicted and justice was finally served. The fact that Sâdât did not show any objections or discontent in the archive records regarding the post-trial process was a proof of this. Both the Ulema and Tradesmen of Mosul were truly confident and clear about their objections and did not seem to believe in the justice of the convictions. The common reference they frequently referred to was that the restoration of harmony, security and peace in Mosul completely depended on this amnesty. According to the Acting Governor Mirlivâ Tevfik, the decision of amnesty could have provoked the reaction of some factions that awaited the outcome of the trial and remained silent until now.⁵⁰² In fact, these groups who were relieved as a result of the convictions, could become enraged by the decision of amnesty and attempt to take revenge on certain people. In Tevfik’s words, the incident was pure brutality, in which many men were butchered to death and blood was shed to a degree that could make one shudder. And an amnesty to be declared as a result of such brutality would certainly ignite the fuse of greater events. It is not known whether the post-conviction requests for amnesty have had a retrospective impact on the judicial decisions rendered in this trial. In any case, an amnesty decision to be given after such a devastating and sensitive incident was based on many different dynamics, and if implemented, even a step ahead could not be predicted. Such a paradoxical amnesty could have had traumatic

makasıd-ı fâside hâtime vermiş olduğundan hakkımızda da izhârıyla tâdil-i mağdûriyet, def-i vahşet ve me’yûsiyete âid vesail için vesatat-ı haşimileri müsted’âdır. Hıdırzâde Mahmud”  DH.MUİ.1/40/Lef 9, 24 Ağustos 1326 – 06 September 1910 “Musul Vilâyetinden gelen şifre. Vak’anın Musul ahâlisiyle Süleymaniye Kürdleri meyânında zuhûr etmiş ve meselenin cidden insanın tüylerini ürpertecek derecede bi-gayri hakkın bir hayli kan dökülmesine, adamlar parçalanmasına, Musulluların sebeb oldukları da tevâtüren ve haklarında hükm-ü lâhik olmasıyla da anlaşılmış bulunmasına nazaran bunların afvlarıyla şimdiye kadar âkıbetine muntazıran sükût etmekte bulunan darb-ı […] sadâ-yı şikâyetle sadâ’ını bais olacağı ve belki de bu fitneyi îka’ edenlerden ahz-ı sârın dahi tâkib edileceği vârid-i hatır bulunduğundan mütâlâasını emir ve müsâadelerini cüretle arz eylerim. Vâli Vekili Mirlivâ Tevfik”

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consequences like heroizing and emboldening the perpetrators or spinning the Sâdât completely out of control. As a result, it is understood from the archive records that neither al-Omari’s, who was arrested as the chief instigator, nor the Mosuli Ulema, Merchants and the Notables’ requests for amnesty yielded positive results. However, it is also a fact that the detentions and convictions in the Mosul Incident connected the different social classes of Mosul to each other like never before.

7 Conclusion: Tracing the Origins of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute in the Mosul Incident Although there are not many sources in the literature on the pre-modern history of the Arab-Kurdish Conflict, this subject has found a solid ground in the literatures of Modern Iraqi and Syrian History.⁵⁰² Considering that these two countries have gone through similar nation-state building processes and have had their share of Baathist regimes, it can be very stimulating to examine the situations of minorities in these two countries and their interactions with the central authorities. However, in this context, the biggest question mark in this book is to analyze whether there was any ancient dispute between the Arab-Kurdish peoples in Hıtta-i Iraqiyah long before the Mosul Incident, and if so, to analyze the possible impact of this dispute on the incident. Although it is not called a dispute or conflict, it is referred in different sources that Arabs and Kurds had a dislike towards each other in the Iraqi territories where they were co-existed in a homogeneous fashion. This chapter aims to look at the personal anecdotes and impressions of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute, the social fabric and fragmentation of Mosul, and how nationalism, as a hitherto unrecognized ideology, was received in the region. British Political Officer and Bureaucrat William Rupert Hay, who served in the Province of Erbil between 1918 – 1920, shares remarkable interpretations about why Arabs and Kurds in Northern Iraq dislike each other in his memoir titled Two Years in Kurdistan. In addition, these contemptuous, offensive and disturbing expressions also offer valuable clues about how British Imperialism looked down on the people of the region: As may be imagined, the Kurds and Arabs have a considerable dislike for each other. The Arab is of an essentially volatile disposition, alternately energetic and lazy, inconsistent and unreliable by nature, but generally extremely cheerful and loquacious, with an immense sense of humour. As regards ideas of cleanliness or morality he is but little removed from the animals. The slow-going, industrious, and respectable Kurd regards him as a being of a lower order, a garrulous ape, or a dirty and shameless “sansculotte”, who is always trying to intrude his presence where he is not wanted. This only refers to the ordinary tribesman. An Arab chief is treated with the greatest respect on account of his ancient de-

 Michael Rear’s Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State (New York: Routledge, 2008) and Harriet Allsopp’s The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East (New York: I.B Tauris, 2014) can be referred as remarkable studies that shed light on the dialogue between Arabs and Kurds, especially in the nationstate building processes. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-014

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scent, and Shaikh Hanash of the Tai, a young man of no ability or importance, will be offered a seat above the biggest Dizai chiefs. Nearly every Kurdish agha boasts of Arab descent, and endeavours to connect himself with the Prophet or one of his early adherents. The Arab regards the Kurd as an incubus which weighs upon him and restricts his liberty of action. He has a proverb which runsThalatha bad-dunya fasad Al Kurdi al jurdi wa al jarrad. There are three plagues in the world, The Kurd, the rat, and the locust⁵⁰³

This work of Hay, who was tasked with establishing the British administration in the region after the occupation following the First World War, is a very detailed and vivid account of the process he spent in Northern Iraq until the 1920 Revolt. The following statements are striking examples of how the British Orientalist perspective exalts and praises the Kurds compared to the Arabs, as in Gertrude Bell or Ely Bannister Soane: The Tai are one of the most famous and ancient of all the Arab tribes. The name of one of their great chiefs, Hatim Tai, is still a byword for liberality and generosity through a large part of the East. A century ago this tribe roamed at will over Shamamik, Kandinawah, and Qara Choq, all of which were desert. The Dizai chiefs at Qush Tappeh paid tribute to them. Gradually the Kurds expanded, and as cultivation advanced its borders, the Tai withdrew, apparently without a struggle, and rejoined the headquarters of their tribe near Nisibin. Only a few settled down and endeavored to build villages and cultivate like Kurds. But the Arabs are lazy and indolent by nature; their only wish is to make just enough to enable themselves to live in a moderate degree of comfort, and they entirely lack the Kurd’s persistent avarice and desire to accumulate wealth. Consequently where Kurdish and Arab villages adjoin, we find the former with their available acreage fully cultivated and asking for more, while the Arabs have only scratched the soil in a few places and left the rest of their village lands fallow. The result is that the Kurds are continually expanding at their expense, and I have little doubt that they will eventually squeeze them right out of the district.

In addition to Hay’s statement emphasizing the economic ambition and entrepreneurship of the Kurds, his following statement emphasizing the class superiority of the Kurds over the Arabs is also noteworthy: “The Kurd is a convinced aristocrat, whereas the Arabs waver between democracy and anarchy.” The expression of “the Kurd’s dislike of the Arab is that of the patrician for the plebeian” in the study of photographer Susan Meiselas also supports the Hay’s

 William Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918 – 1920, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1921), p. 92, 93

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approach in which Kurds consider themselves superior to Arabs.⁵⁰⁴ Paul J. Rich, on the other hand, refers to an analogy that compares the Kurds’ dislike of the Iraqis (meaning the Arabs) to the 18th-century Northern Scots’ (Highlanders) dislike of the English.⁵⁰⁵ Rich also notes that the Kurds still preserve their ancient identity that predates Islam for many centuries, have a rich folklore and music, and have always fought with efforts to “Arabize” their culture. Rich adds that Iraqi Arabs are reluctant to accept the ancient historical reality of Mesopotamia, Iraq’s multiculturalism, demographic structure, and ethnic diversity. It is stated in different sources that the Kurds, who demonstrated a fierce resistance against the Arab-Muslim invasions, eventually converted to Islam without being Arabized.⁵⁰⁶ During this resistance which lasted for nearly a century, Kurdish tribes resisted Arab tribes for social reasons rather than religious ones. All methods, including matrimonial strategy, were used to coax the Kurds to convert to Islam. The field of Transcultural Studies, which has gained momentum and made progress especially in the last decades, can prescribe a theoretical model and constitute a system of common values for future research on the Arab-Kurdish Dispute. Following the approach that cultures do not exist in ethnically closed, linguistically homogeneous and territorially limited spaces, this interdisciplinary field can be really promising and inspiring to have a better grasp of the nature of the dispute.⁵⁰⁷ Combining certain approaches from a wide spectrum of disciplines, the field seeks the origins of cultures among the transformations and entanglements that follow from contacts and relationships between various agents, concepts and institutions. Therefore, the conceptual multiplicity, the intertwined networks crossing the official borders and the transformations mutually influ-

 Susan Meiselas, Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History, (New York: Random House, 1997)p. 59  Paul J. Rich, Iraq and Rupert Hay’s Two Years in Kurdistan, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008),p. xvi, xvii  Kendal Nezan, A brief survey of The History of the Kurds, Fondation-Institut Kurde de Paris https://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php Access Date: 07.08. 2021  Thanks to the institute it has founded specifically on this discipline in 2013, Heidelberg University has made a significant contribution to the field of Transcultural Studies and has produced a comprehensive literature on the transcultural histories, entanglements and asymmetries. Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, Programme Overview, https://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/en/studies/ma-transcultural-studies.html, https://www.uni-heidelberg.de/courses/prospective/academicprograms/transcultural_studies. html, Access Date: 27.07. 2022; Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch, Christiane Sibille, Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources, Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2012) p. 92– 93,

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encing each other, comes to the fore in this interdisciplinary and transregional approach. The collective and original work of Herren, Rüesch and Sibille aptly defines the Transcultural History as: At a glance, transcultural history introduces a global view of the past by focusing on processes of border crossing. Instead of attaching the past to clearly defined entities such as eras, territories, nations, classes, or states, transcultural history focuses on incompatibilities, tensions, and disputes which develop whenever people, objects, concepts, or ideas transgress the ruling orders of their respective time. The permeability of borders provides information on the acceptance or rejection of entanglements in the respective society.⁵⁰⁸

The theoretical foundation and motivation of the discipline is perfectly summarized in the following lines: Transcultural history will therefore have to introduce a shifting perspective from identifying entanglements to focusing on the asymmetric tensions inevitably connected to global coherence. The idea of an intertwined world of cultural exchange, instead of clearly specifiable, connected entities, is the starting point of research.

In addition to looking at the anciency of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute, zooming in Mosul’s demographic and socioeconomic structure can help us understand the ethnocentric motives of the Mosul Incident. At this point, Killian Redden’s article investigating the origins of Jihadism in Mosul and its ties to the Arab Nationalism can be a very original and valuable reference to understand the ethnocentric fragmentation in today’s Iraq.⁵⁰⁹ Synthesized by citing from seminal scholars on Iraqi history such as Phoebe Marr, David McDowall and Sarah Shields, the study offers a retrospective panorama of the Jihadism in Mosul and elaborates on how Mosul became a Centre of Jihadism after the 2003 Invasion. Its location as a frontier city, its historical mission as a defender of Sunni Orthodoxy against the Shiite Safavids, and its demographic structure based on different ethnicities, sects and sufi orders have been decisive in the later transformation of Mosul into a prominent center for Arab Nationalism. The north and east of the Mosul Province were largely inhabited by Kurds and rarely Assyrians and Shabaks, the west was inhabited by Yezidis, and the settlements around the Baghdad road were predominantly inhabited by Turkmens. Moreover, with its thriving trade and economy towards the end of the Ottoman period, Mosul had also turned into

 Herren, Rüesch, Sibille, Transcultural History, p. 6, 11  Killian Redden, In the Shade of the Khilafa: The Rise of Jihadism in Mosul, [Kuwait Program at Sciences Po Student Paper Award] Course ‘Islam and Politics in a Changing Middle East’ taught by Professor Stéphane Lacroix, Spring 2018, p. 2, 3

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an important commercial town. Thus, the city itself as the provincial center, was dominated by Sunni Arabs, who played a leading role in Iraq’s political and economic life, partly due to Ottoman support and partly due to their connections with Arab mercantile networks around the Levant (Maşrık). This community which has a common character nourished by a strong Sunni sectarianism and Arab ethnocentrism, was increasingly associated with Arab Nationalism and reasserted this ideological and political identity whenever its interests are threatened. In the context of Mosul, Arab Nationalism became an instrument for the urban elite to consolidate and reassert its dominance over different ethnic and sectarian minorities, mostly the Kurds. At this point, Shields points out a precedential incident enabling us to extend and solidify these interpretations above.⁵¹⁰ When we look at this incident of collective violence in the downtown of Mosul in 1854, we better understand how far back Mosul’s long history full of ethnic and sectarian tensions goes. The Sunni Arab elite, whose power was threatened and limited by the Tanzimat reforms, began to have economic and political concerns against the non-Muslim classes. In the uprising allegedly incited by the Great Mosque of al-Nuri (Nûri Ulu Câmi) Ulema, it was reported that Muslims from Mosul attacked Christians and Jews in the streets and markets, and even raided their houses and shops. Here, Redden also refers to the Mosul Incident by briefly interpreting from Shields’ section entitled ‘The Revolution of 1908’. After the Young Turk revolution which widened the spectrum of reforms, the Sunni Arab elites who thought that their power was being challenged, apparently organized a demonstration along ethnic sentiments and then this demonstration was turned into a massacre. Elie Kedourie, on the other hand, attributes the Mosul Incident to the irritation caused by the Young Turks on the Mosul Muslims and to the resistance by the local Muslim supremacists against the Constitutional prospects such as liberty, fraternity and the parliament.⁵¹¹ According to Kedourie, the emissaries sent by the CUP to indoctrinate Constitutionalism in Mosul showed disrespect for the Sultan, implied contempt for the Caliph, triggered the overt opposition of the Ulema and eventually created a “disturbed state of public feeling” in the town.⁵¹² While Kedourie highlights that the revolt targeted the Post-Constitutional authorities, he also does not disregard the ethnic argument. He expresses the anti-Kurdish motives and sentiments behind the Mosul Incident as follows:  For a detailed account of the incident, see Shields, Mosul Before Iraq, p. 58 – 60; Redden, In the Shade of the Khilafa, p. 3  Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies, (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1974), p. 142, 143  Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs, p. 142

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This ‘disturbed state of public feeling’ shortly afterwards found vent in a formidable riot in which some seventy people perished. The riot was clearly the outcome of the widespread disaffection towards the authorities which the coup d’état created. Its victims were Kurds and, what is more serious from the government’s point of view, largely men who wore the sultan’s uniform. The Kurds predominated in the vilayet of Mosul and were disliked by the predominantly Arab population of the city of Mosul.

Beyond the ancient dispute between these two elements, discussing the role of local notables in Kurdish and Arab Nationalisms can help us to understand what ethnic sentiments and arguments might have been employed as early as 1909, when the word ‘nationalism’ was not even mentioned. Because, considering that Arab Nationalism sprouted during the First World War and Kurdish Nationalism immediately after the war , it can be thought that some unnamed proto-nationalist sentiments or motives were inventive and decisive in the Mosul Incident. However, as it is not known for certain whether the incident had an inter-tribal background between the Kurdish and Arab tribes, this is still an argumentative approach needs to be elaborated and instantiated at some point. In this respect, questioning whether there were Arab tribes dominating the central town of Mosul, if any, which ones they were, and whether there was any hostility between them and the Barzanjiyya Sheiks of Sulaymaniyah, may take the study to a whole new dimension. Referring to Hakan Özoğlu’s original and remarkable work which analyzes the Nationalist roles of Kurdish and Arab notables (âyân) and compares the two Nationalisms, will be extremely helpful for us to understand whether proto-nationalism played a role in the Mosul Incident.⁵¹³ Özoğlu, who analyzes Kurdish notables through Albert Hourani’s Paradigm of Notables, adds minor changes to this model by stating that Kurdish provinces do not have a separate class of ‘local military leaders’ as in Arab provinces. In this regard, Özoğlu argues that although the local military forces in the Kurdish provinces were centrally appointed and theoretically under the administration of the governor, its leadership in practice was assumed by religious leaders and ’secular’ traditional notables. Moreover, he adds that the local military forces were predominantly composed of Kurdish tribesmen and that these tribal elements outnumbered the forces under the command of the governor. Another change Özoğlu brought to Hourani’s model concerns the classification of the Ulema. Contrary to Hourani’s classification of the Ulema as madrasah-educated religious functionaries, Özoglu states that almost all Ulema in the Kurdish provinces were Sufis. Contrary

 Hakan Özoğlu, “‘Nationalism’ and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman–Early Republican Era.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, 2001, pp. 383 – 409

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to Hourani’s claim, Özoğlu underlines that in some cases the distinction between traditional notables and Sufi Sheikhs was not very clear, and that the Kurdish notables who acted as intermediaries between the state and the people, did not always come from an urban origin. In this respect, another important finding of Özoğlu is that although the majority of Kurdish notables engaged in nationalist activities within the urban centers, they did not fully qualify as urban notables due to their origins and power bases in the rural areas. According to Özoğlu, nationalism played an inventive and decisive role in the crystallization of Arab notables’ dissatisfaction with the central government. By means of their personal charisma and ability to mobilize large groups, Arab notables had a larger voice in the emergence of Arab Nationalism. In fact, Özoğlu’s study aptly demonstrates that this situation is not unique to Arab Nationalism and that Kurdish Nationalism is also nourished by a similar system of common values. However, Özoğlu also underlines that despite their inventive and decisive role in the emergence and development of Kurdish Nationalism, Kurdish notables did not form a cohesive group. Because Kurdish Nationalism was fragmented within itself due to the long-standing disputes between these notable families and was limited by the Islamic concerns of the Naqshbandi Sheikhs. At this point, Özoğlu’s comparative analysis of the position of Kurdish subjects in the Ottoman Empire is also very valuable. The Kurds, whose leaders were of tribal and Sufi origin and who found themselves an important place among the Ottoman elite, would be the last group to claim nationalism among the Ottoman elements. Because, unlike the Greeks, Serbs and Romanians who were the Christian subjects of the empire, they were not inclined to make clear distinctions in the ideological sense and to create a national consciousness. Since these Christian elements already constituted different nations within the empire, their separation was relatively easy. However, Özoğlu states that Kurdish Nationalism had chosen a non-strategic way to create an identity based Kurdish unity. Rather than disabling pre-existing tribal and tariqah-based loyalties in the name of establishing a common identity, Kurdish Nationalism had employed these allegiances in order to mobilize the Kurds. However, the cost of maintaining these loyalties was high and made Kurdish Nationalism vulnerable to tribal and tariqah-based rivalries that had long existed within the Kurds. In short, the Kurds could not renounce their fragmented sub-identities even in order to create an upper national identity, and this situation blocked the way of national unification. Özoğlu also lists the reasons why Kurdish Nationalism was belated compared to Arab Nationalism, despite going through similar ‘cultural renaissance’ processes at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Özoğlu, the first reason was that the Kurdish leaders who were actively involved in the Ottoman bureaucracy, still had hopes of reviving the Ottoman state until the end of the First

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World War. Another reason was that while most Arab leaders had resided in Arab-inhabited lands, some prominent Kurdish leaders (for example, the vast majority of Bedirhanis) who were born and raised outside their homeland had limited access to Kurdish lands and population. The last reason was that Kurdish Nationalism, unlike Arab Nationalism, did not receive much foreign support. In the context of the Mosul Incident, it can be thought that the Arab-Kurdish Dispute took place on three different grounds: Military, Religious and Judicial (see Diagram 3). The military phase of the dispute surfaced within the army over the notions of ethnicity and nativeness (yerlilik) to which the soldiers belonged (see Diagram 2). The ancient mistrust and dislike of the soldiers of these two ethnicities and regions towards each other, local commanders’ resort to the wrong tactics during the armed conflict and their strategic failure to manage the crisis, further deepened this division. Furthermore, the distrust demonstrated by the Ottoman state authority towards both the Kurdish and Arab Military Forces may have leaked from the intrastate correspondence, spread to these two elements and further fueled their distrust towards each other. As Niklas Luhmann aptly articulated that ‘distrust has an inherent tendency to endorse and reinforce itself in social interaction’.⁵¹⁴ Or, to put it another way, ’distrust breeds distrust’. At this point, could the Government have made a major strategic mistake by revealing its distrust of different ethnic groups within its own military? And could these groups have developed a reflex against each other as such an inconsistency within the very same army breeds insecurity. The fact that the Quick Reaction Force that first responded to the harassment incident in Bab al-Toub Square, consisted of the Arab-origin Mosul cavalry, fueled the conflicts in the first place. Kurdish-origin Kirkuk mule cavalry who have been sheltered in the stables after the incident, faced an outburst of collective rage and a stiff attack. Despite serving in the same army and having official Ottoman identities and authorities, the soldiers of these two ethnic elements came across to each other during a public disorder. Furthermore, if the allegation that Arab civilians took up arms and joined the armed conflict by siding with the Mosul cavalry is true, this fiasco can be interpreted as a serious negligence, weakness and lack of foresight in terms of the chain of command. No details were found in the archival documents as to whether these Arab and Kurdish soldiers had any tribal or tariqah affiliation, or whether the conflict between the two groups was based on inter-tribal or inter-tariqah motivation rather than ethnicity. However, I believe that a clearer answer to this question can be given by conducting a further research on the sources of different countries, such as consular archives.

 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017) p. 82

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As a secondary ground, the Arab-Kurdish Dispute emerged over the notion of religious leadership between the Kurdish Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah and the Arab Ulemâ of Mosul. Although he initiated an Islamic formation such as SMU in the context of politics, it was occasionally felt in the correspondences that alOmari neglected the discourse of Panislamism [or Ummahism], glorified Arabism and opposed the Kurdism. In fact, both the Sulaymaniyah Sâdât led by Sheikh Said and the Mosuli Ulemâ led by Reshid al-Omari were based on the Sunni doctrine and empowered by the Monarchist ideology. However, ethnic discrimination and the struggle for supremacy within the religious leadership brought these two blocs against each other, whose common ground was Pan-Islamism and Monarchism. One of the most important factors at this point was the possibility that the Mosul branch of the SMU was established to empower the solidarity of the Mosuli Ulema and increase its influence. This entity under the guidance of Reshid al-Omari may have deepened the polarization between the two Sunni groups during the Mosul Incident and facilitated the conflict between the Mosuli Ulema and the Barzanjiyya Family. The second most important factor might have been that the priorities, privileges and concessions that Sâdât had achieved in the Hamidian regime had long provoked the Ulema of Mosul. The long-standing distaste against the privileged status of the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs could have united all the Ulema of Mosul on a common ground of ethnocentrism, regardless of their sects or tariqahs. As it is known that the Sheikhs in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah localities were affiliated with the Naqshbandiyya-Qadiriyya tariqahs, the place and importance of the Barzanjiyya Family in the Qadiriyya lineage was examined in detail at the beginning of the study. In the telegrams received from the local Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Khalidiyya Sheikhs after the incident, it is seen how important and valuable the Barzanjiyya Family was for these tariqahs. However, in the face of this situation, it has not been explored whether the Arab Ulema of Mosul had any tariqah affiliation and whether they had maintained an inter-tariqah rivalry with the Kurdish Sheikhs of the Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk localities. If such a rivalry existed between them, this finding may provide a contemporary and alternative argument to the positive correlation that this study establishes between ethnic dispute and religious missions. The third platform where Arab-Kurdish Dispute took place was the judiciary, and the dichotomy here emerged over the investigation, detention, trial and the requests of amnesty. Prolonged grievances of the suspects from Mosul, who were detained for a long time such as 10 months in the pre-trial period and 5 months in the trial period, had already increased the tension. When Sâdât’s great concern over the prospect of amnesty was reflected in the tense atmosphere, this state of distress brought the discontent between the two ethnicities to the surface

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on a judicial ground. In addition, the fact that the Arabs of Mosul have found the preliminary investigation which constituted the essence of the case, unreliable and biased, deepened the mutual intolerance. Despite the fact that many Kurdish soldiers and civilians were ordered to be arrested after the incident, no record of their prosecution, trial or imprisonment was found in the archive. It is highly probable that the attention and priority of the state authorities may have suddenly shifted from the harassment incident in Bab al-Toub Square to the murder of Sheikh Said and the ensuing urban crisis. In other words, although the investigations about the Kirkuk Cavalry and Kurdish civilians who were involved in the harassment incident continued, it might not have been reflected in the official correspondence. However, at this point, another question comes up. Could it have been possible that none of the Kirkuk Cavalry or Barzanjiyya affiliates arrested during these events were detained or convicted in the name of appeasing the irritated Kurdish front? Despite the fact that many Mosuli Arabs were arrested and detained after the incident, the possibility that no Kurds were arrested from the Barzanjiyya side may have further provoked the Mosul detainees, families and the notables against the Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah. Meanwhile, Sâdât’s concern and focus was more the trial process and amnesty debates. The fact that the principal investigation was conducted by the Mosul courthouse and that the case was heard in the courtroom there, prevented the Sheikhs of Sulaymaniyah from being involved in the process safely and comfortably. In addition, the amnesty discussions that reached to the ears of Sâdât put the Sulaymaniyah front under great stress and caused the Sheikhs to increase the pressure they have been exerting on the state authority. Although we do not have any findings or documents regarding this, it is one of the possibilities that this conflict started as an inter-tribal one between the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah and the Arabs of Mosul at the first phase. However, even if it is assumed as such, the ethnic emphases felt in the correspondence at the next phase suggests that the hostility has evolved into an ethnic dimension in any case. If there were tribal affiliations of Kirkuk ester süvârs and Mosuli süvâris who were involved in the incident, it is necessary to reveal these affiliations and analyze the dynamics between these tribes. Likewise, if the Mosuli Ulema led by al-Omari have tariqah affiliations, it should be revealed and it should be investigated whether they have any disputes with the Qadiriyya order of which the Barzanjiyya Sheikhs are followers. However, at this stage, since we do not have any argument, claim, indication or even the slightest mark in this direction, these two possibilities do not go beyond assumptions. Tribal Courts and Councils (Mahkamat and Majlis al-Ashair), whose examples such as al-Awaref (‫ )ﺍﻟﻌﻮﺍﺭﻑ‬are still seen in Iraq, are officially affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and are responsible for the resolution of inter-tribal con-

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flicts, show us how deep these conflicts can get.⁵¹⁵ In this direction, if the Mosul Incident had tribal motivations other than the ethnocentric segregation suggested by this book, it can only be explored by a further research based on foreign archive sources beyond the Ottoman state archives. Even if it is assumed that it was based on tribal hostility at first, the fact that the conflict has gained an ethnocentric or proto-nationalist emphasis after a point, validates the argument of this study in all circumstances. Consequently, the religious, political and transcultural codes of the Arab-Kurdish Dispute, which was inherited by today’s Iraq and became prominent especially in the Saddam Regime, can be taken back chronologically by examining pre-nationalist cases such as the Mosul Incident.

As a Last Word Sheikh Said, the famous leader of the Barzanjiyya Family, was transformed into a despot through the privilege, power and authority he had gained during the reign of Abdülhamid II and persecuted the people of Sulaymaniyah for many years. Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya, who had experienced occasional and partial conflicts with the tribes, succeeded in establishing an alliance with these tribes against the state authority when necessary and turning the regional balance of power in its own favor. Sheikh Said who had gained a permanent place under the guise of Siyâdet , an institution of great prominence in terms of Sunni doctrine, often received the full support of all tariqahs and tribes in the region. It is highly controversial that Said, who was portrayed as a very cruel despot or tyrant by some circles in Sulaymaniyah, was so respected and revered by certain groups in the region. At this point, it can be thought that the unconditional obedience to Sâdât and the desire to stand with the strong albeit cruel, outweighs anything else for these groups. The tragic murder of such a respected and revered figure had completely devastated the tariqahs and tribes in the region. The destruction that followed this incident led to a severe uprising against the state authority, caused a series of successive events that could not be pre-

 Mustafa Saadoun, Will Iraq’s new ’tribal court’ undermine rule of law? Al-Monitor.com, April 12, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/04/iraq-tribalism-sheikhs-justice-law.html Access Date:28.07. 2021 For a remarkable review on the Tribal Court and the Council of Tribes (Mahkamat al-Ashair and Majlis al-Ashair) in Palestine during the British Mandate, please see: Joseph Ben-David and Gideon M. Kressel, The Bedouin Market: the axis around which Beer-Sheva developed in the British Mandatory Period, (Nomadic Peoples, Number 39, 1996) pp. 3 – 28

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vented for years and triggered and fostered the rise of Kurdish Nationalism in the territories of Northern Iraq.⁵¹⁶ Said’s son Mahmud, who survived the Mosul Incident and spent his mid-life in such a traumatic environment, would challenge the British authorities after the First World War and proclaim himself the king of Kurdistan.⁵¹⁷ Sheikh Said also got his share from the Post-Constitutional political pluralism, established an association called Society of Unionist Charity (Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye) and became the major competitor of the CUP entity in Sulaymaniyah. Now was the time of politics and Sâdât had to adapt its form of expression and instruments of representation to this environment of liberty, pluralism and freedom of speech. However, we can say that the establishment of this organization drew the reaction of the CUP and accelerated the expulsion of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah. Afterwards, a war of correspondence broke out in the literal sense of the word, and both the CUP clique and the Sâdât front besieged the higher authorities with claims and demands. CUP emerged victorious from this intense and long correspondence traffic and the way for Said’s banishment from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul was paved. After Sheikh Said was banished to Mosul, Sâdât’s allegations about the Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy had a great impact in İstanbul and left the Mosul Governorship in a very difficult situation. The viewpoints and attitudes of the Governors towards Sâdât were also quite different from each other. While Zeki Pasha leaves an Anti-Sâdât impression in many narratives and archive documents, it is claimed that he acted negligently, far from calmness and even hasty during the Mosul Incident and was inadequate for such a critical task. However, the allegations that Governor Zeki caused the incident to escalate, downplayed the incident in the eyes of the higher authorities, and concealed some facts from İstanbul, are much graver than his inability to manage the crisis. Although Zeki was not involved in the conspiracy allegedly masterminded in Sulaymaniyah, in some narratives he was claimed to remain a mere spectator to the incident in Mosul and even to point Sheikh Said and his son Ahmed as a target. Considering his successful military, diplomatic and bu-

 For an overview of the situation of Kurdish Nationalism before and after the Mosul Incident please see: Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006) Chapter 5: The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Kurdish Nationalism ve Chapter 7: The Kurds and World War I; pp. 102– 114; pp. 125 – 132  For Sheikh Mahmud’s revolts and his relations with the British please see: Chapter 10: Shaykh Mahmud and the Rise and Fall of the South Kurdish Confederation in Iraqi Kurdistan after World War I and Chapter 11: Shaykh Mahmud’s Second Rebellion in Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement… p. 160 – 184; p185 – 202

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reaucratic career he resumed after leaving his post as the Governor of Mosul, it is highly probable that none of these were more than allegations. It is noticed that the Joint Task Force (Kuvve-i Mürettebe or Müretteb Kuvvet), which was planned to be dispatched and deployed in Mosul after the incident, occupied the correspondence for a long time. Governor Zeki refrained from making the necessary pursuits, arrests and prosecutions before the JTF reached and therefore he constantly struggled with the higher authorities in this period. Constantly insisting on the deployment of the expected force, Governor Zeki was also busy with the renewal of Mosul’s judicial departments and cadres. Considering the chaotic environment in Mosul after the incident, Zeki’s concerns were not in vain. Because the forces in the provincial center of Mosul consisted of native soldiers and the judicial cadres of Mosul consisted of native officials. Such ‘nativeness’ could have caused major irregularities in both arrests and prosecutions, overshadowed the principle of neutrality and even exacerbated the existing Arab-Kurdish Divide. Therefore, after the 4th Army had gradually reached and deployed in Mosul, the judicial cadres were also renewed, and the atmosphere of trust needed before the trial was partially ensured. Particularly in the case of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah, it is noticed that Sâdât could easily mobilize local elements against the state authority. Aware of the unconditional loyalty and devotion of the surrounding villages and tribes towards them, the Barzanjiyya Family had besieged Sulaymaniyah with the tactical support of aggressive tribes such as Hamawand. Concerns that the Sulaymaniyah Sanjak was on the brink of civil war, and the allegations that army weapons were distributed even to civilians by the local administration, heavily troubled the central authorities. Sâdât, who expected a swift justice from the state authority but could not find what he hoped for, turned to take revenge and directed its anger towards Sulaymaniyah. The fact of ruthlessly and recklessly challenging the state authority is clearly seen both in the bloody attack on Tevfik Pasha’s caravan and in the siege that devastated the people of Sulaymaniyah. The reflections of the incident in the Chamber of Deputies are very helpful in understanding the first parliamentary atmosphere of the young Constitutional Monarchy. The parliamentary pluralism, which gave a new impulse to the Ottoman political tradition, approached the Mosul Incident from several different points. Intense debates arose especially about the legitimacy of the executive power in the practice of banishment and whether the incident fell under the jurisdiction of the parliament. The deputies had debated the rationale for the banishment of Said from Sulaymaniyah, and then the parliament was almost divided into two parts over the legitimacy of the executive power. In addition, the expectations of the parliament to act like a judicial body and to undertake such a mission regarding the incident were met with different reactions by the deputies.

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The arrival of Reşid Pasha to the office of governor was quite decisive for the subsequent course of the Mosul Incident. The new Governor, who started to investigate the conspiracy allegations as soon as he arrived, seized the letters of Major Ali Said’s and the signed promissory note of Sub-Governor Tevfik and reported to İstanbul. The pretrial agenda consisting of criminal investigation, arrests, detentions and amnesty debates, was the busiest period and it coincided with the tenure of Governor Reşid. However, Reşid Pasha would also be the target of different allegations and accusations by some circles. Although it is mentioned in the archive that Governor Reşid had a meeting with Kirkuk Commander İzzet Pasha, the subject of this meeting or the subjects on which they cooperated could not be discovered in the documents. However, the allegations that Governor Reşid protected and patronized Sâdât, cooperated with the Sheikhs in Kirkuk and allowed them to return to Sulaymaniyah are frequently mentioned in the correspondence. It has even been alleged that Reşid tried to cover up Sâdât’s criminal record and drop the charges against them. Even the Sub-Governor Tevfik had accused Reşid of forging documents against him and not returning his extorted belongings. Although none of these allegations against Governor Reşid could not be proven, it is understood that he caught the attention of İstanbul, and he was dismissed after a short time. In the light of this information, it can be thought that Reşid’s position and office in Mosul became questionable after a point. However, considering that no investigations, prosecutions or lawsuits against him were identified in the archive documents and that he later spent two successful tenures in the Erzurum Governorship, it is highly probable that these were nothing more than allegations. Four different conspiracy claims stand out in the study. The first allegation brought up by Sâdât was that Sub-Governor Tevfik and some certain officials had masterminded a conspiracy to banish Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul. The second allegation was also brought forward by Sâdât, and accused Major Ali Said of allying with some Mosuli ringleaders, organizing the house raid in Mosul and plotting the assassination of Sheikh Said. Based on the correspondence between Tevfik and Ali Said and the sum of 1.500 lira allegedly collected in Sulaymaniyah, it was claimed that the first two conspiracies were part of the same plan. The third conspiracy allegation was brought forward by the Sub-Governor Tevfik, and he accused the Governor Reşid of forging a document against him. The fourth conspiracy allegation was brought up by Reshid alOmari who was the prime suspect and instigator of the Mosul Incident, and he claimed that the Governor Reşid unfoundedly incriminated him without any concrete evidence. However, no official accusation or prosecution could be found against Reşid in the archive records, regarding the conspiracy allegations by Tevfik or al-Omari. Although Tevfik Pasha and some local officials in

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Sulaymaniyah were investigated and prosecuted for conspiracy allegations, no convictions were found in archive records. However, both Tevfik and Reşid shared the same fate and were dismissed from their offices. Amid such contrasting paradigms, Sâdât would face an archrival far beyond the local administration. This archrival inspired by the Mosul-based Arabism, encompassed all social strata of the town and uncovered deep divergence in the platforms of military, religion and judiciary. It is observed that the dispute between the Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah and the state authority assumed a tripolar character after the Mosul Incident. The gap between the communities of Mosul and Sulaymaniyah deepened, Mosuli Ulema and Notables were also included in this equation and both sides demanded justice from the state on their behalf. For the Kurdish-origin Sâdât of Sulaymaniyah, justice meant arresting and punishing of the perpetrators of the Mosul Incident and the murderers of Sheikh Said. On the other hand, the Arab natives of Mosul attributed a completely different meaning to the principle of justice. The pardon of the detainees, who had been detained in prison for 15 months without relying on any judgement or conviction, was the only way to ensure the justice. One of the most controversial characters of the period and the case was Reshid al-Omari. Al-Omari, who founded the Mosul branch of the Society of Mohammedan Union, was accused of forming alliances with some religious power centers and disturbing the public order and peace. In some narratives, al-Omari is claimed to be one of the ringleaders and instigators of the mob that raided Sheikh Said’s house, lynched all those in the house, and brutally murdered the Sheikh. After his arrest and detention, al-Omari became the spokesperson for the Mosul Incident detainees and led the requests for amnesty. Al-Omari, who was unable to get the support he expected from Governor Reşid regarding the amnesty, accused Reşid of despotism and partisanship and claimed that he brought a baseless criminal charge against him. However, it could not be discovered in the documents whether al-Omari was among the 11 people who were executed as a result of the trial. Either way, Reshid al-Omari is a figure who left his mark in the local politics of Mosul in the environment of political pluralism that emerged after the Constitutional Monarchy. The allegations and accusations directed against local administrators and authorities around the Mosul Incident can be regarded as a different and innovative contribution to the literature. Because within the scope of such a huge incident, many different authorities and officials were accused, some of them were investigated, and the central authorities in İstanbul were constantly exposed to complaints, demands and criticism. In a tumultuous and sensitive province like Mosul, the fact that the administrators had to carry out a policy in one way or another may have paved the way for irregularity and mismanagement in the

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local administrations. The local administrations devoted to the palace in the Hamidian regime, did not remain neutral even in the Post-Constitutional period and turned into the political apparatus of the Unionists. Because, with the Constitutional Monarchy, local dynamics changed, ethnic and religious elements lost their privileges, and the centralization policies of the CUP gradually began to penetrate the provinces. It is also seen that the Governors, who are caught in the middle of the Arab-Kurdish Divide, lose their composure and make wrong decisions, tend to one side by losing their impartiality or avoid intervening in the conflicts. It is possible that after the incident, which allegedly broke out with a conspiracy and grew as a result of negligence during the administration of Governor Zeki, Governor Reşid might have inclined to Sâdât’s side in order to reduce the pressure and stress on the province. Analyzing the decisions, preferences or mistakes of the governors, who lived in fear of a civil war in Mosul at any moment, would be inspiring for further research on the Post-Constitutional provincial histories.

Chronological Course of Events Year







Month

Day

Event

April



Armed conflict between Sâdât and Ağavât.

June



Re-emergence of the conflict between Sâdât and Ağavât. Governor Mustafa Nûri suggested banishing Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah.

January



Sheikh Said and his affiliates were pardoned by the Sultan.

May



Ağavât was also pardoned by the State for avoiding further hostility.

February



Peace was established between Sâdât and Ağavât and their prosecutions were suspended.

November



Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Sâlih Vasfi Effendi resigned.



Nevşehir District Governor Tevfik Bey was appointed as the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah.



Governor Mustafa Yümnî concealed the proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy from the public and delayed it.



Appointment of Zeki Pasha as the Governor of Mosul.



Uncontrolled branching and undesired interventions of the CUP in Mosul.

 February July

August

September 





The Unionist government and the party leadership took measures against the uncontrolled branching of the CUP.



Serious allegations against the Society of Unionist Charity of Sheikh Said. The Notables of Sulaymaniyah requested the banishment of Sheikh Said from Sulaymaniyah.



Two Deputies were sent to Mosul from the CUP headquarters in Salonika. Governor Zeki suggested that Said be banished to a province outside of Mosul.



Serious allegations by Sâdât against the Sulaymaniyah authorities.



The Notables of Sulaymaniyah gave an ultimatum regarding the banishment of Sheikh Said.

October

November

Serious allegations filed by Aghawat against Sheikh Said and his affiliates Dispute between two different CUP branches in Mosul. All provincial administrations were instructed not to obey orders and directives from CUP branches and to continue their duties as before.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-015

Chronological Course of Events

361

Continued Year

Month

December

Day

Event



Sheikh Said and his retinue were banished from Sulaymaniyah to Mosul.



Complaints by the Ministry of War regarding the failure of Sub-Governor Tevfik in administration and the current situation of Sulaymaniyah.



Warning that Said will flee from Mosul and return to Sulaymaniyah to take revenge.



An article was published in Sabah Newspaper against Captain Fehmi.



Sheikh Said’s contact with the ‘KSMAP’ headquarters in İstanbul.



Investigation by the th Army against the military authorities of Sulaymaniyah.



Governor Zeki justified and praised the performance of Sub-Governor Tevfik.



CUP Sulaymaniyah Branch defended and justified Captain Fehmi.



Allegations that Commander Mustafa has persecuted the Sâdât families.



Sheikh Said’s allegations against the tripartite alliance of Mahmud, Tevfik and Mustafa Pashas.



The relocation of Commander Mustafa, who was constantly complained by Sâdât, was requested by the authorities.



Allegations by CUP Sulaymaniyah Branch that Sheikh Said has been lobbying the state authorities in İstanbul through the KSMAP. The ultimatum from the CUP Sulaymaniyah Branch that the whole town will migrate to another place if the Sheikhs are returned to Sulaymaniyah.



Violent armed clashes in the central town of Mosul after a woman was allegedly harassed.



A crowd from Mosul raided Sheikh Said’s mansion and killed the Sheikh, his son and his men by lynching. The resignation of Governor Zeki Pasha and the Ministry’s rejection.



The th Army was ordered to form a Joint Task Force to quell the turmoil in Mosul.



Sâdât requested that the surviving Sheikhs be transferred from Mosul to Kirkuk.

 January

362

Chronological Course of Events

Continued Year

Month

Day

Event Those who killed Sheikh Said were reported to be from the central town of Mosul and of Arab origin. Governor Zeki requested that new, non-native prosecutors be appointed for the prosecution in Mosul.

 February



Sheikh Said’s salary from the state was allocated to his eldest son after his death.



The banishment and murder of Sheikh Said was discussed at the Parliament in terms of the Separation of Powers.



Said’s -year-old son was sent back from Mosul to Sulaymaniyah.



Sayyid Taha’s invitation to Kurdish Sheikhs and Tribal Chiefs to his lodge. The intelligence that the Kurdish tribes would attack non-Muslim communities. Financial difficulties regarding the supply and maintenance of the JTF in Mosul.



Governor Zeki’s warning that the KSMAP might try to awaken Kurdish Nationalism in the region. Zeki proposed that a Special Judicial Committee be formed for Mosul.



Initial elements of JTF departed from their garrisons for Mosul.



The Mufti of Sulaymaniyah Abdülaziz brought the list of crimes allegedly committed by Sheikh Said to the attention of the Parliament.



The transfer of Sheikhs from Mosul to Kirkuk approved by the state. Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha was officially dismissed from his office.



Appointment of Bitlis Governor Reşid Pasha as the Governor of Mosul. The th Army was ordered to conclude the investigation against Commander Mustafa.



Dersim Sub-Governor Ziyâ Pasha was appointed as the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah.



Mosul Gendarmerie Commander Edhem Bey was appointed to Diyarbekir. Sâdât’s allegations that Major Ali Said was the sole instigator and organizer of the Mosul Incident.



The Sheikhs of Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Khalidiyya tariqahs sought justice for the Mosul Incident.



Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha resigned from the Ministry of Interior.



Talabani Chief Abdulhamid sought justice for the Mosul Incident.

Chronological Course of Events

363

Continued Year

Month

Day

Event The government of Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha was brought down by a vote of no confidence.



Governor Zeki justified Major Ali Said against Sâdât’s allegations. The government of Grand Vizier Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was established.



The initial elements of the JTF reached and deployed in Mosul.



Appointments to the judicial organization of Mosul have been announced.



Complaints by Sâdât’s wives about Tevfik Pasha’s persecution and atrocities.



Tevfik’s convoy was ambushed by irregular forces backed by Sâdât.



The chiefs of the Begzada, Rashwand, Khizirvand, Ramawand and Hamail tribes sought justice for the Mosul Incident. Governor Zeki reported that the initial deployment of JTF was insufficient.



Some Arab and Kurdish tribes attempted to cause chaos throughout the province. Tevfik arbitrarily resumed his duties after the caravan ambush. The Notables of Sulaymaniyah praised Tevfik’s performance, actions and dedication to his duty and demanded his reinstatement.



Allegations of misconduct and nepotism against Tevfik.



The Manifest of Sâdât reached the Ministry of Interior.

/ 

The town of Sulaymaniyah was besieged by Sâdât-backed armed tribes.

/ 

Army weapons were distributed to the civilian population against the siege around Sulaymaniyah.



The Notables of Sulaymaniyah claimed that Tevfik was dismissed through an unjust and uninvestigated process. The th Army Command was requested to appoint an active and capable commander to Sulaymaniyah. Kirkuk Postnish gave advise to the Sheiks and Tribal Chiefs in the region. It was reported that some elements of the JTF departed late due to severe weather, while others dispersed enroute due to health conditions.



Sulaymaniyah Deputy Said reported the gravity of the Siege of Sulaymaniyah.

364

Chronological Course of Events

Continued Year

Month

 March

Day

Event

?

Sulaymaniyah Commander Mustafa was requested to be assigned to a farther place than Kirkuk.



Mosul authorities requested additional forces from the th Army.



The military force deployed in Sulaymaniyah has reached the level of . Retreat of besieging forces to Bazian and normalization in Sulaymaniyah. A public announcement to prevent the people of Sulaymaniyah from joining, aiding and abetting the bandits. Through the KSMAP, influential Kurdish leaders were advised to disperse the besieging forces.



Sulaymaniyah Military Officials were summoned to the th Army headquarters in Baghdad after some certain allegations.



New appointments to the top command posts in Kirkuk. The new Governor Reşid Pasha went to Sulaymaniyah to resolve the crisis with Sâdât.



Two letters proving that the Mosul Incident was planned and organized by Major Ali Said, were seized.



Sâlih Bey, who was stationed in Bitlis, was appointed to the Mosul Gendarmerie Command.



It was alleged that Sulaymaniyah local authorities were involved in a conspiracy against Sheikh Said. An official investigation has been launched against the allegations of the Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy. It was alleged that Governor Reşid committed misconduct in office to protect Sâdât and attempted to cover up their criminal records.



The Baghdad-based newspaper Al-Irshad made serious allegations against Governor Reşid.



Barzanjiyya Sheikhs were officially allowed to return from Kirkuk to their hometown of Sulaymaniyah. A . lira worth promissory note allegedly sealed by Tevfik and proved his involvement in the Mosul Incident, was seized.



The Sub-Governor of Zor was requested to check Tevfik’s official seal which he carried with him, and to hold him there for a few days.



The Notables of Sulaymaniyah made serious allegations against Governor Reşid.

Chronological Course of Events

365

Continued Year

Month

April

Day

Event



Tevfik’s indictment and investigation file were submitted to the judicial authorities.



 individuals including Reshid al-Omari, were arrested in connection with the Mosul Incident. Grand Vizier Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha resigned and the Government fell.



The Ahmed Tevfik Pasha Government was established.



Allegations of misconduct and financial irregularity against Mosul Commander Zühdü Pasha.



Anti-constitutional and reactionary movements in some of the th Army garrisons in the Van Province.



The government of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was brought down and the government of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was re-established.



Complaints by Baghdad merchants that the access and transportation to the Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah Sanjaks are in grave danger.



Reshid al-Omari filed a complaint against Governor Reşid to the rd Action Army Command.



The number of detainees regarding the Mosul Incident reached . It was reported that the JTF’s withdrawal from Mosul could disrupt the investigation and lead to further violations of public order.



The allegations of document forgery and confiscation of property by former Sub-Governor Tevfik against Governor Reşid.



The Grand Vizirate announced that the JTF will withdraw from Mosul. The Grand Vizirate warned that Martial Law would be declared in Mosul if necessary.



It was argued that the Baghdad and Al-Rashad Newspapers were exploited to provoke some circles of Sulaymaniyah against Sâdât.



Reshid al-Omari filed a complaint to the Parliament about Governor Reşid.



It was stated that al-Omari’s involvement in the Mosul Incident and his disruptive actions were based on solid evidence and reliable denunciations.



th Army Commander Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha was appointed as the Governor of Mosul.



A Reserve Battalion was recruited to reinforce the understrength JTF in Mosul.

May



June

July

366

Chronological Course of Events

Continued Year

Month

Day

Event



Tevfik vehemently denied all the accusations against him, arguing that he could prove the forgery of the promissory note. Tevfik claimed that the investigation against him was not conducted in an impartial and reliable fashion and demanded that his investigation be transferred from Mosul to İstanbul.



Nearly  merchants, drapers and shopkeepers filed serious complaints against Ziyâ Pasha, the Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah. Sulaymaniyah Mayor Abdülgafur claimed that Ziyâ Pasha dismissed him without an election and without a trial.



Former Akra District Governor Fuad demanded the execution of Former Governor Zeki, claiming that he escalated the Mosul Incident and inflicted great damage on the province.



Governor Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha stated that the pretrial investigation of the Mosul Incident would soon be concluded legally.



Governor Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha sent his first comprehensive report on the Mosul Incident.

September 

Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Ziyâ Pasha was dismissed, and Bayburd District Governor Rüşdi Bey was appointed instead.

August



Some certain concerns and allegations by Mosul Prosecutor Ömer Lütfi regarding the security and order.



Numerous requests for amnesty sent by the detainees led by Reshid al-Omari began to reach the authorities in İstanbul.



Sâdât’s request to transfer the case to another location due to concerns about the safety of the trial and access to the courthouse.



The Ministry of Interior suggested that the detainees be pardoned under Public Law and tried under Private Law, as a result of the ceaseless requests and pressure for amnesty.



The reluctant and nonintrusive attitude of the Minister of Justice Necmeddin regarding the amnesty.



It was announced that the detainees of the Mosul Incident could not be included in the scope of the general amnesty, as there was no civil, administrative or political justification.

January



The Ministry of Interior stated that a possible amnesty for the Mosul Incident detainees could only depend on the post-trial process.

February

 

Mosul Governor Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha handed over his duties to Brigadier General Muhiddin Pasha The Mosul Incident case began to be heard in court.

October

November

December



Chronological Course of Events

367

Continued Year

Month

Day

Event

March



The wives and mothers of the detainees also requested amnesty for their men from the higher authorities.



The Second Manifest of Sâdât reached the Sheikh-ul-Islam.



Sâdât claimed that their opponents were still supported and encouraged by the local administration.



The Mosul Incident trial was concluded, and the convictions were announced.



 Mosuli Craftsmen, Shopkeepers and Merchants requested amnesty for the Mosul Incident convicts, claiming that the trial was not reliable and fair.



Mosul Deputies contacted the Ministry of Interior regarding the amnesty requests.



The Mosuli Ulema requested amnesty, claiming that the trial was unreliable and unfair.



Telegrams regarding Sâdât’s satisfaction with the convictions reached the KSMAP.

June

July

August

September 

Brigadier General Tevfik, the Acting Governor of Mosul, argued that the amnesty decision may provoke some circles for a revenge.

October

The Mosuli Ulema sought amnesty on the grounds that the convictions were based on personal enmity.



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– Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, Programme Overview https://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/en/studies/ma-transcultural-studies.html, https://www.uni-heidelberg.de/courses/prospective/academicprograms/transcultural_ studies.html, Last Access Date: 27. 07. 2022 – WikiTree, Horace Edward Wilkie Young (bef. 1877 – 1914), https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/ Young-27030, Last Access Date: 17. 10. 2021

Index Since there are too many individuals with the same name in the book, all Sayyids, Sheikhs and Ulema were entered according to their cognomen primarily, if not, by their first names. On the other hand, all administrators, civil servants, military officers and parliamentary deputies were entered to the index with their titles, offices and affiliations, to avoid a possible confusion. Thus, the index will also act as an alphabetical directory of the persons involved. All Sayyids affiliated with the Barzanjiyya Family are listed alphabetically by cognomen or first name under the entry ‘Barzanjiyya Sayyids/Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya’. Since almost all Sayyids are named after their fathers and grandfathers and these names can be easily confused, other details such as kinship ties and religious positions have been tried to be entered as much as possible. ‘Sheikh Said Barzanji’, ‘Mosul Governors Zeki and Reşid Pashas’ and ‘Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor Tevfik Pasha’, on which the entire book is based and whose names are encountered on almost every page, are not included in the index to avoid a possible confusion. Since the book refers to bureaucratic terminology abundantly, the Turkish translations of all political, judicial, military and administrative terms are given next to them. Thus, the index will also function as a glossary for the reader. Abbasid 22 Abdülaziz, Sulaymaniyah Mufti 36, 39–41, 48, 75, 177–183, 277, 362 Abdülfettah, Head Clerk of the Sulaymaniyah Sharia Court 39, 202 f., 245–248, 250 Abdülgafur Agha, Sulaymaniyah Mayor 36, 40, 70, 75, 177, 202 f., 275–279, 281, 366 Abdulghani / Abdülgani, Naqib Qaimaqam of Mosul 339, 341 Abdülhamid II, Sultan 26, 29 f., 36, 38, 50, 83, 109, 125, 179, 300 f., 327 f., 354 Abdulhamid / Abdülhamid, Talabani Sheikh 192 f., 362 Abdulhamid Zahrawi / Abdülhamid Zehrâvî, Hama Deputy 163, 170, 172, 176 Abdullah Hilmi, Baghdad Prosecutor of Appeal 283 f. Abdullah, Official of Imperial Estates 39, 48, 67, 68 Abdullah Pasha, 4th Army Marshall 97 f., 135 f. Abdullah, Sarchinar Accounting Officer 70, 74 Abdulqadir / Abdülkadir, Sulaymaniyah besieger 203, 211 f., 214 Abdulqadir / Abdülkadir, Talabani Sheikh 192 f. Abdülvahab / Abdülvahap Ömer Effendi [Hacı], Bolu Deputy 160, 176 Abdülvahab, Senior Captain, Acting Governor of Gulanbar 202 f. Abdurrahman Agha, Sulaymaniyah Councilman 36, 39, 202 f., 263, 275, 277 Abdurrahman Agha, Sulaymaniyah Mayor 34, 331 Abdurrahman [Başçavuşzâde] 70, 75 Abdurrahman, Khalidiyya Sheikh 187 f. Abdurrahman [Mutasarrıf Hafidi] 70, 75 Absolutism 5 Abu Bakr / Ebû Bekir, Naqshbandiyya Sheikh 187 f. Abu Jasim / Ebû Câsim, Muhammad 114, 118 f., 124, 126, 300, 315 accused (müttehem) 296 f., 317, 324, 335 Âdil Bey / Hacı Âdil [Arda], Tekfurdağı Deputy 161, 170, 176 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110796001-017

376

Index

Âdil Bey, Undersecretary of the Interior 297 Administrative Councils / Councilmen (Meclis-i İdâre / İdâre Âzâları) – Provincial Administrative Council (Meclis-i İdâre-i Vilâyet) 51 f., 79, 171, 322, 338 – Provincial Administrative Court (Vilâyet İdâre Mahkemesi) 161 – Sub-Provincial Administrative Council (Meclis-i İdâre-i Livâ) 36, 39, 60 f., 70, 75, 202 f., 220, 233–235, 263, 275 Aghawat / Ağavât, landlords of Sulaymaniyah 10, 32–36, 176, 179, 360 Ağnâm, sheep tax 26, 32, 34 f. Ahmed, Khizirvand Chief 195 Ahmed Müfid / Müfit Bey [Saner], İzmit Deputy 160, 170, 176 Ahmed Münir Effendi, Chief Secretary of the Province 51 Ahmed Nesimi / Ahmet Nesimî Bey [Sayman], İstanbul Deputy 163, 176 Ahmed Refet, Head of Sulaymaniyah Penal Chamber 39, 48, 202, 277, 331 Ahmed Rızâ Bey, President of the Parliament 111, 122, 183, 240, 285, 301 Ahmed Şerâfeddin / Şerafettin Bey, Bolu Deputy 160, 176 Ahmed Şükrü Effendi, Sivas Deputy 161, 170, 176 Ahmed Tevfik [Okday] Pasha, Grand Vizier 285, 297, 365 Aisha / Ayşe, the wife of Sheikh Kâk Ahmed Effendi 25, 193 Akre / Akra 104, 188, 240 f., 308, 366 Aleppo / Haleb 30, 44, 46 f., 120, 140, 143, 162, 164, 170, 173, 176, 260, 262 Ali Bey, Gendarmerie Captain, brother of Lt. Col. Mustafa Bey 122 Ali Cenani Bey, Aleppo Deputy 164 f., 170, 173, 176 Ali Effendi, Gendarmerie Commander, Mule Cavalry 203 f. Ali Effendi [Mevkufîn Ali], Imam of the Prophet Sheth Mosque, Mosuli Ulema 130 f., 319 f., 322, 326 Ali, Hamail Chief 195 Ali Haydar Bey, Manisa Deputy 167 f., 170, 174, 176 Ali, Sheikh, Sulaymaniyah besieger 203, 211 f., 214–216 Ali Rızâ Pasha, Minister of War 3, 45, 50, 61– 64, 95, 99, 136, 187, 225, 232, 239, 285, 293 f., 297 Ali Said Bey, General Staff Major 11, 70, 75, 84–86, 117, 129–131, 133, 235–237, 243 f., 257–261, 264 f., 357, 362–364 Alla Turca time 90 Altun Kupri / Altunköprü / Köprü 295 f. Amadiya / İmadiye 104 Amarah / Amare 248 Aminah / Emine, the wife of Sheikh Said Barzanji 193 Amnesty (Afv-ı Âli / Afv-ı Umûmi) 4, 17, 35 f., 114, 312, 314–326, 328–330, 338–343, 352 f., 357 f., 366 f. Amurath to Amurath 7, 29, 113, 123 – also see Bell, Gertrude Lowthian Ancien Régime (Devr-i Sâbık) 37 f., 40 f., 55 f. , 59, 65, 69, 71, 84, 150, 157, 173, 178, 180 f., 245, 247 Anti-Constitutionalism 11, 102–104, 303, 305, 365 Arab İzzet [Holo] Pasha, Secretary of the Imperial Chamberlain 19, 30, 37, 38, 78, 83, 177 Arab-Kurdish Dispute [Dislike / Divide / Conflict / Schism] 3, 11, 17, 115, 125, 129, 334, 344, 346 f., 351 f., 354, 356, 359

Index

377

Arab Nationalism 347–351 – Arabism 5, 319, 321, 352, 358 – Arabist Bloc 12 f., 303 – Arabization 346 Arab Nouri of Sulaymaniyah / Nûri Arab, Captain 130 f. Arbat 203, 213 Ârif Bey [Pirinççizâde], Diyarbekir Deputy 149, 156, 161, 169–172, 175 f. Aristidi Pasha [Yorgandjioglu], İzmir Deputy 158 f., 162 f., 170, 173, 176 Armenians 19, 85 f., 305 – Armenian Revolts 101 arz-ı hâl (petition) 51, 122, 268 f., 273, 338 – Arz-ı hâl Encümeni (Commission on Petitions) 111, 155, 168 Asım Bey 303 Assyrians 19, 195, 347 al-Awaref, tribal court 353 Âyân, Meclis-i Âyân (Ottoman Senator, Senate) 60, 102 f., 168, 178, 225, 279, 341, 349 Aziz Pasha [Vrione], Berat Deputy 165 f., 170, 176 Aziz, Sulaymaniyah Councilman 70, 75 Baathist 344 Bab al-Toub / Bâb-ı Tub Square 15, 17, 113, 115, 117, 121, 129, 138, 351, 353 Baban Emirate 25 Baghdad / Bağdad 6, 18 f., 23 f., 30 f., 46, 61, 63, 86 f., 98, 113 f., 117 f., 187, 203 f., 210, 216 f., 219 f., 227, 229 f., 240, 242, 244 f., 248 f., 252–255, 259 f., 271 f., 283 f., 288, 291, 306, 335, 347, 364 f Baghdad / Bağdad, newspaper 244, 253, 277, 278 Baha Effendi 113 f., 120 f., 124 Bahdinan 21 banishment (teb’id) 2 f., 10, 14, 35 f., 39–43, 45, 47–49, 51, 53, 59 f., 62, 66, 70, 77 f., 107, 124, 148, 151, 155 f., 159, 162, 168 f., 172, 177 f., 183, 195, 197 f., 219, 241, 243, 258 f., 312, 355 f., 360, 362 Banu Lam, tribe 248 Barzanjiyya, heterodox tariqah 25 Barzanjiyya Sayyids (Sadaat al-Barzanjiyya) – Abdulkarim / Karim Effendi [the son of Baba Rasulzadeh Ahmed] 203 f., 210–212 – Abdulqadir Nouri Effendi / Sheikh Qadir Nouri [Barzanjizadeh, KSMAP member] 78, 158 – Ahmed Barzanji [Sheikh, Hafidzadeh, the son of Sheikh Said] 58 f., 61, 93, 107–109, 113 f., 118, 120–122, 124, 129, 131, 140, 178, 186, 188, 193–195, 312, 355 – Baba Rasul al-Barzanji [17th cent., the father of al-Venderini] 24 – Baba Rasul of Jeshana 203, 211 f., 214–216 – Baba Rasulzadeh Ahmed Effendi / Sayyid Ahmed 34 f., 45 f., 58 f., 61–64, 69, 93, 134 f., 140, 178, 186, 203 f., 210–212, 214, 244 – Hafiz Hassan Barzanji / Hafid Sayyid Hassan / Mufti Hassan 25 f., 63, 186, 196 – Isa al-Barzanji 23 f. – Jalal Effendi [the son of Ahmed Barzanji] 109 – Kâk Ahmed Effendi [Naqib Qaimaqam, the grandfather of Sheikh Said] 25–27, 57, 71, 78, 127, 188, 193, 195, 332

378

Index

– Mahmud Barzanji [Sheikh, Hafidzadeh, the son of Sheikh Said] 8, 34 f., 45 f., 58 f., 61, 64, 69, 93, 107 f., 113 f., 120–122, 124, 178, 196, 211, 214, 244, 257, 332–334, 355 – Maarouf al-Barzanji [Naqib Qaimaqam, the brother of Sheikh Said] 25, 32, 36, 41, 45 f., 61, 63, 66 f., 69, 71, 93, 106–109, 113, 178, 186, 214, 241–244, 257, 312 f., 332 f. – Muhammad Barzanji [Sheikh Said Effendizadeh, the son of Sheikh Said] 45 f., 124, 196 – Muftizadeh Sheikh Ahmed 203, 211 f. – Muftizadeh Sheikh Qadir 196, 203, 211 f. – Muhammad Gharib [the son-in-law of Sheikh Said, Qaradag Administrator] 211–214 – Musa al-Barzanji 23 f. – Naqibzadeh Nuri / Gozi / Sayyid Nuri 196, 203, 211 f. – Saabiq Mufti Hafid Sayyid Muhammad Barzanji 25 f., 37, 45 f., 62–64, 196, 312 f. – Saabiq Muftizadeh Sayyid Muhammad Effendi 196, 203 f., 210–212 – Saabiq Muftizadeh Sayyid Sheikh Salih Effendi 45 f., 58 f., 61 f., 64 f., 69, 93, 178, 214 Barzinj / Berzenc 23 f. Basrah / Basra 6, 42, 47 f., 135 f., 178, 180, 231, 248, 254, 306 Bazian / Bazyan 32, 34, 195, 218 f., 223, 225, 263, 364 Bedirhanis 351 Begzada / Begzade, tribe 195, 363 Bell, Gertrude Lowthian 7 f., 29, 113, 123, 345 Bitlis 15, 99, 101, 232 f., 283 f., 293 f., 362, 364 British – Archives / Sources / Reports 8, 18 f, 21, 79, 115–117, 119 – Foreign Office (FO) / Consulate / Ambassadors / Emissaries 7 f., 18 f., 21 f.,113–119, 344 f., 355 – Invasion / Occupation / Mandate 28, 354 f. – Orientalism / Imperialism / Provocations 1, 116, 344 f. Bruinessen, Martin Van 7, 23 f., 27 f. caught in the act (cürm-ü meşhûd) 152 f. Cemâleddin Effendi, Sheikh-ul-Islam 58, 285 Cemil Effendi, Captain (Yüzbaşı) from Mosul 130 f. Cemil, Lieutenant (Mülâzım) from Sulaymaniyah 178 f. Çetinsaya, Gökhan 5, 29, 36 f., 98, 124 f., 179, 248, 303 Ceylan, Ebubekir 5 f. Chaldeans / Keldâniler 19, 85 f. Chamchamal / Çemcemal 14 f., 45 f., 68, 116, 194 f., 200 f., 216 f. Chief of Provincial Court Records (Taşra Mehâkimi Kuyud Reisi) 178, 181 Christians / Hristiyanlar 19, 104, 119, 123, 299, 348, 350 Cihâd-ı Ekrâd 127, 129 Çırağan Palace 327 f Civil Service Pension Fund (Mülkiye Tekaüd Sandığı) 272 Code of Criminal Procedures (Usûl-ü Muhâkemat-ı Cezâiyye Kanunu) 152 f. Commission of Personnel Records (Sicill-i Ahvâl-i Memûrîn Komisyonu) 256, 272 f. Commission Report (Encümen Mazbatası) 168 Committee of Investigation / Investigative Committee (Heyet-i Tahkikiye) – Civil / Judicial / Military 52–56, 59 f., 135 f. – Court Martial see Court Martials

Index

379

– Iranian Border 31 – Parliamentary 168, 175 f. Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) / İttihâd ve Terakki Cemiyeti (İTC) 4 f., 7, 11, 13 f., 19, 27, 30, 36–41, 55 f., 65 f., 70, 75– 88, 111 f., 120, 123, 181, 189, 276–279, 298, 304 f., 348, 355, 359–361 confiscation of property (ahz ile yed-i ketm) 268–271, 365 conviction-convict (mahkûmiyet-mahkûm) 4, 12, 98 f., 177 f., 214, 221, 242, 246, 273, 295 f., 312 f., 317, 324, 330, 334, 336–343, 353, 358, 367 Correspondence Secretary Examining Clerk (Mektûbi Mümeyyizi) 149 Council of Ministers (Meclis-i Hass-ı / Mahsûs-u Vükelâ) 178–180, 189, 192, 285–287, 290, 297, 302 Council of State (Şûrâ-yı Devlet) 32, 35 f., 161 f., 272, 273, 285 – Supreme Administrative Court (Şûrâ-yı Devlet Muhâkemat Dâiresi) 161 Court Martials (Divân-ı Harb-i Örfîler) 85, 187, 271, 301 f. – Investigation Board (Divân-ı Harb-i Örfî Heyet-i Tahkikiyesi) 331 f. Court of Appeal (İstînâf Mahkemesi) 171 – Mosul Provincial Court of Appeal (Musul Vilâyeti İstînâf Mahkemesi) 17, 177–179, 310, 312 – Public Prosecutor of the Mosul Provincial Court of Appeal (Musul Vilâyeti İstînâf Müdde-i Umûmiliği) 32, 34 f., 97, 109–111, 165, 283 f., 288, 299, 306 f., 309–313, 330, 335, 362, 366 Court of Cassation (Mahkeme-i Temyiz) 179, 265 Court of First Instance (Bidâyet Mahkemesi) – Central Mosul Court of First Instance (Merkez-i Vilâyet Bidâyet Mahkemesi) 177–179, 264, 284, 288, 310 – Sulaymaniyah Court of First Instance (Süleymaniye Bidâyet Mahkemesi) 264 f., 268 – Public Prosecutor of Sulaymaniyah (Süleymaniye Müdde-i Umûmiliği) 32 f. Cretan Muslims 317 custody (taht-ı nezâret) 44, 46, 48, 52, 59 f., 90, 235, 237 Damascus / Şam 30, 140, 143 Davud of Mosul, Cavalry Senior Captain (Süvâri Kolağası) 130 f. Dâvud Yusufâni Effendi, Mosul Deputy 19 f., 85 f., 339 Dawda / Davda, tribe 105 Dawlatyar / Devletyar, Hamawand, Sulaymaniyah besieger 211 f., 215 f. Decree – Imperial (İrâde-i Seniyye) 25–27, 42, 47 f., 70, 77, 83, 178, 212, 214, 272 – Ministerial, Judicial (İrâde-i Nezâretpenâhi, karârnâme) 86, 185, 253, 261, 272, 285, 287 defendant (maznûn-u aleyh / müddeâaleyh) 110, 296 f., 302, 324, 334–336, 338 Delegation of Deputies (Heyet-i Mebûsân) 82, 85 f. Dermane / Derehmiyan / Remiyan / Reh Miyane 203, 211 f., 214–216 Dersim 256 f., 278, 362 Despotism (İstibdâd / Devr-i İstibdâd) 11, 30, 38–41, 48 f., 53, 59–61, 64, 67, 68, 71, 83, 143 f., 149, 157, 159, 203, 214, 217, 246 f., 263, 275 f., 279 f., 312 f., 317 f., 331 detainee (mevkuf / mevkufîn) – detainment / detention (mevkufiyet) 4, 12,17, 91, 96 f., 114, 159, 282, 296, 299, 302, 307–309, 314–320, 322, 324, 326–329, 334, 352 f., 358, 365– 367 deterritorialization 11

380

Index

Dewedjizadeh / Devecizâde Osman, Mosuli Ulema 341 Divine Justice (Adâlet-i İlâhiyye) 153 f., 156 f., 162, 172 Divine Providence (Mukadderât-ı İlâhiyye) 338 f. Diyarbekir 15, 95 f., 149, 156, 161, 169–171, 176 f., 179, 255, 284, 288, 362 – Diyarbekir Gendarmerie Regiment 101 f. Dizai, tribe 345 document forgery 10, 12, 260, 268–270, 273, 280 f., 365 f. Dodukan / Dudikan, tribe 67 f. Duhok 21, 104, 212 Dulaim / Duleym, tribe 329 Edhem Bey, Gendarmerie Commander of Mosul 15, 100–102, 362 Edhem Pasha, Marshall, Minister of War 297 Edib Effendi, Assistant Public Prosecutor of Mosul 288 Edirne 167, 170, 176, 231 f. Eid al-Adha / Iyd-i Edhâ / Iyd-i Kebir / Kurban Bayramı (The Feast of Sacrifice) 9, 89, 113, 120–122, 124, 130 f., 134, 138, 153, 188, 233, 299, 310 f., 315 f., 318–320, 326, 338 f. Ekici, Deniz 7, 121, 126–129 Emin, Naqshbandiyya Sheikh 40–42 Emin, Servant of Prayer Rugs (Hâdim-üs Seccâde) 186 Enis Bey, Colonel, QRF / Mosul Cavalry Commander 117, 138 f. Erbil 131 f., 134 f., 140, 142, 187 f., 190, 213, 344, – Erbil Reserve Battalion 134, 137 – Erbil Infantry Battalion 218 f. Erkân-ı Harbiye (General Staff) 31, 70, 75, 85, 130, 133 f., 186, 229–232, 235, 243, 258, 260, 264 Erzincan 14 Erzurum 140, 143, 158, 161 f., 166, 170, 172–174, 176, 254–256, 357 Euphrates 1, 117 Examining Magistrate (Müstantık / İstintak Dâiresi) 178, 264 f., 283, 288, 309 f., 317 – Chief Magistrate (Sermüstantık) 81 Executive Power (Kuvve-i İcrâiye) 4, 14, 151, 155, 159 f., 168–170, 172–177, 220 f., 339, 356 exile (nefy / menfâ / menfî ) 2, 42 f., 48, 67, 98, 139, 151–153, 160, 163, 180, 336 expulsion (tagrib) 34 f., 42 f., 151–153, 158 f., 163, 173, 219, 236, 253, 270, 313, 355 Fard al-Ayn (Farz-ı Ayn) 331 f. Fatwa (Fetvâ) 40 f., 244, 341 – Fatwa-Amin (Fetvâ Emini) 341 – Fatwa Department (Fetvâhâne) 341 – Fetvâpenâhi 57, 331 Fatwa Aminzadeh / Fetvâ Eminizâde Muhammad, Mosuli Ulema 339, 341 Fehmi Effendi, Reserve Army Captain, Sulaymaniyah Battalion Commander (Tabur Ağası Vekili) 39, 57 f., 60–62, 65–67, 70, 74, 82, 112, 133, 200–204, 210, 227–230, 235, 237, 244, 361 Fettah Bey, Sulaymaniyah Notable / Councilman 39, 178 f., 202 First World War 31, 102, 113, 116, 320, 345, 349, 351, 355 French Consulate 95, 103 f., 117, 189

Index

Fuad, Akre District Governor

381

240 f., 366

galley servitude (kürek cezâsı) 335 f. Genghis Khan / Cengiz [Mezâlim-i Cengizâne] 197, 221, 277 Ghadban, Sheikh 248 al-Ghailani, Abdulqadir 24, 102 Goktappa / Göktepe 203, 211 f., 214 Government Hall (Hükûmet Sarayı / Konağı) 118, 120–122, 130 f., 158, 178 f., 188, 236 f., 264 f. Great Mosque of al-Nuri 348 Greeks 19, 350 Guest, John S. 302 f. guilt– guilty (mücrimiyet-mücrim) 157, 172, 175, 210, 243 f., 246, 296, 312, 316–318, 329, 341 Gulami Hodja 93, 121 f. Gulanbar / Gülanber 36, 202 f., 269 f. Hacı Ahmed Çelebi, Sulaymaniyah Notable 70, 75 Hacı Fethullah, Sulaymaniyah Merchant 48, 275 Hacı Hüseyin, Sulaymaniyah Notable 178 f. Hacı Said, Sulaymaniyah Councilman 70, 75 Hadith al Sharif (Hadis-i Şerif) 319 Hajjaj / Haccâc 186 f., 277 Hakkâri 168, 176, 304 f. Halil Bey, Menteşe Deputy 168, 170, 175 f. Hama, Sanjak of Ottoman Syria 163, 170, 172, 176, 213, 288 Hamadan (Hemedan) 23 al-Hamadani, Sayyid Ali 24 Hamadaniyya, tariqah 23 f. Hama Haidar, Hamawand, Sulaymaniyah besieger 211–213, 215 f. Hamail / Hemail, tribe 195, 363 Hamawand Confederacy 194 f., 213, 226 Hamawand Karim, Begzada Chief 195 Hamawand / Hemavend, tribe 11, 13, 16, 29, 49, 105 f., 125, 177, 179, 195, 199–201, 203 f., 211–216, 218, 223, 225, 235, 242 f., 249, 252 f., 270–272, 308 f., 331 f., 356 Hamidian era / regime / bureaucracy 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 f. 18, 23, 25–27, 29 f., 38, 78, 125, 127, 129, 213, 248, 303, 352, 359 Hamidiye Regiments 170 Hamza, Hamawand Chief 194 Hasan Rızâ Pasha, Chief Justice of the 2nd Court Martial 302 Hasan Tahsin Pasha, Secretary of the Imperial Chamberlain 37 f., 78, 177 Hasan, Tevfik Pasha’s Aide 200, 203 f. Hatim Tai, Tai Chief 345 hawks and doves 62 Hayrullah Effendi, Yozgat Deputy 160, 170, 175–177 Hay, William Rupert 344–346 Heidelberg University 346

382

Index

Hejaz 22, 44 Herren, Madeleine 346 f. Hilmi, Refik 8, 93, 113, 120–122, 124, 138 Hıtta-i Iraqiyah / Hıtta-i Irâkîye 2, 25, 125, 186, 188, 330, 344 Hızır Lütfi Bey, Zor Deputy 149 f., 152, 156 f., 170, 173, 176 f. Hourani, Albert 349 f. hücûm-u âmm (mass attack) 163, 172 Hurşid Pasha, Chief Justice of the 1st Court Martial 302 Hüseyin Bey, Kirkuk Sub-Governor 236, 238 Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, Grand Vizier, Minister of Interior 64, 144, 146, 285, 297, 302, 362 f., 365 Hut, Davud 6–8, 23, 29 f., 37, 50, 79 f., 113 f., 124–126, 254 f., 298 f., 315 İbrâhim Agha, Dodukan Chief 67–69 İbrâhim Cudi Effendi, Amasya Deputy 164, 170, 174, 176 İbrâhim Edhem, 2nd Army Officer 136, 141, 143–146 İbrâhim Effendi, Captain, 48th Regiment Chamchamal 45 f. İbrâhim Effendi, Major, 31st Cavalry Regiment 236, 238 İbrâhim Pasha, Commander of the Hamidiye Regiments 169 f. İbrâhim Pasha, Marshall, Commander of the 4th Army 303–305 ihbârnâme (notice) 268 Imperial Chamberlain (Mâbeyn-i Hümâyun) 19, 25, 30, 35, 37 f., 78, 108, 150, 156 f., 164, 173, 177 f., 181 Imperial School of Medicine (Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şâhâne) 31 imprisonment (habs / mahbûsiyet) – imprisoned / prisoner (mahbûs) 43, 63, 91, 118 f., 178, 180, 296, 300 f., 309, 318–320, 327 f., 335 f., 341, 353 indictment 257, 259, 264–266, 365 – Indictment Committee (Heyet-i İthâmiye) 81 inquiry (isti’lâm) 119, 258, 311, 316, 318, 322 interpellation (istîzâh) 146, 168, 175 f. interrogation (isticvâb / istintâk) 109 –111, 152, 261 – interrogation process (tahkikat-ı istintâkıyye) 288, 325 – interrogation report (isticvâbnâme) 111 inter-tariqah 12, 16, 351 f. inter-tribal 16, 349, 351, 353 2003 Invasion of Iraq 347 Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government 320 Iraqi Revolt of 1920 345 al-Irshad / İrşâd , newspaper 248, 364 İsmâil Hakkı Bey, Komotini Deputy 154, 156 f., 170, 174 İsmâil Kemâl Bey, Berat Deputy 165 f., 170, 176 İsmâil Pasha [Hattatzâde], Tokat Deputy 152, 170, 173 f. İstanbul / Dersaadet 16, 25, 27, 29, 32, 37, 38, 42, 44, 46 f., 49 f., 54, 60, 78 f., 82, 88, 100–105, 114, 123, 127, 129, 132, 144, 146, 157, 163, 170, 172, 176, 178–181, 192 f., 199, 223, 225 f., 234, 246, 258 f., 261 f., 271, 273, 284 f., 295, 297–300, 302, 308–310, 315, 322, 327, 339, 341, 355, 357 f., 361, 366 istirhamnâme (petition) 326 f.

Index

İzzet Pasha, Brigadier General, Commander of Kirkuk

383

12, 19, 230 f., 245–247, 357

Jaf / Caf, tribe 10 f., 28, 36–39, 45, 47 f., 51 f., 55, 60 f., 64 f., 69, 71, 75 f., 112, 132 f., 214, 216–219, 223, 225 f., 235, 237, 241, 243, 274 Jalili Dynasty 25 Jehanliq / Cihanlık / Cihatlık [Jehartan / Cehartan] 203, 213 Jeshana / Cişane 203, 211 f., 214, 216 Jews, Jewish (Musevi) 19, 85 f., 299, 348 Jihadism 347 jinayet /cinâyet 58 f., 68, 70, 91 f., 95, 188, 224, 312, 335 f. Joint Task Force (JTF) (Müretteb Kuvvet / Kuvve-i Mürettebe) 2,15, 95 f., 98–100, 192, 221 f., 232, 282, 290, 292, 307, 356, 361–363, 365 Judiciary / Judicial Power (Kuvve-i Adliye) 9, 14, 151, 174 23 July National Day (10 Temmuz Iyd-i Milli) 314 f. junha / cünha 58 f., 68, 335 f. Jwaideh, Wadie 6 f., 21, 355 Kahriz / Kehriz 223 Kakaiyya, tariqah 25 Kâmil Pasha, Grand Vizier 58, 64, 146, 285, 363 Kandinawah 345 Kansu, Aykut 7, 18 f., 148, 158 Karak / Kerek 30 Karbala Incident (Vak’a-i Kerbelâ) 9, 63, 132, 134 f., 188, 243, 312, 332 Kavak, Abdulcebbar 23–25 kavmiyyet 105, 194 Kayalı, Hasan 5, 117 Kedourie, Elie 5, 7, 18, 46, 124, 300, 315, 348 Khadija / Hatice, the wife of a detainee 193, 329, 330 Khalidiyya, tariqah 13, 187 f., 190, 352, 362 Khalvatiyya / Khalvatism, tariqah 25 Kharaba / Haraba 203, 213 Kharajyan / Haracyan 203, 213, 223 Khidir Hamawandi 122 Khidirzadeh / Hıdırzâde Mahmud 341 f. Khizirvand / Hızırvend, tribe 195, 363 Kinship – by Blood (Karâbet-i Nesebiyye) 215 – by Marriage (Karâbet-i Sıhriyye) 60 f., 215 Kirkuk / Kerkük 2, 13 16, 19, 25, 30, 32, 34, 44–46, 58, 63 f., 89–91, 93–95, 100, 106–114, 117 f., 120, 122–124, 127, 131 f., 134, 139 f., 142, 180, 183–189, 196, 198, 212, 214–217, 225–231, 245–248, 252 f., 269, 295 f., 316 f., 334, 351–353, 357, 363 – 365 – Kirkuki Cavalry / Ester Suars / Sowwars / Gendarmes [Muleback- Kurdish Origin] 2, 13– 17, 45 f., 59 f., 89–91, 93, 95, 113 f., 117 f., 120, 122–124, 127, 132, 138 f., 235, 237, 334, 351, 353 – Kirkuk Command see 12th Division and İzzet Pasha – Kirkuk Courthouse / Judiciary 110 f., 177, 179, 196

384

Index

– Kirkuk Postnishin see Postnishin – Kirkuk Reserve Brigade see 45th Reserve Brigade – Kirkuk Reserve Division see 23rd Reserve Division – Kirkuk Sadaat / Ulema / Ashraf / Tribal Chiefs 12, 16, 107, 109–111, 186 f., 200 f., 211, 227 f., 293 f., 352 – Kirkuk Sub-Governorate / Sanjak Administration 51, 97 f., 100, 107, 109–111, 200 f., 225, 236, 238 f.,242 f., 252, 269, 338 – Transfer of Sheikhs to Kirkuk 12, 16, 106-112, 185, 197 f., 200, 203 f., 211, 214 f., 217, 219– 221, 227, 229, 236, 238 f., 245, 248, 274, 276, 357, 361 f., 364 Kiyotaki, Keiko 6 Konya 50, 158, 166, 170, 176 Koysanjaq / Köysancak 177 f., 188 Kozaraqa / Kozereka 203, 213 Kubrawiyya, tariqah 24 f. Küçükaşçı, Mustafa 22 f., 28 Kurdish Nationalism 6, 61, 349–351, 355, 362 – Kurdism 102, 352 – Kurdist Bloc 12 f. – Kurdish Revolts 5, 61, 102–104, 220, 345, 348 Kurdish Newspaper of Mutual Aid and Progress (KNMAP) 126–128 Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress (KSMAP) / Kurdish Club 16, 60, 78, 103–105, 123, 126–129, 171, 178, 180, 275 f., 341, 361 f., 364, 367 Kurt, Burcu 6 Lausanne Conference 5 Legislative Power (Kuvve-i Kanuniye) 9, 14, 148, 151, 168, 170 – legislative body 221 – legislature 175 letter of guarantee (kefâletnâme) 111 – to guarantee (tekeffül) 109, 111 Levant (Maşrık) 348 Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley 5 Lowther, Sir Gerard, British Ambassador 19, 114, 126 Luhmann, Niklas 351 Lynch Company 117 f. Mahmud Bedri, Peja Deputy 160, 176 Mahmud Mâhir Effendi, Kırşehir Deputy 165, 176 Mahmud Mazhar Bey [Haznedarzâde], Trabzon Deputy 164, 170 Mahmud Pasha, Jaf Chief, Governor of Gulanbar 10 f, 28, 36–39, 48, 51 f., 60 f., 64 f., 69– 76, 112, 132 f., 225 f., 235, 237, 241, 243, 282, 361 Mahmud, Ramawand Chief 195 Mahmud, Rashwand Chief 195 Mahmud, Reserve Army Major 39, 48 Mahmud Şevket Pasha, Commander of the 3rd Action Army 249 Mahmud, Zor Sub-Governor 262 Mamurat al- Hamidiyah (Mâmuret-ül Hamidiye) 32, 34

Index

385

Mâmuret-ül Aziz 283 f. Manifest of Sâdât / Sâdât Manifest / The Manifest 14, 16, 69–72, 75 f., 129 f., 132 f., 197 f., 204, 212, 226, 237, 298, 363, – Second Manifest of Sâdât 330 f., 333, 367 Manyasizâde Refik Bey, Minister of Justice 285, 287–289 31 March Incident 255, 297 f., 301–303, 306 Mardin 15, 99, 284, 288 Marr, Phoebe 347 Marshall Edhem Pasha, Minister of War 297 Martial Law (İdâre-i Örfiyye / Örfî Muâmele) 62, 70, 77, 155, 157, 160 f., 172, 302, 308, 365 Martin, rifle 178, 180, 200 f., 203 f., 214, 217 Mârûf, Deputy Accountant of Sulaymaniyah 202 f., 205, 211–213, 215., 220, 274 Mârûf Effendi, First Lieutenant 203 f. Marufoğlu, Sinan 6 matrimonial strategy 346 Mauser / Mavzer, rifle 200, 203 f., 219 f. McDowall, David 347 Mecca Sharifate / Emirate 22 Mehmed Ali Fâzıl Effendi, Mosul Deputy 19 f., 339 Mehmed Ârif Bey, Komotini Deputy 161, 170, 176 Mehmed Fâzıl Pasha, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 6th Army, Governor of Mosul 98, 227–230, 249, 252–254, 256, 269–271, 278, 309 f., 312, 318, 329, 335, 365 f. Mehmed Ferid Pasha of Avlona, Minister of Interior 297 Mehmed Rıza Effendi [?], Erzurum Deputy 158, 170, 173 f., 176 Mehmed Said, Administrator of West Sarchinar 263 f. Mehmed Sâlim, First Lieutenant, Mosul 121, 136, 138–141, 143–145 Mehmed Vâsıf Bey, Monastir Deputy 160, 170, 176 Mehmed Vehbi Effendi [Çelik], Konya Deputy 166, 170, 176, Meiselas, Susan 345 f. Meşâyih (Sheikhs) 35, 39, 79, 102, 150, 180, 227, 256, 271 f., 293, 324 Mesopotamia 1, 7, 113, 116, 123, 210, 346 Midyat 15, 99, 102 military governor 135 f., 146 Monarchist / Sultanist 10, 12, 14, 19, 146, 320, 352 Mosul Conspiracy 11, 196, 256, 357 Mosuli Cavalry [Horseback-Arab Origin] 13–15, 17, 92–94, 117, 127, 138 f., 235, 291, 351, 353 also see: 33rd Cavalry Regiment and Enis Bey Mosul Question 5 Mosul Tobacco Régie 113, 124 Müfid / Müfit Bey [Libohove], Gjirokastra / Ioannina Deputy 153, 156 f., 165 f., 170, 172, 176 Muhadderât 67, 89 f., 114 Muhammad, Talabani Sheikh 192 f. Muhiddin / Muhittin Effendi, Niğde Deputy 160 f., 170, 176 Muhiddin Pasha, Brigadier General, Commander of the 24th Reserve Division, Acting Governor of Mosul 313, 329 f., 366 Muhlis Pasha, Major General, Governor of Basrah 97 f., 135 f. Mullah Muhammad, Mosuli Ulema 320, 322

386

Index

Municipal Council (Meclis-i Dâire-i Belediye) 279–281 Mustafa Ârif Bey [Kocabaş], Kırkkilise Deputy 151 f., 163 f., 170, 172, 176 Mustafa Âsım Effendi [Nasuhizâde / Yörük], İstanbul Deputy 157, 159, 170, 172 Mustafa Basri Bey [Dukakinzâde], Skopje Deputy 165 Mustafa Bey, Lt. Col., 33rd Cavalry Regiment, 93, 120–122, 139 f. Mustafa Nûri Bey, Mosul Governor 32, 35, 360 Mustafa Nûri Effendi, Head of Mosul Penal Chamber 284, 288 Mustafa Pasha, Brigadier General, Commander of Sulaymaniyah 11, 36–39, 45, 48, 52–54, 56, 58–64, 66 f., 69, 71 f., 74, 112, 132 f., 158, 185–187, 235–237, 241, 243 f., 361 f., 364 Mustafa Sabri Effendi, Tokat Deputy 166, 170, 176 Mustafa Sırrı Effendi [Serdarzâde / Atay], Karahisar-ı Şarki Deputy 166, 167, 170, 176 Mustafa Yümnî Bey, Mosul Governor 19, 21, 30 f., 50, 80 f., 83, 149, 360 Mustafa Zeki Effendi [Taşhancızâde], Bolu Deputy 160, 176 Müteşeyyih (So-called Sheikhs) 48, 178, 180 f., 203, 213–216, 219 f., 221, 245 f., 248, 274, 275 Nâfi Pasha [Jabirizadeh Abd al-Nafi], Aleppo Deputy 162, 170, 175 f. Naqib al-Ashraf 22, 27, 32 Naqshbandiyya, tariqah 12 f., 16, 24 f., 27, 40 f., 61, 124, 187 f., 190, 350, 352, 362 Nâtık Effendi, Captain 117 nativeness (yerlilik) in military-judiciary 14 f., 17, 92–94, 127, 235, 280, 283–286, 288, 291, 351, 356 – nonlocal (garib) military-civilian officials 140, 142 Nazif Pasha, Chief Justice of the 3rd Court Martial 302 Nâzım Pasha, Governor and Commander of Baghdad 271 f., 335 Necib/Necip Bey [Draga], Skopje / Dibra Deputy [?] 165 f., 170, 176 Necmeddin Mullah [Kocataş], Baghdad Governor, Minister of Justice 260, 325, 366 Nepotism 263 f., 363 Nevşehir 50, 360 Nimrod / Nemrûd 186 Nisibin / Nusaybin 345 Northern Iraq / Kuzey Irak 6, 24, 29, 125, 213, 344 f., 355 Northern Scots, Highlanders 346 Notable / Islam politics 29 Nuh Bey, Administrator of Sangaw 258 f., 263–265 Nurbahshiyya, tariqah 23 Obaidullah Effendizadeh Sayyid Abdulqadir, Ottoman Senator, KSMAP President 13, 60 f., 102 f., 123, 128, 178, 180 f., 225, 275 f., 341 Obaidullah Nahri, Sheikh 60 f., 102, 168 al-Omari, Reshid / Omarizadeh Reshid / Omari Reshid, Mosuli Ulema 3, 12 f., 81 f., 130– 132, 249, 296–303, 314–324, 326–329, 336, 343, 352 f., 357 f., 365 f. Ömer Bey, Sulaymaniyah Platoon Commander 233 f. Ömer Fevzi Effendi, Karahisar-ı Şarki Deputy 166, 170, 176 Ömer Lütfi Effendi, Public Prosecutor of Mosul 284, 288, 310–312, 366 Ömer Vehbi Pasha, Commander of the Reform Force 303 ordinary crimes (cerâim-i âdiye) 152 f.

Index

Osman Agha, Gendarmerie Commander, Mule Cavalry Osman Pasha, Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor 178 f. öşür, agricultural tax 35 Ottoman Bank (Bank-ı Osmâni) 295 Ottoman Land Code of 1858 6 Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 336 Ottoman Provincial Law of 1864 6 Özoğlu, Hakan 61, 102, 349 f.

387

203 f.

Panislamism 352 Paradigm of Notables 349 Penal Chamber (Cezâ Dâiresi / Riyâseti) 39, 48, 70, 75, 112, 202, 277, 284, 288, 310, 331 Persian (Acem) 228, 319 Pishder / Pişder, tribe 214, 217 plaintiff (müddei) 58 f., 110 political crimes (cerâim-i siyâsiye) 152 f. post-colonial 28, 344 post-constitutional 1-6, 10, 12, 27, 30, 50, 146, 179, 331, 348, 355, 359 Postnishin 24, 26, 228 – Kirkuk Postnishin 227 f., 363 power shift 2, 10 Presidency of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Riyâseti) 37 f. Priestland, Jane 113, 116 Prince Islands / Adalar 50, 302 Private Law (Hukuk-u Şahsiye / Husûsiye) 39, 154, 167 f., 174, 247, 324, 366 Procedures of Civilian Administration (Usûl-ü İdâre-i Mülkiye) 152 f. promissory note (sened) 12, 48, 244, 253, 259–261, 263–265, 269 f., 273, 280, 357, 364, 366 Prophet Sheeth / Nebî Şît Mosque 130 f., 320, 322, 326 proto-nationalism 6, 169, 349, 354 public hearing (muhâkeme-i aleniyye) 313, 330 Public Law (Hukuk-u Umûmiye / Milliye) 39, 154, 167 f., 247, 324, 366 qabahat / kabahat 68, 243, 274, 336 Qadiriyya, tariqah 7, 11 f., 13, 16, 23–27, 187 f., 190, 352 f., 362 Qajar Persia 61 Qara Choq / Karaçok 345 Qaradagh / Karadağ 202, 212–216, 233 f. Qaratughan / Karadoğan 203, 213 Qazanqaya Lodge (Kazankaya Tekkesi) 25 Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 15, 351 Qush Tappeh / Kuştepe 345 Rahim Ahmed Nawras / Shershi, Hamawand, Sulaymaniyah besieger Ramawand / Remavend, tribe 195, 363 al-Rashad / el-Reşad, newspaper 244, 365 Rashwand / Reşvend, tribe 195, 363

203, 211–213, 215 f.

388

Index

Rasikh / Râsih Bey, Major 117 Rauf Pasha, Minister of Interior 297 Rawandiz / Revandiz 82, 188, 239 f. Recidivism (Cürm-i İtiyâdi) 42, 48, 180 Redden, Killian 347 f. reinstatement (ibka-yı memûriyet / ibka) 236, 273, 275–277, 363 Reshid, Hamawand Chief 194 Reshid of Sarzal / Sherzel, Sheikh, Sulaymaniyah besieger 203, 211 f., 214 Reşid, Major, Erbil Reserve Battallion 134–137 Reşid, Reserve Army Captain 229 f. Rich, Paul J. 346 Ridwanizadeh Haji Abdullah Effendi, Mosuli Ulema 93 f. Rıza Tevfik Bey [Bölükbaşı], Edirne Deputy 167, 170, 175 f. Romanians 350 Russian Imperialism 1, 102 Rüesch, Martin 346 f. Rüşdi Bey, Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor 278, 331, 366 Rush, Alan de Lacy 113, 116 Sabah, newspaper 65, 361 Sabuncuzâde Muhammed Pasha, Mosul Councilman 79 Sadaat al-Kiram / Sâdât-ı Kirâm 132, 196 Saddam Hussein 354 Safavids 347 Sagirmah / Segirme 218, 223 Said Bey, Gendarmerie Commander of İstanbul 101 Said, Captain and Teacher 203 Said Effendi, Sulaymaniyah Deputy 220–222, 278, 281, 363 Said of Goktappa, Sheikh, Sulaymaniyah besieger 203, 211 f., 214 Said, Rawandiz Notable 239 f. Salahiyah / Salâhiye 216–219, 223 Sâlih Bey, Gendarmerie Commander of Bitlis 101, 364 Sâlih Effendi, Regular Army Senior Captain (Nizâmiye Kolağası), 46th Regiment 39, 48, 57 f., 60–62, 66 f., 70, 74, 112, 133, 202, 204, 210, 227–230, 244, Sâlih Hulûsi [Kezrak] Pasha, Major General, Minister of War 242, 297, 305 f. Sâlih Pasha, Mosul Governor 26 f. Salih, Qadiriyya Sheikh 187 f. Sâlih Vasfi Effendi, Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor 50, 360 Salima / Selime, the wife of Sheikh Maarouf 66 f., 193 Salonika / Selânik 37 f., 70, 76, 80–82, 87 f., 154 f., 159 f., 170, 172, 176–178, 181, 360 salvation ransom (fidye-i necât) 178 f., 248, 263 Saray-Mahmûdî 304 f. Sarchinar / Serçınar 70, 74, 263 Sardasht / Serdeşt 67 f. Sarzal / Sherzel / Şerzel 203, 211 f. as-Sayeh / Es-Sayeh, tribe 105

Index

389

Şemdinan 240 – Şemdinan Family 102, 168 Separation of Powers (Tefrik-i Kuvva) 151, 173 f., 362 Serbs 350 Şevket Effendi, Bitlis Assistant Prosecutor 283 f. Şevket Effendi [Hacı], Erzurum Deputy 166, 170, 176 Seyfullah Effendi, Erzurum Deputy 161 f., 170, 172, 176 Shabaks 347 Shaddad / Şeddâd 186 Shafi 21 Shahrizor / Şehrizor 23–25 Shaikhly Families 7, 9 f., 26–29, 192 Shamamik 345 Shammar / Şemmer, tribe 105 Sharbazher / Şehirpazar 233 f. Sharif / Şerif 22 f., 27 Sheikhan / Şeyhân 303 Sheikh-ul-Islam (Şeyhülislâm / Dâire-i Meşihat-ı İslâmiye / Meşihatpenâhi) 57 f., 285, 314 f., 330, 333, 341, 367 Shiarzadeh [Şiârzâde] Muhammad, Mosuli Ulema 339, 341 Shields, Sarah 6–8, 21 f., 124, 126, 315, 347 f. Shiite / Shiism 25–28, 63, 347 – Shiite Sectarianism (Mezheb-i Şia) 25 f. Shiwan / Şivan, tribe 227 f. Sibille, Christiane 346 f. Simele / Simil / Sumail 107 f., 121, 127 as-Sinjari, Sheikh Abu Bakr Abdulaziz 24 Siouffi, M. N. 303 Siyadat / Siyâdet 22 f., 193, 195, 341 f., 354 Snider / Şnayder, rifle 214, 217, 233 f. Soane, Ely Bannister 7 f., 113, 123, 210, 345 Society of Mohammedan Union (SMU) / İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti 3, 12 f., 17, 82, 123, 249, 297–300, 302, 352, 358 Society of Unionist Charity (SUC) / Cemiyet-i Hayriyye-i İttihâdiye 4, 11, 13 f., 36–38, 43, 47–49, 53–61, 65–68, 70, 106, 355, 360 Special Judicial Committee (Heyet-i Mahsûsa-i Adliye) 284 f., 362 Sublime Porte / Porte (Bâb-ı Âli) 60, 80, 83, 116, 134 f., 144, 149–151, 153, 233, 235, 238 f., 245, 252, 286, 308 f., 311, 335 subpoenas (celb ve ihzâr müzekkereleri) 36 Sulaymaniyah Conspiracy 11, 50, 355, 357, 364 Sunnism / Sunni 7, 10–12, 14, 16, 18, 23, 25–28, 49, 115, 126, 211, 347 f., 352, 354 – sunni orders 7, 10–12, 16, 23, 25–28 also see tariqah suspect (maznûn) 12, 34, 42, 49, 97, 152, 214, 246, 249, 282, 296 f., 299, 301 f., 306 f., 315– 317, 322, 335, 338, 352, 357 Tabrizi (Tebrizi) Yusuf, Hamawand Chief 194 Taha Effendi [Arvâsizâde], Sayyid, Hakkâri Deputy

168, 176

390

Index

Taha Effendi, Sayyid, the grandson of Obaidullah 102 f., 168 Tai, tribe 345 Talabanis, sheikh family 23, 29, 105, 177 f., 192 f., 227 f., 362 Talât Pasha, Minister of Interior 320, 323 Tanzimat 5 f., 43, 272, 348 tariqah / tarikat (sufi order, sufism) 3, 7, 10–14, 16 f., 23–29, 41 f., 49, 101, 124–126, 183, 185, 188 f., 192, 199, 211, 227–229, 347, 349–354, 362 Tashlica/Taşlıca 45 Tawfiq, Hamawand Chief 194 telegram codebook (şifre miftâhı / Mâbeyn şifresi) 37 f., 78, 164, 177 Tevfik Bey, Colonel 34 Tevfik Pasha, Brigadier General, Acting Governor of Mosul 335, 337 Three Classes (Sunûf-u Sülâse) 290, 292 f. Tigris (Dicle) 1, 117, 131 f. Transcultural Studies / History 346 f. treasury (hazine / beyt-ül mâl) 71, 239 f., 274–276, 281 – treasury revenues (vâridât-ı hazine) 178, 180, 275 – treasury laws (hukuk-u hazine) 69, 71, 274 f. Tribal Courts and Councils (Mahkamat and Majlis al-Ashair) 353 f. Tunaya, Tarık Zafe 298 Turkmens 347 Turks (Etrâk) 317, 319 Umayyad 186, 333 Ummahism 126, 320, 352 unfoundedness 12 – unfounded accusations / claims / denunciations 52, 58, 60, 198 f., 238, 299 – unfounded incrimination / crime 12, 249, 301, 357 – unfounded practices 162 – unfounded rumors / news 232, 278 unemployment stipend (Mâzûliyet Maaşı) 256, 272 f. Unionists (İttihâdçılar) 11, 21, 30 f., 75, 125, 127, 146, 171, 359 – Unionist Administrations / Governments / Governors 3, 10, 49, 65, 79, 126, 128 f., 146, 171, 183, 301, 360 – Unionist Authority / Bureaucracy / Regime 8, 11, 18, 49, 125 f., 128, 189, 328 – Unionist Bloc / Clique 10, 12 f., 277 – Unionist Elite 169 – Unionist-Ententist factionalism (İttihâdçı- Îtilâfçı) 146 – Unionist Ideal / Ideology 19, 125, 146 Urfa 37 Vâcid Pasha, Head of the Committee of Investigation Van 15, 99, 101, 304 f., 365 al-Venderini, Sayyid Ali 24 Viranşehir 15, 95 f., 170 Volkan, Newspaper 298

31

Index

waiting list (mülâzımın defteri) Wajib (Vâcib) 331 f. Weladar / Viledar 203, 213 wrongful incrimination 249

391

272 f.

Yakhimali / Yahimali 203, 213 Yezid ibn Mu’awiya 194, 196, 332 f. Yezidis 302 f., 347 Yorgaki Artas Effendi, Salonika Deputy 160, 170, 176 f. Yorgi Honeos Effendi, Salonika Deputy 154 f., 159, 170, 172, 174–176 Young, Horace Edward Wilkie, British Consul of Mosul 7 f., 18 f., 113–116, 121, 124–126, 299 f., 315 Young Turk Revolution 5–7, 18, 21, 38, 127, 348, 355 Yusuf Kemâl Bey [Tengirşenk], Sinop Deputy 151, 152, 154, 170, 174, 176 Yusuf Pasha, Major General, Commander of the 12th Division Kirkuk 230 Zakho / Zaho 103 f. Zehrab / Zorab, Hamawand, Sulaymaniyah besieger 203, 211–213, 215 f. Zeki Bey, Lt. Col., Acting Sub-Governor of Sulaymaniyah, 200 f., 216–218, 221 f., 235, 237 f. Zeki Pasha, Brigadier General, Commander of the Kirkuk Reserve Brigade 230 Ziya Gökalp 169, 171 Ziyâ, Medical Senior Captain (Tabib Kolağası), Doctor 39, 70, 74, 200–203, 228–230 Ziyâ Pasha, Sulaymaniyah Sub-Governor 110, 194, 201, 225, 256 f., 278–281, 362, 366 Zor / Deir ez-Zor 149 f., 156, 170, 173, 176 f., 232 f., 260–262, 306, 364 Zühdü Pasha, Provincial Commander of Mosul 94 f., 117, 133, 233 f., 239 f., 365 3rd Action Army 249, 298 f., 365 4th Army (Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyun), Erzincan 14, 15, 82, 92–100, 103–106, 284, 288, 290–294, 296, 303–308, 356, 361, 365 5th Army, Damascus 105 f. 6th Army (Altıncı Ordu-yu Hümâyun), Baghdad 15, 43, 45 f., 61–63, 98, 104 f., 122, 187, 199 f., 216, 218, 227, 229–231, 236, 238–240, 242 f., 249, 252, 258, 290–293, 303–306, 361–365 12th Division (Onikinci Fırka / Kerkük Fırkası), Kirkuk 14 f., 19, 34, 43–46, 93 f., 112, 187, 200, 223, 230 f., 233, 239, 247, 357 23rd Reserve Division, Kirkuk 187 24th Reserve Division, Mosul 240, 329 30th Regular Army Regiment, Hakkâri, Van 304 f. 31st Cavalry Regiment 236, 238 32nd Regiment, Bitlis 293 f. 33rd Cavalry Regiment, Mosul 14 f., 122, 291 45th Reserve Brigade, Kirkuk 116 f., 230 46th Regular Army Regiment, Mosul 14 f., 202, 291 48th Regiment, Chamchamal 14 f., 45, 116