The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY -------- *-------Geza Palffy

Translated from the Hungarian by Thomas J. and Helen D. DeKornfeld

Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado

mj I Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, Inc. IJzJ Wayne, New Jersey

Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York 2009

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS NO. DCCXXXV

© 2009 Geza Palffy © 2009 by the Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, Inc. 47 Cecilia Drive, Wayne, New Jersey 07470-4649 E-mail: [email protected]

This book is a joint publication with the Institute of Habsburg History, Budapest

www.Habsburg .org Jiu Fublc FO'_nCc’>cn for

Habsburg Studies Institute ot

Habsburg History

Library of Congress Control Number 2008936732 ISBN 978-0-88033-633-8

Printed in the United States of America

In loving memory of Pal Engel (1938-2001) and Ferenc Szakaly (1942-1999)

CONTENTS List of Illustrations Acknowl edgments

1.

2.

3.

xi xv

INTRODUCTION: HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURGS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD 1 Prejudices and Debatable Interpretations 1 Turning Points in the History74of * *the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Habsburg Monarchy 6 The Fateful but Little Known Sixteenth Century 8 The Fallacy of the Projection of the Nation-State Concept onto the Early Modern Era 10 On Sources and New7 Researches 13 BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS A Small Composite State: The Kingdom of Hungary in the Late Middle Ages A Country to be Conquered: The Ottomans and Hungary A Much Coveted Throne: The Habsburgs and tire Kingdom of Hungary MOHACS AND PARTITION The Battle that Determined Central Europe’s Fate Two Kings on the Throne of Hungary Civil War and Partition A Very Important but Dangerous Bulwark

4. VIENNA, THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER OF HUNGARY The Composite Monarchy of the Habsburgs in Central Europe

17 17 23 27 35 35 37 41 48

53 53

viii

CONTENTS

The Political and Centralization Program of Ferdinand I Vienna: Fortress, Residence, and Center of Political Decision Making

5.

6.

7.

8.

59 65

HUNGARIAN ARISTOCRACY AND THE HABSBURG COURT 71 The Joint Habsburg Court and the Virtual Royal Hungarian One 71 Difficulties with the Viennese and Prague Integration 76 The Options of the Hungarian Political Elite after Integration 82 Beginnings of a Supranational Aristocracy 86

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE Hungary, an Important but Largely Unknown Bulwark The Protective Bastion of the Monarchy: The New Border-Defense System The Price of Foreign Assistance The Importance of a Military Career The Sixteenth Century Mi 1 i tary R ev ol ution

89 89

94 104 109 112

HUNGARY’S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MONARCHY Hungary , a Dangerous but Wealthy Country' Financial Administration Reforms in Hungary An Important Source of Revenues for the Monarchy: The Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary The Beginning of Administrative Careers in Hungary

FEEDING CENTRAL EUROPE In the Economic Mainstream of Europe A Fragmented Country—Close Economic Ties The Larder of the Habsburg Court—The MilitaryIndustrial Market of the Monarchy The Flowering of Hungarian Enterprises in the Sixteenth Century

119 119 121 129 134 139 140 145 149 153

CONTENTS

9.

10.

INSTITUTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY Sovereignty in a Composite State Election of a King or Acceptance of One The Hungarian Council and the Highest Dignitaries of the Country7 The Principal Arena of Estate Resistance: Ilie Diet Dispensing Justice, the Legal System, and SelfGovernment of the Nobi 1 i ty

SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY Preservation of the Unity of St. Stephen’s Realm The Titles, Coats of Arms and Banners of the Hungarian Rulers Coronations in Pozsony: A Virtual Hungarian Royal Court The Kingdom of Hungary in the Dynastic Representations of the Habsburgs: Coronations and Funerals in the Monarchy

ix

157 157 161 168 177 186 193 193

194 200

204

11.

THE HUNGARIAN ESTATES AND THE BOCSKAI UPRISING 209 Hungary in Ruins, Armed Counter-Reformation, Shaky Political Equilibrium 209 The ■‘Turkish Emigration” from Transylvania, the Transtisza Haiduks and the Estates of Upper Hungary 213 Uprising, Local and Countrywide Civil War among the Estates 217 Rearrangement of Power in 1605-1608: Strength­ ening of the Estates and Advances of the Lay Elite and of the Lesser N obility 221

12.

CONCLUSION: CHANGES AFTER 1526 IMPACTING THE CENTURIES TO FOLLOW

Appendix A List of Rulers and Highest Dignitaries of Hungary

235

245 247

CONTENTS

Appendix B Gazetteer Appendix C Hungarian Baronial Appointments and Justifications for the Patents Abbreviations Notes Archival Collections andPublished Sources Figures Maps Name Index Place Index About the Author Books Published by CUSP

257 259 267 269 273 279 351 363 375 385 397 407 408

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS tables 1. The Kingdom of Hungary, the Austrian Hereditary Provinces, and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century

20

2. The Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary about 1520

25

3. The Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy of Ferdinand I at the End of the 1520s

45

4. The Kingdom of Hungary, the Austrian Hereditary Provinces, and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown in tlie Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

52

5. The Sequence of Banners at the Funeral Procession of Ferdinand I in Vienna on August 6, 1565

54

6. The Districts of the Hungarian-Croatian State in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

57

7. Pay for tire Soldiers in the Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System. Annual Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary, and Military Expenditure Estimates (1545-1593) 91 8, The Number of Border Fortresses and the Prescribed Number of Soldiers in Hungary and in tire CroatianSlavonian Territory in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

99

xii

LIST QF ILLUSTRATIONS

9. Annual Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary by Chambers in the Middle of the 1570s

130

10. The Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary by Source of Revenue in the Middle of the 1570s 131

FIGURES

1. The Family Ties of the Habsburgs at the Turn of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 364 2. The Hungarian Royal Titles of the Habsburgs in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century 365 3. The Marital Ties of the Hungarian Aristocracy in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century 366

4. A Steyr Knife from the Bajcsavdr Excavations (Last Third of the Sixteenth Century) 367 5. An Austrian Jug from the Bajcsavdr Fortress (Last Third of the Sixteenth Century)

367

6. A 1573 Nuremberg Pocket Sundial from the Bajcsavdr Excavations 367 7. Lead Seal of a Bale of Cloth from Nuremberg with the Initial and Coat of Aims of the German Imperial City (Bajcsavdr, Last Third of the Sixteenth Century), 8. The Coat of Arms of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Sixteenth Century. The So-Called Hungarian Small Coat of Arms 368

9. Banner of the Kingdom of Hungary Paraded in the Funeral Procession of Ferdinand I in August 1565 in Vienna 369

10. Banner of Slavonia Paraded in the Funeral Procession of Ferdinand I in August 1565 in Vienna 369

368

LIST OF HIJJSTRATIONS

11. Common Banner of Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Cumania Paraded in the Funeral Procession of Ferdinand I in August 1565 in Vienna

xiii

370

12. Insignia of the Kingdom of Hungary Paraded in the Funeral Procession of Ferdinand I in August 1565 in Vienna 370

13a . Banners of the Countries of the Realm of St. Stephen Paraded in the Hungarian Coronation Procession of Ferdinand II of Habsburg in July 1618 in Pozsony

371

13b . Banners of the Countries of the Realm of St. Stephen Paraded in the Hungarian Coronation Procession of Ferdinand II of Habsburg in July 1618 in Pozsony

^77

14. Catafalque (castrum doloris) of Ferdinand I in August 1565 in Vienna 3$$ 15. The Administration of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Last Third of the Sixteenth Century

MAPS 1. The Realm of St. Stephen in the Late Middle Ages

2. Central Europe, c. 1520 3. Ottoman Campaigns in Hungary7 (1521-1552)

376

377 378

4. Ottoman Campaigns in Hungary (1552-1606)

379

5. Development of the Principality of Transylvania between 1541 and 1570

380

6. The Composite Monarchy of the Habsburgs in Central Europe in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

381

7. Administration of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

382

LIST OF IIUJSTRATIONS

8.

9.

Ilie Border Defense System in Hungary against the Ottomans (after 1580) Foreign Trade of Hungary’ in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

383

334

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book deals with the Kingdom of Hungary, tom into three parts after the 1526 Battle of Mohdcs. It deals particularly with the segment which became part of a new central European Habs­ burg conglomerate of lands and nations and of a new Monarchy but which remained the direct legal descendant of the five hundred yearold Hungarian Kingdom, the realm of St. Stephen. The book focuses primarily on the position of Hungary in tire Monarchy, its integration into this new structure and the peculiar sovereignty it assumed in this framework. The complex system of the relationships and the function­ ing of the kingdom are emphasized. The four centuries of Hungarian-Habsburg symbiosis were fre­ quently discussed, after the middle of the nineteenth century, from the perspective of, and with the myths and prejudices of the contemporary policies and ideologies. Thus, the Habsburgs were frequently repre­ sented as tlie oppressors of Hungarian independence and the Kingdom of Hungary was viewed as a colony of the Monarchy and as a buffer state vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire. It is my intent to examine the sixteenth century relationship between tire Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary7 with an approach different from the previously popular anti Habsburg or pro­ Habsburg perspective or from the colony versus independence point of view. I have endeavored to discuss the multilayered system of relation­ ships from the perspective of both sides and on the basis of previously only poorly understood new documentation. I map out the conflicts, the debates, the compromises and the resignations in the various areas, such as administration, the court, military and financial matters and matters of sovereignty. I hope that I was able in this volume to do away with most of the still very7 active prejudices and myths about the Habsburgs and about the

XVI

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Hungarian elite that cooperated with them. If 1 was successful, it was due largely to the support of my teachers, my colleagues, and the many staffers of a number of central European archives. First and foremost I wish to thank my university professors. I was introduced to the history of the Ottoman Empire, to the power-struggle between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs and the basic methods of historical research by Gdbor Agoston who is presently on the History Department of George­ town Lfriversity in Washington, D.C., USA. It was the recently deceased Eva H. Balazs who taught me to always think in an international frame­ work and to cooperate actively with colleagues from many lands. The appreciation of archival research was imparted to me by Eajos Gecsenyi and by the late Ferenc Szakdly who always watched my work with great interest and a quasi paternal affection. I wdsh to dedicate this book to the memory of Ferenc Szakdly and Pdl Engel. Working with the late Andrds Kubinyi, I not only learned about the history of the late medieval King­ dom of Hungary and about the often ignored importance of that era but I have also become acquainted wdth his masterful survey, The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526, which had a major impact on a number of chapters in this work. The same can be said about a number of colleagues on the inter­ national scene whom I got to know first from their wmtings and later, personally, at conferences and during archival research. They include Robert J. W. Evans from Oxford, Jeroen Duindam from Utrecht, Jean Berenger, and Olivier Chaline from Paris, Joachim Bahlcke from Stuttgart, Anton Schindling and Marta Fata from Tubingen, Mark Hen gerer from Konstanz, Meinolf Arens from Munich, Vaclav Buzek and some of his pupils (Josef Hrdlicka, Pavel Krdl, Zdenek Vybfral and Tornds Stemeck) from Ceske Budejovice, Jaroslava Hausenblasovd, Jaroslav Pdnek and Petr Mat’a from Prague, Tomas Knoz from Bmo, Milan Kruhek, Hrvoje Petrie and Natasa Stefanec from Zagreb, Tatiana Gusarova and Olga Khavanova from Moscow, Michael Hochedlinger, Katrin Keller, Richard Perger, Peter Rauscher, Karl Vocelka and Thomas Winkelbauer from Vienna. Winkelbauer acquainted me with the scholars of the Habsburg Monarchy, supported my first German language publication and always assisted me most generously. It was their advice, friendly cooperation, and assistance in providing me with their frequently hard to find work which made a major contribution

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xvii

toward enabling me to present the liaison between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary during the sixteenth century in a new light. This work is the summary of my researches performed during the past fifteen years in Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Germany, and the Czech Republic. I owe my thanks to the many staff members of the various state, province and city archives in these countries. I am also indebted to the owners of the privately held family archives of tlie Auerspergs, Erdodys, Grafeneggs, Pdlffys, and Trauttmansdorffs who gave me access to their collections. Among my colleagues at the archives I must pay particular tribute to Lajos Gecsenyi, the former and Istvdn Fazekas, die present Hungarian delegate to the Austrian State Archives. They not only provided daily guidance but also allowed me access to their private data and works in preparation. Without their help and the help of my friend H. Istvdn Nemeth, and two other archivists at the Hungarian National Archives, Margit Juddk, and Attila Sunko, this work would not have been possible. I would also like to extend my thanks to my friends and colleagues who read and reviewed the individual chapters before their publication and offered suggestions and corrections. They include Pdl Acs and Lajos Gecsenyi in Budapest, Peter Dominkovits in Sopron who reviewed the entire manuscript. I am also very grateful to Ildiko Hom, Istvdn Kenyeres, Baldzs Suddr, B. .Idnos Szabo and Istvan Tringli in Budapest, Peter Kirdly in Kaiserslautern and my students Szabolcs Varga in Pecs and Peter Andreis Szabo in Budapest. Zsuzsa Teke in Budapest helped me generously in the interpretation of old Italian material while Vera Zimdnyi provided enormous assistance in sharing with me her enor­ mous collection of reprints. I wish to thank the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for its support for fifteen years, and the colleagues at the institute’s Department of Early Modem Era for many years of produc­ tive discussions. I am grateful to my wife, Magdolna Friedler, for always providing me wdth an ideal environment for my work. Lastly, but most sincerely, I wish to thank the Institute of Habsburg History for supporting the publication of this work; the Hungarian Awards Committee, the National Scientific Research Foundation, the Bohemian, Croatian, Austrian, and Slovakian Academies of Sciences,

xviii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

and the pro Renovanda Culture Hungariae Foundation for their consis ­ tent support of my researches in Hungary and abroad through grants such as Ilie Jdnos Bolyai, Ferenc Deak. and Kuno Klebelsberg scholar­ ships. I also wish to thank Dr. Thomas J- and Mrs. Helen D. DeKom feld for their extensive and constructive work in translating the text into English. Budapest, February 2008

Charier One

INTRODUCTION: HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURGS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD Prejudices and Debatable Interpretations The way in which the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­

tury relations of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary were viewed changed significantly after the first half of the nineteenth century. Modem Hungarian historiography came into existence in the eighteenth century. Its first practitioners were influenced by the con­ temporary Habsburg state in which they lived. The appearance of the nation-states and of the concept of national independence brought major changes. The historical concept of independence became the major trend in Hungarian historiography during the last third of the nineteenth century. Its role is still important today and was particularly important during certain earlier periods. It was accepted equally by Catholic and Protestant historians, by positivists just as much as by the historians of ideas, by Marxists and by the partisans of the national romanticism of our day.1 A solid basis was laid down, during the second half of the nine­ teenth century, by the romantic nationalist historians.2 They uncovered enormous archival material but assessed it from the perspective of the political situation and independist ideology of the times. The principal representatives of this approach were the Protestant KAlmAn Thaly (1839-1909) and the leader of the Viennese research group, SAndor

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Takdts (1860-1932), aPiarist priest. The former published a number of volumes of source material on the activities of Imre Thbkbly and Ferenc II Rdkoczi but, as a leading member of the Independence Party, Ilie concepts of national independence dominated his historiography. Thus, he even published historical poems which he forged himself. Takdts was one of the greatest experts on the contents of the Vienna archives. He was firmly anti-Habsburg and thus in his essays, written in an enjoyable style, he generally endeavored to show the anti-Hun­ gary sentiments of the Vienna court. In the absence of more recent investigations, their writings were used frequently during the decades after World War II and are of importance even today. The perspectives of Thaly and Takats were based on their firm resolve to engage in extended polemics with their Austrian historian colleagues who repre­ sented a dynastic-imperial perspective. In writing the history of the multinational Kingdom of Hungary in the early modem era not every historian subscribed to the concepts of national independence, even when romantic nationalism was at its peak.3 Ignac Acsady (1853-1906), who summarized the history of the sixteenth century for the 1896 millennium of the Hungarian conquest, or Arpdd Kdrolyi (1853-1940), who was another great expert, on the Vienna archives were more careful in their presentations.4 An even stronger position was taken in his Magyar tortenet by the most noted Hungarian historian of the first half of the twentieth century, Gyula Szekfu (1883-1955), even though in his historiographical works, stress on tlie nation-state perspective could be noticed. After several years of research in the Viennese archives and on the basis of the sources con­ cerning the Kingdom of Hungary, he concluded that the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century activities of the Habsburgs vis-a-vis Hungary could not be summarily condemned. According to Szekfu, the Habs­ burgs, in cooperation with the Hungarian landowner nobility, played an important role in the protection of the Kingdom of Hungary against the Ottomans.5 Because of this view Szekfu was severely criticized by his romantic nationalist colleagues and by the major representatives of the post-1950 historians. It was thus that Szekfu was classified with the “bourgeois, pro-Habsburg falsifiers of history.” In these debates the primary considerations were not the appropriateness of the sources but the virulent prejudices of the period and the nationalist illusions.

INTRODUCTION: THE, EARLY MODERN PERIOD

3

The above epithet came from Aladdr Mod (1908-1973), one of the most unusual figures of the national independence concept and the “father” of Hungarian “scientific socialism.” In his celebrated, romantic nationalist monograph, 400 ev kiizdelem az bnallb Magyarorszagert, he offered an inteipretation of history that reflected the political ideology of his times .6 Hie work presents the joint history of the Hungarian state and the Habsburgs, from 1526 to 1918, as a fight for Hungarian independence against the “German oppressors,” the “Austrian colonizers” and the ’’imperialist” Habsburgs. The leaders of this struggle on the Hungarian side were the princes of Transylvania. The work, first published in 1943, was written in opposition to German fascism. In a number of significant­ ly enlarged and modified editions, after the 1950s, it became, in support of communist propaganda, an attack against German imperialism and against the Habsburgs. In this era, the work was very effective. It focused on a few of the critical periods in the history of the Habsburgs and the Hungarians, such as the Bocskai uprising (1604—1606), the R^koczi War of Independence (1703-1711), and the 1848M9 Revolution and War of Independence and superimposed the problems of these limited time peri­ ods to the entire four centuries of the Habsburg-Hungarian relations. He assessed the hi story of Hungary in the early modem era in the spirit of the prevailing political ideology of his times, without having done any basic research and ignoring the fundamental principles of his craft. Even though the work is now rarely read by students, its effects on historical perspectives are still very much alive. The influence of the politics and ideology of the 1950s and 1960s on Hungarian historiography was so profound that even the most sig­ nificant researcher of the history of Hungarian administration, Gyozo Ember (1909-1993), accepted the view that the Habsburgs impeded the evolution of the Hungarian nation in the early modem era.7 This per­ spective resulted, between the 1950s and 1970s, in a very selective use of the sources and consequently led to an idiosyncratic selection of top­ ics and a tendentious assessment of the source material. The debates in the 1960s on the issues of nationalism, firmly attached to the name of Erik Molndr, testify to the contradictions inseparable from this per­ spective.8 Yet, these discussions resulted in a number of internationally important professional results such as the surveys, spanning this entire period, published by Jeno Szucs (1928—1988) A

4

THE, KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE, HABSBURG MONARCHY

Consequently, the majority of the historical surveys, written dur­ ing the twenty-five years after World War II, could say little new about the activities of the Kingdom of Hungary, ruled by the Habsburgs, when compared to the important summaries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 For this reason, such works largely discussed the confrontation of the Habsburgs with the Transylvanian princes who conducted their own foreign policy. According to these works, these princes, particularly Istvdn Bocskai, Gdbor Bethlen, and Imre Thokoly fought for an “independent Hungary,” albeit with the help of several thousand Ottoman and Tatar troops.11 Official policies consistently supported this dubious concept. This was demonstrated vividly to the public when during the first half of the 1950s when the statues of the Habsburg rulers (Ferdinand I, Charles III, Maria Theresa, Leopold II, and Francis Joseph) in the Hungarian royal pantheon on Heroes’ Square in Budapest were replaced by the statues of IstvAn Bocskai, Gdbor Bethlen, Imre Thokoly, Ferenc II Rdkoczi, and Lajos Kossuth.12 Another method for the schematic assessment of the Habsburgs’ Hungarian policies was to show their opposition to the freedom fight and state of Ferenc II Rdkoczi, who conducted an armed struggle for independence. The survey by Agnes R. Vdrkonyi (b. 1928), Ketpogany kozt: A Rakoczi-szabadsagharc tortenete, revealed this method vividly in four successive editions.13 This volume was one of the most popular works during the 1970s and 1980s for the students interested in the his­ tory of the early modem era, including the author of the present vol­ ume. It was decisive in establishing the view of history for the present younger generation. It was thus that the Habsburgs, who wore the royal crown of Hungary’just as legitimately as did the Italian Angevines or the Polish Jagiellos, were transformed into conquerors just like the Ottomans who had in fact conquered one third of the country with armed forces. During the 1960s to 1980s the studies first of Kdlm&i Benda (1913-1994) and Ldszlo Makkai (1914—1989) and later of Ldszlo Benczedi (1929 -1986), Katalin Peter (b. 1937), Ferenc Szakaly (1942 1999), and Imre Szanto (1920-1993) significantly modified the earlier perspective.14 Yet, even then, the Hungarian policies of the Habsburgs and the activities of the kingdom were rarely studied on the basis of the resources in the Vienna and Budapest archives. New investigations

INTRODUCTION: THE, EARLY MODERN PERIOD

5

focused primarily on the resistance of the Hungarian estates against the centralist or absolutist activities of the rulers and on the various anti­ Habsburg movements. In this context, the students of political and administrative history spent most of their time analyzing the rule of Jdnos (John) Szapolyai, the evolution of the Transylvanian principality and, first and foremost, the anti-Habsburg campaigns of the Transyl­ vanian princes.15 Hie selection of topics relative to the Habsburgs and the Kingdom of Hungary was still frequently one-sided in spite of the lessening of the ideological pressures. In both spirit and professional­ ism the three volume history of Transylvania can be considered to be a major achievement.16 After the 1980s, the anachronistic historical theme of national inde­ pendence was gradually replaced by the theory of the national unifica­ tion attempts which originated in Transylvania. This approach is clear in the most significant undertaking of postwar Hungarian historiography, the ten-volume history of Hungary. The two volumes dealing with the period between 1526 and 1686 no longer speak of an independent Hun ­ gary, not even in a discussion on Transylvania. The princes are involved only in ’’anti-Habsburg struggles” and “national unification endeavors” and no longer in fights for freedom or national independence move­ ments.17 This view was rejected sharply by Ferenc Szakdly, one of the greatest experts on the internal matters of the kingdom.18 In spite of this the above concepts continue to be very much alive. Yet, even after World War II not every Hungarian historian inter­ preted the history of the Kingdom of Hungary in the early modem era from the perspective of the anti-Habsburg movements or national inde­ pendence. In addition to the economic historians to be discussed below, we must particularly recognize Eva H. Baldzs (1915-2006), Domokos Kosdry (1913 -2007), Ferenc Szakdly, and Jeno Szucs as well as the Hungarian Osmanists who always thought in terms of international relations.19 While H. Balazs and Kosdry assessed the eighteenth centu­ ry Habsburg-Hungarian relationships and cultural matters from a new perspective, Szakdly studied the role of the Hungarian large estate own ­ ers and the Hungarian history7 of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­ turies.20 Jeno Szucs, in his overarching historical essay in 1983, made daring statements like, “The dreams begin by saying that the Habs­ burgs might have been forestalled... .They continue by stating that there

6

THE, KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE, HABSBURG MONARCHY

was an idea of some kind of ‘national absolutism’ at work in depths of anti-Habsburg movements. They end by concluding that these move­ ments would have achieved some freedom for the serfs.”21 Even the most ardent representatives of the independence perspective of the 1950s -1970s significantly modified their earlier view's.22 The works prepared in a European framework after the 1980s con­ tributed substantially to the beginnings of a gradual reassessment of the Habsburg and Hungarian relations. The independence concept, based on solid nineteenth century traditions resulted in the fact that the post-1526 Habsburg rule of Hungary is given, even today, a biased interpretation. Tins view becomes less frequent in the professional monographs and is seen primarily in works on the seventeenth century and on the Rdkoczi War of Independence 23 The long range effects of the national indepen­ dence perspective of the 1950s-1970s Hungarian historiography can be seen clearly in the Hungarian histoneal summaries of Paul Eendvai (b, 1929), the Austrian journalist of Hungarian descent. The chapter intro­ ducing the reader to Transylvania is entitled, anachronistically in 2003, “Stronghold of Hungarian Sovereignty.”24 The same is shown in the most recent history of Hungary, written in English, discussing the his­ tory of the 150 years after the middle of the sixteenth century under the title of, The Struggle for Independence (1547-1711) 25 The proclama­ tion of the independence of the Republic of Hungary in 1989 made it easy to recruit new adherents to the anti- Habsburg nationalist romanti­ cism. Consequently there appeared a series of new summaries which emphasize the early modem era struggle for independence theme. These were not written by professional historians and their arguments were based on the myths and prejudices, which had become part of the pub­ lic consciousness, and not on valid sources.26

Turning Points in the History of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Habsburg Monarchy Even though the Rdkoczi War of Independence (1703-1711) was evidently a major landmark in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary7 and of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was not the only turning point in Hungarian-Habsburg relations during the six­

INTRODUCTION: THE, EARLY MODERN PERIOD

teenth to eighteenth centuries. Turning points need not be endeavors for independence. In the several centuries there were a number of decisive periods which determined the relationship between the kingdom and the monarchy governed by a common ruler. In my view there are three such periods between the B attle of Mohacs in 1526 and the time Maria Theresa assumed the throne in 1740. During these periods either the sit­ uation and role of the Kingdom of Hungary’ underwent a significant change, or the Habsburg Monarchy and the ruling court underwent sub­ stantive change or the two processes occurred at the same time. 1. One of the decisive periods which had long-lasting effects occurred during the decades immediately after the Battle of Mohdcs. The central European position of the Kingdom of Hungary underwent significant change and at the same time, and largely due to Hungary, the earlier domains of the Habsburg dynasty also underwent changes which lasted for centuries. Due to these events, the first half of the six­ teenth century became one of the most significant periods in Hungari­ an history. 2. The second, somewhat less significant period was the quarter century after the 1606 Peace Treaty of Vienna. This era was rife with contradictions. During this time, and again largely under foreign influ­ ences, the Hungarian estates and the lay elite gained significant strength and then the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) led to major changes and crises in the Habsburg Monarchy. What followed were significant metamorphoses in the Vienna court and in the ruling elite of the Monarchy. 3. Lastly, the third decisive period was the half century’ between the 1670s and the 1710s. The Hungarian crisis of the 1670s, the so-called Wesselenyi Conspiracy, was followed by the almost complete libera­ tion of Hungary from Ottoman rule (1699) and then by the Rdkoczi War of Independence. The Treaty of Szatmdr, which brought this war to an end in 1711, brought peace and renewal after almost two hundred years of war. The Kingdom of Hungary became one of the most signif­ icant, largest, and most appealing components of the Danubian Monar­ chy. This then offered an opportunity for an internal rearrangement between the kingdom and the monarchy and between the Hungarian political elite and the Habsburg court.

8

TIE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND TIE HABSBURG MONARCHY

The Fateful but Little Known Sixteenth Century Of the three turning points it is the Rdkoczi War of Independence that we are most familiar with. There are a number of shorter and longer summaries of this event in a variety of languages.27 Yet. the post-1711 Hungary, with ail the changes of the preHous fifty years has not yet been the subject of a thorough investigation in an international framework.. An understanding of the role of the Hungari­ an aristocracy and of the higher clergy, loyal to the Habsburgs during the War of Independence, is also fragmentary. This is particularly regrettable because their loyalty made the war a civil war. During the past two decades there has been a start, toward investi­ gations in this area. The majority of these no longer assessed the changes occurring after the 1670s from the perspective of the indepen ­ dence theme of the earlier historiography.28 The conditions in the eigh­ teenth century’ have been documented for international historiography by the works of Henrik Marczali, Bela K. Kirdly, and Eva H. Baldzs and by the numerous essays by Robert J. W. Evans.29 The twenty five years after 1606 have received considerably less attention. The important studies of Kdlman Benda and Ldszlo Makkai, during the 1960s and 1970s, focused primarily on the years between 1604 and 1608.30 Since that time only a Russian historian, K.T. Medvedeva, and the authors of several biographies and studies of Bocskai investigated this period in some detail but even they generally lim­ ited their studies to the same four years.31 Thus, the Hungarian and international public, interested in this period, have to rely on the chap­ ter dealing with Hungary in R. J. W. Evans’s monograph, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700, and on the more recent publi­ cations of Jean Berenger and Tatiana Gusarova on the Hungarian diet as well as on the studies on military history by Laszlo Nagy.32 In addi­ tion to these, the recent studies of Peter Tusor on the prelates of the Hungarian Catholic Church are a welcome exception.33 In the 1990s the situation was even more unsatisfactory so far as the half century after the Battle of Mohdcs was concerned. The pre Mohdcs Habsburg-Hungarian relations and the battle itself have a con­ siderable literature in a variety of languages.34 The critically important changes after 1526 were elucidated primarily by the Hungarian eco­

INTRODUCTION: THE, EARLY MODERN PERIOD

9

nomic historians. Their work was in keeping with the general flourish­ ing of economic history in Europe and was linked tightly to interna­ tional investigations.35 The principal resources for the political condi­ tions of the Kingdom of Hungary in this period are Jozef Karpat’s monograph on the legislative powers and Gyozo Ember’s exceedingly important administrative history.36 During the past ten years about a dozen studies, based on basic research, have been published in a vari­ ety of languages.37 The understanding of the functioning of the Kingdom of Hungary after 1526 and its place in the Habsburg Monarchy has not been helped by the recently published Hungarian and Croatian works on constitu­ tional and administrative history'. These works, with the exception of Gyozo Ember’s monograph, have not been based on archival research but were simply summaries of the scholarly literature.38 Thus, they do not go beyond the work that had been done before the middle of the twentieth century. Hie same is true for the two more comprehensive studies of the Habsburg-Hungarian relations. The 1937 survey of Cle­ mens Graf zu Brandis, Die Habsburger und die Stephanskrone, has been largely forgotten by international and Hungarian historiography. While the work is more sympathetic toward Hungary, it has a strong dynastic perspective and is critical of the Hungarian estates.39 Hie ama­ teur historian and jurist, Janos Sdra (b. 1923), has little to say about the century after 1526 in his extensive survey published Hungarian, A Hobsburgok es Magyarorszag 950-1918. Hie volume, written from a Hun­ garian point of view, is a popular survey of political history and of the events.40 Little help is provided by anew work written for a wider read­ ing public, which provides a chronological survey of the history of the Habsburgs and of the Croats.41 The English-speaking readers were able to obtain during the recent decades surveys of Hungarian history published in English. Because there is more interest in the contemporary era, the history of the nine­ teenth and twentieth centuries, however, lakes a prominent place and the history of the sixteenth century is given no more than a few pages. Even in these chapters the emphasis is on events, social, religious, and cultur­ al history.42 They do not discuss the administration and governing struc­ tures of the Kingdom of Hungary or its position in the Habsburg Monar­ chy, or discuss it only in the context of the eighteenth century.

10

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Even less information is provided by the more extensive histories of the Habsburg Empire and Monarchy. Their authors, with the excep­ tion of R. .1. W. Evans and Emil Niederhauser, make little use of the Hungarian literature 43 They spend little time of the sixteenth century and focus their attention on the history of the seventeenth to the nine­ teenth century. Thus Hungary is mentioned only when the Turkish wars, the reformation, or the economic links are discussed.44 Among these works, other than the work of Evans, only the mono­ graph by Thomas Winkelbauer represents an exception.45 This overview studies the period between 1522 and 1699 in two volumes and nearly twelve hundred pages. The author does not use Hungarian primary sources to a great extent but uses the findings of the abovementioned foreign language publications to the full. Furthermore, when Winkelbauer discusses the state governments of the Habsburg Monarchy, he always includes the structure and major issues of the Kingdom of Hungary.

The Fallacy of the Projection of the Nation-State Concept onto the Early Modern Era

Evans and Winkelbauer study the complex, multi­ ethnic and multicultural Habsburg Monarchy in the context of the six­ teenth and seventeenth century state formations, i.e. the Austrian hereditary provinces, the lands of the Bohemian, and Hungarian crowns, and the Holy Roman Empire. This perspective is by no means used widely. In the case of the successor states of the Austro-Hungar­ ian Monarchy, particularly Slovakia which became independent in 1993 and Slovenia, and Croatia, which separated from Yugoslavia in 1991, focus on the nation-state perspective and studies in the frame­ work of modem state boundaries are very much alive. Today, they are related particularly to the actual political situation and to the recently attained independent statehood. The lack of historical perspective, rel ­ ative to the early modem era, is shown clearly in two recent volumes of studies published in the capital of Slovakia. One of them endeavors to analyze the relationship between Slovakia and the Habsburg Monarchy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while the

INTRODUCTION: THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

11

other one discusses the position of Slovakia within the Monarchy between 1526 and 1918 [sic]46 It must be emphasized that during the early modem era Slovakia did not exist, either as a territorial concept or as a state and thus it could not have been a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. To speak of Slovakia in a sixteenth century context is just as much an anachronism as talk­ ing of the thirteenth century' history of the United States of America. Assessment of the documents in the above two works is made difficult by the fact that the authors appear to be unfamiliar with the substantial Hungarian professional literature dealing with that period. The result is as if somebody wanted to write the history of the United Kingdom or of the United States of America, being unfamiliar with any language except Spanish. It is clearly a dubious practice to study the relationship of twenti­ eth century Slovakia to the Habsburgs. In the early modem era Slo­ vakia did not constitute any territorial, political, or administrative unit and was not even an ethnic area. The same is true for the Austrian province of the Burgenland which was created in 1921. As will be shown later, it is incorrect to speak of a united Dalmatian-CroatianSlavonian kingdom until the second half of the sixteenth century, even though Croatian historiography does this frequently, ever since the nineteenth century, by projecting later conditions and borders back to the entire medieval period.47 It is ahistorical to speak of the Slovakian-Turkish border in the six­ teenth and seventeenth centuries, or of the presence of Turks or Buggers in Slovakia, or of the development of customs in Slovakia, or of Slo­ vakian copper, or of copper mining in Slovakia. It is equally anachro­ nistic to speak of Burgenland in the Turkish era, even though a number of works have been published with such titles during the past decades.48 A somewhat more appropriate solution was chosen by the Slovenian historian Ignacij Voje. Because there was no Slovenia in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries when the area was known as Camiola and partly Styria, he wrote the military history of the former Camiola, inhabited by Austrians and Slovenians, under the title of Slovenci pod pritiskom turskega nasilja.49 A similar technique was adopted by Vjekoslav Klaic at the beginning of the twentieth century, who summarized the history of Croatia of his time under the title of Povijest Hrvata...?Q

12

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

'Ilie works prepared from the perspective of the national state do little to make us understand the system of relations between the central European Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary in the six­ teenth century. The Slovakian, Slovenian and Croatian historians examine the historical processes of a given century by projecting onto the period modem national state borders that were established much later. This is just as inappropriate as the examination of an earlier peri­ od from the perspective of a much later national independence move­ ment, as has been done until recently by a number of Hungarian histo­ rians. Therefore, the present work endeavors to show the early modem era in the perspective represented by R. J. W. Evans, Thomas Winkel bauer, and Charles W. Ingrao.51 This is what the title of this monograph attempts to suggest. It therefore speaks of the Kingdom of Hungary and not of Hungary. When I use the term “Hungary,” I am not speaking of the present Republic of Hungary or its territory, but of historic Hun­ gary, namely of the multinational Kingdom of Hungary. In contrast to my predecessors I do not use the terms Royal Hun­ gary7 or Habsburg Hungary7. The term Royal Hungary suggest, incor­ rectly, that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were sever­ al kingdoms of Hungary, such as tire Habsburg kingdom, the Transyl­ vanian kingdom or even a Slavonian kingdom. Furthermore, and more importantly, I do not share the idea that under the name of Royal Hun­ gary, a new entity emerged after 1541 and existed until 1686, or that Royal Hungary emerged from the medieval Kingdom of Hungary7 as a new state. These views have been held by a number of Hungarian his­ torians.52 During the era under investigation such concepts were not used and we cannot speak, of a Hungary of the Transylvanian princes or of a Hungary of tire sultans. The most we can say is Ottoman Hun­ gary. In the latter case the adjective refers to the pow7er elite of the Ottoman Empire, its military7 and subjects and not to the dynasty. It is much more accurate therefore if we use the names applied to the states at tire time, and speak of the Kingdom of Hungary attached to the Habs­ burg Monarchy and of the Transylvanian principality under the Porte, or of the Ottoman Empire. Following the lead of my colleagues abroad I do not use the term Habsburg Empire when writing about the central European state of the Habsburgs under Ferdinand I, but refer to it under the more appropri

INTRODUCTION: THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

13

ate term of Habsburg Monarchy, which indicates its composite state and multinational nature.53 I limit the term Habsburg Empire to the great dynastic conglomerate of Charles V. The term empire (Reich), by itself is used only for Holy Roman Empire (Heiliges Romisches Reich Deutscher Nation or Aites Reich). Turkish power is always referred to as the Ottoman Empire and its ruling class is referred to as Ottomans and Ottoman elite. For primarily stylistic reasons, and in keeping with the traditions of earlier historiography, I refer to the leaders and to the military both as Turks and as Ottomans.

On Sources and New Researches This monograph investigates the system of relation­ ships between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy between 1526 and 1608. I endeavor to analyze it in an international framework, but from a Hungarian perspective. Such analysis has been largely ignored. I emphasize international conditions, administration, the imperial and royal court, military’ and financial matters, and eco­ nomics. I also discuss domestic policies, the estates and the political elite and, in general, the functional mechanisms of the Kingdom of Hungary. Relative to these, I have included a discussion of state sover­ eignty and of the important ceremonies and symbols of power. My approach is similar to the one used during the past decade by Jaroslav Pdnek, Winfried Eberhard, Josef Valka, Joachim Bahlcke, VAclav Buzek, Petr Vorel, and Petr Mat5a in describing the history of the Bohemian crown lauds in the sixteenth century and their position within the Habsburg Monarchy and by Thomas Winkelbauer and Karin J. MacHardy in their work on the Austrian provinces.5^ Religious, cul­ tural and scientific relationships are not discussed because they are independent of borders and because the readers can learn about them from the works of a number of my domestic and foreign colleagues, in a variety of languages.55 My monograph is primarily a summary of my archival research in Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Germany, and Czech Republic. In Vienna, Budapest, Sankt Polten, Graz, Nuremberg, Prague, and Bmo I worked primarily on the government institutions and on the estates. In

14

THE, KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE, HABSBURG MONARCHY

Budapest, Bratislava and Zagreb 1 did my work primarily on the former Hungarian and Croatian aristocratic families, the Batthydny, Dras­ kovics, Erdody, Nddasdy, Pdlffy, Revay, Thurzo, Zay, etc. The best sources were provided by the three major collections of the Oslerreichisches Staatsarchiv in Vienna, the Haus, Hof, - und Staatsarchiv, the Hofkammerarchiv and the Kriegsarchiv and by the Hungarian Nation­ al Archives (Magyar Orszagos Leveltar). In the Haus,- Hof,- und Staats­ archiv, for instance, I reviewed every item in the court records (Hofstaatsverzeichisse) and I have also used many items from the archives1 almost inexhaustible Hungarian collection, the Ungarische Akten. I also profited greatly from the documents in the Hofkammerarchiv which pertained to Hungary (Hoffinanz Ungarn). In the same archive I reviewed, volume by volume, the Hofzahlamtsbucher collection and almost every one of the documents pertaining to Hungarian family mat­ ters (Familienakten). I acted in a similar fashion with the most impor­ tant collections of the Kriegsarchiv, including the Akten des Wiener Hofkriegsrates, the Bestallungen, the Hofkriegsratliches Kanzleiarchiv, and the Alte Feldakten, which contain much material pertinent to the sixteenth century history’ of Hungary’. In Budapest, in addition to the family archives, I studied tire documents in the Magyar Kamara Archivuma (Hungarian Chamber Archives). The preparation of my summaries was greatly assisted by the valu­ able work performed in these same archives, after the 1980s, by Hun­ garian, Austrian, German, Czech, and other colleagues. Ferenc Szakdly, Lajos Gecsenyi, and more recently H. Istvdn Nemeth produced inter­ nationally significant works on economic affairs, Zoltdn Fallenbiichl, Istvan Kenyeres, and Peter Rauscher did the same on financial con­ nections. Jozsef Kelenik, Gyorgy Domokos, and Peter Zoltdn Bagi made significant contributions in military matters. The work of Jaroslava Hausenblasovd, Jeroen Duindam, Mark Hengerer, Katrin Keller, and Vdclav Buzek made significant discoveries in the matter of tire Vienna and Prague Court and were most helpful to me with their monographs and essays.56 More recently Jozsef Bessenyei, Gabriella Erdelyi, Istvdn Fazekas, Andrds Koltai, and Natasa Stefanec uncovered new source material about the Hungarian aristocracy and higher clergy. The same was done for the higher Bohemian and Moravian nobility by Petr Mat’a, Petr

INTRODUCTION: THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

15

Vorel, Tomas Knoz, Vdclav Buzek and his pupils, Josef Hrdlicka, Pavel Krdl, Zdenek Vybfral, etc. Since the writings of Gdbor Barta in the 1980s on this subject, Terez Obomi, Cristina Fenesan, Sdndor Papp, Tamds Kruppa, and Meinolf Arens have published more recently on Jdnos Szapolyai, king of Hungary, and on the relationship of the Tran­ sylvanian Principality with the Habsburgs. The Ottomans’ goals in Hungary and their rule in that country were made available to interna­ tional historiography through the archival revelations of Gdbor Agoston, Geza Ddvid, Pdl Fodor, Klara Hegyi, Mdria Ivanics, Gyula KdldyNagy, Antal Mo Indr, Sdndor Papp, and Ferenc Szakdly.57 Thus, this volume, using the eighteenth century survey of Eva H. Balazs as a model, endeavors to show the sixteenth century HabsburgHungarian relations, the functional mechanisms of an old realm, the Kingdom of Hungary, and its place during the early modem era in a new monarchy, the composite state of the Austrian Habsburgs in cen­ tral Europe. This is done on the basis of new archival researches and with a broader and more objective perspective.

Chapter Two

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS In August 1532 the great encounter almost took place. The troops of the rulers of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, Suleyman I. and Charles V, as well as the army of Ferdinand I, King of Hungary and Bohemia, were encamped in the western Hungarian town of Koszeg and the Lower-Austrian Wiener Neustadt waiting for the clash between forces of the two major powers of the time. The clash never occurred. Yet the situation was symbolic in many ways. It demonstrated that the medieval Kingdom of Hungary7, occupying almost the entire Carpathian Basin (map 1), no longer existed. It also showed that in the immediate future the territory of Hungary- would be divided by the Ottoman and Habsburg great powers. Actually, during the previous two centuries the noblest royal houses of central Europe, including the Angevine, the Luxemburg, the Habsburg, and the Jagiello, had competed for the crown of Hungary.

A Small Composite State: The Kingdom of Hungary in the Late Middle Ages

It was not an accident that the influential central Euro­ pean dynasties endeavored to obtain the Kingdom of Hungary in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After 1270, all of the Hungarian rulers carried the imposingly long titles of: “By the grace of God, King of Hungary7, Dalmatia, Croatia, Rama (i.e. Bosnia), Serbia, Galicia, Lodomeria, Cumania, and Bulgaria etc.” Ilie Angevine Louis I (13421382), added the title of “King of Poland,” Sigismund of Luxemburg

18

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

(1387 -1437) and Albert II of Habsburg (1437-1439) also wore the titles of “Holy Roman Emperor/King and King of Bohemia.” Wladislaw II Jagiello (1490-1516) and Louis II (1516-1526) also wore the title of “King of Bohemia.” This made the kings of Hungary second in impor­ tance only to the Holy Roman emperors and to the kings of Poland in central Europe. They had a significant position in the entire continent.1 Due to their titles, and to the territories that went with these titles, the rulers governed from Buda a composite state with substantial territory and political weight.2 This was true even though the Hungarian state dif­ fered markedly from the Spanish or British monarchies as far as their composition was concerned. Every composite state of the period had its own distinguishing characteristics, depending largely on where in Europe it w-as located and how well developed its territory was. The Kingdom of Hungary was a peculiar, smaller composite state. In order to understand it, it is necessary to study the sequence of the above listed titles. The Hungarian rulers, ever since 1000, when King St. Stephen established the state, controlled the Kingdom of Hungary. During the reign of Coloman the Wise (1095-1116) Dalmatia on the shores of the Adriatic and the Kingdom of Croatia between the Adriat­ ic and the Capella Mountains came under the control of the rulers of Hungary. The latter was only a western fragment of the current, very much larger Croatian Republic. The Hungarian rulers never incorpo­ rated these two states, but assumed the titles of “King of Dalmatia” and “King of Croatia” and governed the two areas through a specific digni­ tary, the ban of Dalmatia and Croatia. Because of having a single ruler a strong union developed between Hungary and Croatia after 1102. The two kingdoms were equal partners in a system that was, in principle, a personal union. In reality, howev­ er, the enormous differences between the two countries, in size and eco ­ nomic strength, made it impossible for them to function on an identical level. The king of Hungary and Croatia had only one court, usually in Buda during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a single governance, a single Royal Council and a joint political elite. There was no separate Croatian coronation and thus the kings of Hungary, crowned with the Holy Crown, became automatically kings of Croatia. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the titles of the king of Hungary were further enlarged. In the 1130s, the province of Rama,

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

19

along the small Rama River was added and later this included ail of Bos­ nia. In 1202 the kings of Hungary became kings of Serbia and in 1205 they acquired Galicia and Volhinia/Lodomeria. In 1233-35 tire poorly defined territory of Cumania (in Wallachia and Moldavia) was added and, lastly, after 1270, the title of “King of Bulgaria” was assumed.3 Hun­ gary increased its territory only transiently and for a relatively short peri­ od. The titles soon became fictional. The kings of Hungary considered themselves kings of these areas and if the local rulers refused to obey them or pay taxes to them the army could be used to intimidate them. The structure of the realm of St. Stephen differed in another aspect from the Austrian hereditary provinces and from the lands of the Bohemian crown. Because its territory was considerable even by Euro­ pean standards (320,000 square kilometers) the areas furthest from Buda gradually came under a separate territorial management. This was true during the fifteenth century for Transylvania in the distant southeastern corner of the country and for Slavonia, between the Drava and the Sava Rivers. The latter at that time contained the counties Zagreb, Korbs, and Varasd. In the case of Croatia the word regnum meant kingdom, while in the case of Slavonia, similarly to Transylvania tregnum Transsilvaniae, Erdelyorszag), the word regnum meant land.4 'This was demonstrated by the German term Windischland and the Hungarian term Tatorszag where the second half of the geographic designation clearly means land.5 Medieval Slavonia was not identical with the modem Slavonia which constitutes the eastern area of the current Republic of Croatia. The Slavonia which formed a part of the Kingdom of Hungary in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not form a joint state with the Kingdom of Croatia. This situation began to change during the second half of the sixteenth century (see chapter 3). The difference in the territories is indicated by the fact that Tran­ sylvania was ruled by a voivode, whiles Slavonia was governed by a ban. These officials were also the supreme judges of their area and were the military commanders as well. In 1496 Slavonia received its own coat of arms from King Wladislaw II and used it for several centuries.6 Both territories had their own assemblies (congregatio) in the late Mid­ dle Ages where they elected delegates to represent them at the Hun­ garian diet (comitia or diaeta). The Slavonian assembly operated com­

20

THE, KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY'

pletely independently from the Croatian diet (sabor). The Kingdom of Hungary thus had a Reichstag, similarly to the Holy Roman Empire and not a Ixindtag. Furthermore it was possible to appeal decisions of the Transylvanian voivode or the Slavonian ban to the Hungarian Chief Justice (iudex curiae regiae). All this clearly demonstrates the peculiar composition of the Kingdom of Hungary. By 1500 the territory of the realm of St. Stephen far exceeded the territory of the neighboring Austrian hereditary7 provinces or of tire lands of the Bohemian crown (table 1), not even including the above mentioned “claimed” territories. The approximately 320,000 square kilometers included all of present Republics of Hungary and Slovakia, a large part of the present Republic of Croatia (including the medieval Slavonia) and a third of the present Republic of Romania, primarily Transylvania. It also included smaller or larger pieces of the present day Ukraine (Subcarpathia), Serbia (Temeskdz [Timis] region) and Backa [Bdcska], Slovenia (part of the Mura River region) and Austria (Bur­ genland) (map 1).

Table 1. The Kingdom of Hungary, the Austrian Hereditary Provinces, and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century

Kingdom of Hungary Area(Km2> 320,000 Population 3,300,000

Austrian Hereditary Prov.

110,000 1,815,000

Bohemian Crown

125,000 2,300,000

Sources: Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 323-344; Kubinyi, Konig und Volk., 148-182; Winkelbauer, Stdndefreiheit und Furstenmacht, 13-14 and 29.

While the population density in the Hungarian regions was gener­ ally below those of the Austrian or Bohemian areas, the population of the Kingdom of Hungary at the beginning of the sixteenth century7 was considerably greater than that of its western neighbors. Because, due to the Jagiello rulers, the Hungarian and Bohemian Kingdoms formed a personal union, the composite entity, ruled from Buda became the most significant power in central Europe. In spite of Hungary’s economic

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

21

problems and in spite of the Ottoman threat, the noblest royal houses of Europe competed with each other for the crown of Hungary. The most important political, military, and economic questions in the Kingdom of Hungary, its autonomous provinces and even Croat­ ia, were decided during the late Middle Ages by the Hungarian royal court in Buda. The highest fonim for the political decisions was the Royal Council (consilium regis). Its members, beside the king, were the so-called “true barons” (veri barones regni),\h^ prelates (praelati), and the representatives of the lesser nobility. Thus every important political segment of the kingdom was represented. It must be added that the “true barons” were not limited to those who held the baronial title from the Austrian-German territories. In the Kingdom of Hun­ gary the baronial title (barones sine nomine) appeared only gradual­ ly by the beginning of the sixteenth century (see chapter 6).7 Some Hungarian families, like the Korldtkdvy, Szechy, and Szekely had already been granted the title of “barons of the Holy Roman Empire” by the Holy Roman emperors.8 'Hie “true barons” or barons in office (barones officiolati) included the highest dignitaries of the country and of the royal court.9 The former included the leading lay dignitaries, the palatine Cpalatinus regni Hungriae), the chief justice, the ban of Slavonia, the ban of Croatia and Dalmatia, the voivode of Transylvania, the governors of Szdreny and Macso, the chief justices of the free royal cities, the royal treasurer (magister tavernicorum regalium), and. the ispans (bailiffs) of 'Femes and Pozsony (comes Themesiensis and comes Posoniensis). Because all of them had to muster a certain number of soldiers under their own flags (ba.nderi.um), they played an important part in the mil­ itary life of the country.10 In addition, the Croatian and Slavonian bans, the ispan of Femes and the voivode of Transylvania were in charge of the triple defense rings against the Ottomans established during the 1470s by King Matthias Corvinus (1458-1490). Hiese defense zones consisted of the Croatian and Slavonian territories (banal us Croatiae el Sclavoniae), the captaincy in chief of the lower parts of the country (capitaneatus partium inferiorum regni Hungariae), and Transylva­ nia.11 Hie high dignitaries of the court included the lord steward (magis­ ter curiae regiae), the master doorward (magister ianitorum regalium), the master senechai (magister dapiferorum), the master cupbearer

22

THE, KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE, HABSBURG MONARCHY

(magister pincernarum), the master of stables (magister agazanum), and the master of chamberlains (magister cubiculariorum).12 In addition to the members of the Royal Council a decisive admin­ istrative role was played by the Royal Chancellery directed by the chief and secret chancellor (summits et secretarius cancellarius) who was also always the archbishop of Esztergom. In financial matters the most important functionary was the royal treasurer (thesaurarius regius) who was the manager of tire rulers’ revenues and whose position was reformed by Matthias Corvinus. The frequent changes in treasure dur­ ing the beginning of the sixteenth century were an indication of the deteriorating financial situation of the country and of the court.. Yet the annual income generated by the Kingdom of Hungary was 250,000260,000 forints (florenus/florin). It shows the substantial financial strength of the country that all the expenses of the border defense sys­ tem against the Turks, 175,000-180,000 forints, were financed annual­ ly from the above revenues. Because the remaining funds were insuffi­ cient to cover all the other expenses of the court, the budgets showed a 20 percent annual deficit.13 In comparison with other European coun­ tries, this deficit was not considered excessive. Together with the clerical dignitaries, archbishops and bishops, the highest dignitaries of the country and of the court, and their noble rela­ tions who had no official appointments, constituted the Upper House of the newly evolving two-house Hungarian diet. The members of the Lower House were the representatives of the lower nobility who con­ stituted about 2-3 percent of the population and who either attended in person or were later represented by 2M- delegates from each county. Poland was the only country' in Europe in which the nobility represent­ ed an even higher percentage of the population. The free royal cities (liberae regiae civitates) gained their status in the system of the Hun­ garian estates only gradually during the decades after 1526.14 Their attendance at the diet, beginning in 1445, was haphazard. In the Kingdom of Hungary the estates represented an unusual strength by European standards and this was true particularly of the members of the Upper House. They constituted the hue force of the Hun­ garian political elite even though they all came from only about fifty fam­ ilies. During the two decades prior to 1526 they almost all came from the Balassi, Bdnffy, Bdthory, Batthyany, Bebek, Beriszlo/Berislavic, Doczy,

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

23

Efrdgffy, Emuszt, Eorgdch, Ifrangepdn/Erankopan, Hederv&y, Homon nai Drugeth, Kanizsai, Keglevics/Keglevic, Korldtkbvy, Korbdviai/ Karlovic, Losonczy, Macedonia!, Orszdgh, P£6czy, Perenyi, Petho, Rdskay, Sdrkdny, Szapolyai, Szechy, Szentgyorgyi-Bazini, Tahy, Thurzo, Torok, and Werboczy families. Thus, the most important problems of the late medieval Hungarian composite state, external affair, military mat­ ters, finances, domestic policies, and justice delivery were all directed from the court in Buda by a small elite group of high nobility and clergy. Even though this elite underwent fairly regular changes in their power relationships, their decisive political, economic and familial connections covered the entire country’.15 Both countrywide and region­ ally the political decision making was in the hands of the high nobility, most of whom were ethnic Hungarians. Their influence remained strong in the joint Hungarian-Bohemian court of Wladislaw II Jagiello and Louis II in Buda, although after 1490 the influence of the Bohemi­ an, Polish and, later under King Louis’s wife Mary (Maria) of Habs­ burg, Austrian courtiers was considerable.16 In 1525, for instance, 45 percent of the chamberlains were foreign.17 In spite of the joint Hun­ garian-Bohemian system of governance, the preponderance of the Hungarian political elite remained dominant and ruled the mid-sized central European power that had almost complete sovereignty. This situation, so favorable for the Hungarian political elite under­ went drastic changes during the decades after the Battle of Mohdcs. Hie Kingdom of Hungary7 became the front line between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The fateful consequences of these changes dur­ ing the fifty years after Mohses, determined the nature of the govern­ ment, the possibilities available to the political elite, and even its central-European role and long-range development.

A Country to be Conquered: The Ottomans and. Hungary

The empire of the Ottoman dynasty, established by Sultan Osman I, (c.1280-1324/26), was one of the most rapidly expand­ ing and longest-enduring states in world history.18 According to tradi­ tion, the Ottoman Turkish principality originated in the camp of four

24

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

hundred tents of a 'lurkmen people who had fled the Mongolian con ­ querors in Central Asia and settled in the 1280s in the south-east of the present Bursa in Turkey. The small principality grew into a significant state during one century and became a major power after two centuries. By the beginning of the sixteenth century it had become one of the most important empires in the world. The rapid rise of the Ottomans was due, in addition to their good for­ tune, to their skill in adapting to prevailing conditions, to their marital policies, and to their innovations assuring the power of the ruling house (fratricide, the Janissaries, making the Muslim leaders government offi­ cials, etc.). They were effective in taking over from their enemies, the Seldjuk (Seljuk) Turks and the Byzantines, those governmental features W'hich assisted them strengthening their empire. These included such items as a military and political elite with a slavery background, a system of taxation, administration, etc. They also recognized that it would be more advantageous to move in the direction of the Balkans rather than remaining in Asia Minor. They then established their first foothold on the Balkan Peninsula in 1354 at Gallipoli. They were very tolerant toward the religious minorities which came under their rule (Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews) and even managed to get the leaders of these minorities to sup­ port the administration. After 1369, the successors of Osman ruled from Edime [Adrianople]. As auxiliary troops under the Bulgarian and Serb princes they came into conflict for the first time with the forces of the kings of Hungary, the Angevine Louis I and Sigismund of Luxemburg who interfered with the conflicts of the southern Slavic states.19 Louis and Sigismund, still wearing the title of “King of Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgar­ ia” wanted to maintain their influence in this area and wanted to use these principalities as buffer states against the Turks. After a struggle for the throne, at the beginning of the fifteenth cen­ tury (1402-1413), was resolved and the capital of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, was occupied in 1453, the Ottoman state became a strong power. Following the occupation of Serbia in 1459 and of the southern part of Bosnia in 1464 the Ottoman Empire was only one step removed from being a very major power. This step was taken by Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) when he conquered a significant portion of the Near East Islamic world (Persia 1514, Syria 1516, and Egypt 1517). As a consequence of these conquests the Ottoman Empire gained

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

25

control of most of the east-west pathways of world trade. Because of this and also because of an effective system of taxation, the sultan’s treasury had a substantial annual budget surplus at the beginning of the sixteenth century. This was in sharp contrast to the Kingdom of Hun­ gary which had an annual deficit. Selim’s son, Sultan Suleyman I the Magnificent (1520-1566), inherited a wealthy and powerful empire, rich in natural and material resources, which could no longer be compared with the Kingdom of Hungary, even though the latter was still considered to be a strong power in central Europe (table 2). The Ottoman Empire had become a decisive factor in European politics (map 2).

Table 2. The Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary about 1520 Ottoman Empin

Area (Km2) Population Annual Revenue Armed Forces

1,500,000 12-13,000,000 4—5,000,000 100-120,000

Kingdom of Hungary 320,000 3,300,000 250-260,000 30-40,000

Sources: Agoston, Habsburgs and Ottomans: Palffy, “Die Tiirkenabwehr in Ungam,” 99; and Winkelbauer, Stdndefreiheit und. Furstenmucht, 23-24.

Titus, when the supporters of the Asiatic and maritime conquests in the sultan’s court in 1521 lost out to those who demanded conquests in Europe, it became evident that the next major goal of the Ottoman Empire would be the annexation of the Kingdom of Hungary.20 The Kingdom still had a dominant role in the central European region but its chances against tire much larger, much more populous and both eco­ nomically and militarily far superior Ottoman Empire were negligible. There were a number of minor border clashes during the “peaceful period” (1463-1520) and the collapse of the southern protective fortress system was only a matter of time. The Hungarian political elite did not face up to this issue until last moment. The changed power rela­ tionships at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the fall of Ndndorfehervar [Belgrade] in 1521 and tire gradual collapse of the southern

26

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

defense fortress system make it obvious that 1521 was the beginning of the end of the medieval Hungarian kingdom.21 The army of Sultan Suleyman far exceeded, both in numbers and quality, the aimed forces of the Hungarian-Bohemian ruler even though these were considerable by central European standards. At that time the Ottomans had the largest, well-trained, and experienced standing army which, in contrast to the European armies, already had substantial reserve and supply formations.2'2 These played a significant role in the successful conquests. in addition the Porte also controlled an increas­ ing Mediterranean fleet. Thus, in the 1520s, a large permanent army confronted an army that was dependent on mustered troops provided by the estates. A comment by a later grand vizier about the relationship of the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary w-as appropriate, “A fly cannot harm an elephant.”23 The defeat at Mohdcs in 1526 was inevitable. The fate of the King­ dom of Hungary became dependent on external forces. These were, first and foremost, the domestic and military decisions of the Ottoman Empire and secondly the internal domestic conditions in Hungary and the political-military’ decisions of Ferdinand of Habsburg, the Archduke of Austria and Hungary’s neighbor to the west. In contrast to the European dynasties, the Ottomans were not inter­ ested in sitting on the throne of Hungary, they merely wanted to con­ quer the territory of the kingdom. During the last few decades a histor­ ical interpretation emerged according to which Suleyman did not want to conquer Hungary but only wanted to entice it wdth promises to become a vassal. Thinking rationally, he must have realized that this area was beyond the effective range of his military forces 24 Tills view has been convincingly challenged by more recent Ottoman studies. According to the new researches, Suleyman did nourish ideas of con­ quering the world and, as a new “Alexander the Great,” reestablishing the Roman Empire. Thus, after E521 and to the end of his days, he wanted to conquer and occupy the entire Kingdom of Hungary7.25 In order to accomplish this, the Ottoman military leadership used the same strategy and techniques which proved successful in the Near East and in the Balkans. Accordingly, by the 1460s, they occupied the Bulgarian, Serb, and Bosnian buffer states protecting Hungary. This was followed by repeated incursions into southern Hungary and into

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

27

the Slavonian and Croatian territories and, after 1521, the southern defense system was gradually destroyed.26 In 1526, Suleyman was induced to wage a war on land in Europe by the uprising of the Janis­ saries in Istanbul and was also urged by his military leadership, who w-ere mostly of Balkan extraction. 'Ilie first major step was to be the conquest of Hungary and at the Battle of Mohdcs a decisive defeat was administered to the forces of the kingdom (map 3). In spite of the victory the Sultan occupied the Hungarian capital, for a short time only. By the end of 1526 he left only some troops in the Syrmium in the eastern area of the Drava-Sava region.27 His retreat was due to the problems of food supplies, bad weather, bad news from the East and his inability to recognize that he had completely defeated the army of his former, formidable opponent, the king of Hungary. It is also possible that he never wanted to occupy Buda permanently and only wanted to min the capital of the enemy, as he had done repeatedly in the eastern parts of his empire. His primary goal, however, was still the complete occupation of Hungary. The fact that, in spite of having the strongest army in the world, he was unable to accomplish this goal, was due to the domestic political conditions of Hungary and, even more importantly, to the increasing role played by the gradually strengthen­ ing realm of Eerdinand of Habsburg: the central European Habsburg Monarchy.

A Much Coveted Throne: The Habsburgs and the Kingdom of Hungary

In the critical period following the Battle of Mohdcs Hungary was very fortunate. In its fight against the ‘‘elephant’’ of the East, it had substantial support from the “double-headed eagle” of the West. This process began during the first half of the 1520s. On the request of King Louis II, his brother-in-law Ferdinand, the archduke of Austria, provided considerable assistance in the defense against the Ottomans, subsequent to the loss of Ndndorfehervdr. Paid for by the estates of the gravely endangered Camiola and Carinthia provinces, Austrian troops arrived regularly to help in the defense of Croatia w7hich was a bulwark in the defense of the above tw7o provinces 28

28

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

The death of Louis II at Mohdcs completely changed this situation. With the election of Ferdinand as king of Hungary, on December 16, 1526, the fate of Hungary and of the nascent Habsburg Monarchy became entwined for centuries. The path to a solid coexistence was a very long and arduous one. Ferdinand’s predecessors would not have believed that the throne of Hungary, so intensively desired by them, would be obtained under such circumstances. In world history, the Habsburg Empire was one of the most rapid­ ly developing and longest-surviving states.29 Its roots were in Switzer­ land where, in the Canton of Aargau, the Fortress of Habichtsburg gave the family its name. After the Battle of Morgarten in 1315, they lost their ancient patrimony. Yet the family was not without major land holdings. By this time they had acquired the true home of the dynasty, namely Austria. It is a curious twist of fate that in this activity they received major assistance from the rulers of Hungary. In 1246, King Bela IV of Hungary (1235-1270), suffered a defeat in a battle along the river Lajta (Leitha). His adversary7, Frederic II of the Babenberg dynasty, Prince of Austria and Styria (1230 -1246) lost his life during the battle which also ended his dynasty. The fight for his domain was decided at the Battle of Dumkrut in the Marchfeld in 1278. With Hie effective assistance of the Hungarian forces of King Ladislaus IV the Cuman (1272-1290), Rudolf of Habsburg, the king of Germany (1273-1291) defeated the forces of Ottokar II Premysl (1253-1278), king of Bohemia. Thus the Habsburgs took control of Austria and Styr­ ia at the same time that the Ottomans established themselves in the northeastern area of Asia Minor and the kings of Hungary already wore all their manifold titles. The German electors made a serious mistake when they elected Rudolf as emperor in 1273. He was considered to be weak and controlled only limited territory7 and thus the German electors put him on the throne assuming that they could continue to be strong rulers of their principalities. Taking control of Austria and Styria made the Habsburgs neigh­ bors of Hungary establishing a relationship which lasted for centuries. Rudolf I was followed only by his son and grandson on the imperial throne. After the death of the latter, the German electors chose the Lux­ emburg Charles IV, Vencel and Sigismund as successive emperors. Sigismund was also ruler of Hungary7 from 1387 to 1437. Until tire end

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

29

of the fourteenth century, the Habsburgs consolidated their control over Austria, taking Carinthia and Camiola in 1335. /Archduke Rudolf IV added Tyrol, Friaul, and Gorizia in 1363. This brought the later Austri­ an hereditary provinces under Habsburg rule and began the evolution of a central-European power. The election of Albert II of Habsburg, son-in-law7 of Sigismund of Luxemburg, as king of Hungary in December 1437 realized a major goal of the dynasty for a short period of time. This was the first time that the Habsburgs held the crown of Hungary. When Albert followed his father-in- law to the German imperial throne and to the Bohemian throne in 1438, the central European Hungarian-German-Bohemian composite state of Ilie Luxemburgs was replaced by the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs. The new structure was still developing when Albert died in October 1439 in Hungary. Ilie banners of the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, Bohemia-Moravia and Austria and the flags of the various Habsburg provinces, paraded at the funeral ceremonies in Szekesfehervdr, indicated a potential for a new central European Habsburg Monarchy.30 A Habsburg Monarchy, incorporating the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, Bohemia, and the Austrian hereditary provinces could exist only for a short while toward the end of the 1430s.31 Even though the Hungarian estates elected Albert’s posthumous son (b. February 22, 1440), the infant Ladislaus, in May 1440, as king of Hungary, he had to flee the country shortly thereafter. After 1440 the real ruler of Hungary was the Polish ruler (1434—1444), Wladislaw I Jagiello (1440-1444). The Habsburgs lost the Bohemian throne as well. Thus the Jagiellos dominated central Europe until 1526. The Habsburgs managed to keep the title of Holy Roman Emperor for a long time. They actually sat on the throne of tire Holy Roman Empire from tire election of Albert in 1438 until 1806. Yet, they were unable to reacquire the Kingdom of Hungary and even the two very powerful emperors, Frederic III (1440-1493) and Maximilian I (1493-1519) failed to do so. In spite of losing the throne of Hungary and of Bohemia, it took less than a century for the Habsburgs to rule one of the largest empires in history. In fact, when Charles V was elected, in 1519, he ruled over an empire “in which the Sun never set.” In establishing this empire Frederic III and Maximilian I had major roles. While tire mechanism of

30

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

creating an empire was quite different in Europe, due to the much more consolidated social conditions, there was still considerable similarity with the one used by the Ottomans. While the latter used marriages only early during the evolution of their empire, for the Habsburgs it was one of the most important features for increasing their territory. It gave rise to the saying: '‘Bella gerant alii, Tu, felix Austria, nube!” (Let others fight wars, you, lucky Austria, marry). It was in this spirit that the Emperor Frederic made his son, Maximilian, marry Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. As a consequence of this marriage and after the unexpected death of Charles the Bold in 1477, the Habsburgs acquired most of tlie Duchy of Burgundy, includ­ ing the Netherlands. Yet, the most important marriages of the fifteenth century were those of Maximilian’s son, Philip the Fair (1478-1506) and of his daughter, Margaret, to Johanna and to Don Juan, children of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon in 1496 (fig. 1). While Maximilian viewed these marriages primarily as coalition against France, they amounted to much more than that. When Don Juan and his daughter and sister all died in rapid sequence, Johanna and her husband, Philip, inher­ ited the Iberian kingdoms. The Spanish inheritance included not only most of the Iberian Peninsula. The Kingdom of Aragon controlled not only Sicily and Sar­ dinia, but, after the middle of the fifteenth century, the Kingdom of Naples which included most of southern Italy. After 1492 the Kingdom of Granada became part of Spain and, after the discovery of the New World, huge colonial territories became part of the empire. Philip the Fair died young and so, after the death of Emperor Maximilian I in 1519, Charles V became the ruler of the most powerful empire (map 2). Reacquiring the throne of Hungary remained one of the principal goals of the Habsburgs. The political conditions, however, and the dynastic relationships in Central Europe were not favorable to them. Instead of a union with Austria, there was first a union with Poland under Wladislaw I Jagiello, then there was the independent kingdom of Matthias Corvinus and finally the union with Bohemia under Wladislaw II and Louis U. The latter reestablished the Jagiello control over Hungary. Emperor Frederic tried several times, unsuccessfully, to get control of Hungary but never gave up. One of his moves was to steal

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

31

the Holy Crown, the symbol of Hungarian sovereignty, which he did after the death of Albert, in 1440, with the help of Elisabeth of Luxem­ burg, queen of Hungary, the widow of Albert. Hie emperor agreed to return the crown only in 1463, on the basis of an agreement with Matthias Corvinus. In exchange for the crowm the king of Hungary had to agree, that if he were to die without an heir, the throne of Hungary'' would go to Frederic or to his son Maximilian. The agreement did not go into effect after Matthias’s death in 1490. Hie majority of the Hungarian political elite placed the king of Bohemia, Wladislaw II Jagiello (1471-1516) on the throne. Maximilan led his armies against Hungary but was not successful. The only thing he achieved at the Peace of Pozsony, in November 1491, was that the terms of the 1463 agreement with Matthias Corvinus were reinstituted and he was also given back the Austrian territories occupied by Matthias.32 After he became emperor in 1493, Maximilian endeavored to obtain the throne of Hungary, or, at least, to assure it for his successors. He realized that Hungary was important not only because of it being a significant power but also because it was a major bulwark for the Aus­ trian hereditary provinces against the advancing Ottomans. For this rea­ son he signed a family contract with Wladislaw II on March 20, 1506. According to the contract, Maximilian’s grandson, Ferdinand, archduke of Austria, would marry Anna Jagiello, the daughter of the king of Hungary. After a group of Hungarian nobles questioned the validity of this agreement, Maximilian again invaded Hungary with his armed forces. It was the birth of Prince Louis, the later Louis II on July 1, 1506, that brought this war to its end. The family contract was renewed with engagements solemnized in Vienna in July 1515, in the present of Sigismund Jagiello, king of Poland (1506-1548), followed by the mar­ riage of Ferdinand of Habsburg to Anna Jagiello in Linz in 1521 and of Louis II Jagiello and Mary of Habsburg in Buda at the beginning of 1522.33 When Louis II died at the end of August 1526 in the Battle of Mohdcs, Ferdinand could claim the throne of Hungary. The favorable marriages and the territories they brought wdth them would, by themselves, not have been sufficient to achieve the territorial expansion of the Habsburg Empire. Hie successful expansion was based, to a large extent, on the persistent policies and effective economic moves of Frederic 1H. It also helped considerably that the emperor survived all

32

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

his enemies. Maximilian continued along the same path and also intro­ duced significant military reforms. He reorganized the infantry, mod­ ernized the artillery, and established a system of military supply ware­ houses.34 In contrast to the Ottomans, however, his army was not a per­ manent, standing force. His financial support came from the taxes imposed on the estates and from loans granted by the great banking houses of the German empire, the Fuggers, Weisers, and others. Consequently, the empire of the Habsburgs equaled in size tire Ottoman Empire and exceeded it in population at the beginning of the sixteenth century (map 2). Yet, in 1520, Charles V’s empire was still very fragmented, consisting of a large number of components, differing in language, wealth, and local political organization. In addition the Christian empire was not a single area and included both economically advanced areas and some of the most backward and undeveloped areas of Europe. Charles V preferred to live in Spain or Germany and thus the great distances within the empire forced him to cede Austria to his younger brother Ferdinand. On the basis of the 1521 Worms and the 1522 Brussels agreements Ferdinand was given complete control of the five Austrian hereditary provinces (Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola) to which later Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Wurttem­ berg were added.35 The biggest problem for the Habsburgs was the fact that, in con­ trast to the Ottomans, they did not have a centralized power and admin­ istrative structure that would have been able to hold together the farflung and vastly different areas of the empire. At the beginning of the sixteenth century this situation prevailed in a number of European countries and the rulers were helpless vis-a-vis their powerful estates. In addition, they did not have a standing army and their forces were almost entirely dependent upon the will of the estates. A similar prob­ lem faced the provisioning of the army. Consequently the forces could not be moved over large distances and usually had to live off the land they traversed. This explains why Emperor Maximilian and his immediate suc ­ cessors took their first steps toward strengthening the central adminis­ tration. The Ottomans not only had a much larger army, but they also had a central administration which far surpassed the Habsburg one. It was Hungary’s misfortune that the forces of Emperor Charles V were

BETWEEN OTTOMANS AND HABSBURGS

33

directed more toward his fight with Francis 1 of France and, after the Reformation, toward the wars of religion which ensued. Furthermore, the new conquests of Suleyman in the Mediterranean area and North Africa began to threaten the Habsburg domains in Italy and Spain.36 Understandably, the Hungarian front against the Ottomans was consid­ ered by the emperor to be only of the third order of interest.37 The Hungarian throne was acquired by Ilie Habsburgs at one of the most critical periods in Hungarian history7. Hie military and political activities of the new Hungarian-Bohemian king, Ferdinand I, were sharply limited after 1526-27. The fact that his new country, the Kingdom of Hungary, did not fall to the much stronger eastern conqueror was due mainly to the mistakes of the Ottoman military leadership. This group did not adapt to the increased difficulties of expansion and persisted in using the previously successful but outdated methods. This explains why the first major confrontation after the Battle of Mohdcs took place under the walls of the residence of Ferdinand in Vienna and not in the yet unconquered areas of Hungary.

Chapter Three

MOHACS AND PARTITION The Battle that Determined Central Europe’s Fate On the battle field of MohAcs, on August 29, 1526, the history' of Hungary took a turn in a few hours, that determined its fate for centuries.1 The forces of Louis II Jagiello, king of Hungary and Bohemia, were crushed by the army of Sultan Suleyman I. With con­ siderable difficulties, the Hungarian military leadership deployed an army of 25-26,000 men, consisting of 12-13,000 light and heavy cav­ alry and 12-13,000 Hungarian, Bohemian, and Polish infantry. By the European standards of the day this was a significant army. The leader­ ship decided to attempt to halt the Ottoman forces about two hundred kilometers north of tire border, a few kilometers south of the small town of MohAcs. The Christian army was of respectable size but the army of the sul ­ tan was superior in every7 respect. It consisted of 75-80,000 men, had independent logistics support and ordnance of at least 150 guns. The royal forces would have needed a great deal of luck for a successful contest. Yet, they tried. Even though some Bohemian contingents and the troops of JAnos Szapolyai, the voivode of Transylvania, were still not present due to the distances to be traveled and also due to contradicto­ ry orders, the Hungarian military leadership wanted to achieve a tri­ umph against the advance guard of the sultan. PAI Tomori, archbishop of Kalocsa and commander in chief of the Christian army, presumably believed that the Turkish army, preparing to camp, was tired and that he could defeat it by engaging smaller, individual units. The Christian army had been standing ready for days and was confident about the forthcoming battle.

36

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Taking advantage of the disposition of the Ottoman troops, the attack by the right wing, mostly by light cavalry, achieved some initial success. Yet the fight soon changed into a general engagement. The majority of the sultan’s forces reached the battle field with most of their artillery. The Christian attack was halted and the increasing artillery salvos started a rapidly spreading panic. While the decision by the Hungarian military leadership to attack might appear questionable, it was the only chance they had against the overwhelming forces of the enemy. In the evolving confrontation a sig­ nificant portion of the Christian forces ran into the salvos of the Ottoman artillery and into the rifle fire of the Janissaries. The battle lasted from four in the afternoon until dark and the majority of the Hun­ garian army, approximately 16,000 men, perished. The leadership of the country suffered disastrous losses through the death of seven prelates and approximately thirty magnates who fell in the battle. At no time in its history were such grievous losses suffered by the Hungarian political elite and nobility. The Royal Council, governing the Hungari­ an composite state from Buda, became functionally ineffective although only one aristocratic family, the Pdloczys, died out as a con­ sequence. The national tragedy was aggravated by the fact that the young Louis II drowned in the Cseie Rivulet during his attempted escape from the battle field. Tire defeat would have produced major changes in Hungarian domestic policies even if Suleyman had not continued his strategies against Hungary. On September 12, he was able to occupy the Hun­ garian capital without any serious opposition. Buda had been left vacant by Queen Mary of Habsburg and her court. Actually, Suleyman did not occupy Buda but only looted it. He could not believe that he had completely destroyed the army of his greatest opponent. His troops pil­ laged through the entire central part of the country'. No such enemy army had been on Hungarian soil since the Tatar invasion of 1241—42. The battle meant more than just the end of the territorial integrity of the realm of St. Stephen. It was a major change in the history of cen­ tral Europe just as the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 had meant a major change for all of eastern Europe. The death of Louis Jagiello and tire election of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand as king of Hungary signified a fundamental change in the 150 year conflict between

MOHA.CS AND PARTITION

37

Ottomans and Hungarians. When the Habsburg archduke became king of Hungary, Hungary ceased to be the primary enemy for the Ottomans. Furthermore, the Sultan considered Buda to be his property because, under Ottoman tradition, any place which bore the imprint of the Padisha’s horse, became his property. A few months after the Battle of Mohdcs, the Hungarian-Ottoman fight became a conflict between the Habsburgs and Ottomans. Hungary remained the site of this conflict for many years. The death of Louis II also meant that, except in Poland, the era of the Jagiello dynasty had come to an end. Both thrones of the late young king, Hungary and Bohemia, were taken over by Ferdinand of Habs­ burg. He was elected king of Bohemia in Prague on October 23, 1526, and king of Hungary in Pozsony on December 16 of the same year. He was crowned in Prague on February7 24, 1527, and again in Szekesfehervdr on November 3. This then revived the short-lived monarchy of Albert II under the rule of Ferdinand I. The year 1526 can thus proper­ ly be considered as the starting point of a major European power under the control of the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs and also as the beginning of the early modem era in central Europe. Hie evolution of the new composite monarchy was facing enor­ mous difficulties. This was particularly true for the Hungarian kingdom of Ferdinand. The losses suffered by the Hungarian political elite at the Battle of Mohdcs, the death of Louis II, and the Turkish occupation of the southern areas of Hungary shortly led to a civil war that lasted for several decades.

Two Kings on the Throne of Hungary Even though in the late Middle Ages Hungary7 repeat­ edly had several legitimate claimants contend for the throne, it was unprecedented in Hungarian history that after Mohdcs there were two lawful rulers in Hungary for almost fifteen years. Both Idnos Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, and Ferdinand of Habsburg, the Archduke of Austria, became rulers of the Kingdom of Hungary by legitimate means. Hie voivode was elected according to the old traditions of the Kingdom of Hungary on November 10,1526, even though a number of

38

THE. KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

magnates, including the palatine, Istvdn Bathory, did not participate in the election. Bdthory later claimed that his absence made the legitima­ cy of King John I doubtful.2 He was crowned on November 11 in accor­ dance with the three requirements of legitimacy: the coronation took place in Szekesfehervar, it w;as done with the Holy Crown and the cer­ emony was performed by the principal prelate of the kingdom, Istvdn Podmaniczky, bishop of Nyitra who was acting for the archbishop of Esztergom, Ldszlo Szalkai, who was killed at Mohdcs.3 Contrary to the views of many contemporary and later opinions, Szapolyai was not elected king of Hungary on the basis of the so-called Decision of Rdkos. This document, of October 1505, stated that if Wladislaw II died without a legitimate male heir, tire Hungarian estates would not elect a foreign ruler.4 On the basis of this decision one of the most influential Hungarian magnates was barred from becoming the king of the country. The throne of Hungary' could be obtained only according to the ancient freedoms and customs of tire country and only by lawful coronation.5 The decrees did not determine the sequence of the process because, until the end of the eighteenth century7, the process was performed according to the customary laws of the country which carried more weight than the decision of the diet. The Decision of Rakos did not provide a constitutional basis for Szapolyai to gain the throne of Hungary7 but it did create a serious claim and a powerful propaganda weapon. This was taken advantage of by the supporters of the voivode of Transylvania and by tire author of tire decision, Istvdn Werboczy.6 Szapolyai relied heavily on the nationalis­ tic fervor of the nobility, even though the Kingdom of Hungary could not be considered a “national kingdom” at the time of the dynastic states as nineteenth and twentieth century Hungarian historiography claimed by projecting its conceptual framework back into the sixteenth century. Similarly, Ferdinand of Habsburg did not become king of Hungary on the basis of the Habsburg hereditary7 agreements of 1463,1491, and 1506, or on the basis of the dual Vienna engagements of 1515, i.e. the hereditary rights of his consort, Anna Jagiello. These did not constitute a legitimate legal basis for his election. Yet, he and his counselors endeavored to view tire Kingdom of Hungary after 1526 as an inheri­ tance and tried to make the Hungarian estates accept this, without much

MOHACS AND PARTITTON

39

success. (The expressions of ius successionis and ius et titulus haereditarius or Erbkvnig zu Hungern seem to show clearly the approach taken.)7 The inheritance agreements and the relationship to Anna Jagiello also provided a strong argument and an effective propaganda tool. Vienna emphasized these aspects in contrast to the traditional method of election in order to make John Szapolyai’s election appear to be invalid.8 Even though Ferdinand’s emissaries emphasized the validity of the inheritance agreements at the diet in Pozsony in December 1526, he became king of Hungary by free election and legitimate coronation. In spite of all the opposition, there was a traditional election to the kingship at the diet held on December 16, 1526, in the Franciscan Cloister in Pozsony. Palatine Bdthory was the first one to cast his vote and he was followed by the prelates, magnates and the nobility. “The election was held freely.”9 The estates set some serious conditions for the elec­ tion, namely that all the ancient privileges, freedoms, laws, and cus­ toms had to be rigidly adhered to.10 Because of the stand of the estates, the leaders of the Vienna court could not avoid the formal elective process, but the very next day the city of Augsburg was told that the election was a consequence of the inheritance and of the inheritance agreements.11 The political arena and propaganda offered a wide range of interpretations for Ferdinand to use. Depending on whom he was talking to, he explained the propri­ etorship of the throne on the basis of the inheritance agreements, on the inheritance rights of his wife, on the free elections, or on any combina­ tion of the above.12 The situation was very similar in the case of his Bohemian kingship. The Bohemian estates rejected his claim on tlie throne that was based on the inheritance claims of Anna Jagiello. Thus, at their meet­ ing in the St. Vitus Church in Prague on October 23, 1526, they were willing to accept Ferdinand as their ruler only on the basis of an elec­ tion. The election was rejected during November and December by the estates of Moravia, Silesia, and Upper and Lower Lusatia. They did not want to accept the Prague election as a valid one because they rejected the idea of Bohemian supremacy. They were able, however, to accept the inheritance right of the husband of Anna Jagiello. They were deter­ mined to preserve their own privileges and the Moravian estates

40

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

accepted Ferdinand as their marquess at their provincial meeting in Brunn [Bmo] on April 7,1527.13 Ferdinand had to appear before the representatives of the Hungar­ ian estates and take a solemn oath that he would preserve the liberties of the Kingdom of Hungary. He did this at the beginning of August 1527 after he crossed the Hungarian border ahead of his troops.14 This was only the second time that he had set foot in Hungary but it was nec­ essary for him to acquire the throne. (The first time he was in Hungary7 was in September 1523 when he spent a few days in Sopron.)15 The acquisition of the crown of Hungary and the revival of the brief monar­ chy of Albert II, was fundamental in Habsburg thinking ever since Frederic III. Ferdinand also recognized that Hungary was essential in the defense of his hereditary provinces against the Ottomans. These feelings were endorsed by the anti-Turkish plans of Emperor Maximil­ ian and the news about the depredations caused by marauding Ottoman detachments in Camiola and Carinthia.16 Hie failure of the peace nego­ tiations with Szapolyai in Olmiitz in June 1527 placed Ferdinand in a very7 difficult position. Even though his financial and military strength were limited, he had no choice but to use his army in securing Hun­ gary.17 His sister, Queen Mary, and his Hungarian supporters urged him to do so.18 Similarly to his predecessors, when Ferdinand crossed the border he had to take an oath before the Hungarian magnates that he would defend the country against domestic and foreign enemies.19 The routine oath seemed very serious at this time in view of the presence of the Ottomans in the south and of the resistance personified by Szapolyai. The success­ ful defeat of King John by Niklas Graf zu Salm, the commander in chief in Hungary, at the Battle of Tokaj on September 27, removed the last hur­ dle to Ferdinand’s coronation. Hiis took place on the afternoon of November 3, 1527, with all the required ceremonies. Ferdinand was made the ruler at the traditional site, Szekesfehervdr, with the Holy Crown and by the senior prelate, Istvdn Podmaniczky, bishop of Nyitra. The following day his wife, Anna Jagiello, was crowned queen of Hun­ gary, using a family crown during the ceremony.20 Hi ere was a fundamental difference between the coronation cere­ monies used for John I and Ferdinand I. Hiis did not affect the legiti­ macy of the procedures but was, nevertheless significant. In contrast to

MOHA.CS AND PARTITION

41

Szapolyai, when Ferdinand was crowned he enjoyed the support of almost all of the Hungarian elite. This difference was demonstrated by the fact that Ferdinand was crowned jointly by the bishop of Nyitra and by the palatine who was carried on a litter.21 It indicated that the new ruler could become king only with the support of the estates. This success of the Hungarian elite was not surprising because a precedent had been set in the Kingdom of Bohemia where the coronations had been performed since 1438 by the leader of the lay elite, the chief warden of Prague.22 The powerful position of the Hungarian political elite is also demonstrated by the fact that the coronation banquet was organized according to the Hungarian ceremonial tradition. An almost exclusive­ ly Hungarian lay and clerical elite sat at the same table with the king 23 The relatively relaxed dining arrangements of the Jagiello tradition must have seemed strange to the archduke who was used to the much more formal and rigid customs of the Burgundian and Spanish proto­ cols.24 Gaining the throne and increasing the number of his Hungarian supporters was much more important than any disagreements with the Hungarian magnates over the ceremonies at table 25 The new Hungari­ an ruler had to make a number of compromises with the Hungarian estates in regard to the election and the coronation and these had a dis­ tinctly calming effect. It did signify to Ferdinand's advisers, however, that in the future the governance of the Kingdom of Hungary and col­ laboration with the strong Hungarian estates would not by easy.

Civil War and Partition Consolidation of Ferdinand’s rule in Hungary was made more difficult because, similarly to the lands of the Bohemian crown, the Kingdom of Hungary was a smaller state of unusual com­ position. In 1526 the Kingdom of Croatia, and the provinces Slavonia and Transylvania had their own provincial assemblies. It was thus of the greatest importance for Ferdinand that his kingship in Hungary be accepted by not only the estates of Croatia, but also those of Slavonia and Transylvania. In contrast with the situation in the Bohemian lands, the principal problem was not whether he came to the throne by inher­ itance or by election but whom the estates would accept as their ruler

42

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

subsequent to Szapolyai’s coronation on November 11 and Ferdinand’s election on December 16, 1526. In Transylvania Ferdinand’s possibilities were limited. Szapolyai had ruled this province as voivode since 1510 and the distance to the area of the country was so great that sending military forces would have been very difficult. Also, it was here that King John sought refuge after his defeat in September 1527. It was considered a major triumph when, by the end of 1527 and with the help of Georg Reicherstorffer, the diplomat who came from Nagyszeben, most of the Saxons joined Fer­ dinand’s side.26 Similar problems existed in Slavonia and Croatia as well. In the defense of Camiola, Carinthia and Styria against the Ottoman danger, Ferdinand had to have these areas.27 He had actually supported the border defenses in these territories for some years, but when several Croatian and at least two Hungarian magnates in Slavo­ nia (Jdnos Bdnffy, and Simon Erdody) supported Szapolyai, Ferdi­ nand’s control of these provinces became doubtful. It was a major success when the Croatian estates, at their meeting on January 1,1527, in the Franciscan monastery in Cetin, elected Fer­ dinand king of Croatia.28 Because there had not been a separate Croa­ tian coronation and the Hungarian rulers automatically became kings of Croatia, the step taken by the Croatian nobility was an unmistak­ able rejection of Szapolyai’s coronation at Szekesfehervar. In addi­ tion, the Croatian nobles, like those of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia, recognized Ferdinand’s hereditary7 rights.29 The key factor in their decision was that Ferdinand had assisted them in the past against the Ottomans and that his emissaries promised that he would continue to do so. The Cetin election received its final endorsement with the corona­ tion of Ferdinand at the beginning of November in Szekesfehervdr. Had there been no Hungarian coronation, the Croatian nobility would have been forced to take other measures to ensure Ferdinand’s rule. In the joint history7 of Hungary and Croatia, the Croatian election must be con­ sidered an exceptional event. It took place not because of an attempt for national independence by the Croatian nobles or because of their ques­ tioning the Hungarian-Croatian union, as claimed by Croatian histori­ ans during the nineteenth, and twentieth century, but was essentially a choice between recognizing Ferdinand or .

MOHA.CS AND PARTITION

43

In response to the Cetin election the Slavonian estates, under the leadership of King John’s Croatian-Slavonian ban and captain general, the Croatian Krst Frankopan, recognized Szapolyai at their meeting at Dombro on January 6-8, 1527, but did not elect him as their king.30 In contrast to Croatia, and similarly to Transylvania, Slavonia was not an independent kingdom, but only an autonomous province and thus its estates could not hold an election for a king. Just like most Szapolyai’s supporters, the Slavonian estates justified their choice of Szapolyai on the basis of the Rdkos Decision. Just like the estates of the lands of the Bohemian crown, the nobility of the various lands and provinces of the realm of St. Stephen fought with each other after 1526. While in Bohemia the argument was about the method of recognizing the claims of the Habsburg archduke, in Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Transyl vania the argument and the increasing hostility were between the sup­ porters of the two claimants to the throne. Thus King Ferdinand had to use armed force to get his rule accept­ ed in Slavonia. This struggle lasted for years because after the summer of 1529 Simon Erdody, the bishop of Zagreb became King John’s Slavonian governor and captain general31 and, using Ottoman troops, devastated the estates of the supporters of the Habsburg king.3'-’ The Ottomans thus had a major role in making the civil war a nationwide struggle. It was based on the alliance made by Szapolyai and Sultan Suleyman in Constantinople at the end of February 1528. Even before Ferdinand’s coronation, John sent the noted Polish diplomat, Hyeronimus Laski, to the Porte to ask for assistance.33 It was the increasingly hopeless situation that made King John take this difficult step. After his coronation he acquired considerable strength but from the beginning of 1527 his situation deteriorated in all areas. In foreign policy he became completely isolated and received no effective help from his relative, Sigismund the king of Poland. His greatest hope was in Francis I, king of France, but Francis thought of him, just as Suleyman did, as a tool in the struggle against the great rival Habsburgs. His Hungarian support also diminished rapidly.34 After his military defeat in September 1527 his position was threatened by complete collapse. He refused to consider abdication and decided to make an alliance with the sultan. In reality this meant that after Febru­ ary 1528 the king of Hungary became a vassal of the sultan even

44

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARYAND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

though, at this time, the relationship was a loose one and there was no payment of taxes.35 Because of the enormous difference in power between the Porte and its vassal, it was evident that there was no way of reestablishing an independent Kingdom of Hungary. According to the well established strategy of the Ottomans they w7ere looking for a Hungarian supporter who would help them in dividing Ferdinand of Habsburg’s strength and who would assist in any military campaign against him.36 The major events in Hungary at the turn of the 1520s and 1530s were determined by the sultan’s military leadership. The new cam­ paign, started by Ferdinand in the spring of 1528, forced John to seek refuge in Poland but even so Ferdinand could not take control of all of Hungary. This w7as due to the Ottomans conquering Bosnia’s last sur­ viving fortress, Jajce.37 Thus the Ottomans occupied the entire southern Slav kingdom and Hungary lost its last advanced buffer zone. Slavonia came within reach of the marauding Turkish raiding parties.38 In tlie spring of 1529 Sultan Suleyman marched wdth an enormous army against Hungary or, more precisely, against Vienna (map 3). It was his plan to administer a crushing defeat to Ferdinand and his immediate goal was the capture of the “golden apple,” i.e. the capital Vienna.39The sultan was respectfully greeted by his Hungarian vassal, John Szapolyai, on the field of Mohacs, who was given the castle of Buda by the sultan in the middle of September. The areas it took Ferdinand 1527 and 1528 to occupy, were wrested away within a few months by tlie Ottoman leadership and its Hungarian ally. In spite of the sultan’s enormously stronger army, he suffered a defeat under the walls of Vienna. Had this not happened, it is probable that most of Hungary would have been rapidly occupied by Ottoman forces linking Hungarian history with that of the Balkans. Three years later, in the summer of 1532, Suleyman, besieging the small Hungari­ an town of Koszeg, was unwilling to fight the army of Emperor Charles V, which was stationed nearby on tlie Austrian border. Presumably, tlie emperor w7as also reluctant to fight a battle with the sultan.40 After 1529, Ferdinand had to contend with both the sultan and his Hungarian vassal. Coming back from Vienna. Suleyman left a garrison of several thousand troops in Buda to support John. These troops regu­ larly participated in all actions against Ferdinand and defended Buda at

MOHACS AND PARTITTON

45

the end of 1530 when Ferdinand’s Austrian commander in chief in Hungary, Wilhelm von Roggendorf, tried to capture it.41 In the fall of 1529, John was forced to start paying tribute to the Porte.42 In addition, Suleyman assigned the Venetian Lodovico Gritti, a confidant of the Grand Vizier Ibrahim, to John as regent and treasurer.43 Consequently, by the end of 1529, the Hungary of John I, was increasingly tightly linked in its vassalage to the Ottoman Empire.44 The break-up of medieval Hungary was now only a question of time. In comparison with the emerging central European monarchy of Ferdinand, the Ottomans enjoyed substantial advantages in strength (table 3). The Ottoman army was much larger than the forces so labo­ riously assembled by the king of Hungary and Bohemia. Ferdinand had to use all the resources of the Austrian and Bohemian lands and all the military and economic support he could gather from his remaining Hungarian supporters to hold on to the Hungarian territories closest to Vienna and to the most seriously threatened areas of Croatia and Slavo­ nia. Continued civil war and increasing Ottoman advances in Hungary appeared to be inevitable.

Table 3. The Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy of Ferdinand 1 at the End of the 1520s

Ottoman Empire

Area (Km2) Population

1,500,000 13-14,000,000

Habsburg Monarchy* 450,000 6.5-7,000,000

Sources: Agoston/The Most Powerful Empire,” 128 -130; Winkelbauer, Stdndefreiheit und Fiirstenmacht, 23-24. * Without the Holy Roman Empire

The failure near Vienna forced the sultan to modify his strategy in Hungary. There were also some international reasons for this. The Ottoman military leadership had to realize that in spite of its great numerical superiority, it could not force the Habsburg conglomerate of states on their knees wdth one stroke. The strongest army in the world

46

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

faced an entirely different group of countries north of the lower reach ­ es of the Danube than they faced in the Balkans. These countries were far more difficult to overcome because they had the centuries-old tradi­ tion of power and were willing to fight to the last man to stay in the Western Christian cultural environment. The concept of a European campaign on land was also affected by the obligations the Ottomans took on in the East (Persia 1534-35 and South Arabia 1538) and in the Mediterranean. These were the reasons why Suleyman and the Habs­ burg brothers, Charles V and Ferdinand I, signed an armistice in Con­ stantinople in 153345 Emperor Charles had assisted his younger broth­ er with one or two thousand Spanish infantry men but it provided even more assistance by opening the Mediterranean front which limited the Ottoman ability to fight in Hungary/6 The Ottomans developed a new strategy vis-a-vis Hungary. On two occasions they tried to move directly against Vienna but when this was unsuccessful, they occupied Buda and decided to move slowly in tire direction of the Habsburg capital.47 It was a specific event that moti­ vated the sultan to occupy the ancient capital of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary. After his vassal, John I, died in July 1540, the armies of Ferdi­ nand, under tire command of the commander in chief in Hungary7 of Ferdinand (1537 -1541), Leonhard von Vels, made an attempt to recon­ quer Buda. This campaign was designed to implement the secret treaty between the two kings of Hungary7, signed at Vdrad on February 24, 1538. According to the treaty, after King John’s death, even if he had a son, his part of Hungary- would descend to the Habsburgs. Szapoiyai’s heir would receive the Szepes principality to be established in northern Hungary.48 Even though Ferdinand was unable to take Buda, he did occupy Visegrdd, SzekesfehSrvdr, Tata, Vdc, and Pest thereby serious­ ly threatening all of the Ottoman vassal state. The sultan had no choice but to start another campaign in Hungary-. On August 29, 1541, Suleyman retook Buda, not by force but by stealth. Hie Hungarian royal capital became the center of a new Turk­ ish vilayet and the westernmost major fortress of the Ottoman Empire 49 This settled Hungary’s fate for many years. The sultan put an end to the Szapolyai vassal state, occupied the central parts of Hungary and organized his first territory in this area as the Buda vilayet. He also decided that he would not abandon the infant son of King John, the

MOHA.CS AND PARTITION

47

baby Jiinos Zsigmond (John Sigismund) Szapolyai, bom on July 7, 1540, and continued to use him as a pawn in his battle with Ferdinand. His decision was made easier by Szapolyai’s supporters electing the infant king of Hungary as John II (1540-1571) on September 13.50 The title was approved by the Porte.51 In contrast with the Transylvanian estates, the Hungarian supporters of Ferdinand as well as the Croatian and Slavonian estates, never recognized the new king. In the end the sultan did not occupy Szapolyai’s Transylvanian and eastern Hungarian territories but appointed John Sigismund as the san jac bey of Transylvania, Peter Petrovics as sanjac bey of the Temeskbz and Friar Gyorgy Martinuzzi, bishop of VSrad, as sanjac bey of the Tiszdntul. In Ottoman usage this meant that these former territories of King John remained part of the Ottoman Empire as vassal entities. The sultan tightened their dependence and John Sigismund and his support­ ers had to pay an annual tribute of 10,000 florins to Istanbul. The legit­ imacy and the power of the young king depended entirely upon the approval of the Porte.52 The fall of Buda changed the fate of all of central Europe for many years. The changes which began with the Battle of Mohdcs were accel­ erated by the occupation of the Hungarian capital. Those who in the Habsburg court at Vienna or at the Hungarian diets in Pozsony still hoped that the Ottomans could be pushed back, had to realize that the late medieval Hungarian composite state was divided permanently into three pails. These were the areas occupied by the Ottomans, the pro­ gressively shrinking Kingdom of Hungary ruled by Ferdinand I and the eastern Hungarian and Transylvanian vassal territories of the Ottoman Empire. Hie increased danger to the Habsburg Monarchy was shown by the fact that wdiile Nandorfehervdr was 660 kilometers from Vienna, Buda was only 270. It was for this reason that both the Viennese military leadership and the German and Hungarian estates reacted more prompt­ ly than in the past. The approximately 50,000 man army, assembled in the autumn of 1542 from the Holy Roman Empire, from the Austrian and Bohemian lands, and from the Hungarian territories of the mag­ nates, failed in its attempt to take Buda. The army, under the command of Marquis Joachim II of Brandenburg, was so weakened by the cold weather and by an epidemic that it could not even retake the city of

48

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE. HABSBURG MONARCHY

Pest.53 The German imperial estates became increasingly involved as shown by the detailed report prepared for them in 1542, indicating the number of soldiers required to man the Hungarian fortresses, should the sultan start another campaign. In order to fully staff these towns and to be certain of effective resistance about 50,000 soldiers (12,500 cavalry and 36,650 infantry) would be needed.54 It did not take long for the sultan to respond to the Christian cam­ paign. Under Suleyman’s leadership tlie Ottoman forces achieved con­ siderable successes in 1543. By occupying Siklos, Pecs, Szekesfehervdr, and Esztergom they established a solid defensive circle around Buda. Further successes by the local forces in 1544—1545 included the occupation of Visegrad, Nogrdd, Hatvan, and Simontomya further con­ solidating the situation (map 3).55 The Ottoman successes also frustrat­ ed the Viennese diplomatic endeavors directed toward acquiring the former territories of Szapolyai. On December 29,1541, in the castle of Gyalu, an agreement was reached to reconfirm the Vdrad Treaty but tire sultan’s campaign consolidated the position of the vassals within the Ottoman Empire.56

A Very Important but Dangerous Bulwark

As a consequence of the Ottoman campaigns of 1529, 1532, 1541, and 1543 and of tire twenty-year civil war, tire tripartite division of the Kingdom of Hungary became a seemingly unalterable fact. Instead of ruling over a significant central European power, Ferdi­ nand, in the mid 1540s, ruled over a very much diminished Kingdom of Hungary. Yet, to hold on to this was of critical importance to his Viennese court and to his Austrian and Bohemian possessions. Thus, the remaining Kingdom of Hungary became one of the most important components of the Monarchy and also a much endangered bulwark. In order to keep it at all costs, the Habsburgs were prepared first to make an armistice, in 1545, and then a peace treaty with the Ottomans. In the Habsburg-Ottoman peace treaty, signed for five years on June 19, 1547 in Adrianople [Edirne], the leaders of the two leading world powers acknowledged that they were unable to realize their plans for Hungary.57 Even though Sultan Suleyman did not relinquish his

MOHACS AND PARTITTON

49

plans against Vienna, he had to admit that he could not conquer Hun gary. Ferdinand I was forced to agree to Hungary’s division and was even willing to pay 30,000 florins of tribute each year to keep control of the remaining part of Hungary. This sum was called “the honorable gift” and was paid to the Porte by Ferdinand’s successors annually until 1606.58 The peace treaty was soon broken. For about seventeen years, 1549-1566, Hungary again became a front line and these years are called the era of the fortress fights. Initially these fights were part of the civil war. In the summer of 1549, Niklas Graf zu Salm und Neuburg, the com­ mander in chief of the armed forces in Hungary, captured several north­ ern Hungarian fortresses including Murdny, Leva, and Csabrag from the followers of John Sigismund. Then, on September 8,1549, in Nyirbdtor, he signed a secret agreement, in Ferdinand’s name, with the Governor Friar Gyorgy, the real head of John Sigismund’s vassal state. According­ ly, in exchange for 100,000 florins and the Silesian principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor, John Sigismund ceded Transylvania, provided Fer­ dinand could muster sufficient forces to protect this territory.59 The unification of the country began in June 1551 but the Porte responded immediately. It could not allow its renitent vassal to endan­ ger the areas of Hungary under Ottoman control. In the autumn of 1551 Mehmed Sokollu, beylerbey of Rumelia, occupied the fortresses of Becse, Becskerek, and Csandd in the Temeskdz, and the following year he took Lugos, Kardnsebes, Temesv&r, Lippa, and Szolnok. (map 3). In the autumn on 1552 the garrison of Eger, under the leadership of Istvdn Dobo, heroically defended the fortress against the Ottoman siege. In spite of this, the Ottomans organized their second vilayet in Hungary with Temesvar as its center. In the summer of 1552 they occupied Veszprem and VSrpalota and thus extended their holdings in the Transdanubian area. In the north of Buda they occupied a number of smaller fortresses. At the same time the area between the Drava and the Sava as well as a large part of Slavonia came under Ottoman rule. On August 9, Ali, the pasha of Buda, gained a victory at the Battle of Paldst.® Habs­ burg troops were kept in Transylvania for several years,61 but the addi­ tional Ottoman victories, Fiilek 1554 and Kaposvdr 1555, made it clear to the Viennese military leadership that the defense of the remaining Hungarian-Croatian-Slavonian territories had to take precedence over everything else.

50

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

It might have been some consolation to Ferdinand that in 1556 the Austrian, Styrian, Hungarian, Croatian, and Moravian troops under the nominal leadership of his son, Archduke Ferdinand, but actually com­ manded by Sforza Pallavicini, Military Commissioner and Palatine TamAs Nadasdy administered the first defeat after 1526 on the troops of the pasha of Buda in a battle in the southern part of Transdanubia.62 It was also considered a triumph when Kassa, the central city of north­ eastern Hungary, which had been lost in 1536, was returned by John Sigismund upon his departure to Poland in 1552.63 Fights went on in the eastern parts of the country, particularly beyond the Tisza River until 1568.64 The era of tire fortress wars came to an end with the sultan’s 1566 campaign. The seventh campaign conducted by Suleyman 1 against Hungary resulted in the capture of Gyula and SzigetvAr. The death of all the defenders of Szigetv&r, under the command of the heroic Miklos Zrmyi, served as an example to follow for many year's. The occupation of these two fortresses meant that now almost 40 percent of the late medieval Hungary was under Ottoman control. Even including the evolving Transylvanian principality (map 5), Ferdinand of Habsburg only controlled an area of approximately 120,000 square kilometers of the original composite Hungarian state. The eight-year peace treaty signed with the Ottomans in Adrianople in 1568 recognized these sig­ nificant Ottoman conquests. Hie realm of St. Stephen did not suffer losses only in the central and eastern areas. Most of the Kingdom of Croatia was under Ottoman rule with the exception of a small area north of the Bihac-Senj line. This remaining area was graphically expressed in the contemporary saying: “reliquiae reliquiarum olirn regni Croat iae” (remnant of remnants of the former Kingdom of Croatia).65 Slavonia was also limited to a narrow segment composed of the remains of Counties Zagreb and Varasd.66 The Croatian nobles, having lost their estates, moved to the remaining Slavonian territories and this led, after middle of the sixteenth century7 to a gradual fusion of the remnants of Croatia and Slavonia. After 1558, the Slavonian and Croatian estates, which had always held separate meetings, held their assemblies jointly.67 In addition, over the next fifty years, the Croatian nobility, skilled in integration, man­ aged to take over the control of Slavonia from the Slavonian estates.

MOHACS AND PARTITION

51

After much of the formerly Adriatic Kingdom of Croatia was lost, the move of the Croatian nobility caused the term Croatia to be transferred to the northern area that was formerly Slavonia.68 This unusual consoli­ dation of territories was aptly expressed in an epigram by Jdnos Szakmdrdy in 1643. He stated: “1 amthat Slavonia wdiichis now- called Croa­ tia.”69 For this reason Slavonia was being cited with Dalmatia and Croa­ tia as an associated lands (partes!'regna annexae) of Hungary. With the Croatian nobility taking the lead, the Hungarian-Slavonian magnates, Erdodys, Rdttkays, Tahys, etc, started to correspond in Croatian.70 Knowing this, one can speak of a Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian kingdom only after the second half of the sixteenth century. Yet the concept of Slavonia survived and was understood to mean the counties of Zagreb, Korbs and Varasd 71 This was clearly shown by the evolu­ tion of the Slavonian military frontier, to be discussed later, and by the preservation of the position of the Slavonian protonotary. This official used the 1497 Slavonian seal on all his publications until the seven­ teenth century.72 In May 1595, mindful of the war, Slavonian estates declared in Zagreb that, “The Land of Slavonia belongs to the King­ dom of Hungary.”73 Ferdinand of Habsburg needed the remaining Hungarian and evolving Croatian-Slavonian territories not only as a defensive area against the Ottomans. Even though the Kingdom of Hungary7 in the sec­ ond half of the sixteenth century did not compare to the Hungary of half a century earlier, it was still considered an important country. Even in its diminished area it was still about the same size as the lands of the Bohemian crown and it was larger that the Austrian hereditary provinces (table 4). Its population was smaller than that of the Austrian and Bohemian areas but it still generated substantial revenues and was therefore of great economic importance.

52

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Table 4. The Kingdom of Hungary, the Austrian Hereditary Provinces, and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century

Area (Km2) Population Annual Revenue

Kingdom of Hungary

Austrian Hered. Provinces

Lands of the Bohemian Crown

ca 120,000 1,800,000 ca 750-800,000

110,000 2,390,000 800- 900,000

125,000 2,950,000 ca 700,000

Sources: Palffy, A tizenhaJodik szazad; Kenyeres, Die Finanzen des Konigreichs Ungam\ Winkel bauer, Standefreiheit und Furstenmacht; and Rauscher, Zwischen Stdnden und Gldubigem.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Kingdom of Hun­ gary , the frontline in the defense against the Ottomans, provided almost one third of the revenues of the Habsburg Monarchy. Hungary was not only the defense bastion of central Europe but also provided it with most its meat. The proximity of Vienna, Ferdinand’s new residence to the Hungarian frontier (only fifty kilometers ) also made Hungary more valuable to the Monarchy. Thus, after 1526. the Kingdom of Hungary became one of the most important components of the evolving Habs­ burg Monarchy. Thus the important changes which took place in Hungary after 1526 affected the history of all of central Europe. The eventual evolu­ tion of the Habsburg Monarchy depended largely on the future of the Kingdom of Hungary’ and on events in the Hungarian theater of war.

Chapter Four

VIENNA, THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER OF HUNGARY The Composite Monarchy of the Habsburgs in Central Europe Even though, according to some interpretations, the central European Habsburg Monarchy was founded by Ferdinand II (1619-1637),1 more recent studies increasingly attach its beginnings to the rule of Ferdinand I.2 These latter theories no longer analyze the events from the perspective of the much debated absolutism paradigm but approach it in the framework of the overall evolution of states in the early modern era.3 This new thesis places the birth of the Monarchy in the years 1526 -1527 and sees Ferdinand I as the “first founder.” From the perspective of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary this seems obvious. In the nineteenth century, during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the beginnings of the symbiosis of the Hungarian-Habsburg states were placed in the years immediately following the Battle of Mohacs. The birth of the Monarchy was followed by a period of develop­ ment lasting several decades. Even though Ferdinand was elected king of Germany in January 1531 in Cologne, he was able to mount the imperial throne only in March, 1558, following the abdication of Emperor Charles V in 1556. It was at this time that the Holy Roman Empire was added to the three large groups of states, tire Austrian hereditary provinces, the lands of the Hungarian crown and the lands of the Bohemian crown. The Iberian, Italian, Netherlands and New World possessions of Charles V came under the rule of Philip II and the Spanish branch of the family (map 6).

54

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

'Ilie short-lived central European state of Albert of Habsburg, Holy Roman, Hungarian, and Bohemian king was revived under the rule of Ferdinand I. Tins was demonstrated during the funerary ceremonies of Ferdinand I in Vienna in August 1565. The flags carried in the funeral procession illustrate the structure of the new central European Habs­ burg Monarchy (table 5).

Table 5. The Sequence of Banners at the Funeral Procession of Ferdinand I in Vienna on August 6, 1565 1. Gorizia (A, c) 2. Common flag of Pfirt (Ha, c) Swabia (A, p), Alsace (Ha, 1) Tyrol (A, c), Habsburg (Ha, c) 3. Upper and Lower Lusatia (B, m) 4. Camiola (A, d) 5. Carinthia (A, d) 6. Styria (A, d) 7. Silesia (B, d) 8. Moravia (B, m) 9. Burgundy (Ha, d) 10. Upper Austria (A, a)

11. Lower Austria (A, a) 12. Common flag of Bosnia, Serbia Cumania and Bulgaria (H, k) 13. Slavonia (H, “k”) 14. Croatia (H, k) 15. Dalmatia (H, k) 16. Common flag of Castile, Aragon and Sicily (S, k) 17. Bohemia (B, k) 18. Hungary (H, k) 19. Holy Roman Empire -Small flag 20. Holy Roman Empire—Large flag (G,e)

Notes: A=Austrian Hereditary Provinces, B=Lands of the Bohemian crown, G= Holy Roman Empire, Ha=Habsburg family territories, H=Kingdom of Hungary, S=Spanish title-infant of Spain, a=archduchy, c=county, d=duchy, e=empire, k= kingdom, l=landgravate, m=margravate, p=principality Sources: OStA Vienna, HHStAFamilienakten Kart. 60, Konv. 5, fol. 1—8; ibid sine dato “Khay exequien 1565” fol. 1-3; OStA Vienna, HKA RA Fasc, 202/A fol. 270 -271; Hannewald, Parentalia', and Palffy, “Magyar cfmerek,” 252-253.

Ferdinand 1 and his successors, i.e. the Austrian branch of the Habs­ burgs4 ruled over a truly composite monarchy.5 Beginning with the 1560s it consisted of four major parts, in addition to the Habsburg fam­ ily territories. These were the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary, the lands of the Bohemian crowai, and the Austrian hereditary provinces. These four major components were themselves conglomer­ ates of states and territories.

VIENNA, THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER

55

Since the reforms of Maximilian I, the Holy Roman Empire con­ sisted of ten imperial districts. The lands of the Bohemian crown con­ sisted of the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia, the Principality of Silesia and the two Lusatian margravates (Upper and Lower Lusatia). The Austrian hereditary provinces consisted of Arch­ duchies of Upper and Lower Austria, the Duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Camiola, the Counties of Tyrol and Gorizia and some smaller ter­ ritories Wendish Mark, Friaul, Portenau, etc. After 1512 the Austrian territories also functioned as an imperial district. The Kingdom of Bohemia never became part of the Imperial District system (Kreisverfassung). The ruler of Bohemia was also the first of the lay electors of the Holy Roman emperor and thus it was considered an Electorate (Kurfurstentum). Lastly, the Holy Roman Empire had an imperial assembly, the Reichstag, its territories had district councils, the Kreistag. The Bohemian and Austrian provinces, however, had provin­ cial assemblies, the Landtag. All of this made it very difficult for the ruler to obtain consent from the estates of all of the territories and thus made political decision-making slow and cumbersome. The lands of the Hungarian or Holy Crown were similar but had some distinctive characteristics (map 7). Because of the Ottoman advances and the evolution of the 'Transylvanian principality only about 40 percent of the realm of St. Stephen remained in Habsburg hands. These included the remnants of the Kingdoms of Hungary and Croatia and the fragments of Slavonia in the western end of the Drava-Sava area. Slavonia was never a kingdom. There was no royal election and no coronation. It was only during the struggles after 1526 and the difficulties created by the acceptance of two kings that the Slavonian estates voted for a king, first for John Szapolyai and later for Ferdinand. After 1540 Ferdinand as king of Hungary, began to use the title of “King of Slavonia” (rex Sclavoniae). Thus the flag of the territory was carried in Ferdinand’s funeral procession (see in the table 5 with “k”). None of his predecessors in the late Middle Ages wore the title, not even Szapolyai.6 Ferdinand and his successors con­ tinued to use the ancient titles of the Hungarian kings claiming the Balkan areas. This was the reason why these areas were represented under one common flag in the funeral procession of the founder of the Monarchy.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

It was not only the system of associated lands and claimed lands that made the Kingdom of Hungary a more complex structure than the Austrian or Bohemian provinces. It was not just a dual kingdom formed by the personal union of Hungary and Croatia. The Croatian estates had their own diet (sabor), but the Slavonian estates also had a territorial assembly (congregation. As stated earlier, because of the Ottoman con­ quest the Slavonian and Croatian estates started meeting together after 1558. At these meetings they elected their representatives who then attended the Hungarian diet. Thus the diet of the Kingdom of Hungary did not function as a Landtag but, more like the Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire. The medieval practice of appealing a decision of the Croatian-Slavonian ban to the chief justice of the Kingdom of Hungary was preserved.7 Because of the Ottoman position in Hungary the geographic con­ tours of the joint Hungarian-Croatian state assumed a peculiar shape by the second half of the sixteenth century. Its extent was still considerable (approx. 120,000 square kilometers) extending in a crescent-shape from the Adriatic to the border of Transylvania. Its diameter in the Mura region was barely fifty kilometers and even in its central part along the Danube it was only two hundred kilometer wide (maps 6 and 7). In these areas the Ottomans came close to the Austrian hereditary provinces. A traveler from the south western area, e.g. Varasd or Kanizsa, wanting to go to Kassa, had to traverse the entire country and make a huge detour. Ihis peculiar geopolitical situation and geographic frag­ mentation were the reasons why Hungary and the attached CroatianSlavonian areas were divided into four districts (districtus, partes, Kreis), in the second half of the sixteenth century (table 6). The princi­ pal reason for this division was regional cooperation of the Hungarian, Croatian and Slavonian estates and the need for a joint arrangement of the defense against the Ottomans.

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Table 6. The Districts of the Hungarian-Croatian State in the Sixteenth and Seven­ teenth Centuries

The Banate of Croatia and Slavonia County Zagreb Varasd Korbs (fragment) The Retained Croatian Territories

The Transdanubian Districts Sopron Veszprem

Moson Gyor

Vas Zala (with Somogy) Komarom (with Eejer)

Cisdanubian Districts or Lower Hungary Pozsony Turoc Zolyom

Nyitra £rva Esztergom

Trencsen Bars Lipto Hont Nograd (with Pest-Pilis-Solt)

Upper Hungary Gbmbr Szepes Zemplen Szabolcs

Heves (with Kiilso-Szolnok) Borsod Toma Abaiij Saros Ugocsa Bereg Ung (at times Bihar, Kraszna, and Szatmar Maramaros)

Sources: OStA Vienna, KAHKR KIAIX c 1, fol. 4 (1574; Transdanubian district); OStA Vienna, HKAHFU rote no. 21, 1570 Aug. fol. 104 (1569: Cisdanubian dis­ trict); MOL Budapest, E 136 MKANo. 173 (20. cs.) fol. 327 (1559: Upper Hun­ gary).

Accordingly, the area of the joint Croatian-Slavonian territory was divided into three counties, Transdanubia into seven, Cisdanubia or Lower Hungary into eleven and Upper Hungary into thirteen. It must be emphasized that Upper Hungary was not identical with the later Fei vid ek (Upper Northern Hungary) but it was much larger than the present Eastern Slovakia. The present Slovakia does not cover the same territory' as the former Upper and Lower Hungary. Thus the later Hun­

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

garian and Slovakian geopolitical concepts cannot be applied to the six­ teenth century. 'Ilie nomenclature of the territories evolved from a central view­ point and it was designated as “Upper” or “Lower” or “Cis” or “Trans” from the perspective of the central or regional center where the author­ ity resided.8 After the loss of Buda the naming originated from Pozsony where most of the Hungarian domestic policy decisions were made. It was from here that the specific territories appeared to be Cisdanubian or Transdanubian and it was also from here and from Vienna that a cer­ tain territory was designated as Upper Hungary’. The mining towns along the Garam River, Hewed from Pozsony, were designated in Ger­ man as niedenmgarische Bergstadte9 The three Hungarian territories were important principally in the defense against the Ottomans and in certain administrative matters of the counties, such as taxation, road and river maintenance, and price setting. To accomplish this, the estates held separate territorial meet­ ings. Their importance increased during the seventeenth century’. By this time even the estates of Upper Hungary gained a significant polit­ ical weight, just as the estates in Croatia-Slavonia had before them.10 Even though the territories did not constitute a rigid structure, their evo­ lution made the composite nature of the Kingdom of Hungary ever more motley. As the structure became increasingly firm it furthered the apparent local identities. When speaking of the composite Austrian Habsburg Monarchy it must be emphasized that the Kingdom of Hungary was never a part, of the Holy Roman Empire. It was also never apart of the Austrian Hered­ itary Provinces. The Kingdom of Hungary w-as a component of the Habsburg Monarchy only. It is therefore a mistake to talk about an imperial administration and it is equally incorrect to use the term kaiserliches Ungam (imperial Hungary) which appears with some reg­ ularity in the German language literature. Until the very end, the Habs­ burgs ruled Hungary as kings of Hungary even though they also wore the higher title as emperor. In their letters Hungarian officials and sub­ jects usually addressed the ruler by his highest title. Yet, tire Hungarian political elite always emphasized Hungary’s separateness from the Holy Roman Empire. When Gyorgy Lippay, the archbishop of Eszter­ gom, was awarded the cardinalate in the summer of 1652, he submitted

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a memorandum in which he said that Hungary was an independent country and had no ties to the empire.11 It is therefore correct when Thomas Winkelbauer recently called the evolving central European Habsburg state: “a monarchic union composed of the monarchic union of states with estates and a compos­ ite state composed of composite states.’'12 Hie composition of the com­ plex conglomerate of states is shown not only by the funeral procession of the emperors but also by the formal title the Habsburgs had as kings of Hungary (fig. 2). Hiis could be seen in its full length on most offi­ cial parchment documents. Thus every Hungarian who received his patent of nobility from Ferdinand or his successors could immediately appreciate the structure of the Monarchy. Hie countries and territories listed in the title of the Habsburgs var­ ied from each other in more than their structure. This was true for their geographic and geopolitical positions, varying economic development and, for their administrative and legal systems. The Monarchy was also inhabited by a number of populations differing from each other in lan­ guage and identity7. Hiis was even true within individual territories. The population included Germans, Slavs (Czechs, Croatians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Sorbs, Uskoks, and Vlachs), Hungarians, Italians and Romanians. Hie estates had varying political weight.13 Hie ruler therefore was engaged in a hopeless task when he tried to create a unified wdiole of this “mass” in just a few decades.

The Political and Centralization Program of Ferdinand I Ferdinand could not yet think in terms off a unified or absolute state. According to more recent studies the evolution of the Habsburgs’ central European state w-as the result of a long-term process rather than an absolutistic revolution. Absolutism is mentioned only in reference to the middle of the seventeenth century.14 The Canadian scholar, Karin J. MacHardy suggests replacing the absolutism para­ digm with a new concept: the coordinating state and she examines the relationship of the rulers and the Austrian noble elite from this per­ spective.15 The long period of evolution of the state had distinctive peri­

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

ods of importance and of reform. The era of Ferdinand I, albeit suffer­ ing by comparison with the rule of Ferdinand H, or Leopold I, can still be viewed as a period of importance. This is true even though I also would not consider the monarchy of Ferdinand I to be a very strong centralized state. Yet, centralization played an important role in his efforts and some initial movement in the direction of “early absolutistic trends” can be seen. I agree with Jaroslav Pdnek who considers Ferdinand I to be the creator of the Austrian Hab­ sburgs’ political program16 and one of the successful centralizers and reformers of the Monarchy. Strengthening the royal powers vis-a-vis the strong estates became an important feature as demonstrated in sev­ eral territories of Bohemia and also in Lower Austria.17 Centralizing administration, financial and military affairs, the court, diplomacy, and the postal service became extremely important from the perspective of the future of the Monarchy. In these areas the coordination and the com­ promises with the estates and noble elites, discussed by MacHardy, became of great importance. The gradually evolving political program was characterized by great elasticity and pragmatism. Much of this was triggered by sudden emer­ gencies.18 The reforms threatened the interests of the Austrian, Hungari­ an, or Bohemian estates who were anxious to maintain their privileges and thus compromises had to be made and the ruler had to yield on occa­ sion. After some early experiments, the innovations really started in the second half of the 1530s and were established in several steps. The fif­ teen years after 1526 have to be viewed therefore as a transitional period of decisions taken under pressure, improvisations and partial successes and not as a true reform period.19 The significant innovations and inte­ grations affected first the territories closest to the Viennese administrative center of the Monarchy, such as Lower and Upper Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia, and the Kingdom of Hungary. The territories lying further away from Vienna were much less involved. This is indicated by the fact that, according to Ferdinand I’s testament in 1554, the Austrian hereditary provinces were divided among his sons. Archduke Charles and his suc­ cessors ruled Inner Austria (Styria, Carinthia, Camiola, Gorizia, and Friaul). Archduke Ferdinand, the former viceroy of Bohemia, ruled Tyrol and the Vorlands, while Maximilian II ruled over Lower and Upper Aus­ tria.20 No faraway possessions were involved in tire will.

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In the context of the Monarchy’s evolution and Ferdinand’s political program a frequently forgotten aspect must be emphasized.21 Because it had been decided by the second half of the 1530s that Ferdinand’s resi­ dence would be in Vienna the events in the near-by Hungarian theater of war, particularly the loss of Buda in 1541 and of Esztergom in 1543, had a profound effect on the above processes. The latter city was only about two hundred kilometers from Vienna, the heart of the Habsburg state, and thus there was no room for any further experimentation. In order to make certain that the military and economic demands for the defense against the Ottomans were met, the estates of the Austrian and Bohemian terri­ tories held a joint assembly at the beginning of 1542 in Prague at which the representatives of the Hungarian estates were also present.22 The defense of the innermost areas of the Monarchy made it essential that the implementation of the centralization program not be delayed. In contrast with Austrian or Bohemian provinces, the political endeavors of Ferdinand could not be accomplished in Hungary at the expense of the estates and their organization. On the one hand, a suc­ cessful defense against the Ottomans required major compromises and, on the other hand, a forceful stand against the estates might have increased the number of John Szapolyai’s and his son’s followers which would have had tragic results. Furthermore a part of the Hun­ garian territories was terra incognita for the Habsburgs. The people in those territories had a peculiar local administration, a special legal sys­ tem and traditions, and spoke an incomprehensible language.23 Yet Ferdinand could claim a number of significant successes by the beginning of the 1560s while continuing the centralizing activities of Maximilian I.24 He established the base for centralized administrative structures functioning in specified regions .These were followed in sev­ eral lands and territories by government bodies entrusted with financial affairs. After a solid start he continued to build the base step by step both in regional terms and also within the administrative structures themselves. The government structures, located in Vienna and in the centers of the individual territories, met and transacted business on a permanent basis and can be considered to have been very modem by the standards of the day. They did, however, adversely affect the inter­ ests of the estates and the bureaucratic activities forced the estates to give up some of their former way of life.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

This did not mean that the noble elite of the Monarchy was excluded from the new governmental organs. The military and financial adminis­ trative activities of the estates did not come to an end but were only some­ what reduced. The modernization of the administration of the composite Monarchy proceeded gradually and was both most necessary and possible in the central regions. It was not possible the change the medieval admin­ istrative structure from one minute to the next. Centralization made sense only if it created a more effective and more competent administration. In 1527 Ferdinand took the first steps. He issued an ordinance on January 1, 1527, in which he began the reorganization of his council, chancellery and chamber.25 In order to handle the most important domestic and foreign affairs of his lands he established his Court Coun­ cil and his Privy Council {Iiofrat and Geheimratf In 1526 and 1528 he also reorganized his chancellery. Originally every country and land of the Habsburg Monarchy was to be represented on the Hofrai and the Kingdom of Hungary was entitled first to two (1527) and later to three representatives (1532). The council was to meet in Vienna, in Prague, and in Pozsony.26 Because of the resistance of the estates these plans were not implemented by the mid 1530s and there was no chance for implementing a joint parliament for the Monarchy. The Court Council w?as reorganized in 1541 and again in 1559 (as the Reichshofrat) and increasingly limited its attention to legal matters and to the dispensing of justice. By the end of the century, the Geheimrat became the most important decision-making organization of tire entire Habsburg Monarchy.27 'Hie resistance of the estates made it impossible to have a freestanding governing body and this deficit was made up to some extent, after compromises with the elites in the vari­ ous lands, by the Privy Council. So far as fiscal management was concerned, innovations w;ere also made gradually. For the central coordination of fiscal affairs Ferdinand established the Aulic Chamber {Hofkammer) in Vienna at the beginning of 1527. In the same year he set up tlie Bohemian Chamber in Prague and, in 1528, the Hungarian Chamber in Buda. The first real benefits were gained only in the 1540s and 1550s. Ferdinand retained the sever­ al decades old Upper and Lower Austrian Chambers. The former had functioned since 1501 in Innsbruck and was responsible for the financial matters in the Upper Austrian lands (Tyrol and Vorlands). The latter w?as

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established in 1522 in Vienna and was responsible for the fiscal affairs of the Lower Austrian lands (Lower and Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Camiola)28 It was only after the reorganizations of the 1530s to thel560s and after the changes implemented by the Landerteilung, mentioned above, that the Chambers became the most efficient professional bodies of the Habsburg Monarchy.29 Their successful operations were appreciably facilitated by controls which were established at all levels of their activ­ ities and by the accounting that was demanded from them. Under Fer­ dinand’s rule there was also a significant modification of the customs system of the Austrian Hereditary Provinces which were now enlarged with the Bohemian and Hungarian territories. Hie reorganization of military affairs also did not take place from one year to the next. In this area the estates took an even stronger posi­ tion. The central military organization, the Aulic War Council (Hofkriegsrai), was organized in November 1556, and its appearance was the result of a several decades-long process.30 Prior to the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1529, Ferdinand I appointed Austrian nobles to serve as military councilors and military commissionaires (Kriegsrate/Kriegskommissare). They functioned alongside of the military commanders in Vienna and also in the Hungarian theater of war. This service was ad hoc but continuous and there were usually three to four persons so employed.31 The Viennese military councilors were referred to as early as the 1530s as consilium bellicum, consilium belli, and consiliarii bellici Viennae constituti or Kriegsrate zu Wien, Hofkriegsrate32 The prin ­ cipal task was to organize the defense against the Turks and the cam­ paigns against King John I Szapolyai. At limes they were also involved in diplomatic measures with Hie Ottomans. Hie institutionalization of the military affairs was largely the con­ sequence of the events in the Hungarian theater of war at the end of the 1520s. The role of the Aulic War Council was substantially less impor­ tant than that of the Aulic Chamber. This shows the flexibility of the centralization and also the strength of the estates. Yet, the establishment of the War Council was highly significant so far as the long-range mil­ itary development of the Monarchy and the provision of defense against the Ottomans were concerned. Hie War Council was also the first regularly employed organization of its type in Europe.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Simultaneously with the Holy Roman Empire, Ferdinand estab­ lished a postal system in the Austrian and Bohemian areas and in the Kingdom of Hungary. This was accomplished with the assistance of the Taxis. Wolzogen, and Paar families.33 The result was a veritable revo­ lution in communication of equal importance with the reorganization of the military and financial matters. There had to be constant communi­ cation between the Hungarian theater of war and the Viennese War Council and between the Aulic Chamber and the Hungarian Chamber.34 The consolidation of the central and Hungarian areas is shown by the fact that the Viennese court chief postmaster’s area of control until 1583 included Upper and Lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and most of the Kingdom of Hungary7.33 Ferdinand’s ordinance of 1527 can be considered a milestone in the modernization of his household. The court of the Monarchy was not only the center of power and the seat of the new administrative organi­ zations but it was also tlie most important integration and communica­ tion center for the political elites of the individual countries and “the most effective centralizing agency” of the Monarchy.36 While the 1527 ordinance referred only to the German, Austrian, and Spanish courtiers, the later 1537 ordinance no longer made such distinctions.37 Thus the Viennese residence of Ferdinand I became the joint court of the Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian parts of the Monarchy to which in 1556 the Holy Roman Empire was also added. It was not called a Reichshofbut was referred to as tlie Kaiserhof, or as the Hun­ garian usage had it, the aula caesarea or aula imperatoria.^ The most correct term is the Habsburg court of Vienna, or after 1583, the Habs­ burg court of Prague. The number of courtiers was approximately 550 in the middle 1550s. Early on the courtiers were mostly from the Netherlands and from Spain. In the 1550s the majority of the courtiers were provided by nobility of the hereditary provinces.39 The highest dignitary in the court was the lord steward of the household. The Dutch Claude de Bouton served from 1522 to 1524, followed by tlie Lower Austrian Wilhelm von Roggendorf (1530 -1537) and then by the Tyrolean Leonhard von Vels (1537-1545) -40 The number of courtiers remained constant until the 1580s when, under the rule of Rudolf II, their number increased between 1580 and 1611 to approxi­ mately 1,100.41

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The organization of the household also evolved gradually and the first detailed household records are dated to the end of the 1530s.42 The position of the court, paymaster was created at about that time and his first directive was dated October 21, 1542 43 The 550 courtiers were about the same number as those in the late medieval Jagiello court in Buda or the Innsbruck court of Emperor Maximilian I. The court of the king of France had about the same number of courtiers at that time.44 In spite of a slow and gradual process, the political-centralization program of Ferdinand created, in a period of about forty years, a solid base for the court of the Habsburg Monarchy, for the administration of the Hungarian territories and for the highest level of military and finan­ cial administration. It was on this base that his successors could build in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With some significant reor­ ganizations and restructuring the organization that Ferdinand I started functioned well into the nineteenth century.

Vienna: Fortress, Residence, and Center of Political Decision Making Ferdinand’s political endeavors after 1526 were greatly impeded by events taking place in the Hungarian theater of war. For almost a decade it was a real question where the center of the nascent Monarchy would be. In addition to Vienna, the capitals of Bohemia and Hungary, Prague and Buda, Emperor Maximilian’s capi­ tal of Innsbruck, and the site of Ferdinand’s wedding, Linz, were all considered.45 In 1437 Albert of Habsburg, who grew up in Austria, had no doubt that he would establish his court in the capital of the most important component of his realm, the Kingdom of Hungary. This is what his predecessor, Sigismund of Luxemburg had done. It seems likely that Maximilian of Habsburg would also have settled there, had he gained the Hungarian crown in 1490 instead of Wladislaw. The king of Bohemia, who also became the king of Hungary, did settle in Buda. For Ferdinand, who grew up in Spain and in the Netherlands and who settled in Vienna in 1521, the civil war in Hungary and the Ottoman threat made such a choice impossible. In addition, after 1529 and through the patronage of Sultan Suleyman, the Hungarian capital was

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

in the hands of Suleyman’s vassal, John Szapolyai. Recapture of Buda was urged by the Hungarian estates and was attempted three times, in 1530,1540, and 1541, by Habsburg forces under Wilhelm von Roggendorf and Leonhard von Vels, but unsuccessfully. After gaining the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary in 1527, it seemed that Vienna would be Ferdinand’s capital but the Turkish siege in 1529 and the severe damage suffered by the city made this doubt­ ful.46 Prague was tlie only other serious consideration, partly because Ferdinand’s wife, Anna Jagiello, was very fond of her native city and partly because Prague had already been the capital of a composite monarchy under Charles of Luxemburg and under his son Wencel. Also, Ferdinand was fond of the Hradzin Castle and particularly of the Summer Palace (Belvedere) which he built for his wife. His fondness is also shown by his selecting St. Vitus Cathedral as the burial place for him and for his wife. Yet, by the middle 1530s Ferdinand and his advi­ sors decided that the capital of the Monarchy was to be in Vienna. Ferdinand’s relationship with the population of Vienna gradually improved after the early serious confrontation over the Wiener Neustadt Bloody Assizes of L522.47 Also, the geographic location of Vienna was more central in the Austrian-Hungarian-Bohemian com­ plex. This had both advantages and disadvantages as shown by the Turkish campaign of 1529 and 1532. The more remote cities of Prague, Linz, or Innsbruck would have provided a more secure capital. It was a question of how tire Habsburg control over important Hungarian areas could be secured from further away. Also, at the time Ferdinand’s court consisted primarily of Austrian nobility who dominated both numeri­ cally and by their political influence. These nobles, coming mostly from Lower Austria, realized that if Hungary could not be secured under Ferdinand’s rule, their own estates would soon be in danger from the Turks. It was not a coincidence that from the 1520s to the 1540s the commanders in chief in Hungary were taken from Ferdinand’s senior advisors. Niklas Graf zu Salm, Sr. (1527, 1529-1530), Hans Ungnad von Sonnegg (1543 -1544) were councilors. Niklas Graf zu Salm, Jr. (1546-1550) was a high chamberlain and Wilhelm von Roggendorf (1530-1531 and 1541) and Leonhard von Vels (1529, 1537-1541, and 1544—1545) were lord stewards.48 Of these the two Salms and Ungnad were commanders in chief simultaneously in Hungary and in the five

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provinces of the Lower Austrian lands?9 Salm, Jr. and his sons also held the positions of steward of Pozsony County and captain general of Pozsony from 1545 to 1580.50 Hie position of Vienna was strengthened by the temporary loss of Buda in 1529 and the permanent loss after 1541. It became a critical question for Ferdinand’s Monarchy which city would assume the important political, administrative, and economic role of the Hungari­ an royal seat. The changes looming were illustrated by the Fuggers closing their Buda office in October 1533 A1 Prague and Innsbruck and even Linz were unsuitable for this purpose and thus only a Hungarian city, like Pozsony, Sopron, or Nagyszombat could have been consid­ ered. These cities attempted to become the capital of Hungary during the 1530s--1550s but without success.52 After the Turkish occupation in 1526 and 1529 and after John Szapolyai ordered their removal in 1530, most of the German burghers of Buda, having relatives in Vienna, fled to that city.53 Their appearance there caused some conflict54 but the sup­ ply of produce from Hungary to the central areas of the Monarchy could not be satisfactorily accomplished without the cooperation of the original Viennese and former Buda residents. Ferdinand’s advisors real­ ized that the political-administrative functions of Buda could also not be maintained from distant Prague and not even from Linz. It w;as important to preserve as much as possible of the role of the Hungarian royal seat within the framework of the new Monarchy. Consequently the political, military, and economic interests of the ruler, of the Lower Austrian nobility, and of the Viennese population all favored Vienna. By the 1560s Vienna became the administrative center of the Habs­ burg Monarchy, the royal seat and the imperial capital. Because of the proximity of the Hungarian theater of war it also became one of the most modem fortress cities in central Europe. It had a powerful system of bastions, walls and moats, a large armory and a well supplied food storage facility. It was appropriate for the contemporary German sources to refer to it as “bulwark and bastion of Christianity.” Being the Habsburg seat, it was also referred to as “haven and ornament of Chris­ tianity.”55 Its prestige was raised even higher in 1558 when it became the capital city of the Holy Roman Empire. At this time the construc­ tion of the Enperial Palace, the Hofburg, was well under way. Beauti­ ful gardens were planted, there w;ere numerous spectacular festivities,

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

and enrichment of the cultural and artistic life of the city ensued. Ilie university prospered.56 In 1536 the Hungarian diet declared that: “Until the seat of the administration of the country is recaptured with God’s help, the admin­ istrative seat will be Pozsony.”57 In spite of this, Vienna assumed a strong role in the life of the Kingdom of Hungary by mid-century. Po­ zsony became the “domestic policy capital”58 of Hungary and the seat of the diets, the judiciary and of the Hungarian Chamber which was reorganized in 1531. Vienna, however, was the site of the joint Habs­ burg court and of the administrative government agencies and thus became the center of administration and, effectively, Hungary’s second capital. The role of Pozsony was increased by the Hungarian Regency Council sitting there and also because after Szekesfehervdr’s capture by the Ottomans (1543), it became the site of the coronations after 1563.59 It could not compete with the Habsburg seat, the near-by city of Vien­ na, in the size of its population, or its economic and cultural activities. The proximity of the two cities was very beneficial for the governance of the Kingdom of Hungary. Vienna and Pozsony joined in assuming the political and administrative role of Buda. Vienna becoming the second capital of Hungary demonstrated the significant changes which took place during the decades after 1526. Due to the ongoing Turkish wars, the loss of the Hungarian capital and the evolution of the joint Viennese court and of the central administra­ tive structures a large number of Hungarian affairs became a joint mat­ ter.60 There w?ere practically no purely Hungarian affairs other than domestic ones, jurisprudence and the rights and freedoms ofthe estates. The Hungarian estates had great difficulty in accepting the new sit­ uation. During the 1530s and 1540s they had clamored that Ferdinand must reside in Hungary even though there was no realistic possibility for this.61 Then they urged that in his absence he be represented by one of the archdukes.62 This actually did take place and Archdukes Maxim­ ilian and Charles functioned in this role during the 1550s to 1560s, albeit primarily in military matters even though they did not reside in Hungary either.63 Finally, in the 1550s and 1570s, the estates asked that, “in Hungarian matters and affairs His Majesty be pleased to act on Hungarian advice.”64 Actually, the importance of Hungarian military and economic affairs made them a joint matter between the central ter­

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ritories of the Monarchy and Hungary. This was recognized by Act 38 of the 1569 Diet of Pozsony.65 Even though joint affairs are usually dis­ cussed in the context of the 1867 Compromise, the foreign policy, mil­ itary, financial and economic matters did become joint affairs in the decades after 1526, even though the fact was not formally recorded in any international agreement. Even though Prague became the capital of the Monarchy in 1583 66 Vienna retained an important role in the central administration of the Kingdom of Hungary. When the Hungarian Court Chancellery, just like all the other chancelleries, moved to the Bohemian capital,67 the mem­ bers of the Hungarian Council still usually went to Vienna to discuss the problems with Archduke Ernest rather than going to the distant court in Prague.68 In the absence of Rudolf II, the archduke was the governor of Lower and Upper Austria and in charge of Hungarian affairs after 1576.69 After 1578 he became the chief governor and administrator of tire Hungarian defensive territories extending from tire Drava River to Transylvania.70 After Ernest moved to the Netherlands in 1594, Archduke Matthias assumed this increasingly important role. Thus in the last decades of the sixteenth century, tire Viennese Aulic War Council controlled military matters in Hungary. A partial exemption w?as provided in the Long Turkish War (1591-1606) when the Aulic War Council of Prague was established 71 Even though, after 1583, only a smaller part of the Aulic Chamber remained in Vienna, it had a stronger controlling role in the financial and economic affairs of Hungary than the councilors in Prague. In consequence, Vienna remained the central administrative seat of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Chapter Five

HUNGARIAN ARISTOCRACY AND THE HABSBURG COURT During the fifty years after 1526 the Hungarian polit­ ical elite lost much of its position due to the changes that took place at the court. Late medieval Hungary’ was directed from Buda by a small number of the lay and clerical elite. After the death of Matthias Corvinus in 1490, Jagiellonian rulers held the throne for several decades and the Bohemian, Polish and Austrian courtiers who accompanied them represented a considerable number. Yet, the Hungarian aristocracy had a dominant role, but his situation changed radically after Mohdcs.

The Joint Habsburg Court and the Virtual Royal Hungarian One After the Battle of Mohdcs, and prior to the death of King John I Szapolyai in 1540, there were two heirs to the court of Buda. Because for fifteen years after 1526-27 the Kingdom of Hun­ gary had two legitimate kings there were two successors of the original court. This was true in spite of the fact that John I became a vassal of Sultan Suleyman in 1528 and that Ferdinand of Habsburg never set foot in Hungary between the end of 1528 and November 1542.1 The char­ acteristics of the court of Buda were nevertheless preserved by both rulers. Rarely has such a situation prevailed in any royal court in Euro­ pean history. The situation was made even more interesting from an international perspective because during the decades after 1526 there were actually three, rather than two, courts in Hungary.

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The first court was established by King John I in November 15262 He continued the traditions with which he was very familiar as a promi­ nent member of the late medieval political elite and as a Guardian of the Holy Crown (1510-1526). Yet, other than the positions of master of chamberlains and master of the stables, he did not fill the high courtly positions on a permanent basis.3 He paid much attention to the employ­ ment of the court hussars. Prior to 1526, the hussars were paid by the Royal Treasurer, had special privileges and formed part of the rulers’ personal guard. When the Ottoman danger increased they and their rid­ ers were assigned to various border fortresses.4 Their number, in the service of King John, reached 821 by 1531F The increased number was due to the requirements of the ongoing hostilities, to the need to defend the ruler and also to provide a showing at ceremonies. The war regu­ larly forced John to move his court. The size, organization and impor­ tance of Szapolyai’s court never measured up to the Hungarian-Croat­ ian-Bohemian court of the Jagiellos which was larger, multinational, ongoing, and internationally significant. In contrast to Szapolyai, Ferdinand of Habsburg never had an inde­ pendent Hungarian royal court, and he never had a separate Bohemian, Croatian, German, or imperial court either. There was no need for such because when the Austrian archduke was crowned in Szekesfehervdr in November 1527, he became simultaneously king of Bohemia, of Hun­ gary, and of Croatia. He could have had a separate Hungarian royal court only for the four months between his coronation in November and his departure from Hungary the following March.6 Even while in Hun gary, he was accompanied by a number of prominent members of the Vienna court. From among the members of his large traveling court we are familiar with the names of Wilhelm von Truchsess, his lord steward of the household, Andreas Ungnad, the master seneschal, Georg von Auersperg, Julius Graf zu Hardegg, Joseph von Lamberg, Hoyer von Mansfeld, Georg von Puchheim and the already mentioned Niklas Graf zu Salm, Sr. and Jr.7 Ferdinand’s personal safety was protected by his new personal guard the so-called Hartschier? By the end of the 1550s all of the new territories of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Austrian hereditary provinces, the lands of the Bohemi­ an and Hungarian crown, and the Holy Roman Empire had a joint court.9 Excluding the Imperial, Bohemian, and Hungarian Court Chan­

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cellery, the new Habsburg household did not have divisions or offices for the individual countries. The Viennese and, later, the Prague court had only one lord steward of the household, one chief marshal, one chief chamberlain, etc. Similarly, there were no chamberlains, cupbear­ ers, seneschals, or pages identified for the individual countries. All this was not considered to be unusual because in the late medieval Jagiello court in Buda, the dignities were also not divided among Hungarian, Bohemian, Croatian, or Austrian attendants.10 It was the same in all of the early modem European composite states with only one joint court. In some of them the queen, the crown prince and the archdukes had their own households.11 Even though there was only a joint Habsburg court, Ferdinand retained a number of features from the pre-1526 Buda court for his own use, either transiently or permanently. This was not peculiar to Hungary because the highest dignities of the Bohemian royal court, were also preserved.1'2 Thus, in addition to the Hungarian royal household of John Szapolyai and to the Viennese Habsburg court, a third courtly structure can be demonstrated in Ferdinand’s Hungarian kingdom, consisting of some of the retained elements of the former Hungarian royal court,. Of these elements the most important one was the preservation of the highest Hungarian royal court dignities.13 Ferdinand could not elim­ inate them because not having them filled would have seriously harmed the interests of the powerful Hungarian political elite. He was evident­ ly cautioned about this by his sister, Mary of Habsburg, and by the most influential aristocrats, the Palatine Istvan Bdthory, the Chief Judge Elek Thurzo, and the Chancellor Tamds Szalahdzy. Ferdinand also had to swear repeatedly that, he would preserve the privileges of the estates. Even in much more insignificant matters, like the ceremonial at the coronation banquet, the new king of Hungary w;as forced into making compromises with the Hungarian nobles. Following the coronation Fer­ dinand appointed new persons to every'' high dignity associated with the Hungarian royal court. We have no data about appointments to the low;er dignities w7hich shows that Ferdinand was thinking in terms of a common court. The highest Hungarian royal court dignities were maintained until the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918. Their actual responsibilities were limited to the coronation of the Hungarian king

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and queen and to attendance on the king when he appeared at a session of the diet. They were not members of the joint Habsburg court in Vien­ na or in Prague. Their tasks were severely limited when compared to the pre-1526 era, and actually became occasional, nominal and even fictional.14 This was particularly true between 1528 and 1542 when Fer­ dinand never visited Hungary. Consequently their stipend, paid by the Hungarian Chamber, was reduced at the end of the 1540s.15 Between 1536 and 1549 Ferdinand did not have a Hungarian lord steward and for a long time he did not even have a Hungarian master doorward.16 In spite of this, it would be a grave mistake to assume that the polit­ ical role of these nominal court dignitaries had become symbolic. By virtue of their titles and in accordance with medieval traditions, they were members of the Hungarian Council.17 Also, their titles were usu­ ally associated with other countrywide or military dignities, emolu­ ments, and pensions. They belonged to the domestic leaders and Ferdi­ nand and his successors had to rely on them in governing the country and in any discussion or compromise with the estates. The considerable annual salary, 400 -1000 Hungarian florins, that came with the nominal dignity became a pledge fortheir loyalty and so were the frequent dona­ tions of land. Preserving these dignities gave the Habsburg rulers the opportunity to shape Hungarian political life in their interest and to attach the leading groups of the Hungarian nobility to themselves with skillful patronage. For a while Ferdinand preserved the Jagiellonian era structure of the court hussars. It is likely that he did this on the advice of his Hun­ garian and Austrian military advisers who recognized the hussars’ use­ fulness in the fight against John Szapolyai and against the Ottomans. Thus, after 1527, Ferdinand hired court hussars, or more accurately, hussar captains who commanded 10-150 light cavalrymen. Around 1532, 758 men served under 15 light infantry captains and in April 1533 there were 654 men serving under 16 captains.18 Thus Ferdinand Habsburg had approximately the same number of court hussars as Sza­ polyai. At this time they were paid by a new government agency, the Hungarian Chamber in Pozsony.19 Ferdinand had no such outfit in his army and therefore he used the Hungarian hussars abroad. Some of them fought in the Schmalkalden War (1546-1547).20 Some of them accompanied the ruler on his travels. For example, Ferenc Nydry and

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his riders accompanied the king to the Imperial gathering in Speyer in 1542 and there represented the Kingdom of Hungary with their color­ ful Hungarian parade uniforms.21 The court hussars gradually disap­ peared by the 1560s and their role was assumed by hussar captains hired by the Aulic War Council in Vienna. These new hussars general­ ly served in the fortresses of the border defense system against the Ottomans. A position that was retained and was infused with a new life was the royal courtier (aulae regiae familiaris) which survived until the nineteenth century. In the late medieval period this was a high court title usually borne by a magnate22 although the kings of Hungary occasion­ ally bestowed it on their foreign followers 23 When the court, moved out of the country after 1526 it became a title only which was awarded by the ruler for a variety of services rendered by the recipient. The people who were so recognized included nobles, townspeople, treasury and county officials, and even intellectuals. These included, in 1547, Jdnos Dessewffy, the future president of the Hungarian Chamber, in 1563, Peter Parkas from Nagyszeben, the future secretary of the chamber and, in 1594, Lukdcs Pechy, the Catholic clergyman-writer. After 1600 the title was bom by Tam ds Nagy, an eskudt (counselor) of Sopron Coun­ ty, in 1603 by Jdnos Lukin, a merchant of Kassa and after 1557, tire future noted historian of the Habsburg court. Johannes Sambucus.24 In the beginning of the seventeenth century the royal courtier title carried a generous annual salary of 300 Hungarian florins, paid by the Hungarian Chamber 25 The increasingly frequent award made it possi­ ble for the Habsburg rulers to elevate representatives of lesser nobility, burghers, and the increasingly important officialdom into the group which controlled the Kingdom of Hungary in its coordination and its compromises with the Habsburg court. Even though the “functional heir’’ of the medieval Buda Jagiello court was first the Viennese and then the Prague Habsburg court the Hungarian royal household survived in the Kingdom of Hungary in real, nominal, or temporary titles and positions. This was true for cer­ tain elements of the justice delivery system and the ceremonies as well26 In spite of the fundamental changes after 1526, the Hungarian political elite hoped that at some time in the future the court, of the ruler of Hungary would have real functions again in Buda 27 This was a pre­

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requisite for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Habsburg Monarchy.28

Difficulties with the Viennese and Prague Integration It was not simply the creation of a joint Habsburg court that made the critical difference for the Hungarian nobility. The Jagiello court in Buda was also an internationally important combined court for the large number of multinational Hungarian, Croatian and Bohemian courtiers. The critical difference was tlie fact that the seat of the joint court was no longer Buda but Vienna. This was a novel situa­ tion in the history of Hungary. Sigismund of Luxemburg, king of Hun­ gary and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire spent much of his time after 1410 in his German realm but this did not mean the end of the court in Buda. In fact, the latter remained the most important center of power and culture in central Europe. Beginning with the second half to the 1530s the Hungarian nobili­ ty had to contend for the various dignities of Ilie Habsburg court, in Vienna, beyond the borders, in a foreign environment and with Ferdi­ nand’s Austrian, German, Spanish, Netherlands, and Bohemian follow­ ers. Compared to Buda, where they had a solid position, this was not an easy task. The slowness and difficulty of the process of adjustment was not due to some obstinacy or anti-Habsburg hostility but to the very7 serious obstacles which arose during the decades after 1526 29 These had to be overcome in the most difficult and tempestuous period in early modem Hungarian history. The rapid and successful adjustment of the Hungarian nobility to the Vienna court was greatly retarded by the ongoing fight against the Ottomans and against John Szapolyai and by the prevailing civil war situation. Their castles and estates, the keys of their power, were in seri­ ous jeopardy and therefore they preferred to stay home and see to their defense. Except for the followers of Queen Mary of Habsburg, a few estate owners on the western part of Hungary and few German-speak­ ing merchant families, like the Pemfflingers and Hallers, the Hungari­ an aristocracy had limited contacts with the influential leaders of the Vienna court. The foreign milieu, the court consisting of mostly Austri

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an, German, Spanish, and Netherlands courtiers, the communication and language problems and the different court customs and practices were all serious impediments to a smooth and successful integration. Hie integration of the Hungarian nobles was also made difficult by the anti German sentiments ensuing from the Habsburg hereditary con­ tracts of 1463, 1491, and 1506, as well as by the long standing antago­ nism between the small number of nobles attached to the court and the very large number of rural nobles. This antagonism was further accen­ tuated in the Jagiellonian era because of the Bohemian, Polish and Aus ­ trian courtiers. An additional factor was the very high cost of living in the new residence city. Another problem was that because of the Ottomans and John Szapolyai there was an increasing distrust of the Hungarians. The Austrian and German nobility, holding the most important court appointments, were not about to yield these to B ohemian or Hungarian nobles. Lastly, Ferdinand did not set foot in Hungary between 1528 and 1542, did not learn Hungarian and thus could do lit­ tle to make his Hungarian followers more welcome. Consequently the Hungarian nobles could not make the appropri­ ate adjustment to the Habsburg court in Vienna during the twenty-five year's after Mohdcs, even though their predecessors managed to rise rapidly in the Jagiello court in Buda in years past. Other than the mem ­ bers of the Hungarian Court Chancellery7, few Hungarian nobles spent much time in Vienna in the 1530s and 1540s. Integration into the Habs­ burg court was a slow and expensive process. Few recognized its importance and even fewer could become effectively integrated. With the beginning of the 1550s a significant numerical increase can be seen. The number of Hungarian nobles serving at court., particu­ larly young aristocrats, doubled in number. Most of them were courtiers, serving with one, two, three or four horses, as seneschal, or pages. Some advanced to the position of meat cutter and cupbearer. None of them, however, had a truly high position and this signified a major change when compared to the situation prior to 1526. The only exception to this situation was Ferenc Thurzo who served as president of the Hungarian Chamber from 1549 to 1556 and who, after 1556, served as president of the Aulic Chamber for several years.30 Using a modem term, he was the finance minister of the Habsburg Monarchy. During Ferdinand’s reign there were very few Hungarians among the chamberlains. Hie only

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Hungarian chamberlain was Peter Macedonia! (1553 -1560) who was raised to this dignity after having served for ten years at court.31 He came to the court with the patronage of his uncle, LAszlo Macedonia!, Bishop of VArad and owed his promotion to the fact that in 1557 he married a close relative of Lord Steward Leonhard von Vels.32 The increase in numbers after 1550 had several causes. It was pro­ moted by the noted humanist, Miklos 01 Ah, who lived at the Viennese court and who served as deputy Hungarian chancellor after 1543 and then as chancellor. He had accompanied Queen Mary of Hungary to the Netherlands and later became archbishop of Esztergom (1553-1568). He repeatedly urged the Hungarian aristocrats to send their sons to Vienna.33 His activity was not unique and the Bohemian court chancel­ lors gave the same support to the Bohemian and Moravian nobility.34 The influence of the Hungarian chancellors at court was enhanced by their services there and by their providing expert opinion on Hungarian domestic issues and on the awarding of dignities, titles and estates. In the improvement of the relations between the ruler and the Hun ­ garian nobility, the royal regents of Hungary appointed by Ferdinand after 1526, played an important role. PAI VArday (1542-1549) and Ferenc Ujlaky (1550-1554) were among the most loyal Hungarian fol­ lowers of the king and were thus able to find a compromise with the most influential personalities at court.35 After 1527, Ujlaky serving as Ferdinand’s first Hungarian secretary and later as deputy chancellor had lived for years in the “second Hungarian capital.”36 VArday was esteemed so highly by his ruler that he could frequently sit at the royal table and occasionally was allowed to stay at the palace in Vienna.37 The change was also promoted by Ferdinand participating regu­ larly in the Hungarian diets after 1542.38 When he was absent from his Viennese court, after 1552, he asked Archduke Maximilian to act for him in Hungarian affairs. The integration was further assisted by the new schools in Vienna, the Jesuit Gymnasium and the Lower Austrian Territorial School and by the gradual consolidation in Hungary39 The Hungarian aristocrats sent their sons to serve at court with increasing­ ly frequency. The increase in numbers (fourteen to eighteen per year) seen at the beginning of the 1550s did not last long and toward the end of the decade the number started to decrease again (twelve to fourteen per

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year). When Maximilian II ascended the throne, the numbers went up again. Other than the chamberlains, the Hungarian nobility were repre­ sented in practically all of the lesser court dignities. This was facilitat­ ed by the good relations which Maximilian established with the Hun­ garians during the 1550s. Acting for his father he was an important par­ ticipant in the negotiations with the Hungarian estates at the diets of 1555 and 1559 and he also participated in establishing of a new defense system against the Ottomans.40 The young people at court were mostly the sons of the noblemen who had worked with Maximilian during the decade after 1552. Some members of the Thurzo, Revay, and KasztelIdnfy families first served in Archduke Maximilian’s household and were transferred to the imperial court when he came to the throne.41 The number of Hungarians in major positions, fourteen to seventeen per year, remained steady with minor variations, until Maximilian’s death. During the 1550s-1570s the twelve to eighteen Hungarian nobles represented 3^4- percent of the Habsburg court, only slightly less than the Bohemian nobility which represented 4 -5 percent of the total.42 Ilie great majority of the courtiers were Austrian and German, mostly Bavarian, and there was also a sizable group of Spaniards and Netherlanders. At the beginning of the 1560s, other than the Hungarian court chancellor, only three Hungarian aristocrats had a house in the imperi­ al city: Tarnds Nddasdy, the palatine, Miklos Zrihyi, the captain gener­ al of Szigetvdr and limos Petho, the captain general of Komdrom. Even though some members of the nobility had homes in Vienna the Registry7 of Residences of the courtiers stated about them: '‘rarely here.’’43 Ilie Spanish nobles had twice as many houses and these were in the elegant Herrenviertel.^ In summary it can be stated that the late medieval Jagiellonian court in Buda and the mid-sixteenth century Habsburg court in Vienna had a similar structure and approximately the same number of people but the move of the royal court to Vienna meant a significant loss for the Hungarian nobility. This was a particularly serious loss if we con­ sider how important Hungary was for the monarchy. The presence of the Hungarians at the Vienna court was substantially less than the for­ mer presence of Bohemian, Polish, and Austrian nobles in Buda. When Rudolf II ascended the throne in 1576 and moved his court to Prague in 1583, another strongly negative turn was taken from a

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Hungarian perspective. On coining to power Rudolf took two Hungari­ ans, Miklos Pdlffy and Ldszlo Kolozsvdri, from his archducal court to the imperial court.45 Yet the change in rulers again led to a decrease of the Hungarians at court. At the end of the 1570s there were only seven to eleven Hungarian noblemen serving in Vienna. In Prague this number further declined and until the end of Rudolf’s rule it remained in the range of two to six, mostly from the Balassi, Draskovics, Nydry, and Revay families. At the same time the total number of courtiers increased by several hundreds. The few Hungarians served mostly as pages. Ilie only exception was Miklos Pdlffy who served after 1576 firsts as Oberstsilberkammerer and then from 1579 to 1584 as chamberlain.46 The move of the court to Prague made it much more difficult for the Hungarian nobility to reside there for extended periods of time. From Upper Hungary, from southern Transdanubia or from the Croat­ ian-Slavonian areas Prague was almost unreachable for both geograph­ ic and financial reasons. Integration in Prague was further impeded by the military situation arising from the Long Turkish War beginning in the Hungarian tlieater of war in 1591. The Hungarian aristocrats had closer relationships with the Moravian nobility and many had estates in neighboring Moravia.47 The peculiar position which arose because of the enormous dis­ tance from Prague is illustrated by a plaintive letter from Tamds Erdody, Croatian-Slavonian ban to Gydrgy Draskovics, the Hungarian court chancellor in Prague in the summer of 1586: “We are here almost com­ pletely isolated and know nothing about what goes on in Prague.”48 The Hungarian-Croatian aristocrat asked Prague for information about the upcoming Hungarian diet, about the unfilled clerical and lay dignities and about the vacated estates. It was easier to obtain this from the court than from contacts in the distant Hungarian or Croatian-Slavonian ter­ ritories. Consequently the most distinguished Hungarian aristocrats used the lesser nobility Hungarians in Prague and the officials in the Hungarian Court Chancellery as agents to obtain information and for the protection of their interests. Ldszlo Kolozsvdri, for instance, served as the agent first for Ferenc Dobo and later for Miklos Pdlffy 49 The Hungarian royal secretaries received similar requests from other Hun­ garian magnates, prelates, and free royal cities. The most important of these was Tiburtius Himelreich who was bom in Hungary but was Ger-

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man speaking. His activity was always compensated with money, gold or silver cups, Tokaj wine, etc., according to the importance of the problem.50 A more suitable Hungarian could not have been found at the distant court. Himelreich was awarded the title of imperial counselor in 1595 and in June of the following year he received the Bohemian diplo­ ma indigenatiis.51 During the twenty-five years after 1583 the Bohemian nobles, overcoming the resistance of the Austrian and German courtiers, assumed important court positions in increasing numbers. They were less successful in getting places in the central administrative structures but more than a third of the chamberlain positions were held by them.52 By contrast the number of Hungarian nobles in Prague decreased sharply. At first sight, the situation resembled the first period of Ferdi­ nand’s rule. Yet the picture was not quite as unfavorable as in the transi­ tional period after 1526. The Hungarian aristocrats, realizing the geo­ graphic, economic and other problems of the Prague integration changed their strategy. They took advantage of the fact that, after 1576, in Rudolf’s absence, Archduke Ernest became the administrator of Hun­ garian affairs and his position was strengthened when the court, moved to Prague.53 Thus he had to maintain continuous contact with the Hun­ garian political elite. During the last decades of the century the magnates chose Ernest’s court in Vienna as the site for establishing contacts and for integration. Tins was particularly appropriate because Vienna remained the central administrative site of the Kingdom of Hungary. By the middle of the 1580s there w;ere more Hungarian nobles in .Archduke Ernest’s court than there were in Prague. They included members of the Dobo, Doczy, Forgdch, Liszthy, Petho, Revay, and Thurzo families. The majority of the Hungarian young aristocrats held the honorable position of seneschal.5*1 The most prominent member of this group was Gybrgy Thurzo, the future palatine, who served in the archduke’s court for eleven years, first as a seneschal and then as a cup­ bearer.55 Hie Croatian and Hungarian magnates of the CroatianSlavonian area, primarily the Blagay, Draskovics/Draskovic, Erdody, Frankopan, Keglevics/Keglevic and Szekely families, made their con­ tacts Erst in Archduke Charles’s and later in Archduke Ferdinand’s court in Graz.56 Some aristocratic families, e.g. the Balassi and the Revay, were represented simultaneously at the court in Prague and at

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

the archducal court in either Vienna or Graz. Some families had a pres ­ ence in every one of the Habsburg households. Gdbor Doczy, for instance, served first in the court of Queen Anna Jagiello and then in the court of Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol while his older nephew, Ferenc, served in the court of Ferdinand I in Vienna and his younger nephew, Lorinc, served in Archduke Ernest’s court.57 During the sum­ mer of 1549 the Doczys wanted to send a young member of their fam­ ily to the court of John Sigismund in Transylvania, so that he could look after their Transylvanian estates from there.58 After Archduke Ernest departed for the Netherlands in 1594, the Hungarian aristocrats shifted their allegiance to the court of the Arch­ duke Matthias in Vienna. Pdl Nydry served at the Prague court in the 1580s as seneschal and his son, Istvdn, was a member of the household of .Archduke Maximilian for a number of years, first as meat cutter and later as chamberlain.59 It was here that Kristof Thurzo started his career as cupbearer. Hie same position was held by Mihdly Kdrolyi who was granted a patent of Hungarian barony in 1609. He had served the arch­ duke as seneschal for two years.60

The Options of the Hungarian Political Elite after Integration These examples well illustrate that even though the court moved abroad and the Hungarian elite had lost much of its posi­ tion, the court maintained its importance for the Hungarian aristocracy. The Viennese imperial and archducal courts became the most important international focal points for communication and for integration for the Hungarian political elite. In order to maintain their position the families belonging to the first rank of Hungarian aristocracy could not forego service at Habsburg court. This was particularly true for the noble fam­ ilies in the second rank who wanted to move up and gain more elevat­ ed titles and honors. Just like in the late Middle Ages, the homo novus, owed his rise to service at court. Tiie career of Miklos Pdlffy can serve as an example.61 He served for almost twenty year's at the Habsburg courts. First in tire household of .Archduke Rudolf, as page, seneschal, meat cutter and finally as

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Oberstsilberkammerer. He rose along with the future ruler and, w7hen Rudolf came to the throne, his path led to similar appointments at the imperial court, becoming chamberlain in 1579. Thus Pdlffy became acquainted, as a young man, with the Austrian, German and Bohemian young noblemen who twenty years later were directing the political, military and financial affairs of the Habsburg Monarchy. This was crit­ ically important for Pdlffy and for the future of his family. Pdlffy took full advantage of the opportunities granted by his expe­ riences and contacts at court. In 1581 he rose, from nowhere, to become a baron, with his patent of barony making special reference to his ser­ vice at court. Prior to this elevation he was just the ispan (bailiff) of Pozsony County.62 Yet he already had a substantial wealth of connec­ tions. To this he added enormous real wealth by his marriage to Maria Fngger in 1583, the daughter of one of the most significant banking families in Europe. He enjoyed a long series of positions and honors, both in Hungary7 and also in the various countries of the monarchy. He was even appointed captain general of Komarom in 1584, a position which from the middle of the century to the expulsion of the Ottomans, was held only by the most reliable and trusted Austrian and German military'7 leaders.63 Pdlffy was the only7 exception. In recognition of his experience at court and of his military service, the Hungarian aristocrat received the diploma indigenatus of Lower Austria in 1589 and of Bohemia in 1597 64 In his case the recognition awarded to him was due to his training and to his military abilities. In 1589 he became captain general of the mining district and, in 1594, he was granted again the same honor for Komdrom. When Esztergom was retaken in 1595 he was given the command of the fortress and controlled all the major military roads leading to Vienna. He was the only Hungarian who appeared on the lists of Rudolf H’s highest counselors in the 1590s.65 In addition to his actual Habsburg court service, Pdlffy carried the honorific title of royal Hungarian master of chamberlains from 1581 until his death in 1600. The already mentioned Peter Macedonia! also had the same title in the 1550s, in addition to his title of chamberlain at the Vienna court. Jdnos Petho was granted the same title in recognition for his court and military services.66 In the second half of the century this became a widespread practice and about 60 percent of the highest

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

dignitaries of the country and of the nominal Hungarian royal court served at the Habsburg court. Several of the Hungarian magnates, who had never served at court, had relatives and children who became mem­ bers of the Viennese household. This was even more so for those aris­ tocrats who did serve at court, particularly the Balassi, Nydry, Perenyi, Revay, Thurzo, and Zrmyi families. Miklos Zrihyi, the hero of the defense of Szigetvdr in 1566, had excellent connections with the court and married his seven daughters to Hungarian magnates who were serving at the Habsburg court at the time. Serving in Vienna in the joint Habsburg court in one of the minor dignities became a stepping stone for the Hungarian aristocrats in acquiring one of the pre-1526 Hungarian royal court titles which had become purely nominal but were meaningful and significant for the Hungarian political elite. For this elite serving at court was still highly important and significantly furthered their career. Combining the real Viennese dignities and titles with the nominal Hungarian ones gave tire Habsburg rulers an opportunity to create a group of Hungarian high nobles who became instrumental in managing the affairs of the King­ dom of Hungary. In addition to the prelates, the leading personalities of tlie domestic activities came from approximately twenty families: the Balassi, Bdnffy, Bdthory, Batthydny, Czobor, Dobo, Draskovics, Erdody, Forgdch, Homonnai Drugeth, Nddasdy, Nydry, Pdlffy, Perenyi, Revay, Tally,Thurzo, Vdrday, and Zrihyi families. They recognized the importance of service at court and spared no expense in providing their children with an education in Vienna and with training for court service. The court career strategy was not exclusive. Depending on the number, ability, economic position, and religious affiliation of their children, the Hungarian magnates combined their court and country dignities and titles, with military, sacerdotal and, occasionally, office­ holder careers. When successful, these moves complemented each other satisfactorily and contributed greatly to the political power of the family in Hungary’. In the Forgdch family of Ghymes, Zsigmond I turned Protestant. He had three sons, Ferenc, Imre, and Simon. Of these, Ferenc combined an ecclesiastic, court and officeholder career. He studied in Padua, became nominal bishop of Vdrad (1556-1567), dean of Pozsony, and Hungarian royal secretary and deputy chancellor (1559 -1563) at the

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Habsburg court. In 1560, his family was awarded a Hungarian barony and in 1565 he gave one of the orations at the funeral of Ferdinand I in Vienna.67 His influence assisted his Protestant brother, Imre, at the court in Vienna where he served first Ferdinand I and later Maximilian II as a two-horse courtier.68 He used his court connections to establish contacts with leading scholars in Europe and corresponded with humanists like Hugo Blotius, Andreas Dudith and Theodore de Beze.69 The brother, Simon, also a Protestant, had an unparalleled military career. He was captain general at Varad, Eger, the mining district, and Upper Hungary and combined these positions with the highest country dignities.70 His services were well recognized at the Habsburg court and in 1584 he became a candidate for the position of an aulic war councilor.71 His wife w7as the Austrian Ursula Pemfflinger. Thanks to her, he was accepted into the Lower Austrian upper nobility (Herrenstand) in 1568.72 In 1581 he received the Moravian diploma indigenatus 73 Continuing the family strategy7, the sons of Simon, Zsigmond II, Ferenc II and Mihaly, went even further. Following his father’s foot­ steps Zsigmond pursued a military7-political career and eventually became the palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary (1618-1621). Ferenc became a priest, eventually archbishop of Esztergom and a cardinal (1607-1615).74 Their brother, Mihdly studied in Strasbourg and Witten­ berg and then devoted his life to literature. He is the first Hungarian that we know of whose letters were answered by the foremost representa­ tive of contemporary humanism, Justus Lipsius, the professor of the University of Leyden.75 Members of the Hungarian lesser nobility rarely appeared in the Vienna or Prague Households. Tills was quite different from the late Middle Ages. For the more learned of this group, or for the sons of the bourgeois, positions in the central administrative structures (Aulic Chamber, Aulic War Council), Hungarian or Turkish translator posi­ tions, and the lower dignities of the Hungarian Court. Chancellery7, e.g. notary7, recorder, became available. The contacts established in Vienna were then used by the brightest ones to improve their position in Hun­ gary and acquire additional dignities, positions or estates.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Beginnings of a Supranational Aristocracy

The marriage of Peter Macedonia! to a relative of the lord steward of the Viennese household, Leonhard von Vels, and the marriage of Miklos Pdlffy to Maria Tugger indicated another significant pattern in the sixteenth century. The integration of the Hungarian aris­ tocrats within the monarchy, service in the imperial city, studies and the purchase of houses, was greatly accelerated by the family relationships established with the high Austrian, German, and Bohemian nobility. The most noteworthy marriages during the period of this study, between Hungarian aristocratic ladies and domestic and foreign high aristocrats and court and country office holders, were undertaken by Magdolna Szekely and her tw7o daughters, Margit Szechy and Erzsebet Thurzo (fig. 3). These were motivated by power considerations but the political, economic, and cultural effects went far beyond the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary. Magdolna Szekely lost her first husband, Tamas Szechy, on the battlefield of Mohdcs and then married Elek Thurzo, the chief justice of Hungary who later became the royal regent of Hungary’ (1532-1542). After he died, Magdolna married Jan z Pernstejna (Johann von Pernstein), a Bohemian magnate in 1544.76 The marriages of Magdolna’s children from these three marriages opened the way to family liaisons with a number of important Hungarian-Croatian, Austrian-German and Bohemian aristocratic families. Her daughter from the marriage with Tamas Szechy, Margit, w-as first married to Niklas Graf zu Salm, Jr., chief chamberlain to Ferdinand I in Vienna and later commander in chief in Hungary. In 1550 Margit became a widow and then married Pyrcho Graf von Arco of Tyrol, the brother of Scipio von Arco, Ferdi­ nand’s other chief chamberlain. Both husbands w-ere among the most valued counselors of the ruler to the advantage of their children and their Hungarian and Bohemian relatives. The sons of Niklas Graf zu Salm, Eck, Niklas, and Julius, grew up in the court in Vienna beginning as pages. After 1551, Eck was already ispan of Pozsony County and captain of the Pozsony fortress. Later he became the general of the Gyor Captain General cy and served in this capacity until his death in 1574. Niklas, who was fluent in Greek, Latin, Italian, and French, became the chief commissioner of the fortification

HUNGARIAN ARISTOCRACY AND THE, HABSBURG COURT

87

works of the Hungarian border fortresses in 1578 and died as captain general of the fortress of Kanizsa in 1580. Julius became an imperial court counselor. All three brothers received Hungarian diploma indigenatus at the diet of 1563 in Pozsony. Niklas was awarded Bohemian nobility in 1561 and Julius in 1575 and thus they were simultaneously naturalized in Lower Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia.77 Eck married the younger stepsister of his mother, Katerina, the daughter of Magdolna Szekely and Jan z Pemstejna in 1550. His younger brother, Julius, married Erzsebet, another stepsister of his mother, the daughter of Magdolna Szekely and Elek Thurzo in 1567. The marriage between Erzsebet Thurzd and Julius Graf zu Salm, was her third one. Her first husband was her stepbrother, Jaroslav, the son of Jan z Pemstejna, who died young and who was the brother of the famous Bohemian Court Chancellor, Vratislav z Pemstejna 78 Her sec­ ond husband was Adam Ungnad who received his Hungarian diploma indigenatus at the Pozsony diet of 1563. A number of Ungnad relations served in Hungary. Hans Ungnad was repeatedly commander in chief in Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia after 1540 and his son, Christoph, served as captain general of Eger and ban of Croatia-Slavonia.79 Chistoph’s cousin, David, was first ambas­ sador in Constantinople (1573 -1578) and then became the president of the Aulic War Council (1584-1600). The Salm-Ungnad-Tliurzo-Pemstejn relationship tightly linked an important and influential group of political and military leaders of the Vienna court, of the Kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, and of the territories of Croatia-Slavonia. Through the Arcos, this ‘‘family alliance” was joined by the Zrihyis and, through the Zrihyis by the Rozmberks/Rosenbergs and Kolovrats/Kolowrats who had a major role in the governance of Bohemia. The daughter of Margit Szechy and Pyr cho von Arco, Anna, was married to Gybrgy (Juraj), the son of the famous Hungarian-Croatian magnate Miklos Zrihyi (Nikola Zrinski).80 Hie second wife of the hero of Szigetvdr was Eva z Rozmberka (Eva von Rosenberg) whose son, Jan Zrinsky, married Marie Magdalena z Kolovrat thus further strengthening the family linkage.81 Finally, this group was joined by the Lobkovic Popel (Lobkowitz-Poppel) family. Magdalena, the sister of the three Salm brothers, was married in 1563, in Pozsony, by Ladislav 1H z Lobkovic Popel, who received his Hun­

88

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARYAND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

garian citizenship in 1572, due to his family connections and his estates in Hungary. The Salm-Arco-Ungnad, the Pernstejn-Lobkovic-RozmberkKolovrat and the Szekely-Szechy-Thurzo-Zrinyi family linkages signi­ fied the beginning of a supranational aristocracy in the middle of the sixteenth century. The members of these families held nobilities in sev­ eral lands of the Habsburg Monarchy, acquired major estates, held important positions at court and in the various countries, and improved their joint interests. Their influence on the entire Monarchy was impor­ tant. The “cohesive strength of the Habsburg Monarchy” (Kitt der Habsburgermonarchie), the supranational aristocracy thus included a part of the political elite of the Kingdom of Hungary at the middle of century.82 In the absence of major court linkages it was no longer possible to become part of the occasionally changing elite. Knowing this, it becomes clear why the appointment of the Hungarian Ferenc Thurzo as president of the Aulic Chamber caused no problem for the Viennese political elite. The family linkages, crossing international borders, made it very’ much easier for Ferdinand I to accomplish his goals in the central areas of the Monarchy. These families were also the most generous mecaenases of the period.83 After Hans Ungnad left Hungary, he became famous for pub­ lishing the first South Slav bible in Wurttemberg. His nephew, David, the president of the Aulic War Council, translated Psalms while Julius Graf von Salm supported the newly established press of the Hungarian Protestant preacher, Peter Bomemisza. The powerful court and country dignitaries, the influential president of the chamber, the captain gener­ al fighting the Ottomans and the entrepreneur magnate were frequently indistinguishable from each other in this era. The aristocrat network, linked tightly to the Habsburg court, represented not only serious polit­ ical and economic powers but was also the supporter of the late renais­ sance. Humanism and reformation thus became the principal motiva­ tion behind the Habsburg Monarchy’s cultural connections.

Chapter Six

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE Hungary, an Important but Largely Unknown Bulwark

The campaigns of Sultan Suleyman in 1529 against Vienna, in 1532 against Koszeg, in 1541 against Buda, and in 1543 against Esztergom made it increasingly clear to the political leadership in Vienna that the Ottoman conquests made the Kingdom of Hungary of paramount importance for the Habsburg Monarchy. Earlier, Hungary7 appeared to be only a distant and dangerous terrain. Except for the nobility of Camiola, Styria, and Lower Austria, that had experienced the marauding raids of the Ottomans, the Hungarian border areas appeared to the leaders of the more distant parts of the Monarchy as peculiar and exotic.1 This feeling was strengthened by the strange lan­ guage and dress of the Hungarians in eastern style and by the fact Hun­ gary that was largely unknown to them.2 During the 1530s, Ferdinand I had a very7 difficult time convincing the estates of the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy to send soldiers and money to Hungary, several hundred kilometers away. As early as 1539, Tam ds Nddasdy, the ban of Croatia-Slavonia, drew attention to the great danger that would arise if such help were not forthcoming. He wrote, “If Your Holy Majesty does not support this country with your other provinces it will certainly happen that, due to the loss of this country, the other provinces of Your Holy7 Majesty will be lost.”3 Hie loss of Buda in 1541 and of Esztergom, Szekesfehervdr, and Becs in 1543 meant that the dangers, earlier thought to be far distant, suddenly became imminent. The Ottoman occupation of Jajce in 1528

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

immediately threatened Camiola. Carinthia and Styria and by the mid 1540s the same could be said about the more central provinces of the Monarchy. The Vienna residence of Ferdinand was closer to Ottoman Esztergom than the capital of Carniola, Laibach, to Jajce which was in Bosnia. When the 1542 re-conquest of Buda, attempted with all the mil­ itary and economic resources of the Holy Roman Empire, failed, there was no more doubt in the mind of the leaders of the Monarchy that a border defense system against the Ottomans in Hungary had to be established without delay. Fortifying Vienna was insufficient. Establishing such a new defense system encountered enormous difficulties. Fighting with the Ottomans and with their Transylvanian vassal, continued until 1568 with only minor interruptions, and thus the foundations for the defense system had to be laid down during warfare. It also became apparent that in spite of its extensive territory and sub­ stantial revenues, the Kingdom of Hungary, by itself, was unable to meet the costs of defense. Six and one half months pay of the approxi­ mately 10,000 German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Italian soldiers who garrisoned the Hungarian fortresses and towns in the winter of 1542-1543, came to 197,480 Rhenish florins.4 This represented approximately one fourth of the annual revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary of 700 -800,000 Rhenish florins. The Hungarian estates drew the attention of their ruler to this in a special act at the Diet of Pozsony of 1547. It stated, ‘There is a need for the financial and military aid by the Holy Imperial and Royal Majesties [i.e. Charles V, and Ferdinand I] and by the imperial princes, because the Hungarian war tax alone cannot cover all of these.”5 The previous year an attempt was made to finance the frontier fortresses from the war tax voted for by the estates but this endeavor failed.6 In spite of this the leaders of the estates wanted to preserve their legal rights to manage military affairs. This led to serious conflicts between the palatine and the royal regents, the leaders of Hungarian military affairs, and the commanders in chief of the troops arriving in Hungary, who were payrolled by Austria, Germany, and Bohemia. Ferdinand endeavored to appoint commanders in chief, like Niklas Graf zu Salm, Sr. or Hans Ungnad, who had gained experience prior to 1526, in the Croatian and Slavonian areas.7 In spite of this the Viennese military leadership was seriously handicapped by lack of knowledge

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE

91

about Hungarian geography, language, and legal system. The frontier area needing a defense system was extensive. Ferdinand was thus com­ pletely dependent upon the local knowledge and advice of the Hungar­ ian magnates. The geopolitical conditions favored the Ottomans. After the occupation of the fortresses between the Sava and the Danube, there was no natural barrier, mountains, rivers, or swamps, which could have held back an advance to Lake Balaton and beyond.8 The Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian-Bohemian areas were thus interdependent. Up to 1566 this interdependence increased as a result of further Ottoman conquests and of the formation of the Princi­ pality of Transylvania that became a vassal of the Porte. Table 7 shows that, after the mid-1550s, even the considerable revenues of the King­ dom of Hungary were insufficient for the regular payments to the sol­ diers serving in the border fortresses.

Table 7. Pay for the Soldiers in the Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System. Annual Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary, and Military Expenditure Estimates (1545-1593) Year

Military Pay in Hungary-Croatia in R.f.

1545 1546 1548 1549 1554 1556 1558 1572 1676 1577 1578 1582 1593

383,640 358,776 600,682 496,938 761,766 945,475 1,025,040 1,220,761 1,658,736 1,461,900 1,368,348 1,418,292 1,726,622

Pay per Revenue %

100 100 100 100 100 81 75 63 46 53 56 54 45

Notes: * - 460,000 R. f.; R. f. = Rhenish florins Source: Palffy, LtDer Preis fur die Verteidigung,” 27, table 2.

Pay per Military Expenditures* % 100 100 64 78 50 40.5 37.5 31.5 23 26.5 28 27 22.5

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

In addition to the increasing military7 pay requirements there was also increasing need for funding military equipment, supplies, fortress repairs, naval vessels, military intelligence, mail, and military adminis­ tration. The latter amounted to 400-500,000 Rhenish florins annually by the second half of the sixteenth century.9 This amount was roughly equivalent to the annual expenditures of the Habsburg household.10 The approximately 1.7-2.1 million Rhenish florins annual requirement for the defense system in the 1570s was much too large to be covered by tire Hungarian revenues. At best these revenues could have paid for about 30-40 percent of the total sum required and this was a consider­ able achievement for a country that had become a theater of war. Even for the entire Habsburg Monarchy the sums required proved to be a substantial burden. After the 1540s-1550s the Hungarian defense system required the financial assistance of the Habsburg central European domains. The defense of the imperial city of Vienna and of the Austrian and Bohemian territories depended on the Hungarian frontier defenses. 'Fhe entire Habsburg Monarchy had to rely for its defense on the Hun­ garian and Croatian-Slavonian areas. In the autumn of 1555, not for the first time, Palatine Tamas Nddasdy urged Archduke Maximilian to, “send, without any delay, troops from Austria, Styria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, particularly heavy cavalry men who are much respected by the Turks,” because otherwise Nddasdy saw no way to organize the defense.11 The estates in Camiola, Styria, and Lower Austria, familiar with the depredations of marauding Ottoman detachments, from the 1540s supported the establishment and maintenance of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian border defense systems with annual contributions. It was a more difficult task, however, for Ferdinand and his successors to convince the Bohemian, Moravian, Silesian, and German estates. Even though the Turkish question became one of the central agenda items at the imperial diets, the distance from Speyer, Regensburg, or Augsburg to the Hungarian theater of war was very great.12 Because Hungary was not a part of, but only a neighbor to, the Holy Roman Empire, the German estates were obliged to send armed assistance only if an imperial territory or after 1556-58 the imperial capital, Vienna, was in danger.13

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE,

93

The emperors thus had to offer increasingly meaningful evidence to buttress their demands for assistance against the Turks.14 The major­ ity of the imperial estates had sparse information about Hungary. More accurate information was held only by those German nobles who had served in the Hungarian theater of war or by some South German mer­ chant families. Even from the near-by imperial capital the German nobility came to this unknown frontline state only to see the spectacu­ lar Hungarian coronations, to inspect one of the more imposing Hun­ garian fortifications or, perhaps, to visit Hungarian aristocrats.15 The central government structures had to prepare massive, sub­ stantive material for the imperial diets in order to convince the German estates to offer their support. The material prepared listed the fortress­ es in Hungary and Croatia which had been occupied by the Ottomans and gave graphic descriptions of the Turkish raids into Hungarian and Austrian territories.16 They also prepared detailed memoranda on the fortresses built for the new defense system, the number of soldiers assigned to them, and the amount of money needed for their pay. They also quoted the dire reports of the Habsburg ambassadors from Con­ stantinople.17 Special maps were prepared for the central military lead­ ership and for the German Estates. For the latter these served informa­ tional purposes only but for the former they became an essential tool of the trade. A map was prepared for the 1570 Imperial Diet of Speyer which showed the Hungarian-Croatian defense system consisting of ninety-six larger and smaller fortifications.18 This map has not survived and the most detailed sixteenth century map of Hungary7, the work of the Italian cartographer Nicolo Angielini from the mid 1570s with a dedication to August, the elector of Saxony, was discovered only recently in Dresden.19 Prior to preparing this map, the Aulic War Council implemented a complete survey of the Kingdom of Hungary during the 1560s. This effort is attested by the six surviving copies of a detailed map of the borderlands in Vienna and five in Karlsruhe.20 This military7 cartogra­ phy deserves serious consideration even by European standards because it represents the earliest precursor to the systematic eighteenth century military mapping activities in central Europe. The Hungarian and Croatian maps were prepared locally on the basis of visits to all the border regions. While much of this work was directed by Austrian

94

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

senior officers, acting on orders from the War Council, most of the local information was provided by Hungarian and Croatian captains. The actual maps were drawn by members of an Italian fortress-building and map-making family, the Angielinis from Milan, the brothers Natale and Nicolo and the son of Natale, Paolo. The maps completed by the end of the 1560s were repeatedly revised and finally copied into separate man­ uscript volumes in the 1570s. This was done so that the entire border defense system of the Habsburg Monarchy would be available to the ruler and to the War Council when military decisions had to be made.21 The Ottoman conquests not only contributed to growth in government affairs but also gave a substantial boost to the science of military car­ tography in the Monarchy. The Hungarian frontline state became increasingly familiar to the German, Austrian, Bohemian, and Mora­ vian estates and by the end of the 1570s, “The Kingdom of Hungary was the protective bastion of the German territories and their forward shield.”22

The Protective Bastion of the Monarchy: The New Border-Defense System The new defense system was the result of a major effort, lasting several decades, mobilized huge financial and military resources and was accompanied by serious conflicts in areas of author­ ity. The Hungarian estates and aristocrats refused to give up their mill tary privileges in their jurisdiction. In the late Middle Ages they were in charge of all elements of the border defenses of Croatia, Slavonia, southern Hungary7, and Transylvania, including the fortresses. They were also responsible for the armed levies of the nobility, for the coun­ ty militias and the militia portalis.23 The estates in Camiola, Carinthia, Styria, and Lower Austria, endeavoring to establish protection for their areas via a Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian buffer, demanded an increasing participation in the direction of the border defenses, in exchange for regular material and military support. The conflicts in the spheres of authority began when the first Ger­ man mercenary pikeman set foot in Hungary, accompanying Ferdinand I to his coronation in summer of 1527. According to the 1486 Palatine

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE,

95

Acts, in Hungary “the regular captain and captain general of the land and of its inhabitants” was the palatine.24 There was no mention of any foreign soldiers stationed in the country by the ruler, because in the late medieval Hungary such a situation could not even be imagined. lliis changed dramatically after 1526. In his fight against the Ottomans and against John Szapolyai, King Ferdinand regularly sent troops to Hungary and, occasionally separately, to Croatia and Slavo­ nia, under the leadership of his own commanders in chief.25 Hie former were paid mostly by the Aulic Chamber and by the Lower Austrian estates, while the latter were paid by the estates of Camiola, Styria and Carinthia. Because of the frequent shortages of money, even the Hun­ garian troops of Ferdinand were frequently paid with Austrian assis­ tance in the 1530s to 1550s. Thus, the Hungarian military and financial affairs became a joint problem for the Hungarian, Austrian, Bohemian, and Moravian territories. Ferdinand and his Viennese military advisers, the Austrian estates, and the Hungarian magnates all tried to shape the new situation accord­ ing to their own interests. The commanders in chief increasingly attempted to extend their authority over the Hungarian troops and this was opposed vigorously by the Hungarian aristocracy.26 At the same time some Austrian estates c oncentrated on the defense of the areas adja­ cent to their borders and wanted to partake in directing the effort. The Camiola, Carinthia, and Styria estates were interested primarily in the Croatian and, after die 1540s. in the Slavonian areas, while the Lower Austrian estates, after the fall of Szekesfehervar and Esztergom in 1543, were interested primarily in the area between the Balaton and the Danube. The Moravian estates were interested in die areas of Hungary, north of die Danube, which were located in the proximity of dieir own territory.27 The Hungarian estates, naturally, tried to preserve their own position. They endeavored to accomplish this through die assistance of Palatine Istvtin Bdthory (1526-1530) and later, in the absence of the ruler, by the royal regents. Elek Hiurzo (1532-1542), Ptil Vtirday (1542 -1549), and Ferenc tJjlaky (1550 -1554). In a clever tactical move, Ferdinand omitted any reference to military matters in his instructions.28 Thus the royal regents gradually lost the palatine’s military’ responsibil­ ities and so did die bans of Croatia-Slavonia.29 These responsibilities were increasingly assumed by foreign commanders in chief.

96

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

'Ilie loss of Buda induced the Hungarian estates to take decisive steps. At the 1542 Diet of BesztercebAnya, two captain generals of the country were chosen to assure the defense against the Ottomans.30Thus in addition to the Croatian-Slavonian ban, Miklos Zrinyi, Andrds Bdthory was appointed in Transdanubia to assure the defense of the border for the estates. He was succeeded in this position twice by Tamas Nddasdy and then by Ferenc Tahy in the 1540s-l 550s. East and north of the Danube the same role was assigned first to Peter Perenyi and then to Andras Bdthory. Lacking the necessary resources, all of the above could hold their position for a limited time only. Nddasdy resigned twice, in 1542 and 1552, which showed clearly that the exclu­ sive right of the Hungarian estates to direct the military affairs and the defense of the country had become an illusion.31 Even though the Hungarian high officers were all solid supporters of King Ferdinand, this did not exclude their identification with the struggle for influence of their estates and for the tenacious defense of their own privileges. In the system of government dualism the interests of the ruler and of the estates were opposed to each other but this did not represent an antagonistic relationship. It meant that according to the prevailing conditions there was a changing, complex system of rela­ tionships.32 Loyalty and patriotism, i.e. attachment to the ruler and defense of the interests of the Kingdom of Hungary did not exclude each other. In fact, the major role in the governance of the country’ con­ tinued to belong to the Hungarian aristocracy in the closest possible relationship with the Habsburg court. 'Hie limited knowledge about Hungary abroad assisted them in their role. Ferdinand’s commanders in chief needed the wide experience and advice of the Hungarian aristo­ crats in working out tire concepts of the new border defense system. 'Ihe military leadership in Vienna took advantage of the available expe­ rience and advice because the Ottoman danger did not allow them the luxury of making mistakes. The political and military leaders of the estates were regularly invited to Vienna for consultation in the 1530s1550s, as shown by the repeated invitations issued to Personalis and later Deputy Palatine Ferenc Revay.33 Hie coordination became more effective after 1550 when several war councils were held in Vienna and Pozsony. These discussions were based on the frontier surveys. They included debates on which fortress­

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE,

97

es needed strengthening, which needed additional troops, which could be dismantled, or where a new fortress should be constructed and who would pay for the troops to man it and where the military supplies and food would come from.34 The views of the Hungarian magnates were always sought before senior military appointments were made.35 When major decisions had to be made, the court in Vienna could not ignore the Hungarian aristocrats. The direction of Hungarian military affairs and the defense of tire frontiers was thus neither an exclusively Viennese matter nor was it an exclusively Hungarian affair. After the mid 1540s the Hungarian and Austrian estates, the commanders in chief and the war councilors all had made a series of compromises. Fortunately, the Commander in Chief Niklas Graf zu Salm und Neuburg, Jr. and his deputy, Reinprecht von Ebersdorf, could work successfully with Royal Regent PAI VArday.36 The cooperation between Sforza Pallavicini, the supreme field mar­ shal in Hungary (1552-1556), headquartered in Gyor and the Palatine Tamas NAdasdy (1554-1562) w-as not without considerable friction. NAdasdy, who was very skillful in achieving his goals, managed to gain authority over the county forces both north and south of the Danube.37 He also succeeded in preserving control over the military levy of the nobles and over the militia portalis. These were among the most impor­ tant privileges of the Hungarian nobility who paid no taxes to the ruler other than their service and blood. NAdasdy was unable, however, to retain control over the border fortresses which were staffed by German and Hungarian soldiers paid by funds from the Lower Austrian estates. The same thing happened to him when he was of ban of Croatia-Slavo­ nia (1537-1539). At the end of April 1538, Ferdinand appointed the Carinthian Erasm von Thum captain general over the fortresses of Senj, Bihac, Ripac, Otocac and other smaller ones, i.e. over the former Croa­ tian frontier areas.38 Neither NAdasdy nor his successors could command these fortresses and, after the 1540s, he lost control of those Slavonian fortresses in which the garrison was paid by the Styrian estates. This meant that there was a split in the command of the military serving in Hungary, Slavonia and Croatia depending on whether the pay of the sol­ diers came from Hungarian or Austrian sources. In this process the establishment of the Aulic War Council, in 1556, took on great significance. Its authority did not extend over the entire

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Monarchy and this was not part of its original instruction.39 Even though, in principle, it was responsible for military matters everywhere, its primary task during the first few decades of its operation was the organization of the Hungarian frontier defenses. It was the most urgent military problem of Ferdinand’s Habsburg Monarchy in tire middle of the sixteenth century. This is shown by the fact that the first president of the War Council, from 1556 to 1560 was Ehrenreich von Kbnigsberg, from Lower Austria, who had served as the captain general of the light cavalry in Gyor and then became the deputy commander in chief in Hungary in 1552. In these roles he was instrumental in building a defense belt around Lower Austria and Vienna.40 It is also significant that most of the surviving sixteenth century material of the Aulic War Council deals with Hungarian matters.41 Because of the dual financing and the differing interests of the Hun­ garian and Austrian estates and of the Viennese military leadership, the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian defense system also assumed a dual quality during the 1570s. Because of the mutual compromises and con­ cessions there was an overlap in the command over the defense of the military frontier. The captain generalcies covering the border fortress regions were under the authority of the Aulic War Council. The district (sector) captain generalcies (Kreisgeneralat} of the border defense zone, however, came under the control of the Hungarian estates.42 The most important features of the defense system were the border fortresses. The number of fortresses in the new system grew during the two decades after the mid 1550s by 50 percent and by the end of the century there were 110 -130 (table 8). In these, during the 1570s--1580s, approximately 20-22,000 Hungarian, Croatian, German, and Serb sol­ diers were stationed on a permanent basis. This is a substantial number even though in some fortresses the prescribed numbers were not met.

DEFENDING THE COMPOSITE STATE.

99

Table 8. The Number of Border Fortresses and the Prescribed Number of Soldiers in Hungary and in the Croatian-Slavonian Territory in the Second Half of the Six­ teenth Century Number of Fortresses

Year

Hungary

Croatia- Total Slavonia

1556 1572 1576 1582 1593

Ca 30 53 51 71 75

Ca 50 75 72 47 96

Ca 80 128 123 118 171

Prescribed Garrison Hungary

CroatiaSlavonia

10,832 13,862 17,190 16,403 15,446

3,150 5,999 5,323 4,745 7,247

Total

13,982 19,861 22,513 21,148 22,693

Source'. Palffy, “Tiirkenabwehr, Grenzensoldatentom,” 131, table 3.

The military border zone with a chain of fortresses, extending over several hundred kilometers (map 8) was divided into six captain generalcy regions (Grenzgeneralat). Each of these was under the command of a border fortress captain general who set up his headquarters in a centrally located fortress or fortified city. Beginning with the Adriatic and progressing to the border of Transylvania we find:

1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

The Croatian and Adriatic Captain Generalcy was the first one to be established with the border fortress at Bihac and, after 1579, at Kdrolyvdros as the command center. The Slavonian or Wendish Captain Generalcy with Varasd as its center.43 After 1578 it was known as the Wendish-Bajcsavdr Cap­ tain Generalcy.44 The Kanizsa Captain Generalcy, replacing the one centered at Szigetvdr which was lost to die Ottomans in 1566. After the loss of Kanizsa inl600, it was known as the Captain Generalcy Across from Kanizsa. The Gydr Captain Generalcy, protecting imperial Vienna. The Captain Generalcy of the Mining Towns, along the Garam River minig region with the border fortress of Leva and, after 1589, of Ersekujvdr as its command center. The Upper Hungary or Kassa Captain Generalcy, with Kassa as its command center.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

In addition to these, an important position in the defense system was taken by the fortress of Komdrom along the Danube. Straddling the major military highway, it was of critical importance in the defense of Vienna. It was also the command center for the Danube flotilla and its captain general served directly under the Aulic War Council. Because of its importance, this position was held, from 1566 to the beginning of the seventeenth century, by Lower Austrian nobles with Miklos Pdlffy as the only exception. Die commanders of the Gy or Captain Generalcy were also recruited only from the leading Lower Austrian noble fami ­ lies (Gall, Hardegg, Nogarol, Salm, Teufel, and Zelking). Direction of the Croatian-Slavonian captain generalcies was assumed after the 1540s by the aristocratic families from Camiola-Gorizia and Carinthia (Auersperg, Khisl, Lenkovitsch, Thum) and from Styria (Grasswein, Ilerberstein, Ungnad) 45 By the beginning of the seventeenth century it became an accepted practice that recommendations for the position of captain general of Croatia came from the Camiolan and Carinthian estates and for the same position in Slavonia, the Styrian estates propo­ sed candidates.46 Tliere was a varied articulation of the system of fortresses within each captain generalcy. Due to geographic and strategic considerations the border fortresses differed from each other, yet every fortress had its own specific importance. The principal fortresses were massively enlarged, had a garrison of 1,000-1,500 men and became the pillars of the defense system and the centers of military administration. These key fortresses were followed by the large fortresses with 400 to 600 men and then the smaller stone or palisade fortifications with 100 to 300 soldiers. The guard and patrol ports with only about a dozen sol­ diers also had important functions.47 These included the surveillance of enemy detachments and the provision of equestrian messengers. The guard houses also could signal with cannon or with fire and thus alert the larger fortresses and the people living in Ilie general area.48 Another element of the frontier defense system was the district captain generalcy (Kreisgeneralat) which provided the border fortress captain generalcy with additional military support. The four district captain generals, who dealt with the military issues related to the coun­ ties, and the estates, were headquartered in 1. the Banate of Croatia-Sla­ vonia, 2. Transdanubia, 3. Cisdanubia, extending from Pozsony, to

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Gbmbr County, and 4. The Upper Hungary.49 They were in charge of the increasingly outdated noble levies, of the troops of the counties and of the free royal cities, and of contingents directly under their com­ mand. These contingents, usually 300—500 men, were assigned to various fortresses or private fortifications and thus participated in the defense of the outlying areas. These forces of the district captain generalcy strengthened the system of border fortresses in Hungary7. South of the Drava River, they helped in establishing a separate minor defensive zone. The small fort­ resses, along the Glina and Kulpa Rivers between the border captain generalcies of Croatia and Slavonia, and their five hundred soldiers led to the formation of the frontier defense system in this area, the so cal­ led confines of the ban.50 Thus the single military sphere of activity of the ban decreased sharply after 1526 and was now split into two sepa­ rate segments. The evolution of the district captain generalcies and their survival until the end of the seventeenth century testify to the powder and strength of the Hungarian estates. The captain general’s office could be held only by those who were of “local birth,” i.e. Hungarian nobles. This was also true for the ban’s position in Croatia-Slavonia. A foreig­ ner could only be named if he received a Hungarian diploma indigenatus first. One such person was Ban Christoph Ungnad (1576/78-1583) who had a Hungarian wife (Anna Losonczy).51 The sphere of military activity of the Hungarian estates was sub­ stantially reduced by the establishment of the Aulic War Council and of the Border Fortress Captain Generalcies. Yet, although the war taxes of the estates covered only about 10 percent of the costs of the border defenses, their role was not insignificant.52 Also, the positions of bor­ der fortress and sector captain general were separated only in the Croa­ tian-Slavonian areas and in Transdanubia. The situation was different in the Cisdanubian area and in Upper Hungary. There the two offices sur­ vived, but were held by the same person: the captain general of the bor­ der fortresses protecting the mining towns and the captain general of Cisdanubian sector, was one and the same. On the other hand, in Upper Hungary a single captain general commanded the border fortresses and the noble and county levies from the very beginning. This is why his title in German was, Feldoberst in Oberungarn. The captain general of

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

the Captain Generalcy of the Mining Towns was always a Hungarian, but of Kassa, from 1565 until 1604, an Austrian or a German. This latter situation could be explained by the very important role of the Upper Hungary' Captain Generalcy. The defense system did not protect the Kingdom of Hungary against the Ottomans alone. On die left-bank territories of the Tisza River, the Viennese military leadership organized a small, separate defense zone during the 1570s, the so-called Transtisza Captain Generalcy with Szatmdr as its center (map 8). The critically important fortress was recaptured from the prince of Transyl­ vania, John II Sigismund Szapolyai, in 1565 by the noted German mili­ tary theorist and commander, Lazarus von Schwendi, Captain General of Upper Hungary.53 The captain general of Szatmdr and Transtisza, headquartered in the fort of Szatmdr was entrusted by the captain gene­ ral of Upper Hungary at Kassa with the command of the border fortres­ ses east of the Tisza, namely Kdllo, Kisvdrda, Ecsed and Szatmdr and of Szabolcs, Szatmdr, Ugocsa, and Bereg Counties. Thus this defensive zone protected the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, not so much against the Ottomans, but against the Principality of Transylvania, a vas­ sal of the Porte which was ruled by Christian Hungarian Princes.54 The creation of the Transtisza Captain Generalcy indicated that the Ottoman vassal Transylvania became, from a political and military per­ spective, a separate country and even an enemy of the Kingdom of Hungary, which became an integral part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Tliis was true in spite of the fact that the two Hungarian domains were closely finked by cultural, religious, economic, and familial relation­ ships.55 The divergence was also evidenced by the new chain of fort­ resses along the border of the two countries and by the newly establis­ hed customs regulations.56 Even the contemporaries viewed the king­ dom and the principality as separate countries. In the summer of 1590, for example, in a document written in the Transylvanian city Gyulafehervdr about the principal city of the Upper Hungary Captain Gene­ ralcy, it was stated that “Kassa is in a different imperium”57 A French traveler in 1574 also wrote about the separate status of Transylvania, “Everybody speaks the original language of the country, Hungarian, because earlier Transylvania was a province of Hungary.”58 The maps printed in the second half of the century' also depicted the Ottoman vas­ sal state in a different color than the Kingdom of Hungary.59

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The political interests of the two countries, both inhabited by Hun­ garians, necessarily diverged after the middle of the century. One w;as an important component of the Habsburg Monarchy, the other was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, created in opposition to the Habsburgs. Yet the Hungarian political elite and the Habsburg military leadership never gave up on endeavoring to regain the eastern province which had formed an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Middle Ages. They viewed Transylvania as a temporarily lost area and as a conti­ nuing member of the Hungarian Crown. Curiously, even the Transyl­ vanian princes felt this way for some time.60 Hie Venetian ambassadors in Vienna also felt the same way.61 Because of these strong traditional and political interests, the rulers of Hungary conducted a number of unsuccessful diplomatic and military7 activities (1561-1562, 15701571, 1575, and 1600 -1605) in order to regain Transylvania.62 At the same time they also organized a permanent defense against the Otto­ man vassal state which, in fact, had become an enemy. Hie defensive moves were justified when the successor to John Sigismund, Prince Istvan (Stephan) Bdthory (1571-1586), was elected king of Poland by the Polish estates at the end of 1575. Istanbul agreed because Bdthory had gained his throne in opposition to Archduke Ernest. Bdthory and his victory7 put the Habsburgs in Upper Hungary7 under severe pressure from a Polish-Transylvanian-Ottoman vise. It was frilly justified when Hans Rueber, the captain general in Kassa complained in 1576, “Because Upper Hungary is completely surroun­ ded in a triangle created by the Transylvanians who are just as hostile as the Turks, the Ottomans and Poland and because the territory itself has difficult problems, it is essential that a sufficient number of soldiers are stationed there.”63 The words of the captain general were heeded by the Aulic Wai' Council in Vienna. The salary of tire approximately 6,100 soldiers serving in the thirteen border fortresses on the Kassa Captain Generalcy in 1576 represented about 70 percent of the annual revenu­ es of the Kingdom of Hungary and exceeded the pay requirements of the soldiers seiwing in the border fortresses of tire Gyor and Kanizsa Captain Generalities, defending the central areas of the Habsburg Mon­ archy.64 The fortress of Szatmtir was garrisoned with strong German infantry and artillery under the command of Austrian captain generals.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

The Price of Foreign Assistance

After the 1540s the Austrian, German, and Bohemian dominions of the Habsburg Monarchy increasingly participated in the protection of their areas by providing military payment subsidies for the forces in Hungary-Croatia. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Aulic War Council summarized the method for providing this by sta­ ting, “each land bordering Hungary7 should provide maintenance for the common frontier area.”65 The cost of keeping the garrisons in the border fortresses amounted to several hundred thousand florins annually and most of this was provided by the population in tire Hungarian theater of war. The same population also provided the work force necessary for the maintenance of the fortresses.66 The guns, rifles, military supplies and warships came mostly from the Austrian, German, and Bohemian terri­ tories.67 The huge military support had an equally huge price tag. In accordance with the pronouncements of the Wai' Council, star­ ting with the 1530s andl540s, the Croatian frontier areas were suppor­ ted with financial assistance voted annually, from neighboring Camiola and Carinthia and from the imperia] anti-Turkish funds.68 The Sla­ vonian border fortresses were financed by Styria.69 Only the border fortresses of the Banate were financed by the Hungarian Chamber from Slavonian and Hungarian revenues.70 The maintenance of the Croatian and Slavonian military borders could thus be financed only from the regular subsidies from the three Inner Austrian provinces. In the six­ teenth century this amounted to more than 18,100,000 Rhenish florins which far outstripped the few tens of thousand florins of income gene­ rated annually by the Croat!an-Slavonian territories 71 In exchange for this regular support the Inner Austrian estates gained the captain gene­ ral positions of the Croatian, and Slavonian Captain Generalcies. In addition, and with the help of Archduke Charles, they gained control, in 1578, of the military management of these two border zones which the Viennese Aulic War Council considered to be only secondary thea­ ters of war against the Ottomans. It was thus that at the beginning of 1578 the Inner Austrian War Council was established in Graz. It was controlled by representatives from the three provinces and this group controlled the administration of the two border defense areas south of the Drava River until the beginning of the eighteenth century.72

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In 1580 the Inner Austrian estates attempted to have the Graz War Council assume control over the Croatian-Slavonian ban, but this ende­ avor was not successful.73 It would have been counter to the interests of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian estates and was also contrary to Act 15 of the 1578 Diet of Pozsony. This act recognized Archduke Charles’s authority over the Croatian-Slavonian border fortresses but not over the ban 74 From a strategic perspective it would have been advantageous if the border fortresses of the banate were controlled by the Graz War Council, but because of the resistance of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian estates both Vienna and Graz were reluctant to engage in a major political confrontation. Thus, the central administra­ tion of these border fortresses of the ban remained in the hands of the Aulic War Council until the end of the seventeenth century. The ban, one of the highest Hungarian officials and the highest dignitary among the Hungarian-Croatian estates, owed his allegiance only to the ruler of the Kingdom of Hungary. North of the Drava River even though the Hungarian estates were stronger than the Croatian-Slavonian ones, they still lost much of their position because of their need to rely on outside support. The Kanizsa Captain Generalcy depended on Hungarian funds but still required the support of Styria and Lower Austria. The Gyor Captain Generalcy was financed primarily by the annually approved assistance from Lower Austria 75 It was for this reason that the estates of Lower Austria insi­ sted that they be in charge of the administration of the Gyor and Komdrom fortresses. Moravian and Bohemian support was of major importance for the border fortresses defending the mining towns 76 Yet in the financial support of these areas the revenues of the domains of the archbishop of Esztergom and of the Kormbc Chamber of Mines had a significant role 77 The Captain Generalcy of Upper Hungary had sub­ stantial local revenues but still had to rely heavily on the support of Silesian and Imperial estates.78 Between 1576 and 1606 the latter groups contributed approximately 18,700,000 Rhenish florins which were about twenty -five times the total of the reasonably ample revenu­ es of the Kingdom of Hungary.79 Thus the Austrian, German, and Bohemian subsidies played a critical role in the establishment and maintenance of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian border defense system protecting central Europe in the sixteenth century.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

'Ilie loss of influence of the Hungarian magnates is shown by their complete absence from the Viennese Aulic War Council during the cen­ tury’. Hie Graz War Council was also without any Hungarian or Croati­ an aristocrats. During the summer of 1584 several Hungarian magna­ tes, Boldizsar Batthydny, Simon Forgach, and Miklos Pdlffy were con­ sidered for these honors but failed to be ap inted.80 This was not due to a lack of confidence in these men. The reason was that Vienna consi­ dered only those aristocrats for such an appointment who could always be present at the sessions of the council and could participate in its deli­ berations.81 The same objection was raised against the appointment of Julius Graf zu Salm und Neuburg who belonged to the highest supra­ national aristocracy of the Habsburg Monarchy. Even the most courtoriented Hungarian, Austrian, and Bohemian magnates w;ere unwilling to serve as Viennese officials.82 It would be a serious mistake to assume, however, that the mem­ bers of the Wai' Council were not experts in their field and that they were unfamiliar with Hungarian affairs. All of the early councilors had previously served in the Hungarian theater of war and had fought against the Ottomans. Ehrenreich von Kbnigsberg and Georg von Tan­ hausen were considered experts in Hungarian border defenses, while Georg von Wildenstein, Sigmund Galler, and the former Turkish priso­ ner of war, Gebhard Welzer, were experts in the matters pertaining to the Croatian-Slavonian confines. Konigsberg served for several years in Gyor and Tanhausen performed a variety of tasks in the Hungarian theater of war.83 Wildenstein served repeatedly as temporary comman­ der in chief and field marshal in the Croatian-Slavonian border fortress areas and Galler served in the same area as chief war paymaster in 1540S-1550S.84 At the end of 1584 another very deserving person was appointed to the council. The Lower Austrian Ferdinand Graf zu Har degg, although known primarily for his role in the capitulation of Gyor in 1594, had already served as a military officer in Hungary’ for twenty years prior to his appointment and was also well prepared for working in an administrative structure in Vienna.85 In the most important questions of the defense system against the Ottomans the final decisions were made throughout toe sixteenth cen­ tury by the Austrian, German, and Bohemian members of the Aulic War Council. The council ruled not only on the recommendations of the

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military experts, like Lazarus von Schwendi,86 but also on all the small and large issues pertaining to the border fortresses. Such decisions con­ cerned the appointment of a Hungarian infantry commander for Gyor, when gunboats should be assigned to KomArom, which bastion should be strengthened in Ersekujvar, or which preacher should be assigned to the German troops in SzatmAr.87 In comparison with other parts of the Monarchy, centralization was very’ far advanced in the control of the Hungarian theater of war. The Kingdom of Hungary became an integral part of the military control structure of the Habsburg Monarchy and this radically changed the medieval system of military administration. Once the Aulic War Council was established, any discussion of an indepen­ dent Hungarian military administration or of an independent Hungari­ an army, other than the system of the estate levies would have been meaningless. Military matters became a joint enterprise as shown symbolically by the flags designed for the captains of the border fortresses. On one side of the flag there was a crucifix and under, or next to the crucifix the Virgin Mary, Hungary’s patroness with the child Jesus in her arms. The other side showed the two-headed eagle, representing the kingemperor and the Habsburg dynasty. In the middle of the eagle there was a representation of the Hungarian coat of arms (fig. 8) and, frequently, the Latinized initials of the ruling monarch. In spite of all this, the Hungarian estates, particularly the aristocrats directing the domestic policies of the country, retained a permanent role in the direction of military affairs and in the defense of the frontiers. Compared to the pre 1526 situation, this role was reduced from a cen­ tral control to a regional military administration. Hiere it remained decisive. Hie Hofburg had to rely on the advice of the Hungarian-Croa­ tian magnates and the captain generals, who were experienced in fight­ ing the Ottomans, whose estates were close to the military frontier and who were thoroughly familiar with local conditions. Hieir opinion was sought systematically by the War Council. Early in 1565, King Maxi­ milian asked his Hungarian advisors to designate those individuals on whose advice in military matters he could rely. The Hungarian aristo­ crats recommended a number of magnates, who had earlier served at the court in Vienna, spoke German fluently and had extensive military experience. They included Janos Petho, JAnos Balassi, Simon EorgAch,

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Gdbor Doczy, Domokos Dobo, Bdlint Bdnffy, Mihaly Revay, and Imre Czobor.88 In spite of frequent disagreements, the leaders of the Habs­ burg court and the representatives of the Hungarian political elite were able to make the compromises necessary for the adequate defense of the Kingdom of Hungary. The court did not abuse its privileged posi­ tion in these discussions or did so only when the general interests of the Monarchy made it necessary. Similarly to the military affairs, eastern diplomacy also underwent substantial changes during the 1550s-1570s.89 After the HabsburgOttoman peace treaty of 1547, these policies were directed increasing­ ly, through the newly established Habsburg embassy in Constantinople, by the lord steward and by the Privy Council in Vienna. The military affairs of this policy were handled by the Aulic War Council and thus the Hungarian participation in both these areas was necessarily limited to some degree.90 Prior to the Peace of Adrianople in 1568, the Vien­ nese leadership used, in addition to Dutch, French, and Polish diplo­ mats, numerous Hungarian, Croatian, and Slavonian nobles who were familiar with the Ottoman language and customs. These included Niko­ la Jurisic, Antal Verancsics/Verancic, .Idnos Krusics, Jdnos Habardenec, Jdnos Dessewffy, Ferenc Zay, and Zsigmond Pozsgay, etc.91 Twenty years after the establishment of the embassy in Constantinople, their services were no longer as necessary7. It was at this time that an a stra­ tum of Austrian nobles appeared, mostly from the Brenner, Eizing, Pezzen, and Ungnad families, who were already experienced in diplo­ matic relations with the Ottomans and who were willing to serve for extended periods of time in Istanbul.92 They were less familiar with the problems of the Hungarian frontiers which became a matter of frequent complaints by the Hungarian estates and even by Royal Regent Miklos Olah, who was well known for his loyalty to the Habsburg court.93 After the middle of the sixteenth century the conduct of both the military and eastern policy affairs was largely lost to the Hungarian political elite. In frontier peace negotiations, however, tlie role of the border fortress captain generals and of the Hungarian and Serb military officers in KomArom remained important. Thus the careers of the Hun­ garian aristocrats could be advanced primarily by their diplomatic negotiations with the princes of Transylvania, and with Ottoman digni­ taries by the borders.94

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The Importance of a Military Career The Kingdom of Hungary became a theater of war and thus a military career in the sixteenth century became much more meaningful than it had been during the late Middle Ages. The career models of the Hungarian aristocracy, country- dignities, and aulic and military service became more intertwined than in the lands of the Bohe­ mian crown.95 During the second half of the century more than 80 per­ cent of the highest country dignitaries and more than 60 percent of the nominal Hungarian royal court officers served as captain generals at some time during their career. About a third of the Hungarian ari­ stocrats served at the Habsburg court during their youth and then assu­ med major military responsibilities. The families belonging to the political elite, or striving to become a part of it, had to make sure that one or more of their members served as captain general. The defense of their large estates contributed to thenengaging in border defense, protecting both the country and their own property. The most notable aristocratic families in this respect the Draskovic, Erdody and Zrinski families in the Croatian-Slavonian area, the Batthydny, Bdnffy, Nddasdy, Tbrbk, and Zrinyi families in Transdanubia, the Balassi, Dersffy, Dobo, Eorgdch, Palffy, and Thurzo families in Cisdanubia and the Bdthory and Perenyi families in Upper Hungary-.96 The importance of a military career was shown by the fact that the Hungarian rulers began to elevate their most devoted followers to tire barony shortly after the beginning of the sixteenth century. This move was designed to keep those nobles in the country7 elite who had not pre­ viously achieved the rank of “true barons,” i.e. a high Hungarian coun­ try dignity or a high Hungarian royal court position. It also served to maintain sons of the “true barons” in the elevated positions of their fathers. They became the “nominal” or “natural barons” (barones solo nomine, barones natural.es) who were allowed to place a red seal on their documents, just like the highest dignitaries. They could use the title of magnificus and thus could be addressed as magnates. Their greatest privilege, however, was that they could attend the Upper House of the diet in person. Hie Jagiello rulers of Hungary made several noble families (Podmaniczky, Torbk, Sdrkdny) barons at the beginning of the sixteenth

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

century,97 and awarding Hungarian baronies became more frequent after the 1540s. Ferdinand and his successors took over from their pre­ decessors this method of creating an elite and used it skillfully in creat­ ing a partly new Hungarian aristocracy (see pp. 269-271). in Appen­ dix). 'Hie creation of a baron became by the 1560s and 1570s an award of the baronial title and, by the end of the century, became the award of the magnificus designation.98 It was in this way that by the end of cen­ tury the group of magnates became established. Together with the prelates and the “true barons” holding high country and royal court dig­ nities (barones officiolati) they could sit in the highest assemblies even though they held no official position (simplices magnates).99 The Count dignity, based on German roots, became more frequent in Hungary after the 1620s. In the period under discussion only one family received this honor. Gybrgy Thurzo became Count of Arva in April 1606.100 The first baronial title was awarded in 1535 to Ferenc Nydry, the well known hussar captain of King Ferdinand. He gained lasting dis­ tinction during the decades after 1526 in the fight against John Sza polyai and in protecting the northwest Hungarian counties for the Habs­ burgs.101 The almost fifty barons who succeeded him by 1608 owed their title, with few exceptions (about 70 percent), to outstanding mili­ tary service. This shows that military sendee was not exclusive and was frequently combined with aulic, administrative, or political services. This was especially true for a number of families, such as the Pethos, Forgdchs, Doczys, Dersffys, and Balassis. It appears that military ser­ vice w?as more important in helping a family to rise to an elite position in the country, than was service at the Habsburg court. Even the lesser nobility had an opportunity in all regions to partic­ ipate in military administration of the country. This was made possible by the large number of border fortresses, all of which needed officers. For this group the position of a deputy border fortress captain general or deputy district captain general meant tire peak of a military career. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Gyor, Komdrom, and Upper Hungary Captain Generalcy, held by foreign officers, always had Hungarians serving as deputy commanders. They were essential in dealing with the Hungarian troops in the border fortresses and this was recognized by tire military leadership in Vienna and also by their for­ eign superiors. In the absence of the captain general, they served as

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commanders in his place.102 In fact, they were frequently the actual administrators of the daily affairs in their border areas. Their services were frequently recognized by the rulers. The father of Andrds Jakusics, who had received a barony in 1606, served for almost twenty years in the fortress of Gyor. Balint Prepostvary, serving as deputy captain gen­ eral of Kassa, or Benedek Pograny, serving in the same capacity in Ersekujvdr, also owed their patent to the successful performance as deputy captain generals. Vince Gregoroczy, the Hungarian deputy captain gen­ eral of Gyor, was elevated to the knighthood by the Lower Austrian estates in 1568 for his services in the protection of Lower Austria.103 Service in the Hungarian theater of war offered opportunities for the Austrian, German, Bohemian, and Moravian nobility as well. It offered the aristocrats an important path leading to entry into the Hun­ garian nobility (with the acquisition of the diploma indigenatus), as shown by the example of the Teufel, Salm, Rueber, Ungnad, and Kollonitsch families. The military nobility of the Austrian and Bohemian lands, the Spanish mercenaries sent by Emperor Charles V, and the Walloon and French mercenaries from distant Lotharingia, who came to fight in the great battles at the end of the century, all profited by their service in Hungary.104 During the 1570s and 1580s about 15 percent of the troops in the border fortresses were of German extraction. They were frequently accompanied by members of their family and eventu­ ally settled in Hungary. They usually served in the infantry or in the heavy cavalry7 in the large border fortresses such as Gyor, Kanizsa, Ersekujvdr, Eger, Kdrolyvaros, etc., participating in the defense of the frontier. After 1550s the fortress of Gyor served as a training establish­ ment for the nobility of Lower Austria. It was here that they became familiar with the peculiarities of tire Hungarian theater of war, the way to fight the Ottomans, and the techniques of military administration.105 Of those who served here in their youth, Hans Rueber became cap­ tain general in Upper Hungary, Siegfried von Kollonitsch became cap­ tain general in Ersekujvdr and Siegmund Hager had the same post in the newly created Magyarovar Sdrvdr Captain Generalcy which was estab­ lished in place of Gyor lost to the Ottomans in 1594.106 The fortress of Kdrolyvdros played the same role in the Croatian frontier area. Several general officers served here as young men in the position of captain of the heavy cavalry, including Andreas Auersperg and Georg Lenkovitsch.107

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

In the middle of the 1560s Georg Erasm von Liechtenstein and Fer ­ dinand Graf zu Nogarol served as cavalry captains under General Lazarus von Schwendi. The former became Captain General of Gyor in 1591 and the latter held the same position in Kassa (1584) and then Gyor (1588). They and the mentioned Hager also served in the Spanish Netherlands.108 German troops were employed regularly in most fron­ tier fortresses and in all campaigns. The first German infantry regula­ tions, introduced at the 1570 Speyer Imperial Diet,109 were originally drawn up by Schwendi in Hungary in 1566-1567.110 The noted military theoretician also used the German model to draft the earliest Hungari­ an infantry and cavalry regulations, in Latin and Hungarian and accord­ ing to the Hungarian military traditions. These were translated into Croatian in 1578 and were used until the end of the seventeenth centu­ ry in the Croatian and Slavonian frontier zones.111

The Sixteenth Century Military Revolution The last example seems to support the conclusions made recently by Hungarian historians112 which, following the theories of Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker especially for West Europe, demonstrated the appearance of a Military Revolution in Hungary.113 A number of American and European military historians sharply critici­ zed this concept because they had problems with its claim of revoluti­ on and periodization.1U Most of them, particularly Jeremy Black, saw the real revolutionary changes in the European military affairs occur­ ring only during the decades after 1660. This later period was indeed more decisive so far as quantitative (size of the forces and logistic sup­ ports) and qualitative (armament, uniforms, engineering) aspects were concerned. The success of these later changes, however, was based on the innovations which were made in the Habsburg Monarchy during the fifty years after 1526. The bases necessary for the establishment of a standing army were established at this time in central Europe. The Hun­ garian theater of war with the Ottomans played an important part and was one of the determinant factors in military developments. It is more appropriate to talk about a series of military changes at the end of the late Middle Ages and the beginning of the modem era.

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Ilie first major military change took place in central Europe in the sec­ ond half of the sixteenth century. Even though it moved slowly, it was sufficiently important so that it is not an exaggeration to call it a mili­ tary revolution. It would be a mistake to seek in this period the changes involving the establishment of standing armies which took place in the second half of the seventeenth century. It would be just as much a mis­ take to see mature absolutistic regulations in Ferdinand I’s political and centralization program. The changes occurred primarily in administra­ tive and technical matters. In this area there w;ere huge differences between the conditions at the end of the late Middle Ages and the end of the sixteenth century and this was also true in the Hungarian theater of war. It was, however, also a significant change that in the second half of the sixteenth century almost three times as many soldiers served in the new border defense system against the Ottomans (20-22,000) than in its predecessor in southern Hungary prior to 1526 (7-8,000). These numbers are impressive even in a European context. Over such a long border section and with such a large number of fortresses, no other country in Europe maintained such a large “standing” army. This was true for Poland, for Muscovy in the seventeenth century, for Venice in Dalmatia and even for the Habsburg Spain in the struggle W'ith the Ottomans.115 In the case of the latter the Mediterranean naval warfare dominated and in this area a major and important innovation was the establishment of a standing marine infantry.116 The border fortress troops of approximately 20,000 men, repre­ sented a number that w?as significant even in comparison with the later standing armies because at the end of the sixteenth century the entire population of the Kingdom of Hungary numbered only 1,800,000 per­ sons.117 Not counting women and children more than 1 percent of the population was under arms and this was no less than what could be seen at the turn of the eighteenth century. At that time the standing army in the Austrian territories represented 1.25 percent of the population and even in France the ratio was only 2 percent.118 One of the most significant innovations, the establishment of the Aulic War Council in 1556, has been mentioned repeatedly above. This meant that the king’s councils, prevalent in the late medieval era, were replaced by an administrative unit of experts. The War Council became the first central institution of military affairs in Europe that met regu­

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

larly. It is less well known that, subsequent to its establishment, a num­ ber of military administrative positions were created in Vienna which were initially responsible for the staffing and support of the Hungarian border defenses. After the Habsburg standing army was established in the seventeenth century, these positions became independent sections and specialized offices of the military administration and were due to the military revolution emphasized by Jeremy Black.119 The so-called chief arsenal officer was responsible for the logistics of the border defense fortresses and the troops in the field and for the supervision of the arsenals. It was a position created by Emperor Maxi­ milian I in Innsbruck in 1503 when he instituted his military reforms.120 During the reign of Ferdinand I, the holders of this position had their office in Vienna.121 Their primary responsibility was the organization of the provisioning of military supplies for the Hungarian border defense system.122 After 1578, the Inner Austrian provinces also had their own officer with this title. The Viennese officer was responsible for the sup­ plies to the four Captain Generalcies from the Drava to Transylvania, the Graz officer was responsible for the Croatian and Slavonian Cap­ tain Generalcy. The largest imperial, royal, and estate arsenals were established in the administrative centers of the Austrian and Bohemian domains, in Vienna, Graz, Laibach, Gorizia, Linz, Innsbruck, Prague, Brunn, and Wiener Neustadt. Similar arsenals were established in the centers of the frontier regions, such as Kdrolyvdros, Varasd, Kanizsa, Gyor, Ersekujvdr, Kassa, and Szatmdr. Among the latter the Kassa arsenal was the most noteworthy. Similarly to the Innsbruck, Vienna and Graz ones, it was a military workshop with a gun foundry, gunpowder mill, various workshops and even a boat-building facility. In 1567 General Schwendi recommended that a position be created for an officer to be in charge of this arsenal. The Upper Hungary deputy chief arsenal officer was acting on behalf of his chief in Vienna.123 The importance of the position was such that the first appointee, in 1567, Adam von Wieznick, having been effective in Kassa, was promoted and transferred to Vienna.124 In the major political-military centers of the Habsburg Monarchy in the sixteenth century, the late medieval armories were replaced by variously equipped imperial-royal and estate arsenals which were the precursors of the later modem arsenals.125 This was a major step for­

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ward in comparison with the fifteenth century and also testified to the enormous proliferation of firearms. The border fortresses were equipped with guns and harquebuses and the infantry fighting the Ottomans were supplied with increasing numbers of rifles. Between 1552 and 1577 the number of rifles kept in the Kassa arsenal increased greatly.126 Approximately 75-80 percent of the soldiers fighting the Ottomans in the great battles of the Long Turkish War at the end of the century were aimed with rifles.127 The improvements in siege artillery led to enormous changes in Hungarian fortress construction. The strongest border fortresses of the late medieval Hungarian frontier defenses, such as TemesvAr, NAndorfeherv^r, Szabacs, Jajce, etc., cannot be compared to tire new fortresses and fortified cities built in the second half of the sixteenth century in the Italian style.128 Vienna, Gyor, KomArom, SzatmAr, and the newly erect­ ed ErsekujvAr and KArolyvAros can be compared favorably with the most modem fortresses of the Netherlands, Italy, or Malta as shown, with some criticism, in the famous work, Architedura von Vestungen, of Daniel Speckle.129 The older and smaller fortresses were still suitable to control minor Ottoman incursions as the Spanish guard houses in North Africa or the patrol ports in Malta, Poland, and Muscovy.130 Ihe increase in fortress building for the new defense system in Hungary- required the establishment of a new military- architectural organization which deserves attention even by European standards.131 During the 1550s and 1560s the War Council employed several dozen, mostly Italian, military architects. Their activities were coordinated in the Border Fortress Captain Generalcies by a superintendent of con­ struction.132 After 1569, their activities were supervised from Vienna by a newly designated officer, the Fortress Construction Commissioner.133 This office was held primarily by those Austrian noblemen who earlier saw service in the frontier areas. They included Franz von Poppendorf, Niklas Graf zu Salm und Neuburg, and Erasmus Braun. After 1578 the fortifications of the Slavonian and Croatian generalcies were controlled from Graz. Even in the sixteenth century there were differences between the various specialists of fortress architecture. Some, such as Ottavio Baldigara, Pietro Ferabosco, and Dominico de Lalio distinguished themselves in the design and overall direction of fortress construction

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while others, e.g. Giulio Turco, specialized in the creation of detailed architectural plans.134 Most of them were active in the actual construc­ tion phases. The already-mentioned Angielinis limited their activities to the preparation of maps of the frontier areas. They were the sixteenth century precursors of the military engineers and military cartographers who became formally trained and specialized during the second half of the seventeenth century. There was also an increasingly independent organization for the direction of building pontoon bridges and for the provisioning food supplies. In 1557 there was already an official who served under the War Council and who was responsible for the pontoon bridges over the Danube.135 After January7 1558 there was an independent official, the chief provisions supply officer for Hungary. The title w;as changed in 1569 to chief military7 provisions commissioner for Hungary and this officer was charged with arranging the provisioning of the border fortresses which were considered to be the most important in the defense of Vienna.136 After 1578 there was a second such officer who was stationed in Graz and both of these officials came from the Austri­ an nobility. An important task of the military and fiscal administrations was the provision of pay for the garrisons in the border fortresses and for the troops in the field. Hie muster for the former was supervised from Vienna by two chief muster masters for Hungary while the military paymaster for Hungary7 was responsible for the pay of all soldiers. Hie latter w?as stationed in Vienna and w;as usually referred to as the aulic military7 paymaster. Even though the muster master and paymaster were both subject to the Aulic Chamber, their activities were also supervised by the military administration. Because the duties of the military pay­ master for Hungary were complex they were shared by several region­ al or land paymasters, for Styria, Lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Upper Hungary'7, etc.137 Hie centralization of the military and fiscal affairs was in accordance with the compromise reached with the estates. The principal purpose of the arrangement was to provide the aulic and estate supports to the frontier defenses as rapidly as possible. Hie new military7 and border defense territorial administration was remarkable. Attempts were also made to remedy7 the shortcomings of the existing defense system. In order to accomplish this, the Aulic War

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Council organized a major military conference in Vienna in 1577.138 The minutes, consisting of eight hundred pages, and surviving in ten copies, vividly document the significance of the sixteenth century mil­ itary revolution but also point out its shortcomings.139 Because of the increasing Ottoman forays, Lazarus von Schwendi’s recommendations for an active approach to defense were approved. The border fortress captain generalcies were to be modernized so that the favorable natur­ al formations were further improved and used to create a sealed and strictly controlled defensive zone. Much of this was accomplished by the 1580s. In the area of Kanizsa, for instance, the valley of the Kanizsa River was dammed up, the possible crossings were blocked and guard posts were established in all critical positions. The unnecessary strong points were blown up (map 8). This made possible to control the Ottoman incursions.140 The 1577 military conference also analyzed the most important aspects of military administration and logistic supplies. Moving from fortress to fortress they discussed the fortifications, the problems of w-ar materiel and food provision, the difficulties of providing pay for the soldiers and of maintain!Tig discipline. It was even considered, not for the first time, to move the Teutonic Knights to Hungary. Because of the indebtedness of the Habsburg court only a part of these proposals could be implemented but it was the result of these deliberations that the administration of the border defenses and of the frontier fortresses was put on a sound basis that was still functioning well during the seven­ teenth century. It is not unreasonable to ask why, in view of these significant mililary improvements, the Long Turkish War at the end of the century’ resulted in major successes for the Ottoman forces, including the occu­ pation of Bihac in 1592, of Eger in 1596 and of Kanizsa in 1600. The answer again must be sought in the differences between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsbuig Monarchy in administrative structure, army and logistics. Contrary to frequently expressed opinions, the Ottoman Empire and its military affairs did not start to deteriorate during the second half of the sixteenth century. Even in the middle of the seventeenth century’ the Ottomans were still the evenly matched opponents of every’ Euro­ pean army.141 'Hie latter developed certain advantages, such as more

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effective firearms, more modem fortifications, and improved maneu­ vers, but the Ottomans were able to counter these with relative ease. The Ottoman Empire was still well ahead of the Habsburg Monarchy in territory, population, and financial and natural resources. Thus it was much less of a strain for them to maintain their system of fortifications in occupied Hungary than it was for the Habsburgs.142 The Ottomans were still the only ones in Europe who had a strong standing army, which was highly experienced in siege warfare. The total number of forces the Ottomans could mobilize both nationally and also in the Hungarian theater of war was substantially above those available to the Viennese military leadership. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, their independent logistic support organizations and their well-struc­ tured supply system made it possible to mobilize their forces early in the spring and invade Hungary at the beginning of summer. In contrast, the Habsburg military leadership had no standing forces other than a few regiments and the garrisons of the Hungarian border fortresses. Because of the composite nature of the Habsburg Monarchy, throughout the entire war, the central administration had to depend for troops, pay and supplies, carts and draught animals on the subsidies granted by the German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Bohemian estates. Ilie slow-ness with which all of these could be provided made the Christian forces practically immobile.143 Thus it took less time for the Ottoman forces to get from Constantinople or Adrianople to Buda than it took for the Habsburg forces to reach their encampments on the nearby Austrian-Hungarian border. The principal thing the military revolution of the sixteenth century accomplished in central Europe was to stop the Ottoman advances in the Kingdom of Hungary. Even this was possible only by losing much of the realm of St. Stephen and by mobilizing all the available military and material resources of the Habsburg domains. Expelling the Ottomans from Hungary became possible only at the end of the seventeenth cen­ tury when the new military revolution of the early modern era resulted in the first significant standing army in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Chapter Seven

HUNGARY’S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MONARCHY Hungary, a Dangerous but Wealthy Country Ilie Habsburg ruler, Ferdinand 1, and his successors needed Hungary for more than defense against the Ottomans. Its eco­ nomic potential was evident to the leading financial experts of the Vien­ na court and to the central European economic decision makers. The great South German trading and banking families had a substantial number of contacts in Hungary even prior to 1526.1 Even though its importance increased because of the Turkish wars, the central Europe­ an financial and economic experts still counted heavily on the Kingdom of Hungary. This is illustrated by the record of a trip made by the pro­ minent Ulm burgher, Veit Marchthaler, in 1588, which describes, in fascinating detail, the geographic, ethnic, and economic conditions in both the Kingdom of Hungary and in the Principality of Transylvania.2 'Hie economic potential of Hungary at the beginning of the six­ teenth century was judged positively by the humanist Miklos Oldh. In 1536 the future Hungarian court chancellor and archbishop of Eszter­ gom summarized, somewhat nostalgically, the economic and financial potential of the Kingdom of Hungary in a w ork entitled Hungarian

Hungary is evidently rich in all those items which are considered important for human existence and for the accumulation of wealth. Its soil is black, fat, moist, and returns a rich harvest wdth only minor efforts by the farmers....Th ere is so much wine because almost every region of the country' produces fine wines, sweet

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ones, dry ones, and some between the two. There are strong wines and light ones, red ones and white ones with many more whites than reds. Because there is so much wine, beer is known only in a small part of the country... .Every type of fruit is available in lim­ itless quantities. Varieties of squash and melons are grown in the fields like wheat... .There are so many pheasants, partridges, grouse, thrushes, and all sorts of game birds that Hungary evident­ ly lacks nothing in this area. The expanse and richness of its pastures is such that they can support many thousand horses, cattie, sheep, goats and other simi­ lar animals....There are great many forests and they are so large that the serfs can gather firewood freely and enough for all their daily needs... .There are many bees and much honey. The horses are outstanding, fast and their beauty is remarkable... .There are so many herds of cattle, goats, and sheep and there is such a wealth of game of all kind that not only Hungary is fully supplied but the neighboring countries partake of them as well. Cattle are supplied to the entire Venetian area of Italy, to Austria, Moravia, Bavaria, the Swabian principality, and all of Germany to the Rhine.... There is plenty of gold, silver, iron, copper, copper sulfate, tin, and marble, both red and white... .Salt can be mined in a number of mountains... Tn order to increase the revenues of the king and queen it is strictly forbidden to take salt from the salt mines with­ out the agreement and approval of the king.3

An unprejudiced observer, the German humanist and theologian, Johannes Goehleus, wrote in 1512, “Hungary is large, rich in wines, wheat, cattle, fodder, and gold.”4 These lines are indicative of wealth but also of good fiscal man­ agement. In all of Europe the most significant revenues came from taxes, from the estates managed by the treasury’, from custom duties (in Hungary it was the one-thirtieth), from the ruler’s share of the mining profits, and from coining money. These were the areas which were rec­ ognized as being of high potential, even by European standards and by the German and Italian merchants active in Hungary7. Consequently, in the late Middle Ages they invested heavily in mining and commercial enterprises, taking apart of their profits abroad, but providing the King­

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dom of Hungary with substantial revenues. Prior to 1526 their loans w7ere important in financing the border defenses against the Ottomans and also contributing to the administration of the court. Subsequent to the Ottomans establishing themselves in Hungary, after 1541, one of the major questions was how much of the former revenues could be retained by Ferdinand and his successors.

Financial Administration Reforms in Hungary

King Ferdinand addressed the important task vigorous­ ly. Prior to his Hungarian coronation, in September 1527 he wrote from Buda to his treasurer-general in Vienna, Hans Hoffmann von Griinbuhel, ‘"We have decided that in our Kingdom of Hungary we will consistently and according to need collect all royal revenues derived from offices and estates loyal to us.”5 Ferdinand realized that the revenues were substan­ tial and that he had to have them in ruling Hungary and in his fight with John Szapolyai and with the Ottomans. He had initiated fiscal reforms in the Austrian and Bohemian lands by establishing an Aulic Chamber (Treasury) on January 1, 1527, and a Bohemian Chamber on March 25. He wanted to continue these reforms in Hungary. His statements made it clear to the Hungarian estates that, compared to the Jagiellonian kings of Hungary, they had placed a ruler on the throne who was endeavoring to establish firmer fiscal policies and major reforms. Ensuring the royal revenues and the implementation of the fiscal reforms ran into the same barriers which were encountered in connec­ tion with military affairs. Thus the reorganization of the fiscal matters bore fruit only over a period of several decades. Ferdinand’s endeavors were significantly impeded by the fact that they had to be made in Hun­ gary during continuous warfare with the Ottomans and civil war wdth John Szapolyai and later with his son, John Sigismund. During the three decades after 1526 the territory’ under his control changed several times and this determined the amount of the taxes which could be collected and also all the other royal revenues. Because of the campaign of the Sultan Suleyman against Vienna in 1529, Ferdinand controlled only seven or eight northwest counties during the beginning of the 1530s. The modest area was significantly enlarged during the 1540s when John Sza-

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polyai, and later his son, were pushed back toward the east. Ferdinand controlled seventeen counties in 1537, twenty eight in 1539, and thirtyfive counties in 1546-1549. The largest area under his control, more than fifty counties, was during the first half of the 1550s when he also controlled Transylvania. The subsequent triumphs of the Ottomans and the occupation of Temesvdr and Szolnok (1552), Fiilek (1554), Kaposvdr (1555), Szigctvar and Gyula (1566), and the loss of Transyl­ vania in 1556 significantly reduced the revenue-producing territory under his control to no more than thirty two counties by 1557.6 At the end of his reign Ferdinand controlled thirty counties, but under his successors this rose to thirty-five by the military successes of General Lazarus von Schwendi in Eastern Hungary following the Peace Treaty of Adrianople in 1568 (table 6). Thus, after the middle of the six­ teenth century the rulers controlled only about half of the original sev­ enty counties which had made up Hungary in the Middle Ages. In addi­ tion, the borders of the area controlled by them were constantly exposed to Ottoman raids and to the resulting payments of tribute.7 The Hungarian troops in the larger border fortresses (Szigetvdr, Gyula, Eger, Kanizsa, etc.), however, continued to collect state and church taxes from the territories under Ottoman control.8 Initially Ferdinand encountered another major problem. A certain por­ tion of the basic royal revenues, the one-thirtieth tax and the mines, were pledged, leased out, or belonged to the queen. Reclaiming them became an urgent task. Hie same was true for some of the royal estates. The bat­ tles between Ferdinand and J ohn Szapolyai were not fought with weapons alone. Increasing the number of his followers cost him a number of estates. According to a contemporary report, between 1527 and 1532, 1,150 noblemen received a total of about 700-800 estates as donations.9 To make the appropriate fiscal decisions it was essential to have a thor­ ough understanding of the Hungarian local, legal, and economic situation. Even Ferdinand’s most experienced Viennese experts lacked this knowl­ edge. Hius, the Hungarian estates with the nobles could not be ignored in the management of the Hungarian fiscal affairs. This was not different from the situation in Austria and Bohemia where Ferdinand had to work with the Austrian and Bohemian nobility. He had to have their support. The first decisive fiscal reform steps taken demonstrated the need for mutual cooperation and for making the necessary compromises. On

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January 8, 1528, Ferdinand established the Hungarian Chamber in Buda for the central management of the Hungarian fiscal affairs.10 It had five counselors, was designed on the Bohemian model, and was subject to the Aulic Chamber in Vienna. The medieval fiscal adminis­ trative procedures could not be eliminated by a stroke of the pen and therefore the royal treasurer, who had been the director of fiscal affairs prior to 1526, was put in charge of the new organization. This step was not peculiar to Hungary7 because the Aulic Chamber did not have a president either and was under the control of the treasurer-general {Generalschatzmeister). At the beginning of 1528, Miklos Gerendi, bishop of Transylvania was appointed to the position of treasurer. His selection might have been due to the fact that he had served as secre­ tary to the king in 1523 -1525.11 His fellow counselors were also wellknown experts of the late medieval Hungarian administration. One of them was Tamds Nddasdy, also a former royal secretary, who from 1527 to 1529 served as castellan of Buda and thus could assist in the collection of taxes with his soldiers. True continuity was assured by the appointment of Ferenc Kisserenyi, the head accountant, who had served as deputy treasurer prior to 1526.12 Another counselor, Stefan Pemfflinger, had relatives in Vienna and in the Transylvanian Nagyszeben and had been Ferdinand’s expert on Hungary since 1521.13 Establishment of the Hungarian Chamber was a major innovation. Hungarian fiscal affairs were now under an independent organization, which held meetings regularly and which set up three large sub­ groups, the Treasury Council, the Cashier’s Office and the Accounting Office. With time an archive was also established.14 Its authority, at least in principle, extended over all of the Kingdom of Hungary, including Croatia and the two independently administered provinces, Slavonia and Transylvania. Its principal task was to cooperate with the Aulic Chamber in collecting the royal revenues, and to recapture all revenues from estates, duties and mines currently in other hands. The treasury officials had their duties specified in writing. These stated that there were mandatory accounting practices and that there were inspec­ tors appointed to conduct independent accountings and audits. The loss of Buda in 1529 caused the final institutional organization of the Hungarian Chamber to take place in Pozsony, beginning in 1531 and lasting for a quarter of a century.15 Its activities became increas­

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ingly stable and efficient. Yet, just like for the household and for the military affairs, the years of the 1530s and 1540s were a transitional period of emergency measures, experiments and failures. The area under its authority changed continuously, collection of the war-taxes approved by the diet, was only partially possible under the civil war conditions. The property tax levied on the Hungarian nobility, being one-sixtieth tax, was modeled after the German system and was only partially successful. The Hungarian estates voted twice in favor of it, in Besztercebanya in 1542 (Act 28-31) and in Pozsony in 1546 (Act 5). Yet, their principal privilege, the freedom from taxation, was defended so vigorously that the property tax never became a regular item in the royal revenues.16 The reorganization of the western border customs duties resulted in significant improvements and was made possible by the establishment of the Magyarovdr thirtieth in 1531 and by the appointment of treasury supervisors. It was also considered to be a major success when the Slavonian thirtieth w;as removed from private hands in 1538.17 Getting the bureaucratic changes accepted was not an easy task. They included the regulation and supervision of official activities, the assignment of tasks specified in the instructions, and the control of the “second Hun­ garian capital” by the Aulic Chamber. This was not an exclusively Hun­ garian problem. The Bohemian nobility were struggling in Prague with the same problems.18 The position of a German treasury counselor introduced to the Hungarian Chamber during the 1530s, was important not only in supervision but also in maintaining the necessary contacts between Vienna and Pozsony and in training the experts on Hungarian finances from among Ilie Austrian nobility.19 Central supervision of the accounting practices was an accepted procedure in all of the territorial chambers. Since the end of the nineteenth century Austrian and Hungarian historiography argued about the relations between the Aulic and the Hungarian Chambers.'20 It can be stated, on the basis of records of the time, that the Aulic Chamber, the central organization for financial decision making of the Monarchy, became the superior and superviso­ ry authority over the Hungarian Chamber, even though the latter had considerable local authority. This authority was exercised by the Aulic Chamber in the name of the ruler, meaning that instructions, ordi­

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nances, and documents were issued in his name. The Hungarian estates continued to insist that they were subordinate to the ruler and not to the central administrative structures. The relationship between the two chambers was not specified by constitutional law, because at that time this w;as not customary. The evolving relationships were determined by the structure and organization of the new Habsburg state, by the posi­ tion of the Kingdom of Hungary and by the ongoing power struggle between the ruler and the Hungarian estates. The subordination was offensive to the interests of the Hungarian estates (the “Feudal Nation”), because it was considered as dependent on a foreign structure or as a service under the Germans. Yet, it would be a mistake to con­ sider this as a “national subservience” from the perspective of the nation states, as was done frequently during the nineteenth and twenti­ eth centuries. The superior authority and supervisory role of the Aulic Chamber can be clearly demonstrated. The presidents of the Hungarian Chamber took their oath of office in the central office in Vienna and they were installed in office in Pozsony only after the oath had been taken.21 The same was true for the captain generals of the border fortresses. They also took their oath in Vienna, swearing to obey their instructions, and were installed in office only after the second oath had been taken in their fortress. After the middle of the sixteenth century, the final deci­ sion on all Hungarian fiscal officials was made in Vienna. In preparing these decisions, however, the Hungarian recommendations had a sig­ nificant role.22 Lastly, all accounts of the Hungarian Chamber were reviewed by the Aulic Chamber. Centralization of financial administra­ tion was complex and variable but was intensive for Hungary. In the transitional period between the 1530s and 1550s it became evident that the financial affairs of the Kingdom of Hungary could not be managed from Pozsony alone. A large portion of the collected rev­ enues were needed locally to defray the costs of the increasing military expenditures. Therefore, after the mid 1530s there were treasury rev­ enue administration directorates in Slavonia and in Upper Hungary with his seat being first in Sdros and later in Epeijes 23 A similar attempt was made in Transylvania during the brief time it was under Habsburg rule (1552-1555).24 Because of the Ottoman advances between the Drava and the Sava Rivers and the loss of Transylvania, only the Upper

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Hungary Administration Directorate led to lasting results. This was due largely to the efforts of Gybrgy Werner and Zsigmond Torda who after May 1554 served as the administrators of revenue for this territory.25 Based on their work of several decades duration, on April 1, 1567, Captain General Lazarus von Schwendi launched the Szepes Chamber in Kassa, to administer the revenues of the thirteen counties in Upper Hungary.26 The term Szepes in this instance referred to all of Upper Hungary and was not limited to the area inhabited by the Saxons and usually referred to as Szepesseg, or Zips in German.27 The principal task of the new chamber was to serve the military needs and to provide the troops in the border fortresses with pay and supplies.28 Similarly to the Hungarian Chamber, this treasury had considerable local authority but was subject to the Aulic Chamber, just like the Silesian Chamber in Breslau, established in 1558.29 Anew turn in the Hungarian financial administration came at the end of the 1540s. The reorganization of Aulic and Lower Austrian Chambers in 1537 and 1539 were followed by the modernization of the Bohemian and Hungarian Chambers. Both received new instructions in 154g30 which determined their structure, activities, and authority for almost one hundred years. Later only minor refinements were neces­ sary.31 Developments were facilitated by the Peace of Adrianople of 1547 with the Ottomans and the Treaty of Augsburg of 1548. In the lat­ ter one, Mary of Habsburg, living in the Netherlands, received 42,500 Rhenish florins annually and a single gift of 15,000 Rhenish florins and in exchange she gave up her Hungarian and Austrian estates, including the Magyarovdr and Zolyom ones, the rich Lower Hungary mines, and her share of the western customs duties.32 Finally, after the 1540s, sev­ eral important fortress estates came under the control of the Hungarian Chamber. They had been held as pawns and were successfully reclaimed, partly or totally, with or without armed force, by agreement, payment, or trade. They included Komdromin 1545, Szigetvdrin 1546, Eger in 1548-1563, Leva in 1549, Gyula in 1552, Szatmdr in 1565, and Kanizsa in 1568. This was of the greatest importance for border defense and for the provisioning of the troops.33 The fortresses, now under the control of the new fiscal administration, were completely modern­ ized.34 After the 1550s, the Hungarian estates voted the war taxes for several years in advance, but did not participate in their collection

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which was performed by the tax collectors of the counties under the supervision of the Hungarian and Szepes Chambers. The estates also approved the corvee for specific fortresses, which had to be provided by the population of the designated counties.35 Ilie remarkable consensus between the Habsburg rulers and the Hungarian estates is shown by the fact that between 1537 and 1608, except for .Tinos Dessewffy (1557-1561), all presidents of the Hungar­ ian Chamber came from the clergy and were first provosts and later bishops. Istvdn Radeczy, bishop of Eger and Istvan Fejerkovy, bishop of Nyitra, were also royal regents of Hungary and thus had a dominant role in controlling Hungarian domestic policies. This did not mean that the prelates did not recognize the true interests of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary. Sharing the same religion with the Habsburgs w?as of assistance to them, but they were no less active in preserving the status of Hun­ gary’ and the position of the estates than were the Protestant aristocrats. The prelates even agreed to a compromise according to which the high­ est Hungarian prelacy, the post of archbishop of Esztergom, remained vacant between 1573 and 1598, with the rulers exercising their prerog­ atives as the royal patrons of the Catholic Church. By leaving the see vacant, the very large revenues of its estates, approximately 50-60,000 Rhenish florins annually, could be managed by the Hungarian Cham­ ber. These revenues were used primarily for the construction and main­ tenance of the new fortress in Ersektijvar, which was also defending the archbishop’s estates.36 At the end of the 1540s another basic change took place. In 1548 the Hungarian Chamber was deprived of many if its revenues. The cus­ toms duties, estates and mining revenues obtained from Mary of Habs­ burg were assigned by Ferdinand to the Lower Austrian Chamber in Vienna.37 This gravely offended the interests of the Hungarian Cham­ ber and of the estates. In 1549 the treasury complained to Ferdinand stating, “Your Majesty has removed all the revenues belonging to this chamber and has assigned them to others for care, management and dis­ position, so that this chamber has practically nothing but a title.”38 The reasons were not political. One of Ferdinand’s major goals was to create a unified system of customs which, located on the western border of the Kingdom of Hungary, conformed to both Austrian and Hungarian traditions and could be supervised from Vienna.39 This is

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suggested by the fact that in 1538 he had already assigned the man­ agement of the Slavonian one-thirtieth tax to the Lower Austrian Chamber. In spite of having the western customs duties under a uni­ fied control, the Hungarian system of customs duties was not elimi­ nated. The purpose was to make the process more efficient and to reduce the thefts and smuggling, lliis w7as advanced by the general regulation of the customs system in 1545. It was also tightly linked to the problem of providing meat to the imperial city and to the central territories of the Monarchy. Control of the mining revenues and of the incomes generated by the Komiirom and Magyarovdr estates, so essential to the defense of Pozsony and Vienna, served the interests of Hungary just as much as the interests of the residence city and of Lower Austria. In the case of the estates, these were old royal domains w7hich now7 came under the supervision and control of the new fiscal administration 3° The rev­ enues from mining w;ere considered to be the most stable ones and were essential for the financing of the defense system, the joint Habsburg household, the central government, and the newly established military and fiscal administration. Hie principal purpose of the regulations was to link the Kingdom of Hungary, so important in the defense of central Europe, to the cen­ tral territories of the Monarchy in financial matters as well. What hap­ pened was really not different from what had been done in military affairs. The Hungarian estates and the Hungarian Chamber were removed from the management of the most important revenues in the vicinity of the imperial city and of the revenues of the mines in Lower Hungary. In making his major economic decisions, Ferdinand believed the central and most important interests of the Monarchy and its central territories outweighed the interests of the individual Austrian, Hungar­ ian, or Bohemian and Moravian estates. Thus Ferdinand assigned the offices of Moravian market supervisor and cashier, who supervised the activities of the merchants arriving from Hungary in Auspitz, to the Hungarian Chamber in 1563, much to the concern of the Moravian estates. The same happened to the cashier’s office in Silesian Teschen, established in 1578.41 Both ordinances had the purpose of controlling tire merchants and to keep them from evading payment of duties which were a major source of revenue for the central treasury. Needless to say,

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neither the Hungarian Chamber nor the Hungarian estates complained about the new arrangement. In effect, the Hungarian estates had much less conflict with the ruler, with the Viennese central administration, or with the Hungarian Chamber in the fiscal arena than in the military one. The more serious debates concerned the collection of the war tax from the estates, the con­ trol of customs duties and mining revenues from abroad, the frequent expropriation of estates at the end of the century, and the abuses of administrative authority by the treasury7 officials. The occasionally appointed estates cashiers (perceptor regni) were much less effective than the increasingly expert tax managers of the treasury. At the time of economic prosperity, in 1580,1582, and 1587-88, the estates repeated­ ly attempted to have all revenues in Hungary7 be administrated by the Hungarian Chamber. This had no basis in reality, 'they claimed in vain, that should this be done and that they would cover all expenses in Hun­ gary from these revenues. This was nothing but illusion as documented by the extensive 1588 inspection of revenues and expenditures, per­ formed for the estates of Hungary and Slavonia Croatia.42 The inspection showed clearly that all the revenues generated in Hungary were insuffi­ cient even to pay the troops of the four Border Fortress Captain Generalcies extending from the Drava River to the borders of Transylvania.43

An Important Source of Revenues for the Monarchy: The Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary

After the middle of the sixteenth century only about 30 percent of the Kingdom of Hungary’s revenues was managed by the Pozsony Chamber (table 9). Forty percent was managed by the Lower Austrian, and 30 percent by the Szepes Chamber. Ilie substantial customs and mining revenues managed by the Lower Austrian Cham­ ber were not devoted to the pleasures of the Habsburg rulers but at least 30^40 percent was used for the border defense of Hungary, for debt reduction and for the expenditures of the court.44 It w-as for this reason that Ferdinand made the popular statement in 1552 that was particular­ ly appropriate for Hungary, “Our revenues are the soul of everything but principally of the war.”45 The same is shown by the accounts of the

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Hungarian and Szepes Chambers. During the second half of the century both treasuries devoted 50-60 percent of their revenues to the war. This was particularly true for the Szepes Chamber because the revenues in Upper Hungary were essential to assure a significant portion of the pay of the troops in the numerous border fortresses, such as Kassa, Szatmdr, Szendro, Tokaj, Kdllo, etc.46 In a country that had become a theater of war, this was no mean achievement.

Table 9. Annual Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary by Chambers in the Middle of the 1570s

Chamber

Revenues in Rhenish f.

Percentage of tire Total Country Revenue

Hungarian Chamber

239,200

29.8 %

Szepes Chamber Lower Austrian Ch.

242,600 321,200

30.2 % 40.0 %

Total Revenues

803,000

100.0 %

Source: Kenyeres, “Die Finanzen des Kbnigreichs Ungam,” 111-113.

The success of the fiscal reforms during the fifty years after 1526 can be seen most clearly in the amount of the revenues collected. Dur­ ing the 1520s and 1530s Ferdinand had only very modest revenues in Hungary.47 They increased to 750,000 Rhenish florins by the first half of the 1550s. This, however, included the revenues from Transylvania, approximately 110,000 Rhenish florins, during Ilie short period when Ferdinand controlled that province. By the 1570s, the revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary increased by approximately 150,000 Rhenish florins, in spite of the loss of Transylvania. This was a significant sum and exceeded the 138,000 Rhenish florins that the Lower Austrian estates annually devoted to the financing of the Gyor Captain Generalcy.48 In spite of the continuous Ottoman incursions, the annual revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary exceeded 800,000 Rhenish florins by the middle of the 1570s. In the best years it reached 900-925,000 Rhenish

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florins. Even during the somewhat depressed 1580s the revenues approached the 800,000 Rhenish florins mark.49 This increase was made possible after 1568 by the consolidation, but without firm fiscal policies and the hard work of the Hungarian and Austrian treasury offi­ cials the increase would have been more modest. When we examine the revenues on the basis of their various com­ ponents, the results are even more interesting (table 10). During the sec­ ond half of the century the one-thirtieths and the revenues from the fis­ cal estates contributed more than 55 percent of the total. This was due largely to the persistent and firm reforms in the areas of customs duties and estate revenues, instituted after the 1540s. This is why the chambers repeatedly called the customs duty revenues the “nervus aerarii.”50 This was true for all treasuries because all three chambers in Hun­ gary dealt with matters of custom duties and estate management. Hie results were due to the expertise in revenue administration and not whether the staff was Hungarian or Austrian.

Table 10. The Revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary by Source of Revenue in the Middle of the 1570s Type of Rev.

Amount in Rhenish florins

Thirtieths Mining, Copper Coinage Fiscal Estates War Taxes Estates in Pawn Taxes from the Free Royal Cities Ollier

284,1(M) 199,100 164,200 94,000 39,600

Total Revenues

803,000

3,200 18,800

Percentage of Total

35.4 24.8 20.4 11.7 4.9

% % % % %

0.4 % 2.6 %

100 %

Source: Kenyeres, “Die Finanzen des Konigreichs Ungam,” 111-113.

The 800,000 Rhenish florins annual revenue of the Kingdom of Hungary deserve considerable attention even in the context of the entire Habsburg Monarchy. This revenue represented approximately one third

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

of the entire annual revenues of the Habsburg state, which w;ere esti­ mated at this time to amount to 2,400,000-2,500,000 Rhenish florins.51 This is the amount shown by a document from about 1577, authored by the influential Privy Counselor Leonhard von Harrach. With the imperial anti-Ottoman assistance, the total annual revenues were estimated to be more than two million Rhenish florins 52 The financial resources of the dangerous but wealthy area of frontline Hun­ gary were successfully mobilized and even increased during the fifty years after 1526. This was due to the reforms, to the new central man­ agement and to the compromises made with the Hungarian estates. During the second half of the sixteenth century the significantly decreased Kingdom of Hungary was not only the defensive bastion of the Monarchy but also one of the major providers of revenue. The money had to cover numerous expenses. In addition to the costs of the war, it had to pay the emoluments for the Hungarian high digni­ taries , counselors, prelates, officials of the two chambers in Hungary, the repayment of increasingly large debts, and the various pensions.53 Ihe Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary did not have a regular budget in the modem sense. It was always the amount of revenues collected which determined how much could be spent and on what and which chamber assigned how much to which paymaster. This was the reason why the debts to the creditors of the treasury increased steadily and why the emoluments of the Hungarian high dignitaries, of the officials of the chambers and of the officials serving at court fell into arrears. Of the total revenues in Hungary somewLat more than half, approx­ imately 400,000-500,000 Rhenish florins, were spent annually on the border defenses.54 This was a considerable sum and exceeded the costs of the Habsburg household. Yet, in view of the ever increasing costs of the Hungarian and Croatian defense system, even this sum was insuffi­ cient. The pay of the border fortress garrisons alone required a third of this sum (1,300,000-1,600,000 Rhenish florins). Thus, in spite of the considerable Hungarian revenues, the country was dependent upon the ongoing financial support of the Austrian and Bohemian domains and of the Holy Roman Empire. A declaration of one group of the estates in their 1580 annual report was clearly unrealistic when they stated that they would pay all the frontier fortress troops if they could control the market in cattle.55 The more realistic politicians refuted such claims.

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Istvan Illeshdzy, for instance declared in June 1605 that the Kingdom of Hungary could survive the Ottoman threat only with the assistance of the Habsburg Monarchy. He said, “I cannot even imagine. If the emper­ or would take his hand off Hungary, how could we maintain the border fortresses in Slavonia, in Transdanubia, and Cisdanubia?”56 Generating the annual costs of the border defenses represented enormous difficulties not only for the Kingdom of Hungary but for the entire Habsburg Monarchy. The total annual revenues of the Monarchy were only about 2,500,000 Rhenish florins each year which would have been barely enough to cover the costs of the defense system. Because of the costs of the Habsburg household and other expenses there were only insufficient funds. Istvdn Illeshdzy commented accurately in 1606 when he said that the border fortresses, '‘could not be maintained by us and even the neighboring provinces were unable to do so.”57 In the early autumn of 1577, the experts at the military talks in Vi enna estimated that the deficit for the following year would be about 500,000 Rhenish florins. The 1584 and 1591 military budgets showed an even greater shortfall.58 Consequently many of the military and strategic decisions were subject to the limitations of the fiscal situation. The number of sol­ diers serving in the fortresses of the Gyor Captain Generalcy, defending Vienna, depended to a large extent on the funds provided by the Lower Austrian estates. The figures were 80,000 Rhenish florins in 1546, 106,000 Rhenish florins in 1554, and 138,000 Rhenish florins after 1566.59 The size of the detachments assigned to the various frontier areas had thus to be adjusted according to the available funds. The enormous costs of maintaining the Hungarian defense system contributed significantly to the Habsbuig treasury’ being in considerable difficulties during the last third of the sixteenth century. By the end of July 1564 the pay ow;ed to the troops had a shortfall of 1,000,000 Rhen­ ish florins and the Monarchy’s total debt exceeded 2.9 million. This sum rose to seven million by 1575 and to 10,700,000 Rhenish florins by 1577.60 Yet the Monarchy survived the critical financial situation. This was made possible not only by the substantial revenues gen­ erated in Hungary, but by the regular support from the Austrian and Bohemian lands, and the Holy Roman Empire. At the time of the Long Turkish War (1591-1606) assistance from Spain and from the Papacy were of critical importance.61 Bankruptcy of the Monarchy was pre -

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

vented by the deficits being made up by loans given by German and Italian merchant bankers, well-to-do imperial and hereditary province communities, and aristocratic families, including Hungarian ones.62 It was still not possible to finance the Hungarian border defenses consistently and reliably. In spite of regular assistance from abroad it happened regularly that the soldiers in some of the border fortresses received no pay and allotments for months or even years. It lead to the seventeenth century saying, “neither money nor cloth,” when during the Thirty Years War (1618 -1648) both the domestic revenues and foreign aid diminished and the troops’ pay was in arrears for a very long time. The lack of payment to the border fortress troops was not due to any lack of confidence on the part of the Habsburgs vis-a-vis Hungary but the entire Habsburg annual revenues were insufficient to completely cover the costs of the border fortresses. This lack of making payments was not limited to the Hungarian troops. Even the most important members of the Habsburg household had to go occasionally without pay for months on end. Ibis was true for the Hungarian counselors as well.63 The letters of complaint about the difficulties caused by the lack of pay does not allow us to draw conclusions because during the seventeenth century a form letter was drafted and widely used for this purpose.64 The establishment and financing of the Hungarian defense system had political, military, economic and social consequences, and affected the development of the Habsburg Monarchy in the financial areas as well.65 Defense against the Ottomans represented an enormous finan­ cial burden for the central European power but hastened the reorgani­ zation of financial management practices in Hungary. The enormous sums expended on the Turkish wars and on border defenses were not wasted because they were critical in assuring the survival of the Monar­ chy and thus of the Kingdom of Hungary. In more peaceful times, these funds could have been used much more effectively in promoting the development of the entire region.

The Beginning ofAdministrative Careers in Hungary Ferdinand’s reforms had an impact on Hungarian society. The chambers and their various subordinate offices made it

HUNGARY’S FINANCIAL, CONTRIBUTIONS

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necessary that a more or less permanent cadre of experienced admini­ strators be developed. This process had some earlier, late medieval models in the Royal Chancellery, in the country judiciary, and in the royal treasury.66 Establishment of the Hungarian Chamber and the marked increase in treasury positions forced a significant concentration on this problem from the 1530s and 1540s on. The total number of these officials exceeded two hundred by the second half of the century; a sig­ nificant increase over the pre-1526 situation. It is thus not an exaggera­ tion to speak of a development of a caste of officials and of the begin ­ nings of a career in the area of fiscal administration. The qualitative changes were even more impressive than the quan­ titative ones. As shown by contemporary documents, in order to obtain an appointment to the treasury in the second half of the sixteenth cen­ tury certain qualifications were required. In addition to loyalty to the ruler, important considerations were suitability, experience, and a vari­ ety of skills.67 By experience it was meant that the applicant had worked in lower administrative positions in the treasury, had learned the office routines, and had demonstrated expertise and organizational abilities. By skills and knowledge it was meant that the applicant had a thorough understanding of the country’s laws and legal practices. Com­ pared to the late Middle Ages this represented a considerable move toward professional expertise. Among the skills, knowledge of languages was a prominent quali­ fication. Until 1844 the official language of the Kingdom of Hungary was Latin and was used in politics, administration, and the judiciary. Beginning in the sixteenth century, however, the Hungarian language began to play an increasingly important role in the use of written records and culture, German was required to communicate with the Habsburg court, with the central authorities and with the foreign cap­ tain generals.68 The majority of the higher officials in the chambers had to speak and write in all three languages. It can be shown that some of the counselors had some university experience in Vienna or in Italy or had, at least, some training at the Jesuit Gymnasium in Vienna. Among the bishops serving as presidents of the chambers such education was taken for granted. At the beginning not very many officials had these qualifications. U ntil the end of the century the counselors of the Hungarian and Szepes

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Chambers frequently included intellectuals with a humanist back­ ground. Gyorgy Werner, a distinguished reorganizer of the finances of Upper Hung ary, was the first one to write about Hungarian minerals and thermal springs. His poet colleague, Zsigmond Torda, was busy in publishing the works of Antonio Bonfini, Matthias Corvinus’s Italian historiographer. This learned circle at the Hungarian Chamber also included Miklos Gerendi, the treasurer in 1528 who had attended the University of Vienna, the diplomat-counsel or Georg Reicherstorffer who came from a Transylvanian Saxon background, the historiograph­ er Jfinos Zermegh, and the poetically inclined president, Bishop and Royal Regent Istvdn Radeczy. Among the German counselors of the Hungarian Chamber we find similarly cultured men, including the Vienna Provost and University Chancellor Paul von Oberstein and the celebrated art collector Seifried Rybisch from Breslau.69 After the middle of the century the humanist intellectuals were being slowly replaced by officials from the Hungarian lesser nobility or from the German and Hungarian bourgeoisie whose parents might have served the treasury before them. Hie nobles were noted principally for their knowledge of Hungarian laws and legal practices which was very useful knowledge for the activities of the chambers. Around the turn of the century a number of former professional judges gave up their job to take a more lucrative counselor’s position with one of the chambers.70 They owed their career to their education, expertise, and family con­ nections with the aristocracy. In the case of the officials of a civic background a true career devel­ opment was characteristic. A perfect example is given by the career of Christoph .Armbruster who was bom in the Transylvanian Nagyszeben. Having studied in Padua and in Vienna, he served for a brief time in the Hungarian Court Chancellery, and then served in all three administra­ tive structures of the Pozsony Chamber. He first worked as an assistant accountant and then became an accountant. This was followed by a term as cashier and this, in turn, was followed by his appointment as counselor. In addition to his work in the office, he regularly participat­ ed in a variety of financial-military assignments.71 A number of his close relatives followed him in a variety of treasury positions 72 Similar careers became increasingly common in the Aulic and in the Lower Austrian Chamber as well.

HUNGARY’S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

137

These examples testify to the beginnings of an evolution of an expert financial officialdom of civic origin and involving several generations. The process became stronger during the seventeenth century and a num­ ber of families were ennobled in recognition of their services. In the Kingdom of Hungary of the time social advancement was linked to nobil­ ity and to the ownership of an estate and it was only thus that a family could enter the envied class of advanced standing. For many burghers this remained the highest goal in the Hungarian society of the estates. Among the officials with a noble background service over several generations was still a rarity in the sixteenth century. For them net­ working with the magnates remained an important consideration although this did not take precedence over expert knowledge. During the decades after 1526 several members of Royal Regent Elek Thurzo’s circle moved to the Hungarian Chamber. Later on the same happened with the entourage of Archbishop-Chancellor Miklos Oltih.73 The jurist counselors of the chambers also frequently had close connections with the ecclesiastic and lay elite. They frequently began their career in the household of a prelate or of a magnate, served in the Chancellery, in the judicial system, in the service of the highest dignitaries or captain gen­ erals and usually finished their career as counselors, secretaries, or cashiers of the chambers. Their social contacts were frequently strengthened by marriage. The emoluments attached to their positions, such as estates, titles, pensions, other gifts, and an annual pension made it frequently possible for them to accumulate a substantial fortune.74 After the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, two notable changes took place in the nature of the fiscal administration corps. As a consequence of the Counter-Reformation, in the 1590s, similarly to the higher military positions, it became important for the chamber counselors to follow the religion of the Habsburgs. In the seventeenth century this became a requirement.75 It was not due to the strengthen­ ing of the ecclesiastic elite. Istvtin Szuhay was the last one of the bish­ op-presidents of the Hungarian Chamber in 1596-1608. After this time direction of the chambers was assumed first by career magnates like Tamils Vizkelethy and Laszlo Pethe in 1600s -1610s and later by lead­ ing aristocrats like Pal Palffy.76 The fiscal officials were not only the executors of the demands of the Habsburg dynasty and of the Viennese central administration but,

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HAB SBUR G MONARCHY

thanks to their origin, career and connections, were also the representa fives of the interests of the Hungarian estates and of certain lobbies of the estates. In their case loyalty and patriotism were not mutually exclu­ sive. In the successful performance of their expert activities a major part was played by the fact that the Kingdom of Hungary became a sig­ nificant component in the financial administration system of the Habs­ burg Monarchy and that the direction of the Hungarian financial affairs proceeded generally smoothly amid considerable difficulties.

Chapter Eight

FEEDING CENTRAL EUROPE In the sixteenth century the Habsburg Monarchy nee­ ded Hungary for economic reasons. Even though the economic relati­ ons were frequently independent of state boundaries, after 1556 the Monarchy of the Austrian Habsburgs included most of central Europe, and thus they were still of critical importance for the evolution of the Habsburg domains. The Hungarian connection was of fundamental importance for providing food supplies to Vienna and to the central pro­ vinces of the Monarchy. The Kingdom of Hungary had been essential for the provision cattle for the Austrian and Bohemian lands ever since the fifteenth century. Its export of copper and precious metals was important from a European perspective.1 After the defeat at Mohacs it became debatable whether the late medieval economic relationships could be maintained. After Buda was Erst occupied, with the help of the troops of Sultan Suleyman, by John Szapolyai in 1529 and then in 1541 by the Ottomans, it became highly problematic whether the supply of meat for central Europe could be sustained under the conditions of ongoing warfare. Until the fall of Gyula in 1566 increasingly large areas, critical for the raising of cattle, came under Ottoman control.2 At the same time cities of considerable economic importance, like Buda, Pest, Szekesfehervar, Pecs, and Szeged came under the control of the Porte while Vdrad became a key city of the Turkish vassal Principality of Transylvania.3 During this time the demand for Hungarian meat supplies, mostly beef and mutton, continued to increase. In accordance with a general European trend, the population of the Austrian, German, and Bohemi­ an territories increased significantly.4 Vienna, having become a city of imperial residence, required increased supplies of meat and grain while

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

the army and the garrisons of the border fortresses also required a steady supply of food. It was a significant question whether the econo­ my of Hungary would decline due to the war and how this would affect the development of the Habsburg Monarchy. Preservation of the late medieval economic relations thus became important from both a polit­ ical and a military perspective.

In the Economic Mainstream of Europe The leading politicians of the Vienna court and of the Hungarian estates realized the importance of this issue. They were reminded of the significance of these relations by the German and Ita­ lian merchant families who were actively involved in such matters .The common interests of the political elite of the Habsburg Monarchy and of the commercial elite of central Europe was indicated by the reports about Ferdinand’s coronation and about the military7 and political situa­ tion in Hungary which were sent by both Ferdinand and by his lord ste­ ward of the household to one of the focal points of European commer­ ce, the city of Augsburg.5 Similar reports were sent to Nuremberg as well.6 The reason for this was made clear by the fact that the Nurem­ berg merchant, Bartholomaus Flick, had provided 10,000 gold florins toward the coronation expenses of Ferdinand, in the autumn of 1527, and had traveled for six days to deliver this sum in person in Hungary? It was presumably for this reason that Flick was given a license by Fer­ dinand to drive 1,200 head of cattle from Hungary without having to pay the usual one-thirtieth tax at the end of October 1527.8 In the defen­ se of their interests in Hungary and in their endeavors to influence the development of political affairs, the Fuggers of Augsburg were under the personal protection of the Elek Thurzo, the chief justice. Thurzo, receiving money from the Fuggers, was also Ferdinand’s principal Hungarian money lender who had provided approximately 70,000 florins for the king in 1526-1530? It was in the best interest of the great merchant banker houses of Augsburg, the Baumgartner, Fugger, Manlich, Osterreicher, Paler, Rot, Weiss, Weiser, and ones of Nuremberg, the Bechler, Gbsswein, Haller, Lang, Rottenburger, etc., to preserve their commercial relationship with

FEEDING CENTRAL EUROPE

Irt

Hungary after 1526. This was also of the greatest benefit to Ferdinand and to his successors. Both for the provision of food supplies to the Aus­ trian and German areas and for the essential economic credits provided by the great merchants it was critical that the political-military and the financial-commercial matters of Ferdinand’s new monarchy be tightly linked. In this system the Kingdom of Hungary played a leading role. Maintaining commercial contacts was also of the greatest interest to the Hungarian magnates, to the lesser nobles as well as to the burghers in the market towns who were all involved in the livestock trade. 'Hie increase in the population in central Europe led to increased demands and to substantial increase in the price of agricultural products and raw materials. The rapidly expanding agrarian economic activity offered huge opportunities for Hungary. Even under the political parti­ tion and the constant fighting with the Ottomans, Hungary’s economy took an upward turn. The central European markets had an increasing need for animals on the hoof, wheat, and agricultural raw materials. By the second half of the century, Hungary and Poland shared in providing these items to the Bohemian, German, Austrian and Italian territories.10 Poland sup­ plied the German and Bohemian areas north of Prague with its three principal exports, cattle, wheat, and furs as well as with other items, such as lumber, potash, and hemp. Hungary sent its products to the Ger­ man territories south of Prague, to the Austrian hereditary provinces and to northern Italy.11 The principal exports were cattle, sheep, and horses and raw materials such as hides, tallow, honey, wax, etc. During that period Hungary annually exported about 100,000 head of cattle to Austria and the Holy Roman Empire, and an additional 40,000 head to Italy. Thousands of horses were sent to the markets of the Habsburg Monarchy. Hides were also a major item and Hungary became tire largest exporter of cattle and hides in Europe. It was the larder of the Habsburg Monarchy. Approximately 35 percent, about 300,000 Rhenish florins, of the annual revenues of tire Kingdom of Hungary was derived from customs duties, which represented one eighth of the entire revenue of the Habs­ burg Monarchy. The political significance of this trade is shown by the serious food shortages occurring in Vienna and in the central territories of the Monarchy every time a major military campaign, cattle disease,

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

bad weather or crop failure led to a decrease in the available cattle. Thus Ferdinand stated at the end of the 1540s that, “in such cases there was not only a significant decrease in the revenues of the Aulic Chamber but that there was also a major shortage of cattle for our country7 and our people.”12 This could lead to unforeseen political consequences and therefore the treasury did everything possible to assure the smooth functioning of the cattle business. Tills was also the reason why in Fer­ dinand’s financial reforms the streamlining of the customs duty system gained priority. Assuring the meat supply for Vienna also led the politi­ cians to further actions. Smuggling and corruption were controlled by major investigations and activities of the Aulic Chamber.13 In contrast to the changes in the customs system, the commercial trade routes changed little and, with minor variations, followed the medieval patterns (map 9). The routes to the Bohemian-Moravian ter­ ritories and to the Silesian cities (Breslau, Teschen) led through Auspitz. Those to Vienna and to the South German cities (Nuremberg, Augsburg, Ulm, Munich, etc.) ran along the Danube, through Pozsony and MagyarovAr. Earlier, the northern route was the major one but after 1540 the Gy6r-Magyar6v£r-Vienna route became the most important one. This is shown by the fact that while in 1531 the Magyarovdr cus­ toms post collecting the one thirtieth tax was an affiliate of the Pozsony customs house, after 1550 the Magyarovdr post became an independent customs duty center (chief thirtieth). This proved to be fully justified because during the 1570s the Magyarovdr customs duties produced four times as much revenue for the treasury as did the Pozsony ones.14 From the perspective of the Inner Austrian and Italian territories the Kanizsa-Legrdd route toward Venice assumed a major importance. This route, by the custom house of the Slavonian Nedelic in the Mura Region, divided into three routes. The northern one led to Venice through the Styrian Pettau and the Camiolan Laibach. The central one led to Flume and Trieste via Zagreb, and the southern one reached the Adriatic at Senj via Zagreb and Modrus. From the north-eastern areas of the Kingdom of Hungary, the merchants sent their goods to Cracow via Kassa. The routes to the Ottoman Empire via Eszek-Belgrade or Szeged-Temesvdr continued to function and even increased in impor­ tance because of the Western demands for goods from the Levant. On these latter routes most of the trade was conducted by Slav and Jewish

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merchants from Ragusa and, in the seventeenth century, by the socalled “Greek” merchants who were all Orthodox Christians, namely Serbs, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians. Merchants from Transylvania also participated in the international trade. Their mer­ chandise reached Wallachia from Kolozsvar via Nagyszeben and Brasso, via Beszterce to Moldavia and via Vdrad and Debrecen to the Habsburg Monarchy (map 9).15 Wine was an important product in the long-distance trade. Hie political-military changes produced significant changes in wine pro­ duction when compared to the Middle Ages. Prior to 1526 the best wines in Hungary were produced in the Synnium, between the Sava and the Danube Rivers. Sultan Suleyman’s armies occupied this area very early and thus viniculture in this region diminished sharply. Even though some grapes were grown here in the seventeenth century, the Somogy-Baranya-Tolna area in Transdanubia gained prominence and, somewhat later, the Tokaj district became the most important one.16 Locally, the Eerto Lake area and the Outer Western Carpathians became important wine growing areas and substantial amounts of wine were shipped from there to the Austrian and Bohemian territories.17 By the end of the sixteenth century much wine from the Tokaj dis­ trict was shipped to Poland and a considerable amount was sent to the Austrian and German areas as well. Within one century the Tokaj wines came to enjoy a European reputation. General Lazarus von Schwendi played an important role in this matter. He took vine shoots from the Tokaj district to his estates in Alsace where careful management pro­ duced excellent results.18 Even years after his retirement from Hungary the general saw to it that his table was always supplied with the excel­ lent Tokaj vintages. On April 1,1572, Emperor Maximilian II gave him permission to export approximately 1,020 liters annually from Tokaj to his residence, free of any customs duties.19 In the sixteenth century, precious metal and copper mining remained a profitable industry. Even though mining in the deep, poor­ ly ventilated and wet mines became increasingly expensive, the ship­ ments of copper from Lower Hungary were a significant feature of European trade. The copper mined in the area of Besztercebdnya, also contained a considerable amount of silver. It was shipped in the south to Venice and in the north to Danzig from where it was forwarded by

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

sea to Antwerp in the Netherlands.20 This was of considerable impor­ tance to the Habsburg Monarchy, both economically and politically. During the second half of the century, mining, the export of cop­ per, and minting produced approximately 25 percent, about 200,000 Rhenish florins, of the Kingdom of Hungary ’s annual revenues. This amount w;as approximately 10 percent of the total revenues of the Monarchy. Subsequent to the Thurzo-Fugger enterprise, the copper mines were leased by major central European merchant houses. For about twenty years after 1548, this was done by the Manlich of Augs­ burg and Manlich Link Weiser companies, and after 1569 by the Paler Weiss-Wagner-Herbst consortium. After 1593 it was in the hands of the Paler-Castell company and, after 1602 by the Palers and by Lazarus Henckel, Senior.21 These companies were the major creditors of the Habsburg Monarchy. Henckel had a significant role in keeping the trea­ sury of the Monarchy from collapsing during the Long Turkish War at the end of the century. Copper was essential in the arms manufacture and gold and silver were needed for coinage. Hungary had a major, albeit declining, role in the production of silver in Europe.22 The gold florins and silver denarii, minted in Kbrmocbdnya, were popular throughout central Europe and were sought even by the Ottomans.23 Compared to tlie late Middle Ages the variety of merchandise imported into the Kingdom of Hungary from the Austrian German ter­ ritories changed very little. Only cloth represented a minor exception. There continued to be a huge amount of various merchandise coming into tire country. It included textiles such as cloth, linen, and silk; vari­ ous industrial and luxury articles such as knives, pewter plates, tools, small metal articles from Nuremberg, fur caps, Venetian glass, fruits such as oranges, tigs, and lemons, spices such as saffron, pepper, and ginger. These reached even the garrisons of the border fortresses, as demonstrated by the archeological excavations of Bajcsavar, south of Kanizsa. These excavations recovered beautiful knives from Steyr in Upper Austria (fig. 4), Austrian jugs (fig. 5) and a pocket sundial from Nuremberg made in 1573 (fig. 6) A The import of textiles underwent a change and the luxury fabrics from western Europe and Italy w7ere largely replaced by less costly materials, primarily Bohemian-Mora­ vian cloths as well as kersey from England.25 All of these reached the estates of the magnates, the homes of the burghers and the frontier

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fortresses. Hie latter is shown by the Nuremberg and English lead seals from bales of cloth found in Bajcsavdr (fig. 7) 26 As compared to the end of the fifteenth century’ there was a sub­ stantial difference and, after the 1540s, Hungarian foreign trade showed a positive balance. Development of commercial relationships could not be hampered by the unfavorable political and military situation. The commonality of interests between the Viennese and Hungarian political leadership and the estates engaged in breeding cattle and other domes­ tic animals contributed to the Kingdom of Hungary remaining an important component of the central European commercial life.27 Illis was true, to a lesser degree, for the Principality of Transylvania and for those parts of the country which were under Ottoman occupation.

A Fragmented Country—Close Economic Ties

The medieval Hungarian state broke into three parts making it impossible to preserve the former unity of the economic system. Yet, both Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire were anxious to preserve profitable trade. Because the cattle and other animals her­ ded in huge numbers to tire West were raised mainly in tire flatlands occupied by the Turks, the Ottoman authorities and the Transylvanian princes derived significant revenues from the export trade by establis­ hing their own new customs duty system. In addition to the customs duties they also set up a number of internal taxes including payments for grazing and watering rights.28 In spite of ail these impediments the trading in cattle remained very profitable and both major powers allo­ wed their residents to engage in this enterprise. Thus, in spite of mili­ tary confrontations, the economic relationships remained intact. An excellent example for the above is furnished by the case of the markets in Kakat (Turkish Parkan), across the Danube from Esztergom. During the spring of 1589, Memi, the Esztergom sanjac bey, wrote to Miklos Pdlffy, the captain general of the Komdrom border fortress with a request to preserve the lucrative markets:

Your Excellency should consider which days would be suitable throughout the year and also which day of the week would be

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARYAND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

appropriate for the weekly market. If Your Excellency decides and lets me know, we will accept it on our honor, honesty, and human­ ity and all multitudes and individuals may come and go to the mar­ ket here at Kakat, whether they are believers or not. They will suf­ fer no harm from anyone, neither while traveling nor at the market, whether they come from Leva, Ersekujvtir, Komdrom, Nagyszom bat, Pozsony, Vienna, Prague, or anywhere else. They should have no fear but come and go confidently with their cattle and buy and sell as they please.29

The markets were held at Kakat on the mutually agreed upon days and both parties profited. It also happened that the Viennese Habsburg authorities and the Ottoman ones in Buda acted jointly against smug­ glers who hurt the profits of both treasuries. The significant political-military’ changes did lead, however, to some important changes in the economic life of the area. These were important for the leaders of international trade both in Hungary and abroad and led to some sacrifices. The most fundamental difference was the complete change in the economic role of Buda. During the late Middle Ages the Hungarian capital was an economic focal point and distribution center for east-central Europe, similar to Nuremberg and Augsburg for the Holy Roman Empire and Cracow for Poland. Ihe leading German and Hungarian families in Buda had important family relationships with the merchant families in the other cities. Buda’s economic role was assumed by Vienna. During the 1530s and 1550s, three Hungarian free royal cities, Pozsony, Sopron, and Nagyszombat, attempted to assume the role of Buda but were not suc­ cessful in blocking Vienna’s success.30 There were several reasons. Most of tlie German and Italian merchants in Buda fled from tire Ottoman threat to the Austrian capital.31 Also, after Vienna became the residence city, Ferdinand I and the Aulic Chamber supported Vienna’s increasing role, which was in the best interests of the major mercantile families in Nuremberg and Augsburg. Thus by the middle of tlie centu­ ry, Vienna became not only the residence city and administrative cen­ ter of the Habsburg Monarchy, but by taking over Buda’s economic role, it also became a major center of distribution with extensive inter­ national contacts.

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Vienna, becoming both as the residence of the emperor and a forti­ fied city, had a major effect on the commercial system. Because it was very near to the Hungarian theater of war, the Viennese military author­ ities could not allow free access to everybody. Banning Hungarian and ■Serb merchants, who arrived from the Ottoman Hungary, became a reg­ ular agenda item after the 1540s 32 The concerns of the Aulic War Coun­ cil and of the magistrates of the imperial city were not without founda­ tion. The merchants were obviously eminently qualified to act as spies. Hamza, tire bey of Szekesfehervdr, boasted in 1561, “I have a spy who has been living in Vienna for the past six years. He has a wife and chil­ dren there. If he wants to he can celebrate a mass, he can act as a stu­ dent, he can be a German or a Hungarian, he can act as a soldier, he can be lame, he can be walking well, just like you and I and he can speak all languages.’’33 The Christian administration, naturally, had spies as well and there were some merchants who acted as spies for both sides. The Hungarian and Serb merchants were never really banned com­ pletely from entering Vienna. The economic and financial interests of the Habsburg Monarchy were considered to be more important than the concern for security. Economic isolation of the imperial city would have hurt too many interests, particularly those of the merchant bankers extending credit to tire court. Thus the regulations, issued in 1544, remained largely in place. These mandated that the merchants who arrived at the gates of Vienna from Ottoman territory be examined care­ fully and kept under surveillance. Hie rules also regulated in consider­ able detail the merchandise that could be exported to the Kingdom of Hungary and to the Ottoman areas.34 Weapons and military supplies, e.g. powder, salpeter, and lead, and tools which could be used as weapons, e.g. sickles, scythes, and knives, were considered contraband materials. Yet smuggling weapons and war materials was so lucrative that it could never be entirely stopped. During the 1570s it was found once that in the carts of the Christian merchants, heading toward the Ottoman Empire, armor was hidden in bales under the driver’s seat, to be delivered to the “eternal enemy.”35 Even at the time of the major bat­ tles at the end of the century there were cases of salpeter and arms smuggling.36 The Hungarian merchants continued to maintain their contacts with Vienna. According to the Registry of Residences of the courtiers for 1563 it was shown that the Hungarian merchants usually

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

lodged in the area of the city in the near of the Stubenlor where the major German and Italian merchant houses had kept their warehouses since the Middle Ages.37 Hungary as a theater of war resulted in another major change in the export trade toward the West, namely the difficulties of the German and Italian merchants. During the late medieval period they were active in Hungary, established warehouses, bought houses and made family con­ nections in Buda, Pozsony and even in Nagyszeben in Transylvania. After 1541 the situation became too insecure and risky and they no longer took the chance of being there. On the sundials of the century, used by the German and Italian merchants, we no longer find the name of the Hungarian capital ,38 This led to an increase in the activity of their Hungarian business associates who functioned as their agents, repre­ sentatives, and suppliers. In order to maintain their earlier commercial contacts, the German and Austrian merchants increasingly needed the assistance of their Hungarian partners who had maintained their con­ tacts with the areas under Ottoman occupation. The latter would have been unable to continue their risky undertakings without the credit granted to them by their German and Austrian business associates. The mutual dependence was paramount in the economic sector. By the middle of the century the leaders of the three parts of Hun­ gary realized that preserving economic contacts was in the best interest of all of them. The Austrian and German areas of the Habsburg Monar­ chy needed the cattle and the sheep raised in the Ottoman Hungary’. The only path led through the Kingdom of Hungary. There was also an increased demand in the Monarchy for “Turkish goods”: woolen and cotton materials, fine linens, carpets and leather goods. Conversely, the luxury items and industrial products of the West were in demand not only by the inhabitants of the kingdom but also by the subjects of the Ottoman Empire and of the Principality of Transylvania. The German merchants were in continuous contact with the merchants of Transylva­ nia. Andreas Kandler, a merchant of Nuremberg was in ongoing con­ tact with about thirty merchants in the eastern part of Hungary and in Transylvania during the late 1580s and early 1590s. The contacts did not cease entirely even during the Long Turkish War at the end of the century and the Nagyszeben and Brasso merchants continued to for­ ward some of their industrial products to the Wallachia.39

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At the border separating tire two hostile great powers complete eco­ nomic unity could naturally not be sustained. The economic role of the former Hungarian capital had been taken over in large part by Vienna, but Ndndorfehervdr/Belgrade also became active. While Buda was the principal military7 and administrative center for the Ottomans, Belgrade took its place in the economic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Buda was always in the theater of war and thus could function as an Ottoman out­ post of the Islamic word but not as an economic center. It could not com­ pete with Belgrade, which was located at the border of the Balkan and Hungarian areas and had become, after 1521, the military staging, sup­ ply and administrative center of the Ottomans. Lastly, the merchants of Ragusa had played a dominant role in the Hungarian-Bal kan trade dur­ ing tlie fourteenth and fifteenth century7 and, after the 1520s, Belgrade became the focus of their commercial activities with Hungary.40 Thus, in addition to the commercial organizations of the Hungarian merchants, who cooperated with the German and Austrian merchants, there was also a network of Ragusan commercial establishments in the Ottoman Hungary. They were located in Buda (1542), Pest (1544), Pecs (1545), and Temesvdr (1554). During the second half of the century, when Buda became only a transfer center, Belgrade became one of the important European economic, distribution, and financial centers.

The Larder of the Habsburg Court—The MilitaryIndustrial Market of the Monarchy Even though there were only about seven hundred courtiers of the Habsburg household in Vienna until the 1580s, the hou­ seholds of the empress and of the archdukes, the large number of ser­ vants and the Viennese garrison raised this number several fold. Becau­ se of the various official ceremonies at court the requirements for sup­ plies were much grater than those of a private establishment. The poli­ tical leadership of the Monarchy could not allow the members of the household to experience a shortage of food because of temporary diffi­ culties in trade. Supplying the Habsburg court in Vienna, geographical­ ly close to the Hungarian border, thus offered real opportunities for the Kingdom of Hungary.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Supplying the court was facilitated by the geographic situation and by institutional arrangements. The Danube had provided a reliable and inexpensive trade route for centuries. It also provided large quantities of fish for the ruler’s table. The relatively flat Hungarian agricultural area just east of Vienna also allowed convenient provision of food. Therefore King Ferdinand, in 1548, refused to release the Magyarovdr and Komdrom estates from his jurisdiction and assigned them to the Lower Austrian Chamber for administrative purposes. The Hungarian Chamber also served in an important capacity in ensuring the food sup­ plies to the court. Consequently, the Kingdom of Hungary became the larder of the Habsburg court in Vienna until 1583. After the end of the rule of Emperor Rudolf II in 1612 Hungary resumed this role albeit to a lesser degree. The beef and mutton required for the court could usually be obtained at the markets in Vienna. Yet, on the orders of the Aulic Cham­ ber, a number of individual merchants drove carefully selected cattle directly to Vienna ‘‘for His Majesty’s kitchen.”41 Pork was brought to the Hofburg from Hungarian markets close to the Ottoman border and from the Szentgybrgy and Bazin area, both on the hoof and in the form of smoked meat.42 A variety of poultry, game, and fish arrived regular­ ly from Hungary.43 Of the latter the most popular was the sturgeon but large quantities of other fish, catfish and carp came to Vienna, both live and preserved. Most of the fish came from the Komdrom estate.44 Large quantities of grain were transported to Vienna, both by water and land from the nearby Csallokoz and from the Magyarov&r estate.45 The importance of this area was shown by the fact that if the Csallokoz was flooded by the Danube, the court had to take immediate steps to assure the delivery of grain from some other area. The Kismarton and Frakno estates, pawned to the Habsburgs since the middle of the fif­ teenth century, were important in supplying the needs of the archducal households of Ernest and later of Matthias and Maximilian. They became archducal dower estates during the 1570s-1580s.46 In providing the court wdth wine the nearby Hungarian areas, the Outer Western Carpathians, the Sopron, and Lajta mountains became important.47 The merchants in Sopron, Ruszt, Kismarton, Szentgybrgy, Bazin, and Modor regularly delivered wine ordered by the Hungarian Chamber. Wine was also transported to the markets in Vienna. After the

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1560s the court cellarer and the wine tasters regularly visited Szent gyorgy and Sopron to sample, select, and purchase the best wines in large quantity for the table of the ruler and of the archdukes living in Vienna.48 These wines were known as vina auliea49 Wine also came to Vienna from the vineyards of the Magyarovdr estate which were under the control of the Lower Austrian Chamber. Wine from the Tokaj district also came through the intermediary of the Szepes Chamber. In February 1572, for example, Bonaventura Posgay took twenty barrels of wine from Kassa to the court.50 From the spring to the autumn there was a constant flow of fruits including apples, plums, melons, and peaches. The Hungarian mag­ nates participated in this frequently sending the finest fruit as a present to their ruler. The Hungarian captains along the border frequently acquired excellent horses from the Ottoman side and sent them on to the king and to his high counselors. In addition to the steeds, workhors­ es were also frequently taken to Vienna from Upper Hungary. Such work horses (Gutschiross) were taken even to the Habsburg court in Prague in the 1590s.51 The Magyarovdr estate was important in provid­ ing fodder for the imperial stables and large quantities of oats were shipped from there to Vienna.52 While the court became an important market for the Kingdom of Hungary’, the latter created an important market for the Monarchy. This was true not only for the already mentioned textiles and industrial prod­ ucts, but was even truer for military materials. The Hungarian guild workshops were far less effective than the German and Austrian ones and were unable to provide the large amount of heavy weapons, rifles, armor, and other war materials required. Their situation became more difficult when a number of them in the formerly free royal cities, came under Ottoman control.53 In providing 100 -120 border fortresses, and the 18-22,000 soldiers garrisoned in them, with arms and ammunition, the Kingdom of Hungary had to rely for help on the Habsburg domains. This offered a great opportunity for the German, Austrian and Bohemi­ an cities which were prominent in the manufacture of war materials. The evolution of the Hungarian defense system provided them with an almost inexhaustible market. Almost all of the guns were brought to Hungary from German, Austrian, and Bohemian foundries as shown by the inventories of the

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

frontier fortresses54 and by the 1593-1594 accounts of the Vienna armory. Most of the guns came from Nuremberg. Augsburg, Ulm, and other imperial cities. A smaller number came to Hungary from Inns­ bruck, Salzburg, and Prague workshops.55 Guns were cast in Hungary only in the Kassa foundry, primarily by Pranz and Andreas lllenfeld. Most of the rifles, harquebuses and other arms were brought to Hun­ gary from Nuremberg, Augsburg and Prague.56 Armor, shields, hel­ mets, other war materials and even powder, sulfur, and tin came in large parts from the German and Bohemian territories. Tin was mined pri­ marily in Bohemia and was sent from there to Vienna and Hungary.57 Hie only exception was sal peter much of which was produced in Upper Hungary.58 At the end of the century7 large shipments of this material were sent to the Vienna arsenal.59 The large Nuremberg and Augsburg arms merchants, Sohners, Eggholds, and Freys, vigorously competed with each other to obtain major weapon, armor, and war material orders during the 1550s to 1590s. The Long Turkish War at the end of the century further increased their opportunities. One member of the Augsburg Frey company, Hans, moved to Graz at Ilie end of 1597, in order to facilitate the continuing transport in aims between the German-Austrian territories and the Hun­ garian-Croatian ones.60 Austrian and Hungarian merchants frequently acted as agents for the large German companies. When Bonaventura Posgay took a shipment of Tokaj wine to Vienna in February 1572, he returned from there with a shipment of artillery supplies for the Kassa armory.61 This clearly shows that Hungary was both the Habsburg court’s larder and the Monarchy’s market for military equipment. In addition to the merchants, artisans came to Hungary from Nuremberg and Augsburg as well. A number of them served in the Kassa armory as armorers and rifle makers. The campaigns of Schwendi in 1565-1568 were the inducement for the increase in their numbers. After the war a number of them did not return to their homes but set­ tled in Kassa, working in the royal armory or, having received a diplo­ ma indegenatus, worked in their own guild workshops.62 The presence of such people is shown by the guild rules for the city armor and arms makers for the year 1586, which stated that, “Concerning the master work of the armorers, it must be performed according to the methods of Nuremberg or Augsburg.”63 In the Monarchy the political-military and

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economic interests were inseparably interwoven and significantly affected the fate of the Kingdom of Hungary.

The Flowering of Hungarian Enterprises in the Sixteenth Century

In spite of the frequent military clashes, the favorable commercial opportunities in Hungary in the sixteenth century, made the country appealing to the great merchant bankers of Germany and Italy. The trade in live animals, in copper, and the arms and military supplies was so profitable that investments in them appeared to be reasonable even though there were also appreciable risks. Hungarian suppliers also took advantage of the opportunities. During the more peaceful twentyfive years after the Peace of Adrianople in 1568, large segments of the population enjoyed appreciable economic improvements. Participants in cattle raising and live animal transport came from several levels of society. These decades can be considered as the flowering of enterpri­ ses in Hungary.64 Hie activities of the local participants in this commerce, on the bor­ der between the two great powers, were quite literally an enterprise. An Ottoman or Christian raiding party, a band of brigands, a serious epi­ demic among the animals, or a very bad growing season could ruin sev­ eral years’ hard work. There being no banking system, the entrepre­ neurs had to rely on their own modest resources or on loans and cred­ its from their German and Austrian partners. When the recipient did not pay up, died, or disappeared the creditor had no way to retrieve his money or his goods. Even the wealthy German renters of the copper mines along the Garam River had reason for concern because Ottoman raids became almost daily events during the 1570s. Regardless, there were hundreds of people every year who endeav­ ored to increase their capital. In order to improve their returns they formed partnerships and created small associations. The main group, within the Hungarian entrepreneurs, came from the so-called peasant­ burgher residents of the market towns in Ottoman Hungary and along the border between the kingdom and the Ottoman territory. These towns included Nagykoros, Cegled, Kecskemet, Kdlmancsehi, Mezo

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

tur, Nagymaros, Rdckeve, Tolna, SimAnd in Ottoman Hungary, and Komdrom, PApa, NyirbAtor, Sdrospatak, etc. on the Habsburg side of the border. The poorer members of this group engaged in the breeding and raising of the animals while the more prosperous members engaged in trade. The fortunate entrepreneurs could amass a consider­ able fortune. The enterprise of the Debrecen burgher. Mate Szabo, had more than 60,000 Rhenish florins worth of cash and goods at the beginning of the 1560s.65 This sum represented approximately eight percent of the total annual revenues of the Kingdom of Hungary. The wealth of such people made them important figures in the administra­ tion of their market towns and they also played an important role in the self-administration of the Hungarian population in the Ottoman occu­ pied areas .66 After these residents of the market towns acquired their wealth they moved to the larger cities of the Kingdom of Hungary (Nagyszombat, Kassa) or of the Principality of Transylvania (Vdrad, Kolozsvdr) where they rapidly assumed important positions.67 Preserving their earlier commercial organization they directed their growing enterprises from their new location. In this group the career of Sebestyen Thbkbly was the most spectacular. He moved from Mezotur, in the Ottoman occupied zone about 1568, and settled in Nagyszombat.68 At this time, “he traveled from Hungary all over the Turkish territory, knew every road and every ford where the Turks and Tatars frequently had their camps, knew their persons, habits and power.”69 Thanks to the local knowledge he gained in the Ottoman territories, to his contacts with the pasha in Buda, and because of his extensive business network, he could travel freely between Vienna, Buda, and Debrecen. On commission from his German and Austrian partners he engaged in cattle purchases worth tens of thousands of florins in 1570s. In the other direction he engaged in equally valuable transport of industrial products. But his transports of potentially contraband merchandise and his contacts with the pasha in Buda made him suspect in the eyes of the military author­ ities in Vienna. Tor this reason Thbkbly no longer entered Ottoman ter­ ritory after 1578 and made a major change in his mercantile policies. He engaged with enormous vigor in supplying the needs of the Habs­ burg army in Hungary7. By the end of the century he had met all his goals. In August 1593 he received the patent of barony. Ilins the former

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dweller from a market town became not only a Hungarian magnate but also entered the political elite of the Kingdom.70 Other Hungarian aristocrats, such as the Choron, Dobo, Erdody, Forgdch, Homonnai Drugetli, Mdgochy, Nddasdy, Perenyi, Thurzo, Zay, and Zrfnyi, also frequently engaged in commercial enterprises.71 It was written in 1550 that, “The Hungarian magnates engage in trade, hire merchants as assistants and deal in cattle, cloth, lead, copper and a number of other items.”72 Because in their areas of the country7 these men were also frequently the military leaders, they could easily take a dominant position in the cattle business. Consequently, the leading Hungarian aristocratic families had not only political and military7 posi­ tions but also controlled considerable economic power. Hie same was true for the Austrian captain generals. 'Hie general in Kassa, Hans Rueber, shipped Tokaj wines on the Danube to the Holy Roman Empire 73 The captain general in Komdrom, Andreas Kielman, was also not dependent solely on his salary. At the beginning of the 1560s he served as muster master and became familiar with the oppor­ tunities in the Hungarian economy. Subsequently, he could keep an eye on the traffic in goods along the Danube from his frontier fortress 74 In this he participated actively and in 1574 his claim on the court for 12,500 Rhenish florins was paid off by the Aulic Chamber with a licen­ se to trade cattle without paying the one-thirtieths 75 In the 1580s he was able to extend several thousand florins credit to the treasury.76

Chapter Nine

INSTITUTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY In spite of the importance of the Kingdom of Hungary' it was a front-line country and thus it could not be a nuclear component of the Habsburg Monarchy in the sixteenth century. Its new7 admini­ strative center, Vienna, was close to the Hungarian border but was still beyond it. This represented a completely new situation in the history of the Hungarian state. In the joint military, financial and economic ende­ avors there could thus never be any true parity just as such parity did not exist between Hungary and Croatia during the Middle Ages. In the latter, the Buda court saw to it that the Hungarians were in a favorite position, in the Habsburg Monarchy the Vienna-Prague central admini­ stration made any ideas about parity illusionary. Yet, in spite of the mas­ sive centralization and integration, the Kingdom of Hungary maintai­ ned a peculiar sovereignty throughout.

Sovereignty in a Composite State In the primarily dynastic composite states in sixteenth century Europe it is anachronistic to speak of a “state or national sov­ ereignty” concept in the twentieth and twenty-first century meaning of the term.1 It is useless to try to reflect the modem constitutional and legal perspective which developed only in the nineteenth century, back to the beginning of the modem era. At that time the evolution of the European countries was far removed from becoming modem, national sovereign states. The term sovereignty was used exclusively in the con­ text of the ruler and not in the context of the country. In the famous

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work of Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la Repiiblique, published in 1576, he speaks primarily of the sovereignty of the ruler or of the monarchy even though he was the first one who began to associate the term sov­ ereignty with the state itself.2 In the telling phrase of John H. Elliott, the sixteenth century '‘Old Continent” was a “Europe of composite monarchies.”3 Even though there were considerable differences between the Kingdom of Spain, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the majority of the large and small dynastic conglomerates, the individual countries or territories had no independence, i.e. internal or external sov­ ereignty, or only a very limited one.4 In addition to the foreign policy which was firmly attached to the person of the sovereign, a significant part of the military and financial matters gradually became the joint affairs of the monarchy, except in the few cases where the estates pre­ served control over some limited territories. Hiis could be seen clearly in tire centrally administered composite states which were increasingly centralized and which developed a supranational elite. The leaders of the new central government structures and the court elite did not think in terms of countries or of the “nation of the estates” because they were subjects with the right to settle in various areas and had possessions, rel­ atives and various interests scattered throughout the Monarchy, Hiey also shared in a multiplicity of languages and identities. The various members of the dynastic composite states of the peri­ od, whether kingdoms, principalities, marquisates, or counties, only enjoyed a certain internal sovereignty. The extent of this sovereignty varied considerably among the components of the central European Habsburg Monarchy. The sovereignty depended on the function of state structure, on geopolitical considerations, on the practice of filling the throne, on the strength of the estates, on domestic policies, legislation, the peculiarities of the local administrations, and their autonomy vis-avis the central authority. The estates in the territories lying outside the central parts of the monarchy perceived the centralized management of joint affairs and the lack of an external sovereignty as a form of subservience. These feel­ ings were aggravated by political differences, different language, diver­ gent administrative traditions, and legal practices. Hie estates frequent­ ly viewed the military personnel, having taken an oath of allegiance to

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the ruler, and the officials of the treasury, particularly if they were for­ eigners, as servants of a central or dynastic power. Hungary’s outstandingly important military and fiscal affairs became joint matters and were controlled by government organs from Vienna, directed by German and Austrian aristocrats. In addition, this control came from a country’ with which the Kingdom of Hungary has had serious conflicts in the fifteenth century. Hie antagonism between King Matthias Corvinus and Emperor Frederic III is a perfect example of this conflict. Anumber of the captain generals in Hungary w;ere Ger­ mans, the frontier fortresses were garrisoned by German soldiers, and the Hungarian Chamber in Pozsony had German counselors. The antag­ onisms were made more acute by the differences in language, tradi­ tions, dress, and legal practices. Ever since the rule of Sigismund of Luxemburg, there was an anti-German sentiment among the Hungari­ an nobility which was fostered by the Habsburg succession agreements and by John Szapolyai’s propaganda. The increasing feeling of subservience among the Hungarian estates was also due to the changes taking place after 1526 when St. Stephen’s realm, a central European middle power, became not only a territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, albeit an important one, but also a frontline country. At this time, and in spite of considerable external mil­ itary7 and financial help, its territory was broken into three parts, was exposed to repeated devastation from military invasions, its capital was occupied by the Ottomans, and its own royal court ceased to exist. There was another circumstance which significantly affected the thinking of the estates, namely the proximity7 of the Transylvanian prin­ cipality. In spite of being a vassal of the Porte, it was led, from the beginning, by rulers of Hungarian extraction who lived among their subjects. The Hungarian chancellor, Jdnos Liszthy, living in Vienna, stated it clearly in 1570 when he wrote, “Prince John Sigismund is beloved by the Hungarians because he is of Hungarian extraction, speaks Hungarian and always lives among them.”5 This was a major and irremediable disadvantage for the kings of Hungary who were part of the Habsburg dynasty. This was also the reason why the princes of Transylvania exerted a strong attraction toward the Hungarian nobility in Upper Hungary. There were other reasons as well and the political leadership in Vienna had to come to grips with them.

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Upper Hungary was immediately adjacent to Transylvania, and, at the time when Stephan Bdthory being also king of Poland (1576), it was confined in a Polish-Transylvanian vice. Also, between 1526 and 1566 the Hungarian nobility suffered enormous losses. Two fifth of the coun­ try came under Ottoman occupation, the nobility lost their holdings in the area and most of them were forced to flee. This exodus of the Hun­ garian nobility was a unique event in Europe. The lesser nobility lost much of their importance when the court moved to a foreign country. For many of them even Pozsony, the new center of politicking for the estates, was a long distance away. Lastly, the noble families in the east­ ern parts of Hungary had centuries-old, close family relationships with their counterparts in Transylvania. These were not destroyed by the cre­ ation of the principality' and some families had extensive properties in both the kingdom and in the principality. Tliere were some among the Upper Hungarian nobility who, after the 1570s, felt that the Hungarian princes of Transylvania, even though under Ottoman supervision or “Turkish protection,”6 w7ere preferable to the Habsburg rulers who at this time were still considered to be Ger­ man.7 The gravity of this situation was made dear to the Habsburg court in Vienna by the departure of several Hungarian politicians and border fortress officers, like Ferenc Forgdch and Ldszlo Gyulaffy, to Transylvania and by the close relations with Transylvania maintained by some Hungarian magnates, like .Tdnos Balassi and Istvan Bobo. After the court moved to Prague even some Hungarian aristocrats, who were loyal to the court, began to feel like subordinates when the King­ dom of Hungary was administered from abroad. In 1588, Simon Forgdch, a resident of both Lower Austria and Moravia who had married an Austrian, stated, “It is against the state of things that a country is governed by the advice of foreigners.”8 As early as 1583, he wrote the ruler that a number of Hungarians “found it dif­ ficult to accept an extraneous administration.”9 At the diets, the list of grievances of the estates included “ GermanorumJexterorum dominatio/iuga'' expression.10 The Bohemian and Moravian estates frequently felt the same way and the Croatian ones felt that way all the time.11 The latter were in a worse position than the Hungarians. They felt that in the late Middle Ages their small country was subservient to Hun­ gary, being that it was centrally administrated from Buda. Now the

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presence of Camiolan and Styrian officials and, after 1578, control by the Inner Austrian War Council, was considered to be subservience to “Austria.” It was for this reason that the Venetian ambassador in Vienna could write in the autumn of 1571 that, the Hungarians consider their situation as a miserable subservience because “they are ruled by a nation, the Ger­ mans, which they held and hold in unrelenting hate by nature and by choice.”12 The court and the central administrative offices were aware of their advantages. In their administration of the affairs of the Kingdom of Hungary they sometimes spoke of a “German administration.”13 In spite of the central administration, the Kingdom of Hungary still maintained a favored position within the Habsburg Monarchy regard­ ing its internal sovereignty even though this also underwent certain changes. In spite of the common ruler, Hungary never became part of the Holy Roman Empire and never became one of the Hereditary Provinces which is what happened to Bohemia after 1620. In addition, until 1687, the Hungarian estates freely elected the Habsburg rulers and this remained an important criterion of the internal sovereignty.

Election of a King or Acceptance of One14 Preserving the free election of the king was not a sim­ ple matter for the estates in the sixteenth century. They were able to exert their will in 1526 -1527 w;hen the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand came to Hungary,15 but on the day after the coronation, Ferdinand inter­ preted the free election as being the result of an inheritance and of the succession agreements.16 He held on to this opinion until his death and based it on the traditions of the House of Habsburg and on the situati­ on in the Hereditary Provinces.17 He was unable, however, to secure the throne of the Kingdom of Hungary for his oldest son, Archduke Maxi­ milian on the basis of the right of succession. It was different from Bohemia where in August 1545 he was able to make the intimidated estates accept the right of succession.18 Following the defeat of the uprising of the estates in 1547, they were forced to accept Maximilian as king of Bohemia in February 1549. This agreement made the estates to accept the primogeniture succession rule.19

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Ferdinand attempted to reach a similar agreement in Hungary on several occasions. In his repeatedly revised and enlarged testaments (1532, 1543, 1547, and 1554) he asserted that after his death the Hun­ garian and Bohemian territories would descend to his oldest son, Maxi­ milian.20 The testament of the ruler did not, however, commit the Hun­ garian estates to anything. Ferdinand also inserted a sentence into the 1538 Varad Peace Treaty with John Szapolyai according to which it was stated unmistakably that after Ferdinand’s death Archduke Maximilian '‘had to be elected king by common consent.,>21 Even this international agreement was insufficient to make the estates give up the right to a free election of the king, particularly because the peace treaty never went into effect. The free election could be given up only in an individual instance by the decision of the estates or by law, or by an appeal to the ancient traditions of the country. The estates had the power to add new items to the ancient traditions if their interests demanded it. Ferdinand attempted to enact the light of primogeniture into law. This would have been possible only with the support of a large per­ centage of the estates. In the Kingdom of Hungary enactment of any new law was possible only with the consent of the estates. At the end of 1547 Ferdinand was partially successful by having obtained the sup­ port of the higher clergy. Article 5 of the Nagyszombat diet stated that, “The estates of the country are subjects not only to His Majesty but also to his successors.”22 This represented the rights of succession of the Habsburg dynasty but did not recognize the right of succession by pri­ mogeniture. The ruler was not satisfied with this relatively modest success. He tried to introduce the right of primogeniture into the diet decrees by a ruse. An opportunity for this was provided when the laws and privileges of the country were being reviewed 23 The designated committee of the estates completed its work by the end of 1552 and it was entitled Quadripartitum, being an enlargement of the noted Tripartitum of Istvdn Werbbczy. At the very beginning of this new compilation of the Hungarian legal practices and enactments into law7, the estates, in vol­ ume four, categorically confirmed their three basic privileges: free and voluntary election of the king, the 1222 Golden Bull with the right of the estates to resist the king, and the right of the estates to supervise the armed forces of the king, through the palatine 24 Ferdinand had this

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document modified by his counselors in Vienna so that it no longer men ­ tioned the free election of the king but accepted the right of succession by primogeniture, nullified the Gohlen Bull and restricted the legal powers of the palatine.25 The majority of the Hungarian estates, particularly the magnates and the lesser nobility, repeatedly rejected these interpolations even though Ferdinand managed to obtain the support of Miklos Oldh, archbishop of Esztergom and Hungarian high chancellor26 The strength of the Hungarian estates is shown clearly by the king being unable to obtain all his goals even though he was able to gain the support of some of them, including one of their most important leaders. When he tried for the fifth time to get the principle of primogeniture accepted he had the support of his German and Hungarian legally trained counselors and attempted to introduce the principle of succes ­ sion by primogeniture among the ancient traditions of the country7. When negotiating with the Hungarian counselors in Vienna in March 1561, preparatory to the coronation of Archduke Maximilian, he referred directly to Hungarian traditions. He tried to have them accept the principle of primogeniture citing Hungarian historical works, chronicles and international agreements, such as the 1515 succession agreement and tire 1538 Vdrad Peace Treaty. He declared that the laws of the country and the royal decrees did not refer to elections and thus this could not be an ancient custom of the country.27 As his strongest argument he referred to tire coronation of Louis II in 1508, where there was no mention of elections, not even in the invitations issued by Wladislaw II to the estates to come to the Coronation Diet. As evidence, he had the archives of a number of free royal cities produce these invi­ tations, and, in fact, none of them mentioned the Latin word election So far as he was concerned, the estates could use elections only if the royal house had no living member. In this entire matter Hungarian High Chancellor and Archbishop of Esztergom Miklos Oldh was his stron­ gest supporter. Even this, however, was not enough. The aristocrats pointed out to him that in Hungary there was no coronation without election.29 It w-as also unnecessary to preserve the country’s ancient tra­ ditions in writing. They lived in the heart of the nobility and in the oral traditions handed down from generation to generation.30 Ferdinand tried again, for the sixth time, in May 1563, after Arch­ duke Maximilian was crowned king of Bohemia on September 20,1562,

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

and king of the Holy Roman Empire on November 30, 1562. It was to his advantage that the Palatine Tamds Nddasdy, Archbishop Oldh’s great rival and the spokesman for the lay estates during the spring 1561 dis­ pute in Vienna, died during the summer of 1562. Yet, a significant num­ ber of the members of the Hungarian Council were still unwilling to give up the right of election for kingship.31 The only compromise they were willing to accept was that if the king had several sons, the firstborn would be elected but that the process of election would be preserved according to the old traditions and could not be set aside against the wishes of the estates, especially the nobility. Ferdinand was still not sat­ isfied. He firmly held out in his determination to do away with the elec­ tion. Thus in his June 6, 1563, letter of invitation to the diet the Latin word eligendum was omitted but reference was made to the ancient tra­ ditions of the country.32 This caused considerable dissatisfaction among the lesser nobility attending the Coronation Diet and even the magnates were displeased. Thus dissatisfaction was made apparent in several ways. First they demanded that Ferdinand, i.e. the actual king of Hun gary, arrive in the country ahead of his son because the latter had not been elected yet. They said, “Hungary was not a hereditary province that can be obtained by inheritance, but it has the right to a free election of the king.”33 The ruler, claiming that he was ill with a febrile disease, rejected this request and sent Maximilian ahead as the king designate. Tire majority of the estates refused to accept him. Even though a mili­ tary parade reception was arranged for him on tire border August 31, he could enter Pozsony only as king of Bohemia and of the Holy Roman Empire. Consequently he was preceded by Konrad von Pappenheim, the Reichserbmarschall (imperial hereditary marshal), carrying the German Imperial Sword and not by the Hungarian master of stables, carrying the Hungarian Royal Sword.34 'Hie decision not to recognize Maximilian as king was also shown by only a few members of the nobility being willing to kiss the Archduke’s hand contrary to estab­ lished traditions.35 Coronation could not proceed. The nobility resisted the endeavors of the increasingly pro-Maximilian prelates and mag­ nates from September 2 to September 7, and insisted that as a prelimi­ nary to the coronation there had to be an election of a palatine and that the grievances of the nobility had to be remedied. Archbishop Oldh and his followers were equally firm on the other side.

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From the perspective of the leader of the prelates the elections of the king and of the palatine were serious issues. If he could achieve that there was no election of the palatine, the highest lay dignitary, his own position among the estates would became unassailable. He could even prove this to the highest dignitaries of the Habsburg Monarchy at the time of the coronation. In the end the nobility cited the privileges of the country in vain and even the citing of the clause of resistance of the Golden Bull of 1222 was ineffective.36 The struggle was not limited to the king versus the estates and, in the end, the Habsburg court and Oldh’s Hungarian party carried the day. In contrast to the events of 1526-1527, in the case of Ferdinand’s son, the election to the throne could be avoided in 1563. This was pos­ sible only with the agreement of the majority of the clerical and lay magnates and with the use of Archbishop Oldh’s powerful influence. In the autumn of 1527, when John Szapolyai was also King of Hungary, an election was absolutely essential for the legitimacy of Ferdinand’s coronation. The large majority of the estates felt that way, but at this time they were willing to yield at least for the time being but only to a limited extent. The leaders of the Hungarian political elite, with few exceptions, obeyed the ruler and bowed to the necessity, knowing that it had to be like this.37 It meant that the acceptance of Archduke Maxi­ milian as their king coincided with his coronation. This was in contrast to the beggarly entry into the country at the end of August. At the September 8 coronation the Hungarian Royal Sword was carried by Ferenc Tahy, the Hungarian master of stables. This was particularly meaningful because when Ferdinand entered Pozsony on September 1, he had Tahy lead him into the city, even though his Reichserbmarschall wished to do so himself. Ferdinand wished to show the dissatisfied Hungarian estates that he, the Holy Roman emperor, entered Hungary as king of Hungary and not as the emperor.38 Ferdinand’s oldest son followed him in Hungary as. In doing so, and in accordance with medieval traditions, he immediately became the new ruler of the Kingdom of Croatia. 'Hiis required no action on the part of the Croatian estates in contrast to the Cetin election that took place on January 1, 1527. All of this did not mean, however, that the Hungarian estates had accepted the principle of primogeniture or that they had given up the free election of the king. In spite of all of Ferdi­

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

nand’s endeavors, primogeniture did not enter into the Hungarian tra­ ditions, nor was it codified in law. Thus in 1563 a compromise was struck between the Habsburg court and the Hungarian estates with both of them making concessions. In the case of Maximilian’s firstborn successor, Archduke Rudolf, the Hungarian estates used cleverer tactics than in 1563. In March 1572, at the Pozsony diet they, themselves, suggested that Maximilian should have Rudolf elected as king of Hungary7. They supported their request by suggesting that in the absence of the ruler from Hungary, the elected king could, ‘‘act for his father, protect the liberties of the coun­ try and live in the country, be surrounded with Hungarian counselors and courtiers, discuss the affairs of the country with them, and become acquainted with the customs and language of Hungary.”39 They wanted to have all their grievances resolved by this election of the firstborn, and after some debate Ilie Lower House agreed.40 In his response, the ruler did not mention election or the demands of the estates and only emphasized the importance of the coronation.41 This again represented a clash between the Habsburg court’s concepts of accepting a ruler and the Hungarian estates’ demands for an election. In the spring of 1572 the members of the Upper House found a par­ ticular solution to pacify both the ruler and the Lower House while still strengthening the Hungarian position. They made a concession to Maxi­ milian in their proposal of April 2, by speaking of Rudolf’s declaration as the crown prince and not mentioning an election. They still insisted that Rudolf reside in Hungary and govern it wdth his Hungarian coun­ selors 42 This was entered into the diet decrees which were then made a part of the text approved by the ruler in Vienna on April 27 43 They could make the Lower House accept this because in the meetings of the latter the discussions always centered on Rudolf’s election and corona­ tion. On April 1, they actually held an election in the Franciscan Clois­ ter in Pozsony and this was confirmed on the same day by the Upper House.44 All of this was confirmed in Pozsony Castle on the following day, in the presence of Archdukes Rudolf and Ernest, by Antal Verancsics, archbishop of Esztergom and royal regent45 The legates from Kassa referred to Rudolf on April 7, as “electus Ungarorum rex.’,A(s This might not have been a great victory7 for the estates but it was def­ initely a successful political action. There was nothing King Maximil­

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ian could do and Archduke Rudolf could not reject the election by the estates. The ruler made only minor concessions to the estates and in the let­ ter calling for the meeting of the Coronation Diet, dated June 23, he did not use the term “election.”47 Yet, the clever maneuvers of the estates forced him to make a number of concessions. As a ruling monarch he arrived in Pozsony by boat, on September 20, ahead of his son, appar­ ently still remembering his unfriendly reception nine years earlier.48 He could not prevent that the following day, when Rudolf arrived by road, the estates welcomed him on the border as their elected king.49 The coronation took place on September 25. In 1572 the aristocracy and lesser nobility strengthened their posi­ tion. Even though the oldest son became the ruler of Hungary, primo­ geniture was never mentioned and certainly did not become a part of the traditions. Making the necessary compromises, the estates pre­ served the privilege of a free election of the king. This became important in the 1580s. Rudolf had several periods of illness and the question of electing a king for Hungary was raised again. This was particularly important because the king had no male heir but had two uncles. Ferdinand of Tyrol and Charles of Inner Austria, and four younger brothers, Archdukes Ernest, Matthias, Maximilian, and Albert. Electing one of them became a legitimate question in Hungary. Among the nobility of Upper Hungary the election of Stephan Batho­ ry, king of Poland was also raised as a possibility.50 His support was limited to the northeastern nobility and he had no chance of acquiring the throne of Hungary. It was well known in Warsaw in February 1581 that the Hungarian estates were in favor of Rudolf’s oldest brother, Archduke Ernest.51 Hie sentiment was justified. As Rudolf’s deputy, Ernest cooperat­ ed fully ’with the estates in the administration of the kingdom and in modernizing the frontier defense system. Ernest’s court, in Vienna was a favorite place for the Hungarian aristocrats. Rudolf, when once again ill, during the summer of 1586, also supported him. The question of calling a meeting of the diet for the election of the archduke was con­ sidered. Royal Regent Gydrgy Draskovics was instructed to do so in October 1586 in Prague. The estates continued to insist on a free elec­ tion of a king and Draskovics was asked by the court to use all his influ­

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ence, and money, and to persuade the leading magnates and nobles to elect Archduke Ernest.5’ The ruler recovered and therefore the matter became moot. Yet the situation again showed that the Habsburg court, reluctantly and with con­ ditions, was willing to accept the right of the Hungarian estates to elect their king freely. The Kingdom of Hungary remained an elective state of the Habsburg Monarchy even though Act 5, of 1547, limited the electors ’ choices to the Habsburg dynasty. This was not different from the situa­ tion during the Middle Ages and pertaining to the Arpdds, tire Angevines and the Jagiellos. In the autumn of 1608, the Hungarian estates could exercise their right to holding a free election within the dynasty, and this represented a triumph in their ongoing battle to preserve their privileges. In achieving this, they were greatly helped by the international situation and the activities in the Hungarian theater of war.53

The Hungarian Council and the Highest Dignitaries of the Country

The election issue clearly shows that the relationship between tlie Habsburg court and the Hungarian political elite was not a simple matter of antagonism. The resistance of the estates was always a significant feature in the relationship of the ruler and the subjects but so were the compromises, the cooperation, the political bargains and tlie exploitation of interests. In none of the major issues was there a uni­ fied perspective among the members of the diet, the Upper and Lower House, the Hungarian Council or even the highest country dignitaries. Even in single individuals there were composite identities, split loyal­ ties and divided interests. We have already seen this in the case of Simon Forgdch and Miklos Olah. Eorgdch had a dominant role in the construction of the defensive system for the protection of the Monarchy but repeatedly condemned the foreign counselors. 01 dh supported pri­ mogeniture but insisted that the ambassadors to Constantinople be thoroughly familiar with Hungary. Among the various characteristics loyalty to the ruler, preservation of Hungary’s sovereignty and privileges of the estates, thorough famil­ iarity with certain district of Hungary, various political groupings and

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private interests played a prominent role. In the case of the individual high country dignitaries’ attachment to one of more of the concepts such as Deus, Rex/Regia Maiestas, Corona Hungarica!Sacra Corona, Patria, Natio Hungarica, Antiqua Libertas et Consuetudo, Bonum Publicum, and Privatum could and did change and could affect the decision reached on a certain question. During the second half of the sixteenth century religious affiliation also markedly affected the deci­ sion-making process. In the case of the Austrian, German, or Bohemi­ an estates there was a similar conflict between the loyalty to the ruler or the dynasty, the privileges of the estates, the ancient traditions, the protection of the common weal, provincial loyalty or a belonging to the German or Bohemian early modem nation (feudal “nation”).54 The conflict of these identities can be shown to have existed between the Hungarian Council and the highest country dignitaries as well. The medieval Royal Council (consilium regis) became the Hun­ garian Council (Consilium Hungaricum) after the court’s departure to Vienna and lost much of its prior powers in tire areas of foreign policy, military affairs and financial matters. Its activities were also much less structured than when it worked with the king in Buda.55 Ferdinand’s attempts to establish a court council with authority over all of the provinces and with its seat moving from area to area failed because of the resistance of the Hungarian and Bohemian estates. Ferdinand’s attempt to establish a smaller, expert, and permanent government struc­ ture, a Hungarian Regency Council in Pozsony to attend to matters of domestic policy and, in the king’s absence, under the control of the Royal Regent, also came to nothing because of the resistance of the estates in the 1530s-1540s.56 After the Royal Regent’s Council disappeared during the 1550s, repeated attempts by Ferdinand and by his successors to have two or three of the Hungarian counselors constant attendance on the king, or in his absence, on one of the archdukes, also failed.57 The estates enact­ ed several statutes to this effect but none of them were ever enforced.58 The members of the Hungarian political elite refused to serve in the central administrative bureaucracy and were unwilling to serve along the royal regent as well.59 Therefore only the Hungarian court chancel­ lor and the royal secretary were in constant attendance an the ruler’s court. Hie Hungarian Council held both its regular meetings and its

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

emergency meetings in Pozsony, the domestic policy capital of the country. For the negotiations on country prominent issues such as: defense against the Ottomans, peace treaties, relationship with Transylvania and Poland, coronations, preparations for the diets, filling high ecclesiastic and lay positions, and the dispensing of justice, a new form of consul­ tation developed. After the 1530s the rulers frequently called Hungari­ an counselors to Vienna, and Arch dukes Maximilian and Charles, than later Ernest and Matthias did the same in the second half of the centu­ ry.60 Because the court and the central administrative structures were not fully acquainted with the country’s geographic, linguistic and legal affairs and because this was essential for making compromises with the estates, they needed the advice of the Hungarian political elite. At the discussions in Vienna, the Hungarian counselors frequently requested reimbursement of their travel and other expenses.61 Regular trips to the Imperial city and staying there represented a significant financial bur­ den for the counselors coming from the more distant parts of the coun ­ try or being of only modest means.62 In 1588 an act was passed accord­ ing to which the council should meet every’ three months for the dis­ cussion of the most important issues and, that counselors who lived too far away or who could not attend for whatever reason, could submit their opinion in writing. None of this had any lasting effect. Consequently, by the second half of the century the composition of the Hungarian Council changed little in comparison with its late medieval precursor. Minor changes included the absence of the elected lesser nobility representatives, of the voivode of Transylvania and of the ispan of Temes. A more important change, after the middle of the century, was the appearance of a number of clerical and lay counselors who held no country offices and who were appointed to their position by the ruler. Their numbers increased significantly by the end of the century. Because of the failure to convert the Hungarian Council into a gov­ ernment agency or to have a permanent staff of counselors in Vienna, the appointment of counselors who did not carry country7 dignities, was related to the ruler’s intent to add individuals to the council, other than the prelates and high country dignitaries, who were willing to partici­ pate actively in the discussion of the Hungarian affairs. These appointees

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had a permanent position on the council, and were known as the “true Hungarian counselors,”63 received an annual salary of 400, or occa­ sionally 500-600 Hungarian florins from the Hungarian Chamber, which was only slightly less than the 600-1,200 florins paid annually to the highest country dignitaries. Because of the salary they received as the titulo consiliariatus they were occasionally referred to as consilarii titulares,64 This term does not correspond to the seventeenth cen­ tury truly “titular counselors” (consiliarius titulatus).65 The appreciable annual salary w-as attractive even for the wealthi­ er Hungarian aristocrats. It was also a judicious investment for the court. The archdukes, acting for Rudolf, who was residing in Prague, trying to reach compromises with the estates, needed the expert advice of the Hungarian counselors. Most of the appointed counselors lived up to the expectations. Gybrgy Thurzo, who grew up in the household of Archduke Ernest, served in the army for a few years but, after the spring of 1598, he functioned as a counselor to Archduke Matthias and became one of the leading Hungarian politicians wdthin a few7 years. Peter Revay, the future noted guardian of the Holy Crown, played an important role, after 1605, as an appointed counselor, advising Arch­ duke Matthias.66 Hie increasingly frequent appointments were important because they helped to shape the Hungarian aristocracy. At the time of their appointment most of the counselors were barons already, or received the barony soon after their appointment. Thus tire prelates and the high dignitaries could raise objections only when the appointee w7as very poor and there was a true social abyss between them. From a social­ estate perspective only a few appointed officeholder counselors fell into this category. One of them was, at the middle of the century, the Vice Palatine 'Famas Kamarjay, a protege of the Palatine Tamds Nddasdy. Others included the personalis or royal secretary-counselors. These positions could be obtained only by appointment and could not be an ex officio title for anybody, not even the presidents of the Hungarian and Szepes Chambers.67 During the second half of the century, in addition to the salaried counselors, the majority of the members of the Hungarian Council were the prelates and the “true barons” filling the highest country dignities, the palatine, the chief judge, the Croatian-Slavonian ban, and the royal

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treasurer {magister tavernicorum). In addition to them permanent posi ­ tions were assigned to the high dignitaries of the Hungarian royal court, the master doorward, the master seneschal, the master cupbearer, the master of stables, and the master of chamberlains, even though these position had become largely nominal. They referred to themselves, according to ancient traditions, as “consiliarii inclyti Hungariae regni tarn ecclesiastici quam politici ordinis ” or “Sacrae Caesareae Regiaeque Malestalls ulriusque ordinis domini consiliarii Hungari.”6^ In spite of the endeavors of the Habsburg court the resistance of the estates resulted in the Hungarian Council remaining, until the end of the sixteenth century, an advisory and preparatory' body and not an expert structure. The same happened at a highest level of the Habsburg Monar­ chy to the Privy Council. It did not have its own chancellery and the decisions reached at its meetings were usually recorded by the Hungar­ ian royal secretaries. According to its medieval practices, the decisions were principally due to the political influence, experience, age and position of a single prelate or magnate. The decisions of the council were not due to a vote but were formed according to the ancient for­ mula “vota. non numerantur sed ponderantur.” Thus an elderly coun­ cilor-magnate could affect the outcome even though he held no official position. An example for this is Ferenc Batthydny who lived to a ripe old age. A former Croatian-Slavonian ban, he held no office in the 1540s-1560s but preserved considerable political influence. He was used during these years as Ferdinand’s particular confidential councilor who spent considerable time at the Habsburg court. When the king asked Batthydny to come to Vienna or Graz for a consultation, the court paymaster provided him with a substantial daily fee which amounted first to 125 and later to 200 Rhenish florins per month.69 The ruler could not do away with the Hungarian Council, but he could decrease its influence by not filling certain high country dignities or by reducing the councilors’ stipend, using the shrinking territory' of the kingdom as an excuse.70 Such steps carried considerable political risks. Without the support of the Hungarian aristocracy, the border defense against the Ottomans, the role of Hungary as the larder of the Monarchy, and the administration of the country' could not be implemented proper­ ly. The ruler could thus reduce the strength of the high lay dignitaries by not filling the highest of the country dignities, the palatinate.

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Ferdinand and his successors used this technique successfully dur­ ing the sixteenth century. At the time when the central administrative structures were created in Vienna the position of the palatine was a crit­ ical one because, ever since the late medieval period, the palatine was also the captain general of Hungary. Thus, in order to avoid a conflict in the sphere of military authority, after Istvdn Bdthory’s death in 1530, Ferdinand did not appoint a palatine for almost twenty-five years. The military authority of the royal regents acting for the ruler was gradual­ ly decreased until this role was taken over by the Aulic War Council in 1556. The struggle with the Hungarian estates was thus of fundamental importance from the perspective of the Habsbuig Monarchy’s defense. Furthermore, the palatine was elected by the estates while the royal regent was appointed by the ruler and this obviously was a significant difference. During his tenure as palatine, Tamds Nddasdy (1554—1562), a Protestant magnate, was able to exert sufficient power to curb the activities of the Vienna military leadership. Consequently, after Nddasdy’s death, Ferdinand and later Maximilian did everything possible in order not to fill the position. It was far more satisfactory for the court to appoint prelates, loyal to the dynasty, as royal regents and this is what happened prior to 1554 by the appointment of Pdl VArday and Ferenc Ujlaky. The Catholic Church lost much ground in Hungary and thus they, and their fellow bishops, were dependent on the court for financial support. Also, the majority of the bishops were not aristocrats but rose to their political eminence from a modest background.71 Even the Ottoman conquests were helpful to them in obtaining their position. Because their former dioceses in Csanad, Esztergom, Kalocsa, Pecs, and Vdc came under Ottoman control, they lived in Pozsony and thus had opportunities to actively participate in politics and in the delivery of justice by accept­ ing a position. The ruler also needed the support of the prelate-coun­ selors in religious matters because a large part of the lay magnates remained Lutherans or Calvinists, for many years. The Habsburg rulers could not have left the position of the palatine vacant without the support of one part of the Hungarian estates. To leave the position vacant required the collaboration of the court, the Aulic War Council and the prelates. Archbishop Miklos Oldh, high chancellor, had a major role in this. When the matter of the palatinate

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was raised at the Coronation Diet in 1563, this must have been a par­ ticularly sensitive issue for him. Had there been a palatine, Oldh would have had to share with him in the coronation ceremonies and, also, Ohih had been the royal regent since 1562, and the election of a palatine would have meant the loss of this position. Olah did everything to avoid this because he had to work very hard after Nddasdy’s death, during the summer of 1562, to gain the appointment. At the meeting of the Hungarian Council in Vienna on July 23, 1562, the majority of the councilors did not support the archbishop of Esztergom for royal regent.72 If we ignore Oldh’s vote for himself, Chief Judge Andrds Ba'hory received seven votes, Oldh four, Miklos Zrinyi and Bishop of Gyor Pal Gregoridnczy one each. Oldh was supported only by his two prelate colleagues, Hungarian Lord Steward Janos Dessewffy and Personalis Mihdly Merey. The last one also cast his vote for Chief Judge Bdthory. This means that the lay elite unanimously sup­ ported the appointment of Bdthory. Yet the vote of the councilors was not binding and was not even of the same weight. Archduke Maximil­ ian had a major influence on the outcome and negotiated with the coun­ selors in the king’s absence.73 By the beginning of August, Maximilian came out strongly in favor of Oldh, presumably remembering the arch­ bishop’s strong support in his accession to the throne of Hungary. The final decision was in the hands of the ruler. Even though nobody in Vienna doubted Bdthory’s loyalty and Ilie value of his past services, Oldh appeared to be a more favorable choice. Bdthory had the disadvan­ tage that his eastern Hungary estates kept him frequently away from Po zsony and Vienna and also that his health appeared to be failing. Oldh had spent most of Ilie past twenty years in Ilie service of the court, first as deputy7 chancellor, then as chancellor and finally as high chancellor. His humanistic education was also most impressive. It seems likely that Fer­ dinand also remembered Oldh’s support in the matter of primogeniture. Olah had played a major role as high chancellor in the administration of the country, was very successful in gathering supporters and clients, and was in matters of domestic policy on the same level as the wealthiest landowners 74 This is what Ferdinand said in the letter he wrote to Olcih on August 9, in which he informed him of his appointment.75 The counselors could not argue against the ruler’s decision because the appointment did go to the person who had received the second most votes for the regency.

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Olah remained loyal to his supporters. He played a critical role in the matter of Archduke Maximilian’s inheriting the throne in 1563 even though this action made him unpopular and even hated by many nobles. Collaborating with the court he was able to block the appointment of a palatine. His biggest contribution to the dynasty was that in his house­ hold and in the Hungarian Court Chancellery he raised a new genera­ tion willing to follow his policies and activities. Members of this group worked with him in the chancellery until the end of the century in the administration of the country, in the direction of the domestic policies, in making certain that the system of delivering justice functioned prop­ erly, and in working out the compromises with the court. His royal regent successors were also instrumental on several occasions in pre­ venting the appointment of a palatine. To do this, they appointed a deputy palatine in the interim between two sessions of the diet because a palatine could only be appointed by a diet called especially for this purpose.76 Among his royal regent successors, Istvdn Radeczy (1573 -1585) and Istvdn Fejerkovy (1587-1596) were his pupils. In addition to being regents, they also directed the Hungarian Chamber. The historian Mik­ los Istvdnffy, the later deputy palatine, and the jurist Zakarids Mossoczy, bishop of Nyitra, also began their career under Oldh.77 Who­ ever offended the archbishop’s circle of power, such as the former pro­ tege, Ferenc Forgdch, had little to look forward to.78 The supporters, on the other hand, were well rewarded. Mihdly Merey, who had voted in favor of Oldh’s regency in July 1562, received a barony in the autumn of 1563 79 At the Vienna funeral ceremonies for Ferdinand I in August 1565, the coronation regalia of the Kingdom of Hungary’ were carried by the principal supporters of Oldh’s regency. Miklos Zrinyi carried the crown, Jdnos Dessewffy the sword, Mihdly Merey the scepter and Ldsz 16 Bdnffy the orb (fig. 12). This may seem a coincidence, but knowing that all recommendations to Vienna were made by Olah, it certainly was not.80 Olah and his prelate regent successors saw to it that the clerical members of the Hungarian Council could formulate a more consistent position than the lay members. The latter were hampered in their coun­ cilor activities by the distance of their estates and by many of them serving also as captain generals in the border regions of the country.81

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Their acting in unison was also made more difficult by the fact that they belonged to two religious denominations and that, in addition to their divergent family interests, they also frequently had to consider region­ al interests. The Draskovics and Erdody, having estates in the CroatianSlavonian area, frequently had different political interests than the Batthydny, the Nddasdy, and the Zrfnyi in Transdanubia, or the Perenyi, Homonnai Drugeth, and Bdthory in Upper Hungary.82 Significant changes in the Hungarian aristocracy also made the job of the lay councilors more difficult. Fluctuations among the aristocracy can be followed well from century to century. By the 1550s-1570s a number of the aristocratic families of the tum of the fifteenth and six­ teenth century7 no longer existed. Of the aristocratic families active at the beginning of the century the Bebek, Beriszlo, Drdgffy, Emuszt, Kani zsai, Korldtkbvy, Losonczy, Orszdgh, Pdloczy, Szapolyai, Szentgybrgyi-Bazini, Tbrbk and Werboczy families had died out. By the end of the century they were replaced by tire Choron, Dobo, Draskovics, Erdody, Illeshdzy, Istvdnffy, Mdgochy, Merey, Nddasdy, Nydry, Pdlffy, Rdkoczi, Rdttkay, Revay, Seredy, Serenyi, Szunyogh, Thbkbly, Zay, and Zrfnyi families. Some of them, such as the Choron, Dobo, Istvdnffy, and Mdgochy families survived only for two or three generations.83 The new generations, in the second half of the century, were no longer under the influence of the 1526 disaster, but were bom into a new situation which was inherent in the Kingdom of Hungary being part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Together with the new baronial fami­ lies appearing at the beginning of the seventeenth century, such as the Alaghy, Apponyi, Esterhdzy, Hosszutothy, Jakusics, Osztrosics, Pethe, Pogrdny, Vfzkelethy, etc., they gradually became aware of the opportunities for the advancement of the lay elite from education in the archducal households to holding offices and to the fulfillment of individual interests. Hius, the transiently weakened lay and clerical elite of Hungary were able to preserve the medieval Royal Council under its new name of Hungarian Council, and have it accepted by the Habsburg rulers. Even though the sphere of activity of the council was restricted by the newly established central government agencies, the same would probably have happened had the council functioned in Buda under the rule of a Hun­ garian dynasty. When the government organs entered unmistakably Hun-

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garian domestic policy matters or interfered with the ancient traditions and privileges of the country, the councilors were the first ones to resist vigorously and usually successfully.84 By having paid counselors the court was able to shape the Hungarian Council after the 1570s and 1580s, and make its activities more effective. The court needed the con­ tinuous input from the Hungarian magnates in order to govern effec­ tively. Thus the Hungarian aristocrats, groomed in the households of Archdukes Ernest and Matthias, assumed increasingly important political roles. Hiis made the system of compromises possible under which, pre­ serving the ancient traditions and establishments of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary, they could function in the new framework of the Habsburg state.

The Principal Arena of Estate Resistance: The Diet

Hie principal arena for the most violent political struggles and the resistance of the estates was the diet.85 Its role and importance continued to grow in spite of the Kingdom of Hungary becoming a part of the Habsburg Monarchy, although it underwent con­ siderable long-range changes in structure and activities. These changes wzere occasioned by the division of the country into three parts, the changes in the political elite, the attachment to the Habsburg Monarchy, and to the spread of Protestantism. Fragmentation of the territory led to a considerable reduction in the sphere of activity of the Hungarian Diet. It remained the gathering of the estates of St. Stephen’s realm but its authority over the counties of the realm was reduced from seventy to thirty-five. In spite of this, it remained an “imperial gathering” (Reichstag) even though the German sources usually referred to it as a local parliament (Landtag). In con­ trast with the late Middle Ages, the estates from Transylvania no longer participated except for the short period of time when Transylvania was under Habsburg control (1551-1556 and 1600-1604). In the evolving principality the former territorial assembly (congregatio generalis) was converted into a diet and, with an increased area of authority became the diet of the estates of the new eastern Hungarian state.86 Hie Ottoman advances also caused major changes in the CroatiaSlavonia. After 1558, the delegates elected at the Croatian-Slavonian

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Assembly regularly represented these territories at the Hungarian diets. Contrary to the late medieval practice, the diets took place mostly in Pozsony and not in Pest or Buda. In its structure the Hungarian Diet differed substantially from both the Austrian, Bohemian, and the Croatian-Slavonian, and Transylvan­ ian assemblies. The former used a curial system, usually four of them, while the latter remained faithful to the medieval traditions and had only one house or chamber.87 The Hungarian Diet became a permanent two-house body in the sixteenth century where both the clergy and the laity served in both houses, and in very much larger numbers than their Austrian or Bohemian counterparts. These changes were occasioned by the Kingdom of Hungary becoming a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Act 1, confirmed at the diet after the 1608 coronation of King Matthias, specified the structure of the diet and was the closing act of an extend­ ed process.88 The Upper House {Tabula Superior) became a firm structure by the second half of the century.89 It usually met in the Pozsony palace of the archbishop of Esztergom and this later became a tradition. Its long Latin name Tabula Procerum, sen Praelatorum, Baronum et Magnatum illustrates its composition. The members were invited by a Latin letter of invitation from the ruler, dispatched by the Hungarian Court Chan­ cellery’. They included every member of the Hungarian Council and first of all the first estate, the ecclesiastic dignitaries, archbishops and bishops. Secondly the second estate, the so-called “true barons? i.e. the highest country dignitaries, and the nominal high officials of the Hun­ garian royal court. Originally numbering about twenty-five, by the second half of the century the number of members of the Upper House increased signifi ­ cantly. The second estate members now included the barons, called also as simple magnates, who had no official appointments. Their numbers were increased by a growing number of counts from the first half of the seventeenth century.90 Consequently, by the end of the sixteenth centu­ ry, this new baronial group within the Hungarian political elite out­ numbered the Hungarian counselors. The membership also included the noblest families from the late medieval Kingdom of Croatia, the Blagay, Frankopan, Keglevic, Zrinski/Zrinyi, etc., and the German, Austrian, and Bohemian nobles who received the Hungarian diploma

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indigenatus during the century. Even though most of these foreign aris­ tocrats did not actively participate at the diets, some of the members of the families which had settled in Hungary some time before, particu­ larly the Salm, Ungnad, Lobkovic, Rueber and Kollonitsch, had to be taken into account by the original Hungarian and Croatian members. This was true in making compromises with the court, in the military’ administration of the country, and in acting as partners or adversaries in the resistance of the estates to Vienna. Even more impressive changes took place in the Lower House of the Hungarian Diet {Tabula Inferior or Tabula Regnicolarum, seu Statuum et Ordinum). This was of great importance because ever since the Jagiellonian era, the members of the lesser nobility were considered the principal defenders of the privileges of the nobility. The major change was caused by the nobility no longer participating in person. The Pozsony coronation of Archduke Rudolf in September 1572 was the last time that the nobles received a personal invitation.91 The rea­ sons for this were appropriate and it was not due to the scheming of the Vienna court.. Pozsony was much more peripherically located than Buda and the expenses of travel and accommodations induced the less­ er nobility to be represented by delegates of the counties. They made this change in their own interest, departing from the ancient practices of the country and this was illustrated by the 1572 invitations.92 The new system became the standard practice and was confirmed by the 1608 diet. Thereafter the counties were represented at the diet by two to three delegates each. They were known as the third estate. It was also at the same time that, following medieval Slavonian traditions, the Croatian-Slavonian estates sent joint representatives, from their joint meetings, to the Lower House. It was also during the decades after 1526 that the representation of the free royal cities became established. The practice had occurred dur­ ing the politically troubled periods of the fifteenth century (1445-1460, 1490 -1508), but became a standard practice during the rule of Ferdi­ nand I.93 It was partly due to Austrian-Bohemian influence but also because under the troubled political and military conditions, the ruler needed the support of these cities. Starting at this time the cities were represented by two or three delegates each and they were referred to as the fourth estates. It was considered a peculiarity of the system that the

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Slavonian free royal cities, Zagreb, Varasd, Korbs, and Kapronca, were represented in both the Croatian-Slavonian assembly and at the Hun­ garian diet. This also meant that the Hungarian political elite continued to consider Slavonia as an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. Just as among the nobility, the Catholic Church w;as represented in the Lower House by delegates from the chapter houses and provostries. Seats were also offered to the widows of the magnates and to the rep­ resentatives of the magnates who had been personally invited but would not attend. Similarly to the delegates from the counties they were usually from the lesser nobility. An increasingly important role was played in the Lower House by the personnel of the Royal Judicial Court which over time became its corps of officers.94 Their leader, the per­ sonalis, was the president of the Lower House and the judges and asso­ ciate judges were also invited to attend the diets.95 Their importance was such that at the coronation banquets in the seventeenth century they had their own table which was the most distinguished one among all tables of the Lower House.96 The composition and structure of the Hungarian Diet in the six­ teenth century shows that the political struggle of the estates at the diets was complex. In the presence of dualistic governance the most striking issue was the resistance of the estates, but it would be a mistake to assume that this was the only background to the relationship of the ruler, the court and the estates. In contrast to the curial system of Austria and Bohemia, the twohouse system in Hungary made it much more difficult for the ruler to prevail. The nobility and the clergy were represented in both houses. Hie aristocrats could use their extensive family relationships and noble retainer system to influence the political position of some of the coun­ ties while the prelates could take advantage of the support of the chap­ ter houses and provostries. AH in all this strengthened the position of the estates. Their joint resistance was further increased and strength­ ened, by the absence of the ruler, by the affairs of the country being directed from abroad, by the captain general positions being filled by foreigners, and by the excesses committed by the Austrian-German troops stationed in the border fortresses. With the spread of Protes­ tantism the medieval right of tire estates to resist the throne (ius resistendi), guaranteed by Article 31 of the Golden Bull and the Wer

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boczy Tripartitam91 was further strengthened and given a new inter­ pretation by the various Lutheran and Calvinist theories of resistance.98 In addition to the protection of the rights and privileges of the nobility, most of the grievances of the estates dealt with this problem.99 It w;as for this reason that they demanded, over and over again, that the ruler, or in his absence the archduke acting for him, live in Hungary, maintain a Hungarian household, learn Hungarian, and rule with Hun­ garian counselors. The influence exerted by the central administrative structures on Hungarian affairs and leaving the position of the palatine vacant was also among the frequent complaints. They also resented that the posts of captain general of the fortresses Kanizsa, Kassa, Szatmtir, Eger, and Tokaj was held by foreigners. During the second half of the century these positions were held by some captain generals who held patents of Hungarian nobility, but the estates now insisted that these offices be held by native Hungarians. Among their grievances three others were prominent. These were the matter of the discipline, pay and supplies of the garrisons in the frontier fortresses, as well as the control of the misbehavior of the for­ eign troops. This matter affected a large segment of the nobility and remained a bunting issue among the political and religious matters. The second issue was the protection of religious freedom for the Protestant nobility, and this soon became the most prominent one. The third mat­ ter was the struggle against all endeavors to curb one of the principal privileges of the nobility, namely the freedom from taxation. In their resistance they could refer to concrete written country law?s, to the resistance clause of the Golden Bull and to Werboczy’s Tripartitum which listed their privileges in proper sequence.100 The most solid buttress of their defense was the unwritten or only partially written cus­ tomary law and the ancient freedoms of the country (consuetudo regni et antiqua libertas). The rulers not only took an oath at the time of their coronation that they would preserve and protect the liberties and cus­ toms but also incorporated them in numerous legislative acts.101 Actu­ ally, the estates could interpret these in any way they found desirable in order to serve their interests according the saying, “in ore omnium versatur vetus libertas.”102 Protection of the ancient liberties was thus not some outmoded conservatism but gave the estates increased political power. In this way they could add to their liberties at will and did

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include the freedom of religion, just as the Austrian estates had done earlier.103 They could protect their privileges forcefully by denying approval of the war tax until their complaints were satisfied. Because this tax represented about 10 percent of the country revenues, approxi­ mately 80 -120,000 Rhenish florins, Ferdinand and his successors had a great need for it. Being able to threaten the withholding of the taxes gave the estates substantial political leverage.104 The ability of the estates to resist was, however, limited by several factors. Because in Hungary the diet was not based on any particular social class the rulers could exploit the conflicts within the individual houses. In the matter of the hereditary succession to the throne the Upper House was divided. The rulers also tried to control the lesser nobility by supporting the free royal cities. The latter had increasing conflicts with the nobility, primarily because of the great number of nobles moving into the cities.105 The kings of Hungary could also exploit the traditional conflicts between the aristocrats and the lesser nobility. In the sixteenth century the Upper House was the dominant force at the diets. This changed in favor of the Lower House only after the middle of the eighteenth century.106 In the midst of the changes after 1526 the clerical and lay elite was in a much more favorable position than the lesser nobility. The latter went through the most difficult peri­ od of its entire history. Also, the lesser nobility representatives of the more than thirty counties rarely acted as a group. The interests of the nobility of the Transdanubian counties and of the counties around Po zsony frequently differed markedly from those of the nobility in Upper Hungary. The regional and other self-interest struggles were then exploited by the court and by the central administrative structures for their own purposes. The nature of the resistance by the estates was changed by the new position of the Kingdom of Hungary. In order to protect its frontiers it had to rely on the regular military7 and financial support of the Habsburg Monarchy. Defense based on they own resources was an illusion and could be used only for political propaganda. In exchange for the sup­ port from abroad the estates had to agree that the major military posi­ tions would be filled with Austrian and German nobles. So far as the district captain generals were concerned, except in Upper Hungary, the

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estates could always preserve their privileges. Pilling these positions presented a serious problem to the Aulic War Council because it was not always possible to find a Hungarian aristocrat who was willing and able to assume the position. This is what happened in Transdanubia between 1578 and 1582.107 The estates also had serious problems with the new central admin­ istration of the country. Even though the nature and structure of the Hungarian Court Chancellery and of the Hungarian Council could be preserved reasonably w-ell, the spheres of activities of the chambers and of the Aulic War Council were only partially under their control. Their complaints about the central structures were mostly ignored. The government agencies in Vienna repeatedly responded by saying that they issued all their commands in the name of the king of Hungary or of the archduke acting for the king, usually bearing the appropriate sig­ natures. They also said that in the majority of cases the orders were issued after consultation with the Hungarian Council. This, in fact, was true in most cases.108 It w;as true also for many of the proposals made by the ruler at the diets. These proposals were discussed by the royal regent, the chancellor, and the Hungarian counselors with the king and with the government agencies in Vienna or in Pozsony. It happened repeatedly that the Hungarian counselors denied having given a prior opinion. Thus, at the negotiations at the diet, the counselors could count on the support of a broader portion of the estates in their oppos­ ing the complaints about the ruler’s proposals being injurious to the interests of the estates.109 Resistance to the military excesses, lack of religious freedom, and taxation of the nobility, was not free of contradictions. The estates fre­ quently complained about the misbehavior of the foreign and Hungari­ an troops in the border fortresses, yet they repeatedly rejected the reg­ ulations governing the behavior of the Hungarian border fortress gar­ risons issued by the Aulic War Council.110 Using a German model, but in agreement with the Hungarian traditions and the Hungarian captains, Lazarus von Schwendi prepared such regulations for both the infantry and cavalry in the second half of the 1560s. Accepting these would have served only the area of military discipline, but because in other areas it infringed on the privileges of the estates, they refused to incor­ porate them into the law7. Because the border fortress garrisons includ­

18^1

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

ed soldiers of both noble and peasant background, acceptance of the regulations would have meant that both groups would have to be judged by the same tribunals. The estates refused to incorporate this into the legal system because they considered jurisdiction over the nobility to be their exclusive privilege. In this matter there was a con­ flict between two interests of the estates which was eventually resolved in favor of the one which confirmed their privileged status.111 Similarly to the Austrian, German and Bohemian estates, by the middle of the century, the Hungarians raised the matter of religious free­ dom to become one of their most constant complaints. In this there was also no unanimity.112 Even though by this time the Catholic Church had lost much of its position, it still had a major role in the governance of the country, in the delivery of justice, and in the life of the estates. This sig­ nificantly limited the prospects of the majority of the aristocrats and less ­ er nobility who had converted to Protestantism. With their clever politi­ cal maneuvers the bishop-regents, chancellors and counselors could pre­ vent Protestants from being appointed to major positions. The Catholic Counter-Reformation, under Miklos Olah’s leadership, started in Hun­ gary at the same time as the Council of Trent, a remarkable event.113 During the last decades of the century some of the Hungarian aristocrats began to return to the Catholic Church. After the first few conversions, such as Peter Pdzmdny’s in 1582 and Ferenc Forgach’s in 1584, the turn of the century saw the conversion of such prominent personalities as the future palatine, Miklos Esterhdzy, Gyorgy Homonnai Drugeth, and Zsigmond Forgdch.114 There was little chance that religious freedom could be legally enacted because of the political opposition of a largely Catholic portion of the estates. It was made possible only later, because of the armed actions of the Hungarian Catholic elite and because of the conditions caused by the Long Turkish War.115 The varying interests of the estates clashed over the taxation of the nobility as well. In principle, every member of the nobility in Hungary had “the same identical nobility” (iina eademque nobilitas), yet there were considerable differences between the various sections of the less­ er nobility. Which section they belonged to depended on the size of their wealth, the role they played in the county administration and their personal and family relationship with the large estate owners. Because freedom from taxation was the principal privilege of the nobility it was

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insisted upon for a long time even for the lowest level of the nobility who struggled for an existence at the level of the serfs.116 During the financial crisis occasioned by the Long Turkish War at the end of the century, it was no longer possible to prevent the introduction of taxa­ tion for this poorest segment of the nobility. It was the estates which issued the acts regulating these taxes (Act 5,1595 and Act 10,1596).117 The members of the Vienna court who were familiar with Hungar­ ian affairs and anxious about defense and food supplies for the Monar­ chy were not always favorably inclined toward the remedy of the griev­ ances of the estates but were always most wdlling to work out compro­ mises. They were very much aware of the fact that if they would upset the equilibrium with the prominent representatives of the Hungarian estates, an equilibrium established with great difficulty, this would have fateful results for the entire Monarchy. Thus, while during the 1560s 1580s they frequently over-reacted in their relationship with the Hun­ garian and Transylvanian nobility,118 they did try to reach a modus vivendi with tire Hungarian aristocrats and prelates so that the latter w;ere willing to accept that the country would be governed from abroad. The participants at the Vienna military conference in 1577 strong­ ly recommended that the Hungarians should be granted a benevolent understanding, that the time-consuming and expensive Viennese responsibilities be made more flexible, and that at the diet a spirit of cooperation be demonstrated. They were very anxious that the Hungar­ ian soldiers in the border fortresses be paid punctually and that the high dignitaries of the country be appropriately placated. The principal goal w;as that among the frequently feuding, but obviously interdependent Germans and Hungarians, a perhaps not perfect but nevertheless smoothly working cooperation be established.119 On Cavalry Captain Bdlint Prepostvdry’s recommendation, the Aufic War Council recom­ mended in January 1582 that, in the most critical Upper Hungary, the most important members of the nobility and the older border fortress officers be granted an allowance or some other inducement in order to make them more compliant.120 Hie military, financial and economic importance of Hungary and the mutual interdependence resulted in most of the grievances of the estates being remedied, at least to some extent, with the exception of the complaints affecting joint affairs. The direction of Hungarian

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domestic policies remained largely in the hands of the estates. Ilie estates managed this almost completely by themselves, primarily through the Hungarian Council and the diets, albeit with the assistance of the Hungarian Court Chancellery which was estate-oriented even though formally a centralized office. Without the estates’ approval the ruler could not enact any laws.121 Actually, in Hungary, without the cooperation of the estates the kings of Hungary could not take any action in any domestic policy affair. Thus, in spite of a successful cen­ tralization and administrative reforms, the Habsburg rulers were forced into making substantial compromises with the estates. The arena for these compromises was the diet which functioned well in spite of seri­ ous conflicts. As a consequence, St. Stephen’s realm remained a strong state of the estates that could almost be called a small estates monarchy. Within the great Habsburg Monarchy, next to the Holy Roman Empire it was a state formation, with the strongest feudal orders, whose internal sov­ ereignty was protected and preserved by the increasingly solid diet sys­ tem evolving during the sixteenth century. Contrary to frequently voiced opinion, the successful centralization, but not absolutism, and the strong estate system were not mutually exclusive in Hungary7. In this arrangement in some areas the Hungarian estates had to yield while in other areas the Habsburg court was forced to do so. In spite of smaller and larger tensions, the equilibrium became a reality by the second half of the century. It was this that made it possible for the Kingdom of Hun­ gary to maintain its statehood wtithin the Habsburg Monarchy and also its role as a defensive bastion, larder and source of critical revenues.

Dispensing Justice, the Legal System, and SelfGovernment of the Nobility

In the sixteenth century the estates successfully defended the dispensing of justice and the legal system in Hungary.122 Being unfamiliar with the conditions in Hungary the Vienna or Prague Habsburg court had few opportunities to implement any changes. The Hungarian judicial and legal system differed fundamentally from its counterparts in Austria, Germany, and Bohemia.

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In the beginning King Ferdinand and his Austrian advisers made several attempts to interfere with the Hungarian system of justice. In February, 1527, Ferdinand assigned Dietrich von Hardsell as Captain of Sopron and stationed a large number of Austrian and Croatian troops in this western Hungarian free royal city. Billeting these troops caused friction with the residents of the city. The parish priest, Jdnos Paesa, got into an argument with the Croatian soldier billeted in his house. The soldier denounced Paesa and claimed that Paesa maintained contacts with the followers of King John Szapolyai. Hartisch’s deputy arrested the priest and his chaplain and had them taken to Vienna where they were supposed to be tried by Lower Austrian, i.e. foreign authorities. This was a serious offense to the city and the City Council turned to Tamds SzalahAzy, the Hungarian chancellor, for help. The intervention of the chancellor, who was one of Ferdinand’s principal Hungarian counselors, brought rapid results. The Hungarian counselors in the court of Queen Mary of Habsburg in Pozsony also protested vigorous­ ly against this gross offense against the Hungarian legal system. Hie procedure violated the basic privileges of the estates. These privileges included the rule that any legal suit which originated in Hun­ gary had to be tried in Hungary. The principle was stated clearly in the orders issued by Queen Mary to the Lower Austria authorities in her directive of March 1527.123 It was in vain that the Austrian counselors claimed that this was a military’ matter. The estates prevailed. The Hun­ garian legal system could not be violated and Hungarians could not be placed before foreign courts even in military matters. We know of sev­ eral similar cases from the sixteenth century, the estates successfully preserved the Hungarian legal tribunals’ privileges. In this the estates were assisted by the Hungarian Council, the Hungarian Court Chan­ cellery and the Royal Judicial Court.124 The same is shown by the method developed to deal with the trial of the Hungarian captains who surrendered border fortresses to the Ottomans. Because the Austrian-Hungarian military matters became joint affairs, technically, a special court of the Aulic War Council should have ruled in these cases, just as they did with the German officers who surrendered frontier fortresses, such as Ferdinand Graf zu Hardegg who surrendered Gy dr in 1594 and Georg Paradeiser who did the same in Kanizsa in 1600. Because this was a matter of disloyalty (nota perpetu-

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ae infidelitatis), as specified by Werboczy’s Tripartitum^5 the trial became the privilege of a special court delegated by the diet. The mili­ tary leadership in Vienna was forced to yield. Until the end of 1550s the military counselors realized that the Hungarian estates absolutely insist­ ed on their prerogatives and that therefore a compromise was required. Thus, in order to avoid further political confrontations they yielded to the estates in this legal matter which would have been one of serious legal difficulties. Consequently, for the next 150 years, a special court appointed by the diet sat in judgment over the captains who surrendered border fortresses. The captains were sentenced to death and loss of prop­ erty, but in contrast to the German captains, the Hungarian captains were pardoned by the ruler on the request by the estates.1'26 It also demonstrated the estates’ pow-er that the so-called Knightly Court of Honor (curia militaris) was preserved .127 In the late Middle Ages this court dealt with the defamation cases against Hungarian noblemen serving in the court of the Hungarian ruler. Even though tire independent Hungarian Royal Court came to an end after 1526, the Hungarian estates would not allow a high dignitary of the joint Habs­ burg court to render judgment over Hungarian noblemen in such cases. This was not an issue in Vienna. The chief marshal of the court could render decisions only in the cases invoicing Hungarian courtiers actu­ ally serving at court.128 The more important defamation cases against Hungarian noblemen continued to be handled by the Knightly Court, of Honor.129 The survival of this special form of legal practice shows clearly that although the joint Habsburg court became the functional successor of the late medieval Hungarian royal court, some of the legal practices and traditions of the independent Hungarian royal court were preserved intact. In spite of being a part of the Habsburg Monarchy, legal practice in Hungary was little affected by Austrian or German influ ences. The only exception to this were the western Hungary cities of Koszeg, Kismarton, Frakno, and some others, which since 1447, and for the ensuing two hundred years were mortgaged to the Habsburgs. In these cities tri­ als for crimes were conducted according to the German criminal code introduced by Emperor Charles V in 1532. The imperial law was in effect in Koszeg until 1647 when tire city was returned to tire Hungari­ an crown.130 As soon as this took place the legal practice immediately

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reverted to the Hungarian legal system, having followed the German one for more than a century.131 Even Emperor Ferdinand Ill’s criminal code became effective only in the eighteenth century and was then based on a Latin version (Praxis Criminalis) published in Nagyszombatin 1687.132 It is evident that the Kingdom of Hungary had a legal background and legal practices which had centuries-old traditions. These were set by the solidly established customary law (ins consuetudinarium), the laws of the country (leges regni). and Werboczy’s TripartitumV33 The estates preserved these traditions in the sixteenth century and even fur­ ther strengthened them. The Quadripartitum in 1553 which summa­ rized civil law and criminal law could not be published because it had been revised in Vienna for political purposes. Zakarids Mossoczy, the bishop of Nyitra, published the first comprehensive collection of Hun­ garian laws (Decreta, constitutiones et articuli regum inclyti regni Vugariae) in 1584 and this proved to have considerable effect. Hie work was published in several hundred copies and, in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary, it was the first attempt to collect the results of five hundred years of legislation and to correct mistakes in the text. Its importance is shown by the fact that during the ensuing 150 years the various levels of Hungarian jurisprudence used it with great benefit.134 The judiciary in Hungary continued its activities more or less in conformance with medieval practices. The only major changes were the significant reduction in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, the absence of the ruler and the vacancy in the post of the palatine. Hie reduction in territory made the high courts meet in Pozsony and Eperjes, on previously determined days, usually on the eighth day after a major religious holiday (octavo).135 The royal regent, and the deputy palatine, assuming the legislative duties of the palatine, became an important factor in the judicial system of the country and shared these responsibilities with the chief justice and the personalis. The free royal cities were, from a legal perspective, divided into two groups with Pozsony, Nagyszombat, Sopron, Kassa, Eperjes, Bdrtfa, Szakolca, and Trencsen being in one group and Ldcse and Kisszeben being in the other one. Appeals from these cities were handled by the courts of the royal treasurer (magister tavernicorum) and of the personalis. Appeals could also be made from the court of the Croatian-Slavonian ban to the

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

chief justice. All of these courts continued to function without interfer­ ence from the central government agencies. This was only partly true for the local self-governments of the nobil­ ity in the counties. In the remaining thirty-five counties of the Kingdom of Hungary the sixteenth century was just as much a period of funda­ mental change as it had been for the diet. It was at this time that the counties became the bastions of self-government and representation of the interests of the nobility. The counties solidified their administrative structures, their activities became more efficient, and their written records improved markedly.136 The counties were led by the bailiff (ispari), an official appointed by the ruler, referred to as lord lieutenant (foispdn) from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Foreigners served in this capacity only if they held Hungarian diploma indigenatus, such as the Salm in Pozsony, Hans and Georg Rueber in Sdros and Ladislav z Lobkovic Pope! in Trencsen Counties. When Ferdinand appointed the Lower Austrian Dietrich von Hartisch as bailiff of Komdrom County in 1535, the county refused to install him.137 The officials of the county government, the deputy lord lieutenant, the magistrate, the jurors, the tax collector, and the notary were cho­ sen by a general assembly. The lower level administration of justice was at the county courts from w7here appeals could be made to the Royal Judicial Court of Appeals. A majority of the counties issued local regulations which had the effect of laws and which were impor­ tant factors in their self-administration.138 A smaller group of counties, Somogy, Heves, Arva, Veszprem, and a few others had their own coat of arms and seal.139 In the Croatian-Slavonian territories the only county which func­ tioned like the counties in the Kingdom of Hungary was Varasd. Until the beginning of the fifteenth century, Varasd County w;as not a part of Slavonia but was an integral component of the Kingdom of Hungary. Ulis was the reason why even in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Varasd followed Hungarian customs while Zagreb and Korbs Counties were rigidly controlled and administered by the Croatian-Slavonian ban and his deputy. In Varasd the Ungnad family furnished bailiffs after the 1540s; after 1607 this position was held successively by members of the Erdody family who were all appointed by the king. About this time the counties of Zagreb and Korbs united and the bailiffs were, wdth few

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exceptions, the deputy bans themselves. In this they were like the coun­ ties in Transylvania in the early modem era.140 In contrast to the situation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu­ ry, the sixteenth century counties were not yet the strong bastions of the resistance of the estates. The central government agencies in Vienna did not wish to interfere with the life of the counties and, being ignorant of the language and the laws of the country could not do so. No attempt was made to change the self-government of the nobility in the counties and with the increase in the number of noble families the self-govern­ ment became progressively stronger.141 The sixteenth century Hungar­ ian county was not yet the power base for estate resistance, but the site of the increasing local autonomy of the nobility and the conscientious executor of the royal and treasury mandates.142 lliese mandates dealt primarily with taxation, the maintenance of the border fortresses and their garrisons, other issues of the defense against the Ottomans, the levies of the nobility, the creation of fords, and the maintenance of roads and bridges. The county was the lowest level for lesser nobility politics, the increasingly frequent regional or district assemblies were the middle level and the diet was the highest level. In order to coordinate their interests several counties, e.g. Vas, Sopron, and Zala in Transdanubia, held joint meetings. At these meeting they could plan joint anti­ Ottoman activities, discuss political issues and, in the seventeenth cen­ tury talk about religious matters. The counties of Pest-Pilis-Solt, Heves Kulso-Szolnok, and Nogrdd, largely under Ottoman occupa­ tion, met in the market town of Fiilek after the beginning of the sev­ enteenth century. These counties, known as the refugee counties, were still supported in their administration, estate matters and the adminis­ tration of justice by magistrates and their assistants w-ho crossed over into Ottoman occupied territories. These officials were instrumental in assuring that the Hungarian nobility could preserve its right to their estates and to their privilege of collecting taxes. The nobility could even sell and buy property on both sides of the frontier as though there was no Ottoman occupation.143 This was obviously in the interest of the Hungarian ruler in Vienna or Prague and they continued to make donations of land in these Ottoman areas to their followers.

Chapter Ten

SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY The statehood of St. Stephen’s realm continued after the middle of the sixteenth century as the Habsburg Kingdom of Hun­ gary and this was shown by the continued use of the medieval symbols and ceremonies of the Hungarian state. This preservation was due pri­ marily to the Hungarian political elite which in the complex conflict and compromise relationship with the Habsburgs successfully protec­ ted the institutions and traditions of Hungary7.

Preservation of the Unity of St. Stephen’s Realm Ilie breaking up of Hungary into three parts after 1526 significantly reduced its central European political importance, but it was in the interest of both the estates and of the Habsburg rulers to preserve as much as possible of its former importance. The occupa­ tion of the central parts of the country by the Ottomans and the inde­ pendence of Transylvania were considered to be only temporary. This explains why the Hungarian rulers continued to award estates to Hun­ garian nobles in the Ottoman-held areas and why tlie diets continued to enact laws which applied to these territories.1 The bishoprics and eccle­ siastic benefits in the occupied areas were still being awarded and the bishoprics in Transylvania and Vdrad were now filled as titular sees.2 The former eastern Hungarian province, which had become a vassal state of the Ottomans, was considered to be only temporarily separated from the Kingdom of Hungary. The Long Turkish War at the tum of the century showed that the continuing strength of the Ottomans made any hope for the unification

ISM

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

with Transylvania futile.3 Yet the Hungarian political elite continued to think in terms of a unified statehood under the Hungarian crown.4 Star­ ting with the last third of the century, the estates increasingly identified the concept of the Holy Crown with themselves, that is with the Hun­ garian feudal “nation” vis-a-vis the ruler living abroad.5 This move was facilitated by the strong feeling that the Holy Crown was more than just a part of the coronation regalia or a symbol of statehood. In fact, ever since the Middle Ages, the Holy Crown as a relic had its own particu­ lar identity and myth.6 It was thus that, in addition to the geographic units, the estates also became members of the Holy Crown. This con­ cept was congealed at the beginning of the seventeenth century through the influence of Peter Revay’s great work: De Sacrae Coronae regni Hungariae ortu..published in Augsburg in 1613 2 Maintenance of the virtual unity of St. Stephen’s state was not only based on the hope that the future would bring the reunification of the country but was a matter of the highest importance. The increasing reduction of the size of the country and the failure of the attempts to regain Transylvania strengthened the resolve of the Hungarian political elite to do everything possible on the international and domestic scene to maintain this significant tradition with the active support of the Habsburg rulers. Ihe fact that after 1526 it was not just a country, but a small and special imperium that joined the Monarchy, substantially contributed to the standing of the Habsburg domains in central Europe. The joint interests of the Habsburg dynastic powers and of the Hunga­ rian estates were manifested by the fact that the Kingdom of Hungary could preserve its symbols and ceremonies and its particular sover­ eignty within the Monarchy.

The Titles, Coats of Arms and Banners of the Hungarian Rulers

There was no doubt in Ferdinand of Habsburg’s mind that after acquiring the Hungarian throne he had to acquire also the Hungarian royal titles of his Jagiellonian predecessors. His titles as king of Hungary were the same as those of Louis II and included those of the associated and affiliated countries, Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia,

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Galicia, Lodomeria, Cumania, and Bulgaria. The gradual unification of Croatia and Slavonia, after the 1540s, led to the Hungarian titles being supplemented with rex Sclavoniae, which had never been used by the medieval rulers (fig. 2). King John Szapolyai did not use this new title and neither did his son John II Sigismund. The latter even abdicated from his title as elec­ ted king of Hungary in the Speyer Agreement of 1570 and continued to rule as prince of Transylvania and of the Pariium^ He used his royal title only in his diplomatic correspondence with the Porte.9 Thus the legitimate legal heirs of St. Stephen’s state were only those who could claim to be kings of Hungary even though, at this time, they were not even Hungarians. In 1570 no one could have predicted that the relati­ onship wdth the Habsburgs would continue until 1918. Gaining the Hungarian royal titles increased the prestige of the Habsburg dynasty. Even though Emperors Frederic III and Maximilian I used the title of King of Hungary, Dalmatia and Croatia, it was Ferdi­ nand I wdiose titles were not only increased but also became a reality. This was true even though the Ottoman conquests led to considerable losses in the territories of Hungary; Croatia and Slavonia between 1526 and 1541. Ever since the late Middle Ages, the dynastic rivalries had increa­ sed throughout Europe10 leading to an increased importance of the tit­ les and the associated coats of arms and banners in the dynastic and artistic representations and in political propaganda.11 Uris was shown by the coat of arms wall erected by Emperor Frederic III in Wiener Neustadt and by the coat of arms tower erected by Emperor Maximili­ an I in Innsbruck. On the latter and on the Gate of Honor designed by Albrecht Durer, a number of Hungarian coats of arms were displayed, including the Hungarian, Dalmatian, Croatian, and Bosnian one. The latter was displayed over the Austrian term, Bosna and not over the tra­ ditional Hungarian designation of RamaM After 1540 Ferdinand I and his successors throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century used the Hungarian royal titles, which increa­ sed in number to ten by the inclusion of rex Sclavoniae. Ferdinand’s Hungarian dual seal (sigilium duplex'), used until 1558, did not conform completely. The titles on the seal read: “EERDINANDVS DEO EAVENTE CLEMENTIA ROMAS'ORVM REX, SEMPER AVGVSTVS

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

AC GERMANIE, HVNGARIE, BOEMIE, DALMATIE, CROATIE, BOSNE,LODOMERIE. BVLGARIE, SCLAVONIE, RAME SERVIEQUE REX.”13 Bosnia appeared twice, both as Bosna and Rama thus using both the Austrian and the Hungarian form. Galicia and Cumania were not used at all. Slavonia appeared in the wrong sequence. It seems like' ly that this could have been due to the insufficient knowledge of the officials of die Austrian Court Chancellery. On the front of the seal, in addition to the two traditional Hungari­ an coats of arms (the so-called Hungarian Small Coat of Arms, fig. 8), the coat of arms of Dalmatia also appeared.14 On the back of the seal the Hungarian coats of arms were repeated but there was also a repre­ sentation of the coats of aims of Croatia, Lodomeria, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Galicia. Slavonia, Serbia and Cumania were not represented. The former were probably taken from the late medieval Hungarian Chan­ cellery practices. On the seals of Matthias Corvinus and Wladislaw II Dalmatia, Galicia, and Bulgaria were already represented.15 On the large Holy Roman seal, used by Ferdinand I, the Hungarian, Dalmat­ ian, Croatian, and Bosnian coats of arms were present as they were on the coat of arms tower of Maximilian I in Innsbruck.16 The Hungarian royal titles, the titles listed on the dual seal and the coats of arms did not correspond accurately to each other. Neither did the banners carried at the coronation of Ferdinand in SzekesfehervAr. At these ceremonies in November 1527, in addition to the Austrian archducal and Bohemian royal banners, only the banners of the Kingdom of Hungary, of Dalmatia and Croatia w;ere carried.17 It seems that in the late medieval era the titles, the coats of arms on the seal and the ban­ ners used at the ceremonies all had their own system. These symbols gained increased importance in the middle of the century and therefore it became an important task for the Hungarian estates, in cooperation with the leaders of the Habsburg court, to straighten out the existing confusion. This was accomplished during the 1550s-l 570s. There were sever­ al opportunities to do so. One was in 1558 at Ferdinand’s accession to the throne as Emperor Charles’s successor, which made it necessary to create new seals for him in Hungary indicating he was now the Holy Roman emperor. Ferdinand’s new and corrected Hungarian dual seal read: “EERDINANDVS DEI GRATIA ELECTVS ROMANORVM

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197

IMPERATOR, SEMPER AVGVSl'VS, GERMANIE. HVNGARIE, BOEMIE, DALMATIE, CROATIE, SCLAVONIE, RAME, SERVIE. GAUGIE, BOSNE, LODOMERIE, CVMANIE BVLGARIEQUE REX.”™ Slavonia appeared in its proper place, behind Croatia, while Bosnia was listed under two names, Rama and Bosna, but also Rama appeared in its proper place. Galicia and Cumania were also listed on the seal, according to the traditional Hungarian titles. The number of coats of arms on the two sides of the seal did not change and those of Slavonia, Serbia, and Cumania were not represented. The Great Impe ­ rial Seal changed even less. In addition to the imperial, Austrian and Bohemian coats of arms, it showed only the Hungarian, Dalmatian, Croatian, and Bosnian ones.19 Further correction of the coats of arms and banners was made pos­ sible in the autumn of 1563, during the coronation of Archduke Maxi­ milian in Pozsony. The banners of the Kingdom of Hungary and of all its components were used only at the Hungarian coronation and funeral ceremonies of the rulers. At the various other ceremonies of the Habs­ burg court the components of the Monarchy were represented only by a single herald. These were the heralds of the Holy Roman Empire, of the Hungarian Crown, of the Bohemian Lands and of the Archduchy of Austria. Every herald wore a festive uniform and the Hungarian herald’s uniform displayed the most important symbol of the country, the socalled “small coat of anus” (fig. 8). The subject of banners was raised during Ferdinand’s reign only in 1561 when the negotiations concerning the coronation of Archduke Maximilian as king of Hungary began. On March 26, the Hungarian councilors in Vienna stated, “The banners of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the associated and affiliated countries must be prepared immediately.”20 No numbers were mentioned. At Maximilian’s coronation on September 8,1563, seven of the ten Hungarian royal titles were represented by banners. These were Hun­ gary, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria.21 The banners of Galicia, Lodomeria and Cumania were missing. Hie Hun­ garian political elite differentiated between the affiliated provinces. Just prior to the ceremonies, the Hungarian counselors made specific recommendations about the components making up the parade. They recommended the inclusion of only the seven banners mentioned above.22 Their decision might have been due to the fact that the six sou-

198

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

them Slav countries, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Bulgaria were a part of, or closely affiliated with, the Kingdom of Hun­ gary, permanently, or for longer periods of time. This could not be said about Galicia, Lodomeria or Cumania. The same perspective determined the number of Hungarian or Hungary-affiliated banners which were carried in August 1565, at the Vienna funeral ceremonies of Ferdinand.23 Hungary (fig. 9) and the associated countries (Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia) were given separate banners (fig. 10), and the affiliated countries (Bosnia, Serbia, Cumania, and Bulgaria) only one common banner (fig. 11), as shown by an illustration of the funeral procession. This illustration was publis­ hed in Augsburg in 1566 by Bartholomaeus Hannewald, a noble retai­ ner of Privy Counselor Johann Ulrich Zasius.24 In contrast to the con­ temporary Hungarian battle flags, which displayed the two-headed eagle of the Habsburg, the banner of Hungary (fig. 9) showed only the Hungarian small coat of arms. The common banner of the affiliated countries was changed and, in addition to Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, Cumania was also included (fig. 11).25 At the funeral of Ferdinand of Habsburg eight of the ten royal tit­ les of St. Stephen’s realm were represented with their own coat of arms, even though they were represented on only five banners. This was mod­ eled, directly or indirectly, on the 1563 coronation ceremonies in Pozsony. In July 1565, the members of the Hungarian Council submit­ ted a detailed report in Vienna, on the Hungarian ecclesiastic and lay dignitaries w;ho had to be invited to the ceremony.26 After some debate, agreement was reached on who was to carry the banners and the Hun­ garian royal regalia.27 In the history7 of the central European Habsburg Monarchy this was the first time after 1526 that a ceremony took place which affec­ ted the entirety of the dynasty and of the Monarchy. The Vienna lord steward of the household and the organizers of the funeral ceremony therefore needed the assistance of the Hungarian political elite. They urged Archbishop and High Chancellor Olah to submit a recommen ­ dation in a timely fashion and they accepted this recommendation in its entirety 28 Ol£h took full advantage of this opportunity. The Hun­ garian royal regalia could be carried only by Miklos Zrinyi and by the nobles who supported Oldh’s appointment as royal regent in summer

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of 1562 (fig. 12). He also assigned his nephew Miklos Oldhcsdszdr to carry the banner of Croatia. The choice of this banner was probably due to the fact that Oldhcsdszdr’s wife, Anna, was related to the Croa­ tian Frankopan family.29 Ilie Hungarian royal titles, the inscriptions and coats of arms on the dual seal, and the ceremonial banners carried at coronation cere­ monies were finally brought into conformity at the coronation of Rudolf I as King of Hungary (1576-1608). The Hungarian dual seal of Maximilian still showed the titles used by his father, namely: “MAXIMILIANVS SECVNDVS DEI GRATIA ELECTVS ROMANORVM IMPERATOR, SEMPER AVGVSTVS, GERMANIE, HVNGARIE, BOEMIE, DALMATIE, CROATIE, SCLAVONIE, RAME, SERVIE, GALLITIE, BOSNE, L0D0MER1E, CVMANIE BVLGA RIEQUE REXT30 In contrast to the coronation procession and titles, Bosnia was still represented by two names. At the time of the engraving the name of Galicia was modified from GALICIE to GALLITIE. When the death of Maximilian in 1576 made the Hungarian dual seal obsolete, the new dual seal for Rudolf was prepared in Vienna more carefully. Both the inscriptions and the coats of arms were much improved. They corrected the inscription which heretofore differed from the correct titles. Rudolf and his successors henceforth used the following form, “ELECTVS ROMANORVM IMPERATOR, SEMPER AVGVSTVS, GERMANIE, HVNGARIAE, BOEMIAE, DALMATIAE, CROATIAE, SCEWONIAE, RAMAE, SERVIAE, GALLITIAE, LODOMERIAE, CVMANIAE BVLGARIEQUE REXT3[ Bosnia thus appeared only under the customary medieval name of Rama and all the other names on the circular inscription were correct. All ten coats of arms also appeared on tire seal. On the front the Hungarian, Dalmatian and Croatian ones and on the back, to the right of the Imperial Crown, Bosnia, Galicia and Cumania, and on the left, Slavonia, Serbia, Lodoineria, and Bulgaria. The appearance of all of the coats of arms of St. Stephen’s realm on Rudolf’s Hungarian dual seal was a logical development. When the archduke was crowned in Pozsony, on September 25, 1572, the banner of every’ country’, with the coats of arms, in the royal title appeared in the procession.32 On the recommendation of Royal Regent Antal Verancsics and of the Hungarian counselors, the eight coats of arms, seen at the

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

imperial funeral in 1565, were augmented in 1572 with the coats of arms of Galicia and Lodomeria.33 Even though we have no illustrations reflecting this, we do have a painting showing the ten banners at the Pozsony ceremony of Ferdinand II, in July 1618 (fig. 13).34 This did not change until the coronation of the last king of Hungary, Charles IV (1916-1918), in December 1916. The ten coats of arms appeared fre­ quently on a variety of seventeenth century paintings, on funeral coats of aims of Hungarian aristocrats, on the cover of almanacs, and on the pages of the theses of the students of the University of Nagyszombat.35 The endeavors to regulate these matters during the 1550s-1570s were successful. The members of the Hungarian political elite were firm in maintaining the virtual unity of the Hungarian Crown. Their resolve was strengthened by the actual division of St. Stephen’s realm and by the central administration having moved abroad. In spite of the ongoing disputes with Ilie Habsburg court their overlapping interests made it easier to find a compromise with the highest dignitaries there.

Coronations in Pozsony: A Virtual Hungarian Royal Court Even though the independent Hungarian royal court disappeared and was replaced by the joint Habsburg court, the Hunga­ rian estates were able to preserve a certain virtual reality for it. In the seventeenth century they viewed the move of the court from Hungary to Austria as a temporary event. They hoped for a reunification of the country and for the reestablishment of the royal court in Buda. This was one of the reasons why they insisted that the now only nominal positi­ ons of the high Hungarian royal court dignities be filled. The virtual preservation of the Hungarian royal court, until the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, was assured by the conti­ nued existence of the high Hungarian court dignities, by the royal coro­ nations, and by the diets.36 The dignitaries fulfilled a variety of tasks both at court and also in country events and ceremonies. The royal master of the stables was responsible for arranging quarters during the coronation and when the diet was in session. The master seneschal and the master cupbearer coordinated the coronation banquet of the kings and queens in

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close cooperation with the royal lord steward. 'Ilie master of chamber­ lains was responsible for the wardrobe of the ruler and the master door­ ward was responsible for the accommodation of the king and queen.37 Hie coronation ceremonies of the kings of Hungary during the six­ teenth century were important in the preservation of the statehood of the Kingdom of Hungary and for the virtual survival of the former Hun­ garian royal court. The Habsburgs attempted to reduce the coronation to a formal political act in early modem period, but this endeavor was not successful because of the resistance of the Hungarian estates.38 In fact, the estates were able to convert the coronation ceremony into a major political and artistic representational event, emphasizing the sov­ ereignty of Hungary and the power of the Hungarian aristocracy. In this process the March 26, 1561, recommendations of the Hun­ garian Council in Vienna gained great significance. On the request of Ferdinand I, the clerical and lay counselors described in detail the steps necessary to organize the coronations in the future. The ancient site of coronations, Szekesfehervdr, came under continuing Ottoman occupa­ tion in 1543 and thus the future coronation ceremonies had to be con­ ducted in a new setting. The counselors voted unanimously in favor of Pozsony. Yet they insisted that the ancient traditions of the greatest of Hungarian country ceremonies be preserved in the new location. Based on late medieval foundations, and adapting them to a new environment, the counselors prepared the modem era Hungarian coronation script. In preparing the plans, the leaders of the Hungarian political elite, assisted by the bishops, used the Roman Pontifical Ceremonial, and the ancient letters of privilege of the Esztergom diocese. The officials of High Chancellor Miklos Olah studied the chronicles of tire Hungarians, particularly the works of Jdnos Thuroczy and Antonio Bonfini. They also used their owm personal experiences, learned from their predeces­ sors, and witnessed at Ferdinand’s coronation in Szekesfehervdr, in November of 1527.39 The recommendation revealed clearly that the coronation was the strongest guarantee of the privileges of the estates, because the new ruler had to subscribe to these privileges and to the rights guaranteed by the Golden Bull by oath as part of the coronation ceremony. This was accepted by the court in Vienna. Pozsony became the new of coronation city from 1563 to 1830.40 The lay part of the ceremony was conducted according to the recom

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

mendations made by the Hungarian Council in the spring of 1561. There were only two reasons for later changes. One was the changes in the power relationships of the various groups of Ilie estates, particular­ ly during the seventeenth century7.41 The other reason was the incorpo­ ration of the Kingdom of Hungary into the Habsburg Monarchy and the changes inherent in this. Of the latter one of the most meaningful changes was the intro­ duction of a “German imperial” element in the coronation ceremony of the Hungarian king and queen, after 1563. This new practice was employed when the coronation of the son as Hungarian crown prince took place while the father was not only the Hungarian king but also the Holy Roman emperor. The same was the case when the wife of the Hungarian crowm prince was crowned queen following his imperial coronation. Thus at the coronations of Maximilian in 1563, Rudolf in 1572, and Mary of Spain in 1563, copies of the German imperial sym­ bols, the scepter, the orb, the sword and the imperial crown were inclu­ ded in the parade. The sword w;as carried by the imperial hereditary marshal (Reichserbmarschall), the scepter, the orb and the crown were carried or worn by the emperor, who was assisted by two German mag­ nates.42 Tliis meant that it was the Holy Roman emperor who sat on the Hungarian throne, appearing at the august Hungarian ceremonies, the coronation of his successor or wife. Some changes in the ceremony were also caused by the evolution of the joint Habsburg court and by the appearance of tire household in Pozsony. These affected even the virtual Hungarian royal court. Even though the highest dignitaries of the nominal Hungarian royal court were in their glory on this occasion, their medieval duties and dignities were somewhat reduced. The master of tire stables had to consult with his Viennese counterpart in assigning quarters because only the latter was familiar with the members of the Habsburg court43 The master doorward was no longer in sole charge of the safety of the king but had to share this responsibility with tire troop of bodyguards, established by Ferdinand.44 Ilie presence of many foreign courtiers made it necessary that the Hungarian royal steward and Viennese high steward work together. The members of the Vienna court, had no duties in the actual coronation ceremony but were present both at tire religious ceremony in church, at the coronation procession and at the coronation banquet.

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The Hungarian elite was able to preserve much of the ceremonial order at the coronation banquets and thus the ancient Hungarian royal court was revived for a few hours in 1563, 1572, and 1608. Only Hun­ garian high dignitaries and magnates could attend at the royal table and the seneschal’s staff consisted of the sons of the high nobility as the Jagiellonian era.45 Only the master doorward and the royal lord steward had to share their duties with the Austrian guardsmen.46 The music at the banquet was not provided exclusively by Hungarians but was part­ ly provided by the Vienna court orchestra.47 The seneschals at the table were all Hungarian but the food they served was prepared by the court kitchen moved from Vienna to Pozsony. ■Some other aspects of the ceremony underwent substantial chan­ ges. One of the most important ones w;as the change in the seating arrangements. Very few could sit at the festive table of Maximilian, Rudolf or Matthias. Other than the crown prince only Habsburg arch­ dukes and, in 1572, the prince of Bavaria and the dukes of Julich sat there. The estates were represented by the leaders of the Hungarian cle­ rical and lay dignitaries, the archbishop of Esztergom, who had perfor­ med the coronation and by the palatine in 1608 while the office was vacant from 1562 to 1608. Miklos Oldh successfully insisted that the archbishop sat higher, that is closer to the ruler. This was a major change because at Ferdinand’s coronation in 1527 considerable numbers of the clerical and lay elite sat at the King’s table.48 In September 1563 the leaders of the estates protested against the change but were not successful. It would have been against the Burgundian-Spanish traditions, followed rigidly by the Vienna court, for the new king to sit at the same table with all of the Hungarian poli­ tical elite. The practice was changed according to the usage of the public feasts in Vienna and, in contrast to 1527, created few conflicts. There were only a few seats around the table and these were occupied by the members of the dynasty and, if the emperor was present, by the papal nuncio and by the ambassadors of Spain and Venice 49 Changing the seat assignments, however, was not an anti-Hungarian move by the Habsburgs. It had happened in 1476, when Matthias Corvintis’s second wife. Queen Beatrix of Aragon, convinced her husband that, according to the strict ceremonial of the Naples court, she should not have to share the table with the Hungarian magnates.50

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HAB SBUR G MONARCHY

Still, the ceremonies of the Hungarian royal coronation emphasi­ zed the importance, the ancient traditions and the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hungary . The sixteenth century compromises made in this matter were significant because, other than some minor changes, the new royal table ceremony remained intact until the last such event at the Buda Castle at the end of 1916. Hie German imperial symbols appearing at the Hungarian corona­ tion and the new and traditional elements of the coronation banquet reflected the special position assumed by the Kingdom of Hungary within the Habsburg Monarchy in the second half of the century. Even though the Hungarian and foreign spectators at the coronation were cer­ tain that Hungary possessed an independent statehood and considerable internal sovereignty, the most important decisions were made by the Habsburg court in Vienna.

The Kingdom of Hungary in the Dynastic Representations of the Habsburgs: Coronations and. Funerals in the Monarchy

'Hie attachment of the Kingdom of Hungary to the Habsburg Monarchy was manifest at the highest court festivities of the Monarchy, at the country wi de ceremoni es of the other components of the Habsburg domains, and at the funerals of the members of the dynasty. At the representational events of the court (weddings, baptists, and knightly tourneys) the Kingdom of Hungary was represented by the Hungarian herald, a salaried member of the household. This was true in Vienna, where Hans von Francolin, Thomas Domer and Peter Krabat, and later in Prague, where Jdnos Ruda from Kassa, served in this capacity.51 All the heralds wore a ceremonial garb with the small coat of arms of Hungary depicted on it (rig. 8). In accordance with the titles of the Habsburg emperors, the Hungarian heralds marched behind the imperial heralds but ahead of the Bohemian or Austrian ones. This was true at all the corona­ tions . At the Bohemian and German coronation of Archduke Maximilian in the autumn of 1562 and at his Hungarian coronation in 1563 all four heralds were present.5'2 They paraded in their ceremonial garb, each hol­ ding a white wand; this custom continued for a long time.

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At the German and Bohemian coronations and at the Imperial diets the Kingdom of Hungary was not represented by the Hungarian herald alone. In representing Hungary abroad, the Hungarian magnates and aristocrats were present with their groups of hussars in their parade uni­ forms. In February 1528, King Ferdinand invited Peter Erdody, Sr. to accompany him on his imperial trip to Germany with thirty-two of his well-equipped hussars.53 In 1542 Ferdinand asked Ferenc NyAry to accompany him to the Speyer imperial diet, with his hussars, and all at the emperor’s expense.54 At the end of 1558 Ferdinand asked JAnos Revay to accompany him to Bohemia and to the Augsburg diet with twelve spectacularly uniformed hussars.55 In all of these instances the hussars represented the Kingdom of Hungary. The employment of Revay, who served in the Vienna household, was significant. During the 1520s-1540s Ferdinand I had very few Hungarian courtiers and used the court hussars as representatives of the country.56 From the beginning of the 1550s their role was taken over by the young Hungarian aristocrats who accompanied the ruler on his journeys, at coronations and at knightly tourneys. Most of these young men served in the household of the king, or an archduke, as one, two, three, or four-horse servants. The young Hungarian aristocrats w7ere not only most suitable to represent the Hungarian state but were also thoroughly familiar with the customs of the Habsburg court. At the tum of 1551-1552, these young Hungarian courtiers accompanied Archduke Maximilian, and the Indian elephant he was bringing with him, with great pomp from Genoa to Vienna.57 Parading in festive garb and accompanied by their hussars, the group included JAnos Balassi, the future distinguished border fortress commander, and four future chief judges of Hungary, GAbor Perenyi, Kristof OrszAgh, IstvAn BAnffy, and Miklos BAthory.58 During the summer of 1562, four hundred hussars under the command of the noted courtier and fortress captain Janos Pelho, accompanied Ferdinand I and Archduke Maximilian to the Bohemian coronation in Prague and later to the coronation in Ger­ many.59 Their beautifully caparisoned horses with gold and silver tackle, the sparkling Hungarian uniforms, the shining headgear, and the lances decorated with red and white pennants, suitably represented Ferdinand’s important Kingdom of Hungary at the Bohemian and Ger­ man ceremonies.60

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

At the knightly tourneys in Vienna, Prague, and Innsbruck the sons of Hungarian aristocrats, serving at Habsburg courts, participated from the mid-1540s on. Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol was particularly fond of the hussars. In his book of tournaments he described a tourney held in Prague in 1549 and relates that Peter Macedonia!, the future Hunga­ rian chamberlain of Ferdinand I, and a number of Hungarian noble you­ ths participated.61 Archduke Ferdinand was royal regent of Bohemia at the time. Hie performance of these Hungarians at the tourney raised his interest in the Hungarian hussars and when he established one of the world’s first museums in Ambras, he ordered several hussar uniforms from Hungary to be displayed there.62 Similar tendencies could be seen in the funeral ceremonies of the rulers of the Habsburg Monarchy. In the funeral procession in Vienna for Ferdinand I, in August 1565, the banners of Hungary and of the associated and affiliated countries were carried by the young Hungari­ an aristocrats who served at the Habsburg court. Seneschal Boldizsdr Balassi carried the banner of the affiliated countries and the horse, decorated with their coats of arms was led Seneschal Mihdly Vdrday (fig. 11). The banner of Slavonia was carried by Seneschal Kristof Kerecsenyi, while the horse was led by Imre Forgdch, a two-horse cour­ tier (fig. 10). The horse for Croatia was led by Miklos Banffy, also a two-horse courtier, while the banner of the Kingdom of Hungary was brought by Seneschal Gyoigy Zrfnyi. He was followed by the Cupbea­ rer Boldizsdr Batthydny who led the horse decorated with the coats of arms of the country. In contrast to the Hungarian magnates, these men were invited to the funeral ceremonies by the Imperial Court Chancel­ lery, in German, and not by the Hungarian Court Chancellery, in Latin.63 The situation was similar at the funeral of Maximilian II, in Prague in 1577. The majority of the Hungarian banner-carriers and horse-leaders were members of the Habsburg household.64 While at the highest Hungarian ceremonial occasions, the Pozsony coronation ceremonies of 1563 and 1572 the carriers of the banners came from the highest levels of the Hungarian aristocracy, the same role at the Habsburg funeral ceremonies, the highest ceremonial occa­ sions of the Habsburg Monarchy, in 1565 and 1577, was performed by the Hungarian noble youths serving at court. This was both an accepta­ ble and practical arrangement. Ilie Hungarian members of the Habs

SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY

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burg court could thus simultaneously represent the dynasty and the Kingdom of Hungary. This arrangement also relieved their families of a financial burden, because the men were working at court and had both free lodging and a salary. In the case of the Hungarian royal regalia carried at funerals a dif­ ferent practice was used. At the Hungarian coronations, ever since the late Middle Ages, the original insignia were carried in the strict order of precedence by the Hungarian high dignitaries, but these rules were not followed closely at the funeral ceremonies. Ihe insignia carried were copies and the order of precedence was not followed strictly. This gave an opportunity to the leaders of the Hungarian estates to assign these tasks to their protegees, as the Royal Regent Miklos Oldh did, in 1565. At this time the copy of the Holy Crown was carried by the fourth highest dignitary, the Royal Treasurer Miklos Zrmyi, there being no palatine and the chief judge and the Croatian-Slavonian ban being absent (fig. 12). The funeral procession of Ferdinand 1 and Maximilian II demon­ strated not only presence of Hungary but also its position in the Habs­ burg Monarchy. In 1565 the insignia and banners of the Kingdom of Hungary returned to be represented in the dynastic-power display of the Habsburgs. They were present already at the 1439 ceremony for Albert of Habsburg in Szekesfehervdr and for Frederic III in Vienna, in 1493.65 Since the latter received only the nominal title of the king of Hungary, the copies of the Hungarian regalia were not displayed. Only the Hun­ garian banner, the helmet, the shield, and the horse with the coats of arms represented the Kingdom of Hungary, which the Habsburg wan­ ted to acquire, and were proceeding immediately ahead of the German Imperial symbols.66 A comparison of the funerals of the Habsburg rulers allows us two conclusions. The order in which the banners appeared indicated the ele­ vated position of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy, being in second place immediately after the Holy Roman Empire. Hie Hungarian royal banner appeared behind the Holy Roman Empire’s but ahead of the Bohemian’s. The importance of St. Stephen’s realm is also shown by the position of the Hungarian royal insignia which were car­ ried by the Hungarian magnates behind the ones of the Holy Roman Empire but ahead of the Bohemian ones. The same was demonstrated

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

by the position of the insignia on the catafalque where they were pla­ ced immediately in front of imperial crown, imperial orb, scepter, and sword. The Bohemian insignia were placed behind the imperial ones (fig. 14) 67 Among all of the banners paraded in 1565 and 1577, the associa­ ted and affiliated countries of the Hungarian Crown constituted one fourth of the total. This showed clearly that the Kingdom of Hungary was a small special composite state, the old realm of St. Stephen, con­ taining, in fact or fiction, a number of other countries. Tor Ferdinand and his successors Hungary became a political and prestige item, important both in world politics and as symbol of power. They endea­ vored to convey this to the Ottomans during the negotiations in Vienna and in Hungary. At the time of the 1604 peace negotiations in Eszter­ gom, Archduke Matthias ordered Peter Revay to be present for the reception of the Ottoman mission with a large number of splendidly caparisoned hussars, saying, “His Majesty ordered it to honor the coun­ try and you and to intimidate the enemy. ”68

Chapter Eleven

THE HUNGARIAN ESTATES AND THE BOCSKAI UPRISING Hungary in Ruins. Armed Counter Reformation, Shaky Political Equilibrium

The equilibrium between the Habsburg court and the Hungarian estates, established in the middle of the sixteenth century, was upset at the end of the century as a consequence of the long war with the Ottomans. The Long Turkish War, lasting for fifteen years, from 1591 to 1606, was the first modern war in Hungarian history.1 It affected all areas of the Carpathian Basin, the Croatian-Slavonian terri­ tories after 1591, the Danubian region after 1593, and the northeastern and Transylvanian areas after 1594. The Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy mobilized armies of several tens of thousand men in each of these years (map 4). The Ottomans sought relief from their domestic problems through the safety valve of war. By 1597 it became clear that they were not ent­ irely successful but, when the war came to an end with the peace trea­ ty of 1606, it was evident that they had greater achievements than their Habsburg adversary. Even though they were able to occupy Gyor and Pdpa in 1594, so important in the defense of Vienna, only temporarily, the more lasting occupation of Bihac in 1592, Eger in 1596, and Kanizsa in 1600 represented a substantial gain. In comparison, the Habsburg military leadership could point with pride only to the recapture of fort­ resses Fiilek, Nogrdd, and Szecseny, and the temporary repossession of Esztergom (1595-1605) and Szekesfehervdr (1601-1602). It did have enough power, however, to block additional Ottoman advance, by mobilizing all their central European forces.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

It was beyond the Monarchy’s power to unite with the Hungarian kingdom the Principality of Transylvania permanently, even though Emperor Rudolf II and Prince Zsigmond (Sigismund) Bdthory formed an alliance on several occasions (1595, 1597, 1599, and 1602).2 The reason for this w;as that the Ottomans still had advantages in manpower and in logistics and, also, the loss of Eger in 1596 made the union of the principality and the kingdom much more difficult from a military’, geopolitical, and supply perspective. There was also a pro-Ottoman party in Transylvania which by necessity and by political realism sub­ scribed to the survival of the vassal state. Yet, the desire for the unifi­ cation of St. Stephen’s realm was so strong among the Habsburg rulers, the Hungarian estates and in some of the leaders of the Transylvania political elite that it overcame the political realities. The erroneous poli­ tical and military decisions had tragic consequences. Tire war lasting fifteen years completely changed life in the Carpa­ thian Basin. Hie fighting, involving tens of thousands on each side, was much more destructive than the previous minor skirmishes and raids. Eventually even the most resistant population had to succumb. There was no escape from the repeated advances and retreats of the Ottoman and imperial armies and from the devastations they caused. There were also the usual accompaniments of such w arfare, ruin, fires, looting, and epidemics. The latter included pest, typhoid fever, dysentery, and mala­ ria, alone and in combination and was referred to as “the Hungarian disease” (morbus Hangaricus). After a few years the theater of war was completely depleted. The question was, how many new settlements would be destroyed, how rapidly would the numbers of the disposses­ sed grow? In some areas the network of settlements, the population and its possessions were so heavily damaged that the likelihood of their being repaired was minimal. It was for this reason that the Long Tur­ kish War was a watershed for both the network of settlements and for the Hungarian population ? By the beginning of the seventeenth century7, tire increasing social tensions were aggravated by serious political problems. In the midst of the prolonged warfare the Aulic Chamber was unable to solve the pro­ blem of making timely payments to the troops in the border fortresses and in the field even though they had substantial contributions from the Pope and from Spain and from the increased burdens placed on the

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population of the Holy Roman Empire, the Austrian and B ohemian pro­ vinces.4 Because the Habsburg military leadership did not have a stan­ ding logistics service, the supply of food to the Christian armies could not be properly organized.5 Hie Habsburg treasury found itself in a disastrous situation. In view of the extensive military needs, the Hungarian estates reluctantly agreed in 1595-96 to the taxation of the poorest class of the lesser nobi­ lity. This meant a significant, and now legalized, injury to the privile­ ges of the estates.6 It was also to generate revenues that the chambers took over large properties, occasionally using the soldiers to do so. The also initiated fiscal, punitive and disloyalty proceedings in order to con­ fiscate the property of the accused and thus ease tire constraints on the treasury.7 One of the most important of these legal actions was the lengthy disloyalty action against Istvdn Illeshdzy in 1601-1603, in connection with property held in pawn by the cities of Szentgybrgy and Bazin in Pozsony County.8 All of this was very offensive to the Hun­ garian magnates and estates. The suits were conducted, however, by the court and by the treasury with the assistance of another group of the estates, particularly the higher clergy who were in charge of the Hun­ garian and Szepes Chambers. In Hungarian legal practice the dispen­ sing of justice, even in cases of disloyalty, was the privilege of the esta­ tes. The above cases indicate that during the war significant cracks appeared in the structure of the Hungarian estates. Increasing social and political tensions were created by the syste­ matic plunder perpetrated by the foreign soldiers of the imperial armies. Without them, however, there was little chance for successful battles against the Ottomans or for the reconquest of fortresses, yet the repea­ ted ravages created displeasure even among the aulic magnates. They increased the anti-German sentiments of the lesser nobility and strengt­ hened the feeling of the estates that they were being oppressed by for­ eigners. Actions taken by the diets after 1596 against the depredations of the foreign soldiers indicate the injuries done to the estates.9 It also irri­ tated them that after 1583 King Rudolf refused to attend any of the diets. The situation was the gravest in Upper Hungary and in Transylva­ nia. The population in the area of the Tisza River was not only beco­ ming increasingly impoverished but was also strongly militarized. In addition, in Transylvania there was a major internal fight among a num­

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

ber of candidates for the princely throne who appeared in response to the repeated abdications of Sigismund Bdthory. The reunification attempt of the Habsburg military leadership and the brief governorship of General Giorgio Basta in Transylvania, in 1602-1604, in addition to the war and to the ensuing famine made the population of Transylvania believe that it was the victim of a hostile occupation rather than the participants in the unification hoped for by the kingdom and by the principality.10 After a few years the nobility of Hungary also came to view the Austrian, Ger­ man and Walloon soldiers as a foreign army of occupation. The situation was further aggravated by the Hungarian clergy. Encouraged by the success of the Counter-Reformation in Lower Austria, it believed that the time has come for it to regain its former position, particularly in Upper Hungary and by arms, if necessary. The more radical prelates, particularly Ferenc Forgdch, bishop of Nyitra and chancellor, Mdrton Pethe, archbishop of Kalocsa and royal regent, Istvdn Szuhay, bishop of Eger and president of the Hungarian Chamber, and Miklos Migazzi, bishop of Vdrad and president of the Szepes Chamber used foreign mercenaries to occupy the Protestant churches and schools and to expel Protestant clergymen and teachers. Tire most notorious case was the occupation of the Lutheran church in Kassa, in January 1604, by the soldiers of Giacomo Barbiano Belgiojoso, captain general of Upper Hungary. Hie indignation of the Hungarian estates and the nobility as a res­ ponse to the armed Counter-Reformation was understandable. During the sixteenth century Protestantism spread quickly throughout the old realm of St. Stephen. The country'’ which was mostly Catholic, became mostly Protestant. By the end of the century Lutheranism found adhe­ rents among the aristocrats and the burghers of the free royal cities. Cal­ vinism w;as embraced by the lower nobility, the inhabitants of the mar­ ket towns, the peasants, the soldiers of the border fortresses, and by some of the magnates. In Transylvania even some of the more radical varieties of Protestantism succeeded in attracting partisans among the faithful. The spread of Protestantism meant a huge loss to the Catholic Church, yet the Catholic bishops continued to have a decisive role in the shaping of Hungary’s internal, financial, and legal policies. Thus, the Hungarian high clergy, spreading the religion of the Habsburg dynasty with German soldiers, and conducting the actions of

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the chambers under their direction became, for the mostly Protestant les ­ ser nobility and the burghers of the free royal cities, the symbol of foreign oppression. The prelates in fact used the treasury actions to reestablish the Catholic institutions. Under the presidency of bishop Szuliay, the Hun­ garian Chamber proposed in 1603 that, “the Calvinist school in Sdrospa tak shall become a seminary for the young students and that the most learned professors, namely the Jesuit fathers, be assigned to it.”11 In this situation, Act 22, inserted without the approval of the estates by the ruler in Prague into the decisions of the Pozsony diet in the spring of 1604, was fuel to the flames.12 This was an unprecedented intrusion by King Rudolf and by Archduke Matthias, the initiator of the insertion, as it upset the political equilibrium. The real furor was caused by the act’s prohibition of the discussion of religious issues by the diet in pre­ dominantly Protestant Hungary. This led to major political and religious dissatisfaction among the Protestant estates of the country. Political equilibrium seemed to collapse so far as the estates and nobles of Upper Hungary were concerned. The campaigns for the reu­ nification with Transylvania affected them more than anyone else. It was here that most of Ilie properties, including theirs, were confiscated by the Habsburg treasury and the number of those who became estran­ ged from of society was on the increase. It was also in Upper Hungary where for the first time armed forces were used by the Counter-Refor­ mation. In the beginning of September 1604, at their district assembly in Gdlszecs, the nobility refused to accept the illegally inserted Act 22 of the diet. They warned that if the ruler would not remove this act, they were prepared to defend their liberties and their religion with arms.13 Very shortly thereafter an unusual movement created a promising but very dangerous situation. During the following two months the politi­ cal-military situation in the region underwent a significant change and this was due to the events taking place beyond the Tisza.

The “Turkish Emigration” from Transylvania, the Transtisza Haiduks and the Estates of Upper Hungary When the Transylvanian claimant Mozes Szekely was defeated in July 1603, his followers, under Gabor Bethlen’s leadership,

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

fled from Transylvania to the Ottoman Empire in considerable num­ bers.14 They wished to return the principality to a vassal state and this was more realistic in view of the true balance of forces between the Porte and the Habsburg Monarchy. They were successful in the spring of 1604 in obtaining the support of Istvdn Bocskai, the former captain general of Vdrad and one of the most influential politicians in Transyl­ vania.15 In March 1604 Bocskai began to negotiate secretly with the high Ottoman dignitaries in Belgrade and Temesvdr about his beco­ ming the prince of Transylvania.16 This about face of Bocskai w;ho grew up at the Habsburg court in Vienna had a number of reasons. They included injuries suffered during the war, such as being sent into exile by the Transylvanian estates in 1600, his captivity in Prague in 1601 and 1602, and the court’s refusal to return his Transylvania pro­ perties.17 His decision might also have been influenced by his not being able to endure being excluded from the leadership of Transyl­ vania. In the end Bethlen and his associates placed Bocskai into such an invidious position that there was no return. The Ottoman alliance of the Bethlen party nobility became known to the Habsburg military leader­ ship. On September 14, 1604, the Walloon cavalry of the French Colo­ nel Henri du Vai, comte de Dampierre and the troops of the Haiduk Cap­ tain Lajos Rdkoczi attacked the camp of the ‘‘Turkish emigrants” near the Ottoman Temesvdr in order to prevent Transylvania again becoming a vassal of the Porte.18 Bocskai tried to break off his contacts with this group but Bethlen, being in a very difficult situation, could not allow this to happen. He divulged that Bocskai had sought an alliance with the Ottomans. Tins act, at the time when Transylvania was under Habsburg control for some years, amounted to treason and could have been punis­ hed by death. Fearing an arrest, Bocskai refused an invitation from Bel giojoso, the captain general in Kassa, and at the end of September deci­ ded to cooperate with the Bethlen group. At the beginning of October Cyprian von Concin, the captain general of Vdrad, embarked on an attack against Bocskai’s fortresses. Bocskai tried to defend himself and turned to the Haiduks, living beyond the Tisza and at the time in the service of the king of Hungary, for assistance. This was not a difficult task. When Bocskai was captain general of Vdrad in 1592-1598 he was in charge of them and, having

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extensive properties in the area, was familiar wdth most of them. Recent studies have shown that the majority of the Haiduks, serving the king came from this area.19 Bocskai’s task was made easier by the fact that the pay of the Haiduks was months in arrears and that the German and Walloon mercenaries had invaded some of their holdings. Beginning in 1604 a number of them were arrested and charged with mutiny both in Transylvania and in eastern Hungary. Even though General Belgiojoso tried to keep them loyal to the king by promising them permission to engage in freebooting and the payment of overdue salaries, this foreign general who supported the armed Counter-Reformation, had little suc­ cess among the Protestant Haiduks. Increasing numbers joined Bocs­ kai, expecting payment and religious freedom. For the Habsburg military leadership and for the king of Hungary this amounted to desertion and mutiny but for Bocskai it represented essential armed support and a spontaneous uprising of the Haiduks. The Turkish emigrants from Transylvania thus accomplished their goal, Bocskai avoided arrest and the Haiduks were given a chance to make up their unpaid salary during their uprising. The Bethlen movement, endeavoring to reestablish Transylvania’s vassal status and being overt­ ly anti-Habsburg, thus united with the uprising of the Haiduks from beyond the Tisza who w;ere led by Bocskai.20 The Haiduk uprising rapidly spread to Upper Hungary. On Octo­ ber 15 Bocskai’s troops defeated the troops of Colonel Johann Baptista Pezzen between Almosd and Dioszeg, and many of the Haiduks serving Pezzen deserted and joined Bocskai. 'Hie following day Bocskai ente­ red Debrecen and this led to additional groups of soldiers joining his forces while they were pursuing the fleeing imperial-royal troops. The garrisons of several frontier fortresses switched to Bocskai and, on October 30, the key to Upper Hungary, the city of Kassa opened its gates to the troops of Bocskai, largely because of the pressure brought by the Calvinist middle class of that city. A few days earlier, these same townsmen refused entry to the retreating General Belgiojoso. This was due largely to the fact that the armed re Catholization was still going on and Mdrton Pethe, the royal regent and provost of Szepes and Kristof Thurzo, lord lieutenant of Szepes, made several attempts to take over the Lutheran church of Locse.21 This forced Counter-Reformation induced the free royal cities to make common cause wdth the lesser nobility.

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

At the end of October 1604, the Haiduk uprising, which spread to their part of the country, gave an opportunity for the Upper Hungary Protestant estates to come forward and declare that they wanted to pro­ tect their religion with arms. They did not have much choice because Bocskai’s Haiduks, assisted by the Ottomans and the Tatars, made major advances by the beginning of November. They occupied the Lutheran city of Loose.22 In this area, and for some time, only the fort­ resses of Szatmdr, Tokaj, Szepes and the city of Epeijes remained true to the Hungarian ruler, mainly because of the troops stationed there. From the middle of November, Bocskai established his capital in Kassa and issued proclamations inviting the nobles and cities of the region to join him. The latter soon realized that they could use the Haiduk upri­ sing for the defense of their privileges, primarily for the free practice of their religion.23 The prompt appearance of the Ottoman and Tatar troops on Bocs­ kai ’s side was due to a largely forgotten event. Grand Vizier Lala Meh­ med in Buda realized that the Bocskai movement could be of enormous help to the Ottomans. In addition to regaining Transylvania, the Otto­ man military leadership immediately realized that domination might be extended to Upper Hungary7 and that this region could also become the part of the Transylvanian vassal state, just as it had been under the rule of John II Sigismund until the middle of 1560s. Therefore, between November 5 and 14, 1604, the grand vizier issued a proclamation, in the name of the sultan, which hailed B ocskai not only as prince of Tran­ sylvania but also as king of Hungary A On November 20 or about, Bocskai received this document in Kassa from the representatives of the grand vizier, and also received the official insignia of installation, the caftan, poling, banner and mace.25 Thus Bocskai, who controlled significant parts of Upper Hungary and the area beyond the Tisza River, accepted Ottoman protection. This is also suggested by the Hungarian language letters of Sinan, the beylerbey of Eger. He used Bocskai’s phrases on patriotism and hate for the Germans in urging the magnates of the region to support the prince. He wrote to Zsigmond Rdkoczi, “You should rise with your people and line up with His Excellency Bocskai, to expel the arrogant German nation from Hungary, by the Grace of God, so that Your Honor may remain in his country and his nation in peace.” Among some hidden threats he also

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suggested that by doing so, Rdkoczi would do a service to the sultan, “By doing this Your Honor would do something nice to the powerful emper­ or, who would protect your property, castles and cities.”26 Tliis all meant that the situation of Bocskai’s movement had chan­ ged radically by the end of November 1604 and had become highly inconsistent. The movement which started during the summer of 1604 to reestablish the vassal status of Transylvania and the Haiduk. uprising beyond the Tisza had become a fight for religious freedom and for the remedy of the injuries suffered by the estates of Upper Hungary. It also became a fight used by the Ottomans to strengthen their own position in Hungary under the Long Turkish War. The critical question was whether tliis complex movement would find support among the estates of the other three districts of the Kingdom of Hungary, Cisdanubia, Transdanubia and Croatia-Slavonia.

Uprising, Local and Countrywide Civil War among the Estates

To date Hungarian historiography has not really loo­ ked for an answer to this critical issue. It mentions only a few dozen people among the important members of the prince’s household. Actually the support of Bocskai’s complex movement was not clear cut in Transylvania or in the Kingdom of Hungary. This can be said in spite of the fact that on February 21, 1605, Bocskai was elected ruling prin­ ce of Transylvania by the Szekelys at Marosszereda. On April 20, the lesser nobility of Upper Hungary’ and from a few Cisdanubian counties elected Bocskai ruling prince of Hungary. Uie majority of the Hungarian estates, however, did not join the uprising for any substantial length of time even though Bocskai’s armies achieved considerable victories in 1605. If the nobles joined him for a while this was done to protect their privileges and their religious freedom, but also under pressure from the Haiduks and from the Otto­ man-Tatar troops or because their landed estates and castles w'ere threa­ tened. The prelates and the majority of the magnates active in the admi­ nistration of the Kingdom did not join Bocskai.27 This was universally true for the Catholic higher clergy. 'Iwo thirds of the largely Protestant

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

aristocrats remained loyal to the Habsburg ruler and this limited the movement from becoming a general uprising of the estates. Not one of the highest country dignitaries joined Bocskai and even of the members of the Hungarian Council only Pdl Nydry joined immediately and Zsig­ mond Rdkoczi only in the spring of 1605. Nydry became Bocskai’s lord steward and Rdkoczi became his regent of Transylvania. None of the border fortress or district captains generals or their lesser nobility depu­ ties went over to B ocskai even though many of their unpaid soldiers did join the prince for some time.28 Of the magnates who joined Bocskai the majority came from Upper Hungary, an area controlled by Bocskai’s troops. They included the Homonnai Drugeth, the Perenyi and the Rdkoczi. Others came from among the wealthier land owners from the Transtisza region or from the group which was indicted for fiscal or loyalty violations. The latter included Bdlint Homonnai Drugeth, Istvdn Illeshdzy, Tamds Nddasdy, Zsigmond Rdkoczi and others. Hie location of their estates was a deter­ minant factor and if a magnate family w;as divided geographically, those with estates in Upper Hungary, for instance the Czobor, Dersffy, Szechy and Thurzo, joined Bocskai. In contrast to the lesser nobility, religious affiliation did not usually affect the magnates’ decision to remain loyal to the king. The devout Lutheran, Gybrgy Thurzo, was one of the strongest fighters against Bocs­ kai, while in July 1605 his Catholic brother, Kristof, the lord lieutenant of Szepes County, had no choice but to join the insurgents who controlled practically all of Upper Hungary. Yet we find Gyorgy Homonnai Drugeth, one of the leaders of the Catholic Reformation and one of the greatest land owners of the area, and the deeply religious Catholic Lajos Rdkoczi, a cap­ tain of the Haiduks, in the Bocskai camp. Of the Transdanubian magnates, the Calvinist Ferenc II Batthydny and Istvdn Torok remained solidly on the side of the Catholic Habsburgs. Only a very- few major land owners from the Croatian-Slavonian area, Transdanubia, and Cisdanubia suppor­ ted the uprising. They refused to give up their regional interests or the compromises they made with the Habsburgs in directing the kingdom, even under pressure from Bocskai’s Haiduks or the Ottoman-Tatar troops. Hie depredations caused by the latter extended beyond the Hungarian ter­ ritories and reached, during the summer of 1605, the eastern areas of Lower Austria and Styria and the southern areas of Moravia.29

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The Hungarian magnates and nobles actively engaged in aimed battles. In addition to the mostly foreign imperial troops, Austrian, Ger­ man and Walloon, and to the Hungarian units of the king, they fought Bocskai with their own private armies and with the garrisons of the fortresses. They even used the major remaining privilege of the estates, the armed levy of the nobility, just as Bocskai had done on his part in Upper Hungary.30 This meant that during the summer of 1605, the esta­ tes siding with the legitimate king of Hungary engaged in battles with the estates siding with Bocskai, whom the Ottomans supported as the king of the country. It was an internecine war of the estates and a full scale civil war. This was claimed by Bocskai’s diplomat, Johannes Bocatius who noted about the events at the end of 1605, “A much hoped for peace could replace the tempests and trials of this war which had become a civil war.”31 Looking back at these years, the Hungarian Chamber, in 1609, speaks about the “dreadful internal and civil war.”32 According to a contemporary estimate, Gyorgy Thurzo suffered losses of 300,000 florins during the campaign of the Haiduks.33 The civil war conditions were made worse by the fact that the les­ ser nobility and the urban population were also not uniformly on the side of the insurgents. We know of people who temporarily joined Bocskai because of offenses even in Transdanubia and Cisdanubia, but their number was not large and did not include any major notabilities. In the Croatian-Slavonian territories the prince had practically no adhe­ rents. In this the magnates played a role with their perseverance that was emulated by the lesser nobles who were often their retainers.34 In Upper Hungary the situation was just the reverse. Here only very few prominent lesser nobility families could maintain their loyalty to the king. Doing this exacted a major price, the destruction of their property, the necessity to flee and being labeled a “hireling of the Germans.” The same was true for the free royal cities and for the border fort­ resses. Thanks to their garrison, only the city of Epeijes and the fortress in Tokaj remained loyal to the king in Upper Hungary. Hie mining towns in Lower Hungary sooner or later did change over, albeit with little enthusiasm. Because of the victories of the Haiduks during the summer of 1605, temporarily even the smaller border fortresses, except Murdny and Vegles, were forced to join them. The larger royal cities and border fortresses of the western Transdanubia did not open their

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THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

gates to the insurgent troops and Sopron successfully resisted three sie­ ges during the summer of 1605.35 Even in his homeland, Transylvania, Bocskai had a difficult task in sustaining his rule. The prince had the support of the Szekelys and gai­ ned the support of the leaders of the estates, but his election as prince could be accomplished only with the force of arms.36 Resistance of the imperial and royal forces and of the Saxons was finally overcome by troops from the Wallachia and Moldavia and by Ottoman-Tatar out­ fits.37 On September 14, 1605, at the Diet of Medgyes, Bocskai, who was present, was elected prince by the three Transylvanian nations, the Hungarians, the Szdkelys, and the Saxons. Tibs diet was also attended by the representative of the Porte and Bocskai was legally elected prin­ ce of Transylvania by the estates and with the approval of the Otto­ mans. Thus the principality regained the position it held prior to the Long Turkish War and, in accordance with the balance of forces, once again became a vassal of the Porte. Just as the inhabitants of Transylvania in 1600 -1604 did not view the German and Hungarian troops of General Basta as a unifying force, the political elite and a large part of Ilie population of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary refused to view the insurgents, accompanied by Ottoman-Tatar troops, as the defenders of religious freedom and of the rights of the esta­ tes. In addition to the Habsburg propaganda and to the Catholic establish­ ment, the contemporary letters of Ilie Hungarian aristocrats and nobles spoke of “rebellion or insurgence” and called the adherents of Bocskai “Godless rebels, insurgents and traitors.”38 Bocskai’s propaganda which repeatedly used the terms: homeland, nation, and religion and strongly appealed to patriotism, to Ilie increasing xenophobia, and to the religious convictions of the Hungarian nobility brought only transient results. Knowing this, Bocskai’s complex, multifocal and contradictory movement cannot be called a national independence movement or a war of independence, regardless of the frequent statements to this effect in Hungarian historiography. At best, the Bocskai uprising could have achieved that Transylvania and, to some extent, Hungary would have been an Ottoman vassal kingdom as it was under the rule of John Szapolyai and his son, John II Sigismund. This is demonstrated by the fact that in March 1605 Bocskai sent to Istanbul the old letter of agreement that John Szapolyai signed with

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the Ottomans in 1528. In the accompanying message he also asked the sultan for a royal crown.39 The Ottomans delayed for months and thus he could receive the sultan’s letter of agreement only at the end of October, in Sdrospatak, after his return from Transylvania.40 Hie crown made for him in Istanbul was handed over to him on November 11, in the Ottoman camp next to Pest. In spite of what the propaganda state­ ment of Johannes Bocatius, who was present, says, new studies seem to show that Bocskai did not refuse to accept the crown from the Turks.41 Bocskai’s diplomat tried to mislead the estates of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary and central European Christian public opinion, but Bocskai, in fact became the carefully manipulated vassal of the Ottomans, a “Turkish king of Hungary.” This way he became John Sigismund’s heir. In view of the above, it is clear that in 1604-1606 the majority of the estates in the Kingdom of Hungary did not wish to sever their rela­ tionship with the Habsburg Monarchy and did not support Bocskai’s multifocal movement which was full of contradictions. The creation of a Hungarian state, independent of both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans was far in the future. The Bocskai uprising, even though anti-Habsburg, cannot be considered a precursor of the Rdkoczi independence move­ ment in 1703-1711, or of thel848M9 Wai' of Independence.

Rearrangement of Power in 1605-1608: Strengthening of the Estates and Advances of the Lay Elite and of the Lesser Nobility

The internecine and civil war within the estates asso­ ciated with the Long Turkish War and the Bocskai uprising could come to an end only by a compromise of the partisan estates and by a peace treaty between the two great powers. The majority of the divided Hun­ garian elite were very anxious to have peace come to the Hungarian theater of war. With the approval of King Rudolf and Archduke Mat­ thias at the beginning of July 1605 peace negotiations began with Bocskai in Kassa, even though the Haiduk soldiers were still succes­ sfully lighting in western Hungary. The Hungarian ruler was represen­ ted by Royal Commissioners Zsigmond Forgdch, Benedek Pogrdny, and Gybrgy Thurzo, while Istvdn Illeshdzy was the principal spokes­

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man for the prince/2 He returned from exile in Poland and joined the prince in July 1605, primarily in order to participate in reestablishing peace as soon as possible.43 This is proven by the fact that he joined Bocskai only after having met and exchanged ideas with Forgdch and Pograny who were on their way from Prague to Kassa. It was Illeshdzy who influenced Bocskai in 1605-1606 to take a more enlightened view.44 Tins magnate, calumniated by the Aulic Chamber and by his Hungarian politician rivals, knew the central admi­ nistration of the Kingdom of Hungary, the institutions of the estates and the mechanisms of its functioning much better than the prince. As a for­ mer captain of Hussars in Gyor he was familiar with military matters, as a former counselor of the Hungarian Chamber he understood its fis­ cal management and its role in sustaining defense and finding revenue sources. As deputy lord lieutenant of Pozsony County and later as lord lieutenant of Upto County, he understood the aspirations of the lesser nobility, because it was from their ranks that he had been elevated to the barony in 1587. He also spent fifteen years among the magnates as a Lutheran Hungarian counselor and royal lord steward 45 He participa­ ted in the functions of the kingdom as the larder of the Monarchy by engaging in major shipments of grain to Lower Austria. This was true, more or less, for all of Bocskai’s aristocratic coun­ selors, Mihdly Czobor, Ferenc Mdgochy, Ptil Nytiry, Zsigmond Rtikoczi, Gydrgy Szechy, Btilint Homonnai Drugeth, and others. They all became increasingly aware of the fact that the majority of the estates of the kingdom would not accept the Turkish protection attached to any recognition of Bocskai, even though they also resented the injuries done to the privileges of the estates. Because of the damages suffered and the fear of the spread of Calvinism, the citizens of the Lutheran free royal cities increasingly worked for peace. Even the lesser nobility, having suffered repeated depredations from the Haiduk and OttomanTatar forces, wanted peace as soon as possible. The magnates, the les­ ser nobility and the cities all tied peace to the remedy of their injuries and to confirmation of their religious freedom. The first step toward peace was the initial agreement among the estates, reached at the peace negotiations in November-December 1605 in Korpona.46 Even though here the interests of the estates of the King­ dom of Hungary, loyal to the Habsburgs, were represented by the

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Catholic magnate and Royal Commissioner Zsigmond Forgdch alone, the estates generally agreed that their interests were identical. This included the representatives from the counties of Cisdanubia who were never adherents of Bocskai, and their relatives who stood with Bocskai and also the principal architect of the agreement Istvdn Illeshdzy. The latter was tied to the elite of the kingdom by both his entire career and by his influential relatives who served in the Habsburg household.47 For this, the radical followers of Bocskai derided him, called him “German bellied” and threatened him with death.48 The peace process ending the Bocskai uprising was much more complex than shown hitherto in Hungarian and Austrian historiography, where it is seen as an agreement between the Habsburgs and Bocskai, and as a victory of the estates over the ruler. The peace negotiations with the prince actually addressed the termination of the Haiduk uprising and of the civil war, the agreement between the divided parts of the estates, remedy of the injuries to the estates and even a peace treaty to be arran­ ged with the Ottomans. All this can be w-ell followed from the Korpona negotiations, at the end of 1605, to the Peace Treaties of Vienna and Zsitvatorok of June 23 and November 11, 1606, and the diet of 1608.49 The international endorsement of the Vienna peace treaty by the estates of Lower and Upper Austria, Styria, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Lausitz in September of 1606 made a future confederation between the Hungari­ an estates and the estates of some of these areas possible.50 Just as the resistance of the estates in peace time was determined by the power relations among the various groups wdthin the estates, this was equally true at the 1605 peace conferences. It was shown most clearly in the matter of the principal offense against the estates, name­ ly the issue of freedom of religion. Contrary to public opinion, this was demanded by Bocskai and his followers already at the Korpona nego­ tiations, and it was for Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics alike.51 Thus the religious issue created unanimity among the estates while superseding the religious differences.52 Knowing that that a number of Bocskai’s advisors were Catholic magnates or leading Catholic lesser nobility (Mi h Aly Czobor, Gy orgy Homonnai Dnigeth, Mihdly KAthay, Lajos RAkoczi, etc.) this becomes comprehensible. The 1606 Vienna peace treaty consequently rescinded Act 22 of 1604 and guaranteed fre­ edom of religion to the estates and also to the Hungarian garrisons of

22-4

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

the border fortresses but without the prejudice of the Catholic religi­ on.53 Even though this item was omitted from Act 1, prior to the coro­ nation in 1608, the freedom of religious practice was improved for the citizens of the market towns and for the serfs.54 This meant a loss for the Catholic Church even though the estates made no attempt to place a prohibition on the religion of the dynasty. This also caused major conflicts for Archduke Matthias in Hungary with the leading Catholic clerics who immediately started to take steps in the opposite direction and in Prague with Emperor Rudolf and with the papal nuncio.55 Because of the victory of the estates in Hungary at the 1608 diet, Archduke Matthias was forced, in 1609, to make con­ cessions in religious matters to the Lutheran estates in Upper and Lower Austria.56 Allowing freedom of religion was only one of the issues which weakened the position of the Catholic Church in Hungary. From 1605 and up to the coronation in 1608 the Protestants insisted that Act 8, passed prior to the coronation in 1608, prohibiting the Jesuit Order from buying property in Hungary be enforced.57 A similar blow was the delay in returning the church properties taken over or mortga­ ged by Bocskai, which included abbeys, provostries, and estates belon­ ging to chapters or bishops. The political agreements between the divided lay estates, going beyond religious matters, represented a serious blow to the high and mid-level clergy. The cooperation between the magnates and the lesser nobility was the consequence of the rearrangement of the power relati­ ons and the events which had taken place during the war. The lay esta­ tes took full advantage of the favorable conditions between 1605 and 1608 to strengthen their position within the system. In doing this they also significantly solidified their position vis-a-vis the ruler. They managed to implement to a large extent the mandate of the Korpona negotiations that the king of Hungary “direct and govern this country with lay lords, barons, and nobles and not with bishops and priests.”58 The previously favorable position of the clergy was significantly weakened by the debates prior to 1608 and by the new compromises. The greatest triumph of the lay estates was the election of the palatine. They insisted on this until 1608. Their successful politicking was hel­ ped by the crisis in power within the Habsburg Monarchy. This resul­ ted in a feud between brothers which was unprecedented in the modem

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era history of the Habsburg dynasty and which was used by the estates to further strengthen their position vis-a-vis the ruler.59 Because of the military and political failures and the weakening of the position of the Monarchy, Emperor Rudolf’s relatives became estranged from him. In addition, Rudolf did not have an heir which in itself presented a serious problem. In April of 1606, in Vienna, the Habsburg archdukes designa­ ted Archduke Matthias as the head of the dynasty. The familial conflict led to a war between the brothers when, in the spring of 1608, Archdu­ ke Matthias, confederating himself with the Austrian, Hungarian, and Moravian estates marched on Prague, against his brother, with Austri­ an, Hungarian, and Moravian troops. An armed conflict was avoided when on June 25 the emperor abdicated from the throne of Hungary, of the Austrian hereditary provinces, and of Moravia in the Lieben [Liben] agreement. As the prize for the major concessions, he could keep his Bohemian crown until May 23,1611, and was allowed to keep his title as emperor until his death in January, 1612. The armed assistance provided by the Hungarian estates was a factor in the election of a palatine being allowed at the diet in Pozsony, in the autumn of 1608. Other than the religious freedom, this was the first item to be included in the acts passed prior to Archduke Matthias being crowned king of Hungary.60 In Act 3 the estates set out the methods for future elections. The election by the estates would be from two Catholic and two Lutheran candidates recommended by the ruler. If the palatine were to die within one year of his election a new diet had to be called immediately. On November 18, 1608, a day before .Archduke Matthias’s coronation, the estates elected Istvtin Illeshdzy as the next palatine. Thus, the aristocrat who was sentenced to death five years earlier, and who became Bocskai’s advisor, was raised to the hig­ hest lay dignity of the Kingdom of Hungary. He was accepted by Archduke Matthias who was familiar with Illeshtizy’s ability to reach compromises and with whom he had conducted negotiations in Vien­ na, after the start of 1606. The election of Illeshtizy to the palatinate signified both the strengthening of the estates vis-a-vis the king and also the strengthening of the lay estates. The era of prelate royal regents being appointed by the ruler thus came to an end and did not recur until 1667. The palati­ ne, elected by the estates, automatically became the royal regent. For

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the first time, Hungary had a Lutheran palatine. Moreover, after 1116s hdzy’s death on May 5,1609, the Lutheran Gybrgy Thurzo was elected palatine.61 In contrast with the mid-century, filling the position of the palatine at this time caused no serious problems as far as military authority w;as concerned. The controlling role of the Aulic War Council was questio­ ned repeatedly by the estates but they were unable to disband it or cur­ tail its power. The strengthening of the estates had no effect on the mili­ tary administration in Hungary which had been established solidly by the 1570s. Military affairs remained a joint affair between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary. In the local management of the defense system against tlie Otto­ mans the rearrangement of the power relations became manifest. In the seventeenth century the captain generals of Upper Hungary were always Hungarian aristocrats and even the fortresses of Szatmdr were no longer commanded by foreign captain generals. Hungarian magna­ tes were the captain generals in the new border defense area, across from Kanizsa. This fortress was lost to the Turks in 1600. A frequent complaint of the estates about foreign captain generals had thus come to an end. In the first half of tlie century only the Croatian-Slavonian border areas and Gyor and Komdrom were commanded by Austrian, German, or Italian officers. The demands made in Act 11, passed prior to the coronation in 1608, were never realized. The Gyor captain gene­ ral never came under the authority of the palatine, the key fortress of Komdrom did not receive a Hungarian commander and the Croatian and Slavonian Captain Generalcies were commanded by Inner Austri­ an aristocrats. During the ensuing decades, however, the role of the palatine in border diplomacy with tlie Ottomans and in tlie negotiations with the princes of Transylvania became critical.62 The estates remedied another serious military affair offense. Man­ dated by Act 12, also passed prior to the coronation in 1608, the Ger­ man garrisons were gradually but completely removed from the border fortresses after the Peace Treaty of Zsitvatorok was signed with the Ottomans.63 Because the German presence was the most important cause for the feeling of foreign oppression, the Aulic War Council was forced to concede. During the decade after 1608, German troops remai­ ned only in Gyor, Komdrom, Ersekujv^r, and Leva. None w;ere left in

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Kassa and Szatmar.64 The Hungarian estates still demanded, however, that Austrian estates assist with the payment of the Hungarian garri­ sons, particularly in the Croatian and Slavonian area. All this shows that the demands made by the estates in 1605-1608, and even enacted in law7, w;ere not always realized in practice. Even though the filling of the position of the palatine meant that after 1608 the Hungarian Council was led by the leader of the lay elite, the prela­ tes still had a seat on it. This was true even for the bishops who did not reside in their see, such as the bishops of Csanad, Eger, Transylvania, Pecs, Syrmium, Vdc, Vdrad, etc., even though their exclusion was man­ dated by Act 6, passed prior to the coronation in 1608.65 In the seven­ teenth century we also find the titular prelates in the Upper House of the diet,66 even though Act 1, passed after the coronation of 1608, does not list them among the members of the Upper House.67 It was also an expression of the progress of the lay estates when they demanded to assume the leadership of the Hungarian Court Chancellery, which so far had been led by the bishops. As another remedy of the general offenses against the estates, they demanded that the chancellery, which in Prague had its authority repeatedly diminished, be fully restored.68 This was tlie explanation of the odd situation that at the end of 1605, in Korpona, the mostly Protestant estates spoke up in favor of a chancellery which was at that time under the leadership of a man of the armed re-Catholization, Ferenc Forgdch, bishop of Nyitra.69 These contradictions characterized the demands and changes w'hich pertained to the fiscal administration of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary. A broad segment of the lesser nobility came to detest the Hunga­ rian and Szepes Chambers, which were under the leadership of bishops, to such an extent that in 1605 they demanded the abolishment of these government agencies.70 Bocskai did close the Szepes Chamber at the end of 1604 71 To replace the chambers, they demanded, without suc­ cess, the appointment of a royal treasurer of tire country7 from among the lay estates, who was not under the authority of the Aulic or of the Low'er Austrian Chamber72 The magnates, who wzere more familiar with the functions of the kingdom, realized that such a move might not only lead to tire collapse of the Hungarian finances but also to that of the border fortresses and other estate structures.

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Doing away with the chambers was apparently only a propaganda move or the demand of the most radical segment of the estates. This is made likely by the fact that, from April 1608 until the Coronation Diet, the Hungarian Chamber was under the direction of Istvdn Illeshdzy and the Szepes Chamber was directed after the spring of 1607 by Gybrgy Hoffmann, Bocskai’s former counselor.73 IlleshAzy was instrumental in the changes made in the Kassa Chamber in August, 1608. It is a clear indication of the contradictions in the demands of the estates that the financial establishments which some of the estates wanted to disband were being reorganized by the top leadership of the estates. Eventually the established practices were continued in the area of fiscal administration as well. The Szepes Chamber, disbanded by Bocskai was gradually reestablished but its name was so strongly disliked that, until the end of the 1610s, it was referred to as an Administration Directorate.74 The German counselors at the Hungarian Chamber were no longer present but there were no major changes in the financial administration of the kingdom. The Aulic Chamber continued to con ­ trol and supervise the Pozsony and Kassa Chambers and remained the highest decision-making central fiscal body. The system existing since the 1530s could not be undone by a single act. The changes in the chambers were not in their structure but in their leadership which reflected the shifts in power within the estates. After 1608 the complete direction of the Hungarian and Szepes Chambers was taken over by lay estates. The one in Kassa was directed, until his death in 1613, by Gybrgy Hoffmann and the Pozsony one was directed after 1608 by Tamils Vfzkelethy. The latter, assuming the direction of a gover­ nment agency, came from the lower ranks to become a “baron official,” his appointment being welcomed by his lesser nobility brethren. His career was an example for many of them and henceforth the road to an official career in the chambers came from the extended noble retainer net­ works of the aristocracy and not from the sees of the bishops. The example of Vfzkelethy shows that Archduke Matthias and the Hungarian political elite continued their sendees which in the past had led to the reestablishment of peace. There were also a number of lesser nobles who played an important part in the creation of tire Vienna and Zsitvatorok peace treaties which promoted the future of tlie country. Some of them had sensed the ruler and some of them stood for Bocskai and none of them had

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any reason to complain. For example, of the lesser nobility signatories of the Vienna treaty, Pdl Apponyi and AndrAs Osztrosics were made barons five days after signing. The same was done for Benedek. Pogrdny and Tamds Vizkelethy in 1607-1608. Beginning in the spring of 1608, the last two, and Ferenc Alaghy, from Upper Hungary, could also sit as Hungari­ an counselors. Alaghy received the appointment as partial compensation for the damages caused to his properties by Bocskai’s Haiduks. These examples show that in 1606-1608 Archduke Matthias and tire magnates recognized that during the war the lesser nobility had gai ­ ned new strength and that in the future its leading personalities had to be included in the central and estate administration of Ilie country and that they had to be raised to its elite. This did not mean, of course, that the Habsburgs no longer maintained contacts with the weakened Catho­ lic leadership. In fact, Archbishop Forgdch, with help from the papal nuncio, was able to restore some of the lost positions at the Diet of Pozsony at the end of 1609.75 The new Hungarian king adapted well to the changed power relationship within the estates. This was shown symbolically at the November 18 coronation banquet where, in additi­ on to the old magnate families, we also find the names of Pdl Apponyi and Tamis Vizkelethy among the seneschals. Reconciliation between the ruler and the estates which had supported Bocskai is shown by the fact that the seneschals also included Gy orgy Homonnai Drugeth and Tamis Nidasdy, two of the noble defendants of the earlier fiscal suits, as well as Mihily Czobor, Bocskai’s former counselor.76 Matthias of Habsburg, in 1606 -1608 placed the relationship bet­ ween the Habsburg court and the Hungarian estates on a new basis. F.ven though some elements of the 1606 Vienna treaty and of the acts of the 1608 Pozsony diet reflected the hopes of the estates rather than reality, it is no exaggeration to compare the 1608 compromises between the ruler and the Hungarian estates to the 1867 Compromise and call it a similar Ausgleich. This is true in spite of the fact that the expectations of the estates included remedies for a number of old injuries which could not be remedied in the Kingdom of Hungary. They included such items as the ruler living in Hungary and that he should deal only with Hungarian counselors in Hungarian affairs.77 Some acts regulated the relationship between the ruler and the estates for a long time and laid down, in writing, the position and

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strength of the estate establishments. Act 1, passed immediately after the coronation, codified the structure of the two-house diet, the most effective arena for the resistance of the estates. It incorporated all the developments of the sixteenth century'.78 The nature of Ilie Kingdom of Hungary7 as a state of the estates was also confirmed by the return of the Holy Crown from Prague to Pozsony 79 The estates had demanded this ever since 1605, but it was their support of Archduke Matthias, in his fight with his brother, which made the move possible. Rudolf abdi­ cated from the Hungarian throne in June 1608 and then a Hungarian delegation under Gy orgy Thurzo, took the Holy Crown first to Vienna and then to Pozsony. Act 4 enacted prior to the coronation sanctioned the transfer and Act 16, passed after the ceremony, spelled out the methods of guarding and keeping it.80 A regular contingent of crown guards was organized, the position of tow Guardians of the Crown, who had to be a Hungarian lay magnate, was revived, and even the way to certify and seal the receptacle for the crown w;as defined. Return of the Holy Crown had particular significance. The symbol of Hungarian statehood, which was kept since 1551 in the center of the Habsburg Monarchy, first in Vienna and then in Prague was returned to Pozsony, the capital for domestic policy of the Kingdom of Hungary. This move endorsed the process which resulted in the last third of the sixteenth century in identifying the Holy Crown with the estates rather than with the ruler living abroad or with the royal authority.81 The return of the crown strengthened the preservation of the concept of St. Stephen’s realm. It was also a signal for those who supported the “Tur­ kish kingdom” of Bocskai, that the legal ruler of Hungary had to be cro­ wned with this symbol of majesty. Hie return of the Holy Crown strengthened the political position of the estates, hi contrast to his predecessors, Matthias did not have the opportu­ nity to question the right of the estates for a free election. He was truly and freely elected on November 16 and legally crowned on November 19, 1608, thus becoming the ruler of Hungary. All tills strengthened the nature of the Kingdom of Hungary as an elective kingdom. The estates linked the coronation with a set of conditions, codified in acts. In this they created a lasting tradition. Beginning with Matthias’s successor, Ferdinand II, the estates had the new-’ Hungarian kings issue a coronation diploma which defined and listed the privileges and the actual demands of the estates.82

THE HUNGARIAN ESTATE,S AND THE BOCSKAI UPRISING

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Mention must also be made of two important conditions of the Vienna peace agreement which contributed to the reconciliation bet­ ween the divided parties of the estates but which did not address esta­ te issues. These were the problem of the Haiduks and the fate of the prince Bocskai. The former was perhaps Bocskai’s most significant historic accom­ plishment when, at the end of 1605, the prince found a way to create a peaceful future for the Haiduks. As a former captain general of Vdrad, Bocskai knew how to mobilize them but he also knew how to redirect them tow^ard a peaceful existence. On December 12, 1605, he perfor ­ med the largest collective ennoblement in Hungarian history. On this date he settled about 10,000 Haiduks in seven of the so-called old Hai­ duk towns, namely Dorog, Bbszbrmeny, Szoboszlo, Ndnds, Hadhdz, Polgdr, and Vdmospercs. In September 1606 he settled another 1,000 in the same areas and bestowed on all of them inalienable privileges. These include freedom from taxation and self-administration.83 In addi­ tion, in Bihar and Szabolcs Counties, he awarded a number of indivi­ dual patents of nobility for the Haiduks. This resolved the problem only partially, and the Haiduks rose up again in 1607-1608, but it was still a significant step.84 The privileges of the Haiduk towns were confirmed by King Mat­ thias II of Habsburg on April 1, 1613, at which time the Haiduks were placed under the command of the captain general of Upper Hungary.85 Thus the Haiduk towns became an integral part of the frontier defense system against the Ottomans. Even after the Ottomans were expelled from Hungary, the Haiduks did not come under the authority of the large landowners, but had their own special administrative structure, the Haiduk district. In 1876 this area was made into a county, under the name of Hajdu. Hie county7 lines, with many minor changes, survive to this day. It was also of great importance to the Haiduks, that the Vien­ na peace treaty did not mandate the return of property looted during the uprising and the civil war.86 Hie Vienna treaty addressed the matter of Bocskai himself. It was the joint wall of the estates, primarily Illeshazy’s proposal, which was accepted. Neither the Habsburgs nor the Hungarian estates questioned the legitimacy of Bocskai’s Transylvanian principality. In doing so they recognized the realities of the situation and recognized the Principality

232

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

of Transylvania as an Ottoman vassal state. They continued to believe, however, that in spite of the enforced separation, Transylvania continu­ ed to be a part of the Crown of Hungary.87 Bocskai did have to abdica­ te from his Hungarian principality and in exchange he received Bereg, Ugocsa, and Szatmdr Counties and the market towns of Tokaj, Tarcal, and Bodrogkeresztur in Upper Hungary. After his death, these areas were to return to the legal king of the country’.88 This came to pass shortly. Bocskai died in Kassa on December 29, 1606. He was succeeded as prince of Transylvania by his regent Zsig­ mond Rdkoczi.89 The Upper Hungary counties were returned to the Kingdom of Hungary in February’, 1607, by the Royal Commissioners Gyorgy Thurzo, Zsigmond Forgdch, and Andrds Doczy. The Ottomans raised no objection because on November 11,1606, at an encampment, at the confluence of the Zsitva and the Danube, a peace treaty was sig­ ned by the representatives of Emperor Rudolf II and Sultan Ahmed I.90 In article 6 of this treaty’ the conditions of the Bocskai settlement were approved. The Peace Treaty of Zsitvatorok, designed to be effective for twenty years, finally brought back the peace between the two great powers and to the Hungarian theater of war. The treaty was favorable to the Ottomans because it guaranteed the status quo. They also recei­ ved a single payment of 200,000 florins in lieu of the annual “honora­ ble gift” paid by the Habsburgs since 1547.91 This made the Habsburgs and the Ottomans equal negotiating partners. Before his death Bocskai made one more important political con­ tribution. Even though earlier he held on to his title of “Prince of Hun­ gary7,” he accepted the stipulations of the Vienna peace treaty and reno­ unced this title in his last will and testament. In doing so, he accepted the point of view of the reunited Hungarian estates. This was largely the result of Illeshazy’s activities. During the last days of his life Bocskai accepted the reunification of the Hungarian estates, became an adherent of realpolitik, and even gave the estates advice about the advantages which might be obtained from Transylvania under “Turkish protec­ tion.” He wrote, “As long as the Hungarian crown is held by a stronger nation, the Germans, and the Kingdom of Hungary is in the orbit of Germany, it is necessary and useful to maintain a Hungarian prince in Transylvania because this would be a protection and support for them [i.e. the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary].”92 In the seventeenth

THE HUNGARIAN ESTATE,S AND THE B OCSK.AT UPRISING

23 3

century this became one of the leading principles of Hungarian estate politics. The Principality of Transylvania became a bargaining chip visa-vis the Habsburgs and not only for the Ottoman Empire but for the estates of the Kingdom of Hungary as well.

Chapter Twelve

CONCLUSION: CHANGES AFTER 1526 IMPACTING THE CENTURIES TO FOLLOW The years between 1526 and 1608 brought changes to the late medieval Kingdom of Hungary, the realm of St. Stephen, that could be still be felt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These changes were partly due to the Ottoman conquests, to the continuous warfare, and to the frequent campaigns which produced irreversible consequences.1 Of equal, if not greater, importance was the hitherto litt­ le-studied process whereby the remaining parts of the Kingdom of Hungary7 joined the evolving central European Habsburg Monarchy. The appropriateness of calling the decades after the Battle of Mohdcs one of the most critical periods in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary is made more evident by contemporary Hungarian and other comments. Keen observers sensed the changes even in their own time. Let it suffice to cite the Hungarian historian and politician Miklos Istvdnffy and the Venetian ambassador in Vienna, Giovanni Michiel. In his major historical work, Istvdnffy described the post Mohdcs changes as follows, “This memorable and lamentable Mohdcs disaster in which we lost the old glory’ of our nation, and the flowers of our nobility and knighthood,...which resulted, to our eternal disgra­ ce, in servitude to foreign heathens [i.e. the Ottomans] and to conti­ nuing service to a foreign nation [i.e. the Habsburgs/the Germans].”2 Similar comments were made, forty-live years after Mohdcs, by an unbiased foreign observer, Michiel: “So far as Hungary is concerned, the Virgilian line applies: ‘We have been Trojans, Ilium [Troy] has been.’3 Hungary has been subjected to unheard of misfortune and misery. It sank into being a province, from having been not only a

236

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

kingdom, but one of the foremost kingdoms of Christianity, whose king was equal to the king of France.”4 The eyewitnesses exaggerated only very’ little. They could not know that the changes they observed would determine not only Hun­ gary’s but also central Europe’s history for several centuries. The prin­ cipal victims of the sixteenth century Ottoman conquests in central Europe were the southern and eastern parts of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary. One of the prominent countries of Christian Europe of the late Middle Ages was tom into three parts and, until the reconquest of Temeskbz in 1718, became an almost constant theater of war between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the Hungary’s eastern part became the Princi­ pality of Transylvania, a vassal of the Porte. Transylvania, forced by the Ottomans to become a separate but carefully controlled state, did not become a part of the Kingdom of Hungary again until 1867. This was due, to a large extent, to the agreement reached at the end of the seven­ teenth century, by the Habsburg court in Vienna and the Transylvanian political elite.5 Yet the basic conditions were the creation of Sultan Suleyman I and the Ottoman political and military leadership. Without the Ottoman conquests there probably would have been no fusion of the Kingdom of Croatia with the Hungarian province of Slavonia, which had autonomy during the late medieval period. The evolution of the Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian kingdom, beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century, played a long-lasting role in the territorial extent of the present Republic of Croatia. The early modem history of central Europe would presumably be quite different if the Ottoman conquest would have stopped somewhere in the Bal­ kans or even if their extension into Hungary had not reached in 1541 Buda, its capital. The Ottoman victory at Mohdcs in 1526, the occu­ pation of parts of Hungary and Croatia, and creation of a vassal state in Transylvania made the Turks a major factor in the history of central Europe. Their conquest affected the map of the area permanently and had major and lasting effects on the conditions in the Balkans. The advance of the Ottomans along the Danube also played an important role in the reduced Kingdom of Hungary’ becoming a part of the Habs­ burg Monarchy, the new great power in central Europe. This event had more long-lasting consequences than the Ottoman conquests and the rela­

CONCLUSION: CHANGES AFTER 1526

237

ted tragic political, economic, and ethnic effects. Both Miklos Istvanffy and the Venetian ambassador realized the importance of this event. Their expressions, while not entirely objective, did indicate that the late medie­ val mid-size power, St. Stephen’s state, became, though not a province, but a part of the monarchy of the Austrian House of the Habsburgs and was ruled from abroad, first from Vienna and then partly from Prague. The critical importance of this change was that it did not come to an end for centuries and never reverted to tire more favorable medieval conditions. The fundamental changes taking place during the fifty years after Mohdcs determined the fate of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Habsburg Monarchy for centuries. First to the expulsion of the Ottomans from Hungary (1699), then to the fall of the Holy Roman Empire (1806), then to 1848 and 1867 and finally to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918. The defeat at Mohdcs and the progressive occupation of Hungary by the Ottomans, between 1526 and 1566, then in some steps until 1663, brought about negative changes most of which were irreversible. Yet 1526 disaster was not the end of the medieval Hungarian state, like the Battle of Kosovo Polje was for Serbia in 1389. The Kingdom of Hungary did not dissolve even though 60 percent of its territory7 was occupied or lost, and it also lost its capital for many years. With the election of Ferdinand of Habsburg in 1526 and his coronation in 1527, the Kingdom of Hungary became a part of a new dynastic great power, the Habsburg Monarchy. It became part of a composite state, similar to the one ruled by Ferdinand’s Hungarian king predecessors, Sigis­ mund of Luxemburg and Albert of Habsburg and much like the one ruled by Matthias Corvinus and, until 1526, by the Jagiellos. Contrary to the statement of the Venetian ambassador, the King­ dom of Hungary never became a province of the Habsburg composite state, or a hereditary province. As a consequence of the Ottoman advan­ ces and particularly after the loss of Buda in 1541, the country indubi­ tably became a kingdom ruled from abroad. Its central administration and its court were located in Vienna, Hungary’s secondary capital. Its primary capital, the center of its domestic policies and of the political life of its estates was Pozsony. Tliis process, the move of the court to a foreign country and the establishment of new central government structures, led to a significant

238

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

loss of position for the Hungarian political elite. This was true in the new joint Habsburg court, in the centralized administrative system and even partly on a countrywide and regional level. Foreign affairs, mili­ tary matters, and fiscal administration became joint endeavors of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Hungary and remained so until 1918, albeit not in the firmly stated form as it was under the 1867 Compromise. Creation of the Aulic War Council in Vienna, in 1556, meant that the late medieval military sphere of activity of the estates was reduced to the level of local military administration. At this level it remained essential and necessary in spite of the vigorous centralization. Knowing Illis, it is anachronistic to speak of an independent Hungarian military leadership or of an independent Hungarian (national) army in the early modem era. In a paradoxical way, the loss of position of the Hungarian politi­ cal elite was due to the continuing importance of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary. I do not wish to overestimate the value of the smaller Hungarian state (ca 120,000 square kilometers) to the Habsburg Monarchy, but I believe that I was able to show that in the sixteenth century the King­ dom of Hungary was of the greatest significance to the Monarchy in a number of areas.6 The Kingdom of Hungary was the bulwark of the Habsburg Monarchy with its new frontier defense system against the Ottomans established during the second half of the century by the effec­ tive cooperation between the Viennese military leadership and the Hun­ garian political elite. Hungary was not a simple military buffer state, subject to armed coercion as Serbia and Bosnia had been for the medie­ val Hungarian state. After 1526, the Kingdom of Hungary became an organic component of the strongest military alliance in Europe. This was critical for its survival because the establishment of the new defen­ se system, and financing and supplying it was possible only with regu­ lar annual financial assistance from neighboring Austrian and Bohemi­ an lands and from the more distant Holy Roman Empire. It is no exag­ geration to state that Hungary received the most significant military and financial assistance in sixteenth century Europe, in return for w-hich Hungary guaranteed the Monarchy’s protection and peaceful develop­ ment. The interdependence of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Habsburg Monarchy was evident and this was the reason why it was so successful and remained so for an extensive period of time. The new

CONCLUSION: CHANGES AFTER 1526

239

defense system established by the 1570s, remained effective with many minor changes until the end of the seventeenth century. The Habsburg dominions needed Hungary for reasons other than military as well. Hie export of live animals to the West, copper mining, and coining still produced substantial revenues. In spite of the conti­ nuous warfare, Hungary still contributed approximately one third of the entire revenue of the Monarchy and remained one of its principal sour­ ces of income. The flourishing live animal export made Hungary into the indispensable larder of the Austrian and German territories, the imperial residence city of Vienna, and the Habsburg court. At the same time the Hungarian-Croatian theater of war became a marketplace for military7 goods within the Monarchy. It offered enormous possibilities for the Austrian, German, and Bohemian merchant bankers and arms manufacturers. During the second half of the sixteenth century similar opportunities became available to almost every social group in Hun­ gary: aristocrats, lesser nobles, citizens of the free royal cities, residents of the market towns, peasants, and frontier fortress garrisons. They par­ ticipated in the live animal business as exporters, transporters or sub­ contractors. It is no exaggeration to call the twenty-five years after the Peace of Adrianople in 1568 as the flowering of Hungarian enterprise. St. Stephen’s state carried substantial political weight and presti­ ge within the Monarchy. The Venetian ambassador did not exaggerate when he said in 1571 that in the late medieval period the Hungarian rulers of the composite Hungarian, Croatian, and Bohemian state were of equal standing with kings of Trance. The respect in wTich the King ­ dom of Hungary was held during the Middle Ages did not disappear when it lost a significant part, of its territory to the Ottomans. The Hun­ garian political elite and the leaders of the Habsburg court cooperated in this area attempting to preserve as much of the traditions of St. Ste­ phen’s Hungarian state as possible. They focused specifically on the territorial aspects of the old composite Kingdom and on the symbols which reflected, in reality and nominally, countries and provinces which belonged to it and which were reflected in the long Hungarian royal titles of the Habsburgs. This cooperation lasted for centuries. Starting with the Pozsony coronation of Rudolf in 1572 until the last Hungarian coronation in 1916, the realm of St. Stephen was symboli­ zed by the ten country banners which were introduced by the Hunga­

240

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

rian political elite in cooperation with the Habsburg court in the 1560s and 1570s. The Hungarian royal regalia and symbols of power displayed at the sixteenth century imperial funeral ceremonies in Vienna or Prague indi­ cated that within the Habsburg Monarchy the Kingdom of Hungary ranked in second place after the Holy Roman Empire, ahead of the lands of the Bohemian crown. Within the framework of the Monarchy, Hungary even had a certain, detailed external sovereignty. Even though it had a joint ruler, emperor and king, and joint administrative affairs, the Kingdom of Hungary was a component of the Monarchy but not of the Holy Roman Empire. Thus we cannot speak of any imperial autho­ rity or legal matters. Stating it more emphatically this meant that the countries of the Hungarian crown, which had no formal relationship with the Holy Roman Empire, really made the central European, Austrian-German-Bohemian dominions of the Habsburgs into a true composite state. The Kingdom of Hungary became a strongly centralized area of the Habsburg Monarchy in military and financial matters, but remai­ ned, nevertheless, an influential state of the estates with a large and strong political elite. Even though the possibility of strong centralizati­ on, wdthout the accoutrements of absolutism, combined with a strong estate system has been underestimated in historiography, this work indicates that in sixteenth century Hungary they did coexist. During the decades after 1526 both the Habsburg leadership and the estates reali­ zed that in order to defend the central areas of the Monarchy, the capi­ tal city of Vienna, and the Kingdom of Hungary bilateral compromises and sacrifices were necessary. The interdependence made mutual con­ cessions mandatory. It was also true that in the late medieval period the Hungarian estates w-ere already much stronger than their Austrian and Bohemian counterparts. During the sixteenth century Ferdinand I and his successors made numerous compromises with the Hungarian political elite. In spite of all the efforts of the dynasty and of the Habsburg political leadership Hun gary remained an elective monarchy. The Habsburgs could not even make the estates accept the right of dynastic primogeniture. Hie estate structure suffered little or no damage and the organization of the Hun­ garian diet became firm during the century when Hungary joined the

CONCLUSION: CHANGES AFTER 1526

2U

Monarchy. The high Hungarian royal court dignities were preserved and survived until 1918 even though their duties became nominal and they became active only at Hungarian coronations and at the meetings of the diet. The domestic political influence of these titleholders remai­ ned strong in Hungary. The bastions of the Hungarian lesser nobility’s self-government, the counties, continued to perform their functions without problems and with an increased administrative organization and strengthened self-government. Hungarian legal practice and the delivery of justice were also not under any Austrian or German influence. The direction of the domestic life of the country and the delivery' of justice were fully preserved as the prerogative of the estates. All these were the most important pledges of the internal sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hun­ gary within the Habsburg Monarchy. The strong Hungarian elite vigo­ rously defended its special sovereignty and the ancient rights and customs of the St. Stephen’s realm within the framework of the Habs­ burg Monarchy. In its political consciousness the peculiar sovereignty of Hungary was preserved throughout the existence of the Habsburg Monarchy. During a few decades after 1526 the Habsburg leadership in Vien­ na was forced to accept the fact that from the perspective of the Mon­ archy, preserving the border defense, financial, and food supplier role of the Kingdom of Hungary was much more important than the assumption of potentially serious political conflicts. Thus, in certain matters the Habsburg rulers could achieve substantial results only if they worked with an influential subset of the Hungarian estates. They inherited the methodology from their Jagiello predecessors and applied them successfully. They also used appointments to high Hungarian dig­ nities, to military and financial management positions, to baronies and counsellorships, as well as the donation of estates, to shape the Hunga­ rian aristocracy. At the same time the members of the Hungarian political elite rea­ lized that the lack of information about Hungary and Hungarian geo­ graphy, language, and legal matters made them indispensable to the Habsburg court. Successful governance of the Kingdom of Hungary' and the maintenance of its contributions were impossible without them. Within a few decades they also realized that their loss of position, due

242

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

to the court moving abroad and the Hungarian royal capital being occu­ pied, could be minimized best by assuming major roles in the new, stron­ gly centralized fiscal and military management controlled from Vienna. Tarnds Pdlffy, the Hungarian Court Chancellor expressed this succinctly in 1674 when he said, “Between two evils the lesser evil must be chosen and it is wise to adapt to the times. Otherwise, the rejection of the impe­ rial and royal favors caused great displeasure here at court.’"7 After the middle of the sixteenth century, the leaders of the politi­ cal elite and of the estates assumed an imperishable role in both sectors of the new dualistic governance of the Kingdom of Hungary (fig. 15). Because of the interdependence of the parties, the leaders of the Habs­ burg court were willing to engage in an impressive system of compro­ mises. To cite just a few examples: this development was clearly illust­ rated by the dual system which was established, by the second half of the century, in the Hungarian and Croatian defense system against the Ottomans. The dual system consisted of border fortress and district cap­ tain generalcies. In the latter the Hungarian estates assumed a major role. Not only because the district captain general positions could be held only by Hungarian aristocrats but also because these persons fre­ quently were the captain generals for both tlie district area and the bor­ der fortresses. Furthermore, the magnates participating in the military administration were simultaneously the highest leaders of the Hungari­ an estates, the holders of the highest country dignities, and the members of the Hungarian Council. They simultaneously participated in the cen­ tralized military administration of the Kingdom of Hungary and in the political life of the estates. The same was also frequently true for the prelates. In the sixteenth century the two local organizations of tlie Hungarian fiscal administra­ tion, the Hungarian Chamber in Pozsony and the Szepes Chamber in Kassa, were directed in most cases by bishops. They also had a leading role in the administration of justice and in the direction of the Hungari­ an Court Chancellery which was estate-oriented even though in form it was a centralized office. Lastly, in the second half of the century, at least half of the aristocrats, holding the highest country and estate dig­ nities, served as youths for some time in the joint Habsburg household, tlie most effective integrating and centralizing organization in the enti­ re Monarchy. Service in one of the minor but real offices at the joint

CONCLUSION: CHANGES AFTER 1526

24.3

Habsburg court became a stepping stone for the Hungarian aristocrats toward the highest, now nominal, dignities of the former royal Hunga­ rian court, and toward the leadership positions in the Hungarian dome­ stic policy-estate policy system. Consequently the sixteenth century Kingdom of Hungary functio­ ned very differently than what had been reconstructed to date. The dominant traits in international historiography, namely “the rebellious and always resisting Hungarians” or the “Hungarians constantly fighting for independence” are just as mythical as the romantic Hunga ­ rian nationalist view of history which speaks of “Habsburgs oppressing the Hungarians,” or of the “anti-Hungarian Vienna court.” Maintaining the interests of the estates and their resistance in Hungary went along smoothly and reached compromises with the Habsburg court and with the central administrative agencies and resulted in excellent cooperati­ on in some areas. The highest representatives of the estates were the same people who were implementing the centralizing programs of the Habsburgs. This explains why in Hungary successful centralization and the strong estates marched side by side. Participation in the two struc­ tures of the dualistic governance did not mean relinquishing the state­ hood of St. Stephen’s realm, the traditions of the Kingdom of Hungary, or the interests of the estates. In a paradoxical fashion it actually strengthened them. Being loyal to the dynasty and to the court did not mean, at the beginning of the modem era, that the interests and sover­ eignty of Hungary had to be given up. Loyalty to the Habsburgs and Hungarian patriotism were not mutually exclusive. It was not only a narrow segment of the Hungarian political elite which participated in the central and estate administration of the King­ dom of Hungary. At the Hungarian diets, along with the prelates and the magnates, the third estate, consisting of the lesser nobility, and the fourth estate, consisting of the citizens of the free royal cities, all partici­ pated. They served in the military as captains and officers of fortresses, in the fiscal administration as officials of the chambers and the “one­ thirtieth” tax collection, and manorial treasury employees. The extensi­ ve connections as noble retainer linked the lesser nobility with the poli­ tically active Hungarian aristocrats and prelates. All of this had long-range consequences. Because of interdepen­ dence and in spite of mutual sacrifices, a solid system of compromises

244

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

evolved in the sixteenth century between the Habsburg court and the Hungarian elite. This could be eliminated only if a very significant por­ tion of the Hungarian political elite were willing to upset the equilibri­ um established between Vienna and Pozsony. Or, if the Habsburg court would institute forceful absolutistic actions with armed forces as in the 1670s. Because of the strength of the estates this would have been extremely dangerous. While the Hungarian political elite adapted to the times and found in the Kingdom of Hungary, integrated into the Habs­ burg Monarchy, a satisfactory position, those who tried to upset this arrangement encountered a practically impossible situation, at least until the end of the Ottoman wars in the second half of the eighteenth century. The system of compromises was so effective that the majority of the Hungarian political elite and of the Hungarian estates refused to side with Istvdn Bocskai, the vassal of the Porte, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, with Gdbor Bethlen, the Prince of Transylvania, or even with Ferenc II Rdkoczi, who did in fact lead an independence movement in 1703 -1711. The fundamental changes taking place during the decades after 1526 determined the symbiosis of the Kingdom of Hungary and of the Habsburg Monarchy for a very long time.

APPENDIX A LIST' OF’ RULERS AND HIGHEST DIGNITARIES OF HUNGARY

LIST OF RULERS AND HIGHEST DIGNITARIES OF HUNGARY KINGS OF HUNGARY John (Jdnos) I Szapolyai (1526-1540 ) Ferdinand I (152(^1564) John II Sigismund (Janos Zsigmond), only elected king (1540-1571) Maximilian I (1564—1576) Rudolf I (1576-1608) Matthias II (1608-1619) PALATINES (palatinus regni Hungariae) Istvan Bdthory (1526-1530) vacant (1530-1554) Tamas Nddasdy (1554-1562) vacant (1562-1608) Istvdn Illeshdzy (1608-1609)

ROYAL REGENTS (locumtenens regins) Queen Mary of Hungary (1527) Istvan Bdthory as Palatine (1528-1530) Tamas Szalahazy and ElekThurzo (1531-1532) ElekThurzo (1532-1542) PdlVdrday (1542-1549) Ferenc Ujlaky (1550-1554) Tamds Nddasdy as Palatine (1554 -1562) Miklos Oldh (1562-1568) Pdl Bomemissza (1568-1572)

248

APPENDIX A

Antal Verancsics (1572 -1573) Istvdn Radeczy (1573-1586) Gyorgy Draskovics (1586-1587) Istvdn Fejerkovy (1587-1596) Jdnos Kutassy (1597 -1601) Mdrton Pethe (1602-1605) Ferenc Forgdch 1607-1608 Istvdn Illeshazy as Palatine (1608-1609)

CHIEF JUSTICES (index curiae regiae) Elek Thurzo (1527-1543) Tamds Nddasdy (1543-1554) Andrds Bdthory (1554 -1566) GdborPerenyi (1566-1567) Kristof Orszdgh (1567) Istvdn Bdnffy (1567-1568) Miklos Bathory (1568 -1584) Istvdn Bdthory (1586-1605) Zsigmond II Forgdch (1606-1608) BANS OF CROATIA AND SLAVONIA (banns Croatiae et Slavoniae) Ferenc Batthydny, Sr. (1525-1533) Ivan Karlovic (1527-1531) Lajos Pekry (1531-1537) Tamds Nddasdy (1537 -1539) Petar Keglevic (1537-1541) Miklos Znnyi/NikolaZrinski (1542-1556) Peter Erdody, Jr. (1556-1567) Franjo Frankopan (1567 —1572) Gyorgy Draskovics (1567-1578) Gdspdr Alapy (1574—1576) Christoph Ungnad (1578-1584) Tamds Erdody (1584 -1595) Gdspdr Sztankovdchky (1595-1596) Jdnos Draskovics (1595—1607) Tamds Erdody (1608-1615)

LIST OF RULERS AND HIGHEST DIGNITARIES

ROYAL TREASURERS (magister tavemicorum regalium) ElekThurzo (1523-1527) Andris Bithory (1527-1532) vacant (1533-1535) Tanias Nidasdy (1536 -1542) Andris Bithory (1544—1554) Gibor Perenyi (1554—1557) Miklos Zrinyi/Nikola Zrinski (1557-1566) Gyorgy Zrinyi/Juraj Zrinski (1567-1603) Tamis Erdody (1603-1608) LORD STEWARDS (magister curiae regiae) Imre Orszigh and Miklos Thuroczy (1527 -1532) Imre Orszigh (1532-1536) vacant(1536-1548) Milton Kecseti (1548-1551) vacant (1551-1553) Iinos Dessewffy (1554-1568) Ferenc Thurz6 (1569-1574) Iinos Krusics (1575-1580) vacant (1581-1586) Istvin Illeshizy (1587-1608) MASTER DOORWARDS (magister ianitorum regalium) Imre Orszigh (1519 1536) vacant (1536-1539) Andris Thamoczy (1539-1556) Liszlo Binffy (1556-1573) Iinos Balassi (1574—1576) Mihily Revay (1577-1587) Ferenc II Revay (1587-1598) Miklos Istvinffy (1599-1615) MASTER SENESCHALS (magister dapiferorum regalium) Liszlo More (1523-1527) Iinos Lengyel (1527-1532) Liszlo Orszigh (1534 -1542)

2-19

250

APPENDIX A

vacant(1543 1545) Lajos Pekry (1546-1551) vacant (1552-1554) Istvdn Banffy (1554—1567) vacant (1567-1568) Boldizsdr Batthyany (1568-1590) vacant (1590-1598) Tamds Erdody (1598-1603) Gyorgy Thurzo (1604 -1609)

MASTER CUPBEARERS (magister pincemarum regalium) Ldszlo More (1523-1527) Antal Losonczy (1527-1533) Kristof Batthydny (1534-1571) Mihdly Vdrday (1572-1584) vacant (1584—1587) Simon Forgach (1587-1598) Gyorgy Thurzo (1599-1604) Zsigmond II Forgach (1604—1607) Andrds Doczy (1608-1609)

MASTERS OF STABLES (magister agazonum regalium) Gyorgy Bdlhory (1505-1534) Peter Erdody, Sr. (1535-1545) Ferenc Nydry (1545-1553) Ferenc Tahy (1553-1573) Ldszlo Bdnffy (1574-1583) vacant (1584—1586) Ferenc Nddasdy (1587-1604) vacant (1604—1606) Seifried von Kollonitsch (1606-1608) MASTERS OF’ CHAMBERLAINS (magister cubiculariorum regalium) Imre Orszdgh (1519-1527) Gdspdr Horvdlh (1527-1545) vacant (1545-1550) Peter Macedonia) (1550-1561)

LIST OF RULERS AND HIGHEST DIGNITARIES

251

Jdnos Petho (1561-1578) Imre Czobor (1578-1581) Miklos Pdlffy (1581-1600) Jdnos Draskovics (1601-1610)

OTHER CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE HUNGARIAN KINGDOM (personalis praesentiae regiae) Ferenc I Revay (1527-1542) vacant (1542-1544) Mihdly Merey (1544—1562) Einos Zomor (1562-1570) Damjdn Aranydni (1571-1571) Andrds Szdszy (1572-1585) vacant(1585-1587) Jdnos Joo (1587-1603) Jdnos Lippay (1604—1616) PRESIDENTS OF THE HUNGARIAN CHAMBER (praefectus Camerae Hungaricae} Miklos Gerendi (1527-1531) Stefan Pemfflinger (1531-1537) Albert Pereghy (1537-1546) Baldzs Petervaradi (1547-1549) Ferenc Thurzo (1549-1556) Jdnos Dessewffy (1557-1561) Jdnos tJjlaky (1561-1568) Istvan Radeczy (1568-1586) Istvdn Fejerkbvy (1587-1596) Istvan Szuhay (1596-1607) Tamils Vizkelethy (1608-1611) COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF HUNGARY (Oberstfeldhauptmann) Kasimir Markgraf von Brandenburg (1527) Niklas Graf zu Salm, Sr. (1527) Hans Katzianer (1527-1529) Niklas Graf zu Salm, Sr. (1529-1530) Wilhelm von Roggendorf (1530 -1531)

252

APPENDIX A

Hans Katzianer (1532-1537) Leonhard von Vels (1537-1540) Wilhelm von Roggendorf (1541) Joachim Markgraf von Brandenburg (1542) Hans Ungnad (1543-1544) Leonhard von Vels (1544-1545) Niklas Graf zu Salm und Neuburg, Jr. (1546-1550) Gianbattista Castaldo (1551-1553)

CROAFIAN BORDER FOR1RESS CAPTAIN GENERALS Erasm von Thum (1538-1540) Hans Ungnad (1540-1543) Georg von Wildenstein (1543-1545) Niklas Graf zu Salm und Neuburg, Jr. (1546-1550) Hans Lenkovic (1546-1553) Hans Ungn ad (1553-1556) Hans Lenkovic (1553-1567) Lukas Zaki (1567 -1568) Herward von Auersperg (1568-1575) Hans Weikhard von Auersperg (1576-1578) Johann Femberger (1578-1579) Hans Weikhard von Auersperg (1580) Andreas von Auersperg (1581-1582) Jobst Josef von Thum (1582-1589) Andreas von Auersperg (1589-1593) Georg Lenkovic (1594-1602) Johann Jakob von Khisl (1603-1611)

SLAVONIAN (WENDISH) BORDER FORTRESS CAPTAIN GENERALS Hans Ungnad (1540-1543) Georg von Wildenstein (1543-1545) Niklas Graf zu Salm und Neuburg, Jr. (1546-1550) Hans Lenkovic (1546-1553) Hans Ungnad (1553-1556) Hans Lenkovic (1553-1567) Lukas Zaki (1567-1568)

LIST OF RULERS AND HIGHEST DIGNITARIES

Veit von Hallegg (1568—1589) Hans Globizer (1589) Stefan von Grasswein (1589-1594) Hans Sigmund von Herberstein (1594—1603) Sigmund Friedrich von Trauttmansdorf (1603-1630) KANIZSA BORDER FORTRESS CAPTAIN GENERALS Ferenc Tahy (1566-1567) Gy orgy Thury (1567-1571) Bdlint Banffy (1571-1573) Gdspdr Alapy (1573-1574) Gy orgy Zrinyi/Juraj Zrinski (1574-1575) Jdnos Bomemissza (1575-1577) Andreas Kielman (1577-1580) Niklas HI Graf zu Salm und Neuburg (1580) Erasm Braun (1581-1582) Gy orgy Zrinyi/Juraj Zrinski (1582-1590) Bertalan Gereczy (1590-1594) Christoph Haimb (1594—1597) Georg Paradeiser (1598-1600) GYOR BORDER FORTRESS CAPTAIN GENERALS Adam Gall zu Loosdorf (1556—1560) Eck Graf zu Salm und Neuburg (1560-1574) Andreas Teufel (1575-1577) Karl Ludwig von Zelking (1577) Andreas Teufel (1577-1588) Ferdinand Graf zu Nogarol (1588-1590) Georg Erasm von Liechtenstein (1591) Ferdinand Graf zu Hardegg (1592 -1594) Sigmund Hager (in Magyarovdr and Sdrvdr) (1595-1598) Adolf Graf von Schwarzenberg (1598-1600) Ruprecht von Eggenberg (1602-1606) Hans Breuner (1606-1633)

253

254

APPENDIX A

CAPTAIN GENERALS OF THE BORDER FORTRESSES DEFENDING THE MINING TOWNS, AND CISDANUBIAN DISTRICT CAPTAIN GENERAIN Istvdn Dersffy (1564—1568) Simon Forgdch (1569-1582) Ferenc Dobo (1582-1589) Miklos Pdlffy (1589-1600) vacant (1600-1602) Gyorgy Thurzo (1602-1604) Seifried von Kollonitsch (1604—1611) CAPTAIN GENERALS OF UPPER HUNGARY Imre Thelekessy (1559 -1560) Ferenc Zay (1560-1565) Lazarus von Schwendi (1565-1568) Hans Rueber (1568-1584) Ferdinand Graf zu Nogarol (1584 -1588) Andreas Kielman (1588-1590) Ferdinand Graf zu Hardegg (1591-1592) Christoph von Teuffenbach (1592-1598) Giorgio Basta (1599 1601) Ferdinand Gonzaga (1601-1602) Giacomo Barbiano Belgiojoso (1603-1604) vacant (1604-1608) CAPTAIN GENERALS OF KOMAROM Jdnos Paksy (1552-1562) Jdnos Petho (1563-1566) Andreas Kielman (1566 -1577) Ferranto Samaria de Speciacasa (1577-1578) Andreas Kielman (1580-1584) Miklos Pdlffy (1584-1589) Erasm Braun (1589-1594) Miklos Pdlffy (1594-1600) Hans Molart (1600-1606) Ferdinand von Kollonitsch (1606-1609)

LIST OF RULERS AND HIGHEST DIGNITARIES

TRANSDANUBLAN district captain generals Andrds Bdthory (1542) Tamds Nddasdy (1542-1546) vacant(1547) Tamds Nddasdy (1548-1552) Ferenc Tahy (1553-1554) Tamds Nddasdy as Palatine (1554-1562) vacant(1562-1563) Miklos Zrfnyi/Nikola Zrinski (1563-1566) Ferenc Torok (1566—1571) Eek. Graf zu Salm und Neuburg (1572-1574) Gyorgy Zrinyi/Juraj Zrinski (1574—1575) Idnos Petho (1576-1578) vacant(1578-1582) Gyorgy Zrinyi/Juraj Zrinski (1582-1598) Ferenc Nddasdy (1598-1604) Ferenc Batthydny, Jr. (1604-1609)

CISDANUBIAN DISTRICT CAPTAIN GENERALS Peter Perenyi (1542) Andras Bdthory (1542-1552) vacant(1553-1554) Tamds Nddasdy as Palatine (1554-1562) Istvdn Dersffy (1563-1564)

255

APPENDIX B GAZETTEER

GAZETTEER The form used in the book is given in bold; the form in current use is given in italics. The names are arranged in alphabeti­ cal order of the form used in the book.

Hungarian

Almosd Elzasz

osztrak orokos tartomanyok

Bajcsavar, Baicsa Lake Balaton Barria Bajororszag Bazin Becse Becskerek Nandorfehervar, Belgrad

Berkisevina Besztereebanya Bihacs

English, German (Austrian)

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Serbian, Slovakian, Czech, Italian Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish

Alsace (E) Elsass (G) Ambras (G) Augsburg (G) Auspitz (G) Austrian Hereditary Lands (E) osterreicliische Erblander, Erblande (G) Weilschawar (G)

Flatten see (G) Bartfeld (G) Bavaria (E) Bayern (G) Bosing (G)

Beograd (E) Griechisch WeiBenburg (G)

Hustopece (Cz)

Bardejov (Slo)

Pezjnok (Slo) Novi Becei (Se) Zrenjanin (Se) Belgrad (Se)

Belgrad (T)

BrkiSovina (Cm) Banska. Bystrica (Slo) Neusohl (G) Bihac (B) Wihitsch (G)______

______

260

APPENDIX B

Hungarian

B odrogkeresztur Csehorszag

Bosznia, Rama

English, German (Austrian)

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Serbian, Slovakian, Czech, Italian Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish Cechy (Cz)

Bohemia (E) Bohmen (G) Bosnia (E) Bosnien (G)

Bosna (B)

Boszormeny, Hajdubbszbrmeny Brasov (R) Brasso Kronstadt (G) Boroszlo Breslau (G) Brest Pokupski (Gro) Breszt Bruck an der Leitha (G) Brunn (G) Buda (Buda, from Buda (E) Ofen (G) 1873 Budapest) Bulgaria Bulgaria (E) Bulgarien (G) Burgundia Burgundy (E) Burgund (G) Karintia Carinthia (E) Kaniten (G) Kranjsko (Slov) Krajna Camiola (E) Krain (G) Cegled Cetin (Cr) Cologne (E) Kbln (G) Constantinople (E) Konstantinapoly Konstantinopel (G) Krakko Cracow (E) Krakau (G) Hrvatska (Cr) Horvatorszag Croatia (E)

Wroclaw (P)

Brno (Cz) Budin, Budun (I')

Bulgarska (Bu)

Istanbul (T) Krakow (I’)

Kroatien (G)

Csitbrag Csallokbz Csanad Dalmacia Duna River

Debrecen

Schuttinsel (G) Dalmatia (E) Dalmatien (G) Danube (E) Donau (G) Debrezin (G)______

CabradslC\ Vrbovok (Slo) ZitnOostrov (Slo) Cenad (Se) Dalmacija (Cr)

__________________

GAZETTEER

Hungarian

English, German (Austrian)

Dibszeg Dombro Dorog, Hajdltdorog Drava (E) Drau (G) Drava River Dresden (G) Drezda Adrianople (E, G) Drinapoly Ecsed, Nagyecsed Erlau (G) Eger Eperies (G) Eperjes Neuhausel (G) Ersekujvar Eszek Esztergom Gran (G) Neusiedler See (G) Lake Ferto Fiume (E. G) Finnic Forchtenstein (G) Frakno Friaul (G) Fiilek Galicia, Gacsorszag Galicia (E) Halics Galizien (G) Galszecs Garam River Gran (G) Danzig (G)

261

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Serbian, Slovakian, Czech, Italian Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish Diosig (R) Dubrava (Cr) Drava (Cr) Edirne (T)

Egri, Egre (T)

Presov (Slo) Nove Zamky (Slo) Osijek (Cro) Ostorgon (T)

_____

Rijeka (Cro)

Flume (I)

Filakovo (Slo) Halicina (U)

Galicja (P)

Secovce (Slo) Hron (Slo) Gdansk (P) Glina River (Cr)

Gorizia (E) Gbrz (G) Graz (G)

Gyor Gyula Gyulafehervar

______ Gilau (R)

Gyalu Raab (G) Jula (G) Karlsburg/ Weisenburg (G)

Yanik (T)_________ Gble (T)

Alba Iulia (R)

Hadhaz, Hajduhadhaz

Hatvan Nemet-romai Birodalom

Belso-Ausztria

Isztambul

Holy Roman Empire Old Empire (E) Heiliges Rdmisches Reich, Alles Reich (G) Inner Austria (E) Innerdsterreich (G) Innsbruck (G) Istanbul (E)_______

Istanbul (T)_______

262

APPENDIX B

Hungarian

English, German (Austrian)

Jaica

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Serbian, Slovakian, Czech, Italian Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish Jajce (B)

Jiilich (G) Kakat, Parkany Kalki, Nagykallb Kalmancsehi, Kdlmancsa Kalocsa Kanizsa, Nagykanizsa Kaposvar Kapronca Karansebes Karolyvaros Kassa Kecskemet Kesniark Kismarton Kisszeben Kisvarda, Varda. Kolozsvar Komarom Korpona RigdmezO Kbrmbcbanya Korbs Koszeg Kulpa River Lajta River Legrad Leva

Stiirovo (Slo)

Parkan (I)

Kanischa (G)

Kaniza (Cr)

Kanije, Kanija (T)

Kopreinitz (G)

Koprivnica (Cr) Cavaran (R) Karlovac (Cr) Kosice (Slo)

Karlstadt (G) Kaschau (G) Kasmark (G) Eisenstadt (G) Ze ben (G)

Klausenburg (G) Komom (G) Karpfen (G) Kremnitz (G) Kreuz (G) Guns(G) Kulp (G) Laibach (G) Leitha (G)

Lewenz (G) Lieben (G) Linz (G)

Kezmarok. (Slo)

Sabinov (Slo) Cluj -Napoca (R) Komdmo (Slo) Krupina (Slo) Kosovo polje (Se) Kremnica (Slo) Kri'zevci (Cr) Kupa (Cr) Ljubljana (Slov)

Legrad (Cr) Levice (Slo)

Lipova (R) Lodomeria, Volhy- Volodimiija, nia (E) Lodomerien, Volyn (U) Wolhinien (G) Lower Austria (E) Alsb-Ausztria Niederdsterreich (G) Also-Magyarorszag Lower Hungary (E) Niederungam (G) Lippa Lodomeria, Volhinia

Liben (Cz)

Lodomeria, Wolyn (P)

GAZETTEER

Hungarian

English, German (Austrian)

Locse Lugos Luzacia

Leutschau (G)

Lusatia (E) Lausitz (G) Magyarovar, Ovar Ungarisch Mosonmagyard var Altenburg (G) Marosszereda, Nyaradszereda Mediasch (G) Medgyes Mezatur Modor Modern (G) Modrus Mohiics Moldavia (E) Moldva Moldau (G) Moravia (E) Morvaorszag Mahren (G) Munich (E) Munchen (G) Murakoz Murinsel (G) Mura Region (E) Mur any Nagykords Nagymaros Hennannstadt (G) Nagyszeben, Szeben Tymau (G) Nagvszoinbat Nanas, Haidunanas, Nedelitz (G) Nedelic Nbgrad Nuremberg (E) Nurnberg (G) Neutra (G) Nvitra Nyirbiitor, Bator Olnriitz (G) Oppein (G) Otocsac Palast Papa Passau (G) Funfkirchen (G) Pecs

263

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Serbian, Slovakian, Czech, Italian Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish Levoca (Slo) Lugoj (R) Luzice (Cz) Luzyce (P)

Miercurea Nirajului (R) Medias (R)

Modra (Slo) Modrus (Cr)

Moldova (R) Morava (Cz)

Medimurje (Cr), Prekmurje (Slov) Mttran (Slo)

Sibiu (R)

Trnava (Slo)

Nedelisce (Cr)

Nitra (Slo) Olomouc (Cz) Opole (P) Opoli (Cz) Otocac (Cr) Plastbvce (Slo)

Papa (T)

Pe^uy (T)

264

APPENDIX B

Hungarian

English, German (Austrian)

Pest (Pest, from 1873 Budapest) Potoly Polgar Pozsony

Pest (G)

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Czech, Italian Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish Pe$te (T)

Pettau (G)

Ptuj (Slov)

Pressburg (G)

Presporok, Bratislava (Slo)

Praga Rackeve Raguza Rakos

Praha (Cz)________

Prague (E) Prag (G) Ragusa (E. G) Rakusch (G) Ratibor (G) Regensburg (G)

Dubrovnik (Gro)

Ripac (B)

Ruszt

Saros Sarospalak Sarvar Szava River Zengg Szerbia Siklbs Szilezia Simand Simoniornya Szlavonia, Totorszag

Sopron

Stajerorszag Svab hercegseg Szeremseg Szabacs

Rust (G) Salzburg (G) Sankt Gallen (G)

VelkCSaris (Slo) Patack (G) Save (E) Sau (G) Zengg (G) Serbia (E) Serbien (G)

Sava (Cr) Senj (Cr) Serbska (Se)

Slezsko (Cz) Slask (P)

Silesia (E) Schlesien (G) Simand (R)

Slavonia (E) Slawonien, Windischland (G) Gdenburg (G) Speyer (G) Steyr iG) Styria (E) Steiermark (G) Swabia (E) Schwaben (G) Syrmium (E) Synnien (G)

Slavonija (Cr)

Srijem (Cr) Srem (Se) Sabae (Se)

GAZETTEER

Hungarian

Szakolca Szatmar Szecseny Szeged, Nagyszeged Szekesfeltervdr Szendro Szentgybrgv Szepesseg Szigetvar Szluin, Szlunj Szoboszlo, Hajdftszoboszlo Szolnok Szbreny, Szdrenyvar Szredicsko Tarcal Tata Temesvar

Tisza River Tokai Tolna Dunantul

English, German (Austrian)

Sackmar (G)

265

Croatian, Romanian, Bosnian, Serbian, Slovakian, Czech, Italian Slovenian, Ukrainian Polish, Turkish Skalica (Slo) Satu Mare (R)

Segedin (G)

Stahl weiBenburg (G)

Istolni Bel grad (T)

SvaSZdur (Slo) Sank! Georg (G) Spis (Slo) Zips iG) Siget (G)__________ Siget (Cr) Slunj (Cr)

Sigetvar (T) ___________

Turnu Severin (R)

Sredicko (Cr) Toris(G) Temeschwar (G) Teschen (G)

Tata (T)__________ Timisoara (R)______ Trmisvar (T) Cieszyn (P) Tesin (Cz)______________

TheiB (G)

Tisa(R,Se, Slo,U)

Transdanubia (E) Transdanubien (G) Transylvania (E) Erdely Siebenbiirgen (G) Trentschin (G) Trencsen Trent (E) Tri ent (G) Triest (E, G) Trieszt Tyrol (E) Tirol (G) Tirol Ulm (G) Una River Un (G) Upper Austria (E) Felso-Ausztria Oberbsten'eich (G) Felsri-Magyarorszag Upper Hungary (E) Oberungam (G) Waitzen (G) Trie Vamospercs

-----------------------------

—------ —------------_ _________________

Transilvania (R)

Trencin (Slo)

Trst (Cr)

__ __________________ Trento (T)_________ Trieste (I)

—-------- —------------Una (Cr)

Una (B)

____________

Vai? (T)

266

APPENDIX B

Hungarian

English, German (Austrian)

Varad, Nagyvarad Wardein, GroBwardein (G) Warasdin (G) Varasd

Croatian, Romanian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian, Ukrainian Oradea (R)

Bosnian, Czech, Italian Polish, Turkish Varat (T)

Vara zdin (Cr)

Varpalota Vegles Velence

Veszprem Becs

Visegrad Havas alfbld Varso

Becsujhely Zagrab Z61yom Zsitva River

Zsitvatorok

Vigias (Slo) Venice (E), Venedig ( Wesprin (G) Vienna (E) Wien (G) Plintenburg (G) Wallachia (E) Walachien (G) Warsaw (E) Warschau (G) Wendish Mark (E) Windisch Mark (G) Wiener Neustadt (G) Agram (G) Altsohl (G)

place at the confluence of the Zsitva River and the Danube in the eastern vicinity of Komarom (today Komarno, Slo)

j)

Venezia (I) Bespirim (T)

Valachia (R)

Warsaw (P)

Zagreb (Cr) Zvolen (Slo) Zitava, Stara Zitava (Slo)

APPENDIX C HUNGARIAN BARONIAL APPOINTMENTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PATENTS

HUNGARIAN BARONIAL APPOINTMENTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PATENTS Name

Date

Ferenc Nyaiy Ferenc I Revay Gabor Majlath

8.16.1535,V 1537 8.13.1547, Pr

Janos Peth6 and family members Istvan Dobo Mihaly Budy

4.7.1549, Pr

Ferenc 11 Revay and siblings Miklos Olah and his relatives Laszld Kerecsenyi Pal and Peter Rattkay Mark Horvath Stancic Zsigmond, Simon, Pal, and Inne Forgach Janos Paksy Ferenc Zay Mihaly Merey Domokos Dobo

Justification for the Patent (type of service) Military and court

Official, administrative, and political Influential high dignitary and rela­ tive (Chief Justice Tamas Nadasdy) Military7 and court

5.26.1553,V Before 3.12.1556 End of 1556

Military and court Military and court

4.16.1558,V

Official, administrative, and court.

5.30.1559, V 5.30.1559, V 5.30.1559, V 3.30.1560, V

Military Military Military

4.10.1560,V 7.1.1560,V 11.13.1563,Po

11.15.1563,Po

Official, administrative, and court

Influential brother at court (Deputy Chancellor Ferenc) and military Military Military and diplomatic

Official, administrative, and Hungarian high dignitary Military7 and sundry

270

APPENDIX C

Name

Date

Miklos and Gabor Doczy Istvan Dersffy Gaspar and Janos Draskovics Peter Kasztellanffy Janos Kmsics Gaspar Alapy

12.1.1563, V 2.1.1564, V 8.3.1567, Po

Gaspar Magochy Miklos, Tamas, Janos, and Istvan Palffy Istvan Gregorianczy Miklos Istvanffy Istvan Uleshazy

8.1-10.26.1569 1.8.1570, Pr 1570s Before 1572 4.24.1581,Pr

Justification for the Patent (type of service) Military and court Military and court Military and influential brother at court. (Deputy Chancellor Gydrgy) Court and military Military Military

Military Court and military

10.11.1581,Pr 1.19.1582, Po 11.12.1587, Pr

Military and official Court and official Military, official, and influential relatives

Pal Czobor Zsigmond Rakdczi Janos II Szunyogh

1.6.1588, Pr 8.28.1588, Pr Around 8.1588

Official and administrative Military7

Balint Prepostvary Sebestyen Thdkdly Mihaly Serenyi

2.20.1589, Pr 8.20.1593, Pr 6.25.1596, Pr

Benedek Thuroczy Gydrgy Thurzo Pal Melith Mihaly Konszky Mozes BI Szunyogh

4.1.1599, Pr 7.10.1599, Pr

Istvan Csaky Peter and Pal Apponyi Andras Osztrosics

Before 1605 6.28.1606, Pr 6.28.1606, Pr

Andras Jakusics Laszlo Pethe

Around 6.1606, Pr 9.24.1606, Pr

Ferenc Alaghy

5.3.1607, Pr

Before 1603 5.10.1603,Pr 10.28.1604, Pr

Favorable location of tire estate and relatives Military Agrarian and financial Military Military Court, military and family merits Military Military Favorable location of tire estate and relatives Material and political Military and political Father’s military and official merits, and political Father's military merits and political

Military7 and influential brother at court (Chancellor and Royal Regent Marlon) Official, military, and father’s merit

HUNGARIAN BARONIAL APPOINTMENTS

Name

Date

Lajos Rakoczi Istvan Hosszutothy

11.5.1607, Pr 3.5.1608, Pr

Justification for the Patent (type of service) Military Court, official, administrative, and merits of the relatives (Gyorgy in diplomatic service)

Benedek Pograny Tamas Vizkelethy Daniel Pongracz

3.5.1608, Pr 3.5.1608, Pr 3.5.1608, Pr

Military and political Official and political Political

271

Notes: V - Vienna, Po - Pozsony, Pr - Prague Sources: MOL Budapest, A 57, Vols. 1-5 (under the given dales); OStA Vienna, HKA Familienakten (under the name of specific families); Scluller, Az brbkbs

forendiseg, 273-275; Kovachich, Scriptores minores, 2:225-228, no. 19 (1569); MOE 7:137-138, no. 2 (1582), MOE 9:486^187, nos. 2-3 (1601); MOE 10:83, no. 10 (1602), 199-200,no. 10 (1603),430, no. 10 (1604); MOE 11:78-79,no. 15 (1605); MOE 12:722, no. 127 (1606); OStA Vienna, HHStA Hungarica Com. Fasc. 395, Konv. B, fol. 1-2 (1608 Jan.).

ABBREVIATIONS JOIRWI.S AAM

Adler

AH AHY AMN Annates AnzWien

AO AOG

ArchErt ArchOtt ArtLomb AV AZ BHBl Carinthia. I

CH

Anna.rut Arhivelor Mures ene [Yearbook of the Archive of Targu Mures] (Targu Mures) Adler: Zeitschrift fur Genealogie und Heraldik (Vienna) Acta. Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae (Budapest) Austrian History Yearbook (Minneapolis) Acta Musei Napocensis (Cluj-Napoca) Annates: Economies, Societes, Civilisations (Paris) Anzeiger der philosophisch-historischen Klasse der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna) Acta. Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae (Budapest) Archivfiir bsterreichische Geschichte (until 1864 Archiv fur Kunde osterreichischer Geschichtsquelleri) (Vienna) Archaeolbgiai Ertesito [Archeological Bulletin] (Budapest) Archivum Ottomanicum (Wiesbaden) Arte Lombarda (Milano) Arhivski vjesnik [Archival Review] (Zagreb) Archivalische Zeitschrift (Cologne-Weimar- Vienna) Burgenlandische Heimatblatter (Eisenstadt) Carinthia J: Zeitschrift fir geschichtliche Uindeskunde von Karnten (Klagenfurt) Cartographica Hungarica (Budapest)

274

ABBREVIATIONS

CHSl Wien CMM EEQ EVH FHB Fo

FolArch HC Historica, HJb HK HS HSR JbGO JbGPO

JbKGS JbVGStW

JSH

EK M MGSz

MHVSt MiKA MIOG

Collegium Hangaricum-Studien (Vienna) Casopis Matice moravske [Review of Matice moravske] (Bmo) East European Quarterly (Boulder) Egri Var Hiradbja [Review of Fortress Eger] (Eger) Folia Historica Bohemica (Prague) Fons (Forraskutatas es T'drteneti Segedtudomanyok) [Fons (Sources Research and Auxiliary’ Disciplines of History)] (Budapest) Folia Archaeologica (Budapest) Historid^casopis [Historical Review] (Bratislava) Historica: Historical Sciences in the Czech Republic (Prague) Historisches Jahrbuch (Freiburg-Munich) Hadtortenelmi Kozlemenyek [Military History Quar­ terly] (Budapest) Historicke studie [Historical Studies] (Bratislava) Hungarian Studies Review (Toronto Budapest) Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas (Munich) Jahrbuch fur die Geschichte des Protestantismus in Osterreich (Vienna) Jahrbucher fur Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven (Breslau) Jahrbuch des Vereins fur Geschichte der Stadt Wien (Vienna) Jihoceskdsbornik historic[Southern Czech Histor­ ical Yearbook] (Ceske Budejovice) Leveltari Kozlemenyek [Archival Proceedings] (Budapest) Majestas (Mainz-Budapest et al.) Magyar Gazdasagtbrteneti Szemle [Hungarian Eco­ nomic History Review] (Budapest) Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins fur Steiermark (Graz) Mitteilungen des Kriegsarchives Wien (Vienna) Mitteilungen des Instituts fur Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung (Vienna)

ABBREVIATIONS

MoBl. Adler MOStA MRK

MT MuE OOH RHM SlArchiv

SM SMHW

SMIM

SOF SSz Sz TSAB TSz FT UJb URd VSWG

WGBll WZKM ZAA ZfO

275

Monatsblall der Heraldischen Gesellschafft Adler (Vienna) Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs (Vienna) Mitteilungen der Residenzen-Kommission derAkademie der Wissenschqften zu Gottingen (Gottingen) Mediaevalia Transilvanica (Satu Mare) Muveszettorteneti Ertesito [Bulletin of Art History] (Budapest) Osterreichische Osthefte (Vienna) Rbmische Historische Mitteilungen (Roma) Slovensko. archivistika [Slovakian Archival Sciences] (Bratislava) Scripta Mercaturae: Zeitschrift fur Wirts chaffs- und Sozialgeschichte (St. Katharinen) Studia i Materiafy do Historii Wojskowosci [Studies and Materials to War History] (Warsaw) Studii si Materiale de Istorie Medie [Studies and Materials of Media History] (Bucuresti) Sudost- Forschungen (Munich) Soproni Szemle [Revue of S opron] (Sopron) Sz.dz.adok [Centuries] (Budapest) The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin (Grand Rapids) Torlenelmi Szemle [Historical Review] (Budapest) Tbrtenelmi Tar [Historical Magazine] (Budapest) Ungam-Jahrbuch (Munich) Ungarische Rundschau fur historische und soziale Wissenschqften (Munich-Leipzig) Vierteljahrschrift fur Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Bonn) Wiener Geschichtsbliitter (Vienna) Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes (Vienna) Zeitschrift fur Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie (Frankfurt am Main) Zeitschrift fur Ostforschung (Marburg)

276

ABBREVIATIONS

ZliF ZHVSt

Zeitschrift fur historische Forschung (Berlin) Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines fur Steiermark

ZNR

Zeitschrift fur neuere Rechtsgeschichte (MainzVienna)

PUBLISHERS AND INSTITUTIONS A PF

BUM CEU ELTE BTK

FFUK

HAS HAZU HNM HIJAVCR

HtJ SAV

ISP ITI

JATE JU HU

Academic Electronic Press (Bratislava) Budapest Historical Museum (Budapest) Central European University (Budapest) Eotvos Lorand TudomAnyegyetemen, Bolcseszettudomcinyi Kar [Lordnd Eotvos University, Philo­ logical Faculty] (Budapest) Filozofickd fakulta Univerzity Komenskeho [Philo­ logical Faculty of the Comenius University] (Bratislava) Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest) Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti [Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts] (Zagreb) Hungarian National Museum (Budapest) HistorickQ ustav Akademie ved Ceske Republiky [Institute of History7 of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic] (Prague) HistorickEJ ustav Slovenskej akademie Med [Institute of History of the Slovakian Academy of Sciences] (Bratislava) Hrvatski institut za povijest [Croatian Institute of History7] (Zagreb) MTA Irodalomtudominyi Intezet [Institute of Litera­ ture of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences] (Budapest) Jozsef Attila Tudomiinyegyetem [Attila Jozsef Univer­ sity] (Szeged) Jihoceskd univerzita v CeskUch Budejovicich, HistorickD ustav [Institute of History of the Southern

ABBREVIATIONS

KGRE

KHM KLEE KSH

METEM

MNG MSzT

MFA

MTT

OmvH

OSI OSzK

OAW OBV ONB PPKE PUP’ SAZU SNL

277

Czech University in Ceske Budejovice] (Ceske Budejovice) Kdroli Gaspar Reformatus Egyetem [Gaspar Kdroli Calvinist University] (Budapest) Kunsthistorisches Museum (Vienna) Kossuth Lajos Tudomdny egyetem [Lajos Kossuth University] (Debrecen) Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal [Hungarian Central Statistic Office] (Budapest) Magyar Egyhdztorteneti Enciklopedia Munkakozosseg [Society for Encyclopedia of Church History of Hungary] (Budapest-Pannonhalma-Szeged) Magyar Nemzeti Galeria [Hungarian National Gallery] (Budapest) Magyar Szemle Tarsasag [Hungarian Review Society] (Budapest) Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] (Budapest) Magyar Tbrtenelmi Tdrsulat [Hungarian Historical Society] (Budapest) Orszdgos Muemlekvedelmi Hivatal [National Board for the Protection of Historic Monuments] (Budapest) Osterreichisches Ost- und Sudosteuropa-Institut (Vienna) Orszagos Szechenyi Kbnyvtar [Szechenyi National Library] (Budapest) Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna) Osterreichischer Bundesveriag (Vienna) Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek (Vienna) Pdzmdny Peter Katolikus Egyetem [Peter Pdzmdny Catholic University] (Budapest-Piliscsaba) Presses universitaires de Prance (Paris) Slovenska akademija znanosti i umetnosti [Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts] (Ljubljana) Sveucilisna Naklada Liber [University Press Liber] (Zagreb)

278

SPN SSEES

SzIT TTI

UP VML VOAW VSAV VW GO

ABBREVIATIONS

Slovenske pedagogicke nakladatelstvo [Slovakian Pedagogical Publisher] (Bratislava) School of Slavonic and East European Studies (Lon­ don) Szent Istvan Tdrsulat [Saint Stephen Society] (Buda­ pest) MTA Tbrtenettudomdnyi Intezete [Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences] (Buda­ pest) University Press Vas Megyei LevelUr [Archives of Vas County] (Szombathely) Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna) VydavateTstvo Slovenskej akademia vied [Publisher of the Slovakian Academy of Sciences] (Bratislava) Verband der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Osterreichs (Vienna)

NOTES NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Steven Bela Vardy, Modern Hungarian Historiography (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1976), 23-37; Peter Gunst, A magyar tbrtenetlrds tbrtenete [History of Hungarian Historiography), 2nd revised ed. (Debrecen: Csokonal Kladd, 2000), 139-273; Ignac Romsics, “Ungarische Ges chic htsschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert. Tendenzen, Autoren, Werke,” in Nalionale Geschichtskulturen—Bilanz, Ansstrahlung, Europabezogenheit: Beitrage des iniernationalen Symposions in der Akademie der Wissen-schaften und der Literatur, Mainz, vom 30. Septem­ ber bis 2. Oktober 2004, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), 200-203 and 210-216. 2. Vardy, Modem Hungarian Historiography, 43-46 and 121-128; Gunst, .4 magyar tbrtenetirds, 178-224. 3. Arpad v[on] Klimo, “Transnationale Perspektiven in der ungarischen Geschichtsschreibung des 20. Jahrhunderts: Von ‘Homan-Szekfu’ bis 4Ranki-Berend,,f’ in Nationale Geschichtskulturen, ed. Heinz Duchardt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), 221-240. 4. Ignacz Acsady, Magyarorszdg harom reszre oszldsdnak tbrtenete. 1526-1608 [The History of the Division of Hungary into Three Parts, 1526-1608] (Budapest: Athenaeum Irodahm es Nyorndai Reszvenytarsulat, 1897); Ignacz Acsady, Magyarorszdg penzilgyei I. Ferdinand uralkoddsa alatt. 1526-64 [Finances of Hungary under the Reign of Fer­ dinand I, 1526-64] (Budapest: Athenaeum R. Tarsulat, 1888); Arpad Karolyi, Illeshdzy Istvan hutlensegi pore [The Impeachment of Istvan Illeshazy] (Budapest: MTA Kbnyvkiado-Hivatala, 1883); Arpad Karolyi, Nehdny tbrteneti tanulmany [A Few Studies in History] (Budapest: MTA, 1930). 5. Gyula Szekfu, Magyar tbrtenet [Hungarian History], 2nd ed. (Budapest: Magyar Kiralyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1935), 3:63-227. 6. Aladar Mod, 400 ev kuzdelem az. bnallo Magyarorszdgert [400 Years of

280

NOTES TO PAGES 3-5

Struggle for Independent Hungary], 7th enlarged and revised ed. (Buda­ pest: Szikra, 1954). 7. Gyozo Ember, “Die absolute Monarchic der Habsburg er als Hindernis der ungarischen nationalen Entwicklung,” AH 4, nos. 1-3 (1955): 73-100. 8. Gunst, A magyar tbrtenetiras. 259-262; Janos Gyurgyak, Ezze lett ma­ gyar hazdtok: a magyar nemzeteszme es nacionalizmus tortenete [This Is What Became of Your Hungarian Homeland. The History of the Hungar­ ian Nation Concept and Nationalism] (Budapest: Osiris Kiado, 2007),

526-535. 9. Jeno Szucs, Nation und Geschichte: Studien (Budapest: Corvina Kiado, 1981); Jeno Szucs, “The Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline,” .47/29(1983): 131-184. 10. Laszlo Szalay, Magyarorszag tortenete [History of Hungary], vol. 4 (Lipcse: Geibel, 1857); Franz Salam on, Ungarn im Zeifalter der Turkenherrschaft (Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1887); Acsady, Magyarorszag; Szekfu, Magyar lortenet, vol. 3; Gyozo Ember, Az ujkori magyar kbzigazgatds tortenete Mohacstol a tbrbk kiuzeseig [History of the Hungarian Admin­ istration in the Modem Period, from the Battle of Mohacs until the Expul­ sion of the Turks from Hungary] (Budapest: MOL, 1946). 11. Laszlo Nagy, Bethlen Gabor a fuggetlen Magyarorszagert [Gabor Bethlen for the Independent Hungary] (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1969); Bela Kopeczi, “The Hungarian Wars of Independence of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in Their European Context,” in From Hunyadi to Rdkbczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary, ed. Janos M. Bak and Bela K. Kiraly (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1982), 445-455. 12. Andras Gerd, Heroes’ Square, Budapest: Hungary’s History in Stone and Bronze (Budapest: Corvina, 1990), 30-33. 13. Agnes R. Varkonyi, Ket pogdny kbzt. A Rakoczi-szabadsagharc tortenete [Between Two Heathens: History of the War of Independence of Ferenc Rakoczi], 4th ed. (Budapest: Mora Kiado, 1979). 14. See their works in this book’s bibliography posted on the website of Cen­

ter for Hungarian Studies and Publications, www.hungaria.npublicati.ons. org and on wwwdiabsburg.org.hu 15. Zsolt Trocsanyi, Erdely kbzponti kormdnyzata 1540-1690 [The Central Government of Transylvania, 1540-1690] (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1980); Gabor Barta, Az erdelyifejedelemseg szuletese. [The Making of the Principality- of Transylvania], 2nd ed. (Budapest: Gondolat Kiado, 1984); Gabor Barta, “An d'illusions (Notes sur la double election de rois apres la defaite de Mohacs)." ATT 24, nos. 1-2 (1978): 1-40; Gabor Barta, La

NOTES TO PAGES 5-6

281

route qui ntene a Istanbul 1526-1528 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1994). 16. Bela Kbpeczi et al., eds. History of Transylvania, 3 vols. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2001). 17. Zsigmond Pal Pach, ed., Magyarorszdg tortenete tiz kbtetben [The Histo­ ry of Hungary in Ten Volumes], vol. 3, Magyarorszdg tortenete 15261686 [The History of Hungary 1526-1686], ed. Zsigmond Pal Pach and Agnes R. Varkonyi, 2nd ed. (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1987), 10431155; Agnes R. Varkonyi, A Kiralyi Magyarorszag 1541-1686 [Royal Hungary, 1541-1686] (Budapest: Vince Kiado, 1999). 18. Perenc Szakaly, A mohacsi csata [The Battle of Mohacs], 3rd ed. (Buda­ pest: Akademiai Kiado, 1981), 126. 19. Geza David and Pal Fodor, “Hungarian Studies in Ottoman History,” in The Ottomans and. the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, ed. Adamrm Fikret and Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 305-349. 20. Eva H. Balazs, Hungary and the Habsburgs 1765-1800: An Experiment in Enlightened Absolutism (Budapest: CEU Press, 1997); Domokos Kosary, Magyar kulpolitika Mohacs elott [Hungarian Foreign Policy before the Battle of Mohacs] (Budapest: Mag veto Konyvkiado, 1978); Domokos Kosary, Culture and Society in Eighteenth-Century Hungary (Budapest: Corvina Kiado, 1987); Ferenc Szakaly, Magyar adoztatds a tbrbk hodoltsdgban [Hungarian Taxation in Ottoman Hungary] (Buda­ pest: Akademiai Kiado, 1981); Ferenc Szakaly, Mezovdros es reformdcib

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