The Irish amateur military tradition in the British Army, 1854–1992 9781526108463

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Beginning with the re-establishment of the Irish militia during the Crimean War and continuing to the disbandment of the Ulster Defence Regiment in 1992, William Butler examines the Irish amateur military tradition in the British Army – distinguishing it from both the British amateur military tradition and the wellknown paramilitary tradition in Ireland.

Taking the period as a whole, two divergent Protestant and Catholics traditions emerge, making the book ideally suited for students and lecturers with an interest in Ireland and the British Empire, the British Army and military history, Imperialism and British and Irish society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. William Butler is Associate Lecturer in Modern British and Irish History at the University of Kent

Cover image: Members of the North Down Rifles in Uniform, 1856, D4567/3/1. Courtesy of the Deputy Keeper of the Records, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland and Lady Rose Lauritzen

ISBN 978-0-7190-9938-0

IRISH AMATEUR MILITARY TRADITION Butler IN THE BRITISH ARMY 1854–1992

Irish men and women of both religions and political persuasions made a significant contribution to the British Army, playing an important role within the Empire while also providing a crucial link between the Army and Irish society. This link often involved a fractious relationship, especially at the beginning and at the end of the period, but in many ways these organisations came to reflect Irish and, later, Northern Irish society. It has long been assumed that, especially during the nineteenth century, Irishmen were driven into the British Army by a ‘compulsion of destitution’. Butler strongly contests this. Drawing on a detailed analysis of around 30,000 enlistments, he argues that, far from being destitute, many of those involved in the Irish amateur military tradition were in steady employment. For these recruits the key factors were social mobility, political patronage and loyalty to Britain and its Empire.

THE

IRISH AMATEUR MILITARY TRADITION IN THE BRITISH ARMY 1854–1992

Cover design: riverdesign.co.uk

9 780719 099380 www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

William Butler

The Irish amateur military tradition in the British Army, 1854–1992

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The Irish amateur military tradition in the British Army, 1854–1992 WILLIAM BUTLER

Manchester University Press

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Copyright © William Butler 2016 The right of William Butler to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN  978 0 7190 9938 0  hardback

First published 2016 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset in 10.5/12.5 Adobe Garamond by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire

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Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements  List of abbreviations

vi vii ix

Introduction1 1 Politics and strategy 12 2 The officer corps 51 3 The rank and file 84 4 Discipline and morale 116 141 5 Auxiliary forces on active service 6 Public image 163 Conclusion189 Select bibliography 194 Index207

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Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8

Militia officers’ place of birth, 1854–81 53 Militia officers’ place of birth, 1881–1908 53 Officers who joined regular army battalions, 1854–1908  59 Religion of officers, 1854–1908 62 Occupations of men in units embodied, 1854–60 85 Occupations of men in the militia, 1881–1908 85 Religious breakdown of units, with a breakdown of religion of total 87 population for each county, 1881 Percentages short of establishments by country, 1885–1905 91 Occupations of Irish Imperial Yeomanry who served in South Africa, 1900–2 93 Religious breakdown of Irish Imperial Yeomanry who served in South Africa, 1900–2 94 Strength of the Ulster Home Guard by county, with a percentage of the male population, and percentage of the Protestant male population, 1942  101 Religious composition of UDR applicants, March 1970 105

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Acknowledgements

This book is the product of many years of research, and during the process I have incurred many debts. Firstly, I would like to thank my PhD supervisor, Professor Ian Beckett, for his support and advice, and for his constructive criticism of my work. In particular, I would like to mention my primary PhD supervisor, Dr Timothy Bowman, for his faith in my ability as a historian, as early as my second year as a War Studies undergraduate at the University of Kent, throughout my Master’s year, and during the course of work on my thesis and the writing of this book. Without his thoughts, interest, and support I would  not have had the initial confidence to undertake this work. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank my PhD examiners, Professor Alvin Jackson and Professor Mark Connelly, for their comments and thoughts, and for their advice as to what and where to go next in my future endeavours. The two anonymous reviewers appointed by Manchester University Press also offered much appreciated guidance and constructive criticism, and for that I thank them. I would like to thank the School of History at the University of Kent, partly because they have provided me with a nurturing environment for the last nine years but also because they facilitated my PhD studies through the award of a scholarship. Vanessa Nedderman and those within the Partnership Development Office at the University have also given me the freedom and flexibility to complete this book, and for that I am very grateful. In Belfast, I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of staff at the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, especially Liam O’Reilly, Carrie Green, Bethany Sinclair, and particularly Ian Montgomery. Without their help a crucial section of this book would not be what it has become. I would also like to thank Amanda Moreno and Jonathan Maguire of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and Royal Ulster Rifles Museums for granting me access to more vital material and being most helpful. In Dublin, I would like to thank the staff at the National Library of Ireland, and at Trinity College Library. In London, I would also like to thank the staff at the National Archives, Kew, the British Library, and the National Army Museum for answering my seemingly endless requests.

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viiiAcknowledgements

On a personal note, I wish to thank my family, my parents, and my brother, for their constant support and encouragement from an early age, even as a teenager with a more than unusual interest in history. My grandparents were always at the forefront of encouraging this interest and the book is dedicated to them. I’d specifically like to thank my closest friend, Mario Draper, for his unending support, advice, and comments on my work. I am particularly grateful for his ability to read and reread seemingly endless drafts with little complaint, and to still want to hear more about my plans and future work. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Emily. Without her by my side over the past five years none of this would have been possible. Her constant support, her ability to listen to my endless talk on the militia, yeomanry, or Home Guard, and her constant encouragement have made this all the more possible.

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Abbreviations

BL BLHCMA BMH DUOTC GOC HC HL IAVTC INV IPP IRA LDV NAM NLI OTC PRONI RAMC RIC RUC TA TCD TNA UDA UDR UHG USC UVF VTC

British Library Basil Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Bureau of Military History Dublin University Officers’ Training Corps General Officer Commanding House of Commons House of Lords Irish Association of Volunteer Training Corps Irish National Volunteers Irish Parliamentary Party Irish Republican Army Local Defence Volunteers National Army Museum National Library of Ireland Officers’ Training Corps Public Record Office of Northern Ireland Royal Army Medical Corps Royal Irish Constabulary Royal Ulster Constabulary Territorial Army Trinity College Dublin The National Archives Ulster Defence Association Ulster Defence Regiment Ulster Home Guard Ulster Special Constabulary Ulster Volunteer Force Volunteer Training Corps

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Introduction

The study of the auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom is an important one, and this is in no small part down to Britain’s historical reliance on sea power and a small standing army with Imperial obligations. This left the need for an amateur force at home both to protect against invasion from a foreign aggressor and to keep internal order within the country itself. This was carried out through use of the amateur forces as an aid to the civil power and through a form of social control by encouraging participation within the various amateur bodies. As has been identified by Ian Beckett in his crucial work on the amateur military tradition in Great Britain, auxiliaries provided a direct link between the army and society. These auxiliary forces have taken many different forms, with wide-ranging degrees of popularity throughout British history. Specifically since the beginning of the Crimean War in 1854, they have included the militia (later to become the Special Reserve), the yeomanry, the Rifle Volunteers, the Territorial Force (later the Territorial Army), the Home Guard, the Officer Training Corps, and the Volunteer Training Corps. In Ireland, this also extended as far as the Ulster Defence Regiment as late as 1992, and, beyond that, the Royal Irish Regiment Home Service Battalions, which formed part of the regular army. All of these institutions and traditions have, in different degrees of detail, been assessed by historians over time, with a general focus on an English amateur military tradition, followed, to a lesser extent, by the Scottish experience of amateur soldiery.1 A detailed study by historians of these forces in Ireland, especially for the Victorian period, however, has been a neglected area. This is partly because there  has been a tendency to focus much more on paramilitary organisations ­­outside of the parameters of the British Army, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, Irish Volunteers, Irish Republican Army, and the various groups which existed after partition in 1921.2 Thus, the Irish amateur military tradition within the British Army, existing throughout a tumultuous period of Irish history, providing an interesting backdrop to some of the issues associated with Irish independence and partition, has been somewhat overlooked. This does not mean that amateur soldiery in Ireland within a formal military framework has been entirely neglected, especially for earlier periods in Irish

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­­ history, and it is important to outline exactly which forces are under consideration here. The idea of non-professional soldiery was one that emerged during the early seventeenth century, when, as David Miller has argued, the Old English aristocracy and the Gaelic Irish leaders, attempting to be treated as part of the polity in Ireland, created a form of amateur soldiery primarily as a means of defending their newly established order.3 This can be seen as the creation of what could be deemed as a Protestant volunteering tradition in Ireland. This tradition, seen mainly in the province of Ulster, formed an important part of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland, as argued by Allan Blackstock, most notably taking the form of the amateur yeomanry of the late eighteenth century, sharing close links with the Orangemen of Ulster. This would continue throughout much of the period, by making a significant contribution to the auxiliary forces of Ireland, particularly as an aid to the civil power.4 According to Blackstock, the yeomanry became an agent for pre-existing religious divisions, formally pitching Protestantism against Catholicism. Moreover, by rolling the old militia, the Volunteers, the Boyne Societies, and the loyal associations all into one, the yeomanry attracted all social and most political elements within contemporary Irish Protestantism.5 This is an important factor to bear in mind when thinking about amateur forces at the turn of the twentieth century. However, it was not only this Protestant contribution that made an impact on the amateur forces of Ireland during that period. Coinciding with the raising of a yeomanry force was the creation of an Irish militia that was to have a significant proportion of Catholics within its ranks. This was due in some part to the use of the Militia Ballot, used to raise the majority of the force. What is significant about this arm of the auxiliary forces is that it was raised solely as a defence force on Irish soil. It was only much later that it was permitted to move to English soil, this being legislated by an Act of Parliament. Once the threat of invasion and rebellion subsided somewhat after the early part of the nineteenth century, the militia in Ireland were to go into a state of limbo, which would not change until a little before the outbreak of the Crimean War. Contextually, the force in Britain, during the eighteenth century, was similar to the army in its social composition, in that it recruited from the lowest classes of society and included men who were ‘neither persons of substance nor impelled to join by patriotic enthusiasm. They were poor men who joined for the pay or for other purely personal reasons, like recruits for the army.’6 Even in the officer corps ‘only a few of the gentry could ever be induced to serve as militia officers’.7 In his ground-breaking work, J.R. Western argues that the militia in the eighteenth century represented two related military tendencies. This force was an attempt to create a reserve formation of men for home defence,  while using the obligation of military service and the equivalent of conscription, the Militia Ballot, as the basis for recruiting into the regular forces. Furthermore, he saw the militia as an example of the genius of the English governing class

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for ­­self-preservation, using the militia as a means to control the lower orders of society.8 These conclusions, although having some relevance to the Irish context, can only be taken so far. In 1949 Henry McAnally published his important work on the Irish militia which covers many central aspects of this force within the political context. But also, using a method that was in many ways ahead of its time, he studies social and cultural aspects of the militia, along with its religious dimension. McAnally even goes as far as to comment on the high degree of religious tolerance that existed within the militia because of the high proportion of Catholics within its ranks.9 Of course, this also highlights what might be deemed the earliest example of the Catholic Irish amateur military tradition and points to the fairly apolitical nature of the force. More recently, Ivan Nelson has covered the Napoleonic period in his study of the militia, but adds very little to McAnally’s earlier work, except for appreciating the problems associated with raising the officer corps, and the severe disciplinary issues surrounding the force. Crucially though, Nelson does highlight some of the religious discrimination that did take place within the militia, and how the authorities in Dublin tried to ease this by permitting freedom of worship. These disciplinary issues have also been covered by Thomas Bartlett in his work on the militia riots in 1793, looking at wider society’s position in relation to the militia. 10 In more general terms, J.E. Cookson’s study The British Armed Nation, 1793–1815 is able to put the raising and use of the Irish militia in to a British context, with particular reference to the political problems experienced by politicians and Protestant Ulstermen over the arming and use of Catholic Irishmen. Cookson sees that the heavy dependence on Catholics within the Irish militia did much to cause suspicions over its reliability and to provoke Protestant self-defence and nationalism.11 After much indecision and debate, the militia was re-formed in Ireland in 1854, two years after it had been reconstituted in England and Wales. Despite existing for the remainder of the Victorian period, the force in Ireland has been widely neglected by historians. During the South African War the yeomanry was also re-established in Ireland as an Imperial force. The formation had existed in Great Britain, largely dominated by landowning elites and the farming class, but also including a significant proportion of the urban class, as a support to the civil power.12 The latter was not a role that the Irish militia would perform, the controversial sectarian legacy of the late eighteenth century force seemingly still too raw for many. One of the other important studies of the auxiliary forces of Great Britain is Ian Beckett’s The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945 which details the formation and role of the many different amateur forces that have existed in the British Army, with a particular reference to and concentration on the Volunteer Force established in 1859. Beckett has argued that the auxiliary forces were as unrepresentative of society as the regular army as they drew their ranks from the

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same class of men. The Volunteer Force in particular has been viewed as a challenge by an anti-militarist middle class to the aristocratic and landed dominance of the officer corps, which was also able to attract a kind of respectable workingclass man who had not previously enlisted in any of the auxiliary forces.13 There never was, of course, a Volunteer Force on the British model of 1859 raised in Ireland itself, despite repeated attempts in Parliament for such a force to be established. In Beckett’s account any discussion of the amateur military tradition in Ireland is omitted, apart from a small appendix detailing some factual information regarding the various forces raised there. This aside, he believes that the constant threat of invasion, whether a real threat or just perceived, fuelled the development of the auxiliary forces, while also they came to be regarded as able to fill a constabulary role, so as to provide a degree of social stability.14 Again, this is something that was not a universal experience, given the hostility by various governments, either to arm the Irish population or to leave the defence and aid to the civil power to the auxiliary forces of Ireland. Ultimately, Beckett argues that the auxiliaries of Great Britain represented a far greater cross-section of society than the regular army did and that these were not the men likely to join the regulars in any great numbers. Despite the Irish amateur military tradition being neglected by academic historians for the period covering the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, some of its aspects have been studied by popular historians. For example, Richard Doherty undertook a study of the North Irish Horse for its centenary, concentrating almost entirely, and not without inaccuracies, on its service during the First and Second World Wars. On both occasions it very quickly ceased to be a truly amateur formation.15 Moreover, the UDR has been covered in great detail by Chris Ryder, a journalist who covered the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and John Potter, a veteran of the regiment, in what is the closest work to an official regimental history.16 Moreover, Terence Denman has gone into some detail regarding the use of Reserve battalions during the early part of the First World War and also during the Easter Rising. Denman is also able to give some detail of the University Officer Training Corps of Trinity College, Dublin, and Queen’s University, Belfast, with particular reference to the number of officers they were required to supply to the army during the early part of the war.17 Additionally, in a recent study of the Edwardian army, Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly have assessed the operation of the OTC, with specific reference to the case in Ireland.18 Once more, this was a force that was not originally extended to Ireland, but came to be a very popular vocation for middle-class, mainly Protestant, university students, providing an alternative outlet for amateur soldiery throughout the United Kingdom. The Territorial Force, and later Territorial Army, was not created in Ireland in 1906, and did not come into existence in its modern guise in Northern

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Ireland until immediately before the outbreak of the Second World War. These citizen soldiers, replacing the militia, yeomanry, and Special Reserve in Great Britain played a significant part, with a role of home defence, during the First World War. These so-called ‘Weekend Warriors’ survived many army cutbacks throughout the interwar period, until, once again, they were required at the outbreak of war in 1939.19 The force in Northern Ireland played its part during the latter conflict and survived after the war and throughout the Troubles: it is still in existence today, under the title of the Army Reserve. In terms of the Ulster Home Guard during the Second World War, in work dealing with ‘Dad’s Army’, the Home Guard in Great Britain, by the likes of S.P. Mackenzie, Penny Summerfield, and Corinna Peniston-Bird, the situation in Northern Ireland is mentioned little more than in passing. Nevertheless, these studies provide valuable insight into the force as a whole and provide a degree of  contextualisation for the Irish position.20 One such is David Orr’s richly ­­illustrated study of the force, which provides a detailed narrative of the Ulster Home Guard’s history throughout the Second World War and the ‘red scares’ of the 1950s. Arthur Hezlet, in his official history of the B Specials, also makes some reference to the UHG.21 Lastly, the UDR was formed after the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary, as a force to re-establish the trust of all sections of the Northern Irish population during the Troubles, and under the direct control of the British authorities. Historians such as Michael Dewar have focused any discussion of the UDR within the context of the British Army’s experience in Northern Ireland as a whole, while others, such as Wallace Clark, Chris Ryder, and John Potter, have made written accounts based on personal recollections of service and through the more tradition regimental history.22 All these studies help to provide an important understanding of these forces, but fail to put them into any context of an amateur tradition. This is particularly important with regard to the UDR, because it was the only force to exist uniquely in Northern Ireland and, although a part-time force, was wedded very clearly to the regular British Army. Historians have identified an Irish military tradition, largely focused within the British Army: a belief that the Irish have a tendency to actually define themselves militarily, and that, undoubtedly, from the medieval period to more modern times it has made a military career seem ‘normal’.23 The present book takes this idea a step further, identifying an Irish amateur military tradition within the British Army, as distinct from a paramilitary tradition – although sometimes the line between these two traditions has become somewhat blurred. As will be demonstrated, within this amateur tradition two further traditions emerged, and these will be discussed: firstly, the re-emergence of the Protestant volunteering tradition, witnessed in Ulster as early as the seventeenth century, and, secondly, a Catholic amateur military tradition largely present in the Irish militia during

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the nineteenth century. Importantly, these two traditions, although not directly competing, also reflected Irish, and later Northern Irish, society up until the disbandment of the UDR in 1992. An assessment of these traditions will be made using different themes, in essence what has been labelled as the ‘army and society’ approach. This builds upon the framework that has been used by the likes of David French, Edward Spiers, and Ian Beckett in evaluating the British Army during the nineteenth century, and most recently by Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly in their work on the Edwardian British Army.24 However, the present book builds upon this concept to evaluate the Irish position in detail, within the British context, for the first time. In so doing, it also seeks to disprove some of the assumptions made about the Irish situation and how its amateur forces were placed within Ireland’s unique political, social, and cultural environment. The first chapter discusses the political and strategic considerations that were defining factors for Irish auxiliary forces. These were of particular importance for the militia, which was originally not embodied at the same time as its English and Welsh counterparts, and then had to contend with a persistent distrust of arming what was a Catholic-dominated force in the wake of the Fenian infiltration of the British Army. As a result of the Protestant domination of the yeomanry, Officers’ Training Corps, and Volunteer Training Corps from the South African War to the end of the First World War, these political problems did not exist to such a great extent, although there were correct suspicions that members of these forces had close links with paramilitary organisations, particularly the UVF.25 In contrast, the Protestant domination of the UHG and the UDR meant that political problems risked involving the army in sectarian issues. This became a particular problem when members of the UDR were suspected of collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. This claim has been substantiated but, as correctly stated by John Potter, such collusion involved only a very small number of the forty thousand men and women who served in the regiment.26 Any strategic capabilities of auxiliary forces were greatly affected by these political considerations. Once more, this was particularly the case for the militia, at a time when amateur forces were so important to the defence of the United Kingdom. The militia was not permitted to serve in Ireland for the majority of its existence. This was not a popular measure, but it meant that the militia could form a more integral part of the defence of British shores. All auxiliaries were able to perform strategic duties, by undertaking duty at home, in the Empire, or on the European continent, in a variety of ways. Once more, however, the home defence duties of the UHG and UDR serve to highlight the fast-changing political nature of service at home, showing just how important Northern Irish forces were with regard to maintaining strategic considerations, especially when trust was given to Protestant-dominated forces.

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Chapter 2 addresses the issues associated with the officer corps of the amateur forces in Ireland, whilst placing it within the context of British forces. It is clear that the corps came to be dominated by Protestant men, even in the predominantly Catholic militia. This went as far back as the Napoleonic era, and was a result of the British auxiliary system, which was organised on the existing structure of authority, and for the officer corps this meant gentry leadership.27 Using data gathered from officers’ service records, the chapter highlights the significance of the landed classes during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how the decline of the landed classes, as highlighted by Terence Dooley,28 was also present within Irish auxiliary forces. The gradual increase in reliance on English-born officers is also addressed, showing that many used auxiliary forces as a ‘back door’ into the regular army, and how this affected the capabilities of these forces. Patronage is discussed in relation to the rise of the middle classes in the officer corps, especially after partition, and how these officers, as well as those with previous military experience, came to characterise the officer corps from the middle of the twentieth century onwards. Chapter 3 uses similar parameters to discuss the rank and file of Irish auxiliary forces. First and foremost it highlights the initial domination of Catholic men, followed by a clear re-emergence of the Protestant volunteering tradition. A discussion of the efforts in the UDR to attract Catholic recruits is undertaken, analysing how successful this was, especially after the experiences of the UHG and the almost complete absence of this element of society in auxiliary forces for over fifty years. Within the context of the British Army, an assessment is made regarding the success of the militia and yeomanry’s primary role, draft finding for the regular army. Linked to this, a wider analysis of the Cardwell-Childers reforms is undertaken, especially the aspect of localisation. This was a reform which sought to provide direct links between the army and wider society and has largely been deemed a failure in Britain.29 However, there is clear evidence that it was much more of a success in Ireland. An assumption has previously been made that the Irish rank and file followed the same pattern as its British counterpart in its social composition: that it was essentially drawn from the ‘underemployed’ in society.30 In fact, partly because there was no Rifle Volunteer Force in Ireland, a ‘better’ class of recruit was attracted to the militia and yeomanry, many recruits working for large employers such as the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, the Guinness Brewery, and Jacob’s Biscuits in Dublin. Once more, the emergence of the middle class and those with previous military experience is addressed, and how this had an impact on auxiliary forces in Northern Ireland, as well as the eventual incorporation of women into the ranks. The UDR became the first regiment in the British Army to fully integrate women into its structure, doing so primarily to facilitate the authorities’ ‘stop and search’ policy, putting women firmly in the front line.

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Chapter 4 considers the evolution of the discipline and morale of Irish amateur forces over the period under consideration. It is widely accepted that there was a perception that Irish regiments had poorer discipline than other regiments, and that this perception was largely true.31 Additionally, there is a recognition that the army’s behaviour steadily improved over time, and auxiliary forces were no different in this respect as acts of indiscipline became more infrequent in the late Victorian period.32 Acts of disobedience, in particular drunkenness and rioting, were common at the start of the period, but the biggest issue for the authorities was any indication of political links between auxiliaries and anti-British organisations or paramilitaries. In the militia, links with Fenianism were strongly suspected, although the evidence suggests that this was an isolated problem and did not affect the majority of men. In the yeomanry, strong links with the UVF were suspected, and after the Curragh Incident in 1914 it was even suggested that the North Irish Horse would defect enmasse should the UVF command wish it to.33 Little problems of this kind existed for the OTC, VTC, and UHG (although this force being under civilian, not military, control brought its own problems), but it was for the UDR that this disciplinary issue became an important subject. For the most part this was because of the high-profile accusations of collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, although, similar to the militia and Fenians during the nineteenth century, this was not a widespread problem despite claims to the contrary. Chapter 5 focuses on the auxiliary forces on active service. A variety of roles were undertaken when these forces were embodied, and these broadly fit into the same pattern as those in Great Britain. It was, of course, a slightly different situation for the UDR which by 1992 had become the regiment in the British Army with the longest continuous active service. The roles carried out while on service varied over time, and included the garrisoning of fortifications, ceremonial duties, and, most contentiously, as an aid to the civil power. The majority of the time was taken up by training, the exception being when regiments served in South Africa, and during the First World War, or the important patrolling duties carried out in Northern Ireland by the UHG and UDR. Chapter 6 takes all of the previous elements into account and looks at the public image of these amateur forces. Largely in line with improvements in discipline, the public perception of these forces gradually improved. The poor legacy of auxiliary forces during the Napoleonic Wars had a lasting effect on this image and early acts of disobedience and violence did little to improve it. During periods of embodiment, especially during the war in South Africa, this image was exponentially enhanced, and the press played a key role in this, despite nationalist elements attempting to make the militia a political issue. This also falls in line with the improved image of the army during this period and the associated jingoism that the war in South Africa provided.34 Throughout the Second World

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War, despite the external image of the UHG suffering because of its sectarian nature, within Northern Ireland it remained unaffected. It was for the UDR that this image went into steep decline. For much of its existence it attempted public relations exercises that largely fell on deaf ears and left the force with a poor and somewhat dubious reputation that has never recovered. Overall this perception provides an impression and recognition of a distinctive Irish amateur military tradition. This was shaped by the complex social and political circumstances which existed in Ireland and Northern Ireland throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These complexities shaped every aspect of the amateur tradition within the British Army and in many ways complemented it. This context also facilitated the emergence of two separate strands to this amateur tradition. The first was a Catholic amateur military tradition which in the nineteenth century reinforced Protestant dominance of Irish society, but was to decline as a result of the Land Acts and mirror society up until partition. The second strand facilitated a re-emergence of an Ulster Protestant volunteering tradition which also reinforced the dominance of Protestant society in Northern Ireland, despite some attempts to remedy this within the amateur forces. Evidently though, there is an overall tradition that can be traced as far back as the seventeenth century, which reflects Irish society and came to form an important part of it. Notes   1 I. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991); J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793–1815 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); P. Dennis, The Territorial Army, 1906–1940 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1987); S.P. Mackenzie, The Home Guard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); P. Summerfield and C. Peniston Bird (eds), Contesting Home Defence: Men, Women and the Home Guard in the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); H. Strachan, ‘Scotland’s Military Identity’, Scottish Historical Review, vol. 85, no. 2 (2006); J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political Issue 1660–1802 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965).   2 T. Bowman, Carson’s Army; The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1910–1922 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); S. Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); M. Farrell, Arming the Protestants: Formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1920–27 (London: Pluto Press, 1983); P. Hart, The IRA at War, 1916–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A. Hezlet, The ‘B’ Specials: A History of the Ulster Special Constabulary (Belfast: The Mourne River Press, 1972).   3 D.W. Miller, ‘Non-professional soldiery, c.1600–1800’, in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery (eds), A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315–34 (pp. 316–17).

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 4 For a full account of the history of the Irish Yeomanry see A. Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army: The Irish Yeomanry, 1796–1834 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998).  5 Ibid., pp. 298–9.  6 Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, p. 256.  7 Ibid., pp. 439–40.  8 Ibid., pp. 443–4.   9 H. McAnally, The Irish Militia, 1793–1816: A Social and Military Study (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949). 10 I. Nelson, The Irish Militia, 1793–1802: Ireland’s Forgotten Army (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1997), p. 25; p. 121; T. Bartlett, ‘An End to Moral Economy; The Irish Militia Disturbances of 1793’, Past and Present, no. 99 (May 1983). 11 Cookson, British Armed Nation, p. 14; p. 160. 12 G. Hay, The British Yeomanry Cavalry, 1794–1920 (PhD Dissertation, University of Kent, 2011). 13 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, p. 164; pp. 170–1. For more on the Rifle Volunteers see also I. Beckett, Riflemen Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement, 1859–1908 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2007); and H. Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History, 1859–1908 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975). 14 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, p. 286. 15 R. Doherty, The North Irish Horse: A Hundred Years of Service (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2002). 16 J. Potter, A Testimony to Courage: The History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969– 1992 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Ltd, 2001); C. Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace? (London: Methuen, 1991). 17 T. Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War, 1914–1918 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992). 18 T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army; Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 19 See Dennis, The Territorial Army; Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition; I. Beckett, A Century of Service; The Territorials; A Century of Service (Plymouth: DRA Publishing, 2008); I. Beckett, ‘The Territorial Force’, in I. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds), A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of The British Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985). 20 Mackenzie, The Home Guard; Summerfield and Peniston Bird (eds), Contesting Home Defence. 21 D. Orr, Duty Without Glory: The Story of Ulster’s Home Guard in the Second World War and Cold War (Newtownards: Redcoat Publishing, 2008); Hezlet, The ‘B’ Special; Philip Ollerenshaw has also made a minor study of the UHG in his recent book, P. Ollerenshaw, Northern Ireland in the Second World War: Politics, Economic Mobilisation and Society, 1939–45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). 22 M. Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985); W. Clark, Brave Men and True: Early days of the Ulster Defence Regiment (Coleraine: Coleraine Printing Company Ltd, 2002); C. Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace? (London: Methuen, 1991); J. Potter, A Testimony

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to Courage: The History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969–1992 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Ltd, 2001). 23 T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery, ‘An Irish Military Tradition?’, in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery (eds), A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7; see also K. Jeffery, ‘The Irish Military Tradition and the British Empire’, in K.  Jeffery (ed.), ‘An Irish Empire’?; Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). 24 For examples of this see Beckett, Riflemen Form; Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army; D. French, Military Identities: The Regimental System: The British Army, and the British People, c.1870–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); E. Spiers, The Army and Society, 1815–1914 (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 162–3; and E. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 25 Bowman, Carson’s Army, p. 170. 26 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 377. 27 Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 262–3; Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 115–16; McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 58; Nelson, The Irish Militia, p. 28; Blackstock, An Ascendancy Army, p. 29. 28 T. Dooley, The Decline of the Big House in Ireland: A Study of Irish Landed Families, 1860–1960 (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2001), p. 273. 29 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 2–28. 30 French, Military Identities, pp. 209–10. 31 T. Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 6. 32 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 58–9; French, Military Identities, p. 182. 33 Bowman, Carson’s Army, p. 52; I. Beckett (ed.), The Army and the Curragh Incident (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1986), p. 391. 34 S. Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture; Civil and Military Worlds (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 44–69.

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1

Politics and strategy

The history of the auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom, dating to long before 1660 and the creation of the first standing army, has been inextricably linked with political developments. This has been recognised by many historians looking at the British context of amateur soldiery.1 Similarly, in late eighteenth-century Ireland, the formation of a militia for home defence was heavily influenced by political considerations, particularly with regard to the distrust of the Volunteers and the inevitability of granting more power to the Irish Parliament when such a force was established.2 When this force was re-formed in the mid-1850s, political factors still had some significance, and continued to remain at the forefront of any policy towards auxiliaries until the end of the Northern Ireland Troubles. Across the period under discussion, political considerations also heavily influenced strategic concerns in Ireland, most notably when home defence was discussed. Historically, auxiliary forces had been used in a variety of ways, but, particularly during the Napoleonic wars, the militia was primarily viewed as capable of this defensive role. Specifically, the Irish militia was utilised as a force for the defence of Ireland, originally not to be sent out of the country (although service within Britain was briefly facilitated by the 1811 Militia Interchange Act), and, in fact, saw action against an invading French force in the south-west of Ireland in 1798, and also helped to quell the rebellions in Antrim, Down, and Wexford by United Irishmen in the same year, performing surprisingly well. Despite this, given the problems of raising the force by the ballot system, and the subsequent riots relating to this, a growing trend emerged of attempting to post the Irish militia to other areas of the United Kingdom, this being officially enabled in 1811.3 Similar issues continued to exist throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is not possible to discuss the utilisation and continued existence of the militia without briefly discussing the political situation in Ireland during the ­­nineteenth century, for its use and maintenance depended on the perception of this situation by the authorities both in London and in Ireland. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century the political and strategic role of the Irish ­­militia

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depended on issues such as Fenianism and the Land Wars, which created heightened violence and the rise of nationalist political parties, which made the position of the militia a difficult one in Parliament at Westminster, especially when questions over a policing role were raised. As a result, distrust also began to emerge outside of Ireland, which had a profound effect on the position of the force. As one commentator on politics and violence in Ireland has observed, Anglo-Irish relations at this time leave an impression of English government and Irish resistance locked in a seemingly endless embrace.4 The militia was caught somewhere in between this embrace, under the political control of the English government, whilst also viewed very much as an outlet for Irish resistance: something which was to endure for much of its existence. Before discussion of the legislation as it affected the re-establishment of the militia in Ireland, it is important, firstly, to look at the legislation which closely predated this so as to build a picture of how the force was able to be resurrected in Ireland in 1854. It must be recognised that the militia was re-established in England and Wales in 1852 and that even this legislation was by no means the first attempt to enable the raising of a militia force since its last period of active service during the Napoleonic wars. Between 1845 and 1852 there were, in fact, four different attempts to resurrect the militia for the purposes of home defence. The first, discussed by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Palmerston in 1845, looked at the possibility of finding a hundred thousand recruits by means of the ballot system. The second attempt by Lord Russell’s government, again with Wellington and Palmerston as the driving forces behind it, looked at the possibility of raising a force two hundred thousand strong, including both British and Irish men, by use of the ballot, and liable for twenty-eight days’ training. This failed as, in order to raise this force, income tax was to be increased, and few supporters were found. The third attempt occurred in the aftermath of the second invasion ‘panic’ following Louis Napoleon’s coup in France in December 1851. Russell this time proposed a force of 72,000 men, raised by voluntary enlistment and balloting, increasing, eventually, to 150,000 men after two years. However, this was rejected in a vote in Parliament.5 In 1852 the fourth attempt was enacted and given royal assent on 30 June. The Act gave provision for the raising of fifty thousand men in the first year, followed by thirty thousand in the second. Men would be raised by voluntary enlistment for a period of five years and, as an inducement, a bounty of £6 would be paid, spread out across the enlistment period. Furthermore, training and exercise were to last for a period of twenty-one days in a year, extended during emergencies, and all or any part of the militia forces could be moved out of their counties to any part of England and Wales.6 Significantly, the Bill did not include the provision for the raising of a militia force in either Scotland or Ireland, and this, particularly from the Irish viewpoint, was to be a bone of contention, causing much debate in Parliament. Russell himself remarked in a speech to Parliament

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in March 1852 that, as Scotland and Ireland were not included in the measure, ‘it was clear that the Scotch were cowards, and all the Irish traitors’.7 This was a theme that prevailed for much of the subsequent debate on the subject. Furthermore, John Reynolds, an MP for Dublin, questioned why England should have a militia, and not Ireland, saying, metaphorically, that ‘what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander; but here all the sauce was given to the goose, and none to the gander’, and also that, although Ireland had been left out of the Bill, it was included in the most important part of it, as Ireland had to pay its share of the burden.8 Others, such as Milner Gibson, MP for Ipswich, took the view that Irishmen should have been included in the Bill because many were unemployed, or were badly paid, and this would take the burden off the people of England, who were generally fully employed and with much better wages.9 Russell did leave the door open for the formation of a militia in Ireland, if necessity arose for it. 10 Nevertheless, once the Bill had been passed, after over two hundred hours of debate in Parliament, for the time being this debate died down. Once war had broken out in the Crimea, rumours began to circulate in the press about the possibility of the Irish militia, twenty thousand in number, being enrolled under the same terms as those in England.11 By February, Palmerston had made a number of speeches in Parliament which intimated that the raising of the militia in Scotland and Ireland was imminent. The view was that this would be a popular measure, supported by all parties, in Great Britain at least.12 Palmerston reiterated the fact that the Irish militia was not called out for any doubts of loyalty, but simply that it was not required for defence, a point which the nationalist press did not see as an adequate explanation.13 Similarly, again, John Reynolds did not let the issue lie, stating that he did not know whether the exemption of Ireland was to be regarded as a boon or an insult, but that he did not believe it was a compliment. He also vehemently made the point that, given Ireland’s geographical position, it was more susceptible to invasion than anywhere in England, and, therefore, the necessity for such a force was greater than in any other part of the country.14 Lords Panmure and Russell similarly reiterated that the Irish were excluded for practical reasons, not for a doubt of loyalty. Russell argued that the first Militia Bill in England had been made as a foundation to the new force, and Scotland had not been included in the Bill, any more than Ireland had.15 The arguments put forward by the government do have validity as the priority was always going to be on the defence of England over that of Ireland, and the fact that Scotland was not included only adds further weight to this argument. The conclusions by, particularly, Irish politicians about the degree of loyalty given by Irishmen are also understandable given the historical suspicions of arming and training men from Ireland. By May 1854, after many discussions following the announcement that an Irish militia was on the verge of being recreated, another Militia Act was passed.

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Politics and strategy

15

It included provisions for the militia to be called out whenever war existed between the United Kingdom and any foreign power, and stated that it would be lawful to call and embody all or any part of the respective militias of England, Scotland, and Ireland.16 Two months after this, the first Militia (Ireland) Act was passed in Parliament, which authorised the enrolment of thirty thousand private militiamen, for a period of five years, under the direction of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The oath upon enrolment made it possible for the men to serve anywhere in the United Kingdom, and there was no mention of the use of the ballot, meaning that, the raising of the force was to be done entirely by voluntary enlistment.17 So, finally, the militia in Ireland was included in legislation enabling it to be re-established. This, however, did not occur straight away as it was still deemed that embodiment in Ireland was not necessary, and questions over suspicions of loyalty emerged once more. The Times even suggested that Irishmen might have felt aggrieved by this decision.18 Finally, though, in December 1854, it was deemed that some regiments of militia in Ireland should be embodied for the first time, the first nine being permitted to do so at the beginning of that month, with another nine permitted by the middle of the month.19 By the start of 1855, all Irish militia regiments were permitted to enrol to their established strength, so ending two years of controversy. Once the militia in Ireland was embodied it took on a variety of roles, most of which were the same as the militia of other parts of the United Kingdom and British Empire. The exact detail of some of these roles during the first and subsequent embodiments will be discussed in due course but it is important to outline some of them here. Primarily, the role envisaged by the authorities for the militia, and in particular the Irish militia, was to furnish recruits to the regular army in order to reinforce its ranks. The dispatching of recruits to the Line, more often than not after the visits of recruiting parties, was a regular occurrence throughout all of the embodiment periods, and none more so than during this first stage. As one historian of the militia during this period has remarked, ‘the Scottish and Irish militias were also revived purely as a mechanism for channelling manpower to the army’.20 This has some validity, but does not tell the whole picture, as other roles were fulfilled. To a much lesser extent, the Irish militia was used in isolation as an aid to the civil power. More often than not the Permanent Staff of officers and NCOs were used, rather than the entire battalion, or at most small pickets of men were detached to guard against any civil unrest. For example, in May 1855, the Cavan and Monaghan Militia Regiments were used to ‘preserve the peace’ at the execution of some convicts in their localities. In August 1855, 140 men of the South Tipperary Militia were required for the suppression of a riot in Clonmel.21 This role, however, was fraught with difficulties for the militia as a whole, and to an

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even greater extent in Ireland, where it was felt that local sympathies would play a bigger part, and cause a high degree of indiscipline. The final role which the Irish militia performed was the garrisoning of forts and barracks, the majority left unmanned by the regular army which had been transferred abroad. This role was viewed as an important one, particularly the garrisoning of areas by Artillery Regiments of Militia, especially given the disproportionate number of Militia Artillery in Ireland compared to that of other areas of the United Kingdom. Linked to the role of garrisoning forts and towns was that of the militia’s distribution throughout the United Kingdom. It would appear that the argument relating to any distrust of Irishmen within a military body was unfounded. In the areas in which the Irish militia was stationed, it is clear that, a year after its initial embodiment, of the thirty-eight regiments of militia, both Infantry and Artillery, thirty-one were permitted to remain and serve in Ireland, with only seven having left to serve in England. Three of these were stationed in Portsmouth and Plymouth, areas of important strategic consideration; a further two, the Antrim Rifles and North Cork Rifles, were stationed for training at Aldershot; and the remaining two were stationed in Manchester and Sheffield. None of the thirty-one regiments was stationed near its depots, but this was a common occurrence for all British regiments of militia during longer periods of embodiment. What this demonstrates, at least for this first embodiment period, is that there was little distrust over the loyalty of Irishmen, as had been the suspicion when the militia in Ireland had not been re-established with that of England and Wales in 1852. The second period of embodiment, in the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny, also saw the Irish militia given an active role in the defence of the United Kingdom, and a continued trust in its capabilities as a military force. Twelve of the thirty-three militia regiments that were embodied for this second phase were based in Ireland, and similar roles were carried out, the garrisoning of forts coming increasingly to the forefront.22 A report into the home defences of the United Kingdom in 1858 even stated that the militia embodied at this time was ‘a very good reliable force, daily improving, and quite equal to all duties, whether in the field or in quarters’.23 However, the Committee making this report was dominated by those with the militia’s interest in mind, and so hardly impartial in its assessment of the force.24 Importantly though, the trust in the Irish militia was further demonstrated, even though all of the embodied militia forces in Ireland had been moved away from their locality. This is shown in the Committee’s findings that Irish militia regiments should, if all battalions were embodied, form a major part in the defence of Ireland. It was recommended that seven Irish militia regiments should form part of the defences in this region, supported by militia regiments from England.25 Furthermore, outside of Ireland, two militia battalions should also aid in the defences of Portsmouth; eleven battalions garrison the Isle of Wight; and the remaining fifteen battalions would garrison the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, forming the only garrison in these final

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two areas.26 Of course, the majority of Irish regiments were detailed for transfer from Ireland in the event of a full-scale embodiment. However, the very fact that any battalions were used in Ireland at all is significant and cannot be ignored, and should be remembered when thinking about the change in use of the militia in Ireland throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century. There was a disproportionately large number of Artillery Militia based in Ireland, relative to its size as part of the United Kingdom, and this this disproportion was to remain. It actually became proportionately larger over time. The Earl of Donoughmore stated in 1906 that, when the militia was formed during the Napoleonic wars, it was safer to give forty Irishmen one big gun between them than a musket each.27 This view does partly explain why so many of the militia regiments in Ireland were artillery regiments, and is reflected by the fact that fewer, and less up to date, arms were handed out in Ireland. From a strategic point of view, the vulnerability of the Irish coast also seems to have been a consideration when deciding this. In a memorandum on the organisation of the Artillery Militia of the United Kingdom in 1856, it was stated that these regiments were especially designed for service in maritime counties. A total of thirteen vulnerable districts were identified for England, five for Scotland, and  a further seven for Ireland, also a disproportionate number. These were spread around the entirety of Ireland at the vulnerable points at Belfast, Dublin, and Cork, but also included Galway, Limerick, Waterford, and Meath. Naturally, some of the Militia Artillery of Ireland came from counties inland, and, indeed, many remarked on the incomprehensible nature of their being selected for coastal artillery. A memorandum mentioned, however, that those in the Artillery needed to be of a ‘peculiar and hardy class of men’, largely found in the agricultural districts, as the hard life of the camp would ‘send men from the manufacturing districts into hospital’, but was ‘not merely supportable, but pleasant to these men’.28 This further explains the use of more artillery in Ireland as, traditionally, a better quality of recruit was to be found in these rural areas of the country. Moreover, those who were based inland were in battalions scheduled to move away from Ireland to other areas of the United Kingdom in the event of embodiment, so the fact that they were based inland became irrelevant. The standard and reputation of Irish Artillery (Militia) regiments immediately ­­ after the Crimean War are most clearly demonstrated by the, rather ­­unorthodox, decision by Sidney Herbert, the Secretary of State for War, to initiate the conversion of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia) into a permanent brigade of the Royal Artillery. The regiment had already made a name for itself whilst guarding the  Queen, and experienced much publicity upon a visit to the Crystal Palace. The proposal was to make it a permanent body of the newly formed 16th Brigade of the Royal Artillery, transferring six hundred men, of the nine hundred required, directly into the corps, along with non-commissioned ­­officers. The officers were also to be made up directly from the regiment, and from men

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already in the Royal Artillery. It was to recruit entirely in County Tipperary making it, in essence, an Irish artillery brigade.29 This idea could trace its roots back to the Royal Irish Artillery of the eighteenth century, a former incarnation of ­­independent artillery recruited in Ireland under the 1699 Irish establishment. The ­­proposal was accepted and the corps was created immediately, through the voluntary enlistment of the officers and men of the regiment.30 Within two weeks, whilst it was waiting for orders to form, however, the War Office and the press were bombarded by letters from officers of the Royal Artillery and officers of other militia corps in outrage at the proposition.31 The main problem many within the military had with the proposal was that officers within a militia regiment, not to mention an Irish militia regiment, would be promoted ahead of those already in the Royal Artillery, particularly when the rate of promotion within this arm was limited anyway.32 By January 1861, the plan was abandoned, in view of the great pressure put upon the authorities by the press and the public. The cancellation was announced with great satisfaction by some newspapers, The Times stating that the idea was ‘utterly untenable’ and that the biggest surprise was not its rejection but its original conception, as, quite rightly, it was pointed out that there were no provincial distinctions in the Royal Artillery for Scottish, Welsh, or even entirely English brigades. It was further mentioned that the affair would probably have the effect of being made into an Irish grievance.33 Some of the nationalist press pounced on the story with little hesitation, believing that the men of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia) had been tricked and cheated into joining, describing them as being taken to market and disposed of by their officers like cattle.34 Reflecting afterwards, however, the Earl of Donoughmore, Sidney Herbert, and the Duke of Cambridge remained of the opinion that the regiment should have been permitted to transfer to the Royal Artillery and was prevented from doing so only by the will of a minority of officers and officials.35 When all units were disembodied, the original schedules of annual training were carried out, which by this time had been extended to twenty-eight days.36 Very soon, however, Fenianism emerged within the regular army, causing suspicion to rise within the militia. This meant that for the next six years no training occurred. Additionally, until a little before the Childers reforms of 1881, the militia in Ireland was little more than a force on paper, largely because annual training rarely occurred. It is clear that suspicions may have been raised towards the militia because it was believed that the class from which the Fenian movement obtained many of its men was similar to that of the militia, although research has suggested that this was not entirely the case.37 Isolated cases of Fenianism had been reported in militia regiments of Ireland as early as 1865, and a number of arrests were made in relation to this. Reports in early 1866 stated that ‘the Militia of every part of the United Kingdom, and

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the Rifle Volunteers of England have hundreds of Fenians in their ranks’.38 As a result of this, the annual training for the Irish militia was cancelled for that year, due to ‘the disturbed state of the country’, to the dismay of many in Ireland. In Parliament, it was stated that this cancellation could only fuel the threat of Fenianism as, yet again, it was asserted that a question over loyalty had been raised. In reply, Chichester Fortescue, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, stated that ‘the Irish militia must inevitably be more or less affected by the spirit of Fenianism, as the class from which they are mainly recruited was unfortunately more or less tainted with it’, and that ‘without meaning to cast an imputation on the fidelity and loyalty of the militia as a body, it was impossible for them to escape from the infection’.39 Even though reports were made of Fenianism in other areas of the United Kingdom, the annual training of other militia regiments was not cancelled, leading to further discontent. It appears that within this body, however, no real threat was prevalent, and only isolated incidents of  Fenianism were reported within regiments, a view supported by General Lord Strathnairn, Commanding the Forces in Ireland, who saw that ‘very many, and far too many, cases of individual, but not collective, treason, have occurred amongst the Irish Roman Catholic soldiers’.40 By 1868, calls were made to reintroduce the annual training for the Irish militia, Lord Mayo believing that all signs pointed to the dying out of Fenianism, and that confidence would be instilled in the Irish people if the militia was called out. Moreover, if there was any Fenianism among the men, it might afford the opportunity to get rid of it.41 Nevertheless, the militia in Ireland was not called out until 1871, a gap of five years, and this was not insignificant. Many of the men had come to the end of their enlistment and had simply not re-attested, whilst recruiting had completely stopped over this period. During this time the Irish militia was, in a sense, in a state of suspended animation, the authorities hardly acknowledging its existence. In two official reports made on the militia and auxiliary forces during the five-year period of suspension, no mention at all was given to the force in Ireland.42 Permission was given in December 1870 to enrol volunteers again in Ireland, and by the training of 1871 the strength of the force had reached 21,000. Because it was the first annual training in some time, the Inspector General of Auxiliary Force, Colonel F.F. Maude reported on the occasion. He noted the greatest anxiety on the part of all ranks to learn their work, and that ‘not a single case of Fenianism or disloyalty has been substantiated against an individual of the force during the training’.43 This did not mean, however, that safeguards were not put in place to try to stop this from happening. In preparation for annual training in 1872, a memorandum was sent to all Commanding Officers of auxiliary forces, which stated that ‘it will be understood that exhibitions of sympathy on the part of soldiers, with popular demonstrations, are absolutely contrary to the principles according to which military bodies are permitted to

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exist under the laws of the country’. They were also reminded that the militia now came under military authority and those who took part in such demonstrations should feel the full weight of the law.44 Furthermore, conversations between officers in Dublin revealed that a strong feeling of Fenianism still existed in many regiments (regular and militia) and this led to the questioning of the feasibility of calling out the force for annual training in 1873.45 Even if there was a possible risk when training did resume, it was suggested by ‘loyal Irishmen’ that a safeguard was required which meant that the arming of the Irish militia would occur only if they departed Ireland.46 The loyalty of the militia was again questioned when training was suspended for a second period during the Land War from 1879 to 1882, due to ‘a system of lawless terrorism which prevails over many parts of Ireland’.47 It was even noted that in the Kerry Militia ‘nearly all are members of the Land League’.48 The force once again suffered as a result of this, decreased drastically in number, and was viewed as having little strategic value. After the Land Wars, from the time of the Cardwell–Childers reforms, the Irish militia once again began to form an important part of the United Kingdom’s defence requirements, more so than it had done in the preceding decades. One of the results of the reforms of 1868–81 was the localisation of the regular and auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom. For regiments in Great Britain, each was made up, as a general rule, of two Line battalions, one militia battalion, and between one and three battalions of Rifle Volunteers loosely linked to the regiment, in many ways mirroring the role of the Landwehr and Landsturm in Germany.49 In Ireland, however, the situation was somewhat different, partly because there was no Rifle Volunteer Corps, but also because of the number of militia regiments based in the country. Attempts were made to raise Rifle Volunteers in Ireland on no fewer than eight occasions during the Victorian period. In 1859, consideration was given to the idea, but suspicion over arming the force caused the proposal to be dropped. Other attempts occurred in 1863, 1877, 1890, and 1897, but the most serious attempt was made in 1879, when the government had little hostility to the idea, but was defeated in the House of Lords.50 It was claimed in one debate on the issue in 1860 that the reasons for a rejection of this idea were threefold. Firstly, the force would be sectarian in nature, composed exclusively of Protestants. Secondly, it was not possible to leave arms in the possession of the men because of concerns that they would be used inappropriately. Thirdly, religious differences would cause much bloodshed because Protestants and Catholics would be brought together under one banner.51 Naturally, many Irish politicians rejected these claims for a variety of reasons. However, by 1883, it was even claimed in Parliament that Irish gentlemen were being turned away from Rifle Volunteer Corps in Great Britain unless they were domiciled in the area. In another example, members of an Irish Rifle club wished to be drilled, were not permitted to do so in Ireland, and proposed

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to join a Volunteer Corps in Wales for this purpose. This was deemed incompatible with regulations and so they were rejected for service.52 Additionally, in relation to the localisation of the British Army, the majority of Line regiments in Ireland had three militia battalions attached to them, with the Royal Irish Rifles and the Connaught Rangers having as many as four linked battalions. Three militia regiments were also attached to the Rifle Brigade, and two to the King’s Royal Rifle Corps.53 Furthermore, the Artillery (Militia) regiments were organised into the North Irish Division and South Irish Division for the purposes of convenience. However, these new designations, along with the arrangement of new depot systems in each district, did have their critics. Colonel John Craig, for example, claimed that the depot centre system was not likely to work in his area, the 83rd Sub-District, Belfast, as he did not get along with the officer commanding, Colonel Green. Craig even went as far as saying that Green had personal ill-feeling towards militiamen in general, and requested that Lord Dufferin should use his influence with Cardwell to have him replaced.54 Similarly, Captain Charles Pakenham, of the Armagh Light Infantry, did not believe in the advantage of having NCOs attached from the depot to his regiment, rather than the other way round, according to policy, as he did not believe the officer would perform his duties for the regiment in the same way.55 Other commanding officers complained for a long time afterwards that the new policy made them lose their regional identity, as the old county designations were seen as better identifiers, and the old designations continued to be used long after this, as they were in England. Many officers also felt that generally, the militia continued to have little to do with their linked battalions anyway, some having almost no contact with them. Home Defence considerations, both internally and externally, remained high on the agenda during the 1880s and 1890s, particularly with the growing threat of war with a major European power. In this event, the militia was designated to form an important part of the defences of the nation. Specifically, the Irish militia was seen as a crucial cog within this machine of strategic planning. Internally, by 1881, it was advised that the auxiliary forces, during annual training and under military law, were liable for use as an aid to the civil power, but only in the case of emergency, and this remained an even more contentious issue in Ireland.56 It was even suggested that running the risk of using an inadequate military force was preferable to using the Irish militia in aid of the civil power because the men were too young and the officers too inexperienced for a duty which demanded great self-restraint and a certain amount of diplomacy.57 With the fall of Khartoum in the Sudan in 1885, additional regular forces were required for the defence of Egypt and it was proposed that one battalion of militia for each county regiment be embodied. There was no suggestion that Irish militia regiments would be excluded from this, and, in fact, it was felt that the defence of Ireland was one of the greater priorities.58

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At this time, a large number of committees were set up to look into the defence capabilities of the United Kingdom and the feasibility of army mobilisation if war with a European power was declared. It was decided that, in this event, all Irish militia regiments, except six Irish battalions who were ‘well known to be loyal’, as well as two brigades of Artillery (Militia) would be brought over to England and employed in garrisons there.59 Those battalions deemed to be loyal were the four battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles, based in Counties Antrim, Down, and Louth, and the 4th and 5th battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, based in Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone and which would be based in and around Belfast and Dublin.60 There is no doubt that the question over the loyalty of the militia in Ireland was a result of the mistrust created during the Fenian conspiracies in the previous decades. The corollary was that the Irish militia would play a much more significant role in the defence of the United Kingdom if war broke out. For the proposed garrisons for militia regiments, it was envisaged that the force from Ireland would form prominent parts of key strategic areas. Dover and the south coast, for example, were to be garrisoned by twelve militia battalions and three of these would be Irish. In Plymouth, five of the fourteen militia battalions would be Irish, as well as six of the ten brigades of Artillery; and in Portsmouth, of the nineteen militia battalions and fourteen artillery brigades detailed for its defence, seven militia regiments of Ireland, and five brigades from the North and South Irish Divisions of Artillery, had been earmarked for service.61 This is a clear indication of the trust put in the Irish militia, as long as they were not stationed in Ireland. By 1890 and up to 1895, further questions of loyalty had been raised about the battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and the 6th Royal Irish Rifles, meaning that only the other three battalions of the latter regiment were detailed for service in Ireland.62 This further deterioration of trust can largely be put down to the views of Garnet Wolseley, the Commander in Chief of Forces in Ireland from 1890. Wolseley’s opinions were most keenly expressed when making his recommendations on the use of Irish forces in Ireland, when he stated that I am influenced by the conviction based upon my knowledge of Ireland and Irish ways that you draw the teeth from the elements of possible internal disturbance whenever you remove from Ireland all regular Irish regiments, all the Army Reserve and all the militia regiments except the Antrim, Mid-Ulster and Londonderry Artillery, and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Royal Irish Rifles, and the 3rd Royal Irish Fusiliers.63

These views were subsequently agreed with by the War Office, as it saw it as expedient to remove all ‘dangerous’ elements from Ireland in the event of war.64 Subsequently, in addition to these units, the 8th King’s Royal Rifle Corps, recruited in Carlow, was added to the list of ‘loyal’ battalions, and by the outbreak of the war in South Africa this battalion, along with the 3rd Royal Irish

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Fusiliers had been allocated for garrison duty in Dublin, and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Royal Irish Rifles allocated to the defence of Belfast. It is clear that other policy proposals had some effect on the militia during this time. It was recommended that militia engineer companies be established in Ireland, as they already had been in other parts of the United Kingdom. It was felt that the best way of doing this was by converting a battalion of Artillery (Militia).65 Initially, it was suggested that the Donegal Artillery (Militia) might be best suited to this task. However, on consideration it was deemed that a city corps might be more adequate as it was more likely to include artisans, so the Dublin City Artillery (Militia) was selected instead.66 The Commander in Chief of Forces in Ireland, the Duke of Connaught, agreed to this proposal in principle but, whilst quoting his predecessors Lords Wolseley and Roberts, he was of the opinion that on political grounds the use of the Dublin City Artillery (Militia) in Ireland, upon mobilisation, or even for training, was undesirable.67 Furthermore, it was stated that by the very nature of the duties of engineers, they would be conversant with all parts of a fortress and so, unless completely trustworthy, would be in a position to do much harm.68 As a result of these views, the idea was abandoned, but not before it was also suggested that a Submarine Mining Company of Militia be formed in Cork, an idea which was also subsequently abandoned.69 What these proposals do show, however, are the genuine attempts to allow the militia in Ireland to provide a valuable contribution to the strategy of defence, even if the politics of mistrust did, on occasions, still come into the equation. After the outbreak of the war in South Africa, and the subsequent embodiment of all militia forces across the country, the Irish militia was called to perform its duties in the garrisoning of areas around the United Kingdom. However, the need for extra troops in South Africa meant that a small number of regiments were asked to serve abroad. Six full battalions, along with detachments from another five battalions, carried out military duties in South Africa, St Helena, and Malta throughout the course of the war. It is evident that some distrust still remained as there was no official change in policy, and this did not go unnoticed when further questions were raised over the issue of taking militia regiments out of Ireland. Nevertheless, when put into practice in a wartime scenario, the Irish militia was able to perform duties within the strategic framework of British defence policy, which would help prove their loyalty when consideration was made of future planning matters. The immediate aftermath of the war in South Africa saw a period of upheaval for the auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom when many of their deficiencies had been exposed as a result of active service. Under Richard Haldane this led to the disappearance of the militia and Rifle Volunteers as arms of the military, and the establishment of a Territorial Force, in which Ireland played little part. Instead,

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when the Special Reserve was created, Ireland was put on a different footing to other areas of the United Kingdom. Before this though, much discussion was had by politicians and the War Office over the use of the militia in the future. By 1904, the Norfolk Commission had concluded that the Militia and Volunteer forces as they stood were not adequate, either in strength or in efficiency, to perform the duties for which they were detailed, namely those of home defence.70 As a result, serious discussions over the reform of the auxiliary forces began to take place, with many criticisms, but also comments on successes, mentioned in relation to the militia as a military force. The Secretary of the newly formed Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir George Sydenham Clarke, stated in a note on military organisation in 1906 that ‘the past history of the force (the militia) proves its extreme value as an integral part of our military resource, and the experience of South Africa properly understood indicates plainly that the Militia can be made into a 2nd Line Army’.71 Clarke also recognised and understood the poor state of training and equipping of the militia throughout the nineteenth century, believing that the conditions under which the militia served in South Africa were distinctly unfavourable. The force had deteriorated greatly prior to 1899, previous training of the force had been indifferent, ‘and there were not the means of giving the best kind of training from embodiment to embarkation’.72 He suggested that during periods of annual training, time might be better spent on musketry and battalion exercises, rather than on barrack fatigues, which he saw as a waste of time.73 In the Irish context, further radical reductions and changes were suggested in relation to the militia at war. It was suggested that, in order to place the militia on a war footing, a large number of amalgamations had to take place, and for Ireland this meant a recommendation that only six battalions be retained. Specifically this meant that all battalions of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Royal Irish Rifles, Connaught Rangers, Leinster Regiment, and Royal Munster Fusiliers should amalgamate to form one battalion for each regiment, and that battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Royal Irish Regiment, and King’s Royal Rifle Corps raised in Ireland be amalgamated into one single battalion.74 It appears that this suggestion of such a drastic reduction of forces in Ireland was, at this point, little to do with the scepticism of loyalty of Irish militiamen. Instead, all of these suggestions were realistic as many of the battalions were significantly under strength, existing little more than on paper. Under the reforms initiated by Haldane, the existing 124 infantry militia battalions across the United Kingdom were reduced to 101, meaning the disbandment of twenty-three battalions.75 Of these, eight were Irish, and the artillery in Ireland, those units in Cork, Antrim, and Londonderry, were converted into Special Reserve units of the Royal Garrison Artillery.76 The Special Reserve also worked in a slightly different way in Ireland, owing to there being no Territorial Force, and the North and South Irish Horse were included in the Special Reserve

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even though yeomanry regiments in the United Kingdom were included in the Territorials. There were, as in England and Scotland, eight 3rd Battalions, behind each of the Irish regular regiments, whose primary function was to train drafts for regular battalions to offset the wastage of war. In addition to this, however, a further twelve Battalions were created, as 4th and 5th Battalions, whose primary purpose was to furnish units as a whole, though also liable to supply drafts if required.77 When this was put to the test during the opening months of the First World War, the latter option was actually carried out. Within the Irish regiments themselves the outcome of these changes varied. There is evidence to suggest that in some units the majority of the men transferred to their new role in the Special Reserve, but in others evidence suggests that the response was rather more lukewarm.78 In the 3rd Royal Irish Rifles, for example, although all of the officers transferred, only 394 of the other ranks did so, leaving 237 men who either took a free discharge or chose to remain militiamen.79 Politically, the Irish Special Reserve, by 1912, also provided an outlet for ­­illegal drilling of men, perhaps vindicating the suspicion of the authorities about the susceptibility of Irishmen becoming turncoats. This illegal drilling by men of the Special Reserve is most clearly shown by some of the testimonies released by the Bureau of Military History, which undertook a project to interview former IRA men. There is evidence of training being carried out by former Special Reserve and militiamen in Louth, Galway, Limerick, King’s and Queen’s Counties, and Wexford in the period leading up to the First World War.80 Between 1903 and 1904, the loyalty of Irish troops on home soil had come into question once more, particularly that of men in the Royal Irish Rifles. Previously, all battalions had been allocated to the defences at Belfast and Lough Swilly, but by 1904 only the 5th Royal Irish Rifles was allotted to this task, along with the 3rd Leinster Regiment, a new addition to the Irish defence scheme.81 The 4th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was also entrusted with this task. In this specific defence scheme it was also indicated that the defence of ordnance stores in the area was of upmost importance, mainly against local sympathisers if an attack occurred, and because of this it was undesirable to use militiamen.82 Conversely, in 1902, an Irish infantry battalion was detailed to the defences of Cork harbour for the first time. Out of the six militia battalions due to be stationed there, three were Irish: the 3rd Royal Munster Fusiliers, and the Royal Garrison Artillery Regiments of Cork and Antrim. Specifically, the 3rd Royal Munster Fusiliers was to be tasked with taking over the six war signal stations around Cork harbour.83 This was certainly a key change in policy and one which would become ever more pronounced over the coming years. Meanwhile, discussions took place relating to the situation in Ireland in the event of a hostile raid on the country. It is clear that many within government, the army, and the post-1905 Committee of Imperial Defence were of the opinion that in this event many of the ‘malcontent Irishmen’ would sympathise, and

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even join, an invader.84 It was also considered that the probability of a hostile raid was low because there were no arsenals or large magazines, and, with the exception of Belfast, no large shipbuilding centres. This meant that the defence of Ireland slipped further back on the agenda.85 The secondary importance of Ireland as an area to defend against invasion is clear therefore. Despite this view, defence schemes continued to be reworked between 1906 and 1914, utilising the new Special Reserve. The trust and loyalty of certain regiments lingered as only Irish Special Reserve battalions were allotted to the defences in the North of Ireland. The 3rd and 4th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 3rd Royal Irish Fusiliers were detailed to the Lough Swilly defences; and, once more, all three battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were detailed to the defences of Belfast. The 4th Battalion was even entrusted with the defence of the areas around the shipyards, as well as the electrical power houses around Harland and Wolff, and Workman, Clark and Co. shipyards.86 Later in 1909, an unprecedented decision was made regarding the use of Irish auxiliary forces. Neville Lyttelton, GOC Forces in Ireland, took the decision to allow all twenty Irish Special Reserve Battalions to be employed in Ireland in the event of mobilisation. Lyttelton stated that ‘the time has now come when the Irish soldiers can safely be entrusted with the local defence of Ireland’.87 This ended the long period of mistrust and accusations of potential disloyalty of Irish auxiliary forces if stationed within their own country. By 1912, the same six Special Reserve Battalions were detailed with garrisoning Belfast and Lough Swilly in the event of mobilisation.88 In the South of Ireland, however, the shift in policy provided a dramatic change to the defences of this area. In Queenstown harbour, nine battalions of the Special Reserve, all of which were from Ireland, were allocated a garrison role. This is compared to only four which had been allotted in 1908. Furthermore, the remaining five Irish Special Reserve battalions were detailed for garrison duties at Berehaven.89 This meant that, true to the word of the authorities, all twenty Irish battalions were detailed within Ireland in the event of mobilisation and at the outbreak of war in August 1914 this is almost exactly what occurred. This policy meant that, for the first time, Irish forces were left almost entirely responsible for the defence of the island. Political debates and issues surrounding the Irish Imperial Yeomanry, in stark contrast to that of the militia in Ireland, played little part when its use and maintenance were raised in late 1899. There are a number of reasons for this: it was originally intended for use only during the period of war in South Africa, and the class of recruit from which it was drawn was not seen as the sort who would pose a threat to the establishment if armed. Historically, the yeomanry in Ireland, dating back to 1796, was viewed very much as a continuation of the Protestant self-defence tradition and largely sectarian in nature. It was used, for the most

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part, as a constabulary force, concentrated mostly in Ulster, but was almost made redundant when the Irish Constabulary was established in 1822, eventually leading to its disbandment in 1834. This sectarian legacy no doubt contributed to the decision not to re-establish the yeomanry in Ireland until the end of the century (as had been a consideration in not raising the Rifle Volunteers), despite some attempts to do so during the Crimean War.90 After the initial disasters in the opening weeks of the war in South Africa, necessity called for the raising of a Mounted Infantry force, in order to adapt to the conditions experienced by the British Army. Thus, a large force of Imperial Yeomanry was created in the United Kingdom as a whole. Initially, it was argued that each company should have a ratio of one trained yeoman to three civilians, in order to ensure the quality of the force.91 Of course, this could not be applicable to Ireland as there was no existing yeomanry force. Nevertheless, it was agreed that a total of six Irish companies be formed, three based in Dublin and three in Belfast. Because a large majority of men had little or no military experience, it was stated in the Special Army Order that all qualifications, namely riding and shooting, be fulfilled by every man before departing for the front.92 The six Irish Companies of this first contingent of yeomanry were spread across three Battalions: the 45th (Dublin), 46th (Belfast), and 54th (Belfast) Companies formed part of the 13th Battalion; the 74th (Dublin) Company formed part of the 16th Battalion; and the 60th (Belfast) and 61st (Dublin) Companies formed part of the 17th Battalion. The 45th, or Irish Hunt Contingent, is perhaps the most famous of these companies, and was formed as a result of pressure by the Earl of Longford. It proved to be a popular unit and the additional companies in Ireland were formed partly because of a large number of men came forward.93 The rather brisk level of recruiting was widely reported, with descriptions of the ‘streams of candidates’ passing through the recruiting offices in Belfast on a daily basis.94 Once these companies had been formed, and the requisite drill and musketry training had been carried out, they were sent to the Curragh for final training before embarkation for South Africa. Four of these initial units saw frontline action after their dispatch from Ireland between March and April 1900, and saw service during the disaster at Lindley, where men of two of the Irish companies were captured by Boer forces.95 Due to the success and popularity of the Imperial Yeomanry, by January 1901 it was decided that a second contingent be formed in the United Kingdom, which by March numbered 13,644 men, with only an additional three hundred more from Ireland.96 Proportionately, this was a small figure, described as ‘steady, but slower’ than other areas, and it was decided that recruiting would continue until 750 men were obtained. By September 1901, recruiting for a third contingent was also undertaken, this, initially, open only to men who had previously served in the Imperial Yeomanry, Colonial Forces, Honourable Artillery Company, and City Imperial Volunteers. As a result, the 29th Battalion was created and

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­­ specifically designated the ‘Irish Horse’, comprising six squadrons. It was noted that this Irish Battalion ‘was raised with considerable celerity and success, owing to the influence and zeal of its Commandant, the Earl of Longford’.97 As a result of the success in raising the Imperial Yeomanry in Ireland, as early as June 1901, questions were asked, perhaps surprisingly, by a Nationalist MP, Edward Thompson, as to whether the government had any plans for allowing the yeomanry to remain a permanent corps once the war in South Africa was over.98 In a Parliamentary Report submitted a month earlier it was recommended that a force consisting of six regiments, equating to approximately 1,800 men, should be kept and maintained in Ireland.99 By 1908, with the introduction of the Haldane reforms, yeomanry regiments in Ireland, like their militia counterpart, were put on a different footing from other units of the United Kingdom and established as Special Reserve units. The yeomanry in Great Britain transferred to the newly formed Territorial Force, but, with no such force in Ireland, the Irish Yeomanry was asked to transfer to the divisional cavalry, which, on mobilisation, would be attached to the regular army.100 In essence, it would form part of the Special Reserve, like its militia counterpart. Initially, these units had been designated the ‘Irish Yeomanry’.101 Commanding Officers of the North and South of Ireland Yeomanry objected to the use of this term, and instead suggested that their regiments be called the North and South of Ireland Horse, a suggestion with which the authorities disagreed. However, when the reasons for this proposal were explained – the term ‘yeomanry’ in Ireland brought up ‘many sad recollections in the hearts and minds of Irishmen, of the rebellion of 1798’, and because of this had a deterrent on recruiting – the authorities relented, and permitted the suggested names to be used.102 It may be worth mentioning here, however, that, especially in the North Irish Horse, links were maintained with external Unionist organisations. It is clear that many of the men of this regiment were part of the Ulster Volunteer Force, something that was openly ­­acknowledged and apparently unchallenged by the military authorities. For example, in September 1912, men of the North Irish Horse formed a mounted escort for Sir Edward Carson when he opened a Unionist demonstration in Enniskillen.103 Upon the outbreak of the First World War, both the North and South Irish Horse were called up for active service at the front. Strategically, these regiments formed an integral part of the British Army’s actions in the opening months of the war in France. For example, A Squadron, North Irish Horse, arrived at Le Havre and proceeded to the front as early as 19 August 1914, continuing to see action until May 1916.104 Similarly, squadrons of the South Irish Horse had proceeded to the front by September 1914, attached to various cavalry divisions, and by September 1917 had been converted into an infantry battalion, the 7th Royal Irish Regiment.105 By this time, both regiments had lost much of their original amateur identity, having been filled up with volunteers and drafts when casualties were sustained.

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After the war, followed by partition, the South Irish Horse was disbanded for obvious reasons, and the North Irish Horse existed as little more than a force on paper. In fact, in July 1938, it was reported that ‘Britain’s one-man regiment, the North Irish Horse, disappears today when Major Sir Ronald Ross MP, the only serving officer of the regiment, reaches the age limit and retires’.106 However, in a little under a year, Neville Chamberlain announced the reconstitution of the regiment on a Supplementary Reserve basis to form a light tank unit of the Royal Armoured Corps.107 Recruiting began in August 1939, in the counties of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and Armagh, with each county asked to provide one hundred men, in addition to officers and non-commissioned officers. Sir Basil Brooke was given command, and the headquarters was at Enniskillen. The scheme was put in place after a discussion between Neville Chamberlain and Lord Craigavon, himself a veteran of the militia and the first contingent of the Imperial Yeomanry in 1900, when it was suggested that the Territorial Army be expanded to include Northern Ireland.108 Again, once war had commenced, the unit formed an integral part of the British fighting machine, and served with great distinction in Tunisia in 1942 and 1943, as well as in Italy until 1945. From a political point of view, the OTC, established separately in Belfast and Dublin in 1908 and 1910 respectively, although part of the Territorial Force, was treated similarly to the yeomanry of Ireland, for comparable reasons. This is despite the fact that it was not included in the original list of corps formed in the rest of Great Britain in 1908.109 Irish institutions had, however, been included in the original list of potential universities in 1907. Queen’s University, Belfast, had provisionally agreed to the idea, along with sites in Cork and Galway, but Trinity College, Dublin, had originally rejected the proposal.110 Although it was decided not to include Ireland in the initial scheme, an OTC was set up at Queen’s University, with the approval of Sir Neville Lyttelton, in early 1909.111 This was closely followed only a year later at Trinity College when what was known as the University of Dublin OTC was established, with the full approval of the University board.112 The responsibility of the organisation and control of the OTC rested with the War Office, the university authorities being given control of supervision and discipline. Importantly, when a cadet enrolled, he was not required to take an oath of allegiance, nor was he liable for any form of military service.113 Additionally, four cadet corps were set up in schools: two in Dublin, one in Belfast, and one in Cork. In 1910, Irish Command sent out a circular letter to forty-two headmasters asking if they were interested in forming cadet units, and many took up this offer.114 In Dublin, companies of Infantry, Engineers, and a Field Ambulance were established, in part to complement the degrees offered by the University.115 Similarly, in Belfast, these companies were also formed, although the dominance

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of medical students at the University meant that the Medical unit was the most popular. As a result, as early as August 1909, Lyttelton remarked that, because such a high percentage of the men were studying medicine, it would hardly justify the corps’ existence for the purpose of training men for the army.116 Nevertheless, it did survive, and, during the First World War, thrived when the opportunity was given to continue training officers for the fighting services. At Trinity College, a Graduates Corps was even formed after the outbreak of war for past members of the University to carry out military training.117 At this time, similarly to the yeomanry, the OTC in Ireland was viewed as a Protestant vocation. In light of this, in 1915, Sir Matthew Nathan, the UnderSecretary in Ireland, with the support of John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, made enquiries about the possibility of forming an OTC at University College, Dublin, which was primarily a Catholic institution, in order to aid the supply of officers to the army.118 This appeal was rejected on the grounds that no new OTC contingent had been established in any other part of the United Kingdom, despite the fact that many other applications had been received.119 There is no evidence to suggest that this was because of any concern over allowing arms to be stored at a Catholic institution and, therefore, no ­­parallel to the experiences of the militia in Ireland relating to suspicions over loyalty. However, there is evidence to suggest that some men of the OTC were involved in illegal drilling of both unionists and nationalists, as had been the case with the Irish yeomanry.120 When the Volunteer Training Corps was formed in Great Britain in late 1914, once again, Ireland was initially left out of the scheme.121 No doubt this was largely due to the issues surrounding the ongoing existence of the UVF and Irish National Volunteers, who continued to meet and drill throughout the country.122 Despite this, unofficial corps emerged centred in Belfast and Dublin, most notably the Irish Rugby Football Union VTC, under the tenacious leadership of Francis Browning,123 and an ‘Athletes Volunteer Force’ was established in various locations across Ireland, such as that at Carrickfergus.124 As a consequence, pressure was put upon the authorities to grant some sort of official recognition to these corps.125 This was duly granted in March 1915 when an Irish Association of Volunteer Training Corps was formed.126 In the rules of the Association it was laid down that the organisation was to be entirely non-political and, importantly, that no member could be associated with any other military or quasi-military body.127 This was not an entirely satisfactory outcome for men of either the UVF or INV. Richard Dawson Bates suggested to Sir Edward Carson that the object of this new organisation was to do harm to the UVF and to boast that it had gained official recognition when the UVF could not.128 Although it was explicitly stated that no men in the VTC could be members of other military bodies, there is evidence to suggest that this was not the case in practice.129

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Of course, the fact that the UVF was the initial inspiration for the VTC did little to ease the concerns of nationalists. By October 1915, a Private Member’s Bill had been introduced in the House of Lords which aimed to revive the Volunteer Act of 1863 and facilitate an arrangement for a home defence force. It has been suggested that this occurred to try to stop the INV from receiving official recognition from the government, and thus pressurise Carson into incorporating the UVF into the VTC, an idea which had been rejected on several occasions.130 Significantly, it was also claimed that Carson was of the opinion that an oath of allegiance should be inserted, and wanted assurances that the VTC would not become a haven for INV personnel who would otherwise be eligible for service in the armed forces. These suggestions, according to Redmond, were ‘puerile’ and ‘most offensive’, the Irish Parliamentary Party leader being of the opinion that this action would relieve as many as twenty thousand regular soldiers from defence work in Ireland.131 Even as late as March 1916, Redmond was pressing for the INV to be used in conjunction with the IAVTC on defence duties, but to no avail.132 After the Easter Rising in April 1916, and despite the action of various detachments of the IAVTC in Dublin during the uprising, in November the decision was made to disband the organisation. It was explained that, owing to the precarious political situation, the military authorities could no longer grant the measure of recognition that would justify the formation’s continued existence.133 It had never been an entirely satisfactory political or strategic position, largely because of the political wrangling of unionists and nationalists. The VTC’s early disbandment clearly demonstrated just how insignificant the body was within the wider strategic sphere of a world war. It would prove to be one of the last opportunities for the majority of men of the twenty-six counties that would form the Irish Free State in 1921 to take part in amateur soldiery as part of the British Army. The OTC in Dublin of course ceased to exist after 1921, although, even at this time, it had remained popular amongst the student body. At Queen’s University, the OTC was permitted to continue operating throughout the 1920s and 1930s and was the only auxiliary force with any links to the British Army in existence until a Territorial Army contingent was established in Northern Ireland in 1937.134 After exclusion from the original Territorial Force scheme in 1908, no force was raised in Northern Ireland immediately after the First World War, despite attempts to do so. Even as early as 1915, suggestions were made that the Territorial Force Act might be applied to the whole of Ireland. When approached by nationalist representatives to look into the viability of such a scheme, Carson had his suspicions, much as he had with regard to the VTC, as he felt once more that the scheme would provide legitimacy to the INV. Moreover, it would mean that the INV would become well armed, equipped, and drilled, but the UVF would cease to be under the command of the Ulster

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leaders.135 Ultimately, it was agreed that such a scheme would not be expedient, largely because it would have such a detrimental effect on the success of recruiting to the Kitchener armies.136 After the partition of the six counties of Ulster into the Northern Ireland state, a paramilitary force, the Ulster Special Constabulary, was established as a means to provide an aid to the civil power.137 The USC was formed of four sections: the  A Specials, a full-time paid force; B Specials, who trained on a part-time basis, and would later form the nucleus of the Ulster Home Guard; the C Specials, who were unpaid, ununiformed reservists; and the C1 Specials, who were non-active and would be called out only during emergencies.138 By the end of 1923, the internal situation was one of ‘protracted peace’, and it was suggested by the Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, that an Ulster Territorial Division be formed, using the C1 Constabulary as its basis.139 The Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby, agreed in principle with this suggestion, believing that the C1 Specials were ideally suited for a transfer to a Territorial Division, but was cautious, owing to ‘considerable legislative and financial difficulties’.140 Ultimately, it came down to who would be responsible for paying for the force, the Imperial government or the Northern Ireland government (which was responsible for financing the USC), and to issues relating to its use as an aid to the civil power. Stephen Walsh, who had replaced Lord Derby in early 1924, reminded Craig that a Territorial Division could not be utilised in case of civil disturbances and, by transferring the C1 Constabulary, a safeguard would be lost, and that, if the plan was for the Imperial government to pay for the scheme, then very convincing arguments would need to be put forward to obtain agreement.141 A meeting of senior British politicians came to the conclusion that raising a new military force would be ‘prejudicial to the amicable settlement of the boundary settlement’. Nevertheless, in response to the financial question, Craig argued that Northern Ireland was already making a monetary contribution to Imperial defence and so should be permitted to raise a Territorial Division.142 Despite the Northern Ireland Cabinet pressing the point that Northern Ireland should be put on the same footing as the rest of the United Kingdom on the issue of military matters, no agreement was reached, even when a suggestion was made that the Territorials would number only the size of a brigade.143 In fact, it was not until early 1937 that a scheme was finally agreed upon, putting Northern Ireland on a similar footing to the rest of the United Kingdom. In March, it was announced by Alfred Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War, that a Territorial Army and Air Force Association for County Antrim would be established, responsible for raising and administering a number of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer units, to garrison forts for the coastal defences of Belfast. Furthermore, an Auxiliary Air Force would be formed by converting the Ulster Special Reserve Squadron. The President of this Association was Viscount

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Massereene and Ferrard, the Lord Lieutenant of Antrim, himself a former officer in the North Irish Horse.144 In fact, the possibility of creating an Auxiliary Air Force Squadron had been explored as early as 1935, but it was decided that this would be postponed until a decision had been made with regard to Territorial Army units in Northern Ireland so that they could be created concurrently.145 One Battery of Royal Artillery was established, the 188th (Antrim) Battery, along with the Antrim (Fortress) Company of Royal Engineers, and the Auxiliary Air Force Squadron, the latter of which was not part of the Territorial Army.146 These units provided service during the course of the Second World War, and an additional anti-aircraft regiment was created in Londonderry, which served in Britain and France for the majority of the conflict.147 In addition to this, during the war, the Ulster Home Guard came into existence, which was once more to fully revive the amateur military tradition in Northern Ireland. Initially, when the Home Guard was raised in Great Britain in May 1940, the formation was not extended to Ulster, and, as the Northern Ireland official history indicates, the country was ‘disappointed not to be permitted an equal opportunity of war service’. This resulted in the Prime Minister, Lord Craigavon, pressing for the inclusion of the province within the scheme, no doubt once again influenced by his experiences as an amateur soldier.148 However, difficulties with regard to this did exist. Most notably, Local Defence Volunteers in Great Britain had been formed using the existing Territorial Associations around the country, but in Northern Ireland this association was far too small, and of too recent creation, to be able to handle the task.149 As a result, in the Northern Ireland Cabinet as early as 20 May, Craigavon outlined the possibility of informing the press that a similar scheme could be extended to Ulster, by creating a new section within the B Specials.150 Three days later, it was reiterated by a County Commandant of the USC, Robert Hanson, that the duties of the LDV of Great Britain would be undertaken by the USC in the event of an invasion.151 Nevertheless, on 25 May, Craigavon announced in Cabinet that a Corps of Defence Volunteers would be formed without delay, and that the 20,000-strong B Specials would be used as a nucleus for the new force.152 Concurrently, independent home defence formations based around Old Comrades’ Associations had begun to spring up across Northern Ireland, such as that based around the 14th Royal Irish Rifles (Young Citizen Volunteers), as well as various associations of other battalions who had served within the Ulster Division.153 These would be absorbed into the newly created Ulster Defence Volunteers section of the USC, announced in Stormont on 28 May, and RUC as has been previously claimed.154 The main RUC and USC were detailed to undertake home defence duties, as well as to deal with ordinary crime. However, this new section was to be confined to home defence and not an aid to the civil power.155 It was to be recruited on a county basis, in accordance with the ­­military

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authorities’ assessment of requirements, and to consist of ‘carefully selected Ulstermen’.156 Importantly, from the outset, it was maintained that, in the event of invasion, all members of the police force would come under the command of the military, meaning that at that point they would be classed as military combatants and not civilian police.157 It was towards the end of the summer in 1940 that some of the issues began to resurface, mainly relating to the UHG’s close association with the B Specials. Persistent accusations were made that, because of this close association, the UHG was by definition a sectarian and political force, used by the Unionist government for its own gains. By this time, because of the rapid expansion of the force, a scheme of decentralisation of the County and City Command was undertaken, which divided each into an Area, under the command of an Area Commandant and an Area Adjutant. Each Area was subdivided into Districts, and Districts into Sub-Districts. Each B Special district required the strength of one military platoon; therefore, one or more UHG platoons were formed, depending on the number of volunteers. This was designed to try to negate any controversy relating to the close association of the two forces.158 This structure, however, also very closely resembled the original organisation of the USC when it had been established in 1920.159 This did not stop the perceived problems, and publicly this came to a head when a letter was sent to Churchill (as well as other prominent political leaders), signed by twenty-two influential Anglo-Irish figures, including many Unionists, headed by Sir Hubert Gough, of Curragh Incident fame, which denounced the sectarian nature of the UHG because of its affiliation with the USC.160 In response to this, the Northern Ireland government was very definite about its position on the matter, stating that the reason for raising the force, with the USC as the nucleus, was that it was the most satisfactory solution in such a short space of time, and that because of this it was able to raise and equip, quickly, ‘a body of men of proved loyalty’, and that this was working in a way suitable for the purposes for which it was designed.161 In many respects, the first part of this explanation is adequate in its logic, as the Territorial Association in Northern Ireland was in no position to administer a force of the size required; meaning that carrying this out through the USC was the obvious solution. Unfortunately, this had the effect of alienating almost an entire section of the population, something which was of secondary importance when the risk of invasion was so high in the summer of 1940. The issues surrounding the UHG not only concerned the problems of sectarianism but also included the issue over the civilian or military control of the force (although these debates were related), and this debate continued for much of the first half of the war. Robert Fisk has argued, having interviewed J.C. MacDermott, who was the Minister for Public Security during the war, that doubts had been raised in late 1940 over the constitutional position of

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the UHG. MacDermott wished responsibility for the force to be transferred to Westminster, but the Northern Ireland District GOC, Major-General Ridley Pakenham-Walsh, was consulted and felt that separating the UHG from the USC would be ‘disastrous’, so this was not pursued.162 Pakenham-Walsh stated that a strong framework already existed, suited to the circumstances, and that a transfer of power to the army could mean that ‘undesirable elements’ might be given access to weapons as the military could not carefully screen applicants, as the USC was able to.163 Additionally, MacDermott believed that the Northern Ireland government had no power to raise such a force under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 in the first place, but that at the time nobody minded because of the immediate emergency.164 As early as November 1940, Pakenham-Walsh reminded MacDermott that, if the War Office gained control of the administration of the UHG, then the responsibility for recruitment would also fall to them ‘with the consequent discrimination between individuals’ and ‘such responsibility is bound to leave them open to attack for political bias one way or the other. This it is most essential the Army should avoid.’165 In the same month, the Prime Minister, J.M. Andrews, was told by MacDermott that he did not see how the military would be involving itself in a political issue because it had already used the police to report on recruits for the regular army. He also reminded him that the decision over this issue could be made only by the Imperial government.166 In the early days of 1941, discussions in Westminster were held, reiterating the memorial letter of the previous September. Herbert Morrison, the British Home Secretary, felt that the responsibility of the volunteers being in the hands of the Northern Ireland government could be justified as a necessary measure for raising the force in an emergency; however, he did not see it as possible to keep it as a lasting arrangement. This was for two reasons: firstly, that constitutionally the force could be responsible only for internal law and order, not defence, and, secondly, that ‘loyal Catholics’ were unwilling to join a force which they saw as administered by a sectarian government.167 In reply to this, David Margesson, the newly appointed Secretary of State for War, outlined the army’s position, stating that ‘on the grounds of both military efficiency and of the absolute necessity of not involving the Army in the religious animosities of Ireland, we should not offer to take over this force, and I am not at all disposed to make any withdrawal from this position of principle’.168 It was this second reason that became the biggest sticking point for any transfer of authority, the overwhelming opinion being that the army should avoid any controversies which might arise from such a transfer. Sir John Anderson, the Lord President, justified the decision by outlining that at the time the UHG was not being used for defence purposes under the control of the Northern Ireland government, and, in fact, was only training and equipping for such a task in the event of invasion.169 The outcome to this situation was perhaps best summed up

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by Churchill, who noted that, given this issue was not in the public eye, there was no need to make it so, and thus, in his view, it was ‘better to let sleeping dogs lie’.170 S.P. Mackenzie has noted that, because the Northern Irish government had involved the British government in decision-making with regard to the future of the force, it was being made a scapegoat.171 This is a misreading of the situation as the Northern Ireland government could not make any decision on the administration of the UHG, especially if it involved the army, which was under the sole control of the British authorities. Even if the Northern Ireland government did not wish this transfer to take place, it would still have been required to seek guidance from the Imperial government as to how to proceed. MacDermott remained unhappy about this arrangement, but it was not to change and, as has been argued by Fisk, the situation meant that the Imperial government had pressed the Northern Ireland government into maintaining an unconstitutional arrangement, which had the result of strengthening the sectarian nature of the force.172 This is largely true but, of course, the Northern Ireland government had not done itself any favours in the way that it had acted when the force had first come into being. Although it had been recognised that the UHG would come under the jurisdiction of the military in the event of an invasion, even as late as the end of 1941 this had not been officially codified. Its name in Northern Ireland had been changed to the Ulster Home Guard by April 1941, in line with changes in Great Britain. During the summer of 1941, discussions were still being had with regard to the possibility of eventually separating the UHG from the USC, but these did not progress.173 Eventually, however, the British government drafted a Defence Regulation which officially denied the existence of the UHG (except as Special Constabulary members), but stated that it would come officially under military law and control when an emergency arose.174 As a result, members of the force were required to undertake a new declaration recognising this.175 This also outlined that they were required to serve only in Northern Ireland.176 These points were, undoubtedly, crucial to the future organisation of the force, and went some way towards satisfying the various parties concerned, although this did not mean that these problems went away. The British Attorney General, Donald Somervell, for example, still emphasised the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between the police and the armed forces, which would be easier should an emergency occur.177 Even within the UHG itself, when notes were compiled with relation to the history of the force, it was stated that any mention of the B Special connection should be avoided.178 It appeared, though, that this was the most satisfactory settlement that was ever to occur. After the Second World War, because of the threat of war with the Soviet Union, the Territorial Army was re-established and, in contrast to the prewar years, this was immediately and fully extended to Northern Ireland. The TA included the

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North Irish Horse, infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft brigades, the Royal Army Service Corps, a Photographic Interpretation Section, and Intelligence sections.179 Recruiting, however, was initially poor, and this was blamed on the fact that the TA had to compete with the USC and, of course, later, with the UDR.180 To combat this it was even suggested that men might be recruited from Eire, but this was felt too complicated, mainly because no disciplinary action could be taken for non-attendance, mobilisation could not be enforced, the wearing of a British uniform was prohibited in Eire, and arms would have to be taken over the border.181 Although recruiting steadily improved, the TA throughout the United Kingdom was subject to a number of re-organisations from the 1960s onwards. Accordingly, the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) was established, with a view to giving it a greater strategic role in support of the British Army of the Rhine. In the event of a general war, the first- and second-line TAVR was to mobilise and move to the Continent to reinforce British and NATO forces.182 For units in Northern Ireland, this meant the amalgamation of its three infantry battalions.183 Crucially from a political and strategic point of view, the TA in Northern Ireland was not used for internal defence or as an aid to the civil power. This was despite suggestions, throughout the duration of the Troubles, to involve it. Before the formation of the UDR, it was proposed in Westminster that units might be mobilised in the Province to support the regular forces.184 By the mid1980s, the Northern Ireland Secretary, James Prior, seemed to suggest that the government would finally consider its use in an anti-terrorist role – a suggestion which was very quickly dismissed by the authorities on the basis that the force in Northern Ireland could not have a different role from that of the rest of the UK, the prime function being an integral part of NATO reserves.185 The next major reorganisation for the TA came with the ‘Options for Change’ Defence Review. For Northern Ireland, this meant a reduction of the force by 40 per cent (and as much as two-thirds of the strength of some units).186 This reduction was understandable given the change in the UK’s strategic concerns, but did much to harm the TA in the short term, especially because some specialist units were significantly reduced. Unlike its predecessors, however, it continues to survive, and forms an integral part of the UK’s defensive operations and, certainly, there is little suggestion about any subversion or collusion, as there is with its sister force, the Ulster Defence Regiment. The political legacy, both direct and indirect, of the B Specials with amateur forces in Northern Ireland continued when the UDR was formed in 1970. Officially announced in the Westminster Parliament by Roy Hattersley on 12 November 1969, the UDR was formed as a regiment of the British Army, replacing the USC, with the task of meeting ‘armed guerrilla-type attacks’ but,

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specifically, not as a means for riot control. As a key to Hattersley’s proposal, based upon the recommendations of the Hunt Committee, the UDR was to be representative of the community as a whole.187 Politically, this was an integral element of the new force. Significant pressures had been put upon the British government under Harold Wilson to reform or disband the USC because of its sectarian nature and its handling of the rioting and unrest which had occurred since 1968. As a result, a committee under Lord Hunt was formed and within five weeks it had made recommendations to reform the RUC and to disband the USC, and the UDR was the resulting replacement. Legislatively, the new regiment was drafted along the same model as the 1951 Home Guard Act and authority was held at Westminster, not at Stormont, and was carried out by regular, not local, officers.188 As might be expected, reactions varied across all communities, the British and Republic of Ireland press ‘mainly welcoming’ the proposals as a positive step.189 In Parliament, however, the most vocal stance was taken by Bernadette Devlin, with the support of Kevin McNamara, Gerry Fitt, and Michael Foot. Crucially, they felt that the UDR would simply be the USC under the guise of the British Army, and that the use of the word ‘Ulster’ was a poor decision. Devlin argued that, when an organisation was described as an Ulster organisation, it was generally accepted by many as a Protestant organisation.190 Nationalist opinion, however, was split with regard to the force. Eamonn McCann, spokesperson for People’s Democracy and then a member of the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) denounced the new force as a defender of Toryism in the six counties. In contrast, Keith Lindley, Chairman of the Londonderry Association of the NILP, welcomed the creation of the force and actively urged members of the opposition to encourage enlistment.191 The actions of the Stormont government, however, quickly raised suspicions, even before the force officially existed. During the last week of November 1969, it was discovered that unionists had placed advertisements in Northern Irish newspapers about joining the UDR, and had sent out forms to USC members to attempt to gauge how many would be interested in transferring when the need arose.192 The latter caused the most political controversy, especially for those at Westminster, for they had no prior knowledge of this action. To many these ‘application forms’ were a clear indication that unionists were attempting to keep the UDR under the grip of the USC, a not wholly insignificant leap to make. An editorial in the Guardian stated that Stormont has apparently been trying to prove to its own supporters that the UDR is the ‘B’ Specials by another name- and therefore smelling just as sweet in Orange nostrils. It is simply not possible to do this while at the same time persuading Catholics to join. Some of the advertisements … went too far in assuring ‘B’ Specials of the continuity between their old force and the new one … It must be made clear to Stormont that a single-religion force is not acceptable.193

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The attitude expressed by many USC men did little to ease the British government’s concerns about the success of the UDR. A report on these attitudes, dated November 1969, stated that ‘there were grave reservations about the wisdom of allowing Catholics (“our natural enemy”) in the force as they had not proved their loyalty and trustworthiness. There was a strong risk that, if they were taken into the force, many of the existing members of the USC would not join but would “go underground”. The Protestants would not feel safe on mixed patrols with armed Catholics alongside them.’194 Furthermore, during a meeting between senior members of the USC and Northern Ireland ministers, it was stated that those charged with setting up the UDR were clearly anti-USC and anti-Protestant.195 Even at this stage, from a political point of view, things looked bleak. As a means to try to bring in a degree of impartiality to recruiting matters it was decided that a UDR Advisory Council should be formed. This had potential complications because the army was supposed to be entirely responsible for recruiting matters so the question remained about whether the Advisory Council would involve itself in individual cases. Ultimately, it was decided that the Council would be consulted in the event of any allegations that the army’s recruiting activities were favouring one side or the other, and only in this instance would individual cases be discussed. Additionally, the Council had to comprise a ‘reasonable cross-section of responsible opinion in Northern Ireland’, but remain small enough so that no factions could form within it.196 By October 1971, however, the British government seemed a little exasperated at the Council’s actions. An unnamed minister wrote that, instead of coming up with ideas about how best to serve the regiment, during meetings they ‘spent a good deal of time explaining individual entrenched positions’ and had to be prompted for responses to various matters that concerned the regiment.197 Recruiting for the regiment was initially very slow, and one of the principal reasons for this was the tremendously lengthy enrolment process, which included no fewer than fourteen stages. By the time it was due to be operational only 2,500 men had been commissioned or enlisted.198 The concern at this point was that it would not be able to effectively take over the USC’s responsibilities and, politically, any blurring of the roles of both formations had to be avoided.199 It is clear from the correspondence between Westminster and Stormont that ministers in Northern Ireland were very uneasy about this, and at just how low the recruiting strength of the UDR was.200 To ease these concerns eventually the UDR strength was to be temporarily supplemented with additional regular forces. One of the biggest sticking points for any political decision was whether members of the regiment were to be permitted to store arms at home, an element that had been so controversial for the USC. In December 1969, it was calculated that 4,354 rifles, 1,020 machine-guns, and 1,462 revolvers were stored at home by USC members.201 Once these were returned to the arms depots it was

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­­ suggested that the arms required for the UDR would be stored in RUC barracks, the problem with this being that it was intended that the RUC should be viewed as an unarmed police force. As a result, Sir Arthur Young, the Inspector General, was very reluctant to agree to this plan.202 Prohibition of storing arms at home was a major problem for some members of the UDR living in border areas. Once called out, members could not be expected to have to wait for their arms to arrive from a central store. Denis Healey suggested that he could authorise no more than 10 per cent of the total number of arms that USC members had held at home, but this was still not satisfactory.203 It was not until the end of October 1970, seven months after the UDR came into operation, that a final decision was made, and after a series of ad hoc decisions had been put in place. All trained men of sixteen UDR companies would be authorised to keep arms at home. Twelve of these were border companies, and the other four were companies in areas where the distances between armouries, homes, and the most likely operational areas presented particular difficulties. This policy meant that as many as 2,132 weapons, or 42 per cent of the total available to the UDR, would be kept at home.204 Undoubtedly, as much as this irked some critics, especially nationalist dissenters, of the regiment, it was the most practical solution available. Operationally the UDR had to have quick and easy access to its weapons because of the nature of the work it was expected to carry out. By the mid-1970s, two significant changes had been made to the UDR, both of which had political and strategic implications. For the first time in history women were fully integrated into a regiment of the British Army when they were permitted to join the UDR, especially required as searchers at checkpoints.205 This was the result of a large number of women being convicted of terrorist offences and the inability of the Women’s Royal Army Corps or the RUC to carry out the task. It was initially thought that seven hundred women would be required, as officers and in the ranks, and, unlike male enlistment, female members were forthcoming in greater numbers than were required.206 The fact that female members were killed in the line of duty is testament to their contribution to the UDR whilst the fact that its members were some of the first to call for equal employment rights for women who have children is credit to their wider contribution in civil society. The second significant change to the UDR came with the establishment of a full-time element of the regiment. Of course, this diluted the ‘amateur’ nature of the force, but provided a more professional element, and, for the British authorities, a politically more reliable section to the regiment. This element had become particularly important during the United Unionist Action Council strikes, and calls were made for this component to make up the largest proportion of the UDR.207 By March 1978, the permanent cadre, although varying by battalion, accounted for a third of the total strength of the regiment.208 Strategically, this

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section was significant as it permitted the UDR to form a wider role in the event of a general European war, the feeling being that ‘the UDR should be left with a kernel of professional full-time members trained and equipped to support the regular army’.209 This policy was to become a contributing factor to the regiment’s demise. By the early 1990s the British government was undergoing a major review of its armed forces, named ‘Options for Change’, which importantly set out to reduce the size of the army by forty thousand.210 After public relations disasters, relating to collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, the BBC’s Panorama documentary in early 1990, and the publication of the Stevens Inquiry findings, the UDR was a prime target for disbandment or a merger. The latter option was taken, and it was decided that the UDR should merge with the Royal Irish Rangers, which was set to lose one of its battalions under the review. When announcing the implications of these changes to Parliament, Archie Hamilton, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, claimed that the merger would allow the UDR to be integrated more fully into the army. Seven battalions would be retained for home service and, perhaps optimistically, and with no recognition of the problems experienced by the UDR, he proclaimed that one of the main strengths of the new regiment would be that it would recruit from the Catholic as well as the Protestant community.211 Ultimately, of course, what this also meant was the steady erosion of the part-time element of the regiment. Members of the regiment were permitted to serve under the original terms of their engagement, but, thereafter, they would have to re-enlist on a full-time basis.212 Like the majority of its predecessors, the UDR ceased to be an amateur force, and so ended the most politically controversial of forces associated with the Irish amateur military tradition. From a political and strategic point of view, it is certain that a number of patterns emerged with regard to the maintenance and use of the auxiliary forces of Ireland. Political factors were almost always at the forefront of any policy towards these formations, and this was particularly the case when looking at the militia, UHG, and UDR. For the militia, there was a persistent fear of disloyal Catholic men, most explicitly demonstrated during the Fenian conspiracies and the Land Wars of the 1860s and 1870s, and this had a detrimental effect on the force. For the UHG and UDR, a contrasting view was held that the force was too sectarian, dominated by Protestants, and in many respects this was the case, especially for the latter. Conversely, this was seen as a positive element of the yeomanry, OTC, VTC, and TA, and meant that there was no such suspicion as there had been over the political reliability of the militia. These changes in attitude, to all of these auxiliary forces, demonstrate just how much the political environment had changed in Ireland, and how these changes could affect the attitudes towards these forces.

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The strategic capabilities of the auxiliary forces of Ireland were always linked to these political factors. For the most part, they formed an integral part of home, and Imperial, defence, whether this was as part of the garrison forces of Great Britain, as an Expeditionary Force, or when defending Irish shores. This, once more, varied over time, especially because Catholics in the militia were viewed as untrustworthy for use in Ireland, whilst Protestants were seen as an integral part of any defence. However, the composition of the UHG and especially the UDR made this distinction very challenging, as it became much more difficult to suggest that they had represented all elements of the population. These factors, no doubt, had a strong impact on the composition of officers and men, discipline, military capability, and public image. Notes 1 See Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 5–6; Cookson, British Armed Nation; and Western, English Militia, pp. xiii–xiv. 2 McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 8; Nelson, The Irish Militia, pp. 14–15. 3 For the militia as a whole during the latter part of the eighteenth century see Cookson, British Armed Nation; and Western, English Militia. For specifically the Irish militia see N. Garnham,  The Militia in Eighteenth Century Ireland: In Defence  of the Protestant Interest (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012); McAnally, The Irish Militia; and Nelson, The Irish Militia. For the Irish militia riots see Bartlett,  ‘An End to Moral Economy: The Irish Militia disturbances of 1793’, pp. 41–64. 4 C. Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland; Government and Resistance since 1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 406. For further discussion of the military situation within Ireland see also E. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886–1914 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991). 5 For further detail of the attempts to raise a militia force in the middle of the ­­nineteenth century see Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 146–9. 6 PP (392) Militia. A bill (as amended in committee) to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the militia in England and Wales, 1852. 7 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 120, cols 267–339, 29 March 1852. 8 Ibid., vol. 121, cols 466–94, 10 May 1852. 9 Ibid., vol. 121, cols 691–733, 17 May 1852. 10 Ibid. 11 Freeman’s Journal, 14 January 1854; Belfast Newsletter, 16 January 1854. 12 The Times, 9 February 1854. 13 It was stated that ‘Lord Palmerston then passed a lofty eulogy on the loyalty and patriotism of Irishmen, and attributed the omission to the simple fact that they were not wanted just at that time to guard their native shores from invasion!’, Freeman’s Journal, 8 February 1854. 14 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 119, cols 550–97, 16 February 1854. 15 Ibid.

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16 PP (83). Militia. A bill to amend the acts relating to the militia of the United Kingdom, 1854. 17 PP (250). Militia (Ireland). A bill (as amended in committee) to amend the laws relating to the militia in Ireland, 1854. 18 The Times, 27 October 1854. 19 Parl. Debs (HL), vol. 136, cols 426–9, 18 December 1854. 20 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 153. 21 NLI Ms. 1226 Returns of military parties assigned in aid of the civil power, 1837– 1870. 22 NLI Ms. 1056 Copy of Warrant issued to all Regiments, outlining the re-­ embodiment of some Irish militia Regiments, 3 September 1857. 23 TNA WO 33/5 Report of the Committee on Home Defences, 1858. 24 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 155. 25 TNA WO 33/5 Report of the Committee on Home Defences. 26 Ibid. 27 Parl. Debs (HL), vol. 154, cols 6–50, 19 March 1906. 28 TNA WO 33/2A Memoir on Organisation of the United Kingdom Artillery of Militia by Lieut.-Col. R.A. Shafto Adair, Suffolk Artillery (Militia), 1856. 29 TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia), 1854–1908. 30 The Times, 8 December 1860. 31 TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia); The Times editorial columns were also filled regularly with a campaign against the idea of forming this sort of corps. 32 The Times, 19 December 1860. 33 Ibid., 15 January 1861; also quoted in Belfast Newsletter, 17 January 1861. 34 Nation, 19 January 1861. 35 Parl. Debs (HL), vol. 161, cols 763–81, 22 February 1861. 36 PP (2553). Report of the commissioners appointed to enquire into the establishment, organisation, government, and direction of the militia in the United Kingdom, 1859. 37 For occupational details of Fenians see R.V. Comerford, ‘Patriotism as Pastime: The Appeal of Fenianism in the Mid-1860s’, Irish Historical Studies, vol. 22, no. 87 (March 1981). For more on Fenianism see J. Gantt, Irish Terrorism in the Atlantic Community, 1865–1922 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and B. Jenkins, The Fenian Problem: Insurgency and Terrorism in a Liberal State, 1858–1874 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008). 38 TNA HO 45/7799 Letter regarding the Fenian Conspiracy in the Army, by Daniel Ryan, Dublin Metropolitan Police, 26 February 1866. 39 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 183, cols 177–80, 30 April 1866. 40 TNA WO 32/6000 General Lord Strathnairn’s views on the social and political state of Ireland, 1867. 41 PRONI D623/A/306/33 Letter to Lord Abercorn from Lord Mayo, 12 May 1868. A suggestion was also made by Colonel F.F. Maude in 1870. See BL Ms. 77082 Letter to the Earl of Spencer, from F.F. Maude, 25 October 1870. 42 TNA WO 33/21A Memorandum on Militia Recruiting, 10 March 1870; TNA WO 70/36 Militia and Auxiliary Forces: Confidential Memorandum and Papers, 1869–1872.

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43 TNA WO 33/24 Inspection returns of Irish Militia Regiments, 1871; BL Ms. 77082 Letter to the Earl of Spencer, from F.F. Maude, 24 June 1871. 44 NLI Ms. 1066 Memorandum from the Adjutant General to Officers Commanding Corps of the Auxiliary Forces, 27 July 1872. 45 NLI Ms. 1304 Letter from Major-General Steele, to the Under-Secretary, Dublin Castle, 26 December 1872. 46 Ibid. Letter from Eugene Oswald to the Earl of Beaconsfield, 7 April 1878. 47 TNA CAB 37/3/68 Letter from the Earl of Donoughmore to Mr Forster on the State of Ireland, 8 October 1880. 48 NLI Ms. 1304 Letter from the Adjutant of the Kerry Militia, to the Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle, 8 January 1881. 49 For further discussion of the Cardwell–Childers reforms see Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 1–29; French, Military Identities, pp. 10–30. 50 Cunningham, The Volunteer Force, p. 156; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 154, cols 785–9, 7 July 1859; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 156, col. 811, 10 February 1960; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 245, cols 1903–36, 7 May 1879; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 25, cols 116–26, 1 March 1880. 51 Ibid., vol. 159, cols 2106–10, 17 July 1860. 52 Ibid., vol. 276, cols 1738, 8 March 1883. 53 Ibid., vol. 236, col. 671, 9 August 1877. 54 PRONI D1071/H/B/C/665 Letter from Colonel John Craig to Lord Dufferin, 27 November 1873. 55 PP (C.1654). Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the militia and the present brigade depot system, 1877. 56 TNA WO 32/6327 Use of Auxiliaries as an Aid to the Civil Power, 1881. 57 TNA PRO 30/67/27 Letter from George Wyndham to William St John Brodrick, 17 November 1900. 58 TNA WO 32/6104 Proposed calling out of Reserves and Militia for Egyptian Expedition, 1885. 59 TNA WO 147/33 Reports of a Committee on Army Mobilisation, December 1886. 60 TNA WO 32/7081 ‘Irish Militia Battalions allotted to Defended Ports in Ireland’, 1886–1914. 61 Regiments were also detailed to form part of the garrisons of Chatham, Pembroke, Harwich, and the Severn Defences. TNA WO 147/33 List of Return of Garrisons in the United Kingdom, along with units stationed at times of war, 1886. 62 TNA WO 32/7081 ‘Irish Militia Battalions allotted to Defended Ports in Ireland’. 63 Ibid. Extract from a letter to the War Office from Lord Wolseley, 31 March 1895. 64 Ibid. Letter from Neville Lyttelton to Lord Wolseley in reply to the above letter, 25 April 1895. 65 TNA WO 32/6376 Letter regarding the establishment of Militia Engineer ­Com­­panies in Ireland, 14 July 1900. 66 Ibid. 26 July 1900; 28 July 1900. 67 Ibid. Letter from the General Commanding Forces in Ireland, 29 August 1900. 68 Ibid. Note regarding the establishment of Militia Engineer Companies in Ireland, 7 September 1900.

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69 Ibid. 28 December 1900. 70 PP (Cd.2061). Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 71 TNA CAB 38/11 Minutes of meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1906. 72 Ibid. Note on the Militia, March 1906. 73 Ibid. 74 TNA WO 32/9234 Memorandum by the Adjutant General on the Future of the Militia, 1906. 75 PP (92). Territorial and reserve forces. A bill to provide for the reorganisation of His Majesty’s military forces …, 1907. For further discussion see Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 106–46; E. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984). 76 Those Irish Battalions disbanded were: 3rd Royal Irish Regiment; 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; 6th Royal Irish Rifles; 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers; 3rd Connaught Rangers; 8th and 9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps; and 6th Rifle Brigade. The Times, 24 December 1907. 77 TNA WO 33/3385 Memorandum on the 124 Militia Battalions serving in the United Kingdom, 1907. See also Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 176, cols 180–280, 17 June 1907. 78 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, p. 121. 79 Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, C.J. Robb, ‘History of the Royal South Down Militia’, unpublished manuscript, pp. 11–12. 80 Bureau of Military History Witness Testimonies. WS Ref. 677, Witness: Patrick McHugh, Lieutenant IV, Dundalk, 1916; WS Ref. 1311, Witness: Patrick Mahony, Captain IRA, Galway, 1921; WS Ref. 1334, Witness: Joseph Stanford, OC Galway Brigade, IRA, 1921; WS Ref. 1419, Witness: Michael Conway, Commandant IRA, Limerick, 1921; WS Ref. 1574, Witness: Seamus Millar, Gaelic League, Laois, 1917; WS Ref. 1041, Witness: Thomas Doyle, Officer IV, Wexford, 1916; and WS Ref. 238, Witness: Arthur Greene, IRB and IV, 1912–1916. 81 The 5th Battalion also recruited much better than the 3rd and 4th so this may have been a contributing factor to this decision. 82 TNA WO 33/323 Ireland. Belfast District Defence Scheme, January 1904. 83 TNA WO 33/324 Ireland. Cork District Defence Scheme, November 1903. 84 TNA CAB 38/10 Minutes of meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Memorandum on the Defence of Ireland, October 1905; WO 106/44 The Defence of Ireland, October 1905. 85 TNA CAB 38/11 Minutes of meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Minutes of the 86th Meeting, 28 March 1906. 86 TNA WO 33/484 Ireland. Defence Scheme. North Irish Defended Ports. Part I and II: Lough Swilly and Belfast Defences, May 1909. 87 TNA WO 32/7081 Letter from N.G. Lyttelton, Commanding Forces in Ireland, to the War Office, 14 September 1909. 88 TNA WO 33/601 Ireland. Defence Scheme. North Irish Defended Ports. Part I and II: Lough Swilly and Belfast Defences, July 1912.

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89 TNA WO 33/604 Ireland. Defence Scheme. South Irish Defended Ports. Part I and II: Queenstown Harbour and Berehaven Defences, September 1912. 90 Ibid. 91 TNA WO 32/7866 Letter from General Sir Evelyn Wood to Lord Chesham, 27 December 1899. 92 Ibid. Raising of the Imperial Yeomanry and Division into Units, December 1899 – January 1900. 93 Ibid. 94 Belfast Newsletter, 18 January 1900. 95 TNA WO 108/375 Appendix 27: Annexure B, Report of Sir Herbert Chermside on the Irish Imperial Yeomanry in Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the Raising of Drafts and New Battalions for the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, supplementary to the Report Submitted on 15 May 1901. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 95, col. 1393, 25 June 1901. 99 PP (Cd.803). Imperial Yeomanry. Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the force regarding its home organisation, inspection of the constitution of its base and advanced depots, and distribution of stores in South Africa, 1st June, 1900, ­­submitted 15th May, 1901. 100 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 176, cols 180–280, 17 June 1907. 101 TNA WO 32/6550 ‘Memorandum, January 1908’, Position of the Irish Yeomanry in 1908. 102 Ibid. ‘Minute Sheet No. 5, A.G.I, 1 July 1908’; ‘Letter from Colonel Waterford, Commanding South of Ireland Yeomanry, relating to reasons why using the designation “Yeomanry” in the future would not be advisable, 26 June 1908’; The Times, 3 September 1908. 103 Irish Times, 28 September 1912; 8 August 1914. See also Bowman, Carson’s Army. 104 TNA WO 95/86 War Diary: A Squadron, North Irish Horse, August 1915 – December 1915; and WO 95/2914/1 January–May 1916. For detailed information relating to its service during the war see P. Tardif, The North Irish Horse in the Great War (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2015). 105 Brigadier-General S. Geoghegan, The Campaigns and History of the Royal Irish Regiment from 1900 to 1922 (Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press, 2007), p. 118; Doherty, The North Irish Horse, pp. 15–36. 106 The Times, 13 July 1938. 107 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 346, cols 2095–209, 4 May 1939; The Times, 5 May 1939. 108 The Times, 17 August 1939. 109 TNA WO32/8675 Regulations of the Officers’ Training Corps, 16 March 1908; Irish Times, 19 March 1908. For more on the formation of the OTC in the United Kingdom see Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, pp. 140–6. 110 TNA WO32/9033 Observations from Universities of Draft Proposals for an Officers’ Training Corps, 1907. 111 Irish Times, 9 January 1909.

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112 R. Willoughby, A Military History of Dublin and Its Officers’ Training Corps, 1910– 1922 (Dublin: The Medal Society of Ireland, Special Publication, no. 1, 1989), p. 1; K.C. Bailey, A History of Trinity College Dublin, 1892–1945 (Dublin: University Press, Hodges, Figgis, 1947), p. 157. 113 TCD DUOTC papers. Ms. 2783/2 The Dublin University Officers’ Training Corps Handbook, July 1913. 114 See G. Fitzpatrick, St Andrew’s College, 1894–1994 (Blackrock: St Andrew’s College, 1994); J. Springhall, Youth, Empire and Society (London: Croom Helm, 1977). 115 Irish Times, 10 May 1910. 116 BLHCMA Lyttelton papers. Lieut.-Gen. Neville Lyttelton to his wife, 10 August 1909. 117 F.M. Laird, Personal Experiences of the Great War (Dublin: Eason and Son Ltd, 1925), p. 4. 118 NLI Redmond papers. Letter from Sir Matthew Nathan to Harold Tennant, MP, 21 May 1915. 119 Ibid. Letter from Harold Tennant, MP, to Sir Matthew Nathan, 4 June 1915. 120 BMH WS Ref. 300, Witness: Henry Murray, Officer IV, 1914–1921; WS Ref. 1438, Witness: Christopher Moran, IRA, 1921. 121 TNA WO161/105 Letter from the War Office to the Central Association Volunteer Training Corps, 19 November 1914. 122 Bowman, Carson’s Army, pp. 163–89. 123 See B. Hanna, The Pals at Suvla Bay: Being the Record of ’D’ Company of the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1998, p. 13. 124 The Carrickfergus Advertiser, 20 November 1914. 125 Volunteer Training Corps Gazette, 11 March 1916. 126 Ibid., 18 March 1916; Daily Express (Dublin), 10 March 1915. 127 PRONI D1507/A/11/34 Draft Rules of the Irish Association of Volunteer Training Corps, 22 April 1915. Also quoted in Bowman, Carson’s Army, p. 170. 128 PRONI D1507/A/11/33 Letter from Richard Dawson Bates to Sir Edward Carson, 30 April 1915. 129 Bowman, Carson’s Army, p. 170. 130 PRONI D1327/4/2 UVF, Headquarters Council Minute Book, 3 May 1915; 20 March 1916. 131 NLI Ms. 15,192/7 Letter from Percy Harris, CAVTC, to John Gulland, 13 December 1915; Letter from John Redmond to Percy Harris, 14 December 1915. 132 NLI Ms. 15,188/10 Letter from John Redmond to L.B. Friend, 9 March 1916. 133 Volunteer Training Corps Gazette, 4 November 1916; Irish Times, 13 November 1916. 134 H.J. Johnston, The Queen’s University (Belfast) Contingent of the Officers’ Training Corps, Golden Jubilee, 1908–1958 (Belfast: Graham and Heslip Ltd, 1958). 135 PRONI D1327/4/17 Letter from Eustace Jameson to Viscount Esher, 8 April 1915; Letter from Eustace Jameson to Edward Carson, 29 June 1915; Letter from Edward Carson to George Richardson, 30 June 1915. 136 Ibid. Letter from George Richardson to Edward Carson, 5 July 1915.

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137 For the establishment of the USC see Farrell, Arming the Protestants; and Hezlet, The ‘B’ Specials. 138 Hezlet, The ‘B’ Specials, p. 20. 139 PRONI HA32/1/404 Extract from the Draft Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting, 9 November 1923; TNA HO45/24851 Letter from James Craig to Lord Derby, 9 November 1923. 140 Ibid. Letter from Lord Derby to James Craig, 19 December 1923. 141 Ibid. Letter from Stephen Walsh to James Craig, 25 February 1924; also in PRONI HA32/1/404. For more on the political relationship see P. Buckland, Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland, 1921–39 (London: Gill and Macmillan, 1979); B. Follis, A State under Siege: The Establishment of Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 142 TNA WO32/5309 Letter from James Craig to Stephen Walsh, 11 March 1924; TNA WO32/5309 Meeting hosted by the Secretary of State for War, 6 February 1924. 143 TNA HO45/24851 Letter from James Craig to Stephen Walsh, 28 February 1924; PRONI CAB4/105 Draft Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting, 10 March 1924. 144 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 321, c.171, 2 March 1937; TNA AIR2/2244 Letter from R.B. Pargiter to C.G. Markbreiter, 24 June 1936; Letter from A.E. Widdows to Viscount Massereene and Ferrard, 22 January 1937. 145 TNA AIR2/2244 Letter from C.B. Brigstocke to Cyril Newall, 31 October 1935; Letter from Charles Bonham-Carter to Cyril Newall, 16 February 1936. 146 Ibid. Territorial Army and Air Force Association of the County of Antrim, List of Officers, May 1936. 147 PRONI CAB9/CD/85/2 Notes from the Prime Minister, Basil Brooke, on the occasion of the return home of the Londonderry Anti-Aircraft Regiment, October 1944. 148 J. Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War (London: Blackstaff Press, 2000) pp. 178–9. 149 PRONI CAB3A/77 Notes on the Formation of the Ulster Home Guard, 1945. For the formation of the LDV in Great Britain see Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 266–7, and Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 33–7. 150 PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Cabinet Conclusions, 20 May 1940. 151 Quoted in Orr, Duty without Glory, p. 31. 152 PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Cabinet Conclusions, 25 May 1940. 153 Ibid. Letter from D.C. Lindsay to R. Grandsen, 25 May 1940; Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 29 June 1940. 154 Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p. 84. 155 Northern Ireland Parl. Debs, vol. 23, p. 1256, 28 May 1940; details also outlined in PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Statement issued by Lord Craigavon, 28 May 1940; 156 Belfast Newsletter, 29 May 1940. 157 PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Statement issued by Lord Craigavon at a Press Conference, 30 May 1940. 158 PRONI CAB3A/77 Notes on the Formation of the Ulster Home Guard, 1945. 159 See Hezlet, The ‘B’ Specials, p. 20.

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160 PRONI HA32/1/781 Memorial Letter on the LDV in Northern Ireland, 23 September 1940; Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p. 84. 161 PRONI HA32/1/781 Letter from R. Grandsen to C.G. Markbreiter, October 1940; letter also quoted in PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1. 162 R. Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939–45 (London: Gill and Macmillan Ltd, 1985), p. 230. 163 PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Letter from R.P. Pakenham-Walsh to J. C. MacDermott, 22 November 1940. 164 Fisk, In Time of War, p. 231. 165 Ibid. Letter from R.P. Pakenham-Walsh to J.C. MacDermott, 23 November 1940. 166 PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Letter from J.C. MacDermott to J.M. Andrews, 29 November 1940. 167 TNA CAB123/197 Letter from Herbert Morrison to David Margesson, 1 January 1941. 168 Ibid. Letter from David Margesson to Herbert Morrison, 15 January 1941. 169 Ibid. Letter from N. Brook to Sir A. Maxwell, 17 February 1941. 170 Ibid. Prime Minister’s Personal Minute, 17 March 1941. 171 Mackenzie, The Home Guard, p. 85. 172 Fisk, In Time of War, p. 232. 173 TNA WO32/10013 War Office responsibility for the Ulster Home Guard, August 1941. 174 Fisk, In Time of War, p. 232. 175 PRONI CAB9/CD/169/1 Declaration of the Ulster Special Constabulary, 1941. 176 PRONI D3077/L/4 Letter from the Inspector General’s Office to All Area Commandants, 13 November 1941. 177 TNA CAB75/13 Minute of a meeting of the Home Policy Committee, 10 March 1942. 178 PRONI HA32/1/794 Letter from C. Wickham to H.C. Montgomery, 5 February 1943. 179 PRONI CAB9/CD/85/2 Proposals for Effecting a revised Territorial Army Organisation in Northern Ireland, submitted by HQ NI District, 24 September 1946; I.B. Gailey, An Account of the Territorials in Northern Ireland, 1947–78 (Belfast: Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Association of Northern Ireland, 1979), p. 14. 180 PRONI CAB9/85/5 Notes on a discussion held in the Cabinet Offices, 27 February 1950. 181 PRONI CAB9/CD/85/9 Letter from Major-General E.V. Lang, GOC NI District, to all TA Associations, 10 October 1947; Letter from Sir Basil Brooke, to J.E. Warnock, MP, 15 October 1947. 182 D. French, Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945–1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 297. 183 Gailey, An Account of the Territorials in Northern Ireland, pp. 16–17. 184 Parl. Debs (HL), vol. 301, cols 317–21, 21 April 1969. 185 Guardian, 16 April 1983. 186 The Times, 15 October 1991.

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187 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 791, cols 417–27, 12 November 1969. 188 TNA CJ3/58 Draft Report for the Legislation Committee, Ulster Defence Regiment Bill, 5 November 1969. 189 TNA CJ3/58 Survey of Irish Press/TV Reaction to White Papers on UDR and RUCR, prepared for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 17 November 1969; The Times, 13 November 1969; Guardian, 14 November 1969. 190 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 791, cols 417–27, 12 November 1969; Guardian, 13 November 1969; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 791, cols 1319–452, 19 November 1969; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 792, cols 980–1041, 1 December 1969; The Times, 3 December 1969; Guardian, 2 December 1969. 191 TNA CJ3/58 Telegram from the Home Office to Headquarters, Northern Ireland, November 1969. 192 Guardian, 18 November 1969. 193 Ibid., 19 November 1969. 194 TNA CJ3/58 Note for the Record: Minister(A)’s Visit to Ireland on 10 November 1969 – Conversations with Officers of the USC. 195 PRONI HA/32/2/34 Notes of a meeting between USC members and NI ministers, 13 February 1970. 196 TNA CJ3/116 Report on the Advisory Committee on Recruitment to the Ulster Defence Regiment, 24 November 1969. 197 TNA DEFE13/816 Report on the Secretary of State’s Meeting with the UDR Advisory Council, 19 October 1971. 198 TNA DEFE13/1398 Confidential Report from the Secretary of State to the Home Secretary, 14 May 1970. 199 TNA CJ3/62 Draft Note on the Overlap of the UDR and USC, 18 December 1969. 200 PRONI CAB/9/G/89/1 Letter from William Porter to Roy Hattersley, 25 March 1970. 201 TNA DEFE24/465 Details of USC Arms Stored at Home, December 1969. 202 Ibid. Memorandum on Security and Centralisation of USC/UDR Arms, by Sir Ian Freeland, 5 January 1970. 203 Ibid. Letter from Denis Healey to James Callaghan, 4 February 1970. 204 Ibid. Memorandum on UDR Arms at Home, 15 October 1970; Letter from Sir Victor Fitzgeorge-Balfour to Sir Ian Freeland, 29 October 1970. 205 TNA DEFE24/1192 Development of the UDR, 29 December 1972. 206 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 859, cols 892–912, 6 July 1973. 207 TNA CJ4/2174 Letter from Roy Mason, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to Fred Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence, 6 May 1977. 208 Ibid. General remarks regarding the strength of UDR battalions, March 1978. 209 TNA CJ4/3064 A Policy Appraisal of the UDR, 9 June 1980. 210 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 359. 211 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 196, cols 136–7, 15 October 1991. 212 Ibid., vol. 203, cols 1139–203, 13 February 1992.

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The officer corps

The most notable characteristic of the officer corps of the auxiliary forces of Ireland is its evolving nature during the period under consideration. This is, in relative terms, a distinctive feature, especially in comparison to that of the amateur and regular forces of the rest of the United Kingdom. During the Napoleonic era, the British auxiliary system was organised, it has been argued, on the existing structure of authority, and for the officer corps this meant gentry leadership.1 In the Irish context, the militia and yeomanry of this early period ran along these lines. This meant inevitably that the majority of these landowners were Protestants.2 When the auxiliary forces were reconstituted in Ireland in 1854, the status quo of its leadership was maintained. Irish-born landlords dominated the militia officer corps, and political patronage formed an important part of its role. Owing largely to the Land Acts, this did not last, and so emerged an increasing reliance on Protestant businessmen, as well as those born outside of Ireland, who wished to utilise the ‘militia back door’ to gain a commission in the regular army, to fill these important positions in county society. The emergence of the yeomanry during the war in South Africa highlighted the continued reliance on business interests for the maintenance of the officer corps, whilst also demonstrating that it had become a much more respectable pursuit than the militia. Furthermore, the creation of the OTC, VTC, TA and UHG show that, in line with Great Britain, a shift had been experienced, which reinforced the reliance on the Irish middle class to fill the officer corps. When the UDR was established, this trend was largely maintained. Importantly, many of these officers had previous military experience, and the effect of this bore mixed results. In all of these institutions, political patronage still played a vital role in their continued existence. Moreover, for the majority of the period, the predominance of the Protestant volunteering tradition was present, and this had important ramifications for all other aspects of these forces, especially in relation to their position within Irish society. When it was re-formed in 1854, the Irish militia consisted only of a small cadre of mainly elderly officers and NCOs. A small Permanent Staff was permitted to

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exist when the militia was put into suspended animation in 1816, and those who were officers in 1816 retained their commissions so many of these officers were still present in the Army List upon its rebirth.3 This caused many problems when it came to organising the new regiments. For example, when an inspection was undertaken of officers of the Monaghan Militia it was stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, from his advanced age, and having been 32 years without any military employment, and having never advanced beyond the rank of lieutenant, cannot be expected to be competent to the command and formation of a young regiment; and as it appears that Major Cronin is upwards of 70 years of age, it is considered that he must be totally inefficient, particularly as he has never served in any military capacity.4

A similar opinion was also given with regard to the officers of the Kilkenny Militia, the view taken that gentlemen who were upwards of fifty years of age were not ‘calculated to commence the active duties of a military life’.5 Yet, this did not mean that all elderly officers were found to be inefficient. Two officers in the Roscommon Militia were over seventy years of age but were permitted to remain with the regiment owing to the testimony of its Commanding Officer.6 In most cases, however, these older officers were eventually replaced. This meant that many new officers had to be found in a short space of time, and the local landed gentry could be relied upon to fulfil this task. In the Louth Militia, it was noted that all officers in the regiment were local to the county, even those who had enlisted in the regular forces. In this case, the situation was short-lived, as, by 1858, the regiment had ‘lost many of the county officers and they could not be replaced from the county’. Even at this early stage, it was remarked that, as a result, the regiment ‘soon ceased to be what it was at first – a really county regiment’.7 Nevertheless, an assessment of all officers to hold a commission in a further four regiments of Irish militia, from its re-establishment until the Cardwell– Childers reforms, shows the importance of the Irish landed gentry in the maintenance of the officer corps, at both a local and a national level (Table 2.1).8 A number of observations might be made with regard to these findings. Firstly, the officer corps of these regiments was mainly reliant on men born in Ireland. This proportion was much higher during the periods of embodiment between 1854 and 1862, supporting the situation which occurred in the Louth Militia in 1858. In fact the North Cork Rifles could boast that its officer corps was 81 per cent Irish-born, the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) could claim that 92 per cent of its officers were from Ireland, and the Roscommon Militia could boast that all of its officers were born locally. Secondly, the Wexford Militia, in a slight difference to the other regiments sampled, could only obtain two-thirds of its officers from Ireland, and an even smaller proportion were drawn from the

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The officer corps Table 2.1 Militia officers’ place of birth, 1854–81 (%)

North Cork Rifles Roscommon Militia Wexford Militia 1st or South, Tipperary   Artillery (Militia)

County

Rest of Ireland

Total from Ireland

Rest of the UK

Rest of the World

48.4 39.7 25.0 58.7

27.4 41.3 36.4 19.0

75.8 81.0 61.4 77.7

19.8 8.7 25.0 15.8

4.4 10.3 13.6 6.5

Table 2.2 Militia officers’ place of birth, 1881–1908 (%)

North Cork Rifles Wexford Militia 1st or South, Tipperary   Artillery (Militia) Dublin City Artillery  (Militia) Londonderry Artillery  (Militia)

County

Rest of Ireland

Total from Ireland

Rest of the UK

Rest of the world

45.7 20.0 21.1

18.4 38.5 44.7

64.1 58.5 65.8

23.5 27.7 21.1

12.4 13.8 13.1

35.4

29.2

64.6

22.9

12.5

12.5

45.0

57.5

35.0

7.5

county itself. This was mainly because of the geographical position of County Wexford. Its position on the east coast of Ireland and proximity to Dublin made it an attractive unit in which to serve, demonstrated by the fact that the majority of those who enlisted from other parts of Ireland came from the city of Dublin. This closeness to Dublin was also an attraction to those from other parts of the United Kingdom as the officers’ duties could still be carried out without being too far away from a large city. Someone who took advantage of this was Major Arthur Henry Chichester, who succeeded to the title of 3rd Baron Templemore, County Donegal, in 1906. Born in London and educated at Eton College, he entered the militia at the age of twenty and served for twenty-seven years, resigning his commission in 1901. During his time in the militia he became a prominent figure in County Wexford, becoming a High Sheriff in 1890, then a Justice of the Peace, and a Deputy Lieutenant, a good example of the political importance that the militia played in Irish society at this time (Table 2.2 here).9 The period from the Cardwell–Childers reforms until the disbandment of the militia in 1908 marked an increasing reliance by the Irish militia on officers from outside Ireland. Further analysis, based upon surviving officer records, show that the Irish officer corps relied for a quarter of its new commissions on other parts of the United Kingdom, with as many as a third in the Londonderry Artillery

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(Militia). In this unit there were also a large number of men who enlisted from other parts of Ireland, demonstrating the possible larger appeal of an artillery regiment, and one based in the province of Ulster. The North Cork Rifles became more insular in its appeal, and very few of its men came from other counties of Ireland, whilst a very high percentage came from County Cork. Captain John Charles Oliver Aldworth, a native of Newmarket, County Cork, served between 1889 and 1904, including in South Africa and would later see service during the First World War as part of the 1st Garrison Battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles.10 Similarly, Captain Edward Fitzedmund Burke Roche, the 2nd Baron Fermoy, served in the North Cork Rifles for six years whilst also holding the offices of Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenant of County Cork.11 On the other hand, the Tipperary Artillery (Militia) came to rely on men from outside its own county to a much greater extent, only 21.1 per cent coming from County Tipperary, a huge change from the 77.1 per cent that had come from that area in 1854. What this demonstrates is that, whilst there were significant differences in the ‘Irish’ composition of the officer corps, there was an increasing reliance on obtaining officers, especially as ensigns or second lieutenants, from the United Kingdom. As will be shown, this became even more pronounced by the turn of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Irish landed classes still played a prominent role in the officer corps. This was largely in the capacity as senior officers of the militia, and, as a result, they were important for the purposes of political patronage, as well as for promotion within their regiments. Senior officers of militia regiments were given considerable power to nominate men for appointments, as laid down in the regulations.12 A prime example is highlighted in the correspondence of Lord Dufferin, who was the Colonel of the North Down Rifles. In 1864, he was approached by the father of Lieutenant Louis Deladier, requesting that he spare ‘a whisper to those at the Horse Guards’ so as to help his son be put up for officer examination early.13 In 1871, he was approached by George Rowan-Hamilton, a member of a leading gentry family in Killyleagh, County Down, requesting that he be appointed as the Instructor of Musketry to the regiment. This was despite the fact that he considered himself ‘not at all clever, anyone who had spent the same time and steady study at drill would be better than I am, I only acquired my knowledge by intense study, and I have seen fellows join and learn in half the time’.14 Notwithstanding, Lord Dufferin accepted his request, and he was appointed as the Adjutant of the regiment, and hoped that he would not make Dufferin ‘ashamed’ of his appointment.15 In actual fact, it was remarked that, by 1875, a drastic improvement had been made to the regiment.16 In an earlier example, a thirty-seven-year-old lawyer wrote, again to Lord Dufferin, requesting that he take over the vacant company command in the regiment. He indicated that he had no previous military experience, did not wish to be a subaltern at his age, but had an income of £600 a year, and owing to his

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family connections he should be considered. It does not appear that this request was granted, but the fact that Dufferin was asked in the first place demonstrates the power he held in the decision-making process of his regiment.17 Additionally, in 1880, a request was made by the Commanding Officer of the Galway Militia (Artillery) that Mr Edmund Lynch be appointed as a captain in the regiment. It was believed that his position in the county, his connections, and high character would be of material interest to the regiment when dealing with recruitment matters and general efficiency of the corps.18 Even the future Major-General Sir Edward Spears noted in his memoirs that when he was commissioned into the Kildare Militia ‘I knew the Colonel and had a respectable local address and relations in the county apparently sufficed as qualifications’.19 Unfortunately for these commanding officers, they did not always have the luxury of picking exactly who they wanted for these positions, a fact that further demonstrates the difficulties of obtaining Irish-born officers in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Marquis of Downshire, for instance, complained that he did not wish to promote either of the two subalterns in his regiment because they ‘are not fit to be promoted and never will be, they are so stupid and never will be fit for promotion’.20 In the Clare Militia, four second lieutenants were recommended for promotion to the four available vacancies on the basis that they had served for a single training. In the Dublin City Artillery (Militia), a similar course was taken for two available vacancies.21 In the Donegal Artillery (Militia), it was requested that an appointment be made from outside the regiment, because the Commanding Officer believed that all of the captains within the regiment were too young and unfit for the position of field officers.22 As late as 1890, the Nationalist MP for Kerry West, Edward Harrington, remarked that officers in the Irish Militia were ‘puppies and cads’, and, furthermore, that they were the merest ragtag and bobtail of landlordism. If they were wanted to fight for their country, they would either become Members of this House, or they would get some appointment which would relieve them of the necessity of endangering their precious lives. The officers mostly are young fellows whose fathers do not know what to do with them, and their rowdyism causes much dissatisfaction … Many of the officers are Justices of the Peace, or sons of Magistrates and it is most interesting to hear the moral lectures delivered by the occupants of the Bench.23

Harrington was not wholly incorrect in his observation about the majority of the officers coming from the landed classes in Ireland. A similar observation has also been made about the militia officers from other parts of the United Kingdom, particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century, David French remarking that ‘some county gentlemen, secure of their place in the county community, regarded a few years’ service in their local Militia regiment as a necessary rite

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of passage’. He goes on to say that by the second half of the nineteenth century they had become fewer in number.24 In a biography of Charles Stewart Parnell, sometime leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, it is stated that he joined the Wicklow Rifles ‘as befitted a Wicklow landowner’.25 It is even remarked that he was proud of this fact, and hated the idea that his uniform might be mistaken for that of a Fenian.26 The problems associated with obtaining sufficient Irish gentlemen, owing to the Land Acts, were beginning to be felt by the mid-1890s. A letter which most eloquently highlighted this problem is worth quoting at length here. There are at present five vacancies for Subalterns. There is great difficulty in obtaining suitable officers. The sons of county gentlemen, who formerly joined the militia, now go into business owing to the depression in land, and I foresee great difficulty in keeping up the full establishment of the regiment. The steps that are at present taken to ensure a supply of officers are as follows: all eligible candidates in the District are asked to join, and the officers of the regiment, during the non-training period, are requested to submit the names of any gentleman they may consider eligible candidates for a commission.27

After the South African War, this strain was further accentuated, and led to an even greater reliance on officers from other areas of the United Kingdom. As part of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers after the war, a number of Irish militia officers were asked to put forward their views on a variety of issues, including the composition of the officer corps. Lieut.-Col. Lord Castletown, commanding the 4th Leinster Regiment, noted that, as a rule, the Irish officers were gentlemen farmers, but by 1904 for that type of gentleman ‘it is a considerable strain to give up that month away from his farm, or land agency, or business’. Colonel Cooke-Collis, of the 9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps based in Cork, went as far as to state that he knew of many men who wished to join the militia and would make efficient officers, but did not wish to because it was not an attractive enough prospect and would cost them too much money to do so. He continued that ‘the class from which officers were drawn, and from which the best officers would naturally come, would be the sons of the county gentry in Ireland’, but ‘many of them have been so badly hit by the Land Acts and land agitation that really they cannot afford to put their sons into an occupation which only occupies them for one month in the year’. By these officers, however, it was accepted that it was this class of men who still made up the bulk of their officers, albeit to a much lesser extent than in the past. This was not the case for all units, particularly those in the North of Ireland. Colonel Stewart, commanding the Fermanagh Militia, which at this time had a full establishment of officers, had not a single officer from the County of Fermanagh. It was only by ‘going out into the highways and by-ways that I can get them’. A similar situation was experienced by the Donegal Artillery (Militia)

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which ‘had a great many officers from England’ and the Antrim Artillery (Militia), where Major Gilmour-Smith believed that as many as half of his officers came from England alone.28 A detailed analysis of the addresses of officers in Irish Militia and Special Reserve regiments, listed in the Irish Military Guide, demonstrates that, even during the period from 1902 to 1914, there was a further increase in those residing outside of Ireland, especially those in regiments in Ulster. In 1903, in battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 38 per cent of officers lived outside Ireland, but by 1914 this was 44 per cent. Similarly, in the battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles, in 1903 such officers comprised 30 per cent, and by 1914 had increased to 42 per cent. In contrast, in the Connaught Rangers, the number of those from outside Ireland remained at 35 per cent throughout this time.29 There is some evidence to suggest that, particularly in Ulster, militia colonels turned to attempting to commission young businessmen and professionals, James Craig, the future Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, being a prime example of this when he was eventually commissioned into the 3rd Royal Irish Rifles. By 1908, Major F.H. Crawford observed that his regiment, the Donegal Artillery, was dependent on businessmen from Belfast, like himself, for a large proportion of its officers.30 It is clear though, that this demographic was not the most desirable to those responsible for appointing officers.31 This decline of the landed classes in the militia is representative of Irish society as a whole, especially considering the demise of the ‘big house’. As Terence Dooley points out, by the mid-1880s the typical Irish landlord was heavily in debt.32 Olwen Purdue has taken this analysis further when looking at the six counties of Ulster, stating that a similar degree of decline was experienced in this area, and that the landed classes had ‘retreated into oblivion’.33 In a study of the Irish landed classes in the British Army, Nicholas Perry has uncovered the fact that, by 1920, as many as a quarter of male landowners had served in the militia or Special Reserve, and 34 per cent had served as regular officers.34 The cost of being an officer in the militia as a deterrent for these landowners is demonstrated by Perry when it is seen that the numbers of men who held a militia commission fell off dramatically, whilst the numbers who gained a regular commission remained much the same.35 What these studies fail to reveal, however, is that, although Irish landowners were in dramatic decline, both in society and in the militia, the higher echelons of the Irish militia were still dominated by this class of officer. A further analysis of officers’ service records reveals that a high proportion of those who served in a regiment for fifteen years or more were from the landed classes. In the North Cork Rifles, for example, seven of the eight officers who served for twenty-five years or more were members of local landed families. In contrast to this, the vast majority of men served for a very short period of one to three years. This was as a result of the high proportion of British-born officers using the militia as a route into the regular army. In the Tipperary Artillery (Militia), for example, 40 per cent of those who served for under three years

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joined a regular battalion. Similarly, in the Wexford Militia, 50 per cent of the men who served for this time joined a regular unit. In the North Cork Rifles, the Dublin City Artillery (Militia), and the Londonderry Artillery (Militia) the figures were at a similar level of 39.7 per cent, 55.6 per cent, and 55 per cent respectively. In Wexford, 71 per cent of those who joined a regular battalion, having served fewer than three years, were not Irish-born, further emphasising the fact that the officer corps of the Irish militia gradually became less Irish in its character. Of course, not all of those who took this route were of British descent. The most famous Anglo-Irish officer who took this route was Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, who served in the 6th Rifle Brigade (the former Longford Militia), and in the 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers, in order to enable him to go up for the competitive examinations into the regular army, after failing to enter Woolwich or Sandhurst.36 By 1872, the route for militia officers to obtain commissions into the regular army had been made easier, truly creating a ‘back door’. A general order had permitted each militia regiment with at least ten companies to nominate a subaltern for a regular commission. They had to be aged between nineteen and twenty-two, have attended at least two annual trainings and have passed an examination in their duties.37 Obviously, owing to the abundance of militia regiments in Ireland, gentlemen began to take advantage of this legislation. Between May 1879 and May 1880, no fewer than thirty-eight applications for commissions into the regular army were made from Irish militia regiments. In June 1880 alone, a further twenty-three men were sent forward for competitive examination, and in July of that year an additional seventeen were put forward.38 It appears that the system was being exploited by those eager to enter the regulars as, in February 1880, a request was made for Second Lieutenant P.J.L Tottenham, of the Fermanagh Light Infantry, to be permitted to attend two militia trainings in a single year in order for him to go up for competitive examination, as he had not previously attended a training. This request was made because in 1878 a subaltern of the King’s County Militia was permitted to qualify for a line commission by undergoing two trainings in a single year. By 1879, it was ruled that the militia trainings had to be attended in different years, so closing this loophole.39 This did not appear to deter applicants considering taking this route. Between 1888 and 1890 no fewer than 174 Irish militia officers made applications to go up for the military examinations for admission to the regular army.40 This was despite the fact that by 1890 the minimum number of trainings that a militia officer had to attend was increased to three. This did, however, result in a higher number of rejected applicants.41 As a significant proportion of officers who joined the regular army from the militia were not from Ireland; localisation was only of limited success.

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The officer corps Table 2.3 Officers who joined regular army battalions, 1854–1908 (%)

North Cork Rifles Wexford Militia Fermanagh Militia 1st or South, Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Dublin City Artillery (Militia) Londonderry Artillery (Militia)

Joined a regular battalion

Joined a linked battalion

18.2 29.4 33.3 24.1 33.3 35.0

6.0 18.8 20.0 17.6 62.5 64.3

On average, of all the officers who entered the militia in Ireland, 28 per cent transferred to a Line battalion at some point. This occurred at a much higher rate during periods of embodiment, as demonstrated by the Wexford Militia where 43 per cent of its officers who transferred to a Line battalion did so during the South African wars. The percentage of those who joined the regular army, and the percentage of those who joined the linked Line battalion were as in Table 2.3.42 The high percentage of men who left the Fermanagh Militia backs up the assertion by their commanding officer in 1904 regarding not being able to obtain any officers from the county of Fermanagh. It also underlines the attractiveness of a militia regiment in the North of Ireland to those who wished to serve their apprenticeship before entering the regular army. This point is further underlined by the fact that only 7.2 per cent of those who joined a Line battalion from the Londonderry Artillery (Militia) joined an Irish regiment. In contrast, the comparatively low percentage of 18.2 per cent of men who joined a regular battalion from the North Cork Rifles reasserts the point that a larger percentage of officers in this unit were from the landed classes in County Cork. In this unit, of those who did join a regular battalion, only 6 per cent joined a battalion of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The other infantry battalions could boast that around a fifth of their officers had joined a linked battalion. For units of artillery, the Dublin City and Londonderry Artillery (Militia) provided 62.5 per cent and 64.3 per cent respectively, of their men to the Royal Artillery. This rather high percentage is hardly surprising given the technical nature of this arm, particularly in comparison to the infantry. Although a quarter of the men from both of these units entered an infantry battalion, none entered an Irish regiment. In stark contrast to this, the Tipperary Artillery (Militia) provided only 17.6 per cent of its men to the Royal Artillery, a much lower figure than the other two regiments, and the majority of these cases occurred during the South African War. A very high proportion of this unit did, however, join a regular unit at the end of their embodiment after the Crimean War.

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As has been demonstrated, less than a third of all officers who joined the militia exploited the ‘back door’ and joined the regular army over the course of the period. The motivation, when joining a regiment, of the other two-thirds of militia officers in Ireland might be touched upon here. As has been mentioned, senior officers, such as Lord Dufferin, held considerable power when it came to nominating men for commissions. This highlights the importance of patronage, both in the sense of political and family connections and for social climbing. This proved important to a number of officers, who used the militia in order to obtain high civil and military occupations, especially in the expanding British Empire. This was, in a wider context, undoubtedly a reason for other gentlemen to join the Irish militia. In the Imperial context, officers of auxiliary forces came to form an important part in the establishment of colonial police forces. In 1894, no fewer than eight Irish militia officers were on secondment in British Honduras, Lagos, Sierra Leone, British Guiana, the Gold Coast, and Cyprus.43 By 1905, the increased control in Africa by the Colonial Office, and shortage of regular officers caused by the war in South Africa, were evident. At this time, a total of forty-six Irish militia officers were on secondment to various forces of the Empire. As many as twenty officers had joined the West African Frontier Force, whilst additional officers were, amongst others, in the Uganda Rifles; Lieutenant Ernest Goldie Taubman was even the second in command of the Forces of the Sultan of Zanzibar.44 Furthermore, Captain Alan Maxwell Boisragon was the Superintendent of the Shanghai Police Force, on secondment from the 3rd  Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment. In 1896, Boisragon had been part of an invasion of Benin in West Africa as part of the Niger Protectorate Force. It consisted of five British officers and 250 African soldiers. Once in Benin City the force was ambushed and massacred, and only Boisragon and one other officer escaped. He subsequently wrote an account of what had happened during the expedition.45 Presumably, it was this experience that allowed him to obtain a commission in the militia, and also gain the further secondment to Shanghai. It was not only in the Imperial context that officers were able to take advantage of their militia positions in order to further their careers. Sir Eyre Massey Shaw, for example, was a captain in the North Cork Rifles for eight years before his appointment as the commander of the Belfast Fire Brigade, and later as the first Chief of the London Metropolitan Fire Brigade.46 In fact, he was ordered to leave the militia by the Lord Lieutenant in 1863, owing to his employment commitments. It was stated that the two positions were not compatible and, having been asked to select between them, he did not comply, so was removed from the militia by the authorities.47 Additionally, Myles O’Reilly, owing largely to his captaincy in the Louth Rifles, was appointed to command the Irish Battalion of the Papal Brigade in defence of the Papal States in 1860.48

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From a political point of view, being an officer in the militia could also offer gentlemen who wished to pursue a career in politics an influential position within the county in which they were based. As has already been stated, Charles Stewart Parnell, the future leader of the IPP, was a Lieutenant in the Wicklow Rifles and whilst on preliminary training in 1865 ‘became immersed in the accompanying social round’.49 Similarly, as a nationalist, William Redmond, the brother of John Redmond, joined the Wexford Militia in 1879, and served for two years before embarking on a career in politics.50 This is in contrast to testimony which outlined that militia officers were ‘all true blue Unionists’. This testimony also went on to say that very few of these officers were actively engaged in politics, or were members of the ‘Orange Institution’.51 Moreover, Edward Saunderson, known as the ‘Orange Colonel’ and leader of the Irish Unionist Party from 1885 until 1905, was a member of the Cavan Militia for thirty-one years.52 Furthermore, Colonel R.H. Wallace, of the South Down Militia, was a known Orangeman, and this influenced his choice of officers. It is clear that political patronage did not play as important a role as it did in the future auxiliary forces in Ireland, but certainly it had some significance. This is most clear when it is seen that, at the same time, the future leaders of both the Nationalist and Unionist parties held commissions in the Irish militia. Linked to the political question is that of the religion of officers in the militia. Upon their first embodiment in Ireland in 1854 the MP for Cork, Vincent Skully, made remarks regarding the officer corps, and, in this particular statement, the raising of the two militia regiments in County Cork. Skully commented that ‘as a representative of the County Cork, I feel called upon to inform you that great dissatisfaction prevails among my liberal constituents, from an apprehension that the militia, about to be embodied there, will be officered exclusively by Tories and Protestants, whilst the vast majority of this large force will be liberals and Catholics’.53 It has been widely assumed that in Ireland, for the whole of the period under discussion, the officer corps was open exclusively to Protestants and as a result few or no Catholic officers were present. In fact, what is clear is that there were more Catholic officers than previously thought. Although sparse in numbers, their presence in the officer corps was far from insignificant (Table 2.4).54 A number of patterns emerge from these figures. Firstly, and unsurprisingly, the units based in Ulster, the Fermanagh Militia and Londonderry Artillery (Militia), were almost exclusively Protestant in their makeup. This can be attributed to the higher percentage of Protestants in the Ulster area, but also to the higher number of officers joining these units from the rest of the United Kingdom. This also explains the high percentage of Protestants compared to Catholics joining the Dublin City Artillery (Militia) despite it being in a majority Catholic area. In the Fermanagh Militia, the figures available from 1881 show

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The Irish amateur military tradition Table 2.4 Religion of officers, 1854–1908 (%)

North Cork Rifles Wexford Militia Fermanagh Militia Roscommon Militia 1st or South, Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Dublin City Artillery (Militia) Londonderry Artillery (Militia)

Protestant

Catholic

84.4 82.4 98.0 48.0 86.0 92.0 93.7

15.6 17.6 2.0 52.0 14.0 8.0 6.3

only one Catholic officer in the regiment, Henry de Courcey Denny, a native of County Fermanagh, who became the District Commissioner of Ashanti. Clearly, however, in the North of Ireland the presence of Catholic officers was still rare. In most of the Southern Irish Regiments officer corps, on average 15 per cent of officers considered themselves Catholic. Although this is a relatively small percentage, particularly because this was not at all representative of the Irish religious demographic, it is a much higher percentage than previously thought. What is somewhat surprising is the high percentage in the Wexford Militia given that, as mentioned previously, many of their men were from other parts of the United Kingdom. This would suggest that it had an even higher proportion of Catholic Irishmen than other regiments, one of whom was, of course, the aforementioned William Redmond. However, these figures do not show the whole picture. Over the whole period it is clear that the vast majority of those who were Catholic enlisted during the initial embodiment during the Crimean War. Throughout the period this became less common. For example, between 1854 and 1880, of those enlisting into the Roscommon Militia, the numbers of Protestants and Catholics are similar. Towards the end of the period, this shifted dramatically when there was an over-reliance on men from other parts of the United Kingdom, and the majority of those were Protestant. Again, however, the Wexford Militia was an anomaly and still attracted Catholic men, all of these being Irish-born. Despite the distinct religious disparities, there was little in the way of sectarian ill-feeling amongst officers. For the most part this non-sectarian attitude was driven by the desire either to do a gentleman’s duty or to move on to the regular army. This was demonstrated by the commissioning of Myles O’Reilly, and to a lesser extent Charles Stewart Parnell. It was northern Protestants who tended to stir up tensions, sometimes inadvertently. For example, Colonel Wallace of the South Down Militia was accused of presiding over a meeting of Orangeman in Downpatrick, in which acts of violence were incited against Nationalist Catholics.55 Similarly, officers of the Cavan Militia were accused of attending a concert in uniform to raise funds for an Orange Hall, although it was claimed

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that nothing of a party or political nature occurred on that evening.56 There is little more evidence, however, that in the officer corps at least, there was any open discrimination or acts targeting those in opposite religious groups. The training and proficiency of officers appear to have varied over time, and from unit to unit. Many commanding officers believed that their officers were inadequate, as already witnessed with regard to promotions. However, there was agreement that proficiency dramatically improved during periods of embodiment, because training was carried out for much longer periods than the usual annual training. To aid this training and proficiency, the Irish militia appears to have been able to rely on a considerable number of former regular soldiers, both as senior officers and NCOs, especially in the early stages of its existence. In the North Cork Rifles, for example, of the twelve field officers and captains only one had no previous military experience.57 The Tipperary Militia had the most challenging time at this early stage. It was decided on embodiment in 1854 that it would become an artillery regiment, and, as was noted in the Digest of Service, ‘it is curious that the militia of an inland County whose people knew nothing of guns or gunnery was selected to become Artillery’.58 The regiment was formed in a rather ad hoc manner which affected the ability of the officers and NCOs, leaving the regiment ‘deplorably wanting of non-commissioned officers to drill the men or to perform ordinary duties’, and ‘the consequence of this want of properly qualified Sergeants forming an efficient Permanent Staff was to throw double work upon the two or three men capable of doing their duty’.59 As the period of embodiment progressed, the efficiency of the regiment greatly improved, so much so that by the end of embodiment there was an attempt to convert it into a regular artillery regiment. Even as late as 1871, the quality was still maintained: it was remarked by the Adjutant of the regiment that the Permanent Staff had an ‘unusual amount of intelligence and ability’. Company Sergeant Michael Boland was singled out as ‘a perfect soldier; respectful and obliging having an excellent education, he is a master of his duties both as a Pay Sergeant and drill instructor’.60 More often than not, the positions of Adjutant, Quartermaster, and Paymaster were filled by former members of the regular forces. This appears to have been a largely successful exercise. In 1883, in confidential reports on Adjutants of the Irish militia, all commanding officers reported them as ‘favourable’.61 In the following year, similar reports were received from all commanding officers of Artillery (Militia) regiments.62 But the wider experience of appointing former regular soldiers was not always an entirely satisfactory one. When commanding officers were asked in 1877, as part of a report on the localisation of the brigade depot system, whether they attached any importance to the militia containing a proportion of officers who had served in the regular army, opinion was, once again, fairly split. There was broad agreement that if the officer was ‘zealous’ and

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‘of good character’ then that would be beneficial to the force. The commanding officer of the South Cork Light Infantry, however, attached higher importance to officers being county gentlemen of position, for he would ‘not care to have an officer whom his men did not know’. The commanding officer of the North Down Rifles wished for officers to be connected with the county by both family and property, and to be good officers with previous experience. In the Dublin County Light Infantry the opposite view was taken, as in its Colonel’s experience those who had served in the Line were ‘the most dodgy and inefficient officers I have had; they have left the service because they dislike discipline, and feel they have no soul for their profession’.63 This negative view taken of some officers, both those with previous military experience and those new to the profession, was not an isolated one. As early as 1859, Captain Pigott, of the Wexford Militia, was removed from his position in the regiment for being a ‘habitual defaulter’, who could not be trusted with the care of a company.64 Similarly, it was requested that an Adjutant of the Waterford Artillery (Militia) be removed from his position ‘with the least possible delay’ as he showed ‘a total lack of zeal and energy in carrying out the duties of his office’. Having been asked to reorganise his books because they were in a poor state, he had failed to do so and this was deemed enough of a reason to dismiss him.65 Poor efficiency was not always the fault of the officers themselves; sometimes the blame could be levelled at the authorities for not providing adequate facilities for training. The Louth Rifles, for example, were given no drill sergeants and the parade ground which they were using was not large enough for a six-company regiment to stand in open column, but was on the side of a steep hill, meaning that it was impossible to march the entire body of men steadily.66 Similar occurrences were noted after the embodiment during the South African War where many Commanding Officers noticed the increased efficiency of their officers once they were able to train for a longer period of time. Captain Stewart noted that ‘they are greatly improved since the embodiment of the regiment and since the war training which the officers had. I may say that the captains are certainly the most efficient militia captains I have ever seen.’ Lord Castletown, commanding the Queen’s County Rifles, however, voiced some resentment at the regular battalions taking away all of the best officers of the militia regiments in South Africa, meaning that they were left with those ‘not of course of the first class’. 67 The commander of the Belfast District commented that so many militia officers from the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Royal Irish Rifles had volunteered for service in South Africa that he was left with only eleven company officers between the three battalions.68 At times when there was no embodiment, and so a limited amount of training, efficiency was often criticised. Colonel Cooke-Collis was of the opinion that the shortage of good officers was ‘destroying’ the militia, believing that ‘the

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­­ officers you have, often leave young, and go into the regular forces, and even while in the militia, either because they do not get the opportunity or because they cannot afford the time or both they are not able to go through the courses of instruction and the training which is requisite to make a fully trained officer’.69 As a result of condemnation by commanding officers, the War Office did make some attempts to aid and improve training. In 1862 militia officers had become eligible to attend courses at Hythe in Kent, and by 1870 this was extended so that officers were permitted to attend regular schools of instruction.70 Even so, one commanding officer claimed in 1904 that he had made repeated attempts to send his officers to Hythe, but to no avail, as not a single officer had been permitted to attend.71 Following the announcement that officers were allowed to attend regular training schools, a number of Schools of Instruction were set up in Dublin, where in the first two months ninety-five officers attended and seventy-five obtained proficiency certificates.72 Similarly, for Artillery regiments, units were allowed to train at ranges in order to fire their guns, something which occurred only every fifth year of training. Despite being permitted to train at gun ranges, they were for the most part training with obsolete guns.73 Upon the establishment of the Imperial Yeomanry in Ireland, it is clear that its officer corps continued with the same traditions and composition as those of the militia. In fact, many of these officers were actually detached from militia regiments for the duration of the war. There is certainly a link between the officer corps of the militia and the Imperial Yeomanry, particularly immediately after the establishment of the latter. This demonstrates the continued amateur military tradition within Ireland, and also underlines the greater appeal to the landed classes of Ireland of a class corps such as the yeomanry. This is most evident when the names of the yeomanry officers are consulted in the Army List for the period during the war in South Africa. In the 13th Battalion alone, in which three out of four companies were Irish, of a total of eighteen appointed officers, including the Adjutant, ten had an affiliation with an Irish militia regiment. Eight of these officers’ affiliations were ongoing, as they were attached to the Imperial Yeomanry only for the duration of the war.74 Five of the officers had also been attached from militia battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles, something of which Colonel Wallace later complained when voicing his concerns about the shortage of officers in the regiment. A ­­further example was the 17th Battalion, of which two Irish companies formed a part, where a further six officers had close, and existing, connections with the militia.75 It would appear that this, albeit limited, experience of officers had a positive impact on the initial recruitment and training of the companies when they had been raised, and was further aided by the prior military experience in the regular army of a number of other officers. This was alluded to by Major-General ­­

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Brabazon when he reported that ‘it should have been made a hard and fast rule that the CO, 2nd in command, and, above all, the adjutant should have been old soldiers’.76 In the Irish context, the last suggestion seems to have already been the case, as all Adjutant positions within Irish battalions were filled by former soldiers. The satisfactory nature of the recruitment and training of the first contingent was remarked upon in a number of reports. Major-General Sir Herbert Chermside, commanding the Curragh District, remarked that the Irish Yeomanry had been raised in a very positive way, and made particular reference to the ‘highly satisfactory manner’ in which Colonel Graves, Assistant AdjutantGeneral, Imperial Yeomanry, had carried out his duties. This attention to detail was further demonstrated by the meticulous selection of men, putting them through a number of exercises in order to obtain those of the highest standard.77 Colonel Graves also had personal responsibility for the selection of the officers and, although it is true that the duties were performed in a satisfactory manner, it may be suggested that the officer corps was much like a gentlemen’s club. This view is supported by James Craig’s comments whilst serving in South Africa that ‘it is splendid to have such a nice lot of chaps with one. Maude, our Captain, is a dear old chap and so is Hugh Montgomery’ and that ‘Lord Leitrim is a decent, quiet little boy, about 19 years of age’.78 This atmosphere continued after the war and there was, in fact, a South Irish Horse Gentleman’s Club situated in Dublin.79 The high quality of officers continued to be maintained throughout the war, and was even present in the third contingent. For example, it was remarked that the training before embarkation of the 29th Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel the Earl of Longford and the ‘excellent officers he selected’ had been carried out with the ‘greatest zeal’.80 Moreover, the Earl of Longford personally remarked on the quality of officers in the battalion under his control, and in particular commented on the energy and local influence of officers like James Craig, who was able to find his own subalterns.81 Throughout the South African wars, and after its re-establishment during the Edwardian period, the force was made up of three social groupings. Firstly, and again similarly to the militia, the landed classes in Ireland were represented, forming the core. As has been mentioned, the Earl of Longford was instrumental in the force’s establishment in 1900, but other officers present in the yeomanry included Viscount Ennismore (the future 4th Earl of Listowel, Richard Granville Hare); and, importantly, the highest Catholic in the Irish peerage, the Earl of Fingall, who served in South Africa with the Second Contingent.82 During the period up to the First World War, this link with the landed classes was maintained. Prominent officers during this time were the 9th Earl of Bessborough; the 2nd and 3rd Dukes of Abercorn; and the future 5th Earl of Enniskillen, John Henry Michael Cole, who, having served in the North Irish Horse after the

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South African War, became Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, commanded it for the duration of the First World War, and also became Aide-de-Camp to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1918.83 It is interesting that the yeomanry still relied so heavily on the Protestant aristocracy and landed gentry for its officer corps at a time when the militia struggled to attract these groups. Clearly, the yeomanry was regarded as the more prestigious corps, especially because there was no Rifle Volunteer Corps. Certainly, within this context, it can be argued that the yeomanry in Ireland came to represent one of the last bastions of power for the landed classes when the Home Rule movement, Land Acts, and local government reform began to reduce their political power in Ireland.84 The second group who made up a portion of the officer corps consisted of men with previous military experience. A large proportion of the officers who served in South Africa had been attached from militia battalions. However, many of the other officers had also previously served in a regiment in the regular army, most commonly in a cavalry regiment. The enlistment of men with prior military experience became more prevalent in the Edwardian period. For example, in 1905, no fewer than eleven officers of the North and South of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry had served in cavalry regiments of the British Army. This represented a higher proportion than in regiments in England, giving the officer corps in Ireland a degree of professionalism not seen elsewhere.85 The third and final social grouping which the yeomanry in Ireland was able to attract was the owners of businesses, mainly from the city of Belfast. This was a group of men that the militia had largely failed to attract. This further demonstrates the greater appeal of the yeomanry to the middle classes in Ireland. If the Army List is consulted once more, clearly the officer corps in Ireland was much closer to its full establishment than its British counterparts, a pattern which was also to emerge amongst the rank and file. The presence of this type of officer was once again more commonplace during the war in South Africa: they included James Craig, who was the son of a whiskey distiller, and Sir John Power, also a whiskey distiller, who was killed during the disaster at Lindley.86 The importance of the Irish Yeomanry, particularly in the North of Ireland, as a social enterprise for the purposes of political patronage, rather than a military institution, must also be mentioned with respect to social class and, indirectly linked to this, religion. The connections forged in the Edwardian period by those men in the officer corps of the yeomanry came to be crucial for a significant proportion of them when Northern Ireland was established in the 1920s. Once again, James Craig may be mentioned here, as the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. As Alvin Jackson has argued, Craig’s military service in South Africa had a profound effect on how he dealt with the Home Rule crisis from 1912 onwards.87 However, he was not the only Northern Irish yeomanry

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officer to become a Unionist politician. Of the seventeen officers in the North of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry in 1905, no fewer than six had a ­­political career. Furthermore, taking all officers in the Irish yeomanry from 1905 until the outbreak of the First World War, it is clear that a career in politics was one which interested many in the new Northern Irish state. Of the original twenty-one members of the Northern Ireland Senate elected in 1921, three had served in the yeomanry, and a further two former officers were subsequently appointed to office. One of them, Viscount Massereene and Ferrard, was even the leader of the Senate from 1921 until 1929.88 Robert Percival-Maxwell, who was a Major in the North Irish Horse in 1905, and would later become instrumental in the formation of the 36th (Ulster) Division and became a member of the Northern Ireland Senate from 1935 to 1941. Additionally, Sir Emerson Herdman was a member of the Northern Ireland Senate from 1923 until his death in 1949. In 1905, he was a Lieutenant in the North Irish Horse and had previously stood, losing by 12 votes, for the East Tyrone seat at Westminster.89 Former yeomen were also represented in Westminster. Sir Ronald Deane Ross was the MP for Londonderry City between 1929 and 1951, whilst Robert O’Neill, the future Baron Rathcavan, was an MP in Antrim from 1915 to 1921 and was elected to the Northern Ireland House of Commons in 1921. He would later become the first Speaker of the Northern Ireland House of Commons, and was also the uncle of the future Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill.90 Additionally, Lord Farnham, elected as an Irish representative peer, was an active member in Unionist politics, whilst being a senior officer in the North Irish Horse. It may be said that the Irish yeomanry officer corps, particularly in the North, was largely a Protestant force: only one of the seventeen officers mentioned above was a Catholic.91 Not only was the corps largely Protestant in composition but officers were more often than not actively engaged in Unionist politics, and from the nine counties of Ulster. This is in contrast to the high percentage of English-born officers present in the Irish militia by this time. This further demonstrates what a political stronghold the yeomanry had become during the upheaval surrounding Home Rule and shows the importance of these earlier links when the Northern Irish state was established in 1921. This certainly continued to be the case when the Territorial Army and UHG were established, and, to a lesser extent, these political considerations came to form a part of the OTC and VTC when they were established from 1910 onwards. For the OTC in Great Britain, it has been established that the majority of the officer corps was made up of university and school staff, meaning that it came to be dominated by the middle classes. This had significant disadvantages, especially because it meant many units had little military experience, outside of their adjutant and some NCOs.92 This situation was little better in Ireland, although more senior officers appear to have been more militarily experienced, especially

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in the North. Lord Arran, who commanded all the contingents in Ireland from 1910, had fought with the Royal Horse Guards during the South African wars, and commanded the Civil Service Rifles thereafter. He also held the positions of Justice of the Peace for Louth and Mayo, and was the Deputy Lieutenant for Mayo.93 The first Commanding Officer of the Queen’s University (Belfast) contingent of the OTC was Captain H.H.B Cunningham, who had previous service with a militia battalion of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, as well as in the 16th Middlesex (London Irish) Volunteers. He had also served as a surgeon in the Army Service Corps, thus demonstrating a continued amateur tradition in this corps. It was noted that ‘he applied himself with energy to the task of starting the ­­contingent’.94 Major Gregg Wilson, who replaced Cunningham, had been a senior figure in the Edinburgh OTC.95 Lieut.-Col. R.G.D. Groves-Raines, who held the same position between 1928 and 1938, had been a decorated officer in the East Kent Regiment during the First World War.96 The Dublin University OTC could boast that the first four of its instructors had previous military experience. However, the majority of the senior positions were filled by prominent members of Trinity College teaching staff, although George Arthur Harris, who took overall command of the Infantry Unit in 1910, had served in the South Irish Horse.97 The contingent in Dublin, similarly to the yeomanry in Northern Ireland, was used by some as a method for furthering their careers in the Irish Free State. Former members such as Ernest Henry Alton, who commanded the contingent during the Easter Rising, became the representative of Trinity College in the Dáil and the Senate from 1922 until 1943, as an Independent Unionist, and served as Provost of the University from 1942 until his death in 1952.98 Additionally, John Hunt and Michael Stacey, owing to their previous military experience, were prominent in the creation of the Irish Defence Forces during the interwar period.99 This further demonstrates the continued advantages for officers to serve in auxiliary forces, even in the South of Ireland. For the IAVTC, a mixture of upper-class and middle-class men filled the senior positions of the officer corps, and this was in line with other units across Great Britain.100 The Committee of the IAVTC was presided over by the Earl of Meath and was supported by forty-five other patrons, most of whom were members of the peerage residing in the South of Ireland.101 This was another example of the landed classes attempting to cling on to their prominent positions within Irish society. Realistically, they held very little power in these positions, particularly because the IAVTC was not associated with its British counterpart, and had very little influence on the day-to-day running of individual units. In fact, it was middle-class men who came to dominate the officer corps of local detachments and committees, and held the greater power, reflecting their own growing ­­influence on local affairs.

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The Commandants of the ten VTC formations in the Dublin area in 1915 had occupations such as solicitor, optician, magistrate, and doctor. The Commandant of the Glasnevin Volunteer Corps was a cattle salesman, whilst Francis Browning, head of the Irish Rugby Football Union Volunteer Corps, was the President of the Rugby Association and a barrister.102 On the Com­­ mittee of the City of Cork VTC, many officers were bank managers, civil ­­engineers, merchants, manufacturers, and directors of companies.103 Much as in the rest of the United Kingdom, the majority of these officers were above the age of forty, but almost none had any previous military experience. Importantly, however, this officer corps was not an entirely Protestant group. In Cork, there were at least thirteen Catholic members, and one Jewish member, of the city’s committee.104 Clearly, this social composition suggests that a Rifle Volunteer Corps would have been popular for the emerging middle class in Ireland before the First World War, and explains why successive attempts were made to raise it. Since the TA and UHG were formed in Northern Ireland within a short period of time, there existed a very close association between the two formations in terms of their respective officer corps. The landed gentry played only a small part in the officer corps of the TA. The 13th Viscount Massereene and Ferrard (son of the 12th Viscount who had been an officer in the North Irish Horse), owing to his position as the Deputy Lieutenant of Antrim, was appointed as the President of the County Antrim Territorial Army and Air Force Association. The other original committee members were officers with previous military experience, including Professor Gregg Wilson of the Queen’s University, Belfast, OTC. Other members of the committee included Colonel O.B. Graham, a former officer in the Rifle Brigade and Director of the York Street Flax Spinning Company, and Captain J.M. Sinclair, who was a veteran of the 36th (Ulster) Division.105 Upon the formation of the TA in 1937, it was stated that sixty-seven applications were received for commissions when only twelve officers were required. This meant that the best applicants could be selected. Following an interview process, four subalterns were selected: Samuel Toppin, the Director of Philip Johnston and Sons Ltd; Michael Marsham, a land agent; Edgar Shearer, an Irish football and cricket international; and Thomas Cooke, a director of J. Christy Ltd, a miller and merchant in Londonderry, who had also served in the North Irish Horse.106 The appointment of these four officers and the composition of the original committee show the increasing importance of obtaining those from within Ireland with a business background, as had been witnessed in the VTC. The TA Association was deemed to be too small to cope with the newly established UHG in 1940, but many of its officers, particularly those on the Association committee, willingly transferred to the UHG, and served for the remainder of the war.

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The UHG had much closer links to the Irish Yeomanry and the TA in Northern Ireland, established only two years earlier, than it did with the militia and Special Reserve of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There were, of course, those who could claim to have played some part in one or all of these previous forces, but some of the officers in the UHG were veterans of the First World War, both as officers and in the rank and file, and this was reflected in many of the testimonies regarding the training of the whole force. By January 1942, an estimated 1,349 officers were serving in the twenty-nine battalions of the Ulster Home Guard.107 Amongst them were at least two peers, a Member of Parliament, three Deputy Lieutenants, and five Justices of the Peace. Thus, just as the Irish Yeomanry and the TA had served as an outlet for Unionist political patronage, so did the UHG, both before and after the war. For example, Sir Henry Mulholland, the Stormont MP for Ards, Speaker of the Northern Ireland House of Commons, and also married to Sir Basil Brooke’s sister, almost certainly used his prominent position in society to become the LieutenantColonel of the 5th (Belfast) Battalion UHG, particularly because he had no previous military experience. Similarly, it might be said that Lt-Col. A.C. Herdman, of the 4th (Antrim) Battalion UHG, utilised his brother’s political connections to gain such a high rank. After the war, other UHG officers also obtained high positions in Ulster society. This was not a direct consequence of their service in the UHG, but this experience and opportunity for political networking did not do any harm. Lt-Col. Arthur O’Neill Chichester of the 2nd (Antrim) Battalion UHG, for instance, who, apart from being an Honorary Colonel in the TA in Northern Ireland after the war, and having been a committee member on the TA Association before the war, was appointed the Clerk of the Parliaments of Northern Ireland from 1945 to 1948, and served as the Mayor of Ballymena from 1948 to 1951.108 Furthermore, William Millar Cameron, a Major in the same Battalion, was also appointed as a member of the Northern Ireland Senate as late as 1969, no doubt partly as a result of his strong political connections. Importantly, this element made up only a very small proportion of the officer corps in the UHG. What is clear in the UHG, and much more pronounced than in the yeomanry, was the importance of business leaders as a source of officers. It is not possible to gather information for a large number of the officers of many of the battalions, mainly because in most cases only an initial and surname were listed on any documentation. However, this does not mean that no information may be found at all. It is possible, for example, to discover information relating to those officers who were awarded decorations at the end of the war as their full names were listed in the London Gazette and a number of men may be mentioned here to demonstrate this stronger business link. Major John Kerr of the 2nd (Belfast) Battalion UHG, for instance, was a partner in Kerr and Reid, a grocer’s business situated on the Upper Newtownards Road in east Belfast. Captain Robert Alexander Johnston, of the 1st (Down) Battalion UHG, was the

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Managing Director of the Northern Ireland Tyre Service, having previously been a member of the Queen’s University OTC and a C1 Special Constable. Other aspects of professional, as well as business, life were also represented within the corps. Lt-Col. William Henderson Fyffe, 2nd (Tyrone) Battalion UHG, was the Crown Solicitor for the County; Lt-Col. John Norman Fulton, 4th (Belfast) Battalion UHG, was also a solicitor; whilst Major William Wilson, 1st (Fermanagh) Battalion UHG, was a prosperous farmer and the sheep-dipping inspector for the county.109 These examples were, of course, supplemented by the presence of the many business detachments of the UHG whose officers were made up of the managers within these companies, such as the leading linen manufacturer, William Ewart and Sons Ltd, the Ormeau Bakery, and the BBC detachments of the force. The system of appointing those prominent in civil life did have its pitfalls. In the Stormont Parliament in January 1941, it was announced that a gentleman with no military experience, and one arm, had been appointed as the Commanding Officer of the Castlereagh UHG, over the heads of qualified ex-servicemen.110 Over a year later it was revealed that not only had the men of the detachment been balloted and selected a different man, but, because someone else had been selected, the majority of the men had resigned in protest.111 Conversely, as early as August 1940, an officer, with no military experience, complained that someone with a military background had been appointed over his head, arguing that the effect of this would reduce his status in the area and he saw no military purpose in doing this.112 Other than businessmen, the officer corps was made up of a large proportion of current, or former, officers of the USC, or of ex-servicemen, mainly those who had served during the First World War. Many of these former servicemen were also decorated in their capacity as soldiers. Of the 1,349 officers listed in January 1942, at least twelve had been awarded a DSO; twenty-six an MC; seven an MM; and four a DCM.113 Furthermore, many of these men had actually served in the ranks, rather than as officers, a demonstration that it was thought that those with previous experience of training and weaponry would be the best suited to lead men should an invasion occur. In terms of the B Specials officers, they were appointed proportionately to the size of the B Specials section of the force. So, in the 1st (Derry City) Battalion UHG, 36 per cent of the men were B Special Constables, as were 35 per cent of the officers. This may have been so that little animosity could exist if Home Guard officers were put in charge of B Specials, or vice versa. This assertion is also supported by this particular battalion, which split up its individual platoons into Home Guard and B Specials so as not to cause any friction between the two.114 Previous military experience in any branch of the service did not necessarily warrant instant appointment as an officer, or indeed as a ranker, especially if the man was a Catholic. Many leading figures maintained that the UHG was not a

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sectarian force and there is little evidence to suggest that those in high-ranking positions actively stopped Catholics from becoming officers, but this did not mean that it did not happen at a local level. This normally occurred at the expense of a trained individual who would under other circumstances have been an asset to the force. One such example was brought up at Stormont as early as July 1940 when it was stated that, in a company in County Down, an ex-NCO of the Gordon Highlanders had presented himself for enrolment to the Force but had been rejected solely on the grounds that he was a Catholic. The local Commandant had stated that he  ‘would not take any Papishes’.115 The most extreme example of such discrimination came about with the appointment of Colonel McCarthy O’Leary as the Chief Instructor for County Tyrone in 1943. In a letter to John Andrews, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, one UHG member, J.A. Gregg, outlined the unhappiness of some of the members in the county, stating that O’Leary was a Roman Catholic and not only that, he is a native of Southern Ireland: all these points have come up at a sitting of our club of Apprentice Boys sitting in Beragh Orange Hall. All the members of the club are Home Guard. After many different opinions it was finally agreed that one of our own religion should get the position as it was very bad if there was not an old comrade of the Ulster Division who was not able to fill the position, and an Ulsterman … We can see that the Roman Catholic is trying to push themselves in at the head of all good government jobs and they are able to make a fool of a good many of our friends through their civility, but we won’t have it here in Beragh, we say not an inch and no surrender.116

This clearly suggests the political leanings of at least some of the Home Guard, regardless of any use Colonel O’Leary would have been to the force. Gregg was reminded that O’Leary was in fact a distinguished officer who had won a DSO with Bar and an MC, spending most of his time in an Ulster Regiment, as well as commanding a battalion of the Ulster Division. The matter was dealt with by the authorities in an unsympathetic way, H.C. Montgomery, the Secretary to the Minister of Home Affairs, explaining that the UHG could consider itself ‘lucky in having the assistance of a man like this’ and the matter was laid to rest.117 It is easy to conclude from cases such as this that the officer corps was almost entirely Protestant in its composition and was, therefore, even more unrepresentative of Northern Irish society as a whole than the RUC when it was estimated that at least 25 per cent of its officers were Catholic.118 Moreover, it is clear that because of this intolerance of Catholic officers, the UHG was even more unrepresentative of society as a whole than any of the previous amateur forces in Ireland. As a result of the reluctance in many areas to appoint Catholics as officers in the UHG, many men who would otherwise have been useful in training the force were lost. This does not mean that officers were not given ample opportunity to

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hone their skills in a military environment. In fact, the training and efficiency of the officer corps was viewed as the most important aspect of any successes that might be obtained. It was even stated that ‘the success or the failure of the Home Guard will depend entirely on the efficiency, knowledge and initiative of junior leaders. It is the actual leaders on the spot who will have to fight the battle. If he knows his job the men will follow him.’119 With this in mind, tactical schools for officers were set up independently in Northern Ireland, based on those set up by Tom Wintringham at Osterley Park for the Home Guard of Great Britain, with varying degrees of success.120 This attitude prevailed when the TA was re-established in Northern Ireland in 1947. For the officer corps, military efficiency was of utmost importance, particularly because of the intended role of the force in the event of a large-scale conflict. In discussions of TA regulations in late 1946, it was stated that men would be granted commissions only if they had served in the regular forces, putting a lower age limit for officers at nineteen years.121 Once the force had come into existence this stipulation was reiterated, stating additionally that those with no previous military experience would have to serve for twelve months in the ranks and have qualified from a special cadet course of training.122 Despite these strict requirements, the TA does not appear to have struggled to obtain, and maintain, officer strength throughout its existence. Being an officer in the TA was a slightly more desirable prospect than in the UDR, partly because of the higher pay, and it is clear that many officers continued to serve in the force for a considerable period of time. For example, in the 5th (Territorial) Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, at least a third of officers served for the twenty years of the life of the battalion.123 In the postwar period, the OTC had also come to form part of the TA and, in light of its important role, all of its Commanding Officers were men with previous military experience.124 Clearly, by this time, those with prior experience in the armed forces were the most desired. If the TA and the UHG had marked a return to using Irish-born officers to lead amateur forces, then the UDR continued this tradition to a very large extent. Although, because of the absence of conscription in Northern Ireland during the Second World War, leading to a shortage of trained men, a proportion of British-born officers had to be relied upon. They were also supplemented by former officers of the USC: this was necessary, but had a detrimental effect on the perception of the force. When the UDR was established, priority was given to the appointment of the seven County Commandants, a task accomplished by the middle of January 1970. All of those appointed were former regular officers, and were the existing USC Commandants. The rationale behind this decision was that ‘for reasons of local knowledge and continuity at County level, it is important to use the best of the existing County Commandants USC to get the

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new UDR battalions off the ground’.125 None of those appointed was deemed a Protestant hardliner, an important point if these appointments were to be successfully sold to the public, but this mattered little.126 The fact that former USC officers were appointed to lead the new force was a clear indication to many that little change had occurred. Despite this, it was calculated that to every Protestant officer there were 3.4 Protestant men, while there was one Catholic officer to every 2.7 Catholic men.127 In terms of numbers this meant that there were only twenty-six Catholic officers in the opening years, compared to the 345 Protestant officers, but the better ratio is not insignificant. Undoubtedly, this decreased over time, as the proportion of Catholic other ranks diminished. At this early stage, company and platoon level officer selection was a little more rigorous and only those with previous military experience were approached to join the UDR. It was thought that building a corps of officers with experience of training, discipline, and weapons handling was of utmost importance. In reality, the situation was patchy at best. In the 7th (City of Belfast) Battalion, for example, eleven officers were ex-servicemen, either in the regular or Territorial army. Two officers had served in the Indian Army, one had served in the American Army, and one had flown in the RAF. In complete contrast, in the Larne Company, only one officer had previous military experience, as a Wing Commander in the Fleet Air Arm.128 Although it is difficult to provide any specific figures for previous military experience in the officer corps, owing to a lack of released paperwork, it may be surmised that previous military experience was favoured above anything else as time went on. Although this still remained patchy, the UDR very soon became the last posting for a significant number of regular officers. Many also felt that Northern Irish officers were best suited to the task. In 1971, the Minister for Agriculture, H.W. West, suggested that it was important to get officers in the UDR who were respected locally, especially in rural areas. West felt that this would also have an impact on recruiting.129 From the outset, the majority of the NCOs were Ulster-born and former members of the USC or TA. The majority of the officers in the Newry Company had been members of the local TA Company which had been disbanded two years previously.130 This ‘Ulsterisation’ was also maintained through the UDR’s existence, especially in the upper ranks. By 1982, of 109 posts of the rank of Major or above, eighty were filled by Ulstermen.131 Interestingly, as a demonstration of the strong amateur military tradition in existence in Ireland, the UDR struggled to appoint officers to full-time positions. As early as 1972, officials complained that it was difficult to find men with suitable experience to join the force on a full-time basis.132 As a result, this meant that instructional ability was severely limited, described as of a ‘generally very low standard’.133 As time went by it also became increasingly difficult to recruit a sufficient number of officers to offset any wastage. Throughout the late 1970s,

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the intake of officers remained higher than the outflow. However, throughout the 1980s, this situation reversed. For example, in 1982–83, only twenty-six new officers were appointed, while fifty-one left the service. During the following year, another twenty-six officers were appointed, and fifty-seven left the service. The figures remained fairly consistent for the other ranks, putting additional pressure on the officer corps.134 Despite the high level of wastage, the average number of years served by officers remained higher than for other ranks. In 1986, it was calculated that an officer served for 7.9 years on average before resigning his or her commission, compared to only 4.5 years for other ranks.135 For 1990, the figures were similar but, for both male and female officers, on average, part-time officers served for nine years and four months, over double the amount of time served by those in the permanent cadre.136 Once again this is a strong demonstration of the continued importance of the amateur military tradition. It is clear that the amateur military tradition was able to survive within the officer corps of the TA and UHG, despite prolonged suspension during the first half of the twentieth century. Many members of these corps had previously served either in another amateur unit or, more often than not, in the regular army during the First World War. In earlier incarnations this was also the case, especially between the militia and yeomanry, when officers were cross-posted on many occasions. Catholics were almost non-existent within these later corps, and Protestants continued to dominate these positions. A fairly significant proportion of Catholics were commissioned into the militia, yeomanry, and VTC, and this occurred much more frequently than has previously been assumed. Despite this, the officer corps in Ireland was reserved almost entirely for Protestant society after the turn of the twentieth century, and reinforces the idea of a re-emerging Protestant volunteering tradition. For auxiliary officers in Ireland, the importance of patronage cannot be overestimated, particularly for those in the militia. This continued, despite the declining influence of the landed classes throughout the nineteenth century, and an ever-increasing reliance on obtaining officers from the rest of Great Britain. Even prominent nationalists, such as Parnell, recognised the importance of this as a form of social climbing. The TA and UHG proved to be useful outlets for Unionist political patronage but the UHG was much more democratic than other formations, and business interests were represented in much larger numbers. There were also perceived weaknesses in the officer corps, a fact recognised by contemporaries. For the militia, the use of the ‘back door’ was the main reason for this as it resulted in many of the best officers leaving after serving only for a very short time. This problem was compounded after the South African War when large numbers of officers were seconded to military formations ­­throughout

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the Empire. The yeomanry was an exception to this as it was able to attract the more dedicated officers, because it was viewed as a much more respectable formation. Ultimately, the officer corps gave prominent members of society the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the Union and allowed them to exercise their own personal power, whilst also giving them the opportunity to be a part of the British establishment in a military capacity. Notes 1 Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 262–3; Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 115–16. 2 McAnally, The Irish Militia, p. 58; Nelson, Irish Militia, p. 28. 3 Information relating to those still on the Army List for militia regiments in 1850 is available in A. Sleigh, The Royal Militia and Yeomanry Cavalry Army List: Containing the Name and Seniority of Every Regimental and Staff Officer in the Militia and Yeomanry Cavalry (London: British Army Despatch Press, 1850). 4 NLI Kilmainham papers. Ms. 1055 Letter from the Military Secretary regarding the inspection of officers of the Monaghan Militia, 27 January 1855. 5 Quoted in Bowman and Butler, ‘Ireland’, in Beckett, Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire, p. 43. 6 Ibid. 7 TNA WO68/313 Digest of Service of the Louth Militia, 1854–1908. 8 This and the forthcoming tables related to the officer corps of the militia are drawn from a number of sources. The Officers’ Service Records of the respective militia battalions were consulted in the WO68 series at TNA: WO68/307–10 North Cork Rifles; WO68/75 Roscommon Militia; WO68/90–1 1st or South, Tipperary Artillery (Militia); WO68/173–4 Wexford Militia; WO68/31 Dublin City Artillery  (Militia); WO68/64 Londonderry Artillery (Militia). Information such as place of birth, religion, and occupation have been drawn from the Officers’ Service Records as well as the British and Irish Census Records; Thom’s Irish Almanac and Official Directory 1862 for the counties of Tipperary, Roscommon, Cork, and Londonderry; H. Montgomery-Massingberd (ed.), Burke’s Irish Family Records (London: Burke’s Peerage, 1976); C. Mosley (ed.), Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage and Knightage, 107th edition (London: Burke’s Peerage, 2010); L.G. Pine (ed.), The New Extinct Peerage 1884–1971 (London: Burke’s Peerage, 1972); The Times  obituaries; P.W. Hammond (ed.), The Complete Peerage or a History of the House of Lords and All Its Members From the Earliest Times (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998); G.E. Cokayne (ed.), The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom, Extant, Extinct, or Dormant (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000); and B. Burke, Burke’s Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry of Ireland (London: Burke’s Peerage, 1958). 9 Mosley, Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage and Knightage, p. 1160. 10 Montgomery-Massingberd (ed.), Burke’s Irish Family Records, p. 7. 11 The Times, 2 September 1920

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12 PRONI D3078/3/52/3 Letter from Gathorne Hardy, Secretary of State for War, to the 3rd Duke of Leinster, 11 May 1874. 13 PRONI D1071/H/D/1/1 Letter from the father of Louis Deladier to Lord Dufferin, 11 July 1864. 14 PRONI D1071/H/B/H/78 Letters from George Rowan-Hamilton to Lord Dufferin, April 1871. 15 Ibid., July 1871. 16 Ibid., 30 June 1875. 17 PRONI D1071/H/D/1/2 Letter from William Richardson to Lord Dufferin, 5 December 1867. 18 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1246. Letter from James O’Hara to J. Mitchel, 10 November 1880. 19 E. Spears, The Picnic Basket (London: Secker and Warburg, 1967), p. 64. 20 PRONI D1071/H/D/1/2 Letter from the Marquis of Downshire to Lord Dufferin, 14 May 1867. 21 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1246. Letter from William MacDonnell to J. Mitchel, 8 October 1880; Letter from W.J. Magill to J. Mitchel, 8 October 1880. 22 Ibid. Letter from Charles Lowry to Colonel Woolsey, Director of Artillery Studies, 24 January 1881. 23 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 348, cols 367–425, 9 August 1890. 24 French, Military Identities, p. 207. 25 R.F. Foster, Charles Stewart Parnell: The Man and His Family (London: The Harvester Press Ltd, 1976), p. 116. 26 Ibid., p. 93. 27 PRONI D1071/H/B/A/124/1 Letter from Captain Edward Allen to Lord Dufferin, 8 March 1895. 28 PP (Cd.2063). Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 29 Irish Military Guide for 1903 and 1914. 30 PRONI D1700/10/1 F.H. Crawford to Lieutenant-Colonel Gore, 29 January 1908; 22 February 1908; 19 March 1908, cited in Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 113. 31 See Bowman and Butler, ‘Ireland’, p. 45. 32 Dooley, The Decline of the Big House in Ireland, p. 273. 33 O. Purdue, The Big House in the North of Ireland; Land, Power, and Social Elites, 1878–1960 (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009), p. 237. 34 N. Perry, ‘The Irish Landed Class and the British Army, 1850–1950’, War in History, vol. 18, no. 3 (2011), pp. 311–12. 35 Ibid., p. 316. 36 C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson; His Life and Diaries (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1927), pp. 3–4. 37 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 186–7; French, Military Identities, p. 207; PP (C.5922). Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the militia, 1890. 38 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1246. Letters issued by the Commander of the Forces

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in Ireland on administrative matters, mainly promotions, finance, and pensions, 1879–1882. 39 Ibid. Letter from J. Mitchel to Horse Guards, 9 February 1880. 40 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1250. Letters issued by the Commander of the Forces in Ireland on administrative matters, mainly promotions, finance, and pensions, 1888–1890. 41 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1114. Correspondence relating to Infantry Regiments in Ireland, 1872–1894; Letters to the Officers Commanding the 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and 3rd Royal Munster Fusiliers, 7 January 1889. 42 Those who joined a Linked Battalion include those joining the King’s Royal Rifle Corps from the North Cork Rifles; the Royal Irish Regiment from the Wexford Militia; the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers from the Fermanagh Militia; and the Royal Artillery from the Tipperary Artillery (Militia), The Dublin City Artillery (Militia) and the Londonderry Artillery (Militia). 43 Hart’s Army List, 1894; also quoted in Bowman and Butler, ‘Ireland’, p. 46. 44 Hart’s Army List, 1905. 45 A.M. Boisragon, The Benin Massacre (London: Methuen and Company, 1897). 46 R. Cox, Oh, Captain Shaw: The Life Story of the First and Most Famous Chief of the London Fire Brigade (London: Victor Green, 1984). 47 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 9246. Letter from the Inspector-General of the Militia to Lieutenant-Colonel St Leger Stawell, 3 May 1862; 9 May 1863. 48 G.F.H. Berkeley, The Irish Battalion in the Papal Army of 1860 (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1929), pp. 23–4. 49 Foster, Charles Stewart Parnell, pp. 116–17. His brother John was also in the Irish militia at the same time, commissioned as a Lieutenant in the Armagh Light Infantry. 50 T. Denman, A Lonely Grave: The Life and Death of William Redmond (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995), pp. 19–20. 51 BMH WS Ref. 1770, Witness: Kevin O’Shiel, Judicial Commissioner, Dáil Land Courts, 1920–22. 52 A. Jackson, Colonel Edward Saunderson: Land and Loyalty in Victorian Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 42; R. Lucas, Colonel Saunderson, MP: A  Memoir (London: John Murray, 1908), pp. 62–3; For the Militia and Orange Order see D. Fitzpatrick, Descendancy: Irish Protestant Histories since 1795 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 32–3. 53 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 136, cols 794–898, 22 December 1854. 54 Religious data have been compiled from various sources. Some have their religion listed on their Officer Service Records, others have been found by using the Irish Census records for 1901 and 1911. This, therefore, means that finding the religion for officers as far back as the 1850s becomes rather more difficult due to many men no longer being alive by 1901. 55 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 66, col. 1081, 16 February 1899. 56 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 225, cols 998–9, 6 July 1875. 57 J.D. Mercer, Record of the North Cork Regiment of Militia, with sketches extracted from history of the times in which its services were required, from 1793–1880 (Dublin: Sealy, Bryer and Walker, 1886), pp. 73–5.

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58 TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia). 59 Ibid. 60 NLI Ms. 8593. Letter from the Adjutant of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia) to the Inspector General of the Militia, 5 March 1871. 61 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1309. Confidential Reports on Officers: Adjutants, Auxiliary Forces (Infantry Militia), 28 November 1883. 62 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1210. Confidential Reports on Officers: Adjutants, Auxiliary Artillery, June 1884. 63 PP (C.1654) Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for War to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the militia and the present brigade depot system, 1877. 64 NLI Kilimainham papers Ms. 1056. Letter from the Lieutenant-Colonel of the Wexford Militia to Horse Guards, 7 April 1859. 65 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1380. Confidential Report from Lieutenant-Colonel A.M. Murray, Commanding Militia Artillery, Cork District, to Staff Captain, Cork District, 14 November 1900. 66 TNA WO 68/313 Digest of Service of the Louth Rifles. 67 PP (Cd.2063). Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 68 NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1380. Note from F. Stokes, Belfast District, 8 February 1902. 69 PP (Cd.2063). Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 70 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, p. 186. 71 (Cd.2063). Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 72 TNA WO 33/24 Inspection Returns of the Irish Militia Regiments, 1871. 73 Ibid. 74 Hart’s Army List, 1901. 75 Ibid. 76 TNA WO 108/263 Report on the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, rendered to the Field Marshal, Commander in Chief, by Maj-Gen. J.P. Brabazon, October 1900. 77 TNA WO 108/375 Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the Raising of Drafts and New Battalions for the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, 15 May 1901. 78 PRONI D1415/B/9B Letter from James Craig to his mother, whilst serving in South Africa, April 1900. 79 The Irish Military Guide, 1910. 80 TNA WO 108/375 Appendix 70: ‘Report by the General Officer Commanding 3rd Army Corps on the Recruiting for the Imperial Yeomanry in Ireland in 1902’. Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the Raising of Drafts and New Battalions … on 15 May 1901. 81 Ibid. Appendix 70: Report of Lieut.-Col. the Earl of Longford, Commanding 29th (Irish Horse) Battalion, March 1902.

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82 Hart’s Army List, 1901; Mosley, Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage and Knightage, p. 2366; Freeman’s Journal, 4 April 1900. 83 Mosley, Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage and Knightage, p. 1330; TNA WO 95/816 War Diary of the North Irish Horse, 1917. 84 Olwen Purdue has identified that the political power of the landed class in the North of Ireland significantly declined after 1915, especially at a local level, but this decline was already being felt before this. See Purdue, The Big House in the North of Ireland, pp. 202–8. 85 Hart’s Army List, 1905. 86 Belfast Newsletter, 17 February 1900. 87 A. Jackson, ‘Irish Unionists and the Empire, 1880–1920: Classes and Masses’, in Jeffery, ‘An Irish Empire?’, pp. 132–3. 88 The other former yeomanry officers were the 3rd and 4th Dukes of Abercorn, Robert Percival Maxwell, and Sir Emerson Herdman. See J.F. Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party, 1882–1973: Its Development and Organisation (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1973), pp. 204–9; Hart’s Army List, 1905–14. 89 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party, p. 207; E. Phoenix, ‘Nationalism in Tyrone, 1880–1972’, in C. Dillon and H.A. Jefferies (eds), Tyrone: History and Society (Dublin: Geography Publications, 2000), p. 772. 90 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party, p. 183. See also A. Jackson, ‘“Tame Tory Hacks”? The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922–1972’, The Historical Journal, vol. 54, no. 2 (June 2011), p. 457. Margaret Waring, the widow of Colonel Holt Waring, was also elected as a member of the Northern Ireland House of Commons, serving from 1929 to 1933. 91 This has been calculated using Hart’s Army List and the Census for Ireland, 1911. 92 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, p. 141. 93 Mosley, Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage and Knightage, p. 114; Irish Times, 6 August 1910. 94 Johnston, The Queen’s University (Belfast) Contingent of the Officers Training Corps; London Gazette, 4 February 1899; 26 December 1901. 95 Irish Times, 3 January 1910. 96 Hart’s Army List, 1914; Edinburgh Gazette, 29 June 1915. 97 TNA WO339/50930 Service Record of George Arthur Harris, South Irish Horse, 1902–1918. 98 Willoughby, A Military History of the University of Dublin and Its Officers Training Corps, p. 29. 99 Ibid.; Bailey, A History of Trinity College Dublin, p. 158. 100 J. Osborne, ‘Defining Their Own Patriotism: British Volunteer Training Corps in the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, no. 1 (January 1988), p. 60; K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion; Britain’s Home Army, 1908– 1919 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 83. 101 PRONI D1507/A/11/34 Draft Rules of the Irish Association of Volunteer Training Corps, 22 April 1915. 102 Irish Times, 5 June 1915; Irish Census 1911; Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, 1916. Compiled by the Weekly Irish Times, 1917, p. 260; Hanna, Pals at Suvla Bay, p. 13.

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103 PRONI D989/C/4/4 Pamphlet on the City of Cork Volunteer Training Corps, 1915; Irish Census 1911; Daily Express, 22 May 1915. 104 Ibid. 105 Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 7 August 1937. 106 TNA WO192/324 Record Book of Grey Point Fort, Belfast, 1904–1957; London Gazette, 14 April 1939. 107 TNA WO199/2930 Order of Battle of the Ulster Home Guard, January 1942. 108 London Gazette, 16 December 1955. 109 London Gazette, 29 December 1944; Orr, Duty without Glory, pp. 256–61. 110 Northern Ireland Parl. Debs, vol. 23, pp. 2781–2, 16 January 1941. 111 Ibid., vol. 25, p. 45, 3 February 1942. 112 PRONI HA32/1/793 Letter from a Staff Officer of the UHG to J.C. MacDermott, 10 August 1940. 113 TNA WO199/2930 Order of Battle of the Ulster Home Guard, January 1942. 114 Ibid. Order of Battle of the 1st (Derry City) Battalion, UHG, January 1942. 115 Northern Ireland Parl. Debs, vol. 23, p. 1802, 24 July 1940. 116 PRONI PM/2/16/48 Letter of Protest from J.A. Gregg to the Prime Minister, regarding the Appointment of McCarthy O’Leary in County Tyrone, 18 February 1943. 117 Ibid., Letter from H.C. Montgomery to R. Gransden, 23 February 1943. 118 TNA CAB123/197 Composition of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 28 February 1941. 119 PRONI LA/7/3H/9 Notes on the address given by the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland District, at a Home Guard Conference, 1 July 1941. 120 For more information on Wintringham and Osterley Park see Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 71–5. 121 PRONI CAB/9/CD/85/2 Proposals for Effecting a revised Territorial Army Organisation in Northern Ireland, 24 September 1946. 122 PRONI D3703/E/2/2 Circular letter relation to the provision of TA Officers in Northern Ireland, 26 November 1947. 123 Gailey, An Account of the Territorials in Northern Ireland, p. 42. 124 Ibid., p. 75. 125 TNA DEFE24/827 Confidential Note to Roy Hattersley, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, 14 January 1970. 126 Ibid. Confidential Letter to Ivor Richards, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army, to Sir Ian Freeland, 14 January 1970. 127 TNA CJ3/117 Enclosure 1: Summary of the State of the Ulster Defence Regiment, 25 October 1972. 128 Potter, A Testimony of Courage, pp. 30–1. 129 PRONI CAB/9/G/89/4 Notes on a meeting about the UDR with Northern Ireland Ministers, 14 October 1971. 130 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, pp. 34–5. 131 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 34, col. 170, 15 December 1982. See also Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 278. 132 TNA DEFE13/816 Summary of the state of the UDR, 4 October 1972.

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133 TNA DEFE70/241 Report on a visit to HQ UDR, by Officer Commanding, Army School of Instructional Technology, October 1971. 134 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 69, cols 412–18, 11 December 1984. 135 Ibid., vol. 90, cols 351–3, 27 January 1986. 136 Ibid., vol. 176, cols 243–5, 11 July 1990.

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The rank and file

The rank and file of the auxiliary forces of Ireland, from the militia, when it was re-established in 1852, to the UDR until it was disbanded in 1992, experienced many changes. Despite this, a number of common themes may be identified throughout this whole period. In contrast to its officer corps, the Catholic population of Ireland was overrepresented in the rank and file of the militia. This was, largely, the skilled labouring class, a point which has not been fully appreciated within the Irish context. The yeomanry attracted many Protestant artisans and businessmen, providing an outlet for military service which had not previously been available, as there was no Rifle Volunteer Movement in Ireland. The OTC, VTC, and TA continued this tradition, permitting a largely Protestant middle class to serve in the ranks. From 1940, the UHG permitted a large portion of the Protestant male population in Northern Ireland to rediscover the amateur military tradition, and this brought together the working and middle classes in its ranks. Similarly the UDR, after the disbandment of the USC, continued to permit the Protestant majority, most of whom were of the working and middle classes (a significant proportion with previous military experience) to reinforce the Ulster Protestant volunteering tradition within the framework of the British Army, rather than within paramilitary organisations. The militia in Ireland relied on the working classes to fill its ranks, but this evolved significantly over time. This evolution involved a shift from a reliance on unskilled labour at the time of the Crimean War to a dependence on more skilled labour by the later nineteenth century. This was in contrast to its counterpart in Great Britain which relied on the ‘underemployed’ of society throughout its existence.1 Additionally, although the majority of men were involved in working-class occupations, a significant proportion of men were also employed in what might be deemed middle-class occupations.2 Various occupational groupings are highlighted in Table 3.1 and serve to emphasise a number of patterns regarding the militia when it was first embodied during the Crimean War. Firstly, as might be expected, in more rural provinces and counties such as King’s, there was a higher proportion of labourers than in

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The rank and file Table 3.1 Occupations of men in units embodied, 1854–60 (%)

Labourers Artisans Mechanics Shopmen/ Professions clerks North Cork Rifles Carlow Rifles Armagh Light Infantry King’s Co. Rifles

66.1 73.0 30.1 73.6

18.9 13.5 60.4 13.5

7.3 5.3 4,0 6.6

6.8 5.9 5.0 6.3

0.9 2.3 0.5 0

Table 3.2 Occupations of men in the militia, 1881–1908 (%) Labourers Artisans Mechanics Shopmen/ Professions Clerks 4th Royal Irish Rifles 4tl Royal Dublin  Fusiliers 3rd Royal Inniskilling  Fusiliers 5th Connaught Rangers Sligo Artillery Dublin City Artillery

81.5 59.3

9.1 14.3

5.1 6.3

4.0 19.2

0.3 0.9

67.8

12.9

5.2

13.4

0.7

69.5 68.1 60.5

9.7 11.6 14.1

6.6 6.9 6.3

13.3 10.8 15.0

0.9 2.6 4.1

urban areas such as Cork. The fact that there were more skilled jobs available in places like Cork demonstrates why more men were listed as artisans in the North Cork Rifles.3 The high number of artisans in Armagh resulted in a large number of weavers in the ranks of the Armagh Light Infantry. Detailed occupational information is not available for this early period in the militia’s existence, as it is for the latter half. Notwithstanding, there are other ways to demonstrate that the Irish militia fit into the pattern of the rest of the United Kingdom. For example, it was observed by the Adjutant of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia) that in the hurriedness of embodiment many of the men ‘were poor creatures from the streets of towns, who from age, wretched appearance and bad habits would not at another time have been enlisted; although in these respects the Tipperary Artillery was not so bad as other militia regiments’. Furthermore, he went on to say that over time this changed, claiming that nearly all ‘untidy’ characters were got rid of and were carefully excluded.4 The changing nature of the rank and file over time can be demonstrated in Table 3.2,5 and a number of important observations might be made. On the whole, the percentage of recruits who were classified as labourers marginally decreased over the period, with the exception of the 4th Royal Irish Rifles, which had a higher proportion because it was recruited from the industrialised area of Belfast. Detailed employment information is available for this battalion, as well as for the 4th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, which was not available

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­­ previously, and an analysis of this allows conclusions to be taken further. In Dublin, for example, a fifth of recruits were employed by only four companies. Jacob’s Biscuits employed the highest proportion, followed closely by the Guinness Brewery, as well as the Dublin Gas Company and the Dublin Tramway Company. Not all of these men were employed as labourers, which further explains why a higher percentage were shopmen or clerks. Clearly then, the vast majority of these men were not the ‘underemployed’ as has previously been assumed, but were in steady jobs.6 Similarly, the ‘better’ quality of enlistees was recorded in the 4th Royal Irish Rifles which took a quarter of its recruits from only five employers. Although listed as labourers, the employers included the Barbour Thread Mill, Belfast Tramway Company, and Murrays Tobacco Company; and, most importantly, as many as 15 per cent were employed by the shipbuilding companies Harland and Wolff and Workman, Clark and Co. The latter two employers were seen to employ ‘well paid, intelligent, and well behaved’ men.7 Colonel Waring of the 5th Royal Irish Rifles echoed this sentiment when he commented that those in the militia were generally of a better quality than those in the regular army, were generally ‘well-employed’, and joined the militia for a change or an outing.8 As a final example, even as early as 1873, it was noted when recruiting in County Armagh that there would be no difficulty in obtaining men because of the large number of handloom weavers who were ‘their own masters’ and not ‘hired agricultural labourers’, so could arrange their own working hours to fit around militia commitments.9 The point that a ‘better’ class of recruit was attracted to the militia in Ireland can be finally illustrated through the literacy rates in militia regiments. Without a doubt, the militia was disproportionately literate when compared to wider Irish society. In the census for 1871, the percentages of those able to read and write from the Counties of Cork, King’s, and Dublin were 48.5 per cent, 50.7 per cent, and 69.1 per cent respectively. When the literacy rates are taken from the attestations of those men who joined units of those counties it is found that the North Cork Rifles had a literacy rate of 51.3 per cent; the King’s County Rifles of 56.7 per cent; and the Dublin City Artillery (Militia) of 83.1 per cent.10 This shows that soldiers in Irish regiments had a higher than average standard of education. As already suggested, the question of religion, as in the officer corps, is an important aspect to consider with regard to the militia in Ireland. With this in mind it is clear that, as the officer corps was over-representative of Protestants, the rank and file had a disproportionately high Catholic representation (Table 3.3).11 This religious breakdown demonstrates that, of the nine battalions studied, only one had an over-representation of Protestants, the 3rd Royal Irish Fusiliers based in County Armagh. In contrast, the 4th Royal Irish Rifles, whose ­­recruiting

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Table 3.3 Religious breakdowns of units, with a breakdown of religion of total population for each county, 1881 (%)

8th King’s Royal Rifle Corps 3rd Royal Irish Fusiliers 4th Royal Irish Rifles 4th Royal Dublin Fusiliers 3rd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 5th Connaught Rangers Sligo Artillery (Militia) Dublin City Artillery (Militia) Londonderry Artillery (Militia)

Catholics in battalion

Catholics Protestants Protestants in county in battalion in county

94.4 32.0 51.7 96.7 58.7 98.5 94.2 94.3 57.4

88.5 46.4 25.7 79.5 55.8 96.5 90.9 79.5 44.4

5.6 68.0 48.3 3.3 41.3 1.5 5.8 5.7 42.6

11.3 50.6 71.5 19.1 39.5 3.4 8.8 19.1 55.0

district covered what would now be regarded as Greater Belfast, had the highest disproportion of Catholics amongst its ranks. This is even more striking because the area in which it was recruited was between two-thirds and three-quarters Protestant. However, this Catholic overrepresentation is hardly surprising given that, in terms of the social structure, Catholics made up the majority of the labouring class, relative to their total population.12 The Catholic population in 1871 was approximately 77 per cent, however, Catholics accounted for 87 per cent of general labourers, 90 per cent of outdoor labourers, and 86 per cent of indoor labourers. Given the militia’s social makeup, and the fact there was a large overrepresentation of Catholic men in Ireland who were employed in labouring, it is only natural that there was a large over-representation ­­ of Catholic men. This meant that, to a very large extent, it was a reflection of Irish society. Excluding Ulster, this also demonstrates the Catholic amateur tradition within the militia, as distinct from that of the auxiliary forces which would be formed during the twentieth century. As a large majority of units were made up almost entirely of Catholic men there was little threat of sectarianism within the ranks. However, where units had a religious split in their makeup, particularly those based in the North of Ireland, there appears to have been some deliberate attempt to try and avoid such incidents. In particular, in the Londonderry Artillery (Militia), where there was a Catholic/Protestant split of 60/40 in the battalion as a whole, each of the six individual companies within the battalion was also split to almost these exact figures, showing a clear attempt to stop any sectarian rivalries between companies should one be made up overwhelmingly from one of the religious groups.13 Additionally, a suggestion was made, in 1872, that it might be expedient to cross-post Catholics and Protestants between different regiments, as a way of trying to even up the numbers and reduce the chance of any trouble.14

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There were incidents in some regiments which did exacerbate sectarian tensions, in both the North and South of Ireland. For example, it was claimed that Lord Massareene, a Major in the 4th Royal Irish Rifles (a predominantly Catholic regiment), granted permission for 300 members of the regiment to attend an Orangemen celebration, and ordered the regimental band to play the party tune ‘Protestant Boys’, which offended some of the Catholic members of the band, who refused to play, but the tune was nevertheless performed.15 Other examples of Orange activities, such as marches and parades, in militia regiments were reported throughout the period.16 These were not confined to demonstrations of Protestant feeling, but examples of Catholic pride and passion were also on show. Fenianism aside, perhaps the most famous example was that of the burning of an effigy of Judge Keogh, who in 1872 had made a contested ruling against a Catholic Parliamentary candidate and caused much outrage across Ireland. The Kerry Militia’s reaction to this was even reported in Parliament, by the MP for Carlow, who stated that no less than one hundred of these men conducted and formed part of the procession. Some walked in front and acted as leaders, giving the word of command to their followers. Some formed in military array on the flank of the procession, in order to protect it from interference on the part of the authorities, and when one constable remonstrated with the persons active in that disgraceful proceeding, he was set upon and beaten by some of the soldiers of that regiment; they using for the purpose of wreaking their vengeance on him the accoutrements provided for them by the government.17

Similar scenes were reported when the North Tipperary and Westmeath Militias also burned effigies of the Judge.18 Some such protests were understandable given the treatment Catholic soldiers received in some regiments of the Irish militia. Whilst in camp in 1876, for example, no religious provision was arranged for the Catholic men of the Louth, Longford, and Monaghan Militia. A member of one of the regiments died of sunstroke and no clergyman was present to administer the last sacraments to him. Again, whilst in camp in 1883, men of the Monaghan Militia were given meat as their ration, but, it being a Friday, they refused to eat it. Little sympathy was given by the authorities to these men. A case was even taken up by Charles Stewart Parnell in Parliament after it was claimed that the Meath Militia had been refused permission to attend divine service, and instead the commanding officer had confined his men to barracks. On this occasion, Parnell went as far to say that the authorities should be sorry to say anything to arouse religious animosities, and that as an Irish Protestant he hoped that Irish Catholics in the militia would be permitted, in future, to attend such events.19 This sort of treatment did little to encourage them to join the regular army, although many did.

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It was widely considered that the militia’s primary role was to provide men for the regular army. Between 1882 and 1904, for the United Kingdom as a whole, a third of men from the militia transferred to the Line.20 This figure was broadly the same in Ireland. During its three years of embodiment, the Kerry Militia provided 325 men to the Line.21 The Armagh Light Infantry provided no fewer than 744 men to the regular army during the same period.22 In the urban areas of Belfast and Dublin, transfer rates were a little lower, confirming that many militiamen were a higher quality of recruit and far from any ‘compulsion of destitution’. During the first embodiment period, in the UK as a whole, 14,117 men from the militia had transferred to the regular army. Of these, 3,676 had come from the Irish militia.23 So, at a time when the militia from Ireland made up 21 per cent of the total strength in the UK, it provided 26 per cent of the manpower to the regular army. Even as late as 1884, the Irish militia still provided more men to the regular army than regiments based in Scotland, despite the fact that it had not recruited during the previous two years.24 All of this occurred at a time when transfer rates to the regular army had steadily decreased, the Irish contribution falling from 14 per cent of the UK total in 1899 to only 10 per cent in 1901.25 The issue of the localisation of the British Army is an important one, largely because of how significant this was for helping to provide a direct link to society, and has received some attention from historians of the period. By the end of the Cardwell–Childers reforms in 1881, only 48 per cent of militiamen who joined the regular army joined their linked regular unit.26 From 1855 to 1881 Irish militiamen who joined the regular army fitted into this pattern, at a time when there were only minimal local links that encouraged men to join specific units. This is most evident when looking at the North Cork Rifles and their record of men joining a regular battalion from 1860 to 1880. Of those who did transfer, 30.6 per cent joined the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, the unit to which it would be linked under the Cardwell reforms. The rest of the men joined a total of fiftyseven other regular battalions; this included a fairly high number to the Royal Artillery, with a smaller number to the 18th Foot and 87th Foot, both with Irish links. Similarly, men from the Carlow Rifles joined a total of forty-six different regular battalions, many joining the Royal Artillery and Irish regiments.27 It was recorded that the vast majority of those who enlisted in the regular army from the Monaghan Militia joined the 47th Foot, associated with Lancashire, or the 46th Foot, associated with South Devon.28 From this, it is clear that there was a degree of regional variation, and this is further accentuated by a report of 1878. By this time, the Monaghan Militia provided 86 per cent of its recruits to its linked regiment, and the South Mayo Rifles gave 83 per cent to its linked regiment. In contrast, the Longford Light Infantry, Queen’s County Rifles, and Westmeath Rifles provided no men to

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linked regiments. The report does show, however, that this fits the pattern for the rest of the United Kingdom: the percentages of men who joined a linked regiment from England, Scotland, and Ireland was 34 per cent, 34.7 per cent, and 34.8 per cent respectively.29 After the Cardwell–Childers reforms were implemented, however, the Irish militia became proportionately better at providing men to linked regiments, and especially to Irish regiments. The lowest percentage of any Irish infantry unit was the former Antrim Militia, which had links to the Royal Irish Rifles, where only 45 per cent of those who joined a regular regiment joined the aforementioned unit, slightly lower than the accepted average. By comparison, the highest percentage of men who joined their linked regiment came from the Fermanagh Militia, linked with the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers: 79 per cent of men joined this unit. What this exemplifies again, however, is the ­­considerable regional differences in the numbers who actually did join their linked unit. What is important about this is that such a high percentage of men joined an Irish as opposed to a British regiment. Once more, the former Antrim Militia had the lowest percentage, but this was still as high as 80 per cent; as many as 91 per cent of the former Dublin City Militia joined the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. With Ireland’s unique relationship with the British Army it is important to recognise this fact. It demonstrates how important a ‘national’ as well as ‘local’ identity was in the Irish context, and shows at least a degree of success for the localisation schemes conducted by the authorities. A final area to address with regard to the rank and file of the militia is the number of men involved, and how this compared with the rest of the United Kingdom. The first period to consider is that of the first embodiment. This is because the Irish militia was asked to provide more than its population share because the quotas had not been revised after the Famine in the 1840s. Despite this, the Irish response to the call to arms was viewed as rather satisfactory; for example, in February 1855 The Times reported that the Armagh Light Infantry had become so popular that ‘without a doubt the full complement of recruits to complete the regiment will be obtained this month’, and similar reports were made about the Fermanagh, Antrim, and Galway Militias.30 As a result, by 1858, fourteen regiments had met their quotas; a further thirty-three had not, but four of these were only ten men below establishment.31 The quotas completed by Irish militia regiments do not appear to show a very satisfactory return. However, when put into the context of the rest of the United Kingdom, they paint a very different picture. English militia regiments managed to complete only twenty quotas, leaving eighty incomplete, and in Scotland only three quotas were complete, with another fourteen left incomplete. Thus, the Irish militia performed much more satisfactorily than was

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believed at the time, and this was shown again when twelve of the thirty regiments re-embodied during the Indian Mutiny were Irish regiments. After the period of embodiment Irish regiments, like their British counterparts, were permitted to remain intact and embark on recruitment and annual training. However, from 1868 until 1873 it was not deemed safe enough in Ireland to conduct annual training, owing to the ‘disturbed nature of the country’ due to the threat of Fenianism. As a result of this, very little recruiting took place. This meant that, until 1873, there are no figures available for recruiting, and annual training was cancelled. However, the figures from this point onwards show that, although there was no training for five years, the strength for the first year was just over 25,000, at a time when the establishment of the Irish militia had been set at a little over thirty thousand. This meant that it was 22.5 per cent short of its establishment. In comparison, the establishment in England was eighty thousand but in practice the force stood at approximately seventy thousand, 14 per cent short of establishment, and Scotland stood at 4.9 per cent short.32 By 1880, despite the lack of annual training and recruitment, the Irish militia was only two thousand men below establishment, meaning that its deficit was reduced to only 8 per cent.33 From 1885 to 1905, the recruitment of the militia, in Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, was subject to high degrees of fluctuation (see Table 3.4).34 The establishments in England and Scotland remained on similar lines; however, in Ireland in the early 1880s, with the threat of the Land War and the cancellation of further training, the number of recruits took another downturn. Annual training was an important part of the attraction to recruits when considering whether to join the militia, and so had a significant impact on the number of recruits attracted to the force. The Irish statistics can also be viewed as somewhat of a surprise given that, in a report of 1890, it was finally recognised that the Irish quotas were far in excess of what they should have been, and it was recommended that they should be halved. Taking these high quotas into consideration, the Irish performance, in terms of numbers of men, was above that asked. However, the fact that there was no Rifle Volunteer Force in Ireland would undoubtedly have had an impact in terms of increasing the numbers who joined, and given the class of recruit that the militia in Ireland was able to attract. Table 3.4 Percentages short of establishments by country, 1885–1905

1885 1890 1895 1900 1905

England

Scotland

Ireland

12.1 14.5 12.7 29.4 25.3

6.7 16.5 8.0 21.2 26.9

27.6 19.2 18.1 33.5 31.0

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Given the unjustified feeling by the authorities that the Irish militia was not able to provide enough men and was far below its establishment, there were examples of ways in which individual regiments attempted to attract recruits, sometimes with little success. George Rowan-Hamilton, for example, remarked in September 1871 that he ‘went to Killyleagh yesterday, for the purpose of recruiting. We had immense fun, such chuff. All the women abusing us like pickpockets, and hauling away our recruits as fast as we got them. We did very well though, we got five men.’35 This view of women was echoed in 1904 when it was believed that there was a need to ‘get over the great dread and dislike there is against the militia amongst the women; the mothers and wives having the greatest dislike to allowing their men to enlist’.36 A number of units tried fairly new and innovative ways to combat this and attract more recruits; an example of this was the Cavan Militia. This regiment bought advertising space in the local nationalist newspaper, the Anglo-Celt, and a series of fortnightly advertisements included information such as where to enlist, what sort of man was required, and how many days’ service were expected, saying that those enlisting ‘will be well paid and made comfortable’. This continued for nearly two years in the paper, but does not seem to have had any dramatic effect on numbers.37 In 1906, the South Down Militia carried out its annual recruiting march around the county, showing that these old-fashioned methods were still being employed. However, it encountered much nationalist anti-recruiting propaganda as, along the route, ‘it found every mile of the road placarded with warnings to young Irishmen not to be entrapped’.38 In response the Colonel of the regiment composed a pamphlet ‘to counteract to some extent the seditious placards against joining the South Down Militia’.39 What can be deduced from these examples is that it is hardly surprising that Irish militia regiments were so far below their required establishment, and this broadly falls in line with the decline in numbers of Irishmen who joined the regular army at this time.40 Coupled with the fact that the quotas were never fully revised to reflect Ireland’s changing population demographic, and that seditious anti-recruiting propaganda began to be employed, it is a wonder that recruiting levels were as high as they were. The Irish Imperial Yeomanry, unlike the militia, never experienced problems when attempting to obtain the required number of men to fill its ranks. This is just one of the many differences between these two auxiliary forces and ­­highlights the competing amateur traditions, and a difference in military culture in Ireland. The rank and file of the yeomanry fall under the re-emerging Protestant volunteering tradition, which fed the desire of many middle-class men, mainly professionals, who wished to take part in amateur soldiery and had not previously been given the opportunity in the Rifle Volunteers. This was in stark contrast to the Catholic amateur tradition seen in the militia, which had relied so heavily on the labouring classes to fill its ranks.

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The rank and file Table 3.5 Occupations of Irish Imperial Yeomanry who served in South Africa, 1900–2 (%)

Labourers Artisans Mechanics Shopmen/ Professions Landed clerks gentry 45th(Dublin)  Company, 13th Battalion 46th(Belfast)  Company, 12th Battalion 54th(Belfast)  Company, 13th Battalion 134th (Irish)  Company, 29th Battalion

3.9

4.6

4.6

9.3

42.1

35.5

1.1

14.8

15.7

27.8

35.1

5.5

2.8

22.4

15.9

33.6

20.6

4.7

2.1

23.5

23.4

18.1

29.7

3.2

When the occupational background of the recruits of the Irish yeomanry during the South African War is assessed, the difference between it and the militia is clear. As Table 3.5 shows,41 a significant proportion of the men who served in Irish Yeomanry companies in South Africa came from gentry, professional, or office backgrounds, with only an insignificant percentage drawn from the labouring class. These findings are at odds with those of Richard Price, who claims that a large proportion of those in the Imperial Yeomanry were from the working class.42 Naturally, the 45th (Dublin) Company, the Hunt Contingent, or ‘Millionaires’ Own’, had a much higher percentage of landed gentry (or more specifically a large proportion of sons of landowners) within its ranks, and, given that this was truly an ‘elite’ formation, this is not surprising.43 The percentage of landed gentry is much lower in the other companies, but the fact that the yeomanry throughout this time was largely middle class in composition is clear to see. Importantly, it is also clear that, once again, there was a difference in the composition of the yeomanry in Ireland and in the rest of the United Kingdom. As has been demonstrated in recent years by Stephen Miller and George Hay, many of those ­­volunteers to the Imperial Yeomanry in Britain were from either a farming background or an urban working-class background, this latter grouping even rising to as high as 75 per cent of the force by the Third Contingent.44 It is clear that this was never the case in Ireland, where the higher ‘quality’ of volunteers was maintained throughout all three contingents, although the Earl of Longford remarked when reporting on his attempts to raise the Third Contingent that ‘the small sporting gentleman, so conspicuous among the Yeomen of 1900, hardly

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appeared at all’. Instead there were ‘a sprinkling of middle class youths’, in his view not as well equipped for yeomanry service.45 Other evidence might be cited to reinforce this social composition. For example, in one account of the training of the 45th Company, it was stated that a discussion was commenced regarding what the role of the yeomanry would be when it reached South Africa. It was claimed by the author that one speaker asserted that they should be used in a scouting role, because ‘you know, we’ll be so much more intelligent than the ordinary Tommy’, and this was met with wholehearted agreement by the other men.46 Moreover, in another striking example, it was reported in one Belfast newspaper during the recruiting period for the First Contingent that a Mr Gerald Fitzgibbon, an insurance broker, had asked for an injunction to stop Mr John Charles Lyons from going to South Africa with the Imperial Yeomanry, because he held a life insurance policy.47 The ordinary militiaman would not have been able to afford such a luxury. A re-emergence of the Protestant volunteering tradition is clear when the religious data is assessed. What is most striking is that no Catholics at all had enlisted in the 46th (Belfast) Company, which was part of the First Contingent. Furthermore, even when Catholics were present their numbers were almost negligible, and begin a pattern that would be seen in future amateur forces. Of course, the 45th (Dublin) Company had a higher proportion of Catholics in its  ranks, given its designation as a southern Irish Company rather than one based in Ulster. In this company, a quarter of the men came from Dublin itself, and the others came from twenty-five other counties, particularly Cork, Tipperary, and Westmeath. Interestingly, in the other three companies sampled, over 80 per cent of the men came from within Ulster (Table 3.6). The success of recruiting in Ulster during the South African War and up to the First World War is worth exploring further. During the war in South Africa, for instance, for the Second Contingent, out of a total of 767 men attested, 582 had done so in Belfast, 155 in Dublin, and thirty from the Curragh district.48 It was stated that, of a total of 2,016 men recruited for the Irish contingent up to May 1901, 1,741 had been furnished from Belfast. However, this was because ‘political and religious matters and questions had a very unfortunate effect on recruiting in the South and West of Ireland’.49 In addition to this, when Tom Byrne, a Table 3.6 Religious breakdown of Irish Imperial Yeomanry who served in South Africa, 1900–2 (%)

45th (Dublin) Company, 13th Battalion 46th (Belfast) Company, 12th Battalion 54th (Belfast) Company, 13th Battalion 134th (Irish) Company, 29th Battalion

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Protestant

Catholic

83.2 100.0 94.4 94.7

16.8 0 5.6 5.3

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member of the Boer ‘Irish Brigade’ serving in South Africa, witnessed the arrival of the men of the 13th Battalion at Maschadopp after their capture, he recalled that he recognised a few of them, and they had been recruited almost exclusively from the North of Ireland, and for this reason did not want to go near them.50 Recruiting numbers in Belfast were so high, compared to the number of men actually required, that a rigorous selection process was carried out and, of those 2,016 men enlisted, a total of 1,268 were rejected for reasons such as inadequate shooting or lack of ability to ride a horse.51 Furthermore, such large numbers of the RIC based in Belfast wished to join the Imperial Yeomanry that restrictions were put in place, meaning that only fifteen men were permitted to enlist.52 This pattern of recruitment continued beyond 1902, further demonstrating the strength of the emergent Protestant tradition. In 1913, it was reported that, despite the fact that the four squadron headquarters of the North Irish Horse were situated across Ulster, with thirty-two drill stations in support of them, there was never any difficulty in obtaining recruits. In fact, it was believed that double the number required could be enlisted, and this meant that they could ‘pick and choose’, the vast majority of those chosen being farmers and farmers’ sons.53 Of course, this was a very similar demographic to those who made up the ranks of certain formations of the UVF, such as the Enniskillen Horse, and there were certainly close links between these two organisations. There is evidence to suggest that members of the North Irish Horse presented themselves as mounted guards for senior Unionist figures, and one trooper, Hugh Bennett, was a section leader of the Dungannon Battalion of the UVF.54 The establishment of the OTC in Ireland provided an additional outlet for the sons of middle-class men to express their interest in the amateur tradition. Once more, this was predominantly a Protestant vocation, but a significant proportion of the Dublin University Officers’ Training Corps was Catholic, despite claims to the contrary.55 Specifically, an analysis of all men who passed through the DUOTC during the First World War demonstrates that 13.4 per cent were Catholic, four men were Jewish, and the rest were of varying Protestant denominations.56 When the corps remained briefly in existence between 1920 and 1922, the enrolment books show that 11.3 per cent of the men were Catholic, and still took part in military activities. As many as 4 per cent of the corps were Jewish, whilst the rest were Protestant.57 Unsurprisingly, the Queen’s University, Belfast OTC was mainly composed of Protestants, although as many as 7.5 per cent were Catholic.58 Despite some Catholic participation this was undoubtedly an expression of the Protestant volunteering tradition. The fact that the amateur military tradition was evolving into a middleclass activity is reinforced when the occupational data of the fathers of those students involved in the OTC is assessed. In Belfast, significant numbers of students’ fathers were accountants (5 per cent), clerks (5.2 per cent), merchants

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(8 per cent), and managers (5.8 per cent). Interestingly, 13.5 per cent considered themselves as farmers, but on the census records it is not always clear whether this was as a gentleman farmer or a tenant.59 In Dublin, as many as 11 per cent were barristers or solicitors, and 9.4 per cent classed themselves as gentlemen. There were also significant numbers of doctors (8.2 per cent), clerks (7 per cent), and clergymen (5.8 per cent). Nearly half were from the Dublin area, and 92 per cent were actually born in Ireland, demonstrating that this was very much an Irish vocation to pursue.60 Training men for commissions into the regular army was one of the key tasks of the OTC. The DUOTC Handbook stated that the objective was to provide a standardised measure of elementary military training for students, with a view to their eventually applying for a commission.61 It is perhaps surprising that although there were school OTCs in Ireland, very few joined the university contingents with this previous experience, as was the case in Great Britain. Despite this, both contingents had little trouble in recruiting students to take part in the corps. At Queen’s University, Belfast, it was noted that the movement had been taken up with such enthusiasm that within a few months 156 cadets had been enrolled and three companies established.62 When the corps was eventually established in Dublin in 1910 it was noted that, within a few weeks, two hundred men had enrolled, and in a little over a year this had increased to 350.63 In fact, in two years, in all units (Engineering, Infantry, and Medical) no fewer than 510 students had gone through the DUOTC.64 Even at its last camp in 1921 it was noted that the strength of the corps was 230.65 In comparison to other OTCs, such as the University of London, which had a strength of 827 cadets in 1910, those at Belfast and Dublin were much smaller, although bigger than those at places such as Leeds, Birmingham, and Manchester.66 As a result, fewer students took up commissions in the forces. Bowman and Connelly have noted that the primary role of the OTC was an abject failure before August 1914 as so few cadets had taken up a commission. In 1913, for example, sixty-five cadets took a commission in the forces from the University of London OTC, an increase from forty-two in the previous year.67 From the Belfast contingent, only sixty-two cadets had taken commissions in the period 1908–14. Of these, fifty-one were to Irish Special Reserve battalions, and the other eleven to Territorial Force units. Importantly, thirty-six cadets had joined the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), demonstrating the dominance of the Medical Faculty at the university.68 Similarly, at the DUOTC, thirty-seven cadets had taken commissions in the Special Reserve, sixteen in the Territorial Force, and thirteen in the regular forces. It is important to note here that, before the OTC was established in Dublin, the University had the power to nominate up to twelve students per year for commissions.69 With the outbreak of war in August 1914, significant numbers of men passed through the OTC in Ireland and throughout the United Kingdom.

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In Belfast, of those who had formed part of the OTC before the outbreak of war, at least 53 per cent gained a commission during the course of the war. Of these, a quarter served in an Irish regiment, whilst another quarter joined the RAMC.70  Furthermore, at least eighteen of these served in the 36th (Ulster) Division, a significant number of whom served in the 8th Royal Irish Rifles, whose adjutant, J.D.M. McCallum, had been the adjutant of the OTC at Queen’s University, Belfast.71 If this is put into context, however, nearly as many cadets were commissioned into the King’s Liverpool Regiment, indicating that there was no absolute link between the OTC in Belfast and the 36th (Ulster) Division. In relation to the 16th (Irish) Division, Terence Denman has established that, up to October 1914, thirty-four of the ninety-six officer appointments had come from the DUOTC.72 During the rest of the war, only an additional seven officers directly joined the Division from the OTC. In general terms, a third of all commissions from the DUOTC went to those who joined an Irish regiment. For example, double the number of officers joined the 10th (Irish) Division than had joined the 16th (Irish) Division. A further 14 per cent joined the RAMC, and 10 per cent joined the Artillery, whilst 8 per cent of officers were commissioned into the Royal Engineers.73 Unfortunately, little information survives on the VTC rank and file in Ireland, although the likelihood is that it differed very little from that of the rest of the United Kingdom. That is, it was primarily made up of middle-class professionals who otherwise could not serve in the regular army, at least prior to the conscription element introduced in Britain from 1916.74 In addition, in Ireland, the VTC had significant competition with the INV and UVF, which hindered its ability to recruit. For the Territorial Army in Northern Ireland before 1939, owing to its relatively small size, candidates were rigorously tested, similarly to candidates for the yeomanry. When it began recruiting on 7 August 1937, a crowd of three to four hundred men assembled in order to put their names down for selection. Many of these original candidates were not considered suitable and were not accepted. By the end of October 1937, the 188th (Antrim) Battery had 105 recruits, over half of whom had previous military experience, and this appears to have been the most favoured, regardless of social origin.75 With the establishment of the UHG the amateur military tradition in Ireland continued. This was a continuation of the Protestant volunteering tradition as seen in the yeomanry, and, to a large extent, the OTC and VTC. Many similarities may be found with regard to occupational backgrounds, age profiles, and the numbers of men joining the rank and file, in comparison with the militia and yeomanry of previous years, and with that of the rest of the United Kingdom. Thus, a strong volunteering tradition was still present in Ulster, despite the lack

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of conscription and problems with regular army recruiting. Of course, the UHG acted as a draft finding body to the regular army in a manner not dissimilar to the militia. Additionally, it is clear that a number of men had previously served in Irish regiments, the Special Reserve, the yeomanry, or even the militia, further demonstrating the continuation of the amateur tradition.76 The occupational background of members of the UHG allows for important observations to be made in comparison to previous amateur forces in Ireland, and permits an assessment of how representative of Ulster society it was. Unsurprisingly, Lord Glentoran, the Minister for Agriculture and a private in the UHG, was an exception when it came to the social background of the force.77 Although specific occupational breakdowns are not available for every company of the UHG, it is possible to make some observations with the available data from surviving muster rolls, mainly from the Antrim battalions of the UHG. In a company in a large provincial town, Ballymena, a wide range of different occupations were recorded for the 189 men concerned. These included: labourers (eighteen), clerks (twenty), bankers (thirteen), merchants (six), solicitors (four), and grocers (four).78 Similarly, for the Newtownards Company of the UHG, of the 178 for whom there are occupational data there were: labourers (thirty-one), mechanics (five), clerks (twelve), butchers (four), and grocers (four).79 Amongst the other towns in Antrim, such as Antrim town itself, Larne in East Antrim, and Lisburn in South Antrim, men with comparable occupations were listed.80 In the rural areas of County Antrim, as might be expected, the majority of the companies were made up of men who listed their occupation as ‘farmer’ or ‘farm labourer’, such as the Craigywarren and Cloughmills Companies, situated just north of Ballymena, or the Bushmills Company, situated in the far north of the county; this company also included a large number of fishermen and distillery workers among its ranks.81 This takes into account the specific occupational breakdowns of only one county of Northern Ireland; however, it is clear that, broadly speaking, these results were very similar across the Province. When commenting on the UHG and its initial recruiting in 1940, Charles Wickham stated that ‘many men in business, in industry, and in the farming community immediately joined the force’.82 Furthermore, in a radio broadcast in February 1942, Major May commented that the UHG had obtained a large proportion of men from industries and from the land.83 Even in the official history of the war in Northern Ireland, it was claimed that men came ‘from the fields and the factories, from trade, industry and agriculture, government offices and line houses, from the hills and the valleys’.84 With these points in mind, it can be said that the UHG in County Antrim was at least representative of the rest of Northern Ireland. With this in mind, how did this compare with the occupational backgrounds of those in the Home Guard of Great Britain? Many of the problems with

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r­­ ecruitment to the UHG did not exist in Northern Ireland, as they did in Britain, in particular concern about the admittance of left-wing, possibly ‘subversive’, elements, subscribing to the idea of a ‘people’s militia’.85 The UHG was much more concerned with the admission of Catholics. Broadly speaking, however, the same sections of society were represented, at least in terms of occupational profile. There was certainly a clear correlation with the Imperial Yeomanry which, as it will be remembered, largely consisted of shopmen or clerks and professionals. Similar parallels were also present in the social composition of the OTC and VTC during the First World War. It is clear that the controversies over the UHG being raised as part of the B Specials had a lasting impact on the religious composition, i.e. Catholic participation, in the force, resulting in almost complete apathy towards it. Even as early as 29 May 1940, The Irish News, the leading Belfast nationalist newspaper, had commented that the UHG, on the lines along which it had been raised, could not possess the confidence of the whole population.86 Only a few days later, the Labour Party in Belfast had declared that it did not approve of the force for similar reasons.87 By June 1940, it was stated in Stormont that, because recruiting was conducted through the B Specials at a county level, open discrimination had occurred, with a result that a large section of the population felt that all those under the police force were sectarian and politically motivated.88 These sorts of accusations continued into 1941 after the ongoing use of euphemisms by Unionist politicians, relating to the fact that ‘loyal’ and ‘trusted’ men had been selected to join the force. In Stormont, the definition of ’loyal’ was questioned by a Nationalist MP, and it was stated that recruiting for the Ulster Special Constabulary and UHG was purely a political issue.89 By this time, the government in London had become involved in some of the controversies surrounding the UHG and questions were asked with regard to the number of Catholics in the force. Previously it has been accepted that very few Catholics had joined the UHG, but that it was not a 100 per cent Protestant force.90 At the time, it was claimed that ‘quite a considerable number of Catholics’ had been recruited, but no definitive number could be given because religion had not been asked upon attestation, and previous historiography has gone along with this assumption.91 However, upon insistence from London, the civil authorities in Northern Ireland were able to come up with a figure of 150 Catholics in the force, mainly in Newry, north Antrim, Derry, and Tyrone. It was admitted that this was an ‘inconsiderable’ figure, but that there was no question of Catholic applicants having been rejected on the grounds of religion; it was more to do with a sense of apathy towards the force.92 In many ways, this figure is astounding, and, although it may not have been a 100 per cent Protestant force, the Northern Ireland government was prepared to admit that little more than 0.5 per cent of the UHG were not of this denomination.

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This rather paltry figure shows a complete contrast to the militia of the nineteenth century and, therefore, the final and complete departure from an all ‘Irish’ amateur military tradition. These findings reaffirm the idea, and confirm a re-emergence, of a distinct Protestant volunteering tradition. This, of course, dating as far back as the 1600s, was evident in the yeomanry of the late eighteenth century, and re-emerged in the early part of the twentieth century with the establishment of the Imperial Yeomanry in the North of Ireland. The UHG provided an opportunity for this Protestant tradition to re-establish itself within the British military framework after a lull at the end of the First World War, doing so at the expense of Catholic participation, and possible increases in numbers and efficiency, within the force. Away from religious issues, for the first time in the history of amateur forces in Ireland, the UHG was able to enlist employers’ support. This came in the form of the establishment of utility companies in and around the Belfast area. There were approximately twenty-five different Companies of the UHG, and these included the BBC, Belfast Newsletter, Mackie’s Foundry, the Ormeau Bakery, the Sirocco Works, the Law Courts, and Short and Harland’s aircraft factory. In total, these companies consisted of over two thousand men, a significant proportion of the force. When civil servants were permitted to join the force in 1943, this further added to the pool of men that could be drawn from, and in the same year continued suggestions were made to induce County Councils, Chambers of Commerce, the Farmers’ Union, churches, Trade Unions, banks, and big employers of labour to encourage their men to take an interest in the force and give their members every opportunity to join.93 At its height in November 1940, the strength of the UHG (including the B Specials) was 39,388 men. This number went into steady decline throughout 1941, until, in January 1942, there were a total of 36,060 men in the force.94 The main reasons for this decline were that throughout the latter half of 1941 battalions had been conducting a systematic process of eliminating men who had not been attending training.95 Although there were constant fluctuations regarding the numbers in the UHG, it is certain that its strength never reached establishment, despite the success of recruiting campaigns throughout the war. An absence of conscription into the force, as seen in Great Britain, meant that a continued decline occurred after it had reached its peak until its ‘stand down’ in 1944. It was claimed that the disparity between strength and establishment was general to all counties in Northern Ireland, but not general to areas within each county. For example, in County Down, the fact that strength was nine hundred below establishment was attributed to a Catholic reluctance to join in the Newry District.96 Although detailed figures for districts within counties are not available, a comprehensive county return was carried out in January 1942, and, when this is cross-referenced with the census returns of Northern Ireland for 1937, a number of interesting observations may be made. As has already been established, the

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Table 3.7 Strength of the Ulster Home Guard by county, with a percentage of the male population, and percentage of the Protestant male population, 1942 Number of UHG Belfast (borough  and district) Antrim Armagh Down Fermanagh Londonderry  (borough and district) Tyrone Total

 7,505 (incl. Utility  Companies)  4,712  4,477  5,054  3,347  5,656  5,269 36,020

% of male population

% of Protestant male population

3.7

5.8

4.9 8.2 4.9 11.6 8.0

6.9 17.8 8.9 31.7 16.9

8.0 5.8

19.5 9.5

number of Catholics in the UHG was negligible, which is why an analysis of the percentage of the total male and total Protestant male population has been carried out (Table 3.7).97 From this analysis it is clear that a disparity existed between the numbers of men who joined the force in each county. Perhaps understandably, the three counties with the lowest population had the highest percentages of men enlisted. This was because the numbers required for these counties was higher, as they were considered strategically more important. They were the three border counties most at risk, both because they were in closer proximity to Eire and also because they were the more rural areas and so more susceptible to an airborne invasion. Furthermore, particularly in the case of County Fermanagh, the guarding of specific strategic targets, such as aerodromes, was necessary, and so there was a greater demand for men there. In the absence of conscription some of these statistics are rather impressive, and compare favourably with those of the rest of Great Britain. In the semiofficial history of the force, Charles Graves even called the recruiting efforts in Ulster ‘amazing’.98 Percentages in some of the Northern Irish counties were similar to those of the Home Guard of Great Britain for the male population before conscription was introduced.99 However, if only the Protestant male population is taken, the Northern Irish contribution is much more significant. Of course, there are problems with analysing only one section of the population, but is clear that, at least from a Protestant point of view, the contribution to the war effort was much higher than has previously been appreciated. By 1942, recruiting into the UHG and the regular forces was at a standstill but this does not mean that no men joined the regular service at all. In fact, like previous amateur forces, the UHG acted as a stepping stone for some when deciding

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to join the regular army, albeit on a much smaller scale. In the 1st (Derry City) Battalion UHG, for example, it was recorded that during the course of the war 450 members of the battalion had joined the regular armed services.100 Also, in the 4th (Belfast) Battalion UHG, between July 1942 and December 1943 a total of forty-one members had joined the armed forces, mainly the RAF.101 Similarly, in the 3rd (Down) Battalion UHG in 1943, a total of forty-three men had joined the armed forces, split evenly between the army and the RAF.102 Although this provides only a snapshot of the numbers of men who joined the armed forces, it provides clear evidence that the UHG proved to be an alternative route into the regular forces, and, despite a lack of conscription, was able to provide a taste of military life which became a draw for some. It has been noted that gradually, especially after the introduction of conscription in Great Britain, the Home Guard became younger in its composition whilst also including fewer men with previous military experience.103 Again, despite a lack of conscription in the country, the UHG followed a similar pattern. It is certainly true that large numbers of men were older than thirty-five when the force was established in 1940, but throughout the war many more men under this age were attracted.104 In the Ballymena Company the average age of men when they joined the force was thirty-one. Two-thirds of the Company were under thirty-five, and a third of these were under twenty-five.105 Even more strikingly, 75 per cent of men of the Hillmount Company, situated just west of Ballymena, were under the age of twenty-five.106 Additionally, the Newtownards Company in County Down had an average age of only twenty-five throughout the course of the war, and almost half of these men were twenty years or younger when they joined the force; many were even as young as sixteen.107 This younger demographic is an important observation, as it demonstrates the continued willingness of younger members of Northern Irish society to play their part in home defence, and perhaps shows that the degree of apathy towards the war was not as pronounced as was once thought. Furthermore, a comparison might again be made with regard to previous amateur forces in Ireland: although the average age of the force was higher than in the past, a considerable proportion of men under the age of twenty years were still attracted to amateur soldiery, a continuation of what had once been in both amateur forces of the British Army as well as in the UVF.108 It is also important to recognise that, although the preponderance of men with military experience declined throughout the war, a significant number of men at the birth of the force had a military background. In particular, it was recorded that a large number of veterans of the 10th (Irish), 16th (Irish), and, most notably, 36th (Ulster) Divisions, had formed the backbone of the UHG (and the USC before it), having also been a driving force behind its original establishment.109 Importantly, this falls in line with findings with regard to the Home Guard in Great Britain where, in some cases, units were composed almost

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entirely of men who had served during the First World War.110 Veterans of the First World War were not the only men who volunteered their services, with the Protestant amateur military tradition still forming some part of this force. A proportion of men, by default of the more advanced age of the UHG, had also been a part of the Special Reserve in Ireland; had been in the North and South Irish Horse; during university had been in the Officers’ Training Corps; and had also formed part of the Territorial Army in Northern Ireland before the outbreak of war.111 Gradually this type of man became less common, but their contribution was nevertheless significant during the early days of the force and continued to be so until it was stood down in 1944. As with the majority of the UHG, few occupational or religious data are available for a detailed study of the TA in Northern Ireland post-1945. However, some surviving official records do point to the fact that its composition had changed little, when compared to recent incarnations of amateur forces. In the early 1950s, officials took great care to discover the numbers of men in reserved occupations, should a major conflict occur. It was discovered that, in Belfast, a small proportion of men worked for Harland and Wolff, whilst a significant proportion outside Belfast were farmers or labourers.112 As a high proportion of shipyard workers were Protestant, these observations point to the fact that the TA remained a Protestant vocation and fitted into this volunteer tradition. The significant problem that the TA had in Northern Ireland was its inability, especially immediately after the Second World War, to recruit anywhere close to its establishment. In January 1950, it had reached only 23 per cent of its establishment, with a strength of 2,689. It was estimated that 1.29 per cent of the Northern Irish population was in the TA, but this was the same proportion as in Scotland, which also supplied men for National Service, an obligation not required of men in Northern Ireland. It was argued that the reason for these poor figures was that there were not enough men of the required age to fulfil both commitments for the TA and for the USC.113 This was not helped when the Home Guard was re-established for a brief period at this time. Some of these recruiting problems seem to have disappeared by the late 1960s, when the strength of the TA was approximately six thousand.114 Successive defence cuts then decreased the establishment of the TA, and by the late 1970s its strength sat at three thousand, compared to an establishment of 3,800.115 The fact that it was still under establishment is perhaps surprising given that, although the TA now competed with the UDR for recruits, the pay and benefits system were better, a point often remarked upon by those in the UDR. However, when the UDR was established, some men did transfer directly from the TA.116 Despite some of these problems, the TA in Northern Ireland survived, and still proves to be popular. In July 2013, it was estimated that the average soldier in the UK spent four years in reserve forces, whereas in Northern Ireland the

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­­ average was twelve years. As a testament to the continued popularity of part-time soldiers, while representing 4 per cent of UK reserves, it also represented more than 20 per cent of reserve personnel when on overseas deployment.117 From January 1970, however, significant numbers of part-time soldiers had been required at home. When the Hunt Commission published its report on its recommendations for the USC in October 1969, it was decided that the force should be disbanded, and a locally recruited part-time force, under the control of the General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, should be raised to replace it. The sectarian nature of the USC had been an issue for quite some time, not only because it was a force dominated by Protestants but also because it was administered by the Unionist government in Stormont.118 This situation had meant that the UHG was similar in composition, as has already been discussed, but as the Troubles flared up in late 1968 it quickly became unjustifiable to allow this police force to be administered from Stormont. The Hunt Report identified that one of the most important aspects to consider was the control and administration of any force and, for what was to become the UDR, this meant being under control of the military authorities. In turn, it was thought that this would instil confidence in all sections of the community and ultimately lead to a situation whereby more Catholics would join the ranks of the RUC, and also offer themselves for service in this new part-time force.119 The force was officially inaugurated in Belfast on New Year’s Day 1970, initially formed of seven battalions, one for each of the counties and another for Belfast itself. The colonel commandant of the new regiment, Sir John Anderson, stated on this occasion that for it to be a success both Protestants and Catholics should join the force and no effort would be spared to achieve this end. Anderson made it clear that application forms were available from regular army unit centres, public libraries, post offices, and police stations, and that the first two applicants received were from Catholics. He hoped that this might represent a willingness on behalf of the minority in the community to participate in making the UDR a non-sectarian body.120 By 23 January 1970 it was reported that a quarter of all applicants to the UDR were Catholic, already a little under the intended target.121 Within two weeks, in private at least, it was acknowledged that there was already a trend showing that the number of Catholic applicants was decreasing. By this time it was already down to 22 per cent, at a time when applications from former USC and RUC members were increasing.122 This trend would only continue as the months passed. As Table 3.8 shows,123 Catholic applications had already decreased to only 19 per cent by March 1970, but this varied by county. It is no coincidence that the lowest percentage of Catholic applicants came from the three border counties

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Protestant (Including USC) Catholic Others Total applicants Catholic population % in 1961

350 (80.1) 174 (39.6) 85 (19.45) 2 (0.45) 437 24.4

Antrim 454 (88.5) 353 (68.8) 57 (11.1) 2 (0.4) 513 47.3

Armagh 411 (62.46) 53 (8.05) 233 (35.4) 14 (2.12) 658 27.5

Belfast 263 (73.25) 155 (43.17) 93 (25.9) 3 (0.85) 359 28.6

Down 371 (93.45) 317 (80.05) 25 (6.31) 0 396 53.2

Fermanagh 423 (73.31) 311 (53.9) 149 (25.82) 5 (0.86) 577 42.6

Londonderry

913 (89.5) 742 (72.67) 105 (10.29) 3 (0.21) 1,021 54.8

Tyrone

Table 3.8 Religious composition of UDR applicants, March 1970, number and (%)

3,197 (80.9) 2,115 (53.2) 749 (19) 30 (0.76) 3,976 34.9

Total

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most at risk of Fermanagh, Tyrone, and Armagh, which also had the highest percentage of USC applicants, as well as highest Catholic populations. Moreover, these counties, during the Second World War, had been those with the highest number of UHG members, reinforcing the rural role that the UDR was to play and highlighting the continued importance of amateur forces in these areas. Roy Hattersley, at the time a Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, commented in April 1970 that a ‘proper balance’ in the regiment should be a priority and that Catholic participation should be as near to 30 per cent as possible. It was suggested that recruitment should continue irrespective of religion until the strength of the force reached four thousand. At that point a policy of preference should be implemented to ensure Catholic applicants had priority, unless an individual Protestant held military qualifications that made his membership of the UDR particularly desirable.124 Within the Ministry of Defence, these suggestions were not positively received, partly because it was feared that they would lead to Protestant discontent, so the situation remained unchanged. By October 1972, a total of 18,963 had applied: of these 16,697 (88 per cent) were Protestant, leaving only 12 per cent Catholic. Of these, only 13,671 were approved by the Board after numerous vetting procedures (72.1 per cent). Of those who had been approved, 12,303 (90 per cent) were Protestant, the rest (10 per cent) being Catholic, demonstrating that after the vetting procedure slightly more Protestants were approved. Furthermore, a high proportion of those Catholics accepted did not take up their position after enrolment, further decreasing the number present within the force.125 In February 1973, at the 39th meeting of the UDR Advisory Council, it was stated that only four Catholic applications had been received in a three-month period and only one of these had resulted in an enrolment. It was also said that the total number of Catholics within the UDR was 315 (3.3 per cent), a decrease of fifteen in the same three months, and a drop of 378 in a year. It was stated that ‘until the situation in the Province improves it appears unlikely to be any marked increase in their membership’.126 Catholic antipathy towards the force, partly as a result of the policy of internment, had well and truly set in. Importantly though, there was certainly no suggestion that Catholics had been barred from joining the regiment at a local level, as there had been in the UHG. By October 1975, it was estimated that only about 3 per cent of the UDR was Catholic.127 By 1978, the British government was a little more reluctant to divulge the percentages when questioned in Parliament, although when pressed on the matter James Wellbeloved, the Under-Secretary of State, indicated that the percentage of Catholics had remained steady at 3 per cent. However, 5.6 per cent of all applications had come from Catholics, indicating that they were being disproportionately rejected from the force.128 By the mid-1980s, the government had simply refused to provide an answer to any question over Catholic participation, stating that it would be too costly to find out the

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i­­ nformation.129 Very quickly then, despite attempts to change this, the UDR had come to resemble the Ulster Protestant volunteering tradition. Occupational breakdowns are not available as they are for previous amateur forces, but a number of observations are possible with regard to the social composition of the UDR. Cross-referencing the list of those members of the UDR killed during the Troubles with McKittrick et al.’s work Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles clearly shows that a high proportion, especially in the border counties, were farmers (as they had been in the UHG). Most of the occupations range in what would be classed as upper working and lower middle class, including managers, teachers, office workers, and engineers.130 A large proportion of those involved in the UDR had also been part of the USC, or in the regular armed forces, another similarity to the UHG. As demonstrated in Table 3.8, within three months, over half of all applications for the UDR had come from members who were previously members of the USC, and this was despite the initial confusion over whether these men would be permitted to join. Another 25 per cent of those who applied had previous military service, either in the regulars or in the TA.131 For example, Private Edward Stewart, who was killed in April 1976, had served for nine years in the Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards before joining the UDR.132 This placed the UDR in a favourable position because only a quarter of its strength had never conducted any type of military training, although the number of qualified instructors to provide this training was quite low.133 Despite the initial surge of recruits in the opening months of 1970, the authorities found it difficult to keep the UDR up to strength. This was of course a problem that had hampered most auxiliary forces for almost two hundred years. The continued apathy of the Catholic population did little to help the situation. The initial establishment of six thousand men was revised down to 5,300 as the numbers of applicants in County Down and Antrim were far below what was expected.134 A survey conducted in September 1972 showed that only 1 per cent of the male population in Down, and 2.1 per cent in Antrim, were serving in the UDR, when proportions were much higher in other counties.135 It was very difficult to encourage even unemployed members of society to join the regiment. This was because if an unemployed man undertook duties he would have his unemployment benefit reduced, and many felt that this was not worth risking their lives for.136 This was still not remedied by 1980, when it was stated that if a man was made redundant he could not serve in the UDR and draw unemployment benefit; if he did so he would ‘be soldiering for nothing’.137 Despite some of these recruiting problems, the size of the UDR by the middle of 1977 had reached 7,600 full- and part-time members. Recruiting continued to be vigorous until at the end of the decade it had reached a figure of 12,400, of whom a quarter were full-time members.138 By the time that it was disbanded in

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1992, over forty thousand men and women had passed through the regiment, a significant number given the political and social difficulties associated with UDR membership. It was suggested as early as 1973 that women should be permitted to join the force. Enlisting women eased the pressure on recruiting, provided a strategic advantage, and permitted women to form part of the amateur military tradition in Ireland, as they had been briefly permitted to do during the Second World War. The strategic value of having women in the ranks was by far the most important reason for their inclusion. They were needed primarily to search other females for explosives at checkpoints. Over seven hundred were recruited and, at a time when male participation was difficult to maintain, the female contribution remained constant.139 Their recruitment also set a precedent for the rest of the British Army as women in the UDR were the first to be fully integrated into the regimental system, rather than as a separate force, and this was eventually adopted in the British Army as a whole. Interestingly, nearly half of the female soldiers, known as Greenfinches, were married, and almost as many were mothers. The proportion of those married was even slightly higher than for male UDR members.140 They were often subjected to the same conditions as male members: the fact that six female soldiers were killed, and many others wounded, is testimony to this.141 For those conducting shootings and bombings there was no distinction, and these casualties are among the almost two hundred UDR members who were killed during the course of its existence, making the supreme sacrifice to pursue the amateur military tradition. Thus, it is clear that the rank and file of auxiliary forces during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries experienced a high degree of evolution. At times this fell in line with the United Kingdom, but occasionally was a uniquely Irish experience. The changes within Irish, and later Northern Irish, society were reflected to a great extent in the amateur forces. In the militia, where, far from the ‘underemployed’ in society finding their role, the Catholic amateur military tradition was present, at least in the ranks. Led by the landed Protestant elite, this reflected society as a whole, and sectarianism was only a minor issue. Importantly, this was a clear contrast to the experience in the United Kingdom, whilst still fitting into its military framework. In comparison to this, the yeomanry, OTC, VTC, UHG, and UDR embodied the re-emergence of the Ulster Protestant volunteering tradition, which can be traced back to the seventeenth century. The UHG, with its close links to the USC, actively attempted to exclude Catholics from joining, at least at a local level, and this is reflected by its complete Protestant domination. The UDR, however, actively sought to encourage Catholic enlistment, but to little avail. The consequence of this was that it allowed the Protestant tradition to continue to flourish.

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These two traditions existed distinctively from the paramilitary tradition, ever present in Ireland and Northern Ireland, and because they drew from different sections of society they never competed with one another. This meant that, within the British Army, a unique Irish amateur military tradition may be found. Notes 1 French, Military Identities, pp. 209–10. 2 These occupational groupings are similar to those used by Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, and are taken from the classifications of the Medical Department of the Army. Labourers include servants and butlers; Artisans includes weavers, cloth-makers, lace-makers, and dyers; Mechanics includes trades such as smiths, carpenters, and masons; Professions includes teachers, doctors, solicitors, and accountants. The occupational data are taken from the Militia Attestation forms held at the National Archives, Kew, based on 5,500 enlistments. These are: WO68/311–312 North Cork Rifles, Enrolment Books, 1854–1872; WO68/303 Carlow Rifles, Enrolment Book, 1854–1865; WO68/476 Armagh Light Infantry, Description Enrolment Register, 1854–1871; WO68/408 King’s County Rifles, Enrolment Book, 1854–1894. 3 C. Ó Grada, Ireland before and after the Famine: Exploitations in Economic History, 1800–1925 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 36. 4 WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the Tipperary Artillery (Militia). 5 Categories are as above. Information covering the whole period is taken from a sample of the following 5,500 Attestation forms: WO96/1124–1149, 4th Royal Irish Rifles; WO96/1221–1238, 4th Royal Dublin Fusiliers; WO96/504–515, 3rd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; WO96/1166–1173, 5th Connaught Rangers; WO96/1432–1433, Sligo Artillery (Militia); and WO96/1330–1336, Dublin City Artillery (Militia). 6 On skilled workers at the Guinness Brewery see S.R. Dennison and O. MacDonagh, Guinness 1886–1939: From Incorporation to the Second World War (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998). 7 PP (C.4925). Report of the Belfast Riots Commission, 1886. 8 PP (C.5922). Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the Militia …, 1890. 9 NAM Ms. 8112/54/217. Letter from Captain Y.H. Burgess to General Warre, 21 September 1873. 10 The classification of a man who was ‘literate’ is one who could both ‘Read and Write’, as opposed to only ‘Read’. PP (C.1377). Census of Ireland, 1871. Part III; TNA WO68/311–312 North Cork Rifles, Enrolment Books; WO68/408 King’s County Rifles, Enrolment Book; WO96/1330–1336 Dublin City Artillery (Militia). 11 Regiments recruited approximately within their County boundaries. Religious breakdown for each County is taken from PP (C.3365) Census of Ireland, 1881. Part II; Regimental religious data taken from Attestation Forms as quoted previously. 12 Occupation v. religious breakdowns found in W.E. Vaughan, ‘Ireland c.1870’, in W.E. Vaughan (ed.), A New History of Ireland, vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University

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Press, 1989), pp. 740–1; For Belfast see A.C. Hepburn, Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland in the Era of Joe Devlin, 1871–1934 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 13 TNA WO68/65 Londonderry Artillery (Militia), Enrolment Book, 1862–1908. 14 PRONI D1071/H/B/5/476/22 Letter from Lord Spencer to Lord Dufferin, 24 March 1872. 15 Nation, 27 July 1872. 16 Freeman’s Journal, 21 August 1856; Nation, 3 August 1872 17 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 212, cols 1748–9, 25 July 1872. 18 Ibid., 9 July 1872. 19 Ibid., 20 July 1876; 24 May 1883; 10 June 1875; 18 June 1875; 26 February 1876. 20 French, Military Identities, p. 214. 21 NAM Ms. 1974-08-59. Bound Manuscript book: History of the Kerry Militia, 1793–1893. 22 Armagh County Museum. Numerical Return showing the number of men who went to the regular army from the Armagh Light Infantry up to the 31 July 1858. 23 PP (422). Militia (volunteers). Return of the Number of Men who have Volunteered from the militia to the cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, the Guards, and the Line …, 1858. 24 PP (C.4314). Army and Militia. Annual report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, 1884–85. 25 K. Jeffery, ‘The Irish Soldier in the Boer War’, in J. Gooch (ed.), The Boer War; Direction, Experience and Image (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 149; K. Jeffery, ‘The Irish Military Tradition and the British Empire’, in K. Jeffery (ed.), ‘An Irish Empire?’; Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 97. 26 French, Military Identities, p. 215; Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, p. 19; PP (C.3503). Annual Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, 1883. 27 Information taken from TNA WO68 Attestation Forms. 28 W. Watson, Records of the Monaghan Militia, 1793–1870. Originally published in the Northern Standard, March 1928. 29 PP (C.1874). Return of the number of volunteers from each regiment of the militia to the line in the year 1878, stating in each case how many volunteered to the linked line regiment, and how many to other corps; of number of commissions in the line given to officers in the militia …, 1878. 30 The Times, 21 February 1855; 26 December 1854; 15 January 1855; 23 January 1855. 31 PP 1857–58 (126). Militia. Return of all regiments of militia in the United Kingdom who shall not have completed their respective quotas, and the number of men required to complete the establishment in each of such regiments …, 1857–1858. 32 PP (147). Militia (training establishments) Return showing the training establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom …, 1873. 33 PP (C.2785). Militia (training establishments) Return showing the training establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom …, 1880. 34 PPs 1885 (C.4675), 1890 (C.6261), 1895 (C.7939), 1900 (Cd.579), 1905 (Cd.2697). Militia regiments. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in

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the United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete …, 1885–1905. 35 PRONI D1071/H/B/H/78 Letter from Captain Hamilton to Lord Dufferin, September 1871. 36 PP (Cd.2063). Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 37 Anglo-Celt, 30 January 1897; 6 February 1897; 4 December 1897; 18 December 1897; 5 November 1898; 19 November 1898. 38 This fits in with the broad campaign of anti-recruiting propaganda produced in Ireland at this time. See T. Denman, ‘“The Red Livery of Shame”: The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899–1914’, Irish Historical Studies, vol. 29, no. 114 (November 1994). 39 Connaught Telegraph, 30 June 1906. 40 See H.J. Hanham, ‘Religion and Nationality in the Mid-Victorian Army’, in M.R.D. Foot (ed.), War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour of J.R. Western (London: Harper Collins, 1973). 41 This breakdown has been calculated by analysing attestation forms for the respective companies, held at the National Archives, Kew, in the WO128 series. The forms are listed in order of Regimental Number rather than by Company so the Regimental Roll was taken from www.angloboerwar.com. For the purposes of this table, ‘Landed Gentry’ are classed as anyone who listed their occupation as the following: landowner, son of landowner, gentry, large farmer, and income from land. 42 R. Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class; Working Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War, 1899–1902 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 200. 43 W. Bennett, Absent-Minded Beggars: Volunteers in the Boer War (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999), p. 110. 44 S.M. Miller, Volunteers on the Veld; Britain’s Citizen Soldiers and the South African War, 1899–1902 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), p. 67; Hay, The British Yeomanry Cavalry, p. 188. 45 TNA WO 108/375 Report from the Officer Commanding the 29th (Irish) Battalion, Earl of Longford, March 1902. 46 Fitzgibbon, Arts under Arms, p. 26. 47 Belfast Evening Telegraph, 18 January 1900. 48 TNA WO 108/375 Appendix 27 Annexure A. Report on the Arrangements made at the Curragh with Regard to Recruiting, Captain W. Thornton, May 1901. Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the Raising of Drafts and New Battalions for the Imperial Yeomanry, supplementary to the Report Submitted on 15 May 1901. 49 Ibid. Appendix 28. Report on the Raising, Training, etc., of the Irish Imperial Yeomanry Drafts, by Colonel F.J. Graves, Assistant Adjutant General, Imperial Yeomanry, Ireland, in 1901. 50 BMH WS Ref.: 564, Witness: Tom Byrne, Member of the Irish Brigade, South Africa, 1900–1902, Captain IV, Dublin, 1916, Commandant IRA, Dublin, 1921.

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51 TNA WO 108/375 Appendix 28. Report on the Raising, Training, etc., of the Irish Imperial Yeomanry …, 1901. 52 Belfast Newsletter, 22 January 1900. 53 Dorman, ‘The North Irish Horse’, pp. 540–1. 54 Bowman, Carson’s Army, p. 52; Irish Times, 28 September 1912; 8 August 1914; See also Beckett, The Army and the Curragh Incident, p. 391. 55 T. Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008), p. 46. 56 This is a detailed database of 1,033 men who passed through the DUOTC throughout the course of the war. 680 of the men’s religion could be found. University of Dublin, War List, February 1922 (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, and Co., 1922); Census of Ireland, 1901 and 1911. 57 TCD Ms. 2780. Enrolment Books, Records of Service, 1920–22. 58 PRONI MIC204/1 Queen’s University, Belfast OTC Registers, vols 1–6, 1908– 1914; Census of Ireland, 1901 and 1911. 59 PRONI MIC204/1 Queen’s University, Belfast OTC Registers, vols 1–6, 1908– 1914; Census of Ireland, 1901 and 1911. 60 University of Dublin, War List, February 1922; Census of Ireland, 1901 and 1911. 61 TCD Ms. 2783/12 The Dublin University Officers’ Training Corps Handbook (Dublin: Alex Thom and Co. Ltd, July 1913). 62 PP (Cd.4831). The report of the President of Queen’s College, Belfast, for the year 1908–1909. 63 Irish Times, 10 May 1910; 23 September 1911; 1 December 1911. By November 1910, it is established that 259 cadets had enlisted in the corps, Willoughby, A Military History of the University of Dublin and Its Officers Training Corps, p. 5. 64 TCD Ms. 2775. Enrolment Book, Records of Service, 1910–1912. 65 Observer, 13 September 1925. 66 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p. 142. 67 Ibid., p. 144. 68 PRONI MIC204/1 Queen’s University, Belfast OTC Registers, vols 1–6, 1908– 1914. 69 TCD Ms. 2776. Enrolment Book, Records of Service, 1912–14; TCD Ms. 2783/12. The Dublin University Officers’ Training Corps Handbook; Willoughby, A Military History of the University of Dublin and Its Officers Training Corps, p. 2. 70 PRONI MIC204/1 Queen’s University, Belfast OTC Registers, vols 1–6, 1908–1914. 71 Ibid. Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War, p. 75; T. Bowman, ‘Officering Kitchener’s Armies: A Case Study of the 36th (Ulster) Division’, War in History, vol. 16, no. 2 (2009), p. 204. 72 Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers, p. 45. 73 University of Dublin, War List. 74 See Mitchinson, Defending Albion, p. 83. 75 TNA WO192/324 Record Book of Grey Point Fort, Belfast, 1904–1957. 76 There is also every chance that a large number of those who served in the UHG had also been members of the UVF, but with a lack of sources this does not allow for easy matching.

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77 Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 6 February 1942. 78 PRONI HG2/1/6 Nominal Roll of the Ballymena Company, Antrim UHG, 1940–44. 79 Ibid. Newtownards Company, Antrim UHG, 1940–44. 80 PRONI HG2/1/3 Nominal Rolls of the Antrim Town, Larne, and Lisburn Companies, Antrim UHG, 1940–44. 81 Ibid. Nominal Roll of the Bushmills Company, Antrim UHG, 1940–44; PRONI HG2/1/6 Nominal Rolls of the Craigywarren and Cloughmills Companies, Antrim UHG, 1940–44. 82 PRONI HA32/1/794 Note on the Ulster Home Guard, by Charles Wickham, 1944. 83 PRONI LA7/3H/11 Transcript of a radio broadcast by Major May, ‘Today in Ulster’, 19 February 1942. 84 Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War, p. 180. 85 See Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 271; Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 68–72; Summerfield and Peniston Bird, Contesting Home Defence, pp. 30–8. 86 Irish News, 29 May 1940. 87 Ibid., 31 May 1940. 88 Northern Ireland Parl. Debs, vol. 23, pp. 1426–7, 11 June 1940. 89 Ibid., vol. 24, p. 418, 12 March 1941. 90 Orr, Duty without Glory, p. 56; p. 74. 91 TNA CAB123/197 Letter from C.G. Markbreiter to Norman Brooke, 26 March 1941. 92 Ibid. Letter from John Anderson to Winston Churchill, 28 March 1941. 93 PRONI HA32/1/859 Letter from Charles Wickham to William Lowry, 12 May 1943. 94 This calculation is based upon official figures listed in TNA WO199/2930 Order of Battle of the UHG, January 1942 and PRONI HA32/1/791 Statistics of the Strength and Establishment of the Ulster Home Guard. 95 PRONI HA32/1/791 Report by Charles Wickham on the Reduction in Strength of the Ulster Home Guard, 27 October 1941. 96 Ibid. Note accompanying the Strength and Establishment statistics, 10 June 1941. 97 This table is compiled from the detailed Company strengths outlined in WO199/ 2930, as well as the Statistical Breakdown of the 1937 Census of Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO, 1938). 98 C. Graves, The Home Guard of Britain (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd, 1943), p. 170. 99 Based on strength returns of the Home Guard of Great Britain listed in Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 267. 100 Before the war, a number of the USC members had joined the Derry Anti-Aircraft Regiment, and had served abroad for the entire war. E.J. Traill, 1st Derry Battalion, Souvenir Review (Belfast: W. and G. Baird Ltd, 1944), p. 19. 101 PRONI HG1/1/20 Records of Transfers, Recruits, and Resignations of the 4th (Belfast) Battalion, UHG, 1940–45. 102 PRONI HG8/22 Recruiting in the 3rd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 1942–44.

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103 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 269–70; Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 37–8; Summerfield and Peniston Bird, Contesting Home Defence, pp. 28–9. 104 The oldest member of the UHG is recorded as Volunteer James Lynch, of Campsie, of County Londonderry, who in 1942 was eighty years old. He is also the oldest member recorded for the force in Great Britain. Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 6 March 1942. 105 PRONI HG2/1/6 Nominal Roll of the Ballymena Company, Antrim Home Guard, 1940–44. 106 Ibid. Nominal Roll of the Hillmount Company, Antrim Home Guard, 1940–44. 107 PRONI HG8/1 Nominal Roll of the Newtownards Company, Down Home Guard, 1940–44. 108 Bowman, Carson’s Army, pp. 55–7. 109 Belfast Newsletter, 18 June 1940; Newry Reporter, 22 June 1940; Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 29 June 1940; PRONI LA7/3H/11 Transcript of a radio broadcast by Major May, ‘Today in Ulster’, 19 February 1942. 110 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 269–70; Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 37–8; Summerfield and Peniston Bird, Contesting Home Defence, pp. 28–30. 111 An example of these sorts of service can be seen in PRONI HG8/1 Nominal Roll of the Newtownards Company, Down Home Guard, 1940–44. 112 PRONI LAB5/88 Recruiting for the Territorial Army: Shipbuilding workers, 1 July 1953; Territorial Army and other Reserve and Auxiliary Force in Northern Ireland: Recruiting Policy Committee, 29 July 1952. 113 PRONI CAB9/CD/85/5 Letter from Sir Reginald Denning, HQ NI District, to Sir Basil Brooke, 30 January 1950; French, Army, Empire, and Cold War, pp. 56–7. 114 Gailey, An Account of the Territorials in Northern Ireland, p. 15. 115 Ibid., p. 17. 116 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 846, cols 219–20, 16 November 1972. 117 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-23251464 (accessed 14 June 2015). 118 Farrell, Arming the Protestants; M. Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 1980). 119 PP (Cmd.535). Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, October 1969. 120 Irish Times, 2 January 1970; Belfast Telegraph, 2 January 1970. 121 Belfast Telegraph, 23 January 1970; Irish Press, 23 January 1970. 122 TNA CJ3/117 Note on Ulster Defence Regiment Recruiting Figures, 6 February 1970. 123 Adapted from TNA CJ3/117 UDR Application Forms and Recruiting Planning, 1969–1972. 124  Ibid. Confidential Recommendations laid out by Roy Hattersley, to the Ministry of Defence, 16 April 1970. 125  Taken from TNA CJ3/117 Enclosure 1: Summary UDR State as at 25 October 1972. 126  TNA DEFE24/1192 Minutes of the 39th meeting of the UDR Advisory Council held on Friday, 23rd February 1973; Draft Report on the UDR, 14 March 1973. 127 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 898, cols 253–4, 23 October 1975. 128 Ibid., vol. 957, cols 245–6, 8 November 1978. 129 Ibid., vol. 56, cols 128–9, 13 March 1984. 130 Information taken from the roll of honour of the UDR in Potter, A Testimony to

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Courage, pp. 384–9; D. McKittrick et al., Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1999). 131 TNA DEFE13/686 UDR: Recruiting Summary for week ending 23 January 1970. 132 McKittrick, Lost Lives, p. 642. 133 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 35. 134 TNA CJ3/70 Letter from the Ministry of Defence to David Hopkins, Home Office, 17 March 1970; Breakdown by County of UDR enlistments, May 1970. 135 Armagh: 4.4%; Fermanagh: 7%; Tyrone: 5.5%; Londonderry: 2.3%; Belfast: 2.6%. These figures are quoted in Potter, Testimony to Courage, p. 407. 136 Ibid., p. 39. 137 TNA CJ3/3036 Letter from Brigadier David Miller, UDR HQ, to Philip Goodhart MP, 10 January 1980. 138 TNA CJ4/2174 Proposed increase in the full-time cadre of the UDR, 1978; and Changes to the Role of the UDR, 1978–1982. 139 TNA DEFE70/148 Enlistment of Women into the Ulster Defence Regiment, August 1973. 140 Potter, Testimony to Courage, p. 120. 141 Ibid., p. 375.

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4

Discipline and morale

The discipline and morale of the amateur forces in Ireland were varied. Certainly, the biggest problems existed in the militia, and acts of disobedience became a common occurrence, especially towards the end of annual training, whilst the perceived threat of Fenianism in the latter half of the nineteenth century further accentuated problems. Importantly, these acts of indiscipline became more infrequent as time progressed, and this broadly fits in with the steady improvement of the army’s behaviour towards the latter Victorian era.1 Nevertheless, the cases of indiscipline in the Irish militia were much higher than in non-Irish militia regiments, and this reflects the experience within Irish regiments of the regular army both before and during the First World War.2 In contrast, the Irish Imperial Yeomanry and the OTC had no serious breaches of discipline before 1914. When the much bigger UHG was formed, there was, once more, a higher number of acts of disobedience. As the UHG was under civilian, rather than military, law, punishments for any acts of indiscipline were much more minor. Because of the UHG’s social composition, any nationalist subversion was far from the minds of policy-makers, a contrast from the experience of the militia. There is little doubt that, for policy-makers and the authorities, because the yeomanry, OTC, and UHG were almost exclusively made up of Protestants, there was little chance of any serious trouble occurring. Conversely, the case for the UDR was much more complex because of its Protestant domination. Acts of collusion with loyalist paramilitaries became a high-profile problem that would never go away, but these were, in fact, few in number. For an organisation which was on active service for so long, it handled itself remarkably well in terms of military discipline; however, its high-profile role did much to harm its reputation. During the Crimean War, and the periods of embodiment between 1854 and 1860, many cases of indiscipline occurred within the regiments of militia in Ireland. The reasons for and severity of these disturbances varied from the minor to the serious, and it is important to outline some of these incidents in order to build a picture of the state of discipline within these regiments. Firstly, the

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number of cases of flogging in the years 1857 and 1859 shows that clearly the Irish militia was disproportionately ill-disciplined, compared to regiments in Great Britain. In these years there was a total of thirty-two cases of flogging for all regiments of militia, eighteen of which were carried out on men of the Irish militia, more than half of the total. The reasons for this punishment included insubordination, desertion, violence to superiors, and disgraceful conduct.3 Eleven of these cases were also attributed to only three regiments; the Limerick County Militia, Royal Dublin City Militia, and the Louth Rifles, suggesting a higher degree of indiscipline (or stricter officers) in these particular regiments.4 It was also noted in the Kerry Militia Court Martial book for the year 1858, that a total of fifty-three cases were brought against men of that regiment, nine cases on one man, Private John Casey, for ‘habitual drunkenness’.5 This particular offence accounted for 55 per cent of all offences in the regular army, and, as a result, a fine was eventually introduced.6 It must be noted that the number of cases in all militia regiments was much lower than that of the regular army at this time; nevertheless, as a representation of the discipline of the militia as a whole, Irish regiments were much poorer in this respect. A number of riots, mutinies, and disturbances occurred which involved the Irish militia, both in Ireland and in the rest of the United Kingdom, and these  occurred for a number of reasons. The most famous example of this indiscipline was the mutiny of the 2nd or North Tipperary Militia, stationed at Nenagh, County Tipperary, in July 1856. The mutiny occurred for several reasons, most notably because the men had not been paid their enlistment bounty in full, and when the officers attempted to take back part of their new uniform the men refused, leading to the mutiny being dubbed by part of the local press the ‘Battle of the Breeches’. The men then stormed the town, and gained control of it, which resulted in the calling out of a detachment of regular soldiers, leading to the death of two militiamen and one soldier of the 41st Regiment of Foot.7 After the event there was much sympathy for the militiamen from both Parliament and the public through the regional press. Lord Naas stated that the men of the militia were left in a state of destitution, and that it was the authorities’ treatment of the militia in Ireland which caused the outbreak to occur.8 Furthermore, the Belfast Newsletter stated that the ‘whole treatment of the Irish militia, from first to last, has been shameful’.9 As a result of the mutiny there was a total of ninety courts martial, and the man identified to have killed the soldier of the 41st Regiment of Foot, Private Stephen Burns, was sentenced to death, although this was commuted to transportation.10 In a subsequent inquiry it was also discovered that the officers were largely to blame for the incident. It was argued that the men were disembodied early so that they could not claim their bounty or gratuity allowance, meaning that the officers, in the opinion of the regiment’s Colonel, were probably the cause of the mutiny.11 Other examples which demonstrate the poor state of discipline might also be

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cited. In the Limerick County Militia, for example, three incidents are recorded within their four years of embodied service. The first, in 1856, was an occurrence of serious rioting with the Royal Marines in Plymouth, where it was stated that there was a Hibernian desire to give the Marines a ‘bating’ as a parting memento before they left town.12 In the following year a hundred men of the militia attacked the police at Boherbuoy Barracks, County Limerick, after a quarrel between a soldier of the militia and a policeman. Seven militiamen also attempted to intercept a police escort of a female prisoner and gave her shelter in the barracks.13 Finally, in 1859, the alarm of the inhabitants of Portsea was reported as, for a whole week, disturbances had occurred between the militia, seamen of the navy, and the inhabitants of the town. However, in this case, it appears that much of the blame was attributed to some of the inhabitants: two women, Fanny Lot and Elizabeth Moore, for example, had been charged with foul and abusive language towards the militia, with Miss Lot having called them a ‘set of Irish ____’.14 There were also occasions when trouble was caused between Irish and English militia regiments. The foremost example was an incident between the South Down Militia and Cheshire Militia. It was reported that a Cheshire militiaman had struck a female who was in the company of a Down militiaman, resulting in a general riot in which the two regiments attacked each other wherever they met, both parties ‘using their bayonets somewhat freely’. After the event it was stated that ‘the Cheshire’s, though the more numerous party, were severely handled by the Downs, who are all country lads, and, though on the whole, very peaceable, seem to have got a faculty of “hitting hard”’.15 Disturbances and indiscipline which had an underlying religious tone were also a regular occurrence. In the early years much of this was due to the failings of the authorities to adapt to the situation: many regiments were, for the most part, Catholic in their composition and the authorities failed to allow for this. The most prominent example was the mutiny of the Kerry Militia in October 1855. It was a tradition for the regiment to be played to worship by its band, but it was made known that General Chatterton, Commandant of the District, did not wish to allow this. As a result ‘a flame of indignation spread throughout the entire ranks’, and ‘a general disposition to mutiny suddenly sprang up from one end of the line to the other’, resulting in the assault of a number of the officers of the regiment, and a subsequent confinement to barracks.16 The outcome was the arrest and court martial of nine of the principal ringleaders.17 Much like the mutiny at Nenagh, there was a large amount of sympathy from the regional and national press, as well as from the public, one article stating that ‘such acts of insubordination arise from causes with which a whole population must sympathise’.18 One nationalist newspaper even went as far as comparing this mutiny to the Indian Mutiny when it occurred in 1857.19 Immediately after units had been disembodied following the Crimean War, problems of absenteeism during annual training were experienced in almost

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epidemic proportions, in both Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The South Cork Militia, numbering close to its establishment of 1,010, had an attendance of only 314 privates at its training. Similarly, the North Tipperary Militia, which had recently been caught up in the mutiny at Nenagh, had 710 men on its books, but had a training attendance of only 256 privates. There were a further six units in Ireland which had at least three hundred men absent, but this seems to have been symptomatic of units across the United Kingdom who had also been recently disembodied. The worst example was that of the 7th Lancashire Rifles, which had 1,092 privates absent without leave and only 154 men actually attending training.20 Although men of the Irish militia regiments represented approximately 21 per cent of the militia as a whole, in terms of their establishment they made up only 17 per cent of men present at training, demonstrating a much lower attendance rate than other areas of the United Kingdom. The evidence suggests that those regiments from Ireland were more likely to mutiny, riot, or cause a disturbance. The level of indiscipline is, perhaps, unsurprising, considering there was a prevailing attitude that the length of annual training was not long enough to create a well-disciplined soldier.21 It did not mean, however, that all regiments were in a poor state. Men of the Armagh Light Infantry, for example, during their stay at Portsmouth in 1856, had ‘earned for themselves the esteem and respect of all classes’ for their conduct.22 Similarly, in 1859, upon the departure of the Westmeath Militia, the Chairman of Mullingar Town Council wished to have it on record that the regiment had shown excellent conduct and discipline during their training.23 There was an obvious lull in the number of cases of indiscipline when training was not held due to the threat of Fenian infiltration. When training recommenced, so did incidents of indiscipline, and these largely followed the same pattern as those which had occurred during the Crimean War. The majority of these cases occurred towards the end of the training period, when bounties had been paid, and the frustration of barrack life had started to take hold. One witness testimony typifies the general activities undertaken by the militia after training: The week in May that the militia were paid off and disbanded was a wild one in the town. Respectable people cleared off the streets early in the evening and left them to a drunken mob of militiamen, and the town’s underworld of both sexes, who broke windows and kept up a raucous din of shouting, singing, brawling, and quarrelling for the better part of the night. Custom, seemingly, gave these disbanded warriors a licence to do much as they liked for that particular week.24

In 1880, after the training period for the South Cork Militia had ended, five hundred men arrived at Mallow, County Cork, to await a train to take them to Cork. However, they boarded an ordinary train, rather than the special train which had been arranged for them. Once on board, the soldiers proceeded to eject the passengers, including men, women, and children, ‘by forcibly flinging

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them out through the doors’. Some offered resistance, resulting in several fights occurring.25 Furthermore, in 1886, upon the disembodiment of the Westmeath Militia, it was stated in Parliament that similar scenes occurred at Mullingar, County Westmeath. James Tuite, MP for Westmeath North, noted that ‘the men are out at all times of the night, they sleep in the ditches and barns… and they are promoters of scenes of riot and disorder which would be a disgrace to any civilised country’. He even went as far as to suggest that the money that the men received at the end of training should be sent home to their families so that they would not spend it on drink.26 Furthermore, in 1873, a request was made that the dismissal of the Donegal Militia be brought forward so that it did not occur on 12 July, when Orange Order parades could provoke tension during the anniversary celebrations for the Battle of the Boyne. The civil authorities believed that it would cause a war in Londonderry if the militia was not dismissed before that date, and this was something they wished to avoid at all costs.27 In Waterford, arrangements were also made for three regiments of the Line to be present in case of any disturbance when the militia was disembodied there.28 On occasion problems occurred during training as well, one example occurring in 1873 between the North Cork Rifles and the Queen’s County Rifles at the Curragh Camp.29 This event is an important one because it demonstrates that a serious disturbance was allowed to take place at a large barracks, but also as a rare example of friction between two Irish militia regiments. Saunders’s Newsletter reported that there had been animosity between the two regiments owing to an old feud between them, dating back to the Napoleonic period. To make matters worse they had been lodged at opposite sides of the same square and so ‘unfriendly exchanges of words began to be made’, followed by exchanges of stones and other missiles. The windows of many huts were broken, and several of the men had been wounded. The regular army was sent out owing to the inability of the officers to regain control, and by this time both sides had seized their rifles and bayonets, minus ammunition. The affray lasted approximately six hours, with several men having been taken prisoner, many men with serious wounds, and there were reports that two men had been killed.30 As a result of this disturbance, both regiments were disbanded, with the officers being exempted from all blame, and commended for their attempts to restore order.31 When the story was first circulated, one reporter in the Freeman’s Journal, who was a witness to the events, went as far as to say that the whole cause of the disturbance was want of discipline, due to the men, civilians for the majority of the year, not conducting training for a long enough period.32 The contentious issues surrounding the position of the Irish militia and that  of both Catholics and Protestants all too often led to indiscipline. An ­­example in Ulster, in 1888, might best illustrate this, as it highlights some of the problems associated with the reporting of disturbances between these

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two groups. This event was first brought up in Parliament by a Nationalist MP, Michael McCartan, in July 1888, after a report, by a number of newspapers, that three hundred men of the South Down Militia had attacked, without any provocation, a Catholic juvenile band at a railway station in Downpatrick.33 The Chief Secretary for Ireland, Arthur Balfour, replied, stating that he believed that the incident involved 150 men of the regiment, and that the band was actually not juvenile but consisted of adults. It was further commented that many of the reports had been exaggerated as none of the bandsmen was severely injured.34 Four days later the same question was again asked in Parliament, to which it was stated that the South Down Militia had been provoked by the Catholic band shouting ‘To hell with the Queen and the South Down Rifles’. A report from Colonel Waring, commander of the regiment, stated that it had been provoked by seditious and offensive language, and that the attack was in fact ‘most trivial’. A further claim was made that the same regiment, a number of years earlier, had been charged with attacking the houses of Catholics in Downpatrick; again, a claim which was seen to be much exaggerated at the time.35 Another example, which was not only exaggerated at the time but continues to endure in writing on the subject, involved the Louth Rifles, and its decision not to volunteer for service in the South African wars. Much of the detail of this incident has been covered in an article by Donal Hall, but a few further conclusions can be made regarding the ‘mutiny’.36 Under the Militia Regulations, it was possible for men to refuse an order for foreign service. In most cases this did not happen, and the quota of men needed to proceed abroad was reached. This, however, was not the case for the Louth Rifles, where 176 men refused when asked the question. The Regimental Digest of Service stated that these men were finally persuaded upon being asked a second time.37 As Hall outlines, a letter appeared in the Dundalk Democrat, stating that the men had been coerced into changing their minds and that, in various newspapers, information had appeared questioning the men’s patriotism and loyalty, with a strong suggestion of nationalist sympathies.38 A local newspaper in Sheffield, where they were stationed, then outlined the ‘slandering of the Irish militia’, making it clear that all had been a misunderstanding, rigorously defending the regiment, making clear that almost all had volunteered for service.39 The issue was thought so serious that it was brought up in Parliament on a number of occasions, with, it seems, some misunderstanding on the part of MPs as to the right of a militiaman to refuse service abroad, eventually leading to the cancellation of embarkation.40 What this highlights is the importance of a misunderstanding of indiscipline, particularly in relation to the use of the term ‘mutiny’, as men of the Louth Rifles were fully within their rights to refuse service abroad. Therefore, this incident cannot be described as a mutiny, despite what some of the press at the time wished to portray. Another important point to highlight is that the Louth Rifles were not the only Irish militia regiment to refuse service abroad during the South African

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War. The Wexford Militia similarly did not reach the required proportion of men, and it was even asked in Parliament whether, because of this, they would be tried by court martial.41 In the Kerry Militia, it was also reported in letters sent to the local MP that the men had received punishment from their officers due to their unwillingness to volunteer for service in South Africa.42 Moreover, a point was raised in Parliament regarding the North Cork Rifles, and its willingness to serve abroad. It was stated that it had agreed to foreign service, but that if proper inquiry were made it would be found that very few of the men of the North Cork Militia who were induced to volunteer to go out to South Africa were sober at the time, because care was taken by the petty officers to ply them with drink from money which had been put into their hands, so that the men would not know what they were doing.43

There is little further evidence to prove this, but it was certainly not the only claim that this sort of coercion had occurred in order to induce militiamen to serve abroad. These refusals were, crucially, not acts of indiscipline, but, at a time of high levels of jingoism on the part of the British public, they were seen as such, and this has distorted some of the reporting and, therefore, perceptions of the level of discipline of Irish militia regiments at the time. The issue of the threat of Fenianism in the Irish militia is something which must also be discussed as it was taken rather seriously by the authorities. As a first resort to stop the threat, the militia training period was suspended on two separate occasions in the 1860s and 1870s. There is clear evidence that Fenianism was present in Irish militia regiments, but only in very isolated cases and that in many respects this was considerably exaggerated. In September 1865, the annual training of the Irish militia was widely reported in the national and provincial press, and this was largely down to the perceived success of Fenian agents infiltrating the regiments during training. A report from the Irish Times was circulated which stated that Fenians were ‘eager aspirants for enlistment in the militia’, for when the militiamen were called out for training their drill was perfect, and they performed their duties nearly as skilfully as soldiers of the Line. The report detailed that the reason for this sudden change from previous years of ‘deficient’ training was that many of the men were being drilled illegally in the early hours of the morning, or late at night, by Fenian agents sent from America.44 Although this may seem somewhat extreme, there is evidence to support this assertion, for in the same month it was reported in The Times that a corporal of the Louth Rifles had been caught and charged with illegal drilling of about 120 men, a witness claiming that he had seen the corporal forming men into sections along a road, with a short stick in his hand, and marched them along calling out phrases associated with drill, such as ‘close up’, ‘double up’, and ‘fall into fours in the front’.45 Isolated arrests of Irish militiamen continued throughout 1865 and 1866,

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including the arrest of eight men of the Kilkenny Fusiliers.46 Even in Irish militia regiments based in Ulster, a sergeant of the North Down Militia was arrested for attempting to seduce several militiamen to join the Fenian Brotherhood, and a number of non-commissioned officers of the Antrim Rifles were also arrested.47 Partly because of this, training was suspended for the summer of 1866, as Chichester Fortescue stated that it would be unfair to the militia to call them together in large masses at a time when all the barracks in Ireland which usually received them were filled by detachments of troops, and to expose them to the attempts and to the machinations of Fenian agents, who, the Government knew, from information they had received, had directed their endeavours especially … to the corruption of the Irish Militia.48

Despite the suspension of training, arrests continued to be made into 1867, including three men of the North Mayo Rifles.49 During the second Fenian scare in the early 1870s, arrests and suspicion of militiamen endured, especially when thefts of arms from militia stores were reported. This seems to have been particularly prevalent in Cork. For example, the barracks of the North Cork Rifles in Mallow was broken into whilst the regiment was occupying it, with 120 stand of arms stolen, and some suspicion fell on those on guard duty who allowed this to take place.50 In 1877, the same thing happened, involving the same regiment at the same barracks; however, this time no suspicion was attached to any man of the regiment.51 Similarly, in the South Cork Militia in 1873, two noncommissioned officers were charged and imprisoned for organising and carrying out a theft at the barracks in Cork in which eight stand of arms were stolen.52 On the whole, the discipline of the Irish militia steadily improved throughout the period, and this is best illustrated by looking at the court martial cases which relate to the South African War. For officers serving abroad during the years 1901–2, there were a total of thirty-three prosecutions. Two of these relate to officers of Irish militia regiments, with four cases brought against officers of other militia regiments of the United Kingdom.53 Furthermore, in prosecutions of other ranks between October and December 1901, the Irish militia were not disproportionately ill-disciplined. Out of a total of 3,552 cases, only thirty-seven prosecutions were made against men of Irish militia regiments. These included prosecutions for a man leaving his guard; being drunk on duty; and on four men of the North Down Militia for receiving public goods and using threatening language.54 When being inspected at this time, the good conduct and discipline of certain corps was also noted. Of the 4th Leinster Regiment, it was stated that only seven men were absent upon its muster, much better than some regiments, and that the Commanding Officer, Colonel Crawford, considered them ‘ready for any duty that may be given’.55 For the Special Reserve, the continued improvement in discipline was maintained from 1908 onwards. General Sir Neville Lyttelton noted in letters to his

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wife that on many occasions, whilst inspecting regiments in Belfast, Naas, Birr, Limerick, Downpatrick, and Clonmel, what a ‘fine body of men’ the Special Reservists were.56 Whilst conducting his inspection tour in January 1909, on witnessing the training of the Special Reservists of the Royal Irish Regiment, Lyttelton remarked that they were all ‘a good class of reservist. At all stations I visited the reports on the conduct of the Special Reservists was uniformly favourable, crime being almost non-existent.’57 A further important point to consider is the maintenance of morale, particularly during annual training or periods of lengthy embodiment. Some initiatives were undertaken with this in view, and these normally included sporting activities. These initiatives were, on the whole, started only in the latter part of the period, and were also possibly used as a means to attract a greater number of recruits. In 1904, it was stated by Colonel H.H. Stewart, of the 3rd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, that for his men there were no recreational facilities whatsoever and the men had to conduct their training under canvas, rather than in huts or billets. It was seen that this meant that the militiaman, in general, saw only the harder side of soldiering, and therefore this was a detriment to recruiting, and also to morale.58 In 1873, a request was sent to Lord Dufferin, and accepted, that a rifle team made up of militiamen be put together in order to compete in Canada and the United States of America.59 Furthermore, in 1875, it was reported that the Tyrone Fusiliers had held their annual athletics competition, which had been well attended by both the gentry and the people of the neighbourhood.60 There is also some evidence of officer paternalism during this period, this being particularly prevalent during the first embodiment. There are at least two examples of schools which were set up by the officers for the benefit of the men, their wives, and their children. In the Longford Militia, whilst stationed in Ennis, a school was set up for the ‘many’ wives, and fifty children, who accompanied it, and books were sent from Dublin to maintain a proper supply for study.61 A similar scheme was set up for the wives and children of the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) whilst it was stationed in England. It was claimed that Lady Donoughmore had devoted herself with ‘great zeal and kindness’ to improve the condition of the women and children, and that a fund was also established to assist women in times of sickness.62 It is clear from these examples that morale was maintained and improved by the degree of support given to the men’s families. In comparison to the militia, discipline and morale in the yeomanry was certainly far superior, especially during the war in South Africa. Nevertheless, indiscipline was not entirely absent. During the war period, testaments of praise for the Irish yeomen were more frequent than criticisms, and this was also more often than not linked to the fact that men were drawn from the traditional yeoman class. Major-General Brabazon, when reporting about the entire Imperial Yeomanry,

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stated that ‘taking them as a whole, a finer body of men never entered the field’, and that they were ‘as valuable a corps of fighting men as ever wore the Queen’s uniform’.63 With regard to the Irish yeomanry specifically, similar statements were made by the Duke of Connaught upon his inspection before its departure from the Royal Barracks in Dublin.64 This perception, along with an appreciation of the class from which these men were drawn, occasionally also led to acts of indiscipline going unpunished. For instance, Maurice Fitzgibbon recalled that on one evening during the early part of their assembly in Dublin, during a dinner hosted by the officers, the men were ‘in a high state of jubilation’. When one man was heard to make disparaging remarks about Captain Villiers-Stuart ‘he was immediately set upon by officers and men … and savagely beaten’.65 This appeared to be acceptable to all concerned and no other mention was made of it. Once in South Africa the authorities, and officers, appear to have seen discipline as more of a problem, although incidents of indiscipline were still linked with inferior social standing. As has been mentioned, the social composition of the men changed throughout the different contingents of yeomanry, and in May 1901 Major-General Chermside reported that in discipline and general conduct while in the Command of the men of the 2nd Contingent did not reach the standard of the 1st, who in these points left very little to be desired, there being practically no crime among the latter. In the present sections, absence has been rife and drunkenness accompanied by disturbance not infrequent. I attribute this difference to the social grade of the men who form the present drafts, and to their possession of more money than they have been accustomed to, owing to the high rate of pay.66

As a caveat to that, Chermside also admitted that, except for the above remarks, ‘there has been little to complain of in the general conduct of the men of the 2nd Contingent from a military point of view, and, equally with their predecessors, their behaviour when marching away and entraining has been orderly and good’.67 It appears that there still tended to be a degree of tolerance of indiscipline, if the military work undertaken was acceptable, and perhaps a degree of leniency owing to the fact that the men were civilian volunteers. After the war in South Africa, this high degree of discipline continued to be maintained in the Irish corps. It was noted that the yeomen treated the annual camp like a holiday amongst their friends. It was thought that absenteeism was comparatively rare, that there was little difficulty in getting the men to show due respect to their sergeants or section leaders, and that drunkenness was almost absent. Until 1913, there had been no court martial cases in the North Irish Horse, and no reason to believe that this would ever change.68 Once more, this had much to do with the class from which the yeomanry was drawn, its comparatively small size, and the short periods of peacetime training.

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For the OTC, also comparatively small, poor discipline was almost unknown, at least before the First World War. For example, in 1908, of 156 cadets who had enrolled in the Queen’s University, Belfast OTC, only one had been dismissed for insubordination and disobedience of orders.69 During training, there were consistent reports of good attendance and favourable conduct of all contingents.70 However, in 1913, General Sir Arthur Paget, the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, while remarking on the satisfaction of the work of the corps, referred to several absences without leave from the general inspection as a regrettable feature.71 In the DUOTC, after the war, attendances at parade also appear to have been quite poor, this perhaps a symptom of a contingent on the brink of being disbanded. Between December 1920 and June 1921, very few parades were held at all, and, when they were, cadets attended only one or two per month.72 By November 1921, only three cadets were studying for the Certificates A and B, and only one of these attended classes regularly. By this time, the attendance at parades had slightly improved, only four not attending at all. Additionally, the number of men on parade was in double figures for much of the time.73 A number of challenging, and unique, disciplinary issues emerged for the UHG during the Second World War, which were not present for previous incarnations of amateur forces in Ireland. It appears that, on the whole, discipline and morale were in a much better state than they had been for its predecessors, continuing the trend of a general improvement across all arms over time. This also demonstrates the importance of a (Protestant) united goal in home defence, when faced with a very immediate threat for the duration of the war. The issue of civilian or military control over the UHG is an important political element in relation to the discipline and morale of the force. This situation had a number of separate consequences for those members of the B Specials on the one hand, and those of only the UHG on the other. For the Special Constables it meant that a declaration had to be signed, which made a member liable to serve under military control should an emergency arise and, therefore, subject to military law.74 A similar declaration was also signed by members of the UHG upon enrolment, making it clear that this covered all provisions laid down by the Army Act, including desertion and absence without leave.75 Importantly for members of the UHG, as it was to fall under civilian law until the occurrence of an invasion, men were liable for all activities which fell under these laws, as well as being individually accountable if, for example, a member of the public was injured due to their mistake and they were sued. This caused much confusion within the force and also hindered morale because of the perceived risk that men would be taken to court if such accidents occurred. The fact that the military had no jurisdiction upon the force until an emergency meant that no punishment could be handed out as a penalty for not attending training, exercises, or parades, and this undoubtedly had a knock-on effect on the attendance rates for these activities.

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Of course, when the force was first established in May 1940, low attendances were not a problem, largely because of the perceived threat of invasion, as well as the initial enthusiasm for the force. It was only when this initial fervour had waned during the winter of 1941–42 that it was recognised that, at least within some companies, problems existed with men turning out on a regular basis. Statistics for the Londonderry City area in early 1941 are a prime example of the disparity in attendances, as well as of a waning enthusiasm for the UHG after nearly a year in existence. For instance, G Company of the 1st (Derry City) Battalion UHG consisted of four platoons. In March 1941, one platoon had an attendance of 92 per cent, whilst the other three had attendances of 44 per cent, 59 per cent, and 47 per cent. Similarly, one platoon of E Company had a turnout of 89 per cent, whilst the other platoons only managed a consistent rate of 75 per cent. At the same time, the rural turnout varied greatly, with the Molenan detachment in Londonderry able to muster 82 per cent of its men during the same month, whereas the Kildoag Road detachment, also in Londonderry, managed a turnout of only 24 per cent. Importantly, in all but two platoons (Molenan and Straidarran detachments), in the whole battalion of twenty-nine platoons, the turnout decreased for the month of April, a demonstration of the rising sense of apathy towards the force and a clear lack of discipline within it.76 These varying turnout rates were experienced in other areas of Northern Ireland, and a continuing downward trend throughout the war was present within the majority of battalions. In 1943, in C Company of the 3rd (Down) Battalion UHG it was noted that turnout was as low as 10 per cent when two years previously it had been as high as 90 per cent. This was put down to the inability of the Company Commander to fulfil his duties.77 Likewise, in the Donaghmore Detachment of the same battalion, it was noted that for the first six months of 1943 the average attendance at training and parade had been at a ‘very poor’ 30 per cent of the strength, again owing to the poor leadership of the platoon commander.78 This latter company was in fact a B Special detachment, and it is clear that absence was more of a problem within these units than it was in independent UHG units.79 As regards the problem of the UHG being under civilian control, it is hardly surprising that, for many battalions, attendances were so low as there was little obligation on the men to turn out for these activities. One Commanding Officer stated that he had a corporal tasked with investigating each case of absence, but the problem was that if a man did not like it he simply resigned with no other obligation.80 In Great Britain, after compulsion was introduced to the force, this was no longer a problem as those who failed to attend the minimum number of parades were taken to civil court.81 With no conscription in Northern Ireland, this was not an option. General apathy towards attendance at parades was noted in some companies as early as November 1940. In the Pomeroy detachment UHG for instance, it

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was stated that one man could not attend parade because of the delicate health of his wife; another was recorded as being a young active man, but took no interest in the force. A third was said to have been a good shot, was a previous member of the B Specials, which he had attended badly, and still seldom attended anything in the UHG. A further seven men were also felt to be disinclined to make an effort because they were still without uniforms.82 In the same unit, by the middle of 1942, a two-day camp was held, which sixty-eight men attended. However, a further seventeen did not attend for reasons such as their cattle being sick, being ill themselves, or work commitments.83 Sometimes, these work commitments were unavoidable and understood by Commanding Officers, particularly in rural areas during the harvest.84 Naturally, things were not all bad. In County Down, the high turnout at parade was noted by the Commander of the District, who put this down to his ‘good fortune in having got at least 3 very competent ex-Colonels to Command Battalions who are able to assist in training’.85 What this clearly outlines is the continued importance of a strong officer corps to promote discipline and, therefore, consistent attendance rates. Poor attendances were also put down to the lack of competence of the officers, right down to platoon level. Acts of indiscipline did not only include non-attendance at training, parades, or conferences but took many forms. In December 1941, for instance, it was recorded in the Pomeroy District of the UHG that a member had lost his coat while attending a dance at Donaghmore. It was noted that he had not received authorisation to wear his uniform and that, as a result, he should ‘be dealt with in a manner that will be a warning to the others in this area’.86 In Belfast, it had been discovered that a rifle had been stolen from the residence of a volunteer and that, despite orders to do so, he had not stored his rifle bolt in a different location to the rifle itself. He was reminded that he had shown ‘no regard for the ever present danger of IRA activity’, and was dismissed.87 Other Commanders, however, were a little more lenient when it came to discipline. In County Tyrone, it was found that a member of the Home Guard had stolen some ammunition, but, in this case, the man had ‘always been a satisfactory member of the force and always appears on Parade in a tidy and orderly fashion and in my opinion it would be a pity if he was dismissed’.88 Similarly, when it was noted in Londonderry in March 1942 that some officers had not been wearing their uniform while on parade and that others had been arriving late, the men were simply reminded that this should cease with no mention of any punishments.89 Once again, this illustrates the inconsistent nature of the UHG at a local level, but also shows that such acts of indiscipline were relatively minor, especially in comparison with previous incarnations of amateur forces in Ireland. Only one case of drunkenness, which had been such a problem in the militia, was recorded in the UHG, and this man claimed that, although drunk, he was attempting to help fire-fighters put out a fire at a cinema.90

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Although military discipline could not be enforced in order to compel men to fulfil their obligations as Home Guards, other methods were used in an attempt to encourage a consistent turnout at functions and to convince them of the necessity to follow orders. This came in the form of forcible resignations or dismissals. Once again, this appears to have varied between battalions, but also fluctuated depending on the period of the war. By June 1941 an Order had been circulated to all battalions which stated that any member who absented himself from three consecutive parades, without legitimate reason, would either be required to resign or would be dismissed.91 In many respects, this was a stricter policy than in Great Britain as mentioned above. The option to resign before being dismissed if attendances were poor makes it difficult to gauge the exact numbers disciplined, but some observations can be made. In the 5th (Belfast) Battalion UHG for example, it was explicitly mentioned that twelve men had been dismissed because of non-attendance, while a further six had resigned for varying reasons.92 In the 1st (Londonderry City) Battalion UHG, in a month period in September and October 1942, a total of twenty-three men had been dismissed because of poor attendance, and another sixteen had resigned.93 By January 1943, in the same unit, a further twentyfive men had been dismissed, being offset by only sixteen new enrolments.94 Similarly, in the first three months of 1943, in the 4th (Belfast) Battalion UHG, a total of fifty men had been dismissed because of non-­attendance, indicating a possible ‘cull’ because of the planned recruiting weeks during these months.95 On many occasions it was understood, especially in rural areas, that the attendance at parades was not always the greatest priority for many men, most notably during the annual harvest.96 Officers were reminded that, given the nature of the force, a part-time unpaid one, members should not be called upon to perform duties which would necessitate their absence from their civil employment.97 In County Down, during the harvest, it was understood that a lower attendance was due to the work commitments of many of the men, but it was hoped that they would still attend when possible.98 By August 1943, it was noted that training had completely ceased because of the harvest, but that some members in Downpatrick had formed Home Guard units to aid farmers in bringing in the crops. This activity was appreciated by the Commander-inChief, who stated that ‘this could not be helped’, but it was also stressed that normal training ­­activities should resume as soon as possible.99 These sorts of activities do, of course, highlight another issue with the enforcement of discipline within the UHG, but one which does not appear to have been seen as a problem. Nevertheless, it was recognised that a continued presence on parade and ­­successful training, supplemented by sporadic dismissals for those who did not attend these activities, were not enough to keep an interest in the force, especially during the winter months, and when the threat of invasion began to recede.

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It is also important to mention the issue surrounding the possibility of ­­ subversive elements, such as the IRA, having an effect on the UHG, particularly in comparison to concerns raised in the previous hundred years over Fenian infiltration into the amateur forces. Many of the political and practical implications of this have been discussed in previous chapters, but other considerations which relate to the discipline of the force might be mentioned. Of course, safeguards were made which sought to stop ‘undesired’ elements from joining the UHG and posing a possible security risk, such as banning men who were residents of Eire from obtaining membership.100 Despite the policy of internment, information was often received which detailed IRA plans to disarm members of the UHG whilst on training, or ambush them whilst patrolling, but little consideration was given to the idea that they might be infiltrated, no doubt a consequence of the local recruitment policy carried out through the USC.101 It is clear that no such problems or suspicion of problems were observed within this force, a testimony to the changing nature of the political environment in Northern Ireland. A wide-ranging number of activities were undertaken for the purposes of relieving boredom and raising morale at this time and, in many ways, they resembled the plethora of activities that had been undertaken in other amateur military formations, and those undertaken by many units during the First World War.102 It was stated in one Home Guard Directive that ‘boredom is the enemy of keenness and efficiency’.103 As a result, it was decided that training should be as varied as possible, so that men did not go over the same information over and over again, and also that competitions should be set up which would not only aid training but also aid in improving morale. The companies based around Londonderry consistently took part in both rifle and Lewis Gun shooting competitions, where the presentation of trophies was made.104 Other team sports were played, such as football, rugby, and even snooker (a tournament involving thirty-six UHG platoons took place in January 1942), which also went some way to create an esprit de corps.105 Non-sporting activities also took place which looked to aid the formation of a stronger bond, both within the Home Guard and within the local communities, dances and film nights being the most common forms of this type of endeavour.106 In contrast to its successor, as will be shown, the TA in Northern Ireland had little trouble with discipline. This is largely to do with the fact that since the Second World War its primary responsibility has been with the defence of the United Kingdom as a whole, with control vested in Westminster. By and large, as a result, it has remained above politics and, because it was never embodied for a significant period of time, acts of indiscipline have been rare. Notwithstanding, there were some examples of poor discipline, and evidence of links with loyalist paramilitaries. The Westminster authorities had always been very keen to reiterate that, because the TA was under its control, few problems of this kind

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should or could arise. However, in 1989, a sergeant major of the TA was arrested in Paris when caught showing stolen parts from Blowpipe and Javelin missiles to a South African arms agent.107 The scandal was to prove a blemish on the heretofore good record of the Territorials in Northern Ireland. With civil unrest occurring around it, and a seemingly endless run of reorganisations, the morale of the TA was of upmost importance. The authorities carried this out in the ‘traditional’ way: by conducting parades, inspections, sporting events at annual camps, and social activities.108 It was sporting competitions that were of the greatest benefit to morale. These included competitions in shooting and military skills, as well as football, boxing, cross-country running, and athletics.109 Clearly, these activities were of great benefit to the formation as a whole, often attracting large crowds to cheer on the competitors, while also boosting the TA’s public profile. The same could not be said, however, of the UDR. As a result of the circumstances in which it was created, the discipline of the UDR was kept under the highest possible scrutiny. The consequence of this is the slight distortion by many commentators and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, a harming of the image of the force during and after its existence. An assessment of acts of collusion should not be taken lightly and, as will become clear, the authorities did not help the UDR in its handling of loyalist collusion. Conviction rates for UDR members should be viewed with caution as many crimes and thefts went unsolved, or the dismissal of members took place before any conviction. Naturally, a lot of emotion is still attached to this subject, which further clouds any judgement but, nevertheless, an assessment will be made here. In 2013 and 2014, Anne Cadwallader and the Pat Finucane Centre published works on British and UDR collusion in Northern Ireland.110 Both paint a rather bleak picture of the disciplinary record of the UDR, using an extensive range of official documents, rather convincingly in many aspects, not least on the theft of arms from UDR armouries and their use by loyalist paramilitaries. However, on some aspects, these works are somewhat unbalanced. In his study of loyalist paramilitaries, Steve Bruce concluded that ‘a very small number [of the security forces] have given slight assistance in the form of weapons and information. Despite sharing a common enemy, recruiting from the same population and living in the same areas, the security forces and the paramilitaries have not enjoyed a cosy relationship.’111 In March 1979, it was admitted that, in the nine years of the UDR’s existence, more than thirty of its members had been convicted of serious terrorist offences; five had been found guilty of murder; five more of manslaughter; ten for arms and explosives offences; four for serious assault; and a further nine for other terrorist type offences (sixty-three in total).112 Given that as many as forty thousand men and women served in the regiment up to 1979, this figure is

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comparatively small. This does not, of course, tell the whole story. As has been pointed out by Cadwallader, on a number of occasions when suspects were convicted in court, the fact that they were members of the UDR was excluded from proceedings. Convicts recently discharged from service were also excluded from the figures.113 The theft of arms from UDR or other barracks was a crime which often went unsolved, and, on many occasions, collusion with loyalist paramilitaries was suspected. One example occurred in October 1973 at Portadown, when twelve armed men stole eleven weapons, as well as other military equipment. This raid occurred on the anniversary of the raid on a TA Volunteer Reserve Centre in Lurgan, when 104 weapons were stolen, and collusion had been suspected. The official military report on the Portadown theft stated that there were grounds to suggest that the raiders had assistance from members of Headquarters or B Company of 11th UDR, the sangar door through which the raiders had gained access having been left open.114 A year earlier, an investigation had been made into stolen arms and suspected collusion. It found that of sixty arms stolen from all battalions in 1970 and 1971, in seventeen cases there was suspected collusion, the most, twelve in total, from 2nd UDR, based in County Armagh, and 8th UDR, based in County Tyrone.115 All of these thefts were of personal weapons, held at home, often involving a break-in. In a military intelligence file entitled ‘Subversion in the UDR’, released by the National Archives in 2004 and originally published in August 1973 it was estimated that in some areas as many as 15 per cent of UDR soldiers were also members of loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Defence Association or the Ulster Volunteer Force. It stated that, although collusion did not occur in all cases, there was a degree of passing on information and training methods, as well as the leaking of arms and ammunition.116 The report alluded to the Portadown armoury theft, stating that the UDR Guard Commander on duty had nine previous convictions and had spent time in jail, had one UDA trace, and was reportedly also a member of the UVF. Perhaps most damningly, in the conclusion it stated that ‘any effort to remove men who in the foreseeable political circumstances might well operate against the interests of the UDR could well result in a very small regiment indeed’.117 By 1977, after reports in the press relating to loyalist paramilitary infiltration of the UDR, it was admitted by A.A. Pritchard, a senior Northern Ireland official, when writing to the Secretary of State for Defence, Fred Mulley, that there are some very nasty cases, and there are a number of intelligence traces of these men being members of the UDA, UVF, or RHC (Red Hand Commando). These are undoubtedly ‘rotten apples’ in Commander UDR’s words. But there is also a good deal of petty crime; there is a high proportion of crime committed after the man in question had left the UDR; and in many cases there is no trace of paramilitary connection.118

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Pritchard went on to say that an internal investigation had found that two hundred men, out of a total of 7,700, had some connection, however slight, with loyalist extremist organisations and, of those, twenty-seven were thought to be actively involved, and were therefore discharged. Furthermore, in consequence of a number of high-profile incidents, especially the Miami Showband killings, which had indicated UDR involvement, a process of re-vetting the entire regiment had taken place.119 The army, perhaps strangely, never announced this review. Although some would slip through the net, two years earlier, in 1975 and 1976, no fewer than a thousand people had been dismissed from the UDR, and as many as ten thousand applications rejected. This was a dramatic increase from the 1 per cent of applications rejected for extremist backgrounds in the first eighteen months of its existence.120 UDR heavy-handedness also gradually became more of a problem as time went on. Reports of harassment and aggression were often reported to the authorities. For example, one UDR patrol was accused of harassing Catholics as they attended church in Annaclone, County Down, and questions were often asked at road blocks which went beyond the norm, often targeted at Catholics.121 In June 1980 William Glenndinning, a Belfast City Councillor, complained about UDR activities in the Markets in Belfast, stating that spot vehicle checkpoints and random searches were being carried out ‘in a fairly brusque fashion’. He felt that the UDR were ‘fuelling sectarian antagonisms’ and that if they ­­continued they would be stoned by local youths and someone might get shot.122 There is certainly no excuse for the acts of indiscipline and outright collusion by members of the UDR, but this should also be placed in some context. A study by the Irish Information Partnership quotes comparative statistics for terroristrelated offences in the period 1985–89 by the civilian population, the army, the UDR, and the RUC. The figures per thousand were respectively 5.9, 1.7, 9.1, and 0.9. However, as Bruce points out, these statistics are based on a false premise. The majority of people serving in the UDR were males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. When the figures are adjusted for civilian males between these ages the rate per thousand increases from 5.9 to 23, in other words two and a half times greater than for the UDR, a point which is not recognised by the Pat Finucane Centre publication.123 Additionally, there is the argument that the UDR actually prevented loyalist paramilitaries from going underground and becoming even more ‘extreme’ in their actions, essentially providing them with an outlet but within view of the authorities. Policy-makers were not unaware of this ability. In September 1971, Brian Faulkner, the then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, wrote to Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister, to specifically urge the creation of UDR units in places such as the Harland and Wolff shipyard, as ‘a means of avoiding further

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pressures for the formation of irregular Protestant armed groups’.124 In late 1979 this was still a view held by the authorities. When discussing the future role and organisation of the force it was stated that ‘politically it will remain essential to provide a force which members of the public can join and take an active part in the fight against terrorism; in any case it will continue to be important to attract into the UDR those who might otherwise join paramilitary organisations’.125 This policy has left the UDR’s disciplinary record open to scrutiny, and tainted the legacy of the majority who served without disciplinary issues. From a morale point of view, the UDR’s involvement in such a prolonged period of active service has complicated matters. Throughout its existence it carried out many sporting and ceremonial duties, in common with older auxiliary forces, and was consistently viewed as having ‘high’ morale by the authorities.126 However, after concerns for the state of morale, one major initiative sought to permit the UDR to train outside of Northern Ireland. By 1974 it was felt that at both training centres at Ballykinler and Magilligan every bump and bush was ‘known ad nauseam by UDR units’. Moving annual training to England, it was argued, would undoubtedly help morale and have a good effect on recruiting.127 Concerns were raised that this would provide an opportunity for liaison between members of extremist groups within the UDR and their counterparts in Great Britain, but these claims were dismissed, and training was permitted outside Northern Ireland from 1976.128 As far as morale goes, this decision certainly had a positive effect on the force, whilst also permitting it to train more fully for its mobilised role of home defence should a major war break out in Europe. Such a prolonged period of active service eventually took its toll on members of the UDR, bringing into focus an aspect not previously experienced by other amateur forces. It is estimated that, during its twenty-two years of existence, as many as fifty-one former or serving members of the UDR had taken their own lives. A further 220 had died of natural causes by 2001, a considerable number as a result of heart failure.129 It is accepted that a large proportion of these deaths resulted from the pressures, strains, and stresses under which those members of the UDR were working.130 These deaths, along with the large number of murders of UDR members while off duty, as well as the constant associated danger of being targeted, surely took their toll on morale. The problem of suicides was a real embarrassment to the security forces and, according to the Samaritans, they were ‘somewhat resistant’ to offers of help.131 Eventually, however, in 1990 a stress management system was set up within the UDR, working closely with the Command Psychiatrist. Within forty-eight hours of any incident the psychiatrist would visit the battalion and interview those involved, recovering casualties, and those on duty in the operations room or members of the platoon who had lost a comrade. In addition, every soldier who had come under attack, on or off duty, was interviewed. As the regimental

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history notes, ‘welfare in the UDR was of a very high order, practical, generous, caring, immediate and continuing’.132 The disciplinary record of the Irish auxiliary forces is a varied one, but it improved steadily over time. In the militia, acts of disobedience were very common. They normally took the form of drunkenness and rioting after periods of annual training and continued for much of the militia’s existence, albeit less seriously as time went on. In comparison to the disciplinary record of the militia of Great Britain, and the regular army, discipline was much worse in Ireland, a fact that corresponds with research up to the end of the First World War. In contrast, men of the yeomanry, OTC, and TA were only prone to isolated acts of indiscipline. The UDR proved to be a different case altogether, especially because of its prolonged period of service. A significant portion of the force was involved in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, and, although this was not as widespread as is sometimes stated, it did much to harm the reputation and disciplinary record of the force. For the much larger UHG, discipline once more became more of an issue. This was mainly because it came under civilian, rather than military, law, and this limited the forms of punishment that could be handed out. They normally took the form of forcible resignations or dismissals, mainly for consistent non-attendance at parades and training. Despite these differences in the levels of discipline (or indiscipline), the methods for sustaining morale remained largely the same, both in Ireland and in the United Kingdom. For the militia these were, at least initially, few and far between, but, as time went on, activities, particularly competitive sport, became an important part of camp life. This continued to be the case for the yeomanry, OTC, and UHG, but, for the latter, social events such as film showings and dances, and general enterprises such as recruiting drives and elements, which contributed to the national war effort, continued to be a staple method of creating an esprit de corps. This was increasingly important at a time of prolonged mobilisation, when the risk of apathy was much greater, particularly when there was no compulsion in Northern Ireland. Once more, for the UDR, the issue of morale was somewhat different, primarily because of its prolonged activity, and the number of suicides and service-related deaths are testimony to this fact. Notes 1 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 58–9; French, Military Identities, p. 182. For information on discipline during the Victorian period see Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 71–5; P. Burroughs, ‘Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815–1870’, The English Historical Review, vol. 100, no. 396 (July 1985), pp. 545–57. 2 Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War, p. 6. 3 PP (519). Flogging (army and militia). Return of the number of persons flogged

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in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in the year 1857; PP (47). Flogging (army and militia). Return of the number of persons flogged in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in the year 1858; PP (366). Flogging (army and militia). Return of the number of men flogged in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, 1859. 4 In 1857, there was much reportage of incidents involving the Limerick County Militia and the police in Co. Limerick; Freeman’s Journal, 23 September 1857; Saunders’s Newsletter, 23 September 1857; Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 27 September 1857. 5 TNA WO68/411 Courts Martial Book of the Kerry Militia, 1858. 6 Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 71–2. 7 NLI Ms. 1056. Memorandum by the Under-Secretary of Ireland, regarding the Nenagh Mutiny, 10 July 1856; The Times, 10 July 1856; 11 July 1856. Details of the ‘Nenagh Mutiny’ are covered at length in D. Murphy, Ireland and the Crimean War (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002), pp. 197–204. 8 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 143, cols 860–2, 15 July 1856. 9 Belfast Newsletter, 11 July 1856. 10 NLI Ms. 1056. Memorandum detailing the sentences given to those convicted in the North Tipperary Militia, 1 September 1856; Freeman’s Journal, 24 July 1856. See also Murphy, Ireland and the Crimean War, p. 204. 11 NLI Ms. 1056. Confidential memorandum on the Nenagh Munity, 5 August 1856; NLI Kilmainham papers Ms. 1239. Letter from General Lord Seaton to MajorGeneral Sir Charles Yorke, 11 August 1856. 12 Dundee Courier, 11 June 1856. 13 Freeman’s Journal, 23 September 1857; Saunders’s Newsletter, 23 September 1857; Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 27 September 1857; NLI Ms. 1056 Police Report on the Limerick County Militia, Butternant, 29 September 1857. 14 Hampshire Advertiser and Salisbury Guardian, 22 October 1859. 15 Freeman’s Journal, 26 December 1855. 16 The Times, 10 October 1855. 17 Ibid., 12 October 1855. 18 Freeman’s Journal, 12 October 1855; The Times, 15 October 1855. 19 Nation, 12 September 1857. 20 PP 1863 (14). Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom, the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, 1859–1862. 21 French, Military Identities, p. 219; PP (C.5922). Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the Militia, 1890. 22 Royal Irish Fusiliers Museum. The Historical Record of the 3rd Battalion (Princess Victoria’s) Royal Irish Fusiliers, The Armagh Light Infantry, 1855–1908. 23 NLI Ms. 1057. Letter from Mr Kelly, Chairman of Mullingar Town Council, to the Under-Secretary for Ireland, 8 August 1859. 24 BMH WS Ref.: 1770, Witness: Kevin O’Shiel, Judicial Commissioner, Dáil Land Courts, 1920–1922.

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25 The Times, 24 May 1880; Daily Gazette, 24 May 1880; Liverpool Mercury, 24 May 1880; Manchester Guardian, 29 May 1880. 26 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 308, cols 1327–456, 6 September 1886. 27 NAM Ms. 8112-54-141. Letter from F.F. Maude to General Warre, 8 July 1873. 28 NLI Ms. 1056. Letter from the Under-Secretary of Ireland to the Mayor of Waterford, 18 July 1856. 29 PRONI D618/173 History of the 4th Leinster Regiment (Queen’s County Militia), 1793–1918. 30 Saunders’s Newsletter, 13 August 1873. Also reported in The Standard, 13 August 1873; Morning Post, 14 August 1873; Nation, 16 August 1873; Freeman’s Journal, 18 August 1873. 31 The Times, 25 August 1873. 32 Freeman’s Journal, 12 August 1873. 33 Pall Mall Gazette, 30 June 1888; Morning Post, 2 July 1888 34 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 328, cols 427–8, 5 July 1888. 35 Ibid., vol. 328, cols 719–21, 9 July 1888; Ibid., 12 July 1888; Belfast Newsletter, 10 July 1888. 36 D. Hall, ‘The Louth Militia Mutiny of 1900’, Journal of the County Louth Archaeological and Historical Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (1998), pp. 281–95. 37 TNA WO68/313 Louth Militia, Digest of Service. 38 Hall, ‘The Louth Militia Mutiny of 1900’, pp. 288–90. 39 Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, 12 February 1900. 40 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 79, cols 62–6, 15 February 1900; ibid., cols 568–9, 20 February 1900. 41 Ibid., vol. 79, cols 568–9, 20 February 1900; Reynolds Newspaper, 25 February 1900. 42 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 87, col. 771, 6 August 1900. 43 Ibid., vol. 79, cols 239–315, 16 February 1900. 44 Irish Times, 5 September 1865; Standard, 6 September 1865; Dundee Courier, 6 September 1865; Cheshire Observer, 9 September 1865. 45 The Times, 5 September 1865. 46 Ibid., 26 February 1866; Morning Post, 26 February 1866; Bristol Mercury, 3 March 1866. 47 Nation, 12 August 1865; Belfast Newsletter, 20 October 1865; The Times, 23 February 1866; The Times, 27 February 1866. 48 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 183, cols 177–80, 30 April 1866. 49 The Times, 17 May 1867. 50 Freeman’s Journal, 20 June 1871. 51 Ibid., 28 June 1877. 52 Ibid., 18 July 1873; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 217, cols 970–1, 25 July 1873. 53 TNA WO 92/3 General Courts Martial Register, 1899–1917. Scottish amateur forces were also deemed to be fairly well disciplined whilst in South Africa. See E. Spiers, The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854–1902 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 192. 54 TNA WO 92/10 Courts Martial Records for Foreign Service, October 1901 – December 1901.

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55 PRONI D618/175 Digest of Service of the 4th Leinster Regiment. 56 BLHCMA Lyttelton papers. Letters to his wife, 24 July 1908; 6 January 1909; 8 January 1909; 29 June 1909; 21 January 1910; 25 January 1910; 21 March 1911; 28 June 1911. 57 NLI Ms. 1388. Notes on the Inspection Tour by the Commander of the Forces in Ireland, 5–11 January 1909. 58 PP (Cd.2063). Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 59 PRONI D1071/H/B/H/78 Letter from George Rowan-Hamilton to Lord Dufferin, 1 December 1873. The Rifle Volunteers also competed in such competitions abroad, see Beckett, Riflemen Form, p. 114. 60 Belfast Newsletter, 14 June 1875. 61 H. Richey (ed.), A Short History of the Royal Longford Militia, 1793–1893 (Dublin: Hodges Figgis and Co., 1894), p. 78. 62 TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia). 63 TNA WO 108/263 Report on the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, rendered to the Field Marshal, Commander in Chief, by Maj.-Gen. J.P. Brabazon, October 1900. 64 Belfast Newsletter, 8 February 1900. 65 Fitzgibbon, Arts under Arms, pp. 44–5. 66 TNA WO 108/375 Appendix 27. Annexure B. Report of H. Chermside, May 1901. Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Force regarding the Raising of Drafts and New Battalions … 15 May 1901. 67 Ibid. This corresponds with work done on the Second Contingent of the Imperial Yeomanry. See E.W. McFarland, ‘“Empire-Enlarging Genius”: Scottish Imperial Yeomanry Volunteers in the Boer War’, War in History, vol. 13, no. 299 (2006), p. 317. 68 Doherty, North Irish Horse, p. 10; Dorman, ’The North Irish Horse’, pp. 541–2. 69 PP (Cd.4831). The report of the President of Queen’s College, Belfast. 70 Irish Times, 31 May 1909; 16 July 1909; 2 August 1909; 29 November 1909. 71 Ibid., 6 December 1913. 72 TCD Ms. 2783/8. Parade Roll, No. 1 Section, Infantry, December 1920 – February 1921; Ms. 2783/4. Parade Roll, No. 4 Section, Infantry, April–June 1921. 73 TCD Ms. 2783/17. Record of Attendance of Lectures, November 1921; Ms. 2783/18. Parade Roll, No. 3 Section, Infantry, June–July 1921. 74 PRONI CAB/9/CD/169/1 Declaration of the Ulster Special Constabulary, 1941. 75 PRONI LA/7/3H/13 Letter to All County Commandants from the Inspector General’s Office, 18 August 1942. 76 PRONI D3077/L/4/20 Londonderry City Area Attendance Return, March–April 1941. 77 PRONI USC/5/1A/4 Letter to the Commanding Officer of C Company, from the Commanding Officer of the 3rd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 15 April 1943. 78 Ibid. Letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Down, from the Commanding Officer of the 3rd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 15 July 1943.

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79 See PRONI D3077/L/4/1 Average Attendance Returns in Londonderry, 1941–42. 80 PRONI USC/5/1A/1 Letter to a Captain in the 499 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, 4 December 1943. 81 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, pp. 277–8; Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 110–11. Before compulsion was introduced, members of the Home Guard had the option of resigning with fourteen days’ notice. This was known as the ‘housemaids clause’. See Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 273. 82 PRONI D1132/9/6 Drill Attendance Report, 9 November 1940. 83 Ibid. Report on Weekend Camp, Pomeroy, 13–14 June 1942. 84 PRONI HG8/22 Home Guard Activities, 2nd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 24 April 1943. 85 Ibid. Note, 3rd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 25 March 1942 86 PRONI D1132/9/6 Letter from the Head Instructor in the Pomeroy Area to the District Command, 9 December 1941. 87 PRONI LA/3H/4 Weekly Orders, 2nd (Belfast) Battalion, 3 January 1942. 88 PRONI D2023/11/1A Letter from the Commanding Officer of the Ballyfawley Detachment, UHG, to the County Tyrone Commandant, 28 November 1941. 89 PRONI D3077/L/4 Weekly Orders, 1st (Derry City) Battalion, UHG, 2 March 1942. 90 Irish News, 20 January 1942. 91 PRONI LA/7/3H/4 Weekly Orders, 2nd (Belfast) Battalion, UHG, 28 October 1941. 92 PRONI HG8/20 Resignations and Dismissals from the 3rd and 5th (Belfast) Battalions, UHG, December 1942. 93 PRONI D3077/L/4 Weekly Orders, 1st (Londonderry City) Battalion, UHG, 14 September – 19 October 1942. 94 Ibid., 18–25 January 1943. 95 PRONI HG1/1/20 Resignations and Dismissals from the 4th (Belfast) Battalion, UHG, July 1942 – December 1943. There were a total of 296 resignations and dismissals for this period in the battalion. 96 Training was also disrupted for the regulars due to the harvest. See T. Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), pp. 41–2. 97 PRONI D2023/11/1A Memorandum to All County and City Commandants, 13  May 1943; PRONI D3077/L/4 Weekly Orders, 1st (Londonderry City) Battalion, UHG, 7 September 1942. 98 PRONI HG8/22 Home Guard Activities, 2nd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 24 April 1943. 99 Ibid., 21 August and 11 September 1943. 100 PRONI D998/25/8 Letter from the County Fermanagh Commandant to Area Commandants, 31 July 1940. 101 Ibid.; PRONI LA/7/3H/4 Weekly Orders, 2nd (Belfast) Battalion, UHG, 3 January 1942. 102 For more information on the issue of morale during the First World War see Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War.

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103 PRONI LA7/3/H/7 Ulster Home Guard: Directive on Winter Training, 1941. 104 Derry Standard, 12 October 1942; 23 October 1942. 105 Ibid., 9 January 1942. 106 PRONI HG8/22 Home Guard Activities, 2nd (Down) Battalion, UHG, 27 March 1943. 107 Guardian, 26 April 1989. 108 For examples see Gailey, An Account of the Territorials in Northern Ireland, pp. 15–16. 109 Ibid., pp. 93–5. 110 A. Cadwallader, Lethal Allies; British Collusion in Ireland (Cork: Mercier Press, 2013); Pat Finucane Centre, The Hidden History of the UDR: The Secret Files Revealed (Newry: Pat Finucane Centre, 2014). 111 Bruce, The Red Hand, p. 225. 112 Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment, p. 183. 113 Cadwallader, Lethal Allies, pp. 327–34. 114 TNA DEFE22/822 Report on the Theft of Weapons from UDR Armoury, 23 October 1973. 115 Ibid. Table of Stolen Arms and Suspected Collusion, 1971. 116 TNA DEFE13/822 Joint Security Committee Report into Subversion in the UDR, August 1973; extracts quoted in P. Shirlow, The End of Ulster Loyalism? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 71. 117 Ibid. Also quoted in The Hidden History of the UDR, pp. 19–20. 118 TNA CJ4/2174 Letter from A.A. Pritchard to Fred Mulley, 3 June 1977. 119 For an account of the Miami Showband killings see Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment, p. 80. 120 PRONI Letter from Henry Tuzo to Brian Faulkner, 19 November 1971. 121 TNA CJ4/3063 Letter from A.E. Huckle to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 14 January 1980. 122 Ibid. Note by S.J. Leach, Political Affairs Branch, 20 June 1980. 123 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 379. 124 Cadwallader, Lethal Allies, p. 324, 125 TNA CJ4/3064 Confidential Report on the Future Role and Organisation of the Ulster Defence Regiment, 14 November 1979. 126 See PRONI CAB/9/G/89/5 Unsigned letter to Sir Ian Freeland, relating to the visit of the Prime Minister and other Stormont MPS to the UDR, 7 September 1970; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 69, cols 412–18, 11 December 1984. 127 TNA DEFE70/241 Memorandum on UDR Service outside Northern Ireland, 4 October 1974. 128 Ibid., 18 February 1975; Memorandum by D.B. Omand on UDR Training outside Northern Ireland, 30 June 1975. 129 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 399; Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment, p. 145. 130 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 203, cols 1139–203, 13 February 1992. 131 Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment, p. 146. 132 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, pp. 399–400.

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Auxiliary forces on active service

Following discussing the many elements of the auxiliary forces in Ireland, such as their social composition, their strategic importance, and their discipline, it is important to look at the forces as they carried out their roles on active service. For the militia, this occurred in three distinct periods: for a short time during the Crimean War; for a period during, and shortly after the Indian Mutiny; and, most intensely, during the South African wars. For the Irish yeomanry, many men saw service in South Africa, and served during the First World War. Similarly, the OTC and VTC played a role during the First World War, the latter, most notably, during the Easter Rising in 1916. Furthermore, for the TA and UHG, active service occurred during the Second World War, and for the UHG this was the sole reason for its existence. The UDR continued active service within Northern Ireland, and even became the regiment with the longest continuous service in the history of the British Army. It is clear that all of these auxiliary forces formed an integral cog in the defence of the British Empire, whether defending the British Isles themselves or carrying out service abroad. When the Irish militia was embodied in late December 1854 it is clear that, for the authorities at least, its primary task was to facilitate the enrolment of men from the militia into the regular army, so as to reinforce it after heavy losses in the Crimea. The authorities’ view that the militia’s priority was not to exist at home as full regiments is seen in the haphazard nature in which the militia was clothed, equipped, and trained during these opening months. It was noted in the Louth Rifles Digest of Service, for example, that in the early months of 1855, even though there was ‘severe weather’, the men were badly clothed as no uniform had been ready for them, and it was not until February, two months after the unit was first embodied, that it received its first smooth bore muskets and boots.1 When the men were finally able to conduct drill, the parade ground at Drogheda, in which it was stationed, was not big enough for a six-company battalion to stand in open column as it was situated on the side of a steep hill. It was observed that it was almost impossible to teach the men to march steadily up and down the hill. This was not remedied until August 1855 when the regiment was moved to Dundalk Cavalry Barracks, where ‘the parade ground was large enough

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and level’.2 Similar scenes were noted in other regiments, for instance when it was recorded that, although the Longford Militia had mustered 386 privates in the first three months of its embodiment, it had been furnished with only seventy stands of arms, ‘an amount ludicrously insufficient’.3 Militia regiments also had to constantly contend with recruiting parties from regular regiments arriving at their barracks and enrolling their men for the line, a common practice, but one which was resented by many officers. Again in the Louth Rifles, it was remarked that a party of Dragoons marched into its barracks in May 1855 and induced a quarter of the men to volunteer to the Line, something which was seen as a ‘severe blow’ by those who wished to see the regiment serve as one fighting unit.4 These were not isolated incidents, and Line regiments were well within their right to carry out this practice, but it was consistently noted that at least one-fifth of recruits were induced to leave militia regiments, something that was viewed as terrible for the efficiency of the respective ­­battalions.5 Despite this constant interruption in the opening months of embodiment, a number of regiments saw fit to volunteer for active service abroad. By the end of May 1855, twelve battalions had requested the Secretary of State for War to allow service overseas, and a thirteenth battalion volunteered in early 1856.6 Specifically, the Longford Rifles volunteered its services for duty in the Mediterranean. The War Office, however, further reinforced the intended role for the militia, advising the regiment that it would prefer men to volunteer separately into different regiments of the Line.7 The requests of another six battalions were also rejected by the Secretary of State, apparently for similar reasons, and other roles within the framework of the defence of the United Kingdom were soon found, most notably garrison duties. Importantly, during this first embodiment the majority of regiments remained in Ireland for the greater part of their engagement. It has been mentioned that the Louth Rifles, in the opening months of its active service, spent time in Drogheda and Dundalk, but it had also moved to the Curragh by April 1856, and spent the remainder of its embodiment carrying out duties including setting up drill, picking stones off the parade ground, and marking paths and roads.8 During its period of embodiment the Westmeath Rifles spent time training in Athlone and at the Curragh, travelled to Cork, sailed to Portsmouth to garrison a number of forts, went to Chichester, and finally sailed home and disembodied back at Athlone.9 The South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) spent its period of embodiment in Clonmel Barracks, briefly garrisoned Dublin, which had previously been entirely garrisoned by the militia of Great Britain, before travelling back to Clonmel for disembodiment.10 Some elements of the Irish militia were also used as an aid to the civil power when disturbances took place. In March 1855, for example, the Wicklow Rifles was asked to aid in the suppression of a riot in Arklow, County Wicklow.11

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Similarly, in August of the same year, the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) was asked by the Mayor of Clonmel, County Tipperary, to aid in the suppression of a ‘very serious riot’ after police had arrested a man for being drunk, leading to a backlash from hundreds of citizens from that town.12 During the second period of embodiment, the most publicised example of this role was when the Wexford Militia, while stationed in Dorset, helped to quell a revolt at Portland Prison in September 1855. It was reported in The Times, by an eye witness of the proceedings, that the revolt began when forty inmates rushed to a central point of the quarry in which they were working, picking up any weapons they could find. The authorities, it is claimed, were prepared for this, and a picket of the Wexford Militia, numbering approximately 150, led by Captains Pigott and Alcock, charged down at the inmates with levelled bayonets, stopping the revolt fairly quickly, without any loss of life, as they had been under strict orders not to fire a shot unless all other means had been exhausted.13 Its actions, discipline, and conduct were highly praised, and a letter from the Secretary of State was even published, which gave special thanks to the regiment for its role in stopping the revolt.14 Although these incidents were largely isolated, they do further demonstrate that the militia had a role of home security, both externally and internally, as an aid to the civil power. The militia was embodied until the summer of 1856 when it was finally felt that the United Kingdom was no longer in as much danger. For some regiments, this period of disembodiment lasted only a short time due to the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. From October 1857, a large number of regular battalions were moved away from the United Kingdom, and, as a result, some militia regiments were re-embodied in order to take over garrisoning roles. This embodiment lasted for many regiments until the middle of 1861, a longer period than previously experienced. Not all militia regiments across the UK were called upon for this embodiment, and it is clear that the Irish militia provided more than their proportion of battalions to this mobilisation. Of a total of thirty-three militia regiments embodied, twelve were based in Ireland, with eighteen provided by England, and three by Scotland. In contrast to the first embodiment, all Irish battalions were moved away from Ireland within a month of the start of the second embodiment.15 A possible reason for this was the potential security risk in allowing too many Irish regiments to serve too close to their locality. Although this did not suit many people in Ireland, particularly Nationalist MPs, the result was a much greater participation in home defence duties. When in England, the majority of battalions moved around to varying locations, but, for the most part, garrison duties were carried out in coastal areas, mostly in Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the vulnerable areas around Kent. The South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) found itself, for a large part of its embodiment, in Sheerness, where it aided in the defence of the Medway River, and also had the responsibility for guarding the Queen while the men were

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stationed in Gosport.16 At varying points of their engagement, the Louth Rifles, North Cork Rifles, and Fermanagh Militia were stationed in Great Yarmouth, charged with the defence of that area. The movement of regiments to camp at Aldershot also took place and much was done in terms of training and drill. The Donegal, Wexford, and Kerry Militias were stationed there on the occasion of an inspection by the Queen.17 While stationed at Hythe for musketry training, the Donegal Militia also beat the school record for accuracy, something which was put down to the superior training the men had received during its period of embodiment.18 Other ceremonial duties were carried out by various militia regiments, a role which had not been undertaken in previous years. The Antrim Rifles, stationed near Dover in January 1858, for instance, provided a guard of honour for the King of Belgium, the Prince and Princess Royal of Prussia, and the Duke and Duchess of Saxe-Coburg upon their arrival in England.19 Despite the part played in the defence of the United Kingdom, problems with clothing and equipment were still not fully remedied. Even by 1888, the state of the clothing of the Sligo Artillery (Militia) was commented on in the Irish Times, which stated that All the arms, knapsacks, and great coats of the gunners were obsolete, the two latter simply rotten and quite unserviceable, whilst the carbines of the oldest pattern were many grooveless and all unbrowned. Even on parade, it was stated, some knapsacks in the Brigade (issued before the Crimean War to the Sligo Rifles) fell off, so rotten were straps, buckles, and canvas. The great coats, also relics of ante-Crimean days (1852 their date), literally honeycombed with moths, of unpleasant odour, of many patterns … totally unfit for issue, and should have been condemned years ago.20

The training of the militia was also a problematic one. This was particularly so for the Artillery (Militia) owing to the disproportionate number of regiments in Ireland. More often than not, there were not adequate facilities to accommodate all who needed them, mainly because there were not enough ranges. This meant that many regiments were restricted to drill for much of their training.21 The infantry fared little better in relation to this. It was recorded in 1870 that, out of a total of 53,769 rifles in the possession of the militia of the United Kingdom, militia regiments in Ireland held only 736, and 601 of them were the older long-barrelled Snider rifle. Of course, this was at a time when no training was held in Ireland but little was done to remedy the deficiency when training did occur the following year.22 Furthermore, following the introduction of the Martini-Henry rifle and its distribution to much of the militia in Great Britain in 1881, there was a substantial delay in its issue to the Irish militia.23 As a result, in 1886 the militia in Ireland was still training with the Snider rifle and reports began to circulate that these weapons were so old that the barrels had worn and were effectively useless. One instructor of musketry remarked that because of the worn barrels the guns were incapable of correct fire, meaning that the projectiles

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entered their target at an angle and in many cases deflected back at a great force.24 Finally, in May 1887, it was announced that the Irish militia would receive the Martini-Henry rifle.25 However, at the training of that year it was still reported that none had been distributed and because of this the Irish militia were on an uneven footing, compared to the English and Scottish militia, especially when competing in the inter-regimental rifle matches.26 After the outbreak of war in South Africa and the terrible performance of the British Army during ‘Black Week’, it was deemed necessary to embody the auxiliary forces of the United Kingdom, for service both at home and abroad. This led to fifty-nine battalions totalling 45,566 officers and men seeing service in South Africa. A further five battalions saw service in Malta, three on St Helena, and one in Egypt.27 Of the seventy-two battalions asked to serve overseas, only four failed to meet the required quota of men accepting this duty, and, rather importantly, three of these battalions were of the Irish militia. It has been estimated that approximately 28,000 Irishmen fought in South Africa, a significant proportion of these in the militia.28 Of the battalions that did serve in South Africa, however, the Irish militia was sparsely represented as a proportion of all regiments abroad. As full regiments of militia, the 9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps; 3rd Leinster Regiment, 3rd Royal Munster Fusiliers, 4th and 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers all served in South Africa. In addition, a full battalion of the 5th Royal Irish Rifles, with Service Companies of the 3rd and 4th battalions of the same regiment, also served abroad.29 Detachments of the Antrim Royal Garrison Artillery (Militia) and Donegal Royal Garrison Artillery (Militia) also united to form the Brigade Division Irish Militia Artillery, which served both in South Africa and on St Helena. Additionally, the 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers was stationed at Malta and Gozo on garrison duty. Not including those men in the Militia Reserve, and those who had volunteered to transfer to the Line from a militia regiment, it means that a little over 4,100 men served abroad with the Irish militia, a little under ten per cent of the total from all auxiliary forces across the UK.30 This was however an impressive figure given Irish nationalist opposition to the South African War. As with the previous embodiments, the roles which the militia had to perform while on foreign service varied greatly, but one common element was how, for the majority of the time, these regiments were used in a supporting role. The ­activities of the 9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps, the first Irish militia regiment to serve in South Africa, show this clearly. Upon its arrival in South Africa on 1 February 1900 and during the initial weeks of its engagement it marched to Nauwport, Tweedale, and Steunsburg to reinforce the garrisons of these towns. By March, it was charged with guarding the railway bridges at Kroomhoogts and Henning, and in May it assisted the Royal Engineers in creating a deviation for the railway at Vet River. One soldier of the regiment remarked that they patrolled for twenty miles each night during this time.31 In the middle of

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June it was ordered to guard eighty-seven Boer prisoners, its first contact with the enemy. The battalion then moved on to Taailbosch Kop where it was given charge of the line between Vereeniging to Wolverhoek, a distance of eleven miles, and this was noted as ‘a task of great importance and responsibility’ as the Boers were very active in the district and made many attempts to wreck the line. It was noted in the regiment’s record of service that ‘in no case were they successful’.32 The Regimental Digest of Service records very little more until the following year, when orders were received that it was to return home, and on 6 July 1901 it embarked from Cape Town, for Ireland. The important role which the battalion carried out during the advances of 1900 was recognised when a circular memo was issued by the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General lines of communication which praised the officers’ ingenuity in devising means to stop interference from the Boers trying to break the line. The battalion’s lack of direct action is demonstrated, however, when it is observed that, in the eighteen months of its service in South Africa, only three officers died, one of pneumonia on the ship en route, and one of sun stroke in the first week of arrival; and twenty-two NCOs and men died, both in action and of disease. Despite the lack of action, nine officers and men were mentioned in despatches, two men received a DSO, and a further two a DCM.33 The roles that the 9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps undertook during its foreign service were typical of the activities carried out by militia regiments, as is evidenced by Spiers’s study of the Scottish militia in South Africa.34 There is certainly evidence to suggest a degree of discontent from serving members as to their relative boredom at having to carry out these tasks. Whilst the 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers was serving in South Africa, for instance, a letter by an officer stated that the regiment had marched from Kimberley, to Barkley, and Ironfield, where it had built a fort ‘which, I think, would now withstand 2,000 Boers’, and that ‘there are Boers all round with a few guns, and people come in every day with tales of looting and depredation, but we daren’t go too far out. We captured two Boers by strategy; they had not time to get their guns up as we had them covered. This is the only actual thing the 5th Battalion have done.’35 A little after this, the battalion was sent to guard a convoy, ‘on account of its smart general appearance’, and were sent further to the front than any other militia battalion.36 Similar boredom was also experienced by Captain F.H. Crawford, Adjutant of the Donegal Royal Garrison Artillery (Militia), when recording his experiences of service in South Africa. The most challenging job that the unit was given was to escort a thousand Boer prisoners en route to St Helena. Although he did express some confusion at being given this task owing to it being an artillery unit, its lack of suitability to this task was most keenly demonstrated when, upon the order to load its carbines, one man accidentally pulled the trigger with the result that a man was shot through the shoulder on the ship opposite. Crawford stated that, for the seven years he had been in the unit, the men had never seen

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or fired a weapon, and now they were expected to guard prisoners with them.37 Other duties which the Brigade was given included patrol and guard duty, road building, and the building of a fort, Fort Ulster, whose walls ‘were so thick that no artillery could penetrate them’. After eight months of service, the frustration at any lack of action is clear to see, Crawford writing: If I had only known what I do now, never should I have volunteered. They do not want us out here at all, and now they are only keeping us out here for the look of the thing. They do still want infantry, but no Garrison Artillery, and now that I have been up at the front and been threatened by the Boers, if they are not going to attack I want to go home. It shall be a long time before I volunteer again.38

He would have to wait a further eight months before returning home in July 1901. What these testimonies demonstrate is the clear frustration at much of the monotonous work carried out by the militia once it had been sent abroad. This work, however boring and unrewarding for the men, was of great importance, mainly because it freed up many soldiers of the Line, enabling them to fight the Boers directly. The authorities were reluctant to allow the auxiliary services to partake in direct action because of a fear that the men would not be of sufficient quality. The inability of the militia to directly engage with the enemy was one of the deficiencies highlighted by the Elgin Commission after the war, and these problems ultimately led to the militia being disbanded. Incidentally, no officers who had served abroad with the Irish militia were called to present evidence to the committee, therefore not allowing it to justify itself.39 The majority of Irish militia regiments did not serve abroad, but were still embodied. For these units the tasks carried out were largely the same as had been undertaken during the previous two embodiments, that of providing men to the Line, and garrison duties around areas of the United Kingdom. The 9th Rifle Brigade, for example, embodied in December 1899, was stationed at the Curragh, and carried out garrison and training duties there for almost a year until it was disembodied. A total of 180 men transferred to the Line, joining the Welsh Regiment, South Wales Borderers, Connaught Rangers, and the Rifle Brigade.40 The Wicklow Artillery (Militia), embodied in May 1900, proceeded for garrison duty in Portsmouth. Curiously, the regiment volunteered for service in China, because of the Boxer Rebellion, while it was stationed there. It was thanked for the offer but it was never taken up by the War Office. The battalion was stationed at Gosport until its disembodiment five months later.41 The South Tipperary Artillery (Militia), also embodied in May 1900, left for Plymouth, where it was charged with the garrisoning of Fort Bovisand, one of the defences on the eastern side of Plymouth. It was also instructed in drills and details of the armaments in and around Staddon Heights, and selected to provide a guard of honour for the Princess of Battenberg, who visited Plymouth.42 These activities largely mirrored those which had been carried out in previous embodiments, and

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formed an important part of Britain’s home defences, enabling regular troops to be freed up for active service. During this last embodiment it is also important to note that not all militia battalions were sent to other areas of the United Kingdom, some being allowed to remain in Ireland, demonstrating the changing attitudes towards Irish forces on home soil. During its relatively short and staggered existence, the yeomanry of Ireland took part in three major conflicts: during the Boer War as companies of the Imperial Yeomanry; for the duration of the First World War as both the North and South Irish Horse; and during the Second World War, when the North Irish Horse was designated a Tank Regiment. For much of the latter two engagements, however, their part-time citizen composition was quickly eroded, meaning that they soon resembled in only a small way an amateur military force, whereas, while in South Africa, this identity had remained largely intact. It is clear that, much like its militia counterpart, the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa largely took part in actions along the lines of communication, the infamous engagement at Lindley being the notable exception, and letters and diary entries reflect these activities. Piecing together first-hand accounts of experiences while they were on duty in South Africa makes it clear that an overwhelming sense of suffering and boredom was felt by the men of the Irish Yeomanry. Upon the arrival of the First Contingent in the middle of April 1900, the men were confined to the ship for a number of days, before being permitted to disembark and set up their encampment five miles away at Maitland Camp. At this point, the yeomen were restricted to company exercises and skirmishes while awaiting the arrival of their horses. The next task normally given to these men was some form of guard duty, most commonly a railway bridge, as well as the escort of prisoners.43 One yeoman complained that one of the activities they had undertaken was ‘making desperate bayonet charges at an imaginary enemy’.44 The diary of another yeoman was filled with entries which related to the polo club set up in camp, and notes that contact was made with the enemy on only two occasions.45 These sorts of grievances were supplemented by criticisms, amongst other things, of the lack of food and the unbearable heat, as well as the issues with the terrain, which put the men in a position in which ‘you drink sand, breathe sand, eat sand, and wash with sand’.46 Similar activities continued to be experienced by the later contingents of the Imperial Yeomanry. While enduring his period of engagement in September 1900, James Craig lamented that the job he had taken up was that of moving troops, sorting provisions, and arranging trains, because ‘all the real fun is over’ and all that was left were the duties of a police force, while hoping that he would be able to return home by Christmas.47 However, while on duty with the 74th (Belfast) Company in late 1900, a corporal recalled that ‘we were nearly nine weeks on the march, and had rather a rough time of it. Little sleep, little food,

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being on half rations for a long time; alternatively roasting and soaked, and at night being nearly frozen with the cold’. This was intermingled with actions against the Boers with many fire-fights and several prisoners taken, demonstrating that ‘we have not been on a picnic out here’.48 Furthermore, recognition of the Irish contribution was rendered by Arthur Conan Doyle in his history of the war. He noted the ‘heroic defence of a convoy’ by the 14th Company of Irish Imperial Yeomanry during a Boer attack, and also recognised the bravery of the Irishmen who held a ridge until they were almost exterminated.49 Not all was quiet and uneventful for some companies of the Irish Imperial Yeomanry, most notably considering the actions, and the so-called disaster, at Lindley.50 The outcome of the engagement is well known, but little attention has been given to the events surrounding it, and leading up to the surrender of the 13th Battalion, as well as the fate of the men held captive. The most detailed account was written by Trooper Maurice Fitzgibbon in his book Arts Under Arms, in which he recounted his experiences in the 45th (Dublin) Company, and in particular the action at Lindley. Fitzgibbon recalled that three Boer commandos had been permitted to enter the British lines in a form of gentlemanly act, and were able to ‘find out our numbers, our armaments, and the amount of our supplies, and had even had lunch with us’.51 This was perhaps the first of many poor decisions made by Lieutenant-Colonel Basil Spragge, a regular soldier, who was given command of the 13th Battalion. About this, as well as Spragge’s decision to hold the position at Lindley (even though the town was unexpectedly in Boer hands) rather than to retreat towards Kroonstad, which initially was still possible, Thomas Pakenham (a descendant of the Earl of Longford, who was captured in the action) is rather scathing, going as far as calling Spragge a ‘regular ass’.52 Subsequently, historians have also commented on the poor position in which the Imperial Yeomanry had been placed, and especially on the poor communication between British headquarters and the various commanders.53 From Pakenham’s, as well as Fitzgibbon’s, accounts of events, and also the few letters passed to the press, it is clear that the Imperial Yeomanry had been put in a rather difficult situation, largely not of their making, and suffered the consequences: a tarnish to its reputation. Nevertheless, the Irish companies fought admirably despite the circumstances. Exhausted and fighting in an infantry role for which they were not adequately trained, against a force comprising approximately five thousand Boer commandos, Fitzgibbon recalled that they had been drawn into a game of chess in which the situation ‘demanded of a pawn the moves which were only possible for some larger piece’.54 They managed to hold out for four days before their surrender, taking on both a defensive and an offensive role. The commander of the 45th (Dublin) Company, the Earl of Longford, exhibited great gallantry during a charge on the final day of operations. A vivid account written by Trooper James Smithwick was published in the Kildare Observer and is worth recounting at length:

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For the four following days we kept up the fight. As soon as it was light every morning the Boers and we opened fire on each other, kept it up till dark; and still no help came. The nights were dreadfully cold, but still we could have stuck to it had they not brought four big guns against us, and commenced bursting shells amongst us … Our company was the last one to give in, and we held a kopje for two hours after the rest had surrendered. Lord Longford was hit in four places, still he would not wait to have his wounds dressed, but went on encouraging us. He gave us a great lead up a hill in a bayonet charge on the morning of the last day … Villiers-Stuart was badly wounded just about this time. I have heard since that Sir John Power has died. He was hit on the Monday while looking through his field glasses. The bullet went through his right wrist, entered behind the right eye, and lodged behind his left one. He was struck down immediately, of course, and became blind.55

In all, after the four days of fighting, eighty men had been killed and a further 530 surrendered, with Boer losses amounting to seventy killed, demonstrating a determined effort by the yeomen.56 The prisoners were taken to the Transvaal, while many of the wounded were left behind, under the care of Fitzgibbon, who had some medical experience as a student of Trinity College. It was not long before many of the men were freed, but their defeat had been viewed as an embarrassing one for the military establishment.57 It was such an embarrassment that a court of inquiry was held in September 1900, which found Spragge culpable for the surrender, despite support from many of the officers under his command, because of his decision not to retreat when he found Lindley deserted of British forces. Some blame was also laid, however, on Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. Colvile, for his inaction when a message for help was received.58 These findings were fair in their assessment of the poor command given to the yeomanry, and the admirable fight put up by the 13th Battalion was constantly noted. It is also a fair representation of the engagement. During the First World War, the OTC and VTC were involved in one engagement: the Easter Rising in 1916. Prior to this the OTC had been responsible for the preparation of officers before they went to the front. This task was carried out satisfactorily, and many men who served, in all theatres of war, had gone through the system in place at Dublin and Belfast. For the VTC, a small active role was undertaken in the defence of Ireland, albeit unofficially. In March 1916, it was noted that, in Belfast and Dublin, the VTC were being used on ‘Special Constable’ duties, including work supervising the arrival and departure of soldiers at North Wall in Dublin and at railway stations, while also conducting drill in conjunction with the OTC.59 Importantly, they were armed only with batons and sticks, and, in Belfast, patrolled the dock premises outside the parts covered by military guards.60 On Monday 24 April 1916, the Dublin companies of VTC, numbering 120 men, were on a training exercise in the Wicklow Hills when they heard of the

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Rising. As a result, they began to make their way back to Beggar’s Bush Barracks which they found besieged. They had no ammunition for their rifles, and no bayonets, but came under heavy sniper fire from a railway bridge. It is said that their ‘G.R.’ brassards made them easy targets. Six of the battalion were killed, including Commandant Browning, and ten were wounded, when attempting to enter the barracks.61 These were the only VTC members in the United Kingdom to die in combat in the war. Even when the men did finally reach the barracks, there were only seventeen Lee-Enfield rifles between them, so they were instructed to use their old Italian rifles as clubs if the ‘Sinn Feiners’ attempted to rush them.62 The barracks was never taken and, after the events, the Chief Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police expressed his thanks for the invaluable assistance provided by the VTC in their assistance to the authorities.63 Similarly, the DUOTC, numbering between twenty and thirty men because it was a holiday, was tasked with defending the grounds of Trinity College, and many other buildings in its vicinity. Rifles and ammunition were available to them, and it was deemed that, if the College was taken by enemy forces, it would be very difficult to retake it without heavy artillery.64 As it happened, they were never directly threatened; its important strategic location apparently not appreciated by the rebels. Members of the OTC garrisoned the College for two days before being relieved and subsequently a presentation was made to them for their work. A large sum of money was raised, and trophies were presented to those who had taken part in the defence. Money that was left over was presented to the Browning and G.R. Volunteer Training Corps Fund, which was set up to aid the families of the VTC who had been killed, this demonstrating the close association between the two organisations.65 This was an important episode for both formations as they had never been expected to take part directly in any military action. Despite this, they carried out all that was asked of them and successfully defended their positions. For both artillery batteries of the TA in Northern Ireland, the war diaries from late August 1939 record the monotonous garrison duties undertaken at Grey Point Fort. Much detail is recorded of the training exercises carried out by the men, which included the installation and use of anti-aircraft guns. Other than this, no direct action was ever experienced by these batteries in Northern Ireland.66 Thankfully, from a military point of view, the UHG never came face-to-face with the enemy during the course of its existence. As a force whose purpose was to meet the enemy in the event of invasion, however, a large number of activities were undertaken in order to try to make sure that they were ready should this eventuality occur. It is clear that the active functions which it did perform, namely the manning of defences and assistance to the civil authorities, were carried out successfully, the most important result of this being the freeing up of regular troops for active service.

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Within days of the initial formation of the UHG, it was noted that defensive activities were already under way, notably assisting police services in the manning of roadblocks, and setting up anti-tank obstacles on important road junctions, on the outskirts of towns, and along defensive lines which would be held in the event of invasion.67 It was contemplated that the forms of enemy attack could range from airborne raids, the capture or destruction of industrial or military targets, to a full-scale invasion. Additionally, the greatest vulnerabilities were seen to be the northern coast of Ireland – a risky landing at Dundrum Bay or Belfast Lough – or even an attack through Eire.68 As a result of these varying scenarios, the forces in each county were assigned specific tasks in order to attempt to carry out their roles in the most successful way. Given its largely rural landscape, battalions of the UHG in County Fermanagh were specifically entrusted to defend aerodromes in the event of an enemy landing. Their task, upon a call for mobilisation, was to form perimeter defences around these aerodromes so as to repel any possible enemy offensive. In County Down the priority tasks for the battalions in the region were beach defence, particularly at Dundrum and Newcastle, with a secondary task of protecting telephone exchanges so that communications could be maintained. It was reiterated that ‘there will be no withdrawal from defended localities which will be held to the last round and last man’.69 Naturally, these initial tasks and schemes were very similar to those carried out in Great Britain. The force was to adapt to local strategic circumstances and, therefore, be trained for specific tasks in a static role.70 Throughout 1940, senior officers were reminded that, as the UHG would come under military control in the event of an invasion, training should be carried out along military rather than police lines, despite the fact that the internal situation of the country would be at a critical point shortly before an invasion.71 At the onset of winter 1940, however, the risk of invasion subsided and battalions simply carried on their training programmes until the probability of an attack rose in the spring of the following year. As might be expected, priorities remained much the same, an airborne attack being the most likely, although not seen as likely to be on a large scale unless German forces could capture aerodromes in Eire. At this point it was decided that there were four main operational roles for the UHG: the gathering of information regarding enemy movements; manning of static defence areas, particularly Belfast and Larne; harassing and a mobile form of defence; and the relief of regular troops at vital points. Each unit was to be trained in one of these roles so as to have a greater understanding of what its operational role would be, and men were to understand that strategic points were ‘to be held to the last’.72 Additionally, the Utility Detachments of the UHG, formed when the need for them was at its highest, were reorganised so that they would no longer act as static defence formations and instead, especially in Belfast, would be employed in a sector of the defence of the city, while attached

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to another battalion.73 Apart from this very little changed with respect to training and what would be expected of the UHG in the event of invasion. The German bombing raids, particularly those on Belfast in April and May 1941, however, meant that a new role for the UHG was established, one which enabled it to undertake direct participation in the war. When Major-General Pollock took over command of the Belfast UHG in the aftermath of the most serious raids, he insisted that, when invasion was not imminent, all members should help the authorities and the civil defence services in any way possible during air raids.74 By June it had been recognised that strong collaboration and understanding had been established between the services during the raids.75 Despite this, no official order was given to UHG units, although many battalions still reiterated that all possible assistance should be given during an air raid, this still occurring until April 1942.76 Official orders were finally given to all UHG personnel to carry out this role at the end of September 1942, dictating that all members should report to the nearest Air Raid Precaution (ARP) post for duty as it was the obligation of all Home Guardsmen to assist in every possible way.77 Discussions had taken place in the Northern Ireland Cabinet and it was decided by the Minister of Public Security that in view of the greater possibility of air raids than of invasion in the immediate future, the provision for assistance by the UHG, in line with similar assistance seen in Great Britain, would be well received by the civil defence services and a logical decision to make.78 Although this role was to be a crucial one for the UHG, of the eight operational roles, anti-paratrooper and closing the border with Eire were the two most important, and the assistance in civil defence was seen only as the seventh priority in this list for many battalions.79 The assistance of the civil defence authorities was not the only new role established for the UHG at this time. The second, more direct, role came in the form of the manning of anti-aircraft batteries, particularly around Belfast and Londonderry. The decision for the UHG to undertake this role was made as early as February 1943, so that it would come in line with the activities of the Home Guard in Great Britain.80 It was felt that this task would be welcome to the men as it gave them a job which was more immediately concerned with the war effort, and that members would feel that the responsibility of the Home Defence Army was being increasingly entrusted to them.81 This intention certainly turned out to be the case, one Adjutant remarking that, once training had commenced at the anti-aircraft sites, all ranks were determined to make it an outstanding success in this ‘most important undertaking we had yet attempted’.82 When certain companies were employed on anti-aircraft duties, a number of practical considerations had to be made. It was decided that these duties were to be undertaken entirely on a voluntary basis, and those wishing to make this commitment had to sign a new agreement which stated that they would faithfully carry out their duties and would carry out their tour of duty on the gun

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sites for one night in every eight.83 In the Belfast area, for example, 1,888 officers and men were required, and it was calculated that this would free up 662 regular soldiers for other duties.84 In obtaining the Home Guard to undertake this role it was also thought that some of the older men who had left the force because it had been too physically active would be prepared to rejoin and that this should be encouraged in every way possible.85 Although, in reality, little action actually took place for the UHG manning these posts, as this role had been established so late in the war, it certainly alleviated any boredom or monotony of the previous training. It also freed up many regular soldiers, who continued to be needed in other theatres of war, especially after the invasion of Europe. Despite the invasion of France in June 1944, UHG defence schemes continued to be developed and employed. Only four days after the invasion in Normandy, a test mobilisation was undertaken in preparation for an invasion of Northern Ireland. It was thought that a seaborne invasion was highly unlikely, but that because of the Allied advances the country was at much greater risk of a retaliatory airborne invasion.86 There were also fears of German spoiling raids in Britain, so UHG activities fell in line with this. In many ways this seems like a rather absurd possibility, but the continued use of these schemes is understandable as a method to try to curb any absenteeism, when it may have been perceived that any threat was a very small possibility, and the role of the UHG seen as no longer required. Once the Territorials had returned home after the war the monotonous garrison role was largely maintained. The TA’s operational duties consisted of guarding its own armouries, especially after the new TA Headquarters in Dungannon had been attacked by the IRA in January 1957.87 This continued into the Troubles, especially because it had no role whatsoever in the conflict within Northern Ireland itself. However, reports were made in 1977 that one unit had been forced to guard its drill hall with pickaxe handles, after its arms had been stolen.88 Although murders of TA members did occur throughout this period, the ability to travel between locations in civilian clothing, and the minimal role played within Northern Ireland, meant that it was comparatively safe to be a member of a TA regiment. Notwithstanding, it did, in theory at least, have an active role to play in the defence of Europe, but owing to restrictions on training – the force was unable to train with armoured vehicles in Northern Ireland – it was confined mainly to ceremonial duties.89 Of course, annual camps occurred, either in Great Britain or in Germany, but during this tumultuous period it is hardly surprising that the TA was consistently under strength. The duties carried out by the UDR in action were, in most respects, somewhat different from those of previous amateur forces. When the role of the UDR was imagined in the Hunt Report in 1969, it did not include the controversial

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task of riot control, the task so poorly carried out by the B Specials and that had sporadically been performed by the militia over a century earlier. Instead, it was entrusted with ‘protecting the border and state against armed attack and sabotage’ by guarding key points, patrolling, and establishing check points and road blocks, not dissimilar to role of the UHG. In addition, by the time of its vesting in April 1970, it was also given the task of guarding the 283 ‘Key Points’ in Northern Ireland, which included power stations and military installations, from IRA raids from across the Republic of Ireland border, from attacks made by the Northern Ireland IRA, and from attacks by extremist Protestants.90 It was on this basis that the UDR operated for the first six years of its existence. Despite initial concerns that the UDR would not reach the required strength to take over operations from the USC in April 1970, with a strength of approximately 2,500, by May it had taken part in guarding key points and setting up checkpoints.91 In fact, some companies, such as A Company 4th Battalion UDR in Fermanagh, had taken over the duties of the USC on 1 April, albeit with no ammunition for its rifles.92 According to Potter, by July 1970 the regiment had carried out a total of 3,883 days of operational duties; in July, at its peak, 14,056 days were carried out. By the end of 1970, the average number of days of duty carried out each month was 9,870.93 Typical activity for UDR battalions, not only in 1970 but for much of its existence, was as follows. The 5th (Londonderry) and 6th (Tyrone) Battalions assumed responsibility for road checks on the Londonderry/Donegal border from Muff (now Eglinton) to Clady, in support of the regular army. In Armagh, the 2nd Battalion provided patrols along the Monaghan and Louth borders, whilst the 1st (Antrim), 2rd (Down), and 7th (City of Belfast) Battalions carried out routine guards and patrols on Key Points.94 In October 1970, the army carried out an exercise, Operation Palaver One, to ascertain the speed at which the UDR might be mobilised in an emergency. A total of 215 roadblocks were established throughout the Province and the operation found that 42 per cent were deployed within one hour, 80 per cent within two hours, 90 per cent within three hours, and all within four hours. It was argued that deployment had been particularly rapid in units with a high percentage of pre-issued weapons. Sir Ian Freeland went as far as to say that it must have been ‘soul destroying’ for men to have to kick their heels until their arms arrived.95 Despite this recurring issue, as discussed in a previous chapter, the exercise was declared a success, and the UDR’s rapid response was particularly impressive given the short time it had been in operation. The UDR played only a minor role during Operation Demetrius, the arrest and internment of suspected terrorists, the majority of battalions carrying out their normal duties at a slightly higher intensity than usual. Similarly during Operation Motorman, the army’s attempts to take control of the so-called Republican ‘no-go areas’, the UDR took a secondary role, mainly setting

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up roadblocks and mounting patrols. Its ‘indispensable contribution’ to the ­­operation was noted by the military authorities, especially because 5,300 men and women had been mobilised for the action.96 Operationally, 1974 was the most important year for the UDR. Throughout the year, the regiment had come under attack on over seventy occasions, including bomb attacks on company bases, a mortar and rocket attack at Clogher, eight landmine and twenty-seven shooting attacks on patrols, and twenty-one armed assaults on off-duty soldiers.97 However, the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) strike was the most significant episode. As Chris Ryder explained, ‘the strike called into question … the integrity of the RUC and UDR, for both forces were caught between the community and the British government in a difficult conflict of loyalty’.98 Admittedly, the armed forces were largely impotent to problems associated with the strike but, despite fears that many UDR companies would be severely under strength, many had nearly full turnout for a two-week period.99 The result of this was an improved attitude towards the UDR by the regular army and the police, and the regiment’s coming of age. In 1976, the confidential report The Way Ahead called for a greater presence for the RUC in the fight against terrorism, as well as a more prominent role for the UDR, effectively meaning a reduced role for the British Army.100 This ‘Ulsterisation’, as it has been termed, gave the UDR an expanded operational role, and increased its permanent cadre in order to deal with this. Moreover, it had given the UDR a role of intelligence gathering. It was felt that by undertaking this role UDR members could identify those in their local communities who were responsible for terrorist activity, just as the B Specials had done earlier. As Chris Ryder has argued, involving the UDR in the sensitivities of intelligence work, giving it a role in obtaining intelligence, and providing it with access to existing material did much to harm its longer-term reputation and, as events would show, the many misgivings expressed turned out to be very wellfounded.101 When defining the security forces’ capability, the military authorities had determined that certain areas would require a continued UDR presence. West Belfast, west Londonderry, and parts of the border area were identified as the most in need of a presence, particularly in the roles of patrolling, searching, and guard duties. It was felt that ‘the local knowledge and intuitive feel for an area possessed by the UDR is particularly valuable in undertaking such operations with minimum interference to legitimate civil activity’.102 However, the limitations of the UDR’s operational role were also outlined, pointing to some rather serious flaws when in action. Firstly, in many urban areas, it was felt that, if public order had deteriorated to such a degree that the RUC required military support, ‘in such circumstances it could only be provided by soldiers with a standard of discipline and training higher than that which it is realistic to assume could be provided by men of the UDR in sufficient strength’.

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Moreover, in some Republican areas, because of the view that the UDR was ­­sectarian in character, it would be unlikely to achieve any community support ‘in a disorderly situation’. Finally, and linked to the last point, because the regiment was so short in establishment in certain areas, particularly those in the extreme border counties, such as south Armagh, if terrorist activity did occur, the UDR would have to be restricted to a supporting role because units could not be moved from other areas for long periods of time.103 Notwithstanding these criticisms, it was foreseen that the UDR would have to play a key role in home defence, as its amateur forefathers had done before it, in the event of war. It was given this role in home defence as early as 1973, and training provision was set up to cater for the potential variations in its role in certain scenarios. Two circumstances were hypothesised, revolving around whether there was an ongoing sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland at the time of a declaration of war. If there were such a conflict, then the UDR would fulfil its existing role, in support of the regular army and RUC. However, if there were no sectarian conflict, the UDR and two companies of the TAVR would be the only effective military force left in the Province. Its role would thus be to guard Key Points and carry out the ‘post-strike task of assisting in the recovery of the nation’.104 When asked about the UDR’s operational role in the middle of 1981, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Goodhart, stated that The UDR assists the Regular Forces in providing support for the RUC. It now provides first call support to the police over most of the Province, patrolling rural and urban areas, guarding important sites and installations and manning vehicle check points. Elements from the regiment were also called upon recently to enhance security during the local government elections. The UDR has taken part this year in a number of ceremonial occasions in Northern Ireland and other parts of the United Kingdom. Sadly, the UDR continues to be the subject of terrorist attacks; this year seven UDR soldiers have been killed – five of them whilst off duty.105

This is a demonstration as to how little the role of the regiment had changed over time, and an indication of the dangerous nature of its operational role. By 1992, it provided over six thousand men and women to a total armed services contribution of seventeen thousand in Northern Ireland, not an insignificant proportion.106 Throughout its twenty-two years of existence, a total of 197 men and women belonging to the regiment had been killed, and a further 444 wounded. In addition to this, 58 former members had been murdered.107 These figures are much higher than for any other auxiliary force in action and are testimony to the sacrifice not just of the time of many of the members. The fact that a very high proportion of these deaths also occurred when members were off duty, many carrying out their daily routines, is also an indication of the ever-present

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danger facing members of the UDR, a danger not experienced to anywhere near the same degree by the older amateur forces in Ireland. For most of the time, auxiliary forces in Ireland carried out a supporting role. For the militia, other than the role of sending men to the regular army, it performed garrisoning and guard duties with success. Even for units which were sent abroad, a supporting role awaited when in theatre. Similar roles were undertaken by the yeomanry in South Africa, with the exception of the frontline action experienced by many in the First Contingent, notably at the disaster at Lindley. The VTC and, to a lesser extent, the OTC also fulfilled garrison and training roles within Ireland, an option not afforded to many previous Irish amateur forces. The Easter Rising put their military capabilities to the test and, perhaps surprisingly, this was accomplished with aplomb. For the UHG, when invasion was a real possibility in mid-1940, a variety of defence schemes were planned and they provided the basis for training at a local level. However, as the war progressed, and the risk of invasion diminished, other roles were soon found, such as the manning of anti-aircraft defences. This was carried out with great success, freed up vital manpower for the remainder of the war, and gave the UHG the opportunity to continue to contribute to the war effort. The UDR carried out the most dangerous operational role, one which was to last for a total of twenty-two years. Once more, it acted in a supporting role to the regular army, and in so doing took its fair share of casualties. It is clear that, although not always appreciated by the authorities, the auxiliary forces of Ireland performed all military duties required of them, and at least matched their counterparts in Great Britain. Although not given many opportunities to show their capabilities in action, when required, those who contributed towards the amateur military tradition did so to the best of their abilities, often at a disadvantage to their professional counterparts, continuing the legacy and reputation of the ‘fighting Irish’. Notes 1 TNA WO 68/313 Louth Militia Digest of Service. 2 Ibid. 3 H. Richey (ed.), A Short History of the Royal Longford Militia, 1793–1893 (Dublin: Hodges Figgis and Co., 1894), p. 75. 4 TNA WO 68/313 Louth Militia Digest of Service. 5 In the Galway Militia it was noted that ninety-four men out of a strength of a little under five hundred volunteered to the Line, TNA WO 79/43 Historical Records of the Galway Regiment of Militia. In the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia), a similar number of men were also persuaded to volunteer to the Line at this time, TNA WO 68/88 South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Digest of Service.

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6 TNA WO 4/818 Secretary at War Out-Letters, Militia in Ireland, April 1855 – September 1856; also PP (286). Militia. Return of the regiments of militia in the United Kingdom that volunteered for service abroad during the late war, 1856. The Regiments that volunteered for foreign service were: South Cork Militia; South Down Rifles; Armagh Light Infantry; Westmeath Militia; Dublin City Militia; Longford Rifles; South Mayo Rifles; Antrim Rifles; North Cork Rifles; Fermanagh Militia; Limerick City Militia; Roscommon Militia; South Tipperary Artillery (Militia). In comparison, thirty-seven regiments from England, Wales, and Scotland had volunteered. 7 Richey (ed.), A Short History of the Royal Longford Militia, p. 76. 8 TNA WO 68/313 Louth Militia Digest of Service. 9 TNA WO 68/329 Westmeath Militia Digest of Service. 10 TNA WO 68/88 South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Digest of Service. 11 TNA WO 68/118 Wicklow Rifles Digest of Service. 12 TNA WO 68/88 South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Digest of Service; Morning Chronicle, 22 August 1855. 13 The Times, 23 September 1858; also reported in The Standard, 24 September 1858, and Morning Post, 24 September 1858. 14 Freeman’s Journal, 1 October 1858; Hampshire Advertiser and Salisbury Guardian, 9 October 1858. 15 Freeman’s Journal, 30 November 1857. 16 TNA WO 68/88 South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Digest of Service. 17 Morning Post, 24 April 1858. 18 Belfast Newsletter, 27 January 1859. 19 Morning Post, 28 January 1858; The Standard, 28 January 1858. 20 Irish Times, 18 June 1888; Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 327, cols 1271–2, 26 June 1888. 21 In 1872, Colonel F.F. Maude, Inspector General of the Irish militia, stated that this was, in fact, a preferable situation because drill was the priority for the militia. BL Add. Ms. 77082. Letter from Colonel F.F. Maude to Earl Spencer, 24 January 1872. 22 PP (453). Army (rifles). Returns of number of breech-loading infantry rifles produced since the adaption of the snider breech-loading principle, giving the numbers obtained by the conversion of muzzle-loading rifles into breech-loaders; of the number obtained by the direct manufacture of breech-loaders; of the number of breech-loading rifles issued to the regular troops and the reserve forces; and, of the number of breech-loading rifles of all descriptions now in store, 1870. See also Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 203, col. 873, 25 July 1870. 23 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 259, col. 546, 8 March 1881. 24 Ibid., vol. 306, cols 1003–5, 4 June 1886. 25 Ibid., vol. 315, col. 905, 23 May 1887. 26 Ibid., vol. 317, cols 777–8, 14 July 1887. 27 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 200. 28 Jeffery, ‘The Irish Soldier in the Boer War’, in Gooch, ed., The Boer War, p. 142. 29 This was despite the outrage of Colonel R.H. Wallace, who believed it to be an insult that his battalion was not permitted to serve as an independent unit, when, in

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his words, ‘Catholic’ regiments were. See PRONI D1889/4/1/1 Letter to the Lord Mayor of Belfast from Colonel R.H. Wallace, 4 November 1899. 30 Col. G.J. Hay, The Constitutional Force: An Epitomized History of the Militia (London: United Services Gazette, 1908), pp. 193–434. 31 Cork Weekly Examiner, 24 March 1900. 32 TNA WO 68/306 North Cork Rifles, Digest of Service. 33 Ibid. 34 Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, pp. 184–5. 35 Kildare Observer, 19 May 1900. 36 Ibid., 9 June 1900. 37 PRONI D1700/3/2 Copy of Diary of Captain F.H. Crawford, Donegal RGA (Militia). 38 Ibid. 39 PP (Cd.2064). Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904. 40 TNA WO 68/329 Westmeath Militia Digest of Service. 41 TNA WO 68/118 Wicklow Rifles Digest of Service. 42 TNA WO 68/88 South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) Digest of Service. 43 Letter from a Trooper of the 46th (Belfast) Company, Lisburn Herald and Antrim and Down Advertiser, 12 May 1900 44 Letter from Mr Hubert of the Irish Yeomanry to his mother, Kildare Observer, 15 April 1900. 45 NAM 2004-01-42 Manuscript diary of Major H.W. Biddulph, 4th Connaught Rangers, attached to 11th Mounted Infantry, April 1901 – February 1902. 46 Lisburn Herald and Antrim and Down Advertiser, 12 May 1900. Similar hardships have been noted for the Scottish Imperial Yeomanry, see E.W. McFarland, ‘‘‘Empire-Enlarging Genius”’, pp. 232–3. 47 PRONI D1415/B/18 Letter from James Craig to his brother, 15 September 1900. 48 Letter from a Corporal of the 74th (Belfast) Company to the Editor, Irish Times, 12 January 1901. 49 A.C. Doyle, The Great Boer War (London: Smith, Elder, and Company Ltd, 1900), p. 274. 50 For a full account of this action see Bennett, Absent-Minded Beggars, pp. 110–22. 51 Fitzgibbon, Arts under Arms, p. 121. 52 T. Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Abacus, 1991), p. 436. 53 Bennett, Absent-Minded Beggars, p. 113. 54 Fitzgibbon, Arts under Arms, pp. 141–2. 55 Kildare Observer, 1 September 1900. 56 Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 437; Hay, The British Yeomanry Cavalry, p. 196. 57 Kildare Observer, 1 September 1900; Fitzgibbon, Arts under Arms, p. 167. 58 TNA WO 105/40 Proceedings of Court of Inquiry into the Disaster at Lindley, held at Barberton, 25 September 1900; TNA WO 105/8 Despatches of Lieut-Col. Sir  H.  Colvile, Commanding 9th Division, May 1900; S. Miller, Lord Methuen and the British Army: Failure and Redemption in South Africa (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 198. 59 NLI Ms. 15,188/10. Letters between L.B. Friend and John Redmond, 8–11 March

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1916. This was similar to some of the duties carried out by other VTC in Great Britain, see Mitchinson, Defending Albion, p. 204. 60 Ibid. Note attached to letter dated 8 March 1916, regarding unofficial gratuitous work carried out by members of the Belfast VTC. 61 A description of the events leading to Browning’s death was published in Northern Whig, 4 May 1916. 62 Sinn Fein Rebellion 1916 Handbook. Compiled by the Irish Weekly Times, 1917; Irish Times, 22 May 1916; M. Foy and B. Barton, The Easter Rising (Stroud: The History Press, 2011), p. 104; Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin, 2006), pp. 177–8. 63 Irish Times, 12 May 1916; Volunteer Training Corps Gazette, 20 May 1916; 27 May 1916; 3 June 1916. 64 Townshend, Easter 1916, pp. 185–6. 65 TNA PRO30/89 Sinn Fein Rebellion, 1916. ‘A Souvenir of Presentations to the Officers’ Training Corps, Trinity College, Dublin’. 66 TNA WO192/324 War Diary of the 188th (Antrim) Heavy Battery, 1939–1945; War Diary of the Antrim (Fortress Company) Royal Engineers (TA), 1939–1945. 67 Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War, pp. 180–1. 68 Ibid., p. 161; also quoted in Orr, Duty without Glory, pp. 104–5. 69 PRONI USC5 Priority Tasks for the ‘B’ Specials and Local Defence Volunteers, 27 July 1940. 70 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 267; Mackenzie, The Home Guard, pp. 55–61. 71 PRON HA32/1/793 Letter from J.C. MacDermott to Major-General Sir William Thomson, Northern Ireland District, 8 August 1940. 72 PRONI LA7/3/H/9 Notes on an address given by the GOC, NI District at a Home Guard Conference, 1 July 1941; PRONI LA7/3/H/7 Ulster Home Guard, Directive on Training, by Brigadier General Kemp-Welch, Spring 1941. 73 PRONI LA7/3H/6 Extracts from Minutes of the General Purposes Committee of Belfast County Borough, 18 August 1941. 74 Belfast Newsletter, 22 May 1941. 75 Ibid., 5 June 1941. 76 PRONI LA7/3H/4 Weekly Orders for 2nd (Belfast) Battalion, UHG, 21 April 1942. 77 Ibid., 28 September 1942. 78 PRONI CAB4/526 Civil Defence Services and the Ulster Home Guard, 2 October 1942. 79 PRONI HA3/3/1 County Armagh Ulster Home Guard Defence Scheme, 4 November 1942. 80 For use in Great Britain see Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, p. 280. 81 PRONI HA32/1/859 Letter from Charles Wickham to William Lowry, ­Parlia­­mentary Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs, 18 February 1943. 82 Traill, 1st Derry Battalion, Souvenir Review, p. 15. 83 PRONI USC5/1A/1 Ack-Ack Duties: Employment of UHG; Appendix A: ­Agree­­ment signed by all ranks of UHG undertaking AA duties, 1943.

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84 Ibid. Letter from County Commandant, Belfast, to Commanding Officers, Belfast, Down, and Antrim UHG Battalions, 29 June 1943. 85 Ibid. Draft Instructions for the manning of AA Defences by UHG, Belfast, 21 August 1943. 86 PRONI LA7/3H/21 Memorandum to Commanding Officer, 2nd (Belfast) Battalion, UHG, 20 June 1944. 87 Observer, 20 January 1957. 88 Guardian, 7 November 1977; 16 April 1983. 89 See The Times, 27 August 1981, for an example of such a ceremony. 90 TNA DEFE24/827 Report on UDR Force Levels, 9 January 1970. 91 TNA DEFE13/1398 Draft Confidential Report from the Secretary of State to the Home Secretary, 14 May 1970. 92 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 34. Potter’s work provides many examples of the UDR in action throughout its existence, covering much more detail than is possible here. 93 Ibid., p.39. 94 PRONI CAB9/G/89/3 Report on the Employment of the UDR, 11–14 August 1970. 95 Ibid. Initial Report on Operation Palaver One, November 1970; Note by Sir Ian Freeland, 15 October 1970. 96 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, pp. 84–6. 97 Ibid., p. 122. 98 Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment, p. 77. 99 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 132; The Times, 7 June 1974. 100 T. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Colonial Era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 110. 101 Ryder, The Ulster Defence Regiment, pp. 87–8. 102 TNA CJ4/1784 Report by the Security Forces Capability Working Group to the Secretary of State, 28 October 1977. 103 Ibid. 104 TNA DEFE70/241 Draft Minute relating to the UDR: Home Defence Role in War, 1973. 105 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 7, cols 126–-7, 23 June 1981. 106 Ibid., vol. 203, cols 1139–203, 13 February 1992. 107 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, p. 383.

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Public image

The public image of the amateur and regular forces is often overlooked by historians discussing military forces.1 This includes the image of the various arms of the military during their existence, but also the legacy in the collective memory of a population. Within Ireland, this sort of remembrance, particularly in the form of memorials which commemorate the First World War, often has to be balanced with the remembrance of nationalist opposition, culminating in independence, and the sacrifices of those in British military service are often overshadowed in the (now) Republic. In Ulster, however, the commemoration of Irish service in the British Army has remained in the forefront to a much larger extent. The study of the image, both at the time, and long after its existence, is important in relation to Ireland, given Ireland’s delicate position within the British Empire. Much like many other aspects of auxiliary forces in Ireland, an evolution was experienced, which was closely linked with improvements in discipline. Upon its reincarnation in 1854, it is clear that the image of the Irish militia was at a low point, a possible legacy of the dubious reputation of some regiments following the rebellions of 1798.2 This poor image was certainly accentuated by some friction experienced between regiments and the general population throughout this first embodiment, and the reporting by the press of some of these incidents. The relationship between militia regiments and cases of indiscipline has already been discussed, mainly with reference to the friction which existed between battalions. There is much evidence to show that more serious tension existed between the Irish militia and civilians, both in Ireland and in the rest of the United Kingdom, and this had a lasting effect on the image of the force. These relations fluctuated throughout the period, depending on local and national circumstances, and were also affected when the militia was embodied for a long period of time and during annual training. The militia in Ireland was not embodied until 1854, for reasons already alluded to. As a result, the response to the enrolment of men in Ireland was rather understated. By default, this meant that the image of these regiments was poor from the outset.

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Press reports largely concentrated on recruiting numbers, with many contrasting views. Some believed that ‘recruits for the Irish militia are coming in very slowly … It is feared that the ballot will have to be resorted to.’3 Others were more optimistic and outlined the enthusiastic response in some areas, which meant that certain regiments could be fully fit for service and that the quality of the men who had enlisted was exemplary.4 Problems were also reported when recruiting parties of the Queen’s County Militia had to be escorted by the local constabulary so that they would not be interfered with on duty. For the Leitrim Rifles recruiting had been hindered by a Roman Catholic priest who had openly prevented men from enlisting and drove many men away with a whip.5 Furthermore, the Irish press lent most of its reporting of the Irish militia to the issue that some regiments had not ordered their clothing from Irish companies, and instead had used English ones.6 The initial response to raising the militia aside, it was this first embodiment that saw the image of the Irish militia at its lowest ebb. This was mainly down to the large number of disturbances recorded, affecting residents of towns in which the militia was stationed. To a large extent, this image was to be an enduring one, whether justified or not, and was eagerly reported and embellished by the contemporary press. Perhaps the most serious incident to take place during this time was the disturbance in 1859 in Kinsale, County Cork, where the Antrim Artillery (Militia) was stationed, a case so serious that a Parliamentary inquiry was ordered to try to establish its cause. A sectarian element was seen as a primary source for the disturbance, mainly because it had occurred on 12 July, the anniversary of the  Battle of the Boyne and a major Orange celebration.7 The nationalist press, in particular, played upon this fact, one newspaper proclaiming that ‘the Orange rabies had been manifesting itself among the rabble who compose the Antrim Militia for many days’, and that, although Catholics of the North of  Ireland might be accustomed to such violence, those in Cork were not, but were still able to give the ‘Orange Militia’ such a drubbing as they would ­­recollect.8 It was reported in Parliament that many windows had been broken, and there were even accusations that a Roman Catholic chapel had been attacked. A picket of two hundred Royal Horse Artillery and a troop of the Scots Greys had to be dispatched in order to quell the disturbance.9 Initially, much confusion existed about the events in the town, the Earl of Ripon stating in Parliament that, in fact, no chapel had been attacked, and that a letter had been received by a respectable resident of the town, which had claimed that the attack on the regiment was premeditated by the inhabitants.10 A week later it was reported in The Times that the attacks had actually originated on 9 July, from a trivial collision, which had no relation to any party feeling. It was noted that a man local to Kinsale had seen his sister walking with a man of the Antrim Artillery (Militia),

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and had taken exception to this, and had assaulted her in a brutal manner, to which the militiaman retaliated on the brother, so that trouble had escalated.11 The Parliamentary inquiry found that no party feeling existed between the regiment and the townspeople and that isolated attacks on militiamen had occurred prior to the events of July 1859. It was concluded that the inexperience of the officers had contributed to the lack of discipline demonstrated, but that before the disturbance the conduct of the regiment had been ‘creditable and soldier-like’, and that any attacks on the militiamen might, indeed, have awakened some party feeling amongst some of the men.12 It was also reported that a new song, called ‘The Battle of Kinsale; or, the Defeat of the Antrim Orangeman’, had come to light, which The Times saw as ‘truly diabolical, the tone most virulent, the rhyming is wretched, and the language in every way detestable and blackguardly’.13 Events such as these certainly had a detrimental effect on the image of the Irish militia at home. However, this disturbance is the only example of this sort of friction between Irish inhabitants and the militia.14 A more common occurrence was friction with civilians when Irish militia regiments were stationed in England, of which there were a number of examples. It was reported in several newspapers that the Fermanagh Militia had been involved in some trouble with some inhabitants of Great Yarmouth in September 1858. The soldiers were blamed for the injuries of some of these townspeople, but it was deemed that these injuries were caused as a retaliatory measure. One local newspaper remarked that, on the whole, it was the lower orders of the townspeople who had been inciting trouble, primarily by shouting abusive language and insulting epithets in the streets towards the soldiers. Ultimately, after a number of collisions, the soldiers were blamed and removed from the town so as to bring a degree of order to the area.15 A second disturbance, which was widely reported around the country, occurred during the following month, between inhabitants of Sheerness, Kent, and the North Cork Rifles. In the first report of this quarrel in The Essex Standard, the problems with the Fermanagh Militia in Great Yarmouth were alluded to as a way of demonstrating a continuation of ‘outrageous proceedings’ of Irish militia regiments towards civilians. In the article, it was stated that some militiamen had chased and beaten a sailor, and that one militiaman was detained by the police. The soldiers took exception to this and rushed the police with bayonets in order to obtain the release of the man. Following this, a picket of two to three hundred men effectively ran amok around the town, throwing stones, breaking windows, and assaulting anyone they came across, with cries of ‘Brain ’em!’ These proceedings were allowed to continue for three days, until a detachment of the Royal Artillery was sent out to gain some order in the town.16 A War Office court of inquiry was held to determine the cause of this disturbance and it was found that the militiamen had not been the ‘original aggressors’. However, these ­­findings were not accepted by the townspeople of Sheerness, who saw

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the inquiry as being one-sided, superficial, and unfair.17 One letter to the press argued that the conduct of the inhabitants was nothing other than ‘peaceable and orderly’ and that the inquiry had come to its conclusion in order to completely discredit the people of the town.18 It must be remembered that there is little evidence of any serious friction between civilians and English, Scottish, or Welsh militia regiments, pointing to the fact that the image of the Irish militia was worse than that of its counterparts.19 However, this is not to say that all was negative in terms of image making during this early stage. This is most clearly demonstrated with the events surrounding the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia), which harboured an image in stark contrast to its neighbouring regiment, the North Tipperary Militia, which had taken part in the mutiny at Nenagh. The effects of this mutiny were felt by the former regiment as, when it arrived in Clonmel shortly after it had taken place, the magistrates had applied for the town to have extra protection as ‘they knew the men of the two regiments were the same and they did not sufficiently appreciate what discipline had done for the Corps at hand’.20 The South Tipperary Artillery (Militia) was disembodied in 1856, and then re-embodied in 1858 with a number of other militia battalions. When it was ordered to leave for England, it was ‘surrounded by the friends and relatives of the men who came in crowds to see them off’.21 Once in England, the regiment was stationed in Gosport and was charged with manning the Artillery Forts in the area. On one occasion, it was even given the responsibility of guarding Queen Victoria while she was holidaying on the Isle of Wight. It was as a result of this event that the image of this particular regiment of Irish militia began to take a turn for the better, one newspaper writing; Some dozen years ago, London would have been in a panic had it been informed that the Queen was at her seaside home, protected solely by some hundreds of Irishmen, all freshly arrived from Tipperary whose name was supposed to be synonymous with lawless violence. Now the case is different, and Tipperary turns out, not a body of wild rebels, thirsting for Saxon blood, and practicing [sic] for landlord shooting, but an orderly soldier-like body of men, such as few localities in our own Country can boast of.22

The image was not to stop at this praise as, only days later, the regiment found itself in the press once more, for all the right reasons, when it was announced that the officers of the regiment had arranged for the men to visit the Crystal Palace in London.23 This event was reported in both the local and national press, and was outlined with great joy in Ireland, further accentuating the positive image that the regiment had built for itself. The Times stated that here were several hundred young men in the flower of youth and masculine comeliness, clean, orderly, intelligent, and sober to a marvel, now admiring a statue, now a flower, now gazing in wonder on the hollowed trunk of the great tree, now

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playing innocently on the terraces or in the toy gallery with the little children who accompanied the regiment. Here was Tipperary! – not Tipperary of old – drinking, quarrelling, bloodletting, but Tipperary paid, trusted and disciplined.24

The Standard reported the event in the wider framework of the use of Irishmen as soldiers of the British Empire, and put it a little more philosophically when stating that The Whigs deem it inadvisable to arm the Irish at home, and when the sons of the Green Isle who follow an absurd crusade abroad show no merit of the soldier beyond a love of fighting, it is refreshing to see that ‘the might which slumbers in a giants [sic] arms’, is still to be found in the sister country whenever it is deemed necessary to awake it for our own military purposes, to develop it by kind treatment and good pay, and to organise it by training and discipline. These remarks are called forth by the appearance and demeanour of the Tipperary Artillery Regiment at the Crystal Palace.25

As might be expected, the press in Ireland was rather more patriotic about the whole event. The Freeman’s Journal reported that ‘never was there such a thoroughly Irish day at the Crystal Palace … The Tipperary Artillery, accompanied by their splendid band … and thousands of their Irish friends from London went down to greet the corps’, and that in military terms ‘Guards and Royals pale in stature, shape, and general appearance, while in efficiency in the field, and precision in firing shot and shell, no regular corps can excel them’.26 The Belfast Newsletter, in slight contrast, was a little more understated, writing that ‘Monday was a day of many attractions at the Crystal Palace. Some went to see the pigeons and rabbits, others the poultry and the hollyhocks, great numbers of Irish went down to see a regiment Hibernicis Hiberniores, more Irish than the Irish themselves, a corps collected from the heart of once lawless Tipperary’.27 Throughout the day, the men were permitted to visit the grounds, and a dinner was put on for all seven hundred men present. Afterwards, the band played to a large crowd which had gathered in the great central hall to hear them, playing largely ‘Irish airs’, and engaging an ‘immense audience’.28 Upon their departure a large spontaneous cheer greeted the regiment, from both English and Irish who were present.29 The Freeman’s Journal once more praised the regiment by paying tribute to the appearance of ‘the finest and most soldier-like looking men in her Majesty’s service’, and to the ‘self-respecting, orderly, and even most polite conduct on the part of those who, though but peasants, respect themselves and their country’.30 Upon their return to Clonmel in March 1861, they were even permitted to march through the town under arms, a privilege not afforded to other militia regiment across Ireland.31 In later years, friction continued to exist when militia regiments were billeted in towns during their annual training, but instances of this sort of disturbance

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tended to occur much less. By the end of the period this had almost ceased to occur. When these disturbances did occur amongst militiamen and the public, they followed a similar pattern to those which had previously taken place. For example, when the Monaghan Militia undertook training in Monaghan in the summer of 1861, many had been billeted within the town and friction began to be felt, to the point that people and buildings had been attacked. This continued until police and regular soldiers of the Line had been called, and led to the arrest of seventeen members of the regiment.32 Little in the way of friction arose during the middle part of the period, largely owing to the fact that the Irish militia did not assemble for training often because of the Fenian conspiracies. But when they did assemble, friction re-emerged in the context of the Land War (1879–82). A good example is the disturbances caused by the Galway Militia in July 1880 in Loughrea, County Galway, where civilians had been attacked on many occasions, leading to a number of the militiamen being committed to jail, or being put up for courts martial.33 To further diminish the image of the militia, a number of articles, some of them simply untrue, were published outlining performance in training and on manoeuvres. One such incident related to the autumn manoeuvres in 1872, in which the Kilkenny Fusiliers, along with the South Down Militia, took part. Much press coverage was given to these exercises and, in particular, the alleged poor display by the Kilkenny Militia, resulting in some rather harsh words, even from the Irish press.34 The ’bould bhoys of Kilkenny’ as they were depicted in some newspapers, were said during one event to have ‘made a wild, frantic rush at the regiment opposed to them, filling the air with hideous yells, and brandishing their rifles around their heads evidently intended to make use of them as shillelaghs should the base Saxons dare to withstand their onset’.35 These reports caused much outrage, both to the commanding officer of the regiment, Colonel St George, and in particular in the Freeman’s Journal, which set out on a campaign to exonerate the regiment from any wrongdoing or poor performance. Colonel St George stated that those ‘hideous yells’ were in fact ‘Irish Cheers’ for the Prince of Wales.36 It was claimed that the Kilkenny men had not been given any prior warning of their mobilisation and therefore had had no opportunity for any drill or training whatsoever before the manoeuvres began.37 This further illustrates that the press were often keen to jump on any suggestion of poor behaviour or performance by an Irish militia regiment, contributing to diminish its image further. It may very well have been the case that the Kilkenny Fusiliers were not the most disciplined or well-trained regiment in the militia, but it does appear that this negative press coverage was unwarranted. During the army manoeuvres of 1876, derogatory press reports were published about a number of Irish militia regiments. This occurred at a similar time to the reports of a mass desertion in the Armagh Light Infantry, which proved to be untrue. Some newspaper articles outlined the alleged poor behaviour and

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performance of the North Cork, South Cork, and Galway Militias. The Belfast Newsletter once again leapt to the defence of these regiments, and expressed the view that there was ‘some exaggeration’ and that the ‘three regiments of Irishmen are slandered for what at most could only be described as the excesses of a few individuals’. The article ended with the damning statement that ‘The Times is remarkably fond of snapping up, and publishing to the world, every idle rumour reflecting injuriously on Ireland and Irishmen’.38 It was not only the press which seemed to have a negative image of the militia. Some employers in Ireland also appear to have been unequivocally opposed to the force. This occurred as late as 1898, when, by and large, the image of the militia had improved. It was claimed at a Mayoral Dinner in Belfast that in the Ards district of County Down the largest employers had absolutely boycotted the militia to such an extent that the North Down Militia felt the need to apply to remove the headquarters away from Newtownards. It was claimed that a mill owner had posted a notice which proclaimed that any man who joined the militia would be discharged from employment, and that it was known that this had happened to a number of men.39 In contrast, it must be restated that a large number of men in Belfast who were members of the militia were employed by the large shipyards, and that many militiamen in Dublin were employed by Guinness’s Brewery and Jacob’s Biscuits. There was a clear support for the Irish militia by many of the bigger employers of Ireland. The outbreak of the war in South Africa in 1899 saw a great outpouring of patriotism and jingoism throughout the United Kingdom, and this only aided and reinforced the positive image of the military which had been growing towards the latter half of the nineteenth century. This image was certain to continue when it was announced that a number of amateur units, militia, yeomanry, or volunteers, were to be embodied, and some were to go to the seat of war, leading to a further public outpouring of emotion towards the military.40 This sort of outpouring of emotion was also present within Ireland in relation to the militia, particularly when regiments were sent to South Africa, and this is reflected in much of the press at the time. There was, however, a slightly different dimension to this image, owing to the strong feelings of nationalists, and particularly of the Transvaal Committee, which was opposed to the conflict. It was not only these organisations that were opposed to the war, as there is some evidence to suggest that pro-Boer feeling existed within some Irish militia regiments, something which the nationalist press embellished with great enthusiasm. This also went to reinforce the image of the militiamen within the minds of many nationalists who saw them as being sent to do the dirty work of the British Empire. Seven Irish militia regiments were sent to South Africa during the course of the war, having volunteered for overseas service. Of these regiments, by far the most enthusiastic send-off was experienced by the North Cork Rifles, owing

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mainly to the fact that its ship departed from Queenstown, in County Cork. It was also the first Irish militia regiment to be sent abroad, and its departure was widely reported in the press. In Templemore, where it had been stationed, ‘pathetic scenes’ were witnessed amongst friends and family, who had ‘assembled in large numbers’ to see the men off. In Queenstown ‘the send-off was the most enthusiastic that had been accorded to troops … and the cheering was loud and continuous as the troopship passed out of the harbour’. Many spectators had also passed parcels, mainly containing whiskey, to the men on board.41 It was not only regiments serving abroad that got such enthusiastic send-offs, as demonstrated when the Wexford Militia was transferred to Aldershot to relieve regular troops. Upon its departure, a crowd of over two thousand assembled to follow the party to the railway station. The band played ‘Boys of Wexford’ and ‘the cheering of the men and those accompanying them was loud and prolonged, and the excitement of the more patriotic of the corps most intense’.42 When the Limerick County Militia left Waterford in May 1900, en route for Salisbury Plain, they were also met with loud cheers from an ‘enormous crowd’ which had ‘thronged’ the platform.43 This positive image can be further demonstrated by the subscriptions to the ‘Patriotic Fund’ from inhabitants of Ireland. It is no coincidence that large funds were set up in Cork and Dublin, two towns in which militia regiments were serving abroad. Within a month of the departure of the North Cork Rifles, the South of Ireland War Relief Fund, set up by The Cork Constitution newspaper, had obtained ten thousand subscriptions, nearly all in Cork, from people of all classes and all political sides.44 It was mentioned that the fact that the North Corks were serving abroad had helped to swell very considerably the donations to the general fund.45 In Dublin, funds set up by Lady Roberts and the Irish Times had raised a total of £30,000. The Dublin County Militia was also serving in South Africa, and this clearly had an impact on the amount of money raised.46 Enthusiasm was still present when many units returned to their home towns, particularly if they had been away for an extended period. When the North Cork Rifles returned from South Africa, after over a year on service, it was met with a joyous welcome from friends and relatives. Preparations had been made on an ‘elaborate scale’ to receive the battalion, and people had spent the night at Queenstown harbour in order to see its return.47 Similarly, when the South Cork Militia returned from South Africa, it was presented with its war medals by the Duke of Connaught, was entertained at a meal paid for by local public subscription, and was met by a large crowd of relatives and friends.48 Another regiment which had served in South Africa, the King’s County Rifles, returned after an absence of two years and four months to Birr, where it was addressed by the commanding officer, and men of the nationalist-controlled Birr Urban District Council, in front of a crowd of the inhabitants. A subscription fund was set up in preparation for its return, and hundreds of people had turned out for its arrival.49

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What can be surmised from these examples is that, particularly when regiments were sent abroad, there was great enthusiasm displayed for the militia by the general public. However, it is important to recognise some of the antiwar feeling that existed within Ireland, and how this affected the image of the militia.50 This pro-Boer feeling often manifested itself in the nationalist press’s reporting of these feelings within Irish militia regiments. Newspapers often took the view that regiments were being forced to fight a war by the British Empire, when they had no desire to do so. This was particularly prevalent when regiments refused to volunteer for service abroad, as seen most publicly in the case of the Louth Rifles, or when irregularities were discovered when units were asked to volunteer for service abroad, as with the North Cork Rifles.51 The nationalist press lost no opportunity to report such incidents, or incidents when anti-British feeling was present. When the Wexford Militia was ordered to serve away from Ireland, upon its departure it was recorded that many within the regiment were heard to shout ‘Cheers for Kruger’, and ‘Hurrah for the Boers’. On this occasion, some members of the corps also made open-air speeches, to large gatherings, one stating that ‘we won’t fight for England … we will fight for Kruger and Joubert, for they will give us and our families a comfortable home’.52 Similarly, when the Kerry Militia was ordered abroad it was reported that many of the militiamen cheered loudly for the Boers, and that ‘unless the feelings of the men change very much on the voyage to the Cape, they are not likely to engage with any eagerness in the work of trying to slaughter the Boers’.53 In this particular case, the authorities decided not to send the regiment abroad. Even after the war it was written that ‘we have seen the Irish militia taken from a hungry, idle, uneducated, and depopulated country, and sent out in the name of “civilisation” to burn the farms of the Boers’.54 A number of leaflets relating to the militia even made reference to the war, the most important of which, entitled ‘Save the Militia’, opined that the government was trying to send the militia to be slaughtered at the front.55 However, it was rare for there to be any direct criticism of the men themselves. The view was taken that the militia was continually sent out, largely against its will or unwittingly, as a tool of the British Empire. This meant that the view of the militia remained, on the whole, sympathetic, and seemingly positive throughout this time and until it was disbanded in Ireland in 1908. It is also important to look at the militia’s cultural impact on the arts, and its legacy after disbandment. At the time of its existence by far the most prevalent of the art forms in which the militia was represented was poetry or song. These poems or songs were often inspired by the regiments’ time on embodied service and presented the militia in one of two ways: either, when inspired by nationalism, as slaves of the British or, in a patriotic way, as loyal soldiers of the British Empire. Most famously, this was encapsulated in R.H. Wallace’s ‘The Terrors

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of the Land’, which concerned the South Down Militia, and is still used as a loyalist song today. Another such song, written in August 1857, entitled ‘A Song for the Irish Militia’, took a very nationalist stance, and is summed up by the lines The slave who pants not to be free, but hugs his chain, A slave, oh, may he ever be, and still remain. May curses light upon his brow, who shrinks to pledge the hallowed vow – That never more shall tyrant stand, upon our own dear Native Land.

This particular poem had a clear nationalist stance and painted the men as stuck in shackles, wishing to break free. In contrast to this, on occasion, such representation of the militia was a little more light-hearted, as in ‘The Galway Militia Polka Mazurka’, written by Mrs J. D’Arcy, the wife of an officer of that regiment, in 1871. The lyrics largely relate to a horse, Stella, which had won the Cork Grand National, but as a dedication to the regiment one verse is as follows: The Galway men will do what’s right And ne’er as cowards fall or fight We’ve no assassin ’mongst us here No landlord for his life need fear.56

In contrast to the previous song, the lyrics represent the regiment as one of loyalty and bravery, and, in general, are more of a celebration of the gallant men of Galway. As might be expected, during the South African War a number of songs and poems came into prominence, which certainly represented the loyal and patriotic side of the militia in Ireland. In February 1900, because the North Cork Rifles was serving in South Africa, the Nottinghamshire Guardian published a poem specifically about the regiment, which talked about its bravery in the face of danger, fighting the foes of England, and ends with the line ‘To the gallant North Cork Rifles, the brave soldiers of the Queen’.57 Perhaps the most famous of the songs relating to the militia, one which still has some resonance in unionist circles, is ‘The South Down Militia’ song. Like many such songs, it centres on a regiment which was in the front line and ends with the verse: When Kruger heard the regiment was landed at Capetown, ‘De Wet’, says he, ‘we’re bate’, says he, ‘they’ve sent out the South Downs’. Says De Wet, ‘If that’s a fact, me son, we’d better quit the Rand For them South Down Mileeshy is the terror of the land.’58

Such a cultural representation of the militia reinforced the idea that, although sometimes in a negative light, these regiments were in the forefront of the minds of the people, particularly in times of war, and they contributed significantly to its image.

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The Irish militia has also left some legacy in the twenty-first century. This is especially the case in relation to the regimental Colours, which can be found in many of the local museums, or churches and cathedrals, across Ireland. A number of small memorials, mainly dedicated to individuals, can also be found in different churches. For example, at St Patrick’s Church, Monaghan, a memorial to Captain Fitzherbert Dacre, of the South Tipperary Militia, can be found, which outlines his service during the Indian Mutiny. Lieutenant-Colonel William Aldworth is commemorated in St Fin Barre’s Cathedral, County Cork, owing to his long service with the North Cork Rifles. Traces of the Irish militia can also be found on larger memorials. For example, on the Boer War Memorial in the centre of Cork, which is dedicated to all those officers and men from Cork killed during that conflict, men who were killed serving with the North Cork Rifles are listed on a separate part of the memorial.59 These points notwithstanding, it is clear that, even considering its long existence, the Irish militia’s legacy is not one which is enduring in the memory of the Irish people. There is a small amount of interest within Ireland relating to the heritage of the militia, but this mainly comes from a genealogical point of view, the exception to this coming from the Armagh County Museum, which houses an exhibition of the Armagh Light Infantry. The First World War has largely overshadowed the force in terms of memorialisation and remembrance, meaning that today the Irish militia is largely a forgotten arm. When it was established in December 1899, the Irish Imperial Yeomanry never truly experienced the poor public image which had been clear to see when the Irish militia had been re-established some fifty-five years previously. Instead, owing partly to the high degree of jingoism present within the United Kingdom after the setback during Black Week, the yeomanry enjoyed adulation from both British and Irish publics. Excitement was caused in the press, particularly in Dublin, upon the announcement of the raising of the ‘Irish Hunt Contingent’. In the Irish Times, within days of the declaration that the yeomanry was to be formed in Ireland, the occasion was drafted as a ’red-letter mark on the history of the beginning of the new year, for they [the yeomanry] form a force that never were called into existence before’.60 Similar sentiments were apparent when a further announcement was made regarding the establishment of more companies in Ireland, and, throughout January, numerous reports were made detailing ‘floods of candidates’ at recruiting offices in both Belfast and Dublin.61 Additionally, to help equip and support the men of the force, subscription funds were set up where, by 20 January 1900, donations had reached a total of £670 14s 6d.62 To ­­supplement this, individuals and local businesses also actively supported the new volunteers with other equipment, such as the donation of fifty pairs of riding breeches by a well-known military tailor.63 There were many reports of complimentary ­­ dinners

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and concerts being held for the officers and men of the newly raised yeomanry forces. One such report stated that the employer of three young men who had volunteered for the front had offered to keep their jobs open for them when they returned from the seat of war.64 The inspections, carried out by those such as the Duke of Connaught and the Duke of Cambridge, in Dublin and at the Curragh were highly publicised, partly because they attracted large crowds, and statements regarding the yeomanry’s soldier-like appearance were commonly written.65 Much of this, however, paled into insignificance when the various companies left Ireland. For the militia the biggest crowds yet assembled had lined the streets to witness these occasions, and for the yeomanry these events were an even bigger spectacle. Three separate departures are worth mentioning in further detail as a demonstration of the positive image that the Irish Yeomanry had in the eyes of the public. The departure of these forces began in earnest by the middle of March 1900, a mere two and a half months after the beginning of its embodiment, with the 46th (Belfast) Company leaving first, closely followed by the 45th (Dublin) Company. Two weeks previous to this, however, the 46th (Belfast) Company had vacated its barracks in Belfast in order to travel to the Curragh for its final training. On this occasion, the Lord Mayor led the farewell with a ‘hearty send-off’ at the railway station. It was stated that, although it was at an early hour (8.15 am), as many as ten thousand people had assembled at the station ‘to witness the departure of the citizen soldiers’.66 Such gatherings were not uncommon, even on a more local level. For example, in Lisburn, County Antrim, upon the departure of one local man, Trooper John Hamilton Sinclair, a large crowd had assembled at the railway station to grant him an enthusiastic send-off.67 Similarly, in Dublin, when the 45th Company left for the Curragh, ‘the ornament of the town … both by raison [sic] of good looks and soldierly air, not to mention the nate [sic] uniform, are now, to the regret of many fair damsels gone’.68 Despite already offering enthusiastic scenes when the yeomanry departed for the Curragh, the populations of Belfast and Dublin were, after only a short time, able to reignite this enthusiastic feeling when the two companies of the First Contingent re-entered these cities en route to their troop ships, ready to depart for South Africa. In Belfast, when the 46th (Belfast) Company left the city on 3 March 1900, it was decided that its march would not encroach on the centre of the city. Notwithstanding, the volunteers were accompanied by a large crowd of enthusiastic inhabitants, ‘eager to show their patriotic spirit’. The Company then departed from Larne harbour, which it had reached by train, where the local businesses had closed early to enable the population to assemble and accord them a ‘cordial goodbye’. Fog horns were let off amongst loud cheering, and a number of bands arrived, striking up patriotic airs, until all the men had departed.69

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Similarly, in Dublin, a record gathering of people was recorded at the railway station upon the departure of the 45th (Dublin) Company. Inside the station ‘scenes of great enthusiasm were enacted. The whole area of platform was occupied by the friends and well-wishers of the departing yeomen.’ As the men passed down the platform ‘each was honoured with a round of cheering, and this was taken up continuously along the whole length of the platform … Each of the yeomen was a hero in the eyes of the admiring crowd.’70 Additionally, once they reached the harbour, the crowd was so great that it took the men three-quarters of an hour to make their way along the few hundred yards which separated the train and the boat.71 This enthusiasm had not dissipated a month later when the second Company from Dublin and the third from Ulster departed for the front. In Belfast ‘one of the most remarkably enthusiastic demonstrations that have been witnessed in the city’ took place. Clifton Street, North Queen Street, and Henry Place were densely crowded, with thousands of men, women, girls, and boys accompanying the yeoman to the station. In Dublin, the yeomen left ‘amidst a scene of indescribable confusion, and wild enthusiasm’, songs such as ‘Rule Britannia’ and ‘Soldiers of the Queen’ being sung as they departed the railway station.72 Perhaps linked to these scenes, the reporting of the Imperial Yeomanry disaster at Lindley in May 1900 showed disbelief, despair, and ‘stunned incredulity’.73 It has been stated by one commentator on the yeomanry that the reputation of the First Contingent has become synonymous with the disaster at Lindley.74 In Ireland, however, its reputation had been left intact, and this is reflected in many of the reports of the disaster. Many articles reflected on ‘The Disaster of the Irish Yeomanry’, or ‘The Irish Yeomanry Mishap: Overwhelmed at Lindley’, while others published casualty lists, at a time when information was still patchy at best, and specific tales of the killing and wounding of prominent men in society.75 One newspaper reported that the disaster had ‘produced widespread anxiety in Ireland’.76 Perhaps the best response, which summed up the general feeling of the population, especially in Dublin, was outlined in The Dublin Evening Mail: ‘the receipt of the news that almost a score of the members of the Irish Yeomanry had lost their lives at Lindley caused a painful shock not only to their relatives and friends but in all circles in Dublin’.77 In contrast to this was the response of one nationalist. When recalling the aftermath of the disaster, he stated that he often had ‘a good laugh’ when he read in Irish newspapers about the heroics and wonderful service that the Irish Yeomanry had rendered to the Queen.78 Nevertheless, the positive image was again invoked by the Irish population upon the yeomanry’s return to its home shores, a reflection of a continuing jingoist attitude. For example, when the 61st (2nd Dublin) Company returned in the middle of June 1900, a ’hearty Irish welcome was accorded to the men on their arrival’, and, despite the poor weather, the yeoman marched along the quays in Dublin, where ‘an immense crowd assembled’ in the Castle Yard, and

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the men were loudly cheered from all sides.79 Moreover, a year later, in Belfast, a crowd of twenty thousand people assembled to witness the return of the 46th, 54th, and 60th Companies. Business was temporarily suspended, and the men were cheered along many of the principal thoroughfares.80 The Lord Mayor also gave a reception and a garden party, in which ‘all of the leading families of the North of Ireland were represented’.81 By September 1901, the displays had become a little more muted but, still, ‘a large number of citizens’ turned out to witness the medal ceremony of the 74th (Dublin) Company, when it was decorated for its services in South Africa.82 Until the First World War, the public perception of the yeomanry was, understandably, a little more muted. Press reports were made each year of its annual training, although these did little more than mention the activities being undertaken.83 The exception to this was when a short film was made, which reported on the annual camp at the Curragh in the summer of 1914 of the South Irish Horse.84 In Ulster, the North Irish Horse remained popular amongst the gentry, and also formed close links with the UVF. This, no doubt, aided its image in the North, as a regiment which was prepared to defend the Union should it be required to do so.85 For the OTC, similar positive remarks were made with regard to annual training and drill.86 The Belfast and Dublin contingents also sent a large number of members to London for the Coronation of George V and the Royal Review at Windsor in 1911, also taking part in a review at Phoenix Park, Dublin, which involved sixteen thousand men.87 The DUOTC appears to have aroused much interest in Dublin itself. It was noted that pedestrians in Nassau Street often watched the muster of cadets with great interest, and large numbers of people would gather on the football ground in order to view drill. Some students referred to the contingent as ‘the Boy Louts’, but the reporter in the Irish Times associated this term with those who were too lazy to join.88 Although this demonstrates a largely positive image, during the Third Home Rule Crisis the Queen’s OTC and Campbell College OTC were not permitted to retain their rifles for training, as there was an apparent fear that they could fall into the hands of the UVF. Nevertheless, the DUOTC was permitted to retain its rifles, and took them to annual training in 1914.89 The VTC, at least initially, had some degree of support from both sides of the ideological divide when it was established in 1915. However, it was most enthusiastically greeted in Dublin. The Irish Rugby Football Union Volunteer Corps was given the highest adulation of all the corps, viewed by many as setting an example for the duty of all Irishmen (especially because it had been instrumental in the formation of the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers), and this explains the emotional response by the press, when some of the first casualties

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of the Easter Rising were members of this Corps.90 Before this, parades and drill were held which attracted large numbers of spectators. In July 1915, a parade of all affiliated corps of the IAVTC was held at Lansdowne Road, Dublin. A tribute was paid to the corps by Major-General Friend, and it was reported that ‘it was inspiring to watch grey-haired men, with heads erect and rifles firmly gripped, swinging by with steady gait to the strains of rousing music’.91 Clearly, although short-lived, the VTC was viewed positively by a large section of the population, especially in Dublin, and also in Great Britain, where a fund was set up for relatives of those wounded during the Easter Rising, raising £167.92 Even after the Rising, great disappointment when it was disbanded was shown, many feeling that it was a regrettable consequence of the instability in Ireland from that point onwards. Only a limited picture can be established as to the image of the TA of Northern Ireland when it was established in 1937. When recruiting began, however, large crowds assembled to witness the event.93 In comparison, the same excitement was not felt when the UHG was formed in May 1940, and the response was certainly far from the excitement felt when the Irish Yeomanry was established in 1900. In many newspapers the details of the force were simply outlined in a very matter-of-fact way, giving information on the conditions of service and where a man could join.94 The most excited statement made during these announcements was that the rush of recruits might be on an ‘almost embarrassing scale’.95 It did not quite match these expectations when recruits did begin to register their interest in the force. Nevertheless, it was a popular venture, largely owing to the immediate danger it was felt existed at the time. The nationalist press was somewhat underwhelmed by the prospect of a force that was to be administrated and recruited through a seemingly sectarian force that was the B Specials, and sections of the labour movement within the country also took this view.96 These concerns regarding the possible sectarian nature of the force, the political details of which have already been discussed, did have some effect on the image of the UHG, and this was the closest it came to any direct conflict with any other sections of society. The image of the force had much harm done to it, for the most part externally, when the memorial letter was sent by Sir Hubert Gough and other signatories in September 1940. This caught the attention of the international community, putting the UHG in the eyes of the world. The letter stated that, because the UHG was recruited through the B Specials, it has at once become identified with all the most bitter sectarian and political differences which have long divided Northern Ireland opinion. Its enrolment has been largely governed by considerations of religion and politics which would naturally be absent if it had been conducted on normal lines by the British War Office or under its direction. It has thus incurred the odium attaching to a political police force of a type familiar on the Continent of Europe rather than the general popularity and

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respect possessed in full measure by the Home Guard throughout the remainder of the United Kingdom.97

Of course, this brought negative attention to the force throughout the Empire. At home, however, the nationalist press was much more apathetic. In The Irish News, for example, more coverage was given to the Home Guard in Great Britain than in Northern Ireland, and greater column space was devoted to the newly raised home defence battalions.98 Press coverage from other newspaper sources was much more positive throughout the war, contributing to the many recruiting successes, as well as to public perceptions of the force. It was also much more comprehensive compared to coverage given to previous forces, although it did vary depending on the newspaper. The Derry Standard, for example, simply ran a single column on a Friday entitled ‘Home Guard Notes’, which included local developments, as well as a section in which an officer posed a tactical question and invited responses from UHG members.99 By far the most coverage was given to the UHG in the Belfast Weekly Telegraph. The newspaper ran articles and photographs which related to the UHG throughout 1940, paying particular attention to the training of the force. These were not so prevalent throughout 1941, but, with the new recruiting efforts in early 1942, they soon increased again, as they did in many other publications. The reporting of the UHG within the newspaper press is an important one. In the summer of 1940 this image was truly moulded, and this made an important impact on the idea of an amateur military tradition in Ireland. In August and September of 1940, a series of articles written by Colin Johnston Robb, an architect and writer on, amongst other things, the Irish militia of the eighteenth century, appeared in the press. They detailed the history of some of Ulster’s local defence forces, going as far back as the early seventeenth century, and compared them to the UHG, finding similarities in the role of home defence. One such article concluded: so down the ages of Irish history the professional man, merchant, farmer, artisan and labourer responded to their country’s call and donned the apparel of those kaleidoscopic days of war, just as the men of today have donned the less attractive battle dress and are prepared to meet the invader whether he crosses our picturesque coastline or drops from the eternal blue.100

These articles are an important indication of the perception of the UHG, with a clear identification with these older amateur forces, which had an influence on the image of the force in the public eye. Importantly, these articles deal with ‘Ulster’ rather than simply Protestant home defence forces, perhaps as a way to detract from the issues surrounding the recruiting and administration of the UHG. A notable decline in the number of articles relating to the UHG occurred throughout the rest of 1942. One Commanding Officer noted in July 1942 that

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no publicity had been given to the force in the local press and this was because no information had been given from the Home Guard authorities. Such information was vital to maintain public interest in the force, as well as to stimulate recruiting.101 On the whole, for the remainder of the Home Guard’s existence, press coverage largely concentrated on any recruiting activities, these again occurring in the opening months of 1943 and 1944. It was not until the Stand Down ceremonies that any comprehensive coverage was once again given. The Stand Down of the Ulster Home Guard officially took place on 3 December 1944, and various parades took place across the Province in recognition of the service it had provided throughout the war. In Belfast, where the biggest ceremony took place, 3,500 men of the UHG took part in the parade, where ‘thousands of citizens’ had gathered to witness the march past, while the salute was taken by the Governor of Northern Ireland.102 A contingent of three officers and 105 men, drawn from each battalion, was also sent to London, where a march past was carried out in front of the King in Hyde Park, thus demonstrating the UHG contribution within the context of the defence of the whole of the United Kingdom.103 Once the TA was reconstituted in Northern Ireland after the war, for a long time units had a rather low-key existence. Little in the way of friction was present, and even relations with employers were fairly positive. For example, from the mid-1950s, men working in Belfast City Council were permitted two weeks’ additional leave, on full pay, to attend the TA annual camp.104 Once the Troubles had begun, Territorials, and the members of the Queen’s University Officers’ Training Corps (QUOTC) attached to them, continued to be viewed positively by all sections of the population, largely because they had no direct military role within Northern Ireland. Even sections of the press which could be fairly negative towards the TA recognised its unique position and portrayed it positively. In an article in the Guardian in 1977, it was referred to as ‘Ulster’s crack force that keeps its head down’, quoting, and agreeing with, Roy Mason, when he described the TA as ‘gladiators’. Additionally, it was remarked that, although largely Protestant in composition, it was not marked by the ‘orange and green tribal maps of Belfast, but on NATO’s overall defence plan’.105 This perception remained, and continues to influence public opinion towards it in Northern Ireland even today. When major cuts to ‘The Terriers’, as they were affectionately known, were announced, under the ‘Options for Change’ defence review of 1991, much was made of the disproportionate effect that this was to have on units in Northern Ireland. In an open letter to The Times, it was stated that ‘to the local population their local TA units provide a much-needed link with normality and offer crosscommunity opportunities not possible elsewhere’.106 The latter, of course, was an aspect which was to prove impossible to surmount within its sister organisation, the UDR.

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In many ways the legacy of the USC and, to a lesser extent, the UHG did much to harm the image of the UDR when the latter was formed in 1970. Politically, it was always going to be a difficult task to satisfy the demands of all sections of the community. As has already been mentioned, the actions of the Stormont government and the USC even before the UDR came into existence did little to allay the fears of Catholics about the possible sectarian nature of this new force. This was despite the fact that, in mid-November 1969, press reports had been fairly favourable, even in the Republic of Ireland press. The Irish Times and the Irish Independent had made generally favourable comments, especially because provision had been made to safeguard certain deployments for the UDR which had not existed for the USC. One newspaper, the Irish Press, however, was a little more sceptical and, in line with other prominent critics like Bernadette Devlin, was disappointed that there had been little change for the better.107 It was also reported that some Labour backbenchers suspected too close a resemblance to the USC.108 At least at this point criticism was fairly muted, pointing more to the Stormont government and its actions. In contrast to previous years and as a result of the rather nervy start to proceedings, the authorities had begun to recognise the value of publicity, and in the early months of the UDR’s existence a great deal of attention was given to this. When the UDR Advisory Council was formed in January 1970 a Public Relations Officer was tasked specifically with creating ‘the right kind of atmosphere and stimulate the interest of the public’ so that people could better understand the regiment. Within twenty-one days of the attestation of the first recruits, 1,250 column inches had been devoted to the regiment in the national and Irish press, and there had been ten items reported on the television and four on the radio. An additional £3,500 had been set aside for advertising in the press and on television.109 Despite the continued use of publicity, including television commercials, especially to try to attract more Catholic recruits, the British policy of internment continued to harm the image of the UDR.110 Within the Catholic community and, to a large extent, outside of Northern Ireland, this only got worse, especially when suspected collusion with Protestant paramilitaries began to be reported. For example, a lead article in the Observer in November 1972, entitled ‘Some “Dad’s Army” men stepping out of line’, claimed that to working-class Catholics the UDR was ‘synonymous with armed Protestants and everything that entails’. Many believed that Britain had simply raised another colonial police force along the lines of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries of the 1920s.111 This is certainly an extreme comparison, but the article did go on to say that even the most casual evidence of bias within the UDR was enough ‘to bring rage, terror or despair to the Catholic community’, and little comfort was to be found when the UDR Commander, Brigadier Denis Ormerod, had publicly stated that membership of the UDR and the UDA was not necessarily incompatible.112 This attitude was reported already in 1972, and matters continued to deteriorate.

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Much has so far been made about the attitudes of Catholics to the UDR, rather than those of Protestants. Clearly, the latter viewed the force much more favourably from the outset, but from the mid-1970s this began to change. A report on civil affairs from January 1979, relating mainly to the Belfast area, is worth discussing in detail here as it sheds significant light on the shift in attitudes towards the UDR. In general, it was stated that ‘most of the population do lump the UDR and the army together now on most matters of comment’, but that initially the UDR was regarded by most of the Protestant population as a partisan ally in uniform. Two things appear to have changed this. The first was the last Workers Strike where the UDR was seen to come of age in its impartial treatment or, as one Protestant put it, ‘We always thought you were our mates’. The second factor has probably been the emergence of the daytime Ops Platoons consisting of full-time members, i.e. a different species of UDR man.

The report went on to say that, as far as the Protestant population was concerned, there appeared to be a diminishing image of the ‘friendly, neighbourhood’ UDR man, but that such comments were arguably a compliment to the impartiality of the force.113 As far as Catholic attitudes to the force are concerned, it was claimed that many of the younger members of the population ‘have an ardent hatred of the UDR’ and that a diminishing body of opinion among the older generation regarded them as ‘B Special offshoots’. It was claimed that a number of points were repeated on a number of occasions. Some said that UDR men did not look like soldiers because their uniforms were ill-fitting and they had long hair. Others said that they were simply UDA men in UDR uniform. Many asked how anyone could be a part-time soldier – if someone were a half-soldier than he must only be half-trained and, therefore, was a second-class peacekeeper. Interestingly, it was also noted that, on many occasions, the advertising, especially television commercials, showed UDR units operating in Catholic areas against members of the Provisional IRA, implying that this was the only group the regiment were interested in and so, by association, it targeted only Catholics.114 Despite these attitudes, and those of the Protestant community, the report was optimistic, claiming that the bulk of the population had little but praise to offer for what the regiment was doing. Alleged collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, and the view that the UDR targeted only Catholics, continued to dog the regiment throughout the 1980s. The regimental historian, John Potter, is of the opinion that the media only exacerbated this negative appearance by consistently publishing articles detrimental to its image. He claims that over a period of two months in 1989 hardly a day went by without an article on the UDR in the British and Irish press. Chris Ryder, who wrote an unofficial history of the regiment, and was a reporter at the Daily

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Telegraph, wrote an article entitled ‘A loyal or loyalist Regiment?’ which, in Potter’s view, was ‘disgraceful’. Seemingly, Potter feels that, although many of the accusations levelled at the UDR proved to be untrue, the harm had already been done and attached a stigma to the regiment which still remains.115 It was the BBC’s weekly Panorama television programme, however, that was to intensify this negative image when ‘The UDR: A Question of Loyalty’ was broadcast on 19 February 1990, bringing the actions of some members of the UDR into the public eye once more. Potter is indignant about the content of this programme, stating that the BBC had ‘decided in advance to denigrate the regiment and … had put together a programme that would provide the justification for their prejudices. It was a programme almost completely lacking in objective balance.’116 Potter’s assessment of the programme, however, is, perhaps understandably, also lacking some objective balance. It is not the place of this work to go into any great detail about the programme itself, other than to say that the comments made by Brigadier Charles Richie, Commander of the UDR, particularly relating to whether UDR platoons were briefed only on suspected Republican suspects and, therefore, acted only against them, did much to harm the regiment’s image further. Most commentators focused on this point, the Belfast Telegraph writing that ‘for the Brigadier to admit that its operations were directed almost exclusively against Republican terrorist groups, with the fight against Protestant extremists the domain of the RUC, only adds to the fear of many nationalists that the UDR exists only to operate against their section of the community’.117 In a general sense, this programme helped to intensify the feelings of loyalists that the media were pursuing a witch-hunt against them.118 It also united certain portions of opinion behind the UDR, especially supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party who, only a year earlier, had launched a ‘Hands Off the UDR’ petition and pamphlet.119 The petition itself was handed to Downing Street by Ian Paisley and William McCrea on 21 February 1990. In Parliament, Paisley leapt vehemently to the defence of the regiment, referring to the ‘consistent conspiracy to blacken’ the UDR, stating that ‘if members of the UDR did something that they should not have done, they should be dealt with like anyone else, but the whole regiment should not be maligned as it has been’.120 By this point, however, the damage to the regiment was done. Within three months, the Stevens Inquiry had published its initial findings, saying that, although it was not widespread, there had been collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries, and the UDR was directly implicated in this. These publications had effectively sparked the debate over whether the UDR should be disbanded or amalgamated. The ‘Options for Change’ review of 1991 decided that amalgamation would be the best option as it was thought that ‘it was important to integrate it more fully with the regular British Army’.121 Sir Archie Hamilton, Minister of State, stated that ‘the UDR will

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bring to the merged regiment the best features of its own unique tradition – concept of ­­military service to the local community’. During the same debate, John Reid, MP for Motherwell North, stated that ‘throughout the recent troubles, the UDR, of all the regiments in the British Army, has remained the most vulnerable to terrorist attack. It has been under more pressure, a more direct level of threat, than any other regiment; consistently over the past twenty-two years … They deserve our deepest respect.’122 For many in Northern Ireland, mainly those in the Protestant community, and unlike some of the older amateur forces from Ireland, the UDR has the deepest respect and has not been forgotten. Many memorials exist throughout the country, commemorating those who lost their lives while serving, on or off duty, with the UDR. For example, in Palace Barracks, Holywood, County Down, a memorial is dedicated to the men and women of the regiment. In Lisburn, a large bronze sculpture of a UDR soldier and a Greenfinch stands to remember the forty thousand men and women who served in the regiment, and was funded entirely through public donations to the UDR Memorial Trust. John Potter has immortalised the members of the UDR in the poem ‘The UDR Soldier’ which is worth quoting here: As poppy petals gently fall Remember us who gave our all Not in the mud of foreign lands Nor buried in the desert sands. In Ulster field and farm and town, Fermanagh’s lanes and drumlin’d Down We died that violent death should cease And Ulstermen might live in peace. We did not serve because we hate Nor bitterness our hearts dictate. But we were they who must aspire To quench the flame of terror’s fire. As buglers sound and pipers play The proud battalions march away Now may the weary violence cease And let our country live in peace.

For the UDR, at least, its legacy and image live on, and the actions of some of its members still cause a significant level of controversy today. A new BBC Panorama documentary was broadcast in May 2015 which once more uncovered high levels of collusion between paramilitaries and the security forces. Existing during such a contentious period of Irish history, it is hardly surprising that the UDR’s image divides people the most, and why it is most remembered.

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The public have largely forgotten other amateur forces, and this has a lot to do with the passage of time. Whilst in existence, the militia was viewed by the public fairly negatively, largely because of the high number of disturbances it caused, and the concerns with Fenianism. When discipline improved, so did its image, and this was most evident in the yeomanry, OTC, and VTC, especially when unprecedented scenes were witnessed upon embarkation for South Africa. Moreover, during the Third Home Rule Crisis, the yeomanry and OTC gained popularity within some sections of society who saw them as loyal to the Union. For the UHG, any positive image was threatened by its sectarian makeup, a problem also encountered over a twenty-year period for the UDR. For the UHG, press coverage was mainly positive, or, in nationalist newspapers, apathetic. During the Second World War some harked back to the citizen soldiers of earlier centuries, as the defenders of the country, and likened the UHG to these amateurs. For the UDR, this was more challenging, as it was viewed by one section of the population as the defender of the other, and, by this time, this was not an acceptable point of view. Its image was tarnished by sustained bad press coverage over a long period of time, and even today its image has not recovered. Notes 1 Exceptions to this can be viewed in French, Military Identities, pp. 232–58; Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp. 152–78. 2 See McAnally, The Irish Militia. 3 The Standard, 30 November 1854. 4 Daily News, 25 November 1854; 2 January 1855; Morning Chronicle, 30 November 1854. 5 NLI Ms. 1055. Letter from an unknown author to the Under-Secretary of Ireland, 19 February 1955; Letter from the Adjutant of the Leitrim Rifles to the UnderSecretary of Ireland, 12 April 1955. 6 Freeman’s Journal, 29 December 1854; 10 January 1855. 7 NLI Ms. 1057. Letter from James Colborne to the Under-Secretary of Ireland, 16 July 1859. 8 Nation, 16 July 1859. 9 Parl. Debs (HL), vol. 154, cols 1280–1, 15 July 1859. 10 Ibid., vol. 155, cols 3–4, 19 July 1859. 11 Belfast Newsletter, 25 July 1859; The Times, 27 July 1859. 12 PP (19). Kinsale Riots. Copies of the official reports made by the civil and by the military authorities, who held investigations regarding the recent rioting at Kinsale, between some of the soldiers of the Antrim Militia Artillery and some of the inhabitants of Kinsale, 1860. 13 The Times, 3 February 1960. 14 There are examples of friction between the militia and the RIC. See NLI Kilmainham

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papers Ms. 1055. Letter from the Adjutant of the Armagh Light Infantry to the Under-Secretary of Ireland, 7 March 1855; Ms. 1057. Letter from Major-General Eden to the Under-Secretary of Ireland, 18 July 1859. 15 The Times, 6 September 1858; Bury and Norwich, and Suffolk Herald, 7 September 1858; Essex Standard, 17 September 1858. 16 Essex Standard, 15 October 1858; also reported in Lancaster Gazette, 16 October 1858; Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 17 October 1858; Bury and Norwich, and Suffolk Herald, 19 October 1858; Birmingham Daily Post, 20 October 1858. 17 The Times, 2 November 1858; Reynolds Newspaper, 7 November 1858; also outlined in Cox, Oh Captain Shaw, p. 30. 18 The Times, 9 November 1858; Freeman’s Journal, 10 November 1858; Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 14 November 1858. 19 There are few examples of rioting by other militia regiments. The Lancashire Militia rioted in Glasgow, Glasgow Herald, 5 March 1856. 20 TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia). 21 Ibid.; The Standard, 2 November 1858. 22 Globe Newspaper, 29 August 1860; also quoted in TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia). 23 Belfast Newsletter, 30 August 1860; Freeman’s Journal, 31 August 1860. 24 The Times, 30 August 1860. 25 The Standard, 30 August 1860. 26 Freeman’s Journal, 1 September 1860. 27 Belfast Newsletter, 4 September 1860. 28 TNA WO 68/88 Digest of Service of the South Tipperary Artillery (Militia). 29 The Standard, 30 August 1860. 30 Freeman’s Journal, 1 September 1860. 31 NLI Ms. 1057. Letter from E.A. Whitmore to the Under-Secretary of Ireland, 12 March 1861. Enthusiastic scenes were also noted upon the return of the Armagh Light Infantry to their locality. RIF Museum The Historical Record of the 3rd Battalion (Princess Victoria’s) Royal Irish Fusiliers. 32 Freeman’s Journal, 24 June 1861; Birmingham Daily Post, 26 June 1861. 33 Freeman’s Journal, 5 July 1880; Nation, 10 July 1880. 34 Belfast Newsletter, 11 September 1872. 35 Quotations from Daily News, reported in Freeman’s Journal, 12 September 1872. 36 Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times, 28 September 1872. 37 Freeman’s Journal, 2 October 1872. 38 Belfast Newsletter, 22 July 1876. 39 Ibid., 28 February 1898. 40 The image of the British soldier in British culture has been discussed in some detail in Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture, pp. 44–69. 41 Morning Post, 15 January 1900; The Standard, 15 January 1900; Cork Weekly Examiner, 20 January 1900; 24 February 1900. 42 Freeman’s Journal, 12 January 1900. 43 Ibid., 12 May 1900.

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44 Pall Mall Gazette, 20 February 1900. 45 Morning Post, 23 February 1900. 46 Ibid. 47 TNA WO 68/306 Digest of Service of the North Cork Rifles; Southern Star, 20 July 1901; Cork Weekly Examiner, 3 August 1901. 48 The Times, 1 April 1902; Irish Times, 1 April 1902. 49 Ibid., 29 May 1902; King’s County Chronicle, 29 May 1902; Irish Times, 31 May 1902. It was mentioned that the Urban District Council, owing to it being a ‘wholly Nationalist body’, was severely censured by the local branch of the United Irish League, for presenting an address of this kind to the regiment. 50 For more information about the pro-Boer feeling within Ireland see D. McCracken, Forgotten Protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2003). 51 Cork Weekly Examiner, 13 January 1900; 20 January 1900. 52 Freeman’s Journal, 12 January 1900. 53 Southern Star, 12 May 1900. 54 Ibid., 17 November 1906. 55 McCracken, Forgotten Protest, p. 52. 56 BL The Galway Militia Polka Mazurka, with verses, composed and dedicated by special permission to Col. The Marquis of Clanricarde and Officers of the County Galway Regiment of Irish Militia, by Mrs J. D’Arcy, 1871. 57 Nottinghamshire Guardian, 10 February 1900. 58 Quoted in McCracken, Forgotten Protest, p. 166. 59 All information relating to war memorials in Ireland is taken from www.irishwarme morials.ie, and the author’s visits to the Royal Irish Rifles Memorial, Belfast City Hall, and St Patrick’s Cathedral, Dublin. 60 Irish Times, 30 December, 1899. 61 Dublin Evening Mail, 4 January 1900; Belfast Evening Telegraph, 9 January 1900; Belfast Newsletter, 11 January 1900. 62 Irish Times, 20 January 1900. 63 Dublin Evening Mail, 4 January 1900; Belfast Newsletter, 11 January 1900. 64 Belfast Newsletter, 24 January 1900; 29 January 1900; 6 February 1900. 65 Dublin Evening Mail, 7 February 1900; The Times, 8 February 1900; Belfast Newsletter, 8 February 1900. 66 Belfast Newsletter, 14 February 1900. 67 Lisburn Herald and Antrim and Down Advertiser, 20 January 1900. 68 Irish Times, 24 February 1900. 69 Northern Whig, 3 March 1900. 70 Irish Times; Freeman’s Journal, 13 March 1900. 71 Fitzgibbon, Arts under Arms, p. 56. 72 Belfast Newsletter, 6 April 1900; Irish Times, 6 April 1900; Daily Express (Dublin), 6 April 1900. 73 Bennett, Absent-Minded Beggars, p. 119. 74 Hay, The British Yeomanry Cavalry, pp. 195–6; Jeffery, ‘The Irish Soldier in the Boer War’, in Gooch, ed., The Boer War, pp. 142–50.

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75 Irish Times, 6 June 1900; Dublin Evening Mail, 6 June 1900; Daily Express (Dublin), 6 June 1900; 8 June 1900. 76 Daily Express, 8 June 1900. 77 Dublin Evening Mail, 7 June 1900. 78 BMH WS Ref. 564, Witness: Tom Byrne, Member of the Irish Brigade, South Africa, 1900–1902, Captain IV, Dublin, 1916, Commandant IRA, Dublin, 1921. 79 Kildare Observer, 15 June 1900. 80 Irish Times, 11 June 1901. 81 Ibid., 12 June 1901. 82 Ibid., 28 September 1901. 83 See Doherty, North Irish Horse, pp. 9–11. 84 IWM 1056 South Irish Horse Regiment Sports, 28 May 1914. 85 Beckett, The Army and the Curragh Incident, p. 391. 86 See Irish Times, 16 July 1909. 87 Willoughby, A Military History of the University of Dublin and Its Officers Training Corps, pp. 6–7; Bailey, A History of Trinity College Dublin, p. 158; Johnston, The Queen’s University (Belfast) Contingent of the Officers Training Corps; Irish Times, 4 July 1911; 15 July 1911. 88 Irish Times, 10 May 1910. 89 Ibid., 10 June 1914. 90 Ibid., 10 May 1915; 13 May 1915. For response to Easter Rising see Irish Times, 12 May 1916. 91 Ibid., 26 July 1915. 92 Volunteer Training Corps Gazette, 24 June 1916; 22 July 1916; 2 September 1916. 93 Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 7 August 1937. 94 Ibid., 1 June 1940. 95 Belfast Newsletter, 29 May 1940. 96 Irish News, 29 May 1940; 31 May 1940. 97 PRONI HA32/1/781 Gough Memorial on Local Defence Volunteers in Northern Ireland, 23 September 1940; also printed in The Times, 15 October 1940. 98 For an example of this see Irish News, 2 July 1940. 99 Derry Standard, 23 January 1942; 30 January 1942; 6 February 1942. 100 Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 10 August 1940; 22 September 1940; 28 September 1940. 101 PRONI HG8/22 Memorandum to All Commanding Officers, UHG, 30 July 1942. 102 Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 8 December 1944. 103 PRONI CAB3A/77 Notes on the Formation of the UHG, 1945. 104 PRONI LAB5/88 Letter from the Belfast Town Clerk to the Minister of Home Affairs, 18 May 1961. 105 Guardian, 7 November 1977. 106 The Times, 15 October 1991. 107 TNA CJ3/58 Survey of Irish Press/TV Reaction to White Papers on the UDR, prepared for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 17 November 1969. 108 The Times, 13 November 1969. 109 TNA DEFE24/827 Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the UDR Advisory Council, 22 January 1970.

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110 TNA INF6/1847 Television commercial ‘Why don’t you join the Ulster Defence Regiment and help us keep the peace in Northern Ireland’, October 1971, costing £3,966 to make. 111 Observer, 12 November 1972. 112 Ibid.; Guardian, 12 December 1972. For another example of loyalist infiltration and Catholic attitude to this see Guardian, 1 September 1975. The Ministry of Defence had begun to produce documentaries in order to improve public relations, see Potter, A Testimony to Courage, pp. 178–9. 113 TNA CJ4/3063 Civil Affairs Report, prepared for the 10th (City of Belfast) Battalion, UDR, by Major P.H.S. Newel and Major A.F. Roberts, 31 January 1979. 114 Ibid. 115 Potter, A Testimony to Courage, pp. 324–7. 116 Ibid., p. 334. A detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the programme and its aftermath can be found at pp. 333–40. 117 Belfast Telegraph, 20 February 1990. 118 A. Parkinson, ‘Bigots in Bowler Hats: the Presentation and Reception of the Loyalist Case in Great Britain’, in D. Boyce and A. O’Day (eds), Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801 (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 281. 119 P. Robinson, Hands Off the UDR (Belfast: Democratic Unionist Party, 1989). 120 Parl. Debs (HC), vol. 169, cols 30–71, 12 March 1990. 121 Ibid., vol. 196, cols 136–7, 15 October 1991. 122 Ibid., vol. 203, cols 1139–203, 13 February 1992.

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Conclusion

Throughout the period there is a clear indication of a continuing and distinct Irish amateur military tradition. Within this, two separate strands emerged that were closely interrelated. The first of these was a Catholic Irish tradition, which mainly manifested itself in the ranks of the militia. The second tradition, largely focused in the North, was a re-emergence of an Ulster Protestant volunteering tradition, which went beyond the boundaries of the Irish yeomanry of the late eighteenth century. This occurred within the British military framework, and was able to survive, albeit outside of this framework, when paramilitary groups, most notably the UVF, were formed shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, and continued to survive throughout the Troubles. Even before the first embodiment of the Irish militia during the Crimean War, political considerations were in the forefront of the minds of policymakers, which partly explains why it was not embodied at the same time as its English counterpart. These political considerations continued to shape any decision made with regard to the auxiliaries in Ireland, and were at their most pronounced for the militia in the 1860s, for the UHG during the Second World War, and for the UDR thereafter. For the yeomanry, OTC, and VTC, no such political problems existed; this was largely because they were predominantly made up of Protestants, so a lingering threat of nationalist subversion was not a consideration. Conversely, this Protestant domination in the UHG and UDR threatened to create political problems, particularly risking embroiling the army in a sectarian issue, something which the British authorities wished to avoid at all costs. These political considerations had repercussions for the strategic capabilities of Irish amateur forces in both a positive and a negative sense. The militia was not permitted to remain in Ireland when embodied, and this was something which angered nationalist politicians. However, this meant that it was able to form an integral part in the defence of the United Kingdom, often serving in important strategic locations across the nation. For the other forces, political concerns were of less importance and, in this context, permitted them to prove their loyalty to the Empire in a variety of conflicts, or on duty at home. This was most plain to

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see in the UHG, which, after Dunkirk, was one of the most heavily armed sections of the British forces. Undoubtedly, the confines of the complex political environment in Ireland had a profound effect on all other aspects of its amateur forces, while reinforcing its refection of Irish society. Largely as a means to maintain the equilibrium in the Irish establishment, the officer corps of all of the Irish amateur forces was dominated by Protestants. This does not mean that it was an exclusively Protestant venture, as there were more Catholics in the militia officer corps than has previously been appreciated, particularly in regiments based in the west of Ireland. At least initially, the landed classes dominated the militia officer corps. By the early twentieth century, their numbers were in sharp decline, and this reflects the decline of the landed classes in Irish society as a whole.1 As a result, the militia came to rely on officers from England, many of these keen to utilise the militia ‘back door’. Thereafter, a reliance on middle-class businessmen became a notable feature of auxiliary forces in Ireland. Additionally, the importance of patronage should not be underestimated, especially for the militia in the latter nineteenth century, when being a member of this force was viewed as an integral part of county life. Its importance was of less significance for the yeomanry, OTC, VTC, and UDR, but for the TA and UHG it remained crucial to anyone with Unionist political aspirations in the Northern Ireland state. In contrast to the officer corps, Catholics were overrepresented in the rank and file of the militia, and in nearly all cases there were a disproportionate number in local battalions, even in Ulster. In line with the militia in Great Britain, although a vast majority of these men were labourers, a more detailed analysis reveals that, especially in Belfast and Dublin, a high proportion were in steady employment, far from the ‘underemployed’ of society, as has been previously argued.2 This is a clear indication of social climbing, as well as an open demonstration of loyalty to Britain and its Empire. The other auxiliaries, however, were dominated by the middle classes. For those who joined the yeomanry, the South African War gave businessmen the opportunity of adventure, and provided an outlet for military service which had previously been denied to them, owing to the fact that no Rifle Volunteer Movement was present in Ireland. A similar social composition was witnessed in the OTC and VTC, the former allowing university students to experience military life, the latter giving older men the chance to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Empire. The TA, UHG, and UDR were able to attract a broader cross-section of society, at least from an occupational point of view, but this was due to the fact that a high proportion of men were veterans of the First and Second World Wars, and some had even been members of previous amateur forces. Despite the wider appeal in this respect, the UHG’s sectarian makeup is clear when it is seen that only 150 Catholics were estimated to have taken part in the force, and this low number has, perhaps, not been fully appreciated until now.

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Additionally, the makeup of the rank and file most strikingly amplifies how the auxiliary forces in Ireland came to reflect Irish, and later Northern Irish, society. The contrast between the militia and yeomanry, particularly the latter’s greater popularity, and dominance by the Protestant middle class, exemplified the position of this social group within Irish society. In Northern Ireland, the complete dominance of Protestant men in the UHG and UDR typifies the position of Catholics in this atmosphere, and accentuates their apathy towards many official instruments of the state. The role in which the rank and file of the Irish auxiliary forces played also evolved over time. The militia, despite its strategic importance in Britain, successfully fulfilled the role of draft finding for the regular forces. This easily matched the efforts in other areas of the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the overall number of Irishmen in the British Army declined over time. The yeomanry fulfilled a limited role in draft finding, but was initially a response to the situation in South Africa, and subsequently played an active role during the First World War. In contrast, the role of the OTC, VTC, UHG, and UDR in home defence duties was of much greater importance, and this is reflected in the standard of training that these forces received. Despite this higher degree of training, the limited capability of the officer corps was often reflected in the discipline of many of these forces. In line with the rest of the United Kingdom, the discipline of the auxiliary forces in Ireland improved over time. This varied, and the militia had major disciplinary problems, especially early on. Acts of disobedience, especially drunkenness and rioting, were a common occurrence at the end of periods of training, and these problems were further accentuated by the perceived threat of Fenianism. This threat existed for a number of decades and did much to harm its ability, and, in the eyes of the authorities, this made it untrustworthy and undisciplined. For the yeomanry, OTC, VTC, UHG, and even the UDR, indiscipline was only a minor problem. The fact that the UHG was under civilian, rather than military, authority until an invasion occurred, meant that punishments were only very minor and often varied from company to company. The UDR proved to be a minor problem, but the poor perception of its discipline outweighed any problems that it may have actually had. During embodiment, and especially during the First and Second World Wars, the auxiliary forces carried out a variety of different roles in action. Initially, the roles performed by the militia included garrison duties, ceremonial duties, and, on rare occasions, acting as an aid to the civil power. These largely fell in line with the duties of auxiliaries in Great Britain, and were often carried out whilst still providing significant numbers of men to the regular army. During the South African War, however, the militia as a whole was provided with the opportunity to serve abroad, and a number of Irish regiments took up this chance. This is perhaps an indication of the military worth of this formation. The yeomanry,

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initially formed exclusively for service in South Africa, carried out many of its duties on the lines of communication. However, the authorities were much more willing to allow it to carry out frontline service to a greater degree, and at the outbreak of war in August 1914 the North and South Irish Horse were some of the first units to go to France with the BEF. The VTC, UHG, and UDR were entrusted entirely to the role of home defence, an opportunity not afforded to previous forces. For the VTC this meant that its military capabilities were put to the test during the Easter Rising in 1916, and these abilities were carried out satisfactorily, even in adverse circumstances. For the UHG, although never put to the test militarily, when an invasion was a real possibility in 1940 training for mobilisation, as well as manning strategic points, was of utmost importance. As the Second World War progressed, activities such as the manning of AA batteries were also vital for freeing up regular soldiers for frontline service. After 1945, the TA was to form an important part of any British response to another conflict in Europe, but specifically was not permitted to serve in Northern Ireland. The UDR took on this role continuously for twenty-two years, and formed an integral part of British defence planning. As a force administered by the government in Westminster it acted in crucial support of the regular army in Northern Ireland, but importantly was not permitted to act in any capacity as a force for riot control. From 1854, the image of the auxiliary forces in Ireland steadily improved until the formation of the UDR, and this improvement was intrinsically linked with the advancement in discipline. For the militia, this image began at a low point, partly owing to the legacy of its reputation during the Napoleonic period. Consistent acts of disobedience early on in its embodiment, such as rioting with local populations and drunkenness, did little to improve matters. As discipline improved throughout the century, so did its image, but the war in South Africa was its watershed. The yeomanry, OTC, and VTC were viewed much more favourably by the majority of the public. Responses from the nationalist camp were a little more muted, but these forces’ reputation was again aided by the war in South Africa and the First World War. An important factor that influenced this positive attitude towards these auxiliaries was the social class from which they were drawn. Owing to the middle-class compositions of these forces, little suspicion existed in the public eye and in many instances they were applauded in the press for their devotion to duty. Reports of the sectarian nature of the UHG did much to harm its reputation, especially outside of Northern Ireland. From within, the unionist press saw no such problem and extensive coverage was given. The most significant aspect in relation to its image throughout the war was the identification made with previous amateur forces in Ireland, especially those tasked with preventing invasion during the Napoleonic wars. The perceived sectarian nature of the UDR also greatly harmed its image. Its unintended Protestant domination and continuous

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accusations of collusion with Protestant paramilitaries dogged its reputation and military record, and continues to do so beyond its existence. Ultimately though, auxiliary forces in Ireland came to reflect society to a very high degree across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The distinctive amateur military tradition is crucial, but so is the divergent nature of it, reflecting the conflicting nature of the island of Ireland. Much focus has been given to Irish paramilitaries throughout this period, as well as to the tradition of Irish resistance to British rule. What is clear, however, is that significant numbers of Irish men (and later women) were keen to demonstrate their loyalty to the Empire and to participate in its activities. As one commentator has stated, for Ireland, ‘the Empire was simultaneously a chain and a key: it was a source both of constraint and of liberation’.3 For many, military service came to represent that key, opening up opportunities that would not ordinarily have been open to them. Notes 1 Dooley, The Decline of the Big House, pp. 272–3; Purdue, The Big House in the North of Ireland, pp. 237–8. 2 French, Military Identities, pp. 209–10. 3 A. Jackson, ‘Ireland, the Union, and the Empire, 1800–1960’, in K. Kenny (ed.), Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 137.

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Archival sources The National Archives, London Air Ministry: AIR 2 Registered Files Cabinet Office: CAB 37 Copies of Cabinet Papers CAB 38 Minutes and Memoranda of the Committee of Imperial Defence CAB 75 War Cabinet: Home Policy Committee, and Sub-Committees; Minutes and Papers CAB 123 Registered Files, Correspondence and Papers Ministry of Defence: DEFE 13 Registered Files (All Ministers) DEFE 22 Registered Files DEFE 24 Registered Files DEFE 70 Registered Files and Branch Folders Northern Ireland Office: CJ 3 Registered Files CJ 4 Registered Files (NI Series) Home Office: HO 45 Registered Papers HO 68 Original Patents of Appointments Information Office: INF 6 Film Production Documents War Office: WO 4 Secretary of War Out-letters WO 32 Registered Files (General Series) WO 33 Reports, Memoranda and Papers

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WO 68 Records of Militia Regiments WO 70 Muster Rolls and Battalion Order Books WO 79 Papers of Various Private Collections WO 92 General Courts Martial Registers WO 95 First World War and Army of Occupation Diaries WO 96 Militia Attestation Papers WO 105 Lord Roberts Papers WO 108 Correspondence and Papers, South African War WO 128 Imperial Yeomanry Attestation Papers WO 147 Garnet Wolseley papers WO 161 Miscellaneous Unregistered Papers, First World War WO 192 Fort Record Books WO 199 Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War WO 339 Officers’ Service Records, First World War Other papers: PRO 30/67 Midleton papers British Library, London Althorp Papers The Galway Militia Polka Mazurka, with verses, composed and dedicated by special permission to Colonel The Marquis of Clanricarde and Officers of the County Galway Regiment of Irish Militia, by Mrs J. D’Arcy, 1871 National Army Museum Ms. 1974-08-59 Manuscript History of the Kerry Militia, 1793–1893 Ms. 2004-01-42 Diary of Major H.W. Biddulph, 4th Connaught Rangers, attached to 11th Mounted Infantry, 1902 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London Lyttelton papers Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast Official papers CAB 3 Official War History of Northern Ireland CAB 4 Cabinet Conclusion Files CAB 9 Subject Files (2nd Series) D989 Irish Unionist Alliance papers D1327 Ulster Unionist Council papers HA 32 Department of Home Affairs, Secret Files HG 1 Ulster Home Guard; Belfast City Files HG 2 Ulster Home Guard; County Antrim Files HG 3 Ulster Home Guard; County Armagh Files HG 4 Ulster Home Guard; County Down Files HG 5 Ulster Home Guard; County Fermanagh Files

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HG 6 Ulster Home Guard; County Londonderry Files HG 7 Ulster Home Guard; County Tyrone Files HG 8 Ulster Home Guard; General Administration Files LA 7 Belfast Corporation / County Borough Council papers LAB 5 Ministry of Labour papers MIC 204 Queen’s University, Belfast, Officers’ Training Corps Registers PM 2 Correspondence of the Prime Minister USC Ulster Special Constabulary papers

Personal papers: D618 Savage–Armstrong papers D623 Abercorn papers D998 Brookeborough papers D1071 Dufferin and Ava papers D1132 Alexander and Lowry papers D1415 Craigavon papers D1507 Carson papers D1700 Crawford papers D1889 Wallace papers D2023 Moutray papers D3077 Hart papers D3078 Leinster papers D3703 McFarland papers National Library of Ireland, Dublin Harrington papers Kilmainham papers Redmond papers Trinity College, Dublin, Library Dublin University Officers’ Training Corps papers Armagh County Museum Numerical Return showing the Number of Men who transferred to the Regular Army from the Armagh Light Infantry, July 1858 Royal Irish Fusiliers Museum The Historical Record of the 3rd Battalion (Princess Victoria’s) Royal Irish Fusiliers, The Armagh Light Infantry, 1855–1908 Royal Ulster Rifles Museum C.J. Robb, History of the Royal South Down Militia, unpublished manuscript

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Parliamentary papers (392) Militia. A bill (as amended in committee) to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the militia in England, 1852 (83) Militia. A bill to amend the acts relating to the militia of the United Kingdom, 1854 (250) Militia (Ireland). A bill (amended in committee) to amend the laws relating to the militia, and for raising a volunteer militia force, in Ireland, 1854 (286) Militia. Return of the regiments of militia in the United Kingdom, that volunteered for service abroad during the late war, 1856 (126) Militia. Return of all regiments of militia in the United Kingdom who shall not have completed their respective quotas, and the number of men required to complete the establishment in each of such regiments; also, of the number of men in each ­­regiment of militia whose period of service shall expire within six months from the present time, 1858 (422) Militia (volunteers). Return of the number of men who have volunteered from the militia to the cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, the guards, and the line, from 1st March 1857 to 21st April 1858, showing the numbers furnished by each regiment, 1858 (519) Flogging (army). Return of the number of persons flogged in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in the year 1857; specifying the offence, the regiments, the place of station, the time, the sentence, and the number of lashes inflicted, 1858 (158) Militia. Return of the number of volunteers given by each regiment of embodied militia between 1st January 1858 and 5th February 1859; and of the highest number of effectives in each of the above regiments during the year 1858; showing also, in each case, the relative proportion of volunteers so given to the above-mentioned effectives, 1859 (2553) Report of the commissioners appointed to enquire into the establishment, organisation, government, and direction of the militia of the United Kingdom; together with the minutes of evidence and appendix, 1859 (19) Kinsale Riots. Copies of the official reports made by the civil and by the military authorities, who held investigations regarding the recent rioting at Kinsale, between some of the soldiers of the Antrim Militia Artillery and some of the inhabitants of Kinsale, 1860 Flogging (army). Return of the number of persons flogged in the army and militia of Great Britain and Ireland, in the year 1858; specifying the offence, the regiments, the place of station, the time, the sentence, and the number of lashes inflicted, 1859 Britain and Ireland, in the year 1859; specifying the offence, the regiments, the place of station, the time, the sentence, and the number of lashes inflicted, 1860 (14) Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom, the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete at each training, for the years 1859, 1860, 1861, and 1862 (453) Army (rifles). Return of the number of breech-loading infantry rifles produced since the adoption of the snider breech-loading principle, giving the numbers obtained by the conversion of muzzle-loading rifles into breech-loaders; of the number obtained by the direct manufacture of breech-loaders; of the number of breech-loading rifles issued to the regular troops and the reserve forces; and, of the number of breechloading rifles of all descriptions now in store, 1870

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(147) Militia (training establishments). Return showing the training establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom; the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete for the training of 1873, 1874 (C.1377) Census of Ireland, 1871. Part III. General report, with illustrative maps and diagrams, summary tables, and appendix, 1876 (C.1654) Report of the committee appointed by the Secretary of State for War to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the militia and the present  brigade depot system; together with minutes of evidence, appendix, and index, 1877 (202) Army (volunteers and militia). Return of the number of volunteers from each regiment of the militia to the line in the year 1878, stating in each case how many volunteered to the linked line regiment, and how many to other corps; of number of commissions in the line given to officers in the militia, stating in like manner whether the commission so given was in the linked corps or another; and, of number of officers of the line transferred to militia, and whether linked or other corps, 1878 (C.2785) Militia (training establishments). Return showing the training establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom; the number present, absent, and wanting to complete for the training of 1880, 1881 (C.3365) Census of Ireland, 1881. Part II. General report, with illustrative maps and diagrams, tables, and appendix, 1882 (C.3503) Army and Militia. Annual report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, 1883 (C.4314) Army and Militia. Annual report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, 1885 (C.4675) Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, and the number of militia reserve men enrolled and effective, at the training of 1885, 1886 (C.4925) Belfast Riots Commission, 1886. Report of the Belfast Riots Commissioners, 1887 (C.5922) Report of the committee appointed to enquire into certain questions that have arisen with respect to the militia, together with minutes of evidence and appendices, 1890 (C.6261) Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, and the number of militia reserve men enrolled and effective, at the training of 1890 (C.7939) Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the  United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, and the number of militia reserve men enrolled and effective, at the training of 1895 (Cd.579) Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, and the number of militia reserve men enrolled and effective, at the training of 1900 (Cd.803) Imperial Yeomanry. Report of the Deputy Adjutant-General of the force regarding its home organisation, inspection of the constitution of its base and advanced depots, and distribution of stores in South Africa, and proposals for future organisation called for by the Secretary of State for War, 1902 (Cd.2061) Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904

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199

(Cd.2063) Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers (Volume II), 1904 (Cd.2064) Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. Appendices to the minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 1904 (Cd.2697) Militia. Return showing the establishment of each regiment of militia in the United Kingdom; and the numbers present, absent, and wanting to complete, and the number of militia reserve men enrolled and effective, at the training of 1905 (92) Territorial and Reserve Forces. A bill to provide for the reorganisation of His Majesty’s military forces, and for that purpose to authorise the establishment of county associations and the raising and maintenance of a territorial force, and for amending acts relating to the reserve forces, 1907 (Cd.4831) The report of the President of Queen’s College, Belfast, for the year 1908–1909 (Cmd.535) Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, October 1969 Newspapers Anglo-Celt Belfast Evening Telegraph Belfast Newsletter Belfast Weekly Telegraph Birmingham Daily Post Bristol Mercury Bury and Norwich, and Suffolk Herald Carrickfergus Advertiser Cheshire Observer Connaught Telegraph Cork Weekly Examiner Daily Express (Dublin) Daily Gazette Derry Standard Dublin Evening Mail Dundee Courier Echo, Army and Navy Gazette Essex Standard Freeman’s Journal Guardian Glasgow Herald Globe Newspaper Hampshire Advertiser and Salisbury Guardian Irish News Irish Times Irish Weekly Times Kildare Observer King’s County Chronicle Lancaster Gazette

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Lisburn Herald and Antrim and Down Advertiser Liverpool Mercury Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper London Gazette Manchester Guardian Mid-Ulster Mail Morning Chronicle Morning Post Nation Northern Whig Nottinghamshire Guardian Observer Pall Mall Gazette Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times Newry Reporter Reynolds Newspaper Saunders’s Newsletter Southern Star Sheffield and Rotherham Independent The Standard The Times Volunteer Training Corps Gazette Websites www.angloboerwar.com www.bbc.co.uk/news www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie www.irishwarmemorials.ie Secondary material

Books

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Beckett, I., A Century of Service: The Territorials: A Century of Service (Plymouth: DRA Publishing, 2008). Beckett, I.F.W. (ed.), Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire, 1837–1902 (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012). Beckett, I.F.W., and Gooch, J. (eds), Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1844–1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981). Beckett, I., and Simpson, K. (eds), A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985). Bennett, W., Absent-Minded Beggars: Volunteers in the Boer War (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999). Berkeley, G.F.H., The Irish Battalion in the Papal Army of 1860 (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1929). Blackstock, A., An Ascendancy Army: The Irish Yeomanry, 1796–1834 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998). Blake, J.W., Northern Ireland in the Second World War (London: Blackstaff Press, 2000). Boisragon, A.M., The Benin Massacre (London: Methuen and Company, 1897). Bowman, T., Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). Bowman, T., Carson’s Army: The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1910–1922 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). Bowman, T., and Connelly, M., The Edwardian Army; Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Boyce, D., and O’Day, A. (eds), Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801 (London: Routledge, 2002). Bruce, S., The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1992). Burke, B., Burke’s Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry of Ireland (London, 1958). Cadwallader, A., Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland (Cork: Mercier Press, 2013). Callwell, C.E., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1927). Clark, W., Brave Men and True: Early Days of the Ulster Defence Regiment (Coleraine: Coleraine Printing Company Ltd, 2002). Cokayne, G.E. (ed.), The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom, Extant, Extinct, or Dormant (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000). Cookson, J.E., The British Armed Nation, 1793–1815 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Core, J., Historical Record of the 2nd (now 80th) or Royal Tyrone Fusiliers Regiment of Militia, from the embodiment in 1793 to the present time (1872). Cox, R., Oh, Captain Shaw: The Life Story of the First and Most Famous Chief of the London Fire Brigade (London: Victor Green, 1984). Cunningham, H., The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History, 1859–1908 (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1975). Denman, T., A Lonely Grave: The Life and Death of William Redmond, 1914–1918 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995).

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Denman, T., Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992). Dennis, P., The Territorial Army, 1906–1940 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1987). Dennison, S.R., and MacDonagh, O., Guinness 1886–1939: From Incorporation to the Second World War (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998). Dewar, M., The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985). Dillon, C., and Jefferies, H.A. (eds), Tyrone: History and Society (Dublin: Geography Publications, 2000). Doherty, R., The North Irish Horse: A Hundred Years of Service (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2002). Dooley, T., The Decline of the Big House in Ireland: A Study of Irish Landed Families, 1860–1960 (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2001). Dooner, M., The Last Post: Roll of Officers Who Fell in South Africa, 1899–1902 (London: Kent and Co. Ltd). Doyle, A.C., The Great Boer War (London: Smith, Elder and Company Ltd, 1900). Duggan, J.P., A History of the Irish Army (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991). Farrell, M., Arming the Protestants: Formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1920–27 (London: Pluto Press, 1983). Fitzgibbon, M., Arts Under Arms: An University Man in Khaki (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901). Fitzpatrick, D., Descendancy: Irish Protestant Histories since 1795 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Fitzpatrick, G., St Andrews College, 1894–1994 (Blackrock: St Andrew’s College, 1994). Fisk, R., In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939–45 (London: Gill and Macmillan Ltd, 1985). Follis, B., A State under Siege: The Establishment of Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Foster, R.F., Charles Stewart Parnell: The Man and His Family (London: The Harvester Press Ltd, 1976). Foy, M., and Barton, B., The Easter Rising (Stroud: The History Press, 2011). French, D., Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945– 1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). French, D., Military Identities: The Regimental System: the British Army, and the British People, c.1870–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Gailey, I.B., An Account of the Territorials in Northern Ireland, 1947–78 (Belfast: Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Association for Northern Ireland, 1979). Garnham,  N., The Militia in Eighteenth Century Ireland: In Defence of the Protestant Interest (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012). Geoghegan, Brigadier-General S., The Campaigns and History of the Royal Irish Regiment from 1900 to 1922 (Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press, 2007). Goldstrom, J.M., and Clarkson, L.A. (eds), Irish Population, Economy, and Society: Essays in Honour of the Late K.H. Connell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). Gooch, J., (ed.), The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

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Graves, C., The Home Guard of Britain (London: Hutchinson and Company Ltd, 1943). Hammond, P.W. (ed.), The Complete Peerage or a History of the House of Lords and All its Members From the Earliest Times (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998). Hanna, B., The Pals at Suvla Bay: Being the Record of ’D’ Company of the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1998). Harbinson, J.F., The Ulster Unionist Party, 1882–1973: Its Development and Organisation (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1973). Harries-Jenkins, G., The Army in Victorian Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). Harrison Place, T., Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day (Oxford: Routledge, 2000). Hart, P., The IRA at War, 1916–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Hay, G.J., The Constitutional Force: An Epitomized History of the Militia, United Services Gazette (London, 1908). Hepburn, A.C., Catholic Belfast and Nationalist Ireland in the Era of Joe Devlin, 1871– 1934 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Hezlet, A., The ‘B’ Specials: A History of the Ulster Special Constabulary (Belfast: The Mourne River Press, 1972). Jackson, A., Colonel Edward Saunderson: Land and Loyalty in Victorian Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Jeffery, K. (ed.), ‘An Irish Empire?’: Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). Jeffery, K., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Johnston, H.J., The Queen’s University (Belfast) Contingent of the Officers’ Training Corps, Golden Jubilee, 1908–1958 (Belfast: Graham and Heslip Ltd, 1958). Kenny, K. (ed.), Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Laird, F.M., Personal Experiences of the Great War (Dublin: Eason and Son Ltd, 1925). Lucas, R., Colonel Saunderson, MP: A Memoir (London: John Murray, 1908). Mackenzie, S.P., The Home Guard: A Military and Political History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). McAnally, H., The Irish Militia, 1793–1816: A Social and Military Study (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949). McCracken, D., Forgotten Protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2003). McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C. and McVea, D., Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1999). Miller, S.M., Lord Methuen and the British Army: Failure and Redemption in South Africa (London: Routledge, 1999). Miller, S.M., Volunteers on the Veld: Britain’s Citizen Soldiers and the South African War, 1899–1902 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007). Mitchinson, K.W., Defending Albion: Britain’s Home Army, 1908–1919 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

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Mockaitis, T., British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Colonial Era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Montgomery-Massingberd, H. (ed.), Burke’s Irish Family Records (London: Burke’s Peerage, 1976). Mosley, C., (ed.), Burke’s Peerage and Baronetage and Knightage (London: Burke’s Peerage, 2010). Muenger, E.A., The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886–1914 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1991). Murphy, D., Ireland and the Crimean War (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002). Nelson, I., The Irish Militia, 1793–1802: Ireland’s Forgotten Army (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1997). Ó Grada, C., Ireland before and after the Famine: Exploitations in Economic History, 1800–1925 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). O’Halpin, E., Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies since 1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Ollerenshaw, P., Northern Ireland in the Second World War: Politics, Economic Mobilisation and Society, 1939–45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). Orr, D., Duty without Glory: The Story of Ulster’s Home Guard in the Second World War and Cold War (Newtownards: Redcoat Publishing, 2008). Pakenham, T., The Boer War (London: Abacus, 1991). Pat Finucane Centre, The Hidden History of the UDR: The Secret Files Revealed (Newry: Pat Finucane Centre, 2014). Perry, N. (ed.), Major-General Oliver Nugent and the Ulster Division, 1915–1918 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2007). Pine, L.G. (ed.), The New Extinct Peerage 1884–1971 (London: Burke’s Peerage, 1972). Potter, J., A Testimony to Courage: The History of the Ulster Defence Regiment, 1969–1992 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Ltd, 2001). Price, R., An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working Class Attitudes and  Reactions to the Boer War, 1899–1902 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). Purdue, O., The Big House in the North of Ireland: Land, Power, and Social Elites, 1878– 1960 (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009). Regimental Historical Records Committee, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers: Being the History of the Regiment from December 1688 to July 1914 (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1928). Robinson, P., Hands Off the UDR (Belfast: Democratic Unionist Party, 1989). Ryder, C., The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace (Belfast: Mandarin, 1992). Shirlow, P., The End of Ulster Loyalism? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). Sleigh, A., The Royal Militia and Yeomanry Cavalry Army List: Containing the Name and Seniority of Every Regimental and Staff Officer in the Militia and Yeomanry Cavalry (London: British Army Despatch Press, 1850). Spears, E., The Picnic Basket (London: Secker and Warburg, 1967). Spiers, E., The Army and Society, 1815–1914 (London: Longman, 1980). Spiers, E., Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984).

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Spiers, E., The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Spiers, E., The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854–1902 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). Springhall, J., Youth, Empire and Society (London: Croom Helm, 1977). Strachan, H., The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Summerfield, P., and Peniston Bird, C., Contesting Home Defence: Men, Women and the Home Guard in the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). Tardif, P., The North Irish Horse in the Great War (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2015). Townshend, C., Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). Townshend, C., Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin, 2006). Vaughan, W.E. (ed.), A New History of Ireland: Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Western, J.R., The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political Issue 1660–1802 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965). Willoughby, R., A Military History of Dublin and Its Officers’ Training Corps (Dublin: The Medal Society of Ireland, Special Publication no. 1, 1989). Journal articles Bartlett, T., ‘An End to Moral Economy: The Irish Militia Disturbances of 1793’, Past and Present, no. 99 (May 1983). Beckett, I.F.W. ‘Aspects of a Nation in Arms: British Volunteer Training Corps in the Great War’, Revue internationale d’histoire militaire, vol. 63 (1985). Blackstock, A., ‘“A Dangerous Species of Ally”; Orangeism and the Irish Yeomanry’, Irish Historical Studies, vol, 30, no. 119 (May 1997). Burroughs, P., ‘Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815–1870’, The English Historical Review, vol. 100, no. 396 (July 1985). Denman, T., ‘“The Red Livery of Shame”: The Campaign against Army Recruitment in Ireland, 1899–1914’, Irish Historical Studies, vol. 29, no. 114 (November 1994). Dorman, E.M., ‘The North Irish Horse’, Army Review, vol. 3 (1913). Fitzpatrick, D., ‘The Disappearance of the Irish Agricultural Labourer, 1841–1912’, Irish Economic and Social History, vol. 7 (January 1980). Hall, D., ‘The Louth Militia Mutiny of 1900’, Journal of the County Louth Archaeological and Historical Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (1998). Jackson, A., ‘“Tame Tory Hacks?” The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922–1972’, The Historical Journal, vol. 54, no. 2 (June 2011). McFarland, E.W., ‘“Empire-Enlarging Genius”: Scottish Imperial Yeomanry Volunteers in the Boer War’, War in History, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006). Osborne, J., ‘Defining Their Own Patriotism: British Volunteer Training Corps in the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, no. 1 (January 1988). Perry, N., ‘The Irish Landed Class and the British Army, 1850–1950’, War in History, vol. 18, no. 3 (2001). Strachan, H., ‘Scotland’s Military Identity’, Scottish Historical Review, vol. 85, no. 2 (2006).

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Theses Butler, B., The British Army in Ireland 1916–1921: A Social and Cultural History (PhD Dissertation, University of Hull, 2007). Hay, G., The British Yeomanry Cavalry, 1794–1920 (PhD Dissertation, University of Kent, 2011). Smyth, P.D.H., The Volunteer Movement in Ulster: Background and Development, 1745–85 (PhD Dissertation, The Queen’s University of Belfast, 1974).

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Index

Abercorn, Dukes of 66 aid to the civil power 2, 4, 15–16, 21, 32, 37, 142–3, 191–2 Aldershot 16, 144, 170 Aldworth, Captain John Charles Oliver 54 Aldworth, Lieutenant-Colonel William 173 Anderson, John 35, 104 Andrews, John 35, 73 annual training 18–21, 63, 91, 118–19, 122, 124, 134, 167–8, 176 anti-recruiting propaganda 92 Antrim 12, 22, 32, 68, 98, 101, 105, 107, 174 Armagh 29, 85–6, 101, 105, 119, 155 Armagh County Museum 173 arms dealers 131 army, regular 4, 15, 20, 35, 37, 40–1, 52, 57–9, 60, 63–4, 88–9, 96, 98, 101–2, 117, 120, 142, 154, 156–7, 163, 182–3 B Specials 32–3, 37–8, 72, 99, 126, 154–5, 177 Barbour Thread Mill 86 Bates, Richard Dawson 30 BBC Panorama 41, 182, 183 Belfast 17, 64, 67, 71, 85–7, 89, 94–5, 97, 103, 105, 124, 128, 133, 153, 169, 173–5, 179, 181, 190 defences of 21, 22, 25–6, 29, 32, 100, 150, 152, 156 Belfast Blitz 153 Belfast Fire Brigade 60 Belfast Tramway Company 86 Benin Massacre 60

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Bessborough, Earl of 66 Boxer Rebellion 147 British Army formations Home Guard 1st (Antrim) Battalion 155 2nd (Antrim) Battalion 71 4th (Antrim) Battalion 71 2nd (Belfast) Battalion 71 4th (Belfast) Battalion 72, 102, 129 5th (Belfast) Battalion 71, 129 3rd (Down) Battalion 102 1st (Londonderry City) Battalion 127 1st (Fermanagh) Battalion 72 2nd (Tyrone) Battalion 72 Militia Regiments and Battalions 5th Connaught Rangers 85, 87 8th King’s Royal Rifle Corps 22, 87 9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps 56, 145–6 3rd Leinster Regiment 25, 145 4th Leinster Regiment 56, 124 6th Rifle Brigade 58 9th Rifle Brigade 147 4th Royal Dublin Fusiliers 85–7, 145 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers 145–6 3rd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 26, 85, 87 4th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 22, 25–6 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 22 3rd Royal Irish Fusiliers 22, 26, 86–7 3rd Royal Irish Regiment 60 3rd Royal Irish Rifles 22–3, 25, 57, 64, 124 4th Royal Irish Rifles 22–3, 64, 85–7, 88

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208 5th Royal Irish Rifles 22–3, 25, 86, 145 6th Royal Irish Rifles 22, 64 3rd Royal Munster Fusiliers 25, 145 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers 58, 145 Antrim Artillery (Militia) 24, 25, 57, 145, 164–5 Antrim Rifles 16, 22, 90, 123, 144 Armagh Light Infantry 21, 85, 89–90, 168, 173 British Army formations (cont.) Militia Regiments and Battalions (cont.) Carlow Rifles 85, 89 Cavan Militia 15, 61–2, 92 Clare Militia 55 Donegal Artillery (Militia) 23, 55–7, 120, 145–6 Dublin City Artillery (Militia) 23, 53, 55, 58–9, 61–2, 85, 87 Dublin City Militia 90, 117 Dublin County Light Infantry 64 Fermanagh Militia 56, 58–9, 61–2, 90, 144, 165 Galway Artillery (Militia) 55, 90, 168, 172 Kerry Militia 20, 88–9, 117–18, 122, 144, 171 Kildare Rifles 55 Kilkenny Fusiliers 52, 123, 168 King’s County Rifles 58, 85, 170 Leitrim Rifles 164 Limerick County Militia 117–18, 170 Londonderry Artillery (Militia) 22, 24, 53, 58–9, 61–2, 87 Longford Militia 58, 88, 124, 142 Louth Rifles 52, 60, 64, 88, 117, 121–2, 141–2, 144, 171 Meath Militia 88 Monaghan Militia 15, 52, 88, 89, 168 North Cork Rifles 16, 52–4, 57–9, 62–3, 85, 89, 120, 122, 123, 144, 165, 168–9, 170, 172 North Down Rifles 54, 64, 123, 169 North Mayo Rifles 123 North Tipperary Militia 88, 117, 119 Queen’s County Rifles 64, 89, 120, 164

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Roscommon Militia 52–3, 62 Royal Tyrone Fusiliers 124 Sligo Artillery (Militia) 85, 87, 144 South Cork Light Infantry 64, 119, 123, 168–9 South Down Militia 61, 92, 118, 121, 168, 171–2 South Mayo Rifles 89 Tipperary Artillery (Militia) 15, 17–18, 52–4, 57, 59, 62–3, 85, 124, 142–3, 147, 166–7, 173 Waterford Artillery (Militia) 64 Westmeath Militia 88–9, 119–20, 142 Wicklow Artillery (Militia) 147 Wicklow Rifles 56, 61, 142 Officer Training Corps Campbell College 176 DUOTC 95–7, 126, 151, 176 Queen’s University, Belfast 31, 69, 72, 95, 97, 126, 176, 179 Territorial Army 5th (Territorial) Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 74 188th (Antrim) Battery 33, 97 Antrim Fortress Company (Royal Engineers) 33 Ulster Defence Regiment 1st (Antrim) Battalion 155 7th (City of Belfast) Battalion 155 2nd (Down) Battalion 155 4th (Fermanagh) Battalion 155 5th (Londonderry) Battalion 155 6th (Tyrone) Battalion 155 Volunteer Training Corps City of Cork 70 Glasnevin 70 Irish Rugby Football Union 30, 70, 176–7 Yeomanry 45th (Dublin) Company 27, 93–4, 149, 173–5 46th (Belfast) Company 27, 93–4, 174, 176 54th (Belfast) Company 27, 93–4 60th (Belfast) Company 27 61st (Belfast) Company 27, 175

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Index 74th (Dublin) Company 27, 176 134th (Irish) Company 93 Regular Army 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers 177–8 7th Royal Irish Regiment 28 14th Royal Irish Rifles (Young Citizen Volunteers) 33 36th (Ulster Division) 33, 68, 70, 73, 97, 102–3 King’s Liverpool Regiment 97 Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards 107 Royal Irish Artillery 18 West African Frontier Force 60 Women’s Royal Army Corps 40 Uganda Rifles 60 Brooke, Sir Basil 29, 71 Browning, Francis 30, 70, 151 Cambridge, Duke of 18, 174 Cardwell-Childers reforms 7, 20, 53–4, 89–90 Carlow 22 Carrickfergus 30 Carson, Sir Edward 28, 30–2 Chamberlain, Sir Neville 29 Chermside, Major-General Sir Herbert 66, 125 Chichester, Arthur Henry 53 Churchill, Sir Winston 34, 35–6 Clarke, George Sydenham 24 Clonmel 15, 124, 142, 166–7 collusion 6, 37, 41, 131–3, 180–2 Connaught, Duke of 23, 125, 170, 174 Cork 17, 25, 29, 61, 86, 94, 119, 123, 142, 164, 170, 173 Craig, Sir James 29, 32–3, 57, 66–7, 148 Craig, John 21 Crawford, Major F.H. 57, 146–7 Crimean War 17, 27, 59, 62, 84, 116 Crystal Palace 17, 166–7 Cunningham, H.H.B 69 Curragh Camp 27, 120, 142, 147, 174, 176 Curragh Incident 8, 34 Denny, Henry de Courcey 62 Derby, Lord 32 Devlin, Bernadette 38, 180

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Donegal 53, 155 Donoughmore, Earl of 18 Dover 22, 144 Down 12, 54, 62, 73, 100, 101, 102, 105, 128, 133, 152, 169, 183 Dublin 17, 20, 22–3, 31, 53, 65, 86, 89, 94, 96, 124–5, 142, 150–1, 169, 173, 175, 177 Dublin Gas Company 86 Dublin Tramway Company 86 Duff Cooper, Alfred 32 Dufferin and Ava, Lord 21, 54–5, 60, 124 Easter Rising 31, 69, 150, 176–7 Egypt 21, 145 Eire 37, 101, 130, 152 Enniskillen 28 Earl of 66–7 Ennismore, Viscount 66 Eton College 53 Faulkner, Brian 133–4 Farnham, Lord 68 Fenianism 6, 8, 18–22, 56, 91, 119, 122–3, 168 Fermanagh 22, 29, 62, 101, 105 Fingall, Earl of 66 Fitt, Gerry 38 Fleet Air Arm 75 Foot, Michael 38 Fortescue, Chichester 19, 123 Fulton, Lieutenant-Colonel John Norman 72 Fyffe, Lieutenant-Colonel William Henderson 72 Galway 17, 25, 168 Gibson, Milner 14 Gough, Sir Hubert 34, 177 Greenfinches see women in the UDR Guinness Brewery 86, 169 Haldane Reforms 23–5, 28 Hamilton, Sir Archie 41, 182–3 Hanson, Robert 33 Harington, Edward 55 Harland and Wolff 26, 86, 103, 133–4

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210 Hattersley, Roy 37–8, 106 Healey, Denis 40 Herdman, Sir Emerson 68, 71 home defence 12, 13, 21, 24, 31–3, 126, 134, 143, 157, 178, 192 Home Rule 67–8, 176 Hunt Committee 38, 104 Hythe 65, 144 illegal drilling 25, 30, 122 Indian Mutiny 16, 90–1, 118, 143, 173 internment 106, 130, 155, 180 Irish Defence Force 69 Irish military tradition 5 Jacob’s Biscuits 86, 169 Johnston, Captain Robert Alexander 71 Kerr, Major John 71 Kerry 55 King’s County 25, 84, 86 Kinsale riot 164–5 Land Acts 51, 56, 67 Land Wars 13, 20, 41 Landwehr 20 Limerick 17, 25, 118, 124 Lindley, disaster of 27, 67, 149–50, 175 Local Defence Volunteers 33 localisation 20–1, 52, 58–9, 89–90 Londonderry 33, 38, 68, 70, 101, 105, 120, 128, 153, 156 Longford, Earl of 27–8, 66, 93–4, 149 Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 15, 67 Lough Swilly 25–6 Louth 69 Lyttelton, Sir Neville 26, 29–30, 123–4 McCann, Eamonn 38 MacDermott, J.C. 34–5, 36 McNamara, Kevin 38 Mackie’s Foundry 100 Malta 23, 145 Margesson, David 35 Massereene and Ferrard, Viscount 32–3, 68, 70 Massey Shaw, Sir Eyre 60

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The Irish amateur military tradition Maude, F.F. 19 Mayo 69 Mayo, Lord 19 Meath 17 militia, Irish delay in Ireland and Scotland 13–15 embodiment 15–16, 23, 141–3 localisation of 52–3, 58, 89–90 military role 12, 15–16, 21, 23, 89, 141–4, 145, 147–8 nationalist attitudes to 121, 164, 167, 168, 170–2 officer’s length of service 57–8 political reliability 17, 18–20, 22 reliance on British officers 55–6, 57 religious composition of officer corps 61–2 religious composition of rank and file 86–7, 88 social composition 53–4, 60, 61, 84–6 militia back door 7, 51, 58, 60 Militia Ballot 2, 13, 15, 164 Ministry of Defence 106 Monaghan 155, 168, 173 Montgomery, H.C. 73 Morrison, Herbert 35 Mounted Infantry 27 Mulholland, Sir Henry 71 Murrays Tobacco Company 86 mutiny 117, 118, 121, 166 Napoleonic Wars 8, 13, 17 Nathan, Sir Matthew 30 NATO 37, 179 Nenagh Mutiny 117, 166 Norfolk Commission 24 officer paternalism 114 Officer Training Corps and the Easter Rising 150–1 and the First World War 96–7 attitudes towards 176, 179 establishment of 29 military role 96, 150 religious composition 30, 95 social composition 95–6 O’Neill, Robert 68 Options for Change 37, 41, 179

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Index Orange Order 2, 88, 120 O’Reilly, Myles 60 Ormeau Bakery 72 Osterley Park 74 Paget, Sir Arthur 126 Pakenham-Walsh, Major-General Ridley 35 Palmerston, Lord 13–14, 42 Papal Brigade 60 Parnell, Charles Stewart 56, 61, 62, 76, 88 Pat Finucane Centre 131 patronage 51, 54, 60, 67, 71 Percival-Maxwell, Robert 68 Plymouth 16, 22, 118, 143, 147 Portsmouth 16, 22, 119, 142–3, 147 Power, Sir John 67, 150 Prior, James 37 protestant volunteering tradition 2, 5, 51, 76, 92–5, 100, 107, 189 Queen’s University, Belfast 29, 96 Queen Victoria 143–4, 166 Redmond, John 30–1, 61 Redmond, William 61–2 Reynolds, John 14 Richie, Brigadier Charles 182 Rifle Volunteer Corps 19–20, 70, 91 rioting 8, 15, 117–20, 142–3 Roberts, Lady 170 Roberts, Lord 23 Roche, Captain Edward Fitzedmund Burke 54 Ross, Sir Ronald 29 Rowan-Hamilton, George 54, 92 Russell, Lord 13–4 Sanderson, Colonel Edward 61 Sandhurst 58 sectarianism 6, 9, 20, 26–7, 34–6, 38, 62, 72–3, 87–8, 99, 104, 133, 157, 164, 177, 180, 189, 192 Shanghai Police Force 60 Short and Harland aircraft factory 100 Sirocco Works 100 social composition of auxiliaries 2–4, 7, 70, 93–4, 107, 125, 190

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South African War 3, 23, 27, 51, 65–7, 93–4, 121, 123, 125, 145–8, 169–70, 172, 174–5 South of Ireland War Relief Fund 170 South Irish Horse Gentleman’s Club 66 Soviet Union 36 Spears, Major-General Sir Edward 55 sport 130, 131, 134 Stevens Inquiry 41, 182 St Helena 23, 145, 146 Strathnairn, Lord 19 Sudan 21 suicide 134–5 Territorial Army as part of USC 32–3 military role 103, 154 social composition 70, 103 Tipperary 18, 94, 166 Transvaal Committee 169 Trinity College, Dublin 29, 69, 150–1 Tyrone 22, 68, 73, 99, 101, 105, 128, 132 UDR Advisory Council 39, 106, 180 Ulster Defence Regiment and loyalist paramilitaries 131, 132–3 and theft of arms 132 attitudes to 38, 39, 74–5, 157, 180, 181, 182 military role 155–6, 157 religious composition 38, 104–6 social composition 74–5, 107 storage of arms at home 39–40 women in the 40, 108, 131, 157 Ulster Home Guard and British Government control 35–6 and conscription 102 links with B Specials 34–5, 36, 72, 99, 177–8 military role 151–4 nationalist attitudes to 99 religious composition 72–4, 99–101 social composition 70, 71–2, 98–9 subversion in 130 training requirements 127 Ulsterisation 75, 156

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Volunteer Training Corps and the Easter Rising 31, 151–1 and the First World War 30, 158 attitudes towards 176–7 religious composition 70 social composition 69–70

Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henry 58 Wilson, Major Greg 69–70 Wintringham, Tom 74 Wolseley, Lord 22–3 Woolwich 58 Workman, Clark and Company 26, 86

Wallace, Colonel R.H. 61–2, 65 Walsh, Stephen 32 War Office 24, 35, 65, 142, 165–6 Waterford 17, 120, 170 Wellington, Duke of 13 Westmeath 94, 120 Wexford 12, 25, 53, 170 Wickham, Sir Charles 98 William Ewart and Sons Ltd 72 Wilson, Harold 38

Yeomanry in First World War 148 in South African war 148, 149–50, 174–5 links with militia 65–6 nationalist attitudes to 175 occupational composition 66–7, 68, 93–4 religious composition 26–7, 67, 68, 94–5

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Zanzibar, Sultan of 60

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