The Mexican Revolution and the Limits of Agrarian Reform, 1915-1946 9781685856458

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The Mexican Revolution and the Limits of Agrarian Reform, 1915-1946

The Mexican Revolution and the Limits of Agrarian Reform,

1915-1946

Dana Markiewicz

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

To John and Kate

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Markiewicz, Dana. T h e Mexican Revolution and the limits of agrarian reform, 1915-1946 / Dana Markiewicz. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-321-9 (alk. paper) 1. Land reform—Mexico—History—20th century. I. Title. HD1333.M6M37 1993 333.3'172'0904—dc20 93-12003 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction

vii 1

Part 1 AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM 1 2 3 4 5

Agrarian Revolution: The Peasant War Carranza: Bourgeois Entrenchment Obregón: Bonapartism, Cañonazos, and Capitalism Calles: Croesuses and Técnicos The Maximato: Crisis and Repression

13 23 35 47 59

Part 2 CARDEN1SMO, AGRARIAN REFORM, AND REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION 6 7 8 9 10

Cárdenas and Cardenismo Agrarian Structure, Politics, and Economic Development Class Struggle and the Collective Ejido Regime Institutionalization and the Decline of the Agrarian Reform The Ejido and the Legacy of Cardenismo

73 83 95 103 113

Part 3 THE "RECTIFICATION" OF CARDENISMO 11 12 13

The Avila Camacho Presidency: An Agrarian Counterreform? Elections, War, and the Politics of Conciliation The Contradictions of Agricultural Development

121 125 131

CONTENTS

VI

14 15 16

The "Consolidation" of the Agrarian Reform "Small Property" and the Legal Recourse of Amparo Conclusion

139 157 165

Glossary and Acronyms Tables Bibliography Index About the Book and Author

171 177 195 205 215

Acknowledgments

I first began work on this topic while a doctoral student at UCLA. Research grants came from the Fulbright Foundation (1980-1981) and the Organization of American States (1981-1982). 1 began writing while employed as a teaching associate in the UCLA Department of History and as a transcript editor at the National C e n t e r f o r Bilingual Research in Los Alamitos, California. I began revising the first draft of the manuscript while working as a reference librarian at the Anaheim Public Library in Anaheim, California. In Mexico, I did research at the C u e r p o Consultivo Agrario library, which has the most c o m p l e t e collection of DAAC/SRA reports; the Secretaría de Hacienda librar/, which has a large collect i o n of g o v e r n m e n t r e p o r t s , p a m p h l e t s , a n d n e w s p a p e r s ; t h e Secretaría de Agricultura, whose library archives all agency reports, along with o t h e r publications of historical interest; the technical library of the Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos, which keeps a long run of d e p a r t m e n t publications; the Cámara de Diputados, which maintains the Diarios de los Debates; and the Hemeroteca Nacional. I was also fortunate enough to be admitted to the private archive of Marte R. Gómez, maintained in Mexico City by his widow, Hilda Leal de Gómez, and their children. The archive, which contains the personal correspondence, official papers, and private diaries of Ing. Gómez, is especially rich for students of Mexican history for the period of the mid-1920s through 1946. Ing. Gómez was practically unique a m o n g Mexican leaders in offering scholars access to his private papers even while he was still alive. I am indebted to the Gómez family for opening this valuable and impeccably organized source to me, and to Jorge Alvarez, Enrique Krauze, and Emilio Alanís Patiño for helping me locate and gain admission to the archive. Research in the U n i t e d States was c a r r i e d o u t at t h e UCLA Research Library, the UC Berkeley Main Library, and the Bancroft Library. T h e reference staff of the Indian Trails Public Library in Wheeling, Illinois, helped me obtain materials through interlibrary loan. VI1

vi»

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe thanks to several people in Mexico who were generous with their time and knowledge. Emilio Alanís Patiño was particularly helpful on statistical source materials and on the early years of the reform. Ruth Macias helped me understand the bureaucratic and legal complexities of the land distribution process. The professional staff at the Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Agrarias were kind e n o u g h to answer questions and h e l p me locate research materials. Arturo Warman made insightful comments on Mexico's m o d e r n agrarian history. Valentín Campa and Dionisio Encina provided orientation on the history of the agrarian reform in general and on the role of the Mexican Communist Party in particular. I am very grateful to Ramón Danzós Palomino, who granted time for a lengthy interview over the course of two days and invited me to accompany the Central I n d e p e n d i e n t e de O b r e r o s Agrícolas y C a m p e s i n o s (CIOAC) to Simojovel, Chiapas, where they were organizing agricultural workers. The entire leadership of the CIOAC was generous enough to take my work seriously. I would also like to acknowledge the h e l p of the Unión de Sociedades y Grupos Solidarios "40-69" in the La Laguna region of Coahuila and Durango, who made it possible for me to tour several collective ejidos affiliated with them. I would like to thank Jeff Bortz and Peter Reich, who gave me a practical and academic orientation in Mexico City, and Stephanie Wood and the late Marie Musgrave de Portilla, who read portions of an earlier version of this book. Stephen Haber offered thoughtful criticism of the entire manuscript and generous encouragement. The anonymous reviewer for Lynne Rienner Publishers provided helpful comments. Of course, the information and conclusions presented here are my own responsibility. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Bruce Gibbs. He read the manuscript at an earlier stage, but more important, he has given me indispensable moral support over the years. My parents, J. F. and Patricia T. Markiewicz, influenced my early political consciousness and encouraged my interest in Latin America. Although my father disagreed with many of my views, he urged me to publish my work. It is impossible for me to express the depth of my appreciation for J o h n Lubina. Without his emotional, intellectual, and financial support, this project would probably not have been completed. Finally, I would like to remember Martha Phillips, Richard Fraser, Kim Kilmer, and Marie Musgrave de Portilla. Their love of life, dedication, courage, and generosity are worthy of emulation. Dana Markiewicz

Introduction

In N o v e m b e r 1991, the g o v e r n m e n t of Carlos Salinas d e Gortari m o d ified Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution to allow the rental a n d sale of lands held by ejido peasant communities and to e n c o u r a g e private investment a n d p r o m o t e greater foreign involvement in the agricultural sector. Salinas a n n o u n c e d the e n d of the agrarian r e f o r m init i a t e d in 1915. G o v e r n m e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s insisted t h a t t h e new measures would modernize, not destroy, the ejido; at the same time, they implied that the regime n o longer n e e d e d the o n c e crucial political s u p p o r t of the ejido peasantry. T h e initiative was praised by business interests, the right, and the C h u r c h ; peasant organizations a n d the left almost unanimously declared t h e m a disaster f o r ejidatarios, agricultural workers, a n d the rural poor. T h e news m e d i a r e p o r t e d b o t h a rush to s p e c u l a t e in ejidal l a n d s a n d c o n f u s i o n a n d a n g e r a m o n g the peasantry. 1 T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s are not surprising. First, they c o n c u r with the many o t h e r steps taken by Salinas's g o v e r n m e n t to privatize a n d allow g r e a t e r foreign p e n e t r a t i o n of the Mexican e c o n o m y — a n economy t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i z e d a n d e n t e r e d t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y u n d e r State protection. 2 Second, they have b e e n advocated f o r decades by p r o l a n d l o r d forces a n d in many cases merely give legal sanction to a s t a t e of a f f a i r s t h a t a l r e a d y e x i s t e d . As this b o o k will s h o w , t h e Mexican agrarian r e f o r m was d e f u n c t by 1946; its m a i n institution, the ejido peasant community, declined with respect to large-scale, private agriculture a f t e r a brief period of e x p a n s i o n a n d relative prosperity in 1936-1940. Much of the e c o n o m i c rationale f o r the e j i d o — as a wage-cost subsidy f o r private agriculture a n d as a p r o d u c e r of basic f o o d c r o p s — h a s b e e n i m m a t e r i a l f o r at least 25 years. T h e Mexican regime now seems to think that increased private a n d foreign investment in agriculture, and in the e c o n o m y as a whole, will g e n e r a t e e n o u g h prosperity to take the ejido's place as a political a n d 1

2

INTRODUCTION

economic shock absorber for millions of landless rural laborers. In this they may be mistaken, as were the Porfirians before them, but only the passage of time will reveal the specific outcome of their decisions. The landlords and capitalists who opposed the old Article 27 have long argued that a system of large, privately owned agricultural concerns is economically and socially superior. History has shown their claims to be self-serving. Particularly in the late-industrializing countries, commercial agriculture based on large landed estates—whether relations of production are precapitalist or modern in character 3 — has rarely contributed to economic and social well-being; rather, it has impoverished the masses of agricultural laborers, laid waste to the land, and often proved an obstacle to economic diversification and development. 4 Large, privately owned agricultural estates dominated Mexico during the late nineteenth century; by 1910, 95 percent of rural heads of family were landless. Sugar, henequen, tobacco, cotton, citrus, cacao, and cattle are examples of commercial products raised on the haciendas of the Porfirian era, which witnessed a general impoverishment of the rural towns, the violent dispossession of the indigenous populations, the entrenchment of coercive labor relations, and even a resurgence of slavery. If there was "order and progress" under the Porfirians, the peasantry reaped no benefits. Their verdict on the hacienda was revolution. Salinas's forebears created the ejido to put a stop to social upheaval among the peasantry, which had been completely stripped of its lands during the late nineteenth century. The petty bourgeois leaders who opposed Porfirio Diaz and his political heirs reasoned that peasant militancy could be quelled if land grants provided a supplement to the day wage earned on the haciendas. As time went on, a faction of the post-Porfirian bureaucracy emerged that saw land reform as a positive economic and social step for the peasantry and the nation as a whole. This group believed that agrarian reform would ameliorate the contradictions of capitalist growth, make agriculture more productive, and lay a foundation for economic development by increasing rural prosperity. When this proreform faction came to power in the 1930s at a time of significant worker and peasant protests, it implemented one of the most thoroughgoing land reforms ever carried out under capitalism. As this book will show, that reform was more significant for its limitations than f o r its achievements. It helped to stifle peasant revolts, succeeded in modifying land tenure relationships, and was of paramount importance in the institutionalization of the new regime. "Land to the tiller" remained an unfulfilled peasant aspiration; the bourgeois leaders had never really promised it but had violently sup-

INTRODUCTION

3

pressed those who fought for it. The reform did not relieve the contradictions of capitalism; neither did it lay the foundation f o r balanced economic development or create a prosperous rural sector. Rural inequality, poverty, and violence c o n t i n u e d u n d e r the new regime; protection of private property and bourgeois class rule meant that even the most notorious practices of the Porfirian hacienda were not completely eliminated. The term "small property" (pequeña propriedad) b e c a m e a e u p h e m i s m f o r large-scale, c o m m e r c i a l , a n d export-oriented agriculture. Agrarian law allowed "small proprietors" (pequeños propietarios) to possess far larger expanses of land than were g r a n t e d to ejidatarios; moreover, the constitutional g u a r a n t e e of property ownership enabled large landed proprietors to masquerade as p e q u e ñ o s propietarios and to combat land reform both in the courts and with armed force. Although the Mexican regime came to power after crushing the agrarian revolution attempted by Emiliano Zapata, Pancho Villa, and others like them, it claimed for itself the mantle of the great peasant revolutionaries. An orthodox history of the reform took shape; it became ubiquitous but probably found its most important exponent in Jesús Silva Herzog. 5 According to this version of events, the postPorfirian regime, as the rightful successor to peasant revolutionaries like Zapata and Villa, carried out a successful land reform; despite occasional unfortunate backsliding, the regime never wavered in its fundamental commitment to the peasantry. Each Mexican president is evaluated on the basis of his support for land reform. This criterion elevates Lázaro Cárdenas, who changed the face of rural Mexico in the 1930s by extending and supporting the ejidos, to the status of a demigod. Other presidents, however, most notably Alvaro Obregón, Emilio Portes Gil, and Abelardo Rodríguez, are also praised for their commitment to reform. This book shows that despite its often radical-sounding agrarian reform rhetoric, the post-Porfirian regime never intended to fulfill peasant aspirations; nor was concern about rural development and peasant well-being a prime factor in molding agrarian reform policy. To explain this apparent contradiction, I characterize the regime as "bonapartist." 6 Under capitalism, a bonapartist regime is a dictatorship that elevates itself above the social classes, typically at times of social crisis when the rule of one class is not secure. It controls mass organizations with concessions or repression but does not completely destroy them as in fascism; it may portray itself as a champion of the masses, but its function is to preserve the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. Late-industrializing countries, which are decisively shaped by foreign capital, are particularly susceptible to this dynamic. Typically, the domestic bourgeoisie is relatively weak and the working class rela-

4

INTRODUCTION

lively strong; the government rales "either by making itself the instrument of foreign capitalism and holding the proletariat in the chains of a police dictatorship, or by maneuvering with the proletariat and even going so far as to make concessions to it, thus gaining the possibility of a certain freedom toward the foreign capitalists." 7 The Mexican regime, forged in the crucible of civil war, fits this description. Its agrarian policy, though rationalized in a phraseology of social justice, was determined by considerations of political stability, regime institutionalization, and the dictates of domestic and foreign capital. The post-Porfirian leaders had, for the most part, little personal sympathy for the goals of the peasantry; to give "land to the tiller" would call into question private property and bourgeois rule, and they sought to minimize rural change. Most viewed the reform as a necessary evil for political pacification and regime consolidation. Even proreformers who hoped for social improvement in the countryside were never in favor of agrarian revolution but accepted the disadvantages of a slow, bureaucratically implemented reform as part of the price that must be paid for the simultaneous guarantee of private property and political stability. Spurts of rapid land distribution originated in the regime's intermittent need for peasant support against seditious rebellion, or in massive worker and peasant militancy, as in the 1930s. While their sporadic concessions to the working class and peasantry enabled them to institutionalize their rule, the bonapartist leaders enriched themselves via graft, land theft, and speculation, becoming an increasingly privileged social layer. Their pseudorevolutionary rhetoric claimed to conciliate the social classes but actually favored bourgeois property forms and class rule. At some level, the Mexican left has always accepted the bourgeois prototype of agrarian c h a n g e i m p l e m e n t e d by the post-Porfirian regime. The limitations and failures of the land reform have generated significant opposition, but the left has long been h a m p e r e d by populist and reformist notions of the peasantry as an undifferentiated social group or class with the potential to catalyze positive historical change. Often, the peasant way of life is championed, either because it is assumed to be economically more rational and productive, or for its historical and aesthetic value. Some have argued that because the post-Porfirian regime came to power in the wake of peasant unrest, it could be pressured into completing an agrarian reform in the interests of the rural masses. The Salinas government has proved them wrong once and for all, but this book will show why their perspective has been in error from the first. In Mexico, as in many late-industrializing countries, the political and economic hegemony of large-scale private agriculture caused e x t r e m e social malaise. The following chapters will show that the

INTRODUCTION

5

Mexican e x p e r i e n c e also indicates the sterility of the b o u r g e o i s model of land reform. Thus, it is reasonable to seek an opposition viewpoint that does not involve implicit acceptance of either prototype. Indeed, there is a third significant model f o r the historical issues of land tenure and the political nature of the peasantry. It comes from the theoretical and historical writings, as well as from the political experiences, of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. In Capital, Marx observed that the forcible expropriation of peasant lands was fundamental to the appearance of capitalism. A universal occurrence "written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire," it formed the two social classes of modern society: the bourgeoisie, which owns the means of production, and the proletariat, which owns nothing and must sell its labor power to survive. This process of "primitive accumulation" was essential because without a "free and 'unattached'" proletariat the basis of capital accumulation, surplus value, cannot exist. Once "cleared" of people, the land itself also became "part and parcel of capital." This allowed the capitalist farmer to extract surplus value from his hired laborers and the landl o r d to c o l l e c t rent and increase the value of his estates at the expense of his capitalist tenants.8 In his turn-of-the-century study of capitalism in Russia, Lenin discussed the "disintegration" of the peasantry, the concomitant formation of a rural bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the rise of agricultural capitalism. T h e Russian agrarian populists of the era believed that preserving the peasant community and "small popular production" would enable the country to develop without experiencing the ravages of capitalism; they depicted the peasantry as anticapitalist. Lenin demonstrated with a great wealth of statistical detail that the peasant community was already disintegrating under the influence of capitalism, producing a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat. T h e poor peasant was actually an "allotment-holding" proletarian who was unable to earn a livelihood solely from his own parcel and must sell his labor power as an agricultural or industrial worker. Commercial, capitalist production was expanding at the expense of peasant production. T h e middle peasants were in an untenable position, unable to live by their independent labor except in the best years, many thrown into the ranks of the proletariat with each bad harvest.9 Marx and Engels wrote at a time when capitalism was ascending but had not yet reached its apex. Lenin's analysis, although it looked toward socialism, preceded the Russian proletarian revolution by about 20 years. In Trotsky's revolutionary and postrevolutionary writings, the political significance of the peasantry in late-industrializing countries became clearer as a result of the concrete experiences of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. These had shown that the

6

INTRODUCTION

peasantiy of the m o d e r n era of socialist revolutions was even less capable of political independence than it had been in the era of the bourgeois revolutions that destroyed feudalism and h e r a l d e d the domination of capitalism. The experiences of the Bolshevik Party showed that in a political crisis when control of State power was in the balance, there was no middle road for the peasantry, which would follow either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. 10 From these theoretical, political, and historical writings, we can distill a revolutionary model of agrarian change that will provide a counterpoint to the bourgeois model of land reform. Peasant radicalism arises because of the disintegration of the peasantry u n d e r capitalism. This may sound like smooth going; in reality, as Marx pointed out, it is a brutal process. As capital searches for opportunities to accumulate, it usurps peasant lands or encroaches on communal past u r e to satisfy its i n c r e a s i n g n e e d f o r labor power a n d n a t u r a l resources. Communities disintegrate as peasants lose their land and become day laborers. Even in the least disruptive of circumstances, when capital penetrates the peasant village in the guise of usury, commerce, or petty trading in land, it enriches a minority of community dwellers and impoverishes the majority. This inexorable process—the formation of the two social classes of modern society, bourgeoisie and proletariat—causes tremendous social friction even when it occurs on a small and incomplete scale. In Marx's classic example of England, the expropriation of the peasantry was relatively complete by the beginning of the nineteenth century. 1 1 In modern, late-industrializing countries, because of the uneven penetration of capitalism in agriculture and the distorted n a t u r e of industrialization, the peasantry characteristically retains great social importance. In cases where the peasantry is deliberately preserved, the cycle of enrichment of the few and impoverishment of the many can occur, on a small scale, over and over. Although the p o o r e s t peasants are, as Lenin p o i n t e d out, really workers, they remain tied by law, custom, or economic necessity to a village, an estate, or a parcel. These worker-peasants are socially f r a g m e n t e d , tied to the production techniques and social and political traditions of a former era. Thus, at its most radical, a peasantry that succeeds in formulating independent political goals will produce a revolutionary bourgeois program centering on the equitable division and ownership (or usufruct) of the land. Unlike the industrial proletariat, with its roots and collective experience in modern industry, the peasantry is incapable of proposing the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, the collective organization of society, economic planning, or the destruction of the bourgeois State and the construction of a new State power representing the dispossessed. 12

INTRODUCTION

7

T h e Mexican agrarian r e f o r m provides an opportunity to consider these views. Because it was relatively extensive, it can serve as a m o d e l f o r both the potentialities and limitations o f b o u r g e o i s land r e f o r m . This study argues that technical changes in the administration o f the r e f o r m were inconsequential c o m p a r e d with the imperatives o f capital; f r o m 1936 through 1938, cardenismo went to the very limits o f what was possible under capitalism. Thus, if a b o u r g e o i s land r e f o r m c o u l d a c c o m p l i s h what its p r o p o n e n t s claim, the M e x i c a n r e f o r m should have p r o d u c e d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , social amelioration, and rural political calm. In contrast, the revolutionary viewpoint w o u l d predict little real e c o n o m i c and social b e t t e r m e n t as a result o f l a n d tenure changes; in fact, it w o u l d e x p e c t a constant renewal o f poverty, violence, exploitation, and political unrest in spite o f r e f o r m . As the f o l l o w i n g chapters will show, the history o f the Mexican agrarian r e f o r m confirms the predictions o f the revolutionary m o d e l and points to the need f o r revolutionary change. T h e b o o k is p r e s e n t e d in t h r e e parts, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h r e e chronological periods. Part 1, which spans the years 1915-1934, discusses the intellectual and social antecedents o f the agrarian r e f o r m and p r o c e e d s to the early history of that r e f o r m u n d e r Presidents Carranza, O b r e g ó n , Calles, Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio, and R o d r í g u e z . Part 2 analyzes the determinants and results o f the agrarian r e f o r m u n d e r L á z a r o Cárdenas, f r o m 1934 to 1940. Part 3 c o n s i d e r s the agrarian and agricultural policy o f the Avila C a m a c h o g o v e r n m e n t , f r o m 1940 to 1946, during which the cardenista r e f o r m began to deteriorate. T h e r e are several reasons f o r the rather traditional division o f the manuscript by presidential period. First, the conventional historiography has a basis in reality: the political i m p o r t a n c e o f the M e x i c a n presidency. Second, because o n e o f the goals o f the b o o k is to dispute the o r t h o d o x history o f the agrarian r e f o r m , which is o f t e n told in this m a n n e r , the presidential divisions are a logical p o i n t o f reference. T h e emphasis o n the Cárdenas and Avila C a m a c h o presidencies is a result o f the argument presented. That is, the Cárdenas p e r i o d is i m p o r t a n t because cardenismo c h a n g e d rural M e x i c o in significant ways, yet had i n h e r e n t limitations that led to the r a p i d d e m i s e o f r e f o r m . T h e p e r i o d 1940-1946 merits a t t e n t i o n b e c a u s e , w i t h o u t explicitly repudiating c a r d e n i s m o , the Avila C a m a c h o g o v e r n m e n t reversed many cardenista transformations. Avila C a m a c h o paved the way f o r M i g u e l A l e m á n ' s v e h e m e n t antireform stance without threate n i n g the stability o f the post-Porfirian regime. Part 1 begins with a brief survey o f pre-1910 land tenure systems and agrarian conflicts. Peasant revolts in d e f e n s e o f c o m m u n i t y lands o c c u r r e d throughout the colonial p e r i o d and the nineteenth century,

8

INTRODUCTION

b u t they b r o a d e n e d a n d i n t e n s i f i e d b e t w e e n 1 8 4 0 a n d 1 8 7 0 a n d e x p l o d e d into all-out war after 1911. A l t h o u g h they had i m p o r t a n t differences, the movements led by Emiliano Zapata in Morelos and P a n c h o Villa in northern M e x i c o were simultaneous responses to the crisis o f the peasantry u n d e r capitalism. T h e Zapatistas r e t u r n e d all land to the villages and operated the expropriated sugar mills for the benefit o f the community. They rejected the legitimacy o f all national b o u r g e o i s l e a d e r s h i p , b u t c o u l d o f f e r n o v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e . Villa y e a r n e d for an a u t a r c h i c utopia o f peasants and artisans, socialism without t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f capitalism. Ultimately b o t h m o v e m e n t s were c r u s h e d , but n o t b e f o r e instilling in t h e a n t i - P o r f i r i a n b o u r geoisie sufficient fear of further revolt to instigate a land reform. C h a p t e r s 2 t h r o u g h 5 discuss t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m f r o m 1 9 1 5 , when landlord and f o r m e r Porfirian senator V e n u s t i a n o Carranza was f o r c e d to promulgate land reform legislation as part o f his offensive against the peasant armies o f Zapata and Villa, through 1934, when Lázaro Cárdenas initiated a short period o f rapid land distribution. I emphasize that the bonapartist petty bourgeoisie suppressed peasant attempts to regain usurped lands and created a c u m b e r s o m e b u r e a u cratic process for land grants whose purpose was to prevent land distribution rather than facilitate it. As the post-Porfirian r e g i m e began to coalesce after Carranza's death, it discovered the political utility o f a peasantry made loyal by m o r e g e n e r o u s l a n d grants, but the prog r e s s i o n o f t h e r e f o r m was e r r a t i c , a f f e c t e d by d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l struggles as well as by imperialist opposition. It was n o t until the presidency o f Cárdenas, with international class struggle on the increase a n d the United States temporarily distracted by e c o n o m i c depression and plans for war, that populist elements o f the M e x i c a n regime were able to gain ascendancy and c o n d u c t a b r i e f but massive distribution o f land. Part 2 is devoted entirely to the period 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 4 0 , the C á r d e n a s years. F o r the next half century, much o f the left saw c a r d e n i s m o as p r o o f o f the Mexican regime's ability to c o m p l e t e an agrarian r e f o r m in favor o f the rural masses. I show why the cardenista reforms were in great m e a s u r e reversible and even illusory. In o r d e r to take o n even a tamed Colossus o f the North, the M e x i c a n regime had to s e e k the support o f the workers and peasants, tolerating an elevated level o f popular struggle. Neither the Mexican n o r the United States b o u r geoisie could permit this for long, and after 1 9 3 8 , the r e g i m e aband o n e d the peasantry and began a renewed c o o p e r a t i o n with t h e gove r n m e n t o f the United States. T h e results o f c a r d e n i s m o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t u n d e r capitalism, even a g o v e r n m e n t sympathetic to t h e peasantry c a n n o t fundamentally improve the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f those w h o till the soil.

INTRODUCTION

9

P a r t 3 surveys the years 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 4 6 , d u r i n g w h i c h c a r d e n i s m o wound down u n d e r Manuel Avila C a m a c h o . T h e s e were n o t years o f blatant c o u n t e r r e f o r m , as many writers have suggested. R a t h e r , t h e r e g i m e simply began to withdraw its financial a n d legal s u p p o r t o f land reform and used its resources for agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t proj e c t s and wartime collaboration with the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t . T h e edifice o f the land reform crumbled, revealing an u n s o u n d foundation. By 1946, when the new president, Miguel Alemán, d e c l a r e d a g r a r i a n r e f o r m a n t i t h e t i c a l to e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e c a r denista project was already in ruins. I c h o s e 1 9 4 6 as the e n d point for this study for several reasons. Alemán's right-wing, probusiness g o v e r n m e n t was unequivocal in its opposition to c o n t i n u e d land distribution and to g o v e r n m e n t support o f the land reform sector o f rural M e x i c o . T h e p o o r e r quality and r e d u c e d volume o f historical sources after 1 9 4 6 are partly a reflection o f this. T h e regime c o n t i n u e d to distribute land, but the time a n d struggle n e e d e d to receive a grant increased, the c h a n c e s o f success decreased, and land granted was of increasingly p o o r quality. In spite of occasional cases of peasant success, t h e r e were no new cardenistastyle e p i s o d e s . 1 3 T h u s , 1 9 4 6 , n o t 1 9 9 1 , m a r k e d t h e e n d o f t h e M e x i c a n agrarian reform. Salinas de G o r t a r i ' s r e c e n t m e a s u r e s a r e t h e logical c o n s e q u e n c e o f a b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s r o o t e d n o t in agrarian revolution, but in the defense o f capital.

Notes 1. See Proceso 783 (November 4, 1991: 13-15), 784 (November 11, 1991: 6 - 1 7 ) , 785 (November 18, 1991: 20-26), 786 (November 25, 1991: 6 - 1 7 ) ; Nexos 169 (January 1992: 45-53). 2. Haber (1989). 3. As a predominant mode of production, feudalism has been extinct for centuries, although the uneven development of capitalism on a world scale has determined the persistence or recurrence of precapitalist relations of production in many areas. A given system of large-scale, private agriculture may appear more or less "feudal" depending on local conditions. See McBride (1923: 1-2, 30, 118-119); Tannenbaum (1929: 125-126); Soboul ( 1 9 7 7 : I n t r o d u c t i o n ) ; Katz (1974, 1976a); Dobb ( 1 9 4 7 ) ; Duncan and Rutledge (1977); Kay (1980). 4. See, for example, the critique of latifundismo in Feder (1971). 5. Silva Herzog (1964). 6. For basic writings on bonapartism, see Marx (1968); Trotsky (1970; 1974: 326). For scholars of Mexican history who follow a similar schema, see Gilly (1971: 339-340; 1979: 48) and Aguilar Mora (1979: 127-134). 7. Trotsky (1974: 326). 8. Marx (1967:1: 713-733; 3: 614-639). 9. Lenin (1956: Chapters 2 - 4 ) .

10

INTRODUCTION

10. Trotsky (1969: 70-73, 127-129, 189-205, 276-281). 11. Marx (1967: 1: 722-723). 12. Marx a n d Engels (1977); Marx (1967: 1); Lenin (1972); Trotsky (1969); Trotsky (1977: 126-128), who emphasized that petty p r o d u c e r s , w h e t h e r farmers, peasants, or artisans a n d s h o p k e e p e r s , s h o u l d not be forcibly expropriated and collectivized, as under Stalin, but should decide at their own pace whether collectivization meets their needs. 13. Yates (1978: 1: 672-673); Reyes Osorio etal. (1974: 40-52).

PART 1

Agrarian Revolution, Agrarian Reform

1

Agrarian Revolution: The Peasant War

T h e a g r a r i a n q u e s t i o n — t h e battle for c o n t r o l of t h e l a n d , its a p p u r t e n a n c e s , a n d its p r o d u c t s — w a s a d r i v i n g f o r c e of t h e M e x i c a n Revolution. T h e i m p u l s e to regain c o m m u n i t y l a n d s lost d u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h century to t h e e x p a n d i n g g r e a t estates d r o v e t e n s of t h o u s a n d s of p e a s a n t s t o war a g a i n s t t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p of P o r f i r i o D i a z ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 1 0 ) , t h e Porfirian restorationists of t h e H u e r t a g o v e r n m e n t (1913-1914), and the anti-Porfirian bourgeoisie a n d petty bourgeoisie of t h e C a r r a n z a g o v e r n m e n t ( 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 0 ) . T h e refusal of any bourgeois faction to consider d e m a n d s for land distribution a n d social r e f o r m f u e l e d t h e war, c o m p e l l i n g t h e a r m i e s of t h e dispossessed p e a s a n t r y to t r a n s c e n d t h e i r local a n d r e g i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s . F o r a b r i e f t i m e ( 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 5 ) , t h e c o m b i n e d p e a s a n t f o r c e s of E m i l i a n o Z a p a t a a n d P a n c h o Villa c o n t r o l l e d m o s t of M e x i c o a n d o c c u p i e d Mexico City. 1 T h e p e a s a n t war did n o t develop s u d d e n l y or even u n e x p e c t e d l y . Its origins lay in t h e Spanish C o n q u e s t of Mexico in t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n tury. T h e basic u n i t of social a n d e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a m o n g t h e Aztecs a n d m a n y o t h e r M e s o a m e r i c a n p e o p l e s was t h e l a n d h o l d i n g c o m m u n i t y , k n o w n to t h e Aztecs as t h e calpulli. T h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s h a d lost m a n y of t h e i r e a r l i e r k i n s h i p - c o m m u n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s by t h e t i m e of t h e c o n q u e s t ; social d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n was t a k i n g place, l a n d was b e c o m i n g t r a n s f e r a b l e , a n d s u r p l u s a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n was h a n d e d over to r u l i n g g r o u p s instead of b e i n g e m p l o y e d f o r p u r p o s e s i n t e r n a l to t h e c o m m u n i t y . 2 D e s p i t e these c h a n g e s , the i n d i g e n o u s l a n d h o l d i n g villages w e r e f a r f r o m d e f u n c t by t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n d c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n m a d e c e r t a i n a t t e m p t s t o p r o t e c t t h e m as s o u r c e s of t r i b u t e a n d l a b o r . Pueblos in s o m e areas were able to m a k e use of t h e s e provisions to stave off t h e loss of t h e i r l a n d f o r m u c h of t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d . H o w e v e r , as a g r i c u l t u r e a n d m i n i n g d e v e l o p e d — a n d as M e x i c o ' s 13

14

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM

i n d i g e n o u s population rapidly d e c l i n e d — t h e Spanish began to a p p r o p r i a t e l a n d b e l o n g i n g to t h e I n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e rate of Spanish u s u r p a t i o n of I n d i a n l a n d varied inversely with d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e capital o r o t h e r i m p o r t a n t c e n t e r s ; it i n c r e a s e d w i t h t h e likelih o o d of profits f o r t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r s . 3 With i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m Spain, t h e slight p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d by the Spanish monarchy disappeared. The "Indian Republics" were now c o n s i d e r e d "a s h a m e f u l relic of t h e old colonial r e g i m e , " econ o m i c a l l y b a c k w a r d a n d i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e d e m a n d s of m o d e r n society. 4 Both t h e Conservatives a n d t h e Liberals d e f e n d e d l a n d l o r d interests against p e a s a n t attacks d u r i n g t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e s t r u g g l e . 5 By t h e late 1820s, twelve states h a d p r o m u l g a t e d a n t i c o m m u n a l legisl a t i o n of s o m e k i n d , m a n d a t i n g t h e division a n d s a l e of c o m m o n c r o p l a n d (terrenos de común repartimiento) a n d l a n d d e d i c a t e d to t h e s u p p o r t of t h e village g o v e r n m e n t {propios). O f t e n , v i l l a g e s w e r e allowed to k e e p t h e i r ejidos, d e f i n e d by t h e S p a n i a r d s early in t h e colonial p e r i o d as a c o m m o n g r o u n d f o r I n d i a n livestock. H o w e v e r , in several cases, state legislation r e q u i r e d t h e division of all c o m m u nal l a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e fundo legal, t h e very site u p o n w h i c h village b u i l d i n g s , c h u r c h , a n d dwellings were built. S u c h m e a s u r e s clearly i n t e n d e d to e x t i r p a t e t h e p u e b l o s completely. In J u n e 1856, t h e Liberal g o v e r n m e n t of Ignacio C o m o n f o r t p r o m u l g a t e d t h e Ley L e r d o , w h i c h r e q u i r e d t h a t all l a n d h e l d by relig i o u s a n d civil c o r p o r a t i o n s b e divided a n d sold. T h e Liberals h o p e d to c r e a t e a large m i d d l e class of progressive small l a n d o w n e r s , d o i n g away with t h e h u g e h o l d i n g s of t h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h as well as t h e c o m m u n a l h o l d i n g s of t h e villages. T h e only e x c e p t i o n s w e r e c o n t a i n e d in A r t i c l e 8, w h i c h a l l o w e d local g o v e r n m e n t s to c o n s e r v e "buildings, ejidos, a n d lands d e s t i n e d exclusively f o r t h e p u b l i c service of t h e towns to which they b e l o n g . " Regulatory legislation m a d e c l e a r that c o m m u n i t y c r o p l a n d was e x p e c t e d to e n t e r t h e r e g i m e n of private p r o p e r t y . 6 A b e t t e d by the Liberals' a n t i c o m m u n a l legislation, t h e e x p a n s i o n of large-scale c o m m e r c i a l a g r i c u l t u r e led to w i d e s p r e a d o f f e n s i v e s against p e a s a n t resources. This was a c c o m p a n i e d by a c h a n g e in t h e characteristics of rural protest. D u r i n g t h e colonial era, village uprisings were caused m o r e o f t e n by disputes over taxes, ecclesiastical fees, a n d official abuses t h a n by struggles over l a n d , a n d p r o t e s t s t e n d e d to b e small a n d isolated. By contrast, a f t e r 1819, m o s t r u r a l r e b e l l i o n s involved conflicts over l a n d , a n d a f t e r 1840 t h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e in large uprisings a n d o n g o i n g r e g i o n a l a n d caste wars. T h e a l i e n a t i o n of l a n d a n d r e s o u r c e s was a d e t e r m i n a n t of i m p o r t a n t p e a s a n t rebellions in s o u t h w e s t e r n Mexico ( 1 8 3 2 - 1 8 3 4 , 1 8 4 2 - 1 8 4 5 ) ; t h e I s t h m u s of T e h u a n t e p e c ( 1 8 4 5 - 1 8 5 3 ) ; a n d in c e n t r a l a n d s o u t h -

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION: THE PEASANT WAR

15

ern Mexico (1849, 1856-1858; 1868-1872). Resistance to land usurpat i o n was a l s o a key f a c t o r in t h e war o f t h e Maya o f Y u c a t á n ( 1 8 4 7 - 1 9 0 4 ) a n d the r e b e l l i o n of t h e Yaqui a n d Mayo tribes in Sonora, which began in 1825 and was not suppressed until well after the turn of the century. 7 During the era of Porfirio Díaz ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 1 0 ) , the appropriation of village lands was carried out o n a grand scale. T e n d e n c i e s first perceived during the Reform era or earlier—the push for foreign immigration i n s t e a d of d o m e s t i c r e f o r m , t h e i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e disent a i l m e n t o f c o m m u n a l l a n d , a n d t h e b r u t a l r e p r e s s i o n o f any protest—were carried to their extreme conclusions u n d e r Diaz. T h e construction of a national system of railroads brought more foreign capital to Mexico and increased land values along projected routes, setting off speculation in real estate by the rich and protest by the poor. In an effort to encourage agricultural colonization and bring untitled lands under the national d o m a i n or private control, Diaz passed laws providing for the survey and transfer of public lands. T h e ultimate beneficiaries were foreign speculators, as well as various of the president's associates, who received "almost gratuitously" millions of hectares of newly surveyed land. 8 Porfirian legislation of 1883 created surveying c o m p a n i e s that were paid for their services in untitled and national lands. By 1889 they had surveyed 38 million hectares—a third of the national territory—and received as compensation 12.7 million hectares. T h e regime also sold to the surveying companies, at extremely low rates, m o r e than 14 million hectares of land. T h e 1883 law, as well as legislation p r o m u l g a t e d in 1893 and 1894, p r o v i d e d a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r offensives against c o m m u n i t y lands and facilitated the acquisition and regularization of property titles for the wealthy. T h e result was a massive expropriation of community lands, a monopolization of public lands, and an extreme concentration of land ownership. By 1910, 54 percent of the national territory was controlled by latifundia, 20 percent by small agriculturists and ranchers, and six percent by peasant communities; the remainder was classified either as national or unimproved land. An estimated 95 percent of all heads of rural families lacked land of their own. 9 T h e depredation of peasant resources e n c o u r a g e d by the Diaz g o v e r n m e n t led to rebellions e n c o m p a s s i n g m u c h of northern and central Mexico; the army suppressed them by 1883. Scattered village revolts after this time were easily put down. J o h n Hart has described the 1880s as "a dark period of land seizures, loss of tenancy a n d water rights, . . . migration, rurales, and armed discipline." 1 0 T h o s e w h o kept fighting, like the Yaquis, were rewarded with a policy of slavery a n d g e n o c i d e . 1 1 By 1890, however, t h e r e was a revival o f p r o t e s t

16

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM

involving many of the villages and leaders who would become prominent in the Revolution. 12 Both the Porfirians and their bourgeois opponents realized the importance of the agrarian question. During the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, there was an increased awareness that the extreme concentration of land ownership was causing social misery and economic inefficiency and could result in a massive social explosion. 13 The best-known and most influential of the commentators on the problems of rural Mexico were Wistano Luis Orozco, who wrote Legislación y jurisprudencia sobre terrenos baldíos (1895), and Andrés Molina Enríquez, a u t h o r of Los grandes problemas nacionales (1909). Both blamed the great hacienda f o r M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m i c a n d social p r o b l e m s ; t h e i r c r i t i q u e s of Porfirian society emphasized that large property u n d e r the sway of "rural feudalism" was economically backward and kept the people in misery. For Orozco, the dispossession of the peasantry was an unmitigated evil; there was no way forward for the rural proletariat; the only answer was to return to an idealized, fictional past of prosperous, i n d e p e n d e n t producers. In Molina's opinion, the extensive cultivation techniques, monopoly over the land, and coercive labor practices of the hacienda kept grain production low, impeded the free movement of agricultural labor, and degraded the rural work force. Furthermore, the miserable conditions of agricultural laborers forced them to migrate to the cities in search of better salaries, creating a pool of excess industrial laborers with a consequent reduction in wages and increasing labor militancy. For both Orozco and Molina, small property was the answer to Mexico's problems; the more equal distribution of land would confer social benefits and lead to agricultural development. Both men advocated reforms that would break up the latifundia into smaller holdings and create a rural middle class of prosperous, politically stable smallholders. 14 In spite of these warnings, the regime took no concrete action. There was much talk, and in 1910 a census of rural holdings was proposed. 1 5 But haggling over the price of social peace could not prevent the coming storm. The political revolt led by Coahuila landowner and businessman Francisco I. M a d e r o b e g i n n i n g in N o v e m b e r 1910 sparked a revolution not easily contained by the bourgeoisie; the radical peasantry, ultimately defeated, played a critical role in the formation of the post-Porfirian order. 1 6 By the time of the Madero revolt, most rural dwellers had lost access to lands and resources they had claimed as theirs for generations if not centuries. Peasants and members of indigenous communities had become landless workers. Nevertheless, their traditional ties to the land gained full expression in the radical politics of the revolu-

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION: THE PEASANT WAR

17

tionary p e r i o d . T o t h e n o r t h a n d west of t h e Valley of M e x i c o , t h e h e i r s of m i l i t a r y c o l o n i s t s a n d m e s t i z o t e n a n t f a r m e r s c o n s i d e r e d themselves a u t o n o m o u s peasants, n o t workers. In c e n t r a l a n d s o u t h e r n Mexico, t h e p u e b l o s t r u c t u r e , even w i t h o u t its lands, f r e q u e n d y r e m a i n e d viable a n d o f t e n f o r m e d t h e n u c l e u s of p r o t e s t s . V a r i o u s f o r m s of p r e c a p i t a l i s t a n d coercive l a b o r r e l a t i o n s — s h a r e c r o p p i n g , l a b o r r e n t , p e r s o n a l service, e v e n d e b t p e o n a g e a n d s l a v e r y — k e p t m u c h of t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n t i e d to b a c k w a r d p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s a n d social traditions. A l o n g with t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e p e t t y b o u r g e o i s a n d anarchist u r b a n l a b o r m o v e m e n t of t h e time, this gave t h e protests of landless l a b o r e r s a decidedly a g r a r i a n cast. T h u s , r u r a l strikers a n d p r o t e s t e r s did not d e m a n d to be g r a n t e d h i g h e r salaries, b e t t e r h o u s i n g , o r safer w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , b u t to r e g a i n lost c o m m u n i t y l a n d s o r to receive t h e i r own parcels of l a n d . 1 7 T h e political inclinations a n d limitations of t h e radical p e a s a n t r y were e v i d e n t in t h e two most i m p o r t a n t a g r a r i a n m o v e m e n t s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d , l e d by E m i l i a n o Z a p a t a a n d P a n c h o V i l l a . Zapatismo a n d villismo h a d s t r i k i n g political a n d social d i f f e r e n c e s ; u l t i m a t e l y , t h e s e w e r e n o t as s i g n i f i c a n t as t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s . B o t h m o v e m e n t s r e s p o n d e d to t h e crisis of P o r f i r i a n M e x i c o — a n d to t h e crisis of all p e a s a n t s u n d e r c a p i t a l i s m — a c c o r d i n g to t h e d i c t a t e s of t h e i r r e g i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s . F o r c e d by t h e i n t r a n s i g e n c e of n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s a n d e n c o u r a g e d by radical petty b o u r g e o i s l e a d e r s h i p , b o t h t r a n s c e n d e d local b o u n d a r i e s to b e c o m e w i d e s p r e a d r e g i o n a l m o v e m e n t s . N e i t h e r was able to p r o p o s e an alternative to b o u r g e o i s r u l e or, f o r that matter, to a radical b o u r g e o i s a g r a r i a n p r o g r a m . In this i n t r i n s i c w e a k n e s s lay t h e g e r m of t h e i r d e f e a t , f o r t h e b o u r g e o i s i e — a n d t h e U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t — h a d a b r o a d e r vision; t h e Russian Revolution, which would p r o v i d e a new m o d e l f o r workers a r o u n d t h e world, was still several years away. 1 8 Z a p a t a ' s L i b e r a t i n g Army of t h e S o u t h , which by M a r c h 1912 c o n trolled n o t only Morelos b u t most of s o u t h e r n M e x i c o , 1 9 c o n s i s t e d of a p e a s a n t r y with d e e p - r o o t e d t r a d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i t y l a n d h o l d i n g a n d self-government. Many villages jealously c o n s e r v e d colonial d e e d s p r o v i n g t h e i r centuries-old claim to t h e l a n d they lived o n a n d cultivated. H a c i e n d a enclosures of village l a n d s h a d i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g t h e l a t e 1880s as technologically m o d e r n s u g a r p l a n t a t i o n s g r a b b e d f o r m o r e l a n d a n d m o r e workers. As l a n d u s u r p a t i o n i n t e n s i f i e d , so d i d village resistance. In 1911, the Zapatistas p u b l i s h e d t h e P l a n d e Ayala, a c o g e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e most radical p e a s a n t v i e w p o i n t o n t h e u r g e n t political a n d social questions of t h e day. T h e p l a n d e m a n d e d t h e r e s i g n a t i o n of M a d e r o , w h o m t h e Zapatistas c o n s i d e r e d " i n e p t at realizing t h e p r o m i s e s of t h e revolution . . . i n c a p a b l e of g o v e r n i n g , b e c a u s e h e has n o respect for t h e law a n d j u s t i c e of t h e p u e b l o s , a n d

18

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM

a traitor to t h e f a t h e r l a n d , because h e is h u m i l i a t i n g in b l o o d a n d fire M e x i c a n s w h o w a n t liberties, so as to please t h e científicos, l a n d l o r d s , a n d bosses w h o enslave us." 2 0 P u e b l o s o r i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h titles t o l a n d s t h a t h a d b e e n u s u r p e d by " l a n d l o r d s , c i e n t í f i c o s , o r bosses" w o u l d "immediately enter into possession" of those lands "maintaini n g at any cost with a r m s in h a n d t h e m e n t i o n e d p o s s e s s i o n . " T h e b u r d e n of p r o o f f o r the rectification of any mistakes t h a t m i g h t result f r o m t h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e s t r u c t u r i n g of l a n d t e n u r e lay o n t h e u s u r p e r s . 2 1 T h e Zapatistas r e f u s e d to r e c o g n i z e t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of M a d e r o , H u e r t a , o r C a r r a n z a , a n d as t h e i r m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s inc r e a s e d , they were able to e x p r o p r i a t e t h e h o l d i n g s of t h e M o r e l o s l a n d l o r d s a n d capitalists a n d set u p a rural d e m o c r a c y . T h e y r e t u r n e d all lands to t h e villages a n d ran t h e sugar mills f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e c o m m u n i t y . 2 2 T h e p r o u d i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y intransig e n c e of t h e Zapatistas a t t r a c t e d many left-wing intellectuals; several of t h e m j o i n e d t h e mostly p e a s a n t Zapatista l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e f a i t h f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e aspirations of t h e Zapatista p e a s a n t r y , r e p l e t e with political c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , in t h e written d o c u m e n t s of zapatismo. 2 3 V i l l a ' s N o r t h e r n D i v i s i o n , w h i c h by 1 9 1 5 c o n t r o l l e d m o s t of n o r t h e r n a n d c e n t r a l Mexico, 2 4 l a c k e d t h e social c o h e s i o n , s t r o n g c o m m u n i t y traditions, a n d radical l e a d e r s h i p of t h e Zapatistas. T h e rural n o r t h e r n e r was less apt t h a n t h e s o u t h e r n p e a s a n t to b e tied to a n y s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n o r t r a d e ; h e m i g h t m a k e a living in v a r i o u s l o c a l e s as a n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r e r , a r t i s a n , p e t t y t r a d e r , o r c a t t l e rustler. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t the n o r t h e r n e r s h a d a c o m m o n a g r a r i a n aspiration, it was e x e m p l i f i e d by t h e military colonists, w h o h a d originally received l a n d f r o m t h e viceregal g o v e r n m e n t s in e x c h a n g e f o r d e f e n d i n g t h e m i n i n g zones f r o m attacks by n o m a d i c I n d i a n s . T h e s e c o l o n i e s h a d s u f f e r e d t h e e n c r o a c h m e n t of h a c i e n d a s a n d i n c r e a s e d g o v e r n m e n t taxation d u r i n g the Porfirian era a n d were a m o n g the first to s u p p o r t M a d e r o . Villa himself told j o u r n a l i s t J o h n R e e d t h a t his d r e a m was a system of agricultural-military colonies, w h e r e capital f o r agricultural p r o d u c t i o n a n d small m a n u f a c t u r i n g e n t e r p r i s e w o u l d b e p r o v i d e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t . Half t h e week w o u l d b e devote d to a g r i c u l t u r e a n d artisanry; t h e o t h e r half w o u l d b e s p e n t in military training, so that the colonists would b e p r e p a r e d to d e f e n d against p o t e n t i a l f o r e i g n invaders. 2 5 U n l i k e t h e Zapatistas, t h e villistas did n o t have leftist l e a d e r s o r s p o k e s p e r s o n s . Significantly, t h e C h i h u a h u a b u r e a u c r a t s w h o gove r n e d villista territory were o p p o s e d to t h e i d e a of agricultural-military colonies. T h e y were afraid of State c o m p e t i t i o n with private agric u l t u r e ; p e r h a p s m o r e i m p o r t a n t , they feared t h a t t h e e s p r i t d e c o r p s a n d a n t i b o u r g e o i s t e n d e n c i e s of the N o r t h e r n Division m i g h t b e p r e -

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION: THE PEASANT WAR

19

served in s u c h colonies, m a k i n g t h e soldiers u n r e l i a b l e to t h e b o u r geoisie in a civil war. 2 6 W h e r e a s t h e Plan d e Ayala was written by a rural intellectual in c o n s u l t a t i o n with rebel chiefs, most of t h e m a g r i c u l t u r a l laborers, t h e a g r a r i a n legislation of villismo was p r o d u c e d by a g r o u p of officials a n d p e t t y b o u r g e o i s advisers w h o a d m i n i s t e r e d n o r t h e r n M e x i c o while t h e N o r t h e r n Division was o n c a m p a i g n . T h e s e w e r e m e n w h o , given t h e i r social a n d political b a c k g r o u n d s , c o u l d easily have b e e n carrancistas. M a n u e l Bonilla, w h o a u t h o r e d m o s t of t h e C h i h u a h u a n a g r a r i a n r e f o r m legislation of t h e villista p e r i o d , was typical of t h e s e m e n ; t h e aspirations of the villista fighters were given short s h r i f t in his e x t r e m e l y conservative agrarian laws. In 1914, h e wrote: Would it be jusi for the Government to dispose for the benefit of one class what . . . belongs to everyone? . . . Nevertheless, it is said, the Revolution . . . has offered to give lands and this promise must be fulfilled. In the first place, the Revolution has offered no such thing. Perhaps some chief, who has not reflected sufficiently on the matter, may have gained adherents by promising to give them lands when the Revolution triumphs, and it would be just for him to be o b l i g e d to fulfill that promise with his own m o n e y . What the Revolution has offered . . . is to make amends for the injustices committed by the conservative regime; but [it shouldl not commit others, no matter what the pretext. 27

T h e r e was a t r e m e n d o u s gulf b e t w e e n B o n i l l a ' s i d e a of revolut i o n a n d t h a t of a n old peón living o n a n o r t h e r n h a c i e n d a . " T h e Revolución is g o o d . W h e n it is d o n e we shall starve never, never, if G o d is served," t h e p e o n told J o h n R e e d . 2 8 U n l i k e t h e Zapatistas, t h e villistas m a d e few social c h a n g e s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of t h e i r g r e a t e s t military s u c c e s s e s . 2 9 T h i s was n o t , as o r t h o d o x versions of the revolution o f t e n c o n t e n d e d , b e c a u s e Villa o r villismo w e r e i n h e r e n t l y reactionary. 3 0 R a t h e r , t h e conservative leade r s h i p a n d t h e lack of social c h a n g e s flowed f r o m villismo's inability, as a p e a s a n t m o v e m e n t , to t r a n s c e n d t h e b o u n d s of a radical b o u r geois p r o g r a m : t h e m o r e equal distribution of t h e l a n d a n d its a p p u r t e n a n c e s . If t h a t distribution was n o t i m m e d i a t e , it h a d less to d o with t h e i m p u l s e s of villismo t h a n with t h e e x t r e m e l y m o b i l e n a t u r e of its a r m y a n d its w a r . T h i s is s h o w n i n a 1 9 1 5 l e t t e r f r o m V i l l a t o C h i h u a h u a g o v e r n o r Fidel Avila: "With r e g a r d to t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of lands, I h e r e b y i n f o r m you t h a t since t h e soldiers a n d m e m b e r s of t h e army c a n n o t be p r e s e n t to m a k e t h e i r r e q u e s t s , p l e a s e b e so g o o d as to reserve f o r t h e m all t h e T e r r a z a s [family] h a c i e n d a s a n d distribute t h e rest." 3 1 Likewise, t h e Zapatistas, f o r all t h e i r revolutionary distrust of t h e

20

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM

successive national representatives of the bourgeoisie, envisioned a society where small land ownership (or individual usufruct by members of a peasant village) was the norm; this was to be accomplished by the expropriation of the holdings of the monopolists. Peasant landholdings would be d e f e n d e d "arms in hand," b u t the nation would not be governed by a workers' or peasants' regime; the peasantry would retire to its lands, ready to rise up if the "cultured people" in high office made any false moves. 32 The result was defeat for the peasant armies and death for their leaders. Zapata and Villa converged on Mexico City in D e c e m b e r 1914. The Porfirian State had been smashed; Carranza was in retreat; but the bourgeoisie was intact and soon renewed the offensive. In the spring of 1915, General Alvaro Obregon's army broke the Northern Division at Celaya and Aguascalientes. Zapata was assassinated in a carrancista a m b u s h in 1919; Felipe Angeles, one of Villa's most important advisers, was captured and executed by carrancista forces later the same year. Landlords began to return to their estates; the agrarian democracy in Morelos was dismantled as a reign of terror was conducted by carrancista officers. In 1920, after Carranza was assassinated by his personal guard and the radical petty bourgeoisie took power under the leadership of Obregon, new, more malleable p e a s a n t l e a d e r s n e g o t i a t e d the d i s a r m a m e n t of t h e i r f o r c e s in exchange for their incorporation into the federal army. There, old unconditional Zapatista fighters stood side by side with the carrancista officers who had ordered Zapata's murder and crushed the revolution in Morelos. 33 However, this was not an unconditional surrender. Carranza had been forced by the peasant war to promulgate agrarian legislation, which he completely opposed. His Decree of January 6, 1915 proposed the "restitution" of village lands, now known generically as ejidos, which had been illegally taken from the peasant communities in violation of Liberal and Porfirian land laws. It also allowed for land grants to villages whose resources had been legally transferred u n d e r those same laws and to those lacking legal titles to the land they claimed. The Constitution of 1917 mandated the continuation of the D e c r e e of J a n u a r y 6, 1915 as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. 3 4 O b r e g o n , Carranza's successor, knew that the pacification of the country and the consolidation of a new regime depended upon his government's ability to implement an officially controlled land reform that would create just enough change to discourage new rebellions. What follows is an analysis of that official reform beginning in January 1915, when Carranza was forced to react to the social and agrarian programs of his opponents with legislation of his own as part of his offensive to win national power.

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION: THE PEASANT WAR

21

Notes 1. Gilly's attempt at a Marxist interpretation of this period is thought provoking and important (1971). Knight (1986), an anti-Marxist approach, brings to light a great deal of fascinating research. 2. See Gibson (1964) and Florescano (1976) for information on preconquest Mexican civilization and the changes that occurred after the conquest. 3. See Altman ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; Bakewell ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; Bazant ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Chevalier ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Fabila (1941); Florescano (1976); Gibson ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Harris ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Lockhart (1969, 1976); Taylor (1972, 1976, 1979); Tutino (1976); and Wood (1984) for studies of land, labor, and Spanish legislation during the colonial period. 4. Cardoso (1980: 98); González y González (1956: 1 6 2 - 1 6 3 ) ; Powell (1973); Semo (1977). 5. Hart (1987: 29-33). 6. See Fraser (1972) and Fabila (1941: 103-107, 109-115, 118-119) for the Liberal laws on disentailment. For various interpretations, see Fraser (1972); McBride (1923); Powell (1973). For the various types of village land classified according to colonial usage—classifications still often in use in the nineteenth century—see Fraser (1972: 631) and Zaragoza and Macias (1980: 94). 7. Coatsworth (1988); González y González (1956: 163-164, 230-239, 280-285, 290-291); Hart (1972: 131-140); Hart (1987: 3 4 - 4 0 ) ; Meyer (1973: 8, 11, 14, 16, 20). 8. Coatsworth (1974: 50-51, 63, 65); Bulnes (1916: 7 8 - 8 0 ) . 9. Luna Arroyo and Alcerreca (1982: 52); Cardoso (1980: 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 - 3 2 5 ) ; Fabila ( 1 9 4 1 : 1 8 3 - 2 0 5 ) ; González Navarro ( 1 9 5 7 : 1 8 8 - 1 9 2 , 196-197, 223, 249-255); McBride (1923: 73, 125, 154); Tannenbaum (1929: 6 2 - 6 3 ) . For an idea of the complexity of property entidement, see Molina Enriquez (1978: 200-215), who enumerates the diverse origins of different types of "legitimate" property. 10. Hart (1987: 43). 11. Coatsworth (1974: 59, 63, 6 7 - 6 9 ) ; Gilly (1971: 1 2 - 1 4 ) ; González Navarro (1957: 206-208, 242-246, 249-259, 258, 263); Hart (1972: 132-140, 144, 146-147); Meyer (1973: 20-21, 2 3 - 2 4 ) ; Turner (1969). 12. Hart (1987: 4 4 - 5 1 ) . 13. G o n z á l e z Navarro ( 1 9 5 7 : 1 4 1 - 1 4 2 , 2 7 5 - 2 8 0 ) ; O r o z c o ( 1 9 7 5 : 172-173); Silva Herzog (1960-1962: 1: 7 - 1 3 ) . 14. See Cordova (1978); Hamon and Niblo (1975); Molina Enriquez (1978); Orozco (1974, 1975). 15. Silva Herzog (1960-1962: 1: 7 - 1 3 ) . 16. Hart (1987: 237-275). 17. Bartra ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; Basurto (1981: 5 7 - 8 6 ) ; González Navarro ( 1 9 5 7 : 2 0 6 - 2 0 9 , 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 344-380); Hart (1987: 4 0 - 5 1 ) ; Meyer (1973: 23); Turner (1969). On the existence of precapitalist labor systems and dues, see McBride (1923: 1-2, 30, 118-119), who makes explicit comparisons to European feudalism; Tannenbaum (1929: 125-126), whose brief description of the relationships between cropsharers, renters, and haciendas bears a striking resemblance to Soboul's (1977: Introduction) discussion of the hated feudal dues and taxes that subsisted in eighteenth-century France long after the legal demise of feudalism. For a discussion of regional variations in labor conditions on haciendas, see Katz (1974, 1976a).

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18. This analysis owes much to Gilly (1971). See also Hart (1987: 43-73, 187-234); Basurto (1981: 153-183). 19. Gilly (1971: 67-68); Ulloa (1979a: 13). 20. T h e científicos were influential in the latter half of Diaz's rule (from about 1892 to 1911). They advocated "order and progress," basing their theories of government on positivism and social Darwinism. See Cockroft (1983: 87-88); Knight (1986: 1: 21-25). 21. Womack (1970: 400-404). 22. See Gilly (1971); Womack (1970). 23. Gilly (1971); López González (1980); Ulloa (1979a: 9); Womack (1970), especially pages 393-404. 24. Katz (1979: 35-37); Reed (1969: 144); Ulloa (1979a: 7-9). 25. Reed (1969: 145-146). 26. Gilly (1971: 90-91, 319-325); Katz (1976b: 272; 1979: 29-32, 35-37); Ulloa (1979a: 7-9); Gómez (1966: 210-216). 27. Gómez (1966: 174-182). Others in Villa's cabinet who may have collaborated on the villista legislation were Miguel Díaz Lombardo, Francisco Escudero, and Manuel Garza Cárdenas. For background on all but Garza, see Diccionario Porrúa (1965); Katz (1976b: 271); and Gómez (1966: 125). For the texts of many of the northern agrarian laws during the villista period, see Gómez (1966). 28. Reed (1969: 19). 29. Katz (1976b). 30. See Carranza's "Manifiesto a la Nación" of J u n e 11, 1915, a n d his Decree of December 12, 1914, in Fabila (1941: 254-259, 275-279) for the carrancista version of the struggles of 1910-1915 and Pancho Villa's status as a "reactionary"; see Gómez (1966: 44, 123-124) and Ulloa (1979b: 206-215) for modern versions of the old carrancista argument. 31. Katz (1976b: 272). 32. Womack (1970: 402); Gilly (1971: 141-147). 33. Gilly (1971: 139-347); Womack (1970: 252-330). 34. See Bolaños (1925: 136-143) for the full text of t h e D e c r e e of January 6, 1915; see Rouaix (1959: 217-222) for the original text of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. Simpson (1937: 749-755) has an English translation of a later, modified version.

2

Carranza: Bourgeois Entrenchment

The hacendados have legally sanctioned rights; it is not possible to take away their property and give it to those who do not have the right. . . . This land redistribution business is absurd. Tell me which haciendas you own and are able to redistribute, so that each of you can redistribute what belongs to you and not to someone else. —Venustiano Carranza 1 By t h e fall o f 1911, when the Zapatistas' Plan de Ayala was published, the anti-Porfirian bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie b e g a n to u n d e r stand that the peasant war d e m a n d e d a serious response. T h e e j i d o was their answer. It would b e a r little r e s e m b l a n c e to the p u e b l o lands d e f e n d e d by villagers, a n c i e n t titles in o n e h a n d , w e a p o n s in t h e o t h e r , t h r o u g h o u t the n i n e t e e n t h century. T o t h e i n s u r g e n t peasantry, the villages' ejidos were the lands they had always c o n t r o l l e d and cultivated, that is, the entire c o m p l e x o f p u e b l o lands known during t h e colonial period and into the n i n e t e e n t h century as t e r r e n o s de c o m ú n r e p a r t i m i e n t o , propios, f u n d o legal, a n d e j i d o . I n c r e a s ingly after 1856, this c o m p l e x o f lands had b e c o m e known simply as ejidos. T h e change in terminology may have resulted in part f r o m t h e language o f Article 8 o f the Ley L e r d o o f J u n e 1856. If, as specified t h e r e i n , ejidos were e x e m p t from disentailment, it may have b e e n to the pueblos' advantage to argue that all lands still c o n t r o l l e d by t h e m were e j i d o s . 2 It was to r e c o v e r these ejidos, t h e s u s t e n a n c e o f t h e pueblos for centuries, that the peasantry fought. However, the majority o f pueblos would never regain their f o r m e r lands. T h e maderistas, t h e carrancistas, and their successors could n o t recognize t h e peasants' claims. T o do so would call into question the validity o f many a landlord's seemingly legal titles and, ultimately, the validity o f all private property, a danger illustrated by zapatismo's expropriation o f t h e

23

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AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM

sugar mills as well as the land supplying t h e m . 3 Thus, t h e postPorfirian ejido was much less the creation of the peasantry than it was an invention of the new regime. T h e social and military significance of the ejido f o r the antiPorfirian bourgeoisie was given early expression by Luis Cabrera, the law partner of Andrés Molina Enriquez and a prominent spokesman for many of Molina's ideas. In 1912, when the future of the Madero government was doubtful and interest in the agrarian question was at a high owing to the proximity of Zapata's war in Morelos, Cabrera presented an initiative to the legislature entitled "The Reconstitution of the Ejidos of the Pueblos as a Means of Suppressing the Slavery of the Mexican Agricultural Worker." Cabrera wholeheartedly seconded the legislators who spoke of the need to develop small private property but stressed the more immediate difficulty posed by the pressure of the haciendas on the pueblos. The disaster created by the antipueblo policies of the Reform and Porfirian eras was now coming home to roost in the form of zapatismo: The rural population needs to complement its salary, if it had ejidos, during half the year it would be employed as day laborers, and during the other half it would apply its energies to harvesting [the ejidos] on its own account. Not having them, it is obliged to live six months from its wages, and the other six months it takes up the rifle and is Zapatista. . . . As long as it is not possible to create a system of small [private] agriculture to replace the large properties of the latifundios, the agrarian problem should be resolved by employing the ejidos as a means of complementing the salary of the day laborer. 4

The solution was the "reconstitution" of the ejidos, and there was no choice but to take the necessary lands from large properties bordering the villages. This could be done by purchase, obligatory sharecropping, or expropriation for reasons of public utility with indemnification, but it must be d o n e soon, lest the peasant revolution go beyond what was acceptable to the maderistas. And since respect for private property was paramount, the return of the villages' former lands would involve unacceptable delay. Cabrera wrote: No, señores; the ejidos are in the hacendado's hands in 10% of the cases illegally; but in 90% of the cases they are protected by a seemingly legitimate title that we cannot ignore. . . . The proletarian classes cannot wait for judicial procedures . . . we should close our eyes in the face of necessity . . . and resolve to try to have the necessary land. . . . There must be land to cultivate by the end of the next harvest.5

Cabrera emphasized the military urgency of his proposal, noting that

CARRANZA: BOURGEOIS ENTRENCHMENT

25

the mere announcement that the government is going to proceed to the study of the reconstitution of the ejidos, will result in the concentration of people in the villages, and it will facilitate, therefore, the military domination of the region. 6

Cabrera's definition of the ejido is significant both for its clarity a n d because Cabrera was to b e c o m e a p r o m i n e n t a u t h o r of carrancista agrarian policy. First and foremost, the ejido was needed for military pacification. Although this tactic was not effective in Morelos until after the military subjugation of zapatismo, it became efficacious in winning converts to carrancismo in o t h e r areas of the country. Second, neither private property nor, indeed, the haciendas themselves would disappear. Cabrera claimed to be in favor of small property, but the destruction of the large estates was not proposed in his initiative except insofar as they might be partially affected to grant ejidal lands. Third, the ejido was not intended to provide a comfortable life for the peasant; Cabrera clearly stated that it would produce a complement to the day wage. Implicit was the understanding that the hacendados were paying wages that did not meet their laborers' costs of subsistence. The initiative assumed that these jornaleros would continue to work for the landlords and would continue to receive wages that did not meet their needs. The ejido would make up the difference; it would provide seasonal employment and food, thus obviating the n e e d for rebellion or labor militancy. It would also f r e e the hacendados from having to raise wages and thus diminish their own returns. Finally, the ejido would slow the process of proletarianization that always accompanies the concentration of landholding and the accumulation of capital in agriculture, for ejidal lands would be inalienable. The State would thus be given a respite from the problems caused by a growing pool of migratory, landless laborers—problems so clearly outlined by Molina Enriquez in Los grandes problemas nacionales. Cabrera's ideas were not immediately put to use; the Madero gove r n m e n t fell to General Victoriano Huerta, and the nation o n c e again took up arms against the Porfirians. Venustiano Carranza, who claimed leadership of a united anti-Huerta movement, soon alienated not only the peasant armies of Zapata and Villa but even the left wing of his own movement by his opposition to social reform. Years later, Marte R. Gomez, a prominent member of the post-Porfirian regime, p e n n e d the following euphemistic description of Carranza's proclivities: To the impetuous young men who urged him to incorporate clauses of social importance in the Plan de Guadalupe [1913], Carranza explained t h a t . . . it was urgent for the nation to rise up as a single

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man against the dictatorship; that once Huerta was defeated, there would be time to think of new forms of government. . . . He maintained the same attitude when he sent special emissaries to put to death in their cradle the agrarian grants begun by General Lucio Blanco at Rancho Los Borregos, near Matamoros, Tamaulipas, in August 1913. It is almost certain that Carranza was also the one who convinced Ing. Pastor Rouaix . . . to leave his agrarian reform plans . . . locked away in his governor's desk in Durango [in 1913], 7 In N o v e m b e r 1914, as Zapata a n d Villa c o n v e r g e d o n M e x i c o City, General O b r e g o n a n d his troops evacuated the capital a n d followed a politically weak Carranza to Veracruz. General Lucio Blanco, left in c h a r g e of C a r r a n z a ' s forces in Mexico City, r e b e l l e d in t h e n a m e of the Convention of Aguascalientes a n d was soon followed by o t h e r Constitutionalist officials. By December, when Zapata a n d Villa o c c u p i e d t h e capital, C a r r a n z a f a c e d m o r e t h a n n i n e t y t h o u s a n d a r m e d o p p o n e n t s : forty t h o u s a n d villistas, twenty t h o u s a n d Zapatistas, a n d twenty to thirty t h o u s a n d troops answering to various chiefs w h o h a d a d h e r e d to the Convention. Those forces controlled c o m m u n i c a tions, railroads, access to t h e b o r d e r with t h e U n i t e d States, a n d Mexico City itself. 8 Moreover, i m p o r t a n t representatives of U n i t e d States capitalism and, increasingly after 1916-1917, the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t itself 9 o p p o s e d his faction. Clearly, if Carranza were to avoid defeat, he must p r e p a r e not only a military but also a political a n d social counteroffensive. T h e Plan d e Ayala a n d even the conservative villista a g r a r i a n initiatives h a d to b e a n s w e r e d . C a r r a n z a was f o r c e d to bow to t h e left wing of his m o v e m e n t by p r o m u l g a t i n g social reform legislation. Even so, the authors of the carrancista agrarian reform laws were n o t radicals like Francisco J. Mugica or Alvaro O b r e g o n ; they were c o n s e r v a t i v e e x - m e m b e r s of t h e t w e n t y - s i x t h L e g i s l a t u r e u n d e r Madero. 1 0 Luis Cabrera, a m e m b e r of this g r o u p , d r a f t e d the Decree of J a n u a r y 6, 1915, p r o m u l g a t e d in Veracruz. In 1917, with Carranza a n d O b r e g o n victorious over t h e i r o p p o n e n t s , it was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e new C o n s t i t u t i o n . Its basic p r i n c i p l e s f o r m e d t h e earliest legal f o u n d a t i o n of the land reform carried out by the post-Porfirian regime. 1 1 Like Cabrera's initiative to the C h a m b e r of Deputies in 1912, the D e c r e e of J a n u a r y 6, 1915 was an attempt to control the p e a s a n t war r a t h e r t h a n an e f f o r t to fulfill t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e r u r a l dispossessed. Its immediate p u r p o s e was to aid carrancista military officers in their counteroffensive against the peasant armies. It authorized the "superior military authorities operating in each area to carry out the indispensable expropriations a n d give sufficient lands to the pueblos t h a t lack t h e m . " C a r r a n c i s t a g e n e r a l s w e r e i n s t r u c t e d to post t h e

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27

d e c r e e in public places as they occupied new zones. T h i s p r a c t i c e was i n s t r u m e n t a l in g a i n i n g a d h e r e n t s to t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t c a u s e . A l o n g O b r e g ó n ' s route from Mexico City to Celaya, where h e defeate d V i l l a , h e o r g a n i z e d m e e t i n g s to p r o m i s e social r e f o r m s in t h e n a m e o f carrancismo. H e also granted provisional possessions o f "military ejidos" and established agrarian commissions. T h e p r e a m b l e o f the d e c r e e criticized the "powerful landlords" and "vested interests" who monopolized the n a t i o n ' s rural property to the detriment o f t h e pueblos, and implied that the villages would be given the right to reclaim through "restitution" the land that had o n c e b e e n theirs. However, the d e c r e e recognized t h e legitimacy o f p r o p e r t y legally t r a n s f e r r e d s i n c e 1 8 5 6 a n d r e q u i r e d p r o p e r titles showing pueblo ownership of lands claimed in restitution. T h u s , the l i k e l i h o o d was slight that villages would s u c c e e d in r e g a i n i n g t h e i r old lands; many transfers o f property f r o m peasants to landowners had b e e n made legally, and many pueblos lacked titles o r had claims that did not satisfy the requirements of m o d e r n bourgeois law. Most villages would t h e r e f o r e b e forced to a c c e p t the " r e c o n s t i t u t i o n " o f their ejidos: land grants requiring approval by the state and national land reform bureaucracies and not necessarily including f o r m e r p u e b l o lands. T h e victory o f agrarian grants over restitution would often mean that pueblos received land o f r e d u c e d quantity and quality c o m p a r e d with t h e l a n d t h e y c l a i m e d as t h e i r o w n . F i n a l l y , a l t h o u g h the f o r m a t i o n o f small private property was a part o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t p r o g r a m , the D e c r e e o f J a n u a r y 6, 1 9 1 5 did n o t expressly provide for the dissolution o f the great estates. C l e a r l y , C a r r a n z a w a n t e d to a v o i d e v e n t h e m o s t m o d e r a t e c h a n g e s in favor of the peasantry. T h e defeat o f Villa a n d the d e c l i n e o f zapatismo did n o t make him more generous. At the Constitutional C o n v e n t i o n in Q u e r é t a r o in November 1916, t h e First C h i e f s loyal "apostles" and ideologists presented a rewarmed Constitution o f 1 8 5 7 f o r t h e d e l e g a t e s ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n . B u t a l t h o u g h this was a strictly C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t g a t h e r i n g — a d h e r e n c e to t h e Plan de G u a d a l u p e was m a n d a t o r y , a n d e l e c t i o n s o f d e l e g a t e s h a d b e e n c o n t r o l l e d — t h e r e was a left wing o f radical generals and youth who, with the support o f O b r e g ó n , opposed the carrancista draft. T h e s e " j a c o b i n s , " as t h e y c a l l e d t h e m s e l v e s , i n s p i r e d by t h e r e f o r m g o v e r n o r s h i p s o f Salvador Alvarado, J o s é Agustin Castro, a n d F r a n c i s c o J . M u g i c a , 1 2 and conscious of the threat o f c o n t i n u e d peasant rebellion, d e m a n d ed social provisions in the Constitution. T h e First C h i e f s version o f Article 27, regulating the use o f land and natural resources, was so little c h a n g e d from the 1857 version that it was u n a c c e p t a b l e to them. In an e f f o r t to s t r e n g t h e n his p o s i t i o n , C a r r a n z a w e n t to t h e e x t r e m e of preparing for the delegates a sanitized version of

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Francisco Zarco's history of the Constitutional Congress of 1857, cens o r i n g it of P o n c i a n o Arriaga's s p e e c h e s on t h e a g r a r i a n q u e s t i o n . T h e First Chief evidently h o p e d to avoid any i m m o d e r a t e proposals by extirpating the views of Arriaga, w h o was c o n s i d e r e d a radical a n d was virtually the only representative at the congress c o n c e r n e d with agrarian reform. But Carranza's maneuvers did n o t pacify the majority of the delegates, who insisted o n a r e f o r m e d Article 27. T h e new article, hurriedly drafted by an ad hoc committee d u r i n g the last 10 days of t h e c o n g r e s s a n d a p p r o v e d with p e r e m p t o r y d i s c u s s i o n , b e c a m e the constitutional f o u n d a t i o n of the official land r e f o r m . It allowed t h e State to impose limitations on private p r o p e r t y in the p u b l i c interest, reiterated the provisions f o r l a n d distribution contained in the Decree o f j a n u a r y 6, 1915, and m a n d a t e d state and federal laws requiring the division of the latifundia. 1 3 In s p i t e of his c o n c e s s i o n s to t h e j a c o b i n s , t h e F i r s t C h i e f r e m a i n e d f i r m l y o p p o s e d to social c h a n g e . E n t r e n c h m e n t , n o t r e f o r m , was the hallmark of the C a r r a n z a years; between 1915 a n d 1920, Carranza set important limits for the land reform. A national agrarian bureaucracy was created; like the laws it was c h a r g e d with enforcing, its p u r p o s e was to stall or prevent, not facilitate, land dist r i b u t i o n . T h e landlord-peasant s t r u c t u r e was officially r e c o g n i z e d a n d the h a c e n d a d o s ' claims to the land d e f e n d e d . T h e p r e s i d e n t and the bureaucracy scrupulously protected the landlords' rights to a full h e a r i n g a n d to i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n f o r e x p r o p r i a t e d lands; l a n d invasions were repulsed by the army. L a n d distribution was minimal, a n d Porfirian landlords began to recover properties e x p r o p r i a t e d by the peasants d u r i n g the early years of the Revolution. Legal reforms that would have clarified the role of the ejidos and the status of the peasantry were repeatedly blocked. D u r i n g the early revolutionary p e r i o d , local f o r c e s — t h e peasantry, military chiefs, state officials—took the initiative on questions of land tenure. 1 4 T h e new agrarian reform bureaucracy was c h a r g e d with reclaiming d o m i n i o n over rural Mexico for the national governm e n t . In J a n u a r y 1916, C a r r a n z a o r d e r e d t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e National Agrarian Commission (CNA), the p r e c u r s o r of the Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t and the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform (SRA), to apply t h e D e c r e e o f j a n u a r y 6, 1915 a n d oversee t h e a g r a r i a n activity of state governors. A c c o r d i n g to the First Chief, t h a t activity must b e strictly limited. T h e decree authorized land grants or restitutions to villages; it did not allow the division of "lands that d o n o t f o r m part of ejidos" (i.e., haciendas or latifundia), f o r that constituted " a n o t h e r aspect of the agrarian problem, o n which the National Executive has not yet legislated." T h e decree could not be altered or regulated by

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the states and must be applied only by the federal government. All disputes over waters and forests must also be resolved at the national level, through the Department of Development, not by the states or state agrarian commissions. N e i t h e r were the states to make any d e t e r m i n a t i o n o n the u n r e s o l v e d question o f c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r expropriated land. Petitions to military chiefs f o r land, which had been allowed during the military phase of the revolution (the military ejidos), were now severely restricted. 15 In June 1916, the C N A ordered peasants not to alter any provisional holdings until they received definitive possession f r o m the federal executive. But the pueblos must have disregarded the warning. In S e p t e m b e r , Carranza d e c r e e d that lands w o u l d no l o n g e r be awarded for provisional use by petitioning villages pending definitive resolution of their cases by the C N A and the executive. This was an extremely unpopular measure; while it could not slow the already cumbersome administrative procedure leading to a definitive possession, it prevented the villages from using the land awarded them f o r another lengthy period. 1 6 Some provisional grants were still made in an e f f o r t to stimulate agricultural production, but in N o v e m b e r , the C N A ordered local authorities to cancel them. 17 N o t surprisingly, little land was transferred to the peasantry under Carranza. Published official summaries, which are the only figures available except archival materials at the level of the individual village, are of limited validity, but it seems that f r o m 1917 until 1920 fewer than eighty thousand peasants were granted fewer than 400,000 hectares of land, representing perhaps 0.3 percent of all agricultural land. T h e percentage of resolutions resolved in favor of the pueblos was low, especially considering that the reform was only just beginning. Land definitively received was far less than that ostensibly granted: about forty-six thousand "beneficiaries" received some 167,000 hectares of land. Parcels were small, and the quality of the land distributed, though better than in later years, was not particularly high. (See Tables 1-6. All tables appear at the back of the book.) Determined to regain their prerevolutionary status, the landlords actively defended their interests at the national level. T h e y presented complaints to the C N A , invented ways to circumvent agrarian law, and took their cases to the Supreme Court, alleging violations o f constitutional guarantees. T h e Supreme Court, reflecting rural conditions and national politics that were still chaotic, attempted to guarantee the rights of both the landlords and the villages. 18 In July 1917, the National Agrarian Commission declared that the agrarian bureaucracy would consider invalid any means employed to elude the Law o f January 6, 1915. Purchasers of holdings that were the object of pend-

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ing agrarian proceedings could expect no aid from the government. If they wished to recover their losses, they would have to sue the former landlords for the selling price plus damages. 19 Members of the CNA may not always have a p p r e c i a t e d these efforts to circumvent the law, but they were required to give the landlords' complaints a full hearing: the government was constitutionally b o u n d to uphold "legitimate" private property. An example is furnished by the case of the hacienda La Purísima. T h e CNA had to decide w h e t h e r the casco, or house and central buildings of t h e hacienda, should be included in the restitution given to the pueblo of Ixtapalapa. O n e member believed that while the restitution of the lands would be a just measure, the buildings should be exempt; he also proposed a zone of protection a r o u n d the casco that would remain in the hands of the hacendados. Andrés Molina Enríquez argued that a restitution of lands should include all installations on those lands. Years later, Marte R. Gómez remarked: "It is necessary to clarify that they were only discussing a broken and empty shell. In a case where there were real installations, the focus would have to be different." Indeed it would. In 1918 and 1919, the CNA examined the possibility of enlarging the area legally exempt from expropriation and ruled that, in consideration of the investments made by landowners, land planted with henequen would be respected unless its expropriation were the only way to satisfy the needs of the pueblos. 2 0 Legal and bureaucratic schemes were not the only avenues for the resurgence of Porfirian agricultural capital. T h e isolation and defeat of the peasant armies often allowed landlords to d e f e n d or recover their properties on the basis of terror and repression. In 1918 and 1919, with zapatismo in decline, General Pablo González stepped up the military campaign in Morelos. He secured his military occupation, seized plantations and rented them to carrancista generals, and used prisoners of war to rebuild Cuautla, his base. Now the local b o u r g e o i s i e b e g a n to r e t u r n , and political a u t h o r i t i e s loyal to Carranza were imposed. The new state governor declared that since there was no public record of real estate transfers since 1914, there would be a new registration of deeds; thus, the Carranza government refused to recognize the zapatista occupations of pueblo lands or the work of the agrarian commission surveyors who had aided the pueblos in d e f i n i n g t h e i r b o u n d a r i e s u n d e r t h e C o n v e n t i o n of Aguascalientes. In December 1919 and January 1920, the old landlords started to resume production. 2 1 Marte R. Gómez, who was an agrarian commission surveyor in his youth, said of this period that "one could take away a man's life, but not the smallest part of his hacienda." 22 Morelos was the most t r e n c h a n t , but not the only, example.

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Abetted by the Carranza government, landlords recovered their properties in all areas of the republic. The war against zapatismo led, in 1916, to martial law in Morelos, Guerrero, México, Puebla, Tlaxcala, and parts of Hidalgo. Villages suspected of sheltering rebels were burned. Detachments of the army protected haciendas from agrarian petitioners and expelled campesinos who were already in possession of lands. 23 Constitutionalist officers and officials acquired large tracts of lands and other business interests, beginning to merge with the resurrected Porfirian elite. 24 Legislative debates during this period r e f l e c t e d Carranza's prolandlord outlook and threw into relief the contradictions inherent in the government's position, but they resolved nothing. T h e legislature stalled, revised, and failed to reach definitive conclusions. Any law that was actually approved was consigned to the archives by Carranza. The issues of urban labor, regional political violence, and political consolidation often eclipsed the land question, which remained confused. 25 Carranza's extreme reluctance to make any reform of the agrarian structure was shown in his treatment of the proposed "idle lands" law. Initiatives were proposed by legislators in 1917, 1918, and 1919, but the First Chief vetoed all measures. Thus, far from taking action to permanently change the system of land tenure, Carranza refused even to sign a law that aimed at increasing agricultural production by giving peasants temporary access to uncultivated lands. Such a law was finally promulgated only after Carranza was deposed. 2 6 Another important matter left unresolved was the regulation of the Law of January 6, 1915. A bill presented in the C h a m b e r of Deputies in October 1917, although never promulgated, may have reflected Carranza's preferences. It categorically affirmed the right of proprietors to be indemnified for expropriated lands, authorized the creation of a public agrarian debt, and declared that the "beneficiaries" would pay for the land they received. When no progress had been made by December of the following year, legislator Vito Aguirre presented an initiative requesting that the commission responsible for critiquing and revising the proposed law present its work to the chamber in three days. His proposal was voted down by the deputies, who were obviously no more anxious than Carranza to implement an actual agrarian reform, no matter how limited. In December 1919, a law was finally approved and sent to the executive, but it never took effect. A particular point of interest in this bill was its provision that the pueblos would be exempt from all payment for lands received, which was in contrast to the many proposals for the creation of an agrarian debt that had been considered during the period. This was indicative of the contradictions inherent in the position of the new

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regime, which n e e d e d to give the peasants access to l a n d as a deterrent to rebellion, but also wanted to protect private p r o p e r t y a n d capital. It also reflected the developing political split between the obregonistas a n d carrancistas, which would acquire some agrarian overtones. T h e issue of c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r e x p r o p r i a t e d lands was a n o t h e r thorny matter. In J a n u a r y 1919, the CNA told its local representatives to obtain written a g r e e m e n t f r o m all petitioning villages to pay the g o v e r n m e n t for the lands they were to receive. T h e CNA wanted the local commissions to e n s u r e that these a g r e e m e n t s were "expressed with a b s o l u t e f r e e d o m by the i n t e r e s t e d parties." However, "This information shall be taken d u r i n g the f o r m a t i o n of the censuses. . . . In t h o s e a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t a r e a l r e a d y b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d by t h e National Agrarian Commission, the latter . . . must p r o c e e d . . . to fill this prerequisite . . . so that the applications may receive definitive resolution." In o t h e r words, the villages had to a g r e e to pay u p o r receive n o land. 2 7 After years of debate, a federal agrarian d e b t authorizing the gove r n m e n t to issue agrarian b o n d s as payment f o r e x p r o p r i a t e d lands, payable at 5 p e r c e n t by a n n u a l raffle over a p e r i o d of 20 years, was a p p r o v e d in J a n u a r y 1920. 28 This was the only a g r a r i a n law passed d u r i n g the period 1917-1920, a n d the reasons for its i m p o r t a n c e to t h e g o v e r n m e n t were revealed w h e n the bill was p r e s e n t e d to t h e C h a m b e r of Deputies in D e c e m b e r 1919. T h e assembly was e n c o u r aged to "pay attention to the urgency of . . . [this] law, since many applications for [agrarian] grants that have r e a c h e d their final stages have not been resolved by the President of the Republic in virtue of t h e fact that h e considers it unjust to c o n t i n u e e x p r o p r i a t i n g lands f r o m the hacendados without their receivingjust indemnification." 2 9 T h e role of the ejidos r e m a i n e d unclear, but t h e r e was a m p l e evid e n c e that the post-Porfirian regime m e a n t to s h a p e this basic l a n d r e f o r m institution a c c o r d i n g to its own n e e d s . Colonial a n d nineteenth-century traditions which, if r e s u r r e c t e d , m i g h t have implied the restitution of village lands a n d the persistence of local a u t o n o m y , bowed to centralization. Thus, the colonial p r o c e d u r e of tracing l a n d g r a n t s b e g i n n i n g at t h e c e n t r a l c h u r c h was d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . Administratively a n d politically, the national g o v e r n m e n t a f f i r m e d its control over the pueblos a n d attempted to d o away with the traditional political a n d e c o n o m i c role of the local governments. Municipal authorities still administering ejidal lands, r e n t i n g t h e m o u t a n d taxing t h e m to the benefit of local coffers, were i n f o r m e d that the p r o p erty a n d administration of t h e ejidal lands n o l o n g e r p e r t a i n e d to t h e m but to the pueblos themselves. T h a t s t a t e m e n t was not strictly true: the regime i n t e n d e d to claim full control over the ejido villages, a p u r p o s e m a d e clear in debates over the f o r m of ejidal land t e n u r e .

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T h e preference for private property clashed with the need to promote social peace by controlling proletarianization and the concentration of rural property in few hands. These concerns were revealed in conflicting measures: one designed to promote the eventual conversion of ejido parcels to private property, one prohibiting the transfer of ejidal lands. 3 0 T h e new rulers had not yet agreed which was more advantageous, but they did not intend to let the peasants decide for themselves. As the decade drew to a close, Carranza had apparently crippled his worst military enemies. Villismo and zapatismo were in decline; Zapata was dead. 3 1 However, the First Chief faced increasing opposition from within his own ranks. Discontent ran especially high among the more radical military officers, who wanted social reform. When Carranza imposed Ignacio Bonillas as official candidate for president instead of the more popular Alvaro Obregón, the opposition came to a head. By April 1920, when the Sonorans broke with Carranza in their Plan de Agua Prieta, various civilian and military authorities had already pronounced against the First Chief, and Obregón had the support of the Zapatista leadership, now headed by Gildardo Magaña. In May, with virtually the entire armed forces against him, Carranza fled and was assassinated by members of his personal guard. 3 2 With the radical wing of Constitutionalism now in power, the way seemed clear for the agrarian reform to proceed along the route planned for it by the Constitution of 1917.

Notes 1. Carranza to Zapatista leadership, 1914. See Gilly (1971: 120-121). 2. This hypothesis, suggested by the increasing use of the term ejido as a generic label for all pueblo lands during the latter half of the nineteenth century, might be confirmed by studies of the pueblos' litigation in defense of their lands. 3. The bourgeoisie was well aware of the danger; see Molina Enriquez (1978: 305, 462-464); Silva Herzog (1960-1962: 2: 281-282, 303-304). 4. Silva Herzog (1960-1962: 2: 289-293, 301). 5. Silva Herzog (1960-1962: 2: 281-282, 303-304). 6. Silva Herzog (1960-1962: 2: 306). 7. Gömez (1966: 28-29). 8. Gilly (1971:137-138); Ulloa (1979a: 58). 9. Katz (1981: Chapters 11-15). 10. Palavicini (1976: v-xv, 17-24, 99-104); Gömez (1975: 60). 11. Bolanos (1925: 136-143). 12. In the states ofYucatan, Chiapas, and Tabasco, respectively. 13. See Cordova (1973: 218-219); Gilly (1971: 220-221, 2 2 3 - 2 2 6 , 230-231); Niemeyer (1974: 32, 35-36, 39, 42-43, 114-116, 119-120, 131-132, 137-138, 155-158, 160-163); Rouaix (1959: 61, 6 3 - 6 4 , 143, 145-148,

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151-152); Smith (1973: 364-366, 372-373, 380-382); Ulloa (1979b: 62, 77-81). Niemeyer (1974: 223-224) claims that Obregón's influence on the C o n v e n t i o n h a s b e e n e x a g g e r a t e d . But f o r a m o r e c o m p l e t e view of Obregón's role, see Hall (1981: 167-169, 171-182). Obregón's omnipresence in the public eye, his known support of the radicals, his links with the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, and Carranza's fear that he might resign or rebel all gave him an influence on the Constituyente, even if he did not directly contribute to the drafting of the articles. With regard to Article 27, it is almost certainly pertinent that Andrés Molina Enriquez visited Obregón frequently during this period. 14. Knight (1986: 2: 183-191). 15. Bolaños (1925: 143-147). 16. Fabila 1941: 296-297; Gómez (1975: 110); Bolaños (1925: 228-229). 17. Circular Number 33 (November 22, 1918) of the National Agrarian Commission, in Bolaños (1925: 271-272). 18. See the summary of the j u r i s p r u d e n c e of the Mexican S u p r e m e Court on agrarian matters for approximately the years 1915-1925, in Bolaños (1925: 216-218), which does not seem to indicate a hard antiagrarian reform position for this p e r i o d . T h e r e has b e e n little study of t h e role of t h e Supreme Court in the early years of the agrarian reform or of the variety of legal avenues open to landlords for the defense of their properties. Published summaries a n d u n p u b l i s h e d archival material are available on S u p r e m e Court cases, but these sources would be material for a separate book. At last report, a study on the recourse of amparo in agrarian proceedings, sponsored by the Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Agrarias in Mexico, had been canceled. This is unfortunate, as much of the research had been completed and in its final form would have been useful to students of Mexican agrarian history. See also C h a p t e r 15 of this book. For c o m p l a i n t s to the N a t i o n a l Agrarian Commission, see Gómez (1975: 114-116). 19. Circular Number 25 of the National Agrarian Commission (July 11, 1917), in Bolaños (1925: 256-258). 20. Gómez (1975: 110). 21. Katz (1981: 5 3 4 - 5 3 6 ) ; Gilly (1971: 2 8 8 - 2 9 0 ) ; W o m a c k (1970: 311-314, 317-318, 353-354); Knight (1986: 2: 366-367). 22. Gómez (1975: 119). He was referring to Carranza's proposal in favor of the death penalty for highwaymen, arsonists, and kidnappers. 23. Knight (1986: 2: 366, 391, 455-456, 464-469, 636); Katz (1981: 287-293). 24. Knight (1986: 2: 464-469). 25. Gómez (1975: 118-143). 26. Gómez (1975: 119). 27. See Circular Number 34 of the National Agrarian Commission (January 31, 1919) in Bolaños (1925: 272-273). 28. See "Ley de 10 de enero de 1920" (Bolaños 1925: 158-160). For the years of debate preceding this law, see Gómez (1975: 108-110). 29. The legislative debates for 1917-1920 are discussed in Gómez (1975: 118-139). 30. Circular 36 of the National Agrarian Commission, July 11, 1919 (Bolaños 1925: 275-277); Gómez (1975: 97). 31. Katz (1981: 534); Knight (1986: 2: 330-375). 32. Gilly (1971:326-329).

3

Obregón: Bonapartism, Cañonazos, and Capitalism

O n June 2, [1920], twenty thousand soldiers of the new [ obregonista] r e g i m e , a m o n g t h e m zapatista troops, paraded in f r o n t o f t h e N a t i o n a l Palace. From the balcony, n e x t to the P r e s i d e n t a n d G e n e r a l O b r e g ó n , s u c h m i s m a t c h e d figures as G e n e r a l P a b l o González and General Genovevo de la O watched the parade, all united under the banner of obregonismo and giving an early example of the contradictory and even antagonistic social foundations u p o n which obregonismo and its successors would base their power. —Adolfo Gilly 1

The bonapartist character of the new government is well illustrated in the proximity of those two figures: Pablo González, who had defended the landlords, conducted a reign of terror in Morelos, and plotted Zapata's murder, and Genovevo de la O, an old and unconditional zapatista. Obregón, an entrepreneur and ranchero from the northern state of Sonora who became a millionaire owing to the opportunities a f f o r d e d him by the Revolution, had no personal sympathy for an agrarian reform. At the same time, like other revolutionaries f r o m Sonora, he had a close familiarity with the struggle of the Yaqui Indians; he had fought the villistas and knew the depth of agrarian discontent; he had negotiated with the workers and was aware of possibilities for class conciliation. In the 1919 manifesto that declared his independence from Carranza and opened his candidacy for the presidency, O b r e g ó n p r o m i s e d to give easy o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r capital investment in Mexico, "always searching for the most practical and equitable way to conciliate the advantages that capital, labor, and the treasury may obtain." On campaign in Mazatlán, he reiterated his belief that "the best governor will be he who . . . establishes equilibrium between these two factors [labor and business], so that they may have the advantages . . . that each should obtain on the basis of equi-

35

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ty." Clearly, O b r e g ó n did not plan to favor the peasants a n d workers at the expense of capital. Instead, he would portray himself a n d his g o v e r n m e n t as impartial a r b i t r a t o r s of antagonistic class interests, while in reality favoring private property a n d the rule of the b o u r geoisie. T o begin to construct the social peace that would favor capital investment a n d economic growth, O b r e g ó n negotiated with representatives of the peasantry and the working class. In 1919-1920 h e m a d e p e a c e with Zapatista representatives Gildardo Magaña a n d A n t o n i o Díaz Soto y Gama; he m a d e deals with Villa and o t h e r , less p r o m i nent, peasant chiefs by giving t h e m agrarian colonies and i n c o r p o r a t ing their forces into the military. He assured himself the s u p p o r t of organized labor by signing a secret pact with Luis Morones, leader of the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) a n d f u t u r e f o u n d e r of the Mexican Laborist Party, a pillar-to-be of t h e regime. O b r e g ó n ' s o f f i c e r c o r p s p r o v i d e d i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s of t h e renascent capitalist class: Abelardo Rodríguez, Aarón Saenz, Plutarco Elias Calles, a n d others. All, like O b r e g ó n , became rich as a result of the Revolution; all were i m p o r t a n t politicians. T h e new r e g i m e was a d m i n i s t e r e d in t h e i r interests a n d in the interests of o t h e r s like them.2 T h e g r e a t e r m o m e n t u m of the land r e f o r m u n d e r t h e o b r e g o nistas, t h e n , was n o t t h e result of a conviction in favor of radical agrarian change, but r e s p o n d e d mainly to the political n e e d s of the m o m e n t . As conflicts e m e r g e d within the bourgeois political arena, agrarian policy increasingly r e s p o n d e d to questions of power: W h o was t h e b e t t e r self-styled B o n a p a r t e ? O b r e g ó n a n d his o p p o n e n t s tried to use land reform policy to gain the allegiance of the peasantry a n d e n s u r e control of the political apparatus. Obregón—"£Z caudillo"—was the momentary victor. O b r e g ó n ' s own sympathies as a successful, increasingly m o n o p o listic grower a n d distributor of garbanzo in Sonora went to large or medium-size capitalist enterprises, certainly not to p e a s a n t agriculture. H e was against the "indiscriminate" destruction of t h e latifundia, a n d o n his presidential c a m p a i g n in 1919, h e told t h e Jalisco National C h a m b e r of Agriculture that I am in favor of the development of small agriculture, because I am in favor of giving help to anyone who makes an effort to improve his narrow and measly lot . . . but by n o means do I believe that we should resort to the division of properties to give them to small agriculturists, before small agriculture has succeeded in developing and evolving. Neither am I of the opinion that for the development of that small agriculture we should use violence and plunder. I feel that the way to encourage its development is not to dismember large

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37

property and divide it in fractions. . . . In this way one destroys without obtaining any benefit. . . . I do not believe that this transcendental problem can be resolved with only superficial study or with the handing out of a few lands. 3

Although his assurances to a g r o u p of large landowners may have been an attempt to widen the appeal of his candidacy, O b r e g o n ' s own social b a c k g r o u n d — h e was the youngest son of a o n c e p r o s p e r o u s family a n d was s u c c e e d i n g as a n a g r i c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l i s t — l e n d s verisimilitude to this statement. O b r e g o n wanted agricultural development, and he was not any more convinced than Carranza that the division of large, more or less productive properties would achieve that aim. N o n e t h e l e s s , O b r e g o n a c q u i r e d a r e p u t a t i o n as an a g r a r i a n reformer. This legend had its roots in four aspects of his early career. These were his awareness of the importance of land to the Yaqui and Mayo troops who f o u g h t o n the side of the Constitutionalists; his e f f o r t s to avert a split between Villa a n d C a r r a n z a by s u p p o r t i n g Villa's d e m a n d for a land policy in the Pact of T o r r e o n ; his support of the left wing of Constitutionalism, which forced social reform legislation, including the Decree o f j a n u a r y 6, 1915 and a more radical version of Article 27, on Carranza; and his p r o c e d u r e of setting u p agrarian commissions and giving military possessions of ejidos d u r i n g his 1915 campaign against Pancho Villa. Although these tendencies and actions were t h e result of a p e n c h a n t f o r c o n c i l i a t i o n i s m , w h i c h always put him at the service of the bourgeoisie and looked toward his own ascendance in that milieu, Obregon was later able to build them into a politically profitable agrarista image. Whatever their personal loyalties or preferences, the obregonistas n e e d e d the support of the peasantry to achieve and maintain power, and they immediately made some small concessions to land h u n g e r . A n t o n i o Villarreal, who had a reputation as a partisan of agrarian r e f o r m f r o m his days with the Liberal Party of Flores Magon, was a p p o i n t e d secretary of agriculture and head of the CNA by interim President Adolfo de la Huerta. T h e CNA reinstated provisional possessions of land and promulgated a law allowing temporary occupation of uncultivated land by peasants who wished to p r o d u c e crops. T h e latter proved to be a fiscally p r u d e n t "escape valve" that temporarily lessened the "impatience" of the land-starved peasantry. 4 Although Article 27 of the Constitution had o r d e r e d both federal a n d s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n to c o m p e l t h e division of t h e h a c i e n d a s , O b r e g o n , like Carranza, was content to leave this matter to the states. Federal law allowed for the expropriation of property in favor of the pueblos but placed n o u p p e r limit on the a m o u n t of territory that

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could be owned by a single individual or company. State laws passed between 1918 and 1923 did set such limits but were rarely applied. 5 Moreover, the state laws allowed landlords to keep large extensions of land, usually permitted them generous periods of time in which to sell their excess property, and sometimes granted exceptions f o r efficiently run estates. If expropriation did occur, beneficiaries were expected to pay the state governments f o r the land received, and landowners were entitled to indemnification. 6 Obviously, the p o o r peasantry and agricultural workers could not benefit from these laws, not having cash with which to purchase land. With the Reglamento Agrario of April 1922, the Obregon government codified the agrarian reform mandated by Article 27. This measure established the magnitude of the difference between ejidatario and "small property" owner. Each ejidatario would receive between 3 and 5 hectares of irrigated cropland, 4 and 6 hectares of g o o d quality rainfed land, or 6 and 8 hectares of rainfed land of other categories. In arid or rugged zones these amounts could be tripled. Landowners were guaranteed 150 hectares of irrigated land, 250 hectares of g o o d quality rainfed land, or 500 hectares of second-quality rainfed land; as long as land reform grants were held in abeyance, there was nothing to prohibit them from retaining the much greater extensions allowed by many states. If a property marked for expropriation formed part of an efficient "agroindustrial unit," the proprietors had the option of ceding an equivalent parcel of land in another location. Peons residing permanently on haciendas could receive land grants only by founding colonies. Ejidal grants would not include buildings, gardens, or orchards; plantations of coffee, cacao, vanilla, rubber, and other similar products; or installations for the irrigation of nonejidal lands. " T h e favorite sons of the regime," as A r t u r o W a r m a n has termed the Mexican peasantry, if fortunate, would receive the land, and nothing else.7 Still unresigned to changes favoring the peasantry, prolandlord interests m o u n t e d a bitter campaign against the i n c i p i e n t land reform. On December 15, 1921, the editorial page of the Mexico City daily Excelsior proposed alternative solutions to the agrarian problem: respect for private property, agricultural and livestock development, division of large landholdings, construction of dams, colonization, and other measures, including the modification of Articles 27 and 123 of the Constitution of 1917.8 In the Senate, landowners had numerous allies who blocked the passage of agrarian laws by introducing new bills, breaking quorums, and polemicizing against the National Agrarian Commission and the climate of insecurity being created by the ejido program. Local chambers of agriculture and landlords' associations approached the Senate directly, protesting the

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reinstatement of provisional possessions of ejidos and the passage of land reform legislation. 9 Landowners often used private p o l i c e f o r c e s — t h e so-called guardias blancas—to prevent peasants from taking possession of ejidal grants; some hacendados even had local detachments of the federal army in their employ. In one case in Veracruz, where the army and the guardias blancas clashed with proreform forces and were backed up by pistoleros hired by the landlord, Obregón himself supported the antiagrarista general Guadalupe Sánchez and ordered the disarming of the entire Veracruz civil guard and all agraristas "to prevent further bloodshed." No small possibility for temporary postponement or advantage was scorned; Marte R. Gómez recounted that when he was head of the Yucatán office of the National Agrarian Commission, members of the casta divina offered him 50,000 pesos just to stay away from the ceremony giving definitive possession of ejidal lands to the village of Conkal. "I resisted that cañonazo," reported Gómez, "and later I wrote the report on the amparo [injunction] that was immediately initiated [by the landlordsl." 1 0 O t h e r f o r c e s o p p o s e d t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m . T h e C a j a de Préstamos, a Porfirian agricultural development bank, still held lands as a result of defaulted loans on property and defended the interests of landlords indebted to it. Antiagrarista state governors opposed land distribution, refusing to cooperate with the federal bureaucracy and even threatening its representatives. In March 1921, Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama denounced, on behalf of the National Agrarista Party, governors Garcia Vigil of O a x a c a , Azuara o f Hidalgo, and López de Lara of Tamaulipas, for refusing to distribute land in their states. López de Lara, a particularly independent local strongman, threatened the representative of the National Agrarian Commission with hanging from the nearest tree if he were not out o f Ciudad Victoria in 4 hours. 11 Local judges often sided with their local landlords, granting amparos against provisional possessions. T h e local agrarian representatives, obeying the letter of the law, played a catand-mouse game with antireform forces, keeping provisional grants secret as long as possible in order to make sure the villages were in possession of their lands before the amparo was before the j u d g e . 1 2 Even as the landlords tried to halt or stall ejidal grants and restitutions, would-be caudillos fought over the projected political spoils of the official reform. T h e agrarian policy of the de la Huerta and early Obregón presidencies was associated with the political designs of Antonio I. Villarreal, head of the National Agrarian Commission. Villarreal pushed land distribution; for the year 1921, positive resolutions were up, the number of beneficiaries of both presidential resolutions and definitive possessions increased, and the amount of land

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granted e x c e e d e d that distributed during the entire period 1917— 1920 (see Tables 2 - 4 ) . V i l l a r r e a l also issued a n u m b e r o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m e a s u r e s intended to favor petitioning villages. In October 1920, Circular 40 o f the National Agrarian Commission encouraged state governments to give official political recognition to population groups within the latifundia to enable the agrarian bureaucracy to grant t h e m land in accordance with national legislation. Had it been implemented, this measure would have enabled hacienda workers to receive ejidos, a right not given them by national law. Circular 42 (April 1921) made landlords responsible under civil law for conserving e x p r o p r i a t e d property until the pueblos entered into definitive possession of their lands, thus a t t e m p t i n g to prevent s a b o t a g e by t h e h a c e n d a d o s . Circular 44 (March 1921) abrogated the requirement that villages agree to pay for land before their petitions for ejidos could be comp l e t e d . C i r c u l a r 47 ( J u n e 1 9 2 1 ) stated that o n c e a p u e b l o h a d received definitive possession of its lands, no further proceedings o f the affected landlords would be admitted. In what may have been an effort to acquire more authority for the CNA and thus Villarreal himself, Circular 48 (September 1921) attempted to promote the democratic and cooperative organization of the ejidos and link them to the National Agrarian Commission through the commission's local delegates. 1 3 Villarreal's tenure as secretary o f agriculture and head o f the National Agrarian Commission ended in November 1921 after a protracted congressional fight between the Obregôn administration and the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC). T h e matter began as a controversy over budget and other concerns and evolved into a full-scale battle for power with the PLC attempting to eliminate the presidential system in favor o f a parliamentary system. Villarreal, whose own presidential ambitions were bound up with the PLC's power play, was soon followed into open opposition by Rafael Zubarân Capmany, secretary o f industry, and Enrique Estrada, secretary o f war, both members of the PLC. T h e elimination o f these political o p p o n e n t s was made easier for Obregôn because Villarreal's land program had c o m e under severe attack in the press. Thus, the president could claim that "'certain functionaries' were violating the spirit o f the agrarian laws, in search of political power"; 1 4 this statement neither repudiated the agrarian program nor explicitly offered to change it, but soothed the nerves of threatened landlords and temporarily rid O b r e g ô n o f some potentially troublesome political opposition. C o n c e r n a b o u t U.S.Mexican relations may also have influenced O b r e g ô n ' s decision to get rid o f Villarreal. U.S. capitalists wanted reassurance that their Mexican property would be left untouched; the secretary o f agricul-

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ture's battles with the press did not provide it and were thus not conducive to U.S. diplomatic recognition of the regime. 15 After Villarreal's departure, Obregón reconstituted the CNA with less prominent and ambitious personnel. 1 6 In May 1922, Ramón P. Denegrí was made undersecretary of agriculture; since the post of secretary r e m a i n e d vacant, he also h e a d e d the N a t i o n a l A g r a r i a n Commission. Denegri, a partisan of agrarian reform, supervised a concerted effort at land distribution and ejido organization and was at the same time completely s u b o r d i n a t e and loyal to O b r e g ó n . Beneficiaries of presidential resolutions and definitive possessions more than doubled between 1920 and 1924 in comparison with the period 1915 through 1920; more than a million hectares were distributed. Activity at the state level was sharply up, as was the proportion of cases resolved positively at the national level (see Tables 1-4). Denegri's program did not stop at land distribution. In 1922, he asked Marte R. Gómez, now director of the CNA, to suggest ways to ensure the success of the agrarian reform. The result was Circular 51 of the National Agrarian Commission, issued in O c t o b e r 1922. It sought to improve peasant agriculture through cooperative organization and represented the most radical impulses of the bonapartist leaders who now held power. 17 Circular 51 observed that the development of capitalism tends to make obsolete an agriculture based on small individual property, and that the latter actually obstructs the development of the productive forces in the modern era. Its proposed solution was government organization of production and marketing cooperatives at the village and regional levels. Elected village administrative committees would be responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the cooperatives but were subordinate to the National Agrarian Commission, which would provide technical assistance and had the right to convoke assemblies and otherwise regulate village affairs. Cooperatives would be organized by the commission's Department of Ejido Development, which would supervise them until they could function independently. Far from an attempt to combat capitalism by collectivizing the ejido peasantry—a misperception that imbued some, like Denegri himself, with false illusions and caused others to protest—Circular 51 was essentially a bid to improve the way capitalism functioned in the reform sector of agriculture. 1 8 The measure was clearly within the bounds of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, which allowed pueblos to utilize their resources in common and gave the State the right to impose on private property such limitations as were necessary to protect the public interest. Although the land granted to the ejidos was ultimately considered to be under the national domain and was not fully transferable, neither ejido nor cooperative transcended the

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limits of private property, nor did the authors of Circular 51 intend for them to do so. Gomez did not expect a Utopian transformation of ejidal life as a result of Circular 51; 50 years later, he would state, "I am not a romantic; I am an agricultural engineer." 1 9 Nor did he envision the cooperative ejido as a solution that would be imposed everywhere; he saw the cooperative option as being feasible mainly in prosperous commercial zones "where the use of agricultural machinery is viable on a large scale; that is, where the technical situation justifies it." 20 His acceptance 3 years later of the Law of Ejido Patrimony, which required the division of ejidos into family parcels, is further evidence that Gomez expected the imperatives of the capitalist market, not Circular 51, to determine the future of the Mexican peasantry. 21 On the basis of budget and personnel resources alone, Circular 51 could not have been a resounding success. For the 3 years it was in effect, the organization staff of the National Agrarian Commission averaged one man for every 34.4 ejidos and spent 1 peso per year per ejidatario. The agricultural engineers assigned to the villages were given a j o b description so lengthy it was almost comical. They were expected to observe the political and economic development of the ejidos, resolve problems, and keep the national office informed; collect data on ejidal agriculture and keep production statistics; solve the technical problems of the ejidos in their jurisdiction; make sure that the ejido administrative committees were legally constituted; check on the b o u n d a r i e s of the ejidos a n d the d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources; discover if irrigation could be implemented at low cost; try to introduce machinery and cooperative production; aid in the development of local agricultural industries and the elimination of intermediaries; establish museums and contests to stimulate the interest of the peasants in bettering their methods and crops; keep good relations with the local authorities; and maintain the confidence of the pueblos. 22 The j o b was clearly impossible, not only because it was too much work, but because it completely failed to take into account the social and political reality of rural Mexico. The circular depicted the ejido as a homogeneous, fairly isolated community, without internal social distinctions and more or less free of external exploiters. O n e is reminded of Felipe Santander's play El Extensionista, in which a young agricultural extension engineer who takes his mission seriously runs into the implacable opposition of the local hacendado and strongman, the official banking system, and the corrupt agrarian bureaucracy, and is murdered as a result of his efforts to help the peasants. 2 3 Obregon's willingness to distribute land, as well as his tight control of the National Agrarian Commission, paid off when he was faced with a military rebellion beginning in December 1923. Two-thirds of the armed forces joined this attempted coup, the de la Huerta rebel-

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lion, which was fundamentally an effort to replace the increasingly powerful Obregón-Calles group at the head of the system. T h e CNA went on campaign, telling the peasantry that the g o v e r n m e n t p l a n n e d to s p e e d u p ejidal grants. O n the advice of Denegri, who aided O b r e g ó n in determining areas of potential enlistment, Plutarco Elias Calles s u s p e n d e d his campaign f o r the presidency a n d j o i n e d Obregón in personally recruiting in the rural areas. Local CNA delegates and procuradores de pueblos24 collected information o n the military operations a n d transmitted it to the national office. From Morelos, t h e state of México, a n d t h e F e d e r a l District alone, some 120,000 peasants came to the support of the O b r e g ó n government. A contingent of two thousand Yaquis was transported to t h e Bajío f r o m S o n o r a to f i g h t t h e r e b e l s . In P u e b l a , T l a x c a l a , V e r a c r u z , San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, a n d T a m a u l i p a s , p e a s a n t s offered their services to the regime. Many were rewarded with land; ejidal grants, particularly definitive possessions, were u p in 1924 (see Tables 2 and 4). In recruiting the peasants, the g o v e r n m e n t depicted the rebels as antiagrarista reactionaries, even t h o u g h a m o n g their n u m b e r s were politicians like Antonio Villarreal, FranciscoJ. Múgica, and Salvador Alvarado, who were j u s t as committed to the tactic of agrarian reform as the obregonistas. Later, as the g o v e r n m e n t gained the u p p e r h a n d over the rebels, who were finally defeated in March 1924, Denegri publicly declared that the best way to end a r m e d uprisings and ensure social peace was to speed u p the ejidal grants, presumably to e n d the climate of insecurity as s o o n as possible a n d remove the material conditions for peasant rebellions through widespread small property ownership. At the same time, the g o v e r n m e n t t u r n e d its efforts to keeping a tight lid on the land struggle of the a r m e d peasantry. A D e c e m b e r circular distributed secretly in rural areas by the National Agrarian Commission's Miguel Mendoza López S. had incited the peasants to defend and extend revolutionary conquests against the de la Huerta rebels by organizing themselves into a r m e d g r o u p s a n d t a k i n g possession of t h e e j i d o s they n e e d e d . O b r e g ó n , w h o h a d n o i n t e n t i o n of a l l o w i n g any f u r t h e r g a i n s , o r d e r e d the disarming of groups of agrarians who had f o u g h t against the delahuertistas and the military suppression of land invasions that were taking place in several states, i n c l u d i n g C o a h u i l a , D u r a n g o , Veracruz, a n d Tamaulipas. M e n d o z a lost his j o b a n d s u f f e r e d an assassination attempt by Obregón's forces. 2 5 T h e de la Huerta episode confirmed the principle that whoever had the support of the peasantry held power. T h e rebellion was also an early indicator of the political bankruptcy of the petty bourgeois forces vying f o r supremacy. The delahuertistas may not have b e e n the reactionary devils that the obregonistas made them out to be; never-

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AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, AGRARIAN REFORM

theless, their agrarian program, what was known of it, did not surpass that of their opponents in any way. Neither faction could ignore the peasantry; n e i t h e r was p r e p a r e d to challenge the rights o f private p r o p e r t y by effecting t h o r o u g h changes in the agrarian s t r u c t u r e . T h e conservatism of obregonista agrarian law, the failure of Circular 51, and the inability of the delahuertistas to put forward a m o r e radical agrarian program, all clarified the limitations of a land reform implemented by even the most radical elements of a petty bourgeois leadership committed to the defense of capital.

Notes 1. Gilly (1971: 329). 2. Matute (1980: 23, 34, 39, 71, 7S-74, 115-116, 130-133, 164); Cordova (1973: 270-272); Gilly (1971: 110, 339-340). Obregón signed the secret pact with Morones, Celestino Gasea, Samuel O. Yúdico, and other CROM leaders in August 1919. In return for the support of the CROM for Obregón and his government, the latter would create a Ministry of Labor and appoint a cromista to head it. The CROM leaders also wanted one of their number to head the Department of Agriculture and Development, and they promised to deal directly with the authorities in all matters relating to organized labor (Matute 1980: 6 8 ) . For the text of the pact, see Carr ( 1 9 8 1 : 2 7 0 - 2 7 1 ) . Obregón never created the Ministry of Labor, but the CROM leaders were appointed to important posts in his administration (Medin 1982: 18). For a fascinating social and political account of the Sonoran revolution through 1920, which produced so many of the early bourgeois revolutionary leaders, see Aguilar Camin (1977), which gives especially interesting social background on Obregón, Calles, de la Huerta, and others, as well as on the Yaqui war and many other questions. For some of the economic activities of the generals and politicians who were also capitalists, see Meyer, Krauze, and Reyes (1977: 304-310); Hansen (1971: 158-159); Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 174-176). 3. Cited in Cordova (1973: 278). 4. Circular 39 of the National Agrarian Commission, August 7, 1920 (Bolaños 1925: 281-283); Ley de Tierras Ociosas, J u n e 23, 1920 (Bolaños 1925: 160-165); Gómez (1975: 188-190). Villarreal was expelled from the Organizing Committee of the Partido Liberal in 1911 owing to his connections with the reformist wing of the labor movement in the United States and his inclinations in favor of maderismo (Bartra 1977: 51). 5. Simpson (1937: 71). 6. These state agrarian laws are in Bolaños (1925: 611-840). 7. Warman (1972). For the Reglamento Agrario (April 10, 1922), see Bolaños (1925: 1 7 6 - 1 8 5 ) . Marte R. Gómez claimed that Obregón never applied "nor seriously intended" to apply this law (Gómez 1975: 304). 8. Gómez (1975: 301,305). 9. Gómez (1975: 278-289). 10. For the guardias blancas, see Gómez (1975: 240-241); for the protection of the hacendados by the federal army, see Tobler (1971) and Gómez (1975: 181); the Veracruz incident is in Salamini (1971: 37-40). Gomez's ref-

OBREGÓN: BONAPARTISM, CAÑONAZOS 8c CAPITALISM

45

e r e n c e to a cañonazo (Gómez 1975: 264-265) alludes to a saying attributed to O b r e g ó n that reputedly expressed his philosophy of g o v e r n m e n t : "No hay j e f e q u e resista u n cañonazo de cincuenta mil pesos [ T h e r e is n o leader who can resist a c a n n o n blast of fifty thousand pesos]." 11. Gómez (1975: 254-255, 337, 340, 349-350). 12. Gómez (1975: 257). 13. Bolaños (1925: 283, 285-288, 292); Fabila (1941: 368-381). 14. Gómez (1975:210). 15. T h e r e are virtually n o studies o n the political history of this period, and those writings that d o exist tend to be anecdotal. This discussion is based on Hall (1980: 218-219); Gómez (1975: 207-221), who gives a blow-by-blow account from the point of view of an obregonista partisan in the legislative struggle; a n d M o r e n o (1982: 7 5 - 8 3 ) , a collection of writings o n various Mexican political parties. Hall's biographical study of O b r e g ó n (1981) u n f o r tunately e n d s with the year 1920, b e f o r e he b e c a m e president a n d 8 years before his assassination. 16. Hall (1980: 219-223). 17. For the text of Circular 51 see Bolaños (1925: 303-314). 18. S i m p s o n ( 1 9 3 7 : 323, 3 3 2 - 3 3 4 ) ; G ó m e z ( 1 9 7 5 : 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ) ; Wilkie/Gómez interview, Wilkie and Wilkie (1969: 100-101); Gómez (1978: 74, 83-84). 19. Wilkie/Gómez interview, Wilkie arid Wilkie (1969: 137). 20. Wilkie/Gómez interview, Wilkie and Wilkie (1969: 102). 21. Gómez (1978: 83-84). 22. T h e b u d g e t and personnel estimates are f r o m Simpson (1937: 332). See Cordova (1973: 283-284), who claims that Circular 51 was a c o m p l e t e failure; Gómez (1975: 311), who mentions that Miguel Mendoza, as general s e c r e t a r y of the N a t i o n a l A g r a r i a n C o m m i s s i o n , was e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t Circular 51 a n d included money for the D e p a r t m e n t of Ejido Development in the 1923 budget of the commission. For the tasks of the agricultural extension e n g i n e e r s see E c o n o m i c Circulars 2 a n d 4 of t h e D e p a r t a m e n t o d e A p r o v e c h a m i e n t o d e E j i d o s ( B o l a ñ o s 1925: 3 6 6 - 3 6 7 , 3 7 4 ) ; s e e a l s o " I n s t r u c c i o n e s a los I n g e n i e r o s q u e D e p e n d e n d e l D e p a r t a m e n t o d e Aprovechamiento de Ejidos de la Comisión Nacional Agraria" (Bolaños 1925: 405-108). 23. Santander (1978). 24. Special federal representatives placed in each state b e g i n n i n g in 1921 to guide villages through the process of land distribution. See Bolaños (1925: 165-168). 25. O n the de la H u e r t a rebellion, see Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez L e ó n (1978: 44 45, 128-132), who give a detailed account of the contradictory n a t u r e of the rebellion; González Navarro (1977: 4 6 - 4 7 ) ; Gómez (1975: 316-325); Hall (1980: 221-231). For c o m m e n t s on the agrarian p r o g r a m of the delahuertistas, see Salamini (1971: 42-43). For the CNA circular distribu t e d by M e n d o z a , see Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez L e ó n (1978: 5 5 - 5 6 , 135).

4

Calles: Croesuses and Técnicos

Army officers occupied 60 per cent of government posts between 1920 and 1935 . . . they formed a new group of property owners, who j o i n e d f o r c e s with the ci devants. T h e y were i m p r o v i s e d Croesuses wearing the mask of Spartacus; they opposed agrarian reform and protected their new-found social equais. —-Jean Meyer 1 Agrarianism must be developed with all energy and without vacillation, but within the limits of method and order, so that our agricultural production not suffer or harm come to those we are seeking to benefit. . . . The breaking up of the large estates which are yet intact . . . must be brought about through evolutionary proceedings, amply planned and studied, backed by a firm system of agricultural credit and by the organization of cooperative societies by the small farmers. —Plutarco Elias Calles 2

Like O b r e g ó n , Calles was o n e of t h e new Croesuses, so it is n o t surp r i s i n g t h a t h e s p o k e of o r d e r , p r o d u c t i v i t y , a n d g r a d u a l c h a n g e w h e n discussing t h e a g r a r i a n q u e s t i o n . In this h e a g r e e d with O b r e g ó n a n d with most of t h e obregonistas. U n l i k e O b r e g ó n , Calles h a d n o r e p u t a t i o n as a partisan of a g r a r i a n r e f o r m . His a u t h o r i t y was f o u n d e d o n a n alliance with t h e C R O M a n d t h e M e x i c a n L a b o r i s t Party of Luis M o r o n e s , which d u r i n g his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n m a d e g r e a t strides t o w a r d e l i m i n a t i n g l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d took p r i d e in r e d u c i n g t h e n u m b e r of strikes a n d s t a m p i n g o u t labor militancy. 3 Calles a n d his técnicos s o u g h t to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c r e c o n s t r u c tion a n d industrialization. T h e y p r o m u l g a t e d fiscal a n d tax r e f o r m s , c r e a t e d t h e B a n c o d e México—Mexico's first c e n t r a l b a n k , r e n e g o t i -

47

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ated the foreign debt, and made plans to extend the rail network and build new roads and dams. Limited advances were made, 4 but by 1926 the economy was in crisis owing to the simultaneous decline of petroleum and silver exports. 5 This crisis, as well as Calles's own conservatism, political unrest, and the pressure of the U.S. government, all had their effect on the course of the agrarian r e f o r m f r o m 1924 through 1928 and beyond. It is important to note the fundamental continuities behind the events of the moment; interpretations that label Obregón an agrarista and Calles a conservative who was more interested in the development of private agriculture cannot explain the course of the official reform. During the Calles administration a n d the maximato, d u r i n g which Calles was the real power (jefe máximo) behind the presidency, disagreements on the style and timing of the agrarian reform played a role, but they were less important that the struggle for power and the institutionalization of the regime. Most of the new bourgeois politicians closed ranks behind the j e f e máximo, in spite of any differences, when the stability of the regime was threatened. On the whole, callista agrarian policy was an extension of obregonismo, not a clear break. Legislation remained consistent with the principles established by Carranza and Obregón: obstruction of land distribution and peasant organization and protection for landlords. Land distribution increased only when political stability was threatened by rebellion. Private property was preferred; various measures sought to create a sector of prosperous and stable middle-class farmers but all failed or ultimately benefited the wealthy, not the peasantry. United States pressure against land distribution once again proved an important factor in the course of the land reform. In April 1925, the Reglamento Agrario of 1922 was modified to allow the distribution of arid or rugged land in place of cropland. Amplifications of ejidal grants were in effect prohibited, based on the argument still familiar to today's rural poor that all available land must be shared equally among peasants. 6 Of course, the large tracts still allowed to the bourgeoisie were not considered subject to expropriation for the benefit of the peasantry. In October, f u r t h e r changes in the basic agrarian law facilitated the landlords' presentation of evidence in expropriation proceedings. 7 In December 1925, Calles's intention that the ejidos eventually become private property was given expression in the Law of Ejido Patrimony. 8 The division of ejidal croplands into individual parcels was now mandatory, although these lands were considered inalienable and imprescriptable. Forests and pastures would still be used communally. These individual and collective "property rights" were to be inscribed in the National Agrarian Register. Responsibility for the

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cooperative o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d control of t h e ejidos was t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m t h e N a t i o n a l A g r a r i a n C o m m i s s i o n t o t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Agriculture, traditionally m o r e conservative a n d c o n c e r n e d with technical, n o t social, problems. Regional p e a s a n t organizations proteste d — t h e Veracruz peasants were especially vocal—but most m e m b e r s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t w e r e u n d i s t u r b e d a b o u t t h e c h a n g e f r o m t h e cooperativism of Circular 51 to t h e individualism of t h e n e w law. Marte R. Gómez, the a u t h o r of Circular 51, s t e p p e d i n t o line with Calles, r e m a r k i n g that the cooperative organization of smallholders would b e imposed by m o d e r n e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s o n e way o r t h e other. 9 Luis L. León, Calles's secretary of agriculture, stated that the new measure was not a step backward but a bridge to the f u t u r e . 1 0 In Congress, only Luis G. Monzón objected: "My g o o d friends, t h e r e is no bridge possible . . . either you cultivate l a n d on the basis of private property or you cultivate it on the basis of c o m m u n a l exploitation. D o n ' t talk to m e about bridges . . . 1 like my tamales either sweet or with chile." 11 T h e cornerstones of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s plans to e n c o u r a g e private initiative in agriculture were colonization, cooperativism, credit, a n d irrigation. Like O b r e g ó n and Carranza b e f o r e him, Calles h o p e d to a m e l i o r a t e agrarian u n r e s t a n d develop t h e c o u n t r y by c o l o n i z i n g vacant territory. A law passed in April 1926 m a d e national lands or private p r o p e r t i e s n o t efficiently e x p l o i t e d subject to colonization, but landowners were given every opportunity to carry o u t the process privately or in cooperation with the g o v e r n m e n t . Colonization companies could also be authorized by the g o v e r n m e n t to develop proj e c t s a n d sell parcels to peasant families. 1 2 As in the past, peasants were not m u c h affected by colonization projects: after 7 years, only a b o u t 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 h e c t a r e s h a d b e e n o c c u p i e d by f o u r t h o u s a n d colonists. 1 3 T h e problems involved in bringing credit to the peasantry proved i n s o l u b l e within t h e callistas' f r a m e w o r k of t h e d e f e n s e of private property. In 1925, Calles p r o m u l g a t e d legislation to e n c o u r a g e private investment in cooperatives, ejidos, a n d small agriculture. T h e law h a d little effect, since it could n o t alter c o m m e r c i a l capital's basic aversion to the risks a n d low returns of peasant f a r m i n g . 1 4 Reform-orie n t e d m e m b e r s of the regime sought to c h a n n e l credit to small-scale agriculture t h r o u g h the National Agricultural Credit Bank (BNCA), which o p e n e d its d o o r s in March 1926. T h e Bank was s u p p o s e d to m a k e "popular credit" available to the peasantry by organizing local a n d regional credit cooperatives; but m o r e t h a n j u s t a credit institution, it was to provide appropriate e d u c a t i o n a n d aid in the improvem e n t of rural life. M e m b e r s of local credit societies, m o d e l e d o n t h e G e r m a n Raiffeisen system, could be m e m b e r s of agrarian c o m m u n i -

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ties, small landowners, renters, sharecroppers, or colonists who did not employ more than five salaried workers. Legislation also provided for regional cooperative organizations of large property owners. 15 Marte R. Gómez, who helped launch the BNCA, would later complain bitterly about the "egotistical, lazy, opportunistic" large property owners, who failed to establish even one regional credit cooperative. Profitable operations with such cooperatives might have helped the BNCA offset the costly work of providing credit to the peasantry. As it was, the landlords had no need for cooperativism; they received BNCA money almost from its inception. Special loans were given to generals or other important persons for the improvement of their haciendas or to purchase new land. Some of the earliest recipients of these credits were General A b u n d i o Gómez, G e n e r a l J. Gonzalo Escobar, T o m á s Robinson Bours, and Bias Valenzuela. G e n e r a l O b r e g ó n was at t h e top of the list, p u r c h a s i n g t h e R i c h a r d s o n Company lands in Sonora with government aid. In the next few years, General J o a q u í n Amaro and Luis L. León n u m b e r e d a m o n g the recipients of loans. 16 If generals and capitalists favored by the regime received their cañonazos, peasant societies received relatively little aid. In 1926, the BNCA organized 153 local credit societies; many of them soon failed. In 1927, there were 378 local societies with some seventeen thousand members, but this hardly constituted a drop in the bucket for a country with 12.5 million rural dwellers. The problem was that organizing cooperatives and making small-scale loans was not profitable, and the BNCA lost money on these operations. By 1928, it had lent 28 million pesos to private parties as opposed to 6 million pesos in credits to local cooperatives. Profits registered for 1926 t h r o u g h 1929 were, according to Marte R. Gómez, not even attributable to agricultural loans but rather to "the benefits of credit pure and simple . . . loans were made for [nonagricultural] purposes, with the idea that meanwhile the credit system would branch out and become firmly rooted, but unfortunately it did not work out that way." After 1929 the institution consistently operated with substantial losses, seemingly because of growing corruption. 1 7 Thus, only a small fraction of peasant agriculturists received government credit or aid. This was not only because of corruption, but also because in a society where the Obregóns, the Calieses, and the Robinsons existed, the flow of capital would always benefit them. Put another way, money, even if distributed widely, tends to reconcéntrate under capitalism, and this process can never benefit the poorer layers of the peasantry. 18 With government-sponsored irrigation projects it was much the

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s a m e story. Calles set t h e p r e c e d e n t of d e d i c a t i n g q u i t e large p e r c e n t ages of t h e f e d e r a l b u d g e t to irrigation projects, a v e r a g i n g 4.4 perc e n t b e t w e e n 1926 a n d 1928 (see T a b l e 7). T h e p e a s a n t s w h o colonized t h e newly o p e n e d lands were e x p e c t e d to f o r m a " m i d d l e class of agriculturists . . . t h e small p r o p e r t y o w n e r s w h o s e i n t e r e s t s a n d aspirations place t h e m between ejidatarios a n d l a r g e l a n d o w n e r s . . . serving as a stimulus by t h e i r e x a m p l e to t h e ejidatarios a n d a b a r r i e r to t h e m o n o p o l i s t i c a m b i t i o n of the latifundistas." T h e i r r i g a t e d l a n d w o r k e d by this a m b i t i o u s r i c h e r p e a s a n t r y was e x p e c t e d to i n c r e a s e agricultural p r o d u c t i o n a n d b e c o m e t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e "agricult u r a l g r e a t n e s s " a n d " o r g a n i c p e a c e " of M e x i c o . 1 9 A l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e critical p r o b l e m s with several of t h e new p r o j e c t s , 2 0 f e d e r a l l y f u n d e d irrigation works h e l p e d p r o d u c e t h e agricultural b o o m of t h e 1950s a n d 1960s. H o w e v e r , Calles's m i d d l e - c l a s s f a r m e r s w e r e chimerical. Financial r e q u i r e m e n t s for colonization were difficult; f a i l u r e to m e e t t h e stipulated p a y m e n t s a f t e r 3 years resulted in loss of the land. Speculation was r a m p a n t ; new l a t i f u n d i a a p p e a r e d ; capitalists p u r c h a s e d l a r g e lots a n d s u b l e t s m a l l e r p a r c e l s t o p e a s a n t s . A l t h o u g h few historical statistics are available o n this process, T a b l e 8 gives a n idea of t h e results of l a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n in t h e g o v e r n m e n t i r r i g a t i o n districts by t h e mid-1940s. Even w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e s e d a t a q u i t e possibly u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of private lands—capitalists r e p u t e d l y c o n c e a l e d t h e e x t e n t of their h o l d i n g s by r e g i s t e r i n g parcels u n d e r n a m e s of various family m e m b e r s o r o t h e r preslanombres—ejidatarios w e r e at a n o b v i o u s d i s a d v a n t a g e w i t h r e s p e c t to p r o p e r t y owners. By 1966, as T a b l e 8 shows, t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of l a n d in t h e i r r i g a t i o n districts h a d b e c o m e even m o r e p r o n o u n c e d . Ejidatarios were m o r e n u m e r o u s b u t on average h a d access to less l a n d . T h e historical t r e n d toward g r e a t e r l a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n clearly indicates that Calles's plan f o r constructive h a r m o n y b e t w e e n latifundistas, p r o s p e r o u s f a r m e r s , a n d p o o r p e a s a n t s b e n e f i t e d o n e class only: t h e capitalist. 2 1 Between 1925 a n d 1928, t h e t h r e a t of r e n e w e d political c o n f l i c t a n d t h e i m p e r a t i v e s of r e g i m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n e c l i p s e d Calles's d e s i r e to slow a n d , if possible, e n d land distribution. In M a r c h 1926, O b r e g ó n , w h o h a d s e e m e d t o r e n o u n c e p o l i t i c s in f a v o r of his S o n o r a n b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s , u n o f f i c i a l l y o p e n e d his c a m p a i g n f o r r e e l e c t i o n to t h e presidency. H e publicly d e c l a r e d t h a t his e l e c t i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e n o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m ; h e sent legal a n d constitut i o n a l initiatives to t h e Congress, a n d s o o n t h e r e was a virtual d u a l p r e s i d e n c y in Mexico City. T h u s b e g a n a struggle f o r p o w e r b e t w e e n callistas a n d o b r e g o n i s t a s that, d e s p i t e variations, w o u l d really e n d only w h e n Calles left t h e c o u n t r y in 1935. T h e a g r a r i a n q u e s t i o n occa-

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sionally assumed a role of some importance in this fight as contenders trotted out more liberal or more conservative versions of agrarian policy for the benefit of their factions. 22 Early 1926 also saw the growth of tensions between the government and the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. When the Ley Calles of June 14 reformed the penal code to deal with religious matters taken up in Article 130 of the Constitution, the Episcopal Committee suspended religious services, and large numbers of peasants in central Mexico went to war against the government. 23 By 1929, when the government and the Catholic hierarchy came to terms, some ninety thousand combatants had lost their lives in a fierce guerrilla war, fought by have-nots against the regime and never officially sanctioned by the Church. O n e Cristero fighter stated: " T h e government is taking everything from us, our maize, our pastures, our little animals and, as if that were not enough, they want us to live like animals, without religion and without God, but this last they will never live to see." T h e Catholic hierarchy proved itself capable of mass manipulation on a scale to rival the government's, cynically using the Cristeros as pawns against the regime's army and agrarista auxiliaries in a struggle that ended up escaping the control of the manipulators.24 The Cristero war, and power struggles within the regime, which already presaged new military rebellions, made it necessary to proceed apace with land grants. Agrarista peasant divisions fought f o r the government against the Cristeros and enabled Calles to stage a preventive coup against Generals A r n u l f o G ó m e z and Francisco Serrano in October 1927. Twenty-five generals and some 150 others were executed by the government, resulting in the convenient elimination of a threat to Obregón's reelection and a reduction in the number of popular presidenciables.25 Tables 1, 2, and 4 give a rough idea of the e f f e c t on land distribution. T h e r e was a 40 p e r c e n t decrease in the amount of land granted by governors' resolution, which may mean that the callistas relied on a backlog of state-level provisional grants to accelerate land grants by presidential resolution and—especially during the critical year 1927—definitive possession. For the entire 4 years of the Calles presidency, land granted by presidential resolution was up by 91 percent, and the number of beneficiaries by 126 percent, over the years 1920-1924. During the period 1924-1929, the government supported various regional peasant organizations, generally known as L e a g u e s o f Agrarian Communities ( L C A ) . This had risks attached to the obvious benefits: the leagues might either challenge the regime's policies or serve as independent power bases f o r the regional politicians who sponsored them. O n e such f i g u r e was Emilio Portes Gil, whose

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national political p r o m i n e n c e originated partly in his sponsorship o f the L e a g u e o f Agrarian Communities in Tamaulipas. A n o t h e r important case was Adalberto T e j e d a o f Veracruz, who had a r m e d peasant militias linked to the local peasant league and responsible to him as g o v e r n o r o f t h e state. T h r o u g h p e a s a n t l e a d e r U r s u l o Galvan h e m a i n t a i n e d ties with the M e x i c a n Communist Party ( P C M ) , and an effort was m a d e to e x t e n d the local LCA's i n f l u e n c e to o t h e r states through t h e National Peasant League ( L N C ) , f o u n d e d in N o v e m b e r 1926. N e i t h e r O b r e g o n n o r Calles had any o b j e c t i o n s to using t h e C o m m u n i s t Party for his own political-electoral purposes during this period when Stalin and the C o m i n t e r n were in a conservative phase. After 1 9 2 8 , when the latter entered their T h i r d P e r i o d phase o f ultraleft adventurism, the tejedistas broke with the PCM and the Portes Gil g o v e r n m e n t s u p p r e s s e d t h e party a n d s e v e r e d r e l a t i o n s with t h e Soviet U n i o n . Nevertheless, b e f o r e 1 9 3 0 the r e g i m e was m o r e o r less f o r c e d by circumstances to distribute substantial land and give s o m e f r e e play to regional forces for peasant organization. T h e latter, as in t h e case o f the tejedistas, sometimes moved to the left o f the governm e n t . However, they never seriously t h r e a t e n e d b o u r g e o i s property o r political rule and ultimately could not sustain i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m the regime.26 Although agrarian reform and peasant organization were important political tools for the regime, pressures to slow the distribution o f lands also built during this period. T h e e c o n o m i c crisis b e g i n n i n g in 1 9 2 6 impaired the government's finances, and payment on t h e foreign debt was suspended. International, primarily U.S., bankers, and t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , pressured Mexico, but there was n o b l o o d to be g o t t e n out o f the turnip. In 1927, therefore, the U n i t e d States decide d to take a softer approach and sent Dwight Morrow to M e x i c o as ambassador. Morrow's j o b was to deal with the p r o b l e m s o f the petrol e u m law, the international debt, and the religious question. Less conf r o n t a t i o n a l than his predecessors, he easily won Calles over. S o o n t h e Mexican S u p r e m e Court ruled that oil legislation would not b e retroactive, the law itself was modified, and Morrow's p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r fiscal austerity were a c c e p t e d . 2 7 M e x i c o n e e d e d to renew payment on its foreign debt in o r d e r to b e eligible for new loans, and Morrow, an international b a n k e r himself, wanted to see those payments resumed and M e x i c o in a position to borrow again. His plans involved measures to r e d u c e the internal public debt, a n d a rather large share o f the b u r d e n for this was to rest o n t h e M e x i c a n peasantry, who would have to f o r g o f u r t h e r l a n d g r a n t s in view o f the supposedly large onus that c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r e x p r o p r i a t e d l a n d was p l a c i n g o n t h e f e d e r a l b u d g e t . C a l l e s c o n c u r r e d with this arrangement; he himself had c o m e to the c o n c l u s i o n

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that the ejido policy was undermining Mexican agriculture and economy. Peasant agriculture, according to the jefe máximo, was unproductive, and the continuing expropriations made for an undesirable climate of insecurity; large landowners were therefore reluctant to invest in their holdings. Calles liked to blame the ejido, as well as the process of the land distribution itself, for the stagnation in agricultural production since the turn of the century. It was true that the threat of expropriation caused an insecurity not propitious to agricultural investment; but this was the responsibility of the bonapartist leaders and their insistence on control, legality, and full guarantees for private property. An agrarian revolution carried out by the peasantry, as the Zapatista e x p e r i e n c e showed, would have m a d e a much q u i c k e r and less ambiguous j o b of it. Members of the regime who continued to defend the ejido—people like Marte R. Gómez and Emilio Portes Gil—had certainly never been in favor of agrarian revolution; but they accepted the disadvantages of a slow, bureaucratically implemented reform as part of the price that had to be paid for the simultaneous guarantee of private property and political stability. As for the p u r p o r t e d role of the ejidatarios, the poorest layers of the peasantry seldom have access to the resources necessary for productivity, so that the land distribution may in fact have contributed to the decline in production. However, Calles's interpretation of Mexico's agricultural and economic ills glossed over other equally important factors. The revolution itself had interrupted economic activity all over the country. More recently, the Cristero war, with its massive disruption of harvests and high toll of lives, led to a sharp drop in the quantities of basic grains produced. And despite Morrow's contention that the agrarian debt was impeding a balanced budget, agrarian bonds issued up to the end of 1927 totaled less than 27 million pesos, a rather small portion of the public debt. Of course, the minister of finance claimed that the agrarian program had g e n e r a t e d a total floating debt of about 400 million pesos, a somewhat more impressive figure. 2 8 In the final analysis, it was the interests of foreign landlords and the power of the foreign bankers that gave the matter relevance. The first emission of agrarian bonds in 1925 was never followed by another, and with the depreciation of the bonds, government expropriations of Mexican-owned land for the agrarian program became, essentially, confiscations. 29 But the requirements of foreign capital could not be denied, and the paper existence of the debt provided a good pretext for antireform agitation. In April 1927, antireform pressures were given expression in a new agrarian law. Resident hacienda laborers were now explicitly prohibited from receiving ejidos, as were villages with fewer than twenty-

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five p e r s o n s e l i g i b l e f o r g r a n t s . T h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e j u n t a s a p p o i n t e d to take the agrarian censuses was c h a n g e d to i n c l u d e a representative of the affected landowners, s o m e t h i n g that h a d n o t b e e n explicit in earlier legislation, wherein the j u n t a s h a d b e e n c o m p o s e d of m e m b e r s of the local agrarian commission, the local ayuntamiento, a n d the pueblo. Clearly, in the earlier situation t h e r e was t h e likelih o o d of p r o l a n d l o r d forces having a voice, but now this was m a n d a t o ry. Separate steps for water grants were still r e q u i r e d , a d d i n g f u r t h e r m o n t h s of bureaucratic proceedings for some villages. Amplifications of ejidos, while now admitted in theory, would not be c o n s i d e r e d f o r 10 years a f t e r the original grant, a n d a m o r a t o r i u m of 5 years was placed on all amplifications. This d o o m e d many pueblos whose first grants h a d b e e n inadequate to a wait of many years b e f o r e their situation had any possibility of b e i n g alleviated. T h e g a p b e t w e e n e j i d o peasants a n d property owners r e m a i n e d e n o r m o u s . Ejidatarios were entitled to receive f r o m 2 to 9 hectares of cropland, d e p e n d i n g on its quality, or f r o m 3 to 10 hectares p e r head of livestock if t h e r e were n o c r o p l a n d s in t h e r e g i o n , o r f r o m 2 to 4 h e c t a r e s of f o r e s t s , o r 1 hectare planted with h e n e q u e n plants plus 4 n o t yet p l a n t e d . Proprietors, on the o t h e r h a n d , were g u a r a n t e e d f r o m 150 hectares of cropland to 2,000 hectares of grazing land, and d i f f e r e n t pieces of p r o p e r ty owned by the same landlord were considered as o n e p r o p e r t y only if they o c c u r r e d in full or in part within a radius of 10 kilometers surr o u n d i n g the village applying for an ejido. Irrigation waters a n d large extensions of commercial plants such as coffee, cacao, a n d r u b b e r were also e x e m p t f r o m expropriation. 3 0 By 1928, p e r h a p s 4 p e r c e n t of all agricultural land h a d b e e n distributed as a result of the agrarian program; only a b o u t 10 p e r c e n t of all h a c i e n d a s , s o m e five t h o u s a n d , h a d b e e n a f f e c t e d , so t h a t t h e l a n d l o r d s w e r e still a p o w e r f u l a n t i r e f o r m f o r c e . V i o l e n c e against agraristas was c o m m o n , p e r p e t r a t e d by h a c e n d a d o s a n d the regime. L a n d l o r d s o f t e n drove off t r o u b l e s o m e p e a s a n t s by b u r n i n g t h e i r dwellings, t h r e a t e n i n g d e a t h to a n y o n e who resisted. In 1925, t h e a r m y i n t e r v e n e d a g a i n s t t h e p e a s a n t r y in M i c h o a c a n , G u e r r e r o , Oaxaca, Tlaxcala, and Puebla, a n d proagrarista general Francisco J. Barbosa was killed. In 1926, the agrarista general Luis Rojas was exec u t e d in P u e b l a , as was t h e l e a d e r of t h e L e a g u e of A g r a r i a n C o m m u n i t i e s in M i c h o a c a n , P r i m o Tapia. In 1927, a n o t h e r p r o a grarista g e n e r a l was assassinated, a n d p e a s a n t s w e r e m a s s a c r e d in Nayarit. In 1929, peasant leader J. G u a d a l u p e R o d r i g u e z a n d nineteen of his comrades were executed by the army in D u r a n g o . 3 1 It is quite possible that f u r t h e r research would e x p a n d the list of atrocities. T h u s , the criteria of Calles, Morrow, a n d t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s tri-

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u m p h e d at the legislative level, and official policies and institutions supported antiagrarista violence. This state of affairs was not reflected in land distribution data only because continuing political struggles and the imperative of institutionalizing the regime made it impractical for the government to suspend agrarian grants immediately.

Notes 1. Meyer (1976: 25). 2. Statement of Calles during his presidential campaign, quoted in Simpson (1937: 89). 3. See Anguiano (1975: 22-23); Meyer, Krauze, and Reyes (1977: 89-90, 151-174); Medin (1982: 18-21); Carr (1981: 194-212); Cordova (1973: 323-324, 327-328); Loyola Diaz (1980: 100-102). It is noteworthy that Calles took a special interest in Mussolini's Italy. See Marte R. Gómez to Calles, August 5, 1930, in Gómez (1978: 282-294), wherein Gómez paints an extremely favorable picture of Italian fascism for Calles's benefit and explicitly states that fascism is preferable to proletarian revolution. 4. Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 9 - 1 0 , 15, 18-22, 30, 79, 97, 104-105); Cordova (1973: 318-320, 351-357, 360-362, 38^-384, 394-400). 5. Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 27). 6. Decreto de 23 abril de 1925, in Fabila (1941: 412-414). 7. Decreto reformando los artículos 22 y 28 del Reglamento Agrario de 10 de abril de 1922, 8 de octubre de 1925, in Fabila (1941: 419-420). 8. See also a precursor, Decreto de 16 de julio de 1925, in Fabila (1941: 416-418). In April 1924, while still a candidate for the presidency, Calles had commented publicly that "the ejidos, as communal property of the pueblos, are . . . the first step toward small rural [private] property" (Cordova, 1973: 335). 9. Ley reglamentaria sobre repartición de tierras ejidales y constitución del patrimonio parcelario ejidal, in Cuadros Caldas (1932: 92-101); see also Simpson (1937: 321-334), who was a strong o p p o n e n t of the law; Gómez (1978: 83-84). 10. For segments of his speech in favor of the law to the Chamber of Deputies, see Silva Herzog (1964: 327-328). 11. Quoted in Simpson (1937: 323). 12. Ley Federal de Colonización, 5 de abril de 1926, in Cuadros Caldas (1932: 73-77). 13. Simpson (1937: 638). 14. Decreto sobre refaccionarios de 31 de julio de 1925, in Cuadros Caldas (1932:219-220). 15. Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 146-153); Markiewicz (1980: 2-3, 13); Gómez (1978: 154-155). 16. Gómez (1978: 154-155); Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 156157). 17. See Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 155-161) for an excellent summary of the problems of the BNCA during the 1920s; Marte R. Gómez, "Memorándum sobre la situación del Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola," AMRG (Marte R. Gómez. Personal archive) (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1), which analyzes the BNCA's financial situation between 1926 and 1941; Markiewicz (1993). For an overview of the government agricultural

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credit system, see Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 748-861). See also Table 24 at the end of this book, which gives an idea of the amount and distribution of BNCA lending. 18. For figures on government credit that theoretically reached the peasantry, see Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 831-847). 19. Calles's reasoning on irrigation and the "middle class" is in Silva Herzog (1964: 336-337). 20. Examples of projects that did not measure up to expectations in terms of area irrigated were the Pabellón Dam in Aguascalientes and the Rio Salado project in Nuevo León; the main problem was the lack of hydrometric studies. See "Comisión Nacional de Irrigación, 1941," in AMRG (1941). T h e Guatimapé, Durango project was a complete failure owing to inaccurate reports on the quality of the soil to be irrigated, which t u r n e d out to be unsuitable for cultivation after 1.6 million pesos had already been spent. See Sterrettand Davis (1928: 165-166). 21. Krauze, Meyer, a n d Reyes (1977: 1 3 4 - 1 4 5 ) ; see Wilkie (1970: 134—135) for figures on federal expenditure for irrigation; for general histories of irrigation policy see Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 862-905) and Orive Alba (1970). O n federal colonization of the irrigation districts, see Orive Alba (1946: 115-121) and Orive Alba (1970: 199-204). See also Marte R. Gomez's c o m m e n t s on land c o n c e n t r a t i o n in g o v e r n m e n t irrigation districts, in Gómez (1978: 745-746); Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 882-884); and Orive Alba (1970: 212), who comments on the reliability of data for the 1960s. As noted in the text, historical data on the process of land concentration are scarce; regionally and locally focused studies will doubtless expand knowledge on this topic in the future. 22. Medin (1982: 22-23); Meyer, Krauze, and Reyes (1977: 126-127); for the politics of the Obregón-Calles struggle see Loyola Diaz (1980). Obregón claimed in March 1926 that the constitutional prohibition against reelection of the president applied only to consecutive terms. In November, the obregonistas removed all doubt by reforming the Constitution to make this "principle" explicit. See Medin (1982: 23). 23. Meyer, Krauze, and Reyes (1977: 17, 20); Meyer (1976: 43-44). 24. Meyer (1976: 64, 188). This interpretation differs f r o m Meyer's, although it is based on evidence presented in his book; see especially pages 185-188. 25. On the Gómez and Serrano affair, see Meyer, Krauze, a n d Reyes (1977: 134-144); on agrarista auxiliaries against the Cristeros and the government's increased land distribution see Meyer (1976: 106-109, 160-161). 26. On Portes Gil and the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias in Tamaulipas, see Mexico (11); Wilkie/Gómez interview, and Wilkie/Portes Gil interview, both in Wilkie and Wilkie (1969). O n the tejedistas, see Meyer, Krauze, a n d Reyes (1977: 93-96); Falcon (1977). O n t h e C o m m u n i s t Party a n d t h e Comintern, see Meyer, Krauze, and Reyes (1977: 48-51); de Neymet (1981: 33-69); Márquez Fuentes and Rodríguez Araujo (1973: 107-129); Spartacus Youth League (1976: 8-18). 27. For an interpretation of the economic crisis and Morrow's part in its "solution," see Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977). T h e same work treats the petroleum question (pp. 239-253) and Morrow's part in the religious conflict (pp. 270-275). 28. On the public debt and agricultural production, see Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 60-65, 163-169, 217); Meyer (1976: 64-66, 178-180); and Meyer (1978: 35-36). On Calles's attitude toward the ejido as opposed to the regime's proponents of agrarian reform, see Meyer (1978: 230-231).

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29. Luna Arroyo and Alcerreca (1982: 227-229); Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 32-34). Eventually, the Mexican government was forced to pay millions in c o m p e n s a t i o n for lands e x p r o p r i a t e d f r o m U.S. capitalists (see Chapter 9 of this book). 30. See "Ley de Dotaciones . . of April 23, 1927, in Fabila (1941: 449-475). Also see the law of August 11, 1927, which reforms slighdy some of the specified surface areas for both ejidatarios and property owners, in Fabila (1941:476-501). 31. See Table 6 in this book; Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 118-122, 128-130); Falcon (1977: 52); author interview with Dionisio Encina.

5

The Maximato: Crisis and Repression

If we want to be sincere we must confess . . . that agrarianism . . . is a failure. The happiness of men cannot be assured by giving them a parcel of land if they lack the preparation and the necessary elements to cultivate it. . . . On the contrary, this road will lead us to disaster, because we are creating pretensions and encouraging indolence. It is interesting to observe the large n u m b e r of ejidos in which the land is not cultivated and, nevertheless, it is proposed that they be enlarged. Why? If the ejido is a failure, it is useless to amplify it. If, on the other hand, the ejido is a success, then it should have the money necessary to buy the additional lands that are needed, and thus free the nation from having to spend more money and make more promises to pay. . . . What we must do is draw the line and not continue on in our failures. . . . What was done during the struggle in the name of the supreme necessity of survival should be left as it is. The pariah who seized his parcel of land should keep it. But at the same time we have to do something about the present situation. . . . Each state government should fix a relatively short period of time during which communities that still have the right to ask for lands may exercise this right; and, once this period has expired, not one more word on the subject. Afterward we should give guarantees to everyone, to the small farmer as well as the large landowner, so that initiative and public and private credit will be revived. —Plutarco Elias Calles 1 These remarks represented Calles's perspective o n the agrarian program and at the same time reflected his c o n t e m p t for the "pariahs" w h o had f o u g h t the Revolution. O n c e again, however, his desire to halt land distribution was frustrated by the threat of political instability. Obregon's assassination in July 1928 after his election to a s e c o n d term as president left a void that was not easily filled. "El caudillo" had b e e n the only personality capable of uniting the diverse cliques vying for power. In his absence, this task fell to Calles. Obviously, h e

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could not b e c o m e president; already, discontented obregonistas were accusing him of responsibility for their c h i e f s demise. H e did i n t e n d to institutionalize his control of the presidency. His vehicle f o r this jefatura máxima was the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), a loose c o n f e d e r a t i o n of regional parties f o r m e d in J a n u a r y 1929, which h e would head. 2 In 1935, Calles's scheme e n d e d in failure a n d exile, b u t d u r i n g the p e r i o d f r o m O b r e g ó n ' s d e a t h to 1935, his power h a d n o equal in Mexico. Thus, this period will be treated as a unit, a l t h o u g h it s p a n n e d the presidencies of Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, a n d Abelardo Rodríguez. Portes Gil was chosen as provisional president n o t because of his reputation as a s u p p o r t e r of agrarian reform, but because h e was an obregonista who was loyal to Calles a n d a civilian whose t e m p o r a r y presence in the seat of power could ameliorate rivalries a m o n g the n u m e r o u s i m p o r t a n t generals. Thus, h e was a candidate of conciliation on whom Calles could rely at a time when his p r i m e c o n c e r n was the election of a new full-term president who would b e easily m a n i p u lated by the j e f e máximo f r o m his post as head of the PNR. Portes Gil, however, had every intention of t u r n i n g this o p p o r t u n i t y to his own advantage; the Constitution at that time would have allowed his election f o r a r e g u l a r t e r m as p r e s i d e n t even a f t e r serving as i n t e r i m executive. His t r u m p card, o n e which h e h a d used successfully in Tamaulipas, was the distribution of lands a n d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of peasant a n d worker organizations loyal to the his g o v e r n m e n t . 3 T h e political events of the m o m e n t — t h e Cristero war c o n t i n u e d , a rebellion of discontented obregonistas was forecast, a n d t h e r e was p o t e n tially serious opposition to the callistas in the u p c o m i n g presidential election—favored Portes Gil's strategy. W h e n Calles w a n t e d to limit ejidal grants, Portes Gil replied, according to his own account: Look, General, I have to give more lands than you did because within three or four months we are going to have a revolution o n top of us, and I have the obligation of demonstrating to the campesinos that I am just as revolutionary as you are. Part of the army is going to rebel against me and I'm going to n e e d the campesinos as substitutes for the army. 4

An idea of the organized peasant forces the g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d c o m m a n d at this m o m e n t is given by Portes Gil's travel plans in t h e event of a rebel victory. H e would flee Mexico City to Hidalgo, w h e r e C o l o n e l Matías R o d r í g u e z h a d ten t h o u s a n d a r m e d c a m p e s i n o s u n d e r his c o m m a n d , t h e n t h r o u g h San Luis Potosí, w h e r e S a t u r n i n o Cedillo's military colonists n u m b e r e d f i f t e e n t h o u s a n d , a n d o n to Tamaulipas, where h e himself could c o u n t on a n o t h e r fifteen t h o u -

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sand armed agraristas. For his part, Calles was perhaps the more willing to go along with Portes Gil for his own political reasons. He may have actually encouraged the rebellion he knew was coming in order to rid himself of political dissidents and consolidate his own position as jefe máximo of the regime. The loyalty of the land reform peasantry would act as further insurance for his plans. 5 Portes Gil distributed lands rapidly, signing presidential resolutions at approximately twice Calles's rate (see Tables 1 and 2). He also made propagandistic and military preparations for the rebellion. In January 1929, he authorized the formation of the defensas agrarias, which were militias of the peasantry based in the ejidos and responsible to the federal government. 6 That same month, an agrarian congress took place in San Luis Potosí. It was presided over by Portes Gil's secretary of agriculture, Marte R. Gómez, and three h u n d r e d delegates were present from the ejidos and military colonies. 7 T h e government needed a lot of goodwill, because agrarista auxiliaries— some twenty-frve thousand by one estimate—were already fighting the stalemated war against the Cristeros and desertions were r u n n i n g high in the army. The Cristero war was at a crucial phase; there was a possibility that José Vasconcelos, an independent candidate for the presidency, might form an alliance with the Cristero leaders. Dwight Morrow expressed the fears of both the Mexican regime and the U.S. government when he reported: It is the general opinion among the better class of Mexicans here that unless the Mexican g o v e r n m e n t is able to e x t e r m i n a t e the marauding bands of "Cristeros" which infest the surrounding country, or c o m e to some agreement with the Church whereby religious services may be resumed, the possibility of a return to normal conditions is very remote. 8

In retrospect, the "better class of Mexicans" had little to fear— except, perhaps, the continued existence of armed peasant militias after the immediate excitement died down. The Escobar Rebellion, which began in March 1929, was defeated by May with the aid of the peasantry at a cost of 125 million pesos and two thousand lives. The United States government, which was so strident about the need for internal economies that would enable Mexico to pay back its foreign debt, was more than willing to supply arms, munitions, and even airc r a f t to P o r t e s Gil a n d to allow f l e x i b l e t e r m s of p a y m e n t . In September, the government came to terms with the Catholic hierarchy and organized the disarmament of the Cristeros. 9 Although Portes Gil was a partisan of land reform, there were definite limits to his agrarian fervor. In January 1929, his government

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reinterpreted the status of resident hacienda laborers, giving official sanction to precapitalist labor relations that the regime supposedly wanted to extirpate: resident laborers received wages or wages plus food, and occupied houses owned by landlords without paying rent. 1 0 Portes Gil also dissolved the local agrarian commissions in Morelos and the Federal District, thus "drawing the line" as Calles wished. 11 Dismantling the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for land distribution, even in these two zones where a relatively large proportion of rural dwellers had received ejidal grants, was a clear signal that the regime intended to end the land reform as soon as possible. Graphic evidence of what the regime would do if the peasant movement threatened to get out of hand was provided by the arrest and assassination of J. Guadalupe Rodriguez in May 1929. A leader of t h e N a t i o n a l P e a s a n t L e a g u e a n d m e m b e r of t h e M e x i c a n Communist Party, Rodriguez commanded peasant forces that aided the government in putting down the Escobar Rebellion in Durango. Then, evidently obeying orders from the now ultra-left Comintern, he refused to lay down his arms and attempted a rising against the callista g o v e r n m e n t . Following R o d r i g u e z ' s e x e c u t i o n , P o r t e s Gil b a n n e d the PCM and broke relations with the Soviet Union; many communists were imprisoned. Although Portes Gil always d e n i e d responsibility for the assassination, it was revealed that the orders had come from his secretary of war. Marte R. Gomez was sent to Durango to calm outraged peasants; years later, while still denying the government's responsibility, he commented that Rodriguez had been "shot unnecessarily." Presumably, had the execution been "necessary," it would have been defensible. The upshot of these events was a blow on the eve of the economic crisis to both labor and the organized peasantry, which would make it easier for Calles to implement his antireform policies. 12 During the presidency of Ortiz Rubio, Calles had his opportunity to implement the agrarian program agreed upon by Morrow and the m o r e conservative members of the regime. T h e Cristero war was essentially over, and reforms in the structure of the armed forces m a n d a t e d the rotation of t h e top generals a m o n g the d i f f e r e n t regional posts, so that the likelihood of their building the local followings so conducive to rebellion was diminished. Thus, for the moment, the regime had no need to call on armed agraristas for support. The world economic crisis that began in 1929 caused unemployment and hardship among vast sectors of the working class, but did not immediately increase rural unrest. For the moment, the rural poor merely tried to cope with their increasing misery as the unemployed, including tens of thousands of Mexican workers who were forced out of the United States during this period, returned to their

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home villages to share in the meager subsistence economy. With relative peace prevailing, Calles's advantages—his strong political power in the center, and the conservatism of the army officers, whose loyalty was now more secure—could be brought into play. As yet, elements within the regime more committed to land distribution were unable to consolidate their regional forces at the national level. 13 Ortiz Rubio seemed to fit the j e f e máximo's specifications for a president who could be dominated from behind the scenes. H e was an old maderista who had been out of the country f o r some 7 years; thus, he had acceptable revolutionary antecedents but had no power base of his own, no recent political involvement, and no enemies. When Ortiz Rubio was unwilling to play by all of Calles's rules, conflict ensued among the contenders for power, and the president was eventually f o r c e d to resign. 14 It is significant that Ortiz Rubio and Galles had no differences on the subject of agrarian reform; agreement on this matter did not prevent the former's decline. In the final analysis, the reform, seemingly so important an issue, played a small part in the immediate political struggles at the top, in spite of the e f f o r t s of politicians like Portes Gil to use it as a s p r i n g b o a r d to power. Shrewder políticos—Lázaro Cárdenas is a g o o d example, in view o f his later p r o m i n e n c e as an a g r a r i a n r e f o r m e r — f o r the moment supported Calles's every move. 15 T h e propaganda offensive began in January 1930. El Nacional r e p o r t e d that social pressure in favor o f the agrarian r e f o r m was diminishing. This no doubt would have c o m e as a surprise to the armed peasants of Veracruz, who were supporting the rapid land distribution carried out by Governor Adalberto Tejeda. 1 6 T o w a r d the e n d o f the m o n t h , Calles r e t u r n e d f r o m a tour o f E u r o p e and declared that the agrarian reform should come to an end. 1 7 Soon, Ortiz Rubio followed the propaganda with action. H e continued the process begun by Portes Gil of dismantling local agrarian c o m m i s s i o n s . In May 1930, he o r d e r e d the N a t i o n a l A g r a r i a n C o m m i s s i o n to fix a p e r i o d o f 60 days d u r i n g w h i c h villages in Aguascalientes that had not solicited agrarian grants could d o so. O n c e these had been dealt with, the local agrarian commission would be dissolved. W h e n Ortiz Rubio resigned, similar action had been taken in twelve states.18 Land distribution had essentially stopped at the national level; the president signed no new grants but merely cleared the implementation of those already approved by Portes Gil. Governors' resolutions vastly exceeded actions taken nationally, and the number of presidential resolutions was sharply down (see Tables 1 and 2 ) . Clearly, important elements o f the bonapartist r e g i m e , which claimed to guarantee the legitimate interests of both capitalists and laborers but would never tolerate any social transformation that

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was perceived as a possible threat to capitalist property relations, still planned to reverse even the limited rights won by the peasantry as a result of years of armed struggle. 19 Modifications to the agrarian law of January 1929 followed this line, which might be considered a minimum interpretation of Article 27 of the Constitution. A liberal definition of resident hacienda laborer was retained in an effort to guarantee an adequate work force for the estates. Landlords could now protect themselves by formulating contracts for their workers that specified the status of acasillado (resident), thus eliminating the possibility of an agrarian grant. 2 0 T h e same decree granted exemption from agrarian grants to lands planted with a wide variety of cash and plantation crops. Calles and Ortiz Rubio wanted the complete elimination of ejido amplifications, but others—notably Portes Gil and Luis L. León—argued against such a radical step from the point of view of political stability. T h e decree therefore made amplifications conditional: ejido communities requesting more land were required to prove they were making efficient use of what they had, and they must pay for new land up front, in cash. 21 In September 1931, Ortiz Rubio declared in his annual report to Congress that two-thirds of all villages with a right to land had now petitioned for grants. This showed, according to the president, that the cancellation of the reform in twelve states flowed naturally from the fulfillment of the Revolution's c o m m i t m e n t s , not f r o m reactionary or antiagrarista policies. But as Ortiz Rubio's presidency weakened under pressure from Calles, he was less able to serve as bulwark against sectors of the regime who had committed themselves to continuing land distribution in an effort to wrest political power from the Sonoran dynasty. A few governors—Tejeda in Veracruz, Arroyo Ch. in Guanajuato, Cárdenas in Michoacán—were still distributing lands in their own states by halting agrarian proceedings at the gubernatorial level, thus denying the national executive the opportunity to reverse positive d e c i s i o n s . 2 2 Ortiz R u b i o was n e v e r a b l e to p r e s e n t to Congress legislation that, it was rumored, would have required immediate cash payment for all expropriated lands. Proreform legislators won an equally significant victory over the conservatives when they passed reforms of Article 10 of the Law o f j a n u a r y 6, 1915 specifically p r o h i b i t i n g any " o r d i n a r y legal r e c o u r s e or t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y [recourse] of amparo" to landlords affected by the land reform. This eliminated an important tool of the hacendados against expropriation. 23 Not all victories went to the agraristas, for Ortiz Rubio did promulgate a law permitting the imprisonment of state functionaries and members of the National Agrarian Commission who sabotaged his agrarian policy. However, the measure was vigorously protested by

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proreform forces. 2 4 Finally, Ortiz Rubio resigned in S e p t e m b e r 1932, and Abelardo Rodríguez was appointed president. In d e f e r e n c e to agrarista opinion, Rodriguez immediately repealed the ortizrubista legislation specifying jail terms for recalcitrant agrarista functionaries. 2 5 Rodriguez, already a millionaire by the time he b e c a m e president, was not a conspicuous partisan of the agrarian conservatives, although he had more in common with them than with the agraristas. Above all, he was loyal to Calles, and this earned him the presidency, which he administered in cooperation with the j e f e m á x i m o . 2 6 T h e loyal regency of Rodriguez provided a veneer of stability for the m o r e open political situation that resulted from Calles's failure to control Ortiz Rubio through the mechanism of the m a x i m a t o / P N R . 2 7 T h a t Calles had been unable to institutionalize his rule meant opportunity for proreform forces, who stepped up the debate on the agrarian question and won some victories over the conservatives. At the same t i m e , t h e impulse toward i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e b o n a p a r t i s t regime, if not of the maximato itself, continued apace. This left less room for any i n d e p e n d e n t agrarian action outside of that regime, now increasingly identified with the PNR. T h e greater clout of the agraristas, as well as the continuing flood o f petitions for ejidos, led the Rodriguez government to take some steps that proreform forces considered favorable to the peasantry. Amplifications of ejidos were reinstated: immediate enlargement of ejidal grants was authorized in cases where the National Agrarian Commission declared a deficit of parcels. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t that 10 years must pass before an amplification could be considered was now dropped. 2 8 Article 27 of the Constitution was reformed to include the recently legislated prohibition against the use of the amparo in land expropriation proceedings. 2 9 Deadlines for agrarian petitions in the states established during the Ortiz R u b i o g o v e r n m e n t were c a n c e l l e d . 3 0 Lands were distributed at a p a c e rivaling that o f t h e Portes Gil government (see Tables 1 and 2). Still, many victories continued to go to the landlords. Article 5 3 o f the Agrarian Code o f March 1934 posited the establishment o f ejidal districts on lands donated by the local landlords who would otherwise be affected by agrarian proceedings. T h e s e districts were to be c r e a t e d in areas w h e r e t h e n a t u r e o f the c r o p s raised p r e v e n t e d "good yields within the agricultural-ejidal regimen normally mandated by this code." Landowners used the ejidal districts to try to avoid expropriation. For example, in La Laguna, Rodríguez d e c r e e d the formation of ejidal districts outside the prime agricultural areas, then declared the entire zone exempt from the agrarian reform. This took place at the initiative of the local landlords, who were threatened with

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agrarian a n d syndical agitation. 3 1 T h e material a n d political f o u n d a tions of local attempts at agrarian reform that were perceived as too i n d e p e n d e n t , a n d thus a potential threat to the institutionalization of the regime, were also quashed. T h e ultimate goal was the i n c o r p o r a tion of all regional movements into the PNR. Most worrisome to the regime was the agrarian m o v e m e n t of the tejedistas in Veracruz. T h e e s t r a n g e m e n t in 1929 of t h e i r n a t i o n a l organization, the National Peasant League (LNC), from the C o m m u n i s t Party h a d s t r e n g t h e n e d T e j e d a ' s own p o s i t i o n w i t h i n V e r a c r u z ; with t h e b a c k i n g of t h e p e a s a n t militias l i n k e d to t h e L e a g u e of Agrarian C o m m u n i t i e s a n d the s u p p o r t of t h e chief of operations of the federal army in Veracruz, General Miguel Acosta, h e distributed m o r e lands than ever b e f o r e a n d p r o m u l g a t e d legislation requiring owners of m o r e than 50 hectares to rent uncultivated lands to campesinos on d e m a n d . Tejeda's g o v e r n m e n t never exceeded what might be t h o u g h t of as a m a x i m u m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Article 27 of the Constitution, a n d his popular front-style politics p r o d u c e d n o global threat to bourgeois property relations, a l t h o u g h his policies a n d laws w e r e f r e q u e n t l y i n c o n v e n i e n t f o r l o c a l c a p i t a l i s t s a n d involved the partial e x p r o p r i a t i o n of s o m e l a n d h o l d i n g s . However, T e j e d a ' s popularity a n d s t r e n g t h in Veracruz m a d e him a possible candidate for the presidency, and the existence of his a r m e d militias, which were s u b o r d i n a t e to but not completely controlled by the federal army, were an obstacle to regime centralization a n d institutionalization. Thus, the callistas d e t e r m i n e d to bring T e j e d a a n d his organization to heel. General Acosta, who had collaborated with T e j e d a , was replaced with General Eulogio Ortiz, who could be trusted to implem e n t t h e wishes of the federal g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e were new splits within the Liga Nacional Campesina, probably e n c o u r a g e d by Emilio Portes Gil a n d Lázaro Cárdenas, both close to the PNR a n d p e r h a p s even at this early d a t e (1931) a n t i c i p a t i n g a C á r d e n a s p r e s i d e n t i a l candidacy in 1933-1934. O n e of the groups to e m e r g e f r o m the ruptures, the LNC "Ursulo Galván" associated with C á r d e n a s , b e g a n a national organizing campaign, convening state congresses of peasant organizations to unify the peasant leagues a n d choose delegates f o r a national convention. Toward the e n d of 1932, the Rodriguez governm e n t b e g a n f o r c i n g i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e callista Law of E j i d o Patrimony of 1925 to divide the cooperative ejidos of Veracruz a n d thus deprive the tejedistas of o n e of their organizational tools. Tejedismo was definitively b r o k e n by the central g o v e r n m e n t in J a n u a r y 1933, when the campesino militias were disarmed—by o r d e r s of General Calles a n d the minister of war, General Lázaro Cárdenas. Following the d i s a r m a m e n t of the Veracruz militias a n d t h e political

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destruction of tejedismo by the PNR, hacendados began to recover their expropriated lands, and many hundreds of agrarista peasants were assassinated by federal troops and the guardias blancas. O n e proprietor, Manuel Parra, maintained a private army known as the Black H a n d which, d u r i n g the C á r d e n a s p r e s i d e n c y a n d into t h e 1940s, protected the interests of the landlords o f the central Veracruz sierra. Parra had close connections with General Pablo Quiroga, who was his business p a r t n e r and a f o r m e r s e c r e t a r y o f war, a n d with Veracruz governor Gonzalo Vázquez Vela. Campesino militias were also disarmed in Jalisco, Guanajuato, Puebla, and Y u c a t á n , w h e r e peasants resisted the army, thirty-eight were killed, seven wounded, and twenty arrested. A m o n g the militias left intact w e r e t h o s e o f S a t u r n i n o C e d i l l o in San Luis P o t o s í a n d S a t u r n i n o O s o r i o in Querétaro, peasant groups whose conservative leaders were on friendly terms with Cárdenas. These and other similar local peasant organizations provided the nucleus for the c r e a t i o n in May 1 9 3 3 o f the Mexican Peasant Confederation ( C C M ) , which was instrumental in advancing Cárdenas's candidacy for president. 3 2

Notes 1. Comments made by Calles to El Universal, J u n e 23, 1930, cited in Cordova (1974: 21-23). 2. For excellent discussions of the politics of this period see Medin (1982) and Loyola Diaz (1980). For the creation of the PNR see Medin (1982: 29-42); Loyola Diaz (1980: 123-125; 165). 3. See Medin (1982: 3 6 - 3 8 , 5 9 - 6 0 ) ; Loyola Diaz (1980: 1 1 1 - 1 1 4 ) ; Meyer (1978: 238); Hernández Chávez (1979: 84); Mexico (11, 12, 13); Markiewicz (1993). 4. Wilkie/Portes Gil interview, in Wilkie and Wilkie (1969: 513). See also Medin (1982: 53-54). For opposition in the elections, see Meyer (1976: 64-66); Loyola Diaz (1980: 127-130, 132-133). 5. This interpretation is suggested by Medin (1982: 5 9 - 6 0 ) . 6. Medin (1982: 60); Loyola Diaz (1980: 130-131). 7. Medin (1982: 60). 8. Meyer (1976: 64-66, 106-109, 160-161); Loyola Diaz (1980: 141). 9. Krauze, Meyer, and Reyes (1977: 78); Loyola Diaz (1980: 130-131, 140-145); Meyer (1976: 64-66). 10. Decreto de 17 de enero de 1929, in Fabila (1941: 505-510). 11. Meyer (1978: 217). 12. See Falcon (1977: 5 2 - 5 3 ) ; Gómez (1975: 325); Shulgovski (1968: 220-221). Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 63-64, 138-139) note that partly owing to the silence of the PCM itself, the full extent of the repression of 1929 and its cost in lives is unknown. See, however, Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez Léon (1078: 316-317) for information on the repression of the PCM during this time period in La Laguna, culled from an interview with an old PCM militant. 13. See Meyer (1978: 9 - 9 8 , 232-233, 2 3 5 - 2 3 9 ) ; Carreras de Velasco

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(1974: 125-127, 173-176); H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979: 167-171); Cordova (1980: 83-85). 14. See Loyola Diaz (1980: 134-135); Medin (1982: 43-44, 74-95), who gives an excessively glowing picture of Ortiz Rubio but an extremely helpful account of the politics surrounding his election and resignation. 15. See Medin (1982: 129-144). 16. Meyer (1978: 217); Falcon (1977: 47-91). 17. Medin (1982:96-97). 18. Meyer (1978: 217-220). These included Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala, Zacatecas, Coahuila, Q u e r é t a r o , Nuevo L e ó n , a n d Chihuahua. 19. Besides Calles's declarations about the need to end the reform, declarations of other members of the regime indicated similar thinking. See Medin (1982:97-99). 20. Medin (1982: 99-100) fixes this in the Ortiz Rubio period, but as we have seen, the same impulse was present in Portes Gil's January 1929 law. For an informative case study showing how landlords could use some of these legal measures to block or delay expropriation, see the case of the pueblo of Agua Caliente, Contepec, Michoacán, vs. the Hacienda de Bravo y Anexas, recounted in Meyer (1978: 178-182). 21. "Decreto por el cual se modifica la Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas de 21 de marzo de 1929," December 26, 1930, in Fabila (1941: 536-539). See the insightful comments of Medin (1982: 97-103) and Meyer (1978: 210, 221-222) on this topic. 22. Meyer (1978: 219-220, 235-236); Medin (1982: 133-134). 23. See "Decreto que reforma el Artículo 10 de la Ley Agraria de 6 de enero de 1915," December 23, 1931, in Fabila (1941: 541-543); also Chapter 15 of this book. 24. Meyer (1978: 222-223). 25. Medin (1982: 104-115, 121); Meyer (1978: 223-224). 26. On Rodriguez's personal fortune, which included investments in horse racing, casinos, and brothels in the border cities, and in real estate, food processing, and banking, see Hansen (1971: 159). On his loyalty to Calles and the nature of his presidency see Medin (1982: 121-123). 27. See Medin (1982: 111). 28. "Decreto que reforma la Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas," December 27, 1932, in Fabila (1941: 544-545); Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 64). 29. "Decreto que reforma el Artículo 27 de La Constitución de 1917," December 30, 1933, in Fabila (1941: 547-555). See also Chapter 15 of this book. 30. They were canceled in July 1933. See Meyer (1978: 224). 31. Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez León (1978: 317); Fabila (1941: 579-580). 32. For the rise and fall of tejedismo, see Falcon (1977) a n d Salamini (1971). Lázaro Cárdenas's part in the affair is mentioned in Falcon (1977: 100, 117) a n d S a l a m i n i (1971: 116). See also Meyer (1978: 2 2 4 - 2 2 5 , 234-240). O n Parra's Black Hand and the resurgence of landlord power and t e r r o r i s m in V e r a c r u z a f t e r t h e d i s a r m a m e n t , see F a l c o n ( 1 9 7 7 : 127, 146-150) and Salamini (1971: 131-132). For comments on other agrarista governors of the time, see Meyer (1978: 238-239); for the disarming of independent campesino militias in other states, see Meyer (1978: 251-252). For

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the CCM and Cardenas's candidacy, see Medin (1982: 134-135); Salamini (1971: 131-132). The CCM became today's National Peasant Confederation (CNC).

PART 2

Cardenismo, Agrarian Reform, and Regime Institutionalization

6

Cárdenas and Cardenismo

Mexican history from 1934 to 1940 is dominated by the quasi-mythical f i g u r e of L á z a r o C á r d e n a s . " L á z a r o C á r d e n a s , M e x i c a n Democrat," "Tata Lázaro," Cárdenas's "Reconquest of Mexico"— these phrases label the images of the period that consistently come to mind. Cárdenas, champion of the Mexican "people," rid the country of the archreactionary Calles, tool of foreign imperialism; he distributed land to the peasantry, c o n f r o n t i n g and vanquishing the evil landlords who still dominated the rural landscape; he was a friend to the workers, encouraging their movements toward organization and unification; and he wounded the Goliaths of British and U.S. imperialism when he expropriated the foreign-owned oil holdings. Head of the "democratic, anti-imperialist forces" that led the "anti-imperialist liberation movement," he briefly pushed the Mexican Revolution to a point that "objectively surpassed the limits of capitalism." T h e portraits of Cárdenas himself run the gamut from friendly admiration to blatant hero worship. 1 Cárdenas, to be sure, had and has his enemies among those who lost their property or their political power during his administration. But the bourgeoisie survived, the ostensible unity of the regime prevailed, and today, safely 6 feet under, he is accorded his place in the official pantheon alongside the likes of Hidalgo, Morelos, Juárez, and Madero. 2 Of perhaps greater consequence is the virtually unanimous adulation accorded Cárdenas by the left, testimony to the appeal of reformism and the seemingly perpetual fiction that some reasonable a c c o m m o d a t i o n with the bourgeoisie—elections, n e g o t i a t i o n s — might somehow achieve real social change. U n d e r these circumstances a knowledge of C á r d e n a s ' s background is helpful, for it takes him out of the ether and places him in modern social reality. A provincial petty bourgeois, like many of his generation who came to power, Cárdenas was born in 1895 in the 73

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small town of Jiquilpan, Michoacán. H e had less formal education than many of his future political associates, for he completed only the fourth grade before leaving school as a result of family economic difficulties. From the age of twelve he worked as a clerk, an amanuensis, and a printer; he and a group of fellow workers bought the print shop that e m p l o y e d them, but in 1913 they ran afoul o f the huertistas when they printed a carrancista political manifesto. Cárdenas was forced to leave town or be arrested; he traveled to the Tierra Caliente of Michoacán, where he initiated his military career as a second captain and secretary to General G u i l l e r m o García A r a g ó n . H e was issued a horse and a "30-30" carbine. 3 At the age of 18, Cárdenas thus began the military career that took him to power. It is significant that he fought on the side of the carrancistas and not the villistas or the Zapatistas. As a junior officer in the Constitutionalist army, he directed or took part in 1914 in battles against the Zapatistas in the Federal District, in 1916 and 1917 against the Yaquis who were fighting landlords and authorities in S o n o r a , and in 1917 against the villistas. 4 D u r i n g this p e r i o d , C á r d e n a s b e c a m e the p r o t e g e of P l u t a r c o E l i a s C a l l e s , t h e Constitutionalist general who was h o l d i n g out against José María Maytorena and the villistas in Agua Prieta, Sonora. This close relationship with Calles was fundamental to Cárdenas's c a r e e r as he ascended to brigadier general, major general, chief o f operations of various military zones, g o v e r n o r o f Michoacán, p r e s i d e n t o f the National Executive Committee of the PNR, secretary of war, and finally, president of Mexico. 5 As even this brief overview of his career demonstrates, Cárdenas's personal background was replete with the contradictions of the petty bourgeoisie. His provincial childhood and military assignments in various regions during his youth made him sensitive to the poverty and oppression suffered by the Mexican masses. In spite of his lack of formal education, he acquired what has best been described as a "body of ideas of Marxian flavor," perhaps as a result of his contact with university students in Michoacán in the late 1920s. At the same time, his career and loyalties were inextricably b o u n d up with the bourgeois Constitutionalist regime—"the Revolution"—and the bonapartism of O b r e g ó n and Calles. 6 Cárdenas's social and political background—and his inclination toward reform—were shared by an important element of his political generation. During the early 1930s, as this proreform group began to coalesce, Cárdenas emerged as its leader. T h e cardenistas came to power at a time of economic crisis and social protest. U n d e r their influence, the r e g i m e veered to the left and m a d e consequential changes, i n c l u d i n g a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the a g r a r i a n structure.

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However, as the following chapters will show, popular change was not the most durable result of cardenismo. Both the content and style of their reforms enabled the cardenistas to stabilize the bonapartist regime where Obregón and Calles had failed. The result was not, as some hoped, lasting social progress, but an all too swift renewal of business as usual. The Soviet historian Anatoli Shulgovski, whose work has been widely read in Mexico, made a sharp distinction between the proreform wing of the PNR and more moderate or conservative members of the regime. Despite the failure of cardenismo to enforce lasting popular change, Shulgovski held that "the influence of revolutionary democracy in the government" could lead to "the development of the country along a non-capitalist path." He exhorted the workers' movem e n t of t h e late 1960s to s u p p o r t p r o r e f o r m c u r r e n i s in t h e Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). 7 T h e following chapters will argue against this p o i n t of view, emphasizing the basic political continuity of the regime. 8 Ideological gradients and even sharp conflicts did, of course, exist; Cárdenas, for example, was tolerant of the Communist Party, politicians like Emilio Portes Gil and Marte R. Gómez far less so, and figures like Abelardo L. Rodriguez quite flagrantly anticommunist. These were differences of style and strategy only; all agreed on the paramount importance of regime consolidation and stability. This included Cárdenas, who, as we shall see, deliberately limited worker and peasant struggles. The Mexican capitalist class, like all others, experienced internal competition and dissension over tactics but was firmly united on the issue of p r o p e r t y . T h e ruling party consolidated u n d e r C á r d e n a s , as an increasingly privileged bureaucratic layer and advocate of capital, suffered the same dissension but maintained the same ultimate unity. 9 From the early years, as we have seen, bourgeois revolutionary ranks contained proreform elements. A n u m b e r of factors allowed this left-wing current to implement its program in the 1930s. With the world economic crisis and the coming war, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t became less aggressive toward Latin America; Roosevelt a n n o u n c e d the Good Neighbor Policy, which led to reciprocal trade agreements and a vague commitment to nonintervention. While the U.S. posture on some of Cárdenas's measures—particularly the faster pace of the agrarian reform and the expropriation of foreign oil holdings in 1938—was by no means positive, involving an economic boycott and hostile diplomacy, pressure against them did not m o u n t until late 1937. The U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, had some sympathy f o r C á r d e n a s and believed in preserving capitalism by increasing the purchasing power of the masses. 10 Thus, between 1934 and 1938, the cardenistas had some leeway

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on social reform. They needed it. T h e political crisis of callismo and the economic crisis of 1929, overlapping, could not be confronted by the regime without the intervention of the organized workers and peasants, but this necessitated keeping labor within certain bounds, and friendly to the government. Mass militancy, which had been delivered a blow by the economic crisis and the repression of the Calles years, was never completely crushed; as the economy began to recover, the number of strikes increased. Telegraph, postal, railroad, mining, and oil workers were among those who struck in fundamental sectors of the economy; workers in smaller enterprises, such as shoemakers, taxi drivers, and textile workers, also went out. And for the first time, great numbers of agricultural workers were organized along syndical lines. T h e miserly response of the Rodriguez government, which legislated an insufficient minimum wage and a federal labor law, sparked numerous strikes, and the workers' movement continued to gain momentum and strength. T h e confusion reigning within the labor bureaucracy since the fall of M o r o n e s and the CROM's loss of prestige gave the government some time to maneuver, but clearly the only real solution was concessions to the working class. An improvement in the government's financial situation beginning in 1932 made this an easier proposition. 11 T h e syndical movement, then, was given the green light. But there were limits. Cárdenas himself regarded the labor strike not as a revolutionary weapon but rather as an equilibrating mechanism, which, if properly settled, would strengthen economy and society and allow the reestablishment of good relations between labor and capital.12 H e and other members of the regime also justified the more liberal policy of the government toward strikes by invoking the need for an expanded internal market to boost industrial production and diversification. T h e cardenistas received backing from important elements of the bourgeoisie who agreed with this point of view; in particular, the Banco Nacional de México came out in support of the government's economic strategy.13 Working class organization and the strike were therefore, for the cardenistas, a means of pressuring recalcitrant sectors of the bourgeoisie and of strengthening the position of the bonapartist regime with respect to the capitalists. T h e regime was not about to establish this leverage over the bourgeoisie only to hand over power to the workers and peasants. The latter, too, were to be directed by the government-as-arbiter. Socialism, if spoken of by m o r e radical cardenistas, was something for the distant future. T h e workers' movement was kept within bounds that would not threaten the ultimate hegemony of capital. Like Tejeda's movement in Veracruz, cardenism o inconvenienced important components of the b o u r g e o i s i e —

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particularly foreign—but never overstepped the b o u n d s of a "maximum" interpretation of the Constitution of 1917, which g u a r a n t e e d the right of private property even while allowing t h e g o v e r n m e n t some discretion in its regulation. These factors defined the limits of Cárdenas's política de masas.14 The class struggle would be managed by the government; Cárdenas made this clear even when he most n e e d e d working class support. In response to provocative antilabor declarations m a d e by Calles in J u n e 1935, the Communist-led Unified Syndical Confederation of Mexico (CSUM) i n i t i a t e d the f o r m a t i o n of t h e N a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e f o r Proletarian Defense (CNDP). When the former j e f e máximo returned to Mexico in December 1935 after an exile of 6 months, the CNDP and four thousand electrical workers t h r e a t e n e d to call a general strike to f o r c e Calles to leave t h e c o u n t r y a g a i n , r e m i n d i n g Cárdenas of his campaign promise that h e would arm the workers and peasants against their enemies. Railroad workers, peasants, teachers, a n d s t u d e n t s also p r o t e s t e d a n d d e m a n d e d that Calles leave Mexico. Cárdenas sent telegrams to these groups reading: "I recomm e n d that you dedicate yourselves fully to your ordinary activities and exhort in my name the organizations you represent to abstain f r o m work suspension since it is unnecessary . . . and in view of the negative consequences for the national economy." 1 5 S u p p o r t f o r his government was fine, but a national political strike went outside the b o u n d s of the acceptable. T h e CNDP leadership, which included C o m m u n i s t Party officials like Valentín C a m p a a n d aspiring labor b u r e a u c r a t s like Vicente L o m b a r d o T o l e d a n o , Fidel Velázquez, a n d F e r n a n d o Amilpa, cooperated. Eighty thousand workers, peasants, a n d students demonstrated at the Zócalo in Mexico City on D e c e m b e r 22, 1935, but the demonstration explicitly supported Cárdenas, and there was no general strike. 16 Rather than risk mass labor strikes with the potential to threaten regime stability, the cardenistas preferred to take bureaucratic action against the callistas. In 1934 and 1935, Cárdenas n a m e d loyal generals to important posts in the government and strategic positions in the armed forces. In J u n e 1935, after the publication of Calles's antistrike declarations, Cárdenas fired his mostly callista cabinet. Seeing the writing on the wall, federal legislators, a majority of whom had declared themselves callistas only a few days previously, now claimed to be dyed-in-the-wool cardenistas. Calles a n d many state officials linked to him were expelled f r o m t h e PNR, a n d t h e official press accused the callistas of plotting rebellion. Finally, d u r i n g 1935 a n d 1936, most state governors were replaced by politicians friendly to Cárdenas. 1 7 Clear limits were also set for the workers' movement in the heat

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of the struggle against one of the most militant and outspoken sectors of t h e Mexican b o u r g e o i s i e , t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r s of M o n t e r r e y . Threatened with a labor strike, the bosses shut down their factories in early February 1936. Cárdenas immediately traveled to Nuevo León, where he threatened government intervention to reopen the plants. In a famous declaration, he informed the bourgeoisie of Monterrey that those who were "tired of the social struggle, may hand over their industries to the workers or to the government. That will be patriotic; a lockout will not." 18 At the same time, Cárdenas told eighteen thousand workers: What has been said about the supposed threat to the republic from the organized workers is not true. . . . At this moment, the workers know that . . . within the possibilities of our industry, they have a limit, and that limit has never been exceeded . . . the movements now being carried out by the workers' organizations are merely a social struggle that respects the law and does not alarm the country or the government, because we all know that the objective of the workers is limited to achieving the conquests that are compatible with the productive and financial capacity of business. 1 9

Thus, while the bosses were put on notice that they must make concessions to the workers, the working class was warned n o t to threaten the existence of business by asking for more than the government felt the capitalists could afford. I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s in the early 1930s allowed the cardenistas to court the proletariat and peasantry by supporting syndical and agrarian demands. The railroad system was nationalized and the workers given a hand in its administration. Similar nationalizations were carried out in industry and mining; land distribution increased. Working class and peasant support of the regime in turn allowed Cárdenas to seek increased independence from foreign capital; the most spectacular example was the expropriation in 1938 of sixteen foreign oil companies. This proved to be a brief, if politically significant, interlude. Compensation was paid to the oil companies and foreign landowners, and the debt for the nationalization of the railroads was m a d e good; by 1940, the workers' administrations of the oil industry and railroads were bureaucratized and corrupt, workers' cooperatives largely a failure, and the land reform virtually over. 20 Thus, although the gains of the workers and peasants under cardenismo were o f t e n t o u t e d as m o m e n t o u s , in reality the r e g i m e h a d demonstrated that even at its most radical there were f u n d a m e n t a l popular demands that it could not satisfy and many reforms that it could not guarantee. The most important legacy of cardenismo was political and fully

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in keeping with the evolution of the regime since 1917. T h e transformation in 1938 of the PNR, a loose confederation of regional political g r o u p s w i t h o u t significant or explicit mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i n t o t h e Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), a tightly knit party that compartmentalized organized labor, the peasantry, the military, a n d the m i d d l e sectors a n d tied t h e m closely to an all-powerful p r e s i d e n t , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d t h e b o n a p a r t i s t r e g i m e a n d s t r e n g t h e n e d it. Mexico's f a m e d political stability has owed m u c h to this a r r a n g e m e n t , which, as various writers have n o t e d , ultimately b e n e f i t e d capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . 2 1 T h e leftist-sounding r h e t o r i c of t h e PRM, far f r o m supplying "proof that the democratic-revolutionary circles were trying to . . . p r e s e n t a non-capitalist alternative f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of Mexico," 2 2 proved only that the regime n e e d e d to control the workers a n d peasants. For this purpose, the PRM was an a d m i r a b l e device, even e a r n i n g the approval of the Mexican C o m m u n i s t Party, which considered it to be a "specific form of the p o p u l a r f r o n t suitable to t h e c o n d i t i o n s of Mexico" a n d e n c o u r a g e d workers to j o i n . 2 3 T h e agrarian r e f o r m played a primary role in this process of political institutionalization, giving the g o v e r n m e n t a radical look that e a r n e d it mass s u p p o r t a n d helped it defuse social struggles.

Notes 1. See Anguiano (1975); Benitez (1978); Cordova (1974); Gilly (1971); González (1979, 1981); Shulgovski (1968); Tannenbaum (1960); Townsend (1979); Weyl and Weyl (1955); among many others. 2. Although Cárdenas was loyal to the regime until his death in 1970, his relatively radical politics did at times cause controversy within the PRM (now the PRI); for example, his support of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional and the creation of the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) caused some furor in 1963. Prominent members of the regime, especially those linked to the CNC, accused Cárdenas of disloyalty and "divisionism." It is particularly interesting that Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama, having completely capitulated to the bourgeoisie many years earlier, accused Cárdenas of supporting "the subversive activities of criollo communism, subsidized by Soviet totalitarianism." See the extensive documentation on this matter in Política (3: 66, January 15, 1963: 3-16), and Cárdenas's January 21, 1963, open letter replying to the attacks by members of the PRI and others, made available to the author by the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (CIOAC). An example of ideological dissension within the regime, this incident nevertheless illustrates the rule that regime stability was and is the bottom line; Cárdenas's reply denies any disloyalty to the government or "divisionist" intentions toward the peasantry and emphasizes the legality of the CCI's foundation. 3. González (1979: 185-243) gives a brief but excellent biography of Cárdenas. Its value is enhanced because it follows a social biography of

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C á r d e n a s ' s g e n e r a t i o n that is full of a p p r o p r i a t e details. H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979: 209-218) provides a useful chronology of C á r d e n a s ' s life. 4. González (1979: 2 0 8 , 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 ) . 5. See H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979: 2 0 9 - 2 1 8 ) . 6. González (1979: 226), who c o m m e n t s that these contacts with stud e n t s d u r i n g his governorship "does n o t m e a n that h e a b s o r b e d the e n t i r e body of dialectic a n d historical materialism. T h e philosophy studied in t h e cafes with t h e university students did n o t m a k e h i m into a p h i l o s o p h e r , but r a t h e r i n t o a m a n f u r n i s h e d with m o r e o r less g e n e r a l i d e a s . " G e n e r a l Francisco J . Miigica, who was particularly close to C á r d e n a s d u r i n g t h e latt e r ' s p r e s i d e n c y , w r o t e to Sylvia N. Weyl in M a r c h 1939 t h a t " G e n e r a l C á r d e n a s was n o t a socialist. H e had n o t r e a d , n o r p r o c l a i m e d , MarxismLeninism; he, like t h e majority of the country's revolutionary personalities, was self-educated, h a d n o knowledge of universal philosophical theories o r social systems. Concretely, h e h a d felt the rigors of t h e m o n o p o l y of lands a n d t h e h e l p l e s s n e s s of t h e m a n u a l l a b o r e r s in a c o u n t r y in which, like Mexico, industry was weak a n d oppressive; t h e salaries at starvation levels; a n d t h e land cultivated with r u d i m e n t a r y systems o n t h e basis of twelve-hour workdays. With these a n t e c e d e n t s . . . he d e f i n e d a n d c o m p r e h e n d e d . . . t h e n e e d for t h e r e f o r m s that h e carried out" (cited in H e r n á n d e z Chávez, 1979: 188). See also Cárdenas's personal notes (Cárdenas, 1972: 426-428) for s o m e interesting a n d contradictory c o m m e n t s on "the Revolution" a n d t h e Yaqui tribe. 7. Shulgovski (1968: 17, 19, 168). This b o o k has g o n e into n u m e r o u s p r i n t i n g s in Mexico. T h e S p a n i s h e d i t i o n is u n f o r t u n a t e l y m a r r e d by a n e x t r e m e l y s l o p p y t r a n s l a t i o n t h a t c o n t a i n s h u n d r e d s of g l a r i n g e r r o r s . Shulgovski p r o m o t e s t h e tactic of the p o p u l a r f r o n t , or collaboration of t h e working class, with "progressive" elements of t h e bourgeoisie, which is o n e of t h e hallmarks of t h e Stalinist doctrines of two-stage revolution a n d socialism in o n e country. 8. See González (1979) a n d H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979), whose social a n d political portraits of cardenismo provide s u p p o r t for the a r g u m e n t presented here. 9. T h e c h a r t drawn u p by Gómezjara (1979: 15-16) helps illustrate this point, a l t h o u g h h e later ignores his own evidence with his f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e ruling b u r e a u c r a c y as a "class in itselF (Gómezjara, 1979: 2 0 - 2 1 ) . See Knight (1986: 4 5 9 - 4 6 5 ) a n d Gilly (1971: 3 4 3 - 3 4 4 ) o n c o r r u p t i o n a n d t h e e n r i c h m e n t of t h e postrevolutionary bureaucracy. 10. G o n z á l e z (1981: 1 8 6 - 1 9 2 ) ; Shulgovski (1968: 3 5 5 - 3 7 0 ) ; T r o t s k y (1979: 784, 793). 11. O n t h e depression a n d its effects o n various s e g m e n t s of t h e working class, s e e A n g u i a n o (1975: 1 2 - 1 4 , 16, 2 5 - 2 6 , 3 1 - 3 2 ) ; S h u l g o v s k i (1968: 3 4 - 3 7 ) , w h o m e n t i o n s e s t i m a t e s by t h e C o m i n t e r n t h a t u n e m p l o y m e n t r e a c h e d a b o u t a million persons d u r i n g 1931-1932. O n the developing worke r s ' m o v e m e n t a n d t h e n u m b e r s of strikes, s e e A n g u i a n o (1975: 3 5 - 3 6 ) ; Cordova (1980: 87, 121-133, 196-200, 205-207); H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979: 121-165); Shulgovski (1968: 70-71); Wilkie (1970: 184). O n t h e d e c l i n e of M o r o n e s a n d t h e C R O M see H e r n á n d e z C h á v e z ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 0 - 1 4 ) ; M e d i n (1982); González (1981: 7 4 - 7 8 ) . O n t h e m i n i m u m wage a n d labor legislation a n d t h e r e s p o n s e of t h e left, see Cordova (1980: 107, 176-177, 183-184). O n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s f i n a n c i a l situation, see A n g u i a n o (1975: 1 8 - 2 1 , 3 9 - 4 1 ) ; C á r d e n a s (1972: 356).

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12. A n g u i a n o ( 1 9 7 5 : 7 6 - 7 7 ) . 13. A n g u i a n o (1975: 40, 42-43, 81-84, 99-100, 146, 163). 14. T h e policies of t h e C á r d e n a s g o v e r n m e n t have b e e n so l a b e l e d by Cordova (1974) a n d A n g u i a n o (1975: 46). 15. A n g u i a n o ( 1 9 7 5 : 5 5 - 5 6 , 150); G o n z á l e z ( 1 9 8 1 : 3 7 - 3 8 , 42, 5 3 ) ; Shulgovski (1968: 275-277). 16. A n g u i a n o (1975: 5 6 - 5 7 ) . 17. H e r n á n d e z C h á v e z (1979: 4 3 - 4 6 , 5 7 - 6 0 , 174); G o n z á l e z ( 1 9 8 1 : 40—15, 53); A n g u i a n o (1975: 5 6 - 5 7 ) . 18. C á r d e n a s ( 1 9 7 2 : 3 4 3 - 3 4 4 ) ; G o n z á l e z ( 1 9 8 1 : 6 4 - 6 5 , 6 7 - 6 9 ) ; H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979: 6 7 - 6 9 ) . 19. A n g u i a n o (1975: 148-149); C á r d e n a s (1972: 317, 3 5 3 - 3 5 4 ) ; Mexico (16: 3 7 - 5 7 ) . 20. O n the nationalization of t h e railroads in 1937, t h e oil e x p r o p r i a t i o n , a n d t h e w o r k e r s ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a n d c o o p e r a t i v e s , see G o n z á l e z ( 1 9 8 1 : 169-192, 207, 287-289, 310, 319); A n g u i a n o (1975: 6 1 - 6 3 , 8 6 - 9 1 ) . O n t h e agrarian r e f o r m , see C h a p t e r 7 of this book. 21. O n c a r d e n i s m o a n d capitalism, see A g u i l e r a G ó m e z (1969: 175); Cordova (1973, 1974); Eckstein (1966: 9 4 - 9 5 ) ; a n d Wilkie (1970: 2 6 5 - 2 6 6 ) . O n the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the PNR into the PRM, see the excellent discussion by A n g u i a n o ( 1 9 7 5 : 6 5 - 7 4 , 136-139). 22. Shulgovski (1968: 134). 23. Shulgovski (1968: 144).

7

Agrarian Structure, Politics, and Economic Development

That class will rule in Mexico as in every Latin American country which has the peasants. — L e o n Trotsky 1

The cardenistas comprehended the importance of the peasantry better than any other faction of the ruling bureaucracy. The older generation, like Obregón and Calles, had come mostly f r o m the north, where village traditions were less important than in the center and capitalist relations of production more developed. T h e cardenistas were mostly from central Mexico, an area where the land problem was definitive. Like Cárdenas himself, they had lived from a young age the destruction of the civil war, had observed the behavior of the peasantry during the various uprisings of the 1920s, had witnessed the Cristero rebellion, and had seen a radicalized segment of the peasantry in action in Veracruz. They knew f r o m experience what the peasantry could do on behalf of the regime; at the same time, they had feared a renewed outbreak of civil war for most of their political lives.2 The intensification of worker and peasant struggles in the early 1930s did nothing to allay this fear. Thus, the cardenistas were predisposed to give the agrarian reform high priority in their efforts to consolidate the regime. By the late 1920s, the regime was faced not only with a radicalized peasantry in Veracruz and in certain other less important areas, but also with a growing syndical movement among agricultural workers. The United Sugar Company in Los Mochis, Sinaloa, was the object of increasingly militant strikes beginning in 1924. In December 1932, the agricultural workers in Lombardia and Nueva Italia, Michoacán, fought against personnel cuts; their movement would later demand higher salaries as well. In February 1934, the minimum wage legisla-

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t i o n o f t h e R o d r í g u e z g o v e r n m e n t s p a r k e d a wave o f strikes in r u r a l z o n e s a c r o s s t h e c o u n t r y , i n c l u d i n g t h e El P o t r e r o S u g a r M i l l i n V e r a c r u z , t h e c o f f e e p l a n t a t i o n o f G u a t i m o c in C h i a p a s , s u g a r mills in t h e A c a t l á n r e g i o n o f P u e b l a , a n d t h e h a c i e n d a F e r r a r a in C a m a r ó n , N u e v o L e ó n . T h e newly f o r m e d G e n e r a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f M e x i c a n Workers and Peasants ( C G O C M ) , 3 and the Mexican

Communist

Party l e d m a n y o f t h e s e m o v e m e n t s . 4 F r o m t h e t i m e o f t h e R o d r i g u e z p r e s i d e n c y , t h e r e f o r e , m i l i t a n c y was i n c r e a s i n g a m o n g b o t h p e a s a n t s a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l workers. In spite o f the p r o r e f o r m r h e t o r i c o f the O b r e g ó n a n d early C a l l e s p e r i o d s , rural c o n d i t i o n s h a d c h a n g e d little by t h e e a r l y 1 9 3 0 s . O f t h e 3 . 6 m i l l i o n p e r s o n s w h o l a b o r e d in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , p e r h a p s 2 . 5 m i l l i o n w e r e landless ( s e e T a b l e 9 ) . H o w m a n y o f t h e s e w o r k e r s h a d p e r m a n e n t e m p l o y m e n t is u n k n o w n , b u t u n e m p l o y m e n t was q u i t e h i g h in c o m m e r c i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l z o n e s d u r i n g t h e d e p r e s s i o n . By c o m p a r i s o n , a c c o r d i n g to t h e c e n s u s o f 1 9 3 0 , t h e r e w e r e 4 , 1 8 9 ejid o s a n d 8 9 8 , 4 1 3 e j i d a t a r i o s , w h o , as r e c i p i e n t s o f l a n d g r a n t s u n d e r t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m , c o n t r o l l e d an a v e r a g e o f 2 . 2 h e c t a r e s o f c r o p l a n d e a c h . F j i d a t a r i o s w o r k e d an average o f 1 3 9 days p e r y e a r o n t h e i r e j i d o p a r c e l s a n d 1 1 4 off, a n d a b o u t 3 2 p e r c e n t w o r k e d p r i m a r i l y as a g r i c u l t u r a l day l a b o r e r s . T h e r e w e r e also s o m e 5 7 7 , 0 0 0 m i n i f u n d i s tas, h o l d i n g plots a v e r a g i n g 1 . 5 h e c t a r e s ( s e e T a b l e s 1 0 - 1 3 ) . M a n y o f t h e s e o w n e r s o f tiny p a r c e l s m u s t also have w o r k e d as day l a b o r e r s o r p r a c t i c e d s o m e o t h e r o c c u p a t i o n to s u p p l e m e n t what t h e y c o u l d raise on their p o o r holdings. F o r t h e i r p a r t , t h e l a n d l o r d s h a d successfully r e s i s t e d e x p r o p r i a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to official statistics, 5 , 5 6 5 h a c i e n d a s h a d b e e n a f f e c t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m ; o f t h e o r i g i n a l 4 1 . 3 mill i o n h e c t a r e s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e i r o w n e r s , o n l y 6 . 9 m i l l i o n , o r a b o u t 17 percent, had been expropriated. T h e smaller haciendas o f central M e x i c o h a d lost a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r l a n d t h a n t h e l a t i f u n d i a o f t h e o u t l y i n g a r e a s , w h e r e t h e r e was less d e m a n d f o r g r a n t s ; still, t h e s e h o l d i n g s as a g r o u p h a d lost less t h a n h a l f o f t h e i r o r i g i n a l surface area. T h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of landholding r e m a i n e d

extremely

h i g h ; 1.5 p e r c e n t o f t h e h o l d i n g s c o n t r o l l e d 8 3 p e r c e n t o f t h e l a n d ( s e e T a b l e s 1 4 a n d 1 5 ) . H u g e l a t i f u n d i a with t e n s a n d e v e n h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s o f h e c t a r e s e a c h survived in m a n y a r e a s , i n c l u d i n g t h e states of C a m p e c h e , Q u i n t a n a Roo, Baja California,

Chihuahua,

Aguascalientes, and Querétaro.5 T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s p r o m p t e d official d i s s e n s i o n o n a g r a r i a n policy. D i s c u s s i o n o n t h e l a n d q u e s t i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y h e a t e d at t h e

1933

convention o f the PNR. G r a c i a n o Sánchez, who would later b e c o m e h e a d o f t h e N a t i o n a l P e a s a n t C o n f e d e r a t i o n ( C N C ) , c r i t i c i z e d callista agrarian policies, insisting that m o r e land must b e distributed,

lati-

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fundismo destroyed, and the ejidos made the center of radical change in the agricultural sector. Sánchez also d e m a n d e d that the resident hacienda laborers be given the right to receive land. Luis L. León defended callismo, stating that Sánchez's ideas were Utopian and that the g o v e r n m e n t must have the final word on the distribution of land to the acasillados, who, a c c o r d i n g to legislation already in f o r c e , could receive lands only if they were willing to move to a new location, thus preserving the hacienda on which they worked. 6 The a r g u m e n t between these two groups—sometimes called veteranos (the callistas) and agraristas (the cardenistas)—carried over into 1934, the year of the presidential campaign, in a series of conferences on the agrarian question. The cardenistas p r e a c h e d the destruction of the l a t i f u n d i a and the spread of the ejido, which they claimed could ensure social peace and the efficient use of agricultural land. The callistas d e m a n d e d that small and medium-size p r o p e r t i e s be protected and supported, promising that the success of these purportedly more capable agriculturists would contribute to agricultural development and the well-being of society as a whole. Ing. Manuel Meza of the Department of Agricultural and Rural T e a c h e r Education went so far as to claim that the cardenista program of creating more ejidos would lead the country to ruin, as "the Mexican peasantry, in general, is characterized by its ignorancc, its incapacity to c o n q u e r and transform the environment, and its lack of efficiency in working to take maximum advantage of the scant productivity of the soil." 7 Of course, this debate on the style of Mexican development had been present since before the Revolution in the work of writers like Wistano Luis Orozco and Andrés Molina Enriquez, and even in the thinking of the Porfirian elite itself. Now, in the 1930s, the a r g u m e n t took new shape, and perhaps there was a momentary h a r d e n i n g of positions. T h e callistas, in their emphasis on the modernization of latifundista agriculture, relegated the ejido to a political e x p e d i e n t and a c o m p l e m e n t to the day wage, in the style of Luis Cabrera's proposals of 1912. T h e i r models f o r agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t were the N o r t h A m e r i c a n f a r m e r or the m o d e r n a g r i c u l t u r a l capitalist of n o r t h e r n Mexico, exemplified by Obregón. In practice, given that the latifundia had been minimally affected by the official reform, the vete r a n o program amounted only to advocacy of the modernization of Porfirian agriculture, supposedly without the monopolistic abuses of foreign landowners. The agraristas, on the other h a n d , leaned m o r e toward a peasant-based form of development, which, r o o t e d in the ejido, would theoretically distribute the means of p r o d u c t i o n m o r e evenly and avoid the pitfalls of Porfirian-style growth. In the fashion of t h e 1909 a r g u m e n t of M o l i n a E n r i q u e z , they a s s o c i a t e d t h e

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Porfirian model with mass poverty and semiserfdom, a stunted internal market, the lack of the labor mobility necessary f o r capitalist development, and most of all, the possibility of another revolution. 8 T h e Great Depression was followed by revolutionary activity in many areas of the world, and this atmosphere of change lent a sharpness to the debate that had not been seen since the period immediately following 1910. Nevertheless, the veterano and agrarista groups were socially and politically intertwined and in agreement on fundamental issues: the consolidation of the regime and the preservation of capital. This limited the quantity and quality of change under the cardenistas. It also led to the resurgence of the veterano style, softe n e d only with some rhetoric left over f r o m the Cárdenas years, as world war approached and the United States resumed a more aggressive posture. T h e P N R convention of 1933 nominated Cárdenas f o r president and p r o d u c e d the Plan Sexenal, the so-called Six-Year Plan. T h e name is deceiving, for it was not a true economic plan but merely a s t a t e m e n t o f p r o m i s e s or i n t e n t i o n s . L i k e the c r e a t i o n o f t h e autonomous Agrarian Department and the signing of the Agrarian C o d e in 1934, the plan, while unveiled during the Rodriguez presidency, is generally seen as an achievement of cardenismo. In the Plan Sexenal, the P N R declared that the agrarian problem was the most important social question facing Mexico and promised to continue distributing lands until the needs of all rural population centers in the country had been satisfied. It proposed to d o this by increasing the resources dedicated to the land distribution process, simplifying the administrative procedure f o r land grants, automatically c o n f i r m i n g provisional grants already received, and d o i n g away with the legal difficulties preventing many villages f r o m receiving land. T h e National Agrarian Commission would be replaced by an autonomous Agrarian Department, which would be responsible not only f o r the land distribution process but also for ejido organization. A budget of not less than 4 million pesos annually would be dedicated to the new department. Land distribution itself must be completed as soon as possible, not only to satisfy the needs of the peasantry, but also to establish "a definitive situation of confidence in the agricultural enterprises free from future [agrarian] alterations." Small property, as defined in agrarian law, must receive the strictest respect. T h e P N R also promised to give resident hacienda laborers the right to receive land; it noted that they were the most needy group, and that "their transformation into autonomous agriculturists is an indispensable prerequisite f o r the agricultural progress of the country, because it is tightly linked to the disappearance of the latifundia." Because the "peasant masses" would not all be eligible f o r ejidal grants, the plan

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proposed new state laws regulating the division of the latifundia and colonization f o r peasants u n a b l e to receive land in t h e i r h o m e regions. Finally, for those who despite the beneficence of projected federal and state legislation still needed to labor for a day wage, the PNR promised to enforce the Federal Labor Law to make certain that rural workers received the minimum wage; the right to make domestic use of the pastures, woodlands, and water controlled by their employers; and free housing, medical care, and education. 9 T h e s e p r o m i s e s were at best p a r t i a l l y f u l f i l l e d d u r i n g t h e Rodriguez and Cárdenas governments. More land was distributed between 1935 and 1940 than during all previous administrations combined (see Tables 2 and 6). Yet, the needs of all rural communities were certainly not met. Although by 1940 the rural proletariat had declined both in absolute numbers and in proportion to the economically active population in agriculture, landless wage workers still comprised 50 percent of the agricultural work force; the number of landless agricultural workers would increase dramatically in the 1950s after a n o t h e r d r o p in the 1940s (see Table 9). T h e a u t o n o m o u s Agrarian Department was established in place of the old National Agrarian Commission, which had been a branch of the Department of Agriculture; its budget increased ever)' year until 1939, but its resources were always deficient with respect lo the needs of the landhungry peasantry. 10 In 1934, the automatic confirmation of provisional ejidal grants was decreed, but made conditional on the lack of objection by any interested party. Of course, this was an important qualification, leaving open the possibility of further delays. The PNR had hoped to resolve some five thousand applications in this way, but there is no evidence on how many provisional grants were actually confirmed. 1 1 Numerous hacendados lost land to the ejidal distribution, which during the mid-1930s affected some important commercial empires in rural areas. Nevertheless, rural capitalism survived, and latifundismo came back in new forms, stronger and more efficient, in the 1940s. No significant changes were made in the new Agrarian Code of 1934; resident hacienda laborers had to wait until 1937 f o r legal reforms that allowed them to receive ejidal grants as i n d e p e n d e n t population centers. These reforms, promised in 1933, came only after the eruption of intense syndical struggles in the commercial agricultural centers of La Laguna and Yucatán. Likewise, Article 53 of the Agrarian Code, authorizing the h a t e d ejidal districts established u n d e r the Rodriguez government, was abrogated only in 1937. 1 2 Colonization, no panacea, often proved a cruel hoax and provided only small amounts of land for peasants. 13 The struggle of rural workers to better their conditions was tolerated within certain limits, but

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in spite o f m i n i m u m wage legislation and rising nominal wages, t h e r e is e v i d e n c e that t h e real w a g e s o f the rural p r o l e t a r i a t a c t u a l l y d e c l i n e d during the p e r i o d 1936-1944. Sharp regional d i f f e r e n c e s in the standard o f living o f rural laborers were never erased and persist to this day. Thus, even during its most radical phase, the r e g i m e was unable to d e c r e e fundamental improvements in the standard o f living f o r the masses o f rural workers or the peasantry. 14 N o n e o f this is meant to understate the extent o f the c h a n g e in land t e n u r e relationships that t o o k place in M e x i c o b e t w e e n 1935 and 1940. During this time, Cárdenas signed over eleven thousand presidential resolutions, granting some 19 million hectares o f land to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 774,000 peasants. In the same t i m e p e r i o d , s o m e 800,000 villagers received definitive possession (that is, actually took possession according to official data) o f almost 18 million hectares. A l t h o u g h land distribution rulings at the state level w e r e numerous, decisions at the national level must have taken care o f a great b a c k l o g o f petitions, since they e x c e e d e d the number o f g o v e r n o r s ' resolutions, as well as the area granted, in every region. T h e quality o f the land granted, while not dramatically better than in previous years, was s o m e w h a t i m p r o v e d ; the p e r c e n t a g e o f positive resolutions at the presidential level was the highest it had been since the early 1920s (see Tables 1 - 6 , 16). This was far m o r e and better land than previous presidents had even d r e a m e d o f distributing, and the result was a p r o f o u n d c h a n g e in the agrarian structure o f the country. Whereas in 1930 the ejidal sector was tiny, comprising 6.3 percent of the agricultural land and 13.4 percent o f the cropland, in 1940 it controlled 22.5 p e r c e n t o f the agricultural land and 47.4 percent o f the cropland. By 1940, the ejidos also c o n t r o l l e d 57.4 percent of the irrigable land, as c o m p a r e d with 13.1 p e r c e n t in 1930 ( s e e T a b l e 17). T h e s e w e r e i m p o r t a n t developments, f o r the ejido could n o longer be directly attacked by m o r e conservative elements o f the regime as it had b e e n during the Calles years. O n a material level alone, it was now far t o o e n t r e n c h e d . Politically, the integration of the ejidos into the C N C and thus into the P R M also made their c o n t i n u e d existence necessary: they w e r e the most malleable and dependable support possessed by the r e g i m e . N o n e t h e l e s s , the agrarian structure was f a r f r o m

completely

transformed. A c c o r d i n g to census data, in 1940 there still existed 308 landholdings with an average o f m o r e than 100,000 hectares each. 1 5 Private plots o f u n d e r 5 hectares, c o m p r i s i n g 76.2 p e r c e n t o f the number o f holdings, controlled a m e r e 1.1 percent o f the land. T h i s s e c t o r o f tiny p e a s a n t p l o t s had actually e x p e r i e n c e d a r e l a t i v e increase since 1930, when it comprised 69.2 percent o f all holdings. Haciendas o f over 1,000 hectares, 0.8 percent o f the total n u m b e r o f

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h o l d i n g s , c o n t r o l l e d 79.5 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d (see T a b l e 15). F u r t h e r m o r e , distribution of land within the ejidal sector was far from uniform. While 9.1 percent of all ejidatarios controlled 1 percent of the ejidal cropland, in plots that averaged less than 1 hectare, the 2.5 percent of all ejidatarios who utilized plots averaging more than 20 hectares controlled 13.8 percent of the ejidal cropland. The Gini indexes of concentration in Table 18 show that while the concentration of cropland within the ejidal sector was less than in the private sector, ejido land distribution was nevertheless far from equal. 1 6 To a certain extent, this situation reflected regional differences in the land distribution: parcels in the North, the North Pacific, and the Gulf of Mexico regions tended to be larger than plots in the Central region or the South Pacific, where land was scarcer. T h e quality of land was also a factor, since poorer quality land implied larger plots and better land, smaller plots. But it also reflected a differentiation within the ejidal sector that the regime had been unable to prevent even by ostensibly removing ejidal lands from the sphere of the capitalist market (they could not legally be sold, rented, mortgaged, or alienated in any way). The Gini indexes in Table 19 suggest that the concentration of ejidal cropland was fairly high within all geographic regions, although it was slightly more p r o n o u n c e d in the Gulf and Centra] regions. That certain ejidatarios controlled more and better land than others was a factor in the polarization of the supposedly homogeneous ejido community along income and, ultimately, social lines. Case studies on individual ejido communities tend to confirm these conclusions. By the 1940s and perhaps much earlier, rentals and even sales of ejidal land were commonplace, resulting in the enrichment of some ejidatarios and the proletarianization of others. 1 7 Advocates of the reform have long argued that the transformations of the 1930s played a fundamental role in the process of economic growth that earned Mexico renown in the 1950s and 1960s. Evidence on this point is ambiguous. In his comprehensive analysis of t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of t h e " G o l d e n Age" of M e x i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e between 1940 and 1965, Paul Lamartine Yates emphasized the importance of the expansion of agricultural land, the increase in irrigated land, and the greater use of improved inputs and machinery. Yates believed that the cardenistas' land reform was socially progressive, but assigned it slight weight as a factor in agricultural growth and had no conclusive evidence on whether income had been redistributed in favor of the peasantry. 18 Other economists have asserted that the cardenista reform contributed to economic growth by e x p a n d i n g the domestic market for manufactures, but they have provided no compelling proof. 1 9 The data in Tables 20 and 21 give limited support to the hypothe-

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sis that ejidatario incomes rose between 1930 and 1950. In 1930, 46.8 p e r c e n t o f all "proprietors" were ejidatarios; they c o n t r o l l e d 13.4 percent o f the c r o p l a n d and were responsible f o r 11 percent o f the value o f agricultural production. In 1940, ejidatarios—now 50 p e r c e n t o f all " p r o p r i e t o r s " — h a d 47.4 percent o f the cropland and p r o d u c e d 50.5 p e r c e n t o f the value o f all crops. By 1950, the e j i d o s had d e c l i n e d with respect to large private agriculture; the ejidal sector's shares o f the value o f capital, machinery and equipment, livestock, and production had fallen o r failed to keep pace with those o f h o l d i n g s greater than 5 hectares. T h e ejidos' 37.2 percent o f agricultural p r o d u c t i o n n e v e r t h e l e s s r e p r e s e n t e d an a b s o l u t e i n c r e a s e o v e r 1930 l e v e l s . D u r i n g this p e r i o d , a g r o w i n g share o f ejidal p r o d u c e was marketed: 47.2 percent in 1930 and 72.4 percent in 1950. Thus, ejidatarios were likely spending m o r e m o n e y in 1950 than in 1930. T h e a m o u n t and e f f e c t o f this increase remain unknown, since historical surveys o f family i n c o m e and expenditures d o not exist. 20 In summary, the e f f e c t o n M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f land tenure changes in the 1930s remains nebulous. T h e g r o w t h o f the urban p r o l e t a r i a t p r o b a b l y had m o r e i m p a c t o n d e m a n d f o r domestic manufactures than the purportedly larger i n c o m e s o f the rural workers o r the peasantry. A g g r e g a t e d e m a n d e f f e c t s resulted mainly f r o m the n e e d f o r intermediate goods, such as construction materials, that arose when masses o f p e o p l e migrated f r o m countryside to city and the g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r t o o k big p u b l i c works programs. I n c r e a s e d i n v e s t m e n t in m a n u f a c t u r i n g may h a v e b e e n a result o f the liberation o f capital previously tied up in rural enterprises. T h e agrarian r e f o r m o f the 1930s certainly c o n t r i b u t e d to all o f this, but the decades o f social unrest p r e c e d i n g the Cárdenas g o v e r n ment may have played a m o r e important role in migration a n d investment patterns. Furthermore, the rapid e c o n o m i c growth o f the 1950s and 1960s did not originate solely in the 1930s. Rather, much o f the basic industry, such as steel, cement, glass, cotton textiles, and paper, was Porfirian in origin and survived the revolution; thus, the roots o f M e x i c o ' s post-1940 growth antedated the cardenista agrarian r e f o r m by almost 50 years. 21 Alain d e Janvry has revealed similar m a c r o e c o n o m i c results f o r b o u r g e o i s land r e f o r m s t h r o u g h o u t Latin A m e r i c a . T h e s e r e f o r m s had n e g l i g i b l e effects o n e x p a n d i n g the domestic market f o r wage goods, small net e m p l o y m e n t effects, and ambiguous i n c o m e effects. T h e d e m a n d f o r capital g o o d s in agriculture generally increased as the result o f accelerated d e v e l o p m e n t in n o n r e f o r m sectors o f agriculture; limited evidence suggests that production i m p r o v e d faster in n o n r e f o r m than in r e f o r m sectors. 22 U n d e r the relatively f a v o r a b l e international c o n d i t i o n s o f the

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p r e - W o r l d W a r II period a n d the pressure o f local class struggle, the cardenistas p r o d u c e d the earliest a n d m o s t radical b o u r g e o i s l a n d reform in Latin America. T h e y extended the official reform to a point where it was in no immediate danger o f c o m p l e t e reversal; they gave the p r o r e f o r m viewpoint a solid footing within the ruling b u r e a u c r a cy; and, with the ejido peasantry firmly in the political grasp o f t h e PRM, they stabilized the post-Porfirian regime. However, they failed to c r e a t e a h o m o g e n e o u s , p r o s p e r o u s agricultural s e c t o r ; n o r did their expectations about the role o f land reform in e c o n o m i c develo p m e n t b e a r fruit. In a m o r e fundamental sense, this was clearly n o t an agrarian revolution that swept the countryside radically c l e a r o f old land t e n u r e patterns, labor relations, and political practices. T h e cardenista viewpoint prevailed only briefly; it would soon fall victim to its own limitations.

Notes 1. Trotsky (1979: 784). 2. See González (1979: 116-117, 177-183); Hernández Chávez (1979: 29-31); Meyer (1978: 230-231). 3. The CGOCM originated in a split from the CROM and was the forerunner of today's CTM. 4. Cordova (1980: 130-132, 196-199); Anguiano (1975: 36). Local studies of these movements, based on oral tradition and local archives, have been appearing frequently in recent years. See in particular the excellent studies by García de León (1979) on Chiapas and by Morett and Paré (1980) on Los Mochis. 5. Hernández Chávez (1979: 167-172); Tello (1968: 19). 6. Shulgovski (1968: 227-228); Meyer (1978: 239-240). 7. Meyer (1978: 240-241). 8. See Meyer (1978: 230-231) for some nicely phrased comments on the agraristas and veteranos. For the agrarista position as interpreted by a North American scholar who spent many years in Mexico, see Simpson (1937). Simpson envisioned a Mexico devoid of the crowding and alienation of modern urban and industrial society, based on the ejidos, which would serve as the center of an integrated and humanistic economy with small-scale manufacturing linked to the ejido community. See also Cárdenas (1972: 361-362); Cordova (1974: 101); and Anguiano (1975: 95) for various quotes from Cárdenas on the ejido. 9. See "Plan Sexenal del P.N.R.," in Fabila (1941: 555-562). 10. "Decreto que crea el Departamento Agrario," January 15, 1934, in Fabila (1941: 562-563). See Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 1154-1155) for the budgets of the National Agrarian Commission and the Agrarian Department from 1920 to 1967. See Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 644-656) and Mexico (7: Part 1) for evidence on the Agrarian Department's paucity of resources. 11. See "Plan Sexenal del PNR: Departamento Agrario" in Fabila (1941: 561); Meyer (1978: 227). 12. See "Código Agrario de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos," March 22,

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1934, in Fabila ( 1 9 4 1 : 5 6 6 - 6 1 4 ) , wherein the status o f peones acasillados remains unchanged with respect to earlier agrarian laws; and "Reformas al Código Agrario," August 9, 1937, in Fabila ( 1 9 4 1 : 6 4 1 - 6 4 3 ) , which allow them to receive ejidos. See also "Decreto que reforma el Código Agrario," August 30, 1937, in Fabila (1941: 6 4 3 - 6 4 6 ) . 13. Studies of the Mexican agrarian reform often claim that the results o f colonization have been important, when in fact few hard data are available. What data do exist suggests that colonization has been fairly insignificant in the overall scheme o f things. Government-directed colonization in benefit o f the landless peasantry has always proved too expensive and when attempted has often failed; private capital has evidently never found the prospect o f developing colonies attractive enough. In a 1943 m e m o , Marte R. G ó m e z wrote of the Colonization Law of April 5, 1926: "In 17 years there has been not one large colonization project, not one irrigation work for colonization purposes, not one population transfer worthy of the name. T h e law has functioned in reality in the arid zones o f the country to a c c o m m o d a t e modest livestock ranchers or, in exceptional cases, as a supplement to the Agrarian Code, when not [working] as a resource . . . to elude [the lawl, which in reality has been the most frequent" ("Memorándum sobre la inconveniencia de permitir que la iniciativa privada intervenga en materia de colonización agrícola," AMRG 1943/Asuntos Oficiales). See also Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 6 9 5 - 7 0 1 ) . Zaragoza and Macías (1980: 244) present historical data on new ejidal population centers (ejido colonies) created from 1922 to 1979; and Whetten (1948: 5 9 0 ) shows new colonies formed by region for the entire period 1 9 1 6 - 1 9 4 3 . Orive Alba (1970: 199-204) discusses in some detail the evolution of government colonization policy for irrigation districts. 14. On wages and the cost of living, see Whetten (1948: 2 5 9 - 2 6 2 ) ; Yates (1978: 1 : 6 0 3 - 6 1 1 ) . 15. Tello (1968: 34). 16. T h e Lorenz curve and the Gini index of concentration are measures o f the inequality of income or, as in this case, o f land distribution. If plotted on a graph, the cumulative percentage o f proprietors or plots (y axis) as against the cumulative percentage o f land area (x axis) would yield a line with the equation * = y in a situation where land distribution were completely equal. T h e Gini index is computed from the same data according to the formula: L = 1 - I ( / ¿ + ] - f t ) (yi + yi+

i),

where the summation index i runs from 1 to K. A Gini index o f 0 would indicate equality o f land distribution; as the index a p p r o a c h e s 1, it indicates increasing concentration of landholding. See Miller ( 1 9 6 0 ) . 17. On concentration, rental, and sales of ejidal lands, see Barbosa and Maturana (1972); Glantz (1974: 1 6 3 - 1 9 1 ) ; Restrepo Fernández and Sánchez Cortés ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 4 4 1 - 4 4 8 , 4 5 1 - 4 5 5 , 4 7 6 - 4 8 3 ) . See also Paré ( 1 9 8 1 ) , whose field work on the agricultural proletariat showed conflicts within the rural community. For an early example o f ejidatarios as "kulaks," whose interests as employers led them to side with landlords against the wage demands of syndicalized workers, see Cuadros Caldas (1932: 6 1 5 ) . That rental and sharecropping o f ejidal land was a widespread problem meriting official concern by the 1940s is shown in a letter from Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, January 9, 1946 (AMRG 1 9 4 6 / O f i c i a l e s / l ) .

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18. Yates (1978: 1: 18-37). 19. For example, Flores (1973: 21); Aguilera Gomez (1969: 142-144, 174-175). 20. See Dovring (1973: 50), who thought there was a "modest" increase in the income of the ejidal population. 21. For the traditional a r g u m e n t s on agrarian r e f o r m a n d e c o n o m i c development, see Eckstein (1966: 82-83, 94-96); Aguilera Gomez (1969: 142-144, 174-175). For a more sophisticated a r g u m e n t that is nevertheless s h o r t on evidence and repeats some of t h e old u n p r o v e d assertions, see Flores (1973). See also Reynolds (1970) and V e r n o n (1965), who do not attempt to give the agrarian reform any direct causal role in Mexican economic development. For new research on the roots of Mexican industrialization, see Haber (1989). 22. Dejanvry (1981: 211-217).

8

Class Struggle and the Collective Ejido

The cardenista land reform developed at an uneven pace, determ i n e d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l events, conflicts within the r e g i m e , a n d domestic class struggle. Official data on the numbers of land distribution rulings show that most of the major changes in the agrarian structure took place between 1936 and 1938, or 3 years out of the 6 that Cárdenas was in office (see Tables 2 and 4). The initial delay was partly the result of dissension within the regime. For the first 16 months of his administration, Cárdenas's prime concern was his conflict with the callistas, and most of his energy went into shoring up his government. By mid-1936, with the callistas out of the way and loyal cardenistas in the important political and military positions, Cárdenas was freer to carry out the Plan Sexenal. 1 Like his predecessors, however, he intended to keep a firm rein on the agrarian process. A March 1936 circular to the state governors, the military zone commanders, and the head of the Federal District asked them to "take the measures you deem necessary to avoid . . . acts like the ones that have been occurring in various areas of the country, in which certain elements have taken possession of lands without the intervention of competent authorities." 2 By 1935, the cardenistas had begun planning their approach to the problems of land hunger and agrarian strife; there were even a few concrete proposals to deal with certain troublesome cases. 3 But it was the reality of increasing agrarian and labor unrest that determined the surge in land distribution beginning in 1936. In October of that year, the g o v e r n m e n t intervened in the o n g o i n g conflict between rural laborers and landowners in the L a g u n a region of Coahuila and Durango, which was threatening to get out of hand. While Cárdenas was in La Laguna supervising the distribution of land, he made notes about his intentions to resolve similar problems in the Yaqui and Mexicali valleys and in Yucatán. A short time later he 95

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indicated that agrarian reform plans for certain other areas should be accelerated. 4 Organized protest in important commercial areas like La Laguna made it clear to the regime that it had competition for the allegiance of the rural p o o r . By 1936, the Mexican C o m m u n i s t Party h a d pledged to support the "national-reformist" government of Cárdenas, a policy that followed the Communist International's turn to the class collaborationism of the popular front. 5 Nevertheless, pressure from the masses demanded action, and through the 1930s, leaders associated with the PCM led important syndical and agrarian struggles in many areas, i n c l u d i n g Michoacán, Yucatán, V e r a c r u z , Chiapas, Sinaloa, D u r a n g o , a n d t h e L a g u n a r e g i o n . T h e newly f o r m e d Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), not yet under the control of the regime, was also organizing peasants and agricultural workers, bringing them together with urban workers in one large federation. 6 Rural strikes and land invasions in commercially important zones d u r i n g the years 1936 t h r o u g h 1938 p u s h e d the g o v e r n m e n t to action, leading to the swift application of the agrarian laws, their modification when necessary to accommodate desired changes, and the creation of the "collective" ejidos. In August 1936, following the expulsion of Calles and on the heels of railroad and electrical strikes, there was a general strike in the Laguna region that involved more than twenty thousand agricultural and industrial workers. The result was the expropriation of 448,000 hectares of land (150,000 irrigable hectares) and the creation of almost three hundred collective ejidos. The same process was repeated, with certain variations, in Yucatán and the Yaqui Valley of Sonora (1937), and in Lombardia and Nueva Italia, Michoacán; Los Mochis, Sinaloa; and Soconusco, Chiapas (1938). 7 The left generally interprets the collective ejidos as part of an evolutionary process of social reform or as proof of Cárdenas's revolutionary inclinations. In fact, for the cardenistas, the collectives were a matter of simple economic necessity. Although an ejido was awarded in usufruct to a community of peasants as a whole, the general rule was to divide the croplands into family parcels. This was the result of both peasant preference and government policy: from the inception of the official reform in 1915, the regime had mandated the division of ejidos into parcels; the ephemeral Circular 51 was the only notable exception. Now, however, valuable commercial lands were being expropriated, holdings that produced cotton, wheat, henequen, rice, sugar, citrus fruit, and cattle. 8 Dividing the holdings into peasant parcels would cause commercial production of these goods, important for both the domestic and export markets, to decline in favor of subsistence production of traditional crops. To avoid this, the new eji-

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dos were organized as production cooperatives and given credit and technical assistance. 9 T h e collective ejidatarios received better land a n d more government assistance than any other peasant group; yet, t h e limitations of the official reform were revealed in the context of the collectives perhaps m o r e than in any other. Total expropriation of lands, buildings, and e q u i p m e n t in favor of the workers a n d peasantry o c c u r r e d in only o n e case—in Lombardia and Nueva Italia, Michoacán. Because agrarian law allowed the landlords to k e e p substantial p o r t i o n s of land along with buildings, livestock, and equipment, the acquisition of the e n t i r e package implied an e x p e n d i t u r e of 2 million pesos, financed on behalf of the peasants and workers by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s National Ejidal Credit Bank (BNCE). This huge debt, which placed the ejidatarios in an extremely disadvantageous position, c o n t i n u e d to grow a n d was never amortized. Unfavorable to t h e workers a n d peasants as this deal was, it was possible only because t h e owners decided it was in their interests to dispose of the property that they had a legal right to keep. In November 1938, Cárdenas wrote: "The proprietors . . . have agreed to sell all, since if the unit is b r o k e n u p it is not profitable for them to operate the rest." 10 In each of the other cases, landlords kept substantial a m o u n t s of the best land—agrarian law allowed t h e m to choose the location— along with the installations, equipment, a n d livestock that h a d m a d e their holdings so profitable. T h e result was a crazy quilt of ejidal a n d private lands that broke u p the productive units Cárdenas claimed to be saving and preserved the core of the economic a n d social power of the bourgeoisie in these zones. 11 This led to landlord sabotage of the collectives. In La Laguna, the hacendados, who still controlled about half the irrigation wells, damaged 256 of the six h u n d r e d wells possessed by the ejidos. O t h e r acts of sabotage included the killing of livestock a n d the deliberate flooding of ejidal lands. 1 2 In Chiapas, expropriated coffee fincas were returned to their original owners in 1946. 13 In Yucatán, sisal processing machinery originally h a n d e d over to ejido cooperatives in 1938 was given back to hacendados in 1942 after a continuous campaign of propaganda and economic sabotage. A r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i v e of all e j i d o s was a d m i n i s t e r e d by H e n e q u e n e r o s de Yucatán, an association run by ejidatarios, f o r m e r plantation owners, and "small" and "medium" property owners, which claimed to harmonize the interests of all three groups. Because they were i n c l u d e d in this organization, b o u r g e o i s f o r c e s w e r e able to work f r o m within to u n d e r m i n e the collectives. 14 U n d e r these circumstances, it is not surprising that the collective ejidos should have failed within a very few years. Rife with political dissension a n d e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s , they d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o small

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groups or individual plots. This process was intensified in the 1940s and 1950s when official policy turned against collectivization, but even under the relatively favorable circumstances o f the Cárdenas years, the collectives were hardly an unqualified success. Institutional support from the government was hampered by ineptitude, lack of b u d g e t and c o o r d i n a t i o n , and corruption that r e a c h e d f r o m the highest bureaucratic levels into the administrations o f the ejidos themselves. Within the ejidos, administrative confusion, a lack of adequate planning, and underemployment took their toll. Social differentiation was present f r o m the beginning; those who administered the ejidos, workers with special skills, or those who came into the ejidos with some small capital of their own were at an immediate advantage over the other members of the cooperatives. Over time, these difficulties resulted in smaller harvests and less remuneration f o r ejidatarios. 15 All of these problems reflected not a lack of potential for collective production, but the economic and social isolation in which the collective ejidos operated. Best estimates indicate that in 1940, only about 5 percent of all ejidos were collectives, representing 3.3 perc e n t o f all e j i d a l l a n d in p r o d u c t i o n a n d 4.8 p e r c e n t o f all ejidatarios. 16 This tiny fraction of the agricultural workers and peasantry received most of the government credit budgeted f o r the land reform sector—in 1936, the La Laguna collectives received 36 million of the 46 million pesos lent by the National Ejidal Credit Bank—but credit support was short-lived; the percentage of organized ejidatarios operating with the Bank declined steadily after 1937.17 In o r d e r to succeed, particularly after 1940, the collectives needed to compete in the marketplace with capitalist producers who had access to private credit both domestic and international, were the main beneficiaries of government spending on rural infrastructure, and were saddled with none of the social directives, debts, and other expenditures o f the workers' and peasants' cooperatives. In cases where the main crop required immediate processing— f o r example, sugar in Sinaloa, Michoacán, and Nayarit, or henequen in Yucatán—ejidatarios had to contend with processing plants that were still privately owned and proprietors who were sometimes openly hostile to them. In some cases, sugar mills were purchased by the government and converted to workers' cooperatives, but the ejidos that supplied them were separate enterprises, and the peasantry was excluded by government policy and bureaucratic interests f r o m participating in mill administration. Even when workers and peasants were j o i n e d in a single cooperative, as in El Mante, Tamaulipas, the peasants, whose remuneration depended on the amount of sugar produced per individual, were at a disadvantage with respect to the work-

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ers and other mill personnel, who received a guaranteed daily wage. This created ongoing conflicts between plant workers and ejidatarios. In 1946, a government commission sent to El Mante r e p o r t e d to President Avila Camacho: If the agrarian organization, instead of [being based on] individual parcels, were to adopt the form of a collective operation, . . . the campesinos [would be remunerated] on the basis of fixed payments per day worked, the same as the workers . . . according to more equitable ideas; but we do not believe that such a radical transformation could be immediately achieved. 18

Workers and ejidatarios generally lacked leadership that might have unified their efforts at improving their conditions by targeting the common enemy: the plant proprietor or the regime itself. They were thus often reduced to making fruitless appeals to the government. 1 9 In a capitalist economy, the collectives were c o n d e m n e d to isolation and, in most cases, failure. To survive and prosper, they needed a radically different environment: total expropriation without compensation of the land and its appurtenances; nationalized banking, credit, transportation, and distribution; free technical assistance; and education. However, by promoting land distribution and the formation of the collectives—seemingly such a victory for the landless agricultural workers—the left had demonstrated from the outset that it was unable to put forth such a program, which would necessarily call into question capitalist property relations and bourgeois rule. The PCM, which played an important role in many of the struggles that resulted in the collectives, was committed to a popular f r o n t with the cardenistas; Vicente Lombardo Toledano, leader of the CTM, shared the Stalinist perspective of blocking with the bourgeoisie. With the support of the left and the reformist labor bureaucracy, Cárdenas was able to solve potentially explosive syndical conflicts by distributing land, thereby converting a militantly independent agricultural proletariat into a peasantry d e p e n d e n t u p o n the regime for credit, for technical support, indeed for its very survival. T h e deficiencies of political l e a d e r s h i p are illustrated by La Laguna, the first and most important of these cases. A general strike in the middle of August 1936 jeopardized the harvest of cotton, one of Mexico's most important export crops. The president of the strike committee, PCM leader Dionisio Encina, relates that "the government intervened to try to convince us not to strike. . . . Cárdenas was afraid of losing the harvest." But in spite of this favorable conjuncture, the massive support of industrial workers throughout the zone,

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and the high levei of worker militancy nationally, when Cárdenas called the leaders to Mexico City 10 days after the initiation of the strike to offer them land reform, they quickly agreed, asking only f o r the removal of the military chief of zone, the departure f r o m the region of the several thousands of scabs that had been trucked in by the landowners during the strike, and permission to notify the press that land would be distributed in La Laguna. Present at this gathering were Encina, a peasant representative named Mariano Padilla, a legal consultant, and Vicente L o m b a r d o T o l e d a n o , who, a c c o r d i n g to Encina, was "in agreement with everything that happened at the settlement." Encina subsequently c l a i m e d that the P C M l e a d e r s h i p had p l a n n e d this o u t c o m e f r o m the b e g i n n i n g but had not " o p e n l y declared the struggle f o r the land" for tactical reasons. Valentin Campa stated years later that this was "a correct revolutionary line. Organize the agricultural workers, struggle for their salaries, and raise their consciousness in order to take the lands f r o m the landlords." 20 Nevertheless, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the eagerness of these leaders to be in the g o o d graces of the government cost the Laguna strikers dearly and had negative consequences for the future. Cárdenas got o f f cheaply in La Laguna: a militant leadership might have forced total expropriation and, more important, maintained a politically independent class struggle organization in the region. With this successful precedent he was soon able to head off similar situations in other economically important areas by applying the agrarian laws as a response to strikes or land invasions. That this was indeed the strategy f o l l o w e d is suggested by the case of Yucatán, where intense syndical activity coupled with worker and peasant opposition to the application of the r e f o r m and " f o r c e d cooperativization" preceded government intervention and the creation of collective ejidos. Demonstrators of the mid-1930s carried placards that read: " T h e people are dying of hunger; work b e f o r e lands." 21 Because of their inability to provide independent leadership for militant workers and peasants, the PCM and the C T M bore a large part of the responsibility for the incomplete results and relatively paltry benefits of the rural struggles of the 1930s. As W o r l d W a r II approached, their continued practice of popular front politics further weakened them, so that when government support of the collectives and the agrarian reform evaporated, the gains of the peasantry and workers were sacrificed on the altar of "national unity" against fascism.

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Notes 1. Calles, Luis León, Luis Morones, and Melchor Ortega were expelled from Mexico in April 1936 owing to reports from military chiefs that they were conducting subversive activities against the government. See González (1981: 74-78). 2. González (1981: 71, 92, 96-97); Anguiano (1975: 155). 3. Mexico (1, 2). 4. Cárdenas (1972: 359-362, 366-367). 5. De Neymet (1981:121-122). 6. Hernández Chávez (1979: 138-139); More» and Paré (1980); García de León (1979). 7. Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez León (1978: 6 6 - 6 8 ) ; Markiewicz (1980: 17). Figures differ slightly in these two sources. See also Morett and Paré (1980); García de León (1979). By far the best work on the gestation, birth, and decline of the collective ejidos is Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978). See especially pages 65-108, 302-381. This thesis suffers from excessive length and serious problems of theoretical perspective and proportion. For example, the authors speak of the need for working class leadership of the peasantry, but their emphasis on the collective ejidos encourages their tendency to view the peasantry as a revolutionary force in a n d of itself. Nevertheless, it is one of the few studies that even attempts to delve beneath the surface of official rhetoric on the agrarian reform. 8. Markiewicz (1980: 17). 9. "Texto del Acuerdo presidencial de 6 de octubre de 1936 relativo al problema agrario de la Comarca Lagunera de Coahuila y Durango," in Fabila (1941: 629-632); "Acuerdo presidencial del 8 de agosto [de 1937], que orienta la acción gubernativa y social en pro de la recuperación económica de Yucatán," in Fabila (1941: 636-640); Eckstein (1966: 129-178); author interview with Ramón Danzós Palomino. 10. Glantz (1974: 109-110); Eckstein (1966: 158-159); Cárdenas (1972: 400). 11. Eckstein (1966: 129-178); Markiewicz (1980: 39, 41); Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 324-325); Shulgovski (1968: 260-261). 12. Shulgovski (1968: 259); Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 327-328). 13. García de León (1979: 84-85). 14. Mexico (14); Shulgovski (1968: 251-253, 260-261). See Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados (DDC), November 12, 1937 (Año 1, Per. Ord., 37 Leg., No. 25), pages 18-19, 21, for accusations that the landlords were smuggling h e n e q u e n processing machinery to Cuba. In S e p t e m b e r 1939, fifteen thousand ejidatarios went out on strike with the support of electrical, railroad, and other workers to d e m a n d that the administration of Henequeneros de Yucatán step down. However, the president of the Ejidal Defense Committee collaborated with national representatives of the PRM, calling in Federal troops to "avoid bloodshed" and asking for Cárdenas's personal intervention. See DDC, September 27, 1939 (Año 3, Per. Ord., 37 Leg., T o m o 6, No. 7), pages 8-11. 15. See Eckstein (1966: 129-178); G l a n u (1974: 101-123). 16. Calculated from 1940 Agricultural-Ejidal Census data and data on the most important nuclei of collective ejidos in Markiewicz (1980: 17).

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17. Eckstein (1966: 140); Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez León (1978: 398400); Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 838). An oddly moving photographic testimony of what government support and credit meant to the ejidatarios of La Laguna in their first few years is contained in Reyes Pimentel (1939). Here the government proudly exhibits schools, hospitals, tractors, a n d irrigation projects that were out of reach for the vast majority of rural dwellers. 18. Sociedad Cooperativa . . . del Ingenio del Mante, S.C.L. (1946). 19. O n the conflicts in Los Mochis, Sinaloa, see Marte R. Gómez to C o m i t é Nacional de la CTM, April 22, 1942, Oficio #101-2539, AMRG ( 1 9 4 2 / D o c u m e n t o s Oficiales, Vol. 1); Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, December 14, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1); Marte R. Gómez to J.Jesús González Gallo, July 8, 1944, Oficio #101-4007, AMRG ( 1 9 4 4 / O f i c i a l e s ) ; a n d Eckstein (1966: 163). O n M i c h o a c á n see C á r d e n a s (1973: 35). O n the El Mante conflict, see Markiewicz (1993); Sociedad Cooperativa . . . del Ingenio del Mante (1946). O n sugar producing ejidos in Nayarit, see Marte R. Gómez to Consejo Nacional Ejecutivo de la Unión de Productores de Caña de Azúcar de la República Mexicana, J u n e 7, 1944, Oficio #101-3314, AMRG (1944/Oficiales). For sugar mill cooperaüves in Morelos, Puebla, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz, see Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez León (1978: 16-19, 83-84). 20. Author interviews with Dionisio Encina and Valen un Campa. 21. Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 76).

9

Regime Institutionalization and the Decline of the Agrarian Reform The institutionalization of the bonapartist regime, so pivotal in ending the agrarian reform of the cardenistas, was in full swing long before the land distribution reached its apex. In July 1935, barely 6 months into his presidency, Cárdenas signed a resolution ordering the preparation of state peasant congresses to bring together all ejidos and villages with provisional possession of lands into a single League of Agrarian Communities in each state. The ultimate goal was the unification of all of these state leagues into a single national organization linked to the PNR. 1 The government invented an appealing label for this process: "campesino unification." What it was really about, as was revealed in the case of the tejedistas and the National Peasant League, 2 was the elimination of organizations that might prove a threat to regime hegemony in the countryside. With the victory of the cardenistas over the tejedistas, the peasant leagues friendly to the regime had gained power and were now playing a conservative and even repressive role in various zones. In La Laguna, the League of Agrarian Communities began to complain in 1936 of unwarranted involvement by the working class (the CTM) in agrarian matters. LCA leaders went after municipal and state posts, finally succeeding—with the support of the PCM—in getting one of their number, General Pedro Rodriguez Triana, elected governor. Meanwhile, PCM members were expelled from the local CTM, foreshadowing the increasing weakness of the Communists at the national level, where the leadership's policy of "unity at all costs" with rightist CTM bureaucrats, officially articulated in 1937, soon led to t h e party's virtual liquidation politically. 3 As governor, Rodriguez Triana, who had been the PCM's candidate for president in 1929 but now had tied his fortunes to the PNR, denied legal registration to all agricultural workers' unions in April 1938. By 1940, the collective ejidos had already begun to break up under the influence of stricter BNCE 103

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lending policies; the LCA mouthed the government's wishes in this matter, demanding the division of the ejidos into individual plots to give ejidatarios a feeling of "security." 4 T h e process of "campesino unification" culminated in August 1938, when the PRM created the National Peasant Confederation. The government claimed to have incorporated 2,400,000 peasants into the new organization. 5 Unlike the CTM, which originally had some semblance of i n d e p e n d e n c e from the government, the CNC was a creation of the regime, its institutional claim on the peasantry. The PRM made this clear at the founding congress of the CNC, where Cárdenas told delegates that the new organization must avoid using organized elements against local authorities. . . . The authorities have an obligation to help resolve . . . the needs of the peasantry, but [they] need the support of those same masses to comply with their political and social responsibility. . . . The leadership that uses the organization to attack the authorities will not be fulfilling its obligation, since it possesses quick means of making itself heard and demanding the guarantee of its rights.6

The president of the Central Executive Committee of the PNR and head of the Organizing Committee for Campesino Unification, Luis I. Rodriguez, reinforced this, reminding the assembly that the National Peasant Confederation must not only inscribe on its banners the rights it is demanding, but also the responsibilities with which it must comply. The leagues and their confederative organization must be efficient allies of the political authorities. . . . The campesino confederation is morally obliged to aid the public powers. 7

The government claimed for itself the right to sharply delimit the spheres of action of worker and peasant organizations. Rewriting history in an effort to give a progressive flavor to his party's profoundly reactionary strategy of separating the peasantry from the proletariat, Rodriguez commented that the worker and peasant movements were of different historical eras and had different tactics. The workers, under present conditions, demanded only improved standards of living and thus did not propose to change the conditions of production. The peasants, on the other hand, struggled for the liquidation of the old, unjust system of land tenure, and when they received ejidos actually c h a n g e d the conditions of agricultural p r o d u c t i o n . They n o longer had bosses to exploit them, and distinctions between peasants a n d h a c i e n d a workers w e r e "happily e r a s e d . " T h e g o v e r n m e n t claimed to encourage collaboration between the workers' and peas-

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ants' organizations, but Rodriguez's remarks contained a clear warning: the Revolution will only go so far. 8 Since 1936, the regime had been i n t e r f e r i n g with the CTM's efforts to organize the peasants. The PNR prevented attendance at the CTM's founding congress in March of that year by fraternal peasant delegates. When the CTM protested, Cárdenas replied that since the agrarian reform was the government's domain, the government had exclusive rights to the "social organization" of the peasantry. He threatened: Thus, if the CTM or any other organization should try . . . to organize the peasantry on its own, far from succeeding, it would only "sow seeds of dissolution," introducing within the peasantry the same internal conflicts that had such fatal results for the industrial proletariat. 9

Of course, a division of the peasantry, if it occurred along class lines and resulted in an alliance of the poorest layers with the workers, would have the potential to threaten the regime. This was exactly what the cardenistas feared. 1 0 In spite of government interference, the CTM maintained its influence among certain important groups of agricultural workers. However, neither the CTM nor the PCM disputed the regime's control over the peasantry. The CTM leadership at both the national and state levels collaborated with the government program to strengthen the state peasant leagues and create a single national organization, thus surrendering any independence from the regime on the agrarian question. The PCM acted similarly. In the spring of 1936, Hernán Laborde wrote in the PCM newspaper El Machete that the party should aid the PNR in its efforts at campesino unification and contribute to the preparation of a national congress for the creation of a single national federation of the peasantry. The party should then penetrate the organization and struggle for the close collaboration of the workers with the peasant federation. 1 1 The major workers' organizations thus abandoned the peasants without a fight in favor of a popular front with the cardenistas. In doing so, they burned their bridges behind them. T h e regime was slowly but surely strengthening its political control over the peasantry with an increasingly strong presence in the countryside. In January 1936, Cárdenas promulgated a decree creating the rural reserves, which according to government statistics resulted in the arming of sixty thousand peasants by the end of his term. This time-honored m e t h o d of ensuring political stability was now improved in several ways. The days of the regional caudillos—with one important excep-

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tion, S a t u r n i n o Cedillo of San Luis Potosí, w h o r e b e l l e d a n d was killed in 1 9 3 8 — w e r e over. T h e r u r a l reserves w e r e now a d i r e c t d e p e n d e n c y of the federal army, f o r m i n g seventy battalions a n d seventy-five cavalry regiments, u n d e r the orders of s o m e four h u n d r e d officers a n d nine generals. T h e army itself, in turn, was m u c h m o r e d e p e n d a b l e than it h a d been in the 1920s, after the many unsuccessful antigovernment rebellions, the reforms of the a r m e d forces u n d e r Calles a n d General J o a q u í n Amaro, and Cárdenas's anticallista substitutions. T h e p e a s a n t reserves, which were s u p p o s e d to aid in t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m by d e f e n d i n g a g r a r i a n s against intransigent hacendados, thus became an i m p o r t a n t arm of the central government; they helped the regime b r i n g the peasantry u n d e r its c o n t r o l a n d at times were used to b r e a k strikes of r u r a l workers. 1 2 T h e r e g i m e ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s e n c e in r u r a l a r e a s was a l s o increasing as a result of the expansion of the a g r a r i a n r e f o r m a n d g o v e r n m e n t b a n k i n g bureaucracies. T h e Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t budget for the period 1934-1940 was almost 47 million pesos, an average of almost 8 million pesos per year, u p f r o m about 21 million pesos, or a b o u t 3.5 million yearly, for the previous 6 years. This reflected b o t h the increased rate of land distribution a n d the growth in the n u m b e r s of related matters dealt with by the agrarian bureaucracy, f r o m petitions for water rights to divisions of ejidos into parcels to certificates of e x e m p t i o n f r o m possible expropriation (certificados de inafectabilidad) f o r landowners and cattlemen. T h e creation in D e c e m b e r 1935 of t h e BNCE a d d e d a new a n d p o w e r f u l b r a n c h to t h e a g r a r i a n bureaucracy. Although the BNCE never financed m o r e than a minority of e j i d a t a r i o s , w h e r e it did o p e r a t e it h a d t h e f i n a l say o n t h e a m o u n t , distribution, a n d uses of credit, as well as e c o n o m i c organization a n d the use of social funds, a n d became a n o t h e r link in t h e chain between regime and ejidatarios. Collusion with the local powers a n d financial c o r r u p t i o n became serious problems. Finally, u n d e r C á r d e n a s , federal e x p e n d i t u r e s on agriculture a n d irrigation increased, a n d t h e formerly exclusive focus on large irrigation works was altered to include projects of modest size b e n e f i t i n g smallholders. T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s f u r t h e r e x t e n d e d the g o v e r n m e n t ' s prese n c e in rural areas a n d laid the f o u n d a t i o n s for the spectacular develo p m e n t of capitalist agriculture in the 1940s a n d 1950s. 13 By the e n d of 1938, the peasantry was thus firmly in the grasp of t h e regime, with n o i n d e p e n d e n t organizational base a n d isolated f r o m the working class. Even as Cárdenas carried o u t his most p o p u lar action—the expropriation of foreign oil in March 1938—the militancy of t h e workers' m o v e m e n t was subsiding. In August 1938, t h e CTM a n d CCM b u r e a u c r a c i e s issued a j o i n t m a n i f e s t o u r g i n g t h e

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workers a n d peasants to give full s u p p o r t to t h e C á r d e n a s government, postponing, "at this time, the use o f any m e t h o d s which might provoke . . . conflicts" that could " i m p e d e the resolution o f the problems [caused by the expropriations]." T h u s , to employ a phrase that w o u l d b e m u c h u s e d in t h e 1 9 4 0 s to j u s t i f y class c o l l a b o r a t i o n , "national unity" was invoked as t h e p r e t e x t f o r t r u n c a t i n g workers' struggles. 1 4 In 1939, the C T M made a pact with t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r to limit strikes, which did little to r e d u c e their n u m b e r but did deprive strikers o f any c o n c r e t e support or national solidarity. At the same time, the government's favorable political and financial c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a m e to an end. Inflation and capital flight had b e e n a p r o b l e m from 1935 on, but retaliation for the e x p r o p r i a t i o n s made matters worse. In 1938 the oil c o m p a n i e s withdrew large sums o f m o n e y f r o m M e x i c o ; the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t refused to e x t e n d its 1 9 3 3 a g r e e m e n t o n silver p u r c h a s e s , a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d B r i t a i n b o y c o t t e d M e x i c a n oil, f o r c i n g M e x i c o to work o u t b a r t e r a g r e e m e n t s with Germany a n d Italy that were never fully c o m p l i e d with owing to t h e start o f W o r l d W a r II. As t h e events in E u r o p e u n f o l d e d , M e x i c o lost i m p o r t a n t E u r o p e a n e x p o r t m a r k e t s a n d its d e p e n d e n c e on higher-priced imports from the U n i t e d States increased; a shortage of foreign e x c h a n g e f o r c e d i m p o r t limitations, fueling the displeasure of the local capitalists and petty b o u r g e o i s i e , w h o d e m a n d e d an e n d to c a r d e n i s m o . R i g h t - w i n g a n d f a s c i s t i c groups multiplied, threatening rebellion; Cedillo, s t r o n g m a n o f San Luis Potosí, was thought to have intimate c o n n e c t i o n s with foreign oil companies; the regime was worried about the presidential candidacy o f J u a n A n d r e u Almazán, t h e darling o f f o r e i g n capitalists and the Mexican middle and upper classes. 1 5 Official agrarian policy reflected these developments. In M a r c h 1937, Cárdenas promulgated a d e c r e e a m e n d i n g the Agrarian C o d e in favor o f livestock ranchers. I n t e r e s t e d parties c o u l d p e t i t i o n t h e Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t for a 2 5 year e x e m p t i o n o f their landholdings f r o m e x p r o p r i a t i o n f o r a g r a r i a n p u r p o s e s . T h e p e t i t i o n e r was r e q u i r e d to own a minimum o f five h u n d r e d head o f cattle or t h r e e h u n d r e d dairy cattle, and was guaranteed f r o m 3 0 0 to 5 0 , 0 0 0 h e c t a r e s o f land, d e p e n d i n g on its quality. Cárdenas's justification for the meas u r e was the n e e d to e n c o u r a g e cattle p r o d u c t i o n f o r t h e d o m e s t i c m a r k e t and for export; 2 5 years was j u d g e d the m i n i m u m a m o u n t o f t i m e n e c e s s a r y f o r c a t t l e m e n to r e c u p e r a t e t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t s . 1 6 Obviously, the i n t e n d e d beneficiaries o f this d e c r e e were n o t peasants b u t substantial capitalists; intensive cattle p r o d u c t i o n c o u l d j u s t as well have b e e n — a n d has b e e n — d e v e l o p e d on ejidos. B u t in spite o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s "profound and deep-rooted faith in the productive capacity o f the campesino class," livestock p r o d u c t i o n was left in pri-

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vate hands for at least one overriding reason: only the land, not the livestock or installments, was expropriable by law, and the government had reached its financial limits in La Laguna, Michoacán, and Yucatán. 1 7 Between 1937 and 1940, 107 certificates of e x e m p t i o n were granted to livestock ranchers, for an average of 10,902 hectares and 1,136 head of cattle per grant (see Table 22). This measure caused much controversy even within the ruling bureaucracy; almost 40 years later, proreform representatives of the latter, while defending the inafectabilidades ganaderas as a necessity u n d e r the circumstances, noted that "there is no question that they slowed the applicat i o n of t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m in livestock z o n e s , as well as t h e development of cattle raising, for a generation." 1 8 In March 1938, only days after the expropriation of foreign oil, the head of the Agrarian Department sent a circular to the state delegates of the d e p a r t m e n t , the state governors, and the Leagues of Agrarian Communities, explaining that the responsibility for agrarian reform proceedings was being returned to the state governments. The circular noted that the governors should rule on all complaints regarding the expropriation of property for land reform purposes; any errors could now be rectified by a revocation of the presidential resolution concerned. Governors would also determine when and how peasant communities would be armed according to local security needs. Finally, they should attempt to encourage private local investment for ejido and other agricultural production, since the federal government was unable to meet all needs. 19 The government's renunciation of its accountability for the pace of the agrarian distribution and for financial support of the peasants endowed with land was a clear forfeiture of the cardenista agrarian program, reflecting the pressure of U.S. imperialism and local private interests on the regime. The measure signaled a greater involvement of private capital in the government agricultural credit institutions and a shift of official sympathy from prospective ejidatarios to hacendados. Even Carranza's Decree o f j a n u a r y 6, 1915 had made presidential resolutions irrevocable; persons whose property had been mistakenly expropriated had the right to compensation, but not to a return of their land. This policy was given institutional expression in May 1938 when Cárdenas established the Office of Small Property as a dependency of the federal executive. The timing of this action suggests that it may have been taken both to assuage the U.S. government and to forestall the support of private landowners for an impending antigovernment revolt led by Cedillo. The office soon became notorious as a point of support within the bureaucracy for landowners who wished to evade the agrarian laws.20 But the evident rightward shift on agrarian matters only made the U.S. government more aggressive in claiming pay-

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ment for lands expropriated from U.S. citizens. As early as October 1937, U.S. Ambassador Josephus Daniels was demanding immediate indemnification for these lands, and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles was t h r e a t e n i n g to u n l e a s h c o n g r e s s i o n a l w r a t h against Mexico unless immediate compensation were promised. In July 1938, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent the Mexican government a n o t e insisting on i m m e d i a t e c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r l a n d s previously owned by U.S. citizens. Although it initially resisted these demands, Mexico eventually complied. In October 1938, Cárdenas promised that no U.S.-owned lands would be expropriated until an agreement could be reached between the United States and Mexico. Mexico eventually promised to pay no less than a million dollars annually on the agrarian debt to U.S. citizens. 21 The difficulties faced by the Cárdenas government in the wake of the oil e x p r o p r i a t i o n s provided the PRM with o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r u n b r i d l e d cynicism on the agrarian question. In the C h a m b e r of Deputies in July 1938, J o r g e Meixueiro of the CCM s u p p o r t e d a recent state governors' declaration in favor of "respect for small property"; he noted that although the CCM was in favor of the abolition of private agricultural property, for the m o m e n t this was impossible owing to the enormous problems faced by Cárdenas and the nation. León García then took the podium to assure the deputies that the PRM was in agreement with the CCM and that if it were not for the grave national situation, he himself would immediately propose legislation abolishing private landed property. 2 2 As might be expected under these circumstances, land distribution declined dramatically after 1937-1938—in area granted (both provisionally and definitively), numbers of beneficiaries, and percentage of positive resolutions. The area per beneficiary was rising, establishing a trend that would continue more or less uninterrupted duri n g t h e 1940s; however, with t h e sole e x c e p t i o n of 1940, this seemingly positive development was vitiated by the poorer quality of the land distributed (see Tables 1-6). Concessions to private property, the slower rate of land distribution, and the increasingly conservative orientation of government agricultural lending were particularly injurious to the collective ejidos, which depended for their very survival on continued institutional support. Credit to ejidatarios diminished as the BNCE began to raise interest rates and refused to lend to the poorest clients in an effort to attract private capital. Progress was made on the latter—the percentage of BNCE operations undertaken with the participation of private capital doubled f r o m 1938 to 1945 (see Table 23)—but the collectives rapidly disintegrated. Their most m i l i t a n t elements p r o t e s t e d to the g o v e r n m e n t , d e m a n d i n g the expropriation of private landholdings and installations in favor of the

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collectives, lower interest rates, a debt moratorium, c o n t i n u e d gove r n m e n t lending to even insolvent credit societies, control of social funds by the ejidos instead of the BNCE, federalization of all irrigation wells, and government control of marketing. T h e g o v e r n m e n t refused their demands, secure in the knowledge that the power formerly w i e l d e d by t h e s e forces as agricultural workers was greatly d i m i n i s h e d now that they were peasants, politically a n d financially indebted to the regime. 2 3 With the working class in decline, the most militant sectors of the peasantry powerless to reverse the new trends, a n d the masses of ejidatarios increasingly u n d e r the political a n d institutional control of the regime, the agrarian reform of the cardenistas came to an end.

Notes 1. See "Acuerdo del C. Presidente . . . Lázaro Cárdenas para constituir la Confederación Nacional Campesina. México, D.F., julio 9 de 1935," in Mexico (15: 43-^15). 2. See Chapter 5 of this book. 3. See Shulgovski (1968: 286-306) for the most complete discussion of the relationship of the PCM to the CTM. See also Márquez Fuentes and Rodríguez Araujo (1973: 238-300); de Neymet (1981:64, 140-143). 4. Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 327-330, 335-336). 5. Mexico (15: 117). 6. See "Discurso del . . . general Lázaro Cárdenas, en el Congreso Constituyente de la Confederación Nacional Campesina. Agosto 28 de 1938," in Mexico (15: 93-95). 7. See "Discurso del Lic. Luis I. Rodriguez. Agosto 28 de 1938," in Mexico (15: 96-104). 8. See "Discurso del Lie. Luis I. Rodríguez. Agosto 28 de 1938," in Mexico (15: 96-104). 9. Interview with Lázaro Cárdenas in El Nacional, February 28, 1936, cited in Morettand Paré (1980: 187); Shulgovski (1968: 264-265). 10. Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 335-336); Markiewicz (1993). 11. Anguiano (1975: 73-74); Shulgovski (1968: 265-266); Mexico (17: 51); Markiewicz (1993). 12. Gilly (1971: 360-361); Shulgovski (1968: 266-267). 13. Shulgovski (1968: 266); Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 763-768, 831-838, 1154); Mexico (7: Part 5); Wilkie (1970: 130-142); Eckstein (1966: 102-125); Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 335-336, Chapter 4); Ronfeldt (1973); "Decreto que reforma el Código Agrario de 1934," August 30, 1937, Ardele 148, in Fabila (1941: 644-646); Orive Alba (1970: 79-80). 14. DDC, August 18, 1938 (Año 1, Per. Ext., 37 Leg., T o m o 2, Suplemento), pages 29-38. 15. H e r n á n d e z Chávez (1979: 191-192); Anguiano (1975: 8 1 - 8 4 ) ; Shulgovski (1968: 402, 434); Prewett (1941: 143-152, 205-210); Markiewicz (1993).

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16. "Decreto q u e adiciona el Código Agrario de los Estados U n i d o s Mexicanos," March I, 1937, in Fabila (1941: 633-635); "Reglamento a que se sujetarán las solicitudes de inafectabilidad de terrenos ganaderos," October 20, 1937, ir. Fabila (1941: 646-661). 17. See Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 38-39); "Acuerdo Presidencial del 8 de agosto, que orienta la acción gubernativa y social en pro de la recuperación económica de Yucatán," August 8, 1937, in Fabila (1941:636-640). 18. Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 39). 19. " C i r c u l a r N ú m e r o 434 Bis," M a r c h 31, 1938, in Fabila (1941: 666-668). 20. De Neymet (1981: 148); Shulgovski (1968: 4 0 2 - 4 0 4 ) ; González Navarro (1977: 94); Chapter 15 of this book. 21. Cárdenas (1972: 376-377); Shulgovski (1968: 378-383); "Decreto que a p r u e b a las notas cambiadas entre los Gobiernos de México y los Estados Unidos . . . . " in Fabila (1941: 669); Cordell Hull to Dr. D. Francisco Castillo Nájera, November 9, 1938, and Eduardo Hay t o j o s e p h u s Daniels, November 12, 1938, in Fabila (1941: 669-674). 22. DDC, July 20, 1938 (Año 1, Per. Ext., 37 Leg., T o m o 2, No. 18, Suplemento Bloque Nacional Revolucionario), pages 17-22. 23. Arboleyda Castro a n d Vázquez León (1978: 328-330, 3 3 5 - 3 3 6 ) ; S h u l g o v s k i (1968: 404, 4 0 6 - 4 0 7 ) . See also C h a p t e r 14 of this b o o k ; Markiewicz (1993).

10

The Ejido and the Legacy of Cardenismo

Although the cardenistas did not invent the ejido, they m a d e it a dominant feature of rural Mexico by using it as the nucleus of their populist politics in the countryside and as a foundation of the consolidated b o n a p a r t i s t regime. T h e ejidal system of land t e n u r e was e x t e n d e d far beyond what was envisioned by t h e a u t h o r s of t h e Constitution of 1917 and in special cases was given extraordinary government support. Private property, however, was not abolished but protected and encouraged, particularly after 1937. The callistas could not impose private property across the board; neither could the cardenistas impose the ejido. And in spite of warnings that the two forms of property could not coexist, they have done so, if uneasily, for more than half a century. 1 Given the impact of the cardenista reform, it is not surprising that most studies of the Mexican agrarian question devote a great deal of attention to the ejido. However, this scrutiny, which sometimes borders on complete enthrallment, tends to distort reality. Like Eyler Newton Simpson in the early 1930s, people want to believe that the ejido is Mexico's "way out" of the uncertainty, cruelty, inequality, and repression that accompany capital accumulation. Thus, the ejido is characterized as somehow noncapitalist or nonprivate, sharply distinguished from private property. Both reform-minded members of the regime and the reformist left have often used the term "social property." 2 This image is reinforced by the ejido's separation from private property in Mexican law and in official statistics, as well as by the pseudorevolutionary ideology of the regime itself. A 1975 ejido organization manual published by the agrarian reform bureaucracy claimed: The ejido is one of the fundamental conquests of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. It is the triumph of communal over private land113

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ed property. It is a new form of labor and productive organization f o u n d e d o n equality of opportunities, peasant participation, and internal democracy.®

Another text published for the peasantry in 1975 noted: The ejido . . . is . . . a clear manifestation of our own cultural identity. It is the traditional and modern expression of the will of the communities to assure the predominance of their own interests over that of the individuals who belong to them. It is, finally, the way of life of the rural men of Mexico. 4

To b e l o n g to an ejido community is democratic, egalitarian, patriotic, and, above all, quintessentially Mexican, if we are to believe the propaganda of the ruling bureaucracy. By logical extension, we have the myth of Mexican exclusivity: the Mexican road to social change is unique, falling somewhere between capitalism and socialism, and cannot be compared with the experience of any other country. Its cynical promotion of this classless conception of the revolution has enabled the bureaucracy to portray itself as a radical purveyor of meaningful social change and to route the justified anti-imperialist feeling of the masses of workers and peasants along a sterile, nationalist path. In reality, as this study shows, the ejidal system is not some vast, socially homogeneous exception to the rule of capitalist relations of production, but is in fact subject to the laws of capital accumulation. In spite of the legal provisions designed to protect ejidal resources from the destructive effects of the capitalist market, ejidal lands have entered into that market from the beginning, through rentals, production contracts, and even sales. The majority of ejidal produce is marketed, not self-consumed. And ejidatarios are not socially equal but have from the beginning been subject to social differentiation. Some are able to enrich themselves, constituting a small, economically unstable rural petty bourgeoisie whose more marginal elements are constantly t h r e a t e n e d with proletarianization. However, the vast majority remain poor, and a large proportion are essentially wage laborers. Precise data on this point do not exist, but indications are that the percentage of ejidatarios who are also wage laborers has grown since 1940. 5 The regime's inability to control these processes within the ejidal sector is evidence that there is no unique, classless Mexican road to social change. The ejido and ejidatario, like the rest of Mexican society, can and must be discussed in the context of social classes under capitalism. Lenin's prerevolutionary writings on Russian society recognized the importance of the class division of the peasantry and reflected a

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debate on this matter that is relevant to today's polemics on the ejido. With the decline of feudalism after midcentury, the Russian peasant communities were breaking up, but the czar had attempted to reconstruct them by distributing parcels of land to the peasantry. T h e reconstituted peasant communities were a subject for endless comment by the Narodnik Party, agrarian populists who believed that the development of capitalism could somehow be avoided by the support of "small p o p u l a r p r o d u c t i o n . " Lenin exposed the falsity of this notion, showing in great detail that capitalism had already penetrated the supposedly idyllic, noncapitalist community. He demonstrated that the poorest layers of the community were actually an "allotmentholding" proletariat, noting that the small czarist land grants were "tying the workers" to capitalist farms and that the "allotment-holding farmworker or day-laborer is a type characteristic of all capitalist countries." 6 Lenin also showed the irrationality of the populists' views on small popular production: T h e position of the peasant in capitalist society is i n d e e d h o p e less, and in village-community Russia, as in parcellized France, leads . . . to an u n n a t u r a l m e a n s of p o s t p o n i n g t h e d o o m o f small economy. . . . One would think that the conclusion . . . [is] that there is no sense in . . . supporting small production, which leads to the producer's standard of living being forced below that of the farmworker. But Mr. V. V. thinks otherwise. He is delighted with the "zeal" of the peasant in tending his cattle; he is delighted with the "good results f r o m livestock farming" o b t a i n e d by t h e p e a s a n t w o m a n w h o "spends all her life with her cow and sheep." What a blessing, to be sure! To "spend all her life with her cow" (the milk of which goes to the improved cream separator), and as a reward for this life, to receive "one-fourth of the cost" of tending this cow! Now really, how after that can one fail to declare for "small popular production"! 7

The Russian debate provides some historical perspective on the ejido controversy. Clearly, for Luis Cabrera, Venustiano Carranza, a n d many of the veteranos, the ejidatario was an allotment-holding laborer for capitalist agriculture; the ejido plot was never meant to be more than a complement to the day wage from which the more capable peasants would graduate as middle-class farmers. In contrast, the cardenistas theorized that the ejidatario, on the basis of his links with the ejido community and the government, could become productive e n o u g h to feed the nation and prosperous enough to contribute to economic development as a consumer. The ejido communities—with suitable doses of cooperativism and technical assistance—would be t h e foundation of Mexico's unique process of social change. T h e contradictions of capital accumulation would be controlled and the worst

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abuses of capitalism eradicated, without the actual elimination of either private property or the bourgeoisie. As a regime ideologist enthused: T h e ejido was no longer the bridge to full private property [as it had been for the callistas], Neither was it the means for the campesino to obtain a complement to his sustenance. Now it was the social regimen "that was liberating the campesino from the exploitation of the landlord" and the "system of production" that should fundamentally supply national requirements. It was the great historical leap that permitted the conversion of the salaried worker with a parcel, into an i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m u n a l farmer in the construction of a new Mexico.®

T h e outcome of cardenismo demonstrated that this supposed "great historical leap" was a cruel fiction. The rapid land distribution of the 1930s, while it increased the number of smallholders and temporarily reduced the size of the agricultural proletariat, could not eliminate the contradictions of capitalist accumulation or even mitigate them. The ejidatario was not a member of a stable social class, but rather was subject to the same general social processes and pressures experienced by peasants anywhere in the world at any point in the history of capitalism. T h e ejido community, far f r o m unified, democratic, and egalitarian, was defined by those same processes and pressures, broken up into tiny parcels and deeply divided politically and socially. Ejidal production, initially impressive, soon fell behind that of private agriculture, which after 1940 b e c a m e increasingly modern and capital intensive. The poorest ejidatarios, along with the private minifundistas, were like the Russian Narodniks' zealous peasants, squeezing relatively high p r o d u c t i o n f r o m p o o r r e s o u r c e s through the intense use of unremunerated family labor. These peasants rarely received the full value of the labor invested, let alone any profit. 9 The few exceptional success stories—for example, collective ejidos of the 1930s that survive today—prove the rule: the relatively prosperous ejidatarios, who control the land and installations, are far outnumbered by their hired laborers, who have no hope of receiving land. 1 0 Even so, agrarian reformism retains its appeal. T h r o u g h t h e 1980s, reform-minded members of the regime assiduously created new plans centering on the ejido and its organization. Campesinista intellectuals extol the virtues and efficiency of the peasant smallholder, attempt to show that small agriculture is more efficient than large, a n d often view the peasantry as a h o m o g e n e o u s social class with democratic or revolutionary potential. Influential sectors of the left promote fallacies about the nature of the ejido and its role in social

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change. Trailing the bonapartist bureaucracy, claiming Cárdenas for their own, these groups continue to promote the idea that the ejido, as a popular organization, can serve as a foundation for the democratic reform of agriculture and society.11 While it is not possible to predict the exact effects of the regime's recent changes to Article 27, it is highly likely that the peasantry— including the remnants of the ejidal sector—will continue to play a significant part in Mexican society. However, it will not be the role traditionally assigned by the reformist left. The peasantry is far too weak and divided to spearhead popular reform, let alone to serve any revolutionary leadership role. If there is to be revolutionary change, the proletariat must lead the way. This assertion leaves open the question of a working class program as regards the peasantry. Given a revolutionary situation today, a majority of ejidatarios, as members of the poorest layers of the peasantry, could probably be won to a program for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, but this would not happen uniformly or automatically. Certainly the ejido community, divided as it is along income and social lines and inextricably linked to the rest of bourgeois society, could not be expected to present an undivided front with respect to the proletariat. A revolutionary party of the Mexican working class would be aware of the need to win the agricultural workers and the poor peasants, including ejidatarios, to its position, seeking to link the immediate needs of these exploited rural dwellers to a revolutionary program. While such a party would certainly not advocate the eradication of the ejido, it would disseminate no illusions about the potential of the peasant community as a nucleus or agent of social change.

Notes 1. See Simpson (1937: 486-487), who thought that "what Mexico may not do, on pain of the penalties sooner or later visited upon houses divided against themselves, is to continue to sing both songs at once. If confusion be not confounded . . . a choice must be made [between the socialization of agricultural resources via the ejido and the path of private property]." 2. See Simpson (1937: 5 1 0 - 5 1 1 ) ; Aguirre Avellaneda (1976: 31); Zaragoza and Macías (1980: 156); "Un programa alternativo de política agraria del PSUM" (1983: 13). 3. Aguirre Avellaneda (1976: 29). 4. Mexico (32: 5). See also Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 4 3 4 ) : "Throughout Mexican history, there has existed a constant conflict between private and communal landed property, and . . . the Mexican Revolution of 1910, by creating the ejido . . . gave, to a certain point, a triumph to communal property."

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5. See Table 9, which gives estimates that are probably too low; also Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 481-482) and dejanvry (1981: 129). 6. Lenin (1956: 34S-344). See also dejanvry (1981: 98). 7. Lenin (1956: 289-290). 8. Aguirre Avellaneda (1976: 56). 9. See dejanvry (1981: 127-129) on agricultural and livestock production in Mexico. The work of Bartra (1974) on agrarian structure and social classes in Mexico argues that there is a peasant "mode of production" that is separate from, but "articulated" with, the capitalist m o d e . See especially Chapters 1 and 2. 10. I observed this p h e n o m e n o n on a 1980 visit to several collective ejidos in La Laguna affiliated with the g r o u p "40-69," formerly h e a d e d by Arturo Orona. See also Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 79-80) on the Quechehueca ejido in Sonora, where 73 percent of the labor is performed by hired workers. 11. PRI members associated with the Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Agrarias tend to be proejido. Reyes Osorio et al. (1974), which originally appeared in three volumes in 1970, preceded the Echeverría government's attempt at collectivizing the ejidal sector, in which Reyes Osorio himself was an important participant. Zaragoza and Macias (1980) is a good example of the more recent output of this group, which was still active in the mid-1980s in spite of the tarnished image of the Echeverría government. See Markiewicz (1980) on ejido organization. For the work of some campesinista intellectuals, see t h e magazine Narxht-Nandhá', Warman (1972, 1976); a n d Esteva (1978). For a critique of the position that small peasant production is more efficient than large-scale agriculture, see Bartra (1974: 40-45). For the continuing appeal of "small popular production" to the reformist left, see "Un programa alternativo de política agraria del PSUM" (1983: 11-21).

PART 3

The "Rectification" of Cardenismo

11

The Avila Camacho Presidency: An Agrarian Counterreform? December 1940 is often seen as the beginning of an agrarian thermid o r in Mexico. W h e t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a p e r i o d of " c o u n t e r reform," the "ascendance of capital's . . . restorationist current," or as an "agrarian rectification" or "stabilization," 1 the 1940s are sharply contrasted with the Cárdenas years on the basis of a decline in the amount and quality of land distributed, tougher agricultural credit policies, an attack on the collective ejidos, and a renewal of regime favoritism for private agricultural property. These facts are not o p e n to question; their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is another matter. Those who emphasize a thermidor beginning in 1940 often imply that only the "errors" of the cardenistas prevented the reform from continuing its gradual transformation of the Mexican countryside along a "noncapitalist path." Disregarding the capitalist nature of the State built on the Constitution of 1917, such interpretations assert, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, that a truly democratic agrarian reform could have been—still can be—implemented without the complete destruction of that State and the expropriation of the capitalist class it represents. 2 This study has shown that it was precisely the existence of the bourgeois State and its protection of private p r o p e r t y that, even under Cárdenas, prevented the fundamental transformation of rural conditions. From this point of view, the real agrarian counterreform occurred in the period 1915-1919, with the defeat of the peasant armies, the promulgation of the Decree of January 6, 1915 and the Constitution of 1917, the overthrow of the agrarian democracy in Morelos, and the assassination of Zapata. The brief upswing in land expropriations and agrarian grants in the mid-1980s, forced on the regime by militant worker and peasant struggles, created illusions in the bourgeois State. It did not radically transform economy or society: the ownership of property and the right to exploit labor were guaran121

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teed; the ejido, social panacea of the cardenistas, barely resisted the p r e s s u r e s of capital. T o o , t h e p o p u l a r r e f o r m s of t h e 1930s w e r e d e t e r m i n e d as much by international as by internal conditions. Thus, it s h o u l d n o t b e s u r p r i s i n g t h a t c h a n g i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m stances—specifically, the advent of World War II—had their negative e f f e c t o n r e f o r m a n d t h a t this was m a n i f e s t s o m e t i m e b e f o r e D e c e m b e r 1940. After 1938, the r e g i m e e x p e r i e n c e d increasing difficulties with the i n h e r e n t physical limitations imposed by its p r o t e c t i o n of private agricultural property and its agrarista demagogy. T h a t is, it was runn i n g o u t of legally e x p r o p r i a b l e c r o p l a n d a n d , t h u s , of a r a b l e hectares for distribution to a rural population that was still h u n g r y for land. 3 Cárdenas himself m e n t i o n e d this problem b e f o r e his t e r m of office e n d e d . 4 To c o n t i n u e the distribution of ejidos, Cárdenas-style, would now necessarily mean a reduction in the legal size of p r o p e r t y e x e m p t f r o m e x p r o p r i a t i o n . At a time when b o t h t h e U.S. governm e n t a n d domestic capital were agitating in favor of m o r e a m p l e g u a r a n t e e s for private property, this was not a viable option. Even had it b e e n politically feasible, such a m e a s u r e w o u l d h a v e given t h e regime only a brief respite f r o m the problem of what to d o with the landless rural p o p u l a t i o n , not to m e n t i o n t h e d i l e m m a of how to e x p a n d agricultural p r o d u c t i o n f o r domestic c o n s u m p t i o n a n d foreign e x p o r t on the basis of peasant agriculture. 5 T h e only rational s o l u t i o n — t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n of all l a n d e d property, the gradual creation of cooperatives a n d State-run farms, t h e equal division of available work a m o n g the economically active rural population—was not possible within the limits of capitalism a n d could not be considered by the regime. Thus, by 1941, t h e g o v e r n m e n t was officially d e n y i n g the probl e m ' s e x i s t e n c e by c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e a g r a r i a n g o a l s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1917 h a d now b e e n achieved. T h e l a t i f u n d i a were destroyed a n d the "redistributive phase" of the agrarian r e f o r m was over. It was t h e r e f o r e the new president's policy to c o n c e n t r a t e on technical aspects of the agrarian question. 6 T h e reality, of course, was far less cut a n d dried. Marte R. Gómez, Avila C a m a c h o ' s secretary of agriculture, expressed the regime's worries f o r the i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e when he stated in a 1943 m e m o r a n d u m to the president: Sooner or later . . . the rural proprietors will be reduced [by means of expropriation] to small proprietors protected by certificates of inaffectability . . . and then the problem of granting land to humble campesinos . . . will inevitably leave its orbit within the current agrarian legislation. 7

The regime could not extend cardenismo; the penalties, both

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political a n d e c o n o m i c , were potentially t o o great. N e i t h e r c o u l d it g o backward; the agrarian r e f o r m , which was its key to a m o d i c u m o f political stability, c o u l d not b e completely r e p u d i a t e d . T h e l a b o r milit a n c y o f t h e 1 9 3 0 s , a l t h o u g h s o m e w h a t c o o l e d , was n o t a l t o g e t h e r e x t i n g u i s h e d ; presidential elections, in which t h e P R M f a c e d s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n , were i m m i n e n t ; world war was a p p r o a c h i n g . I n s t e a d o f e i t h e r definitive advance or retreat, the g o v e r n m e n t o p t e d f o r c o n c i l i ation a n d " c o n s o l i d a t i o n . " A g a m u t o f legal, administrative, financial, p o l i t i c a l , a n d p r o p a g a n d i s t i c m e a s u r e s was e m p l o y e d to slow t h e r e f o r m . In late 1946, these p r o c e d u r e s were c a r r i e d to t h e i r n e x t logical stage when Miguel Alemán reinstated the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right o f a m p a r o f o r p r o p e r t y owners who had certificates o f e x e m p t i o n f r o m e x p r o p r i a t i o n , s i g n a l i n g i n c r e a s e d g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t f o r private capital a n d i n a u g u r a t i n g a new e r a o f i n t e n s e , o p e n r e p r e s s i o n o f worker a n d peasant movements. Even within r e g i m e circles, " t o b e an agrarista m e a n t , o n c e again, to g o against the c u r r e n t . " 8 F o r t h e m o m e n t , such drastic m e a s u r e s w e r e n o t p o s s i b l e , b u t n e i t h e r were they necessary. T h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d m e r e l y to slow its s t e p , wait, c o n c i l i a t e , let n a t u r e t a k e its c o u r s e . T h e w e i g h t y c a r denista bureaucracy, which had briefly served to n u d g e r e f o r m a l o n g , now sat down, f o l d e d its a r m s , a n d b l o c k e d t h e r o a d . A g r i c u l t u r a l capital, alive a n d healthy, c o n t i n u e d its advance. T h e following c h a p ters detail that process.

Notes 1. See Aguilera Gómez (1969: 144-151); author interviews with Ramón Danzós Palomino and Valentín Campa; Medina ( 1 9 7 8 : 2 3 1 ) ; Gutelman (1974: 112); Shulgovski (1968); Arboleyda Castro and Vázquez León (1978: 181); and Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 40). 2. This is the viewpoint of both the proejido sector of the PRI (see Reyes Osorio et al., 1974) and much of the reformist left (Shulgovski, 1968). 3. See Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, January 19, 1943, AMRG (1943/Agrarios); Mexico (7: "Propósitos fundamentales de la política agraria del presidente Manuel Avila Camacho"). 4. In his preamble to the Agrarian Code of 1940, Cárdenas implied that the regime would solve this problem by colonizing newly opened lands, augmenting the e x p r o p r i a t e radius of land surrounding villages under certain circumstances and allowing ejido grants to consist of any type o f land, not just irrigable or rainfed cropland. See Fabila (1941: 6 8 9 - 6 9 1 ) . 5. An excellent example of later efforts by the proreform sector of the regime to deal with both problems is Reyes Osorio et al. (1974). 6. Mexico (3: 5 4 - 5 5 ) . 7. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, January 29, 1943, AMRG (1943/Agrarios). 8. Marte R. Gómez, "Agrarios," AMRG (1946/Asuntos Oficiales, Vol. 1).

12

Elections, War, and the Politics of Conciliation

T h e rise of E u r o p e a n fascism, the preparations of the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t for war, a n d the election of C á r d e n a s ' s successor were factors of p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e in shaping Mexican politics in the 1940s, creating pressures that were felt several years b e f o r e Manuel Avila C a m a c h o took office as p r e s i d e n t . C o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n C á r d e n a s a n d F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt i n d i c a t e s t h a t by S e p t e m b e r 1937, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t was s o u n d i n g out Mexico o n the possibility of w a r t i m e e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n ; f o r his p a r t , C á r d e n a s was expecting world war as early as J u n e of that year. 1 At the same time, by the e n d of 1937, the first signs of presidential futurismo were evident in Mexico. 2 T h e PRM's n o m i n a t i o n of Avila C a m a c h o as its official c a n d i d a t e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e m o r e r a d i c a l Francisco J . Mugica, followed t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n of t h e f o r e i g n oil companies, the ensuing diplomatic a n d e c o n o m i c retaliation, a n d the resultant domestic political crisis that took place at the highest levels even in the face of mass p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for the m e a s u r e . 3 Fearing increased opposition f r o m the right if c a r d e n i s m o were c o n t i n u e d , the PRM o p t e d instead for a representative of t h e "nascent technomilitary bureaucracy." 4 Like most of his predecessors, the c a n d i d a t e was a general; "the h o u r of the licenciados h a d not arrived." 5 But h e was a m o d e r a t e with little combat experience or personal following. Avila C a m a c h o c a m p a i g n e d a n d g o v e r n e d u n d e r t h e s l o g a n "national unity." What kind of unity? His definition of the term, given in April 1939 w h e n h e was a p r e c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e p r e s i d e n c y , was almost biblical (with the Revolution cast in the role of a g e n e r o u s Creator): All Mexicans united, forming a single front, consolidating our material and spiritual riches, which the Revolution has given us, must demand of ourselves the greatest effort to contribute to the great-

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ness of our country, silencing in our spirit any sentiment contrary to true social justice.®

According to the candidate, the m i n i m u m g u a r a n t e e s f o r workers a n d peasants had now been established; it was time to give stimulus to "private initiative, s u r r o u n d i n g it with just security." After all, [the nation] is not a heterogeneous aggregate of classes, each o n e angrily d e f e n d i n g its interests, but rather a great historical unit, rooted in the past and struggling united for a common future. 7

Avila C a m a c h o ' s Six-Year Plan did not deny the existence of class struggle but d e c r e e d that it would now be kept within legal b o u n d s . 8 T h e new administration would not aim to abolish c a r d e n i s m o but to "consolidate" it. 9 Conciliatory rhetoric notwithstanding, militant elements of the working class were aware that modifications of cardenism o were in store. Attempting to pacify the rank a n d file, the CTM c l a i m e d t h a t these would n o t be c h a n g e s in t h e " e s s e n c e " of cardenista politics, but rather its "application . . . to reality." 10 T h e reality was world war, with the c o n c o m i t a n t d i s r u p t i o n of trade patterns a n d military and economic pressures f r o m U.S. imperialism. T h e p r o b l e m was to ensure production and profits d u r i n g the war. 11 Mexico was to play an auxiliary role in the U.S. war effort, producing strategically important agricultural goods and providing military cooperation. This role was beneficial to capitalists a n d even prod u c e d a transient little b o o m for certain sectors of the peasantry; but the majority of the working class and p o o r faced the increasing inflation of the war years on stagnant salaries. 12 Efforts b e g a n at an early d a t e to convince the proletariat a n d peasantry that involvement in the war was in their interests. In S e p t e m b e r 1939, Vicente L o m b a r d o T o l e d a n o spoke in favor of a declaration of war by Mexico, o n t h e g r o u n d s that it would b e economically a n d politically beneficial to t h e " p e o p l e . " 1 3 O n May 15, 1942, 2 days a f t e r t h e s i n k i n g of t h e Mexican-registered oil tanker Potrero del Llano, the CTM d e m a n d e d that Mexico declare war on the Axis powers. O n the twenty-sixth of the m o n t h , the National C o m m i t t e e pledged n o use of strikes until the e n d of the war. 14 Later, L o m b a r d o was willing to s u p p o r t the bid of Fidel Velazquez for an extension as the head of the CTM national c o m m i t t e e — a l t h o u g h r e e l e c t i o n was p r o h i b i t e d in t h e s t a t u t e s — u n d e r the pretext of unity for the war effort. This unity, however, h a d a m o r e immediate goal: s t r e n g t h e n i n g the CTM with an eye toward the 1943 elections for the federal legislature. 1 5 L o m b a r d o , with his orientation toward the "progressive" bourgeoisie a n d his emphasis o n electoral m a n e u v e r i n g within the PRM, thus threw his c o n s i d e r a b l e

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power behind the continuismo ofVelázquez and its dire consequences for the workers' movement. 1 6 T h e PCM also supported the candidacy o f Avila Camacho and, eventually, Mexico's participation in the war. In a 1 9 3 9 pamphlet authored by Hernán Laborde, the party declared that the only possible heirs to cardenismo were Mtigica and Avila Camacho, and that the two should unite to strengthen the PRM in the coming elections. T h e "unity of the people," declared Laborde, "is the unity of the PRM." T h e party's extraordinary congress in 1940 characterized the contest between the PRM and oppositionist generals Almazán and Amaro as a "struggle between revolution and counterrevolution." 1 7 With its slogan "the enemy is Almazán!" the PCM gave its full backing to Avila Camacho. 1 8 T h e attitude of the PCM toward the war changed with the nationalistic whims of Stalin. Thus, before the German-Soviet pact of nonaggression in August 1939, the tactic of the popular front imposed a friendly attitude toward the "democratic" bourgeoisie, including the Roosevelt government; immediately afterward, the war was characterized as "interimperialist." When the Soviet Union was compelled to enter the war in J u n e 1941, suddenly the interimperialist conflict became a "just war of popular liberation against hitlerism"; the PCM gave its unconditional support to the Avila Camacho government, demanding the immediate institution of a draft, the acquisition o f ships and planes for the national defense, the establishment of munitions factories and shipyards for naval repairs, and the signing of a military and commercial treaty with the United States for defense and industrial development purposes. T h e party also declared: T h e revision of the tactic of the class struggle is now imposed. T h e struggle "for the specific demands of the working class and the popular masses, should be carried out with the realization that the principal duty is the defense o f the fatherland." This means that the workers must exhaust all means for resolving worker-employer conflicts without resorting to the strike, except in those extreme cases in which the employers' intransigence obliges it. 1 9

It was now necessary, from Stalin's point of view, to convince the Allies that the Soviet Union's only war aim was to defeat the Nazis. T h e T h i r d International was dissolved; Earl Browder, head o f the American Communist Party, declared that the era of imperialism was over; the PCM began to dissolve factory cells. Class struggle was now considered collaboration with fascism. T h e PCM, not surprisingly, entered a period of crisis and lost many members. 2 0 This situation was favorable to the PRM, which could face the

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threat p o s e d by o p p o s i t i o n presidential candidate Juan A n d r e u Almazan much more easily at a time of international uncertainty and with the l e f t in its pocket. Almazan, whose political and military career went back to the earliest days of the Revolution, had been on the wrong side as much as on the right o n e but had always managed to survive. His conservative candidacy was originally backed by the industrial bourgeoisie of Monterrey; but discontent with the regime and the labor bureaucracy ran so high in some quarters that he also attracted support among the liberal petty bourgeoisie and significant elements of the proletariat, who, thanks to the bankruptcy of the left, had no other political option. When the Almazan campaign began to acquire the characteristics of a popular crusade, the bourgeoisie withdrew its support, fearing insurrection; the PRM, confronted with its first major electoral opposition, battled with every weapon at its disposal. These included rhetoric, threats, organized violence, and electoral fraud. 21 With Almazan vanquished, Avila Camacho began to implement a program that differed little f r o m that put forth by his f o r m e r rival. Cardenas's "socialist education" immediately came under attack, a l t h o u g h A r t i c l e 3 o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n was not m o d i f i e d until N o v e m b e r 1946.22 Rightist members of the P R M claimed that 90 percent of all BNCE functionaries and employees were communist sympathizers and demanded the expulsion of all communists f r o m the official party; there was a purge of leftists in the cabinet. 23 Legislation was promulgated to extend the role allowed private capital in the petroleum industry. 24 Mexico agreed to pay the United States 49 million dollars in compensation for property expropriated from U.S. citizens, and another 24 million to settle the petroleum dispute. 25 T h e popular sector within the PRM was strengthened, culminating in the creation of the National C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Popular Organizations ( C N O P ) in early 1943. T h e new organization, created to facilitate the political participation of the conservative middle class, acted as a buffer against the intersectoral disputes in the legislature that were disrupting the unity of the P R M and gave Avila Camacho an extra institutional counterbalance to the working class. It favored mediation for the solution of its members' problems, promotion of national unity, and an emphasis on economic production; o n e of its p r i m e goals was the reinstatement of the constitutional right of amparo in agrarian proceedings. 2 6 T h e working class came under attack by the Supreme Court, which began to resolve an increasing n u m b e r of cases in favor of the capitalists; federal labor legislation was revised and the Constitution modified to place further limits on the right to strike and increase the control of the federal government over industries considered strategic for the war effort of the Allies. 27

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Justification for Avila Camacho's program was consistently provided by the conciliatory rhetoric of national unity and the n e e d to produce for the victory of the Allies. This was equally true for the agrarian reform, which took a back seat to the e c o n o m i c a n d technical problems of production and government promotion of private interests in the countryside.

Notes 1. González (1981: 214); Cárdenas (1972: 370). 2. Hernández Chávez (1979: 193-194). 3. The fear in Cárdenas's cabinet of the consequences of imperialist retaliation was so great that it was suggested the case be turned over to international tribunals. Hernández Chávez (1979: 194-195). 4. Hernández Chávez (1979: 113, 196-198). 5. Hernández Chávez (1979: 193). 6. Medina (1978: 87). 7. Medina (1978:97). 8. Shulgovski (1968: 416-417). 9. Medina (1978: 275); "Plan Sexenal del PRM, 1941-1946," in Fabila (1941: 674); Markiewicz (1993). 10. Medina (1978: 87). 11. Medina (1978: 288). 12. Medina (1978: 312-314); Memorándum, Secretaría de la Economía Nacional, January 18, 1943, AMRG (1943/Asuntos Oficiales); Author interview with Ramón Danzós Palomino. 13. Confederación de Trabajadores de México (1939: 6 6 - 6 7 ) . Even Cárdenas, who at least had the honesty not to masquerade as a workers' leader, repeatedly expressed his opposition to a declaration of war on nationalistic grounds, knowing only too well the difficulties already being created for Mexico by its close collaboration with the U.S. war preparations. See Cárdenas (1973: 52-53, 65, 77, 83-84). Cárdenas was commissioned by Avila Camacho in 1941 to secure the defenses of the Pacific Coast; in September 1942, he was appointed secretary of defense. 14. Medina (1978: 173, 302). 15. Medina (1978: 174-184). 16. For Lombardo's maneuvering, his campaign to create a new party of "progressive, democratic" forces to pressure the PRM f r o m without, the increasing capitulation of the CTM to the regime, and syndical charrismo, see Medina (1979: 112-175). 17. Márquez Fuentes and Rodríguez Araujo (1973: 252-253, 263). 18. Shulgovski (1968:412). 19. Márquez Fuentes and Rodriguez Araujo (1973: 272). 20. Márquez Fuentes and Rodríguez Araujo (1973: 240-250, 253-254, 256-259, 269-272, 275-286. 21. On Almazán's candidacy, see the informative study of Contreras (1980); Medina (1978: 13-131) for the campaign in its entirety; DDC, March 6, 1940 (Año 3, Per. Ord., 37 Leg., Tomo 6, No. 39, pp. 3-16); March 14, 1940 (No. 40, pp. 7-17), April 3, 1940 (No. 41, pp. 5-12), J u n e 26, 1940 (No.

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44, pp. 9 - 1 4 ) , a n d August 6, 1940 (Año 3, Per. Ext., T o m o 7, No. 5, pp. 22-28) for PRM anti-Almazán rhetoric, much of which centers on his infamous past as a huertista; also Prewett (1941: 227-251) for a description of election-day violence. On Almazán's early background, see Portilla (1979). 22. Cárdenas (1973: 15, 18-19) Medina (1978: 345-400). 23. Medina (1978: 147-148, 155-157). 24. Márquez Fuentes and Rodriguez Araujo (1973: 231-232); Cárdenas (1973: 22-23). 25. Shulgovski (1968: 481-482). 26. Medina (1978: 159-162; 191-193). 27. Medina (1978: 290-292, 314-319).

13

The Contradictions of Agricultural Development

Inescapably, the war overshadowed the Mexican regime's every intervention in the agricultural sector during the period 1940-1946. The already close links of the Mexican economy with that of the northern Colossus were tightened as production, international trade, and even the local labor supply were influenced by the war effort of the United States. Wartime "cooperation" was the institutional manifestation of these circumstances. 1 The Mexican-United States Commission for Economic Cooperation was established in April 1943 to coordinate production for war, and the Mexican government maintained a close relationship with the United States Board of Economic Warfare. Collaboration was accompanied by assurances of "mutually advantageous cooperative programs" and benefits for Mexico; the Board of Economic Warfare "appreciatefd] deeply the close cooperation" and made a show of stressing the "provision of higher nutritional standards for the mass of the population of Mexico who are producing for the war effort." But the war requirements of the U.S. government were the only real priority. In 1943, between 300,000 and 800,000 hectares of irrigated and rainfed land were requested for production of war surpluses in Mexico; the supply of agricultural machinery and aid for the completion of irrigation projects were directly tied to production agreements. 2 Any illusions that Mexico would benefit by collaboration with the U.S. government were shattered at war's end. Growing products essential to the war had to some extent underm i n e d Mexican grain p r o d u c t i o n , but in 1946 the U n i t e d States refused to guarantee Mexico the shipment of any quantity of wheat. Now that imperialism's priorities were centered on halting communism in Europe, all surplus grain was needed there. 3 The Avila Camacho government took office in 1940 with definite plans for the technical development of agriculture. 4 Increased production was the top concern: of basic food crops such as maize and 131

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wheat, through genetic innovations and technical improvements in farming, storage, and preservation practices; of oilseeds; and of tropical crops for export. T h e government made plans to develop certain crops for industrial use, such as hops, and medicinal plants that could be exported or used in the domestic pharmaceutical industry. Import substitution was planned for crops that could be grown in Mexico, such as almonds, pepper, and cloves. 5 T h e Rockefeller Foundation was invited to M e x i c o and initiated the p r o g r a m of agricultural research and development that later produced the Green Revolution technology of dwarf wheat strains.6 The government, both independently of and in conjunction with the Rockefeller Foundation, carried out studies on maize, wheat, and a great variety of other crops, including rice, sesame, beans, sugar cane, cotton, and cacao. 7 There was a campaign to popularize fertilizer use, and progress was made in disease and pest control. A drive was begun to improve the quality, marketability, and exportability of agricultural products. Government spending on irrigation rose; thirty-five large projects were initiated or continued and sixty-six smaller works were completed in this period, for a total of almost 550,000 new and improved hectares (see Table 7). 8 These activities continued throughout the 1940s, but goals were m o d i f i e d as the war continued. Oilseeds and rubber increased in importance when supplies from the East were cut off. Sugar was perpetually scarce and maize production, as always, fluctuated. T h e maize supply was not such a great problem for the regime under normal conditions, when deficits could be supplemented with imports. During war, however, the international market was unreliable, and a severe shortage could lead to popular unrest. There was a perpetual battle between the secretary of agriculture and the secretaries of the treasury and economy on how best to deal with shortages of agricultural goods and the larger problem of inflation. 9 Wartime regulation of agricultural production and development was initiated in mid-1942, after Mexico's declaration of war on the Axis powers, with the Agricultural M o b i l i z a t i o n Plan. Favorable results the first year, as the Department of Agriculture itself recognized, owed more to good weather and the development of previous market trends than to the efforts of the government. In 1943, the cumulative effects of a severe drought, late torrential rains, cyclones, and freezes led to disastrous harvests. Maize, grown primarily in areas dependent on rainfall, was especially a problem. T h e secretary of agriculture commented that it "was not the worst year f o r maize in Mexico (thanks to the fact that the bad effects of climate were partially counterbalanced by the large area cultivated), but . . . the current world conditions may make it seem like the worst." 10

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From 1943 on, the government's efforts were directed mainly to increasing the production of maize, wheat, and sugar, although thirty-seven products were controlled by the plan. Maize cultivation was encouraged in a variety of ways. Decrees promulgated in September 1943 mandated that 10 to 15 percent of the total cultivated area in each agricultural zone be dedicated to maize cultivation and established government control over maize distribution. Recently opened irrigable land and areas cleared with newly acquired g o v e r n m e n t machinery must dedicate 50 p e r c e n t of their c r o p l a n d to maize. Regional self-sufficiency was promoted in an effort to avoid difficulties of storage and transportation. Technical personnel of the government agricultural credit banks, the National Irrigation Commission, and the Department of Agriculture were ordered to give top priority to organizing the maize harvests on penalty of losing their j o b s . Agricultural machinery stations were established—seven h u n d r e d new tractors were added in 1943—and preferentially designated for maize cultivation. Official credit policy was oriented toward maize. 11 Although the measures taken by the government did stimulate p r o d u c t i o n , new contradictions resulted. T h e main p r o b l e m was transportation. Maize harvests in Nayarit, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Chiapas were j e o p a r d i z e d owing to lack of a d e q u a t e storage a n d insufficient railroad cars. Rice harvests in Michoacan and Sonora; wheat, cottonseed, and cotton in La Laguna; sugar in Morelos and S i n a l o a ; b e a n s in S i n a l o a a n d Nayarit; p o t a t o e s a n d c h i l e in Guanajuato; mangos in Veracruz; pineapple, coffee, and bananas in the southeast: all faced spoilage or w o r s e n e d m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s because of lack of transport. The government feared that Mexico's inability to distribute wheat imports would lead the United States to cut off sales. 12 With regard to production, moral exhortation and threats of sanctions were effective only up to a certain point. In an economy ruled by capitalist relations of production and exchange, the price of a crop was the best stimulus to production. But price incentives were consistently vetoed in favor of the government's policy of fighting inflation by keeping agricultural prices low. The secretary of agriculture's constant demands to be given responsibility for the establishment of guaranteed prices for agricultural products fell on deaf ears; instead, prices were influenced indirecdy by a consortium formed by the National Distributing and Regulating Agency, the BNCA a n d BNCE, and the Import-Export Company, which acquired stocks and released t h e m on the m a r k e t when necessary. T h e g o v e r n m e n t resolved to "resist at any cost the establishment of a 'parity' system which automatically links agricultural with industrial prices." The secretary of agriculture warned that the policy of squeezing agriculture

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at both ends would undermine the government's authority with the producers and thus its ability to orient the economy. 1 3 Hoarding and speculation, omnipresent, drove up consumer prices; the government was essentially powerless to d o anything about them. 14 T h e lack of fuel f o r agricultural machinery and transport was a persistent bottleneck to production and distribution. In April 1944, it was reported that shipments of fuel were taking almost a month to reach El Bajio, in central Mexico, from the port of Tampico. 1 5 In May 1946, 120,000 tons of cane were threatened with spoilage in the fields of Morelos owing to lack of fuel for transport. 16 T h e lack of machinery, accessories, and parts—in g o o d measure a result of the war—and the lack of fuel were the more serious because of increased migration of workers to the United States. With much of the U.S. labor f o r c e appropriated by the war, the U.S. government pressured the Avila Camacho administration to provide laborers for production north of the border. Agricultural capitalists in the United States agitated f o r an open border, and the immigration authorities relaxed their surveillance. Officially, more than 320,000 Mexican laborers were cont r a c t e d f o r j o b s in the U n i t e d States b e t w e e n 1942 a n d 1946. Emigration, both official and informal, had a noticeable e f f e c t in Mexico, especially during harvest lime and in areas close to the border. According to the secretary of agriculture, a " g o o d proportion" of the emigrants to the United States consisted of ejidatarios, and a d r o p in ejidal production was feared. 1 7 T h e case of the sugar industry embodied many of the contradictions o f agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t in the 1940s, p r o v i d i n g a g o o d example of difficulties originating in the anarchy of the free market that government agricultural regulation was unable to resolve. Sugar production was a concern of the government from the beginning of the period. Mill machinery was often decrepit and poorly located and there was no private investment in the modernization of the industry. Fluctuating production was becoming inadequate f o r growing domestic needs, and sugar was being imported. In 1941, the secretary o f agriculture recommended a 9 million peso government program to upgrade and rationalize the sugar industry, financing improvements in key mills and letting inefficient or small mills go by the wayside. 18 In 1942-1943, unfavorable weather led to reduced harvests, m o r e than 100,000 tons of cane spoiled in the fields for lack of adequate processing capacity, and the National Union of Sugar Producers sold 26,000 tons of sugar to Pepsi-Cola, all leading to a national sugar deficit of 38,000 tons. 19 Increased production was squeezed from peasant cane growers with almost despotic measures. Ejidatarios in "zones of supply" surrounding sugar mills were required to sow cane to the exclusion of all

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other crops, even though the price of cane was so low that they preferred growing almost anything else, including maize. T h e government repeatedly promised better prices to head off protest, t h e n repeatedly reneged; even the low official price was not respected by the intermediaries who bought much of the cane. T h e government came into conflict as well with capitalist renters of ejido lands; in the summer of 1944, when all irrigation water in the Fuerte region of Sinaloa was reserved for cane, "a storm broke loose" among the tomato growers. Meanwhile, table sugar remained scarce and the government's control over market operations was undermined as cane and unrefined sugar went to alcohol production. Relations between peasant cane producers and mill owners worsened; the government established the N a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n to try to p r e v e n t increased conflict. 20 The inherent weakness of the Mexican bourgeoisie with respect to the U.S. capitalist class, and the inability of the regime to substitute for its own bourgeoisie, were revealed in the wartime shortage of agricultural machinery and in the cases of International Harvester and A n d e r s o n , Clayton and Company. T h e almost c o m p l e t e lack of domestically manufactured agricultural tools and machines of even the simplest type meant that Mexico was d e p e n d e n t on the United States for imports of machinery, parts, and components. This was what made wartime restrictions so critical. Of the ten thousand tractors, h a r r o w s , a n d plows r e q u e s t e d by t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Agriculture's agent in Washington in 1943, Mexico received fewer than twelve hundred. A study published in 1943 noted that the one real agricultural machinery plant in the country was run with State participation and intimated that only government intervention and planning in all aspects of agriculture—"proposing national goals of great scope"—would solve the more specific problem of how to produce agricultural machinery in Mexico. 21 T h e regime had neither the ability n o r the desire to take this road. Instead, the U.S. firm of International Harvester was invited to build a plant in Saltillo and was offered a 5-year e x e m p t i o n f r o m taxes on the production of various types of machinery as well as on the importation of a long list of machinery needed for the manufacture of these items. 22 As the secretary of agriculture noted in the draft of a letter to the representative of Anderson, Clayton and Company, which was providing large amounts of capital for agricultural production in northern Mexico, some half of which was f u n n e l e d through the BNCE: The Government of the Republic lacks elements to develop all the sources of work in the country, and thus views sympathetically the

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THE "RECTIFICATION" OF CARDF.NISMO activities of private enterprises like yours, which have served an apprenticeship in our customs. . . . It pleases me for you to operate in our territory and to obtain from your investments the benefits to which you have a legitimate right. 2 3

T h e c o m p l e t e inadequacy o f private initiative within M e x i c o was obvious, but a c o n t i n u a t i o n o r e x t e n s i o n o f c a r d e n i s m o was o u t o f the question. T h e regime had only o n e alternative; capital, b o t h d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n , h a d t o b e e n c o u r a g e d , given g u a r a n t e e s , to p a r t i c i p a t e in M e x i c o ' s d e v e l o p m e n t . 2 4 A n d as g o v e r n m e n t investm e n t in irrigation and agricultural t e c h n o l o g y b e g a n to b e a r fruit, it was p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e that b e n e f i t e d , p a s s i n g t h e e j i d o b y . 2 5 T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f private agriculture in turn e n g e n d e r e d its own c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , b u t t h e s e did n o t b e c o m e obvious until t h e late 1 9 6 0 s , w h e n an agricultural crisis o f overwhelming m a g n i t u d e c o n t r i b u t e d to the e n d o f the " M e x i c a n M i r a c l e . " 2 6

Notes 1. Plans for the "emergency transformation of the resources for agricultural production" were mentioned in the Plan Sexenal for 1941-1946. See Fabila (1941: 677). 2. Memo authored by George S. Messersmith recommending creation of a U.S.-Mexican Agricultural Commission, no date; Oliver M. Kisich to Marte R. Gómez, J u n e 28, 1943; Claude R. Wickard to Dean Acheson, August 6, 1943; all in AMRG (1943/Oficiales). Rubber, garbanzo, and castor seed were all the objects of specific agreements between the United States and Mexico. Castor seed cultivation involved 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 hectares of previously uncultivated land. See AMRG ( 1 9 4 3 / O f i c i a l e s ) . According to Orive Alba (1970: 65, 77, 84), there were about 965,000 irrigable hectares in Mexico in 1940; some 14 million hectares were characterized by the 1940 Agricultural Census as arable and were o f greatly variable quality. Thus, 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 to 800,000 hectares, if they included some of the best land, would theoretically account for a substantial chunk of Mexico's agricultural production. 3. Marte R. Gómez, "Memorándum confidencial sobre mi entrevista con los señores Lester Mallory y Leslie Wheeler," April 24, 1946; Clinton P. A n d e r s o n to M a r t e R. G ó m e z , April 2 4 , 1 9 4 6 ; b o t h in A M R G (1946/Secretaría de Agricultura). 4. See the Plan Sexenal for 1941-1946, which stated the PRM's intention to establish increased State direction of the economy and increase agricultural production by means of State intervention (Fabila, 1941: 675, 681). 5. Mexico (18: 25-26). 6. Marte R. Gómez, "Rockefeller Foundation"; Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, September 21, 1942; Marte R. Gómez to Rockefeller Foundation, October 17, 1942; all in AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 2). See also Mexico ( 2 3 : 1 : 56-59, 89-404); Alcántara (1976). 7. Mexico (23: 1 : 8 9 - 4 0 4 ) . 8. Orive Alba (1970: 8 5 - 9 2 ) ; Marte R. Gómez, "Comisión Nacional de

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Irrigación, 1941," AMRG (1941); Mexico (23: 2: 53-56, 8 1 - 1 0 0 , 181-182, 228-235,423-588). 9. Marte R. Gómez, "Planeación Agrícola," AMRG ( 1 9 4 3 / O f i c i a l e s ) ; Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, Secretario de H a c i e n d a y Crédito Público a n d Secretario de la Economía Nacional, J a n u a r y 28, 1943, AMRG (1943/Oficiales); Marte R. Gómez, "El maíz. Cosecha d e 1943. Sus efectos en el a b a s t e c i m i e n t o d e M é x i c o . . . . M e d i d a s a d o p t a d a s p a r a c o n j u r a r la escasez," J a n u a r y 19, 1944, AMRG ( 1 9 4 4 / O f i c i a l e s ) ; M a r t e R. G ó m e z to Eduardo Suárez, S e p t e m b e r 11, 1944 (Oficio #101-5114), S e p t e m b e r 29, 1944 (Oficio #101-5322), O c t o b e r 26, 1944 (Oficio #101-5576), N o v e m b e r 23, 1944, AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 10. Marte R. Gómez, "El maíz. Cosecha d e 1943. . . . Medidas a d o p t a d a s para conjurar la escasez,"January 19, 1944, AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 11. Marte R. Gómez, "El maíz. Cosecha de 1943. . . . Medidas a d o p t a d a s para conjurar la escasez," January 19, 1944; Marte R. Gómez to state governors, January 1944, both in AMRG (1944/Oficiales); Mexico (9, 10); Mexico (20: 5); Mexico (21: 6 - 7 ) . 12. M a r t e R. G ó m e z to M a n u e l Avila C a m a c h o , F e b r u a r y 24, 1942, AMRG ( 1 9 4 2 / D o c u m e n t o s Oficiales, Vol. 1); Marte R. G ó m e z to M a n u e l Avila Camacho, D e c e m b e r 18, 1943, AMRG (1943/Oficiales); El Universal, April 11, May 29, J u n e 12, 1944; Excelsior, May 10, May 25, May 31, J u n e 11, J u n e 12, 1944; La Prensa, May 30, 1944; Marte R. Gómez to E d u a r d o Suárez, May 30, 1944 ( O f i c i o #101-3125), AMRG ( 1 9 4 4 / O f i c i a l e s ) ; " B o l e t í n d e Prensa," May 10, 1946, AMRG ( 1 9 4 6 / S e c r e t a r í a d e Agricultura); Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, April 9, 1946 (Oficio #101-1576); Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 4, 1946 (Oficio #101-1780); Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 4, 1946 (Oficio #101-1781); Sección 77 Sindicato Azucarero y Cooperativa Ejidal de Atencingo y Anexas to Marte R. Gómez, May 8, 1946; Marte R. Gómez to Pablo M. H e r n á n d e z , May 21, 1946 (Oficio #101-2095); Marte R. Gómez to Pablo M. H e r n á n d e z , J u n e 1, 1946 (Oficio #101-2283); Marte R. Gómez to Pablo M. H e r n á n d e z , J u n e 6, 1946 (Oficio #101-2243); Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, J u n e 13, 1946; all in AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 2). 13. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, April 29, 1942, AMRG ( 1 9 4 2 / D o c u m e n t o s Oficiales, Vol. 1). See also Secretaría de la E c o n o m í a Nacional, January 18, 1943, " M e m o r á n d u m : La inflación, p r o d u c c i ó n y precios"; M e m o r á n d u m Marte R. Gómez a Manuel Avila Camacho, Secretarios de Hacienda y Crédito Público y de la Economía Nacional, J a n u a r y 28, 1943; Secretaría de la Economía Nacional, "Puntos tratados y resueltos e n la j u n t a c e l e b r a d a c o n el s e ñ o r P r e s i d e n t e de la República p o r los Secretarios d e Agricultura y F o m e n t o , de la Economía Nacional y d e H a c i e n d a y Crédito Público," February 23, 1943; Marte R. Gómez, "Los precios y la p r o d u c c i ó n agrícola," May 14, 1943; Marte R. Gómez, notes o n m e e t i n g of the J u n t a de Economía d e Emergencia, May 19, 1943; Marte R. Gómez, "Los precios d e los p r o d u c t o s agrícolas y el costo de la vida según datos de mayo p r ó x i m o pasado," J u n e 16, 1943: all in AMRG (1943/Asuntos Oficiales). Marte R. Gómez to E d u a r d o Suárez, S e p t e m b e r 11, 1944 (Oficio #101-5114); Marte R. Gómez to E d u a r d o Suárez, S e p t e m b e r 29, 1944 (Oficio #101-5322); Marte R. Gómez to E d u a r d o Suárez, O c t o b e r 26, 1944 (Oficio #101-5576); Marte R. Gómez to E d u a r d o Suárez, November 23, 1944; Marte R. G ó m e z to E d u a r d o Suárez, N o v e m b e r 27, 1944: all in AMRG ( 1 9 4 4 / O f i c i a l e s ) . M a r t e R. G ó m e z to Nazario Ortiz Garza, February 16, 1946 (Oficio #101-661); Marte R. Gómez to

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Nazario Orüz Garza, May 18, 1945 (Oficio #101-2010); Marte R. Gómez to N a z a r i o O r t i z Garza, May 30, 1946 ( O f i c i o # 1 0 1 - 2 2 2 8 ) : all in AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 2); Mexico (23: 1:13-15). 14. El Universal, J u n e 14, 1944, reported that the head political authority in Celaya, Guanajuato, was a grain hoarder, as were certain authorities in Tlaxcala. In Sonora, the hoarding of rice for speculation purposes caused Avila Camacho to suspend exports previously authorized, with the consequent damage to the interests of the "agriculturists and ejidatarios." Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 13, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). See also Mexico (23: 2: 176-177). 15. El Universal, April 11, 1944. 16. Sección 77 Sindicato Azucarero y Cooperativa Ejidal de Atencingo y Anexas to Marte R. Gómez, May 8, 1946, AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 2). 17. See Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación (1980: 3); Marte R. G ó m e z to S e c r e t a r i o del T r a b a j o y Previsión Social, M e m o r á n d u m Confidencial, July 19, 1943 (Oficio #101-4023), AMRG (1943/Oficiales); Mexico (23: 2: 177-178). Of course, emigration was not confined to border areas; for example, in 1981 I spoke with a weaver in the Oaxaca Valley who related that the men in his village left Mexico to work in the United States for the first time during World War II. 18. Marte R. Gómez, "Memorándum: Medidas . . . para aumentar la producción de azúcar," July 17, 1941, AMRG (1941/Correspondencia Oficial); Marte R. Gómez, "Planeación Agrícola," AMRG (1943/Oficiales). 19. Marte R. Gómez, "Planeación Agrícola," AMRG (1943/Oficiales). 20. Marte R. Gómez, "Planeación Agrícola," AMRG (1943/Oficiales); Marte R. Gómez to Eduardo Suárez, November 23, 1944; Marte R. Gómez, "Oficiales de 1944," both in AMRG (1944/Oficiales); Marte R. Gómez to Rubén F. Morales, August 2, 1946, AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 1); Mexico (23: 2: 361-366). El National reported on January 12, 1946, that the government planned to issue 50 million pesos in bonds to provide financing for the modernization of the sugar mills. The bonds were to be amortized with a tax of 1 centavo per kilo of sugar a n d would be a d m i n i s t e r e d by N a c i o n a l Financiera or Financiera Industrial Azucarera. Even increased government intervention in the sugar industry over the years was unable to deal with the constant crisis in that sector. 21. For the complete list of requests by Juan Mas, agricultural agent in Washington, D.C., and the results, see "Maquinaria Agrícola que Conviene Importar," AMRG (1943/Oficiales); for the analysis of Mexico's agricultural machinery industry, see Gleason Alvarez (1943: 43-45, 90-92). 22. El National, January 17 and 24, 1946. 23. See Lamar Fleming, Jr., to Manuel Avila Camacho, April 15, 1942; draft of letter authored by Marte R. Gómez for Manuel Avila Camacho to Lamar Fleming, J r . , April 15, 1942; both in AMRG ( 1 9 4 2 / D o c u m e n t o s Oficiales, Vol. 2). 24. Conditions required "order in the countryside, and this would only be obtained by ending the excessive and irresponsible ejidalist policy and by guaranteeing to private parties the ownership of their lands. Security in the countryside was an urgent task in the achievement of national agricultural development." See Aguilera Gómez (1969: 145). 25. See Eckstein (1966: 88-92); Alcántara (1976). 26. See Yates (1978); Mejido (1974); Gómez Oliver (1978); Luiselli Fernández and Mariscal Orozco (1978). For the term "Mexican Miracle," see Hansen (1971).

14

The "Consolidation" of the Agrarian Reform

In F e b r u a r y 1941, w h e n the h e a d of t h e A g r a r i a n D e p a r t m e n t claimed that the latifundio had been eliminated from the Mexican countryside and that the agrarian goals of the Constitution of 1917 had been fulfilled, he was not merely deceiving the public; he was also admitting the inherent limitations of the bourgeois land reform instituted by the regime. 1 In 1943, the Agrarian Department said as much; it "recognized that latifundios still exist[ed]," but pleaded for the understanding and cooperation of the peasantry and its leaders since "as the reform advances and the a m o u n t of land distributed increases, the possibilities for land grants will diminish." Colonization of new areas, it predicted, would be the main activity of the department in the future. 2 In 1946, the Agrarian Department summarized: The speed of the cardenista land distribution could not last: first, because the applications for lands diminish as the agrarian necessities of the pueblos are satisfied; second, because the technical work necessary for the localization of expropriable lands becomes more difficult . . . as the agrarian distribution advances . . . and third, because the volume of expropriable lands is less every day and will have to run out when the redistribution of rural property is completed.3 Its protection of private property m e a n t that the r e g i m e was unable to go beyond a certain point in the redistribution of rural holdings without threatening bourgeois property forms. But the limitations of the reform went even further. The protection of private property and bourgeois class rule meant that even Porfirian conditions had not been completely eliminated and that the regime in many cases could not carry out its own program where latifundismo was concerned. This was particularly true in the north, where vast livestock holdings still existed in the 1940s. Although in some instances 139

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the original Porfirian concessions had been declared null, the law m a d e n u m e r o u s exceptions for landowners or c o m p a n i e s w h o had acquired holdings from the concessionaires "in g o o d faith." Thus, "legal avenues" were o p e n e d "for the indefinite prolongation of the pre-1917 situation." The Department of Agriculture, which evaluated petitions for the recognition of property rights based on acquisitions from Porfirian concessionaires, claimed to follow a strict policy in the matter. Essentially, this consisted of a refusal to grant r e c o g n i t i o n unless the petitioner signed a conditional contract agreeing to divide its properties into lots not greater than the maximum allowed to o n e individual u n d e r local law, transferring them to M e x i c a n citizens within 5 years. In various cases this was achieved, but since limits to individual land ownership at the state level were quite generous, this hardly constituted a radical revision of latifundismo. In other cases, nothing was accomplished; owners filed repeated injunctions against the government with the Supreme Court, delaying the p r o c e e d i n g s interminably. 4 Where United States citizens were involved, which was often the case in the north, the regime presented a tough front to the Mexican p o p u l a t i o n but in reality tread softly. For e x a m p l e , in 1939, t h e H a c i e n d a El Carrizal in Tamaulipas was a f f e c t e d to the e x t e n t of 1,152 hectares for an ejido. The U.S. Embassy led the Mexican gove r n m e n t to believe that the owner of the property was making g o o d faith efforts to purchase lands of equivalent quality to be d o n a t e d for the ejido so that El Carrizal could remain intact. Cárdenas agreed, a n d t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l r e s o l u t i o n was left u n i m p l e m e n t e d . But by November 1941, the hacienda was still in the hands of its U.S. owners, n o land had been donated for the ejido, and the g o v e r n m e n t was discussing the possibility of purchasing the entire property to rid itself of the problem. 5 Similarly, 20 years after the original presidential resolution affecting the 1 million hectares owned by the Palomas Land and Cattle Company, the government, which was paying indemnification to the shareholders even though the company still had possession of the land, was trying to d e c i d e between "conciliation" a n d a costly legal battle that could drag on for years. 6 In such cases, the regime was more interested in improving the image of latifundismo than in eliminating the large holdings themselves. Stirring those d e e p waters could prove to be a dangerous policy both domestically and internationally; f u r t h e r m o r e , actual e x p r o p r i a t i o n of the l a n d w o u l d b e h a r m f u l to t h e i m p o r t a n t n o r t h e r n livestock industry. T h u s , t h e ostensible elimination of U.S. capital was considered sufficient, even t h o u g h U.S. shareholders r e m a i n e d d o m i n a n t in M e x i c a n c o m p a nies, and there was nothing to prevent new Mexican landowners f r o m renting their holdings to Americans. 7

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L a t i f u n d i s m o may have b e e n particularly resilient in t h e n o r t h e r n livestock z o n e s , b u t t h e l a n d r e f o r m was also r e a c h i n g its limits in o t h e r areas. In 1943, the h e a d of t h e A g r a r i a n D e p a r t m e n t s e n t Avila C a m a c h o a m e m o r a n d u m d e s c r i b i n g t h e p r o b l e m s in L a L a g u n a , where the presidential resolutions h a d left t e n t h o u s a n d peasants with rights to l a n d in reserve (derechos a salvo), i.e., landless. T h i s was r a t h e r s t r a n g e , since C á r d e n a s himself h a d c l a i m e d in 1936 t h a t t h e lack of p o p u l a t i o n was what p r e v e n t e d t h e c o m p l e t e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e r e g i o n i n t o ejidos. 8 T h e Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t w a n t e d a resolution reserving irrigation district lands f o r p e a s a n t s f r o m t h e L a g u n a r e g i o n a n d d e c l a r i n g t h a t pequeños proprietaries a f f e c t e d by e j i d a l g r a n t s s h o u l d n o t receive c o m p e n s a t i o n within t h o s e districts u n t i l t h e e j i d a l p o p u l a t i o n was a c c o m m o d a t e d . O p p o s i n g t h i s r e q u e s t , S e c r e t a r y of A g r i c u l t u r e M a r t e R. G ó m e z p o i n t e d o u t t o A v i l a C a m a c h o that La L a g u n a was n o t t h e only r e g i o n with this p r o b l e m ; nationally, in 1942, t h e r e w e r e a l m o s t 500,000 p e a s a n t s with ejidal rights in reserve. 9 G ó m e z t h o u g h t t h e p r o b l e m s h o u l d b e solved by p l a c i n g l a n d l e s s e j i d a t a r i o s o n v a c a n t p a r c e l s l o c a t e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e A g r a r i a n D e p a r t m e n t ' s t e c h n i c a l work, s u c h as divis i o n s of e j i d o s i n t o p a r c e l s o r i s s u a n c e of c e r t i f i c a t e s of a g r a r i a n rights, a n d by e n d i n g abuses by local officials w h o were r e n t i n g ejidal lands. T h e p r o b l e m in La L a g u n a , h e t h e o r i z e d , c o u l d b e d e a l t with by r e d u c i n g t h e a r e a legally e x e m p t f r o m e x p r o p r i a t i o n t o 100 h e c t a r e s f r o m 150 a n d c o n s t r u c t i n g n e w d a m s . H e a d v i s e d Avila C a m a c h o against any d e c r e e giving ejidos exclusive p r e f e r e n c e to irrigation district l a n d , o n the g r o u n d s t h a t this w o u l d b e p e r c e i v e d as an attack o n small p r o p e r t y . H e n o t e d : You, Mr. President . . . have examined the problem from this point of view and have arrived at the conclusion that for reasons of national unity, that is, for political reasons . . . related to the . . . "state of war" . . . it is convenient to reserve, in the new Irrigation Systems, areas for compensation to small property owners and much larger areas for ejidal amplifications in favor of campesinos left without land in various Resolutions.... In addition, it is you yourself who specifies, by express Resolution, the areas destined for compensation to small property owners, and you yourself can resolve that they be very small or nonexistent without any written Resolution. Nevertheless, if what is desired is to give the impression that the Government of the Republic is beginning a stage of energetic agrarian action, the Resolution suggested by the Agrarian Department can convenienüy serve this end. 10 It was n o t c o n v e n i e n t , of course, e i t h e r to give t h e l a n d l e s s p o p u lation t h e illusion t h a t t h e r e f o r m would b e e x t e n d e d o r to b r i n g f u r -

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t h e r wrath o f private interests down on the regime. Instead, official p r o p a g a n d a a p p e a l e d to t h e m o s t conservative s e n t i m e n t s o f t h e peasantry, emphasizing the i m p o r t a n c e o f " e n t i t l e m e n t " o f individual e j i d o plots to fortify the "security" and "tranquillity" d e e m e d necessary for agricultural productivity. Individual titles to ejido parcels now b e c a m e a " r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e s i r e " with w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t was happy to comply. 1 1 T h e D e c r e e o f D e c e m b e r 11, 1940, which o r d e r e d the division into parcels and individual entitlement o f the ejidos, state d that the "juridical c o n c e p t i o n " o f the collective e j i d o s h o u l d b e eliminated in favor o f security and consolidation and claimed that the peasantry d e m a n d e d that "the e n j o y m e n t o f their right [to an ejido patrimony] be protected from . . . those who, twisting the aims o f the collective ejido, . . . utilize the system . . . to propagate e x o t i c doctrines and exercise untoward h e g e m o n i e s within the ejidal c o m m u n i ties." 1 2 T o criticize government agrarian policy was now an unpatriotic, if not traitorous, activity. 13 T h i s c a m p a i g n was part o f the effort to mask the fact that t h e regime was granting less, and increasingly p o o r e r quality, land. T h e proportion o f presidential resolutions resolved in favor of petitioners f o r e j i d o s d r o p p e d f r o m h i g h s o f 9 7 to 9 9 p e r c e n t d u r i n g t h e C á r d e n a s y e a r s , h o v e r i n g a r o u n d 5 0 p e r c e n t d u r i n g t h e Avila C a m a c h o administration. Almost 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 peasants had received m o r e than 20 million hectares between 1934 and 1940, but from 1 9 4 0 through 1946, fewer than 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 rural dwellers were g r a n t e d a b o u t 5.5 million hectares for ejidos. T h e proportion of irrigable land awarded in definitive possessions d r o p p e d from 14.8 p e r c e n t in 1 9 4 0 to 0 . 9 p e r c e n t in 1 9 4 5 , even t h o u g h the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f irrigation works was p r o c e e d i n g rapidly. T h e ejidal sector as a whole r e c e d e d somewhat with respect to the private sector; whereas in 1 9 4 0 , 4 7 . 4 p e r c e n t o f all c r o p l a n d c e n s u s e d and 5 7 . 4 p e r c e n t o f all i r r i g a b l e land b e l o n g e d to ejidos, by 1 9 5 0 that sector c o n t r o l l e d 44.1 p e r c e n t o f all cropland a n d 4 9 . 8 p e r c e n t o f all irrigable land. Meanwhile, in t h e private sector o f l a n d h o l d i n g s larger than 5 h e c t a r e s , t h e total average land p e r h o l d i n g was down, but the average c r o p l a n d p e r holding had risen by 1 9 5 0 (see Tables 1 - 6 , 13, 17). A study o f s o m e seventy agrarian cases on file in the archive o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f A g r a r i a n R e f o r m , c h o s e n at r a n d o m f r o m t h e states o f V e r a c r u z , S i n a l o a , P u e b l a , G u a n a j u a t o , a n d T a m a u l i p a s , m a d e s o m e p e r t i n e n t if n o t surprising discoveries a b o u t t h e postCárdenas r e f o r m . 1 4 T h e majority o f the cases e x a m i n e d had b e e n initiated in periods p r e c e d i n g the Avila C a m a c h o administration, a n d they took from 5 to 3 5 years to reach a definitive resolution. All the t i m e - h o n o r e d tactics o f the landowners to c o m b a t the offensives o f t h e landless were in e v i d e n c e . T h e s e i n c l u d e d t h e use o f guardias

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blancas employed by the landlords to terrorize the peasants, as well as collusion of the hacendados with local and state authorities to lengthen or impede agrarian action. To pay for political support or acquire and defend their own holdings, state governors stalled the initial proceedings, for which they had ultimate responsibility, or supported repression against the peasants. When implementing presidential resolutions, Agrarian Department authorities, in confederacy with the landlords, changed the location of the ejidos, giving them land of inferior quality. Resistance to the change met with forcible removal. In several cases, d i s p l a c e d e j i d o c o m m u n i t i e s f o u g h t f o r years attempting to regain the originally granted lands. Another landlord tactic was to resist the formation of an ejido claiming that the community in question no longer existed. This was a legally defensible position because by the time the presidential resolution was signed, many of the original applicants had died or moved to other locations in search of employment. Finally, in some cases landlords had actually sold the lands that were to be the object of an ejido grant, which created further delays if the purchasers were "legitimate small property owners." 15 Appealing to the most backward impulses of the peasantry had more than just propaganda value for the regime. Reminding the former rural proletarian of his new status as an upwardly mobile petty capitalist aided the government in its efforts to get a firmer grip on the rural sector, which still teemed with conflict despite the land distribution of the 1930s. 16 The collective ejidos were often the center of government attention; but this was not, as has often been claimed, a concerted, across-the-board campaign to eliminate them. When the collective structure was needed for overriding economic or political reasons, it was protected, shored up, and actually imposed on ejidatarios in spite of protests and dissension; u n d e r some circumstances it was even d e f e n d e d against the offensives of local landlords. 17 When, however, independent leadership threatened to cause problems and economic imperatives were not great, the regime simply allowed the collectives to disintegrate, helpfully p u s h i n g the process along with propaganda, tight credit policies, and attacks on troublesome elements. An example of a collective structure that was buttressed by the regime in spite of internal dissension and protest is given by the case of the Sociedad de Interés Colectivo Agrícola Ejidal (SICAE) of Los Mochis, Sinaloa, a c a n e p r o d u c i n g region. D i s c o n t e n t ran high against the SICAE, in part because of administrative "despotism," in part because of the large differences in salaries for administrative, mill, and field work, and even among the peasant producers. Several groups of ejidatarios had attempted to break away to produce crops

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m o r e r e m u n e r a t i v e t h a n s u g a r c a n e . T h i s w e a k e n e d t h e collective a n d e n d a n g e r e d sugar p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d f o u n d it " i n d i s p e n s a b l e " to "legislate severely in d e f e n s e of t h e i n d u s t r i a l s u g a r p r o d u c t i o n u n i t , " f i x i n g a " z o n e of supply" within w h i c h only c a n e c o u l d b e p r o d u c e d a n d establishing that d u r i n g d r o u g h t years water f r o m t h e F u e r t e River would be u s e d only to irrigate c a n e . In 1942, ejidatarios d e m a n d e d an i n c r e a s e in t h e p r i c e of c a n e a n d t h e right to raise o t h e r , m o r e p r o f i t a b l e , crops. O n t h e i r b e h a l f , t h e C T M h a d previously a p p r o a c h e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t with t h e r e q u e s t t h a t t h e BNCE raise advances (anticipos) l s by 25 p e r c e n t . B u t h e r e , t h e r e g i m e h a d t h e advantage. Ejidatarios were n o l o n g e r day laborers w h o c o u l d simply d e m a n d wage increases f r o m t h e i r e m p l o y e r s ; t h e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m h a d c o n v e r t e d t h e m i n t o i n d e p e n d e n t small p r o d u c e r s w h o s e i n c o m e d e p e n d e d o n t h e i r own p r o d u c t i o n of m a r k e t a b l e p r o d u c e . T h e a n t i c i p o p a i d by t h e BNCE was n o t a wage b u t a n a d v a n c e o n credit, which must be paid back at t h e e n d of t h e season. T h e g o v e r n m e n t advised t h e m to tighten t h e i r belts a n d e c o n o m i z e o n "useless" p o s i t i o n s w o n " u n d e r t h e r u b r i c of ' u n i o n c o n q u e s t ' " t h a t c o u l d now b e e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t " i n t r o d u c i n g t h e least d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n . " R u b b i n g salt in t h e w o u n d , t h e government noted: The Federal Government would be very disappointed if the ejidatarios of Los Mochis, distracted from their fundamental goals by the legitimate, but wrongly oriented, desire for immediate betterment, should lose sight of all that they have accomplished since the day they received the ejidal grants, or lose faith in a process of social transformation which carries the germs of a new, independent and happy life for the same peasants. When they received the lands they were pariahs with no perspective other than the salary paid them by the company. Since that time, with the product of their efforts, by means of the credits directly given them by the Ejidal Bank, or which they have received from United Sugar, they have become the owners of considerable interests. 19 T h e SICAE r e s p o n d e d to dissension by p r o p o s i n g new s t a t u t e s giving it m o r e authority. It h a d o b t a i n e d t h e approval of a m a j o r i t y of e j i d a t a r i o s , b u t t h e BNCE o p p o s e d t h e n e w m e a s u r e s ; t h e g o v e r n m e n t f e a r e d they would eventually i n c r e a s e dissatisfaction, c a u s i n g it to " e x p l o d e . " T h e BNCE's position a n g e r e d t h e ejidatarios; t h e gove r n m e n t q u i c k l y c l a r i f i e d t h a t "if t h e n e w s t a t u t e s a r e n o w b e i n g o p p o s e d , it is n o t to c o m b a t t h e SICAE o r to try to b r e a k it u p , b u t r a t h e r to save it f r o m t h e e x c e s s e s with w h i c h its d i r e c t o r s , in a n a t t e m p t to r e o r g a n i z e it, w o u l d in fact a r r a n g e its d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . " C o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e C N C a n d t h e CTM, w h i c h were vying f o r

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representation of the ejidatarios, added to internal conflict. T h e gove r n m e n t noted that "these ejidatarios with a worker mentality still want to be connected with the workers' organization from which they came." The importance of cane production made the survival of the collective structure imperative; it also meant that the regime had to ensure its control of that structure. 20 In the case of Yucatán, where the landlords were still quite powerful, the regime attempted to arbitrate between the ejidatarios, the local government, and the bourgeoisie. H e n e q u e n e r o s de Yucatán, which administered henequen production, processing, and marketing, had become a tool of the governor and the landlords. This raised the protest of ejidatarios, who appealed to the federal government for intervention. Promptly, the governor, Ernesto Novelo Torres, received orders from Avila Camacho to retain nominal predominance of the "ejidal group" on the board of directors, although its representatives did not have to be peasants but could be professionals who were somehow "connected with the necessities of the ejido." The general m a n a g e r would now be designated by the f e d e r a l executive rather than by the governor. 21 The return of the h e n e q u e n processing machinery to private ownership in January 1942 did not produce immediate protest, basically because the bad m a n a g e m e n t of the plants by Henequeneros had caused popular discontent. But it did propitiate agitation of another kind. In March 1942, the secretary of agriculture wrote to the general manager of Henequeneros: As a result of the resolution of the State Government of Yucatán dated last January 22 . . . this Department has learned that certain agitation has resulted among the sector of proprietors, who have reached the extreme of affirming that soon the henequen fincas will be returned. That version has no foundation whatsoever. 22

G ó m e z also w r o t e to Avila C a m a c h o t h a t t h e r e t u r n of t h e henequen processing plants "must be accomplished in such a m a n n e r that the enemies of the ejido do not consider it an initial step toward ending ejidal policy in the Yucatán Peninsula." 23 But an even graver problem was posed by the fact that Henequeneros would now have to contract out to the owners of the machinery for the processing of the crop; there were about 100 large proprietors who wanted to charge a processing quota of 60 percent of the product and a few who refused to be bound by any contract whatsoever, as opposed to only about thirty small owners who were agreeable to "conciliatory a r r a n g e ments" for processing. The secretary of agriculture advised the general m a n a g e r of H e n e q u e n e r o s to m e e t with the p r o p r i e t o r s a n d

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inform them that the government had no intention of "altering the agrarian program of the Revolution." Furthermore, if the processing charges turned out to be "unfair," there would be "sufficient reason f o r a great agitation a m o n g the ejidal e l e m e n t a n d the Federal Government will not be able to ignore it." Gómez also threatened that if a satisfactory arrangement were not reached with the hacendados, the "temporary occupation" of the plants would have to remain in effect until new processing equipment could be installed on behalf of the ejidos. 24 The ejidatarios were ultimately saddled with a contract prescribing a 50 percent processing charge, making clear that the sole purpose of government threats was to pressure the plant owners into any kind of agreement in an attempt to guarantee henequen production and the economy of the peninsula. Improving the local economy would be no mean feat; the Yucatecan landlords were notorious for mining the h e n e q u e n industry when the international market was favorable, with no thought of investment or diversification; the predictable result was economic crisis when the market worsened. In 1944, the. local agent of the Department of Agriculture noted in a report to the director of Agricultural-Ejidal Organization that between 1880 and 1935, henequen cultivation on the basis of virtual slave labor had produced an annual average of 21 million pesos for the landlords, so that "morally . . . the hacendados have a huge debt with the campesinos, which could not be paid back with all the machinery that the former possess." These same hacendados were now c h a r g i n g e l e v a t e d q u o t a s f o r h e n e q u e n p r o c e s s i n g with machines dating from the nineteenth century, whose cost had obviously long since been amortized. At the same time, the c o r r u p t Henequeneros had failed to take advantage of the favorable market to equip the ejidos with their own, new equipment. The report recommended revising the processing contract; dismantling or reforming the state d e v e l o p m e n t bank F o m e n t o de Yucatán, which was absorbing ejido funds but contributing nothing to the ejidos; making sure the ejidatarios received their due share of Henequeneros profits; and raising the weekly anticipos of the ejidatarios. Once again, however, the henequen market was the bottom line. The ejidos should be e q u i p p e d with t h e i r own processing plants, t h e r e p o r t advised, because in the postwar period when the e x p e c t e d market s l u m p materialized, they would be able to compete internationally. In other words, the ejidatarios, accustomed as they were to low wages, would save the henequen industry and local economy during a slump, while the hacendados would not. 25 By 1946, ejidatarios were still paying high processing quotas to plant owners, and there had been virtually no improvement of the

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henequen industry and no crop diversification since 1941. But the r e g i m e was still trying to p r e s s u r e t h e s t a t e g o v e r n o r a n d Henequeneros into purchasing new processing machinery for the ejidos in the hope that this competition would spur property owners on to improving their own plants. 26 In contrast with the government's efforts to prop up the SICAE in Los Mochis and its balancing act in Yucatán, in the Laguna district it came into s h a r p conflict with the Unión Local de Sociedades de Crédito Colectivo Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera, headed by Arturo Orona, who was affiliated with the PCM. By 1940, the collective ejidatarios of La Laguna—as elsewhere—were reaping the contradictory and often bitter fruits of the left's capitulation to the regime in the mid-1930s. The strategy of socialist struggle in one union of collective ejidos ran into the brick wall of government control of every aspect of the collectives, which had been built with government credit and political support and were hard put to survive without them. Every activity of even those leaders who aspired to some form of independence was oriented toward the regime, which quite easily thwarted any effort at wresting economic or political concessions. In his personal notes for 1942, the secretary of agriculture, Marte R. Gómez, clearly explained the nature of his dealings with Orona's group: The group of Laguna ejidatarios headed by Arturo Orona, who were affiliated with the Communist Party, gave me a lot of trouble because, even though its ideas did not matter to me and I was not attempting to combat them or try to dissolve them, I nevertheless cut off, beginning in 1941, its [government] funds, which it received under the rubric of supposed credits, and owing to which the Agency of the National Ejidal Credit Bank in Torreón had become a wet nurse to the Laguna communists. With their well-prepared methods of struggle and their discipline, Orona's people were dangerous enemies of my efforts and I accepted that enmity in the knowledge that the scorpion being thrown onto my breast was poisonous, in order to carry out my duty as I perceived it, and also thinking that after all, even though they were my enemies, with respect to the operations of the Ejidal Bank in Torreón Orona and his people were carrying out a critique which for me was the equivalent of a second auditor. 2 '

Cotton production was high throughout the war years—overprod u c t i o n was even a potential p r o b l e m , given the state of the international market 2 8 —so presumably the survival of the collective s t r u c t u r e in La Laguna was not as crucial as in o t h e r areas, a n d O r o n a ' s troublesome organization could be dealt with harshly n o matter what the consequences. And the Unión Local was definitely troublesome. In October 1942, the group organized a march of five

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hundred campesinos from La Laguna to Mexico City; more than two hundred finally arrived at their destination to present a list of fortytwo demands to Avila Camacho. 29 T h e pilgrims accused the BNCE o f deliberately "absorbing ejidal activities" and withdrawing support f r o m the associations c r e a t e d by the A g r i c u l t u r a l C r e d i t Law; 3 0 protested stricter government credit policies; demanded that the cotton gins and Decauville light rail system enter into the possession of the local cooperatives and unions of ejidos; and requested positive resolution of e j i d o amplifications in favor of ejidatarios' children. T h e i r accusations were systematically denied or disputed with statistics and their requests refused. As in the case of protest against the B N C E in Los Mochis, the U n i ó n Local was r e m i n d e d that the ejidatarios of La Laguna were no longer wage laborers but small businessmen in debt to the government for large amounts; that as businessmen they must take risks; and that only their hard work could make them prosperous. T h e y w e r e advised to take advantage o f BNCE supervision and to stop making trouble, since their "innumerable complaints" were causing the "unnecessary demoralization" of the local ejidatarios and giving "inveterate enemies of the agrarian r e f o r m " material to use in their attacks. T h e government hammered h o m e its superior technical and managerial capabilities, implying that the Union's own incompetence had led to the decline of which it complained. 3 1 As time went on, the Unión Local presented shorter and more moderate petitions, basically demanding that the regime implement its own agrarian program. T h e responses of the government became more categorical. In December 1944, representatives of the U n i ó n met with Avila Camacho and presented a twelve-point appeal. T h e y requested an irrigation plan f o r the Nazas and Aguanaval rivers, providing f o r water distribution, the construction and i m p r o v e m e n t of canals and other structures, and the relocation of ejidos with poorquality lands. T h e y w a n t e d express g o v e r n m e n t o r d e r s f o r the reestablishment in the Laguna district of the "Cooperative System of agricultural-ejidal farming;" the BNCE and the Agrarian Department must stop authorizing the formation of ejidal sectors and encouraging the division of ejidos into parcels. They thought the BNCE should provide aid to insolvent ejido credit societies and renegotiate loans to enable payment. A p p e a l i n g to what they assumed was the government's sense of self-interest, the representatives pointed out that cutting o f f credit made it less likely that insolvent societies would ever pay their debts to the BNCE. They also alleged that BNCE policies, not peasant incompetence, were generally what caused insolvency. T h e Unión also requested more rapid processing of loans, the payment o f damages by the BNCE when remuneration for products pur-

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chased from ejidatarios was delayed, local decisions on the purchase of inputs and equipment and the sale of crops, and recognition and aid f r o m the BNCE for t h e Unión. Finally, they wanted an agricultural experiment station, more schools and teachers, baseline medical care for everyone in the region, completion of the Ejido Hospital, local clinics, d r i n k i n g water systems, a n d aid f r o m the National Irrigation Commission to repair canals and borders recently destroyed by flood. 32 As before, the petitions were denied. The government insisted that public funds for ejidal credit had long since been tied u p in previous loans and thus current loan money was coming only from private sources; this was the inevitable origin of tight credit policies. The representatives were reminded that La Laguna had always been the most favored of regions in terms of credit for ejidos, so they really had no right to complain. 33 Claiming that credit had, contrary to the allegations of the Unión, been abundant and punctual, the government accused the organization of wanting to turn the BNCE into a "charitable institution." It claimed that the policy of "selective credit" had actually improved the position of the credit societies and that the government would consider any constructive ideas for an improvement of the credit program. Particularly caustic responses were reserved for the Union's complaints regarding its own lack of participation in BNCE decisions on credit, purchasing, and marketing. Given, the government n o t e d , that the Union's influence was solely the product of the resources handed out by the BNCE, the former merely drove away clientele and thus u n d e r m i n e d itself with its incessant criticism of the BNCE. Furthermore, the fact that the Unión charged a commission to market ejidal produce weakened its "moral position" and caused ejidatarios to prefer selling through the BNCE, which charged no such commission; "when the societies declare categorically . . . that they do not want you to sell their harvests, the Bank cannot require them to do so," nor could the BNCE award the Unión commercial representation of the credit societies for the purchase of machinery or inputs when the societies had not approved it. In one transaction, the response implied, the Unión had recommended the purchase of seed at 140 U.S. dollars per ton when it was available for 115 dollars, in order to earn a larger commission. The government also accused the Unión of having promoted a recent strike against the Torreón cotton gin and claimed that the local peasants believed it had done so in o r d e r to c o n t r o l t h e i r harvest a n d thus c h a r g e t h e m c o m m i s s i o n . 3 4 T h e regime's strategy of utilizing the individualistic impulses of the peasantry to discredit those who aspired to independent leadership comes through especially clearly in this exchange.

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THE " RECTI FI CATION" OF CARDENISMO

T h e problems of the collective ejidos, whose decline would soon be reflected in hard data on decreasing numbers of collective and semicollective credit societies, 35 were a notable manifestation of the limits and contradictions of the post-Cardenas agrarian reform. But there were others of equal or perhaps greater significance f o r the masses of peasants. T h e B N C E evolved in less than ideal fashion, demonstrating the tight constraints placed on the reform sector o f agriculture by the requirements of capital. In effect, after its first 2 years of operation, the BNCE had essentially exhausted its government funds, f o r c i n g a search f o r private loan money. A f t e r 1938, never less than 59 percent of BNCE loans to ejido credit societies consisted of private capital (see Table 23). This had several significant consequences. First, the bank's lending policies became much stricter in deference to private money's aversion to risk. Only solvent credit societies would now receive government credit; the rest were cut off. H e r e it must be r e m e m b e r e d that ejido land could not serve as a guarantee, so that the only surety was a credit society's collective promise to pay. Second, U.S. capital had to be relied upon f o r agricultural expansion in important areas. Thus, in 1941, A n d e r s o n , Clayton and Company lent more than 21 million pesos f o r cotton p r o d u c t i o n in M e x i c o ; o f this sum, 11 m i l l i o n w e r e c h a n n e l e d through the BNCE, representing about half of what the Bank lent to cotton growers. In Los Mochis, U n i t e d Sugar p r o v i d e d credit f o r sugar production. 3 6 N o t only did these companies have a direct say in the operations of the ejido enterprises they financed, but they also s k i m m e d o f f the best o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n v e s t m e n t in the e j i d o sector. 37 L e f t for the BNCE were the riskier ejidos and longer-term loans f o r purposes other than production during o n e agricultural cycle. Third, private credit was expensive for the BNCE, weakening its financial status and impeding further expansion of its operations. In 1940, the BNCE was charged 8 percent on private money channeled through the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior; since the interest rate charged to the ejidos by the BNCE was also 8 percent, the operation was "ruinous f r o m a banking point of view." Gradually the interest rates charged to the BNCE lowered; by 1946 it was getting private funds at 4 percent, but according to the secretary of agriculture, this was still an unjust rate, given that government guarantees made the investment risk free. 3 8 T h e B N C A experienced a similar evolution. T h e poorest peasants no longer received credit; a more select and stable clientele was now favored, consisting of "authentic small and m e d i u m agriculturists, cultivators o f g o o d lands, preferentially in the irrigation systems being built by the government." T h e government hoped that in this way the B N C A would "stop being an endless tunnel and become an

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authentic credit institution that does not profit but also does not spend, t h r o u g h bad o p e r a t i o n s . . . or . . . wastefulness . . . the resources given to it by the Nation." 39 The policy of abandoning the poor peasantry and semiproletariat in favor of agricultural development was financially prudent and allowed a slow expansion of credit (see Table 24), but it left the majority of rural producers in the hands of local landlords, usurers, and caciques. The widespread p h e n o m e n o n of caciquismo, the economic and political oppression by local or regional bosses that was o f t e n an expression of the rural class structure, showed that no matter how much change had taken place in the 1930s, in fundamental ways conditions r e m a i n e d the same. A typical example was the Irrigation District of Tula, Hidalgo. A study made by the National Irrigation Commission in the early 1940s showed that Federal Senator Vicente Aguirre from the state of Hidalgo, who was president of the local Irrigation Association, was boss of a regional network that included local caciques, lower municipal authorities, municipal presidents, and employees of the irrigation district. The network's members monopolized credit and commerce in the region, and its political chiefs had the power to approve or veto the use of district water by any individual. At harvest time, a grower's p r o d u c e was h a n d e d over to the moneylender, who discounted the a m o u n t of credit plus the high interest charged. Payment made for any remnant was usually made not in cash but in goods, mostly clothes and liquor. These caciques were careful of appearances, so that the producer was normally credited with enough cash to pay the Irrigation District offices for his quota of water; but any protest of these conditions by the user would result in a veto of his right to the quota, even if he had already paid for it. The study noted that merchants from the Federal District never bought directly from the producers of the region; any a t t e m p t to break free from the network's control of commerce subjected a producer to persecution, assault, and sometimes even murder. Because of these conditions, the BNCE had e n c o u n t e r e d little success in establishing new credit societies, which would be a challenge to the local usurers. In the event that the BNCE delayed providing credit or purchasing harvests—which was quite often the case—the producers linked to it would suddenly find that the caciques' financial support had been withdrawn. T h e National Irrigation Commission frankly admitted that it was unable to do anything about these problems. 4 0 The survival of old interests and the creation of new were evident in conflicts over the distribution of scarce water in federal irrigation districts, land concentration and speculation within those districts, and the illegal rental of ejido lands. Two studies publicized in 1946 noted that the regime had granted more irrigable land than could be

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serviced by available i r r i g a t i o n water. A l t h o u g h f e d e r a l law established p r e f e r e n c e f o r ejidos in the use o f irrigation water, in fact, the land tenure structure within the irrigation districts and the local irrigation statutes tended to favor private property. N o t surprisingly, this led to conflict, with ejidos refusing to allow the irrigation o f private p r o p e r t i e s w h e n w a t e r was scarce and s o m e t i m e s

fighting

among

themselves f o r access to water. In severe cases, continued protest and conflict led to the intervention o f federal military authorities to prev e n t l a w b r e a k i n g a n d " a n a r c h y . " 4 1 But n o a m o u n t o f c a j o l e r y o r threat o f f o r c e c o u l d h i d e the fact that the r e g i m e had p r o m i s e d m o r e than it could deliver. This was equally true o f the government's claim to b e p r o m o t i n g rural democracy in the irrigation districts by controlling the accumulation o f private property. Privately, the g o v e r n m e n t a d m i t t e d that speculation in land known to be the object of future irrigation works was a p h e n o m e n o n that it could not control. T h e speculation in itself was bad enough, but "capricious adjudications" o f land p r e v e n t e d the N a t i o n a l Irrigation C o m m i s s i o n f r o m " d e v e l o p i n g . . . the harmonious plan o f agricultural p r o m o t i o n which is c o n v e n i e n t f o r the N a t i o n f o r the b e n e f i t o f the c o l l e c t i v e . " O w i n g basically to l a n d scarcity, conditions in central M e x i c o were somewhat less u n e q u a l , but the paucity o f land also m e a n t that t h e r e was little r o o m f o r i m p r o v e m e n t even when the g o v e r n m e n t intervened to redistribute resources. 4 2 T h e illegal rental o f e j i d o lands was widespread, showing that the redistribution o f rural property through ejido grants and o t h e r methods was by n o means irreversible. Landlords and local officials, using threats a n d t e r r o r i s m to e x p e l ejidatarios f r o m t h e i r lands, then claimed the right to rent or utilize those lands in c o m p l i a n c e with the A v i l a C a m a c h o g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c y o f e n s u r i n g cultivation o f all available cropland to boost production. T h e g o v e r n o r o f Q u e r e t a r o , N o r a d i n o Rubio, and the state M i x e d Commission f o r Agricultural D e v e l o p m e n t , 4 3 which he headed, used the slogan " N o t an inch o f land l e f t uncultivated" to justify their usurpation o f ejidal lands f o r personal use. T h e y w e r e verbally chastised but allowed to c o n t i n u e the practice. 4 4 In northern Sinaloa, the head of the B N C E and o t h e r Bank employees were renting e j i d o lands. 45 Nevertheless, w h e n Avila C a m a c h o asked Marte R. G o m e z to suggest a remedy f o r the p r o b l e m o f e j i d o land rentals, G o m e z replied that i m p r o v e d vigilance by the federal bureaucracy was the answer. Placing the blame f o r the situation o n the ejidatarios themselves, G o m e z also r e c o m m e n d e d the "moralization" o f an e j i d o that was renting or sharecropping its lands to p r o v i d e an e x a m p l e . " P e r h a p s the p u n i s h m e n t o f a s i n g l e case

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would be a great help in correcting the problem in others," he c o m mented. 4 6 In reality, the regime could not police its own forces, could not control the accumulation of agricultural property and its effects on the ejido, and certainly could not curtail the growth of private interests in rural Mexico. This growth, which had been briefly slowed by cardenismo, was now reflected in the campaign for the protection of private agricultural property and the reinstatement of the constitutional right of amparo in agrarian proceedings.

Notes 1. Mexico (4: 51-56). 2. Mexico (6). 3. Mexico (7: "Propósitos fundamentales de la política agraria del presidente Manuel Avila Camacho"). 4. See "Press Release. March 6, 1946," AMRG (1946/Secretaría de Agricultura), a fascinating document that plainly details the many constitutional, legal, and diplomatic problems facing the regime when dealing with land titles and concessions. 5. Marte R. Gómez to Ezequiel Padilla, November 29, 1941 (Oficio #101-6879), AMRG (1941/Correspondencia Oficial). 6. Marte R. Gómez, " M e m o r á n d u m al S e ñ o r P r e s i d e n t e de la República," November 14, 1944 (Oficio #101-5984), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 7. See "Press Release. March 6, 1946," AMRG (1946/Secretaría de A g r i c u l t u r a ) ; " M e m o r á n d u m al S e ñ o r P r e s i d e n t e de la R e p ú b l i c a , " November 14, 1944 (Oficio #101-5984), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 8. Cárdenas (1972: 361). 9. Gómez's figures may have been too low; according to a publication of the Secretaría de Gobernación, in 1940 there were 525,000 campesinos with "rights that had been recognized but were unfulfilled owing to lack of land, and two and a half million with applications in process" (Medina, 1978: 15). 10. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, January 19, 1943, AMRG (1943/Agrarios). 11. Mexico (3: 51-60); Mexico (5: 23); Medina (1978: 92). See also Table 25, which shows a substantial increase in the number o f communities, parcels, and total area affected yearly by divisions of ejidos into parcels for the 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 4 6 period, and a moderate increase in the number of titles issued. 12. Mexico (3: 12-15). 13. Mexico (3: 54-55). 14. The Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria (formerly the Departamento Agrario) archives an individual file for each agrarian reform proceeding. These records are, of course, much more useful for individual or regional case studies than for generalizations about the entire republic of Mexico. Nevertheless, the study of seventy cases undertaken by Medina (1978) as part of his work on the Avila Camacho administration is a valuable effort. 15. Medina (1978: 248-253).

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16. O n e symptom was continuing land invasions. See "Texto del Circular de 11 de j u n i o de 1941," in Mexico (3: 53-54). Agrarian Department delegates were advised to act "with the support of the military zone, but exhausting persuasive measures." See also "Circular del C. Presidente de la República de 22 de julio de 1941, girada a los Gobernadores de Estados y Territorios Nacionales," in Mexico (5: 21). 17. See the Agrarian Code of 1940 (Articles 148-156) for a legislative expression of official concern with production and the role of collective organization (Fabila, 1941: 733-736). 18. The BNCE paid weekly advances to collective ejidatarios; although they were part of the credit package given for production, the peasants often perceived them as salaries and so treated them in negotiations with the government. 19. Marte R. Gómez to Comité Nacional de la CTM, April 22, 1942 (Oficio #101-2539), AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 20. Marte R. Gómez to Comité Nacional de la CTM, April 22, 1942 (Oficio #101-2539); Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, December 14, 1942: both in AMRG ( 1 9 4 2 / D o c u m e n t o s Oficiales, Vol. 1); Marte R. Gómez to J . J e s ú s González Gallo, July 8, 1944 (Oficio #101-4007), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 21. Comité Central de Defensa Ejidal de Tixkokob, Yucatán to Marte R. Gómez, January 16, 1942; Manuel Avila Camacho to Ernesto Novelo Torres, January 29, 1942: both in AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 22. Marte R. Gómez to Rafael Salazar Trejo, March 3, 1942 (Oficio #1011324), AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 23. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, January 19, 1942, AMRC. (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 24. Marte R. Gómez to Rafael Salazar Trejo, March 3, 1942 (Oficio #1011324), AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 25. Ing. Carlos M. Ramírez to C. Director de O r g a n i z a c i ó n Agraria Ejidal, Department of Agriculture and Development, Mexico City, J u n e 8, 1944 (Oficio #730-1488), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 26. Marte R. Gómez, "Proyecto de una carta de Manuel Avila Camacho a José González Beitia, Gobernador del Estado de Yucatán," January 9, 1946, AMRG (1946/Asuntos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 27. Marte R. Gómez, "Oficiales: Banco Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera," AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 28. Mexico (21: 10). 29. Excelsior, October 20, 1942; Marte R. Gómez to Campesinos ejidatarios de la Comarca Lagunera, November 6, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1, "Oficiales: Banco Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera"). 30. The Agricultural Credit Law gave legal justification to collective ejidos and larger, umbrella organizations like the Unión Local that represented them on a local and regional basis. 31. Marte R. Gómez to Campesinos ejidatarios de la Comarca Lagunera, November 6, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1, "Oficiales: Banco Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera"). 32. U n i ó n de Sociedades Locales de Crédito Colectivo Ejidal d e la Comarca Lagunera to Manuel Avila Camacho, December 14, 1944, AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 33. This, of course, was true. It did not follow that all the ejidos' credit needs were met.

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34. Marte R. Gómez to the Unión de Sociedades de Crédito Colectivo Ejidal de la Región Lagunera, December 28, 1944, AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 35. See Markiewicz (1980: 32-33). 36. N o b l e (1949: 1 2 3 - 1 2 5 ) ; L a m a r F l e m i n g , J r . , to M a n u e l Avila Camacho, April 15, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 2). 37. Noble (1949: 30-31). 38. Alberto Piñón Cordova to Marte R. Gómez, May 30, 1940, AMRG (1940/P-R); Mexico (18: 119); Mexico (23: 2: 379-393); Marte R. Gómez to Eduardo Suárez, November 8, 1946, AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 1). 39. Marte R. G ó m e z , " M e m o r á n d u m s o b r e la s i t u a c i ó n del B a n c o Nacional de Crédito Agrícola," AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1); Mexico (23: 2: 375-379). 40. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, J u n e 2, 1943, AMRG (1943/Asuntos Oficiales). 41. Mexico (8: 149-153); Marte R. Gómez to Francisco L. Urquizo, March 23, 1946 (Oficio #1338); Marte R. Gómez to Francisco L. Urquizo, April 3, 1946 (Oficio #1464): both in AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 1). 42. Secretaría de Agricultura y F o m e n t o , Dirección Consultiva y de Legislación, to CC. Ministros de la H. S u p r e m a Corte de Justicia d e la Nación, January 21, 1946; Marte R. Gómez to Salvador Urbina, January 23, 1946: both in AMRG (1946/Asuntos Oficiales, Vol. 2); "Boletín de Prensa: A c u e r d o a la S e c r e t a r í a de A g r i c u l t u r a y F o m e n t o y al D e p a r t a m e n t o Agrario," March 20, 1946; "Boletín de Prensa," March 20, 1946: b o t h in AMRG (1946/Secretaría de Agricultura); Marte R. Gómez to Magdaleno Aguilar, February 8, 1944 (Oficio #101-996), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 43. These regional boards were set up in 1941 with the ostensible goal of overseeing local agricultural prices and distribution; in 1942 they became the Consejos Mixtos de Economía Regional, charged with coordinating "the diff e r e n t sectors which intervene in agricultural p r o d u c t i o n . " See Marte R. Gómez, Eduardo Suárez, Francisco J. Gaxiola et al. to Manuel Avila Camacho, J u n e 5, 1942, AMRG ( 1 9 4 2 / D o c u m e n t o s Oficiales, Vol. 2); G o n z á l e z Gallardo (1943: 532). See also Medina (1978: 278-281), who notes that the participation of organizations of private landlords and livestock ranchers in the Consejos strengthened the agriculture and livestock associations. 44. N o r a d i n o R u b i o to M a n u e l Avila C a m a c h o , F e b r u a r y 10, 1942 (Oficio #1055); José Pérez Tejada G. to Manuel Avila Camacho, March 3, 1942; Consejo Mixto de Fomento Agropecuario ( Q u e r é t a r o ) to Marte R. Gómez, March 18, 1942; Marte R. Gómez to Noradino Rubio, April 4, 1942 (Oficio #101-2062): all in AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 45. Marte R. Gómez to Rubén F. Morales, March 31, 1944 (Oficio #1011977), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 46. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, January 9, 1946, AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 1).

15

"Small Property" and the Legal Recourse of Amparo

Small property will continue to be deprived ofjurisdictional guarantee and political force as long as it does not succeed in withdrawing itself from the harmful influence of large property which uses it for its own interests. More than that, small property will no longer desire any juridical defense as soon as the expropriatory phase of the agrarian reform is closed, and this would have occurred a long time ago, and still can occur quickly, if the amparo is no longer used as a fortification to combat the execution of the agrarian reform. Twenty-eight years have passed since the Law of January 6, 1915 was promulgated. In that time, there has been a continuous struggle to battle against and invalidate the agrarian reform; but time and time again the people have resisted the attacks and have defended the reforms which are their salvation. Each attack against the agrarian question . . . [has] served only as a temporary alleviation; afterwards, the push [toward reform] has been more energetic. . . . But the goings and comings have taken time, and, what is more regrettable, they have cost money. —Marte R. Gomez 1 T h e argument that "small property" was merely b e i n g used by "large property" to attack the agrarian reform, that large l a n d o w n e r s set authentic small proprietors against ejidatarios, causing social unrest and harming national interests, was o f t e n used by Marte R. G o m e z a n d was a fairly consistent position of p r o r e f o r m m e m b e r s of the r e g i m e . T h e Avila C a m a c h o administration, with its e m p h a s i s o n social conciliation and e c o n o m i c productivity, wanted to s m o o t h over conflicts between ejidatarios and property owners. Like the writings of Molina Enriquez early in the century, however, this perspective was characterized by a fundamental disregard of the reality that to protect small property was also to protect large property. T h e campaign in favor of hard and fast guarantees for private agricultural property and

157

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the reinstitution of the constitutional right of amparo in agrarian proceedings illustrates this reality. It also exposes the basic fallacy of the position that the regime's land reform could eliminate large property and impose small property as the norm, thus softening or eliminating the contradictions of capital accumulation in agriculture. The legal recourse of the juicio de amparo was, from the beginning of the official reform, one of the tools used by landlords to delay and even reverse the distribution of lands. The amparo, also known as the juicio de garantias, is a guarantee of individual rights recognized by the Mexican Constitution. A party initiating an amparo proceeding in federal court requests suspension of the effects of dispositions of any law or authority tending to violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights. Such proceedings may be reviewed at various stages up through the Supreme Court. The Decree of January 6, 1915 allowed landlords to make full use of the courts to contest presidential resolutions affecting their holdings for agrarian purposes; a judicial Finding in their favor entitled them not to the return of their lands but to compensation. As previous chapters have shown, landlords did in fact use all legal (and many illegal) means available to them in defense of their holdings; this included the juicio de amparo, which had the effect of delaying agrarian proceedings for years. In December 1931, the Congress reformed Article 10 of the Law ofjanuary 6, 1915 to disallow the use of the amparo against presidential resolutions granting or restoring land to the pueblos. And in December 1933, when the Law ofjanuary 6, 1915 was abrogated, Fraction 14 of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 was reformed to state: "The proprietors affected by resolutions granting or restoring ejidos or waters, which may be dictated in favor of the pueblos, or are dictated in the future, will have no ordinary legal right or recourse, nor may they initiate amparo proceedings." 2 These changes did not by any means signify that landlords were deprived of guarantees or methods of fighting the land reform. Foremost was the guarantee of private property ownership provided by the Constitution; all others flowed from it. The very length of the agrarian proceedings gave the advantage to the landowners. There were ways of dividing a latifundio to avoid the application of agrarian laws. Violence and terror tactics were much used. There were numerous legal ways to stall the proceedings long before they ever reached the presidential level. Finally, although the use of the amparo itself has been little studied, evidence presented here will suggest that it was extremely flexible in its application and was never completely out of use even during the period of constitutional prohibition. 3 Thus, landowners were certainly not bereft of tools for the defense of their holdings. But like the Porfirians, who awarded themselves more and

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more privileges at the expense of the pueblos, they were not satisfied until their right to contest agrarian resolutions in court was carved in stone. Thus, there was a continuous campaign to reinstate the constitutional right of amparo against agrarian proceedings, a campaign that, not surprisingly, intensified during the late 1930s. Numerous books published during that period extolled small property and its "social function," and called for its defense. Some titles explicitly argued in favor of the restoration of the amparo as "an effective defense of small property." 4 Pressure in favor of guarantees for private property led Cárdenas to establish the Office of Small Property as a dependency of the federal executive to deal with the complaints of proprietors whose legally exempt holdings had been the object of agrarian proceedings. The office evaluated the claims of the property owners and, if it found them valid, issued presidential resolutions confirming that their holdings were exempt from expropriation under agrarian law. Some expropriated properties were now actually returned to their former owners, a procedure that had been prohibited in legislation since 1915. 5 This situation raised legal and constitutional difficulties. In cases where exempt status was confirmed, two presidential resolutions confronted each other: one issued by the Office of Small Property, the other by the agrarian authorities. In an effort to resolve this dilemma, the Cárdenas government amended the regulations of the Office in 1940 to state that a recognition of exempt status did not confer restitution of the property in question to its former owners. T h e Avila C a m a c h o administration attempted to convince p r o p r i e t o r s with exempt holdings recognized by the office to opt for "certificates of compensation." This was of course unacceptable to the landowners, who preferred to bring legal proceedings demanding the return of their properties; the Supreme Court began to find in their favor. Fearing the social explosion that these tactics could engender, Avila Camacho solemnly promised that no more small properties would be affected for agrarian puiposes. 6 This effort to conciliate the interests of proprietors and would-be ejidatarios motivated a series of decrees and circulars focusing on the regularization and entitlement of rural property, both ejidal and private, and requiring elaborate technical preparations for land grants and divisions of ejidos that would take into a c c o u n t applications f o r e x e m p t status b e f o r e g r a n t s were m a d e . 7 To the extent that these dispositions were a p p l i e d , they almost certainly resulted in a further slowing of already cumbersome agrarian proceedings. Avila Camacho's commitment to the rights of property owners went f u r t h e r than the reform of entitlement procedures, demonstrat-

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ing the regime's contradictory position. Even while he explained that returning expropriated lands to their former owners would cause harmful "agitation," he noted that the government legally had no choice but to respect and comply with Supreme Court rulings in favor of the landlords in cases of land invasions. The result was that the Agrarian Department continued to return expropriated properties to their former owners if they had been recognized as exempt prior to 1940 or had been granted amparos by the Supreme Court owing to illegal land invasions. 8 Proprietors affected by agrarian proceedings were offered compensation in land or, sometimes, cash. During the Avila Camacho government, some 14,000 hectares valued at almost 7 million pesos, including valuable land in government irrigation districts, were so awarded. In July 1942, the government dropped all pretense that it was c o m p e n s a t i n g only a u t h e n t i c small property owners w h e n it began granting compensation "for reasons of equity" to landlords whose holdings had been only partially expropriated for ejidos. These landlords received compensation equivalent to 12.5 percent of the value of their expropriated holdings even though they still possessed the maximum exempt surface area. In total, they were granted more than 240,000 hectares valued at approximately 6 million pesos. 9 Conciliation and even decided advantages were not enough for landlords and their apologists, who wanted nothing less than the absolute right to hold, utilize, and dispose of their rural property however they pleased. Here, the term "national interest," foundation of the Constitution and watchword of the regime, carried no influe n c e . In D e c e m b e r 1942, t h e Association of D e p u t i e s to t h e Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917 came out in favor of reinstating the constitutional right of amparo in agrarian proceedings. Avila Camacho warned: We have the best intentions of saving and elevating small property; but, for that very reason, we opposed any confrontation [of it] with the ejido, because this would be a struggle in which small property would be obliterated. No one who appreciates the social and human importance of the ejido and of the campesino class in Mexico can believe, in effect, that the stability of small property can be based on the destruction of the ejido. 10

Along the same lines, Marte R. Gomez c o m m e n t e d in 1943: "Assuring a modest patrimony for those who have nothing, will be . . . the best possible way to protect the large patrimonies." 11 Nevertheless, the landowners were uncooperative, and the S u p r e m e Court continued to award numerous amparos against agrarian proceedings. The government fought a rear guard action against the offensives of

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the landlords, attempting to postpone or avoid the constitutional amendment they coveted. In 1942, Marte R. Gomez refused to implement an amparo granted by the First District Court and later the Supreme Court to a landowner in the Federal District. A resolution issued by the Office of Small Property had given the landowner, whose property was legally exempt, the right to compensation. T h e landowner had obtained an amparo against the resolution and was arguing that this entitled her to retrieve the e x p r o p r i a t e d lands. Gomez maintained that the Department of Agriculture could not return the lands to their former owner. First of all, the department was not a legal agrarian authority; f u r t h e r m o r e , to i m p l e m e n t the order would be to revoke a presidential resolution, which was unconstitutional. Finally, and most important, Gomez argued: This expeditious, novel, and even ingenious form of twisting the Constitution, the Agrarian Code, and the repeated findings of two Supreme Courts [in the sense that the amparo could not be used against agrarian proceedings], would shake to its foundations the current organization of the country, since the plaintiff . . . took advantage of a resolution of the Office of Small Property . . . in an attempt to make a "complaint" against the Office . . . into a . . . revocation of Presidential Resolutions.

For the landlord to obtain restitution of the ejidal lands, Gómez a r g u e d , s h e would n e e d to o b t a i n an a m p a r o n o t a g a i n s t t h e Department of Agriculture and Development, but against the president of the Republic and the Agrarian Department with respect to the presidential resolution that affected her property. In further support of his case, Gómez wrote to Avila Camacho: Mrs. García Lascuráin is not a small rural proprietor of the type you desire to protect. . . . She wants . . . her lands to sell them for urban purposes, and if she has resorted to such despicable maneuvers as i m p e d i n g , with the complicity o f a D e p a r t m e n t o f A g r i c u l t u r e lawyer, the timely delivery [to the Supreme Court] of a brief for the appeal, it is because she expects that her costs . . . will be compensated with the product of the real estate sales. 1 2

In spite of G o m e z ' s stalling tactics, in D e c e m b e r 1944, t h e Supreme Court ordered that Mrs. García Lascuráin's former property be r e t u r n e d with the aid of federal forces. Gómez advised Avila Camacho to instruct the secretary of defense not to send troops to implement the return of expropriated properties whose owners were granted amparos. Instead, the landlords should be instructed to consult the Office of Small Property. 13 The landlords of Yucatán were also inventive in their search for

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CARDENISMO

ways to regain their lost properties. In March 1944, Marte R. Gómez provided Avila Camacho with a list of old and new amparos granted to proprietors in that state. Seventeen had recently been granted against the Office of Small Property's resolutions of compensation. Avila Camacho's private secretary received instructions to let the Supreme Court know that its orders for the return of lands to former owners were unacceptable; "no Authority could implement" these resolutions, and if they were implemented, they "would have no real value . . . except to create a state of struggle that would make life impossible." 14 Gómez himself wrote Salvador Urbina, the president of the Supreme Court, pressuring him to rule against nineteen amparos brought before the court by Yucatecan landlords. 15 Nevertheless, in 1946 these landlords were still attempting to recover properties originally granted as ejidos as far back as 1925 and 1937; Gómez found himself stalling in a case that would affect three ejidos. 16 In May of that year, he wrote to the head of the Agrarian Department that the return of ejido lands was unconstitutional: For this reason, in order not to violate the Constitution, independent of my own convictions, I will have nothing to do with any effort to promote or execute the return of lands affected for ejidos. 1 7

By this point, Gómez was protesting in favor of a lost cause. In J a n u a r y 1946, the Supreme Court had restricted ejidatarios' legal rights while recognizing and broadening the landlords' by ruling that the former must protest the return of a previously expropriated property within 15 days of restitution to its former owners. 18 The regime's weak and contradictory position and the pressure of private interests were shown in controversies within the administration on the legality of the amparo. The head of the Department of Agriculture's Consultative and Legislative Section was favorable to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that the courts were allowed to intervene in cases where small properties had been illegally expropriated. So were Jesús González Gallo, Avila Camacho's personal secretary, and his legal staff, who claimed that Fractions 14 and 15 of Article 27 deprived landlords of legal recourse only in cases of grants or restitutions, but not in amplifications or the creation of new population centers. They also were of the opinion that any agrarian resolution affecting "small agricultural property in operation" could legally be opposed with the recourse of amparo. Marte R. Gómez argued against these interpretations, denying any c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n F r a c t i o n 14, which p r o h i b i t e d t h e recourse of amparo, and Fraction 15, which prohibited the expropriation for agrarian purposes of exempt property. Their hierarchy, he

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maintained, established a preference for ejidal grants to landless villages over the p r o t e c t i o n of private property; in cases of e x t r e m e need, legally exempt property could be expropriated, but must immediately be compensated. However, he conceded that if the S u p r e m e C o u r t could n o t be " m a d e to u n d e r s t a n d a n d comply with" social needs and constitutional law, then it would be preferable to modify the Agrarian Code or Article 27 of the Constitution. 1 9 Gomez's position was officially shared by the Supreme Court as late as September 1942, a n d it was still t h e p u b l i c p o s i t i o n of t h e g o v e r n m e n t in October 1943. Nevertheless, the bitterness of his m e m o r a n d a o n the subject suggests that by 1943, his perspective may already have been the losing one. Congressional controversy and rumors of p r o p o s e d legislation from 1942 on tend to confirm this point of view. 20 T h e m a j o r i t y of t h e d e l e g a t e s to t h e N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s of Agrarian Law organized in July 1945 by c a r d e n i s t a Silvano Barba González r e j e c t e d the idea of r e i n s t a t i n g the right to invoke the a m p a r o against agrarian proceedings; o u t n u m b e r e d , leading conservative Noé Lecona resigned as head of a commission on the question of property. 2 1 But this was the last gasp of the opposition. Presidential candidate Miguel Alemán explicitly linked the right of a m p a r o "in favor of small property" to the creation of an " a t m o s p h e r e which makes possible private credit and investment in the land." 2 2 Less than a m o n t h after Alemán took office as president, Fraction 14 of Article 27 was modified to allow owners of agricultural or livestock holdings p r o t e c t e d by certificados de inafectabilidad 2 3 to use the a m p a r o in case of the "illegal privation or e x p r o p r i a t i o n of t h e i r l a n d s a n d waters." 2 4 Thus, by the beginning of 1947, the Alemán g o v e r n m e n t h a d d e c l a r e d that l a n d r e f o r m a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e mutually exclusive; it had also repudiated the ejidos' main legal and constitutional defense against the hacendados, the inapplicability of the juicio de a m p a r o in agrarian proceedings. In essence, the officially sponsored agrarian reform was over, although the regime would c o n t i n u e to manipulate the rhetoric of agrarian change f o r decades to come.

Notes 1. Marte R. Gómez to Jesús González Gallo, December 28, 1943 (Oficio #101-7139), AMRG (1943/Agrarios). 2. Luna Arroyo and Alcerreca (1982: 29-30). 3. Further study might clarify whether the constitutional prohibition on the amparo had any effect on its use against agrarian resolutions at the local and state levels. 4. Mexico (24).

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5. González Gallardo (1943: 513); Mexico (18: 73-74). 6. Mexico (18: 73-74, 97); González Navarro (1977: 111-112). 7. C i r c u l a r JD, No. 2-11, f r o m J e f e del D e p a r t a m e n t o Agrario to Delegados Agrarios, December 13, 1940; Acuerdo Presidencial, December 20, 1940; Acuerdo Presidencial, January 29, 1941; Circular JD, No. 6, March 13, 1941, from Jefe del Departamento Agrario to Delegados Agrarios: all in Mexico (4: 19-31, 38-41). 8. Marte R. Gómez to Jesús González Gallo, December 28, 1943 (Oficio #101-7139), AMRG (1943/Agrarios); González Navarro (1977: 111-112). 9. Calculated from information presented in Mexico (23: 2: 200, 205). 10. Marte R. Gómez, "Borrador de carta de Manuel Avila Camacho a l a Asociación de Diputados Constituyentes de 1916-1917," December 23, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 11. Marte R. Gómez to Jesús González Gallo, December 28, 1943 (Oficio #101-7139), AMRG (1943/Agrarios). 12. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila Camacho, October 29, 1942, AMRG (1942/Documentos Oficiales, Vol. 1). 13. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Avila C a m a c h o , D e c e m b e r 27, 1944 (Oficio #6689), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 14. Marte R. Gómez to Jesús González Gallo, March 9, 1944 (Oficio #1011572), AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 15. M a r t e R. G ó m e z to Salvador U r b i n a , M a r c h 17, 1944, AMRG (1944/Oficiales). 16. Marte R. Gómez to personal secretary of Manuel Avila Camacho, August 7, 1946, AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 1). 17. Marte R. Gómez to Jefe del Departamento Agrario, May 23, 1946, AMRG (1946/Oficiales, Vol. 1). 18. El Nacional, January 10, 1946. 19. M a r t e R. G ó m e z to J e f e del D e p a r t a m e n t o C o n s u l t i v o y d e Legislación, Secretaría de Agricultura y F o m e n t o , S e p t e m b e r 30, 1943 (Oficio #101-5257); Marte R. Gómez t o j . J e s ú s González Gallo, December 28, 1943 (Oficio #101-7139): both in AMRG (1943/Agrarios). 20. See Medina (1978: 260-266, 276-277). 21. Mexico (8: 15-16, 347-363, 435); Medina (1978: 267-272). 22. Aguilera Gómez (1969: 147). See also Medina (1978: 266-267) for the comments of Eduardo Villaseñor, director of the Banco de México, on the need to end social reform in favor of private investment in agriculture. 23. Beginning with the Agrarian Code of 1940 (Articles 252-254), owners of exempt private property, in addition to the inscription of the property in the National Agrarian Register and the Diario Oficial, could request a resolution of exempt status (resolución de inafectabilidad) signed by the president and entered in the National Agrarian Register. See Fabila (1941: 759). See also Table 22 for concessions of exempt status. 24. Luna Arroyo and Alcerreca (1982: 30).

16

Conclusion

The Mexican agrarian reform was conceived to stifle peasant revolution, guarantee the rights of private property, and reestablish social peace in the wake of the Revolution of 1910. Francisco I. Madero's call to arms sparked a civil war that destroyed the Porfirian State and threatened the bourgeoisie. Landless rural dwellers fought for the return of land and resources traditionally controlled by peasant villages, indigenous communities, and autonomous peasants, of which they had been stripped during the Porfiriato. In order to defeat the insurgent peasantry and consolidate its power, the anti-Porfirian bourgeoisie was compelled to promise land reform. T h e early years of the post-Porfirian order, u n d e r Venustiano Carranza, were characterized by bourgeois entrenchment rather than r e f o r m ; although later disavowed by p r o r e f o r m m e m b e r s of t h e regime, carrancista policy shaped the land reform in important ways. The Constitution of 1917 stated a preference for "small" private property; it guaranteed the rights of capital even while it allowed "the Nation" to regulate the use and development of resources, expropriate property with indemnification, and grant land to the villages. A national agrarian bureaucracy was created not so much to distribute lands as to reassert central government control over rural Mexico and to safeguard landlords' claims. Little land was transferred to the peasantry; landlords recovered resources e x p r o p r i a t e d d u r i n g the Revolution. The ejido was shaped in the interests of the new regime. It was designed to function as a wage-cost subsidy to the landlords and as a deterrent to peasant rebellion, not as a vehicle for revolutionary change in favor of the peasantry. Carranza's demise allowed the radical wing of Constitutionalism to assume power. These leaders were not militantly propeasant; in fact, they often expressed a p r e f e r e n c e for capitalist agriculture, d e c r i e d the insecure business e n v i r o n m e n t c r e a t e d by a g r a r i a n 165

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reform, and channeled financial resources toward large private agriculture. Some, like Marte R. Gómez or Ramón P. Denegrí, believed that land reform and cooperadvism might ultimately lead to a homogeneous, prosperous agricultural sector, social amelioration, and economic development. 1 All favored the tactic of land reform as a tool f o r social pacification and regime consolidation. During the 1920s and 1930s, the regime, with the support of the agrarista peasantry, was able to prevail over the de la Huerta and Escobar rebellions, the Gómez and Serrano revolt, the pro-Catholic Cristero peasantry, and strongman Saturnino Cedillo. T h e military usefulness of a proregime peasantry impelled the continued distribution of land in spite of regime conservatism, landlord intransigence, and opposition f r o m the United States government. T h e regime secured its political control over the ejidos by disarming peasant militias, crushing independent peasant movements, assassinating irreconcilable peasant leaders, and incorporating friendly regional organizations into the official party, the PRM. By the early 1930s, rural Mexico had changed relatively little. About 70 percent of rural laborers were still landless. T h e ejido sector controlled some 13 percent of the cropland; ejidatarios worked an average of 2.2 hectares of cropland each. More than 30 percent of ejidatarios worked primarily as agricultural day laborers. Only 17 percent of hacienda lands had been expropriated in favor of the peasantry. Fifteen years after the Decree of January 6, 1915, rural Mexico was still a place of poverty and violence; the regime was faced with an increasingly militant peasantry and agricultural proletariat in important agricultural zones. Grave rural problems and a temporary reduction of antireform pressure by the United States enabled the proreform faction of the regime to gain power. Under Cárdenas, the agrarian structure of the country was radically altered. By 1940, the ejido sector controlled almost 50 percent of the cropland and almost 60 percent of the irrigated cropland. "Collective" ejidos controlled lands and installations in important commercial zones and received organizational and financial support from the government. T h e ejido peasantry was integrated into the PRM through membership in the CNC, becoming the regime's most malleable and dependable political support. T h e ejidos were now too important, both materially and politically, to be attacked directly by more conservative elements of the regime, as they had been in the early years. However, in pushing for land r e f o r m rather than for independent working class leadership of the peasantry, the reformist labor bureaucracy and the left helped to lay the conditions for secure and effective regime control of the countryside and, ultimately, the end of reform.

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During the mid-1930s, the redistribution of land and resources in favor of the peasantry went to the limit of what was possible under capitalism; that is, the imperatives of capital, domestic and foreign, determined the extent of the cardenista reform. T h e relatively favorable circumstances of the p r e - W o r l d War II p e r i o d were over by 1938. Landlords again went on the offensive, pressing for an end to reform and the right to reclaim expropriated property. T h e transformations of the Cárdenas period were not profound enough to withstand this assault; indeed, the cardenista bureaucracy, which had favored reform for a brief period, now served just as well to curtail it. Latifundismo and its abuses endured; the concentration of landholding remained high; the ejido community was deeply divided along income and class lines; illegal rentals and sales of ejidal lands were commonplace by 1940; the collective ejidos went into decline as government support was withdrawn. During the Avila Camacho presidency, the r e g i m e withdrew resources and support from the ejidos and concentrated on agricultural development rather than social reform. This tendency, which began as early as 1938, was dictated by the increasing scarcity of legally expropriable agricultural land, domestic and foreign agitation in favor of more ample guarantees f o r private property, cooperation with the U.S. war effort, and the political bankruptcy of the labor bureaucracy and the left. T h e more militant elements of the land reform peasantry were rendered powerless by the withdrawal of gove r n m e n t support and the left's prowar, p r o g o v e r n m e n t stance. Agricultural development was contradictory and distorted; government research and policies helped lay the groundwork not only for the rapid growth of agriculture, but also for the increased economic and social polarization of the agricultural sector. Foreign capital was welcomed; the regime needed credit, machinery, and expertise f o r agricultural modernization. Foreign ownership of latifundia and flagrant lack of compliance with agrarian law was tolerated and concealed. It became more difficult for villages to receive land grants, and the quality of land distributed grew worse. In late 1946, the "rectification" of cardenismo culminated in the reinstatement of the legal recourse of amparo in agrarian proceedings, marking the virtual end of the agrarian reform process begun in 1915. T h e probusiness A l e m á n g o v e r n m e n t d e c l a r e d that land reform and economic development were mutually exclusive; modifying Article 27 to allow landowners to challenge land reform expropriations in court deprived the ejidos of their main legal defense against the hacendados and placed the regime's stamp of approval on the revanchist appetites of the landlords. With the demise of cardenista reformism, the years between 1940

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CONCLUSION

and 1 9 6 5 b e c a m e a golden age for large-scale c o m m e r c i a l agriculture. T h e financial, technical, and political resources of the regime were placed at the disposal of agricultural capitalists; the ejidos lost government support and began a process of decline with respect to private agriculture. T h e expansion of irrigated lands t h r o u g h construction of irrigation works, the increased productivity of labor via m e c h a n i z a t i o n and technical innovations, falling real agricultural wages, and the relative abundance of agricultural labor were factors that favored large private agriculture. T h e e c o n o m i c importance of the ejidos diminished; the contribution of large private farms to the gross agricultural product increased from 3 6 p c r c e n t in 1940 to 5 8 percent in 1960, while the ejidos' contribution shrank from 4 4 percent to 3 5 percent. T h e ejidos' share of land, capital, and livestock also declined. Ejidatario standards of living, surveyed in the 1960s, were extremely low. 2 T h e shrinking importance o f the agricultural s e c t o r in the e c o n o m y as a whole, and the growing d o m i n a n c e of large private agriculture with respect to the ejidos, made it m o r e feasible for the regime to let the land reform sector of agriculture fall by the wayside. In the mid-1960s, an agricultural crisis marked by slowed growth, increased d e m a n d for agricultural products, and—beginning about 1 9 7 1 — s o a r i n g imports of basic c r o p s c o n t r i b u t e d to a t e m p o r a r y revival of the proreform point of view in government, with a burst of land distribution a n d ejidal organization u n d e r Luis E c h e v e r r í a . 3 Little changed as a result of this short-lived program. Neocardenista reformism still had some political value, but, as in the 1940s, redistributive reforms—the essence of cardenismo—could not be extended at the expense of large-scale capitalist agriculture without threatening political stability. Both the left and reform-minded members of the regime long p r o m o t e d the notion that the ejido was an exception to the system of capitalist property relations and could thus serve as the nucleus of a uniquely Mexican, democratic, reform-based process of social change. That view has g o n e hand in hand with a belief that, u n d e r the right circumstances, proreform elements of the regime could be e m p o w e r e d to c o m p l e t e the c a r d e n i s t a a g e n d a a n d i m p l e m e n t a maximum interpretation of the Constitution of 1917. I have argued against that assessment, showing that the ejido has always been subj e c t to the dictates of capital; that the "great historical leap" o f cardenismo could not eliminate o r even mitigate the contradictions of capital accumulation; and that ejidatarios were, from the beginning, subject to the same social processes experienced by all peasants. T h e regime's explicit a b a n d o n m e n t of land reform in 1991 m a d e c l e a r that the neocardenista position no longer had any place within the

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PRI. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who left the official party to pursue the neocardenista strategy, has even less h o p e of renewing agrarian reformism than the PRI itself. The history of the Mexican agrarian reform indicates that the peasantry, while politically significant, cannot provide a revolutionary program or leadership. That history also shows, and recent events have reconfirmed, that the ability of the bonapartist post-Porfirian regime to carry out social change is strictly limited by the nature of capitalist imperialism. The post-Cárdenas dominance of large-scale capitalist agriculture, like the rule of the bonapartist bureaucracy and the influence of U.S. imperialism, can be broken only by the proletariat. However, if the Mexican working class is to reshape society in the interests of the dispossessed, it requires a leadership that will disseminate no illusions in the potential of the peasant community as a nucleus or agent of social change and, more fundamentally, in the capacity of the bourgeois State for reform. Notes 1. Markiewicz (1993). 2. Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 312, 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 , 3 4 3 - 3 4 6 , 4 1 0 ) ; S i m p s o n (1937: 712); Alcántara (1976: 1 0 1 - 1 3 6 ) ; Yates (1978: 1: 18-37, 4 5 3 - 4 5 6 , 461-464). 3. Yates (1978: 1: 32-37); Markiewicz (1980); Markiewicz (1985).

Glossary and Acronyms

Acasillado. Laborer residing permanently on an hacienda or in a village considered part of the permanent labor force of an hacienda. See Peón. Agrarista. Partisan of agrarian reform; supporter of the official agrarian reform; member of the proreform faction of the post-Porfirian regime. Amparo. Injunction suspending the effects of legal disposition(s) tending to violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights; often used by landlords to stall or halt agrarian reform proceedings. Amplification. Presidential resolution enlarging an existing ejido. AMRG. Archivo Marte R. Gómez (Marte R. Gómez Archive, Mexico City). Anticipos. Payments from the BNCE to ejidatarios, made on a regular basis and often perceived as salaries; in fact, advances against a line of credit to be repaid at the end of the season. Ayuntamiento. Municipal government. BNCA. Banco Nacional de Crédito Agricola (National Agricultural Credit Bank). BNCE. Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal (National Ejidal Credit Bank). Cacique. Local or regional boss. Caciquismo. System of economic and political oppression headed by caciques. Callismo. Conservative political tendency associated with President Plutarco Elias Calles. Callistas. Political allies of President Calles. Calpulli. Aztec landholding community. Campesinista. Writer or intellectual who champions the peasant way of life. 171

172

GLOSSARY & ACRONYMS

Campesino. Peasant. Cañonazo. Bribe (literally, cannon blast). Cardenismo. P r o r e f o r m political tendency associated with President Lázaro Cárdenas. Cardenistas. Political allies of President Cárdenas. Carrancismo. Political tendency associated with President Venustiano Carranza. Carrancistas. Political allies of President Carranza. Casco. House and central buildings of an hacienda. Casta divina. T h e landlords of Yucatán. Caudillo. Leader; strongman; political nickname for Alvaro O b r e g ó n ("El caudillo"). CCI. C e n t r a l C a m p e s i n a I n d e p e n d i e n t e ( I n d e p e n d e n t P e a s a n t Organization). CCM. C o n f e d e r a c i ó n C a m p e s i n a M e x i c a n a ( M e x i c a n P e a s a n t Confederation). Certificado de inafectabilidad. Certificate of exemption f r o m possible expropriation for land reform purposes. C G O C M . C o n f e d e r a c i ó n G e n e r a l de O b r e r o s y C a m p e s i n o s d e M é x i c o ( G e n e r a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n of M e x i c a n W o r k e r s a n d Peasants). Chartismo. Government-sponsored violence and bossism in the trade unions; the term originated in the late 1940s when Jesús Díaz de León, nicknamed El Charro, collaborated with the Alemán gove r n m e n t ' s efforts to control the railway workers' union. CIOAC. Central I n d e p e n d i e n t e de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos ( I n d e p e n d e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n of A g r i c u l t u r a l W o r k e r s a n d Peasants). CNA. Comisión Nacional Agraria (National Agrarian Commission). CNC. C o n f e d e r a c i ó n Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation). CNDP. Comité Nacional d e Defensa Proletaria (National C o m m i t t e e for Proletarian Defense). CNOP. Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (National Confederation of Popular Organizations). Constitutionalism. Military and political movement associated with Venustiano Carranza. Continuismo. A leader's self-perpetuation in power. Convention of Aguascalientes ("the Convention"). Military convention begun in O c t o b e r 1914 to avert a split between Venustiano Carranza and Pancho Villa; soon disavowed Carranza, n a m e d an interim executive, adopted the social and political articles of the Plan of Ayala, and established a government in Mexico City. T h e Conventionist government left Mexico City in January 1915, when

GLOSSARY & ACRONYMS

173

the capital was occupied by Carranza's forces, led by Alvaro Obregón. Criollo. Native; Latin American. Cristeros. Pro-Catholic peasantry who warred against the government during the period 1926-1929. CROM. Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers). Cronista. Leader of the CROM. CSUM. Confederación Sindical Unitaria de México (Unified Syndical Confederation of Mexico). CTM. Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (Confederation of Mexican Workers). DDC. Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados (Daily Record of the Chamber of Deputies). Defensas agrarias (or Defensas rurales). Militias of the ejido peasantry; created during the Portes Gil government. Definitive possession. Delivery of lands to a village as specified in a p r e s i d e n t i a l r e s o l u t i o n a n d a c c o r d i n g to legally r e q u i r e d surveys. Delahuertista. Adherent of the political rebellion headed by Adolfo de la Huerta (December 1923-March 1924). Derechos a salvo. Rights to land in reserve; may apply to an entire village or to an individual peasant whose right to receive land is legally recognized by presidential resolution but is not executed owing to scarcity of legally expropriable land. Ejidatario. Recipient of a land reform grant, restitution, or amplification, entitled to individual or collective use of commonly assigned lands. Ejido. Early in the colonial period, the name given by the Spaniards to common Indian livestock grounds. Gradually, the meaning of the word expanded to encompass all agricultural lands claimed by a village. In the postrevolutionary period, a land grant u n d e r the official agrarian reform; also the term for a landholding village endowed by the agrarian reform. Finca. Plantation. First Chief. Political nickname for Venustiano Carranza. Fundo legal. Colonial and nineteenth-century term for the site of a village. Futurismo. Political maneuvering and speculation s u r r o u n d i n g the selection of the president of Mexico. Governor's resolution. The final step in the land distribution process at the state level, theoretically resulting in provisional possession of land for an ejido village pending resolution by a federal consultative commission and the president.

174

GLOSSARY & ACRONYMS

Guardias blancas. Private police forces employed by landlords for the protection of their holdings. Hacendado. Owner of an hacienda. Hacienda. Great landed estate. Inafectabilidades ganaderas. Concessions of exemption from expropriation for land reform purposes, granted for a period of 25 years to Mexican cattle ranchers who met certain requirements. Jefatura máxima. Plutarco Elias Calles's position, which he intended to institutionalize, as the power behind the presidency. Jefe máximo. Political nickname for Plutarco Elias Calles. Jornalero. Agricultural wage laborer. Juicio de amparo. See Amparo. Juicio de garantías. See Amparo. Latifundio (plural: latifundio or latifundios). Great landed estate. Latifundista. Large landed proprietor. Latifundismo. System of land tenure dominated by latifundia. LCA. Liga(s) de C o m u n i d a d e s Agrarias (League[s] of Agrarian Communities). Ley Lerdo. Law promulgated in 1856 requiring land held by civil and religious corporations to be divided and sold. Liberal Party. Partido Liberal Mexicano, organized in 1905, an anarchist-led party; through its newspaper Regeneración and its organization of armed revolts and strikes, it was an important element of the movement to overthrow the Porfirian regime. Licenciado. Professional person; holder of a college degree. LNC. Liga Nacional Campesina (National Peasant League). Maderismo. Political movement associated with Francisco I. Madero; sought the overthrow of dictator Porfirio Díaz. Maderista. Follower of Francisco I. Madero. Maximato. Period from 1928 to 1934, during which there were three presidents (Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo Rodríguez), but the power behind the presidency was held by former President Plutarco Elias Calles (the "jefe máximo"). Minifundista. Cultivator of a small parcel, sometimes defined as less than 5 hectares, usually insufficient to maintain a family. Obregonismo. Political t e n d e n c y associated with P r e s i d e n t Alvaro Obregón. Obregonistas. Political followers of President Obregón. Pact of Torreón. Agreement signed in July 1914 between Venustiano Carranza's forces and Pancho Villa's Northern Division; the latter agreed to remain subordinate to Carranza, temporarily avoiding an o p e n rift; at the insistence of Villa and more radical carrancista officers, the pact included popular ««rial and political clauses.

GLOSSARY Sc ACRONYMS

175

PCM. Partido Comunista Mexicano (Mexican Communist Party). Peón. Agricultural laborer; the term is associated with the repressive practices of the nineteenth-century hacienda. See Acasillado. Pequeña propiedad. Small property; the term was deceptive because it indicated a legal category of property that, while c o n s i d e r e d exempt from expropriation for land reform purposes, was many times larger than the area allowed for ejidal land grants. Pequeños propietarios. Small landowners; owners of properties defined as exempt from expropriation under agrarian law. The realities of agrarian politics and rural power allowed large landed proprietors to masquerade as small property owners. Pistolero. Hired gunman. Plan de Agua Prieta. Declaration signed in April 1920 by Sonoran political and military authorities, disavowing the central government headed by Venustiano Carranza. Plan de Ayala. Political program of zapatismo, signed in Morelos in November 1911. Plan de Guadalupe. Political declaration of Venustiano Carranza and followers, signed in Coahuila in March 1913, disavowing the gove r n m e n t of General Victoriano H u e r t a and forming the Constitutionalist army headed by Carranza. PLC. Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (Liberal Constitutionalist Party). PNR. Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party). Política de masas. Mass-based politics; a term s o m e t i m e s used to describe cardenismo. Porfirian. Having to do with the era of dictator Porfirio Díaz ( 1 8 7 6 1910). Porjirians. Political and social elite of the Porifirian era. Presidenciable. Political or military figure with potential as a contender for the presidency. Presidential resolution. Approval by the president of an ejidal land grant, restitution, or amplification. The resolution is published in the Diario Oficial de la Nación and the official bulletin of the appropriate state. The grant is recorded in the National Agrarian Register and the Register of Public Property. Prestanombre. Person who "lends his name" to another for the registration of property, permitting statutory limitations on land ownership to be circumvented. PRI. Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party). PRM. Partido de la Revolución M e x i c a n a (Party o f the M e x i c a n Revolution).

176

GLOSSARY & ACRONYMS

Procuradores de pueblos. Special federal representatives placed in each state b e g i n n i n g in 1921 to guide villages t h r o u g h the land distribution process. Propios. Colonial and nineteenth-century term f o r lands dedicated to the s u p p o r t of the village government. PSUM. P a r t i d o Socialista U n i f i c a d o d e México ( U n i f i e d Socialist Party of Mexico). Pueblo. Indigenous or mestizo l a n d h o l d i n g village; increasingly, during the late n i n e t e e n t h century, a landless village. Ranchero. I n d e p e n d e n t agriculturist. SICAE. Agricultural Ejidal Collective Interest Society (Sociedad d e Interés Colectivo Agrícola Ejidal), an ejidal credit a n d p r o d u c tion cooperative. SRA. S e c r e t a r í a d e la R e f o r m a A g r a r i a ( D e p a r t m e n t of A g r a r i a n Reform). Técnico. Technician; expert. Tejedismo. Political tendency associated with p r o r e f o r m Veracruz gove r n o r Adalberto Tejeda. Tejedistas. Political followers of Adalberto Tejeda. Terrenos de común repartimiento. Colonial and nineteenth-century term f o r villages' c o m m o n cropland. Veteranos. Callistas; wing of the post-Porfirian regime o p p o s e d to land reform. Villismo. Military and political m o v e m e n t associated with P a n c h o Villa. Villistas. Followers of P a n c h o Villa. Zapatismo. Military and political m o v e m e n t associated with Emiliano Zapata. Zapatistas. Followers of Emiliano Zapata.

Tables

TABLES

179

Table 1 Land Distribution Rulings at the State and National Levels, by Presidential Period, 1915-1946 Presidential Period

1915-1920 May-November 1920 1920-1924 1924-1928 1928-1930 1930-1932 1932-1934 1934-1940 1940-1946

Governors' Resolutions Number

Hectares

508

966,331

95 1,436 1,437 750 2,141 839 8,609 2,154

148,630 3,676,763 2,329,353 973,325 2,117,764 897,257 15,313,204 3,074,590

Presidential Resolutions Negative

Positive

Hectares

Beneficiaries

96

260

224,395

59,848

15 28 400 71 255 89 1,327 3,072

72 738 1,664 1,096 754 1,573 11,427 2,914

157,536 1,677,071 3,195,033 2,061,849 1,203,739 2,094,638 19,072,959 5,327,947

17,345 158,204 302,382 155,826 84,009 161,327 774,019 112,447

Source: Mexico (7). Note: For the standard reference on the process of land grants, restitutions, a n d o t h e r agrarian proceedings, see Chavez Padron (1979). T h e governor's resolution was the final step in the process at the state level. A petition approved by the governor was t h e n sent to a federal consultative commission (originally the Comision Nacional Agraria, then the C u e r p o Consultivo Agrario), which studied the case a n d m a d e a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to t h e president. Presidential resolutions in theory conferred rights to the use of a specified p o r t i o n of land. However, a presidential resolution m u s t b e " i m p l e m e n t e d " b e f o r e b e c o m i n g a reality, a step that often did not take place. Nevertheless, the n u m b e r of presidential resolutions signed during a president's term of office is the most c o m m o n l y used indicator of a g r a r i a n r e f o r m activity. T h e accuracy of official a g r a r i a n r e f o r m statistics has often b e e n questioned. Zaragoza a n d Macias (1980) u p d a t e d a n d corrected previously p u b l i s h e d official data on t h e agrarian r e f o r m process by c h e c k i n g t h e m against presidential resolutions published in the Diario Oficial de la Nacion. T h e old data are preferred h e r e for two reasons: first, the revised data do not differ greatly from the old for the period 1915—1946; second, the old data are presented in less c o n d e n s e d form, revealing the individual steps in the agrarian process.

TABLES

180 Tabic 2 Land Granted by Presidential Resolution, 1915-1946 Year

Number of Beneficiaries

Area Granted (Hectares) 3

Area per Beneficiary (Hectares)

0 182 182

0 1,246 1,246

0 6.8 6.8

1917 1918 1919 1920 Subtotal

12,016 19,715 19,478 25,812 77,021

64,208 66,564 57,117 192,791 380,680

5.3 3.4 2.9 7.5 4.9

1921 1922 1923 1924 Subtotal

36,552 18,086 48,500 58,650 161,788

552,130 177,849 465,329 520,274 1,715,582

15.1 9.8 9.6 8.9 10.6

1925 1926 1927 1928 Subtotal

86,174 68,246 82,575 64,592 301,587

880,624 853,369 835,090 604,066 3,173,149

10.2 12.5 10.1 9.4 10.5

1929 Subtotal

126,317 126,317

1,850,532 1,850,532

14.6 14.6

1930 1931 1932 Subtotal

60,367 40,262 16,462 117,091

582,691 660,268 249,349 1,492,308

9.7 16.4 15.1 12.7

1933 1934 Subtotal

42,885 115,254 158,139

538,167 1,509,029 2,047,196

12.5 13.1 12.9

1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Subtotal

110,286 194,427 199,292 118,336 94,779 54,520 771,640

1,923,457 3,985,701 5,808,979 3,472,226 2,203,685 2,680,657 20,074,705

17.4 20.5 29.1 29.3 23.3 49.2 26.0

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 c Subtotal

25,674 23,148 20,295 18,186 11,868 14,237 113,408

1,315,122 1,312,501 794,031 760,689 589,865 674,097 5,446,305

51.2 56.7 39.1 41.8 49.7 47.3 48.0

1,827,173

36,181,703

19.8

1915 1916 Subtotal 6

Total d

Source: Mexico (7). Note: Figures include grants, restitutions, and amplifications. a. Refers to area granted on paper, not to area actually received. b. Subtotals only approximate presidential periods. c. Source of 1946 data: Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 50). d. 1915-1946.

181

TABLES

Table 3 Percentage of Presidential Resolutions Resolved in Favor of Petitioning Villages, 1915-1945 Year

Positive (%)

Year

Positive (%)

1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930

0.0 66.7 81.4 70.4 64.4 85.2 95.7 98.8 97.6 96.1 87.7 70.3 82.8 81.7 92.6 86.2

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

80.6 66.5 81.2 99.7 99.8 97.4 99.1 97.9 69.6 68.1 54.5 51.9 51.6 47.7 55.9

Source: Mexico (7). Note: Figures include grants, restitutions, and amplifications.

182

TABLES

Table 4 Definitive Possessions Awarded Yearly, 1915-1945 Year 1915 1916 Subtotal 3

Number of Beneficiaries

Number of Ejidos

Total Area (Hectares)

Average Area per Beneficiary

0 182 182

0 1 1

0 1,246 1,246

0 6.8 6.8

1917 1918 1919 1920 Subtotal

1,536 14,228 14,772 15,680 46,216

8 58 60 67 193

5,491 63,292 37,639 60,267 166,689

3.6 4.4 2.5 3.8 3.6

1921 1922 1923 1924 Subtotal

25,689 14,670 29,911 63,416 133,686

116 60 128 314 618

173,013 113,157 255,265 582,509 1,123,944

6.7 7.7 8.5 9.2 8.4

1925 1926 1927 1928 Subtotal

78,798 76,480 81,736 59,671 296,685

410 388 397 364 1,559

713,438 762,037 890,304 606,666 2,972,445

9.1 10.0 10.9 10.2 10.0

1929 Subtotal

104,829 104,829

640 640

1,003,849 1,003,849

9.6 9.6

1930 1931 1932 Subtotal

66,176 43,740 20,710 130,626

445 348 203 996

699,512 603,576 339,418 1,642,506

10.6 13.8 16.4 12.6

1933 1934 Subtotal

16,872 51,561 68,433

133 462 595

189,203 597,419 786,622

11.2 11.6 11.5

1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Subtotal

176,556 199,137 181,219 114,695 65,154 71,510 808,271

1,886 2,030 1,917 1,161 733 842 8,569

2,909,371 3,304,911 5,047,571 3,191,949 1,702,511 1,708,466 17,864,779

16.5 16.6 27.9 27.8 26.1 23.9 22.1

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Subtotal

33,281 27,278 36,567 21,836 15,593 134,555

437 363 487 348 233 1,868

895,098 1,180,149 1,163,587 1,102,131 598,969 4,939,934

26.9 43.3 31.8 50.5 38.4 36.7

1,723,483

15,039

30,502,014

17.7

Total*'

Source: Mexico (7). Note: Figures include grants, restitutions, and amplifications. a. Subtotals only approximate presidential periods. b. 1915-1945.

TABLES

183

Table 5 Quality of Land Awarded Through Definitive Possession, 1917-1945 (Percentages) Year

Irrigable

Rainfed

AllOther

1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

15.3 10.5 9.9 7.5 8.2 6.0 5.4 4.2 3.8 3.8 4.7 3.1 3.7 2.7 3.3 2.2 4.8 7.5 5.5 8.8 3.4 4.0 3.8 14.8 2.6 1.7 3.1 1.6 0.9

79.4 44.8 54.4 41.4 40.9 30.1 37.9 31.2 35.4 31.9 30.9 18.4 24.0 21.9 25.4 15.5 20.7 25.6 24.3 22.5 22.6 21.4 19.4 26.8 24.4 12.1 21.8 13.2 24.1

5.3 44.7 35.7 51.1 50.9 63.9 56.7 64.6 60.8 64.2 64.4 78.5 72.3 75.5 71.3 82.3 74.5 66.9 70.1 68.7 74.0 74.6 76.9 58.4 73.0 86.2 75.1 85.2 75.0

Source: Mexico (7). Note: Figures include grants, restitutions, and amplifications; last column (All Other) includes forest, pasture, mountainous, and other uncultivable lands.

184

TABLES

Table 6 Land Distributed as Percentage of All Agricultural Land, by Presidential Period, 1915-1946 Presidential Period Carranza (1915-1920) Obregon (1920-1924) Calles (1924-1928) Maximato (1928-1934) Cardenas (1934-1940) Avila Camacho (1940-1946)

Land Distributed (Millions of Hectares) a

%of Agricultural Land*5

0.4 1.7 3.2 5.4 19.1 5.3

0.3 1.3 2.4 4.1 14.5 3.6

a. From Table 1. b. From Yates (1978: 2: 1084—1087). See his discussion of anomalies in census data. For the purposes of this table, land censused (tierras en unidades de producción) was figured at the 1930 level for 1915-1940 and at the 1950 level for 1940-1946. In the absence of census data on this point until 1930, it is reasonable to assume that agricultural land surface did not grow as fast during 1915-1940 as it did after 1940, when irrigation projects became important. The area censused decreased for 1940, which cannot reflect reality, so the 1930 figure is preferred.

Table 7 Government Investment and Construction in Irrigation, 1926-1946

Years 1926-1928 1929-1934 1935-1940 1941-1946

Investment (Millions of Current Pesos)

Investment (As% of Federal Budget)

Investment (Millions of 1966 Pesos)

New and Improved Irrigated Land (Hectares)

40 51 174 641

4.4 3.3 7.8 12.6

310 448 1,203 2,449

2,000 146,600 118,495 549,129

Source: Orive Alba (1970: 72, 76,81, 88, Table 11).

TABLES

185

Table 8 Land Concentration in Government Irrigation Districts, 1943, 1966 Private Owners

Parcel Size (Hectares)

Ejidatarios

% of Holdings

% of Area

Average Parcel (Hectares)

% of Holdings

% of Area

Average Parcel (Hectares)

56.2 29.5 12.9 1.4

20.0 37.6 33.2 9.3

4.1 14.7 29.5 74.6

90.0 10.0 0 0

66.5 33.5 0 0

4.2 19.1 0 0

1943 0.1 - 10 10.1-20 20.1-50 50.1 + Average a

11.5

5.6

1966 0.1 - 10 10.1-20 20.1-50 50.1 *

68.5 16.7 10.2 4.6

14.8 20.7 27.0 37.4

Average 2

2.8 15.9 33.9 104.1

93.0 6.5 0.5 0

73.4 22.2 4.5 0

12.8

3.5 15.3 43.6 0 4.5

Scwrces: Orive Alba (1946: 115); Orive Alba (1970: 211). Note: Percentage figures may not add to 100 because of r o u n d i n g . a. For parcels of all sizes.

Table 9 The Agricultural Proletariat, 1910-1970

Year

Landless UnreEjidatarios Economically Economically Active Landless Laborers as m u n e r a t e d W h o Work Active %of Family as Wage Population in Agricultural Population Laborers Agriculture Laborers EAP in Laborers (Thousands) (Thousands) (Thousands) Agriculture (Thousands) (%)

1910

5,002

3,597

3,130

87

a

a

1930

5,352

3,626

2,479

68

a

a

1940

6,055

3,831

1,913

50

191

15

1950

8,345

4,008

1,472

37

852

19

1960

10,213

5,045

2,204

44

95

25

1970

12,955

5,122

2,552

50

556

a

Source: Paré (1981: 88, 93). Note: a. N o data available.

186

TABLES

Table 10 Population and Land in the Ejidal Sector, 1930-1950

N u m b e r of Ejidatarios

Total Land (Hectares)

Cropland (Hectares)

Average Land p e r Ejidatario (Hectares)

Aveiage Cropland per Ejidatario (Hectares)

Year

N u m b e r of Ejidos

1930

4,189

898,413

8,344,651

1,940,468

9.3

2.2

1940

14,680

1,601,479

28,922,808

7,045,220

18.1

4.4

1950

17,579

1,552,926

38,893,899

8,790,866

25.0

5.7

Sources: Mexico (26: 107); Mexico (28: 85-86, 9 6 - 9 7 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 ) ; Mexico (30: 7 - 8 , 13-14). Note: For several reasons, these data d o n o t tally with Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t d a t a p r e s e n t e d in T a b l e 2. T h e l a t t e r r e f l e c t a b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s ( t h e n u m b e r of resolutions dealt with at each stage of agrarian proceedings), while the census data a r e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e for giving a picture of t h e agrarian s t r u c t u r e at 10-year intervals. Double counting probably contributes to inflation of Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t figures; the census data represent incomplete a n d sometimes inaccurate samples of landholdings. See Yates 1978 (2: Apéndice Estadístico) for a careful analysis of census data anomalies.

Table 11 Average Number of Days Worked by Ejidatarios (April 1934-April 1935) Average N u m b e r of Days Worked Region Total Mexico North Gulf North Pacific South Pacific Central

O n the Ejido

Off the Ejido

139 178 135 173 150 124

114 71 97 102 33 138

Source: Mexico (26: 107). Note: T h e regional breakdown is the o n e used in the Mexican censuses. Although sometimes criticized (see Reynolds, 1970; Yates, 1978), it has the advantage of standard usage over time. T h e regions are as follows: North—Coahuila, C h i h u a h u a , D u r a n g o , Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, a n d Zacatecas; G u l f — C a m p e c h e , Q u i n t a n a Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán; N o r t h Pacific—Baja California ( N o r t h a n d S o u t h ) , Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora; South Pacific—Colima, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca; Central— Aguascalientes, Distrito Federal, G u a n a j u a t o , H i d a l g o , Jalisco, México, M i c h o a c á n , Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, a n d Tlaxcala.

TABLES

187

Table 12 Ejidatario Employment, 1934-1935 Those Who Total Number Worked Ejido of Ejidatarios Lands

Region

%

of Total

Those Who Worked Chiefly % As Day of Laborers Total

Those Who Practiced Some Art or Trade

of Total

%

Total Mexico

898,413

664,371

73.9

286,991

31.9

75,395

8.4

North

141,785

111,424

78.6

18,319

12.9

7,228

5.1

Gulf

139,241

98,889

71.0

53,437

38.4

8,390

6.0

North Pacific

39,417

20,652

52.4

12,627

32.0

2,578

6.5

South Pacific

90,575

71,415

78.8

22,624

25.0

9,119

10.1

487,395

361,991

74.3

179,984

36.9

48,080

9.9

Central

Source: Mexico (26: 107).

Table 13 Population and Land in the Private Sector, 1930-1950

Year

Number of Holdings

Land (Hectares)

Average Land per Holding (Hectares)

Cropland (Hectares)

Average Cropland per Holding (Hectares)

Holdings 5 Hectares and Under 1930

576,547

889,393

1.5

889,393

1.5

1940

928,593

1,157,285

1.2

1,074,190

1.2

1950

1,004,835

1,362,799

1.4

1,279,815

1.3

Holdings l a r g e r Than 5 Hectares 1930

277,473

122,360,506

441.0

11,787,908

42.5

1940

290,336

98,669,132

339.8

6,751,668

23.3

1950

360,798

105,260.245

291.7

9,857,590

27.3

Source: Mexico (30: 7-8).

188

TABLES

Table 14 Haciendas Affected by the Agrarian Reform, 1915-1932 Size of Affected Holdings

Number of Holdings Affected

Original Area (Hectares)

Affected Area (Hectares) 3

%

Affected

1-500

1,122

350,763

130,413

37.2

501-1,000

1,060

874,148

290,045

33.2

1,001-2,000

1,107

1,631,869

585,448

35.9

2,001-5,000

1,081

3,480,507

1,144,866

32.9

5,001-10,000

507

3,558,426

977,316

27.5

Over 10,000

688

31,415,195

3,814,524

12.1

5,565

41,310,908

6,942,612

16.8

Totals

S//uu>\ Mexico (26). a. Does not include 1,355,362 hectares of national, munic ipal, and state lands.

Table 15 Land Concentration in the Private Sector, 1930-1940 1930

1940

%of Holdings

of Area

%

%of Holdings

of Area

Under 5

69.2

0.8

76.2

1.1

5-50

21.5

2.8

16.6

3.6

51-100

2.9

1.7

2.6

2.4

101-500

4.0

7.1

3.3

9.0

501-1,000

0.9

4.8

0.5

4.4

Over 1,000

1.5

82.8

0.8

79.5

Size of Holding (Hectares)

Source: Tello (1968: 33).

%

TABLES

189

Table 16 Land Distribution Rulings at the State and National Levels, 1934-1940 Governors' Resolutions Region

Number

North

2,347

Gulf

Hectares

Presidential Resolutions Negative

Positive

Hectares Beneficiaries

5,841,464

122

2,900

8,402,594

196,782

1,268

3,773,490

63

1,493

3,593,233

113,891

North Pacific

668

1,887,415

24

753

1,895,564

70,180

South Pacific

871

1,138,896

58

1,031

1,625,598

81,977

Central

3,455

2,671,939

1,060

5,250

3,555,970

311,189

Total Mexico

8,609

15,313,204

1,327

11,427

19.072,959

774,019

Source: Mexico (7).

Tabic 17 Percentage of Lands in Ejidal and Private Sectors, 1930-1950 Year

All Land

Cropland

Irrigable Land

93.7 6.3

86.6 13.4

86.9 13.1

77.5 22.5

52.6 47.4

42.6 57.4

73.2 26.8

55.9 44.1

50.2 49.8

1930 Private Ejidal 1940 Private Ejidal 1950 Private Ejidal

Source: Adapted f r o m Reyes Osorio et al. (1974: 55).

TABLES

190

Table 18 Concentration of Ejidal and Prívate Cropland, 1940 Ejidal Sector Area of Plot (Hectares)

% o f E j idatarios (in Possession of Cropland)

% of Area

9.1 12.6 22.3 21.1 22.5 9.9 2.5

1.0 3.3 11.7 17.9 30.0 22.4 13.8

Less than 1 1-2 2-4 4-6 6-10 10-20 More than 20 Gini index of concentration 3

0.632 Private Sector

Area of Plot (Hectares) 0-5 5.1-10 10.1-25 25.1-50 50.1-100 100.1-200 200.1-400 400.1-800 800.1-2,000 2,000.1-4,000 More than 4,000 Gini index of concentration 3

% of Holdings

% of Area

26.0 30.5 24.7 10.3 5.2 2.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 h

2.8 8.2 14.2 13.1 13.1 10.9 6.1 6.0 6.7 4.7 14.4

0.808

Source: Mexico (28); Mexico (29). a. The Gini index (calculated here by the author) is a measure of the inequality of land distribution. See note 16, Chapter 7. b. Less than 0.1.

Table 19 Concentration of Ejidal Cropland Within Regions, 1940 Region

GiniIndex

Total Mexico

0.632

North

0.572

Gulf

0.644

North Pacific

0.588

South Pacific

0.626

Central

0.642

Source: Mexico (28). Note: The Gini index (calculated here by the author) is a measure of the inequality of land distribution. See note 16, Chapter 7.

TABLES

191

Table 20 Distribution of Land, Capital, and Value of Production by Land Tenure Sector, 1930-1950 (Percentages) Private Holdings Larger than 5 Hectares*

Ejidos

5 Hectares or Less15

1930

1940

1950

1940

1950

1930

1940

1950

Proprietors' 1

53.2

11.9

13.1

38.1

36.7

46.8

50.0

50.2

Cropland (area)

86.6

45.4

49.4

7.2

6.4

13.4

47.4

44.2

Value of land

89.8

59.0

60.7

5.1

3.8

10.2

35.9

35.5

Value of capital"1

96.3

46.1

66.7

1.3

2.0

3.7

52.6

31.3

Value of machinery and equipment

94.4

45.8

62.8

4.2

3.8

5.6

50.0

33.4

e

25.1

49.4

52.6

11.7

e

22.3

38.9

Value of production' 89.3

36.0

45.7

20.4

7.7

10.7

43.6

34.1

Value of agricultural production 89.0

40.2

54.1

9.3

8.7

11.0

50.5

37.2

Value of livestock

Source: Adapted from Eckstein (1966: 62). a. For 1930, all holdings larger than 1 hectare. b. No data for 1930. c. Ejidatarios or landowners. d. Excluding land and livestock. e. No data. f. Agriculture, livestock, and forestry.

Table 21 Value of Agricultural Produce Maifceted by Ejidos, 1930-1970

Year

Value of Agricultural Production (Thousands of Pesos)

Value of Sales (Thousands of Pesos)

I Marketed

1930

90,304

42,587

47.2

1950

1,913,806

1,384,928

72.4

1970

11,325,770

9,767,356

86.2

Sources: Mexico (26: 41); Mexico (30: 208, 211); Mexico (31: 331, 337).

TABLES

192

Table 22 Concessions of Exemption from Land Reform Expropriation, by Presidential Period, 1934-1946 Livestock Concessions N u m b e r of Concessions

Area (Hectares)

Cattle (Head)

Sheep (Head)

1937-1940 Total Yearly average

107 36

1,166,562 388,854

121,561 40,520

100,197 33,399

1940-1946 Total Yearly average

336 56

3,449,391 574,899

372,619 62,103

226,163 37,694

Years

Agricultural Concessions 3 N u m b e r of Concessions

Years

Average Area (Hectares)

Total Area (Hectares)

1934-1940

1,396

197,546

141.5

1940-1946

11,957

1,090,952

91.2

Source: Mexico (7). a. Beginning with the Agrarian Code of 1940 (Articles 252-254), owners of e x e m p t property could request, in addition to the inscription of the property in the National Agrarian Register a n d the Diario Oficial, a resolution of e x e m p t status signed by the president a n d entered in the National Agrarian Register. See Fabila (1941: 759).

Table 23 BNCE Credits to Ejidos, 1936-1946

Year

Total 3

Private Capital 3

%

BNCE Funds3

%

1936

23,278

0

0

23,278

100.0

1937

82,880

0

0

82,880

100.0

1938

63,442

24,163

38.1

39,279

61.9

1939

61,177

50,928

83.2

10,249

16.8

1940

59,149

45,238

76.5

13,911

23.5

1941

63,420

49,172

77.5

14,248

22.5

1942

68,038

40,732

59.9

27,306

40.1

1943

103,257

61,818

59.9

41,439

40.1

1944

108,442

84,206

77.7

24,236

22.3

1945

108,768

83,476

76.7

25,292

23.3

1946

131,157

112,301

85.6

18,856

14.4

Source: Adapted from Noble (1949: 41). a. Thousands of pesos.

193

TABLES

Table 24 BNCA Lending, 1926-1946

Year

Total*

Lent to Credit Societies 3

1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946

16,654 8,578 5,067 3,102 2,999 1,162 2,080 2,174 6,190 18,940 11,459 19,535 11,500 6,284 6,303 6,585 10,244 13,973 19,918 25,884 27,433

329 1,230 1,141 1,831 1,949 603 1,625 2,174 6,087 18,689 11,459 19,154 11,212 5,620 5,888 6,551 9,917 13,323 19,015 24,838 26,398

%

Lent to Private Parties 3

%

2.0 14.3 22.5 59.0 65.0 51.9 78.1 100.0 98.3 98.7 100.0 98.0 97.5 89.4 93.4 99.5 96.8 95.3 95.5 96.0 96.2

16,325 7,349 3,927 1,272 1,050 559 455 0 103 251 0 381 288 664 415 34 328 650 903 1,046 1,035

98.0 85.7 77.5 41.0 35.0 48.1 21.9 0.0 1.7 1.3 0.0 2.0 2.5 10.6 6.6 0.5 3.2 4.7 4.5 4.0 3.8

Smira: Noble (1949: 30, 78). a. Thousands of pesos.

Table 25 Division of Ejidos into Parcels, 1926-1946 Years

Number of Communities

Number of Parcels

Area Parceled (Hectares)

Number of Titles Issued

1926-1934 Total Yearly average

348 44

62,659 7,832

156,807 19,601

65,088 8,136

1934-1940 Total Yearly average

473 79

58,442 9,740

206,223 34,371

28,667 4,778

1940-1946 Total Yearly Average

839 140

84,964 14,161

456,705 76,118

30,705 5,118

Source: Mexico (5, 7).

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Index

Acasillados, 38, 54-55, 62, 64, 85, 86, 87 Acosta, Miguel, 66 Aggregate d e m a n d effects, 90 Agrarian censuses, 55 Agrarian change: revolutionary model, 5-7 Agrarian Code: and ejidal districts, 65; a n d inafectabilidades ganaderas, 107-108 Agrarian commissions: Constitutionalist, 27, 37; Conventionist, 30; state, 62, 63 Agrarian " c o u n t e r r e f o r m " : interpretation of, 121 Agrarian D e p a r t m e n t : a n d amparo, 161; b u d g e t of, 87, 106; and La L a g u n a collectives, 148; a n d landless p o p u l a t i o n , 141; a n d landlord interests, 107, 139, 143, 160; a n d Plan Sexenal, 86 Agrarian law of April 1927, 54-55 Agrarian r e f o r m , 2 - 4 , 8 - 9 , 36, 48, 152; b o u r g e o i s m o d e l of, 2, 5, 7; b u d g e t for, 86; u n d e r Cárdenas, 9 0 - 9 1 , 116; a n d conflict between "small" a n d "large" property, 157; a n d crisis of 1926, 48; a n d dissension within regime, 84-86, 95; a n d e c o n o m i c growth, 89; e n d of, 1, 9, 108, 163, 168; in La Laguna, 99-100; in Latin America, 90; l a n d l o r d opposition to, 3, 29, 3 8 - 3 9 , 54, 142-143; limitations of, 2, 97-98, 99, 139-142, 150; pressures against, in 1940s, 138 n.24;

a n d regime, 48, 64, 79, 103, 165-166; results of, by early 1930s, 55-56, 84; Senate o p p o s i t i o n to, 38-39 Agrarian r e f o r m i s m , 116-117, 168 Agrarian revolution, 3, 54 Agrarian s t r u c t u r e : c h a n g e s in, u n d e r Cárdenas, 8 8 - 8 9 Agrarista auxiliaries: a n d Cristero war, 52, 61 Agraristas, Veracruz, 39 Agricultural credit banks, 108. See also National Agricultural C r e d i t Bank; National Ejidal C r e d i t Bank Agricultural Credit Law: a n d collective ejidos, 148, 154 n. 30. See also Legislation, a g r a r i a n Agricultural crisis of 1960s, 136, 168 Agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t , 49, 131-132, 167 Agricultural engineers, 42 Agricultural machinery, 135 Agricultural Mobilization Plan, 132-133 Agricultural p r o d u c t i o n : a n d collective ejidos, 96; a n d Cristero war, 54; ejidal a n d private, 54, 90, 116, 122; a n d World War II, 131, 132 Agricultural sector, 136 n.4, 168 Agriculture, 1 , 8 5 , 106, 132 Agriculture, large private, 1, 2, 37; d o m i n a n c e of, over ejidos, 98, 168; " g o l d e n age" of, 89, 168. See also H a c i e n d a s Aguirre, Vicente, 151 Alcohol p r o d u c t i o n , 135

205

206 Alemán, Miguel, 9, 123, 163, 167 Almazán, Juan Andreu, 107, 127, 128 Alvarado, Salvador, 27, 43 Amaro, Joaquín, 50, 106, 127 Amilpa, Fernando, 77 Amparo: constitutional prohibition of, 65, 163 n.3; constitutional reinstatement of, 123, 153, 159, 167; definition of, 158; granted against provisional possessions, 39; and latifundismo, 140, 158; legal prohibition of, 64 Amplifications of ejidos, 48, 55, 64, 65, 148 Anderson, Clayton and Company, 135-136, 150 Angeles, Felipe, 20 Antiagrarista violence, 55-56, 67 Anticipos: and SICAE of Los Mochis, 144, 154 n.18 Anticommunal legislation, 14 Armed forces: and Cristero war, 61; and irrigation conflicts, 152; protection of landlords by, 31, 39, 67, 161; reforms of, 62, 106 Army officers, proreform, 33; enrichment of, after Revolution, 31, 36, 47 Arriaga, Ponciano, 28 Arroyo Ch., Agustín, 64 Article 130 (Constitution of 1917), 52 Article 3 (Constitution of 1917), 128 Ardele 27 (Constitution of 1917), 28, 37, 38, 64, 66; and amparo, 65, 167; and Circular 51,41; modifications of (1991), 1, 117 Association of Deputies to the Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917, 160 Avila, Fidel, 19 Avila Camacho, Manuel: and agricultural development, 131-132, 167; and conciliation of ejidatarios and proprietors, 157, 160; land distribution under, 139, 142-143; and landless population, 141; presidency of, 125, 128-129; and property rights, 159-160; and Yucatán collective ejidos, 145

INDEX Banco de México, 47 Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, 150 Banco Nacional de México, 76 Bankers, foreign, 54 Banking bureaucracy, agricultural, 106 Barba González, Silvano, 163 Barbosa, FranciscoJ., 55 Bartra, Roger, 118 n.9 "Black Hand," 67 Blanco, Lucio, 26 Bolshevik Party, 5 - 6 Bonapartism: and agrarian policy, 31-32, 54, 63-64; and cardenismo, 76, 77; definition of, 3-4; of postPorfirian regime, 31-32, 35-37; and PRM, 79 Bonilla, Manuel, 19 Bonillas, Ignacio, 33 Bourgeoisie: agricultural, 97; antiPorfirian, 13; "democratic," 127; Mexican, 75, 116, 135, 136, 165; Monterrey, 78, 128 Browder, Earl, 127 Bureaucracy: agrarian, 28, 106, 165; cardenista, 123, 167; postPorfirian, 2, 4, 31 Cabrera, Luis, 24-25, 26, 85, 115 Caciquismo, 151 Caja de Préstamos, 39 Calles, Plutarco Elias: and agrarian reform, 47, 48, 51, 53-54, 55-56, 56 n.8, 59, 63, 64, 83; and agricultural development, 49, 51; background of, 36, 83; and de la Huerta rebellion, 43; a n d Escobar rebellion, 60, 61; expulsion of, from Mexico, 101 n . l ; and jefatura máxima, 65; and Lázaro Cárdenas, 74; and Mussolini, 56 n.3; a n d organized labor, 47; and Ortiz Rubio, 62-63, 64; and PCM, 53; and PNR, 60, 77; reforms of armed forces under, 106; and tejedismo, 66-67 Callistas, 85-86, 95, 115 Calpulli, 13 Campa, Valentín, 77, 100 Campesinistas, 116, 118 n.11 "Campesino unification," 103

INDEX

Cañonazos, 39, 45 n.10, 50 Capital: foreign, 3, 54, 140, 150, 167; opposition of, to agrarian reform, 122; regime defense of, 9, 36, 126, 136, 168; a n d sugar industry, 134 Capital accumulation: a n d agrarian communities, 6; and ejidos, 115, 168 Capital flight, 107 Capitalism: a n d Circular 51, 41-42; and ejidos, 115-116; a n d limits of agrarian reform, 109, 121, 122, 123, 167; a n d post-Porfirian regime, 79 Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc, 169 Cárdenas, Lázaro: and agrarian structure, 88-89, 109, 166; and a r m e d forces, 106; brief biography of, 73-74; and Calles, 63, 64, 77; a n d "campesino unification," 103-105; a n d collective ejidos, 95-97; a n d expropriable land shortage, 122, 123 n.4; and foreign capital, 78, 109; a n d inafectabilidades ganaderas, 107; and land invasions, 95; and landlessness in La Laguna, 141; loyalty to regime of, 79 n.2; and Monterrey manufacturers, 78; myth of, 3, 73; and Office of Small Property, 108, 159; p r o r e f o r m philosophy of, 74, 80 n.6; a n d tejedismo, 66-67; view of labor-capital relationship, 76; a n d worker, peasant movements, 75; a n d World War II, 125, 129 n.13 Cardenismo: end of, 8, 126, 136; and illusions in bourgeois State, 8, 121; limitations of, 78, 116, 168; political legacy of, 75, 78-79 Cardenistas: a n d agrarian reform, 74-75, 85-86, 115; a n d socialism, 76 Carrancistas, 23-24, 74 Carranza, Venustiano: a n d antiH u e r t a movement, 25; assassination of, 33; a n d ejido, 115; and "exile" in Veracruz, 26; opposition of, to reform, 20, 25-33, 165; a n d recovery of landlord property, 31; war of peasantry against, 13 Carranza-Obregón split, 31-32

207 Casia divina, 39 Castro, José Agustín, 27 Caudillos, regional, 105-106 Cedillo, Saturnino: a n d Cárdenas, 67; rebellion of, 106, 107, 108, 166; s u p p o r t of, for regime, 60 Central Campesina I n d e p e n d i e n t e (CCI), 79 n.2 Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Agrarias, 118 n . l 1 Certificados de inafectabilidad, 106, 163, 164 n.23 Certificates of compensation: 159, 161 Chiapas: landlord sabotage of ejidos in, 97 Church, R o m a n Catholic, 1, 52 Científicos, 18, 22 n.20 Circulars 40, 42, 44, 47, 48 (CNA, 1920-1921), 40 Circular 51 (CNA, O c t o b e r 1922), 44; and cooperativism in peasant agriculture, 41-42 Class struggle: limitation of, by PCM, 77, 126, 127 Colonization, agricultural: in Plan Sexenal, 87; results of, 49, 87, 92 n . l 3 ; as substitute for land reform, 49, 139 Comintern, 53, 62, 96 C o m m e r c e , 151 C o m m u n i s t Party (U.S.), 127 Communities, landholding, 13-17, 165 C o m o n f o r t , Ignacio, 14 Compensation. See I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n Conciliation, political: u n d e r Avila Camacho, 123 Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), 103, 105, 106-107; a n d decline of r e f o r m , 100; a n d leadership of rural struggles, 96; prowar stance of, 126; a n d SI CAE of Los Mochis, 144-145 Constitutional Convention (Querétaro, 1916-1917), 27 Constitutionalism, left wing, 37, 165-166 Constitutionalist army, 74 Constitution of 1917: a n d agrarian r e f o r m , 121, 139; a n d ejidos, 113; a n d guarantees for property, 165;

208 m a x i m u m interpretation of, 76-77, 168; O b r e g ó n ' s influence on, 34 n.13 Convention of Aguascalientes, 26, 30 Cooperatives. See Ejidos, collective Cooperativism, 41, 49-50 C o r r u p t i o n , 98 Cotton production, 147 Credit: a n d caciquismo, 151 Credit, government: a n d collective ejidos, 97, 148-149; a n d private capital, 108. See also National Agricultural Credit Bank; National Ejidal Credit Bank Cristero war, 52, 54, 60, 61, 62, 83, 166 Daniels, Josephus, 75, 109 Dejanvry, Alain, 90 De la Huerta, Adolfo: 37, 39; rebellion of, 42-44, 166 De la O, Genovevo, 35 Debt: agrarian, 31-32, 54, 109; foreign, 47-48, 53; internal, 53-54. See also Indemnification Decree of December 11, 1940, 142 Decree o f j a n u a r y 6, 1915, 20, 26-29, 31, 121 Defensas agrarias, 61, 62 Democracy, rural: failure of, 152 Denegrí, Ramón P., 41-43, 166 D e p a r t m e n t of Agrarian Reform, 142, 153 n.14 D e p a r t m e n t of Agriculture, 49, 132, 133,135, 140, 161, 162 D e p a r t m e n t of Ejido Development, 41 D e p a r t m e n t of Labor, 107 Derechos a salvo. See Landless population Díaz, Porfirio, 13, 15 Echeverría, Luis, 168 Economic crisis of 1926, 48, 53 Economic development: and agraria n reform, 85-86, 163 Economic reconstruction, 4 7 - 4 8 Ejidal districts, 65-66, 87 Ejidatarios: emigration of, to U.S., 134; incomes of, 89-90; a n d irrigation projects, 51, 141; as peasants, 168; as wage laborers, 114

INDEX

Ejido organization, 41-42, 86, 168 Ejidos, 1-2, 95-102, 113-118; a n d acasillados, 40; and advantages of private property, 38, 51; and Circular 51, 41—42; concentration of l a n d h o l d i n g in, 89; creation of, 23-25, 27-28, 32-33, 165; decline of, 1, 90, 136, 168; in early legislation, 20, 38, 55; and hired labor, 118 n. 10; a n d irrigation conflicts, 151-152; origins, 14; parcels a n d titles in, 104, 106, 142, 153 n. 11 ; and pressures of capital, 122; regional differences, 89; rental and sale o f l a n d in, 1, 89, 114, 151-153, 167; a n d rural wages, 2, 24, 25; a n d social change, 4, 113-118, 168; social divisions within, 89, 167; status of, by 1930, 166; status of, by 1940, 88, 166; and sugar industry, 134-135 Ejidos, collective: 96-101, 101 n.7, 101 n.14, 102 n.17, 116, 154 n.30, 166; conflicts of, with regime, 142; decline of, 109-110, 143-150, 154 n.33, 167; failure of, 98, 103-104 El caudillo. See O b r e g ó n , Alvaro Elections, legislative, 1943, 126 El Extensionista, 42 El Mante, Tamaulipas: worker-peasant cooperative, 98-99 El Potrero Sugar Mill, 84 Encina, Dionisio, 99-100 Escobar, J. Gonzalo: and g o v e r n m e n t credit, 50; rebellion of, 60-62, 166 Estrada, Enrique, 40 Export markets, 107 Expropriation of land: legislation allowing, 3 7 - 3 8 Farmer, N o r t h American, 85 Fascism, E u r o p e a n , 125 Fascistic groups: increase of, 107 Fertilizers: campaign to popularize, 132 First Chief. See Carranza, Venustiano Fomento de Yucatán, 146 Fraction 14 of Article 27 (Constitution of 1917), 134, 158 Fuel shortages, 134 Fuerte River, 144

INDEX

Fundo legal, 14 Futurismo, 125 Galván, Ursulo, 53 García, León, 109 García Aragón, Guillermo, 74 Gasea, Celestino, 44 n.2 General C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Mexican Workers a n d Peasants (CGOCM), 84 Genetic innovations in agriculture: Mexican g o v e r n m e n t research on, 132 German-Soviet pact, 127 Gini index, 89, 92 n.16 Gómez, Abundio, 50 Gómez, Arnulfo, 52 Gómez, Marte R.: and BNCA, 50; a n d carrancismo, 30; a n d casta divina, 39; a n d Circular 51, 41^*2; a n d collective ejidos, 145-146, 147; a n d ejidal land rentals, 152-153; a n d execution o f j . Guadalupe Rodríguez, 62; and e x p r o p r i a t e land shortage, 122; a n d landlessness, 141; a n d Law of Ejido Patrimony, 49; and Mussolini, 56 n.3; opposition of, to amparo, 157, 161-163; a n d PCM, 75; support of, for agrarian reform, 54, 160, 166 Gómez a n d Serrano revolt, 166 González, Pablo, 30, 35 González Gallo, Jesús, 162 G o o d Neighbor Policy, 75 Governors, antireform, 39, 143 Grain imports, 132 Great Depression, 62-63, 75-76,

86

G r e e n Revolution, 132 Guardias blancas, 39, 67, 142-143 H a c i e n d a El Carrizal, 140 H a c i e n d a Ferrara, 84 H a c i e n d a La Purísima, 30 Haciendas, 2 , 1 3 , 14, 15-16; and cardenismo, 87; policy u n d e r Carranza a n d O b r e g ó n , 28-33, 36-38; status of, by 1930, 83-84, 166; status of, by 1940, 88; survival of, after Revolution, 25. See also Agriculture, large private

209

H e n e q u e n e r o s de Yucatán, 97, 145, 146, 147 H e n e q u e n processing, 145-146 Huerta, Victoriano, 13 Huertistas: arid Cárdenas, 74 Hull, Cordell, 109 Idle lands law, 31 Imperialism, U.S., 131, 169 Import-Export Company, 133 I m p o r t limitations, 107 I m p o r t substitution, 132 Imports: increase of, f r o m U.S., 107 Inafectabilidades ganaderas, 107-108 Indemnification: issue of, u n d e r Carranza, 29, 31-32; for land a n d oil expropriations, 128; to landlords u n d e r Avila Camacho, 160 Industrialization: plans of Calles for, 47-48 Industry, basic: Porfirian origins of, 90 Inflation, 107, 132 Institutional Revolutionary Party, 169 Intermediate goods: d e m a n d for, 90 International Harvester, 135 Irrigation: a n d caciquismo, 151; a n d cane p r o d u c t i o n , 135; federal e x p e n d i t u r e on, 50-51, 106, 132; and private agriculture, 168 Irrigation districts, 150, 151-152 Irrigation projects, 51, 57 n.20, 131, 132, 136 Jacobins: a n d Constitution of 1917, 27-28 Jefatura máxima: failure of, 65 Juicio de garantías. See Amparo Labor: right to exploit, 121 Labor, agricultural: a n d large private agriculture, 168; migration of, to U.S., 134, 138 n.17 Labor bureaucracy, 166, 167 Laborde, H e r n á n , 105, 127 Labor law, Federal, 87 Labor militancy, 123 Labor movement, u r b a n , 17 Labor strikes, 95-96, 128 La Laguna, 87, 95, 97, 103, 141; a n d collective ejidos, 147-149; ejidal

210 districts in, 65-66; a n d the left, 99-100 Land, e x p r o p r i a t e : shortage of, 122, 139, 167 Land, irrigated, 51, 141, 151-152, 160 Land, speculation in, 51, 151, 152 Land concessions, Porfirian, 139-140 Land distribution: u n d e r Avila Camacho, 121, 139, 142-143, 167; u n d e r Calles, 52; u n d e r Cárdenas, 87-88, 109; u n d e r Carranza, 29, 165; d u r i n g maximato, 61, 63, 65; u n d e r O b r e g ó n , 39-40, 43; Land grants: size of, u n d e r agrarian law, 38, 55 Landholding, concentration of: 51, 88-89, 151, 167 Landholdings, exempt: size of, u n d e r agrarian law, 38, 55, 141 Landless population, 84, 141, 153 n.9, 165, 166 Landlords: advantages of, u n d e r agrarian law, 48, 64, 97; and agrarian censuses, 55; a n d antiagrarista terror, 30, 39, 152, 158; a n d collective ejidos, 97; a n d ejidal districts, 65-66; and government credit, 50; a n d h e n e q u e n industry, 146-147; a n d irrigation projects, 51; a n d Office of Small Property, 108; opposition of, to agrarian reform, 2, 29, 38-39, 54, 142-143, 145,157, 158, 161-162, 167; and recovery of expropriated property, 28, 30-31, 66-67, 165; regime protection of, 38-39. See also Agriculture, large private; Haciendas Landlords, foreign: compensation to, 54, 58 n.29, 140 Land reform. See Agrarian reform Late-industrializing countries, 3 - 4 Latifundio. See Agriculture, large private; Haciendas Latifundismo, 51, 86, 139-140, 167 Law of Ejido Patrimony, 42, 48-49, 66 League of Agrarian Communities (LCA): La Laguna, 104; Tamaulipas, 52-53; Veracruz, 66

INDEX

Leagues of Agrarian Communities, 52-53, 103 Lecona, Noé, 163 Left, Mexican: a n d decline of reform, 99-100, 147, 166, 167; a n d ejidos, 96, 116-117, 168; a n d Lázaro Cárdenas, 73; a n d support for agrarian reform, 4 Leftists: purge of, from Avila Camacho cabinet, 128 Legal system: a n d support of landlords, 39 Legislación y jurisprudencia sobre terrenos baldíos, 16 Legislation, agrarian: u n d e r Carranza, 31-33; opposition to, 38-39; u n d e r Ortiz Rubio, 64-65; and protection of landlords, 37-38, 48, 68 n.20 Lenin, V.I.: writings on peasantry, 5, 114-115 León, Luis L„ 49, 50, 64, 85, 101 n . l Ley Calles, 52 Ley Lerdo, 14, 23 Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC), 34 n . l 3 , 40 Liberal Party, 37, 44 n.4 Liberating Army of the South, 17 Livestock industry, 139-140 Lombardia and Nueva Italia, Michoacán, 97 L o m b a r d o Toledano, Vicente, 77, 100, 126-127 López d e Lara, César, 39 Lorenz curve, 92 n . l 6 Los grandes problemas nacionales, 16 Machinery, agricultural: supply of, 131 Maderismo: a n d Antonio I. Villarreal, 44 n.4 Maderistas, 23-24 Madero, Francisco I., 17-18, 165 Magaña, Gildardo, 33, 36 Maize, 132-133, 135 Market, internal: in cardenista economic strategy, 76 Martial law: u n d e r Carranza, 31 Marx, Karl: and process of primitive accumulation, 5 Marxism: and Lázaro Cárdenas, 74 Mayo tribe, 37

INDEX Mechanization, 168 Meixueiro, Jorge, 109 Mendoza López S., Miguel, 43, 45 n.22 Mexican Communist Party (PCM): and "campesino unification," 105; and Cárdenas, 77,96; and La Laguna, 100-103; and Obregón, Calles, 53; and PRM, 79; and repression of 1929, 62, 67 n.12; and rural struggles of 1930s, 84, 96, 99-100; and tejedismo, 53, 66; and World War II, 127 Mexican Laborist Party, 36, 47 Mexican Peasant Confederation (CCM), 67, 106-107, 109 Mexican-United States Commission for Economic Cooperation, 131 Meza, Manuel, 85 Middle sectors: and PRM, 79 Military: and PRM, 79 Military chiefs: and agrarian question, 28 Military colonists, 17 Military ejidos, 27, 29, 37 Militias, peasant, 67 Minifundistas, 84 Minimum wage legislation, 83-84 Mixed Commissions for Agricultural Development, 152, 155 n.43 Molina Enríquez, Andrés, 34 n.13, 85, 157 Monzón, Luis G., 49 Morelos agrarian democracy, 20, 121 Morones, Luis, 36, 44 n.2, 47, 76, 101 n.l Morrow, Dwight, 53-54, 55, 61 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, 79 n.2 Múgica, FranciscoJ., 27, 43, 80 n.6, 125 Narodnik Party: and Russian peasantry, 115 National Agrarian Commission (CNA), 28-30, 32, 38-39, 41-43, 49, 65, 86 National Agrarian Register, 164 n.23 National Agrarista Party, 39 National Agricultural Credit Bank (BNCA), 49-50, 133, 150-151

211 National Arbitration Commission, 135 National Committee for Proletarian Defense (CNDP), 77 National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP), 128 National Congress of Agrarian Law, 163 National Distributing and Regulating Agency, 133 National Ejidal Credit Bank (BNCE): and agricultural prices, 133; and Anderson, Clayton, and Company, 135, 150; and anticipos, 154 n.18; and caciquismo, 151; and collective ejidos, 97, 98, 103-104, 144, 148-149; corruption in, 106; and ejidal land rentals, 152; and private capital, 109, 150 National Irrigation Commission, 151, 152 National Peasant Confederation (CNC), 79 n.2, 84-85, 88, 104, 144, 166 National Peasant League (LNC), 53, 62, 66, 103 National Revolutionary Party (PNR), 60, 65, 66, 86-87, 105 National Union of Sugar Producers, 134 "National unity": and Avila Camacho government, 107, 125-126, 129 Neocardenismo, 168 Northern Division, 18, 20 Novelo Torres, Ernesto, 145 Obregon, Alvaro: agrarian policy of, 48; and agricultural development, 37; and antiagrarismo in Veracruz, 39; and Article 27, 34 n.l3; assassination of, 59; background of, 3, 35-37, 83; a n d bonapartism, 35-37; and campaign for second presidential term, 51, 57 n.22; and Constitutionalism, 26, 27, 33; and CROM, 44 n.2; and de la Huerta rebellion, 42-44; land distribution under, 39-40, 43; as model agricultural capitalist, 85; and National Agrarian Commission, 41; and PCM, 53; and peasantry,

212 83; and Villarreal, Antonio, 39-41; and Zapatistas, 20 Obregón-Calles conflict, 51, 52 Office of Small Property, 108, 159, 161,162 Officials, local: and antiagrarista terror, 152 Orona, Arturo, 147 Orozco, Wistano Luis, 85 Ortega, Melchor, 101 n.l Ortiz, Eulogio, 66 Ortiz Rubio, Pascual, 62-65 Osorio, Saturnino, 67 Pact of Torreón, 37 Palomas Land and Cattle Company, 140 Parity system: government opposition to, 133-134 Parra, Manuel, 67 Partido Laborista Mexicano. See Mexican Laborist Party Partido Liberal Mexicano. See Liberal Party Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM): 79, 109, 125, 128; and ejidos, 88, 166 Peasant congresses, state, 103 Peasant "mode of production." See Bartra, Roger Peasantry: agrarian program of, 6, 8; and capitalism, 115; and cardenismo, 76, 77, 78-79; conservatism of, 142, 143, 149; and early agrarian laws, 38; and early land distribution, 28; and government credit, 50; militancy of, during 1930s, 83-84,166; and Obregón, 36-37; organization of, 53; political importance of, 36, 37, 83,105; and PRM, 79; proregime, 43, 60-62, 166; regime control of, 105-107; and Revolution, 13-17, 165; in revolutionary theory, 5-6, 114-117, 169; and sugar industry, 134-135; in Veracruz, 83; and World War II, 126 Pepsi-Cola: and sugar deficit, 134 Pequeños propietarios, 3, 141, 143. See also Small property Pest and disease control: research on, 132

INDEX Petroleum companies: expropriation of, 78, 107, 109, 125, 129 n.3 Petroleum exports: decline of, 48 Petroleum industry: role of private capital in, 128 Petroleum law: and Dwight Morrow, 53 Petty bourgeoisie, liberal: and Almazan candidacy, 128 Plan de Ayala, 17-18 Plan Sexenal, 86-88, 95 Plantations: exemption of, from expropriation, 55, 64 Political conflict: effect on agrarian reform of, 51-52, 56 Political stability: role of agrarian reform in, 54 Popular front: and PCM, 79, 96, 105, 127 Popular sector: and Avila Cainacho government, 128 Population, rural: status of, by 1930, 166 Porfirian conditions: persistence of, 139-140 Porfirian State: destruction of, 165 Porfirian-style growth: debate on, in 1930s, 85-86 Porfiriato: and despoliation of village lands, 165 Portes Gil, Emilio, 3, 52-54, 60-62, 64, 66, 75 Potrero del Llano: sinking of, 126 Presidential election of 1940: and agrarian reform, 123, 125-126 Presidential resolutions, 108, 161 Prices, agricultural, 132, 133 Primitive accumulation, process of, 5 Processing plants: hostility of owners to ejidos, 98 Procuradores de pueblos, 43 Proletariat: and Almazan candidacy, 128; and cardenismo, 76-79; and demand for manufactures, 90; formation of, 33; in 1940s, 126; and Obregon, 35-36; and peasantry, 117; and PRM, 79; and revolution, 169 Proletariat, agricultural, 38, 87; and cardenismo, 76, 88, 116; conversion of, to peasantry, 99-100, 143, 144,

INDEX

148; militancy of, by 1930, 83-84, 166 Property, private agricultural: advantages of, 38, 55; a n d Constitution of 1917, 77, 165; a n d creation of ejidos, 24; and credit for peasant agriculture, 49-50; a n d irrigation conflicts, 152; limits o n ownership of, 37-38; protection of, 3, 33, 38, 54, 85-86, 113, 116, 121-122, 139-141, 153, 157-158, 165, 167; registration a n d entitlement of, 159, 164 n. 23; survival of, after Revolution, 25 Propios, 14 Provisional possessions, 29, 37, 39 Public lands, 15 Public works programs, 90 Pueblos. Se« Communities, landholding Quiroga, Pablo, 67 Railroad construction, 15 "Reconstitution of the Ejidos of the Pueblos as a Means of Suppressing the Slavery of the Mexican Agricultural Worker," 24-25 R e e d , J o h n , 18, 19 Regime, post-Porfirian, 3-4, 75, 103, 106, 168-169; a n d amparo, 162; antireform faction of, 68 n.19; and Cárdenas, 73, 74, 79 n.2; a n d control oí ejidos, 166; a n d domestic bourgeoisie, 135; institutionalization of, 51-52, 56, 65; proreform faction of, 63-64, 75, 168; pseudorevolutionary ideology of, 79, 113-114; a n d separation of peasantry f r o m proletariat, 104-105; unity a n d dissension in, 86,95 Regional C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Mexican Workers (CROM), 36, 44 n.2, 47, 76 Reglamento Agrario (1922), 27, 38, 48 Relations of production, precapitalist, 2 , 9 n.3, 17,21 n.17, 62 Religious question: a n d Dwight Morrow, 53

213

Research, agricultural, 132, 167 Revolution of 1910: a n d agrarian reform, 2-3, 4, 7 - 8 , 16-20, 165 Robinson Bours, Tomás, 50 Rockefeller Foundation, 132 Rodríguez, Abelardo, 3, 36, 65-67, 68 n.26, 75 Rodríguez, J. G u a d a l u p e , 55, 62 Rodríguez, Luis I., 104 Rodriguez Triana, Pedro, 103 Rojas, Luis, 55 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 125 Roosevelt government: a n d PCM, 127 Rouaix, Pastor, 26 Rubio, Noradino, 152 Rural protest: d u r i n g n i n e t e e n t h century, 14-16 Rural reserves, 105-106 Saenz, Aaron, 36 Salaries: stagnation of, d u r i n g World War II, 126 Salinas d e Gortari, Carlos, 1, 2, 9 Sánchez, Guadalupe, 39 Sánchez, Graciano, 8 4 - 8 5 Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria. See D e p a r t m e n t of Agrarian R e f o r m Senate: a n d protection of landlords, 38-39 Serrano, Francisco, 52 Shulgovski, Anatoli, 75, 80 n.7 SICAE of Los Mochis, Sinaloa, 143-145 Silva Herzog, Jesús, 3 Silver exports, 48, 107 Simpson, Eyler Newton, 56 n.9, 91 n.8, 113 Six-Year Plan. See Plan Sexenal Small popular p r o d u c t i o n , 115 Small property, 3, 157, 159. See also Pequeños propietarios Social change: Mexican process of, 114, 115-116 Socialism: and cardenistas, 76 "Socialist education," 128 Soto y Gama, Antonio Diaz, 36, 39, 79 n.2 Speculation and h o a r d i n g , 134, 138 n.14 Stalin, Joseph, 53, 127 Standards of living, rural, 88

214

State: illusions in, 169; role of, in agrarian reform, 121; role of, in regulation of property, 28, 41 State officials: a n d land r e f o r m during Revolution, 28 Sugar: scarcity of, 132, 135 Sugar cane, 135, 143-144, 145 Sugar industry, 134-135, 138 n.20 S u p r e m e Court: and the amparo, 158, 160, 162; role in early land reform of, 29, 34 n.18; a n d rulings against the proletariat, 128; a n d rulings in favor of landlords, 159-160, 162 Tapia, Primo, 55 Technical assistance: and collective ejidos, 97 Technology, agricultural, 136, 168 Tejeda, Adalberto, 53, 63, 64, 66 Tejedismo, 66-67, 103 T e n a n t formers: role of, in Revolution, 17 Terrenos de común repartimiento, 14 Terrorism. See Armed forces; Guardias blancas", Landlords Third International, 127 T o m a t o growers, 135 Trotsky, Leon: a n d peasantry, 5 - 6 Tula, Hidalgo: irrigation district and caciquismo, 151 Uncultivated land: temporary occupation of, 37 Unified Syndical Confederation of Mexico (CSUM), 77 U n i ó n Local de Sociedades de Crédito Colectivo Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera, 147-149 United S u t e s Board of Economic Warfare, 131 United States government, 48, 75, 108-109, 122, 125,166 United Sugar Company, 83, 150 "Unity at all costs": a n d PCM, 103 Urbina, Salvador, 162

INDEX

"Ursulo Galván" National Peasant League, 66 USSR, 53, 62, 127 Valenzuela, Bias, 50 Vasconcelos, José, 61 Vázquez Vela, Gonzalo, 67 Velázquez, Fidel, 77, 126-127 Veracruz civil guard, 39 Veteranos. See Callistas Villa, Pancho, 8, 17, 18-19, 36 Villages. See Communities, landholding Villarreal, Antonio I., 37, 39-41, 43, 44 n.4 Villaseñor, Eduardo, 164 n.22 Villismo, 17, 18-19, 22 n.27 Villutas, 35, 37, 74 Wages, agricultural, 168 Water grants: in agrarian law, 55 Water rights: petitions for, 106 Welles, Sumner, 109 Wheat: imports of, 131, 133 Worker a n d peasant movements: repression of, 123 Workers, Monterrey: a n d cardenismo, 78 Workers' movement: limits to, 77-78 World War II, 75, 100, 107, 122, 123, 126, 131, 136 n.2, 167 Yaqui tribe, 35, 37, 43, 74 Yaqui Valley, 95 Yates, Paul Lamartine, 89 Yucatán: and acceleration of agrarian reform, 95, 97, 100; collective ejidos in, 145-147; labor strikes in, 87; lack of economic diversification in, 146-147 Yudico, Samuel O., 44 n.2 Zapata, Emiliano, 8, 17-18, 121 Zapatismo, 17-18, 19-20 Zapatistas, 33, 36, 74 Zubarán Capmany, Rafael, 40

About the Book and Author

Reappraising the Mexican agrarian reform—the most comprehensive transformation of a land tenure system achieved under capitalism in Latin America—this book discredits orthodox history and explains why an apparently radical movement produced only limited gains for agricultural workers and the peasantry. Markiewicz shows that the reform, begun as an attempt to quell the revolution of the landless, sought to delay or prevent—not to facilitate—land distribution. Her examination of the 1934-1940 period demonstrates that peasant gains u n d e r Lázaro C á r d e n a s were largely reversible and even illusory; and the years 1940-1946, usually represented as a period of reaction to cardenismo, are seen as a natural extension of the conditions that prevailed during the late 1930s. Markiewicz also disputes the widely held notion that t h e ejido peasantry possesses a unique—and uniquely Mexican—potential to catalyze positive social change. Dana Markiewicz studied Latin American history at UCLA. She is author of Ejido Organization in Mexico, 1934-1976.

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