The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin, Second Edition [Paperback ed.] 0815605978, 9780815605973

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The IRA and SINN FEIN 1985 to

TODAY

BRENDAN O'BRIEN

Boston Public Library

Long

Richard

%f

Fallis, Series

Editor

i A?

Studies

Irish Studies RICHARD FALLIS, SERIES EDITOR

Irish Studies presents a

wide range of books interpreting important aspects of

and culture

and general audiences. The richness and complexity of the

to scholarly

Irish life Irish

experience, past and present, deserve broad understanding and careful analysis. For this reason, an important purpose of the series Ireland,

its

is

to offer a

forum

to scholars interested in

history and culture. Irish literature is a special concern in the series, but

from the perspectives of the

fine arts, history

works

and the social sciences are also welcome,

as are studies that take multidisciplinary approaches.

Selected

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the series include:

Cinema and Ireland, Kevin Rockett, Luke Gibbons and John

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Family Secrets: William Butler Yeats and His Relatives, William M. Murphy Fictions of the Irish Literary Revival:

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Land They Loved:

A Frank O 'Connor Reader, Michael The Gonne-Yeats

Great Hatred,

A Changeling Art, John Wilson

Irish Political

Melodramas,

1 890- 1

Foster

925, Cheryl Ller, ed

Steinman, ed

Anna MacBride White and A. Norman Room: The Irish Historical Novel, James M. Cahalan

Letters, 1 893-1 938,

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Jeffares,

ed

Hanna Sheehy-Skefftngton: Irish Feminist, Leah Levenson and Jerry H. Natterstad The Harp Re-strung: The United Irishman and the Rise of Irish Literary Nationalism, Mary Helen Thuente 'Ireland Sober, Ireland Free': Drink and Temperance in Nineteenth-Century Ireland, Elizabeth

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James Joyce: The Augmented Ninth, Bernard Benstock, ed Joyce, O 'Casey and the Irish Popular Theater, Stephen Watt

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Northern Ireland: The Background

Old Days, Old Ways: An The Parnell

Reader, Daniel to the Conflict,

Illustrated Folk History

Split, 1 890-1 891,

J.

Casey and Robert

E. Rhodes,

John Darby, ed

of Ireland, Olive Sharkey

Frank Callanan

Peig: The Autobiography ofPeig Sayers of the Great Blasket Island,

Bryan MacMahon,

A

trans

James Joyce, William York Tindall Reading Dubliners Again: A Lacanian Perspective, Garry Leonard Reader's Guide

to

Selected Short Stories ofPadraic Colum, Sanford Sternlicht, ed Stories by

Contemporary

Irish Women, Daniel Comic Novel, Zack Bowen Warrenpoint, Denis Donoghue

J.

Casey and Linda M. Casey, eds

Ulysses as a

The Whole Matter: The Poetic Evolution of Thomas Kinsella, Thomas Jackson Yeats, Douglas Archibald

ed

D)hg War The IRA and Sinn Fein, 1985 to Today

Brendan O'Brien

SlVJ SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

CN BR

DA963 .027 1995

First published

1993 by The O'Brien Press Ltd.,

20 Victoria Road, Dublin

6, Ireland.

Updated 1995. Copyright

©

1993 Brendan O'Brien

All rights reserved.

95

96

97

00

99

98

1

2

4

3

5

6

Published in the United States by Syracuse University Press,

New York

Syracuse,

13244-5160

by arrangement with The O'Brien Press 20 Victoria Road, Dublin

Ltd.,

6, Ireland.

The author and publisher thank the following for permission to use photographs: The Irish Times for pages 65, 72 (top), 73, 74, 75, 76 (bottom), 80 (top), 179, 185, 189 (bottom); Alan O'Connor 66, 67, 68, 69, 72 (bottom), 178 (bottom), 180, 181, 182; Pacemaker 70 (bottom), 71, 76 (top), 77, 78 (top), 79, 80 (bottom), 177, 178(top), 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189 (top), 190, 192; The Gardai Sfochana78 (bottom),

RTE

Maps and

diagrams: Ivan O'Brien

191.

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

O'Brien, Brendan the IRA and Sinn Fein, From Armed Struggle to Peace Talks/Brendan O'Brien - Syracuse University Press ed.

The long war:

P.

cm. -

(Irish Studies)

Includes an index.

ISBN 0-8156-0319-3

(paper: alk. paper)

and government - 1949 - 2. Northern Ireland - Politics and government - 1969 - 3. Ireland - History, Military -20th century. 4. Violence Military. 6. History, History 20th century. 5. Northern Ireland Ireland 1

.

Ireland

-

Politics

Violence - Northern Ireland - History. I.

Title.

II.

Series: Irish Studies (Syracuse, N.Y.)

DA963.027 1995 941.5062 -dc20

Manufactured

95-6767

in Ireland

q

-^

~^

Clf

Acknowledgements

My first thanks go with affection to my wife Helen for her helpful patience.

More than anything

this

book

is

for her

and

for Sinead,

Dylan, Donal, Sophie and Thomas. In the writing of this book and the many years of journalistic work which preceded it, I received a great deal of confidential assistance and co-operation from a wide range of republicans and members of the IRA and Sinn Fein. For professional reasons they must remain anonymous, but I would like to acknowledge them and thank them. A number of other people helped in a variety of ways which undoubtedly contributed to my capacity to write the sort of book I wanted: Gearoid £) Caralain, Liz Groves, Garbhan Downey, Pat Hughes, the people at the 'McD's' club, Edna and Milo Butler (for their kind hospitality), Paddy McRory, Sydney Elliott and Paul Arthur. Others who have made important inputs to my knowledge and to the final product cannot be given personal thanks for reasons

of confidentiality.

I

would

like

them to know

that

I

greatly value the

confidence they placed in me. I

also

wish

to record

my appreciation for co-operation given by the

RUC

as organisations, but especially to those indi-

Gardai and the

who gave me so much of their personal time. My employers, Radio Telefis £ireann, gave me the extra

viduals

space to do the job. In that regard,

time and

my special thanks go to Neasa ni

Chianain for her good-humoured endurance and to Peter Feeney.

book only came together by the dedicated work of It was a substantial undertaking and I thank However, medals of some kind should be awarded to the

In the end, this

the staff of O'Brien Press.

them

all.

editor, Ide ni Laoghaire, and, for I

from the outside, to Desmond

Fisher,

performing miracles.

take

full responsibility for

the final editorial narrative.

Brendan O'Brien

Contents FOREWORD PREFACE

PART

I

9

13

UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT

CHAPTER 1- The

CHAPTER

2

CHAPTER

- In

the Heartlands I

- In

3

Unfinished Business

-

CHAPTER

PART

4

Belfast

the Heartlands II

Fermanagh, South Armagh

19

30

- Derry, 51

- British and Proud of It

81

CHARTING THE CHANGE

II

CHAPTER

5

- The Coming of the Northerners

CHAPTER

6

- Going Slightly Constitutional

CHAPTER

7

CHAPTER

- The Libyan 8

-

Connection

Sickening the British

133

154

103

118

PART

INTO THE NINETIES

III

CHAPTER

CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER

CHAPTER CHAPTER

and Bullet

Ballot

- Moving into

-

13

-

195

- A Door Is Opened

1

1 1

12

CHAPTER

9

Dialogue

224

Constitutional Stalemate

- Towards

-

14

209

Their

the

Endgame

Hand Is

240 263

Forced 286

15 - The Long Stages of Peace

NOTES

346

APPENDICES 1

Extracts from the Green Book,

2

IRA General Army Orders

325

IRA

350

training

manual

3 Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland, Sinn Fein document

4

Irish

Government document presented

5 British Government statement 6 Proposals for a Settlement

at

at

Strand

1992

Two

political talks

talks,

1992

- a republican document, 1993

7 Joint Declaration, 1993

GLOSSARY

373

INDEX 335 maps and diagrams of arms and explosives finds south of lists and numbers of security force, civilian and IRA deaths and the

Note: The book contains the Border,

based on previously unpublished data. There are also

diagrams showing the results

of elections involving Sinn Fein.

Towns

in

Northern Ireland

FOREWORD

THE ROOTS OF RESISTANCE THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY HAVE existed in

Dublin.

They have had one

since the Easter Rising of 1916

end British

clear objective, to

rule in Ireland

and, according to their Constitution, 'to establish an Irish Socialist lic,

based on the Proclamation of 1916.'

task,

the

whole

island.

Throughout

By

the Act of

'forever'

it

was a mammoth

Union of 1800,

Britain

and Ireland were

under the 'supreme authority' of Westminster. back

that period, right

to the

Act of Union and even

earlier,

an

republican physical force tradition existed to 'break the connection'

with Britain.

The

often reviled

by

and

the start

given that Britain, then a major imperial power, held sovereignty over

bound together Irish

From

Repub-

rebels their

were generally small groups without mass support,

own

people. But with a

historical amnesia, Irish republicans

little

touch of exaggeration

could talk of 'eight hundred years

of struggle' against the British. Irish

republicanism as such had

its

birthpangs in the

French revolutionary upheavals of the

when

Britain

France and,

was

later,

in

competition with rival

Germany.

new

anti-monarchy,

late eighteenth century. It

was a time

imperial European powers

Strategically, Britain

needed

like

to safeguard her

western flank against attack. With that in mind, Ireland was held in firm political

Given

and military control. this strategic

and imperial

emerge organised groups of Irish only

way

to get Britain out

reality

it

was

inevitable that there

of Ireland was by force. Consistently, they

looked to Britain's enemies for assistance, especially 1798, Theobald

Wolfe Tone

in

time of war. In

(the 'father' of Irish republicanism)

United Irishmen got French help while Britain was rebellion

would

separatists dedicated to the view that the

at

and

his

war with France. The

was crushed and Britain tightened her grip on

Ireland.

The

quasi-independent Irish Parliament was abolished and the Act of Union was

THE LONG WAR

1

passed, bringing Ireland emphatically under the control of the Westminster

Parliament in London. In simple terms, those Irish people the

Union with Great Britain came

to

be

known

who

supported

as Unionists. Within three

Emmet was easily squashed Young Irelanders were added to the list of those militant Irish men and women who believed that force was the only way. All the time more rebel heroes and ballads were built into the republican lexicon. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (or Fenians) emerged over the next two decades, drawing military and manpower years a lonely republican rebellion by Robert

and

Emmet

hanged. In 1848 the

support from the emergent United States, with

War and the growing

influx of immigrants

its

experience of the Civil

from the great

that point on, Irish- American support for militant Irish

home was

From

a major ingredient.

For a prolonged period from the

non physical-force to Ireland.

late nineteenth

Irish separatism

Government moved closer

Liberal

Irish famine.

republicanism back

was

ascendancy as Britain's

in the

to granting a

century to about 1912,

measure of independence

This was resisted by the Unionists, mostly in the north, a

resistance backed by the British Conservative Party and elements in the British military.

The north-south

division of Ireland

was being sown. At

Easter 1916, in the middle of the First World War, with Britain again

time against Germany, militant Irish republicans

engaged elsewhere,

this

and separatists took

their lead

from the

struck against the British presence.

came

the Irish Republican

Army,

as the 'legitimate'

claimed Republic. The Easter Rising was, as It

Republican Brotherhood and

Irish

Out of a collection of armed groups

lacked widespread popular support for

it

its

could only be, a

when

politics

When

and

it

politicians

aim - a

mood changed com-

They

were pushed aside

in a tide

of anti-British sentiment.

1918 Westminster general election, a recently-formed

to the

political force called

Sinn Fein (meaning 'Ourselves Alone')

set

up a

won

a land-

separatist parliament (Dail Eireann) for the

newly proclaimed 'Republic' with Unionist

its

the British executed the leaders of the Rising. Constitutional

came

slide victory.

total failure.

methods and for

completely separate Irish Republic. But the popular pletely

army of a newly-pro-

its

own

Irish

Members of Parliament, mostly from the

Republican Army. The north, continued to

sit at

Westminster.

From

that point on, the

IRA remained

dedicated not only to the

total

end

of British rule but to reconstituting the 32-county all-Ireland 'Republic' as

proclaimed during the 1916 Easter Rising. That 'Republic' had been

THE ROOTS OF RESISTANCE short-lived.

With armed turbulence continuing and

ing, Ireland

was

Union with Great

first

Britain,

time between Northern Ireland,

and the

Irish

independence under the Crown. The

Those

that

Members of the

ERA and Sinn

Fein

split

and

split again.

original Dail Eireann, elected for a second time in 1921,

'office'.

But a new Dail and government, as constituted under

the Treaty, eventually

won

numbers almost

decades. But they held on to the 8

when Eamon de Valera led his the chamber. Those that stayed

popular support

republican party, Fianna Fail, into

outside diminished in

Army. On

part of the

still

Free State, with a large measure of

remained opposed to the Treaty fought on for the 'Republic'.

continued in

new

British repression fail-

A Treaty of 1922 left the

partitioned as a partial solution.

country divided for the

11

December 1938

title

to vanishing point over the next

and objectives of the

the last remaining

Irish

two

Republican

members of the executive

of the 1921 Dail formally handed over the powers of government of the 'Republic' to the its

Army Council of the IRA. In 1949 Sinn Fein re-forged IRA under the 'supreme authority' of the Army

alliance with the

Council. In the same year the Irish

Republic, putting itself on a

new

Government declared

be a

itself to

collision course with the

IRA Army

Council, then an insignificant group. But with their assumed legitimacy the

IRA conducted armed campaigns

within Britain and along the

Border, and, since 1970, within Northern Ireland.

IRA

split

from the

(Official)

IRA

in

December

The

new

Irish

current (Provisional)

1969.

The

'Provisionals'

re-grouped from a small armed base and, combined with 'Provisional' Sinn Fein, took

on the whole mantle of militant

Irish republicanism.

They went

on the offensive after August 1971 when internment was introduced Northern Ireland and remained on the offensive from then until 1994. the longest

unbroken period of armed resistance

troubled connection with Britain.

It

in

was

to British rule in Ireland's

Preface WHEN THE ARMY COUNCIL

of the Irish Republican

Army announced

complete cessation of military operations' on 31 August to

have been

set aside.

1994, logic

'a

seemed

This was the illegal guerrilla army which had

sustained a long war, almost twenty-five years long, against British rule

with seemingly unending persistency. Yet they had stopped 'completely'

and there was no end

to British rule in sight.

But

their struggle

was not

over.

The Republican Movement had moved to an unarmed strategy with the same goal in mind. The IRA command structure and its illegal arsenal remained

intact,

waiting to see

if 'politics'

their leading political strategist,

would watch him

would

deliver, as

promised by

Gerry Adams. The unrepentant

militarists

closely.

This book explores the road to that extraordinary turn of events and beyond.

It is

intended as an honest and objective account of the activities

modern IRA and Sinn

and

politics of the

and

political offensive

Fein. Despite a massive military

ranged against them, the

IRA had

survived.

By

the

1990s the British Government had long since reached the conclusion that while the political

IRA

could not win, neither could they be beaten. Sinn Fein,

wing, had not been beaten either. Against great odds, they had

become permanent as time

its

went on

fixtures in the north, with a political mandate,

that

mandate would prove

the Border, their electoral strategy

were very far from

had

realised. In the early

on the leadership of the Republican

to

failed. 1

be highly

restricted.

though

South of

Sinn Fein's higher ambitions

990s these

Movement

realities

bore heavily

as they faced the possibility

of another decade of conflict.

Readers of this book will look the language of condemnation.

uncomfortable. in

If,

some hidden

outset that this

in places,

political

book

is

it

in vain for a

high moral tone, flushed with

The simple aim

fails

is

to provide truth,

in that task, the reason

agenda or motive.

It

is

however

not to be found

should be stated from the

intended to be fair to the subject matter, namely the

THE LONG WAR

14

IRA and that the

As an

Sinn Fein, without being propagandist. The author does not claim

book has

the imprimatur of the Republican

nor obstructing.

Many

individuals co-operated fully.

upon twenty years of journalistic experience conflict, including extensive contacts

It is

It

does not.

hoped the reader

the motives of

its

at all levels,

will get an insight into the Irish

who continued

activists

The author draws

in relation to the

northern

and interviews, on and off the record,

members of the IRA and Sinn Fein

with

Movement.

organisation they adopted a stand-off attitude, neither co-operating

to join

including the highest.

Republican

Army and

up through nearly a quarter

of a century of conflict.

This book does not re-run the events, well-documented elsewhere, surrounding the birth of the Provisional their

campaign. However,

tance', the author

in

the first ten years or so of

backgrounds briefly the origins of the armed

against British domination.

and moves

IRA and

a preliminary overview, 'The Roots of Resis-

The main

story

is

Irish struggle

taken up in the early 1980s

to the present. Nonetheless, the past is so often part of the present

and must form part of the narrative. For example, an understanding of the

IRA's 'long war' strategy would be incomplete without knowing how the long debilitating truce of 1975 gnawed

and

left

them vowing 'Never

leave aside the impact of '69 -

on the psyche of leaders

1990s.

Then

split in the

to

there

is

the

again!' Equally,

-

like

at the fibre it

of the IRA's confidence

would be impossible

Gerry

Adams and Martin McGuinness

In Part

in the

handed-down republican legacy, not just from the

movement 24

years back, but from the rebellious years of 1916

1922 when physical force acted as the catalyst for

pendence and the

to

the 1969 street clashes and house burnings

partial Irish inde-

partition of Ireland.

One of

the book, people in the republican heartlands of

Northern Ireland talk frankly and revealingly about their experiences

and

attitudes.

These chapters

act as an early

backdrop to the main story

IRA and Sinn Fein. They provide an insight into the reasons why young men continued to volunteer to fight for the 'cause' and why an indefinable sense of Trishness' grew new roots in an apparently hostile environment. Chapter 4, 'British and of the armed actions and politics of the

It', turns the focus on the other tradition at a time when there was renewed threat from the loyalist paramilitaries. It examines the depth and power of the 'Britishness' of the Unionists and their refusal

Proud of

to see

themselves as Irish nationalists waiting to be discovered. This,

turn, poses a challenge to the long-held

in

view of the Republican Move-

PREFACE ment

that the loyalist heritage is little

Parts

of the

Two

more than a mere whim.

and Three chart the changing military and

IRA and

Sinn Fein:

how

they

came

political thinking

way towards

to seek a political

the goal of Irish unity rather than pursuing the simple at the

demand of

'Brits

point of a gun. These chapters start with the story of

by Gerry Adams

northerners, led

won

and Martin McGuinness,

Movement and brought

ship of the Republican

it

in

new

and his group dared tablet

to

the

the leader-

politics.

Adams

undermine the sacred cow of abstention, the hitherto

of stone which forbade the taking of seats

Parliament, Dail Eireann. But the failure of the

new

in the

Republic's

electoral strategy south

of the Border had serious long-term implications for the Republican

ment's capacity to influence events, an outcome analysed chapters.

Out'

how

directions. Their

purpose was to weld together armed struggle and electoral

untouched

15

in

Move-

succeeding

These were the years when an enormous national and international

intelligence lapse resulted in massive quantities of

Libya making

their

way

to Ireland

modern weapons from

and into prepared remote underground

IRA bunkers. This extraordinary episode is detailed, as is the attempt by the IRA to use these arms and explosives for a decisive escalation of the conflict.

IRA in

The

activists

result

was a hardening of tactics by

open

to

being shot dead

if

caught

the British

in action.

Army.

It left

The body count

Loughgall and Gibraltar would prove the point. All the while, the

unending war continued, day

after day,

hundreds of small-scale armed

attacks, with the reduced ambition of 'sickening the British'.

As

the story

moves

into the

a sophisticated political

1990s the Republican

programme. The aim

is

Movement develops

to get a seat at the negoti-

ating table for Sinn Fein and to break the 'Unionist veto'

Rather than seeking to tear lead. Britain

now

and

tempt the

tries to

initiative,

Gerry

Republican

insists that

down

on

Irish unity.

Dail Eireann, they look to Dublin for a

she has no selfish interests in Northern Ireland

IRA away from the armed struggle. In a major Adams enters into dialogue with John Hume, anJ the

Movement

signal that they are

on the road

to

compromise. In

the final chapters, constitutional stalemate following the collapse of roundtable talks gives

way

to a

mixture of optimism and foreboding. The search

for an historic breakthrough takes place in the midst of

and

massive

IRA bombs

loyalist assassination attacks.

This book was written process was under

at a critical

way and

time for Ireland.

the guns on both sides

peace process was to succeed, the handing

in,

were

A

fragile

peace

silent. But, if the

or 'decommissioning', of

16

THE LONG WAR

IRA arms would have

to

be

settled.

of Libyan arms and explosives

still

Chapter 13 looks in

IRA

at the

huge quantity

hands, and the pattern of finds

and dumps uncovered south of the Border,

illustrating the size

and com-

plexity of the problem. This chapter also explores the possible political

routes to the

endgame which

lay at the heart of this attempt to settle the

ancient quarrel between Britain and Ireland.

The

final

two Chapters bring

the story on through a sequence of historic landmarks: the Joint Declaration

signed by the British and Irish Governments, the

IRA Complete cessation'

followed by the loyalist ceasefire and culminating

Framework

for

Agreement.

It is

in the British-Irish

a story of two Governments competing for

advantage, of renewed involvement by the

US

administration, of an

leadership being forced to face even greater compromise. Irish hearts

and minds being

possible, but

knowing

lifted,

that the road

It is

IRA

also a tale of

daring to hope that a lasting peace

ahead

is

fraught with uncertainty.

is

PART

I

Understanding the Conflict

1 The unfinished Business IT

WOULD BE WRONG

IRA

to see the

as simply an illegal terrorist

paramilitary group motivated entirely by blind criminal malice. In the 1990s, as

much

as in the 1980s

and the 1970s, the

campaign of shooting, bombing, intimidating, In their

own eyes they were engaged

IRA

killing,

in legitimate

continued with their

maiming,

terrorising.

armed struggle -

this

primarily meant killing people. But the British presence justified every-

When

thing.

understand that guns are dangerous and their main purpose

must

fully

take

human

kill

being trained in the use of arms, volunteers were told that 'they

people.

life, in It is

other words to

kill

not an easy thing to take up a gun and go out to

person without strong convictions of justification strong

enough

to

is

people, and volunteers are trained to

...

kill

some

convictions which are

him confidence to kill someone without hesitation The same can be said about a bombing campaign.'

to give

and without regret.

Volunteers were told not to join because of romantic notions: 'Life

underground army

is

extremely harsh and hard, disillusioning

an

in

at times.'

John Hume, the leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), fully understood this reality in his efforts to get the

IRA

to

stop, as Patrick Pearse had stopped in 1916. In the build-up to his talks with

Hume often publicly

Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams, In

August 1990, calling on the

felt

make

the need to

IRA

to lay

of

my

their

addressed the IRA.

arms

to save lives,

I

do not dismiss them

as such.

I

believe,

profound disagreement with and unequivocal condemnation

of their methods, that they actually believe in what they are doing. That

why

I

he

this point: 'They have been dismissed often as

mindless, as criminals, as gangsters. in spite

down

entertain the hope, although

I

admit

it is

a

frail

is

hope, that sooner rather

than later they will respond to the unanswerable case that exists against their

campaign.'

For most of the two decades and more of

campaign the IRA proved immune the atrocity or

who was making

to

their killing

appeals to stop, no matter

the appeal.

They ignored

how bad

calls

from

THE LONG WAR

20

own commu-

Catholic priests, bishops and the Pope, from people in their

from

nities,

and south, from successive

Irish nationalist politicians north

Governments, from most leaders of Irish-American opinion, from

Irish

main strands of British public and branches of the media

in Ireland

and

all all

There were other pressures

Britain.

Human

brought to bear on the situation.

rights groups like

Amnesty

and Helsinki Watch damned the British Government for

International

human

and from virtually

political opinion

its

rights record in Northern Ireland. Critics included the British

Government's own watchdog body, the Standing Advisory Commission on

Human

was

Rights. Britain

signatory to a host of human rights conventions,

and often the British Government was made hostile international opinion.

turn the spotlight It

Some

to twist

in the face

of

of the same organisations also began to

on the IRA and damn them

too.

took great inner conviction to stand against the pressure. This convic-

tion grew, not just

from the continuing armed British presence and the

republican legacy, but also from the capability of the to adapt to

changing security and intelligence

how

learned

from

to avoid being isolated

There was no the

and turn

own communities.

island, the

class.

It

was predominantly

this

of a century of conflict

one with the

personal power and political allegiance, was

working

an organisation

situations. In particular, they

their

escaping the fact that after a quarter

most vulnerable group on the

IRA as

group

still

least sense

of

the northern Catholic

that sustained the

IRA and

voted Sinn Fein. This was most acutely the case in Belfast where numbers of Catholics had swelled, not diminished. In 1993, Catholic greater west Belfast contained about 75,000 people in one long sprawling interlocking collection of housing estates.

changed. There was

immense armed and threat

from

The

still

From

their perspective, nothing

much had

widespread poverty and unemployment, an

fortified security presence,

and a

real

and terrifying

loyalist killers.

threat

had been

at its

peak

in 1969, a

year never to be forgotten by

The experiences of '69 remained etched in the folklore. That was the year when hundreds of Catholics

northern nationalists.

memory and

in the

from

fled in fear

by frenzied

their Belfast

loyalist

homes

mobs. Peaceful

as

whole

streets

of houses were burned

civil rights protests

had been met with

entrenched resistance from large sections of the Unionist establishment, including, to

ment

at

many

nationalist eyes, elements in the police.

The old

Parlia-

Stormont outside Belfast was run entirely by the Ulster Unionist

Party, with a permanent majority.

It

was they who

controlled the police and

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS the Special Constabulary (the B-Specials). 1969

Army was

was

sent in to restore order in Northern Ireland.

21

the year the British It

was

also the year

Movement brought about the birth of the ProviIRA. These were the times when respectable northern politicians,

a split in the Republican sional

businessmen, even

priests,

looked to the Irish Government

guns to defend their

streets.

When

of intrigue and political

drama

northern nationalists were

left

in the

feeling

feeling greatly sustained the

Dublin for

in

1970, after an entangled episode

in early

Republic, the guns failed to arrive,

abandoned by the southern

state.

newly-formed Provisional IRA.

It

That

was a

Adams and Martin McGuinness Republican Movement who grew out of that

sentiment which never went away. Gerry

were among the leaders of the

vowing never again

period

that situation

to return to that sense

of defencelessness and to

of unionist domination.

Others of their generation and their experiences, most notably John

Hume, rejected the use of force. The Provisionals, however, took on the whole mantle of physical force Irish republicanism, dating back two hundred years. They kept

to the faith that

would

that the British

armed force was the only answer

1970s the Provisionals were convinced

to the British presence. In the early

wilt under a sustained

bombing and shooting

campaign. Victory didn't come as expected. But the simplistic

'Brits Out'

objective kept the ERA campaign going through a turbulent half decade

eventually a long war strategy emerged in the late 1970s. Then

until

came

a

turning point.

The

early 1980s had a character

all their

own. Once the British Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to stand against the republican hunger strikers in 1981,

it

was

clear that a

new

chapter was opening up in the

republican heartlands of Northern Ireland.

down and

the strike ended in

some

disorder.

the streets, in the townlands and in the ballot

box

for Sinn Fein and a

on an abstentionist ticket after election)

by

that of

lican

Gerry

Adams on

homes brought with

it

votes at the

determination by the IRA. The election in

government

Bobby Sands was followed two

a similar ticket.

Both

victories

a world-wide propaganda harvest.

on British policy

alienation'

A resurgence of defiance on

which he would not participate

of hunger striker

Movement

attention

(in

new

strikers at the Maze Mrs Thatcher faced them

Ten hunger

prison died in pursuit of quasi-political status.

in Ireland.

won

years later

the

Repub-

The successes focused

There was much talk of 'nationalist

and warnings about irreversible destabilisation within Northern

Ireland. International opinion, especially in

America, pressed Britain to 'do

THE LONG WAR

22

something'. Eventually

Mrs Thatcher came

to sign a

new

historic accord

with the Irish Republic, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.

The Protestant working

class also experienced real fear, death and

deprivation and a progressive alienation from the state. During 1992 and

1993 an increasing number of allegations against the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) arose from the staunchly loyalist Shankill Road in Protestant west Belfast.

The

emanating from republican

allegations

were similar

to those long since

areas: police harassment, intrusive surveillance,

financial inducements to inform, house searches.

The Committee on

the

Administration of Justice concluded: 'Clearly, consensual policing in the Shankill area has to a large extent broken down.

policing with clear lines of control deniability

by members of the RUC.

An

obsession with the

RUC's

counter-

appears to have exacerbated a divorce between the police and

terrorist role

a

The idea of community

sorely absent, leading to a level of

is

community

traditionally supportive of

Nonetheless, in political terms,

it.'

these people maintained one major advantage over their Catholic counterparts. In general, the politicians they least to negotiating tables

when

voted for had access to power or

In that sense the

The people who voted Sinn

the time came.

Fein had never been directly represented

IRA campaign

at

any

kept their

at

table.

own

people hostage.

It

was

IRA's own choice to kill soldiers, policemen, judges, politicians, 'collaborators'. It was their choice to bomb Belfast, Armagh, Portadown,

the

Derry, Magherafelt, Markethill, Lurgan, Strabane, Coleraine, Enniskillen, hotels, courthouses, police stations,

were not military but struggle that way.

It

army

political actions.

was

By

bases.

They chose

their decision until the

their

own dictum these

to fight their political

1990s not to compromise

on the basic demand of an immediate British withdrawal. By Republican

that time the

Movement had come

to recognise the Unionists as central to

was only

the scantiest of realisation within the

the problem. Yet there

Movement that the IRA killings, maimings and destruction had wounded deeply the Protestant people. They should have known. Irish Republican

history

was

replete with accounts of past injustices visited

upon

population by the occupying British forces. Three hundred and after the event,

even

in the revised version,

Oliver Cromwell was

Catholic hate figure, 'slaughterer of the innocent'. Could Protestants

would remember

all

times the

IRA had

struggle.

There was

little

At

their it

doubt

IRA

within that the

the native fifty

it

years still

a

be that northern

neighbours the same way? its

own

capacity to end the armed

environment

in

which they operated

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS

was fraught with

23

Northern Ireland was the cross-roads of the

conflict.

British-Irish problem, the unfinished business of the early twentieth century, where, in to

end

it,

interests

many ways,

the past

and nationality remained

spawn violence so long But the

was

the present. Despite

all efforts

the clash of traditions, allegiances, religious beliefs, vested

as

in place. It

was a

situation

which would

was unresolved.

it

IRA was no mere

reflex organisation, responding impulsively to

a turbulent environment. Neither were they operating in a purely defensive

mode, using physical force

come

By 1993

to proclaim.

'reluctantly'

'last resort' as

they had

they had been on the offensive for 21 years with

aim of forcing

the explicit

and as a

a British withdrawal.

They had developed

five-fold guerrilla strategy, spelt out in their training manual, the

Book, designed 1.

A

war of

to effect British

attrition against

Green

withdrawal from Northern Ireland:

enemy personnel which

and deaths as possible so as

casualties

a

to create a

is

aimed

demand from

at

causing as

many

people

home

their

at

for their withdrawal.

2.

A bombing

campaign aimed

country unprofitable while

at

at the

making

enemy's

the

financial interests in our

same time curbing long-term investment

in

our

country.

3.

To make

the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable

except by colonial military 4.

To

sustain the

rule.

war and gain support

for

its

ends by National and International

propaganda and publicity campaigns. 5.

By defending

war of

the

liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and

informers.

Since the late 1970s the orchestrated long objectives.

The

destroy and

war

IRA had been engaged

tools of that strategy

kill.

New

planned and

in a

strategy with short-term objectives and long-term

recruits

strategy and those objectives.

were bombs and

bullets intended to

were vetted and trained and

drilled in this

At any stage the Army Council could have

stopped the killing. They could have targeted only property or purely defensive posture. political. It

was open

in political dialogue,

They could have

moved

to Sinn Fein to contest democratic elections,

take seats in parliaments and assemblies.

out choice of the Republican

Movement was

to a

called a cessation and gone

engage

The worked-

to sustain a military

campaign

24

THE LONG WAR

as the core of their political struggle.

None of this was to deny the other realities facing the Republican Movement when they made their choices. Up until the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement defending

power

at least, the British

its

own

was

work.

was a

It

to

A continuing element

arm and

tactic

in their

was

armed

counter-insurgency

do some of the

direct local 'loyalists' to

it

lethal dirty

imported from other parts of Britain's receding empire.

But very early on, Britain proved

its

capacity to

fundamentally undermined the same ists'

as though

interests in the North, utilising a vast array of

in the process.

strategy

Government behaved

political citadel, the

loyalists.

Stormont parliament,

make decisive moves which They abolished the Unionin 1972.

Two

years

later,

a

Conservative Government under Edward Heath signed the Sunningdale

Agreement, providing for top-level sharing of power between Unionists and nationalists within Northern Ireland and a strong Council of Ireland between North and South. and

its

On each

occasion the

IRA renewed

its

offensive

determination to push for a 'Brits out' solution.

In the light of the 1995

Framework Document,

it

may be worth

recalling

the distance the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973 had travelled in

attempting to reconcile both traditions in Ireland.

was

to

be a purely

Irish free-standing

body with

its

The Council of Ireland

own

headquarters and

would be seven ministers each from the Irish The Council would deal EEC membership, basis: with a wide range of issues on an all-Ireland secretary-general. There

Government and

the Northern Ireland Executive.

agriculture, roads, electricity generation, cooperative trade, tourism, sport

and

culture. Decisions

would be taken unanimously. Alongside the Council

would be an advisory body, a Consultative Assembly with 60 members, 30

from each parliament, Dublin and Belfast. The Agreement contained mechanisms which would lead to interlocking of police functions across the island and a reorganisation of local policing within the North. British

sovereignty over Northern Ireland remained. 'Appropriate safeguards' for British financial

and other

interests

were

built into the

Council of Ireland

concept. But there was undoubtedly a blurring of sovereignty and the

Agreement held out

the prospect of ever-closer North-South cooperation

and convergence. As part of the Sunningdale Agreement, the

ment and the

SDLP

Irish

Govern-

upheld their aspiration to a united Ireland by the consent

of a majority within Northern Ireland. If such consent was forthcoming,

Government declared it would support it. This was a formidable compromise package with a strong nationalist dimension. The

the British

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS

whose power-base was

principal losers were the Unionists,

eroded.

The IRA

rejected

it

and continued with

in

substantially

campaign. Within four

their

months, the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed

May

1974

in the face

a loyalist strike and significant Unionist political opposition before

be formally signed and lodged

at the

25

it

of

could

United Nations. Sunningdale remained

minimum

a benchmark for the Irish Government, the

would accept

it

in

attempts to reach a permanent settlement. That was their position in the political talks of

1992 involving both Governments and the Northern

constitutional parties.

They appeared

In the intervening years, the

ceasing.

They had

withdraw from

to accept less in 1995.

IRA had

killed

and bombed almost without

failed to achieve a declaration of intent

Ireland. In

from Britain

to

1995 the Republican Movement was prepared

But was not Sunningdale such an was no 'internal' solution, confined

to settle for 'interim arrangements'.

'interim arrangement'? Certainly to

Northern Ireland.

in the

It

it

neither guaranteed nor blocked a United Ireland

long run.

A guaranteed United Ireland

was not on

offer in

government would budge from the cardinal principle dale two decades beforehand.

They would both

1

995

laid

either.

down

at

Neither

Sunning-

insist that Irish unity

required the consent of a majority within Northern Ireland. 'National' self-determination

would be exercised

in

two

parts,

by concurrent referenda

North and South, requiring a Yes from each. In any event, self-determination could not pre-determine the

question for the Republican destruction achieve

if

outcome. This begged a very grave

Movement. What

they were willing to settle

arrangements' available 22 years earlier?

Up

did

all

the killing and

for the kind of 'interim

to 1995, they

had come to

expect important differences, particularly regarding Britain's policy position

on

Irish unity.

On

another level, they would argue, as Gerry Adams,

President of Sinn Fein, did, that a united Ireland wouldn't even be on the

agenda

if it

weren't for the IRA. Yet, back in 1973 the British Government

had committed

Twelve years

itself to

later, this

supporting Irish unity principle

was

if

consent were forthcoming.

further reinforced in Article

1

of the

Anglo-Irish Agreement. In a very physical and legal sense, Irish unity had

remained on the agenda. But the fact, that

IRA

could point to the

southern public and political opinion turned

fact,

and

away from

it

was a

the North

once Sunningdale collapsed, and for many years afterwards. Northern nationalists experienced a

was especially so

new

as loyalism

sense of isolation and abandonment. This

was rampant

in the

long aftermath of their

26

THE LONG WAR

success in bringing

down

the Sunningdale Agreement. Nationalists felt

further exposed to a resurgent and well-armed Ulster

Defence Regiment (UDR), a Royal Ulster Constabulary given primacy in security and a legal system which defended and protected the use of 'reasonable force' by soldiers

and policemen. In the nature of things, and partly as a

continuous

IRA

killing policy, these forces

result of a

were almost entirely peopled

by Protestants and Unionists.

By August in the

1994,

tion of the victims sional

when

the

IRA called

a ceasefire, 3,346 people had died

Northern Ireland conflict. The sources of the killings and identifica-

IRA was

number

were

attributable to

civilians,

at

times disputed. But in broad figures the Provi-

responsible for about half the dead, 1,776, by far the largest

one single organisation. Of these, 472 were ordinary

506 were native-born members of the police or army, 471 from army in Britain. In other words, up to three-quarters of the

the regular

IRA's victims were

locals.

These deaths arose from deliberate and

planned operations, with a declared political purpose. But there were other statistics, often

masked by

the

sound of IRA bombs. In broad 948 people, the bulk of them

figures, loyalist paramilitaries killed

Catholic. In recent years these killings had again accelerated and ac-

quired a sharper political objective. The British killed

figures,

were

Army and

the

RUC

357 people, again mostly Catholic but also IRA. By their own

IRA and

killed

by

Sinn Fein dead numbered 341 (more than 100 of these

their

Each side had

its

own bombs and weaponry, mostly in the early years). victims. Outside Northern Ireland, few people -

journalists, political parties or

governments - properly focused on the

high rate of loyalist killings. Cardinal Cathal Daly, one of the IRA's sharpest critics, addressed this point in September 1993 during the heat

of a loyalist killing offensive: 'Loyalist violence has not received the same attention, domestically

and internationally as has republican violence,

spite of the fact that loyalist paramilitaries

killings over the past three years than

in

have been responsible for more

have republican paramilitaries and

have accounted for hundreds of killings over the past 25 years. Loyalist violence has regularly been described as "reactive" to republican violence.

This explanation overlooks the fact that loyalist violence has been a persistent factor throughout the history of Northern Ireland, even there

was no IRA violence

The lack of attention ment

to

which

to loyalist killings

in certain nationalist areas

when

to "react".'

added

to the sense

of abandon-

and increased the reliance on the

IRA

as a

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS protective force. But the

negative effect.

Many

IRA campaign had

loyalist killings

were

27

an enormous, quantifiable

direct acts of retaliation.

IRA

actions presented Irish republicanism as an aggressive, brutal force. Just as

RUC

the

and

UDR were mostly

exclusively Catholic.

Protestant, the

They claimed

IRA were

pretty well

be acting for the nationalists alone,

to

Adams said, 'by proxy' for 90 percent of them. Because it was IRA strategy to prevent a political compromise short of British

or as Gerry

conscious

withdrawal, their campaign was, in large part, designed to force the Unionists into

extreme

The policy had

political positions.

the

aim of 'breaking

the connection' with Britain, not only in the traditional nationalist sense of

driving out an the people

unwelcome

who most

The primary

oppressor, but also in forcing Britain

valued that connection, the Protestants and Unionists.

objective, as Sinn Fein

to thwart all British attempts at

the 'democratic option',

By

the time 1993

underway These

arising

away from

secret talks

hope

talks held out the

IRA

leadership often said,

until they

were made

was

to face

an end to partition.

ie,

came around

from

and the

compromise there

was a dramatic new

between John

Hume

and Gerry Adams.

IRA would come

that the

initiative

in

from the cold,

even hand up their enormous arsenal of weapons, join the political fold like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation

was

this

(PLO)

only a hope.

still

in the

Much

Middle

rested

East.

As 1993 drew

on the readiness of the

to a close

two sovereign

governments, particularly the British, to take the necessary political risks involved. This would entail both governments adopting a joint policy, strong enough on the nationalist agenda to bring about a permanent cessation.

Such a policy would also need

to the Unionists to bring like

them on board. This was no simple

an impossible balancing

The

Irish

task.

It

seemed

act.

Government risked

paramilitaries if a final

IRA

to contain sufficient guarantees

the wrath both of loyalist

compromise

satisfied neither

and republican

camp. The Republican

compromise on British withdrawal from was Ireland too great. For her part, Britain was being asked to make a policy shift on Ireland of historic proportions. However it was dressed up, London would be adopting a 'one Ireland' agenda, somewhat similar to that of British governments in the early part of the twentieth century. This was

Movement

risked a split

if

the

being asked of the British Prime Minister, John Major,

and his Government were vulnerable to defeat ist

at a

time when he

in Parliament. Ulster

Union-

votes could be of crucial importance to John Major's survival.

The

THE LONG WAR

28

Orange card was pressure

and ready to be played

ripe

was mounting from

at the precise

moment when more green

nationalist Ireland for a decidedly

agenda. Nonetheless, the indications were that the British Government was tentatively preparing to

move forward

with the Irish Government towards

what was being called a 'balanced constitutional' settlement. Time would tell if

it

was enough

demilitarisation

all

to bring about a

permanent IRA cessation and

round.

One way or another, history was in the making within Irish nationalism. What was on offer was compromise, not victory for the IRA. They had changed from the days when nothing short of 'Brits out' would do. Now they were focusing on Irish national self-determination, exercised by consent.

This was a far more subtle and complicated process than driving the

British

Army up

Belfast Lough.

From

the mid-1980s

onwards the IRA and

Sinn Fein had begun to jettison significant elements of the handed-down republican legacy.

No

longer was there a realistic chance of 'winning the

Republic', of reconstituting the First Dail (Irish Parliament). This had been the historic, almost mystical, goal of physical force republicanism, generation after generation since the all-Ireland Dail in

partitioned

the

1919 declared

by the Treaties of 1920/21, the IRA never gave

new 26-county

Irish

Government. In

its

anything, this assertion justified

ment arrived

be

allegiance to

IRA Army

their lexicon, the

Council was the lawful government of the Republic of 1919.

that Republic.

itself to

whole island of 32 counties. After the country was

the Republic of the

armed

struggle.

The

fight

was

More

to

than

win back

But through a slow twisting process the Republican Move-

in the

1

990s with a more chastened view of

and Sinn Fein were giving de facto recognition government, seeking international agenda.

its It

The IRA

itself.

to the existing Irish

lead in putting the partition of Ireland on the

was

part of their pragmatic acceptance of reality

and of the need for compromise.

Even though compromise was

in the air, the

IRA's long war went on,

unremitting, relentless. During 1992 and 1993 huge in

London's financial

heart; a

bombing offensive

IRA bombs exploded

across Northern Ireland

ripped apart town centres in places like Magherafelt, Portadown and

Newtownards;

at the

end of October 1993 came the massacre of innocent

shoppers on the Protestant Shankill Road in Belfast. These are the events

people remember. But they were the exception. Most small-scale and often unsuccessful: coffee-jar cars, shots fired at passing police,

IRA

bombs lobbed

activity at

was

armoured

house take-overs and hijackings. The

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS Republican

Movement

their twin-track military

more

if

held themselves ready and capable of carrying on

and

political

campaign through another decade or

needs be. All the while loyalist paramilitary attacks intensified,

most of

their victims being

uninvolved Catholics. But the loyalists'

primary, and publicly stated, targets were Fein.

was

29

The

loyalists

members of the IRA and Sinn

were better armed and better organised than before.

clear that, even if a peace process got

It

underway, the years ahead would

be very fraught and very dangerous. Peace or no peace, people republican heartlands faced into a long hard road.

in the

2 IN THE

HEARTLANDS

-

I

BELFAST

PART OF THE REASON

for the survival of the

the fact that they existed in

IRA

against great odds lay in

communities with a deep sense of hurt about

years of economic deprivation, years of feeling abandoned, but themselves seemed to notice death and

injury

among

when no-one

their neighbours.

Considerable improvements in physical economic surroundings

One

difference.

housing allocation, was settled

in the early 1970s.

improved and allocations made recognition

made

little

of the most pressing and very personal grievances, public

fairly.

when compared with

Many

Housing stock was vastly

places were improved beyond

the late 1960s. Derry city

was one. There,

public attitudes greatly dented support for 'the Provies\ but

mem-

still its

bers remained active. The same could be said for Coalisland and Enniskillen. West Belfast was dotted with public leisure centres, the likes of

which would be no more than a twinkle planners south of the Border. However,

in the

eye of cash-strapped local

unemployment remained acute

in

west and north Belfast. Disproportionate Catholic unemployment was

undoubtedly a central factor

in

enormous

soldiers

and policemen on the

Of course, community as fuelling

its

streets

and

in the

homes.

hurt could exist separately from the IRA, as well

support. Lists of 'disputed killings'

by

British

remained contested. Neighbourhoods continued

wounded because of the midst. in the

when

watchtowers and the presence of armed British

allied to

security

continuing discontent, particularly

to

Army and RUC

be emotionally

victims of rubber bullets and plastic bullets in their

When the whole world seemed moved by the deaths of two children IRA bomb in Warrington, England, in 1993, people in west Belfast

asked: 'What about Julie Livingstone and Carol

Ann

12 respectively, both were killed by plastic bullets,

names on a bigger

list. It

Kelly?'

Aged

14 and

and they were only two

was an easy catchphrase, but people from Sinn

THE HEARTLANDS

IN

I

31

Fein heartlands could say with apparent ease of conscience: 'They have their armies,

why

shouldn't

we have

ours?'

That sentiment grew from the most fundamental of the mix.

It

was

'theirs'

and

and

What was never going

to

or

Catholics or nationalists wanted to rush into a

all

If the

vote for Sinn Fein quantified this group,

12 percent of the North's electorate. full

and equal expression of

the

Union Jack

still

all

it

the ingredients in

'us', British

was more than economics

nationalist and Unionist. nationality question. This

'ours', 'them'

and

Irish,

go away was the human rights. Not United Ireland. Some did.

amounted

to 10 percent to

A great many more wanted, at least, a

their Irishness,

even

if

for the forseeable future

flew over Belfast City Hall and Stormont Castle.

POPULATION AND RELIGION By

the 1990s a significant shift in population

numbers was taking place

in

Northern Ireland. Catholics were catching up on Protestants. The 1991 census showed

Roman

Catholics at 38 percent of the total population, the

highest proportion since partition. This represented a gradual rise since the

1926 census when tion.

Roman

There was a dip

Catholics

in the

made up

33.5 percent of the popula-

1960s and 1970s through emigration. But the

long-term figure was escalating. In 1991 the figures showed that 46 percent

of children under ten years were

Roman

Roman

Catholic. If that trend continued,

Catholics could outnumber the rest within a generation.

There was another politico-religious

Catholicism and nationalism

factor.

were assuming a more monolithic look. Catholic numbers were political nationalism

was healing

its

divisions.

On

rising,

the other hand, the

main

Protestant churches were losing numbers, splintering, as the 1991 census

showed. The number of people calling themselves Presbyterian had dropped from a high of 413,000

numbers had

fallen

(in

1961) to 336,000. The Church of Ireland

from a high of 353,000

(in

195 1) to 279,000. Put another

way, these two denominations comprised 58 percent of the population the time of partition in 1922.

percent.

The numbers

Politically,

By

in 'other

Unionism was not so

the early 1990s this

had dropped

to

denominations' had more than doubled. split;

but

new three-way

fault lines

were

re-opening between the centre ground, Paisleyism and paramilitarism.

was

the opposite of

at

39

It

what was happening on the other side of the fence,

which had the look of the onward march of Catholic nationalism. All of this had significant political and psychological implications for nationalists.

Whatever about exact numbers, there was a sense

in

which a

32

THE LONG WAR

Rubicon had already been crossed. Catholics

felt

they were no longer a

minority community but, rather, an equal one. Nationalism was to Unionism. Yet, this situation its

all

the outward

nationalism was demanding changes. Unionism

back pressed ever more

now

equal

symbols of the old order remained. In

tightly to the wall. Belfast

was

was

resisting,

particularly tense.

An expanding Catholic population encroached on former Protestant territory while at the same time leaving Catholics locked into bulging housing ghettoes.

As

these areas pushed out, elements of loyalism hit back by killing

Catholics. North Belfast streets

was

around the Alliance

little

district

There were old Protestant

where row upon row of terraced red-

up with concrete blocks and abandoned, leaving

brick houses were blocked

behind

particularly fraught.

more than empty

silence and faded graffiti. Just a

away, but on the other side of a 'peace

line' wall,

few yards

was a Catholic

area,

similar tight red-brick houses but packed with families, children playing in

the street. In

perhaps 30 targeted

New

Ardoyne and

activists, regularly

them

in their

Lodge, small, skilled

launched attacks on

homes, deep

IRA units,

totalling

RUC patrols but also

in loyalist territory.

The

loyalist para-

UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters), adopted more random murdering Catholics in the street. An example was the random

military group, the tactics,

spraying of Murray's bookies on Oldpark three

Road

men, one aged 50, another aged 62 and the

in

November

third 72.

1992, killing

Four others were

shot in separate incidents within a space of 100 yards at the

same junction

of Catholic and Protestant north Belfast. Such killings were justified on the

grounds that these areas were

IRA

support bases and also that 'violence

pays, Catholics get everything, Prods get nothing'.

The

grievances, real and

imagined, were deepening. Already Belfast had more than a dozen walls or 'peace lines', separating the communities. If

no

lasting settlement

is

found by the time Northern Ireland reaches an

even balance of population, 51 percent Protestant, 49 percent Catholic, it could be a very volatile place. 'I see it coming to civil war, building up to civil war,' said

in

Malachy McNally, veteran republican from Andersonstown

west Belfast, speaking

conditions to avoid

civil

in 1993. 'It's

up

to the British to create the

war, take the Unionists aside and

tell

them Sinn

Fein must be heard, their voice must be heard.'

OLDER ACTIVISTS Malachy McNally was

IRA

in the

Fianna (young IRA) during the 1940s and an

activist in the latter part of the

1950s and 1960s Border campaign.

IN

When

the

most recent conflict erupted

THE HEARTLANDS

I

33

1969, he was one of the old

in

campaigners whose experience was drawn upon. He was interned twice

from 1972 and the

to 1975, with a

Union Jack and

British]

two-month break

in

between.

Kingdom.

view

It's a

Regiment

in the Irish

would not give

the cost of this

that

hold and honest to

I

whole war, the

nationalist people,

The armed

and

they'll

struggle

that they [the

surrender any part of the United

God

I

think I'm right. But

all

the rest, will realise

lives that are lost, the bitterness

people, also the bitterness between the British

it.

always thought,

Army,

in the British

- they would not

in

eventually the English people, the politicians and

do

'I

think today, that with the insignia in the flag, the Irish cross in

I still

have

to

Army and

between our

our people, the

withdraw. They're going to have to

must continue

until the British leave this country.

There can be no compromise whatsoever.'

At 69 years of age, lucid and relaxed, Malachy McNally was amongst comrades

in the

Felons Club.

It

was a busy

night, all

four or five to each, drinking and chatting.

The

dozen or so tables

clientele

republican prisoners except for signed-in visitors. 'Felons'

Belfast's

Club? The idea originated

in the

Why

were former

else call

IRA

1940s among

building off the

didn't get going

It

Upper

Falls

where Orange bands used Methodist Church.

Now

assemble for the 'Twelfth'.

was

full

the

club,' they

1964. They found a suitable

- a derelict Orange Hall and

to

it

till

it

prisoners in

Crumlin Road gaol. 'When we get out we'll form a

decided collectively.

full,

Protestant School It

had also been a

of republican Felons!

'The prisoners are as important as the struggle, very important. The prisoners are a battalion of the Irish Republican Army,' continued Malachy,

adding that

it

would not be possible

prisoners' consent.

Around

this table

to arrive at a solution

were three other veteran republicans,

Jim Collins, Frank McDermott (who then had two nieces life;

another republican social club

son, Terry, killed

by

his

own bomb

from a heart attack a few days

without the

known

as

in 1971),

in

prison doing

'McD's' was called

after his

and 'Dixie' Cordner (who died

later).

Dixie Cordner had been one of the main movers behind the Felons Club.

He

IRA proper for the unit sentenced to IRA six-man

too started out in the Fianna and graduated to the

1940s campaign. In 1942 he was one of a death for the murder of an

RUC constable, Paddy Murphy,

in

west Belfast

on Easter Sunday of that year. Eventually, only the leader of the Williams, was hanged, in Crumlin

imprisonment.

Road

gaol, Belfast.

The

unit,

Tom

others got

life

THE LONG WAR

34

Dixie Cordner was another of the veterans the early 1970s

who became

re-involved in

and was interned. In the mid-1980s, when the great debate

Movement

within the Republican

arose over the dropping of the policy of

abstention (refusal to take seats in both the Westminster and Dublin parliaments abstention.

He was

against partaking in 'polities'. 'This has caused a great

deal of problems at the

you go

into politics

more

trouble

you

moment/ he

said. 'If

you compromise.

accommodation? But the

Cordner was one of many who opposed dropping

if elected),

the

you

Do you

more you blow up

You need

store up.

fight a

fight

war you

on or

fight

try to

If

reach an

their [the Unionists']

to bring in the Unionists,

it.

towns

back into

9

the fold. It's not an easy one.'

The men argued around President

Eamon de

and the 'Free

State'

Valera

the table about politics and the role played by

time of the 1921 Treaty between Britain

at the

of Ireland which established

The general view was

that

partition

and the Border.

de Valera was just a politician - rather than a

military

man. Dixie rounded off the discussion:

military

commanders they'd have

said

"We

'If it

had been

left to

the

want our own country".'

SYMBOLS The Felons was a determinedly bership but also by symbols.

Irish republican place, not

On

its

room and

bar.

They

started with a

dead hunger striker from the 1970s; then 1916 Proclamation which O'Callaghan, shot dead

hanged

in

at

The

pictures

dump

more or

less

photo of Michael Gaughan,

Tom Clarke,

declared 'the Republic';

an arms

mem-

walls hung photographs spanning

twentieth-century militant Irish republicanism. encircled the

only by

signatory to the

moving

in the early 1940s;

on, Gerard

Tom Williams,

Crumlin Road gaol for the murder of Constable Murphy, 1942;

on to a picture of a battle scene

at the

General Post Office, O'Connell

Street,

Dublin, during the 1916 Rising; then a picture of Joe McKelvey, 'executed

by Free

Staters' along with

Barrett, 8

Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes and Dick

December 1922; a single picture of Bobby Sands, IRA hunger May 1981; back to the 1916 Rising and to Sir Roger

striker, died 5

Casement, hanged

in Pentonville prison,

attempt to import arms from

Germany

August 1916, following a foiled

for the republican insurgents;

on

to

March 1988 and the three IRA activists shot dead in Gibraltar - Mairead Farrell, Sean Savage and Danny McCann; finally, a group of ten photos all

- Bobby Sands (IRA), Hughes (IRA), Raymond McCreesh (IRA), Patsy O'Hara (INLA),

the dead republican hunger strikers of 1981

Francis

THE HEARTLANDS

IN

I

35

Joe McDonnell (IRA), Martin Hurson (IRA), Kevin Lynch (INLA), Kieran

Doherty (IRA), Thomas McElwee (IRA), Mickie Devine (INLA).

Around was

as

much on

Ulster as on Ireland.

said Dixie Cordner, 'a stinks,'

Have

some ways

the table, political talk continued. In

the emphasis

Tve no objection to a federal

Ireland,'

nine-county not a six-county.' 'The south of Ireland

was Malachy McNally's view. They're a crowd of racketeers. all the pensions comin' to them [members of the Irish

a look at

when they have had two terms of government, big pensions at Malachy couldn't see compromise 'among the Orange section', but if there were to be one, an 'honourable' compromise in his opinion was that

parliament] that.'

both sides in the North would say to the rest of Ireland 'the Brits are pulling out,

we want

our say,

by the John Hume/Gerry Adams in the

He was

fair rights for all".'

talks

SDLP because I think they

of 1993.

realise a

'I

'very

much encouraged'

do see a change of attitude

crunch between the two factions

of the nationalist people [militarists and constitutionalists], must be avoided.'

EARLY YEARS At

his

house

days of the

in

Andersonstown, Malachy McNally spoke about the early

conflict,

1969 and 1970, and the hopes

'We thought we were

cross the Border.

that the Irish

Army would

definitely going to get help and the

troops were going to come, realising, of course, there'd be great opposition.

And

they would' ve linked up with republican units here.

We had nothing,

absolutely nothing. There were two or three shotguns to defend this area

and a couple of shorts [short automatic revolvers] and it.

They were owned by people who were

Army, and some republicans too from

ex-British

that

would' ve been

Army and ex- American

the '40s. Instead of that, the British

Army came in. What was taking place, it was unbelievable! The British Army came in and it was then we realised it wasn't going to happen [the Irish Army coming north]. We were going to have to arm ourselves, arm was

the people. There

terrible fear.

There were thousands of people

area up from other areas, for fear of being burnt out. I'd say that

if

in this

the

IRA

could have armed themselves, the people would' ve definitely welcomed

them and seen them

Malachy used Politics

to

as their saviours.'

be a bricklayer, working side-by-side with Protestants.

and religion were 'taboo'

at

work, he

background, his father-in-law interned

on the Protestants of the

IRA

killings

in

and

said.

His was a republican

1923. But what about the

bomb

effects

blitzes? 'The explosion at

NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT 1973 2-

ORDER FOR DISCHARGE OF A PERSON DETAINED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE Schedule

of the

1

in

pursuance of Paragraph 36(1) of

ACT

1973

Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act

1973 hereby directs

that

iialachy HcitAKJ .13 -ull^-:.oiu Jar-dens

Jeliust 2nd

detained under an interim custody order dated the unless he shall be

Aoril 1971* be discharged some

in

day of

your custody for 2) of

other cause.

n Dated

_^

\

this

„{

.^U

it is

d,

%^ H~^j

day

h

hi

CtacUM.* erration

//

1975

la

Schedule

hereby directs

ur

of

custody for

aacr.er

ance of

ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL

Iffairs the and thereunto

SECRETARIES OF STATE

f

22,

To

HH Prison, Maze

the Governor or other officer in charge of

the said

Halachy McHALLY Le

/^^•VC/xT

> =V>T7

ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE

ternacnt c *hcre ho 1

To the Governor or other c

"-e sa d ;

officer in

charge

of

HX Priaon

IUm

Kalachy HdS*llj

to

further

*

for the

or is a at least

r^«

^c5 g

CO

o

lit!

>^-o

^

00

2?

cii?

CO

~

"2

§ o

=£

>

_)

oo 0)

^

co

>

—q o o i

o

.9-

c5

1

THE LONG WAR

50

County Dublin. This included 30

find at Station Road, Portmarnock, in

AK47

Kalashnikov

rifles, 3 tripods for machine-guns, 12 rocket-propelled

grenades, 31,000 rounds of ammunition and 50 libs of Semtex explosive.

These arms were

to

be transported north. Four days

smaller, find in Ballivor,

County Meath; another

Limerick, on 10 March; another,

at

later there

was another,

at Patricks well,

County

Finea, County Cavan, on 16 March,

which included an anti-tank gun with 8,000 rounds of ammunition; and on 18 March, a find at Ballymaleel, County Donegal, uncovered a significant

number of detonators and ammunition. Three more empty hides were found County Donegal, around Ballybofey, Malin Head and Ballyshannon, each capable of holding about one and a half tons of arms. The pattern of in

these finds indicated that the Libyan arms had been broken

smaller lots and were being

Northern

Command. The IRA's

into the 'war zone'. rifles

moved

On

north, Southern

3 February the

into

supplying

getting the

weapons

got a sizeable load of 28

as far as the Sprucefield roundabout on the outskirts of Belfast, hidden

in a stolen

RUC.

left

forces,

In

one case the

IRA

down one

satisfied

Northern Ireland after his

was a

they were stopped and

This run of setbacks resulted in the

long-running investigation, tying

members.

when

ice-cream lorry from Tipperary,

seized by the

who

IRA had

Command

was

biggest difficulty

down

IRA

conducting a

of their most important

themselves that a north Belfast man,

home was sealed off by the security man had held the post of quarter-

significant informer. This

master-general of the Belfast brigade for at least two years, with overall control of the city's arms and explosives.

had been an

RUC

Meanwhile, an len

bomb had

The IRA came

to believe that

he

informer for up to eight years. internal investigation into the

finally led to

organised by Northern justification given

was

an

IRA Court

Command

November 1987

of Inquiry in

Enniskil-

February 1988,

quartermaster Kevin Hannaway. The

that the Enniskillen

IRA

unit involved expected

members of the Ulster Defence Regiment to be on duty prior to the Remembrance Day ceremony, and that they were therefore 'legitimate targets'. Serious disciplinary action was not meted out. In any event the local

Army

Council had to contend with the fact that two other devices were

found on Remembrance Sunday, indicating that the Enniskillen a freak incident.

One explosive

device, found at

bomb was not

Tullyhommon War Memorial

on the northern side of the Donegal/Fermanagh border (a command wire led into Donegal),

was primed

to

go off at the

1

lam commemoration

time, but

THE LIBYAN CONNECTION do

failed to

Waring

so.

A second discovery IRA

On

was

Street in Belfast, near the British

DEATHS

1

151

a carload of explosives, found at

Legion headquarters.

987-1 988

SAS shot dead three unarmed IRA McCann and Mairead Farrell, ostensibly in blow up a British Army band parade. The public

6 March 1988 in Gibraltar, the

activists,

Sean Savage, Danny

the act of preparing to

was some consolation

furore over the killings

for the Republican

Move-

ment. But the Gibraltar operation was intended as the IRA's launching pad for the long-heralded escalation.

It

would

also constitute a very appropriate

'thank you' to Colonel Ghadaffi for the arms, indicating that they were to

be used for good anti-imperialist purposes. The

RUC

and British

IRA team

gence had been tracing the movements of the

for

up

Intelli-

to three

months.

The the 12

the

three losses at Gibraltar brought to 19 the

months from

May

1987 to

IRA's most experienced

May

activists:

1988.

The

number of IRA dead

Gibraltar dead were

McCann was

a high-ranking

gence operative, Savage an explosives expert. Earlier, on 2 Terence

McKenna was

throw

over the wall of Springfield Road police station

it

killed

when

a grenade exploded as he

in

among intelli-

May

1987

was about

in Belfast.

to

The

Loughgall eight died that same month. In October 1987 two bomb-makers, Eddie McSheffrey and Paddy Deery, were killed incendiary bomb.

The following February,

in

in

Derry by

explosives, as they transported

them

patrol.

the British

Army

blast

also killed

by

their

days later came the McCracken from Belfast

in a van. Six

Gibraltar killings. Eight days later again, Kevin

was shot dead by

own

Crossmaglen, south Armagh,

bomb-makers Brendan Burns and Brendan Moley were

own

their

while preparing to attack a military foot

During the same year, twelve senior

IRA

operatives were arrested

and charged with serious offences,

six of

and Patrick McErlean; and two

Dungannon: Joseph Corrigan and Sean

Thomas Maguire, George Hagans, Michael Validly, Alex Murphy, Alex McCrory and Harry Maguire; four in Derry: Gerard McKenna, Kevin O'Brien, Sean McErlean in

O'Hagan (who was then replaced

as

them

OC

in Belfast:

the East

Tyrone brigade by Pat

Kelly, one of those killed at Loughgall.) For a relatively small guerrilla

army, greatly dependent on available skilled 'operators',

on a very damaging

All the indications were that the to

be the

start

of a

this

was

first

part of 1988

attrition

scale.

new phase

IRA had

in their

intended the

campaign. Equipped with high-quality

THE LONG WAR

152

weapons

like

to a point

which would cause major tremors

IRA

never before, they would intensify and escalate the conflict in

London, Dublin and

Belfast.

operations in Britain and on the Continent would further tighten the

screw.

By May 1988 when

Martin McGuinness was doing the rounds of the

IRA

anniversary graveside commemorations of the eight

was acknowledging

the Loughgall ambush, he

Army

policy of the British

to shoot

past year has seen an unprecedented

As

out the Republican army.

dead

campaign by

I've said,

miserably,' stated McGuinness. 'Because

spearheaded by the

Irish

that the

and

political, in the

IRA have

I

in the act.

government

has failed and

it

The

to take

has failed

believe the Republican forces,

the defeat of the British forces, both

Six Counties. But in saying that

I

am not saying

the ability to drive every last British soldier out of Belfast,

out of Derry, Armagh, Antrim,

Down

ability to sicken the British forces

McGuinness repeated graves.

caught that

new tough

Republican Army, have got the capability, the

ways and means of bringing about military

it

activists killed in

the effects of the

activists

first

his

The exception was

of occupation/

message

the

or anywhere else. But they have the

at all

but one of the Loughgall dead

commemoration

for Padraig

Moy, County Tyrone, where McGuinness was just a sidelining reflected the fact that

deep

fault lines

McKearney

in

face in the crowd. This

had been developing

Republican Movement over the dropping of abstention and over the

in the politi-

A significant minority of the

cal direction being taken

by the leadership.

army had dissented from

the abstention vote and, while staying on board,

made

certain that their dissent

surfacing. There gall

talk

had been 'putting

making the

was

full

it

use of 'local

among up

to

was recorded. This dissent was now IRA unit at Lough-

traditionalists that the

Adams', flexing

their military muscles,

commander prerogative'. The in-fighting before to get a member of Republican Sinn

ceremony arose over an attempt

Fein to give the oration.

A compromise solution was reached and a veteran

republican, Stan Corrigan,

was

finally chosen.

Padraig McKearney had been on the run since 1983 when he was involved in the mass escape of 23 prisoners from the the second family

been killed to

in a

member to

prison.

He was

die 'on active service'. His brother Sean had

premature explosion 14 years

be sure their deaths were not

Padraig' s brother

Maze

Tommy, doing

in vain. life in

A

the

earlier.

The family wanted

letter

was read on behalf of

Maze

prison for murder, and

THE LIBYAN CONNECTION sister

Margaret,

who

couldn't

come

arrested. Pointedly, their final

153

north from Dublin for feLr of being

message was

to ask

people to leave the

men died. (When Tommy McKearney was released in 1993 he hitched up with Republican Sinn Fein, who by then were accusing Gerry Adams of sell-out graveside vowing never to compromise on the ideal for which the

and compromise.) But the debilitating in-fighting over policy, the Republican Movement's failure to turn all,

on a sustained escalation of the armed campaign and, above

the change in British

retrospect, the

IRA

Army

mark 1988

learned that the odds against

could continue the fight and win war.

tactics

many

as the year when, in

them were too

battles, but they

great.

They

could not win the

8 Sickening the British AT 9. 15AM ON in

Derry

city

13

APRIL 1988 the

staff at the

have an unexpected

and false moustaches walk

North West Centre of Learning day.

start to the

Each

Two men

wearing wigs

They order the The two men are IRA volunteers on an operation. The phone rings out front. The manager is brought out to answer it and he is met by the sight of eight more men wearing in.

carries a pistol.

occupants and staff into the backroom

toilet.

very obvious wigs and false moustaches or false beards.

placed

at

each of four sash-type windows.

One man

at

Two men

are

each window

is

much changes for the next hour or so windows, drogue bombs at the ready, the manager goes

carrying a 'drogue bomb'. Nothing the in

men

are at the

and out five or

the

six times to handle

phone

calls.

Then just

phone rings again. The manager comes out and

The

police arrive on the scene.

As

all

the

explanations are sought,

10.30am

after

men it

are gone.

turns out that

bombs had been thrown from the windows at an RUC Landrover passing in the street outside. They failed to explode. The area was sealed off but no-one was caught. This was the IRA in action, a typical small-scale operation, part of the the

constant

war of attrition described by Martin McGuinness

British forces of occupation.

The

incident

was logged by

as sickening the

the

RUC as one

of three IRA-related incidents in Derry that day. The other two were finds:

hand grenades and

igniters

found

in

one house, 41bs of commercial explo-

and command wire in another. The drogue bombs - 'bean tins' or improvised anti-armour hand grenades - had been on the scene since July 1987. They were a direct sives

by-product of the Libyan shipments, based as they were on Semtex explosive.

The drogues took various

shapes, but in essence they were bean tins

or the like, packed with about one

pound of Semtex and a detonator, with

a short handle sticking out the front.

They were

at

easily

made, simple

to

throw

an armoured police van but potentially lethal on impact. The effect was

SICKENING THE BRITISH to

punch a hole through the armoured covering followed by an

155

internal

explosion which ripped the vehicle apart, leaving no forensic evidence.

They were a

classic piece of invention, totally suited to terrorist guerrilla

warfare, urban and rural. their

mobile

They

units, giving

In their first year of use,

exploded.

One

RUC,

causing them to re-armour

layer.

96 drogue bombs were thrown but only 46

RUC constable, Colin Gilmore,

Belfast on 25 January 1988.

three

terrified the

them an extra outer

Two

was

It

happened

in

drogue bombs were thrown

at the last

of

armoured police mobile vans

killed.

as they entered the Falls

Road from

One drogue exploded on the road and one hit Constable Gilmore' s vehicle. He died from serious head wounds in hospital. Two other RUC men and four passers-by were injured. Of those injured in that year 16 were RUC, two were Army and 20 were civilians. Broadway before nine o'clock

Drogues were thrown

Moy,

Strabane,

in

at night.

Toomebridge, Craigavon, Newcastle, Cookstown,

Deny, Omagh, Dungannon, Pomeroy, Newry, Irvinestown,

Clogher, and the majority in Belfast.

The period from 1987

to

1988 included major incidents which impinged

on the consciousness of Westminster and Downing activity

Take

was

the

month of April 1987, during which

incidents where Belfast,

IRA

commercial

devices exploded:

casualties'; 6th,

RUC

the

1st April,

But most IRA

TSB

bomb

logged

Northbrooke

target, 'no casualties'; 3rd, Ulster

Place, Derry, 'no casualties'; 3rd,

Street,

Bank, Waterloo

Bank, Waterloo Place, Deny, 'no

North Howard Street Mill, Belfast, 'no casualties'; 6th,

RUC station, Belfast, 'no casualties'; 7th, Donegall Road, RUC/UDR patrol attacked, 'no casualties'; 7th, New Barnsley

Springfield Belfast,

Street.

small-scale, almost routine, part of the 'sickening' process.

Road

RUC station, Belfast,

'no casualties'; 7th,

target, 'no casualties'; 8th,

Water

Street,

Newry, commercial

Andersonstown Leisure Centre,

Belfast,

RUC

mobile patrol attacked, 'no casualties'; 9th, Antrim Road/New Lodge Road, Belfast,

RUC mobile patrol attacked,

'no casualties';

Coalisland, 'no casualties'; 12th, Belcoo '1

RUC Reserve injured';

16th,

1

18th,

Rosemount

RUC

Garage

RUC station, County Fermanagh,

Customs shed, Belleek, County Fermanagh,

'no casualties'; security force base, Bessbrook Mill, soldiers injured'; 17th,

1th, Oliver's

County Armagh,

'3

Ballygawley by-pass, Dungannon, 'no casualties'; station,

Deny,

'no casualties'; 20th, Glasvey Drive,

Glassdrummond Army observation post, County Armagh, 'no casualties'; 24th, Springfield Road RUC station, Belfast, 'no casualties'; 25th, Monagh by-pass, Belfast, RUC Belfast, '2 soldiers

and

1

civilian injured'; 23rd,

1

THE LONG WAR

56

attacked, 'no casualties'; 25th, Killeen, on

Maurice Gibson and

Justice

bomb, 8

his wife Cecily killed in remote-controlled

New

civilians injured'; 26th,

casualties'; 27th,

Andersonstown

RUC

Dundalk/Newry road, 'Lord

Barnsley

RUC

RUC

station, Belfast, 'no

station, Belfast, 'no casualties';

28th,

Antrim Road,

RUC

station, Belfast, 'no casualties'; 29th, Fairhill, '1 civilian

Tyrone,

station, Belfast 'no casualties'; 29th,

injured'; 30th,

Oldpark

New Barnsley RUC

Pomeroy, County station, Belfast, 'no

casualties'.

In

amongst those 27 IRA bomb attacks

certainly attracted the attention of

was

lies

one major 'success' which

Westminster and Downing

the killing of Northern Ireland's second

That

Street.

most senior judge, Lord Justice

Gibson, and his wife Cecily. They were returning via Dublin from a motoring holiday. In cold analysis,

bomb

detonate a

in 'no

very high-security risk in nationalist

on 'shoot

'target'.

Lord

Justice

June 1984.

and determination

to

hit a

Gibson had become notorious

eyes since he dismissed the case against three

to kill' charges in

their 'courage

was a highly successful operation,

it

man's land' just north of the Border and

He had

praised the

in bringing the three

RUC officers RUC men for

deceased [IRA]

men

to justice, in this case to the final court of justice.'

A In that

The

same month, April 1987,

list

UDR,

the

indicates the breadth of

British

rators'

MONTH OF

and

RUC logged 24 shootings by the IRA.

IRA

activity.

Here the

targets

were RUC,

Army, alleged informers, alleged criminals, alleged 'collaboBroadway Street, Belfast, stray

loyalist paramilitaries. April 1st,

gun attack on Army,

bullet in

IRA ACTIVITY

'1

Belfast, shot while answering

civilian injured'; 2nd,

back door,

'1

Havana Gardens,

civilian dead'; 3rd, Bally-

RUC killed, RUC Reserve injured'; 3rd, Market Street, Derry, shot by lone gunman, '1 UDR nahinch

RUC station, IRA fire on car leaving station,

'1

dead'; 4th, Glenaline Road, Belfast, punishment shooting,

both legs in

';

5th,

Church Row,

Belfast,

both legs'; 6th, North Queen Street,

1

'1

punishment shooting,

male shot '1

in

male shot

RUC station, Belfast, gun and mortar

attack, 'no casualties'; 6th, Ravelston Park, Belfast, shots fired during

armed robbery,

'1

civilian shot in right knee'; 7th, Falls

Road, Belfast,

attack on soldiers standing at vehicles, '2 soldiers shot in legs'; Portrush, Derry, attack on

Rock

RUC

patrol, '2

RUC Reserves dead';

Crescent, Belfast, punishment shooting,

12th, Killeen,

Newry, alleged informer,

'1

'1

male shot

male shot

in

12th,

1

1th,

West

both knees';

in head'; 17th,

Loanda

1

SICKENING THE BRITISH Crescent, Newry, punishment shooting,

'1

male shot

Promenade, Newcastle, County Down, attack on

in golf

club carpark,

punishment shooting, Tyrone, shot shots at

at his

Belfast,

RUC

'1

RUC

on beat,

RUC

1

dead'; 25th, Ballymurphy Road, Belfast,

'1

in

both legs'; 25th, Pomeroy, County

UDR dead';

gun and grenade

West Link,

26th,

New

Belfast,

RUC

Barnsley

attack, 'no casualties'; 27th, Stanfield

punishment shooting, 'man shot

in

UVF commander,

both legs'; 28th, Shankill

'1

male shot dead'; 28th,

RUC station, Belfast, gun and grenade attack,

30th, Springhill

'

civilian dead'; 23rd, Derry, shot

vehicles, 'no casualties'; 26th,

Road, Belfast, shooting of Antrim Road

home,

male shot

'1

farmhouse,

RUC/ Army

station, Belfast,

Row,

'1

in knee'; 20th, Central

County Tyrone, worker on

dead'; 21st, Ballymulligan Road, Magherafelt, security force base shot while at

157

Avenue, Belfast, punishment shooting,

'no casualties'; '

1

male shot

in

ankles and thigh'.

This constitutes armed

IRA

activity for

one month. Add on the next

months, to complete a 12-month period, and the to

total

1

of IRA shootings runs

140 and explosions to 154. The explosions included the Enniskillen

bomb

on 8 November. In 108 of these bombings there were 'no casualties'. Yet

74

RUC/Army were

injured and 5 killed; 107 civilians injured and 12 killed,

in addition to the killing

of Lord Justice and Lady Gibson, the

UVF man

William 'Frenchie' Marchant and another leading loyalist paramilitary figure,

They

UDA. In the 140 shootings of that year (April RUC/UDR, 4 regular soldiers and 13 others.

John McMichael of the

1987-88) the

IRA

dealt out

killed

22

49 punishment shootings, leaving

victims permanently maimed. failed to

None

virtually all of these

bombs that By a rough of every ten IRA

of these figures includes

go off or were defused, or operations called

estimate, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, about nine out

off.

operations were aborted or failed. In that

same 12-month period

the

RUC recovered

nine more taken after the Loughgall ambush.

105

IRA weapons,

They recovered 43

plus

kilos of

commercial explosives (Semtex) and 5,526 kilos of homemade explosives (including defused bombs). These arms and

weapons

across the North: Newcastle, Derry, Strabane,

finds

Omagh,

were made

right

Castlederg, Cooks-

town, Craigavon, Larne, Ballymena, Antrim, Trillick, Lisburn, Dungannon,

Randalstown, Rasharkin, Eglinton, Limavady, Newry, Coalisland. The

was found in Belfast. Most of this kind of activity - shootings, grenade throwing, under-car booby trap bombs, mortars - went virtually unreported, unknown and

biggest quantity of weapons, though not explosives,

THE LONG WAR

158

unacknowledged British

Army

Army on

bases,

soldiers

alert. It

what kept the RUC,

it is

was why mobile

government buildings, leading

most of which

They could be attacked

failed but

at

UDR and

vehicles, police stations,

politicians, judges, policemen,

on and off duty had to be physically protected, cordoned

blast-proofed.

in,

Westminster. But

at

constant

off,

wired

any time by a number of means,

which were always potentially

fatal.

THE IRA CONTAINED

By

the late 1980s

was

it

clear to both sides that, while the

be beaten, they could be contained. Politically and

most

significant factor.

away

their

It

was why

the

IRA had

guns for another day, as they had done

or to continue with a long 'sickening' war.

IRA

could not

militarily, that

to decide in the

was

whether

the

to put

preceding decades,

The IRA very

often

worked on

an ad hoc basis, making use of good 'operators' and equipment wherever they existed, going for targets as they presented themselves. But there a structure

breaking them up and picking them the General

was

and a discipline which prevented the security forces from

Army

Convention,

off.

The supreme body of the IRA was

made up of delegates from the

brigades and

other sections of the army. Since 1969, the Convention had met only twice, in

1970 and 1986. The Convention elected an

turn elected an

Army

Army

Army

Executive, which in

Council of seven members to take overall charge. The

Council appointed a Chief of Staff and

staff with eight departments,

it

was supported by

the

GHQ

comprising the Quartermaster, and Directors

of Engineering, Publicity, Operations, Finance, Intelligence, Security and

Below

Training.

the

sections, Southern

mand

(1

1

Army

Council and

Command

counties).

Dublin brigade with

Working its

GHQ staff, the army broke into two

(handling 21 counties) and Northern to

Southern

active service units

Command (ASUs) and

staff

Com-

were the

a scattering of

ASUs. Southern Command worked mainly in a quartermaster role Northern Command which controlled the 'war zone'. Working to

rural

for

Northern

Command were

at least five

brigades: Belfast, Derry, Donegal,

Tyrone/Monaghan and Armagh. Each brigade had In practice,

eight

men

or

it

was

its

own ASUs.

the small tight-knit active service unit of about five to

women,

occasionally larger, which carried out the operations.

There was some overlap of people between ASUs, but very

from one

to another.

Weapons were very

tightly controlled

little

swapping

by the brigade

who reigned supreme, though some activists used only their own well-worn guns. Selected teams would be put together by the Army

quartermaster,

SICKENING THE BRITISH

Deaths of IRA Activists from

1

980

Source:

to April

An Phoblacht

1

159

993

160

THE LONG WAR due to premature detonation of their own explosives or incendiary devices from 1969 to October 1993 IRA

fatalities

1982

1969

1983

1970

2

1971

9

1984

2

1972

38

1985

1

1973

14

1986

1974

11

1987

3

1975

6

1988

3

1976

9

1989

1

1977

1990

1978 1979

2

1992

1980

2

1993

1981

1

Total

1991

1

105

Source:

RUC

Deaths of IRA Activists from 1969 to April 1993

Belfast (First Brigade)

Belfast

(Second Brigade)

Belfast (Third Brigade)

19 41

45

Clare

1

Cork

2

Cumann Cumann Cumann Cumann

na

mBan

(Belfast)

7

na mBan (Downpatrick)

1

na mBan (Newcastle)

1

na

mBan

DerryCity

(Portadown)

1

38

Deny County

7

Donegal

2

Dublin

4

England Fianna Eireann

GHQ

Staff

4 19 5

Limerick

1

Long Kesh

7

H-Block

Monaghan Newry

2 10

North Antrim North

10

Armagh

6 10

Portlaoise

2

Sligo

2

South Armagh

South Fermanagh South

Down

Tyrone

10

2 8

52

Sinn Fein deaths, 1969-April 1993 21

Source:

An Phoblacht

SICKENING THE BRITISH

Council/GHQ Britain

staff for special operations like Gibraltar.

161

Operations in

were generally run from Dublin, using southern or northern person-

nel or personnel based in Britain.

Numbers of active members of ASUs

varied and were hard to verify. Belfast

was always

most active and had

the

about 120 directly active members. Derry /North Donegal had less than 100.

After that numbers dropped, though not necessarily activity - South

Armagh/Dundalk, 2

Cappagh, up

to

units totalling about 40, very effective but irregular;

20 members, strong and active; Coalisland,

Fermanagh, 2 ASUs, one around Pettigo and

into east

1

ASU;

Donegal and another

around Newtownbutler/Lisnaskea, both strong and very active; South 1 ASU, on and off; Castlewellan/Hilltown/Kilcoo had the nucleus ASUs; Down, 1 ASU; North Antrim, 1 ASU. Overall, Northern

Derry,

of 2

Command area comprised about 300 hands-on of volunteers on call

is

added, the numbers rise to about 750.

In the late 1980s the Provisional

very good

activists but, if another layer

at intelligence,

IRA was

a sophisticated organisation,

ingenuity and propaganda. Their weakness was

As time went commitment developed because of their

a slackening of central control, particularly over rural areas.

on a lessening

in ideological

members' gradual recognition, or

at least

acceptance, of Dail Eireann as the

legitimate government of the Irish Republic.

By

the early 1990s the loose-

ness grew to the extent that untrained volunteers were admitted, local 'fund-raising' robberies were volunteers

became

irregular (£20 a

week

more

at

times being

tolerated,

for a married

wages

man, £10

to

if single,

a once-off payment of £100 to the family of an arrested volunteer).

The IRA had While also

this type

to

pay another price for operating

removed them somewhat from the people,

urban areas. As one Belfast 1970s and early 1980s put ship.

You always had

You'd have

man who was

it:

a say.

'In

to trust that he's

interned for

says: 'In the early

days

all

kicked out of some.' The

interned and active in the early

might not know who's a commander.

good enough. They had a choice of keeping

familiarity broke down.'

cells,

Another early

two years and

withdrawing from activist, a training

'ran the streets for nine

houses were a hundred percent.

first

it

particularly in the bigger

on losing men and weapons. They withdrew into

who was

small tight-knit units.

those days the ground picked the leader-

Now you

the people, losing the trust of the people.' officer

in

of organisation was a necessary response for survival,

man

interjects: 'Cell structure

months'

Now you'd get changed

things,

These were men who remembered the IRA as a

kind of people's army, with street battles and

street

camaraderie, where the

THE LONG WAR

162

OC and the NCOs - sat waiting in

'crew'- the to

'call

houses' to be told what

do next. 'You were never parted from your weapon, you

weapon.' 'At that stage

was straightforward

it

no reaction we'd

[against the system]. If there'd been

your

slept with

off-the-streets reaction

be

still

sittin'

here

was

there

under Stormont, no fuckin' vote, no nothin'.' So, while the criticism of the trimmer, tighter

on the

streets, so too

fuckin' ballot

There's no

was

box and

way

IRA

organisation

the support for violence.

that's the

the nationalist

way

it's

community

'It's

goin' to stay will

the

till

gun and the

Britain leaves.

be without an army again.'

The younger men kept coming. Some of the older men stayed. The IRA would remain a formidable outfit, capable of turning on the action in a concerted way: 282 bombs in 1992, far more than in any of the preceding six years.

THE OPPOSITION Yet, ranged against

On

the ground,

them was a

far

more

between RUC, British

armed personnel. Above

the ground

electronic surveillance capability.

numbers of undercover

sophisticated security apparatus.

Army and UDR, and

Hidden

in the air

The

level of coordination of resources, within their

the British

Army

service and

all

the

proper, with

way

to the

Army

own

Prime Minister. The

force as well as with

MI5, the

commander had

(DMSUs) and

mobile support units (HMSUs), each comprising 24 police units, fully

armed and

travelling in

secret

RUC was divided into

12 divisions and further sub-divisions. Each divisional

mobile support

significant

RUC developed a high

intelligence, with

access to divisional mobile support units

were 30,000

a vast array of

shadows were

in the

intelligence operatives.

there

was

headquarters

officers.

These

armoured vehicles, could

be rapidly deployed into areas of activity without disrupting normal policing. The MSUs built up a substantial knowledge of the people and geography of their divisional units

area.

(SSUs) were men trained

The

HMSUs

and other special support

in anti-terrorist tactics, in rapid-reaction

firing without any regard for the concept of minimum force, similar to the

Garda Task Force and were given primacy

special units in British police forces.

in security matters, they inevitably

equivalent of the SAS.

A

more

secretive special unit,

(E4A), which knit the police, the

SAS and MI5 more

Once

formed

the

RUC

their

own

Echo 4 Alpha

closely together,

carried out killings in the early 1980s which resulted in the 1984 John Stalker inquiry into the 'shoot to kill' policy. At the top of Northern

SICKENING THE BRITISH was

Ireland's security system to

London. He fed

into a

the Security Coordinator, reporting directly

network of overlapping intelligence committees,

in particular the Joint Intelligence

Downing

Office in

163

Street.

Committee

(JIC), located in the Cabinet

The JIC was chaired by

the

Deputy Under

Secretary at the Foreign Office and around the table were heads of MI5,

MI6, Director General of Intelligence others.

at the

Ministry of Defence plus

JIC reports went to the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Committee

which met each Wednesday morning, chaired by the Prime Minister. These bodies dealt with global intelligence matters, super-power business, the nuclear power balance, spy

of nuisance value, an

satellites.

irritant,

From

that angle, the

IRA was

mostly

very rarely centre- stage.

The RUC, which had overall charge of security since the mid-1970s, knew virtually every member of the IRA. They knew their houses, their command structures, their accomplices, their habits, their capabilities. The RUC could demonstrate this knowledge by coming down hard with house searches,

body searches and heavy

tactics in certain areas.

There was a

constant level of 'harassment'. But the heavier tactics were mostly deployed

only it,

when

the political climate

was

when

'right',

for instance, after an atrocity like the Enniskillen

public opinion tolerated

bomb. By the

late

1980s

RUC too, in particular their interrogation techniques. Unlike the IRA, the RUC were visible targets. They went about in uniform

the

IRA knew

the

and were stationed

in static buildings. In the nature

the initiative, being a secret civilian group

who

of things the

IRA

and blend back into housing estates and townlands. But on the other the

whole panoply of the

police, British

Army,

government had the capacity for swift response,

As one

held

could choose their targets

intelligence services and

to

RUC commander claimed, the RUC were

side,

undermine and

'not

infiltrate.

on top of the Provos'

but they were 'one step ahead.'

PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITIES Although most of their the

IRA had

activity

went unnoticed outside the affected

areas,

maintained the capacity to carry out major operations which

suddenly raised their profile. The 1987 killing of Lord Justice Gibson was one. British actions or unexpected turns of events helped too. In republican

heartlands the

unwelcome

taph, a short time after the

public

odium

become

sight of

Mrs Thatcher

bomb exploded

at the

some of the Mrs Thatcher had Propaganda was always a key there, countered

against the IRA. Since the hunger strikes,

a 'hate figure', easily exploited.

Enniskillen ceno-

THE LONG WAR

164

element

in

IRA

Volunteers were told mistakes it,

which

them.' In

they

...

- exploit

strategy

when being

made

a situation and turn

'green

the mistake,

in turn creates a

new

we

to

it

:

exploit their mistake,

situation

where we could

by propagating

at least

embarrass

3

March 1988

IRA with a mix to their advantage. On 16 March

three events in quick succession left the

of public opinion which, on balance, turned

the funerals of the three activists shot dead in Gibraltar at

your advantage.

booked' 'We exploit their political

Milltown cemetery

in

Andersonstown, west Belfast. Thousands of

mourners were present. Suddenly, a lone and lobbing grenades

began

firing shots

killed:

Tommy McErlean,

More

into the

gunman, Michael Stone,

crowd. Three people were

what was a

IRA member.

chilling, terrifying attack.

public sympathy followed and deep fear spread in west Belfast

in particular.

woman,

loyalist

John Murray and Kevin Brady, an

than 60 were injured in

Enormous

were taking place

However, two days

later the

IRA

shot dead a Protestant

Gillian Johnston, and injured her fiance, at Belleek,

County

IRA claimed they had attacked a member of the UDR, then admitted they had made a mistake. The event caused deep revulsion, particularly in County Donegal where the IRA unit was known

Fermanagh. At

to

first

the

have operated from and where they hid

their

weapons. (A 400-gallon

tank found buried in a forest near Ballyshannon in

of being the

IRA hide which

murder was

partly lost in the events surrounding

May

oil

1988 was suspected

stored the weapons.) But the Gillian Johnston it.

funeral of Kevin Brady, shot at Milltown cemetery,

The following day was taking

place.

the

Two

men drove towards and into part of the crowd. In the melee that followed, one of the men produced a gun and a huge crowd set upon the car in near frenzy. This in the

same

was happening just three days

vicinity so

it

after the

Milltown killings and

could have been another loyalist attack. Deep fear

two were plain-clothes British Army corporals David Howes and Derek Woods, who were later said to have strayed. Both men were taken and shot dead in a cold and brutal fashion by two IRA 'hard men' - gun put to head, brains and blood blown was barely below the

out,

naked bodies

look

like a lynch

and

people.

in

its

surface. In fact, the

left on waste land. TV pictures made the attacking crowd mob. Huge opprobrium was directed against west Belfast

Mrs Thatcher met one of the

soldiers' coffins

England, again re-balancing local opinion

when

it

arrived

in certain hardline republican

areas.

When

the dust settled on this extraordinary sequence of events,

from the

SICKENING THE BRITISH Gibraltar shootings to the soldiers' coffins arriving

propaganda advantage probably

tilted

away from

165

home, the external

the Republican

Move-

ment. British public and political opinion, so important to the guerrilla strategy for withdrawal,

crowd followed by as

freedom

But

was

hostile.

The

sight of the frenzied

naked dead soldiers did not portray the IRA

fighters with a noble cause.

It

depicted them as murderous thugs.

of their greatest support, west and north Belfast, public

in the areas

feeling

was extremely

that of the

flowing strongly in favour of the Republican Movement.

still

Six of their people had been killed, three by the S AS in Gibraltar and three

by a

There was deep hurt

loyalist in their local graveyard.

at

how

they were

being portrayed as a community.

was against this kind of background that support for the IRA was maintained, that young people continued to volunteer, that the IRA kept up It

their attempts to intensify

British

Army

and escalate the conflict and

continued to contain the threat.

Loughgall commemorations,

bomb

at

packed into seven six

weeks

earlier.

in

May

1988, Derry

RUC

and

Sunday of

the

that the

the

IRA

placed a 1,6001b

RUC station. The bomb was defused. The explosives,

Road

Strand

On

plastic dustbins,

False

number

were

plates

set inside a

were

similar van in the North, a 'ringer', as they call

van stolen

fitted to it.

in

Dublin

match an existing

This was a

common

ploy.

number would pass the test in the RUC computer at bomb-carrying vehicle to travel freely. A Peugeot 405 car, stolen in Tralee, was ready for the getaway. The homemade explosives in the bins were 'the Donegal mix' or ANNIE (ammonium nitrate and nitrobenzine) mixed with diesel oil and a booster charge. The The

false registration

a checkpoint, allowing the

l,6001bs of high-nitrogen fertiliser

down through

would have been meticulously ground

a coffee-grinder or the like.

At the time Derry IRA were

reckoned to have five bomb-makers, two of them on the run addition to the

bomb-makers

for the Strand

have used two teams of about six each

up

to its placing.

It

was

to

Road bomb,

in

Donegal. In

the

IRA would

in the intelligence operation leading

have been a high-prestige explosion, coinciding

exactly with the anniversary of the Loughgall ambush, a very suitable time to strike back. In the

end the Derry IRA were foiled and the

catch the culprits. Another statistic

was recorded. The

RUC failed to

'sickening'

war

continued apace.

An Phoblacht published reports of IRA actions in its 'War News' section. 'The Crown forces have been rocked over the past Three weeks

later

seven days by Volunteers of Oglaigh na hEireann launching attacks

in

each

THE LONG WAR

166

of the occupied Six Counties, including one on the Balmoral Show, the establishment's professed "jewel in the crown".

amounted

to

Crown

one British soldier dead and fourteen

four seriously.'

Belfast brigade,

said,

it

forces' casualties

RUC personnel injured,

had people

in

place several hours

before the attack and identified their target, a divisional mobile support unit

RUC. The next report was

of the

search after a the south said:

1

,4001b

Armagh

of a soldier killed on 21

bomb, placed on

brigade,

the roadside at

May

in

a follow-up

Glasdrummond by

was discovered and defused. An IRA statement

'One of our engineering units had positioned a pressure-plate device

containing lOlbs of high explosives in an area where a crown forces' search

was

in progress.

The mine detonated,

Next were reports of brigade. In the

Kinawley

first,

activity

killing

one enemy

soldier.'

by Fermanagh brigade and East Tyrone

an 'anti-personnel device' was found and defused

RUC barracks. The same day, Sunday 22 May, 'volunteers of the at an RUC patrol as made

East Tyrone brigade threw two impact grenades

way along

its

the

Drum Road

in

to detonate.'

seriously injured in Derry. Derry brigade

volunteers placed a booby-trap

was parked outside

RUC man.

it

Cookstown. Both devices

were deflected and failed

target but

was

at

The same

were reported as

bomb under the The device

the Classic Bar.

hit their

car of an

intended

night, a

man

stating:

'Our

RUC man which

detonated, seriously injur-

RUC claims that the injured man was no longer active member of the RUC, we are satisfied that he was. We take this

ing the

an

Despite

opportunity to reiterate our position on those wishing to sever links with

crown

the

forces.

Anyone who

known.' Next day, East Tyrone

resigns should is

make

their resignation

reported to have stated:

opportunity to acknowledge receipt of the resignation of a

Dungannon area.' The next report was of a grenade

'We

take this

UDR soldier in

the

Down Command. the

It

seriously injured an

main promenade

Saturday, 21

'two

G3

on the

in the

the

knew

RUC man

rifles'

was an explosion that the

'as

he travelled along

holiday resort of Newcastle' around

was reported in

1

1pm on

Street barracks, Belfast, with

for Sunday,

22 May, 10pm. Next

the Ligoniel area of North Belfast, described

by Belfast brigade: 'After a robbery unit

by a four-man unit of the South

May. Shooting on North Queen

high velocity

list

attack

in a local social club

an active service

RUC would arrive at the scene and placed a mine where

crown forces would take up

positions.

At approximately 10.15pm, they

detonated the 201b anti-personnel mine which resulted

in five

RUC men

being injured, two of them seriously.' Finally, Fermanagh brigade was

RUC and UDR/RIR

Killed

by Republican groups by

from 1980

to

RUC

Sub-Division

June 1993

Source:

UDR

killed

1970-1980

(the majority by republican groups)

98

RUC

killed

1970-1980

(the majority by republican groups)

130

Civilians killed

RUC

by Republican groups from 1980 to June 1993

Source:

RUC

THE LONG WAR

168

reported as issuing a last warning

who

builders

'to

are helping in the

reconstruction of crown forces' installations in the area. 'desist

It

warned them

to

immediately or suffer the consequences/ Put together, these reports

were designed

to give the appearance of

on the 'crown forces'

every turn.

at

armed

on

activity

all fronts,

intimidation of civilian 'collaborators', essential elements of the struggle.

It

taking

was armed propaganda, mixed with

It

didn't enhance the chances of the British people

armed

demanding a

withdrawal from Ireland. They wouldn't have noticed. But these actions

were a matter of

life

and death

to the

RUC

and put severe pressure on

building workers at police stations.

So armed struggle continued, week Phoblachfs 'War News', fed

into the

week

in

out, reported in

An

RUC computer: the IRA notching up

117 shootings and 186 bombings during 1988; 130 shootings and 151 bombings during 1989; 131 shootings and 111 bombings in 1990; 193 shootings and 187 bombings in 1991 and, during 1992, 144 shootings and

282 bombings. There was no stopping the IRA

if

they didn't want to be

stopped.

TALKS Nonetheless, the Republican tack,

Movement were

embarking on a course during which

testing the wind,

political pressure

exerted in addition to the military campaign which, on to

be insufficient to achieve their aims. Even

be a long and stormy journey. At

Movement there

at its best, this

was going

this stage the issue for the

to

Republican

whether or not armed struggle

until a British declaration to

withdraw was won, or whether

would be a continuation of the

veto', in the

would be

own, had proved

to the question of

boiled

would continue

down

its

changing

medium term

British presence

and of the 'Unionist

or longer, after the ending of the military

campaign. The quandary for the Republican

Movement was that once they make it yield results.

entered the political process ways had to be found to

Otherwise the arguments for a wholesale return to military

tactics

would

be overwhelming. There could be no recurrence of the failure of the earlier

attempts at a political resolution in 1972 and 1975

Government had talked

The the

talks of

IRA and

directly to the

1972 were the

first

when

the British

IRA.

and only

direct,

formal meeting between

ministers of the British Government.

They were

the nearest

the Provisionals got to a repeat of the Treaty negotiations of 1921 British

Government negotiated

partial

when

the

independence for the 26-County area

.

SICKENING THE BRITISH with the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic and the IRA. British side in

Ireland,

the

1972 were William Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Northern

team, flown to England in a British

Adams, released tance.

On

and one of his junior ministers, Paul Channon. The six-man

for the occasion

request of the IRA.

the specific

169

It

Army

from detention indicated

IRA

helicopter, included Gerry in

Long Kesh

prison, at

Adams's standing and impor-

others were Chief of Staff Sean MacStiofain, Ivor Bell, Daithi

The

Twomey

O'Connell, Seamus

and Martin McGuinness.

Shevlin, went as secretary to the delegation.

A solicitor, Myles

was hard

It

to

escape the

conclusion that the British Government had 'recognised' the Provisional

IRA Army Ireland.

The IRA delegation

make-up,

some right to negotiate on behalf of London had been specifically military in

Council, conferring on

fitting the role laid

Council, namely,

'to

to

down

tion

by the

later

British

in the

IRA

Constitution for the

into the

House of Commons record by

confirmed by the IRA. They were:

Government

that

it is

the right of

all

acting as a unit to decide the future of Ireland; 2 (a) to

withdraw British forces from

this,

Irish soil

by

all

A

1

Mr

public declara-

the people of Ireland

A declaration of intent

January 1975; (b) pending

1

the immediate withdrawal of British forces

general amnesty for

Army

conclude peace or declare war'

The IRA demands were read Whitelaw and

it

from

sensitive areas; 3

A

political prisoners in both countries, for internees

and detainees, and for persons on the wanted

list.

These were the

classic,

demands of the IRA, an echo of those made prior to 1921, and each decade since. The failure to achieve them in the past was a huge

traditional in

motivating factor for the Provisionals; this time, from the

determined that the 'unfinished business'

would be

start

of 1970, they

finished. Ultimately this

determination led to the long unbroken war strategy which continued through three generations from 1970 into the 1990s. In 1972, however, the prevailing talks

IRA

view, supported by the Whitelaw earlier, was remember 1972.

and the abolition of the Stormont parliament four months

One

that victory

was

We called

the year of victory.

in that

it

near.

activist

year to get the Brits out.

I

It

from Deny

recalls:

'I

do

as

remember I had was very

to

intense.

I

much

as possible

didn't expect to survive

6 in '72.'

The IRA demands were formally made, formally considered by the British Cabinet and formally refused. Former Chief of Staff MacStiofain said the message from the Whitelaw talks was that Britain would it

not willingly leave Ireland and that only an escalation of the

would do

the job.

7

IRA campaign

This they did, carrying out about 1,400 explosions and

1

THE LONG WAR

70

thousands of shootings that year. The year 1972 was the worst of the conflict, with

was

467 deaths, July the worst ever month.

to say the talks

Later,

Mr Whitelaw

were a mistake which should not be repeated.

THE 1975 TALKS Two-and-a-half years at the table

later the

Republican

Movement

again found a place

with the British Government, though in an entirely different

form. This time, an extended unilateral truce over Christmas 1974 was followed by a long seven-and-a-half month agreed truce which lasted from 10 February to 22 September. The breakthrough resulted from preliminary discussions at Feakle, County Clare, between leading

members of the IRA

and Sinn Fein and senior Protestant clergymen. Significantly, that meeting

was broken up by the Gardai

'just as

we were

getting

Hopes were high the

mood for serious

in the

somewhere towards

Canon William Arlow.

a permanent ceasefire', said one of the clergymen,

Republican Movement that the British were

negotiation. They

were represented by senior

in

officials,

including Frank Cooper from the Northern Ireland Office and James Alan from the Foreign Office - no politicians. The Government proper stayed safely at arm's length. led

by

The Republican Movement's three-man team was

6 Bradaigh himself and included Billy McKee, one-time OC Belfast.

The undisclosed venue was Confusion

later arose

a

house

Hollywood, County Down.

over the alleged agenda and the negotiating position

of the Republican Movement.

6 Bradaigh said the talks

proposition agreed by the British

withdrawal from Ireland.' that the

in

8

Government

devise structures for

'

Much

later, in

Republican Movement had been

British during Christmas

'to

were based on a

1974 stating

1992,

O Bradaigh

in receipt

that

tures of disengagement from Ireland.'

'HMG

would claim

of a message from the

wished

to devise struc-

There could be a world of

difference between 'withdrawal' (possibly referring to withdrawal of the

Army) and 'disengagement' (which could only mean a complete British pull-out). Canon Arlow, who had a third-party role in the talks, said the British side made a verbal statement that the purpose was 'to bring abou withdrawal from Ireland.'

According

to the

most senior British

never about 'disengagement' but,

if

a complete withdrawal of the British

would be

them

in return for a

official involved, the talks

wei

successful, they could have resulted

Army from internal security. This in IRA violence and a move by

genuine reduction

into politics, he said, adding: 'This

is

what worried Dublin.' He said

SICKENING THE BRITISH there

was

'great hostility'

from other

parts of Ireland.

As

171

for the proposition

of Britain leaving Ireland, he said, this 'was not real politics. That has been a [British]

judgement throughout.' That meant, he explained,

that Britain

continued to have a strategic interest in the whole of Ireland and

ways

contemplated a United Ireland they'd have to find strategic interest, at

by holding on

one stage during the 1975

something

less than full British

to ports

and the

talks, the

if

they

defend that

His view was that

like.

IRA were

to

willing to settle for

withdrawal, but that they got into internal

problems with 'hard men' coming out of prisons. Canon Arlow confirmed this interpretation.

He thought

Movement

the Republican

would have accepted a 'peaceful, honourable settlement', drawal of the

6

Army

to barracks in Britain, plus

negotiators i.e.,

a with-

an amnesty for prisoners.

Bradaigh claimed the Republican Movement representatives had

'offered to deliver a

declaration that

was

reality

it

permanent ceasefire

would

that Britain

quit Ireland

was willing

in return for a public British

by a date

to

to negotiate a

but had no intention of conceding disengagement.

ness to negotiate with the

IRA was

12

be negotiated.'

withdrawal of the

Even

The

Army

such a willing-

so,

politically significant.

Minutes recorded by the Republican Movement of two of the meetings, dated 22 July and 31 July 1975, showed both sides discussing a wide range

of issues including the Constitutional Convention called by Merlyn Rees, prisons, internment, British

Army

activity, the attitude of the 'Dublin

Government', and a great deal more. Under the heading 'Declaration', the minutes noted: 'A long discussion took place on tance of retaining confidentiality

was

this subject.

The impor-

stressed.' This appears to

the issue of a British declaration of intent to

withdraw was

prove that

at least

on the

agenda. Under the heading 'Media' was recorded: 'The Brits feel R.M. [Republican Movement] should

R.M. ideals

is

try

and influence journalists as follows:

(1)

To promote

the

non-violent now, while the loyalists are violent; (2)

and programme of R.M. They mentioned

formerly of the Observer as examples.' •ournalists

X of the

Guardian and

Y

The names of two well known

were mentioned as people likely

to report

such

stories.

These

ninutes suggest that the talks were serious and that they had developed to stage

where progress of some

According

sort

was being made.

to the British official these

were 'very serious

serious and partially successful attempt to get the political stance.'

more

But out on the

difficult to hold. Inside the

streets the truce

IRA

there

IRA

talks

...

the last

to take an overt

was becoming more and

was growing suspicion and

THE LONG WAR

172

unhappiness. Loyalist paramilitaries were killing in numbers. Eventually the talks petered out,

Ambassador

British

and ended formally when the IRA assassinated the

to Ireland, Christopher

Ewart Biggs,

in

Dublin.

Movement for many years. It caused serious division in the ranks, making it virtually impossible for them to enter any further meaningful negotiations by way The outcome of these

was

talks

to plague the

Republican

of a temporary ceasefire. In addition, the British Government had long since

IRA and never to talk to Sinn Fein while the IRA campaign continued. And the IRA campaign did continue. There followed the harshest regime against the IRA in tandem with a vowed never again

to talk to the

'normalisation, Ulsterisation and criminalisation' policy on the part of the British

-

in other

words, the primacy of the police, an ending of political

status for prisoners,

and hunt-and-defeat

disaster' said a leading activist

based

in

tactics.

The 1975

Monaghan. He

ceasefire

was

said volunteers

'a

went

off and got married and found jobs, the organisation almost fell apart North

and South,

loyalists

had free reign

in republican areas to get information.

This in turn brought about the restructured IRA, the cell-system, the long

war

strategy and a

cessation.

It

deep unyielding resistance

would have

to

to

any form of temporary

be a permanent end to the conflict or nothing.

JOHN HUME

When

it

came

to

it,

Movement would have to find another They used the good offices of various

the Republican

route into political negotiations.

intermediaries to explain their case for inclusion. But the most tangible

was via their closest political rivals, the SDLP, and its leader John Hume. A series of contacts began in the mid-1980s. Hume knew that any route

such efforts on his part would meet with the severest disapproval from the Irish

Government, which had consistently engaged

in a policy

of isolating

and defeating the IRA. In contrast, the British Government had for long periods tried to inveigle the

John

Hume

IRA

made arrangements

a meeting with Gerry

Adams,

to

into politics.

the Irish

are talking about.

security forces,

The IRA have

460 of whom (over

in

February 1985,

Government responded with venom.

The Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald, put

we

When,

meet the IRA Army Council, following

it

directly

half)

bluntly: 'Let us be clear

whom

murdered 844 people including

were

totally

uninvolved

in security.

They have They have

They also provoked retaliation which killed 560 Catholics. murdered innocent people in Britain and in our own state. robbed, kidnapped and mercilessly murdered members of the Gardai, Army

SICKENING THE BRITISH and prison service as well as civilians, including one Oireachtas, Billy Fox. They

make no

member

173

of the

secret of their objectives to overthrow

our democratic state and substitute a military dictatorship, presumably to be kept

power by murdering and knee-capping

in

do without mercy with them.'

Council

in

identified.

hotel in

in

Northern Ireland.

their

We in this state

opponents as they will

have no truck

Dr FitzGerald went on to say that any meeting of the Army the Republic would be broken up and its members arrested, if

This was just four months after the

which Mrs Thatcher was

the Anglo-Irish Agreement,

staying.

It

IRA had bombed was

when Dublin was

the Brighton

also the run-up period to

trying to extract concessions

was not a time to give any legitimacy to the IRA. Hume's democratic credentials were not being questioned but Dr FitzGerald' s verbal assault was a thinly-disguised criticism of his political judgement. In the dark background, unknown to Hume, from London. As Dr FitzGerald saw

the

At

it,

this

IRA were expecting the first of their massive arms bounty from Libya. IRA were not in the business of lowering their sights. Their

that stage the

objective Britain

was

had

to

persuade

Hume

interests in Ireland

Army because the IRA wanted

Hume's meeting with leader walked out

of the correctness of their analysis: that

and would have

the

to

be forced

Council ended before

it

out. In the event,

began. The It

was a

full three

years

to video-tape the talks.

measure of how treacherous the task was.

It

would be a

SDLP

before a similar attempt was made.

1988 TALKS: John

Hume

invitation

and Gerry

from an unnamed

after the Enniskillen ity

Adams met

HUME/ADAMS

again on

1 1

January 1988, following an

third party, a priest. This

bomb, which

was just two months

resulted in almost unprecedented hostil-

towards Sinn Fein and the IRA. Enniskillen had also elicited enormous

public sympathy for northern Protestants, and a sense of guilt from people in the Republic.

Hume got little public

But the meeting bore

fruit in the

support for his meeting with Adams.

sense that

it

led to formal talks

between

Sinn Fein and the SDLP. These talks had long-term implications for nationalist politics.

They obliged Sinn Fein

question of armed struggle, and the

to set out

its stall

on the central

SDLP were made to justify

that politics alone could bring Irish unity.

Both sides had

their

view

to address the twin

issues of the 'Unionist veto' and Britain's interests in Ireland.

On Each

17

(St Patrick's Day) both parties exchanged documents. four-man delegation: John Hume, Seamus Mallon,

March 1988

side had a

1

THE LONG WAR

74

Sean Farren and Austin Currie for the SDLP; Gerry Adams, Danny Morrison, Mitchel McLoughlin and Tom Hartley for Sinn Fein. It had the look of serious negotiations and caused considerable surprise. This time the

response of the Irish Government was muted, as was that of the British

Government. Unionists expressed outrage, particularly as they were process of producing proposals on devolution. climate in Northern Ireland was complex. the

SAS

killings of three Belfast

IRA

The

As always,

in the

the political

began within days of

talks

activists in Gibraltar, the

Milltown

cemetery killings by loyalist Michael Stone, and the killing of the two British

Army

corporals by the IRA. Emotions were

mixed and

the atmos-

phere for the talks was fraught.

The kernel of the 1988 Sinn Fein argument was was

in

own

Northern Ireland defending her

'neutral',

and must be made

struggle. Sinn Fein spelt

armed struggle

is

it

to leave,

their

view

that Britain

hence the justification

out: 'Like other

was not for armed

interests, that she

forms of struggle

in Ireland, the

about achieving the political demands for national

self-

determination, an end to partition and the creation of a 32-county Irish republic.

Armed

Sinn Fein want

struggle

this

is

war but

seen as a political option. Neither the

IRA

nor

the ineffectualness of all other forms of struggle,

the conditions of repression that

we have

experienced and British attitudes,

have made armed struggle inevitable. The deaths and injuries caused by the

war

are

all

presence.'

tragedies

which have been forced upon the people by the British

17

In his opening statement, dated 17 this latter point.

'It is

not an answer

March 1988, Hume

directly addressed

to suggest that the British presence is

the primary source of our problems, and therefore the cause of violence.'

He

said the

IRA must

all

the

take responsibility for both their methods

and the consequences of those methods.

'Is it

not time for the

IRA

to

seriously reconsider the methods that they have chosen to achieve their objectives or are they in danger of in

it,

moving

to a situation, or are they already

where the methods have become more sacred than the cause? Even

of course, the stated objectives of the

which they have

set out,

we

in the

IRA were

to

be achieved

in the

if,

manner

SDLP would argue that that would not much greater chaos and to

bring peace to Ireland but would lead to

1

o

permanent division and conflict among our people.' Sinn Fein took the view that British disengagement from Ireland within

would prevent such chaos and permanent date within the lifetime of a British government would

the shortest possible timescale division:

'A definite

SICKENING THE BRITISH need to be

set for the

declaration of intent

completion of

this

175

withdrawal. Such an irreversible

would minimise any

loyalist backlash.'

Only then

could the Irish people as a whole exercise their right to national self-determination.

The SDLP/Sinn Fein talks ended on 5 September 1988. Each side restated their positions. They had both agreed that the Irish people had a right to self-determination

and

that the "Irish people" should

be defined as

those people living on the whole island of Ireland. Their disagreement

about

how

that self-determination should

They

resistance to Irish unity.

was

be exercised given Unionist

also agreed that a constitutional conference

of political parties in Ireland, convened by the Irish Government, could be a useful

move towards

exercising self-determination.

Britain should adopt a policy of Irish unity. But the

They agreed

SDLP

that

rejected

all

proposals for joint action by the two parties to try to bring any of this about.

Both sides differed fundamentally over the use of IRA armed force and the twin question of whether or not Britain had "selfish, economic and strategic interests" in Ireland.

While the

talks failed to arrive at a

common

strategy,

both parties expressed the wish that the dialogue would continue in some form. Talks would resume, but before they did, both sides would test at the

hustings their respective support in the nationalist community. Elections

North and South would show

how

confined the Republican Movement's

support base was. If elections

were the

test

of these talks then the

SDLP were

the greater

Hume knew there was a yearning among northern nationalists He knew he was taking little political risk in talking to Sinn Fein with that end in mind. He also knew that his people saw violence as multi-sided, Provo, loyalist and British. The SDLP had addressed this issue in the talks by saying: The speediest way to end the

beneficiaries.

for an

end

to the conflict.

military and

armed police presence on the

streets, together

with

all

the

consequences of that presence which weigh so heavy on the already disadvantaged people represented by

SDLP and

Sinn Fein,

is

the political

SDLP said the most effective response to violence in Northern was non-violence. Sinn Fein wanted the emphasis placed firmly on the British presence, not IRA violence. Near the end of the talks, Gerry way.' The Ireland

Adams

wrote:

'It is

obvious that the

is

the British occupation

to

be overcome.' Votes

which

is

in ballot

support for the two positions.

SDLP remains

to

be persuaded that

the central problem and the

first

it

hurdle

boxes were the most tangible measure of

The following

year, in 1989, there

were two

176

THE LONG WAR

electoral contests in Northern Ireland, district council and

Parliament. In the

first,

the

SDLP vote

European

recovered considerable ground from

the previous district council outing. Sinn Fein lost ground.

It left

the

SDLP

with 121 seats (an increase of 20) and Sinn Fein with 43 seats (a drop of 16). In the

Euro election John

Morrison with almost three times

50,000 for the

Hume was

humiliated Sinn Fein's Danny

his vote; the

armed

Movement.

Sinn Fein vote dipped below

time since they entered "province-wide" elections.

vindicated and Sinn Fein was

limitations of lican

first

Hume

left to

ponder on the popular

struggle. This further fuelled debate within the

Repub-

Seaneen Bradley pictured the frontdoor, 1992.

at her

home

in

west Belfast

after loyalist

gunmen

shot 13 rounds through

ABOVE: The remains

of a hijacked car

a night of loyalist violence following

BELOW: Republican Tyrone IRA,

killed in

plot at

smoulder on wasteground

UVF man

in

the Donegall

Edendork, near Dungannon, County Tyrone,

the Loughgall

ambush

in

Road area

after

OC

East

Brian McCallum's funeral.

1987,

is

buried.

in

which Pat

Kelly,

:i!iii,iMiilr iijii'iiiiiii

mim

Sinn Fein HQ, where part-time police officer Allen Moore shot three people

and then

finally himself,

February 1992.

dead

ABOVE: Street

life in

north Belfast, 1993.

BELOW: Tricolours and Queen

Victoria

- watching the republican march

to Belfast City Hall, 1993.

RUC

officers

keep an eye on

nationalist residents of Ballygawley

housing estate during

12 July Orange parade, Dungannon, County Tyrone, 1993.

Martin

McGuinness before

his oration at

Bodenstown

(burial

place of Theobald Wolfe Tone),

20 June 1993, where McGuinness revealed the Republican Movement's readiness significant policy change. Gerry Adams is in the background.

for

a

Scene

rescue operation directly after the Shankill bomb on Saturday 23 October, which 10 people, including the 23-year-old bomber Thomas Begley, died.

of the

1993,

in

oTweo Buan Sfocb a »2a

ABOVE: Martin McGuinness and Gerry Co. Donegal, 24 July 1994.

BELOW:

Loyalist leader

Adams

at the

m Crei nn

Sinn Fein special conference Letterkennv

Ray Smallwoods, shot dead by the IRA

in

July 1994.

An

historic

then

Irish

after the

handshake. From the

left:

Gerry Adams, President

Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and John Hume, leader IRA ceasefire.

of Sinn Fein, Albert

of the

Reynolds, the

SDLP, on 7 September 1994,

The

funeral of Post Office worker Frank Kerr, killed in

Newry, Co. Down, November 1994.

by the IRA

i

ABOVE: The Sinn Fein delegation, led by Martin McGuinness, 1994,

for

the

first

arriving at

Stormont on 9 December

time since 1921.

BELOW: Gary McMichael (centre) leading the Ulster Democratic Party Stormont

talks.

(loyalist)

delegation

for

Martin

McGuinness lends a hand

to

reopen a cross-border road

in

Co. Derry.

ABOVE: A

British

paratrooper on the

last

BELOW: John Bruton and Gerry Adams

daytime patrol on the

at

Forum

for

Falls

Peace and

Road.

Belfast.

Reconciliation, Dublin.

ABOVE: Sinn Fein

talk to the

press after

their first

meeting with government

officials at

Stormont.

the BELOW: John Major and John Bruton, the British and Irish Prime Ministers, launching 1994. February on 22 document Future the for Frameworks

ABOVE: Gerry

Adams meets

Senator Edward Kennedy, Capitol

Hill,

Washington,

March 1995. BELOW:

Irish

shamrocks

Prime Minister John Bruton presents

at the

White House, March 1995.

US

President

Bill

Clinton a bowl of

FALLS /CLONARD

25 YEARS OF RESISTANCE

Republican wall mural on the

Falls

Road,

Belfast.

/

PART

III

Into the Nineties

9 BALLOT AND BULLET ELECTIONS WERE HIGH-RISK FOR THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT. Defeat the polls could lessen

momentum and

The continuing armed

too far into existing state structures.

designed to avoid both

pitfalls.

As

Movement

to

1993 Sinn Fein put

its

the votes of the nationalist

was reached

1983.

early

on when Gerry

The gap between

SDLP emerged

was

need

it

SDLP for

out with the

community. In the competition, Sinn Fein's high

the

two

Adams

parties

Sinn Fein just 34,000 votes behind the the

to face the

popularity to the test of the ballot

box. In 13 elections, North and South, they battled

in

was

compromise.

From 1982

point

struggle

events turned out, Sinn Fein's limited

success in elections encouraged the Republican for political

at

sap morale. Success could suck them

first

won

was then

SDLP. But

a Westminster seat

at its

narrowest, with

as elections rolled on,

dominant and out of reach. One area defying

this trend

Belfast.

Belfast

was

the cockpit, the principal battleground of the conflict,

the Provisional

IRA grew

its

roots in the street conflagrations of

1970. Here the 'sixty-niners' were born, the

whose experiences were rooted

memories of 1919. The IRA had armed actions

in Belfast.

that this strength

IRA

coming

as

it

activists,

biggest numbers of volunteers and the Republican

first district

SDLP

Belfast City Council to six for the

It

of

where

969 and

of 1969, not the mystical

Movement was

might not translate into votes, especially as the

Fein had actually beaten the

Belfast.

its

The worry within

a 12-year headstart. But in their

for Sinn Fein,

new breed

in the actuality

1

SDLP had

council election of 1985, Sinn

in Belfast.

They won seven

seats

on

SDLP. This had been a stunning result Adams won West

did just two years after Gerry

marked Sinn Fein

as a real political force in the largest urban

area.

By 1993

the

Roman

Catholic population of Belfast had substantially

THE LONG WAR

196

increased and both parties had gained ground. But Sinn Fein remained ahead, consolidating by-election victories and emerging with ten seats to the

SDLP's nine

history.

in a

council of 5

The Unionist

1

permanent Sinn Fein presence. The surge in

West

Belfast,

was a

signal success.

Adams would win back 1992

in a result

was an extraordinary

seats. It

citadel of Belfast City Hall

his

twist of

strong,

Sinn Fein support, particularly

in

It left

Westminster

would have a

the party confident that Gerry

seat,

which he had

lost in April

which rocked the Republican Movement.

Outside Belfast, Sinn Fein had less reason for optimism. They had lost

ground over the years. The gap

in seats

had grown considerably wider,

in

council elections the the

between the two nationalist parties

favour of the SDLP. In the 1985

SDLP had won 42

seats

more than Sinn

district

Fein. In 1993

SDLP won 75 more seats. West of the river Bann, the number of Roman

Catholics had also risen substantially since the start of the conflict. There,

by 1993, a combined nationalist majority was councils. Yet, in 1993 Sinn Fein

likely in

ended up with more

each of the eight

seats than the

SDLP

Dungannon and Omagh. Dungannon was a gain. Since 1985 Sinn Fein had lost their dominance over the SDLP in Fermanagh and

in

only two,

Cookstown. In the second largest city, Derry, Sinn Fein never looked like chal-

lenging the leader,

was

the

home

base of both John

and Martin McGuinness, prominent

a straight head-to-head contest

armed 1

SDLP. This was

politics.

993 election

Council for the

But

was

this still left the

The year 1993 may be seen

SDLP

Sinn Fein.

It

politics

and

the clear winner.

The

won

17 seats to Sinn Fein's five. In

Council, taking in South Armagh, the

three seats and Sinn Fein picked election.

politics

the

with an overall majority in Derry City

time ever. They

first

Newry and Mourne

SDLP

IRA and

between constitutional

John Hume's brand of

result left the

in the

Hume,

up one from

SDLP

SDLP dropped

the previous district council

safely ahead, with 14 seats to five.

as the point

when Sinn Fein

steadied their

around 80,000 votes, compared with the SDLP at around 150,000 votes. There was no doubting the SDLP's dominance. Still, Sinn Fein had halted their decline and proved themselves a perma-

electoral strength at

nent fixture. Sinn Fein's voice had to be heard. Yet these figures raised further questions about the gains to be

while armed struggle continued.

made from

the electoral strategy

BALLOT OR BULLET

Seats

Won, by

Party, in

Northern Ireland District Council Elections, 1993 DUP

Alliance

Antrim

8

3

2

Ards

9

6

6

UUP

Armagh

10

2

Ballymena

10

9

6

6

Banbridge

10

2

Belfast

15 5

Ballymoney

Carrickfergus

Left

SDLP 4

5

9

6

Cookstown

5

Craigavon

2

1

1

2

5

1

2

9

2

others

2

3

5

All

1

3 1

9

Sinn Fein

2 9

6

Coteraine

Dem.

1

12

Castlereagh

1

10

3

4 3

3

3 4

5 6

2

1

10

2

2

Deny Down Dungannon

2

5

17

5

1

8

2

13

8

3

Fermanagh

10

2

7

4

Lame Limavady

3

4

5

4

3

3

1

6

14

5

4

3

2

2

6

1

10

5

4

6

3

5

4 4

3

1

Total (578)

198

102

1989(566) 1985 (566)

193

110

190

142

11

3

44 39 34

1

4 4

The Sinn Fein and SDLP Vote -

Belfast

f

£

3

5

1

5

6

5

2

2

126

51

60

121

43 59

36

101

Source: The

Source: Or. Sydney Elliott The Queen's University of

1

3

2 1

Moyle

Strabane

5

5

3

Magherafelt

North Down Omagh

4

3

1

3

Newry & Moume Newtownabbey

1

2

7

6 16

Lisbum

197

All

2

56

Irish

Times

Elections 1982-93

THE LONG WAR

198

WESTMINSTER ELECTIONS In the

Westminster elections during the same period Sinn Fein was

successful.

the gap

in 1983,

two

contests.

By

heights of success.

the Sinn Fein

tally.

SDLP, 78,291

less

where they topped the 100,000 votes mark,

between Sinn Fein and the

the next

new

From a high

SDLP

widened ever further

the April 1992 election the

They emerged with

substantially

The

each of

reached

more than double

The numbers were 184,445 votes and four

votes and no seat for Sinn Fein.

in

SDLP had

seats for the

SDLP overhauled Sinn

Fein in two key constituencies with nationalist majorites: Mid-Ulster

(where

1983 Sinn Fein's Danny Morrison was a mere 78 votes short of

in

victory) and tion agent

Fermanagh/South Tyrone (where Bobby Sands and

Owen Carron both won

his elec-

seats in 1981). Outside Belfast, Sinn Fein

showed no prospect of winning any Westminster

seats.

The two European

Parliament elections of 1984 and 1989 gave a similar pattern, a widening

gap

in

favour of the

SDLP.

A decade of elections had left Sinn Fein playing permanent second fiddle to the

SDLP

in the

North's nationalist political power-game. But in the

single

most important

force.

They had taken

in

a

area, Belfast, Sinn Fein

was surging

as the

number of elections. Sinn Fein could confidently expect

their support

dominant

the quasi-socialist working-class vote substantially

and be established as a significant

post-settlement situation.

As

to increase

political player in a future

for the present, Belfast

was

the power-house

of the IRA. They could demonstrate that, without doubt, they had a

mandate. Sinn Fein had also proven themselves to be electoral ly strong in Tyrone, a highly active

IRA

heartland. In general, however, the Sinn Fein

vote meant that support for the armed struggle, or militant anti-partitionist 'tendency',

they had

ELECTIONS In the

IN

elections

where party

more

SDLP.

THE REPUBLIC

Republic the nearest equivalent to the North's

elections were the local

the

was inconsistent and patchy. Overall,

with the

lost the electoral battle

at least for

district council

government elections of June 1991. These were

loyalties

were

looser.

A government was not at stake.

Protest votes could be cast with safety, ideal testing ground for Sinn Fein.

Sinn Fein fielded 59 candidates,

in

Cavan, Cork County and City, Donegal,

Dublin County and City, Galway, Kerry. Kildare, Leitrim, Limerick, Louth,

Meath, Monaghan, Offaly, Sligo, Tipperary North and South, Wicklow and

BALLOT OR BULLET Waterford. They

Monaghan and left

won

1

seat in Donegal,

1

in Kildare,

1

Dundalk, 2

in

out of the entire Dublin County and City region,

Sinn Fein with a

total

1

seat.

1

99

in

This

of 6 seats out of 883 countrywide - a disastrous

performance. These results followed the 1989 general election where Sinn

Fein

won no

election,

seats

when

and got

1

.2

percent of the vote, and the

1

they got no seats and 1.7 percent of the vote.

wiped

force south of the Border, Sinn Fein were

out.

And

987 general

As

a political

in the island as

a whole the vast majority of voters had turned their backs on the party.

By

Movement was being

the 1990s, therefore, the Republican

reconsider

its

the South,

were coming

had secured

strategies.

its

More and more, to reject the

forced to

nationalist people, particularly in

IRA. This meant

that,

while the

IRA

base through local community support, they were forced to

recognise that that base was limited largely to the strong working-class

where unemployment was

at its

worst and where the clash

between the armed British presence and

Irish

republicanism reached

urban

districts

its

greatest intensity.

The Republican Movement's primary ing, not as

focus

its

objective of 'Brits out'

an objective but as an achievable aim. The

attention

on a key question: What

were reassessing the gains

to

to

to

do about the Unionists? They

be made by armed struggle and seeking a way

into the political process. Instead of setting out to fell

was reced-

movement began

wreck any moves which

short of a British declaration of intent to withdraw, the Republican

Movement was Fein.

again demanding a place at the negotiating table for Sinn

They indicated a willingness

to take 'risks'

and be

'flexible'.

These

were signals of compromise.

But the signals were

at

times confused,

at

odds with one another. The

pace of change was bound to be painfully slow. Even

in the best

of

circumstances, the process of ending two decades of armed struggle and taking a place at the negotiating table

would be

tortuous.

Such a

transition

could be the most dangerous phase of all, with the danger of armed enemies within and without. the

So

the cardinal rule

still

army must be brought along. Ever since

held.

There must be no

the long

of 1975, there had never been a prospect of the

IRA

agreeing a temporary

or unilateral ceasefire. Equally, Britain had too often stated that

not talk to Sinn Fein while the the

IRA would

splits:

and damaging truce

it

would

armed struggle continued. This meant

that

attempt to intensify the violence unless and until Sinn Fein

were brought into the

political process.

THE LONG WAR

200

ARMED POLITICS So

the

IRA campaign

continued unabated. Electoral weakness had only

IRA view

reinforced the long-established sary, if only to stop the

partitionist settlement.

that they

would not

that

armed struggle was neces-

SDLP and the Irish government going for an internal, However war-weary they became, the IRA vowed

return to Stormont rule. First

and foremost, therefore,

they had to block any 'internal solution'. If they couldn't force a British

withdrawal by military means, they would continue with the task of trying to

make Northern

frustrating

Ireland ungovernable except by military might.

any return

to normality they

devolved administration

So

far, local

in Belfast:

community terms held

firm.

The

than their local bases to provide hides, billets and

cover for their operations. So long as continue indefinitely. The

IRA

to destroy the prospects of a

devolution would copper-fasten partition.

support in electoral and

IRA needed no more

to the

hoped

By

IRA could

this situation prevailed, the

reality, said

one of their

leaders,

was

that an

end

campaign could not be successfully enforced from above, by the

leadership alone. There would need to be a political offensive, led by the

Government,

Irish

where the volunteers and

'sufficient to create a climate

supporters were asking: What's the need for force? This would percolate

This was a measure of

upwards.'

upon, the people

in their

how

the

IRA

be no popular demand for the encourage such a demand

even

saw

it,

the

in the

depended

communities.

But while Sinn Fein remained excluded from

unity,

related to, and

IRA

to stop.

until the political

long term.

As

armed struggle was

political talks there

And

Sinn Fein would not

agenda changed

to include Irish

the leaders of the Republican

still

would

Movement

the instrument to force such a change.

were being lowered, the bombings of towns and villages and the killing of British soldiers, local policemen, workers

Even

if

the 'war aims'

('collaborators') and judges

would continue.

The year 1990 began with undercover

British soldiers killing three

Catholics - John McNeill, Eddie Hale and Peter Thompson -

robbing a west Belfast betting shop.

It

in the act

of

caused widespread anger and another

campaign for justice began. Loyalist paramilitaries were active, killing 19 by year's end, but the IRA beat them on body count, killing 46. The IRA also injured about 350 soldiers and policemen and about 350 civilians. As usual, such statistics told only part of the story. And most of the story went unheard outside small local areas.

BALLOT OR BULLET

JANUARY 1990

IRA ACTIVITY,

month of January, IRA explosions caused damage and

In the

provided

little

material for the media. January 3rd, a part-time

was seriously injured by an under-car booby-trap bomb County Tyrone;

201

terror but

UDR soldier

in Magherafelt,

evening two soldiers were injured by a device explod-

that

ing behind a garden wall in Ardoyne, north Belfast; 4th, evening, a soldier

was

slightly injured

by an explosive device off New Lodge Road, north

same evening, an explosive device was thrown

Belfast;

RUC/British a part-time

Army

mobile patrol

at Springfield

at a joint

Road, west Belfast;

1

1th,

UDR soldier discovered a booby-trap bomb under his car in

Maghera, County Derry - he escaped but

his car

was destroyed

in the

explosion; 12th, early hours of the morning, an explosion caused slight

damage to a restaurant on the Lisburn Road, Belfast; that night, petrol bombs were thrown at Coalisland RUC station, County Tyrone; 13th, an explosion at the perimeter fence of Lisanelly Army Camp, Omagh, County Tyrone, caused little damage but an 87-year-old woman was taken to hospital with shock; 15th, evening, a van

of a bungalow beside Sion Mills

bomb

the

later,

RUC station, County Tyrone; half an hour

in the village; 17th, a

carpark of the Victoria Centre, Belfast, suffered ear injuries and an elderly

off-duty fulltime

booby-trap

car-bomb on the fourth-floor

damaged

woman was

UDR soldier was very

bomb which exploded

it

South Armagh, none

was occupied by an

the building

- a policeman

treated for shock; 20th, an

seriously injured by an under-car

as he drove along Letterbrat Road,

Plumbridge; same day, four mortars were fired station,

driven into the garden

exploded, demolishing the bungalow, damaging the police

and 50 houses

station

bomb was

hit target

but two

at

Newtownhamilton

hit the

RUC

house next door while

elderly couple. In January also, the

IRA

shot dead

UDR soldier Olven Kilpatrick in his shop in Castlederg and shot RUC Inspector Derek Monteith in his kitchen in Armagh.

part-time

dead

ARMS FINDS The explosions, shootings, booby less noticed

made

in

were most of the arms

traps continued, almost daily.

Even

finds. In February, notable finds

were

Cullyhanna, Strabane, Keady, Rathcoole, north Belfast,

Omagh

and Belfast city cemetery. Found were two heavy machine-guns, a sub-machinegun, ten zines,

homemade

rifles,

four hand-guns, ammunition, loaded maga-

explosives, mercury

tilt

switches for under-car bombs,

'

THE LONG WAR

202

timing devices for bombs.

by the

RUC as

IRA became

Many arms and ammunition finds were described by way of prior information. Deny

'planned', in other words,

seriously worried about information passing to the police

about weapons hides. During 1989 the

RUC

had made find

after find in

Deny,

totalling

27 by year's end.

The

attrition

continued into 1990, with four finds in January, two in

February.

Most in

straight to a

It

for a householder

in the city

when

the

house and dug up an arms hide under the kitchen

less inclined to

On

was unnerving

houses; other finds

in individual

Creggan reservoir and on waste ground,

and waste dumps.

were

were of small amounts - single weapons, explosives,

bomb-making equipment -

detonators,

were made

finds

12 March,

become involved

Deny

brigade

IRA

cemetery,

RUC went

floor.

People

again.

issued a public warning to would-be

informants, telling them they would 'have to accept the consequences of their actions' if identified.

civilian

and

The IRA claimed they had already

unconnected with the Republican Movement

who

whom

identified a

they

named

then absconded: 'As a result of this positive identification an

of the Derry Brigade searched his

home on Tuesday,

ASU

13th March. If

apprehended, he would have been executed.'

RUC warned the public of expected IRA bombings following a number of arms and explosives finds. On 9 April four UDR soldiers In April the

travelling in a

Landrover were killed by a massive explosion on Bally-

duggan Road near Downpatrick. They were Michael Adams and Steven Smart from Newtownards, John Bradley from Bangor and John Birch from

An Phoblacht

Bally waiter. All were in their twenties. In 'War News', described the action by South

Down

brigade as

devastating military

'a

operation which has sent shock waves through the British political/military establishment', and stated that 'Monday's fatalities are the worst suffered

UDR in a single operation since the IRA's Tyrone Brigade killed 3 In June a former RUC reservist four UDR soldiers at Ballygawley in 1983.

by the

and

his wife

were killed by a booby-trap bomb

Ballygomartin Road, Belfast, soon after ten o'clock couple, James and Ellen Sefton, were each aged 65.

policemen were shot dead around midday junction in Belfast.

in the

Street/Queen Street

47, and

Gary Meyer,

Both were married with children. Late July, three policemen car were killed by a culvert

bomb

set off

morning. The

The same month two

at the Castle

They were John Beckett, aged

drove along

as they

in

34.

an unmarked

by a command wire, near Armagh.

BALLOT OR BULLET 203 They were Joshua

Willis,

aged 35; David

Sterritt,

James Hanson, 37.

34;

teaching nun, Sister Catherine, travelling in another car

was

also killed,

A by

'mistake'.

As

the year progressed the statistics mounted.

Yet

it

was an average

year,

worse for IRA killings than 1989, better than 1988 and 1987, worse than 1986, 1985 and 1984.

The big

difference in the late 1980s

was

were injuring substantially more people, security forces and in the early part

1990 the

IRA

of the decade.

The

killing

figures were

killed seven regular British soldiers

injured about 190 soldiers and 150 policemen. that year.

changes or

when

There was no diminution

in pattern as

in the

were

civilians, than

relatively small. In

and 12 policemen, and

No IRA activists

were

killed

campaign though there were

always, good 'operators' were used

they returned from prison. There

control. Operations

IRA

that the

when

available

was a certain loosening of central

far less hectic than in the early 1970s, with

more

planning and dry-runs, and an impressive arsenal.

THE LONG WAR CONTINUES Most IRA

actions

made no sound

still

in

close, the pattern of violence continued.

a house in Shantallow, Patsy,

was forced

Westminster. As 1990 drew to a

On

IRA took over known locally as

24 October the

Deny. A man, Patrick Gillespie, away in his Vauxhall Nova car while

his family

to drive

was held hostage.

Later, a car loaded with a

Buncrana Road checkpoint. The explosion

bomb was

driven into the

killed five soldiers

and the driver

of the car. Twenty-five nearby homes were extensively damaged. out that the driver

was Patsy

He had been

Gillespie.

It

turned

forced to abandon his

own

car, take the bomb-carrying car and drive it into the checkpoint. The same day a 65 -year-old man was also used as a proxy driver in a car-bomb

attack

on Cloughoge checkpoint outside Newry.

sustaining a broken leg.

One

soldier

proxy attack that day on Lisanelly

bomb

didn't explode.

to drive the

bomb

in,

A man

was

Army

He managed to jump clear,

killed

base,

and 13 injured. Another

Omagh,

had been strapped

failed

when

to the car seat

the

main

and forced

while his wife and seven-year-old child were held

hostage.

The spate of proxy bombing continued. At around 9.30pm on 22 November, a number of armed and masked men took over a house near Newtownbutler.

up

in a toilet.

and

a short

A man

was taken out while

The man was driven

his elderly parents

to a derelict

time later taken away

in a

were

tied

house south of the Border

Toyota Hilux pickup truck

204

THE LONG WAR

accompanied by two armed men. He was then made the nearby

Annaghmartin checkpoint and

to drive the truck to

told that the truck carried a

bomb

on a five-minute timer. At the checkpoint he shouted a warning and a small explosion was heard.

The bomb

was found

bomb

soldier,

ing

certain death.

homemade

to contain 3,5001bs of

to date.

During the

last

go

itself failed to

enormous havoc, destruction and

month of 1990

off. It

On

would have caused

explosives, the

the

Hubert Gilmore, and seriously injured

bomb biggest IRA

examination, the

IRA killed

a former

his wife in Kilrea

them and ramming them with a Vauxhall Cavalier car

UDR

by shoot-

at the site

of their

proposed new home.

LOCAL DIFFERENCES It

would not be correct

to

lump

all

-

IRA

SOUTH ARMAGH

actions and

all

and view them as one coherent mix. Certain areas had textures of their

own. South Armagh was one such

historical republican tradition. In

RUC

the three police districts around Forkhill.

To

were one

distinctive, separate

area.

It

had a hardened,

parlance, South Armagh comprised

Newtownhamilton, Crossmaglen and

north Louth and north

territory.

good number of North.

into a pot

the IRA, South Armagh knew no Border, their units drawing

manpower from it

IRA units

Much

activists

on the run from Belfast and other areas

Two broad IRA groups

forty activists, roughly half terrorist territory', as

Monaghan and operating as though came from Dundalk, using a

logistical support

in the

operated in South Armagh, comprising about

based south of the Border. This was 'ideal

one senior

RUC

Here the eye caught rolling drumlin

officer

hills,

from the area described

interspersed with lakes,

it.

wound

around by narrow roads, where the traveller could cross the Border without seeing

it,

knowing

the smugglers.

By

it

or smelling

it.

But the

IRA knew

it

totally.

So too did

At times they were one and the same people.

the 1990s smuggling of red diesel and petrol, in particular, had

become such a big money

earner, hitting hard at the livelihoods of legiti-

mate garage owners on the southern

side, that Irish

Customs mounted

a

major, undercover offensive code-named 'Operation Scorpion'. Their targets

were about ten big business and farm owners straddling an area

covering Dundalk, Hackballscross, Culloville, Carrickmacross and

was an important member of

One Armagh and Northern Command, of their targets

ghan.

ment

in

a

man

the

IRA

in

MonaSouth

suspected of significant involve-

the Libyan arms operation. Another man, not known

to be actively

involved with the IRA, was strongly suspected of paying them large sums

BALLOT OR BULLET 205 from

smuggling as a price for staying

his

outlets for their diesel

Westmeath and on

men

but

and petrol across the Republic,

One

at least stalled the

operator alone was estimated to be grossing about £0.75

million a year in illegal earnings.

came complete with

Border',

County

in places like

further south. Operation Scorpion did not get the big

continuous raids and some court cases

its

smuggling.

These men had

in 'business'.

The smuggling operations, 'jumping

the

look-outs, walkie-talkies, heavy tactics and

bribes.

With

this

mix of smuggling and IRA

activity there

was considerable

cross-Border security co-operation between the Gardaf and

The IRA

limited results.

Army

South

in

to adopt special tactics, of

ance and

Armagh had armed

Army

yielded

It

and British

garrisons, long-distance surveill-

minimum ground movement. On

stood an array of British

RUC.

RUC

forced the

the tops of South

Armagh's

hills

observation posts capable of seeing great

distances and engaging in continuous electronic surveillance. Soldiers and

policemen were brought

in

and out by helicopter.

Border had such a heavy security presence. In 1991,

No

other part of the

RUC sources admitted

had operated

in

South Armagh without British

Army support for about fifteen years. IRA activists in South Armagh tended

to

be older than

that

no police mobile

areas, ranging

patrols

from mid-20s

50s involved in planning.

to late-30s,

One such

and with

men

in other brigade

in their late-40s

older group, including a

man

and

heavily

involved in smuggling, had developed a legendary notoriety. Their involve-

ment

in the Provisional

availability of

IRA

since the very early 1970s

is

not in doubt.

The

farmland straddling the Border allowed them to avoid arrest

on a number of occasions. In the early 1970s two of these men were acquitted of serious offences, including attempted murder.

pected of running

IRA

Another was linked the

Down/Louth border

Army 2nd

training

to the in

camps

in

One was

sus-

County Monaghan around 1975.

'Narrow Water' massacre near Warrenpoint on

August 1979,

in

which 18 members of the

British

Parachute Regiment were killed in a double explosion, the

first

when the soldiers took cover was the British Army's biggest

explosion killing six and the second killing 12, in the gate

lodge of Narrow Water Castle.

single loss of the northern conflict.

involvement

Weston

in

Tidey, in

in

It

The same men were suspected of

planning the attempted kidnap of supermarket owner Galen

August 1983 and

November

the kidnap of

that year,

one of Weston's executives, Don

which ended

in

an

IRA

shoot-out and the

206

THE LONG WAR

deaths of a Garda recruit and an Irish soldier. Intelligence sources link the

key

man

of this group to the murder of the Northern Ireland judge Lord

Maurice Gibson and

Justice

his wife Cecily at Killeen in 1987.

men

attempts to arrest and charge these

over the years

said that, unlike other areas of the North, there

failed.

was an almost

Numerous

RUC sources total

absence

of informers in south Armagh, such was the hardened nature of the

IRA

and the integrated nature of their operations.

IRA had

South Armagh

making

family links dating back to the Treaty times,

for an almost unbroken chain. Just north of Hackballscross

IRA

headquarters of the 4th Northern Division of the

When

Northern Ireland erupted

in the late

1

960s

in the

was

the

1918-21 period.

of the country

this part

had a ready-made militant republican culture. This contrasted with Belfast

and Derry where

activists

were more

eruptions

-

IRA men

with a longer pedigree.

likely to

It

explains

why

slower to gear up in South Armagh. For a touched by the

more

have grown from the 1969

were sometimes scathingly described by

'sixty-niners' as they

the Provisional

start

street conflagrations in Belfast

IRA were

they were not directly

and Derry, and they were

IRA when the split came in South Armagh was a reluctant adherent

reluctant to break with the 'Official'

1969-70. In the 1980s and 1990s

of the State'.

move

to 'polities'

At times

and the dropping of abstentionism

this division led

IRA

South Armagh

to

in the 'Free

be regarded as

something of an independent republic within the Republican Movement. South Armagh

IRA were

likely to resist the

road to compromise, given the

deeply entrenched nature of their operation. The

IRA

capacity of the

in

South Armagh had

RUC conceded that the

not diminished in 20 years and

described the calibre of their personnel as higher than in Belfast. In each of

its

two areas of operation (South Armagh/Newry/Dundalk and

South Armagh/Monaghan) the

IRA had two key

people dictating policy

and the pace of activity. Compared with other parts of the North the level of activity was measured and relatively thin, only place in South

Armagh

1

3

IRA

attacks taking

Most weapons were handed on down over personal control. The exceptions were heavy

in 1990.

the years or kept tightly in

machine-guns capable of shooting down helicoptors. One such helicopter attack,

from outside Crossmaglen Health Centre, was filmed by a Dublin 1991 The shooting was done by a machine-gun mounted

TV crew in March

.

on the back of an old square-shaped

accompanied the

lorry.

lorry.

A car carrying other IRA men

Meanwhile, the shooting, which lasted

less than a

BALLOT OR BULLET 207 minute, was watched by locals in the

was

factor

that

In security terms, the significant

street.

RUC or British Army personnel came on the scene for a

no

protracted period of time. This allowed the lorry and car to escape undetected

and unhindered, even though the

yards.

They would have heard

RUC/Army

the shooting but

base was within 50

would not

risk further attack

on the ground.

The

first

attack of

1990 was on 20 January when four mortars were

Newtownhamilton

from a Hiace van in There were no

The next was

hits.

three

village at the

months

later in

a heavy-calibre machine-gun. bullets

were

fired.

One

soldier

was

After another five weeks a

Road, Silverbridge, as an

Army

patrol passed.

A week later at Slatequarry, Cullyhanna, were

fired

later.

On

in

hit.

Crossmaglen a sniper

in

fired at an

officers escaped.

The other two and

the

hit

Army

fields

and died

foot patrol,

at

Meigh, Forkhill. killings. In the first,

County Kerry.

Two

days

later, at

Two of the prison

later the

policeman, Louis Robinson, was found near Killeen. through the head. Five days

Cheshire Regiment was wounded

in the

on as

it

the

shot

stomach during another IRA

On 26 September the body

from Derry was found on the Dundalk Road

The IRA claimed he was an fired

body of

He had been

Drumalt, Cullyhanna, a soldier of the

attack with a heavy-calibre machine-gun.

was

IRA

four prison officers

RUC man were abducted, but the

prison officers were released at Belleeks.

ber, a helicopter

New

were reported.

moving through

RUC detective and

returning from a fishing trip in Dingle in

Patrick Flood

than 180

Kinney's Mills junction, Forkhill, an armed and masked

unit stopped a car carrying an

hamilton.

More

on by

detonated on

injuries

September came four IRA actions and two

15th, at

fired

Eight days later an explosive device was found and

recovered on the Belfast-Dublin railway line

on the

No

soldiers

was

on by a heavy-calibre machine-gun. One soldier was

6 August

but no-one was

Then

hit in the leg.

bomb was

fired

base.

Cullyhanna on 28

A British Army foot patrol of the 2nd Light Infantry

April.

1st

RUC/Army

informer.

landed

at

The same

at

of

Newtown-

day, 26 Septem-

Newtownhamilton RUC/Army

The Army said the helicopter was not hit but that one soldier was slightly wounded in the abdomen. The next attack was more than two

base.

months

later,

on 5 December.

A bomb exploded on

the Belfast-Dublin

railway line near Jonesboro, causing widespread damage.

This was the kind of infrequent, varied and heavy-duty attack typical of

South Armagh - machine-gun attacks on soldiers crossing

fields,

on

208

THE LONG WAR

helicopters,

bombs on

They were limited British

Army on

significant finds

in

the railway line, a carefully planned lethal abduction.

terms of

high

alert.

'kills',

but enough to keep the

The IRA suffered

RUC

real losses too.

and

Seven

were made by the security forces, uncovering two general-

purpose machine-guns, nearly eight hundred rounds of heavy-calibre ammunition, five

components

rifles as

well as radio equipment,

for explosives

two

civilians.

of the

bomb on

damage

the

Dundalk Road, Newtown-

to houses, injuring three soldiers

Another January had arrived.

IRA campaign.

wire, other

and a number of stolen vehicles.

Eight days into 1991 a culvert hamilton, caused extensive

command

It

and

began the twenty-second year

10 A Door BY THE BEGINNING OF were

in the

is

Opened

were signs

1991, there

that the British

Government

Movement. The previous

business of courting the Republican

November, Northern Secretary Peter Brooke had made a detailed statement about Britain's involvement history, this

in Ireland. In the

speech ranks as a major

intent in Ireland.

The IRA took

it

context of Irish-British

statement of British policy

very seriously.

Mr Brooke portrayed Britain as neutral

on the Union, as an honest broker

between two competing national aspirations. His direct message

was

that Britain

would not accede

of significant political

movement

if

to force but

force were

to the

IRA

he opened up the prospect

removed from the equation.

He dealt first with the 'Unionist veto', a factor which in IRA campaign. The reality was, he said, that the Union first

and British

itself 'is

sustained the

affirmed by the

Section of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973 which

declares that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of part of the United

Kingdom without the consent

of Northern Ireland.

We

it

cease to be

of a majority of the people

stand firmly by that solemn declaration and

we acknowledge

assurance. But in so doing

that there is another view,

strongly held by the nationalist minority within Northern Ireland. That

is

the aspiration to a United Ireland, not simply to the Republic of Ireland

which

exists today, but to a 32-county state covering all the territory of the

island,

and worthy

in their

view of the support of all the

possible to take either view with integrity.

It is

Irish people.

It is

acceptable to uphold the one

or advocate the other by all legitimate peaceful and democratic means.

What either

is

not acceptable, and what totally lacks integrity,

is

the promotion of

view by the crude and brutal methods of violence and coercion.'

This was,

at least,

dramatic use of language by a British minister,

particularly the

one charged with administering Northern Ireland. Peter

Brooke went on

to display a

of Theobald

Wolfe Tone,

knowledge of another person's language,

that

the late eighteenth-century 'father' of Irish

THE LONG WAR

210

republicanism.

empire by

Tone had sought

to

break the connection with the British

force in the context of French Revolutionary ideas on liberty,

then sweeping Europe. Tone's most-used and most-abused phrase was his call for the unity

of 'Catholic, Protestant and dissenter' in Ireland, a phrase

exploited by

brands of Irish republicanism. In his London speech,

Brooke

all

said that a 'huge majority' of people seeking a united Ireland

were

against the use of force, against putting a union of territories before a union

of hearts and minds: 'A state brought into being by such corrupt methods

could never live up to the vision of a united Ireland enjoying the loyalty

and protecting the It

was easy

Irish unity,

does

rights of Catholic, Protestant

to interpret

and

dissenter.'

Mr Brooke as being prepared to open

the door to

provided the gun was taken out of politics. 'For what purpose

this killing continue?'

he asked, and then came to what he

knew would

be the answer of the Republican Movement. 'At the heart of this matter

is

the question of the so-called "British presence" in a part of Ireland.

to

remove let

that presence that republican terrorism is said to

It is

be dedicated. So

us examine for a moment, just what the "British presence" actually

Mr Brooke Army,

said the British presence

had four main

the ministers at the Northern Ireland Office,

money from the

exchequer, and the people living in Northern Ireland British.

On the Army, the Northern

is.'

aspects: the British

who

call

central

themselves

Kingdom had They were there,

Secretary said the United

'no vested interest' in maintaining the high troop levels.

'If the threat were no longer there then the would no longer be necessary and Northern Ireland could

he said, to protect the police. military support

have a police force with no need of

Army

support

or,

indeed, for

formidable arsenal of weapons.' In other words, the

withdrawn

to barracks

and the police largely disarmed

armed campaign against them.

its

own

Army would if

there

be

were no

On the second aspect of the British presence

- the Secretary of State and

his ministers

-

Mr Brooke

re-stated his

government's policy to find widely acceptable methods of returning powers to a local administration. it

not, that those

who

He made

this

jab at the IRA:

'It is

interesting, is

amongst the most nervous when movement towards giving real power and

cry "Brits out" are

they see any possibility of real

responsibility to the local people themselves?' Turning to the financial

point

- the

subvention to Northern Ireland from the British exchequer over

and above the taxes raised locally at

IRA

Mr Brooke aimed his language directly

assertions of British 'interests'.

He

said this financial support

'is

not

given in furtherance of some strategic interest or in the expectation of some

DOOR

A

OPENED

IS

21

1

corresponding gain to the people of Great Britain.'

Then he came

to

what he called the 'most

presence', the Unionists. 'Every time

home

to

presence

me is

the

paramount

significant aspect of the British

hear that

call for "Brits out",

reality that the heart

Army

not the British

I

and core of the British

a million people living in a part of the island of Ireland

status,

also a fact of life and a product of history.'

it is

was a

themselves

this for

is

who

new

had

to

is

are,

and

who

not only a legal

He was

saying that

be accepted. 'The obstacle

inclusive Irish identity

if

to

people want

not to be found in Great Britain.' People in Britain

'would not bar the way' such a

reality that

new and more

the development of a

brings

or British ministers, but the reality of nearly

certainly regard themselves as, British. This "Britishness"

the 'Unionist veto'

it

if

the people of Northern Ireland decided to seek

he said,

identity. 'Partition,'

'is

an acknowledgement of reality,

not an assertion of national self-interest.' This was a direct riposte to the

IRA's principal argument

which

it

that Britain

defended by military force

had

in its

to

be forced to abandon partition

own

interests.

Peter Brooke was, in effect, inviting the Republican the

armed struggle and enter

political dialogue.

'An

Movement

Irish

to

end

republicanism

seen to have finally renounced violence would be able, like other parties, to seek a role in the peaceful political life of the

Ireland

we

set

it is

community.

In

Northern

not the aspiration to a sovereign united Ireland against which

our face, but

its

violent expression.'

Mr Brooke

then laid out the

prospect of an inclusive political settlement, going far beyond the parameters of Northern Ireland towards a settlement which would involve reconciliation 'between the Ireland;

communities

in

and between the peoples on both these

the phrase that stuck in the strategic or

economic

memory: 'The

interest in

British

Northern Ireland; within islands.'

He

finished with

Government has no

Northern Ireland: our role

is

selfish

to help, enable

and encourage.' This was a comprehensive statement of British neutrality, but constituted a firm

commitment

to the 'unity

it

also

by consent' formula, the

consent required being that of a majority within Northern Ireland. The Irish

Government had concurred with through

its

by way of

adherence to the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

underpinned

in

May

Agreement under

It

1989 when the two governments,

Article

1 1,

reaffirmed 'their

provisions of the Agreement.' lican

this position

Movement. Not only was

full

stated policy

was a policy in the

and

further

review of the

commitment

to all of the

This was doubly inhibiting for the Repubthe

Agreement

further endorsed, but,

on

this

THE LONG WAR

21 2

occasion, initial

was done by an

it

Irish

Government

by Charles Haughey, an

led

opponent of the Agreement.

ADAMS'S RESPONSE Just six days after the Secretary of State's replied to

Describing Peter Brooke as 'head of the political wing

at length.

it

of the British

Army

use of force:

'We

London speech Gerry Adams

in Ireland',

he reiterated the Sinn Fein position on the

believe that Irish people have the right to use armed

struggle in the context of seeking Irish independence and in the conditions

of British occupation in the six counties.' the position until those conditions

struggle

is

the Irish

would remain that

armed

absence of any viable alternative.'

directed his argument against the constitutional nationalists, like

Government and

the

SDLP. 'The onus

on those who claim

is

an alternative to the IRA's armed struggle to prove that

there

is

case.

Recent British claims that they are no longer

the

said this

a method of political struggle adopted reluctantly and as a last

resort in the

Adams

Adams

were changed. 'The IRA says

Union provides an opportunity

test its validity.' In

for those

who

politically

that

this is the

committed

to

argue such a position to

Movement was

an indirect way, the Republican

accept-

ing the possibility that Britain's declared 'neutrality' might be real and the

IRA

might, therefore, be open to persuasion on the merits of armed struggle.

This was a slight but perceptible shift in the long-held fundamental view, that Britain British

was defending her own

have claimed

to

by

interests

IRA

force. 'Given that the

be politically neutral, then they must be open

to

persuasion that peace and stability can be secured in the context of Irish re-unification. Sinn Fein

is

willing without pre-conditions or rigidity to

enter into immediate dialogue in this context,' said

DOUGLAS HURD SPEECH

Adams.

1991

Brooke speech had raised Republican Movement expectations, another speech, almost a year later, was to confuse the issue. In October 1991, at the Tory Party conference, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd

Though

the

reflected sentiments rejected the

view

which ran counter

that the debate

was

still

to those in the

of Ireland, but on 'how Northern Ireland can run

Kingdom, taking

into account the identities

and the minority communities. In

Brooke speech. He

about the Border or the unification its

affairs within the

United

and wishes of both the majority

this situation the

Republic of Ireland has

a crucial role, not as a rival for sovereignty but as a partner in ending

violence and making possible a return to the decencies of normal

A

democratic affairs

The Republic of

life.

DOOR

OPENED

IS

213

Ireland has a legitimate interest in the

of Northern Ireland; the Anglo-Irish Agreement provides a frame-

work through which

Given matters,

it

his detailed

can be involved.'

knowledge of the

Mr Hurd's views assume some

Kingdom

ern Ireland's status within the United

going an important step beyond Article

to

Irish Constitution.

had a crucial role as within the UK',

the Foreign Secretary

was

specifically excluded

Northern Ireland's status within the United Kingdom

precisely because the Republic

and 3 of the

which govern such

of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and

1

The Agreement

stepping hard on Irish sensitivities.

any reference

subtleties

significance. In referring to North-

'a

a rival for sovereignty, under Articles 2

is

Asked about

partner in

Mr Hurd simply

his assertion that the Republic

making Northern Ireland work

said:

'I

think that's a reasonable

better

summary

of the thinking behind the Anglo-Irish Agreement.'

Mr Hurd was

being pragmatic, stating the position as

it

was, perhaps

being too frank about the British 'thinking behind the Agreement'. But to Irish ears

had a

it

different ring.

existing claims to sovereignty the

It

sounded

more or

Union being 'copper-fastened',

The

fact

was

that the Irish

like

he was dismissing Ireland's

less out-of-hand.

as Gerry

It

had the sound of

Adams claimed

Government had sought a more

ment, one of Joint Authority, or joint rule, as laid out in the It

was clear

that the Irish side did not see the

Agreement

at

the time.

radical agree-

Forum

Report.

as the final state

of play, one which would remain set in concrete until such time as a majority within Northern Ireland agreed to a change in constitutional status. Dublin

saw

it

more

as part of a process,

which should lead on

role for Irish nationalism, a role significant

to a far

enough

to

more enhanced

permit the drop-

ping of the territorial claim to the North, under Articles 2 and 3 of

its

Constitution.

Behind the scenes, the Brooke speech of 1990 had raised the Republican

Movement's expectations

how

flexible he

demanded next

to

his words.

State

it

new

was intending

be included

move and were

Gibney put

to

heights. Sinn Fein wrote to

to be.

in the

It

was

'Brooke

disappointed.

As Ard

Brooke asking

in this context that

talks' process.

Sinn Fein

They awaited

his

Sinn Fein's Northern Organiser Jim

a year later at the 1992

Fheis:

'We opened our minds

to

We dared to hope that he would be the first British Secretary of

who would

begin the healing process between

all

the Irish people and

ultimately between Ireland and Britain by starting the disengagement process.'

Gibney spoke about people

in

Sinn Fein waiting for calls from

THE LONG WAR

214

Peter Brooke. 'Perhaps Peter

Brooke went

be remembered for turning the key

as far as he could.

in the door.'

Maybe

he'll

was a

But, at root, there

IRA tactics. Peter Brooke was after an IRA cessation - he wanted

fundamental difference between British and signalling an involvement for Sinn Fein

IRA to call a cessation as a precondition for involvement in talks. The IRA refused. McGuinness described this precondition as 'childish'. The IRA were determined to keep going until a tangible political and demilita-

the

risation process

was mapped out

up the military pressure on

On 7

February 1991 the

in

advance. With that

was

in the

gained a major propaganda and political

Downing

Street in

garden of the Prime Minister's residence, shattering

IRA made

London while

Gulf War. One mortar

in session discussing the

forcing John Major to reconvene the meeting below the

mind they kept

Britain.

IRA had

coup. They launched a mortar attack on 10 the Cabinet

in

stairs.

a direct political point, the attack coming as

it

hit a tree

windows and

In a statement,

did in the midst

of the flurry over Brooke's assertion that Britain had no selfish, economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland.

Government

The statement

called

which would lead

to 'initiate the process'

on the British

to withdrawal.

MARKETHILL BOMB Later in the year the

IRA launched

another series of attacks which would

culminate in an operation which caused major waves of condemnation. In

August 1991 a 1,0001b bomb of homemade explosives destroyed Markethill RUC station in County Armagh. A unit of South Armagh IRA late

had driven van stolen for a

it

in

down

the Milltown

Dundalk

County Down-registered

Mark

Road

three and a half

via Clady in a white Nissan Hiace

months

vehicle.

earlier.

The van was a

Two escort cars came

with

'ringer' it,

a red

2 Cortina and a red Nissan Bluebird, one for getaway.

This Protestant village was just completing a phase of renewal which

had given

it

a

new

sense of confidence.

The bomb was put

lunchtime on mart day, perfect cover with

all its

into position at

trucks and cars. Virtually

every corner of the village was affected by the blast - shops, houses, cars. Markethill' s largest employer, Spence Bryson, pulled out; the nineteenth-

century weaving factory with

demolished.

Two

houses

in a

its

landmark 100-foot chimney had

knocked down. Others were so damaged

be

that families

were forced

to find

number of months. Some lived in caravans own gardens. Long delays in rehousing them caused anger and

alternative in their

to

nearby private housing estate had also to be

accommodation

for a

A

much

resentment,

of

generally the case,

DOOR

OPENED

As was

directed at the Northern Ireland Office.

it

21 5

took months for assessors to calculate the damage to

it

and for the Chief Constable's Certificate

private housing

IS

to

come

through.

Only then did the Northern Ireland Office pay compensation. Compensation to shops

that

and businesses was paid directly and speedily,

commercial

to

demonstrate

went on regardless. Though no-one was killed

life

Markethill, the people's suffering

was

in

About 120 sheep and lambs

multiple.

died in the explosion, their lungs punctured by the effects of the blast. Three

months

IRA had demolished Glenane

earlier the

further south, using a 2,0001b

injured.

The Glenane bomb

turn, the Markethill

bomb

bomb. Three

soldiers

were

and

killed

fifteen

Markethill people feeling vulnerable. In

left

left

UDR base a few miles

other nearby mainly Protestant towns like

Tandragee, Portadown and Banbridge fearing for the future. Almost every

town and

village

had

its

scars and

history,

its

little

known by

the wider

world.

Markethill minister,

was

more or

Order. Walking

home

the

of Reverend William Bingham, Presbyterian

less a child of the troubles,

down

the

main

street

and Chaplain

chemists, hardware, churches on either side,

how

terraced houses too, he recalled troubles.

'This

is

the

bomb

to the

but

come down

my

the

when

I

arrived

nobody had been seriously

some

me

I

was

hill.

IRA

me

at school,

my home

injured, well that

planted a car-bomb

up as well and take half the

street

I

own home

hadn't heard about

with

it,

me when

I

had been destroyed but

was kind of a

was

and there was a fear

here,

just over

In June 1980, just a

police were waiting for

that

a sizeable crater in the road and there

garage behind

the

is

grandmother was treated for shock. She

back of the house,

off the bus and they informed

left

old grey cemented

garage opposite the house. That exploded and our

was completely destroyed and

Orange

Markethill had suffered in the

month before the twelfth of July demonstration,

had moved

some

the top end of Markethill and an old house

here on the right-hand side as you

just outside the

in the

of the village, past butchers' shops,

relief.

The bomb

quite a fire going

that the petrol tanks

but as

I

got that

on

in the

would go

say people are resilient

and determined that they'll not be put out of business and they're going to build bigger and better.

Whatever damage they do, we'll build up again,

bigger and better and that's always been our answer. Just over to the right-hand side you can see a

little

house, an old lady lived there, a

Robinson, and she didn't hear the warnings of the police and she was in her front

room when

the

bomb went

off.

Mrs

sitting

Her house was badly damaged,

216

THE LONG WAR

parts of the

chimney came down around

and she never returned 'Just

to her

The lady was obviously

home.

around here on the left-hand

the first car-bomb,

North.

her.

and moved from the house to an old people's home outside Armagh

terrified

It

was

it

at the height

was put opposite a

was a bomb

side, there

of the

in 1972,

IRA car-bomb

cafe, Johnston's Cafe,

I

back of our houses,

we were

a terrifying experience as a

waiting for the little

bomb

was

activity in the

which was completely

was about nine years old and we were

destroyed. In 1972

it

to

go

lad to see the glass

off,

all

so

put to the

was

it

come around

quite

us and

see the house shake. 'I

suppose the trouble started when

really

coming

to a year

I

was

of understanding and

six years of it's

age so

something

always lived with, born and bred on the troubles and therefore

normal way of

But, yes,

life.

anger did heighten

in

was no way you would give was car-bombed

shop. This

and beside the shop

whenever bombs

you but you were

at that

in.

all

the

hit,

more determined

Just over to our right here there

in the late '70s

and the family

who

have

I

became a

it

town was

the

was just

I

like that

your

hit,

that there is

a large

above

lived

time were very lucky to escape with their

lives.

There was no warning given and

I think it was the dog barking that awakened them to the difficulties that the house was on fire. People are asking you know, how much more, how much more of this is going to

happen,

why

should

we be under

attack

attack because we're a Protestant frontier.

move

I

mean why

and the feeling

community

is

living, if

you

attack Markethill? Well, because they

in here they are

like,

know

under

on the if

they

going to hurt the Protestant people. Nationalist

IRA

are basically of the Catholic

community, so therefore they're not going

attack Crossmaglen or Forkhill.

to

We are the next nearest place.'

Wouldn't the IRA say they were attacking the police in

that we're

station, the

people

uniform, people representing a British presence here? 'Yes, I'm sure they

would, but

I

mean,

we

people out of uniform.

our community. The

many

make any

It's just

difference to people in uniform and

an attack on our community, the police are

IRA blew up

the local factory

which employed so

people, destroyed chemist shops, the mart where

sell their cattle

when

don't

all

the people

go

to

and animals and destroyed people's homes. They knew

they were planting the

police station, they

knew

it

bomb

that

it

just wasn't going to

would destroy people's

lives

go up

at the

because basically

no warning was given.

'We just passed my

brother's chemist shop here; as

you can see

it's still

DOOR

A

IS

boarded up. His business and his house suffered. The shop another

site

bomb

of a

OPENED

21 7

we just passed

there in 1979, a lorry-load of timber

was placed

outside a local clothes shop and again caused great destruction in this lower part of the town. Thankfully, there has

planning. There could have been

God

thankful to

never been anyone killed in

bombing. That has been due

as a result of a

this

to fortune rather than the

many more

casualties.

We

town

IRA

are very

that there wasn't.

we have a memorial which was erected by the Orangemen remember those who have been killed in the troubles from our own Orange district. It's all Orangemen - it's not a list of everyone 'Just

over here

of the town, to

that's

been

during the

killed, last

20

but those belonging to the Order

who have

years.' Markethill area took in about 15

lost their lives

Orange Lodges,

combining about 500 male members plus two women's lodges with up 30 members, and Junior Orange, about 30. The monument,

in the tall

to

shape

of a war memorial, stood in the centre of the crossroads at the lower end of the village.

It

had eight names on

The walk down

the village had

They were open, pulled back.

If

it.

come

off entry to the village. 'Yes, this is really,

because

in the

to the security gates at the entrance.

necessary they could be closed over, sealing

one of the saddest parts of the town

1980s two of our local policemen were standing over

there guarding the entrance to the town.

The town was completely sealed was the only way in and

off at this stage because of the troubles and this

way out. All traffic was stopped at the barriers here waiting for come into the town and the security men would be involved in checking vehicles; and one November evening when it was just about 6.30pm on the clock, just as it was getting dark, a gunman jumped out of a car, just down Newry Street there, and went over and shot two policemen the only

people to

Samuel Corkey and Ronnie Irwin, and both of them died on the spot. They were very well known in the town and the town was greatly shocked there,

and saddened by

What about

that.'

the

blame on the other

bigotry? 'Absolutely,

we have

side, the sectarian killings, the

suffered at the hands of the IRA, but you

could easily be doing an interview in parts of North Belfast in a Catholic

community and they could tell you the same story, that the loyalists have done what the IRA have done to us and there is no excuse for that and I would hope there would be no people

in this

town

that

would condone

support the violence of the

UVF - innocent Roman Catholic

have had

terrible sectarian

to

go through the

that,

people that

murders, especially over the

THE LONG WAR

218

last

year even.

and the

Now,

RC [Roman

ultimately,

it

is

going to take bravery on the Protestant

Catholic] side to give

up these men of violence and

And

say they have nothing more to do with you. then, there wouldn't be

the

fall in

much

hope. But

we

are encouraged for instance, in

the support of Sinn Fein over the past recent elections.

that a vote for

Sinn Fein

to see that their

a vote for the IRA.

It's

quite simple.

numbers have gone down but there

amount of support

much hope

is

somewhere. Until

there

to

unless they do that, well

is still

We believe We are glad

a considerable

that goes, there

wouldn't be

of a reconciliation.'

MORE ATTAC KS In

September 1991 the IRA

killed Jack Haldane,

managing

director of

Haldane-Sheills, because his firm 'had supplied materials for the rebuilding of Border posts'. In between

were

targeting Catholics and the

Over Christmas

the

IRA

all

IRA were

of

this, loyalist paramilitaries

targeting loyalist paramilitaries.

declared a 72-hour ceasefire, designed to show

that they could turn the violence

on and off

at will,

and

to exert additional

pressure towards their political demands. Immediately afterwards the

began a sustained bombing campaign, using massive bombs devices.

The

targets

were commercial,

1992, an incendiary device exploded

IRA

and incendiary

hitting at the lifeblood: 1st January

in

Budget

DIY

store, Belfast,

minor damage; same day, three incendiary devices

at

causing

Top Man

shop,

same day, an incendiary device Sportsbowl, Glengormley, outside Belfast, caused minor damage; same

Belfast, left the building completely gutted; at

day, incendiary device at Suites Direct, Newtownards, caused a fire which

destroyed and damaged 18 cars in an adjoining garage; 2nd, incendiary Texstyle World, Belfast, caused huge

fire

damage estimated

at

at

around £1

same day, another exploded incendiary device found at Sportsworld, Glengormley; same day, unexploded incendiary found at Martin Phillips, Newtownards; 4th, two incendiaries in Canon cinema, Belfast, million;

caused minor damage; 5th, massive

major damage running Errigle Inn, Belfast, Street, Belfast,

bomb

to millions of

minor damage;

in

Bedford

Street, Belfast, left

pounds; same day, an incendiary 6th, another

massive

caused huge destruction; 10th, incendiary

bomb at

in

at

High

Homestyle

Carpets, in predominantly Protestant Ballymena, extensive damage;

same

day, incendiary at Nu-Furnax Furniture, Ballymena, extensive damage; Starplan Furniture, Ballymena, minor damage;

same day, an incendiary

at

same day, incendiary

Graham's Furniture, Ballymena, minor damage;

at

A

same day, incendiary 1

1th,

at

DOOR

OPENED

IS

County Furnishings, Ballymena, minor damage;

incendiary at Next clothes shop, Belfast, extensive damage;

two incendiaries

at

219

Quality

Used

Furniture,

same day,

Lisbum, caused minor damage;

14th, an incendiary at Carpet Express, Belfast,

minor damage.

THE TEEBANE BOMB As

tension mounted, the

workmen

killing of Protestant tant

workers

IRA

carried out the single biggest planned

since 1976

Kingsmills, County

at

when

mass

they shot dead ten Protes-

Armagh. The IRA

unit had stopped the

workers' bus, taking aside the one Catholic and shooting the ten Protes-

On

tants.

were

on 17 January 1992, eight Protestant workmen

this occasion,

killed, at

Teebane Cross, County Tyrone, by an IRA bomb which blew

apart the Ford Transit van in

which they and

were

six others

travelling.

Tyrone IRA claimed responsibility. The dead were described as

'eight

o

collaborators engaged in rebuilding Lisanelly Barracks.'

Outrage and

condemnation was huge and extensive. The victims came from a wide area of Northern Ireland, from Cookstown, Magherafelt, Ballymena, Doagh.

Many

Protestant communities

were deeply

from England

after

One of the dead was He had returned home

affected.

25-year-old Gary Bleeks from outside Cookstown.

becoming unemployed and taken up

He

Construction Ltd. from Antrim town.

the job with Karl

lived with his grandmother,

Mrs Q

Elma Oxteby. She described how she heard 'Oh,

we

waited

the hospitals.

in

He

that

Gary was one of the dead.

suspense from six o'clock. Didn't

we knew

wasn't admitted and

if

know

till

ten.

We rang

he wasn't admitted that

he must be dead.

And a woman came

held his hand

he died. She asked him where he was from and he said he

till

yesterday and told us that her daughter

was from Cookstown. He was quick and helped him

till

he died.

was somebody with him,

And

that

so

it

was a comfort,

Roman

back

to

that

came

we know there IRA issued

bomb

saying that attacks on 'Crown

would continue.

The Teebane bomb was condemned the

lorry driver

he wasn't dying on his own.' The

a statement straight after the Teebane force collaborators'

A

to tell her that.

in the strongest possible

Catholic Primate, Cardinal Cathal Daly.

some of the worst days of the

'70s, in terms of

T

think

mass

it

terms by

brought us

atrocity, a

mass

murder. There was a particular element of cruelty about the calculated ruthlessness of this.

And

it

must have been intended

occupants from the van into eternity. 10 alive.'

It's

to

blow the whole

a miracle that anyone

came

out

THE LONG WAR

220

The

total

of civilian workers and contractors killed by the

reached 23 since August 1985 when they killed Seamus Coalisland. In the immediate aftermath, the Teebane

another mistaken identity about

IRA had killed at

it. It

IRA had now

McAvoy from

bomb had

the look of

was only a couple of weeks since

the

Logue from Coalisland. The workers

'mistakenly' killed Michael

Teebane Cross were from Karl Construction of Antrim and were

returning from

work on a

Omagh.

security base in

they were 'legitimate' targets. At

first,

So, as 'collaborators',

IRA claimed

the

they worked for

Henry Brothers of Magherafelt. Henry's were a major building contractor for the security forces

and

this

made them prime IRA

Three of

targets.

IRA were

Henry's employees had previously been killed by the IRA. The

also motivated by suspicions of local connections with the loyalist paramilitary group, the In terms of

IRA

UVF. military strategy, the

Teebane bomb was a

struck with deadly ferocity and effect and

'success'.

It

would have been extremely

intimidating to others contemplating taking jobs on

bombed-out

RUC and

Army buildings. Just as in the case of the Kingsmills massacre of 1976, this bomb also served as a warning to loyalist paramilitaries who had

British

carried out a succession of killings in Tyrone. (In the loyalist

UFF used the Teebane bomb

in a Belfast betting

shop a short time

pressure on the Unionists,

manner of things,

the

as their excuse to kill five Catholics later.)

who were made

The Teebane bomb put

further

more vulnerable and Chief Constable had

to feel ever

The RUC T want more policemen and I 11 British Prime them the better.' the sooner I get want more troops and Minister John Major was directly drawn in - another plus from the IRA resentful about British security policies.

gone

to the scene

and declared

to the media:

propaganda point of view. Major promised extra troops, and within days paid a visit to Northern Ireland, pledging that the IRA would not change

government policy.

It

was a long time since

the

engaged the attention of the British Government

IRA had in

so successfully

such a comprehensive

home the advantage. The day Gerry Adams issued a statement directly

Teebane

manner. Sinn Fein pressed

after the

bomb massacre,

linking the attack

to Sinn Fein's political is

demands: 'The

loss of life in Friday night's incident

an horrific reminder of the failure of British policy in Ireland.'

He

said

that the 'tragic event' underscored 'the urgent need for an inclusive dialogue

which can create a genuine peace process.

,12

This had the look of a cynical manoeuvre, trying to pass the blame for the

Teebane bomb onto the

British

Government while

at the

same time

A

DOOR

IS

OPENED

221

Adams was making another bid talks. He was again signalling that

using the 'tragic event' as a political lever. for Sinn Fein to be involved in political the

IRA were

in the

business of looking at

ways

to

end the violence, as part

of an overall peace process. The question was, on what terms? There had

been ill-founded expectations that conciliatory noises by Sinn Fein leaders

ways between

indicated a potential parting of the that

somehow Sinn

Fein might go

it

alone.

edly said that they would talk to Sinn Fein

the

IRA and

Sinn Fein,

Both governments had repeatif

they had 'no guns under the

table'.

In a surprise

move, Cardinal Daly, an uncompromising and vocal oppo-

nent of the IRA, had said in his 1992

could be involved

in talks if

New

Teebane bomb, Cardinal Daly took up long overdue for Sinn Fein leaders,

prepared to go the other mile, to dialogue. Asking

how it

this point,

saying that the time was

who talked so eloquently about being make things as easy as possible for

the Sinn Fein leaders could square their rhetoric with

their refusal to dissociate

Cross, he described

Year's message that Sinn Fein

they no longer espoused violence. After the

themselves from what happened

as 'only one of a

whole

at

Teebane

series of atrocities, a trail of

blood and terror and sadness and heartbreak going back for twenty-two years and they haven't advanced by a single inch and they never will until

they dissociate themselves totally from the IRA.

But the language of the IRA's 1992 'New Year message from Oglaigh na hEireann' had been, as ever, tough.

It

paid tribute to those in prison and to the

families of dead volunteers saying: 'Your courage

and commitment

in the face

of terrible suffering continue to inspire us and add to our determination to pursue

this struggle to ultimate victory.'

The IRA

leadership said their actions

of the previous year had delivered one simple message to the British Government. 'You cannot hope to quench our people's desire for freedom and so long as

you continue

to

occupy and oppresss us you

consequences of your political point.

driven

'Our

actions.'

The

ability to diversify

home the message

will live with the inescapable

New Year message and

that Britain is fast

went on

to strike effectively

stability to the

main

and hard has

running out of options and must

soon face the inevitable by taking the steps necessary to resolve

and grant peace and

to the

people of Ireland.

this conflict

We in the Republican

Movement stand ready and willing to show the courage and leadership required of us. The British for their part must end their current bankrupt policies in regard to Ireland.'

14

This was a message delivered after a period of considerable soul-

222

THE LONG WAR

searching within the

Army

Council. Despite the hard rhetoric,

essentially a 'soft' message. Quite clearly

would be pursued

to 'ultimate victory'

time, the Republican

more complicated

Movement

-

was saying

it

it

was

that the struggle

a united Ireland. But, at the

same

was indicating a willingness to enter a

political phase. If the British

were willing

to take certain

'steps' the Republican Movement would 'respond', or, as the New Year message put it, the IRA would 'show the courage and leadership required'. At its best, this meant that the Republican Movement might be willing to

pursue their 'struggle' by purely political means, provided Britain removed obstacles to unity. In particular, this

would involve

Britain 'joining the

ranks of the persuaders', by trying to convince the Unionists that their best

may appear like a quibble with words and lives. It could be argued that the IRA message was the same old iron fist wrapped in asbestos gloves. Certainly, within the IRA the iron fist remained. There were those who would contemplate no end to From

interests lay in that direction.

armed struggle

until the

Union Jack was lowered over Stormont

This had been the majority view

concluding message

war

is to

and

its

the outside this

in earlier years.

January 1984 had been blunt and absolute: 'This

in

the end. There will be

no

-

interval

Britain will be out of Ireland

and an

as in the disaster of partition

When we

curse on subsequent generations.

democracy

Irish

the 32 counties with a national government.'

New Year message

was

gentle.

Even though

*

away our guns,

put

be established

will

By comparison,

The majority view was now

Army

in

the 1992

the ultimate objective

been abandoned, a mind-set change had taken place on the

had not

Council.

different.

had taken place.

In the previous year or so a radical overhaul of tactics

A

Castle.

For instance, the IRA's

protracted internal debate revolved around the realisable gains to be made

from armed

struggle. Peter

Britain had no

was an important spur on the

issue, at

who was

Brooke's statement of November 1990 - that

selfish strategic or

economic

to this discussion.

interest in

Northern Ireland -

The Army Council had divided

one stage voting by a majority of one. Martin McGuinness,

a key figure in

all

of

this,

remained

in the 'hard'

not to imply splits in the leadership or division between

Adams, who by then had relinquished

The

issue boiled

would

down

all

McGuinness and

direct involvement with the army.

to the question of

whether or not armed struggle

continue until a British declaration to

a different goal

camp. This was

withdraw was won. In the end,

was sought. Instead of demanding straightforward British Army Council decided to pursue the goal of Irish

withdrawal, the

DOOR

A

self-determination.

was a highly

It

arrived at a position

before.

that Britain

Given

some of which

which was a good deal

'softer'

wanted

that for

223

The

Fein, had

and more complex than

grew within the leadership

that Britain

own

and, further,

Northern Ireland pursuing interests of her

in

lingered on.

Movement, both IRA and Sinn

A broadly held consensus

was no longer

OPENED

significant shift of emphasis, reached in

the midst of considerable internal concern,

leadership of the Republican

IS

out.

20 years and more the IRA campaign was based on the

contention that Britain was in the North in order to defend her interests by military force, thereby justifying the

development. In questioning of strategy

was

itself

its

it

was

need for

long-held strategy.

faltering

IRA force, this was a major IRA should permit such

significant that the

and meant

that

It

implied a recognition that the

any moves towards compromise could

look like signs of weakness. The leadership was prepared to take this risk

and also direction

to live with the

would lead

would be exercised,

consequences of the new direction. The new

to difficult choices

particularly

when

it

about

came

how

self-determination

to the 'Unionist veto'. It

could mean a continuing British involvement after the ending of armed struggle, in the

medium term

or longer.

11 Moving into dialogue SINN FEIN

LAUNCHED THEIR NEW PEACE

did so in a

community

initiative in

February 1992. They

hall in Ballyfermot, a 60-year-old working-class

suburb of Dublin. For the

first

time, Dublin Corporation had refused

them

permission to use the historic Mansion House, official residence of Dublin's

Lord Mayor,

in the heart

of the

city. It

was a very physical manifestation

of how marginalised and disliked the Republican south of the Border. The reason was simple

-

Movement had become

IRA campaign.

the

It

was

deeply unpopular and deeply offensive to the vast majority of people and

had proven.This was not

politicians in the Republic, as a series of elections

to say that the

same bulk of people and

politicians

had abandoned

their

attachment to Irish unity or to a resolution of the northern conflict. Head-

to-head talks in Belfast, London and Dublin later demonstrate

how

easily the 'ancient quarrel'

in the

year would

between Britain and Ireland

could be restarted. Britain and Ireland were de facto

'rivals for sovereignty'

over Northern Ireland but there was no prospect whatever of the Irish

Government supporting

the use of the

gun

to

win the argument. Both

countries were long since partners in the European

Community, moving

towards the pooling of sovereignty, about to open Customs frontiers by way

of the Single European Act. Sinn Fein and the

convince the

Irish voter that

IRA

fought in vain to

armed struggle had any relevance

to

modern

Anglo-Irish politics; hence the isolation of a community hall in Ballyfermot for Sinn Fein's annual conference.

REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT PEACE DOCUMENT At the Ard Fheis, Sinn Fein launched

document

called,

'Towards

A

its

new

political initiative in a

Lasting Peace In Ireland', which was

addressed to the United Nations, the European Community, Unionists and the British

Government. In

was a measure of how

particular,

far the

it

looked to Dublin for a lead. This

Republican Movement had travelled since

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 225 the dim, distant days of the early 1970s

when

'victory' also

meant sweeping

aside Dail Eireann, the 'illegal, puppet regime'. In 1992 the Sinn Fein peace

document was saying: 'Dublin has a clear

and a major role

providing the democratic resolution which will bring lasting

to play in

peace.

responsibility

possesses the resources, the political and diplomatic access to the

It

world centres of power.'

This did not mean that the Republican

was about

itself

submerge

to

unilateral ending of

armed

under Dublin's wing. Nor did

But

struggle.

it

dialogue with constitutional Irish nationalism.

out the alternatives

it

was prepared

armed

when

government

a British

resistance or

imply a

it

way

for later

The Sinn Fein document

laid

to contemplate: 'Irish republicans are

determined to play a constructive role Ireland

did pave the

Movement

in building a national

is

democracy

in

convinced either by a continuing

by an effective unarmed constitutional strategy

to adopt

a policy of withdrawal from Ireland.'

Sinn Fein were

now

saying that they were prepared to look seriously

an unarmed alternative to achieve their political ends.

being described as 'an option of

last resort',

Fheis passed a motion which, in theory at tions for the Republican Farrell

Cumann

in

Armed

adopted reluctantly.

least,

It

said: 'Since the

at

was

The Ard

had far-reaching implica-

Movement. The motion came from

Dublin.

struggle

mass of the

the

Mairead

Irish

people -

North and South - are oppressed by partition and the social evils

it

sustains,

Sinn Fein recognises that only the combined forces of Irish nationalism can defeat imperialism in to building a

all its

forms. Sinn Fein therefore reiterates

its

support

broad front to bring about an end to partition and recognises

such a broad front to be the main vehicle for national liberation.'

The

IRA campaign which had One of the Cumann, Owen Bennett, became an open

motion reflected some of the unease about the

been growing within Sinn Fein, particularly south of the Border.

members of the Mairead

Farrell

advocate of the ending of armed struggle and was partly instrumental in fomenting an internal debate on the matter. 'If this [a it

mean

broad front]

for

is

the

main vehicle

He spoke on

for national liberation

armed struggle?' You can't have two main

delegates. People have spoken about an alternative to said, 'this is the alternative.'

The motion

the debate took place in a

Ard

somewhat

what does

vehicles, he told

armed

struggle, he

asserted the primacy of the broad

front over the military approach, said Bennett. This

stage in the

the motion, asking:

was fundamental. But

disinterested atmosphere at a relaxed

Fheis. Nonetheless, the motion went through

by a clear

226

THE LONG WAR

majority, with

Adams and McGuinness on

TOWARDS When

the platform, voting for

it.

LASTING PEACE

A

new Sinn Fein document, Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland', Bennett continued his criticism. He said it was 'a bit of a joke' to say the armed struggle was taken up reluctantly, given the force it

came

to debating the

of the militant republican tradition. Turning to the main contents of the

document, he said

new

form.

it

contained nothing new, merely old ideas presented in

'Now we're more

efforts in the

document

Community. Bennett's voice ing to the

UN

and the

isolated than ever,' said Bennett, jibing at the

to appeal to the at the

EC was

United Nations and the European

Ard Fheis was a minority

one. Appeal-

a similar tactic to that adopted by Yasser

Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in trying to convince the

world that they were entering a

Movement was

fully non-violent phase.

very conscious of such

the opening of an office in Brussels.)

further shifts of emphasis

beginning,' said

by

Tom Hartley, the

Taken

The Republican

1993 they announced

as a whole, the debates

the Republican

Movement.

'This

is

marked

only the

a senior Sinn Fein strategist, referring to the

political offensive being launched by

number of years

activities. (In

way of the document.

armed struggle had been relegated

to

In the previous

being 'an option',

though never an option they would lightly cast aside.

Now

they were

defining the 'broad front' as the 'main vehicle' for national liberation.

movement's principal

political

McGuinness, were endorsing Irish

Government, seeking

partition, politics,

At

strategists,

In large part, these shifts

engage

their attention

The

Adams and

were aimed

at the

on the central issue of

and presenting Sinn Fein as a willing advocate of constitutional

always provided

that stage there

partner

it.

to

and military

that British

was a

was Fianna Fail,

withdrawal was the endgame.

coalition

government

in

Dublin. The major

the republican party, principal advocate of a unitary

was armed struggle which created the conditions for the removal of British jurisdiction over the 26 Counties and the Irish State. 'In Ireland,

it

truncated) Irish state,' said Sinn Fein's

emergence of a separate

(if

document, reminding the

Irish

Government of its

roots.

'It

new

must be recog-

nised that there has been no consistent constitutional strategy to pursue a national

democracy

condemned

in Ireland,'

it

went on, pointing the finger

the IRA. 'Objective evaluations of the

armed

ing those of the British Government, recognise that indicates that

it is

likely to

at

those

who

struggle, includ-

its

history to date

be sustained for the forseeable future. In those

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 227 circumstances there struggle

in the

counterproductive to

is

alternative

an onus on those

is

who proclaim

advance a credible

armed

that the

Such an

alternative.

would be welcome across the island but nowhere more so than

oppressed nationalist areas of the Six Counties which have borne the

brunt of British rule since partition and particularly for over 20 years past.

The development of such an

alternative

This was the language of the

new

would be welcomed by Sinn

political offensive.

was

It

Fein.'

a clear

indication that if Dublin pursued a 'credible' anti-partition objective the

Republican

Movement might row

The Sinn Fein document ment and

its

in

behind

it,

without armed struggle.

also dealt with the role of the British

claim to have no 'selfish strategic or economic interest' in

keeping Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. that the

Govern-

document did not

It

was

significant

directly challenge this assertion. (There

was no

re-statement of their trenchant view during the 1988 talks with the that 'strategic interests are

now

partition should go: '(a) (b)

It

rejects the

It

in Brit-

listed ten reasons

why

defies the wishes of the Irish people as a whole;

It

in Britain as

expressed in opinion

flouts international law; (d)

It is

undemocratic;

permanently abnormal and can only be maintained by the most

extraordinary means;

(f) It

accepted standards; (g)

Its

or lesser degree nationalist

inevitable;

- the

(i) It

(j) It

simply does not work by any universally

consequences have made victims of-

entire Irish nation for generations,

and unionist;

Six Counties;

that the

most important consideration

wishes of the population

poll after opinion poll; (c) (e) It is

the

The new document

ain's interference in Ireland.')

SDLP

(h)

It

in greater

North and South,

has created a generation of casualties in the

perpetuates conditions in which conflict

cannot produce lasting peace.' Sinn Fein

still

is

actual or

maintained

Anglo- Irish Agreement supported the status-quo of partition.

INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS Having

laid out the

arguments, they did not go on to demand a simple and

unilateral declaration of intent

by Britain

to leave Ireland. Instead they

asked Britain to adopt a strategy of persuading the Unionists. The document put

it

this

way:

'Britain created the

problem

in Ireland. Britain

responsibility and role in initiating a strategy

resolution and lasting peace. This

which

has the major

will bring a democratic

must involve, within the context of

accepting the national rights of the majority of the Irish people, a British

government joining the ranks of the persuaders consent of a majority of people

in the

North

in

seeking to obtain the

to the constitutional, political

228

THE LONG WAR

and financial arrangements needed for a United

Movement was

not, in it

arrangements.

was

It

any sense, abandoning

was opening up

withdrawal but

Ireland.'

The Republican

final objective

its

of British

the possibility of accepting interim

explicitly accepting the

need

'to

obtain the consent of

a majority of people in the North.' In another section this argument

advanced

be movement towards conditions

further: 'If there is to

in

was

which

debate about national reconciliation can take place, the British government-

bestowed unionist veto needs government recognises the

would help

to

be removed.

If,

and

failure of partition

in the interim, a British its

Six-County

state, that

create the conditions for dialogue.' Creating the 'conditions for

dialogue' could only

This was not

made

particularly at the

mean

a period during which the

explicit.

The

threat of

IRA guns were

armed struggle remained

silent.

constant,

end of the document when Sinn Fein summed up. They

would play a constructive

role

when

a British

Government was convinced

by armed resistance or by an effective constitutional strategy'

'either

adopt a policy of withdrawal from Ireland. This,

would end only

killing

if

at least,

was

explicit.

to

The

a constitutional alternative were put in place, one

which could achieve the same end. It

was possible

nothing new, merely a change of

to see all of this as

language to appeal to a wider audience.

One of their own, Owen

Bennett,

Ard Fheis. But, in reality, it was more than just a change of language. It was a long way from the absolutist position adopted during the 1988 talks with the SDLP. Then, Sinn Fein had justified armed saw

it

way

that

struggle

North.

at the

on the grounds of Britain's

Then

also, they

strategic

and economic

interests in the

had sought an immediate repeal of the Government

of Ireland Act, terminating Northern Ireland's position within the United

Kingdom, followed by a complete

military

the lifetime of a British parliament.

and

political

withdrawal within

The new document of 1992

implicitly

accepted Britain's claim to have no 'selfish strategic or economic interests' in Ireland.

Going on from

the 'Unionist veto' in a

there,

Sinn Fein had also addressed the issue of

manner not done

in the past,

namely, the need to

And

get 'the consent of a majority of people in the North.'

suggestion of an 'interim' period during which

The document was no approval of the IRA. neither

was

it

at

odds with

said

it

discussed within the movement.

It

The document, he

Significantly,

the

had the de facto

was not put formally

their views.

was

dialogue could take place.

solo venture by Sinn Fein.

Adams

there

Adams

to the

said,

IRA

but

was widely

stated: 'There

had

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 229 been no republican backlash

to this talk of politics.'

He

stressed the

importance of recent statements by the new Irish Taoiseach, Albert

Hume

Reynolds, and by John |

would be on the

Ireland Act

a sign that partition

itself

forthcoming talks the Government of

that in

view

In Sinn Fein's

table.

was

this

positive,

was coming onto the agenda.

Republican Movement was paving the way for an

In essence, the

accommodation of

There was no

sorts with constitutional nationalism.

challenge to the legitimacy of the Irish Government in Sinn Fein's docu-

ment. Given that the document was a substantial and formal statement of their position, this

was a major departure from

Government' was called upon

the past.

Now,

the 'Dublin

to adopt a strategy of persuading the British

Government, the Unionists and the international community about the merits of ending partition on the basis of national self-determination. Publicly, the Irish Foreign Minister of the time,

no further than

Gerry

to ask

Adams

to

David Andrews, would go

abandon armed struggle

in

order to

Andrews saw real changes in Sinn Fein Government was arriving at a position where it was

find a place at the table. Privately,

policy.

The

Irish

prepared to keep the door open for Sinn Fein and accept an alternative to armed struggle.

prolonged period.

It

was

between

their

by the IRA's

two

parties.

period that John

in that

Adams,

consultations with Gerry

test its

willingness to

The door would remain open

conflict.

his

a full five years after the 1988 talks

This was a long and painful process, prolonged

refusal to call a ceasefire except in the context of a

ending of the

for a

Hume resumed

The

reality

was

that the

IRA had

a position where anything short of that would cause a

permanent

got themselves to

split.

SINN FEIN/SDLP DIALOGUE Both Sinn Fein and the

document was

SDLP continued

part of this process.

the dialogue.

John

Hume

speeches, at times directly addressing the IRA.

August 990 1

at the

Merriman Summer School

in

The new Sinn Fein

had made a number of One such occasion was

County

Clare.

Hume made

a pitch for the pride of the IRA. 'The leadership required, given the nature

of the IRA, to abandon what they call "armed struggle", would require

enormous moral courage and istent. If there are

any

in their

real leadership

ranks

need republican precedents for called Pearse,

down

their

who once

arms

lest

which appears

who have

that

their actions, they

to be non-ex-

moral courage and they should remember a

man

issued a statement calling on his followers to lay

they bring too

much

suffering on their

own

people.

THE LONG WAR

230

Are there any such people have the moral courage act in this century

and

to

to

in today's Provisional

change

would do more

to transform the

begin the process of breaking

which are the

real

problem on

IRA?

to totally peaceful

down

this island

went on

to

make

and they

atmosphere on

this island

the barriers between our people,

today and which are the real legacy

IRA

of our past and which are in fact intensified by the

Hume

If there are

methods, then no single

campaign.'

a proposal to both governments, a

way of wiping

the historical slate clean and starting afresh. 'Let the British and Irish

governments together follow the example of the European Community. Let

them make a joint declaration and the prejudices that are

that the divisions

among

the people of Ireland

at their root are the regrettable

consequences of

our history and are not in the best interests of the people of Ireland or of the

European Community;

that the

two governments had decided

to leave the

past aside; that they have decided to build institutions in Ireland, North and

South, which will respect differences but which will allow the people in

both parts of Ireland to work their

common

ground together and through

doing so over the generations, spilling our sweat and not our blood, to grow together, like the Europeans, at our time, will

emerge a new Ireland

respect for difference.

built

own speed

...

that process, in

an approach that need not be feared by any

It is

section of the people on the island of Ireland for the agreement and involvement of

The

Out of

by agreement and solidly founded on

it

can only happen with

all.'

idea of a 'joint declaration' by both governments would emerge

again as a crucial component of the

Hume/Adams

talks in 1993.

It

could

provide the basis for an agreement founded on national self-determination

expressed over a protracted period of time through

new

'institutions'

and

one which required the separate consent of nationalists and Unionists. There had been echoes of this in Ireland'

when

in the

Sinn Fein document 'Towards a Lasting Peace

they spoke of a British government recognising the failure

of partition, thereby helping to create the conditions for dialogue.

Northern delegates had

come

to the

February Ard Fheis from a situation

fraught with tension and violence, which went largely unnoticed or, at least, unfelt south of the Border. series of killings

by

During January and February 1992 there was a

loyalist paramilitaries,

which further fuelled allegations

of collusion between loyalist killers and elements in the security forces.

was

just three

Belfast

Crown

weeks since

the trial

of Brian Nelson had been opened

It

at

Court, following an inquiry into such alleged collusion.

•

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE

Army

Nelson was a British

working as an intelligence officer for the

agent,

loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster

emerged people

victims of

wing, the

tion' s military

Defence Association (UDA).

Nelson had been responsible for providing

in court that

who became

details

It

on

UDA killings, carried out by that organisa-

UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters).

20 charges, including conspiracy

guilty to

231

to

Nelson pleaded

murder and possession and

during 1988, while acting as an

He got ten years. Army agent, Nelson

also involved in the organisation of a major illegal

arms shipment from

Many

of these arms were

collection of information likely to be of use to terrorists. It

later transpired that

was

South Africa for a number of loyalist groups. seized by the

RUC in Northern Ireland, but a significant number remained

in use. It

was a

lethal

supplied by a British

Army

agent working in a key intelligence role within

and

at large

combination, guns and personal dossiers

the North's largest loyalist paramilitary organisation. the year

when

maximum

the reorganised loyalist paramilitaries

The year 1992 was

began

to operate with

effect.

THE KILLING CONTINUES Thirteen Catholics were killed during the January, Kevin

McKearney was

first five

weeks of the

shot at the family butcher's shop in

County Tyrone. He was the brother of Padraig McKearney,

SAS

year.

killed

On

3

Moy,

by the

IRA bombing attack on Loughgall RUC station five years On 9 January, Philip Campbell was shot dead at his work in Moira,

during the

earlier.

County Armagh. Paul Moran was shot dead going 30 January. Four days at his

later in north Belfast,

home. The following day, 4 February,

an off-duty Belfast,

RUC man

and sprayed

to

work

in

Lisburn on

Paddy Clarke was shot dead in

an extraordinary incident,

entered the Sinn Fein offices on the Falls Road,

bullets, killing Pat

Michael O'Dwyer. The policeman

later

McBride, Paddy Loughran and

committed

on 6 February, five Catholics were killed

suicide.

in a south Belfast

Two days

later,

bookie's shop.

They were Peter Magee, James Kennedy, Jack Duffin, Willie McManus and Christy Doherty. Catholic communities were held the loyalist groups, particularly the

UDA, made no

in the grip

of fear as

bones of targeting

ordinary Catholics with a view to putting pressure on the IRA. There would also

emerge within the

UDA a defined political agenda, that of preventing

Dublin having any say over Northern Ireland

affairs.

These killings took place alongside a renewed and sustained IRA

bombing

offensive. In addition,

by the time of the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis on

232

THE LONG WAR

22 February 1992 the IRA had been on the receiving end of the British

Army's toughened approach to catching people 'on active service' On a wall of the Ballyfermot Community Centre had hung large pictures of seven new names for the 'Republican Roll of Honour' Three - Tony Doris, Peter .

.

Ryan and Lawrence McNally - were in the village

armed and 'on an operation aimed photos were also of IRA activists

Army

shot dead by British undercover forces

of Coagh, County Tyrone, the previous June. The three were at

a military target.'

The other four

from County Tyrone, shot dead by

forces six days before the Sinn Fein

Ard

part of

two

active service units returning

headline 'They Died That as

it

political reaction

by the IRA with the Libyan

in

An Phoblacht carried the banner

We Might Be Free'. 8 It was an heroic headline.

did so soon after the Teebane bomb, wider public and

was muted.

were

Privately, there

Coalisland operation was not so

The

much

DHSK machine-gun is a large,

local criticisms that the

heroic as brazen, even foolish. visible

weapon mounted on heavy

designed for long-distance use, being deadly accurate

legs. It is

RUC DHSK

from shooting up Coalisland

shipments. Reporting the Clonoe killings,

coming

in a

Clonoe Catholic church grounds. The four were

at

machine-guns, 26 of which were brought

But,

down

The weapon used was one of the huge 12.7mm Russian

station.

Kevin

Fheis. Peter Clancy,

Barry O'Donnell, Sean O'Farrell and Patrick Vincent went massive hail of gunfire

British

at

2,000

metres and capable of piercing three and a half inches of armoured steel at 1,500 metres. night

its

It fires

tracer incendiary rounds, causing fire

firing location

can be easily seen, unless well concealed.

planned use of this weapon by the operation and getaway.

RUC

station.

mounted on

It

IRA

small town, on the main

was half past

the back of

was

failed these tests.

It

took

street directly facing the

The

DHSK machine-gun,

in the

hands of Kevin Barry

ten at night.

a stolen lorry,

Any

requires an effective strategy for

The Coalisland shooting

place in the centre of the

on impact. At

O'Donnell, a 22-year-old native of Coalisland from a strong republican

who had joined the IRA four years previously. O'Donnell had been engaged on IRA operations in Britain while studying for an agricultural degree. On his return, he was a high-profile, well-recognised IRA activist.

family,

There were

at least

two others on the

lorry, carrying

AKM rifles, and a

supporting active service unit in other locations overlooking the station.

The

lorry

backed

into position

and O'Donnell carried out a sustained burst j

of firing

on the

front of the fortified station just a

few yards away. According

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 233 to

one local

made

at

IRA

source, firing

was over-prolonged and

visible at the back.

left

up the Annagher

Hill, travelling

of hundred yards before passing the street where

IRA

Doris was one of the three lorry

slowed as

into the air with the

Tony

for

It

was

itself clearly

A leader car in front drove with its hazard lights flashing.

The two vehicles turned

The

the getaway

a casual pace with O'Donnell, two others and the gun

it

activists killed at

on a couple

Tony Doris had lived. Coagh the June before.

passed and from the back O'Donnell fired more shots

machine-gun, then shouted: 'Ra, Ra,

Up

the Ra, that's

Doris.'

had the look of reckless bravado. The

lorry

and car drove on by the

back road towards Clonoe Catholic church, about another two miles. In the church carpark they ran into a massive firing-attack from British forces,

At

killing the four.

least

two others escaped. One senior IRA member

Coalisland questioned the

wisdom of taking such

a long

way back

change-over spot after a noisy, high-profile operation, and asked:

in

to the

Why

so

many back to the same spot? This source speculated that the British Army may not have been certain of the exact change-over place, given that two of the six activists escaped when the gunfire started. He said all the ammunition

for the

gun

was

the

itself

machine-gun was spent by the time they got back and

partly dismantled.

At

least

one direct witness

to the

shooting at the church spoke of hearing a long period of firing, lasting more than five minutes, followed by voices shouting to the effect: 'We' re out.

Don't be shooting.' There was then more

coming

Three bodies were

firing.

recovered around the lorry: Patrick Vincent, in the cab, presumed to have

been the driver; Peter Clancy, on the ground

O'Donnell, on the ground O'Farrell,

at the

at the

cab; Kevin Barry

back wheel. The fourth man, Sean

was bent over a fence outside

Repub-

the church grounds. Local

lican Movement sources said O'Farrell had been brought

this far

by one or

two of the men who escaped. At

the funeral service in Coalisland for

O'Farrell, the parish priest

forces for what acceptability

happened

Kevin Barry O'Donnell and Sean

Canon Mac an

at

tSagairt criticised the security

Clonoe church, saying

it

was no way

to

win

from the nationalist community: 'The standards of Sunday

night are unacceptable. If what

questions must be asked.'

of the Republican actions, he said,

The canon then went on

Movement

were

was done was within

the law, then serious

to appeal to the leaders

to 'bring violence to an end'.

'ill-considered'.

He

Many

of their

appealed then to 'think again,

234

THE LONG WAR

turn to more constructive ways to find justice and peace and before more damage is done to the souls of the community.' At this point a sizeable number of people walked out of the service in protest, among them Francie Molloy, a Sinn Fein councillor on Dungannon District Council and the

leading Sinn Fein figure in the area. In the congregation, Gerry

Adams and

Martin McGuinness stayed seated. Before the service there had been a confrontation outside the church door.

The canon had refused

to let the

coffins in while draped with the tricolour, in line with Catholic

regarding paramilitary trappings period of

more than

at funerals.

half an hour, backed

had walked from the homes of the dead

The

with

full

IRA

was carrying out

great roar

from the crowd. The

church and placed

These events at the

fully

rules

up by hundreds of mourners who by Gerry Adams

to the church, led

father, Jim, told the

the wishes of his son for a funeral

Canon Mac an

trappings. In the end,

two

families stood firm for a

and Martin McGuinness. Kevin Barry O'Donnell's parish priest that he

Church

tSagairt gave way, to a

draped coffins were carried into the

at the front.

illustrate the

mixture of emotions and loyalties which tore

heart of the North's nationalist communities. There

ever-present conflict between the

IRA and

the Catholic

was an

Church and also

within the community and within families. Yet, this was very often tem-

pered by the activities of the British loyalist paramilitary groups.

in

At

Army and RUC and by

the Coalisland funerals the

the actions of

RUC turned out

very big numbers to accompany the coffins from each of the houses,

flanking the corteges in lines and leading from the front in depth.

had referred

to this too in his

'entirely uncalled for',

standing'

among

The canon

homily. The high profile of the police was

he said;

it

displayed

the higher ranks of the

RUC.

'a

complete lack of under-

Yet, the confrontation at the

door of the church had underlined the dilemma for priests sensitivities of grieving families as well as the

in

propaganda

handling the

interests

of the

Republican Movement.

RUC POLICY ON FUNERALS At the time, the

RUC

policy on paramilitary funerals was being re-ex

amined. They had decided that the events of March 1988

where three had died had been

in

Milltown cemetery and two

British

in

west Belfast,

Army

corporals

killed during a follow-up funeral, could never be repeated. After

that event, the

RUC

had stood back, following public assurances regarding

the handling of the funerals of

Mairead

Farrell,

Sean Savage and Daniel

-

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 235

McCann, who were was

to prevent

By

and

objective of the

the time of the Coalisland funerals in February 1992, the

had reverted

The

The primary

RUC

happened when the hunger-striker Bobby Sands was buried

coffins, as

1981.

killed in Gibraltar.

any display of weapons or of shots being fired over the

to the policy

police have

IRA

funerals.

to resolve this

problem

of heavy policing for high-profile

made every reasonable attempt

in

RUC

avoid conflict or confrontation. Regrettably, experience has shown

to

that the influence of clerics

tentioned,

is

and others

in the

community, however well-in-

not enough to curb the behaviour of paramilitary organisations.

Experience has also shown that the maintenance of the law and the preven-

be guaranteed through the firm presence of the

tion of outrages will only

police and the Army.'

12

Yet, this policy clearly had accepted.

The

its

downside, as the

local feeling in Coalisland

among

critics

RUC

of the

whereas the circumstances surrounding the shooting attack by the four

huge

had been extremely detrimental

activists

to their

themselves

IRA was in

that,

Coalisland

own

cause, the

RUC presence at the funerals would have ensured new young recruits

to the

IRA. The 'Ra' recovered some ground. In any event, the 'cause' had

IRA members buried around Coalisland was about half the age of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, who, in turn, were 'Sixty-niners', the new breed who had shown

itself to

have very durable

roots.

taken over from the campaigners of the

Each of

fifties

and

the four

forties.

Coalisland had a strong handed-down tradition and plenty of modern

experience to back

up.

it

hands of the British

The

Army

in

funerals of the

Clonoe church grounds encapsulated

Clancy, the father of one of the dead a year previously that Peter

brought

to

Monaghan

young men who died

was

IRA men,

in the

at the

it.

Leo

said he had discovered about

IRA. This was when

his son

was

hospital with shrapnel in his foot following a car

bomb. Peter had by then been three years a member.

Mr Clancy

said he

had

pleaded with his son to get out of the IRA, even threatened him, and offered to get

him a job

in

Dublin or a ticket to America.

He

said Peter,

who was

22, insisted on staying in and fighting for the cause, a united Ireland.

Clancy couldn't see how his son had been properly trained

in the

Mr

use of

arms as he hadn't been away for weekends or extended periods.

Beyond Annagher

Hill

on the outskirts of Coalisland, Kathleen Doris

told a similar story of trying to get her son to leave the

was one of

the three

IRA

activists killed at

IRA. Tony Doris

Coagh by undercover

British

THE LONG WAR

236

Army

forces eight

months

Barry O'Donnell gave the

earlier

-

it

was passing

their street that

Kevin

DHSK Russian machine-gun a few bursts and

shouted in triumph, 'Ra, Ra, up the Ra, that's for Tony Doris', before

on

travelling that

to his death. This

Tony Doris was not

mother,

Tony had been

had been a public show of defiance, a sign

forgotten, that the fight goes on.

him

they once held

in

Army. He was

constantly stopped by the

four or five times and taken to

Gough

According

to his

arrested

barracks for questioning. She said

custody 'on a trumped-up charge' for two months

was a known member of East Tyrone IRA, a

before releasing him. Doris

highly active outfit, responsible for a series of killings. His parents warned

him he'd be said:

in danger.

They

'you have to fight on.

you can't

let

O'Farrell, 22.

have a

life

The hunger

them down.' Doris, aged

two of the IRA

Adams

also tried to get

activists killed at

him

to

go

strikers died

America but he

to

and others died and

21, had attended the

same school

as

Clonoe, Peter Clancy, aged 21, and Sean

'You know they're going

to die if they join the

IRA. They

expectancy of one to two years,' said Mrs Doris. She said Gerry

should be involved

in political talks.

She thought

that if there

were

a compromise, like a power-sharing government in Belfast, the Provos

would

lose a lot of support.

While Mrs Doris wanted her son out of the IRA,

she refused to accept that his actions amounted to murder. for a cause, she insisted.

Above

He was

fighting

her as she spoke, set neatly on the wall of

her living-room, were the gloves, beret and tri-colour which had been placed on her son's coffin.

The nuances,

the subtleties, the depth of history

and experience were always there, but seldom understood by people

who

who came from a different tradition in another part who came from many parts of the 'Free State' south of the Border. A Protestant RUC man or a British soldier entering Mrs Doris's living-room and seeing the IRA insignia on the wall came from

outside or

of the same town

or, for that matter,

might draw a very simplistic conclusion. In another part of Coalisland a senior

IRA

The IRA, he

weariness' in the organisation.

picked up by the British Government, but

this

source spoke of a 'war

said,

wanted

'signals' to

wasn't happening.

was taking place within the Republican Movement, searching able compromises.

It

was hardly

coming out of Tyrone IRA. The

for accept-

surprising to hear talk of 'war weariness'

killing of the four activists at

brought to 34 the number of their members killed 14 in the last two years.

be

A debate

in the

Clonoe church

previous ten years,

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 237

THE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES I

The

'Ra' continued operations,

failures,

most causing

distress,

Fein Ard Fheis a coffee-jar

Rax

most of them small-scale, many of them

damage and

terror.

bomb was thrown

at

The day

a British

Street, Belfast, slightly injuring a soldier; shots

were

after the

Army

Sinn

patrol in

fired at police at

I

no

Millfield, Belfast, causing

Bank

Ulster

two

May

in

coffee-jar

bomb

Next day

at

at

damaged

in a hold-all

Kennedy

Way

the

in Belfast,

Army checkpoint. They Belfast at Woodboume RUC

a police and

Next day, shots were

and Mountpottinger

The routine usual.

Street, Belfast.

bombs were thrown

failed to explode.

station

injuries; a

fired in

RUC station, causing no injuries.

stuff continued, with

Around 6pm on 28 February

house takeovers and hijackings as

there

was a knock on

the door of a house

in the mainly Catholic 'head of the town' area of Strabane.

A man

looked

rifle. He shouted to his wife to lock way in, attempting to smash in the door. Two other armed and masked men came in the back door. The man refused their demand to hand over the key to his blue Toyota Hiace van outside, but was forced to do so. The first group of three left in the van, the other

out to see three

masked men, one with a

the door but the

IRA

two held the man, later the

forced their

his wife

and two-year-old child hostage. Fifteen minutes

van was returned.

It

[look-out post] near Strabane

no

arrests

In these

and no

same few days

found submerged at

injuries.

had been used

RUC

in a

station. Fire

gun attack on a sangar

was

returned. There were

The family would remember. after the

in a lake near

Ard

Fheis, explosives and fusewire were

Cookstown; a coffee-jar bomb was defused

Armagh Road, Newry, during which 20 residents were evacuated around bombs were found at Barrack Street in Coalisland; and

midnight; 63 petrol in

Twinbrook, west Belfast, three

bomb were

AK47

found, along with a huge

1

assault rifles, and a coffee-jar

,6001b primed

bomb

of

homemade

explosives packed into three 'wheelie' rubbish bins ready for transportation.

A week

later, at

half an hour past midnight on 5 March, the

IRA

hijacked a Vauxhall Cavalier car and forced the driver at gunpoint to drive it

in to

Lurgan High

Street.

The Cavalier was used

to clear the

way

for a

Toyota pickup van behind, carrying a 1,0001b bomb. The van bomb was parked, a warning given, and the explosion gutted the town centre, causing millions of pounds of damage. Within the next

small the

bomb

near Wandsworth

Common

week

the

railway station in

IRA exploded

a

London, and, on

Dungannon-Ballygawley Road, Tyrone IRA destroyed McGowan's

THE LONG WAR

238

had continued

service station on the basis that they

This activity happened

in the

run-up to the Westminster general election,

IRA

due on 9 April 1992. In an interview the electoral intervention

and believe

said:

'We

support Sinn Fein

that they are the only credible political

party for which Irish nationalists can vote.

people

'crown forces'.

to supply

We understand that there are

who vote for Sinn Fein who may not be able to support the IRA, but who supports the IRA is duty bound to vote for Sinn Fein. We

everyone

have declared our intention of doing

and voting for Sinn Fein

is

all in

our power to shorten

one way of doing just

this struggle

This was another

that.'

clear expression of the twin-track approach to the negotiating table, by ballot

and bomb.

that the

It

IRA would

was continuing confirmation

not be lured into a temporary ceasefire.

war weariness

also responding to a certain little

up

Command was

sign that Northern

to the election in the

way

in the

signals,

Government

The IRA were

communities. There was

fine-tuning the campaign

they had done in the past.

from the IRA were confused, some hard, some at the top.

to the British

The bombing campaign was

The

signals

soft, reflecting

also their

coming coming

uncertainty

method of sending out

demonstrating that they were not 'on their knees begging the British

Government', as

Adams had

put

Politically, the

Republican

Movement was on an

into dialogue. Militarily they

it

at the

Ard

Fheis. offensive, seeking

were talking of 'shortening the

ways

struggle'.

It

was becoming clear that the terms on offer to them would be hard to swallow. At the same time the IRA were still very well equipped. They had gone through about half of the Semtex high explosive from Libya, leaving them with about

three tons.

It

was sparingly handed out by

the quartermas-

ters, being used in small devices for directional explosions,

downwards.

Homemade

explosives were

cial

bombing. They caused a heaving

ing

damage

to buildings

still

effect,

when placed

the mainstay of the

into a

new phase

commer-

exploding outwards, maximis-

in the street, as in

the IRA had gone through three or four different phases

They were now

upwards or

Lurgan. in

By 1992

bomb-making.

following a shortage of nitrobenzine, a

The problem was solved when they discovered that a very common chemical, which was totally accessible, would do the job. This led to a new and highly active bomb-making phase, as events would show. vital ingredient.

Their bomb-makers would continue the dedicated task, grinding through commercial coffee grinders, 501bs an hour or

days to make the very big bombs,

so, taking

fertiliser

two

to three

or half that time using a corn crusher.

MOVING INTO DIALOGUE 239 These bombs were made of the Border.

As

for

in all types

of locations, urban and

weapons, the

AKM fully automatic rifles were in

abundant supply. More than half the 1,200 imported

IRA hands and dumps. For

a small guerrilla

army

AKMs

this

was

were

sued.

As

for the devastatingly effective

and other weapons

like the

British. Britain also sold

This conflict had

had the capacity

to

worthwhile option.

when

Webley

in

pur-

and versatile general-purpose

on the Libyan shipments) the irony was

in

still

substantial

over-supply - activists had frequently taken to dropping guns

machine-guns (40 came

both sides

rural,

that these

revolvers were supplied to Libya by the

weapons-training to Ghadaffi's regime.

many

twists

and

One thing was certain. The IRA many activists that was the only

turns.

keep going and for

12 constitutional Stalemate THE SEEDS OF THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE which had been sown by Brooke, Britain* s Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,

Peter

in his pivotal

speech of November 1990 and which had been germinating underground in the

North's political

soil since then,

began

to sprout hopeful signs of

fruitfulness in 1991-1992. Representatives of the British

ments and of the North's

political parties

and

Irish

govern-

agreed to a series of meetings

Brooke/Mayhew talks' - Sir Patrick Mayhew was Brooke's successor and which promised to be the most which were

to

become known

as 'the

hopeful effort since 1921 to find a permanent solution to the Northern issue.

The

parties approached the talks

from widely different

starting points.

There could be no doubting the utter polarity of positions which had

and

still

set

-

kept - Unionism and nationalism apart over the 70 years since

partition.

Each

felt

able to express

as though the other didn't exist.

its

political convictions with

There was

sl

abandon,

middle ground, but, by and

large, as the northern conflict entered the final straight of the twentieth

century, the language

opposed had

its

was of past heroic

battles

and of diametrically

political aspirations. Constitutional politics

chance.

It

had

failed.

had taken over, had

Why else was there still a bleeding, open sore?

In the decades after partition, both governments, British and Irish, had settled their differences

on everything except the issue which

first

divided

them. In 1966 they forged a Free Trade agreement. In 1973 they entered the

European Economic Community together, on the same day. Twenty

years later they were partners, buddies, in the Single Market.

This was also 20 years or so since the Stormont Parliament

had been abolished and

its

in Belfast

replacement, the power-sharing Executive,

overthrown. Stormont had been given half a century of

life,

then tossed on

the scrapheap of history. In the 1970s and 1980s, the conflict ebbed and

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE flowed, and so too did the

smart suits tables at

- the

all.

spilt

241

men (mostly men) in - sat around various tables, or no

blood. Meanwhile the

constitutional politicians

In this situation, the Provisional

IRA found

space.

They could

argue that the root cause of the conflict was British rule. They could justify

armed struggle on the grounds on ending

partition. Nationalists

intransigence. This situation

Government' had no policy

that the 'Dublin

and Unionists could accuse each other of

was a

failure

of enormous magnitude. All the

normal, civilised, channels of politics and diplomacy remained open throughout. Civil order in Northern Ireland had not the best strategic objectives of the

come

asunder, despite

IRA. This was not Bosnia. Elections,

parliaments and governments in Britain and the Irish Republic functioned

unhindered. Yet there was no resolution. Constitutional politics could claim one major achievement: the AngloIrish

Agreement of 1985.

It

restored stability to nationalist politics in the

North, effectively reined in the Unionist parties and created a firm basis for relations

between the two governments.

satisfying neither

government nor resolving the

that mattered most,

Northern Ireland.

It left

deeply resentful of Irish nationalism. internal conflict

Still, it

by

It

was an uneasy fudge,

fully

internal conflict in the area

the Protestants of the North

may even have prolonged

virtue of the fact that the

Agreement was

workable between the two governments to allow them

the

sufficiently

to leave the core

issues for another day.

AN INCOMPLETE CIRCLE When,

finally, talks to

end the conflict got under way

of the failure became apparent.

when, for the

first

Unionism

sat

down

Even then

the circle

time, a British

in

1991-92, the scale

stage in the negotiations

government and

all

the

main brands of

was incomplete, its

armed

the Republican struggle.

Movement being

Although

all

issues

in the constitutional position

consent of a majority there and that the

left

were

table' for discussion, the British stated publicly that there

be no change

came

with an Irish Government and northern nationalism.

outside the door because of

be 'on the

The key

to

would

of Northern Ireland without the

IRA campaign must

Sinn Fein could partake in the talks. Despite

this,

cease before

Sinn Fein insisted that

they should be included, their insistence seeming to portend a significant about-face in their traditional position of refusing to join in talks until after a British withdrawal.

Gerry

Adams

insisted that Britain

would

talk to

Sinn Fein. His reasoning

242

THE LONG WAR

was

that Britain first

was axiomatic were

The

talking.

cessation

first

wanted

that there

and

to get the Unionists

would be a cessation

difference between the

in

on board.

IRA

two was

Adams

said

it

activity if Sinn Fein

that Britain

wanted a

whereas the Republican Movement wanted

talks second,

order to bring about a cessation. Their model was the African

talks in

National Congress

(ANC)

in

South Africa, which engaged

negotiations without formally ending

armed

in constitutional

struggle. In the

meantime, the

IRA would continue operations, continue exerting pressure, continue killing. Adams said there was no debate within the Republican Movement about ending armed struggle, only debate about defining its

methods and

its

All of this had to be seen as a form of public negotiation, or

goals.

The Movement was showing itself to be in the business of compromise, though Sinn Fein was still not at the conference table. As for the Brooke/Mayhew talks, it had taken 20 years, some would say 70, to gather together this incomplete circle. By any reckoning, this was an historic public positioning in the context of a very fluid political situation.

Republican

moment.

It

was a

test for constitutional politics. In particular,

showpiece for constitutional nationalism over bombs. Success could render the

to

IRA campaign

redundant.

Success would be determined by the attitudes of all. they failed.

Beneath the

failure there

provided a

it

prove the primacy of words

When

were a few hopeful

it

signs.

came to it, But many

times across the table they had found themselves using the language of 70 years earlier. British

It

was

as though

little

had been resolved

in the

meantime. The

Government played ambiguous honest broker. Unionists were not

budging from the Union as reappraisal and a

new

it

stood. Nationalists sought a fundamental

beginning. Each side wanted very different things

from the process. 'The

conflict, in its essence, is

Unionists should finally

settle for

now

about whether

minority status in the island as a whole

or whether Northern nationalists should do so within the confines of

Some people kill, and many more tolerate killing - on both sides because of their fears that this choice will be resolved the wrong way.' So said the Irish Government in its opening submission on 6 July Northern Ireland.

1992.

It

went on: 'The poles of the problem we are called on

not between two rival views of

how Northern

to resolve are

Ireland should be governed

within the UK. There have been many attempts

to redefine the

problem

in

more manageable terms and they have all failed. The poles of the problem are between those who resent the very existence of Northern these

Ireland and those

who

see

its

existence, and

its

British status, as vital for

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 243 their identity.

could be tempting to say these two things are irreconcilable

It

and to decide, very simply, to support the bigger of the That, however,

was

This was not

tried,

why

and

failure is

its

the Unionist parties

why we were

two communities.

are here.'

there.

As

they saw

negotiations would find a replacement for the Anglo-Irish

which would

finally

status within the

it,

the

Agreement

win the Republic's acceptance of Northern Ireland's

United Kingdom. The Democratic Unionist Party of Ian

Paisley responded with scorn to the Irish Government's opening position.

'The Irish Republic's delegation,

in

coded language, sought an end

Northern Ireland as a part of the United

status of

Kingdom

to the

as established

by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Their arguments were put forward as they might have been in 1919, before the civil war, following

which the

South of Ireland seceded from the United Kingdom, and before the establishment of special governmental arrangements for Northern Ireland as an

United

integral part of the It's

Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

as though there had never been the pre- 1920 to 1925 settlements

Irish

Government] poses the problem

in

...

[The

terms of the very existence of

Northern Ireland and not as a problem of governing Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.' In his

own opening

for an agreement.

statement, Ian Paisley had laid

Then he continued

Irish Constitution

down

his

must go. 'There can be no peace between Northern

Ireland and the Irish Republic until this illegal, criminal, and is

given up. Unilaterally made,

must recognise Ulster's spell out

talks. If the Irish let

it

must be

immoral claim

unilaterally withdrawn.

right to self-determination.

It

them say so

Articles being to get rid of a

this is the

Republic

let

make

the necessary changes,

Let us hear no more about these offensive

in plain language.

on the table but

us hear a clear expression of determination

claim which continues to inspire Republican violence

Northern Ireland.' Later absolute marker: 'Let

to

UK both de

primary pre-requisite for any future to these not prepared to

is

Dublin

must be prepared

Northern Ireland's status as an integral part of the

facto and dejure -

ground rules

to argue that Articles 2 and 3 of the

in his address, Ian Paisley laid

me make

it

in

down another

perfectly clear that these talks are not and

cannot be about any re-negotiation of the Union. Both Secretaries of State

have made has

its

that crystal clear.

The reference

to everything being

on the table

limitations.'

This was a crucial point of difference between the Unionists and the Irish

Government's submission: whether or not 'everything' was on the

table.

It

THE LONG WAR

244

was

crucial, not only within the walls of Lancaster

Dublin Castle, the venues for the Strand the Republican

the

Movement on

Government of Ireland Act 1920,

discussion. Gerry

Adams had

Two

the outside. i.e.,

House, Stormont and but also for the ears of

talks,

They would want partition,

was on

to

know

that

the table for

regarded the Brooke talks process as positive,

one which could eventually bring

Sinn Fein, once the British had brought

in

He had also stressed as significant and important new Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, spoke in early

the Unionists on board.

the fact that the Republic's

1992 about putting the Government of Ireland Act 'on the

would be the

talks themselves.

Secretaries of State, Peter

table'

While Paisley was able

Brooke and Patrick

basis for the talks, agreed between

all

May hew,

to

The

.

test

quote both

in his support, the

the parties and both governments,

had not ruled out anything.

THE BASIS FOR TALKS was

on 26 March 1991

House of

The agreed

basis

Commons

by Secretary of State Peter Brooke. There were three key Union and to what could be discussed: (a) 'Her

spelt out

in the British

sections relevant to the

Majesty's Government reaffirms

its

present status as a part of the United

consent of a majority of

its

position that Northern Ireland's

Kingdom

will not

people.' (This left

change without the

open the possibility of

agreeing structures aimed to facilitate such consent.) (b)

'It is

accepted that

discussions must focus on three main relationships: those within Northern Ireland, including the relationship

the Westminster Parliament;

It is

institutions there

common ground between

all

the parties

hope of achieving a new and more broadly-based agreement

finding a

way

and

the people of the island of Ireland; and

among

between the two Governments. that

between any new

rests

on

to give adequate expression to the totality of the relationships

have mentioned.' (This was broad and flexible, permitting either a strengthening of the Union in the context of wider arrangements or a

I

dilution of the 'In

Union

order to ensure a

in the context

full airing

of strong North/South structures.) (c)

of the issues,

it

will

be open to each of the

parties to raise any aspect of these relationships, including constitutional

any other matter which it considers relevant.' The final security was built into the acceptance that 'nothing would be agreed each side for issues, or

until

everything was agreed'. Everyone had a veto. Taken together, these

formulations were broad enough to get conflicting agendas.

all

parties to the table with their

own

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 245 BRITISH-IRISH ANTAGONISM

When

came

it

conflict

to

it,

some of the agendas were more closed than open. The

between the

nationalist side

and the Unionist side might have been

expected. But the head-to-head antagonism between the two governments

was more

surprising.

It

showed up an extraordinary lack of

trust

and

understanding, even after seven years of working closely through the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

The 3,

British thought the Irish

expecting the

Irish,

it

were being too negative over Articles 2 and

seems, to have the Articles amended without any

The

reciprocal constitutional change.

sive stance, believing the British

adopted a determinedly defen-

Irish

were trying

to 'bounce'

them

into a

pro-Union agenda. They even talked privately of the British having the capacity to destroy an Irish Government. Irish individuals as the

source of

all

The

things

British focused on particular

ill.

At

mistrust reflected fundamental disagreements,

decades of constitutional

antagonism and

root, this still

festering after seven

politics.

The seeds of the disagreement were sown

in

Strand One. This had been

about finding agreement between the northern parties on an administration for Northern Ireland.

the

SDLP

'reserving'

that equality,

The discussions ended its

in

rancour and failure to agree,

position, the Unionist parties expressing disbelief

and not proportional power-sharing, was being sought by the

nationalists. This

remained the rock on which the talks foundered -

the Irish nationalist assertion, based on the premise that partition

that

is,

had not

solved the problem, that both traditions, Unionist and nationalist, should be

afforded equality of treatment through island. Unionists insisted that the time

the

1920

to

1925 settlement as

final.

new political structures across the had come for nationalists to accept

At several points they quoted the 1925

(Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Act, signed by the southern gov-

ernment, confirming the size and extent of Northern Ireland. Inevitably, a settlement based on equality of traditions and allegiances

Union and

alter that 'final' settlement. It

would put

would

dilute the

the all-Ireland nature

of nationalism on an even footing with the all-British nature of Unionism.

THE IRISH POSITION The

Irish Tanaiste

clear.

(deputy Prime Minister), John Wilson,

'Our entire approach

is

made

the issue

based on the belief that a precondition for any

new understanding between

all

the parties around this table

general acceptance of the legitimacy of both traditions.

must be a

We accept without

THE LONG WAR

246

hesitation the right of the Unionist

legitimacy of their tradition.

community

We expect from the

to be Unionist

and the

Unionist community, in

an unquestioning acknowledgement of the right of nationalists to be

turn,

nationalist

and of the equal legitimacy of the nationalist

tradition.'

For the

Unionists and the British Government this had significant political and constitutional implications.

ruled out any

To begin

it

abandonment of Articles 2 and 3 unless they were replaced

by structures across the island which reflected the British

Government,

with, for the Irish

demand

status within the

for an

this equality. It

meant

unambiguous agreement on Northern

UK would not be

that

Ireland's

met without a balancing statement

The outcome

reflecting the 'equality' of the nationalist aspiration to unity.

of this contest could determine whether or not constitutional politics were capable of solving the conflict. This in turn was bound to affect the attitudes

of the Republican Movement, watching from the sidelines and continuing to

engage

in

armed struggle

as a

means of influencing

the political agenda.

The omens were not good.

CONFLICT For the British Government, Sir Patrick

Mayhew

laid out the

conflict.

'None of us can be

different

views which are held on constitutional issues.

in

any doubt as

represented around this table are those that

Northern Ireland

is

1990: "It

is

As my

predecessor put

is

all

all

in

a speech on 9

Mayhew

It is

legitimate peaceful

not acceptable, and what totally lacks integrity,

the promotion of either view by the crude and brutal

and coercion".'

it

possible to take either position with integrity.

and democratic means. What

could

Among other views

who are content with the present reality Kingdom and those who have an

acceptable to uphold the one or advocate the other by

is

and depth of the

to the strength

part of the United

aspiration to see a united Ireland.

November

essence of the

said there

methods of violence

was a chance of success

in the talks if

'we

reach clear agreement on the present constitutional realities and the

circumstances in which they might change.' The British Government, for

its

he said, 'will seek as a product of the Talks process as a whole an

part,

unambiguously expressed consensus on the constitutional issues and a frame-

work that

for relationships

which

will

be genuinely acceptable to

such an outcome should thereby enable

all

Northern Ireland's present status as a part of the will

be no change

who

live there.'

in that status

all.

participants to

We believe

acknowledge

UK, and to recognise that there

without the consent of a majority of the people

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 247 Here was the crunch issue between the two governments. From the outset, Sir Patrick

Mayhew

appeared to endorse the principal outcome

favoured by the Unionists. They sought agreement that Northern Ireland, as an integral part of the United international law

and

that, as

In their opening statement

Kingdom, constituted

an entity,

it

had a

on 7 July, the largest of the Unionist

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), recorded their position.

never accept that Northern Ireland can give up tion.

The

'territorial claim'.

'We

the rule that "nothing

must be

to this, therefore,

not and will

is

entirely a matter for

by the

fully respected

was an end

agreed until everything

to the

agreed" that

is

Irish

Republic's

UUP at the start,

serve notice now,' said the

is

'We do

parties, the

right to self-determina-

its

constitutional future for Northern Ireland

the people of Northern Ireland and

Government.' Essential

people' in

'a

right to self-determination.

we

'under

will not

enter into any arrangements whilst the Republic's harsh, irredentist and

uncompromising

territorial

claim

is

extant.

Our

position

is

based upon

accepted principles of international law on self-determination, the United

Nations Charter and the Treaty of Rome.'

SELF-DETERMINATION It |

was new language

argue on the basis of

to hear the Unionists

may have been more

than coincidental. They would have been aware of the convergence of views coming from the nationalist side about ways of exercising the right of the Irish people as a 'self-determination'.

|

Its

use

whole to self-determination. The question of national self-determination I

had been a central element 1988.

It

and was

SDLP

became

in the talks

insisted that the

leader,

traditions.

John Hume, brought up the 1988 Attempting

told the Unionists: 'In the discussions the

1988 we stated -

seems

"It

to us to reveal a

influence and not their apart

from the

rest

own

of the

talks at this, quite to reassure them,

SDLP had

with Sinn Fein

deep misunderstanding of

the Ulster Protestant tradition to suggest that

to

in

IRA campaign in later years Hume/ Adams talks of 1993. At all times the only way this 'right' could be exercised was by

different, negotiating table five years later.

in

Sinn Fein

of the

agreement between the two main

Hume

SDLP and

the primary objective of the

at the heart

The SDLP

between the

it is

largely the British

make [the Unionists] wish to live people of Ireland".' He told them how he had tried reasons that

persuade Sinn Fein to accept the reality that Unionists had a veto on Irish

unity.

Hume

restated the phraseology used at the time: 'The harsh reality

THE LONG WAR

248

is

that

whether or not [Unionists] have the academic right to a veto on

unity they have history

it

and they have

it

in the exact

Irish

on numbers, geography and

as a matter of fact based

same way

as

Greek or Turkish Cypriots

have a factual veto on the exercise of self-determination on the island of Cyprus.'

However,

this

SDLP to support the Unionists in their

did not compel the

contention that Northern Ireland constituted one single area for self-deter-

mination. 'As to the question of the people of Northern Ireland being "a

people" with an unqualified right to self-determination, the history of Northern Ireland makes clear that the coherence and commonality neces-

which

sary to sustain the "people" argument are missing in the sense in

term would be understood

in international

covenants today.

that

We do not

accept that the people living in Northern Ireland constitute "a people" in the accepted international usage of the term. consisting of

two communities and

them

deny fundamental

realities

Britain,

is

The Unionists continued

to insist

on one

to

are a divided people

from the

from

the island, or indeed

They

in isolation

to see

rest

of

of the

problem.' reality as they

saw

it.

There was

a separate legal entity called Northern Ireland within a wider legal entity called the United

ment

to

Kingdom. That was what they wanted the

acknowledge, no

ifs

Irish

Government

UK' would be an 3 of

its

to accept

historic shift

Constitution. This

Govern-

or buts or qualifications.

ARTICLES For the

Irish

2

AND

3

Northern Ireland's status 'within the

of policy requiring changes

was where

the Irish

in Articles

2 and

Government adopted a tough,

defensive negotiating position, refusing to concede that in certain condi-

promote such constitutional change. They did this because they detected a line-up between the British Government and the pro-Union parties on this issue. As the British saw it, attitudes to Irish unity tions they 'would'

in the

Republic had softened, particularly with the election of Mary Robin-

son to the presidency. They also sought to exploit differences Irish

Government delegation, where one of

its

participants,

among the Desmond

O'Malley, leader of the Coalition's junior partner, the Progressive Democrats, was on record as favouring unilateral change 3.

As

pressure piled on, the Irish

for the talks

which

stated that

Government pointed

in Articles

any issues 'including constitutional

could be discussed. They insisted that

this

2 and

to the agreed basis issues'

meant more than just change on

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 249 the Irish side.

The divide across

the table

ment's paper of 28 August: 'There

was evident

in the Irish

no suggestion anywhere

is

Governagreed

in the

basis for the Talks that such constitutional issues must be confined to

developments

two the

in

one direction only, or

changes regarding only one of

to

on the

rival constitutional perspectives

status of

Northern Ireland.'

To

dismay of the Unionists, whatever about the British Government, the

Irish side

The

were seeking

Irish

to dig into very

roots.

team brought up the Government of Ireland Act

'The Government of Ireland Act lative

deep

is,

bedrock of Northern Ireland.

partition, creating the

new

the rest of the island. This

It

was also the

entity of Northern Ireland

new arrangement was

great majority of nationalists in Ireland at the time collective assent.'

Among the

'the belief in the nationalist

1

920

itself.

Unionist perspective, the legis-

in the

first

instrument of

and dividing

bitterly

it

from

opposed by the

and has never won

their

reasons listed for this failure of assent were:

community

that the traditional entity of the

island of Ireland should be the valid reference for the collective exercise of

the right of self-determination

by the

Irish people; the delimitation

of

Northern Ireland exclusively by reference to the interest and wishes of one

community, with the clear intention of encompassing the consistent with a safe

maximum

area

overall Unionist majority, including two counties of

the six with nationalist majorities; the failure, in creating the majority rule

of one community, to

make any

provision to give effective expression to

the political wishes and aspirations of the

new

minority community of

than one-third of the population involuntarily included in the

new

more

entity.'

Government of Ireland Act, which clearly changes needed to be made in it, the Irish Government raised

Listing further 'failures' of the

implied that

the argument that the

Act was intended

that the division introduced alist

by

that

to

be short-term. 'Those

urge

Act should be endorsed by the nation-

community have a corresponding duty

to say

the original, purportedly temporary, provisions

a context.'

who

how the

evident flaws of

would be addressed

in

such

What was being sought, though not fully spelt out, was a quid in the Government of Ireland Act to make partition

pro quo: changes

acceptable to nationalists in return for changes in Articles 2 and

They came

to the Articles themselves. 'The Irish

3.

Government has been

subject to severe and occasionally intemperate criticisms in the course of the Talks,' the Irish representatives said, placing on record the

had developed. They said

that those

who

mood

that

rejected the Articles misunder-

stood the thinking behind them and the view taken of them by the Irish

250

THE LONG WAR

people. 'The Constitution reflects the nationalist assumption that the traditional historic

and

encompassing the island of Ireland should

political entity

remain the valid frame of reference for the collective exercise of the right of the Irish people to self-determination.' The argument was that the Irish

To

Constitution merely reflected a problem which needed to be addressed. cast the issue in primarily territorial terms

focus of the problem. That

is

to devalue or miss the real

the failure to date to create political structures

is

which can command broad consensus and general support, whether from

The Northern

within Northern Ireland or in the island as a whole.

problem existed before the

Irish Constitution

Ireland

taking issue with the

...

provisions of the Constitution should not be a substitute for addressing and

resolving these basic divisions of opinion themselves.'

The wrangle over 1992 Sir Patrick

Articles 2 and 3 never

Mayhew added

3 of the Irish Constitution, sincerity with

My

attaches to this matter.

unhelpful.

I

endorse

that.

in practical

also

is,

any successful

drawn

attention to the impor-

in

we

our view, no doubt

Kingdom

territorial

are very well aware. at all

about Northern

of Great Britain and

both domestic and international law. Accordingly

in

concern about Articles 2 and is

that

predecessor called Articles 2 and 3

Ireland's position as part of the United

inherent nature,

fully accepts the

Their provisions, which do give rise to a

terms there

Northern Ireland,

18 September

'As to Articles 2 and

rift:

claim, have generated adverse reactions of which

But

On

must include the repeal or amendment of

talks process

The Alliance Party has

those Articles. it

to the sense of

Her Majesty's Government

which the Unionist delegations argue

outcome from the tance

went away.

3,

my

unhelpful though they are because of their

not that they constitute a realistic threat to our constitu-

tional arrangements, or that the Irish

implied claim through force.

Government would seek

Our concern

is

to assert their

rather that for a different reason

they constitute a greater obstacle to that normalisation of relationships on this island

which

Government

is

all

of us seek. This

quite clear that

it

amendments

framework for relationships which

we

little

will

understand implies neces-

to Irish constitutional provisions.'

'encouraged' to believe that

But there was

will seek, as a product

This should extend to a statement of the

present position of Northern Ireland, which sary

it

unambiguously expressed consensus on

the constitutional issues as part of a all.

because, in particular, the British

ought to seek, and

of the talks process as a whole, an

be generally acceptable to

is

Mayhew

said he

was

such an all-round agreement could be reached.

evidence for

this assertion, other than certain highly

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE qualified statements

we do tion,

made by

the Irish Government:

'We made

clear

251

...

that

not rule out constitutional change, including change in our jurisdic-

ensuing from the present negotiations.'

The

qualifications

were substantial. The

Irish

Government would not

trade constitutional change for institutional change. political structures across the island

They sought new

which would 'balance' nationalism and

Unionism, including a strong North-South executive body with

real

powers.

At the table, the language of the Irish Government (18 September) was of fundamental constitutional change the talks

was

'an

all

acknowledgement

round. They said the agreed basis of

that present

arrangements relating to

Northern Ireland, taken together, have failed to produce general consent.

we

are to achieve a better result

we

require change on

all

sides

addresses, in a fair and balanced way, the basic concerns of both nities.'

To

this

end the

Irish

Government wanted

If

which

commu-

'balance' from top to

bottom. In the parallel

government-to-government meetings,

British side sought a clear status within the

Strand Three, the

in

'unambiguous' declaration of Northern Ireland's

United Kingdom. In return, the

Irish

Government wanted

a highly significant 'balancing' statement to the effect that both govern-

ments had

Irish re-unification as a policy objective. In an

atmosphere of

As one negotiator put it, the Government wanted Britain to return to her pre- 1922 stance of favouring Irish independence. The argument went that if Britain agreed to rancour, the British steadfastly refused this. Irish

protect the Irish

long

way down

Government's flank

in that

way, then the

Irish

would go a

the road towards meeting Unionist concerns.

CONDITIONS FOR IRISH REFERENDUM It

was

in this context,

would consider

dum.

'If

...

change capable of being passed

our negotiations achieved the basis of "a

relationships fair

of an historic leap forward, that the Irish Government

constitutional

between the two traditions

in Ireland,

new beginning" and

and honourable accommodation between them were

tional

consequence

in

if

in the

agreement on a

to entail constitu-

our jurisdiction, the Government could approach the

electorate with the prospect of a positive response

-

a response to a

agreement that would lead to peace throughout Ireland, and ation

in a referen-

between the two traditions

in

our island.'

It

new

to reconcili-

was clear

that this

approach would entail a considerable rolling back of the Unionist nature of

Northern Ireland.

On 29 September the

Irish

Government

set out its stall

THE LONG WAR

252

on the scale of change

it

envisaged.

of 1973, saying that from just about

how Northern

should exist

at all.'

its

It

quoted from the British White Paper

inception there had been 'disagreement not

Ireland should be governed, but as to whether

There followed a description of

how

it

the Irish Govern-

ment saw the existing signs and symbolisms of Northern Ireland as they 'The Constitution of

reflected, or didn't reflect, both political allegiances.

Government of Ireland Act that "the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain

Northern Ireland affirms

supreme authority of the

in the

unaffected and undiminished over

ern Ireland.

The symbols of

all

persons matters and things" in North-

the State reflect exclusively the Unionist

identity, to the point that they are routinely

symbols for party

political purposes.

The

used as satisfactorily partisan

security forces manifest them-

selves in their badges and titles as upholders of the union as well as

guardians of the peace. The British identity of the Unionist community the

dominant

ment argued

would

political reality at

level.'

From

that purely internal political structures within

not adequately cater for the nationalist identity.

relegate the [nationalist

minority

likely to

is

alists' identity is that

in a

every

this the Irish

wider

community]

prove

less

and

system no

Northern Ireland

'Any attempt

to

to its previous role of subordinate

less tenable.The

they are Irish and not British.

Irish political

is

Govern-

essence of the nation-

They

aspire to participate

less strongly than Unionists assert the

claim to have their British identity expressed in a British system.'

By any

reckoning, this was extraordinarily basic language after seven years of the Anglo-Irish Agreement with

its

built-in secretariat

and Inter-Governmental

It was as though things were starting from scratch. Government envisaged strong North/South institutions capable of catering for the all-Ireland nature of Irish nationalism while at the same time helping to bridge the divisions between both traditions. The overall

Conference.

The

Irish

purpose of this was ever-closer harmonisation across the island.

hope

this

would enable both

foster the

common

traditions to re-discover

elements

in

common

'We would interests, to

both their heritages and so to lay the

foundation of ever closer understanding, respect and cooperation between them.' Without spelling out the precise nature of these strong North/South institutions, with

identified a very

independent executive powers, the Irish Government

wide range of areas for co-operation: industry, trade and

technology, agriculture and natural resources, fisheries, forestry, transport

and infrastructure, tourism, energy, environment, health and social welfare, science and technology, education, labour and

human

resources.

The idea

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 253 was

that the

North/South body would have equal representation from both

administrations. Decisions teeing that the Unionists this

new

was

would be taken by consensus, thereby guaran-

would not be outnumbered and outvoted. None of

fully detailed, partly

because there had been no agreement on a

administration for Northern Ireland, but mostly because of the basic

impasse

in the negotiations

as Tanaiste

over the key constitutional issue. The fact was,

John Wilson confirmed, a strong decision-making body of this

kind would, in part, be implementing Article 3 of the Irish Constitution by extending the powers of Dail Eireann into Northern Ireland. exact opposite to the aim of Unionists

when

This was the

they called for the repeal of

the Articles.

THE SDLP POSITION In contrast to the Irish

Government, the

SDLP couched its

proposals in the

language of European integration. They proposed a North/South Council of Ministers on the

EC

mentary dimension.

It

model, with a permanent secretariat and a parlia-

would have a wide economic,

industrial,

and

social

remit including 'security and legal affairs' and a special function dealing

Community

with European

Unionists could agenda.

still

see in the

The SDLP envisaged

to 'break

down

to a unity,

which

issues

its

affect the

SDLP

whole

island.

proposals a hidden nationalist

North/South structures having the capacity

barriers of distrust

which

led to past divisions and to lead

based on agreement, of the people

Ireland, accepting both diversity within Ireland

between the people of Ireland and

who

inhabit the island of

and the unique relationships

Britain.'

UNIONIST POSITION The Unionists sought,

first,

a copper- fastening of the Union followed by

agreed North/South cooperation between two quite distinct sovereign entities.

They were not

basis of equality ist

Party

made

there to agree harmonisation across the island on the

between both

traditions. Ian Paisley's

Democratic Union-

a point of pulling no punches. All this talk of 'new arrange-

ments', they said, was a 'verbal smokescreen' which in reality means: '(1) that the

1920 Settlement be

set aside; (2) that there

eignty by the Republic and the United

Kingdom over Northern

(3) that, failing joint sovereignty, there

involvement of the Republic

in all

should be joint soverIreland;

and

should be joint authority with

full

Northern Ireland's affairs

...

Continuous

bleating that communities cannot express their identities and aspirations,

and

that institutions

must be created

to allow

"accommodation" has

led to

THE LONG WAR

254

such folly as the Anglo-Irish Agreement.' The

DUP reiterated

the 1920 and 1921 Treaties settled the matter between

view

its

that

two irreconcilable

groups.

'Some people do not

but

too dangerous to allow loose language and verbal goodwill to

it

is

obscure enduring

Unionism and their

cake and

realities.

Irish let

share of the cake

The

truth

is

be bluntly expressed,

that as political philosophies 'Ulster

nationalism are irreconcilable. Unionists cannot have

the Irish Republic eat

it.

The

1921-22 and confirmed

in

and internationally

arising

Irish

Republic received

its

acceptance, legally, formally

its

Unionists wanted an end to the Anglo-Irish

in 1925.'

Agreement precisely because

new agreement

like the harsh truth to

it

gave Dublin a role

in

from these negotiations must

of Irish nationalism. This was

why

Northern Ireland. stall

Any

the encroachment

they backed the British

Government

in

seeking an 'unambiguous' acknowledgement of Northern Ireland's position within the

UK.

primary objective

'It is

is

no exaggeration

to say that for Unionists the

the maintenance of the Union,' stated the Ulster

Unionist Party from the outset (7 July). 'This

is

translated into a determi-

nation to keep Northern Ireland out of a United Ireland, and a distrust of

any proposals which can be construed as weakening the Union.'

OUTCOME OF THE TALKS This bridge was never crossed.

Two

statements in the Irish Government's

submission of 29 September, near the end of the negotiations, highlighted the impasse. Firstly, they explicitly spelt out their requirement to the gains

made by

New North/South nationalist

the Anglo-Irish Agreement, rather than roll institutions, they said

community

in

expand

them back.

'must provide reassurance to the

Northern Ireland

to a greater

degree than the

operation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, since otherwise there could be little

reason for nationalists to

sion, the Irish

welcome change.' Secondly,

Government again returned

the need to find agreement on

it:

in their conclu-

to the constitutional issue

resorting again to the old and failed expedient of seeking to

make one view

of the status of Northern Ireland finally prevail over the other.

be found

in

accepting that there

is

now

no consensus on

such consensus can follow only from agreement on underlying divisions in Northern Ireland, of is

and

'Such agreement will not be found by

It

will rather

and

that

manage

the

this issue,

how

to

which the constitutional debate

merely the formal reflection.'

Throughout these

talks the positions taken

were often confrontational or

simply bred of misunderstanding. Unionists

felt

threatened, not only

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 255 because they mistrusted nationalist intentions, but also because of the way they saw Unionism being described.

what offended by the in

Irish

'If

Ulster Unionists have been some-

Republic's paper, that

because of the manner

is

which negative aspects of Unionist nature have been portrayed. There

appears to be an underlying assumption

that, if "the fear"

was removed, Unionists would no longer feel so or "distrust" attitude

may

exist,

it

British.

of Nationalism

While the "fear"

does not dominate the positive nature of

our aspiration to retain our unity with the rest of the United Kingdom. Unionists have their identity too,'

(UUP,

8 July).

After a number of question-and-answer sessions across the table, the Ulster Unionist Party returned to the

most vocal of the

fire at the

Irish

same theme on 24

July.

They

directed

Government's ministerial team, Padraig

Flynn, the gregarious Minister for Justice from County

Mayo

and close

confidant of Taoiseach Albert Reynolds. 'Ulster Unionists have been disappointed by the extent to which particularly rhetoric.

Mr Padraig

We felt

Irish

Flynn, resorted to old and out-dated Nationalist

accommodate

things Unionist. There

be made up and bridges to be mended.'

to

proceeded that Flynn was the principal agent ployed by the

Republic's delegation,

betrayed a deep underlying intolerance and lack of any

it

desire to understand or

ground

some of the

Irish

(It

in the

was

is

much

clear as the talks

defensive tactic em-

Government. In essence he did much of the

filibuster-

ing.) Nonetheless, at that stage the Ulster Unionists detected a basis

which

to

move

on

forward. They did so partly on the back of answers to

questions which they formally placed on record. These related to the Unionists' prime, fundamental concern: the status of Northern Ireland.

Among the questions were those put to John Wilson, the Tanaiste and leader of the Irish delegation from the Border County of Cavan, and to David

Andrews, the Minister for Foreign Affairs from Dublin. These were: Question: 'Do you acknowledge that what

Border"

is

is

generally referred to as "the

an international frontier?' John Wilson:

'We

accept that there

is

an international border between our country and the United Kingdom. That is

the reality of the situation.' Question: 'Can

Northern Ireland Andrews: 'Yes,

is

that

were seeking, but

is

the de facto situation.'

failed to get,

talks continued

What

the reality that

the Ulster Unionists

was an acknowledgement

constituted an international 'frontier' between

began

you accept

an integral part of the United Kingdom?' David

that the

two separate

states.

Border

As

the

on through August and September, the Ulster Unionist Party

to spell out its proposals for a

new

British-Irish

Agreement

to replace

256

THE LONG WAR

the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Their proposals

were always on the basis of

Northern Ireland as part of a wider United Kingdom entity co-operating with an entirely separate entity, the Irish Republic. In the meantime, the Unionists raised the matter of

number of ways. 'No people and sympathise with those

who

from 1969

the monster of

IRA

1972

to

terrorism

'Had

earlier Irish

since 1985

is

Republic governments

been willing to take really firm measures,

...

would not have grown

Naturally the Republic has also suffered.' loyalist violence.

violence in a

suffer loss through terrorism,' stated the

DUP in dealing with the matter. especially

IRA

are better placed than unionists to understand

'The substantial increase

to the extent

They turned

it

has.

their attention to

in so-called "loyalist" killings

evidence of the violence of despair. The Chief Constable's

Report, just published, shows that from comprising only 20 percent of terrorist killings ten years

ago

loyalists last year killed

46 percent of those

in terrorist-related deaths. Such killings we unreservedly conwe have always done and would abhor any suggestion that these

murdered

demn

as

should be used to support a political argument. Yet our fear substantial increase will continue in the that democratic politics

is that this

atmosphere created by the belief

cannot bring change. Nobody should be

doubt that our sincere conviction

is

to

work

should be stated, however, that failure to remove the continue to act as a spur to

IRA

in

any

to avoid such a condition. territorial

It

claim will

violence.'

LIBYA'S INVOLVEMENT

The Ulster Unionist Party tabled a detailed paper on violence entitled 'Terrorism and the Rule of Law: The International Dimensions'. It dealt specifically with the role played

terrorism

is

...

into Ireland of

by Libya. 'Libya's involvement

well documented, in particular in regard to the importation

guns and explosives, and possibly

of training and other

in regard to the provision

The paper made out a case for an international compensation. It examined a number of United

aid.'

investigation and for

Nations resolutions on international terrorism, relating explosion on board a

PAN AM

December

1988, which killed

the Libyan

Government

measures: 'Libya

is

to the

aeroplane over Lockerbie in Scotland in letter

from

UN Secretary General dated 27 February to get

agreement on counter-terrorist

prepared to co-operate in every

to terrorist activities

in part to the

270 people. The paper quoted a

1992 proposing a basis on which

end

in Irish

and severs

its

way

possible to put an

relations with all groups

and

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 257 organisations that target innocent civilians. Libya will not allow tory, citizens or organisations to

be used

terrorist acts directly or indirectly.

anyone proven

to

It is

in

its terri-

any way for carrying out any

prepared to punish most severely

in such acts.' The Libyan Government was would pay compensation in certain circum-

be involved

further quoted as saying

it

stances.

Other such commitments by the Libyan Government were documented

by the Ulster Unionists. Following Irish

this

they proposed that the British and

Governments should seek a number of

things: '(1) International

investigation of Libya's involvement in Irish terrorism and the preparation

of a

full report thereon. (2)

identification of

involvement tion

in

The co-operation of the Libyan

and production for

trial

of

all

authorities in

persons believed to have had

such terrorism whether in Libya or elsewhere. (3) Verifica-

by an international monitoring team

An

in

no camps

to train

accordance with Libya's

UN verification committee might be appointed

apparent invitation that a for that purpose. (4)

that there are

groups on Libyan territory

terrorists or terrorist

apology by Libya and repudiation for

statements

its

threatening the right of self-determination and peaceful existence of the

A commitment by Libya to pay full who have been injured or bereaved as a result

people of Northern Ireland. (5) compensation

to all persons

of terrorists acts which Libya has supported or encouraged. (6)

The

estab-

lishment of an international claims commission to investigate claims for

compensation, to

make

fair

awards, and with power to enforce

its

awards.'

THE IRA CAM P AIGN The IRA campaign had always been Unionists and nationalists

came

close to the surface of the negotiations.

at the issue

from

entirely opposite angles.

Unionists wanted total agreement on the 'frontier' of Northern Ireland as a

means of closing off all options historic island-wide

on a basis

that

might draw

traditions in order to

end

in physical force republi-

to the political process.

At the

start,

grounds that ation'.

IRA. Nationalists wanted a broader,

accommodation between both

the 'ancient quarrel'

canism

for the

it

Ian Paisley attacked the Anglo-Irish

failed to deliver the

He wanted the

to the position of

...

Agreement on

stability

the

and reconcili-

Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland to pull back

'good neighbours'. The result of the Anglo-Irish Agree-

ment was what he called night of agony

promised 'peace,

'the voices of

bereaved souls

in their

unending

the voices of the legless, armless, eyeless, hearingless

THE LONG WAR

258

maimed who

pushed about

are

mere vegetables

wheelchairs or

and turn from

for us to heed these voices its

in their

unresting beds,

lie in

as far as real living is concerned. Surely the time has

boasted ends.

a delusion.

It is

It is

a

this path

mad

come

which cannot ever achieve

nightmare.'

In less dramatic terms the Ulster Unionist Party described their goals in the negotiations as 'peace and justice

religious bigotry'.

To

end

this

...

an end to violence, to sectarian and

model was 'working

their political

relation-

ships between both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and between the Irish Republic and the United

ute and which threaten In the

end

the confines of

no

two separate

states.

They proposed a Council of the

regional assemblies within the United It

was

'Celtic fringe' affair.

Relations Committee, ments/assemblies

tate

in

The

would always

this

was a proposed

Inter-Irish

representatives of both parlia-

Dublin and Belfast for the purposes of building greater nationalists. This

committee could also

facili-

their Belfast

Ulster Unionists strongly emphasised that this committee

relate

develop an all-Ireland

back life

to the Dail or

of

its

lished within the

Assembly and

own. 'Our willingness

a committee,' said the Ulster Unionists,

'is

was a measure of the

body

would never

to participate in such it

being estab-

British Isles,

i.e.,

we

are

relating to the island as a whole.'

level of acute mistrust

that this highly restrictive consultative

it

dependent on

framework of the Council of the

firmly opposed to any free-standing It

for

emphatically would not be what the

'executive co-operation' between Dublin ministers and

equivalent.

British

Government and any

body would be co-operative only,

Beneath

made up of

between Unionists and

trust

it

Irish

Kingdom, including one agreed

stressed that this

with no direct executive function and

UUP called a

which everyone can contrib-

to a substantial set of proposals, crafted within

Government, the

Isles to take in the British

Northern Ireland.

to

one.'

came down

this

Kingdom

on the island of Ireland

body should be regarded by the

Ulster Unionists as brave and radical. Yet, in terms of their electorate, the

nature of Unionism and competition from Ian Paisley, step.

However, what made

by the

Irish

it

dissolved and Articles Ulster Unionists

felt

was a

significant

demand of Ulster Unionists 'interim' proposals, the Anglo-Irish Agreement be 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution be repealed. The

Government and

that, in return for these

it

utterly unrealistic, given the positions taken

with

the

SDLP, was

some justification

the

that the responses they got

from

Irish nationalism were less than fulsome. In their final submission of 27

October 1992, the Ulster Unionists made

this

complaint:

'We expected

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE 259 reciprocation from the Irish Republic's government which had previously

be "generous"

articulated a desire to

to talk to

Our request

it.

to Ulster Unionists if

we proved

willing

Dublin was to define a means whereby the

to

aggressive and irredentist Articles 2 and 3 in the Irish Constitution would

be removed.

From

SDLP we

the

Northern Ireland where

meaningful

role.

asked for a de facto commitment to a

constitutional parties

all

would be able

to play a

Neither our concessions nor our requests have, to date,

brought a single positive response.'

HISTORICAL BAGGAGE AND HIGH EXPECTATIONS At

root, these sharp criticisms reflected the harsh reality that the constitu-

tional politicians

from Ireland and Britain gathered

at the

brought historical baggage which weighed heavily on

various tables

It was more than one Irish Taoiseach had promised 'generosity' if Unionists came to negotiate. But this was always couched in the traditional

all

of them.

true that

nationalist

ing a

new

imagery of a constitutional conference aimed

Ireland.

These

talks

were

different.

to 'everything

being on the table' had

there to trade

away

own

their

its

As

at

ways of agree-

Ian Paisley said, references

limitations. Unionists

were not

constitutional position, only that of the

Republic. Nonetheless, an historic opportunity had arisen. Unionists had

eventually sat

down with Dublin. Some,

gambled by going

maimed

in the

Dublin Castle

unending

adopted a 'Sadat to

of their

into

conflict.

Israel'

Government making a to the

of mistrust and open the 'generous'

commitment

Irish

Government could well have

preferred - this would have meant the Irish

large

enemy

The

People were being killed and

approach, as the British were insisting, and some

own would have

Egypt going

the Ulster Unionist Party, had

itself.

magnanimous

gesture (like President Sadat of

citadel of Israel in order to break ancient barriers

way

to peace).

to put Articles

The

gesture being sought was a

2 and 3 to a referendum as part of

an overall package which would acknowledge Northern Ireland as part of the

UK. This would unlock unseen goodwill from

the Unionists,

was

the

argument. It

was never put

to the test.

As

the Irish

commitment of faith would leave them

at the

Government saw

it,

such a

mercy of British goodwill and

there appeared to be

little optimism in that regard. In other words, they would be relying on Britain to travel the road of 'equality' of traditions,

which the Unionists so steadfastly

resisted.

have

The

to 'take on' the Unionists.

The

British

Government would

vulnerability of this presumption

260

THE LONG WAR

became apparent during 1993 when defeat by Unionist votes in vital

Government was saved from

the British

House of Commons debates on

the

EC

Maastricht issue. This led to speculation of a 'deal' between British Prime

Minister John Major and the Unionists, which the British side fervently

denied.

The

British attitude

Hume/Adams

would become The

self-determination in September 1993.

be expected

a crucial issue

agreement on the issue of

talks led to

the

Government would

British

endorse a more evident 'nationalist agenda' with the hope

to

of bringing about a peace process including the end of Insofar as the

became

when

Irish national

IRA campaign was

starkly clear at the end.

IRA

violence.

concerned, the differences of approach

When,

in

October 1992, the Ulster Unionists

presented their final 'British Isles' proposals, they put them in the context

of finding peace: 'The purpose of an interim agreement will be to create

confidence in the democratic process, and to unite the law-abiding people of Northern Ireland, and the two sovereign Governments, in such a compact as will thwart those evil elements within our to political violence

and who

aries of failure to agree.'

proposals,

will

are

wedded

be the principal and immediate benefici-

By any

objective analysis the Ulster Unionist

agreed to by the Irish Government, would have led to a

if

renewed IRA commitment

to the long

war on

and northern nationalists had been sold intention of the Unionists to find

them

community who

into the political process.

evil elements'

out. It

ways of

would never have been the

'satisfying' the

Provos or bringing

The Unionist purpose was

by firmly closing the door on

In contrast, the

the grounds that Irish unity

SDLP were driven

to 'thwart those

their ambitions.

by a desire

to satisfy the outer reaches

of both traditions by placing the North/South element as the centrepiece of

any settlement.

On

6 July they had opened with the analysis that a major

factor in the 'failure' of the existing arrangements in Ireland distrust

of the

rest

of the people of the island' This was .

why

was 'Unionist

they formulated

proposals on the basis of equality between nationalists and Unionists, containing a strong, decision-making North/South Council of Ministers.

They expressly formulated

this

on the European model of pooled sover-

eignty, the device used to heal the ancient quarrel

Germany. They hoped

that this

broad concept would find support across

the island and would, in addition,

amount

self-determination' being sought by the

have made clear that

we

between France and

to the expression of 'national

IRA and

Sinn Fein: 'The

SDLP

believe that any such agreement, which would be

a historic one, should be submitted in a referendum to the people North and

CONSTITUTIONAL STALEMATE South requiring a Yes from each. Should that happen, doubt it

is

that

we would have

261

we would have no

created lasting peace in Ireland, not only because

the first time that the people of Ireland North and South have spoken

remove any

how

they are governed, not only because

it

would

basis of any description for paramilitary activity, but

it

would

or been asked to speak on

produce an enthusiasm and an energy to build an island

among all our people

work together

to

North and South and by spilling our sweat together and

not our blood to break

determination was

down

the destructive barriers of distrust.' Self-

which John

the central concept

discussions with Gerry

Adams

during 1993.

an accommodation between Adams's determination and

Hume's primary

on 'agreement' between the two

first

It

was

Hume

this

brought to the

which allowed for

objective of 'national' self-

interest in a political process

traditions.

which antagonised the Unionists and fuelled

But

it

was

their suspicions

founded

very concept

this

about creeping

Irish unity.

On

1 1

November

Mayhew

1992, Northern Secretary Sir Patrick

and

Taoiseach Albert Reynolds read statements to their respective parliaments about the ending of the

Both said

talks.

were 'achievable'. They based had as

down around

sat

Mr Reynolds said,

to the identity

and

the

this

same

that the objectives as first set out

optimism on the grounds

that all parties

each other's positions and,

tables, defined

accepted that 'new arrangements must give expression

validity of

each

tradition.'

It

was small crumbs 70 years

after the 'settlement' of the 1920s.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES The IRA campaign continued and loyalist paramilitaries intensified their attacks on the 'pan-nationalists'. The files from the talks were put away in drawers and shelves. These cles to

files

included papers listing Issues and Obsta-

be Resolved, submitted by various parties

though nothing

at all

had happened

the 70 years before that.

The

lists

in the six

to the talks.

They read

months of Strand

Two

as

or in

of unresolved issues and obstacles

included: 'Articles 2 and 3; fear, mistrust, and suspicion between the

communities within Northern Ireland and between the two parts of Ireland; lack of

accommodation of

nationalist identity in proposed structures in

Northern Ireland; lack of confidence by

many

nationalists in the institutions

of State; terrorism by both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries; the inclusion of Northern Ireland by the Irish Republic as part of the "national" territory; the failure to

recognise the existence of such an entity as "the

THE LONG WAR

262

people of Northern Ireland"; the refusal to recognise that Northern Ireland is

in

law part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

the undemocratic Irish

and unconstitutional nature and existence of the Anglo-

Agreement; predisposition of the

language

...

e.g., Article

1

Irish

Republic to use ambiguous

of the Anglo-Irish Agreement; perceived am-

bivalence of the Irish Republic in relation to international agreements;

expressed lack of willingness by influential

ona.de facto

basis, with

SDLP

Northern Ireland as a

leaders to identify, even

political entity; the

dominant influence of the Roman Catholic Church attempted settlement of 1920-21

...

the

new

entity,

Unionist majority, cut Northern nationalists off

condemned them

to

permanent and

largely denied their ethos

on

The

plain fact

was

designed to ensure a safe

from the

rest

of Ireland and

minority status in a state which

and many of their

political structures either within

South.'

total

perceived

in Irish State affairs; the

rights;

an absence of agreement

Northern Ireland or between North and

that the constitutional politicians left the table

with no agreement and the same positions.

13 TOWARDS THE ENDGAME THE IRA CONTINUED with their long war strategy, the same pattern of small local actions - some hits, many misses. On the first day of the year, an explosive device with one pound of Semtex is defused in a hairdresser's salon, Royal Avenue Belfast; next day a coffee-jar bomb is DURING

thrown

1993

at

Army patrol bomb is thrown

a police-British

and another coffee-jar

in

Duncairn Gardens, north Belfast,

at

a police-Army patrol in Creggan,

Derry, no injuries in either; 5th January, a shot

is

fired at a military patrol

near Crossmaglen, south Armagh, no injuries; same day, an explosion the Training and Employment Agency, Adelaide three

members of the Royal

a 251b

bomb

of

minor damage; Belfast,

no

homemade

Irish

Regiment;

6th, in Irish Street,

explosives in a hold-all goes

7th, shots are fired at

injuries;

same day,

at

New

at

Street, Belfast injures

Barnsley

off,

RUC

no

Dungannon, injuries

station in

and

west

Airport Road, Belfast, two explosive

devices containing three pounds of Semtex defused. January progresses with an explosion in Lisnaskea and two explosions in Belfast, one of which guts a car

showrooms; rocket and mortar attacks on two

Belfast; a small explosion

aimed

Carrickmore, a few injuries. Then

at

RUC

stations in

Army in Main Street, week of January, IRA units

police and

in the last

shoot dead two policemen, Michael Ferguson in Derry and Jonathan Reid in

Crossmaglen, and

kill

by under-car bomb a reserve policeman, Reginald

Williamson, as he drives near Moy. This pattern continued day after day, and month after month. the

IRA were

on constant on

their

geared up to do - constant

alert

and under heavy

own communities

also gearing

up

to

attrition,

fortification,

It

was what

Army maximum pressure

keeping police and

ensuring

through house searches and raids. But 1993 was

be a year of significant political movement. Sinn Fein

was opening doors. The IRA was preparing on financial and commercial targets

The Brooke/Mayhew

talks

in

had come

for a

major bombing offensive

London and to

the North.

naught and

in

Dublin a new solid

264

THE LONG WAR

Coalition

Government of Fianna

Fail

and the Labour Party was

in place

with an historically large majority. Political opportunities were opening up.

The Northern Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew had made a major speech aimed at the Republican Movement, similar in content to that of his predecessor Peter Brooke two years previously. Adding weight to Mr Brooke's assertion that Britain had 'no selfish economic or strategic ests' in

Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick

Mayhew used

described the British Government as

democratic will leading

it

in

'a facilitator

He

Northern Ireland.'

to pursue a separate

agenda of

inter-

a different phrase.

He

of the expression of the

said Britain had 'no self-interest its

own'. While re-stating both

governments' commitment to the 'unity by consent' formula, Sir Patrick said the aspiration to a United Ireland

Unionist identity. alists like

He praised

was 'no

less legitimate' than the

nineteenth-century constitutional Irish nation-

Daniel O'Connell and Charles Stewart Parnell, talked about the

epic sagas of ancient Gaelic figures Cuchulainn and referred to the cultural ideas of Ernie O'Malley, an

IRA

Maeve, and even

leader of the 1920s.

BRITISH REGRET The Mayhew speech was another signpost on the tortuous road to a final peace process. It could mean a little or a great deal. Mayhew was balancing Unionist sensitivities with his pitch for the republican hearts and minds.

He

expressed 'profound respect' for leaders of constitutional Irish nationalism

because of the manner

in

which they pursued

means. The Northern Secretary then

Government

you

respects both saddening and uplifting.

will

You

uplifting.

On

the contrary, there

deep

shares in that regret to the it

might

later

regret, full.'

become

bring about an

IRA

clean' as John

Hume had

is

by peaceful

placed on record

'The history of

need no reminding, will not find

that Britain's role in this island has only ever

because

He

historical record in Ireland.

its

the island of Ireland as a whole,

history of Ireland for

i.e.,

approach of the British

to the aspiration for a united Ireland.'

Britain's 'regret' for part of

been

their aims,

set out 'the

me

is in

many

seeking to argue

been associated with what has

much

in the

long and often tragic

and the British Government for

its

part

This was very pointedly spoken, not least

part of a formulation of

words designed

to

cessation, part of a joint declaration to 'wipe the slate

suggested two years back. Sir Patrick continued

with the theme of Irish unity by peaceful means, referring to the rejection of violence 'by 95 percent of nationalists within the island of Ireland.' In a

key section he made a direct pitch aimed

at the ears

of the IRA: 'Provided

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME it

is

any

265

advocated constitutionally, there can be no proper reason for excluding political objective

from discussion. Certainly not the objective of an

Ireland united through broad agreement fairly and freely achieved.' Sir Patrick proceeded to lay out

what would happen

the event of a genuine

'in

He said the RUC could dramatically Army could return 'to its garrison role, as

and established cessation of violence'. relax preventative measures, the

of the United Kingdom,' emergency legislation would end and

in the rest

normality return. Talks leading to a comprehensive political accommodation acceptable to both British

some

Government

is

major

traditions in Ireland could ensue,

he

said:

'The

not guided by any blueprint or master plan, leading to

pre-selected constitutional

outcome of our choice.

We have none

...

Her

Majesty's Government would never try to impede any body of opinion in

working

to achieve a place for

Northern Ireland within a united Ireland,

provided they work only by democratic and peaceful means.'

The speech was another benchmark statement of Britain's It

expounded a willingness

to

accommodate a united

'neutrality'.

Ireland, but expressed

no British preference on the matter. Unionist opinion was outraged. The Republican Movement saw the speech as no advance on that of Peter

Brooke

1990.

in

They saw no evidence

that Britain

was about

to 'join the

ranks of persuaders' on Irish unity. They suspected that the Northern Secretary

may have been

nationalist

paign.

appealing over the heads of the

community, exerting pressure

At the

to get an

end

Government would not

it.

He

talk to the

in

Movement envisaged

to the

wider

armed cam-

Movement charted

said they accepted that the British

IRA

about demilitarisation, but they

believed Britain would talk to Sinn Fein about politics. lican

to the

time, a senior source within the Republican

out the future as they saw

IRA

He

said the

Repub-

a situation where Sinn Fein would be involved

dialogue over a number of years while the

IRA campaign was

being

gradually reduced, or perhaps where they were adopting a defensive posture. If there

were

sufficient political progress, a point

armed struggle was no longer seen it

to

likely that talks involving Sinn Fein

declaration to withdraw and that the

would come where

be necessary. Significantly, he thought

might not end with a British

IRA campaign could end

short of such

a declaration.

REPUBLICAN REACTION In his response to the to

be negotiated'.

He

Mayhew

speech, Gerry

Adams

said 'peace will have

took issue with claims about British 'neutrality' and

266

THE LONG WAR

of Britain being merely a

with no blueprint. 'Britain does have

'facilitator'

a "blueprint" and one which was clearly discerned during the Stormont talks

when

British Ministers again tried to secure

arrangement,' said

Adams

a change in this position, and

at

if

partitionist

Mr Mayhew

is

hinting

he wants to be taken seriously on

he should accept that the

issue, then

agreement on a

in a public statement. 'If

Irish

this

people have the right to national

self-determination and facilitatethe introduction of measures to give legislative effect to the exercise

the British

of that right. Instead of the current position,

Government should move

and use

to a positive policy

its

influence and energy to win the unionist consent for an agreement between all is

the people of Ireland on their political future.

in a position to dramatically

The

Government

British

transform the situation by adopting a policy

of ending partition. Such a policy

shift

from Republicans and usher

new

in a

would meet with a

positive response

era.'

This was a considered response from the Republican Movement. They

may have been

in the

substantial actions

mood

for

compromise but they were seeking

by the British Government:

(a)

three

a recognition of the Irish

people's right to national self-determination; (b) a policy objective of

ending partition;

(c) the

removal by legislation of the separate

right of the

people of Northern Ireland to stay in or leave the United Kingdom. In

all

Movement was emphasising that a permanent IRA would come about only as the product of a negotiated peace

of this the Republican cessation

process involving Sinn Fein, not as a pre-condition for Sinn Fein's involve-

ment. They

handing finality

knew

about

that a

permanent cessation would

weapons

in their it.

at

some

point.

In contrast, Sir Patrick

changes that would occur after the

Mayhew

IRA had

commitment to

entail a

There would be a

and physical

real

had been setting out the

stopped. These were funda-

mental differences. The British and Irish governments wanted to demon-

was not being rewarded, hence the demand for a The Republican Movement wanted to hold armed struggle

strate that violence

cessation

first.

as a bargaining counter or as a continuing option, should a political process

not deliver the goods. Yet they were willing to

compromise.

It

later in 1993.

was

that willingness

Those

talks

British-Irish initiative, strong

cessation, while at the

the Unionists.

which led

work

way towards a Hume/Adams talks

their

to the

were part of a search for enough

to

persuade the

same time not causing

a decisive joint

IRA

to

go

for a final

serious destabilisation

among

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME

267

WIDER AGENDA That was for the future. For the

Adams and Mayhew had been formed at the

moment

talk.

Even though

shouting past one another, these statements It

continued

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis the following month, in February 1993.

had been involved

third parties, including Protestant

Movement

number of meetings with

in a

By

that

interested

and Catholic clergymen. The Republican

got the impression that both governments were willing to search

for a wider political

agenda which could eventually involve Sinn Fein

in

At the Ard Fheis, Martin McGuinness sent a number of very strong governments and

signals to both

need

was only

part of the public negotiating positions being adopted.

stage, Sinn Fein

talks.

there

to his

own

people.

He

talked about the

be open and flexible and to be prepared for dramatic

to

new Government of the Brooke/May hew

Dublin and

referred to the

in

resumption

talks process.

initiatives.

He

to the prospect for a

The word from London

and Dublin was that such resumption could take the form of bilateral discussions, separate talks with individual political parties. 'This actually

provides both the British and Dublin Governments with an opportunity to bring Sinn Fein into the process,' said McGuinness.

'If

both Governments

have the courage of their private convictions they should

now

finally

meet

with Sinn Fein.' In a carefully crafted speech,

McGuinness did not call for a British Movement was ready for

withdrawal, and he indicated that the Republican

we we have some of on our participation we are

compromise: 'We would approach any serious haven't got

them

...

all

the answers but

Whilst rejecting any pre-conditions

quite prepared to be

open and

to realistic agreement.'

McGuinness 'a in.

new and The

we most certainly

flexible to serious proposals

Hinting

at the

which can lead

idea of 'interim arrangements',

talked of the need for a 'healing process' and the need to apply

radical thinking to the predicament Unionists find themselves

plight of Unionists

and protect

talks accepting that

believe

is

requiring particular consideration to guarantee

their interests in

any new arrangements which will be needed

to resolve the conflict.'

These were strong indications

that the

Republican

Movement would move quite radically to accommodate the Unionists in new political structures. But they had not moved to the position of the Irish Government and

still

sought the removal of the 'Unionist veto' on British

Movement had adopted a for'maximum consent' to Irish unity.

withdrawal. For their part, the Republican

mula based on

the concept of achieving

268

THE LONG WAR

Their new, somewhat complicated, formula of words called on London and

Dublin to adopt a joint policy of ending partition time consistent with obtaining

maximum consent

'in

the shortest possible

to the process

and mini-

mising costs of every kind and recognising the centrality of inclusive dialogue in this process.' Boiled down, this meant that Sinn Fein should be

involved

in a political

process aimed

at

ending partition where Unionist

consent was desirable but not to the extent that they could exercise a veto.

As 1993 progressed

the

IRA

force their bargaining position

continued to exert pressure. Without armed

would be reduced

mandate, 10 percent to 12 percent of the vote political extinction in the Republic.

in

to

Sinn Fein's electoral

Northern Ireland and virtual

The Army Council decided

that they

could force the issue on national self-determination. According to one source, the Republican able': tions.

Movement had decided

that

two goals were

'achiev-

an end to the 'Unionist veto' and a place for Sinn Fein in negotia-

They

1993 could be the year

felt that

to achieve those goals.

the political offensive continued apace, the quartermaster of

Command, based sustained

Dundalk, was gearing up

in

bombing offensive across Northern

to

IRA

While

Southern

supply materials for a

Ireland. In Britain, plans

were

well advanced for a major attack on London's financial heart, similar to the

huge bomb blast

at the city's Baltic

ously, behind-the-scenes if

the Republican

political

Exchange a year

earlier.

Simultane-

moves were made and channels opened up

Movement could be brought

to see

further along the road of

compromise.

One firm proposal

for a settlement

was drawn up during 1993 by an

involved interested party in Belfast and given to the Irish Government, to

John

Hume and to

Gerry

in confidence, to the

up

Adams

for their consideration.

It

was

also given,

Upsahl Commission, a weighty independent body

to inquire into possible solutions to the conflict. This previously

lished proposal (see

Movement

in

Appendix

6)

may

still

set

unpub-

influence the Republican

pursuing their 'interim arrangements' concept.

It

proposed a

'planned, stage by stage progression towards joint British/Irish Authority in

Northern Ireland, followed by a federal format which would allow of

envisaged a time-scale of 10 to 15 years,

final British withdrawal.'

It

proclaimed from the

which could be shortened or extended. The

start,

author of the proposal accepted that there would be a strong, and somewhat violent Unionist reaction, but the expectation

prepared well consulted

...

in

was

that the

ground would be

advance: 'At every step the Unionist people will be

the British heritage and citizenship of the Unionist people will

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME

269

be permanently protected. Unionist confidence will grow as the rewards of the is

new

departure

become

accepted there will be,

little

and

clear to them,

at the

loyalist

gunmen, of whom,

beginning, many, will find themselves with

public support, face to face, on impossible terms, with the

Army. One

the British

is

it

entitled to question

RUC

and

whether there would be

anything remotely like the 3,000 deaths already caused by the British failure to

meet the problem adequately.' The proposer identified three sections of

Unionism which would

who

react in differing

ways

to such a proposal: (1)

'take pride in being of the history, culture

with a sense of belonging to the family of the British peoples; (2)

more

loyal to the

hatred and fear of

Crown

Roman

British, but as Irish too,

British citizenship

(3)

is

A group

founded on

They see Britain as their protectors The 'Unionists who see themselves as

and take pride

would be most

the author,

whose motivation

Catholicism.

power of Rome;

against the

in this

than Parliament

Those

and traditions of Britain'

in

both traditions.' This group, said

likely to negotiate a settlement

provided their

and identity were safe-guarded. 'They could be joined

in the first group, but never the second.' The principal made in this part of the proposal was that any radical departure would not be met by a unified and monolithic Unionism. The

by elements

point being

by Britain

proposal set out a series of legislative steps to be taken over the transition years: the granting of Irish citizenship; a Parliament or

Assembly

in Belfast;

a commission to examine equalisation of the laws between both parts of Ireland; the establishment of a second,

unarmed community-type police new constitution aimed at

service; a Bill of Rights and provisions in a

securing the rights of Unionists and Protestants. that this

development

a defeat by

'will

The author acknowledged

be seen as a victory by some nationalists and as

most Unionists

[but]

it

must not be forgotten, so

far as the

nationalists are concerned, that they will forsake their vision of a unitary Irish state.'

This proposal had no status other than the weight of

source from which nationalist source.

its

argument and the

came - a highly respected, learned and strongly The author believed it could form the basis of the it

Republican Movement's 'interim arrangements'. Whether or not

it

would

be espoused by the Republican Movement, the proposal laid bare the

magnitude of what could be involved

move, agreed or otherwise, tions

were

that the

to

in 'interim

end British rule

arrangements' or in any

in Ireland.

Republican Movement was unlikely

The

early indica-

to settle for less.

Yet the pressure of events, the limitations of what might be achievable, and

270

THE LONG WAR

the temptation to to

compromise

end the armed nightmare might inveigle some

in

Sinn Fein

This would create great internal tensions within the

further.

Republican Movement.

BALANCE OF RISK

On

the broader political level, a complicated process

was under way

in the

search for an agreed peace process. Early in 1993 a Catholic priest acted as intermediary to bring John

As agreed when

Hume and Gerry Adams together again for talks. between

the talks

two

their

parties

ended

in failure in

September 1988, the two men had continued with a kind of dialogue through public statements. In different ways,

Hume

and Adams had focused on

national self-determination and the need for both governments to address the issue jointly.

For

this to

happen, the British and

to take part in the process in

door open

Sinn Fein for

to

Irish

governments had

some form. Both governments had kept the two years - the Brooke and Mayhew

at least

speeches of November 1990 and December 1992 were proof of that. During

1993 the Irish Government tried

to

persuade the British to go for a

settlement which took in the extremes, rather than the traditional one of

only trying to find agreement in the middle ground. Ireland's

new

Mayhew

at the

lines: Patrick,

One of the

first

things

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, said to Sir Patrick Anglo-Irish inter-governmental conference

was along

these

everything they've tried so far has failed and that includes

the Anglo-Irish

Agreement. This came from a man who,

in

a previous Irish

Government, had been one of the principal architects of that Agreement. Spring meant that the Agreement had historical differences

between the two

unresolved some of the deep

left

islands.

physical force as falling into this category.

'It

He

identified republican

should be our role to complete

the exorcism of violence,' said Spring in a major address to the British-Irish Inter- Parliamentary

would be

body

in Cork.'

'The purpose of

to eliminate the last residues of dissension

ship,'

new arrangements

to address the areas not encompassed in present arrangements and

from the

British-Irish relation-

he said. In essence, this was about partition.

'unfinished business'

would require a

towards Ireland, one which,

To

deal with this

significant shift in British policy

in the prevailing political parlance, entailed

going for a 'balanced' constitutional settlement. Spring made

it

clear that

he was not only talking about constitutional and political change by the Irish: 'I

would caution against any

change can

lie

on one side only.

facile If

we

assumption that the burden of are truly to achieve "a

new

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME beginning", a

new

political

paradigm for Northern Ireland,

profound and potentially controversial change on than Irish, unionist no less than nationalist.

all sides,

will require

British

A problem of this

depth will not be settled in the margins of bureaucratic

Both Governments

no

scope and

or through

files

less

some

have

to share a balance

From March/April 1993 onwards, both governments

wrestled with this

politically cost-free option.

of political

aim was if

to see if

agreement could be found on a joint government approach,

such a joint approach was desirable. In the end,

governments making an

framework

this

could involve both

historic joint declaration, laying out an agreed

Such a declaration

for finally settling the 'ancient quarrel'.

would deal with

Irish self-determination, partition, the status of

Ireland, Articles 2

joint

will

risk.'

mostly through the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference. The

issue,

or

it

271

and 3 of the

Northern

of this British-Irish

Irish Constitution. Part

governmental approach would involve agreement on ways

about

including an

total demilitarisation,

ambitious task.

No

matter

programme would involve

how

them

it

would

'balanced'

it

Britain adopting a

the other hand, nationalist Ireland

mise. For

IRA cessation.

entail

would have

to

end

political

nationalist agenda.

make an

historic

to British sovereignty

would be

it,

though mechanisms

part of

it.

The question

was, would such a formulation be enough to bring about a permanent cessation?

The

British

wanted the

Irish to take the lead in

pursuing

this

agenda. The Irish Government would have to be certain that an cessation finally

would result from such a joint

move

policy.

Only then would

In April 1993, the Irish

Any

IRA

the Irish

ABSOLUTES

Government began

to seek

ways

in

which the IRA's

agreement could be found. They did so through intermediaries. The

go: (1)

IRA new

to get Britain's joint signature.

IRISH

Government

On

compro-

going for a settlement based on a re-drawing

of the terms of the Union rather than an ending of for an agreed

new

was, such a

more

to bring

This was a hugely

laid out

two

absolutes,

formula to do with

two

lines

Irish unity

Irish

beyond which they would not

must involve consent of a majority

within Northern Ireland; (2) There would be no talking to Sinn Fein until a final

IRA

cessation

was delivered. These constituted major obstacles

because they infringed both of the 'achievable' goals lican

Movement: namely, an end to

place at the table for Sinn Fein.

set out

the 'Unionist veto'

The IRA Army Council

by the Repub-

and an unconditional resisted

any formula

272

that

THE LONG WAR had the look of the Unionists retaining their

Instead, they

wanted

across the island. interpreted.

On

It

their

own

on

'veto'

formulation entailing

Irish unity.

'maximum consent'

would be a looser formula which could be variously

a government-to-government level, a

number of possible

formulations for a joint declaration were bandied about through the

and

into the

autumn.

On

the Irish side these delicate matters

by the Taoiseach's (Prime Minister's)

office,

summer

were handled

and the departments of

Foreign Affairs and, to a lesser degree, Justice. For the British the negotiations involved officials

and ministers from the Northern Ireland Office, the

Foreign Office and the Cabinet Office. In the manner of things, the Cabinet Office was reserving final decision It

was

its

position, to allow the

Prime Minister

context that the

Hume/Adams

talks took place,

The two men

not acting as intermediaries. In other words, John

Adams,

make

the

one way or another.

in this

parallel to the inter-government discussions.

for either

to

running

said they were

Hume was no go-between

government and Gerry Adams was not acting for the IRA. But

in particular,

would need

to

be sure

that

anything they finally agreed

would be delivered by both governments. From an

early stage both govern-

ments were aware of the formulations being worked out by Hume and Adams, and gave their tacit approval. Hume had to assume that Adams could bring with him both Sinn Fein and the IRA. The reality was that the

Hume/Adams talks dovetailed into the government discussions, at arm's length, and Adams would do nothing without the IRA being on board, for fear of causing a split in the movement. The IRA let it be known that they were behind Adams.

LONDON BOMB Hume

and Adams had discussions on 10 April 1993 and issued

their first

agreed statement on 25 April. The day before the statement was issued the

IRA exploded a one-ton bomb at Bishopsgate in London. It caused huge among the modern skyscraper business and finance centre. Damage estimated at upwards of a billion pounds included buildings, housing, prestige foreign and domestic groups like Nat West Bank, Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Barclays Bank and Abu Dhabi Investment Bank. The IRA said they used an Ivec truck to carry the explosives, with false devastation

number

plates

matching a

'ringer' vehicle

from Manchester, which they

destroyed two days before the attack. In a statement the leadership of the

IRA

repeats

its call

IRA

said:

'The

for the British establishment to seize

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME the opportunity and to take the steps

war

Two

in Ireland.'

ers as 'proxy'

taxis

other

bomb

and

its futile

New

IRA claimed

to

their targets

taxi-driv-

abandon

their

were Downing

Hume/ Adams

Scotland Yard. The agreed

and costly

same day, using

bombers, failed when the drivers managed

and shout warnings. The

Street

needed for ending

attempts on the

273

statement the

following day said: 'Everyone has a solemn duty to change the political climate

away from conflict and towards a process of national

reconciliation

which sees the peaceful accommodation of the differences between the people of Britain and Ireland and the Irish people themselves.' The

ment

said they both ruled out an internal settlement

self-determination.'

The key

section,

confined to Northern

(ie,

Ireland) and accepted that 'the Irish people as a

state-

whole have a

right to

which would determine the success or

failure of the talks, said 'the exercise of self-determination is a matter for

agreement between the people of Ireland.

and the means of achieving

By

it

on which

It is

we

will

the middle of June an agreed formula

apparently with the backing of the

the search for that agreement

IRA Army

be concentrating.'

was emerging from Council.

which would involve an acceptance by Britain of the to self-determination, exercised

It

was a

the talks,

set

of words

right of the Irish people

by agreement and requiring the allegiance

of both main traditions, regretting past injustices and suffering, and agreeing to the outcome of talks by the

Irish

Such a formula would form only part of any

people determining their future. British-Irish declaration,

would include a number of 'balancing' statements regarding the tional issues.

At

this stage in the talks,

the need for the consent

was unwilling

and allegiance of both

to accept a

prepared to acknowledge

traditions in Ireland, but he

formula which amounted

'Unionist veto' over Irish unity. This

contention.

Adams was

which

constitu-

to recognition

of the

would remain an outstanding point of

The IRA would continue

to exert pressure with a

view

to

breaking that veto. Nonetheless, a highly significant shift of emphasis had

taken place. The Republican self-determination territorial rights.

Movement was coming

was about the

This allowed

Hume to

peoples in Ireland and that any

to accept that

rights of groups of people rather than

new

argue that there were two distinct

political structures

would require the

agreement and allegiance of both groups. In early July

by the

IRA

to

An Phoblacht published

a letter

which they said was sent

foreign-owned financial institutions

in

London. The

letter

contained a direct threat saying 'further attacks on the City of London and

elsewhere are inevitable.'

It

set out the

IRA's price

for a cessation:

'We

in

THE LONG WAR

274

the

IRA point

out that peace will only ensue

when

the causes of the conflict

are removed. This can only be achieved through inclusive negotiations

leading to a democratic settlement which recognises the fundamental and

immutable

right of the Irish people to national self-determination.

acceptance of this right by Britain would

initiate

The

a peace process which can

A number of questions arose from this demand for national self-determination. After all, the hints from the Republican Movement were of impending compromise. Was there any space in this demand for the 'Unionist veto', for the consent of a end

finally

seemingly

long-running war.'

this

flat

majority within Northern Ireland as insisted upon by both governments?

Also,

if

'agreement' meant what

said, then

it

could the Irish people,

exercising their collective self-determination, decide that a continuing British link

was appropriate

to satisfy the Unionist tradition?

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION These were basic

points.

Adams answered

both of them

August

in early

1993. First, would Sinn Fein accept a description of self-determination

which required the consent of a majority within Northern Ireland? 'Well, not only would

we

not accept that but

except the Unionists would accept national self-determination.

may have

there

to be, as

It is

I

don't think that any other party

mean, national self-determination

it. I

is

the Irish people as a whole. Obviously,

Martin McGuinness has said

interim arrangements and an evolution. But,

I

in the recent past,

mean, the

Irish

people

who

reside in this island have the right to national self-determination as a whole.

And

that's

how

it's

outlined in international Treaties and as

internationally in every other situation

What

way.'

if

Sinn Fein going with that? 'Well, there

mean we have had

for

800

years.

processes to

would have But, the

I

upheld

which has been resolved

in that

the end-product of the exercise of self-determination

a continuing British link, agreed by the Irish people

I

it is

There

move

may have to be some

a British interference in our affairs,

may have

to

arrangements.

some would argue

be various bridges and other methods and

us forward. The Unionists

to agree,

were

- would Adams see

may

want, and perhaps one

some arrangement that satisfied their particular needs.

mean, these are

all

things that need to be

end of the day, everything

that has

come

worked

out.

The

fact

so far has not worked.

is,

And

at

the

we want to do with it, way to move forward was

ending of the British connection, and then whatever Q is

the only thing that can work.'

Adams

said the

by 'democratic norms' not mathematics, saying

that Unionists

had a

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME majority in only one-and-a-half counties, mostly around Belfast. that the vast majority of the Unionists

And

to conflict.

want

to see peace,

want

a United Ireland.

It's

was within a United

the British that have to

Ireland then they

Adams was

IRA

whole

have.

letter to

and declare

to self-determination. 'There are

Adams. 'There

parts to the question,' said

the Irish people to self-determination,

the only

insisting that Britain must, in

principle at least, agree to the 'ending of the British connection'

the right of the Irish people as a

if

would accept

move. Unionists are dependent

the British underwriting their position.' In line with the

foreign financiers in London,

two

an end

a telling interview with a series of Unionists, leading

they could get that

upon

believe

I

to see

Unionists from Fermanagh, from Belfast, from Tyrone, said that

way

275

which the

is, first

British

of

all,

the right of

must agree the

Irish

And then there is the exercise of self-determination on which the Irish how they do that.' It would, therefore be open to the Irish

have to agree

people to agree to exercise that right in two parts, North and South, by two concurrent referenda requiring a Yes from each.

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS

When

the

Hume/Adams

were suspended

talks

an agreed statement said the two had

Hume their

made

in late

September 1993

'considerable progress'. John

As a result of this, and from Government were convinced that the

then briefed the Irish Government.

own

soundings, the Irish

Republican Movement had agreed

to the 'concurrent referenda' formula,

giving the people of Northern Ireland a separate and equal right to say

Yes or No

The Irish Government regarded this as the move. But there appeared to be a certain gap of understanding. Sinn Fein continued to talk of the process being done in a situation where both governments had decided on a policy to end partition, albeit over a protracted period. The Irish Government would to Irish unity.

significant

not be asking the British to 'pull the plug' on the Unionists in that

manner. Nonetheless, the

Irish

joint British-Irish Declaration

dients: (1)

own

The

Irish

historic ingre-

people as a whole have a right to determine their

future, this right to

traditions,

Government could envisage an

which would include the following

be exercised by agreement between the two main

and without coercion; (2) the British Government

to accept Irish unity as

is

willing

an outcome of that process; (3) Irish unity requires

consent between both main traditions. This will be done by concurrent referenda, North and South, needing a

Yes from each;

(4) Britain will

work

276

THE LONG WAR

to achieve this consent; (5) the aspirations/allegiances of the Unionists will

be guaranteed on the basis of parity of esteem

equality) with Irish

(i.e.,

nationalism; (6) Britain expresses regret concerning aspects of her past

involvements

in Ireland; (7) the Irish

ing Articles 2 and 3 of

Government commits

Constitution; (8) the Irish

its

itself to repeal-

Government acknow-

ledges Northern Ireland's present status within the United Kingdom.

Alongside such a declaration, both governments would agree to demilitarisation process.

an agreed third party, a

One approach could be

US envoy

institute a

to put this in the

hands of

or a person/people acting under the aegis

of the United Nations or European Community. This would immediately bring the IRA/Sinn Fein into the process. In the end, such a process would involve the

IRA handing

of prisoners.

in its

weapons, perhaps

in return for a final release

was thought the IRA would be more

It

likely to

hand over arms

to a third party rather than to the 'enemy', the British.

But the

Irish

and British governments would only accede to

process provided the cessation.

It

would be

They would support only so long as

it

IRA had

left to

agreed

the Irish

in

advance

Government

to

this

whole

to call a

permanent

make

judgement.

the joint declaration idea, and propose

this it

to the British,

was a matter of how

to manage a gradual demilitarisation They would not do it to find out if the IRA was a crucial and fundamental point of principle

leading to a final cessation.

would agree a

cessation.

It

for both governments. Neither of

hostage to

IRA

intentions.

them would enter a process

The governments would not

include them in political talks unless the finished.

Adams

that held

talk to

them

Sinn Fein or

IRA campaign had permanently

continued to regard the question of demilitarisation as

matter for negotiation', once the overall political framework had been

'a

set.

'We want to see a total demilitarisation of the situation. That means an end of armed conflict of all forces and I think it is a matter once we get into Dublin and London coming to an agreement to, if you like, to end partition or to move towards Irish national self-determination, the rest of it is a matter for political judgement and discussion.' Dublin and London were not talking about an agreement to end partition. Their quest, if it came to anything, was for greater 'constitutional balance' between Unionists and nationalists in Ireland.

DEMILITARISATION In any demilitarised situation, the

IRA might

seek to adopt a defensive

posture against possible loyalist attacks. But the

IRA

also

wanted

to force

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME a complete re-structuring of the

IRA campaign

until

RUC.

you see the

'I

don't think you'll see an end to the

RUC disbanded. This

in '72 and '75,' said one of the Republican

ceasefires during

which the

Belfast.

He was

referring to earlier

IRA

felt

they had lost out as a result. This

T

talked about the need for Sinn Fein to be involved in talks.

Sinn Fein will be involved

in talks

would be the biggest signal of the things that

a

was learned

RUC returned to relatively normal policing in

republican areas. At the time, the

man

lesson

Movement's most seasoned and 12

most senior campaigners from outside

277

before you have an

all to

show

IRA

think

ceasefire.

the British are serious.'

had come out of the Hume/Adams process, he

That

One

said,

of

was

renewed determination: 'Too many people have died, we're too long

on the road

something

to accept

less than

we've

set out to get.'

He

said

a declaration on the right to self-determination wouldn't be enough. Britain must set

There'll be no

Irish unity.

unity,'

up a process of discussions which would bring about

He

he said.

IRA

ceasefire without a definite decision on

thought Irish unity could take a number of forms,

including a federal Ireland of the six and 26 counties or even the (long

abandoned) Eire Nua model of a four-provinces federal [the British] don't set

up the process then we'll return

approach of political and military.' you're looking

at a

state. 'If

to the

If Britain is not interested 'then

long conflict'.

These were the kind of pressures being exerted on Gerry Adams search for a

way

they

twin track

out of the conflict.

was known

It

resistance in three key areas: south

that

Armagh and

in his

Adams was meeting

parts of

Tyrone and

Fermanagh. Adams and McGuinness were acutely aware of the danger of causing a

split.

T wouldn't

get involved in anything which

would cause a

Adams had said as his discussions with John Hume reached their first Adams and McGuinness carried a huge responsibility and a handicap. They were the leaders of the northern group who came to the top in the early 1980s, promising new successful strategies. It was they who split,'

conclusions.

criticised the old leadership

of Ruairi

the failed long ceasefire of 1975.

dropping of abstentionism

decimated

now

at the polls

was they who

From

led the

move

to the

Republic, following which Sinn Fein was

south of the Border.

Adams and McGuinness were

the older generation, the 'Sixty-niners'. There

on them not

Fein,

in the

6 Bradaigh et al for their handling of

It

was an enormous onus

to agree to a 'sell out'.

the sidelines,

6 Bradaigh and his small grouping, Republican Sinn

had been watching unfolding events, believing them

to

be heading for

THE LONG WAR

278

compromise.

'I

would

when people

feel that

depart from fundamental

on a gradual slope and

principles, basic principles, that they are

looking for permits for Easter Lily sales in the South, of course,

Along with

thing.

from the

that,

follows the next thing

it

that is

going

a natural

looking for permission

is

RUC to honour people whom the RUC killed etc, in the North,

taking this Oath or

councils, and

I

Solemn Declaration

believe the like

is

Stormont Assembly. These are

in

also necessary in the event of a

all

or

order to be a candidate for local

part of that. Believe

it

new

or not, most

recently they have been complaining that they have not been given permits

by the police

tell

I

think

But

I

think that these are

the story of course, because

front

...

One

I

mentioned by them

at

It's

the present situation,

accept

when

of,

The

future will

some compromise up

through

When

mention

challenged one of them

I it

every year. Ah!

I

said,

the possibility of Republican Sinn Fein

wing

in the

event of a disaffected section

kinds of possibilities.

all

comes

to

direction. 'There are all kinds of possibilities in

its

A or would you

the time

convinced

is

a very important question.'

was not ruling out

turning in

this year.

you don't have

allying themselves with a military

IRA

trends.

all

believe that there

Bodenstown

said,

why just now?

6 Bradaigh of the

it is

notices for the first time ever British withdrawal wasn't

on the ground, he but

the most extraordinary revolutionary

to carry arms.

situation in the world.

And

if

you said would you

accept B, and so on, again that can only be seen

One

...

my

thing I'm very sure of and I'm completely

years of involvement and so on, and that

is

that

as long as the British are in occupation of any part of Ireland, there will be

a revolutionary

movement

to

include an armed wing, or that

and

certainly

and

I

I

oppose them and

armed

struggle.

that, in part, will

And the

of necessity

British presence begets

think the whole force of history leads one to that conclusion and

am convinced

of that.

that's the ultimate reality

I

feel

and

it

in

that's

my

very bones. That

what we're

is

the reality

facing.'

ARMS CACHES The

situation facing both

governments, and for that matter, the leadership

of the Republican Movement, was fraught with danger. The governments

was brought to an end, there would rump on both sides. If it went badly wrong on the republican side there could be a number of competing armed groups. As in the past, this would inevitably lead to killing feuds among former comrades. Some key members of the Official IRA, which called a ceasefire anticipated that,

however

the conflict

continue to exist an armed

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME back

went about

in 1972, still

20 years

later.

in the early

accompanied by bodyguards

their business

Taking the gun out of republican

Among the

very long-term process.

first

politics

was a

difficult

guns used by the Provisional

1970s were Thompson sub-machine-guns hidden away

1930s. This time the quantity and quality of circulation

was

279

far greater than in previous

and

IRA

in the

weapons and explosives

campaigns.

How

would

it

in

be

possible to bring about a permanent cessation while controlling these

who had

caches and the quartermasters

access to them? This task was being

The

gradually undertaken during 1992 and 1993.

right people

put in place or the loyalties of existing ones being tested. This

of the process undergone during 1985 and 1986 abstention.

One

for Southern in Belfast

area to watch

Command

and also

in

activist in south

to the

Adjutant General

Armagh, a very powerful

IRA. He and South Armagh IRA had the capacity

figure within the

a repeat

run-up to the vote on

would be south Armagh. The quartermaster

Dundalk was working

main

to the

in the

were being

was

to

keep

an armed campaign going. This line-up posed a serious potential threat to

any

North and South, semi-automatic

still

machine-guns; recovered);

60

to

1

things went, there

At the end of 1992

it

was an enormous

was estimated

that the

IRA,

had possession of about 650 Kalashnikov AK47-type

rifles;

about 20 of the huge

ers;

However

call for a cessation.

arsenal to be controlled.

more than

DSHK

a

dozen general-purpose machine-guns;

Russian heavy-calibre armour-piercing

SAM-7 surface-to-air missile (nine others had been RPG rocket launchers; half-a-dozen flame-throw-

more than 40

70 Webley revolvers; more than 600 detonators; about

of Semtex explosive. In other words, after

all

the killing

three tons

and bombing, and

IRA still had roughly half the Libyan arms six years later. Given the IRA structure, Southern Command, acting as quartermaster to Northern Command, held the

arms finds North and South of the Border, the Provisional

the bulk of the big arms caches.

The

extent of this

the Border

became

was examined.

clear

when

the record of

arms finds south of

In the years 1985 to 1993 the Gardai uncovered

a vast range of guns, ammunition, explosives,

bomb-making equipment,

camps and ancillary items. The largest concentration had been in County Donegal but right across the country, in Border counties, the training

midlands, the south and east, there were significant arms

dumps of modern

weapons and sophisticated bomb-making equipment. More than 800 guns of

all

types, including

heavy machine-guns, and about 300,000 rounds of

ammunition were found

in those eight years. In the early

1990s a Garda

280

THE LONG WAR

hunt called 'Operation Silo' discovered a network of command structures

and sealed underground bunkers. This showed for the Libyan

chain of

that the principal hiding area

arms was Munster, with Limerick as the hub. The principal

command

ran from the quartermaster in Dundalk, through an

operator in south County Cavan,

dumps, a man based

in

down

to the

security in mind. Big quantities of arms

sealed bunkers,

OC

for the

Munster arms

Limerick. The system of dumps was designed with

known only

were held underground

to a handful of people.

in large

These people placed

small numbers of guns or explosives in concealed barrel-type containers for immediate collection and use.

An

important figure in

all

of this was 42-year-old Sean Breen, living in

a remote farm at Glantaunluskaha, Brosna, County Kerry. In July 1993

Breen got eight years for having ammunition on his land. court that Breen, also had

two

large

who

It

emerged

had been a completely unknown

until then

underground bunkers on

his land

in

figure,

which Gardaf said had

previously held large stores of weapons. Bunkers found in the Munster area

were believed by Gardaf to have been in place in the 1980s to store American arms seized from the Marita Ann, a ship captured off the Irish coast in 1987. These bunkers were reactivated for the Libyan arms.

IRA's Munster

structure

was

of Kieran 'Kiwi' Dwyer,

further

who was

quantity of Libyan arms. But the

The new

undermined by the

arrest in

May

The 1990

convicted of possession of a substantial

movement of arms northwards

continued.

OC of Munster dumps reported to the quartermaster in Dundalk,

as before.

The

sophistication of

IRA

activities south of the

Border was

further underlined in February 1993 with the discovery in Kilcock,

Kildare, of an advanced engineering operation.

homemade

electrical detonators, tested

County

The haul included 115

and ready for use. They were

intended for the IRA's planned bombing offensive in Northern Ireland, a time

when

they were exerting 'pressure' in furtherance of their

for national self-determination. This loss noticeably hindered the

bombing plans

in the

at

demand IRA's

North. The Kilcock find demonstrated the technical

and research capacity of the IRA and

their ability to put together a

range of advanced electronic devices.

It

was probably

the

wide

IRA's best unit

south of the Border, with young electronics graduates, including 'sleepers'

who were unknown

as

IRA

activists, part

of the

new

All of this threw into sharp focus the claim by the

operate in the Republic.

Movement

It

breed.

IRA

that they did not

posed a major obstacle for the Republican

in their attempts to

convince the

Irish authorities that

Sinn Fein

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME was a party they could regard precisely the claim being

281

normal and constitutional. This was

as

made by Gerry Adams.

In

August 1993 he

delivered a substantial speech in Dublin as part of Sinn Fein's political

Adams was

offensive.

we

pitching for Dublin's support. 'As a political party

pursue our aims by peaceful, democratic means,' he said. 'This should

He was speaking

be encouraged and not subverted.'

in the context of the

broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein and the IRA, seeking to have stated in the

it

26 counties

26-county

state.'

'military operations against 26-county forces

whatsoever.' In the 1970s and 1980s this Order

cash robberies and led to the

have

IRA

under any circumstances

was

at

times waived for big

policemen

killing Irish

armed confrontations. There was no Order prohibiting IRA's war

vital to the

Northern

Command,

effort.

in

unplanned

the use of territory

south of the Border for other purposes; quite the contrary.

was

lifted. 'I

my firm opinion that armed struggle has no place and there clearly is no IRA campaign against the The IRA's General Army Order No. 8 did prohibit

on many occasions

The Republic

Five Border counties were included

part of the 'war zone'.

and the continued, extensive use of the

in

The legacy of the dead Gardai

Irish

Republic for the storage of

arms, the training of volunteers and the preparation of bombs, illustrated

movement towards a peace process or towards orderly demilitarisation. The existence of these dumps, supply lines and command structures also demonstrated with brutal clarity why the

the

enormous

Irish

task involved in any

Government would

a permanent

refuse to involve Sinn Fein in political talks until

IRA cessation was

in place.

SEARCH FOR SETTLEMENT As 1993 progressed

continued. There were fears

among

the British

to the conflict

nationalists that the British

might have gone cold on the idea of a radical

discommode

end

into winter the search for an

the Unionists. This concern dated

shift

from

Government

of policy likely to

late July

1993 when

Prime Minister got the supporting votes of the Ulster Unionist

Party in the tight

House of Commons vote on

Major might need those votes again,

for his

the

EC Maastricht Treaty. Mr

Government's budget

at the

end of November that year. Then there was the Prime Minister's own

weakened leader. No one could be certain that an embattled Mr Major would have the appetite for a troublesome Irish initiative. One way or another the Republican Movement was gearing up. vulnerability as a

They were

either facing an early peace process or an extended political

and

THE LONG WAR

282

military offensive.

They would attempt

to 'internationalise' the issue,

mostly within the European Community and the United States. The Repub-

Movement were prepared

lican

wanted a way paved towards

For their

part, the Irish

compromise. But

for

British

disengagement

it

in the

was

clear they

long term.

Government were promoting

a

scheme

for

guaranteeing the rights of both traditions while allowing for a change of sovereignty by consent.

The Republic's Minister

Spring, called this a 'covenant'.

equality between nationalism and Unionism. political structures, nationalists

would be

a minority. In this

Northern Ireland would reside for Irish unity, sovereignty

meant

It

Dick

the principle of

that, in

law and

in

and Unionists would be equal within North-

ern Ireland and on the island as a whole. This

side

for Foreign Affairs,

The concept was based on

in

would guarantee

scheme of

that neither

things, sovereignty over

Westminster. But should consent be found

would pass to Dublin. In that situation the would remain, guaranteeing security of

equality formula, the 'covenant',

position to the Unionists continue.

It

whose

right to British citizenship

was a proposal designed

both traditions. In particular,

it

would

also

to guarantee the long-term rights of

would counter

the abiding fear

among

Unionists of becoming an ever-receding minority within a unified Ireland.

Once

in place, this 'covenant'

would allow

for the free exercise of national

self-determination while underwriting the Unionists' consent to a change

of sovereignty.

was a novel scheme which had yet There was still a long way to go.

It

negotiating table.

SEEKING In late

by

October 1993 the

IRA

A

at

a

almost derailed the process single-handedly

bomb

attack on the Shankill Road,

Adams helping to carry own bomb. Adams was showing

Outrage was fuelled by the sight of Gerry

the coffin of an

IRA activist killed by his IRA in order to demonstrate

solidarity with the in the

loyalist

be tested

DYNAMIC

killing nine Protestant shoppers in a

Belfast.

him

to

peace process

in

were

at

one with

which he was engaged with John Hume. As the

UFF retaliated in murderous fashion,

the Irish

that they

Government came out with

'six

and a sense of crisis deepened,

democratic principles for peace'.

Enunciated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring, these principles strongly stated the right of a 'majority in Northern Ireland' to

give or withhold consent to constitutional change. This was the 'Unionist veto' with

which Adams continued

to take issue. Spring's principles

contained something close to the right of the Irish people as a whole to

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME self-determination. Principle

and South, should be

Number

said the people of Ireland, North

free to determine their

self-determination being exercised in

The formula might be acceptable if

1

283

own

to the

would mean

future. This

two separate and equal

parts.

Republican Movement but only

the process contained a dynamic: a joint British-Irish policy, with Britain

declaring

it

specifically to

had no long-term

aimed

at

an agreed Ireland, even

call a cessation in

interest in

being in Northern Ireland, a policy

winning Northern majority consent if this

were

to take

to Irish unity or

25 years. The

IRA would

not

a static situation where the 'Unionist veto' was perma-

nently underwritten and with Britain continuing to act as a neutral observer.

By

this stage, late

Hume/Adams

October, both governments had sidelined the

proposals, causing considerable disquiet

ern nationalists.

The key

difficulty with the

among many

Hume/Adams

north-

proposals for

both governments centred on the issue of consent. The formula agreed by

Hume and Adams did not go far enough

in tying

down

the right of a majority

within Northern Ireland to decide constitutional change.

Adams would

still

not concede to words which could be construed to constitute the 'Unionist veto' on British withdrawal or Irish unity. If he

governments refused left

to run with the

conceded

Hume/Adams

this,

and the

package, he could be

Adams wanted flexibility in this (a) in order to avoid serious in his own ranks, and (b) to leave the matter of consent for

hanging.

dissension negotiation.

But for the two governments of

'a

this

was a fundamental

majority within Northern Ireland'

principle.

The

right

was non-negotiable. The IRA were

seeking an agreed time-frame in which consent for constitutional change

would be sought. These ments

in

difficulties

posed major

political

problems for the two govern-

any search for a joint declaration which could bring about an

cessation and not destabilise the Unionists.

The governments were working

towards a joint formula which would be privately tested the Republican

Movement and

IRA

sections of Unionism.

were positive would they consider taking the

final

Only

in if

advance with the soundings

jump. The target date

was early December, when there would be a summit meeting

in

Dublin

between British Prime Minister John Major and the Republic's Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.

A positive response

from the IRA

entail a swift statement

to a joint British/Irish

from the Army Council

that they

cessation and were willing to enter a process to bring

it

move would

were calling a

about.

THE LONG WAR

284

As

events

moved

into

November

1993, both governments were prepar-

move things faster than the British. The British Government accepted that the IRA wanted to end their campaign. But there was still no certainty that the Republican Movement would come en bloc into a process involving serious compromise. In that ing for the joint initiative, the Irish seeking to

regard, the Irish

Government were giving assurances

their right of consent. This British to

go

was designed

to the Unionists about

largely to boost the will of the

by

for a broadly 'one Ireland' agenda, which,

nature would

its

meet with Unionist resistance.

Whatever

outcome of

the

the obscure and complicated political inter-

changes, the Northern conflict was not going to go away. There remained

two

large national groups unreconciled with one another within Northern

While

Ireland and across the island.

not stop.

this situation

They would not be defeated by

repression.

determination to continue, the evidence was that further violence. thirties

and

remained, the

Whatever about

their

could be gained by

little

leaders in the IRA and Sinn Some had grown-up children actively

Most of the

forties.

IRA would

Fein were

in their

involved, and this

constituted a real personal pressure not to engage yet another generation in

a

life

of killing, leading to possible imprisonment and even death.

pretty certain, too, that if this

opening was not taken, by the

IRA

It

was

or by the

governments, the armed struggle would enter a more brutal phase and Dublin and London might combine to face the

IRA

with a

new

repressive

regime.

One

thing

was

certain, the

do so through the Army

IRA would make

the final decision.

Council followed by a General

Army

It

which, according to the IRA's Constitution, was the 'Supreme Authority'. If arms, the

it

were

IRA would

objectives set out in

to consider a

look its

at

to establish

what was on offer and compare

Constitution.

Two

long

way

in

from the

Irish republic

By

cold.

It

it

its

with the five

of those objectives were: 'To

on the Proclamation of 1916,

and uphold a lawful Government

control of the Republic.'

Army

permanent cessation and hand up

establish an Irish Socialist Republic, based

and

would

Convention,

in sole

and absolute

1993 the Republican Movement had come a

had given de facto recognition

to the existing

and jettisoned any notion of re-establishing the 1919 Dail.

Yet they had fought for 23 years. The objectives were very far from achieved. British withdrawal was still not in sight. To call a ceasefire and put

away

the guns for another day, another generation,

They had done so

before.

To end

it

would be one

thing.

permanently, so short of the ultimate

TOWARDS THE ENDGAME goal,

would be something

else entirely.

285

There was no chance of Sinn Fein

own way or forcing the IRA to stop, even if it had a mind to. 'I'd have to say the army rules the roost,' said one involved, seasoned The IRA people, he said, were very conscious that an integral observer. going

its

part of the struggle

was propaganda and

needed Sinn Fein. 'But

if

there

So

politics.

was a settlement

the

the long

army

war

strategy

didn't like, Sinn

Fein would be pushed aside.'

A political initiative. If

it

space had been created, essentially by the

was

let

go, another space

future, after a further period of killings. Irish self-determination,

before 1920.

What was new

in

1993 was that the

virtual

agreement by the that the

Irish

all

be created

It

in the

demand,

had been British policy

realities

of Unionism were

shades of nationalism. There was

Government, the

endgame involved

to

central nationalist

was not a novel concept.

within a whisker of being accepted by

Movement

would need

The

Hume/Adams

SDLP and

nationalists

the Republican

and Unionists working

out their future. This posed a challenge to Unionists and the British

Government.

Irish nationalists

were again looking

to a British

Government

to act rather than to react to unfolding events in Ireland. If all sides did not

grasp the possibilities of the moment, they could face a re-run of their

unhappy

history.

14 THEIR

HAND IS FORCED

AS THE PACE OF EVENTS quickened sharply towards two Governments looked

as if they

would

seize the

the end of 1993, the

moment. December was

a critical month, decision time. Ever mindful of the potential for visiting political graveyards, the

Governments prepared

to put their signatures to

an historic Joint Declaration which would change the political balance in Ireland in unprecedented and unforeseen ways. There

they would close the gap between them. But

when

was no

they did,

it

certainty that

was

the result

of hard-won compromise and political brinkmanship. The Joint Declaration

was

IRA and Sinn But the IRA had

less than the

Fein had said they would

settle for

a few

some risk some two armed campaign a long time before even their own volunteers knew what was happening. When it came to it, the Republican Movement was faced with narrower months

earlier.

years before.

set

out on a course of

They had entered a process

to

end

their

options and tougher choices than they had anticipated. In the prevailing

of political compromise their hand was being forced. The new departure in British-Irish relations dates from 15 December 1993, when the Joint Declaration was unveiled at Downing Street in

reality

London. That appear as

is

little

how

history will record

more than a

footnote.

it.

Yet

Another

that

was

date, 3

the day

December,

when

will

the British

Government, reluctantly and with some trepidation, accepted the need for the

new

summit one

departure. at

The occasion was a

Dublin Castle.

British,

one

to resolving the

Irish.

On

'very acrimonious'

British-Irish

the table for discussion were two documents,

These documents took wholly different approaches

Northern Ireland conflict.

As

far as the

IRA/Sinn Fein was

concerned, the important document, the one to watch, was the Irish docu-

ment, the Irish Government proposal for a Joint Declaration. That document, delivered to the British in June 1993, was what the IRA/Sinn Fein called the 'Irish Peace Initiative'.

It

was

the

combined product of the long

drawn-out dialogue involving Gerry Adams, John

Hume

and the

Irish

THEIR HAND

Government. Already, on 3 October 1993, the IRA

FORCED 287

IS

Army

Council had

publicly stated that the 'Irish Peace Initiative' could provide the 'basis for peace'.

Castle Irish

It

was enough

two months

for

end

to

later the Irish

their

armed campaign. But

Government had a

fight

Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, wanted to be sure

deal he struck with John Initiative' to

ters

them

Major

it

would be close enough

Dublin

hands.

The

whatever

final

on

that

at

its

to the 'Irish

Peace

keep the Republican Movement on board. Both Prime Minis-

were aware of the delicacy and the protracted nature of the dialogue

between

Hume and Adams

IRA Army

and why

its

end product was persuasive

from those on Albert Reynolds. Major had

whose agenda

Initiative'

its

a handful of principal players.

IRA and Sinn

was

entirely

Fein, the 'Irish Peace

volunteers

known only to and Sinn Fein members had

What was

attractive to people in the

Its

IRA

put their trust in the leadership.

Britain

Movement.

importance for the

had not been published.

to deliver the Ulster Unionists,

Union with Great

for retention of the

opposite to that of the Republican

Despite

to the

Council. But John Major was under quite different pressures

precise contents were

republican heartlands was the coming together of John Hume and Gerry Adams, each representing a bloc of northern nationalism, after more than

twenty years of division over the issue of the IRA's armed struggle. The

coming together of Hume- Adams with attractive to northern republicans.

the Irish

For the

first

Government was doubly

time in more than a quarter

of a century, this opened up the prospect of a combined all-Ireland nation-

The emerging

alist strategy.

strategy of the

nationalist consensus

IRA and Sinn

Fein. For those

this

from armed

struggle.

unarmed

vital to the current it

within the

consensus offered the best prospect of moving

Republican Movement, to

was

who wanted

A great deal hung on the negotiating skills

of the Irish Government, led by Albert Reynolds and his Foreign Minister,

Dick Spring. Their proposal for a Joint Declaration 3

December had

at

Dublin Castle on

a long and secretive pedigree.

FROM HUME-ADAMS TO DUBLIN CASTLE The

Irish negotiators at

which ended with the accord

Dublin Castle knew

their proposal. Essentially

between John

initiative possible.

how tortuous had been it

Hume and Gerry Adams was what made the whole

There had been a great deal more

publicly-known dialogue during 1993. While 1988,

it

reached a

new

the path

was Dublin's document. But

it

to

it

than their

had been on-going since

plateau of seriousness from 1990 onwards.

The

first

THE LONG WAR

288

draft of an agreed Joint Declaration passed

between the two men on 6

October 1991. At an early stage Gerry Adams had indicated that the Republican Movement's bottom line in any declaration was a British

commitment

to

Adams Hume fully

being a 'persuader' for Irish unity. Otherwise

Army

couldn't 'with confidence' put a proposal to the

Council.

briefed the British Prime Minister, John Major, directly and through an

agreed senior neutral.

From

official,

the outset

John Chilcott. Major was supportive

Hume understood

bring about an end to the

time being

Army

'total cessation'.

was designed

that the process

IRA armed campaign, The import of this

or, at least,

to

the operative phrase at the

IRA

lay in the fact that the

Council effectively took a decision to end their armed campaign

about two years before their 'complete cessation' on 31 August 1994 (see

pp 222/3). This was of enormous importance, known only

to a tiny

number

of people.

John

Hume was

Haughey, the then

one of the few

Irish

who

believed

it

was

possible. Charles

Prime Minister, was another who was prepared

to

The Hume- Adams dialogue involved highly secret meetHume and Haughey. Formulations for a draft Joint Declaration were worked over by them with Haughey 's

test its validity.

ings in Dublin between British/Irish

Mansergh. Early

special adviser, Dr. Martin

and

Adams and cleared

drafts broadly agreed

by

Hume

with Haughey, included reference to 'the people of

Northern Ireland'. This was a

critical point

of departure for Irish republi-

canism, which had always kept well clear of any suggestion of 'recognising'

Northern Ireland as a separate

entity.

By

the time Albert Reynolds replaced

Charles Haughey as Fianna Fail leader and Taoiseach in February the draft Joint Declaration

was

significantly advanced.

peared cautious about pushing the initiative too attaching to

him

since the arms crisis of 1970,

fast.

1

992,

Haughey had

ap-

Given the suspicion

Haughey remained

vulner-

able to the charge of adopting a 'Provo agenda' Reynolds carried no such .

'baggage', quite the opposite. north. Yet,

by saying

He was

Reynolds surprised many observers on

that the

his first

day as Taoiseach

Government of Ireland Act should be on

table if Articles 2

and 3 of the

Irish Constitution

apparently simple statement. But

much

thought to be light-weight on the

interest within

IRA and

it

was

there.

It

was an

a calculated one which created

Sinn Fein ranks.

by Haughey on the Joint Declaration

were

the negotiating

initiative

When Reynolds was he ran with

it

briefed

with a special

conviction and belief, a belief that such a Joint Declaration could indeed deliver an

IRA

cessation.

Mansergh provided

the continuity between the

THEIR HAND

FORCED

IS

289

two Dublin administrations. His intermediary contact

to the IRA was the Hume-Adams meetings, Fr. Alex Reid of Clonard Monastery in Belfast. By April 1992, two drafts of a Joint Declaration, one by Hume- Adams and one by Reynolds-Mansergh

man who had been

present at

all

the

were brought together into one draft by Dublin. After

was

to get the

IRA and Sinn

that, the objective

Fein to subscribe to what was

now

an

Government proposal. The primary object was to find an agreed trade-off between Irish national self-determination and the con-

emerging

Irish

sent of the northern majority. Central to this dialogue

by the IRA/Sinn Fein for time-limits

was the demand

to the exercise of self-determina-

They sought this to ensure that a negotiation process would not be blocked by a Unionist veto. It was a fraught and difficult area and tion.

remained so for the

IRA and

Sinn Fein.

1993 the IRA/Sinn Fein gave

In June

their consent to the Irish

ment's draft Declaration and Dublin presented

Government proposal. But

IRA

to

London

Govern-

as an Irish

the IRA/Sinn Fein gave this consent with

excruciating difficulty. Their apparent fear the draft, leaving the

it

was

that Britain

might accept

leadership exposed to serious tension in their

own

ranks over charges of sell-out. During a frantic 72-hour period, Sinn Fein

withdrew

became

their consent to the proposal

clear that the British

formulation of words. That to

expand

the Republican

left

their 'peace' offensive

republican heartlands.

Adams, or

A

and then gave

it

back again when

Government would not accept

among

the

Movement

Though few

still

concerted political campaign behind

IRA made

believed

time and space

membership and within

the 'Irish Peace Initiative', got under way.

October 1993 that the

it,

it

this particular

It

the

Hume-

wasn't until 3

public their endorsement of this document.

the

IRA were

preparing for some form of

cessation.

THE HUME-ADAMS PROPOSALS

IRA Army Council in the 'Irish Peace Hume-Adams) were striking. The proposals

The compromises accepted by Initiative' (popularly called

were not

in

themselves a proposed political settlement but rather a

principles agreed

the Irish

pursue

between the IRA/Sinn Fein leadership, John

Government,

its

the

sufficient to permit the Republican

goals by purely political means.

following key elements:

set

Hume

and

Movement

The proposals contained

of

to

the

THE LONG WAR

290

1.

The changes

taking place within Europe and the European

approaches' to be 2.

The

British

made

in solving the conflict in

Government

to recognise

Union require 'new

Northern Ireland.

and legislate for the right

to national

self-determination of the Irish people as a whole. This right to be exercised 'collectively'

3.

The

Irish

by the

people 'within a timeframe to be

Irish

Government

to accept that this right 'must

set.'

be exercised and achieved

with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.' 4.

The

exercise of this right 'could take the form of agreed independent structures

for the island as a whole.'

5.

The

British

Government

'to

become a

people North and South and to help 6.

The

British

economic

Government

interest in

among

persuader' for agreement

'foster'

such agreement

among

the Irish

the Irish people.

to declare Britain has 'no selfish, political, strategic or

Northern Ireland.'

7.

Acceptance of the special relationships between Britain and Ireland could

in

agreed

8.

Negotiations for a settlement to be established, involving both Governments and

'links'

result

between both countries.

all parties.

9.

The

Irish

Government

to establish a

'permanent Convention' under the auspices

of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish Constitution) to foster reconciliation and

agreement among the In addition, the

Irish people.

two Governments would seek

to achieve 'Constitutional

balance' by negotiating changes in each other's fundamental law. There

were two things noticeably absent from these elements: the Constitutional Guarantee on change to a united Ireland. tent with

its

in

The

Northern Ireland's status and a specific reference Irish

its

commitments

negotiations, the British far

to

be consis-

international obligations regarding the right to self-determina-

tion and with

went

Government considered Point 3 in the

Anglo-Irish Agreement. (In

Government did not believe

enough on the question of consent

the Irish proposals

to Constitutional

change

Northern Ireland.) Insofar as these proposals gained the assent of the leadership they contained a

number of

surprises.

The statement

in

IRA

that the

exercise of self-determination 'could' take the form of agreed independent structures left

open the option

that an

independent united Ireland might not

THEIR HAND

And

be the outcome of negotiations.

there

was

FORCED

IS

291

the additional recognition

of the possible need for agreed 'links' with Britain. Put together, these elements constituted real and pragmatic leadership

away from

movement by

the

IRA/Sinn Fein

their traditional call for British withdrawal. Yet, Point

2 was substantial. If a British Government were to recognise the unfettered right of Irish national self-determination 'collectively' 'within a timeframe'

it

and agree

That was the 'dynamic' for change which Gerry about.

The concept behind

radical.

tion

It

and

was

this

be exercised

Adams

so often spoke

recognise Irish national self-determina-

people decide that

consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

would be making a

it

significant shift.

combined formulation was two-sided and

(a) that Britain fully

(b) that the Irish

that

would be a highly

it

be exercised only with the

However one described

Britain

positive shift towards the exercise of Irish self-determi-

nation, rather than adopting a neutral stance. Objectively, in that tal

it,

respect, the 'Irish

Peace

Initiative'

was a good deal

fundamen-

different

from the

final Joint Declaration.

ANGLO-IRISH TURBULENCE During September 1993 to play ball

it

had looked as though the British were not going

on a Joint Declaration, dependent as they were on Ulster

Unionist support in Westminster. effort to pressurise the

Hume

and

Adams went

Governments. By 29 October,

Major and Albert Reynolds arrived

at

very public in an

in Brussels,

a six-point agreement.

John

Coming

as

it

wake of the IRA Shankill Road bomb and loyalist retaliation in Greysteel, this was a significant joint approach. The Brussels agreement opened the way for Sinn Fein and loyalist involvement in talks, following an end to armed action. It was the precursor to a formal Joint Declaration and was vested with high political importance. But within a week Anglodid in the

Irish relations

reached a

new and

potentially serious state of turbulence.

Word came

through to Dublin from London indicating that the British Government were pulling out of the Brussels agreement. The Irish side responded by saying they would have their own initiative but would not be 'covering' for the British. There were accusations that the British were trying to 'double-cross' the Irish.

But British negotiators protested

at this,

saying they had merely referred to the 'great difficulty' they would have in

proceeding. Privately, the British talked of Albert Reynolds engaging in 'political theatre'

during this period.

The manifest

two Governments contained echoes of the bad

distrust

relations

between the

which surfaced

THE LONG WAR

292

across the table during the

Brooke-Mayhew

talks a year earlier.

One way

or another, there were three or four sizeable fractures of this kind in the

run-up to the final agreement.

John Major's Government was

still

particularly sensitive to Unionist

opinion, given their precarious parliamentary position in Westminster. But

became more

as time closed in, the British

November the

British

seriously engaged. During

Prime Minister was encouraged by the prospect

that

Unionist leader Jim Molyneaux would adopt a neutral stance on the

up-coming it.

Joint Declaration

(Molyneaux' s neutrality

and

that

moderate Unionist opinion would buy

Church

largely attributed to the influence of

is

of Ireland Primate Dr. Robin Eames.) Dublin opened up lines to the loyalist

Roy Magee. Most secsome form. John Major's Unionist flank

paramilitaries through Presbyterian Minister Rev. tions of opinion

was being

were moving

in

protected. Albert Reynolds remained confident that the joint

process could deliver an

IRA

(and consequently a loyalist) cessation.

BREACH OF FAITH Then came

the British-Irish

summit

a rough, tough and bitter meeting.

in

Dublin Castle on 3 December.

Around

of the entire joint process being derailed.

it

It

hung

was

Government's proposed Joint Declaration, the been made

to

London. By December

that

It

was

the very real possibility

six

months since the

'Irish

Peace

Irish

Initiative',

document had been

had

the subject

of sustained discussions between the two Governments and had gone

through a number of drafts.

agreement

in late

their

own

had formed the backdrop

to the Brussels

October. Suddenly a second document appeared from the

British side for the 3

made

It

December summit. Unexpectedly,

proposal for a Joint Declaration. In

the British had

its

tenor

it

was

pro-Union. Crucially, the British proposal confined the concept of self-determination to Northern Ireland. The two documents were effectively irreconcilable, unbridgeable. Albert

Reynolds accused the British of a

'breach of faith' in producing such a proposal so late in the day and after the Irish proposal had been the subject of negotiations for so long.

serious and provocative charge. substantially nationalist the

IRA to

heel.

Any

The

British

were being asked

agenda without the conviction

final

that

it

It

was a

to take

on a

would bring

and formal Joint Declaration agreed between the

two Prime Ministers could have epoch-making consequences, for good or bad.

Once signed and sealed it could not be undone. But Albert Reynolds, was a risk-taker. He was prepared to gamble his entire

the businessman,

THEIR HAND political career

IRA had

on

this.

He knew

that

what was on

offer

IS

FORCED

was

293

less than the

agreed to accept with some trepidation back in June. But from his

contacts Reynolds felt the

IRA

could be brought to compromise further.

For him the crunch issue was self-determination.

He

told the British that

unless they accepted the concept of self-determination on an all-Ireland basis they

conflict

were

all

wasting their time. The

would continue. Reynolds

would walk away from the process a

US

IRA campaign and

left the British in if

the bloody

no doubt

that he

needs be. In the background was

administration highly supportive of the Irish position. President

Clinton was fully appraised of the initiative. Clinton had given rare access to Ireland's Foreign Minister, Dick Spring, on more than one

occasion in the run-up period. Clinton's fidante,

own

personal lawyer and con-

Jim Lyons, had become involved, making direct contacts

in

Northern Ireland through his place on the Advisory Committee of the International

Fund

for Ireland

which grew out of the Anglo-Irish Agree-

ment. The 'American card' was being kept warm. Across the table

at

Dublin Castle John Major was more open to persuasion than others such as the Northern Secretary, Sir Patrick

Prime Minister agreed would proceed on the But

side. tist,

it

Mayhew.

In the

end the British

to take his proposal off the table. Negotiations

Irish draft.

It

was a

saved the whole process.

It

difficult decision for the British

marked John Major

as a

pragma-

willing to strike a deal, serious about tackling the Irish problem in

a meaningful way. That day, 3

meant

that a

new,

December 1993, was

historic British-Irish

the turning point.

agreement was

attainable,

It

though

not without further tribulations.

THE SECRET IRA CONTACTS Days before

summit came extraordinary revelations IRA and the British Government dating

the Dublin Castle

about secret contacts between the

back

to

1990 and reaching considerable intensity between October 1992

and November 1993.

Some

aspects of the contacts were disputed in a torrent

of public controversy and recrimination. But an essential truth was con-

firmed and agreed by both Sinn Fein and the British Government. The British

had been dealing

in detail

and

in writing

with the IRA/Sinn Fein

at

a time when they were publicly acting tough on the principle of no truck

IRA stopped. The written record of the contacts Movement regarded as 'negotiations') showed the offering full-scale face-to-face talks with the Republican Movement

with Sinn Fein until the

(which the Republican British

294

THE LONG WAR

on foot of a promised two week outraged. British

From

that quarter

Government. The

in discussions

IRA

ceasefire. Unionist opinion

came charges of treachery

Irish

Government

felt justifiably

on the Joint Declaration the British were

must be a permanent end

was

levelled against the

angry, given that

insistent that there

to violence before exploratory talks with Sinn

Fein could begin. The revelations about the secret IRA/Sinn Fein contacts

added yet more fuel

to the fire at the

Dublin Castle summit. Further,

it

was

revealed that the British had been keeping the IRA/Sinn Fein appraised of

developments during the confidential all-party Brooke-Mayhew negotiations of 1992. But,

on another

level, the secret contacts

were serious about bringing Sinn Fein

British

Martin McGuinness,

who handled

showed

into the political process.

made

the secret contacts,

meeting on 23 March 1993. The British Government called contact by

its

that the

official representative 'unauthorised'.

play of a

that particular

McGuinness

said the

import of that meeting was an admission that Britain wanted to withdraw

from

Ireland. Sinn Fein reported the British representative saying 'any

settlement not involving

all

of the people North and South won't work.

North-South settlement won't frighten Unionists. The union.

It is

determines

A

final solution is

going to happen anyway. The historical train - Europe that.

We

are

committed

to

Europe. Unionists will have to

change. This island will be as one.' Even

in the

Sinn Fein version

this set

of words was open to a number of interpretations, including the concept of an integrated island economy with Northern Ireland remaining

Kingdom. That was island' policy

a concept consistent with Britain's

towards Ireland. There were

many

in the

United

emerging 'one

conflicting signals in

of this. For example, four days before that disputed meeting with

all

McGuin-

ness the British sent a written statement of their position to Sinn Fein. Point

7

made

it

plain the British

Government would not

'join the ranks of

persuaders' for Irish unity. Joining the 'persuaders' continued to be a central

plank of the IRA/Sinn Fein position. The British paper put British

Government does not have, and

of "ending of partition".

The

process, or expect others to

do

British so,

will not adopt,

it

this

way: 'The

any prior objective

Government cannot enter

a talks

with the purpose of achieving a pre-de-

termined outcome.' These were issues which were to impinge directly on the final negotiations

moved

between the British and

towards an agreed Joint Declaration.

Irish

Governments

as they

THEIR HAND

IS

FORCED

295

THE JOINT DECLARATION; REYNOLDS 'BLINKS' 'We

didn't achieve "persuaders" but

was how one of those outcome.

It

we

centrally involved

was an accurate and

did achieve a level playing pitch'

on the

Irish side described the final

significant observation.

It

meant

that

move to a policy position of favouring Irish unity or ending the IRA and Sinn Fein sought. But the British Government did

Britain did not Partition, as

move

to the centre ground, to

Britain

was committed

came

and

to

it

that, in

IRA would have

the

become a

instantly reaction.

to settle for equality

it

Government did seek from

Britain a

persuader'. British negotiators gave

was unacceptable. You'd just know

Irish

When

between the British

current British Irish

commitment

it little

it

to

time. 'You'd

'work

know

was a No-No,'was

their

Britain did not consider this proposition to be compatible with

the principle of consent for the Unionists.

The

any negotiations, the

to the British Unionist side.

Irish traditions rather than victory for Irish nationalism. In the negotia-

tions the Irish to

ensuring

would get equal treatment

nationalist side it

to

an avowed position of neutrality. In so doing,

The

Labour Party policy of favouring

argument went

like this:

Irish

could point to the

Irish unity, but

by consent.

you could accept there would never be

a change in the Constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the

United Kingdon without the consent of a majority of

people; but you

its

could seek to persuade them that Irish unity was in their best interests. Britain's Conservative

Government thought

coercion. But the British did sign up to Joint Declaration, Clause 4.

agreement among the

in the area

When

They would 'encourage,

Irish people. But, in the overall

facilitate

and enable'

scheme of things,

the

had extracted a significant concession from Dublin. This

British felt they

was

amounted to political a substantial commitment in the this

of consent.

the Joint Declaration

December 1993

it

showed

was unveiled

that the Irish

in

Downing

Street on 15

Government had moved even

further towards full recognition of Northern Ireland's status within the

United Kingdom. In Clause ernment, accepted

'that the

5, the

Taoiseach, on behalf of the Irish Gov-

democratic right of self-determination by the

people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.'

Peace

Given

that this exact

Initiative',

form of words was contained

and endorsed by the

by the British as a great

prize.

The

IRA Army

Irish

Council,

Government had

it

in the 'Irish

was regarded

also re-stated

its

THE LONG WAR

296

commitment

Guarantee of Northern Ireland's place

to the Constitutional

The

within the United Kingdom.

As

British

and an

arising

from these principles would be a

Irish guarantee.

was not how

this

of the

'Irish

the

Peace

IRA and

Initiative'.

was now both a

Constitutional Guarantee the British

saw

any

it,

political

What

they signed up to in June 1993 did not

were concerned, the requirement for the consent of

'a

tiations with the British, Albert

got a better deal at a later stage.

Throughout

their contacts

reaffirm their

felt that in

to a

nego-

he would have

was not how Dublin saw

It

was

that

'the

maximum

that

the outcome.

was achievable'.

with the IRA/Sinn Fein, Dublin insisted they would

commitment

to the Constitutional Guarantee,

accepted that some of the wording of the June '93 proposal was a

open

far as they

Reynolds had 'blinked'. Their view was

Reynolds was getting stronger as time went on and

final Joint Declaration

As

majority of the people

of Northern Ireland' was a purely Irish guarantee. They

The

All of

Sinn Fein interpreted the contents and context

explicitly contain a reference to the Constitutional Guarantee.

that

agreement

'partitionist settlement.'

number of interpretations. Reynolds regarded

this

though

it is

bit loose

and

proposal as the

'outer limits' of nationalist expectations and, therefore, not likely to be

accepted in

full

by the British and

leadership believed nationalist initiative

it

was

unionists.

Some within the IRA/Sinn Fein

best to stick to these 'outer limits' and build an Irish

around them. In

effect, this

buy

position should Britain decide not to

in.

had been Reynolds's fall-back

Dublin's case to the IRA/Sinn

Fein leadership was that a British-Irish agreement was best, even with limitations, otherwise

ment

it

might take many years more

to Irish self-determination.

Republican

to get

its

a British commit-

These differences between Dublin and the

Movement were not brought out

into the open.

For the

IRA and

Sinn Fein leadership the growing nationalist consensus led by Dublin was

vital

moving from armed to unarmed struggle. It largely explained why the IRA and Sinn Fein resisted calls to publish the 'Irish Peace Initiative' .'We don't want a row with Dublin,' said a leading IRA strategist at the time, explaining why they weren't then going to publish the document. There was a further, deeper reason. The IRA leadership believed that, privately, both Governments accepted the main thrust of Hume- Adams and that, given the right political circumstances, they would move to that position. A spokesto their strategy of

man

for the

publish

it;

IRA Army

Council put

not the British, not John

dead horse knocking around your

it

this

Hume, stable.'

were concerned, Hume- Adams was

still

way: 'No-one

feels

it is

politic to

not Gerry Adams. No-one keeps a

He meant alive.

that, as far as the

IRA

THEIR HAND

IS

FORCED

297

NO SELFISH INTEREST Privately and publicly the British said they had

were going

to

made

all

the

moves they

make. In the Joint Declaration they had subscribed

significant formal statement of their neutrality

to a highly

on Northern Ireland, though

not without another close-fought battle between the British and Irish

had 'no

negotiators. Britain agreed that she interest in

Northern Ireland.' In the

Irish

selfish, strategic or

economic

proposal of June 1993 Dublin

sought a commitment from Britain that she had 'no selfish, political, strategic or

economic

interest* in

Northern Ireland. This was intended as a

formal re-statement of Peter Brooke's benchmark statement (see

p 21

1).

But the

Irish

had inadvertently added a word

Brooke did not use the word interest in

'political' in

moment

in Britain's

British.

1990

in

Irish mistake, there

Brooke's statement had been a

approach to Ireland.

British (and Irish) policy of isolating

made

Brooke's phrase.

declaring Britain's lack of selfish

Northern Ireland. Leaving aside the apparent

was a great deal being asked of the defining

to

It

marked the end of the

and defeating the IRA and marginal-

ising Sinn Fein's electoral support. Instead, the

gameplan was

to bring Sinn

Fein into inclusive talks, always providing armed struggle had ended. But

no British Cabinet or Prime Minister had publicly endorsed Brooke's statement. In negotiations for the Joint Declaration there

the British side.

The

Irish

would be seen by the IRA/Sinn Fein as a

meaning about to

It

resistance Its

on

absence

significant omission carrying

some

Britain's true interests in Ireland. In the end, the Irish agreed

withdraw the word

statement.

was

regarded the statement as crucial.

was a

'political'

substantial

and the British agreed

move on

to include

Brooke's

Britain's part, putting the full weight

of a British Prime Minister and his Cabinet behind a clear statement of

on Northern

British neutrality

The

inclusion of the

no accident.

It

word

had appeared

Ireland.

proposal was, in

fact,

Hume- Adams agreement. Their

pro-

'political' in the Irish

in the

posed draft Declaration used the phrase 'no

economic

interest'.

They believed

selfish, political , strategic or

This was deliberate on the part of the IRA/Sinn Fein.

Britain did have a political interest in Northern Ireland, that

of maintaining the cohesion of the United Kingdom. With an eye on Scottish separatism, John

Major had made

the

Union a strong theme of his General

Election campaign in April 1992. In the Joint Declaration John

Major knew

he would have resistance enough to a re-statement of Peter Brooke's phrase without adding to

it.

298

THE LONG WAR

SELF-DETERMINATION

IRISH

At

the outset of these negotiations

Major

was no more than an outside chance an

IRA cessation. At root the

was required

in

it

Reynolds he believed there

would

that this joint initiative

British

wondered

if

such a high

anachronistic in

its

would inevitably come

view of British

to an end.

experience of militant republicanism,

felt

The

result in

political price

any event. British intelligence guesswork had

IRA campaign was and that

told

it

that the

interests in Ireland

Irish side, with its

an historic opportunity presented

itself to take the gun out of Irish politics by democratic agreement. For

Reynolds the 'crunch

such high stakes

was

issue'

self-determination.

in rejecting the British

It

was why he went

for

proposal that the concept of

self-determination be confined to Northern Ireland. Quite clearly, there

were elements within the British system aiming Irish unity at this juncture. In

mination than

in 1920.

to close the

door finally on

the end the British went further on

The formulation of words

self-deter-

in the Joint Declaration

brought the issue of Northern Ireland right back into the Treaty times of the early twentieth century. Although the Declaration ran counter to British

hopes of moving

in a

more Unionist

undermining the IRA, was the British felt they had

Reynolds was

attractive.

won

satisfied he

direction, the prospect of peace, or of

So

the British

moved. But whereas

a famous victory on the question of consent,

had made historic gains when

self-determination. Yet this

it

came

to Irish

was one of the key areas where the IRA/Sinn The IRA leadership had sought,

Fein believed that Reynolds had 'blinked'.

and fought

for,

an unfettered recognition by Britain of Irish national

self-determination. Northern Ireland

and Britain were scattered with grave-

yards bearing testimony to the IRA's ruthless determination in pursuit of that goal.

But the pragmatic horse-trading of democratic negotiations was

another arena altogether. The

Reynolds

to deliver

by

IRA and

politics

Sinn Fein had put their

what they had

arms. In the prevailing circumstances,

no

trust in Albert

failed to achieve

Irish

by force of

Government was going

to

seek a Provo agenda. Acutely aware of their promises to the Unionists, Irish negotiators were seeking 'balance'. The IRA and

Reynolds and the

Sinn Fein had already compromised

would have

to consider accepting

in the

Hume- Adams

something

respectively' and

on

They

less again. In the Declaration,

British recognition of Irish national self-determination

would be exercised by

proposals.

was

qualified:

the people of Ireland 'between the

two

it

parts

the basis of consent 'freely and concurrently given,

THEIR HAND North and South.' Clause 4 was the key section. luted.

The

It

FORCED

IS

299

was wordy and convo-

full text read:

The Prime

Minister, on behalf of the British Government, reaffirms that they will

uphold the democratic wish of a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland

on the issue of whether they prefer Ireland.

On

have no

selfish, strategic or

this basis,

he

economic

the people

who

interest in

Union or a sovereign united British

Government,

that they

Northern Ireland. Their primary

and reconciliation established by agreement among

interest is to see peace, stability all

to support the

on behalf of the

reiterates,

inhabit the island, and that they will

work together with

the Irish

achieve such an agreement, which will embrace the totality of

Government

to

relationships.

The

role of the British

Government

will be to encourage, facilitate

and enable the achievement of such agreement over a period through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on traditions in Ireland.

They accept

full

respect for the rights and identities of both

that such

agreement may, as of

form of agreed structures for the island as a whole, including

right, take the

a united Ireland

achieved by peaceful means on the following basis. The British Government agree that

it is

for the people of Ireland alone,

by agreement between the two parts on the basis of consent,

respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination freely

and concurrently given, North and South,

that is their wish.

They reaffirm

to bring

about a united Ireland,

if

as a binding obligation that they will, for their part,

introduce the necessary legislation to give effect to

this,

or equally to any measure

of agreement on future relationships in Ireland which the people living in Ireland

may themselves that the people

freely so determine without external

of Britain would wish, in friendship to

of Ireland to reach agreement on

how

they

may

impediment. They believe

all sides, to

enable the people

live together in

harmony and

in

partnership, with respect for their diverse traditions, and with full recognition of the special links and the unique relationships

which

exist

between the peoples of

Britain and Ireland.

The one of

British interpretation of this section

and represented

'a significant,

was pragmatic. According

symbolic

shift'.

sentence which can be construed as meaning a

somewhat enigmatically. The

to

wording on self-determination was 'new'

their central figures, the

It

was useful

shift, this

to

have a

source added,

British felt they had achieved a description

of Irish self-determination which copper-fastened the Constitutional Guarantee and established British

Government

neutrality

Overall, the British interpretation of Clause

here for historical reasons but

if

on Northern Ireland.

4 was: 'We step back. We're

the people of the island as a

whole want

to

THE LONG WAR

300

go

in a different direction then we'll

remained sceptical

armed campaign. But they saw

it

weakening the IRA's

justification for

traditional republican

view

armed struggle by undermining the

was

accommodate that.' The British would bring an end to the IRA

that the Declaration

in Ireland as a colonial

power

for her

own

interests. Significantly, the

British regarded the Declaration as consistent with their stated that nothing

the

way

would be ruled out

Government had committed Irish self-determination

in all-party negotiations. In theory that left

more

itself,

would be a minority view. The

North and South separately. But there was a great

to consider than that.

people 'alone', the two Governments

(in

was a matter

for the

Clause 2) had also committed

themselves to 'foster agreement and reconciliation, leading to a cal

Irish

along with the British, to the exercise of

In accepting that the exercise of self-determination Irish

commitment

clear for Sinn Fein to negotiate for the unfettered exercise of Irish

national self-determination. But theirs

deal

that Britain

new

politi-

framework founded on consent and encompassing arrangements within

Northern Ireland, for the island as a whole and between these islands.' Parties

who had

permanently ended the use

violence could enter that political process

of,

'in

or support for, paramilitary

due course' (Clause

Reynolds had successfully fought off a British proposal

9).

Albert

that the period of

wait for Sinn Fein and loyalists be three months. Reynolds wanted to

subsume Sinn Fein

into the democratic process as swiftly as possible.

would be the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation as set out in Clause 1 1 The Forum, operating within the Republic's jurisdiction, would 'make recommendations on ways in which

The immediate vehicle

for this

.

agreement and

trust

between both

traditions in Ireland can

established.' This caused confusion

ing figures in the

IRA and

be promoted and

and disappointment among some lead-

Sinn Fein. As they saw

it,

Albert Reynolds did

not succeed in winning British support for a potentially stronger political idea of a 'permanent Convention' was, to the

IRA

and Sinn Fein, a significant plank of the Hume- Adams proposals. In

this

arena, a Convention.

The

scheme of things the Convention could develop over time

into, or

become

the preparatory stage for, the negotiating 'table' for a final Irish settlement

between the

Irish

people acting alone.

tutional Convention,

was

to

As such

something quite different

it

would become a Consti-

to the

Forum, whose remit

'make recommendations'. Some of these misgivings arose from Sinn

Fein's interpretation of the loose formulation of words used in the June '93 proposal. Nonetheless, Sinn Fein had reason to hope for the bigger concept.

THEIR HAND Albert Reynolds saw his Ireland

Forum of

Forum

IS

FORCED

301

idea as a sort of continuation of the

1983, which proposed a

number of models

New

for an inde-

pendent Ireland. At that time, Reynolds's predecessor, Charles Haughey,

advocated a very radical development. Haughey told the

Forum

that, as

he saw

it,

which could then be put

their

to

New

an all-round constitutional conference, convened

by the two Governments as a prelude to British withdrawal. In

Haughey modified

Ireland

purpose was to construct a basic position,

this proposal.

He was no

later years

longer seeking either a confer-

ence called by both Governments or pre-ordained British withdrawal. The

new

task

was

to

win over the Unionists. As Taoiseach, Haughey advocated

by the

a conference, called

Irish

Government,

winning northern majority consent the offer

which remained on the

to a

to prepare a strategy for

new and agreed

Ireland. That

was

table in the long period of secret dialogue

between Hume, Adams, Haughey and Reynolds and which ended with the 'Irish

Peace

adamant

Initiative'

that the

of June 1993. Senior Irish Government sources were

Forum which emerged

in the Joint

Declaration was the

one expected beforehand and that 'Sinn Fein made no 12 it.

The

saw

it

to

its

British,

as potentially another pressure point against them.

But they agreed

inclusion in the Joint Declaration as something the Taoiseach regarded

as important to Sinn Fein,

In

about

difficulties'

however, had difficulty with the notion of a Forum. They

its totality

even

in its less

the Joint Declaration

ambitious form.

was a compromise between two It

threw up sharp differ-

also

between the IRA/Sinn

contrasting sets of ambitions, British and Irish. ences, not just between the

Governments but

Fein and Dublin. But once they had set off on a course of seeking Dublin's lead in pressing the claim for Irish national self-determination, the lican

Movement were bound

Against the grain, the standpoint, they

to

IRA and

had taken

Repub-

be faced with uncomfortable compromises.

Sinn Fein had done

risks for peace.

Now

this and,

from

their

they approached decision

time.

For an organisation offer

(700), of the

like the

IRA the Declaration

from the Governments. After

constituted a substantial

killing of British

Army

forces

policemen (288), of prison officers (23) and others (almost 800),

IRA were

being offered a path to political negotiations without fear of

recrimination or punishment. This It

all their

was a recognition of the

was not due

fact that the

obstacle, a force that could neither

to British or Irish generosity.

IRA had become

an insurmountable

win nor be defeated. Yet they stood

languish in an atmosphere of military stalemate for as

many more

to

years as

THE LONG WAR

302

they cared to continue. These were grave points for militant Irish republi-

cans to ponder.

THE IRA AND SINN FEIN RESPOND The

it

Movement on

Joint Declaration put the Republican

the start. There

was much

in

it

the defensive

found unpalatable.

that they

If

from

they rejected

they risked being seriously isolated, cut adrift from the nationalist

More

consensus they so

much

be cast

of being against 'peace'.

in the role

valued.

than anything they did not want to

As

of this wordy document they strove to view

it

they digested the contents

context of their

in the

own

peace strategy. They could argue with some credibility that the Joint Declaration sprang from the Trish Peace Initiative'.

Movement

months

eight

to

make

It

took the Republican

public their formal response to the Joint

Declaration. This prolonged lapse of time, coupled with the continuing

campaign, brought despair publication the

IRA

many

in

quarters. In the six

carried out 15 shootings,

IRA

weeks following

its

4 hi-jackings, 22 explosions,

placed 24 incendiaries. They injured twenty people and killed one, a British soldier,

Daniel Martin Blinco, by a single sniper bullet in Crossmaglen,

south Armagh.

The

and further south.

attacks occurred across the North,

On New

Year's

Day

from Belfast

to Derry

1994, incendiaries were placed in

eleven Belfast stores, including the much-respected Linenhall Library. Extensive damage was caused to clothes shops and supermarkets where the general public would be most inconvenienced and frightened.

The the

Government expected they would have

Irish

IRA and

Sinn Fein leadership to accept the compromises contained

the Joint Declaration.

by the

final

to set about persuading

At the same time

outcome. While the

that leadership

IRA and

in

was not surprised

Sinn Fein had not wished to get

involved in negotiations at one remove, the Dublin side had briefed them

on the balance,

i.e.

the compromises, to be expected.

Reynolds expected an

IRA

Adams, Martin McGuinness

At worst Albert

cessation by February 1994. Instead, Gerry et al entered into a

long drawn-out exercise of

seeking 'clarification' of the Declaration. This tactic was designed to highlight the perceived 'gaps' Initiative'

and

to

between the Declaration and the

'Irish

wrest more from one or other Government. But

Peace it

also

bought time for the leadership. In the republican heartlands the immediate

response was almost entirely rejectionist. Sinn Fein issued a holding statement. situation

It

would be

three

months before the IRA formally reviewed the

and gave a limited response.

It

was

the end of July before Sinn

THEIR HAND

IS

Fein formally responded and a further month before the cessation came.

The IRA, Sinn Fein and

303

IRA complete

their supporters focused

main areas of concern: the Constitutional Guarantee and the qualified expression of

FORCED

on two

(or 'Unionist veto')

Irish self-determination (to

be exercised

North and South).

Yet the IRA took one

and crucial, decision. The

early,

decided not to reject the Joint Declaration. all

options open. In historical terms

it

will

It

own

Armagh

south lent,

was a steadying move, keeping months

wave of rejectionist sentiment and

When the

ranks.

totally against acceptance,

ten against the Declaration as

IRA

Tyrone and Fermanagh ambiva-

ways of developing

On entering into the change of direction some years IRA Army Council had agreed not to take any decisions which split.

would lead

to a split. In these tense

Movement

they had one significant strength.

around Gerry

to leadership

a decade earlier

were

still in

and fraught times for the Republican

The northerners who had

Adams and Martin McGuinness more place.

It

Back

in 1984, exactly a

leadership had presided over a triumphalist

subsequent generations. Ireland and an Irish

New

in the throes

complex

set

in the disaster

When we

democracy

with a national government.'

were

decade

put

will

away our guns,

be established

In January

same

Year message from is

of partition and

a

who had

earlier, the

Council; that they would fight on to victory: This war

There will be no interval - as

than

gave the IRA and Sinn Fein

steadiness and a maturity at a critical time. These were people travelled a long road.

Army

the

up between Gerry Adams and members

Council over which route to take. But there remained no

prospect of a

come

the responses from their

came out about ninety to There were many queries, about the

stood.

it

Declaration. Extreme tension built

earlier the

was a decision

brigades

exact meaning of words, about the prisoners, about

Army

later. It

leadership sought the views of the brigades they found

Belfast divided. Overall, the

of the

Council

be seen as an important stepping

stone towards the complete cessation eight

taken despite the

Army

the

to the end.

its

curse on

Britain will be out of

in the thirty-two

counties

1994 the Republican Movement

of considering a Joint Declaration containing a far more

of messages. Those messages did not contain the certainty of

a British withdrawal at any stage. In tackling the complexity

Republican

Movement

and the compromises of the Declaration the

attempted to keep the focus on Britain. Reservations

about Dublin, one of the signatories, and John

kept private for tactical reasons. Gerry

Hume, who endorsed

Adams

it,

were

repeatedly attacked the

304

THE LONG WAR

British

Government

for 'rejecting' the 'Irish

to state that there are differences

Peace

Initiative':

like

between what we know of the Downing

the Irish Peace Initiative', said

Adams

John Major also sees a difference. endorse the other?

And

if

there

in

Why

mid- January 1994;

the

'Irish

IRA

'It is

in

clear that

otherwise would he reject one and

was no difference

the

IRA would

have speedily endorsed the Downing Street Declaration.'

on foot of the

would

and the principles, dynamic and processes contained

Street Declaration

was underlining

'I

In this,

surely

Adams

decision six months earlier to end their campaign

Peace

Initiative'.

There was a concerted

call

by Sinn

Fein leaders to have the 'gaps' between the two documents bridged. But,

whatever else they differed on, John Major and Albert Reynolds were jointly insistent that there could

be no changing or shading of a document

so tortuously negotiated. But Gerry

Adams was

also careful to stress

positive elements in the Joint Declaration, bringing his people along. Three

days into the

new

year

Adams

addressed Sinn Fein party activists

in

west

Belfast in a keynote speech. 'The Joint Declaration does contain, for the first

time ever, a recognition by the British, though heavily qualified, that

the Irish people as a

whole have the

right to self-determination. This right

has never been acknowledged before by the British and this significant development.' dictate

how

this right

was

Adams

is

said the British could not

a potentially

presume

to

exercised. 'The right to national self-determina-

tion is inalienable, unassailable

and absolute.

It

cannot be defined or This was another

qualified other than by the Irish people themselves.'

example of the subtle sophistry

that

was under way.

In stressing that Irish

self-determination could only be qualified 'by the Irish people themselves',

Adams was

conscious that that was the very concept

agreement with John Hume. The

IRA and Sinn

at the heart

of his

Fein were prepared to accept

that the exercise of self-determination required the consent of 'the people

of Northern Ireland', provided this was an Irish not a British decision.

The Republican Movement

set

about a prolonged process of public

consultation through what they called a Peace Commission, holding public

sessions on both sides of the Border. ist/republican opinion in the south

was

Soon far

it

became

clear that national-

more supportive of the Declara-

tion than in the north. In all of this opinion-testing, Sinn Fein vice-President

Pat Doherty played a central role.

Though he had been both Sinn Fein

national organiser and national director of elections, Doherty

was

relatively

unknown outside the Republican Movement. But within the ranks Doherty was a long-respected figure, a key strategist and a militant. From that

THEIR HAND

FORCED

IS

305

standpoint, and as one of the principal sceptics on the Declaration, Doherty

had the further task of bringing the southern

activists

along with the decision

not to reject the document. Within the north Martin

gist,

McGuinness was,

IRA Chief-of-Staff and

always, influential. McGuinness, the former

had long since become one of the leading

as

strate-

political strategists as well.

Like Adams, McGuinness argued strongly that the Joint Declaration should not be rejected. British.

He

As he saw

also recognised significant British

it,

commitments

movement on

the part of the

to cross-Border institutions

were

an implicit recognition by them that Partition had failed. McGuinness was

prepared to accept that in the Britain no longer had

senior figure like Martin

he

felt

the

'We're trying to end

said:

IRA could

McGuinness argued

situation,

McGuinness had important implications

IRA campaign. Asked

continuance of the

McGuinness

new European and post-Cold War

strategic interests in Ireland. This acceptance

if

for the

he supported that campaign,

At

it.'

stop within the year

that Britain

if

by a

that stage,

February 1994,

were 'imaginative'.

the British

had already moved on the Government of

Ireland Act (which confirmed Westminster's 'supreme authority' over

Northern Ireland) by virtue of her acceptance

was a matter

self-determination

was

to paint

The

for the Irish people 'alone'.

17 Still,

and an

'irreversible thrust'

IRA and

particular weight

towards

None

were crucial

to the

Irish

of this

He wanted

a

final British disen-

McGuinness was adopting a highly pragmatic

attitudes of the prisoners

within the

Clause 4 that

Martin McGuinness as a closet moderate.

'Brit-less Ireland'

gagement.

in

stance.

need for consensus

Two men carried One was Danny Morrison, of Adams and McGuinness

Sinn Fein on which direction to take.

and influence

in the prisons.

former Sinn Fein publicist and close confidante

in their move to leadership and since. Morrison had been wary that Gerry Adams might concede too much in the long run-up to the Hume-Adams agreement, arguing that Britain should be forced to move further, to a policy position of ending Partition before an IRA cessation could be contemplated. Morrison's voice of support and persuasion was vital when the time was right. So, too, was that of Bobby Storey, largely unknown to the outside world, but a big man with a huge reputation as a hard man in IRA folklore.

Storey had a chequered history during the conflict, successfully

evading conviction,

years for firearms possession in 1981.

new

direction his influence

among

first

until

When

ten years of the

armed

being sentenced to eighteen

Storey weighed in behind the

the prisoners

would be powerful. Like

the rest of the republican 'family' the early sentiment

among

the prisoners

306

THE LONG WAR

was

rejectionist.

took time to change. Nonetheless, there had been a

It

certain inevitability about a decisive

IRA move. The

substantial

argument

revolved around whether or not a stoppage should be permanent. That was,

why

essentially,

the Republican

Movement took its time. There was deep Many felt that Irish militant republicans

suspicion about British intentions.

had been seriously duped, not only during the recent secret contacts and during the long 1975 truce but also back at the time of the original Partition Treaty of 1922.

The

current

IRA were

very conscious of history. They were

particularly suspicious of the 'stepping stone' lieved

was

the fatal mistake

made by

argument which they be-

who backed the Treaty.

those

years on, Partition did not lead 'step by step' to a united Ireland.

Army

Seventy

The

current

Council would end their armed campaign and enter negotiations

provided the process underway was, as Martin McGuinness put towards

'irreversible thrust'

But the

come

IRA was [in

it

was not

Hume-Adams]

attainable. is

ment', said a spokesman for the debate. ration

18

They had

was

leading,

disengagement

commitment from

not expecting such a

to accept that

consent to

final British

where the

the difficult task of identifying

that Britain

19 It

Joint Decla-

was not 'locked

was

IRA wanted

'the essential

was not on

move'.

offer.

left

Britain to 20

would

It

Worse, early

them

in

no doubt

Labour Party Government would no longer be prepared

as a 'persuader'. It

their

had become painfully clear

Sinn Fein delegations to Britain after the Declaration

That policy was

now

changed, under Labour's

narrowed the IRA's options

further.

faced unique obstacles in coming to a decision.

own making. While this

They had

1975 truce that Britain had indeed been locked into victory

'join the persuaders' for Irish unity. It

Blair.

Britain.

Council during the heat of the

what guarantees they had

create the 'dynamic' for change. Yet that

Tony

an

a process leading to a negotiated settle-

IRA Army

over the IRA. That was why, in 1993 and 1994, the

that a future

it,

long term.

'What the IRA have given

into victory' rather than conflict resolution.

after the long

in the

the

new

to act

leader,

The IRA and Sinn Fein

Some

of them were of their

armed campaign continued they had

to

go through

debate from the outside, without any direct access to the British

Government, from a position where most of their volunteers were highly suspicious of 'politics' and where their

them

in the absolute

had come

own

long war strategy had educated

need for armed force. At the same time many of them

to accept that

it

was time

to

end the

hurt. Often, this hurt

on the

republican side was underestimated. Probably more than any group, the prisoners had

become conscious of the need

for a 'healing process' lasting

THEIR HAND

number of years without

a protracted

of

how imprisonment had now

the gun.

They were

FORCED

IS

particularly

307

aware

run through the generations, fathers, chil-

dren, grandchildren even.

Significant signs of

movement could be

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis in

February.

late

detected at the much-awaited

was

It

Ard Fheis since the eight months earlier.

the first

leadership signed up to the 'Irish Peace Initiative'

Motions passed were interpreted by the leadership 'Irish

Peace

Initiative'

Party could

come

to a position

of the

.

It

was an important

as formal

endorsement

necessary before the

step,

on the Joint Declaration. Movement was

slow. People had to brought along. Insofar as the

IRA campaign was

concerned, Martin McGuinness, as always, was the one to watch. significant

new

and explicit

realities'

He

Government says

must not be

at the table.

that for

Sinn Fein to be involved

Fair enough...' This

major move. McGuinness was accepting the provision

campaign must end before Sinn Fein entered at

an Ard Fheis McGuinness had described

(see p. 214).

ment

On

this

that guns, vetoes, is

Two

still. 'If

IRA armed

years previously

the British

21

This meant the

campaign and Sinn Fein enter

remained tional

in place. It

and injustices will

no good reason why

an appropriate atmosphere.'

was

potentially a

that the

Govern-

are prepared to say that the Unionists will not have a veto over British

outside the door then there

their

talks.

was

in talks

this pre-condition as 'childish'

occasion he went further

Government policy and in

He gave

talked about the need to 'grapple with

and the need to talk to the British Government. Then he went

on: 'The British

the guns

signals.

was possible

talks

IRA were

relate to the

Guarantee

alone.

in

Northern Ireland

Such

'policy' could

talks, or Britain's position at talks,

which would

what happened when

diverge from the Unionist parties. (This

was

Unionists opposed the joint British-Irish

Framework Document a year

when

Britain

committed herself

left

for Britain to hold fast to the Constitu-

Her Majesty's Government

agenda for

be

prepared to end

talks while the Constitutional

Guarantee while maintaining that her 'policy'

a matter for

all

cannot take place

precisely

later,

cross-Border institutions.) At the

to strong

time, in February 1994, identifying these Sinn Fein

deciphering Chinese puzzles. But China-watchers

in

moves was akin to London and Dublin

detected the sounds of change.

CREATING THE DYNAMIC The two Governments moved this period.

The

British

at different

paces and

Government, with

in different

ways during

different constituencies to watch,

THE LONG WAR

308

was quick

to

make comforting

noises for the Unionists and slow to 'clarify'

the Joint Declaration for Sinn Fein. Albert

Reynolds wanted

IRA and

as possible in demonstrating to the

Sinn Fein that

deliver results. Reynolds took on board Gerry

a 'dynamic' to there

wouldbz

moves all

move real

things forward.

Adams wanted

it

wanted.

He

could

to

calls for

be convinced that

made

three important

did this through his Government's

private contacts and in public speeches. This

way of

suspicion and excuses in the

the

Government would Irish

no

that there is

clarification

'insist'

on the

Government, he

Movement

salutary.

He

that the Irish

on self-determination,

to

out in the Declaration.

remove

right of northern nationalists to 'equal-

tried to

committed

to ensuring

But some of Albert Reynolds'

remove any hope within

Government would move from

the

Repub-

the position

be exercised separately North and South, as

'It is

laid

not possible to insist that self-determination

must have a guaranteed or pre-determined outcome', he can be found anywhere

to

Fein making a

that in negotiations the Irish

said, 'are absolutely

return to the bad old days.'

was

was designed

IRA and Sinn

At an early stage Reynolds said

decision.

lican

'politics'

attempting to create such a 'dynamic'. Firstly, he gave Sinn Fein

in

The

as fast

Adams's repeated

change. The Irish Prime Minister

the 'clarification'

ity'.

move

to

in a long-divided

said.

'No example

country of the application of the

right of self-determination, except in the way set out in the Joint Declara23 tion.' The second leg of Albert Reynolds's 'dynamic' was the removal

of the broadcasting ban on the these,

IRA and

Sinn Fein. For twenty-two years

and other, organisations were banned from the national

TV and radio

airwaves under Section 31 of the Irish Broadcasting Act. In January 1994, against considerable local and British opposition, the Reynolds Govern-

ment dropped the ban. For

the first time a

whole generation of Irish people

could hear and see sworn 'public enemies' like Gerry

McGuinness. The

result

Adams and Martin

was almost cataclysmic, not just among

the general

public, but most importantly within the republican heartlands of the north

which had conflict.

felt

demonised and abandoned by the south for most of the trust, showing he would deliver on his

Reynolds was building up

word. And, on

this,

he had given his word.

had been a highly unusual meeting

in a

A short time beforehand there

Dublin

hotel. Present

were a number

of 'republicans', which in fact included four senior northern Sinn Fein politicians,

meeting with four non-elected representatives of the

coalition Government, two from Fianna

Amongst

Fail

Irish

and two from the Labour Party.

other things, the government representatives indicated that the

THEIR HAND Section 31 ban would be

lifted.

When

IRA permanently

to

309

time, given that Irish

at the

keep the front door shut on Sinn Fein

until the

stopped. But direct secret contacts were, in fact, a regular

and persistent feature

in the

process of building up

One

these meetings took place in Belfast.

trust.

A large number of

of those present on a regular basis

who

talked about meetings with Irish 'civil servants'

Government would take on

the job of 'persuaders',

the British and the unionists

on the merits of

that

FORCED

was, trust was further enhanced.

it

Such direct contacts were highly unusual Government policy was

IS

insisted that the Irish

working

Irish unity.

to

persuade

The promise was

Dublin would work to establish cross-Border co-operation with a view

to creating a 'transitional'

phase towards eventual

This

Irish unity.

concept of a 'transitional' phase had become a key factor in the IRA's and Sinn Fein's thinking. Their term for it was 'interim arrangements'.

THE AMERICAN CONNECTION The

third

move made by

significant

Albert Reynolds in creating the 'dynamic' was

He intervened directly with President Clinton in Adams a visa for America. Adams was excluded

and important.

favour of granting Gerry

for his espousal of political violence

since

becoming Sinn Fein President

York by

the National

and had been unable

in 1983.

Now

Committee on Foreign Policy

speak

to

US New

to visit the

he was invited to at

a conference

on Northern Ireland. The conference was fixed for early February 1994,

weeks

after the Joint Declaration

opportunity to build trust and further

bonus

in the fact that

was unveiled.

show

the political

damage by giving John Major

move by

This

his first

the Irish

US

to 'take on' the British

(Reynolds had limited

visa.

prior notice of his intention.)

Prime Minister had an intriguing background. At

meeting with President Clinton on

Reynolds gave the

can deliver. There was a

that 'politics'

Reynolds was seen

Government, which lobbied hard against the

six

gave Reynolds a further

It

President

St. Patrick's

some unexpected

Day 1993, Albert He suggested

advice.

Clinton should not proceed with his Presidential campaign promise to send a 'peace envoy' to Northern Ireland. Clinton thought

of the Irish a

US

Government should take

this position.

peace envoy would 'not be helpful'

it

strange that the head

Reynolds's view was that

at that time.

Yet Clinton had been

under increasing pressure to deliver on the campaign promise. this

To

help with

dilemma, Reynolds told Clinton he could publicly announce

was acting on

the advice of the Taoiseach. In return, Clinton told

he'd be pleased to help

if

asked

in future.

When

it

came

that he

Reynolds

to the application

;

THE LONG WAR

310

visa almost a year later Reynolds cashed in his chips

Adams's

for Gerry

and asked the

US

President to grant

it.

John

Hume had

also

backed the visa

application and encouraged the Irish- American lobby on Capitol Hill.

of

Hume's

now

old contacts, like

Nancy Soderberg and Anthony Lake, were

highly placed in the Clinton White House.

granted a 48-hour visa to Gerry victory.

Adams

The support of President

it

When

President Clinton

was seen by Sinn Fein

to

be engaged

as a signal

Clinton, on this and other occasions,

of crucial importance within the Republican Movement. The

was seen

Some

in the Irish

peace process.

He

US

was

President

could be regarded as

a sort of surrogate 'persuader' in the absence of British enthusiasm. Presi-

dent Clinton was willing to put real flesh on a significant promise

made by

his most recent Democratic predecessor, Jimmy Carter. In what was described as 'the most significant development in the Irish American political

President Carter broke the long-established

connection for a century'

American policy of non-intervention

in the Irish question. In

August 1977

he had promised job-creating investment for Northern Ireland

in the

event

of a peace settlement. Bill Clinton was preparing to deliver on that promise in a substantial

way.

A strong international element was building up around

the nationalist consensus

used up considerable

at

home. Albert Reynolds and John

political credit in

America. Gerry

increased pressure to return the favours.

cessation during his

New York

visit, to

Adams

Hume

had

Adams was under little on an IRA

delivered

considerable disappointment in

Dublin and Washington. But the huge American and world-wide exposure

Adams

got while there greatly enhanced his standing and influence within

republican circles. operation by the

American

It

IRA

would not be

long, however, before an extraordinary

threw the whole process into turmoil and spoiled the

party.

'POLITICALLY NAIVE' Illusions about an early

end

to the

IRA armed campaign were

shattered

during a five-day period in March 1994. At 5 o'clock on Wednesday 9

March

the

IRA launched

the first of three mortar attacks on

London's

Heathrow Airport. Three mortars landed on the northern runway, did not explode, but caused it to be closed. Two more attacks, on the following day Thursday, 10 March, and on Sunday, 13 March, closed the southern runway.

Mortars also landed on the roof of Terminal Four. In

twelve mortars

from the backs of cars. None exploded. The attacks were seen warnings, pressure, designed to push the British Government beyond the

were as

all,

fired

-

THEIR HAND Joint Declaration. Reports in

demands on had

the 'Irish

An P hob lac hilinked

establishment.

Albert Reynolds described the

It

seemed the IRA

more by force of arms. Meanwhile,

still

the

believed they could

IRA had completed

review of the situation since their public endorsement of the Initiative' six

months

Joint Declaration,

earlier. In

27

Government's

in

its

Peace the

and

'positive

upon

'refusal to build

A few days later, on St. Patrick's Day IRA to lay down their IRA Army Council said the

'Irish

comment on

a statement they passed no

good or bad. They said they remained

flexible' despite the British

tunity for peace'.

IRA's

and said the Heathrow operation

attacks as 'politically naive'.

extract

the attacks to the

311

Initiative'

Peace

'rattled' the British

FORCED

IS

the oppor-

Washington,

President Clinton called on the

arms. At the same

time a spokesman for the

essential move by 28 He said

Britain there

was

to 'join the ranks of the persuaders' for Irish unity.

would be no permanent IRA cessation without an

towards a final resolution of the conflict. The entering into a non-viable process.' Britain could be

view, Gerry

made

Adams

move

to

spelt out

say, to break the logjam:

they are prepared to

'I

29

'irreversible thrust'

IRA had

'no intention of

Clearly there was a firm belief that

a notch further. Parallel to the

Army

Council

what he wanted the British Government

want them

to tell

me

and the

Irish

to

people that

come about with Dublin upon an agreement whereby

the Irish people will exercise our right to self-determination. That they're

prepared to do this within an agreed period of time. That together to about.

And

work out that

we

all

will

we

will all get

these processes and arrangements to bring this

bend over backwards

and participation of the Unionists

to seek the full

in that process.'

30

What

the

involvement

IRA and

Sinn

Fein wanted was a clear indication from Britain that she would open the

way

for full-scale negotiations within a time-frame

and with an open

agenda. Such a process would constitute the 'irreversible process' leading to the full exercise of Irish national self-determination. In this

IRA and Sinn

Fein remained

at

odds with the

Irish, as

demand

the

well as the British,

Governments. Such a process 'within an agreed period of time' smacked of dragging the Unionists along unwillingly and of a cut-off point for their

consent.

It

'maximum

was consistent with the Republican Movement's concept of

Adams was He wanted the British to show that 'an end to the Constitutional Guarantee will come by the end of the process.' And he 31 wanted the British to 'set aside' the Government of Ireland Act. The IRA consent' but not with the Constitutional Guarantee.

acutely aware of that.

and Sinn Fein were holding out for a clear negotiating table with everything

312

on

it

Act.

THE LONG WAR

Government of Ireland

including the Constitutional Guarantee and the

They would get

the latter in

some form but

the Guarantee constituted

between the two Governments. The Govern-

the bedrock of the agreement

ments would not be prised apart on

that.

The IRA Army Council would

have to look again at the issue of consent. Yet, Albert Reynolds remained confident that the

IRA were on

signals gave

that impression.

pointment

Dublin when the

in

This was regarded by the

the

IRA couldn't understand how Government

said an Irish

sort of dialogue

Movement were by Dublin.

The

private

IRA announced a three day Easter ceasefire. Army Council as a major unilateral step by them,

demanding a response from

was a

the verge of calling a halt.

Within a few weeks there was huge disap-

two Governments. They got nothing. 'The

the outside world didn't see

insider, 'there

was a sense

it

as important.,'

time that there

at the

of the deaf going on' and a feeling that the Republican

content simply to 'pocket' the various

moves being made

32

THE KILLING CONTINUES

IRA

Until the

agreed a formula to end their armed campaign, they would

continue killing, lobbing explosive devices, firing mortars.

much of this

activity

would go

As always,

unnoticed outside a confined area.

On

10

1994, in the midst of the furore over the Heathrow attacks, Belfast

March

IRA shot dead a 33-year-old off-duty RUC

Dunmore Greyhound Stadium in North Belfast. The policeman, John Haggan, was sitting with his wife in the stadium bar when a lone gunman shot him dead at point blank range. During March IRA units carried out unsuccessful mortar and explosives attacks in a number of areas: on Rosemount RUC station in Derry, on British Army mobile vehicles at Hampstead Park, Derry, at Springfield

RUC

station,

cessful

'hit'

RUC

station in Belfast,

County Fermanagh. But,

was

mortar from a

IRA

tractor,

helicopter as

Three soldiers

in the

sufficient to cause serious

services and give the

Army

Road

it

officer. It

happened

and

at

in

Newtownbutler

manner of things, one

suc-

worry within the British security

a propaganda victory. Firing a 'barrack buster'

South Armagh

landed

at

IRA

scored a direct

Crossmaglen

RUC/Army

hit

on a British

base in the town.

and a policeman were injured, one of them

seriously.

The

Crossmaglen incident, on 19 March, came within days of the Heathrow attacks and the IRA statement in which they said they remained 'positive

and

flexible.'

political

The Crossmaglen attack brought

forth

more public and

condemnation, especially as the mortar was fired within a built-up

THEIR HAND area.

IRA

appeared that the

It

showed the IRA

to

be

in

FORCED

313

could be in the process of escalating the

campaign. Intelligence reports

intelligence gathering,

IS

in

Northern Ireland and

in the

Republic

a state of high alert with no stop-off in targetting,

arms procurement, engineering and bomb-making

movement of equipment northwards into the 'war zone'. There was evidence that 150 incendiaries had been made in the south and half of them or in

sent northwards, half to Britain, with explicit instructions that they be used

successfully against 'economic targets'. Intelligence services weren't cer-

IRA were

tain if the

to

gearing up for a

go out from a position of strength.

new phase or gearing down, preparing Some arms dumps were being secured.

A significant series of finds in the midlands around Mullingar was thought, be evidence of arms being stored away for another time;

in retrospect, to

other words, signs of an impending ceasefire.

and oiled fields

in plastic barrels

The

materials, well

and pipes were buried unusually deep

and ditches. Code-named 'Operation Lir\ the

during February had

added up Russian

made

in outlying

Irish police search

eight separate finds which,

to a co-ordinated

in

wrapped

when

put together,

arms dump including two of the heavy duty

DHSK machineguns, assorted ammunition,

two

AK assault rifles

and twelve 51b blocks of Semtex explosives. All of these signals of

ceasefire.

mixed

war and

signals

were being assessed

signals of peace,

though

that followed, in

to the Easter

Within the Republican Movement a primary objective was to

keep cohesion. There would be no

months

London and Dublin,

in

from the Heathrow attacks

IRA and

IRA cessation

loyalist killings

if

it

meant a

split. In

the

became intertwined

as

a final dance of death. There was a belief in loyalist paramilitary

circles that hardline

IRA

units

scores' as a price for their

were being given permission

agreement

loyalists killed three in Catholic north

to a cessation.

Bradley, Gavin

Rose Ann Mallon,

At the end of April

and west Belfast - Paul Thompson,

Joe McCloskey and Jim Brown. During killing pensioner

to 'settle old

May

in Belfast

loyalists struck in

Tyrone,

and Armagh killing Martin

McShane, Shane McArdle, Eamon Fox and Gary Convie.

UVF bomb attack hit Dublin for the first time in many The bombers' target was a Sinn Fein/IRA meeting at The Widow Scallon's pub in Pearse Street. Large-scale deaths were averted when an

At

the

end of May a

years.

IRA

activist,

primed. Then

Martin Doherty, was killed while preventing the

came two

chilling events.

On

bomb

being

16 June a unit from the Marxist

republican group, the Irish National Liberation

Army

drove into the loyalist

heartland of the Shankill Road, fired at a group of four

men

standing at the

THE LONG WAR

31 4

Co-Op

store, killing

alleged

UVF involvement. At the exact time of the Shankill

were

Three days in a

pub

were

Magee

UFF indiscriminate killings.

Italy in the

loyalist paramilitary leaders.

Down.

It

was a

Six people were

'spray job',

Eamonn Byrne, Malcolm

and Adrian Joseph Rogan. unexpected victory over

more

killed instantly

and

watched the Republic of Ireland soccer team play

World Cup. The dead were 87-year-old Barney Green,

Joseph O'Hare,

It

Patrick

Jenkinson, Daniel McCreanor

was a night of horror and

elation. Ireland's

New York Giants Stadium spawned an

Italy in the

enormous wave of emotional celebration

was with

killings,

Command

UVF carried out a horrendous massacre

later, in retaliation, the

injured, as they

for

discussing a possible loyalist cease-

were heard clearly by the

shots

Loughinisland village, County

at

typical of five

Rev. Roy

in session with

The INLA

Road

away, the entire Combined Loyalist Military

just twenty yards

fire.

two of them, Colin Craig and David Hamilton,

at

home and

the indescribable shock in the tiny

abroad.

Mixed

Down

County

as this

village, the

Loughinisland massacre was an event of near disbelief.

As

events

attacks on

moved

RUC

into July, the

and British

Targets included the patrols in

Road the

Army

Courts

kept up their mortar and explosives

stations, bases

station in Belfast,

also kept

amidst efforts

to

up

Derry volgie Royal

their attacks

on leading

Irish

in hospital

1 1

July, the

IRA

statement by the

But

Tension mounted 9 July, a

UVF in the

On

earlier.

Two days later

Ray Smallwoods, one of the new breed politicians. The IRA claimed Smallwoods re-

central figure in the

Smallwoods' s role

base.

shot dead

of ex-paramilitary loyalist

mained a

patrols.

from wounds he received

IRA's gun attack on the Shankill Road three weeks on

Regiment

loyalists.

secure ceasefires on both sides.

commander, Trevor King, died again,

and mobile

Dromore RUC station, army Pomeroy RUC station, Grosvenor

in Belfast,

Crossmaglen and west Belfast,

RUC

IRA

Law

IRA

UFF armed

in that regard,

campaign. Whatever about

he had been the instigator of a public

Combined Loyalist Military Command, put out on 15 July, CLMC would call a ceasefire if the IRA did the same.

declaring that the

The

call

was

rejected

retaliation for

by the IRA. But, notably, the

Smallwoods' s death. From

in paramilitary ranks that ceasefires

loyalists

decided against

that point on, there

was

a sense

were on the way. By coincidence again,

on the day of Smallwoods' s death, Rev. Roy Magee was

in

Dublin discuss-

ing the prospects of a loyalist ceasefire with the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds. But there was more to

come

in the

dance of death and the

of old scores. In north Belfast on 22 July, the loyalist

UFF

settling

shot dead a j

THEIR HAND Catholic publican,

On

Bobby Monaghan,

IRA

31 July, in Belfast, the

two leading

in front

IS

FORCED

315

of his Protestant girlfriend.

shot dead Joe Bratty and

Raymond

Elder,

members of the UFF.

THE SECRETIVE ROUTE TO THE LOYALIST CEASEFIRE It

would be mid-October before the Combined Loyalist Military

finally

agreed a ceasefire.

some on under

It

came

six

weeks

the loyalist side regretted that.

The

if

IRA and loyalist knew that

was made more and

command

made

difficult at first

number of years before-

its

The

task

because of the largely separate existence

two biggest

loyalist groups, the Ulster

military section, the Ulster

and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Attempts

at parallel

more formalised during a two-year period before

came about through

people would feel

to get parallel IRA/loyalist ceasefires.

structures of the

Defence Association (with ers)

ceasefires followed one their

the other side didn't also stop. For a

hand, attempts were

had been

order to claim the higher moral

another was no coincidence. Each vulnerable

IRA's cessation and

loyalist paramilitaries

pressure to get their decision in first in

ground. But the fact that the

after the

Command

Freedom

ceasefires

Fight-

became

the Joint Declaration. This

the involvement of Dr. John O'Connell, a former Irish

Government Minister, who had moved from the Irish Labour Party to Fianna Fail. In the early 1970s, O'Connell had acted as intermediary between the IRA and British Labour Party leader Harold Wilson. His credentials remained good.

O'Connell had been introduced

by Rev. Roy Magee and acted as the 'main

IRA with IRA through

the

tiation

December

between them and

a view to getting parallel ceasefires. O'Connell dealt with the a trusted republican

by the IRA

understood,

catalyst'

to the loyalists

if

Army

who had been

given the power of nego-

Council. The concept of parallel ceasefires was

not formalised, shortly before the Joint Declaration

1993.

By

that stage the

two main

ones, were acting in concert under the

loyalist groups,

Combined

in

and two smaller

Loyalist Military

Com-

mand (CLMC). O'Connell's role then faded as that of the Rev. Roy Magee grew in importance. Rev. Magee acted as conduit between the CLMC and the Irish

Rev.

Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds,

Magee

whom he met directly

also acted as conduit to the British

in Dublin.

Prime Minister, John Major,

but through the Church of Ireland Primate, Archbishop Robin Eames. In

Magee's role was similar to that of John Hume with the IRA/Sinn Fein. Each had routes both to the paramilitary organisations and to the two Governments. The essential assurances sought by the CLMC

essence, Rev.

THE LONG WAR

316

from the Prime Ministers was that the

would be no deal with

that there

Union would not be sold out and

safeguarded.

The responses came

that their Britishness

privately via Rev.

Magee

the

IRA,

would be

or in the form

of public statements from the Governments. These assurances would as-

sume enormous importance after the IRA there was a long road to travel yet.

cessation in August 1994. But

Shortly after the Joint Declaration a meeting in an east Belfast hotel set the

Combined

Loyalist Military

Command

on a similar road

to that taken

by the IRA. The meeting was billed as a conference for Unionists

to

consider the Declaration. Speakers included economists, constitutional

lawyers and politicians and most shades of unionism, including loyalist paramilitary elements.

refused to attend.

Afterwards, the

On

outcome.

It

One

group, Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party,

turned out to be a particularly persuasive conference.

Combined

Loyalist Military

Command met

to discuss the

foot of the evidence produced at the conference the

CLMC

was a

crucial

decided neither to reject nor to accept the Declaration. decision, similar to

if

It

unconnected with the decision taken by the IRA

around the same time. Both paramilitary groups had adopted a neutral stance on the Declaration, leaving

them

rejection of the Declaration

examine the option of a

free to

ceasefire. Further, the loyalist decision,

made

by Ian Paisley's

in the teeth

party,

marked

of vehement

this particular

new independent-minded strand of Unionist politics. many ways to the IRA, who had done men in their late thirties and early forties who had become

brand of loyalism as a

They were of a time in prison, politicised.

generation, similar in

But unlike the IRA these

loyalists felt they

had fought other

people's wars, danced to the sound of other people's drumbeats. They

would

try to

speak for themselves on

this occasion.

This was to become

evident after the loyalist ceasefire, with the emergence from obscurity of the Progressive Unionist Party

and the Ulster Democratic Party, both born

out of loyalist paramilitary activities. In fact, the

PUP and UDP played

a

significant role following the Declaration in pressing for a halt to violence

within the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association respectively.

One

steadying factor in the

particular

This

list

list

CLMC

decision was the inclusion of a

of six civil and religious rights within the Joint Declaration.

had an unusual history and emerged

strange twist.

The

on behalf of the

list

Irish

appeared

in

Clause

in the

5, as rights

Government' promised

Declaration with a

which

'the

Taoiseach

to include within a political

THEIR HAND settlement.

It

IS

FORCED

317

included the right to free political thought, the right to freedom

and expression of religion, the right

equal opportunity regardless of class,

to

The list of rights was brought to the attention of Albert Roy Magee at a meeting in Dublin between the two men. It had come from the Combined Loyalist Military Command as rights which

creed, sex or colour.

Reynolds by Rev.

they

would seek

for Protestants

Ireland settlement.

It

and Catholics within an agreed Northern

was not drawn up with

the Joint Declaration in mind.

But Albert Reynolds made a photocopy of the the Declaration as rights to be guaranteed

inclusion in that

form

left

the loyalists

list

by the

and

it

Irish

later

appeared

Government.

somewhat bemused. Yet

in Its

added

it

considerably to the building of trust between Dublin and the loyalists.

accorded a legitimacy to the Combined Loyalist Military

It

Command which

they had thus far failed to get from the British Government. This, in turn,

added another positive element

in the

search for parallel ceasefires.

Pressure was mounting for the loyalists to 'get their ceasefire in

first'.

By the time of the IRA killings on the Shankill Road in mid- June, the Rev. Magee was telling the CLMC that he thought an IRA decision was imminent. Rev. Magee had been intensifying his contacts with Albert Reynolds and these were the signals he was receiving. A month later came the CLMC's decision to seek reciprocal IRA and loyalist ceasefires. Even though

this

was

were having

rejected

by the IRA, the

difficulty persuading a

reality

was

that the loyalist

needed more time and scope to bring their prisoners along. the

background was a deep fear

also

And always

in

that the small Marxist republican paramili-

tary group, the Irish National Liberation

murderous

groups

number of key hard men. They

Army, would remain

at large

with

intent.

THE IRA DECIDES There was a great deal of despair about

at the

end of July 1994. IRA

had continued. Public optimism about a ceasefire was

killings

in short supply.

Sinn

Fein held a special conference in Letterkenny, County Donegal, to give their formal response to the Joint Declaration.

Much

of the sentiment

coming from delegates was negative and rejectionist. It was then almost nine months since the Declaration was unveiled amidst hopes and clarion calls for peace.

But the pessimism and gloom were misplaced. The

Army Council had

already taken their historic decision.

It

was

to

IRA be a

'complete cessation'. This was conveyed with great secrecy to Albert

Reynolds more than a week prior to the Letterkenny Conference. Reynolds

THE LONG WAR

318

kept the information

would be almost

six

tight, retaining a

the world at large got

not, the

Army

Council decision came shortly

Reynolds forced the pace. In mid- July the

strong message to the IRA.

had done to give.

all

He

It

wind of the IRA's momentous change of course.

Whether by coincidence or after

degree of nervousness to the end.

weeks before Reynolds's Government colleagues and

amounted

It

to

Irish

Prime Minister sent a

He

an ultimatum.

told

them he

he could to build the 'dynamic' and that he had nothing more

said he had given

two years of his

life to this

and had expected

a decision before this. The Taoiseach promised to bring Gerry Adams in to Government Buildings within a week of an IRA cessation and publicly shake his hand; Sinn Fein would speedily be brought into the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. As for a deadline, Reynolds said he was soon

going on holidays after which the political season would

They would have

to decide, or

he would

ment and without them. Without laying

down

move on

up again.

start

with the British Govern-

specifically saying

it,

the Taoiseach

was

a deadline of early September.

Albert Reynolds was conveying this strong message at a time of tension

within his

own Government and

within nationalist parties. Reynolds's

partner in Government, Dick Spring and the Labour Party, were

increasingly sceptical and impatient with the Republican ior figures in

John Hume's Party, the SDLP, were on edge too. Armed

actions continued as before.

The IRA and Sinn Fein leadership

difficulty with the issue of unionist consent tee.

becoming

Movement. Senstill

had

and the Constitutional Guaran-

There had been a slowness of communication between the IRA and

Albert Reynolds. Until they gave up the armed struggle Reynolds could not directly

meet Gerry Adams or other senior

conveyed through to Albert

Fr.

Reynolds

some within further, to

the

at

Alex Reid from

Government Buildings

Christmas

in senior

if

IRA

that stage the

tandem

It

of

it

circles as

was being

repeated journeys

became

clear that it

out

made

the

to stretch

necessary. At a late stage Reynolds

IRA/Sinn Fein

Martin Mansergh

'The Man'). Martin McGuinness

Adams

that the time

was

right for a

campaign. McGuinness remained a pivotal figure.

became convinced and

By

in Dublin.

direct through his special advisor

needed more convincing than Gerry final halt to the

Much

who made

IRA/Sinn Fein leadership were prepared

communications more

(known

figures.

Belfast,

the decision

IRA and

was

taken. 'The

Man' had done

his job.

Sinn Fein leaderships were working tightly

for the purposes of cohesion.

The IRA were

He in

'giving their consent

to a process leading to a negotiated settlement', as the

Army

Council

THEIR HAND

spokesman put

The

it.

struggle

of the Republican Movement.

move

319

means. So,

political

at

cohesion was essential between the two constituent parts

that critical stage,

about the

would continue by

FORCED

IS

to politics

Among

the principal figures

who brought

were Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, Pat

Doherty, Joe Cahill, Kevin

McKenna, Gerry

Kelly,

Tom

Tom

Murphy,

Hartley and Mitchel McLoughlin. There remained the question of the

IRA

The precise wording of a ceasefire statement would be vital to both Governments and, especially, to the volunteers. That was for the public announcement which came more than 'permanence' of the

a

month

later at the

decision.

end of August. For now,

in late July,

Albert Reynolds

had got the news he wanted to hear.

meantime, Sinn Fein were planning

In the

important motions

at the special

Conference

Speculation centred on the prospects for an decision

was taken and known

to

debate a number of

Letterkenny on 24 July.

in

IRA

ceasefire. Privately, the

to a handful of people. Publicly the

omens

looked poor. Beforehand, Sinn Fein sent very strong messages to the

Government telling them not Dublin was also told: 'Don't transmitted to the British to negative signals

to expect too

much from

messages were

lose heart.' In turn, these

Government

as a

warning not

Irish

the Conference.

to react too strongly

expected from Letterkenny. At the Conference, the

many

negative speeches gave the impression that the Declaration was being rejected

and with

political path

found

in the

the prospects for an

it,

IRA

But the signs of the

ceasefire.

Movement were

about to be pursued by the Republican

2 listed the plus and minus points in the Joint Declaration.

by pledging

to build

the Declaration itself to

lasting

-

upon the Declaration and

and the

'Irish

Peace

Initiative'.

advancing the peace process and

in short

by attempting

to

It

be

summed up

to bridge the 'gaps'

Sinn Fein,

to creating the

it

overcome the

by bridging the gaps between what

said,

in the

difficulties

is

between 'commits

foundation for a

peace by building on the positive elements contained

Street Declaration, exist

to

motions voted through by Sinn Fein delegates. Motion number

Downing

which

still

contained in the Irish

Peace Initiative and the Downing Street Declaration.'

Three principal

motions were voted through as Sinn Fein policy. Their general tenor was confident.

They amounted

to a clear assertion that the

peace process could

be advanced by political action through the building of republican/nationalist platform of political in Ireland

and internationally, particularly

dynamic contained

in the Irish

Peace

'a sustainable Irish

demands, with popular support in the

Initiative.'

US

and EU, based on the

In essence, but without

THE LONG WAR

320

it

being said, Sinn Fein was giving approval to the political assessment

made by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness when a cessation to the

IRA Army

they

recommended

Council.

WHY THE

CALLED

IRA

HALT

A

The IRA/Sinn Fein decision came on foot of an extensive programme of consultation among their members, within the prisons and throughout their communities. People were being asked if they would back a ceasefire. Discussions took place

at the

and toddler groups and

in

deliberate tactical decision

a ceasefire

was

that sort could

most

mother

local level, at meetings such as

people's homes. This process was, in

by the leadership.

a real option and a real probability, otherwise a

weaken resolve and divide

itself,

a

was permitted only because

It

As

the support base.

move

events

of

moved

on through 1994 a broad consensus emerged: with the consolidation of nationalist unity around

Hume- Adams-Reynolds,

the northern nationalist

people were confident that progress could be made by base would back an

IRA

ceasefire.

politics; the

However, most discussion centred on a

prolonged stoppage, three months or longer. There was of a complete cessation. Within

some

quarters like south

last to

IRA

little

expectation

ranks severe scepticism remained in

Tyrone and west

Belfast,

which were amongst the

come on board.

One of the armed

support

first

questions asked by the

struggle be sustained?',

They looked

at options in the

departure which began a strategy there

was no

IRA Army

Council was: 'Can the

and the leadership took the view

it

could.

context of their 'peace' strategy, the

number of years back.

talk of a

that

permanent

halt,

new

In the early period of that

only a prolonged ceasefire

with the intention of making gains and drawing concessions from Britain step

by

step.

That remained a popular view. But the new strategy had

brought them to depend on John access and advancement. leading figures:

'We

Hume

Hume's

role

and Albert Reynolds for

was

'pivotal', said

political

one of

couldn't get the Dublin Government without

their

Hume

and we recognised we couldn't get the American Government without Dublin.

This

left

the

Army

Council somewhat boxed

in.

They concluded

armed campaign could be sustained but that the political price, a break with Dublin and Washington, would be severe. It could totally derail their own peace strategy. At its least, the combined strength of Humethat the

Adams-Reynolds, without an IRA armed campaign, would ensure a

level

playing pitch in negotiations and no reverting back to the bad old days for

THEIR HAND

FORCED

IS

northern nationalists. Throughout this period of debate Reynolds bluntly clear, as he did with the

would accept nothing near the end, in the

less than a

last

by Albert Reynolds

told

other than a permanent

permanent end

week of August,

meeting with Sinn Fein leaders

was

IRA's three-day Easter

a

US

in Belfast first

But the

cessation.

it

actions.

Even

delegation destined for a

stopped off

Army

in

Dublin and

encourage anything

in very strong terms not to

IRA

made

ceasefire, that he

armed

to

321

Council had already

taken the 'highly dangerous' and 'incredible' decision of a complete

move as an 'offensive policy', using the tactic of 37 The a cessation in the same way as they used the armed campaign itself. leadership wanted it to be known that they weren't suing for peace. It would be a 'disastrous mistake, a fundamental mistake' to think that the IRA was 38 The worry and the risk was that that is exactly how the suing for peace.

cessation, regarding the

British

Government might have seen the political assessment

Still,

could be

made by

it

-

as a

form of surrender by the IRA.

was the persuasive

politics alone? Essentially, the

What advances

thing.

Army

Council wanted

to

be sure that political negotiations would deliver, not an internal solution within Northern Ireland, but interim arrangements, a transitional phase

towards eventual Irish unity. The IRA/Sinn Fein leadership decided that such a transitional phase was on offer.

It

turned the waverers in favour of

a complete cessation of the armed campaign.

Government, said they

in particular the

The key

to this

the Irish

person of Albert Reynolds. The leadership

had 'Albert Reynolds's word'

that

he would use the agencies of

the state to pursue the objective of transitional arrangements.

stage in the process Dublin

was

conveyed

to the

39

At a

critical

IRA/Sinn Fein leadership the

assurance that the Irish Government was committed to the long-term goal of Irish unity but that an 'interim' settlement was necessary

was in

said that 'interim' arrangements

and

institutions

at this stage. It

must also stand alone

order to bring the Unionists along. Reynolds was conscious of the

tightening Protestant/Catholic population balance in Northern Ireland. talked of

it

being 57/43 percent, a balance which could

unity in the future. Should that situation arise Britain legislate for

was not

tilt

and trigger

He

Irish

was committed

to

an end to the Union. In other words, the argument went, Britain

the obstacle to Irish unity. 'Interim' arrangements

required, or attainable, at this stage. Publicly Albert

spoken about

'a

were

all

that

were

Reynolds had already

long transition period' which could be underpinned by

support from the British exchequer, the European Union and the United States.

He even made

a personal offer: a guaranteed 30 percent of places in

322

THE LONG WAR

an enlarged Irish Government and the public sector for an indefinite

For

period.

their part, the

IRA and Sinn back

historic shift to 'interim arrangements'

made

Fein had publicly in

|

June 1993 with a keynote

speech by Martin McGuinness. The public and private commitment given

by Albert Reynolds

to an interim, transitional

phase was

IRA's

vital to the

decision to end their armed campaign and go for a negotiated settlement.

So, in

making

their political

assessment for the

Adams and Martin McGuinness

Gerry

IRA Army

could persuasively argue:

Council, 1

the Irish

Government, and particularly Albert Reynolds, was committed, with Northern Ireland top of their agenda; 2 the British Government had of their agenda too even

if their

list;

top

it

was high on President Clinton's

4 corporate and political Irish/America was

engaged and supportive; 5 Britain was unpopular vulnerability could be exploited.

Europe and

in

this

European Union financial support would

also be forthcoming; 6 the prolonged military stalemate in the North

continue; 7 the

it

approach was slow. Britain no longer had

a strategic interest in Northern Ireland; 3

foreign policy priority

IRA armed campaign was

would

stunting Sinn Fein's political

growth; 8 the IRA/Sinn Fein support base favoured a stoppage. 9 latent Irish

nationalism would respond to a lead

if

the

armed struggle was out of the

way; 10 Sinn Fein could successfully build on the opportunities created by the Joint Declaration and the 'Irish Peace Initiative'. (There

was

also the

unwritten knowledge that loyalist armed attacks on nationalist areas were

having their

effect. In

some

constituencies Sinn Fein

was having

difficulty

persuading members to go for election.) Objectively, there was another danger

too.

Down the road the IRA faced the prospect of

morale would drop as volunteers no longer believed doing.

On

IRA

the other hand, in 1994, the

could end

'implosion',

in

its

when

what they were

armed campaign

from an avowed position of strength, discipline and military capacity. They had not been defeated.

And that marked

out this campaign from

all

previous

ones.

Outside Ireland, the twenty-five years of the IRA's armed campaign -

- had won worldwide recognition for When the end came, it wound down with a

twenty-three of them on the offensive its

persistence and durability.

fizzle rather than a bang, as

though dying away. Typically, there was one

very notable, but unusual exception.

On

leading Dublin criminal, Martin Cahill, eral'.

The IRA claimed he had

on the

Widow

18 August the

known

assisted the

IRA

shot dead a

notoriously as 'The Gen-

UVF in their failed bomb attack

Scallon's pub in Dublin the

month

before.

The

final

I

the

days

THEIR HAND

IRA campaign were more

and hours of the

RUC

defused a mortar found

trailer at

what they did

Toombridge

In the early

Belfast

On

27

fired

from a farm

Cloghogue checkpoint outside Newry, exploding about 200 yards

from the base. At 10.20pm on 28 August a grenade was car at

best.

behind Tennent Street

in a car

The same evening a mortar was

police station, Belfast.

323

normal: small-scale, local,

partially-successful incidents, volunteers doing

August the

FORCED

IS

RUC

station,

fired

from a hijacked

exploding outside and causing no

injuries.

morning hours of 30 August incendiary devices placed by

IRA caused

fire

damage

to the

B&Q store on Boucher Road and the

Skyline Discount Store on Newtownards Road. The

final

two actions were

by Belfast IRA, attacking the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army. At 10.20pm an explosive device was thrown at Springfield Road police station, causing 1

no

injuries

1pm on Tuesday 30 August

at

army base on

Fort Whiterock

and

little

damage. Forty minutes

1994, Belfast

IRA

the Springfield Road. According to an

number of British soldiers were armed struggle was over.

statement a latest

treated for shock.

Four days before the IRA's public announcement, Gerry John

Hume of the decision when the two men

informed London two days nent.

The

British

later, at

mortar from a van

fired a

later.

met

Adams

to review strategy.

John Major was told

had been expecting a three-month

it

IRA

The IRA's told

Dublin

would be perma-

ceasefire.

The wording

of the cessation statement was passed on to the British just one hour prior this was a request made by the IRA and Albert He was determined to maintain trust. On Wednesday, 31 August 1994 the IRA Army Council announced their

to the

announcement;

Reynolds complied.

decision.

It

would be permanent, though

that

word was not used. Dissident

elements would be more easily brought along that way. In any event only a General

Army Convention could properly use the word 'permanent'. In IRA were not going to bow to the British insistence on the use

addition, the

of that word. Albert Reynolds was satisfied

armed campaign. Through effectively

his office, the

it

was

a permanent end to the

IRA Army

Council statement was

approved and cleared. The statement would use two key words:

'complete' and 'definitive' to signify permanence.

The

full

IRA

statement

read:

Recognising the potential of the current situation and

in order to

democratic process and underlying our definitive commitment to leadership of the

IRA have

its

enhance the success, the

decided that as of midnight, August 31, there will be a

324

THE LONG WAR complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly.

At

this historic

crossroads the leadership of the

IRA

salutes and

commends our

who have

volunteers, other activists, our supporters and the political prisoners sustained the struggle against

all

Your courage, determination and the desire for peace based

remember ment

Our

all

on

sacrifice

have demonstrated

that the

freedom and

a just and lasting settlement cannot be crushed.

who have

those

odds for the past 25 years.

died for Irish freedom and

we

reiterate

We

our commit-

to our republican objectives.

struggle has seen

many

gains and advances

made by

nationalists

and

for the

We believe that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting has been created. We are therefore entering into a new situation in a

democratic position. settlement spirit

of determination and confidence determined that the injustices which created

this conflict will

to achieve this.

was

it

be removed and confident in the strength and justice of our struggle

We

note that the

presented as such by

its

Downing

Street Declaration

is

not a solution nor

authors.

A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations. Others, not least the British

Government, have a duty

to face

up

to their responsibilities.

In our desire to significantly contribute to the creation of a climate

encourage tion

this,

we

urge everybody to approach this

new

which

will

situation with determina-

and patience.

After almost twenty-five years of armed struggle the

IRA had

not

achieved a British withdrawal. They had got a place at the negotiating table. In that, they

were confident and asked for patience. As one of their most

seasoned campaigners put of war.

Now

we're

in the

it:

'People are saying

"We

long stages of peace."

'

were

in the

long stages

15 THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE With the IRA cessation taking hold, the

landscape was being

Irish political

transformed. Hopes were rising and imaginations were taking flight to horizons. Suddenly and unbelievably

came

new

the prospect of an Ireland free

of political violence, of television screens free of funeral processions and of families released from the duty of prison

and prospects. The in the

psyche and the

traditionalists

British presence. In the

Government. full

meantime,

were convinced

until they

It

These were only hopes

visits.

Irish republican physical force tradition

that the

remained deep

had not gone away. Neither had the

loyalist paramilitary

IRA had

groups continued

got no 'deal' from the British

would be quite some time before

the Unionists realised the

implications of a 'peace process' which had the aim of irrevocably

shifting the political

they did realise

it,

and constitutional balance on the

proposals for a negotiated settlement which tailspin.

island.

By

the time

both Governments had put their signatures to a set of left

Unionist politics

in a

These joint Government proposals posed deep questions for the

IRA and Sinn

What

Governments had signed up to, in the Framework for Agreement, signalled the sort of compromise which had been available to the IRA almost from the outset of their armed campaign. Fein too.

the

That development was a further six months down the of September 1994 the in their struggle.

IRA and

IRA Army

was by

The

Chief-of-Staff,

McKenna, who had developed

Kevin McKenna,

post for about twelve years. People on the in the

Army

the southern

a debilitating heart

far the longest-serving Chief-of-Staff,

would have 'acquiesced'

new phase

Council. Tyrone, in particular, remained

was a hard Tyrone man, operating from County Monaghan on condition,

start

was taken by a

a 'complete cessation'

hardline and not entirely convinced.

side of the Border.

At the

Sinn Fein were beginning a risky

The decision on

five-to-two vote of the

line.

having held the

Council

like

McKenna

recommendations of Adams and McGuin-

ness but there would have been 'no handclaps'.

There was no

split,

THE LONG WAR

326

however. Once the decision was taken

it

would be implemented. The task

of the unconvinced elements was to ensure for themselves that there would

be no deviation from the intended path. In any event, the long since publicly accepted that there could

they had given their consent to a political process.

been the culmination of

movement by extreme

McGuinness wouldn't cross up

on the

Army

Council had

be no military solution and

The

final decision

the road without first having

had

'Adams and

caution.

everybody lined

pavement with them', was one caustic observation by a senior

figure.

The

surprise to

many

within

IRA ranks was the absence

of any agreement

with the British Government or agreed timetable for a process of demilitarisation.

Albert Reynolds had told the

back speedily.

IRA

A month was what some

that the British

Army would

pull

of them understood. But the British

new year, a period of four months, to start taking troops off streets. As always, John Major had his own Conservative party and

took until the Belfast

IRA were determined

Unionist constituency to consider. Just as the

to

demonstrate that they had not surrendered, so the British insisted on making it

plain that there had been

no deal and no capitulation

early period caused real strains

to violence.

But

this

and tensions within IRA ranks. For many

of them, the decision on a 'complete cessation' was both a surprise and a bitter

disappointment. They had long been schooled

'politics'

the

would deliver

little.

mind-set that

IRA/Sinn Fein side stressed the absolute need for Britain to address

mind-set. Speedy demilitarisation

would demonstrate

was

most tangible way

the

that the political route

do

this

this. It

under way would not lead

to a

Adams and McGuinness,

dary 1975 truce. This time the firm promise by conjunction with Albert Reynolds, John

would bring

political action

British response

most sensitive

to

and intelligence ambush, as had happened with the legen-

British military

in

in the

In the secret talks with the British during 1993

was

to

real

Hume

and

Bill Clinton,

was

that

change on the ground. Instead, an early

deploy the two most hated

areas, the Parachute

Royal Marines into south Armagh.

Regiment

On

Army

regiments into the

into west Belfast

and the

the ground, these deployments

looked to some like provocation and a signal that

little

was

to

be gained by

was made possible only when the IRA cessation. The IRA's they moved, by small degrees, from an exclusively internal debate, where a permanent cessation was out of the question, to a more inclusive nationfinal decision

alist

IRA

and community-based process. In other words, alone, a complete end to

armed

if

it

had been

left to

the

struggle, in the face of continued

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

would have been almost impossible

British rule,

Adams, McGuinness, Pat Doherty,

strategists like

McLoughlin were Those close

to

it

to achieve. Political

Tom Hartley and Mitchel

largely instrumental in guiding that

understood

its

sensitivity.

327

change of course.

'Having successfully done

that,

some people

are over-estimating the degree of control, over-simplifying the

tensions that

now

when

they were

the IRA/Sinn Fein leadership had not entered the new

situation

exist', said

demanding more from Still,

one of the

the British

strategists at a

time

Government.

They had an analysis and a strategy worked out. And was holding up. For a start, they expected some British As well, keeping the focus on Britain was good for internal

naively or blindly. that strategy

reluctance.

cohesion and external propaganda.

An

internal Sinn Fein strategy paper

shows how alert the leadership was to the realities and the opportunities. The paper was prepared prior to the cessation decision and looked to the future. In stating that the situation was 'fluid' and 'the opportunities to lay out our

are multiple if not infinite', the paper set out the context in

stall

which Sinn Fein would operate:

many

'1

The

areas as intransigent; 2 There

reporting.

Again

government

British is

this is not infinite but

is

perceived

a reasonable balance to

we can

influence

it;

in

media

3 Sinn Fein

position/arguments are getting a reasonable and probably unprecedented airing.

This can only be of benefit

how

4

It is

-

all-Ireland nationalist opinion.'

difficult to assess

all

in a

general

way

to our peace strategy;

of this impacts on our main target audience

The paper

laid out the

need for 'defensive'

recommending that Sinn Fein 'edge forward' in the 'politically cautious' manner it adopted after the Joint Declaration. It listed a number of main points to be noted by members, for example: '(a) The political value of Irish nationalist consensus or agreement and 'offensive'

political strategies,

and John Hume's, and the

Irish

Government's, central position of political

importance; (b) That latent Irish nationalism will take a lead; (c) That the British

government

is

unwilling to change

its

policy at this time; (d) That

Dublin 4/the revisionists/the ideological "Free Staters" can be confronted and

isolated.'

The paper emphasised

the party's need to address Unionism,

describing this element as the 'most underdeveloped part' of Sinn Fein strategy.

-

last

On

the international front there was, pointedly, a 'change of

year unending war but this year Peace Debate.'

shows the Republican Movement preparing for a more complicated cal future: alive to British caution,

Unionists, adopting a 'peace'

image

This strategy paper politi-

needing to improve their approach

image abroad and attempting

to

to manipulate

THE LONG WAR

328

broad nationalist opinion overall objective,

Governments

the British and Irish Initiative',

i.e.,

in Ireland

to

move

to the full adoption of the 'Irish

both

Peace

an end to the Constitutional Guarantee on Northern Ireland

'collective' exercise of Irish national self-determination through

and the

open negotiations. In entering ship

while isolating the 'revisionists'. The

which they believed was achievable, was

this

new

process the IRA/Sinn Fein leader-

expected a prolonged period - two

to five years

-

for negotiations to

conclude. They were not expecting swift political progress.

With

that in

mind, mechanisms were put

in place to

between Sinn Fein and the ERA. The lessons of the

had been

learnt.

communicate

failed long truce of

1975

This time they would reduce suspicion and turbulence by

avoiding undue secrecy. Sinn Fein set up internal 'core groups', constantly

reviewing the agreed strategy, which fed into a central body presided over

by Gerry Adams. The IRA trimmed down

were given cific

'political' tasks,

its

organisation and

such as involvement

in

its

propaganda campaigns or the 'Peace Action Monitor' (monitoring

RUC

infringements by the

and British Army).

GHQ staff began taking on

explicit Sinn Fein functions at party headquarters in a similar

that of the 'Official'

IRA

following their ceasefire of 1972.

numbered about a dozen key

figures

working team of about five or remained

structure gathering, effect,

intact, units

six. Parallel to this the

whom had a IRA command

weapons hides being secured and

the cessation being policed. In

IRA was running a new IRA and Sinn Fein became team at the Forum for Peace and

during the fluid pre-negotiating period, the

deliberately explicit

when Sinn

Reconciliation in

prisoners

officials

began

in 1973.

to the

leading

well, when the exploratory talks with British December 1994, Sinn Fein's team included

part of the

connections to the IRA's campaign

mass escape from the Maze Prison

McGuinness was involved

The message full

O'Hagan being one of three

a daring daylight escape from Dublin's

activist with strong

Europe who had been

has the

As

in Belfast in

Gerry Kelly, a key

1984. Martin

leaders,

who had made

Mountjoy Prison

Fein's

Dublin included such people as Joe Cahill and J.B.

O'Hagan, both veteran IRA

talks.

to

staff

continuing to be active in intelligence

process. This fusion of the

in

manner

GHQ

from the south, each of

campaign - the peace

IRA

volunteers

demonstrations, spe-

in

both the

Forum and

membership and volunteers was

clear: this

backing of both constituent parts of the Movement.

in

the Belfast

process

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

329

REYNOLDS MOVES FAST South of the Border there was no Unionist constituency to

on the

end he had pressurised the IRA

In the

More than anyone, Albert Reynolds IRA decision would bring immediate to

no troops

He had Adams and Martin

There, Albert Reynolds had a different agenda.

streets.

specific promises to fulfil, particularly to Gerry

McGuinness.

satisfy,

felt the

need

to

into their cessation.

demonstrate that the

results. So, in the

Republic, the

move

democratic politics for Sinn Fein was swift and breath-taking, almost as

IRA cessation Gerry Adams came

dramatic as the

itself.

nouncement,

to

Within a week of the IRA an-

Government Buildings

in

Dublin and

It

might have

posed for handshakes with Albert Reynolds and John Hume.

been even sooner but for John Hume's busy schedule and the special arrangements made by Reynolds to satisfy the desire of his Foreign Minister,

at

Dick Spring, not

to take part in the hasty political

Government Buildings was made

which Spring had initiative but

in

to coincide with

embrace. The occasion an

official

Germany. Spring undoubtedly came

engagement to

back the

he had been sceptical of the IRA's intentions and remained

cool to the idea of giving Gerry

Adams

Albert Reynolds had given his word

any standards the

triple

at

such immediate legitimacy. But

a critical time and he delivered.

handshake of Reynolds,

Hume

and

By

Adams was

astounding. Standing on the steps of Government Buildings on Tuesday, 6

September 1994, the three leaders issued a joint statement. The opening sentence said:

committed

to

problems.'

It

'We

are at the beginning of a

era in which

we

are totally

democratic and peaceful methods of resolving our political

marked a

truly historic

rapprochement between militant and

constitutional Irish republicanism, healing

opened up over the Treaty of 1922. had ended

new

this

way.

On

all

It

one of the deepest wounds which

was

the first time an

IRA campaign

previous occasions, in the campaigns of the

1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the

IRA went back

into hiding as

enemies of the

southern State and waited for another time to strike.

While

that

was going on

had special contacts

in

in

Dublin, Joe Cahill, a veteran republican

who

America, was doing the rounds of militant

Irish-America. Albert Reynolds had delivered on another highly sensitive matter.

He

directly intervened with the

a visa for Cahill. Prior to the cessation

IRA had

White House

in

Washington

to get

announcement of August 1994,

insisted Cahill get into the United States to satisfy

IRA

the

support

elements there and quell potential unrest. The White House was consider-

s

330

THE LONG WAR

ably

more negative about

Cahill's visa than the one for

the year. Cahill had a long track record in the

known involvement

in the collection

Noraid, the official Republican

US

Justice

networks and the money

that the

strict

money

trail

earlier in

Department of

and dispensing of money raised by

Movement

support agency in America.

intelligence agencies had broken into and cracked

came under

Adams

US

down on IRA arms

pointed towards Noraid. Noraid fund-raising

surveillance and legal constraints with a view to ensuring

did not go for arms. In a notorious court case, one of Noraid'

leading fund-raisers, veteran

IRA

activist

Michael Flannery, convinced a

US

court that

that

used for Noraid cash. Throughout that time and afterwards, Joe Cahill

money

raised for arms

went

into a different 'pocket'

from

was known to the US and Irish authorities as one of the Republican Movement's principal controllers of finance from America, taking in Noraid cash. Cahill had been an IRA Belfast commander around 1972. In 1973 he was convicted in Dublin for attempting to import arms and explosives from Libya, after an arms-laden boat, the Claudia, was intercepted off Waterford. In 1984 Cahill was deported from the

background and severe reservations

entry. Despite this

in

US

for illegal

Washington,

was strenuously supported by Reynolds during a

Cahill's visa application

fraught 48-hour period and reluctantly approved by President Clinton. Cahill arrived in the

US

on 28 August and on 4 September he was granted

a fifteen-day extension. His task units, political, military

doubt, Cahill was there as an respect

among

the

was

to

keep the IRA/Sinn Fein support

and financial, on board the new direction. Without

IRA

leader, with particular authority

American support base. The urgency attached

mission indicated the signal importance of America to the

campaign.

On

that side of the Atlantic, as in Ireland,

leadership that a split be avoided. the

IRA cessation announcement,

On Thursday, Cahill

was

1

it

was

and

to his

IRA armed vital for the

September, the day after

rallying support at a meeting

of republican activists and supporters in the Roosevelt Hotel, Manhattan,

New

York. Albert Reynolds believed that Washington's eventual support

for Cahill's visa saved the

IRA

cessation from serious internal attack.

A

split did not occur. Yet, as expected, there remained strong residual wari-

ness, especially within

Clan na Gael, the hard Tyrone-dominated secret

American organisation with

militant Irish republican roots dating

the Fenians in the mid-nineteenth century.

was

that the

IRA

more dividends

The

back

to

essential thing, however,

cessation took effect on both sides of the Atlantic, paying to

two

political risk takers, Bill Clinton

and Albert;

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

331

Reynolds. Fulfilling another promise, Reynolds speeded up preparations

Forum

for the in

for

Peace and Reconciliation.

Its

opening session was held

Dublin Castle on 28 October 1994 and Sinn Fein turned up

The Forum

including 'Party Treasurer', Joe Cahill.

started

in force,

up

in a rare

atmosphere on the island of Ireland. Not only were the leaders of militant republicanism on the inside

Irish

peaceful methods', but Military

it

was just

Command announced

'totally

committed

democratic and

to

days since the Combined Loyalist

fifteen

their ceasefire.

NO IRA DEAL Getting the loyalists to stop was, more than anything, dependent on their

being persuaded that the

IRA had

got no 'deal' from the British Govern-

ment. Naturally, the apparently sudden and complete

deep suspicions among the

armed

actions. Just after

10pm on

Skegoniel Avenue, Belfast. Three days

UVF car-bomb exploded outside the

worked on

later, at

9.40pm on 4 September, a

On

8

September the Combined Loyalist Military Com-

publicly set out six prerequisites for a loyalist ceasefire. These

was done with secure.

Dublin

On

train as

the

IRA and

that

it

cessation, that

on the Republic's

tourist trade.

IRA

of a renewed loyalist campaign and this

Communications between

the

Such aggression by

fact, there

was known

conduit to the loyalists. Just before the

IRA cessation

number of key assurances

Reynolds said there would be no in their cessation

'deal'

was

to the

little

prospect

key players on

two Governments and the

had continued and intensified. Rev. Roy Magee was a

enormous

cessation, leading to speculation

about retaliation from the republican side. In

Magee

'deal'

bombing campaign south of the Border. There was

the loyalists appeared to threaten the

given Rev.

no

UVF bomb exploded on the Belfast-

arrived in Dublin's Connolly Station, causing an

talk of loyalist attacks

all sides.

IRA

Northern Ireland's constitutional position

12 September, a small

scare about a loyalist

used

UFF

a friend's car at

Sinn Fein advice centre on Sevastopol

included assurances on the permanence of the

was

number of swift

causing blast damage to the building. Three people were

treated for shock.

mand

cessation aroused

in a

the first day of the cessation, the

shot dead a Catholic, John O'Hanlon, as he

Street, Belfast,

IRA

This was reflected

loyalists.

to

still

CLMC

the principal

Albert Reynolds had

be passed on to the

CLMC.

with the IRA, that the words to be

statement ('complete' and 'definitive') would

mean

'permanent' and that his Government would remain committed to the •[consent formula for Constitutional change in Northern Ireland.

By

that

332

THE LONG WAR

CLMC had been holding very lengthy meetings and were moving

stage the

closer to a ceasefire decision. Nonetheless, in loyalist areas the absence of the

word 'permanent'

in the

IRA

statement and suspicions about a 'deal'

caused continuing angst and controversy. This put further pressure on the

CLMC deliberations. More proof was required. Shortly after the UVF bomb attack on the Belfast-Dublin train September, a highly secret meeting took place just south of the

in the

Border beyond Newry. Present were three men: two

republicans from the south and one loyalist from Belfast. republicans the

Army

was

in

loyalist at the

old school

barman

the 'trusted messenger' with the

Council.

O'Connell

moves

He was

the

man who had

One

of the

power of negotiation from

earlier dealt with Dr.

to bring about a parallel ceasefire

who had got a twenty-year conviction

by the

John

loyalists.

The

UVF commander of the

meeting was Gusty Spence, a former

for the killing of a Catholic

Spence had long since renounced the use of

in 1966.

on 12

Ballymascanlon Hotel,

political

violence and was one of the prime 'persuaders' for a loyalist ceasefire.

Spence had come

to the

Command was

permanent session. His mission

in

meeting while the Combined Loyalist Military

Hotel was to ascertain Government. The

if

'trusted

the

IRA had

got a 'deal' from the British

got no deal and

anything they did would be up-front.

The same

already conveyed this message to the

CLMC

shortly after the

IRA

continued suspicion

Spence wanted to

convey

it

cessation

to the

it

first

would

get no deal, that

'trusted

messenger' had

through Rev.

was announced two weeks

rife in loyalist circles

to hear

Ballymascanlon

messenger' conveyed to Spence, with authority,

IRA had

that 'unfortunately' the

at the

and

Magee very earlier.

With

loyalist violence continuing,

hand. Having done so, he returned post-haste

CLMC in session. Spence also received assurances from

Albert Reynolds at the Taoiseach's private apartment in Dublin. Reynolds

and Spence met on more than one occasion and direct contacts were made with the office of Ireland's Foreign Minister, Dick Spring. In this period, after the

IRA

cessation, a range of meetings took place

sentatives of the Irish

Government and

between repre-

the emergent loyalist political

groups (the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party) acting for the

CLMC. They

of questions posed by the

sought and were given assurances on a number

CLMC.

In contrast, according to one of those

centrally involved for the loyalist paramilitaries, the British 'refused

pletely' to talk to them, saying they

sentatives: the British

gave the

PUP

would and

com-

talk only to elected repre-

UDP

'nothing to deliver the

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

Nonetheless, through their contacts on the nationalist/republi-

ceasefire.'

can side and with the British bishop Robin Eames, the

Government through Rev. Magee and Arch-

CLMC became convinced that no

and that the consent principle on the Union was to

convince

Again the

333

its

safe.

This

'deal' left

was done

the

CLMC

harder elements and, in particular, the loyalist prisoners.

CLMC

had great difficulty with the British authorities

efforts to get into the prisons to discuss a ceasefire.

Coming

of September 1994 there was a two- week delay while the

in its

near the end

CLMC awaited

permission to enter. The logjam was broken through an accidental meeting in

England between Rev. Magee and the former Northern Ireland Minister,

Michael Mates MP. Magee explained the problem and Mates broke through the red tape

by way of phone contact

on Monday, 10 October,

Some

loyalist leaders

to

Maze

A few days later,

were allowed

into the prisons.

caused problems for the future by promising, without

authority, an early release of prisoners.

the

Northern Ireland.

loyalist leaders

At the time, these discussions within

Prison closed the final link in the chain. Three days later again,

on Thursday, 13 October, the Combined Loyalist Military

announced

their ceasefire.

It

was read out

at a

by Gusty Spence, flanked by some of the new-breed including David Ervine and Gary McMichael. to

be

'safe' and, unlike the

IRA, they offered

Command

news conference

loyalist politicians,

They pronounced 'abject

in Belfast

the

Union

and true remorse' to

innocent victims of their violent campaigns. There was another important difference with the

IRA

statement.

The

loyalist ceasefire

was made depend-

ent on the continued cessation of 'nationalist and republican violence.' Clearly the loyalists were attempting to place responsibility for the loyalist

armed campaigns on around the actions Irish

IRA

the

cessation.

IRA and

trying to

They were

tie

a further lock and chain

also hedging their bets against

from other republican sources,

like

armed

Republican Sinn Fein and the

National Liberation Army.

CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE Both of those organisations rejected the current peace process on the grounds that

it

did not guarantee a British withdrawal from Ireland.

Two

days after the loyalist ceasefire, a statement was issued by the Irish Republican Socialist Party, the political front of the Irish National Liberation

Army. The statement was

hostile in tone.

must have been given guarantees about the the United

Kingdom,

'as a socialist

It

said that, because the loyalists

status of

Northern Ireland within

republican party

we

cannot agree with

THE LONG WAR

334

the political process

which has led

INLA were reported

as

the IRA.

to this position.'

At the same time the

denying they had knuckled under

These messages emanated from a

organisations, but ones

to pressure

from

tiny faction-ridden set of

which had demonstrated deadly

down

intent

the

years since they split off from the Official IRA/Sinn Fein in the mid-1970s.

Small as they were, the killings since 1975, conflict.

The danger

INLA

had been responsible for an estimated 125

some of them amongst the worst atrocities of the new situation lay in the fact that, as in previous

in the

times of ceasefires or limited action by the Official

IRA, the

INLA

might draw

up

the years leading

so.

away

INLA

INLA

Provisional

looking for 'action'. In

'complete cessation' the

to their

strenuous efforts to get the

do

in disaffected activists

IRA and

IRA had made

off the stage, publicly warning

them

to

Despite internal killing feuds, including those with another breaksocialist republican faction, the Irish People's Liberation

Army,

the

demonstrated their armed capacity right up to June 1994 when they

shot dead alleged loyalist paramilitary leaders in the heart of loyalist Belfast.

The INLA's best-known

activist

and one-time leader, Dominic

McGlinchey, was himself a defector from the (Provisional) IRA Derry. McGlinchey

February 1994

at a

was shot dead

time

when

in

south

an unclaimed attack in Drogheda in

in

a resurgent republican military force could

pose a serious destabilising factor

Twice re-organised,

in

in the

IRA's deliberations on a

1987 and 1990, the

INLA

regarded

cessation.

itself as a

revolutionary socialist organisation, ideologically totally committed to the

works of Karl Marx. Under life.

its

constitution, volunteers

swear allegiance for

Standing Order number one says:

No

volunteer will be able to obtain release from the Irish Liberation

person has been affirmed/sworn. This

General Staff of the INLA.

No

is

Army

after that

a standing order fully endorsed by the

person should be affirmed before that person

is

notified of this standing order and has been given a period of time to consider this

decision. (24 hours

recommended).

Each volunteer takes the following I

...

oath:

hereby affirm/swear allegiance to the cause of National liberation and socialism

in Ireland.

I,

affirm/swear

Army

Army

of the people of Ireland, also

and unconditional allegiance

to the Irish National Liberation

having been informed of the

my

total

to achieve the aforesaid conditions in Ireland. I will strive

through force of

arms to maintain the qualified discipline, unity and purpose of the Irish National Liberation

Army

until

my

farewell to

my comrades

in arms.

!

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

Though armed

the

INLA

struggle,

places where

it

remained on the stage and dedicated

posed only a limited military challenge

it

had been

active, in parts

INLA

area,

Armagh

city,

to

ism was no threat

however, the

INLA was

even

if their

IRA.

In

IRA on.

fraught, given the

between the two organ-

even more

to Sinn Fein's political support-base,

slightly left of centre

to the

know what was going

was more

history of turbulence and interchange of personnel isations. Ideologically,

to continued

of Belfast and south Derry, the

were well enough organised on the ground

Another active

335

isolated.

which

at

Marx-

most was

declared aim was a Democratic Socialist

Republic. Potentially

more damaging were

military threat

coming from

the hostile language and the tentative

the republican traditionalists of Republican

Sinn Fein. They had led the IRA/Sinn Fein military and political campaign for the first sixteen years of the conflict. Ideologically they heart of the Republican

Movement. As time went on

after the

grew from

the

IRA cessation,

Republican Sinn Fein came to claim that they were the Republican Movement. Militarily, also, they were throwing shapes.

On

cessation, Republican Sinn Fein President Ruairi thinly-veiled public warning:

The

O

the day of the

IRA

Bradaigh issued a

centuries of Irish resistance to British

aggression teach us that history has not stopped today. The Provisionals only speak for themselves. The right of the Irish people to engage struggle in a controlled and disciplined

manner

for the

in active

freedom of

their

country remains intact and the Provisionals have no monopoly on resistance

The rift between Gerry Adams and Ruairi 6 Bradaigh, former comrades in the IRA's armed struggle, seemed unbridgeable.

to British rule.'

Adams

publicly expressed a desire to have talks with

sent to Republican Sinn Fein a general letter

6 Bradaigh. He also

which had gone out

to a

wide

range of organisations seeking their views in the post-cessation situation.

On 22 September

1994, Republican Sinn Fein replied to

Adams

in a terse

and tense manner:

A chara, We are writing in

response to your

letter

received on September 19. In view of our

continued adherence to Republican principles and in particular to the three steps to a lasting peace with justice outlined by the Republican

two decades now

i.e.

Movement

for

more than

THE LONG WAR

336

A public British declaration of intention to leave Ireland; A new Ireland negotiated by the Irish people themselves; and 3. A general amnesty for all political prisoners; 1.

2.

and having regard to your stated position which contradicts these, there

is

no point

meeting with you.

in

The

letter

was signed by two members of the Party's executive body.

Small as his party was,

would show

6 Bradaigh was determined to continue carrying

and second Dail and the true

the mantle of the first

however

that,

'republic'. Irish history

small, the flame of 'Brits out'

would never be

extinguished so long as a British presence remained in Ireland. That sentiment had a toughness and a tenacity about

struggle goes on,' said

Adams on many

would be a long wait before the in practice. In the

it.

away from

ness argued that they had not walked

Adams and McGuin-

occasions after the cessation. There

faithful

immediate period

But

the central objective. 'The

would know how

after the cessation

that

worked out

most volunteers,

members and supporters were prepared to trust the leadership. There was no evidence of significant defections from the IRA or Sinn Fein to

6 Bradaigh' s party IRA Army

after the cessation

Council. But there was

disregarded the

IRA

threat,

and

little

sign of worry within the

some evidence

that

6 Bradaigh

had

made at the time of the split in 1986, that he new army. Intelligence sources believed that

should not ally himself with a

'Arm Poblaigh na hEireann' (transNational Republican Army) was put in place as far back as

an embryo military organisation lated to Irish

titled

was believed to have an Army Council and a Chief-of-Staff, a former IRA/Sinn Fein activist from the south-west. The name Arm Poblaigh na hEireann was regarded as a holding title until such time as they 1987.

It

could assume the

can Army. The

1994

'rightful' title

first

of Oglaigh na hEireann, the Irish Republi-

tentative public sign of this shift

in Saoirse, the

was seen

in

February

monthly publication of Republican Sinn Fein. The

paper published two photographs, showing a three-man firing-party

grave of

months

Tom

Maguire

in Cross,

earlier in July 1993.

He had been

the last surviving

1921 Dail Executive and had handed on 'legitimacy',

IRA

in

1969/70

after the split with the Officials,

Sinn Fein, after the

split

at the

County Mayo. Maguire had died first

member

of the

to the Provisional

and then

to

over abstention in 1986 (see Chapter 6).

became patron of Republican Sinn

six

Republican

Tom Maguire

Fein. Apart from the photographs

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

337

themselves, one showing shots being fired, an accompanying statement

from the

Bureau' bore

'Irish Publicity

Provisional IRA.

hEireann - the

Irish

Comdt-General

all

the hallmarks of the early

described the firing-party as 'Volunteers of Oglaigh na

It

Army -

Republican

Tom Maguire.'

It

loyal to the principles of the late

was a public shot across

the

IRA Army Council. The clear and intended message was

bow

of the

that another

Oglaigh na hEireann grouping existed, loyal to the original all-Ireland 'republic' of 1919-1921.

Cumann na mBan,

Another straw

in the

wind was sighted when

an otherwise defunct women's military

IRA

support

group, re-emerged with a statement in September 1994 rejecting the cessation.

The statement

said

Cumann na mBan

further and further along the road of

annual conference in

Cumann na mBan

as

November one of

its

'rejects this latest sell-out

who have

of Republican principles by erstwhile comrades

IRA

compromise and

since 1986

gone

At

surrender.'

its

1994, Republican Sinn Fein described

Cumann

support groups.

na mBan's

Constitution describes itself as 'an autonomous body of the Republican

Movement' which 'recognises

Army

the

Army

Council of the

Irish

Republican

as the lawful authority of the Irish Republic and accepts

issued by

it.'

Its

Constitution prohibits participation

'in

all

orders

any partition

assemblies', the defining issue which brought Republican Sinn Fein into existence. All of this positioning suggested the gradual construction of a

new Republican Movement and

the instigation of a

Army, though by spring of 1995

this

new

Irish

Republican

had not yet been formalised.

Yet a number of military-style actions occurred which apparently linked

back

to the 'Irish National

Republican Army'.

On three occasions small On 18 December 1994 a

Semtex bombs were placed and unclaimed. one-kilo bomb was discovered in a furniture shop on 8 February 1995

March 1995

in the

of this activity

in a large general store in

came from

was strongly believed

it

that part

IRA individuals warning against of IRA arms. But the first 'warning', in

dissident

elements, designed to appease

agreement that

another

the third on 16

same Newry premises. There was speculation

impending 'decommissioning' Enniskillen,

in Enniskillen,

Newry and

to

have been the work of 'INRA'

men who were

would not be claimed.

criticised for not sanctioning

calling for action but with an

Internally, Ruairi

armed action prior

to the

6 Bradaigh was IRA

cessation,

bearing in mind the heightened danger of starting actions during a ceasefire. Intelligence reports

showed

the

'INRA'

a small amount of Semtex and electronic

to

have some

AK47

assault rifles,

bomb-making components.

In late

338

THE LONG WAR

1994 formal meetings took place south of the Border between the

and the INLA, two senior

members from

TNRA'

each, to discuss a form of

co-ordinated armed campaign, the idea being to share out territory. Nothing

came of it and

it

seemed

that such co-ordination

two organisations with quite

distinct political ideologies.

sions underscored the lurking threat to the in

an interview

if

would be unlikely between

IRA

cessation.

But such discus-

Asked repeatedly

Republican Sinn Fein was aligned with any armed faction,

6 Bradaigh refused a categorical denial, except to say this:

Ruairi

'What

I

have said and what has been the case right down through the years since 1917 with regard to the Republican Movement, there has always been such a thing. But nothing like that has emerged. Nothing like that has emerged. I

can't say if

it

would emerge or when

Bradaigh was cutting

will

it

In castigating the leadership of the

emerge or anything

IRA/Sinn Fein, as he

like that.'

did, Ruairi

at the vulnerability, the Achilles' heel,

6

of that lead-

was they - Adams and McGuinness et al - who had come to leadership with a worked-out long war strategy designed to do what O

ership.

It

Bradaigh' s leadership failed to do, force a British withdrawal. In 1995

O

Bradaigh could point to the promises about continued armed struggle made at the

time of the

split

over abstention in 1986. In a report of the 1986 Ard

Fheis, defending the dropping of abstention, Sinn Fein the doubters: 'The decision

was taken against

and continuing armed struggle

which

it

to

is

not only committed, but

pledges will be intensified until Britain declares that

ing from Ireland.'

The

report

went on

to

this point to

background of a unique

the

which the IRA

made

make a prediction

it is

withdraw-

regarding those

who had followed 6 Bradaigh into Republican Sinn Fein: 'Among who later joined them are people who have deep-seated republican

people those

reservations about the change in policy

lead to a

we

run-down of the armed

which they believe

struggle. In the

will inevitably

months and years ahead

look forward to the return of these comrades whose fears will be amply

assuaged

in the

and Sinn Fein

passage of time by the sacrifices of those

activists

who

of a democratic, socialist republic'

Those statements alone

IRA

volunteers

single-mindedly pursue the revolutionary goal 12

illustrated with great clarity the distance the

IRA/Sinn Fein leadership had travelled in the eight years since 1986. They had come

to

end the armed campaign

in

favour of a political process with

an indefinable end product. They had done so in a controlled and disciplined

manner. But

their past

was never

far

away. Neither were the promises made

about British withdrawal, nor the doubters

who

could count the chickens

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE

339

made the IRA cessation more fragile than it why those centrally involved - Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, John Hume, Albert Reynolds, John Major, Bill Clinton understood the need to nurture the new peace and show that politics would coming home

to roost. It

appeared. That

is

pay dividends.

BUILDING THE PEACE The

sensitivity involved

was highlighted when, on 10 November 1994,

members of south Armagh IRA

shot dead a postal worker, Frank Kerr,

during a robbery in Newry. This immediately raised questions about what

was covered by

the 'complete cessation'.

Two days

later the

statement saying the cessation covered 'any use of arms'.

IRA

issued a

said 'the

It

IRA

leadership has granted no-one permission to use arms since August 31.'

The incident remained an isolated one. But, at the time, it was serious enough to cause a stalling in the promised early release of nine IRA prisoners in the Republic. November was a difficult month. The British Government had been holding back on opening up dialogue with Sinn Fein.

It

had taken

until 21

to accept a 'working assumption' that the

permanent; and

it

IRA

officials.

For the sceptics within

months of a valley period was an

was intended

cessation

was 1 5 December before exploratory

Sinn Fein and British a-half

the promised exploratory

October 1994 for John Major

eternity, long

talks

IRA

ranks three-and-

enough

suspicions about British intentions to be raised. In between, tially

devastating blow to

ernment

in

IRA

Dublin collapsed

complex and bizarre

as

began between

for all the old

came

a poten-

confidence. The Fianna Fail/Labour Govin late

crisis. It

November over an

extraordinarily

arose from the Irish Attorney General's

handling of an extradition case involving a paedophile priest. Albert Reynolds, the

man whose

'word' and personal involvement had been so

crucial to building confidence within the Republican

Movement, was

unexpectedly off the political centre-stage, having resigned both the office of Taoiseach and the leadership of the Fianna Fail Party. Coalition

new

was

installed,

centre-left

Government of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left

brought to government a Taoiseach, John Bruton, critical

A new three-party

with a far more slender parliamentary majority. The

who had been sharply IRA and

of Reynolds's earlier risk-taking advances towards the

Sinn Fein. As well, the leader of Democratic Left, Proinsias de Rossa, had a troubling history as far as the IRA/Sinn Fein were concerned.

had gone with the Officials against the Provisionals

at the

De Rossa

time of the

340

THE LONG WAR

original split in 1969/70 the

and had remained a vehement opponent both of

IRA's armed struggle and

their political objective

of a unitary Irish

state.

These differences were masked by the necessity of keeping up the pace of the peace process. John Bruton

Adams and

moved

swiftly to build bridges with Gerry

Sinn Fein. But the political

Dublin had the effect of

crisis in

slowing up the final negotiations between London and Dublin on the long-awaited Framework Document, which would provide the launching

pad for eventual round-table negotiations. As such, tance to the

IRA, who had called

open negotiating

table

given their consent

to,

it

was of vital impor-

on the assumption

their cessation

that

an

would follow. That was what the Army Council had an open negotiating process. The permanence of the

cessation depended on the British delivering that. A

NEW FRAMEWORK FOR AGREEMENT

The Framework Document, launched

in Belfast

titled

'A

New Framework for Agreement', was

on 22 February 1995 by both Prime Ministers, John

Major and John Bruton.

It

was described

between the two Governments, designed tion involving the

Northern Ireland

of the Joint Declaration.

It

as a 'shared understanding'

was much

like that

was an agreed position between the two Gov-

ernments but no other party was required to accept initially

and negotia-

to 'assist discussion

Parties.' Its status

it.

Unionists were

very negative. But they were unlikely to march on Stormont Castle

in protest against

a 'discussion' document. For the same reason republicans

weren't going to pull out of the process. Everything was

and nothing was pre-determined. building as

it

It

still

allowed for very subtle

on the table

politics. But,

Framework showed both

did on the Joint Declaration, the

Governments jointly driving the process forward. In its language the Framework represented a major forward movement and, as far as the Republican Movement was concerned, the context was the whole island of Ireland.

They could

easily identify 'transitional arrangements' in the con-

cepts being presented. There were proposals for

new North/South

institu-

tions with 'executive, harmonising and consultative functions' with the

purpose of bringing about new co-operative and constructive relationships

and promoting 'agreement among the people of the island of Ireland.' Paragraph 18 showed the extent of the shift and the compromise involved: 'Reaffirming their commitment to encourage, facilitate and enable the

achievement of agreement over a period among

all

the people

who

inhabit

the island, [both Governments] acknowledge that the option of a sovereign

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE united Ireland does not

command

the consent of the Unionist tradition, nor

does the existing status of Northern Ireland

new arrangements and

in the

document was

command

the consent of the

background, they acknowledge the need

nationalist tradition. Against this

for

structures.' Central to all the principles spelt out

agreement by both Governments

the

341

Irish unity required the separate

move

that a

to

consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

But the British Government developed further

its

position of neutrality on

Northern Ireland (paragraph 20): 'The British Government will discharge their responsibilities in a

way which does

not prejudice the freedom of the

people of Northern Ireland to determine, by peaceful and democratic means, future constitutional status, whether in remaining a part of the United

its

Kingdom

or in forming part of a united Ireland.

cognizant of either option and open to

its

They

will be equally

democratic realisation, and will

not impede the latter option, their primary interest being to see peace, stability

and reconciliation established by agreement among the people

who

inhabit the island.'

For the intent

hand, the tion,

IRA

there could be

no further argument

on holding onto Northern Ireland

IRA could

by the

Irish

Framework (paragraph 21)

new

its

people

everyone born

is

were

the other

was

It

the

the Irish

Government committed

'fully reflect the principle

itself to

of consent

territorial

claim of

Northern Ireland contrary to the will of a majority

asserted, while maintaining the existing birthright of

in either jurisdiction in Ireland to

Irish nation.' All of this

Ireland,

On

process and taking Dublin's lead. In

Northern Ireland and demonstrably be such that no

right to jurisdiction over

of

that the British interests.

argue that the unfettered right to Irish self-determina-

promote Constitutional changes which in

own

people acting as a single unit, was being denied.

price being paid for entering the

the

in their

was looking

to a

where two separate national

co-exist on the basis of equality

new

be

part, as

of right, of the

'dispensation' for Northern

identities, British

and

would

Irish,

and where both Governments would step

back, leaving the constitutional future of Northern Ireland to a majority of its

people. Whatever

treatment. This Irish

was

its

future,

each identity would retain equality of

essentially the concept of a covenant spelt out

Foreign Minister, Dick Spring, back

in

1993 (see

p. 282). It

by the

was

very encouraging for Irish nationalists and worrying for unionists,

all

who

would have preferred to see their own Government make an absolute commitment to the Union. But, for the IRA/Sinn Fein there were no guarantees in

this.

Self-determination, North and South, could not be

THE LONG WAR

342

In the throes of his dialogue with the

p redetermined.

to the cessation, Albert

Reynolds had bluntly made

IRA/Sinn Fein prior

that point: 'Self-deter-

mination does not have to take the form of unity or independence.

can be

It

expressed by the endorsement North and South of any comprehensive settlement that territory

would

constitute an agreed Ireland.'

and the new language towards which the

13

This was the

IRA and

new

Sinn Fein were

gradually moving. In the unpublished 'Irish Peace Initiative', there

was no

acceptance that the outcome of negotiations would be a united Ireland,

or,

for that matter, a complete British withdrawal. In any event, Sinn Fein's St. Patrick's Day celebraAdams was using the new addition, as the Framework

language was changing. In America for the 1995

on Capitol

tions

Hill

and the White House, Gerry

In language, 'a new and agreed Ireland'. Document pointed out, a new comprehensive settlement would include 'interlocking and mutually supportive institutions' across the three strands: that

is,

within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between

Britain and Ireland. This concept 'Irish

Peace

Initiative'

matched with the notion agreed

in the

of possible 'links' between Britain and Ireland in

any new agreement. The writers of the Framework Document were conscious of the need to address the language and concerns of the Republican

Movement. There was an expression of 'deep and often tragic history of Anglo-Irish

regret' regarding 'the long

relations'.

The document

called for

a 'collective' effort to create agreement. 'A climate of peace enables the process of healing to begin',

paragraph

4:

beyond the constant

'Everyone

it

now

said.

Most

pointedly, the

said, in

has a role to play in moving irreversibly

failures of the past

...'

Here was a genuflection towards a

demand of the IRA/Sinn Fein

leadership, the call for an 'irre-

versible thrust', a 'dynamic', to ensure that

change actually occurs. The

New Framework for Agreement did not offer a it

document

'Brits out' prescription.

But

did promise a process of dynamic, ever-changing relationships on the

island of Ireland.

It

guaranteed the continued existence of Northern Ireland

as a separate political entity.

It

also guaranteed a united Ireland if that

was

what a majority of the people there so wished. Martin McGuinness said Sinn Fein would approach the Framework document 'pragmatically' and 'in

a

spirit

of compromise'

.

Times had changed -

irreversibly?

TAKING THE GUN OUT OF IRISH POLITICS By March 1995

the Irish peace process

was entering a new phase. Sinn Fein

were edging towards direct meetings with British ministers. For the IRA

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE and Sinn Fein such intentions.

It

direct contacts

would mean the

'core issues', namely, tion.

to create a situation

Government's

British

of British

IRA

arms.

The

difficulty in

original

moving

the extra

IRA/Sinn Fein strategy was

where the handing up of arms would be dependent on

a satisfactory negotiated settlement. that the

test

were serious about dealing with the

open negotiations, policing, prisoners, demilitarisa-

At the heart of the

mile was the issue of

were the immediate litmus

British

343

More

weapons of war would be held

crudely, the hardline view

was

such time as Britain was

until

disengaging from Ireland. Anything else would smack of surrender and sell-out. Tactically, in talks with the British,

their role to

Sinn Fein alone.

It is

Martin McGuinness and Gerry Kelly are

IRA

too, said

one of their key

Sinn Fein sought to confine

a 'dangerous assumption' to in there talking

strategists at a critical stage,

were being accused of stalling over the arms could be parallel discussions with the

IRA

issue.

make

that

on behalf of the

when

the British

This source said there

leadership or a dialogue that

IRA asking for their Semtex off. The arms issue had the

involves them. If they, Sinn Fein, went to the to

be handed up, they'd be told to 'piss

potential to split the

Sinn Fein and the

IRA. Irish

It

also

had the potential

to create tensions

Government. By March, John Bruton and Dick

Spring were exerting pressure on Sinn Fein to commit negotiations on

IRA

arms. These were the

between Sinn Fein and the new

Gerry

Adams

Irish

against the British

March 1995. He

first

US

itself to

meaningful

public fissures opening up

Government. But John Bruton backed

Government on an important matter

put his weight behind Gerry

permission from the

between

Adams who had

in

sought

administration for Sinn Fein to raise funds in

America. The application was vehemently opposed by the British Govern-

ment which lobbied hard against it. President Clinton was faced with a dilemma when his own State Department recommended against, on the basis of their intelligence assessment that the

wing of Sinn Fein' and he had done

in

that

Gerry

Adams had

IRA remained

the 'armed

yet to renounce violence.

February 1994, Clinton took another

again backed by the Irish Government, granted

As

'risk for peace' and,

Adams and

Sinn Fein

permission to raise funds. But Clinton extracted a political concession from

Adams on

the question of arms. Following private contacts between Sinn

Fein and the office of the National Security Council

Gerry

Adams

agreed to

said Sinn Fein

make

a

move on

at the

White House,

arms. In a public statement, he

would discuss a range of issues with

British ministers

'including repressive legislation, prisoners, and the decommissioning of

THE LONG WAR

344

weapons.' The gap was closing with the British Government, which had also adopted a

On

more

flexible position.

March 1995

21

the political parties acting for the

Military

Command had their first meeting

Ancram

from the Northern Ireland Office.

It

seemed

like a

Combined

Loyalist

with a British minister, Michael

They discussed

breakthrough but afterwards the loyalists

the

made

arms

clear that

it

their position had not changed. They saw the question of illegal arms

context of an overall political settlement.

It

was language

issue.

in the

similar to that

used by Sinn Fein. But the loyalists had entirely opposite objectives. They

would not go that the

to the paramilitaries

Union was, indeed,

and ask for

'safe'. All

the starting stages of the long road to peace.

was

would remain

still intact. It

'irreversible thrust' it.

towards a

The doubters stood

People like Gerry

and

was

difficult

AK47s

more aggressive

Martin McGuinness knew

the route opening

structure

they could detect an

of the conflict as they viewed

but were making ever

off,

were sure

The IRA command

intact, at least until

final resolution

Adams and

until they

of these moves were very tentative,

noises.

how dangerous

up ahead of them. They had given the

leadership and taken the risks in this historic

accommodation with

consti-

Adams and McGuinness fully understood the splits and killing feuds. And they knew how far

tutional Irish nationalism. historical precedents for their people

had travelled

to

where they were from where they had been.

The IRA Green Book schooled a generation of volunteers of certainty.

It

told

struggle: 'The Irish Irish

them they had 'moral Republican

Army

in the

language

superiority' in their

armed

as the legal representatives of the

people are morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance

against foreign occupation forces and domestic collaborators. All volunteers are

and must

legal government. Irish

feel

morally justified in carrying out the dictates of the

They

as the

Army

are the legal and lawful

of the

Republic which has been forced underground by overwhelming

forces. All volunteers

must look upon the

British

force,

must look upon the RUC, the Gardaf, the

Army

as illegal armies

and

and as such morally wrong, able.

Army

illegal forces

Army

UDR and the Free State

whose main

politically unacceptable

tasks are treasonable

and ethically inexcus-

Given where the Republican Movement was

said that the

IRA made

a long killing

A

it

could be

in

carrying on such

false position of justification.

They would say

they held the fort for their people and could

prospect of justice.

in 1995,

an enormous historical mistake

war from a

as an occupying

now

great deal had changed and

look forward to the

was changing

at

an

THE LONG STAGES OF PEACE accelerating rate.

The volunteers were being asked

superiority and

their old certainties

compromise. In

reality,

way along

that road.

shed their moral

and travel the road of pragmatism and

they had already moved, or had been moved, a good

For the

not just in their

trust,

to

345

own

first

time they were being asked to place their

A lot

leadership but in the leadership of others.

was expected from Dublin, Washington and London. There was tangible evidence of confidence

They seemed prepared even

if

among

the people of the republican heartlands.

for the long stages of peace. Their

hope was

that,

they had not achieved victory, they would at least attain equality.

Few could have predicted that the long war would end this way, assuming it ha d ended. People like Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Joe Cahill - and

O Bradaigh as well - were at the forefront of the early

Ruairi

insurrection.

At

first

it

was

to

armed

have been a short war, a victorious war,

justifying the horrendous death toll

and mass destruction. Victory '72 gave

way

'74. In those early years the British

to Victory '73

and Victory

demonstrated a willingness to make bold moves and reach honourable

compromise. The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was proof of contained the same elements as the in the sense that

twenty years

by the

was

Army

too.

The

was a concrete agreement not a discussion paper.

came

Council

required.

healing.

it

later

the

in the

knowledge

The IRA were not alone

British forces

and the

For many years the southern

that a very long 'healing process'

in contributing to the hurt that

loyalists

had serious questions

political establishment

carefully planned, consciously offensive, sustained

victims were locals.

The widows and widowers,

Though

its

to

had turned

needed

answer

its

back,

IRA campaign was

and dedicated. Most of the fatherless children

and the maimed lived on. The campaign did not achieve force of arms.

A full

IRA's 'complete cessation', a decision made

increasing the isolation of northern nationalists. But the

its

that. It

New Framework for Agreement - more,

its

stated

aims by

leaders had the courage to turn to the path of

peace, they had yet to face the full and tragic consequences of their long war.

8

NOTES CHAPTER

CHAPTER 4

1

Green Book, IRA training manual, p. 2 John Hume, Leader of the SDLP, 'Ireland and 1

the

New

Europe', Merriman

Summer

School,

County Clare, August 1990 3 Just News, published by the Committee on the Administration of Justice, Belfast, September 1993 4 Cardinal Cathal Daly, Roman Catholic Primate of Ireland, statement, 9 September 1993

CHAPTER

1

Bro. the Rev.

M. W. Dewar, Why Orangeism,

(undated late 1950s)

2 Ibid 3 Ibid

4 Ibid 5 Report of the Committee on the Constitution,

Government Publications, Dublin, December 1967

IRA

6 Green Book,

training manual, p.25

7 Ibid, p.26

2

8 Ibid, p.28 1

Malachy McNally, interview by

author, Belfast,

1993

9 Ibid, p.31-2

Loyalism, Republican Lecture Series No.

1

9,

2 Harry 'Dixie' Cordner, interview by author,

published by Sinn Fein, Dublin (undated, early

Belfast 1993

1980s)

3 Interviews

by author, Belfast, 1993

interviews by author,

Belfast,

11

1993

Report of Tribunal of Inquiry, Violence and

Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969,

5 Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action,

HMSO,

'Twenty Years of Deprivation', Briefing paper,

12

Belfast,

May

1993

Belfast, 1972, pp.15, 16

Common

Sense, published by the Ulster Politi-

cal

Research Group, Belfast, 1986

6 Liz Groves, interview by author, Belfast, 1993

13

UDA

7 Plastic Bullets and the Law, published by the

author, Belfast, February 1993

Committee on fast,

the Administration of Justice, Bel-

March 1993

15

Emma Groves

and Eithne (Groves) Butler,

in-

Belfast,

16

10 Seamus MacSeain, interview by author, Bel-

17

1993

Lord Justice Kelly, sentencing judgement,

Belfast

terviews by author, Belfast, 1993

fast,

UVF spokesman, interview by author,

February 1993

8 Ibid

9

14

Inner Council members, interview by

Crown

Amnesty

Court, 3 February 1992

International, Report 1993,

Dr Robin Eames, Chains

to

London

be Broken,

& Nicolson, London, 1992, p. 174 Adams, President of Sinn Fein, Dungan-

Weidenfeld

Assembly', internal Republican Movement document, undated, c.1978 11 'Peoples'

18 Gerry

non,

May

1993

19 Ibid 1

John Carlin, Sinn Fein member, interview by

author, Derry, 1993

2 Adrian Healy, interview by author, Derry, 1993 3 Frank

McManus,

solicitor, interview

by author,

Enniskillen, 1993

Ibid, p.

7 Ibid,

138

1993

May

1993

CHAPTER 5 1

Green Book, IRA training manual, p.20 6 Bradaigh (President of Republican

2 Ruairi

Sinn Fein), former President of Sinn Fein,

inter-

view by author, 1993

144

3

IRA

source, interview by author, Belfast, 1993

4 Ruairi

maglen, 1993

Fein,

Mary Caraher, interview by

May

22 Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, Dungan-

8 Margaret Caraher, interview by author, Cross-

9

346

p.

statement,

non,

4 Pat Cox, Sinn Fein, interview by author, Co. Fermanagh, 1993 5 Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights Report for 1992-1993, HMSO, London, p. 1 3 1 (paper by Prof. Tom Hadden) 6

20 Dr Robin Eames, Archbishop of Armagh, Church of Ireland Synod, Dublin, May 1993 21 Mitchel McLoughlin, Sinn Fein member,

author, Cully-

6 Bradaigh,

Ard

5 Ruairi

outgoing President of Sinn

Fheis, Dublin,

6 Bradaigh,

November 1983

internal discussion paper,

hanna, 1993

'A strategy for contesting Parliamentary elections

10 Peter John Caraher, interview by author, Cul-

in the

lyhanna, 1993

6 Gerry Adams, incoming presidential address,

26 counties', July 1983

1

11

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Dublin,

CHAPTER

November 1983

4

Tom

King, Secretary of State for Northern

1986

Ireland, statement, 19 April

6

The Sunday Times, London, 20 April 1986 6 Donald Hamilton, Counter-Terrorism office, 5

Sean MacStiofain, former IRA Chief of

1

Staff,

interview by author, County Meath, 1984

2 Ruairi

6

US

Bradaigh, former President of Sinn

Fein, interview

by author, Roscommon, 1984

7

by author, 1988 Hamburg, Germany, interview by

State Dept., interview

Tony

Divall,

author, 1988

3 'Where Sinn Fein Stands', statement issued by

8 Swiss

Caretaker Executive of Provisional Sinn Fein, 17

9 Terry Arnold, consultant to

January 1970

ism office,

4 Constitution of Oglaigh na hEireann (IRA) 5 IRA Green Book, p.5 6 IRA Staff Report (seized by Gardaf on arrest of Seamus Twomey, IRA Chief of Staff, in Dublin,

1988

Maltese Veterinary Dept., September 1987

December 1977) 7 Gerry Adams, interview by author,

author, 1993

US

US

Counter- Terror-

State Dept., interview

by author,

10 Donald Hamilton, Ibid

Adrian Hopkins, telex no. 91552 to Dr. Vella.

1

12 British Intelligence sources, interview by Belfast,

1984

13

8 Ibid

14

An Phoblacht, 26 May 1988 IRA statement, 9 November 1987 15 Republican Movement source, interview by

9 Ibid 10 Ibid

author, 1988

Mrs Eileen McDonnell, interview by

1

arms dealer, interview by author, 1988

author,

Andersonstown, Belfast, 1993

March 1975 Bradaigh, 'Sinn Fein For A New

12 Sinn Fein Press Release, 25

13 Sean

6

Ireland',

1975

14

IRA

source, interview by author, 1993

RUC source, interview

IRA Green Book,

p.36

16 Ibid, p.40 17 Magill, Dublin, July 1983 18 Ibid

Adams, interview by

author, Belfast,

1984; and Gerry Adams, The Politics

Of Irish

Freedom, Brandon Books, Kerry, 1986, p. 160 20 Sinn Fein Republican Lecture Series, No.

7,

interview by author,

by author, 1984

The

Canon William Arlow, interview by

1985

22 Gerry Adams, interview by author, Belfast, 1984

author, 1984

Bradaigh, President of Republican

Sinn Fein, statement, Dublin, 21 April 1993

25 Ruairi

6 Bradaigh, interview by

author, Ros-

common, 1984 26 Gerry Adams, Presidential Address to Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Mansion House, Dublin, 2 November 1986 27 Gerry Adams, The p.

1

British

1

12 Ruairi

Government

6 Bradaigh,

author,

negotiator, interview by

letter to

The

Irish Times,

Dublin, 30 April 1992 13 Republican

Movement minutes of meetings

with British Government officials, July 1975

14 British Government negotiator, interview by author, 1984

15 Republican

Movement

source, interview by

author, 1984 Politics

Of Irish Freedom,

167

CHAPTER

Irish Times,

Dublin, 30 April 1992

10

6

984

9

'Economic Resistance', undated (early 1980s)

23 "Where Sinn Fein Stands', 17 January 1970

1

6 Bradaigh, interview Ruairi 6 Bradaigh, letter to

8 Ruairi

21 Magill, Dublin, 1983

24 Ruairi

by author, 1988

IRA Green Book, p.34 A An Phoblacht, 26 May 1988 5 IRA Constitution, 'Duties and Powers of the Army Council', clause 5 6 IRA source, interview by author, 1993 7 Sean MacStiofain, former IRA Chief of Staff, 3

15 Ibid, p.41

19 Gerry

1

2

16

Dr Garret FitzGerald, Taoiseach, statement,

3

February 1985 7

Sources:

RUC and

Irish

Information Agenda,

Update 1986, London

17 Sinn Fein document, Sinn Fein/SDLP talks, March to September, 1988 18 John Hume, letter to Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein/SDLP talks, 1988

2 Voice of the Arab homeland, Tripoli, Libya, 22 April 1984 3 Colonel Ghadaffi,

May 1984

1

Republican Movement source, interview by 347

11

1

author, 1988

12

3

IRA statement, An Phoblacht, An Phoblacht, 12 April 1990

4

RUC source,

2

15

March 1990

'

13

interview by author, 1991

RUC

statement,

March 1988,

still

operative

February 1992

IRA

CHAPTER

interview,

An

Phoblacht, 12 March 1992

12

5 Ibid 1

CHAPTER

Gerry Adams, interview by author, 1991

10

2 Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, interview 1

Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern

London, 9 November 1990 2 Review of Anglo-Irish Agreement, 24 May Ireland, speech,

1989

Adams, statement, 15 November 1990 4 Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, interview by author, October 1991 3 Gerry

5

Jim Gibney, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Ballyfermot,

by author, 1991 3 Ibid, 1992 4 John Wilson, Tanaiste, leader of Irish Government delegation to Strand Two Talks, interview

by author, November 1992

CHAPTER 1

13

Sir Patrick

Mayhew,

for

6 Rev. William Bingham, Presbyterian minister,

ster,

interview by author, 1991

2 Republican

7

IRA

source (The Kingsmills massacre was not

claimed by the

IRA

leading

IRA

but was confirmed by a

activist of the

time

in

Tyrone,

in

Iris, a

lin,

Republican Movement publication, Dub-

May

Movement 1

at

University of Ul-

December 1992 source, interview by

993

Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein,

state-

ment, 21 December 1992

4 Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein Ard

interview by author, 1984) 8

Coleraine, 16

author, January 3

British Secretary of State

Northern Ireland, speech

Dublin, February 1992

Fheis,

Dun-

dalk, February 1993

5 Republican source, interview by author, Bel-

1992

June 1993

9 Mrs Elma Oxteby, interview by author, Cooks-

fast,

town, January 1992

6 Dick Spring,

10 Cardinal Cathal Daly, interview by author,

address to British-Irish Association, Cork, Sep-

January 1992

tember 1993

Hugh Annesley,

1

RUC Chief Constable,

17

IRA

letter,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

published in

An

Phoblacht, 8 July

1993

January 1992 12 Gerry

7

Irish

Adams, statement, 18 January 1992

8 Gerry

Adams, questioned by

13 Cardinal Cathal Daly, interview by author,

meeting, Dublin, 12 August 1993

January 1992

9 Ibid

14 15

IRA IRA

CHAPTER

An interview, An

statement,

Phoblacht, 2 January 1992 Phoblacht, 5 January 1984

author, public

10 Gerry Adams, interview by author, Dublin, 12 August 1993 1

Ibid

11

Movement source, interview by September 1 993 13 Gerry Adams, interview by author, Dublin, 12 August 1993 14 Ruairi 6 Bradaigh, President of Republican Sinn Fein, interview by author, Roscommon, August 1993 12 Republican

1

Towards a Lasting Peace

in Ireland,

published

by Sinn Fein, February 1992 2 Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland, Sinn Fein, 1992 3 Sinn Fein

Ard

Fheis, motion no. 3, February

1992

4 Tom Hartley, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, February 1992 5 Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, interview by author, February 1992 Iris,

August 1993

CHAPTER published by Sinn Fein, Dublin,

May

14

1992 Irish

Government source, interview by

9

An Phoblacht, 20 February 1992 IRA source, interview by author, February 1992 10 Republican Movement source, interview by

Dublin, January 1994

author, February 1992

author,

8

1

Local civilian source, interview by author,

Coalisland area, February 348

15 Ibid

16 Gerry Adams, public meeting, Dublin, 12 17 Interview by author, Belfast, June 1993

6 Ibid 7

author,

1

992

1

2 British

3 Irish

author,

Government source, interview by

November 1994 Government source,

January 1995

interview by author,

1

1

4 British Government source, interview by author, January 1995

5 Ibid,

March 1994

view by author, January 1995 37 Ibid 38 Ibid

6 Senior Sinn Fein source, interview by author,

39 Senior Republican Movement source,

January 1995

view by author,

7 Senior Irish Government source, interview by

40 Albert Reynolds, speech

author, Dublin, February 1995

Conference, Malahide. Co. Dublin, 16 April 1994

8

IRA

leadership source, interview by author,

Belfast,

Ogra Fianna

Movement

source, inter-

Army

Council, interview

CHAPTER

Government source, interview by November 1 994

1

15

Senior

IRA

source, interview by author,

2 Ibid

Ibid

3 Senior Sinn Fein source, interview

February 1995

January 1995

13 Interview by 'authorised spokesman' for the IRA, An Phoblacht, 5 January 1994 14 Gerry Adams, statement, 12 January 1994

4

15 Gerry

Adams, address

Belfast, 3 January

to party activists,

West

Internal Sinn Fein strategy paper,

5 Senior

IRA

6 Senior loyalist source, interview by author, Belfast, February 1995

1994

6

Bradaigh, President of Republican

7 Ruairi

Sinn Fein, statement, published

17 Ibid, February and March, 1994

tember 1994

for

IRA Army

Council, interview

8 Saoirse, February

Cumann

9

19 Ibid

tember 1994 10 Ruairi

Ibid

21 Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein

Ard

Fheis,

Dublin, February 1994

lin, 1

1

6 Bradaigh, interview

15

US,

12 Ibid

Dublin, 20 January 1994

Adams, press conference, Washington, March 1995 15 Martin McGuinness, interview by author, 14 Gerry

'The US and Ireland: Political Connections 1969-1992'

London, February 1995

26 An Phoblacht, 16 March 1994

January 1995

27 Ibid

17 Ibid

Army

Council, interview

by author, Belfast, 17 March 1994 29 Ibid 30 Gerry Adams, interview by author, March 1994

Belfast, 17

31 Ibid

32

Irish

Government

source, interview

by author,

Dublin, January 1995

33 Senior

IRA

source, interview

by author, Janu-

ary 1995

34 Sinn Fein Special Conference, Motion No.

2,

Letterkenny, Co. Donegal, 24 July 1994 Ibid, Motion No. 1 36 Senior Republican Movement source,

35

inter-

by author, Dub-

13 Albert Reynolds, speech, University College

article,

28 Spokesman for IRA

Sep-

'The Politics of Revolution', Sinn Fein report

ary 1995 to

1

November 1994

on 1986 Ard Fheis, Dublin 1986

Ambassador

Sep-

994

22 Albert Reynolds, address to Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations, Dublin, January 1994 23 Ibid 24 Republican source, interview by author, JanuIrish

in Saoirse,

na mBan, statement, Dublin,

by author, March 1994

25 Sean Donion, former

1994

ary 1995

Derry, February 1994

Spokesman

by author.

source, interview by author, Janu-

16 Martin McGuinness, interview by author,

20

March

1995

12 Irish Government source, interview by author,

18

Fail

March 1994

10 British

1

to

1

9 Spokesman for IRA

author,

41 Senior Republican

inter-

October 1994

view by author, December 994

February 1994

by author,

Belfast,

16 Senior Sinn Fein source, interview by author,

18

IRA Green Book, page

7

APPENDIX 1 EXTRACTS FROM THE GREEN BOOK, IRA Training Manual

CONFIDENCE MOVEMENT

COMMITMENT

Commitment

to

organisation.

Commitment

an organisation

is

to the

belief in that

Army

is total

Army, in its aims and objects, in its style of war, in its method of struggle, and in its political foundation. Commitment is dedication to its cause in the good times and the bad. Commitment means standing steadfast to principles when belief in the

condemn those principles and villify the Army. It means choosing a path because one all

others

believes in the righteousness of that course, and

having chosen obstacles.

ment tary

is

it,

to stick

Commitment

by

to the

the firm belief that

and

its

it

regardless of

all

Republican Movestruggle both mili-

morally justified, that war

political is

morally justified and that the

Army

is

is

the direct

representatives of the 1918 D£il Eireann parlia-

ment, and that as such they are the legal and lawful

government of the

Irish Republic,

moral right to pass laws tion over, the Ireland,

its

resources,

for,

and

the

to claim jurisdic-

whole geographical fragment of

maritime

territory, air space,

means of production,

exchange and

which has

all

of

its

mineral

and

distribution

people regardless of creed

or loyalty.

This

all

IN

give moral strength to

should and must

Volunteers, and

all

all

members of every branch of the Republican Movement. The Irish Republican Army, its is

the lawful

government of the

Irish Republic, all other parliaments or

blies claiming the right to

assem-

speak for and to pass

the Irish

VICTORY AND LOYALTY TO THE

The present campaign of resistance has been fought now for the past number of years, and in spite

of

all

military and police activity, both North

and South, the

Army

still

has the ability to carry

out a successful military campaign in the occupied

beginning of the present phase of

area. Since the

war of freedom, enemy propaganda has con-

the

spoken of the dying throes of the

tinually

Irish

Republican Army. They have used Internment as a cure to what they termed the 'troubles', harass-

ment of

the Nationalist population, long jail sen-

tences and the most primitive type of penal conditions, torture, blackmail and murder in an

attempt to break the

all

spirit

methods have

All these

of the freedom fighters.

failed miserably

members of the Army

because

are confident in victory.

For the past 800 years the British ruling class have

attempted to smash Irish people.

down

Campaign

the resistance of the

after

campaign, decade

after decade, century after century,

armies of re-

sistance have fought and despite temporary set backs, slavery and famine, penal laws and murder, the will of the Irish people in their desire to cast

off the chains of foreign occupation continue an

unremitting and relentless war against

belief, this ethical fact,

Leadership,

Government of

legal actions of the

people.

enemy

cupation. This stubborn confidence in their

oc-

own

overcome forces which were numeriarmed and equipped than the various Irish armies is an immortal monument to ability to

cally superior, better

their

courage and to their

victory.

Today

own

belief in an eventual

the Irish Republican

Army

carries

on that self same war which was fought by

all |

laws on behalf of the Irish people are illegal

previous generations of Irish people.

assemblies, puppet governments of a foreign

we

power, and willing tools of a occupying force.

and courage, pride and loyalty

Volunteers must firmly believe without doubt

and

and without reservation that as members of the

essential ingredient in

Irish

Republican Army,

all

orders issued by the

Army

Authority, and

Army

Authority are the legal orders and the

all

actions directed by the

Government of the Irish Republic. This is one of the most important mainstays of the Republican Movement, the lawful actions of the

firm belief that rected by the 350

all

Army

operations and actions diare in effect the lawful

and

as an organised

to

Army must

From

this,

drain confidence to

our

own Army

our appointed and elected Leadership. The

Army and to

its

any army

Leadership.

is

loyalty to that

The enemy

forces have

continually attempted through their various agents

of propaganda to fragment the

Army by the old tactic

of division and doubt. They have attempted to set individual

members

have attempted

members tion

at

against the Leadership, they

to humiliate publicly individual

Leadership level by character assassina-

(Maire Drumm). The purpose of this exercise

.

is

fragment the loyalty which binds the Move-

to

ment together, because the enemy force knows well that

Army

it

cannot defeat the Irish Republican

Propaganda always has three

militarily.

means what

it is

you obey

orders, whether

supposed

to

mean

you

literally, that

them or

like

not.

Orders and instructions sometimes may be distasteful to the Volunteer, but this is

volved

forms:

all

what

being a Volunteer, and this

in

is in-

is

the

1

Propaganda by omission.

meaning of being a Volunteer

2.

Propaganda by

orders and to carry them out to the best of your

3.

Downright

addition.

These various facets of propaganda have been used time out of number years. Their

within the

militarily

and

number of

ASPECT,

after

to create disloyalty

expected

to

in the past

main purpose was

Army,

distrust

and whispering cam-

paigns. All volunteers must be fully aware of these

enemy

and must understand

tactics

Being a Volunteer involves acting both

ability.

lies.

clearly that loyalty to the

Movement

fully

most

the

is

and

an

initial training,

wage

Volunteers are

war of liberation

a military

against a numerically superior force. This involves the use of arms and explosives. Firstly the

use of arms.

When

Volunteers are trained in the

use of arms they must fully understand that guns

important aspect of being a Volunteer. Loyalty in

are dangerous, and their

human

make up of eventual

THE MILITARY

politically. In

conjunction with confidence in victory are the essential ingredients in the

the ability to take

-

life, in

main purpose

other words to

Volunteers are trained to

kill

kill

to take

is

people, and

people.

It is

not an

some

victory.

easy thing to take up a gun and go out to

MORAL SUPERIORITY

person without strong convictions of justification.

The

Republican

Irish

Army

as the legal repre-

sentatives of the Irish people are morally justified in carrying out a

campaign of resistance against

foreign occupation forces and domestic collaborators. All volunteers are

and must

feel

morally

justified in carrying out the dictates of the legal

government, they as the lawful

Army

Army

are the legal and

of the Irish Republic which has been

forced underground by overwhelming forces. All volunteers must look upon the British

Army as an RUC, the

occupying force, must look upon the Gardai, the illegal

UDR

armies and

are treasonable

and the Free State

illegal forces

Army

system and corrupt too,

ing to find

have attempted

and

have twisted and bent logic

and disregarded

into

one force and before any potential Volunteer

decides to join the

Army

to give

him confidence

They

bombing campaign. Again all people Army must fully realise that

said about a

wishing to join the

when

life is

own.

being taken, that very well could

If

you go out

fully realise that they too

all

warp

tal

picture of guerrilla lifestyle. There certainly

no romance

in

war of any

declare that they

Army

Authority. This

is

type, except perhaps less

And

as for mental

pictures or suspected ideas of guerrilla lifestyle, there it.

is

certainly nothing romantic or pleasant in

Life in an underground

army

is

extremely harsh at

times.

their

orders issued to them by their supe-

and by the

because

of romantic notions of guerrilla warfare or a men-

So

Army he

should think seriously about the whole thing.

Again people must

obey

can shoot you.

Army

a dangerous thing to join the

before any person decides to join the

Army

mean

to shoot soldiers or police

their ethics in a vain attempt

All recruits entering the

enough

someone without The same can be

and hard, cruel and disillusioning

WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A VOLUNTEER

rior officers

to kill

hesitation and without regret.

It is

to justify the unjustifiable illegal set ups.

shall

he must have these strong

convictions. Convictions which are strong

so in an underground army.

their theological,

It

Army

politi-

and are attempt-

illegal assemblies.

based upon

these strong convictions which bonds the

illegal assemblies. to

is

as

some form of theological justification

for those corrupted

motivating force

tasks

and ethically inexcusable. Again enemy propagandists have been and are working hard and long in order to bolster up a Churches

is

their

cally unacceptable

tottering

its

strong convictions, convictions of justification.

you must

whose main

and as such morally wrong,

The Army,

kill

Army

if

realise that

captured, which

is

not happen to the other person,

you' and

if

captured the

hesitate to use

members of the

possible it

enemy

'it

just does

can happen to

forces will not

extreme methods of both physical 351

and psychological torture to extract information on yourself and or your organisation. The Army expects that Volunteers won't disclose information on themselves or on others. That is what is expected from you, and

The Army

this is

no easy

home

privacy of your

and friends,

ily

life, it

in other

on creating a

socialist Republic.

3(b)

A.

long-term objective: Establishment of a Demo-

B.

SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE:

C.

SUPPORT ACTIVE/PASSIVE

cratic Socialist Republic.

It

invades the

fragments your fam-

words claims your

Movement. Again he should examine motives bearing in mind that the

are intent

LECTURE

and ex-

pects your total allegiance without reservation. life. It

Army

task.

as an organisation claims

enters into every aspect of your

within the

his political

All support lost to us

total

the allegiance.

BritS OUt.

is

potential support for

enemy.

Exploit a situation or create a situation and

All potential Volunteers must realise that the exploit threat of capture and of long jail sentences are a

TACTICS DICTATED BY EXISTING CONDITIONS.

E.

ENEMY - CATEGORISE - CURE.

F.

GUERRILLA STRATEGY.

very real danger and a shadow which hangs over

Many

every Volunteer.

in the past

They

thoughts about their allegiance to the Army. realised at too late a stage that they had interest in

Defensive before Offensive.

joined the

Army out of romantic notions, or sheer adventure, but when captured and jailed they had after-

being Volunteers. This causes

no

splits

it.

D.

FOREWORD

real

The above

and

of reference within which for the most part

points are a framework, general terms

we

dissension inside prisons and divided families and

must wage the Politico-Military struggle against

neighbours outside. Another important aspect

our enemies. All are co-related factors which for

potential Volunteers should think about ability to

obey orders from a superior

is

all

their

officer. All

Volunteers must obey orders issued to them by a

the

Army

all

orders

must be obeyed and respected regardless of the officer

who

issues

means respect

them and respect

for the

Army

point separately bearing in

Also

we do

in this series in

mind always

that in

as a whole.

not deal with the long-

any detail as that will be dealt

Army

is in

effect a political

Army, because

the actions of the

long-term objective: The long-term objective of the

campaign being waged by the

of the

cam-

paign. People with no political concepts have place in the

movement.

must be considered

practice the points

an extension of political action

therefore the military

Republican

whole and as individual

For lecture purposes we shall deal with each

a.

Irish

as a

units or branches of that

with separately in later lectures.

POLITICAL ASPECT is

movement

term objective

for the orders issued.

Military action

part determine the majority of our actions

members,

superior officer regardless of whether they like the

particular officer or not. In an

most

both as a

movement as stated in the constitution Army in which the rest of the movement

vests leadership

no

is

the 'Establishment of a

Democratic Socialist Republic'. Towards

Army

end

all

that

our Politico-Military activities must be

are directed towards a political objective that is the directed. real

meaning of the present

military campaign.

The B.

Army

as a political force are intent

socialist

Republic in

tential volunteers

on creating a

this country, therefore all

must be

po-

socialist in outlook.

Before any potential Volunteer decides to join the Irish Republican fully

Army

he should understand

and clearly the issues involved.

not join the

Army

own

He

our final objective of a

Demo-

cratic Socialist Republic. In the context

of Irish

on the road

to

society from at least the time of

should examine

motives, knowing the dangers in-

volved and knowing that he will find no romance

Wolfe Tone

the Republican analysis dictates that in order

should

because of emotionalism, sen-

sationalism or adventurism. fully his

He

short term objectives are therefore hurdles or obstacles which must be cleared from our path

to create conditions in

which the achievement

of the long term objective ish connection

campaign

is

is

possible, the Brit-

must be broken. The

Brits out

therefore our 'National' short-

term objective.

.

But

objective

if

we

mem-

branch of the movement to clearly

analyse their

own

particular obstacle or short

term objective which hinders the achievement

how best to renew recruits' im-

is

potential support for our Irish reformist and

are to achieve that national

the need for the individual

is

ber, unit or

Brit imperialist enemies. D.

A

TACTICS:

tactic is

simply a way of doing

A

something, a means of getting from

to B.

Tactics are employed both militarily and po-

Two

of that national objective and

litically.

move

of

tactic.

1.

Get your defensive before your offensive:

it.

In simple terms: a

mediate obstacle

the removal of his (her)

is

how

ignorance about

to handle

OC's might be how

An

footing:

This does not imply pursuing a defensive cam-

An

paign such as for example the Volunteers of

to put a unit

how

10' s

intelligence network:

how

on a military

1916 did

an effective

hold

to create

A Cumann Chairman's

mount a campaign on a given

best to

general rules dictate the choice

weapons, mili-

tary tactics, security, interrogations etc.

issue

taking ground and attempting to

in

What

it does mean is that before we go on the offensive politically or militarily we it.

take the greatest defensive precautions possi-

we do

members of the movement regardless of which branch we belong to, to enhance our commitment to and

ble to ensure success, e.g.

participation in the struggle through gaining as

we do

comprehensive an understanding as possible of

our means without being able to

e.g.

H-Block

etc.,

and for

all

our right to such a

state as

we have no

more everyday simple that

summary, our individual,

activities,

unit or branch

our short-term objectives must be in

keeping with the national short-term objective of breaking 'The Connection' which

movement

we

as a

believe to be not only in keeping

we

Active and Passive.

ment are active supporters as are the people who billet us, hold our dumps, provide transport, contribute to

our collections

etc.

and

to

handle interrogations

2.

can funerals even

if

etc.,

who

attend Republi-

only in an observer capacity.

Both categories support

at least

our short-term

Here again

much

all

Brits

The

to

struggle that

we

ers as possible.

alienate as

few of our support-

is

quite simple:

opera-

campaign. In September of that Brits

were

to the people acceptable targets.

existing conditions had been changed.

present for example although the

leadership of the

responsibility to ensure that by our personal

the logic

be shot, but after the Falls curfew

Likewise

conduct and by our collective conduct of the

event of

that the opera-

1969 the existing conditions dictated

were not

percentage also support our long-term objec-

by necessity our individual and group

in the

we cannot mount an

less a

objective of Brits out while an indeterminate

tive. It is

ammuknow

Without support, Volunteers, dumps, weaption,

Houses

we have

Tactics are dictated by the existing condi-

tions.

ons, finance etc.,

operation being set up,

we

enhances rather than alienates our

when the see know of IRA

IRA

if

supporters.

who condone

an

and of course

their capture etc.,

Passive supporters are those

Billets, Call

war

mount an opera-

that the Volunteers involved

our activities by not informing,

2.

not

are in proper working order with proper

tion itself

We as members of the move-

we do

in

accurate intelligence, security, that weapons

how

Active support:

are going to escalate the that;

Or

We do not claim

taken the necessary defensive precautions of

Democratic Socialist Republic.

1

terms:

as

illustrate that

tion without first having ensured that

nition

port,

to partition;

recourse to any other means.

cannot do just

with but crucial to the long-term objective of a

SUPPORT: Basically we have two types of sup-

opposed

employ revolutionary violence

not

can alternative through self and group educa-

In

not advocate

a united Ireland without being able to justify

our present society and the proposed Republi-

tion.

C.

All support lost by us from either category

priority dictates that, of equal if not greater

importance

at

SDLP has

proved

itself to

be

enemy of the people, at various stages since 1 974 we could have employed the tactic of making them a subject of ridicule by tarring and feathering them when, for instance, they were members of an collaborationist and thus an

executive which tortured and interned Irish-

nies in the fields of nationality, housing, edu-

men, which penalised rent and

cation,

or

etc.,

when

rates strikers

they recently declared at West-

minster in a debate on H-Block that 'Life

mean life and there should be no status.' The defensive precaution

should cal

latter

example being of course

The

make such an rule of

thumb

all

of Irish nationals and foreign investors

our actions can there-

we must

by whatever means we have

at

why we bomb, why we punish we execute informers etc.

A.

explain

our disposal

criminals,

why

public.

and

which

that conditions in

that unjust situ-

Our

turned will exist only in a united Ireland.

aim therefore must be

that,

our words, our policies,

we

sion of their

own

by our actions,

force by compul-

convictions as

many of the

All support lost to us

is

as our resources and personnel permit in their areas of disenchantment, to bring

OUt. ist

potential support for

enemy.

Exploit a situation or create a situation and

Republic as possible.

In practical terms that

means

zone we must channel

all

that in the

by the nationalist population against the British

Army,

the

RUC,

Loyalist murder gangs etc.,

whose

into resistance while educating those

Enemy

resentment

D.

TACTICS DICTATED BY EXISTING CONDITIONS.

E.

GUERRILLA STRATEGY

is

purely sectarian about the root

cause of sectarianism

To

Create Resistance

war

the resentment felt

it.

Isolate the

them

as far along the road to a Democratic Social-

SHORT TERM OBJECTIVE: BritS C. SUPPORT ACTIVE/PASSIVE B.

F.

own

or control most of the wealth of our country,

varying forms of support by being as active

3(C)

exploit

is

disenchanted to gravitate towards us in the

long term objective: Democratic Socialist Re-

the

it is

ation can be successfully resisted and over-

fore be clearly seen to be that

LECTURE

the overall Irish society

unjust: unjust that a small minority

in the

utterance. for

Our analysis of that

be made aware beforehand that they actually did

facilities

politi-

people

that the

employment, recreational

etc.

create resistance

itself,

the Brit presence.

we must

give the lead by

showing resistance through the resistance

CHANNEL RESISTANCE INTO

press, demonstrations, protests etc.,

and by

Support Active/Passive

How

military or other suitable actions against the to stop Isolation

IRA involvement

various branches of the Brit establishment.

with

all

anti-imperialist

groupings.

By now it is clear that our task is not only to kill as many enemy personnel as possible, or to cause as much economic damage as possi-

The

resistance thus created

must

in turn

ongoing process through our actions, our educa-

programmes, our policies of attempting

tion

dump

turn the passive supporter into a ble, but

which

of equal importance

is

to create support

will carry us not only through a

war of

member of the movement,

which could

last

another decade but ers

to

a paper seller

to

holder, a etc.,

with

the purpose of building protective support barri-

liberation

which

be chan-

nelled into active and passive support with an

will support us past the 'Brits Out' stage

the ultimate aim of a Democratic Socialist

Republic.

It is

no overstatement

between the enemy and ourselves, thus curb-

ing the enemy's attempted isolation policy.

of course the more barriers there

to say in the it is

for the

context of the whole population of Ireland that

time

we

enemy

are, the

And

harder

to get at us while at the

same

increase the potential for active support

the majority of that population are in varying in its various forms.

degrees disenchanted with that society: on the national issue, on cultural issues, on social and

economic

issues,

on

sectarian issues,

on

354

their

own

our

own

protective barriers are of course

security, the other branches of the

their lack

of power to be involved in any real decision

making about

The immediate

or their childrens desti-

movement, our

billets etc.

But we must build

up other barriers by championing the various causes in our support areas through involve-

:

ment

in the various

peoples committees in

More important still is the need for us as a movement to replace the various enemy structures which have been brought down as a

2.

A VOLUNTEER SHALL

those areas.

(a)

alternative to our plotting such a course

we have an

obvious. If for example

(b)

etc.

period, regardless of

how

leave are

have been against the

Brits, they

end up

in

jail

leaving no structures behind - no poten-

tial

for resistance, recruits, education or gen-

enhancing of support. Back to square one in other words where at this stage of the war the Brits do not make the same mistakes of earlier years which enabled us to build up our influence and support to such an extent are

now

well

hEIREANN SHALL: (a)

When mula:

(b)

At

all

(c)

in

State.

when

Irish

in

Par.

1

defend himself

3,

and

in court

delegated Authority.

INTERROGATION -

IF

ARRESTED OR INTERROGATED

A VOLUNTEER SHALL.

in-

(a)

Refuse

to give

any account of his movements,

activities or associates,

These were estab-

Government

to

legal authority

permitted to do so by General Headquar-

ters or the

any relation

when any of these have

to the organisation or personnel

of

to

Oglaigh na hEireann.

maintain control in Ireland. In effect, they are

imposed on the

orders

may employ

produce witnesses

occupied Ireland

lished by the British Imperial

still

of

Subject to compliance with the orders in Part a Volunteer

N0.1 (Deals with the attitude of

36 county

cross-examine witnesses

penalty for breaches which are not also a

breach

2

Volunteers towards courts, parliaments and

in the

right to

DISMISSAL WITH IGNOMINY.

5.

and

subsequent court hearings 'refuse to

Reserve the

Maximum

GENERAL ARMY ORDERS

government

for-

to say nothing at this stage."

and make an unsworn statement.

(As amended by the Army Council) October 1973

stitutions of

wish

plead'.

4.

general ORDER

charged use the following

initially 'I

will to resist in all forms.

IRA

DISMISSAL.

VOLUNTEER CHARGED WITH ACTS DULY AUTHORISED BY THE COMPETENT OFFICERS OF OGLAIGH NA

entrenched there has never been a lack of

APPENDIX

this.

penalty for breaches:

3.

eral

which we

bound by

Minimum

After a

successful they

any undertakings as to his future

to give

Volunteers released from prison on ticket-of-

with a unit of IRA volunteers and nothing - no Sinn Fein Cumann, no Green Cross

committee, no local involvement

Refuse

behaviour.

area

else

that in the areas in

obey any order issued by the him to

fied area in Ireland.

lection, advice-centres, etc.

is

to

leave Ireland or reside inside or outside a speci-

result of the war: policing, transport, bin col-

The

Refuse

authorities of these States requiring

people by the British

(b) (c)

Imperial Government.)

Refuse to make or sign any statements. Any Volunteer committed to prison forfeits

all

rank. 1.

A VOLUNTEER SHALL NOT:

(a)

6 or 26 County (b)

Minimum

DISMISSAL WITH IGNOMINY. (SPECIAL NOTE - This general order does not cover a charge of treachery which might arise following interrogation as noted

States.

Swear or pledge recognition of their legitimacy as sovereign governing bodies for the

in

Swear or pledge himself overthrow British rule

Minimum

No.

2.

(Deals with membership of

political parties.) in

any way to refrain

from using arms or other methods of struggle to

Par. 5 above).

GENERAL ORDER

Irish people. (c)

penalty for a breach of any of these orders:

Swear or pledge allegiance or recognition to the partition institutions of government of the

in Ireland.

penalty for breaches:

DISMISSAL

(a)

No member of Oglaigh na hEireann may be a member of a political party which recognises the partition institutions of

government as sov-

ereign authorities for the Irish people.

)

(b)This order does not forbid Volunteers from

being members of Industrial Trade Unions as distinct

is

forbidden.

(a)

No.

promise

tions issued

and the

pro-

capitalist literature is

When

(b)

obey

to

...

all

Army

by the

Army

Declara-

orders and regula-

Authority and any

to in the letter

spirit.

an order issued by a duly accredited

officer has

been disobeyed, the Volunteer

in

question must be suspended immediately

3.

pending investigation of the case.

No member of Oglaigh na hEireann shall make

Any Volunteer

(c)

any statement either verbally or

carrying out an unofficial op-

in writing to

eration the press or

'

The Declaration must be adhered

capitalist

automatically dismissed.

GENERAL ORDER

7.

superior officers.'

Any Volunteer found

moting communist or

tion

economic develop-

ment or of Sinn Fein. (c)Membership of any communist or

No.

Volunteers when making the

(a)

political labour parties: co-op-

from

erative organisations for

party

GENERAL ORDER

mass media without General Head-

is

automatically dismissed from the

Army and

is liable

to

immediate repudiation.

quarters permission. (b)

Volunteers are forbidden to advocate anything

Army

inconsistent with

GENERAL order

No.

4.

DISMISSAL. 8. (Deals with what may be construed as aggressive action within the 26

general ORDER

strikes without the express sanction

(a)

GENERAL order

No.

5.

emphasised.

(Deals with firing parties

the case of Volunteers

(b)

who

die

on active serv-

to

be waived

in the

at this

General Order No.

Maximum when to

26

No. 6. (Deals with control.)

arms

be rendered

shall

must be taken

must always be posted

warn of emergency. Volunteers

arrested dur-

out that the arms were for use against the British forces of occupation only. This statement should

8).

Committees

Committees under Army control

every

arms away

security precautions

training. Scouts

be repeated

GENERAL ORDER

raid,

to get the

ing training or in possession of arms will point

time

could be construed as aggressive and as such in conflict with

in training in the

useless and abandoned. (c)

may have

be used

safely. If this fails, the

view of the provisions of General Order No.

Counties area since any such action

shall

made

effort shall be

enemy action. General Headquarters permission must be obtained.

Minimum arms

26 County area. In the event of a

only allowed in

ice or as a direct result of

(a)

County forces under

especially in the Border areas cannot be over-

DISMISSAL.

(a) Firing parties at funerals are

Army

forbidden to take any

any circumstances whatsoever. The impor-

of General

and unofficial action.)

under

strictly

tance of this order in present circumstances

penalty for breach:

8, this tribute

Volunteers are

military action against 26

Headquarters.

(In

No.

Counties.)

(Deals with Hunger-Strikes.

Volunteers are forbidden to undertake hunger

Maximum

penalty for breach of this order:

policy.

Minimum penalty for breaches: DISMISSAL WITH IGNOMINY.

(a)

Minimum

(d)

At

all

at all

subsequent court proceedings.

times Volunteers must

Army

the policy of the

will

have

is to

make

it

clear that

drive the British

forces of occupation out of Ireland.

their terms of references clearly laid out for

them. They will adhere

strictly to these

terms

of reference. In case of departure from these

GENERAL ORDER

resigned from the

Army

must be submitted

to the

delegated Authority,

who

of such Committee from the Committee

at

who Army

re-admission by those

who

member

be removed from the Committee. The

time.

9.

were dismissed or

the individuals or individual responsible will

Authority has the right to remove any

No.

(a) All applications for

Army Council

or

alone have the power

to sanction reinstatement.

any (b)

Where

a Volunteer

from the

Army

he

is

may

summarily dismissed apply to his unit

OC

to

have his case tried by court martial. Such 356

i

made

application must be

within seven days

from the date of receipt of notification of

Penalty for breach of this order: Note: As

dis-

be

ratified

DEATH.

other cases of the death penalty, sentence must

in all

by the Army Council.

missal, (c)

Once

a court martial has

dismissal, then as in

all

confirmed such a

Army Council

to the

outside

other cases, any further

appeal or application for reinstatement must be

forwarded

general ORDER

Army

(a)

Minimum

Membership of

Army

the

through being an active

is

only possible

member

Any man who

member

of a Unit or working directly with

ceases to be an active

member

reserve in the

of the Army. There

Army.

is

Volunteers in

no

vidual in the

All Volunteers must be

at the discretion

of the Unit Commander.

If,

reasons a Volunteer

unable to carry out the

for

unit, the

OC may

e.g. intelligence

allot

him some

So long

in the

and parade grounds

shall

taking part in a campaign of

Army

deemed

into disrepute,

guilty of treachery.

Minimum

penalty: DISMISSAL WITH IGNOMINY.

APPENDIX

be considered

Leave of absence may be granted

to a

3

TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE IN

Volun-

IRELAND

Sinn Fein document 1992 (extracts) INTRODUCTION

Volunteer who, for any reason, ceases to

maintain contact with his unit or with General

Headquarters for a period of three months shall

automatically cease to be a

member

of the

The is

heart-felt aspiration of

The onus of maintaining contact

is

on the Vol-

The provision of this General Order does not

popular desire

it

cannot become to

reality.

A genuine

recognise that an end to

conflict does not, of itself, lead necessarily to a

mere cessation of

hostilities leads inevitably to a

recurrence of the conflict in the future.

apply to Volunteers in prison.

process,

GENERAL ORDER No. 11. (Deals with the seizure of arms and dumps which are under Army Con-

ing,

if it is

to be both meaningful

seizes or

is

party to the

ammunition or explosives which are being held under Army Control,

seizure of arms,

be deemed guilty of treachery.

constituted court martial shall try

all

A duty-

cases.

that a

A

peace

and endur-

must address the root causes of the

For our part we believe

trol.)

shall

in Ireland

lasting peace. Irish history has taught us that a

unteer himself.

Any Volunteer who

most people

for peace. If this aspiration remains limited to a

peace process needs

Army.

(a)

indi-

etc.

reasons.

(e)

any

special duties,

teer in the case of illness or for other valid

A

in

Control shall be deemed

thereby weakening authority and disci-

shall likewise be

an active Volunteer.

(d)

Leadership or

as he performs these duties satisfactorily

and makes regular reports he

(c)

attempts to lower the

pline and bringing the

work, care and cleaning of weap-

ons, procuring of training

Army Army

Any Volunteer

good and genuine

normal duties and routine which obtains

at-

slander and denigration against another volunteer,

is

DISMISSAL.

guilty of treachery.

(b)

The duties of a Volunteer shall be

this:

morale or undermine the confidence of other

active. (b)

not under

No. 13. (Deals with attempts to or to undermine the confidence

Any Volunteer who

(a)

General Headquarters, automatically ceases to be a

is

lower morale in Army Leadership and with slanderous tacks on Volunteers.)

Unit or directly attached to General Headquarters.

property which

penalty for failure to do

general ORDER

Army

of an

Army

Control shall report such information

immediately to his OC.

membership

No. 10. (Deals with

of the Army.)

any property

Control.)

Volunteer with knowledge of the where-

abouts of

Unit Commander.

general ORDER

A

(a)

through the

No. 12. (Deals with

Army

conflict.

genuine and sustain-

able peace process must be set in the context of

democracy and self-determination.

A true

peace

process needs to focus on these dimensions. The

proposals which follow represent a responsible

and

realistic contribution to the

debate on peace

in Ireland

offer this

which we believe is long overdue. We document as a contribution to that de-

go:

defies the wishes of the Irish people as a

It

bate.

whole;

ARMED STRUGGLE

It

Armed

struggle has, throughout history and in

wishes of the population in Britain

all It

been seen as a legitimate compo-

parts of the globe,

rejects the

as expressed in opinion poll after opinion poll; flouts international law;

It is

undemocratic;

It is

permanently abnormal and can only be

nent of peoples' resistance to foreign oppression. In Ireland,

it

was armed struggle which created

the

maintained by the most extraordinary means;

conditions for the removal of British jurisdiction

simply does not work by any universally

It

over the 26 Counties and the emergence of a separate

accepted standards; truncated) Irish state.

(if

However, armed struggle

Its is

recognised by re-

when

all

other avenues to pursue freedom have been

at-

publicans to be an option of

last resort

for generations,

must be recognised

North and South, nationalist

and unionist;

tempted and suppressed. It

consequences have made victims of- in - the entire Irish nation

greater or lesser degree

It

been no

that there has

has created a generation of casualties in the

Six Counties; consistent constitutional strategy to pursue a na-

democracy

tional

It

in Ireland. Certainly, there

has

perpetuates conditions in which conflict

is

actual or inevitable;

been no consistent and principled strategy advanced during the last 20 years of continuous

It

cannot produce lasting peace.

Today

the British

government maintains

parti-

conflict.

Objective evaluations of the armed struggle, including those of the British government, recognise that to

its

history to date indicates that

who

is

is

likely

they leave.

an onus on those

proclaim that the armed struggle

which have

borne the brunt of British rule since partition and

20 years

alternative

past.

this stance

with

They have now added

to this scare

Union they have 'no

selfish strategic or eco-

The Britgovernment cannot have it both ways. It cannot on the one hand claim a 'preference' for maintaining the Union while on the other hand claiming no strategic or economic interests in being in Ireland. Governments act out of their perceived political interests and preferences. The British government is no exception. nomic reason'

for maintaining partition.

ish

is-

land but nowhere more than in the oppressed

ment of such an

They back up

counter-

an alternative would be welcomed across the

particularly for over

claims, to the wishes of the

claim the spurious argument that while they prefer the

is

productive to advance a credible alternative. Such

nationalist areas of the Six Counties

unionist people.

it

misleading propaganda about a blood bath should it

be sustained for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances there

tion in response,

The develop-

would be welcomed

by Sinn Fein.

Formal British government policy as contained

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT British

in the

propaganda now claims

ring' to

keep the Six County

'United Kingdom'

economic reason

it

that while 'prefer-

statelet within the

has no selfish strategic or

for doing so.

Hillsborough Agreement - the 'unity by

consent' formula

Labour Party the status

- which

is

also ostensibly British

policy, supports the maintenance of

quo of partition.

THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT

British preference in relation to matters internal to Ireland holds

no

Notwithstanding the overall responsibility of sucvalidity against the preference of

cessive British governments for the creation and the clear majority of the Irish people for national

maintenance of conditions which have sustained independence as expressed for generations.

Moreover, notwithstanding Britain's alleged

the past

20 years of continuous

conflict,

Dublin

has a clear responsibility and a major role to play lack of 'selfish strategic or economic' reasons for

maintaining partition there are multiple democratic

358

and practical reasons why

in

providing the democratic access to the world

centres of power. partition should

For the greater part of the 26 County

state's

political

The

existence, successive Dublin governments have

adopted a negative attitude

in

and popular support for the principles:

recognition by the British government that

the Irish people have the right to national self-

regard to the issue

determination:

or national democracy.

That the British government change

For most of that period the issue of the British-

its

current

imposed border has been addressed largely for

policy to one of ending partition and handing

purposes of electoral gain.

over sovereignty to an all-Ireland government

Since Hillsborough, we

now have

hands-on approach from Dublin

whose

a firm

in

support of the

if

there

in Ireland a its

context and that the British government has a

Dublin government will have to

responsibility so to influence unionist atti-

is to

tudes;

national responsibility.

Upholding

lies in this

be

Sinn Fein would argue that

assume

a democratic matter

That the future of the unionists

partition of our country.

peace

would be

selection

for the Irish nation.

that responsibility

Dublin government aimed at:

this process the Dublin and London governments should consult together

That as part of

must involve the

developing a strategy

in

to seek

partition of Ireland has

been a disastrous

ending

fail-

ure;

Persuading the unionists of the benefits of Irish reunification and seeking their views constitutional, political

partition.

partition;

Having agreed

on the

and financial arrange-

agreement on the policy objective of

Having agreed this both governments should consult together to seek agreement on the policy objective of ending

Persuading the British government that the

this

both governments should

issue a public statement outlining the steps they

ments needed for a united Ireland;

intend taking to bring about a peaceful and orderly

Persuading the international community through the use of international forums and

British political

institutions to support Irish national rights;

If the British

In the interim, promoting and defending the

democratic rights of the population of the Six Resisting further erosion of Irish national integrity

by the deletion or dilution of

that

claim as

government refuses

to

do the above

1.

(a)

To win

international support

for the Irish

and commit-

demand through

a

campaign

utilising to the full Irish diplomatic skills

the Irish nation enjoys internationally;

A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE

(b)

land to the continuing division of our country and

our people by British government policy should

be the development of the

maximum

commenced this process, with the few resources we have at our disposal. We will continue to argue in

both the national and international arena for a

British withdrawal

and a solution based on an

USA, Britain and Australia; To utilise every avenue available

in inter-

national forums, including the United Nations

and the (d)

To

CSCE

in support

of Irish demands;

mobilise political and popular support

in Britain itself, to create conditions in

which

the right to Irish national self-determination

(e)

Sinn Fein believes that such a scenario

To

initiate a

debate leading to dialogue

with Northern unionist opinion on the demois

AIMS

maximum

for the Irish de-

people and descendants

can be secured;

achievable based on the following propositions.

secure

the

Irish

national democracy.

To

Irish

of Irish people exiled abroad, especially in

degree of

of democracy and peace. Sinn Fein has already

To mobilise support

mands among

(c)

unity and action possible in the peaceful pursuit

and

resources and maximising the good will which

contained in the 1937 Constitution.

In the above context the obvious response in Ire-

Ire-

then the Dublin government should strive:

ment

Counties;

and military withdrawal from

land within a specified period.

national and international

cratic nature of national self-determination.

To assure the unionist community of full commitment to their civil and religious rights

and

to

persuade them of the need for

an Irish society

their participation in building

based on equality and national reconciliation. 2. (a)

To

launch a concerted national campaign to

mobilise popular support for the above in every

whether social or economic

aspect of Irish

life,

and including

cultural,

community, religious

and sporting organisations and trade unions.

To review

which commit Dublin

all treaties

com-

(b)

To launch

a concerted international

cam-

paign to mobilise political and economic support for the above principles and objectives. part of this

campaign

As

particular attention to be

conjunction with the above to organise

through concerted political action nationally

and internationally the defence of democratic social

and economic

social

and economic conditions for

rights,

and

to

improve

and formally accept the

logical conclusion,

right of the Irish

people to

Accepting

that the

pathway

peace will not

to

be quick and easy, these parties have a responsi-

any abuses of human rights

bility to highlight

directly or indirectly as result of Brit-

They

ain's continued presence in Ireland. in particular,

curity

demand

that the

and Co-operation

the abuse of

human

should,

Conference on Se-

Europe should monitor

in

rights currently being perpe-

THE UNIONISTS Unionists represent around one

fifth

of the Irish

people and will thus have a considerable impact, it

negative or positive, on the peace process

proposed

document.

in this

We

recognise that

peace in Ireland requires a settlement of the long-

To

establish a democratic structure by

standing conflict between Irish nationalism and

which the above strategy can be agreed, impleIrish

mented and overseen.

unionism.

We would

like to see that conflict,

often bloody, replaced by a process of national

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONALIST PARTIES

Those

that Britain actually

its

self-determination.

be Irish citi-

zens;

(d)

to believe that

trated in the Six Counties.

paid to mobilising British opinion; (c) In

carries out that statement to

committed

mitments;

wish

demand

Ireland they should

to

co-operation with the British on issues such as extradition with a view to ending these

If the nationalist parties

Britain has 'no selfish interest' in remaining in

reconciliation, a constructive dialogue

which describe them-

parties in Ireland

At present there

and debate.

one overwhelming obstacle

is

commencement of

That

selves as nationalist, including Fianna Fail and the

to the

SDLP, wield considerable

British guarantee of the artificially constructed

it

in the corridors

Brussels. This, of

political influence,

be

of Westminster, Washington or itself,

sibility to forcefully

places on

them a respon-

and continuously represent

the interests of the nationalist people.

These

is

the

unionist majority in the Six Counties. These cir-

cumstances mean

engage '

parties are in a position to harness the

that debate.

...

it

When

debate

in

is

that unionists for, as

John

have no reason to

Hume

has said:

a guarantee of perpetual sectarianism.

the state

came

into being

it

was

set

up on a

considerable sympathy for Irish reunification and

basis of a sectarian headcount. That having been

sovereignty which exists in Europe and further

done the British government then said

afield.

It is

implement

essential that they

move

their stated objectives

the Six Counties

is

decisively to

and

regarded by the

policies. If

SDLP and

the

Dublin government as a non-viable context for a resolution of the conflict

let

them firmly and ex-

plicitly reject partitionist scenarios.

No

serious international observer believes that

Britain's role in Ireland

is

simply that of 'honest

broker' between the 'warring factions'.

and the Dublin government are international legitimacy

where they can, with con-

siderable credibility, reject this spurious interpre-

360

want

to".

By doing

guar-

that they trapped the unionists

into perpetual sectarianism

they were saying

is

power and

privilege

ian bloc!"

And

behaved.

No

because

in effect

what

"In order to maintain your

you must behave as a

that's exactly

sectar-

how unionism

has

other group of people in the same

circumstances would behave any differently.'

The SDLP

in a position of

"We

antee you can stay with us as long as the majority

John analysis, to

Hume

remove

veto.

should follow the logic of his

on which he has

failed to act,

and work

the British guarantee of the unionist

be

If there is to

in

movement towards

conditions

which the debate about national reconciliation

about a problem which profoundly affects us both.

The

failure to

do so soon enough, or adequately

can take place, the British government-bestowed

enough, has led to tragedy. Terrorism and evil

unionist veto needs to be removed. terim, a British

If, in

the in-

have rooted

government recognises the

failure

failure,

would

our

of the partition and

its

Six County

state, that

we

recognise the obsta-

cles to a unionist/nationalist dialogue, it is

we

believe

necessary to break out of the present concep-

tion of politics prevalent in Ireland,

person's gain

Six Counties

who

The

where one

Protestant people of the

are presently

The

development

to address.

committed

to a

we

it

has touched us

also from

shown

way

a

to enable this

tional reconciliation the

must be addressed.

deep fears held by people

We need to address those fears

beyond

honestly, going

real underlying issues.

political rhetoric to the

Democratic debate may be

improbable, but not impossible, under present

cumstances,

its

The republican

necessity

none the

less urgent.

tradition will play a constructive

role in the debate for a lic,

is

cir-

new

Ireland,

Protestant and Dissenter' can

all

which 'Cathoclaim as their

own.

now

a neutral

to British/Irish Round-table talks,

dented opportunity, a correspondingly

its

it

litical

progress.

has a precedent in 1973, or in 1925, or of us will dispute that

it is

one

of the painfully few instances since 1920

when all the strands of the unionist tradition have sat around a table with representatives of the nationalist tradition in

rise to

No-one here needs any reminder How from political despair in

relation to Northern Ireland.

IDENTITIES

we can acknowledge

identities in Ireland in

complexity, and strike a

fair

and accept-

able balance between them, this meeting could

be truly historic all

in its results.

That will require

of us to go into uncharted waters and to

It

last aired

three generations ago,

will call for

feel they are

None

would give

failure

deep sense of despondence,

courage on

on dangerous

if

all

visit

between us indeed even our parts.

in particular

political

I

may

ground

in

Strand Two, notwithstanding our rule that noth-

FOCUS OF HOPE

We would all, I think, agree that our meeting today is of historic significance. We might debate earlier.

things as they

left

an almost unprece-

of the evils that

more than

Mr. Chairman,

whether

is

accept that unionist leaders

THIS MEETING A

room

perhaps even despair, about the prospects of po-

then.

EXTRACTS

taken risks

in this

must do our utmost

development which

very fundamental issues

6 July 1992

We

were. Because our meeting

all their

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT,

even

the focus of hope.

NEED TO ADDRESS BOTH

4

We

meeting to go ahead.

Ireland. In

all

not to disappoint that hope. Failure would not be

If

APPENDIX

we have

out of the

history has

terrible

are

and no

hand contact the deep yearn-

first

ing of our peoples to be

response to that sentiment,

Irish republicans realise that to achieve na-

all

believe every political leader at this table

knows

from a democratic settlement.

continuation of the present impasse.

upon

been immune.

part of these islands has

democratic and secular Ireland.

We can all gain We all lose from a

of the

pain directly

its

dilemmas which our troubled imposed on both our communities in

pro-British unionism have nothing to fear from a

me

are called

They have experienced

and personally, but

I

at

representatives from the Northern

scope and horror of the tragedy

conceived automatically as an-

is

other person's loss.

peril.

by our political

left

this sinister

Ireland parties need no reminder from

help create the conditions for dialogue. In the meantime, while

spaces

in the

and we ignore

Ireland and reasoned together

ing

is

agreed until everything

is

agreed. They,

may fear any return to these issues, but unless we do address them they will continue to haunt us. It may be they will find at the end of this process that those who insist on especially,

dealing with the problem in

all its

complexity -

including the real dimensions of nationalist sen-

timent - are their truest friends.

A

lull

and

of the problem carries the best

realistic definition

and viable solu-

for a generally acceptable

hope

the nationalist tradition finds hardest to accept

without a sense of betraying traditions have

tion.

FORUM REPORT THE COMMON POINT OF REFERENCE FOR NATIONALIST PARTIES The Forum Report with

common

remains a

its

rejection of violence

point of reference for

the

all

in Ireland. Its find-

democratic nationalist parties

ings are therefore a departure point for our discus-

While

sions.

fully

articulating the nationalist view,

it

accepted that constitutional nationalists

alone could not determine the structures of an agreed Ireland.

It

acknowledged

peo-

that the best

been

dred years or more on

own

its

at cross

one

this

past.

Our two

purposes for a hunissue.

CONCERN FOR THE UNIONIST POSmON I

have spoken of the nationalist perspective, but

would

like to

make

we

clear that

also for the position of the unionist

They

are victims, as

We

legacy of our past. of identity

no

is

we

I

are concerned

are, of the

community. unresolved

accept the unionist sense

less valid,

and no

less worthy, than

dream of an unques-

the nationalist one. Their

tioned and untroubled enjoyment of their British

ple to identify the interests of the unionist tradition

identity

less real than the

dream of a Northern

were the unionist people themselves. The three

nationalist for unquestioned

and untroubled en-

pro-union parties represented here did not take

joyment of

part in the

Forum. They would probably not accept

findings.

its

I

would hope, however, they would

who

accept the motives and the goodwill of those

took in

part.

The urgency of

finding agreement has

no way diminished since the publication of the

Forum Report. We have now at the table those who are qualified above all others to speak for the unionist

community.

We have therefore an opporand the possibility

tunity for a fuller perspective,

of fresh insight issues,

when we come

which was not available

ure to those involved in the

to

consider these

in the

Forum

same meas-

as they grap-

pled with these same problems and

made

their

recommendations.

is

no

his or her Irish identity. History has

decreed that neither dream can be

would wish.

We know that

munity as a whole

many

com-

has been a

We understand their

of the things which seemed

a bulwark of their position have disappeared in the

We know their anxiety that may be no point of safety between where now stand and the realisation of their worst

course of our century. there

they

fears.

We

of the

many members of that community who have

have witnessed the dignity and fortitude

so wantonly suffered

know

at the

hands of terrorism.

have

that unionist leaders here

We

to deal with

a deep sense of anger in their community, and a

deep suspicion Mr. Chairman,

that all political

movement must

be to their detriment. PARTITION DID NOT RESOLVE THE CONFLICTING ASPIRATIONS

NATIONALIST VISION RESPECTS DIFFERENCES

The

this recent period

time of suffering and of trial. perplexity that

fulfilled as they

for the unionist

nationalist vision is

one where

of Ireland take charge of their

own

all

the people

political des-

Partition sought to resolve the conflicting aspirations of majority

and minority

in Ireland

by divid-

harmony and agreement and with

full

respect for the differences between them.

Our

ing the island in two. Unfortunately, the

minds

arrangement created a new minority - Northern

tiny, in

history has established a close link in our

between independence and inely difficult for

dition to understand

how

genu-

self-respect. It is

members of

the nationalist tra-

these ideals could be

perceived as threatening by others. Yet, plainly, the reason

we

are seated at this table

is

because

Irish nationalism is perceived as threatening

the unionist rejected.

community, or

Moreover,

at

by

any rate clearly

that rejection takes the

form

of an insistence on the continuation of British rule in Ireland, the

362

one aspect above

all

others

which

nationalists into the

-

in effect

transposing the problem

"narrow ground" of Northern Ireland. The

conflict, in

its

essence,

is

now about whether

unionists should finally settle for minority status in the island as a

whole or whether Northern

nationalists should

Northern Ireland.

more

do so within the confines of

Some

tolerate killing

people

- on both

and many - because of

kill,

sides

their fears that this choice will be resolved the

wrong way.

WAYS OF ADDRESSING PROBLEM

port the bigger of the

There are various ways we here could disarm

however was

We

those murderous fears:

could find a way of

ending our political divisions.

way of purging

We

could find a

the concepts of "majority" and

"minority" from the fears and passions

associated with them.

We

at

present

could find a way of

accommodating and regulating our differences and agreeing

The

Irish

fair

and acceptable rules for change.

Government

will

be open

to

any of these

approaches, or any combination of them, that

is

two communities. That

and

tried,

failure is

its

why we

ADVANTAGE TO UNIONISM OF A GENERALLY ACCEPTED ARRANGEMENT may be

It

objected that unionists could have noth-

ing to gain from such a recognition of the nationalist aspiration.

I

believe on the contrary they

could win an inestimable prize. They could for the first

time have a role in Ireland which did not rely

on external guarantee, or on assertions of domi-

consistent with the goal stated in the Anglo-Irish

nance, as necessary defences of their identity.

Agreement of reconciling and acknowledging

nationalist tradition in Ireland as a

"the rights of the

two major

traditions that exist in

Ireland, represented

on the one hand by those who

wish for no change

in the present status

of North-

who

ern Ireland and on the other hand by those

aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by

peaceful

means and through agreement".

source of unionist fears.

which can

we to

Northern Ireland

two

the notoriously difficult

is

There

sets of conflicting rights.

is

ment for the self-determination of the unionist community that cannot be applied, with at least equal force, to the nationalist community in

the

much we

fears,

which

believe

them

be unfounded. IN

DEPTH

have spoken plainly and openly, because it is

problem

be-

I

important from the outset to address the in its full

one of

no argu-

Northern Ireland. That community sees

them from those

liberate

accept as real, however

lieve

to resolve in relation to

The

is

also the source of the

NEED TO ADDRESS ALL ASPECTS I

The problem we have

It is

whole

only guarantee which will be truly reliable and

PROBLEM OF TWO SETS OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS

are

here.

dimension. The measure of

peace in our island will be the depth of our understanding of

We

how we

from unionism

we

share

it.

should not expect miracles of conversion to nationalism, but neither should

expect them in reverse.

itself

We need to address our We need

rival constitutional perspectives in full.

locked into a political entity Its

it

aspiration to independence

bitterly

opposed.

was denied.

It

was

to address the

which

all

cut off from the rest of Ireland and consigned to

minority status which repeated itself inexorably at

every level of politics and society. The symbols

of the state, like the working of majority rule, might be neutral are

- both

far

in

reminders of a hateful past, or of a future

We

need

from neutral

the

in

APPENDIX

Northern Ireland.

UK. There have been many attempts problem

in these

all failed.

Sir Patrick

more manageable terms and The poles of the problem are

Northern Ireland and those

who

see

its

1. It is

its

existence,

British status, as vital for their identity.

More

opponents

to

say these two things are

"We

often

it

to quote him.

It

sented with the

could be tempting

British/Irish

sometimes convenient for a

quote himself. his

and

Mayhew to

Round-table talks, 18 September 1992

to redefine

between those who resent the very existence of

5

STATEMENT OF BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND,

problem we are called on to two rival views of how

Northern Ireland should be governed within the

the

threat.

address the practical issues which

divide us.

resolve are not between

they have

to

Great Britain. They were - and

REAL POLES OF THE PROBLEM

The poles of

symbols we each have inherited and

too often appear to the other tradition as

first

is

Today

British

I

am

pre-

kind of occasion.

are concerned in Strand II",

irreconcilable and to decide, very simply, to sup-

politician to

convenient for

I

said in the

Government's opening statement

in

363

"with relationships within the

this Strand,

land of Ireland.

It is

have implications for these

tional issues

change without the consent of a majority of

is-

7.

Though perhaps

relationships - as they do for other topics

which

fail to

proposition that we, and the Irish Government,

would give

of us, reflected that view

all

agenda we have

Strand

set for

agenda

for Strand III that constitutional

issues are no less

germane

Not

at all surprisingly,

8.

As

these issues contain within

to

them

be overcome

factors

I

think

today

it

in

our journey

we

bear in mind that

in the

of substantive negotiations. That will

full

My

In the event, Sir Ninian,

and

I

believe

we now have

view, no doubt

a

of course, several constitutional

made

clear.

That

is,

in

our

about Northern Ireland's

Kingdom

concern about Articles 2 and

ture, is not that they constitute

of

in

of

both

3,

unhelpful

to

a realistic threat

our constitutional arrangements, or that the

Government would seek

course, well within our ground rules since the

Irish

26 March Statement

implied claim through force. Our concern

said:

will

to assert their is

it

rather that for a different reason they constitute

be open to each of the parties to raise any

a greater obstacle to that normalisation of rela-

"In order to ensure a full airing of the issues,

tionships on this island which

aspect of these relationships, including constitutional issues, or any other matter

which

it

10.

Probably no participant

This

is

is

fully satisfied with

it

all

of us seek.

because, in particular, the British

ernment

considers relevant."

6.

at all

though they are because of their inherent na-

is-

is,

are very well

domestic and international law. Accordingly

sues which participants wish to canvass, as

other speakers have

we

Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

my are,

Their provisions, which do

position as part of the United

a fair under-

table.

There

that.

aware. But in practical terms there

standing of the views of everyone around the

5.

attaches to this matter.

adverse reactions of which

and frank exchange on constitutional mat-

ters,

endorse

ful. I

mode come

we have had

it

predecessor called Articles 2 and 3 unhelp-

give rise to a territorial claim, have generated

are dealing with these matters as part

of our survey of obstacles, and not

later.

importance 9.

important that

we

Irish Constitution,

outcome from the talks process must include the repeal or amendment of those Articles. The Alliance Party has also drawn attention to the

which

towards a settlement. 4.

and 3 of the

unionist delegations argue that any successful

recognised that

warrant inclusion in our catalogue of obstacles

which have

to Articles 2

HMG fully accepts the sincerity with which the

to relationships

we have

by a majority of the people

of Northern Ireland for any alternative status.

between the two Governments. 3.

effect to any wish that might in

future be expressed

II, al-

though we have also of course acknowledged in the

I

was underwritten by the Anglo-Irish Agreement; as indeed was the

be addressed in the Talks as a

Together we have, in the

not everyone will agree,

believe that position

whole". 2.

its

people."

inescapable that constitu-

is

quite clear that

it

Gov-

ought to seek, and

will seek, as a product of the talks process as

unambiguously expressed consen-

the constitutional arrangements in our 2 juris-

a whole, an

dictions.

sus on the constitutional issues, as part of a

As

to British constitutional

arrangements,

there are specific proposals in these talks

framework

if

we

for relationships

erally acceptable to

all.

this

which

will

be gen-

should extend to a

shall certainly be ready to consider them,

statement of the present position of Northern

against the accepted general test that they must

Ireland,

secure general acceptance,

sary

element of

my

I

repeat another

predecessor's statement of 26

March when he said: "Her Majesty's Government reaffirms

position that Northern Ireland's present status

as a part of the United

Kingdom

sions. 1

their

will not

which we understand implies necesamendments to Irish constitutional provi-

1.

The question we have

to face it

whether there

to be a

is likely

for

up

to,

indeed

we

some time now,

have been considering

is

convergence on

these important and sensitive constitutional

matters by the end of the Talks process.

HMG

exchanges

has always regarded that as a realistic target.

1

From what we have heard the Irish Government say today we are encouraged. 2. Before suggesting the basis on which we might go forward, perhaps I could make a general point.

The Talks

whole have

as a

wide range of interlocking are dependent to sions

drawn

some degree on

No doubt

which they regard as of pre-eminent impor-

These considerations led us

that nothing until

rate

everything had been agreed in the talks as is

generally acceptable settlement in pursuance

common

aim, rather than an exercise in

bargaining to which the language of the quid

pro quo

gives us the freedom to

is apt. It

address each issue on a contingent basis, able to enter reservations is

implicit in our

and forth and until

we have

the emergent

to all

rules, to

withhold

full

to assess

I

see grounds for real

which the

in the statement

Government delegation has made

recommending

revision of Articles 2 and

Irish

in relation to

to the people the

3.

On

have been given, we shall argue change should occur.

common ground amongst

substantive exchanges tutional matters

and

that

will

us

that

have not been

fully

consti-

concluded,

point to return to them, perhaps

more than

III

no way intended

to

or even an immediate,

settlement of Ireland's future political structures.

Rather

is

it

an expression of ideas which the author

thinks are worthy of consideration and debate, and

possible development of those which are not entirely rejected.

The only firm commitment of the author is to and to the main thesis which he

his analysis,

presents - that a planned, stage by stage progres-

sion to joint British/Irish authority in Northern

by a federal format which would

allow of final British withdrawal,

is

the only

means by which even-handed justice can be done to all traditions in Ireland and permanent peace brought

The

to pass.

time-scale envisaged

is

10-14 years, to be

so proclaimed from the beginning, but this period

could be shortened or extended as circumstances

I

the

appropriate

once; and in Strand

is in

final,

dictate. all that

we have had on

be necessary

we

such

at the

it

be a blue-print for a

the under-

standing of the constitutional position that

15. It is

The document attached

Ireland, followed

exploit that freedom.

Against that background,

EXTRACTS

dodge back

outcome of the Talks as a whole.

encouragement

the option of

as

commitment

had an opportunity

We must, I suggest, 14.

where necessary and,

ground

new

a corpo-

and co-operative process of constructing a

of a

desire of

anonymous)

could be agreed in any one Strand

a whole. Properly understood this

common

as part of their discussions 1993. (Author wishes to remain

on the proposition

structure of the Talks and

reflect "the

for consideration

are.

agree on the

all to

to the

APPENDIX 6 PAPER FROM A BELFAST REPUBLICAN SOURCE SUBMITTED TO JOHN HUME, GERRY ADAMS AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT

which

tance, but not surprisingly delegations will not

always agree on what such issues

can continue,

relationship".

each delegation has some matter or matters

13.

II

the people of the island of Ireland for a

the conclu-

of other issues.

in respect

rangements to

to address a

issues, all of

Strand

in

point of addressing possible institutional ar-

(where they feature as

agenda item 7) as well as in Strand II. 16. But daunting though the programme ahead of us undoubtedly is, I believe that we may now have established a basis on which substantive

have not dealt with the matter of funding of

the joint authority or federal stages, but this will present I

am

I

believe

no serious problems. Britain

sure not unwillingly, carry

much

will.

of the

financial burden in the joint authority period, and,

decreasingly, through the early federal stage. But this will

be much less than the financial strains

suffered to deal with security and compensation for injuries and

violence.

The

damage

Irish

at

the present level of

and American Governments

and the

EEC

are other probable sources of finance.

in

both the traditions. This group,

if satisfied

many

with guarantees that their British citizenship

years has been called "the Irish Problem" can, in

and identity would be safe-guarded, would be

The

British political

respect of

up

in

its

problem which

for

Northern Ireland aspects, be

one word -

ALLEGIANCE.

summed

There are

in

Northern Ireland two quite distinct communities, almost equal in

size.

They

them, the larger, gives

its

are both Irish, but one of

allegiance to the

Crown,

and (sometimes with reservations) the Parliament, of

The

Britain.

other does not consider

it

of allegiance to Britain, but renders nation.

It is

tine,

has any duty

it

to the Irish

of course that almost

of the

all

former group are in religion Protestant, and almost all

of the other group are Catholics, and there are also

marked

cultural differences coinciding with the

among

two

most

likely to negotiate reasonably for a per-

manent settlement. They could be joined

by elements

in the first group, but

second. If this grouping

in this

never the

valid (and there

is

could be other groups and sub-groups) then the point can be

made

that

one

is

not faced, in

seeking a solution, with Unionism as a unified

and monolithic structure -

a matter of

more

than passing importance.

How

should this process begin?

The process can be commenced ways. But

I

believe

it

in a

number of

has to be with an addition to

the causes of the

the declaration of the former Secretary of State Sir

problem, and therefore matters to be addressed in

Peter Brooke to the effect that Britain has no

working out a solution, are not the problem, which

further interest in remaining in Ireland, and his

But

religions.

is

these, while

the question of allegiance. Solve that, and the

and

religious

their present

cultural differences will cease to

magnified importance.

While the allegiance of the is

allegiance of unionists it

inevitably,

is

not always of the same

intention of the British

on

would follow

to say that

Government

it is

to

the

begin

some overlap between them.

leaving behind a state of civil conflict. This state-

who

take pride in being

and traditions of

and they have a sense of belonging, a

feeling of family, in being counted

among the much

ment

will,

of course,

make

it

very clear that no

precipitate withdrawal is contemplated, the process will be

by managed

stages,

and

that

and over a

akin to those of nationalists towards Ireland,

It would probably be better if a was proposed. It would be a vital and absolutely necessary component of such a decla-

and are no

ration that the Protestant

British peoples. Their feelings are very

Then alty,

less intense.

there are those

who

claim a similar loy-

but whose declared allegiance

conditional.

It is

highly

citizenship and their Protestant heritage

protected by

it

is

founded is

less

on

the group

based on an intense

Roman

Catholicism. In Brit-

ain they see their protection against the

of

Rome, whose cunning plans

their Protestant faith they

power

to subjugate

can detect in the most

unlikely people and places.

Most people may

see these fears as irrational and bizarre, but that

does not mean they are not real to the people

who hold them. And lastly there

and unionist people were

given positive guarantees that their right to British

Crown

real motivation is

hatred and fear of

final date

is

love than on self-interest. This

whose

period of years.

stronger towards the

than the Parliament, and

3.

declaration

not on

working for the creation of the conditions under which Britain could leave, without the fear of

part of the history, culture

2.

The new

the logic of that, by going

is

a neutral

is in fact

there are three broad groupings, with,

Firstly, there are those

Britain,

successor's repeated assertions that he

one side or the other, but "facilitator".

nationalist people

a thing of the heart, a product of love, the British

order. In

1.

have

all

would be

possible means, including such

statutory provisions

and international

treaties as

seemed necessary. The next step would be the publication, in some detail, of the steps the British, and the Irish Governments propose to take to further their objective - which, as I shall later set out in

more

detail, is to

move towards joint

rule of

Northern Ireland by the two Governments, and, eventually,

when

it

has received a substantial level

of support, to a federal Ireland. It is

necessary to pause here

to

look more

closely at the original declaration by the British are unionists

who

selves as British, but as Irish too,

see them-

and take pride

Government, for truth".

that constitutes the

"moment

of

He would be a fool who would not such a momentous development

that

recognize as

here

is

proposed will create a situation of great tension and danger - and, unquestionably, violence. It is

more than any other single factor, has given pause to - paralysed, indeed, all

announcement, they would have only one front

I

that

one,

who down

the years have sought solutions

who would

therefore those

to Ireland,

break out of the trap

and

Partition created will be people of courage

imagination - giants of the political world. Their

reward, alas,

unlikely to be immediately pre-

is

sented, but will be a place of honour in history.

do not know

now

such a person

if there is

I

alive in

am puzzled by

do not believe

will in large

to

event of loyalist violence. the

common

announce an intention

ish

which would give permanent peace

in the

predictions of

massacres, blood-baths and holocausts

the fear of this,

those

on

fight

that

numbers

the Brit-

if

to leave Ireland.

for

I,

our Protestant neighbours fall

wholesale. For one thing,

on us and murder us

it is

not in their nature.

For another, one does not imagine a bald statement at a

Stormont press conference

will be the first

intimation of British intentions, but that the

ground

will

have been most carefully prepared tor

many months in advance of any formal statement. By this means it will be made known that nobody

imme-

seeks victory over the unionist people, but only to

political

begin a slow and careful process towards perma-

scene, will be the hour when, for Ireland, "peace

nent peace in Ireland: that at every step the union-

comes dropping slow".

ist

Ireland or in Britain, or likely to be in the diate future, but his, or her advent

It is

probable that the real

will be that of the British

on the

moment of

destiny

announcement of

its

intention to leave Ireland at a specified future time.

When

moment

that

is

passed,

all

subsequent

effect, as

are

whom

it

many,

will find

meant not

to

all.

to

Above

the glittering prize of peace will begin to

emerge out of the barren years of despair. believe there will be reject

all,

that the

harm, but

serve and to protect the vital interests of all else,

it

many who

I

will, at the

for any British

is

accepted there will be

themselves with

at the little

beginning

public sup-

on impossible terms, with

port, face to face,

RUC

and the British Army. One

is

motely

like the

3,000 deaths already caused by the

British failure to

end of

to

meet the problem adequately, not

mention those which will continue

to

announcement of a

If

the first step

is

for Britain to

make

intention to begin a process by which

prepared in advance with great care and sensitiv-

create conditions in

so that legitimate fears are

honest way, and

what

is

it is

proposed

but a victory for

is

made

occur

if

present policies, or lack of them, are maintained

departure from present policies will have to be

ity,

the

entitled to

question whether there would be anything re-

do not

without thought.

The ground

will grow as the rewards of the new departure become clear to them, and loyalist gunmen, of

laid,

and particularly the unionist people, see

new arrangements

be permanently protected. Unionist confidence

both communities,

ground for them carefully

steps, with the

could have a healing

people will be consulted; and that the British

heritage and citizenship of the unionist people will

at

once met

in

beyond doubt

clear

an

that

not a victory for any faction,

which eventually

Ireland, then the next step should

clear it

its

could

to leave

be the enactment

of legislation by which the legitimacy of the nationalist identity

and

political allegiance is

given

statutory recognition and protection.

all.

In so far as a violent reaction can be anticipated

By

this I

mean

that nationalists will

have legal

from some quarters, the British announcement

acceptance of their right to regard themselves as

should have some beneficial effects to set against

Irish citizens,

that.

Of

reaction of the

most important

and so describe themselves on

will be the

official or other

documents, and will be

IRA and Sinn Fein. It seems to me, how the British policy is an-

protected against

all

these, the

all

fully

forms of discrimination,

in

would be a prob-

employment or otherwise, as a consequence of so doing. The right to Irish citizenship conferred on them by the Irish Constitution and

ably consequence. If that were to be so, an enor-

subsequent acts in the Republic of Ireland will be

mous burden would

thus confirmed and accepted by Britain. This will

and depending on

nounced, that there

is

every reason to hope that a

cessation of republican violence

be

lifted

forces. Reinforced, as they

from the security

would be

prior to any

the matter of

not, of course, relieve nationalists of their obliga-

367

population, cannot be cast aside. For one thing,

tions to observe the laws for the time being in force.

will,

It

of course, be remembered that the

same

Irish Constitution conferred the

on Northern

citizenship

on nationalists would apply equally they wish to avail of

it.

The

them,

to

not an intended fact, that for

extremely sectarian

is

of

in the attitudes

As soon

the force.

many

as possible, a

second police service should be established,

if

answerable to an independent authority

right to British citi-

by both Governments acting

At the same time a Parliament of Assembly set up, elected

if

make-up, and

members of

zenship would not be interfered with.

might be

a fact, even

in its

legally conferred

is

is

various reasons the force

and any such

Protestants,

confirmation of that right as

it

rights of

form, badges and the

up

name should show no

adherence to either tradition, and

by proportional repre-

set

jointly. Its uni-

its

sole

aim

should be unarmed

would elect an Executive on a power-sharing basis. Power would gradually be devolved to it in matters not reserved to the two

phasis ought to be on

sovereign governments. But there are strong argu-

Such a service might

ments for postponing the setting up of a local

traffic duties,

administration until the federal phase

prevention and detection of ordinary crime, of

and

sentation,

There

is

should be to serve justice.

it

and have no security role whatever. The em-

reached.

is

forces in

at this stage.

Some of these are (a) The establishment of a Commission by the British and Irish Governments to examine equalization of the laws, and

looking

at

is

one it

is

part of the island to the other.

hoped

that the redundant

By

this

Customs

would have a

should have any role

suitable, at

at all to

play in

way

record in Northern Ireland shows, (c)

I

have made

earlier reference to the

importance

of guarantees to the people of the Protestant Northern Ireland.

and the unionist traditions

in

for

warmer welcome.

predomi-

those areas.

any rank, for such duties, as their

These should be a subject

aspect and a

in

part to play in this,

on the northern side of them,

north-bound travellers with a less forbidding

to the

to be considered.

have been removed, thereby presenting

tary fortresses

The

operate in certain

policing, they are not trained or in any

time

posts,

something

No army

from

and equally unnecessary and even uglier miliwill

is

really the sense of

difference, or "foreignness" for travellers

to the

Whether, as joint authority develops, the Gardai Siochana

roads and traffic signs and regula-

This sort of thing

members who

would have due regard nant culture and allegiance

those laws which the public most

traffic laws,

and move on from that

areas

often experience in operation, such as the road

tions.

policing.

be allocated road

most countries. The religious compo-

sition of the

might begin by

it

community

at first

the types traditionally dealt with by police

a whole series of matters which should

be considered

It

emphasis

at

each

and every stage, and from the very beginning. It

has to be borne in mind that the develop-

advocate will be seen as a victory by

ments

I

an early stage, for the same reason of increas-

some

nationalists,

ing the feeling of "oneness" throughout the

must by all available means be brought home to everybody that no defeat is

licensing laws might also be

The Commission can then go on

island.

more

at the

examined

controversial laws in

at

to look

which matters

unionists.

sought, and no victory

of sexual morality, marriage and divorce are

the great victory for

involved.

will bring.

(b) Early attention has to

be given to the question

of policing, and the role in

Army

in

it

of the British

Northern Ireland. The plain fact

the historical burden carried by the to

its

RUC

role in the early days of the state,

British

Government" s use of force

the front line of a

war with

is that

due

and the

to fight in

particularly nasty

aspects for the civilian (mostly the nationalist)

and as a defeat by most

It

And

it

is to

be pursued, except

all that

a permanent peace

should not be forgotten, so

far as the nationalists are concerned, that they will forsake their vision of a unitary Irish state.

The unionists should be offered

a Bill of

Rights, international treaties between Ireland

and Britain, provisions statutes passed

in a

new

constitution,

by the British and

Irish parlia-

ments, endorsements of these guarantees by the

EEC

and the USA, and undertakings

in

solemn form by the Roman Catholic Church. These promises and guarantees

2.

The Taoiseach and

the

Prime Minister are con-

will include a

vinced of the inestimable value to both their

right to British citizenship in a federal Ireland

peoples, and particularly for the next genera-

Northern Ireland

to all those in

them and

What

who want

it,

for

tion,

of healing divisions in Ireland and of

ending a conflict which has been so manifestly

their heirs.

the author contemplates

process, but one in which each succeeding

to the detriment of all. Both recognise that the ending of divisions can come about only

phase has been planned before commence-

through the agreement and co-operation of the

is

a gradual

ment, (for only in this way can one raise rea-

people, North and South, representing both

sonable hope of a Republican cease-fire), with

traditions in Ireland.

a view to gaining at least acceptance,

solemn commitment

siastic

approval

is

more

if

of attainment,

difficult

from a growing number of unionists stage.

One hopes

for a substantial

But no

anyone

section, let

be

it

a veto on progress.

veto, in unionist hands,

which

that fact,

is

principles, undertakings, obligations

ternational agreements, to

not

is

therefore

jointly

make

a

promote co-operation under

in-

which they have

committed themselves, and the guaran-

be otherwise.

tees

which each Government has given and

can be vouchsafed

now

reaffirms, including Northern Ireland's

for

said,

It is

it

They to

on the basis of the fundamental

at all levels

each

at

measure of

acceptance in both communities, and in the interests of

enthu-

it

to

the presence of such a

statutory constitutional guarantee.

and the

aim

a cause of

failure to face

many of our

to foster

It is

their

agreement and reconciliation,

leading to a new political framework founded on consent and encompassing arrangements

present woes.

within Northern Ireland, for the whole island,

and between these

Appendix 7 3.

Joint Declaration, 1993

They

Europe

The following

is

by the Prime Minister, Rt Hon John Major the Taoiseach,

MP and

Mr Albert Reynolds TD on the

itself,

require

common

new approaches

to both parts

of the

island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the United

5th

1

December 1993: The Taoiseach, Mr Albert Reynolds TD, and the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon John Major MP,

of

will,

to serve interests

the text of the Joint Declaration

islands.

also consider that the development of

4.

Kingdom as partners in the European Union. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Government, reaffirms

that they will

uphold

issue facing the people of Ireland, North and

number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether they prefer to support the Union or a

South, and the British and Irish Governments

sovereign united Ireland.

acknowledge

that the

together, is to

overcome

most urgent and important

remove

the causes of conflict, to

the legacy of history and to heal the

the democratic wish of a greater

iterates,

on behalf of the

that they

have no

On

this basis,

British

he re-

Government,

selfish strategic or

economic

Northern Ireland. Their primary

divisions which have resulted, recognising that

interest in

the absence of a lasting and satisfactory settle-

terest is to see peace, stability

and reconcili-

ment of relationships between the peoples of both

ation established by agreement

among

islands has contributed to continuing tragedy

people

They believe

suffering.

that the

and

development of

an agreed framework for peace, which has been discussed between them since early

which

is

last year,

and

based on a number of key principles

articulated

by the two Governments over the past

who

all

in-

the

inhabit the island, and they will

work together with

the Irish

Government

to

achieve such an agreement, which will embrace the totality of relationships. The role of the British facilitate

Government

will

be to encourage,

and enable the achievement of such

20 years, together with the adaptation of other

agreement over a period through a process of

widely accepted principles, provides the starting

dialogue and co-operation based on

point of a peace process designed to culminate in

for the rights

a political settlement.

in Ireland.

and

full

respect

identities of both traditions

They accept

that

such agreement 369

may, as of right, take the form of agreed

and

struc-

tures for the island as a whole, including a

-

means on Government

peaceful and legitimate means;

united Ireland achieved by peaceful the following basis.

agree that

it is

The

British

two

-

the right to equal opportunity in all social and

economic

self-determination on the basis of consent,

sex or colour.

their wish.

They

if that is

reaffirm as a binding obliga-

tion that they will, for their part, introduce the

necessary legislation to give effect to

this,

or

equally to any measure of agreement on future relationships in Ireland in Ireland

may

which the people

living

themselves freely so determine

without external impediment. They believe people of Britain would wish, in friend-

that the

ship to

all sides, to

enable the people of Ireland

agreement on

to reach

how

they

may

live to-

activity, regardless

These would be reflected

North and

South, to bring about a united Ireland,

in

of class, creed,

any future

political

and constitutional arrangements emerging from a

new and more broadly based agreement. The Taoiseach however recognises the genuine

6.

difficulties

and barriers to building relation-

ships of trust either within or Ireland, will

from which both

work

to create a

beyond Northern

traditions suffer.

new era of trust,

He

which

in

suspicion of the motives or actions of others

removed on

the part of either

is

community. He

considers that the future of the island depends

on the nature of the relationship between the

gether in harmony and in partnership, with

two main

respect for their diverse traditions, and with full

must be made to build a new sense of trust between those communities. In recognition of the fears of the Unionist community and as a

recognition of the special links and the unique relationship which exist

between the peoples

traditions that inhabit

it.

Every

effort

token of his willingness to make a personal

of Britain and Ireland.

The Taoiseach, on behalf of the

Irish

Govern-

contribution to the building up of that neces-

examine with

ment, considers that the lessons of Irish history,

sary trust, the Taoiseach will

and especially of Northern Ireland, show

colleagues any elements in the democratic

stability

and well-being

will not

that

be found under

and organisation of the

Irish State that

his life

can be

refused allegiance

represented to the Irish Government in the

or rejected on grounds of identity by a signifi-

course of political dialogue as a real and sub-

any

poliical

system which

is

cant minority of those governed by reason,

it

would be wrong

it.

For

to attempt to

this

impose

stantial threat to their

that

way of life and

ethos, or

can be represented as not being fully con-

that the democratic right of

modern democratic and pluralist to examine any possible ways of removing such obstacles. Such an examination would of course have due

self-determination by the people of Ireland as

regard to the desire to preserve those inher-

a whole must be achieved and exercised with

ited values that are largely shared throughout

and subject to the agreement and consent of a

the island or that belong to the cultural and

majority of the people of Northern Ireland and

historical roots of the people of this island in

a united Ireland, in the absence of the freely

given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. Irish

He

Government,

accepts,

on behalf of the

sistent with a

society,

and undertakes

The Taoiseach hopes

must, consistent with justice and equity, re-

all their diversity.

spect the democratic dignity and the civil rights

over time a meeting of hearts and minds will

and religious

develop, which will bring

liberties of

both communities,

including: -

the right of free political thought;

-

the right to freedom and expression of relig-

ion; -

370

the right to live wherever one chooses without

hindrance;

parts respectively, to exercise their right of

freely and concurrently given,

5.

-

for the people of the island of

Ireland alone, by agreement between the

political aspirations;

the right to seek constitutional change by

the right to pursue democratically national

all

that

the people of

work towards that objective, but he pledges in the meantime that as a result of the efforts that will be made to build mutual confidence no Northern UnIreland together, and will

ionist should ever

have

:

to fear in future that:

be pursued either by threat or

this ideal will

commodation, put forward and support proposals for change in the Irish Constitution which would fully reflect the principle of con-

coercion. .

Both Governments accept

that Irish unity

would

who favour this who do not, peace-

be achieved only by those

outcome persuading those fully and without coercion or violence, and

sent in Northern Ireland

The Taoiseach recognises the need to engage in dialogue which would address with honesty

8.

that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland are so persuaded, both Gov-

ernments will support and give legislative

and

the status of Northern Ireland

em

must be entered into with an acknowledgement that the future security and welfare of the people of the island will depend on an open, frank and balanced approach to all the problems which for too long have caused

in

would only come

misgivings which dominate so

division.

The

9.

much of North-

He believes that we stand at a stage of our when the genuine feelings of all tradi-

must be recognised and acknowledged He appeals to both traditions at start

and a new beginning, which could hold

such promise for tions to

all

all

all

share their grief and

ful future.

to

develop the best possible which

and new understanding can flourish and grow. The Taoiseach also acknowledges the

many

lie

deep

has

come

to

consider together of

all

how

best the

more balanced ways, which no longer engender division and the lack of trust to which he has referred.

He

confirms

that, in the

event of

an overall settlement, the Irish Government will, as part of a balanced constitutional ac-

and

of Europe.

Irish

Governments

reiterate

They confirm that,

which establish a commitment

in the

can be expressed in

British

paramilitary violence.

in these

to exclusively

peaceful methods and which have

Irish

identities

The

circumstances, democratically mandated parties

shown

that

they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in to join in dialogue in

Governments and the way ahead.

Ireland, the Taoiseach believes that the time

hopes and

and peace-

achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for,

men and women North and South. But as we move towards a new era of understanding in which new relationships of trust may grow and bring peace to the island of hearts of

This will help

necessary to end

that the

presence in the Constitution of the Republic of elements which are deeply resented by Northern Unionists, but which, at the same time,

hopes and ideals which

trust

Such structures would, of course,

links with the rest 10.

trust

reflect

interest.

links that exist between the peoples of Britain and Ireland as part of the totality of relationships, while taking account of newly forged

shame over

relationship with them, a relationship in

will seek,

include institutional recognition of the special

the suffering of the last quarter of a centruy

and who want

common

past divisions, leading to an agreed

our lives and the genera-

come. He asks the people of Northern

who

areas of

over a period to build the

Ireland to look on the people of the Republic as friends,

Governments

Irish

and structures which, while respecting the diversity of the people of Ireland would enable them to work together in

tions in the North

time to grasp the opportunity for a fresh

and

to create institutions

history

this

British

along with the Northern Ireland constitutional parties through a process of political dialogue,

Unionist attitudes towards the rest of Ire-

land.

that

parts of Ireland

in

about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the Taoiseach also recognises the continuing uncertainties and

But

the people and their representatives of both

ef-

fect to their wish. But, notwithstanding the

solemn affirmation by both Governments the Anglo-Irish Agreement that any change

integrity the fears of all traditions.

dialogue, both within the North and between

1 1

The

Irish

democratic politics and due course between the political parties

Government would make

on the

their

own

arrangements within their jurisdiction to enable democratic parties to consult together and

share in dialogue about the political future.

The

Taoiseach 's intention is that these arrangements could include the establishment, in consultation with other parties, of a

Forum

for 371

Peace and Reconciliation to make recommendations on ways in which agreement and trust between both traditions in Ireland can be pro-

moted and 12.

established.

The Taoiseach and Prime Minister mined

to build

peoples

are deter-

on the fervent wish of both

to see old fears

their

and animosities

re-

placed by a climate of peace. They believe the framework they have set out offers the people

of Ireland, North and South, whatever their tradition, the basis to agree that from now on

be negotiated and resolved exclusively by peaceful political

their differences can

means. They appeal to the opportunity for a

concerned to grasp

all

new

departure. That step

would compromise no position or

principle,

nor prejudice the future for either community. On the contrary, it would be an incomparable gain for

all. It

would break decisively the cycle

of violence and the intolerable suffering tails for

it

en-

the people of these islands, particularly

communities in Northern Ireland. It would allow the process of economic and soits full cial co-operation on the island to realise potential for prosperity and mutual under-

for both

standing.

It

would transform

the prospects for

building on the progress already

made

in the

Talks process, involving the two Governments and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland.

The Taoiseach and

the Prime Minister

believe that these arrangements offer an oppor-

more peaceand harmonious future devoid of the violence and bitter divisions which have

tunity to lay the foundations for a

ful

scarred the past generation.

They commit

themselves and their Governments to continue to work together, unremittingly, towards that objective.

15

372

December 1993

Glossary ABSTENTION POLICY

Traditional

IRA/Sinn F6in policy of abstaining from taking

Dail £ireann or Westminster

seats in

elected.

if

AN PHOBLACHT

Weekly newspaper of Republican Movement, published

ARD CHOMHAIRLE

Central committee or ruling body of Sinn Fein.

ARD FHEIS

Annual conference of Sinn Fein.

ARMY COUNCIL

Top

operational, decision-making

in

Dublin.

body of the IRA.

(IRA)

ARTICLES

2

AND

3

Articles in the Constitution of the Irish Republic six counties

BODENSTOWN CEMETERY

which lay claim

to the

of Northern Ireland.

Burial place of Theobald

Wolfe Tone,

'father'

of Irish republicanism

(1798).

BOGSIDE

Strong working-class area in

Deny

city,

scene of the Bogside

riots' in

the early 1970s.

DAIL EIREANN

The

DUP

Democratic Unionist Party led by Reverend Ian Paisley.

FIANNA EIREANN

Young IRA.

FIANNA FAIL

Largest constitutional republican party in Repbulic of Ireland.

FORUM REPORT

Irish

parliament in Dublin.

Report by Irish constitutional nationalist parties following a public

Forum

in

Dublin Castle, 1984,

of

to consider the political future

Ireland.

FREE STATE

A

term for the Republic of Ireland dating from the name

State,

given to the south of Ireland (26 counties)

when

Irish

Free

Ireland

was

partitioned in 1920-21.

HUNGER STRIKE

Refers to the major hunger strike of republican prisoners in the

Maze

prison near Belfast, during late 1980 and 1981.

INLA

Irish

National Liberation

'Official'

IRA

Army,

illegal paramilitary off-shoot

of the

IRA.

Irish

Republican Army, an

IRA

split

from

'Official'

illegal paramilitary group. 'Provisional'

IRA

to

form a separate organisation

in

December 1969.

LOYALIST

Person loyal to Union with Britain, often meaning an extremist Unionist

MI5

The

British Security Service responsible for domestic

counter-intelligence operations.

NATIONALIST

Person, generally Catholic, in favour of Irish nationhood.

ORANGEMAN

Member of Orange

ORANGE ORDER

Protestant socio-religious organisation loyal to the British

PROVIES/ PROVOS

Terms used

RUC

Royal Ulster Constabulary, the police force of Northern Ireland.

SAS

Order.

Crown.

for Provisional IRA.

Special Air Services regiment of the British

Army,

specially trained for

covert operations.

SDLP

Social Democratic and Labour Party, the largest nationalist party in

Northern Ireland.

SINN FEIN

The

political section

of the Republican Movement. Sinn Fein

is

also an

independent, legal, political party organised on a 32-county, all-Ireland, basis.

SIX

COUNTIES

STICKIES

(Sticks)

The

six counties of

Northern Ireland.

Members of Official IRA

or Official Sinn F6in. Traditionally they

stuck their Easter Lily badge on their clothing

when commemorating

the Easter Rising of 1916. (The Provisionals pinned their

STORMONT

badges on.)

Building which housed the old parliament of Northern Ireland,

sometimes known as the Stormont Parliament.

TD

THE

Teachta Ddla, member of Dail Eireann, the

'RA'

Irish parliament.

Local term for the IRA.

THIRTY-TWO COUNTIES

The whole

TWENTY-SIX COUNTIES

The 26 counties of the Republic of Ireland.

UDA

Ulster Defence Association, illegal pro-British loyalist organisation in

island of Ireland

-

all

of

its

counties.

Northern Ireland.

UDR

Ulster Defence Regiment, locally recruited British duties in Northern Ireland,

UFF

Ulster

Freedom

now merged

into the

Army

Royal

regiment for

Irish

Regiment.

Fighters, illegal pro-British paramilitary section of the

UDA.

UUP

Ulster Unionist Party, the largest Unionist political party in Northern Ireland.

UVF

Ulster Volunteer Force, pro-British loyalist paramilitary organisation.

WESTMINSTER

The parliament of the United Kingdom

(meaning parliament)

in

London.

1

1

1

1

INDEX Amnesty Abercorn restaurant bombing, 38 abstention, 15, 21, 34, 105,

1

15-16,

divisions on,

dropping

abstention debate, 130-1

Andrews, David, 229, 255

Arklow meeting, 137

Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985, 22,

121-2, 126,

of, 115, 118,

vote, 1986,

113-14

130

Hume

(ASUs), 158,

161,232 14, 15, 21, 25, 27,

103, 111-13, 120,

129,213,235-

see also ceasefire, 1994;

Hume-Adams

244

and Brooke statement, 212 carries coffin,

282

50, 116,

126,195

and Enni ski lien bomb, 142 talks,

moves, 222-3

political

Whitelaw

169

talks,

133-5

Unionists seek replacement, 243,

Arnold, Terry, 140 Articles 2 and 3. 85-6, 89, 106. 213.

254, 255-6

271,276

1

on agenda, 288, 290

Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement,

in

Brooke-Mayhew

talks, 243-6,

1988, 173-5, 247

ANNIE,

165

52

and

Government, 281

1

1

1.

Ewart Biggs, 172

226

informers, 52

Arlow, Canon William, 170, 171

political,

Arm

sectarian, 32, 55.

Poblaigh na hEireann, 336-8

Armagh, County,

142, 201-3, 231,

40-1

231,313-14

Austin, Joe, 122

B

disturbances, 1969, 89, 107

and Joint Declaration, 302-12

IRA campaign, 1 55

B-Specials, 21

leadership style, 116-17

Markethill bomb. 214-15

Ballygawley, Co. Tyrone, 202

and

Mayhew

statement, 265-7

nationalist submission to,

and

O Bradaigh,

268-9

policy of, 41, 131-2,228-9 political strategy,

226

brigade, 158, 161, 279,

303,312,339 armed

struggle, see

on self-determination, 274-5

153,277

campaign of vio-

arms and explosives,

Behal, Richard,

QMs,

US

decommissioning, 15-16

169

electronic capability,

African National Congress (ANC),

amnesty, 38

INLA, 335 interviews with activists, 39-42

278-80,313

143-4, 150-1, 173, 204,239,

279

IRA IRA

arrests, 151

support

nationalism

Loughgall, 141 loyalist, 90-2, 92,

133, 155-

302, 323

Libyan stocks, 129-31, 135-41,

250

1

bookies' attacked, 220, 231

280

finds, 143-51, 157, 201-2, 208, 237,

Alan, James, 170

Adams' power in, 13 arms finds, 50 bombing campaign, 119, 6,201,218-19,237,263,

Eksund capture, 142

Commit-

22

Alliance Party,

15,320

'Donegal mix', 165

Adams, Michael, 202

Agnew, Paddy, 123

1

1

309-10, 330

242

1

Belfast, 42-3, 122, 131, 313, 31 4-

150, 158, 278-

80

27,

34

1

and Unionists, 96-9

tee on,

Barrett, Dick,

15, 16, 121-2,

controlled by

Administration of Justice,

Down. 133

Down, 215

133-4,206

"Think Tank", 122

talks,

Antrim, 218-19

Beckett, John. 202

and Teebane massacre, 220-1

visits,

Co

Banbridge, Co.

Amsterdam find, 34 bombing techniques, 56-7

Whitelaw

Ballymena,

Ballynahinch, Co.

lence

reorganisation of IRA, 107-1

sell-out accusation,

Armagh

South, 204-8, 279

335-8

164,

218

Antrim, County, 91

263, 277, 335

interned,

conditions for referendum, 251-3

306 assassinations. 91. 92-3.

Arafat, Yasser,

Coalisland funeral, 234

MP,

stability of,

168-9, 254, 298,

talks,

consent' formula, 271

248-51.258-9

British talks, 240-1

Brooke-Mayhew

266

'maximum

violent tactics, 23-4

Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921, 34, 103,

130

Irish

227

1966, 240

on Army Council, 121

'long war',

and

partition,

unity by consent, 86, 2

talks

abstention debate, 123, 124, 128

Bell,

and

293

257-8

reaffirmed, 1989,211-12

Adams, Gerry,

contacts, 172-3

and Joint Declaration. 303, 306, 312

Caraher case, 62

failures of,

active service units

Hume

and Hume-Adams document, 287-9

126,143,173,213,245,

effects of, 46, 240, 252,

Act of Union, 84

elected

24-5,

290

O Bradaigh paper on,

Council, 92, 109, 131, 135,

284,315,345

and ceasefire, 1994, 317-24

19, 152-3

1

127, 129

and

Army

93

Anglicanism, 82

206

6.

International, 20,

Ancram, Michael, 344

23

Semtex, 154-5, 157,238 types of, 154-5, 232-3, 238-9, 239

population riots,

in, in.

30-50, 198 20-1, 54-5

shifts,

31-2

1969-70,35,89, 107.206

rubber bullets, 44-5

375

1

RUC attacked,

1

Hurd speech, 212-14

155

Road bomb, 282

Shankill

international pressure on, 21-2

UDAin,91 Belfast-Dublin railway

line,

302

207

Bennett,

Owen, 225-6, 228

Birch, John,

283-5

as 'persuader', 290, 294, 295, 306,

202

and SDLP/SF

Bleeks, Gary, 219

last resort,

174

talks,

SF

59

Bodenstown commemorations,

59,

97, 278

talks,

battle

of

the,

support

342-5

Caraher family, 61-4

112

Carlin, John, 52-3

Carrickmore, 263

by consent', 25, 86, 21

'unity

1,

275-

Bratty, Joe,

315

Bray Travel, 135-6

Army,

Catherine, Sister, 203

Body,

134,207,312,323

Bloody Sunday, 51

Cavan, County, 40, 150, 280 ceasefire, 1994, 13, 16,

broadcasting ban,

also

263

alert, 158,

killings by, 26, 30, 60, 135, 151,

200

lethal force, 60-2, 133, 141-2, 1512,

1

12, 281,

308-9

Nelson agent

of, 92-3,

plastic bullets,

talks,

RUC patrols,

conditions for referendum, 251-3

outcome, 254-6

SDLP position,

Government,

self-determination

Anglo-

Irish

Agreement; Brooke/May-

hew

talks

ceasefire, 1994, 13, 319, 321-3,

IRA campaign,

27,

96

financial support for NI, 210-1

Framework

376

247-8

unresolved issues, 261-2

Brussels,

for

Agreement, 340-2

rights record,

20

343-4

future of, 342-5 Irish political crisis,

339-40

33 1-3

resistance to, 333-9

Reynolds support

US

for,

SF office

329-3

support, 329-31

238

census data, 3 1 42 ,

Chains to be Broken (Eames), 93

Channon, Paul, 169 Chilcott, John,

288

Church of Ireland, 31 in,

226

Bruton, John, 339-40, 343

effects of

human

in,

Unionist position, 253-9, 260

Brown, Jim, 313

326-8

issue,

Framework Document, 340-2

ceasefires, 218, 229,

253, 260-1

13, 24, 105,

135, 221, 224. see also

decommissioning

republican motivation, 325-8

245-7

motivations of participants, 259-61

205

317-24,325-

45

loyalist response,

244

withdrawal sought, 43, 210

and

240-61, 263,

British/Irish antagonism,

Warrenpoint bomb, 55, 205

British

talks

statement, 1990, 209-12, 270, 297

Brooke-Mayhew basis for,

231

44-5

reinforcements promised, 220

and

Brooke-Mayhew

291-2,294

232-4

community

Britishness, sense of, 14, 81, 88, 93-

Brooke, Peter, 213-14, 222, 240. see

and ceasefire, 1994,326

84

Catholics, see nationalist

201,207 constant

to,

British Legion, 151

5,210

casualties, 26, 119, 135, 164, 166,

repudiates violence, 143

Unionist attitude

270

269

Catholic Church paramilitary funerals, 234

British-Irish Parliamentary

15, 21, 35, 39, 90,

162, 237, 265,

attacks on,

Casement, Sir Roger, 34

and withdrawal, 43, 64

151,162,231

Brighton bomb, 53, 134, 173 British

White Paper, 1973, 252

British Intelligence, 138, 140, 141.

Breen, Sean, 280

Jimmy, 310

Casamara, 136, 137

weakness, 49, 119, 125 Brady, Kevin, 164

Carron.Owen, 115, 125, 198 Carter,

6,288

Bradley, Martin, 313

224

to,

162

Caraher, Fergal, 61-4

81,89

and Unionists, 93-4, 260, 281

Bradford, Robert, 41

for,

Campbell, Philip, 231

'Ulsterisation', 135

Bradley, John, 202

116-17

170-2,209-12,293-4

truce, 1975,

82

attitude to,

talks with republicans, 125, 168-70,

target,

Border campaign, 32-3, 106

Boyne,

SF

90

212, 225

Southern response

and self-determination, 275-6

Bloody Sunday, Derry, 51, 53-4, 56,

225-6

internally,

justification of, 59-60, 88-9,

security apparatus of, 162-3

302

Blinco, Daniel M.,

church opposition, 143

end sought

309 regret for past, 264-5

Tony, 306

Blair,

241,266,276,281,

299-300 peace process, 281-5

Bingham, Rev. William, 215-18

campaign of violence, 200-4, 228 cessation as talks precondition, 214.

227, 264-5, 295, 297,

169

322

Cahill, Martin,

speech, 264-7, 270

'neutrality', 59, 93, 209, 21 1-12,

Bell, Ivor, 107, 129-30, 137-8,

345

295-307

May hew

Opera House, 96

Belfast

Cahilljoe, 107,319,328,329-31,

Joint Declaration, 230, 286, 292,

Belfast brigade, 158, 161, 166,

civil rights

movement, 20-1,

46, 81,

89-90

Bunscoil Phobal Fairste, 46

Clan na Gael, 330

Burns, Brendan, 151

Clancy, Leo, 235

Byrne, Eamonn, 314

Clancy, Peter, 232, 233, 235, 236

1

Clarke, Paddy, 231

Culturlann

Clarke, Thomas, 34

Cumann na mBan, 337

Claudia, 140,330

McAdam O Fiaich,

47

Doherty, Pat, 304-5, 319, 327

Donegal, County, 51, 54, 56, 58,

Currie, Austin, 174

Clinton, President Bill, 293, 309-1

122, 151

arms

1,

322,326,330-1 and

ceasefire, 339,

Clogga

strand,

D£lEireann,15,35, 127, 128 acceptance

136

Coalisland, Co. Tyrone, 30, 155, 237 funerals,

232-6

'collaborators', 54, 56, 168, 218,

237-8 killings of,

Collins, Jim,

Combined

33

Loyalist Military

Com-

314, 315-17,

331,

344 the Administration of

Justice, 61

'Common

strike elections,

Down, County,

123

inheritors of First Ddil,

nity; nationalist

commu-

community

Cordon, Vincent, 122

O Brddaigh warning,

Constitution, Irish, 290. see also Articles

2 and 3

253

Constitutional Guarantee, 15, 93-5,

Drumm,

de Valera, Eamon, 34, 63, 106

IRA HQ. peace

26, 135

Defence, Ministry

of,

British attitude to, 209-10,

299

attitude to, 97, 265-6, 270-1,

274,296,303,318,328 Convie, Gary, 313

Cooke, Margaret, 52

Cooke, Sergeant Tom, 52

Cookstown, Co. Tyrone, 166, 196

Corkey, Samuel, 217 Corrigan, Joseph, 151

276-7, 326

Craig, Colin,

Dublin Corporation, 224 Duffin, Jack, 231

Duffy, Seamus, 44

and Brooke/Mayhew 256

talks,

253-4

finds,

IRA campaign, riots,

Eames, Archbishop Robin, 93, 96-7 292,315,333 Easter Rising, 1916,34

151, 155, 156

51-7

Echo 4 Alpha (E4A), 162

1969, 89, 107,206

Education, Department of, 46

SDLPin, 196

'EireNua', 111-13.277

UDA in, 91

Eksund, 129,136,140-2

Derry, County, 134,201

Elder,

Derry brigade, 51-2, 158, 161, 165

202

Devanney, Sammy, 55

Ervine, David, 333

European Community, 105, 224, 226, 230, 240 growing unity, 290, 294, 305

200

Cromwell, Oliver, 22 cross-border institutions, 307

Crossmaglen, Co. Armagh, 312

Crumlin Road gaol, 33 Cullyhanna Justice Group, 61

Divall,

Tony, 140

Doherty, Christy, 231 Doherty, James,

57-

model

for North-South Council,

253, 260

SF results, 195-6 (NI) Act 1967, 60-1

337

59, 142-3, 150-1, 157, 163, 173

Devine, Mickie, 35

district council elections, 50, 54,

Raymond, 314

Enniskillen, Co. Fermanagh, 30,

Remembrance Sunday bomb, 58

Derry City Council, 196

8,96, 176

Law

89, 107,

E

202

nationalist heartland,

Dungannon, Co. Tyrone, 151. 196,263 Dunne, Ben, 121

Derry, 30, 154, 203

Dewar, Rev. M.W., 81, 82-3

314

Dublin Castle summit, 1993, 286 292-4

Democratic Left, 339-40

Council of Ireland, 24-5

Craigavon, 96

313, 331,332

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),

devolution,

58-9

1993,62-3

Dublin, County, 150

163

Cooper, Frank, 170 Cordner, Dixie, 33-4, 35

1 1

103, 107

rally

UVFbomb,

INLA, 335

311-12

Maire,

death

arms

202

Street Declaration, see

Dublin, 112

and Belfast, 51, 54-5

223, 282-3, 290, 307,

202

Joint Declaration

de Rossa, Proinsias, 339-40

deprivation, 30, 42-3

Constitutional Convention, 125, 171

Criminal

Downing

114, 115, 131

to NI,

Daly, Cardinal Cathal, 26, 219, 221

toll,

170,

brigade. South, 166,

Downes, Sean, 44

104-5, 120

82,92,243,316

Conservative Party, 295

Pat,

Down

28 87

demilitarisation, 16, 27, 28, 210,

Sense' (UDA), 91

communities, see loyalist

Cox,

Doris, Tony, 232, 233, 235-6

Deery, Paddy, 151

Committee on

SF

IRA

powers extending

133-4,219-20

mand (CLMC),

279

Doris, Kathleen, 235-6

225

of, 134, 161,

Constitution Committee, 86

hunger

234-5

RUC station attacked,

finds, 143-4, 150, 164,

Donegal brigade, 158, 161

343

1

36

Doherty, Kieran, 35, 123 Doherty, Martin, 313 Doherty, Paddy, 122

and peace process, 276, 282, 319 321, 322 European Convention on

Human

Rights, 61

European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. 143

European Rights Commission, 52-3 Ewart Biggs, Christopher, 172

Extradition

(Amendment) Act 1987,

General

Army

Convention, 158, 284

general elections,

143

Ghadaffi, Colonel, 129, 138-9, 151,

F

Hughes, Anthony, 141

Hughes, Francis, 34

198, 238

Falls

Community Council, 42-3

264, 315 see also

funerals attacked, 164

Gibson, Lady Cecily, 156, 157, 163,

Fan-en, Sean, 174

Gibson, Lord

FBI, 122

157,

Feakle, Co. Clare, 170

Fermanagh, County, 133, 134, 142,

tion,

Government of

Civil Rights Associa-

sidelined,

FitzGerald, Garret, 134, 143, 172-3

Fletcher, Constable

Yvonne, 138

Flood, Patrick, 207

Department

of,

272

Peace and Reconciliation,

informers, 52, 139, 143,150,202,

206-7

Hale, Eddie, 200

integration,

Hamilton, David, 314

Inter-Governmental Conference,

Hartley,

Tom,

'interim arrangements', 25, 29, 97,

267, 269-70, 274 122, 174, 226,

1 1 1,

Agreement,

16, 307,

326, 340-2

234-5

Fund

International

200

for Ireland,

effects of, 54-5

Healy, Catherine, 55-6

in South,

106

torture alleged, 52-3

Heath, Edward, 24 attack, 310-11,

Gael Scoil na bhFal, 46

Hegarty, Frank, 139

Gael Scoil na Fuiseoige, 46-7

helicopter attacks, 206-7

Galway, County, 131

Helsinki Watch, 20

Garda Siochana, 121, 162, 170, 344

Henry Brothers, 220

Irish

Army, 35

Irish

Free State, 85, 95, 103

Irish

Government, 28, 46, 175, 212,

224, 230. see also Anglo-Irish

Agreement; Brooke/Mayhew talks

appeals

to,

1969,21,35

Holmes, John, 52

and arms

80,313

Home Office, 272

Articles 2

cross-border co-operation, 205 and Libyan arms, 131, 135-7

Hopkins, Adrian, 135-7, 141

balance of risk, 27, 270-1

arms

Gaughan, Michael, 34 Geddis, Stephen, 44

378

293

internment, 33, 38, 39, 57, 107

312

279finds, 138-9, 143-4, 150,

SF document, 227-9

Healy, Adrian, 54-5

Heathrow Airport

G

in

'internal solution', 131-2,

288, 301

Fox, Eamon, 313

56

252, 270-1

Hannaway, Kevin, 131

Haughey, Charles, 123, 143, 212,

Fox, Billy, 173

49-50

I

Haggan, John, 312

319,327

300-1,318,328,331

politics,

Hurson, Martin, 35

H

Hanson, James, 203

Foreign Office, 163, 170

for

and electoral

Hamilton, Donald, 140

Flynn, Padraig, 255

163

Hurd, Douglas, 212-14

Haldane, Jack, 218

Flannery, Michael, 330

Framework

Greysteel shootings, 291

Hagans, George, 151

Fine Gael, 339

283

strikes, 21, 34-5, 38, 44,

effect of, 112, 123-6

Groves family, 44-6

339 and peace process, 308-9, 339-40

Foreign Affairs,

hunger

164

coalition, 264,

funerals,

1988, 173-5, 247-8 nationalist response, 45-6, 58-9

Green Book, 23, 86-7, 97, 120, 127,

Fail, 89, 106, 123, 143, 226,

for

282, 285

Green, Barney, 314

58

talks, 15, 27, 35, 39,

96,229-30,260-1,270-7,

Ireland Act 1920,

311-12

brigade, 166, 168, 303

315, 339-40

Forum

295-301,304

Hume/Adams

85, 228-9, 243-4, 249, 288, 305,

57-60, 155, 164

310

US contacts,

Hume/ Adams Document, 286-91,

Gilmore, Hubert, 204

Fianna, The, 32, 33

Fianna

republican contacts, 172-3

203

Glorious Revolution, 82

1%, 277 ASUs, 161

Fermanagh

56

Gilmore, Constable Colin, 155

Ferguson, Michael, 52, 263

and Joint Declaration, 229-30, 303 nationalist submission to, 268-9

206

Gillespie, Patsy, 52,

Felons Club, 33-5

IRA campaign,

Deny support, 196 EP election, 176

Justice Maurice, 156,

Gillespie, Paddy,

federal solution, 35, 36, 111-13

1988, 173-5, 247-8

talks,

and ceasefire, 1994,318,320-4, 326, 327, 339

206

Faul, Fr Denis, 45

Fermanagh

Adams

151, 161, 165, 174

Road Think Tank', 122 Farrell, Mairead, 34, 151, 234

Hume/Adams

talks

Gibraltar shootings, 15, 34, 130,

'Falls

John, 15,19,21,90,229,

Hume,

239

and

3,

85-6

Caraher case, 62

housing, 30, 32, 42

Howes, Cpl David,

finds, 280-1

164, 174,

234

'concunent referenda', 275

1

and Hume/IRA

and

and SDLP/SF

relations with SF,

172-3

talks,

'internal solution',

1

16, 122, 225-6,

238, 285

200

174

talks,

1

in,

97-8

London, 138

search for settlement, 281-5

and SF peace document, 228-9

and SF peace document, 229

victim numbers, 26, 301

Six Principles, 282-3

war weariness, 45, 236, 238

language, 46-7

Irish

National Liberation

Irwin, Ronnie,

Republican

Army

27-8, 29, 32, 42,

Army

see also

fire,

1

286-91, 295-

Loughgall ambush,

253

123, 152,

1,

283-

Council; cease-

1994; Republican

15, 83-4, 141-2,

commemorations, 152, 165

312,340

Loughinisland shootings, 314

Loughran, Paddy, 23

violence continues, 302, 310-15,

Louth, County, 204. 280

323

(IRA), 15,

19, 157,

21, 107-1

328

151,157,231

joint authority, 134, 213,

301,304,311,319,322,342

4.

Jenkinson, Malcolm, 314

Joint Declaration, 230, 286, 292Initiative',

1,312

warning, 273-4

Long Kesh,

Johnston, Gillian, 164

336-8

Irish

217

IRA

214

attack, 310-1

Longford, County, 131

Irish National Republican Army,

Peace

St attack,

Heathrow

Army

317,333-5,338

'Irish

Downing 63

169,

34, 35, 39-41, 313-14,

INLA),

28, 96, 121,

237, 266, 272-3

Irishness, sense of, 14, 31, 46-50,

and united Ireland, 25 Irish

bombing campaign,

younger generation, 235-6

271-2

talks requirements,

Lockerbie explosion, 256

Logue, Michael, 220

sectarianism

Sunningdale Agreement, 24

1

loyalist

Joint Intelligence Committee, 163

253

joint sovereignty, 39, Justice,

Department

of,

community,

22, 89. see also

loyalist paramilitaries

and

272

civil rights

effects of

Movement

movement, 20-1

IRA campaign,

22, 27,

214-18

abstention policy, 130-1

armed struggle

central to, 52-3,

and Karl Construction Ltd., 164

130-1, 200-4, 300 attitude to Unionists,

bombing campaign,

Kelly, Carol

87

96, 133-5, 218-

border campaign, 32-3 British talks, in

Ann, 30, 44

217-18,261,344 arms, 24

Brooke/Mayhew

assassination campaign, 53, 218,

Kelly, Pat, 151

293-4

230-1,313-15

Kennedy, James, 23 talks,

257-8

cell structure, 39, 109, 111, 122,

339

331-3

Kerry, County, 280

compared

158, 161, 172

command

structure, 131, 158,

community

203

support, 20-2, 26-7, 41,

200

Kildare, County, 180

retaliatory attacks. 27. 60. 220,

Kilpatrick, Olven, 201

and security forces. 230-

King,

1

220

Lyons, Jim, 293

Army Order No.

La 8,

281

guerrilla strategy, 23, 126

history of, 104-7 talks,

272-3

Mon

M restaurant

bombing, 38

306

Labour

Party, British, 295,

Labour

Party, Irish, 132, 264, 308-9,

Leitrim, County, 58

and Joint Declaration, 302-13

Libya, 15, 16, 256-7 see also arms

Limerick, County, 150, 280 Linenhall Library, Belfast, 302

to,

54-6, 162-3, 199

goals', 57, 151

an tSagairt, Canon, 233-4

McBride,Pat,231

Northern dominance, 103, 105-6

'own

Mac

McAvoy, Seamus, 220

Lake, Anthony, 310

isolation of, 126-7, 161-2

Year message 1992, 221-2

Maastricht debate, 260, 281

McArdle, Shane, 313

315,318,339-40

interviews with activists, 39-42

opposition

Lurgan, Co. Armagh, 96, 237

326-8

finances, 57, 121,161

New

255

Lynch, Kevin, 35

Kula, 136, 137

effects of ceasefire, 1994,

and Hume/ Adams

to,

282

Lynagh, Jim, 142

37

and demilitarisation, 276-7

General

91-2

victims of, 26, 135

Kissaun, Roland D.,

dissension, 204-8

of,

Unionist response

Tom, 139

Kingsmills, Co. Armagh, 219,

criticisms of, 232-4

IRA, 98

development

King, Trevor, 314

Constitution, 120

to

kidnappings, 121, 143, 205-6, 207 'collaborators' targeted, 54, 56, 133-4, 168,218-20

16,315-17.325,

ceasefire, 1994, Kerr, Frank,

217-18

loyalist paramilitaries, 29, 172, 200.

Kelly, Gerry, 319, 328, 343

Kelly, Lord Justice, 92-3

19,231,266

loyalist violence,

and Sunningdale, 25-6

Lisbum, Co. Antrim, 40, 219, 231

politicisation of, 127

Lisnaskea, Co. Fermanagh, 263

propaganda, 163-8

Livingstone, Julie, 30,

44

McCann,

Daniel, 235

McCann, Danny,

34, 130, 131, 151

McCauley, Richard, 122

McCloskey,Joe,313

McConomy,

Stephen, 44

McCracken, Kevin, 151

1

1

McCreanor, Daniel, 314

McSheffrey, Eddie, 151

McCreesh, Raymond, 34

MacStiofain, Sean, 107, 119, 169

McCrory, Alex, 151

Magee,

McDennott, Frank, 33

Magee, Rev. Roy, 292, 314, 315,

McDermott, Terry,

174

Murphy, Alex, 151

23

317,331-3

38

33,

Peter,

SDLP talks,

Mountbatten, Lord, 55

Murphy, Constable Paddy, 33, 34

Murphy, Tom, 319

McDonnell, Eileen, 124-5

Magherafelt, Co. Deny, 28, 96, 97

Murray, Anto, 131

McDonnell, Joe, 35, 124

Maginnis, Ken, 94

Murray, John, 164

Maguire, Frank, 126

Murray's bookies, 32

McD's

Club, 33, 38-9

McElwee, Thomas, 35

Maguire, Harry, 151

McErlean, Patrick, 151

Maguire, Thomas, 151

McErlean, Sean, 151

Maguire, Tom, 336-7

McErlean,

281, 315. see also Joint Declara-

McEvoy, Seamus, 1 33-4

and ceasefire, 1994,339

McGlinchey, Dominic, 334

McGuinness, Martin,

Framework

14, 15, 21, 55,

107,120,129, 132,154,222, 235. see also ceasefire, 1994 British contacts,

169,294

possible, 214, 267-8

influence of, 130-131 'interim arrangements', 59,

97

leader, 103, 109, 111, 121

and Joint Declaration, 302-7

on

lethal force policy,

Joe,

McKenna, Kevin,

152, 153

Markethill bomb, 214-18

151

Maze

New

talks

McManus,

Willie, 231

McMichael, Gary, 333

McMichael,John,91, 157 McNally, Lawrence, 232

opinions, 38-9

Ireland

report,

Forum, 301

213

Newry, Co. Down, 155, 156-7, 203, 237, 323, 337

Long Kesh

Newry and Moume

Council, 196

Newtownards, Co. Down, 28, 96,

Mellowes, Liam, 34

97,218 Nicholson, Jim, 94 Noraid, 330

Northern

MI6, 163

Command,

109, 130, 168,

279, 281

Milltown cemetery attack, 164, 165,

234

Libyan arms, 131, 150

numbers in, 161 war weariness, 238

Moley, Brendan, 151 Frank, 58

165

122

Nelson, Brian, 92, 230-1

Sir Patrick, 261, 264-7,

prison, see

174,

327

of,

and RUC, 89-90

women's

MI5, 162, 163

325

7,161-2, 199,200,236

Neave, Airey, 40

McLoughlin, Mitchel, 98, 174, 319,

McManus,

234

and IRA, 20-1, 38. 51-2, 54-6, 126-

voting patterns, 195-6 marriages, mixed, 59

Meyer, Gary, 202 151

McKenna, Terence,

heartland, 51-7

population growth, 31, 321

Marita Ann, 280

Merriman Summer School, 229

170

129, 319,

Deny

politicisation of,

Meath, County, 150

34

McKenna, Gerard,

38-9, 62-4

Marchant, William 'Frenchie', 157

hew

McKearney, Sean, 152

McKelvey,

abandoned by Republic, 21, 25-6,

media portrayal

270, 293. see also Brooke/May-

McKearney, Padraig, 152-3, 231

McKeamey, Tommy,

community, 43, 105-6,

134

Mansergh, Dr Martin, 288-9, 318

Mayhew,

Margaret, 153

Billy, 107,

Mallon, Seamus, 91, 134, 173-4

Mates, Michael, 333

McKearney, Kevin, 23

McKee,

Mallon, Rose Ann, 313

Maskey, Alex, 122

277

Susan, 62-3

McKeamey,

US, 309

Belfast heartland, 30-50

Mallon, Kevin, 121

Marx, Karl, 334

Think Tank', 122

McHugh,

Agreement, 340-2

152

stands for election, 196 strategy, 226,

for

peace process, 286-95

Malta, 136-7, 140, 141

Coalisland funeral, 234

IRA

icy,

dissension,

and ceasefire, 1994, 318-22, 328

compromise

National Committee on Foreign Pol-

nationalist

tion

94

Chris,

'Narrow Water' massacre, 205

Major, John, 27-8, 214, 220, 260,

Tommy, 164

McGimpsey,

N

Molloy, Francie, 234

Northern Ireland Assembly, 125, 126

Molyneaux, Jim, 41, 94

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Asso-

Monaghan, Bobby, 315 Monaghan, County,

122, 172, 204,

ciation

(NICRA), 89

Northern Ireland (Confirmation of

Amending Agreement) Act

205 Monteith, Inspector Derek, 201

McNally, Malachy, 32-3, 35

Moran, Paul, 231 McNeill, John, 200

1925, 245

Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, 85, 94, 209

Morrison, Danny, 111, 120, 122,

McShane, Gavin, 313 MacSheain, Seamus, 47

380

176, 198 'ballot

box' speech, 127-8

Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action,

42

1

Northern Ireland Executive, 24-5,

240

Peace Action Monitor, 328

131-2, 152-3

armed struggle

Peace Commission, 304-5

Northern Ireland Office (NIO), 44,

46,170,210,215,272,344

attitude to Unionists, 22, 81, 83,

229

Pearse, Patrick, 19,

Northern Ireland Parliament, 20-1,

88-90, 96-9

People's Assemblies, 47-8,

1

14 British talks,

240

Phoblacht, An, 111, 121, 168, 232,

abolished, 24, 107

273-4,311

plantation, 82-3

107,

1

'Eire

on

Nua' policy, 111-13

electoral politics,

and

113-14

talks,

1975, 170, 171

6 Bradaigh, Sean,

population shifts, 31-2

and

civilian deaths,

Portadown, Co. Armagh, 28, 83, 92,

and constitutional

96, 97,

Observer, 171

effects of 'Eire

prisoners, role of, 33, 305-7, 320,

1

333 15, 130,

169

Hume/Adams hunger

effects of

O'Connor, Rory, 34

O'Dwyer, Michael, 231

35, 38,

236

334

295-315

237-9,261,263 and

Army (IRA)

Mayhew

speech, 264, 265-7

111-13, 115-16, 132

punishment shootings, 156-7

peace document, 224-9, 230

and peace process, 283-5

Q

political strategy, 47-9, 118-32,

128

Quintin, Mrs, 59

221-3,238

328

in Republic, 13,

R

O'Hagan, Sean, 151

1

18, 224,

Radio

O'Hara, Patsy, 34

railways,

314

Failte,

47

search for settlement, 281-5

207

and self-determination, 274-5

Reagan, President Ronald,

1%

1

39

'sixty-niners', 21, 195, 206,

socialism

O'Malley, Desmond, 248

referenda, 25

and Sunningdale, 25

O'Malley, Ernie, 264

Reid,Fr Alex, 289, 318

Lir,

313

Remembrance Day bomb,

Enniskil-

len,58-9, 142-3, 150, 157, 163,

Operation Silo, 280

Orange Order, 82-4, 94, 96-7, 217

Republic of Ireland, 35, 212-13. see also nationalist

MrsElma,219

arms

finds,

and Brooke/Mayhew

316

talks, 243,

253, 258, 259 Palestine Liberation Organisation

(PLO), 27, 98, 226 Parnell, C.S.,

264

Republican Sinn Fern,

1 1

1

15, 130,

131,153,277-8,333,335-9

peace process, 286-95

143

IRA in, 280-1 SF election results,

261, 314, 315. see also Joint

Declaration

community 106

attitudes to North, 21, 25-6,

Paisley, Rev. Ian, 41, 82, 92, 98,

168-72

Reynolds, Albert, 229, 244, 255,

173

Opsahl Commission, 266

talks, 27,

Republican News, 107,

Reid, Jonathan, 263

Operation Scorpion, 204-5

Oxteby,

and

in,

235

127-8

Rees, Merlyn, 171

Operation

280-1

resistance to 1994 ceasefire, 333-9

O'Hanlon, John, 331

J.,

172-3

23-6

long war'. 28-9, 107. 109. 154-8,

proxy bombs, 203-4, 272

IRA, 41, 206, 278-9, 328,

Omagh, Co. Tyrone,

1

Northern dominance, 103, 105-6,

O'Farrell, Sean, 232, 233,

O'Hare, Patrick

talks.

strikes.

and Joint Declaration, 286, 292,

IRA campaign,

Provisional IRA. see Irish Republi-

can

233-4

and Hurd speech, 212-14

59

53-4

O'Donnell, Jim, 234

J.B., 107,

to violence sought,

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP),

Protestants, 31,46,

O'Donnell, Kevin Barry, 232-3, 236

end

1994 ceasefire, 326-8

history of, 104-5

316,332-3

O'Connell, Dr John, 315, 332

O'Hagan,

1503

Nua' policy, 111-13

Progressive Democrats, 248

O'Connell, Daniel, 264

Official Sinn Fein, 113,

49-50,

dissension. 172, 270, 273, 277-8

O'Callaghan, Gerard, 34

Official

in difficulties, 133, 141-4,

poverty, 30, 42-3 Presbyterians, 31,82, 83

1 1 1,

38 politics,

195-9

215

Portlaoise prison, 142

125

O'Brien, Kevin, 151

O'Connell, Daithi,

16,317-24

movement, 89-90

civil rights

131-2

'internal solution',

44-5

and

plastic bullets, 30,

244

talks,

and Brooke speech, 209-14 ceasefire, 1994.13,

16,

128,130,277-8,335-8,344

293-4

and British withdrawal, 19-24, 27 and Brooke/Mayhew

'War News', 165-6, 168,202

6 Bradaigh, Ruairi, 49,

central, 23-4, 130-1,

200-4

'peace lines', 32

resignation,

339

and US, 309-10 132, 198-9

Republican Movement, 13-14, 15,

Reynolds, John, see also ceasefire,

1994

28,46,154,165,174-5,271-2.

'ringer' vehicles, 165, 214,

see also ceasefire, 1994

robberies,

abstention debate, 34,

1

13,

1

15-16,

273

121,161,200

Robinson, Louis, 207 381

5

1

Robinson, President Mary, 43, 248

self-determination, 25, 175, in

Robinson, Peter, 41

in

rolling devolution, 125

Roscommon, County,

112, 139

Smyth, Rev. Martin, 41 Social Democratic and Labour Party

311

(SDLP), 19,35,54,58,90-1,

republican attitude, 28, 222-3, 266

Regiment, 263

Unionist right of, 223, 247-8, 273-5

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC),

27,41,53,121,141,151,265,

269,344 arms

Smart, Steven, 202

smuggling, 204-5

Hume-Adams document, 290-3

in Joint Declaration, 298-305, 308,

Rowntree, Francis, 44 Irish

Small woods, Ray, 314

277

talks, 247-8,

260-1

Rogan, Adrian, 314

Royal

Brooke/Mayhew

1

134, 172

and ceasefire, 1994,318

Shankill Road, 22, 28, 282, 291,

Deny

313-14

finds, 92, 150, 201-2,

231

attacks on, 32, 154-5, 156-7, 166,

198

Shergar, 121

Hume

Shevlin, Myles, 169

and

207,232-3,312,323 casualties, 26, 33, 52, 58-9, 90, 133,

135,

155,201-3,207,217,263,

shoot to

312 employees

constant

targeted, 133-4

Re-

19-20

abstention, 49-50,

disarming, 210

ArdFheis 1981, 127

disbandment sought, 39, 277

ArdFheis 1983, 116-17

divisions of, 162-3

ArdFheis 1986,132

funerals policy, 234-5

Aid Fheis 1992, 213-14, 225-6, 307

and armed struggle, 52, 53, 116-17,

lethal force, 60,

British talks,

Loughgall ambush, 83-4

and Brooke, 213-14

community, 22

casualties,

resources,

12,

1

seen as Unionist, 20

Hume talks

SF office

hunger

Standing Advisory Commission on 1

15-

1988, 173-5, 247-8

strike elections,

1

stations attacked, 134, 165,

267, 269-70, 274 and IRA, 109, 111, 113-14, 122,

237

Tribunal of Inquiry, 89-90

RUC

Reserve, 90, 156, 202, 263

Ryan, Peter, 232

1

15,

125-6, 198

SAS,

Sunday Times, 139 Sunningdale Agreement, 24-5, 345

nationalist opposition to,

220-1,240-1,263,267-8

Scotland, 297 sectarianism, 97-8

SDLP talks,

Section 31, 112, 281, 308-9 Security Coordinator, 163

382

Ellen,

202

T Tandragee, Co. Armagh, 215

Teebane Cross bomb, 56, 219-20, 221, 232

political strategy, 28, 45, 96, 200,

in Republic, 13,

James and

54-6

peace document 1992, 224-9, 230

Savage, Sean, 34, 151,234

symbols, 34-5

218

office attacked, 231

235

130, 141,151,162, 165,231

Sefton,

Stormont. see Northern Ireland Par-

Letterkenny conference, 317, 319-

membership as stigma, 61, 62, 64

Sands, Bobby, 21, 34, 50, 57,

IRA

Bobby, 305-6

liament

loyalist attitude to,

259

44

Strabane, Co. Tyrone, 96, 237

'Loyalism' document, 88-9

funeral,

Storey,

60

and Joint Declaration, 302- 1

20

S Sadat, President,

Stewart, Brian,

285

rubber bullets, 44-5

Rights, 20,

David, 203

Stickies. see Official

charges, 156

kill'

Human Sterritt,

23-6

'interim arrangements', 25, 59, 98,

'shoot to

Spence Bryson, 214

Stalker, John, 162

16,126, 132,175-6, 195-9,238

attacked, 23

Special Constabulary, 2

and Clinton, 293 Six Principles, 282-3

support, 41, 195-6

election results, 20-2, 31, 57-8,

220

224

281

26

community

Marke thill bomb, 214 'reasonable force', 26

282

rivalry for, 212-13,

332,341,343

broadcasting ban,

loyalist

sovereignty, 24, 85-6,

293-4

and Libyan arms, 131, 137-9 and

266

Spring, Dick, 270, 287, 318, 329,

212

162

109, 158,

Spence, Gusty, 332-3

ArdFheis 1994,307

interrogation, 109, 163

60

Command,

arms caches, 131,150,279-80

informers, 150

killings by, 26,

284

Soderberg, Nancy, 310

Southern

ArdFheis 1993, 267-8

55

200

173-5

South Africa, 92, 231

Movement

cross-border co-operation, 205

hostility to,

talks,

socialism, 127,

127. see also ceasefire, 1994;

1

227-8, 247-8

and Sunningdale Agreement, 24

Single European Act, 224

publican

263

alert, 158, 168,

talks,

'internal solution',

Sinn F£in

policy, 151-2, 162

kill*

Sinn Kin, 13-15,25,27,29, 39,

civilian

support, 51

election results, 126, 175-6, 195-6,

Shaw's Road Gaeltacht, 46-7

329

173-5

and Unionists, 98-9, 327

territorial claim,

45 see Articles 2 and 3

'Terrorism and the Rule of Law'

(UUP), 256-7 Thatcher, Margaret, 40, 124, 139,

Sjarmar, 137 Sligo, County,

Teresa, Mother,

139

163, 164

Anglo- Irish Agreement, 22, 134

Ulsterisation, 135

Brighton bomb, 53, 134,173

unemployment, 30, 42, 51

'whataboutery', 30, 59-60

Unionists, 27, 81, 85, 327. see also

Whitelaw, William, 40,

hunger

21

strikes,

Thompson,

Paul,

Thompson,

Peter,

313

Brooke/Mayhew

200

attitude to Britain, 24,

'Towards a Lasting Peace

168-70

Widow

Scallon's pub, 313, 322

William of Orange, 82 Williams, Michael, 52

WJfcams, Thomas, 33, 34

230 and

dissentipn, effects oT

Truce 1972, 40 14, 112, 125,

31,46

ftb~-2,m

Reginald, 263

WilliftJoshua, 203

IRA campaign, 22

and Joint Declaration, 292, 294301,308

Tullyhommon War Memorial, 151

Wils™, Harold, 315 WilsS, John, 245-6,

253, 255

Wolfe Tone, Theobald,

83,

209-10

nationalist attitude to, 41, 43, 268-9,

women, involvement

285

Twelfth of July, 97

Twomey, Seamus,

Wimamson,

ceasefire, T994,

Green

Book

107, 109, 169

Tyrone, County, 103, 152, 201, 277,

and peace process, 287, 291-2

Woods, Cpl Derek,

republican attitude

World Cup 1994,314

to,

88-90, 96-9,

of,

1

22

164, 174,

234

199

313,320

IRA campaign,

response to ceasefire, 340, 341

156, 157, 232, 235-

and SDLP/SF

6

talks,

security concerns,

Tyrone brigade, 158, 202, 236, 2378,

93

288, 290, 294-5, 306, 309

in Ire-

training, 40, 56, 205. see also

174

220

and Sunningdale Agreement, 24-5

303, 325

East, 136,

19,

1

Whitters, Paul, 44

Britain as 'persuader', 222, 227-8,

Timothy, Mick, 121

Truce 1975,

talks

and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 134

Tidey, Don, 121,205

land', 224-9,

Weston, Galen, 121,205

veto, see Constitutional

166

Guarantee

in Westminster, 27-8, 260,

Teebane Cross, 56, 219-20, 221,

281

united Ireland, 25, 43, 45-6, 95

232

in

U

Mayhew

speech, 264-5

prime objective, 56-7, 222, 277

Ulster Defence Association

unity by consent, 86, 21

(UDA),

casualties, cell

275-6,

United Irishmen, 83

157

United Nations, 105, 226, 276

system, 92

and Nelson, 92-3, 231 Ulster Defence

1,

288

91-2,98,315,316

United States of America, 45, 61,

282

Regiment (UDR),

Adams

26,27,53,158,162,166,344

visits,

309-10, 330, 342,

343-4

casualties, 58-9, 90, 157, 201, 202,

arms from, 121-2

204

Cahill visa, 329-30

Glenane bomb, 215 killings by,

and

60

ceasefire, 1994, 321,

and peace process,

316, 332-3

Freedom Fighters (UFF), 91,231,282,314,331

Ulster

Ulster Resistance,

322

and Libya, 139, 140

Ulster Democratic Party (UDP),

16, 21-2, 293,

311,319

32,

92 Validly, Michael, 151

Ulster Unionist Council,

82 Vella,

DrL,

Villa,

137

141

Ulster Unionist Party, 20-1, 41, 82,

94-5, 281

and Brooke/Mayhew

talks, 254-7,

Dublin

Vincent, Patrick, 232, 233 violence, see

258-9 visit,

259

and self-determination, 247 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 93,

217,220,313-16,322,331,332

campaign of violence

W Warrenpoint bomb, 55, 205

Warrington bomb, 30, 62-3

casualties, 157

weapons, see arms and explosives

reactive force, 91-2

Westmeath, County, 205

383

& ..

it

I

The Long War is a timely book, given the ongoing events taking place in Northern Ireland. It chronicles the very active history of the relationship among the IRA, Sinn Fein, and the British government from the early 1980s to today. The author has spoken with many of the participants on all sides and has included material that updates the book right up to the latest peace talks. "O'Brien deserves congratulations for with issues in a balanced manner that avoids the language of condemnation or confrontation. A dealing

book all

to be

who

recommended

are interested in

strongly to

where we are

going on the island of Ireland." THE

IRISH

INDEPENDENT

BRENDAN O'BRIEN

is

the senior political

correspondent of the television network in the Irish Republic (RTE). He made two major documentaries on the IRA for "Today Tonight", and also set up and spent a year leading an investigative unit for Independent Newspapers. He has won several awards for investigative journalism including the Jacobs Award for Broadcasting and the A.T. Cross National Media Award for Outstanding Journalism.

SYRACUSE

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 13244-5160 ISBN 0-8156-0319-3

90000>