The Justification of Linguistic Hypotheses: A Study of Nondemonstrative Inference in Transformational Grammar [Reprint 2017 ed.] 9783110872415, 9789027925428

Citation preview

JANUA L I N G U A R U M STUDIA MEMORIAE NICOLAI VAN WIJK DEDICATA edenda curai C. H. V A N S C H O O N E V E L D Indiana University

Series Maior,

84

THE JUSTIFICATION OF LINGUISTIC HYPOTHÈSES A Study of Nondemonstrative Inference in Transformational Grammar

by

RUDOLF P. BOTHA with the collaboration of

WALTER K. WINCKLER

1973

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1973 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 73-82416

Printed in Belgium by N.I.C.I., Ghent.

To Hanna and Suzette

PREFACE

We wish to thank various people and institutions for the assistance we have received from them in the course of preparing this book. Through the kind offices of Professor H. Schultink of the University of Utrecht Rudolf Botha was able to spend some months as a visiting lecturer at the Instituut A.W. de Groot voor Algemene Taalwetenschap. We are grateful for the opportunities of discussion and for the ample library facilities enjoyed during this time. Particular thanks must go to the Principal of the University of Stellenbosch, Professor J.N. de Villiers, for two generous grants towards the costs of academic visits to The Netherlands. The financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa towards the costs of the research reported on in this book is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed or conclusions reached are those of the authors and are not to be regarded as a reflection of the opinions or conclusions of the Human Sciences Research Council. For additional financial assistance we thank the Netherlands Ministry of Education and Sciences. Valuable editorial assistance came from Hanna Botha and from Rusandré Hendrikse. Finally, we hardly know how to express adequately the debt of gratitude which we owe to our typists, Mrs. L. Gildenhuys and Mrs. I. le Roux. Stellenbosch, November, 1972.

R.B. W.W.

CONTENTS

Preface

7

1. Introduction 1.1. A Fundamental Question 1.2. General Purport 1.3. Organization of the Book 1.4. Mode of Presentation Appendix 1.1. A Scientific Paradigm Appendix 1.2. The Criticism of Arguments as an Aim of Logic

15 15 17 19 21

. . . .

2. Nondemonstrative Inference 2.1. Introductory Remarks 2.2. The Nature and Structure of Arguments 2.3. Demonstrative vs. Nondemonstrative Inference 2.4. Nondemonstrative Inference in Empirical Science 2.5. Levels of Merit for Nondemonstrative Arguments 2.5.1. The Issue 2.5.2. The Basis for a Scheme of Levels of Merit 2.5.3. The Level of Support 2.5.4. The Level of Acceptability 2.5.5. The Level of Persuasive Power 2.5.6. Conclusion 2.6. Inductive Inference in Early Transformational Grammar Appendix 2.1. The Traditional Conception of the Structure of an Argument Appendix 2.2. The Toulminian Conception of the Structure of an Argument Appendix 2.3. "The Problem of Induction"

23 24 25 25 25 28 32 37 37 38 39 45 49 52 53 55 56 57

10

CONTENTS

Appendix 2.4. Barker's Notion of Content-Extension Appendix 2.5. Support and Acceptability 3. Nondemonstrative Forms of Argument in Transformational Grammar . 3.1. Introductory Remarks 3.2. Identifying the Forms of Argument 3.3. Nondemonstrative Forms of Argument by Logical Analysis . . . . 3.3.1. The General Framework 3.3.2. Internal Arguments 3.3.2.1. Explanatory Arguments 3.3.2.1.1. The Deep Structure Argument 3.3.2.1.2. A Remind Argument of Postal's 3.3.2.2. Confirmatory Arguments 3.3.2.3. Generalizing Arguments 3.3.3. External Arguments 3.3.3.1. Introductory Remarks 3.3.3.2. Explanatory Arguments 3.3.3.3. The Negative Correlates of External Explanatory Arguments 3.3.3.4. Confirmatory Arguments 3.3.3.5. Disconfirmatory Arguments 3.3.4. The Analysis in Perspective 3.4. The Forms of Argument by Linguistic Identification 3.5. The Transformationalist Notion of Support 3.6. Summary of Conclusions

70 71 73 73 73 75 75 80 80 82 84 88 91 94 94 96 101 104 108 Ill 112 115 116

Appendix 3.1. An Internal Explanatory Lexicalist Argument by Chomsky Appendix 3.2. A Confirmatory Form of Argument in Early Transformational Grammar Appendix 3.3. An Internal Confirmatory Lexicalist Argument by Chomsky Appendix 3.4. A Generalizing Argument by McCawley Appendix 3.5. The Chomsky-Halle Exposition of the Braces Argument Appendix 3.6. Weigl-Bierwisch External Explanatory Arguments . . . . Appendix 3.7. An External Confirmatory Argument by Postal

120 122 123 124 126 127 128

4. Questions of External Evidence in Transformational Grammar 4.1. Introductory Remarks 4.2. The Qualitative Relevance of External Linguistic Evidence . . . . 4.2.1. Preliminaries 4.2.2. Kiparsky's Use of Diachronic Evidence 4.2.2.1. The Background 4.2.2.2. Identification of a Problem of Qualitative Relevance

130 130 133 133 136 136 137

CONTENTS

11

4.2.2.3. Kiparsky's Approach to the Relevance Question . . 4.2.2.3.1. Demonstration-by-Definition 4.2.2.3.2. Explanatory and Predictive Success vs. Descriptive Success The General Methodological Problem of the Qualitative Relevance of External Linguistic Evidence The Status of the Alternative Reconstructions of Kiparsky's External Argument Forms Other Methodological Functions of External Linguistic Data and Considerations 4.2.5.1. Introductory Remarks 4.2.5.2. Standards of Acceptability 4.2.5.3. "Psychological Support" 4.2.5.4. Heuristic Fruitfulness Summary of Conclusions Implications of Conclusions

142 143

Appendix 4.1. Psychological Reality in Diachronic Linguistics Appendix 4.2. An Acceptability Standard Involving Dialectal Data and a Diachronic Consideration Appendix 4.3. An Acceptability Standard Involving a Consideration Pertaining to Language Learning Appendix 4.4. "Data" vs. "Considerations" Appendix 4.5. Harre's Nontechnical Distinction Between Pre-Scientific Descriptions and Pre-Scientific Explanations

165

4.2.3. 4.2.4. 4.2.5.

4.2.6. 4.2.7.

5. Questions of Internal Evidence in Transformational Grammar 5.1. Introductory Remarks 5.2. The Reliability of Intuitive Evidence 5.2.1. "Linguistic Intuitions", "Intuitive Evidence", "Intuitive Evidential Statements" 5.2.2. Problematic Aspects of Intuitive Evidence 5.2.3. Specimen Cases of Rejected Intuitive Evidential Statements 5.2.4. The Questions 5.3. The Evidentness of Intuitive Evidential Statements 5.3.1. Introductory Remarks 5.3.2. Evidentness in Empirical Science 5.3.3. Conditions on Evidentness 5.4. The Correctness of Intuitive Evidential Statements 5.4.1. Introductory Remarks 5.4.2. Genuine Intuitions vs. Spurious Intuitions 5.4.2.1. Genuine Intuitions

146 149 153 155 155 155 159 160 161 163

166 167 169 170 173 173 174 174 176 178 185 186 186 187 188 193 193 194 195

12

CONTENTS

5.5.

5.6.

5.7.

5.8.

5.4.2.2. The Origins of Spurious Intuitions 5.4.2.3. Conflicting Genuine Intuitions 5.4.2.4. The Incorrectness of Statements Presenting Genuine Intuitions 5.4.2.5. Retrospect and Prospect 5.4.3. Truth-Directed Strategies 5.4.3.1. The Clear-Case Principle 5.4.3.2. The Notion "Systematic and General Theory" . . . 5.4.3.3. The "Majority-Vote" Strategy 5.4.3.4. Operational and Behavioural Tests 5.4.3.5. Grammatical Argumentation 5.4.4. Truth-Evasive Strategies 5.4.4.1. Objectivity vs. Insight 5.4.4.2. The "My Idiolect"-"Your Idiolect" Gambit . . . . 5.4.4.3. The Explanatory Approach Evidentness and Truth: Conclusions and Implications 5.5.1. Summary of Conclusions 5.5.2. Implications of Conclusions The Comprehensiveness of the Evidence 5.6.1. Introductory Remarks 5.6.2. Evidential Comprehensiveness vs. Comprehensiveness of Coverage 5.6.3. Evidential Comprehensiveness in Transformationalist Controversies 5.6.4. Conditions of Evidential Comprehensiveness 5.6.5. Summary of Conclusions The Independence of the Evidential Statements 5.7.1. Introductory Remarks 5.7.2. "Independent Motivation" in Two Transformationalist Controversies 5.7.2.1. Abstract Deep-Structure Markers 5.7.2.2. Generativist Transformations 5.7.3. Conditions of Independence 5.7.4. Summary of Conclusions Retrospect

Appendix 5.1. Intuitive Judgements by "Any"/"Every" Native Speaker of English Appendix 5.2. The Notion of Evidentness in the Philosophy of Science . . Appendix 5.3. The "Direct" Approach as a Type of Majority-Vote Strategy Appendix 5.4. Insufficient Evidential Comprehensiveness

196 199 200 202 204 204 207 210 212 213 216 216 217 219 221 221 226 230 230 231 232 234 236 236 236 238 238 241 244 249 250

252 253 254 255

CONTENTS

Appendix 5.5. A General Condition of Evidential Comprehensiveness in Transformational Grammar 6. Questions of Acceptability in Transformational Grammar 6.1. Introductory Remarks 6.2. A Survey of Methodologically-Based Acceptability Standards . . . 6.2.1. Introductory Remarks 6.2.2. Explanatory Power 6.2.2.1. A General Standard 6.2.2.2. "Consistent With" vs. "Explained By" 6.2.2.3. "Represent" vs. "Explain" 6.2.2.4. Width of Explanatory Scope 6.2.3. Predictive Success/Failure 6.2.4. Independent Motivation 6.2.4.1. A General Standard 6.2.4.2. "Ad hocness" and "Uniqueness" 6.2.4.3. "Linguistically Significant Generalization" . . . . 6.2.5. Absence of Disconfirming Evidence 6.2.6. Nature of Content 6.2.6.1. "Strength" and "Interestingness" 6.2.6.2. "Empirical" vs. "Notational" 6.2.7. Empirical Nature 6.2.7.1. "Strength" and "Refutability" 6.2.7.2. "Restricted Descriptive Latitude" 6.2.8. Theoretical Fit 6.2.8.1. "Conceptual Redundancy" 6.2.8.2. "Conceptual Homogeneity" 6.2.8.3. "Simplicity", "Economy", "Elegance" 6.2.9. Heuristic Fruitfulness 6.2.10. Miscellaneous 6.2.10.1. Absence of Alternative Theories 6.2.10.2. "Counter-Intuitiveness" and "Naturalness" . . . 6.2.10.3. "Width of Use" 6.3. The Methodological Function of Transformationalist Acceptability Standards 6.4. The Logical Status of Transformationalist Acceptability Standards 6.5. Evaluation of Transformationalist Acceptability Standards 6.5.1. The Rational Nature of Justification 6.5.2. Indeterminacy of Content 6.5.2.1. Conditions on Property Assignment 6.5.2.2. Interrelatedness of Crucial Properties 6.5.2.3. Mode of Assignment of Merit

13

256 258 258 262 262 263 263 264 266 268 269 272 272 273 276 280 282 282 283 284 285 286 288 288 289 291 292 293 293 294 297 297 299 301 301 302 302 306 308

14

CONTENTS

6.5.2.4. Relative Weight of Acceptability Standards . . . . 6.5.2.5. Retrospect 6.5.3. Constraints on Applicability 6.5.4. The Justification for Acceptability Standards 6.6. Summary of Conclusions 6.7. Implications of Conclusions

310 315 316 317 320 323

Appendix 6.1. Expressions such as "The Force/Strength/Depth of Arguments" in Transformational Grammar Appendix 6.2. "Identity of Sense Anaphora" Appendix 6.3. The "Neighborhood Convention"

324 324 325

7. Conclusion 7.1. Justification and Inconclusiveness 7.2. Interpretive Semantics AND Generative Semantics 7.3. Transformational Linguistics and Taxonomic Linguistics Appendix 7.1. Strategies of Persuasion

327 327 328 329 332

Bibliography

334

Index

343

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION This book contains a methodological study of the justification of linguistic hypotheses. More precisely, the questions of justification examined in it relate to current controversies in transformational generative grammar. 1 From a methodological point of view, two general phases may be distinguished in the development of the transformational approach to the scientific study of language. 2 The basic difference between these phases concerns the nature of the discussions of controversial linguistic topics typically conducted in each phase. In the first, by n o w completed, phase of development these discussions primarily took place 1 Within the context of the present study, the expression "transformational" will be used as a synonym for "transformational generative". In transformational generative linguistics two distinct but interrelated levels of theory construction and theory justification are recognized: the level of the general-linguistic theory and the level of the particular grammars which this general theory permits as possible grammars of individual natural languages. Very briefly, a transformational grammar of a given natural language may be characterized as a finite set of rules that enumerates all and only the grammatical sentences of this language and that assigns to each of the sentences enumerated a structural description. A transformational grammar, therefore, is a theory concerning the sentences of a natural language. The general-linguistic theory is a set of hypotheses delimiting the class of possible grammars for individual natural languages; it is, therefore, a theory concerning the essential properties of all natural languages. For a more detailed exposition of the concepts "transformational generative grammar" and "general-linguistic theory" we refer the reader to (Botha 1971a: 39-40) and the bibliography cited there. It is against this background that we will use "linguistic" as a cover term for both "grammatical" and "general-linguistic". Pre-systematically, (i) the justification of linguistic hypotheses may be regarded as the appraisal of their scientific merits and limitations, and (ii) a controversy may be regarded as a debated disagreement among scientists about these merits and limitations. These notions of justification and controversy receive an extensional definition in the remainder of this book. 2 For the relevant distinction between the concepts of "the substantive aspect of a scientific field" and "the methodological aspect of a scientific field" we refer the reader to the exposition given by Botha (1971a: 14, 17-28). In terms of this distinction, very briefly, the substantive aspect of a field of scientific inquiry comprises (a) the scientific knowledge already established in it and (b) the unsolved problems existing in it, whereas the methodological aspect comprises (a) the techniques, the methods, and the procedures used in the justification of that knowledge and (b) the forms of statement in terms of which that knowledge is represented.

16

INTRODUCTION

between transformationalists and their taxonomist opponents. In the second, ongoing, phase the majority of the discussions on controversial topics are being conducted among convinced transformationalists. The basic difference between these two phases of development may be characterized in a more principled way by invoking Kuhn's notion of a "scientific paradigm" in one of its main senses. In this sense a scientific paradigm is a framework directing and guiding scientific inquiry.3 Using the notion of "paradigm" in this sense, we are able to say that transformational grammar constitutes a distinct linguistic paradigm, whereas the various taxonomic approaches to language study constitute, jointly, another distinct linguistic paradigm. The first developmental phase of transformational grammar may then be characterized with reference to the notion of INTER-PARADIGMATIC CONTROVERSY: controversy between the proponents of the "revolutionary" transformational paradigm on the one hand and the defenders of the "established" taxonomic paradigm on the other. As typical examples of inter-paradigmatic controversies may be cited the controversy between Chomsky and Harm an about the adequacy of phrase-structure grammars,4 that between Chomsky and Halle on the one hand and Householder and Matthews on the other hand about the principle of distinctive features,5 and that between Postal and Garvin about nearly every fundamental theoretical principle of the early version of transformational grammar. 6 The second phase of development of transformational grammar may be characterized with reference to the notion of INTRA-PARADIGMATIC CONTROVERSY: controversy among linguists all of whom accept the most general defining principles of the transformational approach to the scientific study of language. As three typical examples of intra-paradigmatic controversies may be cited the controversy between lexicalists such as Chomsky and Katz and transformationalists such as McCawley, Ross, and Chapin; 7 the controversy between interpretive semanticists such as Chomsky, Jackendoff, and Katz and generative semanticists such as McCawley, Lakoff, and Postal; 8 and the controversy between a "concrete" phonologist such as Kiparsky and an "abstract" phonologist such as Hyman. 9 More precisely, therefore, the methodological questions of justification which we will examine in this book relate to intra-paradigmatic controversies currently being conducted in transformational grammar. The general-methodological feature of these intra-paradigmatic controversies which immediately strikes the outsider is their inconclusiveness. For example, at the present stage of the debate between interpretive and generative semanticists the impression one gains is that the arguments put for3

For Kuhn's notion of a paradigm cf. Appendix 1.1. to this chapter. Cf. Harman 1963; and Chomsky 1966. 5 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1965; Halle 1969; Householder 1965, 1966; and Matthews 1968. 6 Cf. Postal 1962; and Garvin 1962. 7 Cf. Chomsky 1972c and 1972d, and also the bibliographical information given by Partee (1971: 4, Note 2). 8 Cf. e.g. Chomsky 1972c; 1972d; Katz 1970, 1971; G. Lakoff 1969, 1970a; McCawley 1971a; and Postal 1970. 9 Cf. Kiparsky 1968b; and Hyman 1970. 4

INTRODUCTIO N

17

ward by the defenders of one position leave the proponents of the other position virtually unmoved. A fundamental question to be considered in this book is: why is it that current intra-paradigmatic controversies in transformational grammar are so inconclusive ? 10 1.2. GENERAL PURPORT

In the most general terms, it may be asserted that what we present in this book is a detailed analysis of one major factor responsible for the inconclusiveness of the intra-paradigmatic controversies in transformational grammar. Of the diverse factors jointly responsible for this inconclusiveness, not all are equally obvious or equally significant. Constituting a first, and obvious, instance of such a factor is the one of the various debating strategies adopted by the participants in the discussions on controversial topics. This is the strategy of counter-attack. Under this strategy a linguist taking up one of the contrary positions in a debate does not attempt to deal directly and explicitly with the criticisms levelled at it by a linguist opposing this position. Rather, the "defending" linguist reacts to the criticisms of his opponent by attacking the position which his opponent champions. It is evident that the debating technique of counter-attack cannot contribute to the cogency and conclusiveness of a scientific discussion. This strategy is frequently used in exchanges on the issues dividing generative and interpretive semanticists. 11 A second, and rather more interesting, possible factor responsible for the inconclusiveness of these intra-paradigmatic controversies is pointed out by Postal in his unpublished paper "Linguistic anarchy notes". In this paper Postal attempts "to show beyond any doubt that there exists no linguistic theory whatever". In support of this contention Postal asserts that "there are apparently endless numbers of fact types not incorporable within any known framework". 12 The absence of a coherent overall general-linguistic theory Postal regards as "linguistic anarchy", an anarchy for the existence of which his paper postulates a definite reason. According to Postal, an (1) ... important difficulty with all such attempts [i.e., attempts to construct a linguistic theory - B.-W.] is that there is not a good a priori statement of the full range of known facts which a theory must handle. T o the extent that theories are formulated in the absence of explicit awareness of this range of facts, they are dream-like. 13 10

Observe that it has not been claimed in this section either that the controversies dating from the first developmental phase of transformational grammar were exclusively inter-paradigmatic or that the controversies of the second phase are exclusively intra-paradigmatic. Note, too, that the notion of inconclusiveness will be elucidated in the course of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 11 Cf. e.g. the exchanges between Katz (1970; 1971) as an interpretivist and McCawley (1971a) as a generativist. 12 Postal (s.a., 1) proceeds: "In particular, what has been called the theory of transformational grammar, seems to have only the most partial relation to linguistic reality (which is not to say, of course, that its competitors are right. In general these vary from the almost totally empty to the absurd. This fact may have led to more faith in transformational grammar ... than is warranted by its actual ability in any version to provide grammars capable of representing the actually discoverable linguistic facts)." 13 Cf. Postal, s.a., 2. The objection may be raised, at this point, that an a priori range of facts is

18

INTRODUCTION

If Postal's diagnosis of the cause of "linguistic anarchy" is correct, then it contains a second reason for the inconclusiveness of intra-paradigmatic controversies in transformational grammar. This reason would be the absence of a good a priori statement of the fii'l range of known facts which a general-linguistic theory must explain. It is unlikely that a discussion of the relative merit of two alternative theories in a given field could ever be conclusive if the participants in the discussion disagree about the range of known facts which a theory in this field must explain.14 Such a disagreement would entail that the "alternative" theories in fact were not alternatives and strictly speaking were not comparable. For whereas one of the theories wouJd have been constructed to explain data from a domain Di, the other would have been developed to explain data from a domain D2, the respective boundaries of Di and D2 not being co-terminous. In the course of this book we argue that there is a factor aggravating the inconclusiveness of intra-paradigmatic linguistic controversies which is more fundamental than either the first or the second one mentioned above. This factor, unlike the one that may be abstracted from Postal's views on "linguistic anarchy", does not directly concern the sc-called linguistic facts. The factor to be analyzed in this book relates to the way in which a certain sort of inference is drawn in transformational grammar: inferences from the statements which represent the linguistic data to the statements which represent the hypotheses constituting either a general-linguistic theory or the particular grammars associated with this general theory. 15 In a slightly different phrasing, this factor may be said to relate to the way in which arguments for or against grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses are constructed on the basis of linguistic data. The general purport of this study may be provisionally formulated as follows: two, interrelated, factors responsible for the inconclusiveness of intraparadigmatic controversies in transformational grammar are 1. the general nature and specific properties of a particular form of argument used in these controversies, and 2. the nature of the standards used by transformationalists for assessing the merit of arguments which are instances of this form of argument. 16 a fictitious entity. It may be argued that what does and what does not count as a "fact" can be ascertained only with respect to a particular theory already in existence. Furthermore, as every active scientist knows, by making a theory more sophisticated in order to account for known "facts", quite often new "facts" are discovered the existence of which could not have been conceived of prior to this expansion of the theory. Here, however, we assume for the sake of argument that it is in fact possible to provide "a good a priori statement of the full range of known facts". 14 In his paper "Linguistics and natural logic" LakofF (1970b) presents in detail a range of "logical facts" for which a linguistic theory should account. It is obvious that the possibility of a coherent debate taking place between Lakoff and a linguist who regards these "logical facts" as outside the domain of linguistic theory is remote. 16 On the distinction drawn in transformational linguistics between the notions "grammar" and "general-linguistic theory" cf. Note 1 above. 16 The distinction between a form of argument and an individual argument as a substitution instance of this form of argument will be explicated in § 2.2.

INTRODUCTION

19

The form of argument mentioned in this formulation is that known as "nondemonstrative argument" or "nondemonstrative inference". 17 Essentially, therefore, the study contained in this book is a study of nondemonstrative forms of argument used in transformational grammar. As a methodological study, in other words, it deals with the justification of linguistic hypotheses in so far as such justification proceeds in terms of nondemonstrative forms of argument. It should be stressed that the import of the conclusions reached in this study is of a methodological sort. The numerous pieces of transformationalist argumentation analyzed here will, even at best, be at least two years old by the time the book goes to press. We fully expect therefore that the linguistic views involved in the pieces of argumentation which we analyze here may since their original presentation have been abandoned by their proponents or may no longer be entertained by them in quite their original form. Our conclusions being methodological conclusions, however, their correctness is not affected by such shifts in the substantive viewpoints of transformationalist linguists. The correctness of our conclusions will remain unaffected as long as the methodological devices used in the justification of transformationalist linguistic hypotheses - in particular, the forms of argument and the conditions of adequacy - have not been extensively revised and supplemented. Also in a methodological vein, Dougherty recently offered a diagnosis of one of the three transformationalist controversies mentioned above: the generativist-interpretivist controversy. Dougherty outlines his diagnosis as follows : (2) (i) The primary differences between GS [ = generative semantics - B.-W.] and GG [ = generative grammar - B.-W.] are methodological and concern attitudes towards research. I will support this position by examining the methods used by GS supporters and by comparing these methods with Chomsky's methods.18 (ii) My main goal is to put the GG-GS controversy into its proper perspective: GG and GS should be compared at the methodological level. The theoretical differences between GG and GS have little to do with the structure of language. They are largely attributable to different attitudes about the goals and methods of research.19 From the analysis and conclusions to be presented in the main text of the present book, it will become evident that Dougherty's diagnosis of the generativist-interpretivist controversy, although interesting, does not go deep enough. The implications which follow from our analysis and conclusions will be reviewed in chapter 7.

1.3. ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

Before we can present a brief synopsis of the general lines along which the content of the book is organized, it is necessary to offer some clarifying remarks on the 17

In § 2.3 it will be made clear that diverse terms are used to denote nondemonstrative arguments, e.g. "inductive arguments", "nonconclusive arguments", and "ampliative arguments". 18 Cf. Dougherty 1972: 2. 19 Cf. Dougherty 1972: 2.

20

INTRODUCTION

nature of the investigation in the course of which this content was established. As is the case with controversies in general, the basic constituents of the intra-paradigmatic debates under consideration are arguments.20 The logical "skeleton" of these controversies is formed by grammatical and general-linguistic arguments.21 The inquiry into such a controversy may thus be reduced to the identification, analysis, and reconstruction of 1. grammatical and general-linguistic arguments, 2. the modes of interconnection among individual arguments, and 3. the standards which transformational linguists use in assessing the merit of the nondemonstrative arguments presented in their field. The notion of the analysis of an argument or, in logicians' terms, "the criticism of an argument" requires some further attention. The question is: what should be understood by "the analysis/criticism of an argument"? The analysis of an argument implies the performance of three, interconnected, operations. First, confronted with an argument, the critic has to determine its components, the relations among the components, and the logical and epistemological properties of each component. Second, having laid bare the structure of the argument, the critic has to identify this argument as an instance of one or another general form of argument. Third, taking into consideration the logical and epistemological properties of the individual argument as well as the significant properties of the general argument form of which this argument happens to be an instance, the critic has to make an assessment of the merit of the argument. For purposes of the analysis of an argument suitable conceptual tools are required. To obtain these analytic instruments the critic turns to the field of logic. This is a natural step for him to take, since many logicians include among the principal objectives of logic that of the criticism of arguments.22 To be able to pursue this objective, logicians have developed a sophisticated set of analytic devices in the form of logical terms, categories, distinctions, and principles. The branch of logic which has 20

The central role that arguments play in grammatical and general-linguistic inquiry is reflected by the way in which transformationalists announce the aims of their papers. For example, Ross (1970: 224) in his paper "On declarative sentences" informs his readers that "the outline of this paper is as follows: in § 2. fourteen arguments ... are presented". Partee (1970: 153-154), in her paper "Negation, conjunction, and quantifiers: Syntax vs. semantics", announces that "a battery of arguments along these lines are represented below, along with some specific counter-arguments to some proposals made for quantifiers in (L-l)." 21 The logical notion "argument" will be characterized in § 2.2. At this point it may be characterized informally in Reseller's (1964: 58) terms as "any section of discourse or discussion (spoken or written) in which evidence is provided in support of some thesis". A grammatical argument is an argument in the conclusion of which something is asserted about one or another language-specific property of a particular natural language. A general-linguistic argument is an argument whose conclusion asserts something about one or another language-independent property of natural language. On the distinction drawn in transformational linguistics between the notions "grammar" and "general-linguistic theory" cf. note 1 above. 22 For more information on the criticism of arguments as a principal aim of logic cf. appendix 1.2.

INTRODUCTION

21

developed the concepts needed for the analysis of nondemonstrative arguments is the one known as "inductive logic". It is now possible to give a brief synopsis of the organization ot this book. In addition to the present introductory chapter, the book contains six more chapters. In chapter 2 we present the logical concepts which constitute the tools used in our analysis of nondemonstrative arguments. Special attention is given in this chapter to the distinctive properties of nondemonstrative arguments, to the related philosophical problem of induction, to the alleged role of nondemonstrative inference in scientific inquiry in general, and to the alleged role of "induction" in grammatical and generallinguistic inquiry. Chapter 3 contains an exemplification of a number of the nondemonstrative forms of argument which are generally used in transformational grammar. In this chapter, in addition, we explicate the transformationalist notion of support with reference to these nondemonstrative forms of argument. Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to an analysis of various metascientific properties 23 of the components of nondemonstrative arguments - logical and epistemological properties which are problematic within the context of the justification of transformationalist linguistic hypotheses. In chapter 4 the focus is on the problem of whether "external" linguistic data possess any relevance for the justification of "internal" linguistic hypotheses. This problem is analyzed with particular reference to the relevance of diachronic linguistic data for synchronic linguistic hypotheses. In chapter 5 the focus is on the problem of the circumstances under which "internal" linguistic data for transformationalist linguistic hypotheses are to be regarded as genuine, evident, correct, sufficiently comprehensive, and independent of one another. In chapter 6 the focus is on the problem of the standards of acceptability which transformationalists use in assessing the merit of linguistic hypotheses. In the closing chapter, chapter 7, the conclusions reached in the other chapters are brought to bear on two topics: first, in general, the overall character of the justification of linguistic hypotheses in transformational grammar; second, in particular, the inconclusiveness which marks current intra-paradigmatic controversies in transformational grammar.

1.4. MODE OF PRESENTATION

In closing this introductory chapter we have to make four remarks concerning the mode of presentation which we will follow in presenting the content of each chapter. First, in addition to footnotes we make use of appendices as vehicles for conveying supplementary background information. The footnotes contain the conventional bibliographical references, brief explicatory remarks, and the shorter quotes. The 23

For the relevant notion of "metascience" we refer the reader to the characterization given by Botha (1971a: 23-28). Very roughly, metascience in this sense includes (a) the respective methodologies of the individual sciences on the one hand; (b) logic, epistemology, and ontology, on the other hand; and (c) the philosophy of science as a common meeting ground for both of these two groups of disciplines.

22

INTRODUCTION

appendices are reserved for longer quotations and, especially, for explications in greater detail of the background against which certain remarks are to be understood. Second, it has been our policy that those arguments, judgements of merit, and standpoints of transformational linguists which we analyze in the course of our discussion should, wherever possible, be quoted in the original formulation. This policy we have adopted for two reasons : 1. Direct presentation of data is an elementary requirement of sound method. In the case of the analysis undertaken in the present book the above-mentioned arguments, judgements of merit, and standpoints constitute just that: the data. 2. In transformational linguistics today there is a noticeable lack of accuracy in the way people represent one another's points of view. By exhibiting the analyzed arguments, judgements of merit, and standpoints in their original formulation we provide our readers with a basis on which to judge whether our interpretation of them is accurate. Third, we have aimed, on the whole, at making this book self-sufficient in its presentation of methodological background information. Limitations of space, however, have compelled us to give up the aim of making the book completely self-sufficient in its presentation of background information of a substantive linguistic sort. Compromising with these limitations we have done two things: on the one hand, we have assumed some familiarity with certain recent writings of such leading transformationalists as Bach, Chomsky, Fillmore, Fraser, Katz, Kiparsky, the Lakoffs, McCawley, Partee, Postal, and Ross; on the other hand, for most of the substantive linguistic issues relevant to our methodological analysis we have tried to give outlines that will be sufficiently informative without recourse by the reader to the original texts. Fourth, and last, we have tried wherever possible to apply the following typographical convention when stating bibliographical references: a reference to a particular publication or passage is enclosed in parentheses in its entirety, e.g. "(Bach 1971)" or "(Bach 1971: 32)"; in a reference to an author the parentheses do not enclose the author's name, e.g. "Bach (1971)" or "Bach (1971: 32)"; in a reference of the cf. type, no parentheses are used, e.g. "Cf. Bach 1971" or "Cf. Bach 1971: 32".

APPENDIX 1

1.1. A SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM

Kuhn's major work to which the notion of a "paradigm" is central is his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,24 An analysis by Margaret Masterman reveals that Kuhn assigns, in effect, no fewer than twenty-one different senses to this notion. Masterman shows that these twenty-one senses may be reduced to three main ones: 1. a metaphysical sense, in which a paradigm is equated with a set of beliefs, with a myth, with a successful metaphysical speculation, with a standard, with a new way of seeing, with an organizing principle governing perception itself, and so on; 2. a sociological sense, in which a paradigm is defined as a universally recognized scientific achievement, as a concrete scientific achievement, and so on; 3. a "methodological" or "construct" sense, in which a paradigm is regarded as an actual text-book or a classical work, as supplying tools, as actual instrumentation, as an analogy, and so on. 25 It is this third sense of Kuhn's notion "paradigm" which is involved in our distinction between inter-paradigmatic and intra-paradigmatic controversies. This notion of a paradigm is especially useful in discussing the methodology of grammatical and general-linguistic inquiry. The relation between a general-linguistic theory and particular grammars is such that the general-linguistic theory constitutes the conceptual framework within which, or the paradigm upon which, particular grammars are constructed.26 24

In our bibliography this book of Kuhn's is listed as Kuhn 1962. Cf. Masterman 1970: 65 ff. 26 On the distinction drawn in transformational linguistics between the notions "grammar" and "general-linguistic theory" cf. note 1 above. For a detailed explication, as well as a defence, of the various senses of the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm cf. Masterman 1970. Kuhn's views on the growth of scientific knowledge and thus, by implication, his notion of a paradigm are critically discussed by, for example, Feyerabend (1970), Lakatos (1970), Popper (1970), Purtill (1967), Toulmin (1970), and Watkins (1970). 25

24

APPENDIX I

1.2. THE CRITICISM OF ARGUMENTS AS AN AIM OF LOGIC The criticism, of arguments as one of the aims of logic is formulated particularly c'early by Alexander. In his view (3) (a) as a branch of philosophy, logic can be said to include the assessment or criticism of all types of arguments, whatever their subject-matter and wherever they occur; 27 (b) The logician is concerned to examine the similarities in and differences between arguments about different subject-matters, to generalize as far as possible about them and to point to those features which make them good or bad, sound or unsound, acceptable or unacceptable, valid or invalid. That is, he is concerned to unearth and state, as far as possible, the principles which govern the soundness or unsoundness of arguments; 28 (c) We might say that he examines the generally accepted and the generally rejected arguments and extracts from this mass the criteria or principles upon which people, on the whole, appear to judge arguments. 29 The vastness of the domain from which the logician selects arguments for criticism is emphasized by Brown, who states that (4) the old conception of logic as dealing in general with the principles of cogent arguments breaks down when it is realized that the principles on which cogent arguments can proceed are heterogeneous. Some are empirical, some are moral, some are analytic.30

27

Cf. Alexander 1969: 1. Cf. Alexander 1969: 5. 29 Cf. Alexander 1969: 5. 30 Cf. Brown 1955: 368. 28

2 NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

2.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This chapter contains a brief characterization of the logical terms, concepts, principles, and distinctions which serve as the instruments in our analysis of typical examples of the nondemonstrative arguments used in transformational generative grammar. The basic logical distinction on which attention will be focussed is the distinction between demonstrative and nondemonstrative inferences or forms of argument. The main topics dealt with are 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

the the the the the

nature and the structure of arguments, distinction between demonstrative and nondemonstrative inference, alleged role of inductive inference in empirical science in general, levels of merit at which nondemonstrative arguments may be evaluated, and alleged status of inductive inference in transformational generative grammar.

In addition, in a number of appendices background information is presented on, among other things, 1. 2. 3.

the traditional conception of the nature and the structure of an argument, the Toulminian conception of the structure of an argument, and the so-called problem of induction.

Scholars versed in inductive logic and in philosophy of science will be aware of the complexity of the questions existing with respect to the topics listed above. These scholars - quite justly so - will have predicted that our brief treatment of these topics cannot be either exhaustive or penetrating.

2.2. THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENTS

We will operate, in this study, with the traditional conception of the general nature and the structure of an argument. In this conception an ARGUMENT is an ordered set of statements or propositions which belong to one or the other of two categories:

26

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

conclusions and premisses, CONCLUSIONS represent propositions which are based on, or affirmed on the strength of, other propositions. These other propositions constitute the PREMISSES and, as such, have the function of presenting the evidence for the conclusion.1 A PROPOSITION is considered to be the meaning or conceptual content of a declarative sentence. A SENTENCE is a linguistic unit, not a logical one. Some scholars draw a distinction between propositions and statements, taking a STATEMENT to be the assertion of a proposition. The linguistic vehicle for this assertion, then, is a sentence.2 In this study we will not assign any special function to the distinction between propositions and statements. The notion of an EVIDENTIAL STATEMENT will, however, be used in the sense of a statement asserting a proposition which, as a premiss of an argument, presents evidence for a conclusion. The EVIDENCE for a conclusion consists of those considerations which are put forward as reasons for accepting the conclusion as being true or probably true.3 The proposition constituting the conclusion of an argument we will denote by means of the term "CONCLUSION PROPOSITION".

The conclusion of an argument and its premisses are related in terms of one or another LOGICAL RELATION. The logical relations incorporated in arguments are conventionally designated by expressions such as "is indicated by", "supports", "entails", "follows from", "implies", "can be reduced to", and so on. 4 Within the framework of the conventional conception of the structure of an argument an individual argument may be reconstructed or laid out schematically as indicated in (1). (1)

Premissi Premiss2

Premissn .•. Conclusion (where ". •." symbolizes "therefore"). Traditionally a distinction has been drawn between the minor premiss and the major premiss of an argument.5 The MINOR PREMISS presents a particular datum (about an 1

For the way in which logicians characterize the traditional conception of the structure of an argument cf. appendix 2.1 to this chapter. 2 For some of the suggested distinctions involving propositions, statements, and sentences cf. e.g. Alexander 1969: § 1.2; and Caws 1966: chapter 9. 3 For this characterization of the notion "evidence" cf. Rescher 1964: 56. An analogous characterization of this notion is to be found in Strawson 1952: 237-238. 4 The logical relations denoted by some of these expressions will be characterized further on in this chapter. 5 Cf. e.g. Toulmin 1964:113-114.

NONDEMONSTRATI VE INFERENCE

27

individual) from which the conclusion is drawn. The MAJOR PREMISS contains a guarantee in accordance with which the step from the minor premiss to the conclusion may legitimately be taken. A fundamental logical distinction drawn in respect of the conventional notion "argument" is the distinction between an argument form (or pattern or type of argument) and a specific argument as an instance of some argument form. Copi explicates the basis for this distinction by pointing out that forms of argument are conveniently discussed by using small letters from the middle of the alphabet, e.g. "p", "q", "r", "s", and so on, as STATEMENT VARIABLES.6 Such statement variables are taken to be letters for which, or in place of which, statements may be substituted. In Copi's terms an ARGUMENT FORM then is "any array of symbols which contains statement variables, such that when statements are substituted for the statement variables - the same statement replacing the same statement variable throughout the result is an argument". 7 A SUBSTITUTION INSTANCE of an argument form is, according to Copi, any argument "which results from the substitution of statements for the statement variables of an argument form ...". 8 Some logicians9 associate with an argument form a RULE OF INFERENCE which authorizes the acceptance of the conclusion on the basis of the premisses. Rescher, for example, regards a rule of inference as a prescription having the general form (2).i° (2)

From Xi, X 2 , X 3 , ..., X n , to infer X

Regarded as a rule of inference, (2) authorizes the acceptance of a conclusion of the type X on the basis of given premisses of the types Xi, X2, X3, ..., X n . The logical principle of modus ponens is usually cited as a classic example of a rule of inference. Schematically this principle may be presented as (3). (3)

p P

q

• • q (where "p" and "q" are statement variables, and "=>" is to be read as "if..., then") 11 6

Cf. Copi 1965: 18. Cf. Copi 1965: 18. Copi (1965: 18) proceeds: "For definiteness, we establish the convention that in any argument form, 'p' shall be the first statement variable that occurs in it, 'q' shall be the second, 'r' the third, and so on". 8 Cf. Copi 1965: 19. 9 Cf. e.g. Rescher 1961: 242-243; and Copi 1965: 35 ff. 10 Cf. Rescher 1961: 242-243. 11 The modus tollens is another logical principle often cited - e.g. by Alexander (1969: 118) - as an example of a rule of inference: P => q 7

~ q

• •• ~ p (where " ~ " symbolizes "not")

28

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

Some logicians - for example, Alexander12, Brown13, and Salmon14 - draw a distinction between "argument" on the one hand and "inference" or "reasoning" on the other. "Inference" and "reasoning" are then reserved as labels for a psychological activity: the drawing of a "conclusion" from "evidence" or "facts" by way of a psychological act. "Argument", in this context, is taken as referring to a "logical structure", presented as a "linguistic entity" : a group of "statements" - including "premisses" and a "conclusion" - whose members are related to each other in a particular way.15 In this study we will be concerned with arguments as logical structures. While recognising the conceptual distinction between psychological acts and logical structures, nevertheless in referring to these logical structures we will use both the term "argument" and the term "(rule of) inference".16

2.3. DEMONSTRATIVE VS. NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

The focus of our attention in this paragraph will be the distinctive properties of nondemonstrative inference. To highlight these properties, we will contrast them with the properties of demonstrative inference. Consider (4) and (5) as typical demonstrative arguments. (4)

If someone is a boxer, then he is beautiful. Cassius Clay is a boxer. .•. Cassius Clay is beautiful.17

(5)

If someone is a boxer, then he is beautiful. Cassius Clay is not beautiful. . •. Cassius Clay is not a boxer. 18

The basic logical property of demonstrative arguments is that they are "truthpreserving".19 That is, in demonstrative arguments the premisses necessitate the 12 13 14 15 16 17

Cf. Alexander 1969: 15-17. Cf. Brown 1955: 358-359. Cf. Salmon 1963: 7-8. Cf. Salmon 1963: 7-8. For Toulmin's conception of the structure of an argument cf. appendix 2.2 to this chapter. (4) is an instance of the argument form of modus ponens : P => q P

• •• q 18

(5) is an instance of the argument form of modus tollens:

P => q ~q ~ p 19

Cf. e.g. Salmon 1967: 8; and Hilpinen 1968: 7. Demonstrative arguments are denoted by diverse terms: e.g. "valid deductive arguments" (Salmon 1963: 14) and "conclusive arguments" (Alexander 1969: 30).

N0NDEM0NSTRAT1VE INFERENCE

29

conclusion in the sense that the conclusion cannot be false if the premisses axe true. 20 It is said that the conclusion FOLLOWS FROM the premisses or that the premisses ENTAIL the conclusion. The basic logical relation between premisses and conclusion in demonstrative arguments is that of ENTAILMENT. Demonstiative arguments have the property of necessary truth-preservingness on account of the fact that they sacrifice all extension of content. The conclusion of demonstrative arguments does not contain any information not already associated with the premisses.21 Although it may be surprising in some psychological sense, such a conclusion cannot augment the content of the premisses.22 To reflect the fact that demonstrative inference is not "content-extending", logicians characterize it as NONAMPLIATIVE INFERENCE. 2 3 An argument form has the logical property of (FORMAL) VALIDITY if it has no substitution instance such that the premisses are true but the conclusion is false.24 An argument has the property of (formal) validity just in case it is an instance of a form of argument which has this property. Taken in this sense, "(formally) valid" is equivalent to "necessarily truth-preserving". To assert that an argument is (formally) valid is not to claim that its conclusion is true. Whereas (formal) validity is a property of argument forms and of arguments, truth is a property of individual propositions or of the statements asserting them. 25 For an argument to qualify as (formally) valid, only one general condition need be satisfied: a condition concerning the existence of a particular type of logical relation between the premisses and the conclusion of the argument.26 To establish whether or not the conclusion of an argument is true, two requirements must be taken into consideration : the argument must be an instance of a (formally) valid form of argument, and all the statements constituting the premisses of the argument must be true. 27 An individual statement is true if what it asserts about a given state of affairs is in fact the case.28 20

Cf. Salmon 1963: 14; 1967: 14; Rescher 1964 : 60; and Alexander 1969: 54. Cf. Salmon 1967: 8. 22 Alexander (1969: 46) formulates this point as follows: "Conclusive arguments are conclusive because they do not 'go beyond' the evidence or what is given. This point has sometimes been made by saying that their premisses contain their conclusions and that the function of the argument is to extract the conclusion from the premisses". 23 Cf. Salmon 1967: 8. 24 Cf. Alexander 1969: 221 ; Copi 1965: 18, 24; and Salmon 1963: 18. 25 Cf. Copi 1965: 4; and Salmon 1963: 18. 26 For a discussion of the primitive factors determining the validity of argument forms cf. Alexander 1969: 37 if. To determine whether an argument is valid or not is not always a simple task. For a discussion of the techniques of doing this cf. Alexander 1969 : 218-221, 222 ff.; and Copi 1965: 34 ff. 27 Cf. Copi 1965: 56. 28 This view of what constitutes a true statement is based on the correspondence theory of truth. The basic tenet of this theory of truth is formulated as follows by Chisholm (1966: 102-104): "A belief or assertion is true provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly, that that state of affairs exists; and a belief or assertion is false provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly, that that state of affairs does not exist." 21

30

NONDEMONSTRAÎIVE INFERENCE

All arguments which do not have the logical property of being necessarily truthpreserving are NONDEMONSTRATIVE ARGUMENTS.29 Consider (6) and (7) as typical nondemonstrative arguments. (6)

Every boxer that has ever been observed is beautiful. . •. All boxers are beautiful. 30

(7)

If someone is a boxer, then he is beautiful. Tom Smith is beautiful. . •. Tom Smith is a boxer. 31

The conclusions of nondemonstrative arguments are not necessitated by their premisses: even if the premisses are true, the conclusions may still be false.32 Consequently, nondemonstrative arguments do not have the property of being necessarily truth-preserving. The reason for this is that nondemonstrative arguments are "content-extending".33 In nondemonstrative arguments the content of the conclusion "goes beyond" the evidence presented in the premisses.34 An inference whose conclusion possesses content that is not associated, either explicitly or implicitly, with its premisses is called an AMPLIATIVE INFERENCE. 35 The conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument is not entailed by the premisses ; it does not follow from the premisses. There exists no single logical relation between the premisses and conclusions of nondemonstrative arguments. A wide variety of logical relations occur in nondemonstrative arguments. Collectively these diverse logical relations occurring in nondemonstrative arguments have been called "the relation of SUPPORT", "the relation of EVIDENCE", or "the relation of EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT". In the field of inductive logic a wide range of terms is used for indicating 29

Cf. Lehrer 1970: 7. Nondemonstrative arguments are also referred to as "inductive arguments,, (Black 1967: 169; Hilpinen 1968: 7; Rescher 1964: 60; Salmon 1963: 14) and as "non-conclusive arguments" (Alexander 1969: 30). Not all scholars use these terms as synonyms. Such terminological distinctions cannot be dealt with here. 30 (6) is an instance of the form of nondemonstrative argument known as "induction by simple enumeration" (Black 1967: 169). Alexander (1969: 48-49) would regard (6) as an instance of "the standard kind of example of inductive arguments". 31 (7) is an instance of a nonvalid form of argument : it is characterized by the fallacy known as "the fallacy of affirming the consequent" (cf. Caws 1966: 111; Salmon 1963: 27). This argument form may be represented as follows: p = q

q

• •• p For a discussion of the logical properties of this form of argument cf. § 2.4. For this point cf. e.g. Alexander 1969: 30, 47; Hilpinen 1968: 7; Rescher 1964 : 60; Salmon 1967: 8; Strawson 1952: 237. 33 Cf. Hilpinen 1968: 7. 34 Cf. Alexander 1969: 47. 35 This notion of extension of content is the one explained in Salmon 1967: 8. Barker (1965) operates with a more refined notion of extension of content. Nondemonstrative arguments, according to him, may be noncontent-extending in two distinct ways. For a brief account of Barker's distinction between "nongeneralizing" and "nonampliative" arguments, see appendix 2.4. 32

31

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

the diverse relations occurring in nondemonstrative arguments. F o r example, it is asserted that in nondemonstrative arguments 1.

the premisses SUPPORT the conclusion, 3 6

2.

the premisses CONFIRM the conclusion, 3 7

3.

the premisses PROVIDE EVIDENCE FOR the c o n c l u s i o n , 3 8

4.

the premisses MAKE the conclusion PROBABLE o r PLAUSIBLE,39

5.

the premisses SUSTAIN the conclusion, 4 0

6.

the premisses INDICATE the conclusion, 4 1

7.

the premisses EXPLAIN the conclusion, 4 2

8.

the premisses ARE EXPLAINED BY o r CAN BE REDUCED TO the

conclusion, 4 3

and

so on. It would take us t o o far afield t o e m b a r k here o n a discussion o f the distinctive properties

o f the diverse types o f nondemonstrative

arguments.44

The

central

characteristic o f all types o f nondemonstrative arguments is that in these arguments a given first statement could present evidence for a given second statement such that this Cf. e.g. Cohen 1970: 12; Hilpinen 1968: 7; Rescher 1958: 83; Salmon 1967: 8. Not all these scholars characterize the logical relation denoted by the term "support" in the same way. For Cohen (1970: 8 ff.), for example, this relation exists between a hypothesis and those consequences of it which have been found by experimental testing to be correct. Rescher (1958: 83) uses the term "support" to denote the relation existing between a hypothesis and the evidence which, before the hypothesis has been tested, lends it prior probability. 37 Cf. e.g. Chisholm 1966: 52; Hilpinen 1968: 7; Rescher 1958: 83. Rescher (1958: 83) uses the term "confirm" in connection with the relation which exists between a hypothesis and those consequences or predictions of it which have been found to be true. 38 Cf. e.g. Brown 1955: 368; Rescher 1958: 93; 1964: 56, 60; Strawson 1952: 237-238. 39 Cf. e.g. Salmon 1967: 8. The considerations which, according to Salmon, bear on the probability of a hypothesis are mentioned in § 2.5. of this study, as well as in note 61 to this chapter. 40 Bunge (1959: 78 ff.) uses the term "sustains" to denote his version of the evidential relationship. The "bases" on which a hypothesis rests and which lend it a certain degree of probability before it has been tested are said to "sustain" this hypothesis. The various types of "sustaining" evidence or "sustenance" distinguished by Bunge are mentioned in § 2.5. of this study; cf. also note 60 to this chapter. 41 According to Swain (1970b: 31) "whenever a relationship holds between a man's body of evidence e and some proposition p such that p is evident relevant to e, I shall say that e indicates p. The problem of defining this relationship is surely one of the central tasks of inductive logic." 42 Lehrer (1970: 109) asserts that "the goal of inductive inference ... is to arrive at conclusions which, if true, are explained by our background knowledge". 43 According to Harman (1970: 89) " . . . we are led to construe induction as inference to the best explanation, or more precisely as inference to the best of competing explanatory statements. The conclusion of any single step of such inference is always of the form X explains Y, from which one may deduce either X or Y. Inductive reasoning is thus seen to consist in a sequence of explanatory conclusions; its principles are principles for deciding among competing explanatory statements." This relationship between the explanatory conclusion and the explained premisses has been called "abduction" or "retroduction" by Peirce (cf. Hanson 1965: 85), "reduction" by Jenkinson (Hanson 1965: 85), and "regressive reduction" by Bochenski (1965: 92). We return to Bochenski's notion of "regressive reduction" in § 2.4. 44 For surveys of the diverse nondemonstrative argument forms cf. Alexander 1969 : 48-61; and Black 1967: 169-170. 36

32

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

second one goes beyond the first in content. 45 This central characteristic distinguishes the logical relation of (evidential) support fundamental to nondemonstrative arguments from the logical relation of entailment incorporated in demonstrative arguments.46 Whereas the relation of entailment is an all-or-none relation, the relation of support admits of grading or ranking. 47 This implies that the premisses may provide more support for the conclusion in one nondemonstrative argument than they do in another. Judged on the basis of the criterion for (formal) validity associated with demonstrative arguments, nondemonstrative arguments are by definition formally invalid or fallacious.48 This is not to say that there cannot be nondemonstrative arguments whose conclusions are true. But even though nondemonstrative arguments with true conclusions are encountered and even though it does make sense to speak, as Salmon does, of "a certain kind of logical rectitude" for nondemonstrative arguments, nevertheless as an argument form nondemonstrative arguments cannot possess "deductive validity".49

2.4. NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE I N EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

One of the points brought out in appendix 2.3., in the discussion of the so-called problem of inductive logic, is that some logicians view the logic of empirical science as being "inescapably inductive".50 The question now arises: What are the particular respects in which these scholars hold the logic of empirical science to be inductive ? First, we will outline the general view that, taken in its entirety, scientific inference must be ampliative, hence nondemonstrative. Second, attention will be given to specific aspects of the logic of scientific inquiry which are held to be inductive. The overall nature of empirical science is quite commonly characterized as "hypothetico-deductive".51 The so-called hypothetico-deductive method consists, according to Salmon, of "... (1) setting up a hypothesis, (2) deducing consequences from the hypothesis, and (3) checking by observation to see whether these conse45

Cf. Rescher 1958: 93. Alexander (1969: 5, 25, 26) is one of those logicians who uses the term "support" to denote the diverse logical relations existing between the premisses and conclusion both of demonstrative and of nondemonstrative arguments. In the case of demonstrative arguments Alexander uses the term "conclusive support"; in the case of nondemonstrative arguments he speaks of "inconclusive support". 47 Cf. Kemeny and Oppenheim 1966: 212; Salmon 1963: 14; and Strawson 1952: 245 if. To the notion "rank" or "degree of support" we return in § 2.5.3. 48 Cf. Rescher 1964: 68. 49 Cf. Salmon 1967: 8. Summaries of the differences between demonstrative and nondemonstrative arguments may be found in Alexander 1969: 53-54; and Salmon 1963: 14. For background information on the so-called problem of induction we refer the reader to appendix 2.3 to this chapter. 50 "... I claim that there is a crucial sense in which the logic of science is inescapably inductive ..." (Salmon 1968: 24). 51 Cf. e.g. Bunge 1959: 262. 40

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

33

quences are true." 52 Though Salmon agrees that empirical science does in fact use a pattern of inference resembling the hypothetico-deductive method, he contends that the conclusion, drawn from this fact, that empirical science is essentially purely deductive is incorrect.53 Salmon argues that, despite its use of the hypotheticodeductive method, any science which exceeds the observational data upon which it is based must be ampliative in its general character: (8) The conclusion is a statement whose content exceeds the observational evidence upon which it is based. A scientific theory that merely summarized what had already been observed would not deserve to be called a theory. If scientific inference were not ampliative, science would be useless for prediction, postdiction, and explanation. The highly general results that are the pride of theoretical science would be impossible if scientific inference were not ampliative.54 From these views it follows for Salmon that, in its overall character, the logic of empirical science is nondemonstrative. The question now arises whether specific aspects of the logic of scientific inquiry are identifiable as ampliative, hence nondemonstrative. The answers which logicians give to this question should be interpreted against the background of a threefold distinction among logically distinct aspects of scientific hypotheses. As identified by Salmon, these three aspects of hypotheses may be denoted as 1. the HEURISTIC ASPECT, which relates to the discovery of hypotheses: to the business of "thinking them up" for the first time, 2. the PLAUSIBILITY or PROBABILITY ASPECT, which relates to the initial plausibility or prior probability which hypotheses have, and 3. the CONFIRMATORY ASPECT, which relates to the testing or (dis)confirmation of hypotheses.55 Within the general framework of a scientific inquiry, the discovery of hypotheses is said to belong to the CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY, whereas both the assessment of the initial plausibility of hypotheses and the testing of hypotheses are said to belong to the CONTEXT OF JUSTIFICATION or VALIDATION.56 It is generally agreed that there exists S2 Cf. Salmon 1963: 78. In a less formal sense, a hypothesis may be viewed as a proposition which is treated as a possible answer to a question or a possible solution to a problem (cf. Cohen 1970: 6). In a more detailed way Salmon (1967: 18) characterizes the hypothetico-deductive method as follows: "From a general hypothesis and particular statements of initial conditions a particular predictive statement is deduced. The statements of initial conditions, at least for the time, are accepted as true; the hypothesis is the statement whose truth is at issue. By observation we determine whether the predictive statement turned out to be true. If the predictive consequence is false, the hypothesis is disconfirmed. If the observation reveals that the predictive statement is true, we say that the hypothesis is confirmed to some extent. A hypothesis is not, of course, conclusively proved by any one or more positively confirming instances, but it may become highly confirmed. A hypothesis that is sufficiently confirmed is accepted, at least tentatively." 83 Cf. Salmon 1967: 18, 20. 54 Cf. Salmon 1967: 20. 55 Cf. Salmon 1967: 114. 86 For the view that, taken in its totality, a scientific inquiry consists of a context of discovery

34

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

no such thing as a "logic of discovery". That is, there are no rules of inference for discovering or thinking up scientific hypotheses.57 Hypotheses are not thought up or discovered by INFERRING them FROM observational phenomena. It therefore cannot be claimed that nondemonstrative inference plays any role in the context of discovery of scientific inquiry. Consequently, the narrow inductivist conception of scientific inquiry - according to which hypotheses are inductively inferred from data— is rejected today. 58 To reject the narrow inductivist conception of the logic of scientific inquiry is not, however, to claim that nondemonstrative inference plays no role at all in scientific inquiry. On the contrary, it is contended that nondemonstrative forms of inference are used in the context of justification of scientific inquiry. In particular, the view is put forward that nondemonstrative forms of inference are used both in determining the initial plausibility of hypotheses and in confirming hypotheses.59 Rescher differentiates between these two roles of nondemonstrative inference in the context of justification by drawing a distinction between two kinds of evidence: supporting evidence and confirming evidence, SUPPORTING EVIDENCE - or "sustaining" evidence in the terminology of Bunge60 - is the evidence which, in the form of the premisses of a nondemonstrative argument, lends a higher initial plausibility or prior probability to a hypothesis Hi than to other, competing, hypotheses H2, H3, ..., H n . 6 1 The hypothesis cannot be said, in any heuristic sense, to be INFERRED FROM the eviand a context of justification or validation, cf. e.g. Rudner 1966: 5-6; and Salmon 1963: 10 ff. Rudner (1966: 6) asserts that "... in general, the context of validation is the context of our concern when, regardless of how we have come to discover or entertain a scientific hypothesis or theory, we raise questions about accepting or rejecting it. To the context of discovery, on the other hand, belong such questions as how, in fact, one comes to latch on to good hypotheses, or what social, psychological, political, or economic conditions will conduce to thinking up fruitful hypotheses". 57 For this view cf. e.g. Bunge 1959: 68; Carnap 1953:195; Caws 1966: 243; Hempel 1966: 14; Nagel 1961: 12; Popper 1965: 31; Rudner 1966: 6; and Salmon 1967: 18-19. 58 59

Cf. Hempel 1966: 11. In this context "strict" is a synonym for "narrow".

Consider Carnap's (1953: 195) version of these views: "The function of inductive logic begins after a hypothesis is offered for examination. Its task is to measure the support which the given evidence supplies for the tentatively assumed hypothesis. In particular, the task will often be to determine among several competing hypotheses the one which is most strongly confirmed by the given evidence." 60 Bunge (1959: 78-79) operates with the notion "sustaining evidence for a hypothesis" or "sustenance for a hypothesis" since "theories are not built ex nihilo but on certain bases: these support them before and after the test; the test itself, if successful, provides the remaining supports of the theory and fixes its degree of confirmation. Hence, the probability of a theory is not identical with its degree of confirmation." For the diverse types of sustenance - empirical, rational, cultural and psychological sustenance - for which Bunge provides cf. Bunge 1959: 78-81. 61 Cf. Rescher 1958: 83. Salmon (1967:125 ff.) draws a distinction among three types of criteria on the basis of which the initial plausibility or prior probability of a hypothesis may be judged: formal, pragmatic, and material criteria. Formal criteria involve the deductive relationships of entailment and incompatibility of a new hypothesis H to a background of accepted hypotheses. Pragmatic criteria concern the source or origin of a hypothesis - such as the scholarly standing of the scientist who proposed it. Material criteria relate to the inductive relationships - such as the relationship of analogy - between a new hypothesis and ones which are similar to it in relevant respects and which have already been accepted.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

35

dence. Rather, the hypothesis is judged on the evidence as giving the most probable or plausible explanation for the phenomenon or phenomena on which this evidence has a bearing. The logical relation which exists between such an explanatory hypothesis (or conclusion) - once it has been devised - and the evidence (or premisses) explained by it is the one variously called "abduction", "retroduction", or "regressive reduction". 62 To the nature of this logical relation of regressive reduction we return below. The inference from evidence to an explanatory hypothesis is nondemonstrative since it is always possible to conceive of more than one, alternative, hypothesis explaining a given problematical phenomenon. Caws makes this point in the following way: (9) A sentence which is a consequence of one hypothesis may also be the consequence of another hypothesis, and if all we have is the consequence we do not know which hypothesis to choose. The sentence 'If a man takes arsenic, he will die', while certainly true for most people, does not allow us to conclude that if one of them dies he must have taken arsenic. There are many ways of dying. One of them must have occurred, but which, without further inquiry, we cannot say. 63 CONFIRMING EVIDENCE is the evidence presented in the premisses of a nondemonstrative argument which is being used for the confirmation of hypotheses. In Rescher's terminology, confirming evidence "establishes" a hypothesis.64 A hypothesis is tested by deducing predictions or consequences from it. These consequences are subsequently confronted with observational evidence. If the predictions are borne out by the evidence, it is said that this evidence "confirms" the hypothesis.65 Whereas the inference from the hypothesis to the predictions is supposed to be deductive, the inference from the correctness of an observational prediction to the truth of the hypothesis is nondemonstrative.66 As will be shown below, the logical relation existing in this case between the hypothesis (or conclusion) and the evidence (or premisses) is that of "reduction", the "reduction being done progressively". The form of argument used for the confirmation of a hypothesis may be represented schematically as (10).

(10)

If the hypothesis is true, then the prediction is true. The prediction is true. . *. The hypothesis is true. 67

The form of argument (10) is nondemonstrative on two accounts. First, it is always possible to derive the same correct predictions from more than one, alternative, hypothesis. Second, if all the tested predictions of a hypothesis have been found to be 62 63 64 65 68 87

Cf. note 43 to this chapter. Cf. Caws 1966: 111. Cf. Rescher 1958: 83. For such an account of confirmation cf. Hempel 1966: 18; and Salmon 1963: 78. Cf. Salmon 1963: 78. For (10) cf. Salmon 1963: 81.

36

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

correct, it does not follow that all untested predictions will likewise be correct. 68 On account of its nondemonstrative nature, the form of argument (10) cannot be used for the purpose of showing conclusively that a hypothesis is true. This form of argument can be used, however, in order to lend some weight to a hypothesis or to confirm it. 69 Let us now return to the nature of the rules of nondemonstrative inference called "regressive reduction" and "progressive reduction" by Bochenski. These rules of inference are characterized by Bochenski with respect to a conditional statement of the form p :=> q. Both in the case of progressive reduction and in that of regressive reduction the consequent q is known to be true, but it is not known whether the antecedent p is also true. (11) ... if the reduction is to be done progressively, however, the antecedent - whose truthvalue is still unknown - is taken as the starting-point, from which the argument proceeds to the known or ascertainable consequent. This progressive reduction is called 'verification'. Regressive reduction, on the other hand, begins with the known consequent and proceeds to the unknown antecedent. Regressive reduction is called 'explanation'. 70

A classic instance of the use of regressive reduction in empirical science is Kepler's explanation for the observed irregularity in the orbit of Mars. Kepler explained this irregularity by "reducing" it to the hypothesis that the orbit of Mars was not circular, but elliptical. In Hanson's opinion this inference of Kepler's constitutes "... the greatest piece of Retroductive reasoning ever performed." 71 It was pointed out above that the sense in which the logic of scientific inquiry can be characterized as nondemonstrative is not the heuristic, or narrow inductivist, sense of this term: true hypotheses cannot be inferred from data or evidence in any heuristic sense. The logic of scientific inquiry is, however, held to be nondemonstrative in the wider inductivist seme. In the context of justification regressive reduction is used to establish plausible explanatory hypotheses and progressive reduction is used to confirm these hypotheses. In chapter 3 it will become apparent that in the logic of inquiry of transformational generative grammar both progressive and regressive reduction in fact play a basic role.

68

Cf. Barker 1957: 102; and Salmon 1963: 87. As Hempel (1966: 18) formulates it: "..., even extensive testing with favorable results does not establish a hypothesis conclusively, but provides only more or less strong support for it". 70 Cf. Bochenski 1965: 92. Bochenski proceeds: "It is obvious that the familiar expression "hypothetico-deductive" refers to these two types of reductive method: the procedure is hypothetical, i.e. explanatory hypotheses are constructed (by regressive reduction), and deductive, because from these hypotheses verifiable consequences are derived (progressive reduction). Of course the expression "deductive" has a different sense here from the one we ordinarily give it". 71 Cf. Hanson 1965: 85. 69

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

37

2.5. LEVELS OF MERIT FOR NONDEMONSTRATIVE A R G U M E N T S

2.5.1. The Issue In § 1.3. it has been pointed out that one aspect of analyzing an argument is that of making an assessment of the merit of the argument. Assessing the merit of an argument, or evaluating an argument, presupposes the availability of some kind of system or theory of LEVELS OF MERIT for arguments. In addition, STANDARDS should be available on the basis of which the merit of arguments at each level of merit may be fixed. In § 2.3. it has been shown that logicians associate the logical property of (formal) validity both with demonstrative argument forms and with substitution instances of these argument forms. Consequently, (formal) validity may be taken as a level of merit for arguments which are purported to be demonstrative. 72 In § 2.3. it has also become clear that logicians regard nondemonstrative argument forms and their substitution instances as being, by definition, (formally) invalid. Therefore it does not make sense to regard (formal) validity as a level of merit at which it is possible to evaluate nondemonstrative arguments. The question accordingly arises: what are the levels of merit for evaluating nondemonstrative arguments in general, and in particular, for evaluating the nondemonstrative arguments encountered in empirical science? Neither in inductive logic nor in philosophy of science have we been able to find, in any single paper or monograph, what will qualify as an adequate answer to this question. An "adequate answer" will be one that provides sufficient conceptual equipment for assessing, in a nonarbitrary way, the merit of nondemonstrative arguments occurring in scientific discourse. Many logicians and philosophers of science have offered suggestions, however, which could form the basis of a system or theory of levels of merit for nondemonstrative arguments. In this paragraph we will present those suggestions which derive from a study of the methodology of empirical science and which, moreover, will be useful to our analysis of the way in which transformationalist linguists evaluate the nondemonstrative arguments put forward in their field. Though we will attempt to systematize these suggestions into a scheme both coherent and not too arbitrary, it is far from our intention - and beyond our competence - to construct a fully justifiable theory or model of the levels of merit for nondemonstrative arguments. This scheme of ours accordingly is not presented as a solution to the profound problems which professional logicians and philosophers of science have to face when dealing with the issue of the merit of nondemonstrative arguments. Moreover, this scheme will be kept as unoriginal as possible, with every aspect of it being founded on such suggestions by logicians and philosophers as seem to us not to be too controversial. Even when conceived as such an unpretentious framework, however, within which one may 72

The level of soundness may be taken as a second possible level at which the merit of demonstrative arguments may be assessed. An argument is sound if it is an instance of a valid form of argument and if all its premisses are true. For the notion of soundness cf. e.g. Copi 1968: 25.

38

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

hope to gain some understanding as to the nature of current intra-paradigmatic controversies in transformational grammar, this scheme suffers from definite shortcomings which will soon become apparent. 2.5.2.

The Basis for A Scheme of Levels of Merit

At the basis for the scheme of levels of merit to be explicated below lies the following tripartite distinction : 1. the proposition constituting the conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument, 2. the scientific hypothesis in the form of which this proposition is presented as the solution to a problem or as the explanation for a puzzling phenomenon, and 3. the nondemonstrative argument which as a whole has the function of persuading people to accept this solution or explanation. Let us briefly consider the notions "proposition," "hypothesis", and "argument" as they are involved in this underlying distinction. In § 2.2. it has been shown that traditionally an argument has been regarded as an ordered set of propositions, these propositions being either premisses or conclusions. Those propositions are said to constitute conclusions which are based on evidence contained in the propositions which constitute the premisses. In the case of a nondemonstrative argument the logical relation holding between the premisses and the conclusion is a relation of support. This relation of support constitutes the basis for the first level of merit that may be associated with nondemonstrative arguments: the level of support. At the LEVEL OF SUPPORT one may assess the merit of the PROPOSITION constituting the conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument. If the proposition constituting the conclusion of an argument is presented as a solution to a problem or as an explanation for a puzzling phenomenon, then - in Cohen's terminology - it is "hypothesized".73 A (scientific) hypothesis, consequently, is a proposition which, as the conclusion of an argument, is presented as a solution to a problem or as an explanation for a problematic phenomenon. Now not all hypotheses are equally good - or equal in their "acceptance-worthiness" or "acceptability" - as solutions to problems or as explanations for puzzling phenomena. 74 This fact constitutes the basis for a second level of merit for nondemonstrative arguments: the level of acceptability. At the LEVEL OF ACCEPTABILITY one may assess the merit of a scientific HYPOTHESIS as a solution to a problem or as an explanation for a puzzling phenomenon. In scientific discourse an argument taken as a whole is put forward by a scholar in order to attain a particular aim : persuasion. The arguing scholar hopes to persuade other scholars to adopt the position or point of view presented in the hypothesized 73 Cf. Cohen 1970:2; as well as note 52 to this chapter for the notion "hypothesis" (or "hypothesized proposition"). 74 Cf. Cohen 1970: 8.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

39

proposition which constitutes the conclusion of the argument. To put it differently, a practising scientist or scholar is on the whole not interested in objectively supported propositions or in acceptable hypotheses merely for their own sake. The practising scientist or scholar wishes, in addition, to convince his colleagues of the merit of these propositions and hypotheses. For the purpose of convincing his colleagues, the scientist or scholar uses arguments as vehicles or persuasion. This fact constitutes the basis for a third level of merit for nondemonstrative arguments: the level of persuasive power. At the LEVEL OF PERSUASIVE POWER one may assess the merit of a nondemonstrative ARGUMENT as a vehicle of persuasion. Thus, provision is made for three levels of merit at which nondemonstrative arguments may be evaluated : 1. the level of support, which relates to the merit of the proposition that constitutes the conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument, 2. the level of acceptability, which relates to the merit of the proposition that is being hypothesized either as a solution to a problem or as an explanation for a puzzling phenomenon, and 3. the level of persuasive power, which relates to the success that nondemonstrative arguments have in persuading other scientists or scholars to adopt a particular point of view. We can now proceed to consider two specific questions that relate to the nature of these levels : 1. What are the factors or considerations that determine the support for a proposition, that determine the acceptability of a hypothesis, and that determine the persuasive power of a nondemonstrative argument? 2. What is the relative weight or importance of each of the determinants of the support for a proposition, the acceptability of a hypothesis, and the persuasive power of an argument? A third question, which will not be dealt with systematically below, would be : 3. What is the justification for accepting or rejecting a given consideration as a determinant of support, of acceptability, or of persuasive power? 2.5.3. The Level of Support

The distinction drawn above between the support for a proposition and the acceptability of a hypothesis resembles Cohen's distinction between inductive support and inductive acceptability. Cohen characterizes INDUCTIVE SUPPORT as a timeless logical relation existing among the logical entities known as "propositions". 75 For Cohen, inductive support is a relation which admits of comparative judgements and which 75

Cf. Cohen 1970 : 8 ff.

40

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

does not exclude the possibility of ranking. Cohen's relation of inductive support is exemplified by the relation that exists between the propositions constituting scientific hypotheses and the propositions presenting the evidence for these hypotheses. In this context Cohen associates inductive support with the notion of experimental test. Those consequences of a hypothesis which are positively instantiated by means of experimental testing inductively support the hypothesis.76 In this study a proposition will be regarded as supported if there exists at least one evidential statement which meets both of the following conditions: 1. the condition of being logically relevant to this proposition, and 2. the condition of being qualitatively relevant to this proposition. 77 The question now arises as to the content to be attributed to the expression "logically relevant" as applied to evidential statements and to the expression "qualitatively relevant" as applied to a given proposition. An evidential statement will be regarded as LOGICALLY RELEVANT to a proposition constituting the conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument if this evidential statement is related to the proposition in terms of one of the explicitly definable rules of nondemonstrative inference. It has been pointed out in § 2.4. that two rules of nondemonstrative inference are held to be of special significance in the logic of empirical science: Bochenski's progressive reduction and regressive reduction. It is itself an empincal question what particular rules of nondemonstrative inference are typically used in the logic of any particular field of inquiry. The main point, here, is that a rule of nondemonstrative inference relating an evidential statement to a conclusion proposition cannot be taken as authorizing us to regard the evidential statement as logically relevant to the conclusion proposition unless the rule of nondemonstrative inference is explicitly definable. Evidential statements, in order to support a conclusion, must not only be logically relevant to it. In addition these evidential statements must also be qualitatively relevant to the conclusion proposition. In the phraseology of Salmon, "in order for 76

The notions of "positive instantiation" and "negative instantiation" are elucidated further on in this paragraph. 77 Relevance as a condition on support is stressed by, for example, (i) Salmon (1963: 4), who asserts that "when an argument is subjected to logical analysis, the question of relevance is at issue"; (ii) Cohen (1970: 35), who sums up his position by saying that "to be able to test a universal hypothesis U experimentally we require to assume that certain natural variables are inductively relevant for any member of a set of materially similar hypotheses to which U belongs, where a natural variable (or variable, for short) is conceived of as a set of observationally identifiable circumstances of which the descriptions are contrary or contradictory to one another"; (iii) Stebbing (1933: 468), who states that "a well-constructed argument the purpose of which is to produce conviction exhibits the characteristics of clearness, connectedness, freedom from contradiction or consistency, demonstrativeness or cogency. Throughout our discussion of logical method we have laid stress upon relevance as an essential characteristic of logical thinking."

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

41

facts to be evidence for a conclusion they must be properly relevant to that conclusion. Obviously, it will not do merely to give true statements to support a conclusion. The statements must have some bearing upon that conclusion." 7 8 For example, to insist to be told why data about the position of the moon should be regarded as evidence supporting a proposition referring, say, to the occurrence of ebb tide at a given time is to inquire into the qualitative relevance of these data to the proposition. Similarly, to demand to know why the evidential statement The lights are on in this room "confirms" the proposition The Universe is in a steady state is to voice doubts about the qualitative relevance of the former statement to the latter proposition. For, as Foster and Martin point out, "... it seems paradoxical in the extreme that we should be able to confirm a speculative theory of cosmology by turning on a light". 79 To require that an evidential statement be QUALITATIVELY RELEVANT to a given conclusion proposition is to insist on the condition that there should exist an inherent connection of "material similarity" between the nonlogical part of the content of the evidential statement and the nonlogical part of the content of the conclusion proposition. 8 0 Cohen points out that it is the task ot scientists themselves to determine from time to time the criteria for qualitative relevance in their field and to determine on the basis of these criteria the list of qualitatively relevant evidential variables in this field.81 The judgements that scientists make concerning qualitative relevance are empirically grounded and empirically refutable. To the problems arising in connection with these judgements we return in § 4.2. In order to regard an evidential statement as lending support to a given proposition it is not necessary to know whether this evidential statement is in fact true. 8 2 The truth of an evidential statement is not a consideration bearing on the support for a proposition to which this evidential statement is logically as well as qualitatively relevant. Support as a logical relation is independent of the actual truth of premisses. Many logicians regard the relation of support holding between evidential statements and a proposition as one that admits of ranking or grading. 8 3 Those logicians who take this relation as one that admits of ranking operate with a comparative concept of support; those logicians who take this relation as admitting of grading operate with a quantitative concept of support. These latter scholars often use expressions 78

Cf. Salmon 1963: 3. Stebbing (1933: 468) makes the point about qualitative relevance by asserting that "to know what is relevant to a situation is to apprehend connexions. The discovery of relevance requires judgement, for not all relevance is logical" (our italics - B.-W.). In the same vein Cohen and Nagel (1966: 157) observe that "... the relevance of the evidence cannot be determined on formal grounds alone". 79 Cf. Foster and Martin 1966: 132. 80 Cf. Cohen 1970: 35 ff. 81 Cf. Cohen 1970: 40. For Cohen's notion of a variable cf. (ii) in note 77 to this chapter. 82 This point Salmon (1963: 4) makes by asserting that "when we say that the premises of an argument support the conclusion, we are not saying that the premises are true; we are saying that there would be good evidence for the conclusion if the premises were true". 83 Cf. Cohen 1970: 12, 35; as well as Foster and Martin 1966: 131 if.

42

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

such as "degree of support" or "weight of evidence" to denote the graded relation of support holding between evidential statements and conclusion propositions.84 Accepting a comparative concept of support allows the making of judgements such as the following three : 1. The proposition Pi receives more/less support from the evidential statement Si than Pi receives from the evidential statement S2. 2. The proposition Pi receives more/less support from the evidential statement Si than the proposition P2 receives from the evidential statement Si. 3. The proposition Pi receives more/less support from the evidential statement Si than the proposition P2 receives from the evidential statement S2. When comparative judgements of support such as the above three are quantified, they express degrees of support for propositions. It is obvious that in the context of justification of scientific inquiry a comparative or quantitative concept, if available, would be extremely useful. Scholars - logicians, methodologists, and practising scientists - who operate with either a comparative or a quantitative notion of support must face two major questions : 1. What are the considerations that determine the rank or degree of support for a given proposition? 2. What is the relative weight or importance of each of these considerations ? These questions have occupied much of the time of those logicians who operate with a notion of rank or degree of support. The answers which have been given to these questions by any single logician have, in turn, raised many unsolved problems. Any scholar versed in logic and philosophy of science will be aware of these further problems. We can do no more here than to indicate the basic lines along which the proposed answers to the above two questions have been given. As determinants of the rank or degree of support for a proposition the following four factors are commonly mentioned: 1. The number of the evidential statements that bear positively on the proposition,85 Those scholars who equate the concept "confirmation of a hypothesis" with our concept "support for a proposition" formulate this determinant of the rank or degree of support for a proposition in terms of the notion of the positive instances or positive instatiantion ofla theory. For Nagel instances of a theory-i.e. statements related to the theory in terms of progressive reduction - which are borne out by observation constitute positive instances of the theory ; instances of a theory which are in disaccord 84

For these expressions cf. e.g. Hempel and Oppenheim 1966: 194 if. ; Kemeny and Oppenheim 1966: 212 ff.; and Nagel 1966: 188 ff. 88 Cf. e.g. Foster and Martin 1966: 135; Kemeny and Oppenheim 1966: 212-213; and Nagel 1966: 188.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

43

with observations constitute negative instances of the theory. 86 It is generally held that the larger the number of positive instances a hypothesis (or theory) has, the better supported it is. 2. The number of evidential statements that bear negatively on the proposition. Scholars who regard the number of positive instances of a hypothesis as a determinant of the rank or degree of support for this hypothesis, usually also take the negative instances of a hypothesis as lowering the rank or degree of support for this hypothesis. 87 3. The rank or degree of qualitative relevance of the evidential statements that bear positively on the proposition. Scholars such as Cohen, and Nagel, delineate a property which is essentially equivalent to our qualitative relevance and which, according to them, may be a matter of degree. 88 With respect to a given proposition P evidential statements referring to one evidential variable Vi may be qualitatively more relevant than evidential statements referring to a second evidential variable V2. The higher the rank or degree of qualitative relevance which evidential statements have with respect to a proposition, the greater is the support lent by these evidential statements to this proposition. 4. The variety in the mutually independent kinds of evidential variables about which there are evidential statements that bear positively on the proposition,89 The contribution made by this consideration to the rank or degree of support for a proposition is characterized by Salmon as follows: (12) It is universally recognized that the degree to which a hypothesis is confirmed depends not only upon the number of confirming instances, but also upon their variety. For instance, observations of the position of Mars confirm Newton's theory, but after a certain number of these observations each new one contributes very little to the confirmation of the theory. We want some observations of falling bodies, some observations of the tides, and a good torsion balance experiment. Any confirming instance of one of the subsequent sorts would contribute far more to the confirmation of the theory than would another observation of Mars. 90 86

Cf. Nagel 1966: 188. In this connection Cohen (1970: 44) makes the point that: "... it is altogether too paradoxical to suppose, in relation to any individual trial of a universal hypothesis, that a successful outcome has just the same value positively conceived as an unsuccessful one has negatively". To the problem of the asymmetry between positive and negative instances of a proposition we return below. 88 Cf. Cohen 1970: 43-44. Cohen illustrates this point with reference to examples of hypotheses about bird-plumage and drug-toxicity "... mating/not-mating is perhaps a more relevant variable than temperature in relation to hypotheses about bird-plumage; and pregnant/not-pregnant is perhaps a less relevant variable than medical history in relation to hypotheses about drug-toxicity". Cohen and Nagel (1966: 157) observe that "the evidence which may be marshaled in support of a proposition may have different degrees of relevance. In general, that evidence is chosen for a proposition which will make the degree of probability of that proposition as great as possible." 89 For this point cf. e.g. Nagel 1966: 190; and Salmon 1967: 130. 90 Cf. Salmon 1967: 130. 87

44

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

Thus the greater the diversity in the independent evidential statements bearing positively on a proposition, the greater would be the support for this proposition. 91 A host of questions - not one of them susceptible of an easy answer - is raised by the above-mentioned four determinants of the rank or degree of support for a proposition. We can do no more here than to indicate some of these questions. As regards the first determinant of the rank or degree of support for a proposition, the question arises whether, say, the hundredth positive instance of a proposition contributes as much to the support for this proposition as does its first positive instance.92 An analogous question, of course, has to be faced in connection with the negative instances of a proposition, hence in connection with the second of the determinants listed above. There is, moreover, the question whether one positive instance of a proposition adds as much to the support for this proposition as one negative instance of this proposition subtracts from its support. In respect of the third determinant, an obvious question concerns the choice of the criterion that is to be accepted as the basis for nonarbitrary judgements of the rank or degree of qualitative relevance of evidential statements. As to the fourth consideration mentioned above as a determinant of the degree or rank of support for a proposition, a similarly obvious question may be posed: on what basis is one to determine whether two evidential statements are mutually independent? We know of no widely accepted answer to any of these questions. Even more problematic than the first is the second major question to be faced in clarifying the notion of rank or degree of support. This second major question, as noted above, concerns the relative importance that is to be assigned to each of the determinants of the rank or degree of support for a proposition. This question breaks down into sub-questions such as the following ones: On what basis should the relative weight of a determinant of the degree of support for a proposition be assessed? Which of the propositions Pi, P2, or P3 has the greatest support if it is the case that 1. the number of evidential statements bearing positively on Pi is greater than the number of evidential statements bearing positively on either P2 or P3; 2. the variety in the mutually independent evidential statements bearing positively on P2 is greater than the variety in the mutually independent evidential statements bearing positively on either Pi or P3 ; 3. the rank of qualitative relevance of the evidential statements bearing positively 61 One reason for using this factor in determining the rank or degree of support for a proposition is presented by Nagel (1966: 190) as follows: "Variety in the kinds of positive instances for a theory is a generally acknowledged factor in estimating the weight of the evidence. The reason for this is that experiments which are conducted in qualitatively different domains make it easier to control features of the theory whose relevance in any of the domains may be in question. Hence, by increasing the possibility of eliminating what may be simply accidental successes of a theory under special or unanalyzed circumstances, the possibility of finding negative instances for the theory is increased. In this way of conducting experiments, the theory is subjected to a more searching examination than if all the positive instances were drawn from just one domain." 92 On this point cf. the views of Salmon's quoted above as (12).

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

45

on P3 is greater than the rank of qualitative relevance of the evidential statements bearing positively on either Pi or P2? To these questions no logical or methodological study, to our knowledge, provides answers which could be used in a fully nonarbitrary way in order to assess the degree of support for propositions formulated in the language of empirical science. It appears that practising scientists - in so far as they do make judgements as to the rank or degree of support for propositions 1. 2.

either do not attempt to motivate these decisions explicitly, or, when they do attempt to provide such a motivation, mention - in their motivation of these decisions - only one at a time the four considerations that were listed above as determinants of the rank or degree of support for a proposition.

In § 3.5. of this study an attempt will be made to explicate the basis of the transformationalist notion of support. 2.5.4. The Level of Acceptability As was pointed out in § 2.5.2, when a proposition is presented as a solution to a scientific problem or as an explanation of a puzzling phenomenon, this proposition becomes a scientific hypothesis. Not all scientific hypotheses - as solutions to problems or as explanations for puzzling phenomena - are of equal merit. The merit of a hypothesis as providing a solution or explanation is judged at the LEVEL OF ACCEPTABILITY. According to Cohen, that solution to a problem which involves the proposition with the greatest inductive support does not necessarily correspond to the most acceptable hypothesis. He observes that it is not (13) ... to be assumed too readily that the solution of a given problem which has the most inductive support from already known truths is necessarily the best solution of that problem at the moment. The question of acceptability, in the sense of acceptance-worthiness - the question of which hypothesis constitutes the best solution of a given scientific problem needs to be carefully distinguished from the question of inductive support. 93 Analogously, Nagel - in stressing the distinction between the TRUTH or PROBABILITY of scientific theories and the EFFECTIVENESS or USEFULNESS of theories as instruments of inquiry - also operates with distinct levels of merit for propositions and for hypotheses respectively. These two levels of merit implicitly provided for by Nagel correspond partially to our two levels of support and of acceptability. 94 Note, incidentally, that logicians are divided on the question whether inductive 93

Cf. Cohen 1970: 8. For a full statement of Nagel's views on this topic cf. appendix 2.5 to this chapter. In this appendix it will be made clear that Lambert and Brittan, too, draw a distinction between confirmation and acceptability which is analogous to Cohen's and Nagel's distinctions. 94

46

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

conclusions are ever "accepted".95 As used by these logicians, "acceptability" turns out to be a multiply ambiguous term. Many inductive logicans, in commenting on the question of "acceptability", are not concerned with the reality of scientific inquiry. That is, these logicians do not consider the questions whether, in what sense, and on what grounds, practising scientists do "accept" scientific hypotheses. Many of these logicians are concerned with a normative issue: the issue whether on the basis of the canons of one or another formalized model of inductive logic inductive conclusions may be "accepted". Since this book is ultimately concerned with "low-level" methodological principles - i.e. principles actually used in empirical inquiry - it is not profitable to engage here in a discussion of the merit of the various positions that logicians take on the issue of "acceptability". It is sufficient to point out here that, in the conduct of an empirical inquiry, scientists do in fact regard some hypotheses as being better solutions or explanations - and hence as being more acceptable - than other hypotheses.96 A question that arises in connection with the level of acceptability is this: what are the considerations (i) which determine whether a given hypothesis is acceptable and (ii) which determine, if a given hypothesis is in fact acceptable, how acceptable it is ? It seems likely that many of the factors which scientists take into consideration when assessing the acceptability of a hypothesis will turn out to be field-dependent.97 What follows below is a merely partial list of those determinants of the acceptability of a hypothesis which are generally mentioned in the literature on this topic. The acceptability of a scientific hypothesis is seen as a function of, among other things, the following eight factors. 1. The (rank/degree o f ) support for the proposition underlying the hypothesis. A hypothesis for which no evidence exists - i.e. a hypothesis such that there is not even one evidential statement which is both logically and qualitatively relevant to the proposition underlying the hypothesis - is generally regarded as unacceptable in empirical science.98 Consequently every factor that is a determinant of the (rank or degree of) support for a proposition is also, indirectly, a (co-)determinant of the acceptability of the hypothesized proposition. 2. The truth of the evidential statements which bear positively on the proposition underlying the hypothesis. As pointed out by Salmon, if the premisses of an argument - i.e. the statements presenting the evidence - are false, then the "... alleged facts are 95

Cf. Kyburg 1964: 276-278 for a brief exposition of the major views held by logicians on the issue of "acceptance" or "acceptability". In § Il.iii of appendix 2.3, to this chapter the notion of a rule of acceptance as a component of a theory of inductive logic is briefly outlined. 96 This is also pointed out by, for example, Black, Cohen, Kyburg, Popper, and Salmon. For bibliographical details cf. Kyburg 1964: 277. 97 For the notion "field-dependent" cf. § Il.iv of appendix 2.3 to this chapter. 98 This view is also put forward by, for example, Kyburg (1968a: 164), Lambert and Brittan (1970: 68-69), and Salmon (1963: 3). Kyburg (1968a: 164) asserts that "all we can ask as grounds for accepting a theory is that we have reason to believe that all of its observable consequences turn out to be true."

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

47

not facts at all; the alleged evidence does not exist. Under these circumstances, we can hardly be said to have good grounds for accepting the conclusion." 99 3. The success with which the hypothesis fits into the framework constituted by those hypotheses which have already been accepted. Salmon points out that "scientific hypotheses are proposed not, in an epistemic vacuum, but against the background of many previously accepted hypotheses and many that have already been rejected." 100 The better a newly proposed hypothesis fits in with already accepted hypotheses, the more acceptable it will be. Nagel makes the same point by observing that "... evidence for a theory often consists not only of its own positive instances but also of the positive instances for another theory, related to the first within a more inclusive theoretical system." 101 Salmon regards both certain "deductive" and certain "inductive" relations by virtue of which a new hypothesis is related to already existing hypothesis as germane to the "plausibility", i.e. the acceptability, of the new hypothesis. Concerning the "deductive" relations, he points out that (14) if an old hypothesis Hi entails a new hypothesis H2, then the prior probability of H2 is at least as great as the posterior probability of Hi. If a new hypothesis H3 is incompatible with an old hypothesis H4, then the prior probability of H3 is no greater than the probability that H4 is false - i.e., one minus the posterior probability of H4.102 In connection with the inductive relations mentioned above, Salmon observes that a hypothesis may be regarded as plausible on the basis of its being analogous to other "successful" hypotheses. 103 Kaplan under the heading "coherence norms for truth", Bunge under the heading "rational support", and Lambert and Brittan under the heading "theoretical connection as a criterion of acceptability", also recognize the factor under discussion as a determinant of the acceptability of scientific hypotheses. 104 4. The fruitfulness or heuristic power of the hypothesis. A hypothesis is regarded as "fruitful" or as having "heuristic power" if it raises new questions or leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown facts. The more fruitful a hypothesis is, the more acceptable it will be. It is this determinant of the acceptability of hypotheses which Kaplan makes provision for under the heading "pragmatic norms for truth". 105 5. The simplicity of the hypothesis and the effect that the hypothesis has on the overall simplicity of the theory of which it is a component. Many philosophers of science 99

Cf. Salmon 1963: 3. Cf. Salmon 1967: 125. 101 Cf. Nagel 1966: 190. Nagel proceeds by saying that "the number of direct positive instances may in such cases be regarded as of small importance, in comparison with the fact that support is given to the theory by the accumulated positive instances for the inclusive system". 102 Cf. Salmon 1967: 125. 103 Cf. Salmon 1967: 126. 104 Cf. Bunge 1959: 79-80; Kaplan 1964 : 314 ff.; and Lambert and Brittan 1970: 72 ff. 105 Cf. Kaplan 1964: 319. Harre (1967: 176-178) and Kuhn (1970b: 261) also consider fruitfulness as a determinant of acceptability. 100

48

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

and scientists bring one or another notion of simplicity to bear on the acceptability of hypotheses.106 Although the attempt at constructing and justifying a general notion of simplicity must inevitably constitute a hazardous intellectual undertaking, philosophers of science and scientists (15) ... place more confidence in simple than in complex hypotheses for purposes of explaining a given body of fact. We judge the simpler hypothesis more likely to be true. We have learned by experience that this works, and at the same time we have learned by experience to avoid oversimplification. 107

6. Practical considerations - relating to time, place, and various other kinds of circumstance - that determine the availability of evidence for the hypothesis.108 The acceptability of a hypothesis may be negatively affected by the "practical" circumstance, for example, that further evidence for this hypothesis is unobtainable because the experiments which would yield such further evidence happen, at the time, to be too expensive to perform.109 7. Ethical considerations relating to the action that would follow or that could be taken if the hypothesis were to be accepted. Cohen illustrates the role of this determinant of acceptability by adducing the case of pharmacological hypotheses whose acceptance would have consequences for the treatment of diseases. In the instance which he sketches, the pharmocologist's problem is to determine whether or not a particular drug has toxic side-eifects. An answer to this question which suggests that this drug has no toxic side-effects "... may deserve acceptance on less supporting evidence if the disease to be treated by the drug is often fatal than if it never is." 110 8. (Quasi-)aesthetical considerations relating to the "elegance" or "beauty" of the theory of which the hypothesis is a component.m Although undeniably scientists do value hypotheses and theories more highly for their "elegance" or "beauty", the import of such (quasi-)aesthetical appraisals is exceedingly difficult to explicate. 112 106

For this point cf. e.g. Kuhn 1970b: 261; Kyburg 1968a: 164; Lambert and Brittan 1970: 69 if.; as well as Salmon 1967: 126. For a synoptic discussion of some of the problems arising in connection with a general notion of simplicity cf. e.g. Caws 1966: 232 ff.; Harre 1967: 164 ff.; and Lambert and Brittan 1970: 69 ff. 107 Cf. Salmon 1967: 126. 108 Some of these considerations are discussed in detail by Cohen (1970: 9 ff.). 109 Cohen (1970: 9) provides the following elucidation of the role of the consideration of evidential availability: "A solution to some chemo-therapeutic problem, that deserved acceptance last year in the light of what was then known about the properties of the drugs involved, may come to deserve rejection later on, when hitherto unsuspected side-effects of the drugs begin to turn up in special cases. Moreover, evidence may be out of a man's reach not only because it does not yet exist, but also because it has not yet been published or is too expensive to obtain, or because no-one will ever be sufficiently ingenious to devise the experiments that would produce it." 110 Cf. Cohen 1970: 10. 111 Cf. Harre 1967: 174-176; and Kyburg 1968a: 164. 112 Harre (1967: 176-177) discusses these difficulties with respect to the problem of explicating the notion of elegance as it applies to mathematical proofs. Kyburg (1968a: 164) also points out this problem: "it is very clear that some desiderata of theories - that they be beautiful, simple,

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE!

49

The task of explicating the content of these and similar determinants of acceptability, and the task of justifying the adoption of the principles from which each such determinant is derived, have both proven to be undertakings of the utmost complexity. Still more difficult is the task of making non-arbitrary judgements of the relative weight to be attributed to each of these determinants. In view of these difficulties associated with the notion "determinant of acceptability of a hypothesis/ theory", Kuhn insists that such determinants cannot be assigned the status of "rules of choice". In Kuhn's opinion, such determinants have the less formal status of "values". With respect to a given field of inquiry it is not the case that all the scholars or scientists working within that field share the same "values". Moreover, those scholars or scientists who do share the same values do not use or invoke these values in the same way when they have to deliver judgement on the acceptability of a given hypothesis. As a result, it is predictable that the appraisals which different scholars or scientists within a given field make of the acceptability of a given hypothesis belonging to that field will vary within certain bounds. 113 It is the task of descriptive methodology to identify, codify, and evaluate, the determinants of the acceptability of hypotheses as these determinants occur and are applied in individual fields of inquiry. One of the aims of this book is to analyze the determinants of acceptability implicitly or explicitly operative in transformational grammar. 2.5.5. The Level of Persuasive Power In empirical science, arguments do not constitute frameworks merely for establishing supported propositions and objectively acceptable hypotheses. Scientists use arguments also for the purpose of "converting" dissenting colleagues to the points of view expressed in these propositions and hypotheses. That is, in empirical science the arguments advanced in scholarly debates have the additional methodological function of being "vehicles of persuasion". The success which an argument achieves in persuading scientists or scholars to adopt the point of view presented in the conclusion aesthetically pleasing, that they have a form which is natural to our way of thinking or similar to the form of other acceptable theories - are hard to spell out in detail". 113 In this connection Kuhn (1970b: 262) asserts that "what I am denying then is neither the existence of good reasons (for valuing one theory higher than a second, alternative one - B.-W.) nor that these reasons are of the sort usually desciibed. I am, however, insisting that such reasons constitute values to be used in making choices rather than rules of choice. Scientists who share them may nevertheless make different choices in the same concrete situations. Two factors are deeply involved. First, in many concrete situations, different values, though all constitutive of good reasons, dictate different conclusions, different choices. In such cases of value-conflict (e.g. one theory is simpler but the other is more accurate) the relative weight placed on different values by different individuals can play a decisive role in individual choice. More important, though scientists share these values and must continue to do so if science is to survive, they do not all apply them in the same way. Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, and even accuracy can be judged quite differently (which is not to say they may be judged arbitrarily) by different people. Again, they may differ in their conclusions without violating any accepted rule."

50

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

of this argument should be judged at a separate level of merit: the

LEVEL OF PER-

SUASIVE POWER. 1 1 4

Whereas the notions of support and acceptability bear on objective attributes of propositions and hypotheses respectively, the notion of persuasive power relates to a subjective, i.e. a psychological, state of affairs: the state of mind which an argument effects in the scientists or scholars to whom it has been directed. There are at least two reasons why it makes sense, within the framework of empirical science, to provide for persuasive power as an attribute of nondemonstrative arguments. First, a nondemonstrative argument by definition lacks the ability to force the scientist or scholar to adopt the point of view expressed in its conclusion. The very nature of the considerations determining the amount of support that there is for the conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument precludes the possibility of reaching unequivocal and absolutely compelling judgements of ranks or degrees of support. Second, the very nature of the considerations determining the acceptability of hypotheses likewise precludes the possibility of reaching, on the basis of these considerations, judgements of acceptability that will be unequivocal and absolutely compelling. These two facts seem to furnish ample justification for Kuhn's assertion that "in a debate over choice of theory, neither party has access to an argument which resembles a proof in logic or formal mathematics". 115 It is on account of the nonavailability of such a means of providing proof - i.e. unequivocal and absolutely compelling evidence - that in empirical science scientists and scholars have recourse to persuasion. Kuhn regards the recourse of scientists to persuasion as "... a prelude to the possibility of proof." 116 We come now to the question of the determinants of the persuasive power of nondemonstrative arguments. This topic has received even less systematic attention than has been accorded either to the topic of the determinants of ranks/degrees of support for propositions or to that of the determinants of the acceptability of hypotheses. Considerations of the three sorts outlined below have, however, been implicitly assumed to be determinants of the persuasive power of nondemonstrative arguments. 1. The acceptability of the hypothesis constituting the conclusion of the argument (which acceptability in turn may, partially, reflect the rank or degree of support 114

Stebbing (1933: 467-468) discusses "persuasion" and "conviction" as purposes of arguments, "persuasion" being the induction of belief by irrational means, and "conviction" being the induction of belief by reasoning. 115 Cf. Kuhn 1970b: 260-261. Kuhn proceeds to point out that in formal mathematics "... both premises and rules of inference are stipulated in advance. If there is disagreement about conclusions, the parties to the debate can retrace their steps one by one, checking each against prior stipulation. At the end of that process, one or the other must concede that at an isolable point in the argument he has made a mistake, violated or misapplied a previously accepted rule. After that concession he has no recourse, and his opponent's proof is then compelling. Only if the two discover instead that they differ about the meaning or applicability of a stipulated rule, that their prior agreement does not provide a sufficient basis for proof, does the ensuing debate resemble what inevitably occurs in science." 116 Cf. Kuhn 1970b: 261.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

51

for the proposition underlying this hypothesis). It is tacitly accepted that the more acceptable the conclusion of an argument is on objective grounds, the more persuasive this argument should be regarded as being. 2. The skill with which the argument is presented by a scholar in his capacity of debater. This consideration relates to the sophistication of the debating technique or strategy of the scholar who puts forward the argument. It is possible for the skilled debater to boost the persuasive power of his arguments by presenting these arguments in terms of sentences which are nonambiguous and easily interpretable, by presenting the arguments systematically in terms of apparently uncomplicated and coherent steps which are easy to follow, and so on. 3. Various kinds of "extra-scientific" considerations relating to psychological, sociological, and cultural traits of the participants in a scientific debate. Some of these considerations are discussed by Salmon as "pragmatic criteria for plausibility judgements" ; 117 others are mentioned by Bunge under the headings of "the psychological support for a hypothesis" and "the cultural support for a hypothesis". 118 Salmon mentions, for example, the source of a hypothesis or theory as a determinant of its "plausibility". This is a psychological consideration asserting that the scholarly standing of a scientist may strengthen or weaken the persuasive force of the nondemonstrative arguments produced by him. This consideration implies that, generally speaking, arguments of well-known and respected scholars in a field will be more persuasive than the arguments of their less well-known colleagues.119 Consider a second psychological consideration bearing on the persuasive power of an argument. A scholar may increase the persuasive power of his arguments by suggesting (implicitly) that dissenters who refused to accept the conclusion would by such refusal show themselves to be irrational, or behind the times, or would upon such refusal find themselves to be the isolated adherents of a belief which none of their colleagues would seriously entertain. Consider, finally, an example of a sociological/cultural consideration bearing on the persuasive power of an argument. An argument may be less persuasive - than the support for its conclusion and the objective acceptability of its conclusion warrant - on account of the fact that its conclusion asserts something that is in disaccord with the prevailing Zeitgeist, cultural mood, or intellectual climate. 120 For example, the arguments which Skinner puts forward in support of his 117

Cf. Salmon 1967: 125-126. a . Bunge 1959: 80-81. 119 This point is illustrated by a somewhat extreme example of Salmon's (1967: 125): "If a religious fanatic without any training in physics or mathematics shows up on our doorstep with a new hypothesis to replace Einsteinian relativity, complaining that most scientists refuse him a fair hearing, we justly place a low estimate on the chances that his hypothesis is true." 120 Bunge (1959: 80-81) has the following to say about the "cultural support of factual hypotheses" : "What we called the cultural support of factual hypotheses consists in their compatibility with some world view and, in particular, with the prevailing Zeitgeist. It is clear that we tend to assign a greater weight to those hypotheses that are congenial with our cultural background and, in particular, with our own world outlook, than to those that contradict it. The dual role of the 118

52

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

contention that the freedom of individuals should be controlled by a technology of human behaviour may be weakened in their persuasive power on account of the clash between this contention of Skinner's and the prevailing intellectual mood about the freedom of the individual human being.121 At present it simply is not possible to judge in a non-arbitrary way how much persuasive power a given argument has. Neither the content of any of the determinants of persuasive power, nor the relative weight or importance of each individual determinant is clear. This fact, however, does not cut away the grounds for adopting a level of persuasive power as one of the levels of merit relevant to the appraisal of nondemonstrative arguments.

2.5.6. Conclusion The preceding paragraphs contain an informal systematization of a number of the suggestions which logicians and philosophers of science have offered on the topic of the levels of merit for nondemonstrative arguments. From these suggestions - which should be descriptive of actual scientific methodology - there has emerged a scheme of levels of merit which provides for three interrelated levels at which nondemonstrative arguments may be evaluated: the level of support for propositions, the level of acceptability for hypotheses, and the level of persuasive power for arguments as wholes. At each of these levels, it has become clear, there is uncertainty about 1. the precise content of the determinants of merit, 2. the grounds justifying the adoption of particular determinants of merit, and 3. the relative weight or importance to be attributed to each determinant of merit. In the face of these difficulties a question now arises as to the significance and usefulness of this three-levelled scheme of merit: what is the "worth" of this scheme? We will argue that, despite the general problems listed above, this scheme has two merits. First, in so far as the scheme under discussion is an accurate reflection of methodological principles applied in actual scientific inquiry, it contributes to our understanding of the general nature of empirical inquiry. Note that, taken as a description of what goes on in empirical inquiry, this scheme would have been deficient if it had presented the determinants of merit at each level as more determinate and coherent and less problematic than these determinants actually are as applied by scientists. In so far as the indeterminacies in the scheme are descriptive of empirical inquiry, they do not reflect negatively on this scheme. cultural support of scientific conjectures is easily realised : on the one hand it moves us to pay attention to certain kinds of hypotheses and is even instrumental in suggesting them; on the other hand, it may prevent us from appraising alternative possibilities - whence it may constitute a factor of dogmatic obstinacy." 121 Cf. Skinner 1972.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

53

Second, the scheme of levels of merit outlined above provides the scientist and methodologist with a conceptual framework within which they may analyze critically the way(s) in which nondemonstrative arguments are evaluated in a particular field of inquiry. This scheme may be regarded as representing some of the considerations which render empirical inquiry "rational" and "objective". In this capacity, the scheme may be used for "diagnostic" purposes. If a scientist or methodologist has the impression that debates in a particular field at a particular stage are "abnormally" incoherent and inconclusive, he may use this scheme in an attempt to "diagnose" the causes of this excess in incoherency and inconclusiveness. Within the framework of this scheme it may be possible to identify the causes of the excess in incoherency and inconclusiveness as located in particular features of the standards of merit which the scientists in this field apply, implicitly or explicitly, in their evaluation of nondemonstrative arguments. It is in this "diagnostic" function that we will use the scheme in Chapters 3-6 to identify one of the causes of the highly inconclusive nature of current intra-paradigmatic debates in transformational grammar.

2.6. INDUCTIVE INFERENCE I N EARLY TRANSFORMATIONAL G R A M M A R

The only major topic still to receive attention in the present chapter concerns the alleged methodological status of inductive inference in the earliest version of transformational generative grammar. In his paper "Structural linguistics and the philosophy of science", Bach attempts to demonstrate the influence that "ideas about the nature of science" exercised on the drastic departure which transformational generative grammar took from the Bloomfieldian taxonomic tradition. In order to explicate the differences in methodological basis between generative grammar and this taxonomic model, Bach draws the outlines of two views of science: the Baconian view, and the Keplerian view. As presented by Bach, the Baconian view of science is essentially the strict inductivist view of science outlined in § 2.4 of this study: general statements of hypotheses are "discovered" or "thought up" by inferring them inductively from secure data. 122 The Keplerian view - emphasizing the creative nature of scientific discovery and the leap to general hypotheses whose merit lies in their fruitfulness, simplicity, and elegance - is essentially a prototype of the so-called hypotheticodeductive method. 123 122 Bach (1965: 112) characterizes the Baconian view in the following way: "The purpose of science is to obtain secure knowledge about the world. The only sure basis for such knowledge is observation and experiment. The scientist collects a large body of statements about particular happenings in the world or the laboratory. Starting from these true statements about real events he proceeds by a method of induction to limited generalizations about classes of events. After verifying these cautious generalizations he proceeds to more general statements. A general statement is reliable to the extent that it is based on such inductive methods." 123 "Whereas the Baconian stresses caution and 'sticking to facts' with a distrust of theory and hypotheses ('anticipations' in Bacon's terminology), the Keplerian emphasizes the creative nature

54

NONDEMONSTRATIVE INFERENCE

Having outlined the differences between the Baconian and Keplerian views of science, Bach attempts to show that "American linguistics prior to 1957 were essentially Baconian in nature". 124 In contrast, he asserts, Chomskyan linguistics has other scientific aims than that of inferring statements inductively in terms of rigorous procedures from secure data. In Bach's terminology transformational grammar would be Keplerian.125 Bach even goes so far as to see in generative grammar "the correctness of what I have called the Keplerian view of science".126 Though Bach does not explicitly argue the point, one could get the impression from his paper that transformational grammar is a field of which the logic of inquiry is essentially noninductive, i.e. a field in which nondemonstrative inference plays no role. This impression could be derived from Bach's 1. characterizing taxonomic grammar as essentially Baconian in nature, 127 2. stressing the alleged heuristic function of inductive inferences in the Baconian view of science,128 3. characterizing generative grammar as exhibiting the essential features of the Keplerian view,129 4. characterizing the Keplerian view of science as a view according to which the distinctive methodological feature of science is the construction of deductive theories.130 The impression that the logic of inquiry of transformational grammar is essentially noninductive would be incorrect. First, it is not a justifiable procedure to regard a field of inquiry simply as being "inductive" or "noninductive" without taking into account the distinction between the strict inductivist and the wider inductivist views of science. Second, in the remaining part of this study it will be shown that whereas transformational grammar certainly is noninductive in the strict inductivist sense, as a field of inquiry it is inescapably inductive in the wider inductivist sense. That is, it will be made clear that in a heuristic function nondemonstrative inference plays no demonstrable role in transformational grammar, but that transformational grammar does employ diverse nondemonstrative argument forms for the justification both of general-linguistic and of grammatical hypotheses.

of scientific discovery, the leap to general hypotheses - often mathematical in form - whose value is judged in terms of fruitfulness, simplicity and elegance" (Bach 1965: 113). 124 Cf. Bach 1965: 114 ff. 125 Cf. also Dougherty 1972. 126 Cf. Bach 1965: 125. 127 Cf. Bach 1965: 114 if. 128 Cf. Bach 1965: 112, 113. 129 Cf. Bach 1965: 125. 130 Cf. Bach 1965: 125.

APPENDIX 2

2.1. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ARGUMENT Consider the following typical explications of the traditional conception of the structure of an argument: (16) (i) In any piece of reasoning it should be possible to discern what may be called the 'argument', that is, the statement intended as the conclusion and the statements taken to support it. 131 (ii) An argument may be defined as any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as supplying evidence for the truth of that one .... Every argument has a structure in the analysis of which the terms 'premiss' and 'conclusion' are usually employed. The conclusion of an argument is that proposition which is affirmed on the basis of the other propositions of the argument, and these other propositions which are affirmed as providing evidence or reasons for accepting the conclusion are the premisses of that argument. 132 (iii) Typically, an argument consists of certain statements or propositions, called its premisses, from which a certain other statement or proposition, called its conclusion, is claimed to follow.133 (iv) By an argument we mean a system of declarative sentences (of a single language), one of which is designated as the conclusion and the others as premisses.134 (v) Roughly speaking, an argument is a conclusion standing in relation to its supporting evidence. More precisely, an argument is a group of statements standing in relation to each other. An argument consists of one statement which is the conclusion and one or more statements of supporting evidence. The statements of evidence are called 'premises'. There is no set number of premises which every argument must have, but there must be at least one. 135

131 132 133 134 135

Cf. Alexander 1969:4. Cf. Copi 1965: 3. Cf. Lemmon 1965: 1. Cf. Mates 1965: 3. Cf. Salmon 1963: 2-3.

56

APPENDIX II 2.2. THE TOULMINIAN CONCEPTION OF THE S T R U C T U R E OF A N A R G U M E N T

Compared with the traditional views, Toulmin presents a more complex picture of the structure or "layout", as he calls it, of arguments. Instead of classifying the statements constituting arguments either as premisses or as conclusions, Toulmin provides for six functionally distinct components of arguments: 1. a CLAIM or CONCLUSION, which is the statement "whose merits we are seeking to establish"; 136 2. the DATA, which are "the facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim" ; 137 3. a WARRANT or "inference-licence" which entitles one to draw a particular conclusion on the basis of particular data and, thus, authorizes or legitimates the step from the data to the conclusion or claim; 138 4.: a QUALIFIER, which - usually in the form of a modal expression - explicitly indicates the degree of force which the data confer on the claim or conclusion in virtue of the warrant; 139 5. CONDITIONS OF REBUTTAL, which specify - as the basis for the qualifier - the particular circumstances under which the authority of the warrant would have to be set aside;140 6. a BACKING, which "stands behind" the warrant in that it provides the assurances from which the warrant derives its general authority and, thus, contains the grounds that serve to render the warrant acceptable in general.141 Within this framework of Toulmin's the structure of an argument may be schematically presented as follows: D

*

Since W

So, Q, C

Unless R

On account of B

(where D = Data, W = Warrant, B = Backing, Q = Qualifier, R = of Rebuttal, C = Claim.142 136 137 138 139 140 141 142

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

Toulmin Toulmin Toulmin Toulmin Toulmin Toulmin Toulmin

1964 : 97. 1964: 97. 1964: 98. 1964: 100-101. 1964: 101. 1964: 103. 1964:104.

Conditions

APPENDIX II

57

2.3. "THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION"

I. A Many-Faceted Problem With respect to nondemonstrative inference the question arises whether there are inferences which are both ampliative and "necessarily truth-preserving". That is, "is there any type of inference whose conclusion must, of necessity, be true if the premisses are true but whose conclusion says something not stated by the premisses?"143 The so-called "problem of induction" as considered by Hume was whether a philosophical justification could be given for any particular type of ampliative or inductive inference.144 Hume answered this question in the negative. Hume's position is summarized by Salmon as follows: (17) We cannot justify any kind of ampliative inference. If it could be justified deductively it would not be ampliative. It cannot be justified nondemonstratively because that would be viciously circular. It seems, then, that there is no way in which we can extend our knowledge to the unobserved. We have, to be sure, many beliefs about the unobserved, and in some of them we place great confidence. Nevertheless, they are without rational justification of any kind. 145

This attitude of Hume's toward the "problem of induction" marks the origin of the philosophical controversy which has raged over nondemonstrative inference. The mass of literature generated by this controversy has grown to vast proportions. Selective bibliographies listing major publications dealing with "the problem of induction" and related issues in the field of inductive logic have recently been provided by various scholars.146 Even if we were competent to do so, it would not be possible in just a few paragraphs to trace systematically the history of "the problem of induction" and to present a not too seriously oversimplified and distorted picture of the current developments in inductive logic. For attempts to present the history of "the problem of induction" and recent developments in the field of inductive logic the reader may consult several authorities.147 The most we can hope to accomplish is to give the briefest of outlines of the major attitudes philosophers take today toward the constellation of problems into which Hume's "problem of induction" has grown. Hume's "problem of induction" has developed in the field of inductive logic into an array of intricately interrelated problems. Lakatos recently traced the way in which Carnap, for example, has reformulated this original problem. 148 The current range of diverging problems of inductive logic is subsumed by Black under three general headings: 143 144 145 146 147 148

Cf. Salmon 1967: 8. Cf. Salmon 1967: 11; and Cohen 1970: 183. Cf. Salmon 1967: 11. Cf. e.g. Black 1967: 179-181; Schilpp 1963: and Slaght 1970. Cf. e.g. Black 1967; Kyburg 1964; Lakatos 1968; Salmon 1967: 10 ff.; and Salmon 1968: 24 ff. Cf. Lakatos 1968: 322 ff.

58

APPENDIX II

(18) (i) The general problem of justification: Why, if at all, is it reasonable to accept the conclusions of certain inductive arguments as true - or at least as probably true ? Why, if at all, is it reasonable to employ certain rules of inductive inference? (ii) The comparative problem: Why is one inductive conclusion preferable to another as better supported? Why is one rule of inductive inference preferable to another as more reliable or more deserving of rational trust ? (iii) The analytical problem: What is it that renders some inductive arguments rationally acceptable? What are the criteria for deciding that one rule of inductive inference is superior to another? 149 Black refers to these three problems as "justification", "differential appraisal", and "analysis" respectively. Caws presents a different classification of the problematic aspects of induction: (19) Inductive inferences are problematic in three ways. The first problem is to account for their happening at all, and this may be called the psychological problem of induction. What induces us to go beyond the facts, and to go beyond them in these particular ways ? The second is to describe the logical relationship between protocol sentences and the generalizations and hypotheses to which they lead; this may be called the logical problem of induction, and will occupy our attention in the remainder of this chapter. The third is to justify our confidence in inductive inferences; this goes beyond the purely logical scope of the second problem, and raises the most profound philosophical questions, the answers to which are still in dispute. It may be called the metaphysical problem of induction, or Hume's problem.160 The classifications made by Black and Caws of the issues in the field of inductive logic present a somewhat misleading picture. From these classifications one could get the impression that inductive logic as a field of inquiry was extremely well ordered, with all of the issues neatly pigeonholed. This is all but the case, as is clear from the following description by Nagel of the field of inductive logic: (20) C. D. Broad once remarked that though inductive reasoning is the glory of science, it is the scandal of philosophy. Whether or not this characterization of philosophy is a merited one, there is no doubt that despite substantial advances made by logicians and philosophical scientists in the analysis of inductive arguments, even competent students continue to disagree on many fundamental issues encountered in the subject. These issues include not only the notorious general problem of 'justifying' principles of inductive reasoning but also special questions concerning the formal logic and the methodology of inductive inference. They run the gamut from doubts about the relevance of the mathematical calculus of probability to the task of codifying the tacit rules governing habitual inductive reasoning through questions about the conditions under which inductive inferences are valid and about the correct analysis of the central notion of 'the weight of evidence', to problems concerning the epistemic status of generally accepted principles of inductive inference. If it is a scandal to have unresolved issues, then the present state of philosophic discussion on induction is indeed scandalous.151

149 150 151

Cf. Black 1967: 170. Cf. Caws 1966: 195-196. Cf. Nagel 1963: 785.

APPENDIX II

59

II. The Justification of Inductive Inference Il.i. General Orientation As regards the general problem of providing a philosophical justification of inductive inference three basic views are discernible.152 The first view is that there cannot be a philosophical justification of inductive inference. In this view the logic of science can be explicated without reference to inductive inference, inductive logic can be dispensed with, and the problem of justifying inductive inference can be dismissed.153 The second view holds that inductive inference must and can be justified in some way or the other. The logic of science is regarded in this view as being "inescapably inductive", and it is contended that a justification of inductive inference is essential to a full understanding of the logic of science.154 The third view is that induction, being a deeply-entrenched type of inference, does not require any justification. In this view the problem of the justification of induction exists by virtue of an indefensible acceptance of the criterion of formal validity connected with demonstrative arguments as a criterion of validity which must necessarily be satisfied by all other forms of argument, or rules of inference, as well.155 The attitude taken by scholars toward the problems of "differential appraisal" and "analysis" is a function of their stance on the issue of the justification of inductive inference. Accordingly, each of the three basic views held on the problem of justification must now be examined at somewhat closer range. Il.ii. The Anti-Inductivist View That inductive inference cannot be justified and that the logic of science is not inductive - i.e. the so-called anti-inductivist view - is the view developed by Popper and defended by followers of his such as Lakatos and Watkins. For an outline and defence of the anti-inductivist position we refer the reader to the writings of these scholars.156 Taking as his point of departure the question of the growth of scientific knowledge - i.e. the problem of heuristic, of method, or of the logic of discovery Popper has arrived at the conclusion that science is not inductive. He presents a model of the logic of science in which inductive inference is supposed to play no role: (21) ... scientists would have little use for an inductive logic, even if inductivists could provide them with one. For the central problem of inductive logic is the problem of acceptance: Under what circumstances should I accept a theory? The inductivist answer is: Accept the most probable theory! I believe that this is a completely mistaken solution to a comparatively unimportant problem. The problems which confront scientists have little to do with acceptance, since they are problems connected with the growth of science; that is to say with the comparison of the merits of competing theories. Scientists would not (and should not) worry about whether a theory should be accepted because it has probability 0.73 while 152 153 154 155 166

Cf. Salmon 1968: 24 ff. Cf. Salmon 1968: 25. Cf. Salmon 1968: 24. Cf. Salmon 1968: 24; Toulmin 1964: 148 ff. Cf. e.g. Popper 1965; Popper 1968; Lakatos 1968; and Watkins 1968.

60

APPENDIX II

another one only has probability 0.72; quite apart from the fact that there does not exist so far any probability theory in which it has been established of any scientific theory that it has more than zero probability.157 Consequently, Popper dismisses the problem of the justification of induction and dispenses with inductive logic as a field of inquiry, labelling it "really just a red herring - or perhaps, in view of the amount of paper it devours, a white elephant". 158 Popper's noninductivist model of the logic of scientific discovery is not outlined here, since the fundamental notions of this model play no role in our treatment of the topic of nondemonstrative arguments in generative grammar. It is interesting to note that Popper's model has come in for heavy criticism of which a central tenet is that Popper has failed in just what he has set out to do: the elimination of inductive inference from the logic of science. It is contended that even in Popper's model inductive inference does in fact play a role. Salmon is one scholar who contends that Popper has not "succeeded in purging the logic of science of all inductive elements".159 He concludes that Popper (22) has not avoided the problem of justification of induction raised by Hume. It seems to me that he is engaged in the same enterprise as many of his inductivist friends - namely, the task of providing some sort of justification for a mode of nondemonstrative inference.180 ll.iii. The Inductive Logician's View The second basic attitude toward the justification of inductive inference is that science is inescapably inductive and, consequently, that in some way or the other some sort of justification must be provided for inductive inference. At least three fundamental modes of justifying inductive inference have been contemplated: validation, vindication, and ratification. Attempts have been made to VALIDATE inductive inference by showing that, although it involves special principles such as that of the uniformity of nature, it can be derived from more ultimate rules.161 Cohen sees the "normal" feature of validations as their presentation of "inductive reasoning as relying solely on the logical or mathematical criteria of valid reasoning that are involved in deduction from non-controversial premisses".162 Other scholars have endeavoured to VINDICATE inductive inference, as a heuristic measure, by claiming that its adoption is well-suited as a means to some desired end. 163 In the attempts to vindicate induction as a heuristic measure much has been made of the view that induction, as a rule of inference, is "self-correcting".164 According to Cohen 157 158 189 160 161 162 163 164

Cf. Popper 1968: 139. Cf. Popper 1968: 139. Cf. Salmon 1968: 25-28. Cf. Salmon 1968: 29. Cf. Salmon 1968: 34. Cf. Cohen 1970: 190. Cf. Salmon 1968: 34. Cf. Cohen 1970:185.

APPENDIX II

61

(23) ... Vindications sought in effect to rely on a third set of criteria for reasonableness, viz. criteria for the reasonableness of performing certain actions as distinct from the reasonableness of making certain inferences - practical reasonableness as distinct from deductive reasonableness.165 Finally, it has been attempted to RATIFY inductive inference by showing that there exist such analogies between inductive and deductive inference that it is justifiable to include inductive inference in the domain of terms such as "valid reasoning" which are traditionally applied only to deduction. 166 A ratification of inductive inference begins, according to Cohen, "from the assumption that there are distinctive, nonreducible criteria of inductive reasonableness and that therefore the older, reductive methods are misplaced". 167 Particulars of the diverse attempts to justify induction in one or the other of the above modes of justification cannot be given in this synoptic paragraph. For such particulars we refer the reader to the authoritative scholars in the field of inductive logic. 168 The logician who endeavours to provide a justification of inductive inference must satisfy a particular requirement. He is under the obligation to construct some model ol inductive logic, or - as Lehrer puts it - the "primary task" facing such a logician is to formulate "some principle of inductive justification". 169 In the field of inductive logic diverse models of inductive logic have accordingly been developed. Typical examples of such models of inductive logic are, among others, 1. Caraap's model of rational probability, 170 2. Kyburg's subjectivist theory of rational belief, 171 3. Hintikka and Hilpinen's empiricist theory of rational belief, 172 4. Levi's pragmatist theory of rational belief, 173 5. Lehrer's theory of explanationism, 174 6. Harman's theory of inductive inference as inference to the best of competing explanations, 175 7. Jeffrey's theory of partial belief, 176 and 8. Swain's theory of epistemic consistency.177 In a study with the aims and scope of the present one it is not possible to outline these highly technical models of inductive logic. Although these models differ from one another in major respects, their basic components are drawn from a restricted set. This set of components includes, among other things: 1. 2.

a distinctive formulation of the objective of inductive inference, diverse types of conditions on or rules for evidence,

165

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 179 177

Cohen 1970: 190. Cohen 1970: 193. Cohen 1970: 190. e.g. Black 1967: 172 ff.; and Salmon 1967: 12-54. Lehrer 1970: 108. e.g. Carnap 1963. e.g. Kyburg 1968b; and Schick 1970: 6-10. e.g. Hilpinen 1968; and Schick 1970: 10-14. e.g. Levi 1970; and Schick 1970: 14-19. e.g. Lehrer 1970. e.g. Harman 1970. e.g. Jeffrey 1970. e.g. Swain 1970.

62

APPENDIX II

3. a rule of inductive inference, also referred to as "a rule of detachment" or a "support function". It must be stressed that not every model incorporates all three these types of components. For the basic framework of "a theory of justification" we refer the reader to Firth's account.178 One general pattern on which a theory of inductive logic may be constructed emerges from the general way in which Swain characterizes his model of inductive logic: (24) When are a man's beliefs rational, and when are they irrational ? A systematic answer to these questions constitutes a theory of the ethics of belief; that is, a theory which tells us what a man is obligated, permitted, and forbidden to believe, from the point of view of rationality. A theory of the rationality of belief will consist in large part of a system of rules which determine, in a given cognitive situation, what a man's doxastic commitments ought to be. The most general form of a theory of rational belief will incorporate a set of rules that tell us what our doxastic commitments are once it has been determined which propositions, in a given cognitive situation, are justified, evident, reasonable, unreasonable, and so forth. A general theory of this sort becomes more exact when it is supplemented with a set of rules that also determine, in a given situation, which propositions are justified, evident, etc. The latter body of rules will generally incorporate but not wholly consist of, criteria of inductive support. In addition to criteria of inductive support, such rules will generally incorporate criteria for determining which nonexperiential propositions, if any, are justified independently of the need for inductive support, and which experiential propositions are justified but not justified by any other propositions. These criteria might serve as explications of the general concepts Justified, Evident, Reasonable, and so forth. 179

Let us take a cursory glance at each of these three types of structural components of models of inductive logic. In every model of inductive logic provision is made, implicitly or explicitly, for the objective or aim of inductive inference. The aims assigned by different inductive logicians to inductive inference do not coincide. Instead of being regarded solely as that of arriving at TRUE conclusions, the goal of inductive inference is alternatively construed as that of obtaining, for example, conclusions which are PROBABLE on rational grounds,180 2. conclusions which can be BELIEVED or ACCEPTED on rational grounds,181 3. conclusions which are INDICATED by the evidence,182 4. conclusions which are SUSTAINED by the evidence: "Whenever a proposition p is related to a's [i.e. an agent's - B.-W.] evidence e in such a way that p is reasonable for a, I shall say that e sustains p",183 5. conclusions which are JUSTIFIED because they EXPLAIN the evidence184 or because 1.

178 179 180 181 182 183 184

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

Firth 1956: 738-739. Swain 1970: 27. e.g. Carnap 1963: 967, 971. e.g. Schick 1970: 6, 10, 14. e.g. Swain 1970: 31. Swain 1970: 31. e.g. Harman 1970: 88-89.

APPENDIX II

63

they constitute SOLUTIONS to problems or CORRECT ANSWERS to given questions,185 6. conclusions which are JUSTIFIED because they ARE EXPLAINED BY the evidence,186 and so on. From these diverse formulations of the goals of inductive inference it should be clear that the terms "inductive inference" and "inductive argument" are in fact generic terms referring to a set of different subtypes of inferences or arguments. Each subtype of inductive argument is defined by the special type of logical relation which is supposed to exist between the premisses and the conclusion. This set of logical relations - collectively referred to as "evidential support" - includes: a relation of truth, a relation of probability, a relation of "believability" or "credibility", a relation of indication, a relation of sustenance, and two relations of explanation differing in their directionality. The second structural component incorporated in at least some models of inductive logic is a set of criteria for or conditions on evidence. These diverse types of conditions on evidence have the general function of regulating the membership of the set of statements which - as premisses - may properly constitute the evidence in inductive arguments. This set of diverse types of conditions on evidence or criteria for evidence includes: 1. criteria for determining what propositions are DIRECTLY EVIDENT, i.e. what propositions constitute ULTIMATE evidence. Though sense experiences have conventionally been considered as constituting what is directly or ultimately evident,187 there is much disagreement among philosophers on this question. Swain points out that "Some philosophers have maintained that there is, for example, a set of propositions each member of which is directly evident for a given person: this set might include basic propositions, phenomenal reports, first-person introspective reports of sensations, pains, and so forth. There is very little agreement (to put it mildly) about what the members of this set are, and indeed very little agreement about whether there is such a set of propositions." 188 For an attempt to give a characterization of what is directly evident we refer the reader to Chisholm's account. 189 2. criteria for determining what propositions are INDIRECTLY EVIDENT, i.e. what propositions are evident on account of their relation to other propositions which are directly evident. For characterizations of what is indirectly evident the reader may consult the recent remarks by Swain and Levi.190 Levi includes in the set of indirectly 188

Cf. e.g. Levi 1970: 154-155: "... an inductive inference is an attempt to justify a solution to a problem of a specific kind - namely, to a cognitive problem where the aim is to find a correct answer to a given question." 186 Cf. e.g. Lehrer 1970: 100, 103, 109-110. 187 Cf. Firth 1956: 735. 188 Cf. Swain 1970 : 30. 189 Cf. Chisholm 1966: 27 fF. Cf. also § 5.3.2. and appendix 5.2. 190 Cf. Swain 1970: 30-31; and Levi 1970: 153.

64

APPENDIX II

evident propositions those that can be "legitimately accepted as evidence via nondeductive inference from other evidence". 3. criteria for determining what propositions contain

RELEVANT

evidence.191

4. criteria for measuring the DEGREES OF RELEVANCE of evidence or for grading or ranking relevant evidence as more or less relevant.192 5. criteria for weighting evidence to determine the confers on a conclusion.193

DEGREE OF SUPPORT

6. criteria for determining what propositions contain evidence that is of evidence contained in certain other propositions. 194 7. criteria for accepting evidence as 8.

which it

INDEPENDENT

TRUE. 195

criteria for determining whether evidence is true which has been initially accepted but has afterwards been challenged.196

9. criteria for determining the COMPREHENSIVENESS OF THE BODY OF EVIDENCE which is required in order to lend sufficient support to a conclusion. Some logicians e.g. Carnap 197 - require that the total evidence or total observational knowledge be explicitly given before an inductive inference may be made. 198 This list of types of conditions on or criteria for evidence is not presented as being exhaustive. A third component built into at least some models of inductive logic is a so-called rule of detachment or acceptance. Such a rule is one that permits the "detaching" of a conclusion from its premisses. It is a rule which allows the acceptance of a statement representing a factual inductive conclusion, given that certain criteria are satisfied.199 According to Kyburg "a rule of detachment in general may be regarded as a permissive rule allowing the detachment of a conclusion from a particular set of premisses".200 It is a rule that says under what circumstances a conclusion may be accepted.201 These circumstances or "criteria" - as Kyburg calls them (25)

will be expressed in terms referring to one or more of the following: [1] a body of statements regarded as evidence, and satisfying some principle of acceptability, and also a condition of total evidence; 191

For such a criterion cf. Cohen 1970: 36 ff. For a discussion of the possibility of devising such criteria cf. Cohen 1970: 45, 51-52. 193 The need for such criteria is mentioned, for example, by Levi (1970: 151). 194 Problems relating to criteria for independent evidence are discussed by Salmon (1961: 130-131). 185 These criteria are considered by Levi (1970: 152). 196 For a discussion of these criteria cf. Levi 1970: 152-153. 197 Cf. Carnap 1963: 972. 198 For a discussion of the requirement of total evidence cf. Levi 1970: 142 fF. 199 Cf. Kyburg 1968b: 101. 200 Cf. Kyburg 1968b: 98. 201 Cf. Kyburg 1968b: 101. 192

APPENDIX II

65

[2] the probability of h [i.e. the hypothesis - B.-W.], relative to this body of statements; [3] the information content of h (this may also be relativized to the body of statements mentioned in [1]); [4] the simplicity and fruitfulness of h; [5] other factors not generally regarded as relevant by philosophers of science, such as political or moral utility. 202

Kyburg's position on a rule of detachment is also outlined in his "Recent work in inductive logic". 203 Bar-Hillel regards a rule of detachment simply as "a rule of inference in some yet unspecified sense". 204 Thus to "detach" or "accept" a conclusion simply means, in this context, to "inductively infer" it. Carnap, for one, considers rules of acceptance, such as that proposed by Kyburg, to be inadequate as rules of inductive inference. 205 Instead of providing rules of detaching or accepting a hypothesis, Carnap's model of inductive logic assigns to the hypothesis a mathematical degree of probability or a "degree of confirmation" on the basis of the evidence. In this Carnap is supported by, among others, Bar-Hillel. 206 For a defence of detachment rules as a component of a model of inductive logic the reader may consult, e.g., Salmon's discussion. 207 Models of inductive logic of the type considered above have one general property in common. They are constructed for artificial languages and none of them is sufficiently complex and sophisticated to accommodate the language of empirical science. In other words, none of the models of inductive logic so far proposed accounts satisfactorily for the diverse types of inductive inference which are supposedly employed in empirical science. To state it plainly, none of these models of inductive logic completely fits - what are supposed to be - the facts of the logic of empirical science. In order to remedy this situation Cohen has recently made an attempt to ratify inductive inference and to develop, not a formalized model of inductive logic, but a number of fundamental concepts which give a true explication of, among other things, the types of inductive inference supposedly employed in empirical science. 208 The content and merit of Cohen's proposals cannot be treated here in detail. A basic distinction which Cohen draws is the distinction between "inductive acceptability" and "inductive support". This distinction will be considered in § 2.5. II.iv. The "Working-Logic" View The third attitude taken toward the problem of providing a justification of inductive inferences holds that induction is a deeply-entrenched type of inference which does not need to be justified, and holds moreover that, in principle, it is in any case impos202 203 204 205 206 207

208

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

Kyburg 1968b: 101-102. Kyburg 1964: 276-278. Bar-Hillel 1968: 121. Carnap 1963: 972-973. Bar-Hillel 1968. Salmon 1968: 139-144.

Cf. Cohen 1970.

66

APPENDIX II

sible to provide such a justification. This view is advocated in some version or other by philosophers such as Ayer, Strawson, and Toulmin.209 Here this thesis will be considered as defended by Toulmin. Philosophers - such as Strawson and Ayer contending that it is not possible to present a justification of inductive inference have produced two main arguments in support of their thesis: (26) Two main arguments have been offered for the thesis that no non-trivial sense can be given to purported requests for the justification of induction. The first argument - let us call it the argument from ordinary language - is that to ask for a proof that it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures is quite pointless, since proportioning the degree of one's conviction to the strength of the inductive evidence (construed as the number and variety of observed cases) is just what 'being reasonable' ordinarily means in such a context. The second argument - let us call it the argument from the need for standards - is that it is senseless to ask whether the use of inductive standards is justified unless we can say to what other standards we are appealing for this justification, just as it makes no sense to inquire in general whether the law of the land as a whole is or is not legal since there are no other legal standards to which we can appeal. 210

Toulmin's rejection of the requirement that inductive inference should be justified is presented within the framework of his distinction between analytic and substantial arguments. He regards an argument from data to a conclusion as ANALYTIC if the backing for the warrant authorising it includes, explicitly or implicitly, the information presented in the conclusion itself. Such an argument, in his view, is tautological. 211 In the case of an analytic argument, checking the truth or falsity of the backing of the warrant ipso facto involves checking the truth or falsity of the backing of the conclusion.212 An argument is a SUBSTANTIAL one if the backing for the warrant does not contain the information conveyed in the conclusion. Such an argument is not tautological.213 Checking the truth or falsity of the warrant of substantial arguments does not ipso facto involve checking the truth or falsity of the conclusion of these arguments. For the sake of this discussion Toulmin's analytic arguments may be taken as corresponding to our demonstrative arguments, whereas his substantial arguments may be viewed as corresponding to our nondemonstrative or inductive arguments. Toulmin would, most likely, disagree with this equation since he regards the categories of demonstrative and nondemonstrative arguments as conflating diverse distinctions which should be kept apart. 214 Given the pragmatic aims of the present exposition, however, no harm is done by accepting such an equation. Whereas in analytic arguments the data entail the conclusion, in substantial arguments they do not. 215 In substantial arguments the step from the data to the claim or conclusion involves a "type-jump". Toulmin, however, maintains that there is no reason why substantial 209 311 212 213 214 215

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

e.g. Ayer 1956: 71-75; Strawson 1952: chapter 9; and Toulmin 1964. Cohen 1970: 185. Toulmin 1964: 125. Toulmin 1964: 133. Toulmin 1964: 125. Toulmin 1964: 149. Toulmin 1964: 167-168.

APPENDIX II

67

arguments should meet analytic standards of validity. 216 In conventional terms, what Toulmin maintains is that nondemonstrative arguments do not have to satisfy the criterion of formal validity associated by definition with demonstrative arguments. This thesis Toulmin defends by drawing a fundamental distinction between "idealised logic" and "working logic" as well as diverse derivative distinctions of which the crucial one is that between an idealised concept of (formal) validity and field-dependent and context-sensitive concepts of validity. Toulmin contends that the categories employed in the practical business of arguing are the categories of "working logic". When the arguments resulting from such practical reasoning are analysed, however, this analysis is traditionally performed in terms of the categories of "idealised logic". These are the logical categories which are set out in the standard textbooks on formal logic. 217 Toulmin then asserts that there exists a wide divergence between the categories of "working logic" and those of "idealised logic". 218 The latter categories constitute an inaccurate and misleadingly simple presentation of the former ones. This distortion is due to the fact that since Aristotelian times logicians have been primarily concerned with the study of the form of argument which is known as the "analytic syllogism". 219 (27) In the analytic syllogism, a conclusion follows 'necessarily' if and only if its contradictory is formally inconsistent with the data and backing. Thus we can say, 'Anne is Jack's sister; Every single one of Jack's sisters has red hair; So (necessarily) Anne has red hair', just because, having stated our data and backing in the first two sentences, to add that Anne's hair is not red would be to take away in the conclusion something already stated.220 Logicians have endeavoured to develop the simplest and most comprehensive set of logical categories adequate for criticizing this form of argument. In the course of this endeavour, however, these logicians have neglected the real differences which exist between four or five crucial logical distinctions, which in the analytic syllogism happened to coincide. 221 These distinctions are those between 1. 2. 3.

4.

216 317 218 2 9

1

220 221

necessary arguments and probable arguments, formally valid and formally invalid arguments, arguments in which warrants are relied on whose applicability have previously been established and arguments which are themselves intended to establish the adequacy of warrants, arguments expressed in terms of "logical connectives" or qualifiers and arguments not so expressed, Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin

1964: 1964: 1964: 1964: 1964: 1964:

167-168. 146. 146, 147, 148. 148. 151. 148.

68

APPENDIX II

5.

analytic arguments and substantial arguments.222

Toulmin proceeds to suggest, then, that (28) Having made this the starting-point of their analysis, logicians allowed themselves to be excessively impressed by the unique character of the analytic syllogism: it is not only analytic, but also formally valid, warrant-using, unequivocal in its consequences, and expressed in terms of 'logical words'. By contrast, other classes of arguments were apparently less tractable - they were less trustworthy and more tentative involved substantial leaps, fell away from any formal standards of validity, were expressed in terms of vague, unlogical words and in some cases appealed to no established or even recognisable warrant. Under the pressure of motives about which we shall have to speculate afterwards, logicians thereupon conflated our five distinctions into one single distinction, which they made the absolute and essential condition of logical salvation. Validity they would from now concede only to arguments which passed all five tests, and the analytic syllogism thereby became the paradigm to which all self-respecting arguments must conform. 223

Toulmin consequently rejects this analytic norm ol formal validity as a norm which is to be applicable to non-analytic arguments. As a consequence, there is for Toulmin no need to justify "inductive" inference. According to Toulmin arguments belong to diverse fields of argument and all arguments in the practical business of arguing are set out at a given time, in a given situation or context.224 In his view arguments are dependent on their context. Consequently, in the criticism of arguments their background should be taken into account. "So the practical critic of arguments, as of morals, is in no position to adopt the mathematician's Olympian posture".225 As a result of the field-dependence and context-sensitivity of arguments their properties - such as those Toulmin labels "strength", "cogency", "evidential support", and "validity" - resist idealization. According to Toulmin questions about the acceptability and validity of arguments should be handled with due regard to the context within which the arguments were produced.226 This requires a field-dependent and context-sensitive norm of validity for the arguments produced in each field and context of argumentation. Toulmin stresses the general point of the absolute necessity of realizing that an essential feature of logical categories is their field-dependence.227 This property springs from the fact that there a r j irreducible differences as between the types of problems with which arguments are designed to deal.228 In summary: (29) What has to be recognized first is that validity is an intra-field, not an inter-field notion. Arguments within any field can be judged by standards appropriate within that field, and some will fall short; but it must be expected that the standards will be field-dependent, 222 cf. Toulmin 1964: 148-149. 223 224 225 226 22? 228

Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin cf. Toulmin cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin Cf. Toulmin

1964: 149. 1964: 182. 1964: 182. 1964: 184-185. 1964: 176. 1964: 176.

APPENDIX II

69

and that the merits to be demanded of an argument in one field will be found to be absent (in the nature of things) from entirely meritorious arguments in another .... If we ask about the validity, necessity, rigour or impossibility of arguments or conclusions, we must ask these questions within the limits of a given field, and avoid, as if it were, condemning an ape for not being a man or a pig for not being a porcupine.229 This is not the place to attempt to give a critical evaluation of Toulmin's views. For critical discussions of Toulmin's views we refer the reader to the reviews by Cooley, Körner, and Will. 230 Körner, for example, points out that Toulmin does not make sufficient allowance (30) ... for the elementary fact that in all fields of argument, including of course the field of law, deductive arguments - often of a highly complex kind - play a large role. This alone would suffice to justify the study of deductive arguments, which is all that the logicians, whom Toulmin criticizes, pretend to do. 231 Two ad hoc remarks may be added to the critical observation made by Körner. First, one point is rendered, to our mind, admirably clear by Toulmin: the importance of the requirement that a methodologist or scientist who wishes to criticize arguments in a particular field should not tackle these arguments with an inadequate set of analytical tools comprising inadequate and oversimplified logical concepts and distinctions. Second, we find it regrettable that Toulmin gives no attention to what is a fundamental problem facing the methodologist or logician who attempts to determine the particular context-sensitive criteria of validity, acceptability, and so on, which are actually employed in a particular field of argument. This is the problem of evaluating the model of argument - hence the diverse types of criteria of adequacy or standards of merit - which is used in this field. It is obvious that a particular field-dependent criterion of merit cannot be adequate or acceptable merely on account of the fact that it is actually used in a particular field of argument. Even field-dependent standards for validity, acceptability, and so on, must be judged if they are not to be completely arbitrary and ad hoc - on the basis of some fieldindependent or over-arching model of argument or rationality. This model, of course, need not necessarily have any connection with the "analytic ideal". This question of evaluating the adequacy of field-dependent logical categories Toulmin unfortunately does not consider. Gottlieb - following Ryle, Urmson, and, especially, Toulmin - has attempted to devise for jurisprudence a field-dependent model of argument to replace the "analytic ideal". 2 3 2 Central to his model is the notion of rule-guidance: "We define our field as the field of reasoning in which reliance is put on ru'es for guidance. This permits the construction of a rational model of arguments for following or applying rules in a variety of contexts. This determination of the field of argument fastens on rules as the 229 230 231 232

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

Toulmin 1964: 255-256. Cooley 1959; Körner 1959; and Will 1960. Körner 1959: 427. Gottlieb 1968.

70

APPENDIX II

critical inference-guidance device t o be analyzed". 2 3 3 Gottlieb clearly sees the necessity of devising a set of standards of adequacy which even this field-dependent model of reasoning of his must satisfy: (31) ... here we must distinguish between the justification and rationality of arguments using rules and between the justification and rationality of the model in terms of which we can assess such arguments. We thus use a three-layered concept of rationality: 1. specific arguments in a field, the rationality of which is assessed in terms of 2. a model procedure for reasoning in that field, which performs in such field the functions which the model of inductive reasoning performs for inductive arguments, and such model is in turn 3. justifiable in terms of general notions of rationality. 234 Gottlieb's proposals for the standards f o r justifying the categories of his fielddependent model of reasoning by means of rule-guidance cannot be treated here. 2 3 5 It is sufficient to point out that Gottlieb makes n o serious attempt to justify his fielddependent model of reasoning.

2.4. BARKER'S NOTION OF CONTENT-EXTENSION

Barker seems to agree with Salmon that necessary truth-preservation is the defining logical trait of demonstrative arguments. 2 3 6 N o w to be necessarily truth-preserving in this sense, Barker argues, the demonstrative argument must possess two further logical traits: it must be nongeneralizing and it must be nonampliative. F o r an argument to be NONGENERALIZING its conclusion must be no more general t h a n its premisses: roughly speaking, the conclusion of an argument is more general than its premisses if (32) ... there are two classes c and c', concerning whose interrelation the premises entail merely that part at least of c is included in (or excluded from) c\ while the conclusion by itself entails that all, or at any rate a more inclusive part, of c is included in (or excluded from) c'. 237 The connection between the logical properties of necessary truth-preservation and non-generalization is this: if the conclusion of the argument were more general than its premisses, then the argument would fail to be necessarily truth-preserving since knowing the premisses to be true could not then absolutely justify one's believing the conclusion to be true. 2 3 8 F o r an argument to be NONAMPLIATIVE, Barker says, 233 234 235 236 237 338

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

Gottlieb 1968: 29. Gottlieb 1968: 29-30. Gottlieb 1968: 31-32. Barker 1965: 61; and Salmon 1967: 8. Barker 1965: 60. Barker 1965: 61.

APPENDIX II

71

(33) the conclusion cannot have empirical content going beyond that of the premises; in other words, any empirical observation or discovery that would count against the conclusion would have to count against the premises to an at least equal degree.239 The connection between the logical properties of necessary truth-preservation and nonampliativeness is this: an argument whose conclusion had any sort of empirical content going beyond that of its premisses would be an argument with regard to which knowing the premisses to be true could not absolutely justify one's believing the conclusion to be true. 240 To be nongeneralizing and to be nonampliative in the manner outlined by Barker are, in effect, two distinct ways of refraining from any extension of content. In a demonstrative argument all possibility of such extension of content is sacrificed for the sake of necessary truth-preservation.241

2.5. SUPPORT AND ACCEPTABILITY In the passage quoted below Nagel draws a distinction between "the truth of a theory" and "the usefulness of a theory as an instrument of inquiry" which is in a certain sense analogous to our distinction between support and acceptability: (34) It has been customary in the traditional discussions of scientific theories to seek grounds for our knowledge of their truth or at least of their probability (in some one of the many senses previously discussed). Omitting more than mention of those students (e.g. Wittgenstein and Schlick) who have dismissed such discussions as meaningless because, according to them, theories are not 'genuine' propositions since they are not completely verifiable, reference must be made to another group of writers. According to this group, the traditional discussions have not fruitfully illuminated the character of scientific inquiry because those who take part in them neglect the function which theories have in inquiry. When this function is examined, it has been urged, it turns out that questions of the truth of theories (in the sense in which theories of truth have been traditionally discussed) are of little concern to those who actually use theories. Reflective inquiry is instituted for the sake of settling a specific problem, whether it be practical or theoretical, and inquiry terminates when a resolution of the problem is obtained. The various procedures distinguishable in inquiry (such as observation, operation upon subject matter including the manipulation of instruments, symbolic representation of properties of subject matter, symbolic transformation and calculation, etc.) are to be viewed as instrumental to its end product. The use of theories is one patent factor in reflective inquiry. They function primarily as means for effecting transitions from one set of statements to other sets, with the intent of controlling natural changes and of supplying predictions capable of being checked through manipulating directly experienceable subject matter. Accordingly, in their actual use in science, theories serve as instruments in specific contexts, and in this capacity are to be characterized as good or bad, effective or ineffective, rather than as true or false or probable. Those who stress the instrumental function of theories are not necessarily committed to identifying truth with effectiveness and falsity with uselessness. Their major insight does not consist in denying 239 240 241

Cf. Barker 1965: 60. Cf. Barker 1965: 61. Cf. Salmon 1967: 8.

72

APPENDIX II

the meaningfulness of certain types of inquiries into the truth of theories but in calling attention to the way theories function and to the safeguards and conditions of their effectiveness. A theory is confirmed to the degree that it performs its specific instrumental function. From this point of view, which has been developed with much detail by Dewey, the degree of confirmation for a theory may be interpreted as a mark of its proved effectiveness as an intellectual tool for the purposes for which it has been instituted. 242 Lambert and Brittan's distinction between "confirmation" and "acceptability" also has features in common with our distinction between support and acceptability: (35) Acceptability is, in fact, a broader notion than confirmation. Individual scientific hypotheses are accepted in part as a result of their having been confirmed (for example, by laboratory observations) to a greater or lesser degree, but only in part. Acceptability depends on other factors as well. We will mention two: simplicity and theoretical connection. 243

242 243

Cf. Nagel 1966: 193-194. Cf. Lambert and Brittan 1970: 68-69.

3 NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF A R G U M E N T IN TRANSFORMATIONAL G R A M M A R

3.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the introductory chapter to this book it was pointed out that the present inquiry is essentially one into the role of nondemonstrative inference in transformational grammar. In examining the nature and function of nondemonstrative inference in a given field of inquiry, a first objective is to isolate and characterize the nondemonstrative forms of argument used in that field. This objective having once been achieved, it becomes possible to pursue a second goal: that of explicating the content which the general logical notion ot "support" has in this field. In this chapter an attempt is made to realize these two general objectives with respect to transformational grammar. First, the major nondemonstrative forms of argument used recently in transformational grammar are identified and characterized. Second, on the basis of this characterization, the transformationalist notion of support is explicated. On the whole, this chapter accordingly has a nonevaluative, explicatory nature.

3.2. IDENTIFYING THE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

Two methods may be applied for the purpose of identifying the forms of argument used in a field of inquiry. For the sake of brevity, these two methods may be called "logical analysis" and "linguistic identification" respectively. LOGICAL ANALYSIS means that - through the use of the conceptual tools provided by one or another branch of logic 1. 2. 3.

1

a number of individual arguments are dissected into their component parts, these arguments are reconstructed in an explicit form, individual arguments which in their reconstructed form exhibit the same internal logical structure are recognised as (substitution) instances of one and the same underlying form of argument. 1 For the notion "analysis of an argument" cf. § 1.3.

74

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

In the case of nondem onstrative arguments it is the concepts of inductive logic that serve as the analytical devices. In determining the properties of arguments and of argument forms by means of logical analysis, whatever comment the users of these arguments and argument forms may offer about these properties on a level of metascientific abstraction is of secondary importance. No logical property can legitimately be ascribed to an individual argument or an underlying form of argument unless the existence of such a property has first been revealed by means of logical analysis. LINGUISTIC IDENTIFICATION takes as its point of departure the metascientific expressions in terms of which the scholars in a field characterize the logical and epistemological properties which they ascribe to their arguments and to the component parts of their arguments. The scholars in a field may, for example, characterize the conclusion of an argument metascientifically as being "true", "probable", "confirmed", "indicated". Analogously, they may refer to evidential statements as "indicating the conclusion", "providing support for the conclusion", "confirming the conclusion". The linguistic identification of the forms of argument used in a given field comprises the following steps: 1. listing the metascientific expressions in terms of which the scholars in this field refer to properties of their arguments, 2. determining whether the scholars in this field give any indication of the meaning which they take each of these expressions to carry, and 3. determining whether the use which the scholars in this field make of the listed metascientific expressions is made in a deliberate manner and in a consistent manner. If the use of the method of linguistic identification reveals that the scholars in a field use in a deliberate and consistent manner a fixed set of reasonably clear metascientific expressions to characterise particular arguments and their component parts, then these arguments may be regarded as indicative of the existence of an underlying argument form. In order to rule out the arbitrary postulation of underlying forms of argument by means of linguistic identification a further condition, however, must be satisfied. This is the condition that the putative argument forms whose existence has been suggested by linguistic identification must admit of a logical reconstruction. From this reconstruction it should be clear what is the logical relation incorporated in these forms of argument. Accepting the condition of logical reconstructibility implies that linguistic identification, as a means of identifying forms of argument, is subordinate to logical analysis. Judiciously practised, linguistic identification accordingly has the function of isolating candidate forms of argument, candidates yet to be subjected to logical analysis. The usefulness of linguistic identification in a given field of inquiry would vary directly with the degree of metascientific awareness attained by the scholars working

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

75

in this field. On the one hand, if the scholars in a given field applied metascientific expressions to their arguments in a deliberate and consistent manner, linguistic identification could provide useful clues as to the forms of argument employed in this field. On the other hand, in a field where the use made of such metascientific expressions was arbitrary and inconsistent and the meanings attributed to these expressions were obscure the usefulness of linguistic identification would be severely limited. In this chapter the nondemonstrative forms of argument used in transformational grammar will be considered first in terms of logical analysis and then in terms of linguistic identification.

3.3. NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT BY LOGICAL ANALYSIS

3.3.1. The General Framework This paragraph deals with the major nondemonstrative foims of argument in transformational grammar as these forms of argument are identifiable by logical analysis. These forms of argument are: (1)

I.

II.

internal arguments 1. explanatory arguments 2. confirmatory arguments 3. generalizing arguments external arguments 1. explanatory arguments 2. confirmatory arguments 3. generalizing arguments

Though not too much theoretical significance should be attached to the classificatory scheme (1), it is not completely arbitrary. In the course of the discussion of the forms of argument provided for in this scheme, the general principles of which this classificatory scheme is a function will be dealt with in some detail. In order, however, to provide at this stage a bird's-eye view of what is to follow, it is necessary to give here a brief indication of the content of these principles. The two basic nondemonstrative forms of argument encountered in transformational grammar may be called, for short, "internal arguments" and "external arguments" respectively. 2 The distinction between internal and external arguments derives from an underlying distinction that may be drawn between two kinds of linguistic evidence adduced by transformational grammarians: internal vs. external 2

In compound expressions such as "internal arguments", "external arguments", "explanatory arguments", "confirmatory arguments" and "generalizing arguments" the term "arguments" is often used as an abbreviation for "form(s) of argument". The context will enable the reader to judge where "arguments" is to be interpreted as an abbreviation in this sense.

76

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

linguistic evidence. 3 The distinction between internal and external linguistic evidence has a substantive as well as a methodological aspect. Substantively, this distinction reflects the existence of two categories of linguistic phenomena between which a differentiation should be made. The distinction between internal and external linguistic evidence is accordingly reflected by a type difference as to the content cf the two respective sets of evidential statements in terms of which the two kinds of evidence are represented. Methodologically, this distinction is reflected by a difference as to the logkal propeities of the two respective sets of evidential statements in terms of which internal and external linguistic evidence is presented. Here we will give a provisional characterization of the distinction between internal and external linguistic evidence with reference to the content of these evidential statements. In a later paragraph, § 4.2.3., this characterization will be abandoned in favour of one constructed in terms of a difference in methodological, properties between the two classes of evidential statements. INTERNAL LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE, then, may be characterized as synchronic linguistic data about grammatical and general-linguistic properties of linguistic structures and rules inasmuch as these structures and rules are held to constitute the language ability of an ideal speaker-listener. Several of the expressions occurring in the characterization just given are in need of clarification. By "grammatical properties", on the one hand, we refer to what are also known as "the language-dependent, language-specific, or nonuniversal aspects of a language". A language's morphological properties of flexion and derivation may be taken as instances of its language-specific properties. On the other hand, the expression "general-linguistic properties" denotes those aspects of a language which are also referred to as its "language-independent, or universal, aspects". The various levels of linguistic structure - e.g. syntactic surface structure, lexical (phonological) representation, and so on - provided for by the general transformational theory are instances of language-independent or universal aspects of language. The term "language ability" refers to two human linguistic capacities : the ideal speaker-listener's linguistic competence and his faculté de langage. "Ideal speaker-listener" is a term of Chomsky's: "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speechcommunity, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actu?l performance." 4 The data envisaged here are "linguistic" as opposed to data which may be "statistical", "sociological", "neurophysiological", and so on. Linguistic data, moreover, are synchronic in bearing on one given language-state as opposed to "diachronic" linguistic data, which bear on linguistic changes reflected by 3

The term "evidence" denotes the considerations which are being put forward as reasons for accepting the conclusion as true or probably true. Cf. § 2.2 as well as note 3 to chapter 2 for this sense of "evidence". 4 Cf. Chomsky 1965: 3.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

77

differences in two consecutive language-states. From the characterization given at the start of the present paragraph for the notion "internal linguistic evidence" it follows that internal linguistic evidence includes the linguistic data which traditionally have been known in transformational grammar as "primary linguistic data". A corpus of primary linguistic data for a given language consists of a set of utterances plus native speakers' intuitive judgements about linguistic properties - such as grammaticalness, ambiguity, semantic similarity, and so on - of the sentences underlying these utterances. 5 The following five statements may serve as examples of evidential statements that present internal linguistic evidence. (2)

(i) (ii)

(iii) (iv) (v)

The utterance *the one who I reminded of a gorilla was myself is illformed. 6 The expressions (a) and (b) in the following pairs are identical in meaning (a) Footwear. (b) Articles of wearing apparel for the feet. (a) Camping-gear. (b) Artifacts for use in camping J Derived nominals such as proof and criticism have the internal structure of noun phrases. 8 The selection of the verb name is based on semantic properties. 9 The sentences the sonata is easy to play on this violin and this violin is easy to play the sonata on "share a single system of grammatical relations and, in some sense of paraphrase, may be regarded as paraphrases; they have the same truth conditions, for example". 10

Internal linguistic evidence includes the kinds of evidence which have been characterized elsewhere as "intuitive evidence", and "hypothetical evidence". 11 As regards the concept "external linguistic evidence", the most that we can do at this stage is to characterize it in a negative way and to give a few examples of evidential statements presenting external linguistic evidence for some grammatical or general-linguistic claim, EXTERNAL LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE, then, may be viewed as comprising all those kinds of data which transformationalists adduce in support of 5

For the notion "primary linguistic data" cf. for example Chomsky 1965: 25 if., and Leech 1968: 89. Whereas attention will be focussed in chapter 5 on problematic aspects of linguistic intuitions as internal linguistic evidence, methodological issues raised by external linguistic evidence will be dealt with in chapter 4. 6 Cf. Postal 1970: 39. 7 Cf. Katz 1970: 238. In § 5.2 we will consider a methodological issue raised by doubts about the correctness of this evidential statement of Katz's. 8 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 20-21. 9 Cf. McCawley 1968: 134. This evidential statement will be encountered again in the exemplification of generalizing arguments given in appendix 3.4. 10 Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 106. 11 Cf. Botha 1970: 42 ff.

78

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

grammatical and general-linguistic claims but which do not exhibit the defining characteristics of internal linguistic evidence. Data such as those which concern the diachronic, statistical, dialectal, idiolectal, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological aspects of language and which are adduced in support of grammatical and generallinguistic hypotheses about the ideal speaker-listener's language ability constitute external linguistic evidence for these hypotheses. The following four statements may serve as typical examples of evidential statements presenting external linguistic evidence for hypotheses of the kind just indicated: (3)

(i) In all languages the more strongly stressed vowels are, as regards relative frequency, in the minority.12 (ii) Marked phonological elements are acquired later in the process of language learning and lost first in certain pathologies.13 (iii) The misreadings of German words by the alexia patient W. are controlled by particular semantic fields and are organized according to strong semantic correspondences.14 (iv) In English the two rules respectively laxing vowels before consonant clusters and laxing vowels in the pre-penultimate syllable of a word underwent a phonological change in that in both of these rules the number of consonants that must follow the vowel to be laxed was decreased by one.15

It should be stressed once more that, as presented above, the distinction between internal and external linguistic evidence is provisional only. At this stage this distinction allows us to differentiate between the two major nondemonstrative forms of argument in transformational grammar: INTERNAL ARGUMENTS, which incorporate in their premisses internal linguistic evidence, and EXTERNAL ARGUMENTS, within the framework of which external linguistic evidence is presented for a grammatical or general-linguistic hypothesis. Underlying the threefold secondary distinction drawn in (1) among explanatory, confirmatory, and generalizing arguments are considerations relating to the functions and to the structure of nondemonstrative forms of argument. With reference to their function the majority of nondemonstrative arguments encountered in transformational grammar may be characterized as belonging to one of three distinct types. First, there are the nondemonstrative arguments within the framework of which plausibility is lent to the conclusion proposition as a hypothesis which gives an explanation for the puzzling phenomena referred to in the premisses of the arguments.16 For short, these arguments, and the form of argument underlying them, will here be called EXPLANA12

Cf. Postal 1968: 169. Cf. Postal 1968: 172. 14 Cf. Weigl and Bierwisch 1970: 13 as well as appendix 3.6 to this chapter. 15 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333 as well as appendix 3.5 to this chapter. 16 This notion of plausibility was introduced in § 2.4. For Salmon's characterization of this notion cf. note 26 to this chapter. 13

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

79

Second, it is possible to identify a class of nondemonstrative arguments within the framework of which evidence is advanced which has the function of confirming the conclusion proposition.17 These arguments, as well as the form of argument of which they are substitution instances, will be denoted by the term CONFIRMATORY ARGUMENTS. Third, there are those nondemonstrative arguments within the framework of which support is provided for the conclusion by generalizing, in a numerical sense, the proposition incorporated in the conclusion.18 These arguments, and the form of argument underlying them, may be referred to as GENERTORY ARGUMENTS.

ALIZING ARGUMENTS.

Explanatory, confirmatory, and generalizing arguments differ as regards their internal structure. In generalizing arguments the conclusion is related to the premisses in terms of the rule of inference known as simple induction or enumerative induction.19 In explanatory and confirmatory arguments, on the other hand, the conclusion is related to the premisses in terms of the rule of inference known as reduction.20 Whereas in the case of explanatory arguments the reduction is done regressively,21 in the case of confirmatory arguments the reduction is done progressively 22 The notions of simple/enumerative induction, regressive reduction, and progressive reduction will be characterized in the paragraphs dealing with generalizing, explanatory, and confirmatory arguments respectively. In addition to examining the above-mentioned internal and external forms of argument, we will discuss briefly the properties of two external forms of argument which axe problematic in the sense that they may be reconstructed either as demonstrative or as nondemonstrative arguments in transformational grammar. These two forms of argument - being the respective negative correlates of external explanatory and external confirmatory arguments - may on account of their function be referred to collectively as DISCONFIRMATORY ARGUMENTS. Within the framework of such disconfirmatory arguments, external linguistic evidence is brought to bear negatively on grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. Depending on whether one analyzes these forms of argument as demonstrative or nondemonstrative, they incorporate either a deductive or a quasi-deductive relation between the conclusion and the premisses.23 The forms of argument provided for above we will deal with in the following paragraphs by analyzing a number of typical substitution instances of them. Owing to limitations of space it will on the whole not be possible to analyze in the main text 17

For the notion "confirming evidence" cf. § 2.4. The sense in which a conclusion is said to be "generalized" will be made clear in § 3.3.2.3. Cf. also appendix 2.4. for Barker's notion "nongeneralizing". 19 The rule of simple or enumerative induction is characterized in § 3.3.2.3. 20 For the rule of inference denoted by "reduction" cf. §§ 2.4., 3.3.2.1. 21 For the use of the term "regresfively" in connection with reduction cf. §§ 2.4., 3.3.2.1. 22 For the sense in which one may speak of reduction as being done "progressively" cf. §§ 2.4., 3.3.2.2. 23 For "deductive inference" cf. § 2.3. 18

80

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

of this chapter more than one typical instance of each form of argument. Additional instances will be considered in the appendices to this chapter. In dealing with these arguments below, we 1. present them - for the reasons discussed in chapter 1 - as far as possible in the words of the linguists who use them, 2. lay them out schematically in what is known as a "reconstructed form", 3. point out the basis or bases from which they derive their nondemonstrative nature. The arguments to be treated below come from a number of recent papers by Chomsky, Postal, Kiparsky, and McCawley. We have deliberately drawn these arguments from papers which may be assumed to have been widely read by linguists. 3.3.2. Internal Arguments 3.3.2.1. Explanatory Arguments Those arguments which may be identified in transformational grammar as internal explanatory arguments have three properties which jointly set them apart as instances of a distinct underlying form of argument. First, the evidential statements incorporated in their premisses present internal linguistic evidence for the conclusion. Second, the function of these arguments is to justify a hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the puzzling grammatical or general-linguistic phenomenon or phenomena upon which the above-mentioned internal linguistic evidence bears. Within the framework of these arguments the inference accordingly is to what appears to be a plausible explanatory statement.24 Observe that the function of internal explanatory arguments is not "heuristic" in the sense that within their framework explanatory hypotheses are thought up or discovered for the first time in any psychological sense.25 The function of these arguments is "justificatory": an already existing hypothesis is justified as a plausible explanation for a puzzling grammatical or general-linguistic phenomenon.26 Third, internal explanatory arguments, from a structural point of view, incorporate the relation of reduction.27 Moreover, in the context of an inquiry the reduction, or act of reductive inference, is done regressively. In reduction, according to Bochenski, 24

Cf. Harman 1970: 89. Cf. Salmon 1967: 113-114. 26 The initial plausibility or prior probability of a hypothesis, according to Salmon (1963: 84), is "the probability, without regard for its confirmatory instances, that it is true. The prior probability is logically independent of the testing of the hypothesis by way of deduced consequences. In this context, the term 'prior' has no temporal connotations. The prior probability may be assessed before or after confirmatory instances are examined; the point is that the examination of confirmatory instances does not affect the assessment of prior probability". The appraisal of prior probabilities is a highly controversial issue on which serious disagreement exists among expeits. 27 This logical relation has also been denoted by such terms as "retroduction", and "abduction". For these terms cf. Hanson 1965: 85. 25

NONDEMONSTRATIVÉ FORMS OF ARGUMENT

81

for a given conditional statement the consequent of this conditional statement (i.e. the then clause) is known to be true, but not the antecedent (i.e. the if clause). 28 If the reduction is being done regressively, the starting point of the inference is the known consequent, from which one then proceeds to the unknown antecedent. That is, with respect to a conditional statement "p q" what regressive reduction means is that q is known as true and is taken as the starting point from which the inference proceeds to p as a plausible explanation for q q ••• P (where q is the starting point of the inference).

In transformational grammar internal explanatory arguments play a the justification of grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. This clearly from Chomsky's reply (5) to the critically intended observation that the postulation of syntactic deep structure as a level of linguistic need of justification. 30

major role in point emerges by McCawley structure is in

(5) McCawley observes, quite correctly, that it is necessary to provide some justification for the hypothesis of an 'intermediate' level of deep structure: 'there is no a priori reason why a grammar could not instead consist of, say, a "formation rule" component which specifies the membership of a class of well-formed semantic representations, and a "transformational component" which consists of rules correlating semantic representations with s u r f a c e syntactic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' . ... There is only one way to provide some justification for a concept that is defined in terms of some general theory, namely, to show that the theory provides revealing explanations for an interesting range of phenomena and that the concept in question

plays a role in these explanations. In this sense, each of the four concepts just mentioned, along with the notion of grammatical transformation and a number of others, receives some justification from the linguistic work that is based on grammars of the standard form. 31 28

Cf. Bochenski 1969 ( = German version): 101; and 1965 ( = English translation): 92. Cf. Bochenski 1969: 101; and 1965: 92. 30 Transformational grammarians such as Katz (1970), Lakoff (1968) and McCawley (1971a) are currently in disagreement as to how the level of deep structure was defined in the Aspects model of transformational grammar. Katz (1970: 221-222), who is a defender of the decision to adopt a level of deep structure, defines this as "a level of syntactic structure for which the best account is a set of phrase markers K that satisfy the conditions: (5) K is the full input to the transformational component of the grammar (i.e. the members of K and only these phrase markers have no rule of the transformational component in their history). (6) K is the full input to the semantic component of the grammar (i.e. the members of K give the syntactic information required for a compositional semantic interpretation of sentences). (6) embodies the two principles stated in (7) and (8): (7) The semantic component is an interpretative system that operates on phrase markers independently generated by the syntactic component to assign them a compositional semantic interpretation. (8) The phrase markers on which the semantic component operates are just those in K." Deep structure proponents such as Chomsky, who allow for surface structures to contribute to the semantic interpretation of sentences, would not at present defend Katz's principle (8). 31 Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 79-80. The italics are ours. 29

82

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

To elucidate the nature of the internal explanatory arguments occurring in transformational grammar, we will analyze in the main text of this chapter the general outlines of the argument for postulating the level of deep structure as well as deal in some detail with an argument of Postal's for deriving the surface verb remind from a complex source structure. As an additional instance of internal explanatory arguments, an argument of Chomsky's for explaining the grammatical properties of derived nominals in the lexicalist manner is considered in appendix 3.1. 3.3.2.1.1 The Deep Structure Argument. - An analysis of the initial argument for the postulation of a level of deep structure derives a special interest from at least two circumstances. First, the status of the level of deep structure is a focal point in the current controversy between interpretive and generative semanticists. Second, this argument provides a striking demonstration of the nondemonstrative nature of internal explanatory arguments. The crux of the initial argument for postulating a level of deep structure is presented in the following remarks of Katz's: (6) Historically, Chomsky posited a level of deep syntactic structure on the basis of the failure of taxonomic grammar to handle certain linguistic data. These data provided good reason to claim that there is such a level.... 32 As used in (6), "handle" is an informal synonym for "explain" in Bochenski's sense of "explain" which has been characterized in §§ 2.4. and 3.3.2.1. of the present study. As is well known, the data referred to by Katz are about such grammatical properties of sentences as syntactic ambiguity of sentences, identity in the interpretation of superficially distinct sentences, distinctness in the interpretation of superficially similar sentences, and so on. 33 The incorporation of a level of deep structure in the general-linguistic theory made it possible to construct grammars which provided explanations for sentences in individual languages having such grammatical properties. If these properties of sentences are symbolized by Pi, P2, ..., P n , then the general form of the initial argument for postulating a level of deep structure may be laid out as (7). (7)

If a level of deep structure is introduced into the general-linguistic theory, then it follows that sentences can have the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., PnSentences do have the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n . . •. A level of deep structure should be introduced into the general-linguistic theory.

32

Cf. Katz 1970: 257. Recently, particular properties exhibited by derived nominals in English have been cited by Chomsky (1972d: 160-161) as additional data that support the adoption of a level of deep structure. For Chomsky's interpretation of these data cf. (71) (ii) in appendix 3.1 as well as note 130 to this chapter. 33

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

83

The deep structure argument (7) is a reductive argument, the reduction being done regressively. From statements which describe puzzling grammatical properties of sentences and which are known to be true, the argument proceeds to the deep structure hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the occurrence of these properties. The deep structure hypothesis is justified in the sense that it provides this explanation. Being typical reductive arguments, internal explanatory arguments are nondemonstrative for the reason described by Caws in the following way: (8) A sentence which is a consequence of one hypothesis may also be the consequence of another hypothesis, and if all we have is the consequence we do not know which hypothesis to choose. The sentence 'If a man takes arsenic, he will die', while certainly true for most people, does not allow us to conclude that if one of them dies he must have taken arsenic. There are many ways of dying. One of them must have occurred, but which, without further inquiry, we cannot say.34 For just the reason mentioned in (8), McCawley, Lakoff, and Postal, in fact, have recently rejected the level of deep structure as a necessary component of the generallinguistic theory. Consider the way in which Lakoff argues this point: (9) Given the rather considerable array of evidence against the existence of a level of 'deep structure' following all lexical insertion and preceding all upward-toward-the-surface cyclic rules, it is rather remarkable that virtually no arguments have ever been given for the existence of such a level. The arguments that one finds in works of the Aspects vintage will usually cite pairs of sentences like 'John ordered Harry to leave' and 'John expected Harry to leave', show that they have very different properties, and claim that such properties can be accounted for by assuming some 'higher' level of representation reflecting the different meanings of the sentences ('order' is a three-place predicate; 'expect' is a two-place predicate). Such arguments do seem to show that a 'higher' or 'more abstract' level of representation than surface structure exists, but they do not show that this level is distinct from the level of semantic representation. In particular, such arguments do not show that any intermediate level of 'deep structure' as defined in the precise sense given above exists. It was simply assumed in Aspects that this 'higher' level contained all lexical items and preceded all transformations: no arguments were given.35 In these remarks of Lakoff's, the source of the nondemonstrativeness of the internal explanatory argument for deep structure is clearly indicated: the phenomena which are explained in terms of the deep structure hypothesis may also be explained in terms of, or be reduced to, some alternative hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis which Lakoff has in mind is that the surface structures of sentences should be transformationally derived from their semantic representations. If the internal explanatory argument for positing a level of deep structure had been demonstrative, no such counter-proposal could have been made. The conclusion, however, of the original deep structure argument has content not associated with the premisses, and this conclusion accordingly does not follow necessarily from these premisses. 34 35

Cf. Caws 1966: 111 and also (a) of chapter 2. Cf. Lakoff 1969: 51.

84

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

3.3.2.1.2 A Remind Argument of Postal's. - In support of his grammatical hypothesis that the English surface verb remind should be transformationally derived from a complex underlying source structure Postal presents numerous arguments, certain ones among which may be analyzed as internal explanatory arguments.36 Postal's concern here is with the grammatical analysis of remind in the sense of "perceive similar" which it has in a superficially non-complex sentence such as (10).37 (10)

Larry reminds me of Winston Churchill.

Postal claims that the source structure from which remind should be transformationally derived contains, not one single verbal element corresponding to remind, but, rather, two abstract verbs or predicates: 1. one occurring in the main sentence and having properties such as those of the surface verbs strike and perceive, and 2. the other occurring in the complement sentence and having properties such as those of resemble, is like, and is similar /o. 38 One of the forms in which this source structure for remind sentences may be represented is given in (11).39 (11) NP

I

S

NP(S)

V

I

- NP(O)

[SIMILAR] (where (IO) = Indirect Object, (S) = Subject, (O) = Object)

The source structure (11) is also realized as the sentence (12), in which overt verbs correspond to the abstract predicates [PERCEIVE] and [SIMILAR]. (12) 36

I perceive that Larry is similar to Winston Churchill.

These arguments are presented in Postal's paper "On the surface verb remind" ( = Postal 1970). According to Postal (1970: 38) English also has a verb whose phonological shape is remind but whose meaning is "cause to remember", as in the sentence Harry reminded Betty to visit her uncle. 38 Cf. Postal 1970: 37. 39 In order to simplify the discussion below we will refer to (11) as representing "the source structure of remind sentences." The source structure of remind sentences is presented by Postal (1970: 49) in the following manner as well: 37

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

85

Let us examine now one of the Postal arguments which may be analyzed as an internal explanatory argument. Postal argues that, if (11) is posited as tbe source structure of remind sentences, then certain grammatical properties of these sentences ARE EXPLAINED. These grammatical properties include coreferential restrictions and reflexivization characteristics. For example, remind sentences have the property that, of their three surface noun phrases, the Subject (S) cannot be a presupposed coreferent of the Object (O). This fact is illustrated by the ungrammaticalness of the sentences 3) (i) and (ii).40 (13)

(i) (ii)

* Harry reminds me of himself. * Johnson reminds Betty of himself

The same restriction, however, occurs in certain sentences whose surface structure contains two noun phrases. The source structure of these other sentences contains a similarity predicate which is realized overtly as one of the forms is similar, is like, or resembles :41 (14)

(i) (ii) (iii)

* Harry is similar to himself. *Jack is like himself * Your mother resembles herself.

Postal accordingly asserts that (15) the natural suggestion at this point is that one can explain the S - 0 constraint in sentences with the Surface verb remind if they are derived from underlying structures containing embedded sentential structures with those properties that are common to sentences like [20], This assumes that the coreference block in such sentences is attributed to some set of syntactic-semantic features common to predicates like similar, resemble, like.42 S

like similar resemble

With reference to the above representation of the source structure of remind sentences Postal denotes his grammatical analysis of remind by the term "the strike-like analysis of remind.'''' 40 Cf. Postal 1970: 40. 41 Cf. Postal 1970 : 42. 42 Cf. Postal 1970: 42.

86

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

In this quotation [20] refers to the sentences: (16)

(i) Harry is similar to Ben. (ii) Jack is like Tommy. (iii) Your mother resembles my aunt.

Consider, as a final example, the Subject-Indirect Object (S-IO) blockage which characterizes remind sentences and which is manifested in the ungrammatical sentences (17) (i) and (ii):43 (17)

(i) (ii)

* Harry reminds himself of a gorilla. * Johnson reminds himself of an Argentinian admiral.

The same coreference blockage characterizes sentences having an abstract underlying predicate [STRIKE] which is realized overtly by the verb strike :44 (18)

*Jack struck himself as being like Bill.

With respect to this property of remind sentences Postal concludes that (19) the derivation of remind sentences by way of underlying structures including a verb like strike as main verb reduces the peculiar S-IO coreference blockage of remind sentences to the independently required constraint of sentences like [37], a constraint which is, moreover, valid generally for PSYCH MOVEMENT sentences, and which can be shown to be the same as that in PASSIVE reflexives like [38]. 45

In this quotation [37] refers to (18) above and [38] to (19') below. (19')

(i) (ii)

* Jack was stabbed by himself. * Louise was criticized by herself.

The internal explanatory argument by Postal outlined above may be reconstructed schematically as (20). (20)

If remind sentences are transformationally derived from the source structure (11), then it follows that remind sentences exhibit the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n . Remind sentences do exhibit the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n . . •. Remind sentences should be transformationally derived from the source structure (11).

In (20) the expression "Pi, P2, ..., P n " symbolizes grammatical properties of remind sentences such as the coreference restrictions and reflexivization characteristics discussed above. «

Cf. Postal 1970: 39. Cf. Postal 1970: 46. 45 Cf. Postal 1970: 49. "PSYCH MOVEMENT" denotes a transformation "that has the effect of interchanging subject and object NP with certain 'psychological' verbs and adjectives. That is, as far as nominal-verbal ordering is concerned, its operation is exactly parallel to the more well-known rule PASSIVE" (Postal 1970: 43-44). 44

NONDEMONSTRAT1VE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

87

The argument (20) is clearly a reductive one, the reduction being done regressively. A given hypothesis is here being justified on account of the fact that statements describing puzzling properties of linguistic units can be reduced to this hypothesis. These statements - whose truth is assumed - constitute the starting point of the inference. If we take the statement variable 1. p to symbolize the statement "remind sentences are transformationally derived from the source structure (11)" and the statement "remind sentences should be transformationally derived from the source structure (ll)", 4 6 and 2. q to symbolize the statement "remind sentences (do) exhibit the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n " then the argument (20) can be laid out in such a way that its reductive nature is immediately obvious: (21)

p ZD q q ••• p (where the inference proceeds from q).

Being a reductive argument, Postal's remind argument is nondemonstrative in essentially the same manner in which the deep structure argument (7) is nondemonstrative. The logical possibility exists that the relevant grammatical properties of remind sentences may also be reduced to and thus, in technical terms, also be explained by some hypothesis distinct from Postal's. 47 The nondemonstrative nature of internal explanatory arguments such as (7) and (20) is pointed out by Chomsky when he comments on the competing theoretical solutions that have been proposed for the problematic grammatical phenomena involved in the controversy between interpretive and generative semanticists. (22) In summary, I have so far outlined a certain general framework and a 'standard theory' that develops this framework in a specific direction. Furthermore, the literature contains further elaborations of this standard theory, and many realizations of it with respect to particular languages (that is, fragments of grammars of specific languages constructed in terms of the standard theory). At each level, there are reasonable doubts that can be raised, and alternatives can be envisaged. It goes without saying that the investigation of these doubts and the study of alternatives can only be beneficial, in the long run, and should be 46

Observe that these two statements, both of which are to be symbolized by p, actually differ as to their "modal" content. This difference is indicated by are occurring in the first statement in the position where should be appears in the second statement. Within the framework of this monograph, however, it is not necessary to reflect differences of this nature in the symbolic representation of arguments or of argument forms. No conclusion drawn in the paragraphs following below is based on the fact that the differences in question have not been overtly symbolized. 47 In § 6.2.2 the point will emerge that individual transformational grammarians, including Postal, in addition to the general logical requirement of reducibility, impose other, field-dependent, conditions on their concept of grammatical explanation.

88

NONDEMONSTRATTVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

actively pursued. It must also be kept in mind that at each level of discussion, justification can only go so far - in particular, that it can never be conclusive.48 As has been shown in (5) at the beginning of this section on internal explanatory arguments, justifying a hypothesis means, according to Chomsky, showing that it has explanatory power. From the above characterization of internal explanatory arguments it follows that the explanations which are rendered plausible within the framework of explanatory arguments have the logical status of "sufficient explanations", and not that of explanations which are either "necessary" or "both necessary and sufficient". It is possible to speak of "necessary explanations", "sufficient explanations" and "both necessary and sufficient explanations" on account of the fact that, as Bochenski puts it, "reductive explanatory statements always specify at least one condition governing the phenomenon which is to be explained ... ", 49 Such a condition may be sufficient, or necessary, or both sufficient and necessary. A is a sufficient condition for B if and only if the statement "If A, then B" is valid. In this case, it suffices for A to be given in order for B also to be given. A is a necessary condition for B if and only if the statement "If B, then A" is valid. In this case, if A were not given, B could not occur; hence A is a necessary condition for B. Finally, A is a necessary and sufficient condition of B if both the statements given above are valid: "A if and only if B". 50 In so far as the explanatory arguments state conditions governing the problematic phenomena referred to in the premisses of these arguments, these conditions clearly are sufficient ones only. It is for this reason that the explanations established within the framework of these arguments have been called above "sufficient explanations". 3.3.2.2. Confirmatory Arguments There are three properties of internal confirmatory arguments which jointly define them as instances of a distinct underlying form of argument. First, the evidence adduced within the framework of these arguments for the conclusion stated is internal evidence, i.e. synchronic linguistic evidence about grammatical or general-linguistic properties of linguistic structures and/or rules. Second, internal confirmatory arguments have the function of justifying a hypothesis on the grounds that the hypothesis yields correct predictions. Salmon explicates this function of confirmatory arguments in terms of a schematic layout similar to (23).51 (23)

If the hypothesis is true, then the prediction is true. The prediction is true. .'. The hypothesis is true.

48

Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 68-69. Cf. Bochenski 1965: 103; 1969: 113. so Cf. Bochenski 1965: 103-104; 1969: 113. 51 Cf. Salmon 1963 : 81. 49

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

89

Third, internal confirmatory arguments are progressively reductive arguments. In the case of progressive reduction, with respect to a conditional statement p => q the starting point cf the inference is the antecedent p, which is given but whose truth value is not known. The consequent q is inferred from p\ that is, q is derived from p as a prediction. The truth of q is then checked, and if q is found to be true the truth of p is inferred from that of q. A true consequent is said to CONFIRM the antecedent of the conditional statement from which it follows. 52 The logical format of confirmatory arguments may be laid out as follows: (24)

P => q

q •'• p (where p is the starting point of the inference). For the role which this form of argument played in the early phase of the development of transformational grammar we refer the reader to appendix 3.2. As typical instances of internal confirmatory arguments we will analyze, directly below, one of Postal's remind arguments and, in appendix 3.3., one of Chomsky's lexicalist arguments. Recall that Postal contended with respect to the surface verb remind that it should be transformationally derived from a complex source structure. In this source structure - which was represented as (11) - there appear, among other things, the two abstract predicates [PERCEIVE] and [SIMILAR]. Although these abstract predicates are not realized as overt verbs in remind sentences, they do appear overtly in sentences such as (25) (26)

Larry strikes me as being like Winston Churchill. I perceive that Larry is similar to Winston Churchill. (= (12))

The internal confirmatory argument which Postal offers for deriving remind sentences from the source structure (11) is based on the view that, if remind sentences are derived from the same source structure as sentences such as (25) and (26), then remind sentences and sentences such as (25) and (26) should be isomorphic with respect to certain grammatical properties. In deriving remind sentences from the source structure (11), Postal as a grammarian of English is therefore in effect predicting that these sentences should have particular grammatical properties. Postal proceeds to check systematically whether these predictions of his about the grammatical properties of remind sentences are correct. As an illustration of this point consider the following findings of Postal's, quoted here in his own words: (27) (i) An analysis like [14] (i.e. our (11) - B.-W.) of remind clauses claims that these should be paraphrases of sentences with perceive main verbs and complements involving 52 Cf. Bochenski 1965: 92, 93-94. Bochenski in this context uses the terms "confirm" and "verify" as synonymous expressions.

90

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

assertions of similarity. Hence, for instance, [14] claims that [15] (i.e., our (10) - B.-W.) should be an essential paraphrase of: [17] I perceive that Larry is similar to Winston Churchill. [14] also claims that, just as [18a] is contradictory, so is [18b]: [18] a. I perceive that Larry is similar to Winston Churchill although I perceive that Larry is not similar to Winston Churchill, b. Larry reminds me of Winston Churchill although I perceive that Larry is not similar to Winston Churchill. The essential correctness of these predictions from [14] suggests that [14] is indeed a basically right analysis for remind clauses semantically.53 (ii) In particular, the derivation from strike sentence structures predicts that that NP which corresponds to the derived subject of strike must be largely selectionally unrestricted with respect to remind, while being restricted to the remnants of the clause fragment. This NP is the Surface subject of remind. Just so, the analysis predicts that the NP in remind sentences which corresponds to the post-verbal NP in strike sentences must be animate, possibly 'human'. This NP is the 10 of remind sentences. Both predictions are borne out: [91] a. Harriet reminded me of a monkey. b. that dump truck reminded me of Harry's tractor c. that proposal reminded me of Harry's suggestion d. that month reminded me of last month e. that location reminded me of the place where Harry's mortuary used to be. [91] illustrates that remind does not restrict the nature of its subjects. 54 The underlying form of this internal confirmatory argument of Postal's may be represented schematically as (28). (28)

If remind sentences are transformationally derived from the source structure (11), then it follows that remind sentences exhibit the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n . Remind sentences do exhibit the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., Pn.". Remind sentences should be transformationally derived from the source structure (11).

Using the statement variable 1. p to symbolize the antecedent of the conditional statement and the conclusion, and 2. q to symbolize both the consequent of this conditional statement and the minor premiss, (28) may be laid out in the typical format of progressive reductive arguments: (29)

p o q q p (where p is the starting point of the inference).

83 54

Cf. Postal 1970: 41. Cf. Postal 1970: 59-60.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

91

As reductive arguments, internal confirmatory arguments are nondemonstrative for fundamentally the same reason as the reason why internal explanatory arguments are nondemonstrative. The crux of the matter is that statements which represent correct predictions of a hypothesis H i may always be derived from alternative hypotheses H2, H3, ..., H n . As formulated by Salmon: "There are, in fact, an infinite number of hypotheses for which any observed fact constitutes a confirmatory ininstance." 55 3.3.2.3. Generalizing Arguments Generalizing arguments are arguments within the framework of which a general statement referring to all the members of a given class is inferred from singular statements referring to a restricted number of individual members of the class. Within the framework of this nondemonstrative form of argument, properties which have been established as typical of a limited number of the members of a class are generalized to all the members of the class. Generalizing arguments incorporate the socalled rule of "simple induction" or "induction by enumeration". 5 6 Seen in this light, the underlying form of generalizing arguments may be represented as (30). (30)

p i is a q P2 is a q Pn is a q

.'. All p's are q's Simple inductive arguments are also analyzed by some logicians, e.g. Lukasiewicz, as instances of a special form of reductive arguments. 57 Bochenski illustrates this by means of the following example: there are three pieces of white phosphorus, a, b, c, for which it has been established that they ignite at 60°C; it is inferred from this that all pieces of white phosphorus do so. This inference may be reconstructed either as the simple inductive argument (31) or as the reductive argument (32). (31)

The piece of white phosphorus a ignites at 60°C. The piece of white phosphorus b ignites at 60°C. The piece of white phosphorus c ignites at 60°C. .'. All pieces of white phosphorus ignite at 60°C.

(32)

If all pieces of white phosphorus ignite at 60°C, then a, b, and c do. a, b, and c ignite at 60°C. .'. All pieces of white phosphorus ignite at 60°C.

55 Cf. Salmon 1963: 83. 56 For the expression "induction by enumeration" cf. e.g. Black 1967: 169, and Salmon 1963: 55-56. For "simple induction" cf. e.g. Alexander 1969: 48 ff. For Barker's notion "nongeneralizing", cf. Barker 1965: 60; as well as appendix 2.4. 57 Cf. Bochenski 1965: 68; 1969: 73-74.

92

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

(32) is a typical reductive argument: the truth of the antecedent has been inferred from a conditional statement and the truth of its consequent. Whether reconstructed as simple inductive arguments or as reductive arguments, generalizing arguments remain nondemonstrative. There is a significant difference in content between the evidential statements, in which reference is made to a limited number of things in a given class, and the conclusion, in which reference is made to all the members of this class. The logical possibility exists always that there is an unchecked p which fails to be q. Thus from true premisses a false conclusion may be inferred. 58 In transformational grammar generalizing arguments are not frequently presented in an explicit manner. In their major role they occur implicitly in conjunction with confirmatory arguments. In the case of a general hypothesis occurring as the conclusion of a confirmatory argument, the normal situation is that the truth of only a limited number of the predictions of this hypothesis has been checked. When the linguist or grammarian now infers the truth of this hypothesis from the truth of the checked predictions, he is implicitly assuming that all the predictions of the hypothesis, including the unchecked ones, are true. This implicit assumption may be explicated in the form of a generalizing argument. This generalization may be laid out either in the form of the simple inductive argument (33) or in the form of the reductive argument (34). (33)

The prediction Pi is true. The prediction P2 is true. The prediction P x is true. All the predictions are true.

(34)

If all the predictions are true, then so are the predictions Pi, P2, P x The predictions Pi, P2, P x aie true. .". All the predictions are true.

Interesting negative variants of such generalizing arguments are found in Postal's remind article and in McCawley's article "The role of semantics in a grammar". Postal's remind argument will be analyzed below; McCawley's generalizing argument is dealt with in appendix 3.4. to this chapter. In his remind article, Postal attempts to show that the correct analysis of remind sentences - in terms of which these sentences are transformationally derived from a source structure such as (11) - is incompatible with the "Classical Theory" of transformational grammar: (35) In particular, it is incompatible with its assumption that there is a level of Deep Structure which is distinct from the level of Semantic Representation and which contains in it structures corresponding directly to the lexical items of the Surface Structure. We have seen that in those structures which are input to the transformations deriving Surface remind 58

Cf. Salmon 1963: 56; and Barker 1965: 59-65.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

93

clauses, there can be no single element corresponding to the lexical item remind, since such clauses are derived from complex Main Verb + Complement Sentence structures.59

From the nature of this analysis of remind Postal then draws the following conclusion about the methodological status of the level of deep structure as a "natural level of structure containing syntactic atoms, i.e. lexical morphemes, which could be assigned meanings" : (36) But the analysis of remind constructions shows that no such level exists for remind clauses. The lexical item remind cannot be inserted into representations at some major juncture in the mapping of Semantic Representations onto Surface Structures which is such as to define grammatical relations and contain all other lexical items. Remind cannot be inserted until after certain definite transformational rules have already operated, in particular RAISING

and P R E D I C A T E

RAISING,

HENCE, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ASSUMING AN

INDEPENDENTLY DEFINED LEVEL OF STRUCTURE WHICH IS SUITABLE TO SERVE AS THE INPUT TO THE PUTATIVE PROJECTION RULES. THE CLAIM OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY THAT THERE IS A BASIC JUNCTURE IN THE PROCESS OF RELATING READINGS TO SURFACE STRUCTURES IS SEEN TO HAVE NO SUPPORT. 6 0

In the remarks of Postal's quoted as (36), a typically nondemonstrative argument occurs: an argument which, from the evidential statement reporting that there exists no level of deep structure for remind clauses, proceeds to the completely general conclusion that the level of deep structure has "no basis", "no support", at all. There is a marked difference in content between the evidential statement referring to one phenomenon and the conclusion referring to a whole class of phenomena. Underlying this argument is the assumption that no other lexical item could provide support for the existence of a level of deep structure. This assumption is not warranted by Postal's finding, correct as it may be, that a level of deep structure does not exist for remind clauses. Consequently, his argument is a generalizing one and hence nondemonstrative. This argument may be laid out in terms of simple induction as (37) or in terms of reduction as (38). (37)

The analysis of remind provides no basis for assuming a level of deep structure. .'. There is n o lexical morpheme such that its analysis will provide a basis for assuming a level of deep structure (or, for short, the claim that there is a level of deep structure is seen to have no support).

(38)

If there is no support for a level of deep structure, then the analysis of remind will provide no support for the level of deep structure. The analysis of remind provides n o support for a level of deep structure. There is no support for a level of deep structure.

59

Cf. Postal 1970: 100. Cf. Postal 1970: 100. The small capitals are ours. Postal proceeds: "As it stands, it is an arbitrary assumption. There is no known evidence for it. It is notable that in the literature on interpretive semantics this assumption is not defended but is more or less taken as a necessary assumption. But it is certainly not true that it is a necessary assumption." 60

94

NONDËMONSTRATÎVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

Although the conclusion proposition of (37) and (38) may be true, this conclusion certainly does not follow from the evidential report about the grammatical analysis of remind,61 3.3.3. External 3.3.3.1. Introductory

Arguments

Remarks

One of the properties of external grammatical and general-linguistic arguments is that they incorporate one or more evidential statements presenting external linguistic evidence for a claim about one or another aspect of the ideal speaker-hearer's language ability. As examples of types of external linguistic evidence we have cited in § 3.3.1. diachronic evidence, dialectal evidence, statistical evidence, neuropsychological evidence, and neurophysiological evidence. In this section we will deal with the properties of external arguments in transformational grammar mainly as these properties are revealed in two papers of Kiparsky's: "Linguistic universals and linguistic change",62 and "How abstract is phonology?". 63 The external linguistic evidence figuring in these papers comprises diachronic data about linguistic changes. In "Linguistic universals and linguistic change" Kiparsky asserts that a grammar is "psychologically correct" if it represents the FORM of the linguistic competence of a fluent speaker.64 A grammar represents the form of this linguistic competence when the rules contained in it actually correspond to "the system of rules which is internalized by the speaker and constitutes part of what enables him to produce and understand arbitrary utterances in the language".65 A linguistic theory may claim psychological reality when the theoretical principles and notational conventions it incorporates make possible the construction of psychologically correct grammars. In the present study the claims made by a grammar and by a general-linguistic theory about either the form of a fluent speaker's linguistic competence or the form of his faculté de langage will be referred to as "mentalistic claims". 61

In appendix 3.4. a second generalizing argument is analyzed. This paper will be referred to below as "Kiparsky 1968a". 63 This paper will be referred to below as "Kiparsky 1968b". 64 Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 171. 65 Kiparsky (1968a: 171) explicates his notion of psychological reality by invoking an analogical distinction between psychologically correct and psychologically incorrect rules of arithmetic: "Suppose that someone succeeds in writing a grammar which correctly enumerates the sentences of a language and assigns them the right structural descriptions. Such a grammar would ipso facto correctly represent the substance of a fluent speaker's knowledge of this language. But it would not necessarily represent the form of this knowledge in the sense of actually corresponding to the system of rules which is internalized by the speaker and constitutes part of what enables him to produce and understand arbitrary utterances in the language. Similarly, the knowledge of someone who has learned arithmetic, that is, the infinite set of correct arithmetical computations, could be defined by many different systems of rules, including both psychologically incorrect ones, such as certain axioms of set theory, computer programs, and so on, and the psychologically correct one, namely whatever knowledge is actually used in arithmetical performance, such as the rules of school arithmetic and the multiplication table. How do we know that generative grammar is not psychologically as wrong a model of linguistic competence as set theory is of arithmetical competence?" 62

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

95

Kiparsky in his paper "Linguistic universals and linguistic change" tackles the problem of finding a basis on which to determine whether grammars and the generallinguistic theory within the framework of which they are constructed are psychologically correct. Kiparsky's problem is therefore to find a criterion by virtue of which mentalistic claims may be evaluated. As Kiparsky puts it: "What we really need is a window on the form of linguistic competence that is not obscured by factors like performance about which next to nothing is known." 66 He proceeds to assert that "in linguistic change we have precisely such, a window".67 In this paper, accordingly, Kiparsky's essential concern is with "making a case for the legitimacy and potential fruitfulness of certain general patterns of inference from linguistic change to the nature of grammar". 68 This is also one of the objectives of Kiparsky's paper "How abstract is phonology?", a central thesis of which has it that "... numerous kinds of valid and fruitful conclusions may ... be drawn from diachrony to synchrony".69 The general way in which he wishes to allow historical evidence about linguistic change to bear on the correctness of mentalistic claims is stated by Kiparsky as follows: (39) Returning after this brief survey of some main types of phonological change to the initial question about the justification for assuming the psychological reality of generative grammar, suppose that we now raise this question about some aspect of generative grammar, such as the requirement that grammars contain a certain level of representation, or that they be written with the use of certain notational conventions. The conception of linguistic change sketched out above, in which linguistic structure crucially figures at several points, suggests as one test for determining the answer that we ask the question: D o the levels, the kind of rules, and so on, which are required by this theory play a role in linguistic change ? Taking as our example again the simple case of the brace notation, we can ask: Do blocks of rules collapsed by braces form units of a kind which can undergo systematic change? If they do, this will be a powerful argument for this notation, and if not, we will have prima facie evidence that it is a spurious notation. 70

Careful analysis of the arguments by Kiparsky in which external evidence about linguistic change figures reveals that these arguments are instances of four underlying forms of argument: explanatory arguments and their negative correlates, and confirmatory arguments and their disconfirmatory correlates. The external explanatory and confirmatory arguments may be reconstructed as nondemonstrative arguments. Depending on how this reconstruction is done, the respective negative and disconfirmatory correlates of these arguments may be analyzed either as nondemonstrative or as demonstrative arguments linked with nondemonstrative arguments. 66

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 174. Kiparsky (1968a: 174-175) "roughly" thinks of linguistic change in the following terms: "Grammars are subject to changes of two kinds: the addition of new rules to them and the simplification of them." 68 Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 189. 69 Cf. Kiparsky 1968b: 11. 70 Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 179. 67

96 3.3.3.2. Explanatory

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

Arguments

The external explanatory arguments put forward by Kiparsky take as their point of departure certain historical data about particular linguistic changes which have occurred in one or another language. It is then determined what theoretical linguistic principles and notational conventions are needed to "formulate", "account for" or "characterize", i.e. to explain in the technical sense of Bochenski, the changes reflected by the diachronic data. If the required theoretical principles and notational conventions already exist in the linguistic theory as so-called "theoretical devices", then the fact that these theoretical devices figure in the "characterization" of the given linguistic changes is taken as evidence for the psychological correctness of these devices. If the linguistic theory does not already incorporate the required theoretical devices, this theory is held to be psychologically incorrect and it is required that this theory be extended so as to incorporate these devices. The theoretical devices thus postulated are in addition assigned psychological reality. The linguistic changes for the "characterization", i.e. explanation, of which the theoretical device is required constitute supporting external linguistic evidence for the psychological reality of this device. The role of diachronic evidence about linguistic changes as supporting evidence in explanatory arguments is indicated in the following assertions of Kiparsky's: (40) (i) The force of this kind of argumentation rests not of course on this single example, but on the general character of this class of phonological change. In other words, fully abstract and fully concrete morphophonemics fail not just because they cannot explain a particular change in Slavic, but because they are an inadequate foundation for historical linguistics in general. Now item-and-arrangement morphophonemics and fully abstract morphophonemics do not really need this kind of rather labored and complicated refutation by historical evidence. They are both amply refuted by more general considerations. But I have not given this example for its own sake only. I have given it in order to illustrate a method by which linguistic structure can be investigated through language change. It is an extremely delicate method which in subtler disputes may well be the only one available, at our present stage of knowledge. The method, briefly, is this: examine changes that depend on linguistic structure and see what kind of structure they presuppose. 7 1 (ii) This last conclusion has the peculiar status of at present resting entirely on historical evidence, and of a fairly indirect kind at that. Whether or not we draw it depends on what we consider the subject matter of linguistics to be. We could not draw it if we regarded a grammar simply as a theory of the sentences of a language, and a linguistic theory as a theory of grammars. For this position would entail that linguistic change is no concern of linguistic theory, although it might of course be a pleasant bonus if linguistic theory could be usefully 'applied' to questions of linguistic change. But it would not cause us to demand of a linguistic theory that it must (in conjunction with a theory of linguistic change) provide an explanation of the linguistic regularities of diachrony. 7 2 71

Cf. Kiparsky 1968b: 7-8. The linguistic changes referred to in (40) (i) by Kiparsky are outlined in (57) in § 3.3.3.3. They occurred in Ukrainian and Belorussian and concern the reaffrication to [3] of those [z]'s which, synchronically speaking, are derived from underlying /d/. 72 Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 188. In (40) (ii) "this last conclusion" refers to Kiparsky's decision to assume a system of four vowel heights for particular Swiss German dialects.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

97

The underlying form of the external arguments for which provision is made in (40) (i) and (ii) may be reconstructed in at least two different ways. The statements from which the components of these two reconstructions are drawn are those in (41). In (41) the statement variables p, q, and r are inserted in parentheses immediately to the right of the statements which they will symbolize in the schematic layout of these reconstructions to be presented at a later stage in the text. (41)

(i)

If a theoretical device has to be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory for explaining linguistic changes which occurred in a given language (p), then this theoretical device should be regarded as psychologically correct (r). (ii) If the theoretical device D is incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (p), then it follows that the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n could have occurred (q). (iii) The linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n occurred in the language L x (q). (iv) The theoretical device D should be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (p). (v) The theoretical device D should be regarded as psychologically correct

(r). In the first reconstruction - Reconstruction I - the given form of argument is represented as a single nondemonstrative form of argument. In the second reconstruction - Reconstruction II - this form of argument is analyzed as a complex entity incorporating as its first component a nondemonstrative form of argument to which is linked, as a second component, a demonstrative form of argument. Reconstruction I incorporates as its premisses the statements (41) (ii) and (iii) and as its conclusion a conjunction of the statements (41) (iv) and (v). (42)

Reconstruction I If the theoretical device D is incorporated in the general-linguistic theory, then it follows that the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n could have occurred. The linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n occurred in the language L x . .'. The theoretical device D should be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory and should be regarded as psychologically correct.

Laid out in terms of the statement variables p, q, and r - as these variables occur in (41) - the abstract format of (42) may be represented as (43). (43)

p => q

q P •r (where "." symbolizes "and").

98

NONDEMONSTRATTVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

(44) (i)

Reconstruction II If the theoretical device D is incorporated in the general-linguistic theory, then it follows that the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n could have occurred. The linguistic changes Ci, C 2 , . . . , C n occurred in the language L x .

.•. The theoretical device D should be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory. vii)

If a theoretical device should be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory for explaining linguistic changes which occurred in a given language, then this theoretical device should be regarded as psychologically correct. The theoretical device D should be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (for explaining the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n which occurred in the language L x ). The theoretical device D should be regarded as psychologically correct.

Using the statement variables p, q and r as they occur in (41), the general format of Reconstruction II of Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument may be laid out as (45). (45)

(i)

p => q

q ••• p (ii)

p 3 r

P .•. r Reconstructions I and II of Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument are equivalent in two fundamental respects. First, both of these reconstructions incorporate a regressive reductive inference. On account of its reductive nature Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument is, therefore, nondemonstrative. Second, in both of these reconstructions there exists a material or qualitative difference in content between those evidential statements which report a diachronic phenomenon the occurrence of one or another linguistic change in a given language - and that part of the conclusion which refers to a synchronically existing mental state of affairs. In this respect, therefore, this form of argument is ampliative. As a concrete instance of Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument, we will present below his argument for the psychological correctness of the notational convention which governs the use of the braces "{ } ". 7 3 Note, incidentally, that this argument has been taken over by Chomsky and Halle in their book The sound 73

This argument is put forward in Kiparsky 1968a.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

99

pattern of English.74 Before turning to the argument under consideration let us first look into the general function of the notational convention governing the use of braces as this is explicated by Chomsky and Halle. The brace notational convention (46) permits the abbreviation of a set of partially identical rules such as (47) to the rule schema (48), but it disallows a similar abbreviation of the unrelated rules (49). (46)

Two or more partially identical rules may be coalesced into a single rule by enclosing corresponding nonidentical parts in braces: "{ }". 75

(47)

i->y/-p i-*y/ —r i-*-y / — y i - > y / — a78

(48)

/p\77 i -*• y / — J r f

l ya ( \

(49)

/

i - > y / - P r ^ l / - r t->p/-y n / — a78

As pointed out by Chomsky and Halle, the notational convention (46) and rule schemata such as (48) make an implicit claim about the mode of organization of the rules constituting the internalized grammar of the fluent speaker. This claim is that languages tend to place partially identical rules such as (47) next to each other in the ordered sequence of rules which constitutes the phonological component of a grammar. 79 The question is whether it can be shown that the notational convention (47) and the rule schemata resulting from it possess psychological reality. Consider, in his own words, Kipsarsky's argument in support of the psychological correctness of these devices: (50) In English, underlying long vowels, which are otherwise realized as diphthongs, are shortened in two main phonological environments: before two or more consonants (for example, keep -.kept) and in the third syllable from the end of the word (for example, vain: vanity, severe severity). The rules which bring these shortenings about are the following: 74

Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333-334. The Chomsky-Halle exposition of the argument in question is presented in appendix 3.5. 75 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333. 78 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333. 77 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333. 78 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333. 79 Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333.

100

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

5'. 5".

V->[—long]/ V-*[—long]/

CC C... V...V

The theory of generative grammar requires that 5' and 5" be collapsed into a single rule as follows: 5.

V ->- [— long] /

C [

C

y

y

}

It asserts that of the two descriptively equivalent grammars, one of which contains the two rules (5'and 5") as separate processes, and the other as a single process combined into 5 by factoring out their common part and enclosing the remainder in braces, it is the latter which is the psychologically correct one. Rule 5 arose in Early Middle English as a generalization of a much more restricted process of shortening. In Old English, vowels were shortened before three or more consonants (for example, godspell > godspell, brSmblas) > brSmblas) and in the third syllable from the end provided they were followed by two consonants (for example, bledsian > bledsian). The corresponding rules were: 6'. 6".

V -> [— long] / V->[—long]/

CCC CC... V . . . V

Again, these rules must be collapsed as before: 6.

V ->- [— long] /

CC

v

v

j

On comparing the Old English rule in 6 and the Early Middle English (and indeed Modern English) rule in 5 we see that the only difference between them is that the later rule (5) has lost one of the required consonants in its environment. It represents a simpler, more general form of the Old English vowel-shortening process. It will apply in all cases where 6 applied but also in cases where 6 would not have applied. Evidently the change from 6 to 5 is an instance of simplification, which we have seen to be one of the basic mechanisms of linguistic change. But in a linguistic theory in which the brace notation plays no role, the relation between the Old English and the Early Middle English shortening processes is a different one. If the brace notation were not part of linguistic theory we would have two separate changes namely, 6' > 5' and 6" > 5" - on our hands and we would be faced with the very peculiar fact that two separate, unrelated rules have undergone an identical modification at the same point in the history of English. 80

The external explanatory argument occurring in the quoted remarks by Kiparsky may be reconstructed in terms of any one of the two manners of reconstruction designated above as "Reconstruction I" and "Reconstruction II". If we denote the change of Kiparsky's rule 6' to 5' as "the linguistic change Ci" and denote the change of his rule 6" to 5" as "the linguistic change C2", then this argument may be represented in terms of the format of Reconstruction I as (51). (51)

80

If the brace convention (46) is incorporated in the general-linguistic theory, then it follows that the linguistic changes Ci and C2 could have occurred as a single unitary linguistic change C.

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 179-181.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

101

The linguistic changes Ci and C2 occurred as a single unitary linguistic change. The brace convention (46) should be incorporated in the generallinguistic theory and should be assigned psychological reality. The argument (51) is a reductive argument, the reduction being done regressively. Moreover, there is a distinct qualitative difference in content between the evidential statement, which as the minor premiss refers to a historical and diachronic state of affairs and the second half of the conclusion, in which a claim is made about a nonhistorical, nondiachronic mental state of affairs. 81 In §§4.2.2.2. and 4.2.4 we return to problematic aspects of the reconstruction (51) of external explanatory arguments. 82 In summary, then, the external explanatory arguments of which (51) is a typical instance may be characterized 1. as arguments within the framework of which a general-linguistic hypothesis, by means of regressive reduction, is justified in the sense of being shown to be a plausible explanation for one or another puzzling "external" linguistic state of affairs, and 2. as arguments within the framework of which the above-mentioned hypothesis is, moreover, justified as being a psychologically correct description of one or another formal aspect of the ideal speaker-listener's language ability.83 3.3.3.3. The Negative Correlates of External Explanatory Arguments In the remarks by Kiparsky quoted above as (40) provision is made for a form of argument which is the negative, in the sense of "disconfirmatory", correlate of his external explanatory form of argument. If this external explanatory form of argument is analyzed on the pattern of 1. Reconstruction I - (42) - , then its negative correlate may be laid out as the non-demonstrative form of argument (52); 2. Reconstruction II - (44) - , then its negative correlate may be laid out as the demonstrative form of argument (53). In the (i) components of the layouts (52) and (53) the statement variables p, q and r and the negation sign " ~ " are inserted immediately to the right of the statements which they will symbolize in the more abstract (ii) components of these layouts. 81 Whereas in this context "historical" means "belonging to the past (of a language)", "diachronic" conveys the meaning "involving a relation between a given language state A and a subsequent language state B". 82 In addition to the type-jump between the content of the factual data and that of the mentalistic half of the conclusion, the Kipaisky argument under discussion has another problematic side, one that we will deal with in appendix 4.1. 83 For an external explanatory form of argument within the framework of which neuropsychological data are adduced in support of mentalistic claims cf. appendix 3.6.

102

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

(52) (i)

Reconstruction V In terms of natural language: If the theoretical device D is incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (j>), then it follows that the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n could not have occurred

The linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n occurred in the language L x (q). .•. The theoretical device D should not be incorporated in the generallinguistic theory (~p) and should not be regarded as psychologically correct (ii)

In terms of symbolic notation:

P = ~ q q ~ p . ~ r (53) (i)

Reconstruction II' In terms of natural language: (a) If the theoretical device D is incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (p), then it follows that the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n could not have occurred (~q). The linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n occurred in the language Lx (?)• The theoretical device D should not be incorporated in the generallinguistic theory (~p). (b)

If the theoretical device D should not be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (on account of its failure to explain the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n ) (~p), then it should be regarded as psychologically not correct (~r). The theoretical device D should not be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory (on account of its failure to explain the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C n ) (~p). The theoretical device D should be regarded as psychologically not correct (~r).

(ii)

In terms of symbolic notation: (a) p =a ~ q

q ~ P (b)

~ p => ~ r ~ p .•. ~ r

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

103

The question as to which of the above two reconstructions of the negative correlate of Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument should be preferred will be dealt with in § 4.2.4. For the present it is sufficient to note that Kiparsky uses this negative form of argument as a framework within which diachronic counter-evidence is adduced for synchronic linguistic hypotheses. This diachronic evidence is counterevidence to these hypotheses in the sense that the linguistic changes referred to in the evidence cannot be explained by the hypotheses. Kiparsky's argument, in his paper "How abstract is phonology?", against fully abstract morphophonemics and against fully concrete morphophonemics is an instance of the negative form of argument under consideration. In fully abstract morphophonemics morphophonemic representations are viewed as having a purely classificatory function. Fully abstract morphophonemic representations are constructed in terms of morphophonemes which do not have phonetic properties. 84 Fully concrete morphophonemics, on the other hand, has as its basis the hypothesis that morphophonemic representations should provide a direct record of all the actual forms in which morphemes appear. 85 Kipaxsky argues - within the framework of a negative external explanatory argument - against fully abstract and against fully concrete morphophonemics on account of the fact that neither is able to explain the phonological change in Slavic which he describes in (54). (54) In Russian the dentals t, d, s and the velars k, g, x, become palatalized to c, z, s, by a process that is quite productive in the verb conjugation. This process is represented in a generative phonology by two rules: (1) Palatalization (t, d, s and k, g, x become c, 3, s) (2) Spirantization (3 becomes z) The palatalization rule first converts the dental and velar stops and continuants into strident palatals. The resulting affricate 3, derived by palatalization from /d/ and /g/, must be further converted into a spirant z by the second rule. Underlying form t d s k g x Palatalization c 3 3c 3 s Spirantization " z " " 2 " 84

Cf. Kiparsky 1968b: 1: "The diametrically opposed view that morphophonemic representations have a purely classificatory function has recently been defended by Lamb (1966), Fudge (1967), and, apparently, Householder (1965). Morphophonemes here are 'completely abstract' elements; they have 'absolutely no properties which are even remotely phonic' (Fudge). They are represented by 'completely neutral labels' (Fudge) which should be 'constructed ad hoc for each language* (Householder); according to Lamb these 'labels are chosen for mnemonic convenience and are not part of the structure'. As Fudge puts it, 'phonologists ought to burn their phonetic boats and turn to a genuinely abstract framework'. The writings of Hjelmslev may be interpreted as setting forth a similar position." 85 Cf. Kiparsky 1968b: 1: "At the concrete end, we find the view that the morphophonemic representation should provide a direct record of all the actual forms in which the morpheme appears. The underlying form of a morpheme is nothing but the set of its allomorphs, or some representation from which that set can be immediately constructed. Examples are the item-and-arrangement model developed by American linguists in the forties, and the approach initially taken by the pioneers of the Prague school."

104

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

In Ukrainian and Belorussian this system has been changed .... Those [z]'s which, from the synchronic point of view, were derived from underlying /d/, have become reaffricated to [3]. But there was no change in the [z]'s which synchronically were derived from /v/ (the Ukrainian and Belorussian reflex of Slavic /g/) and likewise no change in those [z]'s which occurred in nonderived, synchronically isolated forms, no matter whether they historically had /g/ or /dI before palatalization took place. Contrast, for example, the retention of Ukr. bizu 'I run' (stem beg- > biY-) with the change of Ukr. sizu 'I sit' to sizu (stem sid-), and likewise with the retention of meza 'boundary'. 8 6

The argument for which the diachronic evidence is presented in (54) is reconstructible as a negative external explanatory argument in either one of the forms (52) and (53). This can be done mechanically - and the operation is therefore not performed step by step here - by substituting in (52), and (53) 1. for the expression "the theoretical device D" the expression "either a level of fully abstract morphophonemics or a level of fully concrete morphophonemics" and 2. for the expression "the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., Cn" the expression "the linguistic change in Slavic described in (54)". Observe, finally, that in the paper "How abstract is phonology?" Kiparsky does not explicitly reaffirm his position that linguistic hypotheses such as those involving the postulation of a specific kind of level of morphophonemics make mentalistic claims. Neither, however, does he indicate that he has given up this position as presented in "Linguistic universals and linguistic change". One may therefore conclude that this position also implicitly underlies the views presented in the former paper. Even if such is not the case, however, Kiparsky's argument would be an external one in the methodologically defined sense of "external" to be developed in § 4.2.3. In this paragraph it will be shown that for a general-linguistic or grammatical argument to be an external one from a methodological point of view, it is not required that the conclusion of this argument should per se refer to a mental state of affairs. 3.3.3.4. Confirmatory

Arguments

A third form of argument within the framework of which Kiparsky adduces diachronic evidence about linguistic change in support of a synchronic mentalistic hypothesis is analyzable as a confirmatory form of argument. In the case of confirmatory arguments the point of departure, at the level of the general-linguistic theory, is one or another theoretical linguistic principle or notational convention already contained in the general-linguistic theory. This theoretical device is then regarded as making predictions-or, better, postdictions-about possible linguistic changes which could or could not have occurred. If these predictions are borne out by diachronic evidence about linguistic changes which actually occurred in one or another language, then 88

a . Kiparsky 1968b: 5-6.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

105

the hypothesis involving this theoretical device is viewed as having been confirmed and the device in question is viewed as being psychologically correct. If the predictions turn out to be incorrect, then Kiparsky views the mentalistic claim embodied in this theoretical device as having been "refuted". In this latter case the argument containing the mentalistic claim should be analyzed as a disconfirmatory argument - as will be shown in § 3.3.3.5. The roles which diachronic data about linguistic change may play as confirming and as disconfirming external evidence are indicated by Kiparsky in the following terms: (55) (i) The proposed test also has the virtue of rendering such notations eminently vulnerable to potential counterevidence from historical change. The counterclaim which would be made by the theory which excludes braces is that rules like 5' and ¡5", or 6' and 6", when found together in a grammar with no necessarily intervening rules forcing them apart, should be able to undergo simplification individually, in such a way that the resulting pair of rules could not subsequently be collapsed by braces. Such a change, which in this theory would be a legitimate simplification, would be neither a possible sound change nor a simplification in a theory which allows collapsing by braces, and it would therefore be excluded in the latter. If such changes could be found, they would be clear counterevidence against the brace notation and would suggest that the generalizations effected by means of braces are spurious ones. The position which excludes braces would also entail that a rule could be inserted between two rules collapsed by braces in such a way that they subsequently could no longer be so collapsed. And finally, it would also entail that the parts of rules collapsed in this way should be individually capable of reordering with other rules of the grammar. The fact that no such changes appear to exist is strong negative evidence which adds to the historical support for the essential correctness of this abbreviatory convention of generative grammar. 87 (ii) The core of my historical argument against absolute neutralization has roughly the following form: (1) From the assumption that absolute neutralization exists, certain predictions about change in phonological systems follow. (2) These predictions are false. (3) The theory of change cannot be adjusted in any general way to exclude these predictions. (4) Therefore absolute neutralization does not exist. 88 The external confirmatory form of argument provided for in (55) (i) and (ii) may be reconstructed in at least two ways. The resulting reconstructions - let us call them Reconstructions A and B - correspond in an essential way to the two reconstructions Reconstructions I and II - which have been given above for Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument. Reconstructions A and B of the external confirmatory form of argument draw their components from the set of statements (56). Immediately 87

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 181. In (58) (i) the numbers 5', 5", 6' and 6" refer to the rules cited in (50) in § 3.3.3.2. 88 Cf. Kiparsky 1968b: 17. With the term "absolute neutralization" Kiparsky (1968b: 8) refers to the possibility, provided for in generative phonology, that phonological distinctions which are never realized in the "phonetic surface structure" may appear in the lexical representation of morphemes.

106

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

to the right of each statement in (56) appears the statement variable which will be used to symbolize it in a more abstract form of representation in (57) (ii) and (58) (ii). (56)

(i) If a theoretical device contained in the general-linguistic theory is confirmed by the correct predictions it makes about possible phonological changes in one or another language (p), then this theoretical device is psychologically correct (r). (ii) If the theoretical device D is contained in the general-linguistic theory (/>), then it is predicted that the possible linguistic changes Ci, C2,..., C n could have occurred in the language L x (r ~P

The external disconfirmatory argument outlined by Kiparsky in (60) may be analyzed on either one of the patterns of reconstruction A' and B'. This can be done by substituting in A' or B' 1. for the expression "the theoretical device D" the expression "a level of autonomous phonemics", and 2. for the expression "the linguistic changes Ci, C2, ..., C3" the expression "a sound change the environments of which are not morphophonemic and the environments of which cannot be reformulated in terms of the phonetic level without restating exactly the rules that relate the phonetic and the phonemic level". Executed with respect to Reconstruction A', this substitution provides the following analysis of the argument under consideration: (63)

If a level of autonomous phonemics is contained in the general-linguistic theory, then it is predicted that a sound change of which the environments are not morphophonemic, etc. could occur. No sound change of which the environments are not morphophonemic, etc. did occur. A level of autonomous phonemics is disconfirmed and is psychologically incorrect.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

111

Observe that in terms of the Reconstruction B' external confirmatory arguments are demonstrative arguments. Reconstructed as A', however, this form of argument is nondemonstrative. The relative merit of these alternative reconstructions will be commented on in § 4.2.3. For the present, it is sufficient to note that, as in the other external forms of argument, there exists in external disconfirmatory arguments a marked difference in content between the mentalistic claim incorporated in the conclusion and the minor premiss, referring to diachronic phenomena as the factual evidence for this conclusion.96 3.3.4. The Analysis in Perspective To conclude the section which has been dealing with nondemonstrative forms cf argument in transformational grammar as these may be identified by logical analysis, we wish to place the content of the preceding paragraphs in the correct perspective. This we will do by indicating what these paragraphs do not pretend to be. Specifically, we will list a number of claims which should not be read into these paragraphs. First, these paragraphs do not purport to deal exhaustively with all nondemonstrative forms of argument which have been used in the full of transformational grammar. We have attempted to isolate only the major nondemonstrative forms of argument which have been used recently in transformational grammar and which exhibit, as will be shown in the later chapters, methodological properties which are at once problematic and interesting. For example, external generalizing arguments on account of their essential similarity to the internal generalizing arguments exemplified in § 3.3.2.3 - have been expressly omitted from the preceding survey of transformationalist nondemonstrative argument forms. With respect to the various nondemonstrative forms of argument discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is not claimed that they all play an equally important role in terms of the research goals of transformational grammar. In our opinion internal arguments are more widely used than external arguments. Moreover, as regards internal arguments, explanatory and confirmatory arguments are encountered - in a more or less explicit form - more often than are generalizing arguments. In addition, it is not contended that it is out of the question that novel nondemonstrative forms of argument could be developed in coming years in transformational grammar. Note, in passing, that Chomsky, Halle, and Ross, in fact, regard the invention of good arguments of a type previously unknown as the major step whereby advances in any scientific discipline are achieved.97 It is reasonable, however, to expect that the novelty of such new forms of argument will not lie in their incorporating previously unknown rules of inference. It is rather 96 A second instance of the external disconfirmatory form of argument is the one against absolute neutralization the outlines of which Kiparsky presents in (55) (ii) above. 97 Cf. their foreword to Burt 1971: "Needless to say, learning to appreciate and construct good arguments is a never-ending task, for the invention of good arguments of a type previously unknown is the major step whereby advances in any scientific discipline are achieved."

112

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

to be expected that the novel forms of argument, if any, will incorporate known rules of inference and will be new as regards the content of the conclusions and content of the evidential statements which they will contain. As will become clear in chapter 4, what may be expected is a proliferation of those forms of argument which incorporate kinds of external linguistic evidence. Second, as has also been warned in § 3.3.1, not too much theoretical importance should be attached to the general classificatory scheme of nondemonstrative forms of argument which has been adopted in the preceding paragraphs. Although we have attempted to reduce its arbitrariness where possible, this scheme is a typical taxonomy in the sense that it may be rearranged in more than one way without thereby being changed in any essential respect. For example, instead of taking as basic the distinction between external and internal arguments, the "basic" status could have been assigned to the distinction between confirmatory and explanatory arguments. Generalizing arguments could then have been analyzed as a subtype of confirmatory arguments. Note that in its present form the taxonomy under discussion accommodates generalizing arguments in a rather disputable manner. It may be argued that generalizing arguments constitute a meta-form of argument of a special kind to which the distinction between internal and external arguments is not applicable. Third, the terms in which the forms of argument here surveyed have been characterized do not, in the preceding paragraphs, convey any value judgements. That is, by characterizing an argument (form) as "nondemonstrative", we do not mean to imply that this argument (form) is in some sense either "good" or "bad". In the same vein, when characterizing an argument (form) as "external" we are not implicitly judging it to be of lesser merit than one characterized as "internal". Our discussion of those problematic properties of the argument forms here surveyed which bear on the usefulness of these argument forms is reserved for chapters 4 and 5 hereafter.

3.4. THE FORMS OF ARGUMENT BY LINGUISTIC IDENTIFICATION

The method of linguistic identification, as outlined in § 3.2, may be used to check whether in the logical analysis of forms of nondemonstrative argument in transformational grammar major forms of argument have not been overlooked. Unfortunately, the method of linguistic analysis yields meagre results when applied to the metascientific expressions in terms of which transformational grammarians themselves characterize their arguments and the component parts of their arguments. In the first place, by using this method, it is revealed that transformationalists draw from a very large stock of metascientific expressions when referring to properties of their nondemonstrative arguments. The lists given below as (64) merely present typical examples of these expressions and by no means exhaust this stock. (64)

(i) "Assertions", "assumptions", "claims", "conclusions", or "hypotheses"

NONDEMONSTRATTVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

are said to be plausible98, confirmed," verified,100 correct,101 basically right102 unchallenged,103 justified,104, supported,105 consistent with the data,106 to accommodate the facts101 and so on. (ii) "Evidence", "data", or "facts" are said to indicate,109 {provide) support (for),109 suggest,110 not to disprove but severely weaken,111 show,112 throw doubt on the validity of113 cast great doubt on,114 lend plausibility to,115 bear on,116 provide good reason for,111 provide a much stronger basis for,118 "assertions", "assumptions", "claims", "conclusions", or "hypotheses". In the second place, using the method of linguistic identification it soon becomes clear that, barring a few exceptions, transformationalists do not attempt to make sufficiently clear what they intend metascientific expressions such as those in (64) to mean. As a rule no deliberate attempts are made to delimit in an explicit manner the content which a given metascientific expression purports to convey in relation to that of other metascientific expressions. As a consequence, it is next to impossible for the analyst, in most cases, to determine whether terminological distinctions such as, for instance, "confirmed-verified-supported" and "shown-indicated-supported" are, or are not, drawn intentionally in order to reflect underlying conceptual distinctions. In the third place, it is found that both as a group and as individuals transformationalists more often than not use metascientific expressions of the kind in question in a non-systematic manner. Exceptions to this general finding do occur - for example Chomsky's use of the expression "justification" as explicated in § 3.3.2.1, (5) - but are few in number. 98

Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 102; 1972d: 132. For the use of the term "implausible" cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 187; and Postal 1970: 100. »9 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 54. 100 Cf. Chomsky 1972d: 107. i" 1 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 60; Postal 1970: 41, 57. i"2 Cf. Postal 1970: 41. 103 Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 103. 104 c f . Postal 1970: 101, 102. 105 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 17. W6 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 12, 26. 107 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 17, 19, 29. 108 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 32; 1972d: 136; Postal 1970: 37, 63, 68, 69, 79-80, 91, 117. 109 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 24, 26, 54; 1972c: 97; Katz 1970: 235; Postal 1970: 57, 38, 68, 72, 86. Cf. also § 3.5 for an explication of the transformationalist notion of support. " 0 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 15; 1972c: 82; Postal 1970: 51. 111 Cf. Katz 1970: 238-239. 112 Cf. Katz 1970: 235; Kiparsky 1968a: 187; Lakoff 1969: 51; Postal 1970: 51, 71, 93, 100. 113 Cf. Postal 1970: 89, 95. 114 Cf. Postal 1970: 37. Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 37. u « Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 188. 117 a . Katz 1970: 257. 118 Cf. Postal 1970: 62.

114

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

The three foregoing findings about the manner in which transformationalists use metascientific expressions such as those listed in (64) have two important corrollaries. First, it follows that the usefulness of linguistic identification as a method of identifying forms of argument is strictly limited in the case of transformational grammar. If, for example, it is not clear that transformationalists deliberately and consistently use the two expressions "The evidence E indicates the conclusion C" and "The evidence E supports the conclusion C" as expressions distinct in meaning, then it is not admissible to conclude that there occur in transformational grammar two distinct forms of nondemonstrative argument, the one incorporating a logical relation of indication and the other a logical relation of support. Second, it may be inferred from the above findings that at a level of methodological awareness transformationalists are unclear as to what functions can be fulfilled by nondemonstrative arguments. If one took metascientific expressions such as the ones listed in (64) as true reflections of what transformationalists believe the functions of nondemonstrative arguments to be, one would end up with rather peculiar nondemonstrative forms of argument. For example, it would then become necessary to allow for the existence of a nondemonstrative form of argument that was "conclusive"! The metascientific expression used by Kiparsky to characterize the nature of a possible external confirmatory argument for a level of autonomous phonemics would lead one to provide for just such a form of nondemonstrative argument: (65) The psychological reality of levels of representation which emerge in different linguistic theories is subject to verification and falsification by diachronic evidence along the same lines. A question to be asked whenever some level of representation is proposed as linguistically relevant is whether this level functions in linguistic change. For example, it would be a striking and, to my mind, CONCLUSIVE piece of evidence for the reality of autonomous ('taxonomic') phonemics if it could be shown that there were sound changes whose conditioning environment could be stated naturally only at precisely this level.119 Rather than to provide for a "conclusive" form of nondemonstrative argument, the analyst should interpret the occurrence of the metascientific expression "conclusive" in (65) as indicating either terminological carelessness on Kiparsky's part or unclarity in Kiparsky's "methodological" mind about the possible functions which could be assigned to nondemonstrative forms of argument. In conclusion it should be noted that the generally incoherent way in which transformational grammarians use metascientific expressions to describe the properties of their nondemonstrative arguments does not by any means imply that these arguments as elucidated by logical analysis will turn out to be logical monstrosities. It is well known that, more often than not, what scientists have to say about the properties of their methodological tools fails to reflect the real properties of these devices.120 Nevertheless, as will be argued in the following chapters of this book, the insufficiently deliberate manner in which transformational grammarians currently 119 120

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 183. The small capitals are ours - B.-W. Cf. Kuhn 1962: 43 ff.

NONDEMONSTRATTVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

115

operate at a level of methodological awareness does have serious consequences for the rationality of present mtra-paradigmatic debates in their field of inquiry.

3.5. THE TRANSFORMATIONALIST NOTION OF SUPPORT

In § 2.3 it was pointed out that the basic relation holding between the premisses and conclusions of nondemonstrative arguments is described by logicians as one of "inconclusive or non-conclusive support", 121 "evidential support" 122 or, simply, "support". 123 This basic relation of support has various manifestations, however, including those denoted by the terms "confirmation", "sustenance", "indication" and "explanation".124 One of the objectives of an inquiry into the nature of nondemonstrative inference in one or another field of inquiry should accordingly be to determine what the various forms are in which the basic logical relation of support occurs in this field. The question, then, to be considered in this paragraph is: In what form(s) is the basic logical relation of support manifested in transformational grammar? To raise this question is to inquire into the content of the transformationalist notion of support. The question just raised was answered indirectly in § 3.3, where a logical analysis was presented of the major forms of nondemonstrative argument used in transformational grammar. If we disregard generalizing arguments as constituting a secondary form of argument in transformational grammar and, by implication, consider explanatory and confirmatory arguments as the primary nondemonstrative forms of argument in this field, then we may say that in transformational grammar the basic logical relation of support is realized 1. either as an explanatory relation, the act of reductive inference being done regressively, 2. or as a confirmatory relation, the act of reductive inference being done progressively. This entails the following: to say in transformational grammar in a methodologically defensible manner that there is support for a given hypothesis is, more often than not, to say 1. either that this hypothesis is a plausible explanation for a range of puzzling grammatical or general-linguistic phenomena, 2. or that this hypothesis yields predictions which are borne out by hitherto unobserved grammatical or general-linguistic phenomena. 121 122 123 124

Cf. e.g. Alexander 1969: 25, 30, 53; Rescher 1964: 57. Cf. e.g. Tornebohm 1966. Cf. e.g. Chisholm 1966: 52; Cohen 1970: 12 ff.; Hilpinen 1968: 7. Cf. § 2.3.

116

NONDEMONSTRATTVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

Transformational grammarians do actually use the term "support", among other expressions, in the two senses specified above. As regards the "explanatory" sense of this term, Chomsky, for example, asserts that the facts about derived nominals on account of their being explained by the lexicalist hypothesis "give strong empirical support to the lexicalist hypothesis".125 In its "confirmatory" sense the term "support" is used by Postal, for example, who sees support for the strike-like analysis in the fact that this analysis correctly predicts that particular grammatical properties of strike sentences will be found to be properties of remind sentences as well.126 On the basis of the insufficient rigidity with which transformational grammarians use metascientific expressions such as "support" it may be predicted that they would use the term "support" in other senses that differ from the above two. This fact, nevertheless, does not invalidate our finding that the content of the transformationalist notion of support, insofar as it is explicable in a methodologically defensible manner, has two major aspects: an explanatory aspect and a confirmatory aspect.

3.6. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. The following distinctions define a useful framework within which it is possible to perform a logical analysis of the nondemonstrative forms of argument isolable in transformational grammar: (i) as regards kinds of linguistic evidence - the distinction between internal and external linguistic evidence; (ii) as regards the function(s) of nondemonstrative arguments - the threefold distinction in terms of which a conclusion is justified as an explanatory statement, or as a statement confirmed by its correct predictions, or as a general statement; (iii) as regards the logical structure of arguments - the distinction between, on the one hand, those arguments that incorporate the inference rule of reduction which may be applied either regressively or progressively - and, on the other hand, those arguments that incorporate the inference rule of simple or enumerative induction. 2. Characterized provisionally and in substantive terms, internal linguistic evidence may be said to comprise synchronic linguistic data about grammatical and generallinguistic properties of linguistic structures and rules. 3. External linguistic evidence may be viewed, again in substantive terms, as comprising all those kinds of data - e.g. diachronic data, statistical data, neuropsychological data - which transformationalists adduce in support of grammatical 125 126

Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 26. Cf. Postal 1970: 58.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

117

and general-linguistic claims but which do not exhibit the features peculiar to internal linguistic evidence. 4. The rule of reductive inference authorizes a scientist, in regard to a conditional statement, to infer the antecedent from a conjunction of the conditional statement with its consequent. 5. If the reduction is done regressively, the starting point for the act of reductive inference is the consequent. From the consequent, which is known to be true, the inference proceeds to the antecedent as a plausible explanation for the consequent. 6. If the reduction is done progressively, the starting point for the act of reductive inference is the antecedent, whose truth-value is unknown. From the antecedent predictions are derived which, if true, are said to confirm the antecedent. 7. The rule of simple or enumerative induction gives authority for a property which has been established as typical of a limited number of the members of a class to be generalized to all the members of this class. 8. Within the framework mentioned in (1) above, the following major nondemonstrative forms of argument are identifiable in transformational grammar: internal explanatory arguments, internal confirmatory arguments, external explanatory arguments, external confirmatory arguments, and generalizing arguments. 9. Within the framework of internal explanatory arguments, internal linguistic evidence is presented which justifies a grammatical or general-linguistic hypothesis in the sense that this hypothesis constitutes a plausible explanation for the puzzling phenomena referred to in the evidence. These arguments are reductive arguments, the act of reductive inference being done regressively. 10. An internal explanatory argument is nondemonstrative in the sense that it is always logically possible for the puzzling phenomena to be "reduced" to some alternative explanatory statement. 11. Within the framework of internal confirmatory arguments, internal linguistic evidence is presented which justifies a grammatical or general-linguistic claim in the sense that this hypothesis yields correct predictions about the phenomena referred to in the evidence. These arguments are reductive, the act of reductive inference being done progressively. 12. An internal confirmatory argument is nondemonstrative in the sense that it is always logically possible for the correct predictions derived from a given statement to be derived from some alternative statement as well. 13. Within the framework of external explanatory arguments, external linguistic evidence is presented by which a linguistic hypothesis involving a mentalistic claim is

118

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

justified in the sense that this hypothesis provides an explanation for the phenomena referred to in the evidence. 14. On account of its (regressive) reductive nature, an external explanatory argument is nondemonstrative. Moreover, such an argument is ampliative or contentextending in the sense that there exists a distinct difference in content between what is provided as factual evidence and what is asserted, in the conclusion, about a mental state of affairs. 15. Within the framework of external confirmatory arguments, external linguistic evidence is presented by which a linguistic hypothesis involving a mentalistic claim is justified in the sense that the evidence shows that this hypothesis makes correct predictions about the phenomena referred to in the evidence. 16. On account of their being (progressive) reductive arguments, external confirmatory arguments are nondemonstrative. Moreover, like external explanatory arguments, these arguments are ampliative in the sense that there exists a distinct difference in content between what is provided as factual evidence and what is asserted, in the conclusion, about a mental state of affairs. 17. Generalizing arguments, in transformational grammar, are linked to confirmatory (and disconfirmatory) arguments. In one function, they serve as a framework within which, from the fact that a limited number of checked predictions of a hypothesis are true [false], the inference is drawn that all the predictions of this hypothesis are true [false]. These arguments incorporate the rule of simple or enumerative induction. 18. These generalizing arguments are nondemonstrative for the reason that the logical possibility cannot be ruled out that, even if all the checked predictions of a hypothesis are true [false], there may be at least one unchecked prediction which is false [true]. 19. External explanatory arguments have, as a correlate, a negative form of argument within the framework of which a linguistic hypothesis involving a mentalistic claim is argued against on account of there being one or another external linguistic phenomenon which it is incapable of providing an explanation for. 20. External confirmatory arguments have as a similar kind of correlate a negative or disconfirmatory form of argument within the framework of which a linguistic hypothesis, involving a mentalistic claim, is disconfirmed on account of there being one or another external linguistic phenomenon which it makes false predictions about. 21. What is remarked by transformational grammarians, at a level of metascientific abstraction, about the properties of their nondemonstrative arguments does not yield much by way of insight into the properties which these arguments have in reality. The reason for this is that, in general, the manner in which these scholars use the metascientific expressions which they intend to be descriptive of the properties of the arguments under consideration is unsystematic and insufficiently motivated.

NONDEMONSTRATIVE FORMS OF ARGUMENT

119

22. To state in a methodologically defensible way in transformational grammar that a grammatical or general-linguistic hypothesis has support is in essence (i) either to assert that there exists a range of grammatical or general-linguistic phenomena for which this hypothesis provides an explanation, (ii) or to assert that there exists a range of grammatical or general-linguistic phenomena about which this hypothesis makes true predictions.

APPENDIX 3

3.1. AN INTERNAL EXPLANATORY LEXICALIST ARGUMENT BY CHOMSKY

In his paper "Remarks on nominalization" Chomsky presents arguments intended to justify the hypothesis that English derived nomináis should be treated by extending the base component of the grammar rather than by extending its transformational component. One in particular of these arguments may be analyzed as an internal explanatory argument. The derived nomináis in question are exemplified by eagerness, refusal, and criticism in (66)

(i) John's eagerness to please. (ii) John's refusal of the offer. (iii) John's criticism of the book.

Chomsky's proposed treatment of such derived nomináis implies that they should not be transformationally derived from the deep structures of the respective sentences (67) (i), (ii), (iii). (67)

(i) John is eager to please. (ii) John refused the offer. (iii) John criticized the book.

Rather, according to Chomsky, what should be transformationally derived from the deep structures of (67) are the gerundive nomináis occurring in (68). (68)

(i) John's being eager to please. (ii) John's refusing the book. (iii) John's criticizing the book.

The alternative ways of generating derived nomináis are summed up by Chomsky as follows: (69) We might extend the base rules to accomodate the derived nomináis directly (I will refer to this as the 'lexicalist position'), thus simplifying the transformational component;

APPENDIX III

121

or, alternatively, we might simplify the base structures, excluding these forms, and derive them by some extension of the transformational apparatus (the 'transformationalist position'). 127 In defense of the lexicalist position Chomsky draws attention to three important differences between derived and gerundive nomináis: (70)

(i)

Whereas the productivity of derived nomináis is restricted, the transformation that gives gerundive nomináis applies quite freely. (ii) Whereas the semantic interpretation of gerundive nomináis is "straightforward" in terms of the grammatical relations of the respective underlying propositions in the deep structure, the semantic relations between derived nomináis and the associated propositions are quite varied and idiosyncratic. (iii) Whereas gerundive nomináis have not the internal structure of noun phrases, derived nomináis do have this structure. 128

The observations (70) (i)-(iii) Chomsky adduces in justification of the lexicalist position by arguing that, whereas the grammarian in terms of the lexicalist position is able to EXPLAIN these observations, it is impossible for him to do so in terms of the transformationalist position. Chomsky summarizes his argument as follows: (71) (i) Summarizing these observations, we see that the lexicalist hypothesis explains a variety of facts of the sort illustrated by examples [6] through [10] (in part, in conjunction with other assumptions about underlying structures, such as [12]). The transformationalist hypothesis is no doubt consistent with these facts, but it derives no support from them, since it would also be consistent with the discovery, were it a fact, that derived nomináis exist in all cases in which we have gerundive nomináis. Hence the facts that have been cited give strong empirical support to the lexicalist hypothesis and no support to the transformationalist hypothesis. Other things being equal, then, they would lead us to accept the lexicalist hypothesis, from which these facts follow. 129 (ii) The properties of gerundive nomináis follow directly from the assumption that there is a transformational process of gerundive nominalization. The very different cluster of properties of derived nomináis follow directly from the assumption that they are not transformationally derived, but rather that the base component of the grammar contains a phrase 127

Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 17. Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 18-21. 129 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 26. In this quotation the numbers "[6] through [10]" refer to sentences such as: 128

John is easy (difficult) to please. ( = [6] [i]) John's being easy (difficult) to please. ( = [7] [i]) * John's easiness (difficulty) to please. ( = [8] [i]) John's eagerness of please. ( = [9] [i]) John's being eager to please. ( = [10] [i])

By [12] Chomsky denotes the following underlying structure: the stories [+ cause] [s he was amused at the stories]s From this structure it is possible to derive the stories amused him. (Chomsky 1972b: 24).

122

APPENDIX III

structure schema that applies to all lexical categories (i.e. noun, verb and adjective), and that certain lexical items may appear in more than one lexical category. 130

3.2. A CONFIRMATORY FORM OF ARGUMENT IN EARLY TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR One of the methodological contributions which early transformational grammar made to the field of linguistics was a particular confirmatory f o r m of argument. The development of this form of argument was made possible by the view that a grammar is a system of rules one of whose functions is that of making predictions about the properties of sentences. In more detail, this view may be outlined as follows: 1.

A grammar for a language is a system of rules which explicitly enumerates

all and only the grammatical sentences of the language, assigning to each sentence a structural description which explains the grammatical properties o f the sentence. 2.

These rules are established on the basis of a finite corpus of data, consisting o f

observed utterances and of linguistic intuitions which native speakers allegedly have in connection with these utterances. 3.

The rules g o beyond this corpus, however, by generating infinitely many sentences

and by making predictions about the grammatical properties of these infinitely many sentences. 4.

If some of these "surplus" sentences are realized as utterances, it becomes

possible to check against the linguistic intuitions of native speakers whether the sentences in question have or do not have the grammatical properties predicted. 130

Chomsky (1972d: 160-161) proceeds by constructing on the basis of the properties of derived nominals a further argument for adopting a level of deep structure: "These assumptions account for the observed convergence of formal properties - that is, the fact that derived nominals have one set of properties and gerundive nominals an entirely different set. Of critical importance, in the present connection, is the fact that the explanation for the convergence of properties in the case of derived nominals depends on the assumption that deep structures exist the appropriate explanatory principle is formulated in terms of the properties of base structure;;. If, on the other hand, we were to suppose that each nominal, gerundive or derived, is generated from an initial phrase-marker representing its semantic interpretation, we would fail entirely to explain why the gerundive nominals, with a regular semantic relation to the associated sentence, have the formal properties of sentences, whereas the derived nominals, which would have a variety of different sources, exhibit the convergence of formal properties just noted (i.e. in essence, the properties of noun phrases), differing from gerundive nominals in this respect. All of this would be simply a remarkable accident, from this point of view. The convergence of formal properties and the relation between range of meaning and correspondence to either noun phrase (in the case of derived nominals) or sentence (in the case of gerundive nominals) cannot be explained in terms of universal semantics or properties of transformations - the only devices available to generative semantics for expressing regularities at early stages of derivation - though it can be explained immediately in terms of some general conditions on deep structures. Notice that the failure is one of explanatory, not descriptive adequacy. There is no doubt that the facts noted can be described in a grammar that derives all of these forms by transformation."

APPENDIX III

123

5. Correct predictions about these properties confirm the rules ( - incorrect predictions disconfirm the rules). This form of confirmatory argument coupled to the concept of a grammar as a system of rules is informally described by, for example, Bach in his introductory text-book to early transformational grammar. 131 3.3. A N INTERNAL CONFIRMATORY LEXICALIST A R G U M E N T BY CHOMSKY

As pointed out in appendix 3.1, Chomsky proposes as an explanation for the grammatical properties of derived nominals such as eagerness, refusal, and criticism that they be generated by means of extending the base of the grammar of English, hence by leaving the transformational apparatus fundamentally unchanged. Having presented the internal explanatory argument dealt with in appendix 3.1, he proceeds to argue that if derived nominals are considered to be base structures with the internal structure of noun phrases, then it "follows", i.e. it is predicted, that these derived nominals should have the typical grammatical properties of their respective basestructure correlates.132 This prediction Chomsky then checks against a number of asserted grammatical properties of the relevant base-structures, these base-structures being noun phrases. Chomsky finds, for example, that 1. derived nominals, similarly with noun phrases, do not contain aspect; 133 2. derived nominals pluralize and take determiners and adjectives in the same way as do the corresponding noun phrases.134 These two findings are in accord with the lexicalist prediction that derived nominals will exhibit the same grammatical properties as are exhibited by the corresponding noun phrases. In the correctness of this prediction Chomsky sees a confirmation of his lexicalist hypothesis, observing that "evidence in favor of the lexicalist position appears to be fairly substantial". 135 If the properties which the lexicalist hypothesis predicts that derived nominals must have are symbolized as Pi, P2, ..., P n , then this internal confirmatory argument by Chomsky may be reconstructed schematically as (72). 131

Cf. Bach 1964: § 8.4.; and Botha 1968: § 3.2.3.4. Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 26. 133 "Returning to the main theme, notice that aspect will of course not appear in noun phrases, and therefore, on the lexicalist hypothesis, will be absent from derived nominals (though not gerundive nominals)" - Chomsky 1972b: 29. And: "... derived nominals do not contain elements that are unique to verb phrases and never appear in other noun phrases, specifically, aspect. There is, in other words, no derived nominal containing perfect or progressive" - Chomsky 1972d: 159. 134 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 29. Chomsky (1972d: 159) sums up this point as follows: "... derived nominals have the internal structure of noun phrases - that is, many of them pluralize and take determiners and internal adjectives (John's several proofs of the theorem, John's uncanny resemblance to Bill, the remarkable proof of the theorem that John presented, etc.)". 135 Cf. Chomsky 1972b: 30. 132

124 (72)

APPENDIX III

If the lexicalist proposal for generating derived nominals is adopted, then it follows that derived nominals must have the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n of the corresponding base-structures (noun phrases). Derived nominals have the grammatical properties Pi, P2, ..., P n . .•. The lexicalist proposal for generating derived nominals should be adopted.

On account of its being a typical regressive reductive argument, this lexicalist argument by Chomsky is nondemonstrative.

3.4. A GENERALIZING ARGUMENT BY McCAWLEY As a further instance of the generalizing form of argument, we may examine an argument advanced by McCawley in his paper "The role of semantics in a grammar". This argument is advanced in support of the claim by McCawley that selectional restrictions are definable solely in terms of properties of semantic representations. McCawley maintains (73) ... that the various nonsemantic features attached to nouns, for example, proper versus common, grammatical gender, grammatical number, and so on play no role in their selection. All the verbs which have suggested themselves to me as possible counter-examples to this assertion turn out in fact to display selection based on some semantic properties. For example, the verb name might at first glance seem to have a selectional restriction involving the feature [proper]: 28. They named their son John. 29. T h e y named their son that boy. However, there are in fact perfectly good sentences with something other than a proper noun in the place in question: 30. They named their son something outlandish. The selectional restriction is thus that the second object denote a name rather than that it have a proper noun as its head. Regarding grammatical number, verbs such as count might seem to demand a plural object: 31. I counted the boys. 32. *I counted the boy. However, there are also sentences with grammatically singular objects: 33. I counted the crowd. The selectional restriction on count is not that the object be plural but that it denote a set of things rather than an individual. Similarly, there is no verb in English which allows for its subject just those noun phrases which may pronominalize to she, namely noun phrases denoting women, ships, and countries. I accordingly conclude that selectional restrictions are definable solely in terms of properties of semantic representations and that to determine whether a constituent meets or violates a selectional restriction it is necessary to examine its semantic representation and nothing else.136 136

Cf. McCawley 1968: 134-135. In a later article "Interpretive semantics meets Frankenstein"

APPENDIX III

125

At first glance, it seems that one has in (73) an uncomplicated generalizing argument which may be reconstructed in terms of simple induction as (74) and in terms of reduction as (75). (74)

The selectional restrictions of name are based on semantic properties. The selectional restrictions of count are based on semantic properties. All selectional restrictions are based on semantic properties.

(75)

If all selectional restrictions are based on semantic properties, then the selectional restrictions of name and count are based on semantic properties. The selectional restrictions of name and count are based on semantic properties. All selectional restrictions are based on semantic properties.

Katz apparently interprets the quoted remarks by McCawley as containing an uncomplicated generalizing argument such as (74) or (75). (76) But even if what McCawley says about these cases could be accepted, his conclusion... would not follow. Assuming his examples show that syntactic selection does not operate in sentences of the sort he considers, they cannot show that it does not operate anywhere else. McCawley's argument is like that of the defendant who offers to produce, for every ten witnesses brought forth by the prosecution to testify that they saw the defendant commit the crime, ten others to testify that they did not see him do it. His claim cannot be established by a few examples that conformed to it, but it can be refuted by one that does not. 137

On our interpretation, however, the argumentation presented by McCawley in the remarks quoted above is not to be reconstructed as either (74) or (75). On account of the role played here by the notion "examples of counter-examples", these remarks should be analyzed as containing two arguments: a confirmatory argument and, attached to this, an implicit generalizing argument. The confirmatory argument may be reconstructed as (77). (77)

If selectional restrictions are based solely on semantic properties, then the selectional restrictions of all apparent counter-examples should also turn out to display selection based on semantic properties. The selectional restrictions of all apparent counter-examples turn out to be based on semantic properties. Selectional restrictions are based solely on semantic properties.

( = 1971a), McCawley draws a distinction between a strong and a weak form of the claim that "only semantic information plays a role in selection". The strong form of the claim is "that selectional restrictions have to do only with semantic structure and have nothing directly to do with lexical items" (McCawley 1971a: 290). In its weak form the claim is "that a selectional restriction imposed by an item (whether by a lexical item or by a semantic item) is a presupposition about what an item in semantic structure purports to denote" (McCawley 1971a: 290). 137 Cf. Katz 1970: 237.

126

APPENDIX III

The generalizing argument linked up with the above confirmatory argument exists by virtue of the fact that the apparent counter-examples for which McCawley attempts to show - namely, for name and count - that their selection is in fact based on semantic properties are limited in number to no more than two. His findings with respect to name and count McCawley then implicitly generalizes to all apparent counter-examples. Observe, that McCawley does not assert that name and count are the only apparent counter-examples to the hypothesis in question. He refers in so many words to them as examples of counter-examples. In a later paper, "Interpretive semantics meets Frankenstein", he in fact makes provision for the existence of real counterexamples to the strong form of this hypothesis. The generalizing argument under consideration may be reconstructed either in terms of simple induction as (78) or in terms of reduction as (79). (78)

The selection of the apparent counter-example name is in fact based on semantic properties. The selection of the apparent counter-example count is in fact based on semantic properties. .•. The selection of all apparent counter-examples is in fact based on semantic properties.

(79)

If the selection of all apparent counter-examples is in fact based on semantic properties, then the selection of the apparent counter-examples name and count should be based on semantic properties. The selection of the apparent counter-examples name and count is based on semantic properties. The selection of all apparent counter-examples is in fact based on semantic properties.

Observe, in conclusion, that the use of the generalizing argument (78) in conjunction with the confirmatory argument (77) constitutes, from a debater's point of view, a quite clever stratagem. This stratagem allows the debater, on the basis of a highly limited amount of factual evidence - the data about the selection of name and count -, to argue in a persuasive way for the acceptance of the general-linguistic hypothesis that selection is a question of semantics.183 3.5. THE CHOMSKY-HALLE EXPOSITION OF THE BRACES ARGUMENT

Chomsky and Halle have taken over Kiparsky's external explanatory argument for the brace convention, outlining this argument as follows in The sound pattern of English: 138

For Katz's attack on McCawley's "semantic" formulation of the selectional restrictions of name and count cf. Katz 1970. For McCawley's rejoinder cf. McCawley 1971a. This difference of opinion between Katz and McCawley is not relevant to the present stage of our discussion. We will come back to it in § 5.2.3.

APPENDIX III

127

(80) Implicit in the brace notation is the assumption that languages tend to place partially identical rules such as those in [2] next to one another in the ordered sequence of rules that constitutes the phonological component of a grammar: it is only when partially identical rules are adjacent to one another that the brace notation can be exploited. It has been noted by Kiparsky (forthcoming) that phonological change provides evidence in support of this assumption. One of the examples discussed by Kiparsky is the evolution of the rules laxing vowels before consonant clusters (see (20III), chapter 5) and in the pre-penultimate syllables of a word (see 20IV), chapter 5). The historical antecedents of these two rules differed from their modern counterparts in that preconsonantal laxing took place before three (instead of two) or more consonants, whereas trisyllabic laxing required that the vowel be followed by two (instead of one) consonant. The historical change, then, was that both of these rules decreased by one the number of consonants that must follow the vowel to be laxed. This parallelism may be regarded as a mere coincidence, as has been the approach in every treatment of English historical phonology known to us. Alternatively, and more satisfactorily, in view of the fact that there is no evidence to show that the changes in the two rules were due to separate processes, the parallelism may be regarded as being the result of a single change: the generalization of the schema [6] to the schema [7] by deletion of one of the consonants that must follow the vowel to be laxed.

The characterization of the change as a single process, however, presupposes the existence of rule schemata as entities to which phonological changes may apply. Since schemata exist in a grammar only by virtue of conventions such as those discussed in this section, the examples just cited might be regarded as evidence in support of the reality of rule schemata and the conventions governing their use. 139

3.6. WEIGL-BIERWISCH EXTERNAL EXPLANATORY ARGUMENTS Weigl and Bierwisch in their paper "Neuropsychology and linguistics" advance a number of arguments which may be analyzed as external explanatory arguments containing, as the external linguistic evidence, various neuropsychological data. In the introductory paragraphs to their paper they raise a number of general questions relating to the possible functions of neuropsychological data as external linguistic evidence: (81) What can be inferred from observations made with respect to the psychological status of linguistic competence as described by linguists? Are linguistic assumptions further justified by such neuropsychological evidence because they are able to provide explanations for particular types of disorders? Might pathological evidence reveal particular gaps in the scope of competence as described by linguists?140 Subsequently, Weigl and Bierwisch present data about the language pathologies of given patients. These data constitute neuropsychological evidence in justification of 139

Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333-334. In this quotation [2] refers to the partially identical rules which we have presented as (47) in § 3.3.3.2. 140 Cf. Weigl and Bierwisch 1970: 2.

128

APPENDIX III

the psychological reality of two linguistic hypotheses: 1. the hypothesis that the lexical knowledge of the fluent speaker is structured in terms of semantic fields,141 2. the hypothesis that there exist "transformational relations" between "sentences" and "deep structures". 142 The authors view these data - whose bulk precludes their being presented here - as justifying the given hypotheses in the sense that these hypotheses provide an explanation for the pathologies on which the data bear.

3.7. A N EXTERNAL CONFIRMATORY ARGUMENT BY POSTAL

In his discussion of the role played by the notion of markedness in the theory of phonology, Postal in support of a M-U decision with respect to the phonological feature [Glottalized] presents the outlines of an argument which may be reconstructed as an external confirmatory argument. This discussion is found in Postal's book Aspects of phonological theory.1*3 Before dealing with this argument, it is necessary to consider briefly the conceptual basis of the markedness version of the theory of generative phonology. The markedness theory of phonology provides for two levels of lexical (phonological) representation: 1. a level of M and U representation, where features have two possible values: "Marked" and "Unmarked", and 2. a less abstract level of matrix representation where features have " + " and "—" values. 144 The "crucial" and "fundamental" assumption is that the latter level of representation is entirely a function of universal rules, the so-called marking conventions, which operate on the former level by substituting tor the M-U specifications the appropriate " + " and "—" specifications.145 A marking convention not basically different f r o m (82) will, for example, express the fact that it is natural for segments which are [ + Vocalic, — Consonantal] to be voiced. (82) [U Voice] -> [ + Voice] /

141

+ Vocalic — Consonantal

Cf. Weigl and Bierwisch 1970: 13-14. Cf. Weigl and Bierwisch 1970: 15-16. 143 This monograph will be referred to as "Postal 1968". 144 For the reasons for distinguishing between these two levels of lexical representation cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 400-402; Postal 1968: 165-166; and Botha 1971a: 69 ff. 145 Cf. Postal 1968: 167. 142

APPENDiX III

129

Postal is well aware of the fact that "accepting such a theory commits one to determining for each feature value in each context grounds for a non-arbitrary choice of M or U representation. That is, accepting such a theory involves the responsibility for discovering the right class of universal rules interpreting M and U representations as + and —," 1 4 6 Though considering this a "vast undertaking", Postal points out that "there is already a great deal of knowledge, and many M - U decisions can be made with some confidence". 147 In Aspects of phonological theory Postal is a proponent of mentalism. 1 4 8 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Postal takes M-U decisions to embody claims as to psychological reality. In justification of certain M-U decisions Postal presents the outlines of a number of external arguments containing as the evidence data about statistical, psychological, neurophysiological, historical, dialectal, articulatory, and perceptual aspects of particular natural languages. One of these skeleton arguments is analyzable as an external confirmatory argument containing dialectal and historical evidence for a M-U decision involving glottalization. The outlines of this argument are contained in the following remarks by Postal: (83) ... one would expect, for example, that given two series of related segments, one of which is of the Unmarked type, that sound change will frequently merge the Marked with the Unmarked, or change the Marked in some other way. Hence one would expect to find dialects differing in that, for example, one had two seriesof consonants, one Glottalized and the other not, while the other had only non-Glottalized consonants which were cognate with both these series in the former, etc. But opposite situations in which there is loss or merger of 'normal' to 'non-normal' types should be extremely rare or nonexistent. 149

Fleshing out the skeleton argument outlined in (83), one may reconstruct it as the external confirmatory argument (84). (84)

If [—Glottalized] is the unmarked value for the feature [Glottalized], then it is predicted that a pair of dialects, D i and D2, will be found which differ in that, for example, D i has two series of consonants, one series Glottalized and the other not, whereas D? has only non-Glottalized consonants, non-Glottalized consonants which are cognate with both of the consonant series of Di. Dialectal differences such as that described in the consequent of the above conditional statement do occur. .'. [— Glottalized] should be regarded as the urmarked value for the feature [Glottalized] (where the conclusion embodies, in addition, a mentalistic claim).

146

Cf. Postal 1968: 168. Cf. Postal 1968: 168. 148 That Postal is a mentalist in one or another sense is clear from, among other things, the views which he holds as to the nature of phonetic representations (cf. Postal 1968: 31, 33 ff., 97,107, 273 if., 290 ff.) and of sound change (cf. Postal 1968: 269 fT.). 149 Cf. Postal 1968: 170. 147

4

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

4.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the preceding chapters it was made clear that in empirical science nondemonstrative arguments are logical structures within the framework of which evidence is presented for a hypothesis which exceeds this evidence in content. 1 On account of their ampliative, i.e. content-extending, nature nondemonstrative arguments do not have the logical property of necessary truth-preservingness.2 Consequently, it does not make sense to attempt to judge the merit of nondemonstrative arguments with respect tc levels of merit such as those of formal validity and soundness.3 For evaluating nondemonstrative arguments what is required is a special theory about the distinctive sort of logical rectitude attributable to nondemonstrative arguments and about the potential virtues such arguments may have in empirical science. One possible instance of such a theory was outlined in an informal manner in § 2.5. This theory took the form of a system of three levels of merit: the levels of support, acceptability, and persuasive power. At the level of support, the merit of the proposition constituting the conclusion is assessed in relation to the propositions presenting the evidence for that conclusion.4 These latter propositions were referred to as "evidential statements". The level of acceptability is the level at which it is determined how acceptable the hypothesized conclusion is as an explanation to a puzzling state of affairs.5 Finally, the merit which a nondemonstrative argument, taken as a whole, has as a vehicle of persuasion is judged at the level of persuasive power.6 In dealing with the factors which determine the relative merit of nondemonstrative arguments at the level of support, it was pointed out that at this level these factors comprise particular properties of evidential statements and of evidential variables. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Cf. § 2.3 for this characterization of nondemonstrative arguments. This point was explicated in § 2.3. Cf. § 2.5.1 for this point. Cf. § 2.5.3. Cf. § 2.5.4. Cf. § 2.5.5.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

131

These properties were further identified as including at least the following five: the logical and qualitative relevance of the evidential statements with respect to the conclusion proposition, the number of the evidential statements bearing positively on this latter proposition, the number of the evidential statements bearing negatively on this proposition, the rank or degree of qualitative relevanct of the evidence presented in the evidential statements that bear positively on the conclusion proposition, and the variety in the mutually independent evidential variables from which evidence is drawn that bears positively on this proposition. 7 The factors fixing the relative merit of nondemonstrative arguments at the level of acceptability include, among other things, particular properties of evidential statements and of evidential variables. The properties of evidential statements and of evidential variables listed above as determinants of the support for the conclusion proposition were all five of them found to contribute indirectly to the acceptability of the hypothesized conclusions as well. In addition, the epistemological property of the truth of the evidential statements and the pragmatic factor of the availability of evidential statements bearing positively on the hypothesized conclusion are two further determinants of the relative merit which nondemonstrative arguments have at the level of acceptability. 8 The remarks on the merit of nondemonstrative arguments summarized above have two major implications for the practice of evaluating such arguments. First, in order to assess the relative merit of a nondemonstrative argument at the levels of support and acceptability, it must be determined both what are the relevant properties of the evidential statement(s) incorporated in this argument and what are the relevant p.operties of the evidential variable(s) to which these statements refer. Second, in order to determine whether a particular evidential statement or a particular evidential variable does or does not possess a particular property, it must be known what are the general conditions on assigning such a property to such an evidential statement or evidential variable. This brings us to the point at which it is possible to state what chapters 4 and 5 of this study are about, what their goals are, and what questions these chapters will raise. These are chapters about questions of evidence in transformational grammar. They contain an analysis of a number of difficulties encountered in attempts to determine in a nonarbitrary manner the following: whether evidential statements and evidential variables do, or do not, have certain crucial - logical and epistemological - properties as these statements and variables figure in certain forms of transformationalist arguments. The ultimate goal of these chapters is to show that in the face of these difficulties it is virtually impossible to assess in a nonarbitrary manner the merit that instances of these forms of argument have at the level of support. Among the properties of evidential statements and evidential variables alluded to above two will here receive special attention: 7 8

Cf. § 2.5.3. Cf. § 2.5.4.

132

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

1. in chapter 4, the property of the QUALITATIVE RELEVANCE of certain external linguistic variables from which evidence has been drawn for, among others, mentalistic general-linguistic and grammatical hypotheses, and 2. in chapter 5, the property of the RELIABILITY of certain evidential statements which present linguistic intuitions of native speakers as evidence for grammatical hypotheses. In addition, we will briefly outline in chapter 5 some of the questions concerning 3. the property of the COMPREHENSIVENESS of sets of evidential statements presenting internal linguistic evidence for genernl-linguistic and grammatical hypotheses, and 4. the property of the INDEPENDENCE both of certain variables of linguistic evidence and of the evidential statements referring to these variables. It is not being suggested that the above four are the only methodologically interesting and problematic properties of the evidential statements and evidential variables figuring in transformational grammar. The special interest of these four properties derives from the way in which their problematic nature has contributed to the inconclusiveness of current intra-paradigmatic controversies in transformational grammar. The analysis of what is problematic with respect to each of these properties will be guided by two questions : 1. What are the conditions under which the methodological property P may be assigned in transformational grammar to the kind of evidential statement S or the kind of evidential variable V ? 2. Are these conditions of "property assignment" sufficiently clear and sufficiently well justified to guarantee that the assignment of the methodological property P to an individual evidential statement 5 or to a given piece of evidence e will be a NONARBITRARY decision? In dealing with these two questions with respect to external linguistic evidence and internal linguistic evidence we hope to show what are the limitations on the current use of these kinds of evidence in transformational grammar. Before turning to the question of the qualitative relevance of external linguistic evidence in transformational grammar, let us first briefly consider the general question of how conditions of evidence fit into the logic of justification of a field of inquiry. As component parts of the logic of justification of a field of inquiry certain conditions C x , C y , C z of evidence - e.g. conditions of relevance - have the function of determining WHETHER OR NOT a conclusion proposition P is supported by a given set S of evidential statements. Given that the set S of evidential statements is found to lend support to the conclusion proposition P, the field may have further conditions C a , Cb, C c of evidence - e.g. conditions of evidential comprehensiveness and independence -

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

133

such that these conditions determine the EXTENT of the support conferred by the set S of evidential statements upon the proposition P under consideration. The latter conditions C a , Ob, C c of evidence fulfill their methodological function in a logical foim reconstructible as the major premiss of a demonstrative argument. This demonstrative argument is linked to the nondemonstrative argument of which the proposition P is the conclusion proposition. With reference to the skeletal condition of evidential comprehensiveness (1), the general lay-out of the former demonstrative argument may be represented as (2). (1)

If a conclusion proposition P is supported by a set S of evidential statements having the measure M of comprehensiveness, then this conclusion proposition P should be assigned support of the extent E.

(2)

(i) In terms of natural language: If a conclusion proposition P is supported by a set S of evidential statements having the measure M of comprehensiveness, then this conclusion proposition P should be assigned support of the extent E. The conclusion proposition P is supported by a set S of evidential statements having the measure M of comprehensiveness. The conclusion proposition P should be assigned support of the extent E. (ii) In terms of symbolic notation : P => q P •'• q

To sum up: in a field of inquiry which has appropriate and clear conditions of evidence, the assignment of a given extent - be it degree or rank - of support to conclusion propositions of nondemonstrative arguments may proceed in a nonarbitrary manner within the logical framework of demonstrative arguments such as (2). 4.2. THE QUALITATIVE RELEVANCE OF EXTERNAL LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE

4.2.1. Preliminaries So far, external linguistic evidence has been informally and provisionally characterized as comprising data which relate to such "external" aspects of language(s) as the diachronic, statistical, dialectal, idiolectal, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological aspects and which are adduced in support of synchronic grammatical and generallinguistic claims about one or another language capacity of the speaker-listener.® 9

Cf. §3.3.1.

134

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

In recent times an increasing number of transformational grammarians have been using in one or another methodological function of their synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic inquiries factual data and theoretical considerations relating to an increasing number of external aspects of language(s).10 Thus, for example, data or considerations about the diachronic aspect of language(s),11 the neuropsychological aspect of language(s),12 the neurophysiological aspect of language(s),13 idiolectal and dialectal linguistic variation, 14 sociolinguistic phenomena such as borrowing, creolization, and pidginization,15 and phenomena relating to language acquisition and child language16 have been cited as bearing in one or another way on one or another kind of merit of synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. The main question that will be dealt with in this section - § 4.2. - concerns the qualitative relevance of external linguistic evidence as evidence which, within the framework of nondemonstrative arguments, bears positively or negatively on synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. In order to frame this question more precisely, it is necessary to recapitulate briefly what has been said in § 2 5.3 about the notion of relevance. As was pointed out in the discussion of the nature of support as a level of merit for judging nondemonstrative arguments, for a proposition to have support there must exist at least one evidential statement that is properly relevant to this proposition. In order for an evidential statement to be properly relevant to a conclusion proposition, two conditions must be met. First, this evidential statement must be logically relevant to the conclusion proposition. That is, it must be possible to infer the conclusion proposition from the evidential statement - in conjunction perhaps with additional premisses by means of one of the definable rules of nondemonstrative inference. Second, the evidential statement must be qualitatively relevant to the conclusion proposition. Qualitative relevance is a property which evidential statements derive from the evidential variables to which they refer. An evidential statement is qualitatively relevant to a given conclusion proposition if a relation of similarity in kind exists between the nonlogical, i.e. the factual, material,or qualitative, content of the evidential statement and the nonlogical content of the conclusion. Framing this in different terms, we may say that an evidential proposition is qualitatively relevant to a con10

The distinction between "factual data" and "theoretical considerations" invoked here is clarified in appendix 4.4. The analysis to be presented in chapter 4 has evolved from the work reported on in § 4.3.3.5 of Botha 1971a, and in Botha 1971b. 11 Cf. e.g. Bach 1968: 138; Bechert 1969; Carden 1970a: 98-99; Chafe 1968: 115, 117; Chomsky and Halle 1968: 333-334; Crothers 1971: 23 ff.; Hass 1969; Kiparsky 1968a; 1968b; Postal 1968:170. 12 "Neuropsychological data", in this context, denotes data about language pathologies. For reference to such data cf. e.g. Weigl and Bierwisch 1970; Postal 1968: 172; Whitaker 1970: 46-47. 13 "Neurophysiological data", in this context, denotes data about what seem to be constraints on the neural structures underlying verbal communication. For reference to such data cf. e.g. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 6; Katz 1964: 134; 1967: 135, 174. 14 Cf. e.g. Carden 1970a: 60; 1970b: 281-287; Elliot, Legum and Thompson, 1969; Postal 1968: 170. Cf. also § 5.4.4.2 of this study. 15 Cf. e.g. Hyman 1970: 58, 66-67; Ferguson 1971: 141 ff.; Vanek 1971: 379. 16 Cf. e.g. Crothers 1971: 26 ff.; Ferguson 1971: 141 ff.; Postal 1968: 172.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

135

elusion proposition if these two propositions refer to objects, phenomena, or events which are members of the same ontological class. 17 The questions of qualitative relevance which arise in transformational grammar and which will be dealt with below are: 1.

2.

What are the conditions under which in transformational grammar a variable of external evidence - and by implication statements presenting such external evidence - may be regarded as properly qualitatively relevant to synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses about the form of a given mental language ability ? Are these conditions of qualitative relevance sufficiently clear and sufficiently well justified in order to make the assignment of the property of qualitative relevance to a given external evidential variable - and to specific evidential statements referring to this variable - a nonarbitrary affair ?

These two questions concerning qualitative relevance may be asked with respect to any one of the external linguistic variables listed above. In transformational grammar, however, the variable of external linguistic evidence from which evidence has been drawn most freely during recent years is the diachronic one. This fact has become apparent already in chapter 3 in the analysis of arguments by Kiparsky which involve both diachronic data and theoretical considerations pertaining to linguistic change. 18 The two questions concerning qualitative relevance will therefore be considered below mainly as they bear on the use of diachronic evidence. It will be argued that conclusions drawn about the qualitative relevance of diachronic linguistic evidence hold good essentially, however, also for the other kinds of external linguistic evidence adduced in support of synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic claims - whether these claims be mentalistic or nonmentalistic. Having dealt with external linguistic phenomena as the source of positive evidence for or counter-evidence against mentalistic linguistic claims, we will consider a number of other methodological roles in which data and considerations about such external linguistic phenomena have been used recently in transformational grammar. Examination of the diverse methodological functions in which data and considerations about external linguistic phenomena have been used - including that of serving as positive evidence for mentalistic claims - will shed some light on the inconclusive nature of the current controversy in transformational grammar between "abstract" and "concrete" phonologists. The main topics, then, to receive attention in this chapter include 1.

17

the methodological peculiarities of the manner in which Kiparsky uses diachronic evidence in support of or against mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims,

For the notion 'ontological class/category' cf. Harre 1961: 8. The distinction between "external linguistic (factual) data" and "external linguistic (theoretical) considerations" is clarified in appendix 4.4. 18

136

2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

the question of the qualitative relevance of diachronic linguistic evidence as this evidence may bear on such mentalistic claims, the question of the conditions of adequacy for a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence to mentalistic claims, the question of whether a theory's explanatory success in one domain of phenomena may be taken as an index of its descriptive success with respect to another, qualitatively different, domain of phenomena, the root of the problem of qualitative relevance as this problem exists in transformational grammar with respect to all variables of external linguistic evidence, the additional methodological functions in which external linguistic evidence has been used in transformational grammar.

From the discussion of these and other, related, topics a methodologically-based characterization of the distinction "internal linguistic evidence vs. external linguistic evidence" will emerge. The analysis presented in chapter 4 is restricted to methodological aspects of the external explanatory and confirmatory arguments which Kiparsky puts forward in favour of mentalistic hypotheses. For a discussion of fundamental substantive problems connected with mentalism in transformational grammar we refer the reader to Bever's paper "The cognitive basis for linguistic structures". 4.2.2. Kiparsky,s

Use of Diachronic Evidence

4.2.2.1. The Background The manner in which Kiparsky uses diachronic evidence either in support of or against particular mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims has two interesting methodological aspects which are questionable. The first concerns the qualitative relevance of the evidential variable of diachronic evidence in relation to claims about the form of a mental language ability. The second involves the question whether a theory that is explanatorily successful in a given domain of phenomena may on this account be regarded as being descriptively successful with respect to a qualitatively different domain of phenomena. Before turning to the first of these issues - the second will be considered in § 4.2.2.3.2 - it is necessary, for the sake of the coherence of the discussion, to recapitulate briefly Kiparsky's general views on what synchronic grammarians and general linguists may infer from diachronic data about linguistic change. According to Kiparsky, grammars and the general-linguistic theory must meet the condition that they be psychologically correct. A grammar is psychologically correct if it correctly "represents" the FORM of the fluent speaker's linguistic competence. For a grammar to be psychologically correct, it is not sufficient if only the substance of the fluent speaker's linguistic competence is correctly characterized by the grammar. In order to represent correctly the form of the linguistic competence of the fluent speaker the grammar, as a system of rules, should actually correspond

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

137

"to the system of rules which is internalized by the speaker and constitutes part of what enables him to produce and understand arbitrary utterances in the language". 19 The linguistic universals specified by the general-linguistic theory determine what the grammars are which can be constructed for natural languages. By implication the general-linguistic theory, in specifying these universals, also makes claims about what is psychologically real and what is not. Kiparsky's problem now is that of finding a basis on which it will be possible to judge what grammatical and generallinguistic claims are psychologically correct and which ones are not. As a solution to this problem Kiparsky turns to linguistic change, which he regards as "a window" on the form of linguistic competence. 20 Reduced to its essentials Kiparsky's concern is that of (3)

(i)

(ii)

"... making a case for the legitimacy and potential fruitfulness of certain general patterns of inference from linguistic change to the nature of grammar"; 2 1 showing how " ... numerous kinds of valid and fruitful conclusions may ... be drawn from diachrony to synchrony". 22

In chapter 3 of this study we have analyzed and reconstructed a number of arguments by Kiparsky which are cases t f (3) (i) and (ii). Though alternative reconstructions of these arguments can be given - and have been given in fact all the alternatives share two distinctive properties. First, the conclusions of these arguments ultimately embody a grammatical or general-linguistic claim about the form of the linguistic competence of the fluent speaker. Second, as factual data constituting positive evidence for or counter-evidence against these mentalistic claims, the data presented in these arguments are data about linguistic change(s). 4.2.2.2. Identification of a Problem of Qualitative Relevance Let us now turn to what is problematic as regards the relevance of diachronic evidence to the justification of mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims. That the evidential statements presenting these diachronic data are logically relevant to the given mentalistic conclusions cannot be denied. To deny this would be to claim that Kiparsky's evidential statements presenting diachronic data cannot be related to his mentalistic claims by virtue of any of the rules of inference. That just this can be done, however, is clear from the logical reconstructions which have been given in chapter 3 for Kiparsky's external explanatory and confirmatory argument forms and for their negative correlates. Thus the problem of relevance which was indicated as existing with respect to these argument forms is clearly not one of logical relevance. Rather, the problem is one of qualitative relevance. In Cohen's terminology two 19 20 21 22

Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf.

Kiparsky Kiparsky Kiparsky Kiparsky

1968a: 1968a: 1968a: 1968b:

171. 174; as well as § 3.3.3.1 of this study 189. 11.

138

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

propositions are "materially dissimilar" if the nonlogical expressions, i.e. the "descriptive terms", out of which they are constructed are members of different semantical categories.23 In the terminology of this study, two such propositions will be said to exhibit a difference in kind in their material, or qualitative, or factual, content. That is: they refer to aspects of the scientific world such that it is not immediately obvious that these aspects are characterized by inherent similarities. In any case, when two propositions appear to be "materially dissimilar" or different in qualitative content and, moreover, if within an argument one of them is offered as an evidential statement supporting the other one as a conclusion, then the question of qualitative relevance may legitimately be raised. In its most general form this question may be framed as follows: 1. On what grounds would the scientist find himself compelled to accept an evidential statement with content of the kind Ki as bearing on the correctness of a conclusion having the different kind of content K2 ? 2. What do claims about phenomena of this kind ( = Ki) have to do with claims about phenomena of that kind ( = K2) ? It is possible to isolate a number of obvious differences between the kind of qualitative content of evidential statements presenting data about linguistic changes and the kind of qualitative content of linguistic claims about the form of mental abilities. One way of characterizing these differences is to indicate the essential differences between the respective sets of properties of the phenomena referred to by such evidential statements on the one hand and such mentalistic claims on the other. The linguistic changes postulated by Kiparsky for the purpose of characterizing differences between the forms of two consecutive stages of a language have three essential properties. First, a postulated linguistic change, in the above sense, is a diachronic phenomenon in that it relates to two distinct and consecutive stages of a language. Second, such a linguistic change is a historical phenomenon in that it is an event which took place in the past. Third, such a linguistic change is not known on a priori grounds to have been or not to have been psychologically real. Extending Kiparsky's use of the term "psychologically real" in a natural way one may say that a linguistic change was psychologically real in the sense that it represented an actual mental "event" through which a change came about in the form of the linguistic competence of the fluent speakers belonging to two consecutive linguistic generations. If this linguistic change were to define a difference in merely the substance of the linguistic competence of the speakers of two consecutive generations, it would not be psychologically real. It seems to us that the problem of psychological reality is a problem not of synchronic linguistics only but of diachronic linguistics as well. The question of psychological reality in diachronic linguistics is dealt with briefly in appendix 4.1 to this chapter. 23

Cf. Cohen 1970: 39.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

139

Consider now the kind of content that mentalistic grammatical and generallinguistic claims have as the conclusions of the arguments analyzed in chapter 3. The content of these claims bears on the form of the fluent speaker's linguistic competence. This object, first, has the property of existing at a synchronic level, within "a single language state". Second, it is a nonhistorical object. Kiparsky is concerned with the linguistic competence of speakers of a nonpast language state. Third, this object is assigned the property of being mental or psychological. It is claimed to be a psychological ability. The above differences in kind of qualitative content between diachronic evidence and mentalistic linguistic claims as operated with by Kiparsky may be summarized as in the following scheme: (4) Content of Evidential Statement 1. Diachronic

2. Historical 3. Psychological status unclear

__ . Content of Claim 1. Synchronic 2. Nonhistorical 3. Psychological reality asserted

These differences (4) between the kind of qualitative content of evidential statements presenting diachronic data and the kind of qualitative content of mentalistic claims can be overlooked only with difficulty. Inferring claims of the latter sort from statements of the former sort would represent, in Toulmin's terminology, a qualitative type-jump. 24 In empirical science, in cases where such a qualitative type-jump can be indicated, it becomes imperative to inquire whether the evidential statements are in fact qualitatively relevant to the claims on which they are brought to bear within the framework of arguments. This question of qualitative relevance must, therefore, be raised with respect to the use which Kiparsky makes of diachronic data as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims: 3.

Given diachronic data and given mentalistic claims from which these data appear to differ as to kind of qualitative content, what grounds are there for accepting such diachronic data as being qualitatively relevant to such mentalistic claims ?

That it is proper to raise the question 3 is clear also from recent remarks made on this matter by King and from the manner in which Hyman has defended abstract phonology in the face of Kiparsky's rejection of this position in phonology. Let us first con24

Cf. Toulmin 1964: 219.

140

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

sider some crucial things that King has to say on the question of "the relation between historical development and the synchronic evaluation of grammars": (5) Let us begin by asking the question: Does historical evidence decide which of two synchronic grammars is higher valued? The answer is a flat No. Given two grammars Gi and G2 that correctly account for the same data, and given that Gi is simpler than G2 but that G2 more nearly recapitulates this historical development, then the simpler grammar Gi is higher valued than G2. Given two grammars Gi and G2 of equal simplicity, and given that G2 better reflects the historical development of the language, nevertheless both grammars are equally valued in the evaluation measure. There is no reason to prefer G2 over Gi (or vice versa, for that matter). What has been said here about the relevance of historical evidence to synchronic evaluation applies ceteris paribus to the evidence of neighboring dialects. Why evidence of these types is not directly relevant to the evaluation of synchronic grammars should be clear. A grammar is an account of a speaker's intrinsic knowledge of his language, his competence - not his father's competence, not any of his ancestors' competences, not the competence of his neighbor whose dialect is slightly different. To admit historical evidence into the evaluation of synchronic grammars would be to claim that the linguistic competence of one's forebears should play a role in evaluating accounts of one's own competence, and there is no reason in fact or theory to entertain such a curious claim. 25 The quoted remarks by King are in line with Kiparsky's views in the sense that Kiparsky too rejects the contention that a synchronic grammar should recapitulate the history of a language. 2 6 The position of King quoted as (5) has implications, however, which may be developed in a natural way such that these implications are shown to be tantamount to a questioning of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence as used by Kiparsky in support of mentalistic claims. King's reasoning may be extended as follows: (6) Since grammars are constructed and evaluated within the framework of the general-linguistic theory, the form of these grammars and part of the content of these grammars are determined by the universal theoretical principles and notational conventions incorporated in the general theory. This implies that to motivate and constrain the general-linguistic theory with reference to data about linguistic change(s) is t o bring these diachronic data indirectly, but inevitably, to bear on the evaluation of the synchronic grammars constructed and evaluated within the framework of this general-linguistic theory. To d o this is to entertain in a somewhat disguised form the "curious claim" "that the linguistic competence of one's forebears should play a role in evaluating accounts of one's own competence". 2 7 Although Kiparsky's position o n the use of diachronic evidence is weaker than the one which contains the condition that synchronic grammars should recapitulate the history of a language, nevertheless Kiparsky's position is still exposed to the challenge of qualitative irrelevance. This was shown above, where three differences 25 26

Cf. King 1969: 102. Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 187; 1968b: 8. Cf. King 1969: 102.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

141

in kind o f qualitative content between diachronic evidence and mentalistic claims were pointed out. W e turn, next, to Kiparsky's criticism ol abstract phonology and H y m a n ' s defence o f it. In his paper " H o w abstract is phonology ?", Kiparsky argues against the position which he calls "fully abstract morphophonemics". As pointed out in § 3.3.3.3., this position provides f o r the postulation o f underlying phonological

segments

without phonetic properties and provides for phonological processes o f absolute neutralization. 2 8 Within the framework o f a negative external explanatory argument - outlined in § 3.3.3.3. o f this study - Kiparsky produces diachronic data a b o u t linguistic changes in Slavic which are supposed to show the untenability o f the position o f fully abstract morphophonemics. It is interesting, therefore, to find in H y m a n ' s paper a defence o f the abstract phonology position. This defence has as its pivot the notion o f psychological reality. T h e content o f this paper Hyman summarizes as follows: (7) This paper presents evidence for abstract phonology - that is, a phonology that recognizes underlying segments which are not realized phonetically. Two underlying vowel segments jo/ and /e/ are posited for Nupe (a Kwa language of Central Nigeria), both of which are realized as [a], therefore merging ('absolutely neutralizing') with /a/. Arguments based on pattern congruity, naturalness, and a 'weak' form of alternation are brought forth in support of this solution. Central, however, is the demonstration of the psychological reality of these two segments. . . . 2 9 H y m a n ' s criterion for psychological reality is drawn from sociolinguistic phenomena involving linguistic borrowing. This criterion is that, if in linguistic borrowing the speakers o f the borrowing language nativize the foreign sounds o f the borrowed forms in accordance with the phonological rules that have been postulated f o r this language, then it may be concluded that these rules have been internalized by these speakers and, consequently, are psychologically real. O n the basis o f this criterion H y m a n finds that the rule o f absolute neutralization by means o f which N u p e ' s abstract /o/ and /e/ merge absolutely with /a/ is psychologically real. 3 0 F o r this rule is productively used in the nativization o f foreign sounds - [o] and [e] - in words which Nupe has borrowed f r o m Y o r u b a . There is therefore the following conspicuous contradiction: Kiparsky, l o o k i n g through his "window o f linguistic change" sees absolute neutralization in Slavic as not being psychologically real; Hyman, however, looking through his "window o f linguistic borrowing", sees absolute neutralization as a psychologically real phonological process in Nupe. It is on the basis of this latter "view" that Hyman ultimately argues f o r the position o f abstract phonology. "Absolute neutralization" was characterized in note 88 to chapter 3. Cf. Hyman 1970: 58. 30 Cf. Hyman 1970: 66-67: "The position supported by this evidence is that the nativization of foreign sounds is a valid indicator of what rules have been internalized - that is, which rules are R E A L . And accordingly we must presume that the proposed absolute neutralization represents something real in the Nupe speaker's language and mind." 28

29

142

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

What is of special interest at this point, however, is not the positive si de of Hyman's paper but its negative side: the points not mentioned and not dealt with. 3 1 In this connection, it is striking that it is possible for Hyman to argue for abstract phonology, without feeling himself compelled to counter Kiparsky's diachronist argument against this position. By his not doing this Hyman has, to our mind, come forward with an indirect challenge to the status of diachronic evidence as qualitatively relevant to the evaluation of mentalistic linguistic claims. 4.2.2.3. Kiparsky's Approach to the Relevance Question When in a field of empirical inquiry doubts can legitimately be raised about the qualitative relevance which a given evidential variable possesses for the evaluation of a given category of factual claims, what is required is some sort of demonstration of the qualitative relevance of this evidential variable to this class of claims. 32 Until such a demonstration has been given, the evidence drawn from this variable cannot count as qualitatively relevant to the kind of claims on which such evidence is brought to bear within the framework of arguments. If evidence from a variable whose qualitative relevance had not been demonstrated was the only evidence adduced for a given conclusion, then there would exist no support for this conclusion. 33 Returning to Kiparsky's use of diachronic evidence for and against mentalistic linguistic hypotheses, we now face, therefore, the question whether Kiparsky has demonstrated in one way or another that diachronic evidence possesses qualitative relevance for the evaluation of these hypotheses. In the papers by Kiparsky in which a case is made for the "legitimacy" of certain general patterns of inference from linguistic change to the nature of grammar, we have failed to detect anything that might count as an explicit discussion of the question of the qualitative relevance of such diachronic evidence. Kiparsky does no more than touch, in passing, on the question of the qualitative relevance of diachronic data; this is in the course of the defence which he offers for his conclusion that a system of four vowel heights should be assumed for a Swiss German dialect : 3 4 (8) This last conclusion has the peculiar status of at present resting entirely on historical evidence, and of a fairly indirect kind at that. Whether or not we draw it depends on what we consider the subject matter of linguistics to be. We could not draw it if we regarded a grammar simply as a theory of the sentences of a language, and a linguistic theory as a 31 For a criticism of Hyman's use of evidence from linguistic borrowing in support of his position cf. Crothers 1971: 19 if. 32 1. Cohen (1970:36) sees a variable as "any set of observationally identifiable kinds, characteristics or circumstances of which the descriptions are either contrary or contradictory to one another ...". An evidential variable will be regarded in this study as a specific type of evidence about phenomena which need not themselves be directly observable. 2. In this context, "demonstration" does not mean "demonstrative argument". 33 Cf. Salmon (1963: 3), who asserts that "In order for facts to be evidence for a conclusion they must be properly relevant to that conclusion. Obviously, it will not do merely to give any true statements to support a conclusion. The statements must have some bearing upon that conclusion". 34 For Kiparsky's discussion of the issue concerning the number of vowel heights cf. Kiparsky 1968a:185 ff.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

143

theory of grammars. For this position would entail that linguistic change is no concern of linguistic theory, although it might of course be a pleasant bonus if linguistic theory could be usefully 'applied' to questions of linguistic change. But it would not cause us to demand of a linguistic theory that it must (in conjunction with a theory ot linguistic change) provide an explanation of the linguistic regularities of diachrony. It is a very different matter if we regard a grammar as a theory of linguistic competence, and the field of linguistics as the study of universal grammar. On this view, which forms the topic of this conference and which I share, the facts of linguistic change assume a new relevance as empirical evidence on the nature of language. We must be prepared to allow them to bear on even purely synchronic questions and, for example, to let the fact that some phonological change is explainable by one linguistic theory but not by another carry weight in the choice between these two theories. The application of linguistic change to linguistic theory now becomes at least as important as the converse process.35 To our knowledge (8) represents Kiparsky's most direct address to what we would describe as the problem of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence to the evaluation of those grammars and general-linguistic theories which must satisfy the condition of being psychologically correct. The question that now arises is: What considerations are mentioned by Kiparsky as compelling his audience to accept the "new relevance" of diachronic evidence? That is, on what grounds must one concede that diachronic evidence cacnot be rejected as being qualitatively irrelevant to mentalistic grammaticzl and general-linguistic claims? The only remarks by Kiparsky that may implicitly refer to such considerations or grounds relate to (9)

(i) (ii)

the way in which the subject matter - that is the domain of study of linguistics is delimited, the question of whether or not the general-linguistic theory has explanatory power with respect to phenomena of linguistic change.

The further question now arises whether or not these considerations, as invoked by Kiparsky, can be accepted as the basis for a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence in particular and of an external linguistic variable in general. The nature of the first consideration, (9) (i), will be examined in § 4.2.2.3.1; the second one, (9) (ii), will be dealt with in § 4.2.2.3.2. 4.2.2.3.1. Demonstration-by-Definition. - If the consideration (9) (i) is taken as the basis for a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of the variable of diachronic evidence, then such a demonstration is essentially a matter of the delimitation or definition of the domain of a field of inquiry. If you include within the domain of a general-linguistic theory both a set of objects which are linguistic changes, and a set of objects which are mental abilities, then data about the objects of the one set become by definition qualitatively relevant to the evaluation of claims about the objects of the other set. A variant of this approach to the demonstration of the qualitative relevance of 85

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 188.

144

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

diachronic data to synchronic linguistic theory is also entertained by King, although within the context of this variant it is not clear whether King regards synchronic linguistic theories as making claims - in Kiparsky's sense - about the FORM of mental abilities. Outlining Bach's treatment of the question of whether or not in terms of the simplicity metric a phonological rule of the format 10.1 should be judged to be more or less simple than the two rules 10.1' and 10.1" taken together, King offers (11) as his opinion on this matter. (10) 10.1' A - » B /

C

10.1" A -* B / C (11) Intuitively Rule 10.1 seems more general than the other two somewhat similar rules; a rule carrying out a change either before or after something seems more general than rules effecting that change just before (but not after) or just after (but not before) the something in question. But does any other kind of evidence clinch the argument that 10.1 is simpler than 10.1' and 10.1"? Suppose there are, as one can demonstrate in this case, a number of historical changes in which a rule of the form 10.1' or 10.1" has been replaced in the grammar by a rule of the form 10.1. Does this replacement have any relevance to what originally was a question, purely synchronic if you will, about which of two rules should be regarded as the simpler? Our answer to this depends on our answer to a prior question: Should linguistic theory be responsible for the data of linguistic change? The answer to this is not mandatory. If we decide to answer No, then the facts of historical change simply have no bearing on the question of which rule is simpler. The two questions are unrelated: one has to do with a decision to be made about simplicity, the other is an historical event of no further interest. If we answer this basic question in the affirmative, however, then the historical evidence becomes just as relevant to the question of simplicity as any purely synchronic data; and the testimony of historical change becomes binding on the formulation of theory. 36

In (11) we have a more explicit formulation of the consideration (9) (i): the consideration on the basis of which the demonstration of the qualitative relevance of an evidential variable is a matter of drawing the boundaries of a field of inquiry in a particular way. We come now to what is from a methodological point of view a crucial question: In an empirical field of inquiry, may the demonstration of the qualitative relevance of an evidential variable be a matter of how the subject matter is defined or delimited ? It is striking to the methodologically interested linguist that for a logician and philosopher of science such as Cohen such a demonstration cannot be a matter of definition or delimitation.37 For Cohen, in empirical science, the demonstration of the qualitative relevance of an evidential variable should be a substantive and empirical matter. Operating with the idea that qualitative relevance admits of grading or ranking, Cohen puts his point in the following way : 86 37

Cf. King 1969: 215-216. Cf. Cohen 1970: 44 ff.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

145

(12) ... when scientists working in a particular field of research judge one variable more relevant than another for hypotheses in their field, they do so on the basis of past experience in that field, and their judgement is itself open to correction by future experience. Judgements about the relative importance of trying out new drugs on pregnant animals as well as nonpregnant ones, for example, had to be revised after experience with thalidomide. 38

The quoted point of view of Cohen's seems to us to be essentially correct. We fail to see how science can be empirical in the sense of confronting its hypotheses with factual data, if it is the case that the qualitative relevance of these data to these hypotheses has been posited in a nonempirical way by means of a procedure of delimitation or definition. The question, then, is: What are the conditions that a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of an evidential variable should meet in order to be substantive and empirical? This is the question to which Kiparsky has given no explicit consideration; nor have the other transformational grammars using diachronic evidence in the evaluation of synchronic grammars and general-linguistic theories tackled this question at a level of methodological explicitness.39 The result is that at present in the field of transformational grammar the conditions under which diachronic data are qualitatively relevant as positive evidence for or negative evidence against mentalistic claims are obscure. Although this is not the main concern of this section, let us consider specimen conditions under which a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of the variable of diachronic evidence would be substantive and empirical. In one possible formulation, the conditions on the substantivity and empiricalness of such demonstrations may read as (13) and (14) respectively. (13) A SUBSTANTIVE demonstration of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence to mentalistic claims should show in what essential properties linguistic changes and mental abilities are systematically similar or dissimilar, such that if a given linguistic change C has the property Pi then it is a near certainty that a specific mental ability M will have the property Pi. (14) An EMPIRICAL demonstration of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence to mentalistic claims should state under what kind of factual circumstances the linguist would be compelled to abandon, as disconfirmed, the claim that the essential properties of linguistic changes and of mental abilities co-vary systematically as provided for under (13) above. Within the context of actual linguistic inquiry the conditions (13) and (14) should be formulated more explicitly and should, moreover, be justified with respect to con38

Cf. Cohen 1970: 46. Although Chafe (1968: 117), as a non-transformationalist, has "argued that the mechanisms of phonological change are themselves such that they provide support of the psychological validity of phonological rules ..." he does not in this paper raise the question of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence to the justification of linguistic claims involving psychological reality.

39

146

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

ceivable alternatives. We have mentioned these conditions here for one reason only: to illustrate the difference in nature between a demonstration-by-definition and a substantive and empirical demonstration of the claim that diachronic evidence possesses qualitative relevance for the evaluation of mentalistic claims. Under a substantive and empirical demonstration of the qualitative relevance of diachronic evidence to mentalistic claims the status of the decision either to use or not to use data about linguistic change in synchronic linguistic inquiry would not be that of a matter of arbitrary choice. Moreover, such a demonstration would allow linguists in keeping with the goals of empirical science - the possibility of disconfirming, and hence rejecting, the claim that diachronic data bear qualitatively on mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. 4.2.2.3.2. Explanatory and Predictive Success vi. Descriptive Success. ~ Implicit in Kiparsky's remarks quoted as (8) and underlying his explanatory and confirmatory forms of argument analyzed in chapter 3 is a highly questionable assumption regarding the relation between the explanatory and predictive success of a theory, on the one hand, and the descriptive or "representative" success of this theory on the other hand. This assumption is implicit in Kiparsky's views (15) (i) on the implications of explanatory success, and in his interpretation (15) (ii) of the implications of predictive success. (15) (i) We must allow the facts of linguistic change "to bear on even purely synchronic questions and, for example, to let the fact that some phonological change is explainable by one linguistic theory but not by another carry weight in the choice between these two theories".40 (ii) "The core of my historical argument against absolute neutralization has roughly the following form: (1) From the assumption that absolute neutralization exists, certain predictions about change in phonological systems follow. (2) These predictions are false. (3) The theory of change cannot be adjusted in any general way to exclude these predictions. (4) Therefore absolute neutralization does not exist."41 The choice to which Kiparsky refers in (15) (i) above is - as he has asserted at the beginning of his paper "Linguistic universals and linguistic change" - the choice between a theory which correctly "represents" the form of the fluent speaker's linguistic competence and alternative theories which do not. In this context Kiparsky's term "represents" does not make sense when interpreted either as "explains" or as "predicts", but only when understood as "describes". In (15) (ii) "does not exist" is synonymous, within Kiparsky's framework, to "gives an incorrect representation of the form of the fluent speaker's linguistic competence". 40 41

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 188. Cf. also his remarks quoted as (40) (i) in § 3.3.3.2. Cf. Kiparsky 1968b: 17, and also his remarks quoted as (60) in § 3.3.3.5.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

147

Implicit in Kiparsky's remarks quoted above as (15) (i) and (ii) - as also in those not quoted here, but referred to in the relevant notes - are a number of methodological assumptions. A first, and unexceptionable, one is that a linguistic theory may have three distinct methodological functions: explanation, prediction, and description or "representation" in the Kiparskyan idiom. A second assumption is more interesting, but highly questionable. This assumption concerns the manner in which the explanatory and predictive success of a theory is related to its descriptive success. This assumption may be given the weak formulation (16) (i) or the strong formulation (16) (ii). (16) (i) The success of a theory in giving a correct description or "representation" of some phenomena of the qualitative kind Ki co-varies systematically with the success of this theory in providing a correct explanation of/making correct predictions about other phenomena of the same qualitative kind Ki. (ii) The success of a theory in giving a correct description or "representation" of phenomena of the qualitative kind Ki co-varies systematically with the success of this theory in providing a correct explanation of/making correct predictions about phenomena of the different qualitative kind K2. The weak formulation (16) (i) of the assumption under consideration would be applicable to a situation in which it was known that linguistic mental abilities and linguistic changes belonged to the same qualitative kind, Ki, or the same ontological category. The strong formulation (16) (ii) is applicable to the present situation: the situation in which it has not been shown on empirical grounds that linguistic mental abilities belong to the same qualitative kind or ontological category as do linguistic changes. Both in its strong formulation (16) (ii) and in its weaker formulation (16) (i), however, this second assumption - about the systematic co-variance between descriptive success, on the one hand, and explanatory/predictive success, on the other hand - is methodologically highly controversial. A scholar today cannot entertain this assumption on a rational basis without providing an explicit justification for his belief in it. Several conditions of adequacy which should be satisfied by any such justification spring to mind immediately. First, such a justification should counter convincing arguments by philosophers of science and scientists to the effect that explanation and prediction, on the one hand, differ from description, on the other hand, as regards goals, as regards logical basis, and as regards conditions of adequacy.42 Second, such a justification should invalidate the arguments of those philosophers of science who contend that in empirical science even explanation and prediction have goals, logical bases, and conditions of adequacy that differ. 43 Needless 42

For a brief outline of important differences between explanation (and prediction) and description cf. appendix 4.5. 43 The identity between the logical basis of explanation and that of prediction has been vigorously defended by Hempel (1965c: 364 ff.). Various philosophers of science have made a case for the opposite view - cf. e.g. Toulmin 1961.

148

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

to say, the viewpoint of the philosophers of science just mentioned is directly opposed to the viewpoint implicitly incorporated in the assumption formulated above as (16) (i) and (ii). Third, such a justification should make clear on what grounds a statement that constitutes for a given set of phenomena a merely sufficient explanation should be accepted as a necessarily correct description of a different set of phenomena. 44 Or, it should be shown, in such a justification, how the distinction "necessary-sufficient" drawn with respect to explanations could be carried over to descriptions. Fourth, such a justification would have to find a means of co-existing with the fact that, in the history of empirical science, there are numerous instances of theories which were considered at a given stage to be explanatorily or predictively successful but which toned out at a later stage to be descriptively deficient. This last point may be illustrated with an example of Toulmin's. Babylonian astronomy was for its times remarkably successful as an instrument for making predictions. Yet as a description of the physical nature of the heavenly bodies about which these predictions were made this theory was devoid of any merit: (17) In calculating the times and dates of astronomical events - 'saving the phenomena', as it was later called - the Babylonians were masters. Their mathematical command of the celestial phenomena was ahead of the Greeks', at any rate until the capture of Babylon by Alexander the Great; and the first Greek astronomer to equal them was Hipparchos of Rhodes (second century B. C.) who was probably in a position to take advantage of their work. The Babylonian command of the calender, too, was more exact, while their arithmetical technique for forecasting the first visibility of the new moon and lunar eclipses have [s/c] no parallel in Greek science of the Golden Age. Yet they achieved this without (to our knowledge) having any very original ideas about the physical nature of the heavenly bodies. We know that they referred to the major planets by divine names, but the texts so far deciphered offer no evidence of any serious speculation about them. 45

In the history of empirical science there are many instances of theories or "systems" which achieved some degree of predictive or explanatory success, but which failed as descriptions of a given aspect of scientific reality. The relevant papers by Kiparsky do not contain anything that could be regarded as a justification meeting the four conditions of adequacy stated above. In fact, it seems as if Kiparsky does not even see the need of providing such a justification. In conclusion, then, Kiparsky's assumption about the co-variance between the success achieved by a linguistic theory in explaining and predicting (or postdicting) phenomena of linguistic change and the success achieved by this theory in describing the form of a linguistic mental ability in no way contributes to solving the problem of demonstrating that diachronic evidence possesses qualitative relevance for the evaluation of mentalistic linguistic claims. This assumption has so many highly problematic methodological aspects that any case made on the basis of this assumption could not be other than unconvincing. Before this assumption could be used 44

For the distinction "necessary-sufficient" cf. § 3.3.2.1. Cf. Toulmin 1961: 28. For similar observations on the Ptolemaic system of astronomy of Kuhn 1962: 68.

45

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

149

as the basis for any kind of serious argument in linguistics the methodological problems inherent to it should first be faced and resolved. 4.2.3. The General Methodological Problem of the Qualitative Relevance of External Linguistic Evidence Before external linguistic data - such as diachronic, idiolectal, dialectal, neuropsychological, and statistical data - could be used in an unexceptionable way as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against claims about the form of a linguistic mental ability, transformational grammarians would have to give serious consideration to a number of methodological questions. The first of these, formulated below as (18), concerns the nature of an adequate demonstration that an evidential variable possesses qualitative relevance. (18) What conditions of adequacy should be satisfied by a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of an evidential variable in general ? The answer given to (18) should be such as to indicate in what direction to look for a solution to the further question (19) which is implied by (18). (19) What is the measure of qualitative relevance that would provide transformational grammar with an adequate basis for demonstrating that a given variable of external evidence - such as the diachronic variable - stood in a relation of qualitative relevance to the evaluation of mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims? The measure for qualitative relevance referred to in (19) should make it possible to give a non-ad hoc and nonarbitrary answer to a specific question such as (20). (20) Are the data Di, D2 D n concerning the external linguistic phenomenon P - for example the language change C - qualitatively relevant to the hypothesis H concerning the form of the fluent speaker's linguistic competence? The above questions, and especially (18) and (19), should be faced not only by those linguists who use diachronic data as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against mentalistic claims. These questions should be faced by all linguists - and this is "the general problem of the qualitative relevance of external linguistic evidence" who wish to use as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against a given grammatical or general-linguistic claim data which differ from this claim as to kind of qualitative or material content. The claim involved need not necessarily be a mentalistic one about the form of a fluent speaker's linguistic competence. The data involved need not necessarily be diachronic data. The general problem of qualitative relevance exists for any linguist who in arguing for a claim adduces as evidence data such that the data and the claim differ with respect to their kind of qualitative or material content. An additional problem to be faced by these linguists will be dealt with below.

150

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

A t this point the ground has been sufficiently cleared to attempt to distinguish in a more refined maimer between internal linguistic evidence and external linguistic evidence. So far this distinction has been based on a kind of intuitive notion of aspects of natural language that are internal vs. ones that are external. The distinction "internal-external" can now be explicated and generalized with reference to the methodological notion of "the difference in kind of qualitative or material content of statements". Suppose that there exist two statements Si and S2 such that they differ as to their kind of qualitative content, Si having qualitative content of the kind K i and S2 having qualitative content of the kind K2. If one of these statements were now taken as a scientific claim or hypothesis and the other statement were taken as presenting evidence for the former one, this evidence would be EXTERNAL evidence. Suppose, now, that there exists a third statement S3 such that it has a kind of qualitative content similar to that of S2, that is: content of the kind K2. If now either one of the statements S2 and S3 were regarded as a scientific claim or hypothesis and the remaining one were regarded as presenting evidence for the former one, this evidence would be INTERNAL evidence. Thus (21) (i) EXTERNAL LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE for a grammatical or general-linguistic claim consists of data which are logically relevant to this claim, AND, moreover, which differ to such an extent from this claim as to kind of qualitative content that a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of these data to this claim is required. (ii) INTERNAL LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE for a grammatical or general-linguistic claim consists of data which are logically relevant to this claim, AND, moreover, which are similar to this claim in kind of qualitative content so that a demonstration of the qualitative relevance of these data to this claim is apparently not required.46 Whether in transformational grammar data of a given content kind do or do not constitute internal, or external, linguistic evidence for a claim of a given content kind is an empirical matter not decidable on a priori methodological grounds. The crucial point is this: if doubts can be raised as to whether data which appear to be linguistic evidence for a given grammatical or general-linguistic claim do, or do not, possess qualitative relevance for this claim, it must be possible to provide an acceptable demonstration that these data do possess qualitative relevance for the evaluation of this claim. Consider, now, an additional problem to be faced by transformational grammarians who are already confronted with the question of the qualitative relevance of variables of linguistic evidence. It is at least a logical possibility that there exist fields of inquiry where, for claims or hypotheses of a given kind of content, evidence is drawn from diverse evidential variables, such that not only do the evidential statements referring to each of these variables differ from these claims in kind of 46

That a problem of qualitative relevance can arise also in connection with linguistic evidence which at first glance appears to be internal linguistic evidence will be pointed out in note 88 to chapter 5.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

151

content but the evidential statements referring to the different variables of evidence also differ from each other in kind of qualitative content. In fact, moreover, transformational grammar represents at least one such field. In it, for example, evidence for mentalistic claims is drawn from diverging evidential variables which may be labelled "diachronic", "statistical", "idiolectal", "dialectal", "sociological", and so on. In such a field as those pictured above, and therefore in transformational grammar, the question now arises of the relative degree or rank of qualitative relevance of each of the different evidential variables. A general formulation of this question may read as follows: (22) Given that from both the evidential variable Vi (e.g. a sociolinguistic one) and the evidential variable V2 (e.g. a diachronic one) evidence may be drawn for the content category of claims C (e.g. mentalistic claims), which kind of evidence, that drawn from Vi or that drawn from V2, is qualitatively the more relevant to the category of claims C? That the question (22) is important follows from assigning to the notion of "the rank or degree of qualitative evidence of an evidential statement S" the status of being one of those factors which determine how much S contributes to the support of a claim on which it bears logically. That, in transformational grammar, question (22) cannot be shrugged off is shown by the two cases discussed below. First, consider the manner in which Postal presents the justification for the marking conventions of a markedness version of the theory of phonology.47 In order to establish these marking conventions, M-Udecisions must be made for the various phonological distinctive features. In recapitulating the kind of justification that has been provided for a number of such M-U decisions, Postal refers to several variables of external linguistic evidence as sources from which evidence in support of these decisions has been derived: dialectal evidence, diachronic evidence, statistical evidence, neuropsychological evidence, physiological evidence, and perceptual evidence. In appendix 3.7 we have analyzed an example of an external confirmatory argument within the framework of which dialectal evidence is presented in support of the decision to assign to the feature of "glottalization" as its unmarked value a minus specification. Observe, now, the way in which Postal expresses his evaluation of physiological and perceptual evidence, in the above-mentioned justificatory role, in relation to the value of the other kinds of external linguistic evidence: (23) Ultimately, perhaps some of the strongest evidence for assignment of Marked or Unmarked status will come from physiological and perceptual investigations.48 This remark by Postal can be understood only if it is assumed that, in Postal's opinion, distinct kinds of external linguistic evidence differ in the qualitative relevance which they possess for the particular kind of claim under consideration. The rank 47 48

C f . Postal 1968: 170-171. Cf. Postal 1968: 170-171.

152

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

or degree of relevance of an external evidential variable is therefore a factor accounting for the amount of support which the evidence derived from that variable confers on a given claim. It follows that transformational grammarians should have at their disposal a measure of qualitative relevance which does not only allow them to make decisions in a non-ad hoc way in terms of the opposition "relevant vs. nonrelevant". This measure should, in addition, allow transformational grammarians to make in a non-ad hoc way judgements about the relative rank or degree of qualitative relevance of the evidence derived from diverse external linguistic variables for example, decisions with the general nature of (24). (24) (i) This piece of diachronic evidence D confers more support on the mentalistic claim C than does that piece of sociolinguistic evidence E. (ii) This non-mentalistic synchronic grammatical claim C may be regarded as supported on account of the fact that this piece of diachronic linguistic evidence D bears positively on C even though that piece of sociolinguistic evidence E bears negatively on C. (iii) As regards the alternative general-linguistic hypotheses Hi and H2, Hi being supported by diachronic evidence and H2 being supported by neuropsychological evidence, H2 is the better supported one. Second, recall the case of the disagreement between Kiparsky and Hyman on whether or not the general-linguistic theory should allow phonological rules expressing absolute neutralization. Kiparsky and Hyman share the view that general-linguistic theories and grammars should be psychologically correct. Interestingly enough, however, whereas Kiparsky on the basis of diachronic data about linguistic change argues against the existence of phonological processes of absolute neutralization, Hyman on the basis of sociolinguistic data about borrowing phenomena argues for assigning psychological reality to a process of absolute neutralization in Nupe. Kiparsky's argument incorporating diachronic data has been quoted in § 3.3.3.2. as (58) (ii) and again above in § 4.2.2.3.4. as (15) (ii). Hyman's argument has been outlined in §4.2.2.2. Suppose now that it is possible to show that both diachronic data and sociolinguistic data are qualitatively relevant to the evaluation of mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims.49 The question will then arise as to the relative rank or degree of qualitative relevance which evidence derived from these two external evidential variables possesses: Given a mentalistic linguistic claim C, which kind of evidence, diachronic or sociolinguistic, provides the greater support for C? The Kiparsky-Hyman disagreement constitutes a further illustration of the point that the measure for qualitative relevance required by transformational grammarians is one which would have to permit the nonarbitrary assignment of ranks or degrees of 49

Kiparsky has not demonstrated the qualitative relevance of diachronic data. Nor has Hyman demonstrated that of "borrowing data".

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

153

qualitative relevance to the diverse variables of external linguistic evidence. Until such a measure has been developed and justified, the use of external linguistic data in the methodological role of positive evidence for or of counter-evidence against (mentaiistic) grammatical and general-linguistic claims within the framework of the forms of nondemonstrative argument analyzed in chapter 3 is an arbitrary practice. 4.2.4. The Status of the Alternative Reconstructions of Kiparsky's External Argument Forms In chapter 3 provision has been made for alternative manners of reconstructing each of the external nondemonstrative forms of argument developed by Kiparsky. It is now possible to point out what the basic differences are between the alternative reconstructions of these external forms of argument. In addition, it is now possible to consider the question of the relative merit assignable to each of the variant manners of reconstructing these external forms of argument. We will deal with these two points by referring specifically to Kiparsky's external explanatory arguments. What will be observed with respect to external explanatory arguments, however, may be extended, in a suitably adapted but essentially unchanged form, to the negative correlates of explanatory arguments, to the confirmatory arguments, and to their disconfirmatory correlates. In § 3.3.3.2., (42) (as Reconstruction I) and (44) (as Reconstruction II) were presented as two alternative manners of reconstructing Kiparsky's external explanatory form of argument. The crujial difference between these two ways of reconstructing external explanatory arguments lies in the fact that whereas Reconstruction I does not incorporate (25) as an additional major premiss, Reconstruction II does do so. (25) If a theoretical device has to be incorporated in the general-linguistic theory for explaining linguistic changes which occurred in a given language, then this theoretical device should be regarded as psychologically correct. 50 The interesting question here concerns the relative merit of a reconstruction incorporating (25) and a reconstruction omitting (25) as a major premiss. First, consider the merit of a reconstruction - such as II - which incorporates (25) explicitly as an additional major premiss. The merit of this reconstruction is a "logical" one. The professional logician could maintain that in the reconstruction of a (form of) argument all the "argumentative intentions" of the proponent of this (form of) argument should be represented explicitly. 51 This logical requirement implies for Kiparsky's external explanatory arguments that, if Kiparsky intends the proposition underlying (25) to function as a major premiss in these arguments, then in the reconstruction of these arguments (25) should be explicitly incorporated as representing this proposition. Whether or not Kiparsky has provided an explicit formula50 This additional major premiss can be suitably adapted for the negative correlates of explanatory arguments, for confirmatory arguments and for their disconfirmatory correlates. 51 For a notion which might be labelled "argumentative intentions" cf. Alexander 1969: 27-28.

154

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

tion of this proposition is, from the point of view of the professional logician, beside the point. The logician would emphasize that one of the functions of reconstructions is precisely that: to make assumed but unstated premisses explicit. Second, consider the merit of a reconstruction - such as I - of external explanatory arguments from which (25) is omitted as an explicitly stated major premiss. The merit of a reconstruction not containing (25) as a major premiss is a "substantive" one. This is the merit which a professional linguist would attach to this reconstruction. The professional linguist - whose ultimate interest lies in the realization of substantive research goals of his field - would maintain that (25), if incorporated as an additional major premiss of external explanatory arguments, would have no other status than that of a device whose function it was to conceal the nondemonstrative nature of these arguments. The professional linguist would reject (25) on factual grounds and, if he was explicitly aware of the methodological principles of his field, would, moreover, find (25) objectionable on methodological grounds. Regarding the factual status of (25), the linguist would remark that empirical and substantive data should be provided to bear out what is asserted by (25) about the relatedness of linguistic changes and linguistic mental abilities. The linguist would want to know why linguistic changes, being the phenomena that they are, and linguistic mental abilities, being phenomena that apparently differ qualitatively from linguistic changes, should exhibit co-varying properties. He would accordingly deny that (25) was a statement which presented factual evidence of an empirical nature. To incorporate (25) in external explanatory arguments as devices within the framework of which factual data are presented as evidence for claims would be to the linguist, having as he does his particular substantive orientation, to create an illusion of the presence of factual evidence where no factual evidence existed. Concerning the methodological aspects of (25), the professional linguist - should he have a "methodological consciousness" - would stress their problematic nature. He would inquire why be had to accept the asserted co-variance between the explanatory success and the descriptive or representative success of a theory. Finding no answer to his question, he would suspect this assertion to be an additional device for bridging in a formal manner the gap between the content of the factual premisses and the content of the claim of external explanatory arguments. Consequently, the linguist, valuing arguments for their contribution to the realization of the substantive goals of inquiry of his field, would on this account feel still more inclined to omit (25) from the layout of external explanatory arguments.52 A final question might arise: which standpoint about the manner of reconstructing external explanatory arguments should be accepted: the logician's or the linguist's? Professional logicians, having their typica' scholarly interests, would argue in favour of the logician's reconstruction. Most linguists, pursuing substantive goals of inquiry 62

Salmon (1967: 110) points out that the fact that a given nondemonstrative argument can be transformed into a demonstrative argument by supplying an additional suitable premiss for this nondemonstrative argument does not reflect any special kind of merit of this argument.

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

155

and concerned with arguments only as they relate to these goals, would prefer the linguist's reconstruction. Methodologists of linguistics, to which category the present authors belong, would allow the two manners of reconstruction to co-exist, pointing out the respective merit of each of these manners of reconstructing the arguments under discussion. Such methodologists share with linguists their ultimate substantive research goals, but contend that these goals cannot be realized if the limitations and resources of the methodological equipment of linguistics - such as its patterns of inference - are not known. In order to determine what these limitations and resources are, methodologists need as analytical devices, among other things, the concepts of the professional logician. 4.2.5. Other Methodological Functions of External Linguistic Data and Considerations 4.2.5.1. Introductory Remarks In §§ 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. a first methodological function of external linguistic data was examined: the function of being positive evidence for or counter-evidence against (mentalistic) grammatical and general-linguistic claims within the framework of nondemonstrative arguments. A number of difficulties in connection with this function having so far been noted, three further questions now arise: 1. 2. 3.

What are the other methodological functions in which transformational grammarians have used external linguistic data and considerations ? What methodological difficulties characterize the use of external linguistic data and considerations in these functions ? How adequately have transformational grammarians dealt with these difficulties ?

As methodological functions in which external linguistic data and considerations have been used - in addition to the one considered in the preceding paragraphs - we will discuss below 1. 2. 3.

the function of serving as constituents of the standards of acceptability which are posited for grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses, the function of lending "psychological support" to grammatical and generallinguistic claims, and the function of serving as heuristic directives which guide the transformationalist in the process of thinking up explanatory grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses.

4.2.5.2. Standards of Acceptability In §§ 2.5.2. and 2.5.4. we have dealt with the point of view that, in the eyes both of scientists and of philosophers of science, not all scientific hypotheses and theories are of equal merit, i.e. equal in their "acceptance-worthiness", as explanations for puzzling phenomena or as solutions to problems. This kind of merit of hypotheses and

156

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

theories is judged at a level that we have labelled "the level of acceptability". The acceptability of hypotheses and theories is a function of various factors, some of which were pointed out in § 2.5.4. These determinants of acceptability may function as the bases on which the scholars in a given field may develop standards of acceptability in terms of which it will be possible to judge whether or not a given theory or hypotheses is acceptable, and also - perhaps - given that it is acceptable, how acceptable it is. The topic of the standards of acceptability used in transformational grammar will be dealt with extensively in chapter 6 of this study. At this point, however, in order to clarify the methodological status of external linguistic data and considerations in transformational grammar, it is necessary to anticipate a small section of the discussion of chapter 6. For it turns out that external linguistic data and considerations are used in the formulation of standards of acceptability with which transformational grammarians confront their grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. In the main text below one such standard of acceptability will be considered. Two additional ones will be dealt with in appendices 4.2 and 4.3 to this chapter. In terms of the first of the above-mentioned standards of acceptability, the acceptability of a hypothesis or theory is judged with respect to its "width of explanatory scope". The general methodological framework of this standard of acceptability may be formulated roughly as follows: (26) Given an initial corpus Ci of synchronic linguistic data and given two alternative grammatical or general-linguistic hypotheses Hi and H2 which "explain" these synchronic data with equal success, then at the level of acceptability assign the greater measure of merit to that hypothesis which has the wider explanatory scope with respect to some second corpus C2 of data relating to linguistic change(s). Less formally, (26) may be formulated as (26'). (26')

From among alternative hypotheses or theories, prefer the one with the greater or greatest amount of surplus explanatory power.

Now in transformational grammar the skeleton acceptability standard (26) has been recently filled out in such a way that as the "additional problematic data" with reference to which the width of the explanatory scope of a hypothesis is determined diachronic, idiolectal, dialectal, and various other kinds of external linguistic data have been used. Moreover, some transformationalists have used (26) in a stronger form. These linguists do not merely regard the surplus explanatory power that a hypothesis or theory may have with respect to a particular kind of external linguistic data as "a pleasant bonus" increasing its acceptability. What they do, in addition, is to insist that to be acceptable at all this hypothesis, besides providing explanations for puzzling primary data, must also provide explanations for one or another particular kind of external linguistic data. For example, on the basis of such a stronger form of the acceptability standard (26), Carden, and the joint authors Elliot, Legum and Thompson, among others, require

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

157

that, to be acceptable, the general-linguistic theory should provide - in addition to its "normal" explanations - an explanation for idiolectal and dialectal variations in the speech of ordinary speaker-listeners. 53 Analogously, among alternative grammatical hypotheses the one which accounts for idiolectal and dialectal variations, where the others fail to d o so, will be the (more) acceptable one. A s a case in point, consider the manner in which Carden uses such an acceptability standard in order to show the merit of his "higher-S" analysis of quantifiers: 5 4 (27) (i) Differences among dialects have long been an embarrassment to transformational grammarians, who regularly find that informants disagree on crucial examples. In some analyses such disagreement seems to imply that the grammars of the conflicting idiolects differ in major structural features, though this unaesthetic conclusion is obscured because most analyses describe only one idiolect and mention the others, if at all, as exceptions. In this note I wish to suggest that there is an obligation to seek an analysis that explains as many as possible of the observed idiolects in a consistent manner, and that a search for a unified analysis can sometimes shed light on difficult theoretical questions. 55 (ii) This paper began with the claim that we should require an analysis to explain dialect variations in a unified and consistent way, and that by adopting such a principle we gain a useful tool for choosing among competing hypotheses. The rest of the paper shows the application of this principle to a sample problem, the deep structure of English quantifiers. The higher-S analysis of quantifiers makes it possible to explain the dialect patterns of [2] and [3], starting from the three dialects of [la] and using independently motivated constraints on until and tag questions. In turn, therefore, the dialect patterns of [2] and [3] provide evidence for the higher-S analysis. Moreover, because this analysis handles the dialect data in a unified way, so that the patterns of [2] and [3] follow automatically from the pattern of [la], the proposed principle gives us reason to prefer the higher-S analysis to any competing analysis that describes the different dialects by unrelated rules or ad hoc constraints. If the proposed principle is adopted, it then becomes the responsibility of the proponents of alternate analyses of quantifiers to show how their systems would handle the dialect data of [2] and [3] in a unified and consistent way. By comparing the results we can choose among the analyses. 56 Observe that in the methodological function - the function of constituent of acceptability standard - in which for example Carden, Bach, and Crothers. external linguistic data, these data are not brought to bear in any direct manner the question of the correctness of grammatical and general-linguistic claims about 53

an use on the

Cf. Carden 1970a: 60; 1970b: 281; Elliot, Legum and Thompson 1969: 58. Carden's higher-S-analysis of quantifiers boils down to the following: "... a pre-determiner quantifier [e.g. every in every optimist - B.-W.] appears in underlying structure in a "highei S" that dominates the S in which the quantifier appears in surface structure. A rule of Quantifier-Lowering (QL) will then be required to move the qualifier from this higher S into its surface-structure position as a constituent of the NP it modifies." (Carden 1970a: 10). 65 Cf. Carden 1970b: 281. 56 Cf. Carden 1970b: 289. In the quotation the numbers have the following values: [la] = All the boy's didn't leave [2] = All the boys didn't leave until 6 p.m. [3] = All the boy's didn't leave, did they? 54

158

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

form of one or another mental language ability. That is, they do not use these data as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against mentalistic claims of the kind entertained by Kiparsky. As Carden, specifically, uses idiolectal and dialectal data, the explanatory success which a grammar achieves with respect to these data is kept distinct from the descriptive success which it could achieve with respect to the form of linguistic mental abilities. The explanatory success which the grammar or generallinguistic theory achieves with regard to these external data is not taken as an indication of the descriptive success which it achieves with regard to the form of such mental abilities. Two general methodological difficulties arise when external linguistic data or considerations are used within the framework of an acceptability standard such as (26) and those discussed in appendices 4.2 and 4.3. We will illustrate the nature of these difficulties with respect to Carden's use of idio'ectal/dialectal data within the methodological framework provided by (26). The first difficulty arises in connection with the justification of the decision to use a particular standard of acceptability and not one of the many alternatives. As will be shown in chapter 6 a choice between alternative hypotheses or theories may be made in transformational grammar, and in empirical science in general, on the basis of a large variety of standards of acceptability. It is not self-evident that such a choice should be made on the basis of a standard constructed in terms of the notion of the width of the explanatory scope of a hypothesis or theory. This choice could also have been made - and then most probably with a different outcome - on the basis of a standard of acceptability that had as its key concept a notion of refutability, or heuristic fruitfulness, or some kind of simplicity, or theoretical coherence, or restricted descriptive latitude, and so on. The point is that the decision to use any one standard of acceptability rather than some other one for choosing among alternative theories or hypotheses is in need of justification. And this question of justification has still to be faced by the linguist using external linguistic data or considerations within the framework of one or another standard of acceptability. The second difficulty that arises when various kinds of external linguistic data are used within the methodological framework of an acceptability standard such as (26) is a variant of the problem of judging the rank or degree of qualitative relevance of the diverse kinds of external linguistic evidence that may be used as positive evidence for or as negative evidence against mentalistic claims. Suppose that there exist two alternative formulations Fi and F2 of the general-linguistic theory both of which have "surplus" or additional explanatory power. Suppose, moreover, that the additional explanatory power of Fi and F2 relate to different kinds of external linguistic data. Whereas Fi additionally provides explanations for, say, diachronic data D, but not for the neuropsychological data N, F2 provides such additional explanations for the neuropsychological data N but fails to do so for the diachronic data D. The problem now is to decide which of the two formulations, Fi or F2, is the more acceptable. This decision can only be made if the two kinds of external linguistic

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

159

data under consideration are weighted or ranked relative to each other for the extent of the merit which each confers, at the level of acceptability, on a linguistic theory by which it is explained. In order to use external linguistic data or considerations in a nonarbitrary manner within the framework of standards of acceptability such as (26), the problem of the relative rank or weight of the different kinds of data or considerations will have to be solved. We are not aware of any attempts by transformational grammarians to tackle this problem within an explicitly outlined and justifiable methodological framework. 4.2.5.3. "Psychological Support"

A third methodological function in which external linguistic data or considerations have been used is that of providing "psychological support" for general-linguistic and grammatical hypotheses. 57 The term "psychological support" does not refer to one or another objective logical relation holding between a hypothesis and statements which presumably present evidence for this hypothesis. Rather, this expression refers to a subjective state of mind of the scientists who champion this hypothesis. It may be said that data or considerations lend "psychological support" to a hypothesis if they engender, in some way or another, the conviction in the scientists proposing this hypothesis that it may be correct and acceptable and, moreover, if they engender such a conviction at a stage when scientists cannot sufficiently motivate this conviction with reference to objective arguments and acceptability standards. King, though not formulating it in such overt methodological terms, provides for the function of diachronic evidence as lending "psychological support" to synchronic grammatical hypotheses: (28) The historical evidence, however, is indirectly relevant to synchronic formulation in a number of interesting and often subtle ways. One of the best proofs of the naturalness of a rule is to show that such a rule occurred as an innovation in a language. This is cogent evidence for a bona fide phonological rule. Likewise, the plausibility of an analysis proposed on strictly synchronic grounds is bolstered if one can demonstrate parallels in the history of the language. A rule CC -»• C simplifying geminate consonant clusters in English can be motivated on purely synchronic grounds: the rule is needed to produce, for example, correct dissimilar [disimilar] from underlying/dis=simil£er/, compare dislike, distasteful (see Chomsky and Halle 1968:243). It is comforting to know that this rule was added to the grammar of Early Modern English, for this gives us a minimal guarantee that our analysis is not unnatural. But the sole justification for including this as a rule of contemporary English phonology is synchronic.58

The methodological function of external linguistic data or considerations as lending "psychological support" to grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses should not be rejected out of hand. Although "psychological support" is no substitute for objective logical support and although it cannot confer on a hypothesis the acceptability which an objective acceptability standard can, nevertheless "psychological 57 58

For the notion 'psychological support' cf. Bunge 1959: 80. Cf. also 3 in § 2.5.5. Cf. King 1969: 103.

160

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

support" may play a useful "pre-justificatory" role in grammatical and generallinguistic inquiry. For "psychological support" for a hypothesis may be the factor which stimulates the grammarian or general linguist to keep on looking for objective evidence in the case of hypotheses with respect to which the availability of such evidence is restricted by incidental, practical, considerations. In the end, however, hypotheses having no other merit than that of possessing psychological support have to be abandoned. 4.2.5.4. Heuristic Fruitfulness A fourth methodological role of external linguistic data or considerations is that they may function as heuristic directives by "guiding", in some psychological sense or the other, the grammarian or general linguist toward explanatory grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. As has been pointed out in § 2.4, the point is generally conceded that there exist n o rules or patterns of inference for thinking up or discovering scientific hypotheses. Scientists, and thus also the general linguist and the grammarian, arrive at their new insights in ways which are not amenable to formulation in logical terms. Chomsky made this point, in fact, more than a decade ago f o r generative grammar: (29) One may arrive at a grammar by intuition, guess-work, all sorts of partial methodological hints, reliance on past experience, etc. It is no doubt possible to give an organized account of many useful procedures of analysis, but it is questionable whether these can be formulated rigorously, exhaustively and simply enough to qualify as a practical and mechanical discovery procedure.59 External linguistic data or considerations may provide transformational grammarians with useful hints about the content and form of individual grammars and the general linguistic theory. This point has recently been made by King a n d by Elliot, Legum and Thompson, among others. First, consider the way in which King puts this point with respect to "historical" and dialectal data: (30) Very often knowledge of the history of a language is of considerable help in writing its synchronic grammar. Historical knowledge (as well as knowledge of related dialects) often suggests where to look for phonological alternation, what kind of phonological processes to expect, and so on. Historical knowledge might, for example, suggest the setting up of base forms that are at considerable variance with the surface forms in the language. But the ultimate justification for such a choice rests with simplicity, descriptive adequacy, and the synchronic data. Historical development is useful for gaining insights, but it is not a substitute for the synchronic grammar.60 Second, Elliot, Legum and Thompson have made a similar point with reference to idiolectal syntactic variation. In their paper, they discuss, among other things, the idiolectal variation existing with respect to the application of the identity cons traint on the "do so" transformation. 6 1 They observe that among speakers there is con59

Cf. Chomsky 1957: 56; as well as § 2.6 of this study. Cf. King 1969: 103. 61 The "do so" rule substitutes "do so" for one of two identical verb phrases. Applied to the structure underlying (A) this rule yields (B) : 60

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

161

siderable idiolectal variation as to what constitutes identity with respect to this constraint.62 In the concluding section of their paper one of the general remarks which they offer on idiolectal variation concerns this variation in the "do so" rule: (31) ... the fact that a hypothesized linguistic entity [such as the "do so" rule - B.-W.] functions or is used in a number of ways lends credence to its theoretical status. The more ways it is used, the more certain we are about its status in the grammar. Statements of the form "X can vary" or "Speaker A has feature X which Speaker B does not" constitute one m o r e u s e o f t h e c o n c e p t " X " . THUS VARIATION OFFERS US ANOTHER ROUTE TO THE DISCOVERY OF LINGUISTIC ENTITIES". 63

It should be noted that "discovery" in the sense of the Elliot, Legum and Thompson quote (31) means more than "mere thinking up". "Discovery" in the sense of these authors includes the notion of "credence" - which places their notion of discovery somewhere between "mere thinking up" and "justifying": the thinking up of credible explanatory hypotheses. What King has to say above - see (30) above - about the heuristic power of diachronic and dialectal data holds good, in principle, for all the other kinds of external linguistic data and considerations. These may indeed point to internal general-linguistic and grammatical principles which were previously "undiscovered". Having thought up an explanatory hypothesis, however, the scientist finds himself only with something in hand that may initiate the rational process of empirical science: the process of justification. 4.2.6. Summary of Conclusions 1. In transformational grammar external linguistic data and considerations relating, for example, to the diachronic, idiolectal, sociological, and neuropsychological aspects of natural language(s) - may be used in four methodological roles or functions: (i) within the framework of nondemonstrative arguments - as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against grammatical and general-linguistic claims whose content differs in qualitative kind from the content of the evidence. (ii) within the framework of acceptability standards - as touchstones with respect to which linguists judge the extent of acceptability of grammatical and generallinguistic hypotheses as explanations to puzzling phenomena or as solutions to problems, (iii) as data or considerations which lend "psychological support" for grammatical

(A) (B)

Sam went to school by bus and Herman went to school by car. Sam went to school by bus and Herman did so by car.

Cf. Elliot, Legum and Thompson 1969: 57. Cf. Elliot, Legum and Thompson 1969: 57. 63 Cf. Elliot, Legum and Thompson 1969: 58. The small capitals are ours. 62

162

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

and general-linguistic hypotheses for which at a given time no, or only insufficient, objective support is providable, and (iv) as informal heuristic guidelines directing general linguists and grammarians in the psychological process of thinking up explanatory general-linguistic and grammatical hypotheses. 2. The use of external linguistic data and considerations in each of the four methodological functions mentioned in 1 above is restricted in essential ways. 3. The transformational linguist using external linguistic data (or considerations) within the framework of nondemonstrative arguments as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against grammatical or general-linguistic claims, claims which may be either mentalistic or nonmentalistic, has to contend with the following problematic considerations: (i) In this function the problem arises that the evidence and the conclusions appear to differ in kind of qualitative content. (ii) This requires that a demonstration of some sort be provided which will justify the hypothesis that external linguistic evidence possesses qualitative relevance for the evaluation of synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic claims. (iii) In order for such a demonstration of qualitative relevance to be provided, the conditions of adequacy which it should meet should be stated and justified. For example, it is clear that such a relevance demonstration cannot be one of the "by definition" type but that it should be substantive and empirical. (iv) In transformational grammar the required conditions of adequacy for such a relevance demonstration are not clear, and have not been justified. Consequently, no such relevance demonstration has been provided by any transformational linguist. (v) Transformational grammarians, though implicitly ranking different kinds of external linguistic data with respect to their relative qualitative relevance, do not have at their disposal a measure for qualitative relevance on the basis of which this ranking can be carried out in a non-ad hoc and nonarbitrary manner. (vi) The decision to regard the success which a grammatical or general-linguistic hypothesis/theory achieves in explaining or predicting diachronic phenomena as an index of the success which it achieves in describing or representing the form of a mental language ability is in need of detailed justification. None has so far been provided for it. 4. The transformational grammarian using external linguistic data or considerations in the formulation of an acceptability standard has to face at least two general problems, viz.: (i) justifying the methodological framework of this standard of acceptability in relation to the other acceptability standards available to the field; and

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

163

(ii) weighting or ranking the various kinds of external linguistic data or considerations in terms of the relative contribution which they make - within the framework of an acceptability standard - to the acceptability of synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. In transformational grammar no serious attempt has yet been made to deal satisfactorily with these problems. 5. The "psychological support" given by external linguistic data and considerations to grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses (i) has the merit of stimulating transformational linguists to look for objective evidence for (or counter-evidence against) these hypotheses but, (ii) in the end, cannot be a substitute for objective support explicable within a logical framework. 6. The heuristic directives with which external linguistic data and considerations may provide transformationalists in their search for explanatory grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses (i) have a certain sort of value within the context of scientific discovery, but, (ii) even if these directives prove to be fruitful, are not amenable to rigid formulation in logical terms and, therefore, (iii) bring the transformational linguist only to the very beginning of the rational process of inquiry, namely: the process of justification. 4.2.7. Implications of Conclusions The preceding conclusions, if correct, imply that at present the use of external linguistic data or considerations in each of the four methodological functions considered above poses many important questions and is subject to definite limitations. From this it does not follow, however, that such data and considerations cannot have any useful function in the context of synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic inquiry. What does follow is that in order to keep such inquiry a rational affair, the abovementioned limitations should be recognized for what they are. Moreover, transformationalists may attempt to overcome these limitations by resolving the questions examined above. There is no a priori reason on account of which attempts to do so are doomed to failure. Until these questions are in fact resolved and these limitations are in fact overcome, however, to use external linguistic data or considerations in one of their justificatory methodological functions is to introduce in synchronic grammatical and generallinguistic controversies an additional element of inconclusiveness. One of the reasons, for example, why the controversy between abstract and concrete phonologists has remained inconclusive may be traced to Kiparsky's use of diachronic data and considerations, Hyman's use of sociolinguistic data, and Crothers's use of considerations pertaining to language acquisition in their arguments for or against these

164

QUESTIONS OF EXTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

positions. It is simply not clear at this stage what the precise ways are in which such data and considerations bear on synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic hypotheses. The solution is not to ban such data and considerations from synchronic grammatical and general-linguistic inquiry, but to tackle and resolve the questions to which their use gives rise. It is of especial importance that mentalist transformational grammarians should tackle the problem of qualitative relevance which arises when one or another kind of external linguistic data is used as positive evidence for or as counter-evidence against mentalistic grammatical or mentalistic general-linguistic claims. For, in the end, no thesis of mentalism in transformational grammar can be upheld if appropriate means of evaluating mentalistic grammatical or general-linguistic claims cannot be developed.64 The great merit of Kiparsky's work is that it indicates a direction in which mentalists may look for such a measure of evaluation. Provided that the question of qualitative relevance can be resolved, external linguistic data and considerations may yet constitute the basis for this much needed evaluation measure.

64

For a more general discussion of problems connected with the justification of mentalistic grammatical and general-linguistic claims cf. Botha 1971a: chapter 4. For a recent discussion of substantive problems of mentalism cf. Bever 1970b.

APPENDIX 4

4.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY IN DIACHRONIC LINGUISTICS

In §§ 3.3.3.1. and 4.2.2.1. of this study it has been made clear that Kiparsky is deeply troubled by the question whether or not synchronic grammars, and the linguistic universals of the general theory within the framework of which these grammars are written are psychologically real or correct. Kiparsky, for example, wants to know how we can determine whether or not the notation convention governing the use of braces is psychologically correct.65 As has been shown, he sees in linguistic change a criterion for psychological reality. In § 3.3.2.2. an external explanatory argument by Kiparsky in support of the psychological reality of the brace convention was analyzed. The core of this argument may be stated as follows: the brace convention is psychologically correct on account of the fact that it makes possible the "characterization" of superficially different linguistic changes as being a single, unitary change. Further on in his paper, Kiparsky states that an adequate general-linguistic theory should not provide explanations for synchronic linguistic phenomena only. In addition an adequate general-linguistic theory "... must (in conjunction with a theory of linguistic change) provide an explanation of the linguistic regularities of diachrony".66 What we find puzzling at this point is Kiparsky's concern for the problem of the psychological reality of the synchronic aspect of the general-linguistic theory, but his disregard of the identical problem with respect to the diachronic aspect of this theory. We fail to see how in the case of such a unitary theory this question may be asked with respect to one of its aspects, but would be irrelevant with respect to the other. That is, if a mentalist linguist needs to know whether, for example, the brace convention is psychologically correct in the synchronic dimension, then it seems logical to us that he must raise the question of its psychological reality also when this convention is used for the "characterization" of linguistic changes. How does one know that what this convention "characterizes" are in fact changes in the form of the linguistic competence of two consecutive linguistic generations, and are not "merely" 65 66

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 188. Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 188.

166

APPENDIX IV

changes in the substance of these competences? What would be the criterion for psychological reality on the basis of which an answer to such a question could be given ? These questions Kiparsky does not pose, and his reasons for not doing so are not immediately evident.

4.2. AN ACCEPTABILITY STANDARD INVOLVING DIALECTAL DATA AND A DIACHRONIC CONSIDERATION In his thesis Logical predicates and idiolect variation in English Carden argues that a semantic theory incorporating the concept of derivational constraints is more acceptable than one incorporating the concept of interpretive semantic rules. Central to this argument, which has as its grammatical basis Carden's quantifier analysis of three dialects of English, is an acceptability standard in which reference is made to dialectal linguistic data and to a theoretical consideration about the nature of linguistic change. The core of the argument is outlined by Carden as follows. (32) It appears, then, that the AMB dialect will be the simplest of the three dialects in an analysis with derivational constraints, and the most complicated in an analysis with interpretive semantic rules. If we assume that linguistic change normally represents a simplification of the grammar, at least at the point where the initial change takes place, two additional facts can be seen to give indirect support to the method of derivational constraints: 1. 2.

Speakers of NEG-Q have been known to change to AMB over a period of months, no changes from AMB to NEG-Q or NEG-V have been observed. AMB is the most common dialect.

We can conclude that, while the scope problem remains unsolved, our present data suggests that derivational constraints are more promising than interpretive semantic rules. The important point to notice is the form of argument used, rather than the particular conclusion reached. We have taken a theory of linguistic change motivated by historical data, applied it to synchronic dialect variations, and reached a conclusion about the synchronic analysis of the individual dialects. The synchronic analysis chosen then motivates a choice between competing semantic theories. This sort of argument, if it proves to be widely applicable, offers an approach to the old problem of the synchronic relevance of historical data, and the possibility of a genuinely unified linguistic theory. 67 The skeleton form of Carden's argument may be outlined as follows: the semantic theory incorporating derivational constraints is more acceptable than the one incorporating interpretive semantic rules, since the former and not latter provides for a grammatical analysis of the grammatical phenomena Pi, P2, ..., P n of the dialects Di, D2, D3 in terms of which D3 is the simplest dialect; and that D3 is in fact the simplest dialect appears from the fact that speakers of D i and D2 change over to D3 ( - no changes in the opposite direction have been observed - ) and from the fact that D3 is the most common of the three dialects. 67

Cf. Carden 1970a: 98-99.

APPENDIX IV

167

Underlying this argument is the acceptability standard (33) in terras of which the merit of alternative grammatical analyses may be judged. (33) Given two grammatical analyses GAi and GA2, then at the level of acceptability assign the greater measure of merit to GAi if it is the case that whereas (i) the claims of GAi about the relative simplicity of a set of dialects are in accordance with the (expected) manner in which linguistic changes will affect these dialects, (ii) the corresponding simplicity claims of GA2 are in conflict with the (expected) manner in which linguistic changes will aifect these dialects. At the level of the general-linguistic theory this acceptability standard for grammatical analyses has the reflex (33'). (33') A general-linguistic theory LTi which permits the construction of grammatical analyses such as GAi is more acceptable than an alternative general-linguistic theory LT2 which permits the construction of grammatical analyses such as GA2 only. The acceptability standard (33') brings to bear on the merit of synchronic linguistic theories both external linguistic data and a theoretical external linguistic consideration. The external linguistic data concern differences in the linguistic features of related dialects, concern the changing over by speakers of these dialects from one dialect to another one, and concern the generality in use of these dialects. The theoretical external linguistic consideration is about linguistic change, namely that linguistic change normally represents a simplification of the grammar. For an acceptability standard such as (33) to be used in a nonarbitrary manner a number of requirements must be satisfied. First, general use of such a standard should be justified with respect to conceivable alternatives. This implies, among other things, that it be made clear how much such a standard can add to or detract from the acceptability of the hypothesis to which it is applied. Second, no serious doubts should exist as to the correctness of the external linguistic data referred to in such a standard. Third, the theoretical external linguistic consideration incorporated in such a standard should not be a controversial one for which the justification is scant. 4.3. AN ACCEPTABILITY STANDARD INVOLVING A CONSIDERATION PERTAINING TO LANGUAGE LEARNING

One of the arguments which Crothers uses in his paper "On the abstractness controversy" against Hyman's abstract phonologist analysis of Nupe data refers to an acceptability standard incorporating an external linguistic consideration about language learning: 68 (34) Whatever competence is, it must be acquirable; any assumption about competence implies something about language acquisition. If it is part of a Nupe speaker's competence to know that imaginary /e/ and /o/ merge with /a/, a child learning Nupe would have to 68

This analysis by Hyman has been presented in § 4.2.2.2.

168

APPENDIX IV

acquire such a rule somehow. Since not all languages have the rule, he cannot derive it from innate knowledge exclusively; he must be forced to derive it by the special facts of Nupe, these naturally being the facts adduced by Hyman in his arguments: palatalization and labialization, the form of reduplicated prefixes, and the odd distribution of glides before [a]. In other words an acquisition model powerful enough to provide an abstract analysis must first of all be able to arrive at a sufficiently general statement of these facts. In addition it must have a procedure for postulating imaginary segments and altering the general statements already arrived at so that they will appropriately handle these imaginary segments as well. But why should we attribute this additional power to the model, when without it it is still sufficient to capture the basic generalizations, as is necessary to assume in the first place? An abstract analysis, considered as the end product of the acquisition process, must be based upon a preliminary organization of the data which is obviously much closer to a concrete analysis. Why posit an additional step in the acquisition process? Every step toward abstractness, however much it may tidy up the descriptive statements, must be paid for in a corresponding complication of the learning process. 69

The acceptability standard invoked at the end of the quoted passage (34) may be formulated as (35). (35) Given a corpus C of data and given two alternative grammatical analyses GAi and GA2 of these data, then at the level of acceptability assign the greater measure of merit to the grammatical analysis which is the simpler from the point of view of the process of language acquisition. The theoretical consideration about language acquisition incorporated in (35) cannot be accepted without further elaboration and justification. Since so little is known about the actual process of language acquisition, it is not obvious what kinds of "learning tasks" would be "simple" and what kinds would be more "complicated" in terms of this process. What is interesting about this consideration is its relation to the diachronic consideration underlying the acceptability standard of Carden's presented as (33) in appendix 4.2. It becomes clear that grammatical simplicity may be viewed from diverse points of view - for example that of language acquisition and that of linguistic change - , diverse points of view which cannot be regarded on a priori grounds as merely superficially distinct but identical at a deeper level. Transformational linguists invoking such a notion of simplicity as the key concept of acceptability standards therefore have to face the tasks of explication and justification. They should make it clear whether or not the diverse kinds of external linguistic simplicity are basically the same. To do this would be to show for a set of pairs of alternative grammatical analyses that a specifiable member of the pair is always the simpler from the point of view of every external linguistic consideration. If their findings should be to the contrary, then the question of justification would arise. This is the question as to the grounds on which one kind of external linguistic simplicity - for example, diachronic simplicity - is preferable as the key concept of an acceptability standard to the other kinds of external linguistic simplicity.70 69 70

Cf. Crothers 1971: 26-27. The general question of the justification of acceptability standards is dealt with in § 6.5.4.

APPENDIX IV

169

4.4. "DATA" vs. "CONSIDERATIONS"

In this chapter we operate with a pre-systematic distinction between "(factual) data" and "(theoretical) considerations". Any attempt to provide this distinction with a basis that would be principled and well justified within the philosophy of science would require a detailed and highly technical discussion of the status of concepts such as "fact" and "theory". Such a discussion would take us well beyond the aims and limits of the present study. The most that we can hope to achieve here is to provide an informal, and mainly ostensive, characterization of the content which we assign to the concepts "(factual) data" and "(theoretical) considerations" within the framework of the present study. With respect to linguistic change(s) the distinction between "(factual) data" and "(theoretical) considerations" may be drawn in the following manner: 1.

(Factual) data allegedly constitute bits of information about individual linguistic changes. Such data may be presented by means of assertions such as (36).

(36)

2.

(i) (ii) (iii)

The linguistic change Ci did take place in the history ol the language L. No linguistic change C2 took place in the history of the language L. The linguistic change Ci, as it occurred in the history of L, affected the linguistic forms of L in the respects Ri and R2 and not in the respects R3 and R4.

(Theoretical) considerations constitute those general hypotheses about the nature of sound change which occur in the generative theory of linguistic change. The assertions (37) represent typical instances of such (theoretical) considerations.

(37) (i) Grammars are subjected to changes of two kinds: the addition of new rules to them and the simplification of them. 71 (ii) ... most kinds of 'analogy' too are special cases of simplification, in principle very similar to rule reordering, rule loss, and rule simplification proper. 72

The suggested distinction between (factual) data and (theoretical) considerations as drawn with respect to linguistic change(s) can be extended in a natural manner so as to apply also to assertions about other external aspects of natural language(s) and to assertions about the internal aspects of natural language(s). At the basis of this suggested methodological distinction lies, as was noted above, a general-methodological distinction between the concepts "facts" and "theories". It must be stressed, once again, that within the content of the present study this general-methodological distinction is of a pre-systematic character.

71 72

Cf. Kiparsky 1968a: 174-175. Cf. King 1969:128.

170

APPENDIX IV

4.5. HARRIS'S NONTECHNICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRE-SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTIONS AND PRE-SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS

Philosophers of science have offered divergent explications of the notions "scientific description" and "scientific explanation". 73 A synopsis of these explications within the format of an appendix to the present study is precluded by the highly technical character which these explications understandably assume. What can be offered here is an indication of the way in which one philosopher of science, Harre, distinguishes between the descriptions and the explanations that occur in pre-scientific discourse. It must be emphasized that the particular part of Harre's discussion which will be summarized in this appendix is of a nontechnical nature. A first respect in terms of which Harrd distinguishes between scientific descriptions and scientific explanations is that of their purpose or goal.74 Scientific descriptions are intended to serve as generalized and precise answers to "What?" questions. Scientific explanations are intended to serve as generalized and precise answers to "Why?" and "How?" questions. By way of introduction to his analysis of the workings of scientific description and scientific explanation, Harre then discusses some of the sorts of description and explanation to be found in ordinary, pre-scientific, discourse.75 Part of Harre's discussion of these elementary sorts of description and explanation may be summarized with reference to three further respects considered in his discussion. The first of these further respects is that of the linguistic form of the sentences by means of which pre-scientific descriptions and explanations are expressed. Adopting the analysis of it proposed by Frege, Harre describes the simple descriptive sentence as wholly constituted by "an argument" and "a function". The ARGUMENT of the simple description is a referring expression, and the job - in Harre's phraseology - which it does is to individuate and refer to a certain subject. As a referring expression the argument may be a proper noun, e.g. "Rutherford" in "Rutherford was a tall man", or a descriptive phrase. A descriptive phrase such as "the tallest man alive" cannot have more than one entity as its referent; it is an instance of a DEFINITE DESCRIPTION. In an argument such as "a tall man", however, the uniqueness of reference is left open. The FUNCTION of the simple descriptive sentence is that part of it which remains when its argument is suppressed, e.g. "... was a tall man" in "Rutherford was a tall man". The job which the function does is to characterize the individuated subject either as belonging to a certain kind or as possessing a certain property. A descriptive sentence which cannot be analyzed as being a complex of simpler function-argument units is logically ATOMIC. Descriptive sentences which are logically atomic can be linked up into larger units by means of such sentence connectives as "and", "or", "not both ... and", "if and only if". The truth or falsity of the compound statement 73 74 75

Some of the relevant literature is listed by Danto (1967) and Hesse (1967). Cf. Harre 1967: 4. Cf. Harre 1967: 5-40.

APPENDIX IV

171

can be calculated from the truths and falsities of the atomic statements used to make it up. Such compound statements are called "truth-functional" and an analysis of language undertaken on this basis is called a "truth-functional analysis". Although appropriate to the simple descriptive sentence, a truth-functional analysis is inadequate as a general account of the descriptive discourse of the sciences. In simple - pre-scientific - causal explanations of the type which he calls "explanation in detail" H a n i distinguishes a general statement stating some causal connection in purely general terms and a particular statement stating some particular happening. 76 For instance, the fact that the fire has died down may be explained in terms of the explanation: "Fires die out when their flues are blocked, and this flue is blocked." The second of the three further respects considered in Harre's discussion is that of the logical bases of pre-scientific descriptions and explanations. Logically speaking the process of description involves two steps: 1. 2.

Select something as the subject of the description, and identify the thing so selected either as belonging to a certain kind or as possessing a certain property.

The demand for an explanation "of X " can be interpreted in one or the other of two distinct ways: 1.

2.

Account for the phenomenon of X. For instance, if X is the jet-engine, this means: give an account of what antecedent happenings led to the appearance of jet-engines in the places where, and in the forms in which, they do appear. Make me understand the workings and the general nature of X. For instance, if X is the jet-engine, this means: show me how jet-engines work and what sort of thing they are.

The third of the three parameters inherent in Harre's discussion is that of the conditions of adequacy to be imposed on pre-scientific descriptions and explanations. A simple descriptive statement is to be accounted adequate, or successful, only if 1.

2.

reference to the intended object has been ensured by using as the argument of the descriptive sentence that referring expression - e.g. a proper name or a descriptive phrase - which is conventionally correlated with the intended object, and the object really possesses the alleged property or really belongs to the alleged class and if the function of the simple descriptive sentence contains that propertyword or class-word which is conventionally associated with a standard instance of this property or a sample member of this class. 77

A set of statements offered as a - simple - causal explanation of some problematic happening counts as an adequate, or successful, explanation of it only if 76 7

Cf. Harre 1967: 29. Cf. Harre 1967: 10.

172

APPENDIX IV

1. it gives a reason for this problematic happening by mentioning a certain feature or certain features of the antecedent situation, and 2. it either implies or states directly the relevance which this feature or these features possesses for the problematic happening. On the basis of the different ways in which explanations satisfy these two conditions of adequacy Harr6 distinguishes several kinds of simple explanation, among which it is the explanatory theory that has greatest power and depth. As such, the explanatory theory represents the beginnings of science.78

'8 Cf.Harre 1967: 27-34.

5 QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

5.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The present chapter is devoted to a discussion of problematic aspects of three properties which statements of internal linguistic evidence may have. These properties - as listed in § 4.1 - are reliability, comprehensiveness, and mutual independence: 1. reliability as a property of those statements which refer to linguistic intuitions as evidence for grammatical and for general-linguistic claims, 2. comprehensiveness as a property of a corpus of statements of internal linguistic evidence, and 3. mutual independence as a property of two or more statements of internal linguistic evidence. Internal linguistic evidence for a grammatical or general-linguistic claim, it may be recalled, consists of data which are logically relevant to this claim, AND, moreover, which are similar to this claim in kind of qualitative content. The problematic nature of the above-mentioned three properties of evidential statements will be dealt with by raising in respect of each of these properties the following two primary questions: 1. Under what conditions is this property in fact assigned to an evidential statement, or corpus of evidential statements in the case of comprehensiveness, in transformational grammar ? 2. Are these conditions sufficiently c'ear and sufficiently well justified to make the assignment of this property to a given evidential statement, or corpus of evidential statements, a nonarbitrary act? The implications of the findings which we arrive at by considering these two questions will be brought to bear on the inconclusive nature of current intra-paradigmatic transformationalist controversies. Finally, it should be noted that in the case of the properties of comprehensiveness - § 5.6 below - and independence - § 5.7 - the problematic aspects will be dealt with very briefly only. As already indicated in

174

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

§ 4.1, the main topic of discussion here - in §§ 5.2-5.5 - will be the property of the reliability of statements presenting intuitive evidence.

5.2. T H E RELIABILITY O F INTUITIVE E V I D E N C E

5.2.1. "Linguistic Intuitions", "Intuitive Evidence", "Intuitive Evidential Statements" In quite general terms the native or fluent speaker's LINGUISTIC INTUITIONS may be characterized as his non-reasoned "judgements" or "feelings" that given utterances of his language have certain linguistic properties. These properties have been denoted by expressions such as "acceptability", "ambiguity", "bizarreness", "synonymity", and so on. One of the features which distinguished early, transformational grammar from American structural linguistics was the overt manner in which transformational grammarians were willing to draw (primary) linguistic data and linguistic evidence from the source of native speakers' linguistic intuitions. These linguistic intuitions were assigned a dual role in transformational grammar. 1 First, the native speaker's linguistic intuitions were regarded as PROBLEMATIC DATA, problematic in that they had to be explained by a transformational grammar. Second, these linguistic intuitions were regarded as the source of a body of EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE against which the predictions made by transformational grammar could be tested. Today, the native speaker's linguistic intuitions still figure crucially in transformational linguistic inquiry. These intuitions constitute, among other things, the source of INTUITIVE (LINGUISTIC) EVIDENCE with reference to which grammatical and, ultimately, general-linguistic hypotheses are justified within the framework of internal confirmatory and explanatory arguments. In short, the linguistic intuitions of the native speaker have remained, in transformational grammar, a major source of empirical evidence. An evidential statement presenting intuitive evidence - or, for short, an INTUITIVE EVIDENTIAL STATEMENT - for a grammatical hypothesis has, when formulated explicitly, the general format (1). (1)

The native speaker S intuitively judges the utterance U of the language L to have the linguistic property P. Three general points should be made in connection with (1). First, in this context, transformational grammarians have on the whole not been careful to draw the terminological distinction between "utterance" and "sentence". Consequently, in actual intuitive evidential statements the terms "utterance" and "sentence" have been used indiscriminately. Where no confusion can result by our doing so, we will follow 1

For earlier discussions of this dual methodological role of native speakers' linguistic intuitions in transformational grammar cf. Botha 1968: § 3.3 ; and Leech 1968.

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

175

transformational grammarians in this terminological practice. It should be noted, though, that intuitive linguistic judgements by the native speaker are behavioural responses to concrete utterances which are, stricto sensu, the realizations of - inherently abstract - sentences.2 Second, the native speaker referred to in (1) as giving the intuitive judgement may do so in one or the other of two capacities: either he is the trained linguist in his capacity of fluent speaker of the language or he is an ordinary linguistically untrained fluent speaker of the language. If intuitive evidential statements refer to the linguistic intuitions of the linguist qua native speaker, then, in the technical jargon, the data presented by these statements are "introspective data". 3 Intuitive evidential statements referring to linguistic intuitions of the linguistically untrained native speaker are often said to represent "informant judgements" or "informant data". 4 Third, transformational grammarians on the whole do not overtly draw a distinction between linguistic intuitions and the intuitive evidential statements making one or another assertion about these linguistic intuitions. Accordingly, what transformational grammarians adduce in support of a given claim they themselves call "linguistic intuitions" and not "intuitive evidence" or "intuitive evidential statements". We will adopt this transformationalist mode of speech when no misunderstanding can result from our doing so. It is now possible to characterize intuitive linguistic evidence in a general manner in methodological terms. In transformational grammar intuitive linguistic evidence is covertly accepted as a kind of internal linguistic evidence bearing on grammatical claims about the structural properties of sentences. On the whole, that is, transformational grammarians do not doubt that intuitive linguistic evidence is qualitatively relevant to the justification of certain grammatical claims embodied in proposed structural descriptions of sentences. This is not to say that no problem of qualitative relevance may arise in connection with the manner in which a particular intuitive evidential statement is brought to bear on a particular grammatical claim. Though we will point out in passing specimen problems of the kind just indicated, chapter 5 of this study is not concerned with the general question of the qualitative relevance which intuitive linguistic evidence possesses for the justification of transformationalist linguistic hypotheses. Intuitive linguistic evidence having now been identified as a kind of internal linguistic evidence, its general nature may be further clarified by setting intuitive linguistic evidence against two other kinds of evidencealso used in transformational grammar. 5 The first of these two other kinds of evidence is HYPOTHETICAL (INTERNAL) (LINGUISTIC) EVIDENCE. In synchronic transformational grammar a hypothetical evidential state2 The behavioural aspect of the nature of intuitive linguistic judgements will be discussed in more detail in §§ 5.4.2.1 and 5.4.2.2. 3 For this terminology cf. e.g. Chomsky 1964: 56 ff. 4 Cf. Leech 1968: 96 for this latter expression. 5 For this distinction cf. Botha 1970: § 4.4.

176

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

ment makes an assertion about a property of (a) natural language concerning which, it is implicitly conceded, the native speaker is unable to have reliable linguistic intuitions. For example, in support of grammatical claims about the identity or nonidentity of the deep structures of two or more sentences evidential statements have been adduced which assert something about the (non-)correspondence of these sentences in certain properties. Examples of such properties are: the syntactic selectional restrictions of the sentences involved, the grammatical relations holding within these sentences, and the transformational characteristics of these sentences. It is generally accepted, however, that about such properties of (a) natural language as the three just mentioned no reliable native-speaker intuitive judgements are possible. Consequently, the evidential statements making claims about these properties are regarded as hypothetical. This means that these evidential statements are themselves in need of justification.6 METATHEORETICAL EVIDENCE is a distinct kind of evidence which is both nonintuitive and nonhypothetical in the above senses.7 Metatheoretical evidence, moreover, cannot be aptly characterized in terms of the dichotomy "external-internal". In support of a grammatical hypothesis which postulates either a grammatical rule or a component part of a structural description evidence can be adduced which bears on the methodological status - for example, the degree of motivation - of this rule or structural feature within some larger sub-area of the grammar. In support of a postulated rule or structural feature it can be pointed out, for example, that postulation of it is required for independent reasons or has the effect of reducing the overall complexity of the grammar. Within the framework of the present study evidence of this kind - that is, evidence referring to methodological properties of theoretical constructs constitutes metatheoretical evidence. This notion of metatheoretical evidence will be given a more determinate content in § 6.4 of this study. 5.2.2. Problematic Aspects of Intuitive Evidence The nature of intuitive linguistic evidence having been characterized in general terms, it is now possible to point out some of the problematic aspects of this kind of evidence as these have been noted in the history of transformational grammar. In its early days opponents of transformational grammar condemned the use of intuitive linguistic data or evidence for a variety of reasons. Such opponents of transformational grammar claimed, for example, that 1. linguistically untrained native speakers do not have such things as linguistic intuitions and that these "intuitions" should, in reality, be attributed to the imaginative minds of transformational grammarians; 2. the linguistic intuitions of the native speaker are influenced or biased by his general schooling and cultural training; 6 7

For a discussion of this point cf. Botha 1970: 26, 52-53. The notion of "metatheoretical evidence" has been used for the first time in Botha 1970: 33-34,43.

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

177

3. the linguistic intuitions of the non-linguist native speaker cannot be elicited in an objective manner; 4. with the general use of intuitive evidence in linguistic inquiry linguistics would be plunged into an era of objectionable subjectivism; and so on. These and other similar early criticisms of the transformationalist recourse to intuitive linguistic evidence have been considered in some detail in literature on methodological aspects of transformational grammar. 8 On the whole, these criticisms have made little impression on practising transformational grammarians. This is clear from the fact that in transformational grammar native speakers' linguistic intuitions have not been given up as a source of linguistic evidence. Recently, however, progress in grammatical and general-linguistic inquiry has been arrested by the fact that many of the intuitive evidential statements which were originally intended to play a crucial role in grammatical and general-linguistic arguments have subsequently turned out to exhibit a particular problematic property. This is the methodological property which may be denoted by the informal cover term "DOUBTFUL RELIABILITY".9 It is this property of intuitive evidential statements with which we will be concerned in the present section § 5.2 to § 5.5 of this monograph. Down below, this property will be characterized in epistemological terms of a more technical sort. Let us first, however, consider the skeleton of two typical kinds of situations in which the doubtful reliability of intuitive evidential statements has become conspicuous in transformational grammar. (2)

(i) At the level of grammatical inquiry (a)

A first transformational grammarian Gi identifies puzzling linguistic properties of certain sentences in terms of his linguistic intuitions and then attempts to explain these puzzling linguistic properties by means of a grammatical hypothesis, a grammatical hypothesis which he offers as the conclusion of an internal explanatory argument. AND/OR

(b) the transformational grammarian Gi attempts to confirm such an explanatory hypothesis H by adducing intuitive linguistic evidence for it within the framework of an internal confirmatory argument.

8

Cf. Botha 1968: § 3.3 and Leech 1968. In transformational grammar the term "firmness" is used as a synonym for "reliability" - cf. e.g. Chomsky 1964: 56. For the use of the term "reliability" in the philosophy of science cf. Caws 1966: chapter 25. 9

178

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

(ii) At the level of general-linguistic inquiry the grammarian Gi establishes the fact that, to be able to provide for the formulation of the explanatory grammatical hypothesis H, the general-linguistic theory T has to be modified in certain, often quite crucial, respects. (iii) A second transformational grammarian G2 now comes along - and in many a case G2 is a proponent of the unmodified version of the general-linguistic theory T - and rejects the proposals for the modification of T which are being suggested by the first grammarian Gi. This rejection by grammarian G2 is based EITHER

(a)

on the claim that the linguistic intuitions in terms of which grammarian Gi has isolated the grammatical puzzle mentioned under (i) (a) above are unreliable and that, consequently, the grammatical problem identified by grammarian Gi does not in fact exist, OR

(b)

on the claim that the evidential statements in terms of which grammarian Gi has attempted to confirm the explanatory grammatical hypothesis H are unreliable and that, consequently, this grammatical hypothesis H does not in fact have any justification.

In essence, (2) is a framework describing those situations where one grammarian rejects the linguistic intuitions of a colleague as being "not obvious" or "mistaken". How it can be judged whether or not the "rejecting" grammarian is correct in his rejection is a question to be considered at a later stage of this discussion. First, however, a few specimen cases from transformational grammar of the rejection of intuitive evidential statements must now be considered. 5.2.3. Specimen Cases of Rejected Intuitive Evidential Statements The recent literature within the field of transformational grammar abounds in cases of rejected intuitive evidential statements. Below, seven such cases - all of which bear in one or another way on the controversy between generative and interpretive semanticists - will be considered in general outlines. For a detailed exposition of the theoretical framework within which each of these cases has occurred, we must refer the reader to the original literature. 1. A Postal - Bar-Hillel/Bowers disagreement. — Postal's strike-like analysis of the surface verb remind has been outlined in § 3.3.2.1.2. In Postal's opinion this analysis of his is confirmed by a number of correct predictions which follow from it. To demonstrate the correctness of one of these predictions, Postal offers an intuitive evidential statement reconstructible as (3).

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

(3)

179

The sentence Larry reminds me of Winston Churchill although I perceive that Larry is not similar to Winston Churchill is contradictory.10

Postal presents no argument for his assertion that the sentence in question is contradictory. It is accordingly fair to assume that the basis on which this statement rests is an intuitive judgement by Postal. The intuitive evidential statement (3) has recently been rejected by at least two scholars: Bowers, who characterizes it as containing "a factual error", 11 and Bar-Hil'el, who calls it "empirically wrong". 12 Both Bowers and Bar-Hillel judge the sentence quoted in (3) above to be noncontradictory; and the alleged noncontradictory nature of this sentence would, if it were a fact, imply a disconfirmation of Postal's strike-like analysis of remind. Such a negative finding would be important within the context of the debate between generative and interpretive semanticists. For Postal's strike-like analysis, if correct, implies that Chomsky's (extended) standard theory is incorrect in its assumption that all lexical transformations precede all nonlexical transformations applying in the cycle. In Postal's analysis of remind a number of nonlexical cyclic transformations apply prelexically.13 2. A Katz — McCawley disagreement. - In his paper "The role of semantics in a grammar", McCawley argues for the hypothesis that in a specific sense all selectional restrictions are semantic.14 This hypothesis of McCawley's, if correct, would conflict with Katz's version of the standard theory, a version in which a distinction is drawn between semantic and syntactic selectional restrictions. Katz, however, rejects McCawley's hypothesis, asserting that there are pairs of expressions which are semantically identical but which differ in their selectional restrictions.15 Katz bases his criticism of McCawley's hypothesis on, among other things, an intuitive evidential statement reconstructible as (4). (4)

In (i) and (ii) below, pairs of expressions occur such that the expressions of each pair are identical to each other in meaning: (i) footwear: articles of wearing apparelfor the feet. (ii) camping-gear: artifacts for use in camping.

In his reply to Katz's criticism, McCawley rejects the evidential statement (4). McCawley asserts specifically, with reference to the pair of expressions footwear: articles of wearing apparelfor the feet, that (4) "is not as obviously true as Katz makes 10

Cf. Postal 1970: 41. Cf. Bowers 1970: 560. 12 Cf. Bar-Hillel 1971: 402-403. 13 Kimball (1970) is another linguist who has raised doubts about the reliability of some of Postal's intuitive evidential statements. 14 McCawley's position on selectional restrictions has been outlined in appendix 3.4. 15 Cf. Katz 1970: 237-238. 11

180

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

it out to be". 16 In McCawley's opinion, the outlined criticism by Katz of McCawley's position on selectional restrictions accordingly collapses. 3. A Ross - Fraser disagreement. - Ross in his paper "On declarative sentences" has presented a grammatical analysis of declarative sentences which has become known as "the performative analysis".17 In terms of this analysis, the sentence (5) is assigned the complex deep structure (6), which consists (i) of a higher sentence containing a performative verb and (ii) of an embedded sentence constituting the only part of the deep structure to be realized overtly.18 (5)

Prices slumped.

(6)

S NP

VP V

NP

NP

I

I

S "+ + + -+_+

V performative communication linguistic declarative

you

NP

VP

prices slumped

One of the sets of arguments put forward by Ross for this analysis is in support of a higher object you. This set contains an argument whose conclusion asserts that idioms such as hold one's breath and loses one's cool have a deep structure subject which is identical to the indirect object of the second higher sentence. One of the intuitive evidential statements adduced by Ross in support of this assertion may be formulated as follows: (7)

16

Sentences such as I want Tom's breath (to be) held for 2 minutes, ?? I expect your breath to be heldfor 2 minutes, * I believejknow/etc. your breath to have been held for 2 minutes and *I told Max i that I wanted your breath (to be) held for two minutes are either strange or ungrammatical. 19

McCawley (1971a: 289) continues: "Indeed upon a few moments reflection it becomes obvious, at least to me, that they differ in meaning in the same way as do footwear and articles of footwear or wearing apparel for the feet and articles of wearing apparel for the feet, i.e. the meaning of (ii) involves the proposition that what is referred to is individuated but the meaning of (i) does not." 17 This paper will be referred to as "Ross 1970". 18 This grammatical analysis by Ross (cf. 1970 : 224) is critically discussed by Anderson 1971; Fraser 1971b; and Matthews 1972. 19 Cf. Ross 1970: 246.

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

181

These sentences violate the alleged general restrictio n that the deep subject of the idiom must be identical to the indirect object of the second sentence up. Fraser, however, in his extensive critique of the performative analysis, rejects the evidential statement (7): (8) I find most of Ross' unacceptable examples acceptable. For example, the sentences [53] (i) I want Tom's breath to be held until I say "stop". (ii) Can your breath be held very long under water? (iii) I expect your word to be kept at all times. (iv) I told Max that I wanted fhis 1 word to be kept no matter what. I your| [theirj are all acceptable for me but violate his restrictions.20 By rejecting the evidential statement (8), Fraser aims to demolish an argument by Ross for a higher object you. By implication, Fraser in addition discredits the performative analysis as a whole. If the performative analysis were nonobjectionable, then it could be used as evidence supporting the natural-syntax position. This position, as pointed out by Lakoff, is incorporated in generative semantics. 21 4. A first Lakoff - Chomsky disagreement. - Lakoff has proposed a grammatical analysis of instrumental adverbs in English which in Chomsky's opinion could, if correct, be regarded as disconfirming the (extended) standard theory position that all nonlexical transformations follow all lexical transformations. 22 Lakoff's analysis asserts that underlying sentences of the type of (9) (i) and (ii) there is a deep structure which may be represented as (10). 23 (9)

(i) (ii)

Seymour sliced the salami with a knife. Seymour used a knife to slice the salami.

(10)

s. NPi

VP

V

\

Seymour sliced

MPs the

.

salami

20 Cf. Fraser 1971b: 16. Fraser (16-17) continues: "In addition, I simply don't find the restriction on the second sentence up to be accurate: [54] I indicated to Harry that Mary was not fully informed that they wanted his breath to be held longer than usual, and find that no support is provided for P.A. higher 'you'". 21 The natural syntax position is outlined as (85) in § 5.7.2.1. 22 Cf. Lakoff 1968. 23 Cf. Lakoff 1968: 6-7.

182

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

The deep structure (10) - being quite abstract in that it contains two verbs whereas the surface structure of (9) (i) contains only one verb - represents, according to Chomsky, "a departure from the standard theory". 24 For various reasons, however, Chomsky rejects Lakoff's analysis of instrumental adverbs. One of these reasons is that Lakoff's argument crucially depends on an intuitive evidential statement reconstructible as (11). This statement is characterized by Chomsky as being "not obvious" and is, consequently, rejected by him. (11)

The sentences Seymour sliced the salami with a knife and Seymour used a knife to slice the salami are synonymous.25

A second reason for Chomsky's rejection of Lakoff's analysis of instrumental adverbs will be considered in § 5.6.3. 5. A secondLakojf- Chomsky disagreement. - In his paper "On generative semantics" Lakoff presents a second grammatical analysis which, if correct, would disconfirm the (extended) standard theory's position that all lexical transformations precede all nonlexical transformations. This is his grammatical analysis of dissuade. In terms of this analysis the derivation of dissuade starts from an underlying structure persuadeNP-not and requires the passive transformation to have already applied by the time that dissuade is inserted lexically.26 Lakoff's argument in support of this analysis of dissuade is too intricate to be repeated here. Ultimately, however, this argument is based, according to Chomsky, on intuitive evidential statements such as the following:27 (12)

24

(i) The sentence I persuaded Bill to date many girls (= [13]) can mean "there are many girls that I persuaded Bill to date". (ii) The sentence I persuaded Bill not to date many girls (— [14]) cannot mean "there are many girls that I persuaded Bill to date". (iii) The sentence I dissuaded Bill from dating many girls ( = [15]) cannot mean "there are many girls that I dissuaded Bill from dating". (iv) The sentence I persuaded John to date many girls, in particular, Mary, Jane,... ( = [16]) is well-formed.

Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 81. Cf. Chomsky 1972c: 81 and note 16 on p. 82. This note contains the assertion: "There are also quite a number of factual questions that might be raised. Thus Lakoff assumes that [21] [Seymour sliced the salami with a knife - B.-W.] and [22] [Seymour used a knife to slice the salami - B.-W.] are synonymous. This is not obvious ...." Cf. also Chomsky 1972d: 148 for a rejection of Lakoff's proposed analysis of these sentences. 26 Cf. Lakoff 1969: 15-17. 27 Lakoff (1969: 15-16) presents the first three sentences below with Bill-, Chomsky (1972d: 148) presents them with John in the place of Bill. In (12) the numbers in the square brackets represent Chomsky's (1972d: 148) numbering. 25

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

183

(v) The sentence I dissuaded John from dating many girls, in particular, Mary, Jane,... ( = [17]) is not well-formed. Lakoff's factual claims paraphrased above as (12) (i)-(v) are judged by Chomsky to be "infirm". Chomsky stresses their "indecisiveness" and, on this account, declares himself unwilling to "pursue the argument based on them". 28 In so doing Chomsky provides another instance where an important counter-argument advanced by a first transformationalist against the (extended) standard theory is rejected by a second transformationalist on the grounds of the alleged unreliability of the intuitive evidential statements incorporated in that counter-argument.29 6. A Morgan - Chomsky disagreement. - A third grammatical analysis which, if adequate, would disconfirm the (extended) standard theory's position on lexical insertion is credited by Chomsky to Morgan. This is the grammatical analysis of the English verb kill. In order to explain the ambiguity of the sentence I almost killed John Morgan argues that kill should be transformationally derived from the underlying phrase-marker cause-to-become-not-alive (or cause-to-die in Chomsky's representation of Morgan's argument).30 According to Morgan himself, his grammatical analysis of kill is supported in that it is able to explain the intuitive evidential statements (13) (i)-(ii).31 (13)

(i) The sentence What I did to John was almost kill him ( = [22]) has the same interpretation as I wounded John almost mortally -1 almost killed him ( =

[20]).

(ii) The sentence What / did was almost kill John ( = [21]) has the same interpretation as I shot at John and missed him by a hair -I almost killed him ( = [19]). Chomsky rejects Morgan's analysis of kill for various reasons; one of which is that Morgan's factual judgements paraphrased above as (13) seem to him "insecure". 32 28

Cf. Chomsky (1972d: 148). Chomsky phrases this point as follows: "Judgments about these cases can hardly be very firm, but I see no reason to accept these factual claims. The word dissuade does indeed seem to be rather like prevent, deter, keep, and other verbs that take /ram-complements, with respect to the interpretation of a following quantifier. In all cases, the interpretation in question seems to me as acceptable as in the case of verbs such as persuade, though I stress again the indecisiveness of the factual judgments. In no case do I see any motivation for assuming that part of the 'meaning' is an abstract positive verb (underlying prevent, keep, etc.) accompanied by a negative particle. Since these are the only relevant empirical observations cited, I will not pursue the argument based on them." 29 In all fairness to Lakoff it should be noted that in a footnote (1969: 67, note 6) he concedes that his "facts" about dissuade ¡persuade are not altogether nonproblematic: "Though these facts seem to hold for the majority of speakers I have asked, they by no means hold for all. There is even one speaker I have found for whom the crucial case discussed here does not hold. This speaker finds that dissuade does not work like persuade not with respect to ambiguities." 30 Cf. Morgan 1969 for this analysis. 31 Cf. Chomsky 1972d: 149. In (13) the numbers in square brackets represent Chomsky's numbering. 32 Cf. Chomsky 1972d: 150: "Again, the factual judgments seem to me insecure ..."

184

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

In consequence, Chomsky sees "no argument here for the assumption that such verbs as kill must be introduced by transformations replacing phrase-markers such as cause-to-die".33 7. A "Fraser - Fraser" disagreement. - Finally, consider the manner in which Fraser casts doubt on the reliability of some of the intuitive evidential statements used in his own grammatical analysis of the English e-ven. The crucial claim of this grammatical analysis is that even should "be introduced into the deep structure associated with the constituent which serves as its scope in surface structure before any syntactic transformations apply...". 34 A rival claim would be the interpretivist one that even should "be associated with its scope at some (much) later point in the derivation, perhaps even after the phonological component has applied...". 35 The first claim rules out the possibility that any derived scope could occur for even. That is, this claim does not allow for the possibility that surface structure constituents which arose transformationally could function as the scope of even.36 The intuitive evidential statements (14) (i)-(ii), if correct, would disconfirm the deep structure analysis of even. For in the sentences referred to in these statements a transformationally derived surface structure constituent functions as the scope of even.37 (14)

(i) The sentences The statue was even PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE KING ( = [56a]), The answer was even KNOWN BY MARY ( = [56b]) and Sheila has even been WOOED BY THAT STUDENT ( = [56c]) are acceptable.38 (ii) The sentences That man is even EASY TO PLEASE ( = [61a]),Jones was even CERTAIN TO WIN ( = [61b]), and Frank was even SMARTER THAN I THOUGHT ( = [61c]) are acceptable.39

Fraser judges the sentences [56] and [61] to be unacceptable but qualifies this judgement by pointing out that "the facts are not clear on this issue and native informants differ with respect to the acceptability of crucial cases such as [56] and [61]".40 Summing up and concluding his paper, he asserts that if the two kinds of counter-examples - [56] and [61] - considered above (15) ... represent actual counter-examples, [they - B.-W.] suggest that the deep structure position must be abandoned in any strong (and thus interesting) sense. I think this issue is 33

Cf. Chomsky 1972d: 150. Cf. Fraser 1971a: 164. 35 Cf. Fraser 1971a: 164. 36 Cf. Fraser 1971a: 169-171. 37 In (14) the capitalized expressions represent surface structure constituents that function as the scope of even. The numbers in square brackets represent Fraser's numbering. 38 Cf. Fraser 1971a: 169. 39 Cf. Fraser 1971a: 171. 40 Cf. Fraser 1971a: 171. 34

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

185

fairly clear. It will be resolved by speakers whose intuitions about the sentences in question are sharper than mine, which have been blunted by frequent worrying about these cases.41 5.2.4. The Questions The representation given in §5.2.3. above of seven specimen cases in which important intuitive evidential statements have been rejected in transformational grammar and, as a consequence, theoretically significant arguments have been regarded as neutralized should not be misconstrued. Nowhere in §5.2.3. did we side with any one of the disagreeing transformational grammarians. These specimen cases have been outlined in order to illustrate not a substantive but a methodological point. This point is that in transformational grammar an increasing number of grammatical analyses with important general-linguistic implications have been rejected on account of the alleged unreliable nature of the intuitive evidential statements on which these analyses ultimately rest. Characterizing such intuitive evidential statements as "unreliable" has been taken by at least some transformationalists to be an effective way of neutralizing potentially serious criticisms directed at rival general-linguistic theories. Observe that the transformational grammarians involved in the above cases of disagreement are without exception highly skilled linguists. This fact gives rise to a number of methodologically interesting questions: 1. How is it possible that so often two competent transformational grammarians disagree in their judgement of the firmness or reliability of crucial intuitive evidential or "factual" statements? In the present study an answer to this first question will be sought by considering a second one: 2. What are in transformational grammar the conditions on the firmness or reliability of intuitive evidential statements? This general question can be reduced to two others, both of which may be formulated in epistemological terms of a more technical sort. 3.

Under what conditions may intuitive evidential statements be regarded as evident? 4. Under what conditions may an intuitive evidential statement which is not evident be regarded as true or correct? These last two questions will be the main topics for the remaining part of our discussion on the reliability of intuitive evidential statements. The question of the evidentness of intuitive evidential statements will be considered in § 5.3., and § 5.4. will focus on the question of their truth or correctness. 41

Cf. Fraser 1971a: 178.

186

QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL EVIDENCE IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 5.3. THE EVIDENTNESS OF INTUITIVE EVIDENTIAL STATEMENTS

5.3.1. Introductory

Remarks

Ever since the Syntactic structures era of transformational grammar, the scholars working in this field have entertained the view (16) about the epistemological status of particular intuitive evidential statements. (16)

There are intuitive evidential statements which have the property of being "clear cases", 42 "evident", 43 "obvious" 44 or "hardly open to serious question". 45

In early transformational grammar, these intuitive evidential statements were often formulated in a specific manner. In this kind of formulation the linguistic intuitions referred to by the evidential statements were conceived of as "known by or evident to any or every (native) speaker of the language in question". The following example from Klima is typical of the terms used in this kind of formulation: (17) The general observations about negation to be drawn from this study are not startling. Native speakers of English are most probably aware of them instinctively. It is not surprising that what turns out in this study to be a negative or like a negative is what speakers of English have always felt to be one. Everyone knows, for example, that never and not ever are the same. There is no question in anyone's mind that of the pair fail = succeed, the first is negative. All speakers of English will admit to the similarity of 'to be unhappy' and 'not to be happy'. Nor will they deny that if such similarity also applies to the capacity of items to occur with the same words around them, then 'to be unhappy' and 'not to be happy' also differ in certain respects, on the basis of the absence of a pair 'she isn't happy, and neither is he' = ""she is unhappy, and neither is /*