The Moral Psychology of Terrorism : Implications for Security [1 ed.] 9781443851107, 9781443844703

Citation preview

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

Edited by

Jalil Roshandel and Nathan Lean

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security, Edited by Jalil Roshandel and Nathan Lean This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Jalil Roshandel and Nathan Lean and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4470-5, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4470-3

CONTENTS About the Editors and Contributors........................................................... vii Acknowledgments ....................................................................................... x Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 Jalil Roshandel and Nathan Lean Part One: Philosophical and Ethical Considerations Chapter One............................................................................................... 14 Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism Rico Sneller Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 30 Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence Martine Berenpas Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 44 Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict: Reflections on Spinoza, Emotions and Morality Germán Bula Chapter Four.............................................................................................. 59 The Indecisive Nature of War: Some Reflections on the Concept of “Victory” Richard Feist Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 79 Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims: Prospects and Challenges for Reconciliation Maria Ericson Part Two: Religious Perspectives and Narratives Making Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 118 Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling Derek F. Maher

vi

Contents

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 135 The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men Calvin Mercer Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 150 “One and Indivisible:” The Ideal of Undifferentiated Virtue as a Motivation for Violent Terrorism in Jihadist and Jacobin Circles Liam Harte Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 171 Political Islam in Modern Iran: Ulama, Islamic Militancy and the Elimination of the Alleged Apostates Sedi Minachi Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 184 Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel: The Case of Yehuda Etzion Motti Inbari Part Three: Security and Political Implications Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 202 A Psychological Model of Terrorism: Implications of Addressing Religiously Oriented Terrorists Julian M. Montaquila Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 213 Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad:” Violent Censorship by Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements, 2001-2011 David M. Durant Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 235 The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers: Exploring Security Implications Halil Aydinalp Bibliography............................................................................................ 250

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Editors Jalil Roshandel, Associate Professor of political science at East Carolina University. His specialization is International Security, Iran, and the Middle East. Most recent publications include Jihad and International Security (2006), The United States and Iran (2010), and Iran, Israel and the United States: Regime Security vs. Political Legitimacy (2011). Nathan Lean is currently completing graduate coursework at Georgetown University. He holds an MA in International Studies from East Carolina University, and is the co-author of Iran, Israel and the United States: Regime Security vs. Political Legitimacy (2011) and author of The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims (2012).

Contributors Rico Sneller is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Leiden University, Institute for Religious Studies. He is co-author of a book on philosophy and exceptional experiences, Wild Beasts of the Philosophical Desert. Philosophers on Telepathy and Other Exceptional Experiences (with Hein van Dongen and Hans Gerding, Cambridge Publishers 2013). Martine Berenpas graduated from Leiden University in 2010 and is currently pursuing a doctoral degree, the dissertation of which examines the relationship between Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas. She is interested in phenomenology and French existentialism. Germán Bula is a Professor of Philosophy at La Salle University in Colombia. He is the author of Alteridad y Pertenencia and Ruedas Dentadas and the director of the research group Estudios Hobbesianos. He is a Doctoral Student in Education at the Universidad Pedagógica.

viii

About the Editors and Contributors

Richard Feist is an Associate Professor of ethics and philosophy at Saint Paul University. His research concentrates on the history of ethics, metaethics, and military ethics. He is currently writing a book on ethical systems and the practice of warfare and a book on the metaphysics of Whitehead and McTaggart. Maria Ericson is an Assistant Professor at Lund University. Her doctoral dissertation focused on reconciliation initiatives in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Her subsequent research examines gender aspects of reconciliation in South Africa and lessons from historic violations suffered by Roma and Travellers in Sweden Derek F. Maher is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at East Carolina University. He received his Ph.D. in Religious Studies from the University of Virginia. He specializes in Tibetan religions and history, and recently published a translation of the religious and political history of Tibet, One Hundred Thousand Moons. Calvin Mercer is a Professor of Religion at East Carolina University and founding chair of the American Academy of Religion’s “Transhumanism and Religion” group. He is also trained in clinical psychology. Mercer’s four books focus on the psychology of religion and the religious implications of human enhancement technology. Liam Harte is an Associate Professor of philosophy at Westfield State University. He is the author of several scholarly articles on terrorism, including, “A Taxonomy of Terrorism,” “Must Terrorism Be Violent?” and “New Terrorism and Mythic Terrorism: The Place of Philosophy in Terrorism Studies.” Sedi Minachi is a Research Associate at the Simon Fraser University’s Centre for Comparative Studies of Muslim Societies. Her current research focus is on Shi’a education among the diaspora Iranian community in Metro Vancouver. Motti Inbari is an Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina at Pembroke. He is the author of Jewish Fundamentalism and the Temple Mount (SUNY, 2009) and Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises (Cambridge, 2012).

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

ix

Julian Montaquila is a Master’s candidate in Security Studies program (Homeland Security Policy Emphasis) at East Carolina University, where he also obtained his M.A. in General-Theoretical Psychology, Research Concentration. His research interests include the psychology of terrorism, antisocial personality disorder, violence, aggression, PTSD, and posttraumatic coping in first responders. David M. Durant is an Associate Professor and Federal Documents & Social Sciences Librarian at East Carolina University. His research interests include Islamist attitudes toward intellectual freedom, the future of reading in the digital age, and the future of government information. Halil Aydinalp is an Associate Professor at Marmara University Divinity School at the Department of Sociology of Religion. He writes about religion and terror in the context of suicide bombings, theories of religious fundamentalism and religious life.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people who helped make this volume possible. First and foremost are our contributors who not only provided excellent manuscripts but also were extraordinarily responsive to editorial comments and revisions. This volume is as much theirs as it is anyone’s. Cambridge Scholars Publishing was a pleasure to work with and graciously reached out to us in the early stages of this project to offer a home for this book. Throughout the process, their various team members, who are too numerous to be mentioned in name, oversaw the writing and editing process with an eye for detail and offered many meaningful ideas throughout. We are especially grateful to East Carolina University, the department of political science, the security studies program, and in particular, Alethia Cook, all of whom worked so hard to organize the fourth annual conference in a series on morality and terrorism in April of 2012 in Greenville, North Carolina. It was as a result of this conference that this volume was born. Lastly, we are thankful to our friends, colleagues, and spouses – (Parvin Roshandel (Samei) and Naima Lean), who, over the course of the past several months have borne the burden of our workload, encouraged, and supported us in all possible ways. Jalil Roshandel and Nathan Lean February 2013

INTRODUCTION

The first decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed a dramatic shift in the security issues confronting the United States and the world. Terrorism is now a household term, one that conjures up images of the splintered World Trade Center or the mangled London subway system. Its once-marginal status has been transformed with these types of world events and now it is difficult to turn on the television or pick up a newspaper without hearing or reading about the latest terrorist attack or counter-terrorism meeting or the execution of some foreign policy measure that resulted in the killing or capturing of a state enemy. Despite the prominence of national and international discussions about terrorism, though, the simple presence of the word within our vocabulary and our repeated usage of it to describe violent events often means that we discuss terrorism more than we actually attempt to explain it. As a result, there is a void — an empty space where we constantly hear about a pressing security issue but don’t actually seek to ask the “why” or “how” questions that may, in fact, help solve the issue. As Xavier Raufer notes in the preface to John Corgan’s The Psychology of Terrorism, “The more talk there is about terrorism, the more reports of terrorist crimes grab the headlines — be it in the press, on television or in the media at large — the less experts and commentators feel they have a grasp of what is really happening?”1 What led the hijackers of 9/11 to commit their atrocious act? What is it about their mental state that compelled them to interpret their religious scriptures so severely? Was it their religious convictions in the first place, or were there underlying political grievances that intertwined? What must someone like Timothy McVeigh have felt the moment their bomb exploded, and what were the mental conditions that caused him to travel down such a violent path? How can someone like Anders Behring Breivik shut out emotion from his psyche and systematically shoot children camping on a Norway island without flinching? As the examples above note, acts that are classified by governments or societies as “terrorist” acts are changing. Thus, just as we have entered an era in which terrorism seems to be the primary security concern of most governments, that concern is no longer based on the phenomenon of terrorism as a originating from centralized groups that act from within the borders of their respective states and direct their violence at those who

2

Introduction

exist outside their borders. The case of Al-Qaeda is an instructive example. No longer a nuclear group that extends its tentacles out from its Afghan base, the terrorist organization has taken on a global dynamic and now, its various offshoot groups often act completely independent of the parent organization — a parent organization that, with the death of Osama bin Laden, is in tatters2. Additionally, as groups like the Eritrean Islamic Jihad or others show us, terrorism is often a tactic designed for expressly political purposes — to overthrow governments. This discussion falls within the purview of “old” and “new” nomenclatures of terrorism. Works in recent years have proposed that the “new” terrorism that is emerging on the global stage is one that is uniquely motivated by religious belief and is more concerned with taking over the world than it is with specific political goals. 3 The standard argument suggests that “old terrorism,” the comparative model of which is detailed by Bruce Hoffman, cannot easily compete with forces of “new terrorism” which is broader in scope, more lethal in its manifestation, and derives its power from the fact that its perpetrators do not feel responsible to earthly authorities, but instead cosmic or heavenly ones.4 In addition to these two models, which are comprised primarily of group actors, many terrorism analysts do not think that personality factors can account for terrorist behavior and that terrorism is indeed a group activity.5 It is not within the scope of this book to flesh out a counterpoint to such an argument, and there is much reason, indeed, to believe that group mentalities influence terrorists in significant ways. But it is important to consider, even if just briefly, the emergence of right-wing terrorists, who though not connected to any particular group (in fact many of them operate independently), manage to affect society through their violence in a great way. The aforementioned Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, and Anders Breivik, the Norway killer, are two examples of this. Have we reached a place where terrorism is no longer an especially group activity? If so, how might this paradigm shift change the ways in which we study terrorists? These great variances, we believe, demand that the study of terrorism adapt, and expand its scope such that it addresses not only group mentalities, tactics, political goals, and unpacks the broader definition of terrorism itself, but also focuses on the individual. Behaviorist literature that examines terrorism from a psychological standpoint is often overlooked, despite the fact that it holds the best hope for possibly understanding the reasoning and logics that calculate into the horrific manifestations of violence that we too commonly see. The individual is important for several reasons, many of which are discussed in this volume.

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

3

Most significantly though, it is the individual that commits the acts and while his or her actions as associated with or inspired by a group do offer vital clues about the underlying factors for why such a terrorist act was carried out, at the end of the day the conscious decision to become a terrorist and to enact violence takes place within the mind of the individual.6 Further, because the individual and his or her psychological mapping is so crucial — and because individuals themselves are quite diverse and distinct (that is, after all, the very definition of an individual), we may find that it is more useful and helpful to resist discussions of “the terrorist mentality” or even the overall “psychology of terrorists” as a whole and complete unit. The widespread assumption that the “terrorist personality” exists is a false one. That is, it is more correct to discuss “psychologies” and “personalities” of terrorists rather than resort to reifications that generalize and place all of those who commit terrorist acts under one large umbrella that we can then say defines, describes, or encompasses something essential about the psychology all terrorists. Additionally, the one difference that distinguishes human beings from animals is morality. It is also something that is deeply personal. Though we may derive our moral worldview from external sources (religion chiefly among them), and though we may also be influenced by the dynamics of group morality (society) and intergroup relations, it is always the individual that must process these influences and come to some conclusion about what he or she views and moral or immoral and accept or reject it. John Horgan, the director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University, notes that, most always, terrorists have “internal limits.” 7 Horgan found that while terrorists must believe that violence against the enemy is not immoral, some terrorists for instance, abhor the killing of animals or set limits in terms of the number of casualties they are willing to cause.8 It is from these perspectives that this volume begins. The chapters included in this work were selected from more than three dozen papers and presentations submitted to a conference on the moral psychology of terrorism at East Carolina University in April 2012. The purpose of the presentations that follow is to offer a series of possibilities — all grounded in psychology — that do not simply discuss terrorism, but explain it from an individual, psychological and moral standpoint. We aim to deconstruct the mental mappings of various terrorists, problematizing and critically examining along the way the various factors that influenced them. This is not an attempt to examine, in a clinical sense, or to diagnose, but rather is an effort made possible by the rich contributors of scholars across a variety

4

Introduction

of disciplines to move beyond the more traditional (and in fact, political) discussions of terrorism and situate this phenomenon within the context of the human mind and the temperaments, characteristic makeups, and morality, that make us unique. The unique aspect of this book is that its contributors, as mentioned above, span a variety of disciplines. Despite the fact that this volume focuses on the moral psychology of terrorism, the authors and scholars whose work lines these pages come from many different backgrounds, each offering their particular expertise based o on their interests and their experiences as clinical psychologists, security studies experts, political scientists, religious studies scholars, philosophers, ethicists, and historians. In that regard, this work is interdisciplinary in every sense of the word. We believe that, in fact, this is the best approach to understanding terrorism. The traditional borders that are often defined by think tanks, academic institutions, and the government foster an environment where these topics are pigeon-holed — labeled and defined in such a specialized way that meaningful discussion takes place only within the framework of a particular field. But terrorism is not only a political phenomenon, nor is it only a psychological one. Its perpetrators are themselves students of history, influenced by events of the past. It is a field that demands examination from an ethical perspective, just as it is one animated by the pulses of various religions. The aim here is to provide as comprehensive an approach as possible, opening up this important discussion to a variety of individuals and allowing the public to understand terrorism from the perspective of several different lenses. The discussions that follow are laid out in three distinct parts. Part One is comprised of philosophical discussions. In an ideal world, tragic events like terrorist attacks should be so unforeseeable and irruptive that they upset even our ability to anticipate their possibility. But this is not the world in which we live, thus there is some imperative to examine critically some of the various dynamics that may lead to a clearer understanding of what terrorism is and to evaluate how its actors — terrorists — and deal with issues like morality, for instance. Indeed, analyzing and clarifying the terms of the debate, the arguments proposed, as well as problematizing conventional beliefs and conceptions is necessary. In chapter one, Rico Sneller examines the intersection between dreams, and acts of terrorism, particularly with regards to inspiration and morality. He suggests that dreams frequently affect our decisions, particularly when rational choices are hard to make; this is particularly so in the case of terrorism. Thus, he notes, all religious traditions claim that their founders have had revealing dreams and many terrorists claim to have been inspired

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

5

by dreams as well. Sneller explores the ways in which several prominent terrorist groups who religious interpretations as a basis for their violence have interpreted dreams, placing particular focus on the case of Muslim terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui and his relationship with, and dreams about, Osama bin Laden prior to the 9/11 attacks. Martine Berenpas explores the writing of the French existentialist philosopher Jean Paul Sartre in chapter two. She discusses Sartre’s views of oppression and violence and unpacks his statements about the necessity of violence under certain conditions to show that, in fact, he does not necessarily view violence as moral even when one would otherwise deem it necessary. Berenpas traces this view back to Sartre’s philosophical deliberations on existence; the moral individual, she concludes, acknowledges that terrorism is ultimately a cover up for the existence of a great number of personal failings and is an act of the alienated consciousness. In a similar vein, Germán Bula, in chapter three, discusses the alternative between non-violent resistance and terrorism in the face of an asymmetrical conflict. “What causes the weaker side in an asymmetrical conflict to choose either peaceful or violent strategies?” he asks. Bula introduces the reader to Baruch Spinoza, the Jewish-Dutch philosopher whose seminal work Ethics presents mind and body as parallel manifestations of a single underlying striving. Spinoza’s model of human behavior allows Bula to present strategy and emotion in a single, integrated framework and show that any strategic approach to asymmetrical conflicts must be complemented with an emotional and moral understanding of the same. Chapter four by Richard Feist, “The Indecisive Nature of Battle” Montesquieu and Counter-Insurgency,” proposes that victory in war is a contestable concept, and that presuming victory is even dangerous as it has the potential to lead to, among other things, the privatization of war. Through a series of historical surveys that beginning with the War of 1812 and conclude with a robust discussion of strategic victory and counterterrorism, Feist lays out clearly the well-known philosophical view of concepts: not only do our conceptualizations of the world guide our interpretations of the world, but these conceptualizations can actually influence the future directions that the world, in fact, takes. In the spirit of the French philosopher Montesquieu, Feist shows the dangers of thinking about war in terms of the “decisive battle” and urges the reader to conceptualize such conflicts in much broader terms, namely culture and history. Maria Ericson’s chapter, “Encounters between Violent Perpetrators and their Victims” is an appropriate endpoint to part one. In it, she

6

Introduction

highlights many of the themes previously discussed and analyzes what might happen morally and psychologically in the event of a reconciliation between the perpetrator of a violence crime like terrorism and his or her victims (or in some cases, the families of victims). She combines historical and empirical examples from Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Oslo to propose several key areas that must be addressed if reconciliation is to take place, namely, the aggressor’s worldview and view of conflict, their views of themselves in relation to their victims, and their interpretation of certain values. Ericson also proposes issues that may prevent or hinder any reconciliatory process and aims to clarify, overall, just how possible it may be to emerge from instances of tragedy and heal psychological wounds that could guide society in the direction of forgiveness, patience, and ultimately peace. Part Two of is comprised of four distinctive surveys of narrative construction as it relates to religious and political perspectives. Narratives are, to put it quite simply, the means through which we process the happenings of the world around us. The complexities of life are often formulated, intentionally or unintentionally, into a timeline that orders events and classifies them in such a way that we can make sense of our experiences. Narrative psychologist Jerome Bruner suggests that “a good story and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds” and while the former “verifies by eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal and empirical truth,” the latter “establishes not truth but verisimilitude” and lifelikeness. 9 Within political and religious contexts this is particularly so. The construction of narratives — and those who construct them — wields great power, as the chapters that comprise this section show. The way in which discursive mechanisms are employed, the way in which terms are defined, and, with particular regard to theme of this book, the way in which morality is situated on one particular side of a given debate, all factor into the birthing of narratives that take a life of their own and become, over time, aligned with conceptions of truth. In chapter six, “Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling,” Derek Maher explores the terminology of “terrorism” in the political context of Sino-Tibetan relations. He examines how the term is applied to Tibetans in contemporary China, and situates that usage within the range of exonyms utilized by China throughout its history. He argues that the language of terrorism came into currency in Chinese depictions of Tibetans only within the past decade and that China began using this language in an effort to gain support in the west for policies relating to their rule over the Tibetan people. Additionally, he suggests that China deployed the rhetoric in the hopes that if the actions and motives of the

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

7

Dalai Lama, members of the Tibetan exile communities in the Himalayan region, or Tibetans within China itself could be branded as “terrorist” in nature, China might garner a more sympathetic response to its Tibet policy from the United States, Europe, and other international actors participating in the terrorism discourse. Calvin Mercer, in “The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men,” moves the discussion away from politics and towards religion. He examines fundamentalist violence, and in particular the sexist attitudes and behaviors common in fundamentalist groups. Whereas themes of fundamentalism and sexism are too commonly discussed only within the context of Islam, Mercer’s research studies these themes within the context of fundamentalist Christianity, and unpacks the psychological underpinnings of fundamentalists both at the individual and organization levels. Specifically, Mercer shows how the long tradition of the “male warrior God” allows Christian fundamentalists to advance and justify their views of women as inferior and subordinate subjects, and highlights the concept of threatened egotism — whereby a highly favorable view of self is defended against someone who seeks to undermine or discredit that view — to do so. Chapter eight, “One and Indivisible:” The Ideal of Undifferentiated Virtue as a Motivation for Violent Terrorism in Jihadist and Jacobin Circles,” by Liam Harte, aims to complicate the conventional narrative spun by expert that suggests that “new terrorists” — fanatics willing to cause mass casualties in pursuit of an ideological (and often religion) aim — have largely displaced “traditional terrorists,” whose aspirations are not as globally focused as they are with local domestic politics. Hartre contends that neither the “new terrorism” nor the moral psychology that accompanies it are new at all, and that describing the phenomenon as merely “fanatical” is overly reductive. Instead, he argues that, for instance, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are strongly “mythic” forms of terrorism — a type that recurs in many places throughout history. To highlight this point, he compares an old manifestation of mythic terrorism, France’s Reign of Terror, with the activities and strategies of contemporary violent Muslim terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. He argues that the Rousseauist zeal that drove the Revolutionary Government never to shrink from huge death tolls as a means to purify the French Republic bears comparison to, for instance, Wahhabism that motivates and many Islamist groups. He concludes by outlining specific security issues that are raised by understanding terrorism within this “new” versus “traditional” dichotomy. In chapter nine, Sedi Minachi offers a case study of Rafiq Taghi, an Azerbaijani writer who was stabbed outside his home in Baku-Azerbaijan

8

Introduction

and later died of his injuries. One day before his death, he told an Azarbaijani radio station interviewing him about the attack that he suspected Iranian agents were involved and that it may have been in retaliation an article he wrote, which criticized the ideology of political Islam. The case of Taghi, Miacho shows, offers useful and instructive examples of how those who promote terrorism brainwash their followers by using religious vocabulary to construct powerful narratives of moral obligation, urgency, and divine sanctity. She draws particular attention to the tragic impact of this narrative of violence on youth, who are often targeted with it, and shows how they are encouraged to identity with a sense of belonging espoused by terrorists groups, and, afterwards, are convinced to form a strong commitment to carry out any form of violent activity against the “other.” Motti Inbari, in “Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism and Contemporary Judaism,” examines the ideology of Yehuda Etzion, one of the founders of the Jewish Underground who was arrested in 1984 for attempting to blow up the Dome of the Rock. Inbari presents Etzion’s theocratic perspective, which advocates the “cleansing” of the Temple Mount as a first step toward the Jewish redemption, and discusses the steps he has taken to advance that position. Etzion’s ideology, he argues, is driven by a profound sense of crisis; he once argued that Zionism had reached a dead end and as existing mechanisms could not overcome the crisis new ones needed to be set. Inbari’s presentation shows that Etzion’s approach was the product of his internal struggle with a failure of faith. Since the peace process between Israel and Egypt (1978), many religious Zionists were forced to confront the growing contradiction of their basic assumptions regarding the nature and destiny of the state due to Israeli territorial compromises. Etzion’s reaction to this crisis, Inbari concludes, was to reinforce his messianic faith, and to engage in forceful action with the goal of expediting the realization of the coming of the messiah. Finally, Part Three examines the political and security implications of terrorism from a perspective of moral psychology. In order to address fully and effectively the current challenges posed by terrorism, it is necessary to consider the psyche of terrorist and based counter-terrorism and antiterrorism security measures on that information, not merely on political strategies of military goals. That involves, surely, bridging what appears to be a wide gap between two or more disciplines (psychology and security studies, for instance). But the two are related in an intricate way. Moving, then, from a more theoretical discussion that invokes historical, theological, and philosophical references, this section will aim to complicate the practical application of many of these theories, and compact them into

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

9

several possible ways forward in terms of implementing security measures that address the new challenges posed by terrorism. In chapter eleven, “A Psychological Model of Terrorism: Implications of Addressing Religiously Oriented Terrorists,” Julian Montaquila argues that while multiple security paradigms exist that enable us to understand the threat posed by terrorists, a psychological model of terrorism is actually more valuable at offering insight into the causes, underlying motives, organization, functionality, recruitment, and the radicalization processes of terrorists. Montaquila examines, in great detail, a wealth of statistical and clinical data that clarifies common misconceptions about terrorists, and answers questions about the aforementioned areas. He studies both the group and individual, and shows how age, fear, and a deprived environment, among other things, are significant determining factors as to whether or not one becomes a terrorist. Most importantly, though, Montaquila outlines in each of his analyses the risks and possible implications that may result from each particular level of radicalization, showing that it may be capable to prevent a future-terrorist from being fully radicalized but only if we begin to understand the importance of these psychological factors. David Durant, in chapter twelve, examines Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements (AQAM), and shows that they have been involved in an unconventional, asymmetric struggle against the United States and its allies. Specifically, he examines the phenomenon of “culture war” and shows, through a series of mini-case studies, how important it is to shift our view away from the merely political causes of terrorism, and address what he has identified as a parallel threat: the silencing of Muslim “apostates” and those deemed guilty of blasphemy against Muhammad. Al-Qaeda, he argues, views the elimination of what bin Laden has called “freethinkers and heretics,” be they Muslim reformers or Danish cartoonists, as an essential duty and one that is indispensable to their objective of forcibly transforming Muslim societies. While Durant offers examples of European cases (such as the cartoons of Muhammad) as evidence of violence that attacks cultural elements, he is also suggests that terrorists do not only engage in this new program abroad. In fact, in many cases their violent agendas are directed at their own countries and fellow religious believers — an occurrence that may provide clues and windows into the psyches of potential threats. In chapter thirteen, “The Personal Motivation of Suicide Bombers: Exploring Security Implications,” Halil Aydinalp offers several security suggestions that relate to the personal motivations of Muslim suicide bombers in Chechenistan and Palestine. In that light, he utilizes a model

10

Introduction

that involves four personal motivation levels. At the first level, he observes the presence of some occupation or military intervention. At the second level, Aydinalp places social dynamics. The third level of motivation deals with the terrorist, or potential terrorist’s personal goals, while the fourth is connected with organizational aspiration and political goals. Each of these goals has specific and important security implications. Some of them include: reconsidering conflict resolution methods and eschewing asymmetric military operations; giving priority to human centered regulations and policy implications rather than rigid secular/religious ideologies or unlimited and uncontrolled aspirations to gain more; developing social and economical conditions, especially reducing unemployment and supplying social security even at least minimum rate; frustrating legitimacy forms of bombers and invalidating their modes of justification. Ultimately, his model suggests that occupation creates a “de facto” condition for suicide bombings, and social and psychological dynamics operate in this position as a catalyst facilitating a possible bomber’s decision. This volume, which contains detailed case studies, models, analytics, and theories, should not be considered as a comprehensive study. That is not the point to begin with. In fact, all researchers and scholars who discuss this topic and similar ones should be cautious about drawing inferences from such detailed, specific, and often complex issues. What follows is not intended to indicate a pattern or even emphasize the importance or suggest the superiority of this emerging new field. Rather, it is simply to show that there is much to learn from examining terrorism through the lens of psychology, and much to learn about considering the moral issues that relate to the psychological makeup of terrorists and potential terrorists. As other scholars who have written about this important topic have noted, the interdisciplinary approach is both of great benefit and detriment. As previously mentioned, the wealth of knowledge that stems from several academic disciplines can augment our understanding of terrorism in many meaningful ways and move us beyond the paradigm of political science and security. But at the same time, the approach also inescapably renders gaps that we must be mindful of and eventually aim to fill. If, as most all would readily admit, the aim of the study of terrorism is to provide some analysis that may help alleviate the suffering caused by this global problem and put forth information that could help thwart future attacks, how might we integrate discussions of history, philosophy, ethics, security, politics, government, psychology, morality, and so forth into one streamlined approach? Certainly each field in and of itself offers much opportunity, but new ideas about any one of

The Moral Psychology of Terrorism: Implications for Security

11

the fields divorced from the others is less powerful in its ability to realize such goals. Still, we hope that the reader will gain something valuable from the voices that comprise this necessary work, and learn something about the relationship between psychology, morality, and terrorism. We hope that terrorism, as a result, may become less mysterious to some and that, as a result of understanding it as a phenomenon grounded in the psychology and morality, future scholars (and current ones as well) may build on this research and work towards the realization of a more peaceful future. Jalil Roshandel Nathan Lean 2012.

Notes 1. Xavier Raufer, Preface, In John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, (New York: Routledge, 2005), iii. 2. For an excellent discussion of the newly amorphous nature of once-centralized groups like Al-Qaeda, see Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, No. 6 (2004): 549-560. 3. W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism” Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York” Oxford University Press, 1999), 14. 4. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1999), n.p. 5. E. Sprinzak, “The Psychological Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in A Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen,” In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), 65-85. 6. For a detailed discussion about the ways in which individuals often make rational choices that hinge on an innate desire to belong to a group, see Dipak K. Gupta, “Toward An Integrated Behavioral Framework For Analyzing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics,” Democracy and Security, 1, No. 1 (2005): 5-31. 7. Sarah Kershaw, “The Terrorist Mind: An Update,” January 9, 2010, New York Times. 8. Ibid. 9. Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 11.

PART ONE: PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER ONE DREAMS, MORALITY, AND TERRORISM RICO SNELLER

Introduction It is frequently argued that our moral decisions rest upon rational choices. Sometimes, however, if the choice is too difficult for us, a rational decision seems impossible. This is this case primarily in matters of life and death. In many religious traditions, and especially in Islam, dreams play a preeminent role in decision-making. In this chapter, I will explore the relationship between dreams and terrorist acts, particularly with regards to inspiration and morality. Many Muslim suicide agents have reported that inspiring dreams stimulated their actions. This need not be a surprise since suicide acts always result in death and those preparing their own execution likely experience extreme mental conditions. But even if suicidal acts can be accounted for on a rational basis (e.g., by giving them a political explanation), it seems fairly unlikely that such accounts will necessarily be informative. The British anthropologist Iain Edgar has researched how jihadist dreams may lead to violence. Not only has he studied dreams and their significance within an Islamic framework, but he has also retrieved information on the dreams of several well-known terrorists like Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, Richard Reid, and Zacarias Moussaoui. His studies were used in a 2009/2010 Intelligence Assessment of the Canadian Secret Service, obtained by the Canadian National Post.1 Below is an extensive passage, — a quotation — of one such a dream by Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to kill Americans as part of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He said: Basically, I had, I had a dream, and I had more later, but I had a dream, and I went to see Sheikh Usama bin Laden, and I told him about my dream. He told me, “Good.” Maybe, I don’t know, a few days later, I have another dream. So I went again, I saw him, and I told him about this. This was after I had declined, I was asked before. Then I had this dream. Then maybe a week, a short time, Sheikh Abu Hafs [Mohammed Atef] came to

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

15

the guesthouse and asked me again if I wanted to be part of the suicide operation, me and Richard Reid, and this time I said yes.

A description of the dream follows: But if I want to say the original reason, okay, what I believe, okay, it is I thought I had a dream where I was into the runway of an airport and I actually took a map out, okay, and I open it and it was the White House with a circle with a cross, like when you do when you do target. And next to me, okay, in front of there was the four brother, I couldn’t recognize. And next to me there was a 747, the very distinct, you know, like the cockpit, was very distant.

Finally Moussaoui mentions Bin Laden: So I refer to sheikh Usama bin Laden and some other sheikh there to explain to me the reality, but the dream about the White House, it was very clear to me.2

No matter how one wishes to analyze such dreams, they at least hold a crucial meaning for the dreamer’s justification of his performance. In Islam, dreams count as a perpetuation of prophecy, albeit at a lower level than the Prophet Muhammad’s revelations, which are conveyed in Qur’an and Hadith. Still, his prophecy is also grounded in dreams and visions.3 In Islam a distinction is made between three types of dreams: those coming from God (al-ruya), those coming from the devil (al-hulm), and those relating to the dreamer’s own physical or mental condition. An alternative distinction takes good dreams as coming from God, nightmares as coming from the devil, and other dreams as originating in the dreamer’s own anxieties.4 One need not be surprised about such distinctions. In case a meaning is given to dreams in religious or spiritual traditions, criteria will be mandatory to mark the trustworthiness of these dreams.5

Dreams and Moral Consciousness Let us assume for the moment that dreams do offer a solution for moral dilemmas. If that is so, the question then becomes how the dream content relates to our moral consciousness. It is necessary to respond to this inquiry apart from the common question of how exactly dreams should be interpreted. Whether or not dreams can be acknowledged as relying upon an external (prophetic or divine) inspiration, one can always ask if our dream consciousness is susceptible to moral inspiration, or if it is

16

Chapter One

indifferent, or even hostile to it. To put it differently, do we possess any form of moral awareness in our dreams, whatever their nature? Freud asks this question in his Traumdeutung (Interpretation of Dreams). He refers to the opposite views of Schopenhauer and F.W. Hildebrandt. Schopenhauer holds that our character betrays itself in our dreams. Hildebrandt, a 19th Century German author of a short treatise, believes, on the contrary, that our moral awareness persists even in our dreams. “No matter how much of that which accompanies us during the day may vanish in our hours of sleep, Kant's categorical imperative dogs our steps as an inseparable companion, of whom we cannot rid ourselves even in our slumber.” 6 Similarly Carl du Prel, in his Philosophie der Mystik (Philosophy of Mysticism), claims that our moral consciousness is located in our unconscious, i.e., exactly in the range of our consciousness to which only our deepest dreams give us access.7 Subsequently, German social psychologist Erich Fromm takes a third position, arguing that in our dreams we are most often wiser, more intelligent and more sensitive morally than during our waking hours.8 In this debate, Freud himself holds an intermediary position. Indeed, he affirms, our dreams frequently manifest “immoral” thoughts, ideas, and acts. However, these are, at least partially, censored by our super-ego. We may draw here a provisional conclusion: provided that dreams are censored, any form of moral consciousness must be inherent to our dream consciousness. Dream censorship may be rooted in anxiety. Still, it demonstrates an initial openness to something like a “moral consciousness.” A similar conclusion can be drawn from Fromm’s view. For if we do possess moral, artistic or intellectual sensitivity in our dreams, this also testifies to some form of moral consciousness or moral receptivity. This conclusion relies upon any censorship actually taking place in dreams, and upon some intellectual sensitivity and creativity truly producing itself in our dream consciousness. If these two phenomena are denied then this conclusion is invalidated.

Dreams and Inspiration Moving forward, it is useful to consider further the point that Fromm raises. Dreams can inspire people’s actions and mindset, i.e., their artistic creativity, their philosophical subtlety, and their political acuity. We have sufficient testimonies of this.9 The question, rather, is how this inspiration can take place. Only if we have a sharper idea about that we can say something more about the jihadist dream inspiration I started this article with.

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

17

It seems that two opposite explanations can be given here. One could, for example, assert that dream inspiration does indeed allow for an externalist explanation. A prophet or a divine messenger would have produced it. Such an explanation would obviously still be in need of a further clarification, even for the believer. The less one will have to appeal to “esotericism,” the more convincing an explanation will be. It may be useful to bear in mind the medieval Islamic doctrine of the ‘alam al-mithal, or the mundus imaginalis. This doctrine that has clear neo-platonic and gnostic ancestries originates in thinkers as Ibn Arabi, Molla Sadra, and Sohrawardi. It introduces an intermediate realm between the world of the senses and the world of the purely spiritual: a world of images and forms. Henry Corbin, the great scholar of Shi’ite Islam, has written about it extensively. He says that this world is pictured as “a perfectly real world preserving all the richness and diversity of the sensible world but in a spiritual state. The existence of this world presupposes that it is possible to leave the sensible state without leaving physical extension.”10 Corbin then refers to the 17th Century Cambridge Platonists to show that this medieval doctrine was also held elsewhere, albeit in a different religious context. The Pakistani theologian Fazlur Rahman writes: “Although the ‘alam al-mithal is created for the very purpose of serving as a place where the incredible is rendered credible and where the miraculous is somehow made ‘normal’, the physical world is still not saved from the encroachments of the realm of figures. Indeed, the intellects of the heavenly bodies also project angels from this realm into the mundane world and that is whence the angel of revelation physically manifests himself.”11 The truth of the mystical Islamic doctrine of the ‘alam al-mithal was upheld in later Islam as well, and mainly among Muslim intellectuals. The Leiden Islamologist Umar Ryad points here to the theology of the 18th Century Shah Wali Allah, and to the ideas of the 19th Century Sayyid Ahmad Khan; in their respective theologies the medieval doctrine is transmitted to modern generations of Muslims. 12 The aforementioned Fazlur Rahman can be seen as a contemporary representative of the ‘alam al-mithal, as appears from his 1958 book Prophecy in Islam. These first explanations of dream inspiration will probably only convince those who already believed in them, while others may reject it as being exotic or fictitious. Without going further, comprehensive details on this issue are available in the writings of German philosophers Schelling and Schopenhauer, who each in his own way tried to articulate an analogous escape of the immediate sensuous world. While Schelling mentions the age-old doctrine of the “subtle body,” in his text Clara, oder

18

Chapter One

über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt (Schelling Clara: Or, on Nature's Connection to the Spirit World), Schopenhauer purports that the Platonic ideas form an intermediary sphere between the World Will and the everyday world of representation. Admittedly, however, these parts of their doctrines have hardly, if at all, convinced even their most loyal adherents, let alone other philosophers. In addition, we could perhaps also refer here to Spinoza. In his Tractatus theologicopoliticus divine revelation by means of the prophets is interpreted as a form of human imaginatio. Imaginatio offering a lower type of knowledge than the philosophical and the rational, it nevertheless remains a type of knowledge for Spinoza; it is not as such disqualified. Similarly, Spinoza’s view of the human body and matter -which as a divine attribute is infinitein the Ethica, leaves space for alternative ways of perception. A fully different approach of dream inspiration looks for an origin inside the psyche itself, refusing to resort to some intermediary world, let alone a purely spiritual one. Whereas the latter is usually immediately rejected as “speculative,” we must admit that it at least offers the simplest explanation with dream inspiration allegedly deriving from a subtle sphere in between the sensuous and the divine. An internal-psychological explanation of dream content would much more difficult to understand inspiration. A Freudian account, for instance, would probably propose a retrospective approach, and connect the dream content to suppressed memories and desires. It is not sure, however, that such a retrospective, internalist approach would at all be able to account for dream inspiration. For that matter, Eduard von Hartmann and William James have offered alternative accounts. These accounts testify to a wide range of possible states of consciousness and their interconnectedness. They do not have anything esoteric or exotic in themselves. Rather, they take our immediate consciousness to be necessarily selective. As our consciousness is unable to receive permanently all the variegated stimuli by which it is affected, it must expressly and intentionally focus itself. Meanwhile, the other stimuli will be stored in a peripheral sphere, or, in Jamesian terms, at a “subliminal” level. James declines the Freudian notion of the unconscious, and believes that any content of consciousness can essentially be made accessible. If someone, for example, “suddenly” undergoes a conversion process, James writes in his Varieties of Religious Experience, this must be taken with a grain of salt: for at a “subliminal” level an incubation period must have been taking place, preparing for the conversion. How could dream inspiration be accounted for with reference to different levels or intensities of consciousness? Twentieth century psychologists as M. Nachmansohn or Richard R. Pokorny have argued

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

19

that external or internal stimuli that were unable to find their way to immediate perceptual consciousness will nevertheless incorporate into the psyche’s structure. Nachmansohn calls this our Binnenbewusstsein, or our “inner consciousness.” In it, stimuli are stored that have not immediately been consciously apprehended. These stored stimuli assume a life of their own and frequently give rise to increasing tension. As is always the case with tension, a sustained effort to release makes itself felt. Such release can only take place as soon as the level of daily, focused consciousness is lowered, e.g., during sleep or under hypnosis.13 He writes: The true artist belongs to those who possess a rich inner consciousness [Binnenbewusstsein], because being more susceptible than the average people they assume plenty of impressions that cannot possibly all be perceived [apperzipiert], and that therefore remain at the background and are eventually also suppressed. In the inner consciousness they engage in all kinds of associations. As long as, despite ample strength and abundance, they cannot find any release, the individual will feel an almost unbearable tension, that produces the most characteristic poet’s quirks [Dichterschrullen] and that can justifiably be called hysterical. He suspects that something must break forth from within, until that which has matured in him will almost without spiritual effort be perceived [apperzipiert] and represented within the shortest time.14

Simultaneous with inspiration, Nachmansohn continues, noting that the following phenomena can manifest themselves: passivity, suddenness (Plötzlichkeit), overabundance (Überfülle) and over-strong feelings of desire (überstarken Lustgefühle). 15 That which Nachmansohn calls Binnenbewusstsein is called “sphere” (Sphäre) in Pokorny: Sphere, accordingly, is the field that is stored [gelagerte] around the focus of attention [Brennpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit], in which all memories (engrams) – slowly fading away towards the periphery and getting paler – and all experiences occurring outside immediate attention [alle ausserhalb der Aufmerksamkeit ablaufenden Erlebnisse], are stored; not unconsciously, but vaguely, unclearly conscious. Triggered by an actual perception [Wahrnehmung] or representation [Vorstellung] this adumbrated region is searched through, while our attention is going through it like a spotlight.16

To this Pokorny adds that, in order to acquire the habit of thinking intuitively, giftedness, attentiveness and self-confidence are also needed. For a truly prophetic inspiration to take place, there also needs to be an increased feeling of selfhood and a belief in one’s “chosen-ness.”17

20

Chapter One

Dreams between Psychology and Ontology For the moment I shall not choose between an internalist, psychological, and an externalist, ontological explanation of dreaming. I first want to draw the attention towards three rising problems. To begin with, provided one upholds an ontological explanation, and provided one believes, as is current in Islam, in inspired dreams, how, then, should one distinguish between divine dreams and diabolic, or even personal dreams? Islamic dream traditions, as well as others, classify several criteria for reliable dreams (al-ruya). 18 Dream interpreters, that is, wise and pious Muslims whose advice is asked in case of remarkable dreams, keep a close watch on this. In general dreams of just, loyal, and patient people count as valid, as opposed to those of the wicked. This criterion, therefore, applies to the dreamer himself and to his over-all state of mind prior to the dream. Next, if the prophet Muhammad, an angel, or God’s throne figure in dreams, these dreams are also considered to be veridical. This criterion sees to the dream content. Dreams that have been dreamt in the correct position, i.e., on the right side, or dreams that have been dreamt at the correct moment, preferably just before dawn, are taken to be valid. This criterion relates to the dreamer’s and the dream’s condition. Premonitory dreams of upcoming disasters are usually seen as truthful, just as dreams in which God calls on the dreamer to act. These criteria regard the urgency under which a dream manifests itself. Finally, a dream in which a deceased individual reveals his or her will to the dreamer, are mainly seen as authentic. This criterion is connected to the previous one. There are also criteria for false dreams (al hulm). Confused dreams, for example, are supposed to have been produced by jinns, or spirits. Sexual dreams or nightmares are deprived of veracity, as much as dreams about the past. Finally, dreams that have been influenced, or even evoked, by magicians or sorcerers are also discredited. Obviously, such criteria are liable to continuous reevaluation. They merely insist that a differentiation should be made in dream content (This conviction is paralleled to Spinoza’s or Maimonides’, according to whom the revealed content of the Bible should be differentiated; for not every prophetic message recorded in the Bible has the same authoritative position as Moses’ Torah. If, for example, Maimonides minimizes the revealed content of the book of Daniel to the favor of Moses, it is in virtue of the former receiving divine messages in confused dreams, which,

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

21

moreover, he is unable to interpret. Moses at least understood his own revelations and was able to interpret them for the people). It is remarkable, after all, that in Islamic traditions the manifest dream (that is the dream manifesting itself in a waking, conscious moment) content is exclusively regarded. No attention whatsoever is paid to deeper layers behind the manifest content.19 A second problem is how we could even decide if a dream has a purely internal, psychological origin, or an external, divine origin. I do not believe that a compelling argument can be given for the latter position. The Swiss psychologist and theologian Pfister, who has corresponded with Freud, once said: “Where otherworldly telegrams run in, psychology has lost its right, for it stands and falls, like any science, with the principle of natural explanation.”20 Yet, the argument for a supernatural origin of some dreams cannot be compellingly discredited either. Theories of the unconscious in the human psyche tend to give a subjective account of dream content. Mystical dreams, for example, would testify to a narcissist or hysterical personality structure. They would amount to the dreamer’s over-compensation of a deeply felt inner lacking. Cavendish Moxon relates this idea to mystical thinkers: “[They] are a sub-class of hysterics. The mystic ecstasy corresponds to the four stages of the dream-states – the primary tendency to phantasy, the consequent will not to know the world, the progress through the dark night of the soul to the ineffable depths of light and the exhaustion that follows the ecstasy. We must therefore posit in the mystics as well as in the hysterics a primary auto-erotic or narcissistic activity, a secondary repression, and a final return of the repressed activity in the sublimated or spiritualized form of a religious experience or a mystic ecstasy.”21

Even if such analyses can be true, making an absolute metaphysical claim on the basis of a psychoanalytic theory seems to me to be impossible. Such a claim would, for example, argue that mystical dream states are always the result of a narcissist mind set. At best it could be proved that this or that particular “revealed” dream could be reduced to a pathological personality structure. It is of the utmost importance to always investigate this possibility. Even the great 19th century philosopher and psychologist Eduard von Hartmann, famous for his Philosophie des Unbewussten (‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’), warns of the risks inherent to a mystical focus. Especially if the mystical thinker attempts to intensify mystical unity with the spiritual, Von Hartmann claims, he can ruin his consciousness. Furthermore, he adds, the risks of mystical delusion are far greater than those of pure rational thinking. Rationality is rooted in

22

Chapter One

common sense, whereas mystical consciousness attempts to abandon common sense altogether. The criterion for the inspiration’s reliability, according to Von Hartmann, is “the purity and the inner value of the result”.22 Carl du Prel states that “in the dream brain layers [Gehirnschichten] are active that in waking life either become inoperative [funktionslos], or at least function below the psychophysical level of experience [psychophysischen Empfindungsschwelle], i.e., remain unconscious.”23 In his view the level of our deepest sleep represents another, more profound level of consciousness; we are linked to the world by other threads than the mere external senses. Somnambulism, Du Prel confirms, betrays the existence of this deeper level of consciousness. In fact, it offers its strongest evidence. Du Prel bases his theory on Fechner and Schopenhauer, authors who presumably transmit their ideas to Freud and, in so doing, allow for the Freudian theory of the unconscious. A third problem that I wish to raise here is the following: how can, if at all, the content of an inspired dream be explained on a purely internal, psychological account? Definitive answers cannot be given here, either. First, to be entitled to speak of “inspiration” at all, one has to accept any reference to a reality outside the mind. Any influx or inspiration necessarily comes from without. Johannes Barolin has stated that “inspiration is a perception not from within but from without, a way of getting conscious of thoughts that we would like to designate as “pending thoughts” [Schwebegedanken], thoughts that are only capable of conceiving a mechanism of thoughts that is particularly matched and constructed very harmoniously and that works precisely.”24 A purely immanent, subjectivist explanation can never truly account for dreams with moral or creative overtones as “inspired.” For strictly speaking, such overtones will always be based upon repression or sublimation of subdued inner desires. The entire cultural, philosophical and religious structures of society, on this immanentist view, finally comprehend sole inhibited desires, and come down to exteriorized interiority. An alternative to this Freud-based, internal explanation is offered by Jung’s model. The Freudian, psychoanalytical approach being retrospective, merely addressing the dreamer’s past, the Jungian is prospective, futureoriented, focusing on the dream’s meaning for the dreamer. Dilthey’s famous distinction between erklären (“explanation:” Freud) and verstehen (“understanding,” “interpreting:” Jung, Adler) presents itself here, although we have to admit that Freud’s use of the word Deutung (“interpretation”) in his Traumdeutung is subtle enough to keep the middle between these two extremes.

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

23

Are a retrospective and a prospective explanation of inspired dreams mutually exclusive? Do we have to choose between Freud and Jung? Unable to do justice to this complicated matter, I would nonetheless suggest that youth traumas can sometimes prospectively reveal meaning or make sense. In this regard it is interesting to see how Dilthey, in a short text on the prophet Muhammad, claims that “especially those people who constitute the motive powers, to some extent even the springs in the wheels of history [Sprungfedern im Räderwerk der Geschichte], are almost all psychological problems. The ones who stand on the threshold of big events are variegated and possess a dark profundity, just as the world of representations [Vorstellungswelt] moving them.”25 Dilthey then continues applying this to Muhammad, but obviously a similar case could be made for other great prophets. Possibly prophetic revelation as such could be accounted for in terms of a revealing or unraveling of psychical conflicts or traumas; to be sure, this would not necessarily disqualify any revelation as revelation. Another reference with some relevance here is Sabina Spielrein, the great Jewish-Russian psychoanalyst, who came to Jung for treatment of symptoms with a sadomasochist streak (apparently, she had been maltreated by her father, which had surprisingly given her some pleasure). After her recovery she came to Freud to study psychoanalysis. She was the one who developed the theory of the death drive: a theory that Freud soon appropriated and which enabled him to account for the horrors of the First World War.26 Indubitably, examples can be multiplied of creative spirits whose creativity has developed in the wake of preceding psychical traumas. The psychoanalyst Alfred Adler, for instance, has done a lot of theorizing about the phenomenon of “over-compensation,” that can manifest itself as a result of a felt sense of inferiority in relation to others.27 Obviously by all this I do not want to imply that traumas are retrospectively justified by the creative inspiration they sometimes give rise to.

Some Observations Concerning Moussaoui’s Dream So far we have explored some features that may be relevant for a consideration of jihadist dreams: dreams and moral consciousness, dream and inspiration, natural or supernatural origin of dreams, and retrospective or prospective interpretation of dreams. Let us now return to the dream of Zacarias Moussaoui, which began this chapter. This was a dream that reputedly inspired his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Evidently, the dream was short, and the account had been

24

Chapter One

rendered under unfavorable conditions (in prison). The great importance of dreams in Islam, however, may at least give some credits to the dream’s authenticity. There are some striking characteristics in the dream narrative. First and foremost, there is the repeated verbal filler “okay.” It seems as though Moussaoui has to urge himself time and again to continue speaking. Is he ashamed of his story, or of the fact that he went for advice? Does he feel guilty? The narrator does not mention an experienced sense of guilt in the dream. The verbal filler “okay” might eventually point to a contrast between the dream experience and waking consciousness. Next, Moussaoui’s visits to Bin Laden and another sheikh, where he asked for counsel, are also striking and worthy of brief consideration. As previously mentioned, this is in complete accordance with Islamic custom: religious leaders habitually interpret remarkable dreams of the believers. The question is, however, if there was anything left to explain for Bin Laden: Moussaoui had already understood the dream’s message (“So I refer to sheikh Usama bin Laden and some other sheikh there to explain to me the reality, but the dream about the White House, it was very clear to me.”). Moussaoui tells us that he had this dream after he had first declined Bin Laden’s offer to participate in the attack. It seems very likely to me that his dream was a postponed reaction to the demand, particularly because it would probably have impacted him greatly. In this case the dream could have originated in the peripheral “sphere” of consciousness Pokorny speaks about, or in the Binnenbewusstsein (Nachmansohn), and penetrated dream consciousness as from there. Another observation is that, according to Moussaoui, Bin Laden does not interpret the dream. He only repeats his request regarding Moussaoui’s joining the suicide mission. Earlier, I mentioned truth criteria for dreams in Islam. It is noticeable that neither God nor the prophet Muhammad occurs in Moussaoui’s dream. Nor do God’s throne or an angel. This would have at least made the dream more credible. Little can be said about Moussaoui’s moral character and firmness. Moreover, the assessment would obviously depend on the moral character of the assessor himself. However, it may not be completely irrelevant that two of his pals, Ramzi Binalchibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have indicated that they had lost their faith in him at a certain moment. Also, the instructors under whose supervision he had taken his flight lessons had also been suspicious because of his abnormal behavior.28 This might be an indicator of his fickleness and instability. .

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

25

The dream apparently has a premonitory character: Moussaoui saw the White House with a circle and a cross over it. The premonitory character of this symbol, though, is not unambiguous. It could just as easily be defended that an obsession with violence during his waking consciousness has brought Moussaoui to this association. At a subliminal level of his consciousness he could have been rife with imaginings that would, at a certain level of prompting, lead to violent interpretations. The dream is ambiguous anyhow where it seems to inspire action: it could be interpreted as though it asked something of the dreamer, but this is not completely evident. The dream’s injunctive character mainly seems to rely on the contrast between the dream and the waking state. But once more, for that matter, nowhere in the dream it is stated that God asks Moussaoui to do something. Finally, exclusive attention is paid to the manifest dream content, which is the only thing that is valuated. Not in the least, the possibility is reflected upon that the dream might betray deeper, concealed messages behind the veil of the manifest content. This is also in conformity with Islamic traditions of dream interpretation.

Conclusion If someone claims that his dream has an external origin, this claim entails its morally binding character. Appealing to an exterior or transcendent origin is equivalent to attributing a kind of normativity to this dream. Any conception of immanence in itself enhances the absence, or at best the relativity, of morality; if transcendence makes itself felt it cannot but shed a critical, evaluative light on immanence. This is made clear in Levinas’ philosophy, whereas the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, on the contrary, claiming the purest immanence for itself, radically excludes any supposedly absolute moral bind. In line with this it could be defended that the concept of inspiration as such also entails some kind of normative character, provided, of course, that true inspiration from an external position actually takes place. If inspiration turns out to be pure sublimation, its morally binding character instantaneously “expires.” Next, whoever claims that inspired dreams are only susceptible of an exclusively internal, intra-psychic explanation, claims more than he can substantiate. For this claim entails the assumption that the psyche or the inner life of man can be delimited. This seems to be impossible. One need not basically accept the existence of the aforementioned ‘alam al-mithal, nor the idea of a collective unconscious. Yet these notions point at the

26

Chapter One

permeable border between consciousness and a domain transcending consciousness. The mystical traditions of various religions are without exception directed at a de-limiting of common sense or waking consciousness. They are at odds with the objectifying tendencies of what is called science today, but what in fact comes down to the isolation of one single state of mind that has happened to become dominant in our recent history: i.e., rational-empirical consciousness. Thirdly, even those who want to enclose the psyche within its own boundaries, cannot possibly avoid its susceptibility of external content. In his book The Concept of Anxiety. A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, Kierkegaard tries to make a case for an experience of anxiety that is open for an external, transcendent reality. Even Heidegger, maybe even Sartre, have acknowledged this. And finally, dreams that have inspired terrorist actions are probably all to be seen as erratic, inasmuch as they all give expression to a common interiority (e.g. a common indignation about ‘American arrogance’, a terrorist network, etc.). Even at the basis of the aforementioned truth criteria in Islam they could perhaps be rejected, since they could have been produced by jinns, they are confused, or eventually produced by magicians, i.e., by the extremist indoctrination of charismatic leaders. It is noteworthy that many of the dreams studied by Iain Edgar have not been dreamt by the perpetrators themselves but by their relatives.29 Perhaps it is appropriate to conclude with a quotation from the Qur’an, which is given by Henry Corbin: “O soul at peace, return to your lord, accepting and accepted.” (Sura of the Dawn, 89: 27-28)

Corbin links this verse to another well-known saying, an alleged Hadith: “Whoever knows himself [his soul], knows his Lord.”30

Notes 1

See here: http://nationalpostnews.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/muslimdreamsdoc.pdf. 2 Iain Edgar and David Henig, “The Cosmopolitan and the Noumenal: A Case Study of Islamic Jihadist Night Dreams as Reported Sources of Spiritual and Political Inspiration,” In Dimitrios Theodossopoulos and Elisabeth Kirtsoglou (eds.), United in Discontent. Local Responses to Cosmopolitanism and Globalization, (Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2009), 72.

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism 3

27

Vgl. Hidayet Aydar, “Dreaming in the Life of the Prophet Muhammad,” In Kelly Bulkeley, Kate Adams and Patricia M. Davis (eds.), Dreaming in Christianity and Islam. Culture, Conflict, and Creativity, (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London, Rutgers University Press, 2009). 4 Iain Edgar, “The ‘True Dream’ in Contemporary Islamic/Jihadist Dreamwork: A Case Study of the Dreams of Taliban Leader Mullah Omar,” In Contemporary South Asia 15, No. 3, (Sep. 2006): 265; Hidayet Aydar, “Dreaming in the Life of the Prophet Muhammad,” In Bulkeley, Adams and Davis 2009, 82. 5 Vgl. Barbara Tedlock (ed.), Dreaming. Anthropological and Psychological Interpretations, Cambridge, (Cambridge University Press, 1987); David Shulman and Guy G. Stroumsa (eds.), Dream Cultures. Explorations in the Comparative History of Dreaming, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.) 6 Quoted in Freud, Traumdeutung, Gesammelte Werke II/III, Frankfurt, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999, 71 (Trans. A. A. Brill, 1911) The title of Hildebrandts book is Der Traum und seine Verwertung fürs Leben (“The Dream and its Utilization for Life”), Leipzig 1875. 7 Carl du Prel, Die Philosophie der Mystik, Leipzig, Ernst Günthers Verlag, 1885, 533. Esp. see VII.6 ‘Die Ethik’. Cf. “Die augenscheinliche Gegenwart dieser fremden Autorität fehlt nur, weil eben der Traumzustand fehlt, aber es lässt sich a priori vermuten – wenn mir auch kein Traum dieser Art erinnerlich ist – dass eventuelle Gewissensregungen im Traum und Somnambulismus als Lehren oder Befehle aus fremdem Munde sich darstellen müssen“. Ib., 534. 8 Erich Fromm, “Das Wesen der Träume” (1949), in: Gesamtausgabe Band IX, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981, 165; „Märchen, Mythen, Träume,“ ib., 196. 9 For an interesting text about the relation between religious and poetic inspiration in Islam, see Fritz Meier, “Some Aspects of Inspiration by Demons in Islam,” in: G.E. von Grunebaum and Roger Caillois (eds.), The Dream and Human Societies, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.) 10 “ Visionary Dream in Islamic Spirituality,” in: Von Grunebaum / Caillois 1966, 407. 11 Fazlur Rahman, Dream, Imagination and ‘Alam al-mithal’, ib., 413. 12 Umar Ryad, ‘Eschatology between Reason and Revelation: Death and Resurrection in Modern Islamic Theology’ (as yet unpublished). 13 “Es scheint eines der wesentlichsten Gesetzen unseres Seelenlebens zu sein, dass ein Ausgleich zwischen Erregung und Entladung angestrebt wird und nur so das seelische Gleichgewicht zu erhalten ist. Der natürliche Abfluss seelischer Spannungen findet nun über das Apperzeptionsbewusstsein statt, von wo die entsprechenden Innervationen ausgehen. Wo das Binnenbewusstsein diesen Ausweg findet, tritt ein Gefühl der Befreiung ein; die unlustbetonten Hemmungsgefühle weichen lustbetonten Verlaufsgefühlen. Man ist erlöst!” M. Nachmansohn, Zur Erklärung der durch Inspiration entstandenen Bewusstseinserlebnisse, in: Archiv für die gesammte Psychologie 36, 1917, 268. 14 M. Nachmansohn, ‘Zur Erklärung der durch Inspiration entstandenen Bewusstseinserlebnisse’, in: Archiv für die gesammte Psychologie 36, 1917, 268f. (my translation, RS)

28 15

Chapter One

Ibid., 275. Richard R. Pokorny, "Über das Wesen und den Sinn der Intuition’, in: Acta Psychologica, Vol. 10 (1954), 271v. (my translation, RS) For recent confirmation of Nachmansohn’s and Pokorny’s views on consciousness, awareness, and intuition, see the work oft he psychoanalyst W.R. Bion. 17 Ibid., 275v. Further cf. Kelly Bulkeley, “Dreaming as Inspiration: Evidence from Religion, Philosophy, Literature, and Film,” in: International Review of Neurobiology vol. 92, 2010. 18 Cf. Hidayet Aydar, ‘Dreaming in the Life of the Prophet Muhammad’, in: Bulkeley, Adams and Davis 2009, 83vv. Also see: Muhammad Amanullah, ‘Islamic Dreaming: An Analysis of Its Truthfulness and Influence’, in: ib., esp. 100vv. And also: Iain Edgar, ‘Overtures of Paradise: Night Dreams and Islamic Jihadist Militancy’, in: Curare: Journal of Medical Anthropology 31 (1), 2008, 89vv. 19 Cf. Iain Edgar, “A Comparison of Islamic and Western Psychological Dream Theories,” in: Bulkeley, Adams and Davis 2009, 191. 20 Quoted in Nachmansohn, op. cit., 280. 21 Cavendish Moxon, “Mystical Ecstasy and Hysterical Dream-States,” The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Volume 15 (5-6): 334. 22 Eduard von Hartmann, Die Philosophie des Unbewussten I, ‘Das Unbewusste in der Mystik’, Leipzig, Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1923 (1871), 321. 23 Carl du Prel, 1885, 24. Esp. see II.4 ‘Die metaphysische Verwertung des Traumes.’ 24 Cf. Johannes C. Barolin, Inspiration und Genialität, Wien/Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1927, 9 (my trans.). Also cf. R. Hennig, Das Wesen der Inspiration’, in: Schriften für psychologische Forschung, Heft 17, Leipzig, Verlag von J.A. Barth, 1912. 25 W. Dilthey, "Mohammed," in: Gesammelte Schriften XV, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970. 26 Sabina Spielrein, Die Destruktion als Ursache des Werdens’ (1912), in: Sämtliche Schriften, Gießen, Psychosozial-Verlag, 2002; Aldo Carotenuto, Tagebuch einer heimlichen Symmetrie : Sabina Spielrein zwischen Jung und Freud, Freiburg im Breisgau, Kore, 1986. 27 “Der von diesem Gefühl der Minderwertigkeit ausgehende stürmische Versuch zur Überkompensation, gleichbedeutend mit Überwindung des Fehlerhaften durch angestrengtes Training des Gehirns, gelingt recht häufig, nicht aber ohne dauernd Spuren dieses Zusammenhangs und der Mehrleistung in der Psyche zu hinterlassen. Der ehemalige Bettnässer wird zum Reinlichkeitsfexen und Blasenathleten, das Kind mit unwillkührlichen Stuhlabgängen zum Hyperaestheten, die ursprüngliche Schwäche und Empfindlichkeit der Augen prädestiniert zuweilen zum Maler und Dichter und der Stotterer Demosthenes wird zum grössten Redner Griechenlands. Dabei begleitet sie alle auf ihrem Lebenswege eine unbezähmbare Gier nach Erfolg und ihre dauernde Überempfindlichkeit sucht ihnen die Kulturhöhe zu sichern.” Alfred Adler, in: Über den Selbstmord, insbesondere den SchülerSelbstmord. Diskussionen des Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereins I, Wiesbaden, J.F. Bergmann, 1910, 48. 16

Dreams, Morality, and Terrorism

29

28 Yosri Fouda / Nick Fielding, Le 11 septembre raconté pas ceux qui l’ont commis (trans. by Guy Abadia), Paris, Ed. du Rocher, 2003, 252-254. 29 This applies, among others, to Bin Laden en Mullah Omar. Cf. Edgar 2009. 30 H. Corbin, "Visionary Dream in Islamic Spirituality," in: Von Grunebaum / Caillois 1966, 382.

CHAPTER TWO JEAN-PAUL SARTRE ON OPPRESSION AND VIOLENCE MARTINE BERENPAS

Introduction Jean-Paul Sartre is known for his rebellious life, his affiliation with communism and Maoism and his quote that “Hell is other people.”1 The desire for revolution is the driving force of Sartre’s whole philosophy. He sees human life as a struggle against alienation and oppression in favor of man’s freedom. Sartre was involved in the debate on the French occupation of Algeria around 1956. He openly supported the Algerians in their struggle for freedom and their active resistance, which resulted in the Algerian war from 1954 until 1962. During the French occupation of Algeria in the 1850s, Algerians came to live in poverty and were subjected to inhuman treatment. Resistance to colonial oppression was answered by more oppression. Sartre saw French colonialism as a severe case of disregard of human rights.2 The necessity for absolute freedom is paramount throughout Sartre’s whole philosophy. It is therefore not surprising that Sartre supported the Algerian struggle for independence in order to regain their freedom. Sartre believed that it was his moral duty as an intellectual to speak against the French occupation and to become politically involved.3 He argued that the French had to take responsibility for the occupation, because it infected the French with racism and obliged innocent men to fight despite themselves.4 Sartre provided an introduction to Frantz Fanon’s controversial book Les Damnés de la Terre. In this introduction, he argues that the Algerian people need to use violence in order to overcome the oppression. Sartre admits that terrorism is a horrible weapon, but claims that the Algerians have no other option:

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

31

Il faut tuer: abattre un Européen, c’est faire d’une pierre deux coups, supprimer en même temps un oppresseur et un opprimé : restent un homme mort et un homme libre le survivant, pour la première fois, sent un sol national sous la plante de ses pieds. [For in the first days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead man, and a free man; the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil under his foot. At this moment the Nation does not shrink from him; wherever he goes, wherever he may be, she is; she follows, and is never lost to view, for she is one with his liberty.]5

Sartre seems to argue that in case of severe oppression, one should kill another freedom in order to regain freedom. This seems paradoxical given the absolute value of freedom Sartre endorses. In this chapter, I will discuss Sartre’s remark in the light of his phenomenological ontology. I will concentrate on the relation to the other and how Sartre sees this relation as paradoxical and oppressive. Sartre’s phenomenological ontology that he sets forth in L’Être et le Néant is an account of man’s struggle for absolute freedom. For Sartre, consciousness is nothingness that directs itself to the phenomena. Consciousness is an activity rather than an object. The main characteristic of human consciousness is its intentionality: consciousness is always conscious of something without coinciding with it. Because consciousness experiences that which it is conscious of always as something which it is not, it is absolutely free. Man never is, but is always a “becoming-to-be.” Man is, however, ontologically inclined to mask his absolute freedom. Consciousness experiences its power to negate the phenomena as a lack of being. This attitude makes man prone to acts of bad faith (la mauvaise foi). Bad faith is a denial of the transcendence of consciousness and a refusal to take responsibility for its facticity. The gaze of the other discovers man’s facticity. The gaze of the other confronts man with his embodied existence. Sartre argues that the gaze of the other confronts one with his own objectivity. Man gets a sense of this when he sees himself revealed in the gaze of the other and discovers that the other is another consciousness. The gaze of the other results in concrete relations of love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and sadism. These relations are all characterized by conflict and oppression. In Sartre’s phenomenological account of human consciousness, it is impossible for man to maintain a relation with another consciousness without denial of his or the other’s freedom. In ontology, the gaze of the other keeps hostage and alienates.

32

Chapter Two

In this chapter, I will reconstruct the way Sartre argues that the concrete relations to the “other” are paradoxical and oppressive. I will relate these findings to terrorism and colonialism and the understanding of an oppressor. For Sartre, an oppressor is someone who denies the subjectivity of the other by treating him as a mere object. I will conclude that oppression for Sartre is paradoxical because it is essentially an act of bad faith. An oppressor masks the fact that he needs to take up his own facticity as part of his situation. I will show that the concrete relations that Sartre distinguishes in L’Être et le Néant have their origin in consciousness’ fundamental desire to be. The desire to be causes man to fall into acts of bad faith. Ontology is the sphere of being in which consciousness tries to get hold of being and tries to be something it is not. The gaze of the other is seen as hostile not because the other is hostile, but because man’s ontological attitude leads to interpreting the gaze as such. From Sartre’s ontological account, it necessarily follows that severe oppression can only be put to an end by killing the oppressor. This however does not mean that Sartre argues that killing is morally justified. In strictly Sartrean terms, killing is also an act of bad faith because it is a refusal to take up one’s facticity as part of the situation. For Sartre, oppression only stops when the oppressor himself gives up the desire to be and deals with the fact that he is a transcendence that needs to deal with his facticity. Oppression, terrorism, conflict and violence all stem from man’s anxiety for either his freedom or his responsibility for the situation in which he finds himself. Only the shift from ontology to morality will prevent man from falling into acts of bad faith. In the moral conversion, man accepts the situation as his own and sees the other as another consciousness that has his own projects to realize. I will argue that Sartre’s analysis does not only give us insight in the motivation of terrorists and oppressors, but also gives us insight in the way all humans are prone to use oppression as a way to mask our absolute freedom.

Absolute Freedom and Bad Faith Sartre argues that ontology deals with the difference between consciousness and objects in the world. Consciousness is intentional, what means that consciousness is directed on objects and is aware of objects that are different than it. An object, or a “being-in-itself” (être en soi) as Sartre calls it, is not aware of anything and lacks the intentional structure consciousness has.

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

33

Sartre defines consciousness as intentionality and emphasizes that all consciousness is consciousness of something. Consciousness is directed on objects and as such is not an object but an activity. The mode of human consciousness is not a substance, an object or a subject. Sartre even goes further and claims that human consciousness is ‘nothingness’. Consciousness is as long it intends an object. It is dependent on the objects on which it can direct itself. There is always a rift between consciousness and that which it is conscious of. Sartre defines consciousness in terms of nothingness in order to emphasize the difference between the mode of objects and the mode of human consciousness. Consciousness is an activity that finds itself always at a distance from that which it is conscious of. An object does not have the ability to reflect on itself or on other objects and is not dependent on anything. Sartre argues that for this reason an object “merely is” en can be called a “being-in-itself.” Consciousness’ existence is dependent on the being of the phenomena that it is conscious of. Consciousness can however transcend the phenomena by negating them (néantiser). Consciousness as negating activity that is nothingness is synonymous with absolute freedom; it is never determined because it never is, but is always a becoming-to-be. Sartre calls this special mode of human consciousness “being-for-itself.” Sartre presents man in L’Être et le Néant, but also in his novels, as the creature who is doomed to be free. Doomed because he cannot escape from the endless task of giving himself significance and direction. Man is absolute freedom and is responsible for every choice he makes and everything he was or becomes. Sartre even argues that man needs to take up his own thrownness in the world (facticity) as his own choice. This means accepting one’s body, gender and situation in which one finds himself as part of his project. What Sartre argues is that man is on his own in giving himself significance and direction. In this sense; man is doomed to be free; he cannot rely on anything outside himself for giving him guidance. Man’s absolute freedom and his responsibility for the situation in which he finds himself is something that he will try to mask. Man will often pretend that he is not able to transcend the situation (and thus denies that he is absolutely free) or he pretends that he does not have to deal with his facticity. Sartre argues that man is ontologically inclined to fall into acts of bad faith (la mauvaise foi). Man acts out of bad faith when he for example pretends that the situation in which he finds himself makes it impossible for him to act out of free will. He pretends that the situation determines him and that he cannot do anything to change his situation. This ‘serious man’ (homme

34

Chapter Two

sérieux) as Sartre calls him, acts like he is an object with fixed qualities, which he cannot change. He tries to cover up the fact that he is an absolute freedom who is never determined by anything. Man also acts out of bad faith when he pretends that his facticity doesn’t affect him. In L’Être et le Néant, Sartre gives the example of the young women who has a romantic dinner with a man. The man lies his hand on the woman’s hand, but the women refuses to respond to this gesture. She pretends that the man’s hand touching her hand doesn’t affect her. The woman acts out of bad faith because she refuses to take responsibility for her own facticity. The man who acts out of bad faith acts from an impossibility to choose or to take responsibility for the situation. Man masks in his bad faith his existence as a free individual who has to take up his facticity as his own choice. Bad faith not only affects the way man sees himself, but also affects the way he encounters another consciousness. Sartre argues that it is the other who reveals my objectivity and confronts me with my facticity.

The Gaze of the Other Sartre’s phenomenology presents consciousness as an activity that never coincides with that of which it is conscious. Consciousness always experiences that which it is conscious of as something different than itself. When man encounters another human being, he experiences this other as a consciousness that is not his consciousness. Sartre argues that the relation to the other is defined by the ability to be seen by the other (the gaze, le regard). The other can reflect on his being and reveals his embodied existence. For Sartre, it is the other who confronts him with his facticity. Through the gaze of the other, one not only becomes aware of the subjectivity of the other, but is also confronted with the fact that his consciousness is not only a perspective, but also an object within the world. The gaze of the other alienates him from his absolute freedom, because it forces him to take responsibility for the being that the other reveals of him. One must accept that the being that the other sees is his being. The confrontation with one’s embodied existence is hard for man, because he must take up that which he cannot change, such as gender or body appearance, as part of his situation. Sartre argues that man has to take up his facticity as if it was his own choice. If he fails to do this, he will fall into acts of bad faith.

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

35

Sartre distinguishes two ways in which man reacts to the gaze. In the concrete relations of love, language and masochism, man tries to appropriate the being that the other reveals of him. Man tries to become what the other sees in him. Man can also deny the gaze of the other and pretend that the other does not reveal his embodied existence. This reaction leads to the relations of indifference, desire, hate and sadism. Although these concrete relations different slightly from each other, they are all doomed to fail. These relations are characterized by conflict and oppression and destroy man’s absolute freedom.

Oppression, Conflict and the Other Sartre’s main concern in the encounter with the other is not the experience of the other’s subjectivity, but the role the other plays in revealing his objectivity. The gaze reveals his being-for-the-other. Sartre distinguishes different attitudes to respond to this being-for-theother. The concrete ontological relations to the other are love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and sadism. Love, language and masochism are attitudes that have their origin in the desire to that which the other reveals of man. Indifference, desire, hate and sadism are attitudes that deny the subjectivity of the other by denying that the other reveals man’s facticity. I pretend that the other is a mere object that does not reflect on one’s being. Sartre argues that the concrete relations all result in violence and oppression. In love for example, we try to be that which the other reveals of us. We try to live up to our lover’s expectations in order to gain their love. The assumption that we can be what the other sees in us is, however, an illusion. As absolute freedom, we never are, but are always a becoming-tobe. We can never possess the quality that the other ascribes to us. In love, we are not only fooling ourselves by pretending that we can possess fixed qualities, but we also treat the other as an object by forcing him to love us: Ainsi l’amant demande le serment et s’irrite du serment. Il veut être aimé par une liberté et réclame que cette liberté comme liberté ne soit plus libre. Il veut à la fois que la liberté de l’autre se détermine elle-même à devenir amour – et cela, non point seulement au commencement de l’aventure mais à chaque instant – et, à la fois, que cette liberté soit captivée par ellemême, qu’elle se retourne sur elle-même, comme dans la folie, comme dans le rêve, pour vouloir sa captivité. [Thus the lover demands a pledge, yet is irritated by a pledge. He wants to be loved by a freedom but demands that this freedom as freedom should no longer be free. He wishes that the Other’s freedom should determine itself to become love – and this

36

Chapter Two

not only at the beginning of the affair but at each instant – and at the same time he wants this freedom to be captured by itself, to turn back upon itself, as a madness, as in a dream, so as to will its own captivity.]6 In love, man has made himself dependent on the other and masks the fact that he needs to give himself significance and direction. The loving relationship Sartre depicts here is essentially an act of bad faith; man tries to be something he is not. Man needs to give himself significance and cannot rely on the other in order to escape from this task. Sartre argues that “language” is the attitude in which I appropriate the other ones point of view. In this attitude, man has turned himself to “the language of objectivity.” 7 In this attitude, one tries to adopt the significance the other gives to phenomena in order to gain his love. In language we attempt to fascinate the Other. We tell him stories, express our love in order to make ourselves the center of the Other one’s universe. We are trying to force the other to love us by using language. Masochism is the torturing effort to be against all odds. In masochism, one gives up his freedom in order to gain the other ones love and make himself — in every aspect of his existence — dependent on the other. Love, language and masochism are attitudes that result from the desire to appropriate the being the other reveals of him. In these relations, we trying to assume the other’s subjectivity by making ourselves dependent on him. These relations result in a total alienation of our consciousness as for-itself. For Sartre, man is of bad faith when he pretends that he can escape his task of giving himself significance by relying on something outside of him. The gaze of the other alienates him from his freedom and keeps him hostage. Indifference, desire, hate and sadism result from the second reaction to the gaze, which Sartre distinguishes. These attitudes refuse to acknowledge that the other is another consciousness that reveals one’s facticity. Sartre argues that these attitudes are essentially the refusal to take responsibility for man’s facticity. Indifference is the denial that the other has the capability of revealing one’s objectivity. For example, I treat the other as a thing that cannot reflect on my being.. In relation to terrorism, indifference can be related to the colonist who occupies a certain territory and denies the special way of living of the natives who have their own tradition and history. The second attitude that characterizes the denial of the other ones subjectivity is desire. Desire has a sexual connotation; it is an attempt to possess the other’s body in order to ignore his subjectivity. Sartre argues that desire is the “original attempt to possess the free subjectivity of the other by using his objectivity-for-me.” 8 Desire is directed at using the

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

37

other one’s facticity, but at the same time emphasizes man’s own embodied existence. In desire, one tries to possess the other ones’ body by using his own body. An example of desire is war rape. War rapes and rape by soldiers are attitudes of desire; they have a sexual connotation and are directed at gaining power of the other one’s subjectivity. The other one’s subjectivity is mastered by using one’s own body. Desire is frequently combined with hate. Hate is despising the way the other is. Despising the other for what he is or for what he looks like is denying the fact that the other is not an object with determined qualities but absolute freedom. Sartre argues that hate — which is for example the underlying feeling of racism — is fundamentally a masking of one’s own failure. Hate is directed at the way the other one is, but is driven by the failing attempt to incorporate the other in one’s own projects. An example of hate is the religious terrorist who kills people because the world does not seem to acknowledge the truth of his religious conviction. Hate is masking the fact that one must take responsibility for the whole situation, including the acknowledgement that his projects are not being realized. Sadism is the last attitude Sartre distinguishes. It is the effort to annihilate the other’s subjectivity by inflicting pain on his body. Controlling the subject as an object exhilarates the sadist. The torture at Guantanamo Bay is an example of sadism. Torture is inflicting bodily pain in order to master the other’s freedom. Just like hate, sadism has its origin in the confrontation with the fact that life is permeated with failure and that one’s projects are sometimes frustrated. Sadism is masking one responsibility for this fact of human life. The concrete relations of love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and sadism are all paradoxical in their nature. In love, language and masochism one tries to gain the love of a free consciousness by forcing him to love and by forcing dependence on the other. For example, I give up my freedom and keep the other hostage by tricking him into loving me. Indifference, desire, hate and sadism are directed at denying the other’s subjectivity by using his body. In these attitudes man treats the other as nothing more than a body by using his own body. These attitudes have their origin in the refusal to take responsibility for one’s own facticity. The concrete relations to the other result in conflict and oppression. The concrete relations are either directed at giving up one’s own freedom in order to gain the love of the other as freedom, or are directed at destroying the other’s freedom by abusing one’s own freedom. Both reactions result in undermining one’s own nature as consciousness that must take up its facticity as its own choice. Sartre argues that there is no

38

Chapter Two

other way of approaching the other in the ontological sphere; they all result in objectification and alienation. In Sartre’s analysis, the concrete attitudes are all acts of bad faith. In the concrete attitudes towards the other, man masks the nature of consciousness as for-itself that has to take responsibility for his embodied existence. The reactions to the gaze of the other are fundamentally perverted because they are all grounded in either denying the transcendental nature of consciousness or a refusal to take responsibility for man’s facticity. Based on Sartre’s analysis of the gaze and the concrete relations to the other, we can define what Sartre means by oppression. Oppression is objectifying the other by not taking into account that the other is another consciousness that can reflect on one’s own being. Oppression can also be the result of denying one’s absolute freedom by making one dependent on the other. For example, I pretend in this latter case that the other can give me guidance and significance. Oppression has its origin in the anxiety for man’s infinite task to give himself direction and significance and taking up his facticity as his own choice. For Sartre, an oppressor acts always out of bad faith. An oppressor tries to mask the fundamental nature of human existence. Because oppression has its origin in masking the nature of human existence, it is destructive. Sartre argues in Situations V that oppression such as colonialism, is always doomed to fail: We, the people of mainland France, have only one lesson to draw from these facts: colonialism is in the process of destroying itself. But it still fouls the atmosphere. It is our shame; it mocks our laws or caricatures them. It infects us with its racism; as the Montpellier episode proved the other day, it obliges our young men to fight despite themselves and die for the Nazi principles that we fought against ten years ago; it attempts to defend itself by arousing fascism even here in France. Our role is to help it to die. Not only in Algeria but wherever it exists.9 In the introduction to Frantz Fanon’s book, Sartre argues that the only choice an Algerian has left to overcome the French oppression is to kill the Europeans. This statement can be understood from the ontological relation to the other. An oppressor denies that the other has the power to reveal one’s own objectivity and treats the other as a thing. In order to fight oppression, the other sees only two options: either he may adopt the being-for-the-other and become the oppressor’s slave, or he may deny the subjectivity of the oppressor by treating him as a mere object which has no freedom. These two options however do not result in regaining one’s own freedom; as long

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

39

as the oppressor denies seeing one as another consciousness, he can never be truly free. I believe that it is in this sense that Sartre argues that killing is the only option available to the Algerians. Sartre argues that it is our role as the oppressors to overcome this act of bad faith. We must give up trying to objectify the other and must take up our own facticity in an authentic way. The question is how we can escape from acts of bad faith if Sartre does not give us any alternative in approaching the other. It seems to be impossible to respect the other as free consciousness without alienating ourselves or objectifying the other.

The Moral Conversion In Sartre’s ontology it is impossible not to fall into acts of bad faith when we are confronted with the gaze of the other. The relation to the other is characterized by conflict and oppression and never leads to a situation in which absolute freedom is possible for both. It is from this pessimistic ontological account of human relations that Sartre argues that the only option the Algerians have is to kill their oppressors. Yet, Sartre does not claim that killing is morally justified. There is a fundamental difference between ontology and morality; ontology is descriptive and explains how humans act, while morality is prescriptive and describes how humans should act. In Sartre’s ontological analysis, there is no escape from the alienating look of the other. Based on the account Sartre gives us of human relations; it does seem that the only way to escape from the gaze of the other is to kill the other. Although it might be the only option left in order to regain freedom, it is however not a morally justified option. Killing another man is essentially killing somebody who is just like me an absolute freedom. I would argue that killing another man needs to be classified as an act of bad faith because it stems from hate or indifference. Killing another man in order to regain my freedom is at the same time a denial of the subjectivity of the other. By killing the other, I treat him as a mere object and prevent him of revealing my embodied existence. Killing as such is a failing attempt to regain one’s freedom and is an act of bad faith. Sartre’s whole ontology, which he describes in L’Être et le Néant, needs to be seen as an ontology of bad faith. Ontology is the domain of being and for Sartre, consciousness as nothingness has difficulties giving itself a place in the ontological sphere. Sartre argues that consciousness is ontologically inclined to experience its nothingness as lack. Consciousness tries to appropriate that which it is conscious of and tries to give itself a foundation. The fundamental project of consciousness is the desire to be; it

40

Chapter Two

always tries to escape its nothingness. Trying to escape its nothingness is trying to escape from its own nature, which is why all the efforts of consciousness results in acts of bad faith. Already from the beginning consciousness masks its very own nature as for-itself. The fundamental desire to be prevents consciousness from encountering the other as freedom without restraining its own freedom. Although it seems that Sartre’s ontology provides no exit from bad faith, he does already point to the possibility of an authentic attitude in which consciousness does not fall into acts of bad faith: Ces considerations n’excluent pas la possibilité d’une morale de la délivrance et du salut. Mais celle-ci doit être atteinte au terme d’une conversion radicale dont nous ne pouvons parler ici. [These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we can not discuss here.]10

Sartre never wrote any books on this radical conversion. He did however leave notes in which he describes the moral conversion and the turn to authenticity. These notes are collected in Cahiers pour une Morale (1983). These notes give an insight in how Sartre sees a possibility for consciousness to overcome bad faith and to express its absolute freedom. Sartre argues that authenticity is reached in despair. Despair (désespoir) is the experience that one’s fundamental project - which is the effort to give myself a foundation - is doomed to fail. Human life is permeated with failure, which has its origin in consciousness’ negating activity. Accepting failure is accepting consciousness as nothingness that always negates the phenomena and never can get hold of being. Man needs to accept that he differs fundamentally from being; man never is, but is always a becoming-to-be. In the radical conversion, man accepts that he cannot be reduced to a set of qualities but that he can only be interpreted as a collection of activities. Sartre argues that the “recognition of myself as for-itself ecstatic leads to the recognition of consciousness as de-totalised totality.”11 Giving up our fundamental desire to be is moving from the ontological sphere to the moral sphere. The moral sphere is the sphere in which man acts in accordance with his existence as absolute freedom. The conversion to morality opens a new way of approaching the other, because man is no longer motivated by the desire to be. The relation to the other does not result in oppression because the gaze of the other confronts one with his objectivity, but fails because he has already taken an inauthentic stand to his consciousness. It is our

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

41

fundamental desire to be which prevents us from engaging in an authentic relation to the other. Sartre argues that the turn to morality is the recognition that the other is another free consciousness who has his own projects to realize. In ontology, we either try to appropriate the being that the other reveals of us and ourselves make the other the foundation of my consciousness, or we treat the other as a thing by denying his subjectivity. At a deeper level, these attitudes have their origin in man’s anxiety of himself as embodied freedom. Man finds it hard to accept that he will always transcend being and that he will always have to take responsibility for his own facticity. In the moral conversion, man accepts that failure is part of human existence and assumes responsibility for the situation in which he finds himself. The turn to morality opens a third possibility of approaching the other and changes the reaction to the gaze of the other. When man gives up the desire to be and sees himself as a collection of activities, he will interpret that which the other reveals of him as part of the project the other has to realize. Furthermore, man will take up that which the other reveals of him as part of the situation in which he finds himself. The authentic attitude is to approach the other as another consciousness who has the ability to reflect on one’s being and assume responsibility for being in this particular situation. Since situations change, the gaze will fade away and will not longer be part of one’s consciousness.

Conclusion: Overcoming Oppression, Violence and Terrorism In this chapter, I have analyzed Sartre’s ontological account of consciousness, which is prone to fall into acts of bad faith. I have related this to Sartre’s claim in the introduction to Frantz Fanon’s book Les Damnés de la Terre in which Sartre argues that the Algerians have no other option left than to kill their oppressors. For Sartre, oppression results from the desire to be which leads man to acts of bad faith. In the ontological sphere, man encounters the other as the other who reveals one’s objectivity and reacts to the gaze in an authentic way. Not only do acts of hate, indifference, desire and sadism such as war rape and torture have their origin in man’s inauthentic stand to his own consciousness as for-itself; also love in the ontological sphere is essentially an act of bad faith. Sartre argues that man needs to free himself of ontology and make a turn to morality. In the moral conversion, man acknowledges that he is a collection of activities rather than a set of qualities and accepts the fundamental structure of consciousness as negating activity. The moral

42

Chapter Two

conversion changes our attitude to the other and subsequently alters our reaction to the gaze. The other is no longer seen as an obstacle in realizing our goal, but as another consciousness that has his projects to realize. When Sartre argues that the Algerians have no other option left than to kill the oppressors, he refers to the pessimistic perspective of human relations in the ontological sphere. When man denies his specific way of existence, he will not only be an oppressor to himself, but he will also approach the other in a violent and oppressive way. Sartre’s account is realistic in the sense that Sartre argues that in order to be truly free, the oppressor needs to refrain from his acts of bad faith. When the oppressor does not make the turn to morality, absolute freedom will never be realized. In this sense, killing the oppressors can only stop severe oppression, such as colonialism. This however does not imply that Sartre sees killing as morally justified. Killing is an act that belongs to the sphere of ontology in which consciousness reacts to the gaze by denying the other one’s subjectivity and destroying it. Killing is therefore an act of bad faith in reaction to another one’s act of bad faith. The fundamental paradox that Sartre points out is that the ontological sphere will lead to a spiral of acts of bad faith. Oppression will be answered by more violent oppression. For example, the more I try to be free by denying the other’s freedom, the more I will fail to realize this goal. Ontology is for Sartre not only the sphere of being, but also the sphere in which human existence will be characterized by oppression, violence and terrorism — a sphere in which man can never act authentically, but will always fall into acts of bad faith. For Sartre, ontology, as the domain of being, is a sphere in which human consciousness does not feel at place. Consciousness as nothingness that never is, has an ambiguous relation to being; it needs being in order to exercise its activity, but at the same time it is fundamentally different than being because it will always transcends being and negate it. Morality is the sphere in which human existence finds itself at home. In the moral conversion, man assumes full responsibility of the situation in which he finds himself and the fact that he is a set of activities and never can be a thing with fixed qualities. Sartre argues that every man has his own project to realize and that he cannot force the other to engage in his projects. This does not mean that Sartre argues that two individuals cannot work on the same project. Two individuals can cooperate when they adopt the same project. The cooperation will be successful as long as both individuals refrain from seeing the other as an obstacle or reducing the other to his embodied existence. Cooperation is possible if I accept that human life is situated and as such falls always back into nothingness.

Jean-Paul Sartre on Oppression and Violence

43

Terrorism, violence and oppression are all forms of human acts of covering up the fundamental structure of human existence and have their origin in the anxiety of man’s absolute freedom. It is in this sense that Sartre argues that humans are doomed to be free; absolute freedom is not something which is easily taken up because it implies that man can never rely on anything else than himself. Although acts of terrorism and severe oppression can be seen as excessive, Sartre gives us insight in the motivation behind these acts and the observation that all human beings will fall back into the ontological domain of bad faith. Accepting human existence in its true nature is for all humans at times difficult to bear. In my view, Sartre does not argue that humans do not have the capability to refrain from using terrorism or violence; he does give us an opening to escape bad faith in the moral conversion. It is in despair that we sometimes realize that life is different than we envisage it and that man’s is ultimate on its own in unfolding his life. For Sartre, it is only possible to explain human life by showing that all of the free actions comprising it are all manifestations of one fundamental choice. Consciousness’ fundamental choice will shift from the desire to be to the authentic stand to its nature as free, embodied existence. It is from this perspective that we need to analyze terrorism and oppression and to gain a deeper understanding in their motivations and tendencies.

Notes 1

Sartre, Jean-Paul. No Exit. In: No Exit and Three Other Plays. Edited and translated by S. Gilbert, (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 22. 2 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Situations V: Colonialisme et Neo-Colonialisme, (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 157. 3 Ibid., 26. 4 Ibid., 47. 5 Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1961. Foreword to Damnés de la Terre, (Paris: La Découverte/Poche, 2002). 6 Sartre, Jean-Paul, L’Être et le Néant. Essai d’Ontologie phénoménologique, (Paris : Gallimard, 2006), 407. 7 Ibid., 413. 8 Ibid., 422. 9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations V, Colonialism and Neocolonialism. Translated by Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and Terry McWilliams, (New York & London: Routledge, 2001).19. 10 L’Être et le Néant, p. 453. 11 Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahier pour une Morale, (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 15.

CHAPTER THREE TERRORISM OR NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT: REFLECTIONS ON SPINOZA, EMOTIONS AND MORALITY GERMÁN BULA

Introduction The weaker side in an asymmetric conflict has, broadly, two different sets of means available with which to carry out the conflict. On the one hand, there are non-violent methods such as political action, peaceful protest or non-violent resistance; on the other, there are violent tactics such as guerilla warfare, vandalism and terrorism. Traditional symmetrical warfare is, by definition, not a sound option, as it implies defeat. The questions that motivate this chapter are as follows: What causes the weak side in an asymmetric conflict to choose either peaceful or violent strategies? What external and internal conditions favor the choice of one or another form of action? What can be done by both sides of the conflict, as well as broader community, in order to tilt the scales in favor of peaceful methods? This chapter focuses on the alternative between non-violent resistance (NVR) and that of terrorism, under the supposition that both are strategies of last resort in sharply asymmetric conflict. As we shall see later, NVR requires a high degree of discipline, leadership and moral fortitude, but is still available even when, due to social distance between antagonistic sides, alternatives such as straightforward political action, cultural activism or peaceful protest are not. Terrorism, on the other hand, is a very costly way of dealing with conflict for both sides (as we shall explore later), but can be the only violent alternative left when the weak side in a conflict cannot wage war by more traditional means. I wish to integrate two approaches, strategic considerations and game theory, and also the emotions of each side involved in the conflict. This

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

45

approach justifies our use of Spinoza’s model of human behavior, which allows us to view strategy and emotion in a single, integrated framework. Although I will sometimes refer to historical cases of asymmetrical conflict in order to illustrate a point, this work is theoretical in nature. What I hope to show is that the strategic approach to asymmetrical conflict needs to be complemented with an emotional and moral understanding of the same.

Spinoza: Strategy and Emotion Spinoza’s Ethics is concerned with the achievement of maximum human happiness. To that end, he develops a theory of human knowledge, emotions and relationships that, deductively, yield a form of behavior, that of the “free man”, which should constitute a happy and fulfilled life. For Spinoza, “Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being.”1 That is, each individual object is essentially a conatus, an inner striving that seeks self-affirmation. In that sense, each individual object (humans, states, bacteria or ethnic groups) exists strategically, seeking to become more, to have more power, to be more the cause than the effect of what occurs to it. In humans, this striving is directly related to their emotions: happiness is an increase in an individual’s power of acting; sadness is the opposite. We love that which we perceive to cause an increase in our power of acting (that which we perceive to cause us happiness) and hate that which we perceive to reduce our power of acting (cause sadness). Since those things that we hate or love are also conatus, it turns out that the striving of some things are compatible with our own, and some other things are incompatible. Put another way, our relationship to things we love is a positive sum game (where benefit and loss is mutual), and our relationship with things we hate is a zero sum game (where one party’s gain is another’s loss). The growth and flowering of our children, our spouse, our preferred sports team or our community causes us joy, whereas the waxing of an enemy, or the proliferation of an infectious disease in ourselves or those we love, causes sadness in us. In love, what is good for A is good for B and vice-versa; in hate it is the opposite. Love characterizes relationships of cooperation, hate, those of conflict. This waxing and waning of the power of members in a cooperative or antagonistic relationship is, at the same time, a strategic and an emotional matter. Emotions are not a mere epiphenomenon that accompanies human interaction, but have a causal import. For example, when hatred is reciprocated with hatred, this increases the hatred in a positive feedback

46

Chapter Three

loop 2 . This dynamic can better account for the destructive cycles of vendettas that have ravaged certain communities better than a merely strategic, game-theoretical point of view. A cycle of vendettas is a negative-sum game (both parties lose), into which no rational selfinterested actor would ever enter; and yet such a cycle has occurred historically in places like Sicily, Scotland, Basque country or among the Guajiros in northern Colombia. What this suggests is that strategic models of conflict must be enriched by taking emotions into account. It must be noted that, within this model, words such as joy, hatred or love are used in a broad sense, where, for instance, a disease is something we hate, and a good Internet connection is something we love. Spinoza proceeds deductively rather than inductively, in a manner akin to geometry, and in a rather abstract fashion. However, his model has proven to be a powerful tool for modern neurobiology for thinking about the relationship between human striving and emotions and, as we shall see, is formally consistent with current models of behavior that attempt to integrate strategy and emotions in a more restricted fashion3.

Spinoza’s Strategy for Asymmetric Conflict The strategic rationale for the weaker side of an asymmetric conflict adopting peaceful resistance can be found in part four of Spinoza’s Ethics, expressed in terms of emotion: “He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavors, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him.”4 This proposition, as articulated by Spinoza, is not based on a principled moral stance, but rather on the fact that such a behavior is more conducive to the individual’s happiness and self-realization. How, then, is love a fruitful strategy in conflict? The proof to the demonstration reads: All emotions of hatred are bad; therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such emotions; consequently, he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed. But hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love, so that hatred may pass into love; therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness5

That hatred is bad, in this context, means that it is an emotion that saddens the individual and reduces his or her power of acting; it is not a value judgment but a causal description of the effects of this emotion. According to Spinoza, returning hate with love can transform hatred into love; what

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

47

this means is that a relationship of conflict can be transformed into one of cooperation. He expresses this in the following way: He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers.6

If the relationship of hate can be transformed into one of love, the weaker side of a conflict is suddenly no longer weak; it “withstands many as easily as one.” As long as the relationship is one of hate, the resolution to the conflict will come of a comparison of forces. In a zero-sum game with two sides of different strengths, the stronger side is fated to win. Spinoza’s strategy is to turn zero sum games into positive sum games, where both parties gain. That is why those who are defeated by love “yield joyfully.” Spinoza’s ideas about living as a free man guided by reason can be applied as a rationale for the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict choosing a peaceful method of conflict resolution. By transforming the nature of the conflict, the weaker side is no longer weak. It is hard to imagine India achieving independence from England through conventional warfare or even guerrilla warfare, given the vast differences in military capacity of the countries at the time of independence. However, if the battle is fought on other grounds, the forces are evened. Spinoza’s argument is echoed in Martin Luther King’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, which describes non-violent resistance. King also alludes to the fact that violence begets violence, and sees love as a way out: Sooner or later all the people of the world will have to discover a way to live together in peace, and thereby transform this pending cosmic elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. If this is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method, which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love.7

Love has to do with the creation of cooperation and positive-sum games, in a positive feedback loop: The tortuous road, which has led from Montgomery, Alabama to Oslo … has opened for all Americans a new era of progress and hope. It has led to a new Civil Rights Bill, and it will, I am convinced, be widened and lengthened into a super highway of justice as Negro and white men in increasing numbers create alliances to overcome their common problems.8

48

Chapter Three

Non-violent struggle is unique, as far as struggles go, in that it is conceived as a positive sum game. According to King, in his Nobel Prize lecture, non-violent resistance does a favor to the antagonist: Nonviolence has also meant that my people in the agonizing struggles of recent years have taken suffering upon themselves instead of inflicting it on others. It has meant, as I said, that we are no longer afraid and cowed. But in some substantial degree it has meant that we do not want to instill fear in others or into the society of which we are a part. The movement does not seek to liberate Negroes at the expense of the humiliation and enslavement of whites. It seeks no victory over anyone. It seeks to liberate American society and to share in the self-liberation of all the people.9

Once again, we see how, in asymmetric conflict, it is argued that the weaker side should opt for a strategy that transforms a zero-sum conflict into a positive sum game, mediated by love. In the following section we will look more closely at the nature of NVR.

Non-Violent Resistance In this paper, we shall discuss NVR as it is described and practiced by what is called the principled school of NVR, represented by Ghandhi and Martin Luther King, as opposed to the pragmatic school of NVR represented by Gene Sharp, which sees NVR as a form of guerrilla warfare, warranted by exclusively strategic rather than moral considerations.10 The idea of pragmatic NVR is to stop a given behavior from an antagonist by making it too costly to pursue: “There is no room for problem-solving in pragmatic nonviolent action, which integrates the realist principle of incompatibility of interests, and defines conflict as a win-lose struggle for ascendancy of one group over another”.11 Pragmatic oriented NVR is neither truly peaceful (its purpose is to produce costs on the antagonists, if not physical damage), nor viable in situations of sharp power asymmetries, where a powerful antagonist can easily absorb the material costs of resistance. What makes principled NVR a viable tool for the weaker party is that moral costs are harder to absorb than mere material costs. This moral dimension is definitive of principled NVR; if it were mere non-violent troublemaking in order to get some desired goal, children’s temper tantrums in order to get a toy would count as non-violent resistance. What is principled NVR? According to Dr. King’s Nobel Prize lecture: Broadly speaking, nonviolence in the civil rights struggle has meant not relying on arms and weapons of struggle. It has meant noncooperation

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

49

with customs and laws, which are institutional aspects of a regime of discrimination and enslavement. It has meant direct participation of masses in protest, rather than reliance on indirect methods, which frequently do not involve masses in action at all.12

Some defining factors can be gleaned from this quote. First, non-violence is not mere passivity, but rather non-cooperation with practices that are deemed enslaving, involving both words and actions. Next, whereas other forms of conflict (e.g, guerrilla warfare) involve a minority of active fighters with the more or less passive support of a broader community, non-violent resistance requires massive participation. Thirdly, there is a moral dimension to NVR. It is meant to eliminate unjust or discriminatory practices and it is not an all-purpose political tool. Finally, as we have pointed out in the previous section, principled non-violent resistance is motivated by love, that is, by a desire to create a better situation for both the movement and its antagonists. It is the creation of respect through unrequited hate. Since non-violent resistance requires massive, organized and deeply motivated participation, it requires high degrees of social cohesion within the movement, as well as a legitimate and respected leadership. 13 For example, Ghandhi’s leadership during the Indian independence was pivotal in keeping the Indian uprising non-violent. This is key to effective non-violent resistance, because “When nonviolent techniques are mixed with violent tactics, the power and effectiveness of resistance are undermined.”14 This is because victory in NVR is the transformation of a human relationship, rather than the accumulation of tactical victories over an antagonist. The transformation of human relationships occurs not only between antagonistic groups but also among a group practicing non-violent resistance. Participants in the movement are empowered, as they become agents of change, “correcting their lack of self-confidence as former subordinates, and, through the development of self-reliance and fearlessness, giving them a sense of power-over-oneself.” 15 Indeed, this empowering has been correlated to a more democratic post-conflict order: whereas in violent changes in political order it is the (few) military or guerrilla leaders who tend to acquire power, power is distributed when change is the result of non-violent resistance.16 In the Cauca region of Colombia, Amerindian non-violent resistance has been accompanied by an empowering of the community, which has restored its ancestral language, customs and, to a degree, its sovereignty (through the Guardia Indígena) as a way to set itself apart from the conflict between state, paramilitary and guerrilla forces.17

50

Chapter Three

Change is achieved through a combination of moral suasion, acquisition of sympathy from external actors, making it costlier for the stronger group to continue its practices, and through a sort of moral jiujitsu: “Violent repression against NVR is likely to ‘rebound’ against the attackers by weakening their power position while for the nonviolent group both internal determination and external support become stronger”. 18 Not only does nonviolent resistance turn weakness into strength, it also provides a more viable post-conflict situation. Dr. King explains this concept: Violence as a way of achieving racial justice is both impractical and immoral. I am not unmindful of the fact that violence often brings about momentary results. Nations have frequently won their independence in battle. But in spite of temporary victories, violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones. Violence is impractical because it is a descending spiral ending in destruction for all. It is immoral because it seeks to humiliate the opponent rather than win his understanding: it seeks to annihilate rather than convert. Violence is immoral because it thrives on hatred rather than love. It destroys community and makes brotherhood impossible. It leaves society in monologue rather than dialogue. Violence ends up defeating itself. It creates bitterness in the survivors and brutality in the destroyers.19

Violent conflict requires a de-humanization of the other: in order to surmount the psychological barriers to harming others, those others must be thought of as monstrous and less-than-human20. The emotions produced by a strategy of violence harm the chances of harmonious post-conflict, whereas non-violence resistance “softens feelings of humiliation, hatred, and desire for revenge.” 21 The emotions produced by violent conflict prevent the articulation and legitimization of both side’s claims, and, therefore, prevent an effective negotiation process. There are, therefore, the following distinct strategic advantages (besides moral considerations) for the weaker side in a conflict to use a strategy of non-violent resistance: It empowers the community; it tends to make differences in military capacity irrelevant; and it provides for a more harmonious and democratic post-conflict situation. Why then, is it sometimes rejected as a strategy?

The Lure of Terrorism Like NVR, terrorism evens the playing field in asymmetrical conflict, but through different means. What Grossman calls atrocity, the targeting of non-combatants, particularly if it is shocking in its nature, produces two

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

51

strategic advantages. First, it can stun victims into helplessness, compliance or poor decisions. Second, it empowers the force that uses atrocity by increasing the commitment to the cause. 22 Associated with these tactical advantages are certain moral, political and material costs; as I will argue later, the essence of terrorism lies in a willingness to inflict damage to one’s own side so long as the opposing side takes damage as well. It can be argued that there are circumstances in which non-violent resistance is not effective, or significantly less effective than guerrilla or terrorist tactics. In fact, “There is a common pattern among several major nonviolent campaigns of resorting to guerrilla tactics when NVR is deemed unsuccessful,” particularly in places such as Palestine or Kosovo. 23 There are a number of variables that contribute to the strategic viability of non-violent resistance, such as “the means of control and repression by the regime, the level of active support from outside powers, the degree of loyalty within the state bureaucracy and security forces, or the broader geopolitical context.”24 Nonviolent resistance is made very difficult when it faces undemocratic regimes (that, therefore, cannot be swayed by public opinion) or a ruthless regime: “In extremely asymmetrical situations, particularly in acute ethnic conflicts, nonviolent strategies might not have sufficient leverage to bring about necessary changes.”25 Colombia has the world’s longest lasting armed insurgency, dating from the sixties in its current form. It has often been argued that the Colombian Left is forced to take a violent course of action because the Colombian power elites are ruthless and unwilling to compromise on social and economic issues. 26 This argument gains credence from history: in the early eighties some of the insurgent groups entered a peace process, and participated in democratic elections as the Unión Patriótica, only to see many of their members persecuted and killed by paramilitary groups, including presidential candidates, in what came to be known as the UP massacre. The intention of this massacre was to eliminate this group from public political life, in what appears to be a systematic and concerted effort by the Colombian right (Cepeda, 2012). 27 Non-violent resistance is made more difficult if the weaker group is seen as entirely other in relation to the stronger one. If the cultural or ethnic differences between adversaries are large “the subordinate nonviolent group might be seen as foreign, sub-human or uncivilized, and violent repression may be seen as merited or acceptable by the wider public”28. This de-humanizing of the adversary can also be intentionally caused by the stronger side of the conflict for strategic considerations. The government of Alvaro Uribe Velez, having made a strategic choice to

52

Chapter Three

defeat the FARC guerrilla militarily rather than seek a peace negotiation, also opted to call FARC members mere “bandits” or “narcobandits” rather than insurgents, thus de-politicizing them.29 To summarize, according to NVR studies, the conditions which hinder non-violent resistance are: a repressive and violent regime with a loyal military and bureaucracy; an undemocratic regime; lack of outside support for the weaker side of the conflict; the presence of social distance between the weaker and stronger sides; the weaker side is seen as inhuman, uncivilized, barbarous or a mere group of bandits; and, the stronger side’s lack of desire for negotiation and preference for violent conflict. What is striking about this list is that successful cases of NVR actually had to overcome many or all of the conditions cited: Indian independence pitted an unarmed and non-violent populace against the army of the empire in which the sun never set; this occurred in a time when colonialist ideology was still dominant, and therefore colonized peoples were seen as uncivilized and unable to govern themselves while colonial powers were seen as benign civilizing forces in the context of colonialism, where colonized peoples were seen as uncivilized and unable to govern themselves and colonial powers were seen as benign civilizing forces that ought to govern according to their will . Furthermore, there was a strong incentive for the British Empire to quell the rebellion violently, as a matter of international prestige. The American Civil Rights Movement had to contend with voter discrimination, Jim Crow laws, and an institutionalized and officially sanctioned view of blacks as uncivilized, barbaric and inferior. Moreover, a second glance at the list reveals that the conditions that make NVR difficult are also those that make it necessary. NVR is a harder path than straightforward political action; but political action is not possible in the presence of violent repression, social distance, or the absence of true democracy. Although it is important to isolate and recognize the political factors that hinder the emergence and success of NVR, they should not be treated (at least exclusively) as the deciding factor for a weaker side’s choice for either NVR or violent methods. In what follows, we present the hypothesis that hatred is an important (though not exclusive) factor in the choice between NVR and violence.

Hatred Klumpp and Mialon present a game theory model that takes hatred into account. 30 The model takes an arbitrary game (that is, one that can become either positive-sum or zero sum) and adds a “hate parameter” which gives

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

53

the player an emotional utility (as distinct from material utility) based on the damage suffered by another player. This models the fact that we are pleased by the damage suffered by those we hate; in the words of Spinoza: He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred31

Emotional utility due to hatred can be distinguished from positive emotions arising because of material utilities. Winning money at poker feels better if the money is won from someone we dislike. Spinoza’s idea of hatred is formally equivalent to Klumpp and Mialon’s except for the fact that, for Spinoza, the feeling of hatred is, in itself, a cost; Klumpp and Mialon do not consider the damaging effects of hatred as an emotion. However, a corollary of Klumpp and Mialon’s model is that players, by seeking higher emotional payoffs through hatred, may pay less attention to their own material payoffs; in the words of Eldridge Cleaver: “The price of hating other human beings is loving oneself less”32. The authors suggest that hatred, as modeled, can account for otherwise baffling behaviors: Consider, for example, the phenomenon of suicide attacks. The fact that an individual is willing to sacrifice his own life in order to harm others may seem difficult to reconcile with rational behavior. This becomes less contradictory if one assumes that suicide attackers are motivated by hatred of their intended victims.33

A violent strategy is particularly compatible with hatred. Damage done to an antagonist produces both emotional and strategic payoffs. When hatred is present, both defeats and victories serve to rally the troops, intensifying hatred and, thus, motivation to continue fighting. In the words of George Simmel: “It is expedient to hate the adversary with whom one fights”.34 Hatred seems to be definitive of terrorism as a strategy. The advantages a group gains through terrorism in damaging an antagonist come at certain high costs to the group itself: it dehumanizes the participants in terrorism, reduces the groups political and moral status, provokes harsh retaliations and can cause discrimination for the broader group of people whose interests the terrorists claim to represent. The price of hating others is loving oneself less; that is, being willing to take high costs upon oneself so long as they are inflicted on the antagonist. To paraphrase Buddha, hate is willing to grasp a hot coal in one’s hand so long as one gets to throw it at the enemy.

54

Chapter Three

In as much as hatred is a factor, it excludes the possibility of turning conflict into a positive sum game. We are saddened by the joy of those we hate, and glad of their suffering. Conflict resolution through peaceful means implies that the vanquished are also victors, and yield joyfully. Moreover, peaceful resistance is bound to fail if it is not done in a spirit of love, because it hinges on turning the adversary’s hatred into love, through love. The first Palestinian intifada included bona-fide efforts at non-violent resistance, but they may have been hampered by the feelings of hatred towards Jewish Israelis that were displayed by Palestinians.35 Any group that feels oppressed by a stronger antagonist has cause to feel hatred. However, it can be argued that in some asymmetric conflicts hatred can be overcome enough to enable NVR, whereas in others it runs too deep, tilting the choice towards a violent form of resistance. If hatred is indeed a factor in producing either violent or nonviolent resistance in asymmetric conflict, certain strategic considerations for producing either outcome can be produced.

Hate and Strategy There are strategic reasons for either promoting or reducing hatred. As we have seen, NVR is strategically wise for the weaker side of an asymmetric conflict; therefore it is in its interest to attenuate hatred. On the other hand, certain parties in conflict have an interest in promoting it. According to Klumpp and Mialon’s model, arbitrary games can turn into zero sum games through the presence of hatred, even if only one player feels hatred. 36 Hatred, in itself, is a zero sum sort of relationship, and will transform a relationship thus in as much as it dominates said relationship. When conflict is a purely zero sum game, the outcome is decided by a comparison of forces. Therefore, the stronger side in a conflict has strategic reasons to promote hatred. Furthermore, since NVR empowers large numbers of people and promotes democracy, it may also be undesirable for authoritarian elites, providing yet another motivation for fostering hatred. From this point of view, certain apparently irrational actions such as prisoner abuses in Abu Ghraib or US marines peeing on enemy corpses can be seen as strategically warranted (however morally repugnant). Of course, such a course can be viewed with skepticism, even from a purely strategic point of view. It is hardly a wise strategic choice to act in a way that elicits hatred from those around you, especially considering that hateful relationships tend to produce self-reinforcing positive feedback loops. Recent history has shown that no matter how much stronger the

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

55

strong side in a conflict is, the weaker side can still inflict significant damage. The lesson of 9/11 should be that the course of peace is always preferable to that of war, for either side of an asymmetric conflict. Whereas the stronger side has a strategic temptation to hatred, the weaker side is led to hatred through a more emotional path. Oppressed peoples feel humiliation and despair, because they feel excluded from the dominant social order; and may come to feel that there is no chance of real success except for the emotional rewards of damaging a hated other.37 The stronger side in asymmetric conflict has a strategic temptation towards hatred; the weaker side has an emotional temptation towards the same. If we suppose that peaceful conflict resolution is desirable for both sides, then both sides are called to reject temptations to hatred. Inevitably, strategic considerations lead to moral considerations.

Morality and Peaceful Conflict Resolution If the stronger side in asymmetric conflict wishes to increase the possibility of a peaceful resolution, it must treat its adversary with respect, and comport itself morally even in the course of war. If it treats its antagonist beneath human dignity, it will fuel hatred. In the 1990s in Colombia, the Gaviria government committed, in our view, a critical mistake when it broke a truce with the FARC: in the course of peace negotiations, the government decided to attack the compound of then FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, “La Casa Verde,” with the intent of killing the rebel leader. 38 The operation failed on a tactical level; Marulanda was informed of the operation and left the compound before the operation started. We argue that it was also a massive strategic failure; it created hatred and distrust and arguably was a factor in the failure of peace negotiations during the Pastrana government. This would have been true even if the military operation had succeeded. The temptation to trick and kill the FARC leader should have been resisted on moral grounds, because morally repugnant actions lead to hatred. The weaker side in asymmetric conflicts faces similar temptations. The path of non-violent resistance is morally very demanding. It requires its practitioners to assume the point of view of their antagonists and to seek and propose solutions that are acceptable to both sides of the conflict.39 This is what Goodman calls “moral truth,” a recognition of the claims of all parties involved: All beings make claims and persons make large claims. The claims of a being are its project and program, its essence or conatus (…) When claims conflict, they need to be adjudicated, as every gardener knows. But what

56

Chapter Three the wise gardener or ecologist, and the astute politician, seek is complementarities, claims whose fulfillment strengthens the claimants and cements them in fellowship or symbiosis (…) The pursuit of good is the pursuit of truth- not just of knowledge but of the practical recognition of deserts.40

Non-violent resistance only works if the claims of both sides are recognized, for the side that is “defeated” must yield joyfully. Therefore, it is intimately related to moral truth, a truth that is sought in practice; Gandhi understood his life’s work as a quest for the truth.41 The choice between hateful or loving approaches to conflict resolution is a sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Avoiding violent conflict is in the interest of both sides, yet if either side can score a violent victory over the other it can fully achieve its interests. Both sides can act selfishly or altruistically, and prudence dictates that each side act selfishly, but this leads to a situation that is bad for both sides. As Parfit has shown, prudence is, in such cases, self-defeating, in such a way that prudential considerations tend to recommend a moral approach to conflict. 42 It is usually thought that war, being a nasty business, requires a nasty sort of thinking. Realpolitik is seen as the opposite of naïve idealism; the introduction of moral considerations in policy debates is seen as unwarranted. However, once the complexity of human beings is taken into account (the fact that humans make decisions based as much on feelings as on strategic considerations and the fact that feelings have an intrinsic relation to moral choices, the fact that prudential or strategic decisions are sometimes collectively self defeating), strategic considerations broaden to the point that they include moral considerations.

1

Notes

Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (CSack.net) : http://www.spinozacsack.net78.net/works.php Part 3, proposition 6. 2 Ibid., Part 3, proposition 43. 3 Tilman Klumpp and Hugo Mialon, “On Hatred,” Emory Law and Economics research paper, http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~tklumpp/docs/hatred.pdf 4 Spinoza, Ethics, Part 4, proposition 6 5 Ibid., Part 4, proposition 6, demonstration 6 Ibid., Part 4, proposition 6, note 7 Martin Luther King, “Nobel Prize acceptance Speech”, nobelprize.org: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/kingacceptance.html 8 Ibid. 9 Martin Luther King, “Nobel Prize Lecture”, nobelprize.org: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-lecture.html

Terrorism or Non-Violent Resistance in Asymmetric Conflict

57

10 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries”, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dudouet_handbook.pdf 11 Ibid., 79 12 King, “Nobel Prize Lecture.” 13 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries.” 14 Ibid., 8. 15 Ibid., 13. 16 Ibid. 17 Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres. “Las mujeres también caminamos la palabra” en Boletín Institucional no. 10, June 2009: http://www.rutapacifica.org.co/Boletin10.pdf 18 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries,” 15. 19 King, “Nobel Prize Lecture.” 20 Maria Clara Garavito “Lo humano y lo no humano en la guerra: aproximación desde la mitología y el psicoanálisis” Magistro, vol. 4, no. 8, jul-dic, 2010, pp. 108-119. 21 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries,” 18. 22 Dave Grossman, On Killing, (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009), 205-215 23 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries,” 9. 24 Ibid., 9. 25 Ibid., 16. 26 José Antonio Gutierrez, “Hablemos del conflicto social y armado colombiano,” Rebelion.org 14-02-2012: http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=144629 27 Iván Cepeda, “Genocidio político: el caso de la unión patriótica en Colombia.” Revista Cetil, I, No. 2, 2006 pp. 101-112 : http://www.desaparecidos.org/colombia/fmcepeda/genocidioup/cepeda.html#sdfootnote2sym 28 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries,” 16. 29 Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, E. Una democracia asediada. Balances y perspectivas del conflicto armado en Colombia (Bogotá: Norma, 2004). 30 Klumpp and Mialon, “On Hatred.” 31 Spinoza, Ethics, Part 3, proposition 23. 32 Quoted in Klumpp and Mialon, “On Hatred,” 1. 33 Ibid., 1. 34 Georg Simmel, Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 33. 35 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries,” 19. 36 Klumpp and Mialon, “On Hatred,” 2. 37 Dominique Moïsi, La Geopolítica de las emociones (Bogotá: Norma, 2009).

58

Chapter Three

38 Carlos Villar-Borda, La pasión del periodismo (Bogotá: Fundación Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 2004), 285. 39 Dudouet, “Non-violent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries,” 18. 40 Lenn E. Goodman, In defense of truth (New York: Humanity Books, 2001), 405406. 41 Ibid., 406-410. 42 Derek Parfit, Prudence, morality and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

CHAPTER FOUR THE INDECISIVE NATURE OF WAR: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF “VICTORY” RICHARD FEIST

Introduction Humanity has an odd history of romancing violence. There are many connections with the finest of human art and literature and particular acts of brutality. The one link between violence and romance that I examine in this chapter is the view that war, although brutal, at least settles things. This is captured in expressions like “fight it out and clear the air.” I argue that this kind of thinking is questionable, since it is often passed off as self-evident when in fact it is full of presuppositions. My point here is to show that “victory” in war and in terrorism is a contestable concept. I conclude that holding to questionable understandings of victory has a huge consequence, namely, the rise of the privatization of war. Overall, by a series of musings on war and victory, this chapter illustrates the wellknown philosophical view of concepts: that not only do our conceptualizations of the world guide our interpretations of the world, but these conceptualizations can actually influence the future directions that the world, in fact, takes.

The Indecisive War of 1812 The year 2012 marks the bicentennial of the war of 1812. This is, for many people on both sides of the 49th parallel, a mostly forgotten or at least significantly ignored war. Writing from north of the 49th, the average Canadian may puff with pride when asked about 1812, replying that it was when supposedly “we” beat the Americans. Using the term “we” to describe the peoples of what became Canada is somewhat misleading,

60

Chapter Four

since the Canadian nation had yet to take shape. On the other hand, the average American may remember 1812 as when they beat the British. This general victory over the British is particularly exemplified by Andrew Jackson’s victory at the battle of New Orleans. Of course it was during the war of 1812 that the US national anthem was written. Still, the fact that the war is largely forgotten is surprising in light of the fact that two capital cities were burned. The British burned Washington, which is sometimes remembered. In March of 2012, British Prime Minister David Cameron, in his first official visit to the United States as Prime Minister, joked during a press conference at the White House about how he felt somewhat embarrassed that his ancestors set fire to the place.1 What is more often lost to history is that the British burning of Washington was linked to the American burning of York, then the capital of Upper Canada but now known as Toronto. Canadian pride may swell a bit more and for some time given the Canadian government’s recent injection of about 28 million dollars (Canadian, but the two currencies are on par) into a three-year bicentennial bash. There will be battle re-enactments, various conferences and a new monument to the 1812 war in Ottawa.2 But the US government has no official plans for the bicentennial. A few states, such as Michigan and Virginia have small-scale plans; however, the state of New York, which was in the thick of the war, has had two governors (David Paterson in 2009 and Andrew Cuomo in 2010) veto the establishment of an official 1812 commission.3 So at the highest level of government in Canada and the United States, there seems to be a difference of opinion as to the importance of the war. Among the citizens of the two countries, there seems to be a difference of opinion as to what the war was even about. This difference of opinion regarding the war of 1812 runs through the scholarly literature as well. Consider two relatively recent, major studies of this war, the first by the British scholar, the late Jon Latimer, the second by the American scholar Alan Taylor. Latimer’s book is titled: 1812: War with America.. Taylor’s book is The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies. Clearly the titles say much; the authors take quite different perspectives on the war and draw distinct and opposed conclusions. Latimer regards 1812 as a war between Britain and America. However, he argues that this war can only be understood within the larger — and in his view more important — ongoing context of Britain’s critical struggle with France. Latimer writes: For Britain the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were wars of national survival and the war in America an irritating distraction. Britain was content to settle for the 1812 status quo, and that is what Britain got.

The Indecisive Nature of War

61

The United States, in contrast, achieved none of its war aims, and in these terms, the War of 1812 must be seen as a British victory, however marginal.4

There are a number of important issues contained in this quotation. First, the war of 1812 could be read simultaneously as extremely important to the United States, for it was a war to preserve and develop its commercial traffic in an attempt to rival Britain, but as Latimer says, the war was to Britain but a trifling, a nuisance. Second, when Latimer speaks of a qualified victory for Britain, he stresses that the victory is within “these terms,” namely, that the United States did not achieve its war aims. However, in his closing thoughts on the war of 1812, Latimer stresses that the British victory, in its most decisive and lasting sense, was a specifically a victory in Canada, that: … secured Canadian independence. It would reverberate through history to 1914 and again to 1939, when, in Britain’s darkest hours of need, Canada stood proudly by its side.5

It is interesting to note that Canadian historians have not traditionally regarded 1812 as formative in Canada’s history. After all, this war occurred several decades before Canada came into existence with confederation in 1867. The traditionally Canadian view as to the emergence of a Canadian identity occurs not in the nineteenth, but the twentieth century. The status of Canadian citizen was created in 1910 and the full notion of “Canadian citizen,” to replace “British subject,” only came into existence in 1946. Prior to confederation and several decades after that, Canadians more or less thought of themselves as British subjects. Legal issues aside, the Canadian war historian Tom Cook notes the common view in Canada linking war and identity, namely the WWI assault on Vimy Ridge. The capture of Vimy was more than just an important battlefield victory. For the first time all four Canadian divisions attacked together: men from all regions of Canada were present at the battle. Brigadier-General A.E. Ross declared after the war, “in those few minutes I witnessed the birth of a nation.”6

The other product of the war says Latimer was an ongoing anglo-phobia in the United States. This served to keep the two nations, Canada and the United States, in a state of tension for over a century. This is difficult to believe today, with the generally warm relations between Canada and the United States punctuated by the odd trade dispute or difference regarding foreign affairs. But it should not be forgotten, Latimer insists, following

62

Chapter Four

the work of historian Richard A. Preston, who shows in his The Defence of the Undefended Border, that the United States had a clearly defined plan to initiate a war against Britain, which would include an invasion of Canada, abolishing the Canadian government and the retaining former Canadian lands in perpetuity. This plan, known as War Plan Red, called for several military objectives such as using of poison gas against Canadian civilians and widespread bombing of Halifax, Montreal and Quebec City. The goal was to quickly subdue the Canadian population.7 This is hardly something that a country would have up its sleeve with respect to a friendly neighbour. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the plan was never acted upon. Indeed, had it ever been put into place, there is little doubt that unlike the first invasion of 1812, the second American invasion of Canada in say, 1912, would have been successful. Perhaps in some ironic way, the fact that the plan was there and could have been successfully implemented and yet never was, is testament to a deep friendship between Canada and the United States. Latimer essentially holds that Britain did in fact win the war of 1812, which he also brands as a war that was a failed American attempt to conquer Canada.8 However, this war did not, according to Latimer, just suddenly break out. He argues that the United States and Britain almost went to war in 1794, in 1807 and in 1808; each time, however, cooler heads prevailed via diplomacy and war was avoided. Latimer writes: But by 1812 rationalism was beginning to give way to romanticism, and war was promoted by people who saw it as a form of glory, not as a bloody reality.9

In sum, the emerging Romantic Movement in Europe played a key role in the cluster of causes of 1812. Clearly for Latimer, the war has to be understood in a very wide context. A very different understanding of the war comes about in Taylor’s work. In contrast to Latimer, Taylor works within a much narrower context to understand the war. For Taylor, the question of identity, namely, “who fought the war of 1812?” looms large. Instead of interpreting 1812 as a war between the US and Britain, a war that is ultimately Britain’s side war during its struggles with France, Taylor insists that 1812 was a North American civil war.10 Taylor fully realizes that calling this war a “civil war” is, to use his term, “jarring.” But he argues that our shock at this term is simply because later events have filtered and distorted our perspective on the war. The reality of the war, Taylor argues, has been lost. Taylor writes:

The Indecisive Nature of War

63

Given the later power and prosperity of the United States, we underestimate the fluid uncertainty of the post-revolutionary generation, when the new republic was so precarious and so embattled. We also imagine that the revolution effected a clean break between Americans and Britons as distinct peoples. In fact, the republic and the empire competed for the allegiance of the peoples in North America—native, settler, and immigrant.11

So the true context of this war, says Taylor, is not to be found embedded within the British-French struggle, but within what could be regarded as a then ongoing, overall struggle to carve out and reinforce identities within North America. The war made this struggle all the more difficult. The republic and the empire, in their battle for the hearts and minds of North Americans, Taylor adds, “blurred the national boundaries and political identities in North America.”12 This resonates with and broadens what I mentioned earlier, that it is misleading to say that in 1812 “Canadians” fought the Americans. In many ways one could argue, based on Taylor’s work, that is misleading to say that in 1812 “Americans fought Britons.” While there was clearly the notion of a British subject, the notion of “being American” was still in development and so remained in flux. Identities and perceptions of them are temporal objects. The group of North Americans who were to eventually become the Americans of today, North Americans who gave their hearts and minds to the republic, were at that time only in the early stages of the process of seeing themselves as Americans. Taylor admits that his work on 1812 is “…neither comprehensive nor conventional.” 13 He wants to tell the story of the war as it was on the ground, namely, the interactions between soldiers and citizens and those within a limited geographic area. This excludes aspects of the war such as the conflict between American and British forces on the high seas and along the western American seaboard. But these conflicts, Taylor claims, are “secondary theatre” and stresses that his non-conventional approach makes up for the limited geographic discussion by an expansive investigation of the temporal context of the conflict, that is, Taylor examines the conflict’s roots in the 1780s and 90s and its post-conflicts in the 1820s and 30s. Of course one may object to Taylor by arguing that temporal depth simply cannot make up for geographical restrictions, or at least it is not a priori the case that it can; instead, one would have to show this by examining both and then comparing and contrasting the results. But I certainly do not intend such a project here. Rather, I stress that Taylor’s work, contrasted with Latimer’s, admirably demonstrates that

64

Chapter Four

there are very different approaches to the question what was the war about and who fought it?” This leads to a final question regarding the war: “who won?” As we have seen, Latimer insists that we should not see 1812 as a war that “both sides won,” but as a failed war of conquest and a marginal victory for Britain and ultimately a victory for Canada — not a military victory by Canada, but a military victory for Canada since the British victory secured Canadian independence. Taylor notes that as 1812 was a civil war like 1776, in which there were competing visions of what America was to become, it ended up that neither side was really “victorious.” Taylor concludes: Frustrated in their fantasies of smashing the other, the Loyalist and Republican Americans had to learn how to share the continent and to call coexistence victory.14

This opens the problem as to whether there truly was a “victory” in the war of 1812. One could simply say that neither side won or follow Taylor and say that both sides one. “Victory”—at least in this case—is not simply read off of the historical record. It is by no means self-evident who, if anyone won that particular war. As mentioned, that there was a North American war seems far from us today. But that is not simply because the war settled anything. Perhaps we should say that the Canada-US relationship, the friendly one that we enjoy today, which filters how we see yesterday, was not settled by war, but by several decades of living side by side, trading and working together. In the end, the study of war leads to an interesting philosophical, that is epistemological, problem. How do all these various perspectives and views relate to the actual object, that is, the war itself? It seems that this situation is analogous to the old tale of the blind men and the elephant. There are various possibilities here. First, perhaps the different perspectives on the elephant, or 1812, are true, but incomplete. Second, perhaps it is simply the case that one perspective is true, the others false. Third, and finally, it is still possible that all these versions are false. The breakdown of the epistemological analogy that I have drawn between the war of 1812 and the blind men and the elephant is that in the latter case we have a “god’s eye view.” We can see the entire situation from a sighted perspective, which the blind men lack. But we have no such god’s eye view on the war of 1812. All we have are various perspectives. My point is not by any means to dive into the sea of historical relativism, but simply to import what has been a long-standing notion in twentieth century philosophy of science: there is no privileged observation point, there are

The Indecisive Nature of War

65

only observations. War, in general, is not a terribly clear way of settling things. It is basically indecisive.

World War I and World War II: Decisive Wars? Perhaps the previous discussion is an example of cherry picking. The war of 1812 is notoriously ambiguous. It has often been regarded as the war that lacked a result. After all, many of the pre-war structures, like the border, remained in place afterwards. The fact that the war is not terribly well remembered on either side of the 49th parallel could be testament to the fact that it was largely a useless and indecisive war. On the other hand, there are wars that were decisive. Let us consider WWI and WWII. Was Germany not clearly the aggressor in both of these cases? Was Germany not clearly defeated in both cases? Yes, depending on how one interprets terms like “defeated” and “who is defeated?” Again, my central point is that “victory” is a contested concept. With respect to WWI, distinguished war historian Michael Howard notes that without doubt the German army was defeated; “…the military victory of the Allies in that war had been as total as any in recorded history.”15 However, as Howard goes on to note, as others have, this very war had to be re-fought some twenty years later. In other words, the Allies did not achieve a decisive victory. Hence, the notion of “victory” cannot simply be equated with “military victory.” Or, to put it more philosophically, “victory” is not a species, but a genus with various species. While Howard points out that the Allied military victor of 1918 was not decisive, he argues that the Allied military victory of 1945 was. But I will later argue that even the 1945 military victory is not simply a fact that we read directly off the world, but an interpretation. For Howard, why 1945 was decisive and 1918 was not can be explained by reference to the work of the ancient historian Thucydides, who stated that wars result from one of three causes, or some kind of mixture thereof: interest, fear and honour. Interest — when a state wants something; fear — when a state feels threatened in some way and honour — when a state has been deeply offended and must save face. One may argue that states certainly operate out of interest and fear, but is not “honour” a rather anachronistic notion? Howard says no. Its name may have been changed to ‘prestige’, or sometimes ‘credibility’, but the concept of ‘honour’ has played a part in twentieth-century warfare quite as great as it did in earlier ages.16

66

Chapter Four

The Allies did not secure a victory in 1918 since they failed to respect the honour of the German people. Consequently, they felt humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles, which made it impossible or at least extraordinarily difficult for any post World War II German government to put an acceptable face on the “punitive peace” constructed at the conference. But it was different after World War II. Here, the Germans were made to understand what they had done wrong and accepted their defeat. DeNazification was not a military operation but a civilian-based one. This eventually led to Germany becoming again a member of the family of nations, its honour respected and thus there was a decisive victory, which eluded the world in 1918. Howard’s view is, simply put, that both World War I and II had military victories, but only WWII had an ensuing political victory, which, when put together with the military victory, gives WWII the feel of “the good war,” the decisive war. So it would seem that at least WWII gets to be a decisive war and that my earlier discussion of 1812 is indeed an instance of cherry picking, or, in other words, a hasty generalization. But there are a couple of issues to think through. And, as I mentioned earlier, the notion of “victory” has to be split into military victory and, as we have seen based on Howard’s discussion, “political victory.” The latter is often referred to now as “strategic victory.” If victory is in fact a genus with two species, perhaps it has more? Indeed it does. Another species of victory is “economic victory.” This issue is often disregarded in the academic literature on warfare, but, in fact, Leonard Wibberly burlesqued it in his 1955 novel The Mouse Who Roared. In Wibberly’s novel, the fictional country the Duchy of Grand Fenwich is a 3 by 5 mile European state and militarily weak (its army consists of a handful of bowmen). Its only product is a particular wine, Pinot Grand Fenwich. When an American version is made, the Duchy is shortly afterwards on the verge of bankruptcy. The Duchy of Grand Fenwich’s Prime Minister, familiar with the American Marshall plan, decides to cash in by declaring war on the US, knowing full well that a quick defeat will lead to an massive influx of US war reparations. In one sense we will lose the war, the Prime Minister muses, but in a much more important sense we will win. The last laugh is indeed on the Duchy as through a series of ridiculous flukes they unfortunately gain control of the United States. Still, the comparison of the Duchy of Grand Fenwich with the situation of Japan and Germany is not hard to see. On a more serious note, Robert Mandel (who also notes Wibberly’s novel) problematizes the notion of victory in his book: The Meaning of Military Victory. In chapter four, for instance, Mandel lists and discusses

The Indecisive Nature of War

67

several misconceptions regarding war, everything from informational fallacies (where the victor overestimates its ability to understand the defeated) to a special class of fallacies, into which economic fallacies fall. In his description of the economic fallacy, Mandel writes: The victor is likely to underestimate the costs of postwar economic assistance to rebuild the defeated state, assuming that economic reconstruction will smooth, fast and inexpensive. The victor is likely to overestimate the postwar benefits accruing to the victorious state, assuming that the winner will reap substantially greater gains than the loser.17

With a slight recasting of language that does not significantly modify Mandel’s point, it is entirely possible that a country could militarily lose the war but be the economic victor. Many British subjects have said exactly that following the post-war economic rise of West Germany. With these remarks I go further than Mandel, for I am saying that it is not simply the case that there are misconceptions surrounding the concept of “victory,” but that the very concept of “victory” itself is contestable. To further press the view regarding “victory” as a contestable concept, I pick up on another of Mandel’s warnings regarding misconceptions of victory. Under “social fallacies,” Mandel writes: The victor is likely to overestimate the chances of the defeated state’s postwar adoption of the victor’s social values, assuming that the winner’s values will become more attractive to the loser. The victor is likely to underestimate the vanquished state’s postwar social turmoil, assuming that unruly elements will readily move toward conformity to new social norms.18

There is no doubt that this occurred during the Iraq War. However, the reverse of this happened in the WWII case; here the defeated state, Germany, has over the long term, embraced the victor’s social norms. In fact, Germany has so deeply embraced many norms, that it was a country without a democratic tradition (or at least a very weak one) but is now one of the world’s foremost liberal democracies. I would like to now consider the concept of victory from a different angle, a broader epistemological perspective. In general, if a concept is to make sense, to have content, it has to mark out a territory of the world. Concepts are like file folders: they “contain” the objects that they demarcate. These “contained” objects form a concept’s extension. For example, the concept of “cat” has a particular definition, the intention, and an extension, the actual set of cats in the world. However, note that a

68

Chapter Four

concept’s extension includes but also excludes. The extension of “cat” includes all cats but excludes all non-cats, such as pigs, busses, pumpkins and so on. So the concept of victory, which I maintain is contestable, requires an extension (which includes part of the world) and that extension has to exclude something as well. For the concept of “victory” to make sense, the concept of “defeat” must also. When we say that in a war between X and Y, which we admit was decisive, that, “X achieved a victory,” then we must also have to say that, “Y was defeated.” However, when we say, “Y was defeated,” there are ambiguities. The issue that I wish to look at is that of the nature of the identity of the defeated. In other words, who was defeated? The principle reason for the necessity of asking this question is that states are not monoliths. Thinking that they are is a mode of Westphalian thinking, that the boundaries of a state essentially bind a totality that is like a homogeneous block, impervious to any kind of thinking through or examination. With the notion of the UN approaches such as the Right to Protect and the ensuing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, we need to open our thinking on victory and, in this case, defeat. Thinking differently about war, in terms of victory and loss, finds an analogy in some ways of thinking about the debt that a state incurs. The notion of odious debt is based on asking the question: who owns the debt? If a regime of some sort has acquired power and during its time in power acquires a debt load, then the state in question is not legally liable for the debt load after the regime has been removed. Many states, like South Africa and Nicaragua, have honoured the debt accumulated by their previous governments, but this has been mostly because of the economic circumstances being worse if they were to not honour those debts. But the point is clear: a regime that comes to be the legal power of a state is not in all circumstances, this case finance, legally identified with the state. So the debt question, “who owns the debt?” is not at all self-evident and therefore can be reasonably contested. The same goes for “who fights the war?” Returning to the German case of WWII, it is not self-evident that “Germany lost the war” is a simple and uncontroversial statement. As mentioned, and as burlesqued by Wibberly, Germany after the war had a huge economic influx and eventually returned to the family of nations arguably more powerful and with more influence than it ever had. This is witnessed by recent events, one in particular is recently the German politician, Volker Kauder, a senior member of the Christian Democrats, caused quite an uproar by declaring that “Europe speaks German now.” I would draw another historical example. For French Canadians, 1759 is an emotional date; it marks the date of the British conquest of Quebec

The Indecisive Nature of War

69

City. The view has been in English-speaking Canada that that was the year of the final struggle between Britain and France for Canada. Admittedly, in some sense of the term, the French Canadians did lose that war; however, shortly afterwards, the British government, in order to keep the peace amongst the French Canadians, passed the Quebec act, which is arguably one of the irritants that gave birth to the American revolution. My point is that although Quebec lost the battle on the Plains of Abraham and eventually the entire war against the British, the economic benefits have been enormous. Politically, the benefits have been high as well, as Quebec issues have played a large role on the Canadian political landscape. War by no means settled the question of the relationship between French-Canadians and English-speaking Canadians.

Absolute and Limited War: Temporalizing the Problem of Victory in War The problem of defining victory and defeat has changed over the years. Here we can bring in a distinction of Clausewitz’s: between absolute and limited war. 19 Absolute war is when states fight to the death, the destruction of the other. Limited war is when states fight for a particular interest, like a section of land. With reasoning reminiscent of the doctrine of double effect, the enemy’s destruction may be necessary or accidental to achieving the goal, but it is not directly intended. The precise articulation of this distinction is fraught with problems, but the main idea is clear enough and useful. The history of warfare is one of a slow drift from absolute to limited war. There are exceptions to the trend, of course, but overall many analysts would agree that we are now entering into, at least for the foreseeable future, a world of limited war. As war becomes more limited, there is, so to speak, more left over after military operations are completed. If the goal of war is the destruction of your enemy, once the military operations are done, nothing is left, except the spoils. We no longer live in a world in which “to the victor go the spoils is true.” Instead, we are living more in the world of the Pottery Barn rule, in which, “If you break it, you own it.”20 And, indeed, after the war, there is still something left over to own. Finally we come to the crux of the problem. Historically the notion of victory in war was the victory of the victor in total war. If one looks at the origins of war in the west, at least when war was being documented, it was indeed winner take all. The origins of western morality, the origins of the concept of “good” — which was to play such a dominant role in Plato’s thought and much of western philosophy, originates in the complex notion

70

Chapter Four

of the “good leader.” The good leader was good because he protected the village. “Goodness” was equated with proficiency in battle. A poor leader, one without battle skills, lost the fight and the village was sold into slavery or total annihilation. This notion of victory, a terminal end of the war and a clear answer, is the absolute war notion of victory. This absolute war notion of victory is out of step with today’s world of limited war. Strategic victory is, more than ever, a critical aspect of the notion of victory in war. For the rest of this chapter I wish to reflect on how this disconnect between the absolute notion of victory in war and the reality of limited war leads to difficulties concerning counter-terrorism and ultimately to private armies. The latter of which, I state up front, are fraught with moral problems.

Military Victory and Strategic Victory To clarify issues, let me define military and strategic victory. Regarding “military victory,” the classic definition comes from Liddell Hart: For more than a century the prime canon of military doctrine has been that ‘the destruction of the enemy’s main forces on the battlefield’ constituted the only true aim in war. That was universally accepted, engraved in all military manuals, and taught in all staff colleges. If any statesmen ventured to doubt whether it fitted the national object in all circumstances, he was regarded as blasphemously violating holy writ…21

Hart correctly points out that this definition originates in the work of Karl von Clausewitz. But Hart also correctly notes, misinterpretation abounds of great thinkers by their overzealous disciples. So this should not be read as literally what Clausewitz himself was saying. However, Clausewitz was a student of philosophy second hand—that of Kant—and deeply influenced by the German Romantic Movement. Such a combination often invites misinterpretation. Fortunately, sorting this out is not germane to my task. As to strategic victory, Mandel describes it as going beyond the immediate results of the battlefield and to be composed of six elements.22 These elements are present in various degrees, allowing for the notion of strategic victory to be thought of as a continuum, not an all or nothing affair. Moreover, military victory has what one could call a “simple temporal aspect.” That is, a military victory can occur at a particular place and time. Admittedly, this oversimplifies the notion of military victory since many wars end with jagged edges. When, exactly, did the military victory over the Nazis occur? Moreover, where did it occur? But this

The Indecisive Nature of War

71

notion of an event stretched out over time and space is even more pronounced with strategic victory. Mandel writes: From a purely theoretical perspective, the portrait of strategic victory is relatively clear. Such victory entails the victor exercising full informational control and military deterrence against foes; attaining stable political self-determination, economic, reconstruction, and social justice within the vanquished state; and enjoying unbridled internal and external diplomatic respect. This conceptual picture may seem so self-evident that one might wonder why it is not universally in place today.23

Mandel then goes on to describe why strategic victory is not universally in place. Basically, the current global security environment is rather anarchic. In addition, because there is so much evaluating and interpreting to be done with respect to applying the idealized notion of strategic victory, within a given state’s bureaucracy, different departments will view things differently. The same goes for different states trying to engage in joint efforts and then trying to come to some sort of agreement as to the kind of strategic victory achieved. But a key problem of applying a subtler notion like “strategic victory” to war stems from a fundamental aspect of human behavior: we tend to ascribe more importance to that which is visible and tangible. As Mandel notes, this tendency for the touch leads many analysts (and I would add journalists and the general public) to focus on the quantitative, the easy to measure and the quickest to achieve. This stress on the tangible is none other than the continuing presence of the idea of military victory; it continues to haunt our notions of strategic victory. But my concern is not to make the argument that our views continue to be skewed by the notion of military victory, even though we call our analysis strategic victory. Instead my concern is to stress that this misguided retention of military victory is going to lead to further problems, the key of which is the rise of private military armies. The next step now is to further set the stage, to look at the issue of strategic victory in the most difficult aspect of warfare, namely, terrorism and counter-terrorism.

The Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism Conflict: the Limit of Limited War As noted above, military victory makes less and less sense as war moves further and further away from absolute to limited war. The definition of terrorism is fraught with difficulties; the examination and offering of a definition could easily swallow the rest of this chapter and several books

72

Chapter Four

as well. One could strive for a neutral definition 24 or opt for a Wittgensteinian family-resemblance characterization.25 My opening points here are simple and will be stated categorically. First, warfare forms a continuum. There has never been a completely symmetric battle, let alone a symmetric war. All wars, all battles are, to a certain degree, asymmetric conflicts. One only finds conflict symmetry within the Clausewitzian idealized thought experiment at the beginning of his On War. But it should be stressed that Clausewitz himself never believed that this was anything but an idealization. Secondly, terrorist/counter-terrorist conflicts are located at the limited end of the warfare spectrum. They are just more extreme versions of asymmetry. Not all terrorist/counter-terrorist conflicts exhibit the same degrees of asymmetry. Perhaps at the very limit would be something like Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City Bomber who in 1995 detonated a bomb that crumbled the Murrah Federal Building and killed 168 people, attacking the US. Third, terrorist operations, independently of the question of justification, are not non-causal operations. That is, terrorists have their reasons. Again, this is not to say that terrorism is justified. It is simply to say that it, like most human activity, is purposeful. Of course there are many human actions that are without purpose, that is, there are some who simply commit violence for the sheer pleasure of causing havoc or, to simply “watch the world burn.” Simply put, terrorism is the use or threat of violence, involving a large power asymmetry to achieve a political end of some sort. Note that this power asymmetry can cut against the terrorist, such as a group attacking a country or cut in favour of the terrorist, such as a country terrorizing its own citizens. If the current Syrian leadership is not conducting a campaign of terrorism, it is difficult to say what would be. In neither direction does the notion of military victory work. Clearly from the weaker perspective, the goal is not to defeat the stronger opponent — although the Duchy of Grand Ferny did by accident. Even if we do say things like “the United States lost the Vietnam war,” this cannot be understood as “Vietnam militarily defeated the United States.” But I would also like to stress that the more powerful organization has little ability to defeat a seriously weaker opponent simply because those organizations that are willing to enter into such asymmetry situations are not on the same ontological level as those organizations over which one could, in principle, achieve military victory. This ontological dissimilarity, I suggest, has two consequences. The first is clearly military. Simply put, there is no real battle space in which a military victory could even occur.

The Indecisive Nature of War

73

In other words, if my enemy will not set foot on the battlefield I cannot in principle defeat him on the battlefield. I could perhaps move the battlefield to the enemy, but that would cast an extremely wide net and the collateral damage would be morally problematic; it would require the abandonment of the second pillar of the Just Tradition, combatants and non-combatants. Besides, as much damage as a stronger organization may inflict on a weaker one, the fact that the weaker one entered such a fight would certainly render the stronger, if using its better judgement, leery about declaring victory. Would anyone wish to be on record declaring that alQaeda is finished? Or, for that matter, that the IRA is completely defeated? Clearly the Zealots are finished, but that is largely because the organization against which they fought, the Roman Empire, is also finished. But it is not an iron-clad rule that the terrorist organization is finished when the other it fights is finished. After all, the original term “terrorism” applied to the action of the French government shortly after the 1789 revolution. Although it is extremely difficult (but not impossible) to believe, it remains the case that the French government could terrorize its citizens once again in the future. Strategic victory has an interesting asymmetry here. For the weaker state, to win simply means to not lose, that is, to keep the fight going. For the stronger side, loss is partially defined by the continuation to fight. An important reason for this difference is that the notion of a military victory still haunts the thoughts of those stronger states. It certainly is the case that the citizenry in such states thinks along these lines. The next section will deal with an application of strategic victory to the perspective of the stronger organization in a highly asymmetric situation: counter-terrorism.

Strategic Victory and Counter-Terrorism There are two basic strategic models in counterterrorism: the criminal justice model and the war model.26 These are often regarded as coercive, primarily reactive models. One reacts to terrorism via either the courts or the military. Or, one may take some blend of the two. Moreover, one may employ tactics typically associated with reactive models and engage in proactive counterterrorism, such as attempting to establish a deterrence atmosphere via stricter laws and punishments or via pre-emptive strikes. Finally, one may attempt to send messages to terrorists directly via softer means, such as the propaganda angle: as the media says, “winning hearts and minds.” This notion of terrorism as “sending messages” is also extremely important; terrorism has a basic, communicative nature, “propaganda by the deed.” Counterterrorism, too, has a communicative

74

Chapter Four

nature. But the reactive and pro-active strategies, as well as the tactics that cut across them, share a key objective: to send messages directly to the terrorist community, which is composed of both terrorists (actual and potential) and terrorist sympathizers (actual and potential). My concern here is not to outline a detailed notion of strategic victory over terrorism, but simply to point out what at least seems to be a necessary, but admittedly not a sufficient condition for it. Mandel writes that strategic victory over terrorism will require an emphasis on the psychological, the discrediting of the legitimacy and efficiency of terrorism as well as transforming the conditions that give rise to it. 27 Strategic victory is long-term, expensive, riddled with setbacks and plagued with uncertainty. In the majority of cases strategic victory will be a long process of attrition and only an asymptotic approach to a cessation of terrorism. Bruce Hoffman of RAND states that terrorism is part of modern life and we simply have to get used to it.28 Mandel and Hoffman, I would argue, are absolutely right and they are reflective of a large number of thinkers on counterterrorism. But this long-term view requires some supplementation, as suggested by the views of authors such as Ronald Crelinsten and John Mueller. Crelinsten writes: When thinking of psychological operations [i.e., counterterrorism], targeting one’s opponents [i.e., the terrorist community] most often comes to mind and is typically what the literature focuses on. Addressing one’s own constituencies is equally important, if often ignored.29

So what is necessary here is that counterterrorism begins by addressing our community, ourselves, the actual and for the most part potential, victims of terrorism. So what do we do when addressing our own constituencies? Fear reduction. The notion of fear reduction amongst large numbers of human beings is a complicated subject. Human beings react oddly to being told about their safety. For instance, because humans are notoriously poor at interpreting extreme statistics, it is best advised to stay away from them. For example, airlines have learned not to stress how statistically unlikely it is that a plane will crash. They used to mention such issues but it actually causes people to focus on such odds and magnify them. The problem is that when the average person hears that there is a one in a million chance of a plane crashing, all that really registers is the term “plane crashing.” There are two issues that I would like to mention concerning fear reduction — one is sociological and the other is more philosophical. First, when dire situations do come about, such as in terrorist attacks, the reaction is not what is often feared. That is, people do tend to behave in

The Indecisive Nature of War

75

relatively calm manners, helping their fellow citizens and carrying on. Also, if people were truly afraid of terrorism, who would continue to live in Manhattan? Should not the real estate prices in such a threatened area have collapsed? Back in Ottawa nobody seems to have any troubles with condominiums being built near the Parliament Buildings, which are daily becoming increasingly fortified. In real situations, rationality and calm prevail, but that seems to leave people’s minds when they enter the voting booth. It is here that the fear reduction must take place. The second point is, as I mentioned, philosophical. We no longer think that a given natural disaster is necessarily part of a larger, agent-driven plan. An earthquake is just an earthquake; it may be tragic in the loss of life and all the more so because it was simply the result of coincidental forces in the earth. But we seem to still hold onto the medieval view of causality when it comes to agent-driven events. Descartes articulated the medieval notion nicely in his third meditation. I paraphrase: there must be as much reality in the cause as in the effect. In other words, anything agent driven, if the results are huge, must be the product of some vast amount of agency. Many experiments have been done to show how people enlarge the notion of agency depending on the results of it. For instance, studies have shown that people who read a story about a king who falls ill and recovers versus a king who falls ill and dies have very different views about the cause of the king’s death. If the king falls ill and lives, most people accept that the king simply contracted an illness and recovered. But if the king dies, then that illness must be the result of some kind of conspiracy. A big result, such as a king’s death, cannot simply be the result of a little cause. The same kind of reasoning applies to those who refuse to believe in the existence of lone gunmen or small-scale terrorist organizations having large results.

Conclusions If the military notion of victory continues to influence the public’s thinking concerning counterterrorism, the expectations will be that terrorism is something that can, at one point, be declared defeated. This notion of defeat, as I have argued, is questionable at the best of times, that is, when war is as symmetric as it can be, but given that war is never symmetric and never so asymmetric as in terrorism/counterterrorism, it is simply highly unrealistic to expect such a victory. As Christopher Coker writes, “A counterinsurgency war is more akin to a tough political negotiation than a conventional war.” Coker goes on to stress that Americans (and I would add Canadians as well):

76

Chapter Four …prefer their soldiers to be moral crusades, not risk managers seeking to contain political damage at an acceptable level. They shouldn’t ever be asked, wrote one political analyst, to provide ‘the kind of mercenary professional soldiers’ that limited wars require. They should not be asked to engage in long, extended, inconclusive campaigns often marked by inconclusive results.30

Government-sponsored armies, especially those within liberal democracies, are under certain kinds of political pressures, namely the pressure to obtain a result within a limited period of time, with a limited loss of life. Loss of life may be tolerated, but not much life lost and certainly not for long – and both of these if and only if they are counterbalanced by success. This view opens the doors to private armies, the management of which is not overseen by the electorate in the same way as regular armies. Deane-Peter Baker in his book-length study of private armies makes a powerful case for the use of them.31 Baker articulates many of the standard arguments against private armies and offers a serious critique of them. In that sense he moves the debate much beyond the image of the private army as some band of marauders or pirates. He clearly establishes that a private army could in principle be just as disciplined, moral and effective as a state army. Baker also effectively argues that private armies would be better for dealing with long-term, low-level conflicts such as counterterrorism. Although I recognize the power and elegance of Baker’s arguments, I stand firmly opposed to his conclusions. However, countering Baker’s views is beyond the scope of this chapter and will have to be a story for another time. Hence, I will conclude this chapter with the following thoughts. Arguing for private players in the game of war, even if these new private players are just as ethical as the state players, does not address the fundamental issue that war has become commoditized; it exacerbates it. Rather than regarding war as a human activity that we are seeking to eradicate, by stressing that it is the option of last resort and only undergone by a restricted group of players, the addition of private players opens this domain. And it does not open the domain as though more states and armies were coming into existence; rather, it opens the domain by making war profitable. The motivation of my concern comes from the tendency, I think, of those working in warfare and ethics, to become somewhat blinded by the power of the Just War tradition. War is war, an extremely dubious enterprise at the best of times. Even if the principles of Just War Theory help mitigate its effects, war is still war. War settles, in and of itself, nothing, and to turn it directly over to the market is morally questionable.

The Indecisive Nature of War

77

Again I stress that the case could be made for private armies fighting as well and as morally as state armies. My concern is that allowing the privatization of counterterrorism will, in turn, make terrorism itself a valuable product. I would agree with Mueller that it already, to a great degree is a valuable product, given the vast numbers of security companies. My desire is not to add to their numbers.

1

Notes

David Jackson, The Oval. March 14, 2012, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/03/obama-welcomescameron-to-the-white-house/1 (accessed October 10, 2012). 2 Meagan Fitzpatrick, Politics, June 6, 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/06/14/pol-war-of-1812-bicentennialfederal-events.html (accessed October 10, 2012). 3 Debra J. Groom, "Breaking News," Syracuse News, September 4, 2012, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/09/oswego_loses_again_with_gove rn.html (accessed October 10, 2012). 4 John Latimer, 1812: The War with America, (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 4.  5 Ibid., 408. 6 Tom Cook, Canadians in World War Two, August 9, 2010, http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/vimy/index_e.shtml. 7 John Latimer, 1812: The War with America, (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 408.  8 Ibid., 3. 9 Ibid., 5. 10 Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies, (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 7-8. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 8. 13 Ibid., 10. 14 Ibid., 12. 15 Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?" Survival 41, no. 1 (1999): 130. 16 Ibid., 127. 17 Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publichsers, Inc., 2006), 76.  18 Ibid. 19 Karl von Clausewitz, On War. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 85. 20 William Safire, Arts, October 18, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/arts/17iht-saf18.html?_r=0 (accessed October 21, 2012). 21 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, Second Revised, (New York: Meridian, 1991), 339.

78 22

Chapter Four

Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publichsers, Inc., 2006), 17. 23 Ibid., 27. 24 J. Angelo Corlett, Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003). 25 Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction, (London: Routledge, 2011). 26 Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, (Cambridge: Polity, 2009). 27 Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publichsers, Inc., 2006), 136. 28 John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, (New York: Free Press, 2006,), 144. 29 Crelinsten, 137. 30 Christopher Coker, Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 178. 31 Deane-Peter Baker, Just Warriors, Inc.: The Ethics of Privatized Force, (New York: Continuum, 2011.)

CHAPTER FIVE ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN FORMER PERPETRATORS AND THEIR VICTIMS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR RECONCILIATION MARIA ERICSON

Introduction “I should be decorated with a bravery medal.” This was the demand from Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian man who, on July 22, 2011, set off a car bomb outside government buildings in central Oslo, killing eight people, and then went to the small island of Utøya where, dressed as a police officer, he spent more than an hour methodically shooting and killing 69 people, mostly youth, who were attending a summer camp hosted by the ruling Labour Party's youth wing.1 Showing no sign of remorse, Breivik uttered the above words in early February of 2012 at the first public custody hearing where he was permitted to address the audience. Some of the survivors and relatives present at the hearing wept at first. But as Breivik delivered his message, laughter also erupted among them as they considered the ridiculous nature of his words.2 “He has a completely demented vision of things,” said one 17-year old survivor of the Utøya shooting attacks. “I understand that he wants to be released, seeing that he thinks he's a hero. For us, it's obviously completely crazy.”3 Breivik was indicted on charges of premeditated murder, as well as on charges of terrorism under a paragraph in Norway's anti-terror law that refers to violent acts intended to disrupt key government functions or spread fears in the population.4 In August of 2012, an Oslo court declared him mentally fit enough to be held criminally responsible for the attacks, and sentenced him to 21 years in prison — the maximum sentence under

80

Chapter Five

Norwegian law. If considered a threat to society after that period, he may well serve longer.5 At his trial, he continued to show no sign of remorse, invoking the notion of self defense and arguing that he had carried out preemptive attacks in defense of what he called the Norwegian “indigenous population,” a group he believed was threatened by Muslim immigration and by those in Norway whom he regarded to be too positive towards immigration and multiculturalism (including the ruling Labour Party).6 He stated that his strategy on Utøya had not been to kill only the 69 people who died there, but to “kill them all.” He argued that regardless of their age, even the teenagers had taken up membership in a political party and sought leadership positions. Therefore he saw the summer camp as a justifiable “political target.”7 Examples of unrepentant perpetrators, who claim a “just” political and/or religious motivation for their actions, are quite common. The challenge this proposes, within the scope of morality, is how people may be motivated to ask for forgiveness when they believe that, according to the norms and values of their own community, what they did was not wrong?8 As Donald W. Shriver has pointed out: Alleged wrongdoers are wary of being told that someone “forgives” them. Immediately they sense that they are being subjected to some moral assessment, and they may not consent to it.9

The Challenge of Diverse and Opposing “Moral Landscapes” My research on reconciliation has focused on Northern Ireland and South Africa, and one important starting point was that any initiative for reconciliation would rest upon the conviction that present relationships are flawed, and that wrongs or injustices have been committed – but that these flaws, wrongs, or injustices should be addressed not by revenge or separation but by establishing other kinds of relationships. Inadequate consensus about what was done wrong in the past and what particular future relationships to promote might be a big obstacle, though. Hence I have argued that such disagreements are, to a great extent, based on the diverse and opposing moral landscapes held among people involved in a conflict and I looked at reconciliation as a process in which the following dominant elements of the moral landscapes held in a war-torn society are addressed:

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

x x x x x

81

Experiences of the conflict: especially of trauma, separation and socio-economic inequalities; Views of the conflict, its history and its causes; Identifications and loyalties; Views of oneself and of “the other” (i.e. one’s adversary);10 Norms for interaction in a conflict situation and interpretations of values such as “peace”, “justice” and “reconciliation.”11

When looking in particular at prospects and challenges for reconciliation between violent perpetrators and their victims, the moral landscapes to be dealt with would include the worldview and view of the conflict held by the perpetrators (and their organizations); their views of themselves in relation to their direct victims and other adversaries; their own identifications and loyalties (e.g. ethnic, political, religious) together with their views regarding who is considered a “traitor;” as well as their norms for handling conflicts and interpretations of values such as “justice” and “peace.” In what ways do they defend their cause as “just,” and their violent means as “justified?” Under what conditions might personal encounters between victims and perpetrators challenge such established views of the conflict, and enhance the development of common ground, understanding and empathy? What might hinder, and what might promote such reconciliatory processes, and what dilemmas and challenges might be identified? What roles might be played by wider society?

Some Initial Words of Caution I think the actual moment of a person being willing to meet with someone who has brought a lot of suffering, and vice versa the moment in which a person who caused the suffering is able to face up to the trauma of the person who is a victim, that is part of a personal journey of forgiveness and reconciliation and I don’t think you can predict or prescribe that journey, people take it at their own pace, and some never start at it.12

This was the response from the Leader of the Corrymeela Community, one of the oldest ecumenical reconciliation groups in Northern Ireland (formed in 1965), as I interviewed him after the peace agreement of April 1998, known as the Belfast Agreement or the Good Friday Agreement. The Agreement intended to provide a political solution to three decades of violent conflict (commonly referred to as “The Troubles”), where Unionists and Loyalists wished to preserve the constitutional connection with Britain, while Nationalists (including Republicans) stressed an Irish

82

Chapter Five

identity and belonging (and Republican paramilitaries sought to achieve a United Ireland through what they called the “armed struggle”). 13 The Leader of the Corrymeela Community further argued that: It would be unrealistic to say, “We couldn’t have a reconciled society until every victim has met the perpetrator and they’d been reconciled.”14

Another challenge is that the distinctions between “victims” and “perpetrators” might not always be clear-cut, especially not after decades of civil conflict. When looking at a particular incident it can be quite easy to distinguish between direct victims and perpetrators: the person who plants a bomb is the perpetrator and those killed by the bomb are the victims; the person who is tortured or killed is the victim and the person who tortures or kills that particular individual is the perpetrator. 15 However, when looking at the life histories of individuals, a greater complexity might come to the fore, in the sense that one single individual might well have the personal experience of having both perpetrated and suffered from violent acts. One example is a study carried out in Northern Ireland in 2004 and 2005 in which 300 former paramilitary prisoners (150 Loyalists and 150 Republicans) were interviewed. While they themselves had been involved in organizations that carried out violent acts in the course of the conflict, about one-third of them had a family member killed or severely injured in “The Troubles.”16 People in South Africa who were active in supporting victims (some of whom had testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) also emphasized that the categories of “victim” and “perpetrator” might not always be clear, and that some victims that they supported by counseling and other means might be called perpetrators in somebody else’s book. One psychologist found that those of her clients who had the double experience of both being a victim and a perpetrator of violence were the most difficult ones to work with, since these experiences and identities in a way supported one another.17 Some examples of individuals with such a “double experience” will emerge in the following sections on various (types of) encounters between direct perpetrators and their victims.

Why Arranging Meetings Between Victims and Perpetrators? One part of the Good Friday Agreement, which turned out to be very controversial, was the provision of early release of paramilitary prisoners belonging to organizations who upheld cease-fires. 18 The opinions and

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

83

feelings about this early release differed among victims and survivors: some of them publicly expressed their acceptance of this early release as part of a broader process of reconciliation; some felt that they could not take a position on the issue; others stated that they found the early release of those who had harmed them and others to be so intolerable and unjust that they voted “no” to the Good Friday Agreement.19 Recognizing a diversity of opinions among their members, the victims/survivors support groups whom I visited in Northern Ireland in September of 1998 did not take any unified public stance on this controversial issue. The people in leadership positions whom I interviewed also expressed a certain caution about meetings between direct victims and perpetrators, although they did not rule it out in the future, mentioning that some people wanted to do it, but that such encounters had to be “skillfully set up.”20 A similar caution, and emphasis that the individuals involved had to be well-prepared, and receive a lot of personal support, for such encounters to be constructive, was also expressed more recently.21 During a visit to Northern Ireland in August 2012, I was told that organized meetings between direct victims and perpetrators were still scarce.22 In South Africa, where people had to approach the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) individually with their victim statement or amnesty application, there was a stronger focus on personal encounters between direct victims and perpetrators. However, such encounters through the TRC process were actually quite rare. First of all, the recording of statements from victims and the handling of amnesty applications was made through separate processes: the former being the task of the TRC’s Human Rights Violations Committee, while the latter task was the responsibility of the TRC’s Amnesty Committee. The TRC received just over 21,000 victim statements about gross human rights violations, and about 1,800 of those who submitted such statements were selected to testify about their experiences at the public human rights violations hearings (which were also broadcasted on national media). While these hearings did not involve the direct perpetrators, the amnesty hearings (which always had to be held in public when they concerned gross human rights violations) provided for the encounter between at least some of those applying for amnesty and their victims, as the victims had the right to be present and to oppose the amnesty application by seeking to show that it did not meet the criteria for amnesty. The TRC also provided for some well-publicized encounters between amnesty applicants and their victims in connection with a few of these amnesty hearings.23 However, only a statistically small proportion of the victims had the opportunity to encounter their perpetrator(s) through an amnesty hearing.

84

Chapter Five

Far more victims than perpetrators approached the TRC in the first place, and quite a few victims could not even be reached by advance information and informed that the amnesty hearing for “their” direct perpetrator was going to take place.24 Despite the scarcity of meetings with direct perpetrators through the TRC process, many victims appeared to wish for such meetings. A number of reasons were given for this desire to meet with the direct perpetrator: to get the opportunity to ask questions about what exactly had happened and why (thereby being able to reconstruct a fuller story); to find out about what had happened to loved ones who had disappeared and whose bodies had not yet been found; to hold the perpetrator accountable; to be given an apology or receive reparations; to hear the story of the perpetrator and to see that he too was human (and not a monster to be feared).25 The point was, however, made that forgiveness would only be relevant within the context of a meeting where both victims and perpetrators saw each other as fellow human beings. 26 When pondering about prospects and challenges for constructive encounters between a person who has perpetrated a violent act and the direct victim(s) and survivor(s) of that act, one might ask under what circumstances any such professed desires of victims and survivors might be fulfilled. And what reasons might perpetrators of violence have to want to meet with people they have victimized? Do they seek an opportunity to apologize, or do they rather want to deny or defend their actions? Are they prepared to answer any of the questions that their victims, or bereaved family members, might have, e.g. regarding what happened and why? Do they now recognize their victims as fellow human beings (rather than just “legitimate targets for attack”)?

The Political Contexts: Terrorism, (Civil) war and/or Gross Human Rights Violations? Northern Ireland We would like peace, but we don’t accept peace at any price, it has to be a just peace. There is a verse in the Bible you know: “They cry peace, peace where there is no peace,” and that would be what we see as happening at the minute. We are totally committed to the peace process but not the peace process that’s involved with terrorism. We’d be happy to work with all constitutional parties and draw up an agreement.27

In these words, the representative of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) whom I interviewed in September of 1998, sought to explain why the DUP

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

85

(at that time the second biggest party among Northern Irish Protestants) had left the political negotiations when Sinn Fein (after the IRA renewed its cease-fire) was admitted to the negotiation table, and why the DUP was opposed to the outcome of these negotiations, namely the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, not only the DUP but also the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP, which had remained in the political negotiations and supported the God Friday Agreement), strongly disliked the early release of paramilitary prisoners, since they regarded them as “terrorists” who had “done evil.”28 Yet the UUP (at that time the biggest political party among Protestants) accepted the early release of paramilitary prisoners as a necessary political compromise.29 However, in its manifesto for the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998, the UUP mentioned only “victims of terrorism” (i.e. of paramilitary violence) and underlined that the party was committed to “ensure that the real victims get precedence over those who contributed to their own misfortune.”30 The terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” thus tend to have some pejorative connotations in Northern Ireland, 31 and because of its pejorative connotations also in many other contexts of conflict it has been argued that the term “terrorism” should be taken to mean “a set of actions or strategies adopted by groups for certain purposes, not the identity of those groups or the nature of those purposes.”32 In Northern Ireland the term “paramilitaries” is regarded as more neutral and has been a standard terminology in academic settings, although some scholars nowadays use the term “ex-combatants” (which might be used to include British army soldiers who once served in Northern Ireland). By those who were working on issues concerning the possibility of early release of paramilitary prisoners, the term “politically motivated prisoners” was increasingly used from the mid-1990s onwards.33 The legal definition of “terrorism” enshrined in successive pieces of Emergency legislation in Northern Ireland (and Britain) from 1972 onwards also implied a political motivation as “terrorism” was defined as: The use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any of the section of the public in fear.34

While the provision for early release of paramilitary prisoners as part of the Good Friday Agreement was a form of amnesty, no comprehensive official commission to “deal with the past” has yet to be established in Northern Ireland. 35 The debate about who is to be regarded as a “deserving” or even as a “real” victim, has also remained a thorny issue, as it reflects opposing views of the conflict, as well as of oneself and of “the

86

Chapter Five

other” and of who was fighting for a “just” and “honourable” cause.36 To some, what happened in Northern Ireland was a war, while others would refer to it as a conflict, or civil unrest or terrorist insurgency. In particular there is a controversy over how to view violent acts committed by the security forces, which included the police, the British army and the locally recruited part-time regiment UDR/RIR. 37 Among Catholics the security forces have been a major source of killings and harassment. Over one fifth of Catholic deaths (in contrast to 4% of Protestant deaths) have been attributed to the security forces, in particular to the British Army.38 Some of these killings have been quite controversial and the sentences for security force members who have killed or injured civilians have been comparatively lenient (in contrast to the sentences for paramilitaries convicted of murder). 39 Among many Protestants, and by the major Unionist parties who draw the vast majority of the Protestant vote, the security forces have been regarded as having an honourable occupation in the service of society.40 Republicans have on the other hand criticized the view of the Troubles as primarily a conflict internal to Northern Ireland with the Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries as the main culprits (and Britain as a neutral “peace-keeper”).

South Africa In South Africa the police were to enforce apartheid legislation (e.g. forced removals). The army (South African Defence Force, SADF) was sent out to patrol the townships and curtail demonstrations against apartheid policies. Hence, they were perceived and experienced as enemies in black communities. They were also perceived and experienced as enemies by anyone (including white activists) who resisted apartheid. The political transition, and change of power, affected the terminology in the sense that those armed opposition groups who during apartheid had been spoken of as “terrorists” by the state and in public media are nowadays commonly referred to as “the liberation movements.” The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not discuss “terrorism.” Its mandate was to investigate “gross violations of human rights” committed from March 1, 1960 to the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President in May of 1994. “Gross human rights violations” were defined as: x The killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person; or x Any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a).41

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

87

Killings or injuries in active combat between identifiable combatants were, however, not recorded as “gross human rights violations,” and since the acts had to be “politically motivated,” the TRC’s mandate also excluded “purely racial” violence, as well as violence related to labour conflicts (typically the abuse of farm labourers).42 However, it not only included acts committed by members of military or paramilitary organisations but acts committed by all supporters who acted under instruction from political leaders. “Victims” were defined as those who had been subject to such violations as well as their relatives or dependants.43 In addition to fulfilling the criteria of “political motivation,” the amnesty applicant was required to give “full disclosure” of all the relevant facts relating to the act, and demonstrate proportionality between the act and the desired outcome of the act. Contrary to some critics who argued that all persons whose rights had been violated by apartheid legislation (e.g. victims of forced removals) should be regarded as victims of “severe ill-treatment,” the TRC limited its definition of “gross human rights violations” (and hence its mandate) to encompass “bodily integrity rights” as enshrined in international law and the new South African constitution. This entailed violations of: The right to life; the right to be free from torture; the right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to freedom and security of the person, including freedom from abduction and arbitrary and prolonged detention.44

Referring to its interpretation of the criteria of just war theory, the TRC concluded that apartheid had not merely been a failure (as the former prime-minister F.W. de Klerk had acknowledged in his submission to the TRC), but a “crime against humanity” and hence that those who fought against apartheid “were clearly fighting for a just cause.”45 Furthermore, the TRC pointed at security legislation and increased state suppression that had rendered virtually all forms of non-violent opposition against apartheid illegal or dangerous.46 According to the criteria of just means, the TRC did, however, point at “gross human rights violations” committed by all sides (including the liberation movements).47 The TRC motivated this stance by referring to recent developments in international human rights law, according to which not only the state, but also other groups or persons involved in a conflict, are subject to such criteria. This stance was also motivated by its contribution to “national unity and reconciliation” by treating individuals with equal respect regardless of the source of their victimization. 48 Because of its greater power to abuse as well as its duty to protect all its

88

Chapter Five

citizens, the state was, however, seen as carrying the “heaviest responsibility.”49

Beyond Direct Victims and Perpetrators Lederach underlines that reconciliation involves an encounter where people can “share their perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience.”50 In that respect, giving people the opportunity to share their stories, i.e., to tell about their own experiences of the conflict as well as to listen to people from “the other side,” was an important element of many of the reconciliation initiatives that I studied in the course of my doctoral research, although they did not specifically bring together direct victims and perpetrators.51 In Northern Ireland “reconciliation work” was throughout the Troubles, largely equated with providing space for encounters across the Catholic-Protestant divide in order to enhance mutual understanding and cooperation. This was a major focus for ecumenical reconciliation groups like Corrymeela. Government policy also placed significant emphasis upon this type of reconciliation initiatives and funded various civil society groups and organizations through the Community Relations Council (CRC).52 Through such initiatives, the participants might be encouraged to share their personal experiences, rather than merely debating or exchanging views about the conflict. Providing “safe” (and confidential) spaces for people to share their stories was seen as a way to enhance the development of common ground, understanding and empathy.53 As formulated by the leader of Corrymeela Community: So what we’re actually doing is helping people to confront the truth in terms of interpersonal relationships among people that they’ve got to know and whose stories they hear first-hand, meeting them eye-to-eye so they’re able to hear it in a way which is far more powerful and has a far more lasting effect because it’s situated within a relationship.54

In a similar fashion, Bar-Tal and Bennink argue that reconciliation addresses “the relationship between the parties” as well as their “motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions regarding the conflict.” 55 Such processes of change may begin at leadership and/or grass-roots level, but Bar-Tal and Bennink stress that in order to be effective it must proceed top-down and bottom-up simultaneously. 56 Changing group members’ worldviews furthermore requires an

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

89

accumulation of new experiences that support peace making. There is a need for “a supportive climate that indicates to all society members that the new reality can evolve free of threats, dangers, and fears.”57 While certain nongovernmental and civil society organisations may provide “safe spaces” in their particular settings, official initiatives, e.g. in the form of political negotiations and peace agreements, would also contribute to such a supportive climate. This can be seen in Northern Ireland, where the inclination to talk more openly about one’s personal experience of the violence of the Troubles increased with the cease-fires in the mid-1990s and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. New initiatives were therefore developed to bring people together specifically to share such personal stories within a confidential, structured, space. One major initiative was the project An Crann/The Tree (1994-2000), which gathered and shared narratives about the conflict through visual art, written word, and other creative expressions. An Crann, in turn, served as an important source of inspiration for the organisation Towards Understanding and Healing (TUH), which was established in 1998 and held its first residential workshop in 2001. The workshops of the TUH have been open to anyone who considers themselves to have been affected by the Troubles, with participants coming not only from Northern Ireland but also from Britain and the Republic of Ireland. The small groups in which the participants have been invited to share their personal stories have been designed to give people exposure to a wide range of experiences. One has specifically sought to include ex-members of Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groups, ex-members of the state security forces (including British army soldiers who once served in Northern Ireland), as well as people who have suffered from violence from any of these sources. There have also been other initiatives and organisations (e.g. the Kairos Initiative, the Conflict Trauma Resource Centre, the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation) through which individuals from diverse backgrounds have come together in small groups to share their personal experiences and stories about the conflict. that might include people bereaved or injured by paramilitary or state violence, former paramilitaries as well as.58 One major source of inspiration for such initiatives in Northern Ireland was the Institute for the Healing of Memories in Cape Town, South Africa. This institute was initiated by Michael Lapsley, an Anglican priest and one of the chaplains of the ANC who, while living in exile in Zimbabwe, was badly injured and lost both of his hands through a letter bomb organized by state agents (who never came forward to apply for amnesty from the TRC). The reason he spoke of “the healing of memories” rather than

90

Chapter Five

“forgiveness” and “reconciliation” was based on the recognition that for many victims of violence the perpetrator(s) would remain unknown, and/or not seeking to apologize or reconcile. However, there would always be the question of dealing with oneself and one’s own personal experiences. The approach of the Institute for the Healing of Memories was also more inclusive than the TRC in the sense that it intended to provide all South Africans “who had survived” an opportunity to face the past together. The participants who had lived in South Africa during apartheid would be invited to reflect on their life stories in terms of the following questions: What are my experiences of apartheid? What was done to me? What did I fail to do?59 Such story-sharing approaches might do more justice to the diversity of experiences among individuals. It also prompts a wider discussion about responsibility – as will be evident in a couple of well-know examples from South Africa of encounters between direct victims and perpetrators to which I will turn below.

Conceptions of Reconciliation: From Non-Violent Co-existence and Co-operation to Developing Personal Friendships Distinctions have been made between “thin” and “thick” conceptions of reconciliation: the thinnest form of reconciliation being “reconciliation-as(non-violent) co-existence,” a slightly thicker form being “reconciliationas-co-operation” and an even thicker form being “reconciliation-asfriendship.”60 In its Final Report, the South African TRC, which at times was criticized for expecting too much interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation too soon, distinguished between a conception of reconciliation as applied to interpersonal relationships and a more limited, political notion of reconciliation “applicable to a democratic society”.61 Reconciliation as “peaceful coexistence” was put forward as a more realistic minimum requirement to aim for. This would not necessarily mean the establishment of close friendships but would require: Respect for our common human dignity and shared citizenship, as well as the peaceful handling of unavoidable conflicts.62

Wilhelm Verwoerd, a South African who had worked with the Research Department of the South African TRC and subsequently with the Glencree

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

91

Centre for Reconciliation in Ireland, has on the other hand argued for a slightly thicker form of reconciliation, namely “reconciliation-as-cooperation,” at the large group level. Without the ability to cooperate for common goals, non-violent co-existence would be difficult to sustain. What would be important for lasting reconciliation between large groups of people who continue to live on the same territory would be “the ability to co-operate without undue fear and suspicion.”63 Furthermore, he argues that co-operation, or even co-existence, might be difficult to sustain if resentment continue to smolder beneath the surface, if people feel vindictive and resentful towards each other or towards key institutions such as the state.64 In this respect, examples of people who have developed personal friendships across societal divides, including individual victims and perpetrators, might be sources of inspiration.65

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and their Victims Encounters between former perpetrators and people who have been affected by their violence can take different forms. They might take place spontaneously, and sometimes be forced on people due to external circumstances. They might be accepted as a necessary, or at least important, part of cooperation towards a common future. They might be part of an organized initiative to bring victims and perpetrators together. They might be published or recorded, or take place in more private settings. They might take place at criminal trials or through a truth commission. The might be once-off events or part of more sustained and deepened contact and relationship building.

Co-existence and co-operation Some former perpetrators and their victims simply have to co-exist as part of their every-day-life, as they continue to live close to each other and might easily happen to run into each other in the street. In some cases they might even have been neighbours, friends or colleagues, or even family members. 66 Along these lines, two researchers, who had followed the TRC’s engagement with residents in a small town in the Western Cape, spoke about recovery and repair as “the recovery of the everyday”.67 As concrete examples of encounters between former perpetrators and their victims in the course of their every-day life, they mentioned one man who went to the hospital for treatment and passed the doctor who had declared him fit enough to continue being tortured, and another man who worked

92

Chapter Five

on the same community forum as the policeman who had tortured him. He had asked if the policeman remembered him and the policeman said, “I do”. The second man also mentioned how, at a party, he found himself dancing with a girl who suddenly asked him why he had neck-laced her brother (neck-lacing is a form of summary execution in which some antiapartheid activists killed suspected informers and traitors by placing a rubber tyre, filled with petrol, around their neck and lighting it on fire).68 Working together on the same community forum, while not necessarily having had in-depth discussions with each other about the past, would be one example of reconciliation as co-operation towards a common future. Other common goals might be to reduce community tension and prevent riots, as in co-operation between some former Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries (who had once been each other’s legitimate targets for attack) after the Good Friday Agreement. 69 Co-operating with former perpetrators might, however, also be emotionally demanding for their victims. Some people I interviewed at ecumenical organizations in South Africa (who had been at the forefront of resisting apartheid and bringing people together across racial divides, thus attracting the attention of the security police) told me about how their present involvement in community policing forums, or in projects educating the police, entailed establishing a relationship with the institution (and sometimes the very individuals) who had previously victimized them. This could be difficult emotionally, with intense feelings of fear being awakened by the mere presence of a policeman. Yet, one person said that it seemed as if the policemen who had tortured him found it more difficult to face him than he found it to face them.70 Cooperation towards a common future might furthermore involve taking part in political negotiations, even with those who had killed one’s friends. In a response to my question about the controversial issue of allowing political parties with paramilitary connections into the political negotiation process in Northern Ireland, the representative of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) told me about how one of his colleagues had found himself at the negotiation table sitting not only next to a Sinn Fein representative who was a former IRA bomber, but also next to a representative of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) who once, as a member of a Loyalist paramilitary organization, had stabbed the SDLP senator Paddy Wilson and his secretary to death. And he [the SDLP politician] said, “What the hell am I doing here?” He then said, “I have to be here, because there is no alternative, we have to be inclusive in this process because they are part of the conflict. Now, they are people who in the past used the bomb and the bullet to try and move

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

93

things forward, but the great thing is they weren’t using the bomb and bullet that day. They were in talks about trying to find a peaceful, democratic solution to the situation here. And it is absolutely imperative for political parties who believe in dialogue and negotiation to show these people that that will work.71

The SDLP (which was the biggest party among Catholics in Northern Ireland until the elections in 2003) always rejected Republican armed struggle, and although they aspired to a United Ireland in the long run they gave priority to peace, equality and cooperation between Catholics and Protestants within Northern Ireland.72

Reconciliation as Friendship: Addressing the Past and Co-operating for the Future In South Africa, the TRC’s amnesty hearings gave some victims the opportunity to listen to, and at times even speak with, the perpetrators, and I will recount a couple of examples of how relationships between them evolved through a combination of public and private encounters. One example highlighted by the TRC is that of Brian Mitchell, the commander of a local police station in the Natal midlands who in December 1988 ordered and led the attack that came to be known as the Trust Feed Massacre. Trust Feed was, and still is, a tiny, black rural settlement. Historically the land belonged to 18 black landowners and under apartheid legislation the area was declared a “black spot”. Residents lived under the threat of forced removal. In 1986, the Trust Feed Crisis Committee was formed. It successfully resisted government plans for forced removal and negotiated with the Natal Provincial Administration for the area to be developed. By December 1988, a clinic was nearing completion, water supply had been improved, and roads had been upgraded. It was a unique situation with residents not appointed by the government being recognized as the leaders of the community. The group led by Mitchell attacked and killed eleven people who were attending a night vigil of a relative at the Trust Feed Farm. Hundreds of residents fled the area, and Trust Feed was left in the control of Inkatha officials. 73 Mitchell was tried and sentenced to death for his involvement in the Trust Feed Massacre, where many of those killed were members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) which was politically close to the banned ANC.74 He was the first senior policeman to be convicted for initiating and maintaining the endemic political violence where covert involvement by the state security forces in the form of a “third force” fuelled the conflict

94

Chapter Five

between ANC and Inkatha supporters and used Inkatha as a counter-force against the ANC.75 Brian Mitchell’s sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment, and he was among the first to be granted amnesty by the TRC. At the amnesty hearing Mitchell, by now a member of the Rhema Church, asked the community for forgiveness. Members form the Trust Feed community said they were ready to forgive, providing he became actively involved in reconstructing the community. Mitchell then asked the TRC to facilitate a meeting between him and the community. The TRC initially organized meetings with a special committee representing the Trust Feed community. These were followed by a community meeting where the participants were able to work through their feelings, and eventually reached the point where they were willing to meet with Mitchell. This in turn paved the way for a reconciliation meeting (shown on public television) between the Trust Feed community (including both ANC and IFP members) and Mitchell in July 1997. The community had the opportunity to express their feelings and put direct, clarifying questions to Mitchell, who was also given the opportunity to express his feelings and ask forgiveness. As an overt act of repentance he pledged to honour the request to participate in economic development and reconstruction of the community that had been polarized and destroyed through his operations. According to the Final Report of the TRC, community tensions between ANC and IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) members were also lessened through this meeting. 76 According to Meredith, the Trust Feed community was, however, not unified in its response, as Mitchell’s attempts at reconciliation were rebuffed by some of the residents at Trust Feed.77 In practice Brian Mitchell had some problems to honour his promises: he was unemployed for a while, and he also needed help from people trained in development work. However, he did establish contact with people in the community, including the community leader Thabane Nyoka whose mother was killed in the massacre, and started to discuss what to do.78 On 3 October 2003, the then Deputy President Jacob Zuma attended the sod-turning ceremony for the monument to be built at the scene of the massacre. According to South African Government Information, the Trust Feed Community had now embarked on reconstruction and wanted to build a community resource center in memory of those who died.79 Another example is the interaction between members of St. James Church and some of those involved in the attack against a worship service in St. James Church in July 1993, which left 11 people dead and 60 wounded. The attack was carried out by APLA (Azanian People’s

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

95

Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Pan African Congress, PAC) as part of its Operation Great Storm in the early 1990s. It was motivated by the view of all white people in South Africa as “settlers” who were complicit in the government’s policy of apartheid, together with the view of the churches as complicit in colonialism. An APLA slogan at that time was “one settler, one bullet,” which according to one of the attackers applying for amnesty meant that any white person in South Africa was regarded as a settler and if they came across any settlers during their operation they had to be killed or injured. Another one of the attackers testified that the target had been selected because white people used churches to oppress blacks, and had used churches and bibles to take control of the land. However, it was denied that APLA was a racist organisation. An APLA cadre applying for amnesty for another attack explained that it was the situation in the country at that time which was creating a conflict between a black person and a white person.80 St. James Church was situated in a predominantly white suburb of Cape Town but in practice also had some colored members. As those who had been sentenced to prison for the attack applied for amnesty to the TRC, members of the congregation attended the public hearing, and also had the opportunity to meet with the amnesty applicants in a personal meeting after the hearing. In a subsequent interview, a white Afrikaner man who had been injured and lost several close friends in the attack gave a vivid account of his mixed feelings during the amnesty hearing: ranging from anger (when the perpetrators appeared arrogant and resisted cross-questioning), to empathy (when he discovered that they were of the same age as his young son and when they told about their growing up under apartheid). His anger was softened when they (after another man who had lost his wife in the attack broke in and with tears in his eyes initiated a direct dialogue with them) expressed remorse. In the end, at the personal meeting that was arranged just after the public hearing, he didn’t see “three killers” but “three young men”: I saw them, I saw how frightened they were, I didn’t see three killers coming in there, I saw three young men … I had no feelings of anger and bitterness at that stage … listening to their testimonies [at the hearing], for the first time I could identify with the so-called struggle. What they went through as youngsters ... hearing about the Whites, all of the rich Whites because they’ve all got nice homes, all got motorcars.81

96

Chapter Five

Their testimonies had also made him feel more open toward black people and to learn from them since he in his own words “was exposed for the first time to exactly how the black youths think.”82 While the congregation had slowly become aware of the realities of apartheid in the 1980s through their coloured members, the TRC process made them even more aware of the cruelty of the apartheid system, and of their own complicity in not sufficiently standing up against it. As a result, they initiated a process of dialogue about the past, as well as practical acts of restitution and social reconciliation, between blacks and whites within their own denomination, the Church of England in South Africa (CESA). This included setting up a trust fund to assist the poorest areas within the large black membership of CESA.83 Some of the members of the congregation continued to have contact with the direct perpetrators, and in his autobiography Letlapa Mphahlele, the APLA Director of Operations at the time of the attack, told about how his friendship with one of the survivors, Charl van Wyk, helped him discover his own contradicting personalities: That of a man pouring out vengeful rhetoric on public platforms, and that of a man who feels for the people hurt and maimed thanks to orders I gave.84 Mphahlele and Van Wyk first met through journalists who had interviewed them separately. A few days later Van Wyk invited Mphahlele to a restaurant and from there, their friendship developed. In his autobiography Letlapa Mphahlele also tells about how he and Charl van Wyk went to prison to visit one of those who had carried out the attack, and how Van Wyk encouraged this young man to study and offered to pay the cost.85 At the public launch of his book in Cape Town in October 2002, Mphahlele also met with Ginn Fourie, whose daughter Lyndi was killed in the attack he ordered on the Heidelberg Tavern restaurant in Cape Town 31 December 1993. 86 They continued to meet in private, and started working together to further reconciliation in the country through the Lyndi Fourie Foundation. Here one can also see a “meeting of moral landscapes.” At the website of The Forgiveness Project, Mphahlele explained his previous authorization of attacks on white civilians in the following words: I believed that terror had to be answered with terror and I authorised high profile massacres on white civilians in the same way that the whites did on us. At the time it seemed the only valid response - but where would it have ended?87

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

97

However, he stated that he had changed since then and no longer believed that violence should be met with violence but that “you can deal with oppression in a more creative way.” 88 Ms. Fourie on her part delivered a speech at his homecoming ceremony in his home village, asking his people for forgiveness on behalf of her ancestors for slavery, colonialism and apartheid.89 This was in line with the values of her dead daughter, who had had both black and white friends, as well as her own values as a committed Christian inspired by the non-violence of Martin Luther King and Gandhi, which she had referred to as a reason for extending forgiveness to the direct perpetrators already at the criminal trial in 1994, and subsequently at the amnesty hearing in 1997. 90 In her personal account from these encounters, Ginn Fourie tells about how, already at the criminal trial, she felt not only anger but also empathy for the perpetrators and their situation, and indicated to them that she was willing to forgive them. While there was no response from them during the criminal trial, the turning point appeared to come when she was given the opportunity to address them at the amnesty hearing. She told them, and the wider audience at the hearing, about Lyndi (who was called Lindiwe by her Xhosa friends) – about Lyndi’s determination to use her education to improve the situation for black people, how Lyndi had challenged her mother’s subtle racism, and how her black friends had been as close to her as her white friends. Thereafter Ms Fourie told the perpetrators about her own grief and how she felt about them – that she had no objection to amnesty being granted but that she was not convinced that the whole truth had been revealed, and that she was worried about having them out on the street as potential killers. Hence she stressed the need for counseling to be made available to them. She also expressed an interest in their experiences: Lindiwe would have wanted to hear the stories of your lives. I am interested as a woman who has experienced the pain and frustration of oppression to hear about your experiences.91

After the hearing the three amnesty applicants sent a message that they wanted to speak to her. A personal meeting was arranged, where they thanked her for her forgiveness and said that they would take that message of peace and hope back to their community. One of them, who acted as a spokesperson for the group, said that if someone were to kill his daughter he didn’t think he could forgive them. When asked by Ms. Fourie why they hated white people enough to indiscriminately kill them, one of them (who had a sister called Lindiwe and had thus connected with Lyndi’s

98

Chapter Five

Xhosa name) told her that a white man had killed his father. Another one of them told about how his family had been killed by white security force members. They would welcome counseling, preferably together with the survivors so that reconciliation could take place. At the end of the meeting tears came to her eyes, and the spokesperson of the group turned to the interpreter and said: “Please take Ms. Fourie home.” She concluded: I was amazed by the sensitivity and leadership potential of this man – this same man who was a perpetrator of “gross human rights violations” against my own daughter.92

Another example is the friendship between Jo Berry, whose father was killed by the IRA bomb at the 1984 Tory Party Conference in Brighton, and Pat Magee who was responsible for the bomb. Just two days after the bomb, Jo Berry made a personal commitment to bring something positive out of it and to try and understand those who had killed him. She went to Ireland and listened to the stories people who has been caught up in the violence, and according to her own testimony she then for the first time felt that her pain was being heard. Since then she has visited Ireland many times and worked with victims and former combatants from all sides. 93 In November 2000 she met Pat Magee, who was released under the Good Friday Agreement in 1999. She had started to think about meeting him around 1996, after the initial IRA cease-fire and when the peace process had been running for some time. During that period she took part in some weekends at the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation, and also went to Corrymeela, and started to meet with people who knew him. When she eventually said publicly that she would want to meet him one day, she was told that this could be arranged, and they met for the first time in a mutual friend’s house.94 After that initial meeting, they have continued to meet privately, as well as spoken together at public platforms. In her own words, Jo Berry “wanted to meet Pat to put a face to the enemy, and see him as a real human being.” 95 Pat Magee on his part decided to meet Jo because, apart from addressing a personal obligation, he felt obligated as a Republican to explain what had led someone like him to participate in the action. At the meeting Jo Berry shared a lot about her father, while Pat told her some of his story. Jo Berry recalls: We had an intense first three hour meeting, Pat started by giving his political position but half way through the meeting he opened up and became vulnerable, later saying my empathy disarmed him.96

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

99

At the meeting, she had, through listening and asking questions in a nonconfrontational way, sought to “create a bit of emotional safety, so he could open up.” 97 He told her that he had got involved in the armed struggle at the age of 19, after witnessing how a small nationalist community was being “mistreated by the British.”98 For the last part of their meeting, Pat was also trying to learn more about how the bomb attack had affected Jo herself, and he states that through their meetings he has got a clearer picture of her father as an individual, as a human being, as well as of the pain that he has caused.99 Here the issue of showing remorse for an action that was part of one’s political struggle at a time when one did not see any other realistic alternative, but which one now realizes has caused great pain to others comes to the fore. In the words of Pat Magee: Some day I may be able to forgive myself. Although I still stand by my actions, I will always carry the burden that I harmed other human beings. But I’m not seeking forgiveness. If Jo could just understand why someone like me could get involved in the armed struggle then something has been achieved. The point is that Jo set out with that intent in mind – she wanted to know why.100

Jo Berry on her part concluded: I believe we all have humanity in us [sic] and the way forward for a peaceful world is to give up projecting ‘enemy’ on to others. Instead we can learn to understand and to challenge behavior through non-violence and peaceful means. If we can understand the roots of violence and conflict then we can address the underlying needs and find solutions, which work for all. I believe we all have the capacity to be victims and victimisers, I know that if I had lived Pat’s life [as a Republican] I may have made the same choices.101

According to Pat Magee the big issue between them was still the legitimacy of the use of violence. While he described himself as being “100% in favor of the peace process”, he would not want to claim to have renounced violence. Though he did not believe himself to be violent person and had spoken out against violence, he said he was not a pacifist and would not want to say to future generations, anywhere in the world, not to use violence against oppression. Since their first meeting they have met more than 80 times, worked together and shared their story in many places and countries, according to Jo Berry:

100

Chapter Five Demonstrating how empathy can disarm and it is possible to listen and understand even when there are differences of opinion.102 They have been working regularly in Belfast, and together they have set up the organization Building Bridges for Peace. 103 While Pat Magee initially agreed to a meeting out of a sense of political obligation as a Republican, he believes that what he and Jo have come to do together is also “political in that one can see the need for good examples of dialogue and reconciliation, despite differences.”104

Some Conditions That Might Enhance Reconciliation as Cooperation and Friendship Judith Herman Lewis identifies the following stages in the process of recovery from trauma: x The establishment of safety, including bodily integrity, basic health needs, safe living conditions, financial security, as well as safe/reliable relationships and social support. x Remembrance and mourning, telling the story of one’s trauma. x Reconnection with ordinary life, i.e. incorporating the lessons of one’s traumatic experience into one’s present life and relationships. This reconnection might entail finding a “survivor mission,” by letting the personal experience of trauma become a basis for social action.105 When discussing prospects for constructive encounters between former perpetrators and their victims, it would therefore be important to recognize that people might be at different “stages” in this process of recovery from trauma, and that for some (but not all) victims an encounter with the perpetrator(s) might be helpful in their process of remembrance and mourning. Through the detailed accounts of personal encounters between individual victims and perpetrators related above one can note that it was important that the perpetrators no longer had the power (and the inclination) to do any harm and that the victims were able to hear the life stories of the perpetrators and sense their vulnerability. Similarly, hearing about the victims as persons, listening to their story of pain and loss and discovering a common humanity, and possibly being able to identify with some of their experiences, appeared to enhance the ability of perpetrators to empathize with their victims and express remorse. That the former perpetrators perceived the vulnerability of their victims, and did not feel

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

101

intimidated or threatened, also appeared to be important.106 Furthermore, not only victims of violence but also those who have perpetrated violence might need a certain degree of safety and personal support in order to be able to face up to the past. A common vision, and goal, for the future would also be crucial for “reconciliation-as-co-operation” to make sense, and for victims and perpetrators being motivated to develop their friendship beyond their initial encounter to address the past. This might, as in the case of Brian Mitchell and the Trust Feed Community, include some form of material restitution in order to redress some of the damages caused by the violations. It would also include promoting peaceful relations and reconciliation within and between their respective communities. In this sense one might say that the former perpetrator(s) could share in the “survivor mission” of their victims, or even that victim and perpetrator had now found a joint “mission.”

When Reconciliation is Not Possible But what about situations where these conditions are not fulfilled? This certainly appears to be the case in Norway, where Anders Behring Breivik and his victims have completely opposite ideas of what future society to promote, and where not even “reconciliation-as-coexistence” would be a safe option. This became particularly pointed when prison authorities recently announced that they would plan to hire professionally trained “friends” with whom Breivik could socialise (e.g. play indoor hockey or chess). The reason for these plans would be that Norwegian law forbids keeping prisoners in total isolation for long periods of time because it is considered an unduly cruel punishment. Yet Breivik is considered too dangerous to have normal contacts inside the prison. Prison authorities believe that he might try to seize other inmates as hostages if allowed to mingle with them.107 When someone is considered so dangerous that one has to be professionally trained to be able to interact with him in a safe way, and that people would hardly be prepared to do this without being paid – then any idea of reconciliation becomes absurd: be it “reconciliation as co-existence,” reconciliation-as-co-operation,” or “reconciliation-asfriendship.” Given the fact that in several contexts of conflict, many victims might not even know the identity of the perpetrator, or that interacting with those who have victimised them might be too emotionally demanding, or that the perpetrators might be unrepentant, constructive alternatives to reconciliation between individual victims and perpetrators would also need

102

Chapter Five

to be considered. In this respect, Marie Smyth, from the Cost of the Troubles Study in Northern Ireland, spoke of “positive revenge” as a way of recognising the harm done but refuse to let that harm determine the rest of one’s life. You become determined to live a positive life, to make a positive contribution, and not to let the perpetrator win by resisting the damaging effect and triumphing over them.108

She pointed out that some people with whom she had worked had been able to lead a positive life, and even become active community workers or workers for reconciliation, although not seeking reconciliation with the specific perpetrator.109 Michael Lapsley, who initiated the Institute for the Healing of Memories and whose perpetrator (who organized the letter bomb against him) had not come forward also spoke about his present commitment as a form of revenge: I have decided to opt for revenge, and my revenge will be very sweet; it will be to be part of building a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa, and that will be the sweetest revenge of all.110

In a similar fashion victims and survivors of Breivik’s attacks might seek out forms of “positive revenge” and “survivor missions” that goes against what the perpetrator stood for and wanted to achieve by his action. In the words of one of the Utøya survivors: This guy wanted to kill me because I believe in democracy, openness, tolerance and dialogue … If that is what he wanted to kill me for, I am going to carry on fighting for it.111

Conclusion Coming back to the question posed at the beginning of this article, namely the question of what to ask forgiveness for and what future relationships to promote, one might ask: Should people apologise for actively subjecting other people to certain experiences (e.g. of trauma)? For being complicit in, and benefiting from, certain oppressive structures (e.g. of apartheid)? For holding a particular view of the conflict, its history and its causes? For having and promoting certain exclusive identifications and loyalties? For certain ways of dehumanizing “the other”? For certain norms and values regarding how to address the conflict and interact with one’s opponents, especially with regard to the legitimacy of the use of violence or armed force for political ends?

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

103

A need to uphold a positive self-image, or a genuine belief in the justice of one’s cause, might make it difficult for perpetrators of politically motivated violence to come to the point of apologizing for all these aspects of their moral landscapes. For Pat Magee it was for instance important to get the opportunity to explain the Republican view of the conflict, which was intertwined with his own experience of “the British” in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, even those who believe that they have been fighting for a just cause might express recognition of the harm they have caused to other human beings in the course of that struggle, and reject the use of violence to achieve their ends in the present situation. Debates and dialogues about what was done wrong in the past are likely to continue in societies coming out of armed conflict, and the question is how much room there might be for a diversity of “moral landscapes.” One important insight from my research on Northern Ireland and South Africa was the importance of not only intellectual dialogue and debates but also of providing “safe spaces” where people can meet across prevailing divides and listen to each other’s personal life stories and experiences. Such story-sharing might broaden and challenge the moral landscapes held in the conflict: by making the participants personally aware of each other’s experiences of the conflict and possibly also finding unifying experiences; by challenging established views of the conflict and of “the other;” and by encouraging the building a unity in diversity “from below” based on enhanced empathy and identification with people from “the other side.” In this sense such initiatives present a challenge to prevailing structures of separation and inequality; to exclusive identifications and loyalties; and to any tendencies for dehumanization. The extent to which those who have perpetrated violence in the past might be included in, and contribute to, these initiatives depends on their willingness and ability to contribute to the safety and well-being of the other participants and whether they are open towards being challenged by the life-stories of those from “the other side.” Within such a framework, constructive encounters between direct victims and perpetrators might also take place, although they cannot be predicted or prescribed. Wider society can in turn play an important role by creating a supportive climate that indicates to all society members that the new reality can be free of threats, dangers, and fears. As well as ask critical questions about the spaces that already exist (e.g. schools, universities, neighborhoods, workplaces, places of worship): what is the character of these spaces in terms of safety, power dynamics and rules for interaction? What stories are heard and acknowledged? How can these spaces be more

104

Chapter Five

actively utilized to have diverse moral landscapes broadened and challenged and encourage recognition of common humanity?

Notes 1

“Norway gunman demands medal for his actions”, text by Sapa-AFP, http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/norway-gunman-demands-medal-for-hisactions-1.1228441, 6 February 2012. See also “I deserve a medal, says Breivik”, Belfast Telegraph February 6, 2012: http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/i-deserve-a-medal-saysbreivik-16114024.html. 2 “Breivik provokes tears, ridicule in courtroom”, Reuters, February 7, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/breivik-provokes-tears-ridicule-incourtroom-1.1228816 3 As quoted in “Norway gunman demands medal for his actions”, text by SapaAFP, February 6, 2012. 4 “Anders Behring Breivik indicted on terror and murder charges”, The Guardian, March 8, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/07/anders-behringbreivik-indicted-norway 5 Mark Townsend, “Breivik verdict: Norwegian extremist declared sane and sentenced to 21 years,” The Guardian, August 24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/24/breivik-verdict-sane-21-years. Breivik was sentenced to "preventive detention." Unlike a regular prison sentence – which can be no longer than 21 years in Norway – that confinement option can be extended for as long as an inmate is considered dangerous to society. It also offers more programmes and therapy than an ordinary prison sentence. “Anders Breivik found sane: the verdict explained”, The Telegraph, August 24, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9496641/AndersBreivik-found-sane-the-verdict-explained.html 6 Breivik’s defence speech 17 April (the 2nd day of the trial), as referred to and partly quoted in Magnusson, Erik, “Breivik avslutade med nya terrorhot”, Sydsvenska dagbladet (a Swedish daily newspaper) April 18, 2012. 7 Mark Lewis and David Jolly, “Norway gunman wishes death toll had been higher”, New York Times, April 20, 2012. 8 Cf. Joseph W. Elder, “Expanding Our Options: The Challenge of Forgiveness,” in Exploring Forgiveness, eds. Robert Enright and Joanna North, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 159. 9 Donald W. Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 7. 10 In this context I thus refer to “the other” as not only someone who is “different from oneself and/or one’s own group” but also “one’s opponent or adversary.” 11 Maria Ericson, Reconciliation and the Search for a Shared Moral Landscape: An Exploration Based upon a Study of Northern Ireland and South Africa, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang), 2001, Ch. 3.2–3.3, which is the published version of my doctoral dissertation presented in April 2001. Here, I have been

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

105

inspired by Charles L. Kammer, who argued that, “The factors that determine our moral lives are perhaps best compared to a landscape. Some features are dominant and set a tone for that particular landscape, yet the landscape is actually composed of elements too numerous to list, and they blend together with the dominant ones into a discernible whole.” Charles L. Kammer, Ethics and Liberation: An Introduction, (Maryknoll: Orbis), 1988, 17. Kammer (who did not focus on reconciliation during or after armed conflicts) proposed the following elements of what he called a “moralscape”: worldview; loyalties; norms and values; experiences; teleological or deontological mode of decision-making. In addition to Kammer I used various additional literature by theologians and peace researchers. 12 The Leader of the Corrymeela Community, interview by author, Belfast, September 8, 1998. 13 Irish Nationalists were inspired by the nationalist ideas emerging in 19th century Europe, according to which “the nation” was to be seen as a self-determining community with its own unique history and culture, claiming the right to pursue its destiny by means of a state of its own. The Nationalist tradition has been divided between Constitutional Nationalists who, during the 19th and early 20th century, sought to achieve Home Rule (i.e. a Dublin parliament controlling Irish domestic affairs) through political persuasion and campaigns. The Republicans went further in their demands for an independent Irish Republic, were prepared to use armed force, and less willing to enter into political compromise solutions. During the Troubles, Constitutional Nationalism was represented by the SDLP and Republicanism mainly by Sinn Fein. The Unionist Party was formed in 1886 to preserve the Union with Britain and resist Home Rule, while Loyalism as a political ideology dates back to the 17th century, after the large-scale Protestant immigration to the northern part of Ireland (the so-called “Plantation of Ulster”) had been organised in order to pacify the part of Ireland where resistance to English rule had been particularly fierce. There are several scholarly works providing background accounts to the Northern Ireland conflict, e.g. Paul Arthur, Government and Politics of Northern Ireland, London: Longman, 1984; Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery, Northern Ireland Since 1968, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996; Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 14 The Leader of the Corrymeela Community, interview by author, Belfast, September 8, 1998. 15 Even in certain individual incidents the distinction between victim and perpetrator might not be clear-cut, e.g. when the person planting a bomb (as perpetrator) is also killed or injured in the explosion. 16 37% of Republican and 32% of Loyalist respondents had had a family member severely injured. Nearly 39% of Republican and nearly 33% of Loyalist respondents had been intimidated out of their home. For more details see Peter Shirlow and Kieran McEvoy, Beyond the Wire: Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland, London: Pluto Press, 2008, 85-88. The field research for this study took place in 2004-5.The sample included 150 Republican and 150 Loyalist former prisoners and their relatives (75 from each community). Interviewing was carried out during 2004. Ibid, 16, 19.

106

Chapter Five

17 Ericson, Reconciliation, 365. See also Hugo van der Merwe, “National and Community Reconciliation: Competing Agendas in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission” in Burying the past: Making peace and doing justice after civil conflict, ed. Nigel Biggar, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003, 121-122. At the time of the research for my doctoral dissertations, priority had generally been given to the plight of the victims, and many organisations had only recently started to work with perpetrators. Ericson, Reconciliation, 78. 18 This included both Republican prisoners from the IRA, and Loyalist prisoners from the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF). Two political parties associated with those Loyalist paramilitaries who observed the cease-fires had taken part in the political talks and endorsed the Good Friday Agreement: the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) associated with the UVF, and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) associated with the UDA. The PUP got 2 seats in the Assembly elections in June 1998, while the UDP failed to obtain any seats. Smaller paramilitary organisations like the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) subsequently declared ceasefires later in 1998 and their prisoners subsequently became eligible for release. For more details about the early release scheme see Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire, 49-50. 19 Ericson, Reconciliation, 270. 20 Ericson, Reconciliation, 267-268, 270 (the quotation is from my interview with a leading member of the Survivors of Trauma in Belfast, 9 September 1998). 21 Patrick Magee as quoted in “Understanding Through Collaboration and Friendship: An Interview with Jo Berry and Patrick Magee,” in Forgiving and Remembering in Northern Ireland: Approaches to Conflict Resolution, ed. Graham Spencer, London & New York: Continuum, 2011, 237-238. Mr. Magee also underlined that he and Jo Berry (whose father was killed by an IRA bomb he took part in planting) had been on their own personal journeys for a long time before meeting directly with each other.. 22 Alan McBride, Co-ordinator at WAVE Trauma Centre Belfast, Interview with author August 28 2012. WAVE is a cross-community victims/survivors support organisation that operates across Northern Ireland. In the conversation Mr. McBride told me that Jo Berry and Pat Magee was the only example of a former direct victim and perpetrator doing peace and reconciliation work together that he knew of. WAVE had on 3-4 occasions been involved in preparing small groups of bereaved persons for meetings with former paramilitaries whose organisations had been responsible for their loss. However, these meetings had been once-off events. 23 Cf. Van der Merwe, “National and Community Reconciliation”, 112, who points out that on the occasions that TRC staff engaged in more intensive community intervention and victim-perpetrator mediation, or when they were able to address individual victims’ needs immediately, they managed to draw extensive media coverage of these successes. From what they saw in the media, people might thus feel that the TRC had done much for everybody else but neglected their own community. 24 The TRC received about 7000 amnesty applications and around 2000 of those applications concerned gross human rights violations. In terms of amnesty, the

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

107

TRC was also to assess applications concerning politically motivated deeds that were not gross human rights violations (e.g. bomb attacks where no-one was killed or injured). It was often a logistic challenge to trace the victims of those who applied for amnesty. At times the only thing that was done was to place a notice in the newspaper, which was quite insufficient since only 5% of South Africans read a newspaper. Jeremy Sarkin, “An Evaluation of the South African Amnesty Process,” in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? eds. Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, 95; Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process, Antwerp & Oxford: Intersentia, 2004, 118. 25 These reasons were mentioned by a couple of clinical psychologists who had worked with victims (interviewed for my doctoral dissertation Ericson, Reconciliation, 352), as well as in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Final Report (“Reconciliation”, Vol. 5, Ch. 9) and by people interviewed by Hugo van der Merwe, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Community Reconciliation: An Analysis of Competing Strategies and Conceptualizations, Doctoral Dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1999, 306. See also testimonies at “A Public Symposium” in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 years on, eds. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Fanie du Toit, Claremont (Cape Town): David Philip, 2007, and Timothy Sizwe Phakathi and Hugo van der Merwe in ”The Impact of the TRCs Amnesty Process on Survivors of Human Rights Violations” in Truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC deliver?eds. Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, 131-132, 138. 26 Ericson, Reconciliation, 353. 27 Representative from the DUP, interview by author, Belfast, September 1, 1998. 28 My interviews with a Representative from the DUP (Belfast September 1, 1998) and a Representative from the UUP (Belfast, September 4, 1998), quoted in Ericson, Reconciliation, 25. 29 Representative from the UUP, interview by author, Belfast September 4, 1998. 30 Ulster Unionist Party: Manifesto 1998 (not paginated). 31 As pointed out also in Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire, 23. 32 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, 2006, 69 (who also speaks of “state terrorism” as a kind of “terrorism from above”). 33 Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire, 23. 34 Quoted in Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire, 23. 35 In 2007 the British government appointed a Consultative Group on the Past, which was to make recommendations about how to deal with “the events of the past 40 years”. This Consultative Group on the Past, presented its report in January 2009, and its recommendations are still subject to discussion. 36 See for instance Marie Breen Smyth “Dealing with the Past and the Politics of Victim-hood” in Stories in Conflict: Towards Understanding and Healing, ed. Liam O’Hagan, Derry/Londonderry: Yes! Publications, 2008, 77-84. 37 Among the about 3600 people killed in the Troubles, most of them (59%) were killed by Republican paramilitaries (particularly the IRA), Loyalist paramilitaries

108

Chapter Five

accounted for 28% of the deaths, and the security forces accounted for 11%. The biggest single category of victims of each of the organisations responsible has been civilians. 53% of those killed in the Troubles were civilians, 30% belonged to the security forces, and 16% were paramilitaries (the majority of them Republican). The IRA was responsible for 85% of the deaths attributed to Republican paramilitaries. The Cost of the Troubles Study distinguished between the affiliation of victims (and perpetrators) in terms of religion (“Catholic”, “Protestant”, “not known”, “non-Northern Irish”) as well as in terms of paramilitary affiliation, state security force affiliation, and no such affiliation (i.e. “civilian”). The question was, however, raised whether the category of “civilian” might be too broad, as, for instance, it did not distinguish between totally nonaligned civilians and members of political parties associated with paramilitary groupings. Marie Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, Mapping Troubles-Related Deaths in Northern Ireland 1969–1994, Derry/Londonderry: INCORE, 1997, 34, 43-48. 38 Fay, Morrissey and Smyth, Mapping Troubles-Related Deaths, 47-48. 39 Out of over 300 instances of disputed killings there had, around the time of the Good Friday Agreement, been only four convictions, and when members of the British army was convicted they were released after serving only a few years of their sentence. In some cases they were readmitted into the army. Arthur and Jeffery, Northern Ireland Since 1968, 78-79. Amnesty International, United Kingdom, Northern Ireland: killings by security forces and “supergrass” trials, London: Amnesty Publications, 1988; Brandon Hamber, “Conclusion: A Truth Commission for Northern Ireland?”, in Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition, ed. Brandon Hamber, Derry/Londonderry: INCORE, 1998, 82. 40 John Dunlop, A Precarious Belonging: Presbyterians and the Conflict in Ireland, Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1995, 124. 41 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (Act No. 34 of 1995), Ch.1, No ix:a–b. 42 TRC Final Report, Vol. I, Ch. 4 (“The Mandate”), § 126–127. See also Ericson, Reconciliation, 336. 43 More precisely ”victims” were defined as: (a) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered harm in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial impairment of human rights (i) as a result of a gross violation of human rights; or (ii) as a result of an act associated with a political objective for which amnesty has been granted; (b) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered harms in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial impairment of human rights, as a result of such person intervening to assist persons contemplated in paragraph (a) who were in distress or to prevent victimisation of such persons; and (c) such relatives or dependants of victims as may be prescribed. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Ch.1, § xix:a–c. 44 TRC Final Report, “The Mandate”, Vol. I, Ch. 4, § 55–56 (quotation from § 56).

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims 45

109

TRC Final Report, Vol. I, Ch. 4 (“The Mandate”), § 70. TRC Final Report, Vol. I, Ch. 2 (“Historical Context”), § 49, 58-59, 76-80 and Vol. I, Ch. 4 (“The Mandate”), § 71. 47 TRC Final Report, Vol. I, Ch. 4 (“The Mandate”), § 77-79, and Vol. V, Ch. 6 (“Findings and Conclusions”). 48 TRC Final Report,Vol. I, Ch. 4 (“The Mandate”), § 77–79 (quotation from § 79). 49 TRC Final Report, Vol. I, Ch. 4 (“The Mandate”), § 80. 50 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1995, 54. 51 In my doctoral research I focused on ecumenical reconciliation initiatives, political reconciliation initiatives (in South Africa the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in Northern Ireland the Good Friday Agreement and the subsequent political debates), and finally the perspectives of victims of violence. My material consisted of literature and documents from various organisations, as well as of interviews and personal observations during one research visit to Northern Ireland (in September 1998) and two research visits to South Africa (in July/August 1996 and from early September until early December 1999). In Northern Ireland, I also met with people in leadership positions at one evangelical reconciliation group (ECONI), two victims support groups, one reconciliation group without a specific religious basis (the Peace and Reconciliation Group, PRG, in Derry/Londonderry), and at one human rights group (Committee on the Administration of Justice, CAJ) which stressed the importance of addressing controversial issues regarding inequalities, discrimination and policing. At the time of my doctoral research it was still difficult to find primary sources on the personal perspectives of perpetrators of violence. For a more detailed presentation, and critical discussion, of my sources, see Ericson, Reconciliation, Ch. 2. In April 2005, the Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI) became the Centre for Contemporary Christianity in Ireland (CCCI). See further Gladys Ganiel, Evangelicalism and Conflict in Northern Ireland, New York/Basingstoke; Palgrave McMillan, 2008, 121-122. 52 Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire, 6. 53 Ericson, Reconciliation, 277-280, 284-287. 54 The Leader of the Corrymeela Community, interview by author, Belfast, 8 September 1998. In Northern Ireland, I was particularly interested in the work, and ideas, of unofficial ecumenical initiatives for reconciliation, i.e. joint initiatives set up by concerned individuals from different churches who also kept up ties with, and sought to influence, the leadership of their respective churches and their local congregations. Such unofficial initiatives preceded official contacts between church leaders and, given the ambiguity towards ecumenism that could still be found within the churches throughout The Troubles, the views of those within the churches who have been committed to such “crossing” are particularly relevant. Ericson, Reconciliation, 71-72. Some of these people were involved in unofficial talks and mediation processes that enabled the paramilitary cease-fires and subsequent official peace negotiations. Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick. The Fight for Peace: The Inside Story of the Irish Peace Process, 2nd ed., London: Reed International Books Ltd, 1997, 65-89, 135-137, 222-224, 264. Ericson, 46

110

Chapter Five

Reconciliation, 276-277. For more details about various reconciliation groups in Northern Ireland, see Ericson, Reconciliation, Ch. 6; Mervyn T. Love, Peace Building through Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, Aldershot: Avebury, 1995; Ronald A. Wells, People behind the Peace: Community and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1999. 55 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, “The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process,” in From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation, ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 12. 56 Bar-Tal and Bennink, “The Nature of Reconciliation”, 27. 57 Bar-Tal and Bennink, “The Nature of Reconciliation”, 37. 58 None of these initiatives did, however, actively seek to bring together direct victims and perpetrators of specific acts. For more details see the description of Towards Understanding and Healing in Brian Gormally and Kieran McEvoy, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland “From Below”: An Evaluation, Belfast: The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, 2009; Gráinne Kelly, Storytelling Audit: An Audit of Personal Story, Narrative and Testimony Initiatives Related to the Conflict In and About Northern Ireland, Belfast: Healing Through Remembering, September 2005. As well as Towards Understanding & Healing Information, Derry/Londonderry: Yes! Publications, 2008 and “Towards Understanding & Healing: Storytelling and Dialogue”, DVD 2008; Alistair Little (with Ruth Scott), Give a Boy a Gun, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2009, 160-181 (about the Kairos Initiative, The Conflict Resource Trauma Centre and Glencree Centre for Reconciliation). There has generally been no recording or documenting of the stories told in these sessions, since the “audience” is the rest of the group (not the general public). There have been a few exceptions to this rule. The DVD “Towards Understanding & Healing: Storytelling and Dialogue” (2008) includes extracts from workshop sessions and interviews with participants. The purpose is however to present the design and background to the workshops, and only short extracts from a few personal stories are recorded in order to give and idea of the background and perspectives of participants who are then also interviewed about their experience of the workshop. L.I.V.E. also organised some sharing sessions with invited members of the media, in collaboration with the participants. On the Kairos Initative (through which people who had been bereaved through the Troubles met with representatives from the paramilitary organisations responsible for their loss) see also Ericson, Reconciliation, 268-270 (where I referred to an interview with the person behind this initiative). In addition to Towards Understanding and Healing, Gormally and McEvoy, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland “From Below,”mentions a number of other initiatives where story-sharing was an important part of a project to address the past and build a common future. Towards Understanding and Healing also acknowledges the influence of the work of other groups, in particular the An Crann/The Tree. The research in the mid-1990s for a book entitled Brits Speak Out: British Soldiers’ Impression of the Northern Ireland Conflict, had also led to contact with a number of former British soldiers who had once served in Northern Ireland and a number of them expressed an interest in revisiting Northern Ireland to engage in dialogue

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

111

with people from the communities that they had patrolled. Towards Understanding & Healing Information, 7-8. 59 Ericson, Reconciliation, 375-376, 422-423. I took part in a Healing of Memories workshop in Cape Town in November 1999, as one participant among others respecting the rules of confidentiality. The participants who, like me, had not lived in South Africa during apartheid could replace “apartheid” with whatever experiences that had been formative in their lives. 60 Vilhelm Verwoerd, Equity, Mercy, Forgiveness: Interpreting the Amnesty within the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Leuven: Peeters, 2007, 88, 108-114. 61 TRC Final Report, Vol. I, Ch. 5 (“Concepts and Principles”), § 19. 62 TRC Final Report, “, Vol. I, Ch. 5 (“Concepts and Principles”), § 20. 63 Verwoerd, Equity, Mercy, Forgiveness, 114. 64 Verwoerd, Equity, Mercy, Forgiveness, 114, 143. 65 The TRC also highlighted such a number of such “success stories” or “good examples.” TRC Final Report, Vol. 5, Ch. 9, “Reconciliation.” Most of them are described, also with reference to other sources, in Ericson, Reconciliation, 354364, and in Verwoerd, Equity, Mercy, Forgiveness. 66 Cf. Maureen Hetherington, ”The Role of Towards Understanding and Healing”, in Stories in Conflict: Towards Understanding and Healing, ed. Liam O’Hagan, Derry/Londonderry: Yes! Publications, 2008, 49 (on the situation in a small country like Northern Ireland) and Van der Merwe, “National and Community Reconciliation”, 110-122 (on relationships within and between local communities in South Africa). See also Ericson, Reconciliation, 226, on testimonies about how people involved in the ANC-Inkatha conflict in KwaZulu-Natal might have had to prove their loyalty to their respective political organisation by killing a family member who belonged to the other organization. 67 Fiona C. Ross and Pamela Reynolds, ”Voices Not Heard: Small Histories and the Work of Repair”, in To repair the irreparable: Reparation and reconstruction in South Africa, eds. Erik Doxtander and Charles Villa-Vicencio, Claremont (Cape Town): David Philip, 113. 68 Ross and Reynolds, ”Voices Not Heard”, 112. Neck-lacing = a tyre filled with paraffin placed around the neck of a suspected informer and set alight, burning the person to death. 69 One example is the so-called mobile phones networks during contentious parades and demonstrations, when existing networks were equipped with mobile phones so that they could communicate quickly with each other, monitor the situation, and clarify and respond to rumours that would otherwise have fuelled the situation. While these networks were never explicitly linked to either Republican or Loyalist movements, the various networks overlapped through individual comembership. Neil Jarman, “Ordering Transition: The Role of Loyalists and Republicans in Community-Based Policing Activity” in Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: From Terrorism to Democratic Politics, eds. Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloomer, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008. On additional forms of cooperation between Loyalist and Republican ex-prisoners groups, see Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire.

112 70

Chapter Five

Interviews at the ecumenical organisations Vuleka Trust and Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre in July 1996, referred to in Ericson, Reconciliation, 353. 71 Representative from the SDLP, interview by author, Belfast, September 1, 1998. 72 In the 1998 Assembly elections, Sinn Fein got 18 seats and the SDLP got 24 seats. In the 2003 Assembly elections the DUP got 30 seats and the UUP got 27. Sinn Fein got 24 seats, while the SDLP got 18. In the 2007 elections, the DUP got 36 seats, the UUP 18, Sinn Fein 28 and the SDLP 16. The Alliance Party (i.e. the political middle ground, who has remained neutral regarding whether Northern Ireland should be Irish or British) got 6 seats in 2003 and 7 seats in 2007, while “Other parties” got 3 seats in both of these Assembly elections. For further electoral statistics, see e.g. http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ 73 Fred Kockott, “Uncovering the truth behind the Trust Feed massacre,” April 25 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/opinion/uncovering-the-truth-behind-thetrust-feed-massacre-1.1283657?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot 74 Nathi Olifant, “ANC rewriting history – Buthelezi”, May 6, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-rewriting-history-buthelezi-1.1290035 According to the TRC, however, most of those killed were Inkatha supporters TRC Final Report, “Reconciliation”, Vol. V, Ch. 9, § 70–82. 75 On the ANC-Inkatha conflict, which partly originated in genuine political rivalry but was also fuelled by this “third force”, see e.g. TRC Final Report, Vol. VI, Section III, Chapters 2-3. Inkatha was based on traditional Zulu heritage. KwaZulu was the Zulu homeland/Bantustan during apartheid. 76 TRC Final Report, “Reconciliation”, Vol. V, Ch. 9, § 70–82. 77 Martin Meredith, 1999, Coming to Terms: South Africa’s Search for Truth, (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 112. 78 Wilhelm Verwoerd, ”Personal journeys: Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission” in Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation, ed. Fanie du Toit, Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2003, 36-38. 79 “Deputy Presiden Jacob Zuma to visit Trust Feed and Wartburg”, South African Government Information, 2 October 2003, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2003/03100215461003.htm. 80 TRC Final Report, Vol. VI, Section III, Ch. 4, § 88-91, 115, 162. In contrast, the ANC did not officially sanction operations that deliberately targeted civilians on the basis of race. Yet from 1985 there was a greater acceptance of civilians being caught in crossfire and it was also believed that the struggle had to move out of the black townships to the white areas. TRC Final Report, Vol. VI, Section III, Ch 3, § 51-54. One joke, with a serious undertone, which I have frequently heard from black South African theologians is: ”When the white man first came to our country, he had the Bible and we had the land. He said ‘let us pray to God’. We closed our eyes and joined him in prayer. When we opened our eyes at the end of the prayer, we saw that we now had the Bible and he had the land.” Here quoted in Tinyiko Sam Maluleke, “Postcolonial Mission: Oxymoron or New Paradigm,” Swedish Missiological Themes, 95:4 (2007) 512, who also discusses the ambivalent role played by Christian mission in Africa. On how South African churches became mirrors of colonial and apartheid society, and even members of the same denomination experienced apartheid quite differently and took different

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

113

stands in the struggles, see “Faith Communities and Apartheid: A Report Prepared for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the Research Institute on Christianity in South Africa.” In Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, eds. James Cochrane, John de Gruchy & Stephen Martin, Cape Town: David Philip, 1999, 34-62, 72-75. 81 Quoted in Lars Buur, Between Truth and Humanity: An Analysis of the Amnesty Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Unpublished Research Paper), Dept. of Ethnography and Social Anthropology, Aarhus University, Denmark, 2000, 7-8. 82 Quoted in Buur, Between Truth and Humanity, 8. 83 Verwoerd, ”Personal journeys: Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 38-42. In South Africa there are two Anglican denominations: CESA and the Anglican Church of Southern Africa (ACSA). 84 Letlapa Mphahlele, Child of this Soil: My life as a Freedom Fighter (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2002), 204. Mphahlele was never apprehended and imprisoned at the time of the attack. He initially applied for amnesty but later refused to appear before the Amnesty Commission until the highest ranking apartheid politicians and generals did the same. 85 Mphahlele, Child of this Soil, 204. 86 APLA operatives testifying before the TRC’s Amnesty Committee claimed that according to their intelligence reports, members of the police frequented the restaurant on a regular basis. However, in reality the place was frequented largely by (not only white) students and other young people. Together with Lyndi Fourie, one coloured and one Indian woman were killed. TRC Final Report, Vol. VI, Section III, Ch. 4, § 137-141. In his autobiography Mphahlele said that at the time of that attack, he had issued an order suspending attacks on civilian targets, but had waived that order after South African soldiers killed five children in Umtata in the Eastern Cape. Mphahlele, 202. 87 Quoted from “Ginn Fourie and Letlapa Mphahlele” at the website of The Forgiveness Project: http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/ginn-fourie-letlapamphahlele-south-africa/ (accessed 10 June 2012). 88 Quoted from “Ginn Fourie and Letlapa Mphahlele”, http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/ginn-fourie-letlapa-mphahlele-southafrica/ (accessed 10 June 2012). 89 “Ginn Fourie and Letlapa Mphahlele”, http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/ginn-fourie-letlapa-mphahlele-southafrica/ (accessed 10 June 2012). 90 Ginn Fourie, “A Personal Encounter with Perpetrators,” in Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, eds. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, (London: Zed Books, 2000). 91 Fourie, “A Personal Encounter with Perpetrators,” 234. 92 93

Fourie, “A Personal Encounter with Perpetrators,” 235. “Jo Berry & Pat Magee (England)”, March 29, 2010,

114

Chapter Five

http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/jo-berry-pat-magee-england/ (accessed 10 June 2012), and “Who we are”, Building Bridges for Peace (their joint organization), http://www.buildingbridgesforpeace.org/who_we_are.html (accessed 10 June 2012). 94 “Understanding Through Collaboration and Friendship,” 224. 95 Quotation from Jo Berry at “Jo Berry & Pat Magee (England)”, March 29, 2010, http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/jo-berry-pat-magee-england/ (accessed 10 June 2012). 96 Quotation from Jo Berry at “Who we are”, Building Bridges for Peace, http://www.buildingbridgesforpeace.org/who_we_are.html (accessed 10 June 2012). 97 Jo Berry, as quoted in “Understanding Through Collaboration and Friendship,” 225. 98 Quotation from Pat Magee at “Jo Berry & Pat Magee (England)”, 29 March, 2010, http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/jo-berry-pat-magee-england/ (accessed 10 June 2012). 99 Pat Magee in “Understanding Through Collaboration and Friendship,” 231, 236237. 100 Quotation from Pat Magee at “Jo Berry & Pat Magee (England)”, 29 March, 2010, http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/jo-berry-pat-magee-england/ (accessed 10 June 2012). 101 Quotation from Jo Berry at “Who we are”, Building Bridges for Peace, http://www.buildingbridgesforpeace.org/who_we_are.html (accessed 10 June 2012). 102 Quotation from Jo Berry at “Who we are”, Building Bridges for Peace, http://www.buildingbridgesforpeace.org/who_we_are.html (accessed 10 June 2012). 103 http://www.buildingbridgesforpeace.org/ (accessed 10 June 2012) 104 Pat Magee, as quoted in “Understanding Through Collaboration and Friendship,” 239. 105 Judith Herman Lewis, Trauma and Recovery, New York: Basic Books, 1997, Herman Lewis underlined that this is a complex process, where the progress through the stages may be described as a spiral in which earlier issues are continually revisited on a higher level of integration. In the course of a successful recovery it should, however, be possible to recognise “a gradual shift from unpredictable danger to reliable safety, from dissociated trauma to acknowledged memory, and from stigmatized isolation to restored social connection.” Ibid 155. 106 These conditions could also be deduced from additional examples of encounters between direct victims and perpetrators related in Ericson, Reconciliation (where these conditions are summarised on p. 448). 107 Richard Orange, “Norway prison to hire 'friends' to play chess and hockey with Breivik”, 31 May 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9302676/Norwayprison-to-hire-friends-to-play-chess-and-hockey-with-Breivik.html; “Prison to hire friends for Breivik”, text by AFP, June 1, 2012, published in Herald Sun

Encounters between Former Perpetrators and Their Victims

115

http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ipad/prison-to-hire-friends-for-breivik/storyfn6s850w-1226377931272. 108 Marie Smyth, “Remembering in Northern Ireland: Victims, Perpetrators and Hierarchies of Pain and Responsibility”, in Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition, ed, Brandon Hamber, Derry/Londonderry: INCORE, 1998, 48. 109 Smyth, “Remembering in Northern Ireland”, 48. 110 Michael Lapsley, “Confronting the past and creating the future, the road to truth, healing and forgiveness”, Public Lecture at the New School for Social Research, 4 May 1998 (printed as Occasional Paper by the Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden with the title The Redemptive Value of Truth Telling). 111 Quoted in Gwladys Fouche, Special Report - Life after Breivik, April 15, 2012, Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/15/uk-norway-breivik-idUKBRE83E 03Z20120415.

PART TWO: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES AND NARRATIVES MAKING

CHAPTER SIX TIBETAN TERRORISM? A CASE STUDY IN NAME-CALLING DEREK F. MAHER Statesman, veteran congressman for thirty years, and current chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, James Leach, recently spoke at East Carolina University on the theme of the “Humanities, Citizenship, and the American Spirit.”1 In his speech, he described the vital role that a humanities education plays in fostering the intelligent analysis of public issues, and in that connection, he criticized George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address in which the president uttered the memorable, but regrettable, line: “Axis of Evil.” Calling a country evil, Chairman Leach remarked, has a profound impact on international relations. Advocating a nuanced contextual understanding born of a sophisticated analysis based in the humanities, he suggested that diplomatic efforts would be more successful and global relations more harmonious in the absence of namecalling. He summed up with the commonplace observation that “Words matter.” This evident truism underlies conflict resolution at all levels, particularly in international relations. Words do matter, and the ways in which parties to a disagreement frame the bases of the conflict are critical determinants in how divisions can be surmounted. What can be thought or said about a particular context is, to a large extent, framed by and limited by the language that is used to describe it, and thus, polarizing language— language that renders an opponent as an irrevocable other—cannot serve to mend fissures. But often, those who deploy such rhetoric do not seek to resolve disputes. The Axis of Evil speech, for example, was written for domestic consumption in the United States and could not have been conceived with any hope of promoting greater mutual understanding between the United States on the one hand and the reputedly evil nations—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—on the other. President Bush and his speechwriters could only have expected that the polarizing language 2 he employed would

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

119

accentuate international divisions, and in fact, it is retrospectively apparent that he was merely seeking to establish a narrative he hoped would assure and justify armed conflict with Iraq. By casting those three nations as allies to terrorism, as renegade regimes hiding reckless and dangerous weapons “from the civilized world,” he configured them as wholly outside of the normative conduct of nations, and he advanced the case for the U.S.-led invasion he had already resolved to initiate. Bush’s rhetorical formation of these enemies was intended to situate them as so thoroughly outside of the mainstream that he could claim that normal diplomatic rules did not prevail, and the central element of his strategy was to link the enemy nations to the key term of “terrorism.” The attacks engineered by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were rightly seen as so abhorrent that their perpetrators were understood to have transgressed the ordinary practices of just war theory. They were beyond the pale, and so, the thinking went, they had to be dealt with in an irregular fashion. Normal diplomacy, the utilization of conventional instruments of international relations, and appeals to international bodies were seen as polite conventions that could not be employed in this case. In such an emergency environment, regular state actors even felt justified in setting aside the standards of the Geneva Conventions. The Bush administration’s rhetoric of terrorism, collapsed down to a bumper sticker in the phrase “the war on terror,” was deployed to configure al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies as being so illegitimate that an instant undeclared attack by covert operatives could be launched a mere twenty-six days after the attacks. The rhetoric worked as the world was nearly unanimous in approving Bush’s attack on Afghanistan, and the United Nations Security Council retroactively endorsed the incursion— and the Bush administration’s depiction of it as “supporting international efforts to root out terrorism”—in December of that year with the approval of U.N. Resolution 1386.3 As Bush’s attention shifted to Iraq and he attempted to lay the foundation for war there, he was compelled to articulate a justification that would simultaneously rally domestic public opinion and garner international support. The strategy he settled upon was to appeal to the methods that had proven successful with Afghanistan, although the key elements of the Afghan case were absent in Iraq: a time-sensitive emergency, any terrorist who had attacked the United States, or legitimate threats to the U.S. and its allies. The neoconservatives populating the Bush administration had long wished to wage war on Iraq, and in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, they felt they had found a narrative that would advance their objectives in the

120

Chapter Six

region.4 Despite the lack of supporting evidence, they claimed that Iraq was seeking weapons of mass destruction, that it harbored terrorists within its borders, and that it had played a role in the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks inside the United States. The State of the Union address on January 29, 2002 was part of the campaign intended to depict Iraq as another Afghanistan that could justifiably be treated in the same fashion. The branding of Iraq as a terrorist renegade was the vital core of the strategy to precipitate a crisis. The utility and effectiveness of this strategy of branding an opponent as a terrorist has been noticed, and as some of the most potent buzz words of the early twenty-first century, the terrorism discourse has been misused in a variety of extraneous contexts merely as a way of expressing strong disapproval. For example, in a devaluation of the term’s currency, Representative Peter King (R-N.Y.) suggested that WikiLeaks, a media organization that specializes in revealing classified information, “should officially be designated as a terrorist organization.”5 James Holmes, the shooter in a Colorado movie theatre, was branded with the same term.6 A road-rage incident involving a pickup truck and a bicycle in the Minneapolis suburbs resulted in both the brandishing of an ax and felony charges of terrorism.7 Clearly, Bush was not the only person to realize how effective this delegitimizing language could be. The designation of enemies by the term terrorist has long been used in international venues to map illegitimacy. The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis was framed in the discourse of terrorism in the 1960s, as was the Troubles in Northern Ireland. In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden himself was at pains to configure the United States and Israel in polarizing terms meant to delegitimize them and to justify his own attacks, and in 1998, he described the Americans as “the worst terrorists.”8 In the post-9/11 atmosphere, however, the brand has become more lethal and hence more effective. Many other international actors have taken note of the efficacy of the strategy employed by the Bush administration, and they have tried to employ it to advance their own domestic and international aims. Like the Bush administration’s use of the rhetoric of terrorism, those other diverse efforts consist of narratives that are both accurate, like Bush’s assertion that Afghanistan harbored terrorists connected to 9/11, and fantasy, like the claims that Iraq played a role in 9/11 or threatened the world with weapons of mass destruction.9 In this chapter, I will explore how the language of “terrorism” has been deployed in the context of Sino-Tibetan relations. I will suggest that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has utilized this rhetoric as an internal means of delegitimizing and undermining rival claims to authority. As in

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

121

the case of the Bush’s 2002 State of the Union, the Chinese cannot have intended that their rhetorical program would serve to advance international relations, including relations with the Tibetan exile government based in northern India. In particular, I will argue that the Chinese hoped to piggyback on the intense negative branding that had been undertaken by the United States with regard to “terrorism,” “terrorist,” and “the war on terrorism” in order to advance their own international and domestic objectives. The Chinese regime took up this linguistic frame as a way of challenging the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile, and internal Tibetan resistors in an effort to dismiss both Tibetan historical claims of an independent identity and the protest movement inside Tibet that was sparked in March of 2008 by the preparations for the Beijing Olympics. Although China has employed this rhetoric with regard to its Uighur population in Xinjiang for decades, the language of terrorism emerged quite recently in the Sino-Tibetan context as the Chinese government was entering the world stage as the host of the planet’s most visible international gathering. While the Olympic torch moved through various countries around the world on its way to China, protesters drew attention to the Tibetan cause in several countries, including Greece, England, the United States, India, Nepal, and especially in occupied Tibet itself.10 China was embarrassed by the disruptions and by the prominence of the Tibetan flag in these protests. For a country that jealously guards its self-image as a civilized land, the publicity surrounding these protests stung. The Tibetan people, whose image is thoroughly comingled with the telegenic, appealing, and well-beloved figure of the Dalai Lama, are presumed by most international observers to be sympathetic victims of Chinese aggression. Through their names, their brands, and their missions, both the “Save Tibet” initiative developed by the International Campaign for Tibet and the “Free Tibet” movement depict Tibet as a beleaguered innocent being preyed upon by belligerent China. The pro-Tibet demonstrators skillfully played upon those generalized images. The Chinese aversion to losing face, much discussed by those attempting to explain Chinese motives and actions, contributed both to their abrupt and decisive suppression of political activities within Tibet and a concerted international effort to delegitimize pro-independence Tibetans and the Dalai Lama, who was depicted as the organizer and chief cheerleader of the protests. The initial clampdown in Lhasa and around Tibet resulted in the arrests of many hundreds of people and the death of about 80, according to the Central Tibetan Administration, although the PRC emphasizes the harm that was inflicted on Chinese businesses.

122

Chapter Six

At the end of March of 2008, the Chinese mainly framed events by appealing to an old narrative they had long employed in explaining unrest on the Tibetan Plateau, which is that the Dalai Lama and his supporters, in pursuit of separatist aims, were controlling events from the security of their exile community in India. Qin Gang, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, declared: This riot was deliberately manipulated by the Dalai Lama clique, and our government has taken legal actions to return Lhasa and other places to normality. The Dalai Lama is not purely a religious person. For a long time, he wore a religious coat and held the banner of peace while trying to separate China and destroy social stability and national unity. 11

This account is at odds with the Dalai Lama’s long-standing concession that he no longer seeks Tibetan independence from China. However, without blaming those outside of Tibet, the Chinese are otherwise unable to explain why Tibetans continue to resist Chinese rule since they assert the PRC has done so much to develop Tibet and benefit the Tibetans. China has a long history of skillfully employing language to configure itself and the other in a way that fortifies its own idealized positive selfnarrative. Even as early as the Shang Dynasty, which lasted from the 17th century to the 11th century B.C.E., Chinese thinkers mapped people into the broad categories of the civilized Chinese at the center and the barbarians at the periphery. For millennia, China has called itself the Middle Kingdom, situating itself in the center of the world. Rhetoric describing other ethnic groups has been colored with dismissive connotations on the status of the other, including references to them as dogs and other animals or simply as strange beasts. This language called into question the humanity of the other. Of course, China is not alone in employing such strategies. The Greeks of the ancient world did it, and great empires with a colonizing mentality have been doing it ever since. Great powers find that delegitimizing strategies of this sort are about the most important tools for controlling new conquered subjects.12 In the twentieth century, new strategies of rhetorical control came into being in China. Instead of discrediting the other on the periphery, China deployed innovative strategies to complement its new expansionist mood following on a century of declining influence. Instead of diminishing the other, it sought to assimilate its neighbors into an expanding map of Chinese authority—and imagination. During the Republican Period (19121949) in the early twentieth century, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) himself, the “Father of the Republic of China,” described five ethnic groups—Han,

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

123

Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan peoples—as constituting the five fingers of a hand.13 Despite their long and distinct histories, his evocative image suggested that their unification was a return to a natural state that must have existed in the past, although it did not.14 More recent iterations of this evolving self-representation in the Communist era describe China, or the dominant Han Chinese, as the materialistic protector of the disparate racial minorities under their control. In this configuration, all of the peoples of an expanded Chinese sphere of influence are represented as members of one big and supposedly happy family. The Han come to stand in for the people and the region of the old territory of the Middle Kingdom, but now the surrounding territories and populations have been subsumed into a unified whole that is understood to be so well-established, so historically justified, that any resistance to reunification with mother China is seen as an egregious violation of the natural order, splittism, in the awkward phrase of Chinese propagandists. So thorough was this campaign of reimaging the peoples of the region that language reforms were instituted to remove disparaging allusions from Chinese characters used to write ethnic names of neighboring people.15 Mao Zedong (1893-1976), the triumphant communist victor in China, continued both those linguistic reforms and the new narrative of racial relations that had begun under Sun Yat-sen. These two seminal figures, so different in so many ways, were alike at least in their pursuit of a new Chinese nationalism that placed the Han at the center of an enlarging racial family, now thought to include fifty-six officially recognized nationalities.16 Arguing that the PRC undertook an unself-conscious process of mythmaking, James Liebold suggests that: Academic experts, not to mention the lay observer, are often guilty of projecting China's current state of unity backward in time, blurring the various ethnic and cultural boundaries that operated throughout Chinese history. By privileging the current PRC discourse on the Zhonghua minzu (i.e, the “Chinese nation”) and its bounded ethnic fragments (Han, Mongol, Tibet, etc.), a generation of scholars has largely overlooked the highly contested and fluid nature of cultural identity in China and the crucial role that its ethnic penumbra has played in the construction and contestation of Chinese national identity.

As soon as the Communist armies sent Nationalist Chinese retreating to Taiwan in 1949 and consolidated rule in Beijing, radio broadcasts began to threaten Tibet with “peaceful liberation.” Within months, military forces began to gather along Tibet’s eastern edge. When they attacked, their victories were swift and decisive over the small number of ill-trained and poorly equipped Tibetan troops. Unable to resist the astronomically

124

Chapter Six

stronger military might of the Red Army, the Tibetans met Chinese encroachments powerlessly. Already in 1951, as the Red Army poured into Tibet to fortify their initial military invasion of two years earlier, the rhetorical move of assimilation was in evidence in what substituted for negotiations. The treaty document that was forced on the Tibetan delegation, popularly known as the Seventeen-Point Agreement, was formally known as "Agreement of the Central People's Government (CPG) and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet." Signed in Beijing on May 23, 1951, the preamble promotes the fairly novel notion that Tibet was and had long been an integral part of the Chinese state:17 The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great Motherland. But over the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary Government [that is to say the Nationalist government that was defeated in China and retreated to Taiwan in 1949] continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deception and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great Motherland. Under such conditions the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and sufferings.

Beginning in the 1950s, the Communist government of the PRC staged great conferences intended to strengthen this mapping of the Chinese identity. They were attended by the diverse members of the various national minorities, and careful stagecraft suggested an air of a consultative process that was belied by events. During his only visit to Beijing in 1954, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, was taken to such an event and photographs of him were utilized for the propaganda purposes of depicting Tibetan participation in the new national mythology and of his symbolically representing Tibet’s return to the motherland. An uneasy decade followed from the initial invasion in 1949 until the fourteenth Dalai Lama (b. 1935) was forced to flee for exile in India in 1959 amidst fears of his impending abduction or assassination. The day he fled was March 14, 1959, and it continues to be celebrated by Tibetans as Tibetan Uprising Day since the Dalai Lama’s party escaped the capitol

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

125

under the cover of a general protest on the streets of Lhasa. Only fifteen years old when he assumed political power in November of 1950, the Dalai Lama speaks movingly in his autobiographical writings about how difficult it was for him to decide how to engage with the Chinese when they insisted upon a narrative of history that was transcendently at odds with Tibetans’ own self-understanding as an independent people with a long and utterly distinct identity. Tibet’s status as an independent nation had been ambiguated by a few episodes in its distant past—the Qing Dynasty’s assistance in repelling an aggressive and intolerant faction of Dzungar Mongolians in 1720, their assistance in expelling Gurkha armies in 1788 and 1791, the 1793 TwentyNine Article Imperial Ordinance issued by the Qing Court presuming for itself the prerogatives the Tibetans spent the next century dodging, and the British incursion into Tibet in 1904 that caused the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1879-1933) to seek refuge first in Mongolia and then in China. Nonetheless, the Tibetan court and two Dalai Lamas spent the balance of the first half of the twentieth century trying to fortify Tibet’s separate identity and to disambiguate their relationship with China even as China attempted—more successfully it turns out—to represent to the world that Tibet was an integral part of China. It is not, however, that the Tibetans did not try to establish their own identity. During two successive periods of exile, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama went to China (1904-1909) to avoid the British incursion into Tibet and to British India (1910-1913) to avoid the Chinese presence in Tibet.18 During these prolonged foreign visits, he encountered large numbers of diplomats and dignitaries from many nations, and he became a far more worldly person than had ever led Tibet. He also became conscious that China had been disseminating their own version of Tibetan and Chinese relations, and he came to understand how he too could cultivate a sense of Tibet as a separate nation. Upon his return to Lhasa in 1913, he set about a program of action that he hoped would raise the international profile of Tibet and establish its independent identity. First of all, he issued a proclamation to the Tibetan people that registers an array of complaints against the Chinese government indicating that they had violated the traditional relationship that had existed between China and Tibet, that of a religious patron and spiritual preceptor (mchod yon). While chastising China and distancing Tibet from its larger neighbor, the document advises all segments of Tibetan society to fortify and uphold what is distinctive about Tibetan culture. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama worked to establish treaty relations with several countries, hoping that Tibet’s obvious capacity to sign treaties would serve as evidence that

126

Chapter Six

Tibet was a sovereign nation. Tibet also participated in a tripartite treaty conference at Simla, India with British, Chinese, and Tibetan delegates. Among other things, he also established exchanged letters with several world leaders.19 Even as the Manchurian Qing Empire collapsed in China and the Republican government came to power in 1912, the Dalai Lama’s efforts were being resisted from Beijing. After their initial effort to situate Tibet and other regions within the Chinese family, the Nationalists sought to fashion a unified identity of disparate ethnic groups into a single Chinese nation by appealing to their shared heritage as Buddhists. Sun Yat-sen hoped this approach would situate the Tibetans and other minorities within a unified nationalist program.20 The language of the communist PRC from the beginning of their rule claimed that Tibet had always been part of China and that its severance from the motherland was caused by pesky European imperialists, interference from the counter-revolutionary Nationalist Chinese, or the obstructionism of so-called “splittist” Tibetans who wanted to divide Tibet off from its natural status within the Chinese state. So long as the young Dalai Lama remained inside of Tibet, he was forced to speak and act very carefully lest his people suffer repercussions from the communist cadres busy dismantling the old Tibet and constructing what would turn out to be a new dystopic reality. However, after the Dalai Lama went into exile in 1959 at the age of twenty-four, he spoke more freely about Tibet’s plight, and over time he became both famous in the west as a champion for peace and infamous within China as the chief agitator to divide the motherland. After arriving safely in exile in India, he repudiated the Seventeen Point Agreement that had been foisted upon the Tibetans. As soon as the Dalai Lama reached India a statement was released that began as follows:21 It has always been accepted that Tibetan people are different from the Han people of China. There has always been a strong desire for independence on the part of the Tibetan people. Throughout history this has been asserted on numerous occasions. Sometimes the Chinese Government had imposed their suzerainty on Tibet and at other times Tibet has functioned as an independent country. In any event, at all times, even when the suzerainty of China was imposed, Tibet remained autonomous in control of its internal affairs.

As the possibility of reconciliation with the Chinese grew more remote and as the Dalai Lama grew more confident, he began to articulate the Tibetan perspective on the distinct identities of China and Tibet. In a letter

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

127

to Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on September 9, 1959, the Dalai Lama was more explicit about his view of Tibet’s status:22 Kindly refer to the proceedings of the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held on Friday, November 24, 1950, at which it was resolved that the consideration of El Salvador’s complaint against “invasion of Tibet by foreign forces” should be adjourned in order to give the parties the opportunity to arrive at a peaceful settlement. It is with the deepest regret that I am informing you that the act of aggression has not terminated. On contrary the area of aggression has been substantially extended with the result that practically the whole of Tibet is under the occupation of the Chinese forces. I and my Government have made several appeals for peaceful and friendly settlement, but so far these appeals have been completely ignored. Under these circumstances, and in view of the inhuman treatment and crimes against humanity and religion to which the people of Tibet are being subjected, I solicit immediate intervention of the United Nations and consideration by the General Committee on its own initiative of the Tibetan issue, which had been adjourned. In this connection I and my Government wish to emphasize that Tibet was a sovereign State at the time when her territorial integrity was violated by Chinese armies in 1950.

As the Dalai Lama grew bolder, the Chinese came to denounce him in more vigorous terms. The principle metaphorical field of the period was one of unity and division, unifier and splittist. All the while, though, the Dalai Lama—called by the Chinese merely Dalai—and his exile government and advisors—called the Dalai clique—both terms are felt to be dismissive and insulting by Tibetans—were depicted as counterrevolutionaries who had merely been lured by their privileged status and fools who had been suckered by imperialist forces bent on destroying the unity of the motherland. As frequently as that second claim is asserted in the early communist narratives about Tibet, a thorough search of the literature reveals the grand total of all of the Europeans who were in Tibet at the time of the Chinese invasion was seven, some of them remaining in Tibet for as little as two months. These are hardly sufficient numbers to ensnare millions of Tibetans in a malevolent plot of meddling European imperialists, but the Chinese had to utilize this language as it was the only way to maintain the rest of their account.23 Despite the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in Tibet and China, still, Tibet and the Tibetans continued to be configured as part and parcel of the greater family of China, a backward and less developed part, a reluctant and obstreperous part, a superstitious and unfortunately religious part, but a part nonetheless. The Dalai Lama

128

Chapter Six

continued to formally hold official positions in the Chinese government even seven years after he fled to India and exile, a consequence of the internal PRC narrative that the only reason he opposed the so-called “reforms” that were taking place in Chinese-occupied Tibet is that he was duped by imperialist forces. He would come around in time. Except that he did not come around. Instead the Dalai Lama came to be a prominent spokesman for Tibetan independence—or later at least autonomy—religious freedom, human rights, the environmental movement, and an array of other causes the PRC has found reason to oppose. Increasingly through the years, the Chinese have come to regard him as outside the pale, beyond socialist redemption, a lost cause. And so, the rhetoric around him and other resistant Tibetans has undergone a transformation from their being unwitting tools of imperialists to being splittists. A brief interregnum in the frosty relations between the exile government and the People’s Republic of China occurred in 1979 as Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) sought to open China up to the world community. The slight liberalization of the Tibet policy was stalled as other events unfolded in 1989: large riots broke out in Lhasa in the days leading up to Tibetan Uprising Day in March, the massacre of Chinese protestors in Tiananmen Square, and the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. China became more isolated in light of these events.24 In the intervening decades since that time, opposition to the occupation of Tibet became routine in the worldwide marketplace of ideas. “Free Tibet” stickers prolifically spread across American bumpers. The 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century saw the Dalai Lama gain great international attention and acceptance in international venues. He traveled extensively, speaking before national assemblies worldwide and meeting with heads of state. The Chinese objected to any actions by foreign nations that could be read as endorsing the Tibetan understanding of history, and so they made a habit of vigorously objecting to the welcoming gestures of these foreign nations. Episodically throughout this period, the Chinese government attempted to “liberalize” relations with the Tibetans, which meant on the one hand that during such moments, they opened negotiations with the exile government and that on the other hand, they refrained from enacting the most egregious human rights violations. All the while, military and resource-extraction infrastructure were elaborated on the Tibetan plateau—undertaken within the pretense that China was developing Tibet’s economy—and massive population transfers of Han Chinese into Tibetan-speaking regions threatened to make Tibetans a minority in their

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

129

own land. Their frustration and desperation increased. While Tibetans were winning public sympathy throughout the world, they felt their prospects for maintaining their own culture were rapidly becoming impossible except in exile. In Tibet, matter reached a head in 2008, and a turning point arrived. The approaching Olympics in Beijing during the fall of 2008 put China in the international spotlight as never before. They strove to represent themselves as an international leader, a normal nation that deserved to be taken seriously on the world stage. China had by this time had become a manufacturing powerhouse and a significant player in world commerce and finance. It hoped to be accorded a measure of respect that corresponded to its self-image, part of which reached back to the earliest projections of China as the civilized nation amidst those of less refinement. Given that, it would not do to have contrary representations of China being promoted, and anyone who would project alternate identities for the Chinese government or the Chinese people would have to be delegitimized, ruled out of bounds, rhetorically defined out of existence. But the PRC was not the only entity that saw an opportunity in the higher profile and elevated attention that would come with the Olympics. Realizing this, the PRC elevated security protocols in relation to potentially problematic populations. Chinese dissidents opposed to the regime were rounded up in large numbers, and efforts were made to prevent protests by the million and a half poor people who had been displaced to make room for Olympic venues.25 In Tibet, also, the Olympics were seen as an opportunity to register dissent to a larger audience than usual. As March 14, 2008 arrived, and Tibetans recalled the Tibetan Uprising Day in 1959, they rallied in the streets, staking a claim to a Tibetan identity they felt was being suppressed. They were angered by the decades of domination by the Chinese, and they were particularly angered by the ways they felt their culture was being coopted by the Chinese pageantry surrounding the Olympics. Throngs of Tibetans vented their rage by marching in the streets of Lhasa, whereupon security forces appeared and violence erupted. Tibetans directed their ire towards both Han Chinese and Muslim Hui merchants in Lhasa, both of whom were perceived by Tibetans as unwelcome interlopers who were wrongly taking their resources and destroying their culture. An unknown number of people were killed, unknown because all foreign journalists and visitors were expelled from Tibet. Before long, violence and police crackdowns spread to other population centers in the Tibetan-speaking regions of China, and China cracked down hard.

130

Chapter Six

There had been protests in Tibet before, often timed to coincide with the March 14th anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day in 1959, and there had been violence before. But something changed this time. The Chinese were embarrassed in front of a very international audience just as they hoped to gain a new status as a player on the international stage. In reaction, the Chinese attempted to reconfigure the Tibetans in a new way. In place of the old language about how Tibetans were part of the big family of the motherland, now they began to accuse Tibetans of being terrorists who therefore had to be erased from the family portrait. The terrorism discourse, long reserved for Muslim separatists in Xinjiang region of western China, was now being directed specifically at the Tibetans. Partly, the Chinese were simply prevailing on the branding of terrorism that had been carefully crafted by the United States since 9/11. But there seemed to be something more afoot. This was the language of delegitimization. Tibetans were now being depicted as outside of the pale of the Chinese family, not ordinary co-siblings at the feet of Mother China, but a dangerous foreign and irrevocably irreconcilable other. This rhetorical strategy solidified when, beginning in 2009, protesting Tibetans began to set themselves on fire as an act of political protest. To date, fiftyone Tibetans have self-immolated throughout the Tibetan-speaking regions occupied by China and even in Delhi just before Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived for a conference.26 People resort to the vocabulary of violence when they have run out of other words in which they can express their resistance. When there is no further way they can effectively articulate their dissent, acts of violence that were previously unimaginable become the only remaining means of communication. But self-immolation is a special form of protest statement of ancient pedigree in China. It is meant to be read as the most grievous judgment possible on the unjust nature of a regime. This government, the act says, is so corrupt and illegitimate that I am forced to undertake an action that defies nature. The unnatural act of self-immolation accuses, prosecutes, and condemns the unjust regime.27 Additionally, in the culture of Tibetan Buddhism, dominated as it is by ideals of altruism and selfsacrifice, self-immolation should not simply be read as violence but as an act of ultimate service. The Chinese, however, conscious that this particular form of selfsacrifice is meant to signify the ultimate revocation of their claim to legitimate authority, felt obliged to counteract the criticism. To deny the Tibetan actors standing to level a charge of that kind, they had to be ruled out as partners in legitimate discourse. The most convenient means of achieving that result was to dismiss the self-immolators as terrorists.

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

131

This act of self-sacrifice that does not harm others does not meet most standard definitions of the term terrorism. Since such a self-directed act cannot have the effect of coercion or compulsion, but rather operates on the level of shaming the oppressor, few would read it as meeting the definition of terrorism. But, and this is the key theoretical move, Chinese discourse attempts to bridge this gap by conflating the tactics and the objectives of the actor. Since the ultimate objective of the self-immolator is to dislodge Chinese rule, the thinking goes, the self-immolator must be trying to divide the motherland. Hence, by virtue of their intentions, if not their actions, they ought to be counted as terrorists. Emily Yeh comments:28 The labeling of Tibetan self-immolation as “terrorism” in China today performs another kind of splitting of sovereignty, creating a disjuncture of methods and aims. In this new formation, the state declares a form of terror any perceived threat to state territorial sovereignty, regardless of its actual methods or effects vis-à-vis harm to others.

This reading is confirmed by the fact that after the Dalai Lama offered prayers for Tibetans who had self-immolated, the Chinese foreign ministry accused him of terrorism. 29 Of course, praying in itself is never otherwise considered to be an act of terrorism. The Chinese perception is that by offering prayers on behalf of the deceased, he was sanctioning the selfimmolators condemnation of Chinese rule; hence he is guilty of the same objective as the self-immolators and he thereby becomes a terrorist. In the Chinese thinking, both protests against the Olympics and the campaign of self-immolations offer profound challenges to the legitimacy of Chinese rule in Tibet. When Tibetans undertake these actions and raise a challenge to Chinese rule, they intend to split the motherland, and by virtue of that, they are terrorists! To return to the beginning, “Words matter.” A solution to the acrimony and cycles of violence on the Tibetan Plateau will not be achievable by using polarizing and delegitimizing language. The Chinese will have to develop new narratives that do not simply rule the Tibetan leaders out of the conversation about the future of the Tibetan people, and rhetorical deescalation will be necessary among the most extreme voices on both sides. If China truly seeks reconciliation, it will have to eschew the delegitimizing language that has dominated Chinese rhetoric since 2008. They will have to set aside jingoistic appeals to domestic sentiment and dismissive accusations meant to play for sympathy internationally. They will have to speak in a voice that is not an absolute non-starter for Tibetans. It remains to be seen if they value this path toward peace over

132

Chapter Six

whatever domestic and international benefits they feel they are gaining from the current rhetorical atmosphere. Eventually, potent terminology gets co-opted for dubious purposes. A terrorist becomes “anybody who uses violence you don’t like.”30 It was only a generation between President Reagan’s 1983 Oval Office meeting with the Taliban Mujahedeen, whom he described as “courageous freedom fighters,” 31 to the point that another president branded the same men as terrorists from that same room. One can’t help but think that there is a lesson for the West in this analysis, as well. The casual use of delegitimizing language may have local appeal, but it cannot be expected to provide a foundation for peaceful coexistence. Too often, delegitimizing name-calling has served as a substitute for actual problem solving in the search for peace.

Notes 1

Chairman Leach spoke at East Carolina University on April 12, 2012 as part of a celebration of the humanities at ECU. 2 The well-known line forecloses the possibility of resolving the conflict while rallying American support for disagreements the speech itself elevated: States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic… (A)ll nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4540 Accessed September 18, 2012. 3 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c4e94571c.html Accessed September 15, 2012. 4 Amanda Jean Klimesh, Terror rhetoric: deconstructing dominant and alternative realities. MA Thesis, Iowa State University, 2010. http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/11662/ Accessed September 16, 2012. 5 http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-7098919.html Accessed September 15, 2012. 6 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-24/news/bs-ed-colorado-shootingterrorism-20120724_1_terrorist-label-shootings-lee-loughner Accessed September 15, 2012. 7 http://www.startribune.com/local/south/53060587.html?refer=y Accessed September 20, 2012. 8 In 1998, Osama bin Laden turned the “terrorist” label around in an interview with ABC News:

Tibetan Terrorism? A Case Study in Name-Calling

133

In today's wars, there are no morals. We believe the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets. Cited in Time Magazine, September 24, 2001. http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1000871,00.html Accessed September 15, 2001. 9 See, for example, the analysis in David Kreiger’s “The War on Iraq as Illegal and Illegitimate,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/03/00_krieger_war-illegalillegitimate.htm Accessed September 19, 2012. 10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/24/tibet.olympicgames2008 Accessed April 15, 2012. 11 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/world/asia/27tibet.html?_r=0 Accessed September 21, 2012. 12 A fine example of the type is examined by David Chidester in Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996). He demonstrated that European missionaries, colonial administrators, and travelers alternately described native Africans as either innately religious or utterly incapable of demonstrating religious sensibilities depending upon whether they were compliant or restive at the time. 13 As Gray Tuttle (Tibetan Buddhism in the Making of Modern China. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 9) observes: “From 1912 to 1927, this idea was represented by a national flag , which had five colored stripes of equal size to represent the equality of the races.” 14 http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=202&catid=6&subcatid=37 and James Liebold, “Competing Narratives of Racial Unity in Republican China: From the Yellow Emperor to Peking Man,” Modern China 32: 2 (2006), 181-220. 15 Fiskesjö, Magnus. "The animal other: Re-naming the barbarians in 20th-century China." Social Text 29.4 (No. 109, Special Issue, "China and the Human"), 57-79. 16 Liebold, 182. 17 See Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet. Translated and annotated by Derek F. Maher (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 954-955 and 1124-1125. 18 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, pp. 684-704 and 721750 See also Elliot Sperling, “The Thirteenth Dalai Lama at Wutai Shan: Exile and Diplomacy,” Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, no. 6 (December 2011): 389-410, http://www.thlib.org?tid=T5720 (accessed September 27, 2012). 19 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, pp. 755-787. 20 Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhism in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 9-11). 21 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, p. 1038. 22 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, p. 1053. 23 Warren W. Smith Jr. [Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 278-279, n. 57]

134

Chapter Six

indicates there were seven Europeans in Tibet just before the Chinese invasion. They were: Heinrich Harrer, Peter Aufshneider, Hugh Richardson, the radio operator Reggie Fox, Robert Ford in Chamdo, Geoffrey Bull in Markham, and the White Russian Nedbaillof in Lhasa. In addition, Frank Bessac was in Lhasa from June 11th to July 27th 1950 along with another Russian, Vasili Zvanzov. 24 Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 430-431. 25 http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-06-05-3431055449_x.htm 26 http://www.savetibet.org/resource-center/maps-data-fact-sheets/self-immolationfact-sheet and http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/news_asia/2012-03-29/tibetandies-in-india-after-self-immolation.html Accessed on September 24, 2012. 27 Charles D. Orzech, (1994) “Provoked Suicide and the Victim’s Behavior: The Case of the Vietnamese Self-Immolators.” In Curing Violence, edited by Mark I. Wallace and Theophus H. Smith, 137-60. Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press. 28 Emily Yeh, On Terrorism and the Politics of Naming. http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/533 29 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/19/dalai-lama-prayers-tibetansterrorism 30 Reese Erlich: “Stop using the word ‘terrorist’” in Pulse. http://pulsemedia.org/2010/09/24/reece-erlich-stop-using-the-word-terrorist/ Accessed September 20, 2012. 31 http://www.democracyforums.com/showthread.php?t=8236 Accessed September 20, 2012.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE MALE WARRIOR GOD AND THE THREATENED EGOTISM OF HIS MIGHTY MEN CALVIN MERCER

Introduction In this chapter, I will draw upon my previous work on the male warrior God in fundamentalist Christianity in order to provide a context for understanding fundamentalist violence, broadly understood, and in particular the sexist attitudes and behaviors common in fundamentalists groups. Additionally, I will offer a suggestion about the psychological underpinnings of the fundamentalist mind. This will set the context for applying threatened egotism research to fundamentalist Christianity and its reactive violence, particularly against women. In this regard, I examine fundamentalism as a movement and at the organizational level. I will briefly consider the relevance of threatened egotism research for the typical profile of the individual fundamentalist. Lastly, I utilize research on threatened egotism to bring a deeper understanding to fundamentalist violence. This chapter focuses my analysis on fundamentalism as it has developed within the American religious scene. Fundamentalism, as I use the term here, was a cultural protest movement, the pedigree of which stems from the 1920s and found expression in various people and institutions throughout most of the twentieth century and now into the twenty-first. In my view, the description that best captures the essential fundamentalist mindset is found in the introduction to the massive Fundamentalism Project, a series of monographs edited by R. Scott Appleby and the widely respected dean of American religion, Martin E. Marty. They write:

136

Chapter Seven Religious fundamentalism has appeared in the twentieth century as a tendency, a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative individuals and movements. It manifests itself as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, these believers fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past. These retrieved ‘‘fundamentals’’ are refined, modified, and sanctioned in a spirit of pragmatism: they are to serve as a bulwark against the encroachment of outsiders who threaten to draw the believers into a syncretistic, areligious, or irreligious cultural milieu. Moreover, fundamentalists present the retrieved fundamentals alongside unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations. These innovations and supporting doctrines lend the retrieved and updated fundamentals an urgency and charismatic intensity reminiscent of the religious experiences that originally forged communal identity.1

Marty and Appleby’s project, sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, studied fundamentalism all over the world and in different religious traditions. This chapter focuses on Christian fundamentalism. However, what is outlined below may be understood in a more general way and applied to extreme movements in other religions as well, for the very reason Marty and Appleby note, namely that fundamentalism is a “habit of mind.” The theologies may differ, but the structures of the thought process and the emotions flowing from that pattern of thinking are similar across religious lines. Fundamentalists in Christianity are much more similar to fundamentalists in Islam and Judaism than they are to their own Christian brothers and sisters in nonconservative expressions of Christianity. This right-wing version of modern Christianity, as I indicated, emerged in the 1920s, in part as a protest to progressive and academic notions, like Darwinian evolution and the critical study of the Bible, which moved through the American landscape in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. In those early years, Princeton Seminary and professors such as Charles Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield were the epitome of this emerging movement. The publication from 1910 to 1915 of the influential popular booklets, The Fundamentals: A Testimony to Truth, saturated many American pastors, church leaders, and congregations with fundamentalist ideas. 2 Jerry Falwell, notable for his political activities in the “Moral Majority” that helped elect Ronald Reagan as president, was one expression of fundamentalism in the last quarter of the last century. Today, Bob Jones University, in Greenville,

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 137

South Carolina, is an example of classic fundamentalism, and the religious right in general continues its crusades, political and otherwise, for family values and a Christian nation. Evangelicalism and other versions of conservative Christianity have their own, sometimes more “liberal,” approaches to women. Still, my analysis of the most extreme version of conservative Christianity, fundamentalism, can have value for understanding these other flavors of conservative Christianity, like evangelicalism and Pentecostalism. In this chapter I use terms like “violence” and “aggression” in a broad sense to refer to any aggressive — verbal, legal, physical, or other — response from fundamentalists and their organizations toward others or other entities.

The Male Warrior God and the Subordination of Women3 I have detailed elsewhere the long history of Christianity where the male warrior God, and the related subordination of women, is significant, if not prominent. By way of a brief overview, in the biblical period, Judaism and Christianity emerge out of cultures where this view of deity and of women is present and, most certainly, ultimately influenced the fundamentalist Christianity we here consider in this paper. These views of God and women can easily be traced through the post-biblical early church period, the Middle Ages, and the Reformation. That the Christian religion, for most of its history, is patriarchal in its view of God and female-male relations is widely recognized.4 These views are conveniently delivered to modern day fundamentalists, easily fitting, as we shall see, into the fundamentalist mindset about tradition and the modern world. Fundamentalists, then, have plenty of biblical and historical material to work with in terms of justifying their worldview and their perspective on women. While they strongly advocate for their views of women, the overarching theological framework — i.e., the male warrior God — is held more or less implicitly. In other words, most fundamentalists would not use my term, “male warrior God,” to describe their understanding of deity. They talk about God’s punishment of sin or say that God is a just God. Prominent attributes of the fundamentalist deity include power (e.g.,1 Chronicles 29:11-12), holiness (e.g., Exodus 3:5, Hosea 11:9, Isaiah 6:3), and judgment (e.g., Isaiah 1, Romans 14:10). Fundamentalists also talk about the softer attributes of divine grace and love. However, it is the male warrior God, lying just beneath the surface of fundamentalist ideology and rhetoric, that dances so well with their aggressive stance on many issues, including women.

138

Chapter Seven

With specific regard to their view of women, fundamentalists are quick to quote scriptural passages like Ephesians 5:21, which reads, “Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husband as unto the Lord,” or 1 Corinthians 14:34-35, where women are instructed to be silent in the church and ask their husbands at home if they want to know anything. Of course, careful biblical exegesis can uncover the historical contexts for such texts and suggest various ways the scriptures can be legitimately interpreted, even by the church. Fundamentalists, however, are prone to use selected “proof texts” to justify their positions, without the benefit of scholarly inquiry and insight. An interesting subtheme to the subordination of women is the attack, to use a strong word, on the sexuality of women in fundamentalist programs and churches. Female leadership, anathema in the classical fundamentalist perspective, can be seen in some fundamentalist writers as associated with female sexuality.5 Female leadership and the overt expression of female sexuality are condemned. “Be silent in the church” is found alongside admonitions for abstinence and modest dress (1 Timothy 2:9-15) in fundamentalist instruction to women. The fundamentalist paradigm for women and their role with respect to men is taken almost wholesale from the ancient Israelite ideology found in the Hebrew Bible, the scripture Christians inherited from Judaism and renamed the Old Testament. In ancient Israel, God was the ultimate authority in the structure of power. Far below God was man — male man. Far below man we find women, children, and other property. The fact that there is a debate among exegetes as to the appropriateness of calling women “property” simply indicates that, no matter the side on which one may take on the issue, women were certainly low in the power structures. Women had a role to play, of course, and that role was inside the family, caring for the house and children. With few exceptions, men were the prophets, priests, kings, judges, and leaders of commerce. The male warrior God is, most definitely, not the only view of deity in the Bible and throughout Christian history. There is a submerged feminine aspect to deity in the Old Testament. And there are stories about exceptional women in the Bible. In the Roman Catholic tradition, the emergence of Mary as a prominent figure in devotion and theology can be interpreted as the “feminist” spirit breaking through (though it can also be viewed as a tool of patriarchy6). My point is that the male warrior God is an important perspective in the Bible that fundamentalist Christianity mines and uses for its ends. That the male warrior God contributes in some way to the subordination of women in fundamentalist communities does not mean

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 139

that the dynamic does not operate in the other direction, from the bottom up. The oppression of women can be translated into a projection “into the sky” in a way that fosters a notion of deity that is male and aggressive.7 It is most likely that the degree of influence moves in both directions, with the theology and the social ideology operating in mutually supportive roles. In any case, the notion that religious symbols can be potent in their influence on society and its beliefs and behaviors is a well-regarded idea.8 To drill down into modern American fundamentalism, I would like to quote, from my previously published work, a paragraph that captures the flavor of fundamentalism with respect to the male warrior God: Royal and military metaphors, which permeated fundamentalist writings in the 1920s when the movement began, have continued to be prevalent in fundamentalist language about God and the Christian life. A review of hymns popular in fundamentalist churches includes the following titles: “Come, Thou Almighty King,” “O Worship the King,” “All Hail the Power of Jesus' Name,” “Onward, Christian Soldiers,” and “Lead On, O King Eternal.” Lyrics from the above titles include “Come, thou incarnate word, gird on thy mighty sword,” “His chariots of wrath the deep thunderclouds form,” “Onward Christian soldiers, marching as to war . . . Christ, the royal master, leads against the foe,” and “The day of march has come, henceforth in fields of conquest thy tents shall be our home . . . the crown awaits the conquest, lead on, O God of might.” Titles of books, magazines, and pamphlets popular among fundamentalist Christians at various points in their history also reflect a fighting spirit and include: Sword of the Lord, The King's Business, Capturing a Town for Christ (Jerry Falwell), and Combat Faith (Hal Lindsey). One of the more popular and effective evangelical college organizations is Campus Crusade for Christ and Billy Graham’s revival meetings were called crusades.9

Interestingly, possible sexual undertones can be discerned in some of these titles, i.e., “come,” “conquest,” and “gird on thy mighty sword.” Lest it somehow be overlooked, the militant nature of the above titles are firmly embedded in a male deity, as can be readily seen in the male images of “king,” “master,” and “Lord” and in the masculine pronoun “his.”10 Many other titles of songs and books used by fundamentalists give emphasis to “father” as a dominant image for deity. And, of course, it is understood that males are the mighty men of God and the soldiers who will fight the crusade against evil.11 As in ancient Israel, the woman is the wife who serves as a “helper” to the man.12 I have given most of the biblical examples from ancient Israel and its scriptures that constitute the Old Testament for Christians. While on first glance it may not seem as harsh a patriarchal system, we should not overlook that in the Christian New Testament, the Savior Christ is male

140

Chapter Seven

and all of his prominent disciples, at least as presented by the male gospel writers, were males. It has been argued that in the early Jesus movement, there may have been some rehabilitation of the role of women. However, with the possible exception of the Gospel of Luke, the texts that were chosen to be in the scriptural canon reflect the patriarchal party line. I will not here repeat the historical review I provide elsewhere. Suffice to it say that, even if there was a rehabilitation in the role of women in Jesus and the first century movement that stemmed from him, very soon, in second century, the harsh patriarchal attitudes were back in a most visible way.

A Psychological Profile of Fundamentalists I will now briefly summarize my thesis about the psychological profile of the typical fundamentalist as a way of setting the context for applying research on threatened egotism to the issue at hand.13 Aaron Beck is the well-known and respected founder of cognitive therapy, which is arguably one of the, if not the, most scientifically validated and practiced models of psychotherapy.14 Earlier, I quoted the important description of fundamentalism by Marty and Appleby. While their focus was not on the psychological state of the fundamentalist, their description is quite consistent with my previous interest in the anxiety of fundamentalists. Marty and Appleby talk about “risk” and “threat.” In my view, when the fundamentalist core doctrines are challenged, that can entail considerable risk and, indeed, anxiety. As I alluded to earlier, fundamentalism emerged on the American scene in part in reaction to the threat from the supposedly dangerous ideas of Charles Darwin. I think any threat to the fundamentalist’s well-ordered world of social structure (e.g., traditional male-female roles) or ideology (e.g., the authority of the Bible) entails considerable risk and anxiety. I want to digress briefly in order to make it clear that I am not arguing that fundamentalists are mentally ill by virtue of their extreme religious views. (As a personal aside, I am a past practicing clinician, and having followed the American Psychiatric Association’s manual of disorders, I can attest that fundamentalism is not listed there as a psychological disorder.) Still, it can be valuable to look carefully at a dysfunctional profile as a way of better understanding proclivities in healthy individuals. I do not think, on balance, fundamentalism fosters good psychological health, but that does not mean I think a fundamentalist meets the technical criteria for a mental disorder just because they advocate a fundamentalist ideology.

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 141

Returning to my thesis, Beck’s cognitive model posits the existence of “schemas” as central to how we understand and behave in the world and, indeed, these schemas also impact our emotions. Schemas reflect our most basic assumptions, beliefs, and thought patterns. Importantly, they are usually formed at an early age and are often unconscious. They determine how we think, feel, and act in the world, but without our conscious knowledge, unless we have through therapy or personal work made those schemas conscious. Most of our schemas allow us to function just fine in the world and present no troubling issues for us. Other schemas, however, can be quite problematic. Here are examples of a couple of dysfunctional schemas that can lead to depression: x x

Unless I do everything perfectly, I am a failure. If I make a mistake, I am bad.

In working with fundamentalist clients, in the therapy room,15 and with fundamentalist students, both in the traditional classroom and on study abroad programs, where sometimes anxiety is closer to the surface, I have found that the cognitive schema of the fundamentalist Christian is something very close to the following: x If I don’t get it right, I am not a Christian, and I will go to hell. The “it” in this model is mainly the Christian’s theology, but it can also include moral behavior, always interpreted strictly. The absolutism here is important. The fundamentalist has no room for error. The consequence of not “getting it right” means that the fundamentalist loses his or her basic identity and, also, puts themselves at risk of severe, eternal punishment. An underlying anxiety is understandable.

The Inflated Egos of the Mighty Men of the Male Warrior God For decades, the conventional wisdom, although without good empirical support, was that low self-esteem was a cause of aggression.16 Low selfesteem has been presented as a cause for violence in abusive mothers,17 youth gangs, 18 murderers, 19 and terrorists. D. E. Long surveyed the literature and explained terrorism with the conventional wisdom, i.e., low self-esteem. This view of the role of low self-esteem in violence has been

142

Chapter Seven

so pervasive and influential that public policy and budgetary decisions have been made consistent with the view.20 In a thorough and highly regarded 1996 review article, Baumeister, Smart, and Boden rather convincingly shattered the conventional view about low self-esteem and violence.21 Furthermore, they showed that many studies that posited low esteem as a cause for violence, upon close inspection, actually gave reason to think that it is the opposite — high selfesteem — or some version of it that causes violence. For example, with regard to D.E. Long, referenced above, evidence has actually shown a pattern of high self-esteem. 22 Subsequent studies, designed to look specifically at the link between high self-esteem and violence, have supported the contention of Baumeister, et al. 23 In a recent article, Baumeister, et al, revisits the notion that low self-esteem causes aggression. They reaffirm their conclusion that there is no link.24 More specifically, it is high self-esteem of a particular sort. It is favorable self-appraisals that are inflated or without sound basis and are, therefore, unstable and hence vulnerable. Popular words used to characterize this artificially high self-esteem are “pride,” “egotism,” “arrogance,” conceitedness,” and “narcissism.” 25 Indeed, aggressors generally do not exhibit humility, modesty, and self-deprecation.26 Here is a helpful way of formulating this thesis: High self-esteem means thinking well of oneself, whereas narcissism involves passionately wanting to think well of oneself. The present findings suggest that it is the latter (emotional and motivational) sense of egotism that is decisive for aggression . . . In plainer terms, it is not so much the people who regard themselves as superior beings who are the most dangerous, but rather, those who have a strong desire to regard themselves as superior beings. Some people may be able to brush off criticism easily, just as others may view it as valid and well deserved, and neither response may produce aggression. In contrast, people who are preoccupied with validating a grandiose self-image apparently find criticism highly upsetting and lash out against the source of it.27

When the unstable, high self-esteem is challenged by some threat, then the threatened ego reacts with violence toward the threatener. “Threatened egotism,” with consideration to the narcissistic psychology behind it, has become the most common terminology used to talk about the new paradigm of violence. The degree of ego inflation a person has corresponds to the range of feedback that could be perceived as threatening. In other words, the more inflated and unstable the narcissistic ego, the more likely the person is to feel threatened. When faced with threat to or criticism of the inflated ego,

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 143

the person faces a “choice point.” If the criticism is absorbed, the result can be sadness, anxiety, and depression. If the choice is to react with a defensive posture, that can take the form of some version of violence. The violence is not random; it is directed at a specific target, namely the source of the criticism or threat.28 The psychological condition of narcissism, with the term derived from the Greek myth about Narcissus who fell in love with his own reflection, helps inform the pattern of threatened egotism leading to violence. Narcissists, consumed with self-love, generally have disregard for others, which makes doing violence to another more palatable. Some see this new paradigm of violence as explanatory of many kinds of violence, including group. Tyrannical governments, for example, usually present with attitudes of moral superiority, with North Korea and the “master race” of Nazi Germany being good examples.29 Further study has expanded on the basic insights of Baumeister and his colleagues. For example, the aggression of a highly narcissistic person, under threat, is attenuated when that person shares some key similarity with the one bringing the criticism.30 An opportunity for further research exists, namely gathering empirical research on threatened egotism that considers religious extremism as a factor. So, to summarize, the paradigm of violence proposed by Baumeister and his colleagues entails three variables: egotism, threat, and aggression. This model can be seen as giving explanation to, and forwarding, my thesis about how the fundamentalist mind works. I will show how the model also illuminates the combative history of the fundamentalist movement in America. As explained earlier, I contend that the typical fundamentalist carries an underlying, perhaps mostly unconscious, schema that is close to, if not exactly, the following: x If I don’t get it right, I am not a Christian, and I will go to hell. In other writings, I have emphasized the anxiety engendered by that important schema. Now, in light of the important work on violence that Baumeister has provided, I want to expand this understanding of fundamentalism by looking at fundamentalism at the organizational level and as a movement. Later, I will very briefly consider how the threatened egotism research might enhance our understanding of the individual fundamentalist. It is difficult to cleanly separate these two, because psychological characteristics I have identified in the typical fundamentalist profile certainly inform how I think about fundamentalism as a movement.

144

Chapter Seven

With respect to fundamentalism as a movement and at the organizational level we have seen from Baumeister’s work that threatened egotism entails a narcissistic mentality. Indeed, a sense of rightness is intrinsic to the fundamentalist worldview. Fundamentalists are absolutist regarding their claims about the Bible, salvation, and ethics, and the impact and influence of fundamentalist churches on parishioners and of the movement on culture is informed by this strict stance. Males, using justification from their Bible prooftexts, set themselves up as authority figures in the church and family. The rigid fundamentalist ideology often puts fundamentalism in sharp disagreement with the surrounding culture on a host of issues. Indeed, as we noted, it was fundamentalism’s reaction against Darwinian evolution that constituted one important reason for this movement’s rise on the American scene. Darwinian evolution certainly challenges core fundamentalist assumptions about the Bible and God’s role in creation. The fundamentalist approach to the Bible, often literally and without much attention to historical, rational, and widely accepted methods of critical exegesis, has put the movement at odds with mainline scholarship of the Bible, resulting in a host of fundamentalist Bible Colleges, seminaries, and training institutions. The feminist movement is most definitely the devil’s work carried out by secular humanists and liberals and constitutes a major threat to the male power structure, in church and family, fortified by a narcissistically motivated sense of entitlement. Threatened egotism aggression research has shown that the threat to the narcissistic individual or organization can come in at least three forms or triggers.31 Each of these forms sheds light on fundamentalism at the group level. First, it can come as negative feedback or criticism.32 Because of their rather comprehensive and absolutist views about the Bible, culture, and a host of ethical matters, fundamentalists often either perceive themselves to be criticized or, indeed, are being criticized, especially when they are attempting to use the legal or other structures of society to impose their way or life or ethical views onto others. Second, social rejection, which can manifest as simple dislike and disrespect, can serve as a kind of aggression for those susceptible to threatened egotism.33 Fundamentalist leaders and churches encourage their members to “be ye separate,” to use a popular slogan in fundamentalist circles. So, while there is often some form of rejection of fundamentalists by the larger community, this isolation is actually welcomed by many fundamentalists. As I point out in my earlier work, fundamentalists, by the middle of the last century, had created an impressive infrastructure consisting of schools, institutes, and parachurch organizations, all of which

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 145

allowed members to live to a significant degree outside the “worldly ways.” 34 The worldly ways, of course, includes women stepping outside the traditional roles. Finally, the restriction of freedom or autonomy can provoke aggression.35 This supposed attack on the fundamentalist way of life is the basis for the religious right’s involvement in American politics. For example, fundamentalists believe they have a right to demand public Christian prayer and teaching their doctrine of religious creation in the public schools. So, they aggressively pursue laws and policies that require these things. Fundamentalists believe that their version of the traditional family is being threatened, and so they work to aggressively enshrine their religiously based patriarchal model into law. A version of this fight currently in ascendency in America is found in the various attacks on gay marriage, for instance. From the perspective of the threatened egoism paradigm of violence, the aggression, regardless of the trigger, is directed toward the source of the threat. The history of Christian fundamentalism is one in which fundamentalism as a movement has taken a militant stance toward the instruments of culture considered to be threatening, whether that be the government, liberal seminaries, or organizations advocating equality for women or gay people. The “religious right,” which has been a player in American politics since at least the Reagan era, is an example of fundamentalism fighting back at what fundamentalists perceive as a threat to their way of life, whether it be their religious views or the traditional family. In expanding the research on threatened egotism, Konrath, et al, have shown that a psychological connection between the narcissist and the one who threatens lessens the likelihood of a reactive attack by the injured narcissist. 36 While this is an interesting finding, it fails to offer a way forward for good relations with fundamentalists, because it is the very ideology of absolutism and exclusivism that separates fundamentalists from others. Compromise and cooperation, especially on matters of theology or ethics, are generally unacceptable to fundamentalists, because the fundamentalist would be compromising and cooperating with sin and sinners. “Be ye separate!” is a popular slogan in many fundamentalist circles. Turning directly, though briefly, to a consideration of the individual fundamentalist, my earlier work largely consisted of constructing a psychological profile of the typical fundamentalist. That profile gave significant attention to the anxiety engendered by the underlying animating schema I discussed earlier in this article. I derived that

146

Chapter Seven

formulation with insights gained from the literature on cognitive therapy, authoritarianism, and consistency and certainty. I was also informed by my experience working with many fundamentalists in the classroom, therapy room, and other contexts. I do not retreat from my contention that anxiety is at least one of the mental states involved in the psychological structure of most fundamentalists. However, I find that threatened egotism research can enrich that picture. My experience is that many fundamentalists exhibit the high self-esteem, sometimes arrogantly so, described in the threatened egotism research. My suspicion, at this point based only on anecdotal evidence, is that behind the narcissistic bluster is a fragile, anxious ego. I expect this fragility is more likely to be found in fundamentalists who are in earlier developmental stages, rather than in older adults who are “set in their ways.” Although anecdotal, I have seen this pattern of anxiety, threatened egotism, and aggressive reaction in younger men whose spouses are being influenced by changing women’s roles. Since we do not, to my knowledge, have empirical data to support this hypothesis, I will leave it as a suggestion for further research.

Concluding Reflection The important contribution of Baumeister and his colleagues that aggression is caused by threatened egotism helps illuminate our understanding of Christian fundamentalism as a movement and at the group level. The violence of fundamentalism, as exampled in its insistence on the subordination of women, is more clearly understood when its absolutist and exclusivist ideology — its sense of being absolutely right — is seen in light of the narcissistic egotism, which reacts militantly when threatened.

Notes 1

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., The Fundamentalism Project, 5 vols., vol. 3, Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3. 2 George M. Marsden, ed., The Fundamentals: A Testimony to Truth, 4 Vols. (New York: Garland, 1988). 3 In this section I draw heavily on my article “Sexual Violence and the Male Warrior God,” Lexington Theological Quarterly 41 (Spring 2006): 23-37. See also my book, Slaves to Faith: A Therapist Looks Inside the Fundamentalist Mind (Westport, CT: Praeger), 118-28. For studies of violence in the Judaea-Christian tradition, see the series edited by J. Harold Ellens, The Destructive Power of

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 147 Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 4 vols. (Westport: Praeger, 2004). For the biblical period, see especially vol. 1: Sacred Scriptures, Ideology, and Violence. 4 Elizabeth Clark and Herbert Richardson, eds., Women and Religion: The Original Sourcebook of Women in Christian Thought (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996): vii; Rosemary Radford Ruether, ed., Religion and Sexism: Images of Woman in the Jewish and Christian Traditions (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 9, 13; Denise L. Carmody, Women & World Religions (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1979), 113-136. 5 Margaret L. Bendroth, “The Search for ‘Women's Role’ in American Evangelicalism, 1930-1980,” in Evangelicalism and Modern America, ed. George Marsden (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980): 127-128. 6 Barbara J. MacHaffie, Her Story: Women in Church Tradition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 36-39; Elizabeth A Clark, Women in the Early Church (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1983), 15-25. 7 Naomi Goldenberg, Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 1-9. 8 Clifford Geertz makes a strong case for this position in “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Reader in Comparative Religion, 2nd ed., eds. William Lessa and Evon Vogt (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 204-16. For various feminist analyses that give example to this approach, see: Johann M. Vento, “Violence, Trauma, and Resistance: A Feminist Appraisal of Metz’s Mysticism of Suffering Unto God,” Horizons: The Journal of the College Theology Society 29/1 (2002): 16; Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1973), 6-7, 13-14; Ruether, Religion and Sexism, 9-10; Charles Ess, “Reading Adam and Eve: Re-Visions of the Myth of Woman’s Subordination to Man,” in Violence Against Women and Children: A Christian Theological Sourcebook, eds. Carol J. Adams and Marie M. Fortune (New York: Continuum, 1995), 94; Clark and Richardson, Women and Religion; Patricia Wilson-Kastner, Faith, Feminism and the Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), vii; Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Bread Not Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), xi. 9 Mercer, Slaves to Faith: A Therapist Looks Inside the Fundamentalist Mind, 125. 10 See George M. Marsden, Evangelicalism and Modern America (Grand Rapids: MI: Eerdmans, 1984): 80. 11 e.g., Jerry Falwell, Listen, America! (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 14. 12 e.g., Larry Christenson, The Christian Family (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1970); Dan Benson, Becoming One (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, n.d.); Don Meredith, The Total Man (Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1981); and Dorothy Pape, In Search of God's Ideal Woman (Downer's Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1976). 13 For the particulars and the detailed case for this thesis, see Part 3 of Mercer, Slaves to Faith: A Therapist Looks Inside the Fundamentalist Mind, 129-166. 14 For a good presentation of Beck’s approach, see Aaron T. Beck and Gary Emery, Anxiety Disorders and Phobias: A Cognitive Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

148 15

Chapter Seven

I have training in clinical psychology and practiced as a clinician part-time for a decade. I was the go-to therapist in my city for clients with religious issues and, consequently, worked with many conservative Christians. 16 Many examples could be given. See D. Kirschner, “Understanding Adoptees Who Kill: Dissociation, Patricide, and the Psychodynamics of Adoption,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 36 (1992): 323-33; and D. E. Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1990); and C. G. Schoenfeld, “Blacks and Violent Crime: A Psychoanalytically Oriented Analysis,” Journal of Psychiatry and Law 16 (1988): 269-301. 17 R. K. Oates and D. Forrest, “Self-esteem and Early Background of Abusive Mothers,” Child Abuse and Neglect 9 (1985): 89-93. 18 E. Anderson, “The Code of the Streets,” Atlantic Monthly 273 (May 1994): 8194. 19 D. Kirschner, “Understanding Adoptees Who Kill: Dissociation, Patricide, and the Psychodynamics of Adoption,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 36 (1992): 323-33. 20 E.g., California Task Force to Promote Self-esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility, Toward a State of Self-Esteem (Sacramento: California State Department of Education, 1990). 21 “Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem,” Psychological Review 103 (1996): 5-33. 22 Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism. For the critique, see Baumeister, Smart, and Boden, “Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression,” 7. 23 E.g., Tanja S. Stucke, “When a Grandiose Self-Image is Threatened: Narcissism and Self-Concept Clarity as Predictors of Negative Emotions and Aggression Following Ego Threat,” Journal of Personality 70/4 (August 2002): 509-532; Brad J. Bushman and Roy F. Baumeister, “Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Lead to Violence?” Journal of Research in Personality 36/6 (December 2002): 543-45; and Brad J. Bushman, Angelicca M. Bonacci, Mirjam van Dijk, and Roy F. Baumeister, “Narcissism, Sexual Refusal, and Aggression: Testing a Narcissistic Reactance Model of Sexual Coercion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84/5 (May 2003): 1027-40. 24 Brad J. Bushman, Roy F. Baumeister, Sander Thomaes, Ehri Ryu, Sander Begeer, and Stephen G. West, “Looking Again, and Harder, for a Link Between Low Self-Esteem and Aggression,” Journal of Personality 77/2 (April 2009): 42746. 25 Baumeister, Smart, and Boden, “Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression,” 5. 26 Ibid., 26. 27 Brad J. Bushman and Roy F. Baumeister, “Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Lead to Violence?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75/1 (1998): 219-29. 28 Ibid., 10-11. With respect to a correspondence between the degree of narcissism and the aggression, see Ellison M. Cale and Scot O. Lilienfeld, “Psychopathy

The Male Warrior God and the Threatened Egotism of His Mighty Men 149 Factors and risk for Aggressive Behavior: A Test of the ‘Threatened Egotism’ Hypothesis,” Law and Human Behavior 30/1 (February 2006): 51-74. 29 Ibid., 23-24. 30 Sara Konrath, Brad J. Bushman, and W. Keith Campbell, “Attenuating the Link Between Threatened Egotism and Aggression,” Psychological Science 17/11 (2006): 995-1001. 31 See Konrath, Bushman, and Campbell, “Attenuating the Link Between Threatened Egotism and Aggression,”996, for a brief summary of research. 32 Bushman and Baumeister, “Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-esteem, and Direct and Displaced Aggression.” 33 J. Twenge and W. K. Campbell, “Isn’t It Fun to Get the Respect that We’re Going to Deserve?”: Narcissism, Social Rejection, and Aggression,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 261-72. 34 Mercer, Slaves to Faith: A Therapist Looks Inside the Fundamentalist Mind, 3033. 35 Brad J. Bushman, A. M. Bonacci, M. Van Dijk, and R. F. Baumeister, Narcissism, Sexual Refusal, and Aggression: Testing a Narcissistic Reactance Model of Sexual Coercion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84 (2003): 1027-1040. 36 Konrath, Bushman, and Campbell, “Attenuating the Link Between Threatened Egotism and Aggression.”

CHAPTER EIGHT “ONE AND INDIVISIBLE:” THE IDEAL OF UNDIFFERENTIATED VIRTUE AS A MOTIVATION FOR VIOLENT TERRORISM, WITH CONSTANT REFERENCE TO JACOBINS AND JIHADIS LIAM HARTE

The literature on the moral psychology of violent terrorism says next to nothing about the terrorist’s conception of the ethical character of the community on behalf of which he claims to act. The ethicist envisages him having a texture-less pro-attitude toward it in the face of injustice, while the psychologist contextualizes him amidst his most immediate relationships, but neither asks what may be his overall moral vision of the community. This paper explores the possibility that we can better understand the violent terrorist’s fundamental moral motives — inasmuch as he ever has any—in terms of just such a vision. The central claim that I shall try to prove is that the terrorist’s moral psyche becomes more intelligible if one views him as subscribing, implicitly or explicitly, to a moral principle that I call the ideal of undifferentiated virtue (IUV), and which I take to be the distinctively normative ethical motivation behind a related set of common, possibly universal moral motives for violent terrorism. In short, I shall argue that, in general, the violent terrorist imagines that those for whom he takes his actions are perfectly virtuous and, therefore, better than those who perpetrate injustice against them. An important background assumption of my argument is that an agent engages in terrorism when he tries to alter the conduct of a subject by making that subject afraid.1 Thereafter, I present arguments, stated from the terrorist’s point of view, that are intended to show how violent terrorism, in many times and places, can be well-understood as being motivated by concern for a community, all members of which the terrorist

“One and Indivisible”

151

takes to comply with the IUV. To illustrate my case, I draw on the historical record of two very different groups of violent terrorists: those who subscribe to some form of contemporary political Islam (jihadis, for short), and the members and supporters of the Revolutionary Government of the French Republic during the Terror of 1793-94 (Jacobins, for short).2 Jihadis being paradigmatic members of the class of so-called “new terrorists,” I believe that my account of the moral motivation of violent terrorists, if correct, also shows that neither new terrorism nor the moral psychology that goes with it are new in any significant respect. Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain briefly the aim of this particular thesis. My arguments make no use of research from academic empirical psychology because it does not take normative ethics seriously enough, either in general or with regard to violent terrorism in particular. When it concerns itself with morality in general, such research tends to focus on moral development, whether cognitive or emotional, above all else. Basic introductory texts give evidence of this being the primary orientation of the discipline. 3 I do not deny that there is value in understanding how individuals acquire their moral beliefs, what Kohlbergian level their moral reasoning abilities are at, whether their moral emotions are pro-social, and so on. But it does not help one understand the normative dimension of individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, claims, and so on (a diverse group of phenomena that I’ll refer to as their “moral outlooks”), and fails completely to explain why anyone would engage in violent terrorism, of all things, on the basis of such beliefs. Where the phenomenon of violent terrorism in particular is concerned, empirical psychology treats normative morality in such a reductionist way that it loses all significance. In short, the moral outlooks of violent terrorists are explained away as being mere symptoms of non-moral psychological facts about individuals or groups. Consider, for instance, the work of Jerrold M. Post, one of the foremost psychologists of terrorism.4 In a well-known article, Post flatly asserts that, “political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces,” and that “their special logic, which is grounded in their psychology and reflected in their rhetoric, becomes the justification for their violent acts. 5 Indeed, Post goes on to say that “the fixed logical conclusion of the terrorist that the establishment must be destroyed is driven by the terrorist’s search for identity, and . . . as he strikes out against the establishment, he is attempting to destroy the enemy within.”6 Post explains this entirely by the workings of psychological mechanisms known as splitting and externalization. Splitting occurs in an “injured self” who suffers “narcissistic wounds” during childhood, so that whatever in

152

Chapter Eight

himself he thinks is good becomes the “me,” while his “weakness and inadequacies” become the “not-me.” Externalization takes place when the “me” is idealized and the “not-me” split off and identified with other selves. After that, the injured self “attacks and scapegoats the enemy without.” In a recent article, Post emphasizes the role of group psychology: The combination of the personal feeling of inadequacy with the reliance on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting makes especially attractive a group of like-minded individuals whose credo is “It’s not us, it’s them. They are the cause of our problems. And it therefore is not only not immoral to strike out at them—it becomes a moral obligation.” Terrorism is not a consequence of individual psychological abnormality. Rather it is a consequence of group or organizational pathology that provides a sense-making explanation to the youth drawn to these groups.7

If Post is correct about all this, then one need never accept at face value any moral reasons that violent sub-state terrorists might give, because their actions are ultimately reducible to “group or organizational pathology” that satisfies individual terrorist agents’ predilection for sense-making explanations of something to which splitting and externalization have predisposed them in any case. Intentionally or not, such reductionism rejects the possibility that any moral justification that the violent terrorist might offer for his actions has any substance independent of special psychological facts. But Post gives no reason to believe either that such a reduction is cogent in the case of violent terrorists’ moral outlooks, or that, if it is so cogent one should not treat everyone else’s moral outlooks the same way. For, even if Post wants to discredit violent terrorists’ normative claims, I doubt very much that he wants to do the same with, for instance, his own frequent moral condemnations of terrorist violence.8 On these points, no psychologist of terrorism with whose work I am familiar is any more forthcoming than Post, or any less ready to condemn terrorism. 9 Besides, accepting such reductionism as a legitimate account of violent terrorists’ moral outlooks requires one to accept also that when violent terrorists think they are making sincere moral justifications, they are always mistaken. Until there is good reason to think that the intentional aspect of normative morality is ever fully reducible to non-moral considerations, calling this implication implausible is an understatement — and I know of no such good reason, despite many recent attempts, most notably those of evolutionary psychology.10

“One and Indivisible”

153

In this chapter, therefore, I take the violent terrorist at his word when he says that he believes his activities to be justifiable by normative moral considerations. That is, I take it that one can engage in terrorism while sincerely believing it to be morally either permissible or obligatory. I think that one must at least begin thus, in order to get to grips with the moral psychology of violent terrorism as moral. As such, my own argument is more speculative than those made in the terms of empirical psychology. For that matter, it is more speculative than those made even in philosophically informed moral psychology, which tends to defer to empirical psychology.11 Indeed, where the literature in all disciplines does not, à la Post, explain away this dimension of a terrorist’s moral outlook, it usually dismisses it, without argument, as fanaticism, nihilism or antinomianism.12 Having said what this chapter does not assume, I should say that I am assuming those notions of moral motives and of moral motivation that Thomas Wren puts forward in Caring about Morality. 13 There, he distinguishes between the two as distinct parts of conscience. Motives, he says, “can be thought of as the tendency or set of tendencies to act in conformity with one’s moral judgments,” which “include other-oriented motives such as love or gratitude and self-oriented ones such as the need for acceptance and approval.” 14 This “loosely linked set of relatively distinct conative dispositions,” often “bear the same names as the virtuous action patterns they generate, such as kindness, courage, fidelity, and piety” and “are sometimes characterized as dispositions a moral person ‘acts out of’ (e.g., charity, loyalty, or gratitude).”15 Moral motivation, on the other hand, is the “conative foundation [or moral motives] . . . or a deep structure whose function . . . is moral care,”16 which takes the form of an overall orientation to take moral concerns seriously. Without that latter, it would, presumably, be impossible for an agent to have moral motives. I must confess to finding Wren’s distinction between motives and motivation rather unsatisfactory, because what he calls motivation seems to me very much like what he calls motives, writ large. I shall, therefore, slide between the terms motive and motivation, rather than adhering to the strict senses that Wren gives them. The rest of his vocabulary, though, I keep intact, because everything he says about both motivation and motive is relevant to what I am going to say about the IUV. It is time to turn to the ideal of undifferentiated virtue. Like any complex concept, it is better understood by analyzing it into its components. First, then, for my purposes here, one may understand the notion of virtue in terms derived from the classical Greek tradition exemplified by Plato and Aristotle (which has recently regained popularity

154

Chapter Eight

through the work of Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre, especially), of virtue in general as excellence in character and the particular virtues — moral and intellectual—as the ways in which that excellence manifests itself. 17 Since my focus is on the normative commitments of violent terrorists, it is not necessary for the reader to assume that I accept the truth of the classical tradition on virtue. My point is that all the violent terrorists that I have studied, inasmuch as they concern themselves with moral justification at all, have in mind a concept of virtue that is practically indistinguishable from that which is at the center of the classical tradition. The concept of undifferentiated virtue (UV) does not derive directly from this tradition—indeed, I think that Aristotle would consider it a misunderstanding of the idea of moral virtue. In short, the idea is that any given member of a community will never fail to display the virtues appropriate to its members. Such a consistently virtuous individual we can call a person of undifferentiated virtue (PUV), while a community composed entirely of PUVs would be a community of undifferentiated virtue (CUV). Regardless of circumstances, then, each member of the CUV can rely upon every other member to act with perfect integrity of character insofar as he is a member of the given community. The concept of UV is descriptive at a very general level. It portrays the most basic relationship between a community and its members, and between the members themselves, on something like the analogy of a group of balls, each of which is wholly colored the same shade of red as each of the others. Because each ball is red, the whole pile is red; and no ball is redder either than any other ball nor redder than the pile as a whole. In the same way, the uniformity of virtue permeates the entire community because it is imbued in each member. (One way in which the analogy breaks down is that the community’s propagation of certain virtues will always be a major reason for each member being imbued with any of them. (On the other hand, the fact that the group of balls is, as a whole, red, is not a reason for each ball being colored red.) But this still does no more than describe some possible world, and not necessarily some existing state of affairs. This is an important point, for there is undoubtedly an element of imagination in the violent terrorist’s vision of the CUV, whether it is presented as description or not. In the case of both the Jacobins and the jihadis, we can see a yearning for a CUV, even as it is depicted as being under actual attack by enemies both exterior and interior. This, however, is to anticipate latter parts of the argument, and so for the moment I shall return to the analysis of the IUV into its component ideas. It is when one takes the concept of UV as not just descriptive but normative — i.e., whenever one believes that a community ought to

“One and Indivisible”

155

instantiate the concept of UV — that the ideal of UV (the IUV) comes into view. This ideal is tantamount to the claim that all members of a given community should conduct themselves, spontaneously and constantly, according a given set of virtues. In a logical slide that might have excited David Hume’s attention, violent terrorists never seem to distinguish between the normative claim that their favored community should be a CUV and the non-normative claim that it is one.18 While to hold the IUV is to hold that the members of a community should be indistinguishable from each other in terms of moral character, this does not rule out the possibility that some PUVs may have to acquire certain other virtues associated with a given role within the community — a soldier, for instance, will need to acquire certain martial virtues that would be inappropriate for a physician, whose clinical virtues would be inappropriate for the soldier or the businessman, and so on. But it does require that each and every member of the CUV have the same basic moral virtues or, in other words, that each and every member of a CUV must be exactly the same kind of morally good person. As I mentioned earlier, I shall illustrate my argument with the cases of jihadis and Jacobins. I choose them, firstly, because they stand at such great historical and cultural distances from each other, emphasizing my view that the IUV, as moral motivation, is neither historically nor culturally contingent. Secondly, though, jihadis are the paradigmatic member of the class of so-called “new terrorists.” Elsewhere, I have advanced arguments showing that I am extremely skeptical of the idea that any form of terrorism is qualitatively new. I shall not rehearse those arguments here, but instead concentrate on showing the lack of novelty in new terrorism and its allied moral psychology. First, then, I shall give some idea of the notion of new terrorism, and then briefly revisit my own idea of mythicism, into the context of which I shall place the IUV. A wide range of experts in violent terrorism have averred that, since about 1990, “traditional” sub-state terrorists have been largely displaced by “new” terrorists, who are fanatics willing to inflict huge casualties in the name of limitless, non-negotiable aims. To the contemporary western world, Osama bin Laden was the very personification of new terrorism. The notion of new terrorism has come under heavy attack recently, from the empirical angle especially, and so the hold of the vision may be loosening in the academy.19 While I agree in great part with the empirical critiques, my own conceptual critique has led me to argue elsewhere that most of the differences alleged between new and traditional terrorism are quantitative rather than qualitative. In particular, I have contended that the “limitlessness” noted in new terrorists’ aims is really the relatively greater

156

Chapter Eight

strength of their mythicism to that of other terrorists — although even in this respect I see no clear distinction between certain paradigmatic new terrorists, such as the various Islamist organizations affiliated with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, and such paradigmatic traditional terrorists as the Red Army Fraction.20 Next, I shall place the IUV in the context of the concept of mythicism, before making my argument that the IUV acts as a moral motive for, at least, a very wide range of cases of violent terrorism. Put very briefly, mythicism is a dimension of any action that shows its protagonist to accept, explicitly or implicitly, some mythos. This is a narrative, held in any degree of implicitness or explicitness, that reduces the complexity of experience (or, “flattens” it) sufficiently to make the world intelligible enough for an agent to enable him to take action.21 The important point here is that mythoi are normative and motivational. What I call strong mythicism — the more explicit form of mythic motivation, in other words — is just the clearest case of such motivation, because claims inspired by the mythos are often invoked as justification for actions. Religious mythoi are perhaps the most obvious case of strong mythicism. But (again in Wren’s sense) such motivation alone is not enough for agents to engage in violent terrorism — it could result in all kinds of other actions. To issue in violent terrorism, and especially that which the terrorist attempts to justify morally, the mythos must supply more distinctively moral motivation and motives, which are nevertheless related to the overall mythos. I am going to argue that the IUV and any moral principles subordinate to it supply just such a specific motive, one commonly encountered among violent terrorists, and a very important one. The IUV is a mythic principle in that the idea of a community’s characteristic virtues is “flattened” in a way similar to that in which any aspect of a mythos will be. Indeed, it “flattens” the very idea of virtue, and flattens it upward. That is, the community is taken to be composed of members who spontaneously and constantly act according to the very highest standards set by the virtues that the person who accepts the mythos takes to be characteristic of the members of that community. There is a kind of saintliness attributed to all PUVs, an apparent belief that the supererorgatory is for them a normal way of life. As such, they are conceived of in ways very similar to those in which one might conceive of a monastic community, which, worldwide, are taken to live some given community’s moral principles most rigorously. A monastic community, though, is always a comparatively small subset of a community’s members, whose example acts as an inspiration to the rest of the community. I realize that there is some circularity in this idea (that is, that the member of a CUV is taken to be good in the ways that members of the

“One and Indivisible”

157

CUV are taken to be good), but I take it that a moral motive need not be logically non-circular, only psychologically effective. However, the best way in which to illustrate the importance of the IUV to the moral psychology of violent terrorism is to show how it would issue in moral reasoning, if any violent terrorist agent who is morally motivated were to make an argument at all. The two arguments that I am about to make are somewhat unusual in their function, so I shall explain my method in detail. Together, they provide my rational reconstruction of two important and interrelated aspects of the violent terrorist’s moral reasoning. Each assumes the IUV as a background claim, in the general form in which many violent terrorists seem to have assumed it. The form of these arguments is highly reminiscent of that of the Aristotelian practical syllogism, and their statement in the first person singular makes vivid the fact that I intend them to express the putative moral reasoning — implicit or explicit — of the violent terrorist himself.22 The premises of each are divided between moral claims and non-moral ones, the former being subdivided between a normative moral principle, clearly related to the IUV, and one or more descriptive moral claims that designate both a particular community as a CUV and the agent as a PUV. The non-moral claims are about alleged matters of fact that, combined with the moral claims, issue a judgment about the agent’s actions. This is, of course, a formal expression of the argument, but the historical evidence I produce will, I hope, make it clear that the moral outlooks of violent terrorists are more intelligible if one attributes to them such opinions about their favored communities. The two arguments therefore look like this: Background Assumption (IUV): All members of any community should conduct themselves, spontaneously and constantly, with perfect virtue. (Any agent who does so is a PUV, and any community composed of such agents is a CUV.) Argument 1: P1: All PUVs should defend their CUV from threats; P2: This community (c) is a CUV and I am one of c’s PUVs; P3: There is a threat (t) to c. C: I ought to defend c from t.

158

Chapter Eight

Argument 2: Background Assumption (IUV) P1: If some CUV does not exist, then all its putative PUVs should attempt to found it; P2: C does not exist, but I am one of its putative PUVs; C: I should attempt to found c. Here, then, is my rational reconstruction of what seem to me to be the two most important moral motives behind violent terrorism of all kinds. For this reason, I am claiming neither that they always give such reasoning explicitly nor that, if they do, that anyone should find it compelling. My aim is simply to make their attitude toward their own actions intelligible, by stating what seems to be the moral argument that they would make if they were to make any such argument. But it is also important to point out that I do not think that these arguments themselves are fully intelligible unless one assumes the IUV as a background assumption of both. It is perhaps worth saying also what might be obvious, that the IUV is a quite absolutist principle. PUVs are conceived of as never falling below the most stringent standard of conduct, almost as though the supererogatory were morally required of them all. I have promised to supply evidence from the cases of jihadis and Jacobins as worked examples of the IUV in action. There are many resemblances between the two groups. Neither has ever shrunk from causing mass casualties. The exploits of sub-state groups affiliated with alQaeda, for instance, have caused thousands of deaths, outside and inside the Muslim world. In the west, 9/11 is of course the best-known manifestation of such “new” terrorism, but even actions that are small in comparison — such as the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, of holidaymakers in Bali in 2002, of the Madrid railway station in 2005, and of the London transportation system in 2007 — killed and injured far more people than, for instance, any of the IRA’s operations ever did.23 The Jacobins, with their fusillades and noyades, to say nothing of their use of the guillotine, engaged in proto-industrialized slaughter that prefigures not just jihadi atrocities but even some of the activities of the great totalitarian powers of twentieth-century Europe. They each even have their own literary inspirations: for the Jacobins there is Jean-Jacques Rousseau (especially the Social Contract) and the ancient Romans; for the jihadis, the thinkers of political Islam, such as Sayyid Qutb. To that extent, then, it becomes harder to sustain the claim that new terrorism such as that of jihadis is really new, when the Jacobins were

“One and Indivisible”

159

doing things recognizably similar, two centuries earlier. In fact, the resemblance between the Jacobins and jihadis is probably at its strongest if one compares the former not to a sub-state entity such Islamic Jihad or Hizbollah, but to Islamic state terrorists such as the Taliban in Afghanistan between 1995 and 2001. The resemblance is not merely in the use of violence in various degrees of ceremonialism, but in the relentless use of it to both eradicate the enemies of the new order and to cow into submission others who might try to oppose it. In Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as much as in France under the Terror, everyone was a suspect who might be denounced by the strongly mythic rulers at any moment and imprisoned and executed in order to deter others from doing that which would make them suspects—which, in Jacobin France as much as in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, was practically anything. In this respect, I should emphasize that the mythoi and IUV of the jihadis and Jacobins were both religious. This is absolutely explicit in the case of the jihadis. Like all Muslims, they ultimately appeal to the authority of the Qur’an and the Hadith, though they place far greater emphasis than most on the so-called “war suras” than other parts of the former. The key idea of political Islam is that of the ummah, the community of all Muslims, regulated by shariah, Islamic law, and this aspiration finds expression, in political Islam in the notion of the Islamic republic. The Emirate of Afghanistan is one example among others (e.g., Iran and Sudan) to implement this idea.24 To turn to the violent Islamist terrorists whom, probably, most people think of when the term is uttered, let us take as an example Osama bin Laden. His intense moral rectitude early in life is well documented, and his justifications of his own actions and those of his comrades seem to be as carefully considered as any, regardless of whether one agrees with them or not.25 In fact, it is notable that bin Laden makes no bones about being a terrorist: Terrorism can be commendable and it can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent person and terrorizing him is objectionable and unjust, also unjustly terrorizing people is not right. Whereas, terrorizing oppressors and criminals and thieves and robbers is necessary for the safety of people and for the protection of their property. . . . The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation.26

Note here that the world is simply divided into two camps, that of true Islam and that of everything else — to use terms popularized by Qutb, the

160

Chapter Eight

ummah and the jahiliyyah (the latter being, roughly speaking, the realm of pre-Qur’anic ignorance).27 It is not difficult to see that the Salafist strain of Islam that bin Laden and his associates embrace, if implemented, will result in the ummah being an example of regime terrorism similar in many ways to those practiced by the Taliban in Afghanistan (who offered bin Laden sanctuary after he was forced out of Sudan) or by the Ayatollahs in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, I am inclined to say that the “new” terrorism of today, which is a violent sub-state terrorism, is indistinguishable from the regime terrorism that has been actually practiced, very recently, by Islamists gripped by a moral fervor that, I think, the IUV perfectly captures. Bin Laden himself has argued that his terrorism is a form of selfdefense for Muslims: What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years. Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years. Its sons are being killed, its blood is being shed, its holy places are being attacked, and it is not being ruled according to what God has decreed.28

But it is also clear, if we believe bin Laden’s close associate, and now as a result of bin Laden’s death the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the aim is not simply to protect the ummah, but to extend it. This is not necessarily at the expense of the non-Islamic world, but can also be at that of the secular regimes to be found within the Islamic world, such as the Nasserite Egypt that executed Qutb himself. These regimes political Islamists consider nothing more than atheistic stooges of the western powers. At the mass trial, in 1982, of those who had conspired the year before to assassinate Nasser’s successor, President Anwar Sadat, Zawahiri asked “Who are we?” and answered his own question thus: We are Muslims! We are Muslims who believe in their religion! We are Muslims who believe in their religion, both in ideology and practice, and hence we tried our best to establish an Islamic state and an Islamic society!29

There is no doubt that the Islamic state and society that Zawahiri and his similarly self-assertive associates would have founded would resemble the Emirate of Afghanistan under the Taliban, wherein women had to wear burqas and men had to grow beards, nobody was allowed to listen to music or to take photographs or make videos and in which non-Muslims were obliged to wear something yellow and to fly yellow flags from their homes.30 The incredibly stringent requirements placed on the populace by political Islamists with actual political power is best understood, I think, in

“One and Indivisible”

161

terms of the mythic morality that is encapsulated in the IUV. There is, I believe, abundant evidence that strong mythoi have been a background motivation for the actions of violent terrorists ever since 1793, at least. I mention this date, because it is the start of the Terror in France, the first episode in history that we can label “terrorism” without linguistic anachronism, since the very word was coined to denote those who implemented or supported the Terror. While it is obvious that jihadis are religiously motivated, the claim that Jacobins were needs some justification. In his classic study, The Psychology of Revolution, Gustave le Bon affirms that the French Revolution as a whole “cannot be clearly comprehended . . . unless it is considered as the formation of a religious belief.”31 He appeals to Alexis de Tocqueville’s view that the Revolution exhibited clearly religious characteristics, which is echoed by more recent authorities like R. R. Palmer and M. J. Sydenham.32 Both of the latter two writers put forward as their most striking evidence the “Festival of the Supreme Being,” held on June 8, 1794, at the center of which we find the most notorious Terrorist, Maximilien Robespierre—a man as ethically serious as bin Laden and, it seems, of equally sincere theistic beliefs. Mona Ozouf argues that public festivals in revolutionary France, of which that of the Supreme Being was the most famous, were intended to mold individuals into citizens of the Republic. She points out that this was the golden opportunity for eighteenth-century European intellectuals’ abstract yearning for a utopia of “moderate living, moderate labor, and pleasures in moderation” to be made concrete.33 But the fact that a workable utopia required the people to be unanimous, revealed that “[a]ll the ‘Land of Cockaigne’ of the eighteenth century were Spartas [sic].” 34 The suffocating desire to forge an austere, uniformly virtuous citizenry made revolutionary festivals not only a lot less fun than the traditional festivals they replaced, but also a very effective means of surveillance, precisely because “anyone who failed to find pleasure in this exemplary gathering of the people would be declared, ipso facto, a public enemy.”35 The obvious step to take after identifying public enemies — the saboteurs, traitors, hoarders and spies that stalk through Robespierre’s speeches —is to eliminate them. In Ozouf’s view, then, it is no coincidence that the Festival of the Supreme Being was followed only a few days later by the onset of the Terror’s bloodiest period.36 Where there is blood and religion, of course, there is often also sacrifice, or at least talk of sacrifice. Jesse Goldhammer talks fascinatingly about how religious themes of sacrifice, most notably scapegoating and martyrdom, became so entwined in the political discourse of the French Revolution that “it left several generations of French thinkers convinced

162

Chapter Eight

that political foundation required sacrificial blood.” 37 Goldhammer also claims that the theoretical assumptions that guide Palestinian martyrs or Al [sic] Qaeda terrorists are intimately related to the sacrificial concepts that have captivated modern French theory. After all, it was during the French Revolution that the first terrorists were inspired by Roman Republican sacrifices to decapitate enemy compatriots in order to legitimate a modern republic.38

Since I am drawing what I think is an important connection between the violent terrorism of jihadis and Jacobins, I shall note that this is not the first time that the Terrorists, and Robespierre in particular, have been likened to a threat from the Muslim world. One source, speaking of Robespierre, asserts that, Coveting both the sceptre and the censer, he was consumed with the ambition of the fiend Mohammed—without having his genius or, above all, his courage. Pontiff and despot at the same time, he gathered a great number of followers for himself, pretending to believe, so that all would believe, that the French people had forgotten the existence of a superior intelligence. It was because he appeared to be restoring the cult of the Supreme Being, as if the French nation had ever renounced it. . . . The mask has fallen. Catiline is no more. He and his infamous accomplices have paid with their heads for their horrible patricide, and the pen of the patriotic writer will no longer be restrained by fear.39

These lines, with their frank admission that “the patriotic writer” had hitherto been terrorized into avoiding certain subjects, are the more remarkable because they are drawn from the minutes of the Jacobin Club, the day after Robespierre was guillotined. But once one knows this, and bears in mind what I have said so far, its exoticizing of Robespierre’s rule into not just a despotism but an oriental despotism over the (uniformly) godly French nation makes much more sense. The Jacobin reflex for unmasking traitors to the virtuous people is intact, a day after the Terrorist Tyrant meets the same fate as did Louis Capet. At the time, Robespierre’s execution was, just another purge. Perhaps the most telling statement by any violent terrorist regarding the matters I am talking about came from the mouth of Jean-Marie Collotd’Herbois. A member of the Committee of Public Safety (effectively, the cabinet of the Revolutionary Government), he was sent out to co-direct what turned out to be the shockingly cruel suppression of the counterrevolutionary revolt at Lyons in late 1793. Hearing, on his return to Paris,

“One and Indivisible”

163

that some members of the Jacobin party favored easing the Terror on the grounds that it seemed to have achieved its ends, Collot reacted angrily. Some wish to moderate the revolutionary movement. What! Can a tempest be steered? The Revolution is one. We cannot and we must not check its motion. Citizens, patriotism must be always at the same height! If it drops for an instant it is no longer patriotism . . . .40

And, as Maximilien Robespierre, the foremost member of the Committee of Public Safety made clear in one of his best-known speeches, the true citizens of the French Republic is in a frenzy of love for his country even at the moment of death in battle: The French army is not merely the fear of tyrants; it is the glory of the nation and of humanity. Marching to victory, our virtuous warriors cry, Vive la République! Falling to enemy fire, their cry is Vive la République! Their last words are hymns to liberty; their last breaths are wishes for the fatherland. Had all the officers valued the soldiers, Europe would have been vanquished a long time ago. Each act of beneficence towards the army is an act of national recognition.41

It is hard to imagine a vision of the CUV and of its individual members that is less nuanced with respect to moral possibilities. And, when a CUV is imagined in such austere moral terms, it is hardly surprising that those outside the favored community will be depicted as a similarly stark manifestation of vice. At the debate regarding the decree that brought the Revolutionary Government into being on October 10, 1793, for instance, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, another member of the Great Committee, stated: There is no prosperity to hope for as long as the last enemy of liberty breathes. You have to punish not only the traitors but even those who are indifferent; you have to punish whoever is passive in the republic, and who does nothing for it. For, since the French People has manifested its will, all that is opposed to it is outside the sovereign. All that is outside the sovereign is an enemy.42

R.R. Palmer notes that, in a settled political entity, Saint-Just’s proposal is workable to some extent, but that in the France of 1793, wherein unity was quite lacking, it could be “exceedingly dangerous”—as indeed it turned out to be. [I]n no trait were the French revolutionaries so much alike as in their moral self-approval. The doctrine of the Social Contract, with these moral overtones, became the theory of the Terror. A Group of the consciously

164

Chapter Eight right-minded, regarding their enemies as ‘outside the sovereign,’ took to themselves, in the name of justice and reason, that majestic sovereign will which Rousseau had called indestructible, indivisible, imprescriptible, constant, unalterable, and pure.43

My contention is that not only these original, eponymous Terrorists, but violent terrorists ever since (such as political Islamists) and avant la lettre (e.g., the Sicarii or the Assassins) have taken themselves to be symptomatic of the undifferentiated virtue of the community on behalf of which they engage in their activities: one and indivisible, like the French Republic itself. I hope that the foregoing is enough to show why I not only accept le Bon’s view that the Jacobins were under the illusion that the French people was unified fundamentally by remarkable — and undifferentiated — virtues of fraternity and reason, but claim that similar illusions about the moral character of a favored (though usually imaginary) community has, again and again, inspired violent terrorism. This is certainly the case with violent political Islamism, and I would hold that it has also emerged in what David C. Rapoport has called the first three waves of rebel terrorism, from the late nineteenth century to about 1980. How the grip of this illusion on those with the ambition of protecting or establishing a CUV threatens those outside the CUV is hardly mysterious, but the same security concern can be, and usually is, turned inside-out. Like all ideals, the IUV has an absolutist, speculative character, of which all particular empirical realities must fall short, sooner or later. Even as the violent terrorist claims to be working on behalf of the CUV, any given putative PUV can fail to live up to the unrealistic standards of the IUV. Being merely suspected of having done so is usually enough to initiate a purge. As the history of the French Revolution shows (and as do the histories of the great terroristic totalitarian states of the twentieth century), this is especially the case once the violent terrorist obtains power over persons outside the terrorist vanguard itself. Thus, ordinary life under such regimes is marked by unrelenting, though often undiagnosed fear. And, of course, the members of the vanguard are themselves not safe. This is precisely the sense in which revolutions devour their own children. Consequently, I believe that it is simplistic (though not false) to call violent terrorists’ moral motivation fanatical, and plainly false to call it nihilist or antinomian. Rather, that motivation, insofar as it is a moral motivation at all, seems puritanical: whatever a particular terrorist’s conception may be of the characteristic virtues of the members of some CUV, that CUV itself resembles, more than anything, an ascetic community. Ultimately, I propose that we view the violent terrorist, prima

“One and Indivisible”

165

facie, as subscribing sincerely to the IUV and having some fairly clear conception of the characteristic virtues of a PUV, but also feeling forced to take exceptional measures that often are — whether he acknowledges it or not — inconsistent with his vision of a CUV, precisely because those against whom he takes those measures are not living up to the IUV.44 Thus, violent terrorism threatens the security of not only the CUV’s enemies, real or imagined, but also its own putative members (including the terrorists themselves), because it is too easy to fail to live up to the IUV.

Notes 1

Because the phrase “violent terrorism,” which I use throughout this paper, is likely to appear tautological to readers, I should make it clear that one consequence of my background assumption is that terrorists need not employ physical violence. Hence, to be consistent, I modify the idea of terrorism with that of violence. I pursue these matters much further in Liam Harte, “A Taxonomy of Terrorism,” in Philosophy 9/11: Thinking about the War on Terrorism (La Salle: Open Court, 2005) and Liam Harte, “Must Terrorism Be Violent?” Review Journal of Political Philosophy 6.1 (2008): 103-122. 2 In each case, I must focus on better-known members, usually leaders, of each group, simply because their lives and opinions are more fully documented than those of most of their peers. While I do not claim that subscription to the IUV works differently in motivating leaders from how it works in motivating their followers, I would not rule it out altogether. I suspect, though, that the distinction might be no more than that leaders hold the IUV more explicitly than followers. 3 See, for instance, Robert A. Baron, Psychology, 3rd edn (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 313-17; Michael S. Gazzaniga and Todd F. Heatherton, Psychological Science: Mind, Brain, and Behavior (New York: Norton, 2003), 401-6; Henry Gleitman, Alan J. Fridlund and Daniel Reisberg, Psychology, 6th edn. (New York: Norton, 2004), 523-7; and Stephen M. Kosslyn and Robin S. Rosenberg, Psychology: The Brain, the Person, the World (Boston: Pearson, 2004), 508-10. 4 Post is known as a psychoanalyst, and has attempted to develop a “psychodynamic” theory of terrorist psychology. His work is based on extensive interviews with violent terrorists from many different organizations, conducted by many different interviewers. See, for a summation of his work in this area, Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: the Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 5 Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 25; the emphases are Post’s own. 6 Post, “Psycho-Logic,” 26.

166

Chapter Eight

7 Jerrold M. Post, “The Socio-Cultural Underpinnings of Terrorist Psychology: When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone,” in Root Causes of Terrorism, ed. Tore Bjørge (New York: Routledge, 2005), 55. 8 The dedication of Post’s book expresses the hope that “the cloud of terrorism that shadows our lives be lightened by better understanding man’s inhumanity to man,” notes without apparent irony that “the lay community” assumes that “groups and individuals who kill innocent victims to accomplish their political goals must be crazed fanatics” and offers “a psychological strategy for countering terrorism that draws on . . . understandings of terrorist psychologies” (Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007], iii, 3, 9). It is hard to understand such statements as expressing anything other than moral disapproval of violent terrorism. 9 For instance, from the same collection as Post’s “Psycho-Logic,” take Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161-191. Bandura argues that certain mechanisms of disengagement of moral feeling allow individuals to engage in inhumane behavior by overriding their moral sentiments. The problem is that Bandura takes it that actions can be objectively, uncontroversially inhumane, but, instead of explaining how one can determine them to be such, seems to believe their inhumaneness to be self-evident in a way that renders any attempt to justify them to be self-deceiving. In my view, it is at least logically possible to engage in this kind of conduct while thinking that it is permissible, even obligatory, and thus without self-deception. The examples of violent terrorists that I shall set forth later in the paper are cases that, I think, show it to be practically possible, too. 10 See, for instance, Edmund O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) and Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1976). More recent contributions have come from, for instance, Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unsel¿sh Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1998), and Neil Levy, What Makes Us Moral? Crossing the Boundaries of Biology (Oxford: Oneworld, 2004). For the record, I concur with Paul Lawrence Farber’s judgment, when he says that even sophisticated, “truly Darwinian” versions of evolutionary ethics, like these, have failed to solve “the fundamental problems dogging earlier attempts” made by thinkers such as Herbert Spencer, T.H. Huxley and C.H. Waddington, such as “the oversimplification of ethics; the lack of an independent justification for values; the lack of a rational justification of one’s obligation to comply with those values; and the enormous gulf between actions that promote survival and actions that are deemed moral.” (Paul Lawrence Farber, The Temptations of Evolutionary Ethics [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998; 171-2.) 11 For an overview of the kind of deference I have in mind, see John M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, The Moral Psychology Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Chapters 3 and 6 are especially relevant to my argument in this paper.

“One and Indivisible” 12

167

For an example of putative moral justifications of terrorism represented as fanaticism, see R.M.Hare, “On Terrorism,” Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (Winter 1979): 241-249; as nihilism, see Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and as antinomianism, Paul Wilkinson, Political Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1974). 13 Thomas Wren, Caring about Morality: Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, 1991). 14 Ibid., Caring, 9. 15 Ibid., Caring, 10. 16 Ibid., Caring, 10. 17 The loci classici for this doctrine are Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. As Plato’s Socrates puts it, “virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same” (Plato, Rep 444d-e, trans. Benjamin Jowett, many editions). Aristotle says, more prosaically, that “virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean” between vices that consist in an excess or a deficiency of some action or passion and determined by the principle used by the man of practical wisdom (Aristotle, NE 1107a1-2, trans. W.D. Ross, many editions). For the most influential contemporary versions of the classical tradition, usually called “virtue ethics,” see Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays (University of California Press, 1978) and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 18 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, III.i.1, for Hume’s well-known but highly controversial view that there is something questionable about inferring an “ought” from an “is.” 19 See, for instance, Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11 (Fall 1999): 52-65; David Tucker, “What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (Autumn 2001): 1-14; Thomas Copeland, “Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Studies 21.2 (2001): 91-105; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New is the New Terrorism?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27.5 (SeptemberOctober 2004): 439-454); Jonny Burnett and Dave Whyte, “Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism,” Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media 1.4 (2005): 118; Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism’,” Peace, Conflict and Development 8 (January 2006): 1-33; Thomas L. Mockaitis, The ‘New’ Terrorism: Myth and Reality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Antony Field, “The ‘New Terrorism’: Evolution or Revolution? Political Studies Review 7 (2009): 195-207; and Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” Values and Violence: Studies in Global Justice 4.2 (2009): 117136. There have been some recent attempts to rehabilitate the idea, but they consist largely of reiterations of empirical issues (such as the organization of “new terrorists” into “networks” rather than “hierarchies”) that no-one, to my knowledge, seriously disputes and which, in any case, are not essential to understand the concept of any kind of terrorism. See, for instance, Peter R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the

168

Chapter Eight

Transformation of Political Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); and Ersun Kurtulus, “The ‘New Terrorism’ and Its Critics,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34.6 (Jun 2011): 476-500. Spencer has responded vigorously to Kutulus’s critique, of which he is one of the targets; see Alexander Spencer, “Sic[k] of the New Terrorism Debate? A Response to Our Critics,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 4.3 (Dec 2011): 459-67. 20 See Harte, “Taxonomy of Terrorism,” and Liam Harte, “New Terrorism and Mythic Terrorism,” in Terrorism: Politics, Religion, Literature, Diogo Pires Aurélio and João Tiago Proença, eds. (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2011), 5-19. 21 See ibid. 22 In its standard form, the practical syllogism is an argument whose premises consist of a practical principle (say, I should not eat sweet foods) along with some statement of fact (say, this dessert is a sweet food). When the former is applied to the latter, the two premises lead not so much to a particular judgment but to an action which can be expressed as a particular judgment (say, I should not eat this dessert). Aristotle explains the idea in De Anima 434a15-20 and NE 1147a35-40. 23 In fact, sixty-seven British citizens died on 9-11, more than twice as many as the greatest number that the Provisional IRA ever killed in a single action, at Enniskillen in 1987. 24 One can arrive at a very good estimation of the proposed character of the Islamic republic by reading Hassan al-Turabi, “The Islamic State,” in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 241251. 25 On bin Laden’s upright but surprisingly tolerant ethical character, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: al-Qeada and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 75-77; Jonathon Randal, Osama: The Making of a Terrorist (New York: Knopf, 2004), 60-61. Bodansky describes bin Ladan in his youth as “a drinker and womanizer” prone to brawling in the bars of Beirut (see Yossef Bodansky,Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America [New York: Forum, 1999], 3), but both Randal and Bergen dismiss this as certainly false, Randal perhaps even as deliberate secret service disinformation (see Randal, Osama, 59, and Peter L.Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), 32-33. 26 John Miller, “Interview with Osama bin Laden,” accessed at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html on April 9, 2012. 27 “[W]hen a dozen [Americans] were killed in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Afghanistan and Iraq were bombed and all hypocrite ones stood behind the head of the world’s infidelity—behind the Hubal of the age—namely, America and its supporters. These incidents divided the entire world into two regions—one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity, from which we hope God will protect us.” “Bin Laden’s Warning: Full Text,” accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1585636.stm, on May 5, 2012. 28 Ibid.

“One and Indivisible”

169

29 Quoted in Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 54. 30 See Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response, rev. edn., (London: Routledge, 2002), 250-251. See also Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, Ch. 8; and Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave, 2002), Ch. 14. 31 Gustave le Bon, The Psychology of Revolution (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), 168. 32 See Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (many editions), Part I, Chapter 3; R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: the Year of the Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 323-8; and M.J. Sydenham, The French Revolution (New York: Capricorn, 1965), 214-18. 33 Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 7. 34 Ibid, Festivals, 11. 35 Ibid, Festivals, 11-12. 36 Ibid, Festivals, 12. 37 Jesse Goldhammer, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 8. On scapegoating and martyrdom in particular, see Goldhammer, Headless Republic, 18-23. 38 Goldhammer, Headless Republic, 196. 39 Minutes of the Paris Jacobin Club, 11 Thermidor II (July 29, 1794), quoted in Jean Matrat, Robespierre, or the Tyranny of the Majority, trans. Alan Kendall with Felix Brenner (New York: Scribner, 1971), 288-89. 40 Quoted in R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 129. Sydenham notes that the date was December 21, 1793, and that, that afternoon, Collot had spoken for the Great Committee in recommending that the National Convention reject a petition by a delegation of Lyonese citizens that, among other things, the city be readmitted to the Republic, having been ejected from it as part of the suppression of the revolt. See M.J. Sydenham, The French Revolution (New York: Capricorn, 1965), 205. Schama notes that, during the speech to the Jacobins, Collot also condemned the recent arrest of Charles Ronsin, the leader of the Parisian Revolutionary Army, which had aided him and Fouché at Lyons and—in a foreshadowing of Adolf Eichmann’s defense — complained that he and the others had done at Lyons no more than what everyone had wanted. See Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 813-14. 41 Maximilen Robespierre, “Rapport sur les principes du gouvernement révolutionnaire, December 25, 1793,” my translation, from Robespierre, Oeuvres Complètes 10. 42 Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, “Rapport à la convention nationale au nom du comité de salut public October 10, 1793,” in Keith Michael Baker, ed., The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 356.

170 43

Chapter Eight

Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled, 77. For a look at how one Islamist organization, Hizbollah, was tormented with an issue like this, see Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131-57. The defense of “extenuating circumstances” was put forward in the cases of both its signature tactics, suicide bombing and hostage-taking, in order to remove the embarrassment of doing things fairly clearly contradictory to Islamic law when the ultimate aim of Hizballah is the establishment of an Islamic republic, governed by that same shariah, in Lebanon. In another part of the terroristic spectrum, the Terror in revolutionary France was justified as a national emergency, due to the economic crisis and the invasion of the armies of the First Coalition. One of the reasons for Robespierre’s fall was that many, including Jacobins, took it that, with the expulsion from French soil of the invading foreign armies in late 1793, the purpose of the Terror had been achieved and that it could now be ended, or at least mitigated. 44

CHAPTER NINE POLITICAL ISLAM IN MODERN IRAN: ULAMA, ISLAMIC MILITANCY AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE ALLEGED APOSTATES SEDI MINACHI

Introduction Shahin Najafi, a thirty two-year-old Iranian rapper and musician residing in exile in Germany, has lived in hiding under police protection after posting his latest rap song “Ay Naghi” on the Internet in early May of 2012. The song appeals to Ali al-Hadi, also known as al-Naqi, the tenth of twelve Shiite imams who lived in the ninth century — a man considered by Shi’a Muslims to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Najafi is best known in the exile community for his controversial lyrics that raise awareness about social, cultural and economic difficulties like poverty, corruption, and discrimination against women, minorities and homosexuals in Iran. In his music video for “Ay Naghi,” Najafi shows the dome of a mosque tipped with a rainbow flag. Two Iranian ulama1 angrily reacted to Najafi’s song and immediately issued fatwas (death sentences), declaring Najafi’s song an insult to Shi’a imams and blasphemous — a crime that, according to some interpretations of Islamic law, is punishable by death. To help encourage his murder, the ulama offered a $100,000 reward to anyone who kills Najafi. Najafi's case is reminiscent of the death threats Salman Rushdie received after writing the 1989 novel The Satanic Verses. His book prompted Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, to issue a fatwa calling for the author's death, after which Rushdie was forced to live in hiding under police protection for many years. Najafi and Rushdie are not the first or last people to face death threats by the Iranian ulama.

172

Chapter Nine

Azarbaijani writer Rafiq Taghi was stabbed outside his home and later died on Nov 23, 2011 at a Baku hospital. One day before his death, Taghi told an Azarbaijani reporter that he suspects Iranian agents were involved in his attack, and that it could be in retaliation for his published article “Iran and the Inevitability of Globalization” in which he criticized political Islam.2 Taghi was critical of political Islam and had published a previous article “Europe and Us,” in this same journal in 2006, after which he immediately received death threats from an Iranian ulama named Ayathollah Lankarani in the form of a fatwa. What is political Islam and why do the Iranian ulama aggressively campaign and target anyone who is critical of their worldviews? How do these ulama convince their followers to use violence against their critics inside and outside Iran? While some scholars have argued that Islamists demand that Muslims worldwide follow Shari’a rigidly,3 the discussion in this chapter focuses on the ideology of political Islam promoting fatwa, jihad (understood in this context as a physical, confrontational struggle) and the pursuit of violence to achieve its goals. Throughout it, I will unpack the doctrine of modern Islamism in the Iranian context to provide a better understanding of this ideology and the danger it poses to humanity locally and globally.

The Definition of Political Islam Political Islam is a term used by scholars to conceptualize the intertwinement of Islam and state political affairs. It is a political system that derives its primary source of legislation from the Quran and Islamic (Sharia) law. Since the start of the modernization of Iranian society in early 1920s, Iranian Shi’a Islamists hoped for an opportunity to seize power and to restore Sharia in every aspect of Iran’s society. For many reasons (most of which are beyond the scope of this chapter), the Shia clerics took hold of the leadership of the 1979 revolution and started a new era known as the Islamist movement, first in Iran then later in other neighboring countries. Since that time, Iran’s legal and civic codes have been based on strict interpretations of Islamic law. Accordingly, people must follow strict traditional Islamic codes of conduct and Sharia has been integrated into laws that govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, and punishment of criminals known as ghesas (Sharia-based punishment which calls for revenge equivalent to what the crime inflicted). Although the ideology of political Islam has been the main driving force in Iran since the early 1980s, and the Iranian clerics on many occasions have publicly announced their desire to export the example of

Political Islam in Modern Iran

173

Islamic revolution to other countries around the globe, in my view, many western scholars who are critical of political Islam have paid more attention to the implications of this ideology globally in recent years, particularly following the tragic events of 9/11. It is important to note that many Muslims around the world including the majority of Iranians do not associate themselves with political Islam. However, Iranian citizens from different religious and ethnic backgrounds are not able to question the authority of the clerics nor are they allowed to critique the ulama’s interpretation of Sharia. As documented time and again in the United Nations Human Rights Report (2012)4, the authorities are intolerance of dissent and often use violence against those who aspire democratic change in the Iranian society. In describing the link between religion and civil society, Peter Mandaville argues that the lack of separation between Islam and human activity from every domain of life makes this religion open to extremist interpretations of the Quran and Islamic law.5 According to Mandaville, this is evident in statements by an Islamic theorist, Rashid Rida (18651935), who believed that any political system within Islamic countries must be derived from the Sharia.6 As stated by Mandaville, “The idea of the divine connectedness of all things, as invoked by the central precept of tawhid (“oneness”), is often taken to imply that in Islam it makes no sense to speak of the separateness of religion from any other domain of life.7” Historically, governments in almost all Muslim majority countries derive their laws and policies from religion. However, Iran separated religion from its civil and legal system from the mid 1920s until early 1980s. The re-Islamization of the country since the 1980s brought an end to the division between religious and secular law. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the root causes of the complex factors that contributed to the rise of Islamism in Iran, I will investigate the involvement of political Islam with terror and violence, and explore the Iranian ulama’s justification for violent jihad against so-called apostates.

The emergence of Islamism in modern Iran: terror and violence The ideology of political Islam and the underlying political forces convincing some Iranians to participate in political violence reflects my own memories and observations of the public humiliation, intimidation and aggression used by the Islamists against those who resisted the despotic rule of the ulama at the beginning of the Islamic revolution. As a teenager, I witnessed the immediate emergence of this ideology following

174

Chapter Nine

the 1979 revolution which Islamisized Iranian society and encouraged youth from Iran and other Muslim majority countries in the Middle East to use violence against anyone portrayed as an enemy of Islam. I remember listening to a pre-prayer speech by a mullah8 on the radio who pledged to work with other Islamic leaders to globalize their movement by exporting the example of Iran’s Islamic revolution to the former Soviet Union, Asian countries and other parts of the world. This was early one Friday afternoon, only days after the election that brought about the institutionalization of political Islam in Iranian society. At that point, I realized that the political powerbase the Shi’a clerics had sought since 1925 was being formed, and that this institutionalization of political Islam signified the defeat of secular Iranians. Since the focus of this chapter is not to discuss what the primary goals of the Iranian revolution were, or how Khomeini became its leader, I remind the readers that Iran was a secular country during the fifty years of the Pahlavi dynasty 9 during which the country was modernized. The secular reforms in all aspects of society ruled by Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah created deep hostilities between them and the Shi’a clerics, and also between their government and other traditionalIslamic sectors of Iranian society. For example, many Iranian clergy who feared losing their authority in promoting/enforcing traditional Islamic values, continuously renounced the government’s secular measures and viewed them as being un-Islamic from the beginning of the modernist reforms in the 1920s. This wave of growing ideological opposition to secularism gradually resulted in the creation of a religious opposition movement, providing Khomeini 10 with an opportunity to create an ideology that tied Islamic principles and traditions to Iranians’ social, cultural and political affairs. Khomeini’s victory in 1979 tragically and quickly led to the end of secularism (the separation of religion from politics) in Iran. Now, individual Iranians who express secular ideas are persecuted as the state portrays them as infidels, who following its logic, must be devalued, punished and eliminated. It is worth noting that the leaders of Islamist ideology use religious sentiments to convince their supporters to revolt against any change that undermine their Islamic identity and also to revolt against those who adopt and promote western notion of modernity. The example of the fatwa against Najafi, and also the Iranian regime’s brutal crash against those who disputed the result of the election in 2009, shows how the Islamists are prepared to use terror and extreme forms of violence against those who call for an end to the ulama’s authority in the country.

Political Islam in Modern Iran

175

Scholars who study Islamism characterize extremist behavior as the reaction of ultra-conservative individuals who fervently believe that all aspects of public and private life must be fully morally restricted, and who are appalled by people having freedom of choice. Although elements of fundamentalism, as a form of reaction against modern ways of life, exist in almost all major religions, Islamic fundamentalism has been the dominant form of expression against the social, cultural, and political transformation of societies known as “modernism” in the Middle East, North Africa and several former Republics of the Soviet Union in the last three decades. The re-Islamization of societies in the Middle East (e.g., Iran) since the early 1980s has broadened tension and divisions between people and movements that promote secular modernism and those promoting traditional ways of life. These deepening divisions are reflected across the region today. As argued by the Iranian sociologist Haideh Moghissi, different interpretations of Islamic ideas, symbols and laws in the form of Sharia have formed the political expression for its followers since the early 1980s in which the use of aggression and violence against their opponents have become the cultural symbol for this movement.11 Conflict resolution theorist Johan Galtung defines cultural violence as those aspects of a culture, legitimized by its leaders, which promote violence as a way of responding to conflict and disagreement.12 In other words, the leaders legitimize violence by linking it to the cultural beliefs and practices of their followers. In the case of Iran, the Islamic clergies use traditional cultural values dating back centuries to justify hatred and the dehumanization of those who do not fit within their norm, whom Galtung calls the other. According to Galtung, the other is dehumanized while the self is superiorized; therefore, violent reactions may appear as a form of “normal response” against the other. In linking Galtung’s theory to the political situation in Iran where Islamists have political power, I draw attention to the role of Islamist ideology in the widening polarization and the dehumanization of the other. In the context of contemporary Iran, the other is anyone or any group that does not believe in or follow the Islamists’ interpretation of Islam. Hence, the other is constructed as an outsider and can be the local Muslim Iranians who are critical of Islamist political agenda, Iranians from different religious faith (Baha’i faith, Jewish, Christians and Zoroastrians), Iranians who do not follow any religious faith or the other can be neighbors, or the people with whom they interact on a daily basis in public, but are nonetheless framed as infidels. Through the negative creation of the other, the Islamists have amplified fear among people particularly among women and minority groups in Iran.13

176

Chapter Nine

Cultural Identity of the Islamists: Glorification of the Past Islamism has inspired some to participate in political violence since the politicization of Islam in Iran in the early 1980s. Hilal Khashan, a political scientist working at the American University of Beirut, refers to political Islam as a movement that aims to create an Islamic state, mixing religious practices with civil law.14 Moghissi, in her study of the cultural power of political Islam in the twentieth century, remarks that the form of political Islam shaped by Islamic fundamentalists opposes the separation of religion and politics while it essentializes cultural differences between the West and the East. Thus, in her definition of modernity, Moghissi differentiates it from the process of modernization. According to her, modernity means legal, political, social and cultural advances in any society recognizing inclusivity, social justice, democratic rights, secularism, and the state’s responsibility to protect the legal rights of its citizens. Modernization means economic growth, capital accumulation, and industrialization under the direct control of multinational corporations. Given the historical and current authoritarian nature of Iran and many other governmental systems in the Middle East, one has to ask whether any Muslim majority country has ever come close to reaching this form of modernity. To answer this question, Moghissi argues that while almost all governments in Muslim majority countries have opened their doors to the capitalist form of modernization, none of these governments have begun the process of modernity, defined in this way, even in a limited form. Many who are critical of modernization reject modernity without knowing that these two concepts have different historical backgrounds. Indeed, as Moghissi remarks, modernization has resulted in a wide gap between the rich minority and the poor majority populations.15 However, the most reactionary forces in these societies have the ability to mobilize the poor sectors to revolt against modernity (not modernization), as modernity is in contradiction to extremists’ moral principles and exclusionary practices. The Islamist leaders in the Middle East who oppose modernity and individual freedom seem to have no difficulty embracing the capitalist market economy of the west; but they are against the ideals of western political democracy, individual autonomy, respect for human rights, and democratically run state systems.16 In the context of Palestine, as referenced by Middle Eastern scholar Khaled Hroup, political Islam within the Hamas movement declares war on the Zionist colonialism in Palestine, because it views the existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish enterprise that aims to undermine Palestine Islamic identity. 17 Therefore, the movement uses Islamic discourse to

Political Islam in Modern Iran

177

mobilize the masses against the state of Israel, and its leaders criticize official Palestinian and Arab organizations for their positions on having peace negotiations with Israel. Hroup, who studied the worldview of the Hamas movement in Palestine, believes that Hamas’s ideological war against Israel has been portrayed as resistance to a foreign occupying power and Hamas’s aim is to maintain the Islamic identity in Palestine. In this context, Hamas has used religious education by emphasizing individuals’ commitment to Islam by creating an Islamic civil society in the Gaza Strip. In this context, similar to other Islamic societies in the Middle East, women including girls have to follow strict dress code in public space including schools, and also Sharia has been mixed with cultural, social and political affairs of their society since June 2007 when Hamas took control of Gaza Strip. Through Islamic education and sermons by religious leaders, Hamas and its military wing, such as al-Qassam Brigades, have promoted the ideology of martyrdom as their primary strategy against those who are outside their norms and religious values. Therefore, their primary goal is not to free their homeland from the settlers, but to maintain and save the Islamic identity of the region. Shay, an Israeli scholar who studied martyrdom within the religious extremist movement argued that Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, provided the religious/ideological basis of political Islam in the late twentieth century and encouraged the use of jihad as a way to fight its enemy.18 In other words, Shay regards Khomeini as the father of the theory of political Islam who used his power to mobilize his followers from, within and outside Iran, resulting in groups of extreme Islamists killing both themselves and others through suicide bombings and assassination of their political/cultural opponents.

Culture of terror versus culture of peace The Islamists from Iran played a major role in the expansion of the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in the recruitment of the Palestinian population living in Lebanese refugee camps to suicide missions against civilians in Israel or elsewhere in the Middle East region. Using data gathered from interviews of 342 Palestinian refugees living in southern Lebanon, Khashan examined multiple factors pertaining to suicide attacks: age, the ideology of political Islam, self-esteem, social trust, optimism, and belief in the sanctity of life. Khashan reports that, “The compactness of refugee camps in terms of acreage and congested dwellings enhances the preaching activities of the

178

Chapter Nine

Islamic fundamentalists. Physical mobility constraints and lack of recreational facilities add momentum to the spread of militia teachings.”19 In analyzing his data, Khashan poses that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon strongly supported suicide operations against the Israeli state. In this regards, he writes: Many respondents expressed a willingness to transform themselves into smart bombs by detonating 20 to 30 pounds of explosives in the midst of Jewish assemblies. For them, this was the fastest way to immortalize themselves in Allah’s heavens and the surest way to achieve a balance of terror with Israel’s overwhelming military machine.20

Kashan’s research findings suggest that youth living in refugee camps in Palestine, and Lebanon, are in a vulnerable situation because these youth are often targeted for recruitment by forces seeking unquestioning obedient allies who can be manipulated to work for militant groups under abusive and dangerous conditions in order to carry out the terrorist acts of suicide bombing and kidnapping. The phenomenon of suicide bombing and its expansion in the Islamist movement in countries like Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) and Lebanon continues to be a major concern to this day. Anti terrorist researcher Abraham Rabinovich who studied the root causes of suicide bombing among youth, argues that poverty, along with other variables such as religious ideology and nationalism, are important factors in youth involvement with Islamist movement and committing suicide bombings.21 The ideology of Islamists does not appeal to all youth living in equal socio-economic and political conditions. Instead they attract those youth whose lives lack a sense of direction and meaning and use the ideology of political Islam to justify acts of terror and violence towards its opponents. Rohan Gunaratna, who has studied threats posed by violent political movements, argues that ideology, not poverty or illiteracy, is the key driver of terror in the world.22 The profound appeal of the ideology of political Islam among some youth can be a complex phenomenon. Youth who experience unjust treatment in addition to inhuman living conditions are more at risk due to the dominant presence of the fundamentalist movement in the Middle East.23 This means that some youth aspiring to bring social change to their societies may be influenced by the ideology of Islamists in the form of strict rules of Sharia laws drawn from the Quran, in addition to the promises of a better life after death upon sacrifice for the will of Allah (God) and Islam.

Political Islam in Modern Iran

179

By looking at the ages of the suicide bombers, one can conclude that youth are the primary targets of the Islamists in the Middle East and elsewhere. As discussed by Flaherty, this is because many youth in their late teens and early twenties seek to form their identity and are committed to changing themselves and the outside world.24 “Youth is a time when ideology plays a central role. Those who are searching for a place in the world are easily drawn to ideologies that promise to change their social reality and give them a meaningful role in it.”25 I feel stunned whenever I hear the words “suicide bombing” and it brings out memories of back home in Iran. At the beginning of my tenth grade year in 1981, I heard this word for the first time in the media controlled by the newly established Islamic state in Iran, whose rule strengthened with the start of the Iran-Iraq war. I remember watching teenage boys with heavy guns in their hands, bombs strapped to their waists, and green headbands bearing the word “ya shahid” (martyrdom) on TV, marching on streets prior to their departure to the front line of war in southern Iran (close to the border of Iran-Iraq). These teenagers (between thirteen to eighteen years of age) were told by the Iranian ulama that if they sacrificed their lives for Islam by exploding themselves in the Iraqi minefields, they would automatically enter heaven. Even though it was clear to me that these young people were manipulated by the Islamists, neither I nor anyone else living in Iran had the right to openly question their intentions or use of these youth as cannon fodder. Since then, the world has witnessed many examples of youth involvement in suicide bombings in different parts of the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, the U.S. and Europe. The 9/11 attack on New York City, the bombing of Madrid, London and various Israeli cities demonstrate the Islamists’ disregard for the safety and security of civilians, and how they spread hate against those who challenge their interpretation of Islam.

Discussion To analyze factors contributing to political violence since the institutionalization of Islamism in Iran and other Middle East countries, it is important to examine the precept of education and the role it has played since the rise of this movement in the region. As stated by peace education researcher El-Rifai, education is one of the most important tools influencing the advancement and transformation of any culture.26 In cases in which the educational system and mass media are controlled by Islamist clergies, using the instrument of education to indoctrinate the population

180

Chapter Nine

has always played a role in strengthening mistrust and hatred towards those who do not fit within Islamist ideology. In the context of Iran, as mentioned, the teaching of the Sharia is a core feature of the school curriculum, and everyone attending educational institutions in Iran must learn and accept its basic tenets. Furthermore, the idea that all Muslims have a duty to build a uniquely Islamic society is propagated in religion classes as well.27 Iranian youth are constantly taught that in order to have a better life after death, they must be ready to sacrifice themselves for the will of Islam, the Quran, and God. Textbooks do not mention concepts such as “human rights” (human rights concepts are considered as Western values not applicable to Islamic societies), and instead prescribe sets of social behaviors applicable to an Islamic society. Students are only subjected to Islamic “education” and regularly experience or witness abuse, humiliation, and cruel punishment if they resist or question the authority of the ulama.28 The rise of political Islam as a way to resist the modern political and cultural influence of the West has empowered the most reactionary forces of the Middle East to form an international network carrying out terrorist acts against humanity inside and outside the Middle East. The case of Iran shows how, in the name of Islam, the Shi’a ulama have imposed an authoritarian form of Islam on a society built on modern values for half a century. By focusing on being faithful to traditional Islam, the ulama justify their unquestioning instructions. For example, during Friday prayer in the city of Mashhad on May 24, 2012, Ayatollah Alam al-Hadi29, told thousands of people that Shahin Najafi insulted Shi’a imam and called him an apostate. This member of the Islamic clergy also said that apostates must be eliminated from this earth by execution to deter others from insulting Shi’a imams.3031 Many modernist Iranians are frustrated with the current situation in their country and aspire to separate religion from state affairs. Creating this separation has been extremely difficult, as individuals risk their lives challenging a reactionary system. The examples of Najafi, Rushdie and Taghi prove that the Islamists lack tolerance and respect for freedom of expression regardless of whether their critics reside inside or outside of Iran. While the Islamists’ repression continues in Iran, and while the ulama terrorize critical thinkers with their fatwas and charges of apostasy, some Iranians continue their resistance against Islamism and demand the re-interpretation of Islam to benefit modern values and pluralistic ideas.

Political Islam in Modern Iran

181

Conclusion Although the origin of political violence in the Middle East dates back centuries, violence and terrorist attacks have escalated since the rise of political Islam in Iran over the last quarter of the twentieth century.32 In their encounter with modernity, the Shi’a ulama used religious education and popular agitation to indoctrinate their followers while silencing critics and issuing death sentences against intellectuals, writers and artists in Iran and worldwide who opposed them. Given the direct theocratic rule of the ulama in Iran’s social and political affairs and their on-going drive to increase militancy and sectarian violence against their opponents, transforming Iranian society into a secular society is an enormous challenge. My personal experience regarding the authoritarian rule of the ulama in Iran has been frustrating, because while many Iranians take part in opportunities to promote civic and human rights through non-violent actions, the Islamists in response suppress them severely33. Despite the rise of Islamism in Iran and other Muslim majority countries in the Middle East, and despite there being significant challenges to the implementation of a culture of peace in Iran, I remain hopeful that a struggle to adopt and implement secularism, and respect for human dignity and human rights principles in the Middle East region will succeed one day soon. .

Notes 1 The term ulama refers to Muslim legal scholars who are best known as the arbiters of Shari’a, or Islamic law. The ulama are leading figures whose instructions are thought by many Muslims to be authoritative. 2 Taghi’s article was published on Nov 10, 2011 in the Sa-nat bi-monthly journal. 3 See for instance: Barry Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: the Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2006); Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, Jihad and International Security, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007). 4 http://www.iranrights.org/farsi/document-2043.php last visited on May 24, 2012. 5 The Muslims’ central religious text or Muslims’ divine book. 6 As the father of the Salafiyya movement, Rashid Rida (1865-1935) is considered as a reformist in the early Islamist movement. He inspired to create an Islamic state where the ulama are the keepers of the Islamic tradition and law and also are the political authorities of the state. His famous book is titled: The Caliphate, or the Supreme Immamate (1923). The book was written during the time that secular modernist movement was becoming more prominent amongst political elites in

182

Chapter Nine

Egypt, Turkey and Iran. In this book, he theorizes the renewed caliphate political system with the framework of an Islamic political order in the Muslim majority countries. 7 Mandaville, 12. 8 Mullah is referred to an Islamic priest. 9 Pahlavi dynasty started by Reza Shah in 1925 and ended in 1979 during which his son, Mohammad Reza Shah was in power. 10 Ayatollah Khomeini is known as the leader of Shi’a Islamic revolution in Iran. He was in exile from November 1964 to February 1979. 11 Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis. (London: Zed Books, 1999). 12 Johan Galtung, “Conflict, War and Peace: A Bird’s Eye View.” In Searching for Peace: the Road to Transcend, eds. Johan Galtung et al. (London: Pluto Press), 315. 13 For a detailed discussion of the “other,” see Orientalism by Edward Said, who is perhaps among the best known scholars that critiqued the practice of “othering” and examined over the course of his writings, in great detail, the political effects and agendas of this practice. 14 Hillal Khashan, “Collective Palestinian frustration and suicide bombings,” Third World Quarterly, 24 (2003): 1049-1067. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Khaled, Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, (Washington, D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000). 18 Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks, Translated by Rachel Lieberman, (London: Transaction Publication, 2004). 19 Khashan, 1063. 20 Ibid., 1061. 21 Abraham Rabinovich, “Suicide bombers’ Psyches studied,” Washington Times, December 30, 2002, A8. 22 Rohan Gunaratna, “Responding to Terrorism as a Kinetic and Ideological Threat,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 11 (2005): 243-252. 23 Khashan, 1063. 24 Loise T. Flaherty, “Youth, Ideology, and Terrorism,” Adolescent Psychiatry, 27 (2003). 25 Ibid., 54. 26 Yasmine El-Rifai, “Peace Education: The Key to Sustainable Peace in the Middle East,” (M.A. Thesis, Institute of Development Politics and Management, University of Antwerp, 2002). 27 Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: the Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East. 28 Sedi Minachi, “Status of Women in Iran after the 1979 Revolution and the Role of Iranian Secular Women in the Movement,” Ampersand: working papers. (Vancouver: the UBC Centre for Research in Women's Studies and Gender Relations, 2003).

Political Islam in Modern Iran

183

29 Alam al-Hadi is considered as an Islamic scholar whose instructions must be followed. 30 Peyk Iran News http://www.peykeiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=48497 last visited on May 24, 2012. 31 “Peyke Iran News online,” May 24, 2012, http://www.peykeiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=48497 32 Meir Hatina. The “Ulama’ and the Cult of Death in Palestine. Israel Affairs,” 12 (2006): 29-51. 33 This is reflected in the 2012 United National report on human rights in Iran.

CHAPTER TEN BETWEEN PROPHETIC FAILURE AND TERRORISM IN CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL: THE CASE OF YEHUDA ETZION MOTTI INBARI

In the spring of 1984, the Israeli General Security Service (GSS) uncovered the so-called “Jewish Underground,” a grouping that committed a series of revenge attacks on Arabs. The members of the group planted incendiary devices in the cars of the leaders of the National Guidance Committee, a group of local Palestinian leaders, in response to an attack on a group of Jews in Hebron (May 1980). The mayors of Ramallah and Nablus lost their legs in the action, and an IDF bomb disposal expert was injured while attempting to defuse a third device. At the beginning of July 1983, Aharon Gross, a student at Shavei Hevron yeshiva was murdered. The Jewish Underground responded by attacking the Islamic College in Hebron, a center of anti-Israeli activities. Three Arabs were murdered in the attack and approximately thirty were injured. An attempt by the Underground to booby trap a bus transporting Arab workers in East Jerusalem was foiled after the underground cell was exposed by the GSS. Three men initiated the establishment of the Jewish Underground: Michael Livny, Yehoshua Ben-Shoshan, and Yehuda Etzion. The latter two also had a further objective that was not realized, and this was the true purpose behind the establishment of the Underground. At the beginning of his trial,1 Etzion confessed that, “The action against the mayors took one month of my life. The thoughts, preparations, conceptions, and actions I undertook with regard to the [Temple] Mount occupied years of my life.” Indeed, this was the true objective of the Underground – to remove the mosques from the Temple Mount and prepare the site for the establishment of the Third Temple. This chapter examines Yehuda Etzion, one of the founders of the Jewish Underground, and his activities after his release from prison,

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

185

particularly the establishment of the Chai Vekayam Movement for Redemption. Etzion is one of the most original thinkers among contemporary religious Zionists; his positions constitute a right-wing benchmark and draw the entire religious Zionist public toward religious extremism and radicalism. I shall seek to present his theocratic perspective, which advocates the “cleansing” of the Temple Mount as a first step toward the reconstruction of the Temple, and I shall discuss the steps he has taken to advance his position. “[Yehuda Etzion] is a person who constantly feels he has a role to play in the process of redemption, and who asks himself each day: ‘What am I doing to help the process of redemption[?]’” Etzion’s wife chose these words to describe her husband. 2 The biographical outline of his life – studies at a yeshiva high school in Pardes Hannah, followed by a Hesder yeshiva, and military service in a combat engineering corps – is relatively routine and carries no hint of the unique course he would later take. After the signing of the Camp David accords in 1979, the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, Etzion decided to sever completely his connections with Gush Emunim, the right-wing extra parliamentary movement, formed in February 1974 by the young guard of religious Zionism with the objective of creating settlements in the occupied territories conquered by Israel in the 1967 Six Days War in order to prevent territorial concessions. The disconnection was due to his conviction that the task of raising the Jewish people toward redemption could not be based solely on the vision of the settlements. Etzion’s ideology, which led him first to the Jewish Underground and later to the Movement for Redemption, is driven by a profound sense of crisis. His approach is that in the absence of positive progress, deterioration and retreat inevitably ensue. The redemption of the Jewish people requires proactive steps, and Gush Emunim, the leading body carrying the message of redemption, lacks proper tools for creating the desired breakthrough. Etzion argued that Zionism had reached a dead end; existing mechanisms could not overcome the crisis, and new objectives must be set. In this chapter I shall seek to show that Etzion’s approach was the product of his internal struggle with a failure of faith. Etzion is not alone in these feelings. Since the peace process between Israel and Egypt (1978), many religious Zionists have been forced to confront the growing contradiction of their basic assumptions regarding the nature and destiny of the State of Israel. The withdrawal from Sinai, and, later, the Madrid talks, the Oslo process, and the Disengagement (2005), which led to an Israeli withdrawal from parts of West Bank and the Gaza Strip, led to a theological crisis. Etzion’s reaction to this crisis was to reinforce his

186

Chapter Ten

messianic faith, and to engage in forceful action with the goal of expediting the realization of this faith. Etzion developed his solution to this dissonance as early as the late 1970s, and his approach became more determined as time passed. The psychological dissonance experienced by religious Zionism over the past two decades, and particularly since the early 1990s, produced a broader and deeper response in the practical and ideological approach taken by Etzion.

The Foundation of Crisis – The Background to Psychological Dissonance The messianic role attributed to the State of Israel by religious Zionists, and the actualization of this concept following the 1967 war, later sparked a crisis among many in these circles following the peace treaty with Egypt and the potential shattering of the vision of the Greater Land of Israel. The crisis was caused by the inability and unwillingness of those involved to see the State of Israel moving in a direction that was inconsonant with, and even diametrically opposed to, the process of redemption as they saw it. They could not tolerate any concept of retreat, whether territorial or spiritual; the withdrawals constituted irrefutable proof that the process of redemption was reversible, and this is the underlying cause of the dissonance they experienced. The main thrust of Etzion’s criticism of the religious Zionist leaders is that they allowed secular Jews to lead the process of redemption. The idea that secular Israelis, unaware of the tremendous mission they bore, would deliver their secular enterprise into the hands of a messianic theocracy proved mistaken. The divine mission was neglected by precisely those who were destined to be its bearers — religious Zionism, and in place of progress came regression. The desire for “normality” led the course of redemption to the edge of oblivion. The processes of secularization undergone by Israeli society, and the willingness to view the territories occupied in the 1967 war as bargaining chips in order to secure peace agreements and compromise, while totally ignoring their messianic importance – all this, Etzion believed, proved that the tactic adopted by religious Zionism had been mistaken, since general Zionism did not have the strength to lead the journey toward an era of total redemption. For Etzion, the “supreme strategy” of religious Zionism remained the desire to move closer to a theocratic messianic dominion. In tactical terms, however, an urgent revision was required in the definition of how to lead this process. The answer lay in religious radicalism and theocratic

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

187

activism. Etzion interpreted the “Return to Zion” as a cosmic process progressing toward the redemption of the People of Israel. However, he argued, the way in which religious Zionism had sought to channel the people toward this goal had actually led to the traumatic consequences of Israel’s territorial withdrawals. Surprisingly, Etzion argued that the responsibility for this failure on the part of religious Zionism rested with its adoption of the philosophy of Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook (1865-1935), as embodied in the approach of Mercaz Harav yeshiva. Mercaz Harav yeshiva, which seeks to combine religiosity and nationalism, elevates and sanctifies two principal values: The sanctity of the Land of Israel and the sanctity of the State of Israel. According to the approach of the yeshiva head, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Hacohen Kook (18911982), as transmitted to his students and followers, the Land of Israel constitutes a single, organic entity that belongs to the entire Jewish people — past, present, and future. Thus land and people are fused in complete unity. Accordingly, no individual has the right to relinquish any part of the land, since it does not belong to any single group. The fusion of people and land reflects the divine will for the redemption of the Jewish people.3 Within this structure, the tool for realizing divine will is manifested in Jewish nationhood. Accordingly, the doctrine of the sanctity of the Land of Israel is mirrored by the sanctity of the State of Israel, since the State of Israel advances a messianic process, albeit unwittingly. Zvi Yehuda Hacohen Kook went further still: “It must be recalled for once and for all: that which is sacred is sacred! […] The State of Israel and the governmental regime in Israel are sacred. Everything that belongs to the observance of this commandment, all the tanks and other weapons […] belong to this sanctity.”4 Etzion’s criticism is that the sanctification of the state by the adherents of the approach taken by the Mercaz Harav yeshiva can prevent an effective struggle against the state when it is thwarting processes that can lead to redemption. When the State of Israel decides to withdraw from parts of the Land of Israel, the yeshiva is trapped and cannot take firm action against such a policy. The weakness of the Mercaz Harav school is manifested in the clearest terms in its position regarding the Temple Mount. Etzion argues that if the state were to declare its sovereignty over the Mount and remove the Waqf and the mosques, the followers of the yeshiva would laud its actions. Since the government refuses to do so, however, they justify this inaction by resorting to the traditional formula that “the generation is not yet prepared” for such a step.

188

Chapter Ten

Accordingly, Etzion argues, a different ideology and solution are required. Etzion finds these among the veterans of the Lechi underground movement. The formative figure in shaping Etzion’s worldview is Shabbtai Ben Dov. Ben Dov, an autodidact and a prolific writer, became an ideal and an idol for Etzion. He stated that Ben Dov’s vision inspired his plan to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount.5

The Ideology of Yehuda Etzion Etzion argues that the Torah constitutes the proper standard for the life of the Jewish nation. The Utopia is represented by Jewish dominion. This should be guided by the Great Court, sitting in the “Hewn-Stone Hall” in the Temple, where the religious rituals of the sacrifices are carried out. The Jewish people should seize, farm, and guard the Promised Land from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean. This is the balance of perfection, and from this basis the culture of the Jewish people springs. Etzion argues that the Torah does not permit a state of exile. The perfect state comes when the people lives in its land and worships its God. Accordingly, there is no commandment to reconquer the land, since no permit was ever granted to leave the Land. Neither is there a commandment “to remove the impurity and cleanse the Temple Mount” and to build the Third Temple—since the Temple was supposed to be eternal. The destruction of the Temple and exile were the result of sin and the outcome of the reprehensible behavior of the Jewish people. The Torah teaches that the people must repent their sins and return to the fold; this entails returning to the Holy Land and reinstating their sovereign life as in ancient times. The Torah commands Jews to choose life: “For I have set before you life and death … choose life” (Deuteronomy 30:19). Exile carries the essence of death and the absence of national life; its contrast lies in the return to the Land of Israel and the maintenance of life therein. The Torah demands life as a nation in the Land of Israel; accordingly, life outside the Holy Land is tantamount to the rejection of the entire foundation of the Torah and analogous to idolatry.6 The existence of the people has a purpose and the nation has a destiny: to establish a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. This is the principle that should dictate national laws and behavior. “We exist in the world in order to realize our destiny.” Such a life cannot be merely biological; its meaning rests in the renewal of the Covenant with God. Accordingly, national existence must be independent and free of any involvement or collaboration with alien values of the nations, which “oppose the standard of life our Torah demands and impede our efforts for its realization.”7

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

189

However, the ability to act toward this destiny was blunted during the course of exile, and framed in the terms of a miracle: “The Holy One, blessed be He, will send us Messiah on a white donkey, will lead us to the Land of Israel, and will bring down the Temple from the heavens.”8 Thus, Etzion explains, a life of destiny was replaced by a life of survival. Redemption became an abstract concept, beyond reality, and connected with the expectation of miracles. Etzion says that although it is a movement of national resurgence, Zionism operates outside the bounds of this destiny. Rather than being drawn to the destiny of establishing sovereign life in the Land of Israel, it was pushed in to this position by anti-Semitism and global developments. As a result, it developed its ideology on the basis of the idea of finding a solution to the Jewish question and of locating a refuge for the Jews. In other words, Etzion argues, Zionism sought to find a life of survival and aspired to become “a normal nation.” The Zionist leaders turned their backs on Jewish study and tradition, which was perceived as an impediment and an obstacle along their course.9 The pointlessness of Zionism weakened the people’s resolve to strive toward its destiny and its ultimate objective. Accordingly, that section of the public that has a consciousness of destiny must strive to replace Zionism. The Movement of Redemption that Etzion began to envisage was intended to alter the course of Zionism: To take the initiative, to accept responsibility and authority to act for the redemption of Israel, is the basic logic behind our Torah, and accordingly it is God’s will of us.10 It is our obligation to observe that the cart of Zionism, which has for a long time now – (from the outset, in fact!) – been moving along a nothrough road, has now indeed reached an impasse … Just as we have grown up and abandoned the childish naivety of awaiting a miracle, so we have matured beyond the approach that seeks to cast our redemption in the secular mould of mundane existence.11

In light of Etzion’s anticipation of the end of Zionism and its replacement with a theocracy, I term his positions “theocratic post-Zionism.” The perceived obligation is to impose the Torah as the ruler of the nation’s life, and this kingdom will constitute the end of exile. The heart of the kingdom is the Temple Mount.

190

Chapter Ten

Purifying the Temple Mount and Rebuilding the Temple Upon learning of the price the Israeli government was willing to pay in return for the peace treaty with Egypt, a number of members of the Movement to Stop with Withdrawal from Sinai and of Gush Emunim began to develop the idea that blowing up the mosques on the Temple Mount could thwart the treaty.12 In his analysis, Gideon Aran determines that a clear sociological connecting thread may be seen between the withdrawal from Sinai and the plan to blow up the mosques. The eviction of Yamit was the point at which the barriers preventing this move fell. The traumatic experience of the withdrawal from Sinai, despite the struggle waged to prevent this development, led a number of key activists in Gush Emunim to advocate this idea more forcibly than before. According to Aran, this may be considered a manifestation of frustration and despair, as well as one of destiny, fulfillment, and hope.13 Yehuda Etzion acted on the basis of the same logic. The post-Zionist reaction he developed was rooted in the sense that the approach of the general Zionist movement had failed. This was compounded by disappointment with religious Zionism, which had granted its approval for the weak will that led to the withdrawal. Etzion identified the cause of this weakness, and conceived a dramatic move that would put the proper process back on course, accelerating the process of redemption. He argued that the Temple Mount held the mystical key for ending the period of meek Zionism. The removal of the mosques would put redemption back on course. The booklet The Temple Mount, published during the course of his trial (1985), is written in the form of a statement of defense. Etzion argues that his plan to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount was developed against the background of the refusal of the State of Israel to perform its duty in terms of the deterministic destiny of redemption. Etzion began his argument by proposing that the property of David on the Temple Mount is the eternal property of the Jewish people; this ownership has never expired and will never do so. The State of Israel is required to realize this ownership by virtue of the eternal Covenant between Israel and God. This obligation must be met “here and now,” and no one may rest until it is fulfilled. The longing for the rebuilding of the Temple embodied in the Jewish prayers demands concrete action, and the public is obliged to realize this. “Accordingly, we reject here the evasive approach that leaves the responsibility of the burden of redemption to the Lord in an abstract and vague manner; and we demand here, first and foremost of ourselves,

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

191

but no less of the state of which we are the children – that the overall responsibility for Jewish redemption be accepted.” 14 The object of the prayers lies in Jerusalem, and during his prayers the worshipper turns toward the Temple Mount and the Temple. Generations of worshippers never abandoned the idea of the full return to Zion, and longed for tangible and actual redemption. This is the purpose of Jewish destiny. In the present, however, the Temple is not being built. Etzion does not argue that this work should begin rashly; rather, the Mount must be “redeemed.” This may be done immediately, and gentiles must be prevented from entering the site. Just as Halachic authorization was received for IDF soldiers to enter the Temple Mount area for the purpose of its conquest, so they must return to the site to concretize this conquest by removing the alien presence. “Cleansing” the Temple Mount of the mosques will create the necessary support and understanding for full redemption. The cleansed mount will be the catalyst for the people’s ascent up the scales of sanctity.15

The Chai Vekayam Movement After his release from prison (1989), Etzion initiated the establishment of the Movement for Redemption, reflecting the ideas he had advocated since the uncovering of the Jewish Underground. The difference in Etzion’s position after the Jewish Underground affair was that he became convinced that violent action on the Temple Mount, or anywhere else, was inappropriate until public support had been ensured. He refused to express remorse for his plans in the Underground, but admitted that his plan to blow up the Muslim shrine was mistaken. Etzion admitted that until such time as a new, firm movement would arise and challenge the legitimacy of the current regime in the State of Israel, offering a complete spiritual and religious alternative, no individual or small group was permitted to act on their own accord on such a fateful matter.16 The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir (1995) also reflected this approach. Etzion rejected the assassin’s approach, arguing that “no good will therefore come of the physical elimination of the leaders of the regime of disorder, as long as the culture of disarray is intact … Such a step—as we can see—causes a grave reaction and broad cohesion around the existing regime.” Accordingly, Etzion saw Yigal Amir as a confused child of the transitional season between “the democratic, alien, and imported culture of Israel” and “the culture of the Third Temple that is knocking at the door.” Accordingly, the difference between Etzion and Amir was only a matter of methodology:

192

Chapter Ten In a flash of impatience, Yigal Amir chose to injure the existing regime by shooting its leader, rather than shooting with us the foundation stones and basis of the future regime, and laying with us the rocks of the foundation, layers as we come to build the Hewn-Stone Hall.17

His search for supporters for his approach brought Etzion to Bat Ayin, a settlement in the Judean Hills where he found an attentive audience and emotional support. Most of the settlers in Bat Ayin are newly observant Jews who hold spiritual and mystic worldviews. This is a growing trend among the second generation of Gush Emunim settlers, and is an antithesis to the bourgeois lifestyle that has developed in the well-established settlements.18 The residents of Bat Ayin form a radical ideological hard core. The settlement was the base of a Jewish terror group, which placed a container of explosives outside an Arab girls’ school in Jerusalem in 2002.19 Motti Karpel and Chaim Nativ in 1993 also established The Chai Vekayam (“Alive and Well”) movement in Bat Ayin. Etzion joined the original core group and established the course of the movement.20 In the movement’s “Identity Card,” a three-page document printed for distribution at a press conference, several principles were presented relating to the delegitimization of the laws of the State of Israel. The document requires no interpretation: 2. We ask every citizen this question: Do you realize that your money – taxes and levies to the authorities – is now being poured into the establishment of a PLO state in the heart of your land? Has the time not come for civil disobedience and refusal to give your money to a regime that has betrayed the objectives of the nation? You must choose between your allegiance to a mistaken regime and your loyalty to your people and your G-d, the Eternal of Israel. 3. We ask every civil servant this question: Will you collaborate – “in the course of your function” – with the government that collaborates with the PLO? Will you work with it to establish the enemy state? Will you, for reasons of livelihood, share the awful responsibility for the sin of the leadership? You must choose between your allegiance to a mistaken regime and your loyalty to your people and your G-d, the Eternal of Israel. 4. We ask every soldier this question: Will you obey the instructions and orders of a regime that is using you to establish a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land of Israel? Will you load your brothers and

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

193

countrymen onto trucks? Do you realize that these commands are grossly unlawful in accordance with the laws of the State of Israel, and are “marked by a black flag?” You must choose between your allegiance to a mistaken regime and your loyalty to your people and your G-d, the Eternal of Israel. 5. Neither 120 Members of Knesset nor a referendum nor elections can change the declaration of the people. The Eternal of Israel shall not lie, for He is not a human. The Land was bequeathed to the people for all its generations; we hold it in deposit – and no single generation … is empowered to abandon and destroy the nation’s enterprise through the strength of its God.21 As Ehud Sprinzak shows in his analysis, the messages of this movement embody a clear statement that the laws of the state, and particularly those relating to the settler community in Judea and Samaria, are no longer binding, and that anyone who can do so is required to cease to observe them. Etzion himself raised the possibility of civil disobedience and a refusal to pay taxes. He also praised those rabbis who urged soldiers to refuse to obey orders to evict settlements.22 Motti Karpel, Etzion’s partner in the movement, refused to perform reserve duty and went to prison rather than obey army orders.23 The best-publicized and most prominent actions by the Chai Vekayam movement have been its efforts to enter the Temple Mount for the purpose of praying on the site. The supporters of the movement have attempted dozens of times to enter the Temple Mount site, draped in prayer shawls. Press crews have accompanied some of the attempts. These visits have not been coordinated with any official body, such as the police, since the followers of the movement consider that they are “free from the yoke of the law in matters concerning our entry into the Temple Mount in order to pray.”24 Members of the movement have been arrested during these events and criminal files have been opened. In some cases, they have been held in detention and not released on the completion of the interrogation. One of the aims of these actions is to provoke a widespread public outcry regarding the question of Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount. In terms of public impact, the photographs of Etzion and his supporters being removed from the Temple Mount by force underscore for the Jewish public (and particularly the religious Zionist public) the prevailing reality on the site, which is effectively managed as a broad Muslim autonomy, and which Jews are prohibited to enter for public prayer. The heightened awareness of this situation has led many to demonstrate against the denial

194

Chapter Ten

of the right to pray at the most sacred site to Judaism, while Muslims act as the owners of the site. This has drawn additional figures into the circle of those supporting the movement, such as Moshe Feiglin, leader of the “Zo Artzenu” (“This Is Our Land”) movement, which organized massive demonstrations against Israeli government policy and the Oslo process; and Hillel Weiss, a professor of Hebrew literature at Bar Ilan University and a prominent ideologue in contemporary religious Zionist circles. Both these figures have publicly announced their support for activities opposing the prohibition against Jews praying on the Temple Mount.25 Etzion has also been involved in several other provocative actions: Holding a model example of the Passover sacrifice; establishing the “Census of Priests and Levites;” and running ceremonies for the sanctification of the new month. The objective of these activities was to challenge the authority of the Orthodox rabbinical establishment. During a period of five years, Etzion held annual model examples of the Passover sacrifice. The ceremonies took place on the day before Passover in the Abu Tor neighborhood of Jerusalem, opposite the Temple Mount. The events included speeches followed by the slaughtering of young male goats, in an effort to recreate the sacrifices in the Temple. After the goats were slaughtered, the participants roasted them in the event. The model Passover sacrifice is a symbolic event reflecting the yearning for the reinstatement of the sacrifices; however, it includes a strong subversive message against the Halachic authorities in Israel, who do not carry out such ceremonies due to a rabbinical prohibition. At the festival of Sukkot in 5758 and 5760 (1998, 2000), Etzion held the “Temple Conference.” These colorful gatherings took place in the auditorium at the International Conference Center in Jerusalem and were well attended. At the second conference, in 5760 (2000), the Census of Priests and Levites was announced. Yehuda Etzion and Baruch Ben Yosef, a member of the Movement for the Establishment of the Temple, sought to establish a center that would register all the priests and Levites in Israel. Following the example of King David, who divided the Levite tribe into 24 units, they also sought to establish 24 guards of office on a geographical basis.26 The idea never came to fruition, due in part to the lack of cooperation among the public, and also to a lack of funds.27 A further ceremony initiated by Etzion is the Sanctification of the New Month, held to honor the beginning of each new Hebrew month. The ceremony was held at the foot of the “Hulda Gates,” to the south of the Temple Mount at the end of each month, and sought to replicate the ancient custom of sanctifying the month — determining the beginning of the new month by a religious court – as was the practice in ancient times.

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

195

Due to the absence of a high court, the rabbis ruled that this commandment would be resumed after redemption. According to Etzion, this ceremony symbolizes the revitalization of the people, since, from now on, the new month will be set by a court, and not by the astronomical readings in the rabbinical literature – the method of determining the months employed during exile and up to the present day. Etzion believes that this event has a messianic dimension of subversion. Just as the moon is renewed each month, so the nation is renewed and revived.28 Etzion’s activities in the framework of the Chai Vekayam movement indeed include a strong element of religious subversion. It is important to emphasize that religious millennialism is by its very nature a revolutionary phenomenon that seeks to challenge the existing religious and political order. Millennialism seeks to replace the mundane order, which is perceived as fundamentally rotten and corrupt, with a new governmental strength drawing on Divine authority. The proposed millennial social structure carries a subversive message against the very foundations of existing religion; accordingly, millennial activism can sometimes be channeled toward religious revolution.29 On the basis of his revolutionary approach, Etzion develop his overt criticism of the mainstream theological perspectives of religious Zionism, sharply attacking those who developed these perspectives and, in particular, the two Rabbis Kook. Etzion’s bold opposition to the leading rabbis of the generation is untypical in Orthodox Jewish circles, particularly since he himself is not a rabbinical authority and has never been ordained. Indeed, he shows little sign of seeking support among religious Zionist rabbis. On the contrary: he criticizes the rabbinical authority of the national yeshivot. His theocratic approaches undermine the status of the rabbis, with the objective of replacing them with a different, genuine religious leadership. Thus, for example, the attempts to enter the Temple Mount in order to pray on the site did not take place with the authorization or support of the rabbis. The census of priests and Levites was intended, in part, to create a new pool of potential religious leaders based on biological origin rather than on training and Halachic proficiency. Contrary to the current practice for determining the Hebrew months, Etzion appoints a court to declare the new moon, thus challenging the fossilized state of the Halacha. The Passover sacrifice symbolizes the longing for the reinstatement of the Temple ritual as a manifestation of Jewish redemption, and the preference for this ceremony over the synagogue services – despite the fact that the event is prohibited in Halachic terms.

196

Chapter Ten

In presenting this perspective, Etzion argues that only by withdrawing from the religious establishment will it be possible to bring the message of redemption. Etzion is rebelling not only against Zionist thought, but also against the behavior of Orthodox Judaism.

The Attitude of the Religious Zionist Establishment to Yehuda Etzion The question of Etzion’s status within the religious Zionist camp is of particular interest. Despite his activities in the Jewish Underground, which led to fierce public criticism of the settlement enterprise;30 and despite his fierce criticism of the spiritual leadership and his challenges to religious authority – he has not found disfavor. The contrary is the case. Etzion regular receives generous space to present his views in Nekudah, the journal of the settlers. After his release from jail, circles within the Council of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, working to promote the immigration to Israel of the Ethiopian Jews, employed him. This activity was also intended to advance the activist messianic goal of ingathering the Jewish exiles. Etzion is on close terms with the leaders of the Council and works together with them in various public activities. Despite his unusual views and his fierce criticism, Etzion has not been obliged to leave Ofra, the “flagship” of the settlement movement. By contrast, his neighbor in the same community, Yoel Bin-Nun, was forced to leave Ofra after criticizing the spiritual leaders of religious Zionism. Bin-Nun’s criticism was in a different context and from the opposite direction: After the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1995), which had a profound effect on Bin-Nun, he sharply criticized the atmosphere within the religious public prior to the assassination, which he claimed created legitimacy for the act. He threatened to present to the police the names of rabbis who approved the assassination. Following this threat, which he never realized, Ben-Nun was subjected to fierce criticism, to the point that he preferred to move to Gush Etzion, where he found the atmosphere more congenial.31 The comparison with the experience of Yoel Bin-Nun may reflect the unique public status of Yehuda Etzion, who is considered to be an exemplary figure and a “prophet.” Etzion is a “zealot,”32 someone who is faithful to the absolute truth and does not surrender to pragmatism and compromise. For many, therefore, he represents a pure ideal – something others may aspire to even if they do not dare to put into practice. He has acquired this status through his rigorous quest for perfection. He is perceived as someone who is totally honest and faithful to his ideas, even

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

197

at a heavy personal price. Moreover, Etzion’s criticisms are not designed to weaken the religious Zionist camp, but to lead its course. As a leader, Etzion establishes a right-wing benchmark and urges the remainder of the camp to follow suit. Etzion’s non-conformism and the weakness of the system in confronting him may also be an example of the “messianic dilemma” facing mainstream contemporary religious Zionism, which cannot unequivocally oppose religious zealotry. Although the zealots may be unrepresentative of the “bourgeois” character of religious Zionism and the settlement movement it has spawned, zealotry is still perceived as the prototype for the “authentic” religious Zionist. This ideal represents the pinnacle of aspirations and arouses admiration through its determination. The zealot seeks to implement immediately the most fundamental positions of religious Zionism regarding the dialectical destiny of the Zionist movement – something the pragmatic majority finds difficult.33 Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that such approaches can set down roots and secure a growing measure of support.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have sought to illustrate how the theological crisis created by the threat to the vision of the Greater Land of Israel led to a counterreaction of reinforcement and radicalization in religious terms, and how this, in turn, led to violence and non-conformism, culminating in the plan to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount. The “crisis of Zionism,” reflected in the clearest terms in Israel’s willingness to relinquish territories in return for peace with its neighbors, demands acceptance of the fact that the State of Israel has no intention of becoming a theocracy or a messianic entity, and seeks to act in accordance with the accepted patterns of behavior in Western society and the international community. Accordingly, a crisis of consciousness may emerge due to the discrepancy between the fundamental essentials of faith and the reality that confronts believers in the field. Etzion identified the potential crisis as early as the late 1970s, and the solution he found was to adopt a radical and activist form of messianism. Many others felt the personal crisis experienced by Etzion with full force following the implementation of the Oslo accords in the mid-1990s, and later at the Disengagement Plan (2005) where Israel evacuated all of the settlements in the Gaza Strip. Etzion’s response and the answers he had developed met with a much more positive response during this period. As Ehud Sprinzak shows in his analysis, the force of this ideology may be enhanced

198

Chapter Ten

significantly following the eviction of settlements as part of peace treaties (or as a unilateral measure). “The importance of the Chai Vekayam movement rests, in my opinion, not in the number of its supporters, but in the leadership qualities of its few followers; in the systemic challenge it presents to the tendencies of pragmatism and acceptance among the majority of the members of Gush Emunim; and in the difficult questions it raises for those who have still not lost their faith in the legitimacy of the State of Israel and the IDF.”34

Notes 1

The comments were quoted in Nekudah 88 (1985), 25 (in Hebrew). Yochai Rudik, Land of Redemption, Jerusalem: The Institute for the Study of the Thought of Rabbi A.Y.H. Kook Zatza”l, 5749-1989, 168 (in Hebrew). 3 For a more detailed examination of this aspect, see: Dov Schwartz, The Land of Israel and Imagination – The Status of the Land of Israel in Religious Zionist Thought, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1997, 101-127 (in Hebrew). 4 Shlomo Aviner (ed.), Conversations of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda: The Land of Israel, Jerusalem: Hava Library, 5765 – 2005, 269 (in Hebrew). 5 More on Ben Dov can be found in: Motti Inbari, Jewish Fundamentalism and the Temple mount – who Will Build the Third temple?, Albany: SUNY, 2009, 55-66. 6 Yehuda Etzion, “At Last to Raise the ‘Flag of Jerusalem,’” Nekudah 93 (57451985), 22-24. 7 Yehuda Etzion, “Rabbi Feinstein Comes to Israel,” Nekudah 98 (5746-1986), 1415, 36. 8 Yehuda Etzion, “At Last,” 24. 9 Ibid., 22-23. 10 Ibid. 11 Yehuda Etzion, “From ‘The Flag of Jerusalem’ to ‘The Movement for Redemption,’” Nekudah 94 (5746-1986), 29. 12 For further details, see: Nadav Shragai, Mount of Dispute, Jerusalem: Keter Publishers, 1995, 99-100 (in Hebrew). 13 Gidon Aran, The Land of Israel between Religion and Politics – The Lessons of the Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1985, 1-8 (in Hebrew). 14 Yehuda Etzion, The Temple Mount, Israel: Independent publication, 5745-1985, 3 (in Hebrew). 15 Ibid. 16 Ehud Sprinzak, Between Extra-Parliamentary Protest and Terror: Political Violence in Israel, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1995, 108-110 (in Hebrew). 17 Yehuda Etzion, “And It Came to Pass After Yigal Sent His Hand against Isaac,” Labrit 3 (5756-1996), 40-43. 2

Between Prophetic Failure and Terrorism in Contemporary Israel

199

18 For in-depth discussion of the “hill dwellers” and their way of life, see Shlomo Kaniel, “Hill Dwellers – Are they the Biblical Pioneers?” In: Asher Cohen and Yisrael Harel (eds.), Religious Zionism: The Era of Change. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2005, 533-558 (in Hebrew). 19 The Jerusalem District Court convicted three residents of Bat Ayin of attempting to murder the girls; they received sentences of between 12 and 15 years in prison. Other residents from the settlement were suspected of committing additional terrorist acts, including attacks on Arabs; plotting to attack Israeli politicians; and even planning to blow up mosques around the country, including the mosques on the Temple Mount. However, all the remaining suspects were released due to lack of evidence. See Ma’ariv, September 23, 2003. 20 The principles of the Movement for Redemption were presented at a members meeting in Bat Ayin on 7 Tishrei 5753-1993 and appear in Labrit 1 (5753-1993), 4-5, 19. 21 The document is quoted in Sprinzak, Political Violence in Israel, 110. 22 Yehuda Etzion, “More Strength to the Rabbis,” Nekudah 188 (5756-1996), 5054. 23 His action did not prevent his promotion in the IDF – while he was refusing to perform reserve duty, he was promoted to the rank of major. 24 Ha’aretz, December 11, 1997. 25 Amnon Ramon, The Attitude of the State of Israel and the Different Sections of the Jewish Public to the Temple Mount (1967-1996), Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, 1997, 17-20 (in Hebrew). 26 From a position paper distributed at the conference under the heading: ‘The Second Annual Conference of Temple Supporters” (Tishrei 5760-2000) (in Hebrew). 27 According to the personal testimony of Baruch Ben Yosef in a conversation with the author, May 24, 2001. 28 Yehuda Etzion, See and Renew – For the Sanctification of Israel and the Times, Jerusalem: independent publication, 1995, 6-7 (in Hebrew). 29 Richard Landes, “Millennialism in the Western World,” in: Richard Landes (ed.), Encyclopedia of Millennialism and Millennial Movements, NY & London: Routledge, 2000, 257-265. 30 See: Yochai Rodik, Land of Redemption, 186-188 (in Hebrew). 31 Michael Karpin, Murder in the Name of God: The Conspiracy against Yitzhak Rabin, Tel Aviv: Zemora Beitan, 1999 (in Hebrew). 32 Indeed, he published an article in Nekudah under the title “This Is the Theory of Zealotry,” in which he defined himself as part of the chain of zealots committed to “fulfilling God’s word – as they best understand it and in their sacred responsibility.” See: Nekudah 179 (5754-1994), 26-30. 33 Thus, for example, the former leader of the National Religious Party, Effi Eitam, in an interview for Ha’aretz following his election to his position, was unable to conceal his admiration for Etzion’s devotion to the struggle for the Temple Mount, admitting that Etzion’s commitment to this issue is far greater than his own. Ha’aretz, Supplement, March 22, 2002, 20. 34 Sprinzak, Political Violence in Israel, 110.

PART THREE: SECURITY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER ELEVEN A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF TERRORISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUSLY ORIENTED TERRORISTS JULIAN M. MONTAQUILA

Introduction Multiple security paradigms exist that improve our ability to understand the threat posed by terrorists. However, a psychological model of terrorism appears to offer a substantial amount of insight into the causes, underlying motives, organization, functionality, recruitment efforts, and radicalization processes which all occur within terrorist circles. In the contemporary international environment, developing an accurate understanding of these dynamics of terrorism is important and relying on an inaccurate security paradigm to address terrorism could have dire consequences. Given the highly motivated nature of terrorist operatives, the utilization and sole reliance upon a deterrence strategy to address terrorism would almost certainly be ineffective. Depending on false terrorist profiles or flawed intelligence information developed merely on anecdotal evidence or political rhetoric will also inevitably lead to inefficient counterterrorism operations, which are characteristically unsuccessful. Thus, a psychological model of terrorism can offer a rather comprehensive assessment of the phenomenon — an assessment that ranges from describing the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists, to the psychological makeup and overall mindset of terrorists, and the terrorist’s utilization of fear as a psychological weapon for the purpose of achieving political objectives. The breadth of psychological research into terrorism has typically fallen within these three main overarching areas.

A Psychological Model of Terrorism

203

Recruitment and Radicalization The Individual Backgrounds of Terrorists According to New York Police Department Senior Intelligence Analysts Silber and Bhatt, no useful profile exists that can accurately or reliably determine which individuals will successfully complete terrorist recruitment and radicalization processes. 1 Both White and Nacos also indicate that no single, accurate terrorist profile exists.2 White specifies that the reason for the lack of a single conceptualization of a terrorist is likely a result of the fact that different typologies of terrorism exist.3 That is, one might more accurately discuss “terrorisms” than a single, reified “terrorism.” Moreover, the actions and psychological makeup of individual terrorist members appear to be inconsistent with one another and include variations across social and cultural conditions. 4 Similarly, Nacos indicates a host of variables are likely responsible for the development of terrorism. Furthermore, different factors may offer explanations for different types of terrorism.5 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny noted in their interviews with 35 imprisoned Middle Eastern terrorists that the background of the individuals did vary widely. 6 Again, Silber and Bhatt note that prior to completing the radicalization and recruitment processes, many terrorist operatives came from “unremarkable” backgrounds. 7 Post has ultimately stated that the analysis of individual psychology is insufficient in explaining why people seek inclusion and participation in terrorist organizations.8

Group Identity and Group Psychology Indeed, it appears as though one may be more successful at understanding the dynamics of terrorists and terrorist organizations from the perspective of group psychology, rather than individual psychology.9 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny specify how interviews with incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists seemed to indicate that the individual self-image of recruits appeared to become intertwined with the identity of the group. Not only do the goals of individual terrorists appear to become fused with organizational goals, but also measures of organizational success and personal success become indistinguishable.10 It does seem that members of terrorist organizations (regardless as to whether the organization’s ideology is religiously or secularly based) are allowed to ask questions; however, acceptable questions were limited to those that focused upon

204

Chapter Eleven

understanding operational details. There does not appear to be room for individual decision-making or identity within a terrorist organization.11

A Deprived Environment Although no single factor or environment can be absolutely tied to the development of terrorism, conditions of deprivation have consistently been associated with the emergence of terrorist activity. Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur conducted telephone interviews with more than 1,000 participants in an effort to determine how religion, religiosity, and deprived environments may influence one’s support for political violence. Based on their empirical findings, it appears as though deprived environments influence one’s willingness to support political violence above and beyond an individual’s corresponding religion and degree of religiosity.12 Laurence Miller also notes how deprivation can contribute to a potential terrorist’s personal feelings of injustice and possibly lead to the act of terrorism being viewed as an entirely legitimate response.13 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny specify that many of the imprisoned terrorists whom they interviewed actually felt victimized.14 In fact, it appears as though one successful quality of terrorist leaders is the ability to bring a large number of disenfranchised and alienated individuals together. 15 Snow describes how many suicide bombers lack the connections and resources necessary to achieve a better life. They cannot afford fiancées or girlfriends and are also unable to obtain work.16 Post even indicates that terrorist recruits often possess a lonely, alienated, and disaffected mentality. 17 However, it is important to specify that Zaidise, CanettiNisim, and Pedahzur found objective measures of deprivation (including place of residence, income, and level of education) to be far more reliable in determining the likelihood an individual would be supportive of political violence than were subjective measures of deprivation.18 This information would seem to suggest that prolonged exposure to deprived conditions could certainly have some influence upon one’s decision to become a member of a terrorist organization. However, it is also noteworthy to highlight that deprived environments may in actuality not be directly responsible for engendering terrorist activity. Rather, deprived environments appear to influence a general support for political violence and may serve as an exacerbating factor for terrorism. Despite all of the available information, which demonstrates that some link may exist between deprivation and terrorism, deprivation is likely only an influential

A Psychological Model of Terrorism

205

factor. A clearer picture appears to emerge when youth is evaluated in the context of a deprived environment.

Terrorism: A Young Person’s Game On the issue of youth and terrorism, Snow notes how suicide bombers often tend to be relatively young. Many of who are teenagers under pressure to obtain a job and may still be mentally immature.19 White did acknowledge that no single, accurate terrorist profile exists. However, White stipulated most terrorists tend to be young.20 Jenkins indicates how the many allures of al-Qaeda, such as offering a sense of purpose and direction in life, are particularly appealing to young men. 21 Silber and Bhatt also point out individuals entering the terrorist radicalization process are becoming increasingly younger.22 Miller even speaks to the idea that the anxiety and adrenaline characteristic of adolescent development, in conjunction with the difficulties of a deprived environment, could likely serve as a precursor for supporting terrorist actions or supporting an interest in terrorist membership.23 Although only a slim number of disadvantaged youths will ever go on to complete successfully the terrorist radicalization and recruitment process, there does appear to be some link between terrorist membership and youth. More than anything, youth and deprivation may simply create an enhanced susceptibility or vulnerability to terrorist recruitment and radicalization.

Examining the Psychological Makeup and Mindset of Terrorists Terrorism and Traditional Crime: A Comparison Once the psychological makeup of a terrorist operative is fully formed, understanding their decision-making and motivational processes can be highly advantageous for antiterrorist and counterterrorist initiatives. Generally, one would expect an adversary to behave in a manner that appears logical or consistent with one’s own behavior. This does not appear to be the case with members of terrorist organizations. Douglas Bodrero, a former member of the International Association of the Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism and the former commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, suggests terrorism diverges from typical crime in that ordinary criminals tend to be impulsive, opportunistic, and self-centered. Furthermore, ordinary criminals are dissimilar from

206

Chapter Eleven

terrorists in that they are not committed to a cause. Terrorists appear to be focused, highly motivated, and loyal to their cause.24 Miller also notes that the majority of members of terrorist organizations are characteristically unwavering in loyalty to the cause of their organization. 25 Deterring terrorist activity through the threat of punishment is a difficult task. Such an endeavor would likely require exceptional intelligence, and the ability of terrorist operatives to blend in among members of the general populous further complicates the matter.26 Thus, traditional approaches, which law enforcement and intelligence organizations may take toward crime, may be insufficient in addressing terrorism.

The Influence of Religion Terrorist operatives and leaders have the ability to commit what others would certainly deem to be both horrible and atrocious acts of violence. Moreover, they are willing to give their own lives for the cause of their respective organizations. As a result, it is highly probable that the ability of these individuals to plan and execute terrorist actions is highly contingent upon their belief that these activities serve a purpose — one that is both worthy and absolute in a religious sense.27

Imprisonment Imprisonment may be unlikely to deter terrorist activity for several reasons. First, terrorist operatives do view prison as a potential recruitment ground for new organizational members. Incarcerated criminals not only make convenient targets for the terrorist recruitment and radicalization process, but these criminals also possess skills and interpersonal connections which could be highly advantageous for utilization in terrorist enterprises.28 Second, it is not uncommon for terrorists to view prison as a place where they can communicate, study, and further consolidate their own personal identities with the group identity of their respective terrorist organization.29 Indeed, Post, Sprinzak, and Denny found that incarceration produced similar effects in the terrorists whom they interviewed. Not only did the majority of terrorist members further fuse their personal identity with that of their terrorist organization, but they actually reported that imprisonment made them feel closer to their group and that they were even more committed to their cause. The prison experience even appeared to reinforce the previously held negative perceptions the terrorists had of their captors.30

A Psychological Model of Terrorism

207

Some prisons separate terrorists from other members of the general prison population in order to preclude the radicalization and recruitment of other criminals. However, Christopher Harmon notes one senior British Army Officer’s reaction to the environment created when terrorists were segregated from the rest of a prison’s general population in Northern Ireland — that is, the segregation appeared to have led to the development of a terrorist staff college. Events that transpired in one Peruvian prison during the 1980s produced similar results. Specifically, Shining Path members held regular study sessions to discuss and read the works of organizational leader Abimael Guzman.31 Similar to these findings, Post, Sprinzak, and Denny also found that their interviewees felt they had learned more about their groups while in prison. However, Post, Sprinzak, and Denny reported an interesting dichotomy between the Islamist and secular terrorists whom they interviewed.32 The degree to which group member’s individual identities were further consolidated with that of their respective group was observed to occur at a higher rate among the Islamist terrorists. Namely, this trend was observed in 77% of Islamist terrorists and only 54% of secular terrorist members. Also of interest was the fact that 84% of Islamist terrorists reported returning to their group following imprisonment, compared with that of 62% of secular members returning to their respective organizations. 33 As a result, this information may also have implications in determining the inherent value religion has in driving and motivating terrorist activity.

Terrorism: A Psychological Weapon of Fear The True Meaning of Terrorism In no other way does a psychological model of terrorism present as a better potential security paradigm for addressing terrorism than in its ability to describe how terrorist activity relies upon fear to paralyze and shock a populous. The word “terrorism” originates from the Latin terrere, which quite literally means, “to frighten.” The word was first used during the French Revolution in reference to the “Reign of Terror.”34 The Reign of Terror, which took place between 1794 and 1795, was a period of time during which the revolutionary government executed at least 17,000 people who were suspected of being in favor of restoring the monarchy. As a result, associates and members of the Committee on Public Safety were awarded the title of “terrorists.” At that time, terrorism was used to refer to members of the government. 35 Despite the fact that the

208

Chapter Eleven

contemporary meaning of terrorism is not directed at government authorities, terrorism is still used to describe the tactic of committing aggressive and violent acts to induce fear across large numbers of people.

Challenges Common to Disasters and Terrorist Attacks Hamblen, Norris, and Mueser discuss the unique challenges, which are often present among members of the general public following the event of a large-scale disaster, incident of mass violence, or terrorist attack. Hamblen, Norris, and Mueser first note that such events have the capability of affecting large numbers of individuals all at the same time. As a result, the sudden and drastic need for the delivery of services to individual people can easily surpass what is immediately available.36 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has been previously identified as being the most commonly observed mental health condition following a disaster or terrorist incident. Although individuals who either received the greatest exposure or were most directly impacted by the event typically have the most severe distress, the magnitude and pervasiveness of the distress among other members of the general public can still be significant. PTSD post-disaster prevalence rates range from 30% to 40% of those directly affected by the event, 10% to 20% of first responders, and finally 5% to 10% among members of the general population. 37 It is also not uncommon for disorders to co-occur with PTSD, and depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and panic disorder are the mental disorders most typically comorbid (i.e., co-occurring) with PTSD. In disaster populations, depression (followed by anxiety) has been determined to be the disorder most commonly comorbid with PTSD. Following the Oklahoma City bombing, one study found that 63% of the survivors with PTSD also had at least one comorbid condition (usually depression).38

The Spread of Fear across a Population Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Steinberg et al. conducted an empirical research study where data was collected and analyzed from the implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) of cardiac patients living in New York City at the time of the calamity. During the month, which followed the terrorist attack, the number of patients who experienced lifethreatening ventricular tachyarrhythmias increased to 16 total patients. This number was significantly elevated from the previous month, when only 7 patients had experienced ventricular tachyarrhythmias.39 Shedd et al. conducted a similar study in cardiac patients living in Florida at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Interestingly, the authors

A Psychological Model of Terrorism

209

obtained similar results when they analyzed the data pulled from patients’ ICDs. Following the attacks, 14 patients had experienced increased incidences of ventricular tachyarrhythmias. In the month prior to the attacks, only 5 patients had experienced similar ventricular tachyarrhythmias. 40 Furthermore, the incidence of ventricular tachyarrhythmias returned to normal for the sample population of Steinberg et al. in the second month following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.41 Shedd et al. only analyzed data from ICD participants during the 60-day time period, which began one month before and ended one month after the attacks.42 Thus, no comparison can be drawn between baseline data and the incidence of ventricular tachyarrhythmias for the sample population of Shedd et al. in the second month following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This information has implications for better understanding how acts of terrorism can truly be effective at spreading feelings of fear and dread across a population. While the violence of a terrorist act may be horrific in and of itself, the true success of an attack appears to lie within the ability of terrorist operatives to paralyze and intimidate an entire nation.

Conclusion Although the field of security studies is still an emerging one, it certainly does build upon the work and theoretical orientations of other fields. Of particular relevance to the foundation of security studies is the understanding of various paradigms, which serve as theoretical frameworks for better understanding the dynamics of the international environment. A multitude of such paradigms exists, as no one paradigm is entirely accurate. The realist paradigm may have at one time appeared to be extremely accurate in its depiction of international dynamics. However, it has become clear that the realist paradigm fails to account for the ability of non-state actors to influence the international system.43 Thus, the realist paradigm would seem to fall short in assisting individuals in better understanding the present international security concern of terrorism. Moreover, the possibility of developing an impeccable paradigm, which perfectly encapsulates the complexity of the international environment, is further hindered by the fact that the rapidly changing nature of the international system would quickly make any such paradigm obsolete. While a psychological model of terrorism may not serve as a perfect security paradigm for addressing terrorism, it can certainly offer several advantages. Terrorists may seem illogical and irrational upon initial presentation. However, better understanding terrorist decision-making and

210

Chapter Eleven

motivational processes offers policymakers and security officials more opportunities for adequately responding to the new challenge. Understanding that prison does not serve as a deterrent, but rather as a place for recruitment and further radicalization, could give officials an edge on stopping this unintended cyclical consequence perpetuated by incarcerating terrorists together. Perhaps placing further limitations and enhanced restrictions on the contact which terrorist members are allowed to have with other prisoners would prevent such recruitment endeavors. Likewise, limiting incarcerated terrorists’ access to radicalization and propaganda materials, as well as the contact terrorist members are allowed to have with each other, may help prevent terrorists from further consolidating their personal identities with that of the group identity. If disadvantaged teenagers and adolescents are, in fact, particularly vulnerable to terrorist propaganda, then the early identification of either facilitated or self-radicalization would likely prove critical for successful intervention. After identifying specific targets of the terrorist radicalization and recruitment process, it is not unfeasible to suggest that introducing enhanced mentoring with positive role models and prosocial engagement would offer one viable solution. Such a solution would likely resemble that of many anti-gang programs designed to discourage gang membership among teenagers and adolescents. If terrorists seek to paralyze an entire population with fear, then it is possible that a well-trained and educated public would dwarf terrorists’ efforts to intimidate the masses. Additionally, preventing reports of terrorist attacks from saturating news and media coverage would also likely inhibit the ability of terrorist organizations to “terrorize” an entire nation or nations of people. This strategy would simultaneously limit terrorist organizations from capitalizing on the symbolic nature of attacks as a method for recruiting new members. Integrating our comprehension of terrorist psychology into intelligence and law enforcement initiatives will only enhance the effectiveness of antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations. As attempting to comprehend the logic under which terrorist entities operate may seem like a daunting task, it would be convenient if national security officials and policymakers had the option of being dismissive of the mindset, strategies, motives, and decision-making processes of terrorists. This, however, is not a realistic option. It is only by better understanding how our enemies function that we will be more prepared to address the threats we will face tomorrow.

A Psychological Model of Terrorism

211

Notes 1

Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York, NY: New York City Police Department, NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007), 8. 2 Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc., 2010), 109; Jonathan R. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 39. 3 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 39. 4 Ibid. 5 Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 109. 6 Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003): 172. 7 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 5, 8. 8 Jerrold M. Post, The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 8. 9 Jerrold M. Post, “Appendix—Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 272; Post, The Psychology of Terrorism, 4, 8. 10 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, “Terrorists in Their Own Words,” 175-176. 11 Ibid. 12 Eran Zaidise, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Ami Pedahzur, “Politics of God or Politics of Man? The Role of Religion and Deprivation in Predicting Support for Political Violence in Israel,” Political Studies 55, no. 3 (2007): 499, 515. 13 Laurence Miller, “The Terrorist Mind: I. A Psychological and Political Analysis,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 50, no. 2 (2006): 127. 14 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, “Terrorists in Their Own Words,” 175. 15 Post, The Psychology of Terrorism, 8. 16 Donald M. Snow, National Security for a New Era, 4th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 226. 17 Post, “Psychological and Motivational Factors,” 273. 18 Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur, “Politics of God or Politics of Man,” 515. 19 Snow, National Security for a New Era, 226. 20 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 39. 21 Brian M. Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment, CT-278-1 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 4. 22 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 10. 23 Miller, “The Terrorist Mind,” 127. 24 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 32-33. 25 Miller, “The Terrorist Mind,” 123.

212 26

Chapter Eleven

David P. Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 4 (2006): 545, 548-549. 27 Ibid. 28 Christopher C. Harmon, “Terrorism: A Matter for Moral Judgement,” Terrorism and Political Science 4, no. 1 (1992): 12. 29 Ibid, 13. 30 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, “Terrorists in Their Own Words,” 174. 31 Harmon, “Terrorism: A Matter for Moral Judgement,” 13. 32 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, “Terrorists in Their Own Words,” 174-175. 33 Ibid. 34 Miller, “The Terrorist Mind,” 121. 35 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 119, 123. 36 Jessica L. Hamblen, Fran H. Norris, and Kim T. Mueser, “Chapter 14—Disaster, Terrorism, And Other Mass Violence,” in Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Special Populations: A Cognitive Restructuring Program, ed. Kim T. Mueser, Stanley D. Rosenberg, and Harriet J. Rosenberg (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2009), 267-270. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Jonathan S. Steinberg et al., “Increased Incidence of Life-Threatening Ventricular Arrhythmias in Implantable Defibrillator Patients After the World Trade Center Attack,” Journal of the American College of Cardiology 44, no. 6 (2004): 1261-1262. 40 Omer L. Shedd et al., “The World Trade Center Attack: Increased Frequency of Defibrillator Shocks for Ventricular Arrhythmias in Patients Living Remotely from New York City,” Journal of the American College of Cardiology 44, no. 6 (2004): 1265-1266. 41 Steinberg et al., “Increased Incidence of Ventricular Arrhythmias,” 1263. 42 Shedd et al., “The World Trade Center Attack,” 1265. 43 Charles L. Glaser, “Chapter 2—Realism,” in Contemporary Security Studies, 2nd ed., ed. Alan Collins (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 16-17.

CHAPTER TWELVE AL-QAEDA’S “CULTURAL JIHAD:” VIOLENT CENSORSHIP BY AL-QAEDA AND ASSOCIATED MOVEMENTS, 2001-2011 DAVID M. DURANT

Introduction One of the major debates surrounding 9/11 and the subsequent “Global War on Terrorism” is Al-Qaeda’s motivation for launching terrorist attacks against American and European targets. According to many western politicians and scholars, global salafist-jihadist terrorism is part of a deeply ideological struggle motivated by a profound hatred of western secularism and liberal modernity.1 Other specialists, such as former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, argue that Al-Qaeda’s war against the west is primarily political in nature, undertaken in direct response to western military, political and economic actions in the Muslim world, such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the stationing of American forces in Saudi Arabia from 1990-2003 and American backing for Israel. According to Scheuer, “It was a profound and unnecessary mistake…to believe that the Islamist militants’ animosities for the accoutrements of our society were the main motivating and unifying factors behind their hatred and willingness to wage war against the United States.”2 Osama bin Laden, in his statements directed at western audiences, clearly sought to reinforce the second view. He regularly argued that attacks such as 9/11 were acts of reciprocity and retaliation. As Bin Laden put it in a November 2002 “Letter to the American people:” “Whoever has destroyed our villages and towns, then we have the right to destroy their villages and towns. Whoever has stolen our wealth, then we have the right to destroy their economy. And whoever has killed our civilians, then we have the right to kill theirs.”3 In the words of scholar Raymond Ibrahim,

214

Chapter Twelve

“Reciprocal treatment has been Al-Qaeda's sole justification for all the terrorist acts it has perpetrated against the West.”4 Bin Laden’s most direct attempt to refute the notion that Al-Qaeda attacked America because it hated liberal democracy came in October 2004, when he released a video directed to the American people. The former leader of Al-Qaeda directly attacked “Bush’s claim that we hate freedom. If so, let him explain to us why we have not attacked Sweden, for instance.”5 Eventually, though, salafist-jihadists would attack Sweden, in December 2010, when a would-be suicide bomber with links to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) blew himself up in the middle of Stockholm. The primary motivation for the attack was that three years earlier, a Swedish cartoonist drew an insulting caricature of the Prophet Muhammad. In fact, this attack provides just one example of how bin Laden’s October 2004 claim has been refuted by both Al-Qaeda’s statements and its actions since 9/11. This record shows a proven willingness to attack western countries precisely because of their freedom; specifically, because the right of free expression has enabled the publication of creative works deemed defamatory towards Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. This became quite clear in the aftermath of the Danish Muhammad cartoons published in September 2005. In an April 2006 statement reacting to the cartoons, bin Laden called for the death of not only the cartoonists, but of any writers or intellectuals critical of Islam or the Prophet Muhammad. In his words: “The condition and ruling of the Zindeeqs6 and atheists who defame the religion and slander and insult our honorable Messenger, peace be upon him, has been clarified by the Imam Ibn alQayyim, who made it clear that the crime of the Zindeeq is the grossest of crimes and that the evil of his remaining amongst the Muslims is among the greatest of evils, and that he is to be killed and his repentance is not to be accepted.”7 Even in the midst of its war against both western and Muslim adversaries, Al-Qaeda and its followers have devoted substantial efforts to striking those who “defame the religion and slander and insult our honorable Messenger.” Since 2001, there have been at least 11 AQAM (Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements) terror attacks or plots directed at European targets in relation for acts of creative expression such as the Danish Muhammad cartoons or Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks’ insulting drawing of Muhammad. In addition, numerous creative intellectuals and Muslim reformers have received death threats from AQAM. While AQAM is certainly motivated by what it sees as western aggression against Islam, its response to the Scandinavian Muhammad

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

215

cartoons shows that its definition of “crusader aggression” transcends military and political interventions. Salafist-jihadists see their struggle with the United States and its allies as an all-encompassing one in which western ideas and culture pose every bit the threat that western armies and security services do. As such, silencing those “apostate” Muslims who embrace aspects of western modernity and all those who “defame the religion” and its Prophet, is as important as winning military and political victories. This “cultural jihad” (understood in this sense as a physical, violent act carried out by extremist Muslims, not “struggling,” as most Muslims view it, to lead a pious faith-centered life) is seen by Al-Qaeda and its supporters as an essential duty deeply rooted in both Islamist ideology and certain interpretations of Islamic law. It shows that AQAM is indeed motivated by what it sees as a religious-ideological imperative that transcends short-term political objectives.

What is AQAM? Al-Qaeda, its associates and supporters belong to a broader ideological current called Islamism. Islamism is a political ideology rooted in a belief that Muslim states must be governed by Islamic Sharia law, as drawn from a strict interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith, the recorded sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Islamism dates back to the late 19th century, and is a mix of puritanical, revivalist strains within Islam and elements of western ideologies. Islamism exists in both Sunni and Shia forms, and is currently embraced by a variety of movements and organizations in the Islamic world, some more radical and/or violent than others. Salafism is a strict, Sunni variant of Islamism, strongly influenced by the puritanical Saudi form of Islam known as Wahhabism. Al-Qaeda and its allies represent a subset of salafism known as salafist-jihadism. Many Salafist-jihadists are committed to using violence to bring about a purified, extremist vision of the Islamic state. Salafist-jihadism first emerged as a radical offshoot of the Islamist movement in the 1960s. 8 Prominent pre-9/11 salafist-jihadist movements include Egyptian Islamic Jihad (part of which eventually merged with Al-Qaeda), the Egyptian Islamic Group, and Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA). “Al-Qaeda Central,” the organization once based in Pakistan and led by Osama bin Laden (and now Ayman al-Zawahiri), is the most prominent salafist-jihadist group in the world today, but it is far from the only one. Many of the others are tied to Al-Qaeda through organizational links or ideological affinity. Therefore, rather than thinking of Al-Qaeda as a single, unified whole, it is more accurate to think of it as a movement or

216

Chapter Twelve

alliance containing a number of like-minded organizations and individuals. The term that best reflects this reality is Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM). AQAM contains three main tiers: Al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan; regional allies and affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq; and unaffiliated individuals and groups that support Al-Qaeda’s cause and embrace the salafist-jihadist worldview. 9 All three tiers of AQAM have been part of the “cultural jihad”.

The Ideological Origins of “Cultural Jihad” Salafist-jihadist ideology, like most forms of Islamism or Islamic revivalism, takes as its starting point the idea that the Islamic world is in a serious state of decline. In the words of scholar John Calvert, the ideology of AQAM represents “an extreme manifestation of a particular syndrome of Muslim reaction to the Western-dominated political and cultural order that has been over fifty years in the making.”10 As Emmanuel Sivan put it, Islamism is “primarily a cultural phenomenon,” engaged in “a sort of holding operation against modernity.”11 The main reason for this decline, according to Islamists, is that Muslims have forsaken pure Islam, in particular the Islamic legal code of Sharia, and instead chosen to follow man-made laws which usurp the rightful authority of Allah and encourage Muslims to stray from the true path of Islam. The Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), widely considered the founding father of salafistjihadism, considered the Islamic world to be so corrupted that he condemned it as having reverted to a state of jahiliyyah, the pre-Islamic pagan barbarism that prevailed in Arabia before the coming of Muhammad. In Qutb’s view, it would take the dedicated efforts of a small vanguard of pious Muslims to save the situation by overthrowing the jahiliyyah apostate regimes currently ruling Muslim lands and restore the rightful rule of Allah on Earth as laid out in the Qur’an and Hadith.12 In his writings, Qutb stressed the essential role of western intellectual and cultural forces in corrupting Muslim societies. In many cases, he argued, this corrupting influence was by design. As a result, the future Islamic state would need to suppress all but the most purely practical forms of western thought. He summarized this point in his seminal work Milestones: The Western ways of thought and all the sciences started on the foundation of these poisonous influences with an enmity toward all religion, and in particular with greater hostility toward Islam. This enmity toward Islam is especially pronounced and many times is the result of a well-thought-out

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

217

scheme, the object of which is first to shake the foundations of Islamic beliefs and then gradually to demolish the structure of Muslim society. If, in spite of knowing this, we rely on Western ways of thought, even in teaching the Islamic sciences, it will be an unforgiveable blindness on our part. Indeed, it becomes incumbent on us, while learning purely scientific or technological subjects for which we have no other sources except Western sources, to remain on guard and keep these sciences away from philosophical speculations, as these philosophical speculations are generally against religion and in particular against Islam. A slight influence from them can pollute the clear spring of Islam.13 (emphasis added)

Nearly all the major salafist-jihadist thinkers have echoed Qutb’s concerns about the poisonous, corrupting nature of western ideas and influences. As the Saudi scholar Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani puts it, Muslims who have embraced western modernity, are guilty of “corrupting Muslim society by means of education, media and instilling western thoughts and ways of life into the minds of Muslims.” 14 In his writings, al-Qahtani traces the beginnings of the corruption of Islam to the influence of Greek philosophy during the Abbasid period. 15 This belief in the corrupting influence of western intellectual and cultural currents can be seen in the writings of those affiliated with Al-Qaeda. In his 2005 tome The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, Al-Qaeda affiliated strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al-Suri, stated that westerners have “conspired over the past two centuries to drive Muslims away from their faith, which they realize is the reason for Arab power and glory.” 16 In his view, the “modern, Crusader-Jewish, American-led campaign against the Arab and Islamic world has clearly announced its goals: total elimination of the civilizational, religious, political, economic, social, and cultural existence of Muslims.” 17 Al Suri’s description of the current state of Muslim societies is very much in keeping with the profound sense of cultural pessimism described by scholars such as Sivan.18 This belief in a western conspiracy to culturally and intellectually corrupt Islam can also be found in the writings of bin Laden’s deputy and eventual successor, the Egyptian jihadist Ayman al-Zawahiri. In his view, Jews and crusaders “embark upon intellectual and religious attacks in parallel to their crusading military attacks, in order to mend the bleak reality represented by the ruling regimes in our [Muslim] countries with all their corruption and corrupting effects and their servility toward the worldwide Crusading Jewish oppressive powers.”19 Osama bin Laden himself included this “cultural invasion” as just one facet of a broader “Zionist/Crusader war” against Islam:

218

Chapter Twelve And then what does the continuation of the cunning, malevolent media and cultural invasion mean, when controlled TV channels and radio stations are set up, in addition to the Voice of America, BBC and the rest, to continue the ideological invasion of our Ummah and make war on its beliefs and change its values and spread obscenity and depravity. Indeed, they have gone so far as to interfere in the curricula – especially the religious curricula – and change them. It is a Zionist/Crusader war.20

If secular western culture is a poison that has corrupted Muslim societies, then those writers and intellectuals who have embraced western modernity are carriers of this corruption and should be eliminated. Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian jihadist preacher who served as Osama bin Laden’s mentor wrote a treatise on morality in jihad. In it, he argued that Afghan communist women should be killed, regardless of whether they were armed or not, simply because they were the bearers of dangerous, unIslamic ideas.21 Muslim reformers and freethinkers are regularly accused of apostasy (ridda), an offense that, according to some interpretations of Islamic law, is punishable by death.22 A Saudi salafist scholar named Sa’id Al-Ghamdi even published a book in 2003 labeling over 200 Arab intellectuals and authors as heretics.23 Osama bin Laden, in his April 2006 statement calling for the killing of heretics, mentioned several reformist intellectuals by name as deserving such a fate and even cited al Ghamdi as an authority. 24 Comments or creative works that insult or defame the Prophet Muhammad are considered an especially egregious form of apostasy, and a capital offense whether committed by Muslims or nonMuslims.25 In the words of Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani, “Slandering our faith and insulting our Prophet is aggression against us and an act of war. It is a violation that invalidates the truce between us and our enemies, and is no different from any other assault against us.”26 Salafist-jihadists have proved more than willing to enforce such judgments of apostasy against secular writers and intellectuals. In Egypt in the 1960s, a secret jihadist group tied to Sayyid Qutb allegedly planned to murder a number of leading artists and television personalities.27 In 1992, the Egyptian Islamic Group murdered secular author Farag Foda.28 Two years later, a follower of the group’s main ideologue, Omar Abdel Rahman, stabbed and wounded Nobel Prize winning novelist Nagib Mahfouz. Algeria’s radical Islamist GIA murdered dozens of journalists and other intellectuals during that country’s horrific civil war of the 1990s.29 It is important to note that these attitudes are not confined to Salafistjihadists. Many non-political salafists, traditionalist Muslims and Muslim governments also vigorously condemn freethinking and reformist Muslims,

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

219

and support censoring cultural and intellectual products considered blasphemous or otherwise harmful to Islam, sometimes through violence if necessary. 30 As Petter Nesser has noted, “The full spectrum of militant organizations, most extremists and even many mainstream Muslims support the religious verdict of the death penalty for cartoonists who insult the Prophet Muhammad.”31

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad:” First Phase: 2001-2005 An examination of the record of Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters since 9/11 shows that their willingness to retaliate against “apostates”, “heretics” and those deemed guilty of defaming the Prophet Muhammad is far from merely rhetorical. For example, AQAM has continued the salafist-jihadist practice of targeting “apostate” Muslim intellectuals for death. In July 2005, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) threatened to kill Dr. Sayyid Al Qimni, a reformist Egyptian scholar. The threat was withdrawn after al Qimni (temporarily) retracted his views. A website related to AQI posted a lengthy list of Arab journalists it considered to be critical of its efforts, with a call that they should all be killed. In the words of the posting: “We ask the mujahideen to make preparations to assassinate these agents and enemies of the Faith, since they are the mouthpieces of the Crusader and Jewish occupation.”32 What makes Al-Qaeda’s “cultural jihad” unique from previous salafistjihadist efforts to punish apostasy and blasphemy is that it targets not only Muslims, but westerners guilty of “defaming” Islam and the Prophet Muhammad as well. From 2001-2011, there were at least 11 instances of AQAM violent censorship targeting Europeans: actual or planned terrorist attacks intended as retaliation for acts of expression considered hostile or defamatory towards Islam. Two of these acts occurred between 2001-05, both in the Netherlands.33 The first such instance of AQAM violent censorship targeting Europe was the November 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. A radicalized Dutch Muslim named Muhammad Bouyeri, who belonged to a jihadist cell called the Hofstad Network, committed the murder. 34 Van Gogh had made a short film called Submission that condemned the treatment of women in Islam, in cooperation with a Dutch-Somali parliamentarian named Ayaan Hirsi Ali. This film outraged Bouyeri and after killing van Gogh, left a letter pinned a letter to his body addressed to Hirsi Ali:

220

Chapter Twelve There shall be no mercy for the unjust, only the sword raised at them. No discussion, no demonstrations, no parades, no petitions; merely DEATH shall separate the Truth from the LIE.35

At his trial the following year, Bouyeri bluntly explained his motive for the murder: “I was motivated by the law that commands me to cut off the head of anyone who insults Allah and his prophet.”36 For all their anger over actions such as the Iraq invasion, Bouyeri and the Hofstad Network were very much committed to waging “cultural jihad”. For example, Bouyeri signed his letter to Hirsi Ali “Saifu Deen al Muwahhied,” a pen name he had used since that August to issue death threats. According to Dutch scholar Albert Benschop, this was the name used by a medieval North African Islamic revivalist sect that sought to root out all elements of corruption and decadence from Muslim Spain, such as alcohol and dancing girls. Jason Walters, another Hofstad Network member, saw Islam as under both physical and ideological assault from “the army of disbelief and corruption, commanded by America and Israel.”37 The van Gogh killing is believed to have merely been the first part of a broader plan by the Hofstad Network to murder outspoken Dutch critics of Islam such as Hirsi Ali and parliamentarian Geert Wilders, along with Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen and secular Dutch-Muslim politician Ahmed Aboutaleb.38 A few days after the murder, other members of the network issued a communique in which they stated: We have, in accordance with the authentic Islamic manner slaughtered a lamb. From now on this will be the punishment that will be imposed, on anyone in this country who abuses and challenges Allah and his envoy. Oh, you Ayaan Hirsi, if Allah so desires it will be your turn tomorrow. Allah is the greatest of all and Islam will conquer.39

A second plot was detected in July 2005, when a radicalized teenage convert to Islam was arrested for possible links to the Hofstad Network. He had posted a number of online death threats against Hirsi Ali and Wilders and was found in possession of a homemade bomb.40 Despite this arrest, Hirsi Ali and a number of other prominent Dutch politicians and critics of Islam continued to live under threat. A year after the van Gogh murder, the Washington Post’s Craig Whitlock noted that “A soaring number of Dutch academics, lawmakers and other public figures who have been forced to accept 24-hour protection or go into hiding after receiving death threats from Islamic extremists.”41 By 2006, Hirsi Ali would have to leave the Netherlands and move to the United States. The Hofstad Network succeeded in creating a climate of fear

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

221

among critics of Islam in the Netherlands, and jihadists continue to cite the murder of Theo van Gogh as an example to be emulated.42

“Cultural jihad” Intensifies:” The Muhammad Cartoons, 2006-2011 The key development in the unfolding of Al-Qaeda’s “cultural jihad” occurred in September 2005, when the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten published 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. The move was in response to a perceived reluctance among European intellectuals to discuss or depict Muhammad, caused in part by the van Gogh murder.43 One byproduct of the controversy these cartoons generated was an enormous intensification of AQAM’s campaign of violent censorship against European “blasphemers.” Of the 11 incidents of anti-European AQAM violent censorship, nine occurred between 2006-2011. Seven of these nine incidents were acts of retaliation for the Danish Muhammad cartoons. All but one occurred (or were intended to occur) in Europe. While there were a number of reactions to the cartoons on various jihadist websites, the most noteworthy Al-Qaeda response came in April 2006, with the release of a lengthy audio recording from bin Laden.44 In his statement, bin Laden called upon Muslims to “Punish those responsible for the heinous crime committed by some journalists among the Crusaders or the apostate Zindeeqs (unbelievers) in insulting the chief of the forefathers and the successors, our Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.” Bin Laden then demanded that those responsible for the cartoons be handed over to Al-Qaeda, “to be judged according to the Law of Allah.”45 In his remarks, bin Laden included the publication of the Muhammad cartoons among a long list of western transgressions against Muslims, including, but not limited to, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and Somalia, all of them part of “a Zionist/Crusader war.” He then made it clear that such cultural attacks were very much part of this broader struggle, if anything even more threatening than military invasions: I say: our duty is to make every effort to aid Allah's Messenger, peace be upon him, and his religion and Ummah, with everything in our power and on all levels. And despite the large number of Zionist and Crusader attacks on our Ummah – among them military, economic and moral and cultural attacks – by far the most important and serious of them are their attacks on our Prophet, religion and methodology of our Shari'ah.46 (emphasis added)

The first attempted terrorist attack committed in retaliation for the Jyllands Posten cartoons occurred on July 31, 2006, when two suitcase bombs were

222

Chapter Twelve

discovered on German passenger trains; one of the two Lebanese men arrested for committing this attack testified that the attempted bombing was motivated by the cartoons.47 By September 2007, Danish authorities had discovered three bomb plots within the previous two years. As Nicholas Kulish wrote in the New York Times, “Tiny Denmark is on the front line in the battle against Islamic terrorism in Europe.”48 Rita Katz of the SITE Institute told the Associated Press that this sudden jihadist focus on Denmark was “because of the cartoons.”49 AQAM’s desire to punish Denmark for the Jyllands Posten cartoons intensified in February 2008. After Danish authorities arrested three radicalized Muslims suspected of plotting to kill Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist who drew the most controversial of the 12 Muhammad caricatures, 17 Danish newspapers republished the cartoons as an act of defiance.50 In March 2008, bin Laden responded with an audio statement addressed to “the intelligent ones in the European Union” concerning “the insulting drawings and your negligence . . . to take the necessary measures to prevent their being repeated.” 51 After condemning alleged western military targeting of Muslim women and children, bin Laden returned to the issue of the cartoons: Although our tragedy in your killing of our women and children is a very great one, it paled when you went overboard in your unbelief . . . and went to the extent of publishing these insulting drawings. This is the greater and more serious tragedy, and reckoning for it will be more severe.52

In his remarks, Bin Laden reiterated the religious prohibition against defaming Muhammad or other prophets, stating that, “Whoever detracts from or mocks anyone of them is an apostate unbeliever.”53 He dismissed “the sacredness you accord freedom of expression and the sacredness of your laws and how you won’t change them” by stating that “The laws of men which clash with the legislations of Allah the Most High are null and void, aren’t sacred and don’t matter to us.”54 Bin Laden closed with a warning: “If there is no check on the freedom of your words, then let your hearts be open to the freedom of our actions.”55 Al-Qaeda made good on bin Laden’s promise of retaliation on June 2, 2008, when it staged a suicide car bomb attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. Eight people were killed in the blast. In a communiqué released the next day, an Al-Qaeda leader named Mustafa Abu al-Yazid stated that the attack was “in retaliation for what the infidels from the so-called state of Denmark have published: the insulting cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed”. The statement even quoted bin Laden’s threat

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

223

from March, and went on to note that the attack “should serve as a warning to the infidel countries regarding their crimes against our Prophet Mohammed.”56 Al-Qaeda’s final comment on the Danish Embassy attack came in September 2008, when it released a video featuring the Saudi suicide bomber who carried out the operation. The video revealed how Al-Qaeda viewed the Muhammad cartoons as part of the west’s “ideological invasion”: (Narrator) The Zionist-Crusader war, another installment of the conflict between the truth and the falsehood stretching across time until Allah inherits the earth and everyone on it. The battle of the Zio-Crusader enemy against out [sic] Ummah isn't waged solely at the military and economic level, but is waged first and foremost and in addition to and after that at the level of doctrine. . . . It is a war which targets all strongholds of Islam and invades minds and ideas in the same way it invades lands, and dares to destroy beliefs and meddle with sacred things in the same way it dares to spill blood. "(Narrator) It is within this framework that the drawings insulting the Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) came: drawings which were first published by the Danish press before the insult spread to most European countries in the name of freedom of expression and respect for law.57 (emphasis added)

The Danish Embassy attack is unique in that it is the only anti-European act of violent censorship to take place outside of Europe. It also stands out in that Al-Qaeda Central, not a regional affiliate or individuals supportive of the broader salafist-jihadist movement, perpetrated it. Only two of the 11 planned or actual terrorist attacks intended as retaliation for acts of creative expression can be traced to the Al-Qaeda organization proper. The other such incident was revealed in October 2009, when a US citizen named David Headley was arrested for participation in a terrorist plot targeting the Copenhagen offices of Jyllands Posten. Headley, a Pakistani-American with ties to the Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-eTaiba, had done reconnaissance work for the planners of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. He made his feelings about the Danish Muhammad cartoons known in a 2008 online forum posting: “I feel disposed towards violence for the offending parties, be they cartoonists from Denmark or Sherry Jones . . . or Irshad Manji.”58 Headley made at least two trips to Copenhagen to do reconnaissance on Jyllands Posten’s offices, as well as several trips to Pakistan and England to help coordinate attack preparations. Headley’s efforts were at

224

Chapter Twelve

the behest of Ilyas Kashmiri, one of Al-Qaeda’s top operational commanders. A veteran Pakistani jihadist, Kashmiri had affiliated with Al-Qaeda Central in 2005 and reportedly sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden.59 In his dealings with Headley, Kashmiri made it very clear that he considered the Jyllands Posten attack a priority. The final plan that Kashmiri settled on was for a Mumbai-style seizure of the newspaper’s offices, with the assassination of Westergaard and cultural editor Flemming Rose as a possible backup plan.60 The final four acts of violent censorship in response to the Danish Muhammad cartoons occurred in 2010. On January 1, a Somali immigrant named Muhammad Muhideen Gelle, brandishing an axe and a knife, forced his way into Kurt Westergaard’s home and chased the cartoonist and his granddaughter into a panic room before being captured by police. Gelle reportedly had ties to the Somali Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab (The Youth). 61 Three Muslim immigrants living in Norway were arrested in July. The men were in possession of peroxide-based explosives and reportedly planning an attack against Jyllands Posten. Two of the men were eventually convicted of planning to bomb the newspaper and kill Westergaard.62 In September, a Chechen living in Belgium injured himself while preparing a letter bomb to be mailed to Jyllands Posten’s offices.63 Finally, at the end of December, four radicalized Muslims living in Sweden were arrested on charges that they sought to storm the Jyllands Posten offices and stage a Mumbai-like massacre.64

The Lars Vilks Cartoon In August 2007, Sweden joined Denmark as a target of Al-Qaeda’s “cultural jihad”. In that month, a Swedish cartoonist named Lars Vilks published a caricature in a newspaper called Nerikes Allehanda showing the Prophet Muhammad as a dog. In September, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq, denounced the Vilks cartoon. Addressing Sweden, he warned that, “You will learn how to officially apologize for your crime against our Prophet Mohammed.” In addition to threatening to attack Swedish corporations if an apology was not issued, Al-Baghdadi also promised a $100,000 reward for “anyone who kills that infidel criminal” Lars Vilks. The reward was boosted to $150,000 if Vilks was actually beheaded. A sum of $50,000 was offered for killing the editor of Nerikes Allehanda.65 There have been two confirmed acts of violent censorship by AQAM in response to the Vilks cartoon. In October 2009, an American convert to Islam named Colleen LaRose, who posted on jihadist forums as “Jihad

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

225

Jane”, was arrested and charged with planning to murder Vilks. She pled guilty in January 2011.66 The second incident occurred on December 11, 2010 when an Iraqi immigrant to Sweden named Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly blew himself up while attempting to stage a suicide bombing in Stockholm. Before the attack, al-Abdaly left a recorded message with a Swedish news agency, in which he explained his motives for the attack: “You have Lars Vilks — the pig Lars Vilks — to blame, and yourselves for these actions.” Al-Abdaly demanded that Sweden “stop your drawings of our prophet Muhammad [Arabic], withdraw your soldiers from Afghanistan and no more oppression against Islam or Muslims will be tolerated in any way or any means.”67 As noted above, al-Abdaly also cited the presence of Swedish forces in Afghanistan as a justification for his attack. However, Sweden has been a member of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2002. It was part of ISAF when Osama bin Laden was citing Sweden as an example of a country that Al-Qaeda did not attack.68 In the meantime, countries like Poland and Romania, which have made much larger contributions to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, have yet to be targeted by AQAM.69 It seems clear based on both rhetoric and actions that the Muhammad cartoons primarily motivated AQAM’s targeting of Denmark and Sweden. The scope of Al-Qaeda’s “cultural jihad” is even more apparent in the context of the overall number of European jihadist terror plots. Norwegian terrorism researcher Petter Nesser has documented 79 “planned, prepared, and executed terrorist attacks” by jihadists in Western Europe from September 11, 2001 through the end of 2010. His list does not include the Colleen “Jihad Jane” LaRose plot against Lars Vilks. Adding this item brings the total list of incidents to 80. Ten of these 80 (12.5%) are credibly confirmed as acts of violent censorship. From 9/11 through 2005, there were only two such acts out of 42 overall incidents (4.8%); from 20062010, in the wake of the Scandinavian Muhammad cartoons, eight of 38 incidents (21.1%) were acts of violent censorship. The bulk of incidents occurred between 2008-2010, when seven out of 24 (29.2%) “planned, prepared, and executed terrorist attacks” in western Europe were intended as acts of violent censorship. In short, one out of every five planned or actual terrorist attacks in western Europe since the Danish Muhammad cartoons was in retaliation for either those caricatures or the Vilks drawing.70

226

Chapter Twelve

South Park and Abu Talha al-Amrikee There have been no acts of violent censorship directed at the United States or American targets since 9/11. However, America has not been immune from “cultural jihad”. The most well known instance involves the irreverent animated program South Park. The show’s 200th episode, which aired on April 14, 2010, satirized the reluctance of many western media outlets to show images of the Prophet Muhammad by depicting him in a bear suit. The next day, a New York-based salafist-jihadist website called Revolution Muslim featured a post from an “Abu Talha al-Amrikee.” He warned that the creators of South Park, Matt Parker and Trey Stone, “will probably wind up like Theo van Gogh for airing this show. This is not a threat, but a warning of the reality of what will likely happen to them.”71 As a consequence of this warning, the second part of the episode, which aired on April 21, was heavily edited. All references to Muhammad were bleeped out and the character in the bear suit was covered with a graphic reading “CENSORED.” Six years later, the chilling effects of the Theo van Gogh murder resonated even on the other side of the Atlantic. Abu Talha al-Amrikee was delighted by the publicity. On April 20, via Twitter, he noted that, “The kuffar are starting to really pick up on the South Park story in sha’a Allah this can be the USA’s version of the Rushdie affair in UK.”72 Al-Amrikee was in reality Zachary Chesser, a 20year-old Muslim convert from Virginia. In addition to threatening Parker and Stone, Chesser made veiled or explicit online death threats against a number of other individuals. When a group of Facebook users responded to the South Park controversy by creating an “Everybody Draw Mohammad Day” campaign, Chesser posted the contact information for 11 group members on a jihadist web forum, with the comment that this was “just a place to start.”73 In October 2010, Chesser pled guilty to a three count indictment that included issuing online threats. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The South Park and “Everybody Draw Muhammad Day” controversy would attract the attention of Al-Qaeda’s Yemen-based affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), whose leadership included the Englishspeaking preacher Anwar al-Awlaki. In July 2010, the organization published the first issue of an online English-language magazine called Inspire. While an article titled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” attracted most of the headlines, much of the issue was devoted to “cultural jihad.” The centerpiece was an essay by al-Awlaki entitled “May Our Souls be Sacrificed for You!” The article concerned “the defense of the Messenger of Allah.” Al-Awlaki denounced the west’s “outrageous

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

227

slander, blatant smearing of Muhammad, desecration of the Quran, and the insulting of over a billion Muslims worldwide” all of which were “done under the pretext of “freedom of speech”.” In al-Awlaki’s view, the only solution to these offenses, which are rooted in a “historic hatred for Islam and Muslims,” is “the execution of those involved.” 74 In his opinion, killing those who defame the Prophet is more important than facing “crusaders” on the battlefield: This is a golden opportunity to have the honor of performing an act in the service of Islam greater than any form of jihad. Defending the Messenger of Allah is a greater cause than fighting for Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq; it is greater than fighting for the protection of Muslim life, honor or wealth.75 (emphasis added)

Al-Awlaki went on to condemn western countries for upholding “a system within which the defamation of Islam is not only protected but promoted.” Because “the entire Western system is staunchly protecting and promoting the defamation of Muhammad . . . it is the entire Western system that is at war with Islam.” Therefore, “Assassinations, bombings, and acts of arson are all legitimate forms of revenge against a system that relishes the sacrilege of Islam in the name of freedom.”76 The same issue of Inspire provided further support for this position, in an interview with the leader of AQAP, Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi. One of the questions posed was, “Why does Al-Qaeda insist on operations against the West and especially America?” Al-Wuhayshi answered as follows: All praise is due to Allah. America is the one forcing us to target it. These heinous crimes which the human soul rejects such as the cartoons of the Messenger and holding celebrations and awarding those who curse the Prophet require us to target the Americans. In fact they require us to wipe them out of the map completely. America is a cancer that needs to be removed along with the West that is supporting this criminal behavior and are banning the niqab of the chaste and pure Muslim women.77 (emphasis added)

Al-Awlaki and al-Wuhayshi could not have been any more explicit in their priorities: because western free expression permits defamation of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, all Muslims therefore have a religious duty to attack the west. At a time when the US still had over 100,000 troops deployed between Iraq and Afghanistan, two of the key leaders of AlQaeda’s most important regional affiliate proclaimed that the western defense of free expression, which permitted apostasy and blasphemy, was

228

Chapter Twelve

in itself sufficient cause to justify attacks on western targets and that “cultural jihad” was more important than combating American military forces in Muslim lands.

Conclusion In May 2007, Al-Qaeda released a video featuring its American-born propagandist Adam Gadahn. Gadahn laid out six steps for America to follow in order to spare itself further attacks. In addition to completely withdrawing from all Muslim lands, ceasing all support for “apostate regimes,” and cutting all ties to Israel, Gadahn also demanded that America “Cease all interference in the religion, society, politics, and governance of the Muslim world” and that it “Put an end to all forms of interference in the education curricula and information media of the Islamic world, and impose a blanket ban on all broadcasts to our region, especially those designed to alter or destroy the faith, minds, morals, and values of our people.”78 This statement is a firm indicator of the importance AQAM places on targeting what it sees as a moral and ideological threat posed by the west. Here Al-Qaeda made it abundantly clear that its violent campaign against the “crusaders” will continue until what Osama bin Laden called the “ideological invasion” of Muslim lands comes to an end. The record of the last ten years, and especially since the publication of the Danish Muhammad cartoons, shows that Al-Qaeda, its allies, and its supporters regard the violent suppression of ideas and expression that they consider harmful to Islam as a sacred duty, a religious-ideological imperative. They reserve the right to enforce this prohibition anywhere, against anyone, and they regard such expression as just as harmful, if not more so, than western military or political actions directed against Muslim states. AQAM has engaged in at least 11 acts of violent censorship against western targets, planned or actual terrorist attacks designed as retribution for creative expression deemed hostile or defamatory towards Islam. In addition, salafist-jihadists have made numerous death threats against apostate or blasphemous intellectuals, both western and Muslim. This campaign has indeed had an impact on free expression in western societies, as evidenced by the South Park incident, among others. It is quite likely that further acts of “defamatory” expression will be used by AQAM to justify terrorism even if western intervention in the Islamic world should cease.

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

229

Al-Qaeda and its supporters have also regularly denounced the west’s “cultural invasion” designed to undermine Islam. Deeply rooted in a profound sense of cultural pessimism, the salafist-jihadist movement regards Muslim societies as hopelessly corrupted by the spread of western ideas and cultural products. Convinced that this is the result of a deliberate “crusader” conspiracy to destroy Islam, they demand that this campaign be halted as a condition of suspending hostilities against the west. In addition, new AQAM affiliates, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Dine in Mali, are clearly committed to waging “cultural jihad” against apostasy and western corruption on a local and regional level. All of these factors mean that the phenomenon of violent censorship by AQAM will almost certainly remain with us for the foreseeable future.

Notes 1

For a good example of this view, see Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 2 Michael Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2008), 1. 3 Osama Bin Laden, “Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America,’” The Observer, November 24, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver. 4 Raymond Ibrahim, “An Analysis of Al-Qaeda's Worldview: Reciprocal Treatment or Religious Obligation?” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 12, no. 4 (December 2008): http://www.raymondibrahim.com/7344/an-analysisof-al-qaidas-worldview. 5 Osama bin Laden, “Your Fate is in Your Hands Alone,” in The Al Qaeda Reader, ed. and trans. Raymond Ibrahim (New York: Broadway Books, 2008), 214. 6 According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, a zindeeq (or zindiq) “is a heretic who subscribes to sectarianism and threatens the unity of the community by dissension”. "Zandaqah," In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed May 7, 2012, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2562. Jihadists and other Islamists commonly apply the term to secular and reformist Muslims. See Farhad Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009), 38-39. 7 Osama bin Laden, "Oh People of Islam," (trans. Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, 2006), no longer on site, now available via Internet Archive, accessed April 24, 2012, http://web.archive.org/web/20061209001353/ http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/binladenxscript.html. 8 Bruce Livesey, “The Salafist Movement,” Al Qaeda’s New Front, PBS, January 25, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html; Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report, ed. William McCants, (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy: November 2006): 6.

230

Chapter Twelve

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA 458483. See also Jarret M. Brachman, “Doctrine and Schools,” chap. 2 in Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2009). The terms “jihadist” and “salafist-jihadist” will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. 9 Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Thomas M. Sanderson, “A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2011, http://csis.org/publication/threat-transformed. The term “Al-Qaeda”, along with AQAM, will be used to refer to the broader movement, not just the organization. 10 John Calvert, "The Islamist Syndrome of Cultural Confrontation," Orbis 46, no. 2 (2002): 333-349, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438702001126. 11 Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, enl. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 3. 12 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (New Delhi: Millat Book Centre, n.d.). 13 Ibid., 116. 14 Shaykh Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ wa’l-Bara’: According to the ‘Aqeedah of the Salaf, vol. 1. (n.p.: Kashf ul Shubuhat Publications, n.d.), preface, http://www.alfurqan.com.au/component/content/article/49-comments-on/113-alwala-wal-bara. For more on al-Qahtani’s work, including an alternate translation of this passage, see Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism, 27-29. 15 Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ wa’l-Bara., vol. 2, chap. 1. See also Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism, 80-84. 16 A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab Al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto, ed. Jim Lacey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008): 2. 17 Ibid., 3. 18 Ibid., 33-34. 19 Quoted in Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism, 26. 20 Bin Laden, “Oh People of Islam.” 21 Abdullah Azzam, “Morals and Jurisprudence of Jihad (Excerpts),” in Al Qaeda in its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008), 130-31. 22 Aluma Dankowitz, “Accusing Muslim Intellectuals of Apostasy,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Inquiry and Analysis No. 208, February 18, 2005, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1321.htm. 23 MEMRI Special Dispatch No.1070, "Saudi Doctorate Encourages the Murder of Arab Intellectuals," January 12, 2006, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1579.htm. 24 Bin Laden, “Oh People of Islam”. See also MEMRI Special Dispatch No.1153, "Arab Reformists Under Threat by Islamists: Bin Laden Urges Killing of ‘Freethinkers’," May 3, 2006, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1677.htm. 25 Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 149-52. 26 Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ wa’l-Bara’, vol. 3, 58. 27 Sivan, Radical Islam, 61.

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

231

28 Ana Belen Soage, "Faraj Fawda, or the Cost of Freedom of Expression," Middle East Review of International Affairs 11, no. 2 (2007): http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue2/jv11no2a3.html. 29 Koenraad Elst, “Postscript: The Rushdie Affair’s Legacy”, in Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, The Ayatollah, and the West, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 263-64. 30 See Trevor Mostyn, Censorship in Islamic Societies (London: Saqi Books, 2002); Paul Marshall and Nina Shea, Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Elst, “Postscript.” 31 Petter Nesser, "Individual Jihadist Operations in Europe: Patterns and Challenges," CTC Sentinel 5, no. 1 (2012): http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/individual-jihadist-operations-in-europe-patternsand-challenges. 32 Stephen Ulph, "Al-Qaeda extends threats to journalists and intellectuals outside Iraq," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 14 (2005): accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/. 33 Figures are based on analysis of statistics provided by Petter Nesser in "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10 (2008): 924-946, http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdffiler/chronology.pdf; and Petter Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Update 2008-2010,” (working paper, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, December 20, 2010), http://www.ffi.no/no/Prosjekter/Terra/Publikasjoner/Sider/Artikler-ograpporter.aspx. 34 For more on Bouyeri and his background, see Petter Nesser, “The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker – Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?” (FFI-rapport 2005/00376, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005), http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/05-00376.pdf. 35 “Open Letter to Hirshi Ali”, in Nesser, “The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker,” 32. 36 Ian Traynor, "Unrepentant killer of Dutch film-maker jailed for life," The Guardian, July 26, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/27/film.filmnews. 37 Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands," (SocioSite, 2004), in sec. “Jason W.: slaughter them all and dreams of female slaves,” http://www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php. 38 Ibid. 39 Quoted in Ibid. 40 Ibid., in sec. “Michael R. (17) — Lust for bosomy virgins.” 41 Craig Whitlock, "For Public Figures in Netherlands, Terror Becomes a Personal Concern," Washington Post, November 11, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/10/AR2005111002046_pf.html.

232

Chapter Twelve

42 See, for example, Michael Sandelson and Lyndsey Smith, "Outspoken Norway Muslim praises killer," The Foreigner, March 4, 2012, http://theforeigner.no/pages/news/outspoken-norway-muslim-praises-killer/. 43 For a good overview of the Danish cartoon controversy, see Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). 44 Bin Laden, “Oh People of Islam.” For a good overview of jihadist reactions to the cartoons see “Denmark Targeted by Jihadists,” (The SITE Institute, September 2006), accessed September 2006, (Paper no longer online). 45 Bin Laden, “Oh People of Islam.” 46 Ibid. 47 "Punishing Failed Terror Plot: Cologne Suitcase Bombers Get Long Sentences," Spiegel Online, December 18, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,524134,00.html. 48 Nicholas Kulish, "Terror Battle Puts Denmark on Front Line," New York Times, September 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/world/europe/17cnddenmark.html. None of these three plots were conclusively proven to be direct retaliation for the Muhammad cartoons, and hence are not counted as acts of violent censorship. 49 "Experts say Denmark emerging target for Islamic terror," Associated Press Worldstream. September 6, 2007, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 50 Committee to Protect Journalists, "Three arrested in plot to assassinate Prophet cartoonist," February 14, 2008, http://cpj.org/2008/02/three-arrested-in-plot-toassassinate-prophet-cart.php. 51 “Usama Bin Laden: “'May Our Mothers Be Bereaved Of Us If We Fail to Help Our Prophet': March 19, 2008,” (trans. NEFA Foundation, 2008), 1, http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefabinladen0308.pdf. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 2. 55 Ibid. 56 “Al-Qaida's Abu al-Yazid Claims Denmark Embassy Bombing in Pakistan: June 3, 2008,” (trans. NEFA Foundation, 2008), http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefadenmarkpakistan0608.pdf. 57 Al-Sahab Media, "Al-Sahab Video Presents 'The Word Is the Word of the Swords 1' Video," (trans. World News Connection, National Technical Information Service, 2008), 2, http://hdl.handle.net/10066/4615. 58 Quoted in Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida Since 9/11 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 382. Sherry Jones is the author of a controversial novel about the Prophet’s wife Aisha. Irshad Manji is an outspoken liberal Canadian Muslim who is a regular target of Islamist death threats. 59 Ibid., 384. 60 Ibid., 387-90. 61 Raffaello Pantucci, "East African Terrorism Comes to Scandinavia," Terrorism Monitor, 8, no, 2, (2010): accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/. In a

Al-Qaeda’s “Cultural Jihad”

233

statement, Al-Shabaab praised Gelle’s actions without taking direct responsibility for them. 62 Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Update 2008-2010,” 5. Agence France-Presse, "Two found guilty of ‘terrorist plot’ in Danish cartoon case," Dawn, January 30, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/01/30/two-found-guilty-ofterrorist-plot-in-danish-cartoon-case/. 63 BBC, "Bomb suspect 'targeted' Danish paper Jyllands-Posten," September 17, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11345887. 64 No evidence has been produced linking this plot to the one coordinated by Ilyas Kashmiri. 65 “Audio Statement from Abu Omar al-Baghdadi: September 14, 2007,” (trans. NEFA Foundation, 2007), 3, http://nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/nefabaghdadi0907.pdf. 66 For the official indictment and plea agreement in the LaRose case, see Investigative Project, "USA v. LaRose, Colleen," accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.investigativeproject.org/case/371. 67 “Sweden Bomber’s Telephone Bomb Threat: December 11, 2010,” (NEFA Foundation, 2010), 1, http://nefafoundation.org//file/Taimour1210-2-1.pdf. 68 Swedish Armed Forces, "Swedish Armed Forces in Afghanistan, ISAF," accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Forces-abroad/Afghanistan/. 69 For Afghanistan troop totals, see International Security Assistance Force, "About ISAF: Troop numbers and contributions," accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. For Iraq troop contributions, see Christopher M. Blanchard., and Catherine M. Dale, "Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction," (Congressional Research Service report for Congress, updated December 26, 2007), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/99533.pdf. 70 Statistical analysis based on compilation of European terror plots provided in Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007" and Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe Update 2008-2010." 71 Dave Itzkoff, "‘South Park’ Episode Altered After Muslim Group’s Warning," New York Times, April 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/arts/television/23park.html. 72 Majority and Minority Staff, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, "Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism," (February 2012), 13, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL%20REPORT %281%29.pdf. 73 "United States v. Chesser, (E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2010): 11, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/chesser_information.pdf . 74 Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaki, "May Our Souls be Sacrificed for You!" Inspire, Summer 2010, 27, http://info.publicintelligence.net/CompleteInspire.pdf. 75 Ibid., 28. 76 Ibid., 28.

234 77

Chapter Twelve

"Interview with Shaykh Abu Basir: The Head of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula." Inspire, Summer 2010, 17, http://info.publicintelligence.net/CompleteInspire.pdf . 78 MEMRI Special Dispatch No.1602, “American Al-Qaeda Operative Adam Gadahn in Message to President Bush: Your People Will Experience Things That Will Make You Forget the Horrors of September 11, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Virginia Tech,” May 31, 2007, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2222.htm.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS OF SUICIDE BOMBERS: EXPLORING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS HALIL AYDINALP

Introduction This paper will propose some security suggestions based on an exploration of the personal motivations of Muslim suicide bombers in Chechenistan and particularly Palestine. While it is not easy to explain general suicidal behavior, it is much more difficult to comprehend the suicide bombers’ real psychology and motivations since these perpetrations occur under the effects of historical, political, social, economic and global determinants, not merely personal and psychological motivations. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to consider that personal motivations of suicide bombers are related to all other factors that surround a possible bomber. From this perspective, my model in this paper utilizes four personal motivation levels in order to put forward some security suggestions. The first level is occupation or military intervention and its oft-damaging results as the main motivation for suicide bombers. Occupation, which occurs both in a militaristic way by using armed forces against a country and in a socioeconomic and political way by dominating a foreign state, is the starting point at which a possible human bomb is manufactured. Since their social environments shape suicide bombers, it is impossible to describe them without mentioning socio-economic dynamics. Therefore, the second level is social dynamics that take shape under military intervention or domination. The third level of motivation is psychological and personal goals, while the fourth is connected with organizational aspirations and political goals. At this stage, a would-be-bomber is recruited and trained within a special indoctrination process by organizations.

236

Chapter Thirteen

As seen in the model below, suicide bombings are fulfilled in a complicated context within a combination of different dynamics, and suicide bombings cannot be properly explained depending merely on one or two dynamics without paying attention to the others. Moghadam’s twophase model is a helpful analytical framework for observing suicide bombings as a process, although it focuses on motivational and organizational dynamics without paying any attention to occupation as a basic political dynamic. Besides, it can be said that in his motivational dynamics, social and psychological determinants are not examined in detail either.1 From my model, I argue that occupation creates a “de facto” condition for suicide bombings, and social and psychological dynamics operate in this position as a catalyst facilitating a possible bomber’s decision. At a point, where the individual has been hard-pressed among political and psycho-social deprivations, organizations uncover the path going to the operation, by supplying technical and logistic assistance.

Chart I: The General Model of becoming a Suicide Bomber

Personal Motivations of the Suicide Bomber The Main Political Motivation behind the Suicide Bombing: Military Intervention In the Muslim-majority world, the proliferation of terrorist tactics is in a great deal justified within the context of the invasion of Muslim territories. Real or imagined, the perception of being occupied makes all other social

The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers

237

dynamics meaningless. In this process, existence as free human beings is the basic prerequisite, which discards all other things. That is, groups that feel that their existence is in danger of occupation and military intervention may result in suicide bombers who are prepared to self-detonate, whether they legitimize themselves in a religious or profane context. The occupation of South Lebanon in 1978 and especially in 1982 was one of the most important developments that triggered the formation of Hezbollah as a guerilla entity fighting against the Israeli and other Western Forces. As a result of the militaristic control of South Lebanon, Israel was directly confronted with Hezbollah and this confrontation transformed into an armed conflict. In the perception of a holy struggle, we can see that the invasion provided the ultimate legitimation for the terrorist tactics, including certain kinds of suicide bombings.2 The Palestinian case can be another example of the resistance against military intervention. After 1987 the Infidas can be regarded as reactions against the military control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Given the Palestinians’ own description in a general sense, all Palestinian territory has been gradually invaded after 1948, not just the West Bank and Gaza Strip where the Palestine Authority (PA) held power. In this context, suicide bombings emerged as the military alternative to deter the expansion policy after some reactions from the demonstrations to total shaking off and to guerilla assaults.3 The latest examples of this process are Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which have experienced military intervention. These countries are under turmoil. On the one hand, they are fighting against an occupying force and its internal ally and supporters. On the other hand, they are involved in a domestic conflict of power and balance between each other. Today Iraq has experienced the bloodiest episodes of suicide bombings with denotations occurring almost daily.4 The same assessment is also accurate for the Chechen case where one witnesses “the black widows” for the first time in its history. With the invasion of Chechnya in 1994 and 1996 by the Russian Forces, Chechnya was ruined socially and economically by the occupation and began producing suicide-bombing campaigns against Russia, particularly in Grozny and Moscow.5 Empirical research has verified the occupation as a dynamic behind the suicide bombings. Based on the interviews with five Palestinian suicide bombers and detainees in an Israeli prison, Berko and Erez find a recurrent theme in the interviews: the Palestinians’ social identity is marked by being “dispossessed, oppressed and humiliated,” and they are raised in homes that are continuously exposed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They have heard their parents’ stories about houses left behind and about lands lost upon the establishment of Israel in 1948.6 Interviewing nearly

238

Chapter Thirteen

250 people from 1996 to 1999 in Palestine, Hassan also found that a recurring theme is that Israel humiliates the Palestinians, occupying their land and denying their history. In this respect, while one activist says that, “The Israelis kill our children and our women. This is war, and innocent people get hurt,” another one mentions, “We do not have tanks or rockets, but we have something superior — our exploding Islamic human bombs. In place of a nuclear arsenal, we are proud of our arsenal of believers.”7 From the interviews of the five suicide bombers, prisoners in an Israeli prison, Soibelman’s findings overlap with Berko and Hassan’s. The interviewee’s account supports the approach that the terroristic tactics occur as a result of foreign rule perceived as oppressive, and this kind of resistance becomes long-lasting and institutionalized, while all participants acknowledge that “they should fight the occupation.”8 Our study about Wafa Idris, the first woman suicide bomber of Palestine, also indicates that the occupation is one of the main dynamics of suicide bombing besides other socio-psychological determinants. Idris was born into a Palestinian family that lived in al-Amari refugee camp since they were forced out from Ramalah. Observing the conflict and uprisings of the first Intifada as a twelve year old girl, Idris’s character is shaped by the pains and losses of violent outbursts. Her relatives and friends also explain Idris’s decision to engage in suicide terrorism within a context of occupation and militarily coercion.9 Compiling a database of every suicide bombing around the world from 1980 through 2003—315 attacks in all—Pape also argues that the bombers fight against modern democracies perceived as an occupational force, and compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territories that they consider to be their homeland. Becoming logical when crucial interests are at stake, as a high cost strategy, suicide bombings are the last resort in saving a nation from foreign influence or control, and in gaining independence. 10 In addition, using different theoretical approaches from cases like Tilhami, Pearlman, Masalqa and Sarraj, many scholars acknowledge the correlation between suicide bombings and occupation.11

The Catalyst Forms of the Suicide Bombings: What do Social Dynamics Say? Although it is accepted that social dynamics behind suicide bombings are very important, few studies pay attention to the subject in detail. Suicide bombings develop within a social structure, where occupation and military invasion are leading determinants. This structure points to an environment

The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers

239

of social crisis taking shape under the influence of negative economic and social conditions. In Chechnya, and mostly in the Palestine case, some of the important manifestations of this social structure that nurture suicide bombings are: geographically restricted mobilization capability because of closure and control systems, high population growth as a result of high total fertility and immigration rates, highly densely populated areas, a high number of UN-registered refugees, dependent economic structure in terms of energy and basic needs, “an aid economy” to a great extent, uneven economic development, unjust income distribution, representation problems at the central authority, bad governance, military defeats, sometimes harsh group competition from ultra rightists to leftists and relatively liberals, insufficient education and health services, uncontrolled immigration and irregular urbanization, unemployment and widespread nepotism culture and an identity crisis that entails all these. 12 However, some studies demonstrate that the social conditions in which suicide bombers lived were not so harsh as to compel them towards their attack when special attention is paid to the general economic structure and living standard of their society. Since there are many people more desperate than bombers who do not carry out such violence, it can be said that the social deprivation theory does not fully give us an accurate explanation of the phenomenon.13

The Inner World of the Bomber: Psychology of the Suicide Bombings Although the explanatory influence and power of Durkheim’s concept and typologies are now controversial, nearly all discussions on suicidology studies begin by mentioning Durkheim’s classical work, Le Suicide (The Suicide). One of Durkheim’s suicidal categories akin to the current suicidal attack is the “optional altruistic suicide” which occurs in a situation where the self becomes a part of the group identity, giving up his/her own persona by prioritizing the society or nation’s aspirations without regarding his/her needs and safety.14 It is not easy to explain general suicidal behavior. Likewise, it is much more difficult to comprehend suicide bombers’ psychological dynamics. Studying the cases of Palestine and Lebanon from the 1980s onward, Merari argues that it is not possible to develop the psychological profile of suicide bombers, whereas Israili claims that not even the risk factors associated commonly with suicidal behavior are seen in suicide bombers. However, Lester (along with Yang and Lindsay) argues that these results are not precise and most probably incorrect.15 If we were to summarize the

240

Chapter Thirteen

psycho-dynamic speculations on suicide bombings, we would have such a list: experiencing feelings of hopelessness and anger; having disturbed personal identities and seeking some external agents so as to stabilize their internal world; having a strong feeling of revenge; restoration of selfesteem in destructing of the enemy rather than conquering it and finally having a borderline personality associated with emotional disorders, chaotic interactions, profound fears of abandonment and annihilation, and a tendency to blame others.16 Furthermore, despite lacking clear psychopathological symptoms, as Merari points out, we can say that there is also a correlation between suicide bombings and desires for revenge following a personal trauma arising from killing, torturing or arresting of a family member, a sibling or friend by a paramilitary unit.17 In this sense, killing and tortures cause personal traumas, personal traumas lead to feelings of deep revenge, and these feelings push a possible bomber into action. Another cited psychiatrist on Palestinian suicide bombers, Sarraj reads the suicide bombings as a reaction of people who are hurt because of systematic and chronic humiliation.18 Again while Masalqa says that “[There] is something in the atmosphere that touches everyone, and that can explain a major part of the phenomena: hopelessness, helplessness, despair, and thinking of death rather than life, which is opposite to human nature.”19 Altman points to the same issue in these words: “Extreme shame and extreme humiliation can be experienced as psychological death. People will kill and die for their honor or their self-respect, because to lose their dignity can be experienced as a fate worse than death.” At this point, casting his/her actual death upon an audience consisting of those who he/she feels are responsible for his/her death, the bomber takes revenge of his/her psychological death.20

The Religious Legitimation in the Motivation of the Suicide Bomber The perception of the suicide bombings as manifestations of jihad that may bring about martyrdom enables the bombers to use religious explanations on dying and killing as a source of psychological motivation. In this sense, the cult of martyrdom and sacrifice for God creates a psychological meaning realm, making other external factors and speculations valueless. 21 Furthermore, humanistic and ethical concerns, which make post-attack atrocity inhumane, lose meaning in this process. A martyr who obtains a high status in heaven, on the one hand, frees himself/herself by getting away from all the negativities of the world; on the other hand, the act trumps post-mortem concerns such as fear, pain,

The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers

241

isolation, segregation and mortification that will be experienced during the dying process.22 Another point is that the sub-culture formed by jihad and martyrdom perceptions creates a social environment, which has been honoring suicide attacks. Beyond its theological meaning, martyrdom turns into almost a social norm as heroism causes suicide attacks to be internalized particularly by the younger generation with an elusive subtlety. Normally a person who believes that his/her life is meaningless becomes ready for infinitive salvation in an eschatological sense through the martyrdom operation, and also becomes a legendary hero in his/her social surrounding. That is, a martyr’s social and cultural iconization leads to the systemization of suicide bombings.23 Strictly interpreted as a holy war (most Muslims consider jihad to mean, simply, “a struggle,” and do not necessarily view it in a violent or physical sense but rather as a pious expression of religious faith that strives to maintain goodness and righteousness) jihadists who view the world through a classical Islamic lens may battle against hostile others who intimidate or hinder Muslims existence. Jihad is normally a collective obligation (fard al-kifaya), that is, if a group of Muslims fulfill the obligation of jihad, other Muslims become jihad-free persons. Yet if there is a military intervention or occupation of the lands where Muslims live, jihad becomes an individual obligation (fard al-ayn) that every Muslim must fulfill. Islamic scholars interpret individual obligation to mean that it is the duty of every Muslim to wage jihad in the path of God in defense of Islam, its lands, people, and property. Scholars of all four basic Islamic legal traditions (mazhabs) agree on this Islamic reality, which has also been approved by many Quran commentators, yet this interpretation must also be understood within a specific historical context and we must acknowledge that one interpretation is not necessarily normative. This characteristic of jihad is an important dynamic used to mobilize the Muslim masses, because occupation elevates jihad to a position above all other religious practice and obligations.24 In this case martyrdom cannot be separated from jihad. In Islam, a person is a martyr (shahid) who sacrifices his/her life in the path of God, anticipating only God’s consent. While it has been stated in the Quran that the person who dies in the path of God has an opportunity to enjoy the forgiveness of all his/her sins except violating others’ rights, in the hadiths literature some sayings assert that the shahid has the privilege of accompanying prophets, saints, righteous believers, and of entering into the highest gardens of heaven (jannat al-firdaous).25

242

Chapter Thirteen

We see that explanation of the suicide bombings via jihad and martyrdom also enables the attacks to rely on the classical Islamic battle jurisprudence. Those approving suicide bombings in terms of Islam depend on two general verdicts in the Islamic jurisprudence. One of them is that a Muslim soldier can attack enemy forces with the aim of obtaining martyrdom, even though this soldier is sure to be killed by the enemy. The other is that when enemy uses civilians as a shield, it is impossible to differentiate civilians from soldiers in a battle context and the victimization of civilians becomes a natural and unfortunate part of battle. 26 We should mention that the approving side deducts these arguments from the Islamic tradition, especially the hadith collections by making analogies (qÕyas) from certain texts and historical events in explanation of contemporary attacks. These arguments can be summarized in this way: (a) Civilians play a role in battle; (b) they provide spiritual and material support for battle; (c) it is difficult to differentiate civilians from military forces and their components and (d) civic or military, policy makers utilize civilians as a shield.27 Even though there are clear clues in the Quran and hadith and very strong convictions among the general Islamic society Islam forbids suicide in an absolute manner, keeps individuals from endangering themselves with their own hands, supporters try to justify their arguments based on Islamic jurisprudence. In brief, once the groups interpret suicide bombings within the framework of jihad and martyrdom, providing a religious legitimacy of bombings is not so difficult a task. We can say that when human logic is applied to religious texts and tradition, to some extent, it is not difficult to find a comment or deduction that can justify a cause, whatever it is.

The Effect of Organizations on the Personal Motivation From the perspective of the “rational choice theory,” terroristic behavior is a willful choice within rational logic and calculations as an outcome of a political strategy after its efficiency and value are assessed by organizations as a chosen alternative within other options. It can be said that terrorism is generally a last resort following the failure of other methods. When a person feels that he/she has run out of prevailing options, the human bomb emerges as a strong alternative to cope with problems encountered. At this stage we encounter the organizations. Suicide bombings are not fulfilled alone; the bomber is chosen, encouraged and indoctrinated by a guiding group on the way to an operation.28 Organizations play a critical

The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers

243

role from the recruitment stage to the planning, and the execution of a suicide attack. They provide several resources and services necessary to sustain a prolonged and effective campaign of suicide terrorism, including fund-raising. Organizations also supply the procurement of weapons and explosives, and the technical know-how for their assembly and use. In addition, they are in charge of the recruitment, training, and indoctrination of a would-be-bomber, including the overall decision and planning, intelligence-gathering, target selection and public relations.29 Military interventions, negative social conditions and personal traumas create a suitable environment for organizations. For a bomber on the way to his/her operation, the line between life and death has already lost its meaning. It seems more logical to end one’s own life on one’s own terms for a glorious cause than to have it taken in an unknown manner at an unknown time for nothing in a conflict determined by the realities of an asymmetrical battle. At this stage, suicide terrorism is increasingly becoming an evil but rational choice when all other fighting options are similarly suicidal.30

Security Implications It does not seem to be a proper approach to explain suicide bombings by focusing only on fundamentalism or religious commitment or to merely mention the socio-psychological factors without paying any attention to the negative effects of occupation or military intervention. As mentioned earlier, many examples of suicide bombings show a direct correlation between military intervention and suicide campaigns. From this perspective, the diminishment of suicide bombings requires rethinking our paths of conflict resolution. Suicide terrorism not only springs from negative socio-psychological conditions or intangible inner conflicts or misleading religious interpretations, but also benefits from concrete asymmetric military operations and power proofing. Therefore, eschewing asymmetric military operations and giving priority to human-centered regulations and policy implications will weaken suicidal reactions. As long as there are negative effects of asymmetric military operations which are led by rigid ideologies and unlimited or uncontrolled winning aspirations, it is hard to say that suicide bombings can be prevented by applying other measures. This is because a militaristic intervention pushes a would-be bomber to carry out an operation rather than illusions and unreal convictions.

244

Chapter Thirteen

Struggling against Negative Socio-economic Conditions In this chapter, the negative social and economic conditions are considered to be catalyst forms of suicide bombings. The debate about what the effect of social conditions on terroristic behavior continues, however, the controversy here is about its real effects and it is mostly accepted that there is a positive relationship between bad socio-economic dynamics and terrorism. Therefore, developing general social and economical conditions, especially reducing unemployment and supplying at least a minimum social security for the persons living in the areas where this phenomenon is prevalent will potentially strengthen a perception that such an attack might not be the best alternative in solving problems and particularly prevent suicide bombings from becoming suicidal campaigns as can be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan nowadays. The improvement of social conditions also helps undermine the social base, from which the organizations utilize to recruit for the attacks. At this point, these solutions can be put forward: softening geographically restricted mobilization capability, and closure and control systems by separating regular persons from suspected ones; producing sustainable policies regarding high population rates and fertility increases; controlling unbalanced immigration flow and trying to prevent some centers from being highly densely populated; generating new policies to adapt refugees to normal social life since the refugee life spawns potential extremists; supplying a transition from a dependent and aid economic structure to a relatively independent and self-sufficient economy; providing new job possibilities for young generations to afford and plan their life; supplying at least minimum social security for the persons below the poverty line; improving basic education and health institutions; promoting democratic mentality and apparatus both in education and politics, in especially regarding representation problems at the central authority; regulating harsh group competition between political rivals; fighting nepotism culture and lastly trying to normalize the society with normal human feelings rather than feelings of hate since the more the society normalizes, the fewer suicide attacks there will be.

Generating Rehabilitation Programs It is clear that there is a psychological dimension to suicide bombings, including feelings of hopelessness and anger, disturbed personal identities, strong feelings of revenge and profound fears of abandonment and annihilation. Suicide bombings are a characteristic of conflicting societies

The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers

245

and this social context includes killing, torturing or arresting. Killing and torturing cause personal traumas and personal traumas create feelings of revenge. These wishes for revenge facilitate attacks. This process indicates the need for psychological rehabilitation for both sides of the conflict so as to regulate their inner world. Therefore it is important to practice rehabilitation programs to convey hope and respect, and the belief that all individuals have the capacity to learn and grow. Additionally, it is important to encourage individuals to develop and use individualized wellness plans, to foster social interaction, to facilitate partnerships with other persons, to promote independent living, to encourage occupational performance, to help individuals improve the quality of all aspects of their lives, including social, parental, educational, residential, intellectual, spiritual and financial aspects. It is so reasonable to say that as psychological support increases, the tendency of individuals for bombings will decrease.

Comprehending the Religious Motivation of the Suicide Bombings The suicide bombings take shape under social and political dynamics outside religion and in this process religion is particularly used as a mechanism of motivation and legitimation for the attacks. In suicide bombings, the homicide is transformed into a multi-directional value on account of the culture of shahadad (being martyrdom) and jihad (holy struggle) as if it is divinely purification through sacrificing the life for the sake of God rather than fulfilling an atrocity. Inhumane and devilish sides of the perpetrations evaporate under the effects of the discourse produced by religious explanations. At this stage, it is mandatory to understand the question of how religion functions in the processes of conflict and violence, what the meaning of religious idealism is in religious radicalism, how Islamic law explains the suicide bombings, and how religious motivation and legitimization are utilized in these attacks. It is clear that suicide bombers in some Muslim-majority countries benefit from the local religious edicts issued by unofficial salafi clerics. Hence, to fight against suicide bombings means to fight against the religious edicts approving these tactics and requires the politics of religious edicts by frustrating the legitimacy of bombers, invalidating their justifications, generating religious rehabilitation programs, benefiting from religious leaders and scholars to be interviewed with targeted persons, taking part in Internet forums of radical groups in order to change their attitudes gradually, and

246

Chapter Thirteen

supporting formal, planned and institutionalized religious education while monitoring informal, uncontrolled and irregular religious education.

Surveillance of Organizations It is almost impossible to carry out a suicide bombing without organizations; the bomber is recruited, encouraged, supported and indoctrinated by organizations on the way to an operation. They provide several resources and services necessary to sustain a prolonged and effective campaign of suicide terrorism, including fund-raising, procurement of weapons and explosives, technical know-how for their assembly and use, intelligence-gathering, target selection and public relations. Therefore, deterred suicide bombings are also related to the surveillance of organizations, including both their political and militaristic wings. We can say that gathering intelligence on actions of organization, members will be the most effective and practical way to prevent a possible attack in comparison to the other long-term political and social measures. The monitoring of organizations that support suicide bombins, however, should not be unprofessional with an unnecessary sharpness. We have many examples from different areas demonstrating that the extreme usage of power in an asymmetric way brings more rigid terrorist campaigns, which give the message “We are here and are not afraid of you.” Thus, fighting with organizations requires a delicate balance policy that will consider both different alternatives and future implications. When considering dissuading people from committing bombings, we can also think of the following measures: premature release for normalized radicals within a rehabilitation program, encouraging and backing ex-radicals in using civil and political apparatus to integrate them into the civil system, monitoring camps where people may be given bomb and explosive training, and offering more peaceful alternatives which are less risky and more attractive to radicals.

Conclusion The personal motivation of a suicide bomber is shaped by many dynamics. Therefore, preventing these bombings can only be possible by considering these dynamics. Simply repressing the bombings through counterforce seems unlikely to put an end to this problem in the long-term. The use of asymmetrical force leads to the use of counterforce and at the same time not only strengthens the organizations’ social basis but also justifies their legitimacy and increases their courage. Thereby, it would be more logical

The Personal Motivations of Suicide Bombers

247

to use force in the right place, at the right time and against the actual target. As stated previously, I believe that a long-term solution can be reached within a pluralistic perspective by handling the problem at five different levels at least. To conclude, regarding suicide bombings it may be stated that we are faced with an interrelated structure where political and social factors create a distinct psychology and where, on the one hand, organizations are at work while, on the other hand, religious justification methods are under way. The solution lies in understanding this structure.

Notes 1

Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 17. 2 Abufarha, Nasser A., The Making of a Human Bomb: State Expansion and Modes of Resistance in Palestine, (Madison: PhD Dissertation in Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, 2006), 30; Assaf, Dena, From Stones to Structure: A Sustainable Future for Development in the West Bank-Palestine, (PhD Dissertation in Urban Design and Planning, University of Washington, 1996), 34. 3 Bloom, Mia, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 169. 4 Cronin, A.K., “Terrorist and Suicide Attacks,” (CRS Report for CongressWashigton, DC: The Library of Congress, 2003 August 28), 15; Leung, Olga V., Motivational Factors of Female Suicide Bombers in Chechenya, (Master of Arts in Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of Texas, 2004), 33-34. 5 Berko, Anat - Erez, Edna, “Ordinary People and ‘Death Work’: Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims”, Violence and Victims, V.20, N.6, (December 2005), 609-610. 6 Hassan, Nasra, “Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers-Talking to the ‘human bombs,’” The New Yorker, (November 19, 2001), 49. 7 Soibelman, Mali, “Palestinian Suicide Bombers,” Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, N.1, (2004), 177. 8 AydÕnalp, Halil, “Social Identity of the Suicide Bomber: the First Woman Suicide Bomber of the Palestine-Wafa Idris,” Journal of Social Sciences, V.1-3, N.1-6, (January-July 2009), 208. 9 Pape, Robert A., Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005), 4;42. 10 Telhami, Shibley, “Why Suicide Terrorism Takes Root,” The New York Times, (April 4, 2002), 36; Pearlman, Wendy, “Suicide Bombers Not the Only MartyrsIsrael Creates Many More”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, (May 2002), 14; Victor, Barbara, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers, (Rodale, 2003), 29. Also see: Ibid, p.118 and 180. 11 Wikan, Unni, “My Son-A Terrorist? He was Such a Gentle Boy,” Anthropological Quarterly, V.75/1, (2001), 17 and so on; The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, The Population, Housing and Establishment Census - 2007,

248

Chapter Thirteen

Press Conference on the Preliminary Findings, (Population, Buildings, Housing Units and Establishments), (Ramallah: Palestine 2008), 13 and so on; Abualkhair, Ayman, “Electricity sector in the Palestinian territories: Which priorities for development and peace?” Energy Policy, 35, (2007), 2209;; CIA, The World Fact Book-West Bank, (2008), 4, The World Bank, Country Brief, Main Development Challenges: West Bank and Gaza, http://web.worldbank.org /WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES, Accessed April 25, 2008; IMF-The World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Economic Developments in 2006-A First Assesment, Accessed March 7 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/np/wbg/2007/eng/032607ed.pdf; Dökmeciyan, R. Hrair, Arap DünyasÕnda Köktencilik, Trans.. Muhammed Karahano÷lu, (østanbul: ølke YayÕnlarÕ, 1992), 37-40; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Special Report on the 59th Anniversary of the Nakba-10.05.2006, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Nakba07_E.pdf, Accessed April 27, 2008; The Humanitarian Monitor: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Number 23, Accessed March 4, 2008, 15; Humanitarian Update: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Closure Count and Analysis, Accessed August 12, 2005, 1. Loewenstein, Jennifer, “Return to Rafah: Journey to a Land Out of Bounds”, Journal of Palestine Studies, XXXIII, No-3, (Spring 2004), 104. 12 Hafez, Mohammed M., “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, No.29, (2006), 172; Berko Anat -Edna Erez, “Ordinary People and ‘Death Work’: Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims,” 608; Aydinalp, Halil, “Social Identity of the Suicide Bomber: Wafa Idris, First Woman Suicide Bomber of Palestine,” Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi, S.1-3, C.1-6, (Ankara: Ocak-Haziran 2009), p.204. 13 Durkheim, Emile, Suicide, Tran. John A. Spaulding & George Simson, (New York: The Free Press, 1951), 221-227. 14 Lester, David, Bijou Yang, Mark Lindsay, “Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, N. 27, (2004), 286. 15 Ibid., p.286. 16 Merari, Ariel, “Suicide Terrorism,” Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Suicidal Behavior, (Edit. Robert I. Yufit, John Wiley & Sons Press, 2004), 438439. 17 El Sarraj, Eyad, “Suicide Bombers: Despair, and the Need for Hope: an Interview with Eyad El Sarraj