The Journal of Medieval Military History. Volume III [3] 1843831716, 9781843831716

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THE JOURNAL OF

Medieval Military History Volume III

THE JOURNAL OF MEDIEVAL MILITARY HISTORY

Editors Kelly DeVries Clifford J. Rogers

ISSN 1477–545X

THE JOURNAL OF

Medieval Military History Volume III Edited by KELLY DEVRIES CLIFFORD J . ROGERS

THE BOYDELL PRESS

© Contributors 2005 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. The right of the Contributors to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

First published 2005 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge

ISBN 1 84383 171 6

The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

This publication is printed on acid-free paper Edited and typeset by Frances Hackeson Freelance Publishing Services, Brinscall, Lancs Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

Contents

ARTICLES 1. A Lying Legacy? A Preliminary Discussion of Images of Antiquity and Altered Reality in Medieval Military History Richard Abels and Stephen Morillo

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2. War and Sanctity: Saints’ Lives as Sources for Early Medieval Warfare John France

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3. The 791 Equine Epidemic and its Impact on Charlemagne’s Army Carroll Gillmor

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4. The Role of the Cavalry in Medieval Warfare J. F. Verbruggen, translated by Kelly DeVries

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5. Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife? Valerie Eads

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6. Castilian Military Reform under the Reign of Alfonso XI (1312-50) Nicolas Agrait

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7. Sir Thomas Dagworth in Brittany, 1346–7: Restellou and La Roche Derrien Clifford Rogers

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8. Ferrante d’Este’s Letters as a Source for Military History Sergio Mantovani

155

NOTE Provisions for the Ostend Militia on the Defense, August 1436 Kelly DeVries

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1 A Lying Legacy? A Preliminary Discussion of Images of Antiquity and Altered Reality in Medieval Military History Richard Abels and Stephen Morillo

Introduction In 1990 one of the co-authors of this article, Richard Abels, was asked by Donald Scragg to contribute a chapter on late tenth- and early eleventh-century English tactics and strategy to a volume of essays marking the millennium of the battle of Maldon. He agreed readily, though he was concerned about the paucity of source materials describing battles. Other than the poem of the battle of Maldon, he knew only two extended battle narratives for this period that might shed light on English tactics, John of Worcester’s accounts of Edmund Ironside’s victory over Cnut at Sherston and his subsequent defeat at Ashingdon in the year 1016.1 To the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’s accounts John added telling details. At Sherston, he tells us, when Edmund drew up his army according to the terrain and the forces he had, he moved the best soldiers into the front line, placed the rest of the army in reserve [in subsidiis], and addressing each man by name, exhorted and entreated them to remember that they strove for country, children, wives and homes, and with these most inspiring words he fired the soldiers’ spirits. Then he ordered the trumpets to sound, and the “cohorts” [cohortes] to advance gradually. The enemy army did the same. When they arrived at the place where they could join battle they rushed together with their hostile standards and with a great shout. They fought with spear and lance, striving with all their might. Meanwhile, King Edmund Ironside made his presence felt in fierce hand-to-hand fighting in the front line. He took thought for everything; he himself fought hard, often smote the enemy; he performed at once the duties of a hardy soldier and of an able general.2 1 2

The Chronicle of John of Worcester, vol. 1, ed. R. R. Darlington and P. McGurk, trans. Jennifer Bray and P. McGurk, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 1995), pp. 486 and 490 (s.a. 1016). John of Worcester, Chronicle, 2:486–7: Vbi exercitum pro loco et copiis instruit, optimum quenque in primam aciem subducit, ceterum exercitum in subsidiis locat unumquenque nominas appellat, hortatur, rogat, ut meminerint se pro patria, pro liberis, pro coniungibus, atque suis domibus certare, et optimis sermonibus militum animos accendebat, deinde tubicines canere et cohortes paulatim incedere iubet. Idem facit, hostium exercitus. Vbi eo uentum est ubi ab illis prelium committi posset, maximo clamore cum infestis signis oc currant, lanceis et gladiis pugna geritur, maxima ui certatur. Interea Eadmundus Ferreum Latus in prima acie comminus acriter insta bat, omnia provide bat, multum ipse pugna bat, sepe hostem feri bat, strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia sumul exequebatur. Italicized passages are from Sallust, Catiline, 59.1–60.4.

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John’s description of Ashingdon is similar. Edmund, we are told, “drew up his battle line with three lines of reserves” [triplicibus subsidiis aciem instruit] and attacked in that order Cnut’s troops, who had deployed “on level ground.”3 In comparison with the vague accounts in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle of these and other battles, John’s narratives are a treasure trove of detail about preparations for battle and deployment of troops, derived, Abels then believed, from either a lost recension of the Chronicle or some other near contemporary source.4 Edmund’s approach to battle, as presented by John, was strikingly similar to that of the ancient Romans, and the resemblance was made even clearer by John’s use of classical phrases such as copiis instruit and words like cohortes. After writing a draft of the article, Abels discovered why. John had lifted his accounts, almost word for word (though in highly edited form), from, respectively, Sallust’s Catiline and his Jugurthine War.5 Chagrined, Abels removed his extended analyses of Sherston and Ashingdon, added a discussion of “military organization” to fill out the article, and hoped his readers would not notice how little there was in it on battlefield tactics.6 Before he did this, however, he asked our friend and colleague Professor Bernard S. Bachrach for advice. Bachrach did not see a real problem. That John had selected these particular passages from Sallust was to him highly significant, for John undoubtedly had chosen them because he deemed them to be accurate characterizations of what had actually occurred in Edmund’s battles. Abels did not agree then nor do we agree now. Rather, we think that all that John knew about these battles came from his main source, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, and that he added the details from Sallust to spruce up the narrative 3

4

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John of Worcester, Chronicle, 2:490–1: “triplicibus subsidiis aciem instruit, dein singulas turmas circumiens, monet atque obtestatur uti memores pristine uirtutis atque uictorie sese regnumque suum a Danorum auaritia defendant cum iis certamen fore quos antea uicerunt. Intera Canutus paulatim in equum locum suos deducit . At contra rex Eadmundus aciem sicuti instruxerat uelociter movet, et repente signo dato Danos inuadit. Italicized words are from Sallust, Jugurtha, 49. 2–50. 3. Cf. also Sallust, Catiline, 59: “paululum commotus, … instructos ordines in locum aequum deducit.” C. R. Hart argues that the Worcester Chronicle up to the year 1016 was compiled between that year and c.1020 by the monk Byrhtferth of Ramsey, to whom he attributed the composition of the later annals, including these battle descriptions. C. R. Hart, “The Early Section of the Worcester Chronicle,” The Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983), 251–215. More cautiously, Michael Lapidge, noting the resemblance between the language of the Worcester Chronicle and Byrhtfeth’s Life of St. Oswald, has suggested that a lost version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle underlies the entries for 958 through 992, and that this chronicle could possibly have been composed at Ramsey, perhaps even by Byrhteferth. Michael Lapidge, “Byrhtferth and Oswald,” in St. Oswald of Worcester, eds. N. Brook and C. Cubitt (Leicester, 1996), p. 76. See also Alfred P. Smyth, The Medieval Life of King Alfred the Great (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, 2002), pp. 69–71. Cf. P. McGurk, “Introduction” to The Chronicle of John of Worcester, 2:lxxix-lxxxi, which rebuts Hart’s case. R. R. Darlington and P. McGurk, “The ‘Chronicon ex Chronicis’ of ‘Florence’ of Worcester and Its Use of Sources,” Anglo-Norman Studies 5 (1983), 185–96, at 193, n. 37; C. R. Hart, “Early Sections of the Worcester Chronicle,” Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983), pp. 303–4. Richard Abels, “English Tactics, Strategy and Military Organization in the Late Tenth Century,” in Donald Scragg, ed., The Battle of Maldon, AD 991 (Oxford, 1991), 143–55. John of Worcester’s accounts of Sherston and Ashingdon are discussed on p. 153, n. 17.

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and to demonstrate his own erudition. To be sure, John’s compression and editing of the Sallust texts may be significant. Among the details that he chose not to include in his narrative of the battle of Sherston are Catiline’s decision to drive away his horses so that his men would have to stand and fight, descriptions of topography and terrain clearly inappropriate for Sherston, and references to centurions and subordinate commanders on the wings. John also changed Sallust’s “pila omittunt, gladius res geritur” to “lanceis et gladiis pugna geritur.” Similarly, in his account of the battle of Ashingdon, John edited out Sallust’s description of how the Roman commander Metellus deployed his slingers (funditores) and archers (sagittarios) between the companies of infantry, and placed his cavalry on the wings. These omissions may reflect John’s awareness of differences between armies of his day, the first decades of the twelfth century, and those described by Sallust. (In this respect, John’s decision to change Sallust’s description of soldiers throwing javelins [pila] to soldiers thrusting with lances [lanceae] is suggestive.) Or John may have simply wished to condense the narratives. In either case, John probably used Sallust’s Cataline and Jugurtha not because Edmund Ironside actually commanded and fought like a first century BC Roman general but to demonstrate his familiarity with a classical authority then in vogue.7 Bachrach’s interpretation is indeed possible, but strikes us as inherently less likely.8 It is less likely unless, of course, one begins, as does Bachrach, with the assumption that “the picture of medieval military history which is emerging today” is that of “continuity between the ancient and medieval periods.”9 Bachrach’s thesis is founded, in part, upon his careful study and 7

8

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The growing popularity of Sallust is suggested by the rise in the number of copies of extant manuscripts of his work between the tenth and twelfth centuries: four in the tenth, thirty-three in the eleventh, and fifty-eight in the twelfth. L.D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission. A Survey of the Latin Classics (Oxford, 1983), pp. xxvi-xxvii. Some obvious questions suggest themselves regarding Bachrach’s interpretation that John used Sallust because the description fit what he knew of the battle. Why Sallust? Did John search through any number of classical sources until he found an appropriately parallel battle? What other descriptions did he have available? Given that John edited the accounts in Sallust in ways already noted, why did he not borrow shorter phrases and descriptions from several sources, surely a technique more likely to produce an accurate description than wholesale appropriation of a single battle-piece from a single source? All medieval chroniclers’ heads were full of classical words and short phrases, many of which regularly found their way into descriptions of warfare – see for example the discussion of Orderic Vitalis below, pp. 10–11 and notes 18–20. But when they had clear and abundant information about a battle, either from witnessing it or from other eyewitnesses, they had no trouble creating original descriptions in which classical words and phrases provided some of the bricks of the structure, so to speak, rather than the entire architecture. See, for example, William of Poitiers’ description of the Hastings campaign and battle, which positively invited borrowings from Caesar, but whose account of Hastings is clearly his own: The Gesta Guillelmi of William of Poitiers, ed. and trans. R.H.C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1998), hereafter WP; see further discussion below, pp. 5–6 and notes 15–16. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Medieval Military Historiography,” in Michael Bentley, ed., Companion to Historiography (London, 1997), p. 206. On Charlemagne’s study of Roman military tactics and strategy, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia, 2001), p. 162.

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intimate knowledge of the literary and documentary sources that survive from the early and central Middle Ages and, in part, upon his complete rejection of the old historical paradigm of Rome’s “Fall” and the West’s descent into “the Dark Ages.” Early medieval texts, as he takes pains to point out, abound with classical allusions and often employ technical Roman military and administrative terminology in describing events. Bachrach contends, moreover, that the preservation, transmission, and popularity (as measured by numbers of manuscripts) throughout the early Middle Ages of Roman military handbooks, notably Vegetius’s De re militari and Frontinus’s Strategemata, attests to the Roman foundations that underlay military organization in the West between the fourth and twelfth centuries. “[F]rom the efforts of Diocletian and his successors during the fourth and fifth centuries,” Bachrach asserts, “until the development of gunpowder toward the end of the Middle Ages, the essentials of military organization, relative effective troop strengths, strategy, and tactics demonstrate startling continuity in Rome’s successor states – Byzantium and the kingdoms of the medieval West.”10 But how much of this apparent continuity is real and how much is the consequence of the classicizing tendencies of medieval chroniclers? All historians when assessing sources face the problem of representation versus reality. For military historians of the Middle Ages, this problem takes the special form of classicizing sources versus the realities of early medieval warfare. This article considers this problem. Our consideration cannot rest on an exhaustive survey of all the possible evidence for this problem. Rather, we will examine a few selected and representative pieces of evidence in order to make points about the evidence as a whole, points that are as much philosophical as they are specific historical analysis. Indeed, this article and the rejoinder by Professor Bachrach that will follow in the next volume of this journal are attempts to distill and thus clarify the various issues – methodological, historiographical, terminological and philosophical – implicit in divergent interpretations of early medieval warfare contained in the works each of us has published on specific subjects.11

Written Sources The problem of classicizing terminology is a pervasive one in the sources for medieval military history. John of Worcester’s use of Sallust to describe the battles 10

11

Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 51. Bachrach has developed and advanced this thesis in three monographs, Early Carolingian Warfare; The Anatomy of a Little War: A Diplomatic and Military History of the Gundovald Affair: 568–586 (Boulder, CO, 1994); Fulk Nerra, the Neo-Roman Consul, 987–1040: A Political Biography of the Angevin Count (Berkeley, CA, 1993); in dozens of articles, many of them gathered in two Ashgate Variorum volumes, Armies and Politics in the Early Middle Ages (London, 1993) and Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002); and in several critical book reviews. Directly relevant to the terminological difficulties of the sources for early medieval warfare is S. Morillo, “ Milites, Knights, and Samurai: Medieval Military Terminology and the Problem of Translation,” in The Normans and Their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister, ed. Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach (Woodbridge, 2001), 167–84.

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of Sherston and Ashingdon, in other words, though unexpected, is far from isolated. Some are explicit; others may be hidden. Classical models, for example, may have influenced the Maldon-poet’s account of that battle. Take the poet’s detailed description of Byrhtnoth’s deployment of troops (ll. 17–21), with its emphasis upon the ealdorman’s “instruction” of his troops about how to stand fast and hold their shields: Ða þær Byrhtnoð ongan beornas trymian, Rad and rædde, rincum tæhte, hu hi sceoldon standon and þone stedan healdan, and bæd þæt hyra randan rihte heoldon, fæste mid folman, and ne forhtedon na. (Then Byrhtnoth set about drawing up the men there, he rode and instructed, he told [literally, taught] the soldiers how they should form up and hold the position, and he asked that they should hold their shields properly, firmly with their fists, and not be at all afraid.)12

Although these lines have often been read as evidence for the lack of training of the Essex fyrd, they may simply be the poet’s attempt to render and explain the Latin stock phrase for drawing up battle lines, instructio aciem (or copias), as Abels suggested in the aforementioned article.13 Indeed, the Maldon-poet’s representation of Ealdorman Byrhtnoth as having ordered his men to drive away their horses may have drawn upon the same battle narrative from Sallust’s Catiline that John of Worcester later used in his account of Sherston.14 If so, the poem tells us less about late Anglo-Saxon military practice and the actions of Byrhtnoth in command than many have thought. William the Conqueror’s crossing of the English Channel positively invited comparisons with Caesar’s invasion of Britain in 55 BC, and William’s hagiographer William of Poitiers, a clerk from a military background who might be expected to provide informed contemporary descriptions of William’s invasion, readily and openly obliged. And while the list he provides of the ways in which William was greater than Caesar15 is relatively easy to deal with, more problematic are the ways in which his account of the Conqueror’s crossing may 12 13

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The Battle of Maldon, ll. 17–21, ed. and trans. Donald Scragg, in Scragg, ed., Battle of Maldon, AD 991, pp. 18–19. Abels, “Tactics,” in Scragg, ed., Battle of Maldon, p. 153, n. 10. Compare, by contrast, the detailed description by William of Malmesbury of Henry I instructing his English troops (presumably also the fyrd) in 1101: …docebat quomodo, militum ferociam eludentes, clypeus objectarent et ictus remitterunt; (“he taught them how, in meeting the attack of the milites, to defend with their shields and return blows”): William of Malmesbury, De Gestis regum Anglorum, ed. William Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1887–89), p. 472. Cf. Sallust, Catiline, 59: “Dein, remotis omnium equiis, quo militibus exaequato periculo animus amplor esset, ipse pede exercitum pro loco atque copiis instruit.” This was first suggested by C. R. Hart, “Maldon,” in An Essex Tribute: Essays Presented to Frederick G. Emmison, ed. Kenneth Neale (London, 1987), pp. 75–6, reprinted in Cyril Hart, The Danelaw (London, 1992), pp. 542–3. WP, pp. 168–70.

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have been embellished to make it closer to Caesar’s. Did William really become separated from his fleet early in the crossing, dropping anchor to wait for the rest to catch up, just as Caesar had?16 It is possible, of course, but also suspicious. Suspicion, however, is useful, because when classical episodes and motifs appear, they can be more or less totally discounted, leaving us with less information (which is bad), but not misleading information (which is worse). A more dangerous problem arises with the classicizing hidden in basic terminology. The Annals of Metz is typical of Carolingian sources, for example, in consistently describing Charlemagne’s forces as legiones, as for instance the four groups of troops the King sent against the Saxons in 774 that the Royal Frankish Annals simply calls “detachments” [scarae].17 Similarly, Orderic Vitalis uses legiones to describe forces of troops and cohors to describe smaller units, but the examples show how far from the classical meaning of these terms the medieval terminology had wandered. In addition to using legio of Crusader forces, for example,18 he also used it to describe units of Turks [legio Turcorum], and noted that Peter the Hermit had fled back to Constantinople before Kilij Arslan’s attack at Civetot because sua cohors no longer obeyed him.19 For Orderic, clearly, cohors did not carry any implication of Roman-style organization, but rather was it simply a good classical term for a group of soldiers; we know this because he had already characterized Peter’s followers as an imbellam catervam – an unwarlike rabble.20 Nor could legio carry implications of Roman organization when applied to Turks. But what about Charlemagne’s army? Here we come face to face with the central interpretive problem facing military historians of early medieval Europe: how we read the military terminology depends crucially on how we conceptualize the economic, social and administrative worlds that produced armed forces, it being a given that armies are shaped by the worlds that produce them, reflecting the material capabilities and cultures of those worlds. But armies and warfare, so central to the narrative sources for early medieval history, are by their very centrality a large part of the evidence we have for the economic, social and administrative capabilities of those worlds. In this situation, pervasive classical terminology creates a great danger of tautology: How do we know early medieval kingdoms were administratively sophisticated? Because they produced legiones. How do we know these legiones were up to Roman military standards? Because they were produced by administratively sophisticated governments operating on Roman models. 16 17

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WP, p. 110 and n. 3, where the editors also point out the many Vergillian passages in WP’s description of the crossing. Annales Mettenses Priores, ed. B. von Simson (Hannover: MGH SUS, 1905), s.a. 774; Annales regni Francorum 741–828, ed. F. Kurze (Hannover: MGH SRG, 1895), s.a. 774. See the discussion in John France, “The Composition and Raising of the Armies of Charlemagne,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 61–82 at 73 and n. 37: “The use of such classical terms to describe quite different realities is one of the problems of using Carolingian sources.” The Eccelsiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1969–80), 5:78 (hereafter OV). OV, 5:38. OV, 5:32.

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There is also broader linguistic and representational evidence for continuity, as in titular nomenclature and pictures on coinage that take Roman models. On the basis of such evidence, Roman continuity maximalists such as Bachrach, Charles Bowlus and K. F. Werner argue that any general transformation of society, economy and government from late Roman times into the early Middle Ages was minimal.21 Thus, while Bachrach admits briefly in his tome on Carolingian warfare that western Europe was less wealthy than its Muslim neighbors,22 he argues that “the militarization of the civilian population for local defense [occurred] within the institutional structures of the later Roman empire”23 and that the obsequia – the military households – of the powerful men of Francia were the functional and state-directed equivalent of the “professional element of armies that had flourished during the later Roman empire.”24 Classical terminology and the classicizing world view of our early medieval sources, in other words, if taken at face value, create a world that will admit of some change, but constrains it within institutional structures and mental outlooks whose viability and influence assume central importance in this world. In short, the very coherence of the literary sources creates a powerful lens. If one believes, as we do, that it is a distorting lens, and that the underlying realities of early medieval warfare had fundamentally changed, making a lie of the legacy of antiquity found in the sources, how do we step outside that lens? Where can we turn to decide between opposed positions on Roman continuity in military organization and practice?

Physical Evidence In some cases one may test the hypothesis of military continuity with Rome against physical evidence. Alfred the Great’s system of burhs in the late ninth century is one such case. King Alfred’s connections with Rome are numerous and clear. He made two childhood pilgrimages to the Eternal City, produced coinage closely modeled on Roman originals, and interpolated references to the

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The results of this approach are epitomized by the title of Bachrach’s study of the eleventhcentury ruler of Anjou, Fulk Nerra, the Neo-Roman Consul, 987–1040: A Political Biography of the Angevin Count. For maximalist views of Carolingian warfare, both in terms of Roman administrative continuity and especially in terms of demographic stability and Big Numbers for Carolingian armed forces, see Charles R. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians and Magyars. The Struggle for the Middle Danube 788–907 (Philadelphia, 1995); K. F. Werner, “Heeresorganisation und Kriegführung im deutschen Königreich des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts,” Settimane de Studi de Centro Italiano sull’alto Medioevo 15 (Spoleto, 1968). France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” provides an excellent balanced overview of the issue of numbers in Carolingian armies; his conclusions tend to the Small Numbers side. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 175. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 53. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 167; see also 210.

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city and its history into his translations.25 Most dramatically, Alfred in the 880s and 890s created a defensive network of fortified towns and cities, at least five of which, Bath, Chichester, Exeter, Portchester, and Winchester, were refurbished Roman foundations, and restored the Roman city of London.26 What is interesting is how little continuity can be found between the Roman civitates and the Alfredian burhs. By Alfred’s time most Roman cities in England were like London; the enclosed Roman city lay deserted and derelict, while a commercial wic had sprung up outside its walls. The reoccupation and refurbishment of deserted Roman walled towns had less to do with a memory of Rome than with the pragmatic realization that these sites were strategically well sited, since they were lined up with the Roman road system that was still the major conduit for transportation in ninth-century Wessex, and possessed the remnants of formidable defenses (which Alfred’s surveyors often chose to ignore; see below). Although Alfred had lived in Rome for a year during his childhood, soon after the completion of the walled “Leonine City” to defend St. Peter’s and the pilgrim communities against raiders from the sea, the king and his builders made no effort whatsoever to emulate Pope Leo IV and his predecessors and build in stone. Alfred’s burhs were defended by outer and inner ditches and earthen ramparts. This was true even for those that had Roman walls. At Winchester an impressive new double ditch was dug and traces of its trench survive, indicating an original width of 8.2 m and depth of 1.7 m. As with Offa’s Dyke, dump construction was the rule, though the earthen walls were often reinforced with turf and timber revetments, and, in some cases, crowned with wooden palisades.27 There is no evidence that the stone walls of Winchester or the other burhs of Roman origin were restored before the end of the tenth century. Discrepancies between the actual measurements of the circuits of the Roman walls of Exeter and Bath and the predicted measurements for their defenses based on the Burghal Hidage suggest that the Alfredian and Roman defenses did not in fact coincide. Alfredian Exeter, whose 734 hides imply a wall length of 3028 ft but whose Roman walls have a circuit of 7600 ft, seems to have occupied only a small portion of the Roman city, perhaps Rougemont Hill where the later Norman 25

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Richard Abels, Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England (London, 1988), pp. 57–77, 212. King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies, ed. T. A. Carnicelli (Cambridge, MA, 1969), p. 97: “nat ic no thi hwa Romeburh timbrede the ic self gesawe” (“I know not who built Rome on account that I myself saw it”). Hastings and Worcester may also have begun as Roman sites. John McN. Dodgson, “The Burghal Hidage Place-Names,” in David Hill and Alexander R. Rumble, ed. The Defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon Fortifications (Manchester and New York, 1996), p. 99; David Hill, “Gazetteer of Bughal Hidage Sites,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, pp. 190– 1, 195–6, 202–4, 205, 214–15, 225, 226. Abels, Alfred the Great, p. 206. Vegetius discusses the construction of ditch-earthen wallrampart field fortifications (Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris, 3.8), but the Alfredian burhs were conceived as permanent fortresses more akin to the late Roman Saxon Shore Forts. Nor do Vegetius’s prescriptive depths and widths for ditches and walls match well the actual measurements for the surviving Anglo-Saxon defenses. Cf. discussion by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 233–4.

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castle was built.28 Bath’s 1000 hides indicate defenses measuring 1375 yds, some 125 yds more than the measure of the Roman wall. Archaeologist T. J. O’Leary’s excavations have revealed Anglo-Saxon defenses lying outside the wall, which suggests that “the Burghal Hidage assessment was being made for the perimeter of the outworks, since their circumference, as opposed to that of the surviving Roman wall, approximates closely to the 1,375 yards of the Burghal Hidage.”29 Nor did Alfred’s or his son Edward’s fortress builders employ Roman surveying techniques or manuals (Agrimensores or Gromatici). Manuscripts of gromatic texts circulated in ninth-century Francia but were used mainly for teaching geometry rather than for practical surveying.30 The most useful of these surveyor’s manuals for military planners, pseudo-Hyginus’s De Munitionibus Castrorum, was not among those preserved in Carolingian gromatic collections and was only rediscovered in 1493 by the humanist Galbiato,31 and it was not until the end of the tenth century that the Agrimensores crossed the English Channel.32 Significantly, the formula appended to the Burghal Hidage calculating how many hides and men are needed for the manning and maintenance of specific lengths of wall is given in native English units of linear measurement, the “pole” (OE gyrd) of 16 ft 6 in, “acre” (66 ft), and “furlong” (660 ft), rather than in the Roman pedes and actus used by Roman land surveyors.33 Equally telling is the complete lack of correspondence between the medieval street planning of these Alfredian burhs and the underlying Roman street grids, seen most dramatically at Winchester and London.34 Despite Alfred’s issue of a Roman “London” coin to celebrate his restoration of that city in 886, the actual street planning for Alfred’s London ignored completely whatever traces of the Roman street system then remained. In short, there is little if any real continuity to be found between the defensive system of Late Roman Britain and the Alfredian network of burhs. Alfred’s Burghal network may indeed have been designed strategically to be a defense-in-depth system, but if so, Alfred and his advisors did not draw their 28 29 30

31 32 33

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Hill, “Gazetteer,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, p. 204. T. J. O’Leary, “Excavations at Upper Borough Walls, Bath,” Med. Arch. 25 (1981), p. 22, cited by Hill, “Gazetteer,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, 191. P. K. Marshall, “Agrimensores,” in Reynolds, Texts and Transmission, 1–6, at 4–5. On Roman surveying, see O.A.W. Dilke, The Roman Land Surveyors: an Introduction to the Agrimensores (Newton Abbot, 1971). The gromatic texts have been translated by B. Campbell, The Writings of the Roman Land Surveyors: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary (Hertford, 2000). Marshall, “Agrimensores,” 2. Marshall, “Agrimensores,” 5. Cambridge, Trinity College 939 (belonging to St. Augustine’s, Canterbury) and Oxford, Bodl. Douce 124 (St. Swithun’s, Winchester). Rumble, ed., “An Edition and Translation of the Burghal Hidage,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, pp. 30 and 34. See discussion by Rumble, “The Calculation,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, pp. 70–1. For a brief discussion of Roman measurement, see O.A.W. Dilke, Mathematics and Measurement (Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 26–7. That the Old English words for measuring, gemetan, and for a measurer, metod, apparently derive from Latin metior suggests, however, that the early Anglo-Saxons associated measures and surveying with Rome. M. Biddle and D. Hill, “Late Saxon Planned Towns,” Antiquaries Journal 51 (1971), 70–85; Robert Cowie and Robert Whytehead, “Lundenwic. The Archaeological Evidence for Middle Saxon London,” Antiquaries Journal 63 (1989), 706–18.

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inspiration from the Roman past.

Analysis If archaeology leads us away from the Roman world, further insight into the disjunction between classicizing sources and altered realities can be had through closer consideration of the sources themselves from the perspective of the archaeological results and all they imply. In order to illustrate this, let us look closely into one sentence from Orderic Vitalis, describing the indiscipline of the Angevin army that invaded Normandy in 1137. The translation offered here differs slightly from Marjorie Chibnall’s, in order to highlight some key terms.35 The optimates [“magnates” in Chibnall], however, who ought to have led separate gatherings [coetus; Chibnall uses “squadrons”] in a lawfully led [legali ductu; Chibnall has “properly levied”] army, were ignorant, unless I am mistaken, of the rigor of Roman discipline in military matters, nor did they conduct their “knightly quarrels” [as Chibnall renders militares inimicicias] in the moderate manner of great men [literally “heroes”: haeroum more modeste. Chibnall has “with restraint as lords should”].

The obvious reference here is to Roman discipline and what that implies about the proper method for raising and leading an army. Chibnall notes that this is probably a reference to Vegetius, whose De re militari “was well known in Norman monastic circles.”36 Since Orderic is implicitly drawing a contrast between the hated Angevins and his own Normans, one might conclude that Orderic is imputing to the Normans knowledge of Vegetius, Roman methods of raising and training troops, and so on, by contrast with woeful Angevin ignorance. This is indeed exactly the sort of implication Bachrach and others do draw about references to Romanitas in general and Vegetius in particular in Norman and Angevin sources, among others.37 But for us the real emphasis of the source is not on Roman discipline but on a social structure and a set of social expectations that distinguish Orderic’s world from Rome and link Normandy and Anjou together. The key words are optimates, the tellingly mis-spelled haeroum, and militares. Orderic is describing a world in which great men – magnates who should be noble heroes – create armies from among their own followers: optimates leading their own gatherings, and not Roman discipline, is clearly the context for legali ductu. This tells us that the state, as we and probably the Romans understood it, a res publica whose interests were separate from and largely superior to private interests, is not there. These great men dispute prominence among themselves, and settle such disputes according to a set of cultural expectations that surround milites. It is this last 35 36 37

OV, 6:472; translation by S. Morillo. OV, 6:472, n. 1. See, e.g., B. S. Bachrach, “The Practical Use of Vegetius’s De Re Militari During the Middle Ages,” The Historian 47 (1985), 239–255. For a critique see S. Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings 1066–1135 (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 118 n. 89, 135 n. 156, 155 n. 68.

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word that bears closest scrutiny, for it still carries the classical meaning “elite soldiers,” but the elite is no longer the legionary foot soldiers recruited and trained by the state, but the mounted social elite of optimates and their military households; it is often, though not always accurately, rendered into English as “knights,” and certainly designates mounted troops when used in the common phrase milites peditesque: horse and foot.38 Note that Orderic does not imply that milites never quarrel (which might be the expectation if indeed they were part of a military machine run according to principles of Roman organization and discipline), but that they settle their quarrels haeroum more modeste – one is tempted to translate “in the discreet way Normans do,” since the Normans were Orderic’s heroes. This passage probably should not be pushed so far as to become an early reference to chivalry, nor should one argue that the Normans were in fact models of knightly discretion – image and reality can cut in many directions, after all. But the clear social and political sense of the sentence, stripped of its misleading classicizing veneer and its erudite allusion to Vegetius, describes a world far from the statedominated universe of the Roman empire, and describes warfare that even Vegetius, with all his complaints about the decline of proper Roman discipline in his own day, might find chaotic. Of course it wasn’t chaotic, especially not in mid-twelfth century Normandy and Anjou, but its principles of organization are not obvious to anyone expecting a state-centered system. It is a different world from Rome – and, crucially, a different world from our own – socially and administratively, and the conclusion we draw is that it was a different world militarily. The implication of this for the classical language in our sources is clear.

Conclusion Early medieval chroniclers and historians were familiar with Roman authors and liked to demonstrate their knowledge. We should not mistake this literary fashion for reality, especially when considering Anglo-Saxon and English medieval military history, and early medieval military history generally. When Asser tells us that Alfred the Great “closed the testudo in proper order,” during the battle of Ashdown, “and immediately advanced his standards (vexilla) against the enemy,”39 we ought not to imagine that Alfred had found a copy of Vegetius or Frontinus’s Strategemata (neither of which are quoted in an Alfredian text)40 38 39 40

For a fuller examination of the word miles and the problems with translating medieval military terms generally, see Morillo, “ Milites, Knights, and Samurai.” Asser’s Life of King Alfred together with the Annals of Saint Neots, ch. 38, ed. W. H. Stevenson (with an Introductory article by Dorothy Whitelock) (Oxford, 1959), pp. 29–30. The earliest surviving English manuscript copy of Vegetius’ss De re militari, B.L. Cotton Cleo. D. 1 (s. xi), also containing texts by Vitruvius and Solinus, was probably produced at St. Augustine’s, Canterbury in the first half of the eleventh century. Vegetius, however, was certainly known in eighth-century England, since Bede paraphrased him, though whether from a full copy of De re militari or from a florilegia is unknown. See Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 1.5, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1969), p. 26 and n. 1.

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and revived the Roman “tortoise” formation. Rather, he was using – or misusing – a classical term to express something quite different from Roman practice, a “shield wall” maintained by untrained and, by Roman standards, atrociously undisciplined troops. This tells us nothing about continuity in military practice; only about Asser’s own classical learning. The same, of course, is true for terms such as comes and dux. There can be little doubt that when Bede characterized King Penda of Mercia’s forces in the Battle of the River Winwaed as thirty legiones led by thirty “most noble dukes” (ducibus nobilissimis) he was using classicizing language to describe warbands of ealdormen and great nobles.41 The comites and duces of the early Middle Ages may have borne the same titles as Roman sector commanders in the Late Empire, but this does not mean that their offices or duties derived in any real sense from the imperial military bureaucracy.42 Similarly, if a source describes a battle or a pre-battle oration in terms that recall classical Roman practice, as Bede does on occasion, it may not mean that the medieval general had studied his Vegetius; it may simply mean that the author had.43 Similarly, the proliferation of early medieval monastic manuscripts of Vegetius’s De re militari or of Frontinus’ss Strategemata do not necessarily indicate their practical use by commanders. As Guy Halsall has wisely observed, [W]e cannot be sure that the popularity of Vegetius was not mainly a matter of antiquarianism and the desire to acquire classical learning … [E]arly medieval people were quite prepared to accord great authority to classical works, even while recognizing that they had nothing to do with the world in which they lived. There is no evidence at all that Vegetius’s detailed tactical and organisational recommendations were ever put into practice, and it seems unlikely that his advice on campaigning was followed closely either.44

Though in this article we do not have the space to do more than suggest it, the problem of representation versus reality faced by those who study medieval military history extends well beyond the problem of classicizing chroniclers. Perhaps even more important was the influence of Biblical models upon their writing and thought. Thus those who write on the Crusades tend to take quite seriously the accounts of Fulcher of Chartres and Raymond d’Aguiliers detailing the glorious horrors of the sack of Jerusalem in 1099. But these tales of bloodletting have Biblical echoes in the books of Joshua, Kings, and Revelation that 41 42

43 44

Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 3.24, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1969), p. 290. This is probably true even of seventh-century Visigothic Spain where provincial armies were commanded by generals termed a dux exercitus provinciae . See Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900 (London and New York, 2003), pp. 60–3 and 250, n. 110. This outstanding book provides the most sophisticated examination to date of the evolution and transformation of military recruitment, organization, and practice from late Rome into the early middle ages. Cf. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 162. Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, pp. 145 and 268, n.35. Cf. Bachrach’s careful delineation of the differences between Hrabanus Maurus’ De Procinctu romanae miliciae and his source, Vegetius, and how he infers from that ninth-century military practices. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 84–131.

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have not yet been sufficiently explored. In short, the legacy of Antiquity on the study of medieval military history is that of a distorting lens that imposes apparent continuity on changed reality.

2 War and Sanctity: Saints’ Lives as Sources for Early Medieval Warfare1 John France

Saints’ lives were works of edification that were addressed to all Christians – but they arose from dialogue amongst the clergy themselves and very strongly reflected clerical attitudes.2 Their authors were usually anonymous. Few of those whose names we know were great intellectuals or men of high importance and from what we can deduce of the vast majority of anonymous writers, they were much the same. The ideas they express, therefore, are likely to be those current among the literate clergy. The lives are, therefore, likely to be representative of the literate “Church” as a whole in a way few other types of literature are. They are often highly conventionalized: written to explain what a saint ought to be rather than to describe an actual life. They are deeply concerned with miracles, reflecting the influence of the famous Life of St. Martin by Sulpicius Severus. But however conventionalized, they reflect contemporary reality, as more and more scholars have come to realize. Ian Wood has recently given us a masterly treatment of a group of such lives to reveal the crisis in Merovingian politics around 675, while Carroll Gillmor has succinctly analysed the Miracula Sancti Germani to demonstrate the movements of Vikings in ninth-century West Francia.3 They have their traps. Arnulf the Martyr is a soldier accused of disloyalty by his lord; he died in battle against pagans when he gave his horse to his unhorsed lord so that he could flee. He is nominally eighth-century, but I suspect this is a later life.4 Another is the commander of the Theban Legion, Gerone, allegedly martyred 1 2

3

4

The author is grateful for the support of Leverhulme Fellowship and British Academy Travelling Grant which enabled him to do the research which underlies this article. Some useful introductions to the study of hagiography are: P. Sheingorn, “The Saints in Medieval Culture: Recent Scholarship. Envoi: A Review,” Journal of Medieval Literature 2 (1990), 1–29; S. Wilson, Saints and their Cults: Studies in Religious Sociology, Folklore and History (Cambridge, 1985). See also Thomas Head’s useful web-site: http://orb.rhodes.edu/encyclop/ religion/hagiography/guide1.htm I. Wood, The Merovingian Kingdoms (London, 1994), pp. 224–38; C. M. Gillmor, “Aimon’s Miracula Sancti Germani and the Viking Raids on St. Denis and St. Germain-des-Près,” in R. P. Abels and B. S. Bachrach (eds), The Normans and their Adversaries at War. Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister (Woodbridge, 2001), 103–27. Acta Sanctorum quotquot toto orbe coluntur vela catholicis scriptoribus celebrantur ed. J. Bollandus and G. Henschenius. 2nd edition, 70 vols. (Brussels, 1863–1940), 3, January 29, 587–9. Hereafter cited as AS.

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with 318 other martyrs under Maximian. His life emphasizes the idea that Christianity flourished behind the screen of the legions, and it has been suggested that this should be seen as Ottonian ideology.5 They were often rewritten, as a study of Thomas Head’s book on the diocese of Orléans has revealed in detail.6 This is why the editors of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica took the rather extreme position that they would print only those lives with secure manuscript traditions. Detailed studies of saints’ lives from a textual point of view are, however, rare, and I have had to use my own judgement on such issues – and must, therefore, accept responsibility for errors. Here the intention is to discuss their value for the study of military history in the very early medieval period down to the Carolingians, though there are occasional later references. I want to convey something of the various kinds of material which they provide, and I intend to weight my material accordingly. It should come as no surprise that these lives are very important because they tell us a great deal about attitudes to war. When I looked at the saints’ lives written before 1000 I was under the influence of a conventional view which emphasized the supposed pacifism of early Christianity and suggested that this remained a powerful trait and as a result the Christian Church retained a grudging attitude towards war. In fact systematic study of attitudes to war in the early Middle Ages is rare, and powerfully influenced by Erdmann who noted that some saints had been soldiers, but argued that they went on and “achieved holiness in opposition to their military profession.” 7 In fact this is clearly not true, and I doubt very seriously if early Christianity was ever in any sense pacifist, though a current of hostility to the waging of war can be found in every age. It was quite natural from the earliest times for the struggles of martyrs to be compared to those of soldiers. Nabor and Felix were martyred at the end of the third century under Maximian at Milan: they faced death “armored with invincible arms, clad in the breastplate of faith and the helmet of salvation, protected all about by heavenly strength.”8 About 700 St. Tillo, a Saxon captured in war, was redeemed from slavery by St. Eligius who made him a monk. He is described as “a soldier of Christ, the Cross of Christ on his forehead was to him a helmet, and he was protected by the breastplate of faith.”9 Examples of this kind could be multiplied ad nauseam across the whole medieval period. The early Christian Church produced a large number of military men who became martyrs. Many Roman soldiers were executed for refusing sacrifice to the emperor. Andrew the Tribune was noted as a fine soldier, but was driven out of the army when Christians were being deliberately sought out.10 Fabius the 5 6 7 8 9 10

AS 53, October 10, 36–42; J. F. Nieus, “La Passion de S. Géréon de Cologne (BHL3446) Une composition de l’époque ottonienne,” Analecta Bollandiana 115 (1997), 5–38. T. Head, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints. The Diocese of Orléans 800–1200 (Cambridge, 1990). C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton, 1977), pp. 14–15. AS 30, July 12, 277–8. AS 30, January 7, 376–80; L. d’Achery and D. J. Mabillon, Acta Sanctorum Ordinis Sancti Benedicti, 9 vols. (Paris, 1668–1701), 2:994–1001. Hereafter ASOSB. AS 37, August 19, 723–6.

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Standard Bearer equally was forced to refuse to play his military role by the demands of his superiors, as were many others.11 Maximillian the Conscript and Typasius were in this respect most atypical. The former refused service on the grounds that he was a Christian, and although it was pointed out that plenty of other Christians were serving in the army he persisted and was martyred on 12 March 295. Typasius was a veteran who, recalled to the colors to deal with a North African revolt about 297, refused service and was martyred.12 These cases do support Flori’s suggestion that some soldiers rejected their military role in favor of Christianity, thereby accepting martyrdom.13 But the more general pattern is one of men driven to their deaths who would otherwise have happily soldiered on. In none of these is there disapproval of the soldier’s job and it is sometimes explicitly stated that they were good and brave soldiers. Martyrdom comes to an abrupt halt after Constantine and the pattern changes. St. Martin of Tours (330–97), in the life by Sulpicius Severus, is the son of a tribune who became an officer then converted.14 This pattern of conversion to the clergy is a major theme in the lives of medieval saints and one whose understanding is peculiarly important from now on. It is at the root of Erdmann’s belief that clerics saw the military profession as radically opposed to their Christian vocation. Many early medieval saints had been soldiers. There are explicit statements to that effect in about fifty cases, but this is likely to be a gross understatement, because in real terms the choice for a young man of the noble class throughout the early Middle Ages was between being a soldier, and being a cleric – these were the two honorable professions. The world portrayed by the Vitae is an overwhelmingly aristocratic world. Nonnoble bishops are rare and their origins are commented on, usually defensively. Lebuinus, bishop of Chartres (ob. 556) is noted to have been “humble in origin but noble in spirit,” and the same is said of John of Naples (ob. 850). More often writers were at pains to stress the noble descent of their subjects. A spectacular case is that of Desiderius, bishop of Auxerre (ob. 621), whose Life stresses his high status and connections with the Frankish and Burgundian kings via Brunechildis. Much more commonly, as in the case of Domitian of Tongres (ob. 560), one of many Aquitanians who in the sixth century were called to sees in the northern Frankish lands, there is the remark that he was “noble in birth and in spirit.” This high status, of course, is the reason such men as Praejectus and Leodegar, the primary victims of the crisis of 675, were involved in high politics. A lesser victim of this crisis was Ragnabert, whose nobility as the son of a duke “between Seine and Loire” is stressed, in contrast to the low birth of his killer, 11 12 13 14 15

Analecta Bollandiana 9 (1890), 123–34. Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina (Bruxelles, 1898–1911) No. 5813; Analecta Bollandiana 9 (1890), 110–34. J. Flori, Guerre Sainte (Paris, 2001), pp. 127–9. K. Halm (ed.), Vita Martini Sulpicius Severus in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 1 (Vienna, 1866). AS 8, March 14, 344–9; AS 10, April 1, 33–4; AS 61, October 27, 361–69; AS 15, May 7, 146– 7; Wood, Merovingian Kingdoms, pp. 224–38; AS 23, June 23, 188–9.

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Ebroin, Mayor of the Palace, portrayed as a mere “soldier.”15 It was clearly possible to rise as a soldier (even if this is a libellous remark), but aristocracy was the norm for participation in politics and leadership in war. Any nobleman who is not recorded as entering the clergy at a young age probably had military training and perhaps experience. In the early middle ages the overwhelming majority of saints are bishops, and some are recorded as having had a military career. Their lives stress that they “converted” from their military career to a clerical one although even that is not a constant. Thus Faronus of Meaux had fought the Saxons in battle, though, as befits a future cleric, he converted his prisoners rather than killed them.16 But Arnulf archbishop of Metz, who died in 640, remained a soldier after his elevation.17 Bishops could take the lead in war. The most famous example is St. Germanus of Auxerre who in 429 led the British to the Alleluia Victory near St. Albans.18 Hainmar of Auxerre fought for Pepin III (741–68) against Duke Eudo of Aquitaine, his own son-in-law. He captured Eudo, who escaped; Hainmar was accused of collusion, and died seeking vengeance on his accusers.19 Gerannus of Auxerre (910–14), when the Vikings approached, led the forces of the city against them in full armor and won the battle.20 Udalric bishop of Augsburg (923–73), whose life is unusually detailed, refortified the city and fought at the battle of the Lech in 955 where his brother and nephew were killed and buried with honor at Augsburg.21 Writers of saints’ lives were all too aware that their choice of career did not free the senior clergy from the violence of lay society. Rigobert of Rheims (696–733) in 717 refused to let Charles Martel into the city during his war with Raganfridus for the royal succession, because he was uncertain of the outcome of the war: when Charles Martel won, unsurprisingly he was exiled! But he was still revered as a saint.22 In all these cases, and many others, the authors stress that the saint entered a higher and more holy life by entering the clergy. But in no case is there criticism of the bishop’s former military role. These soldier-bishops are not really seen in a different way from those who never entered the military life. It is very interesting that the miracula of soldier-saints exhibit the same kinds of miracles as other saints. When particular wars between Christians are discussed, approval is expressed only where they could be shown to be defensive, and, therefore, in some sense

16 17 18

19 20

21 22

AS 61, October 28, 609–16; ASOSB 2:606–25. ASOSB 2:150–7. AS 35, July 31,212–30; B. Krusch and W. Levison (eds.), Passiones vitaeque sanctorum aevi merovingici 7 (Hanover, 1919–20), pp. 247–83, French trans. by R. Borius; Constance de Lyon, Vie de S. Germain d’Auxerre, Sources Chrétiennes 112 (Paris, 1965), English trans. by F. R. Hoare; The Western Fathers, in Makers of Christendom Series (London, 1954), pp. 281–320. AS 61, October 27, 369–71. AS 33, July 28, 566–99. The texts of the lives of Hainmar and Gerannus are taken from Gesta Episcoporum Autissiodorensium in P. Labbe, Nova bibliotheca manuscriptorum librorum, 2 vols. (Paris, 1657). AS 28, July 4, 97–122; ASOSB 5:415–77. AS 1, January 4, 174–8.

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“Just Wars” in the Augustinian sense.23 A good example is to be found in the life of St. Droctoveus of Autun. When Autun was attacked by Childebert and Clothar about 576, Droctoveus paraded the relics of St. Vincent and thus enabled the citizens to repel them. Clearly, although this was a war against Christians, the action was approved, for God gave victory to the devotees of St. Vincent.24 An unusually explicit case is that of the tenth-century Scottish bishop, Gervadius. He was present as battle was about to be joined between an invading English force and the Scottish army. One of the English invaders asked him for absolution, concerned for his soul because he was partaking in a war of aggression. He received it and his body was later found on the battlefield because it had a white bird (not black like the rest) upon it.25 Even in the lives of Irish saints, which contain a great range of military stories in some of which holy men seem enthusiastically to endorse the violence of lay patrons, Augustinian notions seem to have had some influence. St. Fintan had a vision of a forthcoming battle in which most of those who fought were evil men, but he distinguished them from those “qui bene vixerunt, et pro necessitate bellaverunt,” and it was for their souls that he prayed when they had perished.26 St. Tigernach felt he had to bless the offensive military expedition of his patron, King Fiarchrius: but the savagery of war was ameliorated because the victorious king, as Tigernach had asked, returned not as tradition demanded with the heads of the enemy dead swinging from his saddles, but with mud and straw imitations.27 When it came to fighting against social outcasts like robbers, the Church’s attitude was positively encouraging. When St. Gudwal, a sixth-century British missionary to Brittany, was confronted by thieves he prayed for their destruction, recalling Moses with hands raised in prayer against the enemies of Israel.28 The violence of patron saints in defence of their churches and property is a wellknown phenomenon. A recent analysis of the famous Miracula Sancti Benedicti shows that even in the ninth century 12% of the miracles attributed to him by the monks of Fleury involved violence and this rose to 34% for the period 965– 1008. The miracles of St. Faith of Conques show a similar penchant for supporting violence in the cause of the saint.29 Approval of the use of violence against infidels is even more patent; here there is no suggestion that war should be defensive, and even the participation of clergy was approved. The Miracula Sancti Bertini record with approval the defeat 23

24 25 26 27 28 29

John Gilchrist, “The Erdmann Thesis and the Canon Law 1083–1141,” in Crusade and Settlement: Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and Presented to R. C. Smail, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 37–45, drew attention to the strength and persistence of the Augustinian notion of the “Just War”; Flori, Guerre Sainte, pp. 266–7, points to the very crude and unsophisticated use of Augustinian notions before the age of the crusades. AS 8, March 10, 36–9. AS 67, November 8, 855–6. AS 6, February 17, 17–20. C. Plummer, Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae 2 vols (Oxford, 1910), 1, No. 84, pp. 265–6. AS 21, June 6, 718–36. Flori, Guerre Sainte, pp. 101–24.

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of Viking attacks on the abbey about 860–70 and attribute victory to St. Bertin.30 In the 930s Odo of Canterbury was present in battle against “pagans” and not only prayed for the victory of the Christian army, but saved King Athelstan when it seemed he might be struck down in battle.31 It is among monks that hostility to war is often thought to have been most dominant. The thirteenth canon of St. Basil certainly was a vigorous continuation of earlier pre-Constantinian traditions against violence, yet it was a dead letter in practice.32 Those who joined the monastic life certainly were not expected to participate in war. Saint Marculf in the sixth century was a Breton abbot who went to a British island that was attacked by Saxon ships. He prayed and encouraged the defenders, but never fought himself.33 Those with late vocations were expected to break with their military past. St. Bavo of Ghent died in 655. As a young man he had been ruler of Brabant and a soldier but after marriage turned away from the wildness of youth and became a pious defender of the poor before becoming a monk and solitary.34 A similarly brief, though faintly positive view of his early career as a soldier is taken by the biographer of St. Guibert who died in 962. He abandoned the warrior life, during which he is said to have fought mercifully and never looted the poor, in order to found Gembloux.35 But although monks distanced themselves from violence, their lives do not condemn it. In the cases of St. Bavo and St. Guibert their biographers could slide over the details of their military careers and focus upon their monastic lives. St. Odo faced a very different challenge in his Life of St. Gerald because his subject remained a layman throughout his life. It is often cited as showing hostility to war because Odo tells us that Gerald ordered his men to reverse their spears and to use the flats of their swords. In fact this is an evasion of condemnation.36 A similar case is the sixth-century Irish St. Comgall. He was forced into the army of Dailnaraida because his father was too old to fight, but the campaign was broken off as God sent peace to save him from necessity of fighting.37 Odo’s Life of St. Gerald is often seen as the earliest attempt to sanctify the powerful noble prince, but a much earlier effort is the early eighth-century Adelbert count of Ostrevant.38 Underlying this acceptance of war is the same force which determined Augustine’s own thoughts when he worked out his view that the state could properly, within Christian terms, wage war, was one very powerful imperative: the need to preserve the political and social order. Augustine saw war in judicial 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

AS 42, September 5, 596–603. AS 29, July 4, 67–73. J. Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204 (London, 1999), p. 16. AS 14, May 1, 72–7; ASOSB 1:128–33. AS 49, October 1, 229–35; ASOSB 2:324–41. AS 18, May 23, 262–9; ASOSB 3:299–314. Odo of Cluny, Life of St. Gerald, trans. G. Sitwell (New York, 1958). AS 15, May 10, 577–87; Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae, 2:3–21. AS 12, April 22, 74.

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terms, as a punishment for wrong deeds. Just as “the barbed hooks of the executioner” had to be deployed against the criminal, so the panoply of war would be approved by God if directed by His agent, the sovereign power, against external enemies. This anxiety is most clearly stated in a rather later saint’s life, that of Bruno, archbishop of Cologne: If anyone who is ignorant of the divine dispensation objects to a bishop ruling the people and facing dangers of war and argues that he is responsible only for their souls, the answer is obvious: it is only by doing these things that the guardian and teacher of the Faithful brings to them the rare gift of peace and saves them from the darkness in which there is no light.39

Running through almost all lives, and especially those of monks, is the idea of conversion. The early martyrs and confessors were converts. The Christian soldier-martyrs refuse to sacrifice to the emperor because in converting they sought a better master, though not one who forbade them to participate in war. Once the Church was established, a new conversion comes to the fore, conversion to the clerical life. This theme of conversion clearly emphasizes the apartness of the clergy as a whole and of the monks in particular. War was seen by the writers of saints’ lives as a part of the life left behind by the process of conversion. They were aware of its sinful nature, but probably this was less important than the simple fact that for most of the people who they revered, people of the upper class, it was the clear and obvious alternative to the clerical life. War was not in itself condemned, most particularly because so many bishops had to fight. Rather it was always seen as part of the evil of the world that had to be faced and made the best of. War could, therefore, be directed and used, for it was part of the created order which men could only escape by the ultimate renunciation of monasticism. But the first concern of the writers of the lives of saints was to emphasize the apartness of the clergy and their association with sanctity. This institutional imperative is a dominant theme in early medieval saints’ lives. It is certainly true, as Erdmann says over and over, that Canon Law forbade the senior clergy to involve themselves in war.40 But actual practice made it virtually essential, so the careful drawing of the line between clergy and laity was always vital in the eyes of clerical writers, but this did not and could not involve attacking those who practised warfare. When we turn to incidents and events of war, the Lives, as you would expect, reveal episodes rather than provide sustained information. There are, of course, some very famous ones, most notably Severin. He lived the most crucial part of his life in the Danube valley and died in 482. About 511 his pupil, Eugippius wrote a Vita which shows how late Roman Noricum survived

39 40

Ruotger, Vita Sancti Brunonis, Coloniensis Archiepiscopi (953–65), PL 134:937–77 or MGH SS 4:252–6. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, p. 15.

War and Sanctity

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and depicts regular Roman troops in the area.41 Rather less well-known is his contemporary, St. Lupicinus, abbot of St. Claude in the Jura who died about 480. He made representations to the Patrician Hilperic (presumably a Burgundian) on behalf of the people afflicted by war. The Life mentions the power of Aegidius and his role as Magister Militum by which he appointed men like Aggripinus as Comes Galliae. The Vita claims that to defend the province the saint went to Rome to defend this count against false accusations: the Emperor was, of course, convinced and acquitted him.42 Lupicinus’s concern for those who suffered in war is quite a common theme in these lives. Cetheus of Pescara perished as a result of the terrible instability in sixth-century Italy. Senzius of Bieda was a holy man in the fifth century who fled his native city to Sardinia to escape Vandal attack, and after many adventures returned. Valerian, Archdeacon of Langres, at the time of great Germanic invasions of Alans, Vandals and Goths, because his bishop was dead, led his people into the Jura for safety but was captured and killed in 268. Severus of Agun was a Syrian in whose life, written somewhat after his death in 507, the province of Aquitaine is described as devastated by invaders and its Gothic (though Arian) king praised for his efforts to check the attacks. St. Joseph was one of a number of Greek saints who in the ninth century fled Sicily: in his case he went to the Peloponnesus where he became a famous monk and hymnographer before being captured by Saracens on a visit to Rome and taken to Crete where he was miraculously liberated. Magdalveus bishop of Verdun, died in 777. In his life the bitter sufferings of a city located in a disputed area during the conflicts of Charles Martel are vividly described.43 The obligation on men of substance to do military service for the king is very clearly referred to in a number of lives. St. Leonard of Vandoeuvre, who died in 570, was accused of recruiting so many young men for his monastery that he was depriving the king of their services. Clothar I (511–61) investigated and accepted the acts of the holy man. The noble Geremarus (ob. 658), when he wanted to be a monk, had first to agree with Dagobert I (622–38) that his son would replace him in the army. Examples could be multiplied, especially among the Irish where Senan was required to serve despite already being a monk.44 Perhaps more interesting are references to those elusive Roman military settlements which are alleged to have survived in Gaul after the departure of Rome. 41

42 43 44

Eugippius, Das Leben des Heiligen Severin, ed. R. Noll (Berlin, 1963); there is an English translation by L. Bieler and L. Krestan, The Life of St. Severin (Washington, 1965). Notable recent studies are: J. Haberl and C. Hawkins, “The Last of Roman Noricum: St. Severin and the Danube,” in C. and S. Hawkes (eds.), Greeks, Celts and Romans. Studies in Venture and Resistance (Totowa, 1973), 97–149; E. Weber, “Soziale Gruppen in der Vita Severini?,” in E. Dabrowa (ed.), Donum Amicitiae. Studies in Ancient History Published on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Department of Ancient History of the Jagiellonian University (Jagiellonian University, Cracow, 1997), 201–7. AS 9, March 21, 261–66. AS, October 58 22, 531–5; AS 23, June 23, 183–7; AS 39, August 25, 159–6; AS 10, April 3, 268–76. AS 55, October 15, 47–9; AS 46, September 24, 698–703; AS 6, March 8, 768–78.

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Senochus, who died in 576, converted to Christianity under Euphronius of Tours (555–72) and founded and ruled the abbey of Ligueil (or St. Senou). He is described as a Taiphal; these were a warrior people settled in Roman times around modern Tiffauges in the Vendée who retained some sense of identity for a very long time, as a marginal emendation in a twelfth-century hand to a manuscript of Rodulfus Glaber testifies.45 Ermenfred of Cousance was a mid-seventh-century abbot whose life was written early in the following century by Egilbert. He refers to two places that appear to have been military settlements: Mandatum Durum, Mandeure in the Jura, which he says was so-called because Hadrian used people there in siege of Jerusalem, and Vincunt milites which is unknown.46 Much more tantalizing is the story of Amantius of Rodez who died before 506. He was a missionary to the pagans in this area, and according to the Vita he had established two churches near the city. He told the people of these churches to fish in the river and take their catch to Rodez. As they did so they were attacked and robbed of their fish by the garrison of the place. Trouble then erupted in the city and the bishop’s house was burned, but in the end the saint won over the soldiers and peace was restored. This garrison was presumably of Goths, but there is no hint of a clash between Arians and Catholics in the story, although the next bishop of Rodez, Quintianus (506–15), was driven out in a troubled period when the city changed hands twice after Clovis’s victory at Poitiers. He ended up as bishop of Clermont.47 Many of the lives report the terrors of plundering troops in general terms. There is a nice illustration of how important it was to soldiers in the life of Nicetius of Lyons (552–73). After his death, one Dado from Tours joined the army of King Guntram (561–92), which attacked the usurper, Gundovald, and defeated him at St. Bertran de Comminges in 585. He vowed to give to St. Nicetius two silver chalices that were among his booty, but in the event bestowed only one until a vision of the saint made him fulfil his vow. Finally, a hint about that most neglected of medieval military subjects: logistics. In the life of St. Médard we are told that King Clothar (probably the first of that name), crossed the Somme, ravaging and looking especially for carts with which to carry the goods of the army. The ravagers came to Sallancy, which belonged to the saint: he ordered them off and made good his stance with the king.48 Overall, saints’ lives are very valuable in themselves for what they tell us of clerical attitudes, and from our perspective, particularly for what they tell us of clerical attitudes to war. What they tell us about the conduct of war is, as I think I have demonstrated, much more fragmented and only becomes comprehensible taken in conjunction with other source material.

45 46 47 48

AS 59, October 24, 769–71 and see J. France (ed.), Rodulfi Glaberi Opera (Oxford, 1989), pp. lxxxvii and 234. AS 59, October 24, 769–71; AS 47, September 25, 106–13. AS 65, 4 November 4, 276–82. AS 23, June 8, 78–81.

3 The 791 Equine Epidemic and its Impact on Charlemagne’s Army* Carroll Gillmor

Charlemagne led his Franks on campaigns of conquest in nearly every year of his reign. From this general pattern, however, the years 791–93 stand out in sharp relief. Even the strong stimulus of Count Theodoric’s defeat by the Saxons in 793 and renewed Muslim incursions from Spain failed to evoke any response by the great king himself.1 The anomalous cluster of 792–94 events deviating from the established pattern include the natural disasters of an equine epidemic in autumn of 791 and a famine in 793. Politically, Pippin the Hunchback, Charlemagne’s eldest son, rebelled in 792, and Duke Grimoald of Benevento defected to the Byzantines. Yet with all these emergencies urging vigorous action, Charlemagne spent 792–93 sitting motionless at Regensburg, an exceptionally prolonged residency there, building mobile bridges in the first year and working on a great (though ultimately unsuccessful) canal project in the second.2 Never before in his reign had this peripatetic and warlike King of the Franks appeared so passive. At the core of these difficulties was a lack of mobility as evidenced by the unusually long stay at Regensburg with no response to imminent military emergencies. Modern historians have recognized that this atypical period required some explanation. Hofmann suggested that the famine of 793 prevented Charlemagne

*In addition to the reviewers, the author would like to express gratitude to Professor Richard Abels, United States Naval Academy, Professor Charles Bowlus, University of Arkansas, and Dr. Erik Szameit, University of Vienna, for their careful evaluation of the manuscript. Also, this article could not have been written without the generous assistance of the Interlibrary Loan Department of the J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah. 1

2

Timothy Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” in Charlemagne’s Heir, New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814–840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins (Oxford, 1990), p. 391, the Avar campaign of 791 and subsequent forays against these steppe nomads in the 790s was the “last really large aggressive military operation conducted by the Carolingians.” This view was accepted by John France, “The Composition and Raising of the Armies of Charlemagne,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2002), p. 77, and p. 78 for a critique of Reuter’s view. Sigurd Abel and Bernhard Simson, Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reiches unter Karl dem Großen, 2 vols. (1883; repr. Berlin, 1969), 2:16–61, for a lengthy discussion of these events.

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from moving away from the plentiful reserves at Regensburg.3 Karl Ferdinand Werner explained that itinerant kingship was more concerned with prosecuting military campaigns than with providing sustenance for the royal retinue so that Charlemagne’s stay at Regensburg should be associated with the Avar campaign.4 Charles Bowlus has also argued that in 791–93 Charlemagne was first and foremost concerned with finishing the Avar war as quickly as possible, which explains his extended stay at Regensburg despite pressing problems elsewhere.5 To solve the puzzle of 791–93 convincingly, however, requires evaluation of an element to which these historians did not give due weight: the equine epidemic of 791. The heavy loss of seasoned warhorses in that year compromised the king’s mobility and hence his military capability for dealing with these crises. The documentation for a shortage in seasoned warhorses has to be pieced together from fragmentary evidence, including the completeness of the mobilization for the first Avar campaign in 791, the occurrence of an equine epidemic towards the end of that campaign, and the defeat of Count Theodoric’s army in 793 which worsened the problem and extended the hobbling of Charlemagne’s armies until the end of 794. In the scholarly literature on Charlemagne’s cavalry6 and his Avar campaigns, the equine epidemic of 791 has received little recognition; in fact, Deér and Pohl 3

4

5 6

Hanns Hubert Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina: Versuch einer Zusammenschau,” in Karl der Große: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, ed. H. Beumann et al., 4 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1965), 1:439. Regensburg was founded in the late second century as a Roman stone fortress for the Legio I Italica, and would have relied on the surrounding fertile countryside to maintain its garrison of some 5,400 men. On the number of men comprising a legion during the Principate, see John Brian Campbell, “Legion,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed., ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (Oxford, 1996), p. 839. Regensburg clearly will have retained these capabilities in order to sustain Charlemagne and his retinue for a period of nearly two years. See Carlrichard Brühl, Palatium und Civitas, Studien zur Profantopographie spätantiker Civitates vom 3. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 1990), pp. 221–4, and Stephen Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications (Totowa, N.J., 1983), p. 174. Karl F. Werner, “Missus-Marchio-Comes. Entre l’administration centrale et l’administration locale de l’empire carolingien,” in Histoire comparée de l’administration (IVe-XVIIe siècles), ed. Werner Paravicini et Karl Ferdinand Werner (Munich, 1980), p. 194, explained that the reason for Charlemagne’s itinerant lifestyle was not to govern but to make war. Regensburg served as the base for launching the first Avar campaign. Charles R. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars, The Struggle for the Middle Danube, 788–907 (Philadelphia, 1995), p. 51. François L. Ganshof, “L’armée sous les Carolingiens,” Ordinamenti militari in Occidente nell’alto medioevo (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto medioevo 15, Spoleto, 1968), pp. 109–30; “Charlemagne’s Army,” in Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, trans. B. and M. Lyon (Providence, RI, 1968), pp. 59–68, 151–61, and his “A propos de la cavalerie dans les armées de Charlemagne,” Académie des Inscriptions et BellesLettres: Comptes rendus des séances (1952), 531–7. J. F. Verbruggen, “L’armée et la stratégie de Charlemagne,” in Karl der Große, 1:420–36. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry: Myth and Reality,” Military Affairs 47 (1983), 181–7 and reprinted in Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West (London, 1993), pp. 1–20; “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” L’uomo di Fronte al mondo animale nell’alto medioevo, 2 vols. (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo 31, Spoleto, 1985), 1:707–51, and reprinted in Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West, no. xvii.

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did not consider the epidemic of sufficient consequence to include in their chronological tables listing the events of the Avar campaign.7 As described in the Revised Frankish Annals, the epidemic was so virulent that “scarcely a tenth part of so many thousands of horses is said to have survived.”8 In other words, the 791 epidemic killed about ninety per cent of the horses that accompanied Charlemagne on his Avar campaign. The effects of this disaster on Charlemagne’s subsequent war-making capabilities is the subject of this inquiry. The figure of ninety per cent is so high that it will naturally evoke some skepticism, particularly in the light of the Reviser’s own caution in adding “is said to.” Significantly, the report of the epidemic did not appear in the Annales Regni Francorum but in the revised annals. The Reviser clearly thought the event important enough to incorporate into his account, but his phrasing indicates that he was not an eyewitness,9 having instead received the information from someone who may have been present on the expedition. 7

8

9

Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 53. Walter Pohl, Die Awaren, Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567–822 (Munich, 1988), p. 317, and chronological table p. 500. Josef Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” in Karl der Große, 1:724–5, 785. Annales Regni Francorum and Annales q.d. Einhardi, ed. F. Kurze (Hanover, 1895), p. 91: “… exercitu tanta equorum lues exorta est, ut vix decima pars de tot milibus equorum remansisse dicatur.” Contemporary evidence does not provide sufficient data to determine with certainty the disease that caused the epidemic. Ann Hyland, The Medieval Warhorse, From Byzantium to the Crusades (Conshohocken, PA, 1994), p. 65 and n. 83 p. 177, made a case for strangles, a disease that can affect horses of all ages, but usually strikes those younger than three years. For evidence that strangles is far less lethal than Eastern Equine Encephalomyelitis (EEE), see The Merck Veterinary Manual, 8th ed., ed. E. A. Susan (Rahway, NJ, 1998), p. 1091: “Morbidity [of strangles] may approach 100% in a previously unexposed population, although mortality is about 2%,” resulting from complications such as pneumonia. Also Calvin N. Kobluk, et al., (eds.) The Horse: Diseases and Clinical Management, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1995), 1:85, states that complications of strangles occur in approximately 20% of infected horses, and mortality may reach 10%, and p. 219, gives morbidity rate of 20–50% but could reach 80% with mortality rates of up to 10%. An intriguing reason for the sudden withdrawal of the Avar forces at the approach of Charlemagne’s army in 791 may have been the Avar intent to introduce an equine disease into Charlemagne’s army. Germ warfare would be feasible for diseases such as strangles that are passed from horse to horse, but not for mosquito borne diseases such as equine encephalomyelitis or West Nile virus. Not a shred of evidence can be construed to credit the Avars with the concept, ingenious for the time had it occurred, of practising germ warfare to debilitate Charlemagne’s army. The Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, p. 88, and the Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 791, ed. G. Pertz, MGH, Scr. (1826; repr. New York, 1963), 1:34 do not suggest even remotely that the Avars left horses behind that could have spread the disease. The passages explicitly stating that the Avars fled from their fortifications can only mean that they were positioned inside their defenses at the approach of Charlemagne’s army. Moreover, an attempt to infect Charlemagne’s horses with a disease passed from horse to horse risked disabling the mounts the Avars intended to ride for their own escape. Both sets of annals explicitly agreed that the Avars fled at the sight of Charlemagne’s formidable army, consisting of a large force moving along each bank with logistical support ships on the Danube. See Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 51. See France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 72: “In the reign of Louis the Pious the annals between 741 and 812 were revised and enlarged by a ‘Reviser’ who … expanded many of the entries and included information about Carolingian problems and reverses.”

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Arguably, if the equine epidemic was so decisive a factor in altering Charlemagne’s military activities, the Reviser, the only source for the event, should have referred to it as such. The equine epidemic should be viewed in the context of the other military reverses Charlemagne experienced. The original version of the Annales Regni Francorum omitted the military setbacks of 775, 778, 782, and 793, events which the Reviser included in his work along with a lengthy description of Charlemagne’s itinerary on the first Avar campaign. A scholarly article, discussing these military setbacks, included only those listed above,10 but the present inquiry will provide a nuanced argument that the equine epidemic of 791 should be added to the list. Explaining the events of 793, the Reviser ended his short description of Count Theodoric’s defeat of 793 with the statement that, “When he received this information [concerning the defeat of Count Theodoric], he discontinued the march into Pannonia, but concealed the magnitude of the loss.”11 In other words, Charlemagne deliberately suppressed the information on this reversal. Moreover, the omissions of 793 were not restricted to the original version of the Annales Regni Francorum. The Annales Laureshamenses contains no reference to the second Avar campaign and the defeat of Count Theodoric.12 Einhard most certainly would have realized the significance of the equine losses in 791, and the absence of the 793 events from his narrative surely deserves an explanation. The first Avar campaign was a success. The epidemic struck at the very end of the campaign, so that the effect of the contagion would have been on subsequent military operations. In this regard, Einhard wrote nothing about Theodoric’s defeat and the aborted second Avar campaign. In fact, he specfied that Charlemagne made only one expedition to Pannonia,13 and did not mention that he had started out on a second one that had to be discontinued because of Count Theodoric’s defeat. Thus, the reverses associated with the second Avar campaign, Count Theodoric’s defeat, and the aborted campaign were not reported in three of the most important sources for Charlemagne’s reign, the Annales Regni Francorum, the Annales Laureshamenses, and Einhard. These four reverses of 775, 778, 782, and 793 share a common feature in that all of them were associated primarily with Charlemagne’s subordinates.14 This observation does not altogether eliminate Charlemagne’s involvement. In 793 Charlemagne was more directly implicated in that he personally gave the order to abort the second Avar campaign 10

11 12 13 14

Roger Collins, “The ‘Reviser’ Revisited: Another Look at the Alternative Version of the Annales Regni Francorum,” in After Rome’s Fall: Narrators and Sources of Early Medieval History, ed. A. C. Murray (Toronto, 1998), p. 209, citing the examples of 775, 778, 782, and 793 without including the equine epidemic of 791. Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93. Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 793, p. 35. Einhard, Vita Caroli Magni, 13, ed. and trans. Louis Halphen (1923; repr. Paris, 1994), p. 38ff. for his narrative of the first Avar campaign. Collins, “The ‘Reviser’ Revisited,” p. 209. The Annales Laureshamenses and Einhard did not include the setbacks of 775 and 782 associated with the Saxon campaign, but both did report on the 778 rearguard ambush at Roncesvalles, placing Charlemagne far removed from the scene of the attack at the head of the army.

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after receiving the news of Count Theodoric’s defeat. What makes the equine epidemic so unique among these military reverses is Charlemagne’s direct participation, as he made the decision to lead his army into Savaria, where the epidemic struck. On the credibility of the ninety per cent losses to equine pestilence, the question is whether an equine disease existed that could inflict so much damage in so short a time, killing many thousands of horses from the possible initial exposure in mid-September to arrive at a ninety per cent loss by the end of October. Veterinary studies on equine infectious diseases explain that Eastern Equine Encephalomyelitis (EEE) kills within two to three days of exposure and the “mortality in EEE epidemics is about 90%.”15 Even horses that contract the disease and happen to survive cannot be ridden again because of neurological damage.16 This modern ninety per cent figure coincides precisely with the phrasing of the eighth-century entry in the Revised Frankish Annals, and was not an exaggeration. EEE, a mosquito-borne disease, would have thrived along the marshy banks of the Danube, an ideal habitat, where Charlemagne’s army was advancing into Avar territory. Outbreaks of this magnitude still ravage unvaccinated equine populations in south-central Europe, including modern Hungary, the area occupied by the Avars.17 Swamps and marshes proliferate in the region between the Danube and the Raab, and would have been excellent breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Mosquitoes were worse in autumn because they had been breeding all summer long and they were more voracious at night. While EEE is communicable to humans, the most susceptible persons are children, the elderly, and the immunosuppressed.18 The soldiers of Charlemagne’s army were presumably healthy military-age males who were largely covered with clothing, having long-sleeved shirts and and long pants underneath their protective armor, minimizing the contact area of mosquito bites. Wariness against fast-striking hit-and-run Avar attacks would have provided an incentive for keeping armor on at night. A discussion of the demography of Charlemagne’s army will not appear here. Nor will the paper contain references to absolute numbers as posited by

15

16 17 18

Hanns-Jürgen Wintzer, Equine Diseases, trans. and rev. A. David Weaver (New York, 1986), p. 354. R. P. Hanson, “Virology and Epidemiology of Eastern and Western Arboviral Encephalomyelitis of Horses,” in Equine Infectious Diseases, 3 vols., ed. J. T. Bryans et al. (Basel, 1973), 3:100–14. Other equine diseases having a high fatality rate, but which do not apply to eighthcentury Pannonia, are African Horse Sickness and Borna Disease. Having a limited geographical range, African Horse Sickness has been largely restricted to Africa and more recently the Middle East, according to the Merck Veterinary Manual. Borna Disease, a fatal neurologic disease of horses and sheep, was first described approximately two hundred years ago. See Jürgen A. Richt et al., “Borna Disease Infection in Animals and Humans,” in Emerging Infectious Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, vol. 3, no. 3 (Atlanta 1998). Ibid. Hanson, “Virology and Epidemiology,” p. 106, fig. 2. Merck Veterinary Manual, p. 934.

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the two extreme positions of Karl F. Werner19 and Timothy Reuter.20 Acceptance of either set of numbers cannot change the wording of the passage in the Revised Annals that Charlemagne lost ninety per cent of so many thousands of his horses on the first Avar campaign. Einhard dwelt upon the extensive preparations for the Avar wars, asserting that these measures were second only to those against the Saxons,21 justifying the maximum number of cavalry being called up. The Annales Regni Francorum provide a clearer idea of what Einhard meant. Early in the summer of 791, the king arrived in Regensburg to prepare for an invasion of Avar territory; he assembled a large and well equipped army consisting of forces drawn from the Franks (Francia defined roughly as the area between the Rhine and the Loire, comprising Austrasia and Neustria), Saxons, and Frisians and other regna east of the Rhine, namely, Ripuarians, Thuringians, Alamanni, and Bavarians.22 Moreover, his son, Louis the Pious, arrived with a force from distant Aquitaine.23 Thus, the mobilization for Charlemagne’s second-greatest campaign represented nearly an empire-wide effort, although excluding regions such as Brittany,24 Burgundy, Provence, and Gothia (Septimania). The forces assembled at Regensburg split into two principal elements, as was often the pattern in Charlemagne’s warfare. One army, under the command of 19

20 21

22

23

24

Karl Ferdinand Werner, “Heeresorganisation und Kriegsführung im deutschen Königsreich des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts,” Ordinamenti militari in Occidente nell’alto medioevo, 2 vols. (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto medioevo 15, Spoleto, 1968), 2:819–22. A fuller explanation of this data appeared in Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984), p. 25, and Werner’s figures were accepted by Simon Coupland, “Charles the Bald and the Defence of the West Frankish Kingdom Against the Viking Invasions: 840–877” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1987), p. 102. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 275 n. 200, 295 n. 62, 296 n. 66, does not analyze Werner’s numbers in depth as do his articles cited by John France, “Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c. 1300,” Journal of Military History, 65 (2001), p. 450 n. 17. Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” p. 398 n. 38; “Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare,” in Medieval Warfare: A History, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), pp. 28, 30. Einhard, Vita Caroli Magni, 13, p. 38. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 349 n. 8: “He waged it [the Avar war] with more vigor than any of the others and with much greater preparation.” Also, on the mobilization for the first Avar campaign, see France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” pp. 68–9. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, pp. 86–8. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:17–21. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 47 n. 6. On the boundaries of Francia, see Julia M. H. Smith, “Fines Imperii: the Marches,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge, 1995), 2:171. For contingents from regna east of the Rhine, see the Annales Laureshamenses, p. 34, the Chronicon Moissacense, MGH, Scr. 1:299. Anonymi (Astronomi) Vita Hludowici Imperatoris, MGH, Scr., ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1829), 2:609–10. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:16. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 349 n. 7. The mobilization of contingents from Brittany, especially during the era of the Saxon and Avar wars, will have been a remote possibility, except for the Spanish campaign of 778 (n. 58, below), as Carolingian lordship over Brittany remained tenuous at best until 799, when the Annales Regni Francorum, p. 108, reported that the Franks had subjugated Brittany. See Smith, Province and Empire, Brittany and the Carolingians, pp. 47–8, 58–9.

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Count Theodoric and the camerarius Meginfried, advanced to the north of the Danube, while another, directly under Charlemagne’s command, travelled south of the great river. Together these forces devastated the countryside more than 300 km (186 miles) down the valleys of the Danube and the Raab during the month of September and into October for fifty-two days,25 and attacked26 Avar fortifications.27 The Revised Royal Annals specify that the epidemic struck only the army south of the Danube under Charlemagne’s direct command.28 The epidemic did not affect the horses of the army campaigning north of the Danube under Count Theodoric and Meginfried, nor the strike-force scarae of Pippin which Charlemagne ordered to attack the Avars from Italy.29 Some of the manpower for these elements may have come from the areas like Provence and Burgundy which were not recorded as contributing to the Regensburg assembly, rather than representing detachments from the main forces. Charlemagne’s route during these raids is well known. With this information from the Reviser’s account, we can determine exactly when the outbreak occurred. The king marched along the Danube until he reached the confluence of the Raab, where he was joined by Theodoric and Meginfried who with their army of Saxons and Frisians returned to Francia via Bohemia. Charlemagne then left the Danube to march roughly 100 km southwest to Savaria (Szombathely), a 25

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28 29

Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, p. 89. Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 791, p. 34. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 51. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” pp. 6, 28, tended to minimize the importance of the epidemic, stressing that the outbreak did not make much difference to the outcome of the largely successful first Avar campaign. This author agrees, but would add that the real effect of the epidemic was on subsequent campaigns. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 52 provided a scenario wherein he implied that cavalry was largely ineffective against fortifications in assuming that cavalrymen were impetuous by nature, and consequently would leave fortifications in the rear. “Cavalry is, however, at a disadvantage when it must deal with systems of fortifications. Mounted units can bypass any particular fortress, but in so doing they take great risks. If the invading army must contend with a well-organized system of fortifications, … then the question of whether to bypass any one of them becomes a serious tactical problem, for if a fortress is avoided, its garrison (perhaps together with other garrisons) can sally out from time to time to harass intruding forces …” This assumption appears to rest on the performance of the Frankish horsemen at the battle of Süntel in R. H. C. Davis’s critique of Bachrach’s earlier interpretation of the battle of Süntel; see n. 52 below. Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 757, explained the tendency of court historians to compare the Avars with the Huns, and advised that by the end of the eighth century the Avars had ceased to be steppe nomads. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 16 n. 27, noted that Avar fortifications and garrisons in the eighth century indicated that the Avars had changed their migratory lifestyle (citing Bowlus, “Warfare and Society in the Carolingian Ostmark,” Austrian History Yearbook 14 [1978], p. 9). For the more recent discussion of the terminology and literature on Avar fortifications, see Pohl, Die Awaren, p. 316, and p. 462 n. 55. Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 791, p. 91. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 49. Katharine Fischer Drew, “The Carolingian Military Frontier in Italy,” Traditio, 20 (1964), p. 439. Also, Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 765, and on p. 785, while discussing the 796 campaign against the Avars by margrave Erich of Friuli, Deér noted that the heartland (the Kagan’s residence) of Avar territory could be reached at a shorter distance from Italy than via the Donau from Bavaria.

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town that was strategically important because it controlled overland communications through western Pannonia. 30 Despite its strategic significance, Charlemagne probably would not have left the Danube for Savaria had the epidemic already occurred. This scenario would explain why Theodoric’s forces were unaffected by the epidemic. His army did not participate in the march to Savaria. Thus, the epidemic must have occurred somewhere around Savaria (or on the way to or from Savaria) very late in the campaign. The ravaging of the countryside for fifty-two days also would place the epidemic towards the end of October. The absence of recurrent outbreaks in the years after 791 can be explained in part by the Reviser’s detailed account of Charlemagne’s itinerary. His inclusion of place names permitted localization of the epidemic to Savaria. This data, when connected with another point of information, namely, the lack of any documented significant numbers of horses in this area in subsequent Frankish raids into Avar territory,31 makes the argument against subsequent epidemics more convincing. Finally, provided the disease is to be identified with EEE, the virus can remain dormant for a period of years before reactivating, and the conditions of reappearance are still imperfectly understood.32 Although the equine epidemic affected only the army operating directly under Charlemagne, sparing the forces of Theodoric and Meginfried, the contingents of the royal army alone – drawn from a wide expanse of territories (Francia, Aquitaine, Thuringia, Bavaria) – represented a large portion of the empire’s disposable cavalry strength, and contained enough horses to account for the Reviser’s “many thousands.” The devastating losses it inflicted brought the Avar campaign of 791 to a premature halt. After the equine epidemic struck Charlemagne’s army, cutting short the Avar campaign, an undocumented logistical nightmare must have occurred, consisting of a dreary procession of former horsemen who had to walk back from the campaigning area to the supply boats waiting on the Danube,33 possibly carrying all of their equestrian equipment, including saddles, and bridles – valuable war materiel which could not lightly have been left behind – in addition to their arms and armor. All of this equipment could have been transported to Regensburg by boat along the Danube,34 occupying the vacant space left by supplies that had 30 31 32

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34

Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 791, p. 89. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, map p. 50. Annales Regni Francorum (both versions), s.a. 796, pp. 98–100. Wintzer, Equine Diseases, p. 353: “The [EEE] virus may persist for years in a swamp cycle between swamp birds and a fresh water mosquito without affecting mammals to any great extent. In particular years infection then spreads through a more widely distributed bird species, and then via various species of mosquitoes to horses, man, and other mammals.” Also, Hanson, “Virology and Epidemiology,” p. 109. Covering up military failures in the Annales Regnum Francorum was acknowledged by their inclusion in the Revised Annals, as discussed above, n. 10. An alternative view, Pohl, Die Awaren, pp. 317, 463 nn. 70–1, argued that the deaths of several bishops and many horses did not demoralize the Frankish army coming back to Regensburg, explaining that Charlemagne still controlled the territory as far as the Vienna Forest. Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 785. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:25 n. 8, citing the Annales Laurissenses, ed. G. Pertz, MGH, Scr., 1:176 that Charlemagne retreated along both banks of Danube.

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been consumed. In this scenario, the boats would be moving upstream against the current, possibly by animals pulling the boats from the banks. Another event subsequently exacerbated the shortage of cavalry mounts resulting from the equine epidemic. In 793 Charlemagne continued his plans for a second offensive against the Avars with the mobilization of forces led by Count Theodoric. The Saxons intercepted and destroyed this army on the Weser as it was marching through Frisia.35 As we have seen, the equine epidemic of 791 struck Charlemagne’s army only; the northern army under the command of Theodoric and Meginfried had retraced its itinerary through Bohemia.36 Although Theodoric’s cavalry remained intact after the epidemic, most of these horses were probably killed or captured by the Saxons, leaving Charlemagne with a minimal number of mounts for another expedition. The equine epidemic was followed by a gap of nearly three years, during 792–3 and most of 794, in full scale military campaigns defined as including columns (Charlemagne’s preferred mode of advance for his own army and that of participating armies including Theodoric’s), which could be deployed to act as pincers.37 The absence of a second column under Charlemagne, the Carolingian weakness resulting from 791 epidemic, doubtless contributed both to emboldening the Saxons to renewed rebellion, and to allowing them to concentrate entirely against Theodoric. This reality enhances the importance of the 791 epidemic as the root cause of Theodoric’s defeat in 793. Theodoric’s defeat further diminished Charlemagne’s war-making capabilities with losses of militarily trained horses and cavalrymen. Even after the disaster on the Weser, Charlemagne still had some capability for cavalry operations, including the ten per cent of the military mounts that survived the epidemic of the Avar campaign, and a remnant from Theodoric’s army. Pippin’s scarae were unlikely to have participated in the raids of 793, as these forces were already committed to a campaign in Benevento, where they succumbed to famine. A possible source of additional cavalry may have come from magnates, residing in areas remote from the staging area of the campaign, who had not contributed contingents to the Avar campaigns.38 These horsemen drawn from disparate 35 36 37

38

Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93: “… copias, quas Theodericus comes per Frisiam ducebat, in pago Hriustri iuxta Wisuram fluvium a Saxonibus esse interceptas atque deletas.” Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 89. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 51 n. 24. On pincer deployment, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 42, 193, 363 n. 176, citing Verbruggen, “L’armée et le stratégie de Charlemagne,” pp. 434–6. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 68. On p. 70, he claims that pincer movements were exceptional, but the examples he cites were drawn from the best documented and renowned campaigns, including the advances into Spain of 778 and Pannonia in 791. Thus, it seems likely that what was exceptional in these years is not that pincers were used, but that they were noted. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 70, emphasized that before 800 magnates negotiated with Charlemagne to arrive at a consensus about the contingents they were to contribute to a given campaign. The earliest chapters of capitularies on Charlemagne’s army as composed of contingents mobilized by the magnates first appeared in the Capitulary of Aachen of 802–3 in Capitularia regum Francorum, ed. A. Boretius, MGH, Leges, II, 2 vols. (Hanover 1893), 1:171, c. 9, No. 77, and Ganshof, Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, p. 63 and 156 n. 27.

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sources fit together with and explain two brief passages in two of the annals which described limited military operations. The Annales Guelferbytani 793 reported that while Charlemagne was residing at Regensburg, he sent scarae, construed here as mounted forces,39 wherever they were needed; the Annales Petaviani for 793 described forces sent by Charlemagne as devastating Avar territory.40 These wide-sweeping raids by Charlemagne’s scarae partly can be explained by the effect of the epidemic on Avar warhorses, particularly devastating as the Avars’ only reserve of warhorses untouched by the epidemic would have been those that campaigned outside the area around Savaria. The passages of the Annales Guelferbytani and Annales Petaviani verify the occurrence of mounted operations during the year 793 and attest that mounted operations were not totally eliminated in this period, but no major campaigns were completed. The equine epidemic diminished Charlemagne’s military power; the limited cavalry strength left to him was then slashed by Theodoric’s defeat; the severe shortage of seasoned warhorses thus created left the Frankish monarch temporarily hamstrung. The crippling of Carolingian mounted forces helps to explain the series of events, 792–94, that otherwise appear puzzling when compared with the pattern of previous military activities: the 792–93 events that deviate from the established pattern include the prolonged residency at Regensburg, the clear-cut lack of an expedition in 792, the logistical projects of the portable bridges and the canal enterprise, the fluvial journeys, and the military emergencies that evoked no large-scale response from Charlemagne, particularly the resumption of the Saxon revolt. All of these events reflect a lack of overland mobility and can be connected with the Avar campaign and the twin disasters of the equine epidemic and Theodoric’s defeat. At the end of the first Avar campaign Charlemagne retired to Regensburg for the winter and began a prolonged residence there which lasted from the end of 791 until autumn of 793, a stay of almost two years.41 Werner and Bowlus view

39 40

41

Significantly, not until after 800, when most of the major campaigns of the reign had taken place, were military regulations, including mobilization procedures, set down in writing, and cannot be used to document the customary practices during the Saxon and Avar wars. Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” p. 398: “It will not do simply to take capitulary provisions of the period 800–830 and project them indefinitely into the Frankish past.” Similarly, France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 66: “almost all of the capitularies on all topics date from after 800 and we have no proper base for making a comparison with what earlier material might have said.” Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 81, that scara should be defined according to the specific operation this force was performing. Annales Guelferbytani, s.a. 793, MGH, Scr., 1:45: “Karolus resedit Reganespuruc; inde transmisit scara sua ubi necesse fuit.” Annales Petaviani, s.a. 793, MGH, Scr., 1:18: “Gloriosus rex Karolus iterum resedit Bawarios, missisque exercitibus suis, vastavitque Hunia, victorque resedit Bawarios.” For scorched earth tactics on Avar territory, see Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:54 and n. 2. Annales Regni Francorum, p. 90 and Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 91. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 792: Charlemagne celebrated Easter at Regensburg; Annales Regni Francorum, p. 92, s.a. 793: Charlemagne did not leave Regensburg until Autumn 793. Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 785 and n. 457; Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:26, 55f. The two classic studies on Charlemagne’s itinerary, A. Gavert, “Zum Itinerar Karls des Großen,” in Karl der Große, 1:307–21, contains no reference to the residency at Regensburg, and Brühl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium Regis, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1968), 1:67 and n. 259, mentions Charlemagne’s lengthy residence there.

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the extended residency at Regensburg as reflecting Charlemagne’s first priority of completing the Avar campaign. But their explanations, which do not give sufficient weight to the equine epidemic, leave it unclear why the Frankish king would pursue that primary goal by sitting still at his own residence, instead of moving against the Avars. In the absence of a full scale campaign during 792– 93, a close look at military activities of these intervening years at Regensburg will show a twofold shift from active campaigns to logistical projects. Two sets of events took place during the stay at Regensburg indicating a lack of mobility followed by sedentary logistical construction. For the year 792, the year following the epidemic, the Royal Frankish Annals expressly reported that no military expedition took place; this makes 792 one of only four such years out of the heaviest campaigning seasons of Charlemagne’s reign dating from the inception of the Saxon wars in 775 through the resumption of the Saxon war in 794 following the interlude resulting from the equine epidemic.42 With a view to a second Avar campaign, the king instead was preoccupied with the construction of portable bridges that could be assembled and dismantled to provide for easy access of troops across rivers.43 Thus, the first Avar campaign, ending with the equine epidemic, was followed by an entire year without a major campaign; a logistical project replaced the customary military expedition.44 And yet, it should be noted there is nothing in the descriptions of the 791 campaign which indicate its failure had anything to do with difficulties in making river-crossings, which might have justified a pause in campaigning to solve a known problem. A repetition of the same pattern occurred in 793, when Charlemagne aborted the limited Avar campaign of that year in response to Theodoric’s defeat and ordered the canal project. In each pair of events a sedentary logistical enterprise followed a setback in the supply of cavalry. The second Avar campaign of 793 shows that a major campaign was undertaken, albeit abortively, but the sources of cavalry indicate that the 793 expedition was attempted on a much reduced scale in comparison with that of 791. The horses for the second Avar campaign in 793, the surviving horses of the epidemic, the preliminary strike forces of the Annales Guelferbytani and Annales Petaviani coalesced and were incorporated into Charlemagne’s army to form the 42

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Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 792, p. 92. Also, s.a. 790 (both versions), pp. 86–7, no campaign took place, because, as the Revised Annals suggest, Charlemagne and the Avars were attempting to negotiate the boundaries of their respective kingdoms. Earlier in the reign s.a. 781, pp. 56–7 (both versions) for an Italian expedition which entailed no military conflict, and s.a. 788, p. 80 ff. (both versions), the year largely occupied by the loyalty issue with Duke Tassilo III of Bavaria. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 792, p. 92: “Eodem anno nullum iter exercitale factum est. Pons super navigia flumina transeuntia factus est, anchoris et funibus ita coherens, ut iungi et dissolui possit.” Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, pp. 51–2. P. D. King, Charlemagne (London, 1986), p. 22, connects the equine epidemic with the absence of a campaign in 792, but more recently, France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 77, ascribes the absence of a campaign in 792 to the revolt of Pippin the Hunchback. As argued below, the rebels clearly took advantage of Charlemagne’s immobility at Regensburg, and surely would not have undertaken an action so drastic as to depose and assassinate the king had they not known about Charlemagne’s sudden reduction in cavalry forces.

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king’s troops of the pincers movement. This sequence fits best the passage from the Royal Frankish Annals describing Charlemagne’s decision to abort the Avar campaign: “When he received this information [the news of Theodoric’s defeat], he discontinued the march into Pannonia …”45 Most important, the passage explicitly stated that Charlemagne was already advancing towards Pannonia, therefore, he must have had enough military mounts in his own army to undertake the campaign provided Count Theodoric also participated. In order to keep the advancing columns roughly equal, the old and the new forces would presumably have been divided in the lull of 792. Had this not taken place, a very lopsided pincers would have resulted with Theodoric’s the stronger and Charlemagne’s weaker. Despite the reapportionment and the pause of 792, however, in 793 there were still substantially fewer horses available for campaigning than previously, so both pincers must have been weaker than usual in cavalry. The weakness of the northern column helps explain its severe defeat; the weakness of the southern column helps explain why, on receipt of the news from the Weser, its operations were called off entirely instead of redirected towards Saxony. After cancelling the 793 Avar expedition, Charlemagne undertook the logistical enterprise of building a canal linking the Rhine and the Danube as reported in the Revised Frankish Annals: “The king was persuaded by self-styled experts that one could travel most conveniently from the Danube into the Rhine if a navigable canal was built between the rivers Rednitz and Altmühl.”46 A look at the circumstances and phraseology of the canal project reflect Charlemagne’s priorities. The canal enterprise suggests an interesting aspect of Charlemagne’s decision making. Charlemagne himself made the decision to stop the Avar campaign, but only after the Avar expedition ceased to be a possibility with the defeat of Theodoric’s army with its share of his remaining cavalry forces. What shows that Charlemagne was still thinking in terms of traditional military expeditions is the mobilization of Count Theodoric which the Revised Annals places after the portable bridges project but before the canal project. Once the defeat of Count Theodoric ended Charlemagne’s first priority of a renewed Avar campaign, according to the Revised Annals, he relied on his advisors to determine what he should do next. Their plan envisioned a canal-digging project, a military operation that did not require large numbers of horses,47 but which if successful would have facilitated an advance down the Danube the following year, relying even more than usual on boats rather than pack-animals (which of course were also lost in large numbers in 791–93) for logistical support. The equine epidemic of 791 and the portable bridge construction of 792 followed by the defeat of 45

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Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 77, mistakenly attributes Charlemagne’s decision to stop the second Avar campaign to the resumption of the Saxon revolt and a major Muslim invasion, apparently without cognizance of the explicit connection to Count Theodoric’s defeat. Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93. For this passage I have used the translation of Bernhard Walter Scholz, Carolingian Chronicles (Ann Arbor, 1970), p. 71. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” pp. 437–53. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” pp. 445ff., giving the manpower and nutritional requirements for this kind of pick and shovel work.

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Count Theodoric and the canal project were all associated with finishing the Avar campaign from his base at Regensburg. The two logistical events suggest a lack of mobility in Charlemagne’s army and a response to a shortage of trained warhorses brought about by the epidemic and Theodoric’s defeat: they show the Frankish king making the best of a bad situation, but one clearly a second-best choice. This does not imply that Charlemagne’s logistical undertakings were “second-best” activities, performed only because of the lack of ability to wage aggressive war. Such a trend cannot be shown throughout the reign. The only other major logistical activity of the reign dates to 789, when Charlemagne constructed fortified bridgeheads and continued the campaign.48 The unusual circumstances of 791–93, when Charlemagne’s first priority was finishing the Avar campaign, should be ascribed to reverses in the supply of cavalry, specifically, the equine epidemic and the defeat of Count Theodoric. Just as the direct and indirect results of the equine epidemic of 791 help explain the decisions to spend 792 and much of 793 on logistical projects rather than active campaigning, so too do they illuminate the causes of two other related characteristics of this anomalous period of Charlemagne’s reign: his prolonged residency at Regensburg (in contrast with his normal itinerant kingship) and his use of fluvial transport for his court when it did move. The demise of ninety per cent of horses in Avar campaign must have included pack horses and other equidae, namely mules; in subsequent years, this loss would have placed limits on itinerant monarchy with insufficient pack animals to transport the royal retinue for journeys overland. The long stay in Regensburg of nearly two years, which was interrupted only by a brief interlude of the aborted march towards Pannonia in the summer of 793, was partly due to a lack of horses, both cavalry mounts and pack horses and mules. This is why the canal project and the fluvial journeys are significant. In this context, the canal project assumed major importance in strategic planning for a two-front war with the Avars and the Saxons with the possibility of linking the two great fluvial systems,49 thereby reducing dependence on overland transport whether for military or commercial purposes. Charlemagne’s itinerary indicates that he made few fluvial journeys during his reign: one in 790, two in 793, one in 794; he also conducted two portage operations, 793 and 797; all except the fluvial excursion of 790 date from the post-epidemic period, and that lone exception, after negotiations with the Avars in 790, appears to have been simply a roundtrip pleasure cruise with no apparent strategic objective.50 The arrival of 48 49 50

Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 789, p. 84. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 440. Paul Fouracre, “Frankish Gaul to 814,” in New Cambridge Medieval History, 2:103. Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 790, p. 87, roundtrip from Worms to Salz. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 793, pp. 92–4 and Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793–94, pp. 93–5: during the autumn of 793 Charlemagne came by ship from Regensburg to the great trench between Altmühl and Rednitz and following the canal project, he went by ship on the River Rednitz into the River Main and on to Würzburg, where he celebrated Christmas and continued on, by ship, to Frankfurt. The texts for both portage operations appear in the Annales Guelferbytani, s.a. 793, p. 45: “cum illis navibus et per terram tractis et per flumina venit ad Franchonofurt” (part of the fluvial journey noted above), and s.a. 797, p. 45: “Karolus rex iterum in Saxonia cum naves magnas per terra tractas et per aquas.” Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 440 n. 30.

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Charlemagne and his army at Regensburg on horseback and their departure by ship in the autumn of 793 still leaves a one-year gap beyond the stay in Regensburg, continuing the absence of a major campaign until the autumn of 794. These events and the occurrence of nearly all the fluvial journeys in this period strongly support the conclusion that Charlemagne was experiencing a serious shortage of horses. Charlemagne abandoned the canal project upon the receipt of two reports: the first of continuing unrest in Saxony followed by news that the Muslims had crossed the Pyrenees to Narbonne and attacked the Rouergue. In order to argue that a deficient number of horses prevented Charlemagne from campaigning against the Saxons for nearly three years (792, 793, and most of 794), two points would have to be made: first, that mounted operations had been necessary for carrying out Saxon campaigns successfully before 791; second, that the presence of military emergencies 792–94 required immediate attention but received no response from Charlemagne. Before 791 two types of cavalry actions were undertaken in Saxony. The only set battles of Charlemagne’s reign occurred during Saxon campaigns. The Frankish army lost the battle of Süntel.52 Another set battle in 784 involved mounted forces; Charlemagne’s son, Charles, defeated the Saxons in a cavalry engagement.53 Far more typical of the Saxon wars, scarae or small mobile strike forces of cavalry engaged reconnaissance and raiding.54 Horses, then, were clearly of the utmost importance in Charlemagne’s Saxon campaigns before 791. The unusual character of the years 792–94 is further suggested by military events in Saxony. Charlemagne’s lack of a military response to the Saxon revolt while he was residing at Regensburg contrasts markedly with the pattern of his military activity in the previous period. During the pre-792 era every documented example of unrest in Saxony was met by an immediate response during the same year either by Charlemagne in person or by his delegates, but not so in 792–93.55 51 52

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Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 95. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 440. Annales Regni Francorum (both versions), s.a. 782, pp. 60, 63. On the performance of the Frankish cavalry at the Battle of Süntel, see R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse (London, 1989), p. 13, citing Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 9, and more recently Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 193–9. Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 784, p. 69: “Karlus vero filius eius, cum ei iter agenti in pago Draigni iuxta Lippiam fluvium Saxonum occurrisset exercitus, commisso cum eis equestri proelio felici ac prospero eventu dimicavit; nam magno eorum numero interfecto, ceteris in diversa fugatis victor ad patrem Wormaciam reversus est.” Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 18 n. 38. Texts from the Annales Regni Francorum on the Saxon campaigns 774–791 contain references to the term scara: s.a. 774, p. 40, s.a. 778, p. 52, s.a. 782, p. 60, s.a. 784, p. 66, s.a. 784, p. 68, s.a. 785, p. 68. On scara as a mounted force, see n. 39 above. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 775, p. 40: the Saxon campaign commenced at the initiative of Charlemagne; s.a. 776, p. 44: the Saxons revolted in 776, and Charlemagne responded the same year; s.a. 778, p. 52: while campaigning in Spain, the Saxons again revolted, and Charlemagne sent a Frankish host against them in the same year and a Frankish detachment pursued the Saxons to the River Eder, winning the battle; (both versions) s.a. 782, pp. 60, 62, 61, 63: the Saxons met Charlemagne at an assembly at the river Lippe. Upon Charlemagne’s departure, Widukind incited the Saxons to revolt; Charlemagne responded by sending emissaries to lead the army to the eventual battle of Süntel; Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 783, p. 64: the Saxons revolted again; Charlemagne initiated another campaign and the Franks won two battles; s.a. 784, pp. 66–8: the Saxons joined the Frisians in a revolt which prompted

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In addition to his preoccupation with the Avar war, a shortage of suitable military mounts incurred as a result of the epidemic and Count Theodoric’s defeat, offers a plausible explanation for this otherwise puzzling inactivity. After 785 no further campaigns took place in Saxony until the autumn of 794, despite the existence of military emergencies there from 792 requiring Charlemagne’s immediate intervention. The Saxons resumed belligerence in 793 when they destroyed the forces of Count Theodoric who with Charlemagne was going to lead a second expedition against the Avars. Following the description of the canal project in 793, the Revised Annals report that papal messengers came to the king at Regensburg, announcing that Saxons had again broken their faith.56 The Annales Laureshamenses for 792 suggest that Saxon hostilities began even earlier, almost immediately after the equine epidemic. These annals mention that the Saxons conspired with the Avars to undermine Charlemagne’s efforts for another campaign; this source also dated the Saxon rebellion to 792 instead of the Royal Frankish Annals’ year of 793.57 An integration of these two accounts would suggest a continuous thread of Saxon hostility from the end of the Avar campaign, spanning the years 792, 793, and most of 794, a sequence of events indicating that the Saxons took advantage of some military weakness here as they did in 778 when Charlemagne was defeated in the Pyrenees.58 To identify this military weakness, it is important to explore whether any other events besides the equine epidemic occurred that could have affected the mobilization of an army. Under the year 793 the Annales Laureshamenses report that Charlemagne sent Pippin and Louis with an army to Benevento, where a great famine overcame their army; the famine, a result of the poor harvest of 792, also struck Burgundy and other places in Francia in 793,59 which the Chronicle of Moissac specified as Gothia (Septimania) and Provence.60 The famine appears to have been confined geographically to these four areas and affected only Pippin’s army in Italy. The losses incurred from the famine appear to have been significant, for Pippin did not mobilize another army in Italy until 796, for a campaign against the Avars.61 As noted above, in 791 Charlemagne had ordered Pippin’s scarae of

56 57 58

59 60

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Charlemagne to conduct an additional campaign which continued into 785 resulting in the conversion of Widukind. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 793, p. 94. Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 792, p. 35. Annales Regni Francorum, p. 52: the Saxons rebelled when they learned of Charlemagne’s defeat in the Pyrenees in 778. The Saxons repeated with another revolt of 793 in response to the Avar defeat as reported in the Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 95. See Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 766 and n. 345. Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 793, p. 35. Chronicon Moissacense, s.a. 793, p. 300. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:55 and n. 2. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 439 ascribed Charlemagne’s prolonged stay in Regensburg during the first part of 793 to the occurrence of this crop failure. The famine did not spread over the entire Carolingian domains but was confined largely to Italy, Burgundy, Provence, and Gothia. The famine did not extend to the line of march to Saxony in the campaign of 794. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 55 n. 39: scarae were used in these subsequent Avar campaigns. Operations against the Avars had resumed in 795 with the campaign of margrave Erich of Friuli. See Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 785.

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cavalry from Italy to Pannonia. The famine overcame Pippin’s army in Italy in 793, so that Charlemagne could not expect any military assistance from these scarae.62 Moreover, Pippin’s scarae were too far removed geographically to be effective against the Saxons. This famine of 793, however, actually did not prevent Charlemagne’s mobilization for the Saxon campaign the very next year, 794. The king’s army, considering its itinerary towards Saxony through Cologne, appears to have been mobilized from the Carolingian heartland.63 The military weakness of Charlemagne’s army in 793 should be connected with the only other event that could have led to this perception by the Saxons, the equine epidemic. The Saxons, having participated in the 791 Avar expedition as part of Count Theodoric’s forces,64 were in a good position to have known about the equine epidemic. The 792 report in the Annales Laureshamenses of the Saxons conspiring with the Avars indicates that the Saxons had received news about the results of the Avar campaign and suggests that Count Theodoric’s army may have remained in the area of the confluence of the Danube and the Raab long enough to learn about the fate of Charlemagne’s army in Savaria (Szombathely). That the Saxons acted on this information in the form of a revolt is a logical inference given that Charlemagne’s immobility precluded suppression of the conflict. In 793 the Saxons continued to exploit Charlemagne’s deficiency of suitable military mounts. In that year the Saxon defeat of Count Theodoric, whose cavalry force had remained intact after the epidemic, exacerbated the shortage of militarily trained mounts. Furthermore, since their own horses had escaped the disease, their withdrawal from Frankish service would have had a disproportionately large impact on the cavalry strength left available to Charlemagne. The prolonged stay in Regensburg lasted for two years of the nearly threeyear gap in full-scale campaigns against the Saxons and the Avars. The divergent scholarly views discussed at the beginning of this paper have ascribed Charlemagne’s campaign inactivity to a need to focus on finishing the Avar war from his headquarters in Regensburg as well as to famine, despite the existence of pressing military emergencies. The Saxon uprising was clearly undertaken with knowledge of the equine epidemic and the realization that Charlemagne lacked the cavalry strength to respond militarily. The remaining examples of political unrest exploited the king’s apparent immobility at Regensburg, a direct result of the equine epidemic. The revolt of Pippin the 62

63

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See n. 29 above for reference to Deér, who rightly explained that the easiest access to the Pannonian plains was through Italy, but the scarae raids of 793 as reported in the Annales Guelferbytani and the Annales Petaviani could not have been conducted by Pippin because of the famine in his army. Pippin was not in a position to take advantage of the vulnerability of the Pannonian plains as a result of the raids of 788 described in the Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 83. Annales Regni Francorum and Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 794, pp. 94–5. This campaign was a continuation of Charlemagne’s war of conquest in Saxony. Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” p. 399, rightly pointed out that the distinction between offensive warfare undertaken by select troops and defensio patriae was a post–800 development. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, p. 88, for the Saxon participation in Avar campaign.

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Hunchback in 792 took advantage of the king’s apparent fixed position at Regensburg.65 The absence of an immediate response by Charlemagne to the Saxons surely enhanced the prospect of a successful revolt, as Charlemagne had a record of dealing promptly with the Saxons. Another disgruntled individual recognized an opportunity as well. Grimoald of Benevento removed Charlemagne’s image from his coins and omitted Charlemagne’s regnal years from the documents of the duchy of Benevento. The Saracens operated from a different understanding of the king’s preoccupations; the Emir of Cordoba was under the impression that the second Avar campaign would not permit Charlemagne to return to Francia.66 This perception was rendered invalid by the Saxon defeat of Count Theodoric, a result which ultimately traced back to equine epidemic; the absence of Theodoric’s cavalry contingents with their vital role in the pincers movement had forced Charlemagne to abort the campaign. These various malcontent entities took advantage of Charlemagne’s lack of mobility during this three-year gap to make their moves in pursuing their own political and military objectives. In explaining the delayed response to the Saxons, it would be inaccurate to argue that Charlemagne was preoccupied with the logistical enterprises of the Avar campaign, specifically, the bridge building and canal digging in 792–93. He had abandoned the canal project at the end of 793, but did not resume any campaigning until the end of 794, an interval of almost a year. A more plausible dimension to these logistical projects and the scheduling of the Council of Frankfurt in the spring of 794 might well be connected with the length of time needed to replenish the supply of suitable military mounts. To replace these mounts may not necessarily mean restoring the cavalry back up to full strength, but simply having sufficient mounted forces capable of conducting a major campaign. The three-year gap in the resumption of fullscale campaigns coincides with the maturation process of horses. The traditions of the Roman agronomists on animal husbandry appear to have been maintained in Carolingian times. Writing in the second century, Columella, whose work De re rustica was preserved in the monasteries of Corbie and Fulda,67 advised that horses must reach three years of age before they could be

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Capitula missorum, MGH, Capit., 1:67, c. 4, No. 25, contains a list of oathtakers including lords who equipped their servi with horses and arms. Ganshof, “Note sur deux capitulaires non datés de Charlemagne,” in Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1947), 1:128–32, dated this capitulary to 792–93. In his Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, p. 153 n. 8, Ganshof connected the Capitulare Missorum with the mobilization for the second Avar campaign: “these dispositions had been decreed in view of an anticipated expedition against the Avars in 793 (which did not occur).” More recently, Matthias Becher, Eid und Herrschaft, Untersuchungen zum Herrscherethos Karls des Großen (Sigmaringen, 1993), pp. 79–85, systematically takes apart Ganshof’s criteria for 792–93, presenting compelling arguments for dating the capitulary to 789. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:36–59. Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics, ed. L. D. Reynolds and P. K. Marshall (Oxford, 1983), p. 146 (Columella).

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ridden regularly; not until four years could they be ready for military campaigns.68 In searching for the reasons a horse cannot be ridden regularly until three years old, the ancient veterinary sources did not have the modern advantages of diagnostic equipment and invasive procedures to evaluate and treat the causes of lameness.69 For a technical explanation, modern veterinary science has found that the closure of the growth plates of the knees, the distal radius bones, occurs from eighteen months to two years; should a horse be ridden prematurely on a regular basis, he most likely will contract epiphisitis, a condition in which: … one side of the growth plate [distal radius] grows faster than the other. This changes the normal axis of the leg and affects the weight bearing alignment of the limb … the concussion [of each stride] is not spread evenly over the bones. This predisposes the young horse to various injuries involving the knees and lower legs, especially the fetlocks.

Ancient and medieval trainers in the West possessed no tradition of veterinary medicine that would have explained this; sheer experience riding young horses before closure of the growth plates would have been their sole means of deriving information.71 Cognizant of chronic lameness in horses trained to be ridden before three years of age, trainers then adjusted their schedules to school in groundwork at age two years, then begin riding at age three. Replacing the equine losses of 791 involved the expenditure of scarce resources in a nearly subsistence economy, assuming these horses were raised on Carolingian farms similar to the ones described in the Brevium Exempla72 and the capitulary De villis. 73 Before reaching age three, these 68

69

70

71

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Columella, Lucius Junius Moderatus, De re rustica, 6.29.4, trans. Harrison Boyd Ash, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1941–55), 2:200–1: “Equus bimus ad usum domesticum recte domatur; certaminibus autem expleto triennio: sic tamen ut post quartum demum annum labori committatur.” (“At two years of age a horse is suitable to be trained for domestic purposes; but, if it is to be trained for racing, it should have completed three years, and provided that it is entered for this kind of effort only after its fourth year.”) Certamen is here translated as racing, but equally could be construed as combat. See Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1966), p. 319. Also, Paul Vigneron, Le cheval dans l’antiquité grécoromaine in Annales de l’Est, Mémoire no. 35, 2 vols. (Nancy, 1968), 1:31. R. E. Walker, “Roman Veterinary Medicine,” appendix to Jocelyn M. C. Toynbee, Animals in Roman Life and Art (Ithaca, NY, 1973), pp. 303–43, 404–15. Klaus-Dietrich Fischer, “Ancient Veterinary Medicine,” Medizinhistorisches Journal 23 (1988), 191–209. James M. Giffin and Tom Gore, Horse Owner’s Veterinary Handbook (New York, 1989), p. 235, making this material intelligible to the educated layperson. For a professional veterinary explanation, see Ted S. Stashak, Adams’ Lameness in Horses, 4th ed. (Philadelphia, 1987), pp. 317–24. Karl Brunner, “Continuity and Discontinuity of Roman Agricultural Knowledge in the Early Middle Ages,” in Agriculture in the Middle Ages, ed. Del Sweeney (Philadelphia, 1995), p. 39 n.37, citing Columella’s reliance on the primacy of experience in De re rustica, 1.16. Walker, “Roman Veterinary Medicine,” p. 315, reached the same conclusion after evaluating Varro’s work: “The observations are only those derived from common experience.” MGH, Capit. 1:128. On the Brevium Exempla, see H. R. Loyn and John Percival, The Reign of Charlemagne,Documents on Carolingian Government and Administration (London, 1975), p. 98ff. Klaus Verhein, “Studien zu den Quellen zum Reichsgut der Karolingerzeit,” Deutsches Archiv, 11 (1955), 333–92.

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colts had to be maintained in healthy condition with proper forage, shelter, and space for exercise. Applying the data developed by Bachrach for the maintenance of war horses, we can appreciate the magnitude and the cost of maintaining a Carolingian mounted force.74 Attending to the daily needs of these colts required an enormous infrastructure working on the various estates. An entire support staff of trainers would be needed to train these colts to ride, and once rideable, they had to be schooled to perform military maneuvers such as the cavalry exercises later described by Nithard.75 Taking rideable three-year-olds on a military campaign would not have been advisable, even though they would be old enough to be physically sound. At three years of age they underwent training to be ridden, but could remain highly unpredictable. If frightened, as would be likely with horses unschooled in military situations, some might bolt and/or buck. Horsemanship skills included wide ranging levels of achievement. The mounted troops in Charlemagne’s army were doubtless competent horsemen accustomed to riding trained horses, but even such riders might not be able to maintain their seat should the horses seriously misbehave. After the epidemic of 791 and the additional loss of horses following Theodoric’s defeat, Charlemagne had the major task of rebuilding his mounted forces if he ever wished to use the pincers movements again. Unlike modern tanks, neither war horses nor pack animals can be manufactured quickly at the command of a head of state. Powerless to speed up natural processes, Charlemagne remained immobilized at Regensburg, while these destabilizing events were taking place throughout his kingdom. Moreover, Theodoric’s defeat with its attendant reduction of cavalry contributed to the disruption of the 793 campaign, yet the epidemic of 791 nevertheless continued to affect the quality of Charlemagne’s own mounted forces, and possibly diminished the Avars’ supply of cavalry horses even more by destroying a large portion of the Avar breeding stock.76 The main 73

74

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MGH, Capit. 1:84, c. 13–15. The fundamental study on this capitulary is still Verhein, “Studien zu den Quellen zum Reichsgut der Karolingerzeit,” 355–94. For the more recent scholarly literature on De villis, see Jane Martindale, “The Kingdom of Aquitaine and the Carolingian Fisc,” Francia, 11 (1983), 131–91, at pp. 159–61. For the equine provisions of De villis, see Ann Hyland, The Medieval Warhorse, from Byzantium to the Crusades, pp. 62–3, and R. H. C. Davis, “The Warhorses of the Normans,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 10 (1988), p. 72. Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” pp. 707–64, and his “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 8 (1986), 1–25, reprinted in his Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (Aldershot, 2002), no. xiv. For a discussion of these military games see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 128, and Carroll Gillmor, “Practical Chivalry: the Training of Horses for Warfare and Tournaments,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 13 (1992), p. 12. Dr. Erik Szameit, University of Vienna, via email correspondence, suggested that the epidemic struck the Avar breeding stock, thus preventing or at least seriously hindering the production of cavalry horses. The epidemic, he argued, helps to explain why the Avars offered so little resistance to the 796 raids of Duke Erich of Friuli and Pippin, as reported in the Annales Regni Francorum, p. 98. The validity of this hypothesis would depend on the territorial extent of the epidemic and the geographical distribution of the Avar stud farms. According to the Annales Laureshamenses, p. 34, the Franks raided most of the areas in Pannonia for fifty-two days.

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concern to keep in mind here is Charlemagne’s supply of militarily trained horses. Yes, there were horses available, but they were not yet seasoned war horses, having still to undergo the initial training period. Allowing seven to eight years for the service life of a warhorse77 means that the normal replacement stream per year must be one-seventh to one-eighth of the total. For the sake of argument, one-eighth will suffice. Four years would be required to recover half strength of the lost horses and full strength reasonably could be expected in eight years. Half of the 791 losses would have been replaced by 795, the year after the next Saxon campaign, and a full recovery could have been expected by 799. This timetable assumes normal development with no increase in production, maintaining the existing breeding stock without reducing its quality with the introduction of less desirable stallions or mares, and without diverting into cavalry training second-class horses, those lacking genuine athletic ability and temperament. The foals replacing the 791 losses would include the crop of 791 which were already born by the time of the epidemic. These foals would have been four years old in 795, the year after Charlemagne resumed the Saxon war. The replacement stock that participated in the 794 Saxon campaign would have been drawn from the foal crops of 790, 789, and 788. In 791 these horses would have been too young to have participated in the Avar campaign, but by 794 they would have been four, five, and six-year-olds respectively. The foals of 791, age three in 794, rideable but not militarily trained, would not have been included in the Saxon expedition. Nor would the foals of 787; having reached age four in 791, most of these would have been fatalities of the epidemic. Thus, Charlemagne’s replacement cavalry was less than half strength in 794, a shortfall suggesting that cavalry-trained second-class horses may have participated in the Saxon campaign. Increasing the supply with the introduction of more breeding stock but of lesser quality would provide a longer term recovery of the 791 losses. The earliest possible year for the introduction of new breeding stock would be 792, the spring following the epidemic; the first foals of this activity would not be born

77

During this period the Franks had no encounter with EEE until Charlemagne’s army marched 100 km to Savaria (Szombathely), where the epidemic was concentrated. The sources contain no information on the distribution of Avar stud farms. Concentration of the farms in the vicinity of the Ring, the Avar power base in the center of the Alföld, some 200 km direct distance from Savaria (Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 50, map 2), would minimize the likelihood of infection there. By contrast, the distribution of Avar stud farms throughout Pannonia would mean that only a portion of the breeding stock would have been affected, specifically, those around Savaria. The Annales Regni Francorum, p. 98, explicitly gave the reason for the absence of Avar resistance in 796, that the Avars had been exhausted by civil war during the interval between 791 and 796, an activity which may have involved some cavalry operations. Information on the service life of a war horse is found in Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 63 and n. 104 and pp. 299–300. Frederick L. Devereux, Jr., The Cavalry Manual of Horse Management (South Brunswick and New York, 1979), held a more conservative view of the age for horses entering cavalry service in the early twentieth century practice of the United States Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas. On p. 143, Devereux explained that “Horses under five years of age are too young, and often six years is a better minimum age. Those over fifteen years of age are approaching the age of senility, but some individuals beyond this age will render excellent service.”

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until 793, as the horse has an eleven-month gestation period, so that these 793 foals would not be functional warhorses until 797. Considering the urgency of the Saxon revolt which required a more immediate response, the introduction of new breeding stock would not have been a viable option. Full replacement of the 791 losses, the second four years of the normal timetable, would have included the foal crops of 792, 793, 794, and 795. Reaching age four years in 799, the 795 foals would have been basically trained as cavalry horses. By then the warhorses of the first replacement phase (the foals of 788–91) would have been retired. The production of warhorses would have resumed its normal schedule by 800, the accepted date for the capitulary De villis and the Brevium Exempla. These two sources indicate that Charlemagne’s horsebreeding program was already a flourishing established practice. Applying this data provides some insights into the supply of cavalry horses during the first phase of the recovery period. In 793, the year of the aborted Avar campaign, Charlemagne had horses which were two and three years old in 791, so that they were four and five in 793. The five-year-olds would have had the most training and possibly some raiding and reconnaissance experience as explained in the earlier discussion of the Annales Petaviani and the Annales Guelferbytani. In order to include on the Saxon campaign the horses which reached their fourth year in 794, they would have spent most of the year in training to perform military maneuvers. The four-year-olds would have begun their military training but should not be considered seasoned war horses, assuming that most of these horses lacked solid experience in military situations and therefore could still behave unpredictably. In the semi-official ordering of events for 794, the Saxon campaign followed the Council of Frankfurt. The autumn mobilization for the Saxon campaign would have permitted an extension of horsetraining activities in providing additional requisite time to school these newly rideable colts to be war horses.78 The Avar and Saxon campaigns were clearly interrelated. The horses lost in Pannonia meant that Charlemagne could not campaign against the Saxons until 794. By then, Charlemagne evidently had enough horsemen to advance with his customary two-pronged attack mode, before which the Saxons capitulated.79 Traditional discussions of Charlemagne’s cavalry have appeared in the context of an eighth-century military revolution that placed the mounted warrior at the center 78 79

Louis Halphen, Études critiques sur l’histoire de Charlemagne (Paris, 1921), p. 189, noticed the slowness of the troop concentration in 794, and the absence of an explanation in the sources. Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 794, p. 94, for a two-pronged assault against the Saxons and their capitulation. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 77, noted without documentation that the use of the word turmas to denote the advancing columns in 794 implied a small force. It remains unclear how this term fits into military terminology, possibly something less than an exercitus but larger than a scara. In 795 (Annales Regni Francorum, p. 96), the Annals reported that Charlemagne advanced into Saxony with an exercitus during a year when he presumably would have had an additional crop of cavalry horses. On p. 79, France continued his theme of magnate consent in the raising of armies explaining, “The Saxon War simply did not produce profitable campaigns like those against Bavaria, Italy and the Avars … The absence of large-scale pincer-movements in the Saxon war is perhaps indicative of the limited resources at the great king’s disposal.”

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of warfare.80 More recently, scholarship on Carolingian warfare has arrived at a consensus on the predominance of logistics and siege warfare,81 assigning cavalry to the more supportive role of reconnaissance and raiding. Of these books and articles that have discussed mounted forces in Charlemagne’s army, none has observed how dramatically the focus of this evidence shifts after the equine epidemic. Before 791 tactical descriptions include horses engaged in various military operations, such as the battle of Süntel and the raids of the scarae in the Saxon campaigns. A close look at the chronology of the evidence points to 791 as a watershed in that all but one of the texts devoted to ensuring the supply, provisioning and care of horses in Charlemagne’s armies date from the period after the epidemic.82 The capitulary De villis, dated around 800, by which point the losses of 791 would have been fully recovered, elaborated on the details for horsebreeding to improve an existing system rather than to establish a new one. The inventories of four estates contained in the Brevium Exempla of c. 800 provided invaluable numerical data on mares as well as two and three-year-olds. Charlemagne’s letter to Abbot Fulrad dated 804–11, containing the fullest description of Carolingian armaments, was preoccupied largely with the mobilization requirements of the equestrian contingents, including a detailed list of cavalry equipment.83 In 806 80

81

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83

For a summary of the issues surrounding an eighth-century military revolution, see most recently France, “Recent writing on medieval warfare,” pp. 445–9, and Kelly DeVries, Medieval Military Technology (Ontario, 1992), pp. 95–110. For older discussions, see Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 179–84; Gillmor, “Cavalry: Western European,” in Dictionary of the Middle Ages, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York, 1983), 3:201–2, 207. Davis, Medieval Warhorse, pp. 11–16, 50–51. A number of Bernard S. Bachrach’s articles on this point appear in Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe. See also his Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 103, 212 (for Aquitaine). Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars, p. 19 and n. 55, citing Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 184. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” pp. 67–8. With the exception of one text, dated in 781, Charlemagne prohibited the exportation of stallions. See MGH, Capit. 1:190, c. 7. Loyn and Percival, Reign of Charlemagne, p. 50. Davis, Medieval Warhorse, p. 53. MGH, Capit. 1:168. Georg Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1885), 4:544: “In einem Schreiben Karls an den Abt Fulrad, das diesen zur Heerversammlung nach Sachsen entbietet und im einzelnen angiebt welche Rustüng verlangt wird, ist nur von Reitern und ihrer Bewaffnung die Rede.” Also, Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962), p. 6, explained, “the only extant military summons sent by him [Charlemagne] to a magnate of his realm, that issued to Abbot Fulrad of Vermandois and Lobbes between 804 and 811, spoke in detail of horsemen but did not indicate that the abbot was expected to produce any footmen for war.” Abbot Fulrad’s letter nevertheless specified, “let the men of each one of your vassals march along with the carts and horsemen.” If the men are marching with the horsemen, then they are not horsemen. These men were presumably footsoldiers, but only the equipment of the horsemen is further specified. The capitulary texts that included passages on cavalry should be set in the context of the larger body of evidence on military activities, specifically the topical organization of the capitularies. For example, three other capitularies devoted exclusively to military campaigns were concerned with the property qualification and eligibility for military service for individuals who served on foot. See MGH, Capit. 1:134–5, no. 48: Memoratorium de Exercitu in Gallia occidentali praeparando of 807; 1:136, no. 50: Capitulare missorum de exercitu promovendo of 808; 1:164, no. 73: Capitula de rebus exercitalibus in placito tractanda of 811. The topical arrangement of these military capitular-

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Charlemagne issued a capitulary on a mobilization against the Frisians, emphasizing that the horsemen be well prepared.84 In apparent realization of the fragility of cavalry and their principal source of transportation, Charlemagne was forced to take precautions to ensure the supply of military mounts. In a historiographical context, the texts on the supply of horses should be viewed as a response to the epidemic and Theodoric’s defeat not as an extension of an earlier military revolution. The equine epidemic of 791 significantly modified Charlemagne’s war-making capabilities, forcing him to curtail the first Avar campaign. Insufficient numbers of riding and pack horses affected more than the cavalry alone. Charlemagne and his royal retinue had to alter their lifestyle of itinerant kingship, remaining in Regensburg for the unusually long period of nearly two years. The more sedentary logistical enterprises of the pontoon bridge and the Rhine–Danube canal assumed first priority only after an offensive against the Avars became impossible. A chronological gap of three years in military campaigns followed the equine epidemic of 791. Large-scale military intervention did not resume until the end of 794, despite the presence of military exigencies. The three-year hiatus in major campaigns cannot be explained solely by the stay in Regensburg to fight the Avar war, for this residency lasted only two years. Charlemagne waited an additional year before resuming the Saxon campaign. Indeed, the stay at Regensburg itself cannot in any case be explained convincingly without reference to 791. The lack of sufficient numbers of suitable mounts and pack animals best explains this gap. The loss of ninety per cent of the cavalry force in his division of the army of 791 prevented campaigning and the three-year interval was spent waiting for the restoration of the supply of horses to operational capacity. Human lives, especially those in the agrarian societies of early medieval Europe, depended on the good health of their animals.

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ies suggests that Charlemagne evaluated the tactical needs of a projected campaign and mobilized the various kinds of troops accordingly. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 62, expressed a similar view, “that there was no single Carolingian army, but rather that we should think in terms of different kinds of armies raised in particular circumstances and differing in make-up.” MGH, Capit. 1:136, c. 3: “De Frisionibus volumus, ut comites et vassalli nostri qui beneficia habere videntur et caballarii omnes generaliter ad placitum nostrum veniant bene praeparati.”

4 The Role of the Cavalry in Medieval Warfare* J. F. Verbruggen Translated by Kelly DeVries

In an article, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare: Horses, Horses All Around and Not a One to Use,” appearing in the Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Bryce Lyon challenged the hegemony of the cavalry in medieval warfare.1 He considers my conclusion concerning the supremacy of knights to be “a romantic statement of this idée fixe.” He thinks that scholars should follow the studies of Bernard Bachrach and others on warfare in the early Middle Ages to the eleventh century. From the study of Carolingian military operations, he concludes that sieges with ladders and tunnels and campaigns in dark woods and marshy terrain were more numerous than battles. If these campaigns were more numerous than battles, how is it then that in 1066 there were three battles which followed each other: the landing of Hardrada and his defeat of the troops of Edwin and Morcar at Fulford on September 20, the march of Harold to the north and his defeat of Hardrada at Stamford Bridge on September 25, and, afterwards, the battle of Hastings on October 14? Where were the sieges? And the woods? Harold came out of a forest to do battle, and he was defeated. Bryce Lyon gives no examples of the campaigns in dark forests and marshy terrain, and he gives no numerical comparisons with battles. There were a few exceptions. There were certainly sieges with ladders and tunnels. It also follows that the Carolingians were victorious in these campaigns and sieges. Lyon forgets that an attacker who was stronger than the defender could avoid the dark woods and marshy terrain and could march through the rest of the land, plundering all that was there, burning the houses, destroying the environs, and leading the people away as prisoners. The attacker could then wait to see how long the defender could live in his dark woods, his marshy terrain, and his fortifications, while the rest of his land was destroyed and he received no more supplies. If the attacker alone had as his purpose to undertake a chevauchée,2 he could burn *(Original: “De rol van de ruiterij in de middeleeuwse oorlogvoering,” Belgisch tijdschrift voor militaire geschiedenis 30 (1994), 389–418. 1

2

Academie Analecta, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 49, 1987, nr. 2, p. 77–90. [Translator’s note: Dr. Lyon is named only as Br. Lyon by Professor Verbruggen in the original article; I have filled in Lyon’s first name.] [Translator’s note: The original Dutch translates as “punishment expedition.”]

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everything and steal from the population, take prisoners and then return to his own home, and return again a year later. He did not have to fight any battle, if the defender did not wish to. He could achieve his purpose without battle. The number of battles had no importance in some campaigns. Much of the warfare of the seventh through the eleventh centuries would have been forgotten had monks not written the few sources in which it was recorded. On the small number of battles Lyon could find much more information in my studies than in Bachrach’s.3 This small number of battles showed the caution of medieval military leaders. The weaker defenders placed themselves in a fortification to avoid battle and to strengthen their territory against the influence of the Carolingians. According to Bryce Lyon, cavalry would only have been used for reconnaissance and raids. He forgets the attack or assault, the pursuit, the retreat, and the possibility of advancing or attacking the land of an enemy on a broader front. Cavalry did not play a decisive tactical role in one significant battle or campaign.4 Lyon has not read my study on the warfare in the Carolingian empire (714–1000), nor my two studies on the tactics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In total, he should have read ten of my works before he wrote his criticism.5 His erroneous claims are already refuted in those studies. As a conclusion, he writes: “Cavalry was never militarily superior to foot soldiers, not even in the Middle Ages when it might have been pos3

4 5

J. F. Verbruggen, De krijgkunst in west-Europa in de middeleeuwen (IXe tot XIVe eeuw), Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van België, Klasse der letteren, Verhandelingen, nr. 20 (Brussels, 1954), pp. 509–14, 524, 535–9; Het leger en de vloot van de graven van Vlaanderen vanaf het ontstaan tot in 1305, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van België, Klasse der letteren, Verhandelingen, nr. 38 (Brussels, 1960), pp. 147–55, 158, 169–90; The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340, trans. S. Willard and S. C. M. Southern (Amsterdam, 1977), pp. 288– 91. [Trans. note: As this article was published before the appearance of the second edition of The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340, I have used the first edition of this work as cited in the original footnotes.] Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 81. J. F. Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien (714–1000),” Revue Belge d’histoire militaire 23 (1979–80), 289–310, 393–412; “Un plan de bataille du duc de Bourgogne (14 septembre 1417) et la tactique de l’époque,” Revue internationale d’histoire militaire 20 (1959), 443–51; “La tactique de la chevalerie Française de 1340 à 1415,” Publications de l’université de l’état à Elisabethville 1 (1961), 39–48; “Vlaamse gemeentelegers tegen Franse ridderlegers in de 14de en 15de eeuw,” Revue Belge d’histoire militaire 24 (1981), 359–82 (translated as “Flemish Urban Militias against French Cavalry Armies in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” trans. Kelly DeVries, Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 145–69); Het gemeenteleger van Brugge van 1338 tot 1340 en de namen van de weerbare mannen (Brussels, 1962); “De militairen: In de middeleeuwen en de bourgondische tijd,” in Flandria Nostra, ed. J. L. Broeckx et al. (Antwerp, 1960), V:161–233; “Bewapening en krijgkunst: het Gentse en het Brugse gemeenteleger in 1477–1479,” Militaria Belgica (1984), 15–23; “Vrouwen in de middeleeuwse legers,” Revue Belge d’histoire militaire 24 (1982), 617–34 (Joan of Arc against the English); “De naam guldensporenslag voor de slag bij Kortrijk (11 juli 1302),” Revue Belge d’histoire militaire 24 (1982), 701–6 (Joan of Arc at Patay, p. 705).

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sible.”6 This claim is so wrong that one can immediately conclude that Lyon knows so little of the subject that he should have known better than write about it. Bryce Lyon and Bernard Bachrach wish to push the exceptions of medieval warfare as the rule: according to them, the infantry played a greater role, and the role of the cavalry was small. But they do not believe the sources, as they think that what was written is completely wrong. Bryce Lyon has not studied the sources of even one battle in the Middle Ages. Should he have done that, he would have found contradictions in thirty different narrative sources, such as those for the battle of Courtrai and the battle of Crécy, and he would afterwards have to be more careful. Then he might think that he has found contradictions in the text of one source, only to simply discover that there were no contradictions. So he gives the French version of camouflaged trenches for the battle of Courtrai, that Henri Pirenne and myself have shown to be a French excuse for the defeat. Bryce Lyon knows better without having studied the sources.7 Lyon does not know enough concerning military theory and practice to make judgements or write about these problems. This lack of expertise shows in his erroneous conclusions. It shows also in the use of the word “infantry” for the footsoldiers of the time.8 Infantry was first introduced in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. The word “infantry” appears in English around 1579. Lyon should not use it for the Middle Ages. Bachrach started to make the same mistake, but he improved under the influence of my study of Carolingian warfare of 714 to 1000. The same thing occurs when Lyon speaks of the “Frankish knight” in the army of Charlemagne.9 Knights did not exist yet, they were vassals. The same mistake was made in his translation of a study on the army of Charlemagne in the work of F. L. Ganshof, Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne.10 In his edition of The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, Lyon speaks of men who do service in the nature of officers of the general staff,11 for a time when there was no general staff! In this work and others one can see that he has not studied the fundamental criteria of the strength of the armies.

6

7 8 9 10 11

Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 90. On the contrary, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), p. 289: “Cavalry was the more effective arm, consisting of the elite; this made such a difference that, although cavalry was always smaller by far, it was always considered to be the decisive element; while foot soldiers were in low esteem and hardly ever mentioned.” Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 83. Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” pp. 82 fn. 16, 83, 85. Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 81. Translated by Bryce and Mary Lyon (Providence, 1968), pp. 65–6. The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340, ed. Mary Lyon, Bryce Lyon, and Henry S. Lucas, with assistance of Jean de Sturler, Koninklijk Academie van België, Koninklijk Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, 1983), p. XCV.

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The Judgement of Aristotle and the Example of the Greeks In his work, Politics, Aristotle gives a number of meditations on military service, of cavalry and foot soldiers, which is very important for the study of military service in the Middle Ages because the same problems also existed then: The earliest government which existed among the Greeks, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the cavalry, for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed, without discipline, foot soldiers are useless.12

The foot soldiers still had no tactical unities, and as long as this was the case, the martial cohesion of the cavalry was better. This period in the history of the Greeks can be compared with the superiority of heavy cavalry in western Europe during the Middle Ages. When the Greek cities became larger and richer, their foot soldiers became more important. And the Greeks had in their cities a small place for the foot soldiers to train, which did not exist in the Middle Ages in western Europe and which would not be introduced until the seventeenth century. This situation changed in Greece under King Philip of Macedonia and his son, Alexander, through whom the Greek city-states were overthrown. They commanded a good cavalry. The cavalry strength of Alexander’s army was responsible for the success of his conquest of the Persian empire. In the final battle, he commanded over 47,000 men, among whom were 7,000 cavalry. He struck into the Persian kingdom to conquer it and to overthrow it completely. The cavalry played an important role in this.

The Romans The Romans had also used their foot soldiers in an efficient way, with an exemplary discipline. The foot soldiers were the main force. But the importance of the cavalry appeared in the armies of their enemies. The battle of Cannae in 216 BC showed this. Polybius writes about this: “At Cannae … the Carthaginians being on this occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both.” Hannibal commanded more than 10,000 cavalry and more than 40,000 foot soldiers; the Romans had around 80,000 foot soldiers and somewhat more than 6,000 cavalry. The Romans were defeated.14 This superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry was thus responsible for the victories of Hannibal. 12 13 14

Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, chapter 13. Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen des Politischen Geschichte (Berlin, 1920), I:208–9. Polybius, Histories, III:114, 117. See also The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. Ian ScottKilvert (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 270–1, 274.

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The Romans had an outstanding army of foot soldiers at the time of Caesar and in the first century AD But in the large plains of Asia they fought against the cavalry of the Parthians and this led them to a serious defeat. The Parthians had at their disposal heavily armored cavalry soldiers with lances and horse archers and a light cavalry with large and strong bows. At Carrhae in 53 BC, Crassus and his legions were defeated: his army may have included 36,000 men, of which 4,000 were cavalry.15 The Romans never did try to conquer the Persian kingdom. In comparison with Alexander the Great, they did not have enough cavalry. After the defeat of Crassus, Antony fought a campaign against the Persian kingdom and had no success in 36 BC. In the year 260 AD, Emperor Valerian fought against Shapur I and was taken prisoner. A century later, in 363, Emperor Julian was killed there.16 In the expansive plains of Asia the Roman foot soldiers had to march for long distances in a terrain in which they would suffer thirst, hunger, privation, fatigue and from the effects of heat and sun. The Persian cavalry could avoid battle and surround the Roman foot soldiers, attacking them in their flank and back, shooting them with arrows and wounding or killing many soldiers. The Roman foot soldiers became exhausted by the long marches, the thirst, and the privation. In Europe, the Romans had to deal with the invasions of Barbarians through which their state weakened and their economy collapsed during the conflict between the candidates for the emperorship. Cavalry soldiers invaded the Roman Empire: the Goths, the Vandals, the Gepids, the Alans, the Huns. In a battle against the Goths, Emperor Decius and his son were killed and his troops defeated in the summer of 251 by Abrittus. In 378, Emperor Valens was defeated by the Goths at Adrianople.17 At the end of the fourth or in the first half of the fifth century Flavius Renatus Vegetius wrote that there were many instructions for the cavalry. But this part of the army distinguished itself through its use of training, in the nature of its armor and in the worth of its horses. Therefore, he was not writing about the cavalry from earlier works. The Goths, Alans, and Huns had provided an example of the armor of the cavalry. The foot soldiers were not armored. They did not wear a helmet or armor. They were only used in defense, and motionless must await the enemy’s attack.18 This inactive posture of the foot soldiers is typical for the entire Middle Ages. It is still suggested by Jean de Bueil in the fifteenth century: “une bataille à pié ne doit point marcher, mais doit toujours attendre ses enemis pié coy. Car quant ils marchent, ils ne sont pas tous d’une force, ils ne peuvent pas tenir ordonnance. Il ne faut que un buysson pour les départir.” Also, the Swiss established this: “Une autre foys advint, devant Basle, que les Suysses se trouvèrent contre les Françoys et, parce qu’ilz marchèrent, les Franchoys les desconfirent.” He considered as a doctrine: “toutes et quanteffoiz que gens à pié marchent contre 15 16 17 18

Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, I:475. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, p. 5. Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae XXXI, 13, 1–13. Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris, III:26; I:20; II:17; III:14.

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leurs ennemys front à front, ceulx qui marcheront perdront, et ceulx qui demeureront pié coy et tiendront ferme gaigneront. Et ceulx de cheval tout au contraire, car ceulx qui assaillent et marchent à cheval, gaignent, et ceulx qui demeurent et actendent, perdent.” Elsewhere, Jean de Bueil added this: “En autres lieux, il est advenu que les foibles combateurs … ont vaincu leurs ennemys, comme naguères, devant Basles, les Françoys desconfirent les Suysses.”19 The small number of French heavy cavalry thus defeated the Swiss foot soldiers at Sankt Jacob an der Birs in 1444 according to Jean de Bueil who was the commander of the French forces and therefore was well informed. The noble of the Middle Ages believed that he with a smaller number of cavalry could defeat foot soldiers: 100 noble cavalry could fight against 1000 foot soldiers according to the Frenchman Guillaume Guiart and the the Brabantese cleric Lodewijk van Velthem. The Bretons held that one noble rider was worth seven non-noble warriors.20 For Jean de Bueil, the most dangerous weapons in the world were the warhorse and the lance, as there were no means to fight against them. At the end of the fifteenth century, the French warriors were still the masters of the battlefield. Sometimes they were also defeated, as at Guinegate in 1479 against the Flemish foot soldiers. But in 1494, still more than half of Charles VIII’s army on campaign in Italy was composed of heavy cavalry.21

The Strategikon In the Eastern Roman Empire, an exceptional treatise on the art of warfare was written, the Strategikon, which in most manuscripts is indicated as written by Maurikios. It is an original work. The writer is a man with experience in leading troops on at least two fronts. He writes in the colloquial language with military technical words placed therein. He explains everything well and gives diagrams that show the order of battle clearly. He knows the daily life of a soldier on march and in camp. As an experienced officer, he writes about the enemy and his method of fighting. This military handbook exercised influence on western European armies until the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Strategikon was written between 573 and 628, years of hostilities against the Persians before the appearance of the Saracens. The enemies of Byzantium were the Persians; the Lombards, appearing after 568; the Avars, after 570; the Slavs, 19 20

21

Jean de Bueil, Le Jouvencel, ed. C. Favre and L. Lecestre (Paris: Société de l’histoire de France, 1887), I:153, cxiv, n.1; II:63. Lodewijk van Velthem, De guldensporenslag, ed. W. Waterschoot (The Hague, 1979, v. 279– 80 (p. 64); Guillaume Guiart, La branche des royaus lingnages, ed. N. de Wailly and L. Delisle, Recueil des historiens de la Gaule et de la France, xxii, v. 20454–56 (p. 290): “10,000 hommes d’armes montez, 100,000 entre la piétaille”; Stephen of Llandaff, Liber Landavensis, ed. W. J. Rees (Llandovery, 1840): “ut milites Armorici fortiores fierent in equitando omnibus gentibus … Sunt enim Armorici amplius victoriosi in equitando, septies quam ut essent pedites,” cited by B. S. Bachrach, “The Origin of Armorican Chivalry,” Technology and Culture 10 (1969), 166. Le Jouvencel, II:100, and Malcolm Vale, War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages (London, 1981), p. 128.

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around the same time, and the Antae, who were not further mentioned after 601. In the best study on this subject, the French scholar F. Aussaresses supported the attribution of this work to Emperor Maurikios. It would have been written in the years 580–582, before the ascension to the throne by Maurikios. While the book is the work of an officer with experience, a general or the emperor, it cannot be said with complete certainty that this officer was Emperor Maurikios. There is now a scholarly edition of the text of the Strategikon by George T. Dennis, and a German translation by Ernst Gamillscheg in the Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, vol. 17: Mauricii Strategicon, published in Vienna in 1981. Dennis has also published an English translation.22 The Strategikon is especially important because it is written by a man with the occupation of soldier. This appears for the first time in the text concerning stirrups; these gave the rider so much more stability in the saddle and made the attacks of the heavy cavalry more powerful.23 These stirrups had already appeared by this time in Byzantium and could have been transferred from the Franks or other people of western Europe who had seen them in the Byzantine army in Italy or elsewhere. Stirrups were thus already in use in Byzantium before the time of Charlemagne in the west. The Strategikon is of even more importance because it recounts: “The general would be well advised to have more cavalry than infantry. The latter is set only for close combat, while the former is easily able to pursue or to retreat, and when dismounted the men are all set to fight on foot.”24 The writer speaks about the neglect of the footsoldiers and about their disappearance. He endeavors to do what is necessary to train the soldiers again. Maurikios explains the problem between the cavalry and footsoldiers as it later would be understood in the west: heavy cavalry would dominate, with a lesser role for footsoldiers – either not appearing at all or only in support of the cavalry. The book is three-quarters written for the cavalry and one quarter for the footsoldiers. Byzantium disposed the necessary finances to maintain a professional army and could train both cavalry and footsoldiers at the same time. Still, the commanders chose cavalry because they could perform all of the military functions better. In western Europe, there was no professional army, and foot soldiers were not trained. The vassals who formed the heavy cavalry were trained from youth and, as soon as they had learned their military occupation, they took part in a war. During peacetime, they practiced in military games and later in tournaments. They gained experience. The footsoldiers had no collective training; they were not trained in a group. They could only gain experience in war when they had fought for a long time in conflict, and this was exceptional. In that case, the footsoldiers also lost many warriors in the fight. Maurikios and Jean de Bueil were commanders, men of practice who knew their business. They knew more about this than Bryce Lyon who dared to write 22

23 24

Strategikon des Maurikios, ed. George T. Dennis, trans. Ernst Gamillscheg (Vienna, 1981), and Maurice’s Strategicon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, trans. George T. Dennis (Philadelphia, 1984). Strategikon des Maurikios, bk. I, 2, 40, pp. 80–1. Strategikon des Maurikios, bk. VIII, 2, 85, pp. 296–7.

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that “cavalry was never militarily superior to foot soldiers, not even in the Middle Ages when it might have been possible.” This erroneous claim is typical. In place of studying the sources and afterwards coming to a conclusion, Lyon arrives at a preconceived thesis. The conclusion of Jean de Bueil can be followed by looking at the Flemish footsoldiers. When the Flemings attacked at Cassel in 1328, at Westrozebeke in 1382, and at Gavere in 1453, they were defeated by cavalry soldiers, because the latter were better trained, had more experience in war and, as noble, professional soldiers, were more knowledgeable in handling weapons. From the time of Maurikios in Byzantium, and the time of Charlemagne in the west, the footsoldiers had to wage a defensive battle against the heavy cavalry. They were not able by their own strength to make a meaningful assault in battle and to gain victory on the battlefield. In such an assault the footsoldiers could not keep their solid formation together – it would be brought to a standstill and surrounded – nor could they break the cavalry by this formation. When the footsoldiers were victorious in a defensive battle, with a counter-attack delivered at the moment that the heavy cavalry had suffered heavy casualties or were exhausted, it seemed very difficult to maintain this victory for a long time. If footsoldiers were able to successfully fight against the cavalry for a certain amount of time, as the Flemings did from 1302 to 1304 and from 1314 to 1319, it was afterwards expected that this success would be repeated in the next period. It happened that the footsoldiers might be victorious once, but would later be defeated by the cavalry. Hans Delbrück rightly suggests as a criterion that footsoldiers on their own must show their worth in an attack on the battlefield. And then it must be concluded whether the victory of the footsoldiers was the beginning of a tradition or a solitary victory.25

Siege or Battle? Clovis and Charlemagne In a single battle Clovis was able to destroy the realm of Syagrius in 486; with another battle he was able to conquer the kingdom of the Alemanni in 496; one battle sufficed to defeat the Burgundian army of Gundobad, and Gundobad was forced to flee to Avignon (500 or 501), and the battle of Vouillé destroyed the kingdom of the Visigoths in 507. Bachrach, the model for Bryce Lyon, has not once noticed nor discussed this strategy: “From Clovis’s siege of Paris in the 480s to Charles Martel’s siege of Avignon in 737, the investment of fortified positions, whether walled cities or garrisoned castra, dominated Merovingian warfare. The Roman origin of this city-oriented warfare which necessarily evolved from it cannot be too strongly emphasized.”26 This conclusion is entirely in error for the strategy of Clovis and Charles Martel. Bachrach did not know then what was the difference between strategy and tactics, as is apparent in the following 25 26

Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, III:373, 458–9. Bernard S. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, 481–751 (Minneapolis, 1972), pp. 127–8.

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sentence: “Siege warfare was not the only tactic of the Merovingian military.” The siege of Paris, which Bachrach speaks of three times in his book, is not a historical occurrence. It comes from the Vita of Saint Genoveva and this story is not accepted by scholars such as Bruno Krusch and Ferdinand Lot. According to Bachrach this siege lasted for five years. Another manuscript of the Vita gives a ten-year length. The best text does not speak of a siege and reports that Genoveva supplied Paris after the war. The siege is placed during the reign of Childerich.29 This undated and thus disputed siege cannot be used in a history of war. It must be classified within the inventions of Saints’ Lives, where the saint destroys the enemy army with the waving of his or her hand. The siege of Verdun is described by Kurth as follows: Au dire d’un vieil hagiographe, l’armée franque aurait déployé à cette occasion toutes les ressources de la poliorcétique la plus savante. Du haut des murs, les assiégés virent l’investissement de leur ville progresser tous les jours, jusqu’à ce que les lignes de circonvallation furent achevées. Alors le bélier commença à battre les murailles, et une grêle de traits refoula les défenseurs qui se présentaient sur les remparts.30

This description was evidently too strong for the art of warfare of Clovis and was not reported. The siege receives only a single line from Bachrach.31 Since the date of the siege of Verdun is impossible to ascertain, it cannot be used in the strategy of Clovis: “Though Tolbiac was a formidable fortress, it seems that this battle, unlike several of Clovis’s previous actions did not involve siege warfare.”32 At the same time, when there was no siege, Bachrach must discuss it in order to protect his thesis. His description of the battle of Vouillé in 507 is entirely incorrect. The text states that the Goths eminus fought the Franks comminus; this means that the Gothic warriors threw their spears from a certain distance, following their usual tactic, while the Franks wished to fight hand-to-hand and so moved close. This interpretation has already been given by Ferdinand Lot.33 According to Bachrach, there were Frankish archers and spear-throwers placed behind the formation, and it was from there that they discharged their projectiles, while others of Clovis’s soldiers fought hand-to-hand.34 This interpretation is unacceptable. It is a bad military solution. According to Bachrach, the siege of 27 28 29

30 31 32 33

34

Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 128. [Translator’s note: I have again added the first names.] Vita Genovefae virginis Parisiensis, ed. B. Krusch, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum, III, (Hanover, 1896), p. 204: “Eius enim Vita, quae extat quadruplex, nullius auctoritatis est.” See also F. Lot, Les destinées de l’empire en Occident de 395 à 888 (Paris, 1940), I:194–5; G. Kurth, Clovis, 3rd ed. (Brussels, 1923), I:262–3; G. Kurth, Etudes franques (Paris, 1919), II:27–8, 65, 85; and Philippe Contamine, La guerre au moyen âge (Paris, 1980), p. 84 n.1. Kurth, I:263. See also Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 6. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 4. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 6. Gregory of Tours, Historiarum libri X, ed. B. Krusch, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum (Hanover, 1937), I.II.37:87. Ferdinand Lot, L’art militaire et les armées au moyen-âge en Europe et dans le proche orient (Paris, 1946), I:81–2. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 11.

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Paris still must serve to dispute an important appearance of a Frankish navy against Danish pirates in 515. The Franks then had no experience with a navy, he asserts. And at the moment that the sons of Clovis inherited the largest part of Gaul they were not able to raise a strong army (validus exercitus) of Franks.35 After 286, the Franks were already settled in an area between the mouths of the Rhine and Schelde during the time of Maximianus. Around 280 the Franks were settled by the Romans along the coast of the Black Sea. They stole ships and came back from the Mediterranean Sea, and through the columns of Hercules they returned to their lands in the Netherlands.36 Franks served in the army and the navy of the Romans in the time of Constantine. In the middle of the fourth century the Franks possessed the largest part of the southern Netherlands. Frankish and Saxon pirates appeared in the area between the Rhine and the Waal under Valentinus I (364–75).37 Between the years 300 and 515 they had more than 200 years in order to learn to travel with a fleet while they lived in an area of streams and along the coast of the North Sea. Under Charles Martel the offensive strategy dominated again with a fast advance towards the enemy and the forcing of a battle. In 716 Charles Martel first fought a conflict against Radbod and the Frisians, but as his army was too small he was forced to retreat: “He sent envoys to everyone with the power to muster an army for the defense of the land.”38 This was the mustering of the militia. Afterwards the army of Raganfred attacked Amblève. In 717 Charles attacked Neustria and defeated the army of Raganfred and King Chilperic at Vinchy. The army of Chilperic and Raganfred was large, but was made up only of commoners. Charles had a smaller army, but of very experienced soldiers.39 Chilperic was defeated and Raganfred, fleeing from them, left his comrades in the lurch. Charles pursued them almost to Paris, apparently with his cavalry. The entire area under the authority of Austrasia was subjugated. In 718 Charles attacked Saxony and advanced to the Weser River; this was the first invasion into this land. In 719 he again advanced against Raganfred who had called in the help of Eudes, the duke of Aquitaine. Raganfred and Eudes were defeated at Soissons. After the death of Radbod in 719 Charles advanced against the Frisians and restored the authority of the Franks in the conquered southern part of Friesland. In 720, 722, and 724 Charles led punitive expeditions against the Saxons. In 724 he marched to Angers and besieged Raganfred there, who, following an agreement, was able to hold onto this town. In 725 Charles attacked the land of the Alamanni, reached the Donau, and invaded Bavaria. He conquered this land. Afterwards he advanced on Eudes of Aquitaine and crossed the Loire. Eudes 35 36

37 38 39

Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 18–19. Later, Charles Martel landed a fleet in Friesland. See below. Zosimus, Historia nea, I, 71, Eumenii oratio, Paneg V (or IX), 18, in Panégyriques latins, ed. E. Galletier, Collection G. Budé (Paris, 1949–52), I:136; Kurth, I:73; and L. Schmidt, Geschichte der deutschen Stämme bis zum Ausgang der Völkerwanderung (Berlin, 1918), II:440. Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, XVII,8,3; XXVII,8,5, and Kurth, I:116. Annales Mettenses priores, ed. De Simson, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1905), p. 21. Ibid., p. 24.

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was put to flight. In 732 Charles marched against the Saracens and fought them at Poitiers. The following year Charles traveled to Burgundy, conquered it, and garrisoned its borders with his most brave leudes, diligent men who would fight the rebels and the disloyal; and, after bringing peace to this land, he gave Lyon to his subjects. Also in the region of Orléans, Charles took possession by siege of the lands of those who resisted him and gave part of them to his satellites. In 733 Charles undertook a new invasion of Friesland, in the northern area, to the Westergo. In 734 he traveled with a fleet to Friesland, from the Rhine to the North Sea, to the coast of Friesland, and between the islands of Westergo and Ostergo. Afterwards he discharged his soldiers. Charles fought a battle against the Frisian duke Bubo near the Boorne River. Bubo was killed, his army defeated. Friesland was conquered again. While Charles was in Friesland, Eudes of Aquitaine died. Charles marched with his troops to Bordeaux and Blaye and besieged Aquitaine. After 734 Charles advanced against the nobles in Burgundy and placed the region of Marseilles under the authority of his counts. So he came in contact with Maurontus, whom he had made master of the town of Avignon, and his socii. Charles sent Childebrand with an army to Avignon, in order to besiege this fortress, apparently with his cavalry. Then Charles arrived with the rest of his army, assaulted the town with battering rams and ladders and entered it. Charles marched afterwards to Narbonne and besieged it. Then an army of Saracens came to relieve Narbonne. Charles marched against them and defeated them along the banks of the Berre. Charles still devastated the area around Nîmes, Agde, and Béziers, but an uprising in Saxony caused him to make an expedition to hold onto that land. In 737 Charles sent Childebrand with dukes and counts into Provence, to subject again the area of Avignon. Maurontus fled to an island in the Mediterranean Sea. It is here alone in the campaigns of Charles Martel that sieges waged until their completion are spoken of, against Maurontus who ruled in the area of Avignon. He did not dare to wage battle and defended his fortress, which was conquered. Charles Martel had subjected the whole of Gallia, again by battles, and had to besiege Avignon and Narbonne there. He did not have the time to conquer Septimania. Bachrach writes: “The investment of fortified positions, whether walled cities or garrisoned castra, dominated Merovingian warfare.”40 This is completely false for Clovis and Charles Martel, the primary figures of Merovingian history. This strategy is purported to have had a Roman origin, as these cities were founded in the Roman time. This is an incorrect interpretation. The Roman origin which Bachrach ascribes to the Merovingians is an invention with no foundation. One can correctly answer that the Roman people of Gallia formed the majority there and so influenced the common army, and that the fortified cities there had a Roman origin. But the particular strategy of the conquerors Clovis and Charles Martel – gathering their army and marching to the enemy; defeating him; pursuing him; and afterwards conquering his last bases – is a classic method of waging war for the strongest army. This strategy was 40

Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 127.

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practiced in all times by capable commanders and can not be attributed to Roman influence. But Bachrach is not objective in his book on Merovingian military organizations; he is very biased against the Franks.

Battle or Fortifications? Waifar For the defense of the fortifications of a land, Waifar, duke of Aquitaine, gave an interesting example in his war against Pepin III. In 760 Pepin went for the first time on an expedition against Waifar. The latter did not dare to do battle. In 761 Pepin conquered the fortress of Bourbon, Chantelle, and the fortress of Clermont, which was burned. Afterwards he conquered the fortifications in Auvergne. He advanced on Limoges. His armies took lots of booty and destroyed much. In the campaign of 762 Pepin destroyed another fortress, conquered the fortified city of Bourges and the fortress of Thoars. In 763 a fourth expedition took place, which led to Cahors. The area was devastated. In 764 and 765 no expeditions took place. In 766 Waifar established that there was no fortified city nor any fortress that could offer resistance to King Pepin and his Franks. He commanded that the walls of his strongest cities and forts be destroyed. Pepin rebuilt the fortress of Argenton and placed a garrison of Franks there, while he allowed the scara of Bourges to control Aquitaine. In 768 Waifar was forced to flee. Pepin sent “his counts, his soldiers of the scara and his leudes” in four directions to take him as a prisoner. Waifar was killed.41 In 760 Waifar thus had realized that he was not strong enough to do battle; in 766 he understood also that the resistance of his very strong cities was useless. The superiority of Pepin was therefore very clear. The war was lost for Waifar. In the meantime, the scara were placed in garrisons at Bourges and from there could advance. They appeared in the pursuit, a role which Bryce Lyon does not delegate to the cavalry. The defender, Waifar, decided which strategy he would apply against the invader. He refused to do battle and retreated into his fortifications. He was also not able to take a stand there. He was still able to retreat into a neighboring land, among the Basques over the Pyrenees. But when he retreated there it was too late.

By Foot or by Horse? We can also once more follow what the warriors or the people of the time thought about this: to fight on foot or on horse? One must here particularly consider the soldier who in time of warfare went on a campaign of 600 to 800 km, 20 41

Fredegar, Chronicarum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici libri IV cum continuationibus, ed. B. Krusch, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum, II (Hanover, 1888), pp. 186–92, cc. 42–52; Annales regni Francorum, ed. F. Kurze, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1895), p. 19 (anno 760), p. 27 (anno 768); and Annales Mettenses priores, pp. 50–5.

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or 30 km a day, 50 km a day at the most. Compare this with the soldiers who undertook this exhausting movement on horse and thus arrived much fresher at their destination. The soldiers also suffered fewer casualties in the conflicts, as they were more strongly armored, were able to take more booty with them, and could more easily escape in the event of a defeat. Then they would not need to take the exhausting flight on foot; on horse they were more quickly beyond the reach of their enemies.

The British in Armorica The first people who after the Romans made a choice and chose to have their warriors fight on horse were the British who had left Britannia after the invasions of the Angles and the Saxons. They appeared in the history of the continent in 469–70. Then they found themselves in Bourges under their commander, Riothamus, and had a 12,000 man army, if this number can be trusted. They were forced to fight in the service of Rome against the Visigoths. They were defeated by King Euric and his soldiers and suffered heavy losses at Déols.42 The Bretons had then settled in mass in the outermost part of Armorica and had come in smaller numbers to the area around the Loire. They were acquainted with German cavalry and had been defeated by them. Their land, the future Brittany, contained many marshes and forests. Under the sons of Clovis they came under the control of the Franks and paid a tribute. Their leaders were counts, not kings. Now and then disputes erupted and the Merovingians sent an army against the Bretons. In 590 two dukes with their troops marched throughout Brittany, over the Vilaine and the Oust Rivers. One part was sent under Beppolenus, the other under Ebracharius. The two leaders did not work together and advanced separately. Beppolenus was opposed by Queen Fredegund when the Saxons of the neighborhood of Bayeux worked together with the Bretons. Beppolenus was defeated and killed. His troops were enclosed between the roads and the marshes. Ebracharius reached Vannes and concluded an accord with the Breton leader, Varocus. He returned with his army to his land, but had difficulty in crossing the Vilaine. His army was made up of robustiores, inferiores and pauperes. The robustiores, the cavalry, crossed the stream with some of the others. The soldiers who still waited to cross over were attacked by Bretons under the leadership of the son of Varocus and many were taken prisoner. Ebracharius marched with his soldiers again to his land but followed a different route than during the advance, because his soldiers had plundered too much of the area. He did this again during his retreat from Angers. Ebracharius and Count Wiliachar were accused by the king. They were said to have been bribed by Varocus. Later he allowed the imprisoned soldiers to go free. From the text of Gregory of Tours it appears that 42

Jordanes, Getica, ed. Theodor Mommsen, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores antiquissimi (Hanover, 1882), V.1:118 ff., cc. 44–45; Gregory of Tours, I.II:65, c. 18; Kurth, I:227; and Lot, Les destinées de l’empire, I:87.

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the robustiores, the cavalry, had no problem during the battle, while the others did.43 The Bretons did not keep the army of Britannia, but introduced heavy cavalry as their main arm. And this occurred in a land with marshes and woods. In the ninth century these Bretons practiced tactics which were like those of the Visigoths, against whom they had fought shortly after their arrival on the continent.

The Franks and their Cavalry: Charlemagne Lyon cites an example of the defeat of a part of the Frankish cavalry against the Saxons in 782. For him this brought the dominance “of the Frankish knight” into question. But everyone knows that in 782 there were still no knights, but vassals. In July 782 Charlemagne held a general muster with his entire army at Lippspringe near Paderborn. After this muster the leader returned to Gallia. When he heard that the Sorben, who cultivated the fields between the Elbe and the Saale, had plundered their neighbors in Thuringia and Saxony, burned their homes and destroyed their fields. The king sent his ambassadors, Chamberlain Adalgisus, Stable-master Geilo, and the Count of Palace Worad, with the charge of an army raised from the East Franks and Saxons to punish a small number of rebellious Sorben. They, with a part of the scara, were to travel with the greatest speed. While on their way they mustered the East Franks. Their force contained different counts and famous noblemen. When they had crossed over the borders of the Saxons, they heard that an uprising under the leadership of Widukind had broken out. The three leaders advanced in the direction of the land of the Sorben. They changed the direction of their march and traveled with their East Franks to the place where the rebellious Saxons were gathered. In Saxony, Count Thierry, a relative of the king, himself marched against them with Riparian Franks whom he had quickly gathered. Thierry ordered his lords to employ spies to discover as quickly as possible where the Saxons were and what they were doing. His command was followed and the two sides met near the Süntel mountain. The Saxons had pitched their camp on the northern side of the mountain. Thierry set up his own camp, while the lords agreed afterwards to travel over the Weser and reconnoiter where they could most easily advance around the mountain. They set up their camp next to the stream. The lords discussed their position with each other and feared that the honor of victory would be awarded to Thierry, if they were to fight together with their troops against the Saxons. They decided only to attack the enemy on their own. They gathered their scara and advanced towards the enemy. But the Franks did not array themselves as in a normal engagement, when they would attack an opponent in battle formation. Here they were made ready with the greatest speed, as quickly as each horseman was able to. It was as if they had only to chase a fleeing enemy and to gather the booty. The attack was 43

Gregory of Tours, I.X:491–94, c. 9.

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badly carried out and ended even more badly. Almost all were killed; whoever could flee went to the camp of Thierry rather than the camp from which they had marched. It was a substantial massacre for this part of the army. Two lords, Adalgisus and Geilo, four counts, and twenty other titled and noble men were killed, as were all those who followed them desiring to die with rather than survive them. The defeat was emphasized more mainly because of the high rank of those killed, and naturally was for the rebellious Saxons a strong encouragement.44 But a defeat still does not show that there was no dominance of heavy cavalry. One can equally conclude that these horsemen were already overconfident of their dominance and were reckless. They could also have miscalculated. Maybe they wanted through a quick attack to nip the rebellion of the Saxons in the bud. They had as an original charge to march as quickly as possible against the Sorben. The reconnoitering of the rebellious Saxons needed also to be accomplished as quickly as possible. On each occurrence, the author of the Annales regni Francorum writes that they attacked hastily in disorder, without working together with those Count Thierry’s soldiers.45 The text is presented as the narrative of an eye-witness, who shows through his criticism that he was well aware that the attack occurred too quickly and without order. The narrative of the second redaction of the Annales regni Francorum seems to have come from Count Thierry. Besides, from the text it appears that no footsoldiers took part in the battle. In order to punish the Sorben, they were able to invade their land with a cavalry army and to cause destruction, set fires, and plunder there. They could raise a unit of footsoldiers close to the border of the Sorben, in order to assist the cavalry in the punishing raid, if they deemed it desirable. In my study of the art of warfare in the Carolingian realm from 714 to 1000 the observations of Bryce Lyon have already been refuted. His argument concerning the number of battles and the number of sieges has no value. It is normal that the weaker defenders would retreat into their fortifications and not fight a battle against the stronger invaders who had more cavalry available to them. It is also normal that these weaker ones would retreat into the woods and marshes where the heavy cavalry of the invader could not be used at all or not so efficiently. However, he forgot that the vassals of the Carolingians could fight as well on foot as on horse and thus also on this occasion could follow into the woods and the marches, and fight in the sieges. This increased the value and the prestige of these soldiers because they could fight as well on foot as on horse. Here one simply must be referred to the attack on the camp of the Vikings at Leuven by the Franks of King Arnulf in 891.46 One part of the Frankish cavalry made their assault of the camp by foot, another part remained on horse to protect the attackers, and their rear, or each beat off a counterattack. This example destroys 44 45 46

Annales regni Francorum, pp. 59–63 (anno 782). Ibid., p. 63. Annales Fuldenses, ed. F. Kurze, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1891), p. 120 (anno 891), and Regino, Chronicon, ed. F. Kurze, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1890), pp. 137–8 (anno 891).

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another idea put forth by Bernard Bachrach. Besides, Bryce Lyon takes a period in which the texts are so scarce and so brief that there are no narratives of battles for the time of Charles Martel, Pepin III, and Charlemagne. The example of 782 is an exception, perhaps because of the appearance of Count Thierry, one of the leaders. Kleinclausz has already called attention to the fact that the mustering letters of Charlemagne were especially directed towards the cavalry. The writers never speak about the role of the footsoldiers, while they often stress the appearance of the cavalry, especially when the sources are detailed enough, such as for the campaign to Tortosa in Spain in 809 and 810. Besides the service of the scara is often described.47 The dominance of the armies of Charlemagne was so great that many enemies did not dare fight a battle against these troops. There were few battles in the subjugation of the Saxons. According to Einhard, Charlemagne personally had to fight only two battles during the subjugation of the Saxons, which lasted for thirty years. He meant the two decisive battles in 783. In truth, Charles took part also in other conflicts. Battles or encounters were fought in 774, in 775 on the Weser and near Lubbecke, in 778, in 779, the defeat in 782, and a fight between cavalry on the Lippe in 784. During the invasion of Saxony in 794 Charlemagne advanced with an army, and his son, Charles, came with troops from another direction. The Saxons wanted initially to fight a battle, but decided against this once they discovered that they were being threatened from two directions. This was the normal strategy of the weaker defender.48

The Vikings The best and strongest evidence for the hegemony of the heavy cavalry in the ninth century is supplied by the Vikings. These invaders had fought against the vassals of the nobility of West Francia. As footsoldiers they were able to decide if these horsemen were better than they; if cavalry to choose to be above the footsoldiers. And they had chosen. After a time the Vikings also mounted themselves on horses, after 853–54. Somewhat later they fought on horse, perhaps already at Brissarthe in 866 where they appeared together with the Bretons who were used to fighting on horse and numbered 400 cavalry. The “great army” of the Vikings for the most part was cavalry (881). In 888 they fought on horse at Montfaucon and were defeated. In 891 they rode on horseback to relieve their footsoldiers. Once established in Normandy after 911 they were cavalry and later knights. The Vikings who invaded England in the same period stood against AngloSaxon footsoldiers. These Vikings were also sometimes mounted, but fought as footsoldiers, the same as the Anglo-Saxons. The Normans who had become 47 48

A. Kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris, 1977), p. 164. See also J. F. Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 292–6. Verbruggen, De krijgkunst in west-Europa in de middeleeuwen, pp. 510, 489–90.

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knights invaded England under Duke William the Conqueror, defeated the AngloSaxon army in only one battle, conquered the entire kingdom, and imported military service on horseback for his vassals there. The Duke of Normandy became king of England, and his knights became the masters of the land and remained so.49 The choice of the Vikings in the years 866–88 occurred for purely military reasons. At the risk of their lives, by the sweat of their brows, and in the fear of death, they established that heavy cavalry was a better instrument than footsoldiers. They also knew that these soldiers would be able to fight on foot as well as horseback. The Franks, who then fought on horseback, did not allow themselves to be influenced by the Vikings who fought on foot, and did not return to fighting on foot as some had done previously and as a number of others still did. They continued to fight on horseback. While Bryce Lyon has not read my study on the art of warfare in the Carolingian realm from 714 to 1000, it has been well consulted and studied by Bernard Bachrach. He gave no answer to the chief argument: why did the Vikings become heavy cavalry and thereafter knights, if they continued to prefer footsoldiers? The evolution of an army in which the heavy cavalry won dominance as vassals was explained by Heinrich Brunner and his account remains still the best. The explanation of Bernard Bachrach is not convincing. P. Roth and H. Brunner have realized that the common subjects of the Carolingians showed less and less desire to take a role in the yearly campaigns which had taken place since the time of Charles Martel.50 Under Charlemagne this was made clear. Under his son, Louis the Pious, this evolution continued. In 830 the people were discontented because they had to advance against Brittany. They found the march along the coast to be too difficult, which incited them to rise up against their leaders and to depart towards Paris. This led to the uprising of Lothar and Pepin against Louis the Pious, and to the disappearance of the footsoldiers from the army.51 This is clear in the war between the sons of Louis the Pious in the years 840 to 842. The armies were then small and made up almost completely of cavalry.52 The treaty of Meersen in 847 allowed the vassals to follow their lord if he dwelt in another kingdom, except in the case of the army, where men had to serve in the land where they dwelt.53 The edict of Pîtres in 864 retained the general rule that all 49 50

51 52 53

Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” p. 306. P. Roth, Geschichte des Benefizialwesens von den ältesten Zeiten bis ins zehnte Jahrhundert (Erlangen, 1850), pp. 313–416; Heinrich Brunner, “Der Reiterdienst und die Anfänge des Lehnwesens,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung 8 (1887), 1–38; and Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, The Stirrup, and Feudalism,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 7 (1970), 49–75. Annales Bertiniani, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum, ed. G. Waitz (Hannover, 1883), p. 2, and Annales Mettenses priores, p. 96. G. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (Berlin, 1885), IV:543, and F. Lot, L’art militaire et les armées au moyen-âge, I:104. Capitularia regum Francorum, ed. A. Boretius and V. Krause, Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Hanover, 1890–97), II:71, nr. 204, and Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” p. 297.

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able-bodied men must serve for the defense of the fatherland.54 From this period on armies in West Francia were almost entirely made up of vassals or heavy cavalry. The Capitulary of Quierzy, issued by Charles the Bald in 877, mustered only vassals for normal campaigns. He who would live by his own property, his allodium, was not required to perform military service, except on the occasion of the invasion of the land, when every able-bodied man was mustered for the army.55

Saxons and Thuringians In other areas the evolution to a cavalry army of vassals can likewise be followed. In Saxony, Henry I raised an army of vassals, skilled in warfare on horseback. As soon as he was strong enough, he refused to pay tribute to the Hungarians. An invasion followed, but the Hungarians were defeated in the battle of Riade on 15 March 933. Afterwards the Hungarians were again defeated in the large battle of Augsburg by Otto I.56 In Germany the Indiculus loricatorum, the list of heavy cavalry of 981, shows that the king could arrange to levy contingents of cavalry from the archbishops, bishops, abbots, dukes, marquises, counts, and lords. A total of 2,160 heavy cavalry made up a part of the army that went with the king or emperor to Italy.57 No footsoldiers were with them. The complete list for all of Germany contained perhaps 6,000 heavy cavalry, and maybe 8,000 or more. While no one has a numerical strength for Charlemagne, there were in the tenth century more than 6,000 cavalry that could be called up for a campaign into Italy. There the army could be strengthened by local units of cavalry and footsoldiers. The cavalry was also sent into Scandinavia. On 4 June 1134 an army of 300 heavy cavalry, German mercenaries, defeated a Swedish army made up entirely of footsoldiers. The feudal army of heavily armored cavalry was then sent into Scandinavia.58 The cavalry was thus the most important weapon of the Romans, the Byzantines, the Bretons, the Franks, the Normans, the Saxons, and the Thuringians, and afterwards the Anglo-Saxons and the Scandinavians. They followed the example of the Parthians, the Persians, the Goths, the Alans, the Vandals, the Huns, the Lombards, and the Hungarians. If we are to believe Bryce Lyon there were no battles before the eleventh century in which armored cavalry played the primary role. If he had read my 54 55 56 57 58

Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 297, 301, and Capitularia regum Francorum, II:321, c. 27. Capitularia, II:358, c. 10, nr. 281, and Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” p. 302. Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 394–5. Ibid., p. 308. L. Musset, “Problèmes militaires du monde scandinave (VIIe–XIIe siècle),” in Ordinamenti militari in occidente nell’alto medioevo, Settimane di studio del centro italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, XV (Spoleto, 1968), I:290, and L. Musset, Les peuples scandinaves au moyen âge (Paris, 1951), p. 179.

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article on the art of war from 714 to 1000, he would have found several. A first example is the battle of Andernach in 876 waged by Charles the Bald against his nephew, Louis the Younger. In both armies the battle was fought by units of cavalry; there were no footsoldiers reported. In Italy there was the battle between Rudolf II of Burgundy and Berenger, king of Italy, on 17 July 923 at Fiorenzuola near to Piacenza; the battle between the troops of Sarilo, count palatine, and those of Anscarius, marquis of Camerino, in Spoleto in 940; and the battle of Capo Colonne in 982 between Emperor Otto II and Emir Abulkasem, between the German cavalry and the Muslims. In Germany the battle of Riade in 933 was fought by King Henry I against the Hungarians, and afterwards the battle of Augsburg in 955.59 Besides, in France the examples given by Richer must be considered. He gives the best witness for the dominance of the cavalry in the tenth century. Five times he indicates that the enemy took flight “for the fear of the royal cavalry:” Count Ricouin of Verdun in 921; the Vikings in 930; and during the siege of Langres in 936. In a battle waged in 943, 800 horsemen broke through the formation of the footsoldiers of the Vikings and drove them into flight. In 955 Duke William of Aquitaine retreated in the face of the king.60 There was also the battle of Nouy in 1044 between the count of Anjou, Geoffrey Martel, and Thibaut III, count of Blois, a battle of cavalry who were accompanied by footsoldiers, the role of whom is not discussed.61 The period from 840 to 1000 is indeed characterized by the dominance of the heavy cavalry in West Francia. Some appear alone, without footsoldiers, as in several of the cited battles. It is also the period in which the Vikings fought as cavalry from 860 to 870. Bryce Lyon apparently does not accept the evolution of footsoldiers to cavalry. As a historian he ought to support with sources the military history he writes. This he does not do. He has not studied the sources and invokes the authority of Bernard Bachrach. Bachrach has written a book: Merovingian Military Organization, 481–751. Before it was published Bryce Lyon read a manuscript of this book.62 At that time he had Bachrach read the Strategikon of Maurikios, the principal treatise on the art of warfare in the middle ages, in which, among other things, is written how to fight against the Franks, and in which the stirrup is already mentioned. The text about the Franks is important for the time of the Merovingians, and Bachrach had to use it in his book, even more because he in an appendix speaks about other Byzantine sources. In place of studying the sources and afterwards drawing conclusions, Lyon and Bachrach set out towards a preconceived thesis that is worthless. Another contention is that the heavy cavalry is not able to be used for a siege, which would be the task of the footsoldiers. They 59 60

61 62

Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 393–7. Richer, Histoire de France (888–995), ed. R. Latouche, Les classiques de l’histoire de France au moyen âge (Paris, 1930–37), I.I.I:62–64, c. 27; I.I.I:110, c. 57; I.II:132–34, c. 5; II.I.III:12, c. 4. Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 396–7. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. viii.

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forget that before this an important number of medieval sieges were waged as a blockade of the fortification, which after a certain time was driven to surrender from hunger. In such a siege the cavalry played an very important role because they were able to close off all approaches around a certain siege of the fortification and do it better than footsoldiers. They can also better protect the besiegers. Lyon and Bachrach have not studied enough sources; they know the military theory and the art of war in an incomplete way. They impose their erroneous dogmas before they have studied the art of medieval warfare from the sources. The exceptions of the art of medieval warfare are for them the rule. Bachrach allows himself to be misled by modern data and information for his study of medieval military life. As Lyon sees him as a model, I shall take the trouble to show in another study how wrong Bachrach is in some articles and how he transforms the texts, manipulating them in an unscientific manner, which naturally is noticed by those who know better. Above I have already spoken about his erroneous thesis concerning the military organization of the Merovingians. His article, “Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, the Stirrup, and Feudalism” is also wrong and can easily be refuted. This is also the case with “Charlemagne’s Cavalry: Myth and Reality.”63 Two other works, “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest”64 and “On the Origins of William of Conqueror’s Horse Transports,”65 are a series of miscellaneous suppositions concerning the numerical strength of the troops and concerning ships. Bachrach did not once have the factual basis to understand the numerical strength of the armies.66 He already had this in his book on the Merovingian soldiers and in his studies on Charlemagne and his soldiers. But these studies do not provide enough foundation. He writes about the assurance of “logistical support” in the camp of Dives-sur-Mer for 14,000 men and 2,000 to 3,000 horses. There is no evidence that such a camp existed.67 But Bachrach assumes it and he calculates the amounts of horse manure of William the Conqueror’s warhorses in this imaginary camp: 5,000,000 lbs of manure and 700,000 gallons of urine.68 The author is so proud

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Military Affairs 47.3 (Oct 1983), 181–7. Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies 8 (1985), 1–25. Technology and Culture 26 (1985), 505–31. “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” pp. 24–5, contains an appendix on the population of England in 1066. He suggests there that in antiquity able-bodied men made up one quarter of the population. Saxon England would thus have had more than 375,000 able-bodied men, half of whom were still a “formidable military potential.” The military historian can not begin with these theoretical data. The difficulties lay in the support, the provisions, and the payment of the soldiers, and afterwards in their military worth. In each land of western Europe there was a disproportion between the number of able-bodied men and the warriors who take part in a campaign. In the work “On the Origins of William the Conqueror’s Horse Transports,” pp. 511–12, he ascertains that Harold could muster roughly 50,000 soldiers. The 375,000 able-bodied men and the 50,000 real soldiers did not send a large army to Hastings, perhaps only 7,000 to 10,000 men. “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” pp. 5–8. “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” p. 15.

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of his calculations that he repeats them again in a book about the cavalry and chivalry meant for American teachers.69 The author does not know that there were camps for the Vikings in Denmark and that William the Conqueror did not need to use a Roman model. Besides, he could have gained just as good an inspiration from a fortification from the time of Charlemagne and his successors or a fortified town or village, or a camp of Charlemagne during his campaigns against the Saxons. There was no camp for the cavalry at Dives. They were housed in the town and the neighborhood. This was the normal procedure. If William the Conqueror had congregated his army in a camp, his chroniclers would certainly have mentioned it. The camp is an invention of Bachrach who attached 3,000 horses to the army in order to make a calculation supported by modern information, which is naturally different from medieval data. His military knowledge is inspired greatly by modern American notions. In place of starting with the definitions of Clausewitz, he comes forward very slowly with modern American definitions of strategy, strategy for a campaign, grand strategy, and tactics. He does not hesitate to manipulate his texts and to decree that cavalry mentioned in a source actually are footsoldiers, or “infantry” which did not exist in the Middle Ages. These footsoldiers were well trained, while in the entire Middle Ages in western Europe from the sixth to the fifteenth century there is no training of footsoldiers. Bryce Lyon asks why in the fourteenth century so much time was spent on the training of the cavalry and so much money on their horses when this cost so much? According to him it was then apparent that the cavalry had only little future and that the future thereafter belonged to the pikemen, archers, and other footsoldiers. He forgets that the French cavalry would dominate the battlefield, and furthermore warfare, to the end of the fifteenth century and was itself still the only constant element in the French royal army formed throughout a large part of the sixteenth century. Archers and pikemen disappeared far more quickly than the cavalry. Bryce Lyon speaks of the defeat of Harold and his Anglo-Saxons at Hastings. Harold should have avoided battle and retreated with his army deeper into England, there to fight a guerilla war, and practiced the policy of scorched earth; thus he would have exhausted William the Conqueror and his army and forced his retreat. The Norman horsemen had only just won victory after they repeatedly failed in their attacks on the Saxon shield-wall and after a feigned retreat had lured the Saxons from their position. The heavy horseman won not because he was better than the Saxon who fought on foot. Here the author of the arguments contradicts himself and does not realize that the cavalry unity in which the horsemen fought was so much more free and flexible than the footsoldiers who had to remain standing motionless and densely packed together on the hill without drinking or eating, and there became condemned to suffer through fatigue and through the losses inflicted on them by the archers and the cavalry, leading 69

Bernard S. Bachrach, “Caballus et Caballarius in Medieval Warfare,” in The Study of Chivalry, ed. H. Chickering and T. H. Seiler (Kalamazoo, 1988), p. 182.

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finally to defeat. The invader who wished to conquer the land could quickly wage a battle in the hopes of a quick victory and the annexation of the whole land. That was the ideal. Why did Harold not avoid battle? He had apparently judged that his footsoldiers were numerous enough to defeat the army of the invader. Maybe he judged, as had Bryce Lyon and Bernard Bachrach, that his footsoldiers were just as good as or better than the cavalry of William the Conqueror. But in the event, he lost the battle and the entire land was conquered after one battle, and it stayed conquered. The results of the battle were the same as those of the victories of Clovis against Syagrius, the Alemanni, and the Visigoths. One battle and the land was conquered. Bryce Lyon gives the example of the footsoldiers of the Lombard towns and the battle of Legnano. In footnote 16 he quotes the judgement of Oman, who writes that the cavalry was not always the weapon that gave the decisive push. Bryce Lyon does not seem to know that the government of the Lombard towns had come to the same conclusion. They preferred knights and cavalry for the campaigns outside the town, strengthened with archers and pikemen, while the urban footsoldiers were especially established to defend the town.70 A comparison can be made with Flanders. In 1292 at Bruges the urban cavalry was mustered. The rich Brugeois burghers had to possess a warhorse and a suit of armor, and had to do service as horsemen, in order to strengthen the cavalry. This was broken off however by the defeat of the count in 1300 and the uprising of the Brugeois in 1301, which led to the replacement of the burghers by the artisans, an evolution that had not been foreseen. And this could be a danger for the count and his nobility. In looking at the great feats of arms of the footsoldiers, Bryce Lyon places his attention on the footsoldiers of Renaud of Dammartin at the battle of Bouvines in 1214. If all leaders of footsoldiers had them so well mustered, the battle would have ended otherwise, he writes.71 What is the truth? Renaud’s footsoldiers were required to stay motionless in place on the right wing of the army, the last to be attacked. Renaud and his cavalry carried out charges against the French and afterwards retreated to their footsoldiers who had to receive and protect them. In fact, he used these footsoldiers poorly. While Renaud and his cavalry attacked the French, his footsoldiers did nothing. In the meantime, the French units destroyed the left wing and center of the allies and turned afterwards against Renaud’s wing which was then defeated. Lyon does not understand the tactic which occurred. For the battle of the Golden Spurs I must remind myself that I repeated the thought of the time: 100 cavalry were worth 1000 footsoldiers. This was asserted by the Frenchman Guillaume Guiart and the Brabantese Lodewijk van Velthem. The Bretons judged that their horsemen were worth seven footsoldiers. This was true on certain occasions, but not always. Lyon reproached me for diminishing the merits of the Flemings in my writing, that they had used the advantages of their terrain well. But Lyon does the 70 71

Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, III:374. Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 82.

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same. According to him the Flemings had ordered themselves smartly behind camouflaged ditches. Henri Pirenne and I have, however, shown that this was merely a French excuse for their defeat.72 For the battle of Woeringen in 1288 he cites the example of the farmers of Berg and the townspeople of Keulen who contributed to the victory there. But these footsoldiers appeared as auxiliaries at the moment that all other troops were fighting the battle, and their intervention was easy.73 In his work, The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, Bryce Lyon has not once provided a table for the number of lords, knights, squires, men-at-arms, and archers. His figures do not agree with those of A. E. Prince.74 The first task of a military historian is as near as possible to calculate the numerical strength. Here it is very important as Lyon criticizes the strategy of the kings of England, because they fought on two fronts on the continent and in the north set out from the Netherlands. Lyon does not once compare the numerical strength of the army of the king of France and that of the king of England. This numerical strength is of principal importance for an understanding of the strategy of the king of England. The ridiculousness of this all is as follows. According to Prince, Edward III came to the continent with more than 1,600 English men-at-arms and 3,150 archers in 1339; with 2,700 men-at-arms and 5,500 archers according to Lyon. The difference between these two numbers is not discussed. I have made my own calculation and reached about the same result as Prince for the men-at-arms. For the archers my calculation comes closer to that of Lyon. Edward III faced an army of more than 17,000 French royal men-at-arms and 500 footsoldiers on 1 August 1340, more than 18,000 men-at-arms and 2,300 footsoldiers on 1 September. Serving with them also were the Tournaisien urban militia, perhaps 3,991 men.75 It proves that Edward III was very poorly informed about the numbers of the king of France’s army. With 1,600 men-at-arms he was forced to attack the French army that in 1340 numbered 17,000 or 18,000 men-at-arms. Bryce Lyon apparently does not know that I have studied the accounts of the king of France and the numerical strength of the armies of Bruges, studies not consulted by him.76 The king of England needed allies to reinforce the small army that he had brought from England. The army of Jacob van Artevelde, that of the duke of Brabant, the count of Hainault, the duke of Gelre, the margrave of Jülich, and a number of lords from the Netherlands and Germany stood with him. Bryce Lyon did not know the numerical strength of the Brugeois and the Ghentenaars who, thanks to the financial support of the king of England, had sent strong armies: Bruges had 72 73 74

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Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” pp. 82–3. See also note 21 above. Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 83. A. E. Prince, “The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III,” English Historical Review 46 (1931), 361, and The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, pp. xcv–cii. See also Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 87. Verbruggen, “La tactique de la chevalerie Française de 1340 à 1415,” pp. 40–1, and Verbruggen, “De militairen: In de middeleeuwen en de bourgondische tijd,” p. 215. Verbruggen, “La tactique de la chevalerie Française de 1340 à 1415,” and Verbruggen, Het gemeenteleger van Brugge van 1338 tot 1340. Lyon should have consulted the latter book also to identify some of the Brugeois mentioned in the Wardrobe Book.

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6,204 soldiers and 343 boys and servants at Tournai; Ghent had 5,385 soldiers and 70 boys and servants.77 The 11,589 townsmen of these two cities contrasted sharply with the 1,600 men-at-arms and the 3,150 or 5,500 archers of Edward III. The general conclusion that comes from this is that Edward III had too few men-at-arms, and too few warhorses, the opposite of what Lyon writes. Through the fact that the king of England at best had only around 5,000 nobles who fought as heavy cavalry against 17,000–18,000 with the king of France, he was forced to take archers with him and to attempt to find allies on the continent, in the Netherlands, the Rhineland, Brittany, and southern France.78 Lyon asked the question why the king had brought so many heavy cavalry to the continent, after he had won so many victories in Scotland with archers and cavalry who had fought on foot: “Why did he put such stock in a mounted force when just six years later at Crécy his longbowmen so easily vanquished the clumsy French knights? There is no certain answer to this question.”79 We again try to understand even a bit of the reasoning of Lyon. Because he does not know the answer, there must be no answer! The answer is simple. It begins with the erroneous interpretation of a number of investigators who did not correctly understand why in certain circumstances the nobles fought on foot in order to stand with the footsoldiers, to strengthen them and give them courage. As a general rule it appears that in normal circumstances the medieval footsoldiers could not hold their own against heavy cavalry. On some occasions the footsoldiers did gain victory, such as those of the Flemings at Courtrai (1302) and at Guinegate (1479). In both battles the Flemish footsoldiers were strengthened by nobles who fought together with the footsoldiers in order to lead them and give them courage. At Cassel (1328), Westrozebeke (1382), and Gavere (1453), the Flemings had no nobility in their ranks and were defeated. On some occasions cavalry fought on foot with the footsoldiers because they were not numerous. Perhaps this was because they were not strong enough in relation to their opponents and did not dare attack this powerful enemy on horse because they knew that they would be driven away from the battlefield. On other occasions the reason lay in a terrain that was more favorable for them to fight on foot. There were many reasons, and the correct explanation differed from engagement to engagement. Lyon maintains that the general conclusion is that it was better to fight on foot. This is wrong. And the erroneous answer is derived from his lack of knowledge of the sources and of the art of war, theory and practice. Edward III later was victorious at Crécy. There he was very lucky, while the French made many mistakes. I have read 23 of the narratives of Crécy and must still study several others before I can write a completely critical narrative. Lyon has not read the sources and still gives his opinion! Bryce Lyon claims that the cavalry did not dominate the medieval battlefields for five centuries. But he forgets that they drove the English from France with 77 78 79

Verbruggen, Het gemeenteleger van Brugge van 1338 tot 1340, pp. 16, 79–80. Prince, “The Strength of English Armies”, p. 364. Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 88.

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the help of their artillery. The great defeats of French men-at-arms at Crécy, Maupertuis (Poitiers), and Agincourt can partly be blamed on the blunders of their leaders and certain units which occurred on those days. The cavalry could win a victory if they employed better strategy and tactics, which later occurred in the time of Joan of Arc. In some areas of western Europe footsoldiers were the primary weapon: Friesland, the land of the Stadingen or Stedingen on the Weser around Bremen, Dithmarschen near Holstein, and the area of the future Switzerland. Living there were villages of peasants, the descendants of communities from the time of the Germans. In these areas there lived few nobles or horsemen and the terrain was very unfriendly to cavalry. Through this the peasants were able to maintain their freedom and to develop their military more completely. When a lord and his nobility governed the state, the peasants were subject to them and this led to an army in which the cavalry dominated, with the most important model being France. When the townspeople and peasants and a part of the nobility in the county of Flanders fought with success against the king of France and his cavalry from 1302 to 1304 and from 1312 to 1319, an uprising broke out from 1323 to 1328 in which the townspeople of Bruges and Ypres and the peasants from the neighborhoods of those towns and from coastal Flanders fought against their count, the nobility, the ecclesiastics, and the king of France and his nobility. Also in the years of Jacob van Artevelde and under Philip van Artevelde the Flemish nobility stood on the side of the count and the king of France. The use of a strong army composed of footsoldiers, townspeople and peasants, posed a danger to the king or the count that these common subjects might restrict his power and that of his nobility. Bryce Lyon concludes his study as follows: Cavalry was never militarily superior to foot soldiers, not even in the Middle Ages when it might have been possible. The centuries-old and deeply ingrained belief that mounted men surpassed all others so blinded ruler, aristocrat, and general to the realities of the battlefield that there was not only defeat in the field and needless sacrifice of men and their mounts but also indefensible costs.

Note 50, which in Lyon’s book follows this statement, says: “See the remarks of Malcolm Vale, War and Chivalry (Athens, Ga., 1981), and J. R. Hale, “The Military Education of the Officer Class in Early Modern Europe,” in: Renaissance War Studies (London, 1983), pp. 245–46.”80 The article from Hale says nothing about the Middle Ages. The text of Malcolm Vale is very important. But Bryce Lyon does not give the precise reference. What did he read in this book? One has a choice here: to give him the benefit of the doubt, one must conclude that Lyon has only read a part of this study and not the end. If he had read the entire book, then he carefully conceals the conclusion and we must presume a deception by Bryce Lyon.

80

Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 90. [Editor’s note: This reference is missing from Verbruggen’s article, although a footnote is placed in the text; I chose to add it for continuity.]

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What are the Conclusions of Malcolm Vale? Without cavalry, a fifteenth-century army was unlikely to achieve a decisive victory on the field of battle. To pursue an enemy, whether in the hope of ransom or in an attempt at annihilation, was scarcely possible without mounted units. Heavy cavalry was not the obsolescent arm that military historians have often decried, eking out an irrelevant existence for social reasons unconnected with the art of war. In 1494, over one half of Charles VIII’s army which began the Italian campaigns was composed of heavy cavalry. The gendarmerie of nobles, all mounted and fully armed, was to be the only truly permanent element in French royal armies for most of the sixteenth century. “The most dangerous arms in the world,” wrote Jean de Bueil in Le Jouvencel, “are those of horse and lance, because there is no means of stopping them.” Heavy cavalry could carry all before it through the momentum and impact of a properly-conducted charge and the resolute pursuit of a fleeing enemy. The lords of battle could rule the field in the fifteenth century as they had rarely done before.”81

81

Vale, War and Chivalry (Athens, GA, 1981), pp. 127–8. [Editor’s note: Again there is a missing reference to this footnote in the original text. My copy, which came from J. F. Verbruggen himself, has the reference written in his hand in the bottom margin.]

5 Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife? Valerie Eads

Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife? Sichelgaita of Salerno would seem to present a golden opportunity to anyone interested in studying medieval reports of women waging war. In 1081, her husband, the Norman leader Robert Guiscard, undertook an invasion of the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine historian Anna Comnena gives a lively account of Sichelgaita on the field at the battle of Dyrrachium: Our men resisted bravely and the enemy turned back (they were not all picked men). They threw themselves into the sea up to their necks and when they were near the Roman [Byzantine] and Venetian ships begged for their lives – but nobody rescued them. There is a story that Robert’s wife Gaita, who used to accompany him on campaign, like another Pallas, if not a second Athena, seeing the runaways and glaring fiercely at them, shouted in a very loud voice: “How far will ye run? Halt! Be men!” – not quite in those Homeric words, but something very like them in her own dialect. As they continued to run, she grasped a long spear and charged at full gallop against them. It brought them to their senses and they went back to fight.1

They also won convincingly. As Eleanor Searle once remarked concerning another account of a militarily active woman, “That sounds like the real thing.”2 But, is it? Earlier generations of military historians apparently did not think so. There is not a lot in the secondary literature about the goddess-like Sichelgaita. While it is hardly surprising that medieval accounts of women waging war were once greeted with a greater or lesser degree of gender-based incredulity, the case of Sichelgaita stands out because this exploit took place at one of the few engagements between Conquest and Crusade that was of interest to that generation of 1

2

Anna Comnena, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth, 1969) bk.4, chap.6, p.147 [hereafter cited as Alexiad]. The parentheses appear in Sewter’s edition; comments in square brackets are my addition; Sewter’s spelling is followed for Greek names. For the Greek text, Anne Comnène, Alexiade (Règne de l’empereur Alexis I Comnène, 1081– 1118) 2nd ed., 4 vols., ed. and trans. Bernard Leib (Paris, 1967–89) was consulted [hereafter cited as Leib]. Eleanor Searle, “Emma the Conqueror,” in Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Allen Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, Christopher J.Holdsworth and Janet L. Nelson (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 281–88.

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scholars. C. W. C. Oman’s account of Dyrrachium does not, however, mention Sichelgaita.3 He was, after all, writing “not a book of annals, but a treatise on the Art of War.”4 As Oman saw it, the significance of the battle was that it marked the last appearance of massed infantry until the resurgence of the foot soldier in the fifteenth century. The presence of the amazonian Sichelgaita was not relevant. Hans Delbrück’s discussion of Robert Guiscard is limited to a few points that suit his emphasis on the small size of medieval armies and relies almost entirely on the secondary literature.5 He considers the sources inadequate to reconstruct the battle at Dyrrachium, and “Anna Komnena is not such a reliable source.”6 There is, of course, no mention of Sichelgaita. That virtually no one any longer discusses the Age of Cavalry and the Age of Infantry and that scholars study women waging war would probably leave Oman or Delbrück rather bemused. If they thought of her at all, they probably dismissed Sichelgaita as something of a dancing dog, interesting or amusing, but not a subject for serious historical study.7 Adding women on the field to minuscule armies and the small number of proper battles was not the sort of thing that would raise the opinion of the art of war in the Middle Ages. The question is: Can the new orthodoxy, which has revised the view of such points as troop strength and the role of battles in medieval warfare, do any better in interpreting the sources when women appear?8 Although Anna’s description is colorful, like many of the reports of medieval women and military actions, it raises a number of basic questions. Not even the most enthusiastic researcher of women’s military activities claims that medieval women were usually on the field of battle. What was she doing there? Anna writes that Sichelgaita took up a spear. Does this mean that she was trained to arms? If so, why, when it would not be expected that she would ever use such training? Would even a prince of Salerno squander a valuable resource, skilled weapons masters, to train a daughter in weapons?9

3 4 5 6 7 8

9

Charles W. C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages 1, 2nd ed. (1924; repr. New York, 1969), pp. 166–67. Ibid., p. vi. Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War 3, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport, CT, 1982), pp. 184–86. Ibid., p.186. An attitude not limited to writers of military history; see Women in Medieval History and Historiography, ed. Susan Mosher Stuard (Philadelphia, 1987), pp. vii–xvi. For developments in medieval military historiography since the 1950s, see Bernard S. Bachrach, “Medieval Military Historiography,” in Companion to Historiography, ed. Michael Bentley (London, 1997), pp. 203–20. Dorotea Memoli-Apicella, Sichelgaita: tra Langobardi e Normanni (Salerno, 1997), p. 227 [hereafter cited as Memoli-Apicella], concludes that the descriptions of Sichelgaita’s military activities speak to her command skills and warrior spirit rather than her physical prowess for the simple reason that she would have had little time to practice the latter. These points will be discussed below.

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The account of Dyrrachium is the most frequently quoted passage, but Anna writes a bit more about Sichelgaita: Robert set out from Salerno and arrived at Otranto. There he stayed for a few days waiting for his wife Gaita (she went on campaign with her husband and when she donned armour was indeed a formidable [ϕοβερου] ′ sight). She came and he embraced her; then both started with all the army again for Brindisi, the seaport with the finest harbour in the whole of Japygia [Apulia].10

So, Dyrrachium was not an anomaly. Sichelgaita habitually accompanied her husband, one of the most warlike men of his generation, on campaign. In this case, the army seems to have set out in at least two groups, one with Robert and one with Sichelgaita, and Robert did not embark until she arrived with her troops. What Anna does not say is why this was the case. She does, however, suggest that Sichelgaita played an active role in Robert’s policy decisions: The subsequent events [the invasion] apparently came about as follows. Robert, they say, was a thoroughly unscrupulous rascal and working hard for a conflict with the Romans; he had for a long time been making preparations for war; but he was prevented by some of his more reputable friends and by his own wife Gaita, on the grounds that he would be starting an unjust war against Christians. Several times his attempts to begin such an enterprise were put off.11

Whatever his scruples, or lack thereof, by 1081, the volatile politics of the Byzantine Empire had given Robert Guiscard a causus belli. The rebellion that eventually brought Alexius I Comnenus to the throne also prevented the arranged marriage of one of Robert’s daughters to Constantine, the son of Michael VII Ducas, the deposed emperor. The little girl was placed in a convent, and Robert undertook a campaign, ostensibly on her behalf.12 And her mother went as well. Dyrrachium was not Sichelgaita’s only appearance in battle. The emperor Alexius entered into a treaty with the Venetians to undertake naval operations against Robert’s fleet: Not long afterward, they [the Venetians] made ready dromons, triremes and some other ships (small, fast sailers) and attacked Robert in greater force. They caught up with him off Butrinto (where he was encamped) and joined battle. The Venetians won, killing many of their adversaries and throwing more into the sea. They very nearly captured his (Robert’s) own son Guy, as well as his wife. The report of this fine success was sent in full to the emperor, who rewarded them with many gifts and honours.13 10 11 12

13

Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 15, p. 66. Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 12, p. 59. Ferdinand Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile 1 (Paris, 1907), pp. 264–65. [Hereafter cited as Chalandon.] This article relies largely on Chalandon’s chronology with additional information from G. A. Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest (Harlow, 2000); Huguette Taviani-Carozzi, La principauté lombarde de Salerne (IXe–XIe siècle).Pouvoir et société en Italie lombarde méridionale, 2 vols. (Rome, 1991); idem, La Terreur du Monde: Robert Guiscard et la conquête normande en Italie (Paris, 1996). Alexiad, bk. 6, chap. 5, pp. 190–91. Butrinto is on the mainland, close to the island of Corfu.

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Anna reports four naval battles between Robert Guiscard’s forces and the Venetian fleet during the 1084–85 campaign. Robert was heavily defeated in the first two. He then won a resounding victory with a surprise comeback after which the Venetians attacked again and were again victorious. The final encounter took place in spring 1085, a few months before Robert’s death.14 It is admittedly difficult to avoid the battlefield during a naval battle, but Sichelgaita is again reported as present when some sort of engagement was clearly a possibility, and she was in some danger. Dyrrachium thus cannot be dismissed as a single anomalous incident. Anna Comnena is not the only source for Sichelgaita’s exploits at Dyrrachium. The report of William of Apulia is, however, somewhat different: In this battle, Robert’s wife was wounded by a stray arrow. Frightened by the wound and not expecting help, she was nearly overcome by the enemy: Fearing the dangers of death approaching close she wanted to entrust herself to her ship. God delivered her, not wanting mockery to be made of such a lady, so noble and worthy of veneration.15

If William’s account is less colorful and his portrayal of her somewhat less heroic, he makes clear why Sichelgaita could have been expected to wear armor as Anna describes. Combatant or not, she was in danger of death or capture like any of her troops. William mentions twice that part of the army traveled to Otranto with Sichelgaita: “He [Robert] stayed a while at Otranto awaiting the arrival of his wife and of many counts whom he knew were going to be his companions on the march.”16 And, “Meanwhile his wife arrived, and the counts who had been sworn.”17 William also gives further evidence that Sichelgaita regularly accompanied Robert on campaign. In 1080, during one of the numerous rebellions of Peter II of Trani, Robert left Sichelgaita in command of the siege of Trani while he himself went south to Taranto to undertake operations there. 14 15

Chalandon 1, pp. 282–83, and Loud, Age, p. 222, omit this action from their discussion. Leib, vol. 2, p. 54, notes the disbelief that this passage once aroused, but accepts Anna’s testimony. Guillaume de Pouille, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, ed. and trans. Marguerite Mathieu (Palermo, 1961) bk. 4, ll. 425–431, p. 226 [hereafter cited as WmA]. Uxor in hoc bello Roberti forte sagitta Quadam laesa fuit. Quae vulnera territa, nullam Dum sperabat opem, se pene subegerat hosti: Navigio cuius se commendare volebat, Instantis metuens vicina pericula lethi. Hanc Deus eripuit, fieri ludibria nolens Matronae tantae tam nobilis et venerandae.

16

English translations are my own. A complete translation by G. A. Loud can be found at: http:/ /www.leeds.ac.uk/history/weblearning/MedievalHistoryTextCentre/medievalTexts.htm WmA, bk. 4, ll. 159–62, p. 212. …, modico remoratus Idronti Tempore, praestolans adventum coniugis atque Multorum comitum, quos noverat ipse futuros Esse viae socios.

17

WmA, bk. 4, l. 185, p. 214. Advenit interea coniunx, comitesque rogati.

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The duke set siege to Trani with an army reinforced by contingents from Bari who were allied to him. The siege was incited by the rebellion of Peter. The duke left his wife at this siege. He went to Taranto, not without many troops, and besieged it by land and by sea.18

Trani was a well-fortified city that had been given to the Norman Peter I in 1042 by Sichelgaita’s father, Guaimar IV of Salerno.19 Peter II also had a claim to Taranto through the guardianship of a minor heir, his nephew Richard.20 William gives no information as to how Sichelgaita conducted the siege, or even how active a role she took, but Peter of Trani later formally surrendered and sought Robert’s forgiveness, so the operation must be considered a success.21 This is not a large body of sources from which to reconstruct and evaluate Sichelgaita’s military career. Despite the considerable space devoted to warfare in both works, the logical description of military actions was not a priority for either Anna or William. Anna was not yet born when Robert Guiscard undertook his invasion. She was still at work on the Alexiad in 1148, when she was 65 years old.22 Her purposes were panegyric, and her model literally homeric. The numerous parallels between the Iliad and the Alexiad have long been noted by scholars.23 The description of Sichelgaita’s actions at Dyrrachium includes a quote from Homer, “or something very like it in her own dialect” along with other details that allude to the Iliad. Anna describes Sichelaita at Dyrrachium as “another Pallas, if not a second Athena.” If the reference is to the giant slain by Athena, an exploit that gave the goddess her double name, Pallas Athena,24 Anna could be simply commenting on Sichelgaita’s display of physical vigor, a quality appropriate to giants and barbarians, who are lacking in the more cerebral martial virtues, such as strategy and discipline, associated with Athena and Romans. Anna also describes Robert Guiscard as being like Achilles, at least with respect to his voice which was 18

WmA, bk. 3, ll. 668–72, p. 200. Dux sibi coniunctis Barensibus obsidet auctis Agminibus Tranum, Petro stimulante rebelle. Hac dux uxorem dimittit in obsidione. Non sine militibus multis petit ipse Tarentum. Protinus obsessum terraque marique recepit.

19

20 21 22 23

24

At that time, the town was still in Byzantine hands. Chalandon 1, p. 105. Guaimar IV used to be numbered Guaimar V due to the misdating of a single document. Loud, Age, p. 61, n. 3, and Taviani-Carozzi, Principauté Lombarde 1, pp. 366–69 give the particulars. On the competition between the Hautevilles and another Norman extended family, the “sons of Amicus” to which Peter belonged, see Loud, Age pp. 234 ff. WmA, bk. 3, ll. 674–684, pp. 200–03; Chalandon 1, p. 256, Loud, Age, p. 242, with, again, no mention of Sichelgaita’s presence. Alexiad, p. 14. Anna is unusual in that, as a porphyrogenita, her birthdate, 1 December 1083, is known although the date of her death is not. The pioneering study of Anna Comnena’s work is Georgina Buckler, Anna Comnena (London, 1929); Andrew R. Dyck, “Iliad and Alexiad: Anna Comnena’s Homeric References,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 27 (1986), pp. 113–20 summarizes earlier scholarship on the point. [Hereafter cited as Dyck.] Apollodorus, The Library, trans. James George Frazer (Cambridge MA, 1976) bk. 1, chap. 6:1–2, pp. 42–47.

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extraordinarily loud.25 The volume was no doubt needed given the poor discipline that she attributes to barbarians in general.26 For Anna, the ability to maintain a formation is a hallmark of Roman (i. e. Byzantine) military superiority.27 The flight of Robert’s forces is merely another example of this well-known flaw. The task of rallying the faltering troops is achieved by Sichelgaita’s spear rather than by Robert’s voice. The etymological connection of Pallas to the brandishing or shaking of the spear makes it easy to assume that Anna added that detail.28 The earlier reference to Sichelgaita’s failed efforts to dissuade Robert from undertaking an unjust war recall Athena’s successful calming of Achilles.29 Sichelgaita, while failing at the task more appropriate for a woman, preventing war, succeeds at the task more acceptable for a man, whipping the troops back into formation.30 Robert, a model barbarian, fails to accept her good advice and fails to properly discipline his troops. The incident, as Anna describes it, comes close to being too good to be true. Anna had access to historical as well as literary sources. Chief among these were her father, who was the loser at Dyrrachium – his attempt to lift the siege of the city failed – and the defender of the city, George Paleologus, a kinsman, the husband of her mother’s sister. Another important source, her husband, the Caesar Nicephorus Bryennius, was not directly involved at Dyrrachium, but gathered information for his own unfinished life of Alexius. This has led some scholars to describe the Alexiad as his work, rather than Anna’s.31 She also refers to a “Latin” informant, an envoy sent by the bishop of Bari to Robert. From this man she received her account of the wreck of part of Robert’s fleet.32 Anna does not say when or in what language they spoke, but he told her that he had been in Robert’s camp, and he is a potentially valuable source of information.33 25 26

27 28 29 30

31 32

33

Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 10, p. 54. “Anna scorns as ‘barbarians’ all other nations not her own ….” Buckler, Anna, p. 5, with a fuller discussion pp. 441 ff. Anna attributes the defeat of the Varangian Guard at Dyrrachium to the hotheadedness of the “axebearers” who, like the “Kelts,” a term here applied to Robert’s troops, were overly passionate in battle with the result that they advanced too far and were then cut off and slaughtered. Alexiad, bk. 4, chap. 6, p. 147. Alexiad, bk. 15, chaps. 5–6, pp. 484–91, repeatedly notes the value of such discipline, this time during a campaign against the Turks. Dyck, pp. 117–18. Homer, Iliad, 2nd ed., trans. A. T. Murray, rev. William F. Hyatt (Cambridge, MA, 1999) bk. 1, ll. 188–222, pp. 26–29. The gender issues are discussed in Patricia Skinner, “‘Halt! Be Men!’: Sikelgaita of Salerno, Gender and the Norman Conquest of Italy,” in Gendering the Middle Ages, ed. Pauline Stafford and Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker (Oxford, 2001), pp. 92–111. Ruth Macrides, “The Pen and the Sword: Who Wrote the Alexiad?” in Anne Komnene and Her Times, ed. Thalia Gouma-Peterson (New York, 2000), pp. 64–65. Alexiad, bk. 3, chap 12, p. 133. For the close relationship between Robert Guiscard and Ursus of Bari, see Loud, Age, p. 243; idem, “Anna Komnena and Her Sources for the Normans of Southern Italy,” in Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to John Taylor, eds. Ian Wood and G. A. Loud (London, 1991), p. 46, n. 20. Bari, taken by Robert Guiscard in 1071, was the last Byzantine holding in Italy. There is evidence that even the Lombards of that city had some Greek. Loud, Age, pp. 33–34; on the siege of Bari, ibid., pp. 134–37, Chalandon 1, pp. 186–90.

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The Byzantine court had an understandable interest in their former territories, and a number of Robert’s troops took service with Alexius after the duke’s death.34 Although she never took part in a battle, Anna and her mother, the empress Irene Ducas, accompanied Alexius on some of his numerous expeditions.35 She is careful to note that she had read and listened to the accounts – good and bad – of those who participated in the events she is writing about.36 Anna doesn’t seem to lack sources. Not surprisingly, war provides much fuel in the debate on the value of Anna’s work and her authorship. The Alexiad is full of blood and battle, and the idea of a woman writing accurately on these subjects is troubling to some scholars who must make use of her work.37 She apparently doesn’t get it all wrong. C. W. C. Oman, although he omits any mention of Sichelgaita, relies on Anna’s description in his brief analysis of the destruction of the Varangian Guard which, as he sees it, is the important part of the battle of Dyrrachium.38 In his description of the battle of Calavryta (1079), in which Byzantines fought each other, Oman again relies on Anna whom he finds to have … for a lady, a very fair grasp of things military. No doubt she accurately put down her father’s account of his doings, and we are really reading Alexius’ versions of his fight.39

Positioning Anna as a dutiful daughter, her father’s amanuensis, makes it acceptable to rely on her battle reports which are otherwise unwomanly in their accuracy. More recently, Anna’s observations on warfare have been cited alongside the surviving Byzantine military treatises.40 William of Apulia wrote the Gesta Roberti Wiscardi, dedicated to Roger Borsa, Robert and Sichelgaita’s son, in the mid to late 1090s.41 The Gesta is thus much closer in time and place to many of the events described than is Anna’s account. Virtually nothing is known of William, whether he was a Lombard or a Norman42 or a layman,43 but this lack of information has not raised questions about the accuracy of his descriptions of military actions.44 If Anna’s work presents the 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

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WmA, bk. 5, ll. 387–90, p. 256; Loud, “Anna Komnena,” pp. 42–46. Alexiad, bk. 14, chap. 7, p. 459; chap. 8, p. 463. Macrides, “Pen and Sword,” p. 70. Alexiad, bk. 14, chap. 7, p. 461; Macrides, “Pen and Sword,” pp. 64–65; Loud, “Anna Komnena,” p. 45. Macrides, “Pen and Sword,” p. 67, especially note 27. Oman, History, 1, pp. 166–67. Ibid., p. 226, n. 1. John Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204 (London, 1999), pp. 208–09, 227–28. WmA, pp. 11–13, Chalandon 1, pp. xxxviii–xl, Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Making History: The Normans and Their Historians in Eleventh-Century Italy (Philadelphia, 1995), pp. 123–24. [Hereafter cited as Wolf.] The question of date revolves around the status of the first crusade at the time the work was completed. Given the short time between the fall of Jerusalem (15 July 1099) and the death of the pope (29 July) more precise dating may not be possible. WmA, pp. 18–21, Wolf, pp. 126–27. WmA, pp. 23–24, Wolf, pp. 124–26. Both Wolf, pp. 125–26, and Emily Albu, The Normans and Their Historians (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 136–37, note William’s interest in military matters, but neither mentions Sichelgaita’s military role although Albu in particular discusses warfare. [Hereafter cited as Albu.]

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best possible interpretation of her father’s reign, William’s no doubt gives a version of events acceptable to both Duke Roger and to Pope Urban II, to whom it was also dedicated. As Anna consciously modeled herself after Homer, William considered himself the heir of the Latin poets of Roman antiquity, especially Virgil.45 These literary models must be taken into consideration when evaluating the portraits of Sichelgaita. Not surprisingly, the two works show a degree of similarity since Anna and William are writing about many of the same events. This has led to conjectures that Anna relied on William’s earlier work or that both shared a common source.46 She would not have relied directly on William’s account for her telling of Dyrrachium since she did not read Latin47 and, in any case, had far better sources in her father and George Paleologus. The portrait of Sichelgaita is not, however, one of the points of similarity. Anna uses the topos of the barbarian virago which she blends with that of barbarian indiscipline. Although she presents these themes by means of homeric quotes and allusions, the Iliad is not a direct source since barbarians and the “man-hating Amazons” play almost no role in that poem. Anna’s description of Sichelgaita has more in common with Cassius Dio’s portrait of Boudicca, the British ruler who led a bloody revolt against Rome in the first century: In stature she was very tall, in appearance most terrifying, in the glance of her eye most fierce, and her voice was harsh; a great mass of the tawniest hair fell to her hips; around her neck was a large golden necklace; and she wore a tunic of divers colours over which a thick mantle was fastened with a brooch. This was her invariable attire. She now grasped a spear to aid her in terrifying all beholders and spoke as follows:48

Boudicca and Sichelgaita have in common a fearful glance and a loud voice. The British queen’s distinctive attire, both rich and colorful, and her red hair could not be attributed to Sichelgaita whose armor and appearance would have been described by Anna’s informants. Both women take up a spear to reinforce their words, Boudicca while haranguing her troops, Sichelgaita while ordering them back into battle. The more colorful, and barbarous, Boudicca is grim, wild′ haired and somewhat masculine (βλοσυρωτατη) while the armored Sichelgaita ′ The overall effect is striking. is simply terrifying (ϕοβερου). The relevant books of Cassius Dio’s Roman Histories were abridged by the monk Xiphilinus during the reign of Michael VII Ducas, shortly before Anna’s birth. Her contemporary John Zonaras made extensive use of Cassius Dio.49 It seems obvious that Anna knew this work as well. 45 46 47

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WmA, Prologue, ll. 1–2, p. 98; bk. 5, ll. 413–14, p. 258; p. 61, n. 4. WmA, pp. 38–46, Loud, “Anna Komnena,” p. 50. Buckler, Anna, pp. 179, 185; Loud, “Anna Komnena,” p. 50. Cf. Albu, p. 135, n. 55, “Anna’s Alexiad translates three brief passages of the Gesta almost verbatim … so perhaps she relied on a bilingual informant …” Dio’s Roman Histories 8, trans. Earnest Cary (Cambridge MA, 1970) bk. 62, chaps. 2–8, pp. 82–97 [hereafter cited as Dio]. Dio 1, pp. 23–24.

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William’s portrait is also homeric, but the goddess recalled is Aphrodite rather than Athena. When Aeneas is wounded, Aphrodite makes an uncharacteristic appearance on the battlefield to rescue her son, but is herself wounded by Diomedes and must be rescued in turn by Apollo.50 William’s Sichelgaita comes under arrow fire, tries to flee the field, and must be rescued by divine will. Anna describes a woman not merely present, but actively participating and turning the course of the battle. The descriptions of the death of Robert Guiscard show the same contrast. Anna mentions that Sichelgaita was at the deathbed of her husband.51 William makes Robert’s deathbed rather than the battlefield her big scene, including a lengthy tragic lament such as Homer gave to Andromache.52 There is little, if any, evidence that William knew Greek, so the Iliad was an indirect source, but many aspects of the story of Troy can be seen as “the common property of medieval poets.”53 In Virgil’s Aeneid, to which William made frequent references,54 Diomedes appears as the leader of the Greeks living in Italy. His city is Argyripa or Arpi in Apulia. He alludes to his wounding of the goddess in a lengthy speech in which he refuses to aid the Latins against Aeneas.55 During the long narration to Queen Dido of the fall of Troy and his subsequent journeys, Aeneas describes a meeting with Andromache who gives a long and tearful account of her life after the death of Hector and the fall of Troy, events that she recalls vividly.56 Since they are writing from opposing sides, it is no surprise that Anna and William present a different view of the battle itself. Anna attributes the failure of her father’s relief action to the hot-headedness of the Varangians who rushed ahead and were cut off. The barbarians thus ruined Alexius’ well-laid plans.57 William attributes the near-disaster to a difficult position. Robert’s troops were caught on a narrow neck of land under heavy arrow fire. He implies that this is their own fault for going heedlessly (incauta) rather than blaming Robert’s tactical plans.58 William also agrees that some of Robert’s troops ran into the sea, not in flight but to escape the press and re-deploy. Then they simply waded out and rejoined the duke who had fought his way through.59 Sichelgaita’s presence, wounded and frightened, is noted only after Robert’s victorious charge, the numbers of the dead on each side, and the quality of the spoils are described. Anna and William agree only that Sichelgaita was present at the battle of Dyrrachium, which her side won, and that she was close to the action. Anna says that this happened because she habitually accompanied her husband on campaign, 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Iliad, bk. 5, ll. 311–54, pp. 228–33. Alexiad, bk. 6, chap. 6, p. 192. WmA, bk. 5, ll. 295–315, p. 252; Iliad, bk. 6, ll. 405–439, pp. 304–07; Wolf, pp. 132–33. WmA, pp. 61–62, Albu, p. 121. WmA, pp. 61–62; Albu, p. 126; Wolf, p. 129. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. 11, ll. 275–78, in Virgil 2, rev. ed., trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge MA, 2000), pp. 254–57. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. 3, ll. 294 ff., ibid., 1, pp. 390 ff. Alexiad, bk. 4, chap. 6, pp. 147–48. WmA, bk. 4, ll. 377–88, p. 224. WmA, bk. 4, ll. 395–98, pp. 224, 226.

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not as Anna herself accompanied her father, remaining where it was considered safe and withdrawing when the battle came too close,60 but actively participating, witness the fact that she went armored. William’s Sichelgaita was left at or sent to (dimittit) Trani when her husband moved on to Taranto. That she had any function there is left to the reader to infer. The following year she is somehow wounded during a battle, where she again appears with no apparent purpose. Robert had burned his camp – presumably a fortified camp that he did not want to risk being occupied by the enemy – before setting out,61 but Sichelgaita did not return to the ships at that time. She advanced into battle with the army, and was wounded when Alexius’ troops, presumably the Turkish archers, responded to the advance with an arrow barrage. Anna describes the instructions given to the Varangians to open and close their lines for the archers. Despite her wound, Sichelgaita could not be evacuated because by that time most of Robert’s sailors had fled.62 Four years after that, Anna writes, she is nearly captured in a naval battle. A few months later she reaches her husband’s bedside shortly before his death, where, according to William, she laments with the same homeric vigor that Anna attributes to her on the battlefield. The marked contrast of these two portraits cannot be attributed only to different literary traditions. Literary analysis, although useful, is not sufficient to evaluate the conflicting accounts of Sichelgaita’s role in the campaign, but if the accounts of her military activities are collated with what is known of the other events of Sichelgaita’s life it is possible to gain a fuller picture, and certain points stand out: Obviously, the most important of these known points is her marriage to Robert Guiscard in December 1058. Robert repudiated his first wife, Alberada, on specious grounds of consanguinity.63 The alliance with her nephew, Gerard of Buonalbergo, was no longer as valuable as it had been several years earlier when the 200 milites that Gerard could bring were a great prize. His subsequent military successes, augmented by the appropriation of the inheritance of his brother Humphrey in 1057, made Robert a man of much greater consequence. Prince Gisulf II of Salerno, Sichelgaita’s younger brother, sought his alliance against the depredations of another newly-powerful Norman, Robert’s brother, William of the Principate.64 Gisulf first tried to obtain help from the anti-Norman pope Stephen IX, but Stephen died on 29 March 1058. 60 61 62 63

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Alexiad, bk. 15, chaps. 1–2, pp. 473–74, gives a vivid picture of the empress Irene on campaign with Alexius. WmA, bk. 4, ll. 369–70, p. 224. WmA, bk. 4, ll. 373–74, p. 224. The observations of Loud, Age, pp. 113–14, do not substantially change the usual perception of Robert’s marriage strategy. If Robert’s elder brother Drogo opposed the marriage because he knew of the consanguinity, it is unlikely that Robert was unaware of the fact. He thus entered knowingly into a consanguinous marriage when it was to his advantage and ended it when circumstances changed. Similarly, Pietro Dalena, “‘Guiscardi coniux Alberada’: donne e potere nel clan del Guiscardo,” Roberto il Guiscardo tra Europa, Oriente e Mezzogiorno: Atti del Convegno … ottobre 1985), ed. Cosimo Damiano Fonseca (Galatina, 1990), p. 164. Chalandon 1, pp. 153–54; Loud, Age, p. 128, on the considerable advantages to both Robert and Gisulf.

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The intention was to pay Robert, but Gisulf had previously failed to keep his financial commitments, and Robert was in a strong enough position to insist on a more substantial arrangement.65 This was not the first marriage between the princely house of Salerno and a Norman. During the lifetime of their father, Guaimar IV, another sister, Gaitelgrima, had married Robert’s elder half-brother, Drogo.66 A cousin had married the oldest half-brother, William Iron-Arm, and another cousin married William of the Principate shortly after Robert’s marriage to Sichelgaita.67 Another half-brother, Humphrey, may have had a similar connection, but the sources are unclear.68 In August 1059, Robert’s position in Italy was further regularized by the new pope, Nicholas II, who invested him with his conquests in Apulia and Calabria as well as hoped-for future conquests in Muslim Sicily.69 Robert’s brother-in-law, Richard of Capua, also received papal recognition of his recent conquest of that city. Certainly the unrest surrounding the reform papacy and the need for protection against the Roman aristocracy, who raised anti-popes at every opportunity, was a factor in this change of policy toward the Normans, but the value of their new association with Lombard princely circles, whether by marriage or by conquest, is also relevant. From one point of view, Sichelgaita could hardly have done otherwise than accompany Robert on campaign, since he did little else – other than produce a large family with his second wife. They had ten children.70 Because so little is known of Sichelgaita’s early life, her knowledge of or views on warfare before her marriage are impossible to determine,71 but certainly these long years of almost constant campaigning gave her plenty of opportunity to learn. One of Robert’s goals was to gain control of the remaining Byzantine territory in Apulia and Calabria. Cariati fell in 1059. The city of Reggio that had successfully resisted previous attacks fell in 1060 after which the Empire also abandoned Squillace and all of Calabria. Earlier in the same year Robert had also occupied Taranto and Brindisi. At the same time, one facet of Byzantine policy in Italy was to take advantage of dissensions that existed among the would-be conquerors. At times, Robert was opposed by some of his numerous nephews. When his brother Humphrey died in 1057, Robert took over his territory without regard to the claims of his 65 66 67 68

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Chalandon 1, p. 146. The information about Gisulf’s unsavory personality comes from Amatus of Montecassino, a notoriously biased source. Wolf, pp. 112–16. Chalandon 1, p. 110. Guaimar IV apparently had two daughters named Gaitelgrima. Since he had only one wife, Drogo’s wife may have been illegitimate. Loud, Age, p. 128. Chalandon 1, p. 153; Loud, Age, pp. 99, 128. Chalandon 1, p. 147, WmA, pp. 325–26, Walter Schütz, Catalogus Comitum: Versuch einer Territorialgliederung Kampaniens unter den Normannen von 1000 bis 1140 von Benevent bis Salerno (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), pp. 91–92, 441. Chalandon 1, pp. 167–71; Loud, Age, pp. 186–94, includes the text of Robert Guiscard’s oath. Loud, Age, p. 300 provides a clear genealogical table while Chalandon 1, p. 283, supplies the names of the “other daughters.” Elisabeth van Houts, ed. and trans., The Normans in Europe, p. 298, credits Emma, the mother of Tancred, to Alberada rather than Sichelgaita. Memoli-Apicella, pp. 12–13, describes the methods by which she attempted to “reconstruct” Sichelgaita despite the gaps in the historical record.

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son, Abelard. Geoffrey of Conversano and Robert of Montescaglioso, the sons of one of Robert’s sisters, often opposed him as did the descendants of Peter I of Trani, a family rivalry that was now in the second generation. Just as Robert had quarreled with his elder half-brothers, Drogo and Humphrey, he was now sometimes at odds even with his youngest brother, Roger, and his brother-in-law, Richard of Capua, although these men were also important allies.72 The Byzantines were aware of and took advantage of the opportunities these quarrels provided. Troops were sent in 1060. They retook Brindisi, Taranto, Oria and Otranto before moving against Melfi in 1061, only to see many of these gains reversed the following year. A new catepan sent in 1064 organized a rebellion that occupied Robert from 1064–67.73 These wasted years made Robert decide that he had to deal with the Greeks before he could again take up another important project, the conquest of Sicily. This was only completed by Roger some thirty years later, but Robert campaigned there in 1061, 1064, and 1071. The last Byzantine stronghold of Bari fell in 1071 when the onslaught of the Seldjuk Turks and the defeat at Manzikert made it impossible for the Empire to continue the contest in Italy.74 This almost ceaseless campaigning eventually exhausted even Robert who nearly died in 1073. At that time, Sichelgaita called together Robert’s Norman followers and had them recognize her son, Roger, as his heir.75 The determination that her son would succeed to all of his father’s patrimony appears to be a prime motivator of Sichelgaita’s actions. The next milestone was the quarrel between her husband and her brother that resulted in the latter being driven from Salerno in the autumn of 1077. The events surrounding Robert Guiscard’s taking of Salerno remain unclear. According to Amatus of Montecassino, Gisulf not only failed to make the payments promised to allies, but also commandeered supplies that he had ordered his people to lay in for the coming siege.76 The hostility of Amatus, who devotes a good part of the fourth book of his History of the Normans to a catalogue of the sins of Gisulf, is notorious.77 Simple incompetence is the most likely explanation for Gisulf’s vulnerability, but one of Amatus’ accusations, that Gisulf abandoned his wife by means of a false vow of celibacy78 may provide a clue. By 1077, Gisulf was well into his thirties, and whether unwilling or unable had apparently produced no

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Loud, Age, pp. 234–46. Chalandon 1, pp. 179–84. Chalandon 1, pp. 173–225, covers these events in detail; Loud, Age, pp. 130–37, 149–53, gives a more concise discussion including re-evaluation of the sources used by Chalandon. Chalandon 1, p. 225. Chalandon 1, pp. 244–47. Wolf, pp. 112–16. Storia de’ Normanni di Amato di Montecassino volgarizzata in antico francese, ed. Vincenzo de Bartholomaeis (Rome, 1935) bk. 4, chap. 49, pp. 219–20. The text of Amatus survives only in a 14th-century French translation. Because Amatus declined to give further details, which would sicken his readers, the translator concludes that Gisulf’s lusts were “against nature.”

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heir.79 Sichelgaita and Gisulf had several living siblings.80 To these and their offspring can be added the children of Guaimar IV’s siblings81 plus his wife’s also numerous family.82 The legal claim to succession was small or nil for many of these relatives, but, given the number of potential contestants for the principality, Robert and Sichelgaita may have decided to take action shortly after Roger Borsa came of age.83 After a lengthy siege, Gisulf was exiled, and spent the rest of his life at the papal court in Rome where he died in 1091. It is obvious that the resources of Salerno greatly increased Robert’s capacity to conduct his operations, but the possible connection of these events to the sudden appearance of Sichelgaita in the field has not been noted. Sichelgaita’s reported military activities cluster in the last decade of her life.84 By 1080, the large family that she and Robert Guiscard produced was complete. Although she obviously spent some time with her husband, the numerous pregnancies and childbirths would have limited her activities during the years from 1058 to 1077 which were devoted to childbearing. Then, just as this activity wound down, Robert took control of the city that her family had long ruled, and within a few years, his wife is reported independently commanding troops at the siege of Trani. Given the difficulties that Robert Guiscard had with his reluctant Norman allies and subordinates, how could he risk turning over command to his wife? If she was not in command, why was she there at all? If Taranto was considered too dangerous for reasons unspecified, who was responsible for her safety at Trani, and, if an un-named man was commanding the siege, why was her mere presence recorded? Were these troops Salernitans who could be counted on to obey her, possibly more reliably than they would have obeyed Robert? That Robert Guiscard needed the resources of Salerno is obvious; what has been less noted was that Sichelgaita’s presence assured their availability.85 Gisulf’s extended kindred could have made attempt after attempt to recover the principality if Robert had not been able to establish himself as something other than a conqueror. For this he needed his wife as an active co-ruler who could position her son as a minor heir, acceptable to the Salernitans, and under the guardianship of his mother, 79

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A daughter may be recorded in a charter of Roger Borsa issued in 1087. Schütz, p. 390; LéonRobert Ménager (ed.), Recueil des acts des ducs normands d’Italie (1046–1127) (Bari, 1980), p. 208. Taviani-Carozzi, Principauté Lombarde, 1:371, 373. Ibid., 2:872, 934. Among the assassins who killed both Guamar IV and his brother Paldolf were his four brothers-in-law. Ibid., 1:403. Roger’s estimated year of birth is 1060, based on Romuald of Salerno’s statement that he was 50 years old at his death in 1111. Ménager, Recueil, p. 166, n. 1. She died on 27 March 1090, and was presumably born in the late 1030s since Gisulf was a younger brother. He was associated with his father in the rule of Salerno in 1042, apparently while still a small child. The point was not lost on contemporaries. WmA, bk. 2, II. 436–39, p. 156; G.A. Loud, “Continuity and Change in Norman Italy: the Campania during the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” Journal of Medieval History 22, p. 325.

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a legitimate member of the ruling house, and of her husband whose military skills could bring opportunity and prosperity to the city. Sichelgaita’s appearance at Trani is only one of several similar actions undertaken by women in Italy in the eleventh century. Adelheid of Turin, Beatrice of Lorraine and Matilda of Tuscany commanded sieges.86 In this respect, she was not an amazonian anomaly, but something of a late bloomer. The battle at Dyrrachium, then, was not her first outing, as Anna correctly reports. It is likely that the troops that she ordered back into the battle, like those she commanded at Trani, were her troops, Salernitans, dependants of Salerno, or in the pay of Salerno.87 According to Anna Comnena, the left wing of Robert’s army, the wing that was driven into the sea, was commanded by Amicus of Giovenazzo (Anna’s “Count Amiketas”) a cousin of Peter II of Trani, and a party in the rebellions against Robert Guiscard. Both Anna and William of Apulia report that Robert had difficulty in organizing this campaign which was both risky and expensive as well as unlikely to be profitable, at least in the short term.88 William’s reference to their grief at being separated from their families suggests that Robert had taken hostages from his reluctant allies as well. He left many of his most reliable supporters in Italy and divided his opponents by taking some with him, to command the troops they had been obliged to send, and leaving others behind. He also divided his family. Roger, approximately 21 years old, was left in Salerno, as regent, but with the supervision or protection of two of his father’s most reliable supporters – his cousin, Robert of Loritello, and Gerard of Buonalbergo, the uncle of Robert’s first wife.89 This would be a normal step in Roger’s career and also reinforce his position as successor. Bohemond, the son of Robert’s first wife, would be of more use in the field, and also be kept away from the temptation to cause trouble in Italy. Sichelgaita went on the Byzantine campaign because Roger needed a chance to establish himself as an adult, and Robert needed as many reliable people with him as possible. To have put an entire wing of his army under the command of Amicus, a recent opponent, would invite trouble, especially if that wing were composed of troops loyal to Amicus. Sichelgaita was with the left wing, and that is the most likely position as well for the troops that came from Salerno. Although Robert took over the rule of Salerno after Gisulf was driven out, Sichelgaita may well have had to take on an active role to prevent a destructive and drawn-out resistance. Her presence with his armies shows the limits of Robert Guiscard’s authority as much as it indicates her physical vigor. 86

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Valerie Eads, “Women and Military Power in Eleventh-Century Italy” (Paper delivered at the International Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, July 15, 2003) makes clear that in the eleventh century a number of Italian noble women made effective use of the military resources at their disposal. Memoli-Apicella, p. 240, describes these troops as Normans whose admiration for Sichelgaita’s courage led them to follow her as their lady. This presumably refers only to those Normans who were at the moment loyal to Robert. Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 14, pp. 65–66; WmA, bk. 4, ll. 128–32, p. 210; Loud, Age, pp. 217–18. Chalandon 1, pp. 267–68.

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Another element is her determination to insure Roger Borsa’s succession to all of his father’s patrimony. Robert had repudiated his first wife, but the son of that marriage, Bohemond, was a grown man and with his father on the 1081 campaign. Bohemond had, of course, no claim to the principality. Roger had a claim to his father’s position as duke of Apulia and Calabria, but his status there was less clear cut. It is not necessary to repeat melodramas of attempted plots and poisonings90 to understand why Sichelgaita would have risked her life to be present. It was the best way to protect Roger’s interests; to insure that Robert did not decide to provide for Bohemond, now technically illegitimate, at the expense of her son. As things turned out, Bohemond provided very well for himself, but that was years in the future. Sichelgaita may well have seen Apulia and Calabria as part of her own father’s patrimony since Guaimar IV had claimed the title. It was as duke of Apulia and Calabria that he oversaw the first apportioning of land to the Normans in 1042.91 Whether she shouted homeric lines or something less heroic is not at issue. No matter how loud her voice was, she would not have been heard in the middle of a battlefield! Perhaps she did have to keep her troops from breaking and bolting; if the men were indeed panicked, charging across their path – emphasizing her orders with a spear, an object that they could actually see – was about the only way to get them back into order. One possibility is that the spear that Sichelgaita snatched up was one with a banner attached. Thus she would be increasing her her visibility and using a signal familiar to the troops, not performing a complex physical skill, charging with a lance, that she had probably never learned.92 A position close to the banner is a logical place for someone who must be with the troops, but not actually engaging the enemy, but neither source supplies this detail. Anna Comnena tells how her father’s well-laid plans broke his opponents. The “Kelts” were running into the sea to get away, until a monstrous woman, more frightful than Roman battle lines or Turkish archers, drove them back into the fight. Then the “barbarians” in his army were undone by their impetuousness and lack of judgment. Perhaps, as William reports, the “Normans” waded into the water to get clear of a difficult and dangerous position. Sichelgaita decided that if too many of her troops took this route, there was the possibility that they would be forced into deep water. To avoid this danger she turned them, issuing her orders in the most practical way. In any case, the battle was a victory for Sichelgaita and Robert, and for Roger. That she was present, properly armored, to oversee the actions of her, and her son’s, troops and to insure that they acquitted themselves at least as well as Bohemond’s – that still sounds like the real thing. 90 91 92

Dalena, “‘Guiscardi,’” pp. 175–77 summarizes the speculations that Sichelgaita either hastened Robert’s death or attempted to poison Bohemond. Chalandon 1, pp. 105–06. Memoli-Apicella, p. 240, concludes that Sichelgaita led the troops back into position instead of simply turning their flight. In the process, she crossed into the enemy’s lines and was in the thick of the fight when wounded. Under these circumstances, her surviving, much less avoiding capture, could well seem miraculous since Memoli-Apicella also concluded that Sichelgaita did not actually practice fighting skills, p. 227.

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The purpose of this overview of her career was to decide whether Sichelgaita was an Amazon, a woman who made use of the military capabilities available to her, or a more passive woman who brought those means to her capable and aggressive husband, a trophy wife. Like the earlier studies of Oman and Delbrück, this article began with certain presuppositions; namely, that in a hierarchical society like that of medieval Europe women would undertake gender-role nonconforming actions only under unusual circumstances, such as a regency or widowhood, when a power vacuum existed, and considerations of class became more important than those of gender. Sichelgaita does not fit this presupposition. She not only had a husband, alive and fit to fight, but he was one of the most ambitious, aggressive and competent predators of his generation. She had three sons. The eldest was still young, but nonetheless an adult. It took a while to determine where the power vacuum was, but it was Robert. If he had merely starved out Salerno and killed or exiled Gisulf, the result could have been years of war that resulted only in devastation. Robert was not the undisputed leader of the Normans of southern Italy. As his numerous nephews came of age, some, like Robert of Loritello, allied with him and others, such as the dispossessed Abelard and Geoffrey of Conversano, fought him every way they could. Nor were the numerous descendants of Tancred d’Hauteville the only Normans in the picture. Peter II of Trani was but one representative of another large family, the “sons of Amicus” that contended for wealth and power. The Norman princes of Capua were kinsmen by marriage, sometimes allies and sometimes not. The sources, being all of Norman origin, are somewhat suspect, but aspects of Gisulf’s rule left him vulnerable, and he apparently had no heir. Sichelgaita and Robert may have presented a desirable alternative. Robert alone was only one of a number of aggressive Normans. It was Sichelgaita’s active presence that made Salerno a valuable resource rather than yet another source of trouble. Since Salerno was not her husband’s only holding, she took steps to insure that her son succeeded to the entire patrimony. She remained active after Robert’s death in 1085 until her own death in 1090, a period that has been characterized as “The Regency of Sichelgaita.”93 The very fact of her strong presence in his life may have influenced William of Apulia to mute his description of her actions in a book dedicated to her son. Conversely, the fact that he was writing about the duke’s mother makes it unlikely that William would make up a battle wound that his patron knew never happened. Sichelgaita’s presence on the field at Dyrrachium was not a historical curiosity. It was an integral part of the ambitious plans of one of the most warlike figures of the Norman world and also very much a part of her own dynastic plans.

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Ménager, Recueil, pp. 164–68.

6 Castilian Military Reform under the Reign of Alfonso XI (1312–50) Nicolas Agrait

Despite more attention from researchers in the past two decades, Alfonso XI’s reign remains somewhat neglected. The most important historian of this monarch is still Salvador de Moxó1 who brought with him his concern for Castilian political and social institutions, especially the history of the nobility. Even though interest in the events and circumstances of the first half of the fourteenth century in Castile was certainly not lacking, most historians, with the possible exception of general works by Marie-Claude Gerbert, Miguel Angel

List of Principal Abbreviations in Footnotes: AHN: CAIV: CAXI: CDACLXI: CDAML: CDPI: CFIV: CLC: CODOM6:

Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid) Crónica do rei Afonso IV Crónica de Alfonso XI Colección documental del Archivo de la Catedral de León. XI. (1301–1350) Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de León (1219–1400) Colección documental de Pedro I de Castilla, 1350–1369 Crónica de Fernando IV Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y Castilla Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, Vol. 6, Documentos de Alfonso XI CODOM7: Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, vol. 7, Documentos de Pedro I GCAXI: Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI LBB: Libro Becerro de las Behetrías RAH: Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid) 1

Though Moxó’s production was vast, some of his most useful works include “Relaciones entre la Corona y las órdenes militares en el reinado de Alfonso XI,” in VII Centenario del Infante D. Fernando de la Cerda, ed. Manuel Espada Burgos (Ciudad Real, 1976), pp. 117–58; “La sociedad política en la época de Alfonso XI,” Cuadernos de Historia 6 (1975), 187–326; and the closest he came to a complete monograph on the whole reign: “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” in Historia de España vol. XIII: La expansión penínsular y mediterránea (c.1212–1350), vol. I: La Corona de Castilla, ed. José Javier Zamora (Madrid, 1990), pp. 279–428. He presented Alfonso, especially after 1330, as a conquering monarch both within and outside Castile, who tamed his realm’s aristocracy, introduced radical administrative changes, and expanded the predominance of Castile over the whole Iberian Peninsula. This view has been echoed by José Sánchez-Arcilla Bernal’s popularizing volume Alfonso XI, 1312–1350 (Palencia, 1995).

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Ladero Quesada and Joseph F. O’Callaghan,2 gravitated towards more specific areas and interests like legal institutions,3 the development of the monarchy,4 and urban, social and economic issues.5 Thus, the overall history of Alfonso’s long reign presently lies unwritten. One of the pieces of the picture which has not yet been given full treatment is military practice during Alfonso’s regime even though his rule, much like those of his European counterparts, was marked by armed struggles. Military conflict, in fact, abounds in the chronicle6 and documentary7 sources: from the frontier wars and the defeat in 1319 of the king’s regents at the Vega de Granada;8 Alfonso’s first campaigns as an adult;9 his struggle against Granada and Morocco and the loss of Gibraltar to the latter in 1333;10 the bloody pacification of the Castilian nobility, in particular Juan Núñez de Lara 2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9 10

Some good starting points are Marie-Claude Gerbert, “Les espagnols de la frontière, VIIIemilieu XIVe siècle. Les grands royaumes chrétiens: les élites, XIe–milieu XIVe siècle. Le temps des tragédies,” in Histoire des Espagnols, vol. I: VIe–XVIIIe siècle, ed. Bartolomé Bennassar (Paris, 1985), pp. 185–299; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada et al., Historia de España 4: De la crisis medieval al Renacimiento (Barcelona, 1988); and Joseph F. O’Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain (Ithaca, 1975). Some examples include Joaquín Cerda Ruiz-Funes, Estudios sobre instituciones jurídicas medievales de Murcia y su reino (Murcia, 1987); Joseph F. O’Callaghan, The Cortes of CastileLeón, 1188–1350 (Philadelphia, 1989) and Manuel García Fernández, “La Hermandad General de Andalucía durante la minoría de Alfonso XI de Castilla: 1312–1325,” Historia, Instituciones, Documentos 12 (1985), 351–75. One should consult Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252– 1369) (Madrid, 1993); Peter Linehan, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain (Oxford, 1993); and the essay collection Génesis medieval del estado moderno-Castilla y Navarra (1250– 1370), ed. Adeline Rucquoi (Valladolid, 1987). Concejos y ciudades en la Edad Media Hispánca. II Congreso de Estudios Medievales (Avila, 1990); Ricardo Izquierdo Benito, “Repercusiones de una crisis y medidas para superarla. Toledo en el siglo XIV,” En la España Medieval 5 (1986), 1:515–36; Teófilo Ruiz, Crisis and Continuity; Land and Town in Late Medieval Castile (Philadelphia, 1994). The main narrative source for Alfonso’s reign is the official history Crónica del rey don Alfonso, el Onceno in Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, ed. Cayetano Rosell (Madrid, 1953), pp. 171– 392. It was written by Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, Alfonso’s chancellor and keeper of the privy seal, under royal auspices in the same chronicling workshop that produced the chronicles of Alfonso X (1252–84), Sancho IV (1284–95) and Fernando IV (1295–1312). Between 1376 and 1379, an anonymous author composed a second and longer version of this chronicle which is known as the Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI, 2 vols., ed. Diego Catalán (Madrid, 1977). Both works cover Alfonso’s reign up until 1344. [Hereafter CAXI and GCAXI respectively.] Alfonso’s chancery records were lost along with those of most of the fourteenth-century Castilian monarchs. The remaining documentation is scattered among the various national, ecclesiastic, and urban archives. Two particularly important published collections are Colección documental de Alfonso XI. Sección del Clero, ed. Esther González Crespo (Madrid, 1985) and Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, Vol. 6, Documentos de Alfonso XI, ed. Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros (Murcia, 1997). [Hereafter CODOM6]. CAXI, chaps. 9, 11, 14, 16, 30, pp. 180–85, 191–94. CAXI, chaps. 57–58, 86–88, pp. 207–09, 226–27. “Letter from Alfonso XI announcing to all his realms that he had signed a truce with the emir of Granada (Seville, February 19, 1331),” in CODOM6, pp. 188–92, doc. 168; CAXI, chaps. 108, 110, 114, 126, pp. 242–45, 248, 257–58.

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and Juan Manuel;11 the wars against Navarre (1335)12 and Portugal (1336– 38);13 the duel with the Marinid dynasty of Morocco for ascendancy in the Strait of Gibraltar, which he achieved through his victory at Salado (1340),14 and the successful siege of Algeciras (1342–44);15 to his death from the bubonic plague during the failed siege of Gibraltar of 1350.16 Among English and American historians, research into the military developments of Castile has mostly concentrated on the thirteenth century along the lines set by Elena Lourie17 and James F. Powers,18 the mid-fourteenth century when the Hundred Years War spilled into the Peninsula,19 and on the fifteenth century.20 Considering the great number of military operations and the period’s general impor11

12

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14 15

16 17 18 19

20

CAXI, chaps. 154, 156, 158, 161, 164, 166, 172, 188, pp. 273–80, 282–83, 293–94; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the council of Murcia ordering it to return to Don Juan Manuel all of his properties and honors (Mérida, June 4, 1337),” in Andrés Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel. Biografía y estudio crítico (Zaragoza, 1932), pp. 631–32, doc. 550. CAXI, chaps. 142–50, pp. 267–71. The most complete treatment so far of this episode remains Pilar Azcárate Aguilar-Amat, “La guerra de 1335 entre Castilla y Navarra,” Hispania 49 (1989), 805–40. Crónica do rei don Afonso IV in Crónicas dos sete primeiros reis de Portugal, ed. Carlos da Silva Tarouca (Lisboa, 1952), chaps. 31–49, pp. 241–93, [hereafter, CAIV]; CAXI, chaps. 166– 69, 177, 185, pp. 280–83, 287–92; “Response by King Afonso IV to Benedict XII’s legate and to the French ambassador (October 23, 1338),” in As gavetas da Torre de Tombo, 12 vols. (Lisboa, 1960–77), 5:662–67, doc. 3659; “Letter from Benedict XII to Alfonso XI telling him that the bishop of Rhodes, papal legate, was headed to the Peninsula to negotiate peace between him and King Afonso IV of Portugal (Avignon, December 30, 1336),” in Monumenta Henricina, ed. Manuel Lopes de Almeida et al., vol. 1 (Coimbra, 1960), pp. 173–74, doc. 81. CAIV, chap. 62, pp. 338–49; CAXI, chap. 251, pp. 325–38. “Letter from vice-admiral Mateo Mercer to Pedro IV detailing the capitulation and entrance of Alfonso XI into Algeciras (Algeciras, March 26, 1344),” in Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel, p. 642, docs. 572–73; CAXI, chaps. 268–337, pp. 342–390. Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (1969, repr. Dover, NH, 1993), p. 86. Elena Lourie, “A Society Organized for War: Medieval Spain,” Past & Present 35 (1966), 54–76. James Powers, A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284 (Berkeley, 1988). Clara Estow, Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350–69 (New York, 1995); Kenneth Fowler, “The Wages of War: The Mercenaries of the Great Companies,” in Viajeros, peregrinos, mercaderes en el Occidente Medieval: actas de la XVIII Semana de Estudios Medievales (Pamplona, 1992), pp. 217–44; idem, “Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIVe siècle: Bertrand du Guesclin et Sir Hugh Calveley,” in Le Combattant au Moyen Age: 18e Congrès de la Société des Historiens médiévistes de l’Enseignment supérieur public, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1995), pp. 243–56; idem, Medieval Mercenaries, vol. 1. The Great Companies (Oxford, 2001); Peter Edward Russell, The English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford, 1955); Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (London, 1990); idem, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (London, 1999). John Edwards, The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs, 1474–1520 (Oxford, 2000); Barbara Holmgreen Fyroozye, “Warfare in Fiffteenth-Century Castile”, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California-Los Angeles (Ann Arbor, 1974); Jocelyn Nigel Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms, Vol. 2: 1410–1516 Castilian Hegemony (Oxford, 1978); a very old yet still useful text is William H. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain. The Conquest of Granada 1481–1492, ed. Albert D. McJoynt (London, 1995). Prescott’s book is based on A History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella (New York, 1941).

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tance,21 it should come as no surprise then that this subject has recently elicited serious consideration from Spanish historians.22 Even so, the early-to-mid-fourteenth century remains understudied. Within Castilian military practice, I will concentrate on three specific reforms that Alfonso introduced at various points during his reign. First, in response to what he perceived to be a marked decline in the ideals and practice of caballería (roughly, chivalry),23 Alfonso became one of the first Castilian monarchs to actively promote the ideals and practice of caballería as part of his monarchical 21

22

23

James Powers termed the period between 1252 and 1284 as the “end of an era,” during which the urban militias were brought under the Castilian crown’s authority and consequently lost much of their previous autonomy and significance. His convincing argument, echoed by others, was that this move towards military centralization resulted from a shrinking Castilian– Muslim border, coupled with Alfonso X’s endeavor to consolidate the huge expanses of Muslim territory conquered during the thirteenth century, and codify and centralize political authority in the kingdom. This solid contention suggests that the decades comprising the end of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century constitute a significant transitional period in the evolution of Castilian military practices and institutions. The study of Alfonso XI’s reign, therefore, is crucial because it comprised the last stage of the great Castilian southern expansion drive. It was also a time when Alfonso introduced important reforms in Castilian military practice, especially during the last fifteen years of his regime (Powers, A Society Organized for War, pp. 68–82). Some important works include: Los recursos militares en la Edad Media hispánica, ed. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada (Madrid, 2001); Francisco García Fitz, Castilla y León frente al Islam. Estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares (siglos XI–XIII) (Sevilla, 1998) in which he details the military developments in Castile up until the start of the fourteenth century; Manuel García Fernández, El reino de Sevilla en tiempos de Alfonso XI (1312–1350) (Sevilla, 1989), and “La defensa de la frontera de Granada en el reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla, 1312– 1350,” in Relaciones exteriores del reino de Granada, ed. Cristina Segura Graiño (Almería, 1988), pp. 37–54, covering Seville during the reign of Alfonso and its defense; the essay collections Las relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb (siglos XIII–XIV), ed. Mercedes García Arenal and María de Jesús Viguera (Madrid, 1988), and Actas del Congreso Internacional “El Estrecho de Gibraltar,” Tomo II: Historia de la Edad Media, ed. Eduardo Ripoll Perelló (Madrid, 1988); Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “La organización militar de la corona de Castilla durante los siglos XIV y XV,” in La incorporación de Granada a la Corona de Castilla. Actas del symposium conmemorativo del Quinto Centenario, ed. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada (Granada, 1993), pp. 195–227; Manuel Rojas Gabriel, “Guerra de asedio y expugnación castral en la frontera con Granada. El reinado de Alfonso XI como paradigma,” in IV Jornadas LusoEspanholas de História Medieval. As relaçoes de fronteira no século de Alcañices (Oporto, 2000); and most importantly Antonio Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam: estudio sobre el cerco y la conquista de Algeciras por el rey Alfonso XI de Castilla, así como de la ciudad y sus términos hasta el final de la Edad Media (Algeciras, 1994) which is especially significant because the author analyzed and diagrammed the city of Algeciras before and during the siege, the route used by Alfonso to reach the city, the battle of Palmones (1343), and the course of the city’s history after Alfonso’s reign. Caballería can be roughly translated as “chivalry.” Yet just like the latter term, it is difficult to define precisely. It can mean simply the practice of fighting on horseback, yet by the thirteenth century in Castile caballería came to refer also, as in the rest of Europe, to a code of conduct for caballeros and nobles (Maurice Keen, Chivalry [New Haven, 1984], pp. 16–17, 239). Caballería itself, however, must be differentiated from caballería popular which was the practice in Castile of non-nobles to arm and serve as mounted warriors in return for a set of privileges which included tax-exemption.

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project. To that end, he created the Order of the Band, one of the first monarchical chivalric orders in Europe, perhaps for his own personal protection and to increase the magnificence of his entourage. Yet he did not limit his attention to the magnate class, targeting also the established institution of “popular chivalry.” Specifically, he substituted the so-called Castilian or promotional system, in which a person who achieved a certain amount of personal wealth could choose to maintain a horse and arms and serve in return for some specific social privileges, with its Leonese counterpart, in which ascent into the ranks of popular chivalry was mandatory according to income. The caballería de cuantía had come into existence. Alfonso also addressed the apparent lack of popular caballeros by demanding that urban centers draw up more updated and thorough lists of those required to serve, and setting minimal standards for equipment and arms.24 Second, Alfonso in his Ordenamiento de León (1338) set down specific guidelines of how the king’s vassals were to spend the royal disbursements known as soldadas. Specifically, those vassals in the northern regions of Castile were to spend two-thirds of those royal monies they received as soldadas for the recruitment of mounted warriors and infantry. These statutes also specified that for every 1,100 maravedíes, roughly 55 florins,25 the recipient had to recruit one caballero and one lancer or spearman and one crossbowman.26 In setting down these procedures, Alfonso achieved more control over the recruitment of troops and also over royal military expenditures. Furthermore, this recruitment mechanism appears to place Castile much more in line with England and France, resembling the indenture system and lettres de retenue respectively. Third, Alfonso, plagued with constant deficits in his royal treasury, attempted to reform the Castilian fiscal structures. Yet his constant need for military funding led him not only to rely on traditional taxation related to warfare, but to open new revenue streams like extraordinary levies, alcabalas, loans, and royal shares of ecclesiastical rents. While Alfonso did not ameliorate Castile’s fiscal problems, he did manage to adequately fund all of his victorious campaigns. Through a detailed exploration of these developments, one can then address several issues. One is whether the sources permit us to ascertain to what degree these reforms were actually implemented. Related to this, is determining what effect these reforms had on the long-term military development of Castile. With regards to popular chivalry, the creation of the caballería de cuantía exacerbated the hardening of the social classes within Castile, with military service becoming increasingly the franchise of the urban elites. In the case of the changes in the soldada system, the practice would persist until the end of the fifteenth century, although to a much lesser extent. Finally, addressing these areas will determine whether these reforms were the result of particularly original thinking by Alfonso or simply the logical outgrowth of earlier developments. 24 25

26

Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, 1348; Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y Castilla. 5 vols. (Madrid, 1882–1903), 1:617–19. [Hereafter CLC]. I am using an estimated exchange rate of 1 florin per 20 maravedíes as presented in Peter Spufford et al., Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London, 1986), p. 158. I will hereafter use mrs. for maravedíes and and fls. for florins. CLC (Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, 1348), 1:450–53.

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During the early part of his adult rule, Alfonso could not but conclude that the ideals and practice of caballería had significantly deteriorated.27 Even so, the decline in chivalry extended back to the reign of Alfonso X (1252–84). As the great Christian expansion during the thirteenth century progressively moved the frontier southward, the ideal of chivalric endeavors remained strong for both the high nobility and the urban militias. In practice, however, military service lagged. In the case of the high nobility, the internal armed struggles that took place during the reigns of Alfonso X, Fernando IV, and Alfonso XI had displayed its willingness to forgo loyalty to the crown and caballería in return for personal gain. In the case of the urban contingents, particularly in the kingdom’s northern regions, there appeared to be a certain apathy and outright hostility towards armed service.28 All in all, it appeared that Castilian caballería sorely needed to be re-energized. One of Alfonso’s principal responses to this decline was to actively promote the chivalric ideals as they had been expressed in Alfonso X’s Siete Partidas,29 especially military service and loyalty to the crown. He created the first true monarchical European order of knighthood in 1332, the Order of the Band, with himself as its master.30 The members of this order wore a distinctive white tunic over their armor along with a black band stretching diagonally across it.31 Those chosen for this new order had to be of noble birth, be a vassal of either the monarch or one of his sons, and take an oath to never leave Alfonso’s service.32 To further stress his own importance and chivalry, Alfonso traveled to Santiago de Compostela, where he held a solemn knighting ceremony for himself. After the archbishop of Santiago blessed his weapons, the king stepped up to the altar, armed himself with armor and weapons, and had himself knighted by a statue of St. James. In this manner, he showed all the nobles and caballeros present that he was indeed a great caballero, but also that no one but the saint had bestowed knighthood upon him. He then went to Burgos and held a crowning ceremony at the monastery of Las Huelgas for himself and his queen. Afterwards, he welcomed

27 28 29

30

31 32

Linehan, History and the Historians, p. 582. Manuel González Jiménez, “La caballería popular en Andalucía (siglos XIII al XV),” Anuario de Estudios Medievales 15 (1985), p. 320. Alfonso X’s Partidas (Partida 2, Title 21), ed. Robert I. Burns, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott (Philadelphia, 2001) has a large section devoted to the definition and nature of caballería and caballeros. Alfonso XI gave the Partidas the power of law in his Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348); Jesús D. Rodríguez Velasco, El debate sobre la caballería en el siglo XV; La tratadística caballeresca castellana en su marco europeo (Salamanca, 1996), p. 23; Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” pp. 385–87. CAXI, chap. 99, p. 234; Rodríguez Velasco, El debate sobre la caballería en el siglo XV, pp. 22–23. D’A.J.D. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown; The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe, 1325–1520 (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 30–33, has argued that although the “Fraternal Society of Knighthood of St. George” in Hungary was founded in 1325– 26, surely by King Károly I (1309–42), it was not a true monarchical order because it was identified with the dynasty and not the monarch himself. Furthermore, the leadership position in this order was not reserved for the monarch. CAXI, chap. 97, p. 231. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, pp. 74, 80–81.

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many nobles into his service.33 Some of these hidalgos continued to arm vassals of their own, which raised the number of men knighted to one hundred and thirtyfive.34 Although from this point on members of the Order of the Band were always present in Alfonso’s court, in the administration of the realm and on all his campaigns, the king’s specific designs for and use of this order are not entirely clear. There is very little information as to the actual duties of the individual members since the order’s statutes were notoriously vague.35 Furthermore, little evidence of Alfonso’s use of the order survives until he linked it in the Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348) to his project of increasing and centralizing monarchical power. In other words, Alfonso either did not want to or did not have the opportunity to closely administer or further develop it. After his death, the Band continued to exist but its significance slowly waned until it became just one more honor bestowed at the king’s discretion.36 So what utility could Alfonso have derived from these Banda nobles, if any? To begin with, the Castilian monarch availed himself of the order to promote caballería and specifically service to him.37 His public displays at Santiago de Compostela and later on at Burgos were designed to promote the image of himself as the ideal Christian caballero and king, specifically for the aristocracy.38 Second, Alfonso – considering the rebellious nature of many of Castile’s magnates – certainly intended to surround himself with a group of nobles whose loyalty he could always count on. Since almost all of the Banda’s members came from so-called new noble lineages, the order served as an Alfonsine counterweight against the regional power of the established aristocratic families. The prestige of the Order could have served as a powerful incentive for lesser nobles to come into Alfonso’s service.39 Third, induction into the Band represented a way for the king to increase the number of royal vassals, in particular for them to serve whenever he needed them. These vassals may have occupied a position similar to those nobles who were subject to indenture contracts in England or were life retainers.40 Finally, Alfonso may have fully intended the Order of the 33 35 36

37 38 39 40

CAXI, chaps. 99–100, pp. 234–35. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, p. 81. Jesús D. Rodríguez Velasco, “The Monarchy’s Discourse according to Alfonso XI: The Order of the Band,” (38th International Congress of Medieval Medieval Studies, Session 600, Kalamazoo, May 2003). Professor Rodríguez Velasco is preparing a monograph on the Order of the Band entitled Alfonso XI, la Banda y la caballería europea. CAXI, chap. 97, pp. 231–32. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, p. 74. Rodríguez de Velasco, El debate sobre la caballería , p. 23. Although they appear similar, there are problems comparing membership in the Order of the Band to formal indenture or life retainer. First, the Castilian sources do not specify much regarding the duties between the monarch and his vassal, other than the latter’s receipt of money in the form of a fief-rente, which consisted of an annual payment from a lord to a vassal in return for service, without the supposedly traditional landed fief. (Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones [Cambridge, MA, 1984], p. 92; Bryce D. Lyon, From Fief to Indenture; The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe [Cambridge, MA, 1957], pp. 5, 244). Another difference between the indentures and membership in

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Band to be his personal elite military unit. He could then have relied on it to ensure his safety while traversing his kingdom or during military campaigns abroad, and to project his authority and power to all.41 While the founding of the Order of the Band was in most respects an appeal to the kingdom’s elite, Alfonso also addressed the institution of caballería popular, generally linked to Castilian urban centers.42 The military function of towns was not a specifically Castilian phenomenon. The fundamental difference with the rest of Europe lay in the fact that the constant presence of a frontier with the Muslims had led to the creation of elaborate urban militias, with defensive and offensive capabilities. The urban forces were feasible because in many cities all citizens were in theory required to provide military service. The existence of these armed forces in turn assured that each town’s administrative divisions had a definite military component.43 These urban militias included both infantry, referred to in the sources as gentes de pie (those on foot), or peones (peons), and cavalry, which were mentioned as caballero (roughly, knight), ome de caballo (man on horseback), jinete (rider), and ome de armas (man-at-arms). The main difficulty with these multiple terms is that, depending on the text, they are sometimes utilized synonymously while in others they point to important distinctions among the fighting forces.

41 42

43

the Order was that the latter offered no specific right to restauro equorum, the practice of valuing horses before campaign so as to provide compensation to the owner if the steed were lost during the campaign (Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses. Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III [Woodbridge, 1999], pp. 88–89; Albert E. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” in The English Government at Work, 1327–1336. Vol. 1: Central and Prerogative Administration, eds. James F. Willard and William A. Morris [Cambridge, MA, 1940], p. 353). Compensation for horses was provided for in Castile from established custom, and not specific agreements. If anything, the English indentures were certainly much more specific regarding the privileges and obligations of both parties involved. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, pp. 81, 94. James Powers in A Society Organized for War has outlined in some detail the military obligations of these contingents. His monograph still remains the best comprehensive treatment of this phenomenon. The literature on the urban militias, however, is large. Some important works include Nicolás Tenorio y Cerero, “Las milicias de Sevilla,” Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos (1907), 222–63; J. M. Garate Córdoba, Espíritu y milicia en la España medieval (Madrid, 1967); María Dolores Cabañas González, La caballería popular en Cuenca durante la baja Edad Media (Madrid, 1980); Bonifacio Palacios Martín, “Las milicias de Extremadura y la conquista de Andalucía,” in Andalucía entre Oriente y Occidente (1236–1492), ed. Emilio Cabrera (Córdoba, 1988), pp. 79–94; Manuel González Jiménez, “Las milicias concejiles andaluzas (siglos XIII–XV),” in La organización militar en los siglos XV y XVI: Actas de las II jornadas nacionales de historia militar (Sevilla, 1993), pp. 227–41. Each city was divided into districts or wards known as colaciones, which in turn were usually divided by parish lines. Each of these districts would then be led by an official known as an alcalde. When a military operation was underway, the alcalde would have been in charge of calling the residents of his colación to service as caballeros or footsoldiers. He then accompanied them to the main town square, where they would be met by the town’s jueces or judges for an alarde or muster. After the inspection, the town’s militia would march out of the town to fight under the city’s banner, with each colación remaining distinct within the larger whole. Powers, A Society Organized for War, pp. 95–97, 309–10.

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Although the gentes de pie or corps of infantry during the first half of the fourteenth century included specialists such as siege engineers, the main division within them was between the peones or plain footsoldiers, and ballesteros or crossbowmen. The peones were generally armed with shortened lances or spears to be used in a thrusting motion with both hands, cast as missile weapons – identified in Castile as dardos – or held steady in a defensive position by sticking the butt of the end of the lance in the ground.44 Other weapons associated with the footsoldiers included knives and daggers, short swords, maces, hand axes, and guisarmes, a type of pole with a long curved blade edged on the concave side with a slender spear point opposite, used to either spear opponents, to hook and forcibly dismount knights, or to sever the sinews in horses’ legs.45 For protection, footsoldiers generally wore no more than a simple loriga (mail shirt) or light leather armor supplemented with a helmet or a shield or anything else the fighter may have personally acquired. The ballesteros, as their name indicates, were specialists who overwhelmingly utilized crossbows in battle. By the fourteenth century, this weapon was often built from a combination of wood, horn, and sinew. The bolts or arrows, narrower than they had been before, were designed specifically to pierce armor. Their effective range was probably about 100 meters.46 Since the ballesteros’ effectiveness lay in their firing missiles onto the enemy, they tended to avoid hand-to-hand combat. Regardless, they often wore light armor and carried weapons such as swords, daggers, and the like for their defense. Ballesteros have been documented as having utilized bows as well, although it is important to stress that the English longbow was never widely adopted in the Iberian Peninsula.47 The cavalry or caballeros occupied a position of fundamental importance in the Castilian urban militias. Within the urban militias, there were two distinctive types of mounted warriors: 1) those who rode a la brida, which implied using heavy armor for both the rider and the horse, straight stirrups and a high saddle; and 2) those who rode a la jineta, a style that used shorter stirrups and smaller saddles allowing the lightly-armed horseman more speed, agility, and mobility.48 The a la brida caballeros wore mail lorigas or hauberks reinforced with metal plates in its vulnerable spots. These included rodeletas used to protect joints such as wrists, elbows, shoulders as well as parts of the chest; guardabrazos providing further cover for the arms; manoplas or gauntlets for the hands; quijotes or cuisses covering the front of the thighs; rodilleras or knee pads; grebas or greaves to safeguard the legs; and escarpes which protected the feet.49 An armored caballeros’ neck and head were protected by almófares or mail coifs and 44 45 46 47 48 49

Alvaro Soler del Campo, La evolución del armamento medieval en el reino castellano-leonés y Al-Andalus (siglos XII–XIII) (Madrid, 1993), pp. 47–50. Ada Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, Arms and Armour in Spain II (Madrid, 1982), p. 210; Powers, A Society Organized for War, p. 132. John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades (Ithaca, 1999), pp. 26–27. Soler del Campo, La evolución del armamento medieval, pp. 47–50. Ibid., p. 157. Soler del Campo, La evolución del armamento medieval, pp. 133–47.

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different types of helmets. To safeguard the face without sacrificing visibility or ventilation, helmets were fitted with visors attached by means of leather straps.50 The final piece of defensive equipment was the shield, which was generally rectangular-shaped, although there is evidence of shields fashioned either in triangular, circular, or “U” shape.51 Their weaponry completed the Castilian caballeros’ equipment. Their principal weapon was a heavy lance, composed of a long wooden shaft topped with a sharp iron point. Another fundamental weapon was the sword. While some swords could be very heavy, especially the two-handed ones, it is clear that they had to be relatively light in order to be used with one hand by a caballero who might be holding a shield with the other.52 Besides these, the caballeros also used daggers, knives, and less frequently, short axes and maces.53 Although some caballeros may have been regarded as lightly-armed because they could not afford all the necessary a la brida equipment, a la jineta mounted warriors, heavily influenced by Muslim equestrian practices, embraced the use of lighter armor and weapons. With shorter stirrups, smaller saddles, and no armor for their horses, these caballeros prioritized speed and freedom of movement over power and protection.54 In the frontier regions of Castile, where the main types of military operations were lightning quick raids and counter-raids, these light horsemen were indispensable. They wore only a light hauberk without plates and were armed with shorter lances used strictly as thrusting and missile weapons; lighter, more limber swords; crossbows; and bows. By the fourteenth century, one type of warrior who had fully adapted to this style of fighting was the adalid. Alfonso X’s Partidas described the adalides as a dedicated and select corps of military officials in charge of both cavalry and infantry.55 During Alfonso XI’s reign the term adalid referred to specialized frontier warriors whose expert knowledge of the terrain, ability to organize military operations, and leadership qualities along the frontier made them very valuable.56 Due to the general obligation of the kingdom’s subjects to serve, an institution known as the caballería popular – essentially, that any town resident achieving a certain amount of income could choose to keep a horse and weaponry and serve as a caballero – developed within these urban milieus. In return for service, the individual caballero and his familiy received tax-exempt status for as long as the mount and equipment were maintained.57 To determine who was required to serve, local officials compiled lists known as padrones. Although 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, Arms and Armour in Spain, pp. 257, 260. Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 165. Ibid., p. 163. Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, Arms and Armour in Spain, pp. 198, 200, 204, 211. Cristobal Torres Delgado, “El ejército y las fortificaciones del reino nazarí de Granada,” Revista del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada y su Reino 1 (1987), p. 210. Partidas, 2, 22, 1–4. Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 130–32. González Jiménez, “La caballería popular en Andalucía,” p. 317; Salvador de Moxó, Repoblación y sociedad en la España cristiana medieval (Madrid, 1979), p. 463; Carmela Pescador, “La caballería popular en León y Castilla,” Cuadernos de Historia de España 35–36 (1962), pp. 93, 37–38; (1963), pp. 148–49; Powers, A Society Organized for War, p. 99.

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almost none of these lists have survived, these documents were extremely detailed and contained rosters of the local caballeros. In 1349, for example, Alfonso sent a royal confirmation of privileges to the town of Tolosa. The document also approved a padrón naming the 319 hidalgos who lived in or around the town.58 These lists were especially significant in the event that a town chose to pay fonsadera (scutage) instead of mobilizing its militias because it contained a list of those that were obligated to pay.59 After a few years of adult rule, Alfonso became convinced that caballería popular in Castile was in serious decline. This was a particularly vexing problem because the populations in and around towns had long been considered an important manpower reservoir by the Castilian kings. While there were several factors at work here – the rise of many non-noble caballeros into the ranks of the lesser nobility, making them less likely to respond to a summons, and the hardening of social differences within the cities that may have reduced the number of those eligible, willing, or permitted to serve as caballeros – the principal reason for the deterioration in mounted military service in most northern Castilian towns was that as the border with the Muslims became more distant many towns neither needed nor wanted to maintain forces beyond those used for local defense. In a losing struggle to preserve their military readiness, many urban centers held annual alardes or reviews to determine the state of their forces and ensure none had become derelict in their duties.60 This decline, however, was not new since its origins could be traced back to the previous century. In fact, Alfonso X had already expressed concern about this issue. Worried that the disinclination of many Castilian cities to respond to royal summons could result in a shortage of military manpower, he implemented a series of measures granting special privileges to urban non-nobles who maintained a horse and weapons. Even so, these moves did not prove to be unqualified successes since many urban caballeros enjoyed the privileges, but found ways not to serve.61 To address this increasingly serious predicament, Alfonso XI attempted to revitalize the caballería popular. One route was to make sure that the service remained an attractive option. He accomplished this by the constant affirmation of the privileges that caballeros had previously enjoyed. The most important of 58

59

60

61

“Privilege from Alfonso XI to Tolosa (Gibraltar, August 11, 1349),” in Colección de documentos medievales de las villas guipuzcoanas (1200–1369), ed. Gonzalo Martínez Díez et al. (San Sebastián [Donostia], 1991), pp. 265–69, doc. 247. “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering the city of León to collect fonsadera for the year 1330 from all those obligated to pay according to the new padrones (Segovia, September 28, 1331),” in Colección documental del Archivo de la Catedral de León. XI. (1301–1350), ed. José Antonio Martín Fuertes (León, 1995), p. 356, doc. 2989. [Hereafter CDACLXI]. González Jiménez, “La caballería popular en Andalucía ,” pp. 320, 322. In fact, Alfonso even decreed in 1331 that knights should travel on horses around the kingdom and not mules. The king was perhaps trying to exalt the chivalric virtue of the horses. This policy was apparently not very successful since the heavier burden upon horses caused many to die and when mules were allowed as steeds again, there was a shortage. CAXI, chap. 93, pp. 228–29. Joseph F. O’Callaghan, The Learned King : The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile (Philadelphia, 1993), pp. 92–94.

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those was, of course, tax-exemption.62 Yet it was not the only type of benefit granted. In 1322, Alfonso, through his regents, confirmed the right of the caballeros in Cuenca to receive the monies collected from fonsadera in the area in return for armed service. Ten years later, he allowed the caballeros to keep roughly one seventh of the royal tax of montazgo63 to assure their preparedness for military service.64 Alfonso also endeavored to streamline the process by which the urban caballeros were recruited and mobilized. Concerned with increasing the supply of mounted warriors, he ordered the various towns across Castile to update their padrones of caballeros under the rationale that cities should provide mounted fighters, or the equivalent in fonsadera, according to their current populations and not outdated lists. The difficulties with communications, armed conflicts, and the resistance of urban councils resenting royal interference in their internal affairs, made the implementation of this reform a troublesome task. Alfonso, for example, commanded the city of León in 1330 to draw up new padrones so that royal officials would be paid fonsadera according to the new lists, instead of an older agreed-upon global sum. The new registers took time to compile for in the next year Alfonso again demanded payment.65 The problems persisted since for a new royal request of military aid in 1332 the king ordered the Leonese urban council not only to draw up new padrones but also assign two men from each district and village to work along with notary publics.66 Even so, eleven years later Alfonso sent a royal inquiry to León to deal with complaints regarding some of the local compilers.67 The difficulties, of course, were neither limited to 62

Alfonso XI granted or confirmed tax-exemption for the caballeros of Ubeda in 1334 (Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de Ubeda. II [Siglo XIV], ed. José Rodríguez Molina et al. [Granada, 1994], pp. 131–32, doc. 47); Almoguera in 1335 (Colección documental de Pedro I de Castilla, 1350–1369, ed. Luis Vicente Días Martín [Salamanca, 1998], 3:150–54, doc. 820 [hereafter CDPI]); Ecija in 1336 (Manuel García Fernández, “Regesto documental andaluz de Alfonso XI,” Historia, Instituciones, Documentos 15 [1988], p. 63, doc. 281); Murcia in 1336, 1337, 1341, and 1342 (CODOM6, pp. 371–72, 385, 436–37, 446, docs. 327, 341, 385, 393); León in 1339 (CDPI , 3:77–78, doc. 729); the whole realm in 1339 (CLC [Cortes de Madrid, 1339], vol. 1, pp. 475–76); Baeza in 1344 (Colección diplomática de Baeza [Siglos XIII–XV], ed. José Rodríguez Molina [Jaén, 1983], 1:142–44, doc. 55); and Córdoba in 1345 (García Fernández, “Regesto,” p. 93, doc. 417), to name only some. 63 The montazgo, rather than an agrarian tax, was a fee charged by local authorities to the owners of large herds of sheep in return for protection as the grazing animals moved seasonally through Castile’s established cañadas (migratory sheep walks). Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla, p. 121. 64 “Privilege from Alfonso XI to the caballeros in Cuenca (Cuellar, May 20, 1322),” “Royal Privilege from Alfonso XI (1332),” cit. in González Cabañas, La caballería popular en Cuenca, pp. 37, 44. 65 “Letters from Alfonso XI to the city of León (Salamanca, April 12, 1330), (Segovia, September 28, 1331),” in CDACLXI, pp. 339–41, doc. 2978. 66 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the city of León (Burgos, August 10, 1332); Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de León (1219–1400), ed. José Antonio Martín Fuertes (León, 1998), pp. 134–35, doc. 92. [Hereafter CDAML]. 67 “Letter from Alfonso XI at the behest of one of his tax collectors to the city of León (Algeciras, September, 1343),” in CDAML, p. 187, doc. 135.

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the northwestern part of Castile, nor did they get resolved by the end of Alfonso’s reign.68 Yet the attention that the king paid to this issue certainly produced, if not a higher number of caballeros performing military service, a mechanism through which many towns had to reassess the scope of their military contribution. Although it is impossible to know exactly when he made up his mind, Alfonso decided that revitalizing the caballería popular required a much bolder solution than promoting it or streamlining its procedures: he had to change its very nature. Alfonso’s final reform of this institution was to eliminate the voluntary character of Castilian popular chivalry. He replaced the so-called Castilian, or promotional system, with its Leonese counterpart, in which ascent into the ranks of caballería was mandatory once a certain amount of personal wealth had been achieved. The caballería de cuantía had come into existence. In 1333, for instance, he decreed that any Murcian citizen with a patrimony of 12,000 mrs. (600 fls.) and over was required to own a horse and weapons.69 At the cortes held at Alcalá in 1348, Alfonso implemented new guidelines regarding the minimum income requirements, lowering the amounts for those towns located in the frontier areas. In Seville, for instance, the minimum amount of patrimonial wealth that would trigger the requirement of owning a horse was 5,000 mrs. (250 fls.); for Córdoba and Jaén, 4,000 mrs.(200 fls.); for Murcia, 8,000 mrs (400 fls.). For towns in northern Castile further away from the border, the minimum patrimony required was much higher. For those living in Salamanca, Toro and Zamora, the minimum income level of a non-noble caballero was 10,000 mrs. (500 fls.) and in places like Logroño and Calahorra, 15,000 mrs. (750 fls.).70 The higher quantities in the northern towns made it more difficult for urban poor and middle groups to afford to rise to caballero status, and consequently the caballeros in these locales were recruited from wealthier, even noble, sectors. In other words, mounted military service in these cities appears to have been increasingly reserved for a privileged elite. The more expensive requirements may have reflected both the desire to assure that mounted warriors were available, but also the local wish to strictly limit who could become a caballero and enjoy its accompanying privileges. In the long run, these onerous requirements exacerbated the decline of the caballería popular across Castile as most found themselves 68

69 70

“Royal missive to the alcaldes at Cáceres commanding they correct the abuses alleged by its urban council and that they commit to the compilation of new taxpayer lists (Alcalá la Real, July 17, 1341),” in Documentación histórica del Archivo Municipal de Cáceres, 1229–1471, ed. Antonio C. Floriano (Cáceres, 1987), pp. 82–83, doc. 48; “Royal letter to the López Díaz de Rojas, merino mayor at Guipúzcoa, and Pedro Ibáñez de Urbieta, alcalde at Aiztondo, to draw up a new padrón of the hidalgos from Tolosa (Burgos, May 10, 1345),” in Colección diplomática del Archivo Municipal de Tolosa. vol. I (1256–1407), ed. José María Roldán Gual (San Sebastián [Donostia], 1991), pp. 35–36, doc. 17; “Royal letter from Alfonso XI to the council of Murcia ordering that a padrón be drawn up containing the names of all the citizens who had enough income to maintain a horse and arms (Gibraltar, November 16, 1349),” in CODOM6, pp. 509–10, doc. 442. “Letter from Alfonso XI to Murcia (Seville, September 10, 1333),” in CODOM6, p. 286, doc. 249. CLC (Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, 1348), 1:617–19.

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unable to afford caballero status, leaving it an activity reserved for the upper classes. In the short run, however, eliminating the voluntary aspect of the caballería popular must have induced a sharp reaction and may even have produced a marked, if temporary, increase in the pool of potential caballeros. Many town dwellers likely found themselves forced to become caballeros or contract the services of others to go in their place.71 As he modified the nature of popular chivalry, Alfonso also targeted one of the principal methods of royal military funding: the soldada72 system. Soldadas, which had been in use since at least the twelfth century, took the form of financial grants from the royal coffers either in the form of money-fiefs, an agreed sum paid to an individual in return for military service, or rent-fiefs, the privilege of collecting the rents from specified royal lands, in order to entice current and potential vassals to serve.73 There were two types of soldadas: the vassal soldada, which was paid to vassals in continuous service, and the war soldada, which was doled out to an individual, vassal or not, for his expenses related to a specific military campaign. As the thirteenth century came to a close, the differences between these two types of royal payment blurred as the Castilian kings increasingly used them not only to help defray military expenditures but also to ensure the loyalty of certain sectors of the aristocracy. The nobles in turn, whether royal vassals or not, came to expect these sums as a reward for fulfilling their duty of service regardless of the amount of their individual patrimonies. By the start of Fernando IV’s reign in 1295, the payment of soldadas had become a necessary portion of royal expenditures.74 There were several important instances of their use. In 1296, the queen mother Doña María was forced to mint new coinage in order to pay a soldada totaling 2,000 mrs. each day to a series of magnates who had gathered at Valladolid to ensure their loyalty to the infant king.75 During 1305 and 1307, Fernando had to implement the collection of extraordinary taxes in order to meet his vassals’ demands for soldada payments.76 When Alfonso’s reign began, soldadas assumed an even larger role. The chivalric conventions regarding relationships between lords and subjects remained 71 72

73

74

75 76

Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” p. 399; González Jiménez, “Las milicias concejiles andaluzas (siglos XIII–XV),” p. 233. Besides soldada, there are several terms related to this system of royal payments. One is quitación, which specifically means income derived from land rents, and the over-arching term of libramiento, which simply refers to a disbursement of royal funds. This type of arrangement was not exclusive to Castile. France was already using the solde under Philip IV, the Fair (1285–1314) in order to compensate for some, but certainly not all, the costs of recruiting an army (Elizabeth Lalou, “Les questions militaires sous le règne de Philippe le Bel,” in Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe–XVe siècles, ed. Philippe Contamine et al. [Villeneuve d’Ascq, 1991], 44), and the English crown had used money fiefs in similar fashion (see note 40). Hilda Grassotti, “Para la historia del botín y de las parias,” Cuadernos de Historia de España 39–40 (1964), pp. 100, 103–05; Fernando Redondo Díaz, Historia del ejército español, vol. 2: Los ejércitos de la Reconquista (Madrid, 1984), pp. 107–10. Crónica del rey don Fernando IV in Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, ed. Cayetano Rosell (Madrid, 1953), chap. 2, pp. 104. [Hereafter CFIV]. CFIV, chap. 13, pp. 140, 144.

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very important, but it was clear that the crown needed these payments to provide a financial incentive for nobles to agree to become vassals. These probably became ever more significant because rent income must have declined for all landlords, whether royal, noble or otherwise, due to the acute economic crisis of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and the further instability of the successive minorities of Fernando IV and Alfonso.77 In 1315, with the king barely three years old, a survey of royal rent income found it seriously lacking and the cortes had to concede several new taxes so the regents could pay royal soldadas.78 In 1329, when Alfonso asked for further funding for a campaign along the Muslim frontier, he specifically mentioned the need for money to give to the magnates, knights, and others who would accompany him.79 Along with diminishing rents, he could no longer count on acquiring vast amounts of land from the Muslims with which to reward his followers for distinguished service. It was clear that the king had no alternative but to rely on the soldada mechanism, as expensive as it was. Nearing the end of the tumultuous 1330s, Alfonso modified the soldada mechanism, introducing in his Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) specific guidelines for those who received either soldadas or quitaciones. They stipulated that anyone receiving a soldada had to spend one-third of the amount received from the crown for personal armament, equipment, and other costs. The remaining twothirds were slated for the recruitment of mounted warriors and infantry. For every 1,100 mrs. (55 fls.) left over, the vassal had to recruit a caballero and two infantrymen (one lancer and one crossbowman). Any magnate who had the privilege of bringing his own banner was obligated to have at least one heavily armored caballero for every ten lesser-armed ones. This particular warrior would count 1,300 mrs. (65 fls.) against the two-thirds to be used for recruitment.80 While it is tempting to assume that heavily armored caballeros were simply those who rode a la brida and that the rest were a la jineta horsemen, the Ordenamiento did not make this distinction. The guidelines simply attempt to make sure that a corps of heavily-armed mounted warriors would be available. The rest of the caballeros’ equipment would have varied depending on personal and local circumstances. Judging from the Crónica, it appears that Castilian caballeros would have been arranged by ascending degrees of protection: 1) a la jineta; 2) a la brida; and 3) heavily armored caballero. Even so, Castilian caballeros never fought as encumbered with armor as their northern European counterparts. The heaviest Castilian caballeros, though in most ways resembling the knights in northern France or England, would have worn lighter equipment.81 77 78 79 80 81

Teófilo Ruiz, Crisis and Continuity, pp. 307–10. CAXI, chap. 8, p. 179. CAXI, chap. 80, pp. 222–23. CLC (Ayuntamiento de Burgos, 1338), 1:450–51. CAXI, chap. 270, p. 344; Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 162– 63. The event in question was the death of a German crusader during the siege of Algeciras. According to the chronicler, the German noble, not familiar with Muslim tactics, charged against a Muslim force at the walls of the city, was quickly surrounded, and killed.

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The Ordenamiento also addressed the quality of mounts and equipment, penalties for non-service, and extra compensation. It specified a minimum value of 800 mrs. for each of the horses in any vassal’s retinue. Each individual receiving soldadas was required to serve in person unless he provided a legitimate excuse. Alfonso was perhaps trying to safeguard himself against soldada recipients who disobeyed his orders, such as Pedro Hernández de Castro who refused to attack Portugal in 1336 despite the monarch’s direct commands.82 This document also established that those men who received soldadas and their retinues would have a fixed term of service. After that term came to an end, these warriors were expected to remain, but were to receive extra compensation. Caballeros were to be paid according to how much additional time they served and the discretion of the king while the foot lancers were to be paid 1 mr. and the ballesteros 1.3 mrs. per day. There were also stipulations within the Ordenamiento providing heavy penalties for those who either refused to serve or did not provide the required ground forces. Finally, the Ordenamiento explicitly stated that these standards only applied to the monies received from the crown away from the southern frontier regions. Any high nobles or caballeros living and serving near the Castilian-Granadan border were exempt from these guidelines because they contributed according to the amount of landed wealth they possessed.83 Intrinsically, the soldada system functioned like a trickle-down mechanism, through which royal monetary resources could be given to the royal vassals and other magnates who in turn passed the wealth along to lesser caballeros and infantry. Determining how long an army had to serve the king is difficult since the Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) does not specify the required duration. In fact, it appears that in the fourteenth century, terms of service were not very clear-cut. By the thirteenth century, the most traditional expectation was that the recruited forces served for a period of three months.84 Although such a period of time would have been enough for most of Alfonso’s campaigns, it hardly would have sufficed for his siege at Algeciras or his Portuguese campaigns. Yet the thirteenth century Crónica latina makes mention of some forces serving the monarch according to their own fuero or charter (secundum forum suum),85 indicating the 82 83

84

85

CAXI, chap. 166, p. 280. CLC (Ayuntamiento de Burgos, 1338), 1:450–53; Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348); El Ordenamiento de las leyes que don Alfonso XI hizo en las Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, ed. Ignacio Jordán del Asso y Miguel de Manuel Rodríguez (1774, repr. Valladolid, 1975), pp. 81– 86. The only difference between guidelines set in the Ordenamiento de Burgos and the Ordenamiento de Alcalá is that the latter stipulates that one mounted warrior be provided for every 1,200 mrs. of the soldada’s portion to be used for the recruitment of ground forces, as opposed to 1,100 mrs. Crónica latina de los reyes de Castilla, ed. María Desamparados Cabanes Pecourt (Valencia, 1964), p. 119; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “La organización militar de la corona de Castilla durante los siglos XIV y XV,” in La incorporación de Granada a la Corona de Castilla. Actas del symposium conmemorativo del Quinto Centenario, ed. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada (Granada, 1993), p. 208, argues that the Ordenamiento at Burgos (1338) assumed 90 days whenever it referred to terms of service. Crónica latina, p. 107.

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practice of variable terms of armed service across Castile.86 Alfonso X’s Espéculo refers to three months of service, but makes it explicitly clear that armies were expected to remain longer if the monarch needed them. In fact, any warrior who left was subject to severe penalties – ranging from being punished for desertion to being declared a traitor if the king was defeated or killed – depending on the outcome of the operation.87 The guiding principle, one that Alfonso most likely worked under in his Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) and later in his Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348), was that military service to the king certainly had limitations,88 but that the monarch was entitled to extend the duration of such service depending on the circumstances. If the sums described in the Ordenamiento were strictly meant for three months of service, then the costs of lengthier campaigns for both the royal and noble military commanders would skyrocket. As illustrated in table 1, in theory, a caballero who served for one year roughly engaged in four terms of military service. He would have been entitled to 900 mrs. or 45 fls. for the first 90 days and then three times that – 2700 mrs. or 135 fls. – for the remainder of year. A heavily-armored caballero in turn would have received roughly 1,100 mrs. (55 fls.) for his first term and then an extra 3,300 mrs. (165 fls). The rest of the money would have gone towards the paying one footsoldier and a crossbowman. As illustrated in table 2, a lancer or spearman was paid 1 maravedí per day after the first term of service expired. Assuming that this rate of pay also applied to the first term, then one spearman would have cost 90 mrs. for the first 90 days, 275 mrs. for the rest of the year, amounting to 365 mrs. overall. In similar fashion, a crossbowman paid 1.3 mrs. per day would have been entitled to 117 mrs. for the first 90 days, 357.5 mrs. for the remainder of the year, for a total of 474.5 mrs. To the original sum of 1,100 mrs., the service of a caballero, one footsoldier, and a crossbowman for one whole year would have required an additional 3,332.5 mrs. or roughly 167 fls. According to these estimations, the cost of an army for a year would be roughly four times what is expressed in the Ordenamiento. Although this is an intriguing possibility, which the extant sources do not explicitly rebuff, it would appear to make long campaigns like Alfonso’s siege of Algeciras prohibitively expensive. Yet this nineteen-month campaign occurred and ended with a Castilian victory. A more likely interpretation is that the guidelines contained in the Ordenamiento referred to the original costs of amassing and mobilizing armies. After their term was finished, Alfonso would have arranged for extended service. If his negotiations with the Gascon forces who briefly served him at Algeciras in 1343 are any indication, he fully intended to provide further compensation for the troops, but he also expected 86 87 88

Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 120. Alfonso X, Espéculo (3, 5, 5), ed. Gonzalo Martínez Diez and José Manuel Ruiz Asencio (Avila, 1985), pp. 198–99. In the ayuntamiento at Alcalá de Henares (1345), Alfonso acknowledged that military terms of service were varied when he granted the request by caballeros across the realm not to have to give back compensation they had received for service at Algeciras aon que non sseruiessen con tanto como auian a sseruir nin todo el tiempo (even if they did not serve as much as they were supposed to serve, or for the whole time); CLC, 1:480.

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the financial outlay to be lower than when the troops first arrived. In this particular instance, after paying the Count of Foix and his brother separately, he then paid 8 mrs. for each mounted warrior and 2 mrs. per footsoldier per day for the month of August – amounting to 248 mrs. (12.4 fls.) per mounted warrior and 62 mrs. (3.1 fls.) per footsoldier.89 The lack of specific references to the numerical strength of the Gascon contingent makes it impossible to even speculate how much Alfonso paid out. Even so, the compensation he provided the foreign soldiers, projected over one year of service, would have amounted to 2,976 mrs., roughly 149 fls., per mounted warrior and 744 mrs. (137 fls.) per footsoldier. While the former sum certainly exceeds the 900 mrs. amount set down in the Ordenamiento, it is also less than the extra 3,600 mrs., or 4,400 mrs. in the case of a heavily-armed caballero, that theoretically one year of service by a Castilian caballero would have cost. If Alfonso could negotiate lower rates of pay for service for foreign troops, then it is safe to assume that he could avail himself of custom to dictate reductions to Castilian soldiers and their commanders over whom he had a much greater degree of authority. Over the course of a campaign, he would not have found it unreasonable to order the troops to stay, and then negotiate with their commanders what the acceptable compensation, invariably lower than for the original term of service, would be. The lack of a reference to a specific number of days may also point to Alfonso’s desire to free his military planning from a specified period of service by his troops, and therefore negotiate further extensions of service from a more advantageous position.

Table 1 Estimated Costs of Cavalry according to the Soldada Guidelines set down in the Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) Type of Soldier

Cost of one term of service (90 days approx.)

Estimated cost over one year (approx. 4 terms of service)

Estimated extra cost beyond first term over one year of service

Caballero Heavily-Armed Caballero

900 mrs. 1,100 mrs.

3,600 mrs. 4,400 mrs.

2,700 mrs. 3,300 mrs.

Source: Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338); CLC, vol. 1, pp. 450–53.

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CAXI, chap. 304, p. 368.

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Table 2 Estimated Costs of Infantry according to the Soldada Guidelines set down in the Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) Type of Soldier

Rates of Pay

Spearman 1mrs./day Crossbowman 1.3 mrs./day

Costs for one term of service (90 days approx.)

Estimated costs over one year (approx 4 terms of service)

Extra cost beyond first term over one year of service

90 mrs. 117 mrs.

365 mrs. 474.5 mrs.

275 mrs. 357.5 mrs.

Source: Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338); CLC, vol. 1, pp. 450–53.

While it is tempting to assume, as Moxó did,90 that these measures were very successful in generating more numerous and disciplined armies, it is impossible to know how successful they actually were. There are no extant chancery records to indicate how much royal money was being disbursed and almost no records of soldada payments. The soldada references that have survived are too few for one to accurately infer or even estimate how much the average payment to a vassal or magnate would have been. So far, I have uncovered only three: one to Guitart d’Albret, Viscount of Tartas, when he became Alfonso’s vassal, one for Juan Rodríguez de Cisneros, and another for Juan Manuel. The viscount joined Alfonso’s service in 1332 and was granted a yearly soldada of 100,000 mrs. (5,000 fls.).91 If he were called by Alfonso for military service and he used the full soldada he received in one year according to the guidelines set down in 1338, he would have used around 33,340 mrs. to equip himself, leaving roughly 66,660 mrs. to use for the recruitment of troops. Assuming he would bring his own banner, this would yield around 5 or 6 heavily armored caballeros, 54 more mounted warriors, and 120 to 122 footsoldiers, half foot lancers and half ballesteros. In the case of Rodríguez de Cisneros, a document has survived indicating that he was to receive a soldada of 80,000 mrs. (4,000 fls.) in 1335.92 He would have been compelled to use 53,333 mrs. in order to recruit a retinue of 44 mounted warriors, 4 heavily armored, and 96 footsoldiers, half of them foot lancers and half ballesteros. In his case, this amounted to only a fraction of the resources available to him since he owned substantial lands in northern Castile. Finally, in 1333 Juan Manuel demanded that he receive 600,000 mrs. (30,000 fls.) in soldada payments (up from his usual 400,000) and that he get an increased share of rent income from royal lands totaling 300,00 (up from 180,000).93 If Alfonso had 90 91 92 93

Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” pp. 398–99. CAXI, chap. 99, p. 234. RAH, Col. Salazar y Castro, MS. M–9, Sign. 9/816, fol. 50 recto. CAXI, chap. 107, pp. 241–42.

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actually accepted his terms, Juan Manuel’s contribution to a royal host according to his soldada would have been 324 mounted warriors, 30–36 heavily armored caballeros, and 720–732 infantry. If Juan Manuel also used the 300,000 he received in rent income – as he was expected to in return for receiving the extra income from the crown lands – then his overall contribution would have been 486 mounted warriors, 45–58 heavily armed caballeros, and 1,080–1,098 infantry, half foot lancers and half crossbowmen. Since all three recipients were ricos hombres, it is sound to assume that they had plenty of other resources at their disposal in addition to their soldadas and whatever else they received from the crown. A projection of the costs of their retinues over one year using the values on tables 1–2 shows that they would have needed it. The viscount of Tartas’ cavalry and infantry contingents would have cost 265,931–272,010 mrs. (13,297–13,600 fls.) for one year, broken down into 194,000 mrs. (9,700 flrs.) for 54 caballeros, 22,000–26,400 mrs. (1,100–1,320 fls.) for 5–6 heavy caballeros, 21,535–22,265 mrs. (1,077–1,113 fls.) for 59–61 foot lancers, and 27,995.5–28,944.5 mrs. (1,340–1,447 fls.) for 59–61 ballesteros or crossbowmen. Overall, an additional 216,400–220,800 mrs. (10,820–11,040 fls.) would have been required after the first term of service. Juan Rodríguez de Cisneros’ forces would have cost 216,296 mrs. (10,815 fls.) over one year with 158,400 mrs. (7,920 fls.) for 44 caballeros, 17,600 mrs. (880 fls.) for 4 heavy caballeros, 17,530 mrs. (877 fls.) for 48 foot lancers, and 22,776 mrs. (1,139 fls.) for 48 crossbowmen. An extra expenditure of 162,222 mrs. (8,111 fls.) would have been needed after the first 90 days. As for Juan Manuel, if his theoretical contingent was recruited using 600,000 mrs. (30,000 fls.) in soldadas and all of it served for one year, then he would have had to spend 1,252,800 mrs. (62,640 fls.) for 324 caballeros, 132,000–158,400 mrs. (6,600–7,920 fls.) for 30–36 heavy caballeros, 131,400–133,590 mrs. (6,570–6,680 fls.) for a corps of 360–366 spearmen, and 170,820–173,667 mrs. (8,541–8,683 fls.) for 360–366 crossbowmen. The total sum would reach 1,651,020–1,642,695 mrs. (82,551– 82,135 fls.) with an additional 1,051,020–1,042,695 mrs. (52,551–52,135 fls.) after the first term of service. If he used 900,000 mrs. (45,000 fls.), then he would have spent 1,749,600 mrs. (87,480 fls.) for 486 caballeros, 198,000– 255,200 mrs. (9,900–12,760 fls.) for heavy caballeros, 197,100–200,385 mrs. (9,855–10,019 fls.) for 540–549 foot lancers, and 256,230–260,500.5 mrs. (12,812–13,025 fls.) for 540–549 crossbowmen. The aggregate sum would have been 2,400,930–2,465,685.5 mrs. (120,047–123,284 fls.), with an additional 1,802,250–1,850,842 mrs. (90,113–92,542 fls.) necessary to cover expenses after the first term of service. These projected sums easily outstripped the sums they received as soldadas. The royal disbursements were evidently meant to provide some compensation for some of the military costs. The rest would have to come from other sources, one of which was the personal resources of the nobility. The viscount of Tartas, for example, was described by the Crónica as a magnate even prior to coming into Alfonso’s service. Juan Rodríguez de Cisneros was one of the most powerful figures in northern Castile and enjoyed substantial rent income from his

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extensive land holdings.94 Juan Manuel, in turn, boasted in his Libro enfenido that he could recruit 1,000 caballeros from his holdings,95 far above the quantities he would have been required to bring by receiving 600,000 mrs. from the crown. Even if one does not take into account these three magnates’ use of personal resources, their contributions to the royal host – based strictly on soldada sums and without counting how much of their wealth they utilized – still would have amounted to nearly 500 caballeros and an infantry corps almost 1,000 strong. Such numbers were quite significant for the time. Besides these references, the other mentions of extraordinary taxation used to pay soldadas do not mention specific sums. This renders impossible any attempt at calculating the size of Castilian armies by comparing the guidelines with any global soldada figures. We are left only with the possibility of theoretical estimations. According to the Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348) formula, an expenditure of one million mrs. would have been enough to recruit 540 to 600 mounted warriors along with 54 heavily armored caballeros and an infantry contingent of 1188 to 1200 soldiers, half of them spearmen and half ballesteros for three months. An outlay of two million would, of course, double those amounts. Yet these figures – as impressive as they appear to be considering the relatively small size of fourteenth-century armed forces – appear low. The 1,000 caballeros, 100 heavily armored horsemen, and infantry contingent of over 2,000 men would have been far cry from the 13,000–14,000 caballeros who were supposed to have composed Alfonso’s host at Salado,96 although the latter figures would have represented a spectacularly huge military outlay. One way in which Alfonso could have assembled such a large army is by marshaling an amount of funds much larger than those reflected in the sources. This, however, would appear unlikely considering the deficits that plagued his regime.97 Since the royal soldadas provided only a fraction, though larger than in previous reigns, of the resources needed to recruit armies, the rest would have come from what we could term today the “private” resources of the magnates, lesser nobility and non-noble caballeros, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the military orders, and the Castilian cities. 94

95 96 97

According to the Libro Becerro de las Behetrías, ed. Gonzalo Martínez Díez, 3 vols. (León, 1981) [hereafter LBB], he had rent income from the merindades of Monzón, Campos, Carrión, Liébana y Pierna, Castrojeriz, Santo Domingo de Silos, and especially Saldaña. LBB, 1:223– 24, 226–30, 239–40, 314–15, 319, 321–24, 341, 350, 601; 2:14–18, 21–33, 38–39, 48–49, 56– 58, 63, 77, 88–96, 231–32, 598–99, 633–34, 642–43, 645, 648, 653. Juan Manuel, Libro enfenido, chap. 6 in Obras Completas, ed. José Manuel Blecua, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1982), 1:162. Robert Ricard, “La relation portugaise de la bataille du Salado (1340),” Hesperis 43 (1956), pp. 19–20, 22. Fiscal deficits were a problem for Alfonso from very early in his reign. In the ayuntamiento at Carrión (1317) it was determined that the royal treasury had revenues of 1.6 million mrs. but the expenses of running the realm ascended to 9.6 million mrs. during peace time. A new levy was granted but probably amounted to only 5 million mrs. due to the general instability in the realm. Budget deficits would continue to haunt him throughout the rest of his rule. CAXI, chap. 10, pp. 180–81; Hilda Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” in Historia económica y de las instituciones financieras en Europa, ed. Manuel J. Peláez (Málaga, 1990), p. 3437; O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 143.

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Since the recruitment of any force would have been an effort combining royal and private funding, Alfonso’s reforms appear to have consisted of increasing the amount that the royal coffers contributed to the overall equation. Despite not knowing exactly how much these new policies cost the royal treasury, it is simply undeniable that warfare in Castile, as in the rest of western Europe, was becoming more and more expensive.98 Besides the issues of recruitment and pay of troops, commanders also had to deal with the logistical issues of foodstuffs, equipment and transportation. In many instances, but especially in Alfonso’s operations at Algeciras and Gibraltar, the necessary naval presence undoubtedly sent costs skyrocketing.99 The Castilian monarch was faced with a particularly difficult dilemma: his military commitments kept increasing while his tax revenues continued to falter. His response was twofold. First, he continued to demand the collection of certain traditional taxes specifically related to warfare. These included tributes such as yantares, acémilas, galera, fonsadera, the quinto real, and parias. Second, he increasingly relied on the revenue gathered from extraordinary levies imposed with the approval of Castile’s cortes. Yantar in its origins was the feudal duty of the monarch’s vassals and other underlings to provide food and lodging when he visited them. By the twelfth century, a yearly monetary payment to the crown had come to substitute for the

98

99

Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” p. 3445; Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 91; Michael Prestwich, “War and taxation in England in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries” in Genèse de l’état moderne. Prélèvement et redistribution. Actes du Colloque de Fontevraud, 1984, ed. J.P. Genet and M. le Mené (Paris, 1987), p. 184. The expenditures of assembling, outfitting and maintaining a fleet were substantial. During Alfonso’s reign, the references to how much each vessel cost per month fluctuated between 16,000 mrs. (800 florins) for a Genoese mercenary galley (CAXI, chap. 212, p. 309) to 9,000 mrs. for an Aragonese galley (“Accounts of Juan Ferrández Muñoz, master of the import of the fleet for Pedro IV of Aragon (1346),” in Madrid, Arch. Museo Naval, Col. Sanz Barutell, Ser. Barcelona, MS. 355, fols. 213–19). These figures are problematic for there were constant disagreements as to how much money was owed (“Letter from Alfonso XI to Pedro IV [Gibraltar, August 30, 1349],” in Francisco de Moxó Montoliú, “Cartas reales de Alfonso XI a Pedro IV en el Archivo de la Corona de Aragón,” Anuario de Estudios Medievales 18 [1988], p. 287, doc. 34). Furthermore, the extant sources are silent about the costs of the round ships and other support vessels that also formed part of Castile’s fleets. These ships surely cost less than the galleys because they either were smaller, requiring fewer oarsmen, or relied on sails for propulsion. Considering these variables, I believe that a more solid estimate is that each ship cost 7,000–13,000 mrs. on the average per month of service in wages, foodstuffs and other materials. By March 1343, Alfonso had amassed a combined Genoese, Castilian and Aragonese fleet at Algeciras that numbered nearly 100 vessels, with 50 Castilian and Genoese galleys, 10 Aragonese galleys, 40 round ships outfitted for combat, and an undetermined number of supply and support ships (CAXI, chap. 287, p. 357–58). The galleys alone—assuming a cost of 9,000 for the Aragonese and Castilian galleys (45) and 16,000 mrs. for each of the, presumably fifteen, Genoese vessels—would have accounted for about 645,000 mrs. (32,250 florins) per month, and 7,740,000 mrs. (387,000 florins) over one year. The costs then for one month would have fluctuated between a minimum of 645,000 mrs. to 1,170,000 mrs. (58,500 florins) per month, and 7,740,000 mrs. (387,000 florins) to 14,040,000 mrs. (702,000 florins) over one year. To place these costs in some context, the royal budget for 1317 amounted to 9,600,000 mrs. (CAXI, chap. 10, pp. 180–81).

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actual provision, under the assumption that the king would grace the paying community with his presence at least once. Despite its steady diminishment in real value due to inflation and the numerous royal exemptions for individuals, and for areas and institutions under ecclesiastical authority, the collection of yantares across Castile could still produce notable sums for the monarchy. During Alfonso’s reign, it became customary for the king to receive this tribute even if he did not visit specific localities, as long as he was on a military campaign. This principle would later be confirmed during Pedro I’s reign (1350–69).100 Since access to beasts of burden was a sine qua non for any military operation’s success, the burdensome task of gathering pack animals, feeding them, and ultimately paying for them was traditionally solved in Castile through the tax or privilege of acémila. This tribute was generally assigned as a specific duty to a town after it had been granted a fuero by the crown and consisted of the provision of beasts of burden and/or money to pay for renting them for military campaigns. The crown staunchly clung to the privilege of collecting acémilas, even in areas that had passed from secular to ecclesiastic hands.101 Although it is difficult to determine with certitude how the collection of this tax occurred in each area, it is safe to assume that, when called upon, local authorities would have administered acémila levies. Those obligated to pay the tribute would have contributed in coin or with an actual beast of burden. What individual taxpayers owed was generally determined by their income levels.102 While in theory the acémila tax should have provided the necessary beasts of burden for a royal expedition, in practice it was a much more complicated matter, especially during and in the aftermath of Alfonso’s reign. While this duty was supposed to apply to everyone, many places had been granted exemptions. The nobility, especially the magnates, were also free from this duty although they probably collected it in their possessions for use by their own retinues. There were other restrictions placed on the use of this particular privilege. Certain places had to pay acémilas to the king only when he had assembled the royal host and personally commanded it. Others could also demand that the host in question be conducting an operation specifically against the Muslims before paying.103 Alfonso’s many expensive military ventures prompted him to raise the contribution rates for this duty, and even to collect it in areas that had been

100 101

102 103

CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1293, 1325), 1:109, 384; “Letter from Pedro I to his steward (Valladolid, July 18, 1352),” in CDPI, vol. 3: pp. 83–84, doc. 736. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 46. I have so far found no evidence elsewhere of such a formal levy specifically geared towards the acquisition of beasts of burden. In England, the royal prerogative of purveyance applied only to foodstuffs. Norman Housley, “European Warfare c. 1200–1320,” in Medieval Warfare. A History, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 128–29. CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1351), 2:126–27, 130–31. “Letter from Fernando IV prohibiting the collection of acémilas from the vassals and dependents of the archbishop of Toledo unless the king is personally leading his host against the moors (Valladolid, June 15, 1307),” in Antonio Benavides, Memorias de Don Fernando IV (Madrid, 1860), 2:565–66, doc. 385.

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previously exempt. During 1342 and 1343, he suspended the bishop of Segovia’s exemption in order to help fund the siege of Algeciras.104 Royal collectors under his orders also imposed the tax during this period on those under the authority of the bishop of León, whose privileges exempted them.105 The most certain conclusion regarding the diverse conflicts and difficulties related to the collection of acémila is that whenever the monarch demanded it from a community, he generally received a good amount, if not all, of what he asked for. For the local population, it was preferable to provide beasts or cash rather than incur the king’s wrath. Galera, or galley, was the obligation of certain Cantabrian towns to provide outfitted ships to the monarch whenever he assembled a fleet. This duty appears to have existed since the late thirteenth century. Santander, for example, had to furnish a nao (round ship) and a galley whenever the king was on campaign and in need of naval support.106 The city of Laredo, in lieu of paying other tributes, provided the crown with an armed galley outfitted with 60 oars and 60 men equipped for fighting for at least three months.107 In similar fashion, Castrourdiales, in return for exemption from all other royal taxation, was obligated to supply a round ship or galley for three month’s service.108 After 1344, Algeciras’s shipyards were under the obligation of providing the monarch with two outfitted galleys whenever a royal fleet assembled in Seville.109 How widespread and effective this mechanism was during Alfonso’s reign is hard to discern. In fact, when galera is mentioned it is in the context of royal grants of exemption from it.110 Furthermore, it is important to note that this tribute was a parallel but separate practice from that of impressing ships in times of war.111 Considering the high costs of building and outfitting ships, galera appears to have been a contentious issue between the monarchy and the individual towns. It would appear that neither side could take this obligation, or exemption from it, for granted.112 Akin to galera, fonsadera (scutage), consisting of monetary payments to the monarch in lieu of military service, was specifically related to warfare and only 104

105

106 107 108 109 110

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“Privilege to Segovia from Alfonso XI acknowledging that Segovia pays 6,000 mrs. annually in return from exemption from acémilas and fonsadera with the exception of the years 1342 and 1343 (Valladolid, November 3, 1351),” CDPI, 2:266–69, doc. 532. “Alfonso XI orders that fonsadera not be collected at Mansilla since the town, along with the rest of the archbishopric of León, has agreed to pay acémilas to the royal collectors (Algeciras, July 8, 1343),” in CDACLXI, p. 454, doc. 3081. LBB, 2:180–81, 108. Ibid., pp. 567–68, 328. Ibid., pp. 569–70, 330. Pedro López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Enrique, Bk. 1, chap. 7 in Crónicas, ed. José Luis Martín (Barcelona, 1991), p. 441. “Alfonso XI confirms a privilege to Avilés from Fernando IV which stated that they were exempt from fonsadera and galera (Madrid, August 16, 1329),” in Colección diplomática del Archivo del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Avilés (siglos XII-XV), 1155–1495, ed. Eloy Benito Ruano (Avilés, 1992), pp. 129–31, doc. 81. “Alfonso XI confirms a letter to San Sebastián from Fernando IV ordering that no more ships be impressed for the royal fleet (Valladolid, 1318),” in Colección de documentos medievales de las villas guipuzcoanas (1200–1369), pp. 135–36, doc. 134. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 45–46.

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supposed to be collected when the kingdom was at war. There are very few references regarding the procedures utilized in the imposition and payment of this tribute, but there are some indications that the sums collected either had been previously established in a local fuero, negotiated with local authorities, or determined through the execution of padrones on the goods of those obligated to pay.113 While the crown received and utilized a good portion of this income, a precedent was set in the thirteenth century by Alfonso X and later affirmed during Alfonso XI’s reign of allowing the local nobility and caballeros or the Military Orders114 to collect and receive the fonsadera instead of handing it over to the royal treasurers. While this probably assured a more efficient collection, in many localities it eliminated royal control over the fonsadera.115 Regardless, the Castilian monarch imposed its collection in 1330,116 1332,117 1340,118 1343–44 for the siege of Algeciras,119 and 1349.120 The scanty evidence that has survived indicates that by the end of Alfonso’s reign, those localities, other than those that were part of the royal patrimony, still paying this tribute to the king were usually under ecclesiastical jurisdiction.121 Even so, fonsadera remained an important resource for the Castilian monarchs, even if indirectly, because rather than fall into disuse it continued to be collected and used by secular lords, caballeros or

113 114

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116 117 118

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See note 59. “Privilege granted by Alfonso XI to the Order of Calatrava (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),” Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional [hereafter, AHN], Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta. 5, vol. 1, doc. 44. CLC, 1:313 (Ayuntamiento de Carrión 1317), 362 (Cortes de Medina del Campo, 1318), 421 (Madrid, 1329); “Alfonso XI grants Infante Fadrique, master of the Order of Santiago, exclusive rights of all fonsadera collected in the Order’s possessions (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),” AHN, Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta. 413, doc. 56. “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering the city of León to collect fonsadera for the year 1330 (Segovia, September 28, 1331),” in CDACLXI, p. 356, doc. 2989. “Letter from Alfonso XI to the city of León (Burgos, August 10, 1332),” in CDAML, pp. 134– 35, doc. 92. “Letter by López Ferrández, from the royal chamber, to Cuéllar, ordering the town council to pay the sum collected from fonsadera to Juan González de Roa or Ferrán Pérez de Saldaña (February 20, 1340),” in Colección diplomática de Cuellar, ed. Antonio Ubieto Arteta (Segovia, 1961), pp. 193–94, doc. 93; “Letter from Alfonso XI to León asking for fonsadera (Madrid, January 25, 1340),” in CDACLXI, pp. 427–30, doc. 3058. “Letter from Alfonso XI to all places under the jurisdiction of the bishopric of Burgos to pay fonsadera (Algeciras, February 1343),” in Luciano Serrano, ed., Cartulario del Infantado de Covarrubias (Valladolid, 1907), pp. 195–97, doc. 164; “Letter from Alfonso XI asserting that anyone who agreed to collect fonsadera in León on behalf of Yuzaf Leví, royal tax colector, was to collect the fonsadera due in March 1344 one year early (Algeciras, September 1343),” in CDAML, p. 186, doc. 134. “Pedro I orders the collectors of fonsadera that in the event that León did not pay fonsadera duing Alfonso XI’s siege of Algeciras, they be exempted from the 1349 fonsadera levy instituted by the king during the siege of Gibraltar (Valladolid, May 14, 1351),” in CDPI, 1:140– 41, doc. 104. Ignacio Alvarez Borges, El feudalismo castellano y El Libro Becerro de las Behetrías: la merindad de Burgos (León, 1987), p. 108.

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urban councils to further fund their contingents during royal military campaigns.122 The Castilian royal treasury also benefited from the collection of the quinto real or a 20 per cent share of all the spoils recovered from mounted border raids and pillage in Muslim lands, whether it be goods, coinage, or captives.123 The manner in which the quinto was accumulated – essentially a share upon an amount of booty undefined until it was actually recovered – made its amounts impossible to predict. Regardless, the king, besides profiting from it as a source of income, utilized the quinto as an enticement for Castilian towns along the Granadan border to engage in military activity by granting shares of it, or exemptions from royal collection, to individuals, cities or groups. References, however, to specific quinto real sums are very few. In 1294, for instance, Sancho IV received 36,000 mrs. from Seville and its surrounding areas,124 yet there are no other references to the rest of the border region. Despite the shrinking frontier, Alfonso remained keenly interested in the plunder collected by the frontier towns. With regards to Murcia, he reaffirmed in 1333 that its citizens pay a royal seventh instead of a fifth of their booty,125 although he continued to collect it.126 The following year, he intervened to resolve a dispute that had arisen over how the spoils from a recent raid should be divided. The specific issue was whether some Christian mounted warriors, after chasing, defeating and recapturing some cattle stolen by Muslims, were entitled to keep the animals as compensation for their losses or return them to their Christian owners. Alfonso confirmed the ruling of a local official that the caballeros were entitled to keep the beasts since, as custom and law dictated, they had recovered the livestock in enemy territory through their own effort and expense.127 At times, the king earmarked whatever sums might be collected in border raids to defray local defense costs such as when he placed the castle of Tiscar under the authority of Ubeda.128 Alfonso also utilized the promise of exemptions from the quinto to encourage military service.129 Even 122

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125 126 127 128

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“Privilege from Alfonso XI to the caballeros of Cuenca (Cuellar, May 20, 1322),” cit. in Cabañas González, La caballería popular en Cuenca , p. 37; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 41–45, 299. Partidas, 2, 26, 6. “Accounts of Juan Mateo de Luna, chamberlain of the frontier”; AHN, Códice 985b, fol. 2r.; Asunción López Dapena, ed., Cuentas y gastos (1292–1294) del Rey D. Sancho IV el Bravo (1284–1295) (Córdoba, 1984), p. 666. This appears to indicate that military raids along the border were quite productive, even if the crown only received 36,000 mrs., accounting perhaps for 180,000 mrs. or higher. Such a sum, even taking into account the expenses related to organizing and conducting the raids, would have been quite significant at the local level. “Royal letter to Mayr Aben Mudur (Valladolid, February 27, 1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 272–74, doc. 236. “Letter from Alfonso XI to Murcia (Valladolid, May 2, 1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 278–79, doc. 241. “Royal decree from Alfonso XI to the alcaldes of Murcia (Burgos, May 2, 1334),” in CODOM6, pp. 312–13, doc. 270. “Alfonso XI’s concession of the castle of Tiscar to the council of Ubeda (Valladolid, November 28, 1335),” in Colección Diplomática de Quesada, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo Arroquia (Jaén, 1975), pp. 40–44, doc. 24. “Letter from Alfonso XI confirming the freedoms granted by Alfonso X to the armadores at Cartagena, Guardamar, Alicante y Murcia (Tordesillas, June 24, 1347),” in CODOM6, p. 469, doc. 412.

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though its sums were not as significant or reliable as others, Alfonso’s administration evidently continued to consider the quinto real an important resource.130 Another source of income linked to the wars with the Muslims were the parias or payments to the Castilian crown from the Granadan emirate during times of peace, a practice extending back to the twelfth century.131 The Muslim emir pledged vassalage to the Castilian king who in turn guaranteed the Granadans the liberty of running their own affairs. The parias, however, were a notoriously unreliable source of income. Although they could be substantial and were slated to be paid every year, there were many reasons – war, Castilian instability or weakness, or Granadan unwillingness – why the payments were suspended. The dislocations that marked Alfonso’s minority and the open warfare between Castile and Granada during the first five years of his adult rule very likely ensured that no parias were sent by the Granadans to Castile. However, Alfonso secured a truce with Muhammad IV (1325–33) in 1331 in which he was to receive a yearly sum of 12,000 doblas or roughly 246,000 mrs. (12,300 fls.).132 It is clear that again these were irregular payments since hostilities broke out again two years later. The sum of 12,000 doblas133 came to be standardized during the last two decades of Alfonso’s reign since similar arrangements were agreed upon after Alfonso’s failed Gibraltaran operation of 1333,134 and his capture of Algeciras in 1344.135 Due to the irregular nature of the quinto real and parias and the continuing trend of traditional tributes like the galera, fonsadera, and yantar to diminish in real value, extraordinary levies, such as monedas foreras, servicios or ayudas (aids), alcabalas, shares of ecclesiastical income, and in some instances the sale of royal lands, became crucially important for Alfonso’s military activities. Even though the fiscal burden upon his subjects increased, Alfonso was able to secure the necessary funding for all of his successful campaigns. Yet the king, as much as he may have desired to, could not arbitrarily impose taxes upon the realm. Abiding by the principle of consent – in essence that no 130 131 132

133

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135

Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 50–52. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 47–48; Valdeavellano, Curso de historia de las insituciones españolas (Madrid, 1968), pp. 410, 609. CODOM6, pp. 186–92, docs. 166–68; CAXI, chap. 91, pp. 227–28. I am utilizing an approximate exchange rate of 20.5 mrs. per dobla for 1330 calculated by Peter Spufford et al., Handbook of Medieval Exchange, p. 159. According to Ladero Quesada, the dobla was worth about 20 mrs. by the end of the thirteenth century. Although inflation may have diminished the value of the maravedí vis-à-vis the dobla during the first 30 years of the fourteenth century, using this ratio one can calculate that the parias agreed to by Alfonso in 1331, 1333, and 1334 each would have totaled around 240,000 mrs. This was a significant sum yet probably not particularly heavy for a kingdom such as Granada. The benefit to the royal treasury was also limited since the bulk of it was earmarked for frontier defense. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 111, 225. M. Alarcón y Santón and Ramón García de Linares, eds. and trans., Los documentos árabes diplomáticos de Archivos de la Corona de Aragón (Madrid, 1940), pp. 61–63, doc. 30; CAXI, chap. 126, p. 257. Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel, p. 642, docs. 572–73; AMV, Manual de Consell, A4, fol. 30 in Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 358–59, doc. 28; CAXI, chap. 336, pp. 386–90.

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one could be deprived of property without just cause and that the consent of the governed was necessary for any new taxation – the monarch was required to call together a full meeting of the cortes or a partial assembly often known as an ayuntamiento. These parliamentary meetings would then serve as platforms for the king to request extra funds, outline their necessity, and obtain consent. While in theory the representatives gathered at these assemblies could rebuff royal requests, they never did so. The real discussion centered on how large each particular collection would be. The representatives certainly complained about the negative economic impact that extra taxation would have on them and at times successfully pleaded to reduce the amounts requested, but they consented in the end.136 Moneda forera was originally a levy granted to the king with the consent of the cortes in return for royal assurances not to alter the composition or value of Castile’s coinage. Devaluing the coinage was a means of raising revenue with royal prerogative, but which caused disruptive inflation. By the late thirteenth century, it had become customary for the moneda to be collected every seven years, perhaps without the need to consult the realm’s representatives.137 Under this seven-year timetable, Alfonso received this tribute in 1318138 and 1325.139 It, however, could also be an extraordinary tax, although in these cases the king needed to secure the specific consent of the cortes. Alfonso collected extraordinary monedas in 1329,140 1336,141 1341–42,142 and 1343.143 He also arranged for a new levy in 1349 to help fund his second Gibraltan operation but he died before it could be fully collected.144 Though moneda forera was a particularly important levy, at what rates it was collected and its overall contribution to the royal treasury remain elusive. This tribute itself was a per capita tax from which few were exempt.145 By 1294, it was being collected at the rate of 8 mrs. per taxpayer in Castile, Extremadura and Andalusia, and 6 mrs. in León. This rate must have remained stable for in 1350, 136 137

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141 142 143 144 145

O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, pp. 130–32. Alvarez Borge, El feudalismo castellano, p. 106; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 55; O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, pp. 133–34; Valdeavellano, Curso de historia, p. 603. CAXI, 182, chap. 12; “Letter from Alfonso XI and his regents (Medina del Campo, September 10, 1318),” in Angel Barrios García, ed., Documentación medieval del Archivo Municipal de Alba de Tormes (Salamanca, 1982), pp. 97–99, doc. 29. CAXI, chap. 40, p. 199; “Letter from Alfonso XI to Murcia (Valladolid, December 12, 1325),” in CODOM6, p. 64, doc. 53. “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering that all his vassals across the realm pay moneda forera (Valladolid, December 12, 1329),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 273–76, doc. 146; CAXI, chap. 80, pp. 222–23; “Royal letter from Alfonso XI to the moneda forera collectors in Murcia (Villareal, June 30, 1330),” in CODOM6, pp. 172–73, doc. 152. CAXI, chap. 155, p. 274; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the moneda forera collectors in Murcia (Real sobre Lerma, October 15, 1336),” in CODOM6, pp. 371–72, doc. 327. “Royal decree from Alfonso XI to the council of Murcia (Madrid, January 25, 1341),” in CODOM6, pp. 436–37, doc. 384. CAXI, chap. 282, p. 354. “Royal communication to the councils in Murcia (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),” in CODOM6, pp. 498–501, doc. 436. Alvarez Borge, El feudalismo castellano, p. 106; O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 135.

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Pedro I decreed that the minimum amount of income to be obligated to pay moneda was 60 mrs. and, specifically in case of Murcia, anyone who achieved this income level was required to pay 8 mrs.146 The global sums, especially for Alfonso’s reign, are even more difficult to calculate. Ladero Quesada has argued that even through the travails of Alfonso’s minority, each moneda still yielded a significant 1,000,000 mrs., though down from 1,500,000 during Sancho IV’s reign.147 The 1343 moneda, for example, was approved in a meeting between the king and those towns that had sent contingents to the Algeciran operation. Though numerous, they certainly would have been less than in a full assembly of the cortes. Equally or even more important than moneda forera for Alfonso’s administration were levies known as servicios or ayudas, extraordinary grants of taxation approved by the cortes or ayuntamientos. The term servicio was first used in the middle of the thirteenth century. It was generally a tax on movable property, unless it was determined to be the equivalent of a moneda when it would be a head tax.148 Similar to monedas, servicios were particularly attractive to the royal treasurers because they were not subject to the traditional fueros. As such, the taxes extended to a greater section of the realm149 and the sums collected would not be set in any previously extant documentation, but instead periodically negotiated.150 By Alfonso’s reign, these extraordinary levies had become frequent enough to be considered habitual. Due to his many military expenses and the instability that marked the early part of his reign, he came to rely even more heavily on servicios. They were authorized to be collected in 1314 at the cortes held in Valladolid and Medina del Campo (5 servicios);151 1315 at Burgos (3 ayudas); 1316 for Infante Pedro (1 servicio worth 1,000,000 mrs.); 1317 at Carrión (5 146

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“Letter from Pedro I to the bishopric of Cartagena and the Murcian kingdom specifying the procedures for the collection of moneda forera (Seville, September, 1350),” in Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, vol. 7, Documentos de Pedro I, ed. Angel Luis Molina Molina (Murcia, 1978) [hereafter, CODOM7], pp. 17–20, doc. 15. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 223. O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 135; Valdeavellano, Curso de historia, pp. 610–11. There were instances in which some localities agreed to pay a certain amount instead of having local officials or tax collectors investigate and draw up a new padrón of tax payers. “Alfonso XI confirms that Bejar and its environs will pay 3,000 mrs. per servicio (September 3, 1322),” in Angel García Barrios et al., eds., Documentación medieval de los Archivos de Bejar y Candelario (Salamanca, 1986), pp. 65–66, doc. 30. My personal survey and database of the Libro Becerro de las Behetrías, a document that reflected established northern Castilian practice rather than any innovation by Pedro I’s administration, reveals that 89% of all fiefs listed were subject to servicios, making it as universal a form of taxation as was possible in fourteenth-century Castile. It is not unrealistic to assume that the Andalusian, Extremaduran and Galician areas not listed would have been liable at similar rates. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 57–58. “Letter of Alfonso XI to the archbishop of Toledo, granting a partial exemption to the servicios approved by the cortes at Valladolid (Valladolid, August 10, 1314),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 48–49, doc. 14; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the tax collectors of Candemuño and Infantado de Covarrubias (Dueñas, April 28, 1314),” in Documentación de la catedral de Burgos, (1254–1293) (1294–1316), ed. F. Javier Pereda Llarena, 2 vols. (Burgos, 1980), 2:319–21, doc. 469.

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servicios);152 1318 (5 servicios);153 1320 (7½ servicios for those recognizing the regency of Infante Juan Manuel154 and 6 for those recognizing the regency of Infante Felipe);155 1323 (5 servicios for Infante Juan); 1324 (5 servicios collected by Juan Manuel);156 1325 when Alfonso started to rule as an adult (5 servicios);157 1329 (4 ayudas);158 1332 (1 kingdom-wide servicio,159 and 4 servicios collected from those under the authority of the Order of Santiago in Toledo and Cuenca);160 1336 (5 servicios),161 and 1337 (1 undefined servicio);162 1339 (unspecified servicio) at the ayuntamiento at Madrid;163 1340 (unspecified reduced servicio) when Alfonso held an ayuntamiento at Llerena;164 and 1349 (2 servicios )165 for the Gibraltaran expedition.166 The lack of fourteenth-century fiscal sources renders problematic any effort to ascertain in any great detail the collection and administration of servicios. There are no references regarding servicio collection rates during the reign of Alfonso, except for Juan Manuel’s levy in 1321 that was gathered at 6 per cent (60 out of every 1,000 mrs. of personal wealth both in terms of property and income) with an exemption for anyone having less than 8 mrs. in assets.167 From the sparse information regarding the inner workings of servicio collection that

152 153

154 155 156 157

158

159 160

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162 163 164 165

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CAXI, chaps. 8, 10, pp. 179–81. “Letter from Alfonso XI and his regents (Medina del Campo, September 10, 1318),” in Angel Barrios García, ed., Documentación medieval del Archivo Municipal de Alba de Tormes, pp. 97–99, doc. 29; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the master of the Order of Calatrava (Valladolid, October 26, 1318),” AHN, Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta 429, doc. 191; CAXI, chap. 12, p. 182. CAXI, chap. 27, p. 191. GCAXI, chap. 27, p. 334. CAXI, chaps. 29, 3, pp. 193, 195. “Letter from Alfonso XI to all locales affected by the levy of Mayorga, regarding the servicios approved by the cortes of Valladolid (Valladolid, February 17, 1326),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 146–49, doc. 91; CAXI, chap. 40, 199. “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering all his realm’s vassals to pay moneda forera (Valladolid, December 12, 1329),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 73–76, doc. 146; CAXI, chap. 80, p. 223. “Royal decree from Alfonso XI to the Murcian council (Burgos, May 30, 1322),” in CODOM6, p. 234, docs. 203. “Letter from Alfonso XI to the master of the Order of Santiago (Valladolid, March 10, 1332),” RAH, Col. Salazar y Castro, MS. M–128, fols. 303v.–305; cit. in Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” pp. 3445–46. “Letter from Alfonso XI to the archbishop of Toledo regarding the collection of four servicios (Lerma, December 5, 1336),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 414–15, doc. 242; CAXI, chap. 154, p. 273 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the collectors of the servicio at Montiel (Mérida, December 20, 1337),” in CODOM6, pp. 402–03, doc. 358. CAXI, chap. 196, p. 298. CAXI, chap. 254, p. 831. “Letter from Alfonso XI to all officials and councils in Murcia, notifying them of the collection of a moneda and two servicios for the war against Granada (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),” in CODOM6, pp. 498–501, doc. 436; CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1351), 2:63. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 65–70. CAXI, chap. 27, pp. 191–92.

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has survived, a standard tax rate utilized in Castile cannot be determined. In fact, the lack of source material would appear to indicate there indeed was no customary rate of taxation.168 Even so, the few references available indicate that the sums collected from servicio levies were very significant. Infante Pedro, for example, received a servicio in 1316 from those under his authority that amounted to a cuento or 1,000,000 mrs.169 In the ayuntamiento held at Carrión in 1317, Alfonso’s treasury was declared to have revenues of only 1,600,000 mrs., yet the expenditures of administering the realm ascended to 9,600,000. Even though one has to be skeptical of these figures due to the lack of corroboration from other documentation, it is evident that the monarchy’s rent income had diminished to intolerably low levels. The king and his regents were granted 5 servicios. If – and this is by no means certain – these new taxes were intended to cover the whole of the royal budget deficit, they would have had to be 1,600,000 mrs. each. Due to the general instability of the realm, the actual sums collected were significantly lower, adding up to less than 5,000,000 mrs.170 Even though it is a problematic figure, if one assumes that the average yield of one servicio, regardless of its extent, was between 500,000 and 1,000,000 mrs., then the global amounts gathered by Alfonso’s tax collectors during his adult rule could have reached between 12–24 million mrs. These monies were used almost exclusively to fund military activities ranging from the defense of the frontier, to incursions into foreign territories, to the conquest of Muslim holdings. Even when only taking into account the potential revenues that could be drawn from servicios, their contribution to Alfonso’s treasury was indispensable. The continuing demands of Alfonso’s campaigns led him to go beyond monedas and servicios to expand the alcabala, an indirect tax charged on the sale of certain items that dated back to the previous century.171 The appeal of the alcabala for Alfonso was twofold: it had great income potential since it tapped into trade, which despite Castile’s economic depression was still vibrant, and contrary to other tributes detailed in the fueros, he wielded more control over its collection. While in theory the amount collected by the royal agents should have been a veintena or 5 per cent,172 it would appear that during Alfonso’s reign it was only collected at the rate of 3.33 per cent.173 Although exact figures are not 168 169 170 171

172 173

O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 143. CAXI, chap. 8, p.180. CAXI, chap. 10, p. 180–81; Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” p. 3437; O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 143. Salvador de Moxó, La alcabala; sobre sus orígenes, concepto y naturaleza (Madrid, 1963), p. 33; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 180; Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 58–59. Making money from trade was not new. England during the first half of the fourteenth century became more and more dependent on the customs and subsidies related to overseas trade. W. M. Ormrod, “The crown and the English economy, 1290–1350,” in Before the Black Death, ed. Bruce M. S. Campbell (Manchester, 1991), p. 169; idem., “The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War,” in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, eds. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 88. Moxo, La alcabala, p. 39; Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 59. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 189.

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extant, this tribute clearly raised very large sums for the royal treasury. In 1333, the monarch imposed alcabalas in the Andalusian region to raise funds for frontier defense and specifically to recruit three thousand extra caballeros to serve at border outposts.174 Alfonso reimplemented this tribute in Andalusia in 1338,175 earmarking some of the funds for the upkeep of local castles and other fortifications such as Tiscar, Quesada and Albanchez, which were administered by the town of Ubeda.176 Looking for ways to raise the necessary funds for his Algeciran operation, Alfonso imposed the first kingdom-wide alcabala in 1342.177 Three years later, he persuaded the ayuntamiento at Burgos to allow for its collection in the following six years.178 Alfonso also turned to the Church for financial support for his campaigns, especially when directed at Muslim targets. While the ecclesiastical tributes were collected locally, the monarchy was expected to ask for papal permission before assuming it had access to them. In reality, the intolerable delays caused by communication problems, diplomatic demands and protocols, and royal, ecclesiastical, and papal bureaucratic procedures drove the Castilian kings to acquire, or attempt to acquire, the sums in expectation of a positive papal response. Even though this practice led to conflicts between the crown and the Papal See, it is evident that the Castilian monarchs more often than not were successful in accessing these ecclesiastical funds. Church monetary support took many forms, such as loans and ayudas,179 but some of the most important were crusading bulls, which in addition to being powerful recruiting tools, also permitted Alfonso to collect shares of ecclesiastical rents such as tercias reales and décimas. During Alfonso’s reign, one of the best ways to provide additional impulse to any military operation was to have it declared a crusade by the Papacy. The procurement of a crusading bull was particularly attractive because it conveyed an indulgence to those who participated,180 and also allowed for the preaching and gathering of alms to help defray military costs. But, what exactly made a crusade different from other campaigns? While any ecclesiastical or secular leader 174 175 176 177 178

179

180

CAXI, chap. 128, pp. 258–59; “Royal letter to the council of Murcia (Seville, November 23, 1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 294–96, doc. 258. “Alfonso XI orders the collectors of alcabalas in Murcia and Lorca to deliver 80,000 mrs. to Gonzalo Rodríguez de Avilés (Sigüenza, July 25, 1338),” in CODOM6, p. 422, doc. 371. “Letter from Alfonso XI to the collectors of alcabalas in Ubeda (September 15, 1338),” in Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de Ubeda, p. 188, doc. 67. CAXI, chap. 262, p. 337. “Royal notebook from Alfonso XI to all the councils in Murcia detailing how the alcabalas were to be collected (Alcalá de Henares, February 2, 1348),” in CODOM6, pp. 482–84, doc. 424; CLC (Ayuntamiento de Burgos, 1345), 1:488–89. “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering the seizure of the necessary goods from the bishopric of Avila to cover the amount he solicited for the Gibraltan operation (Gibraltar, 1349),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 595–97, doc. 339. Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada de España (Vitoria, 1958), p. 133. The issue of the remission of sins for crusades in the Iberian Peninsula can be at times ambiguous. Urban II appears to have implied that the plenary indulgence was only available to those who died while fighting the Muslims in Spain, as opposed to those who received it if they journeyed to Palestine (Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading

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could proclaim or call for a crusade, sanction from the Papal See was necessary for the operation to be an official crusade and benefit from the additional prestige. Furthermore, the Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula had prompted Urban II (1088–99) to forbid Spaniards from going on crusade to the Holy Land under the rationale that their efforts should be directed at the Muslims at hand. With the Papacy’s intended purpose of reestablishing the Christian religion in the Iberian Peninsula by ridding it of Muslims, crusades in Spain were equated with their counterparts in the East.181 When applied to Alfonso’s diverse wars, it is evident that the principal requirements for an operation to be considered a crusade were: 1) that the enemy be Muslim; and 2) that the king receive official sanction from the Roman pontiff. During Alfonso’s rule, crusading bulls were sought and granted in 1317,182 1319,183 1329,184 1340,185 and 1342.186 All these campaigns were either against Granadan or Marinid armies or fortresses, in contrast to the military march into Navarre in 1335, the conflict with Portugal in 1336–38, or the pacification of the Castilian aristocracy. There are very sparse references to the overall sums amassed during the diverse crusade collections, making it very difficult to determine how much of an aid it actually was.187 In the only document I have located, García de Sotocueva and Sancho Ochoa de Baracaldo, crusade collectors for the Infantes Pedro and Juan in 1319, acknowledged their receipt of 17,130 esterlines coronados from the Vizcayan city of

181 182 183 184 185

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[Philadelphia, 1986], pp. 28–29). This was not necessarily standard practice, however, for the Order of Santiago was granted the privilege of preaching the crusade and gathering alms in order to provide for the defense of its frontier castles (“Letter from Fernando IV to Juan Osores, master of the Order of Santiago [Seville, July 1, 1303], confirmed by Alfonso XI [1316],” AHN, Sec. Sigilografía, Caj. 8, doc. 3). In 1386, Clement VII (1378–94) gave a crusading bull including a plenary indulgence for all those who served in the defense of the Order of Santiago’s frontier outposts and suggested that it was more a confirmation than a new grant (AHN, Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta. 116, doc. 4). Joseph F. O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain (Philadelphia, 2003), p. 209, determined that crusaders in Iberia did not need to achieve martyrdom in order to achieve absolution of sins since merely to participate or help economically was enough to be granted an indulgence. José Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, pp. 46, 60–63. Register Vaticanus, 68, ep. 1694, cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 285; CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181. GCAXI, chap. 19, p. 310. Reg. Vat., 87, ep. 2477, cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 299. “Epistola ad Benedictus XII (1334–42) pro Alphonso, regi Castellae et Legionis, conceditur ut per certos archiepiscopos et episcopus praedicteur Crux in regnis, comitatibus et terris … conceditur ad trienium decima omnium reddituum ecclesiasticorum regnorum et comitatuum praedictorum sub certis modificationibus … (Avignon, March 7, 1340),” Reg. Vat., 128, nº 14 as printed in Jean Marie Vidal, ed., Benoit XII (1334–1342). Lettres Communes (Paris, 1902), p. 278, doc. 8103. There were three subsequent epistles related to this one which consisted of announcements to the various ecclesiastical, regular and military order authorities across Castile. Reg. Vat. 128, nos. 15–17 as printed in Vidal, p. 278, docs. 8104–8106. CAXI, chap. 273, p. 347; “Bull from Clement VI (1342–52) to Alfonso XI (October, 1343),” in Luciano Serrano, “Alfonso XI y el Papa Clemente VI durante el cerco de Algeciras,” Cuadernos de los Trabajos de la Escuela Española de Arqueología e Historia de Roma 3 (1912), p. 33, doc. 7. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 207, 209.

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Guetaria.188 How large this contribution is depends on the worth of these esterlines coronados. One possibility is that these coronados were silver coins minted during Sancho IV’s reign, making the sum roughly 1,713–2,855 mrs. (86–143 fls.).189 Another is that the document refers to a silver coin produced either in England or along the territories held in northern France by the English crown. In this case, Guetaria’s contribution to the crusade could have been between 8,780–10,547 mrs. (439–527 fls.).190 Regardless of which figure is more exact, it is clear that the city’s contribution was substantial. Furthermore, although it is dangerous to estimate from one reference how much an individual crusade collection across the kingdom could amount to, the significant contribution provided by this one mercantile town – especially when considering that crusades would be preached in hundreds if not thousands of towns and villages – indicates that these collections undoubtedly yielded large monetary sums. Crusading bulls were, therefore, important tools for financial as well as for recruitment and prestige purposes. The tercias reales consisted of approximately a 2/9 share of ecclesiastical rent income specifically set aside for the construction, repair and supply of church buildings across Castile.191 During Alfonso’s reign, the Papacy conceded the tercias to infante Pedro in 1317 in order to fund his expeditions against Granada.192 As an adult, Alfonso also collected them by permission from the Papacy in 1328–32193 as well as in 1340,194 1343195 and 1349.196 Towards the end of his reign and afterwards, it is clear that the Castilian monarchs took for granted that they would receive 188 189

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191 192 193

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Colección de documentos medievales de las villas guipuzcoanas, pp. 136–37, doc. 135. If one assumes that these coins were Castilian in origin and since Alfonso did not issue new coinage during the first fourteen years of his reign, the esterlines coronados could be silver coins minted during Sancho IV’s reign in 1286 matching Alfonso X’s worth, or a set of those produced in 1305 during Fernando IV’s reign under the same name. Sancho IV’s coronados were generally worth one-sixth of a maravedi but could be worth one-tenth, depending on the coin. Fernando IV’s coronados amounted to one-tenth of a maravedi. Octavio Gil Farres, Historia de la moneda española. 2nd ed. (Madrid, 1976), pp. 343–44. By the 1350s, according to the LBB, coronados were worth one-sixth of a maravedi. LBB, 1:125; 3:124. If the esterlines coronados were English or northern French silver coins, they could have been equivalent to 4 dineros carlines from 1358. Assuming that a sueldo carlín was worth either 10 or 12 dineros esterlines—an assumption that is by no means certain and impossible to determine for sure—then the sum of 17,130 esterlines coronados would be equivalent to between 439–520 Aragonese florins which in turn yield 8,780–10,547 mrs. Earl J. Hamilton, Money, Prices and Wages in Valencia, Aragon and Navarre 1351–1500 (1936, repr. Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 140–41. Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 59; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, 191. CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181; Reg. Vat. 68, ep. 1694; cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 285. “Bull from Pope John XXII (1316–34) to the archbishop of Seville, bishop of Córdoba and bishop of Jaén, granting Alfonso XI the décimas as a subsidy for the war against the moors (Avignon, April 8, 1331),” CDACLXI, pp. 354–55, doc. 2987; Reg. Vat., 87, ep. 2477, cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 299. “Epistola ad Bendictus XII de approbatione indictionis Cruciatae et impositione decame pro bello contra reges Granatae et de Benamarin, aliosque Sarracenos (Avignon, XII kalendas anno sexto [May 10, 1340]),” Reg. Vat. A.A. Instr. as printed in Vidal, Benoit XII, p. 306, doc. 8355; CAXI, chap. 242, p. 318.

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the tercias and therefore set down clear procedures regarding their collection.197 The décimas (tenths) was a ten per cent share of the total of ecclesiastical rents. It evolved over time into a specific amount paid to the royal treasury, with each diocese contributing a determined amount. Usually awarded in conjunction with the tercias reales, the décima differed in that its collection and disbursement was left to ecclesiastical fiscal institutions while the former implied the imposition of the royal fiscal apparatus.198 During Alfonso’s reign, the Papacy granted décimas during times of conflict with Granada in 1317,199 1328,200 1340,201 and 1343.202 Like tercias reales, the décimas had great revenue potential. The lack of sources do not permit us to figure out how much each collection of tercias reales and décimas yielded exactly. However, we do know that when Infante Pedro was granted the privilege to gather them in 1317,203 it was under the condition that the overall sum collected would not exceed 150,000 florins or roughly 3,000,000 mrs.204 The fact that the agreement was capped at such a high amount clearly suggests that the income derived from tercias and décimas could be and was usually very substantial. It is therefore no surprise that the Castilian monarchy constantly attempted to tap into it. Even with these revenue streams, Alfonso was regularly driven to procure empréstitos or loans from diverse entities both inside and outside Castile. Despite his treasury’s financial troubles, all the evidence indicates that Alfonso did not rely on forced loans, although the mechanism for such collections was already established,205 but rather negotiated his empréstitos. To amass the necessary 195

196 197 198 199 200

201 202 203 204 205

“Alfonso XI, regi castellae, scribitur ut ratificatio conditionum habitarum pro concessione decimarum et duabus partibus decimarum per litteras regias extra tempus termini ipsi imposit valeat ac si facta fuisset infra (Avinione, XI kalendas novembris, anno secundo [October 22, 1343]),” Reg. Vat. 137, fol. 127, nº 335 as printed in Eugene Déprez and Guillaume Mollat, eds., Clement VI (1342–1352). Lettres closes, patentes et curiales. Interessant les pays autres que la France publiées ou analysées d’après les Registres du Vatican (Paris, 1960), p. 41, doc. 308; Serrano, “Alfonso XI y el Papa Clemente VI ,” p. 33, doc. 7. “Alfonso XI orders the officials and councils of Cartagena to arrange for the collection of the tercias reales as ordered by Clement VI (Gibraltar, September 15, 1349),” in CODOM6, pp. 502–03, doc. 438. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 195–201. Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 59; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 203–05. Reg. Vat., 68, ep. 1694; cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 285; CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181. “Letter from Alfonso XI to the administrators of the tercias reales, décimas and crusading bull granted by John XXII in 1328,” in García Fernández, “Regesto,” p. 34, doc. 146; Reg. Vat., 87, ep. 2477; cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 299. Vidal, Benoit XII , p. 306, doc. 8355; CAXI, 318, chap. 242. See note 195. CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, MS 13.097, fols. 5–20, 56–71; cit. in Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 198–99. “Privilege granted by Alfonso XI to Valladolid (Valladolid, January 24, 1332),” in Fernando Pino Rebolledo, ed., Catálogo de los pergaminos de la Edad Media (1191–1393). Transcripción y notas críticas (Valladolid, 1988), pp. 248–56, doc. 50. In this particular document, he exempts Valladolid specifically from empréstitos (probably meaning forced loans) implying that such obligatory levies were not uncommon measures across Castile.

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resources to relieve the siege of Gibraltar in 1333, he secured unspecified loans from caballeros in Valladolid, and merchants at Burgos, as well as from other groups in both Madrid and Toledo.206 Later in the same year, he used the granting of alcabalas by the Andalusian towns essentially as collateral to gather the necessary sums to pay for additional frontier defense soldiers.207 When hostilities broke out along the Castilian–Navarrese border two years later, Alfonso had to borrow, probably from groups within Valladolid, to pay for the first month of the operation.208 During the siege of Algeciras, Alfonso’s ever-increasing financial woes caused him to ask for loans from Portugal, the Papal See and France. Though the Portuguese king refused his request, he obtained a loan of 20,000 florins – receiving the actual sums from the Italian banker Guido Maravalla and promising to repay them within one calendar year – from the Papacy209 in 1343. He also secured an even larger loan of 50,000 florins paid in two installments from his French counterpart.210 From domestic sources, he received loans in the form of grain supplies from the archbishoprics of Córdoba and Seville with the latter also providing an empréstito amounting to 333,700 mrs. for the siege effort. In the years following the conflict, Alfonso arranged to pay for these debts by using his share of the tercias reales and décimas.211 In 1343, he was forced to borrow from some of the towns in the region of Extremadura, and later on from some Genoese merchants when the Count of Foix and his Gascon contingents demanded payment.212 Finally, in times of dire necessity, Alfonso was forced not only to temporarily concede the rents from royal lands but to sell them outright. In December 1349, he sold the areas of Orozco and Llodio to Fernán Pérez de Ayala and the locality of Bailén to Pedro Ponce de León for 140,000 mrs with the purpose of financing his second attempt at capturing Gibraltar. The following month, he sold the villages of Valdemoro and Morata to Fernán Pérez de Portocarrero,213 and Palma and Villalba in the Niebla region to Alvar Pérez de Guzmán for the sum of 130,000 mrs.214 Leonor de Guzmán, Alfonso’s mistress, also participated by buying the 206 207 208 209

210 211

212 213 214

CAXI, chap. 111, p. 245. CAXI, chap. 128, p. 258–59; “Royal letter to the council of Murcia (Seville, November 23, 1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 294–96, doc. 258. CAXI, chap. 143, p. 268. “Legal document granted by Clement VI stipulating a loan in favor of Alfonso XI (Avignon, June 14, 1343),” “Alfonso XI ratifies the document granting him said loan (Algeciras, July 4, 1343),” in Serrano, “Alfonso XI y el Papa Clemente VI,” pp. 27–32, docs. 4, 6. CAXI, chap. 303, p. 368. “Letter from Alfonso XI the archbishop of Seville (Seville, February 5, 1345),” “Alfonso XI asks the archbishop of Seville to get permission to collect the first year of décimas he had been granted by Clement VI to fund the siege of Algeciras (Madrid, October 6, 1345),” “Letter from Alfonso XI to the collectors of tercias reales in the bishopric of Córdoba ordering them to give the Cordoban bishop 200 cahíces of wheat and 100 cahíces of barley, which had been lent to Alfonso during the siege of Algeciras (Seville, April 27, 1346),” in García Fernández, “Regesto,” pp. 92, 94, 96, docs. 411, 420, 430. CAXI, chaps. 303–04, p. 368. RAH, Col. Salazar y Castro, MS D–10, fols. 249–50; MS M–49, fols. 79v.–81r. “Deed of the sale of Niebla and Villalba to Alvar Pérez de Gúzman (Gibraltar, January 10, 1350),” in Ignacio López de Ayala, Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid, 1782), IV–V, doc. 2; cit. in García Fernández, “Regesto,” p. 106, doc. 474.

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village of Beteta and its tower in the area of Cuenca for 200,000 mrs.215 Even though it raised large sums for his operations, this fund-raising method was particularly damaging because it ultimately strengthened those magnates who could purchase the lands at the crown’s future economic and political expense. Considering that during any military operation expenditures started immediately and very likely continued to escalate until the campaign was finished, it comes as no surprise that Alfonso and his commanders regarded the financial aspects of warfare to be of fundamental importance and devoted much attention to the acquisition and administration of the necessary resources. Although the references to financial difficulties abound in the chronicle and documentary sources, Alfonso’s impressive military victories, especially those in the latter part of his reign, were in no small part due to his ability to secure the necessary financial support through various means. The experience of having one of his campaigns, the siege of Gibraltar in 1333, falter due in large part to lack of financial support no doubt spurred him to not permit it to occur in any future ventures. In fact, the failure of his second attempt at capturing Gibraltar was the result of an outbreak of bubonic plague among his troops and not because of the lack of funding. It is always difficult when studying Alfonso’s reign not to look at his impressive military record and his reputation and conclude that his reforms must have been unqualified successes as well.216 This rather triumphalist view, however, is not entirely complete for it does not provide for the possibility that Alfonso’s policies may not have been implemented as he intended, or that the Castilian sources may not be available or suitable for determining the product of his reforms. For instance, even though Alfonso pacified his kingdom enough to modify Castilian military and legal structures,217 the conflict between his sons Pedro I and Enrique of Trastámara burst into a civil war that did not end until 1369.218 In the midst of fighting over who was the legitimate monarch, there likely was little time to seriously think about reform. In addition, the extant source material in Castile for the middle of the fourteenth century is ambiguous at best regarding the actual execution of his reforms. The Ordenamientos of 1338 and 1348 and the royal decrees to diverse towns to draw up new padrones of who was required to provide mounted service, are very detailed indeed, but remain prescriptive documents. Their implementation can only be approached indirectly. Pedro I’s continuing struggles to get the towns to update their lists of eligible caballeros may point to the great deal of resistance to Alfonso’s reforms during and after his reign.219 There are similar problems with the documentation related to the soldadas. 215 216 217 218 219

AHN, Sec. Concejos, Memorial del pleito de Orozco, nº 533–36; cit. in Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” p. 3459. Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” pp. 398–99. Ibid., pp. 385–87. One of the best treatments of this civil war is Clara Estow, Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350–69 (New York, 1995). “Letter from Pedro I to the council of Cartagena, ordering that the new padrón be given to Juan Rodríguez de Valladolid and those obligated to own a horse who did not have one be given four months to acquire it (Elche, December 2, 1364),” in CODOM7, pp. 173–74, doc. 115.

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So far, there are only two references – for the Viscount of Tartars and for Juan Rodriguez de Cisneros respectively, since Alfonso never acquiesced to Juan Manuel’s exorbitant demands – to soldada agreements between the crown and individual magnates. The new guidelines set down by Alfonso indicate that enough resources were being disbursed as soldadas for it to be worth the royal treasury’s effort to assert further control over them. Yet the fiscal records that would show how large the soldada sums were and who exactly were the recipients of these monies have not survived for the reigns of Alfonso or Pedro I. Finally, the very few reliable references to the size of armies during Alfonso’s rule make it difficult to see whether the changes in the nature of caballería popular did result in an increase in the number and availability of urban caballeros. Another significant issue to consider is how radical the changes wrought by Alfonso upon the Castilian military system actually were. His modifications actually reflected continuity rather than fundamental change. His decrees to change the caballería popular were indeed new, but by his reign this institution had been in decline and had become more and more the exclusive franchise of the lesser nobility and the urban elites. In this case, Alfonso’s contribution was to take the final step of doing away with the voluntary aspect of caballería popular that may no longer have been as present as in previous years. In similar fashion, the guidelines instituted for the spending of royal soldadas were definitely a step in a new direction, but they represented the expansion and modification of practice already present by the reign of Sancho IV, if not before. As for the financial aspects, Alfonso did expand the monarchy’s reliance on extraordinary levies like alcabalas and servicios, and augmented the royal treasury’s already central role in the underwriting of military operations. Yet this trend was already evident during the reign of his father Fernando IV. It is important to note, however, that this does not in any way diminish the consequence of Alfonso’s contribution. He very consciously provided the impetus for the culmination of previous developments, and streamlined those procedures he felt were the most important. Alfonso, therefore, appears to have been less a revolutionary and more of a clever, level-headed monarch who successfully utilized the tools available to him. Even so, Alfonso’s reform program outlasted him since the procedures he set down continued to influence military practice in Castile. The soldada system survived the Castilian civil war of 1366–69 and persisted in the ensuing reigns. His son Enrique II of Trastámara affirmed its use in 1379. He also decreed that those who received such funds had to swear an oath to not commit fraud in their recruitment of troops and not be derelict in service.220 The practice continued throughout the fourteenth 221 and fifteenth centuries under the name of acostamiento and was even utilized, though to a much lesser extent, for recruiting 220

221

“Decree from Enrique II (Burgos, 1370),” in Alfonso Díaz de Montalvo, Ordenanzas reales de Castilla, Book 4, Title 3, Law 16; Los códigos españoles concordados y anotados, vol. 6, ed. Gregorio Lópes (Madrid, 1872–73), 387–88. CLC (Ordenamiento de Guadalajara, 1390), 2:461.

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the armies that ultimately served to conquer Granada.222 Caballería popular remained in existence as urban caballeros continued to serve in Castilian armies. In 1385, Juan I (1379–90) affirmed the principle of obligatory mounted service at the popular level through the approval of a new set of guidelines outlining what equipment and weaponry was required of each individual according to personal wealth.223 Five years later, the Ordenamiento of Guadalajara again addressed the preparedness of popular caballeros by requiring yearly military reviews in all the realm’s regions.224 These urban militias, with some changes, survived into the fifteenth century and were a source of manpower for the final stages of the Reconquest.225 To conclude, this close analysis of Alfonso’s reform policies should permit us to place him the proper European context. The notion that the Castilian military system, and by extension Castile, was thoroughly different from England and France should be discarded. The soldada system, especially after the Ordenamiento of 1338, was very similar to the indentures in England and the lettres de retenue in France. All three types of arrangements were in essence contracts between monarchs and their sub-commanders in which the latter would recruit a certain number of troops in return for a specific monetary sum.226 The main difference was that in England and France, the documents were much more detailed, while the Castilian soldada arrangements were modified as a whole in the Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338). With regard to military finance, Castile, very much like its European counterparts, had to pursue a revenue-increasing program in order to underwrite the continually escalating costs of campaigns. Since ordinary revenues were not enough, Alfonso, like the English monarchs,227 was forced to rely on extraordinary levies negotiated with the parliamentary bodies in his realm. In the end, with the notable exception of the procedures and institutions related to the urban militias which remained unique, military practice during Alfonso’s reign had much more in common with than different from England and France.

222 223 224 225 226

227

Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada, 2nd ed. (Granada, 1993), pp. 171–72, 174–75, 177–80, 200–01. CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1385), 2:315–16. Ibid., (Cortes de Guadalajara, 1390), 2:460–61. Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada, pp. 201–09. Christopher T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 94; Contamine, War In The Middle Ages, p. 153; Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience (New Haven, 1996), pp. 91, 95. Prestwich, “War and taxation in England,” p. 185.

7 Sir Thomas Dagworth in Brittany, 1346–7: Restellou and La Roche Derrien* Clifford J. Rogers

In terms of battlefield successes, the years 1345–47 were the most impressive in all of British military history. English troops were fighting in three theaters in France (Aquitaine, Brittany, and the north), and also on the Scottish border, and in all four areas they won remarkable victories against heavy numerical odds. The most famous of these is of course Crécy, where Edward III defeated an army which included Philip VI of France and three kings more (James of Majorca, John of Bohemia, and his son Charles, “King of Germany,” as the Emperor-elect was known before his imperial coronation). But the triumphs of Edward’s lieutenants, on their own smaller scale, were perhaps even more impressive. At Neville’s Cross, the Scots were severely defeated, and King David II was captured. In the south of France, Henry of Lancaster twice defeated the main French forces in the theater, first at Bergerac, then at Auberoche. In the latter engagement, Henry captured the Count de l’Isle, Philip VI’s principal general in the theater, “who was then like a king in Gascony.”1 In Brittany, English forces under Sir Thomas Dagworth won two extraordinary victories over the army of Charles of Blois, the Valois-supported claimant to the Breton ducal coronet. The second and larger of these two engagements, the battle of La Roche-Derrien in 1347, resulted in the capture of Charles himself, and – contrary to the assertion of the most recent historian of the action – radically altered the course of the Breton civil war in favor of the Anglo-Montfortian cause. Truly this was a military “annus mirabilis.” Such extraordinary success in war has of course inspired much interest among historians. Jonathan Sumption’s massive history of the Hundred Years War has recently provided us with new narratives of all these fights, and other historians have provided full treatments of Crécy, Neville’s Cross, and Bergerac.2 General *My thanks to Kelly DeVries, Michael C. Jones, and Andrew Ayton for useful suggestions regarding this article. 1 2

Jean Froissart, Chroniques, livres I et II, ed. P. Ainsworth and G. T. Diller (Paris, 2001), p. 462. Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War, vol. 1: Trial by Battle (London, 1990). Crécy: Recent treatments include Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 1996), ch. 13, and Clifford J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge, 2002), ch. 11; note also David Nicolle, Crecy 1346. Triumph of the Longbow (Oxford, 2000) and Andrew Ayton and Sir Philip Preston (eds.), The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005). Neville’s Cross: Clifford J. Rogers, “The Scot-

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explanations for the astounding military effectiveness of the English in this period have tended to focus on three elements. It has long been understood that the yew longbow of the fourteenth century was a superb weapon in the hands of a skilled yeoman archer, and that these troops brought a major advantage to the English armies of the time.3 The tactical skill of Edward III and his captains, and the particular effectiveness of the tactical formation first employed at Dupplin Moor (1332) and Halidon Hill (1333), have also traditionally been given a major place in explaining their victories. More recently, credit has also been given to these men for outstanding generalship at the operational and strategic levels of war, which was key in enabling them to fight their battles on fields and according to tactics of their own choosing.4 Another important factor, one which has not yet been given quite the emphasis it is due, is the sheer toughness, individual prowess, and fighting spirit of the English in this period. These qualities are very well illustrated in the small and almost unknown battle of Restellou in June 1346, where just 180 soldiers under Sir Thomas Dagworth defeated a force around twenty times as numerous – probably the heaviest odds ever overcome by any of Edward III’s troops, and indeed one of the most impressive performances in all of military history. The same captain’s victory at La Roche-Derrien the following year is also exceptionally remarkable, even among the English victories of the fourteenth century, because of the circumstances in which it was fought. It shares with Auberoche the distinction of being one of the very few battles in which King Edward’s men lacked the advantage of the tactical defensive, and it is the only one of all those mentioned above in which the longbow does not seem to have played a major role.5 It

3

4

5

tish Invasion of 1346,” Northern History, 34 (1998), 51–69; The Battle of Neville’s Cross, ed. D. Rollason and M. Prestwich (Stamford, 1998); Michael Penman, “The Scots at the Battle of Neville’s Cross, 17 October 1346,” Scottish Historical Review, 80 (2001), 157–80; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, ch. 15. Bergerac: Clifford J. Rogers, “The Bergerac Campaign (1345) and the Generalship of Henry of Lancaster,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004). For Auberoche, see particularly the somewhat older but (on this battle) sound work of A. H. Burne in The Crecy War (1955; reprint, London, 1990), pp. 105–13, as well as Sumption. Although the lethality of the longbow was recently challenged by one prominent scholar, I have argued that that the traditional view of its effectiveness was fully justified. See Kelly DeVries, “Catapults are not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of ‘Effectiveness’ in Premodern Military Technology,” War in History, 4 (1997), 454–70; Clifford J. Rogers, “The Efficacy of the Medieval Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries,” War in History, 5 (1998), 233–42. Including in my own work. On Edward III, see War Cruel and Sharp and “England’s Greatest General,” MHQ 14 (Summer 2002), 34–45; “Bergerac Campaign” on Lancaster; see also “‘As If a New Sun Had Arisen:’ England’s Fourteenth-century RMA,” in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 15–34. Kelly DeVries has also claimed this concerning Morlaix in 1342 (not mentioned above), but probably incorrectly. Although Geoffrey le Baker emphasizes the ferocity of the hand-to-hand fighting (Chronicon, ed. E. M. Thompson [Oxford, 1889], pp. 76–7), that is hardly sufficient reason to presume that the bowmen who formed the majority of the English army were “using weapons other than their longbows” (DeVries, Infantry Warfare, p. 144), especially considering that the initial French charge was defeated “at once” (Henry Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, ed. and tr. G. H. Martin [Oxford, 1995], pp. 42–3) upon charging into an “ambush of archers” (Istore et croniqes de Flandres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 2 vols. [Brussels, 1879–80], 1:462).

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was fought almost entirely at close quarters and in full or partial darkness, circumstances which did not allow for effective archery. These considerations make these two engagements especially worthy of study, yet neither one has received as full an analysis as it deserves. Furthermore, recently discovered manuscript chronicle accounts of both fights now make it possible to understand them better than was previously possible. This article, taking advantage of those new sources, will provide detailed treatments of both fights, and so give historians a broader foundation on which to build their understanding of how the Plantagenet realm became, for two generations, the most admired martial kingdom of Europe. The Breton civil war of the fourteenth century began in 1341, following the death of Duke Jean III. Years earlier he had arranged for the ducal succession to pass to his niece, Jeanne de Penthièvre, and her husband, Charles of Blois, who was the nephew of Philip VI of France. In the year before his death, however, he changed his mind and decided that the title should go to his nearest male relative, his half-brother Jean de Montfort. Montfort, after Jean III’s death, acted rapidly to seize effective control over the duchy. When it became clear, however, that Philip VI intended to back his own nephew’s claim over Jean’s, Montfort turned to Edward III for help. Edward, King of England and claimant to the French throne as well, was by this time in the midst of his great war with France, the first stage of the Hundred Years War. He was naturally more than willing to back Montfort, who in return did homage to Edward, as King of France, for Brittany. Edward had already been accepted as King of France in two of the six most important provinces of France (Flanders and Aquitaine); adding Brittany to the list would have been a tremendous accomplishment. Even control of just the western and southern regions of the peninsula, where support for Montfort was strongest, promised great advantages, for these were the zones of the province most important for maintaining seaborne communications between England and Gascony.6 Furthermore – contrary to what some historians have argued – Montfort’s claim to the Breton ducal throne rested on the same foundation as the Plantagenet’s claim to the French crown. Jean was the nearest male relative of the deceased duke; Edward had likewise been, in 1328, the nearest male relative of the deceased Charles IV of France. In 1342–43, Edward III supported the Montfort party with increasingly large armies, one of which he led himself. A truce was made at Malestroit in early 1343, solidifying the already fairly well-established pattern that northern and eastern Brittany generally held to Blois, while the western and the southern areas supported Montfort. The pro-French faction suffered a major loss when Olivier de Clisson defected to the English side, but when he was captured and executed in 1344 (despite the Anglo-French truce) the initiative, overall, returned to Blois.7 By June 1346 the French were so strong that they were able to mount simultaneous 6 7

Jonathan Sumption treats these matters ably in Trial by Battle, pp. 370–7, 384–6. Though in 1345–46 the English did capture La Roche-Derrien, sack Lannion, and win a significant skirmish in the same area. See Grandes chroniques de France, ed. Jules Viard, 9 vols. (Paris, 1920–53), 9:260–9.

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sieges of Lesneven, Brest, and La Roche-Derrien.8 The English government, struggling to find sufficient resources to meet a threatened invasion from Scotland, to support Henry of Grosmont’s operations in Aquitaine, and to assemble an army of royal scale for Edward III to lead on the campaign that would culminate in the battle of Crécy, could spare very few men to meet the challenge posed by Blois’s offensive in Brittany. The published primary sources do not offer much detail concerning the Breton theater in 1345–46. Historians have, however, generally concluded from the thin chronicle narratives that are available that King Edward’s captain Sir Thomas Dagworth won two large skirmishes, or small battles, against Charles of Blois in these years. The first of these actions is said to have taken place on 17 June 1345 next to the hamlet of Cadoret in eastern Brittany. The second is variously described as having taken place at, or in the vicinity of, St.-Pol-de-Léon, or else outside La Roche-Derrien, either on 3 or 9 June 1346, or 25 May 1347.9 A more careful look at the evidence already published indicates that there was in fact only one minor battle between Dagworth and Blois prior to the major engagement at La Roche-Derrien of July 1347, and that it took place in 1346, not 1345 or 1347. Taking into account also the new testimony of the St. Omer Chronicle, we can now further conclude that it took place in the very center of Brittany, near Restellou, rather than near Cadoret, St.-Pol-de-Léon, or La Roche-Derrien.10 That Dagworth defeated the French claimant to the Duchy of Brittany on 9 June 1346 (and not 25 May 1347) is certain. The date was specified in a dispatch the Englishman sent to King Edward shortly after the event, which formed the basis for two separate descriptions of the fight in variants of John of Tynemouth’s Historia aurea, both of which have now been published.11 There are enough matching de8

9

10

11

Historia aurea, in Michael C. Jones, “Sir Thomas Dagworth et la guerre civile en Bretagne au XIVe siècle: quelques documents inédits,” Annales de Bretagne LXXXVII (1980), p. 637. Hereafter cited as Historia aurea (Jones). 3 or 9 June 1346; Cadoret 17 June 1345: Dom Pierre-Hyacinthe Morice, Histoire ecclesiastique et civile de Bretagne, 2 vols (Paris, 1750–56), 1:275 (after Walsingham). 9 and 17 June: Arthur le Moyne de la Borderie, Histoire de Bretagne, 6 vols. (Rennes, 1905–14), 3:497, 502. 25 May 1347: V. H. Galbraith, “Extracts from the Historia Aurea and a French Brut (1317–47)” English Historical Review, 43 (1948), p. 213 n. 5. Near St.-Pol: Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 496. At St.-Pol: Burne, Crecy War, p. 88. Outside La Roche: Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 628. Bibliothèque de l’agglomeration de St.-Omer, MS707 (hereafter cited as St. Omer Chronicle), fos. 227–227v. I am completing an edition and translation of this chronicle, which should be in print soon. In Jones, “Dagworth,” pp. 637–9 at 637; hereafter cited as Historia aurea (Jones) (“die veneris proxima post festum Penthecostes anno Xo m0 ccc0 xlvjto scilicet ix die junii”) and Galbraith, “Extracts,” pp. 213–14: “Anno Domini 1346 … die Veneris proxima post festum Pentecostes.” Henceforth, citations to this excerpt will be given as Historia aurea (Galbraith). Galbraith heads this section “1347” and thus gives the date of the combat as 25 May 1347, apparently because the chronicle mentions that Dagworth had been appointed captain of the English in Brittany, an office which Dagworth did not receive until 10 January 1347. But Dagworth was appointed lieutentant of Bohun, who was the lieutenant of the king, in January 1346, and apparently by the principle of transitivity was in April 1346 already terming himself (in a grant of lands to the dame de Clisson) as royal lieutenant. Jones, “Dagworth,” 628; note also Historia Roffensis (British Library, London, Cottonian MSS, Faustina B V), fos. 92v–93.

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tails that there can be no doubt that this was the same engagement as the one described by the St. Omer Chronicle. It is also mentioned briefly in the Historia roffensis and the manuscript epitome of William Packington’s lost chronicle.12 There is no mention in any English chronicle of a similar victory a year earlier. The modern historians who have noted this putative battle of “Cadoret” in 1345 have done so largely on the basis of a single sentence in the Chronicon Britannicarum: “On the Friday before the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, there was a battle in landa Cadoreti in which lord Thomas Dagworth, of the count of Montfort’s party, obtained the victory, and Charles of Blois’s side was defeated and succumbed.” Although la Borderie’s sloppy quotation makes it appear that this text is immediately preceded in the chronicle by the year, MCCCXLV, in fact there should have been an ellipsis between the two, and the portion the historian omitted suggests that in fact the chronicler intended to describe an event in 1346 rather than one of 1345.13 Surprisingly, historians do not appear to have noted that the very same sentence appears in the Chronicon briocense, where, however, it immediately follows the year, “Anno 1346.”14 The day given in these Breton chronicles does not quite match that of the Historia aurea – 9 June was a Friday before the feast of St. John, but the Friday immediately before the holy day was the 23rd. Still, it is much more likely that the sketchy Breton chronicle made this small error than that Dagworth defeated Blois on the 9th and then 12

13

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St. Omer Chronicle, fos. 227–227v. Historia Roffensis, fos. 92v–93: Dagworth, “a worthy man and a martial knight, well schooled in war,” having been left in command in Brittany by Northampton, “twice in one day defeated Charles of Blois with a large French army, and defeated an extremely strong knight in a duel, capturing him. He [then] returned to England, and crossed to France with the king” for the Crécy campaign. (An edition of this text is being prepared by Dr. Mark Buck.) The “epitome of Packington’s chronicle” (BL, Cottonian MSS, Tiberius A VI, fos. 196–196v), also briefly mentions this combat, apparently also making use of Dagworth’s dispatch: “Adonqes fuist un noble chivaler Dengleterre qi fuist appelle monsr Thomas de Dagworth maunde en Brutaigne pour maynteigner et defendre l’estat le Roi illeoqes et garder villes et chasteux qe le Roi avoit conquis; le quel sire Thomas avoit le vitorie de plusours poyntz de guerre et se contient s[i] noblement que merveille; et descounfit sire Charles de Bloys q’estoit illeoqes maundetz par le Roi de Fraunce. Et le dit sire Charles avoit en sa compaignie ml homes d’armes et le dit sire Thomas forsque ijc, les queux, a ceo que fuist dit, touz furent mahaynietz ou naufrez mes nul de eaux fuist tuwe.” La Borderie, Histoire de Bretagne, 3:497, 497n. Sumption, Trial by Battle, pp. 458–9 and Jones, “Dagworth,” pp. 627–8, take the same line, though Jones rightly describes the entry as “non daté.” The full entry reads: “MCCCXLV. Eadem civitas Corisopitensis fuit obsessa per Dominum Joannem Comitem Montisfortis, sed non fuit capta. Obiit Dominus Johannes de Monteforti apud Henbont, frater boni Johannis Ducis Britanniae & filius Arturi VI. Kal. Octobris. Die veneris ante Nativitatem S. Joan. Baptist. fuit bellum in Landa Cadoreti, in quo Dominus Thomas Dagorne tenens partem Comitis Montisfortis obtinuit, & pars Caroli de Blesis fuit devicta & succubuit. MCCCXXX. Guido Briocensis Episcopus. MCCCXLVI. [recto MCCCXLVII] Bellum apud Rocham-Deriani, ut in Chronicis latius continetur.” Note that, if this is taken as being sequential – aside from the interjection about 1330 – the battle of Landa Cadoreti is described as taking place in the June after an event of September 1345, i.e. in June 1346. Dom Pierre-Hyacinthe Morice, Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l’historie ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, 2 vols. (Paris, 1742–49), 1:8. Morice, Preuves, 1:43.

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again two weeks later.15 Granted that the Chronicon briocense and Chronicon Britannicarum were indeed referring to the same battle as the one described in the Historia aurea and the St. Omer Chronicle, i.e. the fight of 9 June 1346, the next question is where it took place. The St. Omer Chronicle says that it was “in a very strong passage behind [or next to, or near] a town called Restellaiu [or Restellain].”16 One version

15

16

It is of course possible that the Breton chronicles’ date is correct, but this is very unlikely. As noted above, the Historia aurea’s account is specifically stated to have been based on a campaign dispatch written by Dagworth himself, and the date is given in two forms, both as “Anno Domini 1346 … die Veneris proxima post festum Pentecostes,” and, in the superior version signaled by A. E. Prince and later printed by Jones, as the “ix die junii” in 1346. Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 213; A. E. Prince, “The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III,” English Historical Review, 46 (1931), pp. 364–5; Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 637; note also Tait’s observations in Chronica Johannis de Reading et anonymi Cantuariensis, 1346–1367, ed. J. Tait (Manchester, 1914), p. 234. St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227: “.J. jour avint que li engles coururent parmi la terre de Bretaigne; mais li dux, qui chou ne pooit souffrir, assambla ses os et les sieui par pluseurs journees tant qu’il s’embati en .j. pas moult fort d’empres une ville que on apelle Restellaiu; la se mirent a garant. Mais quant ce vit li dux, conseil prinst aveuc .j. chevalier d’Alemaigne qui fu nommes monsigneur Renault de Viviers, et aveuc le Galois de le Heuse et monsigneur Renault de Dinain que a piet descenderoient li dessus dit et seure leur courroient. Et al autre leis les envairoit li dux o ses gens d’armes. Lors se mirent a piet environ .iiij. xx hommez d’armes et lor coururent seure. Mais li dux ne les sieui pas ainsi comme ordenes estoit. Et quant chou virent li engles a deffense se misent fort et roit. Et tant dura le mellee que li breton ne les porent endurer, ains furent desconfit. Et y fu prins me sires Renauls de Dinain, le Galois de le Heuse, me sires Foukes de Basillers, me sire Thomas Percheval; et monsigneur Renault de Viviers passa tout oultre ses anemis et revint en son sauf.”

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of the Historia aurea says that Dagworth was “about half way” on his way to reprovision certain, unspecified, English-held towns in Brittany when he unexpectedly met the French. This chronicle could be read as implying that the towns in question were in north-western Brittany, and that the starting point was Quimperlé.17 The other version of the Historia aurea says only that Dagworth had begun to make his way “towards a certain place called Leon” when he suddenly saw Blois’s army.18 All of this fits very well with the hypothesis that Dagworth met the French near Restellou, just south of Callac on the road leading north-east from Carhaix, about half-way between the southern and northern coasts of Brittany.19 The terrain at Restellou also helps explain the astounding success of Dagworth’s tiny force of 80 men-at-arms and 100 archers in fighting off a Breton army reported by the English at 1,000 to 1,500 men-at-arms, 2,000 crossbowmen, and numerous light infantry.20 These numbers are within the realm 17

18

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Historia aurea (Jones), p. 637: “Karolus de Blois … conflasset exercitum ut auderet simul et semel obsidere villas et castella de Brest, de Lesenfenne, et de Roche Diryan. Idem dominus Thomas statuit adire villas alias que pertinebant regi Anglie ut in eis poneret escas et arma contra insultus dicti Karoli si contingeret eum eas adire. Et dum iret quasi media via obviavit inopinate dicto Karolo …” Brest, Lesneven, and La Roche-Derrien are all along or near the northern coast in the western half of Brittany, and the other English-held towns most threatened would be those in the same area as the siege forces. The same text (p. 638) says that after the battle, Thomas drew back (retraxit) towards Quimperlé, implying that was his point of departure for the operation. Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 213: “versus locum quemdam Leon nominatum iter arripiens …” Iter arripere, in medieval Latin, means “to begin a journey.” J. H. Baxter, Medieval Latin Word-List (Oxford, 1934), s.v. “arripio.” (Emphasis added.) And about half-way between Quimperlé and St.-Pol-de-Léon, though if that were Dagworth’s destination one would expect him to have gone north-west, rather than north-east, from Carhaix. The same would be true for Morlaix, another likely candidate for reprovisioning (Morice, Histoire, 1:274). There is a Réhello a short distance north of Cadoret, and from only looking at the names this pairing might seem to be the Restellaiu and landa Cadoreti of the chronicles. However, the positioning of these places in eastern Brittany makes no sense in relation to an effort by Dagworth to reprovision towns threatened by a Breton army besieging Brest, Lesneven and La Roche-Derrien, as stated by the Historia aurea. Also, if the French were at Réhello and the English on the hilltop above Cadoret – or even in the extremely unlikely event that Dagworth would have fought in the narrow vale of Cadoret itself – it would have been the English right flank, not the left, that would have been open for Blois to attack in the last phase of the battle (see below). Both versions of Historia aurea give Dagworth 80 men-at-arms and 100 archers; the “Packington epitome,” however, says he had 200 [men-at-arms]. (Above, note 12.) The numbers in the Historia closely match the size the retinue Dagworth indented to provide when he was appointed Northampton’s lieutenant for Brittany in January 1346, which specified he would have 80 men-at-arms (himself, 14 other knights, and 65 esquires), 120 archers, and 80 bidouers, a.k.a. “servaunt’ bayonays.” Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 628; Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom (microprint ed., Gloucester, 1982), 4:28, note c. The Packington epitome also gives the figure of 1,000 men-at-arms for Blois’s force (above, n. 12); Historia aurea (Jones version) says 1,500 men-at-arms and 2,000 crossbowmen and 6,000 brigands (light infantry) and “tarasonum” and 30,000 infantry, Bretons and others. (In the Galbraith version, the brigands and tarasonum are given as “Carcassonensium et Biterrensium,” without the number.) The figure of 30,000 is clearly a gross exaggeration. The

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of credibility, but even if they are much exaggerated, it remains clear that the English were outnumbered many times over.21 It appears that Duke Charles and his army had been pursuing Dagworth for some time before catching up with him, and so probably would have approached Restellou from the south. If we presume that they came into sight of Sir Thomas’ position when they reached the high-point of the Landujen Roc, near Le Rest, it becomes easier to see how the English could have mounted a successful defense. From Le Rest, around 210m above sea level, the Roc slopes down relatively gently at first, then drops more sharply (at about a 25% average grade) to the bed of a tributary of the Hyère, at around 124m. Restellou sits on the crest of a hill that nestles into the fork between this stream and the Hyère itself. The slope down from Restellou to the stream, a distance of about 700m, is not terribly steep, rising only about 50m. The four roads from the water to the crest converge on Restellou, which is thus something of a road junction. The village is actually split into two segments, Restellou Tanguy on the west, Restellou Braz on the east, with a gap of about 100m between the two.22 Dagworth probably put his men-at-arms in a single line to hold this gap, with his archers occupying the buildings and the flanks; this formation, the line of the roads, and the natural lie of the land, would tend to funnel a French attack inward, exposing the attackers to enfilading fire from the sheltered archers. Like the funnel-shaped woods at Agincourt, it would also tend to squeeze together assaulting lines, potentially causing severe disruption. Recognizing the difficulty of a frontal assault on this position, and wanting to make best use of his vastly superior numbers, Duke Charles divided his army into two attack forces and a reserve. The first battalion, an elite element composed of 500 men-at-arms selected for their fighting spirit, and including many foreign soldiers, was to dismount and move head-on against the English, with the support of numerous crossbowmen and light infantry. The leader of this force was Guillaume “le Galois” de la Heuse, an experienced soldier who had recently been given substantial Breton estates (worth 500 l.t. annually) by Philip VI, from the lands which had been seized from Aumary de Clisson.23 Supremely confident

21

22 23

number for the brigands is likely quite inflated, but not impossible. The other numbers match well with the 1,800 men-at-arms, 2,000 crossbowmen, and 600 archers reported by Dagworth to have been in Charles’ army at La Roche-Derrien a year later. In Robert of Avesbury, De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi tertii, ed. E. M Thompson (London, 1889), p. 388. Hereafter cited as Dagworth, “Report.” The only cross-checks on the numbers given in Historia aurea are that the St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 227) has the attack led by the Galois de la Heuse as including just 80 men-at-arms, while Historia aurea says his force comprised 400 men-at-arms, plus infantry. The latter number seems credible, considering the leaders of the attack; the former seems much too small. If the six named leaders were all bannerets, a force of 500 men-at-arms would be about what one would expect: see Philippe Contamine, Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen âge. Etudes sur les armées des rois de France, 1337–1494 (Paris, 1972), p. 43; cf. also p. 44. Even the numbers given by the Packington epitome indicate a 5:1 ratio of forces. This would then be the “strong pass” in which the St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 227) says the English formed up to defend themselves. On some modern maps the spelling is “Resthellou,” with an “h.” First division: Historia aurea (Jones), p. 637, (Galbraith), p. 213; and the St. Omer Chronicle. Lands: J. Viard, and A. Vallée, Registre du trésor des chartes (Paris, 1979–84) III, part 2, no. 5765. They were to be held directly from Duke Charles.

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of success, given the small numbers opposing him, le Galois promised to capture Dagworth and deliver him, bound, to Duke Charles. The second element, 400 mounted men-at-arms and supporting infantry led by several Breton magnates, was to circle around behind the English and, striking from the rear, ensure that the English could neither win nor escape. Blois himself seems to have kept the remainder of his force in hand as a reserve, though one account implies he was in charge of the encircling force.24 Had these two attacks been coordinated effectively, there is little chance that the English could have beaten them off. It seems, however, that the first battalion made its attack well before the second force had reached its position.25 In order to stay out of view from Dagworth’s hilltop, the encircling battalion would have had to take a surprisingly long route, likely via Duault, St.-Servais, Kerbournet, and Callac, a distance of some 13km, about five times as far as the direct approach. A further delay was occasioned when this detachment ran into the wagonlaager holding the English horses, which had been sent to the rear when Dagworth’s men took up their fighting positions, and paused to collect the valuable mounts.26 Thus, de la Heuse and his men had to fight Dagworth without the support they expected. Even so the Frenchmen had the benefit of superior numbers, but thanks to the advantages of the terrain, the defensive, and the longbow, the English were able to repulse his attack with heavy losses, particularly among the light infantry. Also among the casualties were two of the most experienced soldiers on Blois’s side, le Galois and Pagan de Fontenay, the captain of Rennes, both severely wounded and captured. Just as this attack was ebbing down the south face of the hill, the second battalion finally made its onslaught from the other side. The English, who had suffered many wounds but few or no deaths in the first combat, proved equally successful in throwing back this assault. Their hilltop position was very important in this phase of the fighting. In addition to the advantages inherent in striking or shooting downhill, against an enemy short of breath from a brisk climb in armor, the hill separated the two Breton forces, making communication, and so coordination, between them very difficult. The Historia aurea, based on Dagworth’s own dispatch, says the fighting went on for many hours; doubtless the English were often rushing back and forth over the crest, fighting off an attack from one direction and then hastening to meet the next offensive on the other side. Eventually the French lost the heart to continue the struggle, and Dagworth’s men were left holding the battlefield, and also several important prisoners who had been too badly hurt to withdraw.27 24 25

26 27

Historia aurea (Jones), pp. 637–8. Blois in command of encircling force: St. Omer Chronicle, quoted above, n. 16. St. Omer Chronicle, above, n. 16. One version of the Historia aurea, however, says “omnes simul et semel invaserunt dictum Thomam ante et retro” (Jones, p. 638); the other does not insist on simultaneity: “Duo isti exercitus ante et retro in virtute magna pugnare ceperunt.” Historia aurea (Galbraith, p. 213). Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 214 n.3; (Jones), p. 638. In addition, Gui de Rochefort “and many other knights and nobles” were killed. Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 213 n. 10, from Bodleian MS 240.

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Their day was not yet done, however. Duke Charles gradually managed to collect most of the survivors around his personal standard, an over-sized banner. As evening drew near, he formed his men into three divisions, positioned in front of, behind, and on the left flank of the English position. The presence of the lastmentioned element, on the eastern face of the hill, would have made it much easier to coordinate the attacks of the other two; it was commanded by Charles in person.28 The situation must have seemed nearly hopeless to Dagworth’s men, despite their incredible successes thus far. On the other hand, however, they had nowhere to run: they were surrounded by the French on three sides, and the Hyère foreclosed escape to the west. Having sent their horses to the rear, Blois’s three divisions launched a fierce, simultaneous attack. Somehow the English again emerged victorious from the fighting that ensued. The chronicles offer no real insight into how this was accomplished – the Historia aurea says simply that it was an obvious case of divine intervention.29 The modern historian can note a number of factors working in favor of Dagworth’s men. They still held the high ground, and the buildings of Restellou would have strengthened their defense. Their earlier victories had bought them time to rest, bind their wounds, and retrieve arrows fired in the earlier fighting, and also must have greatly disheartened the French. The English longbowmen were far superior to the French infantry. Even taking all these points into consideration, however, it is hard to imagine anyone could have expected an English victory beforehand. Yet the result was entirely clear-cut. After Blois’s final effort was repulsed, and Dagworth led his men – nearly all of whom were wounded, though deaths were few – back to Quimperlé to recover, he wrote a report of the combat to King Edward, “saying that all in all, he had never seen men who were better in a difficult situation than those who were with him, nor had he heard tell of their equal anywhere.”30 Considering what his 180 men accomplished at Restellou, Sir Thomas’s praise for their fighting qualities seems more than justified. Although the sources are very thin for the subsequent period, it appears that the engagement at Restellou, small-scale though it was, led to the breakup of the French sieges at Lesneven, Brest, and La Roche-Derrien, buying a crucial respite for the Montfortians, and apparently even allowing Dagworth to temporarily leave the duchy so that he could participate in the Crécy campaign.31 But while Charles of Blois had been knocked down, he had not 28 29 30

31

Historia aurea (Jones), p. 638; (Galbraith), p. 214 and ibid. n.1. Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 214; (Jones), p. 638 (“evidenti miraculo”). Historia aurea (Jones), p. 638 (“nullus miles vel generousus occisus fuit ex Anglicis”); 639 (“dicens quod in necessitate meliores homines in suo statu quemlibet considerando quam qui cum eo fuerant numquam vidit nec audivit loqui de talibus in ullo loco.”) It has normally been assumed that he did not participate in the Crécy campaign, for a number of reasons. First, given that he fought in Brittany in early June, there would only barely have been time for him to return to England early enough to join the king’s expedition, especially if he first waited for instructions to do so. Second, he was at that time the acting royal lieutenant for Brittany, and so one would not expect him to leave the duchy. Third, there was no evidence, documentary or chronicle, to say that he was at Crécy.

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been knocked out. The quantitative superiority of the forces at his disposal had hardly been dented. In the spring of 1347, once again Blois collected a large field army and brought it beneath the walls of La Roche-Derrien. With around 4,400 soldiers, not counting the numerous local infantry, this army was far larger than the sum total of all of the Anglo-Breton garrisons in the peninsula. Indeed, again without counting the common infantry, it was on a par with the force King Edward himself had commanded while he was in the duchy in 1343, which had included the earls of Northampton, Devon, Gloucester, Warwick, Pembroke, Derby, Salisbury, Suffolk, and Oxford, among other captains.32 It is fairly clear that Sir Thomas Dagworth, Northampton’s brother-in-law and now Edward III’s lieutenant in Brittany, had no desire to do battle with this imposing host. Even to raise a field force of 1,000 skilled fighters was quite beyond his power. The best he could manage was 300 men-at-arms and 400 archers. He doubtless would much have preferred to let the siege continue indefinitely, hoping that it might collapse when Blois ran out of money or supplies.33 But Blois had brought up nine large siege engines, trebuchets presumably, which cast massive stones over the walls. One of these missiles, weighing over 300 pounds, smashed though the walls of the residence of Sir Richard Totesham, the garrison commander, and nearly crushed his wife and newborn child. Despite the pressure of this fire and of frequent assaults on the walls, Totesham refused to consider surrendering the town for several weeks. Around mid-June, however, he

32

33

The St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 217), however, lists him among the bannerets in that expedition (stationed in the Prince’s division, which bore the brunt of the fighting) and the Historia Roffensis confirms this, noting (fo. 63) that after his first defeat of Blois “ad Angliam remeavit cum rege in Franciam transiturus.” The testimony of two entirely independent chronicles, both wellinformed on military matters, one French, one English, is not lightly to be dismissed in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, although the timing was tight, it was not impossibly so, especially since the contrary winds faced by Edward III while waiting to embark would have been favorable winds for Dagworth’s return. And while Edward would not have wanted to leave Brittany unattended, he would also have been very eager to hear firsthand how a small band of Englishmen had succeeded in defeating a much larger French force with a vast superiority in men-at-arms, since he himself was hoping to do the same on a larger scale. The value of Sir Thomas’s presence and the circulation of his war stories for the morale of the royal army would have been tremendous. Finally, his absence from the financial records of the campaign is certainly not decisive evidence of his absence from the campaign itself. The Earl of Northampton, whose protégé and military right-hand man Dagworth was, is recorded as having served with two bannerets in his retinue, one of whom could possibly have been Sir Thomas. Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 261, based on pay records, estimates Edward’s forces on Christmas of 1342 at 3,600–3,700 men, plus Bretons and several hundred men serving unpaid in return for charters of pardon. For Blois’s strength, see below. The English were famous for being willing to fight against long odds, but in this case the disparity was too great. Granted this assumption, there is no “mystery” as to “why Sir Thomas Dagworth delayed so long in going to the relief of the sorely stricken town.” Cf. Burne, Crecy War, p. 91.

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Key ND H CD PJ

Chapel of Notre Dame Hospital Castel-Du Porte de Jument

Contours in meters, at 10m intervals Scale of 500 meters

was compelled to accept a surrender treaty. He promised to surrender the town and castle if not relieved within eight days, the lives and goods of his men and the townspeople to be spared.34 Although it was proceeding well from the French standpoint, the siege of La Roche-Derrien was nonetheless a difficult operation. Any siege force had to guard against surprise attacks, either sallies by the garrison or relief attempts from outside, and it was difficult to be ready at all times and in all directions. The particularities of the terrain in this location made this problem particularly acute. But surrender agreements such as the one Charles negotiated normally provided for a truce between the garrison and the besiegers to last during the waiting

34

Grandes chroniques, 9:300.

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period.35 This would have allowed Blois to concentrate on preparing to meet any attempt to raise the siege which Dagworth might make. To make the siege effective, Blois had needed to encircle the town, so that the defenders could not escape, and reinforcements or supplies could not reach them from outside.36 This had required him to occupy a front of roughly 6 km, a significant dispersion inherently involving the risk of defeat in detail. What made this especially perilous in the case of La Roche-Derrien was that the river Jaudy encircled the town along roughly half its circuit (the western half), and two other significant creeks split the “pie” of the encircling area as well: one from PommeritJaudy to the Jaudy just east of the town, the other running from Langoat to La Roche-Derrien. Thus the circuit was cut into two halves by the Jaudy, and each half was split again by a smaller creek, so that there were naturally four sectors. Two of these were occupied by large forces, two by smaller detachments.37 One large force held the quadrant south-west of the town, from Langoat to the Jaudy bridge (which led into the town), in the fields known as the “Place-Vert.”38 This sector included the ruins of a large earthwork fortification, in modern times called the Castel-Du or Château Noir, with banks some 150 yards by 100 yards, and up to 18 feet high.39 This fortification would have anchored and strengthened the defense of this part of the field, but it was not large enough to shelter all the troops in its sector, nor would placing all the troops in the area inside the 35

36

37

38

39

Assuming that this was the case here, the truce agreement probably specified – as the treaty for the surrender of Berwick had done in 1333 – that the intermediate truce would not forbid the garrison from aiding the relief army once it appeared. Cf. Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae etc., ed. Thomas Rymer, revised edition by A. Clarke, F. Holbrooke and J. Coley, 4 vols. in 7 parts (London, 1816–69), II, part 2, 863–5. Grandes chroniques, 9:299; Jean Froissart, Oeuvres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (1870–77; reprint, Osnabrück, 1967), 5:169 (“toute la ville et le chastiel ossi”) contra Burne, Crecy War, pp. 90–1. If Dagworth could inject reinforcements and supplies into the town, it might have counted as “relief” in terms of abrogating the surrender treaty. Cf. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 66–8. Though to be precise, if the Grandes chroniques are correct, the border between the southeastern force and its north-eastern neighbor was the main road leading to the Porte de Jument, rather than the creek somewhat further north. Grandes chroniques, 9:298; “vallem viridem” in Chronique de Richard Lescot, religieux de Saint-Denis (1328–1344), suivie de la continuation de cette chronique (1344–64), ed. Jean Lemoine (Paris, 1862), p. 77. Burne, Crecy War, pp. 90–1, 96; La Borderie, Histoire, 3:503n, writes: “la Place Vert semble répondre à une pièce de terre dite aujourd’hui Castel-Du, dans une situation correspondante, en la paroisse de Langoat: pièce de terre tenant environ un hectare, de forme à peu près triangulaire, entourée d’un douve et d’une énorme retranchement en terre …”; but Morice, I think rightly, refers to “la Place verte, du côté de la riviére de Jaudi …” (from which the Castel-Du is separated by around 400 meters), Morice, Histoire, 1:276. The Grandes chroniques (9:298) says this company was stationed “en I lieu qui est apellé la Place Vert, en la paroisse de Langoet, oultre l’yaue qui est appellée Yaudi.” It adds that Blois “ordena et commanda à ceulz qui là estoient … qu’il ne venissent point à nulle autre compaignie …” Note the use of là rather than dedens (and similarly on pp. 302–3, “au lieu qui est dit la Place Vert”; though on the other hand on p. 301 it does refer to those “en la Place Vert”; and on p. 303 it is noted that the men there “ne savoient riens de tout ce qui estoit fait en l’ost du duc, car il estoient assez loing de l’ost du duc, et estoit la riviere et la ville de la Roche Derian entre eulz”).

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earthworks as a “garrison” have been a sensible deployment.40 The other main force, under Charles of Blois himself, occupied the ground just east of the Place Vert, across the river Jaudy, extending from the chapel of Notre-Dame-de-Pitié along the bank to the Porte de Jument, which opened onto the Guingamp road.41 Each of the two main divisions also had a smaller force linked to it on its north. The defeat of either of these minor elements would not have been disastrous, and they were in any case strongly positioned, each with one flank protected by one of the main forces and the other flank anchored on the wide northern segment of the Jaudy. It was thought that the English were most likely to strike the force at the Place Vert.42 Blois rightly anticipated that Dagworth would attempt a night or dawn attack to compensate for his badly inferior numbers43 – discounting the local levies, the Anglo-Breton force was outnumbered by over five to one – and to minimize the advantage which Blois would gain from holding to the tactical defensive, which the strategic situation allowed the Duke to do. The French could even predict, roughly, when the English attack would be made, since, as noted above, they had negotiated a contract obliging the defenders to surrender the town if not relieved within eight days of the agreement.44 (This was a very common occurrence in medieval warfare, especially in cases where a siege was to be used as bait to draw an enemy into battle.)45 Duke Charles evidently also guessed, rightly, that Dagworth would limit his initial main effort to just one sector of the siege lines, and furthermore that Sir Thomas might try to improve his odds by first staging a demonstration against a different portion of the camp, both to cause confusion 40

41

42 43 44 45

Contra Burne, Crecy War, p. 90, and La Borderie, Histoire, 3:503. Dagworth says the French had 4,400 soldiers, not counting the numerous common footsoldiers, whom by implication (subtracting Dagworth’s figures) Froissart numbers at around 9,000. If we reduce that latter figure by more than half, and say there were just 8,800 men under Blois in total, that suggests a total of around 2,500 in the contingent at Place Vert, by an extremely rough estimate. A fort the size of the Place Vert would only require about 400 to 500 men to man the walls completely, at one soldier per yard of frontage. Furthermore, a substantial number of troops would have had to have been stationed outside the ruined fort in order to block the English from reinforcing or resupplying La Roche-Derrien. If 2,500 fighting men were crammed within the embankments (which, if La Borderie’s figure of “a bit under a hectare” for the enclosed area is correct, would allow less than 2 m x 2 m of ground for each soldier, with no additional room allowed for servants, latrines, assembly spaces, etc.) they would have taken far longer to simply exit into the open fields and form up than it would have taken for a body of cavalry to brush past them and enter the town – especially if the relieving force used a few men to block the exits from the earthwork. The current chapel is a construction of the 18th century, but the granite cross it contains suggests the site is much older. Until 1999, the grounds included an ancient yew supposed to have been planted by du Guesclin. Local tradition (as reported on the town’s website) says the chapel was built on the site of the capture of Charles of Blois, but it is on ground too low-lying to serve as a windmill site, or to be called a “montaigne”; cf. Grandes chroniques, 9:304. Grandes chroniques, 9:298, 301, 305. St. Omer, fo. 227v: “Quant li dux sot que si anemi venoient, bien pensoit que de nuit le venroient assallir.” Grandes chroniques, 9:300. E.g. cf. War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 64–7; Anonimalle Chronicle 1333–1381, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), pp. 35–6.

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and to draw troops away from the target of his real assault.46 To prevent this tactic from succeeding, Blois planned to have whatever portion of his line was attacked fight strictly on the defensive (an easier task than attacking, especially in darkness). His own force, by far the largest of his divisions, would go to the aid of the threatened sector if it were not attacked itself. But he strictly ordered the men stationed in the Place Vert (and presumably those in the smaller contingents as well) to hold their positions during the night, regardless of what they might see or hear happening elsewhere. “If Sir Thomas Dagworth comes to us, we can handle him well enough without any help,” he explained, “while if he comes against you, you will barely be able to take him on without assistance.”47 To further minimize the damage a surprise attack could inflict, Blois had had his camps surrounded by a trench and an earthen embankment. Field fortifications of this sort would provide a great advantage to the troops fighting from behind them, if properly manned, but were not substantial enough to pose a major obstacle to a determined assault in and of themselves.48 Rather than strengthening these defenses further, however, Blois had directed his laborers’ energies to creating a cleared zone more than a mile wide around the perimeter of the camps. Within this area, all ditches were filled, and all hedges razed.49 At first glance this seems somewhat of an odd step. It would not help prevent the surprise night attack Blois expected. Indeed, it would make such an attack more likely to achieve surprise. Hedges and ditches would have channeled the advance of an army onto the roads (especially if it were marching by night), which could realistically be warded by sentinels in a way that extensive open fields could not. The French action makes more sense when we take note of the Grandes chroniques’ observation that Blois’s primary objective was not simply to keep his army intact long enough to conclude the siege and capture the town; rather, he was using the siege essentially as “bait” to draw Dagworth into a battle.50 (This was essentially the same strategy Edward III had employed successfully in his siege of Berwick in 1333, leading to the Battle of Halidon Hill, and 46 47

48

49

50

Grandes chroniques, 9:298–93, 303. Grandes chroniques, 9:303. Note that the first half of the sentence should free Blois of the blame he has sometimes been given for not having any thought that Dagworth might approach by some other route – e.g. François Plaine, “La journée de La Roche-Derrien (18 juin 1347),” Association bretonne, session de Guingamp (1875), p. 244. Charles recognized and allowed for that possibility, though he did not consider it probable. Dagworth in his dispatch, in Avesbury, Gestis, p. 388, makes them sound more formidable (“graundes forteresces de fosses entour luy”), but two facts indicate otherwise: (1) none of the chronicles mentions them either in describing Blois’s preparations or in narrating the fighting, and (2) Dagworth’s initial attack was able to get past them and inflict substantial damage on the men in the camp. Dagworth’s dispatch (ibid.) says half a local league, which would be about 2200 meters. Ronald Zupko, French Weights and Measures before the Revolution (Bloomington, 1978), s.v. “lieue,” assuming the standard league of 3 Roman miles (4.411 km). Grandes chroniques, 9:300: “les noz eussent prise la ville s’il eussent voulu … [mais le duc] ne voult prendre la ville jusques atant que messire Thomas Dagorn … venist, et qu’il fust pris …” See also Richard Lescot, Chronique de Richard Lescot, religieux de Saint-Denis (1328–1344), suivie de la continuation de cette chronique (1344–64), ed. Jean Lemoine (Paris, 1862), p. 78.

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unsuccessfully with the siege of Tournai in 1340, and which he was indeed at this same time using to try to draw the French into a battle outside Calais.)51 If Blois had fortified his troops too strongly, the result might be Dagworth accepting the loss of La Roche-Derrien rather than attacking. So the French commander wanted to leave the English room for a “fair” fight (one where they would not have any advantages of terrain to defend their archers) so that they would be willing to give battle, but not likely to win it against his superior numbers.52 It was not a bad plan, in principle, especially considering that in the event of a night attack Blois’s primary concern was to avoid defeat, rather than to achieve victory. All he had to do was drive off the attackers. As long as he could manage that much, the Anglo-Montfortians would still be left with the need to give battle by daylight, in the open fields, or accept the loss of the town.53 The fact that in the end Blois could not achieve even this limited defensive objective, that his plan did fail, disastrously, is a testament to the extraordinary fighting spirit and skill of Dagworth and his men, including the garrison and militia of the town under Richard Totesham. On the nineteenth of June, the day before the battle,54 Dagworth’s forces advanced unopposed to the abbey of Bégard, just fourteen kilometers from La RocheDerrien.55 The monks had fled long since, but the remaining servants were not harmed by the Anglo-Breton army.56 Under his direct command Sir Thomas had some 300 men-at-arms and 400 archers, aside from a substantial number of local footmen, reportedly numbering in the thousands.57 It was not much to throw into the balance against Blois’s 1,600–1,800 men-at-arms, 2,600 archers and crossbowmen, and numerous light infantrymen, many of them local peasants 51 52

53 54 55

56 57

See War Cruel and Sharp, chs. 4, 9, 12. If Blois did succeed in bringing on a battle, it would be to his advantage for the terrain to be clear, to prevent the English from defending their archers with a hedge, and to allow him more freedom to deploy his superior numbers. (Dagworth’s report on the battle, p. 388: “par que mez archiers ne puissent trover lor avauntage sur luy et sur sez gentz, mes covient a fin force de combatre en pleins champes.”) Blois’s intent was not to “provide a good ‘field of fire’”; that would not have been to his advantage, given the superiority of the English longbowmen, which had recently been demonstrated at Crécy. Note Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:169: the Anglo-Breton leadership, learning of the siege of the town, “ne l’euissent, pour leur honneur, jamais laissiet.” Assuming the date in Dagworth’s dispatch is correct, though the funeral monument of Guy de Laval indicates the battle was fought on the 18th. La Borderie, Histoire, 3:505n. Froissart, in what Lettenhove calls his fourth redaction, suggests that they were undetected as well as unopposed (“riens ne savoit messires Carles de Blois de lor convenant.” Oeuvres, 5:172), but Dagworth says “savoient luy et sez gentz par lor espies ma venue sur eaux, et fusrent en lost armez tout la nuyt.” In Avesbury, Gestis, 388. Most likely the French knew something of the English movement, but did not realize how close they had come – otherwise Blois would probably have kept his whole army under arms, not just the troops at Place Vert. See below, n. 64. Grandes chroniques, 9:300. Dagworth’s dispatch (in Avesbury, Gestis, p. 389) says he had 300 men-at-arms, but two chronicle sources (Thomas Burton, Chronica monasterii de Melsa, ed. E. A. Bond. 3 vols. [London, 1866–68], 3:64 and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS78, fo. 176 – the latter possibly due to a misreading of Packington’s chronicle [cf. British Library, Cottonian MSS, Tiberius A VI, fos. 196–196v], confusing the battle of La Roche-Derrien with the fight a year earlier) say 200. The difference may be the 100 men-at-arms under the Celtic Breton knight Garnier de

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armed with staff-slings.58 On the other hand, taking into account the quality of the English troops, the potential advantage of surprise, the inevitably fractured deployment that the terrain imposed on the French, and the help Dagworth could expect to receive from the troops of the garrison (which included 80 more menat-arms),59 the situation was not entirely hopeless. He had reason not to overestimate the importance of his enemy’s numerical superiority. Aside from his own earlier victory over Blois, and his probable personal experience at the battle of Crécy, Dagworth certainly knew men who had helped overcome even greater odds at Dupplin Moor in 1332.60 Doubtless he had received full reports of Henry of Lancaster’s recent victories over much larger numbers at Bergerac and Auberoche in Aquitaine. Both Dupplin Moor and Auberoche had begun with surprise night or dawn attacks on enemy encampments, and whether inspired by those examples or simply compelled by the logic of the situation, Dagworth planned something similar61 – just as Blois expected.

58

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61

Cadoudal whom Froissart says arrived only after the first phase of the battle (see below). Dagworth does not mention the local infantry, but the St. Omer Chronicle says he had some 3,000 infantry, “both archers and others,” suggesting a force of some 2,600 local foot. (Froissart, in his “second redaction,” says 8,000 foot. Oeuvres, 5:169.) If we place any credence in the statement of the St. Omer Chronicle that over 2,000 of Dagworth’s men were killed in the pursuit after their defeat in the first stage of the battle, that likewise implies a total infantry strength of several thousand. Given the substantial portion of Brittany – especially Celtic Brittany – still loyal to the Montfortist cause, a contingent of local footmen on this scale is certainly not impossible. Dagworth, “Report,” in Avesbury, Gestis, 388, says Blois had 1,200 knights and esquires and 600 “other men-at-arms” of lower status, plus 600 archers and 2,000 crossbowmen. This matches well enough with Froissart’s 1,600 “armures de fer” (including 23 bannerets and 400 knights) and 12,000 total foot. Oeuvres, 5:167, 169, 172. Melsa, 3:64, says Blois had 2,000 men-atarms (equitum); the figure of 1,000 men-at-arms given by CCCO MS 78, fo. 176 seems to be a major understatement. Again, it may be from a misreading of Packington. Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 574, gives his force as “1,200 men-at-arms, 2,000 crossbowmen and some 600 other infantry in addition to an enormous number of volunteers from the surrounding region armed with sticks and stones who came to join him after his arrival.” This appears to be based on Dagworth’s numbers, though it is a mystery what happened to the 600 non-noble men-at-arms Dagworth mentions in addition to the 1,200 knights and esquires. (In Avesbury, Gestis, 388: “avoit en sa companye mil CC. des nettez gentz darmes, chivalers et esquiers, et DC. dautres gentz darmes, et des archiers du pais DC., et MlMl balisters, et de comune jeo ne savoi la nombre.”) It should also be noted that Blois’s common infantry probably included substantial numbers whom he had brought with him, not only the locals who joined him with their staff-slings (Sumption’s “sticks and stones”: “fondes pendenz à bastons” in the Grandes chroniques, 9:299.) St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v. Assuming he did indeed serve on the Crécy chevauchée (see above, note 31), it would have been in company with Richard Talbot (Steward of the King’s Household) and Thomas Ughtred, both veterans of Dupplin. Even if he did not fight at Crécy, the number of Edward’s fighting bannerets was not all that great, and it seems likely Dagworth would have known these two and Walter Mauny, another Dupplin man, one way or another, especially considering that Dagworth was the lieutenant and brother-in-law of the Earl of Northampton, King Edward’s Constable – who had also defeated a much larger Bloisian army at Morlaix in 1342. (On Dagworth’s marriage to Eleanor de Bohun, see Jones, “Dagworth,” 626.) Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173.

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The Frenchman, however, had thought it most likely that Dagworth would direct his main assault at the Place Vert. The troops there were on full alert, armed and drawn up for a fight. Sir Thomas’s scouts apparently reported, however, that the enemy forces on the far side of the Jaudy were less ready to resist an attack.62 He may not have known about Blois’s orders for the men at the Place Vert to hold their positions, but by striking near the river and blocking the crossing, he could hope to keep reinforcements at bay in any case. Before launching his attack on Charles’s main body, however, he arranged a feint. The army left Bégard around midnight, traveling just north of east to cross the Jaudy and join the main road which linked La Roche to Guingamp.63 Once the force came near the town, the servants and wagoners of his army were dispatched to take up positions opposite the north-eastern sector of the French lines, between the lepers’ hospital and the mill, under cover of darkness.64 At the same time Dagworth’s elite fighting-

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63 64

He says in his dispatch (Avesbury, Gestis, 388) – and Sumption, Trial by Battle, 574, accepts his testimony – that the French “knew of my coming against them through their spies, and they were collected and in arms all the night.” This last may have been true of the men at Place Vert, where Dagworth was expected to make his attack, but it is clear from the Grandes chroniques (and from the initial success of the English attack) that in the eastern sector of the French camp only the watch was fully ready for combat, the bulk of the men still not being “parfaitement armez” when Dagworth struck, despite having at least some warning from the watch. (“l’ost qui estoit en la Place Vert … s’estoit appareillié à combatre vertueusement encontre ledit messire Thomas Dagorn. Mais ledit messire Thomas sceut par aventure comment il estoient fors; si se tourna vers l’ost du duc. Et le duc et sa compaignie cuidoient qu’il s’en alast de l’autre part et ne se gardoient pas de lui … avant qu’il fussent parfaitement armes, les anemis les assailirent …” Grandes chroniques, 9:301.) It is hard to imagine how Dagworth’s relatively small army could have “fought their way through the siege works” (Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 574), had the French indeed been fully armed, drawn up, and waiting for them. Indeed, Lescot, p. 79 says that the watch had to wake the soldiers who were sleeping, as well as calling them to arms. However, it should be noted that the St. Omer chronicle, fo. 227v, supports Dagworth on this point: “Quant li dux sot que si anemi venoient bien pensoit que de nuit le venroient assallir. Et pour chou fist commander par tout lost que tout fuissent en armes.” Grandes chroniques, 9:301: “par la grant voie qui va à la Roche Derain” east of the Jaudi; this can only be the Guingamp road. Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 574, says the diversionary attack was made on the west, but this is not correct. According to the Grandes chroniques, p. 301, he “savoit bien quel part le duc estoit, et là mist plusseurs charroy et plusseurs varlez … entre le moulin et la maladerie,” and the action began when “commencierent à crier les varles qui estoient vers la maladerie.” (In Lescot, p. 79, “entre le moulin et la maladerie” becomes “inter molendinum ad ventum et leprosariam.”) The fact that this was said to be “là” where “le duc estoit” clearly means it was east of the river. The maladerie was probably located near where the current cemetery is, along the Guingamp road, which led into the Porte de Jument, the eastern boundary of the Duke’s sector. Dagworth’s approach to Roche-Derrien was along this road; the stream which divides the southern from the north-eastern sector runs a short distance east of it. Thus the varlets were on the boundary between the Duke’s sector and the next one to the east; the intent was presumably to pull troops away from the Jaudy crossing which linked the two largest elements of the French force, a link which Dagworth hoped to cut.

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men quietly split off to the west, to within striking range of Blois’s own force.65 The action was begun by the diversionary force, which suddenly began a great clamor as if making an attack. It was half-way between midnight and dawn, on an exceptionally dark night.66 The lords of Beaumanoir67 and Derval, who were in charge of the watch, moved in that direction to investigate the uproar. This was a foolish move. Blois did intend that his main division would go to the aid of the smaller forces if they were attacked, but, especially given that the probability of a diversionary attack by the English had specifically been noted already, the watch should not have abandoned its initial positions until after the troops of the main division had been given time to rouse and arm themselves.68 As it was, the men of the watch did still detect the English strike force and sound the alarm before Dagworth launched his assault, but only barely.69 At first the AngloMontfortians had all the advantages of surprise, and wrought considerable havoc.70 It is not clear whether Dagworth meant to push this fight to the end, or whether it was supposed to be a hit-and-run operation to improve the odds for a set-piece battle the next day, as Froissart suggests.71 In any case, the struggle continued until the whole French army was aroused.72 The troops west of the river held steady in their positions, but the men in Blois’s division alone easily outnumbered Dagworth’s soldiers. The Anglo-Montfortians did enjoy one major advantage: before the fight, their commander had given them a watchword so that they could identify one another in the darkness. They were instructed to speak it only softly, and to immediately kill anyone who gave it in a loud voice, who could be presumed to be a Frenchman who had overheard it.73 Although this certainly helped them greatly in the fighting, in the end the attackers were overwhelmed 65

66 67

68

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70 71 72 73

Froissart says in what Lettenhove terms his first and second redactions that Dagworth took only half his men with him for the night attack, but it seems very unlikely that he left behind any of his better troops, though he might well have left behind the men he did not think could be counted on in a night-fight. He would have needed to do as much damage as he could while he had some advantage from surprise and darkness, and so would have employed all the force available, rather than holding any substantial number back to fight under less advantageous circumstances later. In his “fourth” redaction, which for Roche-Derrien is the best and most detailed, he simply says that “part” of the force was designated for the attack, while some men stayed behind. Oeuvres, 5:168, 169, 173. Dagworth, “Report,” p. 389; Grandes chroniques, 9:301, 304; Lescot, p. 79 (“nox obscurissima”). The Grandes chroniques, 9:301, says “Robert, ayol du seigneur de Biaumanoir,” presumably this means the grandfather of the lord of Beaumanoir at the time the chronicle was being written, not the grandfather of the lord of Beaumanoir killed at the battle. St. Omer Chronicle says: “Et celle nuit fist le gait uns chevaliers que on apelloit le signeur de biaumanoir.” The Grandes chroniques, 9:301, note that some of the knights of the watch – the author circumspectly refrains from blaming Beaumanoir and Derval specifically – “ne faisoient pas bien leur devoir, si comme l’en dit, car il ne veilloient pas bien.” Grandes chroniques, 9:301; cf. Lescot, p. 79. Burne is thus mistaken to say that the French had no sentinels out. He also fails to mention the use of the diversionary attack. Crecy War, p. 93; likewise DeVries, Infantry Warfare, p. 190. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173, 170. Oeuvres, 5:173, 167–8. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:170, 173; St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v. Grandes chroniques, 9:300–01.

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by weight of numbers as more and more of their enemies piled into the combat, bearing blazing torches.74 Dagworth himself was captured, severely wounded: he was a man of “to hy a corage to fly,” a fact that would later result in his death in a skirmish in 1350.75 His surviving troops broke and fled; the French pursued for some distance, striking down hundreds of them.76 That would have been the end of the battle, had it not been for Garnier, sire de Cadouadal, a Breton-speaking knight loyal to the Montfort party.77 This martial nobleman was considered a particularly skillful warrior. In 1342, while Edward III was besieging Vannes, he had been one of two Breton lords assigned to guard the eastern approaches into the duchy against a French offensive, with a “great number of men-at-arms.”78 Presumably having proceeded to the rendezvous from his lands around Ploërmel, he had arrived too late to participate in the initial attack on Blois’s camp. But after the fugitives from La Roche-Derrien rallied at their base at Bégard, he arrived there with 100 fresh, picked men-at-arms.79 It is very difficult to persuade defeated men who have lost their leader to resume the offensive. Sir Garnier, however, managed the trick, arguing that the French would now be careless and off their guard, thinking that they were done 74

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Grandes chroniques, 9:302; Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173, 168; Lescot, p. 79 (torches). The St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v, says that troops piled into the fight from all over the army, but the testimony of the Grandes chroniques regarding the troops at the Place Vert should be preferred. Grandes chroniques, 9:301–2. Corage: Leland’s notes of the missing portion of the Scalacronica, in Thomas Gray, Scalacronica ed. and trans. Sir Herbert Maxwell (Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1907), p. 117. Wounded: Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173. The Grandes chroniques, 9:302, note his capture and indicate that this temporarily brought an end to the battle, which had to “begin a second time” (“commença derechief”) when English reinforcements arrived. Since the reinforcements are said to have rescued Dagworth as he was being led to the Duke’s tents, this is clearly a reference to the same phase of the battle as described in the St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v: “Et quant li engles virent le force de leurs anemis croistre a la fuite se misent. La en ot mort pres de .ij.m. Et quant li jours fu esclarchis et le cache fu remese [sic] li dus o tout ses haus barons se retraisent vers lors tentes aveuc pau de gent …” At this point the chronicler has Dagworth rescued by the garrison’s sally. Like Froissart, he has conflated the two rescues into one; Froissart notes only Cadoudal’s; the St. Omer chronicler notes only the garrison’s. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173 (“ensi que tous desconfis, et furent sus un estat que de tantos départir.”) Account of the lieutenant of the bailli of the Cotentin (appendix VII to Lescot), p. 229: “plusieurs aliez de Bretaigne ovecques ledit Roy [Edward] qui guetoient les passages, c’est assavoir monseigneur Olivier de la Chapelle et monseigneur G. de Cadoudal, chevaliers, qui estoient à grant nombre des gentz d’armes, pour quetier ceulx qui de par le Roy [Philip] nostre sire venoient en Bretaigne, et estoit ledit monseigneur Olivier à Pillemiq, près de Nantes, et l’autre en la forest de Villequartier, près de Dol et de Pontorson.” Also: “ledit Cadoudal espioit pour entrer ou chastel de Pontorson et du Mont Saint-Michiel.” One should always take Froissart’s testimony with a certain skepticism, but this documentary evidence shows that he knew enough to make a very credible identification of the leader of the second strike, and other sources, including the Grandes chroniques and the St. Omer Chronicle, agree that Dagworth was rescued by a new offensive after he had been captured and his men defeated, which fits very well with Froissart’s narrative (except that the St. Omer chronicle has this rescue performed by the garrison in its sally, conflating two events into one.) Ploërmel: Froissart, Chroniques, ed. Ainsworth, p. 628n. Arrival, men-at-arms: Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:174, 170.

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with fighting for the night. There was still good cause to hope that Dagworth could be rescued, and the battle won.80 This reasoning was sound, but under these circumstances logical thinking is often insufficient to move men to action. That this Breton knight succeeded says as much about the quality of Dagworth’s men as it does about his own leadership. Just as Cadoudal predicted, the French, after capturing Dagworth, thought they had won the battle. No watch was organized, and many of the soldiers had removed their armor to recover from their efforts. Some were sleeping, or celebrating their victory with wine and food.81 Sir Thomas was being led towards Blois’s tent by his captors when the rallied Anglo-Breton forces struck again.82 The surprise was greater than before, and despite their small numbers the attackers were able to rescue their commander and inflict a great deal of damage.83 In the chaos and darkness, numbers of Frenchmen were killed by their own comrades.84 Once again, however, the French numbers were so far superior that the battle eventually turned against the Englishmen. Duke Charles personally directed the counterattack. Dagworth was forced to surrender a second time, reportedly captured by Blois himself.85 Small groups of Englishmen continued the fight in scattered pockets, but the situation looked grim for them.86 It was now almost dawn, and growing light enough to see. The French troops west of the river, in accordance with their orders, still had not moved from their initial position.87 Neither, thus far, had Richard Totesham and the garrison of La Roche-Derrien, for similar reasons. For all they knew, the commotion might be a grand deception, intended to lure them out into an ambush and deliver their stronghold into enemy hands. Once the glow on the horizon was bright enough for them to discern that the fighting had been real, however, Totesham decided to throw everything he had into a bold attempt to reverse the outcome of the battle.88 Considering that he had already arranged to surrender on favorable terms if not relieved, this was a risky and admirable choice. Had he failed, it might in retrospect have seemed a foolish step. But he did not fail. 80 81 82

83 84 85 86 87 88

Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:174. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:175, 170–1. Both the Grandes chroniques (9:302) and the St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 227v) describe Dagworth being rescued as he was being led back to the Duke’s tents. The Grandes chroniques sets this episode after this first capture, and have him rescued by the “autre bataille” which re-opened the combat thereafter. St. Omer does not mention that he was captured twice, nor that the English were defeated twice, but sets this episode after the French have defeated and pursued the English, and has the garrison as the rescuers. The Grandes chroniques is in general the better account, and it seems that here the St. Omer chronicler has conflated two separate phases of the battle. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:175, 171. Grandes chroniques, 9:302. Grandes chroniques, 9:302; note also Lescot, p. 79. Froissart leaves out this second defeat and the garrison’s intervention. Grandes chroniques, 9:302. Grandes chroniques, 9:302–3. Dagworth, “Report,” in Avesbury, Gestis, p. 389: “la garnison de Rochedirian … issoient, quant il fust cler jour et nous purroient conustre, et vindrent vers nous sur lez enemys mult chivalrousment”; Grandes chroniques, 9:302.

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Out of the town’s gates suddenly poured a river of fresh men-at-arms, archers, and urban militiamen, 500 “strong and determined fighters” in all. The large majority of the townsmen were loyal to the Montfortian party,89 and Totesham, remarkably, had built on this to the point where they were willing to make a dangerous assault on their erstwhile lord, and indeed against their own neighbors from the countryside, who had flocked in to assist the French because of the heavy impositions the garrison had placed on them during its period of free dominance.90 Rather than the more typical spears, lances or swords, the new entrants to the fighting wielded fearsome short-hafted axes.91 An axe is a relatively awkward weapon, not well suited to deflecting or parrying an enemy’s blows, but by the principles of leverage and concentration of force it hits with greater impact and cuts deeper than a sword-blow. For these reasons, it was the axe rather than the sword that was often used by kings in late-medieval battles: because of their great value as live prisoners, princes could afford to sacrifice the greater defensive value of a sword in favor of the more lethal strike of the axe.92 The troops spilling out of the town carried with them some extra axes and armor, with which they rearmed the numerous English prisoners they rescued.93 (The prisoners from the earlier actions would have been taken to the “rear” after their capture, which means the garrison would have met them shortly after exiting the town.) Thus reinforced, they crashed forward against the same fraction of the French army that had already been through two stiff fights. The men of Blois’s division had been in combat for a quarter of the night already, and must have been exhausted. They were unable to check this new onslaught. The attackers cut their way from one end of the camp to the other. Duke Charles, seeing that the tide had turned against him, began to retreat. If he had been able to link up with his still-unbloodied troops at the Place Vert, he would likely have been able to restore the situation. But the troops west of the river continued to hold their positions, as they had been strictly ordered to do, and Charles could not make his way to them through the English. Instead he fell 89 90 91

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Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:167 (three quarters of them). Grandes chroniques, 9:299. Grandes chroniques, 9:302. There is no mention in the sources of the use of bows, though it was by now light enough for that to have been feasible. This is probably because of the closequarters, intermixed nature of the fighting. It is worth noting that La Roche-Derrien has had a population of around 800–1,000 between 1825 and now. The garrison was probably around 240 men in total (the 80 men-at-arms noted by the St. Omer Chronicle, and two archers for each). To make up the total of 500 would, thus, have required the participation of virtually every man of military age in the town. E.g. Bedford at Verneuil (Jehan de Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, à présent nommé Engleterre, ed. William Hardy. 4 vols. [London, 1868– 1891], 3:114); Robert Bruce at Bannockburn; Peter of Cyprus at Alexandria in 1365 (Guillaume de Machaut, The Capture of Alexandria, trans. Janet Shirley, introduction and notes by Peter Edbury [Aldershot, 2001], p. 94); Henry V and Alençon at Agincourt (Anne Curry, ed., The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations [Woodbridge, 2000], pp. 52, 168). Grandes chroniques, 9:303.

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back onto the high ground by the lepers’ hospital.94 Hard-pressed, he and the remainder of his men set their backs to a windmill and fought for their lives. A crowd of soldiers surrounded the Duke, clamoring for his surrender, but he refused to surrender to an Englishman.95 In the end, however, bleeding from no less than seven wounds,96 he was nonetheless brought down by Nicholas Lovayn, esquire, with the help of one John of “Isplyngrode.”97 What happened next is not entirely clear from the sources. The Grandes chroniques say that “when [Blois’s] surviving men learned that their lord had been captured, 94

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Grandes chroniques, 9:304: “montaigne des mesiaux.” I take “mesiaux” to be a form of “meseau,” lepers, and so a reference to the “leprosarium” mentioned by Lescot, p. 79, presumably the same as the “maladerie” of the Grandes chroniques, 9:301. Plaine, “Roche-Derrien,” p. 253n, reaches a similar conclusion. Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 575, writes that Charles “fought savagely, and was wounded seven times before he finally gave himself up to a Breton knight who made his way through the mêlée to take his surrender. No nobleman of the fourteenth century would willingly surrender to a man too far beneath him.” There are several problems with this. First, it appears to be based on the Grandes chroniques and the continuation of Lescot, but does not quite accurately reflect what the chroniclers say. They actually quite clearly describe the Duke as unwilling to surrender to any Englishman: nationality, not status, was the issue. (Grandes chroniques, 9:304: “ja à Anglois il ne se rendroit, et qu’il avoit plus chier à sourffrir mort”; cf. Lescot, p. 79: “quia Anglicus non erat.”) Second, although the Grandes chroniques are overall our best source for La Roche-Derrien, it is questionable whether this particular story should be given even as much credit as Sumption allows it. The “Bernard du Châtel” of the (related ) Grandes chroniques and Lescot narratives is not otherwise known to have existed, nor is Lescot’s editor’s suggestion that Tanneguy du Châtel might be the captor referred to credible, considering the small scale of the fief-rente Edward granted to him in 1349. Jean le Bel, Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez, 2 vols. (Paris, 1904–5), 2:354. Furthermore, we have documentary evidence that it was in fact Nicholas Lovayn and John of Isplyngrode who were rewarded for Blois’s capture, with the specific statement concerning Lovayn that it was he who “nuper cepit de guerra” Charles of Blois. (Lescot, 80n, and below, n. 97). Thus, on this one point, the essence of the Grandes chroniques’ story is clearly wrong, so its account of the whole episode should be treated with great caution. Grandes chroniques, 9:304; later sources increase it to seventeen. “Kolkino de Lovayn, scutifero,” received £1,166 13s. 4d., i.e. 1,750 marks, in November 1348 “by the king’s gift, both for good service done by him on behalf of the said lord king, and for the capture of Charles of Blois, whom he recently took as a prisoner of war while on the king’s service in Brittany.” In September 1351, another disbursement was made to “Nicholao Loveyn, militi,” apparently the same person, “in part payment of £1,066 13s. 4d. [1600 marks], part of [infra] the sum of 3,050 marks which the lord King granted him for the capture of Charles of Blois.” In addition, also in 1351, “Johanni de Isplyngrode” received a payment towards the 1,000 pounds the King had granted him “for the effective work which the said Johannes recently did, in praiseworthy fashion, in respect to the capture of Charles of Blois.” These entries from the Issue Rolls are quoted in Lescot, p. 80n. Sumption apparently follows Lemaine (the editor of Lescot) in taking Lovayn to be a mercenary from Louvain in Brabant, but it is virtually certain that he was, rather, a relative of Sir John Lovayn, a tenant in capite with lands in Suffolk and Essex who served under the younger Bartholomew Burghersh in 1346–47 and died at Calais. George Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais from the Public Records (London, 1898), pp. 154, 78, 86, 280. Sir Nicholas also served as a captain in the 1359–60 Reims campaign (Ayton, Knights, p. 266), and was granted the marriage of the daughter of Sir John Hardreshull, a leading Brittany veteran, in 1349. He used the profits of the ransom to acquire extensive lands in Surrey and Oxfordshire from the St. John of Lageham family. G. E. Cockayne (ed.), Complete Peerage, 13 vols. (1910–59; reprint, London 2000), 11:350.

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they fled like men entirely without hope.”98 This is probably oversimplified, however. The numerous troops west of the Jaudy had not yet been engaged, and if they had all escaped unscathed, it is hard to see how the total casualties on the French could have been as extensive as they were – with around half the total number of men-at-arms killed, in addition to a “great number” captured. Furthermore, Dagworth in his dispatch says that “we fought with the enemy in four batailles, each after the other.”99 It is not quite clear what this means, because the word bataille can mean either a “battle” in the sense of an engagement, or a “battle” in the sense of a division of an army. In either case, it could mean that after Blois’s capture, the other three French divisions still continued to hold their positions and were defeated one at a time, presumably starting with the north-eastern contingent, then the men at Place Vert, and finally those in the north-western quadrant. This would be the most natural reading of his statement, but it too poses a problem. At the start of the battle, the force at Place Vert was thought to be strong enough, if only barely, to defeat the English by itself. How could Dagworth’s men, after suffering the numerous casualties that must inevitably have accompanied the chaos of a long mêlée in darkness against a numerically superior foe, and after having fought to the brink of exhaustion, have defeated these still-unbloodied French forces, especially if the latter were seconded by the smaller contingent to their north, as the growing daylight should have allowed? To further obscure the situation, if by “battle” Dagworth means “engagement,” he could be counting the fight against Blois’s division as two or even three “battles.” For example, it would not be entirely unreasonable to describe the first attack on Blois’s camp as a “battle” the English lost; the attack by Cadoudal’s force as the second “battle,” and the offensive by the garrison as the third. The fourth would then be an attack on one of the other divisions, presumably the north-eastern contingent (small enough to be defeated easily, and immediately to hand); but that, like the Grandes chroniques’ version, would still leave the forces west of the Jaudy escaping without casualties, and the near–100% casualties suffered by the French bannerets100 a puzzle. So the difficulty, in other words, is that if the troops west of the Jaudy did fight, they should have won (and the Grandes chroniques’ statement about the remaining French taking flight after Blois’s capture would be misleading); if they did not fight, then the French losses seem too high, and Dagworth’s statement about four “battles” cannot be interpreted in the most natural way.

98 99 100

Finally, it should be noted that Sumption – clearly not at the top of his game in his study of these events – misstates the value of the reward given to Dagworth in exchange for Blois. It was indeed 25,000 écus, as Sumption says, but the privy seal authorization itself (printed in Le Bel, Chroniques, 2:353) equates this sum to £4,000 and 1,250 marks, or a total of £4,833 6s. 8d., not Sumption’s £3,500. This was, moreover, in addition to the 3,050 marks (£2,033 6s. 8d.) promised to Lovayn and the 1,000 pounds granted to Isplyngrode. The total Edward paid for Blois was thus £7,866 13s. 4d., still a “very moderate price,” as Sumption says, but at more than twice the cost he gives. Grandes chroniques, 9:304–5: “Quant ceulz de sa gent qui estoient eschapez vifs sceurent que leur signeur estoit pris, si se departirent comme touz desesperez.” Report, in Avesbury, Gestis, 389: “et eusmes a feaire od les enemys, avant qil feust solail levaunt, a iiij. batailles, chescun apres aultre.” See below.

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The most likely explanation of all this is that after Blois’s capture, most of the French soldiers did begin to fly, but that the most noble among them, motivated by their honor and sense of duty, continued to hold their positions, deciding that it would be better to be captured than bear any imputation of cowardice, or the blame for the defeat. We know from Dagworth’s dispatch that eventually his men took “a great number” of French knights and esquires prisoner, though apparently not as many as they killed.101 Normal English practice in this period was not to take any prisoners until the battle had effectively been won, and it is virtually certain that they followed that same rule in this fight.102 Thus, it seems most likely that the men-at-arms in Blois’s own division fought with remarkable courage to the bitter end, and that the large majority of them were killed. After the last phase of this fight, with the capture of Blois and the men around him, the English were able to reform and move against the remnants of each of the other three contingents in turn. These steadfast few, divided as they were, could mostly have been captured without their putting up too much of a fight – especially since the English archers would have by that point been able to contribute effectively with their bows.103 Of the less valorous, some may have fled right into the arms of the Anglo-Breton infantry force which, according to Froissart, followed behind Garnier de Cadoudal’s men-at-arms when they set off from Bégard.104 The above reconstruction of the last phase of the battle could account for the exceptionally high proportion of the French leadership that was killed or captured at La Roche-Derrien. The list of the principal prisoners and slain includes nearly all the bannerets in the army, 105 and reads like a roll-call of the greatest 101 102

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Report, in Avesbury, Gestis, 389: the prisoners included “chivalers et esquiers a graunt nombre.” Grandes chroniques, 9:304: “il en tuerent plus qu’il nen pristrent.” The situation effectively demanded it – the English, badly outnumbered and relying on surprise to make up for their inferiority, could not have spared the time to capture prisoners, nor the men to guard them, while the fighting continued. Furthermore, the Grandes chroniques, 9:301, explicitly state that the English had been ordered to kill (not “kill or capture”) anyone who didn’t return the password in a low voice. We can roughly estimate the breakdown of the men-at-arms in the French army as follows, starting with Dagworth’s figures of 1,200 knights and esquires and 600 non-noble men-atarms. The force at Place Vert was thought to be comparable in strength to Dagworth’s men, potentially aided by the garrison – so, say, 400 knights and esquires plus 200 non-noble menat-arms. Blois’s own division was substantially stronger, say by 50%, which would be 600 noble and 300 non-noble men-at-arms. That would leave 100 knights and esquires and 50 nonnoble men-at-arms for each of the two minor forces. If around two-thirds of Blois’s own menat-arms were killed, in addition to some of those in the north-eastern contingent and a few from the other two, that would account for the 600–700 men-at-arms Dagworth says were killed, and fit with the Grandes chroniques’ statement (9:303) that more than half the men in Blois’s army were slain (allowing for a little hyperbole). Oeuvres, 5:170, 174–5. Froissart has Garnier’s men strike not long before dawn, so the battle would have been over before these infantrymen could have reached the field. In some cases it is not clear which of these men were of banneret rank; but if Froissart is correct that there were 23 bannerets in the army (Oeuvres, 5:169, though 5:168 could be read as saying 23 was the number of bannerets among the slain or captured) – and the ratio of 23 bannerets to 1,600–1,800 men-at-arms is somewhat high for a French force, but not out of line (cf. Contamine, Guerre, état et société, 42–3 [12 bannerets out of 1,115 men-at-arms at a muster; 6 bannerets out of 495 knights and esquires from Artois]; also Ayton, Knights and

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noble houses supporting the Blois party.106 The viscount of Rohan,107 the lord of Châteaubriant, the lord of Malestroit, the lord of Rostrenen, the lord of Rougé, the lord of Vauguion,108 the lord de la Jaille, the lord of Goulaine,109 Aumary de Clisson,110 Sir William de Rieux, Sir Geoffroy de Tournemine, and Sir Ralph de Montfort were killed. In addition, it seems likely that slain included the “acting head” of the powerful Rays family, and perhaps also a leading member of the Machecoul clan.111 Charles of Blois, the lord of Rochefort, the lord of Beaumanoir, the lord of Lohéac,112 the lord of Meillac, the lord of Tinténiac, and a son of the lord of Vauguion were captured.113 Hardest hit were the great houses of Laval, Derval, and Quintin. The lord of Laval was killed along with his brothers Raesse

106

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108 109 110 111

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Warhorses, 264n, for an English force including 34 earls and other bannerets out of 1,373 men-at-arms) then surely this list must include nearly all of them. The following list of those killed and captured derives, except as noted, from the Grandes chroniques, 9:303–4; Lescot, pp. 79–80; Dagworth’s dispatch, in Avesbury, Gestis, 389; Giovanni Villani’s Cronica Nova, 13:XCIII, and the St. Omer Chronicle, fos. 227v–228. The text of the last-mentioned reads: “Mort y furent a celle journee li baneres que nous vous nommerons. C’est a savoir monsigneur de Laval, et monsigneur Jehan sen frere, le signeur de Castel Briant, le viscomte de Rohem, le signeur de Malestrait, le signeur de Brintin[?], le signeur de Derval, et monsigneur Jehan son fil, le signeur de Roistelain, monsigneur Willame de Frieus, monsigneur de la Jaille, le signeur de Machican, monsigneur des Rais et le signeur de Loihai.” Alain VII. The Grandes chroniques note that he was “one of the richest men of Brittany.” Plaine (“Roche-Derrien,” p. 259n) writes that Anselm and the other genealogists follow Dagworth in claming wrongly that he was killed, and that he did not die until the battle of Mauron. It is not only Dagworth, however, who lists the viscount of Rohan among the dead: the Grandes chroniques and Lescot agree. Plaine gives no support for his contrary claim. Grandes chroniques; Lescot, 80. Plaine omits, for reasons unstated. According to Plaine, “Roche-Derrien,” appendix. Froissart, Oeuvres, 21:16–17. He had recently defected from the Montfortist side. The St. Omer Chronicle reports the lords of Raiz and Machecoul among the slain bannerets. The sire de Rays at the time, Girard V Chabot, was however an infant. (Cartulaire des sires de Rais, ed. R. Blanchard, in Archives historiques de Poitou, 28 [1898], p. xcviii.) It seems nearly certain that a knight of the family would have served as a banneret at the battle in place of the child, to lead the family’s clients and vassals, and it was likely this person who was killed. A somewhat similar situation applied to the Machecoul. Girard de Machecoul had died in 1343; his heir Louis was not too young to fight (having married in 1341), but may well for whatever reason not have been personally present at the battle. Jean de Machecoul, uncle of the latter, could be the man in question; the evidence cited by Blanchard as suggesting his death in 1343 (ibid., p. cxxxix) is not conclusive. (“L’exqucion nostre frère monsor Johan” need not refer to the execution of a will, and note the omission of “feu.”) Lohéac, a former Lieutenant for Brittany of Edward III’s, listed by Dagworth as captured, is given among the slain by St. Omer, but it seems incorrectly. See Michael Jones, “Les capitaines anglo-bretons et les marches entre la Bretagne et le Poitou de 1342 à 1373,” La ‘France Anglaise’ au Moyen Age (Paris, 1988), p. 374. In addition, Grandes chroniques, 9:304 notes “messire Chevin Biauboisel” among the barons killed. Viard suggests (ibid., note) this may be Thibaud de Boisbouexel; Plaine has Thibaut de Boisboissel. Plaine adds Robert Arel, Michel Chamaire (a French esquire), and Georges de Lesven to the prisoners. Villani mentions also “il signore di Rualla, e il figliuolo”; the orthography is obscure. Similarly, Villani mentions the death of “il visconte di Durem e il fratello e il filiulo”; if Durem is Derval, this adds his brother to the list of the reported slain.

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and Jean, and his heir was captured.114 The lord of Derval and his only son were both killed. The lord of Quintin and his son Guillaume were both killed; his other son, Jean, had his nose cut off. The Grandes chroniques and Dagworth’s dispatch are in agreement that around half the other noble men-at-arms in the French army were slain.115 The scale of the catastrophe for the Blois party could hardly have been greater. “No men-at-arms ever accomplished such a fine feat as these Bretons and Englishmen,” commented Froissart, “who defeated there in one morning such a great number of noblemen: it should be attributed to their great prowess and skill-at-arms.”116 Jonathan Sumption writes that “the battle of La Roche-Derrien did not transform the military balance in Brittany because the English had too few men to contemplate sweeping over northern and eastern Brittany.”117 The latter portion of his statement may be true, but it must be remembered that before the battle, the French did have enough men to contemplate sweeping over southern and western Brittany. As Sumption himself observed, “the destruction of any significant proportion of Dagworth’s small army would have brought the whole of western Brittany (except Brest) into [Blois’s] hands.”118 After the battle, even with the dispatch of substantial assistance from King Philip, the Blois partisans had all they could do just to hold their own.119 Between the start of the Breton civil war and the battle of la Roche-Derrien, the Montfortists’ position had never been truly secure. But from that point forward, it would never truly be in jeopardy, not even after the defeat at Cocherel in 1363. It took the Battle of Auray in 1364 to finally settle the civil war, but Edward III’s protégé Jean de Montfort would never have had the chance to win that engagement, and rule as uncontested Duke of Brittany, had Sir Thomas Dagworth not, indeed, transformed the military balance in Brittany in 1347 with this astounding victory against the odds.

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Gui de Laval and son: Dagworth. Brother Jean: St. Omer, Villani. Other brother, “messer Rossello”: Villani. Plaine says Gui IX, sire de Laval and his son, Jean, killed. According to L. de Mas Latrie, Trésor de chronologie, d’histoire et de géographie (Paris: Victor Palme, 1889), col. 1623, however, it was Guy X who was killed at La Roche; he did have brothers Jean (seigneur de Pacy) and Raesse, who were co-lords of St.-Père-en-Rays (Archives historiques de Poitou, 28 [1898], p. xxviii), so Mas Latrie seems to be correct. Guy XI died young the next year, possibly due to wounds sustained at La Roche. Grandes chroniques. Including over 200 of 400 knights, according to Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:168– 9. Plaine (“Roche-Derrien,” p. 257) cites no support for his claim that the total number killed was only 300 to 400 at most. 116 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:171: “Onques si belle aventure n’avint à gents d’armes qu’il avint là as Englès et as Bretons, que de desconfire sus une matinée tant de nobles gens: on leur doit bien tourner à grant proèce et à grant apertise d’armes.” Trial by Battle, p. 576. Ibid., p. 574. Cf. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:171: “Si fu la guerre de la contesse de Montfort grandement embellie …” Note also Michael Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 630: the battle “eut un effet anéantissant sur les fortunes de a faction Penthièvre,” and “la capture de Blois et beaucoup de nobles importants, et le massacre de beaucoup d’autres, changèrent d’une façon décisive l’équilibrie des forces dans le duché.”

8 Ferrante d’Este’s Letters as a Source for Military History Sergio Mantovani

Historians have devoted very little attention to Ferrante d’Este, Duke Ercole I’s second son. If he went down in history, it was because of his participation in Giulio d’Este’s plot against his half-brother Alfonso, which ended up with Ferrante dying in prison in 1540 and Giulio being freed 19 years later. Besides this, only poor and fragmentary information can be found about Ferrante. But he deserves more. Born in Naples in 1477, while his mother Eleonora d’Aragona was paying a visit to her father King Ferrante, Ercole’s son spent most of his youth there, coming back to Ferrara at the age of 11. In 1493 he was sent to France to live at Charles VIII’s court, from which he returned in 1497, after having accompanied the king’s descent into Italy in 1494. Some months later, Ferrante managed to enter the service of Venice as a condottiero and the following year went to Tuscany with his company in order to defend Pisa against Florence. The campaign turned out to be a failure and d’Este with the rest of the Venetian army left Pisa in April 1499. After this inglorious experience, Ferrante’s military career came to a stop and, until the already-mentioned plot against Alfonso, he led a courtly life with few events of any importance.1

Abbreviations AG ASE ASFi ASMa ASMi ASMo ASP PNR SPE 1

Archivio Gonzaga Archivio segreto estense Archivio di Stato, Florence Archivio di Stato, Mantua Archivio di Stato, Milan Archivio de Stato, Modena Archivio di Stato, Pisa Casa e stato, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale, Principi non regnanti Sforzesco potenze estere

There is very little on Ferrante, but some information can be found in Edmund G. Gardner, Dukes and Poets in Ferrara (London, 1904), ad vocem; Paolo Portone, “Este, Ferrante d’,” in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 43 (Roma, 1993), pp. 337–39; Thomas Thuoy, Herculean Ferrara. Ercole d’Este and the Invention of a Ducal Capital (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 16, 248.

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Only Lewis Lockwood has devoted some attention to Ferrante, studying his role as a musical amateur,2 yet d’Este also had some role as a patron of literature, for the poet Antonio Tebaldeo dedicated two of his rhymes to him.3 But what Ferrante wanted most was to become a condottiero, as he wrote to his father shortly after his return from France: “I do not want to train myself in anything […] but the profession of arms.”4 Many of his letters, at least those which still exist, deal with military affairs, that is the French campaign of 1494–95 and the Pisan war. This correspondence can be of great value for historians. Let us go into it. First of all, we have to distinguish between the letters of the French period and those written while within Pisa and its surroundings. The first group consists of fewer pieces, which furthermore are of less interest than the others. Here Ferrante was a cold and detached witness, probably well informed thanks to his closeness to the French army, but he often confined himself to reporting King Charles’s movements.5 When the French vanguard took by storm and plundered the papal town of Toscanella, near Viterbo, Ferrante wrote the following: the day before yesterday, [the French wanted] the Most Christian King’s vanguard to quarter within a big papal town called Toscanella […] [the inhabitants] refused to do it and were unwilling to give them victuals. In order to drive the French off [the inhabitants] shot at them, killing three of the French, who entered the town by force and, after killing 400 people, plundered it.6

Not a word more than needed. But when, during the Pisan war, the Florentine condottiero Paolo Vitelli conquered Buti and punished the enemy gunners and handgunners by cutting off their hands, the Este called that “bad war.”7 The second group of letters, indeed, is much richer than the first, with a large number of details about what was happening and sometimes biting commentary. Why is this so? First, we have to bear in mind that in the French descent Ferrante led a secondary role, while within Pisa he was one of the principal commanders and had to defend himself against numerous charges, as we shall see. Still, if Ferrante was much more involved in what happened near Pisa, and 2 3 4 5

6

7

Lewis Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara 1400–1505. The Creation of a Musical Center in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 125, 141, 200, 209, 267. Antonio Tebaldeo, Rime estravaganti, ed. Jean-Jacques Marchand, III/1 (Modena, 1992), pp. 163, 165. ASMo, ASE, PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Ferrara 21 August 1497. See, for instance, ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Asti 12 September 1494, Ponzano Magra 4 November 1494, Florence 17 November 1494, Rome 28 January 1495, Siena s.d., Aversa 21 May 1495; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Casale Monferrato 7 October 1494, Lucca 7 November 1494, Siena 3 December 1494, Rome 28 January 1495, Aversa 21 May 1495. “l’altraieri, volendo alogiare l’antiguardia del Chr.mo Re ad uno castello ben grosso del R.mo papa, nominato Toschanela […] non li volsero alogiare, né dargli victuaria, et per cazarli trassero alcuni colpi d’artellaria et amazorono da tre persone de questi franzesi, li quali per forza entrorno dontro ala terra e, amazati da quattrocento persone, la gitorono a sacho.” ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Acquapendente 9 June 1495. “mala guerra.” ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 21 August 1498.

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this could explain why his letters from there are by far more detailed and interesting, that does not give an explanation for the cold messages of 1494–95. Ercole d’Este was an exacting reader and needed to be kept up to date by his ambassadors, and we can consider Ferrante among them; thus, it is likely that the duke’s second son provided much more information than what remains in the archives today. He sometimes preferred not to put news in black and white but to entrust the bearer to report it orally,8 probably for fear that his messages would fall into the wrong hands. Many letters could also have been destroyed by d’Este’s father or relatives because they were compromising: his correspondence, even that concerning Pisa for some periods, is sometimes too fragmentary to ascribe the gaps to the incomplete survival of archival materials. We know that Ferrante acquainted his relatives with King Charles’s preparations for the Italian expedition,9 and sometimes used a cipher.10 Therefore we can presume that what still exists of Ferrante’s letters is only a part of those he originally wrote. However, we have to concentrate on what we do have. One of the first questions could be: how accurate and truthful was Ferrante? Considering that his accounts were often first-hand, and composed immediately after the events described, d’Este is a good source, especially as far as the Pisan war is concerned. Ferrante was likely sincere, especially since he had good reason not to lie to his relatives, as the addressees had other means of information. This does not mean that he did not express his own point of view; quite the contrary. We can begin from what he wrote about actions. While there are some Este accounts of the battle of Fornovo,11 there is nothing from Ferrante, who was present on the field. As far as the French descent is concerned, his letters offer only short secondhand descriptions.12 But things change when it comes to the Pisan war. Here d’Este was much more involved, and once a raiding party was under his command. Let us read first how he himself described the successful action, and then how a Venetian officer, paymaster (ufficiale pagatore) Vincenzo Valier did it, according to Marin Sanudo’s I diarii. These Magnificent provveditori, in order not to leave the enemy at peace, after deciding that almost all cavalry and infantry here would go to seize the town of Montopoli, appointed the Magnificent Messer Vincenzo Valier […] and myself as commanders in 8

9

10 11

12

See, for instance, ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Francesco Gonzaga, Lyons 5 July 1495; Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Lyons 6 July 1495, Poggibonsi 18 June 1495; ASMo, ASE/ PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Lyons 27 March 1495, Naples 5 May 1495. ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Francesco Gonzaga, Lyons 21 March 1494; Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Lyons 21 March 1494, Lyons 8 May 1494; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Tours 11 January 1494, Lyons 25 March 1494. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Tours 11 January 1494, quoted, Siena 16 June 1495. Diario ferrarese dall’anno 1409 al 1502, ed. Giuseppe Pardi, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, II ed., XXIV/7 (Bologna 1928), pp. 159–60; Luciano Chiappini, “Una relazione inedita sulla battaglia di Fornovo (1495),” Atti e Memorie della Deputazione Provinciale Ferrarese di Storia Patria, s. III, vol. XIII (1973), pp. 173–81. Some of them can be read in ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, camp at Pontremoli 2 July 1495; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pontremoli 1 July 1495, camp at Pontremoli 2 July 1495.

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order to carry it out. And so, after leaving from here as secretly as we could, yesterday at dawn we arrived before the aforesaid place, those men having heard that we were coming in order to damage them. We had been discovered by the people of Pontedera, nearby which we had needed to spend the night, almost on the town moats. They fired many artillery shots at us, and by the grace of God no one was wounded, which was almost a miracle, us being so near. The aforesaid Messer Vincenzo Valier’s sleeve was touched by an arquebus shot. Because of this, since we had been discovered, those of Montopoli had about five hours to make preparations and, while waiting for us, took up a defensive position. Here we launched an attack in good order. Notwithstanding that it is a walled town, as Your Excellency must already know, and very strong, and although we had carried no artillery with us, we took it by storm around mid-day, after cutting to pieces some peasants who were inside – and many had assembled there besides those of the town, which we sacked and partly burned. The majority of people, because of the time they had at their disposal, took shelter with the best of their goods in the rocca, which we did not try to attack as we had no time. In my opinion having destroyed and taken this town was no little thing, and the enemy will judge it as a great misfortune. This having been the first task with which the Magnificent provveditori entrusted me, for my part I did not fail, as we could not be certain of victory. While we were fighting I did not spare myself from jeopardizing my own life, dismounting from my horse and approaching the walls, having the ladders brought and the gates set on fire, and everything I found necessary. While we were fighting, Count Ludovico della Mirandola with many horses appeared not far away, in order to see if he could make us get out of there so the city could be relieved. I did not want at all for the attack to be stopped, in order not to allow the foes to regain their nerve. Fearing dishonour and shame, I immediately made a squad of some 150 light horsemen, crossbowmen and stradiotti gather in order to drive back Count Ludovico in case he came near. Yet, he did not come. And once we had taken the town, evanuit ab oculis nostris [he disappeared from our sight]. I am quite satisfied with my company, which in this action served me so well that I could not have wished for better. The other companies did their duty. Thank God few of our men were killed and wounded.13

And now Sanudo’s account: He [Vincenzo Valier] set off from Pisa on the 26th of December along with don Ferrante [d’Este], Filippo Albanese, Annibale da Doccia, some 140 men-at-arms lightly equipped with their sallets, Giovanni Greco and other commanders of 500 mounted crossbowmen and stradiots. They rode the whole night in order to get to Montopoli; and so as to cross the river [the Arno] easily they waded across it near Pontedera, where many artillery shots were fired at them. One grazed the aforesaid provveditore’s arm, which blackened and became a little infected and swelled much, causing a strong pain for a long time; still, he did not have serious injuries. If the shot had hit the arm, it would have been cut off […] They reached Montopoli two hours before daybreak; that place is rich and prosperous and forever Florentine, 20 miles away from Florence. At dawn they assaulted from two sides: from the first the infantry captain, Gorlino, and he [Valier] with mounted men, from the second the other captain; they fought for about two hours because those within the city defended themselves vigorously. In the meantime Count Ludovico della Mirandola with some 100 horses was seen in the distance and it seemed 13

See Appendix VII. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 28 December 1498.

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that he wanted to relieve the city; the provveditore himself went towards him with many stradiots and other horse, and the other withdrew and could not be reached […] Our men went in both through the gate, after setting fire to it, and with ladders, while on the other side Captain Gorlino had entered. As the infantrymen immediately begun looting, ours were driven back from there; afterwards they tried again and with this entrance repelled the enemies who withdrew into the rocca, many of them being wounded and dead. Seeing that the rocca was strong because of its situation, and the men dispersed owing to longing for money, they decided to loot and burn the city, and did so as long as they could; they left with booty and captives, and between plundering and setting fire great damage had been done.14

As we have just seen, Ferrante’s narration and Valier’s differ little from each other. The other sources add something to the picture,15 but most of what happened can be drawn from these two accounts. Yet, even though d’Este used a sober style, not wanting, as he himself wrote in the same letter, to praise himself too much, it is fair to point out that he omitted some details. For instance, he leaves out that one assault was repelled because of bad discipline, while this is evident in Valier’s statement. But it is also true that the paymaster reflects the Venetian point of view of the taking of Montopoli, for he hardly mentions Ferrante’s presence. As far as the latter is concerned, he, always wanting to win his father’s approval, stresses his role as the chief commander of the attack, which he really was. When Ferrante did not take part in engagements, he seems to be well-informed and accurate, even though extremely critical of others’ strategy. In September 1498 the Venetian army tried to conquer the Sasso della Dolorosa, a hill then manned by the enemy forces, but was taken in the rear by Paolo Vitelli’s relief force and routed. Ferrante criticized the Venetian commanders for not leaving troops to cover their advance.16 If we have to reproach d’Este for something, it is for his inaccuracy in reporting dates: he sometimes made mistakes when writing some days after, so it is better to compare his accounts with other contemporary sources. Ferrante’s letters provide some typical examples of warfare. If pitched battles were rare – in fact d’Este was never involved in one during his 10 months near Pisa – sieges and skirmishes were not. The letters mention some war materials that the Venetian army carried in action, such as ladders17 and kite-shaped shields 14 15

16 17

Marin Sanudo, I diarii, 2, ed. Guglielmo Berchet (Venice, 1879), coll. 300–1. ASFi, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 63, fol. 41r-v, to Guidone Manelli, 27 December 1498; ASFi, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 64, fol. 49r, to Luigi Stufa and Antonio Giacobini, 28 [December] 1498; fols 54v–55r, to L. Stufa and A. Giacobini, 30 December 1498; ASFi, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 65, fol. 7r, to the priore and the vessillifero of San Miniato, 28 December 1498; ASMi, SPE, Firenze, 949, Taddeo Vimercati to Ludovico Sforza, 27 December 1498; ASMi, SPE, Lucca, 1595, [Francesco Litta] to Ludovico Sforza, 29 December 1498; ASP, Comune, Divisione C, 25, Lettere degli Anziani, 5, fols 150v–151v, to the ambassador within Venice, 29 December 1498; Pietro Bembo, Historiae (Venice, 1742), p. 135; Piero Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi 1492–1514, ed. Giuliana Berti, Michele Luzzati, Ezio Tongiorgi (Pisa, 1982), p. 65. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 11 September 1498. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 11 September 1498, quoted, Pisa 13 November 1498.

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called targoni,18 and often few guns,19 evidently in order not to be impeded by heavy pieces. One way of defending themselves against the enemy, frequently employed but neglected by historians, was to divert rivers,20 as Ferrante did with the Serchio in July 1498.21 We have already encountered Paolo Vitelli cutting the handgunners’ hands at Buti and Ferrante’s comment upon it. Such violence is to be seen as common towards this kind of soldier because they were both hard to replace and feared.22 and it is clear that it was welcomed by governments if Florence approved of it23 and no chroniclers criticized Vitelli.24 We also have to bear in mind that stradiotti were paid for each enemy head brought to the Venetian officers,25 and, just to mention a d’Este instance, during the War of Ferrara Guizzardo Riminaldi, captain of Duke Ercole’s mounted crossbowmen, had some foes beheaded and impaled their heads.26 If Ferrante criticized Paolo Vitelli, it was not because of his violence, but because it was directed against the Este’s allies. Another aspect for which Ferrante is of great value is his description of daily problems faced by armies. The letters are a vivid portrait of life within a camp: brawls, thefts, lack of money, quarrels. War was not King Arthur and the Round Table, nor were Ferrante and his men knights in shining armour. It is clear that soldiers were used to violence, both at war and in peace: for instance we can read two letters in which Duke Ercole’s son asked his father for mercy for two soldiers guilty of murder.27 But soldiers were often driven to violence by lack of money; for this reason they procured what was necessary by force. Ferrante himself described some housebreakings of his men within Pisa,28 which, as the Pisan government wrote, had been turned by the soldiers into a ladronia (a den of

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25

26

27 28

ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 11 September 1498, quoted. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 13 November 1498, Pisa 28 December 1498, quoted. Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London, 1974), p. 171. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 16 July 1498. Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, p. 157; Michael E. Mallett and John R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State. Venice c. 1400 to 1611 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 143. ASFi, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 59, fols 111v–113r, to the commissari at the camp, 22 August 1498. For contemporary Florentine chroniclers, see Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, ed. Iacopo del Badia (Florence, 1883), p. 183; Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, ed. Giuliana Berti (Florence, 1994), pp. 256–57. Marin Sanudo, Commentarii della guerra di Ferrara tra li Viniziani ed il duca Ercole di Este nel MCCCCLXXXII (Venice, 1829), pp. 114, 123; Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, p. 198; Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State, p. 73. Mario Equicola, Annali della città di Ferrara, Ferrara, Biblioteca Comunale Ariostea, ms. Cl. II, 355, sub annum 1483; Bernardino Zambotti, Diario, ed. Giuseppe Pardi, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 2nd Edition, XXIV (Bologna, 1928), p. 152; Ugo Caleffini, Diario (1471–1494), ed. Giuseppe Pardi, vol. II (Ferrara, 1938), p. 150. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Lyons 10 May 1496; ASMo, ASE/ PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Ferrara 28 March 1498. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 28 December 1498, Pisa 19 February 1499.

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thieves).29 If Ferrante was not an adamant disciplinarian, and maybe his soldiers were worse than the others, many admitted that unruliness was caused by outstanding payments.30 As a fifteenth-century Venetian officer wrote: “it is not possible to serve well without being paid.”31 D’Este was well aware of this: Every day we hear some rumors of many committed thefts: breaking workshops open, going into the merchants’ warehouses in order to rob. I myself am not only against such things but if I knew that some of my men were involved, I immediately would have them hanged, even though Your Excellency knows what trouble can happen when soldiers are not paid. Hunger makes the wolf come out of the woods.32

The violent behavior of soldiers was a serious problem: communities were often harried by them and could not avoid it.33 That is how Ferrante’s mother, Eleonora d’Aragona, described soldiers’ violence in 1482: If Your Excellency [Ercole d’Este] does not call these soldiers who are quartered within the Barco to order, so that they can be punished for killing, robbing, plundering and beating Your subjects, I foresee an evident threat upon this people. I say this because of those murders which happened after Your Excellency’s departure. Yesterday they killed a respectable man here within Caldirolo because of a pig which they had stolen, and so much pity had never been seen […] the tears and listening to the victim’s brothers and relatives, all of them bloodstained and angry, who came before me in order to complain. This morning some twenty men-at-arms with a good number of infantrymen went to Baura […] and looted that town, robbing wine, beds, drapes and everything those poor men had at home.34

“Cum natura sit stipendiariorum facere quae comoda et utilia eis sunt, nullo habito respectu ad beneffitium vel maleffitium aliorum” [By their nature mercenary soldiers do what suits their own interests, without respect to the benefit or harm to others] thought the Venetian Senate,35 but it was not easy to stop such behavior. Not that commanders liked it, as Ferrante himself wrote, but they knew very well that, if 29

30

31

32 33

34 35

ASP, Comune, Divisione C, 25, Lettere degli Anziani, 5, fols 143r–144v, to the ambassador within Venice, 5 December 1498. See also Michele Lupo Gentile, “La Repubblica di Pisa durante gli anni 1497–1499,” Bollettino Storico Pisano, n.s., a. IX (1940), p. 37. See, for instance, ASMi, SPE, Lucca, 1595, Francesco Litta to Ludovico Sforza, 22 November 1498; ASP, Comune, Divisione C, 25, Lettere degli Anziani, 5, fols 117r–118v, to the ambassador within Venice, 1 October 1498; fols. 119v–120v, to the ambassadors within Venice, 4 October 1498; fols 136r–137r, to the ambassador within Venice, 19 November 1498; fols 143r–144v, to the ambassador within Venice, 5 December 1498, quoted; cc. 152v–153v, to the ambassador within Venice, 4 January 1499; c. 158r-v, to the ambassador within Venice, 15 January 1499. “non è possibile bene servire et non essere pagati.” Giangiorgio Zorzi, “Un vicentino alla corte di Paolo II (Chiereghino Chiericati e il suo Trattatello della Milizia),” Nuovo archivio veneto, n.s., 30 (1915), p. 428. “la fame caccia el lupo fuora del boscho.” See Appendix VI. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 20 December 1498, quoted. Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, pp. 191–92; Marino Berengo, “Il governo veneziano a Ravenna,” in Ravenna in età veneziana, ed. Dante Bolognesi (Ravenna, 1986) pp. 51–53; Maria Nadia Covini, L’esercito del duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza (1450–1480) (Milan, 1998), pp. 416–23. Luciano Chiappini, Eleonora d’Aragona. Prima duchessa di Ferrara (Rovigo, 1956), p. 52. Berengo, “Il governo veneziano a Ravenna,” p. 47.

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not paid, soldiers had to procure what was necessary. Even the more renowned condottieri, like Bartolomeo Colleoni, had problems in keeping their soldiers under control.36 Moreover, we have to remember that soldiers often despised peasants and city-dwellers. When his men were accused by Pisans of causing damage to houses, vineyards and trees, Ferrante replied that for peasants it was the custom to cry always when they have soldiers at home […] jealous of anyone looking at their goods, fearing that someone would steal them with their eyes. They complained even to me although, as far as I have understood, […] they can protest only because of some notched pieces of wood.37

He could not completely deny what his men had done, yet he diminished their misdeeds: of course condottieri preferred to defend their soldiers, being aware of the problems lack of money could cause. Sympathy was first for comrades and then for others. Civilians were not the only ones hit by soldiers’ violence: brawls between companies of the same army were not uncommon. The following is a graphic description of one of them: When one of my men-at-arms under the aforesaid Rizzino [Rizzino da Asola, one of Ferrante’s capisquadra] came here in order to find quarters, he put himself in the billet of Messer Giovanni Diedo […], who was happy to let him stay for Rizzino’s sake, until yesterday, he said. Yet yesterday evening at about six o’clock, Messer Giovanni wanted the aforesaid man-at-arms to come out and gave signs of wanting to throw him out by force. The man-atarms being unwilling and Rizzino saying that he would wait to be provided with another billet, Messer Giovanni was unwilling to delay, and pushed him out, saying that he wanted him to leave immediately. They came to blows with weapons and the members of their households joined them. Some of my men who knew Rizzino stepped in in order to divide them and restore peace, but being understood wrongly, they themselves were caught in the middle as the others were fighting with stones, pole-arms and arrows. Thus everyone was compelled to withdraw along with his own companions, fighting continuously. Messer Giovanni, seeing that he and his men were getting the worst of it, shouted “Marco, Marco”; some fools of my men, I have not been able to find out who, began crying out “Ferrante”; but it was just two times [or: but there were just two of them]. The whole camp, the infantry and everyone, took up arms, supporting Messer Giovanni against my men. I, having heard the clamor while supping, stood up immediately, and had a horse freed from its hobble by someone, I do not even know who he was, that I found at the door of my billet. Fearing that great dishonor would follow, wearing a padded “aketon” and brandishing an unsheathed sword, I raced to where they were fighting and then began separating my men and pushing them into our own quarters. Coming there myself was not without great danger, as continuously passatori and spears passed beside me, yet thank God I returned safe and sound. […] Of Messer Giovanni’s men two famigli were wounded, but not seriously, and one boy severely, yet he is still alive. Of my men, Rizzino’s lips were hit by a blow from a stone, and 36 37

Bortolo Belotti, La vita di Bartolomeo Colleoni, II ed. (Bergamo [1933]), pp. 204–5. “usanza loro de gridare sempre quando hanno soldati ad casa […] gelosi de chiunque guarda li beni loro temendo non se gli portino via cum li occhii. Facevanno etiam ad me qualche lamento, per quanto habia mai potuto intendere ni trovar per loro medemi non si potevan dolere si non de qualche incisione de legname.” ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 18 August 1498.

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some teeth were broken; one of my mule- drivers had a foot transfixed by an arrow and Galassio della Sala had a leg weakened and battered by some stones […]38

This letter suggests how it was not easy to find room for soldiers: cities were rarely big enough to quarter them and perhaps governments preferred to keep armies away in order to avoid plundering. One of Ferrante’s letters provides a vivid short description of what a city could be when occupied by an army: “many people lack water, and the little there is, is putrid and bad-smelling; the streets are full of dead horses, rubbish and dung; there would be need of miners in order to clean them. There is neither a square nor a large space to pitch tents and pavilions.”39 It is evident from the above that condottieri had to deal with concrete problems, but they were involved with something more abstract as well. Honor and glory were not empty words and it was not uncommon that some got into conflict with others after setting their sights on being the first in command. While Ferrante was within Pisa, the Florentine army had two commanders in chief: Paolo Vitelli as capitano generale, and Ranuccio da Marsciano as governatore, and this dualism and the bad relationship between them did not help the state.40 There are many other cases: for instance, Brandolino Brandolini, being in dispute with Erasmo Gattamelata, was forced by the Venetian government to give up his office to the other and retire;41 during the war following the Pazzi conspiracy a dispute over precedence arose within the Florentine army between Sigismondo d’Este, his brother Ercole’s lieutenant, and Costanzo Sforza, governatore delle genti,42 and the same happened some years later, during the War of Ferrara.43 Ferrante behaved the same way: despite the fact that he was a young and relatively inexperienced condottiero, he did not want to stay under Marco Martinengo, governatore of the Venetian army.44 When the latter left Tuscany at the end of 1498, d’Este wished to succeed him in command, “eager to improve myself within this profession.”45 It is not uncommon to find words like honor in Ferrante’s correspondence: once he wrote that someone had blackened his name because he was “malignant, lying, envious and an enemy of my glory.”46 Another time, lacking in money, he complained that it was shameful 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

See Appendix IV. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 28 August 1498. See Appendix III. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Cascina 31 July 1498. Giuseppe Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica fiorentina fino al 1504,” Bollettino della Regia depitazione di Storia Patria per l’Umbria, XVII (1911), pp. 293. Giovanni Eroli, Erasmo Gattamelata da Narni. Suoi monumenti e sua famiglia (Rome, 1879), pp. 97, 317. Lorenzo de’ Medici, Lettere, 4 (1479–1480), ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Florence, 1981), pp. 217–18, n. 15. ASMa, AG, 1230, Pietro Spagnolo to Federico Gonzaga, Ferrara 15 December 1482. ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 7 July 1498. “desideroso crescere in questo mestiere.” ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 14 December 1498. “maligno, bugiardo, emulo et nemico ad la gloria mia.” ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Cáscina 31 July 1498.

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that he, a son of the Duke of Ferrara, was forced to remain as poor as the other condottieri.47 We have to remember that status and appearances were often of great importance in that world. A duke or a marquis was likely to obtain a better contract than a noble of lower rank, even one more experienced. As for appearances, soldiers did not despise them. On the contrary: under Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza, for instance, parades and iconography played a key role in order to show the might of the Milanese army.48 Another point which needs examining carefully is what the youngest commanders felt about the “watch and wait” warfare which armies adopted. Not that they did not like it – after all they had been brought up seeing their fathers and relatives fight that way – yet it was not easy to cover themselves with glory if pitched battles and chances to clash with enemies were rare. So the youngest condottieri may have been eager to fight and carve out a career for themselves. From July 1498 until April 1499 Ferrante and paymaster Valier were two of the most warlike within the Venetian army: as for d’ Este, perhaps it was because of his temper, or maybe he was not yet accustomed to that kind of warfare. On his arrival at Pisa he found the opposing armies at a standstill; hence there was no chance to engage in battle, and for this reason he often complained. Ferrante wanted the provveditore to give him a billet near the enemy, “so that we can sometimes see each other face to face”;49 some days later, while fortifying the Serchio valley, north of Pisa, he wrote: “let the enemies come as they wish.”50 When the Venetian commanders decided to withdraw to Pisa, he declared himself offended by the fact that “with great disgrace we take flight before the foes,”51 even though, it is fair to point out, the Florentines outnumbered Ferrante and the rest of the army, and he was well aware of this. If d’Este was longing to meet the enemy, so was paymaster Valier, who took part in several raids and actions,52 and it was he who wanted to cut off the hands of Calci’s defenders when the town surrendered in November 1498.53 This does not mean that all young commanders and civil officers were impulsive and eager to fight, but raids and battles were the quickest ways to distinguish themselves and perhaps it was those who needed it more than the others – that is, the youngest and least-known members of an army – who urged action.

47 48 49

50 51 52 53

ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 24 November 1498. Covini, L’esercito del duca, pp. 312–328. “acciò qualche volta se possiamo videre in facia.” See Appendix I. ASMo, ASE, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale, Principi non regnanti, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 13 July 1498. “venghanno li nemici al loro piacere.” ASMo, ASE, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale, Principi non regnanti, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 16 July 1498, quoted. ASMo, ASE, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale, Principi non regnanti, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Cáscina 31 July 1498, quoted. Sanudo, I diarii, 1, ed. Federico Stefani (Venice, 1879), coll. 1008–9; 2, coll. 103, 121, 135– 36, 148–49, 300–1, 374–75, 399. Sanudo, I diarii, 2, col. 136.

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To sum up, Ferrante d’Este’s letters, still almost completely unexplored, deserve much more attention, as they are a valuable source for military history within Renaissance Italy. It is true that Ferrante was never one of the most distinguished condottieri of his age (he was still young when he was sentenced to life imprisonment), yet his messages portrayed effectively what warfare could mean and what commanders had to face within wartime. His letters make us understand what he and his comrades thought and felt and are extremely useful in order to reconstruct the events of the Pisan war from July 1498 until May 1499. In them we find not heroic deeds, but complaints, lack of money, brawls, quarrels: that is to say, the condottieri’s daily life.

Appendix Selected Letters of Ferrante d’Este (Punctuation and accents added)

I To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Pisa 13 July 1498 Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Per la mia ultimate scripta ad Vostra Excellentia portata ad essa per el correre suo, quale partite da qui ad li 7 del presente, quella haverà inteso quanto sin alhora gli era di novo. Da poi in qua altro non è sequito. Né creda la Excellentia Vostra ch’io habia dormito et che non sia stato vigilante et solicito per acquistare honore et gloria, sì al Lei, per essere io servitore et factura sua, como ad me proprio. Quella sapia ho tenuto bona praticha et intelligentia per mezo de fidatissimi homini et spie, per modo sicuramente me dava l’animo pigliare o per forza o d’acordo, quando me fosse presentato, el luoco di Pesscia, dischosto da qui circa deciocto o vinti miglia, bono castello importantissimo, quale fa de li homini trecento da facti. Ad questo exequire era bastante la mia compagnia cum giuncta de trecento cavalli legieri et fanti mile, per essere paese dovi non si ponno così commodamente adoperare cavalli. Haveva ordinato giungervi al improviso per accogliere et serrare fuora di quello luoco più gente fosse stato possibile, maxime ad questa stagione eschonno quasi tutti ogni die fuora; né dubito puncto cum li cavalli legieri et fanti n’haveria excluso la maiore parte, chel pensiero non me fosse reuscito, tanto più non essendogli gente forastiera, como gli era. Holo conferito cum lo Magnifico providetore, richesto l’aiuto de le gente bisognerianno. Me ha dicto dovesse soprasedere alquanto. Di continuo aggregiandonelo io cum bono modo, me dixe poi de lì a tri giorni, commendando el parere mio, me daria centocinquanta cavalli legieri, fanti nissuni per non havere el modo. Gli ho facto intendere in questa manera non potersi exequire; hame risposto resti et dimore pur qui sin ad tanto me ordinarà altro. Inteso questo, per non stare in otio ho pregato assai la Magnificentia sua cum grandissima instantia ad darmi uno allogiamento presso li inimici como hanno de li altri, acciò qualche volta se possiamo videre in facia. Me dice non essere al presente ad propposito et che resti puro qua. Non scio ad che fine el lo faci. Ad me convene tenermi ad quanto me commette. La compagnia mia è allogiata quivi vicina sin su le porte di questa cità, de casali in casali per la vale di Sergio. Per essere doppo chel se seria molto bene potuto exequire questo pensere mio, de novo arrivato ad Pesscia el conte Rainucio da Marzano cum ducento hominidarme, dubitandosse non vengha ad nostri danni, et non possendo entrare si non per la via de Librafacta, passo forte et munitissimo per pisani, ho ordinato, de saputa del providetore prefato che de lae da Librafacta assai inanzi se mettino le scholte ogni nocte, et così guardie de die. Et quando altro se sentisse, subito se notificharà ad quelli de la fortileza, quali sonno advertiti, in qualunche modo senno schoperti li nemici, de far certi segnalli, et cum artlaria. Alli qualli se sta cum attentione, et tutti serimo in ordine in arme cum le gente del paese. Darase campanne

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a martello: venghano li nemici al loro piacere, qui li è da rispondere. Qua dimoro Signore mio apparechiato ad fare de le facende per quanto posso; sonno commissionato romanermine como ho dicto. Credo però fare qualche corrarie, non de grande importantia ad mio iuditio come seria stata questa di Pescia. Il tutto per mia iustificatione mi è parso notificare ad la Excellentia Vostra, et acciò mai non potesse essere imputato de negligentia se ad quella paresse notificarlo ad Vinetia ad la Illustrissima Signoria aut che per me se gli notifichasse, me ne remetto al suo prudentissimo parere. Senza consulta di Vostra Excellentia per quelli rispecti gli ponno cadere in consideratione non l’ho voluto notificare altramente. Aspectarò adunque da essa risposta como circa ciò et in simili casi ho ad governarmi. L’altrheri ad Cassina se missero in ordine circa quatrocento fanti de li nostri cum li caporali loro, armati tutti per andarsine per forza ad li inimici vicini livi circa dua miglia, et questo per non esserli dati denari. Gli fu da fare assai: se gli intromissero quelli conducteri de le gente d’arme cum bone parolle per revocharli insiema cum la Magnificentia del providetore. Ritornaronno cum promessa d’havere denari. Heri se gli ne dete, pur non sonno stati così ben contentati, che circa ducento fanti, alchuni cum havere riceputo la pagha et altri senza, se ne sonno fugiti dal canto de nemici, dovi se intende però essere difficultà grandissima ad havere denari et maiore non è qui. Nondimeno questa fugita non me piace per non essere niente ad favore de la nostra impresa, come la Excellentia Vostra può molto bene considerare. Li inimici tuttavia ingrossanno, né altro se fa sin qui. Non me sbighotischo né ho paura. Tengho per sicuro quando mai altro non acquistassimo, essendo li nemici molto più a numero de nui, conservarimo almancho quanto se tene al presente. Non si è pur perduto circum circa a dodeci miglia de questo territorio uno spicho de frumento, né uno filo de feno. El racolto è abondantissimo: gli seranno victualie ad quelli del paese et alle gente siamo per deciocto mesi. Io, per non ritrovarmi sprovisto quando pur me convenesse invernare qua, ho facto già tagliare de le carra di strame circa ducentocinquanta; tuttavia lo facio conducere et ho luoco da reponerlo. Vado providendomi al meglio so et posso per havere pochi denari. La spesa grande cadauno se travaglia; la neccessità non potria però farne più industriosi come siamo. Da poi sonno quo ho havuto per subvenire ad li soldati ducati cinquecento cum promissa ad la mostra haverò ad fare de proximo me serà supplito per uno pagha in tutto. De la qualle mostra non sonno però molto aggregiato da certi pochi giorni in qua, et io poi se ha ad fare né posso fugirla l’aggregio per uscirne presto. Sonno ad ordine; spero non mancharò al numero integro de li cento homini d’arme, quantunque habia havuto pocho tempo per li vinti acresciuti et pochi denari, maxime dovendoli fare così tosto. L’è stato tractato per li inimici cum el castellano de Butti, quale se tene per pisani, et è stato doppio però, chel castellano quanto se tramava tutto ha notificato al providetore passato et al presente. Ha durato qualche die. L’ordine era: questa nocte passata le gente de nemici dovevanno accostarse per ricepere la forteleza, et per li nostri era provisto accoglierle in mezo et tagliarle in pezi. Sonno venute pur questa nocte et gli era Paulo Vitelli, quale ha tardato ad farsi inanzi et

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comparere sin sul fare del giorno. Dovi viduto et schoperto de li nostri essere in aguato se n’è ritornato ben presto a drieto ad man salva cum li suoi. Nè è sequito altro. Per questo rispecto de accogliere li nemici ad Butti et per essere stata mal intesa la cosa da chi governa se l’è romasta l’impresa di Pesscia. Reinscrescemi se sian perdute tutte due. La desgratia mia, Signore, reputo essere chel providetore passato non sie qui: cum esso haveva assai meliore gratia non ho cum questo altro, del qualle non solamente io ma quanti conducteri sonno di qua restino mal satisfacti. Nondimeno non mancho né mancharò de governarmi bene seco et de ubedirlo como debo. In bona gratia di Vostra Excellentia humilmente basandoli la mano di continuo me raccomando. Pisis, die 13 Julii 1498. (ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

II To Duke Ercole I d’Este, San Frediano a Séttimo 28 July 1498 (The words between * and * were decoded by the Ferrarese chancellery) Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Per la mia de 26 ho scripto ad Vostra Excellentia adrizata ad quella per el correre suo partito da Ferrara et venuto ad me cum littere sue de 18 et 21 praesentis, alle quale fece risposta. Haverà prefata Vostra Excellentia inteso quanto sin ad quello die era successo; da poi in qua è sequito che heri me ne venni ad allogiare qui ad Septimo, dovi *non gli trovai* alcuno de li conducteri. *De le loro squadre* dovevano allogiarli *cum le mie mancava* etiam assai del numero de li *provisionati* et *stradioti* ordinati, per modo ad iuditio di ogniun gli era *mal securo*. N’andai in persona ad farlo intendere ad *proveditore. Lui* rispose se facesse al melio si potesse perché era tarde, et che domatina se seria in consiglio ad *Cassina* per fare qualche altra bona deliberatione. Per dicta nocte siamo stati vigilanti et armati, né altro è intervenuto. Hozi si è stato in consiglio: dal canto mio è stato racordato non potere *sicuramente stare qui* cum così pocho numero di gente, quantunche para chel luoco sii assai forte per essere de incomodo ad li nemici transferirsegli, *nondimeno* el non è murato. Gli è un altro maiore rispecto, che li nemici sonno *più* a numero de *nui*: hanno de li *homini* d’arme 700, *provisionati* 3000 boni et bone et assai *artiglierie*. Nui altri siamo in *pochi* a loro comparation et tanto *pochi* è quasi vergogna dirlo. Siamo, ad mettersi tutti insiema, 350 hominidarme et *provisionati* 1000 *mal contenti* et *male* paghati. In questa oppinione de starli *mal* sicuri concorre ogniun, *nondimeno il proveditore* ha determinato et voluto ch’io gli dimore, et appresso me ha dato la compagnia de messer Zoanne Dedo et de Brazo da Perosa, et *provisionati* 300 in tutto, como ho dicto *mal* paghati et *mal contenti*, dato etiam bocche *de artiglierie*, cioè falchoni. *Non* ho potuto havere guastatori per fare de le provisione opportune. Ho voluto per non desordenarmi acquiescere ad la voluntà de *proveditore* poiché non l’havimo potuto

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remmovere, *nondimeno* se gli è facto intendere quasi per un mezo protesto non se doveria *stare qui* ad questo modo. Dovi se tutti se unissano anchora *non* gli seriamo ben sicuri per el rispecto dicto d’essere *pochi* ad comparatione de li nemici che tuttavia ingrossanno. Per conclusione l’ha voluto ch’io gli *stia*, et io, premisso el mio parere et del conte Albertino, sonno obediente. *Illustrissimo Signore mio*, qui sonno le cose in *grande disordine*. Questo *proveditore* ad questa *impresa* gli va cum modo chel pare che *venetiani* non curino s’è la ruina, et cum tanta avaritia non si potria dire più, per modo che ogniuno fa iuditio che *venetiani*, quali han pur el modo di spendere, sian quodammodo contenti lassar *la impresa* et non curarsine si ben perdessero le *gentedarme* hanno di qua. Et messer Zoanne Dedo, qual è gentilhomo di Vinetia, me ha riferto *il proveditore* haverli dicto voria che queste *gentedarme* fossero rotte per liverarla più presto. Ultra di questo el se dubita de *pisani* che habien *prattica* cum el *duca de Milano* de darsegli, aut de pigliare altra forma de addattamento al facto loro; et *il proveditore*, in certo ragionamento havuto col conte Albertino, gli ha dicto dubitarsi di tal *prattica* et non si tene sicuro né contento de *pisani*. Io, Signore mio, me ne dimoro qui vigilante, facio tutte quelle provisione scio et posso. Sii certa Vostra Excellentia non perdarò mai vilmente se dovesse ben morire. El maiore pensere habia sie quando la *prattica* dicta havesse effecto dubito d’essere accolto in mezo et svalizato, tuttavia per questo non mi perdo d’animo et farò sempre el debito mio. Ho voluto del tutto dare aviso ad Vostra Excellentia acciò intenda in che termine sonno le cose nostre. Alla quale humilmente basandoli la mano sempre me ricomando. *Il proveditore et messer Vincenzo Valero* sonno discordi tra loro, et non se intendino niente ben insiema. Datum ex felicibus castris Serenissimi Dominii Venetiarum existentibus Septimi, die 28 Julii 1498. (ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

III To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Cáscina 31 July 1498 Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Per la mia de 28, scripta da Septimo, adrizata al commissario de Castelnovo che la mandi ad Vostra Excellentia, quella haverà inteso quanto sin ad quello die era sequito et como per parere di ogniuno *non dimorava securamente lie*. Heri *il proveditore*, muttato propposito, me commisse ch’io me dovesse riducere cum la compagnia mia in *Cassina*. Mandai prima et conduxi meco el conte Albertino ad *Sua Magnificentia*. Fossimo in ragionamenti et argumenti per questo, et cum bono modo gli feci intendere non era bene *includerse* tante *gente d’arme* dovi sonno tutte l’altre et li *fanti* che *venetiani* hanno ad questa *impresa*, exceptum alcuni pochi romasti ad guardare *Vicopisano*. Abandonando *il loco de Septimo* facilmente li *inimici*, che sonno *più potenti de nui*, gli possino andare allogiare et serrarci in *Cassina*, non essendo nui *bastante*, né volendo experimentare la

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fortuna *a fare facto d’arme*. Racordandogli era molto melio firmarsi tutti quanti in *Septimo*, lassando forniti *Cassina* et *Vico* de *fanti* per conservarsegli. Et cum altre provisione et *artiglierie*, ultra chel sitto de *Septimo* sii forte, melio l’haressimo fortificato. Et *quando non havessemo potuto* stare al contrasto potevamo *passare Arno* et salvarsi nui cum *Pisa* et quanto se tiene, perché, como ho dicto, *siamo poche gentedarme* per vincere *li inimici* et per acquistare et *non serarse qui in Cassina* ad ponersi *in assedio* da nui stesso, dovi cum difficultà vi potrano capire *tante gente cum carastia de aqua*, et *quella pocha* gli è frazida et puzolente, cum le stratte *tute piene de cavalli* morti, *de immonditia* et *ledame*. Gli bisognerian guastatori assai ad *netarle, né g’è piaza né loco grande* per piantare padiglioni et tende. Queste et altre bone ragione adduxi ad *proveditore*, remettendomi sempre ad chi haveva meliore parere, apparechiato obedire et exequire quanto per *Sua Magnificentia* me seria commandato. Rispuosemi havere havuto consideratione al tutto, tandem volere ch’io gli vengha, et così, *Illustrissimo Signore mio*, gli sonno venuto subito cum tutta la compagnia mia, allogiata cum la maiore confussione et incommodità sii stato possibile, et una gran parte per le stratte, cum giuncta d’uno pessimo tempo di aqua. Né alcuno si voleva restringere de li suoi logiamenti, et in questo *il proveditore* se n’è passato molto de legieri, pur gli sonno allogiato. Questi altri conducteri dimonstrano *gran malcontenteza et pocho animo*, et ogniun grida se vadi ad allogiare in *Pisa*. De li *fanti ne fuge* ogni dì et quantunche *il proveditore* habia cominciato far dare *dinari, nondimeno* va cum *avaritia* et non vole dare si non *tri ducati per valente* che si trovi. *Illustrissimo Signore mio* questa sera *ho de bon loco* essere stato per *il proveditore* adimandato in consiglio tutti questi conducteri, et de quelli d’assai mancho *conducta* di me, sin ad li contestabili de le fantarie, et deliberato de redursi in *Pisa*, tutto senza saputa mia et senza essere adimandato. Il che existimo sii proceduto per *qualche suspicione* hanno di me, aut per *mala impressione* de questi conducteri, quali invident glorie mee, o sia per essersi vociferato et quasi acertato che la compagnia del Illustrissimo Signore don Alphonso era per giungere al opposito nostro. *La quale consulta* senza essere adimandato io facta cum li altri, quanto me sii de graveza pensilo Vostra Excellentia, tanto più che a principio sonno intervenuto ad quanto se deliberava, et se sonno stato absente gli è stato richesto el conte Albertino, et sequito el mio parere, sì per lo allogiare facto in valle di Sergio, come ad Septimo. Che ora me sienno usati de questi termini, ultra che cum grande vituperio voltamo le spalle ad *inimici* andando ad *Pisa*, me ne doglio et agravo. Ho voluto notificare il tutto ad Vostra Excellentia acciò intenda quanto seque, et la obedientia mia verso *il proveditore*, et il rispecto me ha. Remettendomi sempre ad la voluntà di quella se gli piace farlo intendere ad *venetiani* vel ch’io gli ne scriva. Ad *proveditore* non dirò altro si non gli andarò ad verso et obedirò. Altro non mi occorre. Ad la Excellentia Vostra humilmente basandoli la mano di continuo mi raccomando. Datum ex felicibus castris Illustrissimi Dominii Veneti Cassine, die ultimo Julii 1498.

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(ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

IV To Duke Ercole I d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs, 28 August 1498 Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observantdssimo. Me pare et per mio debito et ad mia iustificatione de qualunche graveza me potesse essere data avisare la Excellentia Vostra di omne occurrentia. Essendo vaccato el luoco havea cum mi el quondam Brunoro da Porto, fratello di messer Nicolò, atrovandosi qui un gentilhomo di Azola per nome Rizino, quale già era stato cum messer Marco Martinengho, havendo havuto licentia in scripto, lo tolsi ad mei serviti per essere dispostissimo de la persona, praticho nel mestieri, et li deti el luoco haveva Brunoro de cinque coraze. Quando se vene ad allogiare qui uno mio homo d’arme sotto esso Rizino, se pose nel logiamento di messer Zoanne Dedo, conductero de 100 cavalli et gentilhomo di Venetia, quale fu contento lassarglilo dimorare per amore de Rizino, diceva sin al dì d’heri. È accaduto pur heri da sera, circa le 24 hore, che volendo el prefato messer Zoanne dicto homo d’arme se ne uscisse alhora, et subito signandoli per forza volernelo cacciare, stando renitente l’homo d’arme et Rizino cum dire aspectasse gli fosse providuto d’un altro allogiamento, et non volendo lui messer Zoanne differire, anzi spengerlo fuora dicendo voleva se ne uscisse subito subito, furonno alle mane cum l’arme, et li patroni et famegli de l’uno et de altro. Sopragiungendoli alcuni altri de li mei che cognoscevanno esso Rizino, se posero in mezo per dividere et pacificare la cosa. Non intendendola altramente furonno molestati essi mezani si como li altri eranno alle mane, et cum saxi, arme inastate et passatori, per modo fu neccessario ad cadauno ritirarsi cum li suoi menando le mane continuamente. Vedendossi messer Zoanne cum li suoi per havere la pegiore, gridaronno “Marco, Marco”; alcun bestiale de li mei, che non ho potuto intendere che sia stato, se pose ad gridare “Ferrante,” et non fu si non per due voce. Tutto el campo et fantarie et ogniuno presto fu in arme dal canto de messer Zoanne et contra li mei. Io subito, sentito el rumore essendo ad tavolla ad cena, mi levai; fecimi pastare un cavallo da uno, non so che fusse, trovai inanzi alla porta del mio allogiamento, et per dubio non sequisse grandissimo schandalo corsi in zippone, cum la spada nuda in mano, lae dovi eranno apizati insiema, et mi pose ad dividere et cacciare li mei ne li logiamenti loro. Et el mio andarvi non fu senza periculo grandissimo, perché continuo me passavanno acanto passatori et lanzate; pur Dio merce ne sonno reuscito salvo. Sedai la questione, dovi in quello menare de mane non se gli volse intromettere né lo Magnifico providetore, né conducteri che gli sia. Laudato ne sia Dio et reingratiato. Cognosco veramente sel si perseverava seria stata una pessima giornata per li mei, perché havevanno tutto el campo contra di loro. El male sequito è stato pocho per quello ch’io dubitava. De quelli de messer Zoanne sonno stati feriti dui famegli, levemente però, et uno suo ragazo a morte, pur non è anchora morto. De li mei è stato ferito Rizino d’una saxata nelle labra et rotto qualche dente; uno mio mullatere anchora passato un piè cum uno passatore; et Galasso da la Salle fiachata et tempestata una gamba cum saxi, né gli ha male da

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periculo. Altro non gli è stato de feriti né de morti […] (ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

V To Duke Ercole I d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs, 11 September 1498 Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Questo Magnifico providetore, facta deliberatione de intervenimento et consulta di quanti ne sonno in questo exercito, exceptuandone me, heri mandoe el capitaneo de le fantarie cum gran numero de fanti et appresso cum molti cavalli legeri per prhendere el bastione tenenno li nemici sul Monte Doloroso. Et fece richedere ad tutti li conducteri, fuora che ad me, un mullo ad cadauno per portare schale et tarchioni lae. Partironno queste gente de nocte tutte insiema et furonno conducte sin al dicto bastione et lassaronno el castello di Calce a dreto, quale è fornito per li nemici. Arrivaronno al bastione, né gli fu ordinato altre gente appresso, né sul piano per fargli spalle. Lo combattetoro per spatio de una hora, et sempre hebero la pegiore. Dovi che havendolo presentito Paulo Vitelli, o per spie o per segnalli di quelli del bastione, se mosse cum quasi tutto lo exercito et cum bono ordine se ne vene alla via de Calce per tagliare el camino ad esse gente nostre. Et così, essendo loro male governate che non posso dire altramente, lassando per forza l’impresa del bastione ad hore due de giorno, se callaronno verso li nemici al basso sin quasi sul piano, et haverian potuto prhendere altra via et salvarsi per li monti sopra quello de Luchesi. Furanno alquanto ad le mane, ma li nostri hebero la pegiore, et el capitaneo de le fantarie, che è Jacomo da Tarsia, fu ferito in una cossa de partesana, né credo gli serà periculo di morte. Ferito anchora, levemente però, uno contestabile de fanti per nome Gorlino. De fanti pochi morti perché pocho si stete alle mane; tuttavia gli può essere perdita de quatrocento fanti in circa, et de qualche cinquanta cavalli legeri et de quelli mulli portaronno le schalle et tarchoni. De che reputo havenni guadagnato uno per non haverlo inteso, che, se l’havesse saputo et me fosse stato richesto, ge l’haveria dato, et perduto como li altri. Habuto l’aviso qui le gente nostre predicte essere rotte, se mettessimo in ordine cum tutte le gentedarme, et fu tarde perché li nemici hebero tempo d’avantagio di menare via et le persone prese et li bottini al loro piacere, ultra che eranno più a numero de nui et in luoci più sicuri. Il tutto è sequito al modo ho dicto, cum victoria de li nemici ed damno de li nostri, per pocho ordine de chi ha governato queste gente per lassarsi Calce loco nemico a dreto, et per non havergli mancho ordinato spalle de alcune gente d’arme. Non può essere che non me doglia et reincrescha de questa perdita appresso l’altre, che è un ingargliardire tanto più l’animo de li adversarii. Me doglio anchora se ordina de queste facende cum saputa di ogniuno et non mia, appresso li altri torti me sonno facti, como ho notificato ad Vostra Excellentia. Né scio ad che dimorare più qui cum tanta suspitione senza causa. Manchino pur adesso le suspitione del conte Albertino, né si può già dire lui havere hora rotto questo disegno. Prego et supplico prefata Vostra Excellentia, alla quale per altre mie ho notificato el tutto sin a qui, si degni

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darmi remedio et consiglio como ho ad governarmi et non patire tanta graveza del honore mio, che veramente può reputare suo per essergli io servitor et figliolo. Nanzi la perdita di queste gente fu preso Vichopisano, como avisai Vostra Excellentia, poi anchora hebero la rocha li inimici. Altro non è sequito. È stato purtroppo questo a nostri damni et vergogna de chi gli ha colpa. Dominica passata entroe in questa cità el Magnifico messer Dominico Maripero, quale era providetore sopra l’armata de mare ad questa impresa, et hora la Illustrissima Signoria l’ha deputato collega et compagno al Magnifico messer Petro Duodo, et seranno ambi insiema qui. Io gli andai al incontro, l’honorai et accompagnai ad casa, dovi più volte anchora l’ho visitato, né mancho del debito mio. Sin a qui tra epsi providetori pare sia bona intelligentia et sonno boni amici per essere anche, per quello intendo, coniuncti de affinità insiema. L’ha facto prefato messer Dominico Maripero conducere qui per Arno tre galee che gli sonno anchora, et dice havergli mile boni homini per servirsine ad questa impresa. Non scio se sianno tanti: quelli gli sonno sonno tutti marinari et galeoti de nation schiavona. Altro non mi occorre per hora d’avisare Vostra Excellentia, in bona gratia de la qualle humilmente basandoli la mano di continuo me raccomando. Ex felicibus castris Illustrissimi Dominii Veneti in suburbis Pisarum, 11 septembris 1498. (ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

VI To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Pisa 20 December 1498 Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Ho inteso per la littera di la Excellentia Vostra de 14 quanto quella se resente per el scrivere mio havendogli significato de partirmi da qui per la extrema necessità in che me ritrovo, et ho viduto quanta graveza per questo me ne da, cum le minacie et commandamento me fa de contenermine. Rispondendo dico può la prefacta Vostra Excellentia tenere per certo quando io havesse pensato non solamente offendere la mente di quella, ma pur de farla alquanto corozare, me ne seria contenuto et più presto voria patire mile morte che portare un minimo despiacere ad l’animo suo. Ad quello ho scripto el bisogno non me gli ha lassato mettere freno, né ho saputo nì scio dovi me ricorrere sì non ad la Excellentia Vostra, la qualle appresso Idio m’ha generato al mondo et dato l’essere. Quella sa ad che modo sonno conducto cum la Serenissima Signoria. De provisione per la persona mia non mi corre altro sì non per una coraza de caposoldo. Pensi lei quello ne posso cavare stasse qui più de dui mesi inanzi se habia una pagha, et poi non la danno anche compiuta. Quanto alla parte me declara Vostra Excellentia de fare la spesa secunndo l’intrata, io non potria havere assutigliate le cose mie più ho. Se forsi paresse ad quella tenesse troppo bocche in casa, la certifico non gli ho persona de che non ne sente qualche utilità per valermine per cavalli lezeri, et l’haria facta male se non havesse havuto tale avantagio. Per conclusione, Signore mio, io non saperia mai trovare remedio ad potere vivere qui non havendo

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più como ho cum li 100 ducati el mese me da la Excellentia Vostra, nondimeno più presto voglio morire cha portarli caricho in desubedirla. Questi conducteroti sonno qui la fanno malissimo. Ad me convene pur vivere altramente per honore vostro et mio. Siamo qua in cità frustata cum el paese da la guerra, carastia grande gli è d’ogni cosa. Io facio acomparare sin al sole. Ogni die si sente qualche richiamo de mile robbarie se commettino: de rompere buteghe, entrare in fondachi di merchatanti ad robbare. Io non solamente sonno per non tenere mano ad tale cose, ma se intendesse introvenirli alcuno di mei, subito lo faria impichare. Quantunche la Excellentia Vostra sapia che male se gli può providere quando è soldati non sonno paghati: la fame caccia el lupo fuora del boscho. A dì passati anchora alcuni sachomani de mei hominidarme et d’altri et fanti sachegiaronno la piaza di questa cità dovi si tene il pane ad vendere; fu data imputatione l’havevano facto sotto spalle di Galasso da la Sale et di Baptista da la Mirandula. Benché io non me ne habia mai potuto ben certificare per la verità, et ne ho facta diligente investigatione, ne fu tolto pane che valesse da quatro in cinque ducati. È parso ad questi Magnifici providetori sienno cassati de la mia compagnia dicti Galasso et Baptista, et io ho voluto acquiescere ad la voluntà loro, come debo. Significo questi inconvenienti alla Excellentia Vostra acciò possa dare iudicio como vivenno li altri ad questo soldo. Dal canto mio sequa ciò si voglia: me deportarò talmente non mi potrà essere data imputatione per la verità presso la Serenissima Signoria, nì Vostra Excellentia, la qualle devotamente prego sì como mio signore et benefactore che le si degni providere per modo non habia ad patire, né dimorarli cum vergogna sua et mia. In la cui bona gratia humilmente basandoli la mano me ricomando sempre. Pisis, die 20 decembris 1498. (ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

VII To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Pisa 28 December 1498 Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observantissimo. Sonno stato alquanto suspeso di non volere scrivere questa ad la Excellentia Vostra, dubitando quella non existimi voglia troppo attribuirmi et laudarmi da me stesso nel caso sequito. Tuttavia, pensando anche epsa potria darmi graveza se non gli scrivesse de le occurrentie di qua, assicurato da la verità como ne è verissimo testimonio per questo paese, non ho voluto romanere ch’io non gli scriva. Questi Magnifici providetori per non lassare li nemici in quiete, facta deliberatione che quasi tutte queste gente da cavallo et da piè sonno qui andassaro ad pigliare el luoco di Montopoli, deputaronno capi acciò exequire lo Magnifico messer Vincentio Valero, gentilhomo venetiano paghatore qui, et me. Et così, partiti da qui più secretamente potessimo, heri se presentassimo nanzi al dicto luoco sul farsi del giorno. Havendo havuto noticia quelli homini andavamo alli damni loro, essendo nui stati schoperti da quelli da Pontadera, dove fu di bisogno passassimo la nocte a canto a canto, quasi su le fossa di la terra, et ne salutarono

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cum assai colpi d’artlaria, la qualle per Dio gratia non ha offeso alcuno, che pare sie stato miracolo, essendosegli tanto accostati vicini como eravamo. Et fu tocchato messer Vincentio prefato d’una botta d’archibuso in una manicha del vestito haveva indosso. Per questo essere nui stati schoperti hebero spacio quelli de Montopoli per circa cinque hore de providersi, et così aspectandone se posero alle diffese, dovi che gli facessimo ordinatamente dare la battaglia. Et essendo terra murata, come debe sapere Vostra Excellentia, et assai forte, quantunche non havessimo conducto cum nui artlaria veruna, nondimeno l’havessimo per forza circa le 18 hore, tagliati a pezi primo impetu qualche villani gli erano entro, et ve n’eranno congregati molti ultra quelli del luoco, qual mettessimo a sacho et a focho in parte. Assai quasi per la maiore parte de li homini cum el melio di beni loro mobili per el tempo hebero si salvaronno ne la forteza, alla qualle, per non servirne il tempo, non parse experimentare le forze ad combatterla. Non pocho è stato ad mio iuditio l’havere qui distrutta et expugnata la terra, la cui iactura li nemici ponno existimare grandissima. Per essere stata questa una de le prime cure habianno dato li Magnifici providetori sopra le spalle mie, dal canto mio non gli ho manchato, non potendossi havere per certa la victoria. Mentre si dava la battaglia non ho sparmiato in exponere la vita mia sin al scendere da cavallo et accostarmi a piede alle mura, facendogli portare schalle et mettere fuoco alle porte, et tutto quello mi pareva expediente. Comparse mentre si daxeva la battaglia molto da longe el conte Ludovico da la Mirandula cum molti cavalli, ad effecto se l’havesse potuto on ardito de farne levare de lie et succorrere la terra. Io non volsi per niente si desistesse da la battaglia per non lassare rigagliardire li homini. Dubitando di vergogna et schorno feci mettere subito in squadra circa 150 cavalli lezeri, balestreri et strattioti per rispondere al conte Ludovico sel s’accostava. Né mai vi vene, et presa la terra evanuit ab occulis nostris. Io me ho ad contentare summamente di la mia compagnia, la qualle in questo facto me ha tanto ben servito non haveria saputo desiderare melio. Et l’altre anchora cadauna ha facto el dovere. Dio merce, pochi ne sonno remasti morti, et feriti de li nostri. Del tutto ne reingratio Dio nostro signore. Et ho voluto avisarne Vostra Excellentia alla quale humilmente basandogli la mano me raccomando sempre. Pisis, 28 decembris 1498. (ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

Note: Provisions for the Ostend Militia on the Defense, August 1436 Kelly DeVries

One of the most significant defeats of the Hundred Years War was that of Philip the Good’s attempted siege of Calais on 9–28 July 1436. Largely neglected by modern historians of the war who seem more concerned with the AngloFrench conflict alone and not what seems to have been a “side event,”1 at the time, especially in England, the Burgundian failure to capture their French town was important news. As a morale booster for the English, especially after so many recent setbacks in the Hundred Years War, including the abandonment of their lengthy alliance with these same Burgundians the year previously at the Congress of Arras,2 the propagandistic value of the defeat was enormous. This is evident not only in the numerous official accounts of the siege written at the time, but especially in the “unofficial” sources that have survived, most notably several vernacular poems deriding the defeat and decrying those who carried out the siege that became popular a very short time after the Burgundian failure was announced in England. 1

2

The 1436 siege of Calais has been largely neglected by all of the major historians of the Hundred Years War: Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War, trans. W.B. Wells (New York, 1951); Alfred H. Burne, The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453 (London, 1956); Philippe Contamine, La guerre de cent ans, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1977); Jean Favier, La guerre de cent ans (Paris, 1980); Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300–c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1988); Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War, 1337–1453 (Oxford, 2002); and Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War, 2nd ed. (Houndmills, 2003); despite the English victory and the importance this had in England in restoring military confidence after the debacle of the Congress of Arras. Even Richard Vaughan, Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy (London, 1970) downplays the defeat’s significance. I will address the siege’s importance in two forthcoming articles: “The Effect on the Hundred Years War of Philip the Good’s Failures at Compiègne (1430) and Calais (1436),” and “Calculating Profits and Losses during the Hundred Years War: What Really Forced Philip the Good from the War?” in Ivana Elbl and Lawrin Armstrong (eds.), Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: An International Workshop in Honour of John Munro (forthcoming, Leiden: 2005). The Congress of Arras is still best discussed in Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson, The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy (Oxford, 1955), but also see the articles on the peace conference in Denis Clauzel, Charles Giry-Deloison, and Christophe Leduc, ed., Arras et la diplomatie européenne, xve-xvie siècles (Arras, 1999).

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Especially targeted for derision were the Flemings who constituted the majority of those fighting in the Burgundian army at Calais. Several Middle English poems, later assigned names such as “The Englishman’s Mocking Song Against the Flemings” and “An English Ballad Against the Flemings” by their modern editors, circulated through the English towns, celebrating the defeat of Philip the Good’s Burgundian forces that besieged Calais and the role in that loss played by Flemish soldiers.3 That the Flemings indeed may have been to blame is established in a letter written a few days after the siege by Philip to his brother-in-law, Charles, the Duke of Bourbon4 – on the other hand, how effective can a siege lasting only nineteen days be? This, however, may not have been the main reason for the specific derision directed at the Flemings in popular English media. The fact that the Flemish economy relied largely on the availability of English wool, and that the Flemings now not only stood in military opposition to those who supplied this wool but had lost to them, certainly influenced these poems.5 The treachery of Philip the Good at Arras was also important, but that the Flemings had followed their duke in this betrayal, despite their economic necessity to do otherwise, seems to have been of even greater significance to the English. Furthermore, following the defeat at Calais, Philip had abandoned the Flemings, returning to Burgundy and not to the southern Low Countries. This left Flanders open to immediate vengeful military action. Within days of the raising of the siege of Calais, Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, who had succeeded to the leadership of the English troops in France after the death of his brother, John of Bedford, the previous year, and who had arrived to take command at Calais only to see the flight of the besiegers, led his own raid into western Flanders. Taking advantage of the Burgundian confusion after Calais, Gloucester burned several villages south of Dunkirk and around Ypres. The English fleet also raided along the Flemish coast as far north as the Zwin estuary and the island of Cadzand before both army and navy returned to Calais.6 3

4

5

6

I have found four of these poems, one in Ralph A. Klinefelter, ed., “‘The Siege of Calais’: A New Text,” Publications of the Modern Language Association 67 (1952), 888–95, and three more in Rossell Hope Robbins, ed., Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries (New York, 1959), pp. 78–89, these latter two originating in The Brut, or the Chronicles of England, ed. F.W.D. Brie (London, 1906–08). However, Roger Nicholson, of the Department of English, University of Auckland, New Zealand, who has worked on them, assures me that there are at least two more of these poems that are as yet unedited, one in London, Lambeth Palace Library, ms. 6, and a second in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby ms. 102. All were written within a few months of the end of the siege. A translation of this letter is found in Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 81–82. The original is edited in Marie-Rose Thielmans, ed., “Une lettre missive inédité de Philippe le Bon concernant le siège de Calais,” Bulletin de la commission royale d’histoire de Belgique 115 (1950), 285– 96, although she mistakenly has Philip the Good sending the letter to his other brother-in-law, Arthur de Richemont. See, for example, Eileen Power, The Wool Trade in English Medieval History (Oxford, 1941) and John H.A. Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340–1478 (Toronto, 1972). For a history of Flanders in the fifteenth century see David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London, 1992) and Henri Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, vol. II: Du commencement du XIVe siècle à la mort de Charles de Téméraire (Brussels, 1903). Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 82–84.

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Thus in August 1436 the citizens of the county of Flanders found themselves in the ironic position of defending their countryside and towns from the very people on whom their livelihood chiefly depended. Philip the Good and the Burgundian army would not be coming to their aid, as a number of letters from the ducal court to the Ghentenaars and others in Flanders insisting that the Flemings must defend themselves suggest.7 Initially, at least, the Flemings would remain true to their Burgundian overlord. But this was an expensive endeavor. Without an “official” Burgundian army in the southern Low Countries, as the Burgundian troops had dispersed after leaving Calais, the burden of Flemish defense especially fell on the local militias. Payment for those forces fell on the towns and villages that raised those militias. Of course, this was not an unusual event for the Middle Ages. There seems little doubt that militias often defended their localities, although histories of such defense are rare; perhaps this is because of the scarcity of sources, or perhaps these sources have not been utilized to the extent they could be by military historians.8 One of the areas of special interest in the study of militias needing further investigation is the economic support, largely for provisions, for these militias by their funding localities. The sources for such expenses, if they can be found, are often hidden in town expense records and not in more commonly accessed military historical sources. It is within this context that several references to the payment of Ostend’s militia – the heere of the following document – defending the coastline outside of the town during the period of crisis following the defeat of the Burgundian forces at Calais are made in the small town’s registers. Although Ostend had gained the status of “city” two centuries previously, and held a market around a market hall, in 1436 it was still populated principally by fishermen. Nor does the town seem to have been enclosed by walls; at least, no urban fortifications are recorded in any of the medieval sources, while early modern engravings of Ostend show only later bastions and other fortifications.9 Instead, this militia unit was stationed on a “dune,” presumably one of the dikes that had been built only forty years previously to protect the town from the sea, but also undoubtedly serving as an earthen fortification that utilized the natural coastal terrain. The numbers in this militia unit are not revealed in these references, although in the initial reference they are referred to “aldermen and some of the burghers;” yet, the small amounts of provisions – foodstuffs and ammunition – indicates that there were probably not many. Later, the numbers may have increased, as the amount of the foodstuffs for the “sailors and sergeants” are much larger than those in the first records. (The diversity of these victuals will be discussed below.) Also, in every reference to the supply of these provisions, the reason that the Ostend militia was stationed on their “dune” during the month of August 1436 7 8 9

V. Fris, “Documents Gantois concernant la levée du siège de Calais en 1436,” in Mélanges Paul Frédéricq (Brussels, 1904), pp. 245–58. An exception to this is Theresa M. Vann’s “The Militia of Malta,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004), 137–48. Luc François, Bibliographie van de geschiedenis van Oostende (Ostend, 2000).

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was that “the English fleet lay before the town.” The following records for the provisioning of the Ostend militia standing watch during August 1436 were transcribed by Ed Vlietinck and originally appeared in “Le siège de Calais et les villes de la comté flamande,” Annales de la société d’emulation de Bruges 40 (1890), 97, 99:10 Item den VIIIen dach in den oest als de inghelsche vlote hier voor de stede lach, zo was ghesleten up de dune bii den heere, wet ende eenneghe vander poorters, an spise ende an dranke ouer al XIII lb. VIII s. Item den VIIIen dach in den oest als dinghelsche vlote hier voor de stede lach zo waeren ghesconken den goeden lieden die ons biistandichede daden XVI tonnen biers; coste elke tonne III lb. XII s. betaelt LVII lb. XII s.11 Item betaelt van zesse tonnen cleen biers ghesleten ter seluer tiid; ouer elke tonne betaelt XX s.; VI lb. Item betaelt van brode ghesend den goeden lieden die ons biistandichede daden ter voornoemder tyd ende by onse poorters ghesleten ooc, ouer al VIII lb. IIII s. Item betaelt Pieter Lammaerd van poudre en van ghescote by hem gheleuert ter seluer tiid, ouer al IIII lb. V s. Item den XXIIIen dach in den oest als onze zeelieden ende serganten sceipten omme oestwaert te vaerne up dInghelsche vlote, betaelt van vitaille dese nauolghende nommen. Eerst van XXIIII tonnen biers, ouer elke tonne XLVIII s.; Item van VI hoeden broots, ouer elc hoed LIIII s.; Item van II cupin botre, ouer elc cupin VI lb.; Item van baken ende van case, VII lb. IIII s.; Van smare ende van kaersen, XXXVI s.; bet al XCIIII lb. XVI s.

These texts are translated as: Item, on the eighth day of August, when the English fleet lay before the town, so was consumed on the dune by the aldermen and some of the burghers,12 in food and in drink totalling XIII lb. VIII s. Item, on the eighth day of August, when the English fleet lay before the town, so was given to our allies XVI tonnes of beer, each tonne costing III l. XII s., paying a total of LVII l. XII s. Item, paid for six tonnes of small beer consumed at the same time; paid for each tonne XX s., VI l. Item, paid for bread sent to our allies at the abovementioned time and consumed also by our townsmen, overall VIII l. IIII s. Item, paid Pieter Lammaerd for powder and shot delivered by him at the same time, in total IIII l. V s.

10

11 12

Vlietinck’s purpose in including these records in his article is to discuss the participation in and reaction to the loss at Calais by the Flemish towns and townspeople. I have neither found the original documents that he has used nor others from Ostend at the time, but must admit not looking as hard as one might. Ostend’s archives are not well catalogued and some documents were undoubtedly lost during World War I when the town was heavily bombarded. I wish to thank James M. Murray of the University of Cincinnati’s Department of History. Vlietinck notes parenthetically that “le texte porte LXVIIlb XIII s.” As is often the case with documents, notarial terms such as these are difficult to translate with accuracy. Murray suggests that it is odd to know who this refers to precisely.

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Item, on the twenty-third day of August as our sailors and sergeants shipped all eastward to sail up to the English fleet, payment for victuals the following by name: First, for XXIIII tonnes of beers, for each tonne XLVIII s.; Item, for VI measures of bread,13 for each measure LIIII s.; Item, for II tubs of butter, for each tub VI lb.; Item, for bacon and for cheese, VII lb. IIII s.; For fat and for candles, XXXVI s.; paid for all XCIIII lb. XVI s.

Beyond those points mentioned above that are specific to the Ostend militia serving in Flanders at this time, there are several general observations about late medieval militia that can be derived from these logistical records. First, interestingly, the victuals mentioned in the 8 August documents consist only of bread and beer, although the latter is further divided into bier and cleen bier, translated as “small beer.”14 The 23 August documents report a greater diversity in foodstuffs, adding butter, bacon, and cheese to the provisions of bread and beer. This could simply show the movement of the Ostend militia to ships, but more than likely indicates that the militia serving in early August, less than two weeks after such service was required following the failure of the siege of Calais–and probably only a very short time after they had actually been called to defend the town– carried their more durable provisions, including such things as butter, bacon, and cheese, with them, while the less durable, and at the same time more quickly consumed, foodstuffs, such as bread and beer, would need to be replenished more often. Second, fat and candles are referred to only in the 23 August records. These would both be used for illumination, the existence of candles seems logical enough, and fat being included in the same accounting line presumably used for lamps. Again, there may be a simple reason for the inclusion of these items, and also that they are solely mentioned in the later records. These items could be used either to light the camp of the town’s militia, a necessity important to defensive units away from the lights of the town, or on a vessel at sea. The most obvious explanation for the presence of fat and candles is that the militia stayed on watch throughout the night. In addition, it can be surmised that supplies of such items were probably carried with the militia in their initial muster and would also need to be less frequently resupplied than the foodstuffs, which may be why they were missing from the 8 August accounts. Third, the only provider of supplies named in the documents is Pieter Lammaerd, who in the 8 August accounts is paid to deliver “powder and shot” to the Ostend militia standing guard on the dune. His singular presence as a named supplier probably can be explained simply: he was likely the only supplier of such military necessities in Ostend, while the victuals listed in the same docu-

13 14

Usually hoeden are measures of grain. However, I have translated this as measures of bread, as I cannot conceive of baking bread on board ship. The history of medieval beer-making has recently been undertaken in Richard W. Unger, Beer in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Philadelphia, 2004), and more particularly in the Low Countries by the same author in History of Brewing in Holland, 900–1900: Economy, Technology, and the State (Leiden, 2001).

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ment undoubtedly could be supplied by several individuals, and thus their names are not recorded. Of course, another reason for the mention of his name is that Lammaerd may not have been from Ostend. Indeed, there is no indication that he came from the town then being protected, and this may be the reason why powder and shot were not delivered to the militia until after they had already been mustered and set up camp. By this time there were certainly several suppliers of gunpowder and ammunition for gunpowder weapons throughout the Burgundian holdings.15 Yet, these suppliers were most frequently found in larger urban areas than Ostend, and Lammaerd may have lived elsewhere in Flanders, most likely in Ghent or Bruges. He may even have come from as far away as Lille, as this is where the largest Burgundian arsenal of gunpowder weapons was located, and it is logical that a large number of gunpowder and ammunition merchants would have been located near to such a repository.16 Unfortunately, the largest source of archival records of Burgundian gunpowder weapons, Joseph Garnier’s L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne d’après les documents conservés aux archives de la Coted’Or, which is particularly rich for Philip the Good’s reign, does not mention Lammaerd;17 therefore, until further research reveals more about this man more than what is said about this supplier of gunpowder and ammunition is only conjecture. It should not come as a surprise that the Ostend militia possessed gunpowder weapons, either larger artillery pieces or smaller hand-held weapons, the records do not specify which. Gunpowder weapons had been held in Low Countries’ urban arsenals since at least the 1340s; and while there had certainly been a centralization of many if not most of these weapons since the occupation of the southern Low Countries by the Valois Dukes of Burgundy,18 this was far from a control of these guns. Contemporary Burgundian governmental documents show that in 1436 gunpowder weapons were mostly kept in local arsenals,19 while, as would be seen in their use by urban soldiers in the rebellions that would follow this date, in Bruges in 1436–38, Luxembourg in 1443, Ghent in 1449–53, Utrecht and Guelders in 1455–56, and Liège in 1445 and1465–68, others were still under control of the urban militias.20 Thus a ready supply could be used by Ostenders and other Low Countries’ militias for defense purposes, as seen in the records above. Fourth is the idea that the change from “alderman and some of the burghers” 15 16

17 18 19 20

This will be addressed completely in Robert D. Smith and Kelly DeVries, The Gunpowder Artillery of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy, 1363–1477 (Woodbridge, 2005). See Smith and DeVries, The Gunpowder Artillery; A. Fromont and A. de Meunynck, Histoire de canonniers de Lille, 2 vols. (Lille, 1892); and A. de la Fons-Meliococq, De l’artillerie de la ville de Lille aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles (Lille, 1854). Joseph Garnier, L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne d’après les documents conservés aux archives de la Côte-d’Or (Paris, 1895). Nor is there the mention of any variation of the name. See Kelly DeVries, “Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State,” War in History 5 (1998), 133–39. Garnier, L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne, pp. 150–65. Smith and DeVries, The Gunpowder Artillery; see also Kelly DeVries, “The Rebellions of the Southern Low Countries’ Towns during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” forthcoming in Power and the City in the Netherlandic World, 1000–2000, ed. W. TeBrake and W. Kibler

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(den heere, wet ende eenneghe vander poorters) serving as militia in the 8 August documents to “sailors and sergeants” (zeelieden ende serganten) as the militiamen on 23 August may indicate a change in personnel from less to more professional soldiers. It seems that the earlier militia were drawn from the town’s more prominent citizens, but does not denote any martial talent, while the later ones, certainly in the case of the sergeants, if not also the sailors, seems to do so. Does this mean, then, that the Ostender soldiers who had served with Philip the Good at Calais perhaps had not returned to the town between 28 July and 8 August, but had by 23 August? If so, then it must be assumed that Philip’s army stayed intact longer after the failure at Calais than previously thought, and there is no evidence to support this. Perhaps the difference in militia designation can be more easily explained as suggesting two different types of urban militias, land and naval forces. Although few historians of medieval soldiers, or even medieval navies, discuss such naval militia, it seems logical that these troops existed, especially in coastal towns, and also especially with piracy so prevalent. J.F. Verbruggen has found that such troops existed earlier in Flemish military history, while Neils Lund has found them in medieval Denmark, Michael Powicke has confirmed their existence in medieval England, and N.A.M. Rodger has done the same for the sixteenth and seventeenth century.21 This is further suggested in the 23 August records with the use of the words sceipten omme oestwaert, securely meaning “shipped all eastward” and denoting travel on the sea for the “sailors and sergeants.” It is thus probable that the militias mentioned in the later document were simply other soldiers than those mentioned in the earlier document and does not preclude the possible continued service of the “alderman and burghers” on the dune protecting Ostend from the landing of an English force. Finally, much more difficult to understand is who Ostend’s “allies” (den goeden lieden die ons biistandichede daden, literally “the good people who are assisting us”) were and why the Ostenders seem to be paying for some of their victuals, beer and bread, in the 8 August records. Does this mean that some of these were also serving as militia on the dune or elsewhere in protection of Ostend and needed to be supplied with foodstuffs during their service, a logical assumption if a threat to that town might also be judged a threat to some of the other, smaller villages in the region? Or is it possible that Ostend was simply supplying those “allies” because they were not able to do so on their own? Curiously, the document refers to the beer as “given” (ghesconken) and the bread as “sent” (ghesend), and that the expense for these items were paid by the Ostenders, a suggestion that no payment for these was to be received from the “allies.” There is also no

21

J.F. Verbruggen, Het leger en de vloot van de graven van Vlaanderen vanaf het ontstaan tot in 1305 (Brussels, 1960), pp. 118–22; Neils Lund, Lið, leding og landeværn: Hær og samfund i Danmark i ældre middelalder (Roskilde, 1996); Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England: A Study in Liberty and Duty (Oxford, 1962), and N.A.M. Rodger, “The New Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century,” in War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard Unger (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 233–36.

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mention of “allies” in the 23 August document, although this should not be taken as suggesting that Ostend no longer had them. While these questions must remain unanswered without further research, it is quite interesting that militias serving in one location may have been made up not just of men from a single town, especially in the case of smaller towns and villages.22 Nor can it be answered as to why there is a difference in beer prices between the two dates, without a greater knowledge of the economics of beer-making in Flanders at this time.23 Although many of these points might be assumed without having the Ostend documents of payments for supplies to their militia on 8 and 23 August 1436, it is nevertheless important to have some evidence for their veracity. There are no doubt that records of other militias are in other archives and that they similarly will enrich our understanding of the “grass-roots” of medieval military history. Let this be an encouragement for their discovery, study, and discussion.

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To my knowledge no one has written about such militia administration during the Middle Ages, although such a topic deserves consideration. John H.A. Munro, expert in the economics of the Low Countries during the fifteenth century, has suggested that as a result of the currency fluctuation in Flanders during and due to the Hundred Years War, it may be folly to try and derive any conclusive information from the noting of prices during this period. Nor did the more proficient economic administration of the Burgundians change this. See Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold.