The International Politics of Recognition 9781594518102

Citation preview

The International Politics of Recognition ✻ Edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar

Paradigm Publishers Boulder • London

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 1

4/18/11 12:36 PM

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be transmitted or reproduced in any media or form, including electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or informational storage and retrieval systems, without the express written consent of the publisher. Copyright © 2012 Paradigm Publishers Published in the United States by Paradigm Publishers, 2845 Wilderness Place, Suite 200, Boulder, Colorado 80301 USA. Paradigm Publishers is the trade name of Birkenkamp & Company, LLC, Dean Birkenkamp, President and Publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed and bound in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the standards of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. Designed and Typeset by Straight Creek Bookmakers. 16 15 14 13 12

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 2

1 2 3 4 5

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Cute cats can create outrageous miracles. In recognition of my catwoman Catherine Small. Thomas Lindemann

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 3

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 4

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Contents

Illustrationsv Part I  Theoretical Preliminaries Introduction  The International Politics of Recognition Erik Ringmar

3

Chapter 1  Recognition between States: On the Moral Substrate of International Relations Axel Honneth

25

Chapter 2  Prickly States? Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples Reinhard Wolf

39

Chapter 3  Symbolic and Physical Violence Philippe Braud Chapter 4  Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition? Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller

57

71

Part II  Empirical Applications Chapter 5  Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy: Germany and World War II Richard Ned Lebow Chapter 6  World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory: Recognition, “Adjustment Delusions,” and the “Trauma of Expectations Foregone” Charles F. Doran

87

109

v

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 5

4/18/11 12:36 PM

vi  ✻  Contents Chapter 7  Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco: Rethinking Imperial Germany’s Security Dilemma Michelle Murray

131

Chapter 8  Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts: The Evolution of Taiwan’s Identity, 1949–2008 Yana Zuo

153

Chapter 9  Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises Alexandre Hummel

171

Chapter 10  Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence Andreas Behnke

189

Part III  Conclusions Chapter 11  Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition Thomas Lindemann

209

Index227 About the Contributors

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 6

000

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Illustrations

Figures Figure 6.1  Systemic Bounds on Relative Growth

00

Figure 6.2  Conflicting Messages

00

Figure 6.3  Expectations Foregone: Resolving WWI “Puzzles of History”

00

Figure 6.4  Power-Role Lag

00

Figure 6.5  Dynamics of Changing Systems Structure 1500–1993

00

Table Table 8.1  Numbers of States Recognizing Taipei and Beijing (1950–1990)

00

vii

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 7

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 8

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Part I

Theoretical Preliminaries

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 1

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 2

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Int roduct ion

The International Politics of Recognition Erik Ringmar

Identities matter to individuals and they matter to collective entities. In fact, few things matter more than the identities we put together for ourselves since, without an identity, we have no idea of who we are. Yet putting together an identity is often quite a struggle. We need to come up with an account that describes us, but in addition, we need to have this account accepted by people around us. We need to be recognized.1 As the chapters in this book make clear, the logic of identity creation is relevant also to the entities that populate world politics—most notably to the state. States too are coming up with self-descriptions and struggling to have them recognized.2 In fact, the struggle for recognition takes up much of a state’s time and resources, and it makes states act and interact in specific ways. This is a logic of action and interaction, which has been largely ignored by traditional scholars of international relation.3 As a result, many international phenomena, including colonialism and armed conflicts, have been misinterpreted and badly explained. The reason why previous generations of scholars have ignored questions of identities is simply that they did not come up. The state was the indisputable subject of a study of world politics and its existence was impossible to problematize. The question was always what the state did and why, and never what, or perhaps who, the state was. We are placed in a better position. In the twenty-first century, identity crises and identity makeovers are everywhere, and the position of the state in world politics is questioned like never before. Abandoning the old Realpolitik for a new 3

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 3

4/18/11 12:36 PM

4  ✻  Erik Ringmar Identitätsproblematik, we need new intellectual tools. This book unapologetically assumes that world politics is a social system that can be analyzed with the help of the tools of sociology.4 More specifically, we believe that sociological insights into how identities are formed, maintained, and dissolved have much to teach a student of international relations. This introduction provides a first outline.

The Subjectivity of the State To begin, there is a sense that the state is a subject, which can be compared to a person.5 Admittedly, this is a contested and an explicitly Eurocentric argument. It is Eurocentric since it most obviously applies to the international system that came into existence in Europe in the late Renaissance, and it does not necessarily apply elsewhere. The argument is contested since states clearly are not persons.6 States can be compared to persons to be sure but that does not make them into persons. Most obviously, a state has no unified consciousness, no single memory, and no subjective will. As a result, it is surely difficult to talk about the “identity” of a state and to assume that this identity is fashioned in the same way as the identities of individuals. A person may not be what a state is, but this is nevertheless how states have been talked about at least for the last four hundred years. The European origins of this way of talking explain how subjectivity came to be attached to the state. In the Middle Ages, political relations, like all human associations, were understood through the metaphor of the corpus, the body.7 Guilds and fraternities were bodies but so were cities and kingdoms, and all bodies were ultimately incorporated into the universal body, which was the body of the Church. In early modern Europe, the sovereign state found it useful to adopt this body language and to use it for its own purposes.8 It was common to talk about the “body politic,” and to endow this body with “arms,” “legs,” a “stomach,” and a “heart.” Naturally, it was the king, or the “head of state,” who directed the state’s overall movements. The states made up stories about themselves. States in early modern Europe were compulsive self-mythologizers, attaching their often quite undistinguished present to a past filled with classical or biblical references.9 The nationalists of the nineteenth century rearranged these accounts to include more references to “the people,” inventing traditions designed to bring legitimacy to their claims to national self-determination.10 Propagated through the new systems of public education, these stories were soon established as the official histories of the nation-state.11 Most of us still believe in some versions of these semi-mythological accounts. In early modern Europe, the world was often compared to a stage.12 Sometimes, as in Shakespeare, the metaphor was used, slightly pathetically, to express the superficiality and vanity of human pretensions, but it soon became the standardized way in which international politics was discussed. The body-metaphor and the stagemetaphor were combined; that is, the body of the state was turned into an actor.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 4

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  5 After the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the state came increasingly regarded as a sovereign, self-directing actor constrained only by the actions of other states.13 At the royal courts but also on more popular occasions, such as at country fairs, plays were performed that illustrated the political relations of the day.14 On the stage before them, the audience would literally see their state acting and interacting with other states. The stage was a world and the world was a stage. Together the various states formed a theater company that regularly met for performances on the battlefields of Europe or in the conference halls where the peace treaties were signed. It was an illustrious troupe: the actors were civilized, they were Christian, they had an awesome military and political capability. It was in their company that lesser political units one day aspired to appear. And this is how we still think about international politics. Pick up any newspaper article on world affairs, and it will be replete with states “considering options,” “acting aggressively,” “signing agreements,” or “threatening sanctions”—all before the critical or the approving eyes of world opinion. This is how the subjectivity of the state originally came to be established. This metaphorical cluster and its associated performative practices were eagerly adopted by absolutist rulers for whom they seemed ideally suited. The l’ état c’est moi of Louis XIV was not an egocentric indulgence as much as an expression of the official French theory of sovereignty.15 But the subjectivity of the state was equally useful to republics and later to the needs of democratic governments. Both citizens and leaders identify themselves with their states; the state is the protector of our national culture and our status in the world. We tie our hopes to our states and make careers in their institutions; we celebrate their successes and lament their defeats. Funnily enough, such étatisme is often strongest in places where state institutions are least appreciated. L’ état, even Americans agree, c’est nous! 16 In international law, the subjectivity of the state is a well-established commonplace. The state is the persona of international law in much the same way as individuals are the persona of civil law and corporations the persona of commercial law.17 In international law, a state is a subject endowed with rights and obligations, and it is an actor who can think rationally and be held responsible for the consequences of its actions. In fact, in legal treatises the state has usually attained nothing short of a transcendental status.18 The state remains the same even as it changes its rulers, its citizens, and its political system, or as territory is added to or subtracted from it. It is only if the state is completely divided up by others that its subjectivity comes to an end. We may perhaps object that this language is metaphorical through and through and that the subjectivity of the state for that reason is a matter of language rather than any real, observable facts. Perhaps it is nothing more than a hermeneutic device—a way to illustrate and explain things; a way to show how international politics works. And admittedly, beyond this metaphorical language, there can be no additional proof of the state’s subjectivity. But much the same can be said about the subjectivity of individuals.19 If we probe our brains for evidence of our identities we will necessarily be disappointed. Brain states, after all, are not what we are. Identities are social facts created through social interaction, and what is true for the identities of individuals

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 5

4/18/11 12:36 PM

6  ✻  Erik Ringmar is true for the identities of states.20 We are not in the realm of reality; we are in the realm of interpretation.

Recognition and Its Denial If there is a sense in which states can be thought of as persons, it should be possible to understand the formation of state identities with the help of the same intellectual tools we use for understanding the identities of individuals. Relying heavily on Hegel’s celebrated account in the Phenomenology of Spirit, we can understand this process first as a question of the stories that individuals tell about themselves.21 We make up an account, or we make up many, which describe ourselves to ourselves. The problem with these self-descriptions is that they often are faulty. Unfettered in our fantasies, we are wont to exaggerate our importance and our prospects or, alternatively, we are only too ready to accept the accounts, handed down to us by society and by tradition, of what a person like ourselves is supposed to be. In either case, we will be mistaken about ourselves. And even if we somehow manage to describe ourselves in a reasonably realistic fashion, there are still many things about us that we simply do not know. Locating ourselves inside our bodies, we believe we have privileged access to our mental states— indeed we may believe that we are our mental states—but this privileged perspective is also quite limiting. Above all, since we never can see ourselves except awkwardly and in fleeting moments in a mirror, we have only limited knowledge of what we look like while interacting with others.22 Other people, by contrast, are wont to describe us far more realistically. They are unlikely to exaggerate our importance or our looks, but equally, they may be able to see potentials in us that we have ignored. After all, other people have a privileged perspective, too: seeing us from the outside, they know far better what we are like as social beings. In the end, identities are created through an interplay of these two alternative perspectives. We start by telling stories about ourselves, which we go on to test on people around us. We let other people know who we believe we are, and they let us know whether or not our account is reasonable. In this way, our stories about ourselves are, or are not, recognized. Stories are told about states in much the same fashion. A community of storytellers could be referred to as a “nation.”23 A nation consists of people who mutually recognize each other as belonging to the same imagined community. The stories locate the national self in space and time; they provide the nation with a past and a future, a “national character,” certain traditions, ways of behaving, and long lists of things that people like ourselves are likely to think, do, and eat. The stories are expressed in our particular vernacular and disseminated through national printing presses and electronic media. Reading, hearing, or watching these accounts, we know where we belong. The state can be understood as the political guardian of this story-telling community. For that reason, it is important—important to nationalists—that each nation should have a state, and each state only one nation.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 6

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  7 This story-telling capacity is acknowledged by international law. Each state has the right to “national self-determination,” meaning not only a right to independence, but a right to determine the character of its own collective self.24 This right has been protected at least since the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, where the principle of cuius regio, eius religio stipulated that the religion of a country should follow the religion of its ruler. In 1970, the United Nations similarly affirmed that all peoples have the right to freely determine, without external interference, their political status.y25 Many of the stories concern the role of the state in world politics. Some states see themselves as superpowers, others as great powers, as revisionists, revolutionaries, or as neutrals. These stories are not necessarily generally shared, and different stories often contradict each other, yet through public discussions and obfuscations, some dominant accounts usually emerge. This is not necessarily a democratic process. Rather, debates about national roles and purposes are usually dominated by traditional accounts, uncritically accepted, or by groups that yield disproportionate economic or political power—and in some societies, public discussions are of course far from free. Yet stories are still told about states, and most people still believe in them. These stories, much as the stories we tell about our individual selves, must be recognized before they can come to constitute a reasonable account of our national selves. The stories we tell make four separate claims on their listeners.26 On the most basic level, we demand attention from an audience. We want to be recognized in the sense of being noticed. But our stories also ask for respect. That is, we insist that our audiences treat us as equal to others and endowed with the same rights as everyone else. In addition to being equal to others, however, we also want to be different from others. We ask our listeners to recognize us as a clearly identifiable someone with a life that is uniquely our own. Finally, our stories make statements about our affiliations—they place us in an affective field made up of friends and enemies. From our friends we ask support, and from our enemies we ask enmity.27 Stacked inside each other, all stories about ourselves simultaneously make these four demands: (1) we want our existence to be acknowledged, (2) we want respect, (3) we want individuality, and (4) we want an affiliation. These demands turn identity-creation into a profoundly theatrical process.28 Compare the Latin word persona, derived from the masks carried by actors in the Roman theater. “The word Person is latine,” as Thomas Hobbes pointed out, and it “signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or a Visard.”29 Like a Hobbesian actor, we carry our identities as masks before the audiences we address. If the audiences recognize us, we have an identity which we, increasingly self-confidently, can go on to use, and the persona will be attached evermore securely to our face. However, if the audience boos and hisses—if we are denied recognition—we have a problem. To be denied recognition is a traumatic experience. We feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our pride is injured, we have lost our status and our face. This is the case for individuals but also for states. To the extent that people identify with their states—and they do—they will demand redress. ­Doing

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 7

4/18/11 12:36 PM

8  ✻  Erik Ringmar nothing is not an option: we cannot be without being described, and unless we are recognized, we have no social identity. When faced with a denial of recognition, we basically have three options. The most obvious alternative is to give up; to accept that others are right about us and that we cannot be the person we thought we were. Our stories, clearly, do not apply to someone such as ourselves. This is the situation a state faces in the wake of a loss in a war or some similar calamity.30 As a result it is, for example, no longer possible to lay claim to a status as a “super,” “great,” or a “colonial” power. Instead the state in question has to come up with an alternative self-description and re-brand itself as something else. Such a reconsideration of one’s role is often a long and painful exercise, and there is of course no guarantee that the new identity we come up with will be recognized either. A second option is to accept the verdict of the audience but to stick to our stories and insist that we can live up to the self-descriptions they contain. This means embarking on a program of self-reformation.31 The offended state will have to do whatever it takes to be accepted on its preferred terms—develop itself economically, adopt the required political institutions, improve its educational system, and so on. Once this task is completed, the ugly duckling can go back to its detractors as a beautiful swan, hoping to finally be recognized as the state it always presumed to be. A third option is to stand by our stories without reform and instead to fight for the self-descriptions they contain. The task here is to convince our detractors that they are mistaken about us and to force them to change their minds. Violence may work badly in interpersonal relations, since you cannot force someone to respect or love you. In international relations, however, the use of force has greater use and similar threats are often successful. A state that is not taken seriously can to go war to prove its importance, and for a group fighting for its “national independence,” violence is often the only available option.32 If our claims are rejected, we try to bomb our way to respectability. Experts in international law have long recognized the right of such groups to be considered as belligerents rather than as simple criminals, provided that they espouse political goals and are organized into regular armies.33 An identity gives a measure of coherence to the ever-shifting events, memories, and projects that appear in our public sphere; they are attached to a particular subject; they become ours. It is only as recognized that our identities will come to have continuity over time and space.34 To the extent that we are able to achieve recognition for our performance and to the extent that our audience remains loyal, we are able to increasingly take our identities for granted. In the end, we will even forget that we are play acting and that our identity originally was nothing but a make-believe.

Recognition in International Law and Diplomacy Recognition, we said, is an important concern of international lawyers.35 Since the state is taken as the subject of international law, jurists need to decide which entities

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 8

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  9 belong to this class. It is the same in all membership clubs: we must establish some criteria by which members can be selected, non-members excluded, and the relations between members and non-members regulated.36 In addition, and far more fundamentally, recognition plays a role in establishing the conditions that make international law possible in the first place. A world of sovereign states, critics have insisted, is not an environment in which law can have much force.37 To be “sovereign,” after all, means that no other institution or power is in a position to restrain our actions, but restrain our actions is exactly what the law does.38 If it is law, in other words, it is not international, and if it is international, it is not law. This is the problem that recognition addresses. As legal scholars have pointed out, there are other sources of law than sovereign command.39 When states act and interact with each other over time, a standard gradually comes to be established regarding accepted and acceptable conduct. The norms that develop in this way constitute a body of customary law, which is no less powerful than laws promulgated through sovereign fiat. The codification of these norms was the task of the new discipline of positive international law as it came to be developed from the middle of the nineteenth century.40 Yet if international society is the source of the law that governs the conduct of states, the question becomes who belongs to this society. As the first generation of international jurists concluded, not all political units can be included. In the end, only “civilized” states qualified; that is, only European states.41 Only European states—and a couple of extra-European settler colonies—were regarded as similar enough to form a proper society. That is, only they could be counted on to recognize each other—to acknowledge each other’s sovereignty and to behave reciprocally. Without such recognition, there can be no international society, and without an international society, there can be no international law. All European states were regarded as subjects of international law and as equal before it; there was no ranking between them and they enjoyed the same rights and responsibilities. What these rights were was a matter of some dispute, but the list commonly included items such as “the right of existence, of self-preservation, of equality, of independence, of territorial supremacy, of holding and acquiring territory, of intercourse, and of good name and reputation.”42 European states had complete sovereignty; in other words, the right to territorial integrity, and they could act as they saw fit—enter into treaties, make alliances, and go to war. As for responsibilities, they were above all supposed to honor their obligations and to respect the laws of civilized warfare. New countries in Eastern Europe, like Romania, were somewhat problematic cases, but when questions about their status arose, the Europeans usually discussed the matter amongst themselves and decided on a shared course of action. In this way, Turkey was formally admitted into international society in 1856.43 In addition, European states recognized each other diplomatically. They had diplomats stationed at each other’s courts, and they had the right to participate in the diplomatic conferences, which since the late Middle Ages, were regularly convened to discuss common affairs, particularly at the conclusion of major wars.44 On these

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 9

4/18/11 12:36 PM

10  ✻  Erik Ringmar occasions, seating arrangements and rules of precedence and address were designed to assure that all participants were treated with respect and that they were treated equally.45 Since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the practice has been for states to seat themselves in alphabetical order around a conference table; for the doyen—the most senior diplomat in a capital—to enter an audience chamber ahead of his peers; and for states to sign copies of treaties in alternative order, usually starting with themselves.46 In discussions of international law, a distinction is sometimes made between a “declarative” and a “constitutive” conception of statehood.47 According to the declarative view, a state is a state as long as it fulfills a few minimal requirements. It must have a permanent population; a clearly defined territory; and a government with the ability to govern itself, to defend itself, and to enter into relations with the other states.48 As the constitutive view would have it, however, statehood depends instead on recognition. A state that is not recognized may exist in itself but never for itself; that is, it has no status as a subject of international law and diplomacy.49 Again there is a close parallel here to individual human beings. A human being is surely a human being even if unrecognized by others, yet it is only through recognition that she becomes a person in Hobbes’s sense, that is, an actor with an identity. As a practical matter, however, the distinction between declarative and constitutive conceptions of statehood was always far less important than the distinction between civilized and uncivilized states.50 And the declarative and the constitutive views were one when it came to excluding non-Europeans from full membership in international society. Non-Europeans simply lacked the required attributes. Their populations were often nomadic, their territories were badly demarcated; sometimes they had no proper government and no formal means of defending themselves. If entities such as these were included, international society would no longer be a society, and international law would no longer be law. For this reason, excluding outsiders and defining nonEuropeans as uncivilized became crucially important.51 In fact, the more important you took international law to be, the more sharply, indeed aggressively, you were likely to draw the line between the civilized and the uncivilized. Yet non-Europeans were clearly not all the same. There was a considerable difference between, say, the unclothed inhabitants of the Australian bush and the cultivated peoples of East Asia. To accommodate such differences, Europeans came up with a distinction between “savages” and “barbarians.”52 Savages were itinerant peoples without a fixed territory and without political institutions. Barbarians were countries who had a territory, a fixed population and political institutions, and who for that reason in many ways resembled European states. Yet their culture, their history, and their alien ways immediately defined them as strange. Since there could be no such thing as a non-European European, countries like Persia, Siam, Japan, and China could at best be “semi-barbarian” or possibly “semi-civilized.” The two groups were recognized in quite different ways. Savages had no international status and enjoyed no sovereign rights and could instead only count on the benevolence that all human beings owe each other. Like the mentally retarded, savages needed constant help and protection.53 Barbarian states, on the other hand, did have

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 10

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  11 an international status but nothing like full membership in international society.54 They had to make do with partial recognition; that is, they were international subjects only in certain respects. They were formally independent but not fully sovereign, and they periodically saw their territories invaded and parts of their political systems taken over by foreigners. Their actions were constrained by unequal treaties and by military intimidation, but as the lawyers insisted, these arrangements were all for their own good. The barbarians were like children who, if only properly educated and disciplined, would one day perhaps be able to join the ranks of civilized states. Japan was generally considered to be the most promising candidate.55

The Struggle for Recognition The history of all hitherto existing international society is the history of the struggle for recognition. Well, maybe not, but the struggle for recognition surely provides the motivation for many of the things that states do. Everyone needs an identity after all; everyone wants to gain recognition for the stories they tell about themselves. The poor and powerless want to be recognized as rich and powerful; the great as greater still; and everyone, even Switzerland, wants to be a member of the United Nations. Since some of these claims are difficult to reconcile, we would expect a universal struggle for recognition to result in universal strife. Yet as G. W. F. Hegel famously argued, what human beings really are looking for is not preeminence but rather recognition from their peers, provided that their peers are people they themselves can respect. Once we all have attained this respectable status, the struggle for recognition will draw to a close, and since this struggle, according to Hegel, is the main motivation behind human action, history itself will end.56 Looking at international politics from a Hegelian perspective, we would today seem to be closer to the end of history than ever before.57 The international system of Europe now encompasses the entire globe, and with some minor exceptions, everyone is recognizing the sovereignty of everyone else. There are no savages and no barbarians, no imbeciles or infants; everyone is now a responsible grown-up and not only civilized but also capitalist and next-to democratic. As such, every country enjoys the full rights and responsibilities associated with membership in international society. When everyone is recognizing everyone else, and we all have been turned into civilized Europeans, the world will finally be at peace.58 There is a Whiggish smugness to this vision that is profoundly unattractive and, like all Whiggish histories, based on a falsification of history. After all, Europeans did not bring the blessings of their international system to the rest of the world. What they brought was a colonial system that made inequality and lack of mutual recognition into permanent, institutional, features of world politics. Whatever recognition was granted was not granted on the basis of principles but instead purely as a matter of expediency. Take the case of the “treaties” that the Europeans insisted on concluding with whatever natives they came across.59 A typical British treaty with an African

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 11

4/18/11 12:36 PM

12  ✻  Erik Ringmar “king” stipulated that he hand over his territory and sovereignty “in perpetuity” to the British Crown.60 Yet this clearly implied that the ruler in question already had a territory and a sovereignty to hand over—something that savages, by definition, were denied. Moreover, the very fact that a treaty was concluded surely bestowed an international status on the local chief.61 Yet, paradoxically, the rights that the treaty granted were the very same rights that the treaty itself revoked.62 But if the locals already had or were given a standing in international law, with what right did the Europeans invade them? Or take the case of China. The international relations of East Asia had for centuries been organized in an alternative, and distinctly non-European, fashion. Here China was the all-dominant power, and its relations with surrounding states were conceptualized in hierarchical and explicitly inegalitarian terms.63 When the 1842 Nanjing Treaty, which concluded the First Opium War, made perfect equality between Britain and China into a founding principle, this was a joke to the Chinese, but it was a joke to the Europeans, too.64 China did not want to be a part of the European international system, but this was unacceptable to the Europeans who demanded access to Chinese markets. The Treaty of Nanjing stipulated the conditions on which this access would take place: mutual recognition was henceforth to be granted on Europe’s terms.65 The joke the Europeans kept to themselves was that China never had a chance of being recognized as their equal, since it was a barbarian and not a civilized country. The treaty recognized China’s sovereignty, but while sovereignty in Europe meant the right to dispose of one’s own affairs as one saw fit, for China it meant that the country had to transform itself according to Europe’s directions. Which identity the country assumed in international affairs was not for the Chinese to decide, since recognition only was offered on European terms. Sovereignty, for China, meant that the country had to become more and more like Europe and less and less like itself. As these examples remind us, it was not the Europeans who spread the blessings of their international system to the rest of the world. It was instead the way the colonized countries liberated themselves from European control, which eventually assured their sovereignty and equality. Educated in schools that had taught them everything there was to know about “the sovereignty of the British parliament” and “the glory of the French nation,” the first generation of nationalist leaders were quick to apply the same notions to themselves.66 And where no identifiable national self existed—and this concerned a majority of the cases—such a self was speedily invented. Yet the Europeans refused to recognize these new nations as independent states, and recognition was therefore something for which they had to fight. The slaves rose up in rebellion against their masters; they risked their lives, and only through this struggle did they come to establish themselves as the kinds of subjects which the masters were prepared to recognize as equal to themselves. That this logic sounds perfectly Hegelian is not a coincidence. Hegel wrote the famous passage about “Master and Bondsman” in the Phenomenology in 1805, just a year after the former slaves on the French island of Saint-Domingue had risen up in rebellion and declared

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 12

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  13 independence for the “Republic of Haiti.” There is good evidence that Hegel was directly inspired by their example.67 From a Hegelian perspective, the Europeans were nothing as much as the unwitting instruments employed by history—or rather “World History”—in its dialectical movement across time. It was by occupying other continents that the Europeans provided for their eventual liberation, their political development, and statehood. Striking as this argument may be, it is worth asking whether liberation on these terms really was worth it. The struggle for recognition was eventually won to be sure, but it was won on the terms set by the former oppressors. As the former colonies came to be universally recognized, they incorporated the logic of the European state system into the very core of their identity. As a result, there were always limits to their freedom.68 Moreover, they remained fully exposed to the logic that in the nineteenth century had transformed China: the only selves the Europeans were prepared to recognize in the end were Europe-like selves—and Europe-like was what all former colonies now desperately tried to become. Yet few of them were ever Europe-like enough.69 The language of sovereignty and equality was in many ways badly suited to non-European realities. In some cases, too many ethnic groups were crammed into the same state; in other cases, the same ethnic group was divided by state borders. Sorting out these incongruities resulted in conflicts. In addition, the independent state, with its revenue base and power of patronage, was a prize well worth fighting over, and fight the new nationalist leaders did, often with arms or in strings of coup d’ états. For the winner, the European doctrine of self-determination provided the perfect cover for assorted unsavory practices including, in many cases, dictatorship, and in some cases, genocide. The former colonies, the Europeans complained, had failed to live up to their expectations. They had failed to develop economically, failed to establish democratic institutions; indeed many were “failed states” tout court.70 And failed states can never be recognized on the same terms as everyone else. Much as barbarian states in the nineteenth century, they were formally sovereign but in practice subject to both economic expropriation and military intimidation.71 Arguably, it was the terms on which their liberation was achieved that set them up for these failures. Europe has of late started modifying the rules under which recognition is given. What matters is no longer a fixed territory, a permanent population, an uncontested government, and the ability to defend oneself. In a world in which processes of globalization are quickly deterritorializing, sovereignty and equality are no longer first principles.72 In Europe, sovereignty is now shared, functionally divided, or made relative to the time and place in which it is asserted; territories are fully permeable, and entities other than states have an international standing. Europe today combines national decision-making with a considerable degree of Europe-wide centralization. The same processes have yet to produce the same results elsewhere. Ironically, the staunchest defenders of the rules of the traditional European international system are the old colonies that won independence on their terms. There is usually no talking to them about sovereignty-pooling, open borders, or reduced defense capabilities.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 13

4/18/11 12:36 PM

14  ✻  Erik Ringmar This makes them look distinctly old-fashioned and, arguably, badly prepared for twenty-first-century realities. If the terms on which recognition is granted change, they will once again be vulnerable.

Giants on Our Shoulders The academic study of international politics has long been dominated by rationalistic approaches, by an emphasis on the state, and by the rules and practices that governed the European international system. These concerns were related. The world the professors described was the modern world where identities were given, and the predominant problem of social life was how to assure order among self-governing units. Only now, well into the twenty-first century, are we able to turn our back on this paradigm. The world made up of rational, Europe-like states has had its time and it is, all in all, good to see it go. Since it first emerged as a sovereign entity in the late Renaissance, the state was identified as a rational, interest-driven actor on which all other interest-driven actors eventually came to be modeled.73 States, scholars insisted, maximize their power and their security and they act and interact with other states that pursue the same goals. All states are sovereign and all are equal. In the nineteenth century, this doctrine came to be codified in the work of philosophers, historians, and lawyers, predominantly of a Germanic background, for whom the state represented the culmination of world history—es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt dass der Staat ist.74 As a result, they were congenitally unable to imagine a world politics not constituted by states and by state interests. The question of the identity of the state was disposed of with a few off-the-rack definitions. Compare how authors wrote about world politics in the Renaissance when the state was still in the process of being established, and its apologists struggled to delegitimize the claims of rivaling institutions. At the time, there was a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions: the aristocracy made claims to independence and so did peasants—most notably in the great uprisings in Germany and France in the sixteenth century. Meanwhile the pope and the emperor still nurtured pan-European ambitions. Eventually the state emerged from this mêlée as the undisputed winner, but at the time, this was not an obvious or inevitable outcome.75 During subsequent centuries, the state established itself ever more firmly as the subject of international relations, and scholars could no longer make sense of the concerns that had animated people in the Renaissance. But times have once again changed. The neat map of the world that assigns each bit of territory to a specific sovereign is less and less relevant. We are once again in a mêlée of competing jurisdictions. This is why we finally are able to come back to the topic of identities after a hiatus of some four hundred years. We have regained our intellectual flexibility, not because we are smarter than professors of previous ages but because we have finally shrugged off those intellectual giants who were standing on

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 14

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  15 our shoulders. The hegemony of rational choice theory will pass into history with the passing of the hegemony of the state and the hegemony of the European international system. This does not mean that questions of identities will go away but on the contrary that they will become evermore prevalent. Our collective subjectivities will look for other vehicles to which they can attach themselves. There are many competing candidates for such vehicles, and the process of identity realignment is likely to be both protracted and messy. The struggle for recognition goes on.

Notes I am grateful to Jeffrey Alexander, Andreas Behnke, Felix Berenskoetter, Axel Honneth, Jorg Kustermans, Thomas Lindemann, Diane Pranzo, Reinhard Wolf, and Yana Zuo for comments on a previous version. 1. The Urtext is Hegel [1807] 1979. Hegel’s argument was famously analyzed by Kojève 1980. For an update, see Honneth 1996; critically discussed in Fraser and Honneth 2003. On identity-creation and rational-choice explanations, see Pizzorno 1986; Pizzorno 2008. 2. On the role of recognition in international relations, see inter alia Wendt 1999, 193–245; Haacke 2005, 181–194; Greenhill 2008, 343–368; Ringmar 2008; Ringmar 2002; Lindemann 2010. 3. Questions of identities have instead been a preoccupation of “constructivist” scholars. For a seminal statement, see Wendt 1999. For a critical discussion, see Zehfuss 2001; Guzzini and Leander 2001. Other key texts include Bloom 1990; Hall 1999; Bially Mattern 2001. A useful survey is Berenskoetter 2010. 4. A sociological perspective on international relations is implicit in the “English School;” see Bull 1995, 23–49. For an introduction, see for example Linklater and Suganami 2006. For a constructivist update, see Wendt 1999; Weber 2005. Compare the similarities between constructivism in international relations and the “strong program” in cultural sociology. Alexander and Smith 2001. 5. On the ontological status of the state in international relations, see for example the contributions to a forum in Review of International Studies 30, no. 2, edited by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2004). Note in particular Wendt 2004. See in addition Ringmar 1996; Bartelson 1998; Mitzen 2006. In philosophy, discussions on the question of the reality of groups is very extensive; see for example Poole 1996; Baker 2002; Sheehy 2006. 6. For a discussion see, inter alia, Honneth 2011 and Wolf 2011 in this volume. 7. Kantorowicz 1997, 3–23; Gierke 1900. A famous overview is Maitland 1900. 8. Kantorowicz 1997, 23–41; Skinner 1989, 90–131; Melzer and Norberg 1998, 90–131; Ringmar 2008, 154–155. 9. On France, Beaune 1991. On Sweden, Ringmar 2008, 156–164; On Elizabethan England, Helgerson 1995. 10. Hobsbawm 1992, 1–14. 11. On nineteenth-century France, see Weber 1976, especially 303–338. 12. Ringmar 2008, 153–154; On the theatrum mundi metaphor, see Berg 1985; Christian 1987. For the “As You Like It,” quote see Shakespeare 2003. 13. The European international system is often referred to as the “Westphalian system.”

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 15

4/18/11 12:36 PM

16  ✻  Erik Ringmar As Osiander 2001 makes clear, however, the Westphalian treaty itself did not embody most conceptual changes commonly associated with it. More generally on the Westphalian system, see Lyons and Mastanduno 1995; Caporaso 2000; Teschke 2003. 14. On Italian city-states, see Orgel 1975, 10–11. On seventeenth-century Sweden, see Ringmar 2008, 160–161. On Elizabethan England, see Hunt 2008, especially 146–172. 15. Baker 1990, 59–85. 16. “In a poll from 1999,” Lieven reports, “72 percent of adult Americans declared that they were proud of their country. In the country with the next highest score, Britain, the figure was 53 percent.” Lieven 2005, 19. 17. On the state as an “International Person” in international law, see for example, Oppenheim 1912, 107, 116. 18. Ibid., 122–125. 19. What we are, said Hume, is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.” Hume 1986, 300. Compare to Ricoeur 1992 and Pizzorno 1986. 20. Like Hume, we might as well turn the question around and compare the identity of an individual to “a republic or a commonwealth.” Hume 1986, 309. Compare to Jackson 2004. 21. On identity as narratively constructed, see Ricoeur 1992. On the recognition of narratives, see Taylor 1994; Ringmar 2008, 87–91; cf. Pizzorno 1986. 22. Mead 1964. 23. Anderson 2006, 37–46. 24. For a critique, see Kedourie 1993, 24–43. 25. According to the so-called “Friendly Relations Declaration,” see Koskenniemi 1994, 245. 26. Cf. Honneth 1996, 92–130. Honneth 2011, this volume, expresses doubts as to the applicability of this schema to international politics since the motivations of a population are difficult to ascertain. While this may be true as a matter of empirical investigations, this has no bearing on the analytical distinction. 27. Barker 2007, 18–34; Berenskoetter 2007, 647–676. 28. Goffman 1959, 249–255; cf. Butler 2007; Alexander 2006. 29. “Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated,” in Hobbes 1982, 217. 30. Schivelbusch 2004 discusses the cases of France, Germany, and the American South. On the French defeat in World War II, see Sartre 1949. 31. Kojève 1980, 21–25. 32. Ringmar 2008, 81–83. 33. See, for example, Bluntschli 1874, 289, 512. 34. Pizzorno 1986, 365–372. 35. See, inter alia, Kelsen 1941; Lauterpacht 1944; Lauterpacht 1947. For a critical perspective, see Anghie 1999, 38–44. 36. Ringmar 1995. 37. A point first developed in Austin 1874, vol. 1. For a discussion, see Anghie 2007, 44–46, 63–64; Koskenniemi 2004, 34, 46–48. 38. On Carl Schmitt in this context, see Cumin 2005. 39. Koskenniemi 2004, 47–51; Bull 1995, 57–68; Anghie 1999, 13–20. 40. Koskenniemi talks about these jurists as “the men of 1873” in Koskenniemi 2004, 51–54.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 16

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  17 41. Lorimer 1884a; Anghie 1999. See also Keal 2003, 56–83. 42. Oppenheim 1912, 165. 43. Admitting Turkey was, according to Lorimer, not a good idea: “In the case of the Turks we have had bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilisation to barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind.” “The subordinate position into which they are rapidly sinking, seems to be that for which nature has designed them.” Lorimer 1884b, 102. See also Krauel 1877, 388. 44. Mattingly 1937; Mattingly 1988; Satow 1917. 45. See, inter alia, Foster 1906; Satow 1917; Oppenheim 1912, 438. 46. Oppenheim 1912, 174. 47. Ibid., 108–109. On this distinction, see also Honneth 2011, this volume. 48. Article 3: “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.” Avalon Project 1933; Lauterpacht 1944, 385–458. 49. Oppenheim 1912, 117; cf. Kelsen 1941, 605–617. 50. Gong 1984. 51. Anghie 2007, 52–65; Anghie 1999, 20–30; Koskenniemi 2004, 70–97; Keene 2002, 60–96. 52. Lorimer 1884b, 101–102; Lorimer 1884a. On this “stage theory” in the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, see Keal 2003, 74–76. 53. “The right of undeveloped races, like the right of undeveloped individuals, is a right not to recognition as what they are not, but to guardianship that is, to guidance in becoming that of which they are capable, in realising their special ideals.” Lorimer 1884b, 157. 54. Ibid., 216. 55. Lorimer 1884a. 56. From this point of view, it is interesting to note that Kojève ended his life as an EU official. See Lilla 2003. 57. On the teleological march of history in international relations, see Wendt 2003. Watson, for one, clearly believes that the spread of the European international system represents an improvement. Watson 2009. 58. On peace and recognition, see Allan and Keller 2006; Allan and Keller 2011, this volume. The standard work on “democratic peace” is Russett 1993. For some reservations regarding such Kantianism, see Behnke 2008. 59. Anghie 2007, 67–82. On the treaties concluded with Japan, see Auslin 2006; with China, see Wang 2003. On treaty-making within the European international system, see Lesaffer 2008. 60. Anghie 2007, 82–84; Anghie 1999, 32–38. 61. “A treaty is the definition, by two or more separate States, of a specific jural relation actually subsisting between or among them, which definition they engage to accept and enforce as positive law.” Lorimer 1884b, 260–261. 62. Anghie 1999, 48. 63. Fairbank 1942. 64. Mayers 1901; cf. Krauel 1877, 391. 65. “The treaties were instead a means by which they would disabuse the Emperor of his preposterous claim to be the legitimate ruler of all the peoples of the world.” Krauel 1877, 390.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 17

4/18/11 12:36 PM

18  ✻  Erik Ringmar 66. On the role of the educational system in European colonies in South-East Asia, see Anderson 2006, 116–134. 67. Buck-Morss 2000, 842–865; Buck-Morss 2009. 68. This resembles the logic of incorporation of the worldview of the oppressors discussed by Fanon 2008 and Nandy 1989. 69. Keene 2002, 120–144; Keal 2003, 185–216. 70. For a definition and discussion of causes, see Rotberg 2003. On “failed states” in international law, see Thürer 1999. On “failed states” as an excuse for imperialism, see Mallaby 2002 and notoriously PNAC 2010. For a critical discussion, see Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, 409–414. 71. For a defense of self-determination as a bulwark against imperialism, see Anghie 2007, 303–309. An exploration of alternatives to the state is Brooks 2005. For a conservative critique of self-determination, see Kedourie 1993. 72. Two early statements are Harvey 1991, esp. 201–326 and Ruggie 1993, especially 142–144, 168–174. See also, inter alia, Brenner 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2003. 73. Hirschman 1976, 37; Force 2007, 135–144. 74. Hegel [1820] 1991, 258. 75. Creveld 1999, 59–125, has an extensive discussion.

Bibliography Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. “Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy.” In Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, and Jason L. Mast, 29–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Alexander, Jeffrey C., and Philip Smith. 2001. “The Strong Program in Cultural Theory: Elements of a Structural Hermeneutics.” In Handbook of Sociological Theory, edited by Jonathan H. Turner, 135–150. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller. 2011. “Is a Just Peace Possible without Thin and Thick Recognition?” In The International Politics of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. Boulder: Paradigm. Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller, eds. 2006. What is a Just Peace? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Edition. London: Verso. Anghie, Antony. 1999. “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in NineteenthCentury International Law.” Harvard International Law Journal 40: 1–80. ———. 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Auslin, Michael R. 2006. Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Austin, John. 1874. Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law. Vol. 1. Frederick D. Linn & Co. Avalon Project. 1933. “Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.” http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 18

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  19 Baker, Keith Michael. 1990. Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baker, Lynne Rudder. 2002. “The Ontological Status of Persons.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 370–388. Barker, Rodney. 2007. Making Enemies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bartelson, Jens. 1998. “Second Natures: Is the State Identical with Itself?” European Journal of International Relations 4 (3): 295–326. Beaune, Collette. 1991. The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France. Berkeley: University of California Press. Behnke, Andreas. 2008. “‘Eternal Peace’ as the Graveyard of the Political: A Critique of Kant’s Zum Ewigen Frieden.” Millennium 36 (2): 513–531. Berenskoetter, Felix. 2007. “Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International.” Millennium 35 (3): 647–676. Berenskoetter, Felix. 2010. “Identity in International Relations.” In The International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert A. Denemark, 6: 3595–3611. Vol. 6. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Berg, Kent Van Den. 1985. Playhouse and Cosmos: Shakespearean Theater As Metaphor. Newark: University of Delaware Press. Bialasiewicz, L., D. Campbell, S. Elden, S. Graham, A. Jeffrey, and A. J. Williams. 2007. “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy.” Political Geography 26 (4): 405–422. Bially Mattern, Janice. 2001. “The Power Politics of Identity.” European Journal of International Relations 7 (3): 349–397. Bloom, William. 1990. Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. 1874. Le droit international codifié. Paris: Guillaumin et cie. Brenner, Neil. 1999. “Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies.” Theory and Society 28 (1): 39–78. Brooks, Rosa Ehrenreich. 2005. “Failed States, or the State as Failure?” The University of Chicago Law Review 72 (4): 1159–1196. Buck-Morss, Susan. 2000. “Hegel and Haiti.” Critical Inquiry 26 (4): 821–865. ———. 2009. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Bull, Hedley. (1977) 1995. The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press. Butler, Judith. 2007. “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory.” In The Performance Studies Reader, edited by Henry Bial, 187–199. London: Routledge. Caporaso, James A. 2000. “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty.” International Studies Review 2 (2): 1–28. Christian, Lynda Gregorian. 1987. Theatrum Mundi: The History of an Idea. New York: Garland. Creveld, Martin van. 1999. The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cumin, David. 2005. “Impérialisme et droit international: le point de vue de Carl Schmitt.” Institut de Stratégie Comparée, Commission Française d’Histoire Militaire, Institut d’Histoire des Conflits Contemporains. http://www.stratisc.org/strat068_CUMIN.html.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 19

4/18/11 12:36 PM

20  ✻  Erik Ringmar Fairbank, John K. 1942. “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West.” The Far Eastern Quarterly 1 (2): 129–149. Fanon, Frantz. 2008. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. Force, Pierre. 2007. Self-Interest Before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foster, John Watson. 1906. The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the United States. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. 2003. Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso Books. Gierke, Otto F. von. 1900. Political Theories of the Middle Age. Translated by Frederic W. Maitland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday & Company. Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Greenhill, Brian. 2008. “Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics.” European Journal of International Relations 14 (2): 343–368. Guzzini, Stefano, and Anna Leander. 2001. “A Social Theory for International Relations: An Appraisal of Alexander Wendt’s Theoretical and Disciplinary Synthesis.” Journal of International Relations and Development 4 (4): 316–338. Haacke, Jürgen. 2005. “The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Recognition.” Review of International Studies 31 (1): 181–194. Hall, Rodney Bruce. 1999. National Collective Identity. Cambridge: Columbia University Press. Harvey, David. 1991. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Hegel, G. W. F. (1807) 1979. Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. (1820) 1991. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Helgerson, Richard. 1995. Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hirschman, Albert O. 1976. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hobbes, Thomas. (1651) 1982. Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions.” In The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: MIT Press. ———. 2011. “Recognition between States: On the Moral Substrate of International Relations.” In The International Politics of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. Boulder: Paradigm. Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2003. “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance.” The American Political Science Review 97 (2): 233–243. Hume, David. (1739) 1986. A Treatise of Human Nature. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hunt, Alice. 2008. The Drama of Coronation: Medieval Ceremony in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 20

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  21 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2004. “Hegel’s House, or ‘People Are States Too.’” Review of International Studies 30 (2): 281–287. Kantorowicz, Ernst H. (1957) 1997. The King’s Two Bodies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keal, Paul. 2003. European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kedourie, Elie. 1993. Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Keene, Edward. 2002. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelsen, Hans. 1941. “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations.” The American Journal of International Law 35 (4): 605–617. Kojève, Alexandre. (1947) 1980. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Koskenniemi, Martti. 1994. “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43 (2): 241–269. ———. 2004. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870– 1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krauel, A. 1877. “Applicabilité du droit des gens européen à la Chine.” Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 9: 387–401. Lauterpacht, H. 1944. “Recognition of States in International Law.” The Yale Law Journal 53 (3): 385–458. ———. 1947. Recognition in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lesaffer, Randall, ed. 2008. Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lieven, Anatol. 2005. America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lilla, Mark. 2003. “Alexandre Kojève.” In The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, 113–136. New York: New York Review Books. Lindemann, Thomas. 2010. War for Recognition. Colechester: ECPR Press. Linklater, Andrew, and Hidemi Suganami. 2006. The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lorimer, James. 1884a. “La doctrine de la reconnaissance: fondement du droit international.” Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 16: 333–359. ———. 1884b. The Institutes of the Law of Nations; a Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, Vol. 1. Edinburgh: Blackwood. Lyons, Gene M., and Michael Mastanduno, eds. 1995. Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Maitland, Frederic W. 1900. Translator’s Introduction. In Political Theories of the Middle Age, vii–xlv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mallaby, Sebastian. 2002. “The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire.” Foreign Affairs 81 (2): 2–7. Mattingly, Garrett. 1937. “The First Resident Embassies: Mediaeval Italian Origins of Modern Diplomacy.” Speculum 12 (4): 423–439. ———. 1988. Renaissance Diplomacy. Mineola: Dover Publications. Mayers, William Frederick, ed. 1901. Treaties Between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers. Shanghai: North-China Herald Office.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 21

4/18/11 12:36 PM

22  ✻  Erik Ringmar Mead, George Herbert. (1932) 1964. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Melzer, Sara E., and Kathryn Norberg. 1998. From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France. 1st ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. “Ontological Security in World Politics. State Identity and the Security Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations: 341–370. Nandy, Ashis. 1989. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism. Oxford University Press, USA. Oppenheim, L. 1912. International Law, a Treatise, Volume 1. London: Longmans. Orgel, Stephen. 1975. The Illusion of Power: Political Theater in the English Renaissance. Berkeley: University of California Press. Osiander, Andreas. 2001. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organization 55 (2): 251–287. Pizzorno, Alessandro. 1986. “Some Other Kind of Otherness.” In Development, Democracy and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert Hirschman, edited by Alejandro Foxley. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. ———. 2008. “Rationality and Recognition.” In Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, 162–174. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. PNAC. 2010. Project for the New American Century. http://www.newamericancentury.org/ aboutpnac.htm. Accessed January 9, 2011. Poole, Ross. 1996. “On Being a Person.” Australian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1): 38–56. Ricoeur, Paul. 1992. “Narrative Identity.” In On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, edited by David Wood. 1st ed. New York: Routledge. Ringmar, Erik. 1995. “Relevance of International Law: A Hegelian Interpretation of a Peculiar 17th Century Preoccupation.” Review of International Studies 21 (1). ———. 1996. “On the Ontological Status of the State.” European Journal of International Relations 2 (4): 439–466. ———. 2002. “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West.” Cooperation & Conflict 37 (2): 115–136. ———. 2008. Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators.” In State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations.” International Organization 47 (1): 139–174. Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1949. La Mort Dans L’Ame. Paris: Gallimard. Satow, Ernest Mason. 1917. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, Vol. 1. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. 2004. The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery. London: Picador. Shakespeare, William. 2003. As You Like It. London: Chelsea House Publications.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 22

4/18/11 12:36 PM

The International Politics of Recognition  ✻  23 Sheehy, Paul. 2006. The Reality of Social Groups. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Skinner, Quentin. 1989. “The State.” In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, edited by Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, 90–131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Guttman, 25–74. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Teschke, Benno. 2003. The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations. London: Verso. Thürer, Daniel. 1999. “The ‘“Failed State’” and International Law.” International Review of the Red Cross (836). Wang, Dong. 2003. “The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China.” Pacific Affairs 76 (3): 399–425. Watson, Adam. 2009. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Weber, Martin. 2005. “The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the ‘Social Turn’ in IR.” Review of International Studies 31 (1): 195–209. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. “Why a World State is Inevitable.” European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542. ———. 2004. “The State as Person in International Theory.” Review of International Studies 30 (2): 289–316. Wolf, Reinhard. 2011. “Prickly States? Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples.” In The International Politics of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. Boulder: Paradigm. Zehfuss, Maja. 2001. “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison.” European Journal of International Relations 7 (3): 315–348.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 23

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 24

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 1

Recognition between States On the Moral Substrate of International Relations Axel Honneth

From an everyday, non-theoretical perspective, we seem to take for granted that state actors are primarily guided by the aim of insisting that other states respect the communities they represent and of suing for recognition with corresponding measures. In everyday discussion, we readily agree that the behavior of Palestine’s political leaders, for instance, cannot be understood without taking into account such strivings for recognition; that Russia’s government has been going to great lengths to compel Western countries to show more consideration for Russian interests; or that during the Bush administration, Western European governments used diplomatic relationships and maneuvers to obtain renewed respect from their American ally.1 At first sight, these applications of the category of recognition to international relations certainly do not seem surprising. After all, one of the more important motives behind the recent revival of Hegel’s theory of recognition was the desire to return to a stronger moral-theoretical language in analyzing the comportment of collective agents and social groups, thereby extracting this behavior from the dominant paradigm of purely purposive-rational, strategic action.2 But even in a work as old as the Philosophy of Right, Hegel objected to applying the notion of a “struggle for recognition” to international relations, at least in the case of 25

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 25

4/18/11 12:36 PM

26  ✻  Axel Honneth “civilized nations.” Instead, he sought to describe relations between states in terms of the self-assertion of nation-states within the framework of universally accepted international law. He reserved the idea of a striving for recognition and respect for more underdeveloped and unrecognized nations, who were unsuccessful in their efforts at honor and glory, while the enlightened constitutional states of the West were solely guided by the aims of maximizing welfare and preserving national security.3 That is the image that the dominant theory of international relations has adopted over the last few decades. Without making any reference to Hegel, this theory maintains that from the moment of their internationally recognized independence, national governments essentially aim to assert themselves as nation-states and are thus mostly uninterested in matters of international respect and recognition. A significant gap, therefore, seems to lie between our everyday intuitions and the dominant theory, one that appears difficult to overcome. While in our more theoretical explanations of state comportment we accept that state activity is to be interpreted exclusively in terms of purposive rationality, our more everyday intuitions also account for quasi-moral motifs, such as a striving for recognition and violations of respect. These intuitions, however, generally do not stand up to scientific models. The idea that state actors and governments are exclusively interested in collective self-assertion has so much suggestive power that we quickly abandon our everyday intuitions in favor of the standard scheme of purely material motives. From this perspective, what we once assumed to be acts fueled by a feeling of being disrespected, or by a desire for recognition, now represents a merely symbolically concealed act motivated by national interest. The question this raises is, in the first instance, purely empirical and descriptive: Is the dominant paradigm of purposive-rational behavior an adequate model for explaining political tensions, conflicts, and wars? From the perspective of our everyday intuitions, we instead have to ask whether we would need to consider more original [originär] motives, such as the desire for recognition and respect, in order to explain foreign policy in general and international hostilities in particular. The answer to these questions will also have opaque normative implications that cannot be left out of the picture, for the more our explanations of international relations emphasize individual states’ striving for recognition, the more it appears we will have to concede that states do not behave independently of the political reactions of their counterparts and therefore have a latent awareness of the fact that their collective identity must be internationally acceptable. Even if this shift in our perspective cannot yield any immediate guidelines for action, it does strongly suggest that we prefer “soft power” to “military” or “hard power” in international conflicts.4 The explanatory framework we choose, therefore, has a strong bearing on our prescriptions for how states should act in the case of international tensions, disagreements, or conflicts. Depending on whether we emphasize the aspect of individual national self-assertion or that of the foreign political striving for recognition, the normative horizon of our prescriptions will change accordingly. In what follows, I will make some tentative, exploratory efforts to answer these questions. First, I explain why we should give more attention to the dimension of

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 26

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition between States  ✻  27 recognition in explanations of international relations. Again, this concerns the purely descriptive issue of the appropriate categorical means for describing international conflict and tensions (I). Second, I will touch on some of the normative consequences of this suggested paradigmatic shift on how we understand and explain international relations. Because of my lacking familiarity with the issue, I will have to restrict myself to some tentative considerations, which should nevertheless make apparent that by emphasizing the dimension of recognition in international relations, our moral perspective on world politics will be changed significantly (II).

I. The main difficulty we face in applying the category of recognition to international relations is revealed by the obstacles we run into on our search for an appropriate theoretical vocabulary. As soon as we try to give a name to the dimension of respect involved in state conduct, we find that the only terms at our disposal are too psychologically or mentally laden. We speak, slightly helplessly and awkwardly, of a striving for recognition or a need for respect, even though we know that such psychological concepts do not appropriately describe the matter at hand. As long as we only transfer the concept of recognition from the interpersonal level to the behavior of social groups or movements, we do not seem to have any terminological problems. In this case, we view the collective identity of a given community as the higher-level equivalent of personal identity or relation-to-self. We therefore have a relatively clear picture about what is being fought over when individuals, but also groups, engage in a struggle of recognition. Hence, there has never been any problem with speaking of a “politics of recognition” when it comes to the struggles of minorities for legal respect and social recognition for their collective identity. The starting point of these struggles consists in shared experiences of exclusion, indignity, or disrespect, which moves the members of such a group to band together and fight in solidarity for legal or cultural recognition.5 But such a conceptual transfer is much more difficult, and the conceptual problems become much broader once we switch from the level of group struggles to relationships between nation-states. Here we can no longer speak of collective identity, particularly because the obvious increase of ethnic and cultural subgroups has started to make the illusion of a nationally homogeneous population disappear for good. Even where, for historical reasons, the idea of the nation-state has been able to gain a toehold, the state apparatus cannot be viewed as the executive organ of a collective identity because the tasks it carries out——providing for security, preserving power, and ensuring economic coordination—obey their own set of rules [eigengesetzlich]. Not only do the tasks of government change their form in accordance with various overall forms of political organization, but the manner in which they are described also changes according to the theory we employ. Depending on whether the function of the liberal democratic state is regarded as consisting more in the “biopolitical”

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 27

4/18/11 12:36 PM

28  ✻  Axel Honneth management of the population or in creating conditions of social justice compatible with the requirements of national security, we will find great differences in the description of the tasks of government. But even beyond differences pertaining to the form of government or the theoretical system of description, it remains true that the foreign-political function of the state cannot merely be viewed as a compliant agency charged with giving articulation to collective identity. Rather, the state is subject to forces and imperatives that derive from the tasks of preserving the borders, economic well-being, and political security. Therefore, we cannot simply transfer the concept of recognition and claim that wherever collective identities exist, there must also be a struggle for recognition. Between the supposed need of a people to have their own, however fragmented, “identity” respected by foreign nation-states, there are always the self-standing functional imperatives of political control [Steuerung] and the preservation of power. The psychological concepts we use when we speak of “strivings,” “needs,” and “feelings” are thus inappropriate for describing international relations. State actors do not have mental attitudes but are authorities charged with carrying out politically determined tasks. Now, on a theoretical level, there is a concept of “recognition” that is applied to international relations as a matter of course. According to the statutes of international law, a politically organized community only comes into legal existence by virtue of being recognized by other internationally “recognized” states. One of the tasks of a government’s foreign policy thus consists of examining whether a certain community, which regards itself as a state, actually meets the generally defined prerequisites of a “state.”6 Hans Kelsen maintains that this act of legal recognition is a necessarily reciprocal act because a newly recognized state can only be viewed as a full-fledged member of the international community if it recognizes the states that offer it recognition in turn. As long as a state fails to return the recognition extended to it, the birth of a state within the international community will remain incomplete because that state will not yet have proven its competence as a member of the legal community of states.7 At the same time, however, Kelsen emphasizes that in acts of recognition between states, a government only officially takes note of, or cognizes, an empirical reality, rather than conveying its respect for that state. If a state recognizes another political community within the framework of international law, this only means that the recognizing state regards the recognized state as having fulfilled the conditions of statehood. This type of recognition, therefore, is not normative but instead expresses that state’s cognition of a given state of affairs: “The legal act of recognition is the establishment of a fact; it is not the expression of a will. It is cognition rather than recognition.”8 In order to speak of “recognition” between states in the true sense of the term, Kelsen claims that there must be a certain amount of room for decision. This would not involve examining a fait accompli in order to perhaps draw the conclusion that a state deserves recognition; rather, a decision would have to be made as to whether more intense and benign relations should be taken up. According to Kelsen, it is only at this second stage that we can justifiably speak of an act of recognition

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 28

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition between States  ✻  29 between states. This would not refer to the consequence of a state’s cognition of an empirical fact but to a government’s free decision to enter into a positive relationship with another state. Kelsen terms these acts of recognition “political” in order to emphasize their specificity. With a political act of recognition, a government expresses its intention to treat another state as an equal member of the international community. Even if Kelsen primarily focuses on the establishment of diplomatic relations and trade agreements, his conceptual proposal provides us with a key to pursuing the previously mentioned institutions on a theoretical level. Obviously, what we mean when we speak of recognition between states, of disrespect and indignity, lies on the same level that Kelsen has in mind when he speaks of “political” acts of recognition.9 The first step we would have to take in order to get a better grasp of the issue consists of emphasizing the sources of legitimacy that bind the conduct of state actors. The latter cannot carry out the task of foreign political self-assertion without considering whether the manner in which they fulfill that task conforms to the presumed expectations of the population. The manner in which a government defends the nation’s security, political clout, and economic prosperity must be made dependent upon the consent of the nation’s citizens, if only to demonstrate the government’s operational capacity. The necessity of legitimacy in foreign policy even holds true for non-democratic political systems. Even in authoritarian states or dictatorships, such as Iran or China, rulers and political elites usually understand that their authority is wholly dependent on the degree of public consent to their actions. We can assume that a state’s citizens, regardless of the cultural, ethnic, or religious differences that might divide them, are very keen on seeing their country accorded due respect and honor by other countries. The political representatives of other communities are to “recognize” that upon which a community founds its selfimage—the challenges it has overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian tendencies, its cultural achievements, and so on.10 We must not make the mistake of immediately equating such desires with nationalism or feelings of supremacy over other peoples. This is not only because the collective identity of a state-organized community can no longer found itself on historical or ethnic commonalities and not only because the processes of cultural globalization run counter to any such will to supremacy.11 Rather, the desire for international recognition of everything that makes up a nation’s self-respect is fundamentally directed toward the involvement, and not the exclusion, of other states. Mundane examples for such desires can be found in the often bemusing excitement that can envelop an entire population as soon as its team brings home a victory in an international sports event or in the naive pride with which a country’s citizens attempt to draw the attention of visitors to cultural productions that honor the past of one’s own community. That is neither nationalism nor even constitutional patriotism [Verfassungspatriotismus] because it neither demonizes other peoples nor necessarily expresses a positive opinion about one’s own democratic constitution. Instead, this represents a striving for a form of collective recognition, without which a collective identity could not be maintained in an unequivocal and unbroken fashion.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 29

4/18/11 12:36 PM

30  ✻  Axel Honneth It is this kind of collective expectation on the part of a country’s population to which a state’s political agents must remain attached in their foreign-political activities. In order to legitimate their own actions, they understand that they will have to appropriately display those features of their country that deserve recognition while carrying out their functionally defined tasks. Therefore, the collective striving for recognition is not just one particular function within the spectrum of a state’s tasks; rather, it colors and underlies the way in which political agents fulfill the tasks assigned to them by the nation’s constitution. In order to understand the alternatives open to state actors in this context, we need to take the next step in our analysis. We need to get a clear picture of the symbolic horizon of meaning that necessarily encompasses the entirety of state conduct. Political measures and actions have a whole series of meanings beyond their expressly formulated content, and which are communicated through the manner of their implementation. This involves the use of certain easily understood metaphors, historically trained rituals, and even the conscious manipulation of facial expressions and gestures at summits and other political events. These are all parts of the arsenal of symbolic means with which state actors can intentionally communicate messages that go beyond the “official” content of their communiqués.12 Presumably, much of what Kelsen terms “political recognition” goes on in the symbolic staging of foreign policy. Statements intended to raise awareness for the collective identity of one’s own country or to express respect for the achievements of another country’s population are not normally an explicit part of a given political transaction but are contained in the manner in which these transactions are concluded and presented. Of course, there will always be cases in which government representatives believe they are acting in accordance with the political mood of their home country when they explicitly express a certain measure of recognition for the culture of another nation’s population. A striking example is President Obama’s astounding speech at Cairo University in June 2009 before a large number of political and intellectual representatives of the Islamic world. From greeting the audience in Arabic to his repeated mentions of the cultural achievements of Islam, his entire speech sought to remove the impression of disdain in many Arab countries during the Bush years. But much less common are instances in which a political actor explicitly demands respect for the collective identity of his or her own nation’s population. The desire to maintain the appearance that one’s own nation is unaffected by other nations’ opinions, the aim of avoiding public embarrassment, and the etiquette of diplomatic encounters—all that usually prevents a people’s desire for recognition of its collective identity from being directly and openly expressed by its political representatives. This recognitional dimension of international relations is thus typically expressed indirectly and symbolically. Behavior that serves to express a state’s interest in self-assertion is staged so as to implicitly convey a finely calculated game in which respect and disrespect, desires for recognition, and experiences of humiliation find expression. Therefore, distinguishing a strategic dimension of self-assertion from a normative dimension of recognition is problematic. In their transactions with other states,

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 30

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition between States  ✻  31 ­ olitical actors do not initially pursue purely purposive-rational aims, such as prep serving power and maximizing welfare, in order to subsequently grant or revoke recognition. Rather, states always define their interests within a horizon of normative expectations that they presume their citizens to have in the form of diffuse desires for the recognition of their own collective identity or that of another collective. Therefore, it is wrong to initially assume a primary, isolated layer of purely strategic intentions and calculations. State actors cannot formulate such interests without considering the needs for recognition, which [added] they can presume on the part of the fragile collective that is their own population, as well as the needs for moral reparations harbored by an equally porous foreign population. Because political representatives must preserve legitimacy by acting as interpreters of the experiences and desires of their own respective citizenries, all encounters and relationships between states stand under moral pressure generated by a conflict over recognition. Issues of this kind—the need for an appropriate self-image in the eyes of the world, the defense against the shame of collective humiliation, the desire to make reparations for unjust deeds—determine the execution of foreign policy to a degree that makes analytical differentiation impossible. All this, however, relates solely to the descriptive level of an analysis of international relations. When it comes to explaining international relations, it is unwise to assume a certain bundle of interests that refer exclusively to a state’s desire for self-assertion, in order to then subsequently add a diffuse “need” for recognition. Rather, state actors define what they regard as necessary for the preservation of the countries they represent in light of their interpretations of the desires for recognition held by the citizenry. Naturally, rulers or state representatives have a certain amount of leeway in interpreting the smoldering, diverse, and hardly organized sentiments of the population in one direction or another, that is, in emphasizing either the conciliatory or the hostile elements of the public mood. Only in democratic states, in which the constitution itself is a principles-based interpretation of the nation-state’s identity, are rulers compelled to obey certain guidelines in the fulfillment of such collective strivings for recognition. But in no state can political actors simply ignore the population’s demands concerning their collective identity because this would mean risking the loyalty of the population. Therefore, when political agents interpret and execute the functions accorded to them, they must always consider the expectations of their citizens about the conduct of other states. Authors who, like Hegel, refuse to accept such a connection between foreign policy and collective strivings for identity in the case of civilized states do not have a clear grasp on [should be of ] the significance of the need to secure legitimacy. They believe instead that in explaining international relations, they can ignore moral demands emerging from collective identities because they refuse to recognize that even modern, functionally differentiated states depend on the consent of the citizens. If we search out illustrative examples in the recent past, we will find a number of both positive and negative cases. At the negative end of the spectrum, we would find National Socialism’s policy of territorial expansion, which cannot be explained

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 31

4/18/11 12:36 PM

32  ✻  Axel Honneth without reference to widespread feelings of collective humiliation among the German population due to the Treaty of Versailles. These feelings even found their way into the definition of external enemies. In this case, it is almost impossible to examine Nazi foreign policy without reference to the successful attempt to take diffuse feelings among the population and concentrate them on a feeling of national humiliation due to the Treaty of Versailles, thereby creating a justification for an aggressive policy of reparations and revenge.13 At the other positive end of the spectrum, we could cite an example from the very recent past: the new American president’s efforts at reconciliation with the rest of the world. We cannot explain these efforts adequately without seeing in them an attempt to overcome a widespread feeling of isolation and shame among the American population. Certainly, both examples are extreme cases of politically mediatized struggles for recognition. In the first case, political rulers formed a narrative of justification on the basis of a diffuse mood among the citizens, which allowed the rulers to engage in a campaign of conquest and revenge. In the second case, a democratically elected president with impressive rhetorical skills has interpreted the paralyzing unease of the majority in a way that allows him to justify reconciliatory gestures toward currently hostile governments. Both examples, different as they are, clearly illustrate that we cannot divorce a nation’s foreign-political aims from the respective demands of the nation’s collective identity. The manner in which states react to each other, and the forms of relation they maintain with each other, derive from a fusion of interests and values brought about by both sides. This fusion consists in the disclosure of foreign-political goals from the perspective of the hypothetical community that joins together a population, and which is interpreted as a collective that is striving for recognition. Therefore, the psychological terminology I recommended avoiding above has a place after all—not as an element of our theoretical language, but as one of the objects of that language in political reality. And in that reality, state actors must interpret the population’s moods, making use of concepts related to strivings for recognition and historical humiliation. At the same time, the moral spectrum illustrated by these two examples also gives us a clear demonstration of just how many directions the political mobilization of collective sentiments can take. The desire to have one’s own collective identity recognized by other peoples can be used to legitimate both an aggressive policy of conquest and a deescalating policy of reconciliation. This raises questions that are no longer merely descriptive, but that touch on the normative dimension of a theory of international relations.

II. In my opinion, we cannot further differentiate the type of recognition that plays a constitutive role in the explanation of the dynamics of international relations. Unlike social groups or movements, whose own statements can be used to draw conclusions about the specific type of collectively desired recognition, national collectives are far

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 32

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition between States  ✻  33 too amorphous for us to be able to make comparable differentiations. Instead, we must content ourselves with the relatively vague assumption that the members of a nation-state generally have a diffuse interest in having their collective self-respect be respected by other states and in receiving recognition for their common culture and history. Differentiations between various modes of recognition, such as those made in the realm of inter-subjective relations, seem inappropriate on the highly aggregated level of entire populations.14 It is almost impossible to tell whether such populations are striving for signs of goodwill, legal equality, or esteem in the eyes of the other side because their individual members’ motives are too diffuse and their aims are insufficiently integrated.15 In any case, such differentiations play a very marginal role in the explanation of international relations. What is decisive is not the type of recognition for which a certain population “actually” strives but how political actors and rulers interpret its respective moods. The “we” of the population, which will always have an influence on the definition of foreign-political objectives, is not an empirical but a hypothetical quantity. It arises when disordered and presumed expectations and moods are formed into a collective narrative that makes a certain type of international stance appear justified in light of past humiliations or desired recognition.16 Such narratives of justification give us a key to answering the normative questions that arise when it comes to shaping international relations.17 After all, the shape of international relations determines the chances for changing these relations so as to reduce martial conflicts and improve prospects for peaceful cooperation. As soon as we turn away from the descriptive problems of a theory of international relations and turn toward the normative problems these relations entail, we must adopt a different perspective on actual conflicts in the world. We then no longer ask how to properly understand conflicts between states but which measures would have to be taken in order to make such conflicts less likely and raise the chances for a more peaceful state of international affairs. This second category of questions, however, cannot be wholly separated from the first because only an appropriate understanding of the causes of international conflict can enable us to envision solutions for overcoming the prevailing state of affairs. The “realism” of our normative considerations and utopias will increase to the extent that we have correct hypotheses about the considerations that underlie how state actors and governments plan and calculate their relations with other states.18 The theoretical assumptions I developed in the first section of the essay play a central role at the juncture between empirical facticity and normative considerations. If it is true that states can only define their international relations by including narratives of justification containing a credible and convincing interpretation of the population’s interests in collective self-respect, then “political” relations of recognition at the international level indirectly take on decisive importance as soon as we seek to reduce conflicts between states. This basic normative idea results from the close connection between collective feelings on the one hand and political narratives of justification on the other. State actors can only disclose and define foreign-political aims by viewing their citizens’ elementary desires for security and prosperity in light of interpretations that constitute

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 33

4/18/11 12:36 PM

34  ✻  Axel Honneth a narrative synthesis of the diffuse expectations of the population. At the same time, very narrow limits are imposed on these interpretations because a summarizing construction of collective feelings must prove to be a halfway appropriate and convincing interpretation of the citizenry’s actual, if diffuse, expectations. Narratives intended to justify a hostile and aggressive pursuit of foreign-political interests can remain intact only as long as the population has perceptible grounds for feeling that their collective self-respect has been violated or insulted by the conduct of other states. If there is no evidence for such disrespect, feelings of humiliation and degradation will not be able to spread among the fragmented publics in which citizens move, and the narratives in play will fast lose credibility and thus become incapable of playing its legitimating role. What is true in the case of aggressive foreign policy can also apply to a policy of willing cooperation and reconciliation. A narrative interpretation that supports such conduct can only be upheld as long as the feeling of having one’s own collective self-respect be disrespected by other states does not gain the upper hand. In both cases, the collective feelings of a population that follows the signals of other states with interest and suspicion will prove to be the decisive measure for the success of foreign-political narratives of justification. The greater the distance between the diffuse moods among the citizenry and the official justifications for political conduct, the more difficulties state actors will have maintaining foreign-political objectives. Therefore, perhaps we could say that states indirectly codetermine the foreign-political conduct of other states because the symbolic means with which they convey respect and recognition for other nations constitute an instrument for influencing the formation of public opinion and mood in other countries. All these considerations have taken us a long way toward answering the normative questions at issue. We saw that the entirety of a state’s foreign-political conduct stems from a specific interpretation of interests and values. This interpretation must coordinate the functional requirements for maximizing security and prosperity with the public’s expectations about other states’ recognition of its own collective identity. For that reason, state actors or governments must base their conduct on narratives meant to justify, in light of historical events and episodes, pursuing their state’s interests in an either cooperative or aggressive manner. At the same time, however, we saw that states also exercise an indirect influence on how other states legitimate their foreign policies because they can influence the formation of public opinion and mood from abroad. The diverse tools used to signal recognition or disrespect constitute a means for casting doubt on other states’ narratives of justification by demonstrating a divergent view of those states’ collective identity. These measures drive a wedge between the self-justifications of state actors and the political will-formation of the population; by means of credible expressions of respect and recognition, they attempt to convince another citizenry to mistrust their government’s narratives of justification. Although the history of international relations is brimming with examples of such behavior, they play a very marginal role in the theory. Because the latter interprets state activity largely according to the model of purposive-rational behavior, it lacks the conceptual framework for according the

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 34

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition between States  ✻  35 affective dimension of international relations of recognition its proper place. On the normative level, this ignorance comes back to haunt the theory in the form of a procedural lack of fantasy regarding the chances for reducing hostile conflict and expanding relations of peaceful cooperation. The theory instead restricts itself to compromises and agreements under international law, even though the history of international conflict teaches us that collective feelings of recognition or humiliation by other states play a much more significant role. The path for civilizing international relations primarily lies in sustained efforts at conveying respect and esteem for the collective identities of other countries. Even before legal agreements aimed at promoting peace can do their work, and even before the cultivation of diplomatic relations and economic agreements can reduce international tensions, we need publicly visible signals that the history and culture of other nations are worth being heard among the cacophony of the world’s peoples. Only by means of such recognition, which goes over the heads of government representatives and political agents, can we ensure that the citizens of another state no longer believe the demonization practiced by political elites and that they can begin to trust that the other side respects them. The history of international relations contains enough examples proving that a violation of this normative principle only raises the danger of international conflict, while demonstrable respect for this principle has reduced the potential for such conflicts. Willi Brandt’s famous “Warschauer Kniefall” was an internationally perceptible gesture that made it nearly impossible for the Polish government to awake formerly prevalent prejudice and resentment about the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).19 Europe’s (and especially Germany’s) ignoring of the harsh and determined struggle of the Serbs against the Nazis prepared the way for a fatal policy of overly hasty international recognition of individual ex-Yugoslavian states (Croatia, Kosovo), which drove Serbia’s government into increasing isolation and thereby ultimately strengthened ultra-nationalistic narratives among the Serbian public.20 The lacking sympathy, and perhaps even a total absence of solidarity, on the part of internationally dominant states for the demeaning situation of the Palestinian population continues to fuel a situation in which the local ruling elites’ fantasies of taking revenge on Israel finds collective support among the lower, impoverished classes.21 We could easily expand this list of examples. We might think of the constant stream of new members joining Islamist terrorist organizations over the last several years in order to get a sense of the effects of a policy that fails to extend recognition to other peoples, an act of recognition that would go over the heads of state authorities. The first step toward reconciliation between states, toward developing peaceful and cooperative relations, will always consist of using the soft power of respect and esteem, which signals to a foreign citizenry that its cultural achievements are in no way inferior and that it can count on others’ sympathy for its sufferings. The more explicitly we demonstrate such recognition, the more visible these demonstrations will be to other peoples and the more we can cast doubt on demonizations serving to justify hostile reactions. The best means a state has at its disposal for counteracting demonization and resentment on the part of other nation-states consists of globally

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 35

4/18/11 12:36 PM

36  ✻  Axel Honneth visible and clear signals of willingness to include other citizenries in the international moral community. Certainly, such symbols of political recognition are not enough to create a solid basis for transnational cooperation. We need to follow up on efforts to overcome rejectionist attitudes arising from experiences of collective humiliation and to undermine historically grounded and yet long-exploited demonizations by taking steps toward contractual agreements that secure peaceful relations and long-term arrangements on how to coordinate efforts to meet common challenges. On the basis of that cooperation, more stable networks of transnational communities can arise, such as we might find in the process of European integration.22 But before such a decentering of state politics can take place, different citizenries must have the experience of recognizing each other’s cultural productions and historical achievements, both of which make up the conditions of their collective self-respect. A political theory that fails to gain conceptual access to these affective roots of transnational confidence-building will also be unable to appropriately conceive the normative conditions for civilizing world politics. Therefore, it is time that we view international relations in a new light—one that differs from the view of Hegel and the political realists following in his wake.

Notes COMP: UNNUMBERED NOTE TO COME; LEAVE SPACE 1. I have taken these examples from Wolf 2008, 5–42. 2. See Honneth 1995, chapter 8. 3. Hegel 1967, 52. 4. These terms stem from Nye 2004. 5. See Taylor et al. 1994; Habermas 2004, 107ff; Honneth 2003, 110ff. 6. See Kelsen 1941, 605–617. 7. Ibid., 609. 8. Ibid., 608. 9. On this perspective within the theory of international relations, see Wolf 2008; Haacke 2005, 181–194. 10. See Rawls 2001. 11. See Habermas 1988, 3–13. 12. Edelman 1964. For a critique of this book, see Honneth and Paris 1979, 138–142. 13. See Cohrs 2006. I owe this reference to Volker Heins. 14. Honneth 1995, chapter 5. 15. That is why I have doubts about the proposal made by Erik Ringmar in his essay in the present volume—an essay that is otherwise highly valuable. Ringmar 2011. 16. For the logic of such constructions, see Anderson 1983. 17. On the concept of “narratives of justification,” see Forst and Günther 2009, 23–27. 18. See Rawls 1999, 1. 19. For an analysis, see Schneider 2006; Wolffsohn and Brechenmacher 2005. 20. Despite all the idiosyncrasy and hyperbole of Peter Handke’s political statements on

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 36

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition between States  ✻  37 the wars in the former Yugoslavia, his critique of Western Europe’s lack of respect for the sufferings of the Serbian population is nevertheless compelling. 21. See Sarraj 2002, 71–76. I owe this reference to José Brunner. 22. See Brunkhorst 2005, 330–347; Bach 2000.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Edition. London: Verso. Bach, Maurizio. 2000. Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Brunkhorst, Horst. 2005. “Demokratie in der globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft: Einige Überlegungen zur posstaatlichen Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft.” Zeitschrift für Soziologie. Sonderheft “Weltgesellschaft.”. Cohrs, Patrick. 2006. The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edelman, Murray. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. University of Illinois Press. Forst, Rainer, and Klaus Günther. 2009. “Über die Dynamik normativer Konflikte: Jürgen Habermas’ Philosophie im Lichte eines aktuellen Forschungsprogramms.” Forschung Frankfurt 2. Haacke, Jürgen. 2005. “The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Recognition.” Review of International Studies 31(1): 181–194. Habermas, Jürgen. 1988. “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: Remarks on the Federal Republic’s Orientation to the West.” Acta Sociologica 31 (1): 3–13. ———. 1994. “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Charles Taylor. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hegel, G. W. F. 1967. Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. London: Polity Press. ———. 2003. “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser.” In Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, edited by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. London: Verso Books. Honneth, Axel, and Rainer Paris. 1979. “Zur Interaktionsanalyse von Politik.” Leviathan 7 (1): 138–142. Kelsen, Hans. 1941. “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations.” The American Journal of International Law 35 (4) October: 605–617. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. Washington: Public Affairs. Rawls, John. 2001. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ringmar, Erik. 2011. “The International Politics of Recognition.” In The International Politics of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. Boulder: Paradigm. Sarraj, Eyad El. 2002. “‘Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair and the Need for Hope’: An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj.” Journal of Palestine Studies 31 (4).

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 37

4/18/11 12:36 PM

38  ✻  Axel Honneth Schneider, Christoph. 2006. Der Warschauer Kniefall. Ritual, Ereignis und Erzählung. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft. Taylor, Charles. 1994. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wolffsohn, Michael, and Thomas Brechenmacher. 2005. Denkmalsturz? Brandts Kniefall. Munich: Olzog. Wolf, Reinhard. 2008. “Respekt: Ein unterschätzter Faktor in den Internationalen Beziehungen.” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 15 (1): 5–42.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 38

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 2

Prickly States? Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples Reinhard Wolf

Probably the most characteristic error people make when describing human behavior is to attribute the same kinds of properties to groups that ordinarily apply to individuals.1

Do states, nations, and their leaders care for recognition in the same way individuals do when interacting in families or other small groups? Do they react as strongly against disrespect as persons exposed to hurtful slights? Conceivably, respect and recognition are vital for persons’ everyday well-being at their homes or at their workplaces, yet play a rather marginal role for professional decision-makers steering the policies of detached nation-states in a culturally heterogeneous international system. The chief concern of this contribution is not whether or not states or nations really are persons but if they react to recognition and disrespect in ways so similar to individual responses that it makes sense to apply psychological insights to international relations. In this context, I shall base my points on a thoroughly pluralistic ontology. Even though most leaders and citizens tend to anthropomorphize the state and think and talk of it “as if” it were a person, for the sake of my argument, I will 39

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 39

4/18/11 12:36 PM

40  ✻  Reinhard Wolf assume that states and nations are not primary actors in their own right.2 Rather, I will treat them as composite actors that can be reduced to their basic units, that is, institutions, groups, and individuals.3 What I want to demonstrate is that, even in a highly institutionalized environment, persons, domestic groups, and nations can react to international (dis)respect in ways similar to individuals personally experiencing (dis)respect, and that these domestic actors often succeed in making the state conform to their symbolic needs. Due to its conspicuous role in world politics, the established nation-state will be taken as the paradigmatic example of an international actor. Yet, with due circumspection, most of the observations can also be applied to other institutional actors on the international scene.4 As I shall argue, there are indeed ample reasons for proceeding cautiously with regard to extrapolations from psychology or philosophy.5 States, it will be claimed, cannot be equated with individual actors. Even though states and nations are routinely subjected to linguistic, moral, and legal personification by both politicians and political scientists, compared to interacting individuals, they are much more complex actors (to say the least) encountering one another in more complex and diversified social environments. Moreover, both their national decision-making and their mutual dealings are regulated by norms and procedures that are supposed to institutionalize rationality and to minimize the impact of “the personal factor.” Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that, overall, nation-states are actually less “touchy” or at least behave in a more controlled and rational manner than individuals when they are experiencing recognition or disrespect. However, there are grounds for expecting more or less touchy states, depending on national identities, political cultures, elite interests, decision-making structures, and international circumstances. States may sometimes react even more strongly to a given act of disrespect than an individual in an analogous situation. Even when we disaggregate the nation-state into its constitutive components (persons, groups, and institutions), a case can be made that states (or the actors who are authorized to speak for them) demand social recognition from their peers. Thus, while political scientists should not simply expect collective actors to consistently behave according to patterns that other disciplines have established for individuals, they are well advised to make use of such findings when formulating their own hypotheses. This chapter starts with a brief overview of relevant psychological findings and general grounds for caution concerning their application to international relations.6 This is followed by a discussion of various factors that tend to mitigate the impact of recognition and disrespect among states, at least among those states which already enjoy widespread legal recognition. The section thereafter will try to demonstrate that all these factors could also enhance the demand for recognition and, correspondingly, the upsetting effects of disrespect. The conclusion will therefore make the point that states’ reactions to (dis)respect are likely to be more diverse, and thus clearly warrant more thorough empirical studies.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 40

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  41

Psychological Findings on Respect and Disrespect If states (or nations) were known to interact just like individual people, there would be little doubt about the relevance of recognition and disrespect for international relations. For persons interacting in small groups, psychological research has firmly established that respect promotes cooperation while disrespect breeds conflict.7 When people feel respected by fellow group members for their work and ideas, when they think they are accepted as group members, they demonstrate greater compliance with work norms, meet performance expectations to a greater extent, and show greater willingness to engage in extra work on behalf of the group. Moreover, respected employees also identify more strongly with their work group, which further promotes their pro-social activities.8 In those studies, the subjective feeling of respect was strongly influenced by perceptions of fair and polite treatment, which people tend to take as an indication of high personal status within their group. Institutionalized voice opportunities, such as the right to get a hearing or to file a complaint, were particularly important in this regard.9 As a result, individuals become significantly more interested in the success of their groups.10 Not surprisingly then, researchers also found evidence indicating that respect can promote cooperation in problematic social situations.11 On the other hand, psychological research has clearly confirmed folk wisdoms about the positive relation between disrespect, anger, and personal conflict behavior. The experience of disrespect regularly stimulates an instantaneous urge to redress the situation and educate the offender through direct retribution.12 Moreover, disrespect almost automatically arouses anger, which is well known to constrain information processing and to promote strong reactions against the disrespectful actor.13 Experiments have demonstrated that anger leads to negatively biased perceptions, reduces the demand for information, shortens decision times, and consequently leads to more risk-prone and more aggressive behavior.14 Still, as already pointed out, states’ (or nations’) international behavior cannot be predicted by making simple extrapolations from findings in social psychology or social philosophy. Just like persons, states may routinely speak with a single voice to their foreign peers and other actors; yet, if they are unitary actors at all, they are “at best” collective actors consisting of an ensemble of political groups and officials. To produce an authoritative foreign-policy output, a nation’s constituent actors must coordinate their competing preferences through institutionalized debates and negotiations. Perhaps even more important, states interacting on the international scene tend to be far less interdependent than persons dealing with each other at the workplace or within their families. Hence, there may be two basic reasons why sovereign states and their representatives may care less for social recognition than individuals in their daily interactions: (1) once they have gained international legal recognition, states are less dependent on the respect of their peers, and (2) their institutionalized decision-making processes

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 41

4/18/11 12:36 PM

42  ✻  Reinhard Wolf may privilege material cost-benefit calculations over purely symbolic status considerations and emotional needs. These processes can conceivably mitigate the hurtful effects of disrespect. Compared to their individual citizens, states may therefore be in a far better position to heed the challenging advice given by Stoic philosophers: do not pay attention to disrespect you do not deserve.15

Reasons for Skepticism: The Case for the Pervasiveness of Stoic States There are quite a number of factors that should reduce a state’s urge to insist on social recognition. For one thing, states consist of an ensemble of different groups and interact in a culturally diverse arena. This makes for far greater social heterogeneity and also for greater social distance (1) between different nation-states, (2) between nation-states and their citizens, and (3) between groups within nation-states—all of which can significantly attenuate the demand for international recognition. Second, states are institutions regulating the interaction of groups and individuals. As such, they lack emotions and are equipped with norms and rules that tend to control the impact of personal emotions.

Nations Do Not Equal Persons Usually, the well-established link between respectful treatment and personal feelings of self-worth is far weaker when we look at interaction between culturally diverse groups or collective actors. After all, even as individuals, we rely to a greater extent on the judgments of our peer group than on the opinions of complete strangers with whom we may have little in common.16 Even disrespectful or humiliating treatment on the part of outsiders tends to hurt less than abuse by group members because it often can be “explained away” with the outsiders’ “bad character” or their lack of better knowledge. Due to their greater similarities and their closer interaction among themselves, group members can more easily question the validity of out-group views and reassure each other of the worth of their own group. Compared to individuals, interacting group members can more easily nurture or create feelings of superiority vis-à-vis competing actors. Not surprisingly, very large groups, such as nations, are especially good at this.17 Moreover, it is well known that group members tend to put special emphasis on those positive characteristics where the in-group excels.18 Again, such self-serving evaluations can be more easily stabilized when groups rarely interact with foreign groups that excel in other dimensions and therefore tend to propagate different criteria. Therefore, the intra-mural communication within a disrespected group sometimes may go a long way in sheltering its members against its environment’s arrogance or other forms of symbolic ill-treatment. In sum, compared to ordinary individuals, nations should stand a far better chance of stabilizing self-serving identity-narratives.19

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 42

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  43 This greater social distance between nations is mirrored by individuals’ greater distance from their nation. Obviously, when being addressed by others, persons interacting in small groups can hardly avoid identifying with their selves. Hence, the disrespect they directly experience always concerns at least one ostensible component of their personal identity. Even when the slight in question was primarily targeted at a certain group that the victim apparently belonged to, it will hurt at least that part of a person’s social identity. When a Mexico-born American is being told a disparaging joke about Hispanics, he can scarcely avoid feeling offended. If, on the other hand, the insult consists of an official statement directed against one’s nation, it may not hurt an individual at all. After all, persons need not identify with their state in its international dealings. Moreover, while answering national slights can be left to national leaders, personal slights call for personal reactions. They cannot be quietly ducked without damaging a person’s social standing. Consequently, the greater social distance between citizens and their nation will often constrain citizens’ demand for international recognition. Finally, social distance and heterogeneity within nation-states can also mitigate their response to foreign (dis)respect. Most nations are composed of different groups with different ethnic or class identities. Sometimes these groups will not promote similar variants of the same national narrative but incompatible and competing identity discourses, which tend to neutralize each other in the public domain. Where this is the case, the national discourse lacks a common frame to interpret the meaning of foreign acts and thus may fail to bring about an collective response. To be sure, such internal heterogeneity could also undermine mutual affirmation as described above and thus could render foreign disrespect more upsetting for individual citizens. On the international level, however, this will hardly matter, since such an identity-torn state may be burdened by fierce internal debates that gravely impair its external agency.

States Do Not Equal Nations: Institutionalization and (Material) Rationality Yet even when national leaders and citizens feel severely slighted by foreign states’ behavior, the institutional character of the state may attenuate calls for overt retribution.20 When converting various kinds of domestic demands into official foreign policy, states arguably are biased in favor of rational decision-making focused on material costs and benefits. Both bureaucratic processes and officials’ role conceptions can diminish the effect of angry emotions, while better access for economic interest groups tends to marginalize the foreign-policy influence of identity-oriented pressure groups. Whereas the first two mechanisms impede dangerous short cuts, which tend to bias individuals in favor of revenge and retribution, the latter often discriminates against domestic actors insisting on enhanced international recognition. Institutionalized decision-making is guided by norms, rules, and procedures that are partly designed to prevent rash emotional responses. In modern states, even chief executives will rarely decide on the spot without prior consultation with a range of experts within their administration. Often, these experts will submit numerous

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 43

4/18/11 12:36 PM

44  ✻  Reinhard Wolf analytical papers that thoroughly discuss the anticipated (material) costs and benefits of various policy options. Most of these studies will be the joint product of several officials and governmental agencies; that is, even before reaching the highest levels of government, they will have been checked and discussed by experts with different areas of expertise, interests, and perspectives. In the case of more important questions, chief executives must even inform parliamentary leaders and ask the legislatures for their political or financial support. Thus, bureaucratization and legislative control of foreign policy decision-making are likely to promote governmental rationality in several ways, particularly, by upholding norms of individual and collective circumspection, by stressing the need for transparent argumentation, by lengthening the search for information and deliberation, and by ensuring the consideration of contrasting data and assessments. While these effects hardly guarantee sound decisions, they will at least contain the political impact of spontaneous emotions, such as anger. As pointed out above, a person’s angry mood is known to enhance the likelihood of hostile and risky actions. Psychological research has shown that both increased self-awareness of ongoing personal judgment processes and greater accountability make persons less sensitive to such effects of anger.21 Moreover, the trivial fact that bureaucratization delays decision-making may already be useful in as much as it increases the likelihood that, by the time they actually make a decision, individual officials will no longer experience strong personal emotions. Political institutions also affect the personal approach of decision-makers to the problem at hand. When dealing with foreign policy issues, state officials do not act in their personal capacity but as representatives of their states or governmental agencies.22 In other words, they enact specified roles, knowing they will be held accountable if they fail to comply with pertinent norms. This may further circumscribe the potential political effects of personal emotions, for offended officials may come to view slights as directed against their nations or their governments rather than aimed at themselves. As a result, they might take a more relaxed attitude. If, on the other hand, they are more inclined to take such gestures personally, their role as national representatives may help them in disregarding such experiences. As professionals trained and paid for governmental service, they may find it easier to “swallow their personal pride” for the good of their country. Lastly, institutionalized access for interest groups might systematically privilege the consideration of material consequences over demands for national recognition. This especially applies to modern democratic welfare states whose elected leaders are expected to meet the economic aspirations of their constituents. To do so, they largely depend on the investments and exports of private business.23 Besides, companies and other private donors often play a crucial role in the financing of political campaigns. Given this dual dependence, it is hardly surprising that parliaments and state agencies have granted special access to powerful economic interest groups that presumably pay more attention to the material implications of foreign policy than to their recognition aspects.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 44

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  45 Summing up the preceding section, one is tempted to jump to the conclusion that some nation-states will hardly care for social recognition—or if they do, such considerations will scarcely affect their foreign policy output. It seems that nation-states, when dealing with their foreign peers, are both more rational and more materialistic than persons engaged in close interactions. While this may be true in many circumstances, the following section will show that states sometimes act even less “relaxed.”

Reasons for Pessimism: The Case for the Existence of Prickly States Some of the factors discussed previously can also make states more sensitive to foreign recognition. Greater social distance between nations may indeed render them less vulnerable to foreign indifference or disrespect——but only for a certain while and even then, only at the expense of mutual understanding. National divisions might really compromise consensual self-images most citizens deem worthy of common defense, yet they may also tempt endangered rulers to aggravate xenophobia and cross-border conflicts. Finally, some governmental institutions conceivably mitigate the impact of anger on foreign policy, but other state institutions may also propagate national myths and norms that will stimulate national emotions that even pragmatic leaders can not afford to ignore.

Nations, Leaders, and Citizens Can Be Touchy, Too While often respect expressed by fellow members of one’s peer group is more cherished than respect between different groups, respect (or disrespect) expressed by out-groups can still be vital—both for the collective self-esteem of the in-group and for the self-esteem of its individual members. For one thing, greater cognitive and social distance cannot altogether invalidate the explicit or implicit judgments of outsiders. Depending on social context and the salience of categories, current out-groups can quickly become part of a larger (superordinate) in-group.24 Besides, due to higher status, some out-groups’ judgments may always carry great weight. And sometimes, even disrespect shown by lower-status groups can hurt. Cutting ties with groups hardly provides a solution for such unpleasant experiences. In a globalizing world, contact between alien groups can be avoided less and less. (And as the 2005 crisis over the Muhammad cartoons in Danish newspapers demonstrated, even domestic statements related via indirect communication can have grave consequences.) Hence, confirmation among in-group members cannot indefinitely substitute for out-group recognition.25 Eventually, temporary isolation could even increase the risk of especially hurtful encounters in the future. Without the correcting force of an ongoing exchange of assessments, groups are inclined to exaggerate their own virtues or merits in relation to those of out-groups. When social distance increases the leeway for

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 45

4/18/11 12:36 PM

46  ✻  Reinhard Wolf social creativity, it also heightens the long-term risk of conflicts, as divergent status markers promote status inconsistency, which in turn, breeds fights for dominance.26 Moreover, by isolating themselves, groups forgo opportunities for communicating their own needs, ideas, or achievements. The longer this state persists, the greater the risk that renewed encounters will result in particularly upsetting exchanges on relative worth and status. Thus, temporary isolation is no substitute for genuine recognition, especially not in the long run. As concerns the individual’s social distance to his or her nation, it should not be overlooked that, at times, it can be extremely small. When their group is disrespected, individual group members are motivated to defend their standing to the extent that they identify with it.27 Depending on the circumstances, being a member of a given group may figure prominently in an individual’s social identity.28 Whoever disparages my group’s values, achievements, or features calls into question my own feeling of self-worth to the extent that I share and take pride in those values, achievements, or features.29 Resentment against attacks on the in-group’s worth is therefore considered a prime factor in the origins and escalation of ethnic conflicts.30 Fervent nationalists, both within political elites and the public at large, will often react with outrage if other nationals insult their nation.31 Even in the absence of national conscription, millions of ordinary citizens have volunteered to put their lives at risk in combat.32 Citizens can also react strongly against personal disrespect that their leaders suffered at the hands of foreign governments.33 On the other hand, sometimes people experience respect for their group as more pleasant or up-lifting than recognition of their personal rights and achievements. Not a few nationalists have been willing to sacrifice the personal rights that they enjoyed under colonial rule for the independence and international recognition of their nation.34 Respect for their group, its representatives, and its symbols can thus profoundly affect individuals’ self-esteem and consequently also their behavior in various political contexts.35 Also, political leaders themselves may be even more strongly aroused by foreign (dis)respect than ordinary citizens.36 First, they interact more closely and more frequently with foreigners than the rest of their compatriots. Especially within the group of highly industrialized countries or within the “Davos community,” they form an exclusive club whose members subscribe to special norms of dialogue. Thus, they may care a lot if others’ behavior confirms their status within that club. Second, being the leaders of their nations, they often identify even more strongly with their countries than the average citizen. Third, leaders tend to be far more sensitive to status considerations than average citizens. Most of them have embarked on a political career not so much for monetary reasons but because they sought an elevated status: they wanted to lead. And those who make it to the top must be both especially qualified for playing the status game and especially sensitive to its emotional rewards. Political success not only confirms their belief in their own leadership capabilities but arguably also reinforces their habit of seeking personal satisfaction in this particular way. Finally, leaders need to be concerned about the domestic effects of international disrespect. Slights experienced at the hands of their foreign peers may not only hurt

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 46

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  47 their personal pride but can also fatally compromise their standing vis-à-vis domestic subordinates. Many lieutenants who have been willing to defer to a leader commanding international respect will no longer accept the orders of someone who failed to respond to foreign insults.37 Moreover, it hardly needs mentioning that national leaders, even when they personally lack a nationalistic outlook, often will be inclined to promote their citizens’ national sentiments, given the fact that such identification usually enhances citizens’ loyalty to the regime currently acting on behalf of the nation.38 This temptation is particularly strong at times when the government’s legitimacy is heavily contested by domestic opposition groups.39 Hence, deep domestic divisions are no guarantee against an outburst of national sentiments. Rather, endangered political elites are especially prone to diverting intra-mural conflicts to external targets.40 The easiest way to do so is to downplay national differences by exaggerating international ones. This can be achieved by making use of notorious group tendencies to subscribe to the negative stereotyping of out-groups. To establish the evil nature of foreign nations and to stress the differences separating them from their own nation, regimes sometimes make up events tarnishing the image of those nations. Usually, however, it is much easier and safer to construe actual foreign moves as unprovoked “slaps in the face” or as other kinds of arrogant or contemptuous behavior. In many cases then, governments will use the leeway for the domestic interpretation of foreign acts in ways that will aggravate rather than moderate their citizens’ sensitivity to alleged instances of foreign disrespect.

Institutions Can Constrain Symbolic Flexibility The institutionalized propagation of national narratives, the widespread bias in favor of conflict norms, and the leaders’ sense of responsibility can sometimes make nations even less accommodating than individuals who have been subjected to alleged disrespect. State institutions play an important role in the construction, promotion, and stabilization of national narratives.41 Nation-states have founded university departments to study the nation’s (alleged) roots and past achievements, national archives to store its records, schools to disseminate official historical interpretations, and have set up cultural agencies for keeping alive the nation’s artistic and folkloristic traditions. They have erected monuments to celebrate national feats, established national symbols, such as flags and anthems, for public worship, and have come up with all kinds of public rituals, which help citizens enacting their identification with the nation.42 In addition, they have set up peace-time military institutions for national protection, which also promote national sentiments by routinely warning against dubious foreign designs and by continuously training large numbers of men and women for the defense of their country. Sometimes the influence of these national agencies and customs are somewhat balanced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) committed to cosmopolitan causes. More often, however, national institutions face little domestic

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 47

4/18/11 12:36 PM

48  ✻  Reinhard Wolf competition in their mission to promote citizens’ identification with a specific notion of their country’s history and mission. As a result, many state institutions emphasize the need to uphold the nation’s selfimage against perceived national challenges. First of all, the work of these institutions underscores the difference between nationals and foreigners. Thereby, it increases the well-known inclination for in-group self-enhancement at the expense of out-groups.43 Second, these activities homogenize the citizens’ positive image of their nation. Accordingly, even leaders who personally do not subscribe to the official narrative will find it more difficult to ignore foreign acts challenging the nation’s established identity. Finally, such leaders’ willingness to search for international understanding will be further compromised by the conflict norms that these institutions, the military in particular, tend to propagate. Under these circumstances, an uncompromising stance and ethnocentric rhetoric become the litmus test for national loyalty—a test that leaders must not fail if they want to stay in control.44 Even leaders’ role-playing is a double-edged sword. While it is true that internalized role conceptions can guard officials against rash escalatory moves, such effects certainly can be marginalized by personal emotions or status considerations. In these cases, leaders who personally feel disrespected may draw their nations into confrontations. Recent examples include the personal rows that German Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac had with US President Bush.45 And political role conceptions can also inhibit the search for pragmatic solutions. It has been demonstrated that representatives acting on behalf of some principals are less accommodating than persons acting only for themselves.46 Thus, when confronted with a strong challenger, individuals may sometimes be prepared to give up personal status claims. True, doing so might diminish their personal prestige. Yet, whether they are willing to pay that price is a decision they can take entirely on their own. Unlike individuals accepting a diminished personal status, national leaders would not only compromise their own international standing but also the standing of their compatriots whom they have been entrusted to protect. Therefore, role-conscious leaders may equate such a move with letting down their fellow citizens. So even if accommodation appears to be the reasonable move, leaders may envision it as a personal failure that they are not entitled to tolerate.47

Conclusion Even if states are neither persons nor peoples, recognition will often be an issue for collective actors on the international scene. This is rather obvious for ethnic groups seeking legal recognition for a new state, but it is also true for established nation-states whose sovereignty is rarely questioned. As has been indicated previously, given their lower level of social interaction, on balance, nations and institutionalized, international actors seem to be less exposed and less vulnerable to disrespect than ordinary persons. However, sooner or later, even ordinary citizens will be confronted with foreign views and actions that either confirm or challenge their own sense of their countries place

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 48

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  49 in history or contemporary international affairs. When this happens, (dis)respect between nations and their states can become an important political issue, sometimes as important as recognition between closely interacting individuals. It has also become clear that the significance of international recognition problems is not only less obvious but also more variable. Due to the great complexity of nationstates (and of their foreign policy apparatus), it is much more difficult to anticipate the former’s reactions to external stimuli. Social psychology may indeed have a good track record in explaining and predicting the average human’s response to certain types of behavior. However, information processing and decision-making within the state are far more complicated and thus open to numerous additional mechanisms that can either enhance or mitigate the impact of (dis)respectful gestures. Thus, the range of typical reactions—technically speaking, the size of the standard deviation—seems to be much broader than in the case of individuals. Apparently, in this context, a great number of factors need to be considered. Particular attention should be given to the behavior of political leaders and prominent intellectuals, for they can exert critical influence on how the broader community comes to see both the status of its own nation and the symbolic implications of foreign acts. In some cases, for example the Danish Muhammad cartoons, such foreign acts would even go wholly unnoticed without domestic leaders setting them on national agendas. In other cases, opinion leaders at least need to describe a particular foreign move and to interpret its meaning for the nation’s identity as the latter is understood in the dominant discourse: Is this act to be seen as a deliberate offense to an important status element of national identity, or is it just a routine action that says little about foreign views of our nation? Thus, the crucial issue here is discursive framing, which gives leaders and intellectuals a pivotal role in shaping the nation’s attitude to possible acts of (dis)respect. How leaders engage in such acts of creative framing depends on their outlook and interests. For one thing, political leaders may actually share strong national sentiments, or they might seek international status for themselves. In this case, they will be motivated to bring the nation along by promoting a public discourse which accords well with their own convictions or prestige ideas. However, they can also stir up national sentiments for strictly instrumental reasons by using society’s nationalist inclinations to boost the regime’s domestic legitimacy. In doing so, however, leaders must consider prominent domestic cleavages. Playing up alleged foreign slights may work wonders for authoritarian leaders embattled by democratic oppositions or by social movements insisting on economic redistribution. On the other hand, it may utterly fail when domestic society is divided between groups holding on to rather different national narratives. In the latter case, stirring up national sentiments could easily backfire because it might only deepen those domestic divisions. Hence, the specific nature of domestic fault lines greatly affects a state’s inclination to engage in the politics of international recognition. Another major factor influencing the likelihood or intensity of recognition politics concerns the nature of norms shaping domestic political cultures. Apparently, a

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 49

4/18/11 12:36 PM

50  ✻  Reinhard Wolf nation‑state in which individualistic and materialist-hedonistic views predominate will be less sensitive to foreign (dis)respect than a nation-state whose society stresses collectivist norms and the honor of family clans or status groups. If protecting one’s honor is an essential purpose for individuals and domestic groups, it seems quite likely that they will externalize such an outlook to international relations.48 In this case, norms mandating the resolute defense of group standings within society may also be applied to foreign policy. Strong collectivist norms make it easier for nationalists to equate dissent with disloyalty and thus discourage both political leaders and intellectuals from advancing more nuanced arguments on the relative merits of insiders and outsiders. Consequently, such norms create a political climate that promotes negative stereotyping and self-righteous positions in international conflicts. Thereby collectivist norms make it much easier to depict foreign behavior as an unjustified violation of national status claims. In sum, domestic honor codes and strong collectivist norms render states pricklier when their demands for recognition are not met by foreign actors—or even when they only appear to be ignored. Essentially then, the differences between persons and peoples boils down to three conclusions: First, there are no plausible arguments that would contradict this volume’s premise that not only individuals but also nation-states care for the social recognition of their peers. Second, it seems likely that state demands for respect are influenced by a far greater number of factors than is the demand for interpersonal respect. Hence, state behavior in this field will be more variable and less predictable than personal behavior. Third, we need far more empirical research on the conditions shaping the demand for recognition among international actors. That is why research on (dis)respect among states (or between states and other international actors) offers a promising field for scholars inhabiting a small planet whose diverse communities interact ever more closely.

Notes 1. Gould 2003, 147. 2. Ringmar 1996; Ringmar 2011 in this volume; Wendt 2004; Johnston 2008, 95–99. 3. Wight 2004. 4. Although numerous types of institutional actors engage in cross-border activities, by focusing on the modern nation-state, the following discussion deals only with the most prominent type. However, most of my arguments can also readily be applied to separatist movements as well as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). On NGOs see Heins 2008. In fact, such actors may be even more eager for international recognition than established states whose sovereign rights are beyond question (see Ringmar in this volume). Moreover, many of these states share a long common history during which, by and large, they have learned to accept their respective roles and identities. Normally, their place in international society is less contested. Thus, the Western nation-state can be seen as a critical case for the recognition perspective. If it can be argued that even rational bureaucratic states

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 50

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  51 seek social recognition just like ordinary persons, the same analogy should also apply to other types of international actors, such as NGOs. Therefore, studies of global governance might also benefit from taking (dis)respect more seriously. 5. Kelman 1965; Tetlock 1998; Stein 2008. 6. For reasons of space, I focus on psychological findings based on empirical observation. However, including philosophical works and more theoretical studies in psychology would hardly affect my line of reasoning, since their pertinent arguments are largely borne out by this empirical research. For a parallel discussion that takes philosophical debates as a point of departure, see Axel Honneth’s contribution to this volume. 7. Most social psychologists doing empirical studies on these issues use the concept of “respect” instead of “recognition.” This is one of the reasons why my own research is also based on the respect/disrespect dichotomy rather than on recognition and disrespect. As I understand the concept, to respect an actor is to recognize its status, that is, its social value and importance. In my view, this strong linkage with status perceptions (rather than with an actor’s overall identity) best explains why people react angrily when they feel disrespected. For the purpose of my argument here, however, the semantic overlap of the two concepts is so large that they will be used interchangeably in this chapter. See Wolf 2011 for an attempt to delineate these concepts and for a more detailed overview of psychological findings concerning the social effects of (dis)respect. 8. Tyler and Blader 2000, 2001; Doosje et al. 1999; Mercer 2008b; Mercer 2008a. 9. Tyler and Blader 2000, 136, 171, 178. 10. Ibid. 2000. 11. De Cremer 2002. 12. Miller 2001. 13. Ibid., 532–536; Smith et al. 2003, 171; Tyler and Blader 2000, 112; Van Kleef et al. 2008. 14. Geva and Sirin 2008, 7; Geva and Skorick 2006, 214, 222; Huddy et al. 2007; Isbell et al. 2006, 65; Van Kleef et al. 2008; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2001. 15. Epictetus 1961; Aurelius 1964. In fact, the Stoic view on recognition draws attention to a paradox that thoroughly challenges cognitivist interpretations of the struggle for recognition: if others see me in a less favorable light because they apply inappropriate standards or because they lack correct data, their judgment must be wrong. Accordingly, it is useless information. As such, it should be put right, were it to have negative material consequences. Otherwise, it should not get more attention than the time shown by a malfunctioning watch. If, on the other hand, their judgment is not mistaken, I obviously ought to correct my own views about myself. Finally, if I am not sure which view is more accurate, I should at least reconsider my own views and ask others to explain their different reasoning. Whichever is the case, there is no reasonable justification for angry arguments. Yet, it hardly needs mentioning that humans rarely follow this rational line. This seems to be a strong indication that the experience of disrespect, especially if it seems wholly unwarranted, inevitably triggers an emotional “gut” response related to human status needs. For evidence that status seeking and status defense are “hardwired” in humans’ emotional apparatus, see Frank 1985, chapter 2; Frank 1999, chapter 9; Wright 1994, chapters 12 through 13. For a contemporary international-relations theory based on this assumption, see Lebow 2008. 16. Turner et al. 1987, chapter 4; Abrams et al. 1990; Haslam et al. 1996; Smith et al. 1998, 490.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 51

4/18/11 12:36 PM

52  ✻  Reinhard Wolf 17. Mead (1932) 1964, chapter 26; Druckman 1994. 18. On “social creativity,” see Tajfel and Turner 1979; Platow et al. 2003, 270. 19. Not surprisingly, the preference for recognition from close associates also affects individuals’ status considerations. Apparently, peoples’ status comparisons largely focus on their rank within close communities rather than their rank within society at large. See Frank 1985, 46–53, 75–79; Frank 1999, chapter 9. 20. See also Honneth in this volume. 21. Lerner and Keltner 2000, 488ff. 22. Kelman 1965, 588; Allison 1971. 23. Lindblom 1977. 24. Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Stone and Crisp 2007. 25. Honneth and Ringmar in this volume. 26. Gould 2003, chapter 3; Lindemann in this volume. 27. Bloom 1990, chapter 4; Mackie et al. 2008; Rydell et al. 2008. 28. Druckman 1994, 49ff. 29. Mead (1932) 1964, chapters 26, 34; Worchel 2003, 482; Tyler and Blader 2000, 144–148, 195; Kelman 1997, 175; Kelman 1977, 548. 30. Horowitz 1985, chapters 4–5. 31. Taylor 1994; Berlin 1991; Mackie et al. 2008; Rydell et al. 2008. 32. Stern 1995. 33. Horowitz 1985, 226. 34. Kelman 1997, 181. Interestingly though, many ethnic groups opposed political independence when decolonization would have put them in a state together with another “more advanced” group that enjoyed higher status. Horowitz 1985, 190ff. 35. As a matter of fact, precisely because of its size and abstract nature, the nation often may be ideally suited for enhancing personal self-esteem. To be sure, smaller groups permit more personal and more intense interaction. Therefore, they are better suited for meeting individuals’ pervasive “need to belong.” Baumeister and Leary 1995. On the other hand, membership in smaller groups has its drawbacks. It invites direct comparisons between group members, which easily leads to unpleasant status rivalries. See Frank 1985. However, internal status competitions can be mitigated by engaging in collective out-group denigration, for the latter activity assigns a higher overall status even to those in-group members who occupy a lower rank within their own group. National chauvinism appears to be especially useful in this regard because it gives out-groups fewer chances to challenge their negative image. Moreover, nations, being “imagined communities,” leave more room for positive self-idealization than domestic groups whose members may be too well acquainted with each others’ faults. See Anderson 1983. 36. See Lindemann in this volume. 37. On such “ripple effects” of personal status contests, see Gould 2003, chapter 5. 38. See Axel Honneth’s contribution to this volume. 39. Snyder 2000, chapter 2; Van Evera 1994, 30–33; Kelman 2008, 176. 40. Gelpi 1997. 41. Ringmar in this volume. 42. Gellner 1983; Assmann 2006; Giesen 1999, vol. 2. 43. Druckman 1994, 48–55; Wright 1994, chapter 13. 44. Kelman 2007, 85–89; Druckman 1994, 58, 63; Honneth in this volume.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 52

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  53 45. Pond 2003; Szabo 2004; Woodward 2004. 46. Druckman 1994, 54. 47. Deterrence theorists often argue that leaders may also hesitate to make concessions because they suspect that accommodation undermines their state’s reputation as a resolute actor. For various reasons, this rationalistic explanation for respect-seeking behavior cannot convince. See Johnston 2008, 7; Mercer [1996] 2009; Tang 2005. 48. Lebow 2008, chapter 2.

Bibliography Abrams, D., M. Wetherell, S. Cochrane, M. A. Hogg, and J. C. Turner. 1990. “Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization.” British Journal of Social Psychology 29: 97–119. Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown. Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Edition. London: Verso. Assmann, Aleida. 2006. Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik. Munich: Beck. Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. 1964. Translated by Maxwell Staniforth. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Baumeister, R. F., and M. R. Leary. 1995. “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation.” Psychological Bulletin 117: 497–529. Berlin, Isaiah. 1991. “The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas.” London: Fontana Press. Bloom, William. 1990. Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Cremer, D. 2002. “Respect and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Importance of Feeling Included.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 (10): 1335. Doosje, Bertjan, Naomi Ellemers, and Russell Spears 1999. “Commitment and Intergroup Behaviour.” In Social Identity. Context, Commitment, Content: An Introduction, edited by Naomi Ellemers, Bertjan Doosje, and Russell Spears. London: WileyBlackwell. Druckman, D. 1994. “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective.” Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1): 43–68. Epictetus. 1961. Epictetus: Selections from His Discourses as Reported by Arrian and from the Fragments. Edited by W. Heinemann. Cambridge: Harvard Univeristy Press. Frank, Robert H. 1985. Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. ———. 1999. Luxury Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess. New York: Simon & Schuster. Gaertner, Samuel, and John. F. Dovidio. 2000. Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gelpi, C. 1997. “Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (2): 255–282.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 53

4/18/11 12:36 PM

54  ✻  Reinhard Wolf Geva, N., and C. V. Sirin. 2008. “Reactions to International Terror: Thematic Relevance of Negative Affect,” paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26–29. Geva, N., and M. J. Skorick. 2006. “The Emotional Calculus of Foreign Policy Decisions: Getting Emotions Out of the Closet.” In Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing, edited by David P. Redlawsk. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Giesen, Bernhard. 1999. Kollektive Identität. Die Intellektuellen und die Nation 2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Gould, Roger V. 2003. Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity about Social Rank Breeds Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Haslam, S. A., J. C. Turner, and C. McGarty. 1996. “Salient Group Memberships and Persuasion: The Role of Social Identity in the Validation of Beliefs.” In What’s Social about Social Cognition? Research on Socially Shared Cognition in Small Groups, edited by Judith L. Nye and Aaron M. Brower. London: Sage Publications, Inc. Heins, Volker. 2008. Nongovernmental Organizations in International Society: Struggles over Recognition. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Huddy, L., S. Feldman, and E. Cassese. 2007. “On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger.” In The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior, edited by W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and Ann N. Crigler. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Isbell, L. M., V. C. Ottati, and K. C. Burns. 2006. “Affect and Politics: Effects on Judgment, Processing, and Information Seeking.” In Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing, edited by David P. Redlawsk. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2008. Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kelman, Herbert C. 1965. “Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: The Question of Relevance.” In International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, edited by Herbert C. Kelman. New York: Holt. ———.1977. “The Conditions, Criteria, and Dialectics of Human Dignity: A Transnational Perspective.” International Studies Quarterly 21 (3): 529–552. ———. 1997. “Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity: Social-Psychological Dimensions.” In Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations, edited by Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub. Chicago: Wadsworth Publishing. ———. 2007. “Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict.” In Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, edited by I. William Zartman. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. ———. 2008. “A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Analysis and Resolution.” In Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, edited by Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, and Jessica Senehi. London: Routledge. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lerner, J. S., and D. Keltner. 2000. “Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgement and Choice.” Cognition & Emotion 14 (4): 473–493. ———. 2001. “Fear, Anger, and Risk.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (1): 146–159.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 54

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples  ✻  55 Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books. Mackie, D.M., E. R. Smith, and D. G. Ray. 2008. “Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2 (5): 1866–1880. Mead, George Herbert. (1932) 1964. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mercer, Jonathan. (1996) 2009. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Mercer, L.L.C. 2008a. “Engaging Employees to Drive Global Business Success: Insights from Mercer’s What’s Working Research.” http://www.mercer.com/attachment.dyn? idContent=1246465&filePath=/attachments/English/WWGlobalReport1.pdf. ———. 2008b. “Research Provides Insights on Engaging Employees to Drive Business Success.” http://www.mercer.com/press-releases/1292085. Miller, D. T. 2001. “Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice.” Annual Review of Psychology 52 (1): 527–553. Platow, M., J. Wenzel, and M. Nolan. 2003. “The Importance of Social Identity and SelfCategorization Processes for Creating and Responding to Fairness.” In Social Identity at Work: Developing Theory for Organizational Practice, edited by S. Haslam, D. van Knippenberg, M. J. Platow, and N. Ellemers. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Pond, Elizabeth. 2003. Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Ringmar, Erik. 1996. “On the Ontological Status of the State.” European Journal of International Relations 2 (4): December 1, 439–466. Rydell, R. J., D. M. Mackie, A. T. Maitner, H. M. Claypool, M. J. Ryan, and E. R. Smith. 2008. “Arousal, Processing, and Risk Taking: Consequences of Intergroup Anger,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34 (8): 1141–1152. Smith, H. J., T. R. Tyler, and Y. Huo. 2003. “Interpersonal Treatment, Social Identity and Organizational Behavior.” In Social Identity at Work: Developing Theory for Organizational Practice, edited by S. Haslam, D. van Knippenberg, M. J. Platow, and N. Ellemers. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Smith, H. J., T. R. Tyler, Y. J. Huo, D. J. Ortiz, and E. A. Lind. 1998. “The Self-Relevant Implications of the Group-Value Model: Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment Quality.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 34 (5): 470–493. Snyder, Jack L. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Stein, J. G. 2008. “Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models.” In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. Oxford University Press, USA. Stern, P. C. 1995. “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?” Political Psychology 16 (2): 217–235. Stone, C. H., and R. J. Crisp. 2007. “Superordinate and Subgroup Identification as Predictors of Intergroup Evaluation in Common Ingroup Contexts.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10 (4). Szabo, Stephen F. 2004. Parting Ways: The Crisis In German-American Relations. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Tajfel, H., and J. Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In Social

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 55

4/18/11 12:36 PM

56  ✻  Reinhard Wolf Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Monterey: Brooks/Cole. Tang, S. 2005. “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict.” Security Studies 14 (1): 34–62. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Guttman, 25–74. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tetlock, Philip E. 1998. “Social Psychology and World Politics.” In The Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. Oxford University Press, USA. Turner, John C., M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher, and M. S. Wetherell. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. New York: Blackwell Publishers. Tyler, Tom, and S. L. Blader. 2000. Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. ———. 2001. “Identity and Cooperative Behavior in Groups.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 4 (3): 207–226. Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International Security 18 (4): 5–39. Van Kleef, G. A., E. van Dijk, W. Steinel, F. Harinck, and I. van Beest. 2008. “Anger in Social Conflict: Cross-Situational Comparisons and Suggestions for the Future.” Group Decision and Negotiation 17 (1): 13–30. Wendt, Alexander. 2004. “The State as Person in International Theory.” Review of International Studies 30(2): 289–316. Wight, Colin. 2004. “State Agency: Social Action Without Human Activity?” Review of International Studies 30 (2): 269–280. Wolf, Reinhard. 2011. “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition.” International Theory 3(1): 105–142. Woodward, Bob. 2004. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster. Worchel, S. 2003. “Come One, Come All: Toward Understanding the Process of Collective Behavior.” In The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by Michael A. Hogg and Joel M. Cooper. Sage Publications Ltd. Wright, Robert. 1994. The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Pantheon.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 56

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 3

Symbolic and Physical Violence Philippe Braud

The manner in which political violence is defined will have a significant impact on the answers to other important questions, such as what types of self-defense are appropriate; who initiated the aggressive interaction; and what factors sparked violence or made it worse or, on the contrary, will help end it. In popular discourse, the word “violence” has three different meanings, the first of which is not really relevant here: the idea of a furious and incontrollable action (“violent storm”); the idea of destructive aggression that causes personal or material injury (“violent behavior”); and finally the idea of attacking things which deserve respect (“doing violence to a belief”). If we accept Durkheim’s rule, according to which the scientific definition of a concept should maintain reasonable links with the term’s colloquial usage, these introductory observations are far from insignificant. This is in part because specifying what constitutes an act of violence is itself a political issue. So we have to distance ourselves from the terms used by the actors. Compare, for example, how the war in Algeria, waged by the French from 1954 to 1962, was labeled as “opérations de pacification,” and how the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was seen by the Soviet Union as a “manifestation of proletarian solidarity.” We must find a way of avoiding the trap of such politically and culturally biased definitions. From the perspective of democratic ideals, violent behavior is normally condemned. As a result, this encourages frequent strategies of semantic evasion in which one qualifies or otherwise hides potentially inappropriate actions with which one identifies. However, scientific analysis has to keep its distance, or rather suspend value judgments that may divert it from an impartial perspective. The object of our analysis is 57

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 57

4/18/11 12:36 PM

58  ✻  Philippe Braud to identify criteria that enable us to understand all forms of political violence without political restrictions. This chapter will begin by defining symbolic violence and explaining how it is related to physical violence. The two are necessarily linked, I’ll argue, since physical violence without symbolic and emotional aspects is meaningless, and since physical violence often is a response to symbolic violence. In conclusion, some implications of this argument will be drawn for the practice and study of international politics.

Why Symbolic Violence Is Violence In the scientific literature, political violence is commonly perceived as physical violence whose targets or victims, modus operandi or effects, add political meaning—either in terms of the resources to be employed or the threats to be prevented. Explicitly or not, a majority of researchers have adopted the definition made famous by Nieburg: “ . . . acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.”1 As is evident from the first part of this quote, it is tempting to emphasize only the material dimension of violence—the part that leaves visible marks. This approach makes it easier to empirically identify violence and, since it is more easily delimited, seemingly presents a more rigorous definition. As a result, this definition has been used by a large majority of field researchers, including those who, like Charles Tilly, attempt to quantitatively compare observable levels of visible violence across time and space.2 Despite its obvious advantages, a definition that relies only, or even in large part, on material criteria leads to serious intellectual problems. In the first place, it does not properly consider the emotional dimension that accompanies all forms of violence. When we say “urban riots,” we refer not only to burned cars and injured bystanders but also to the fear and anger of the victims. Furthermore, the victims include not only those who are injured, but anyone who has suffered from the effects of the violence. For example: urban riots also provide evidence, at least temporarily, of the state’s failure to accomplish its goal of maintaining public order. In this sense, the state is humiliated by public displays of disorder. Similarly, an armed conflict involves not only the deployment of troops, the use of weapons, and physical destruction, but it is intrinsically also a mode of selfaffirmation that entails much emotional suffering. Even if it is limited by relatively restrictive conditions, war justifies the right to destroy and to kill, and this constitutes a significant breach with essential societal values. It sets up a specific body of moral precepts. In addition, physical confrontations are usually accompanied by denunciations and even a demonization of the adversaries in order to describe them as inferior. Exceptions include “chivalrous” battles, or battles fought in sports, but in

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 58

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Symbolic and Physical Violence  ✻  59 these cases, the equal standing of the protagonists is a precondition for the existence of their rivalry. This emotional dimension—which accompanies every form of violence, from assassination attempts to riots, from arbitrary arrests to armed conflicts—is what gives violence its political consequences and ramifications. As noted previously, the impact of material violence depends on the symbolic value of the event, which in turn relies on factors such as the status of the victim, the nature of the targets, and the emotional effects spread by the event. The murder of an ambassador does not resonate in the same way as an attack on the average national of a foreign country. A burning flag during a public disturbance will have a greater impact than the burning of a simple piece of fabric. Even calculating the number of victims in a war or a terrorist act is not a purely objective decision. The statistical operation may be used to mobilize outrage or to dishearten an adversary. The timing of a body count—whether in war-time or in peace—will affect its impact. Or consider the labeling of certain acts as “genocide” or “crimes against humanity.” In contemporary society, such labels have both an emotional charge and juridical consequences (for example, a no-limitation period for prosecuting). So the label establishes the exceptional gravity of certain behaviors and also a special duty on the part of posterity to remember the violence. The stigmatization of terrorism rests on the fact that terrorists ignore the “rules of war” and harm “innocent civilians”—both notions are of course highly psychologically charged. Consider a historical example: the battle of Stalingrad had emotional effects in so far as Hitler, as well as Stalin, regarded the fall of the city as a striking symbol of humiliation and not only as a purely strategic interest. Similarly, the 1940 defeat of France in less than three weeks immediately dissipated the myth that the largest military force of the inter-war years also would be the strongest.3 Civilian victims add an affective aspect to every armed conflict, which technologies such as “intelligent bombs” seek to avoid. In practice, historians of war do not necessarily neglect the importance of such emotional dimensions. In practice, historians of war do not necessarily neglect the importance of such emotional dimensions, yet, if they study them, they often do not include them in the actual definition of violence. A further disadvantage of this restricted point of view is that it disregards the possibility of a kind of violence that is independent of physical or destructive action but causes similar psychological injuries. Xenophobic or racist insults and abuse deliberately try to make the target feel fragile and humiliated. Nationalist arrogance, or the claiming of religious, ideological, or ethical superiority, is a source of affront to those who are not members of these groups. Today, one can observe these effects on formerly colonized people.4 Legally enforced apartheid was based on contempt for some social, ethnic, religious, or national group that established society regarded as inferior and from which it sought to separate itself. During the era of European colonization, this occurred through the creation of a stratified institutional framework, including laws that prohibited

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 59

4/18/11 12:36 PM

60  ✻  Philippe Braud mixed marriage between individuals of different religions or races, the separation of educational institutions and spaces for living and leisure, as well as discrimination when it comes to political rights. More persistent today is social apartheid, or the implicit banning of particular lifestyles. Transgressions of these norms are punished by cultural stigmatization. Even if this psychological form of violence—the emotional impact of which can be equal or superior to that of physical violence—is often intentional, such intentionality disappears in other situations. Psychological violence is often the result of structural constraints and will for that reason happen regardless of the intentions, pure or otherwise, of the perpetrators, and it will occur even in cases where no perpetrators are identifiable. As an illustration of the first case, consider attempts to assist the poor, either within one country or internationally. Policies of poverty relief often confine the recipients to a dependent and inferior status. Even in the most successful case, and in spite of the material benefits, it may still lead a form of psychological suffering. More broadly, social relations of inequality (from master to servant, from superior to inferior, from employer to employee) conceal violent potential as long as this inequality is not recognized by the dominated as entirely legitimate. The nature of this relationship depends not only on the employer’s management style or his ability to acknowledge those under his authority, but also on the ideological framework through which hierarchy and dependence are deciphered. The probability that employees and employers perceive each other as victims of violence increases in a society dominated by the discourse of class struggle. On the contrary, this probability is much weaker in a society where paternalistic relations are accepted by all parties, since the legitimacy of the employers is not questioned.5 The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to international relations, especially when military alliances—the former Warsaw pact, present-day NATO—unite unequal states. Depending on the ways in which the relationships are deciphered, superpower hegemony may be perceived either as an unendurable dependence or as “fraternal friendship.” The presence of a foreign military must be made sense of through subjective perceptions that are socially constructed. Whether such a presence is perceived as political violence or not is never only the mere reflection of a material fact. The same conclusion applies to rapid changes in traditional ways of life. Discoveries of gold and oil, accelerated industrialization, as well as rapid urbanization have always resulted in social upheavals. Depending on whether people have eagerly adapted themselves to the new conditions or regarded the changes as doing irreparable damage to a cherished way of life, the clash between tradition and modernity will be perceived either as an opportunity or as an intrinsically violent process. In fact, both attitudes often co-exist in the same society—sometimes in an individual mind—giving rise to conflicts or to split personalities. However, the violence of these processes becomes obvious when beliefs that underpin the cohesion of a social group are discredited, or when a foreign occupying power denigrates a society’s religious or civil patrimony, its sacred space, or time-honored customs.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 60

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Symbolic and Physical Violence  ✻  61 The Westernization of the world—accelerating throughout the past century—mass migration, and even differences in birthrates between different groups in multicultural societies have contributed to making people disoriented regarding their identities and produced new sources of social and political instability. Following the arrival of the Europeans, the “clash of civilizations” was particularly violent in the Americas, North and South. Today it is especially conspicuous in the Muslim world, torn between accepting or rejecting the alien values. People who seek to maintain their traditional ways of life experience Western cultural and political supremacy as an unmistakable form of violence.6 Symbolic violence is thus an inseparable component of any physical violence on the one hand and on the other, an autonomous, underestimated form of violence. But how can symbolic violence be defined? Pierre Bourdieu understands it as “une violence douce, invisible, méconnue comme telle, choisie autant que subie.”7 He sees symbolic violence in the way knowledge is defined and imposed in school; in the criteria of aesthetic judgments determining good taste or appropriate language; in codes of civility and manners of being or doing by which social elites recognize each other. In all these situations, the dominated are obliged to bow to the pressure of norms presented as socially neutral, though in reality these norms express the interests and aspirations of the ruling class. Thus defined, symbolic violence has affinities with Johan Galtung’s conception of “structural violence,” since it too emphasizes situational effects rather than intentional actions.8 However, both definitions overlook the victim’s point of view. It matters little for neither Bourdieu nor Galtung whether the person accepts the situation, eagerly or indifferently, or whether he or she suffers. According to them, only genuine sociologists know when violence is being exercised! This definition nevertheless leads to an interesting conclusion. Pierre Bourdieu asserts that the “principal effect” of symbolic violence is to reinforce a feeling of inferiority among the dominated. Forced to imperfectly assimilate to the norms of an alien environment, the dominated either internalize their inferiority or they adopt a rebellious, but inevitably very costly, posture. In this way, the author highlights a crucial element of any analysis of symbolic action—the damage done to one’s selfesteem. This is a conclusion of great importance, albeit arrived at from a different point of view. The criterion of any violence, be it justified or not, is the suffering experienced by a victim. We detect violence whenever an attack causes injury to a person or his property, to the affinity networks made up of relatives or members of the same social group, or to his way of life or his beliefs. This injury is never exclusively material. Suffering physical brutalities or material damage is always, at the same time, an experience of confusion, humiliation, and the painful feeling of vulnerability, whether this experience is short-lived or enduring, superficial or intense. Accordingly, mere physical suffering does not constitute a sufficient definition; besides, physical suffering is absent in the case of attacks on a person’s property, and it is absent too, say, in the case of the relatives and followers of a politician who is suddenly murdered. They too suffer but in quite a different way. Neither can a

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 61

4/18/11 12:36 PM

62  ✻  Philippe Braud definition of violence rest solely on the material nature of the act. Strictly speaking, brute force exercised in accordance with the rules of a game, such as in sports, does not create casualties. One cannot reduce violence to a single material, destructive dimension since, crucially, the emotional impact will be missing. On the other hand, menacing gestures, not accompanied by coercion, have a violent potential under some circumstances. For the same reason, no definition should rely merely on an actor’s aggressiveness. As we said, some forms of violence can hardly be attributed to identifiable actors, and others are unintentional results of individual action. Instead any definition of violence, and in particular of political violence, has to focus on the victim. While the perpetrator may be non-existent and the act ambiguous, the event as experienced by the victim is the common element of all forms of violence—be it minor or major, material or purely symbolic. It is the very reality of this experience that sets the dynamic of emotions in motion: outrage and desire for revenge; the attempt to legitimize one’s claims; feelings of compassionate solidarity; the urgent need to reconstruct one’s self. Yet, for the victim to be identified as such in political life, the objective fact of a physical and/or psychological injury is unlikely to be sufficient. First, the victim has to be socially recognized. Sometimes such social recognition of victims is instantaneous: political assassinations or unprovoked aggressions against unarmed countries make it impossible to deny that the targets indeed are victims. In other cases, however, victimhood must be attributed to specific groups by influential organizations before it can result in political action. Often the identification of victims is a drawn-out process and the verdict is not always unanimous. For a long time, “first peoples” in Canada, Australia, and the United States struggled in vain to be recognized as victims of European expansion. Moreover, when the victim is not perceived as innocent, the process may get stuck or fail completely. For example: after the Second World War, Germans were unlikely to be regarded as victims. In fact, they were unlikely to recall even their own experiences of suffering under Allied bombardment.9 Why do we call it “symbolic violence”? It is certainly not because this violence is secondary or minor compared with physical injury or material damage. The opposite is more often true: the assassination of a celebrity, for instance, hurts many people beyond the physical suffering of the victim. This violence is symbolic in the sense that the damage operates at the level of self-representations, and it lowers self-esteem. In this way, all symbolic violence entails humiliation, fragility, and powerlessness, and it inflicts injuries on a person’s identity.10 How victims react to symbolic violence depends on their position of power; whether they have means of retaliating or whether they remain in a state of irreversible inferiority. In the former case, the symbolic violence suffered makes us want to wash away the insult, to remove the feeling of vulnerability and weakness through exhibitions of power. This accounts for the propensity to disproportional retaliation. Compare the reaction of the United States to the September 11 attacks or Israel to raids by Palestinian armed groups. In both cases, the aim is to restore an image tarnished by impressions of weakness.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 62

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Symbolic and Physical Violence  ✻  63 In the second scenario, where the victims have no means of retaliating, they are likely to suffer permanent injury to their identities. This is more likely the more intense the symbolic charge. An arbitrary arrest lowers a person to the status of a second-rate citizen, anguished and bruised, as state protection has abandoned him, and equality before the law has turned out to be an illusion. Only a restoration of justice, noticeably in courts, can lessen the damage to the self-image. During an armed conflict, capitulation in front of a stronger adversary results in a profound feeling of humiliation. Likewise, torture or deportation to camps with inhuman living conditions wounds the victims’ dignity; the damage to one’s self-esteem is so severe it may become irreparable.11 Symbolic violence can be of low or high intensity. It can show itself openly or remain buried, disguised behind the appearance of purely material violence. Occasionally it infiltrates silently and covertly into social and political relations, even if these appear to be outwardly innocuous. Whether or not symbolic violence is related to physical and material damage, it is judged by the same criterion: the reality of psychological injuries lowering or, in the worst cases, even destroying the self-esteem of an individual or a collective. In this way, we are able to incorporate Bourdieu’s conclusion that feelings of inferiority are nothing more than the consequence of the exercise of symbolic action. In my view, however, this feeling is not reduced to a simple side effect but is instead the very essence of symbolic violence. It is a symptom of symbolic violence and its most relevant criterion. Symbolic violence is a form of political violence if, and only if, the collective reactions they provoke have an influence on the course of political life. When subjected to symbolic violence, some people remain passive, but their resignation or apathy, directly derived from a profound sense of inferiority, facilitates the rule of the establishment. Others, more active, over-compensate by imitating the dominant practices of the establishment. Neither are threatening the current political order but contribute instead to reinforcing it. Among other people subjected to it, however, symbolic violence may cause a rejection of dominant values and rules and the results will be destabilizing. This occurs both inside states and the international community.

Symbolic Violence and International Violence The reintegration of symbolic violence into the concept of political violence has several consequences. 1. The first one is perfectly perceived by classical analyses of political violence: there is but an approximate proportionality between the intensity of the violence felt by a victim and the objective reality of the proven injury. On the political stage, particularly in an international context, claims of attacks on one’s dignity and reputation are often exaggerated in order to advance one’s standing, to demand reparations, or to represent a belligerent move as an act of “legitimate

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 63

4/18/11 12:36 PM

64  ✻  Philippe Braud right to self-defense.” In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalist governments have often resorted to this ensemble of arguments in their territorial or commercial conflicts with neighbors. During the era of Romantic patriotism, injured self-esteem—real or imagined—often pushed a country to war. In 1870, the tone of the Ems Dispatch made up by Bismarck was enough to trigger the desire of the French to go to war against the Germans.12 Similarly, the Fashoda episode drove the United Kingdom and France to the verge of an open conflict.13 On the other hand, symbolic violence is minimized, or even denied, in cases of groups who are deprived of political resources adequate for making their complaints heard. For a long time, nomadic peoples forced to settle in one place or traditional farmers removed from their land by agro-industries or by urbanization drew little interest.14 In developing countries, insufficient attention is paid to people displaced by the construction of gigantic dams or oil and mining prospecting. If their fate arouses little more than indifference, their isolated acts of resistance are easily labeled as common organized crime. Or take the case of religious believers in advanced societies whose lives are destabilized as a result of secularization. In nineteenth-century Europe, secularization led to anti-clericalism and political tension. Today Muslim despair is widely misunderstood in Western countries, especially among the most secular strata of the population. As these examples indicate, any assessment of suffering on the part of victims of violence depends on the system of values through which a situation is judged. In the sixteenth century, few moralists were worried regarding a slave trade, which today is universally condemned.15 This way of ignoring the feelings of the victims can perhaps be understood as an indirect consequence of the common conception that violence necessarily is associated with evil. For example: if economic development is understood as intrinsically good, and if the spread of Western values of democracy and liberty throughout the world is an essentially positive process, those who are suffering from the consequences of these processes can hardly be considered real victims. The violence perpetrated on these “backward” people is ignored, and their suffering is perceived as embarrassing, even illegitimate. This conclusion may perhaps be politically justified, but that is not good enough for a researcher who aims to remain neutral and objective. The point here is not to equate political violence with stigmatized behavior— the definition of which, in any case, would always be contested. The point is rather to understand the specific reality that ensues given certain premises. The military violence to which al-Qaeda’s combatants are subject, and the purely symbolic violence suffered in today’s world by fundamentalist believers of all religious faiths can, from a certain point of view, be regarded as the product of legitimate action. Yet this does not mean that no violence is exercised. By acknowledging this fact, we are in a better position to understand how people react to attacks on self-esteem.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 64

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Symbolic and Physical Violence  ✻  65 2. Another consequence of the reintegration of symbolic violence into the concept of political violence is the need to rethink the true origin of military conflicts and armed resistance, as well as the factors to be taken into account for a fair and lasting solution to the problem of violence16. This raises significant political stakes. When a conflict breaks out, the question of “Who started it?” requires the identification of an aggressor, and it gives an internationally recognized right of self-defense to the victim. And yet it is easy to misjudge the role played by symbolic violence in the period preceding the call to arms. For an example, consider the case of people whose firmly held religious beliefs are made fun of—say in the form of caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed—or cases, such as in the Niger Delta, where multinational companies exploiting the country’s mineral wealth without any perceived benefits to the local population are made targets of armed attacks. In order to understand the whole dynamic of the conflicts throughout the Middle East, the Caucasus, or Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the apparently endless confrontations between certain neighboring states, one should not forget to study the exercise of symbolic violence prior to physical violence. The failure to take into consideration what happened before physical violence broke out constitutes an obstacle in the search for lasting peaceful solutions. To neglect references to the events that preceded the open conflict constitutes an additional example of violence inflicted on the victim. When a conflict is ignited, mutual misunderstandings will perpetuate the conflict. Take the case of violence aimed at new settlers. On the one hand, people dispossessed of their land who have suffered injustices that are deeply engraved in their historical memory, consider the presence of these newcomers as unacceptable. On the other hand, the new residents who have become targets of attacks—Israel— or social apartheid—Russians in the Baltic states—find the violence of their neighbors to be cruel and inhuman. Each group rejects the suffering of the other as quickly as the abyss of fear and hatred grows. In addition, labels applied to the adversary—“terrorists” or “Zionists,” “fascists” or “occupiers”—create further antagonisms, adding new wounds to already fragile identities. To take into account the suffering of the other, regardless of the political cost of doing so, is an indispensable element in any lasting solution to an intractable conflict.17 Real peace requires a real recognition of all the suffering perceived by the adversary. However, such recognition does not imply an automatic acceptance of the aim of the adversary or a justification for the methods it uses in its struggle. What is required is a rejection of the idea that the violence perpetrated by the adversary necessarily is “irrational.” Apart from a few truly pathological crimes, irrationality is rare, and explicative factors can be found even in the case of the most odious attack. Surely suicide bombings can only be explained by a sort of personal and collective despair caused, in turn, by injuries to an identity that are ill-perceived by the outside world. The fact that an increasing percentage of Palestinians

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 65

4/18/11 12:36 PM

66  ✻  Philippe Braud understands or even supports such actions is not intelligible as a response to the purely material violence displayed by Israel to assure its security. There is clearly another level of analysis to be explored in order to interpret this manifest discrepancy between actions and reactions. And we need intellectual tools that are able to conceptualize it. 3. Symbolic violence does not only generate aggressive reactions in its victims, but it also increases the probability of aggressive attacks from the dominant group. Symbolic violence, we said, undermines identities, and undermined people are more easily made into targets of physical violence. This is particularly the case if a group’s status is widely perceived as inferior. This means that the violence committed against it draws fewer compassionate responses from the outside world. As a result, the group’s capacity for retaliation is reduced, and harsh measures can be put in place with less hesitation. This is why racism, anti-Semitism, and all fears of otherness are potentially murderous. If such heterophobia comes to constitute an accepted discourse in a society, it creates a favorable climate for aggressive acts. Isolated individuals or extremist organizations, identifying themselves with the dominant group, may feel authorized to commit brutalities either against members of the stigmatized community—“to put them back in their place”—or against the symbols of their identity. In Europe, even today, migrants and Gypsies and synagogues and mosques constitute such targets. Although the first perpetrators of such outrages no doubt have a propensity for violence whose origin is far from political, the choice of their targets is given by the socially accepted discourse of contempt. If such prejudices turn into official ideologies, the state apparatus can be mobilized against the stigmatized communities, enlarging the circle of potential perpetrators while increasing the number of bystanders who feel they can legitimately avert their eyes from the violence being committed. During a civil war, each side tends to vilify the enemy as “monstrous.” If such rhetoric becomes dominant, the temptation grows to ignore regular juridical and humanitarian practices and the consideration appropriate for a human being. As a result, there is an increase in police abuse, imprisonment without trial, harsh interrogations, unexplained deaths, and disappearances. In the course of military operations, methods will be used which increasingly resemble war crimes: indiscriminate military attacks, aggressive treatment of prisoners of war, violence against civilians, and systematic rape. Even if the perpetrators are not officially encouraged in these actions, they are easily absolved of their crimes by a public opinion that does not properly understand the harsh condemnations of the outside world, nor the possible legal consequences. When peace breaks out, however, the conduct widely allowed during the conflict will be re-evaluated. Apologies and regrets, if not actual compensation, are a precondition for a true and lasting reconciliation. At the end of a civil war, a country is often divided between those who want amnesia and/or amnesty, and those who want the perpetrators to answer for the crimes. To

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 66

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Symbolic and Physical Violence  ✻  67 the extent that legal processes are carried out, they do not only have the aim of compensating the victims, but also of providing society as a whole with cathartic experience. 4. Without the concept of symbolic violence, it is difficult to understand the mechanisms behind perpetual violence. Emotional dynamics cause serious distortions of rational judgment. This first happens prior to the decision to resort to force and then again while the violence is in progress. Armed conflicts, in the main, do not originate in simple confrontations of interests. If this were the case, cold rational calculations would lead actors to avoid many wars because they often enough prove to be prohibitively costly, in human and material terms, even for the winner. Moreover, is it really possible to clearly distinguish interests and passions? As Montesquieu already argued, followed by Adam Smith, even the quest for financial profit can be considered as a “soft passion.”18 To fight in defense of economic interests also involves a certain idea of identity. On the international stage, this means to claim a rank and a status. For this reason, if a country’s preoccupation with protecting the security and economic stability of its citizens plays a major role in causing armed conflicts, these factors come to operate in an emotional context, perfectly understood by the actors. There are four main emotions at play here, all closely related to symbolic violence. First there is fear.19 A normal reaction to danger for all vulnerable individuals and groups, fear is a natural emotion, and it weighs heavily in the calculations of all political actors: fear of humiliation, fear of a failure, fear not to respond adequately to the expectations of public opinion, fear of being overwhelmed by challenges. Yet fear is at the same time a particularly volatile emotion. It inspires uncontrollable and disproportionate conduct: paralyzing astonishment as well as frenzied energy. Fear itself is commonly feared, since it often results in dishonorable acts such as withdrawal or escape, or a subservient acceptance of the will of the enemy. To admit to fear when confronting an adversary is to reduce oneself to an inferior position, and this, in turn, is to lose face. In order to cover up such an outcome, decision-makers and opinion-makers may react by means of aggressive rhetoric. Such rhetoric can itself put a country on the path of war, a step that may prove irreversible to the extent that it provokes symmetric reactions in the adversary camp or makes domestic opinion believe in the idea, or the illusion, of triumph. A second emotion, closely related to symbolic violence, we could perhaps refer to as predatory ardor. This emotion often arises both among the ruling circles and the general population of a country if the balance of power is all too clearly in their favor. Armed conflicts are encouraged by everything that stirs this temptation. If a war seems to promise substantial advantages at a reduced cost, the only problem that confronts power-hungry politicians is how to come up with the legitimate motivations. For this reason, wars were often declared in the name of religion or national pride, and today they are often declared in the name of “national liberation” or the

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 67

4/18/11 12:36 PM

68  ✻  Philippe Braud f­ urthering of democracy or human rights. However, behind these honorable motivations, loudly proclaimed by the actors, the passion for triumph and the appetite for material benefit soon show themselves. In the end, the self-confident victors, in violation of their stated war aims, display a considerable reluctance to cede the territories they have conquered or to restrain themselves when it comes to setting the conditions of the peace. Those among them who better anticipate the uncertain future and adopt a more conciliatory line will run into hawks who heavily criticize them for their concessions. Third, one cannot underestimate the role of resentment.20 Nietzsche correctly regarded resentment as a hidden confession of weakness or sense of inferiority, which in return entails an all-consuming desire for revenge. Caused by a previous experience of symbolic violence and/or memories of past cruelties, this feeling strongly feeds the propensity for taking a hard line in conflict situations.21 Resentment may be the main motivation for individuals to join organizations that favor violent words or violent acts. As for decision-makers, regardless of their own thoughts, they have to address the constraints imposed on them by the feelings of resentment among ordinary people. Such feelings are common when a population has experienced oppression or humiliation at the hands of representatives of alternative cultural or political systems. In democracies, when public opinion is sufficiently agitated, it may force the actions of a government that, everything else equal, would like to keep its cool. Although the material benefits expected from a conquest or a war never accrue equally to all members of a society, all can feel the sense of triumph that accompanies the successful exercise of power over an enemy, not least since this gives relief from a lingering sense of inferiority. Last, the emotion of losing and saving face is a well-known explanation for the conduct of individuals in their personal and social lives.22 The same mechanism exists in interstate relations where considerations of prestige are greatly increased. The complex codified language and etiquette of international diplomacy can largely be explained by a concern for avoiding a terminology and behavior, which can be perceived as symbolically violent by the adversary. Officials humiliated on the international stage are politically weakened inside their own country, and their future is compromised. Military defeats almost always provoke at least forced resignations or, in more extreme cases, coup d’états or regime change. The loss of face and the quest to regain it makes citizens swing from feelings of anger to depression and to desire for revenge. By contrast, military successes reinforce the authority of the government, protecting them from criticism of their domestic policy. Indeed, in binding individuals together in a sense of pride in their community, this emotion explains the mystery of allegiance to a community or a nation. The consideration of symbolic violence, be it intentional or unintentional, associated with physical violence or not, seems indispensable for a better understanding of the historic, sequential chain of events at the root of internal troubles as well as international conflicts. The notion of symbolic violence forces us to undertake a more balanced re-examination of the actions and responsibilities pertaining to various

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 68

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Symbolic and Physical Violence  ✻  69 a­ ctors. A better understanding of the global dimensions of violence and war presents without doubt a move forward toward a durable peace.

Notes Translated by Sador Usmanov, with Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. 1. Nieburg 1969, 13. 2. Tilly 2003. 3. Shirer 1969. 4. Ashcroft and Alii 2000. 5. See the model of Nurturing Parent Family versus Strict Father Family as framing political opinions in Lakoff 1996. 6. This is a strong component and even a deciding factor of the famous “clash of civilizations.” See Huntington 1996. His work implicitly refers to the concept of symbolic violence. 7. Bourdieu 1980, 219. 8. For Galtung, “structural violence” occurs when “human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.” Galtung 1969, 168. 9. Sebald 1999. 10. Braud 2003, 33–47. 11. See the deportees’ stories from writers like Jean Amery, Primo Levi, Imre Kertesz (Nazi Camps) and Gustav Herling (Gulag). Adde: Sofsky 1996. 12. In June 1870, German Chancellor Bismarck deliberately hardened the words of a dispatch announcing that the king of Prussia had rejected some claims of France so that the French emperor felt strongly humiliated and went to war, which was what Bismarck secretly wished. See Howard 1999. 13. Levering 1995. 14. Scott 1985. 15. Thomas 1997. 16. Allan and Keller 2006. 17. Again, Allan and Keller 2006. On Northern Ireland, see O’Leary 2007. 18. The classical text here is Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests, 1977. 19. Robin 2004. 20. Ansart 2002. 21. Burg and Shoup 1999. 22. See Goffman 1967; Brown 1977.

Bibliography Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller, eds. 2006. What is a Just Peace? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ansart, Pierre, ed. 2002. Le Ressentiment. Brussels: Bruylant. Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. 2000. The Post Colonial Studies Reader 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 69

4/18/11 12:36 PM

70  ✻  Philippe Braud Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. Le Sens pratique. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. Braud, Philippe. 2003. “Violence politique et mal-être identitaire.” Raisons politiques: Questions de violence. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 33–47. ———. 2004. Violences politiques. Paris: Seuil. Brown, Bert. 1977. “Face Saving and Face Restoration in Negotiations.” In Negotiations. Social-Psychological Perspectives, edited by D. Druckman. London: Sage. Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup. 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. Galtung, Johan. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6. Goffman, Erving. 1967. Interaction Ritual. New York: Anchor Books. Howard, Michael. 1999. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871. London: Routledge. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Lakoff, George. 1996. Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don’t. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levering, David. 1995. The Race to Fashoda: London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Nieburg, H. L. 1969. Political Violence: The Behavioral Process. New York: St. Martin’s. O’Leary, Brendan. 1996. The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland. London, NJ: Athlone. Robin, Corey. 2004. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scott, James. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sebald, W. G. 1999. Luftkrieg und Literatur. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag. Shirer, William. 1969. The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster. Sofsky, Wolfgang. 1996. The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thomas, Hugh. 1997. The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440–1870. New York: Simon and Schuster. Tiffin, Helen, Gareth Griffiths, and Bill Ashcroft. 2000. Post Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts. London: Routledge. Tilly, Charles. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 70

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 4

Is a Just Peace Possible without Thin and Thick Recognition? Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller

Introduction: Peace, Justice, and Recognition Can one have peace without recognition? Obviously, yes: peace may be obtained through imposition. In international relations, when a strong party imposes its will on a weaker one, the violent conflict ends and peace reigns. Although the fundamental disagreement may not have abated, the preceding struggle has ended with the dominance of the powerful. Peace may also result through the utter destruction of the Other. Such a peace can be exemplified by the Roman annihilation of its enemy Carthage on the other shore of the Mediterranean. With the disappearance of a party to a conflict, the conflict itself vanishes. A tautological thought, albeit not an uncommon historical fact. Thus, through imposition or destruction peace can come about in various ways. But is such a peace real, one of a “peace of minds”? Clearly not. For this morally preferable situation, peace needs to be desired by all parties to a conflict. Asserting a wish for peace is vital but insufficient. It does not necessarily trigger negotiations nor bring about a settlement. The real challenge is compromise, achieving peace without either side claiming full victory. It is this second, more demanding kind of peace that we discuss in this chapter by presenting a concept as well as a method of reaching a peace that includes justice or elements of it. 71

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 71

4/18/11 12:36 PM

72  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller Can one have such a just peace without recognition? The simple answer is, obviously, no. But what do we mean by recognition? What kind of recognition is mandated? In our contribution, we argue that “thin” recognition, as we call it, while necessary for a Just Peace, is not sufficient for three fundamental reasons. First of all, such recognition does not include the fundamental defining features of identity, nor does it address the crucial issue of the necessary political support within a party that is essential for finding a peaceful solution. In other words, “thick” recognition is needed from all politically relevant parties to a conflict.1 This means a process by which each party needs to understand the Other’s fundamental features of its identity. Mutual empathy—which does not necessarily entail sympathy—is crucial here. An inter-subjective consensus of what each side profoundly needs to remain “self” and thus satisfied should be developed in a Just Peace process. Second, a Just Peace requires two other conditions we posit as indispensable: renouncement and rule. “Renouncement” refers to the requirement of a significant concession made by each party, thus clearly signaling its quest for peace to the other parties in a conflict. “Rule” is a generic term for all the rules and institutions developed in the public peace formula that fully and explicitly recognizes the other party. Third, these four principles or conventions—thin recognition, thick recognition, renouncement, and rule—are not only the necessary and sufficient conditions for calling a given peace a just one. They are also part of a process of exploration wherein the parties explore each other’s identities and, in this task, redefine them, including their own. As a consequence, we argue that the search for a Just Peace modifies the perceptions of the party that is being recognized; in addition, this task also modifies some important features of the original party. Unlike the doctrine of Just War where all conditions are necessary and, in case all are fulfilled, a given war can be deemed a just one, our Just Peace approach therefore defines a process of mutual recognition that goes beyond the initial selfdefinitions of the parties to it. For many years, scholars have primarily focused on the idea of Just War. Countless books have examined the relationship between war and justice from a legal, political, or moral perspective. Surprisingly, there has been very little research on the concept of “just peace” and its history. We have shelves full of excellent studies referring to “negative peace,” “positive peace,” “armed peace,” “perpetual peace,” “democratic peace,” and “universal peace,” but very little has been written in both political science and international law on what is a just peace. Among theories of international relations today, an extensive literature has been devoted to identifying what justice means in an international context, or the more recent, but already sizeable, body of scholarship on the idea that a new kind of world order is developing.2 Some theorists and practitioners have applied methods of research on conflict resolution that focus on the negotiating process and the way in which it is affected by the “call for justice.”3 They have looked at the extent to which such calls influence the outcome of peace negotiations. They have compared case studies to extrapolate the conditions required for a “just peace.” And they have insisted on the importance of cultural differences, emphasizing how the individual

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 72

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition?  ✻  73 or collective attitudes of conflict parties and psychological factors can shape relations between negotiators.4 International lawyers have also participated in the debate over the link between peace and justice by studying the idea of “unequal treaties.” This notion has its origins in the law of contracts and is an outgrowth of the natural-law concept of a fair price. It was debated in the long drafting processes of the law of treaties and of the state succession in respect of treaties.5 Recently, new attention has been paid to the issue by critical legal scholarship providing us with fresh understandings of the relationship between international law, European history, and colonialism.6 These works insist on the discrepancy between formal equality and substantial political and social inequality, paving the way for the theory and practice of compensatory inequality. Nevertheless, like international relations theorists, they have paid far too little attention to what precisely a “just peace” could mean. They have not investigated enough the various conceptions of peace upon which many agreements—especially between Europeans and non-European peoples from 1600 to 1850—were based.7 The purpose of this contribution is therefore to present our concept of Just Peace while extending the discussion on questions of recognition.8 In that perspective, peace agreements must be understood not only as legal documents but also as documents that distinctively frustrate traditional disciplinary, methodological, and theoretical conceptions of law and politics. In other words, peace agreements do not fit neatly into categories like the “political” or the “legal,” the “international” or the “domestic,” or even into “public” or “private” law. Adopting Christine Bell’s position, we define peace agreements as “documents produced after discussion with some or all of the conflict’s protagonists, that address militarily violent conflict with a view to ending it.”9 In that perspective, they are simultaneously process- and substance-related documents where process and substance cannot be separated but must be understood as operating in complex unity.

Peace and Justice in History In Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Quentin Skinner unequivocally demonstrates how Hobbes pitched his political and legal theory to undermine the humanist culture of the Renaissance.10 He rejected the notion of dialogue inherent in humanists’ moral and political philosophy (audi alteram partem), which held that criteria for such a dialogue were applied on a circumstantial or contextual basis rather than being essential or universal. Hobbes sought to overcome the “uncertainty” propagated through humanist philosophy, opting for a scientific and monological footing by setting up a hypothetic-deductive method. In Skinner’s words, Hobbes first initiated “the shift from a dialogical to a monological style of moral and political reasoning.”11 The powerful appeal of Hobbes’s scientifically rigorous method gave rise to a new wave of international legal theorizing that gradually subordinated and overshadowed Grotius, along with the scholastic and classical traditions upon which

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 73

4/18/11 12:36 PM

74  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller he so heavily depended. Indeed, despite their rejection of the Hobbesian conception of the “state of nature,” Pufendorf, Locke, Vattel, and Kant all forged their systems of international relations on a uniform—scientific—vision of law, which ruled out any dialogue with non-European people. Notwithstanding efforts on the part of Pufendorf and Kant, not one of them defined the right of peace in terms of recognition or fairness. They used a language that marginalized the structure and “political” systems of colonized peoples. They came up with a “liberal” theory of natural rights that could be used to justify the imposition of European ideas of political society and community on non-European cultures. By codifying the terms for membership in this post-Westphalian society of states, they drew the boundaries between those who belonged to this society and those who did not. Those who did formed a moral community bound by mutually agreed rules of conduct. And fundamental to this community was the idea that its members were not obliged to treat non-members according to the norms that applied to relations between themselves.12 Thus, the history of the formative period of international law is important in that it outlines the gradual emergence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of a discourse about law that either had pretentions to, or was regarded as having, universal application.13 Other attitudes toward diversity and customs were discarded in favor of one centralized legal conception of peace agreements. In the search for “universal peace”—which is very different from a Just Peace—no effort was made to integrate non-European peoples and non-European visions of history and peace. The debate was restricted to treaties as expressed in normative, European, and legal terms, based on a homogeneous view of a state or a nation. This view did not go unchallenged. In the eighteenth century, some theorists such as Montesquieu and Rousseau pleaded for the necessity to adopt what James Tully calls the “principle of recognition.” They did value difference, not only for its own sake but also because to do otherwise would be to privilege one understanding of what it is to be human over others. In his early writings, especially in his Lettres Persanes (1721), Montesquieu clearly shows that the idea of diversity was a central feature of his social and political thought. He invoked a conception of diversity that recognized the important pedagogical and moral value of the acceptance of various forms of life, as opposed to a relativist or skeptical stance. Praise of the diversity of modes of association was connected with the awareness that in the complexity of the world, the shapes of political goods and evils are never pure or stable. Montesquieu was fascinated by the diversity of laws and ethics across nations and intrigued by the wealth of beliefs and customs throughout time and space; his views on the analysis of the sources of law and on customary law illustrate that point very well. However, he did not recognize the importance of diversity through the eyes of a skeptic or relativist. He did not merely defend each person’s right to be judged according to his or her own laws. The blanket rejection of despotism that pervades his work could not have been built out of relativism. The Spirit of the Laws (1748) is in fact a fundamental attempt to describe universalism and relativism rather than a decision to adopt one or the other. Extreme relativism is

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 74

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition?  ✻  75 a mere illusion, he argued, but it is impossible to go back to a universal philosophy that ignores cultural plurality and the individual’s quest for equality. Rousseau also understood the importance of “thick recognition” for his social theory. In the two Discourses (1750; 1755) and in l’Emile (1762), Rousseau underlined the importance—and the ways—of “knowing” other people. He pinpointed the necessity to understand what is specific about each people and, by extension, the ways in which they might differ from us. He called for an informed attitude, with no ulterior motives, which requires jingoistic prejudice and ethnocentric preconceptions to be cast aside. Rousseau made that point clear in chapter 8 of his Essay on the Origin of Languages. Consequently, he did not just call for equality between men (implying compassion toward indigenous peoples) but also between peoples. His international thought is clearly a forceful plea for equality and fairness between nations. Of course, Montesquieu or Rousseau should not be seen as modern-day advocates of multiculturalism. Indeed, they did not write of culture in the plural (this was a development that would occur in European writings of the nineteenth century, when cultures would begin to signify—only certain—peoples). Nevertheless, they were perfectly aware of the categories under which human diversity was theorized (climate, national character, race, moeurs, etc.). Before Diderot, Burke, Herder, and Kant, whom they profoundly influenced, Montesquieu and Rousseau believed that human beings are fundamental cultural creatures; that is, they possess and exercise, simply by virtue of being human, a range of rational, emotive, and imaginative capacities that create and transform diverse practices and institutions over time. The fact that humans are “cultural agents,” according to them, underlies the diverse moeurs, practices, beliefs, and institutions of different people. It is therefore fair to say that they did reject assimilation unless it was the free choice of the individual or people being assimilated. They argued for a mutual agreement about the conditions for sharing territory and land. It was clear for them that a lasting peace and a just reconciliation between indigenous people and settler societies required “thick” recognition, mutual consent, and negotiations in a respectful manner on a nation-to-nation basis. In recent years, there have been genuine attempts from within the liberal tradition to recognize other cultures and accommodate distinctive cultural or group rights.14 However, too often, liberals do so in keeping with what John Rawls termed “reasonable pluralism,” but solely on their own terms, according to their own world-view.15 Recognition is only acceptable within their own conceptual universe since it is, in their view, a universal one.16 Why is it difficult for liberal political theory to understand the question of mutual recognition between different parties with identities, histories, and cultures that are quite distinct from their own? Mainly because cultures make demands that are identity-defining, and some of these usually defy the cultural neutrality that is one of the foundations of the liberalism. Liberals see these demands as a threat to the constitutional order. According to them, the liberal state should not seek to recognize distinctive cultural or group rights but instead focus on providing effective individual civil rights such as freedom of expression, association, religion, movement, and the like.17

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 75

4/18/11 12:36 PM

76  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller These arguments have been subject to extensive criticism. Numerous authors have underlined the tension between cultural difference and liberalism. Bhikhu Parekh, for example, observes that the liberal state is “a deeply homogenizing institution.”18 It has evolved as a form of political organization that expects its citizens to subscribe to an identical way of defining themselves and is consequently threatened by identities that can set up rival kinds of loyalty. Feminist authors have also underscored how liberal theories have, in their quest for an imaginary unity, systematically put aside other theories, which gave more place to differences. In particular, feminists argue, liberalism has been identified with an abstract individualism that ignores its own gendered content and have criticized the homogenizing ideals of equality that require us to be or become the same.19 In sum, history shows that Western—and above all liberal—political theory has a fundamental problem with the convention of thick recognition, which is central to our perspective and which it cannot always accommodate. Each party has to be able to understand the other’s fundamental identity features, in particular, the differences it needs to remain “self.” The recognition of these differences typically requires reaching out of a universal scheme equally applicable to all parties. Fundamentally, we are arguing in favor of a line of reasoning that is geared to the existence of multiple institutions, legal traditions, and the presence of plural identities in the way parties see themselves. This makes it impossible to resolve the problems of a Just Peace by one all–encompassing original position (as under universalism) or even by two sets of overarching original positions—one within each “nation” and another among the representatives of all nations. The existence of many identities is a central feature of the world and cannot be ignored in exploring the demands for recognition. Only a formal theory of just peace can give justice to this human diversity. This being said, let us now probe deeper into the two fundamental kinds of recognition, starting with the more limited one, thin recognition.

Thin Recognition With thin recognition, parties, states, peoples, or other such collectives recognize each other as agents, as autonomous “entities” that have a particular identity, a history, a culture, and usually their own common language. In other words, they accept each other as collectives of human beings. This thin recognition proceeds simply on the acceptance of the Other, of its having the right to exist and continuing to exist as an autonomous agent. At this level of a thin or minimalist recognition, the “thickness” of the other agent, while being accepted in principle, is not recognized as such and remains in the background. Simply, the Other is only accepted as a full-fledged negotiating partner while the negotiation may not succeed. The most crucial point is that the parties recognize each other as key for resolving the conflict. It is this acceptance of the Other as such which is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition of a Just Peace.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 76

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition?  ✻  77 In this sense, our perspective is analogous to Kant’s minimalist “cosmopolitan right,” “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory,” a “right of resort,” allowing each human being “to attempt to enter into relations” with others, such as trade.20 However, it does not imply the knowledge of the other party’s identity, simply the recognition that he has a separate one and that one can enter into potentially fruitful interchange with him. Interestingly, contemporary work in game theory has given extensive thought to the mutual understanding of the Other. It is invaluable in probing very deeply into the rationality of decision-making in interdependent social situations where each decision has consequences depending on decisions by others. The modeling of the rational choices of actors in such situations requires a theory of who these actors are. However, in order to keep the analysis manageable, these others are highly stylized and homogenized. Indeed, the Other is seen as homogeneous with oneself, albeit with different preferences. Concepts such as “common knowledge,” that is, the joint cognitive elements of a situation and its involved social actors, have become central. What actors know about the situation, about the other players, and also what they know about themselves has become a central feature of game theoretical modeling.21 The insights gained with these perspectives are invaluable. However, they come at a price of a thin recognition, not a thick one. Recognition needs to be thick in the sense of capturing the richness of the Other— this includes the Other’s contradictions and multifaceted richness, which is hard to model analytically. We now turn to this concept.

Thick Recognition Requiring thick recognition means that each party needs to understand the Other in terms of the essential elements composing its identity. This condition is central because it allows each party to identify essential and inevitable “red lines” that cannot be crossed without challenging the very existence of the other party. To make our claims clear: here, we are not asking for an overall consensus between parties. Nor are we requiring the kind of societal consensus necessary in some societies whereby differences are solved by long palavers, and where each individual has in some sense the power of vetoing the collective decision. All we require for a Just Peace is a minimal understanding of the internal support a proposed just solution would have for each significant or relevant group or sensitivity within each actor. According to the identity of an actor, support may stem from the agreement of the legitimate leaders in a representative democracy, or the consent of the major groups supporting an authoritarian system or any other significant domestic political force or sensitivity which may block a Just Peace formula. The notion of identity is therefore crucial. Despite their undeniable rigidities, identities are potentially changeable (and in fact negotiable) for two reasons. First, unlike territory and resources, they are not inherently a zero-sum game; though they

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 77

4/18/11 12:36 PM

78  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller are perceived and debated as such in intense conflicts, it is in fact not the case that one’s identity can be expressed only if the other’s identity is totally denied. If the two—or more—identities are to become compatible, however, they have to be defined anew or redefined. And here is the second reason they are changeable: they can be redefined because they are to a large extent constructed out of real experiences, and these experiences can be presented and ordered in different ways.22 The discovery that accommodation of the Other’s identity need not destroy the core of the group’s own identity makes these changes possible, and this kind of learning is usually taking place during the negotiation process. Therefore, to find a common ground between identities, it is essential to genially understand the core identity of the Other. Thick recognition implies full acceptance of the humanity of the Other—including the contradictory elements of human experience and their societal dimensions.23 But it is not sufficient to comprehend the Other: it is just as important to understand oneself. Surprisingly, most social scientific approaches start from the premise that actors are knowledgeable of themselves and concentrate on how the nature of the Other is defined. Most often, the rationality of the Other is posited in order to be able to rationally enter into social intercourse with her. However, we believe that those representing a party need to fully grasp the core identity and potential for change of their own party in order to be able to devise a solution that will be, sometimes only with time, recognized and accepted by their own people. Having discussed thin and thick recognition, we now discuss two further conditions pertaining to a Just Peace.

Toward a Just Peace The third necessary convention for our Just Peace concept is renouncement in the sense of concessions and compromises being necessary to build a peace that will be accepted as just. Some symbols, positions, and advantages need to be sacrificed. In other words, it is not sufficient to find a win-win formula, but an essential ingredient lies in sacrifices; that is, costs that each party needs to make with respect to the other. Just Peace cannot be had on the cheap with mutual benefits only. Rather, it is a human experience that requires a visible and obvious rapprochement on the human level and that requires visible sacrifices from both parties. Aside from the division of territory, sovereignty, and power, negotiations are often marked by one overriding factor—a symbolic, initially non-negotiable issue around which the conflict is structured. That issue may be the unity of the state, religious freedom, constitutional reform, or the role of a language. In Northern Ireland, the defining factor is the union with Great Britain. Canada’s conflict is embodied in the issue of language. In Kosovo, religion divides hearts and minds. Rule constitutes our fourth and final condition. Just Peace cannot only be in the minds of peoples, a subjective feeling amongst negotiators, a sentiment of justice

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 78

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition?  ✻  79 or peace between them. For a Just Peace to be durable, it needs to be shown in the open, in the public sphere. It requires explicit rules of settlement, legitimate rules of acceptable behavior, and inter-subjective yardsticks allowing all—both parties and outside observers or guarantors—to approve of the solution found. We define rule in the generic sense of common principles, norms, and accepted behaviors. Typically, the rule between parties to a Just Peace is grounded in law, which is seen as a way of shaping the first three conventions. However, is it really impossible to settle on a legal language shared and accepted by all? Therein lies the challenge posed by relativism (impossibility to choose between legal traditions) and perspectivism (impossibility to claim that one holds the truth inside a school of thought). Tzvetan Todorov, Ashis Nandy, and Andrew Linklater provide us with useful insights to solve this dilemma and think about a way to create channels between rival traditions.24 They are concerned with the process of “othering” by means of which a self understands the relationship between itself and some other and is an understanding with practical implications. All three offer richly rewarding insights into cross-cultural understanding, notably Todorov’s idea of “non-violent communication,” Nandy’s notion of a “dialogue of visions,” and Linklater’s application of Jürgen Habermas’s “discourse ethics” to international relations. Through a conversational process that does not assume Western superiority, they argue, it is possible to achieve a dialogue between cultures and the degree of mutual understanding needed to sustain international society. This dialogue permits—but does not necessarily entail—the development of “rule,” the arena where each party’s cultural conventions on recognition and renouncement are reinvented, fleshed out, and modified. This is done by the negotiators who develop narratives encompassing the essential features of each party’s mind-set and expectations.25 The populations themselves may be involved in this process, although their political elites play the major role. By crafting and then drafting a common acceptable convention using the terminology of both negotiating traditions, it allows the features of the just solution to be objectified by a “text.” This term is to be seen in the widest sense, including the essential symbolic features, such as shaking hands, having a common meal, a reciprocal invitation to visit the leaders’ private home, and so forth. It requires a common language to be set forth, respecting the particular identities of each, making their concessions clear to all, and defining the rights and duties of each in securing a Just Peace that is seen by both as a lasting one. Differently put, after the highly “subjective” thick recognition and renouncement, it is necessary that the agreement be fully communicated to the relevant publics. It needs to be publicized, thus entering the public sphere not only of each party but also of all outside observers and third parties, helping to cement the agreement. So far, however, we have not explained in detail how we arrive at this common language, that is, the process of reaching a Just Peace. We believe that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s approach to the concept of understanding provides us with the key element of how parties reach the common language, which allows them in turn to reach a Just Peace. In one of the most famous passages of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein compares language to an ancient city: “Our language may be seen as

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 79

4/18/11 12:36 PM

80  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”26 This analogy is used to make us understand that language, like a city, has grown up in a variety of forms through practices overlapping in many ways the endless diversity of human activities. Like a city, it does have a multiplicity of possible paths. Consequently, it is impossible to articulate a comprehensive rule that stipulates the essential conditions for the correct application of words in every instance, just as there is no such comprehensive view of a city. Wittgenstein explains that, “a meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our language.”27 He thus shows that understanding a general term is not the theoretical activity of interpreting and applying a general theory in distinct cases. It is rather the practical activity of being able to use it in various circumstances. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s philosophy furnishes an alternative way of building an inter-cultural dialogue by enabling the interlocutors to modify their languages and their “pictures of the world.” This dialogical way of apprehending others thus provides us with a process that does not entail comprehending what they say within one side’s own language.28 In sum, his theory gives us a solid base to anchor our concept “rule.” It not only allows us to “do things with words,” following John Austin’s terminology, but it also permits us to go beyond the usual opposition between liberalism and culturalism.29 Our four conditions thus both define a Just Peace and point toward the necessary features of a process leading to it. In fact, by neither specifying some general rules of justice nor the content of the peace but focusing only on some very general forms that the process of a Just Peace needs to proceed through, we have developed a formal concept. A specific Just Peace formula will not necessarily be, as in a Kantian perspective, a perpetual one. Just Peace needs to be maintained, and therefore adapted to changing societal circumstances, in order to survive. We argue that the existence of many collective identities is a central feature of the world and cannot be ignored in exploring the demands for recognition. Therefore, only a formal theory of Just Peace can give justice to this human diversity: each peace is a particular one, accommodating the specific identities involved. Differently put: only a content-free concept is able to accommodate conflicting identities within a procedural approach of mutual recognition, such as our Just Peace concept.

Conclusion In Worcester vs. the State of Georgia (1832), United States Chief Justice John Marshall used thin and thick recognition as the cornerstone of his argument.30 Referring in 1832 to the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, in which the British Crown set out its views on relations between North America and the Amerindian nations, Marshall not only insisted on the fact that it unmistakably recognized indigenous peoples as autonomous nations. He did not portray them using traditional Eurocentric

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 80

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition?  ✻  81 Enlightenment discourse. Instead, he underlined the attitude of British negotiators who adapted their approach to the Amerindian culture and refused to dismiss its peoples as “inferior” on the evolutionary scale. He observed that the British Crown had incorporated the idea of thick recognition into the treaties signed with Amerindians and concluded that the US government was bound to respect that undertaking. History does provide us with some Just Peace agreements including thin and thick recognition—although, as expected, these are relatively rare. The Edict of Nantes of 1598 negotiated by Henri IV and the commissioners to settle the Huguenot issue in France and to integrate Protestants as full-fledged French citizens; the Great Peace of Montreal of 1701 in which forty Amerindian nations met with representatives of France to end persistent bloody conflicts; the Treaty of San Francisco (1951) between Japan and the United States; and the constitutional negotiations in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 could all be seen as examples of “just” agreements in that they satisfy all four of our Just Peace conditions. In each of these cases, a liberal thin recognition was insufficient for reaching a legitimate and durable peace. This reminds us that recognition in a multilateral context is a thin concept not necessarily permitting full or thick recognition paying due respect to each peace partner’s identity. Peace and justice are both critical imperatives in post-conflict (and often postauthoritarian) contexts. Too often, brokering (and maintaining) peace and advancing justice are assumed to be in tension with each other, or it is thought that seeking one will automatically be to the detriment of the other. Thin and thick recognition are an important part of this accommodation process whereby negotiators seek to agree to a fair and lasting peace. If we want to address the theoretical challenge posed by multiculturalism to modern world politics, then continuing work on Just Peace is essential.

Notes We thank the two editors and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. 1. We borrow Clifford Geertz’s 1973 terminology to distinguish between what we call a classical liberal or minimal “thin recognition,” and our definition of a “thick” one. Geertz (1973, 6) himself adopted his “thick description” from Gilbert Ryle, a Wittgensteinian philosopher. In doing so, we do not follow Michael Walzer’s moral conceptual distinction between “thin” and “thick” morality. See Walzer 1994, xi. 2. On contemporary thinking about justice and international society, see various approaches in Mapel and Nardin 1999. See in particular Rawls 1999. 3. See, among others, Walter 2001; Stern and Druckman 2000. 4. See for instance Fisher and Brown 1988; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988; Cohen 1991. 5. See Lesaffer 2004. 6. See in particular Simpson 2004; Anghie 2007. 7. The same criticism could not be made, at least without serious qualifications, for cultural

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 81

4/18/11 12:36 PM

82  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller and legal historians. For an excellent analysis of the vision of peace defended by indigenous peoples, see Williams 1999. See also White 1991; Jennings 1985; Pocock 2005, 226–258. 8. We have tried to explore and further develop the concept of Just Peace in Allan and Keller 2006. Parts of this chapter are based on this earlier work. 9. Bell 2008, 53. 10. Skinner 1996. 11. Ibid. 16. 12. Todorov 1984, Pagden 1995, Tuck 1999, and Tully 1995 have provided detailed historical accounts of this dynamics. 13. See Keal 2003, 85–86. 14. Kymlicka 1989; 1995. 15. Rawls 1999, 4–5. 16. Tully 1995, 10–11. 17. For a development of these claims, see Kukathas 1992. 18. Parekh 2000. 19. See Phillips 1991; Bock and James 1992. For a presentation of theses debates, see Tully 2004, 855–862. 20. Kant 1991, 105–106. 21. See Allan and Dupont 1999. 22. See Kelman 1997, 338. See also Behnke’s contribution to this volume, which pleads going beyond a Hegelian constitutive recognition. 23. As Ringmar argues in his introduction to this book, states tell stories about themselves and demand approval of the individuality of their narrated self-conceptions. 24. Todorov 1984; Nandy 1992; Linklater 1998, chapter 3 especially. 25. In his contribution to this volume, Honneth contends that political actors and rulers are key in the interpretation of their population’s “moods” given the fact that nation-states are themselves collectives far too complex to allow for simple recognition formulas. 26. Wittgenstein 2001, 7. 27. Wittgenstein 1972, 10. 28. Ibid. 15. 29. Austin 1962. 30. Marshall 1987, 435–445 especially.

Bibliography Allan, Pierre, and Cédric Dupont. 1999. “International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness.” International Political Science Review 20 (1): 1999. Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller, eds. 2006. What is a Just Peace? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anghie, Antony. 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Austin, John L. 1962. How to do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bell, Christine. 2008. On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 82

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition?  ✻  83 Bock, Gisela, and Susan James, eds. 1992. Beyond Equality and Difference. London: Routledge. Cohen, Raymond. 1991. Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy. Washington: United States Institute for Peace. Fisher, Roger, and Scott Brown. 1988. Getting Together: Building a Relationship That Gets to YES. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Gudykunst, William B., and Stella Ting-Toomey. 1988. Culture and Interpersonal Communication. Newbury Park: Sage. Jennings, Francis, ed. 1985. The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treatises of the Six Nations and Their League. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In Kant: Political Writings, edited by Hans S. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keal, Paul. 2003. European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelman, Herbert C. 1997. “Negotiating National Identity and Self-Determination in Ethnic Conflicts: The Choice Between Pluralism and Ethnic Cleansing.” Negotiation Journal 13. Kukathas, Chandran. 1992. “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory 20 (1). Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lesaffer, Randolph, ed. 2004. Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One. New York: Cambridge University Press. Linklater, Andrew. 1998. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Community. Cambridge: Polity. Mapel, David R., and Terry Nardin, eds. 1999. International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marshall, John. 1987. “Worcester vs. the State of Georgia, 6 Peter 515 (U.S.S.C. 1832).” In The Writings of John Marshall, Late Chief Justice of the United States, Upon the Federal Constitution, 435–45. Littleton: F.B. Rothman Press. Nandy, Ashis. 1992. Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Pagden, Anthony. 1995. Lords of All the World. New Haven: Yale University Press. Parekh, Bikhu. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. London: Macmillan. Phillips, Anne. 1991. Engendering Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania State Press. Pocock, John G. A. 2005. The Discovery of Islands: Essay in British History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Simpson, Gerry. 2004. Great Powers and Outlaw States. Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skinner, Quentin. 1996. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stern, Paul C., and Daniel Druckman, eds. 2000. International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War. Washington: National Academy Press. Todorov, Tzvetan. 1984. The Conquest of America: The Question of Other. New York: Harper.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 83

4/18/11 12:36 PM

84  ✻  Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller Tuck, Richard. 1999. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tully, James. 1995. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. ———. 2004. “Approaches to Recognition, Power, and Dialogue.” Political Theory 32: 855–862. Walter, Barbara F. 2001. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Walzer, Michael. 1994. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. White, Richard. 1991. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815. New York: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Robert A. 1999. Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600–1800. London: Routledge. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1972. On Certainty. Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Harper. ———. 2001. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 84

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Part II

Empirical Applications

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 85

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 86

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 5

Spirit, Recognition, and Foreign Policy Germany and World War II Richard Ned Lebow

Plato and Aristotle posit three fundamental drives—appetite, spirit, and reason—each seeking its own ends. Three paradigms of international relations—realism, liberalism, and Marxism—are rooted in appetite. Liberalism assumes that people and states seek wealth and use reason instrumentally to design strategies and institutions conducive to this goal. Realism differs from liberalism in arguing that concern for security must come first in an anarchical world. Realists root their paradigm in Hobbes’s observation—generally taken out of context—that people are motivated to find ways out of the state of nature, not only to preserve their lives but to protect their property and create an environment in which they can satisfy other appetites.1 Marxism is also anchored in appetite, although the young Marx was equally concerned with the spirit. He wrote about man’s alienation from his labor and how socialism would restore workers’ self-esteem by reordering their relationship to what they produced. Marx was a close reader of the Greeks and appreciated their richer understanding of human motives and related understanding that human happiness required more than the satisfaction of appetites. The spirit has not been made the basis for any paradigm of politics or international relations, although, as Machiavelli and Rousseau recognized, it has the potential to 87

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 87

4/18/11 12:36 PM

88  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow serve as the foundation for one, and Hobbes described “vanity”—his term for the spirit—as a powerful, fundamental drive and principal cause of war. I attempt to remedy this conceptual oversight in A Cultural Theory of International Relations.2 With Homer’s Iliad as my guide, I construct an ideal-type honor society and use it as a template to understand the role of the spirit in real worlds, ancient and modern. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the characteristics and tensions of spirit-based worlds and their implications for foreign policy. My understanding of the spirit and the concept of recognition differ from that of other contributors to the volume, whose definitions ultimately derive from Hegel and are commonly applied by international relations (IR) scholars to understand the situation of subordinate communities. I draw my understanding from Plato and Aristotle because they theorize a universal human drive. Aristotle’s understanding of anger also encourages a focus on powerful actors rather than oppressed groups, which allows me to analyze great power politics in terms of the spirit. I use my framework to analyze Germany’s reaction to defeat in World War I and how the resulting desire for regaining self-esteem was focused on the German state and facilitated Hitler’s rise to power. There was deep resentment toward the Allies and the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Revealingly, its most-hated feature was not the loss of territory, reparations, or restrictions on the German military that this Treaty imposed but the articles that required Germany to accept responsibility for the war and hand over the kaiser and other individuals for trial as war criminals. Compelled to sign the treaty by the Allies, the Weimar Republic never achieved legitimacy. Economic shocks further weakened the Republic. Right-wing opponents, Hitler among them, gained popular support by promising to restore Germany’s position in Europe and with it, the self-esteem of the German people. Hitler’s own motives for going to war were pathological because they went far beyond restoration of status quo ante bellum to the conquest of Europe, if not the world.3 Many of his foreign policy and defense initiatives—withdrawal from the League of Nations, rearmament of Germany, Anschluss with Austria, and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia—were welcomed enthusiastically by most Germans and Austrians. His wars against Poland, Western Europe, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Soviet Union were decidedly less popular, but what support they did have derived in large part from the same motives.4 The importance of honor to the officer corps secured Hitler the quiescence, if not the active support, of the German army, and its willingness to keep fighting long after officers of every rank realized the hopelessness, if not the evil character, of their cause.

The Spirit A spirit-based paradigm starts from the premise, common to Plato and Aristotle, that people, individually and collectively, seek self-esteem. Simply put, self-esteem is a sense of self-worth that makes people feel good about themselves, happier about life, and more confident about their ability to confront its challenges. It is achieved by

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 88

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  89 excelling in activities valued by one’s peer group or society and gaining the respect of actors whose opinions matter. By winning their approbation, we feel good about ourselves. Self-esteem requires some sense of self, but also recognition that self requires society because self-esteem is impossible in its absence. The spirit is fiercely protective of one’s autonomy and honor. According to Plato, any restraint on its self-assertion arouses anger. It wants to avenge all affronts to its honor and seeks immediate satisfaction.5 Mature people are restrained by reason and recognize the wisdom of the ancient maxim, as did Odysseus, that revenge is a dish best served cold. Self-esteem is a universal drive, although it is manifested differently by different societies. For the Greeks, identity was defined by the sum of the social roles people performed, so esteem (how we are regarded by others) and self-esteem (how we regard ourselves) were understood to be more or less synonymous because the latter depended on the former. For modern Westerners, esteem and self-esteem are distinct words and categories and are no longer synonymous. We distinguish external honor from internal honor, a modern Western concept associated with behavior in accord with our values. We can behave in ways that provoke the disapproval of others but still feel good about ourselves if that behavior reflects our values and beliefs and confers internal honor. We must nevertheless be careful about making hard and fast distinctions between Greeks and moderns because there is some evidence that internal honor was not entirely foreign to Athenians.6 The spirit is mediated by society. People must be taught how to express and satisfy the spirit through activities deemed appropriate by the society. They need appropriate role models to emulate. For Aristotle, emulation, like many behaviors, is motivated by pain and pleasure. We feel pain when we observe people, who are much like us, and who have good qualities and positions that we do not have but might. To escape this pain, we act in ways that make it possible for us to possess these goods and feel good when we obtain them.7 Societies have strong incentives to nurture and channel the spirit. It engenders self-control and sacrifice from which the community as a whole prospers. In warrior societies, the spirit is channeled into bravery and selflessness from which the society also profits. All societies must restrain, or deflect outward, the anger aroused when the spirit is challenged or frustrated. The spirit is a purely human drive; organizations and states do not have psyches and cannot be treated as persons. They can, nevertheless, respond to the needs of the spirit in the same way they do to the appetites of their citizens. People support collective enterprises in the expectation of material and emotional rewards. They build self-esteem by membership in high-status groups and high status within those groups. Arguably the most important function of nationalism in the modern world is to provide vicarious satisfaction for the spirit. There are a bundle of concepts associated with the spirit that must be defined with some care. The first of these is self-esteem, which I have described as a universal human need on a par with appetite. For Plato and Aristotle, and classical Greek literature more generally, self-esteem or self-worth is an affect and, like all emotions for the Greeks, is mediated by the intellect. We only feel good about ourselves when

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 89

4/18/11 12:36 PM

90  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow we recognize that we are esteemed for the right reasons by other actors whom we respect and admire. Esteem and self-esteem map on to different conceptions of identity. In the ancient world, identity was social. People did not lack a concept of self, but that self was relationally defined and was the sum of socially assigned roles.8 Our word for person derives from persona, the Latin word for mask, and describes the outer face that one presents to the community.9 In the modern world, individual identity and self-esteem have become increasingly important. From Rousseau on, Enlightenment and Romantic ideologies emphasized the uniqueness and autonomy of the inner self.10 Modernity created a vocabulary that recognizes tensions between inner selves and social roles but encourages us to cultivate and express our “inner selves” and original ways of being.11 Self-esteem is a subjective sense of one’s honor and standing and can reflect or differ from the esteem accorded by others. Tension and conflict can arise, internally and socially, when actors’ self-esteem is considerably lower or higher than their external esteem. Esteem and self-esteem can also be described as respect and self-respect. The opposite of esteem is shame, an emotion that arises in response to the judgments, or expected judgments, of others. Both forms of esteem are stipulatively social. Aristotle describes shame as a “pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit.” Examples he provides include throwing away one’s shield in battle, withholding payment from someone deserving of it, making a profit in a disgraceful way, and having sexual relations with forbidden persons or at the wrong times or places.12 Aristotle is clear that we shrink from knowledge of our behavior, not the acts themselves, as we are primarily concerned with how we appear in the eyes of those who matter most to us.13 We must exercise due caution with the binaries of social and individual identities and esteem and self-esteem because Greek tragedy (for example, Sophocles’s Ajax and Euripides’s Medea) reveals that self-esteem existed to some degree in fifth-century Athens. Self-esteem is closely connected to honor (tim˛), a status for the Greeks that describes the outward recognition we gain from others in response to our excellence. Honor is a gift, and it’s bestowed upon actors by other actors. It carries with it a set of responsibilities, which must be fulfilled properly if honor is to be retained. By the fifth century, honor came to be associated with political rights and offices. It was a means of selecting people for office and of restraining them in their exercise of power. To summarize, the spirit is best conceived of as an innate human drive with self-esteem its goal and honor and standing the means by which it is achieved. Honor is inseparable from hierarchy. Hierarchy is a rank-ordering of status, and in honor societies, honor determines the nature of the statuses and who fills them. Each status has privileges but also an associated rule package. The higher the status, the greater the honor and privileges and the more demanding the role and its rules. Status can be ascribed, as in the case of kings, or achieved, and in traditional honor societies, the two are expected to coincide. The king or chief is expected to be the bravest warrior and lead his forces into battle. Other high-ranking individuals must assume high-risk, if subordinate, roles. Service and sacrifice—the means by which

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 90

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  91 honor is won and maintained—have the potential to legitimize hierarchy. In return for honoring and serving those higher up the social ladder, those beneath them expect to be looked after in various ways. Protecting and providing for others is a key responsibility of those with high status and office. The Song dynasty carried this system to its logical extreme, integrating all males in the kingdom into a system of social status signified by seventeen, and then twenty, ranks. Obligations, including labor and military service, came with rank as did various economic incentives.14 Great powers have had similar responsibilities in the modern era, which have been described by practitioners and theorists alike. The Security Council is an outgrowth of this tradition. Its purpose, at least in the intent of those who drafted the United Nations Charter, was to coordinate the collective efforts of the community to maintain the peace. Such hierarchies justify themselves with reference to the principle of fairness; each actor contributes to the society and the maintenance of its order to the best of its abilities and receives support depending on its needs. Honor is a mechanism for restraining the powerful and preventing the kind of crass, even brutal exploitation common to hierarchies in modern, interest-based worlds. Honor can maintain hierarchy because challenges to an actor’s status, or failure to respect the privileges it confers, arouse anger that can only be appeased by punishing the offender and thereby “putting him in his place.” Honor worlds have the potential to degenerate into hierarchies based on power and become vehicles for exploitation when actors at the apex fail to carry out their responsibilities or exercise self-restraint in pursuit of their own interests. Standing and honor are related concepts. Standing refers to the position an actor occupies in a hierarchy. In an ideal-type spirit world, an actor’s standing in a hierarchy is equivalent to its degree of honor. Those toward the apex of the status hierarchy earn honor by living up to the responsibilities associated with their rank or office, while those who attain honor by virtue of their accomplishments come to occupy appropriate offices. Even in ideal spirit worlds, there is almost always some discrepancy between honor and standing because those who gain honor do not necessarily win the competitions that usually confer honor. In the Iliad, Priam and Hector gain great honor because of their behavior on and off the battlefield but lose their lives and city. Honor and standing can diverge for less admirable reasons. Honor worlds are extremely competitive because standing, even more than wealth, is a relational concept. Hobbes compares it to glory and observes that, “if all men have it, no man hath it.”15 The value placed on honor in spirit-based worlds, and the intensity of the competition for it, tempt actors to take short-cuts to attain it. Once actors violate the rules and get away with it, others do the same to avoid being disadvantaged. If the rules governing honor are consistently violated, honor becomes a meaningless concept. Competition for honor is transformed into competition for standing, which is more unconstrained and possibly more violent. As we shall see, there is a repetitive pattern, especially in international relations. The quest for honor generates a proliferation of statuses or ranks. These orderings can keep conflict in check when they are known, respected, and effectively define the

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 91

4/18/11 12:36 PM

92  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow relative status of actors. They intensify conflict when they are ambiguous or incapable of establishing precedence. This is most likely to happen when there are multiple ways (ascribed and achieved) of gaining honor and office. Actors frequently disagree about who deserves a particular status or office. This kind of dispute has particularly threatening consequences in international relations because there are no authorities capable of adjudicating among competing claims. External honor must be conferred by others and can only be gained through deeds regarded as honorable. Honor only exists when recognized. The Greek word for fame (kleos) derives from the verb “to hear” (kluein). As Homer knew, fame not only requires heroic deeds but bards to sing about those deeds and people willing to listen and be impressed by them. For honor to be won and celebrated there must be a consensus about what it is, how it is won and lost, and the distinctions and obligations it confers. This presupposes common values and traditions, even institutions. When society is robust, the competition for honor and standing instantiates and strengthens the values of the society. As society becomes thinner, as it generally is at the regional and international levels, honor worlds become more difficult to create and sustain. In the absence of common values, there can be no consensus, no rules, and no procedures for awarding and celebrating honor. Even in thin societies, honor can often be won within robust sub-cultures. Hamas and other groups that have sponsored suicide bombing have publicized the names of successful bombers, paid stipends to their families, and encouraged young people to lionize them.16 Such activity strengthens the sub-culture and may even give it wider appeal or support. Honor societies tend to be highly stratified and can be likened to step pyramids. Many, but by no means all, honor societies are divided into two groups: those who are allowed to compete for honor and those who are not. In many traditional honor societies, the principal distinction is between aristocrats, who are expected to seek honor, and commoners, or the low-born, who cannot. This divide is often reinforced by distinctions in wealth, which allow many of the high-born to buy the military equipment, afford the leisure, sponsor the ceremonies, or obtain the education and social kills necessary to compete. As in ancient Greece, birth and wealth are never fully synonymous, creating another source of social tension. Wealth is generally a necessary but insufficient condition for gaining honor. Among the egalitarian Sioux, honor and status were achieved by holding various ceremonies, all of which involved providing feasts and gifts to those who attended. Horses and robes, the principal gifts, could only be attained through successful military expeditions against enemy tribes, or as gifts from others because of the high regard in which brave warriors were held.17 Recognition into the elite circle where one can compete for honor is the first, and often most difficult, step in honor worlds. The exclusiveness of many honor societies can become a major source of tension when individuals, classes, or political units demand and are refused entry into the circle in which it becomes possible to gain honor. What is honorable, the rules governing its attainment, and the indices used to measure it are all subject to challenge. Historically, challenges of this kind have been resisted, at least initially. Societies that have responded to them positively

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 92

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  93 have matured, and in some cases, gradually moved away from, all or in part, their warrior base. Throughout A Cultural Theory of International Relations, I use the term recognition to mean acceptance into the circle where it is possible to compete for honor. Recognition carries with it the possibility of fulfillment of the spirit and differs from the use the term has come to assume in moral philosophy. Hegel made the struggle for recognition (Kampf um Anerkennung) a central concept of his Philosophy of Right, which is now understood to offer an affirmative account of a just social order that can transcend the inequalities of master-slave relationships.18 In a seminal essay published in 1992, Charles Taylor applied Hegel’s concept to the demands for recognition of minorities and other marginalized groups. He argues that human recognition is a distinctive but largely neglected human good, and that we are profoundly affected by how we are recognized and mis-recognized by others.19 The political psychology of recognition has since been extended to international relations, where subordinate states are assumed to have low self-images and low self-esteem. Axel Honneth stresses the importance of avoiding master-slave relationships among states and, more recently, the relationship between recognition and morality at individual and social levels of interaction.20 Fernando Cornil argues that subaltern states enjoy the trappings of sovereignty but often internalize the negative images of them held by the major powers.21 I acknowledge the relationship between status and esteem but make a different argument. In terms of at least foreign policy, it is powerful states, not weak ones, who feel the most humiliation. Here, I draw on Aristotle’s understanding of anger as a response to an olig˛ria: a slight, lessening, or belittlement. This can issue from an equal but provokes even more anger when it comes from an actor who lacks the standing to challenge or insult us. Anger is a luxury that can only be felt by those in a position to seek revenge. Slaves and subordinates cannot allow themselves to feel anger. It is also senseless to feel anger toward those who cannot become aware of our anger.22 In the realm of international relations, leaders—and often peoples—of powerful states are likely to feel anger of the Aristotelian kind when they are denied entry into the system or recognition as a great power or are treated in a manner demeaning to their understanding of their status. They will look for some way of asserting their claims and seeking revenge. Subordinate states lack this power and their leaders and populations learn to live with their lower status and more limited autonomy. Great powers will feel enraged if challenged by such states.23 I believe we can profit from reintroducing the Greek dichotomy between those who were included in and excluded from the circle in which it was possible to achieve honor and Aristotle’s definition of anger. Both conceptualizations help to illuminate important social and political phenomena that would otherwise not be noticed or flagged as important.

Germany My account of Nazi Germany builds on my earlier analysis of German imperialism and the origins of World War I. In chapter 6 of A Cultural Theory of International Relations,

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 93

4/18/11 12:36 PM

94  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow I emphasized the survival of pre-modern values among a powerful aristocracy, the partial feudalization of the German middle class, and the deflection outward of its strivings for self-esteem.24 The commitment of the Junker aristocracy to preserve its power and way of life and the vicarious association of the middle class with the state provided reinforcing incentives for an aggressive foreign policy, as well as political backing for it. The German Empire came to an abrupt end in 1918 and was replaced by a republic that drew support from socialists, Catholics, and some members of the middle class. It was opposed by nationalists on the right and communists on the left, and ultimately lost support to both, paving the way for extra-parliamentary government and Hitler’s dictatorship. Historians have offered many reasons for the Weimar Republic’s failure. They include the success of the right in hanging the hated Treaty of Versailles around its neck; the growth of independent, anti-Republican paramilitary forces, the economic crises of the early 1920s and 1930s and their consequences for the middle and working classes; middle class fears of socialism; alienation of the intellectuals; a flawed constitution and bad leadership.25 Historians also point to deeper causes, among them the schism between German and Western political thought, and the sense of a special German mission to which it gave rise in opposition to the more commercial and democratic values of France and Britain.26 German idealism encouraged deep respect, if not reverence, for the state and the subordination of the individual to it. The German middle class and intellectuals were predisposed to look to the state for unity, purpose, and guidance, a role that a querulous, controversial, weak, and threatened republic could not possibly fulfill.27 I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive explanation for Hitler’s rise to power and Germany’s role in bringing about World War II. Rather, I offer an account that highlights the role of the spirit in understanding these events and to advance the claim that concern for self-esteem was not only an underlying cause of this conflagration but a necessary condition. Self-esteem was a key, if frustrated, ambition for the semi-feudalized German bourgeoisie. This need became more acute after the humiliation of defeat in World War I and the imposition of what Germans widely regarded as the punitive Treaty of Versailles. British and American revisionists would support this German charge, while later revisionists would argue against the punitive nature of the treaty. What is relevant for my argument is that the majority of Germans perceived the Versailles settlement as punitive and humiliating and that this belief made it correspondingly more difficult for the Weimar Republic to build legitimacy, and comparatively easier for its right-wing opponents to win support in the name of nationalism. Hitler was particularly adept at playing on the desires of the middle class for self-esteem. The Nazi emphasis on the Volksgemeinschaft held out the promise of a higher purpose to be achieved through unity, sacrifice, and struggle in a showdown with the nation’s internal and external enemies.28 Hitler’s defiance of the Western powers and the Treaty of Versailles was widely popular with the middle classes, who were his largest supporters at the polls. In November 1918, Allied advances on the Western front and German war-weariness led to mutinies and worker uprisings. On November 9, socialist leader Philip

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 94

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  95 Scheidemann proclaimed a republic on the steps of the Reichstag, and Kaiser Wilhelm fled to Holland the next day. Prince Max of Baden, the last imperial chancellor, had opened negotiations with the Allies in October for an armistice, which came into effect on November 11. The victorious Allied leaders, meeting in Paris, summoned a German delegation to Versailles in May 1919 to receive a draft treaty. The Allies gave the Germans fifteen days to submit objections and questions in French or English, a deadline that was later extended by a week.29 The treaty required Germany to return Alsace-Lorraine to France, hand over Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium, northern Schleswig to Denmark, Hultschin to Czechoslovakia and parts of West Prussia, and Posen and Upper Silesia to Poland. East Prussia was separated from West Prussia by a corridor of territory given to Poland to guarantee it access to the Baltic Sea. The Saar, Danzig, and Memel were put under the control of the League of Nations, and Germany was required to give up all of its colonies and the land it had taken from Russia under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The German army was reduced to 100,000 men, and severe restrictions were placed on its navy and air force. The Rhineland was to be demilitarized permanently. Germany was forbidden from incorporating Austria, despite strong sentiments for unification in both countries. It had to accept responsibility for starting the war and assume the burden of reparations in an amount to be determined, the bulk of which was to go to Belgium and France to compensate them for damages caused by the war and four years of German occupation.30 The German reaction to the draft treaty is revealing in two respects. The first is the state of shock and denial that it provoked. By all accounts, Germans of all classes were stunned by the peace terms, having convinced themselves that Woodrow Wilson would compel a reluctant Britain and France to offer a generous peace based on the American president’s Fourteen Points. The draft treaty was in fact mild in comparison to either the September Program of 1914, prepared by the German government in the expectation of victory over Belgium and France, or the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, imposed on Bolshevik Russia by Germany in March 1918. The latter forced Russia to cede or give independence to all of its western territories (Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine). It offers evidence of the kind of harsh terms Germany would have imposed on the Western powers if its 1918 offensive had succeeded in breaking Allied resistance. Germans on the whole failed to make this comparison and saw themselves as undeserving victims. The German military deluded itself into believing that it would receive Allied backing for a drang nach Osten (march to the east) to St. Petersburg to overthrow the Bolshevik regime.31 It is equally revealing that Germans gave evidence of being more upset by those articles of the treaty they considered offensive to their honor than by those inimical to their security or well-being.32 Article 228 allowed Allies to indict and try people “for acts against the laws and customs of war.” Almost across the political spectrum, Germans opposed this demand as a matter of national pride, without any concern for the possible substance of the allegations. It was a largely symbolic issue as the kaiser had taken refuge in Holland. Article 231, the so-called “war guilt clause,”

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 95

4/18/11 12:36 PM

96  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow demanded reparations for allied and associated governments “as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.” The German delegation summoned four experts with international reputations to draft a response. The document they submitted insisted that the question of war guilt could only be determined by a careful comparative analysis of the archives of all the warring powers. The Allied reply played to Allied public opinion and excoriated the Germans for their wartime actions. In the judgment of Wolfgang Mommsen, it “paved the way for the passionate, often demagogic, discussion of the ‘war-guilt lie’ which helped kindle German nationalism once again.”33 With respect to territory, public opinion accommodated itself readily to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine but was least reconciled to ceding territory to Poland. Harald von Riekhoff reasons that Germans respected France as an equal or superior power and thus more readily acquiesced in that loss than in the loss of territory. They looked down on the Poles as their inferiors and had no respect for anything associated with them, which made it more difficult to relinquish territory to them.34 This phenomenon offers more evidence for Aristotle’s understanding of anger as an emotion primarily aroused by slights from those we consider beneath us.35 With respect to both reparations and territory, the spirit, not appetite or fear, appears to have dictated the German response. Prime Minister Scheidemann told the Reichstag that the treaty was unacceptable. Even moderates rejected its terms and spoke about revenge.36 Hans Delbrück wrote in the Preußische Jahrbücher that “The day and hour will come when we will demand everything back.”37 Only one deputy, an Independent Social Democrat, was willing to affirm the treaty on the sensible grounds that Germany had no choice but to make peace. Marshal Ferdinand Foch drew up very public plans for an invasion of Germany, while British prime minister David Lloyd George pleaded with the French to accept some revision of the treaty in the hope of reaching an accommodation. French prime minister Georges Clemenceau agreed to some changes, the most important of which was a plebiscite to decide the political future of Upper Silesia. The draft treaty had awarded the territory outright to Poland. The German government sent representatives back to hold out the prospect of signing the treaty without its two most objectionable provisions concerning war guilt and war criminals. The same day, word reached Paris that the German navy had scuttled its battle fleet in Scapa Flow. The French, Americans, and British were furious and refused to consider any further revisions. The German government had no choice but to accept the treaty, making the Republic vulnerable to charges by the right-wing nationalists that its socialist leaders were responsible for Germany’s humiliation.38 The treaty became a central issue of Weimar politics, and all parties save the independent socialists (USPD) condemned it. The Burgfrieden—the truce among parties at the outset of the First World War—had made criticism of pre-war diplomacy all but impossible during the war. The treaty controversy effectively foreclosed exposure and criticism of the ills of the former monarchical political system under the Republic.39 It deprived pro-Republican forces of what in other circumstances would have been

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 96

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  97 a powerful political tool, while shackling them with treaty terms arising from a war for which they were not responsible. The army and right-wing forces successfully propagated the fiction that the German army had not been defeated but stabbed in the back by socialists on the home front.40 Frei Korps, composed of former veterans, coalesced into extra-legal armies and fought to suppress socialism in Berlin and further east and intimidate voters in plebiscites, especially in Silesia from 1920 to 1921. Frei Korps also participated in the Kapp Putsch of March 1920, an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Republic.41 The foreign ministry conspired with conservatives to propagate the fiction that Germany bore no responsibility for the war. In a cover up that would continue into the 1960s, an entire department within the Wilhelmstraße cleansed, edited, forged, hid, and destroyed incriminating memoranda, letters, and cables and paid scholars and journalists at home and abroad to refute what it called “the war-guilt lie.”42 With a few exceptions, the German historical profession was a willing participant in this “patriotic” self-censorship and self-delusion. In 1930, Hermann Hesse lamented to Thomas Mann that “of 1,000 Germans, even today, 999 still know nothing of [our] war guilt.”43 Pro-Republican parties—Social Democrats (SPD), Democrats, and the Zentrum— won over 70 percent of the vote in the first post-war national election in January 1919.44 The inauspicious beginning of the Weimar Republic did not bode well for its survival, and some scholars see its demise as inevitable.45 Other historians emphasize the contingency of Nazi Germany. In an early and still highly regarded history of the Weimar Republic, Erich Eyck makes a credible case that the synergism between the economic downturn and bad leadership brought Hitler to power.46 Wolfgang Mommsen maintains that the collapse of Weimar was inevitable but the rise of Hitler to power was not.47 Henry Turner uses counterfactuals to make the case that Hitler’s survival during the First World War and a later automobile accident were both remarkable and that without Hitler, Weimar’s failure would likely have led to a conservative, authoritarian regime with revanchist goals in the east but no stomach for another continental war. It would have been anti-Semitic, but unlikely to have carried out draconian measures against Jews.48 The determinists sensitize us to all the serious impediments that stood in the way of the success of the Republic, and those who emphasize contingency alert us to the need to separate the fate of the Republic from the question of what kind of regime might have succeeded it. The forces arrayed against the Republic were on both ends of the political continuum. The communists on the left opposed a constitutional bourgeois order. Led by intellectuals, their base consisted of workers whose support waxed and waned as a function of the economic situation.49 By 1928, there was very little inclination on the part of the conservatives to cooperate with the socialists, and the pro-Republican parties did not have enough seats to cobble together a left-center coalition. The grand coalition that attempted to govern lasted less than six months, the victim of Gustav Stresemann’s death and the stock market crash.50 The nationalistconservative opposition was divided among several parties, and in the last years of

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 97

4/18/11 12:36 PM

98  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow the Republic, the National Socialists (Nazis) became by far the strongest of these parties. In July 1932, the Nazis won 38.2 percent of the overall national vote, making anti-Republican forces a majority in the Reichstag. Government had to be conducted by emergency decree, which shifted power to President Paul von Hindenburg and paved the way for the appointment of Hitler after the failure of the short-lived von Papen and Schleicher regimes.51 Hindenburg could have used his emergency power to support a pro-Republican government but preferred to rule through a conservative fronde that excluded the socialists from power. He set in motion a chain of events that had an outcome very different from what he imagined.52 So did the Communists. On instructions from Moscow, they made a fatal error in refusing to support the grand coalition, composed of the socialists, Zentrum, and moderate parties on the right. They welcomed the Nazi regime in the expectation that it would quickly fail and pave the way for a worker’s revolution.53 According to Karl Dietrich Bracher, the nationalist, anti-Republican front was composed of people and groups representing four orientations: imperialistic nationalism, conservative authoritarianism, a nationalist and romantic variant of socialism, and supporters of a völkisch, race-based ideology.54 Imperialistic nationalism focused on territorial revisionism, and Weimar’s foreign policy, which “vacillated between East and West, resistance and compliance, cooperation and revision, was incapable of putting a break on this dynamic.”55 Revisionist demands were intense between 1918 and 1923 and again after the depression began in 1929.56 Conservative authoritarianism was well established in Prussia under the Hohenzollers, and in Germany more generally since the creation of the Reich in 1871. It continued under the Republic and sustained a predisposition, formerly directed toward the person of the Kaiser, to support a strong leader.57 Nationalism had been actively encouraged under the empire, but its combination with a romantic variant of socialism was relatively novel. Völkisch sentiment was also strong within the middle class and initially found expression as straightforward xenophobia but increasingly morphed into racial anti-Semitism under the influence of the Nazi Party. Hitler cleverly sold himself as the personification of all four orientations. He rallied the middle class on the basis of his nationalism, opposition to socialists and Jews, and promises of full employment. Analyses of party rolls and election data indicate that Hitler appealed not only to the lower middle class (Kleinbürgertum) but other middle class groups, as well. He won over conservative business and political elites by conveying the impression that he would serve as their pliant tool once in power.58 Success of National Socialism, at home and abroad, was very much the history of the fatal underestimation of Hitler by the army, industrialists, bankers, conservative politicians, and President Hindenburg. Hitler pandered to their shared illusion that they could “box him in” and exploit him for their own ends. He did the same in his foreign policy, where he communicated willingness to negotiate while making threats, preparing for war, and engaging in faits accomplis. Above all else, he displayed great flexibility; he made extreme demands, but was willing to pull back when opposed and to push ahead when his opponents appeared weak or vacillated.59

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 98

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  99 Once in power, Hitler and Goebbels propagated the “Führer myth,” which encouraged his idolization among the middle classes.60 It stressed Hitler’s ability to transcend class divisions, revitalize the economy, restore growth and stability, and restore German rights, territory, and dignity. He was portrayed as personally unattached, selfless, incorruptible, and above party politics. The Hitler cult made some inroads among workers, although the groups least receptive to his propaganda were the organized sections of the working class, Catholics, and the educated elite.61 In 1928, the Nazis garnered a mere 2.6 percent of the vote. Once the depression set in, this figure rose to 18.1. In the March 1933 elections held two months after Hitler took office, the Nazis still received considerably less than half of the vote but more votes than any party had in the Weimar era.62 The Nazis received enough working class support to shock and baffle the Marxists associated with the Institute for Social Research (the Frankfurt School), some of which—Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Fromm—turned to Freud to look for non-rational, non-economic explanations for this baffling behavior.63 Hitler’s foreign policy successes greatly increased his support. Fully 95.1 percent of Germans supported his withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations.64 His popularity soared because he “liberated” the Saar and Rhineland, brought Austria into the Reich and Memel and the Sudetenland as well, and established protectorates over Bohemia and Moravia, and all without war.65 The twin humiliations of defeat and Versailles had been largely overcome. As Hitler put it in a well-publicized speech of April 28, 1939: “I have further attempted to tear up page for page that Treaty, which contained in its 448 articles the most base violations ever accorded to nations and human beings. I have given back to the Reich the provinces stolen from us in 1919.”66 Hitler’s appeal extended well beyond those who thought of themselves as Nazis and included people who were critical of his domestic policies and ideology.67 Despite support for Hitler, there was very little support for war. Most Germans desperately wanted to believe that peace could be maintained. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, there was none of the enthusiasm for war that had been so visible in 1914.68 Hitler’s rhetorical strategy and the basis of his support indicate the extent to which the spirit was central to his rise to power and subsequent popularity. Ian Kershaw, author of the most comprehensive study of Hitler’s speeches, concludes that he “always enjoyed a particular talent, approaching demagogic genius, for appealing to the populist national emotions, hopes, and aggression of increasing numbers of ordinary Germans, in particular by exploiting the deep-rooted resentments which the name ‘Versailles’ conjured up.” He wisely refrained from talking about his wider imperialist aims, as they could not be achieved without a second world war.69 Hitler’s racism, which vaunted the superiority of the Aryans over other races, was also intended to enhance his listeners’ self-image and self-esteem. Economic improvements and stability, valued in their own right, were also portrayed as a means of restoring German dignity and self-esteem. The spirit is easily angered by real or imagined slights and readily responds to opposition with hostility. This process drives the action in Sophocles’s Ajax, where

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 99

4/18/11 12:36 PM

100  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow the armor of the dead Achilles is awarded to Odysseus. Convinced that he deserves it but that it was denied him by virtue of the hostility of others, Ajax seeks revenge against Odysseus, the Atridae clan, and the Greek army. Paranoia of this kind is often associated with heroic actors and is particularly prevalent in societies with low self-esteem. Such paranoia was evident in the German Empire, where Fritz Stern notes that visions of politics were “blurred by clouds of evil fantasy.” 70 Publicists and anti-Semites charged England and France with plotting Germany’s encirclement and Jews and socialists of boring away from within. These conspiracies also flourished in the Weimar period, augmented by the new charge of a dolchstoss (stab in the back) made by Hindenburg to a parliamentary committee in 1919.71 The socialists and Jews—“November criminals”—were made responsible for defeat and the hated Treaty of Versailles.72 The widespread success of conspiratorial theories under the empire and in Weimar is further evidence of the degree to which German politics were driven by the spirit.

Recognition and International Relations A key feature of the modern world is civil society. For a long time, the concept of societas civilis referred to the condition of living within a legal order that possessed sufficient force to guarantee its subjects security and good government.73 Montesquieu was the first to make the connection between the spirit of liberty and personal independence on the one hand and the emergence of civil society (l’ état civile) on the other. Rather than undermining order, he thought it had the potential to create a new form of public mores (mœurs) that could endow social relations with more consistency.74 Adam Ferguson stressed the importance of civil society as a means of opposing illegitimate state authority.75 Hegel redefined civil society (die bürgerliche Gesellschaft) to refer to an equality-based system of social relations among associations of people that was independent of the state and the family, which he thought to have first emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century. His civil society is characterized by free labor, a commodity market, and a system of contract law enforcement.76 In our time, the concept of civil society has been expanded to include a general strengthening of the rule of law and the development of voluntary associations not connected with commercial relations.77 Civil society encourages citizens to find satisfaction in the commercial and private sphere and to indulge their appetites as they see fit. It heralds a turning away from the state, the decline of man as a zoon politikon, and an upgrading of the appetite in response to the perceived social benefits of individual greed. For all these reasons, civil society was anathema to many conservative supporters of the ancien régime and regarded by radicals as at best a necessary evil. Marx considered civil society another means by which the bourgeoisie could tighten its hold over society.78 Montesquieu and Tocqueville sought to adapt the spirit to modern society in the hope that it could act as an effective check on central authority and inspire politicians and civil servants to

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 100

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  101 put aside their private interests in pursuit of projects that benefited the community as a whole.79 Civil society not only legitimized the appetite as a drive, it facilitated its partial blending with the spirit to the extent that wealth became not only a marker of standing but also a means of attaining it. Civil society provided new domains and opportunities for achieving honor and standing. Some of these routes led to national, even international fame (that is, sports, science, the creative and performing arts), while others led to renown in specialized or geographically restricted communities (for example, law, mathematics, spelunking, community service). This diversity gave rise to multiple hierarchies in which individuals of varying talents and interests could compete for honor and standing, making it at least theoretically possible for everyone to achieve self-esteem. A critical development in this regard has been the increasing openness of many of these arenas to people of all class, religious, and racial backgrounds. In Europe prior to the French Revolution, only aristocrats were allowed to compete for standing and honor. Recognition, in the form of admission into this elite, was a significant barrier to those with talent but the wrong religious affiliations or genealogical antecedents. Such prejudice has not altogether disappeared in Western societies, but even the most traditional elite hierarchies (that is, military, diplomatic service, and formerly aristocratic sports like tennis and golf ) began to open up, offering opportunities for members of groups that have historically been at the bottom of the social ladder to rise to the top of these intensely competitive hierarchies. Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Tiger Woods are cases in point. Viewed in this light, the international system is something of an atavism that still reflects the values of warrior societies. In contrast to societies in the developed world, there is still a single hierarchy of standing, and it is based on military power. Beginning in the nineteenth century, revolutionary powers (that is, the United States, France, the Soviet Union, China, and Iran) have challenged the legitimacy of this hierarchy and claimed standing on ideological grounds. These challenges failed, and most of the powers in question subsequently sought and achieved standing on traditional military grounds. A more serious challenge is now underway, spearheaded by a diverse group of countries, many of which, like Canada, Japan, and the members of the European Union, claim standing on the basis of the multilateral nature of the foreign policies and how their wealth is used to benefit their citizens and those of less-developed countries. Their claims for status are based on honor and rest on the hope that international society has become more like domestic societies in that multiple hierarchies are possible and thick enough to allow honor to replace standing as the basis of influence. The transformation of the international system is by no means preordained, but it is a distinct possibility. Key to any transformation is discourses that define what actors consider to be legitimate and illegitimate. Changes in the criteria for standing encourage shifts in foreign policy behavior, which in turn affect how states define their interests and ultimately their identities. As conflictual and violent the current world is, and as remote an ideal a peaceful world appears, there is nevertheless a more realistic

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 101

4/18/11 12:36 PM

102  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow possibility than ever before of transforming the character of international relations to make it more closely resemble the more ordered and complex world of domestic societies. Troy—or Iraq—may ultimately become the tomb of heroes and heroism as understood by Homer and deeply embedded in Western culture ever since. It is important not to lose sight of this possibility and for international relations theory to show us how such a world could come about.

Notes 1. Hobbes 1996, 126. 2. Lebow 2008. 3. Weinberg 1970, 358; Rich 1973, 3–10; Fest 1974, 213–218. 4. Kershaw 1987, 151–68, reports that Hitler’s high point in support came after the fall of France and before his failure to conquer Britain or force it to sue for peace. 5. Plato 1991, 440c–441c. 6. Plato 1989. 7. Aristotle 2004, 1388a29–b30. 8. Durkheim 1984, preface, 219–22; Finley 1978, 134. 9. Hobbes 1996, 112. 10. Hegel 1979, Bb, Cc, described the “authentic” romantic as a “beautiful soul,” pure in its inwardness and uncorrupted by modernity’s divisiveness. Durkheim 2001; Durkheim 1984. 11. For the development of the concept of the relational self, see Shotter 1989, 133–51; Eakin 1999. 12. Aristotle 2004, 1383b15–1884a21. 13. Ibid., 1384a22–28. 14. Yates 2006, 205–240. 15. Hobbes 1991, 1.1. 16. Levitt 2006, 59–60, report monthly stipends of $5,000 to $5,500 to prisoners of Israel and $2,000 to $3,000 to widows or families of those who have given their lives. 17. Hassrick 1964, 296–309. 18. Hegel 1979, 178–196. 19. Taylor 1994, 25–74. 20. Honneth 1996; Fraser and Honneth 2003; Honneth 1997, 16–34. 21. Cornil 2000, 37–55. 22. Aristotle 2004, 387a31–33, 1378b10–11, 138024–29. Konstan 2006, 41–76. 23. Aristotle 2004, 1379b10–12, on the anger provoked by slights from our inferiors. 24. Lebow 2008, chapter 7, on the German middle class. 25. Mommsen 1996; Bracher, 1970, 168–178, 191–198; Aycoberry 1981. 26. Plessner 1959; Mosse 1964; Stern 1974. 27. Krieger 1957; Ringer 1969. 28. Kershaw 1983, 1–2; Dahrendorf 1967, 404. 29. MacMillan 2001, 460–463. 30. See “The Versailles Treaty.”

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 102

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  103 31. “Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,” see 1918 Documents. 32. Mommsen 1996, 89–128; Krüger 1994; Walzel 2007; Heinemann 1983. 33. Mommsen 1996, 89–128; MacMillan 2001, 463–474. 34. Riekhoff 1971, 383. 35. Aristotle 2004, 1379b10–12, 1387a31–33. 36. Mommsen 2006, 535–46; Schwabe 2006, 37–68. 37. Mommsen 1996, 91. 38. Schwabe 2006; Lentin 2006, 221–243; Stevenson 2006, 87–110. 39. Broszat 1987, 47. 40. Mommsen 1996, 105–106. 41. Eyck 1967, I, 150–154. 42. Rohl 1973, 21–36; Geiss 1966, 75–91, on the foreign office in the 1960s; Herwig 1987, 5–44. 43. Quoted in Herwig 1987, 000. 44. Broszat 1987, 45. 45. Krieger 1957; Hamerow 1966, viii; Puhle 1972. 46. Eyck 1967. 47. Mommsen 1996. 48. Turner 1989. 49. Mommsen 1996, 456, 494–495, 535–537. 50. Eyck 1967, I, 203–52; Broszat 1987, 94–115. 51. Eyck 1967, I, 350–488; Dorpalen 1964, 301–446; Broszat 1987, 115–149; Mommsen 1996, 357–432. 52. Dorpalen 1964, 302–303, 316–317, 472; Mommsen 1996, 357–432; Broszat 1987, 80–81. 53. Mommsen 1996, 456, 494–495, 535–537. 54. Bracher 1970, 10. 55. Ibid. 21. 56. Broszat 1987, 11–17, on the political consequences of the Great Depression. 57. Mosse 1975, chapters 1–4; Nipperdey 1968, 529–585; Kershaw 1987, 14. 58. Schoenbaum 1966, 119–158; Kershaw 1983, 113–114; Childers 1983, 1–51. 59. Bracher 1970, 48, 287–303; Eyck 1967, 449–487; Mommsen 1996, 433–489; Bracher 1970, 169–214; Bullock 1962, 369–370; Weinberg 1970, I, 358, 363. 60. Kershaw 1987; Schoenbaum 1966; Mommsen 1996, 47. 61. Kershaw 1987, 34, 53; Kershaw, 1983, 71–110; Allen 1984, 69–90; Broszat 1987, 15–16; Mommsen 1996, 318–356; Childers 1983, 1–51. 62. Stöver 1996, 2; Mommsen 1996, 314–317. 63. Jay 1973, chapters 3 and 4. 64. Kershaw 1987, 120–139. 65. Weinberg 1970, I, 159–179, 239–263, on Hitler’s successes. 66. Quoted in Kershaw 1987, 256. 67. Kershaw 1987, 5; Schoenbaum 1966, 77–118, on Hitler and labor. 68. Kershaw 1987, 139–147; Frei “People’s Community and War.” 69. Kershaw 1987, 122. 70. Stern 1992, xxxviii. 71. Dorpalen 1964, 51–52.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 103

4/18/11 12:36 PM

104  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow 72. Krumeich 2003, 585–599; Seiler 1966, 1–20. 73. It is used in this sense by Vattel 2001 and Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” and “Perpetual Peace,” both in Kant, 1991, 000-000, 000-000. 74. Montesquieu 1777, I.3.6, 19.27. 75. Ferguson 1773, 7–29. 76. Hegel 1991, 157, 188. 77. Seligman 1995. 78. Marx and Engels 1972, 146–174. 79. Tocqueville 2002, I.2.10, 383; II.4.7.

Bibliography Allen, William. 1984. Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1922–1945. New York: Franklin Watts. Aristotle. Rhetoric. 2004. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing. Aycoberry, Pierre. 1981. Nazi Question: An Essay on the Interpretations of National Socialism, 1922–1975. New York: Pantheon. Bracher, Karl Dietrich. 1970. The German Dictatorship. New York: Praeger. Broszat, Martin. 1987. Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany. New York: Berg Publishers. Bullock, Alan. 1962. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. New York: Harper & Row. Childers, Thomas. 1983. The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Cornil, Fernando. 2000. “Listening to the Subaltern: Postcolonial Studies and the Poetics of Neocolonial States.” In Postcolonial Theory and Criticism, edited by Laura Chrisman and Benita Parry, 37–55. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer. Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1967. Society and Democracy in Germany. New York: Doubleday. Diephouse, D. J., and Joseph Held, eds. 1983. The Cult of Power: Dictators in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Dorpalen, Andreas. 1964. Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Eakin, Paul John. 1999. How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Eley, Geoff. 1984. “The British Model and the German Road: Rethinking the Course of German History Before 1914.” In The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany, edited by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, Richard J. 1987. Rethinking German History: Nineteenth Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich. New York: HarperCollins. Eyck, Erich. 1967. A History of the Weimar Republic, Two Volumes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ferguson, Adam. 1773. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Edinburgh: T. Cadell, A. Kincaid W. Creech, and J. Bell. http://www.archive.org/details/anessayonhistor01ferggoog. Fest, Joachim. 1974. Hitler. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 104

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  105 Finley, M. I. 1978. The World of Odysseus. New York: Viking. Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. 2003. Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso Books. Goebel, Stefan. 2007. The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914–1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamerow, Theodore S. 1966. Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815–1871. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hassrick, Royal B. 1964. Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Hegel, G. W. F. 1979. Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA. ———. 1991. Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heinemann, Ulrich. 1983. Die verdrängte Niederlage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Herwig, Holger H. 1987. “Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War.” International Security 12 (2) Autumn: 5–44. Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. Man and Citizen: De Homine and De Cive. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. ———. 1996. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Holborn, Hajo. 1964. “Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology.” Political Science Quarterly 79. Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. MIT Press. Cambridge: MIT Press. ———. 1997. “Recognition and Moral Obligation.” Social Research 64 (1): 16–34. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In Kant: Political Writings, edited by Hans S. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kershaw, Ian. 1983. Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933– 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1987. The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich. New York: Oxford University Press. Kocka, Jurgen. 1988. “German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg.” Journal of Contemporary History 23 (1), January: 3–16. Konstan, David. 2006. Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Lit. Toronto: Tortonto University Press. Krüger, Peter. 1994. Deutschland und die Reparationen, 1918/19. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. Lentin, Anthony. 2006. “A Comment.” In The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, 221–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitt, M. 2006. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven: Yale University Press. Livy, Titus. 2002. Livy: The Early History of Rome, Books I-V (Penguin Classics). Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics. MacMillan, Margaret. 2001. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. New York: Random House Trade.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 105

4/18/11 12:36 PM

106  ✻  Richard Ned Lebow Mann, Thomas. 1987. Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man. New York: Ungar. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1972. “On the Jewish Question.” In Collected Works, Volume 3, 146–174. New York: International Publishers. Mommsen, Hans. 1996. The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Mommsen, Wolfgang. 2006. “Max Weber and the Peace Treaty of Versailles.” In The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de. 1777. De l’Esprit des Lois. Paris: Garnier. http:// www.archive.org/details/lespritdeslois01montuoft. Morgenthau, Hans J. 2006. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill. Mosse, George L. 1975. The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich. New York: Columbia University Press. Nipperdey, Thomas. 1968. “Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in 19. Jahrhundert.” Historische Zeitschrift 106: 529–585. Plato. 1989. The Dialogues of Plato, Volume 1: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Menexenus. New Haven: Yale University Press. ———. 1991. The Republic Of Plato. New York: Basic Books. Plessner, Helmuth. 1959. Die verspätete Nation. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Puhle, Hans-Jürgen. 1972. Von der Agrarkrise zum Präfaschismus. Zabern. Reikhoff, Harald von. 1971. German-Polish Relations, 1918–1933. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rich, Norman. 1973. Hitler’s War Aims, Volume I: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. New York: W. W. Norton. Rohl, John. 1973. 1914 Delusion Or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats. London: St. Martin’s/Marek. Schoenbaum, David. 1966. Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933–1939. Garden City: Doubleday. Schwabe, Klaus. 2006. “Germany’s Peace Aims and the Domestic and International Constraints.” In The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, 37–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seiler, Bernd. 1966. “‘Dolchstoss’ und ‘Dolchstosslegende.’” Zeitschrift für Deutsche Sprache 22: 1–20. Seligman, Adam B. 1995. The Idea of Civil Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Shotter, John. 1989. “Social Accountability and the Social Construction of ‘You’.” In Texts of Identity, edited by John Shotter and Kenneth J. Gergen, 133–151. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Spengler, Oswald. 1939. The Decline of the West. New York: A. A. Knopf. Stern, Fritz R. 1992. The Failure of Illiberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Stevenson, David. 2006. “French War Aims and Peace Planning.” In The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stöver, Bernd. 1996. Berichte über die Lage in Deutschland. Bonn: Dietz Verlag J. H. W. Nachf.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 106

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Spirit, Recognition and Foreign Policy  ✻  107 Taylor, Charles. 1994. “Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Guttman, 25–74. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2002. Democracy in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. “Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.” 1918 Documents—World War I Document Archive. http://wwi.lib .byu.edu/index.php/1918_Documents. Turner, Henry A. 1989. Geißel des Jahrhunderts: Hitler und seine Hinterlassenschaft. Berlin: Siedler Verlag. Vattel, Emmerich de. 2001. Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains. Paris: Adamant Media Corporation. “The Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1919.” http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/ vercontents.html. Walzel, Frank. 2007. Die Anfänge deutscher Außenpolitik in der Weimarer Republik—Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau und der Streit um die deutsche Kriegsschuld in Versailles. Berne: Lang. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 1977. Deutsche Geschichte: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918.: Bd 9. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Weinberg, Gerhard L. 1970. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Welch, David. 1983. Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933–1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Winkler, Heinrich August. 2000. Der lange Weg nach Westen, Volume 2. Munich: C. H. Beck. ———. 2002. The Long Shadow of the Reich: Weighing Up German History: the 2001 Annual Lecture. London: German Historical Institute. Yates, Robin. 2006. “Song Empire: The World’s First Superpower?” In Unmaking the West: Counterfactual and Contingency, edited by Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow, and Noel Geoffrey Parker, 205–240. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 107

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 108

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 6

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory Recognition, “Adjustment Delusions,” and the “Trauma of Expectations Foregone” Charles F. Doran

There is a time at which the tides of history change. There is a time at which the nation-state suddenly becomes cognizant that a discontinuity with the past has occurred, that its long anticipated place among countries has been irrevocably altered, that its prior assumptions about role, status, and security have been proven wrong. This is the existential interval in which a government is vulnerable to entanglement in the most major wars. This existential interval is the critical point on the state power cycle.1

History records those existential moments when governments suddenly discover that their long-standing expectations about future role, status, and security are no longer valid. With the familiar foreign policy anchors in question, massive uncertainty and an increasing sense of threat challenge policy-making. In tracing the historical trajectory of a state’s relative power in the system of leading states, the power cycle captures those critical moments when the structural tides of history suddenly pull the state on to a new, uncertain course. The power cycle maps, for each moment in time, the state’s clearly defined past and the likely trajectory of its yet-to-be-determined 109

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 109

4/18/11 12:36 PM

110  ✻  Charles F. Doran future—revealing at each step how contemporaneous decision-makers perceive its likely future security and foreign policy standing. The projected trend embedded at each point in the cycle is the state’s expectation regarding its future power, role, and security. Imagine the sudden shock when the long prior trend of relative power change suddenly undergoes a complete shift, abruptly proving those long-reinforced projections wrong. Everything hinges on those projections, as the quoted paragraph from my book Systems in Crisis reveals regarding the dilemma faced by Germany in the years prior to World War I.2 Germany’s crisis was a systemic crisis, for the relative power and role so highly prized and contested are necessarily systemic. The system provides the norm, which determines whether a state rises or declines, and decides whether a state will be attributed role and status. In arguing the details of power cycle theory, the book explains how “conflicting messages and disturbing surprises of relative versus absolute power growth” made Germany’s sudden turn into decline all the more traumatic and threatening. It demonstrates the paradigm shift in understanding obtained in moving beyond a “balance of power” perspective to a “dynamic structural” perspective. Four chapters delve into the historical record to show “what statesmen saw” and “how they reacted” to the trauma of critical change between 1905 and 1914; the “devastating illusions” that accompanied changes in European power cycles after 1885; and the “incongruities” that followed European efforts to balance a state “so powerful and yet so restless.” The German experience provides unambiguous evidence that, amidst massive structural change, the balance of power operates against the need to adjust diplomatic role through political recognition. From the power cycle perspective, role is coequal with power in matters of statecraft; it is the coordinate concept that amends realism.3 An encompassing notion, foreign policy role indexes the state’s foreign policy behavior over time, and it is deeply normative. More than status or place, role involves informally legitimized responsibilities and perquisites associated with the state’s “diplomatic place” in the system. It involves the practical reality of international political discourse, which governments barter, jealously guard, and sometimes contest. It reflects whether a state is a comparative leader or a follower, an aid-giver or a recipient; whether it joins coalitions or remains comparatively isolated; whether it is a provider or a net beneficiary of security; whether it is sought after for counsel or is disregarded. While role is sensitive to incremental changes in power, it is distinct from power and in fact acts as a guide to the exercise of state power. A role is legitimized when other actors “recognize” the role and declare it politically acceptable. Recognition acknowledges that these role differences exist and that they count in world politics. In explaining the origins of World War I, quite in contrast to both traditional and recent literature (focusing in turn on “war guilt” and German strategy),4 power cycle theory incorporates the concept of recognition as essential to the establishment and maintenance of foreign policy role. This chapter first exposes the adjustment delusions that prevented recognition of Germany and helped precipitate WWI. It then explores some puzzles associated with interpretation of the war and how recognition

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 110

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  111 assists in unraveling them. Finally, it explains the idea of dynamic international political equilibrium developed within power cycle theory, showing how recognition helps overcome some of the shortcomings of balance-of-power logic that led directly to the war outcome. Concluding with a conjecture, the chapter speculates about a counterfactual, namely, that the war was not inevitable. The war might have been averted if other actions had been taken and, in particular, if political recognition had been more aptly employed in the long prior interval of German rise. This chapter thus speaks directly to the links between role, status, identity, and symbolism in international relations.5 Most states are not as convulsed in an identity crisis as was Germany for the century after 1850. But for states that experience an ongoing identity crisis, this preoccupation can drive foreign policy, overwhelming more rational foundations of foreign policy conduct and state interests and thus seriously qualifying the realist foreign policy paradigm and its application. Fed by a diet of social Darwinism,6 Machtpolitik captured the European imagination at the turn of the century and encouraged expression of identity through power and conquest. What was lacking in the German sense of its identity was an ability to coordinate diplomacy. Germany’s institutional development was hollow, and its late bow to democracy incomplete and ineffective. Its identity became increasingly composed of blut und eisen with no sensitivity to the prudent management of power relationships. The kaiser’s exaggerated rhetoric undoubtedly further fueled the flames of rivalry. According to power cycle theory, the dynamic of foreign policy role captures the tragic interplay of realism and constructivism in the German sense of political identity. As a “created” state, mostly by Prussian power, Germany struggled to find its identity in the context of increased role participation, but the failure of recognition channeled its identity in a pernicious direction. Failing to be accorded a legitimate foreign policy role corresponding to its enhanced capabilities, Germany would substitute fantasy for international political reality, a mythic past and a Darwinian power impetus for a more moderate and lasting foreign policy role. Recognition was what Germany sought on the part of other governments and what these governments failed to give. As a result of long being denied appropriate recognition, Germany’s weak sense of identity did not permit a reciprocal recognition of the legitimate concerns and claims of others. The two faces of recognition—the need to find acceptance of one’s own claims in the policy of others and willingness to abide the diplomatic claims of others in one’s own foreign policy—thus never matured or became fixed in the German sense of statecraft. This incongruity in its identity was a tragic legacy of the historical dynamic leading to World War I.

I. Recognition in Power Cycle Theory: Concept and Application How does recognition become an issue in the factors accounting for the origin of WWI? The word “recognition,” from the Latin recognitio, enjoys a long tradition of usage both in domestic and international law as legal permission to be heard. In

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 111

4/18/11 12:36 PM

112  ✻  Charles F. Doran domestic politics, it was the formal acknowledgement of a claim, for example, of the sovereign to be received by the people at a coronation. In the context of general international relations, recognition contains more the meaning of acceptance or acknowledgment of having something worth hearing—of being entitled to consideration or to attention.7 In the context of the late nineteenth century, recognition conveys the urgent desire of Germany to be taken seriously by the international community, to be acknowledged by the other leading states as a juridical equal, and in particular, to gain acceptance of the notion that the German foreign policy role should enjoy incremental increase parallel to its rising power.

Wilhelmian Germany, Role Deprivation, and the Shock of Structural Trend Shifts Germany in the nineteenth century rose faster and further on its cycle of relative power than any other state because of its ever strengthening technological and industrial base. Discovery of the Bessemer process and open-hearth steel furnaces enabled Germany to exploit its huge deposits of high-phosphoric ore, transforming the leading industry and ultimately the entire economic, and hence geopolitical, map of Europe. Germany’s superb science and engineering bolstered its industrial development more broadly. In relative terms, its meteoric rise meant an equivalent decline distributed among other European states. That a corresponding increase in the German foreign policy role would lag behind its surging economic and military power was not unusual for a rising state. For the German foreign policy role to increase, other states had to “move over” to accommodate a role for the newcomer. Traditionally, governments do this with reluctance. But the lag of German role was unusual because particular structural changes affecting its competitors (whose own absolute growth rates increased in the 1880s) reinforced their belief, supported by balance-of-power thinking, that such role adjustments to German rise were unnecessary. Thus ever-widening power-role gaps opened up for Germany and its competitors not just because of Germany’s own surging growth but because of critical changes on the relative power trajectories of older members of the system with which Germany competed for role recognition. To be sure, the power of France, Britain, and Austria-Hungary relative to the central system (including Russia, Japan, and eventually the United States) was in decline. But, as I will explain, their own improvement in rate of absolute growth led each to experience the “hopes and illusions” that their decline was abating. This unusual structural situation exacerbated the lag in Germany’s role attainment and fed Germany’s hunger for political recognition, for acknowledgment of its economic and cultural achievements, for a diplomatic “place in the sun” to recognize its status as a member of the “inner circle” of major powers.8 In reaction to this intransigent role-deprivation, as German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg wrote in his Memoiren: “A nation as large and capable as the German one cannot be restricted from free and peaceful development.”9

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 112

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  113 Thus not only did Germany have to contemplate the normal reluctance of states to make room for a newcomer. The three states in severe relative decline, historically among Germany’s greatest rivals, refused to adjust any of their foreign policy role or diplomatic perquisites.10 What most embittered Germany’s leaders was that Germany was expected to take a second-seat not only in the colonies (where Britain, France, Belgium, and other countries had attained the benefits as first-comers) but also diplomatically regarding governance of the central system.11 For those who hold the hegemonic (unipolar) view that a single dominant state establishes rules of the system and maintains order through military preponderance, this situation of power-role disparity is particularly problematic, not only because those hegemonic theories have no intrinsic conception of foreign policy role, but also because they do not contemplate the possibility of “status competition” and “status dissonance” within such a hegemonic setting.12 The power cycle interpretation differs profoundly: power-role gaps that include status dissonance surface at each of the critical points and implicate all of the states in the system. No amount of “top-heavy distribution of capabilities” can alter the tension caused by these gaps, or by the associated status dissonance, because every power cycle is impacted. The German power-role gap was an externally imposed, made-in-Europe gap in a highly nationalistic era. Only from the power cycle perspective of critical structural change (the “shifting tides of history”) and power-role equilibrium can one fully understand how important “recognition” is to statecraft—and how its denial created a “severely disequilibrated system in crisis” that ended in world war.13 Figure 1: Systemic Bounds on Relative Growth

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 113

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Figure 2: Conflicting Messages

Figure 3: Expectations Foregone: Resolving WWI “Puzzles of History”

Figure 4: Power-Role Lag

114

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 114

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  115 Figure 5: Dynamics of Changing Systems Structure 1500–1993

Legend: Each curve represents the state’s evolving Percent Share of Power in the Central System, 1500–1993. (This representation stresses the “historical trends” in changing relative power and is not to be taken as a precise metric of the actual levels attained. The decline of the Venetian Empire in the 16th century is no depicted.) Source: Conceptualized by Doran (1965; updated 1981, 1989, 1993), based on estimations for the period 1500 to 1815, and data for the years 1815–1993.

The Trauma of Shifting Tides, the High Stakes of Role Deprivation Power cycle theory transforms understanding of the structural changes that fractured statecraft prior to World War I, undermining the thesis that Germany would have been “master of Europe” if it had not gone to war. The accompanying figures represent schematically the dynamics that precipitated tragedy. In the hour of its greatest achievement in terms of absolute power growth, Germany was driven on to unexpected paths by the “bounds of the system” (limited systemic shares, depicted in Figure 1). Power cycle theory exposes the conflicting messages (Figure 2) and disturbing surprises (Figure 3) in the evolution of the European power cycles between 1885 and 1914, which made adjustment to structural change so difficult—first during the period of Germany’s uninterrupted rise in power and expectations for future role recognition and subsequently during the critical interval of 1914 when, suddenly pulled on to the path of relative decline, Germany and all of Europe experienced the “trauma of expectations foregone” of a powerful state that remained severely role-deprived and recognition-denied (Figure 4). Power cycle theory explains the dynamic of state rise and decline (changing systems structure) and how that dynamic affects government decisions about foreign policy conduct. The individual power cycles evolve as part of a “single dynamic” of state and system, and of power and role, which maps the structural trends of history as schematically represented in Figure 5. The “principles of the power cycle” (Figure 1) explain how differential absolute growth sets the cycles in motion, creating a particular

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 115

4/18/11 12:36 PM

116  ✻  Charles F. Doran nonlinear pattern of change (critical points where the prior trend is inverted) on each state’s relative power trajectory. This single dynamic encodes the perspective and concerns of statecraft in the trends, and shifting trends, of the component state cycles. When decision-makers contemplate future change on a state power cycle, they form expectations regarding the state’s future security and foreign policy role. But competition for power share creates powerful undercurrents that contour structural change via critical shifts in the trend on state power cycles. Each critical point on a power cycle creates a crisis of foreign policy expectations: 1. birth throes of a major power (the state’s rise on its cycle begins) 2. trauma of constrained ascendancy (first inflection point, marking the shift from ever-increasing to ever-decreasing rise) 3. trauma of expectations foregone (upper turning point, where the rising state is pulled into decline) 4. hopes and illusions of the second wind (second inflection point, where accelerating decline begins to decelerate) 5. throes of demise as a major power (low-point or exit from the system) Each critical point corresponds in the state’s experience to a time when the “tides of history” have shifted the trend of structural change in the international system.14 Governments push and shove in these intervals of enormous uncertainty, where the rules of the game are in flux and the stakes so high, making wars of large magnitude, high intensity, and great duration much more likely than in normal periods of statecraft. Systems transformation results when several leading states experience such high-stakes change on their power cycles in a rather short interval (as in 1885 to 1914). Failure to adjust to structural change leads to ever-widening power-role gaps (“role surplus” for some, “role deficit” for others), increasing the sense of threat. As critical changes cumulate, one final critical point (such as Germany’s sudden turn into relative decline) makes the ever-growing strains between power and role internal to each state (such as Germany’s huge role deficit and Austria-Hungary’s overextension in the Balkans) ricochet throughout the system as states are forced to confront the power-role gaps amidst the trauma and uncertainty of the latest structural shift. During the five systems transformations since Westphalia, each of the major players saw its foreign policy and security outlook severely altered and at risk, resulting in massive warfare.15 This “dilemma of peaceful change” is exacerbated by the natural inertia of role change. As a state’s relative power increases, other governments refuse to adjust, or the state postpones role gratification believing it can enhance its role more easily and on better terms with even higher power. As relative power declines, allies demand security and elites want to retain role and prestige, causing overextension for states that refuse to adapt. Such failure of role to adjust to power change creates a structural disequilibrium that goes to the heart of the capacity to act in foreign policy. Adjustment must ultimately occur. Yet this inertia in adjustment can be perversely encouraged by the conflicting messages, shocks, and surprises of critical changes on the state

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 116

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  117 power cycles. This invidious relationship between critical trend shifts and powerrole disequilibrium both encourages the use of balance-of-power logic and makes inevitable its tragic failure. It thus provides the foundation within power cycle theory for a dynamic equilibrium that must precede and complement the balancing process. In contrast to other structural interpretations (hegemonic stability,16 long cycle,17 and power transition18 theories), power cycle theory argues that war is not necessary for transformation from one international system to another. Causation goes from structural transformation, to failure of systemic adjustment, to the war that ensued; the shifting tides that restructured the system created the new power relations that will prevail in the new system. The implication is clear: massive warfare can be avoided by a judicious adjustment of foreign policy roles and diplomatic recognition during the period of consistent rise (and decline) on the state power cycles—minimizing power-role disequilibrium——before the onset of critical change alters prior expectations and creates a crisis of failed adjustment.

Adjustment Delusions Prior to WWI Why did the critical structural change on each declining state’s power cycle lead them to believe they need not accommodate German rise with enhanced role, that they need only apply the balance of power to offset Germany’s growing power? And why was that strategy flawed and doomed to failure? Power cycle theory argues that the organic rise and decline of states so twists and distorts the “chessboard” of balanceof-power logic that, in an interval of extreme structural change, the game can no longer be played. Indeed, its use attempts to offset declining power and to halt rising power—resisting rather than adapting to the long-term structural changes. Its use leads to a severely disequilibriated system that ultimately “erupts” to eliminate the ever-growing structural strains between power and role. The balance of power is inadequate as a solution to this “dilemma of peaceful change” because it considers only power, ignoring completely the high-stakes issues of role and recognition. For a system to endure, it must establish a distribution of roles and responsibilities (hence, recognition and status) that matches the capacity of states to carry out these functions. To ensure stability amidst structural change, power cycle theory proposes a dynamic equilibrium that matches strategies of opposition and balance or alternatively, of adaptation and role recognition, to the trajectories of power change of potentially expansionist states (see part III of this chapter). The theory conjectures that World War I could have been prevented. For recognition to be helpful in international relations, it must be based on a conception of statecraft that sees reality for what it is, especially in abnormal intervals of history where structural change is abrupt and massive. But in the decades preceding WWI, the notion of recognition was distorted by the tragic application of the balance of power to offset the long-term rise of German power in lieu of role adjustment. France, Austria-Hungary, and Britain held foreign policy roles far in excess of their declining relative power; but each also passed through a second inflection point on its power cycles marking a suddenly improved (lessened) rate of decline in relative

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 117

4/18/11 12:36 PM

118  ✻  Charles F. Doran power. The second inflection point signifies “the hopes and illusions of the second wind” analogous to a long-distance runner far behind in a race who suddenly experiences a surge and the illusion of possible victory. For a state with a role surplus, the “hopes and illusions of the second wind” creates a particularly egregious problem for statecraft, for it pulls the state into opposing directions. While its continuing relative decline indicates its weakened capability to carry out its existing foreign policy roles (and its vulnerability to challenge by stronger rivals), its sudden experience of improved circumstances (lessened rate of decline) makes it confident that it need not make concessions to other states in the system and, indeed, can be even more assertive in foreign policy matters. It discards any motivation to mitigate its role surplus—to allow any transfer of status, perquisites of diplomacy, or offers of engagement to its competitor for role attainment and recognition. The illusion from its improved circumstances is that it can restore its weakened capability by a new assertiveness, by digging in its heels more resolutely. The state thus acts ever more toughly in communication and negotiation in hopes that its relative decline will reverse. Illusions of the second wind caused France and Britain to believe they did not need to engage Germany but could continue to try to isolate and encircle it; Russia was an enthusiastic accomplice. The second-wind gave Austria-Hungary the illusion of being able to manage its internal empire and cope with the tumult of the Balkans alone, when in fact Austria-Hungary was on the edge of collapse. This hubris was especially trying with respect to Serbia. Germany bought into the Austro-Hungarian illusion wholeheartedly, while Russia sought to puncture it. For recognition to be helpful in world affairs, it must be founded on realism and a correct understanding of the dynamic of structural change. But the structural change that France, Austria-Hungary, and Britain “recognized” after the demise of Bismarck was founded on the illusion of the second-wind. When these illusions combined with those Germany harbored—that it would continue to rise and that it could correct its role and status gap by the use of force—the prelude to WWI is not surprising. Lacking was sound reasoning about how statecraft ought to respond to structural change. Each of the principal actors contributed to this fantasy.

II. Recognition, Power Cycle Theory, and Puzzles of  WWI The problem of recognition, viewed from the power cycle perspective, helps resolve several puzzles regarding World War I.

The Timing of World War If Germany’s power-role gap and its hunger for political recognition help explain why WWI occurred, the dynamics of the power cycle incorporating the anxiety for political recognition explains the timing of WWI, or why the war occurred when it

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 118

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  119 did. Germany had grown into an extraordinarily prosperous and powerful nation in a few decades, but by 1914, its leaders realized that something had gone wrong with the German effort to excel, to achieve ever-greater place in the system. The problem was not its absolute power, which increased in larger and larger increments. So large were these increments that some historians believed Germany was capable of dominating the entire European system politically. Yet, as contemporaneous German government officials were shocked to discover, German relative power was no longer increasing. The more they tried to increase their place in the system, the more they felt the constraints on relative growth. Chief of Staff von Moltke recognized this military and political dilemma. Germany was pressing against the “bounds of the system” and could not increase its relative power further. Sometime between 1905 and 1912, German power peaked, reaching a plateau it could not transcend despite its surging absolute growth. Awareness of this reality set off alarm bells in Berlin. Caught between ever-rising absolute power and stagnating relative power, the German foreign policy elite was traumatized. From the moment Germany confronted passage through the upper turning point on its power cycle, it became distraught about its foreign policy future. It contemplated the trauma of expectations forgone. Then, quite abruptly in 1914, Germany found itself being pulled onto a declining trajectory. The tides of history had shifted against it, completely destroying Germany’s expectations regarding future security and a larger foreign policy role. The timing of WWI was triggered by Germany’s passage through the upper turning point on its power cycle.

Did Germany Know Its Power Had Peaked? How much did contemporaneous Germans recognize about their situation and their fate? Enough historical evidence has now accumulated, at a sufficient level of seniority in government, that German leaders had little doubt about its imminent relative decline even though its absolute power continued to skyrocket. According to Riezler, an advisor to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, the Chancellor said on July 20, 1914: “The Russian power is rapidly growing . . . The future belongs to Russia which grows continually and imposes an ever worse nightmare upon us.”19 These and other quotations from foreign office and the general staff reinforce the same message of German fear in security terms of its recently discovered declining relative power base. In 1912, the German chancellor reports from his Russian journey to a friend: My journey from Russia, albeit too brief, was full of beautiful and great impressions. This journey has also rectified many of my misconceptions about Russia reported by our superficial journalism. The richness of natural resources and brute human strength are factors which we do not fear but which should not be overlooked.20

Germany confronted the reality that Russia’s latent power base was much greater than Germany’s. In the critical interval at the German peak, the massive political

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 119

4/18/11 12:36 PM

120  ✻  Charles F. Doran uncertainty was equaled only by fears about future realities. German government officials could not think clearly about their future. Uncertain about their status among nations, they doubted that other governments would treat them fairly. Denied recognition of their place in the past, they had every reason to believe they would face malice and aggression when in decline. Lack of recognition on the upside of the power curve convinced the Germans that the downside would be even less welcoming, indeed more forbidding.

Geltung, Anerkennung, Gleichberechtigung—and Gefahr Looking at the German objectives in 1914, American historian Jonathan Steinberg was puzzled as to what the Germans wanted. They wanted “Geltung, Anerkennung, and Gleichberechtigung,” but Europe was not about to recognize any of these emotionally charged characterizations. But Germans also feared a surprise British naval attack, a fear Steinberg dubbed the Copenhagen Complex.21 Unable to explain the European reaction to its rising power, Germany thought that it was encircled militarily and that the British fleet would attack at its most vulnerable point in the Baltic Sea. The British navy did have exactly such a plan, but only as a defensive contingency plan. In their obsession with security, the Germans could not distinguish a contingency plan from an offensive military doctrine. Loosely translated from the German, the greatly desired objectives—“Geltung, Anerkennung, Gleichberechtigung”—are “prestige, recognition, equality of rights.” The word Gefahr means “danger”—the danger Germans felt regarding their security in the face of both encirclement and Russia’s rise, and the danger they felt regarding these objectives—the growing fear that their prestige, recognition, and equality as a major power would never be attained. Germany sought objectives in international politics that had been unleashed inside the German Principalities by the French Revolution, but that took on a larger and more earnest connotation when applied to the international system by an ever more powerful Germany. Germany felt that it was being denied these objectives even though they had been “earned” by its growth in relative power, and even though the over-extended declining powers were no longer capable of maintaining the roles of the past. Other governments did not necessarily perceive this power-role gap, much less acknowledge that it was problematic. The notion of Gefahr has also puzzled historians. As Rudolf Stadelmann argued in 1948, “What a strange and incomprehensible self-delusion lay in this word Gefahr!”22 Of what or of whom was Germany fearful? Why did it believe its security and foreign policy role were endangered if it was the most powerful state in Europe? What would it take to erase this sense of danger that so permeated the German consciousness? When one contemplates the conflicting messages of Germany’s huge level of absolute power and undiminished economic dynamism on the one hand, and its counterintuitive peak in relative power growth on the other, the German Gefahr is seen to be neither incomprehensible nor self-delusional.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 120

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  121

Was WWI a “Preventive War”? Machtpolitik is a brutal application of force to politics that all the major powers practiced at the end of the nineteenth century. Each state threatened to use force against the others to forestall aggression against itself. Given the historical context of Machpolitik, might Germany have instigated WWI as a “preventive war” to forestall its decline and Russia’s rise? Some contemporary scholars find this explanation appealing.23 But how plausible is the argument? From one perspective, each government, once convinced that war was inevitable, naturally sought to prevent its opponents from winning and becoming dominant. From that perspective, each government proceeded as though it was waging a preventive war, a war to prevent its own decline as well as preserve its security. There is also abundant evidence that Germany feared Russia in just these terms and worried that eventually Russia would come to dominate Germany politically, economically, and militarily. Thus, when Germany finally decided that war was inevitable, it certainly sought to defeat Russia and prevent its own capitulation. But there are many problems with the “preventive war” notion applied to any of the belligerents in 1914. From the days of the elder von Moltke, Germany worried that the next war could not be ended easily, would not be as short as in mid-nineteenth century, would involve the “cult of the offensive,” and thus would require Germany to strike first to prevail against superior numbers. Such a “cult of the offensive” appears more a best means of defense against aggression than aggressive intent to dominate. If the war were prompted by cold calculation intending to defeat Russia before Russia could dominate Germany, how could Germany expect France not to honor its alliance with Russia, especially if Germany came close to defeating Russia? If France entered the war, Germany’s worst fears would be realized—fighting a two-front war. How could it carry out a “preventive war” against Russia if it had to protect its flank against France? And if France were in danger of defeat, how likely was Germany to avoid a naval blockade by Britain or even active military engagement on land? Once Germany decided that war was inevitable, it fudged the diplomatic transmission to Russia regarding Serbia to try to place the blame for starting the war on Russia. But it did not do so for the “preventive war” motivation conceived in recent scholarship. Where is evidence that Germany thought it could so defeat Russia as to end permanently the prospect of political domination by Russia? The most its military leaders could promise in their wildest optimism was a decade or so to regroup. Given the kind of war the German military leadership thought it faced, its costs and duration, would a rational actor believe that a preventive war against such an adversary as Russia was an acceptable bargain? Only the non-rational response of a government caught in a crisis interval, already certain of its own inevitable relative decline and desperate to escape what it thought was encirclement and the supposedly aggressive intent of its opponents, would have led it to take such risks by embarking on a war with so little true prospects.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 121

4/18/11 12:36 PM

122  ✻  Charles F. Doran A problem with the preventive war hypothesis is that in big wars against big opponents, the costs so far outweigh the possible benefits that the risks are unacceptable to a decision-maker with enough information to act rationally in an environment adequately subject to control. Only miscalculation, aborted strategies, confused signals from opponents, and desperation—all made within the context of huge uncertainty and conflicting messages created by the abrupt shift in future expectations engendered by Germany’s turn into relative decline—can explain how each of the belligerents slipped toward war in the weeks prior to the Russian mobilization. The inflexible military contingency plans of the belligerents did not predestine war, but once war occurred, they surely made war more intense.

Did Germany Plan a War in 1914 to Dominate All of Europe? Most of the war aims were formulated after the war had begun to justify to the German public the sacrifices being made on the battlefield. So a problem of causation exists when war aims are used to explain how the war began.24 Another problem is that those in the government who had doubts were silenced. Bethmann Hollweg resisted announcing war aims publicly, and after the war, militarists claimed that the military was “stabbed in the back” during the war by subversives who had doubts about the war and did not have Germany’s interests at heart. Moreover, each of the allies had war aims that, in terms of territorial transfer, looked remarkably similar in form and content to the German war aims. That these allied war aims were agreed to by secret treaty before the war only reinforced the German suspicions that France, Russia, Britain, and Italy were colluding at its expense.25 A particular danger of historiography regarding WWI and WWII is transposing Hitler’s motives and strategy on to Wilhelmian Germany, oversimplifying and distorting history. That Hitler wanted to dominate all of Europe militarily (albeit step-by-step) does not mean that Bethman Hollweg, the kaiser, and von Moltke had these objectives in mind as they engaged Russia. Even if, in their musings, they occasionally pondered implications of such an outcome, they were far more realistic than their Nazi successors about the negative prospects. In an age when the notion of hegemony is loosely appropriated by scholars and practitioners, such an interpretation is perhaps unsurprising. But as the German historian Ludwig Dehio observed, reflecting on his informed experience of  WWI, “we ourselves” had no desire, no plan, to try to dominate Europe militarily.26 The best antidote to transferring Nazi ideology into Wilhelmian minds is to consider the strategic context of WWI. If German leaders planned to try to dominate all of Europe, why were they so filled with angst over the prospect that the Russians would overwhelm them by 1917? Who was to be dominating whom? It is a very long step from arguing that Russia was capable of subjecting Germany to domination to the contrary view that Germany would have the capacity and purpose to dominate not just Russia militarily but all of Europe. If Germany’s plan was to become the “master of Europe” in 1914, surely the weakest member of the central system, ­Russia,

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 122

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  123 should not have been much of a challenge militarily, since “mastery” would also involve defeating the more powerful France and Britain. The reality is that the German government found itself in a critical interval of history, a crisis in which it did not know what to believe, changed its strategic mind repeatedly, and allowed its contingency plans to do much of its thinking (such as the ill-fated Schlieffen Plan to avoid a two-front war by quickly defeating France before Russia could mobilize).27 It helplessly allowed history to unfold in its alliance with Austria, without adequate forethought or control. Its failure to decide whether it would face a two-front war was a brazen example of strategic contradiction. Another was Germany’s alternating strategic conception of how it would deploy its armies, either against Russia, or France, or both. Its failure to decide whether Britain would enter the war, and if so, where and when, amounted to more than tactical indecision, given the stakes for Germany. It did not decide because it could not. In this abnormal interval of critical structural change in which Germany was torn between the conflicting perceptions of surging absolute growth but declining relative power, its thirst for recognition went un-slaked, political uncertainty was gargantuan, and nothing seemed to make any sense. In such a critical interval, the conditions that had long guided rational foreign policy strategy were no longer valid; and with the criteria for “rational choice” no longer present, “strategy” is likely to be flawed—a condition I call “non-rationality.”28 Charles Maier explains how decisionmakers prior to the war’s outbreak believed that each step was a “rational” choice as the sequence of events unfolded: From one point of view the war was “irrational,” risking national unity, dynasties, and even bourgeois society. Many of the European statesmen . . . claimed to understand that such long-term stakes were involved . . . they did not think they were in a position to act upon these long-term forebodings. Rather, they say themselves confronted with decisions about the next step.29

Joseph Nye concludes: “Although each step may be rational in a procedural sense of relating means to ends, the substantive outcome may be so distorted that one should refer to it as irrational.”30 In other words, the struggle to act rationally was overwhelmed by the sudden and ineluctable inversion of prior expectations regarding high stakes in the midst of enormous uncertainty. In 1914, any clearly thought-out plan for military domination of Europe was very far from the German strategic mind.

III. Recognition, Dynamic Equilibrium, and Stability To show how recognition fits into the framework for stability, I first explain how its absence from the practice of the balance of power in the context of a rapidly changing system led to a monumental failure of the balance mechanism. I then develop the

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 123

4/18/11 12:36 PM

124  ✻  Charles F. Doran concept of dynamic international political equilibrium and demonstrate what part recognition must play in the operation of that equilibrium.

Balance of Power Confronts State Rise and Decline Maintenance of world order in the nineteenth century depended on proper use of the balance of power by all of the states. Assertions that Britain alone practiced the balance or had superior intuition in effectively implementing it are mistaken. Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was no greater practitioner of the art of balance than was Metternich, the German-born architect of Austrian foreign policy, a decade later. Because of its island status, navy, colonies, and abhorrence of a land war on the Continent, Britain practiced a slightly different tactical version of the balance of power than did the Continentals, but the overall strategic vision was exactly the same. Britain threw its weight against any dominant coalition that formed on the Continent, thus bolstering the weaker coalition so as to “maintain the balance” and prevent aggression by any member of the dominant coalition.31 Over time this tactical approach to the balance of power came to be known as “off-shore balancing,” and Britain became known as “the holder of the balance.”32 The only difference in tactical implementation of the balance of power for the Continentals was that they were usually already a member of either a dominant or an inferior coalition. They tended to leave one coalition or to join another as they saw their interests impacted. They too were concerned that the balance should remain in balance, thus preserving first their own security and secondarily the peace, but sometimes their foreign policy interests got in the way of the larger balance-of-power vision. Moreover, Continental states were often contiguous, complicating the task of shifting the balance without upsetting a security-conscious neighbor. But after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, Bismarck maintained the balance for twenty years by applying a peculiarly complex balance-of-power arrangement. Bismarck recognized that he could successfully maintain the balance if he could tie up any two of the five members of the system in an alliance. This tactical version of maintaining balance stood the notion on its head: instead of balancing the dominant coalition, Germany under Bismarck was part of the dominant coalition. And yet the balance “balanced” because Bismarck had a vision of stability for Europe that would allow Germany to mature and prosper. In Bismarck’s view, Germany’s days of territorial expansion were over; the “natural limits” had been reached. By its allying with any two actors in the central system, no other actor or pair of actors was likely to challenge the status quo militarily. The logic was coherent. But neither traditional nor Bismarckian balance could deal with the structural changes straining the system. Indeed, balancing to maintain the status quo enabled the actors to postpone giving attention to the growing imbalance between power and role throughout the system. While the balance of power is crucial to the understanding of world politics and probably has helped preserve the territorial security of many states since the origin of the modern state system, it was designed for normal intervals of statecraft when

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 124

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  125 structural change is minimal. But for Europe after 1885, structural change was rampant. Several states passed through critical points on their power cycles where everything changed in structural terms for state and system. Uncertainty is at a maximum when the tides of history suddenly shift. The flat chessboard of statecraft is twisted and torn. Conventional diplomatic strategy fails. In these transformed intervals of statecraft, the balance of power sends off the wrong signals, becoming part of the problem rather than the solution.

Recognition, the Balance of Power, and WWI WWI might have been averted, but only if the shortcomings of the balance of power during a period of systems transformation could be avoided. To do so required understanding the dynamics of the power cycle and the fundamentals of recognition. Germany was a rising state throughout the latter two-thirds of the nineteenth century. Britain began its relative descent by midcentury, notwithstanding its colonial expansion by the 1870s. France had been in relative decline since the middle of the prior century. Austria-Hungary’s relative decline was so far advanced, because of the disintegration of its internal empire and its laggard industrialization, that by the eve of WWI, it had virtually dropped out of the central system. Germany relied too heavily on Austria for order-maintenance responsibilities in the Balkans that were entirely beyond its capacities. All of these states insisted on their perquisites and place in terms of statecraft, elbowing Germany out of the colonial regions and excluding it from equal status in the central European system. In short, Europe denied Germany recognition of its achievements and a constructive foreign policy role and did so repeatedly and in a fashion that led Germany to identify force as the means to attainment. Britain, France, and Russia observed the balance of power meticulously. Instead of allowing a rising state to attain diplomatic status and recognition, they sought to encircle and restrain it. Instead of engaging Germany early, before its belligerence became too difficult to manage, they in effect created a noose into which, as the Kaiser recognized by late summer of 1914, Germany too readily inserted its own neck. By waiting until 1912 or so to offer Germany some palliatives (such as the Haldane visit to Berlin to alleviate concerns about British naval intentions), they had waited too long. The thunderheads of war were already on the horizon. Recognition of German economic and military achievement did not mean giving up territory to Germany, laying down their own arms, or adopting pacifist postures. Recognition meant treating Germany as a cultural and political equal.

International Political Equilibrium: How WWI Could Have Been Averted According to power cycle theory, rising power cannot be constrained and declining power cannot be artificially bolstered.33 These are the dual impulses of the balance of power that, in a dynamic interval of systems transformation, are bound not only

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 125

4/18/11 12:36 PM

126  ✻  Charles F. Doran to fail but to exacerbate the tensions in the international political climate of the period. Instead, in periods of high uncertainty and insecurity such as the 1890 to 1914 interval, those states attempting to promote world order must acknowledge the need of a rising power to be recognized for its achievements and accepted for its positive contributions. While preserving their own security and the means to that security, the other powers in the system must learn to adapt to rising power.34 They must engage the newcomer and bind it into a series of coalitions that both give it a sense of security and at the same time guarantee the security of its neighbors. Conversely, when a potentially disruptive state is in significant relative decline as was Hitler’s Germany, the other major powers must balance and oppose its claims to greater role as well as its aggression. A state whose relative power is declining no longer can make claims on the system for a larger foreign policy role. By attempting to appease such a power, the other members of the system only invited aggression. Unfortunately, the actions of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States from 1937 to 1939 signaled to Hitler that they did not care whether he canceled the neutrality of the Rhineland, intimidated Austria, or violated the sovereignty of the Czech state. True, they were reeling from the prior war (France and Britain), seeking isolation (United States), or brooding about a deal between dictators (Soviet Union). They were also trying to unlearn mistakes made prior to 1914 that had caused Germany’s outburst in WWI. But they failed to recognize that the structural situation in the last decades of the nineteenth century was entirely different from the structural situation between the wars. Like many historical treatments today, they conflated Wilhelmian Germany and Nazi Germany as well as the structural settings. They attempted to use the medicine appropriate for the earlier period as a prescription for the ills of the latter. By trying to undo the mistakes of the earlier period with inappropriate role adjustments in the latter, the architects of world order fueled Hitler’s aggression. The correct strategy was to respond to a rising Germany with deference and engagement, adapting to its thirst for recognition with ascription of legitimate roles. The correct strategy for a declining Germany under Hitler was to demonstrate early that expansion was illegitimate and that it would not work. Power cycle theory elucidates these two tragic historical lessons. WWII showed that states ignore the balance of power at their period and that illegitimate interests must never be appeased. WWI showed that states ignore power-role equilibrium at their peril and that rising power cannot be halted. The bounds of the system constrain relative growth and future role opportunity, and when expectations long deferred suddenly are foreclosed, the urgent demand for redress of this sense of “injustice,” and to relieve the structural disequilibrium, provokes the tragedy of world war. Recognition is an important instrument in the toolkit of decision-makers contemplating appropriate and viable adjustment to structural change. Among the possible leadership roles a state may assume, recognition establishes which roles are considered legitimate within a stable world order. Wisely used, recognition can enhance the prospects for peace while, in conjunction with a proper use of defensive capability, helping bolster territorial security. But if denied or wrongly used, whether in ­ignorance or in

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 126

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  127 defiance of structural change, any of these instruments of adaptation will disappoint the purported peacemaker.

Notes 1. Doran 1991, 93. 2. This analysis of World War I from the power cycle perspective draws heavily on the author’s detailed theoretical and historical assessment (Doran 1991). The first published account of the theory (Doran 1971) examined the failed hegemonic attempts of the Spanish Habsburgs under Philip II, of France under Louis XIV, and of France under Napoleon. A compact presentation, including the essentials of its application to WWI, is Doran 2003, 13–50. 3. On the nature of the concept of “foreign policy role” as established in power cycle theory, see Doran 1991, 30–33; Doran 2003, 14–15, 25–32. 4. Kissinger 1994; Evera 1985; Sagan 1986; Trachtenberg 1990; Williamson and May 2007; Hamilton and Herwig 2004; Kagan 1995; Snyder and Jervis 1999; Hamilton and Herwig 2004. For early debates, see Albertini 1952–1957; Fischer 1967; Geiss 1967. 5. Honneth 1996; Wendt 1999. 6. Lindemann 2001. 7. Honneth 1999, and the contribution to this volume. 8. Murray provides evidence of this gap in her contribution to this volume. 9. I am grateful to Thomas Lindemann for this reference. 10. This thesis should not be confused with claims that France and Russia started the war, which could be true only in a very narrow technical sense affected by mobilization times. Zuber 1999; Zuber 2002; critique by Mombauer 2005. 11. Lieber 2007, 155–191. 12. Wohlforth 1999. Wohlforth 2009, 28–57, claims that status competition and status dissonance can become possible causes of war only when a unipolar system moves into a system he characterizes as balanced. Status dissonance without unipolarity is central in Midlarsky 1975. 13. Doran 1989, 371–401; Doran 1991, 79–100, 134–140. Doran 2003, 28–38. 14. Doran 1991, 104–107. 15. Doran 1971. 16. Gilpin 1981. 17. Modelski 1978; Thomson 1988. 18. Organski and Kugler 1980. 19. Quoted in Lindemann 2001, 224–226. 20. Ibid., 264. 21. Steinberg 1966; Schweller 2008, 42. 22. Stadelmann 1948. 23. Fischer 1967; Levy 1990/91; Copeland 2000; Trachtenberg 1990/91. 24. Feldman 1967. 25. Ibid., 2–3. 26. Dehio [1948] 1962. 27. Ritter 1956.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 127

4/18/11 12:36 PM

128  ✻  Charles F. Doran 28. Doran 2000; Doran 2003, 26, 37–38. See also the discussion of non-rationality by Ringmar in the introduction to this volume. 29. Maier 1988, 588. 30. Nye 1988. Doran 1991, 40–43. 31. Paul et al. 2004; Ikenberry 2002. 32. Levy and Thompson 2005, 1–33, distinguish maritime from land-based efforts to balance. For a traditional view of the balance of power, see Mearsheimer 2001. 33. See Doran 1991, 144–151; Doran 1995. 34. The requirements and strategies for adaptation and adjustment are articulated in Doran 1991, 169–171, 182–186.

Bibliography Albertini, Luigi. 1952. Origins of the War of 1914, 3 Volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Copeland, Dale C. 2000. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dehio, Ludwig. (1948) 1962. The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle. New York: Vintage Books. Doran, Charles F. 1971. Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ———. 1980. “Modes, Mechanisms, and Turning Points: Perspectives on the Analysis of the Transformation of the International System.” International Political Science Review 1 (1): 35–61. ———. 1989. “Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle: Challenges for Research Design.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (3): 371–401. ———. 1991. Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1995. “The Power Cycle and Peaceful Change: Assimilation, Equilibrium, and Conflict Resolution.” In Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the PostCold War Era, edited by John A. Vasquez, Sanford M. Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ———. 2000. “The Rationality of ‘Nonrationality’ in the Power Cycle Theory of Major War: Confronting the Principles of the ‘Single Dynamic.’” Washington, DC. ———. 2003. “Economics, Philosophy of History, and the ‘Single Dynamic’ of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft.” International Political Science Review 24 (1): 13–50. Evera, Stephen Van. 1985. “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914.” World Politics 38 (1): 80–117. Feldman, Gerald D., ed. 1967. German Imperialism, 1914–1918: The Development of a Historical Debate. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Fischer, Fritz. 1967. Germany’s Aims In The First World War. New York: W. W. Norton. Geiss, Immanuel. 1967. July 14: The Outbreak of the First World War. New York: Scribner. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. 2004. Decisions For War, 1914–1917. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 128

4/18/11 12:36 PM

World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory  ✻  129 Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition. London: MIT Press. Ikenberry, G. John, ed. 2002. America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kagan, Donald. 1995. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday. Kissinger, Henry A. 1994. Diplomacy: The History of Diplomacy and the Balance of Power. New York: Simon & Schuster. Levy, Jack S. 1990. “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914.” International Security 15 (3). Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2005. “Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe, 1495–1999.” Security Studies 14: 1–33. Lieber, Keir A. 2007. “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory.” International Security 32 (2): 155–191. Lindemann, Thomas. 2001. Les doctrines darwiniennes et la guerre de 1914. Paris: Economica. Maier, Charles. 1988. “Wargames: 1914–1919.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (4): 581–590. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Midlarsky, Manus I. 1975. On War: Political Violence in the International System. New York: Free Press. Modelski, George. 1978. “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20(2): 214–235. Mombauer, Annika. 2005. Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nye, Joseph S. 1988. “Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (4). Organski, A. F. K., and Jasek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Paul, T. V., James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds. 2004. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. 1st ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ritter, Gerhard. 1956. The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. New York: Praeger. Sagan, Scott D. 1986. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability.” International Security 11 (2): 151–175. Schweller, Randall L. 2008. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Illustrated edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Snyder, Jack, and Robert Jervis. 1999. “Civil War and the Security Dilemma.” In Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 15–37. New York: Columbia University Press. Stadelmann, Rudolf. 1948. “Die Epoche der deutsch-englischen Flottenrivalität.” In Deutschland und Westeuropa. Wurttemberg: Laupheim. Steinberg, Jonathan. 1966. “The Copenhagen Complex.” In 1914: The Coming of the First World War, edited by Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse. New York: Harper & Row. Thompson, William. 1988. On Global War. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Trachtenberg, Marc. 1990. “The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914.” International Security 15 (3). Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 129

4/18/11 12:36 PM

130  ✻  Charles F. Doran Williamson, Samuel R., and Ernest R. May. 2007. “An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914.” Journal of Modern History 79 (2): 335–387. Wohlforth, William. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24 (1): 5–41. ———. 2009. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” World Politics 61 (1): 28–57. Zuber, Terence. 1999. “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered.” War in History 6 (3). ———. 2002. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871–1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 130

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 7

Recognition, Disrespect, and the Struggle for Morocco Rethinking Imperial Germany’s Security Dilemma Michelle Murray

If the flag of the state is insulted, it is the duty of the State to demand satisfaction, and if satisfaction is not forthcoming, to declare war, however trivial the occasion may appear, for the State must strain every nerve to preserve for itself the respect which it enjoys in the state system. —Heinrich von Treitschke 1

The origins of the First World War have played an important role in the development of international relations theory, helping to inspire the principal concept in structural realist theory: the security dilemma. The security dilemma explains how states with fundamentally compatible goals, namely security, nevertheless end up in competition and war. This happens when the power a state acquires for security can “render others more insecure and compel them to prepare for the worst.”2 That is, a security dilemma exists when the capabilities a state builds for its own defense and security decreases the security of others.3 These states respond in kind with military buildups of their own, the result of which is an action-reaction spiral that leads to security competition and sometimes war. The central insight of security dilemma theory is that states pursuing nothing more than security and self-defense can end 131

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 131

4/18/11 12:36 PM

132  ✻  Michelle Murray up acting as if they are aggressors, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy of competition and insecurity. Accordingly, the dominant view that has emerged on the origins of the First World War is that none of the European great powers wanted war but fought one because of misperceptions, militaristic domestic ideologies, and mobilization schedules. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand initiated a diplomatic crisis, triggered alliance commitments among the great powers and set in motion military mobilization schedules. When Serbia rejected Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, prompting a partial military mobilization in Russia. Fearing the disadvantage that would come from not being prepared if attacked, all of the European great powers began to prepare for war. This created a self-fulfilling prophecy: as these preparations turned to full-scale military mobilizations, neighboring states felt compelled to respond in kind with full-scale ­mobilizations of their own. Under these conditions, the incentives to launch a preemptive war increased “to the degree that striking the first offensive blow [was] considered advantageous compared to waiting to be attacked.”4 By August 1, this spiral had wound too tightly, and Germany declared war on Russia and two days later, on France. When Germany violated Belgian neutrality, Britain was drawn into the war. By mid-August what started out as a localized conflict between AustriaHungary and Serbia had escalated into full-scale European war. World War I is considered an exemplary instance of the security dilemma because the pressures of the international system drove states seeking only security into competitive arming practices, which quickly escalated to war. Recent work in history and political science, however, has put this understanding of the origins of the war—and Germany’s role in precipitating it—into doubt.5 It is clear that since at least 1890, Imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied power, “eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals by bullying if possible, by war if necessary.”6 Its bold naval policy represented a direct challenge to British naval hegemony, designed to bring Germany to the rank of a world power. On the continent, it pursued a belligerent foreign policy, assuming a more vocal role in European politics and often threatening great power war over trivial colonial disagreements. What is more, Keir Lieber has forcefully argued that Germany went to war “eyes wide open,” prepared for a costly and protracted war in order to achieve its goal of dominating the European continent.7 In short, it seems apparent that decisions regarding the use of force in 1914 did not lead tragically to an unwanted war, but rather were part of a deliberate strategy designed to achieve very particular ends. But for what ends was this risky and aggressive foreign policy devised? In this chapter, I argue that Germany’s foreign policy was designed to secure recognition of its status as a world power. By 1890 Germany was the strongest power on the European continent; however, its power beyond Europe was insignificant, and its prospects for enlarging it there were rapidly diminishing.8 As British diplomat Eyre Crowe observed, “Germany had won [its] place as one of the leading, if not, in fact, the foremost power on the European continent, but over and beyond the European

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 132

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  133 Great Powers there seemed to stand World Powers,” within which Germany had not yet secured its place.9 One part of German strategy to achieve world-power status involved instigating a series of crises over the independent status of Morocco. From a material perspective Morocco was of little value to Germany who held no vital economic or security interests in the region. Rather, Germany’s principal interest in Morocco was about identity, as Germany struggled to establish and defend its status among the system’s world powers. During each of the Moroccan crises German demands to be treated as an equal on par with the other world powers went unrecognized, leading to an intense spiral of social insecurity to which Germany responded with increased belligerence. The consequence was the emergence of a keen awareness of the balance of power in Europe, which sparked a costly arms race that contributed to the outbreak of war. The struggle for recognition centered in the Moroccan Crises, I argue, reveals how the experience of disrespect can lead to the material competition traditionally attributed to the security dilemma. The chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I briefly outline a social theory of international politics which argues that in addition to physical security, states also want recognition of their identities from significant Others. My rendering of the struggle for recognition in international politics argues that in response to the experience of disrespect and to secure recognition, states ground their identities in the material practices associated with their desired status, which for great powers involves maximizing material power. The materialization of identity isolates the state from the social insecurity associated with identity formation in anarchy. Next, I apply this argument to the two Moroccan Crises, each of which played an important role in precipitating the First World War. In challenging France and Britain over the status of Morocco, Germany sought to secure its status among the world powers. Finally, I conclude with some implications for international relations theory.

Recognition and Disrespect in World Politics Mainstream theories of security generally assume that all states share the same interest—physical security—and that their pursuit of this interest is conditioned by the balance of power. This paints a materialist picture of international politics where state survival is equated with state materiality, and threats to survival are understood only in terms of material capabilities. Theorists of recognition in international politics, however, have challenged this narrow motivational assumption to argue that concerns over identity importantly shape states’ security interests and motivate foreign policy behavior.10 As Erik Ringmar has argued, “not only physical, but also social survival is at stake” in international politics.11 A secure identity is essential for state survival because the state requires a stable identity in order to be a subject in the international system—that is, identity provides the sense of who the state is, its location within the social order, and given the first two, how it is prepared to act to achieve its interests.12 Without a stable sense of self, states cannot define or realize their interests and hence

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 133

4/18/11 12:36 PM

134  ✻  Michelle Murray cannot be secure. Thus, one of the principal motivations of states in anarchy is to gain recognition of their identities.13 Recognition is a social act that ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other, and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing.14 The struggle for recognition describes the process through which states attempt to gain the recognition of their significant Others and become subjects of a particular kind in the social order. In this formulation, identities are determined inter-subjectively—one’s attitude, or disposition, toward another only emerges in that state’s encounter with its significant Other, and therefore, who or what a state becomes is the outcome of many intersecting and overlapping sequences of action and response.15 The representations that occur during the course of these interactions are the most important aspects of state interaction, for through them the meaning of state identity is contested, made, and reproduced, and hence states are able to define and realize their global interests. This process of identity construction involves the state making a claim to a particular identity and representing other states in correspondingly meaningful counter-roles, what Alexander Wendt has termed “role-taking” and “alter-casting.”16 The international system is shaped by a social structure that relates a state’s self-understanding to institutionalized role-positions, which define the behavioral norms appropriate to a particular identity. Roles are structural positions that exist by virtue of shared ideas about the nature of Self and Other, and place states in specific relationships vis-à-vis other subjects in the system.17 Role-taking thus involves choosing from the available representations of the self that a state holds and identifying which role in the social structure corresponds to that self conception. Consider, for example, the role position of great power. Neorealism takes great power status as a self-evident reflection of material power and thus a pre-existing property of those states that possess the requisite kind and level of capabilities.18 A recognition approach, in contrast, argues that “great power” is an identity sustained through a role structure that grants a recognized set of states special rights and standing in relation to non-great powers.19 These special rights and duties have historically included being able to exclusively determine their own affairs as well as playing a leading role in determining the direction and shape of international affairs, but beyond this, they have varied over time as constitutive norms that define this identity have changed. At the turn of the twentieth century, when Germany made its bid to join the ranks of the great power, this leadership role included direct control over and exploitation of much of the world through colonial empires, as the great powers collectively, though not without contestation, decided how to carve up the colonized world. Today it involves a monopoly on second-strike nuclear capability and a seat on the United Nations Security Council. This social definition of great power underscores how role identities cannot exist without states occupying positions “in a social structure and following behavior norms toward Others possessing relevant counter-identities.”20 And therefore, the act of making a claim to a particular role position necessarily involves alter-casting, as the

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 134

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  135 state is at the same time casting others into the corresponding counter-roles that make their identity meaningful in the first place. Just as there cannot be a teacher without a student, there cannot be a great power without a non-great power. Identities are always defined in relation to others, and role positions play an important part in this process by identifying the boundaries between identity groups such that those inside the collective recognize each other as subjects who “because of their common social position share traits and abilities that are accorded a certain level of social standing” over those who are not part of the collective.21 International politics is in large part about negotiating the boundaries of these collective identities, as states struggle over who is and who is not included in the group. Because identities are formed inter-subjectively in this way, the process of establishing and maintaining an identity in international politics is wrought with insecurity as interaction always holds the possibility that a state’s self-understanding will not be recognized. When a state is recognized, this insecurity is mitigated—its identity and status as a political actor is secured and it is free to pursue the interests associated with that identity unhindered. If a state’s identity is not recognized, however, it suffers disrespect because in being denied membership in the collective, the recognitionseeking state can be represented as “illegitimate” or “second-rate.” With the meaning of its identity called into question, the state can no longer function as a positively informed self and thus cannot pursue the interests that follow from its perceived identity. In response to the insecurity associated with the experience of disrespect, states engage in a struggle for recognition, which can become the motivational impetus for conflict among states.22 The struggle for recognition holds the possibility of producing conflict among states because in response to the experience of disrespect, states ground their aspirant identities in concrete material practices. Material practices are an effective expression of an identity because the material world gives substance to the recognition-seeking state’s aspiring social identity and allows the state to experience its social status as a brute fact, rather than as the uncertain effect of an ongoing political practice of social construction.23 Practices are socially recognized forms of activity that are repeated over time and done on the basis of what states learn from others, which in turn reproduce an inter-subjective reality that gives meaning to particular identities.24 The practices coupled with an identity are defined by constitutive norms, specified by the social structure, which identify “the actions that will cause [other states] to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately.”25 For this reason it is always by way of performance to collectively known generative schemes that actors are empowered and gain the social status they desire.26 For example, one pillar of Germany’s strategy to achieve “its place in the sun” among the established world powers was a full-scale challenge to British naval hegemony, which included building a large fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea. Being a world power necessitates that others recognize you as such, and this is accomplished in part through conformity to a ritualized set of material practices. At the time, powerful navies, anchored in a fleet of battleships, were symbolic of the political power of the state and embodiment of

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 135

4/18/11 12:36 PM

136  ✻  Michelle Murray the nation, the hallmark of world-power status. Therefore, in building a powerful navy, Germany thought that it could create a display of military force so great that Britain simply could not ignore it, allowing Germany to secure recognition of its status as a world power.27 As this example illustrates, state identities are instantiated in practices. In materializing a socially produced identity, the state appears to have sovereign control over the meaning of its identity. By presenting its aspiring identity as a fait accompli, the state demands that it be recognized as it already really is, thereby forcing its significant Other(s) to recognize it. This has the effect of isolating the state from the uncertainty and social insecurity associated with inter-subjective identity formation, giving the temporary illusion that it can alone determine its identity. Moreover, by grounding the state’s aspirant identity in the material practices known to constitute that identity, it appears as if this identity pre-exists social interaction and therefore is not dependent on the experience of inter-subjectivity. The material world reflects back to the state the identity it seeks, lending relative stability to the inter-subjective world by reducing social uncertainty about the status of identity. In the case of great power politics, then, the accumulation of material capability is not always an act “of conscious obedience to something external” like the balance of power, but rather, an act of self-realization that attempts to secure identity.28 In what follows, I apply this theoretical argument to the two Moroccan Crises the preceded the First World War and argue that in challenging France and Britain over the status of Morocco, Imperial Germany sought to secure recognition of its identity among the European great powers and that the resultant arms race was symptomatic of this social process.

The Struggle for Morocco During the decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War, Germany became embroiled in a series of crises over the status of Morocco, each of which threatened general war and contributed to the overwrought environment that led to the July Crisis. German involvement in Morocco has always been puzzling from a strictly material perspective. Germany’s material interests in the country at the time were nugatory, as Germany had no important economic or security interests in Morocco; its overall volume of trade there ranked third among the great powers and as such was not part of Germany’s vital interests.29 Rather, Germany’s foremost interest in Morocco lay in its relationship to Germany’s status among the established great powers and the fear that its position among those states was unrecognized.30 In what follows, I show how the mis-recognition and consequent disrespect that Germany suffered at the hands of the other great powers over the Moroccan question played an important role in motivating Germany’s arming decisions in the lead-up to the war. That is, social insecurity over Germany’s identity as a great power precipitated the material competition among the great powers.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 136

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  137

The First Moroccan Crisis, 1905–1906 The First Moroccan Crisis grew out of the imperial rivalries of the European great powers, particularly France and Germany, and hence Morocco was directly connected to each state’s identity as a great power. France had long had an interest in Morocco, as geographically it was central to French imperial interests in North Africa. During the 1890s, France worked hard to consolidate its North African Empire, completing agreements with Great Britain, Germany, and Spain to gain desired territories. This left only Morocco—a country almost enclosed by French territory—as unclaimed by the French. Accordingly, for France, Morocco became an object whose acquisition had come to be understood as necessary to the completion of its ambitions in the region and maintenance of its position among the world powers.31 For a long time, France maintained a policy toward Morocco that supported the status quo: not allowing any other power to gain undue influence there or permitting Morocco to reform itself away from French interests, but stopping short of officially incorporating it into the French Empire.32 This stance reflected the agreement reached in the Madrid Convention of 1880, which specified the rights and obligations that the great powers had vis-à-vis Morocco and assured that no single great power would assume too large a role in the internal affairs of the country by maintaining an “open door” policy for any great power that wanted to do business there.33 Maintaining a colonial empire was a practice important to the constitution of great-power identity, and so in this way, the Madrid Convention helped to define the behavioral norms constitutive of that identity. In the early part of the twentieth century, French interest in Morocco began to grow, as the Moroccan question came to be seen as paramount to French national and imperial interests. By 1903 nearly every political party within France saw the Moroccan question as a priority of French foreign policy and considered its claims to predominance there as superior to those of any other great power.34 The strength of the French empire, and therefore France’s corresponding identity as a great power, came to rest with Morocco and securing French dominance there. Therefore, looking to secure its position in Morocco, France approached Britain for an agreement that would settle the Moroccan question in its favor, and on April 8, 1904, the two states signed the Entente Cordiale.35 This “friendly understanding” was primarily concerned with colonial expansion, consisting of three documents that resolved differences between the two states in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, thus strengthening each state’s empire. The most important component of the agreement, however, was the third document, which concerned France and Britain’s standing in Morocco. In return for France relinquishing its rights and interests in Egypt to Britain, the British agreed to respect France’s special status and pledged diplomatic support for French involvement in Morocco. The Entente Cordiale did not formally absorb Morocco into the French empire, but France alone would make all of the decisions concerning the internal affairs of Morocco. Thus, the practical intent behind the Entente Cordiale was to eventually make Morocco a French protectorate.36 The

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 137

4/18/11 12:36 PM

138  ✻  Michelle Murray Entente Cordiale replaced years of intermittent conflict between Britain and France with a friendly relationship and laid the groundwork for future French action in Morocco. The Entente Cordiale, however, was a direct violation of the Madrid Convention and thus inflamed Germany, who considered itself to be a great power and as such understood itself as having a right to be consulted on issues surrounding colonial expansion. After all, the Madrid Convention preserved equality among the great powers in their dealings with Morocco. Therefore, when France cleared its plans for Morocco with Britain but deliberately excluded Germany from these dealings, it effectively denied Germany recognition and represented Germany as an inferior power. Shortly after the signing of the Entente Cordiale, Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow took note of this disrespect: “they did not even show us the consideration of informing Berlin and Vienna of the contents of the 1904 treaty . . . in the face of this chain of French aggressions, it seemed necessary to remind Paris again of the German Empire.”37 While Germany’s material interests in Morocco were small, the insult to its identity demanded a response, and on June 3, 1904, Baron von Holstein issued a memorandum that expressed this concern very clearly. He wrote, even more alarming would be the injury to Germany’s prestige, if we sat still whilst German interests were being dealt with without our taking a part. It is the duty of a Great Power not merely to protect its territorial frontiers, but also the interests lying outside them . . . we can never admit that France, as Morocco’s neighbour, has a stronger right to Morocco than we have.38

Holstein went on to argue, “not only for material reasons, but also in order to protect [its] prestige, Germany must protest against France’s intention to acquire Morocco.”39 From Germany’s perspective, allowing the French intrusion into Morocco to go unchallenged would be tantamount to relinquishing its status as a great power. In spite of German warnings, France continued to pursue its expansionist foreign policy in Morocco, hoping to officially add this area to its growing North and West African Empire.40 In January, French foreign minister Théophile Delcassé visited Fez with a series of proposals meant to turn Morocco into a French protectorate, forcing the Sultan into accepting reforms for the police, the banks, and the army, all to be carried out with French assistance.41 By once again disregarding Germany, France ensured that Morocco would be the site of Germany’s struggle for recognition as a great power. Germany’s initial reaction to Delcassé’s plan was to assert its rights as a great power by continuing to support Moroccan independence and prevent France from gaining undue power in North Africa. Simply asserting its support for Moroccan independence, however, was not enough to stabilize Germany’s identity as a great power. Because identities are instantiated in practices, Germany had to back up its recognition claims with behavior appropriate to the role of great power; that is, Germany had to act like a great power in order to be a great power. On March 31, 1905,

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 138

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  139 Berlin materialized its stance on Morocco when Kaiser Wilhelm visited Tangier to directly challenge French claims to Morocco. During an excited speech, the kaiser reaffirmed Moroccan independence and asserted that Germany should have “advantages equal to those of other countries.”42 The German message was indisputable: the kaiser had pointedly told the French that Germany knew how to defend its interests in Morocco and would do so.43 The kaiser’s performance in Tangier signaled to the world Germany’s intention to make an issue out of Morocco, inflamed France, and started an international crisis. Delcassé initially tried to placate Berlin by pledging to maintain the “open door” policy put in place by the Madrid Convention and allowing Germany continued access to commerce in the country. For Germany, however, a simple return to the status quo would do little to reverse the injury it had suffered to its identity, and instead insisted on calling a conference to secure the recognition of the international community. Germany figured that given the terms of the Madrid Convention, the other great powers would surely support its position on the Moroccan question and recognize its status as a great power. Contrary to this expectation, the great powers were reluctant to call a conference without French approval first, and so not only had France disrespected Germany, but in refusing to enforce the terms of the Madrid Convention, the international community as a group had also failed to recognize Germany’s status as a great power and the colonial rights that followed from that identity.44 In response to this denial of recognition, Germany turned to material intimidation by threatening France’s physical security in order to achieve the recognition it demanded. German overtures for war increased, and on June 4, Germany directly threatened France with general war over Morocco, insisting that if France took steps toward formally occupying the country, Germany would defend its position with force. It is clear that Germany never intended to actually go to war with France, and in fact the threat was made without even considering material preparations. Rather, it was primarily a political performance appropriate to its desired role in the international order. In threatening France, Germany had asserted its perceived right to an equal claim to Morocco, attempting to force France to recognize its identity. In the face of German threats, the French position began to crumble; and the more France appeared to be susceptible to these threats, the greater German bellicosity grew, culminating in Germany making it clear that if Britain and France formed a formal alliance, it would wage war.45 Germany had backed France against a wall, forcing it to consider its ability to confront Germany in war. In a meeting of the French Cabinet on June 6, the ministers of war and the navy were consulted over the preparedness of the French armed forces for war with Germany, and when both ministers confirmed that France indeed was not prepared for war, Delcassé was forced to resign, signaling a changed direction in French foreign policy.46 The German threats had their desired effect, and for a moment satiated Germany’s recognition demands: Germany appeared to have the international influence associated with the role of great power.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 139

4/18/11 12:36 PM

140  ✻  Michelle Murray A conference to settle the Moroccan question began in early 1906, and all of the major European powers were involved. German objectives at the Algeçiras Conference were clear and remained consistent with its earlier position: as Metternich argued, “in German eyes it was a matter of defending our rights . . . unluckily the Moroccan question has swelled into one of prestige. If it again looked as if France, jointly with England, was ready to resort to arms in the settlement of it, we should be absolutely forced to oppose the French demands even more bluntly,” although the Germans did not renew this threat of war after Delcassé’s resignation.47 Because Germany’s interest in Morocco still revolved around the state’s connection to German identity as a great power, any settlement had to reflect this concern. Surprisingly, though, support for Germany at Algeçiras was not forthcoming, and when the delegates signed a general act that ended the conference, Germany had been handed another disappointing defeat, as France’s special privileges and position vis-à-vis Morocco were recognized. France (along with Spain) took control of the police force and assumed a dominant position in the Moroccan bank, which essentially amounted to economic control of the country.48 While Morocco was not officially made into a French protectorate, France retained unofficial control over Morocco. The military balance of power had little effect on the outcome at Algeçiras. Once France agreed to the conference, the central issue surrounding Morocco became whether German demands for recognition would be met (through either compensation or the granting of more rights) and whether Britain and France were prepared to “prevent Germany from dictating affairs in Europe.”49 Thus, the Algeçiras Agreement handed Germany a humiliating defeat at the hands of the other great powers who had failed to recognize its role as a European great power. Algeçiras amounted to a denial of recognition because Germany’s claims at the conference were based on the idea of equality so central to meaningful recognition: Germany, as a signatory to the Madrid Convention, deserved the same rights as the other great powers involved in Morocco and so in guaranteeing France special standing in Morocco, the great powers had represented Germany as an inferior state. As Bülow commented at the conclusion of the conference: “the dignity of the empire could not allow these rights to be ignored. [Germany was] not to be treated as a quantité négligeable.”50 The First Moroccan Crisis—which I have argued arose out of concerns over identity and status—and its settlement at Algeçiras had profound effects in setting Europe on the path to war by stimulating arms production in France, Britain, and Germany and encouraging balance-of-power thinking among these states. In the wake of Algeçiras, Germany became preoccupied with its weakness and so responded to the mis-recognition of Algeçiras by grounding its identity in the material practices constitutive of great power status in an attempt to secure its voice in European affairs. In the years following the First Moroccan Crisis, Germany intensified its commitment to Weltpolitik. Weltpolitik, or “world policy,” was Germany’s strategy for achieving world power status, which included expanding its colonial empire and building a naval capability meant to rival Britain. In 1908, Germany announced a new supplement to the Navy Law that called for the building of additional Dreadnought-style battleships.51

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 140

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  141 While Germany suffered the most significant mis-recognition at Algeçiras, the crisis produced considerable uncertainty about France’s ability to maintain its status as a great power: would France be able to defend its interests on its own, or was it simply a satellite of Great Britain? The British government had vigorously supported Delcassé and his firing caused Britain to worry about France’s standing as a great power: “Delcassé’s dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German government displayed a weakness on the part of France, which indicated that [it] could not at present be counted on as an effective force in international politics.”52 One of the defining characteristics of a great power was its ability to determine its own affairs and pursue its global interests unhindered. The First Moroccan Crisis menaced France with the specter of “satellite status” in Europe, subject to the demands of its aggressive eastern neighbor and dependent upon the goodwill of Britain and Russia to secure its interests outside of Europe.53 Faced with the potential humiliation associated with satellite status, France turned its attention toward hardening its identity as a great power by building up its military strength relative to Germany. By increasing its military capability, France sought to demonstrate to important allies—namely Britain—its status as a great power. Shortly after the crisis, France began surveillance of Germany’s borders to give warning of possible German mobilization; military leaves were curtailed and supplies readied for war. A trial mobilization took place, as France undertook medium-term and short-term measures to prepare its military for war.54 French leaders understood that it had to be able to credibly threaten war in the future in order to demonstrate to the international community that it was not a satellite state, but rather an independent great power able to protect its global interests. Perhaps the most important consequence of the First Moroccan Crisis, however, was that it drew Britain into continental politics by stimulating Franco-British cooperation and raising suspicions about German intentions. Britain had concluded that its own security was intimately tied to that of France and as such, “a second overthrow of France by Germany would end in aggrandizement of Germany to an extent which would be prejudicial to the whole of Europe, and might therefore be necessary for Great Britain in [its] own interests to lend France [its] active support should war of this nature break out.”55 For the first time in thirty years, it began to contemplate the use of its army in a continental war, entertaining plans to use the British expeditionary force in defense of Belgium and France on the European continent.56 These plans included a complete program of military reorganization that enabled Britain to send upward of 100,000 troops to France within a month of mobilization.57 As British interests became centered on the continental balance of power, its own identity as a world power became tied to France’s position as an independent great power and centered on opposition of Germany.58 While Germany’s behavior in Morocco was intended to secure its voice in European affairs, instead the crisis had the effect of increasing German diplomatic isolation (which only further increased its social insecurity) and setting in to motion a preoccupation with military force that would haunt the great powers as they moved forward.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 141

4/18/11 12:36 PM

142  ✻  Michelle Murray

The Agadir Crisis, 1911 The Algeçiras Agreement did little to resolve the political questions surrounding Morocco, and in the years following the First Moroccan Crisis, French foreign policy was dominated by questions related to Morocco and its continued policy of penetration pacifique in that country.59 By 1911, France’s ever-expanding political role in the internal affairs of Morocco had bled into the economic sphere, and when a French diplomat claimed that “France finds itself in spite of the Algeçiras Act and the Moroccan Accord on the way to full sovereignty in Morocco,” it had become clear that France planned to formally incorporate Morocco into its empire in the very near future.60 For Germany, Morocco was still intimately connected to its larger role in world affairs, and it looked toward Morocco as an opportunity to “score a coup in world politics that would efface what [was] regarded as Germany’s earlier humiliations.”61 Accordingly, when France occupied Fez—sending 15,000 French troops to the Moroccan capital—the second crisis over Morocco erupted between France and Germany. The French occupation was a direct violation of the Algeçiras Agreement and Franco-German agreement of 1908, both of which explicitly forbade the French from undertaking any sort of military occupation of Morocco without the expressed consent of the other great powers. Germany’s material interests in Morocco had not changed, but it feared that signing an agreement like Algeçiras and then allowing it to be overturned without its rightful consent would do considerable damage to its prestige and influence in the international system.62 And so, on July 1, 1911, Germany sent the gunboat Panther to anchor off of Agadir, a Moroccan port on the Atlantic Ocean, in a spectacular demonstration of armed diplomacy against the French occupation. Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, the new state secretary of the Foreign Office, figured that Germany could assert its power in Morocco by seizing control of two ports on the western coast of Morocco, Adagir and Mogador.63 This would force France to either retreat from its occupation or to allow Germany to keep western Morocco, thereby reinforcing German rights in Morocco and as a great power. The justification for German demands would be an insistence that the Algeçiras Agreement be upheld. There is evidence that French leaders wanted to negotiate a secret deal with Germany to avoid another confrontation over Morocco, and so Germany could have achieved its interests without such bellicosity.64 But Berlin wanted more than a settlement; it needed “a visible success, a demonstration of German power, a gesture of respect and a gain in prestige, and that called for open intimidation.”65 A few weeks later, Berlin demanded almost the entire French Congo in exchange for recognizing Morocco as a French protectorate, or alternatively, called for the observance of the Algeçiras Agreement which mandated Morocco remain independent.66 In doing this, Germany presented France with a fait accompli of its own: no matter which of the two options France chose, it would affirm Germany’s status as great power by either compensating Germany as an equal great power or returning to the pre-occupation status quo.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 142

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  143 Initially, and as Kiderlen-Wächter had suspected, support from France’s allies was not immediately forthcoming. Russia was not interested in another Moroccan crisis, fearful of a European war breaking out over what it considered a trivial colonial concern, and Britain was cautious about becoming involved in another crisis given its own escalating tensions with Germany. Upon learning of the Panther’s leap at Agadir, France asked Britain to send a warship to Mogador, in order to intimidate Germany and show that Britain was standing on the side of France.67 Britain agreed to offer France diplomatic support and encouraged it to make concessions to Germany in the French Congo in order to settle the dispute, but stopped short of offering support in war, unless Germany intended to “inflict on France a humiliation that would jeopardize its great power status.”68 Despite Britain’s willingness to support concessions for Germany, Berlin was not forthcoming in making its intentions clear and in general treated Britain as if it had no right at all to have a voice on the Moroccan question.69 This stubbornness on the part of Germany worried Britain, and by July 21, Grey had persuaded the previously reserved Cabinet to take a stronger line against the Germans, making it clear that if Franco-German negotiations failed, Britain would insist on taking part in the settlement of the Moroccan question. Later that evening, David Lloyd George—the chancellor of the exchequer and in general an advocate of a moderate position on Germany—delivered a speech at the London Mansion House Banquet, which unequivocally outlined the British position on Agadir: I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not only of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world . . . If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at the price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.70

The Mansion House speech revealed Britain’s experience of disrespect and represented a “public calling into line” of Germany: Britain would not tolerate German bellicosity or allow Germany to dictate affairs on the continent.71 A few days later, Grey met with Metternich to discuss the Moroccan question and a solution to the crisis. Metternich reiterated that Germany had no particular interest in Morocco but just wanted proper compensation elsewhere; but he also protested the tone and message of the Mansion House speech and refused to have any German response or compromise tied to that speech. Metternich insisted that linking a German statement on Morocco to the Mansion House speech would represent Germany as inferior to Britain, calling into question its rights in the Moroccan Crisis and permanently jeopardizing its position within the international system. Metternich then stressed that if its demands were not recognized, it would be forced to uphold the Algeçiras Agreement by force of arms.72

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 143

4/18/11 12:36 PM

144  ✻  Michelle Murray German bellicosity, however, had once again backed Germany into a position in which achieving any of its goals was near impossible. The Mansion House speech made it clear that if the Agadir Crisis did escalate to war, then Germany would face both France and Britain and likely Russia. And moreover, Britain’s stalwart support of France meant that any resolution that came through a conference would most likely not be in Germany’s favor. Negotiations over Morocco proceeded slowly, with both France and Germany reluctantly giving and taking in relation to their original positions. In the final phase of negotiations, France refused to relent any further, putting responsibility for peace on the Germans. With the possibility of war hanging in the background, Germany finally recognized the French protectorate over Morocco and in exchange received a substantially smaller part of the French Congo.73 The Second Moroccan crisis was over, and once again, Germany had suffered a denial of recognition that badly damaged its international standing at the hand of France. The defeat over Agadir was especially humiliating for Germany given its extreme belligerence in the lead up to negotiations. As David Herrmann notes, the Panther’s leap at Agadir was a dramatic political performance and assertion of world power. And so when this failed to produce the desired results, Germany was painfully confronted with its inability to engage in this sort of gunboat diplomacy and forced to face its subordinate status.74 The Agadir Crisis dramatically increased the likelihood of major power war in Europe. The crisis roused suspicion regarding German intentions among the great powers. In France, Agadir strengthened public support for mobilization, and Britain and France completed plans for the rapid delivery of the British Expeditionary Force to the continent in the event of war. The most profound effects of Adagir, however, concerned Germany and the military expansion it undertook in the wake of the crisis. In response to its defeat at Agadir and the social insecurity associated with this experience of disrespect, Germany began to harden its identity as a great power by dramatically increasing its material capability, a decision that all realized would lead to a land arms race among the great powers. Germany’s capitulation at Adagir was forced in part by the realization that should war break out, it would face a two-front war against Britain, France, and Russia. At the 1912 annual mobilization conference, Helmuth von Moltke confirmed that preparations for mobilization were influenced by the outcome at Agadir and that Germany would not be humiliated again in future crises.75 In 1912, the Reichstag passed an army law that readied the German army for war at all times.76 From this point on, the peacetime strength of the German army was increased by two new permanent corps, and over the next four years, more regular, permanent, technical formations and machine-gun units would all be added. Overall, these improvements significantly increased Germany’s military capability and shifted the focus of German foreign policy away from colonial ambitions and back to the continent, for as Adagir had demonstrated, it was understood that world-power status could not be secured without a strong continental position. The effect of this transformed understanding of the balance of power was that Germany had become an encircled power and war had come to be seen as inevitable, as the lesson of Agadir for

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 144

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  145 Germany was that “only a war would hold any guarantee of changing the status quo in [its] favor.” 77 The struggle for recognition set in place the self-fulfilling prophecy that would culminate in war: “the Germans regarded themselves as responding to a threat from all sides, but at the same time took the plunge in full expectation that their rivals would react, and that war would only be a matter of time.” 78

Rethinking Imperial Germany’s Security Dilemma The struggle over Morocco played an important role in precipitating the First World War. In the decade before the July Crisis, Germany instigated a series of diplomatic crises over the independent status of Morocco. As I argued previously, these crises centered not on a dispute over material interests, but rather revolved principally around questions of identity and status, as Germany sought to secure its place among the system’s great powers. In each crisis, Germany demanded its rights in Morocco be recognized in accord with the existing treaties regulating great-power behavior in the region. When such recognition was not forthcoming, the experience of disrespect motivated a struggle that played an important role in driving the arming decisions that led to war. By 1914, an obsession with the balance of material power on the continent pervaded great-power thinking—especially in Germany. This belief in the inevitability of war played a decisive role in escalating the July Crisis. The importance of the Moroccan Crises in leading the great powers to war should not be overstated. In the years before the war’s outbreak, the great powers found themselves in an extremely complex social and material environment, and many factors beyond Morocco contributed to the insecurity that spiraled to war in 1914. Taking a closer look at the great powers’ struggle over Morocco, however, reveals an important and often-overlooked dynamic at work in causing the Great War: the struggle for recognition. A shortcoming of much of the literature on the origins of the war is that it focuses almost exclusively on the events of 1914 and reads back generalizations about prewar diplomacy off of this singular event.79 Concerns over status and identity figured prominently in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 and the Balkan Wars, when Russia and Austria-Hungary each struggled to maintain a sphere of influence in the Balkans as a condition of their great-power status. Together this suggests that 1914 was an environment mired in tremendous social uncertainty, as the great powers sought to defend and secure their identities in the international order. The struggle for recognition also has important implications for international relations theory. Security dilemma theory has come to be seen as the most powerful explanation for the security competition that seems to plague great-power politics in the modern era. The argument I propose here reveals another dimension of the security dilemma: that social uncertainty about the status of an identity can motivate the competitive arming practices traditionally attributed to the security dilemma. This is because in response to the experience of disrespect that comes with a denial of recognition, great powers ground their identities in the material practices constitutive

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 145

4/18/11 12:36 PM

146  ✻  Michelle Murray of that status. In this context, the accumulation of material capability is a strategy that great powers pursue in order to obtain recognition and reduce the insecurity associated with the social formation of their identities as great powers. Thus, the competitive arming practices of the great powers are not just the result of material insecurity—as extant security dilemma teaches us—but also social insecurity about the status of identity. This argument inverts the traditional relationship between the material and social forces acting on states in anarchy, with the apparent security dilemma being a symptom of a larger social process, not an intrinsic feature of life in anarchy. Recognizing the importance of social forces, like the struggle for recognition in motivating states’ relationships with the material world, sheds new light on cases of historical importance as well brings important insights to contemporary security policy. As Charles Doran shows, a recognition lens goes a long way to clear up many of the puzzles surrounding the origins of the war, thus potentially offering a more powerful explanation for its outbreak.80 Moreover, recognizing that Imperial Germany may have faced a social security dilemma in the years before 1914 leads to important conclusions about the inevitability of great-power conflict. Had the great powers been able to accommodate Imperial Germany’s rise into the European social order, then perhaps it would not have pursued such a vigorous armament program, thus avoiding the spiral of insecurity that lead to war. While I would argue that given the uncertainties of identity formation, the struggle for recognition among great powers will always have powerful tendencies toward competition, any social approach to great-power politics holds the possibility that states can accommodate each other through careful diplomacy and special attention to what peer competitors want.81

Notes 1. As quoted in Offer 1995, 216 2. Herz 1950, 157. 3. Jervis 1978, 169. 4. Sagan 1991, 113. 5. Lieber 2007, 155–191. Most accounts of the war argue that Germany bore greater responsibility for its outbreak, although they still view the war as an unintended consequence. 6. Kagan 1995, 209. 7. Lieber 2007, 156. Lieber effectively shows that Germany was prepared for a long and bloody war; however, although he clearly is writing from the perspective of an offensive realist, he does not develop an argument as to what motivated German decision-making. 8. Steinberg 1965, 18. 9. Crowe 1928, 403. 10. In addition to the chapters in this volume, for structural treatments of recognition and international relations, see Greenhill 2008, 343–368; Ringmar 2002, 115–136; Wendt 2003, 491–542. 11. Ringmar 2002, 116. 12. In this way, state identity corresponds to what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 146

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  147 call a “situated subjectivity.” See Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 17. On the importance of identity to state survival, see Weber 1998, 77–95; Biersteker and Weber 1996, 1–21; Campbell 1992. 13. For a fuller account of my conceptualization of the struggle for recognition in international politics, see Murray 2008, 39–90. 14. Honneth 1995, viii. 15. Ibid., xii; Markell 2003, 13. 16. Wendt 1999, 328–329. 17. Ibid., 249. 18. Waltz 1979, 131; Mearsheimer 2001, 5. 19. Bull [1977] 1995, 196. 20. Wendt 1999, 227. 21. Honneth 1995, 123. 22. Ibid.,138. 23. Markell 2003, 112. 24. Barnes 2001, 27; Wedeen 2002, 720. 25. Hopf 1998, 173. 26. Ashley 1986, 292. 27. For a fuller discussion of the Germany’s naval program as a struggle for recognition, see Murray 2008. 28. Ashley 1986, 294. 29. Staley 1932, 52. 30. In what follows, I use the terms “world power” and “great power” interchangeably. While there is a distinction to be made between the two in terms of the role positions to which they refer, the states involved in the Moroccan Crises tend to use the terms interchangeably. 31. Anderson 1930, 5. 32. Ibid., 6. 33. Kagan 1995, 146. It also guaranteed special rights for foreign nationals, which included exemption from taxation. See Rolo 1969, 126. 34. Anderson 1930, 6. 35. For a comprehensive history on the origins of the Entente Cordiale, see Rolo 1969. 36. To be fair, France was not the only state given the authority to interfere in the internal affairs of Morocco; the agreement also put parts of Morocco under Spanish control. As Anderson notes, “What was meant was that the international status of the land should be respected. However, the terms of the secret articles foresaw a future change even in that; and it can hardly be called showing a nice regard for Morocco’s international and sovereign independence for two alien Powers to set a time limit to the right of commercial liberty in that land. That Morocco, an independent state, would eventually be partitioned into French and Spanish protectorates was evident to anyone with an understanding of contemporary political practices.” See Anderson 1930, 102. 37. Bülow 1931, 121. 38. German Diplomatic Documents 1928, 220. 39. Ibid., 220–221. 40. Stokesbury 1981, 19. 41. Hayne 1993, 126; Herrmann 1996, 38. 42. “The Landing of Wilhelm II in Tangier” 1905. 43. Craig 1978, 318.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 147

4/18/11 12:36 PM

148  ✻  Michelle Murray 44. Spain and Italy suggested the matter be settled directly between France and Germany, and Russia, preoccupied with its war against Japan, took little interest in continental politics. Britain, “obliged both by honor and interest,” continued to fully support France. Anderson 1930, 209 45. Ibid., 230. 46. Interestingly, Delcassé saw German threats as a bluff and advocated taking a hard line against Germany as a matter of national prestige, but his position was not shared by the prime minister, who considered the military situation as decisive. See Herrmann 1996, 52–54. 47. German Diplomatic Documents 1930, 23; Herrmann 1996, 54. 48. The Act of Algeçiras of April 1907 gave France and Spain control of all eight Moroccan ports with the provision that those at Casablanca and Tetouan should have mixed police. A state bank was established that was open to all nations but gave special privilege to France. Hayne 1993, 142. 49. Herrmann 1996, 55. 50. Bülow 1931, 232. 51. The 1908 naval supplement was an important development because it inaugurated the Anglo-German naval race. When in 1906 Britain decided to meet Germany’s challenge by redistributing its fleet and introducing the Dreadnought, it effectively made Germany’s vision of naval hegemony impossible. The German economy was not powerful enough to sustain a naval program on par with Britain and maintain its continental defense commitments. In spite this impossibility, Germany continued with its plans for naval expansion. On the impossibility of German naval ambition, see Herwig 1991, 221–283; Glaser 2004, 62; Kennedy 1970, 51; Murray 2008, 18–19. 52. As quoted in Anderson 1930, 232. 53. Stevenson 1996, 70. 54. Ibid., 71. 55. Kagan 1995, 150. 56. Ibid., 149. 57. Herrmann 1996, 56. 58. The First Moroccan Crisis represented one source of growing British insecurity because the crisis involved only one pillar of Germany’s strategy for world power status. Of course Germany’s naval program directly threatened British interests, and so as German insecurity grew and its commitment to Weltpolitik intensified, British attention to the German threat also increased. 59. Edwards 1963, 483. In 1909, France and Germany sought to correct some of the faults of Algeçiras by signing the Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, which gave France principal political rights in Morocco and Germany equivalent economic rights. See Mercer [1996] 2009, 157; Stevenson 1996, 181. 60. As quoted in Barlow 1971, 86. 61. Herrmann 1996, 148. 62. Stevenson 1996, 183. 63. Herrmann 1996, 148. 64. Kagan 1995, 170. 65. Ibid., 170 66. Albertini 1952, 171. 67. Kagan 1995, 170.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 148

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  149 68. Great Britain, Foreign Office 1926, 405; Stevenson 1996, 184. 69. Albertini 1952, 330. 70. Ibid., 330; Great Britain, Foreign Office 1926, 412. 71. Herrmann 1996, 185. 72. Albertini 1952, 331. 73. The French protectorate over Morocco and the Congo was the major element of the agreements. In addition, Germany received two strips of territory along the Ubangui and Sangha, and a small slice of territory near Monda Bay. In order to give the appearance of reciprocity, France received the “Bec de Canard” in the Cameroons and a narrow panhandle strip south of Lake Chad. See ibid., 332. 74. Herrmann 1996, 149. 75. Mombauer 2001, 130. 76. The Reichstag also passed a new supplementary naval law, which kept German battleship construction at a high rate, thereby continuing the naval antagonism with Britain. 77. Mombauer 2001, 125. 78. Herrmann 1996, 172. 79. Stevenson acutely makes this point in framing his own argument on the origins of the war. See Stevenson 1997, 126–127. 80. Doran this volume. One of the more important puzzles for Neorealist theory is the timing of the war. According to the distribution of capability in the system, Germany should have gone to war in 1905—when it was clearly the most preponderant state on the continent and Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War left it weakened and unable to participate in a European war. See Schroeder 1972, 323. 81. This can be an important lesson for US foreign policy, as it deals with the problems of nuclear proliferation and the rise of China. If proliferators want recognition, this will call for a dramatically different nonproliferation strategy than one based on narrow “security” interests. Likewise, if China’s rise is marked by a desire to assume its place among the existing great powers, then the US must formulate a foreign policy that responds accordingly.

Bibliography Albertini, Luigi. 1952. Origins of the War of 1914, 3 Volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Eugene Newton. 1930. The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904–1906. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ashley, Richard. 1986. “The Poverty of Neorealism.” In Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press. Barlow, Ima Christina. 1971. The Agadir Crisis. Hamden: Archon Books. Barnes, Barry. 2001. “Practice as Collective Action.” In The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. New York: Routledge. Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber. 1996. “The Social Construction of State Sovereignty.” In State Sovereignty as Social Construct, 1–21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. “Beyond ‘Identity.’” Theory and Society 29 (1). Bull, Hedley. (1977) 1995. The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 149

4/18/11 12:36 PM

150  ✻  Michelle Murray Bülow, Bernhard. 1931. Memoirs of Prince Von Bülow, Volume 2. Boston: Little, Brown. Campbell, David. 1998. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Craig, Gordon Alexander. 1978. “Germany, 1866–1945.” In Oxford History of Modern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press. Crowe, Eyre. 1928. “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907.” In British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office. Doran, Charles F. 2011. “World War I from the Perspective of Power Cycle Theory: Recognition, ‘Adjustment Delusions,’ and the ‘Trauma of Expectations Foregone.’” In The International Politics of Recognition, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar. Boulder: Paradigm. Edwards, E. W. 1963. “The Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, 1909.” English Historical Review 78 (308). German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–1914, Volume 3. 1928. New York: Harper. Glaser, Charles L. 2004. “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational Versus Suboptimal Arming.” International Security 28 (4). Great Britain, Foreign Office. 1926. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, Volume 7. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office. Greenhill, Brian. 2008. “Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics.” European Journal of International Relations 14 (2): 343–368. Hayne, M. B. 1993. The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898– 1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Herrmann, David G. 1996. The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Herwig, Holger. 1991. “The German Reaction to the Dreadnought Revolution.” International History Review 13 (2): 221–283. Herz, John H. 1950. “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 2 (2). Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. London: Polity Press. Hopf, Ted. 1998. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security 23 (1). Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30 (2). Kagan, Donald. 1995. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday. Kennedy, Paul. 1970. “Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900: A Strategical Critique.” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilunger 2. “The Landing of Wilhelm II in Tangier: Report of Councillor Von Schoen, Envoy in the Imperial Suite to the German Foreign Office. Gibraltar, March 31, 1905.” http://wwi .lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_First_Moroccan_Crisis. Lieber, Keir A. 2007. “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory.” International Security 32 (2): 155–191. Markell, Patchen. 2003. Bound by Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Mercer, Jonathan. (1996) 2009. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 150

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco  ✻  151 Mombauer, Annika. 2005. Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murray, Michelle. 2008. “The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics: Security, Identity and the Quest for Power.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago. Offer, Avner. 1995. “Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?” Politics and Society 23 (2). Ringmar, Erik. 2002. “The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West.” Cooperation & Conflict 37 (2): 115–136. Rolo, P. J. V. 1969. Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904. London: Macmillan. Sagan, Scott D. 1991. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability.” In Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schroeder, Paul W. 1972. “World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak.” Journal of Modern History 44 (3). Staley, Eugene. 1932. “Mannesmann Mining Interests and the Franco-German Conflict over Morocco.” Journal of Political Economy 40 (1). Steinberg, Jonathan. 1965. Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet. London: Macdonald. Stevenson, David. 1996. Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1997. “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914.” International Security 22 (1). Stokesbury, James L. 1981. A Short History of World War I. New York: Harper. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Weber, Cynthia. 1998. “Performative States.” Millennium 27 (1): 77–95. Wedeen, Lisa. 2002. “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science.” American Political Science Review 96 (4). Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2003. “Why a World State is Inevitable.” European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491–542.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 151

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 152

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 8

Self-Identification, Recognition, and Conflicts The Evolution of Taiwan’s Identity, 1949–2008 Yana Zuo

Taiwan’s identity reconstruction, characterized by its self-denial of its conventional Chinese identity, has led to massive identity confusion within the Taiwanese people; it has also transformed the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship to the point where, despite Beijing and Washington’s joint efforts, the dispute has become even more difficult to resolve. By the end of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency in late May 2008, the crossTaiwan Strait relationship was characterized by increasing animosity. The aim of this chapter is to show how Taipei’s shifting self-identification and its struggle for diplomatic recognition, based on its self-identification, have complicated Taipei’s relationship with Beijing. The future of the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship is still full of uncertainty and unpredictability, although there has been some progress since the KMT won back power in 2008.1 In fact, Taiwan’s self-identification and international recognition had been problematized by Beijing’s continuous success in joining the international society as the sole legitimate government of China even before the end of the Cold War. The breakdown of Taipei’s diplomatic relationship with Washington and the Republic of 153

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 153

4/18/11 12:36 PM

154  ✻  Yana Zuo China’s (ROC hereafter) withdrawal from the UN in the 1970s caused a dramatic shift in the ROC’s international status. Taipei’s self-identification in relation to the mainland was shifted from “The ROC is the sole legitimate government of the Chinese nation, including both the mainland and Taiwan” to “Taipei and Beijing share China sovereignty as equals” and further to “Taiwan is sovereign and independent from China.” However, due to Beijing’s strong opposition to Taipei’s new position, Taipei’s newly defined identities failed to be recognized by international society, and the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship was further complicated and the confrontation intensified. Yet, within the discipline of international relations, there has been scant attention paid to the question of identity politics in the context of Taiwan. This article seeks to contribute to a more adequate understanding of the issue of recognition and its impact on international relations. It does so by looking at the historical evolution of Taiwan’s self-identification, its struggle for external recognition from both Mainland China and the broader international community, and the impact Taiwan’s struggle for diplomatic recognition has had on the cross-Taiwan Strait relations since the 1940s. The next section explores the change of Taiwan’s self-identification and its struggle for international recognition. The conclusion addresses the implications this study has for understanding both the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship and the role of recognition in identity formation. While providing an account of change and continuity in Taiwan’s self-identification and its struggle for recognition, this study ultimately demonstrates that recognition matters a great deal to international relations. The formation of an identity is not effectual if the new identity has not been recognized by outside communities. When a state re-identifies itself, it demands recognition from the international community for its newly claimed identity. A state’s struggle for recognition might lead to instability and insecurity when its self-identification clashes with how it is identified in the eyes of other actors. However, the “shift” of both self-identification and of the demanded recognition was long neglected by scholars. This chapter aims to bridge that gap. By the same token, the role that mainstream constructivists have assigned to identity lacks a historical perspective. Yet, there are some theorists, such as Mlada Bukovansky and Ted Hopf, who have engaged with history while investigating the conceptions of identity, none of them have looked at the process of an identity’s historical evolution. More specifically, by revisiting the historical events of the French Revolution, Bukovansky observes the constitutive force that ideas of legitimacy factors have on state identity.2 Drawing largely from domestic sources, such as literature and newspapers, Hopf compares and contrasts the discourses of identity in the USSR in 1995 and in Russia in 1999.3 He then ultimately links these identities with foreign policies to demonstrate how the domestic society’s attitudes toward foreign states affect a state and its decision-makers’ understandings of other states. Different from the work aforementioned, this chapter follows the journey of Taiwan’s identity evolution since the 1940s to explore how recognition matters to identity formation.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 154

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  155

I. 1940s to 1988: Consolidating the One China Identity When the government of the ROC first retreated to Taiwan in 1949 after the KMT was defeated by the CCP in the Chinese Civil War, it identified itself as the sole legitimate government of the whole Chinese nation, including both mainland China and Taiwan. The ROC managed to maintain diplomatic recognition based on its self-identification until the early 1970s. Taipei was still a member of the Security Council until Beijing was seated in the UN, and Taipei withdrew from the organization at the same time in 1972. The loss of its UN membership, together with the Washington-Beijing rapprochement in later days, caused a diplomatic crisis for Taipei. Those two events effectively caused international de-recognition of the ROC’s identity as the sole legitimate government of China. Right after the PRC’s establishment, the USSR, the East European states from the Communist Camp, and other Asian nationalist countries set up diplomatic relations with the PRC, and some of the western countries, such as Sweden, also switched their diplomatic relationship.4 Beijing actively sought international recognition and more and more countries turned to the mainland. Taipei’s strategy to compete with Beijing in the international arena was a “zero-sum” principle. The core of this principle was that if a state diplomatically recognized the PRC, the ROC would break its diplomatic ties with that state. This strategy proved to be counter-productive for Taipei. By 1971, the number of states that recognized Beijing was for the first time larger than those that recognized Taipei, and the gap has grown bigger and bigger ever since (see Table 1).5

Table 1: Numbers of states recognizing Taipei and Beijing (1950–1990)a Year

Number of countries having diplomatic relationship with Taipei

1950 44 1960 59 1966 66 1969 69 1970 67 1971 56 1972 43 1974 32 1976 26 1979 23 1980 23 1983 24 1985 23 1988 22 1989 26 1990 28

Number of countries having diplomatic relationship with Beijing 23 42 51 50 54 74 92 104 118 127 130 135 138 141 136 139

a Wei, 1993:2.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 155

4/18/11 12:36 PM

156  ✻  Yana Zuo In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a boost to the PRC’s diplomatic relations and international status. More than eighty countries set up diplomatic relations with the PRC from 1971 to 1989, which increased the number of countries that recognized the PRC to more than one hundred.6 During the same period, only twelve of them established or re-established diplomatic relations with the ROC, which made a total number of twenty-six countries with formal diplomatic relationships with the ROC. Most of the countries that tied with Taipei diplomatically were underdeveloped countries—only Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South Africa were relatively powerful states.7 It became unrealistic for Taipei to maintain that the ROC was the sole legitimate government representing the nation of China. The most influential issue impacting the ROC’s recognition in the wider world was the establishment of the PRC-US diplomatic relationship. The ROC allied itself with the United States in the early 1950s, which blocked the CCP’s military takeover and facilitated the KMT’s rule in Taiwan.8 The alliance also granted the ROC the legitimacy to operate as the representative of China in the international community for a few decades. However, as the PRC-Soviet split became more and more obvious in the late 1950s, the West showed increasing signs of wishing to engage with Mao and his government, which also opened a new chapter of the PRC-US relationship.9 The United States eventually turned to the PRC and set up diplomatic relations in 1979. The diplomatic de-recognition from Washington, Taipei’s formal ally, was a severe blow. The international recognition of Taipei as the sole legitimate government of China was fading away, which threatened Taipei’s existing identity as the legitimate government of the Chinese nation. Prior to the American de-recognition, Taipei had already lost its membership in the UN. The PRC knocked on the UN’s door not long after it took control over the mainland. Yet after almost a decade of effort to improve its international status and the upsurge in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Asian, African, and Latin American countries, the PRC government not only had de facto control over Mainland China but also successfully had the UN General Assembly put the issue of China’s representation on the UN agenda in 1961. Different US administrations proposed different approaches to Chiang Kai-shek, the ROC’s then president, regarding a solution to the “two-Chinas” problem.10 However, for Taipei, China’s sovereignty could not be shared or divided. Chiang asserted, “the idea of two Chinas is what I [am] strongly against . . . [it is] only an illusion”11. He also said, “regarding [the] US’s proposal . . . as a plan to bring about a ‘two Chinas’ arrangement in the UN, the ROC would have no part of such proposals and would withdraw from UN rather than be party to them.”12 In his address, “To All Chinese Patriots Referring to the UN Issue,” Chiang Kaishek said, “Based on the principle of ‘zero-sum’ . . . the ROC intends to withdraw from the UN, of which it was one of the founding members before the 2758 (XXVI) resolution was put into practice. Meanwhile, we clarify that the ROC government

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 156

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  157 and all Chinese people will not accept the legitimacy of the resolution on the grounds that it has violated the UN Charter.”13 Clearly, Taipei still identified itself as the sole legitimate government of China representing the whole nation, both Taiwan and the mainland. The loss of its membership in the UN in 1972 posed a severe challenge to the ROC’s self-identification as the legal representative of China, or even more dramatically, as an acceptable actor in the international community. After withdrawing from the UN, the ROC also lost its membership in many other international organizations. For example, despite being one of the twenty-three founding members of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the ROC was expelled from the organization in October 1971.14 In accordance with the zero-sum rule, the ROC also lost its membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when the PRC joined these two institutions.15 Having lost its diplomatic ties with other states while losing membership in international organizations, Taipei was forced into international isolation. A crisis of identity thus followed—the consequence of global de-recognition was de-legitimization of the ROC government and the collapse of its identity as the legitimate representative body of China. Neither international isolation nor re-identifying the ROC was acceptable for Taipei, and instead, Chiang Ching-kuo found a third way: “pragmatic diplomacy” aimed at changing the international context for the ROC without challenging its self-identification as the sole legitimate governing body of China.16 The essence of this policy was to expand bilateral and multilateral trade, as well as cultural, technological, sports, and even military and political relationships. The channel was economic diplomacy, while treating political reform and anti-communism as the core means to acquire recognition.17 However, Taipei failed to secure recognition on these terms. Due to the PRC’s strong opposition to the use of any names which had official implications since they would represent a challenge to the PRC’s legitimacy as the sole lawful government of China,18 Taiwan was during this period forced to join and re-join ten governmental international organizations under the name of “Chinese Taipei.”19 In this way, the world gradually turned to Beijing and recognized Beijing’s legitimate claim to represent the Chinese nation; Taipei’s insistence on representing the nation became meaningless. Taipei’s identity based on its self-identification as the sole legitimate representative body of China was de-recognized by the international community. This shows that a state’s self-identification is valid only when it is recognized by the international society. This case also demonstrates that de-recognition could take an identity apart, and when it happens, it could lead to an identity crisis for a state. Yet history did not stop here. An identity is something we cannot live without— Taipei could not preserve its identity and it needed to construct a new one.20 In responding to the circumstance, Taipei re-identified itself in relation to the PRC and even in relation to the idea of China. It started a new journey to acquire international recognition for its new self-identification.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 157

4/18/11 12:36 PM

158  ✻  Yana Zuo

II. 1988–2000: Pursuing Dual Recognition After Chiang Ching-kuo’s sudden death in 1988, he was succeeded by Lee Teng-hui. Lee identified the ROC and the PRC as equals, sharing the sovereignty of China. While accepting the PRC’s legitimacy in the mainland, Taipei now attempted to operate in the international community as an equal of the PRC, rather than claiming that it legitimately represented the whole nation of China. Lee Teng-hui’s primary policy was to keep the ROC “alive” in the international community.21 The strategy was labeled “dual recognition.” This position reflected a move away from the previous position: the ROC was no longer the sole legitimate government of China and the PRC was not an illegitimate entity that had usurped power. Beijing strongly re-affirmed the “one China” policy and successfully blocked Taipei’s access to the international community as an independent and sovereign entity. Although Taiwan successfully won the world’s sympathy for its political reforms and economic miracles, it was not able to win recognition diplomatically. Lee used the vast resources of government to expand Taiwan’s international relations and stressed the political separateness of the two regimes.22 In order to acquire diplomatic recognition as an equal of Beijing, Taipei was actively seeking to join international organizations and to develop diplomatic relationship with other states. Lee’s first step was to send delegates to attend the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) conference held in Beijing. This was the first time the ROC sent delegates since the bank changed the ROC’s name to “Taipei, China” after the PRC won its bid for the membership in 1986.23 Since 1991, Taiwan has also tried to re-join the UN, and in 1993, seven LatinAmerican countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urging him to put the matter of Taiwan on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The newsletter issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on September 22, 1994 emphasized that “Our attempt to rejoin the UN does not challenge the CCP government’s membership in the UN, neither does it exclude the unification of China.”24 However, Taipei’s application was not successful. In another effort to achieve “dual recognition” and cohabit with the PRC in the international community, the ROC used “dollar diplomacy.” Its main targets were Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and Africa. Beginning in 1993, the ROC adopted a “Go South” policy to encourage Taiwan’s businesses to invest in Southeast Asia. The “Go South” policy did not bring the ROC a diplomatic breakthrough due to Southeast Asian countries’ insistence on “separating politics and economics”—­economically, they tried to absorb Taiwan’s investments, and politically, they remained faithful to the PRC’s interpretation of the “one China” policy and recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government. Taipei failed to be recognized as an equal of Beijing. The “dollar diplomacy” in Central and South America and some African states was also challenged by Beijing. The PRC’s economic growth in the last few decades

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 158

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  159 made it possible for Beijing to also play “dollar diplomacy” in relation to the same parts of the world. The competition from Beijing was massive and consequently the ROC, by the end of Lee’s tenure, had lost most of its formal diplomatic ties in Africa, including its strongest ally, South Africa. Taipei did not have any breakthrough on the diplomatic front. With the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, Taiwan gradually transformed its political system into a democratic one, and it was recognized by the international community as one of the most vivid democracies in Asia.25 In 1993, the Clinton administration reviewed its Taiwan policy and reported to Congress on September 27, 1994 with the conclusion that the island had made remarkable political and economic progress and that, in light of this fact, it was wrong to maintain the same stance to the ROC as in 1979. There were voices urging support for “the other China.”26 If the US interests were well served by supporting democracy and human rights abroad, as most Americans believed, then such support must entail treating the ROC and its leaders with respect and dignity.27 President Clinton agreed to issue a visa to Lee Teng-hui for a visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, on May 22, 1995. As Lee made clear, the purpose of his trip was to “win international recognition of Taiwan as a political entity.”28 On June 9, 1995, he delivered an Olin Lecture titled “What the People Want Is Always in My Heart.” Here Lee appealed to the international community to treat the ROC in Taiwan “fairly and reasonably.” In his conclusion, Lee highlighted that he acted “with the people in my heart” and that he knew what his people would like to say to the world: “We are here to stay; we stand ready to help; and we look forward to sharing the fruits of our democratic triumph.”29 Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in 1995 ignited the PRC government’s anger. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out large military maneuvers in July 1995 and March 1996, involving missile launches and live-fire tests in areas within one hundred miles of Taiwan.30 The reason for this anger is perhaps explained by Qian Qichen, the PRC’s vice premier and foreign minister at that time, who noted in his autobiography, Ten Stories of a Diplomat, that Lee’s visit to the United States broke a seventeen-year record of no visits to the United States from Taiwan’s highestranking governmental official. He continues that the PRC considered this event as a provocation and counter-attacked accordingly.31 Qian himself called the American ambassador J. Stapleton Roy on May 23 and protested vigorously against the US decision to grant Lee a visa; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC announced that the minister of defense’s scheduled visit to the United States would be suspended and mutual, ministry-level visits and other negotiations were canceled. On June 16, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Li Daoyu, informed the United States about the very serious and negative consequences caused by Lee Teng-hui’s visit. The Taiwanese journalist Huiying Zhang argues that the PRC was fairly tolerant of Lee’s efforts to expand Taiwan’s space in the international community before his visit to the United States in 1995, given that the PRC was so concerned about cleaning up its image as a brutal regime after the Tiananmen incident.32 Immediately

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 159

4/18/11 12:36 PM

160  ✻  Yana Zuo after Lee’s visit to the United States, the PRC started to put limits on Taiwan’s role on the global stage. The PRC’s response shocked the United States, and after rounds of direct confrontations with the PRC, it is reported that Clinton passed a letter to Jiang Zemin in 1995 explicitly stating that the United States did not support a “one China, one Taiwan” policy or a “two Chinas” policy.33 Also the United States did not support Taiwanese independence or Taiwanese membership in organizations requiring statehood.34 The policy was later made official during the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit and it became known as the “three no’s” promise. This effectively broke US relations with Taiwan, and the CCP government became less tolerant toward Taipei’s effort to raise its international profile. Lee’s visit to the United States and its subsequent consequences made most states realize that Lee’s visits to other countries would impact their relationships with the PRC and would also possibly affect the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and even the world. As a result, they chose to avoid such a scenario. Inevitably this reaction prevented Lee from exerting his strength to further lift Taiwan’s international profile.35 Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States served as the dividing point for the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship and also for Taipei’s international space.36 During Lee’s administration, Taipei moved away from the position that it was the sole legitimate government of China and re-identified itself as an equal of Beijing in the international community. Lee did not attempt to represent “all Chinese people,” and the people “in his heart” were those living in Taiwan. Beijing’s refusal to recognize Taiwan’s new identity, particularly after Lee’s 1995 visit to the United States, blocked Taipei’s access to the international society. By 2000 when Lee stepped down as the ROC’s president, the ROC’s goal of achieving equal international recognition with the PRC had failed. Taipei’s effort to cohabit with the PRC and gain global “dual recognition” was unsuccessful. South Korea, the last country in Asia to maintain diplomatic relationship with Taipei, established a diplomatic relationship with the mainland in 1992. By the same token, South Africa, the most influential nationstate still maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC, broke those relations with Taiwan and recognized the PRC in 1997. The PRC’s refusal to renegotiate Taipei’s position was based on its long-held position that the PRC, and only the PRC, could represent the Chinese nation. From Taipei’s perspective, the battle across the Taiwan Strait was over once it had accepted the PRC’s legitimacy in the mainland.37 However, for Beijing, this new position seemed to be even less acceptable because it threatened to divide China. For the PRC, the cross-strait debates still involved a competition between political regimes. And the ROC, as the defeated side in the Civil War, can in no way be an equal of the PRC or the legal international representative of the island of Taiwan. Taipei’s attempt to reformulate its identity turned the question of Taiwan’s status into a salient issue on Beijing’s agenda. The PRC started to further tighten its Taiwan policy, particularly after 2000 when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election. The PRC’s refusal to renegotiate the ROC’s identity did not prevent the latter from insisting on a re-identification and this further formalized the split.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 160

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  161

III. 2000–2008: Seeking Taiwanese Independence In 2000, the DPP, Taiwan’s pro-independence party, won the ROC presidency with the election of Chen Shui-bian. This development ended over half a century of KMT rule in Taiwan. The ROC’s identity has undergone substantial change ever since. Having moved a step forward from Lee Teng-hui’s position, the DPP government explicitly identified Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state from China and tried to expand its international role. In an effort to acquire international recognition for its radical position on Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland, the DPP government drew contrasts between “democratic and peace-loving Taiwan” and China—“the biggest threat to the regional stability and a rogue state.” 38 According to Taipei’s reports on foreign policy, the main strategy of the DPP government from 2000 to 2007 was to participate in international organizations.39 For state-to-state diplomatic relations, apart from some vague statements such as “upgrading our relationship with other states,” the summary of the ROC’s reports on foreign relations do not effectively demonstrate that Taipei had a clear goal about what it intended to achieve and how it was going to achieve it.40 In the foreign policy reports, Taipei merely set the goal as “consolidating the existing diplomatic relationships.”41 Taipei still invested heavily in developing diplomatic relationships with other states, although the island was experiencing an economic downturn. Yet Taipei’s dollar diplomacy did not serve as an effective strategy to acquire international recognition for its self-defined sovereignty and independent status. The PRC was taking advantage of its fast-growing economy and stepped up its dollar diplomacy program, and the PRC’s economy was far stronger.42 At the same time, Beijing was using its political leverage to develop and expand contacts with Taipei’s friends in Latin America and the Caribbean. In September 2004, Beijing sent a peacekeeping team to Haiti, one of Taipei’s formal diplomatic allies. This could have potentially diminished Taipei’s diplomatic ties with other states, which could have seriously affected Taiwan’s ability to act on the world stage as well as its international status.43 During Chen’s tenure from May 2000 to May 2008, Taipei did not make any real progress in its formal diplomatic relationship with individual states.44 Taipei knocked on the doors of key international institutions, and the World Health Organization (WHO) was a primary target. When the ROC left the UN, it also lost its membership in the WHO. Taipei started to make a bid to re-enter the WHO in 1997. In 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) broke out in both Mainland China and Taiwan. The Taiwanese government took the opportunity to proclaim that “health is not a political issue; disease and medical care have no national boundaries,” in order to join the WHO.45 The Foundation of Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan also worked on a project called “Taiwan for the WHO”: it argued that Taiwan’s absence from the WHO was an abuse of “Taiwanese human rights.”46 Taipei was also keen to link its WHO bid with other events in world affairs, such as the anti-terror war, in order to gain further ­leverage.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 161

4/18/11 12:36 PM

162  ✻  Yana Zuo As the Foundation of Medical Professionals argued, “While global terrorism rises, Taiwan may become a dangerous missing part of the worldwide anti-terrorism network, if it is still left out of the doors of important international organizations.”47 Taipei called for each country to “apply its moral conscience when considering whether to support Taiwan’s bid.”48 From 2007, Taipei pursued its membership in the WHO under the name of “Taiwan,” but due to WHO’s requirement for membership—statehood—the PRC blocked the bid. Taipei also sought membership in the United Nations.49 This was not a new policy—the KMT government attempted to rejoin the UN since 1993. What made the DPP government’s bid historic was that the DPP re-identified Taiwan’s position and sought to join the UN under the name of “Taiwan.” In President Chen Shui-bian’s letter to Ban Ki-Moon and Wang Guangya—the PRC’s ambassador to the UN, who also served as rotating president of the UN Security Council—in July 2007, Chen first condemned the international community for not respecting the dignity of Taiwan’s people and labeled Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN as “political apartheid,” which was unfair, “incomprehensible and unbearable.” Chen characterized Taiwan as “a country that advocates the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and peace” and its “identity is denied and security threatened” since it was excluded from the UN.50 Chen’s letter to Ban Ki-Moon was returned by the UN citing the UN’s General Assembly Resolution 2758(XXVI), which recognizes the PRC as the lawful representative of the Chinese nation to the world body. Wang Guangya commented that Beijing firmly opposed Taipei’s “blatant attempt at splitting China,” and he added that “Taiwan is part of China . . . and . . . it is . . . not eligible to participate [in the UN] in whatever name and under whatever pretext.”51 Taipei’s effort to obtain international recognition as an independent and sovereign state fuels conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing pressed the United States to intervene against Taipei’s moves to drag Taiwan further away from China, despite the fact that Beijing had stressed that the issue was a domestic one that should be left to the Chinese across the strait to deal with. The US National Security Council Acting Senior Director Dennis Wilder said at a White House press conference, “Membership in the United Nations requires statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the international community.”52 The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas J. Christensen also said that “frontal assaults on Beijing’s sensitivities are bound to fail and, at the end of the day, leave Taipei further behind.”53 Despite all the efforts the DPP government made to consolidate an independent Taiwanese identity, they received little recognition from outsiders. Beijing strongly rejected any attempt to renegotiate Taiwan’s identity in relation to China—the “one China” policy could not possibly be altered. With its fast-growing economic and political power, Beijing successfully blocked Taipei’s bids to join any international organizations that required statehood. After all, an independent Taiwan was not compatible with the interests of other states, even for the United States—­supporting

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 162

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  163 Taipei involved inflaming relations with the PRC and the cost was simply too high. Without recognition from outsiders, the policy of the DPP government failed. However, the gradual change in Taipei’s self-identification exhausted Beijing’s patience and the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship became increasingly bitter. The PRC, and its joint efforts with the United States, still failed to prevent the DPP government from carrying on with its attempts to acquire international recognition as an independent state. Taipei had gone far beyond what Beijing was willing to tolerate. Indeed, Taipei’s series of moves made Beijing less confident about the future of the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship, although greater integration in both social and economic spheres generated hope within the PRC government that time might be on its side. But Taipei’s efforts to differentiate itself from the mainland and diminish its Chineseness proved increasingly unsettling for Beijing.54 Just before the election in February 2000, the Taiwan Affair’s Office of the State Council published a white paper with the title “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” and raised the three “ifs,” reiterating the conditions under which the PRC would use military forces to block Taiwan’s separation.55 Beijing also issued a law banning secession. This was the first time that Beijing attempted to solve the cross-Taiwan Strait problems under a legal framework, and it was the Hu Jintao administration’s first step toward approaching the Taiwan issue. The purpose of this law was “opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from China,” promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.”56 It clarified that “Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China’s internal affair, which is subject to no interference by any outside forces.”57 The DPP re-drew the boundary between self and other—the demarcation under Chen’s administration was between two separate “nations,” Taiwan and China. China’s sovereignty had gone through dramatic changes in Taipei’s narratives since the 1940s—from the position that China’s sovereignty could not be divided and was represented by Taipei, to one in which China’s sovereignty was shared between Taipei and Beijing, and further to the view that China’s sovereignty does not include Taipei. By questioning and denying China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, the DPP intends to legitimize its long-pursued identity for Taiwan—a sovereign and independent state. This represents a radical shift from the original position in 1949, which glorified China, and it is effectively a form of self-denial—Mainland China, part of the old “self,” has actually become the “other.” Beijing fiercely objected to this new position, and the relationship across the strait went from bad to worse. Taipei identified the issue as one concerning Taiwan’s survival as an independent and sovereign nation. This development demonstrates that when a state’s identity based on its self-identification clashes with how others define it, it may lead to instabilities and conflicts. Taipei once again failed to gain diplomatic recognition in the international community, emphasizing the theoretical point that a state’s claim on its identity is weak as long as it remains unrecognized by others.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 163

4/18/11 12:36 PM

164  ✻  Yana Zuo

Conclusion As this chapter has demonstrated, external recognition matters a great deal to a state’s identity. To form an identity, the members of a group need to identify with each other to form a “self” and also identify against out-groups to form an “other” (or “others”). The nature of identification determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn.58 Identification is more about the image “we” portray in the eyes of others—the process of identification involves how “others” see and judge “our” self-recognition.59 People attribute identity in the process of social interaction—a people claim their identity and audiences make judgments about the claimant. The success of this process always depends on how the self is being seen and judged. Taipei failed to acquire diplomatic recognition in the international community—it failed to maintain its position as the “the sole legitimate government of China” in the early days; it failed to cohabit with Beijing as “an equal” in international society under Lee’s tenure; and it failed to operate as an independent and sovereign state under the DPP government. Without external recognition, none of the aforementioned properties that the government in Taipei has attributed to Taiwan are effectual. How a state identifies itself is meaningless when they are not recognized by others—it does not matter whether the non-recognition is caused by de-recognition or an inability to acquire recognition in the first place. Identity construction is an ongoing and fluid process. Identities do indeed have historical roots and they evolve across time. From “the sole legitimate government of China” to “Taipei and Beijing are equals” to “Taiwan is sovereign and independent from China,” Taipei’s self-identification has changed dramatically.60 Since mainstream constructivists do not examine identity through a historical lens, they cannot explain identity change and its impact on international relations. The attributes embedded in an identity are not stagnant, and when a state reidentifies itself, new recognition is needed. The shift of a state’s self-identification calls for changes of external recognition. A state’s struggle for external recognition based on its self-identification has huge impacts on international relations—once rejected, instability and insecurity might set in. It is particularly true when the shift of self-identification involves self/other boundary re-drawing. Taipei has gone beyond identity enhancement or preservation—it re-drew the boundary between “self” and “other.” Taipei was in essence attempting to re-identify its “corporate identity,” in Wendt’s term.61 This new development reflected the anomalous nature of the Taiwan case, in comparison to the other “divided nations” after the WWII. Although fully equipped with ideological clashes, neither of the Koreas denied their Koreanness. The Germans moved far ahead. Even before the unification had taken place, neither side denied their German identity. Although scholars such as Gebhard Schweigler62 argued that separate identities were formed in two Germanys, the very nature of the division was revolving around their social identities. Neither of them was attempting to alter their corporate identity and their Germanness.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 164

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  165 The Chinese case paralleled the other aforementioned cases until the early 1990s. For a long period of time since 1949, when the ROC government first retreated to Taiwan, both Taipei and Beijing defined themselves as the legitimate government representing the whole nation of China and the other one as an illegal and illegitimate entity. The very start of Taiwan’s attempt to alter the conventional corporate identity of being a Chinese state was during Lee Teng-hui’s tenure. Self—the ROC—does not include the mainland any more since then. The conception of “self” remains the same for Beijing, which still identified itself as the legitimate governing body of the Chinese nation. Beijing rejects being excluded from “self” and rejects Taipei’s new demarcation between the mainland and Taiwan. The relationship across the Taiwan Strait has been intensified due to Taipei’s radical move to re-identify itself. Taipei and Beijing are jointly making efforts to break the deadlock again since the KMT took the office in 2008 with the election of Ma Ying-jeou. Ma’s administration re-identifies Taiwan’s future with the mainland and pulled back from the DPP’s radical independent position to the conception of “Greater China.” Taipei accepted the WHO’s invitation to join the organization under the name of “Chinese Taipei” in May 2009. However, it is hard to believe that the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship is going to be smooth from now on and that “Chinese Taipei” is the permanent solution for the cross debates over Taiwan’s identity. The leaderships across the Taiwan Strait are still facing severe tests. How will the KMT prepare for the next presidential election and react to the DPP’s identity politics while Ma’s popularity plummets because of Taiwan’s deteriorating economy, along with the recent global financial crisis? How will Beijing handle issues with regard to Taiwan’s membership in international organizations while it has to maintain a benevolent interaction with Taipei? As long as there is a chance that Taipei would struggle for international recognition for an independent identity, the cross-Taiwan Strait confrontation would not demise. Germany’s unification showed that differences embedded in social identities do not prevent national unification—two political entities who recognize the common corporate identify, the soul of them, can eventually come together. An independent Taiwan clashes with how Beijing sees Taiwan’s identity in relation to the mainland. Taiwan’s return to its conventional Chinese identity is called for to prevent cross-strait conflicts.

Notes I would like to express my gratitude to Shuyong Guo, Thomas Lindemann, Richard Little, John Pella, and Erik Ringmar for their insightful comments. 1. KMT, Kuomingtang, also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party. CCP: the Chinese Communist Party. 2. Bukovansky 1999. 3. Hopf 2002. 4. Foreign Ministry of the PRC 2000.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 165

4/18/11 12:36 PM

166  ✻  Yana Zuo 5. Wei 1993, 2. 6. Tien 1989,11–36 7. Cai and Wu 1989, 83. 8. See Taylor 2000 for details about the US involvement in the post WWII KMT-CCP conflict. 9. Taylor 2000. 10. Under the Eisenhower administration, Washington proposed a concept of “divided China” and suggested the creation of a new member in the UN for Beijing, and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations proposed more substantial approaches with the main points that the ROC and the PRC, as two states, had succeeded China. See Bush 2004. 11. Chiang 1967. 12. Chiang, quoted in Bush 2004, 108. 13. Chiang 1971, 262. Emphasis added. 14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008. 15. Tien 1989, 14 16. Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, took the presidency in 1978. When Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, it was the vice president Yan Jiagan who succeeded, but Jingguo was the head of the Executive Yuan and the real leader of the ROC from the mid-1960s. See Taylor 2000. 17. Lee 2004. 18. For example, the name of the ROC would not be acceptable for Beijing. 19. See Tien 1989, 14. Also it is worth noting that the Chinese version for Chinese Taipei is different across the strait—Zhonghua Taipei in Taiwan and Zhongguo Taipei in the mainland. The former is more of a cultural/ethnic term and the latter is more of a political term. 20. For example, Guibernau 1999. 21. Lee 1999. 22. See Chao et al. 2002, 115–122. 23. The ROC had been a member of the ADB since 1966. Taipei did not attend the annual conferences until 1989 as a gesture of protest against the ADB’s decision to lower its international status. See Cai and Wu 1989. 24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994. 25. Key steps of Taiwan’s democratization include: legalizing opposition parties, localization of the KMT, direct presidential elections, and so on. For more details about the process of democratization in Taiwan, see Chao and Myers 1994. 26. Referring to the ROC, a term used in the Senate Report. 27. Chang 1995. 28. Romberg 2003. 29. Lee 1995. 30. Garver 2000. 31. Qian 2003. 32. See Zhang 1996, 170–190. 33. Romberg 2003. 34. Kan 2007, 62. 35. Zhang 1996, 243. 36. Su 2003. 37. The National Assembly on April 22, 1991, resolved to abolish the Temporary Provisions

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 166

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  167 Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion, and on April 30, Lee Teng-hui announced that it would be terminated on May 1. 38. Arguments along this line were drawn by various Taiwanese leaders. See, for example, Chien 2002 and Tung 2007. 39. Tien 2000. 40. See for example, ibid. 41. For example Huang 2006. 42. The GDP (in US $billion) of Taiwan and the mainland between 2003 and 2008 is as follows: 305.4/1,641.0; 331.1/1,931.6; 356.2/2,235.8; 365.5/2,657.8; 383.3/3,280.2; 424.1/4,222.4. Figures are from the World Bank statistics, see http://www.imf.org/external/ ns/cs.aspx?id=28. 43. Dumbaugh and Sullivan 2005, 4–5. The Congressional Research Service Report. 44. The MOFA’s newsletters revealed that during this period of time, Dominica, Macedonia, Nauru, Libya (the third time), Grenada, Senegal, Chad (the second time), Costa Rica and Malawi switched their recognition from Taipei to Beijing; the Gilbert Islands, Saint Lucia, switched from Beijing to Taipei with Nauru also re-recognizing Taipei in 2005. 45. Government Information Office 2003. 46. Foundation of Medical Professional Alliance in Taiwan 2008. Added emphasis. 47. Ibid. 48. Government Information Office 2004. 49. Taiwan was invited by the WHO to join the organization as an observer in May 2009. See Xie 2009. 50. Chen 2007. 51. Wang 2007. 52. Hsu 2007, 1. 53. Christensen 2007. 54. Chineseness, a standard usage within the field of China studies, describes everything Chinese, including both social and cultural factors as well as political factors, such as state identity 55. “[I]f a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification.” Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council 2000. 56. See NCP 2005. Anti-Secession Law: article 1. 57. Ibid., article 3. 58. See Wendt 1994, 384–396. 59. Ibid. 60. There are certainly other sources pushing Taipei to re-identify itself, such as domestic politics and structural forces. For more details, see Zuo 2009. 61. Corporate identity, in Wendt’s discussions, is singular, intrinsic, and self-organizing in quality; it is constitutionally exogenous to otherness and represents only one aspect of a state’s identity. However, it is the “site” or “platform” for other identities. See Wendt 1994. 62. Schweigler 1975.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 167

4/18/11 12:36 PM

168  ✻  Yana Zuo

Bibliography Bukovansky, Mlada. 1999. “The Altered State and the State of Nature: The French Revolution and International Politics.” Review of International Studies 25 (2): 197–216. Bush, Richard C. 2004. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Cai, Zhengwen, and Rongxi Wu. 1989. “Evaluations and Suggestions on Foreign Relations of the ROC.” In ROC White Papers on Defense and Foreign Policy, 63–90. Taipei: Yeqiang Publishing House. Chang, Jaw-ling. 1995. “How Clinton Bashed Taiwan—and Why.” Orbis 39 (4). Chao, Linda, and Ramon Myers, H. 1994. “The First Chinese Democracy: Political Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986–1994.” Asia Survey 34 (3): 213–230. Chao, Linda, Ramon Myers, and Jialin Zhuang. 2002. “A China Divided Since the Turnover of Political Power in Taiwan.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15 (1): 115–122. Chen, Shui-bian. 2007. President Chen Shui-bian’s Letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon. Taipei: ROC Office of the President. Chiang, Kai-shek. 1967. “An Excerpt from Jiang’s Meeting with Sado, the Minister of Foreign Ministry, Japan.” In Qin Xiao-Yi: The Thoughts and Speeches Collection of President Chiang Kai-shek, 121–23. Taipei: Executive Yuan, ROC/Archives 40. ———. 1971. “Address to the Nation on the Withdrawal from the United Nations.” In Qin Xiao-Yi: The Thoughts and Speeches Collection of President Chiang Kai-shek, 259–263. Taipei: Executive Yuan, ROC/Archives 34. Chien You-hsin. 2002. The ROC’s 2002 Report on Foreign Policy. Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Christensen, Thomas J. 2007. “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan U.S.-Taiwan Business Council.” Annapolis: American Institute in Taiwan. Dumbaugh, Kerry, and Mark P. Sullivan. 2005. China’s Growing Interest in Latin America. CRS Report for Congress. Foreign Ministry of the PRC. 2000. The PRC’s Glorious Journey on Developing Foreign Relations. Foundation of Medical Professional Alliance in Taiwan. 2008. “The Harm of Taiwanese Human Right,” http://www.taiwan-for-who.org.tw/chinese/say/say_area/content.asp?id=3. Garver, John W. 2000. Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Government Information Office. 2003. “Health for All: Let Taiwan Join the Who.” http:// www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/join_who/2003/who12.htm. ———. 2004. “Support Taiwan’s entry into the World Health Organization,” http://www .gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/join_who/2004/who11.htm. Guibernau, Montserrat. 1999. Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age. Cambridge: Polity. Hopf, Ted. 1996. “Russian Identity and Russian Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan.” In The Sources Of Russian Foreign Policy After The Cold War, edited by Celeste A. Wallander and Anne Wildermuth, 147–72. Boulder: Westview Press. ———. 2002. Social Construction of International Politics. Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 1999. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hsu, Allen. 2007. “U.S. Official’s Comments on Taiwan’s Status Cause Uproar.” Taiwan Journal, September 6.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 168

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Self-Identification, Recognition and Conflicts  ✻  169 Huang, Zhifang. 2006. The ROC’s 2006 Report on Foreign Policy. Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kan, Shirley. 2007. Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990. Report to Congress. Washington DC: Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade. Lee, Teng-hui. 1995. What the People Want is Always in My Heart. Taipei: Office of the President. ———. 1999. Taiwan’s Proposals. Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing Housing. ———. 2004. Witness Taiwan: President Chiang, Ching-kuo and Me. Taipei: Yunchen. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1994. “The UN General Committee Discusses the Agenda of UN General Assembly, 49th Session on the 21st September.” Newsletter 96. ———. 2008. Key Events in the ROC’s History with Regard to Joining the Gatt/WTO. Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Qian, Qichen. 2003. Ten Stories of a Diplomat. Beijing: World Affairs Press. Romberg, Alan D. 2003. Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and US-PRC Relations. Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center. Schweigler, Gebhard L. 1975. National Consciousness in Divided Germany. London; Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications. Su, Chi. 2003. Brinkmanship: From Two-States-Theory to One-Country-on-Each-Side. Taipei: Bookzone. Taiwan Affairs Office, and Information Office of the State Council. 2000. The Chinese Government, Staunch Champion for the One-China Principle. The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwand.html. Taylor, Jay. 2000. The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tien, Hungmao. 1989. “Factors Affecting Taiwan’s Diplomacy and Security.” In ROC White Papers on Defense and Foreign Policy, 11–36. Taipei: Yeqiang Publishing House. ———. 2000. The ROC’s 2000 Report on Foreign Policy. Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tung, Cheng-Yuan. 2007. The CCP Speeds Up Its Military Buildup Intending to Establish an Asia-Pacific. Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council. Wang, Guangya. 2007. “H. E. Ambassador Wang Guangya’s Letter to UN Secretary General H. E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon.” Accessed August 16. http://www.china-un.org/eng/dbtxx/ hyxx/zyhdzys/t357129.htm. Wei, Min. 1993. The Bilateral Diplomacy of the ROC. Taipei: Yeqiang Publishing House. Wendt, Alexander. 1994. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” American Political Science Review 88 (2): 384–396. Xie, Yu. 2009. “Taiwan Gets Observer Status at WHA.” China Daily. Accessed May 19. http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/19/content_7791269.htm. Zhang, Huiying. 1996. The Super Diplomat Lee Deng-hui and His Pragmatic Diplomacy. Taipei: China Times. Zuo, Yana. 2009. Taiwan’s Identity Evolution since the 1940s and Its Impact on the Cross Taiwan Strait Relationship. PhD dissertation, University of Bristol.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 169

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 170

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Chapter 9

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime, and Proliferation Crises Alexandre Hummel

Nuclear proliferation is generally seen as a security problem, and decisions by states to develop nuclear weapons, or to prevent other states from acquiring them, are most commonly explained with at least some reference to the notion of “threat.” The idea that nuclear weapons are a response to a threat and themselves create threats for others is at the core of the “proliferation” concept, which is an amended version of the security dilemma: a mechanistic increase in states’ military capabilities provoked by a spiral of reciprocal fear and hostility. According to this conventional logic, “strategic-chain reaction” will take place because acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state is likely to provoke repercussions elsewhere, and the non-proliferation regime is the device states have found to tackle this problem. For most proliferation analysts, individual choices by states and their national identity do not heavily matter; what is most important is the geo-strategic position of states, their alliances, and the state of the international non-proliferation regime. Realists stress that states in a threatening environment will inevitably seek a nuclear security guarantee that can only be obtained through nuclearization or alliance with a nuclear power. Liberals are somewhat more optimistic and think that an effective regime can be decisive in avoiding a suboptimal situation of generalized proliferation. Nevertheless, both schools of thought share a common rationalist, utility-maximizing perspective about nuclear choices: states will balance between threats, rewards, and costs when considering nuclearization and/or adhesion to the non-proliferation regime. States that do not want nuclear weapons have every 171

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 171

4/18/11 12:36 PM

172  ✻  Alexandre Hummel incentive to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to strengthen it in order to avoid nuclearization by their neighbors. States that do want nuclear weapons will only join the regime to cheat and will try to violate it at a lesser cost and maximum benefit. Non-proliferation advocates thus concentrate their efforts on the strengthening of verification provisions in order to distinguish cheaters from honest participants. This chapter focuses far more on states’ individual choices, national identity conceptions, and considerations about international fairness. I want to show that choices about non-conventional weapons are not only a response to threats or inducements but also involve patterns of recognition-denial and face-saving. This is particularly true in the nuclear field because the non-proliferation regime is one of the very few examples of discrimination in international law; it therefore inevitably clashes with a central feature of the international scene: the myth of sovereign equality. This tension if further aggravated by the symbolic dimension that nuclear weapons have taken—states tend to be far more passionate in this field than a cold-blooded security analysis would suggest. Indeed, an important feature of this debate in the post-1991 world is how a vast ensemble of states feels genuinely hurt by the inconsistencies of non-proliferation and the attitude of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) that emphasize a tough line on counter-proliferation while keeping and developing their own nuclear arsenals. Such normative inconsistencies can be considered a source of symbolic violence, especially when a vast majority of states in the world are not engaged in any sense toward nuclearization but nevertheless face pressure and increasingly stringent controls. According to a traditional perspective, this should not be a problem: these states will comply because it is in their interest to do so. However, a closer look at the symbolic side of the story shows that the current status of the regime is deeply resented outside of the Western world. Normative frustration was, for example, a key cause in the failure of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference where states were not even able to agree on an agenda due to acrimonious disagreements. In other words, there is some evidence that, while many states are truly committed to non-proliferation, they also increasingly resent the unfairness of counter-proliferation policies. Approaches focusing on recognition-denial and symbolic violence can thus be mobilized to understand even hard-core security problems like tensions linked to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In this chapter, I argue that proliferation crises—when two or more states enter a confrontation because of proliferation, real or suspected—are not only caused by security considerations but also frequently encompass emotional dimensions. These crises can be precipitated and aggravated by patterns of struggle for recognition, which means that international tension can exist and grow in ways that a purely security-based approach would not have expected. This is especially true when the state suspected of regime-violating behavior claims a very elevated self-image. In such a case, the wide gap between the lowly status of a “rogue” state and claimed identity can encourage leaders to engage in confrontational behavior that one cannot only explain through material considerations. This is because simply giving in to the international diktat

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 172

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  173 would be equated with a loss of face. If a state sees itself as a proud, exceptional country, pressures exerted in the name of the non-proliferation regime thus have every chance to backfire. This pattern could explain why most proliferation crises since the 1960s have involved countries with a peculiar sense of national identity, while the ones that have been the most eager to cooperate are states with a freshly renewed self-image—South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all gave away their nuclear weapons in the early 1990s. I will first detail how the normative context surrounding nuclear weapons and non-proliferation can be a source of frustration and resentment for states. I will then present two paths that can lead to increased international tension and proliferation crises at least in part through the struggle for recognition. The first is the case of states that may fail to comply with the non-proliferation regime despite having no military nuclear ambitions. The second is the case of states that may twist toward a quest of nuclear weapons at least in part as a tool for self-affirmation.

The Setting: Normative Ambiguities and Nuclear Weapons (Non-) Proliferation On the surface, there is wide acceptance of a norm that is first declaratory: states will not openly recognize that they seek nuclear weapons or even that they want to obtain a military nuclear capability. The further spread of nuclear weapons is generally considered to be a bad thing, and only a few academics and military experts publicly endorse the opposite view that selective proliferation could act as a stabilizing force in the international system. Proliferation was unanimously labeled as a “threat to international peace and security” by the Security Council in 2004, reflecting an international consensus on this point.1 This widespread agreement has been progressively emerging and reinforcing itself since the middle of the 1960s when the idea of non-proliferation first took off as an international priority. Before that, the spread of nuclear weapons was not viewed as a particularly horrendous thing, especially if allies were concerned. At the same time, countries like France and the People’s Republic of China were openly proclaiming, and even boasting, their nuclear ambitions. Since then, the NPT has gained almost universal adherence and was extended indefinitely in 1995. It has been supplemented by other agreements like International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ), export controls or the proposed Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which all start from the premise that an increase in the number of states armed with nuclear weapons would be detrimental to regional and global security. The main evidence pointing to the existence of a taboo stigmatizing open declaration of nuclear ambitions is the fact that all nuclear powers outside of the five NWS took great care to dissimulate the true nature of their nuclear programs at least until their first nuclear tests. In 1974, India was the first country to proclaim that its test was a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” Israel has always refused to admit that it possesses

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 173

4/18/11 12:36 PM

174  ✻  Alexandre Hummel a nuclear force, resorting to ambiguous statements. This attachment to ambiguity goes far beyond cosmetics as exemplified by the case of Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli citizen who was convicted of treason and espionage and served eighteen years in prison for revealing details of the country’s nuclear program. The South African nuclear program was also kept clandestine until its dismantlement was announced in 1993. This pattern of concealment, or “opaque proliferation,” is one of the main differences between the first nuclear era and the second nuclear age.2. Proliferation is now opaque because it is widely considered to be bad, forcing states to explore subterranean ways to procure nuclear materials and know-how in order to avoid sanctions and stigmatization. Even states that finally openly reveal their possession of nuclear weapons somehow feel the need to justify themselves, citing imperious security reasons and re-affirming their ultimate commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. This necessity for proliferators to hide before crossing the threshold and to justify themselves afterward is usually explained by the fact that most great powers place non-proliferation as one of their top foreign policy priorities and are ready to punish states seen as embarking on nuclearization. According to this logic, if non-proliferation is valued by the great powers to the point that they are ready to intervene militarily to defend it, it seems more prudent for most states not to embark on the nuclearization course.3 However, a quick look at recent history reveals that power politics alone cannot explain states’ unusual shyness when it comes to nuclear ambitions. Jumping through the threshold in 2006 has not significantly harmed North Korea’s situation, for example—quite the contrary. Ultimately, successful proliferators have been tacitly accepted into the nuclear club even by the most vocal proponent of counter-proliferation, as evidenced by American cooperation with India, Israel, and Pakistan. The fight against proliferation is not always as intense as declarations of intentions suggest and at least depends on other strategic considerations. It might even be in the established nuclear powers’ interest to assist the newcomers in order to obtain “safe” proliferation.4 Since the fight against proliferation is not always as resolute as it may seem at first, denial of military intentions and concealment of existing weapons could also signal the existence of a wider, prescriptive norm pushing aside the acquisition of a nuclear force.5 It can be described as an individual inclination for states to abstain from building nuclear weapons and to avoid helping other states to attain this goal, as expressed by the rules specified in articles I and II of the NPT. This does not mean that all states will refrain from building nuclear weapons all the time, or that nuclear weapons possession is stigmatized, but rather that a vast majority of states do not consider nuclearization as a legitimate option and expect their counterparts to do the same, or at least that they say so. The wide diffusion and internalization of this belief would provide another explanation for the absence of proper nuclear “proliferation” that has puzzled strategic theorists since 1945. Many pessimistic anticipations have indeed been proved wrong over the years, as nuclear weapons have actually been spreading quite slowly. The NPT is nowadays the arms-control agreement that is the closest to universality, with 191 state parties. NWFZ, unilateral renunciations

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 174

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  175 to nuclear weapons, and even the dismantling of existing arsenals are further signs pointing toward the rise of the abstention norm, which is, as many other norms, a “standard of oughtness” offering states a possibility to affirm their identity as peaceloving, responsible nations.6 The effectiveness of this norm and its constraining effect on state behavior are questionable since it has suffered notable exceptions, and most states that respect it do not have the capacities or the utility to build nuclear weapons anyway. However, this relative weakness actually contributes to its popularity because nuclear abstention is a cheap and easy way for most states to proclaim good faith and dedication to international peace. Indeed, this possible abstention norm is somewhat different from the abstinence perspective found in most realist and liberal accounts of states without nuclear weapons.7 The latter suggests the active repression of a drive to do something perceived as at least partly attractive, while the former is a more passive or even unconscious decision not to do something. Nuclear abstention embedded in the NPT does not seriously constrain most states’ strategic choices and is therefore easily embraced. This abstention—or non-nuclearization—norm should be carefully distinguished from the non-proliferation regime that is partially built on it. A regime is an institution designed to allow and facilitate cooperation between states, whereas nuclear abstention is an individual prescription that states may feel is legitimate to respect independently of treaty provisions.8 This is exemplified by the attitude of states that claim to respect the norm even if they are not, or are not yet, members of the regime. States can adhere to the norm while rejecting the regime, but the opposite is impossible. Another important difference between non-nuclearization and non-proliferation is that, while the former is uncontroversially admitted, there is a growing disagreement between states on the latter. The regime is currently under strain with a widening rift between the nuclear “haves”—NWS, especially the Western ones, and their allies—on one side, and the “have-nots” on the other side. This trend was evidenced at the 2005 NPT Review Conference when states were unable to agree on a final document. This failure of the review process is a direct result of the radicalization of positions on each side. In 2005, Western NWS refused to even consider discussion on nuclear disarmament, while many non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) were increasingly sensible to radical Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rhetoric.9 Things are further complicated by the fact that some non-proliferation regime specifications have become “symbols of condensation” in the international diplomatic arena—they have been reified and acquired a substance of their own.10 Empirical research has shown that, in many fields of international negotiation, states do not look only at their self-interest but pay attention to broader considerations of fairness.11 Agreements that are deemed to be fair have, on an equal-interest basis, more chance of being accepted and implemented. Even a realist like Scott Sagan concurs in saying that “to be most effective over the long term, even strong powers must craft their policies to take into account the ethical concerns of other actors, including the weak.”12 The symbolic and emotional dimension renders the debates about the NPT more passionate and far-reaching than other arms-control issues. Practical considerations

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 175

4/18/11 12:36 PM

176  ✻  Alexandre Hummel are mixed with broader feelings about the international order. The disarmament component in non-proliferation has for example become a symbol of international equality and justice. The refusal of NWS to even discuss the question is therefore taken as an insult and easily leads to accusations of imperialism and arrogance that reveal resentment far beyond the issue of nuclear weapons. Similarly, NNWS, especially those from the South, pay great attention to provision about the “inalienable right” to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is explicitly linked to the economic-development issue. Hence, non-nuclearization should, for the radical NNWS, be only one element in a whole web of norms and rules dedicated to disarmament and development, whereas Western NWS see it primarily as an end in itself, a tool to tackle a security problem. This deep dichotomy between the “South” and the “West” leads to multiple divergences both inside and outside the regime, the main one being the issue of restrictive safeguards on nuclear installations promoted by Western NWS and denounced by the NAM as a violation of article IV. Other disagreements include the extent of sanctions, security guarantees, or export controls. Because of this normative row and the perceived unfairness of their attitude, Western NWS are frequently under fire, especially during multilateral meetings. Their position rests on an unresolved underlying tension—the contradiction between deterrence and non-proliferation. If one really believes in deterrence, it is not coherent to oppose proliferation as deterrence optimists have long argued.13 On the other hand, a strong non-proliferation policy can hardly escape reflection on the dangers of all nuclear weapons, as suggested by proliferation pessimists.14 NWS ignore this abstract debate and continue to openly rely on deterrence while at the same time promoting stricter non-proliferation rules. They resort to a third approach to the consequences of proliferation, “political relativism,” the idea that the problem is not so much nuclear weapons as the states that possess them.15 This position is in sharp contradiction with the disarmament provisions in the NPT, but also somewhat in disagreement with the non-proliferation grammar—the idea that every additional nuclearization is bad. These inconsistencies weaken the public position of NWS: they are increasingly perceived as following egoistically their national interest to the detriment of the common good. This resentment is worsened by the fact that NWS pursue policies outside the regime that aggravate the existing discrimination between “haves” and “have-nots,” especially export controls and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The gap between a widely accepted norm and a deficient regime can be interpreted as a source of symbolic violence. This normative battle provides the setting for two paths that can lead to increased international tensions through patterns of struggle for recognition. The first one happens when a state will respect the norm but refuse to comply with regime provisions because it feels that these violate its sovereignty. Here, the nuclear abstention norm can be superseded by considerations about sovereignty: a state may have no nuclear weapons but nevertheless be reluctant to dissipate suspicions because swift compliance with the regime would be seen as humiliating and detrimental to national independence. In extreme consequences, a state might even prefer to refuse to acknowledge that it has no nuclear weapons in

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 176

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  177 front of international pressure because to do so would be equated with a loss of face. This reluctance to cooperate in the face of external pressure can lead to a spiral of suspicion and resentment. The second path happens when states, or groups inside states, feel that they suffer from recognition-denial because of the non-proliferation regime and therefore come to consider nuclearization as a tool for national affirmation, a way to redress the inequality inherent in the regime, or at least a way to gain international attention.

Heavy Words Are So Lightly Thrown: Proliferation Suspicions and National Pride As noted earlier, nuclear abstention is an individual prescription states feel is legitimate to respect, whereas the non-proliferation regime presents itself as a cooperation device designed to tackle agency problems like free-riding. Hence, a state may consider that the verification and monitoring provisions included in the regime are superfluous, or even that the regime itself is pointless because even in its absence, states would respect a norm that has been widely internalized. According to the NAM line, the IAEA should ideally be an institution dedicated mainly to assistance, its original mission, rather than to verification. States advocating a tougher line on proliferation and monitoring institutions hold the opposite view and promote a strengthening of verification provisions and safeguards to combat nuclear trafficking. The underlying logic is that, if a state has nothing to hide, it will have no difficulty cooperating with international monitoring agencies and will easily accept inspections on its soil. However, the historical record reveals that this is not that simple, with several cases of states suspected as proliferators actually having no intention to build nuclear weapons and no functioning program underway. Unwillingness to comply with verification provisions of the non-proliferation regime when a state is not trying to violate the non-nuclearization norm cannot easily be explained by power or security considerations. In order to fully understand this apparent enigma, one has to concentrate on patterns of recognition-denial and face-saving. Verification provisions are among the most wildly discussed, with some states considering them insufficient and others finding them already too intrusive and in contradiction with NPT’s article IV. This debate about rules and procedures has for a long time been one of the most acrimonious within the non-proliferation regime and may explain why some states prefer to stay outside or on the margins of it. A state may refuse to adhere to the NPT because it does not want any infringement on its sovereignty, because it is reluctant to have its sites visited by foreign inspectors at any time, or because it considers the ability to engage in whatever activity it likes its right. A state may also ratify the NPT hoping to benefit from article IV’s provisions on free access to nuclear technology, but then ultimately feel frustrated by the balance between verification and assistance. It is therefore possible to refuse monitoring of nuclear activities while harboring no real military intentions. On the surface, ­however,

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 177

4/18/11 12:36 PM

178  ✻  Alexandre Hummel this attitude is difficult to distinguish from covered proliferation, in which a state will deny having nuclear intentions at least until it has a well-advanced enough program to intimidate other states. Here again, the discrepancy between norm and regime can lead to tension, suspicion, and ultimately, conflict. Argentina is a good example of a state that has been unduly suspected of proliferation. The country was for more than twenty years, together with its neighbor Brazil, on the “usual suspects” list of proliferators. The situation indeed appeared like a possible textbook-case of proliferation, with two rival regional powers seeking sensible materials and technologies outside of the non-proliferation regime. Argentina’s acquisition of natural uranium-fueled reactors aroused suspicion, as these were known to be less cost-efficient but to produce more plutonium than concurrent devices. Clandestine research on uranium enrichment also caused concern. The 1990 agreement between Buenos Aires and Brasilia, and the subsequent ratification of the NPT and the Tlatelolco treaty on the Latin America NWFZ by both countries, were therefore generally saluted as successes of non-proliferation.16 As it appeared, two states of concern were finally joining the non-proliferation regime, sending a clear signal to other states still outside of it. However, the most recent research on the Argentinean nuclear program reveals the absence of any coherent scheme to build a nuclear weapon. The country’s only military research in the nuclear field was conduced on submarine propulsion, and no nuclear bomb program was launched. Argentina’s attitude is described by Jacques Hymans as a typical example of “sportsmanlike nationalism” where leaders will be very sensitive to national rights and autonomy while not seriously considering equipping themselves with a nuclear force.17 In this perspective, states will value their self-image over the potential benefits of joining the non-proliferation regime. According to a former Atomic Energy Commission head, Argentina’s leaders refused to consider signing the NPT at the time of its inception—a move that would have been profitable to the national nuclear industry—because they felt this would mean a “diminution of [their] dignity.”18 Non-proliferation pressures in this context therefore have the potential to backfire, pushing the suspected state even further toward nuclear ambiguity, since clarification and pure compliance could be understood to mean a loss of face. The whole “carrot-and-sticks” approach to non-proliferation often privileged by Western experts can thus be considered humiliating by a state with a strong sense of national pride. Although states staying outside the NPT or other arms-control regimes may arouse suspicion, they cannot be accused of violating international law and obviously cannot face sanctions in this respect. Their case is therefore somewhat less problematic than the one of states that are parties to various treaties but do not fully comply with the verification and monitoring obligations to which they have voluntarily agreed. The reluctance of these states to accept inspections may of course be explained by the fact that they harbor clandestine activities. However, there is at least one prominent example of a state refusing to fully cooperate with international inspectors while having no prohibited activities under way: Iraq, during the lead-up to the 2003 war. The unwillingness of Saddam Hussein’s regime to swiftly accept extensive inspections

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 178

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  179 and provide a comprehensive clarification about its activities linked to WMD was one of the main arguments of those militating for a tough line toward Iraq. According to the logic, if Iraq really had nothing to hide, it would quickly have complied with non-proliferation when asked to do so. With such an approach in mind, Iraq’s half-hearted cooperation with inspection teams could only be interpreted as a sign that the country clandestinely owned WMD or was secretly seeking them. Iraqi proclamations of good faith and willingness to cooperate were dismissed as pure hypocrisy, a tactic designed to slow down the inspection process and foster division in the international community. Ultimately, Iraq’s alleged failure to comply was taken as the main argument in support of the invasion. In the absence of first-hand source material, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about what exactly provoked Iraqi reluctance to fully cooperate and dismiss doubts about suspect activities. We can nevertheless assume that Saddam Hussein’s attitude was not driven by security considerations, as it clearly was in Iraq’s national interest to cooperate. Rapid disclosure of information and full acceptance of inspections would not have avoided the invasion with certainty, but it would at least have deprived the US administration of a potent argument and thus weakened support for a war that was already divisive. The only coherent power-based explanation is that Iraq wanted to maintain some doubt on its WMD capacities in order to benefit from existential deterrence, but this makes little sense since the United States was publicly committed to going to war because Iraq was suspected to have WMD.19 Existential deterrence is something one tries to obtain before a threat surfaces; it makes no sense to seek it when one is already targeted, with the main casus belli being precisely this quest for a deterrent. We therefore need to look at the symbolic side of the story to try to find some logic behind the events. In his personal account of the 2002 to 2003 events, Hans Blix frequently insists on the absolute necessity for inspection teams to avoid humiliating the Iraqis when making requests for access and information. He shows that cooperation was more easily obtained when demands where formulated in a respectful, diplomatic manner preserving at least the appearance of Iraqi sovereignty.20 For example, the fact that aerial surveillance of Iraqi sites was to be conducted not only by American planes but also by French and Russian aircrafts helped to gain acceptance of the overflights.21 Inspectors also acceded to an Iraqi demand not to publish any pictures from the destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles.22 Although Blix never clearly says that Iraq could simply not openly give in to international and American pressure or admit that its efforts toward WMD were inconclusive because this would mean a loss of face, the idea is suggested in his book.23 This idea also appears in the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) findings.24 We can assume that, in the case of pure and simple submission, Saddam Hussein’s image as a ruthless, charismatic, and independent leader would have been badly damaged, especially inside the Iraqi and Arab opinion. Acrimonious words and deeds on both sides also rendered the issue very emotional, thereby making a cold-blooded assessment of the situation impossible. The Iraqi leader could well have decided that it was

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 179

4/18/11 12:36 PM

180  ✻  Alexandre Hummel better and more honorable to lose a war than to simply cede to US pressure. This does not necessarily mean that recognition-denial and face-saving played a decisive role during the crisis, but the hypothesis at least deserves attention until further primary material surfaces. States can therefore refuse to be fully transparent regarding their nuclear record for reasons other than just a willingness to hide a secret program and cheat on the international non-proliferation regime. Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation advocates often fail to take this possibility into account, thus creating spirals of suspicion and hostility. Another negative effect of the regime is that a state may resent its perceived unfairness to such a point that it considers defying the non-nuclearization norm as a way to seek redress and self-affirmation.

Catch Me If You Can: Nuclearization and Self-Image While a vast majority of states at least pay lip service to the non-nuclearization norm, some may embark on exactly the opposite course, emphasizing the acquisition of a nuclear force as not only a security or power benefit but also as a way to foster national assertiveness and to speak on an equal footing with great powers. Because perceptions of recognition-denial are essentially inter-subjective, it is possible to have at the same time a vast majority of states affirming their identities by respecting the non-nuclearization norm and a minority deciding that they have to build a nuclear weapons option for exactly the same reason. It is a pervasive myth of international politics that possession of nuclear weapons is a key criterion to becoming a true great power, despite the fact that they are useless to obtaining actual gains.25 In fact, possession of nuclear weapons seems to be more a result than a cause of great power status, but this rough conjunction can nevertheless exacerbate some states’ desire for a national deterrent. In this case, nuclear weapons are valued more as an end in themselves than as a foreign policy asset. Morgenthau cites nuclear tests as one prominent example of the “policy of prestige” when one state will boast its military capability or its economic might in order to impress its neighbors and rivals and to obtain recognition.26 He is careful to note that prestige should not automatically be equated with a frivolous demonstration of force; some leaders may conclude that, for various reasons, they imperiously need to resort to the policy of prestige or at least demonstrate some force.27 In the case of nuclear-weapons acquisition, states may be eager to display their technological abilities and their willingness to play a major role in international politics by mastering the most formidable “absolute” weapon. Reflecting on France’s acquisition of a nuclear force, Raymond Aron noted that this move had far more to do with considerations about statehood and sovereignty than with national security.28 States with a strong tendency toward exceptionalism are particularly sensible to this status-through-nuclearization logic because they are ready to see themselves as a particular case in the international crowd and may therefore feel legitimate in derogating to the non-nuclearization norm while acknowledging that

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 180

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  181 general proliferation would certainly be a bad thing. The discrimination inherent in the international regime may thus encourage the existing tendencies of some states to see themselves as above others, or at least as apart from them. Building nuclear weapons and joining the so-called nuclear “club” can be a clear way to demonstrate assertiveness even though—and indeed just because—this means defying the international regime and a widely accepted norm. This leads to a paradoxical effect of the non-proliferation regime that can, in some cases, contribute to proliferation instead of stopping it. The inconsistencies of non-proliferation also exacerbate the tendency of some states to cherish national pride and independence above observance of international norms. Individuals and groups who are very sensible to their country’s perceived position in the world or to moral conceptions of international justice may conclude that the regime is a source of symbolic violence because of its inequity and the duplicity of NWS, particularly if they think that their country should enjoy a privileged position similar to the one granted to these five great powers. This can lead them to consider that nuclear abstention, although possibly valuable in itself, should not be pursued because this would mean acquiescing to the humiliating non-proliferation structure. Acquisition of a nuclear force, or at least of a nuclear capacity, can therefore take on a very significant symbolic and emotional dimension where nuclearization is equated with the rejection of an unfair international structure and of a junior position in international politics. India is the main example of such a course among states equipped with nuclear weapons. India’s nuclearization is the longest of all states, with a twenty-four-year interval between their first nuclear explosion (1974) and ultimate nuclear testing with the acknowledged possession of weapons (1998). This peculiar course cannot be explained through security and power considerations alone, since these would suggest a far quicker process. As much as a progression toward the bomb, India’s complicated story with nuclear weapons can be interpreted as a succession of decisions not to cross the threshold of nuclear possession. Confronted with intense domestic pressure in favor of the bomb, Indian leaders refrained first from building nuclear weapons and then from deploying them.29 Moral considerations seem to have played an important part in this process, pushing alternately toward both nuclearization and restraint. There is a true tendency to reject WMD all the way in India that dates back to Nehru. India’s first prime minister, who genuinely abhorred nuclear weapons, never publicly considered the option of building them and was one of the first voices to call for a test-ban treaty in 1954.30 India was a strong supporter of arms control and disarmament with a clear willingness to act as a global voice for peace and justice in international forums. While internal developments may have been more ambiguous, India maintained its official stance throughout the 1960s: nuclear weapons were bad, deterrence could not be trusted, and the only ultimate solution was to stop and then curb the arms race. This position was maintained despite defeat against China in 1962 and the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, as Indian leaders refused to rush to the bomb, choosing instead to develop only an option.31

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 181

4/18/11 12:36 PM

182  ✻  Alexandre Hummel Ultimately, India’s alternative conception of arms control failed as a large group of states, including some non-aligned ones, sided with the conception promoted by the superpowers—discrimination between NWS and NNWS—in exchange for some concessions on ultimate disarmament. India refused to sign the treaty. The non-proliferation debate had a great resonance inside India’s strategic elite, leading to some resentment against the great powers and a strong feeling of injustice.32 Frustration did not provoke nuclear ambitions, as these clearly predate the NPT, but it undoubtedly strengthened the position of those who were militating in favor of the acquisition of a nuclear military capability.33 The growing rift between India, the international regime, and the United States ultimately led to the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion.” By using this terminology and refraining from building weapons, India wanted to signal its refusal to obey a rule perceived as unfair while also re-affirming its Nehruvian abhorrence toward WMD. The country stayed on this line at least until the 1980s when nuclear weapons were finally built but, at first, not deployed.34 Ultimately, it was again after a heated arms-control debate, the one on CTBT, that India definitely crossed the threshold of open nuclear weapons possession in 1998.35 This does not mean that India’s nuclearization can unambiguously be described as a reaction to recognition-denial. India’s attitude in the international discussions about arms control has frequently displayed characteristics of what Stephen Krasner calls “organized hypocrisy,” when a state will claim to adhere to a consensual but ambiguous norm while actually behaving egoistically in terms of national interests.36 The perceived unfairness of non-proliferation has often been exploited as a pretext, and its imperfections do not automatically lead to the conclusion that nuclearization should be pursued. Nevertheless, it would be equally erroneous to refuse to take into consideration the emotional and symbolical dimension of India’s eventual nuclearization. Normative frustration at least provided bomb supporters with a potent argument to convince their counterparts that India needed a nuclear force even though the weapons were inherently bad. Recognition-denial may well have been instrumentalized, but this does not mean that it has no analytical validity, quite the contrary: if feelings about unfairness are so strong that they can be mobilized to provoke a change of course, their presence stands as a decisive variable to explain variations in national policy. An exceptionalist state like India that claims an elevated self-image will feel humiliated if, in return, it gets only a regular position as a minor player among others. The perceived insult is magnified in the case of non-proliferation by the fact that some states benefit from the favored position that India is denied. Indeed, some in India have advocated inclusion in the nuclear club, and there are reasons to think that, if this would be granted, India’s critique of the regime would become milder.37 This collision between non-nuclearization and non-proliferation leading to nuclearization by defiance can be considered the most extreme case of a general pattern in which states will play along with a non-proliferation regime they resent for reasons linked to recognition-denial. The case of states that at least tacitly back suspected proliferators in international arenas because they are equally or more fed-up with the counter-proliferation policies of Western NWS is a typical example. This mounting

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 182

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  183 defiance and the subsequent difficulty to even agree on an agenda on arms control have led the NWS to accentuate their tendency to act outside of the regime to combat proliferation. This, in turn, accentuates the NNWS’ normative frustration leading to a perverse spiral further blocking any international agreement on arms control. Another case of regime defiance is when a state will toy with nuclearization in order to gain attention and obtain the right to speak on a bilateral footing with great powers. Nuclear aspirations in North Korea have led to the setting up of a specific diplomatic mechanism involving all the major powers in the region and dedicated only to this matter. In addition, a direct negotiation channel between Pyongyang and Washington has also been opened. Through these diplomatic contacts, North Korea has been able to exert notable concessions and even ridicule the great powers on several occasions while escaping strong punishment. This contrasts favorably with the country’s very limited material capabilities. In this case, the use of nuclear capacities as a bargaining chip through a form of blackmail has improved North Korea’s position, especially if one takes into account the overall dire situation of the country. Another case were nuclear intentions have won some bargaining leverage is Libya, a state that, in 2003, was able to exchange the end of its little-advanced nuclear program and other WMD activities against re-integration inside the international community. Like North Korea, Libya was granted a special status and negotiated directly with great powers before complying fully with IAEA safeguards and other verification provisions. Both cases were therefore settled mainly outside of the different arms-control regimes. As Hans Blix wrote, “Demands for recognition seem to be an important motive. Recognition and status may be important to governments that, for various reasons, have been isolated: for example, Libya, North Korea and Iran.”38 In this respect, it is interesting to note that Teheran has long demanded recognition by the United States and the opening of high-level bilateral talks.

Conclusion This chapter does not claim that all proliferation-related crises are linked to struggles for recognition nor even than most of them are. Material considerations obviously play an important role in states’ nuclear choices. More modestly, I aim to point to a somewhat neglected dimension of the (non-) proliferation debate—its emotional and symbolic dimensions. Demands about disarmament and technological assistance are too easily dismissed as demagogy. There is evidence that a good portion of the international crowd feels genuinely hurt by ambiguities and inconsistencies in the non-proliferation regime, most of them being linked to the behavior of NWS. Immediate nuclear disarmament and free access to technology certainly are utopia and propaganda themes, but abrupt refusal to even take these highly symbolical issues into consideration appears to have significantly damaged the legitimacy of the powers that promote a tougher line on non-proliferation. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, an Arab state and close US ally, Egypt, was the most virulent critic of

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 183

4/18/11 12:36 PM

184  ✻  Alexandre Hummel the NWS position, heavily contributing to the failure of the whole meeting. Cairo was thus acting as a tacit ally of Iran. In this normative context, a strictly applied non-proliferation regime has a clear potential to backfire in the most problematic cases, which it is actually supposed to solve. There are, consequently, reasons to think that its presence leads to more international tension than what would exist with the simple individual observance of the non-nuclearization norm. This leads to the conclusion that the regime is ineffective, albeit not for the reason its detractors usually invoke—its inefficiency to prevent cheating by proliferators—but rather because the focus on cheating and excessive suspicion may look like an offense to some states and like an incitement to proliferate to others.

Notes 1. Nuclear Threat Initiative 2004. 2. Frankel and Cohen 1991, 201ff. 3. This is one of the elements in what T. V. Paul calls “prudential realism.” See Paul 2000, 232ff. 4. Feaver, and Niou 1996, 209–233. 5. This tentative nuclear abstention norm must be carefully distinguished from the far more established nuclear taboo norm. According to Nina Tannenwald, the taboo stigmatizes nuclear weapons use but not detention, and its impact on nuclearization choices by states is only consequential: if the taboo is so strong that no nuclear use can be considered, then deterrence will lose any credibility and nuclear weapons possession will be useless. However, this is still a remote possibility in Tannenwald’s taboo perspective. See Tannenwald 2007, 472ff. 6. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891–905. 7. For this abstinence perspective, see Paul 1995, 356ff. 8. In a similar vein, Legro has demonstrated that decisions by states to escalate or not to escalate accidents involving submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare during World War II were best explained as individual decisions consisting of a confrontation between norm and identity—in this case military culture—rather than by traditional rationalist and internationalist explanations. See Legro 1997, 31–63. 9. For accounts of the 2005 Review Conference, see Müller 2005, 33–44; Sauer 2006, 333–340. 10. On symbols of condensation, see Edelman 1985, 117–124. 11. Albin 2001, 282ff. 12. Sagan 2004, 77. 13. Waltz 2003, 3–45. 14. Feaver 1992, 160–87; Sagan 2003, 46–87. 15. Lavoy 1995, 695–753. 16. For an overview on Argentina and Brazil up to 1990, see Reiss 1995, 45–88. 17. Hymans 2006, 141–170. 18. Interview with Admiral Oscar Quihillalt in ibid., 144–145. 19. Existential deterrence is a version of minimum deterrence in which the slightest doubt of its nuclear capabilities could offer a state a degree of protection. See Bundy 1988, 735ff.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 184

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  185 The Iraq Survey Group report claims that Saddam Hussein held such a view. See Iraq Survey Group 2004. 20. Blix 2004, 285ff. I am indebted to Thomas Lindemann for this bibliographical suggestion. 21. “It was as if the humiliation was diminished when the presence of U.S. planes would be diluted by planes from less hostile countries.” Ibid., 120–122. 22. “The Iraqi side asked us in Baghdad not to publish pictures of the operation, saying it was painful to them. This might have been true. There was certainly a pride that they had succeeded in designing and producing these missiles and a corresponding pain in destroying them. Conceivably this could contain a clue as to why the Iraqis chose to destroy biological and chemical weapons without inspectors present, as they claimed. They might have felt it hurt their pride.” Ibid., 189. 23. Blix first evocates this explanation in an interrogative manner: “Now that we feel nearly certain that there were no weapons to hide in Iraq, the explanations for the Iraqi reluctance on the two categories of violations, as on many others, must be sought elsewhere than in a wish to hide weapons. At the time when we encountered and reported on the reluctance, it undoubtedly hurt the claim of the Iraqis that they were providing immediate cooperation. Why where they reluctant in these matters? Self-respect? Pride?” Ibid., 151. Later in the book, he is a bit more affirmative, citing the face-saving hypothesis among “elements [that] may have been relevant.” “A sense of humiliation might have led the Iraqis to balk at giving the inspectors access in some cases, especially to various sites they associated with the sovereignty of their country.” Ibid., 265. 24. “[Saddam Hussein] sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face.” Iraq Survey Group 2004, 1. Emphasis added. “In the late 1990s, Saddam [sic.] realized he had no WMD capabilities but his ego prevented him from publicly acknowledging that the Iraqi WMD program was ineffective, according to the former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research Humam ‘Abd-al-Khaliq ‘Abd-al-Ghafur.,” Ibid., 35. Emphasis added. Despite these few twists toward an emotional analysis of Saddam Hussein’s behavior, the ISG report generally sticks to the deception thesis and does not investigate in detail the reasons for the failure of Saddam Hussein to find an optimal balance between national security, the lifting of sanctions, and the preservation of a WMD capacity. It concludes that Iraq’s chief objective was to have sanctions lifted and then only to maintain as much WMD capabilities as possible. Although this appraisal can coherently explain Iraq’s attitude up to 2002, it clearly does not stand against the record of the 2002/2003 events when the country was threatened with immediate war. According to the ISG report, Saddam’s attitude during this period was plagued by “miscalculation” and “poor decisions,” but the reasons for these errors are not thoroughly discussed. Ibid., 61. 25. Betts 1987, 240ff; Jervis 1989, 266ff. 26. Morgenthau 2006, 89–90. 27. Ibid., 90–93. 28. Aron 2004, 613–615. 29. Hymans 2006, 171–203. 30. Perkovich 1999, 13–59. 31. Ibid., 60–85.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 185

4/18/11 12:36 PM

186  ✻  Alexandre Hummel 32. Ibid., 133–145; Frey 2004, 293–297. 33. Frey writes that, “The negotiations on the NPT in the mid-1960s thus had the paradox effect of further fuelling India’s nuclear program rather than limiting nuclear proliferation.” Ibid., 293–94. 34. Ganguly and Hagerty 2006, 223ff. 35. Frey 2004, 324–347. 36. Krasner 1999, 248ff. 37. COMP: keep 1 line for this fn 38. Blix 2008, 49.

Bibliography Albin, Cecilia. 2001. Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aron, Raymond. 2004. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. New York: Brookings Institution Press. Blix, Hans. 2005. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. London: Bloomsbury. ———. 2008. Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters. Cambridge: MIT Press. Bundy, George. 1988. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House. Edelman, Murray. 1985. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. University of Illinois Press. Feaver, Peter D. 1992. “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations.” International Security 17 (3): 160–187. Feaver, Peter D., and Emerson M. S. Niou. 1996. “Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?” International Studies Quarterly 40 (2): 209–233. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4). Frankel, Benjamin, and Avner Cohen, eds. 1991. Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications. London: Routledge. Frey, Karsten. 2004. “Elite Perception and Biased Strategic Policy Making: The Case of India’s Nuclear Build-up.” Inaugural Dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. Ganguly, Sumit, and Devin T. Hagerty. 2006. Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2006. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Iraq Survey Group. 2004. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Volume 1.” http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf. Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lavoy, Peter R. 1995. “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation.” Security Studies 4 (4): 695–753.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 186

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Proliferation Crises  ✻  187 Legro, Jeffrey W. 1997. “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism.” International Organization 51 (1): 31–63. Morgenthau, Hans J. 2006. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill. Müller, Harald. 2005. “A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference.” International Spectator 40 (3). Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2004. “UN Resolution 1540.” http://www.nti.org/db/1540/index .html. Paul, T. V. 2000. Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Perkovich, George. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reiss, Mitchell. 1995. Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sagan, Scott D. 2003. “The Perils of Proliferation.” In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, edited by Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, 46–87. New York: W. W. Norton. ———. 2004. “Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, edited by Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sauer, Tom. 2006. “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Crisis.” Peace Review 18 (3). Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1981) 2003. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, edited by Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, 3–45. New York: W. W. Norton.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 187

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 188

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Ch apt e r 10

Recognizing the Enemy Terrorism as Symbolic Violence Andreas Behnke

Terror and the Problem of Meaning The purpose of this chapter is to return again to the question of meaning in al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts. It will focus on the “Event” of 9/11 as the paradigmatic example of such violence, but the argument is also relevant in a wider context of al-Qaeda-sponsored violence in London, Madrid, and other places.1 To put the matter simply: What sense does it make to fly planes into buildings? What possible political purpose can such an act have? This puzzle has occupied scholars for the last eight years now, and the answers vary significantly. To return to this question in this essay and to add to the list of explanations is justified by the conviction that a distinctive, so far over-looked social mechanism is at play in this act. We need, this essay argues, to recognize the role of recognition in al-Qaeda’s actions. More precisely, we need to understand alQaeda’s desire to become recognized as a political, indeed quasi-sovereign, rather than criminal actor in the global system. Indeed, as will be argued, it is the extraordinary level of violence, the sublime and horrific nature of its attacks that lead to this interpretation. In this interpretation, 9/11 was an aesthetic act; that is, an act that finished “in the explosive brilliance [éclat] of the beautiful and sublime, that doubled rivalry for sovereignty.”2 Hence, rather than making the act incomprehensible and utterly meaningless, the horrendous nature of the act in fact gives it meaning. 189

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 189

4/18/11 12:36 PM

190  ✻  Andreas Behnke The assessment of 9/11 as inherently (an sich) meaningless, as an act of pure violence without any purpose beyond itself, relies on interpretations of political order that cannot account for the violence involved in the contestation over, and the foundation of, such order.3 Given this truncated notion of the political, scholars such as Michael Ignatieff or Wolfgang Sofsky have to deduce the meaning(-lessness) of the act from the act itself and its horrendous characteristics. Thus, for Ignatieff, [w]hat we are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of their means—the indifference to human costs—takes their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out of the realm of war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their goals makes it absurd to believe they are making political demands at all. They are seeking the violent transformation of an irremediably sinful and unjust world. Terror does not express a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give ultimate meaning to time and history through ever escalating acts of violence, which culminate in a final battle between good and evil. People serving such exalted goals are not interested in mere politics.4

And in Sofsky’s words, “The terror campaign [Terrorkrieg] . . . aims at killing people in large numbers, wants to create a scare, to paralyze life through fear.”5 Therefore, a “political aim could not be discerned. The attack meant nothing, it was an act of destruction without a deeper meaning [Hintersinn].”6 And finally, “what excites the spectator is the violence itself. It repulses, frightens, entices, and enthrals.” 7 As Hans Kippenberg has observed, such an argument can only declare the (political) irrationality of the act and thus ends up in a mere aesthetics of horror.8 This point, however, deserves closer scrutiny. What is most interesting about both Ignatieff’s and Sofsky’s statements is that the initial declaration of the meaninglessness of 9/11 ends up bestowing a particular meaning upon the act. For Ignatieff, the act is aestheticized and exalted within a Manichean metaphysics. For Sofsky too, 9/11, due to its excessive violence, becomes a purely aesthetic performance. For both authors, therefore, 9/11 remains outside the realm of politics, as it does not reflect or express any instrumental rationality. In both cases, the aesthetic, the sublime, and the horrible are defined in opposition to the political. The acts are actually not meaningless at all; rather, their meaning cannot be reconciled with the authors’ respective notions of the political. This essay will not contest the aesthetic or sublime nature of 9/11. What it takes issue with is the distinction, indeed opposition, between the realm of aesthetics and the realm of the political that scholars like Ignatieff and Sofsky employ in order to condemn the event as politically irrational and hence irrelevant. As will be demonstrated, this distinction is both ontologically unstable and analytically unproductive, as it elides the crucial role of the sublime in the constitution of sovereign agency. If we take sovereignty to be a contested concept, not only in terms of its meaning but also regarding its status as a political objective for different groups, we need to be able to account for the processes involved in claiming and recognizing it. By ostracizing the aesthetic and sublime from the horizon of the political, Ignatieff and Sofsky in effect reify sovereignty and define the contest for sovereignty as irrational and meaningless.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 190

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  191 Other researchers have offered different interpretations of 9/11 that try to reconcile the extra-ordinary level of violence with a political purpose. Rather than focusing on the pure phenomenology of the act itself, these interpretations consider the symbolic nature of the Event. In Jennifer Bajorek’s words, Terrorism, before it is an act, is a calculation, on the basis of future traces, in anticipation of how traces yet to be made will someday be read. As such it is more than casually bound up with the complex movements of textuality on both sides—on the side . . . of both the sender and the receiver of the message.9

Some “post-modern” interpretations turn 9/11 into a sign of the aporias of modernity. For Jean Baudrillard, the attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York become a symbol of a generalized mode of resistance of the singular, of distinctive cultural and social identities against globalization and its “generalized system of exchange.” Faced with a monopolized world, and power consolidated within a technocratic machine and the dogma of globalization, terrorism is the only viable form of resistance.10 As such, the terror of globalization meets the globalization of terror. 9/11 is, therefore, the viral, “almost automatic” response to the very operation of the global system. It cannot be explained by reference to Islamic ideology, as such conceptual boundaries miss the pervasive nature of terrorism. “The globe itself is resistant to globalization.”11 While Baudrillard identifies 9/11 as a viral response of the particular or “singular” against the discipline and order of globalization, Slavoj Žižek sees the event rather as an expression of the modern “passion for the Real.” The Real is opposed to the plurality and contingency of everyday social reality. Violence then is the price to be paid “for peeling off the deceptive layers of reality” and to reveal the true, unified, and foundational Truth of the Real. Twentieth-century ideologies, from Nazism to Stalinism to the radical movements of the Left in the 1960s and 1970s, competed for the definition, and the realization of the Real through radical, indeed terrorist actions. This then, according to Žižek, indicates the fundamental paradox of the “passion for the Real”: “it culminates in its apparent opposite, in a theatrical spectacle—from the Stalinist show trials to spectacular terrorist acts. [The] passion for the Real ends up in the pure semblance of the spectacular effect of the Real.”12 While their respective perspectives differ, both Žižek and Baudrillard appropriate the Event of 9/11 by subsuming it into a systemic logic of which 9/11 becomes but one instance or one case. Its apparently singular and exceptional nature becomes qualified and limited as the expression of a general principle.13 For Baudrillard, it becomes the instantiation of a general resistance to the modern project of globalization, while in Žižek’s interpretation, it appears as the expression of the modern universalist project. Moreover, and most significantly for the purpose of this essay, in both cases, political agency vanishes from the analysis. If we compare the radical interpretations of Baudrillard and Žižek to the explanations offered by Ignatieff and Sofsky, it becomes apparent that they share a

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 191

4/18/11 12:36 PM

192  ✻  Andreas Behnke commonality. Both camps dissolve the aporia of the Event in favor of one structural principle. For the latter camp, the tension between singularity and appropriation is resolved in favor of the former, with 9/11 defined by its singular meaninglessness. For Baudrillard and Žižek on the other hand, the tension is decided in favor of the latter. Neither side is therefore willing to recognize the monstrosity of the Event, its ineluctable suspension between appropriation and “unappropriability,” between political purpose (be it resistance or revelation) and the experience of the sublime. In neither case does the Event become productive, its constitutive potential absorbed either by insulating the political against the aesthetic and the sublime, or by folding the latter into a modernist radical political agenda.14 Between these two extremes we can locate approaches that focus in a variety of ways on the role of social mechanisms related to recognition in international politics.15

The Problem of Recognition and Violence: A Hegelian Turn Approaches focusing on recognition have produced a number of fascinating insights into the social grammar of 9/11. For Paul Saurette, the Event of 9/11 can be understood as an attempt by al-Qaeda to humiliate the United States and thereby to “discipline the humiliated party’s behaviour.”16 Reinhard Wolf offers a complementary analysis to Saurette’s “theory of humiliation.” For him, acts like 9/11 can be understood as attempts to gain respect for al-Qaeda, and for the Islamic community. The focus of his analysis is therefore less the effects the attacks had on the United States, and more on the increased reputation and respect for al-Qaeda as an organization that “showed it” to the United States.17 However, both Saurette and Wolf seem to rely in their respective analyses on an ontologically given subject that is either denied (through humiliation) or granted (through respect) what is duly his. Humiliation and respect are therefore secondary and regulatory processes that affect the behavior of ontologically given subjects. In order to function, both humiliation and respect presuppose the status and standing of the subject as subject. Yet, as philosophers and political theorists have argued, recognition does not only influence the conduct of given actors, it also constitutes and establishes their status. In the international system, one theory at least holds that a state is only a state if it is recognized as such by the international community.18 Recognition is therefore not only a regulative but also a constitutive mechanism through which the subject comes into being. Drawing on Fichte, Hegel, and Schmitt, Tarik Kochi develops an “ethics of recognition” that accounts for such a constitutive role. Moreover, and equally significantly, he demonstrates the inherent relationship between recognition and violence and exclusion. In doing so, he outlines an approach within which the Event of 9/11 can be understood as the enactment of a radical claim to sovereignty. Kochi draws on Hegel’s account of the constitution of the self through the delineation of the other. The starting point for this philosophical investigation is the question of how the self

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 192

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  193 can be certain “that what it intuits as itself (the ‘I’) is actually itself and not, in fact something other?”19 The establishment of the “I” is accomplished by distinguishing it from what it is not, from the “not-I,” or the other.20 Knowledge of the self therefore proceeds through knowledge of the other. Through the experience of the non-self and its qualities, the self reflectively acquires knowledge of itself. Being is therefore always mediated being, the knowing subject and the known object are constituted together, the “I”s act of thinking is always an act of mediation with its self and with its other.21 For Hegel, it becomes important to emphasize, contra Fichte—for whom this process takes place only on the mental or cognitive level—that the delineation of the self from its other entails material and physical consequences.22 It involves “harm, destruction, killing, violence.”23 To set yourself apart, to differentiate yourself from what you do not want or desire to be, is therefore violent on the ontological as well as ontic level. The mediated and therefore always “plural” nature of the self puts recognition at the center of its successful constitution.24 A successful moment of recognition is accomplished when “each self recognizes itself as mutually recognizing the other.”25 What is recognized is not just the other as such, but the other in the self, the necessity of the other in the differential constitution of the self. “Recognition involves an affirmation by the self that a necessary and essential element of itself resides in the other and the relation of mediation with it.”26 While Kochi identifies the sources of a regulative and pacifying role for recognition in this successful moment of recognition, for the purpose of this essay, it is imperative to recall the inherent relationship between recognition and violence.27 For Hegel, war plays a productive role in the international system. War in his view produces and re-affirms the ethical-political community that organizes itself within a state.28 As Kochi elaborates, Hegel can be read as developing “an account of an ethics of exclusion.”29 A state constitutes the condition of possibility for such a community, as within a state it becomes possible to create and sustain a set of shared norms, ethics, and customs within a defined territory. War in this view becomes the affirmation of such a community, expressed in the willingness to “put it on the line” and fight for its (continued) existence. The higher significance of war is that, through its agency, . . . the ethical health of nations is preserved in their indifference towards the permanence of finite determinacies, just as the movement of the wind preserves the sea from the stagnation which lasting calm would produce—a stagnation which a lasting, not to say perpetual, peace would also produce among nations.30

As Steven Smith emphasizes, “these passages should not be taken as glorifying war. They are more an argument about what is, conceptually speaking involved in statehood” and thus, in sovereignty.31 War makes states, as much as states make war. In war, the state-sovereign asserts himself in a duel between equals. War can only be declared by, and conducted between, sovereign entities. Warfare, therefore, contains an element of recognition within it. It is not an exercise in pure violence, but conducted according to rules that recognize the sovereign equality of the opponent.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 193

4/18/11 12:36 PM

194  ✻  Andreas Behnke The situation becomes more complicated if we introduce the Partisan. In order to conceptually accommodate the violence this non-state actor brings into the international society, Kochi suggests expanding the concept of war to include not only conflict between sovereigns but also conflict about sovereignty. For, as Schmitt reminds us, the Partisan is a political, rather than a criminal actor; his purpose is not personal enrichment, but the establishment of a new, different public order. These partisans are completely modern, they view their acts of violence as that which will destroy an old legal order and through which a new order will emerge: they wish to posit, raise up and create a new human order through action, and if necessary, through violence.32

One might add that in the contest for sovereignty, violence is the only available mode. For the Partisan, the distinction between legal and political violence is irrelevant. The Partisan exposes that all sovereign and therefore legitimate power rests on political violence. Many, if not all, political orders have been founded, and maintained themselves, through terror in its different guises. Legal violence, the law itself, is in this view a “glorified, mystified, and fetishized form of political violence.”33 The designation and de-legitimization of certain forms of violence as “terrorism” draws on and reproduces such a “naturalization” of law. The foundation of law in political violence “is made in order to hide it; by its essence, it tends to organize amnesia, sometimes under the celebration and sublimation of the grand beginnings.”34 In order to appear legitimate, law needs to hide its own foundations in violence and present itself as self-immanent, as emerging from itself. Confronted with the Sublime, with the violent or the irrational out of which it itself emerged and yet which it can no longer acknowledge, the modern (Western) state becomes violent, even terrorist again in order to destroy it.35 If we reject the mystification and fetishization that produces the semblance of self-immanence of the sovereign, we can expand the definition of war as a general act of political violence, and consider “terrorism” to be a more specific strategy of violence.36 Yet while Kochi considers “terrorism” to be the equivalent to “non-sovereign” war and thus maintains a residue of the reification of sovereignty that his argument seeks to deconstruct, for the purpose of this essay, “terror” shall be considered the hyper-realization of war and thus, of sovereignty. We can find support for this conceptualization in Jean-Luc Nancy’s argument about war as the techne,– the art of sovereignty, as the execution of its Being, as the carrying out of sovereignty to the limit of its own logic.37 It is in war that sovereignty comes to itself, shedding the mythology and fetishization of its self-immanence. War borders on art [as] techne– . . . as a mode of the execution of Being, as its mode of finishing in the explosive brilliance [éclat] of the beautiful and sublime, that doubled rivalry for sovereignty that occurs within the blossoming of physis. Moreover, physis no – or one could say that it never takes longer takes place except as mediated through techne, – 38 place “in itself,” or in any other way, except as the image of the sovereignty of techne.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 194

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  195 The sovereign right to wage war cannot be subjected to law, yet it belongs to it, both as an origin and as an end. War, Nancy adds, is the Event par excellence, “the Event that suspends and reopens the course of history, the sovereign event. Our kings, generals, and philosophers have only ever thought of it this way.”39 One might add that lately, al-Qaeda has thought of it in this way, too. We are now in a position to return to 9/11 as an Event and to understand its role in the contest(-ation) for sovereignty. 9/11 is such an Event in which recognition as sovereign is claimed by producing the “explosive brilliance of the sublime.” To successfully claim sovereign status in international politics requires the ability to produce the “explosive brilliance of the sublime,” as well as the recognition of the status by the addressee of the Event. These two aspects are, as we will argue, inherently related.

Claiming Sovereignty In order to understand the operation of al-Qaeda, we turn to Carl Schmitt’s Theorie des Partisanen.40 Here Schmitt develops a genealogy that traces the historical development and increasing radicalization of the partisan from the Spanish War of Independence to Mao’s writings. For Schmitt, the distinguishing feature of the Partisan is his political nature. The Partisan fights on a political front; this sets him apart from the common thief and criminal, whose motives are aimed at private enrichment.41 As such, the Partisan fights a public enemy for a public cause. The recognition of this public and political motivation derives, according to Schmitt, from the involvement of a third party, usually a state, that supports and instrumentalizes the Partisan for its own purposes. Both materially and ideologically, the involvement of a state was historically crucial for the Partisan. It is this recognition by a third party that prevents the Partisan from sliding back into the realm of the a-political, that is, the criminal. In the long run, the irregular has to find its legitimacy in terms of the regular, and for this there are only two options; either the recognition by an extant regular authority, or the enforcement of a new regularity by its own means.42

With al-Qaeda, a new form of partisan has entered the global political stage.43 AlQaeda’s cause is no longer defined by the interests of a third party or state. Moreover, al-Qaeda has radicalized the mobility of the Partisan, and with that has overcome and transcended his “tellurian” nature, that is, its ties to a particular geographical space and political community.44 While the recognition of the political struggle of the traditional Partisan was tied to the support of a third state, al-Qaeda appears to operate without such direct support links to states. It defines its goals independent of, and in conflict with, the state system. As such, al-Qaeda cannot rely on third party states for the recognition of its political nature. It therefore only has the second option available: to produce

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 195

4/18/11 12:36 PM

196  ✻  Andreas Behnke its own sovereign status and to escape the criminalization of its campaign by the international community. Unlike traditional partisans, al-Qaeda has to declare its own war to declare its own sovereignty. Sovereignty becomes autopoietic, as it cannot be derived from third parties or from international law. It establishes itself through the successful self-designation as the political enemy in a moment of decision against its designated opponents. As indicated previously, terrorism, or rather the enactment of terror, should be considered the most radical expression of political violence and war. Following Schmitt, if political order is based on the production and performance of an intense antagonism that divides and thereby constitutes communities, terror is but the ultimate expression of such an ontogenetic Event. As William Connolly observes, the “territory” of a nation-state is often understood to refer to “terra,” that is, the earth or land on which it rests. Yet as he points out, the Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the form of the word “territory” derives from “terrere”: to frighten, with territory being “a place from which people are warned off.”45 Terror therefore defines the sublime brilliance of sovereignty in which enemies are made, and in which al-Qaeda escapes the slide into the realm of the merely criminal. Interestingly enough, Osama bin Laden is employing this grammar of terror in a justification of al-Qaeda’s strategy. In an interview with the American network ABC, he explains [T]errorism can be commendable and it can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent person and terrorizing him is objectionable and unjust, also unjustly terrorizing people is not right. Whereas, terrorizing oppressors and criminals and thieves and robbers is necessary for the safety of people and for the protection of their property. There is no doubt in this. Every state and every civilization and culture has to resort to terrorism under certain circumstances for the purpose of abolishing tyranny and corruption. Every country in the world has its own security system and its own security forces, its own police and its own army. They are all designed to terrorize whoever even contemplates to attack that country or its citizens. The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. Terrorizing those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right.46

The monstrosity of 9/11 is therefore nothing but a reflection of the monstrosity of sovereignty. It deconstructs the claim to self-immanence of political order and lays bare the foundations of such order in an act of transgression. It founds al-Qaeda as a representative of a transcendental ummah in a violent act against its other, the United States. In doing so, it actually conducts a double move. In constituting its own sovereignty, that is, its status as a (political) enemy rather than a mere criminal, it also deconstructs American sovereignty. “Death, or identification in a figure of (the) death (which is the entirety of what we call sacrifice, of which war is a supreme form), provides the aim of sovereignty.”47

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 196

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  197 Man must fear death as the greatest evil in order for sovereignty to function, to be able to forget and cover up the void of violence from which it emerges, and to establish an ontic order.48 Hence the sacrifice of the nineteen al-Qaeda perpetrators on 9/11, their fearlessness of death, transgresses the limit sovereignty establishes and implodes its order by inserting radical Islamic belief into its structure. In the words of an al-Qaeda spokesperson, “[t]here are thousands of the Islamic nation’s youths who are eager to die just as the Americans are eager to live.”49 In this act of sacrifice that deconstructs the immanence of one political order, another order, another ethical-political community, is constituted a community “worth dying for.” While the boundaries established by the American sovereign are transgressed and invalidated, a new sovereign boundary is drawn that does not follow the distinction between life and death, but the one between Dar al-Islam, the “Abode of Islam,” the metaphysical space defined by religious and universal truths found in the Koran, and Dar al-Harb, the “Abode of War,” the site of conflict and infidelity, the area in which Islamic law is not (yet) observed.50 In the definition of the ethical-political community that is established in this move, death does not define a terminal limit, but a gateway to the final realization of ethical being. What Western political onto-theology would consider the “Beyond,” is an integral part of the metaphysical community.51 The deconstruction of American sovereignty therefore does not aim at the in-statement of a newly defined secular community, does not define the creation of another state as its goal, but rather seeks to spread the fear of God among the infidels and demonstrate his superiority. Here then we encounter the first interplay between terror and recognition in 9/11. The ethical-political community, and in a sense al-Qaeda as its agent, only become recognizable in the Event itself. There is no form given to them other than through the act, no phenomenology other than the experience of the violent strike against the extant structure of sovereign authority. The specter-like “nature” of al-Qaeda that has produced so many fruitless discussions about its precise constitution (an organization, a franchise, a network, an ideology . . . ) refuses and eludes any kind of fixation. Al-Qaeda only exists through the violent enactment of sovereignty. Whether this act is ordered by a central core of the organization or executed by self-designated “franchisees” is immaterial from this point of view. The recognizability of al-Qaeda and the claim to sovereign status that affects the violence do not depend on the precisely identifiable source of the order, but on the nature and extremeness of the violence. The epistemic recognition (Erkennen) is therefore tied into the recognition of its status (Anerkennen) as sovereign. The claim to sovereignty that al-Qaeda produced with 9/11 is therefore a pure transgression. The constitutive move of sovereignty that hides, mystifies, and mythologizes the violence or coup de force at the foundational moment and that constitutes the possibility of order remains suspended. While “all foundation is transgressive,” not all transgression is foundational.52 The terror of al-Qaeda, as realized in 9/11, never aims at converting the Event into Order, converting exteriority into interiority or transcendence into immanence.53 The tension with sovereignty between Event and Order is radically resolved in favor of the former. Or more precisely, the Order

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 197

4/18/11 12:36 PM

198  ✻  Andreas Behnke that al-Qaeda envisions can only be constituted in the permanent Event. 9/11 in particular, and terror in general, therefore constantly mobilizes the supplementary aspect of sovereignty. All order is constituted in an act of violence, only to disavow this moment and to produce the semblance of self-immanence. Al-Qaeda’s terror holds the latter aspect in constant abeyance and constantly reproduces the sublime moment of the founding of a transcendental community that exceeds the boundaries of secular political order. In order to assert this sovereignty, the relevant Event has to be of such sublime power so as to not leave the addressee any choice to deny it. From this perspective, 9/11 set a “sovereignty trap” that the United States and other Western nations could not escape. Simply put, it was inconceivable to respond to 9/11 with “normal measures.”

Recognizing Sovereignty As noted above, the Partisan needs to avoid the criminalization of his practices and his status. The acts need to be distinctly enacting the Political; they need to produce exclusive rather than inclusive moves. The act has to be so dramatic and sublime as to escape the inclusion into the normal criminal and legal disciplinary regime of states. The act has to become an Event, insubordinate to any extant normative grid. The Event has to express the “monstrous obscenity” of sovereignty, instantiating the excess of violence that brings into being political order and community, yet always also escapes from it.54 How can such an act be recognized? Recognition, after all, is usually understood as an inclusive move through which previously excluded actors, or their so-far ignored grievances, are addressed and incorporated in a shared moral or political structure.55 Contrary to this conceptualization, derived from social and political dynamics within domestic society, recognition in the international society entails an exclusionary logic. Sovereignty is recognized in the acknowledgement of the mutually exclusive authority over territorially defined space. Recognition thus renounces, rather than produces, a common moral or legal structure, as the latter is secondary and subordinate to the assertion of sovereignty. As the latter is the constitutive principle of the international society, any commonalities between states are always derivative and parasitic upon the initial foundational differentiation of states within it. It is only through this differentiation and mutual alienation that the inclusion into the international society via the recognition of sovereign statehood can be accomplished. Here, the positivity of statehood and territoriality are the referent points for the process of recognition. In the case of non-state sovereignty and of al-Qaeda’s terror, the logic of recognition becomes even more complicated. Al-Qaeda never transmogrifies the violent act of founding into an (apparently) immanent order. Instead, it constantly reiterates the sublime brilliance of the founding act. Yet such a transgressive Event does not define a political space because transgression “is not a site beyond limits but a nonspace devoid of positive content.”56 Recognition here cannot refer to the positive order established

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 198

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  199 by the act, it can only refer to the act itself and recognize it as the instantiation of a global Partisan that emerges in this act [Erkennen] and as the radicalized act of a political non-state sovereign [Anerkennen]. The latter process can be discerned in the responses of the West in general, and the United States in particular, to 9/11. To declare a “War on Terror” and to institutionalize exceptional measures as part of this war constitute the “functional equivalent” of recognizing a claim to sovereignty. The realization that the declaration of a War on Terror had such an effect among political leaders in the West can be observed in the recent renunciations of the concept. In 2006, a headline in the British newspaper Observer read “Britain stops talk of ‘war on terror.’” And the article continued, A Foreign Office spokesman said the government wanted to “avoid reinforcing and giving succor to the terrorists’ narrative by using language that, taken out of context, could be counter-productive. . . . Whitehall officials believe that militants use a sense of war and crisis and a “clash of civilizations” to recruit supporters, and thus the use of terms such as “war,” “war on terror,” or “battle” can be counter-productive.57

As Joseph Nye elaborates, “al-Qaeda and affiliated groups use a simple yet effective narrative to recruit young Muslims to cross the line into violence. . . . [It] is the language of war and a narrative of battle that gives recruits a cult-like sense of status and larger meaning that leads to action.” And further, “British officials have concluded that when we use the vocabulary of war and jihad, we simply reinforce al-Qaeda’s single narrative and help their recruiting efforts.”58 The first such protestation was delivered as early as October 30, 2001, when Michael Howard criticized the “natural but terrible and irrevocable error” of declaring war on terror. Contrasting it with the British experience in Palestine, Ireland, Malaya, and Cyprus, he points out that the terrorists were not dignified with the status of belligerents: they were criminals, to be regarded as such by the general public and treated as such by the authorities. To declare war on terrorists or, even more illiterately, on terrorism is at once to accord terrorists a status and dignity that they seek and that they do not deserve. It confers on them a kind of legitimacy.59

All three previously noted authors recognize war as a narrative, or as a “discourse between the human and ‘the other’” in which certain syntactical rules apply.60 What all three hint at can be further substantiated with reference to Nancy’s definition of the relationship between war and sovereignty. The conferring of legitimacy that Howard alludes to is the recognition of the political, rather than criminal, status of the Partisan, the recognition of his status as a representative of a public cause, and above all his ability to strike in such a fashion so as to elude the normalizing mechanisms of domestic and international law. To declare war is the prerogative of the sovereign against the sovereign, and the recognition that the other cannot be subsumed and

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 199

4/18/11 12:36 PM

200  ✻  Andreas Behnke disciplined within extant legal structures. War returns conflict to the realm of the political, in which (legal) order is deconstructed, not executed. As noted, terrorism is but the most radical form of war as a conflict over the ability to define political order. Could the events of September 11, 2001, have been dealt with differently? Is it conceivable that the United States could have responded with a criminalization of the acts, thus escaping al-Qaeda’s sovereignty trap? Howard suggests a police operation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations on behalf of the international community as a whole, against a criminal conspiracy whose members should be hunted down and brought before an international court, where they would receive a fair trial and, if found guilty, be awarded an appropriate sentence 61

only to dismiss this “ideal world” solution as unlikely, nay, impossible. As he notes, at stake in the response was also American honor; the outrage and insult that 9/11 meant for the Americans “cried for immediate and spectacular vengeance to be inflicted by America’s own armed forces.”62 From the perspective of this essay, Howard does not go far enough in his insight into the impossibility of the normalization and criminalization of 9/11. He seems to underestimate the “meaninglessness” of the Event that is reflected in the interpretations by Ignatieff, Baudrillard, and Žižek, who either insist on the impossibility of making sense of it, or who place it within the Grand Narrative of Western Modernity—either as a virus working against it, or as the radical expression of its logic. In either case, 9/11 remains a void, the Event deprived of any inherent meaning. And as such, it cannot be subsumed under a criminal or disciplinary regime. Such a move presupposes that the meaning of the act can be ascertained, that a verdict can be passed on the “appropriate sentence.” But the Event of 9/11 escapes this logic, its “explosive brilliance of the sublime” blinding our sense of justice.

Conclusion: Re-cognizing Recognition Recognition has become a central concept in critical theory, where it is more often than not tied to notions of expanding zones of inclusion of social subjects, and, tied to this, a concept of moral progress within societies. As such, mutual recognition is expected to resolve conflicts in a peaceful fashion, address grievances, and re-define and expand the moral code of ethical-political communities.63 In an interesting turn at the end of his treatise on recognition and violence, Tarik Kochi tries to import this inclusive logic into the grammar of war and terror. He notes that judgments on the just nature of war are usually partisan judgments in which particular claims of right, a form of life, or an ethical commitment hide behind claims to universality. Yet on closer inspection, “partisan judgments on the rightness of war lose much of their brilliance. They appear more often as confused, limited, self-contradictory claims over the legitimacy of violence.”64 In order to escape this conundrum,

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 200

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  201 which only feeds into fanaticism and militancy, Kochi wants to solve the problem of judgment by turning to a praxis of recognition. Instead of the usual condemnation of the enemy and its violence, he calls for a different practice: “recognizing the ethics of the other’s war.”65 This recognition seeks to consider “that there is a certain rightness embodies within the other’s act of war,” or that the other might have a right of his own in his use of war. Any act of violence takes place, and is authorized, within a normative structure, posits an ethical claim, and aims to realize particular potentialities of political life.66 Such recognition therefore aims at understanding the rightness of our own moral claims and of our violence in relation to the rightness of the violence of the other. As such, this process of recognition can lead to an understanding of the rightness of war that at least approaches a certain level of “universality.”67 Kochi is careful not to overstate the role recognition can play as a “conflict resolution” tool. The approach he offers is not an answer to the problem of war, but to the problem of judgment. Recognition of the possible rightness of the other’s ethical point of view might facilitate the “pragmatics of negotiation” and thus prevent a logic of extermination. Recognition may moderate conflict, but it cannot abolish it. Yet on closer inspection, even this modest proposal becomes problematic. The normative promise of recognition to provide a peaceful settlement of social and political conflicts cannot be realized within the realm of the international. Here, the recognition is tied to the constitution of communities and not their regulation. Kochi’s reflections focus exclusively on the regulative aspects of recognition, while the constitutive aspects of recognition, war, and violence are obscured. Recognition therefore only pertains to the political or ethical grievances and concerns of extant “others,” not to the formation of such agents through war. This is all the more surprising as Kochi tries to develop his concept of recognition through a critical engagement with Hegel. Yet even on these truncated terms, it seems doubtful that recognition can fulfill Kochi’s expectations. Firstly, if it is true that most partisan judgments are “confused, limited, self-contradictory,” it remains ultimately unclear how the recognition of such judgment on the side of the other can really contribute to a better understanding and open up spaces for political negotiation. The process of recognition that Kochi describes demands a modicum of coherence and normative structure within the other’s judgment. It is difficult to imagine recognition forthcoming for the partisan judgment that lacks these qualities. Secondly, Kochi’s notion of recognition seems to pre-suppose what it claims to produce. The “universal” judgment that is supposed to emerge from the recognition of the other’s ethics of violence is in fact only conceivable, if a prior shared moral code is in effect. The possibility of recognizing some rightness in the other’s violence requires a common set of values according to which such an assessment can be made. The other, in other words, is not a radical other; his violence does not reflect the extreme ontological rift between friend and enemy that is involved in the constitution of ethical-political communities.68 Kochi also seems to overlook a point here that features prominently in his discussion of Hegel’s theory of recognition: the ontological subordination of ethics

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 201

4/18/11 12:36 PM

202  ✻  Andreas Behnke to ­sovereignty.69 Only within a regime of sovereignty can moral-truth claims be articulated and realized in a political context. Any claim to universality is in fact particularistic, always offered as an expression of a particular point of view of a distinctive political community.70 The judgment on violence and the decision to go to war is therefore first and foremost the expression of a desire for sovereignty and the formation of a different, an alternative, ethical community. We therefore need to recognize that recognition does not offer a chance to moderate or mitigate the monstrous effects of sovereignty and war. As the discussion of al-Qaeda and its terror in this essay has demonstrated, a critical-theoretical engagement with recognition in the international society should not aim to fulfill the futile and ever-receding goal of replacing its structure of violence with a diagram of morals. The critique of recognition must instead focus on the constitutive role that it plays in this society and the space it opens for the articulation of new political subjectivities.

Notes I would like to thank the editors for their comments on an earlier draft, and the fellow members of the “Liberal Way of  War” Programme at the University of Reading, in particular Christina Hellmich, for their respective feedback. 1. I am referring to 9/11 as an “Event” here in the sense that Jacques Derrida does, that is, as an act that resists immediate subsumption to a given structure of meaning, a law, or a truth, yet demands such a move in a dramatic fashion. Yet this “appropriation” of the Event falters in the absence of a given horizon of anticipation and experience. Borradori and Derrida 2003, 90. It is therefore the “Event”-character of this event that induced the search for meaning. One could also say that from a political perspective, an Event “suspends and reopens the course of history,” Nancy 2000, 107, as it establishes new points of references, structures of meaning, and practices out of the aporia of the Event’s interpretations. 2. Nancy 2000, 122. 3. Cf. Prozorov 2005. 4. Ignatieff 2001. 5. Sofsky 2002, 177. 6. Ibid.,178. 7. Sofsky, 1996, 107. 8. Kippenberg 2004, . 9. Bajorek 2005, 874. 10. Baudrillard 2002. 11. Ibid. Although focusing more on the role of the United States within the system, Jacques Derrida comes to a similar conclusion. For him, 9/11 constitutes a “double suicide,” or a case of “suicidal autoimmunity”: “let us not forget that the United States had in effect paved the way for and consolidated the forces of the ‘adversary’ by training people like ‘bin Laden,’ who would here be the most striking example.” Borradori and Derrida 2003, 95. The United States, in other words, became the victim of a suicidal, auto-immunitary aggression on 9/11.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 202

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  203 12. Žižek 2002, 9–10. 13. Frow 2003, 69. 14. Borradori and Derrida 2003, 91. 15. Haacke 2005. 16. Saurette 2006, 503. 17. Wolf 2008, 28. 18. This is the constitutive theory of recognition. It is opposed by the declaratory theory, which considers the recognition of states to be little more than the confirmation of an already effective statehood. Ultimately, as shall become clear from the following, neither theory fully grasps the functioning of recognition. 19. Kochi 2009, 139. 20. Ibid., 141. 21. Cf. ibid., 143. 22. Cf. ibid., 137–139. 23. Ibid., 141–142. 24. Nancy 2000. 25. Kochi 2009, 143. 26. Ibid., 143. 27. Ibid., 135. 28. Cf. Smith 1989, 158. 29. Ibid., 159. 30. Hegel 1991, 361. This is of course a dig against Kant’s project of Eternal Peace. For the reason why it is ultimately unjustified, see Behnke 2009. 31. Smith 1989,160. 32. Kochi 2009, 213. 33. Ibid., 209. 34. Derrida 2001, 57. 35. Ringmar 2006. 36. Kochi 2009, 230. 37. Nancy 2000, 118. 38. Ibid., 122. 39. Ibid., 107. 40. Schmitt 1995. 41. Ibid., 21. 42. Ibid., 78. 43. Behnke 2004. 44. Ibid., 308–11. 45. Oxford English Dictionary 2008; cf. Connolly 1995, xxii. 46. bin Laden 1998. 47. Nancy 2000, 139. 48. Blits 1989, 426. 49. Ghaith 2001, 252. 50. bin Laden 2002, 174. 51. See the text of the “Spiritual Guidance” and its critical interpretations in Kippenberger and Seidensticker 2004. An English translation of the text was published in The Observer on September 30, 2001 (“Last Words of a Terrorist” 2001).

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 203

4/18/11 12:36 PM

204  ✻  Andreas Behnke 52. Prozorov 2005, 95. 53. Ibid., 93. 54. Prozorov 2004, 281. 55. Honneth 1995. 56. Simons 2000, 52. 57. Burke 2006. 58. Nye 2007. 59. Howard 2002, 8. 60. Mansfield 1982, 236. 61. Howard 2009, 9. 62. Howard 2002, 10. 63. Haacke 2005; Honneth 1995; Roberts 2009. See also Allan and Keller’s contribution to this book, in which “thick recognition” of the other’s identity becomes a prerequisite for just peace. 64. Kochi 2009, 250. 65. Ibid., 256. 66. Ibid., 257. 67. Ibid., 257. 68. Schmitt 1991. 69. Cf. Prozorov 2005, 100–107. 70. Walker 1993, 63.

Bibliography Bajorek, Jennifer. 2005. “The Offices of Homeland Security, or, Hölderlin’s Terrorism.” Critical Inquiry 31 (4): 874–902. Baudrillard, Jean. 2002. “L’Esprit du terrorisme.” Harper’s Magazine. http://harpers.org/ archive/2002/02/0079058. Behnke, Andreas. 2004. “Terrorising the Political: 9/11 Within the Context of  The Globalisation of Violence.” Millennium 33 (2): 279–312. bin Laden, Osama. 1998. “Interview: Osama Bin Laden, May 1998.” Frontline: “Hunting Bin Laden.” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview. html#video. ———. 2002. “Al-Qa’ida Recruitment Video.” In Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader, edited by Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin. New York: Oxford University Press. Blits, Jan H. 1989. “Hobbesian Fear.” Political Theory 17 (3): 417–431. Borradori, Giovanna, and Jacques Derrida. 2003. “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida.” In Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burke, Jason. 2006. “Britain Stops Talk of ‘War on Terror.’” The Guardian, December 10.http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/dec/10/uk.terrorism. Connolly, William. 1995. Ethos of Pluralization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Derrida, Jacques. 2001. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 204

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Recognizing the Enemy: Terrorism as Symbolic Violence  ✻  205 Frow, John. 2003. “The Uses of Terror and the Limits of Cultural Studies.” Symploke 11 (1–2): 69–76. Ghaith, Suleiman Abu. 2002. “Al-Qa’ida Statement, (October 10, 2001).” In Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader, edited by Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin. New York: Oxford University Press. Haacke, Jürgen. 2005. “The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Recognition.” Review of International Studies 31(1): 181–194. Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. London: Polity Press. Howard, Michael. 2002. “What’s in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs 81 (1): 8–13. Ignatieff, Michael. 2001. “It’s a War—But It Doesn’t Have to be Dirty.” The Guardian, October 1. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4267406,00.html. Kippenberg, Hans G. 2004. “Einleitung.” In Terror im Dienste Gottes: Die “Geistliche Anleitung” der Attentäter des 11. September 2001, edited by Hans G. Kippenberg and Tilman Seidensticker. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Kippenberg, Hans G., and Tilman Seidensticker, eds. 2004. Terror im Dienste Gottes: Die “Geistliche Anleitung” der Attentäter des 11. September 2001. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Kochi, Tarik. 2009. The Other’s War: Recognition and the Violence of Ethics. London: Taylor and Francis. “Last Words of a Terrorist.” 2001. The Observer, September 30. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2001/sep/30/terrorism.september113. Mansfield, Sue. 1982. The Gestalts of War: An Inquiry into Its Origins and Meanings as a Social Institution. New York: Dial Press. Nancy, Jean-Luc. 2000. Being Singular Plural. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Nye, Joseph S. 2007. “Just Don’t Mention the War on Terrorism.” International Herald Tribune, February 8. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/opinion/08iht-ednye.4523392 .html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Joseph%20S.%20Nye%20Jr,%202007&st=cse. Oxford English Dictionary. 1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press.http://dictionary.oed.com. Prozorov, Sergei. 2004. “Three Theses on ‘Governance’ and the Political.” Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (3): 267–293. ———. 2005. “X/Xs: Towards a General Theory of the Exception.” Alternatives 30 (1): 81–112. Ringmar, Erik. 2006. “Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime: The European Destruction of the Emperor’s Summer Palace.” Millennium 34 (3): 917–933. Roberts, Neal. 2009. “Recognition, Power, and Agency.” Political Theory 37 (2): 296–309. Rubin, Barry, and Judith Colp Rubin, eds. 2002. Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader. New York: Oxford University Press. Saurette, Paul. 2006. “You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics.” Review of International Studies 32 (3): 495–522. Schmitt, Carl. 1991. Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corrolarien. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. ———. 1995. Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 205

4/18/11 12:36 PM

206  ✻  Andreas Behnke Simons, Jon. 2000. “Modernist Misapprehensions of Foucault’s Aesthetics.” Cultural Values 4 (1): 40–57. Smith, Steven B. 1989. Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Sofsky, Wolfgang. 1996. Traktat über die Gewalt. Frankfurt: Fischer. ———. 2002. Zeiten des Schreckens. Frankfurt: Fischer. Walker, R. B. J. 1993. Inside/Outside. International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolf, Reinhard. 2008. “Respekt: Ein unterschätzter Faktor in den Internationalen Beziehungen.” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 15 (1): 5–42. Žižek, Slavoj. 2002. Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates. London: Verso.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 206

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Part III

Conclusions

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 207

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 208

4/18/11 12:36 PM

C h a p t e r 11

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition Thomas Lindemann

What does recognition mean and how does the concept apply to the empirical study of international conflicts? This book provided some answers based on theoretical considerations as well as on empirical case studies of the origins of international conflict and terrorist violence. Drawing on these theoretical and empirical perspectives, I will formulate some testable hypotheses about recognition and the origins of war. In the first section, I will propose a definition of non-recognition and explain why the concept of recognition can be applied to interstate relations. In the second section, I will formulate some hypotheses about the link between non-recognition and the origins of war. In a final section, I will outline some methods to empirically investigate these hypotheses.

Non-Recognition in International Relations Almost all of the contributions to this book defended an interactionist conception of non-recognition that includes the offended actors’ self-conceptions as well as their confirmation or non-confirmation by others. Drawing inspiration from sociological theory, we can summarize denials of recognition as the difference between a claimed 209

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 209

4/18/11 12:36 PM

210  ✻  Thomas Lindemann self-image and the image we perceive others to give us.1 If there is a rough equivalence between this self-image and how we are treated, our self-image is recognized. If, on the other hand, we have a more positive image of ourselves than the image of us projected by others, we are not recognized.2 The recognition of an actor does not necessarily imply that other actors completely share their self-images but solely that they treat them according to the way they understand themselves. More than “sincere” recognition, what matters to actors is to preserve their face in social interaction. Ideally we should distinguish between two aspects of non-recognition. In the first case, actors do not feel recognized because their self-descriptions are not confirmed by other actors. The difficulty in satisfying these hubristic identities (inflated selfdescriptions3) is highlighted by studies of Germany’s self-images before World War II, of the sacred character of Israeli’s self descriptions, and of the “virile” self-images (that is, the cult of physical force and the search for domination) attributed to the Bush administration.4 This identity-related denial of recognition is traditionally described as a “struggle for prestige,” and more linked to the subject’s identity than to the disrespectful behavior from others.5 In the second case, actors may feel as if they have not been recognized because socially expected standards of consideration have been violated. In this volume, the contributions of Charles Doran on Wilhelmian Germany’s difficulty in acquiring responsibilities in line with its potential power, and Alexandre Hummel’s study of the discriminatory aspects in the application of the non-proliferation treaty show how the violation of socially accepted standards of recognition fuel aggressive reactions.6 These kinds of struggles are best defined as “struggles for dignity” because they are motivated by the desire to be considered as a normal member of a community more than as a special member with a superior identity. Struggles for identity and dignity are related to each other. For example, Richard Lebow’s study in this volume suggests that self-glorification often is the result of a process of stigmatization by which excluded actors transform their negative differences into something particularly positive, transforming a “pariah people” into an “elected people.” Some may object that it is confusing to define non-recognition as the negative difference between a self-image and a received image, whether the source of nonrecognition be a grossly inflated self-image or a denial of equality. Indeed, ethically it would not be justified to recognize actors with inflated self-images. However, recognition is for most of the authors in this book not a normative concept but an “independent variable”: what matters is the actors’ subjective feeling that they are not recognized, and it is this “symbolic frustration” that is a possible motivation to engage in international conflict. For many contributions in this book, especially those by Axel Honneth and Reinhard Wolf, transporting the concept of recognition to the field of interstate relations still appears relatively problematic, at least in its psychological dimension. Does not such a transposition result in an illegitimate anthropomorphism of the state? 7 Why should state decision-makers feel offended when the refusal of recognition is directed at the political entity and not at the person? Only people and not states have a need for affection or for self-esteem. Moreover, is it not true that bureaucratic and ­decisional

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 210

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  211 logics inside democratic political entities oblige political decision-makers to contend with a multitude of political forces? 8 Such a pluralist configuration of power channels the anger provoked by insults. It is also true that applying the recognition problematic to interstate relations is tricky from an ethical point of view: it is indeed difficult to argue in favor of a state’s basic needs against the rights of individuals. However, interestingly enough, Honneth and Wolf conclude their arguments with a strong plea for the application of the concept of recognition to the study of interstate relations. A sociological argument for such an interstate application is made in this volume by Philippe Braud, who insists on the “identity” value that an abstract institutional entity can possess for the officials of such an institution. In order for individuals to be able to embrace a role such as that of government leader, it is necessary for them to be identified at least partially with the institution that has conferred this role.9 The identification of political officials with their state is all the more probable when the prestige associated with the institution strongly influences their personal prestige. In addition, political elites, as opposed to economic ones, seem to value prestige and power more than wealth. Political activities select “alpha” personalities that should be particularly sensitive to recognition denials.10 The “representative link” (Braud) between the governed and the governing explains why populations seldom are indifferent to attacks on their collective symbols. Emotional dynamics initiated by an act of contempt against a state are far from impossible to ignore. The reference markers of collective identity, “the founding references” of groups, such as religious beliefs, constitute an “emotionally invested” site.11 An objection, discussed by Honneth and Wolf, asserts that political decision-makers in modern democracies are so strongly inserted into bureaucratic processes that they should not easily succumb to such emotional dynamics. Accordingly, only dictators like Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong-Il make wounds to their self-esteem an object of contention. However, emotions are not necessarily individual but can also be collective, especially if the offense is targeted against a head of state in his or her official rather than personal capacity. Thus, taking hostage of a co-national or massacres inside another state can stimulate emotions in the formation of internal opinion, making it difficult for political decision-makers to remain inactive. Even an emotionally insensitive decision-maker cannot easily ignore offense felt by his or her community.12 Interestingly, this perspective invites us to take into account the strategic aspects of recognition in political decisions. Indeed, as suggested by Honneth, we cannot assume that decision-makers define interests of power and wealth-maximization independently of the moral expectations of their constituencies. Moreover, political decision-makers often instrumentalize questions of identity and pride to find resonance among public opinion. In the first place, they could try to appease the adversary’s public opinion through recognition in order to delegitimize war—as suggested by Honneth. Secondly, recognition and non-recognition can be exploited to trigger international conflict. Bismarck’s Ems Dispatch13 offers a good illustration of how decision-makers may be able to force a war by insulting a nation.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 211

4/18/11 12:36 PM

212  ✻  Thomas Lindemann Strategic calculations concerning recognition apply not only to the domestic arena but also to the international. The success of a “tit for tat” strategy in Robert Axelrod’s famous game theory tournament shows that people with the reputation to respond reasonably to provocations have a better chance to succeed in the competition.14 Bearing this in mind, when a state is not preoccupied with its reputation in international society, it risks losing its authority and independence.15 As the realists would have it, “reputation” and “credibility” are crucially important for a state’s ability to deter aggression.16 However, in a “Kantian” anarchy, founded on the rule of non-violence and mutual aid instead of military honor, this same “strategic” interest in preserving a “good reputation” can also play in favor of advocating moderate policies.17 Finally, applying the recognition problematic to international relations is an empirical question. It is worth investigating whether political entities with strong national identities, holistic conceptions of society and states personified by their leaders—l’ état c’est moi—are more vulnerable to offenses than others. The identification with state entities on the part of different actors will always be variable and multidimensional. State identification cannot be abstractly postulated without investigating sociologically the variety of historical situations.

The Empirical Study: Some Hypotheses on Non-Recognition and International Violence From these premises about a state’s symbolic motivation, it is possible to formulate several hypotheses about the link between non-recognition and armed violence. War, according to the main thesis, will become an option when the perceived net recognition benefits of war are superior to the perceived net recognition benefits of peace.18 There is a recognition net benefit when an actor improves his self-image as conveyed by significant others by choosing a policy. Without claiming that it is possible to exactly quantify the recognition benefits of war and peace, the assumption that decision-makers only consider the economic and strategic costs of war is unrealistic. Leaders calculate, subconsciously at least, the symbolic costs and gains in war. Symbolic calculations have their own particular logic and therefore cannot be approached in the same way as material benefits.19 Some may argue that for decisionmakers, losing a war always signifies humiliation and thus a loss of face. If this were true, our calculations could be simplified, since the most powerful would always be the ones who best preserve their reputation. However, we know that state leaders may gain reputation and national support even in military defeat—especially when confronted with an overwhelming power.20 It is thus necessary to consider which types of variables determine the symbolic benefits of peace and war. First, the symbolic costs depend on identities. War will be more likely to promote an actor’s self-image if he has a hubristic identity because actors with inflated self-descriptions are easily offended.21 War can also be an attractive option if the instigators have few moral feelings of guilt or shame, which is the case

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 212

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  213 where the actors fail to positively identify with the victim of the aggressive action. Second, the interest of a state not to resort to force will depend on whether other states or non-state actors treat it according to normal standards of recognition. In this case, the struggle for recognition is not a struggle for a special identity but for dignity; that is, a socially accepted and generally acknowledged standard of respect. The identity-motivated recognition struggles and dignity-motivated recognition struggles represent two modalities of an actor’s quest for self-esteem. In the first case, the quest for self-esteem is animated by a strategy of distinction: a positive self-image is cultivated by exaggerating differences with others and in stressing one’s superiority.22 In the second case, actors seek to obtain self-esteem by identifying with a valued social group and by demonstrating their similarity with other members of a community. The two aspects of recognition are related. It is often by stigmatization that actors, like Nazi Germany, develop idealized and negative identities that especially serve to enhance their self-esteem. In other words, an actor’s strategy of distinction is often not a choice but a necessity because the valued community does not accept them.23 Extensive empirical investigations are needed to validate the thesis about the symbolic origins of wars, and the more modest aim here is to show that the historical evidence presented in this volume and elsewhere about the origins of interstate wars is consistent with the hypotheses that follow. If actors have hubristic identities and do not identify with other actors, and if they are denied dignity and identity, we can say that war is a probable option because the symbolic net benefits in favor of war are higher than the symbolic net benefits of peace. This formula also includes both the emotional and material costs related to non-recognition. All of the following hypotheses are based on the idea that wars often occur when self-images are not recognized. The first and second hypotheses stress the importance of idealized and shared identities while the third and fourth hypotheses stress the dignity-related aspects of non-recognition. The fifth links both identity and dignity, since it is through non-recognition of dignity that actors construct problematic identities that are a possible cause of war.24

Hypothesis 1: Hubristic Identities as a Possible Cause of War Many contributions to this volume suggest that actors with hubristic identities are particularly vulnerable to “narcissistic wounds.” Hubristic identities are defined by the aspiration for recognition by other actors on the international scene of one’s superiority, which is not recognized by other major international actors. For instance, NationalSocialist pretention of “racial superiority” over other nations is an extreme expression of such hubristic identity because this pretention is very different from great power ambitions to participate in international leadership by virtue of international norms that are formalized. In the first case, superiority is totally subjective and hence disconnected from any international norm of recognition. In the second case, superiority is recognized by others on the basis of well-established norms. Inflated self-descriptions are not necessarily restricted to “crazy” authoritarian leaders.25 However, one can argue

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 213

4/18/11 12:36 PM

214  ✻  Thomas Lindemann that these hubristic self-images are better channeled by democratic institutions, to which these leaders are accountable, than by dictatorships. There are several links between hubristic identities and war. First, such identities are more vulnerable than egalitarian identities. Perceiving others’ actions as insults initially depends on actors’ self-image. To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, “I cannot know what insults me if I do not know who I am.” Communities conveying hubristic identities will take every opportunity to feel humiliated, even by minor provocations. Second, when officials of several states lay claim to superiority over each other, an identity dilemma emerges—one’s identity assertion implies the non-recognition of the other.26 Even if respected as equals, actors with hubristic identities are easily offended if others refuse to admit their own inferiority. Thus hubristic identities are exposed to the loss of a sense of continuity of the self (ontological insecurity) in case of their non-confirmation by a significant other.27 Yana Zuo’s study in this volume illustrates the link between ontological insecurity and international conflict in the case of Taiwan, particularly how changes in self-identification demand recognition by others. On the other hand, all claims to superiority imply the depreciation of others. An armed conflict follows when an actor, confronted by another’s identity pretensions, is not satisfied with having a “slave identity.” Third, as Wolf explains, representatives of a culture of prestige are more inclined to take risks, even at the price of their security and that of their community. State officials asserting superiority tend to prefer glory to physical security.28 They also prefer absolute victory, which is more costly but more prestigious, to relative, piecemeal victories. The attempts to conquer Russia by Napoleonic France, then by Nazi Germany, are typical examples of such foolish taste for high risks. Moreover, virile identities that are the cult of physical force and the search for domination are an important factor in explaining the resort to force. Virile identities can be considered a subtype of hubristic identities stressing “physical” and mental, and not “intellectual” or moral, superiority over others. An entire body of literature in international relations, as much psychological as feminist, has promoted the importance of virile images as a possible cause of armed confrontations.29 Responses to provocations can range from verbal protest to the use of force via economic sanctions. The governmental representatives of a virile culture are the ones most anxious to avoid an admission of weakness and are, as a consequence, most willing to resort to force. Thus, as stressed in this volume by Richard Lebow, societies characterized by the cult of honor did not have the same possibility to make concessions without compromising their identities as Athens, antimilitarist ex-FRG, or contemporary Sweden.30

Hypothesis 2: The Propensity for Armed Aggression between Political Actors is Higher When There is No Positive Identity Link between Them A collective identity assumes that others belong to the same community as oneself, even if our similarity is reduced merely to the affiliation of mankind.31 A collective

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 214

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  215 identity also implies identification with others; a minimal emotional participation in their distress and their needs. Identification rests on the perception that others deserve, as human beings, protection of their lives.32 “The Kantian anarchy” of NATO where member states are identified with others is an illustration. The empirical identification of a collective identity does not presume that various qualities are objectively shared by two communities. What counts is instead an awareness of belonging to the same community, forming an “imagined community.”33 The prospect of recognition explains why shared identities are a source of peace. Actors who resort to force against a friendly state for economic and political reasons contribute to the depreciation of their own image—because I identify others as anathema, I can cut them down without compromising my positive self-image.34 The colonial European powers did not have any scruples in waging wars of extermination against African people, whether in the Belgian Congo or German South-West Africa. At the worst, political actors can even presuppose that others convey values that are the exact opposite of their own. In this case, others represent a threat to our identity.35 The link between the lack of shared identities and recognition through international violence is explored in this volume by Andreas Behnke’s contribution dedicated to al-Qaeda. When others are stigmatized or when differentiation is valued, actors may seek recognition through a logic of otherness instead of inclusion. International society is founded on the affirmation of sovereignty, which entails exclusion by the acknowledgement of the mutually exclusive authority over territorially defined space. In such a system, violence is productive in establishing subjectivity. Indeed in war “the state-sovereign asserts himself in a duel between equals” (Behnke). Thus 9/11 can be understood as al-Qaeda’s desire “to become recognized as a political, indeed quasi-sovereign, rather than criminal actor in the global system.” However, in adding to Behnke’s analysis, it would be pertinent to investigate not only the designers of al-Qaeda’s attacks but also those who carry them out. For this latter group, concrete experiences of discrimination—for example, by stigmatized Muslims in Western countries—should count more than the abstract social fact of sovereignty in the international system.36

Hypothesis 3: The Denials of Accepted Standards of a State’s Universal Dignity to a Particular State Are Likely to Incite Wars States are not only struggling for individuality but also for dignity. In this perspective, it is not a desire to affirm one’s superiority that is at the origin of a rivalry between states, but a desire to avoid disregard and the unequal affirmation of superiority by others. These kinds of recognition struggles are not for a special identity but for dignity, meaning that states are striving to be recognized as full members of a community. In this case, recognition is strongly linked to the problem of justice. Many international norms of respect may be open to interpretation, contestation, and therefore to opposite reactions and behaviors. However, it would be rash to conclude that dignity entirely depends on an actor’s perceptions. While it is rare

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 215

4/18/11 12:36 PM

216  ✻  Thomas Lindemann that an actor will feel offended by the refusal to obtain the annexation of its neighbor, it is more than likely that a state actor will feel non-recognized by violations of widely accepted norms, such as “non-interference in internal affairs.” Some norms of international respect are so deeply anchored in social practices and the expectations of state actors that their violation universally triggers feelings of non-recognition. The universal dignity of the state, meaning the abstract respect for an actor as a member of a community of states and not as an actor with special qualities, is protected by a great number of conventions. For instance, normal states are recognized by others and engage in official diplomatic relations with them. This kind of “thin recognition” implies that each party recognizes the other’s right “to exist and to continue to exist as an autonomous subject,” to quote the contribution of Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller. A recognized state enjoys the right of territorial integrity. “Thick recognition” means treating other states as equal members of a shared community. There are norms that claim respect for the hierarchical status and autonomy of states. Equal sovereignty means that each state is its own master and free from any external authority.37 Even small powers will jealously protect their rights, such as the immunity of their ambassadors and the preeminence of those ambassadors over lower-ranking diplomats of “big” powers. Moreover there exist more informal norms of equal dignity among states. The norm of reciprocity is probably one of the universal principal components of moral codes. Symmetry in behavior and mutual renouncement (Allan and Keller) means that nobody suffers any discrimination. Finally, since the Vienna Alliance (1815) system, there has been the rule among great powers to integrate all great powers into some common institutions.38 Many studies suggest that recognition/non-recognition of accepted standards of visibility and equal dignity is a possible cause of peace and war.39 Newly created state-entities, not fully recognized in the international community, such as Communist China until 1971 and the Hamas entity in 2008, often use violence to establish themselves as existing actors in international relations. In the same way, the denial of equal dignity is an important motivation for interstate conflicts.40 Punitive and discriminating peace treaties, verbal depreciation of the other’s status, and harsh injunctions, such as ultimatums, can trigger violent reactions that aim for the re-establishment of a state’s threatened dignity.41 Non-recognition of great powers that have the means to punish the offender will especially fuel humiliation and violent reactions. Nations treated as “parvenu powers” (Lebow) such as Wilhelmian Germany (Murray, Doran) or stigmatized powers are more likely to engage in armed conflicts or displays of military might than integrated and accepted powers. Thus, Michelle Murray shows in her study how Germany’s armament policy before World War I was an attempt to secure identity in light of its non-recognition. German demands to be treated as an equal on par with the other great powers went unrecognized, leading to an intense spiral of symbolic escalation to which Germany responded with increased belligerence. For Charles Doran, the experience of misrecognition by German decision-makers motivated their brinkmanship in the 1914 July crisis.42 This misrecognition is founded on an “unusual lag between Germany’s

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 216

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  217 power and role in the international system.” The origins of World War II are also linked to the refusal on the part of the Allies of accepted standards of “great power dignity.” Lebow’s study shows how Germany’s nationalism was fueled more by those articles of the treaty that were considered offensive to German honor, such as article 231’s “guilt clause,” than by those inimical to German security.

Hypothesis 4: Attacks on Specific Identities such as a State’s Political or Cultural References or a Lack of Empathy Are Also Likely to Encourage the Outbreak of Armed Conflicts Non-recognition may hurt a state’s more “particularistic identity” as an actor with specific values and a right to obtain special attention from other members of the international community. Attacks on specific state identities are identifiable by depreciation of its national values or by the negation of past traumas, as well as indifference toward the suffering of victims in national catastrophes. There exist two forms of a state’s struggle for identity. In the first case, treated in the first hypothesis, states try to affirm inflated self-descriptions, which produce identity dilemmas. In the second case, a state’s struggle for identity is canalized by reference to general international norms and not incompatible with tolerance of the other’s culture. Many legal and moral norms have progressively been developed in the interstate system to assure respect for a state’s specific identity. The development of norms regarding mutual tolerance is linked to the traumatic experience of destructive religious and ideological wars where state actors realized that without a principle of internal sovereignty involving the respect for political independence, there would be a permanent threat to their survival.43 It is easy to show how often this norm of political tolerance is violated, especially by great powers when they are confronting smaller nations. However, normative expectations of internal sovereignty have survived even when violated. Thus, states proclaim their right “to determine their political, economic and social systems, without interference.”44 Great powers assure the norm of “internal independence” in relations among themselves by operational rules, such as those of “peaceful coexistence” during the Cold War.45 Furthermore, offenses against national symbols such as flags are condemned and identified as dommage moral in international law. Finally, informal international norms endow states with the right to receive some empathy from others and the reciprocal duty to offer some to others. Some norms of empathy such as respect for traumatic historical experiences and recognition of past crimes shape, at least since the end of the Second World War, the normative expectations of state and non-state actors.46 The lack of empathy reveals itself in particular by indifference toward human suffering, which is especially offensive in the context of the rise of humanitarian norms. For this reason, it is important to examine the reaction of actors if a state suffers a human or natural disaster. Other experiences of indifference by state actors can be triggered by stressing others’ difference or insignificance.”47

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 217

4/18/11 12:36 PM

218  ✻  Thomas Lindemann Some empirical evidence—such as the case studies about the Versailles treaty and nuclear non-proliferation presented in this book—supports the thesis that violation of a state’s specific identity may trigger violence. Concerning the violation of a state’s internal sovereignty, the most obvious link connects ideological messianism and armed conflicts. Thus, homogeneous international orders are more stable than heterogeneous ones, especially if the latter are governed by powers spreading their ideology, such as during the Thirty Years War or the French Revolution.48 Classic Realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger consider ideological messianism as a cause of war because it neglects power realities. However, it is also worth investigating the symbolic effect of political moralism on such state leaders as Kim Jong-Il or Saddam Hussein. Peaceful international crisis management involving powers of different types presupposes the recognition of the coexistence principle, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Some empirical studies also show that indifference toward a state’s fate or its historical traumas fuels aggressive reactions.49 State actors seek empathy when they are struck by humanitarian catastrophe. For instance, American leaders were deeply offended by Saddam Hussein’s and the Taliban’s state celebrations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.50 Peace researchers underline that rhetorical practice stressing differences between “in-group” and “out-group” helps to fuel conflicts, whereas the display of some empathy toward others by stressing a shared identity often is able to pacify international conflicts.

Hypothesis 5: Attacks against a State’s Dignity Are Also Likely to Encourage Interstate Violence Via the Formation of Stigmatized Identities which Can Be Transformed into Idealized Identities The more subjective and inter-subjective aspects of recognition—the struggle for inflated self-descriptions and struggle for dignity—are related because it is often through stigmatization that actors develop idealized identities. The need for the confirmation of an identity by others explains why actors construct their identities while looking at themselves through the eyes of others.51 In the interstate system, the “significant others” are normally great powers or neighboring states. Hubristic and negative identities, such as extreme nationalism or religious fundamentalism, are often the result of a process of stigmatization, through which others transform the initially negative difference into a positive quality. The construction of hubristic and negative identities rests on contemptuous behaviors, such as humiliating peace treaties. The sentence “anarchy is what states make of it” only makes sense under the assumption that there are behaviors of recognition that are likely to turn Hobbesian anarchy into Kantian anarchy.52 It is true that state identities are constructed by domestic processes, but systemic factors such as recognition and non-recognition from great powers have constantly been minimized in works about state chauvinism.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 218

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  219 Some empirical studies, such as Lebow’s contribution to this book, show the utility in linking non-recognition through stigmatization and state exclusion on the one hand, and construction of idealized and warlike identities on the other. Thus, Germany’s symbolic humiliation by the Versailles treaty explains partly why National Socialism could exploit honor-related themes. The development of fundamentalisms is often exacerbated by external threats and by behaviors of stigmatization. However, it should be noted that even conciliatory movements within a nation—as is suggested by Honneth’s contribution—are not automatically perceived by another nation’s public opinion. National political leaders are often able to select and reinterpret information from the outside world. Indoctrinated by the legends of backstabbing and strong resentment about the humiliation of Versailles, Germany’s public never fully realized the softening of the Versailles treaty induced by the United States and Great Britain that took place in the 1920s and against French opposition.53 These concessions were surely too incremental to be of any tangible effect. To be efficient, a politics of recognition has to address itself quite directly and spectacularly to another state’s public opinion. Willy Brandt’s Kniefall to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and Anwar El Sadat’s speech before the Knesset in 1977 illustrate the important symbolic dimensions of a politics of recognition. It is also worth investigating—as suggested by Wolf in our volume—whether hubristic identities could not result from an excess of recognition. Permanently flattered people progressively develop inflated self-descriptions and are therefore more easily provoked and prone to risky behavior. Studies of “group-think” have stressed that decision-makers whose views are never contested rapidly develop feelings of invulnerability, overconfidence and self-glorification.54 Another possible effect of a submissive entourage is that such decision-makers find it difficult to confront the international community that may contradict their inflated self-descriptions.

International Recognition Study Methods The recognition studies in this volume suggest that all kinds of methods are helpful in understanding or measuring the impact of non-recognition in international politics: correlation studies, case studies, and more interpretative methods. In order to investigate a possible co-variation between recognition and international conflict, it is necessary to objectify non-recognition independently from frustration and mental states expressed by actors. For instance, it is possible to detect idealized self-images by analyzing the architectural characteristics of governmental buildings, important statues, military parades, and national ceremonies.55 In the same way, the lack of shared identities among states can be objectified by the existence of messianic great powers with differentiated identity types (for example, authoritarian regimes compared to democratic states) or linguistic analyses such as the frequency of dichotomous discourses (reinforcing an “us and them” rhetoric). Dignity-related

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 219

4/18/11 12:36 PM

220  ✻  Thomas Lindemann non-recognition is even more easily detected than identity-related non-recognition because it transgresses inter-subjective standards as opposed to specific ideas held by some “megalomaniac” and idiosyncratic actors.56 As already suggested, it is possible to investigate the extent to which fundamental norms of recognition are formalized in international relations in a given period. Thus dignity is not an individual mental state that escapes empirical analysis. The inter-subjective character of identity and dignity makes it possible to grasp the material existence of non-recognition. Once objectified, we can establish co-variation between non-recognition and phenomena such as peace and war. For example, it should be possible to measure whether international orders founded on idealized, virile identities, different identity types, harsh punishment, and stigmatization of vanquished powers are more war prone than orders that conform to social standards of recognition. Doran’s study of Germany’s “powerrole gap” before World War I is a prime example of how to statistically analyze the link between non-recognition and international violence. However, correlations need to be explained and completed by a study of the ways in which actors understand situations in order to grasp how such objectified nonrecognition is experienced in situ. Are they aware of non-recognition, and is their understanding of it comparable with the indicators the researcher has constructed?57 The significance of non-recognition will vary as a function of an actor’s cognitive map. The study of an actor’s subjective drives and representations is also important for grasping the relationship between variables and to identify intervening steps in the process leading from peace to war.58 For example: Why is it that hubristic identities lead to war? Is it because they are more vulnerable to provocations, or is it because actors with such identities are more prone to take risks? It is also very interesting to distinguish different steps of the decision-making process: identification of non-recognition; evaluation and risk assessments of different policy alternatives; interaction with the offender and domestic and international audiences; and the final choice between peace and war. A first approach to grasping actors’ subjective understanding is to detect feelings of humiliation. As made clear in this volume, the detection of such emotions presents considerable problems for the analyst. In this way, the perpetrators of most wars and international violence justify their actions by the existence of injustices. To take public indignations at face value means exposing oneself to the risk of circular reasoning: one identifies the refusal of recognition by violence, which is then explained by the existence of an identity frustration. One way to avoid such circular reasoning is to scrutinize many more private sources from actors, such as personal documents that may give a better clue to true motives than do public discourses. It is also worth examining the rapidity of decisions in order to verify whether they are spontaneous and thus possibly fueled by emotions.59 Other clues to actors’ emotions are their inner circles of advisers, since they get to witness external expressions of feelings of humiliation, such as outbreaks of anger. However, one should not only focus on the emotional aspects of recognition but also on its strategic motivation. Policy-makers may rationally evaluate how a decision affects self-image and ­reputation

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 220

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  221 in domestic and international audiences because their legitimacy depends greatly on these symbolic factors. Even actors driven by glory or humiliation may carefully repress immediate emotions to better serve their long-term aims, as is well expressed in the popular adage, “Revenge is a dish best served cold.” More strategic expressions for the quest of recognition can be empirically analyzed by studying the frequency of words such as “reputation” or “credibility” in an actor’s discourses and by paying special attention to whether domestic and international challenges to the symbolic capital of governmental authorities are correlated with a radicalization of decisions related to international security.60 It is also possible to test explanations in terms of recognition against other explanations, as demonstrated by Lebow and Murray’s contributions. We can contrast the strategic and economic costs and benefits of a decision with recognition-related logics. However we should avoid turning recognition into a purely residual variable to be used only when rationalist explanations fail. The reduction of the quest for recognition to emotions such as self-esteem will reduce it to a purely psychological approach, stressing the limits of rationality. Yet, the quest for rationality is often quite strategic, and reputation is a resource in the struggle for power and wealth. The works of Frank Schimmelfennig and Honneth and Hummel’s articles in this volume suggest how actors elaborate true presentation strategies, which means that they try to maximize their self-image and to lessen those of others by instrumentalizing accepted norms for their political purpose.61 Thus, to test the value of recognition against realist or liberal approaches, we should also consider the emotional aspects of recognition as well as its strategic aspects. Such calculations can even be externally deduced by asking questions about the symbolic net benefits of options related to peace and war.

Epilogue The contributions in this volume provide tentative evidence for the thesis that non-recognition matters in international politics. Most of our cases are related to international conflict and are therefore hard cases for recognition because scholars expect that here physical survival should easily come before vanity. Against such intuitive understanding of armed conflicts, the evidence presented in this book suggests that the quest for recognition is as much a cause of international conflict as that of security concerns or profits in terms of power and economics. Whoever studies international conflicts should therefore not only pay attention to what actors want to have but also to how they want to appear and how these self-images are reflected by others. In this manner, physical violence is often preceded by “symbolic violence” (Braud). This diagnosis should also, as Honneth suggests, have normative implications for the prevention of war. The perspective of recognition suggests an alternative means to the carrot-and-stick approach in the pacification of contentious powers such as China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. One should examine in more detail the recognition aspirations of these states. Such politics of recognition is also aimed

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 221

4/18/11 12:36 PM

222  ✻  Thomas Lindemann at internal audiences of the aggressive state in order to delegitimize the war option for the decision-makers of these states. The politics of recognition is not expensive, but its benefits can be huge.

Notes I am grateful for comments provided by Michael Ahmed, Elena Aoun, Philippe Braud, Justin Cook, Elisabeth Etienne, Volker Heins, Alexandre Hummel, Stephen Humphreys, Peter Koenigs, Ned Lebow, Christian Olsson, Erik Ringmar, and Reinhard Wolf. 1. Goffman 1999; Braud 1996; Honneth 1996. 2. Lindemann 2010; Wolf 2008. 3. Plato 2008, 46–49. 4. White 1970; Saurette 2006. 5. Lebow 2008, 45–121; O’Neill 2004, 85–100; Markey 1999. 6. Doran 1991. 7. Walker 1993, chapter 6; Ashley 1988. 8. Rosen 2005, 50–55. 9. Crawford 2000; Braud 1996. 10. Saurette 2006. 11. Braud 2004. 12. Saurette 2006. 13. The Ems Dispatch was an internal message from the Prussian king to Bismarck related to the French demand that the king should guarantee that he would never approve the candidacy of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne. Bismarck “sharpened” the dispatch and released it to the press. It was designed to give the impression that King William I had insulted the French Ambassador Count Benedetti. 14. Axelrod 1984. 15. Schelling 1960. 16. Tang 2004; Mercer [1996] 2009. 17. Wendt 298–299. 18. On materialist rational choice perspectives, see Fearon 1995. 19. See Erik Ringmar’s introduction. 20. Jervis 1988. 21. Ringmar 1996. 22. Braud 1996, 153–169. 23. Elias 2009. 24. Lindemann 2008. 25. Tajfel and Turner 1986. 26. Ringmar 2002. 27. Mitzen 2006. 28. Vertzberger 1998. 29. Tickner 1996; Steinberg 1996. 30. Lebow 2008, 61–72 and chapter 3; Rosen 2005. 31. Adler and Barnett 1996. 32. Finnemore 1996.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 222

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  223 33. Anderson 2006. 34. Wendt 1999, 259–278. 35. Risse-Kappen 1995. 36. Khosrokavar 2006. 37. Osiander 2001; Bartelson 1995. 38. Bull 1995, 40. 39. Lebow, 2008; Allan and Keller 2006; Lindemann 2001; Ringmar 1996; Schroeder 1994; Doran 1991. 40. Albin 2001, 47. 41. Schroeder 1994; Doran 1991. 42. See also Lindemann 2001. 43. Bull 1995, 35. 44. Cf. General Assembly from October 24, 1970. Anghie 2007. 45. Bull 1995, 41. 46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9th December 1948. Anghie 2007. 47. Albin 2001, 26. 48. Aron 1984. 49. Long and Brecke 2003; Scheff 1994. 50. Lindemann 2010. 51. Wendt 1999, 327. 52. Ibid., chapter 7. 53. Cohrs 2008. 54. Janis 1972; Lebow 1981. 55. Abdelal et al. 2009. 56. Farrell 2002, 60. 57. Vennesson 2008, 234–236. 58. George and Bennett 2005. 59. Rosen 2005, chapter 2. 60. Bourdieu 1979. 61. Schimmelfennig 2003.

Bibliography Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2009. Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler, E., and M. Barnett. 1996. Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Albin, Cecilia. 2001. Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller. 2006. What Is a Just Peace? New York: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Edition. London: Verso. Anghie, Antony. 2007. Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 223

4/18/11 12:36 PM

224  ✻  Thomas Lindemann Aron, Raymond. 2004. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Ashley, Richard K. 1988. “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique.” Millennium 17 (2): 227–262. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Bartelson, Jens. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979. La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement (Le Sens commun). Paris: Editions de Minuit. Braud, Philippe. 1996. L’emotion en politique: problemes d’analyse. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. ———. 2004. Violences politiques. Paris: Seuil. Bull, Hedley. (1977) 1995. The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press. Cohrs, Patrick O. 2008. The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crawford, Neta. 2000. “The Passion of  World Politics: Propositions on Emotions and Emotional Relationships.” International Security 24 (4): 116–156. Doran, Charles F. 1991. Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elias, Norbert. 2009. The Established and the Outsiders. Dublin: University Dublin Press. Farrel, Theo. 2002. “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program.” International Studies Review 4 (1): 49–72. Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 379. Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday & Company. Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. MIT Press. Cambridge: MIT Press. Janis, Irving L. 1972. Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Jervis, Robert. 1988. “War and Misperception.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (4): 675–700. Khosrokhavar, Farhad. 2007. Quand Al-Qaïda parle. Paris: Points. Lebow, Richard Ned. 1984. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ———. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. Lindemann, Thomas. 2001. Les doctrines darwiniennes et la guerre de 1914. Paris: Economica. ———. 2008. Penser la guerre: L’apport constructiviste. Paris: L’Harmattan. ———. 2010. Causes of War. The Struggle for Recognition. Colechester: ECPR Press. Long, William J., and Peter Brecke. 2003. War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Markey, Daniel. 1999. “Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism’s Roots.” Security Studies 8 (4): 126–172. Mercer, Jonathan. (1996) 2009. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 224

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Concluding Remarks on the Empirical Study of International Recognition  ✻  225 Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. “Ontological Security in World Politics. State Identity and the Security Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations, 341–370. O’Neill, Barry. 2004. Honor, Symbols and War. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Osiander, Andreas. 2001. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organization 55 (2): 251–287. Plato. 2008. Laws 10. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ringmar, Erik. 2002. “The Recognition Game. Soviet Russia Against the West.” Cooperation and Conflict, 37 (2): 115–136. ———. 2008. Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. “Democratic Peace; Warlike Democracies?” European Journal of International Relations 1 (4): 491–517. Saurette, Paul. 2006. “You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics.” Review of International Studies 32 (3): 495–522. Scheff, Thomas J. 1994. Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War. Boulder: Westview Press. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2004. The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schroeder, Paul W. 1994. The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848. New York: Oxford University Press. Steinberg, Blema S. 1996. Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by Stephen Worchel and William Austin, 7–24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Tang, Shiping. 2005. “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict.” Security Studies 14 (1): 34–62. Tickner, Ann. 1996. “Identity in International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives.” In The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 147–162. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Vennesson, Pascal. 2008. “Case Studies and Process Tracing.” In Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, 223–239. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vertzberger, Yaacov. 1998. Risk Taking and Decision Making: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Walker, R. B. J. 1992. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Welch, David A. 1993. Justice and the Genesis of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wendt, Alexander. 1994. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” American Political Science Review 88 (2): 384–396. ———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, Ralph. 1970. Nobody Wanted War. New York: Anchor Books. Wolf, Reinhard. 2008. “Respekt: Ein unterschätzter Faktor in den Internationalen Bezie­ hungen.” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 15 (1): 5–42.

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 225

4/18/11 12:36 PM

Lindemann & Ringmar.indb 226

4/18/11 12:36 PM