The Inter-Processual Self: Towards a Personalist Virtue Ethics Proposal for Human Agency 1527508277, 9781527508279

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The Inter-Processual Self

The Inter-Processual Self: Towards a Personalist Virtue Ethics Proposal for Human Agency By

Kleio Akrivou, José Víctor Orón Semper and Germán Scalzo

The Inter-Processual Self: Towards a Personalist Virtue Ethics Proposal for Human Agency By Kleio Akrivou, José Víctor Orón Semper and Germán Scalzo This book first published 2018 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2018 Kleio Akrivou, José Víctor Orón Semper and Germán Scalzo All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-0827-7 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0827-9

We dedicate this book to our colleagues, our teachers, our friends and family, as well as to all students and fellow readers who have an interest in how to live well and in harmony with other human beings.

worms are the words but joy’s the voice […] deeds cannot dream what dreams can do —time is a tree(this life one leaf) but love is the sky and i am for you just so long and long enough e e cummings, ‘Freedom is a Breakfast Food’

CONTENTS

List of Tables .............................................................................................. xi Foreword by José I. Murillo ...................................................................... xii Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... xvi Part I: The Proposal of the Inter-Processual Self Chapter One ................................................................................................. 2 An Introduction to the Theory of the Self and Its Development Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 18 The Starting Point with regard to Cognition 1. Different foundational conceptions of knowledge in each paradigm ............................................................................ 19 2. Cognition in Descartes and Kant, versus Polo and Wang .............. 24 2.1. Cognition in Descartes ............................................................ 24 2.2. Cognition in Kant .................................................................... 27 2.3. Cognition in Polo’s work and reference to Aristotle ............... 29 2.4. Cognition in Wang Yangming ................................................ 35 3. Implications for AS and IPS........................................................... 36 Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 38 Theoretical Basis of Two Distinct Paradigms: “Autonomous Self” (AS) and “Inter-Processual Self” (IPS) 1. Three fundamentals (radicals) of human reality ............................. 38 1.1. Nature, Subject, Person: the three fundamentals of human reality ........................................................................ 38 2. Definition of AS and IPS modes of human development; thesis and argument ........................................................................ 40 Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 44 The Autonomous Self Paradigm 1. Introduction..................................................................................... 44 2. The “Autonomous” perspective ...................................................... 46 2.1. Who is the human being? The subject ..................................... 67

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2.2. Development in AS ................................................................. 71 Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 83 Theoretical Basis of Our Proposal (the Inter-Processual Self) 1. Normative foundations, basic theoretical constructs and key terms for our proposal ....................................................... 83 1.1. The person as the basic theoretical construct .......................... 87 1.2. The person as (open and free) system ...................................... 90 1.3. The personal relation(s) in (open and free) systems ................ 92 2. Key authors of reference in philosophy for the Inter-Processual Self ........................................................... 94 2.1. Aristotle ................................................................................... 94 2.2. Leonardo Polo ......................................................................... 99 2.3. Wang Yangming ................................................................... 102 2.4. Alfred North Whitehead ........................................................ 109 2.5. Conclusions from the philosophical authors ......................... 118 3. Key authors of reference in psychology for the Inter-Processual Self............................................................... 123 3.1. Carl Rogers............................................................................ 123 3.2. Viktor Frankl ......................................................................... 128 Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 131 The Inter-Processual Self (IPS) Model on Human Agency and Human Development 1. Who is the human being—and the self—in IPS? A person.......... 131 1.1. The main reference of maturation ......................................... 132 1.2. Personal agency ..................................................................... 135 1.3. Self-recognition..................................................................... 135 2. Development in IPS ..................................................................... 136 2.1. Notion of integration and how the self-integrating process happens ...................................................................... 137 2.2. What it is to mature in IPS .................................................... 138 2.3. Understanding development and progression........................ 140 2.4. The goal of development ....................................................... 141 2.5. How to understand what exists before the developmental process ............................................................ 142 2.6. Identity, differentiation, growth, and integration................... 143 3. Model of the self and how the IPS model sees the agent in the AS model ............................................................................ 144

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Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 145 Clarifications about AS and IPS 1. Key terms in distinguishing AS and IPS ...................................... 145 1.1. Integration ............................................................................. 149 1.2. Intentional purpose ................................................................ 152 1.3. Cognition revisited ................................................................ 157 1.4. Human freedom ..................................................................... 159 2. How other theories understand the self ........................................ 162 2.1. John Dewey ........................................................................... 164 2.2. Dynamic Systems Approach ................................................. 171 2.3. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela ............................ 180 3. Summary of how life and personal/interpersonal agency are understood within AS and IPS ............................................... 186 Part II: How the Inter-Processual Self May Change Our Approach to Life Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 194 The Process of Human Growth 1. Introduction .................................................................................. 194 2. Basis of the growth process .......................................................... 196 2.1. Education............................................................................... 196 2.2. Emotional education as Integration ....................................... 225 Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 237 IPS Applied to Governance and Business Management 1. Inter-processual self and governance ........................................... 237 1.1. Introduction ........................................................................... 237 1.2. Governance in the AS paradigm............................................ 243 1.3. Governance in the IPS paradigm ........................................... 247 2. Inter-processual self and management of business organizations ............................................................. 268 2.1. Introduction: economic vs. normative theory ........................ 269 2.2. Competing theoretical assumptions on the firm .................... 270 2.3. Competing assumptions on agency and the management of business organizations ........................................................ 275 An Epilogue ............................................................................................. 289 1. A figurative dialogue between AS turning into the transhumanist self-will and IPS ........................................................................... 289 2. Concluding Reflection.................................................................. 296

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Appendix ................................................................................................. 299 The Historical Evolution of Theory of Knowledge 1. Human knowledge from the classical perspective: From Aristotle to Polo through Thomas Aquinas ........................ 299 1.1. Aristotle and the Greek radical ............................................. 299 1.2. The Christian radical and the systematization of a realist theory of knowledge ............................................. 302 2. Human knowledge from the modern perspective: From Ockham to Hegel through Descartes, Hume and Kant ....... 313 2.1. A paradigm shift: The origin of individualism ...................... 313 2.2. Cartesian rationalism ............................................................. 318 2.3. Hume’s empiricism ............................................................... 319 2.4. Kantian idealism: a synthesis between rationalism and empiricism ....................................................................... 322 2.5. Hegel’s objective idealism .................................................... 325 References ............................................................................................... 329 About the Authors ................................................................................... 357

LIST OF TABLES

1 “Autonomous self” (AS) and “inter-processual self” (IPS): presentation of the two paradigms on self, action, and knowing ......... 78 2 Normative foundations and theory constructs in IPS: suggested contrasts in AS .................................................................... 85 3 Key words for distinguishing between AS and IPS ........................... 146 4 Comparing the life and action proposals in AS and in IPS ................ 190 5 Comparison between educational proposal based on AS or IPS........ 202 6 Praise and correction in AS and in IPS .............................................. 215 7 Erikson’s proposal of the personal psychodynamic of development .................................................................................. 231 8 Introducing a governance ideal type according to the inter-processual self (IPS) normative proposal .................................. 266 9 Cognoscitive hierarchy ...................................................................... 312

FOREWORD

Academic life is composed of a large variety of scientific disciplines, each of which is cultivated by a scientific community. These communities behave, to some extent, like tribal societies with their own practices, standards, rites, and a more or less shared history about their forbearers and foundations. This is to be expected since science is the fruit of human endeavor and thrives in the desire to know, as well as in human beings’ shared acquisition and essentially social nature. But this fact sometimes causes problems that affect the very goal of science, namely knowledge and understanding. When it first emerged, science was a unique undertaking that Greek thinkers called philosophy. This was a very beautiful designation indeed, and highlights the fact that the search for truth and knowledge is worthwhile but difficult. It also shows that this undertaking affects human life as a kind of pathos that tends to configure personality. Even in its first instances, philosophy began to divide into different fields. Ethics and the study of human beings began to acquire their own characteristic traits that distinguish them from cosmology. Almost at the same time, the birth of mathematics represented a challenge to the unity of knowledge. It is true that mathematics is clearer than other branches of knowledge, but its connection to reality remains in question. However, the division of knowledge reached a larger scale in modern and contemporary times. First, thanks to thinkers like Galileo and Newton, physics became a clear and distinct field of study with a methodology that reveals regularities in nature, making it a mechanism of prediction and control. This extraordinary success encouraged thinkers from other fields to try to achieve the same kind of success. In this process, they demarcated a field of study, then a methodology. New scientific communities emerged. Establishing a shared methodology presented some risks, however. The idea that the application of a method and the accumulation of knowledge according to it inspires unlimited progress, and the fact that sometimes that progress does actually occur, frequently provoked the belief that the history of science is not at all important. In this view, we only need to know about our colleagues’ most recent developments and discoveries, and then can carry on with our own inquiry.

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This sometimes works well, at least to some extent, in very limited and specialized fields. But, in more complex and difficult fields, obviating history implies forgetting about the choices and presuppositions that make up a discipline and consequently the limitations entailed in the way we cultivate it at any given moment. This difficulty has become more serious because of another process in the history of science. Philosophy has survived the fragmentation of knowledge, but has been left in a difficult state. As new scientific disciplines that claimed to be entirely serious, objective, and rigorous reclaimed different fields of reality, philosophy began to fall back on the unconquered territories that contain the most difficult and ultimate questions. The impossibility of dealing with those questions in a “scientific” way has two different and opposing outcomes. Some philosophers declared that, since those questions cannot be answered with the scientific method, they are not at all attainable and, therefore, are a matter of mere preferences or irrational belief. They frequently hold that only the scientific method and the communities that cultivate it are capable of obtaining true knowledge. In this view, the role of science consists in the justification of this idea, the rejection of other research methods, and the clarification of the language of science. Other philosophers accept this demarcation, that is, that other, established scientific “tribes” already occupied some fields of reality, but they try to clearly demarcate philosophy’s territory and develop special methods for distinguishing this activity from other intellectual practices. Much of this work has been fruitful and it is not my intention to condemn modern science overall or recent developments in philosophy. But the situation that this process has created is, in my opinion, far from ideal. The isolation of philosophy can only end in making dialogue among disciplines more difficult and in obstructing a unified and organic vision of reality. Science is, in fact, very different from the idealized scene of a set of sciences that occupies a well-delimited field of reality, the sum of whose knowledge supposedly expands our vision of the world. In fact, different disciplines frequently study the same realities and deal with not-sodifferent methods, but the fact is that scientists are often unable to converse or understand others’ views on similar topics. This problematic situation often engenders reproaches and a kind of jealousy surfaces between experts; communication therein can become almost impossible. Nevertheless, human beings cannot do without a vision of the world, so it is normal that our vision of the world is full of oversimplifications

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from specialists that ignore the history and complexity of problems. As happens more and more frequently, the humility that a rigorous search for knowledge usually produces in good scientists can lead to skepticism and leave the work of dissemination to popular writers and journalists. I am not rejecting the good work that those professionals and novices can do, but the fact is that scientists have abdicated their task, which has grave consequences for the whole of society. For this reason, efforts like those that motivate this book must be welcome and should also be encouraged in other fields of research. In this case, the authors offer a diagnosis that inspires new approaches to the study of human action and psychological development, and they propose an alternative approach that aims to more accurately and more richly describe reality. Various features of this undertaking are worth mentioning. This text is the fruit of dialogue between researchers of different disciplines and various scientific and cultural backgrounds. Their concern for a common topic has made their task and the enrichment of perspectives possible, and has produced a common understanding. This is clear proof that the effort to overcome disciplinary limitations can be fruitful. As for the proposal, the authors of this work manage to offer not only a theoretical reflection on human beings, but also a model that can be tested and can orient future research and its application to different fields. In accordance with their backgrounds and interests, the authors explain the consequences of their proposal especially for the fields of education and management, but they also make clear its relevance for other fields, like psychological therapy. I am impressed by their effort to understand the theoretical roots and presuppositions of the model that they want to surmount and, especially, of their proposed model. In this way, they show that science is a historical endeavor that, although it often tends to hide its intellectual roots, cannot be properly understood and pursued without understanding its intellectual origins and the decisions that have contributed to its cultivation and delimitation. One especially noteworthy feature of the model that the authors propose corresponds to the fact that it aspires to be intercultural. In fact, modern science tends to overly depend on the Western tradition, although, as mentioned, it is frequently totally ignorant of that fact; yet, a globalized world obliges us to keep in mind other traditions and how they can enrich our perspective. If well done, this intercultural effort is very promising. As the authors present the scholars on whose work their proposal is built, the reader cannot help but admire the variety of personalities

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involved. Philosophers and psychologists that belong to different traditions are put together and the authors take advantage of different aspects of their works. This implies dialogue and mutual enrichment between philosophy and psychology, which should be more frequent. From the beginning, I have witnessed the work that underlies this book. I have seen how it came about and how it has been developed in an intense and sometimes difficult common project. After reading the book, one is tempted to say that the proposal of the “inter-processual self” has already been tested in the very process of writing this text. And this is an extraordinary achievement. Indeed, openness to others, attention to the person, respect for human nature, and hard work are present in the writing of this book, which fittingly correspond to the different roots –or radicals– that are responsible for human life and behavior, and that the authors correctly order and promote. I thank the authors, Kleio, José Víctor, and Germán, for the invitation to offer a prologue to their book, an invitation that I know was extended out of friendship and mutually shared interests. I have every expectation that the process of mutual enrichment that produced this book will continue, leading to developments that allow for its application and testing. It will surely produce fruitful debate about topics that all humans share and whose accurate study is decisive to our lives. José Ignacio Murillo Pamplona, December 26th, 2017

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

One word frees us of all the weight and pain of life: that word is love. Sophocles

Each of us—Kleio, José Víctor, and Germán—met at a time of personal and intellectual seeking, inquiry, transition, and growth in our lives, and know that without each other our potential for growth would not have materialized. We, therefore, warmly acknowledge what each one of us has given and accepted in this process of co-creating, as well as the future research potential this proposal contains that will inevitably strengthen the present relationship and the future collaboration(s) involving the three of us and other colleagues. We also acknowledge how each other receives acts within this relationship congruently with an inter-processual self (IPS) way of knowing. Such giving–receiving relational mutuality has enabled continued personal growth in the process of “learning who we are and be(coming more fully) such,” as Pindar, the early Greek naturalist thinker, brilliantly noted, echoing how we discuss the heart of our proposal in the fifth chapter of this book. Moreover, we warmly appreciate how the personal trust and relation among us remains a safe space: one that allows us to debate, inquire, and act in such a way as to incubate ongoing attention to this work, which has finally been brought to life and to fruition. We hope readers like this work and its proposal and are intrigued to study it, practice it, and create other work based on it. Proposing a new singular voice in the hope that it will be part of other good existing research in the cross-disciplinary domain of virtue ethics and action research is neither an easy nor a quick and safe choice. But its purpose is worthwhile, and mutual support has been the oxygen in the effort of fostering dialogue that aims to restore a humane and ecologically sensitive economy and society. The kind of action we theoretically describe to this common good adheres to free and open system and ethics in relations of mutual growth. Essentially this personalist virtue ethics proposal (IPS) restores humanheartedness, sincerity and benevolence at the core of human action and collaboration. For somehow this is tyranny’s disease, to trust no friends. Aeschylus

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Additionally, we acknowledge and reflect on how our project and proposal may come to challenge hubris. We therefore also recognize the challenge that this personalist virtue ethics proposal we offer may pose to other systems of thought promoting mindsets that engage in sacrificing the flourishing of some to an abstract notion of a service to a greater good or a belief in post-humanism as a newly created “normal”. This same challenge is posed to other systems of thought; systems which seek some normative justification for despotism’s and totalitarianism’s projects to master human freedom and openness; or, systems which promote a version of freedom based upon an excessively individualistic thinking regarding how the common good is reachable in life. We are opposed to such proposals that idolize or seriously crush the singularity and fear difference (in cognitive or actual terms) as threats instead of valuing them as possibilities and a manifestation of our wealth of spirit and nature. We trust the IPS proposal provides normative and some descriptive guidance on how to face what is fearful, sad and dehumanizing, however tricky it is for human action to live up to this proposal in our daily life and personal–social relations. We wish to heartily thank all who believed in us and in this project and celebrate its fruition with us. We also acknowledge our friends and colleagues more broadly who support(ed) us in giving life to this work and/or trusted us in sharing a way of imagining how this new proposal can contribute to the broader dialogue and discourse bridging moral psychology and virtue ethics and applied in educational, organizational and governance theories. Great deeds give choice of many tales. Choose a slight tale, enrich it large, and then let wise men listen. Pindar

Our contribution of this new personalist virtue ethics proposal on the self, action, and human development (the so-called inter-processual self or IPS) has drawn its core argument, structure, and insights from the history of knowledge (see Appendix). This allows our own theoretical original contribution to the social sciences and human development theories to claim one specific cross-disciplinary rooting. We do therefore feel this is a “small and specific” research proposal even if it appears large due to its effort to create connections across disciplines and time via its theoretical rootedness in the history of knowledge we offer in our book’s Appendix. This sense of making a specific contribution enables us to authentically and genuinely feel an integral part of the ethical dialoguing that is a characteristic of academia; and to remain connected and part of the struggles of each and all academic colleagues for a space and voice in their

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effort searching for (more) truthful answers to imminent and important challenges, while maintaining their academic integrity and self-respect. As noted by Professor Murillo in the Foreword, a unity of knowledge that Greek thinkers called philosophy evolved as a division of disciplines that suffered hugely from further fragmentations and subdivisions during the twentieth century; this unity of knowledge was in fact a unity in knowledge and in action with a humanistic ethic with a purposeful orientation to “the good.” Our book simply acknowledges the huge loss of understanding and (practical) wisdom that brings many disciplines and life more broadly further away from a sense of what is the essence of being and acting as a human person with an orientation to the good. We therefore acknowledge how other colleagues around various existing formal disciplinary boundaries (and guided by things we were educated and socialized to take for granted in modern thought and fear to inquire, or costs to our professional and personal lives could ensue) have been dedicating their lives in passionate work to resolve problems of self, and action with maturity, and an ethos of responsibility, respect for other(s) as opposed to a striving for mastery and domination and an ecological ethos and sensitivity. We therefore also respect and acknowledge colleagues in various fields of study (normative and applied ethics, human development, social science, and philosophy more broadly) who deal with the same problems, even those we classify as theories with which we disagree, and ideas we think of as hugely influential, but which we do not classify in this volume for reasons explained. Many of you are or have been our friends, teachers, colleagues, and people we know as mentors and/or reviewers and who practice social and government and broader policy and action. Sincerely, therefore, we wish to acknowledge our being part of this broader community in our profession, and our bonds to all of you. And this brings us to this: we wholeheartedly thank Professor José Ignacio Murillo, who kindly dedicated thought and time for his thorough peer review of the volume. We thank him for his kind scholarly contribution to our effort, via his foreword. Beside the thoughtful and wise words he wrote to prepare readers how to read and understand this work and its roots of inquiry and action, we appreciate this contribution for the uniqueness of its creator: Professor Murillo combines a rare pluridisciplinary expertise spanning from classical to modern and contemporary philosophy and history of philosophy, cognitive science, as well as behavioral and moral psychology fields of study, while he maintains a virtue ethics academic focus. We find this background important for it balances and expresses with craftsmanship, eloquence,

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simplicity, and character ethos the academic “distance–closeness duality” that is required for a foreword to a colleague’s work. We thank Christa Byker, Felicity Teague, as well as Sophie Edmonson, Hannah Fletcher, Adam Rummins -and the design, typesetting and print services teams- in Cambridge Scholars Publishing for the help in copyediting, for making our ideas stylistically clearer and for helping us to finish off this book so nicely. Your collaboration in making our work enjoyable to read is much appreciated with sincere thanks. As a final comment, we believe our contribution to a better understanding of the self is part of a larger effort in recent years following many unexpected economic, social, moral, and humanistic crises in the socalled “developed” world. It is terrible to speak well and be wrong. Sophocles

Crises often offer opportunities to examine ourselves, and to inquire after what is lacking, or what is not really working, investigating how to sincerely reexamine the status quo especially in how established ways of thinking, knowing, and acting can be re-imagined. This requires personal, relational, and systemic action regarding how to approach choices and the process of acting personally and in collaboration with others in various communities of practice. irrespective of who and if our action is being monitored or “managed-regulated” from outside systems. Our book offers a proposal of moral psychology approached through theory of knowledge and its history. Our proposal on knowing and acting approaches action and valuing as something that demands personal and relational inquiry and a sincere concern for honest responses that are integral to identity and our moral feelings and not just a detached rational judgment capacity. This is a delicate process, therefore, that binds how to be a good person, how to love, and how to act well facing one’s and others’ responses. The proposal we offer in this book does not adopt the assumption that being human confers absolute freedom and authority to each of us to autonomously construct each one’s subjective good. Nor is it tied to a notion of the ethical that undermines the importance of personal and shared responsibility (irrespectively of the extent to which our action is being monitored or “managed–regulated” from outside systems or superior authority) and the notion that goodness and living well is possible independently of the choices each one of us is making approaching our relations and action in our identities, relations, and communities.

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Acknowledgments Seek not, my psyche (soul), the life of the immortals; but enjoy to the full the resources that are within thy reach. Pindar

Within this context, we hope this book and its proposal contribute to a broader dialogue and actual good progress and solutions. We are motivated to contribute “our voice” and join other voices that genuinely care about restoring a sustainable, humanistic, and ecological ethos. We believe such broader voices are shared among academic communities, educators, and non-academic communities (policy makers, sustainability and personal development and ethics consultancy and bodies, governments and non-profit or non-governmental international transnational or local organizations, local administration, civil society, etc.), who, as citizens in communities, jointly inquire after how to make a better life ethos and practice possible across various spheres. With full hearts and minds, Kleio, José Víctor, and Germán from the United Kingdom, Spain, and Mexico January 2018

PART I THE PROPOSAL OF THE INTER-PROCESSUAL SELF

CHAPTER ONE AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF THE SELF AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Western culture is highly grounded in Greek philosophy, and especially in Aristotelian thought. For Aristotle, there is a close relationship between action and knowledge. Human action deals with the realization of a wide range of activities, aimed at the configuration of life itself according to a certain ideal representation of the good life. This is what Aristotle calls praxis (Vigo 2007, 110), and only people who possess a certain rational representation of what a good life means are capable of praxis. Human excellence or virtue resides in rightly fulfilling this function in accordance with reason (Sison and Fontrodona 2015, 242). Naturally it should also be noted when it comes to excellence or virtue that “there is no such thing as an objectively virtuous action in itself considered, independently of the person who performs it” (Sison 2015, 252). That is, Aristotelian ethics is premised on a proper human function that expresses reason. Aristotle classifies the different kinds of human knowledge in accordance with the types of related activity, that is, pursuant to its end. He then identifies three kinds of human activity: contemplation (theoria), action (praxis), and production (poiesis). The different kinds of knowledge correspond with the diverse uses of reason. Theoretical reason (sophia) speculates on something and its aim is the contemplation of truth; practical reason (phronesis) deals with human action and it has a moral dimension—that is, it enables man to reflect on his actions so that they are organized towards their own perfection; and technical reason (techne) is aimed at an external end or result (Met. II 2 and VII 1). Technical reason, unlike the other types of reason, unfolds in the realm of means only. However, along with theoretical reason, it knows universal and necessary causes, so it can be easily taught. Practical reason, which relates to both ends and means, deals with contingent actions. The Aristotelian emphasis on excellence in personal moral character (virtue) as the precondition for achieving the “right” reason, although never lost, was gradually degraded thanks to a shift to individualism that can be traced to the fourteenth century (see Appendix). This was a very

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unfortunate turn in the evolution of thought, with profound consequences for human action’s pursuits. It gave way to later critiques of a reductionist understanding of reason and reason’s limits (e.g., Hendry 2016) in contemporary applied philosophy and philosophical efforts to reorient modern thought closer to Aristotle’s profound moral philosophy and authority (MacIntyre 1982). Aristotle’s emphasis on practical–moral reason (phronesis; prudence) as the only form of rational excellence that is solely linked with a moral dimension of human action is well known and explained. For Aristotle, practical reason emanates from virtue and as a result always predicts action that is linked with morally good ends both internally for the actor and for ensuring a good life for all—eudaimonia (Scalzo 2017; Sison 2015). Precisely due to these, and as a result of classical philosophy’s basis on character (personal virtue), ethical1 action is causally linked both to the continuous ethical growth of the actor’s moral character, and to ethical outcomes ensuring that the common good of each and all involved is served well (Meyer 2017). Normative philosophy in various branches deals with ethics and what is ethical. “Ethical” and “ethics” broadly refer to “the branch of knowledge that deals with the moral principles that are the right to govern the person’s behavior or the conducting of an activity” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd edition, 595). There are three main branches in Western philosophy (Melé 2012; Ferrero and Sison 2012, 2014). The first branch refers to virtue ethics, which originates in Aristotelian philosophy and claims that living in virtue and adopting virtues that are inner personal dispositions such as benevolence, generosity, justice, or charity, enables both personal flourishing and wider social prosperity. The second branch in the study of ethics is based on Kantian philosophy and focuses on Kant’s notion of duty to always act as rational beings and in accordance with a universal categorical imperative whereby other human beings are respected as ends and not means. The third branch of ethics is utilitarianism, which argues that ethics is guided by a rule whereby the greatest good for the greatest number of people must be determined and followed in all cases.

1

The term “ethical” in its classical sense (prior to the modern thinking in philosophy) refers to how persons come to know what is the right thing to do to act congruently with virtue and moral character. There is a closer link here with the work of Aristotle as he emphasizes the inner locus of virtue and the unity of the various virtues rooted in the continuity and the depth of moral character (NE 1144b.35–1145a.1).

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Chapter One

The term “ethical” captures a personal quality of approaching and acting based on what is the right thing to do to act for the good, which captures Aristotle’s (NE 1144b.35–1145a.1) and broader virtue ethics’ emphasis on the importance of each singular moral actor’s moral character maturity (Akrivou and Orón 2016; Koehn 1995; Sison 2015). Nevertheless, “modern” academic disciplines are based on the idealization of theoretical, hypothetical, and abstract reason as the highest form of reason, which must guide human action and how we go about pursuing ends and outcomes. Thus, the key philosophy underlying the disciplines and especially the applied disciplines in modern academia pursues a morally neutral ideal linked with how to reach intellectually correct answers (hence, inspired by theoretical reason), rather than how to improve practical human action (of any form) that leads to morally good processes and outcomes (hence, linked with practical wisdom, or Aristotelian phronesis). Of course, “modern” disciplines do try to create foundations for their theories that not only appear independent, but that are also linked with a hypothesis of moral neutrality—that is, theories grounded in abstract principles that are separate and independently autonomous from the character and the moral excellence (virtue) of the acting persons. Within this context, modern psychology found its footing. The origins of modern psychology were intentionally and closely linked with modern philosophy, grounding assumptions around the emergence of new theory and research methods, and this linkage inspired most of what modern psychology has produced (McAdams 1990a). In its early days, the discipline clearly aimed to “create” a grounding of psychology as a theoretical discipline and relying on positive methods and based on universal and scientific laws and principles. Of course, later, even modern psychology developed various branches that are inspired by a more subjectivist and interpretativist ontology and epistemology, but decisive boundaries were not drawn among these traditions and various lines of works. As a result, modern psychology is hugely fragmented. For example, there are many lines of work to date that claim to be based on Aristotelian and classical philosophy foundations (positive psychology is an example), but neo-Aristotelian scholars ardently question this association (for detailed references see Meyer 2017). Psychology’s modern emphasis has specifically focused on creating theory spanning various separate domains, ranging from human cognition, emotion, identity, development and the self, among others. In the following chapters of this book, we position and associate our personalist virtue ethics proposal and its moral psychology in reference to

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key philosophical and psychological authors. Indeed, as we analyze in Chapter Five, the proposal of the inter-processual self (IPS) has broad philosophical and psychological bases, which we further develop throughout the book. However, regarding how the corresponding moral psychology of our proposal (IPS) compares and contrasts with the broader discipline of psychology, we have mainly focused on the so-called cognitive revolution and respective works in the evolution of psychology (Flavell 1992). Our review, therefore, is centered on cognitive and personality models of growth and related works regarding conceptions of human growth, with an emphasis on integrative processes in the self and the role of identity, differentiation, and integration in human agency and interpersonal relations. We have consciously chosen to rely on certain authors, philosophers, and key representative psychologists, because we think that, for the current debate on the person and their development, these works offer better conceptual and descriptive keys. These “keys” allow us to maintain a dialogue with other lines of research that walk along different paths closer or farther from our personalist virtue ethics proposal. We offer in our novel book a personalist virtue ethics proposal (IPS) and our distinct contribution centers also on our approaching the topic of ethical beings, growth, and action via a theory of knowledge. Beyond our distinct contribution, we hope that this work serves to facilitate further open and new cross-disciplinary dialogue and collaboration bridging moral psychology, philosophy, theory of knowledge, and social and behavioral science more broadly. Regarding our proposal, we have chosen to relate it to different and distinct authors to overcome mere cultural conditions that may block one tradition from connecting to another line of thinking springing from another cultural system of understanding the same phenomena. Hence, our reference authors (who are Aristotle, Leonardo Polo, Alfred N. Whitehead, Wang Yangming, Carl Rogers, Erik Erikson, and Viktor Frankl) have indeed very different cultural, geographical, and temporal backgrounds and origins. And this accounts for how they utilize different language and conceptual connections that, as we show, often capture phenomena in a profoundly congruent way. We can relate to these authors as we, both personally and as a research team, are linked with various cultural, linguistic and socio-emotive backgrounds, which perhaps allows us to see connections across these different cultural origins in our key authors of reference. The debate we hold throughout the book to some extent also reflects the debate that psychology has in its evolution. There was a moment in the history of psychology in which the concern for the discipline has been to

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prove and to further become a strictly scientific discipline, which led to a focus on the study of behavior, and the blooming of behaviorist psychology and operant behaviorism (Catanya and Harnad 1988; Skinner 1987; Skinner 1990a, 1990b; Watson 1913, 1926). This turn is part of a broader move in psychology from Darwin to behaviorist thinking (Boakes 1984). And this evolution (behaviorism) has also been due to the ease of measurement via tools and experimental works (Skinner 1947). In experimental psychology, regarding the behavior of a subject and its personality concepts are conceptualized and operationalized as measurable. So this simple fact would allow psychology to stand on its feet towards its becoming “an adult” scientific discipline. This line found a separate field of growth in educational research (Skinner et al. 2008). Skinner is a reference author for this trend (Skinner et al. 1972; Skinner 1996), which led to research on the subject and his behavior. We simply indicate the fact that a huge bias exists when the study of the person has been reduced to the behavior, which influenced modern behaviorism in psychology being taken for granted as “the” only psychological science relevant to the study of the human being who is the acting agent. Our proposal critiques this approach. Behaviorist psychology and the branch in psychology known as Gestalt behaviorist school of thought, opened a new door to psychology towards its “cognitive” turn (Murray 1995). That brings this discipline closer to the research lines we more closely observe in this book as key models of reference for AS. It has been the desire to recover the psychological world of individuals that led to a reaction to the purely behaviorist strand looking to life and people in terms of mere “reflexaction” terms (Watson 1926) and towards cognitive psychology revolution (Murray 1995). In this cognitivist strand’s booming (Flavell 1992), one representative thinker is Vygotsky, whose sociocultural approach (Gauvain 2008) had a big influence in educational and growth psychology with the notion of the proximal zone of development and the development of constructivist curricula (Jaramillo 1996). And, of course, the emphasis of Piaget’s theory of constructivist cognitive development (emphasizing the formal abstract operational thinking marking “proper” adulthood) is a huge influence from the same field. This line of cognitive psychology enriched the ego psychology models because besides the behavior the inner richness of the human psyche starts to be considered in some form. Towards this, an influence has been the move of the daughter of Sigmund Freud to the USA, where much of this psychology development occurred. However, central to this psychology was the “me.” Now, these same authors have already pointed out that the ego and its development outside

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of the game of social relations cannot be understood. Even authors such as Piaget, who is often accused of self-isolation, are, in fact, highly social. For example, it is enough to read Piaget’s (Piaget and Cook 1952, 2013) understanding of the development of the autonomy (Piaget et al. 2013; Kamii 1991) of the child directly to see that it is a tremendously social proposal with its emphatic playful understanding of community and of neighborhood (Piaget 2013a, 2013b). However, we think that psychology is taking a third turn, where the emphasis would be on the social and the community is not only a modulating aspect of human development but also the nature of what is the person and its development. In that line, we include ourselves, but there are many other efforts that have been considered tangentially in this book, and others that have not been considered at all. The reason for exclusion is entirely due to focusing on the interdisciplinary dialogue and debate (philosophy and psychology) of the person and their development in general. For example, of great interest to all of us is a line of work recognized under the terms joint attention and share intentionality, our reference author here is Tomasello, anthropologist, and psychologist (Tomasello 2007, 2014). This line, together with the works of attachment, social referencing, and the we-mode in anthropology (Gallotti and Frith 2013), is showing, as we do ourselves, that the dimension of (inter)personal relationship is not a mere modulating aspect of personal processing in the self. The social and relational in the person is profoundly about our nature as social beings, and, in agreement with our proposal, the person and his/her development can be correctly understood from within personal relationality. Hence, precisely expressing this commonality we have with these anthropological psychologists, in our proposal in the inter-processual self, the term “inter” is expressing this very profound assumption. The difference is that, while these proposals of Tomasello (2007, 2014) and others of social referencing (Klinnert et al. 1986; Mireault et al. 2014; Pelaez, Virues-Ortega, and Gewirtz 2012; Feinman and Lewis 1983) or attachment theory (Bowlby 1982) focus on the study of the small child and adopt a more psychological approach, our personalist virtue ethics proposal focuses on the person in general (and personal relational growth) and with a philosophical and psychological approach. We suggest that many other lines of work are open in the same direction as ours, and future research will give a fuller account of this, giving strength to our work in turn. Just to show some examples, we quote from psychoanalysis, such as Winnicott (1965) and Kohut (1966, 1968), or from the personalist philosophy to humanistic psychology of Mounier

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(2009) or Buber (1970), or from the same psychology to Murray (1964), who came to propose that psychology should evolve to “personology.” We thus discover a common line on which we find ourselves, one that has as a common denominator the characteristic of approaching the knowledge of the person from his natural inter-personal base and never abandoning this base. That is to say, the personal encounter—or relation as natural root of the person—is not just a moment of the self (in its growth), but it is its constant reference that never abandons human beings. And it is from where a(ny) human person accesses the world and itself, as we discuss later in the book with reference to the conceptual foundations of the IPS proposal. This line should not be confused with others that, in our opinion, end up dissolving or diminishing the “I” in the social as if in the end social pressures become the subject who acts in an oblivion of its identity as if it is the impersonal “society.” This seems an exaggeration that we do not share. We find problems with these proposals as they abandon the personalist normative assumption we suggest in IPS. Precisely in order to avoid such misunderstanding instead of repeatedly talking about the social, we refer, instead, to inter-personal relationship(s): we aim this way to preserve and safeguard the character of personal being and personal encounter and to create a form of conceptualizing our proposal that closes the door to the possibility of its supporting views that blur the person in a game of social tensions, laden with sociological concerns and assumptions that cancel the key concerns we represent—as on occasion Bourdie performs (1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) from sociology. At this point it is also useful to refer to basic terms we relate to surrounding the person, the self, and agency in philosophy and psychology. To contextualize these here in the context of psychology so that readers can follow the subsequent chapter analysis, it should be noted that different branches of “modern” psychological research frequently use the terms “person,” “subject,” “actor,” “agent,” “me,” “the self,” and “I.” These terms are used to refer to the human being who is, who acts, and his or her associated “growth”. Often, achieving personal growth in psychology has focused on the question of how to achieve integrity in the self, while the pursuit of being a self-integrated person has been linked with cognitive developmental dynamics associated with the actor’s selfsystem (McAdams 1990a). Congruently, central questions in the “modern” branches of self-integration psychology also touch upon important ontological and epistemological, as well as moral and teleological, issues (McAdams 1990a, 1990b) such as those that have been tackled by normative philosophy in both the classical and the modern traditions.

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These questions, among others, include the following: “Who is the human being in ontological terms?” “Who is the self and how is the self constituted?” “How should we understand agency and the relation between agency and the subject who acts?” “How should we understand the purpose of psychology for agency and the ends that human action creates or pursues?” “What provides unity and purpose in human life?” “What is the nature of personal integrative development and what is the reference for maturation and growth?” “What are the developmental dynamics in the self that allow a person to grow and flourish, and how do we define what effective growth ensures?” Within modern psychology, the branch of theory concerned with human moral action in a way that is linked with a mature inner locus in the acting person (which is the modern equivalent of Aristotle’s concern for human virtue and its inner locus as prerequisite for an ethical teleology connected with human action) were greatly influenced by a few, albeit extremely important, scholars and theorists. Specifically, theoretical foundations in modern psychology surrounding problems of the mature self and ethical human action have received attention from Piaget (1962) and Vygotsky (1980, 1986) in cognitive development, Kohlberg (1969, 1981, 1984; Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990)—and recently Haidt (2001)—in moral development and cognitive theories (also Harvey, Hunt, and Schroeder, 1961), humanistic development psychology inspired by Rogers (Gendlin 1962, 1969, 1978/1997, 1991), and human learning theories (Kolb 2015) that are inspired by radical empiricism in Dewey (1929). In mainstream modern psychology, Richard Ryan equally and profoundly influenced a positivist scientific human development theory (Deci and Ryan 2002, 2013; Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000, 2004, 2006; Ryan and Lynch 1989; Moller, Deci, and Ryan 2006). Additionally, post-Piagetian theorists have developed noteworthy works and theories that are influenced by the postmodern turn in modern psychology that started in the 1990s. Related works include those by Kegan (1982, 1994) and Lahey-Laskow (1986), who were inspired by postmodern thinking on the socially constructed self (Gergen 1985, 1991, 1999). Finally, Loevinger (1966, 1976) and her successor Cook-Greuter (1999, 2000), who worked on the post-Piagetian ego-development branch of modern psychology, were greatly influenced by psychoanalytical traditions on the self (Loevinger’s work is especially and closely linked with Freud, Strachey, and Freud 2001; Freud 1992) and Buddhist thinking (Cook-Greuter’s work). Across all of these theories, and despite theoretical differences in foundations and assumptions, there are very salient commonalities

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regarding what it is to be an ethical person and the links between an ethical (morally mature) self-system and the kinds of agency and action that ensue. They also contain concern about how to maintain and enhance the resilience and the flourishing of the acting agent in pursuit of a desired end. Despite the hyper-fragmentation of modern psychology on the self, and human growth and development, across all modern (or postmodern) lines of work mentioned above, some common questions also emerge, including how some notion of “mature” or “higher-level” human agency for the good occurs. This problem is being approached through a conception that it has to emerge later in life as a result of intentional rational will by subject-agents, and in most cases human mature agency is seen as tied to aspirational conceptions of growth in order to achieve self-direction or self-authorship first, which would then allow human agency to focus on moral concerns and exclusively allow for a connection with broader universal and human values in higher states of growth. Integrative processes in the self in modern psychological theories (e.g., Ryan 1995) have a lot of commonalities with stage development models regarding the inner tendencies of human organisms to strive to actualize themselves by covering increasingly diverse needs, gradually aiming at establishing higher unity in the self. These models assume the self-system of the acting person lacks a naturally existing integrated locus that motivates the organism’s aiming to achieve superior states of integrative processing, which are theoretically linked with an aspirational ideal of retrieving (a lost/inexistent) inner locus of integrity (and virtue) in the person’s organism and self-system. In addition, modern theories on the self and human growth generally understand the self as lacking unity, and human development, through a variety of tasks, aims to integrate different domains, identities, antithetical traits or tendencies, or conflicting functions and processes in the self. Hence the problem of an integrated self has always started from a premise and axiom that the self lacks integration and unity, and a higher-level capacity for integrative development is primarily a cognitive challenge to be solved. Overall, as noted, all the above approaches emanate from the very premises of modern thought and are not in deep theoretical congruence with Aristotelian assumptions that guide a consistent moral psychology (an applied moral psychology that fully corresponds to a classical conception of the self, action, and human and social growth). Based on these critiques and limitations relevant to the current strengths and weaknesses of modern psychology of self, we trust our proposed theory of

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self, and its normative links with agency, will offer new ground for theory in moral psychology. That theory corresponds to the “inter-processual self” as a new interdisciplinary theory of self, human action, knowing, and growth. Our next step is centered on the question of method upon which to ground our argument and introduction of this new theoretical perspective. We aim to systematically summarize the commonalities that exist across the many prominent theories of self and human action and growth, both to capture their commonalities and to underline (in philosophical, anthropological, and psychology terms) their differences with our proposal. Accordingly, we will use a systematic method to approach all these aims in the sections that follow. While most efforts to understand the subject and its development are based exclusively on psychological models, our proposal departs from a review of the theory of knowledge. In that sense, we present two opposite positions regarding the object-subject relationship. The first group of mainstream theories, representing different schools, highlights the distance between the subject and the object. We call them “representationists” since the subject sees the external object as a representation in the process of cognitive apprehension. The fact that the subject and the object pre-exist the act of knowledge leads to a conception of knowing and acting as different and independent things. On the contrary, we consider knowing and acting as two conceptualizations of the same act and the subject and the object as emerging conceptualizations of the development of knowledge. Thus, our position is non-representational because its focus is not on how I know what exists outside of myself, but rather how I intensify the relationship that precedes the emergence of the subject and the object. In order to clarify these different positions, we provide an appendix on the evolution of the theory of knowledge. We rely on the Aristotelian philosopher Leonardo Polo, whose immense work and studies on philosophical (transcendental) anthropology value personalism. Specifically, we refer to the three fundamentals (radicals) of human reality in the work of Polo (2007a, 2007b) and his philosophical–anthropological theory lens on the history of Western philosophy. Aristotle’s work, for its part, is important to our theory because it summarizes the classical thought, and its resulting teleology and ontology are mainly concerned with moral psychology (in its classical conception, as opposed to the modern one). However, Polo’s work is also important herein because personalism and anthropology are significant foundational concerns for a new theory of self and action, and knowing that achieves decisive distance from the modern notions. It should also be

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noted here that our proposal only includes Polo’s version of personalist anthropology, which follows the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition and is not a broader embracement of personalism, which is a philosophical and anthropological viewpoint with many diverse authors, whose broad tradition on the matter departs from a phenomenological approach. Hence, in terms of our goal of bringing Polo’s work into focus as a basis for classification and comparison of two competing paradigms on the self and human action and growth, Polo introduces three distinct concepts, each of which “captures” a particular fundamental root (or “radical”, in his own words) of human ontology. When talking about “fundamentals,” Polo warned that this term has a very strong metaphysical connotation that may be in conflict with freedom, and so he prefered the word “radical” to emphasize the idea of a key or very important reference. The first fundamental identified is the classic radical that comes from Aristotelian philosophy and links all humanity and action with nature. The second fundamental identified is the modern radical; this comes from modern Western philosophy and its contribution idealizes the subject and its activity, with a focus on results. The third fundamental originates in Christian scholars with Aristotle as an origin of thought and is the radical of being a person. In Polo’s thought, each of these “three radicals” conceptually captures in a “keyword” all Western philosophy relevant to the study of humanity. We have chosen Leonardo Polo’s radicals to help us systematically distinguish between the autonomous self (AS) and the inter-processual self (IPS) and the incommensurability involved in these two contrasting paradigms. Although we provide a detailed analysis of Polo later in this book, here it suffices to clarify that his work contains a personalist anthropology. Polo’s proposed conceptualization of the fundamentals of human reality published as the output of cross-comparative analysis of the history of Western philosophy and the study of humanity helps delineate the basic conceptual differences between the AS and IPS paradigms of the self and human development. Adopting these as a classification method, we show that there are two distinct and clearly different paradigms guiding the self and the underlying assumptions regarding cognition, knowing and human action, and maturity and integrity. We suggest that each of these contrasting paradigms gives rise to opposing kinds and qualities of moral valuing and meaning making (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2011; Akrivou and Orón 2016) and corresponding human action ensues. These two contrasting paradigms include (1) an autonomous self (AS), and (2) a contrasting inter-

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processual self (IPS). We briefly summarize these paradigms here, presenting them in a more systematic way in Chapter Five of this book. In AS, the person is defined as apart from (in confrontation with, in opposition to, and distanced from) others who are perceived as object(s) in the social/relational world. The self and others are understood as external boundaries or domains. Internally, AS understands itself as made up of distinct separate “domains.” This is because AS understands the human being as primarily a subject that strives to grow in increasing autonomy via independently authoring “how best one wishes to live one’s life.” Individualist growth in AS happens thanks to maintaining self-control and even a sense of moral self that values moral individualism in thinking, evaluating, and acting. In reality, across various psychological theories in the modern tradition, the “autonomous self” (AS) comprises two polar modes, each of which serves as an aspirational ideal of moral self and action that makes up the two opposing “poles” of AS: a purely “autonomous–rationalist” (or ARS) and a “processual–relationist” (or PS) pole or mode of moral maturity, valuing, and action. This distinction is presented in more detail later; here we will focus on introducing AS versus IPS and their correspondence to Polo’s three radicals. We suggest that the autonomous self (AS) paradigm finds representation in broader modern (and postmodern) human development psychology. Various theories that at first sight appear diverse ultimately share a core premise—that is, that there is a self-subject whose integrative development requires autonomy in cognition (Kegan 1994) and will (Cook-Greuter 1999) in the self-system (Ryan 1995). It seems to us that all the theories classified as AS share an idealized and exaggerated view of the modern subject and human agency. The strength of the subject is so elevated that the subject is even at the core of the post-autonomous states of integrative development in stage theories. For this reason, we have named this model “autonomous”. In addition, across all theories that we classify as AS, there is a shared premise that self-development relies upon a dynamic–synthetic (influenced by Hegelian synthesis) view of the self, enabling gradual self-unification (Ryan 1995). In accordance with Hegel’s work (1969), the dynamic–synthetic view of the self pertains that the parts will be absorbed and will dissolve/disappear because the new (superior state) overcomes the previous state through the incorporation of the previous parts. The second and fundamentally contrasting paradigm of self-maturity (human development) and human action is the inter-processual self (IPS). According to the philosophical–personalist anthropology and teleology underlying this paradigm (our proposal), the human being is primarily a

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person and being a person is premised upon an unconditional ontology. IPS always understands the person as a moral unity with a continuous and consistently integrated character (each particular human person always has a line linking action and connecting across points in times and contexts). IPS also understands the person as a transcendental and unique being. It adopts the lens of Polo’s personalism to help theoretically support how IPS’s ontology and anthropology is grounded in the notion of being a (moral) person. However, in IPS, the person harmonically integrates the other two “radicals” of Polo. IPS is rooted in the Aristotelian tradition concerning human nature (the first or Greek radical), and how it is extended (Polo 1998, 2003). In IPS, the person also accepts and embraces the notion of being a subject–agent (the second or “modern” radical), but does not lose himself or his sense of humanity. Neither personal growth nor moral maturity are possible via a lens of moral individualism for IPS—that is, outside the notion of our relations with others in the groups, communities, and societies we partake in. But acting to create novelty through selfmastery that underlies the notion of the modern subject–agent is employed thoughtfully in the service of being a person and acting from within personal humanity. Instead, in IPS, personal (moral) growth and moral maturity occur only through the improvement in the quality of relations between a person and other persons as well as other beings, and nature. We suggest that the IPS paradigm balances nature, the modern subject, and the person, while these three are integrated (in processual systemic dialoguing terms) from within the person. Additionally, IPS’s moral psychology is based on the concept “system.” This means that IPS understands and values growth/maturity as contingent on how each person chooses to act in relation to others and what kind of mutual growth qualities are brought to life in relational terms. Hence, understanding and action in IPS are profoundly different from independently deciding “how best one wishes to live one’s life,” the issue that characterizes the AS mindset; in fact, the AS way of knowing and acting is meaningless in the IPS paradigm. Hence, the two underlying foundations of the IPS mindset are linked with the concepts person and system respectively. Furthermore, regarding the concept system that constitutes the ontology and moral psychology in IPS’s moral locus, valuing, and action, we suggest that the person, as the foundation of IPS, is understood as an open, free system (Polo in Pérez López 1993). The notion of “openness” in the case of human beings is expressed through intimacy in relations. Openness also maintains itself ad infinitum, so we suggest that, in IPS, the

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growth of oneself and others in a system is unrestricted, while growth does not point to a concrete place or a specific goal, nor is it in reference to some “rule” of development. A systemic view of development claims that the internal relationship between different parts of a system enables growth to achieve both a higher (more integrated) state for each part and the maintenance of uniqueness and difference as parts grow in their internal relationship. The concept person refers to the “felt” and “intuited” intimacies required for growth (in addition to one’s active or rationalist cognition) (Akrivou and Orón 2016). Personal growth requires each person to attend to and respect their inner integrity and personal relating on the basis of mutuality and freedom. While personal relating is a complicated process, we suggest it differs substantially from AS. We introduce the paradigm of human maturity, action, and knowing in IPS with the term “interprocessual” because being a “person” implies that the uniqueness of each one is albeit processually and intentionally evolving in relation to others. Thus, we develop a further systematic analysis of the above and the theoretical foundations of IPS, where we also provide further details that support the classification of various authors’ models in the psychology of human development and the AS and IPS paradigms. Therefore, we also offer a higher order re-integration and a subsequent systematic classification of human development theories and we critically analyze the basic assumptions of AS and IPS.2 In doing so, we suggest that the 2

This does not mean we suggest a precise and perfect fit of the chosen models (e.g., we classify Ryan’s Self-determination theory (SDT) under the AS paradigm, but it clearly has features that bring it closer to IPS). Importantly, we suggest later in this book that there are also a few authors whose models cannot be directly classified under either of the two paradigms. Methodologically, and due to the breadth and highly fragmented nature of human development theories, once the various models of human integrative development (i.e., the notion of integrity) are classified as AS or IPS mode(s), we will be able to study other theories and authors in future research While “data are always data,” the real challenge is found in how the data are understood and made sense of and where their research value can be applied. Indeed, we show that what appear to be “similar concepts or data” across theories can profoundly differ insofar as they are understood from within foundational assumptions of an AS or IPS paradigm. For example, how post-Piagetian stage theories (many of which may be understood as postmodern stage theories) conceptualize their highest post-autonomous stages of human growth may also be examined by assuming a focus on process and relationship, as in the IPS paradigm, but the AS paradigm understands these from within a subject–object frame of reference. Instead, from within an IPS paradigm, basic assumptions on process and

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dominant “AS” view of human development is incomplete. We further suggest that IPS is a complete and profound way to understand the self, human activity (agency), and development/growth that enables virtue as a way of life and favors both personal and interpersonal (relational) flourishing, as well as the broader common good. We argue that IPS is an appropriate moral psychology and congruent with virtue ethics. After a variety of psychological models are classified as AS or IPS based on the above summary, and after the sub-varieties of moral valuing and action that capture AS are presented, the third part of this book crossexamines how AS and IPS differ regarding four key terms, specifically integration, intentional purpose, cognition, and freedom. We choose these terms because they are part of the core vocabulary in all human development theory, while maintaining the original link with psychology, but manifest radical differences in how they are understood and linked to the main premises of branches of human development psychology that classify them as AS or IPS respectively. Looking to how these first three chapters of the book add value, we suggest that our endeavor to organize and classify the various psychology models with a reference to underlying philosophies under two paradigms/modes of human development is useful to scholars, educators, and practitioners. Indeed, our suggested classification provides a theoretical “key” to help appreciate and critically understand the value of the broader tradition of human development theory, and how different psychologies are useful in the study of descriptive ethics that supports their corresponding normative ethical foundational theories. Again, regarding this, we argue for the suitability of the (newly introduced) IPS mindset for problems relevant to virtue theory, while we also show how its key assumptions are grounded in the foundational works of Aristotle (1941), Leonardo Polo (1997, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2012), Wan Yangming (1963), and Alfred North Whitehead (1978, 2011). In addition, we close this part of the analysis by introducing two key works in the humanist psychology tradition (namely the work of Carl Rogers and Erik Erikson) and in philosophy consistent with personalist ontology (the work of Buber) to flesh out how moral psychology encompasses, in practical terms, the concepts person and system in IPS’s way of knowing, valuing, growing, and acting as a moral person in relationship are radically transformed, as we show. A key example lies in how the terms “person” and “system” are understood as basic foundations of the IPS mode of human development, fundamentally differing from Piagetian/post-Piagetian foundations. IPS’s understanding of “system” makes it evident that Piaget’s dynamic systems approach accepts Piaget only as a general, broad description.

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relation to other persons. In the fourth chapter of this book, we look to four broader, well-known works relevant to human development, including John Dewey, the Dynamic Systems Approach, Humberto Maturana, and Francisco Varela, because they are related to the works we classify or the broader tradition, in which case we critically analyze them and explain why they cannot be classified as either AS or IPS. We also look at these because they are influential works (in either positive or negative terms) and we share our related critiques alongside our analysis. Finally, in the second part of this book, implications are drawn regarding how an adoption of the IPS paradigm could ground the way we understand the self and ethics in society and inspire a (new) corresponding view of human cognition, education (and emotional education), and governance as a basis for inspiring a way of life and cultivating human beings who can navigate life’s challenges. We further touch upon how an IPS-inspired perspective adopted in critical spheres such as politics/public governance and business governance would change current perspectives, which we suggest are currently based on the AS paradigm. We conclude by broadly reflecting on the relevance of IPS. We emphasize that ours is a theoretical proposal that aims to encourage dialogue in different fields of knowledge, as well as further application on concrete, practical realms.

CHAPTER TWO THE STARTING POINT WITH REGARD TO COGNITION

In this chapter, we will see how one’s vital approach to the world (trying to control it or wondering about it) and the distinction between act and production reflect two different approaches to what it means “to know.” As seen, the IPS paradigm on self, valuing, knowing, and links to human action are founded on Aristotle’s ethics of virtue (classical thinking) and Leonardo Polo’s personalism. To help show how profoundly these influences associated with our proposal (the IPS paradigm) differ from the modernist viewpoint in philosophy (which we associate with AS), we focus here on how each paradigm understands cognition (see also Appendix). Juxtaposing these two alternative conceptions between the modernist and the classical view of human cognition is an important task before embarking on a detailed and systematic analysis of AS versus IPS. In cognitive and psychological sciences, it is widely recognized that each acting person’s thought (cognition) differs somewhat from reality itself; instead, cognition is a kind of representation of reality. Generally, it is not problematic that “what is thought” and “what is” are not one and the same thing. Indeed, this view is shared by both Aristotle and modern thinkers, and is therefore common to both the AS and the IPS paradigms. However, how (the way in which) these similarities and differences in cognition are understood guides the assumptions of the philosophical foundations that distinguish AS from IPS. Of course, it should be noted that we do not try to offer a complete literature review or a meta-analysis of the various philosophies and theories of cognition that correspond to AS and IPS; such an attempt lies outside the aims of this section. Instead, we take the thought of modern philosophers Descartes and Kant—whose work and methods are broadly known—as examples to facilitate critical thinking on how profoundly their thought differs from that of Aristotle and Polo, which guides the IPS paradigm. Therefore, the idea of cognition in these modern philosophers is critiqued from within an IPS philosophical paradigm.

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1. Different foundational conceptions of knowledge in each paradigm We examine four key philosophers’ thought with regard to both the general theoretical differences between AS and IPS, and how they differ regarding cognition. To help explain the AS perspective on cognition, we focus on Descartes and Kant. To help distinguish the IPS perspective on cognition, we focus on Polo and Wang, who can be referred back to Aristotle. We look to more radical foundational intellectual positions that are based on a distinct existential position (not just theory) because these can help us better understand the notions of thinking and having thought. A theoretical and ontological view of cognition is, in our view, highly dependent upon the closely interconnected philosophical and psychological ontological positions with which one starts. First, it is helpful to understand how the philosophies of Descartes and Kant (for AS) versus those of Polo and Wang (for IPS) choose their starting point, or core assumptions, regarding the notion of cognition and its relation to human life and reality. This is possible not only because we adopt Aristotle’s view on the inseparability between the character of the acting person and the chosen and produced action (praxis), but also because we accept that personal attitude “ultimately determines what is meant by philosophy and method” in each theorist’s abstract work (Corazón 2003). Accordingly, we suggest that Descartes basically seeks security in order to alleviate the doubt wrapped up in his original position. His doubts, and the security he seeks, are resolved by rationalist cognition, such that Descartes can declare, “cogito ergo sum.” Thus, from their original personal position each philosopher intentionally chooses a consistent corresponding metaphysical and existential underpinning. Kant, for his part, intends to bring together the passive understanding of knowledge with a decisive move that sets a clearer, more proactive stance on the surrounding world. Kant assumes that, by imitating science, other disciplines will have the same success as science. He understands cognition following the rules of science (looking for the laws of cognition), as well as employing the same existential movement: science aims to control the world, thus to know something is a way of controlling it. With a contrasting approach and worldview, Leonardo Polo’s starting point is a deeper feeling of amazement that emanates from what it means to be human. This starting point of wonder inspires trust about our shared humanity’s huge potentialities and constitutes his way of approaching

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philosophy, as well as his philosophical stance on human cognition. With this in mind, Polo determines that, only once the faculty of cognition is surpassed and transcended (albeit not discarded), can we really start knowing and acting in ways that allow us to reach the potentialities involved in the notion of being human. Both Aristotle and Polo, who continued the Aristotelian tradition, ground our theory of the interprocessual self. Relying on Polo provides clarity on the coherence and complementarity between the theories that ground our proposal. Indeed, Polo is even clearer and more systematic in extending Aristotle’s view on cognition and the Aristotelian understanding of action. Finally, Wang Yangming integrates the great heaven–earth–humanity family because his starting point is the unity of all related things. His philosophy is based on this initial worldview and way of understanding the self and internal relationship with the world, which always aims to connect things in a way that enables wholeness in knowing and acting in the heavenly–earthly–human realms of existence. Rooted in these radically different original orientations, and in each philosopher’s “personal attitude” to the ontology of being and things, it is not surprising that these four philosophers’ existential positions are strikingly different. In what follows, we will analyze their ideas further. Descartes develops his theory of knowledge in his Discourse on Method; Kant his, as relevant to the rational will, in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason. Polo sets out his thoughts in the four volumes of his theory of knowledge (Polo 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1994), which cannot be read apart from his work on a kind of transcendental knowing “evidence and reality” (Polo 1996). It should be taken into account that Polo’s contribution regarding evidence and reality is a direct criticism of Descartes’ theory of knowledge. In Yangming’s case, his works are more holistic and integrated, but Frisina offers a great analysis of his view of knowledge as part of his concern for unity (2002). Descartes’ position is part of his underlying doubt and intuited suspicion relevant to the fear of being deceived. The theme of deception is fundamental to understanding the Cartesian starting point and his conclusions for overcoming this fear. In reality, this theme is not just relevant to how cognition relates to reality; indeed, Descartes’ attitude is marked by a broader suspicion of everything, which he “logically” seeks to resolve through a reliance on critical thinking as a means of finding security. We suggest, therefore, that his obsession with security leads to the Cartesian position(s): Descartes does not know anything and is suspicious of the possibility of knowing or finding anything outside cognition. He

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doubts the “object world,” but he does not doubt the faculty of cognition as trustworthy, which is not, for Descartes, the object world of reality. Thus, cognition is relied upon as such as an absolute authority for knowing, which guides and masters the subject’s ability to uncover anything that is incongruent with cognition. Polo’s critique (1996) of Descartes’ extreme reliance on rationalist cognition is that, in the end, what Descartes knows is aside from cognition because an act of the (rationalist) will is performed when he a priori ascertains what he knows about the object world (that it cannot be trusted since it is a statement based on the will alone rather than on cognition). Kant focuses on the will, which he considers universal and formal, and it is as if he were ambitiously and bluntly trying to resolve the aforementioned critique of Descartes. Kant’s attitude emanates from the fact that he wants to make (pure, at least clinically) scientific logic and empirical science the highest premise and authority that can be trusted in order to know. This is Kant’s starting point and it is indisputable for him. Kant wishes to bridge or synthesize a passive view of cognition (in agreement with the notion that our mind is the passive receptor of the object) and a more active view of human beings. This latter position leads Kant to formulate the position that space–time categories are merely formal features of our perception of objects, and in no case are they things in themselves—that is, with an independent and objective existence based on objective properties or relations among these objects; instead, space– time renders objects as mere “appearances.” In supporting these positions, Kant intended to show, ambitiously, that science can finally be defended, allowing him to normatively suggest that one can only work towards knowing things insofar as they are scientifically measured and evidenced. Hence, for Kant, scientific knowledge is the only kind of knowing that is trustworthy, which allows for measurement in space and time only. As such, recognizing the effectiveness of science reveals a successful foundation and inspires Kant’s clear departing point: anything that seems similar to science is reliable. The a priori space–time is indebted to its assessment of science. For this (rather problematic) reason, it is not easy to differentiate between truth and logic in Kant, because the line separating the two concepts is very blurred and anything that appears logical is taken to be true in his philosophy. The Kantian philosophical project unfortunately fails in its effort to grasp knowledge, and instead strengthens scientific knowing as superior to other forms of rational knowing. Ethics is a mere addition to this way of knowing. Hence, in our view, enormous amounts of confusion eventually emerge between ethics and knowing in Kant.

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Descartes’ and Kant’s existential positions (and their limits) are recognizable in reference to the AS’s exclusive focus on the subject–agent and human action as agency emanating from the subject–agent who aims to alter the surrounding environment (by utilizing a scientific approach). It contains an initial suspicion about everything that is not about the “I” (the sovereign autonomous subject–agent). The “I,” the autonomous rationalist self, is not debatable and, while it doubts the surrounding object world, it does not doubt its own “reason,” which recalls Descartes. Logically anything that is non-self is an object, and thus the “I” looks upon the “thou” as an external (alien) object. In a different line of argument, albeit on a similar path or reasoning, this leads to a (philosophical) universe of distrust of the object and an absolute trusting of the faculties of the acting subject–agent’s (rationalist) cognition and her rationalist will, which requires distance from the object world and cannot relate to objects except via a position of cognitive superiority. This mindset can work only if “the object” becomes identical to the subject “I,” if the object loses its own humanity and transcendental uniqueness and appears as a reflection of the “I” (which in this philosophy is a rational possibility driven simply by the will). Philosophically, however, this cannot find any logical basis precisely because it presupposes an a priori hypothetical agreement on both universal principles and on the natural convergence of acts of the will by different groups or person. This is the case and a consequence of both Kant’s and Descartes’ works, and of course the limits of this have been critiqued by important contemporary philosophers (Sandel 2010). Accordingly, the Cartesian attitude is that the relationship of the self with the non-self is full of doubt and in search of safety, which really emanates from a “weak” self (who does not trust the possibility of rationality transcending in order to know) that is dependent on science’s “strength” to know and respond to what is experienced in the object world. As noted, AS contains a very strong premise of the self-subject whereby little difference exists between Descartes’ and Kant’s original subject position. But, in the end, with the help of scientific knowledge, Kant’s subject thinks of itself as strong and able to master the reality via the mastery of theoretical reason used as the main means for assessing and responding to the object world, via a safe distance from one’s own humanity and shared humanity. In many human development theories that capture AS consistently with “modern thought,” starting from the constructivist post-Piagetian theories of self and human development, there is a congruent emphasis on “human growth” linked exclusively to the mastery of rationalist knowing

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(for a brief review, see Akrivou 2013). For example, in Kegan’s AS development model (1995), Kegan’s subject is wholly founded upon autonomous rationalist mastery of the will (of the subject proceeding towards increasing self-authorship as its purpose in growth) throughout the entire trajectory of human development in the subject–object framework (Kegan and Lahey 2001; Kegan 2009). AS in Kegan confidently extends its domain; field after field it is extending its mastery over the object world, expanding its sense of control. This includes the mastery by the subject–agent of the world of relations. Self-development progresses towards an ideal of autonomy, via an increasing independence to selfauthor its life and relations as objects of the subject. At best, at the end of the model, relations are seen to grow towards an aspirational ideal of subject-to-subject dialectic. Although self-mastery and self-actualization appeared as legitimate “new” concerns for a while in the twentieth century, they basically originate in a Cartesian concern, as we suggest in this section (since Descartes prioritizes the will). Conversely, there are sharp differences between modern thinking and Polo (see Appendix), who starts with a sense of amazement for the world; his starting point is in a sense childlike. Instead of distrust and fear, his thought contains an original emphasis on wonder and admiration, which are dramatically life affirming and sudden. The following two texts speak for themselves on Polo’s initial position, which profoundly and positively influences the resulting ontology of the self and human action linked with this philosophy: My concept of philosophy is summarized as follows: Philosophy is the wisdom form of theoretical nature consisting of a beginning, admiration, from which comes a thematic development achieved, especially solving problems that come their way. It is, therefore, an ever increasingly incremental love of knowing (philo-sophia) in the same measure as the starting inspiration is not exhausted … (Polo 2002, 9) The admiration is more than a feeling. I try to explain. Above all, it is sudden: suddenly I find myself baffled by the reality that appears to me, unapproachable, in all its breadth. … The admiration has to do with amazement, with the appreciation of the novelty: the origin of philosophy is like a premiere. To that is added the release catch to investigate what admiration presented as yet failed … (Polo 2002, 22)

The starting point of Wang, a neo-Confucian philosopher, is congruent with Polo’s idea of co-existence; it is the internal relationship shared by all who/that exists that constitutes it. It is a metaphysical premise that affirms a shared identity and relationship. All beings are thought of as internally

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interconnected, in relation. This especially guides the resulting ontology that informs IPS: the verb “cultivate” is to develop a personal connection (of relatedness to) with one’s surroundings in a more comprehensive manner, aiming to form one “body” (one shared reality) with all things. This initial position profoundly contrasts with the modern notion of impersonal distance expressed in Kant’s and Descartes’ work herein discussed. In this ontology, one’s relations to others and all things are thus valued as the essence of each person’s being (not a necessity or an instrumental step). Relationships are thought of as the essence of being human and at the very core of the (shared) experience of humanness. Each entity is what it is through its identity-in-relationship-with and in-harmony-with other living and non-living entities. Wang and the neo-Confucians understand everything that ties the beings sharing a social and natural world as having an essentially moral component. In Wang, human action is understood as ethical, and no action is ethically neutral or amoral. Being responsible for one another, others (social groups and communities), and the world more broadly is a precondition for personal ethics, as well as part of acting in the world as a proper human being who acknowledges his own humanity. Wang’s philosophy suggests that each person, by the very act of acknowledging herself as human, should take on a personal and essential role in contributing to the creation of the moral principles that make human life truly humane and worth living. These postures in both Wang and Polo, which are consistent with the classical thought in the Greek philosophy, fully coincide with the attitudinal stance and key foundations of IPS. Now, taking into account their existential starting point, we will discuss their proposal with regard to cognition.

2. Cognition in Descartes and Kant, versus Polo and Wang 2.1. Cognition in Descartes As explained earlier, it can be said (in a humorous way) that Descartes’ theory of knowledge falls into its own trap because it proves to be quite weak in proving that trusting the cognitive rationalist subject’s faculties and distrusting the object world as a starting position is not a cognitive act, but rather a clear and objective rational act (of the will). The intellectual context surrounding Descartes’ thought, as well as Kant’s modern transcendental idealism and all German idealism (from the 1780s

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including Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), maintains focus on the rational will rather than cognition per se (see Appendix). Focusing on the will leads to a subjectivist turn in normative and broader philosophy, or it leads—as in the Kantian rationalist will—to trust objective scientific knowing as the sole premise for knowing. Instead, Descartes as noted seeks security and certainty, and he believes that cognition can achieve both. However, Descartes’ understanding of cognition unfortunately draws his quest down into a subjectivism. Reason, in principle, is the criterion of truth that provides security. Descartes clings to the operation of thinking as a solution, to maintain each agent’s control of the non-self, but he remains wary of what each agent thinks. This turns very problematic. In Descartes, the fact of thinking seems robust in itself; he does not doubt his capacity to think, but rather doubts the content of thought. Descartes examines the object of his thought, but not what it is “to think.” Descartes aims for the action of thinking to be supported by a subject that precedes it: “I think.” This is what makes his philosophical assumption fall back into subjectivism, just like other philosophers in his broader context whose work initially set out to overcome the Cartesian project. Proposing reason as a security blanket is Descartes’ solution, but this security (premised upon the faculty of rationalist cognition) prevents progress because doubt corrodes the possibility of any progress. Truth rests in the will of the person making a judgment to claim autonomously (and at a clinical distance from others) if something is true, or not. The truth lies in the (subjectivist) will of the person who thinks (and not in his intelligence). What Descartes knows is not knowable by intelligence, but rather is premised upon one’s personal will to know in a (willed) particular way and not in any other way. This has profound dehumanizing consequences for human relationships and life, as it depends on the subject in position of power or privilege; (s)he would expect the object world to (will) to behave in conformity with the will of the subject, as if there is an a priori agreement on what is right and what should be thought and done. The movement that Descartes follows in his thinking, is that it gets someone thinking and thinking (critically) unveils how doubt limits thought in relation to each person’s past experience(s) with deception (Descartes reports being disappointed when he discovered that he had been deceived by evaluating reality through the senses). Descartes sees this limitation and, given the fact that knowing via the cognitive faculty is so powerful in his work, he does not allow for any possibility of relating directly, whereby reality is directly knowable. So, the Cartesian premise is a dead end regarding the possibility of knowing anything at all. The same

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can be said of Descartes’ personal life, in which he increasingly withdrew into himself. Descartes returns to the 'will' and then insists on embracing what he intended from the beginning. It is the will that actually ignores data and misleads claims like sole truth, by forcing what the subject (who wills) thinks (s)he knows into reality. Descartes does not doubt the ability to think, or the possibility of thought, but rather the object of thought. In this way, Cartesian reason is limited in knowing and not about what is known (Polo 1996, 262). This locks Descartes not only in loneliness, but also in reality itself; Descartes’ approach has many problems regarding how human beings relate to reality and others in society because reality and reason are totally and irreversibly separate. The starting position is about the affirmation of this separation (cognition vs. reality), because it implicitly requires “modern thought” to distinguish between a subject and an object as a premise upon which thinking embarks. This corresponds to a representational view of reality, which permeates modern thought in philosophy, but is absent from the classical thinking of Aristotle, as well as from both Wang’s and Polo’s virtue ethics. This explains the challenges inherent in the AS paradigm’s conception of the self and its relationship to reality and others, as well as the purpose, idealized trajectory, and meaning of human development in AS (which we present later in this book in detail). In short, integration is, in accordance with the AS paradigm, about (cognitive) internal consistency and a subjective sense of cognitive coherence. In IPS, however, personal integration is a strikingly contrasted notion, entailing the systemic development of a person towards an ethically improved relationship with others whereby integration always includes differentiation both within the self and via accepting and respecting others’ differences and complicated, distinct personal identities. In IPS, these aspects are part of one phenomenon of integration. Descartes’ model of knowledge (and knowing) is entirely passive. The subject receives impressions, which are combined with the intent of the subject. The subject’s approach to reality is not understood as a neutral enterprise (premised upon pure reason as it aspires to be). Instead, in Polo, “intentionality” is not in the subject, but rather in the object because, in his opinion, intentionality is the relationship between the object and reality. In Descartes, intentionality belongs to the subject, while in Polo it belongs to the object. For this reason, Descartes sees limitations as part of the object alone and not as part of the subject or the faculty (the subject’s cognitive activity). Inversely, there is no limitation on the object, which is fine as it is (Polo 1996). In Polo, limitation is found in the cognitive operation (Polo

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1996). These two differences (the intentionality of the subject against the intentionality of the object, limiting the object in front of the limitation of the operation) explain how the Cartesian proposal in relation to knowing ends up closing in on itself.

2.2. Cognition in Kant It is worth mentioning that, as a starting point, Kant “relies heavily on Aristotelian logic as a theoretical tool, and on mathematics and Newtonian physics as fully constituted science” (García González 2005). On the other hand, Kant draws a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, which Aristotle does not do; “[p]henomenon as a possible object of conceptualization, of intellectual categorization, and through him the object judged, understood as susceptible ideal justification, argumentative rationality” (García González 2005, 31). Noumenon is a slippery term that refers to the thing in itself that cannot be accessed (García González 2014). The assessment of mathematics, geometry, and arithmetic in Kant is consistent with his description of an a priori space–time. The subject imposes pre-conditions on perception, which is a kind of filter whereby space and time exist as given a priori. Out there nothing is knowable or understandable. And what’s left to explain the phenomenon of perception makes the process entirely passive, receptive, and constructive. The philosophical premise of IPS rejects the constructive character of knowledge: “Kantian synthesis is a (logical) construction, not an act commensurable with its object”1 (Polo 1988a, 86). There is, in Kant, an eclectic mix between activity–passivity, but what is clear is that knowledge for Kant (as well as for Descartes) is a product, that is, a result, and what is known is simply a phenomenon. Knowledge is not an act for them. This distinction between product and act marks a clear difference between the AS and IPS proposals. In AS, to know is a product; in IPS, to know is an act. We note here again Aristotle’s distinction between acting and producing. The first only involves the development of operative habits and personal change as integral to acting. This is because in acting acts involve the process of knowing and what is known are both part of this very same thing (acting), whereas production only captures what is known—the outcome or product of knowing. Aristotle has shown that the known is not a production or result. Rather, what is known is 1

Please note that both this emphasis and all other emphases within extracts throughout the book are the authors’ own.

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inside of the very process of knowing. Kant’s approach, hence, may be philosophically objected (Polo 1988a, 1988b) on the premise that Kant does not respect what Aristotle discovered despite Kant’s premise of starting from Aristotelian foundational premises. The passive nature of perception found in Kantian philosophy is not Aristotelian. On the other hand, according to Kant, there is no kind of freedom involved in knowing, which Aristotle rejects. There is a mechanism between previous conditions and the constructive nature of perception. In contrast, in a more genuinely Aristotelian premise found in the Polian philosophy (García González 2005, 2014), personal freedom does not exist without knowledge: a mirror is not free when it receives an image, but indeed it does not know (García González 2005, 2014). Cognition in IPS is therefore an act and moreover it must be a personal act, which opens up the possibility of a kind of perception as an act of personal freedom. The active nature of knowledge in Kant results from the a priori imposition of some ideal (for instance space–time categories) or preconception. This becomes a founding act of knowledge; it is the subject that establishes knowledge. But, in Kant, knowledge of the “preconception” (a priori) rests entirely on the subject to know something transcendental. For Kant, transcendental does not really deal with objects, (but) refers instead to an a priori way of knowing (Kant, KRV B25). Kant’s pessimistic determinism appears to confirm that a noumenon exists, but is unattainable. This means that knowledge cannot be regarded as scientific either. Hence it is better either to suppress knowledge and give way to faith (Kant, KRV B30), or, on the other hand, to study reality by relying on scientific instruments. This Kantian dualistic thinking assumes theory and practice to be independent. This independent subdivision squarely recalls the AS paradigm in support of our earlier (internal reference) categorization of AS origins in philosophy. There are more elements in Kant that closely support the AS premises. For example, preconception has a regulatory knowledge function, which is a clear hallmark of AS. “To regulate” is to impose a form and that (regulation) is what makes consciousness. The AS model’s premises related to Kantian philosophy can also be found in the statement that the subject is a clear antecedent to knowledge. The subject, which is foundational knowledge, is prior to knowledge. As mentioned, the undisputed starting point for AS is the subject–object distinction. In addition, Kant favors practical over theoretical reason: “[t]he autonomy of man who gives to himself his own moral law, implies the primacy of practical reason—of will—and the submission of theoretical

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reason interest” (Corazón 2007, 38). But he considers Reason prior to Being, the opposite of Aristotle’s view (Scalzo and Alford 2016).

2.3. Cognition in Polo’s work and reference to Aristotle Polo’s work on knowledge is vast and dense on this matter (Polo 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1994). A concise introduction to his theory of knowledge is explained in Appendix, as well as in Murillo’s article (1998). For the purpose of this chapter, we will present his proposal as an alternative to the modern paradigm, as explained in Descartes and Kant. This will help us to explain the IPS foundational theory relevant to cognition. Abstract perception or abstraction is a technical word in Polo that refers to Aristotelian philosophy’s axiom that material and form are distinct albeit inseparable realities whereby one cannot exist aside the other. In cognition, human beings consider form abstractly, that is to say, without materiality (for example, the thought of fire does not burn). Human intelligence demonstrates its uniqueness in its ability to abstract. The intellectual abilities that precede it—“the common sensorium”—are shared with animals (see Appendix). “Feeling” refers to something concretely felt, while “imagination” refers to representation, and “memory” and “the cogitative” aim to manipulate what is imagined in perception (Polo 2009). That these operations are shared with animals does not mean that humans and animals operate in the same way. What is meant is that imagination is entirely dissimilar between humans and nonhuman species; each one has its own way of imagining. The fact is that imaginative operations occur in humans, but humans can abstract in their imaginative perception. To understand the notion of abstraction, it is important to acknowledge its debt to Aristotle’s theory of knowledge: “Aristotle distinguishes clearly between two types of events: kinesis and prâxis téleia. The former activity has no end. Building is of this type, as long as the activity occurs, its end or final product, does not exist. Moreover (in kinesis), action disappears once the end has been achieved. But this is not so regarding the notion of prâxis téleia. It is simultaneous with its end, and exercised in that measure” (Murillo 1998, 67). This has several consequences for the corresponding theory of knowledge: the object is inside the operation (and not outside and a priori, as Descartes or Kant claim), intentionality points to the object (not to the subject, as Descartes and Kant argue), and knowledge (knowing) does not entail reflexivity (the operation that knows objects cannot know itself, as Kant and Descartes argue).

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Polo takes another step in this matter: habit versus abstraction and the different ways of knowing. Aristotle considered habit as an act, but for Polo, it is the perfection of an operation (for instance of knowing). The faculty is potential and the operation that uses a faculty becomes an act in Aristotle. In Polo, a habit could also be an act in itself; habit is not exclusively related to an operation as in Aristotle. Polo suggests there are three ways to act: through operations, when habits are outside the operations, and the acts of being or personal acts. Hence, for Polo, habit is an act of the person, but it is not an operation, thus habit is linked with human development: in Polo “habit” opens the door for unrestricted growth, or restricts it depending on the context. That is, we can know through operations and habits, but we know different things in each case. These two ways are of course not the only ways of knowing because we have habits that do not involve operations, but rather are innate. Innate habits (of which we present here only wisdom) enable the highest form of knowledge, “personal knowing,” which corresponds to one of the personal transcendentals. The term “transcendental” means something that is real but which is rather existent at a spiritual level or pre-existent, and which, while it is being experienced a priori, is something we are not capable of capturing, or producing by algebraic operations involving addition, multiplication, and involution or their inverse positivist operations. Transcendental means also that something cannot be reduced to psychological or physical levels because the same reality without ceasing to be physical is more. So in this sense what is transcendental is relational because it is pointing out to something else. The unrestrictive growth of the human being is possible thanks to his four transcendentals, which we refer to in Polo’s work as a basis for our theory of the inter-processual self in our proposal. Further exploration of Polo’s theory of habit goes beyond the scope of this book (see Sellés 2006), but it is important to point out that, according to Polo, there is a multitude of acts of knowing. We will show how juxtaposing the two pairs of corresponding philosophers mentioned serves to contrast IPS and AS with regard to cognition. Abstracting is not about merely knowing properties through data obtained from the senses. Instead, the act of abstraction in Polo requires going beyond the data, characteristics, or properties because the act of knowing keeps the intentionality. This means that the object known is connected with the real object (the material manifestation of the form). For Kant and Descartes, knowing is only about cognitive abstraction of data from the senses. In Polo, abstraction requires removing from form both the material and the space–time dimensions. For example, to know what a circle is does not require to do so inside space and time as in Kant,

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but to remove from the form the material and mentally go towards its circumference: “to separate what is strictly formal in the circumference from space and time is to abstract the circumference of space and time; thus we have moved to a higher cognitive level over the imagination. That higher cognitive level, obviously, is intellectual. What is abstraction is noticeable in a very pointed and direct way, if we get to objectify the circumference taking it out of space and time. So to speak, we have witnessed abstraction.” And later he says: “If we can achieve to abstract the circumference of the space, we realize that the circle is what I know as I know, because I know” (Polo 1985: 10, 6). The main sense of this quotation is that Polo explains in his philosophical work the opposite of what Kant argued. According to Polo, for seeing the circumference time and space need to be removed. Abstraction is the process of objectification by which we are able to extract the spatial and temporal connotations that make up existence and we can discover what is known. Kant would disagree with this definition because for him the preconception of space and time cannot be set aside (Kant assumes the existence of a prioris, which in turn are supported by the subject, once the subject sets on discovering knowledge). The abstractive operation in the case of the circle, is from the imagination, but the abstraction has a dual point of departure: “[t]here are two kinds of abstractions: abstract images that are so intent on past and future; and an abstraction that ‘extracts’ only from the imagination” (Polo 1985, 11, 1). This makes possible a large repertoire of abstractive generation. That is, Kant accepts that imagination can be organized under the temporary space of categories, but he does not acknowledge the next step of abstraction. Polo’s approach leads to generating an alternative in relation to Descartes and Kant. Here are some of the points where the alternative is generated. Descartes and Kant approach cognition from the perspective of perception. And in their desire for security, it would appear that a mirror is the best way of perceiving. All that equals reality is a logical and symmetrical copy of it. But that is not a good example of what is known. The mirror does not know. The complete similarity between reality and what is being reflected makes the perception completed and closed in advance with no possibility of openness, surprise, and amazement to discover anything unexpected. There is nothing more to do, nothing more to know. Descartes finds the desired security in the mirror notion of knowing as perceiving. The problem is that there are many mirrors that distort reality and knowing from the outside amounts to knowing

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things and properties. On the contrary, knowing a reality from the inside means reflecting reality from a personal act of freedom as a matter of how a person receives and interprets such knowledge. (Corazón 2003). Moreover, Polo sharply criticizes Descartes and Kant, arguing that the way they introduce the subject known in their theories of knowledge is one of the biggest mistakes that exist in the field. This subject is a distortion of the very theory of knowledge. For Descartes the subject is part of the theory of knowledge, because cognition serves the subject’s decision. This happens as well in Kant, because it is the subject who imposes preconception. For both Kant and Descartes the subject is a constituent factor. Instead, in IPS philosophical roots, knowing is not a personal decision: The act of knowing is not a decision […]. In deciding whether to know or not to know, to draw attention is drawn to this or that. In any case, the decision opens the way to pass the power to act, influences it, but this is not a constitutional ingredient of the act. Moreover, without background knowledge, the subject does not move to constitute the decision. The subjective constitution of an act requires as a precondition another act of which the subject is not the constituent factor. This is the primary joint of the will and knowledge. Admitting what is known because they want to know it is simply ridiculous: the will lacks any power in this regard. (Polo 1988a, 98–9)

Both Descartes and Kant access the knowledge by the reflexivity of knowledge. They think that it is possible to know oneself because one can think of oneself (cogito ergo sum), even though what is going to be known about oneself is very little in this way of knowing. Kant himself says that what is known of the subject is nothing else but that “someone” is supporting the various actions, somebody exists behind the acts, yet who or what is this “somebody” is not known. This explains why, in the AS origins in philosophy, the subject is just a “logical necessity” of the acts. Polo, however, denies the reflexivity of knowledge. Intellectual operations know objects, not operations. If an operation were to know itself, it would be known as an object, not as an operation, which is a contradiction. This also applies to the knowledge of oneself. It is impossible to know oneself that way. Descartes transforms the subject into a mechanistic notion (a thinking thing), along with other things. In Kant, “We can speak, therefore, of thinking, but we can neither do science nor ontology on it.” This explains why it was opined that biology is the proper science to know the human being (Murillo 2011). Polo expresses the non-reflexivity of knowledge as follows: “what is thought does not think” (Polo 1988b, 10). And when this is applied to the human being (a person), the philosopher

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says, “the ‘I-thought’ do not think” (Polo 2003, 44). Via the operation of knowing, things may be known, but the operation (knowing) does not know itself. Operations that can know require a different act, which is called “habit” in Polo as noted (Murillo 1998; Polo 1988a). Moreover, knowing is a verb, but with varied meaning, and there are many ways of knowing while not all knowledge knows everything (Murillo 2011). Importantly, Polo used the distinction between “essence” and “the act of being” originating in Thomas Aquinas. The “essence” belongs to the realm of nature (what human beings have received from their parents and culture). The “act of being” refers to being a person, and uniqueness of each (Polo 1998, 28). But the way of learning is different depending on what one wishes to know. Therefore, we know differently nature in essence versus nature premised in the “act of being” of persons. Access to a person, the heart of being, is done by the habit of wisdom (see Appendix). This is an inborn habit that does not rely on other cognitive faculties but directly emanates as part of the personal transcendental: the personal knowing (Sellés 2001). And thus “[w]isdom as a habit can be defined as: the habit by which man knows how to coexist with the realm of reality in all of its breadth” (Polo 2003, 274). Knowing the person cannot result from reason and abstraction (Sellés 2001). Wisdom shows that man is more than his essence (Polo 1998, 129). Polo is aware that there is something received in the human act of perceiving. But while Descartes and Kant see that the key event is received with a mindset that is constructive, open, and free (in Aristotle’s notion of freedom as something only relevant to some acts and not all acts), Polo does not think this is the case. Using a logical expression, it is said that what is received by the perception is a “necessary but not sufficient condition.” Certainly without getting there, there is no perception, but perception is not just a mere fact of reception but rather an operation. It is a necessity, because there is no operation without it, but sole perception does not explain the operation. The operation is an operation of the person. Upon discovering the limitations of knowledge, Descartes and Kant leave the known object aside. However, Polo sees no limitation or doubts on the object, but in the operation (the faculty of cognition) instead. So Polo often understands that the object is perfect and if there is a bad perception of the object something flawed in the operation is to blame; by a better way of knowing, one can access the object more perfectly. Therefore the object must not be abandoned. He does not propose to abandon cognition, but the limits of (rationalist) cognition. One can know and reach the limit, leave it and still continue knowing (learning and

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growing). Abandoning the limit does not mean for a person to self-erase or self-deny herself, or to hide. Knowledge is useful but limited. Leaving the limit is exceeding it (Corazón 2007). Abandoning the limit is possible because the limitation is in relation to an operation (e.g., cognitive faculty) and not to an acting person or an object. Instead, in Descartes and Kant a limitation is inherent in the objects (García González 2005, 2014; Murillo 1998). In IPS, the problem is in cognition itself, as in Polo’s work cited here. These positions are based on the object’s being understood as something external to the faculty of knowing in both the Cartesian and the Kantian philosophy. The object in its existence is there. Existence is a simple reference to the position, the place of something in space–time (Kant, A 598, B 626). In IPS—consistently with both Aristotle and Polo— the object is inside the operation, because the object does not exist outside the operation. On the subject of Kant, we have noted that for him practical knowing and theoretical knowing are two separate areas. This leads to ethics and knowledge being understood as different areas (García González 2005). And this is the very challenge for AS, as noted. Polo’s position prevents this split between theory and practice thanks to the term “essence” that is the nature of human beings, where we find the two operational powers of intelligence and will co-comprising “synderesis,” which would be like the word “I” used in psychology (Polo 2003). Synderesis is a term that brings out the unity of the human being in its living and working. Synderesis has a double sense of the person according to nature and the nature of personal “acts of being”—although the person is always safeguarded by their character as “additionally” (además in Spanish), which means that the person never can be completely known (Orón 2015b). This makes the essence of the human being “manifestation and disposal, lighting and contribution. Practical reason and theoretical reason are not two separate realms” (García González 2005). Synderesis, the self as the “I”, a person (as in the IPS mindset), prevents separation of knowing and ethics as two distinct realms of acting. We find the same attitude in Wang; and it is thought that Kant’s distinction between theory and practice is a consequence of his personal way of knowing (cognition): “the distinction between pure reason and practical reason is integral with the Kantian interpretation of objectivity” (Polo 1988b, 386). This reference suffices to show the potential alternative that is being generated via the IPS model. In this aim we also provide references to cognition in Wang in support of Aristotle (distanced from how he is misunderstood by Kant and Descartes) and profoundly extended by Polo.

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2.4. Cognition in Wang Yangming The way in which Wang conceptualizes knowledge makes it impossible to understand the exercise of power as a legitimate technique as supported by Descartes and Kant. Currently the abstract concepts of subject and object are emerging from lower-level abstractions of life itself as a broader category. Wang’s theory of knowledge intersects with his metaphysics. Knowing something is equivalent to rebuilding the relationship with what is known, and rebuilding is not merely a cognitive change: knowing is a way of being in relationship with what is real. Knowing is always a way of adjusting oneself to the patterns of movement and it is no way of grasping the essence of an independent entity. Knowledge and action are not independent separable terms. Thinking that we may first know and then be able to act is a very superficial approach to ascertaining what is knowledge. Knowledge and action are united in their original status. Knowing is a way of acting and pure cognition does not exist for Wang (Frisina 2002, 73–100). Knowledge directs the action of persons and the action is the effort towards knowledge. Thus, knowledge is the principle of action, whereas action is the perfection of knowledge. Knowledge and action are united, while they are not interpenetrating. This is because for Wang a division between practical and theoretical knowledge is utterly meaningless. It is well known that practical knowledge is moral, but Wang proposes that the division between theoretical and practical knowledge is not a real one. So Wang is at odds with Kant: knowing is not something that happens in the head. The theoretical discourse regarding this does not (cannot) exist. Once the relationships in the act of knowing are being redefined, the distance between theoretically knowing and practically sensing the reality is only a temporary distance because all is in unity. It should be recalled that, in Wang, to be static is an artifice. The being has a dynamic character. Being something is about being part of a dynamic activity. Polo speaks of the agent’s intellect as transparent, while Wang applied how transparency limits beings. Wang also associated wisdom with the knowing of the intimate reality that can be known. It is wisdom that reveals limits in the self and the limits of what others are discovering in terms of the limits’ transparent internal interconnection. All beings share a common principle or pattern: “Li.” For Wang the opportunity to learn is not unique to humans as there is a kind of innate knowledge co-possessed by all created being, which makes this “all” behave as a coordinated body. This is the “liang-ching,” that is, a pre-primary reflective consciousness in Wang. But human beings have a way of concrete unity of the knowing–acting (for Wang knowing-and-

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acting are not different terms but a unity). The human being expects “Ch’eng,” sincerity in one’s actions so it will not be destructive. There is a unique activity in the mind, “hsin,” which allows each human being to be creative in their actions. The starting point of the human mind is love. In the list of the terms nature, mind, will, knowledge, there are only different conceptions of an interrelated (one) whole. The following words in Wang demonstrate this: Principle is one and no more. In terms of its condensation and concentration in the individual it is called nature. In terms of the mastery of this accumulation it is called mind. In terms of its emanation and operation under mastery, it is called will. In terms of clear consciousness of emanation and operation, it is called knowledge. And in terms of the stimuli and responses of this clear consciousness, it is called thing. (Wang 1963, 161)

The dynamics of thinking and acting seeks to increase this communion of heaven–earth–humanity. And although the term “communion” does not belong to the language of Wang, in our view it is a good term with which to summarize his proposal.

3. Implications for AS and IPS The above helps to explain why in AS the subject is intentionally directed in its knowing, and relies on a rationalist will to adopt a certain belief system. This serves as a “rule” to help AS navigate the world; some cognitive framework is required to provide a sense of safety, guide the cognitive processing of AS, and serve as an auspice of resilience against AS’s doubting stance vis-à-vis others and the world. Intentionality as a stance aims to handle, harness, control, master, manipulate what the subject (self) aims to know while affirming a sense of self-power, or mastery over the object world and one’s own self-system (which requires self-regulation). But in IPS the subject is not (knowingly) intentional on its knowing; intentionality is born as a processually inner experience linked with a sense of purpose and identity, and relies on the person’s natural organismic experiencing process of one’s humanity. In IPS action emerges grounded in wonder and admiration. This initial position of wonder and admiration that often playfully guides action is also oriented in embracing the ontological acceptance of interconnectedness with others and an acceptance of each one’s (and one’s own) uniqueness. IPS’s ontology linked with a position of admiration–wonder–puzzlement–inquiry–calling

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approaches action and knowing by respecting what the self tries to know and understand. This is because the ontology of IPS departs from practical knowledge (prudence) as the core foundation of character in IPS. Polo rejects intentional (goal-oriented) knowledge because commensuration implies intentionality between the object and the reality, commensuration means that they both belong to the same order. And the operation (cognition, for instance) and its purpose are different areas. Polo understands that the intentionality is in the known object. Intentionality in Polo is just a technical word that refers to the object in reference to the real thing and does not mean what it means in AS. The object is intentional from reality. In that case the word “deliberate” simply means to “refer to something.” The object refers to reality. All authors share that knowledge involves or requires some kind of possession, but possession is understood in very different terms comparing the corresponding philosophical origins of AS versus IPS. For example, in reference to the modern thought (guiding AS), for Descartes to want to know is a way to gain personal safety. Kant, given the limitations of knowledge, prefers a practical way for the transformation. But regarding the IPS philosophical groundings we can show that, in Polo, possessiveness refers to how the operation and the object of knowledge occur simultaneously and therefore the end of each action is inside the action itself rather than external to and independent from it. That inner end is possessiveness. Wang also speaks of domination, but for him the dominion is the wonderful workings of creation. Dominion is calm and transformative. From these different substrates, it is easy to see how AS has a character of transformation in which the subject controls and dominates the object, therefore the AS subject expands its personal power. In IPS, however, the notion of possession is more linked to responsibility and increased responsibility in growing systemically a person’s internal relations.

CHAPTER THREE THEORETICAL BASIS OF TWO DISTINCT PARADIGMS: “AUTONOMOUS SELF” (AS) AND “INTER-PROCESSUAL SELF” (IPS)

1. Three fundamentals (radicals) of human reality Leonardo Polo’s conceptualization of the fundamentals of human reality (the “three radicals”) serves to summarize the culminating contributions of Western philosophy, from classical to modern thought. These radicals serve here as our basis for distinguishing an autonomous self (AS) from the inter-processual self (IPS).

1.1. Nature, subject, person: the three fundamentals of human reality The etymology of the word radical refers to the “root” of something, and it is used in this context as a way of capturing the essential character of the concepts of living life, and being human (Polo 2007b, 273) In this sense, a radical refers to the essential foundation upon which a theoretical approach is built. Importantly, and based on Polo’s thought, all three human fundamentals must be simultaneously embraced if we are to truly understand human existence and reality (Polo 2007b, 181–242). Specifically, the three fundamental aspects of being human are the classic radical, the modern radical, and the Christian radical. These terms refer to the cultural and historical background from which the philosopher argues that a particular root corresponds to part of what it means to be a human being. The classical radical comes from Aristotelian philosophy and it contributes to knowledge of human nature. The classical radical (nature) discovers that the human being did not create himself. Our received nature corresponds not only to our bodies, but also to our faculties and way of being. Thus, the word nature refers to everything that one receives from

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one’s parents and even from generations that go further back. This radical also bears out evidence that the truth is not simply subjective human creation. Therefore, human growth is understood as a natural development of what each one of us has already received. The Aristotelian roots of the radical of nature also acknowledge that there is something immaterial about a human being that transcends time, and when the powers of intelligence and will are purposefully exercised human beings improve. According to Aristotle, human beings are a processual act through ongoing action(s) (NE 1099b). Thus, one’s way of life affects oneself and who one is (becomes), and, from there, the urgency of a virtuous life emerges. Virtue is understood as happiness, by its very definition must be something one wants as an end in itself, because happiness is a concrete way of living and acting (NE 1099b, 25–30). The modern radical comes from modern philosophy and its contribution to understanding the subject and its activity. The modern radical—or the radical of the subject—is productive and provides cultural novelty. The modern radical knows that the best is yet to come through the subject’s striving to master and author one’s life story. Modern philosophy, starting with the Enlightenment, takes the same approach, and its manifestation depends on creating novelty via human agency. The key word for this narrative is “production.” We should not confuse the verb “to produce” in the modern radical with the verb “to cause.” Producing something brings novelty, but in causation there is no novelty, because the effect is contained in the cause (Polo 2007b, 181–242). The “cause” evolves into the effect if the conditions are right, which is seen as only a matter of time. But to be a human being based on the modern radical means that it is not enough to cause, but rather is necessary to produce, to bring novelty. This radical is based on modern European philosophy. The various modern philosophers discovered that a subject who is very active when it comes to thinking, as well as in his artistic and cultural productions and philosophy, thinks his raison d’être and constitution is his production. They take this a step further, postulating that the (human) subject can only be known for its production, which underpins all activity—that is, the subject’s purpose is production. We will continue to develop this paradigm in order to show the inherent limitations that arise from within AS assumptions, which are dominated by the modern radical. We want to show that the modern radical is important and useful when the three radicals co-exist, integrated from within the person (as in IPS). The Christian radical comes from the philosophy produced within the Christian tradition. This, in addition to nature and the modern subject, purports the uniqueness of each human being understood as a “person.”

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This fundamental is based on the idea that, beyond the subject and beyond nature, each subject above all expresses personhood. The word “person” refers to the absolute uniqueness of each human being (and their mutual significance). A chair, for example, is at all times suitable for all kinds of uses and subjects. With a human being, based on the Christian radical and understood as a person, this widespread suitability is not the same, and that is precisely what fundamentally distinguishes human beings from other objects and parts of nature. Moreover, a person who is a member of a social group cannot be aggregated into a social category, such as a “group,” “party,” or “community,” since that leads to the abstraction of a concrete person, who is a unique person. To be a person, in the end, means intimacy, which is to say that human relationships are not superficial. If that intimacy is established, a relationship is a “personal offering.” The central premise of being a person is that the person is more than her actions and productions. Each person retains uniqueness and singularity beyond her acts that makes up her identity. One person’s uniqueness signifies a personal offering, since a person is not substitutable. Accordingly, personal relationships (founded on intimacy) exist between people. In this premise, there is a call destined to transcend and find oneself in the interpersonal encounter one person has/grows with another person, whereby the personal offering of one to another is a personal call by love. This is why Polo suggests “person” or “each one,” or “uniqueness,” or “intimacy” can be used as synonymous in the third radical. An important implication exists in the way that the notion of freedom is understood: in the modern radical the notion of freedom means to be free from, whereas in the person (third) radical freedom means to be free for.

2. Definition of AS and IPS modes of human development; thesis and argument All the three radicals presented in the previous section are important. They should be understood in relation to one another and in complementarity, and we will argue this is the strength of IPS that encompasses this premise. Instead, when one of them is ignored, or where one of these three monopolizes the understanding within and across human beings and society, then misrepresentations occur (Polo 2007b, 181–242). Applying these to summarize our argument line, we suggest that the IPS mindset integrates harmoniously the “radical of (human) nature,” the “radical of the (modern) subject” with a focus on production, and the “radical of the person.” Instead, we suggest that the AS paradigm on the

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self and human development is dominated by the modern radical—or radical of the subject—as its fundamental premise. We suggest AS mainly focuses on the “subject,” it is built on the subject–object relationship, and its major constraint is that it aims to know/understand the self (and human development) through its agency, and this is why we argue that it is limited and incomplete. But its main limitation is that it can offer no other way possible to know the self: the self is only a logical construction behind action. Since AS understands the self as a subject who only responds to other objects’ actions, to know oneself only becomes to be known as an object, not even as a subject. We will develop these limitations of AS more systematically. As a second step, the Polo’s three radicals allow us to make a classification, in order to subsequently support our argument, that one paradigm on the self and development (AS) is a reduction of a complete paradigm (IPS). We suggest that the IPS mindset integrates harmoniously the three radicals or fundamentals: in IPS the radicals of nature and of the modern subject are co-existent with the radical of the person (the third radical). However, as the radical of the modern subject is dominant in AS, the starting point for an IPS mindset is the radical of the person (the third radical). This fundamental rootedness in the radical of the person allows understanding growth as both internal to the person and in relation to other persons. So the self is the person and, thanks to being what a person is in one’s unique way, the person will further grow to become more deeply what he/she fundamentally is. We suggest, this very premise is the starting point of IPS paradigm’s understanding of the self, agency, and development. And this provides a more comprehensive human vision that can be relied upon to integrate personal and collective flourishing consistently with virtue theories at different aspects of social and public life (Aristotle 1941, 1985). For, in IPS, the person is a self and, thanks to being fundamentally who each person is as a unique being, enables further unrestricted personal growth not autonomously but in a way that helps integrative growth across personal relations. So, personal growth is not understood autonomously in IPS, but in relation to other persons growing systemically in their internal relation, as we explain systematically later. Instead, when one or two (of these three radicals) are ignored in the understanding within and across human beings and society, then misrepresentations occur (Polo 2007b, 181–242). This is precisely the incompleteness of AS, whose mode of human development is dominated by the modern radical, or radical of the subject as the fundamental premise in isolation. So AS understands the self as the subject who, due to his/her—cognitive/rationalist—activity and will is to autonomously master

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one’s life, change it, and build/create oneself. This incompleteness has dominated human and economic history increasingly since modernity, and, once an incomplete frame is forced onto the understanding of the totality of human reality, serious ethical problems for both personal and shared virtue and the common good arise in how human beings interact and the consequences of their actions upon each other, other communities, and the planet. We critique the dominance of the modern subject assumption in AS, in that it can and will often end up being wrong if it is not put inside an IPS mindset as one of its dimensions. So we clarify here that our argument is not premised upon the suggestion that models within the AS paradigm are wrong, but that AS is an incomplete and problematic way to understand how to constitute the self and human activity and the notion of integrative growth. To summarize the above, our thesis is therefore twofold: we suggest that the IPS model explains better and in a more complete and profound way a personal and human growth towards increasing integrity. Introducing an IPS ethics and the core assumptions regarding the self and development in IPS provides both a theoretically complete and a profound way to understand human activity and growth. Instead, we believe that the competing paradigm of AS is incomplete and overly focuses on one dimension of being human. Thus our intended contribution is to enable a more complete and unified understanding of human development and human integrity. For example, we find that authors such as Kohlberg, whose cognitive stage theory would easily fit in the AS paradigm, clearly reverses and rejects the very core assumptions of the theory with the later addition of stage 7 of post-conventional development. The problem is that the value we offer regarding the completeness of a paradigm of human development is largely due to extracting that value out of the difference of classifications does not fit with the IPS paradigm of human development. AS’s premise is that there is a universal stage commonality in all development, whereas the IPS paradigm’s premise is that people can evolve and should be given free space in which to express themselves as they change, with no fear that if in expressing themselves they seem/sound incoherent and lacking consistent and principled character. In order to describe AS and IPS, we are going to use the research from different philosophers and psychologists; we think they can be taken as the main references for these psychology models. In AS, we can find Descartes, Kant, and German as idealist philosophers, while Kegan, Ryan, and Loevinger/Cook-Greuter are the most prominent theorists in psychology. In IPS, we can note Aristotle, Polo, Whitehead, and Wang

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Yangming as setting out the main philosophical tenets, while Rogers’ and Frankl’s works are chosen as the most representative psychologies. As we have mentioned, there are salient differences between key works that have all been classified together as part of a common mode (AS or IPS). However, the internal discrepancies between authors within one same mode/paradigm can be useful for the development of theory that conceptualizes the inter-processual self paradigm of human development, or IPS.

CHAPTER FOUR THE AUTONOMOUS SELF PARADIGM

1. Introduction In order to describe the contrasting presuppositions regarding the self, human action, and the distinct ways of understanding in the AS and in the IPS “ideal types,” we will employ various key works in philosophy and psychology as key references. In this, what we will be examining concerns “who is in charge of human action (who is the agent who acts),” and “how the development and integration happen” regarding the acting person in relation to other persons and groups. We aim to show the sharp differences that underlie the opposing “paradigms”—AS premised on the notion of autonomous individualism, and IPS premised on the notion of a relational responsive anthropological philosophy and the concept of free and open systems; we analyze respectively how the notions of self and human activity (agency) and development (personal, interpersonal, and social) are understood. All theories/theorists that we suggest correspond to IPS, and some of those that correspond to the AS paradigm, argue at some point that their proposed model/s has/have been influenced by dynamic systems theory (at least to some degree). But this is not in the qualitative way in which the dynamic systems view has been understood and incorporated in works classified in the AS “paradigm” compared with those in the IPS model. This is due to the fact that, within a dynamic systems approach, it is not possible to distinguish between what the things are (their ontology including meta-ethical presuppositions regarding human beings as opposed to other things or non-human living beings) and how the things behave (or evolve, change, grow). In AS models of human development, it is often assumed that a dynamic system approach is adopted somewhere regarding their descriptions about human growth. But this is not enough because what is lacking is that the theories have not involved integrative theoretical handling of ontological presuppositions of dynamic systems. In AS models, there is a contradiction in that the ontological question about who is the subject–agent is considered as an entirely separate domain, a question independent from the problem regarding how personal

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growth/development occurs in the AS paradigm. So the two respective questions of the dynamic system theory in models corresponding to the AS paradigm are treated independently. Moreover, dynamic systems ideas are at the core of works by authors who write according neither to AS nor to IPS paradigms insofar that “a model” of growth intervenes based on the core assumption that there is no agent in any moment of the growth (as for instance in Thelen and Smith (1994), which we discuss in a later chapter). This means that in AS the subject is a precondition: the subject is defined as a subject prior to action, so that this act of defining the selfsubject can then ensure an action. This self (subject) is a logical presupposition to action. However, there is a discontinuity from the being to its activity. An important implication here is that, at the end, the personal acts are not linked with reflexive repercussions on the actor/self. This is because the product of action is seen as an outcome—that is, outside the person. This has significant consequences that characterize the “modern” conception of the self, action, and understanding: the person and personal action are separated from their ethical texture and dimensions. In contrast, the activity is aimed at merely expanding the mastery of the selfsubject, extending its dominion over another domain(s). But in this process the self remains stable and static rather than dynamic, as it is not seen that the choice of how to act has much influence over the self and its ethical growth and maturation. Acts are not seen as personal ones, in the sense of having repercussions reflexively over the self-identity of the actor; nor are the array of action choices understood to influence the degree to which the self grows and matures, the direction and the ethical quality of this process. For this reason, works in the AS paradigm usually understand moral aspects of personal activity as something that could be considered relevant or not, depending on how a subject’s will decides. While in many cases a moral aspect or the moral property of an action may not be valued altogether or it may be seen as something extra or decorative (an additional component one may “add” to personal mastery for looking good in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others). Alternatively, moral aspects of personal action may not be seen as relevant for the social and public realm, but instead they may be seen as private, an interiority that may be irrelevant in affecting the social repercussions of personal identity and action, and the ethical quality of relations with others involved. Instead, in the IPS paradigm, to answer the ontological question regarding agency (i.e., “Who is the agent?” and what is knowable about the agent and how) and questions about how the growth/development of the acting person happens, is seen as one and the same problem that cannot

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be addressed as two separate issues.1 Importantly, ethical aspects of (personal) action are seen as always reflectively affecting who one is (becomes), while a certain kind and quality of personal growth arises every time IPS acts. We show later that personal growth is never independent of its moral texture, while growth and maturation processes can be unrestricted in the IPS paradigm. Growth and human development are not unidirectional: they are not necessarily in reference to an ascending/positive growth direction, but can also happen in descending/ negative terms. Finally, growth and human development involve choices of action within relational dynamic systems, and these personal choices affect the quality of how self–other are related as ethical beings. Personal action in IPS is interwoven with a concern and responsibility for enabling ethical positive growth in the quality of relations of the persons involved. Personal integrity in IPS is always influenced by personal action and the degree to which one chooses how to act every time one acts. So personal integrity in IPS is dynamic and fluid, and its moral texture forms part of the choice of how one grows/becomes as an ethical person. Integrity cannot be permanently possessed or achieved and has to be part of a systematic way of life that includes moral inquiry and an embracement of our humanity (which may include the notion of fallibility, of the need for suspension of judgment, of the importance of phronesis, or a practically wise orientation in how we choose to respond in difficult or obscure complex situations and relations). Therefore, when comparing the notions of self and its moral maturity (integrity) and moral aspects of personal action in the AS and IPS paradigms, we see two profoundly contrasting ways of understanding these, ways that will be more thoroughly analyzed though in the chapters that follow.

2. The “autonomous” perspective This paradigm’s philosophical rootedness lies in the European modern and idealist philosophy tradition’s assumptions as reviewed in Chapter Two (see also Appendix). The key philosophers here are, among others, Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (for review: Düsing 2002). These important modern Western philosophers have discovered a 1

In how the dynamic system approach is understood from an IPS mode, it is not possible to understand growth aside of the mutual interaction with the other parts (in psychological terms these are other human beings) and with their context/environment.

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(philosophy assuming a) subject that is very active in applying scientific reason (a narrowly rationalist thinking/judging self). They developed a philosophy of a subject whose will acts to master majestic production(s): the philosophical, artistic, scientific, and cultural masterpieces in the West and globally since the European Enlightenment. Logically a core premise all these philosophers (the quintessence of the modern paradigm) share is that the subject can only be known/manifested solely by its production. However, this subject ontology is a narrow understanding of the acting person, which is a problem of the modern paradigm: the acting person is seen as rather a rational necessity of its acts. The “modern subject” therefore is reduced to a producer, as opposed to being valued for its transcendental, concretely specific, and unique existence. To evidence this, Kant himself (critiquing all modern idealist philosophy) acknowledges that the subject is a logical assumption behind one’s action (Düsing 2002). So, even in Kant’s words, in the modern idealist philosophy tradition (which we suggest as the AS’s philosophical root), the actor is just the one who acts, because it is the only logical argument to say that someone is who supports the production and for this one must be acknowledged (Düsing 2002): “I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself” (B 158:12). This is, of course, due to the very foundational assumptions in Kant and his claims of knowledge, truth, and reality (Guyer 1987) where he pays tribute to logic and empirical science and principles in order to confirm empirical judgments while he refrains from making initial claims to our knowledge. This is the starting point, which even for Kant is impossible to discuss, as we see in his Critique of Pure Reason; it is not easy to differentiate between truth and logic in his work. This basic theoretical assumption that logic guides being and logic alone ensures truth is a basic premise underlying the AS paradigm, in that the line separating “clinical rationalist knowing” and truth is not critically understood. As it is not easy to differentiate in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his Critique of Practical Reason2 that logic may not be the principle of truth, the line separating logic and truth is a bit blurred and anything that appears logical is taken to be true in Kantian philosophy. This results eventually in substantial confusion between these two terms (logic and truth) in Kant. The following analysis of Kant by Paul Guyer (1987, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2006a) is also useful. It is observed by expert Kantian scholars that, on the one hand, the errors and fallacy of rational cognitive 2

In Chapter Two, we refer to the underlying foundations, attitudes, and core themes in Kant and in Descartes, and we suggest why these two philosophers’ assumptions are not at all so divergent.

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psychology—which are the topic in Kant’s “paralogisms”—are critiqued by Kant. Guyer notes, “‘paralogisms’ (or fallacious inferences) of pure reason … argue invalidly from the formal unity, simplicity and identity of the thought of the subject of thinking or the ‘I ’ to the conclusion that the soul is a real and simple substance that is self-identical throughout all experience (A341–66)” (Guyer and Wood 1998, 15). This, opines Guyer (1999, 2006a, 2006b; Wood and Gruyer on Kant, 1998) infers from the fact that the evidence of a subject agent “I is in all thoughts” to the permanent substance of the soul in Kant’s work (Kant 1998) but the issue is here that diverse mental states must refer to a single I, while nothing is offered nor effectively resolved about the composition of the I itself, and about the person’s constitution in Kant’s Pure Reason, A 350, A, 398 (Kant 1998). “More generally, Kant believed that it is impossible to infer, from the highly general characteristics that could be attributed to the I to account for the possibility of cognition, to any claims about the constitution of the I” (Kant and Guyer 2006, 195). Hence, as per Kantian scholars, Kant’s “response to idealism appears to provide only a Pyrric victory over it” (Wood and Gruyer on Kant, 1998, 15). We suggest this leads to a narrow understanding of the acting person: that self is rendered to a rationalist demonstration manifested exclusively via the production of the self as subject. Ontologically the self is the logical necessity of its action. This ontological understanding of the acting person is incomplete and fails to demonstrate understanding of other important sources that constitute the self (for example we refer to the theological philosophy in Appendix I). Of course the problem regarding who is the self and how the self comes to know that, as demonstrated by the Kantian philosophy, is also congruent with Descartes’ view of knowledge and how the self comes to know what is true—this is due to the deep suspicion of Descartes as to whether anything can be known at all outside the certainty of the mind, in his Discourse on Method (1996). Also flowing from this is Descartes’ position and his assumption of suspicion to everything that is not “I” synonymous with its reason that makes the Cartesian self—“I” the self—an absolute and not debatable. This same origin is influencing the modern paradigm to consider anything that is notself as an object, and the Cartesian position leads to the logical assumption that the I-(thinking)subject must ensure mastery over the non-self object world. These very assumptions lead to the confines of the mechanistic paradigm based on exclusively scientific reason as the premise of modernity, and obliges other modern and postmodern authors to fall into a

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dualism in the effort to deny and reject these premises of modern philosophy from within the very same paradigm. As a result, the modern paradigm’s assumptions overemphasize the autonomy of the subject–agent as their presupposition. For example, in Kant the agent’s will, understood as autonomous and formal and willing to do the right thing, is premised on the capacity of the agent to demonstrate (uncontaminated) reasoning judgment; this requires of the agent to remain uncontaminated from one’s feelings, which are seen as a potential source of vice assuming the Cartesian trust in a narrowly rationalist “I” (Bradley 1927; McFall 1987). So even if the focus is on practical dimensions of reason in Kant, what this philosopher idealizes is the ability for a narrower kind of (practical) rationality with the ability for rationally choosing how to act in the service of the Kantian categorical imperatives as the foundation for ethical and practically wise judgment. This is distancing Kant from the Aristotelian understanding of (theoretical and/or practical) reason: Aristotle understands all social practices we engage in as human beings as essentially characterized by a moral texture; teleological dimensions of action in practices are premised (in Tsoukas 2017; MacIntyre 1982, Sison 2016) in the Aristotelian ontology of self; and human action essentially involves ethics (which is why Aristotle emphasizes the importance of practically wise action (prudence) as the master virtue, which is clearly beyond a simple (learnt, memorized or internalized) normativity beyond mere rule and convention followership (Pol. 1140b). Hence the Kantian tradition and its assumptions presented earlier in this section are seen as conceptual foundations supporting the AS paradigm on the ontology regarding self and the presuppositions of being and action (unless we take Kant’s logical subject as an integral part of the nature and the person’s radicals as IPS theory foundation requires). There are other contemporary philosophers who fit into this modern tradition and who are especially influenced by Kantian thought, hence they would also fit the AS paradigm. For example, Christine M. Korsgaard (post-Kantian philosopher) understands self-constitution as a prerequisite for action (Korsgaard 2009). This is done in the same way the Kantian thought divides between critical and practical reason (Guyer 1999), because it is not possible to make a metaphysics based in the modern view of cognition. So giving more importance to Practical Reason is the conclusion in Korsgaard (2009)—just as it is in Kant (Guyer 1999)—when this philosopher divides the constituent moment of the self, with its activity. Korsgaard (2009) opines that we have a lot of rational motives for doing one thing or another, but we do not have any motive to act: the fact

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of acting is therefore seen as previous to any activity of the acting subject and constitutive of the subject. To act in order to produce as a self-subject is a pre-rational decision because it is a psychic need, and a matter of selfconstitution according to Korsgaard: “the normativity makes possible the agency” (Korsgaard 2009, 7). Under the normativity assumption that characterizes agency only when an act is completed, its production is then how its identity appears, according to Korsgaard; for example, the identity of a house only appears when a good house is built, but to build a bad house is considered as to have constructed not-a-house (nothing worthwhile) according to this philosopher (Korsgaard 2009, 22). The normativity of producing is what rules our way to live and selfconstitution. In this case, agency is a requirement for the unity of the activity (Korsgaard 2009, 25–6) and the function of the action is the selfconstitution of the agent (Korsgaard 2009, 32), insofar as it is voluntary (Korsgaard 2009, 106) and willed. We recognize here that to act is a constitutive moment for the self. But this moment constitutive of the self is not here due to a logical necessity. So it has no retroactivity over the human being, as this moment is constitutive for the reflectivity of the will. For Korsgaard, the action is constitutive because the action is voluntary (2009, 106): in animals and in man there is a will. The difference is that the principles governing action in animals are not chosen by them, but by instinct, whereas humans voluntarily choose (will) an action that then becomes constitutive of being in ontological terms (Korsgaard 2009, 107– 8). However, in Aristotle there is an understanding of the will as retroactive: the concept of virtue has a clear retroactivity over the human being. It is meant by the Aristotelian concept of virtue that what one does affects oneself (who one is/becomes) because the end of the action is not independent of the acting person (Aristotle, NE 1114a). We can find the same retroactivity in the way that Polo understands the will (Polo 1998b). Hence we disagree with Korsgaard (2009), because at the end selfconstitution is seen as a psychic need that must be covered without explaining why. Korsgaard posits that to cover this (self-constitution) there is a psychic need that is something pre-rational and it happens because the self needs this (self-constitution) in order to survive, in order to exist. But, as we see, people act in real life behaving against self-constitution—for example, when one sacrifices one’s life for others or for a good cause, or when people dedicate their lives to an evil cause, or even, sadly, when a person commits suicide. We think that the meaning of the movement of personal action is in order not to cover a need, but to answer a calling, which provides meaning

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and purpose to one’s life. The calling of being who I am answers an existential question in a way that one chooses to act to answer to the specificity and uniqueness of the person each one is. This difference between a (psychic) “need” and a personal “calling” is a big contrast because a calling is about a purposeful and moral way of being; this latter is higher than a natural need. Hence, the notion of a “calling” has a profound moral basis and requires each person to guide reason well and from within one’s humanity (what it means to be and reason as a human person) in order to distinguish from a wide array of choices open to us. This is not about a detached way to reason. It is also important in how our proposal grounds the IPS paradigm, because, as we noted, the “calling” is rooted in what it means to be a specific singular person and not anyone or everyone or no one. As we will see in more detail later, the needs belong to the nature, but the calling is integrally tied to what philosophically it means to be a person. To conclude our thinking, therefore, even if Korsgaard sees selfconstitution as a natural (existential) need, it is not enough to qualify this as consistent with IPS, which is the reason why not only Kantian but also neo-Kantian scholars are classified as grounding philosophical assumptions associated with the AS paradigm on self and action and human growth. Now we transition from modern philosophy to modern psychology of the twentieth century. Congruently modern (and postmodern) human development psychology’s core premise is the strength of a self-subject. Hence, integrative development requires a rationalist autonomous will enabling the self-system of the acting subject to direct its (autonomous) integrative growth process (Ryan 1995). Also, self-development is premised upon a dynamic–synthetic system view of the self in AS that is seen to be associated with fragmentation, while this is believed to gradually enable the self to will to move processes with a self-unifying effect to integrate various self-domains (Ryan 1995). This dynamic– synthetic view of the self involves the notion that progressively parts of the self that form a higher-level-self will be absorbed by other parts and will dissolve/disappear as part of a synthesis of new (superior) states by incorporating the previous (inferior) parts. Modern psychology models and theories that we classify as comprising the quintessentially AS paradigm include broad and diverse lines of work that are in agreement with basic assumptions regarding the self, action, and human development (and the notion of integrity in the self). But they propose distinct theoretical models regarding their detail and logic of development. A salient shared commonality in all these literatures we

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classify as better corresponding with the AS paradigm is that there is “a self in charge” of its (autonomous) development via rationalism guiding thinking and action. We now present evidence of key theories of human development in adult cognitive development literature and in modern psychology, which we classify as AS. An important research tradition in modern (and we include, postmodern) adult development psychology draws from Piagetian and neo-Piagetian thinking surrounding how the self acts in order to grow in increasingly broader domains, including the ethical/moral as a domain of growth. The ideal of autonomous rationalist cogntitivist maturation via detached (“clean”) rationalism is seen in many models congruent with Piaget as the enzyme of the self’s developmental process. Therefore a Piagetian unilinear stage hypothesis (Piaget 1962) is adopted as the theoretical basis to describe the assumed global (universal) growth (maturation) processes in the self. Piaget’s emphasis on the growth of formal operative thinking (1962) guides a shared assumption in the cognitive adult development literature as to what needs to grow for the adult self to “mature” and what guides mature agency is premised upon this assumption. This tradition includes universal constructivist stage theories consistent with neo-Piagetian thinking (Kegan 1982; 1994; Lahey Laskow 1986; Loevinger 1966, 1976); it includes post-piagetian theories focused on patterns of cognitive maturation in specific life stages (e.g. Perry 1970/1999), radical empiricist theories regarding human learning (Dewey, 1929; Kolb 2015) and “global” cognitive growth theories (Flavell 1963; Harvey, Hunt and Schroeder 1961). Such theories share a biologically based assumption rooted in Werner’s 1948 orthogenic principle (Johnson 2000) which considers increasing differentiation as a prerequisite of integrative development which manifest higher levels of maturity in the self (Akrivou 2008; Johnson 2000). All these lines of work focus on the problem of integrity in the self (self-integration). Hence they are valuable in the psychological tradition which explores deeper lever aspects of the personal character. These theories disagree with other psychological schools of thought such as behaviourism which looks to more surface level traits and behaviours as to how the self displays morally mature character and action. Cognitivist stage psychology models understands growth in the self as an ascending movement via distinct stages, whereby each expresses an equilibrium achieved by the organism; the breaking of the equilibrium signifies further ascending movement inspired by a unidirectional growth hypothesis (Kolb 2015). Also the growth in the self is increasingly aiming to master more

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self-domains, with integrity in the self and relations being itself a domain which awaits mastery towards the end of the growth process (Akrivou 2008). Within this so-called neo- or post-Piagetian approach to human development, various key themes or problems capture in diverse ways what means to be a subject, how the subject acts in the lifeworld and how the problem of unity in the self and action in the so-called “higher” (more cognitive mature) stages of human growth are dealt by the self as subject. In opposition to all the earlier sequences and stages of cognitive development, neo-Piagetian adult development literature assumes that an ethically involved and concerned way of being is a possibility that only happens at the end of the developmental process. We refer now to important models in this tradition. Robert Kegan (1994) and Lahey-Laskow (1986) adopt a subject–object relations theory foundation in psychology and psychotherapy: the notion of subject–object relations (e.g., in the work of Kohut) is adopted as the dimension that “matures” for overall character growth to take place in the highest stages. Qualitative changes are traced and qualitatively coded based on how people understand relations between the subject and the object world, while the self is understood as a subject who strives to develop thinking and action capacities, which enables a gradually increasing space for independent and autonomous self-authoring in the world. These models start from the premise of subjectivity and the confines of the mind versus the external mental demands. A steady concern in these models (Kegan 1994; Lahey-Laskow 1986) regarding how growth stages are defined is about how various consecutive subjective frameworks (equilibria) that a subject–agent is able to mentally display allow one to “assess” and synthesize an(y) object (another human being, an act, a situation) in the object world outside the subject’s mind. The Cartesian separation problem between a subject and an object is a basic concern here, and although this is a postmodern adult development theory we see its links with Descartes. Kegan’s model basic assumption is that maturation and a move to a higher mental state happens when what has been understood as part of the “subject” is objectified in a subsequent stage; growth then is about being able to master one’s will and cognitive ability to “master” the “object.” The subject’s mastery of the object work, using for a critical evaluation processing increasingly higher frames of mind (cognitive domains), is the ideal pursuit here for increasing selfmastery and autonomy. Each person is understood as a subject–agent whose mind is thus seen as capable of developmental shifts in meaning making structures and qualities to increasingly “conquer” more domains

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until a shift in meaning making reaches a new (higher) mental equilibrium (Kegan 1994). For the author of this model (Kegan 1994) and related versions that follow similar assumptions to the model of Lahey-Laskow (1986), there is a similar emphasis in autonomous rationalist growth first. Kegan (1994) introduces such meaning making in “the self-authoring mind” stage (“fourth order, or modern mind” in this model). He illustrates that AS autonomously defines one’s value system(s), identities, goals, and destiny using critical reason, while it enables the subject–author to independently “author” personal moral choices, actions, and decisions that are detached from feelings as the particulars of each relationship are approached with skepticism (Kegan 1994). Mastery is mainly the preoccupation here, and we do not see as much evidence of concerns for overall character and moral growth as we see in Kohlberg’s work, for example. However, in the so-called highest stages of subject–object development in these models, the problem of being and acting starts becoming concerned with moral dimensions of these stages facing others’ distinctiveness and the moral complexities in the broader object world. A proposal for what it means to be an ethical, integrated subject appears first in Kegan’s model highest post-autonomous stage, using the labels “the self-transforming mind” (Kegan’s fifth order, or postmodern mind in Kegan 1994). Transformation here for the first time seems to be noticing the limits of mind and the limits of autonomous reasoning processing, while a more processual quality of being is seen as a more powerful way to self-transform (one’s mind), especially considering the relations with others and how to escape the confines of understanding others as cognitive objects that the self as subject needs to master. What the model prescribes in this case is that, processually, the subject learns and operates dialectically (but not dialogically, emphasis ours) facing the object world and relations in Kegan (1982, 1994). Further regarding this matter, there is the fifth order of Kegan (the self-transforming mind) whereby a cognitivist context linking subject and object relations is adopted. But the purpose of a focus on process and relation here is that the relation becomes a higherorder cognitive frame in the subject–agent whereby “relation(s)” become an object to master. The solution offered aims to orient the subject to master the object via a synthetic fusion between a subject and an object who relate, inspired by a Hegelian dialectics. Kegan opines in his stage of the subject–object maturity model of 1994 that, as and while the “subject” develops, it faces an ongoing struggle towards greater unity (assuming the self is lacking unity and integration) and that in order to increase integrative unity and complexity it is required

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of the self as subject to internalize/synthesize what has been understood as the “object” in a previous (less developed) cognitive stage. The focus here is on the growth in the cognitive processing qualities and mental control in the subject’s mind to overcome inferior ways of sense making and action vis-à-vis any outside object. Therefore a self is assumed to grow via expanding its power because the subject of today will synthetically be(come) the object of tomorrow, and thus in this way the master of the self-subject is reaching increasingly more domains, says Kegan (1994). These models initially state an intent to theorize about the self, human action, and the conception of human development processing in a manner that withdraws from the Piagetian overly cognitivist assumption of higher growth capacities in the self. Some effort is being made to depart from the Piagetian (1962) focus on abstract formal operative processing as the key mechanism facilitating development. In order to do this, they pursue an effort to qualitatively code how people make meaning from experience, including rationalist–cognitive affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal domains. Unfortunately, however, despite the effort by Kegan (1994) and Lahey-Laskow (1986) for multi-dimensionality in the progression that human character maturity follows, research statistics that meta-analyze the factors making up these subject–object theories still evidence a heavy emphasis on the cognitive rationalist growth dimension (Creamer, Baxter, and Yue 2010, 550 and 552). We suggest, therefore, based on these previous paragraphs, that the radical (fundamental root of being) of the modern subject–agent in Polo (2007b) is (still) evident in the terminology used to conceptualize Kegan’s (1994) highest stage of the theory. Hence, progression to Kegan’s highest post-autonomous integrative stage (“self-transforming mind” or Kegan’s fifth order, or postmodern mind) requires for subject–object relations to be performed dialectically, relating to others more directly than abstractly (Kegan 1994), with the aim of synthesis, whereby the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the two parts (subject and object) that relate must be dissolved and disappear. Alternatively, in Kegan’s own words, a fusion or a synthesis is possible whereby “[t]he relationship becomes a context for sharing and interacting in which both parties experience their ‘multipleness’, in which the many forms or systems that each self is are helped to emerge [via a synthesis of a subject’s and a] partner’s positions” (1994, 312–13) And Kegan’s fifth stage is still an abstract rationalist (postmodern) frame of analysis that remains a power struggle between a subject and another to influence the quality of a synthetic fusion, whereby a subject’s frame of mind guides the fusion.

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The main challenge here is how to escape the confines the previous stages created, which are expressed as transcendence of one’s “mind” aiming to find ways to adaptively and reflexively respond to relations that involve diverse ways of seeing things, disagreements, and the respect of others’ different subjective perception without objectifying them via ideological positions, principles, and ideologies, as Kegan’s subject is seen resorting to in the previous stage. Here, the proposed solution is a valuation that chooses a dynamic Hegelian-type dialectic whereby the subject acknowledges and accepts its dialectical interdependence (fifthorder post-autonomous selves in Kegan 1994) and the solution adopted is for the self-subject to grow by synthesizing the other-object into who the self as subject is. Although this requires a fluid immersion in a subject– object dialectic, and a more processual kind of meaning making and rational willpower fails to do this, at the end the mastery of the relation as the very object of the subject requires rational willpower for the subject to internalize the relation and the other as part of one’s own identity. Besides, the last stage of Kegan’s model (his fifth order), which we discussed earlier, brings up the issue of what the self is. In the last stage of Kegan, the self is able to put in question everything, even one’s deeper beliefs. So at the end what it is more important becomes for the self (subject) to understand oneself via how one displays the capacity to choose to change. But there is no point of reference regarding what is the purpose or teleology guiding change. Unable to resolve this question effectively renders the epilogue to Kegan’s books a contribution to a postmodern tribute to the eternal cognitivist movement rather for its own sake. Another salient tradition in post-Piagetian adult development theory is rooted in Freudian psychoanalysis. This is best represented by Jane Loevinger’s (1976) model and operational definitions of human development in her ego development theory. This model is later further developed by Suzanne Cook-Greuter (1999), adopting Freudian psychoanalysis principles (Freud 1992; Freud, Strachey, and Freud 2001). The self is accordingly believed to be a weak premise: various other strong forces of conscious and unconscious origin (such as the ego) are seen to direct and control the self. Here the ego is viewed as primarily serving the executive control center in the self (Akrivou 2008) and this is achieved via a synthetic organizational function of the ego (Ryan 1995); this is relying upon intrinsic motivational tendencies in the self to extend in the world and to integrate what is experienced (Ryan 1995). In Cook-Greuter’s (1999) model, Loevinger’s work is further developed by breaking her (1976) highest “integrated stage” into two

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hierarchically placed integrated stages: the Construct Aware and the Unity Integrated Stages. As noted in Cook-Greuter’s model, the synthesis moment is the dissolution of the self. In her ego-transcendent stage/state, the self ends up vanishing in her union state in which the ego has been transcended. This is the non-material Unity Consciousness (a stage beyond the stages in Cook-Greuter 1999). If conventional stages lean on the separation between the knower and the known, the post-conventional stages conceptions of the self and other relation end up proposing a merger or synthetic fusion between the knower and the known (!). Maybe in Cook-Greuter’s (1999) work the salient intention is to bring in her beliefs, adopting a (Buddhist) interpretation that the self has to be set free and needs to suffer a purification, which intervenes. But this changes this theory’s later stages suddenly to something that has not been an explicit premise foundation. The self in the higher stage of Cook-Greuter in 1999 realizes the problem of how language and conventions shape discourse and (s)he needs to be set free from the habits of language. This liberation gradually allows for the growth of consciousness, which is reminiscent of the problems and sequences in the work of Nietzsche (Nietzsche 2003, 2017; Nietzsche and Ludovici 1911): “[i]n the post-autonomous step of deconstruction, individuals come to reject the overall stance of the systems thinker. By turning further inward, they start to see through their own thought and language habits, and become aware of the profound splits and paradoxes inherent in rational thought” (Cook-Greuter 2000, 234). Here it seems necessary that the focus is systematically kept in maintaining the autonomous subject–agent while everything that disturbs the emergence of the self has to be removed in order to grow. This logically leads to the next step, which becomes an act of self-denial or self-suicide, with the only justification offered by Cook-Greuter being that “people at this stage are more at ease with a fluid, open-ended self-identity, that is, with ‘notknowing’ who they are” (1999, 234). The highest stage in these models of ego development thus direct persons to an act of self-denial and this metaphorically invokes an act of self-suicide. However, various pathologies could be rooted in this suggestion; even if this would be a useful self-cure path for a few, it might not be a normative good proposal for the many. One further step is prescribed whereby the ego is dethroned in the final integrated stage of Cook-Greuter (1999)—here, one discovers his/her Divine Self. (234). Even Kegan criticizes (1994, 330) CookGreuter’s ego transcendence stage on the basis that it requires a death of the self (also, Cook-Greuter 1999, 236).

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In all post-Piagetian models we have presented so far, the strength of the self (as subject) can be recognized especially in the models’ higher stages of growth, because: (a) The unity of self is approached as something the self lacks and which can only be regained at some final point in its developmental movement insofar as the subject follows one specific prescribed rule of development from the higher to the highest stages of being and action, and (b) Self-development is believed to be driven through synthetic processing linking the hypothesized separate, autonomous self and the outside world of objects (social world, social and interpersonal relations, and mental and other demands of society). In a Hegelian synthesis approach (adopting a method of thesis–antithesis– synthesis), the type of growth of the self, the dialectic subject– object, involves the self’s facing non-self objects, unfolding and willing to author its cognitive growth progress autonomously. Hence, in all these models the object is any-thing that is not the subject, and the growth happens when the subject can assume the object as a part of oneself so terminally that the subject has mastered the object and the boundary (difference) has ceased to exist. Therefore, this subject’s growth is premised upon one’s will and capacity to grow autonomously by expanding one’s mastery over other beings, relations, the natural and broader world, cognitive domains, and even one’s own self. We now refer to another stage model that follows a Piagetian assumption. This is set out by Kohlberg in his cognitive moral development theory or CMD (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984); we do not consider this model as quintessentially AS, but it sits somewhere between AS and our proposal. For Kohlberg (1969, 1981, 1984), the nature of moral growth is part of the broader cognitive rationalist growth in adulthood, hence this cognitive stage theory’s reliance is on the growth of individual abstract reasoning as the main premise for moral character and action maturity in the self, which emphasizes cognitive reason qualities and a universal stage proposal regarding moral development (Akrivou 2013). The main premises of this model so far (which dominated most of Kohlberg’s career) fit well with AS because Kohlberg (1969, 1981) assumes a link between cognitive and moral reasoning maturity. As known, Kohlberg’s theory in its initial formulation consists of six rationalist developmental stages of moral

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reasoning, while each of his stages forms three levels of cognitive moral reasoning—a pre-conventional, a conventional, and a post-conventional moral reasoning capacity (Akrivou 2013). All these are seen as linked in a unidirectional ascending staged order. In his unilinear stage moral reasoning maturity model, Kohlberg’s (1969, 1981) stages 5–6 clearly conceptualize the main patterns of mature cognitive processing. This is akin to an ideal type of an autonomous self (AS), and it is expressed via an autonomous and principled will. Moral (reasoning) maturity in Kohlberg is empirically found to be a concern for universal standards of justice and fairness—the fifth Cognitive Moral Development stage—followed by an autonomous willpower to abide by universal moral rules and concepts such as justice, human dignity, and human rights in the sixth CMD stage (Kohlberg 1984; Colby and Kohlberg 1987), guiding how to approach relational and broader moral challenges. This is an understanding of action with moral maturity that adopts a Kantian deontological principled action with an emphasis on pure reason and detachment from feelings and passions. Kohlberg’s stance here is not Aristotelian but clearly in line with normative rule-based approaches to ethics guiding human conceptions of self and action. However, as noted, among all the cognitivist development theories we are not classifying Kohlberg’s work as typical of AS. This is due to a later radical revision in Kohlberg’s thinking and theorization, shortly before this theorist’s suicide, that gave rise to Kohlberg’s last work on a seventh stage of moral human growth (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990): this is clearly much more in harmony with the open and free dynamic systems approach in the IPS paradigm. In this late work of Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990), he clearly reverses and rejects the very core assumptions of the earlier cognitivist basis of the CMD theory. In his stage 7 (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990), he overtly denies the common premise of post-Piagetian stage model assumptions of human development (that fall within an AS paradigm). In this stage (more in consistency with the IPS paradigm), Kohlberg discovers that the progress could be understood under the paradigm of the internal relationship with others and with nature, in a cosmic relationship. More specifically, Kohlberg’s seventh (highest) stage of moral maturity in his model (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990) is more akin to a more open, intuitive fluid cognitive processing as a way for the entire human character to approach life’s moral complexities. This aspires to a more processual kind of being and understanding, with sensitivity to the particulars and context that have been named as a processual self (PS), a clear move away from the previous rationalist conception of self-maturity

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as noted by Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang (2015). This seventh stage (Kohlberg and Mayer 1972; Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990) proposes a contrasting pathway of how to display moral maturity: by abandoning detached rationalism and adhering to a more “naturalistic,” processual systemic–organismic way of acting and being. Kohlberg and Ryncarz in 1990 opine that this can be better trusted (in comparison with detached rationalism and the followership of moral rules) as a universal shared capacity premised upon our being human whereby contextually sensitive issues can be resolved via good ethical action. Kohlberg’s evolution of theory in Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990) is important because it clearly presents an underlying conflict, and a profound assumption in the modern tradition in psychology that there is a dualism between two systems of cognitive processing, one a purely socioemotional–intuitivist cognition—or System 1—and the other a cognition based upon pure analytical reasoning, system 2 (Evans 2008). The key differences associated with dual systems of thinking are as follows. A key research line in this literature focuses on consciousness. Here, System 1 is less conscious, implicit, automatic, and holistic (perceptual) cognition, whereas System 2 is conscious, explicit, highly controlled, and analytic (thinking/reflective) cognition; however, these do not operate concurrently but require choice (Evans 2008). For the purpose of facilitating reading, we label models or specific stages inside models of works classified in the AS paradigm with a focus on System 2 as their aspirational ideal for human growth as “autonomous– rationalist self” (ARS) mode in AS. And we classify the ones that look to the synthesis of System 1 and System 2 vas an aspirational ideal for human growth as “autonomous–processual self” (APS) mode in AS. These latter often appear as a sudden reversal of the AS model’s main “rule” for moral human maturation in models that propose a “cognitive–rationalist rule” as the pathway for human progression in moral and broader terms. All the modern school of thinking about human growth and development that is moral or meets moral context demands is marked by this dualism, but Kohlberg’s CMD theory is the most conceptually clean descriptive psychology regarding both ARS and APS paradigms and the unbridgeable dualism associated with this way of thinking (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990) in the modern philosophy and philosophy of mind. This is why we should note here that Kohlberg’s model cannot be fully representative of AS because with the addition of the seventh stage of growth Kohlberg seems to deny his earlier theoretical rule of development. Kohlberg promotes the ARS mode until his sixth stage of growth, but his seventh stage is not conceptually explained in full – it is a novel

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realization. Indeed, Kohlberg in his model brilliantly and ethically acknowledges that his previous work might have been on the wrong scientific path, but his suicide shortly after this publication (probably not related to this matter) stops him from completing theoretically the work on how his seventh stage reverses his prior assumptions concerning human action with ethical purpose at the core. Kohlberg, until his last published work, naturally cannot solve how to reconcile these two different ways to respond to the world ethically but only recognizes two opposing ways of knowing and understanding, which constitute profoundly different ethical proposal options, as in a dualistic model (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990). We therefore suggest that this last writing of Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990) is a clear and well-explained rupture in theory terms of his priorstage model based entirely on logic. We suggest that the intuition that Kohlberg had in what he called his seventh stage is in fact another way to understand all the stages. The progress could be possible thanks to relationships to others and cosmos, which involves more than cognition. This last stage in Kohlberg is actually closer to IPS, and we believe it is the entry or discovery of a new “paradigm” of being and acting in the world, which, as we show later in Chapter Five, is congruent with the IPS philosophical and moral psychology foundations and conception of how the world, knowing, and personal action are being understood from within IPS. Hence, this last part of Kohlberg’s theoretical work has been mentioned in this section not because we see it as representative of AS but because we think it underlines and demonstrates with better theoretical and methodological clarity a core (unresolved) challenge that is inherent in all modern psychology of personal and character growth, and in how theorists try to understand what constitutes the highest forms of ethical being and action. This challenge involves a perception that there is an unbridgeable dualism between two modes of self, being and action, as described below. (1) A purely autonomous–rationalist way of being and acting (which when facing moral challenges has to follow some universal moral prescriptive rule on how to be and act). The autonomous–rational self (ARS) is typically associated with a concern for independent and predominantly rationalist meaning making that is formal and which acts with a preference for an independent formal autonomous reasoning process (which, even in the context of team and collective processes, has a preference for autonomous action and decision making). Typically ARS prefers detached rational judgment that therefore avoids the passions and prefers reason as a

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way to resolve personal affective pressures involved in judgment and decision making, considering that these could perfect answers as a way to decide which means-and-ends decisions are the optimal to adopt. To avoid moral subjectivism and relativism, ARS tends to choose to make meaning and choices independently albeit in accordance with moral universals such as deontological conceptions of the good; this preference ensures from the point of view of ARS that just solutions and frameworks are adopted that (from within the perspective of ARS moral actor) guarantee its relevance for other moral actors in the practice and across the practices of the institution. Alternatively ARS typically chooses to meet and talk with others who may represent different perspectives, with a focus in rational negotiating which solutions and ends– means choices will prevail in the face of disagreement, in the end of the reasoning processes involving various independent actors. (2) A more relationist–intuitivist and affective way of being and acting whereby we can trust inward natural mechanisms we all share as human beings that naturally allow us to be and act ethically. Subjective emotivism and inuitivism are considered better solutions in this sub-type of AS, which is the autonomous-processual self (for which we use APS as its acronym). The autonomous– processual self (APS) is generally associated with a concern for relationist and affective meaning making that typically uses social intuitionist and influencing approaches to decision making and action (Haidt 2001 on “The emotional dog and its rational tail…,” seminal article), whereby reason serves well but only as a post hoc tool for justification of the decisions in line with this author (Haidt 2001). Processual action driven approach is adopted here as the most effective way to resolve how the self acts and relates with others in life. In the context of team and collective processes, APS has a preference for emergent processual solutions that do not follow cleanly rationalist rules adopting rationalist principles or negotiation for resolving disagreements and differences of opinions for the decision making but are still dependent on autonomous reasoning while unconscious or conscious social influencing processes (majority–minority and in-group vs. out-group or even “group think” etc.) guide on the final choice regarding which directions and means are the collective result from decision making. Typically APS operates well in situations requiring affective type of influencing and emergent flexible decision-

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making processes and the avoidance of strict normative (or face to face rationalist negotiation) frameworks regarding guidance on normative evaluative aspects associated with judging the meansand-ends aspects of decisions. The strength of APS is a contextual and situational sensitivity (in contrast to ARS), which still prefers autonomously generating action strategies (like ARS). APS operates best when agents are given freedom to act in an interindependent way to allow them to “pick and mix” choices with an emphasis on a post hoc rationalist communication aiming to influence social action in favor of a certain (preferred) agenda that a particular “elite” values and wants. This means that APS tends to avoid genuinely dialoguing, and in this way it can be perceived as employing a subjectivist stance. In this respect it is weak in coorienting persons and stakeholders concerning how to act and sensemake in common based on synergistic and genuinely trustbased relations of an emergent shared sense of what is the right means for the right ends. APS will resort to rationalist communication to justify or claim that a certain solution or decision is good for all involved, which is not ensuring system-wide trust and openness across all related and involved parties and their practices. We noted earlier that we consider Kohlberg’s seventh stage (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990) an anomaly in how we classify and discuss the previous literature, in that in this later work of this brilliant theorist we do not see an expression of APS in a reductionist way; rather, we see an incomplete new approach, which has some theoretical proximity to our proposal and its philosophical authors of reference (see Chapter Five in this book). The previous paragraphs provide a more simplified summary of what is involved in the two dualistic sub-types (modes) in AS, which emerge3 3

Dual-processing accounts in social cognition theory in cognitive research also echo a theoretical foundation that supports this dualistic way whereby persons are predisposed towards either a more abstract–rationalist and more processual– relationist–emotivist processing (Evans 2008) linking cognition (Evans 2008) and responses in action. The same assumption, namely the idea that there are two opposing kinds of social cognition, forms the basis of Kahneman’s fast and slow brain (2011; Kahneman and Riis 2005) work. These works show differences associated with dual systems of thinking as follows. The first cluster focuses on consciousness, whereas system 1 is less conscious, implicit, automatic, and holistic (perceptual), and system 2 is conscious, explicit, highly controlled, and analytic (thinks/reflects) (Evans 2008). The second cluster distinguishes systems 1 and 2 in

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as two opposing incommensurable expressions of the autonomous self paradigm (AS) and its presuppositions regarding the ontology of being and action. Understood from within the basic assumptions of modern philosophy and idealist philosophy (which we presented in the first section of this chapter) logically leads modern psychology to an understanding of these two modes as mutually exclusive and in sharp contrast—that is, irreconcilable. Finally, outside the tradition presented so far but echoing these basic themes and understandings regarding the ontology of self and action, there is another important line of work that belongs in the modern positivist personality psychology we classify as more in line with the AS paradigm. This comprises the work of Richard Ryan (Deci and Ryan 2002, 2013; Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000, 2004, 2006), which primarily fits AS. Ryan (1995) adopts in his model a particular way to operationalize dynamic system theory. Accordingly, it is believed that inherent, autonomous integrative tendencies in the self exist but require a strong autonomous self-regulatory functioning and intrinsic motivation (Deci 1980; Deci and Ryan 1985). Ryan argues that motivation is a domaindependent function that accepts the possibility of self-fragmentation and multiplicity (Ryan 1995), hence the unity of the self is assumed lacking evolutionary terms. System 1 is old in this perspective, with a focus on an evolutionary kind of rationality that is shared between animals and humans and that is more holistic/non-verbal. System 2 is evolutionarily more recent, with a focus on individual, autonomous reasoning processing; it is uniquely human and mainly linked to language. The third cluster is based on the assessment of the two systems on the basis of their functional characteristics. System 1 is associative, domain specific, contextualized, and more pragmatic; system 2 is rule based, domain general, universal, abstract, non-contextualized, and sequential. Finally, the fourth cluster of classifications of prior studies on system 1 and 2’s distinctions is based on individual differences. According to this focus, system 1 is independent of general intelligence and working memory, and is thus more shared/universal across the human species, whereas system 2 is highly dependent on a person’s general intelligence and limited by one’s working memory capacities; therefore it is less universal and more particular. Finally, Evans (2008) suggests that evidence explicitly associates system 1 cognition with emotion and is capable of utilizing rationalist cognition as secondary (Evans 2008, 258). Clearly we can say that the more abstract–rationalist (Evans 2008) or the slow thinking capacities (Kahneman 2011) are supporting the kind of phronesis in ARS, while the more relationist–emotivist processing (Evans 2008) and the fast brain (Kahneman 2011) are supporting the way APS displays phronesis associated. This latter is associated with a socio-emotional cognition in the opposing domains theory (ODT) (Jack 2014; Jack et al. 2013; Boyatzis, Rochford, and Jack 2014).

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and is a problem to be solved in the more mature states of integrative processes. Ryan adopts a dynamic model view of how one develops emphasizing individual personality differences and is influenced by domain-specific social-contextual specific conditions; therefore, integration is not just a premise of “global” integration but it “varies from domain to domain, situation to situation and at times from moment to moment … (and is) in accord with variations in situational motives and supports” (Ryan 1995, 416).4 Ryan also trusts one’s autonomous will and neither considers nor bothers about the potential bias of the emotions, because in Ryan’s model the will is the last reference for decision making in the self. Throughout Ryan’s seminal works (Deci and Ryan 2002, 2013; Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000, 2004, 2006) it is consistently assumed that autonomy in the self is required for an individual to experience integration in the self; and that self-autonomy assumes mastery of the subject’s self and mastery over one’s actions. Moreover, it is believed that such mastery linked with self-autonomy enables a sense of competence and is experienced as emanating from the individual’s self (Deci and Ryan 2002, 2013; Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000, 2004, 2006). For fairness it should be noted that Ryan opines that, whereas autonomy and integration have to do with volition and with internal coherence, independence is believed to concern whether one relies on others or not (Ryan 1995, 419). And according to Ryan independence is a separate and dynamically related dimension from that of autonomy (of self) (Ryan 1995, 419). Ryan highlights a lot this need of being autonomous, but being autonomous is close in Ryan’s theory with the idea that the subject’s “will” is who decides. The problem here is that there is no presence of a moral concern or an acknowledgement of the moral substance of being and acting: in Ryan (1995) it does not matter at all what one decides, even if one decides to be in-dependent or dependent on others. The key question is that the subject and one’s autonomous will has to be who decides how to act. This assertion, however, in all this line of work, bears the problem that it allows the acceptance of a sentence such as, “I can be autonomously dependent if/because I decide to” (Deci and Ryan 2013, 29; Ryan and Deci 2006); hence it is a subject-master who autonomously wills how to act in any given situation. This is a romanticized view of the self, as if one could be 4

Related to this, it is precisely Ryan’s premise, “some cultures do a better job of facilitating the well-being and integrity of individuals” (Ryan 1995, 415), that is a moment in this theorist’s thinking bringing it closer to the inter-processual self paradigm of human development. However, as noted, the overall premises of SDT better classify it as part of the AS paradigm of human integrative development.

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outside the lifeworld and make decisions from this safe boundary (the self as boundary is a presupposition of the modern psychology). Not only does it romanticize the self, but this work is an amoral view of the self who, even in the case of freely willing to act unethically or amorally, takes such action to be a sign of growth and integrity in the self. As long as doing this is willed by a subject, it constitutes a lever in one’s autonomous integrative growth process. This relatively naïve assumption justifies our classification of Ryan in the AS paradigm. However, Ryan’s self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2002) also contains some elements that would bring it closer to our proposed IPS paradigm when he tries to bring up more dynamics aspects, so the theory is of interest. But this creates potential theoretical confusion. For example, it may be the reason why Ryan (surely unintentionally, albeit falsely) argues in a later article that there is a close link between his work’s assumptions and the Aristotelian view of the person, society and eudaimonia (Ryan, Curren, and Deci 2013). At the end, Ryan understands happiness as something that can be possessed by the self instead of understanding its Aristotelian meaning; happiness is the kind of activity of the soul according to the personal virtue, as Aristotle wrote5 (NE 1099b.25–30). Despite the effort of Ryan (1995; Deci and Ryan 2002) to explain the human being as an organism that is conceptualized as a system with dynamic processing capacity, this model ends up falling again in a subject–object relations narrative and assumptions. We suggest this because, at the end, everything that is to be integrated is understood as necessities, which are “needs” (hence, objects) to be covered and not at all as noted as something with a profound moral substance (relevant to the notion of a personal calling, as mentioned earlier). Ryan distinguishes between integrative tendencies and conditions. The conditions are thought of as purely psychological (domain-specific) needs, while the integrative tendencies in the self are seen as aiming towards “preserving the overall integrity” of the human organism, which thus requires strong innate selfregulatory mechanisms (Ryan 1995, 399). This latter is the motivational goal of the inner organism, but the goal, in Ryan’s model, is also a “need.” It means that the goal is conceptualized as another need, because “an aspect of this orderly regulation, organisms appear to have aims, purpose, or ‘needs’” (Ryan 1995, 400). The self is driven by his/her needs that need to be covered one by one.

5 In the following section, which discusses the IPS paradigm’s philosophical origins, we refer more substantially to the Greek philosopher’s works of relevance.

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We now analyze in more detail the commonalities throughout all the previous works that make up basic assumptions of the (AS) paradigm regarding the self and action, and relevant notions of human integrative growth (and human development more broadly). Throughout the analysis, we cite examples of how various models we have examined understand specific questions of agency and human development.

2.1. Who is the human being? The subject In the modern (AS) paradigm of growth, the human being is understood as a subject who is believed to only know oneself through one’s actions. But, in this modern position on the human being as a subject, the most that can be known concerns the possibility that there may be someone behind these actions. The self is recognized through the boundary that separates a subject–agent from other things–objects; this boundary makes things differ, irrespective of the quality of relation uniting them. The self here is mainly a reference to one’s direct present, considering choices within a frame of present mindfulness and possibilities for agency. The self is knowable solely by its action/production. This ontology of the self is hence a subject synonymous with its agency. This reduces the subject only to a logical presupposition for action (Düsing 2002), an assumption that is already rooted in modern idealist Western philosophy. For example, for Descartes, “the I think, therefore I know.” A clear understanding that there is an I-person with a substantial being and identity that needs to remain internally related to one’s actions is absent from AS. Kant’s I is nothing more than a formal, abstract conclusion. For Descartes, “the I know”; in Fichte, “the I want”; in Schelling, “the I create art”; in Hegel “the I am”; for Husserl, the psychological I is the abridged and identically purified I who performs the actions of all former I-s, and any other mental action. The I, the Idealist subject, ends up being an object, for it only knows about itself through its relation to objects (Orón 2015b). Echoing these AS models, psychology and current philosophies (Korsgaard 1989) accept the unity in order to constitute agency. Logically this (AS) subject aims to capitalize “profits” from one’s actions directly or as early as possible. The autonomous subject’s reality is that of being a sum of parts, or domain-specific “selves” (Ryan 1995), independently of what it is the human being does. As this subject-self is fragmented in its multiple agency, there is no perceived self-unity (Ryan 1995), opposite from IPS.

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Agency in AS The agent is an autonomous subject, one who can and aims to autonomously “author” one’s life. Aiming to know oneself via one’s actions, the autonomous subject–agent attempts to capitalize “profits” from one’s actions directly or as early as possible. The autonomous subject’s reality is that of being a sum of parts, or domain-specific “selves” (Ryan 1995), independently of what it is the human being does. The multiplicity of the selves brings up the problem of unity, that it is usually understood as integrity in the sense of having consistent rules and criteria of reference to guide how to act in every situation (Moore 2015). Therefore, the human being is defined/assumed to exist as boundary, (a) outside his/her activities and relationships and how these are internally related, and (b) not in relation to one’s prior, broader, and subsequent acts. Kegan’s highest stages can be drawn upon as an example to show that human development cannot evolve outside a (cognitive–rationalist) understanding of subject and its growth. Kegan’s model directs the subject–master to understand and expand oneself by maintaining mastery over one’s life (1994). This is described as “the self-authoring mind” stage (“fourth order, or modern mind” of Kegan’s stage theory). Finally, the mastery of the subject over one’s direct relationships is understood in terms of objects that the subject’s rationalist cognition can dynamically synthesize and internalize in order to grow, described as “the selftransforming mind” stage (“fifth order” in Kegan 1994). Even in the highest stages, the subject is understood to be the agent, and it is not possible for the subject–agent to conduct other ways of relating to others outside one’s cognitive mastery and autonomy; so at the end the self does not know who the self is because everything that he knows consists of objects. Kegan disagrees with Cook-Greuter’s work (1999) because the self in this latter model of human development (extending Loevinger 1976) at the end vanishes; but this is also the case in Kegan’s 1994 model because the self is the pure ability of the knowing-master here. Hence, the autonomous self (AS) requires having and relying upon a strong (autonomous) abstract judgment capacity (the Piagetian “formal operational thinking”) that allows the subject to dominate the object world via extension of its mastery.

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The self (of the subject–agent) The self is recognized through the boundary that separates a subject–agent from other things–objects; this boundary makes things differ, irrespective of the quality of relation between them. The self here is mainly a reference to one’s direct present; the self only considers choices within a frame of present mindfulness and possibilities for agency. In AS, the self is knowable directly via its actions and productions. While the agency that constitutes the subject-self is believed to be fragmented across various domains and roles, there is rather a presumption that the self faces and resolves the problem of unity as a problem of the higher stages and integrative processes (Ryan 1995). The main reference of maturation in AS Development and maturity here are conditional upon following a specific “rule,” and the success of doing what the rule requires enables the pathway to growth and development.6 Development means mastery of one’s acts 6

As noted, this paradigm on human development is premised upon Western and North European normative and broader philosophical thought. Even in the most demanding and humanistically driven Kantian moral philosophy, to be able to qualify as a mature, virtuous (Kantian), moral agent, a person must submit to the unconditional followership of a moral rule taken as default, to do what an agent “ought to do” to act in the service of “good” and “refrain from harm” according to the (Kantian) framework as if each agent can be a neutral judge of a situation in order to act in alignment with the Kantian moral imperative. This requires of the agent to discount/ignore that one is a person and one’s own personal feelings underlying one’s humanity must be put aside—for the Kantian model of moral judgment–agency, feelings are considered inferior, competing with and potentially dangerous for (rationalist) cognition. The AS integrity depends on a person’s capacity to: (a) pursue a thorough rational justification by one’s logical consistency with the universal moral code, and (b) detach oneself from the “passions.” The latter comprise inner intuitions/instincts and feelings in relation to an agent’s own wishes to engage in one’s important projects and obligations, and feelings towards others’ good. Acting with care, pursuing the mutual good of all parties involved in a situation, must be put aside for the sake of remaining an objective and neutral judge of how best to act consistently with a Kantian decision procedure. To maintain one’s integrity, one’s own projects and interests that matter to one personally (Rajczi 2007) must also be put aside to remain a neutral and clinically detached moral agent—that is, AS in the Kantian frame must distance oneself from being fully human and try to pursue an agent, a neutral good (Rajczi 2007) and a personal relation to one’s personal integrity (Rajczi 2002, 2007, 2011) that is potentially dehumanizing and perhaps too idealistic. These are part of an AS way

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and relations while the subject–agent acts thinking about integrity as a “new” or extra task to add to those same acts and relations. Each AS model has a different “rule” for assessing whether autonomous agency is performed effectively. An example of the thinking of Kegan (1994) is that the subject of a later stage acquires more mature, broader (cognitive/abstract) frameworks (from the previously internalized “objects”). In Kegan, the subject-object “rule” serves as the main frame of reference of maturation in the adult development theory postmodern psychology lens (1994), also in Lahey-Laskow (1986). The subject of a later stage is conceptualized as having acquired more mature, broader (cognitive) frameworks from the previously internalized “objects” as the “new” or “higher” subject has been understood to grow and mature insofar as it synthetically “swallowed” what was previously understood as “object” in order to fuse with it in cognitive terms. Hence, the mature, integrated subject is capable of developmental shifts in meaning-making structures and qualities of AS that Kegan (1994) describes in his “the selfauthoring mind” stage (“fourth order, or modern mind”). Each of these is an autonomous agent in different ways. Kegan illustrates that the subjects with the “self-authoring mind(s)” see themselves as fully autonomous independent agents and rationally define their value systems, identities, goals, and destinies. Ryan also argues that the rule is the reference of integrative development, but the main condition of the rule is that the subject has chosen it, because the main goal in Ryan is self-determination (1995). If Kegan trusts the cognitive aspects, over all others, for judging, Ryan’s model is premised more upon volitional aspects.7 So there is no process for critically defining the rule, but what matters is that the freedom for the rule chosen is premised upon the autonomous subject whose expertise concerning rule keeping is required. Ryan does not know that the will cannot act outside cognition, because the will cannot want what it does not know.

of integrity requirements that we suggest are evident already, even within a Kantian theory premise. These linkages, between an AS perception of descriptive moral agency with a normative equivalence in all rule-oriented normative ethics, have been the focus of an earlier article by Akrivou and Kolb (under review). 7 In Kant the rule is universal, but at the end it is also supported by the subject.

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2.2. Development in AS In models inspired by an AS conception of growth, growth is mainly a cognitive action. Understanding cognition premised upon rationalism is a primarily logical (in the sense of narrowly rationalist as opposed to reasonable) process of making decisions, albeit without considering emotions or intuitions except once they are understood as signaling a threat to a logical way of integrating oneself. In the foundational philosophy of the AS paradigm of human development, this is very clear because it is always required of a self to exist as synonymous of being in charge—in the Kantian thinking, for instance. It is true that psychoanalysis-based models of human psychology acknowledge emotions at some part of their model, but this is not fully integrated nor convincingly understood. For example, Cook-Greuter (1999) supports the notion that emotions are incorporated in one of the stages, but this is not systematically explained nor is it integral in the basic assumptions of the model; moreover, it is not explained why emotion suddenly happens in later stages and how this is related to choices regarding ethical action. So emotion is believed to be taken into account in a later stage of growthaffective domains of being, appearing with no explained links to the self’s ethical substance and without clearly stated implications for its role in the overall growth model. And whether affect is an integral, or competing, or peripheral part of the human condition and growth process, is not theorized. In Ryan’s model (1995; Ryan and Deci 2013), as noted earlier, the question of how to develop assumes the existence of dynamic integrative autonomous tendencies in the self (psyche), which are seen as premised upon psychological processes activating self-regulatory mechanisms and intrinsic motivation within various self-domains (Deci and Ryan 2002, 2013; Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000, 2004, 2006). In the post-Piagetian stage models of Loevinger (1976), development is dependent upon an increasing capacity for mastery over the self and the object world, which is seen as a way to ensure that self-defense mechanisms in the self are appropriately managed and harnessed (Akrivou 2013). In Kegan, the subject is autonomously performing abstract analysis more or less throughout the process of growth, remaining detached from feelings; Kegan (1994) explains this as achieving neutral objectivity by experiencing the world as being “too much in their head.” While the very cognitive “make up” of AS may also result in approaching a relationist– dialectical stance on the world (in the sense of a Hegelian dialectics process view of relations), it is precisely the concern for mastery over relations underlying this dialectics that defines the directionality and

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mechanisms of action and how to utilize reason in Kegan’s higher stages (Kegan 1994). This is supported empirically insofar as the cognitive basis of Kegan’s stage of self-authorship mainly relies on rationalist thinking, despite its multi-dimensional nature (Creamer, Baxter, and Yue 2010, 550, 552). How the progress (towards integration) happens AS understands the progress (towards integration) as reliant upon the integrative tendencies in the self to bring about dynamic synthesis. A (dynamic) synthesis requires a subject in a hypothetical state A to move to a new state (no-A) by making a synthesis between A and something outside A, a B stage; and the new stage shows up as synthesis. This progress brings AS close to the dialectic sequence in Hegel’s thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Hegel 1969). But what is important in the dynamic synthesis model’s understanding of how an integrated self (and related action with integrity) comes about is that integrity is what the self fundamentally lacks. And integrity can arise at the end as an idealized endgoal state via progressive unilinear always-ascending moves towards new (more mature states via the rejection of one’s previous way of being; hence to A requires a move towards no-A as the only way to progress): hence here the difference between the two parts disappears. Indeed, in subject–object-inspired models in (post)modern psychology this is possible only via a subject–object integrative “fusion.” This is because the new (supposedly) higher stage must overcome what has been its (previousstage) subject–object foundation. Hence, progression to Kegan’s postautonomous integrative stage (“self-transforming mind” or Kegan’s fifth order, or postmodern mind) requires dialogic consciousness between subject and object (Kegan 1994), with the aim of synthesis, whereby the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the two parts (subject and object) that relate must be dissolved and disappear to be replaced by a synthetic fusion (i.e., required to be defined by the one in the position of subject-master). In Kegan’s (1994) words, a fusion or a synthesis is possible whereby “[t]he relationship becomes a context for sharing and interacting in which both parties experience their ‘multipleness’, in which the many forms or systems that each self is are helped to emerge [via a synthesis of a subject’s and a] partner’s positions” (312–13.) The dominance of a rationalist approach to a problem of relationship between two persons is evident in this thinking that assumes a synthetic act guided by the mastery of a subject relating to its object-relation. This is a particular way to

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understand the self as dynamic system:8 the subject is the A, the object is the no-A, and through the mastering appears the B that is required to be some dissolution of the constituent parts. As noted in Cook-Greuter’s model, the synthesis moment is the dissolution of the self. In her ego-transcendent stage/state, the self ends up vanishing in his union state in which the ego is transformed (Cook does not say who transforms the ego), and its transparence is believed to be permanent and is put inside the eternal cycle of life. In Ryan’s model, as noted, the need for autonomy is a key concern, and his proposal of self-determination is that the self can freely decide, no matter what the self wills, regarding its acts. And through his decisions he finds himself in the world, can achieve self-recognition and become selfassumed. The self develops itself by knowing itself via its (rationalist) will. This presents risks to recognizing human growth and integrity because even when a subject wills unethical actions or to act in amoral manner it is not seen as an issue that somehow reverses or stops the integrative growth. What it means to “mature” in AS In AS, to mature is to become an adult with a capacity for an autonomous self (AS), to develop mastery mainly via cognitive mastery, and to be more efficient in one’s roles and along various dimensions of growth (e.g., Ryan’s assumptions on domain- and context-specific focus of integration). The reference of what it means to be mature is the latest stage. The more mature one is, the closer to the latest state he/she is. This reclaim is present clearly in all the models examined, including Kegan, Ryan (1995, 2013), Loevinger (1966, 1976), and Cook-Greuter (1999), even if it is assumed that very few people attain this level of growth (e.g., Cook-Greuter in 1999 shows evidence that she found less than 1 percent of persons populating the so-called higher stages of moral maturity in the respective adult development models). How “stage of development” and “progression” are understood In AS, human development and the self are understood as different things because it is presupposed that the subject pre-exists and aims to master the object world. However, this means that what one does, in terms of one’s 8 We show later that the IPS understanding of dynamic systems is of open-free systems.

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activity or one’s growth, is something like a developmental goal to achieve, something that exists outside the subject. Therefore, the stages are clearly defined a priori and development is seen following a universal, generic pathway. Stages are hierarchical and development follows a unidirectional forward motion, while the highest stage is always superior to all other stages including the stages within a post-conventional categorization. But growth may be slower or faster depending on personal cognitive capacities and motivation (Kolb 2015). As noted earlier, this view of development is a premise of all post-Piagetian psychology. Reading the above-cited works of Kegan, Ryan, and Cook-Greuter, it’s easy to have the impression that the self never grows. The self at the beginning and the last stages is the same in these models. What has changed based on their premise of growth is that the self comes to become a powerful self. But in critically reviewing this, it is clear this is a question of growing power, rather than an integrative self-growth and development. There is no internal growth here, nor a personal growth. Maybe in CookGreuter’s (1999, 2000) model there is a (Buddhist) interpretation that the self has to be set free and needs to suffer a purification, as noted earlier in more detail. The goal of development The goal of development is to be able to maintain autonomous action by each agent to author one’s synthetic path towards one’s own selfintegration. This autonomous goal of development underlying the dynamic–synthetic (AS) view of integration may well accept and strive for a selective growth of one part (in the self) over another (or of a subject over another person or relation-object); it also entails a selective growth of one part in a particular domain over another domain (as in Ryan’s view, 1995), with no concern over how this impacts other relations and across the remaining domains. Progressively the self masters more domains. In each domain, the self has to deal with the situation, so in one domain it could be motivated because he/she has reached the master situation and he/she is autonomous, whereas in other domains this has not yet occurred. In Kegan’s 1994 model, this progression can take the form of becoming an autonomous master–author of one’s life destiny, identity, and actions, or reaching Kegan’s fifth order (“self-transforming mind”), or of relating to others in a way that enables the master–subject to grow by synthesizing a higher-order identity, potentially absorbing the other party– object through a relation that is viewed more as a context or means for the integrative development of a subject–author. The relationship here, seen

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critically, is in our view a resource, a means towards greater autonomy and hierarchic integration of a subject who adopts this frame of growth. But alas, it is not a relationship between equals, because the other is viewed as an object. So the relationship does not have value, nor does it possess integrity in itself. It is only the way (means) through which the self reaches the object. Besides the path towards independence, the development in these models is conceptualized as having one end—that is, ending when the subject–agent achieves an integrative complexity in the self that is a perfect form of unity. The unity of the self is at the end of development. In Kegan’s epilogue (1994, 353–5), when the self has finally found its maturity and unity, it discovers a justification or defense of the movement’s pathway core premise by discovering the futility of it, as there is no directionality and purpose for the development. This means that, in later stages, the conclusion denies the overall essence of this as a personal development model, but for Kegan and many postmodernists movement is everything. However, we find an ethical problem here in that this stance supports a Heracletian view of movement (“everything is flow”) for the sake of movement, which is not going anywhere. Ryan in 1995 and later understands that the goal of development is to fulfill the tendency of integration in the human organism regarding three related fields: intrinsic motivation, internalization, and emotion integration. But to achieve this integrative growth the self needs to attend to different psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. This allows Ryan (1995, 2013) to understand human development in a dynamic way, with a more dynamic vision of growth. But at the end the human being is reduced or simplified to a being of needs. It does not matter how one fulfills these needs (there is no referent for this in SDT theory), as long as one fulfills them. Even the goal of development ends up being seen as another need (Ryan 1995). So it is to be expected that Ryan uses wellbeing as a goal and as an indicator of the developed human being (Ryan 2013). The goal of the development emerges as a great effort that actually aims to find a way towards self-constitution and the best strategy for mastering this “game.” But in cases where the self-constitution is reached, what is there is more unclear, or when there is an answer it is not logically consistent with the theory premises of these models. Ryan throughout the work (1995) does not answer this question; Kegan in his 1994 epilogue could only propose the notion of an eternal movement; and Cook-Greuter (1999), following the Veda tradition, proposes the vanishing of the self. Therefore, when unity is reached, the progress of the self-growth stops, which is another problem.

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How to understand what exists prior to the developmental process The model of an AS requires asserting the subject as pre-existing its development and able to form a clear boundary with what it is not – that is, other objects in the world, including animals and other humans. A clear boundary and distance between the subject–agent’s self and the rest of the object world is required; even the self itself can become an object to master in some models. This may mean that what is understood as preexisting the developmental process is the subject and its will! Identity, differentiation, growth, integration These terms are understood as different realities, and each is a diverse aspect of the subject’s psychology. Regarding differentiation, the AS view is premised upon the axiom or pre-requisite that only insofar as the differentiation of subject–object increases can a subject’s identity manifest in maturity. And it therefore assumes some sort of dissolution, end, or synthetic fusion of relationships for the subject to progress towards the highest stages of integration. So the starting point is the logical differentiation of the subject from the objects that are separate, alien entities. The growth increases the differentiation. In a deeper consideration, the self never grows. Rather than speaking of growth, it may be better to speak of an “incremental process of mastering”: the bigger the differentiation, the bigger the identity. In this moment, the subject starts one movement of integration thanks to the strong self. This self (possessing identity following an expansion–contraction process) needs to spread its mastery over its environment, including other objects– selves required under one’s mastery to reach the final goal of unity. The more the self subsumes one domain at this stage, the more its identity is changed. Cook-Greuter (1999) recognizes this movement of expansion– contraction: she divides all the development into pre-personal, personal, and transpersonal (the last act of the self before its dissolution).9 Summarizing the AS paradigm and the characteristics of the models we classify as AS (excluding Kohlberg’s work as noted), personal agency 9

In Erik Erikson’s model, which does not necessarily belong to AS, it is possible also to recognize this movement because in the last state the self needs to relive in all the previous states. So in the same way that in infancy the child lives the challenge of acquiring basic trust, in adulthood it is necessary to update the basic trust that has undergone many challenges during the lifetime. And it is adolescence that involves the pivotal point of the change in which the self reaches its identity.

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is believed to rely on inherent autonomously functioning integrative processes that progressively unify one’s understandings and behavior into a coherent agency (Ryan 1995, 399), and hence the problem of unity in the self is a problem that is recognized and is to be solved at the end of integrative growth. These autonomous models of self and development have been critiqued as an individualistic view of agency by sociologists like Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985). Therefore, in AS models it is required of the agent–subject to trans-act with and draw upon the object world and synthetically internalize it as a means to achieve unity. The subject and its development are understood as separate issues and questions, whereas it is believed that agency emanates from a preexisting, autonomous master–subject whose quality and integrity can be inferred behind the subject’s actions directly and solely. Integrity is seen as an internal coherence of the self, irrespective of its kind and in an amoral way denying the moral substance inherent in being human and human action. Also, integrity, in AS, does not refer to other people and the social implications linking self and social identity. In stage models for measuring, if someone has reached one specific (higher/lower) cognitive stage it is assumed as a given that the person must have a corresponding (higher/lower) degree of individual integration, and hence it is assumed that being a more or less integrated person is a direct equivalent of higher cognitive superiority (Akrivou 2008). This is often associated with the presence of a higher intelligence, education, socioeconomic status, and so on, while only a strikingly small minority of adults has been found to be truly self-integrated as very few are seen reaching the highest stages (as we know from Kegan and Cook-Greuter’s works). For example, in stage models in which stage one is measured to be is important to attach a degree of being as more or less integrated person. However, no other form or way to relate to others outside the self is previewed as possible outside the subject–object perception regarding the ontology of being (a human being) and action. The self of AS is strong, but it is alone; in having achieved its autonomy, it presents a problem to solve what has been achieved. Thanks to the self’s activity, which is mainly cognitive rationalist mastery considering the self and the world as in boundary relations, the subject–agent demonstrates mastery until the point when the subject logically shows it has become the master–author and ruler of the progress that it itself has defined and actualized. Of course a logical implication is that the self needs to add some integrity (as an additional extra need) to its mastery, at the end of its self-authoring process. A summary of the above can be found in Table 1.

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A distance between subject–object is needed for AS to logically make sense of what needs to be synthesized/mastered.

Chapter Four To consider myself inside the relationships with others and nature. It is necessary not to confuse systemic vision with holistic vision in which the beginning is the unity. Analytic vs. holistic vision (one thing/unity that swallows parts) vs. systemic vision in which every part depends on the unity and the others (Frisina 2002).

CHAPTER FIVE THEORETICAL BASIS OF OUR PROPOSAL (THE INTER-PROCESSUAL SELF)

1. Normative foundations, basic theoretical constructs, and key terms for our proposal Our theoretical proposal (“inter-processual self,” IPS) is a normative offering on the self and action and implies a new corresponding moral psychology. IPS is a personalist virtue ethics proposal on the self and action. As in all virtue ethics, the moral character maturity of the person is its core assumption, with the main emphasis and concern comprising how action with ethics at its core occurs. However, our proposal (IPS) understands the person as a transcendental “complicated unity” (referring to something not present, and something unique and singular to each human being ontologically speaking) from which both ethical character growth and action (expressing the integrity of each person) emerge. In our proposal, the “personal” ontology we offer is premised on core congruent thinking in important virtue philosophers in the classical paradigm in Europe and in the East (namely Aristotle, Polo, and Wang Yangming) and contemporary process philosophy (Whitehead), which helps support our personalist transcendental virtue ethics with: (a) an understanding of a person “as an open and a free system,” and (b) an emphasis on personal, interpersonal, and systemic growth that therefore poses (ethical) “relations” as a key theoretical construct in our proposal. Therefore, these manifest how our proposal offers a corresponding moral psychology that is in sharp contrast to models in the modern paradigm. We believe also that our proposal’s presuppositions help to eschew the reductionism of the modern paradigm brought to the understanding of self and action (see Appendix) and how it has to some extent led modern psychology models to emphasize self-autonomy as the presupposition to

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human action and growth, especially in the last half of the twentieth century. We therefore present in this chapter the normative foundations and works supporting our proposal and related theoretical constructs, and then discuss systematically key terms and their understanding for the IPS paradigm. Before that, we show the fundamental background conceptions in the IPS paradigm on self and human action; see Table 2 below.

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1.1. The person as the basic theoretical construct The person in IPS is at the core of our virtue ethics normative proposal (and its corresponding moral psychology). The foundational construct “person” is the term used to refer to the uniqueness of each human being (personal transcendental), while it also refers to the uniqueness we share as part of our nature of being human (common human nature transcendental). Our proposal’s core construct “person” and its understanding is rooted in the Aristotelian tradition’s ontology of personal being and human nature (we provide more detail on Aristotle’s proposal later in this chapter and in Appendix). This tradition has been extended more thoroughly by the philosopher Leonardo Polo (Polo 1998, 2003), who profoundly informs our proposal’s conceptual foundation. We will show how two other prominent thinkers (North Whitehead in the West and Wang Yangming in the neo-Confucian tradition, which is congruent but extends the classical virtue ethics European tradition) influence our proposal’s understanding of the human person, which links IPS to the person as a free and open system and places an emphasis on personal–relational ethics. So with the key term “person,” we are suggesting that the human being is more than its appearance. Therefore, by capturing only what is present and manifest, it is not possible to grasp the person in IPS theory. Here we should note that we are not referring to the traditional term soul: as Aristotle wrote, in the animal and the human being the soul “appears,” the soul is always and totally present (Aristotle 1978). So, in IPS, in accordance with Aristotle, the soul is part of the appearance of the being—that is, it is part of the presence of being. But in the human being, there is something that is not manifested, something that exists and which is central to being beyond any “appearance” (even of the soul). What exists that is present (but does not “appear” directly, or its “appearance” does not exhaust its presence) is there as something more, which is something “additionally.” This unexhausted reality is what we call in the IPS-based conception of the person the personal “intimacy,” “interiority,” “uniqueness,” or “each one.” The fact that we cannot easily capture or know this core property of being is not understood as a weakness in our knowledge capacities, as personal intimacy exists not as a result or feature of our knowledge. Consequently, in IPS we suppose that we cannot substitute one person for another: human beings are not exchangeable due to their uniqueness and personal intimacy and interiority of each one. In contrast, for example (regarding other things), if we agree that two chairs look similar, we can legitimately say that they are interchangeable: we can exchange them because by swapping one chair with another that looks similar we still have the same chair after the exchange. On the other hand,

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in IPS ontology presuppositions regarding the person, we cannot exchange two Siamese twins because they look the same or because they share body organs and even soul. They are different in their intimacy. For this reason, IPS supports a profoundly ethical proposal regarding each person’s being a unique and a non-exchangeable being with valuing each person in their uniqueness. We suggest that this idea also thoroughly influences our understanding of human nature, its ethics and ontology, which respects and always values human uniqueness and singularity. The readers should hence note that we are not suggesting the same as Kant’s proposal. Kant, through the distinction between the phenomenon and noumenon treated in his book Critique of Pure Reason, chapter III (1934), opined that it is not possible to grasp the whole reality. Kant, therefore, understands that it is only because our knowledge has intrinsic weaknesses that it prevents us from knowing all the reality and the reality of being human as a subcategory. Our not grasping the personal singularity and intimacy is not because of the poverty of our knowing and related human faculties but is due to the notion of being a (human) person in its singularity and uniqueness; it is not possible to grasp human singularity and intimacy even where we assume that our (human) knowledge has no limitations whatsoever. Fully comprehending this (personal interiority, intimacy, singularity, uniqueness, or our “each one-ness”) is also out of our control. Congruently in the IPS proposal, is wishing to know and to act from within who each one really is about acting from our intimacy, while human persons do not control our intimacy. Our intimacy is the gift of our uniqueness and makes us singular, while we are plural and we all share a humanity. Importantly, the “additionality” of our intimacy prevents us from the notion of control, because any control is a reduction. To control the intimacy is the same as to reduce the person to appearances. With this finding, we are far from the modern (and postmodern) proposal summarized in the AS mindset (we believe the postmodern is an apex or phase or expression within the modern paradigm and does not break from it, and we support this with the historical reference in Appendix). In sharp contrast to the IPS paradigm, the AS paradigm emphasizes that the person is in control of herself via the so-called second-order cognitive volition. One key author for this analytic point of view on the person is Harry G. Frankfourt (1971): he distinguishes between the person and the wanton. The wanton is a term created by Frankfourt to refer to the animal and kinds of human beings who have only desires. For him, personhood stems from our volition to master and create our second-order desires (Frankfourt 1971). A (first-order) desire is “A wants X”

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preferences and wants, whereas a second-order desire is about “A wanting to want X,” which eventually means creating the right second-order desires so as to elevate us to being a person (Frankfourt 1971): in this thinking, the person has more than a will—the person has a free will because he/she decides what to want. This view means that self-mastery (being completely in charge of oneself), even in the case when one cannot develop one’s free will, is key. Frankfourt’s (1971) model fits very well with the moral psychology models we present in AS and explains a key critique of the IPS proposal concerning the AS paradigm’s philosophical presuppositions. However, according to our IPS proposal, Frankfourt (1971) is, in fact, destroying the ontological profound notion of the construct “person”, rendering it a reductionist proposal whereby free will is what makes someone a person. We are proposing instead, in IPS, that what makes someone a person is the singularity of being and personal intimacy uniqueness. These are always additionally even when we refer to one same person: each of our intimacies is unique and singular and non-substitutable. So we agree (with Kant and the modern philosophy) that, with our will, we are acting in ourselves, but in IPS we cannot limit (reduce) ourselves (being a human person) to our free will. In fact, for IPS, we have free will because we are unique and have intimacy (and not the contrary). Hence, in more simple terms, we believe that in the AS paradigm the self is understood as a subject primarily, whereas in IPS the self is a person (in the understandings we offer on the construct in this chapter). The term “subject” is an impersonal way to name the agent, which is a core premise of the AS paradigm of human development, as discussed in the previous chapter. But it is the “self” who supports and generates the action. Trying to capture the “self” just as the subject who acts and creates significant challenges is meaningless in IPS, in opposition to the philosophers of reference in AS. We have seen that, in AS, the self who acts is no more than a logical necessity of his(her) acts (the-subject-whoacts and therefore the self-subject is knowable via its production in AS). This premise helps to critique AS as an incomplete and limited theorization regarding the self, action, and human development, from within the IPS paradigm. This same assumption enables us to suggest that the IPS proposal, and its corresponding moral psychology, is a more complete and complicated theoretical proposal on persons and how we act in the real world, and how we grow personally and systemically. Besides this, limiting the self to the-subject-who-acts (as in AS) implies that the subject’s self could become an object or even lose/deny its ethical core (as happens in the highest stages/states of AS models),

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whereas in IPS we support ethical being and action is a core and integral element of being and acting as a person. Since the subject can only know objects, it comes to know itself as an object too, or it comes to deny its own heart, soul, and intimacy.

1.2. The person as (open and free) system The person is the foundation of IPS, albeit understood as an open, free system. This is explained further below (Orón 2015b). (a) The notion of “openness” means something that manifests itself, something that is exposed. In the case of human beings, this is expressed through intimacy in relation with others. Openness can maintain itself ad infinitum, as systemic human growth is unrestricted, (b) The notion of “freedom” indicates that growth is not to be understood in a prescriptive predetermined universal and unidirectional way. Human growth does not point to a concrete, specific goal, and an a priori determined “rule” is not required to determine growth. Integration places conditions on growth because in a system everything improves without anything being lost. A systemic view of personal development and human action in human/social systems pertains that the internal relationship between different parts of a system enables growth, achieving both a higher (more integrated) state for each part and the maintenance of the uniqueness and difference (as parts grow in their internal systemic relationship). However, growth in this paradigm cannot be performed autonomously nor is it achievable in an individualist lens and pursuit: it is personal and premised upon volition and intelligence. In a systemic view of human development, growth does not require mastery of the self (as the autonomous self does). Individual and systemic change and growth is a result of morally good or bad choices. In IPS, pursuing growth requires trusting in the personal human capacity to act as ethical beings. This may increase risk and vulnerability in some way, but it also elevates the importance of personal choice and responsibility. As IPS understands the person(s) as (dynamic) open and free system(s), our proposal is premised upon volition and intelligence. This requires being found in a philosophy of being and action whereby being human has a profound spiritual and moral ontology basis. As a

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consequence, any kind of growth enables some sort of (increasing/decreasing) maturation in all the persons who—as parts—coconstitute a system. Systemically morally good growth is premised upon practically wise actions from everyone involved in a human system. Such actions recognize the inseparable cognitive–affective nature of being human as well as openness to diversity, to recognize that distinct identities are the basis of personal, interpersonal, and broader social differences. Excellent and meaningful change, and (personal/systemic) growth, starts from the fact that an ethical dimension as part of human nature makes to be human a superior form of intelligence, which differs from artificial intelligence as much as it differs from other living or non-living organisms. Integrative growth in our proposal, therefore, recognizes the uniqueness of each person as a moral actor by nature. Integrative growth in IPS trusts free human action at the moment of relating with others, which means that each state of growing concerning an-other (or others) has meaning in itself. In other words, meaning is not only in relation to others but also in the way each person chooses to evolve in her own distinct identity, since there is no universal model in each person’s life evolution (via childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, besides common identity issues in each of these life phases). They are different for each person thanks to each life’s context and its personal, cultural, and societal history. The goal of human growth in IPS is not to be an adult who increasingly masters his destiny and authors how best to achieve self-actualization. The goal is to be (become more of) who everyone really is. Every moment in each person’s life presents its own challenges regarding personal growth and how to resolve the set of choices involved in becoming more deeply and more profoundly who everyone is. Society does not need adolescents to grow rapidly into adults who can rationally master, as subject agents, their object world. Instead, what society needs is that everyone lives thoughtfully and in plenitude the moments (and days, and years) of life, with an ongoing sense of personal and shared responsibility regarding how to relate to others (i.e., every other person, since in our proposal the term “others” is never understood as an abstract collective). In this way, human action and freedom are deliberately allowing mutual growth and this results in a healthy and flourishing society. This diversity also enables society to grow in prosperity as an interconnected system in which everyone can live in happiness (we will refer later to Aristotle’s concept of happiness, eudaimonia, to explain this further).

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1.3. The personal relation(s) in (open and free) systems Personal ethical relations and growth in relations is the third theoretical presupposition of our proposal. Based on all we have presented concerning the understanding of the person in IPS and the person as a free and open system, we can also infer that growth in relations is personal before we can talk for more abstract terms of growth—for example, societal and systemic growth. In IPS, the relationships require each relating person to engage fully in a complicated unity. This means that it is not only about actively engaging in or managing relations via cognition and action based upon cognition. Further, to engage fully as a person in one’s relationships in a way that enables the person, the relationships, and the broader system to grow and flourish depends on the systematic ethical quality persons bring into their relations. Premised upon each person as a moral actor who acts as a complicated unity, this means that how the person authentically “feels” and “intuits” the relations in which one engages is a systematic and ongoing concern in IPS and a presupposition for positive broader growth and flourishing to occur in this paradigm. Simply put, each person experiences herself as growing insofar as one grows congruently, and in relation to the other fellow persons to whom one relates (with reference to the notion of system in the previous paragraph). This “felt and intuited meaning in relation to” requires an authentically free dynamic process that evolves from choices allowing each person to relate to her(him)self her or his own inner integrity and to others as ethical beings. Benevolence, sincerity, courage, generosity, trusting, and love are important elements for persons to remain engaged in this personal–relational growth process as open and free systems, and to not shy away or escape back into autonomous, secure growth that may allow safer and faster ways for growth while depriving the broader system of growing in a harmonious way. This theoretical foundation trusts and needs free albeit virtuous expression of the self of each person in relationships. It also exposes persons to a higher degree of vulnerability. Therefore, for an open free system, it is possible to experience relationships with others, but the meaningfulness of these relationships will be based on how they are contextualized by both (all) people involved in a given relationship. In IPS, relations can genuinely grow insofar as relating persons remain relating to each other in a “person to person” way. Once any person–relation configuration reverts to a person–subject or a subject–object way of acting/relating, the relationship experiences some form of degradation that either reduces its capacity for positive ethical growth in the system, or which regresses the relation in negative or

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backward growth and may retard systemic growth. Therefore, in the IPS proposal, how each relating person chooses to respond to one’s relationships influences the quality and direction and dynamics of growth in this given relation and in the system. Moreover, such choice is profoundly linked with an evaluative and ethical element as ethics is integral to being, and action in IPS. This also elevates the notion of shared ethical responsibility in IPS beyond the notion of autonomous selves— moral agents to mutuality—as moral choices are both personal and premised upon a dialogic ethical habitus that is the ground for being and acting as persons (Akrivou and Todorow 2014). Not choosing to respond to a human person with whom one relates as “a subject” or “as an object” helps personal and mutual growth remain congruent with the philosophical foundations of IPS (i.e., our philosophers of reference, whom we present later in this chapter), even when other people choose to respond to someone who acts within the IPS mindset from within a mindset that better corresponds to the autonomous self and modern assumptions on the self and action. This latter, of course, naturally requires virtuous personal character capacities. We can see how this is an ethical, relational response that is premised upon virtue. Instead, our proposal goes beyond a mechanical processing or even a dynamical system idea of a process based on the response to the stimulus. Also, it can neither be understood through direct mimicry nor via a thesis–antithesis–synthesis dialectics. Further, it cannot simply adhere to the mechanistic learning and memorization or rule-based responses, since it requires understanding and respect for widely accepted moral universals (“moral absolutes”). Therefore this process requires intelligence and reason as much as it relies on each person’s humanity and affective processing. Hence, we sketch here a complicated relational–systemic growth process with its own dynamic qualitative aspects. What makes a person-to-person relationship and mutual growth possible differs substantially from the principles that make up a relationship of a subject to object, or subject-to-subject kinds (as relations and growth are perceived in the AS paradigm). More specifically, the person–person is a space of the interpersonal genuine meeting whereby two unique, different, and complicated beings choose freely to remain and mutually grow in relation to each other while respecting their own and others’ diversity. However, the subject–object is the kind of relationship that results when the person conceptualizes the relationship under categories of cause–effect (that said, the relationship subject–object could be very useful, only insofar it is contextualized inside a person–person kind of understanding).

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Thus this goes back to the core conceptual construct in the foundation of IPS associated with being a person (presented earlier). We consider the IPS paradigm as a new theoretical proposal on human beings, action, and development (regarding growing integrity in the self and its relationships), and in the next section we offer a more detailed account of its foundational philosophical grounding.

2. Key authors of reference in philosophy for the Inter-Processual Self 2.1. Aristotle Aristotle (384–322 BC) needs a brief introduction since he has been poorly or falsely understood and referenced by authors of AS (and some Aristotelian premises are falsely linked with AS models); subsequently we develop his main contribution to our proposal. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics present a complicated and dense theory of virtue. A strong personal ethical foundation in an ontology of being and action is in Aristotle a prerequisite for good politics, because nothing can be built outside the personal and virtuous growth. Human development, which is always characterized by a moral concern and teleology (to grow as a virtuous person), is a key premise in Aristotelian theory. Virtuous growth is purposeful, and that is the main reason why Aristotle neither talks about the individual’s quest for happiness nor erases the importance of personal flourishing of all involved as the foundation for a shared broader telos of happiness, which achieves the common good. The purpose of virtuous growth is oriented towards enabling eudaimonia or systemic happiness. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is uniquely the telos of all (morally purposeful) human and social activity. In Aristotle, the notion of personal flourishing (happiness) involves an evaluative moral basis (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002 in Phillips et al. 2017) opposite to a widespread understanding of happiness as a descriptive concept, which only means “feeling good” (Phillips et al. 2017). Hence, moral considerations regarding whether one’s life is morally right and whether one acts systematically as a morally good person allow a good and meaningful life: as a result, an evaluative and choice-laden understanding of happiness is (at least partially) required in addition to a positive affective psychological state (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002 in Phillips et al. 2017). This is not just a matter of minimizing one’s immoral action numbers: it involves a systematic moral inquiry on how best to live a moral and good life with others (Phillips et al. 2017).

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Within this context, living according to virtue is essential, but it is seen as rooted in human being’s nature, because it is a way of being following the right reason (1144b.25–30). Living in accordance with the right reason is, for Aristotle, to display action with phronesis (meaning for the classical tradition from Aristotle to Aquinas the ethically and practically wise action), which cannot be performed unless the acting person is a virtuous and therefore a phronemos person (1144b.25–30). This also is parallel to Aristotle’s understanding (NE 1178b) that there are various forms of human activity (energeia) (Scalzo and Alford, 2016). Contemplation (theoria, or abstract knowing) is governed by theoretical reason (nous). This represents a kind of knowledge that is formal, universal, and explicit. Production (poiesis) is governed by technical reason (technai). Action (praxis) is governed by phronesis or moral–practical reason, which for Aristotle is a moral master virtue that enables ethical knowledge, and it involves moral, affective/relational as well as cognitive traits and related practical skills (Scalzo 2017). Hence, moral–practical knowing and acting (phronesis in Aristotle) is a master virtue that facilitates human action and enables the unity of virtues. For this reason, the moral virtue of phronesis requires a “qualified agent account” (Hursthouse 1999, 28)—careful, practically wise action in decision making, deliberation, and choices that should be not just a standard neutral (or morally indifferent) third-party observer type of action, but also a complicated, careful, and sensitive consideration of the particulars leading to carefully deciding on the right means to achieve the right ends. A notion of a principled formal rationality of an autonomously logical subject–agent who performs practically wise judgment capacity via detaching it from an awareness and respect of one’s own and others’ affections and emotions is not relevant for Aristotle (1144b.25–30). Virtues in Aristotle belong to the order of being; they are not abilities or faculties or skills in the self. Contemplation is the best action for personal development by virtue and the one that displays phronesis. So Aristotle’s understanding of the ontology of self and human action fulfills the condition that personal development to embrace virtue is to be wanted as an end in itself (1985, 1178a.10–1179a.32). This will later help us ground the IPS paradigm’s basic presupposition that ethics and integrity is not some end goal or aspirational ideal of being and growing as a person, but integral to being and acting. And it is inseparable from how each of us chooses to processually answer evaluative questions about how best to be a good person and live a good and meaningful life facing the particulars, others, and one’s own identity.

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Hence virtue and ethics are practical and not primarily theoretical concerns in Aristotle, and this regards how it is manifested and its practice is politics (1985, 1179a.32–1181b.25). This is why Nicomachean Ethics ends in a mysterious way in Aristotle’s reply regarding the inquiry on how a virtuous person can be an essential part of the social/political life of the (Greek city-state) polis: “Let’s start talking about this (1181b.25). The following issue is the politics.” Aristotle ends Nicomachean Ethics— whose topic is personal ethics and how to live in accordance with virtue— after having opined that contemplation is the best action for personal ethics because it fulfills the condition that people are growing following virtue is something to be wanted in itself (1178a.10–1179a.32). And for Aristotle, (personal) happiness is not a feeling or interior state or something that can be possessed or externally given. It is rooted in the person’s soul before anything else: “an activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (1985, 1099b.25–30), with happiness theorized as the end goal of all human life and activity. Aristotle’s happiness is therefore falsely understood when it is described by the perfection of the individual faculties as by Ryan and Deci (2013). From the above, it is clear that for Aristotle the notions of virtue and happiness are grounded on a personalist lens before being extended to a concern or the social process (e.g. via politics) whereby virtue for the common good purposefully oriented towards Eudaimonia (a higher form of personal-shared happiness and well being which requires contemplation and learning at the core of our habits of how to act and live) is possible. This happiness, by its very definition, must be something one wants for itself, for it means that happiness is an activity, a concrete, meaningful way of living and acting that in itself makes one fulfilled (to some degree). Aristotle’s happiness is the kind of activity of the soul according to the virtue of a person (1985, 1099b.25–30). The human being is impacted by their further growth from the degree in which one’s personal actions systematically demonstrate a practical-ethical higher virtue (prudence, or phronesis). The virtue of phronesis in Aristotle requires a systemic (natural, voluntary, sincere, stable) integration of rationalist with affective aspects of being and is capturing the practical-ethical dimensions of the knowing and action unity (non representational cognition). How each person “processually” chooses to act in the entire process of living affects how a person chooses to grow from that moment on, hence the urgency of an ongoing commitment to seeking the power to live a virtuous life (a life worth living).

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So, to be and to act with maturity in Aristotelian (and IPS) terms is that this being concerning virtue and happiness is the (only) one way to live (1985, 1099b). Hence, the notion of the locus of normativity in Aristotle is the personal moral character premised upon virtue (the “unity of virtues”), whereby there are required master virtues such as phronesis and virtues such as moral courage, truthfulness, generosity, friendliness, integrity pride, and liberality (Sison, Beabout, and Ferraro 2017). And therefore “the ethical” in the self and action in Aristotle is capturing the very ontology of being/self. The significance of this last sentence is that our action returns to us and affects the quality of who we are at the core of our being. A person can become what his actions (thoughts, interpretations) are; however, at the same time, the person is additionally to one’s acts. Hence persons are not constituted by their actions nor can one’s actions substitute for the person who acts.1 It is the clear conclusion of understanding virtue as “one’s way to being” (1985, 1106a.20–25 and 1114a.10–132). Aristotle argues this because he notices a difference between acts (action) and production (the outcome, the product our actions result to). In the Aristotelian conceptualization of production, the action and the outcome (production/product) are two distinct things.2 For instance, when I am building (action) a house, I do not have the house; and when I have the (outcome) house, I am not building. For Aristotle, theoretically speaking, action (praxis) is distinct from that which it produces, which is our production (poiesis). But in actions (praxis), the act itself and the outcome happen at the same time. For instance, when I see I have what I am seeing at the same time I perform the act of seeing. When I do not see, I do not 1

In later reference to Polo, it becomes clearer that the human nature is not enough to understand that human being is a person. 2 Here is one of the roots of how AS understands and relates to happiness and the frequent false method of how AS models we classify as AS argue their relevance with Aristotelian eudaimonia. AS thinks that the acts of oneself have consequences for the agent, but it is not believed that these (acts) return to affect what the self is because they believe the activities and the outcomes of the subject’s action are two separate and unrelated things (besides believing the subject to be just a manifestation of one’s acts and not in addition to these). The ethical dimension of action in AS is understood just as another thing (“object”) that needs to be mastered by the subject. This is manifested when we adopt the expression “that the self has integrity.” The ethical dimension of one’s action in AS is understood as just another domain that the autonomous self has to master, while it is believed that once something is mastered it is possessed, permanently concurred with, and internalized.

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have anything. Aristotle in Book IX, 7 (p. 457) made the distinction between acts and movements found in his Metaphysics. In Aristotle’s movements, there is a process where the verb and the result/output of the verb (referring to the outcomes of poiesis) are not simultaneous. So, for Aristotle, there are certain kinds of acts (which he calls movements) in which the outcome is outside and external to the activity: these types do not affect the (moral) quality of a person. Instead, for Aristotle, there are other kinds of acts whereby the activity and its outcome are co-concurring, part of the same act; hence, these acts affect the (moral) quality of the person. This is the reason why ethics in Aristotle is not something to add to the person as an end product. What this means regarding human development and moral maturity is that integrity in the self and personal growth are not produced as outcomes at the end of the developmental process, but they are coinciding as part of acting in ways that make one grow personally–systemically, as a free open system. Understanding Aristotle’s premise that ethics is integrally part of being and growing as a person, and part of what is involved in the evaluative process regarding how to live meaningfully, is important and a foundational premise of the IPS paradigm. Aristotle understands the self as a complex unity (NE 1102a.5–1102b.40). Based on these in IPS ethics is part of the overall personal process of living and growing, which cannot be understood and able to exist as a separate dimension but is integrally linked with a systematic personal moral inquiry regarding how to act to live well. Within the framework of (Aristotelian) thought on happiness, in IPS happiness (eudaimonia) is a specific way to act that follows answering the evaluative questions regarding living meaningfully as an ethical being (being a good person). But, as noted, this is the only way for Aristotle because for him it is part of acting naturally. Human nature therefore for Aristotle means pursuing virtue as an integral part of every action involved in living, and for its own sake, as if there is no other way to act (Aristotle 340 BCE/2002). Instead, happiness in modern psychology, which underlines the AS paradigm, is an emotional experience; this purely descriptive conception of happiness is about feeling positive emotions and a goal state to reach. This happiness is only something to achieve and it is related to the idea of feeling good (Phillips et al. 2017). Hence, only from within the IPS paradigm’s philosophical grounding is it possible to understand what Aristotle said: “the happy man will never be miserable, but neither is fortunate if he falls into misfortune" (NE1101a.5–6). We suggest that it is not possible to profoundly perform

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ethics and understand the qualities of growing as human (free and open systems) from within the AS paradigm’s assumptions. This brings us to Polo, who complements and extends Aristotle.

2.2. Leonardo Polo The Spanish philosopher Leonardo Polo (1926–2013) was a prolific writer, but his foremost works for our proposal here are: Theory of Knowledge (Polo 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1994) and Transcendental Anthropology (Polo 1998, 2003; for a brief presentation see Polo 2007a and 1997). In Person and Freedom (Polo 2007b), he introduces the three radicals or fundamental roots of being human to which we refer as the grounding key ontology of being human in the IPS paradigm. Polo understands the human being as both complex and yet unitary, as Aristotle does too. Everything about the human is a duality; but Polo (1998, 157–60) distinguishes this criterion in contrast with the (modern) notion of dualism. For Polo, what characterizes the human being is that everything about the human being is being dualized (our duality is what makes human nature complicated). Considering the human being characterized as a duality means to think that there are several inner parts of a person that could be unified. But considering the human being as dualized—as Polo does—means that (since the human being is a rich, complex system) it is necessary to consider all the aspects that are mutually required to be able to understand the human being indeed. He explains this idea saying that there is no symmetry in the dualities. Thanks to the lack of symmetry, growth is unrestricted in human beings (Polo 1998a). The dualities discovered by Polo, therefore, traverse the whole human reality (Polo 1998a, 176–201). It should be therefore underlined here that Polo’s conception of “duality” (1998a) is not the same claim with the assumptions in modern idealist philosophy about “being dualistic”. This latter (modern) assumption of dualism asserts that the parties are different and independent: dualism has to solve the problem of unity, as it understands parts independently and often in mutual opposition. This is not the case in duality because a duality is always an integrated unity albeit lacking symmetry. As noted in the AS model’s synthetic view, the problem of unity is often resolved by the premise of canceling the constituent parts’ uniqueness and particularity. This may potentially mean that Dennett (1971, 2017), Dewey (1958), as well as Thelen and Smith (1994) all affirm the duality in humans as an acknowledgment of the complexity of the human being; however, at the same time, the non-independence of

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parts of systems is maintained. And there is not an opposition here because the complicated nature of personal and systemic (human) action is due to the internal relationship(s) binding the parts (of the unity of an organism) whereby growth results in mutual growth under certain assumptions. This refers to the grounding assumptions in the philosophy of Aristotle, who wrote: “Nature is not simple, nor perfect” (NE 1154b.30–32). According to Polo (1997), the human being manifests him(her)self through his or her intimacy, which is the ground for personal and social action. The openness of a human being proceeds from inside and has a dual directionality: towards both external and internal realms at once. This means that it is meaningless to talk about the boundary between the human being personally and our social nature, as modern psychology assumes. Intimacy has a personal meaning for each person that is also a guarantee of unity in each person’s life and social action, and relationality is grounded on personal intimacy (Polo 1997, ch. I). Hence, we may speak of a growing intimacy for relational and systemic growth. Interpersonal encounter with other different beings is also possible thanks to intimacy: it allows being co-existent-with. Moreover, the person–person encounter is the dialogue between intimacies. In his/her manifestation from his/her intimacy, the human being is understood as “additionally” (además in Polo’s writing in Spanish). Being “additionally” is also a safeguard for the possibility of the I being known, but not for the person being known, for the person cannot be reduced to his or her nature. “The I” and the essence of a person are important as they capture human nature in this philosophy, while the person is more than (additionally to) one’s nature or essence. Hence that the person is always “additionally” is what makes up being human: here, Polo refers to Aristotle, whose work he is expanding. That the person is “additionally to the I”—the nature—allows not only for unrestricted growth, but also makes the human being the only possible agent for bringing about integration. The character of “additionally” entails that human beings are never exhausted in their expressions, and guarantees that their interventions will have a proper originality, a novelty according to each one. Polo’s anthropology is a transcendental anthropology, which means that, just like the metaphysics has its own transcendentals, the human being has transcendentals as well as part of the nature of being human. Transcendentals mean fundamental principles that have to be considered in order to know the human being, but which cannot be proved. They need to be known directly and not through a cognitive activity. Polo’s personal transcendentals are four co-acts: all of them appear at the same time and

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cannot be understood independently as separate notions. It is possible to convert each of them to the other three because each one needs the other three as co-constitutive. The four personal transcendentals are coexistence-with, personal freedom, agent intellect (or personal knowing) and personal love (Sellés 2006). Although the four of them always have self-integration and self-unity, we can think of each of them as highlighting an aspect of human beings: co-existence underlines relation(ality); personal freedom guarantees the authenticity of action and its novelty; the agent intellect enables authorship over our own acts; and personal love ensures the pathway and the destination of growth. “Co-existence-with” guarantees that the hypothesis of an isolated person is unthinkable; hence the notion of an independent self is meaningless. One must begin, out of necessity, with the relational state to understand what being and growing as a human person is about. The human person is, by necessity, a relational being co-existent-with a specific other (as in the I–Thou relation), others, and the world. According to Polo, “nothing human is real without personal co-existence with” (1998a, 178). The dynamic of co-existence implies that human perfection is lived through personal relationships. There is neither growth outside a relationship, nor personal happiness. “Freedom” explains the radical openness of the being that is “additionally,” and makes human beings into generators of (thoughtful) alternatives. Freedom is much more than a measure of the quality of actions; it is actually a personal transcendental, and precisely because of this, only certain actions can be called free. “Personal knowing” guarantees that human beings live searching for knowledge. The “personal knowing” stamps upon them the dynamic process of searching and allows for finding. The possessive character of human knowledge is thus safeguarded. Possessing is not in order to manipulate, but rather to guarantee each one’s agency. And still, personal knowing allows the person to be qualified as transparent (Polo 1988b, 335), which means that “we can see through it,” since it shows what its origin is. “Personal love” shows the way towards the perfection of the human being, attained through a dynamic life of giving and offering. We are personal love because we have intimacy, but first of all we need to recognize and accept our intimacy, our character of being a person who is a profoundly relational being. According to Polo, no one can give anything if he(she) does not accept him(her)self first. Since “to give” is more than “to receive,” accepting is more than giving, because in order to accept, we must give. A person needs to give to understand herself as a creator.

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Accepting implies welcoming what has been received. From acceptance, we become a gift, and this gift is offered to someone who in turn receives. But this is not unidirectional, because when others receive me and accept me, they have at the same time given me something, and thus in this mutuality, their acceptance returns to enrich me. This introduces an unrestricted kind of growth, thanks to a wise maturation of systemic relationships. Personal love not only guarantees unrestricted growth but also ensures that freedom is not lost in the process. Thanks to personal love, freedom “knows” where to direct itself, because it is not only freedom from (as in AS freedom means autonomy and freedom from the society to self-author one’s destiny) but also, and more importantly, freedom for. In order to understand the self in our proposal (IPS paradigm), it is still necessary to explain the word “system”. Polo claims that every human being is a person that should be understood as a system but that this systemic view of the person and personal development must be understood exclusively linked with very specific features: of being an open and a free system (Orón 2015b). The term ‘system’ can be defined as a series of identifiable realities, with a specific kind of relations between them such that, when one element is modified, all the rest also change (Polo 2007b, 261).

2.3. Wang Yangming WANG Shouren ⦻ᆸӱ, whose courtesy name is Bo’an ՟ᆹand style name is Yangming 䲭᰾, was born in the city of Yue 䎺in modern Zhejiang province. WANG Yangming led one of the most diverse, dynamic, and distinguished careers of any Chinese thinker in history. He spent most of his early years absorbed in intense intellectual and spiritual inquiry into Daoist longevity techniques, Buddhist scriptures, Confucian classics, prose and poetry composition, as well as the military arts and warfare. After passing the highest civil service exam in 1499, he began a career as a minor official and garnered a reputation for brilliance in administration and military strategy. He greatly improved the financial and security conditions of the areas under his jurisdiction, and he pioneered efforts to build schools and promote education. He also devised innovative methods for rehabilitating criminals. Wang became an acclaimed military commander, suppressing a number of bandit uprisings and major rebellions. By the end of his life, Wang had become a renowned scholar, poet, calligrapher, provincial governor, and military commander, as well as

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the most influential and charismatic Neo-Confucian teacher of his time. (Tien 2010, 295)3

The neo-Confucian philosopher and statesman of the Chinese empire Wang Yangming (1472–1529) offers in-depth understanding and insights of the old Confucian philosophical thought, correcting interim misconceptions and orthodoxies that from 1000 until 1400 AD threatened to adjust Confucian work in the morality of certain dynasties. Wang’s works are wisely extending, and deepen the understanding of the solid work of Confucius in the Great Learning. This is one of the Four Books of Master Confucius that philosophically binds the concern of “how to know and how to extend knowledge” with the process and steps of appropriate self-cultivation as a moral being. It is precisely Wang’s contribution that deepens the understanding of the qualitative ways in which personal being and innate moral growth of knowledge and consistent acting are an inherent part of the process of extending knowledge. Wang’s work centers on the philosophical doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting.” Wang’s purpose is not to build a theory of knowledge with the aim of merely resolving theoretical issues and disagreements among Confucian and neo-Confucian thinkers, but it is bound by a clear albeit subtle metaphysical proposition of ethics; its metaphysical foundations lie in two interrelated concepts that will help us later also to make the links to how this philosophy helps set the theoretical foundations of IPS. Wang’s first metaphysical conception is the Pattern, or li, which is for Wang the fundamental structure that underlies all the universe and binds all different levels of being and existence together (Nivison 1996). “Li” is translated as principle or pattern that we can find in all. Whereas “Li” (capital “L”) is the universal (abstract) pattern, “li” (lower-case “l”) is the concrete realization of this universal pattern internally in each person. While the pattern or “principle” thoroughly presents itself in the universe and each of its constituent entities, each entity—including the human being(s)—is entirely individuated via the presence and operation of qi. “Qi,” or framework—the second metaphysical conceptual foundation of Wang’s work—is the hidden underlying albeit fluid and dynamic state that constitutes and reconstitutes each person as they relate and grow processually albeit in relation with each and all other entities. “Qi” can also be understood as life energy and defines a non-fixed, fluid state that constitutes each and all objects and which exists and evolves in a spatial– 3

This section is based on Frisina (2002) and other key readings and sources (Angle 2010; Ching 1976; Ivanhoe 2002; Nivison 1996; Tien 2010; Tiwald and Van Norden 2014; Tu 1976; Van Eijck and Visser 2012).

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temporal way (Van Eijck and Visser 2012). So this philosophy wholly agrees with the IPS’s metaphysical underpinnings. On the one hand, there is the common nature and origins of human beings (we are all part of the same pattern or Li) and this elevates humaneness, an ethical requirement for benevolent humanism as an obligation to contribute to positive change in the world around us in a way that all humanity is better off. On the other hand, there is a premise that each human being is unique and each one’s uniqueness can only be apprehended and valued if it is appreciated as a transcendental being (“Qi”). In Wang’s metaphysics, each of these two notions (“li”–“Li” and “qi”) is distinct, and at the same time interrelated as in unity, which means that both are simultaneously required. The substance or principle (“li”) is in itself an entity, and being literally body it underlies the connection between and across all things: the universe, the human mind, as well as plants, animals, and even non-living things are connected in li, forming one Substance, or “yi-ti” (Ching 1976; Ivanhoe 2002; Nivison 1996; Tu 1976; Van Eijck and Visser 2012). What makes up virtue and a virtuous human being must act in accordance with accepting this unity with others and the universe, while vice and the vicious and egoistical think–act as separate from the body that is common nature and origins of all entities (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014). However, qi is function, and a changing characteristic, manifestation, or appropriate activity relevant to the life energy of each entity (Ching 1976; Ivanhoe 2002; Nivison 1996; Tu 1976; Van Eijck and Visser 2012). For example, the waves (“qi”) that are characteristics of water (“li”) are not fixed or given but subject to dynamic changing manifestation; and so is the light (“qi”) of a lamp (“li”) (Van Eijck and Visser 2012) and the wisdom or the sincerity (qi) of a person (li). Once the person does not regard or value herself as part of the same pattern that binds everything together, she may think she is free to act in a narrow, self-serving way, even failing to demonstrate benevolence and compassion. This results in the absence of “qi” as the effect of non-acknowledging “Li” and the metaphysical unity between these two conceptions. These reflective examples serve to show that the unity of “qi” and “li”/“Li” is a fundamental metaphysical premise of being and acting in Wang. But their distinctiveness also has importance for understanding human beings and their innate ethical predicament and potential in the theory of being and acting premised upon the inter-processual self (IPS). Wang’s work offers a profound philosophical pathway that aims (and succeeds) to correct a somewhat superficial albeit orthodox interpretation of the Confucian Philosophy by Zhu Xi (Van Eijck and Visser 2012), who

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was another neo-Confucian philosopher before Wang (Zhu Xi’s lifespan was from 1130 to 1200). Wang’s profound contribution to Confucian/neoConfucian virtue ethics is appreciable in full once its integrity and coherence with the overall way Wang’s philosophy (and life) understood (and practiced) a unified way whereby “self,” “mind,” “thinking,” “knowing,” “acting,” and “all things” are defined and are intertwined as an unbreakable spiritual sequence (Van Eijck and Visser 2012). While they are each one distinct to know–act in a way that enables them to be part of a single chain of things that requires a demanding personal spiritual, ethical training, this process enables a sensitive, complicated way of personal being and acting. This training for Wang mainly should tap on a person’s natural awakening of moral faculty, while it may also be facilitated through studying the classic four books of Confucius (Van Eijck and Visser 2012). Wang restored the meaning of the dense Confucian concept “ge wu” relevant to extending knowledge, with a certain quality and purpose of “rectifying things” Wang purports. This reminds us of the kind of role Aristotle’s original conception of phronesis (as a moral character master virtue and not just an intellectual one) was theorized as linked with the generation of a certain quality of knowledge and action that is ethical knowledge, which for Aristotle allows each person to morally orient the means–ends choices towards not just the external common good but the common good that achieves the inner moral growth and happiness of all involved (Scalzo 2017). Wang’s work is so close to Aristotelian virtue philosophical concepts and thinking because he aimed to correct/rectify neo-Confucian scholars whose misleading interpretations threaten to lower the deep ethical weight of Confucian philosophy among virtue ethics (Van Eijck and Visser 2012). Wang’s restoration of this philosophically complicated understanding linked with the concept “ge wu” shows that, for him, knowing binds together (like how “li”/“Li” and “qi” are bound together) the intellectual knowing-about things and situations in unity with the “why” via personal action imbued with an ethical quality of being consistently to the quality of one’s knowing about the (“li” of) actual objects/situations. This is the premise that underlines Wang’s understanding of knowledge and action as unity (Xhi Xing he yi): “knowledge and action need each other. It’s like eyes can’t walk without feet, but feet cannot see without eyes. If we discuss them in terms of their sequence, knowledge comes first. But if we discuss them in terms of importance, action is what is important” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 180–81). Here Wang emphasizes the importance of action because for him the purpose of human being(s) is living up to our pure knowing and ideas and trying to

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achieve positive change and flourishing for all in the real world (Van Eijck and Visser 2012). It is precisely this act of philosophical–ethical rectification in Wang’s work that renders ethical choice (and ethics more broadly) an integral, inherent part of (the unity of) human knowing–acting; this is a fundamental founding conception linked with the cognition and acting as inter-processual theory. For Wang, if a person really wants to know in a way that restores true understanding one has to engage in ethical choices, which Wang thought are possible directly via exercising our personal innate faculty of being morally aware of what is right/wrong, in order to know in a pure way (pure knowing) (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014). This innate quality (of moral awareness) has an inherent moral dimension. To be able to achieve ‘ge wu’, for Wang, a person has to cultivate him/herself so that one’s understanding and thoughts have sincerity and one avoids self-deception. Wang also finds that sincerity and avoidance of selfdeception involve “not being conflicted” between what motivates action guided by one’s physical natural desires versus action as a cultivated moral person. Here Wang seems in full agreement with Aristotle’s premise that virtue and virtuous personal growth lie in being able to cultivate further and extend our nature by making conscious ethical contemplation and action choices; this involves choosing means to act oriented to the higher purpose of human flourishing (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002). For Wang, being conflicted between “natural desires” and proper moral cultivation in a way that favors acting solely according to the first, is indeed conscious self-deception and makes a person engage in wrongdoing (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014). Hence, motivation as cognitive disposition and action have no meaning, unless understood as a unity; but it is also important to summarize that the notion of “pure knowing” as a way of accessing this unity “ge wu” emphasizes a certain kind and quality of understanding wherein ethics is an integral part. Wang supports the notion that division between cognition and action is a false, misleading, and potentially dangerous premise, as it breaks apart the notion of ethics as inherent to the unity of personal knowing–acting (not an abstract and third-party position that requires a neutral and detached stance in the process of knowing, as we see linked with the AS paradigm’s presuppositions). Whereas, as shown above, the official philosophical orthodoxy promoted that a thinking self (cognition) and the acts produced by the agent (action) can become independent, and therefore the first thing is to know the reality (through the mental model one has of it) and then to act on it in order to reach a state of personal perfection, Wang argues that the nature of human beings (“li” being part of “Li” and

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interwoven with “qi”) does not allow this division, so Wang is very consistent with Aristotle. However, Wang does not distinguish acts/action (praxis) and production (poiesis) as separate acts of human activity, which is a finer distinction only available via Aristotle’s virtue ethics. It should be noted that, in this section of our book, both cross-referencing and studying Wang and Aristotle and the other philosophers as in “spiritual” relation to one another enable a richer understanding of the dense presuppositions and premises of virtue theories as opposed to modernist philosophy in the West. Therefore, for Wang, the way to relate to the world is being defined by the internal constituent relationship that connects each one to each other and our all (people, animals, plants, matter) partaking of the same reality. Li is bound with each li, as noted earlier. Interestingly, Wang has been criticized for falling into idealism because he put forward the notion that there is no principle and value outside the heart/mind of the person. Wang maintained this statement because his worldview is that all of us share the same reality “li” with “Li.” However, the reader might like to keep in mind that these are not two different but the same principles that Wang argues are shared with other people in addition to animals, plants, things, and so on (he called this all heaven and earth). The relationship is constitutive of our existence. We are what we are because of our particular way of living in relationship. It is a metaphysical premise that all things are internally connected. It is not an external (social) but an internal relationship that connects things. Accordingly, linking with how the “li”–“qi” dimensions result in the individuation of all beings and things, one can also argue that here Wang would even agree with Polo that each person chooses to relate to other persons in an intimate and personal way. For Wang, the entire universe is biological and not merely physical; it is an organism continuously growing and transforming. The limits of beings are qualified as transparent, but we can recognize them thanks to “liang-chich,” which is the primordial consciousness, a pre-cognitive faculty that perceives the union of all in all beings and the union of knowledge and action. That is a unifying principle of all human action and the same person because “liang-chich” is innate and is in all things and all people (knowing to be inside of a relationship belongs to everything). The role of humanity according to Wang is to be the beginning of personal and simultaneous relational movement and growth. This aims to bring the fullness in relations, thus enabling growth in a more perfect unity. It is unrestricted growth where love is the starting point of the

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human mind, so here again Wang Yangming is in accordance with Leonardo Polo. The growth is the growth of “li”—to grow ourselves as we grow within our relationships. Growth is understood in key growing harmony as the best way to explain the unity of different things (even persons) systemically. It is not a unity that comes about via the dissolution of the constituent parts—Wang used the metaphor of the human body to understand that unity. Growth in unity is, therefore, better understood as harmonious growth of relations (there is no possibility of growth by selfrealization outside the joint growth). For Wang, to enter the interior of one person is the same as to transcend one’s autonomous self and move relationally towards others, since we determine what we are within our relationships with others. Wang thus understands that our relationships and their qualities make the essence of who we are and in all of our activities we are acting vis-à-vis our relationships. Wang is congruent with Aristotle regarding the essence and meaning of eudaimonia and human flourishing, which we discussed extensively earlier. But, as noted earlier, Wang does not make the difference between action and production as salient as Aristotle does because for him they are a unity. But the ethically demanding conditions Aristotle sets on the primacy of praxis over poiesis enable us to apprehend the possibility of what is involved in personal and relational level flourishing. This is demanding, and thus it is not selfserving but requires each one to live meaningfully, which as noted includes an evaluative form of action/choices. Hence this is a contemplated form of happiness that is also a pathway bearing a potential for broader eudaimonia linking the system–person with the system– community (or with the larger system society). For Wang, human activity and creativity “tao” must be understood with sincerity “ch’eng.” Also for Wang, “those who desired to correct their minds would first make their own thoughts have Sincerity. Those who desired to make their thoughts have Sincerity would first extend their knowledge. Extending knowledge lies in how one knows and acts in ‘ge wu’”4 (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 188–9). When acting without “ch’eng,” harmony is lost and destruction appears; when acting with “ch’eng,” the “li” grows. Therefore, it is necessary that human will orients a person to act sincerely. The place of creativity is the activity of the human mind “hsin.” The “hsin” occurs within the “liang-chich” and sometimes it is difficult to 4

Here readers might consider recalling and reflecting on the dense correction and restoration of the meaning of ge-wu in Wang Yangming’s work, mentioned earlier in this chapter; the reason why Wang insisted on this becomes more fully evident here.

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differentiate between them. “Hsin” is not just cognition but also the sincere will for the unity of knowing–acting. As noted, this personal sincerity is a subtle and multi-faceted notion that is imbued with a genuine attention to acting as a learner in awakening the innate moral awareness and knowing what is self-deception and how to avoid it at all costs. According to Wang this innate quality “never fails” to achieve the sincerity that is required for knowing–acting as a virtuous person (Van Eijck and Visser 2012). So “consequently at the beginning of the Education in the Great Learning, the learner must be made to encounter the things of the world, and never fail to follow the Pattern that one already knows and further exhaust it, seeking to arrive at the farthest points. When one has exerted effort for a long time, one day, like something suddenly cracking open, one will know in a manner that binds it all together” (Van Eijck and Visser 2012, modified translation from Tiwald and Van Norden 2014, 191). The “hsin” is not static because when a creative act “tao” happens it does not only grow the “li” but its “hsin” is also given. So there is a processual element here, in accordance with Whitehead’s work (we present this in the next section). Therefore, the “hsin” can also be identified with virtue and moral excellence/integrity that are not owned permanently by each person, or something to be possessed at the end (Akrivou and Orón 2016) of the growth journey but rather are subject to continuous moral contemplation and action in sincerity (cheng) to extend knowledge that lies in “ge wu.” Wang is also congruent with Aristotle in that he believes morality is not something to be added to the innate experience and human behavior, but the same behavior that makes up personal constitution. This is because “liang-chich” is a unifying principle of being and doing. Finally, all these terms are understood as convertibles; that is, starting from one of them can (and must) reach everyone else, because all of them are required.

2.4. Alfred North Whitehead The intellectual trajectory of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) is thought provoking. He started as a mathematician with a good knowledge of quantum physics and ended as a philosopher of nature. Quantum physics ended up being very important in his philosophical proposal, from which he primarily utilized two key concepts: the idea of no single localization and the importance of the presence of the observer to determine the way for existing. For instance, in the structure of an atom, the electron cannot occupy any position, but specific positions depend on the energy levels (nature is no longer continuous). Besides, the position

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that it will finally occupy will rely on the (same) observation of the (same) observer. Thus, the position that the electron ends up occupying is not initially determined; rather, it will be the result of a determination process. Quantum physics is the platform that allows Whitehead to criticize the mainstream philosophical tradition, as we will see, in the concept of “simple location”. In Science and the Modern World (1925) he describes the evolution of the way of knowing in science and philosophy, sustaining that the base of science is faith (science has not proved assumptions, but just assumed). According to its historical appearance, science presupposes a way of understanding nature and its order from logical categories and cause– effect relationships. Different events are united thanks to causal chains, which are fixed and determined. The traditional view explains the existence of things based on this conceptualization. However, for Whitehead, this way of thinking has the form of faith, which is the antecedent of reason (Whitehead 1925, 4). Science presupposes fragmentation and demands clear and distinct ideas; that is why elements are defined—linked to a background to which they owe their existence— and outcomes are explained by their cause–effect interactions, in the form of laws. This perspective assumes the medieval teleological presumption that there is an order of nature, as a result of the laws that govern it; and that it is a man’s task to decipher and master these laws to know nature (Whitehead 1925, 13–18). According to Whitehead, this evolution led to scientific materialism, the belief that there is a fixed routine imposed by external relations that does not arise from nature itself. In fact, nature is not clear and distinct, but somewhat obscure and confused, but this confusion is not a source of disorder—it is precisely its main possibility of growth (Whitehead 1925, 17). From this materialistic view, mathematics has been fundamental for scientific progress, because it allowed science to be independent of traditional philosophy and religion, acting as a substitute for them. But Whitehead shows how mathematics also responds to many presuppositions of philosophical order. Whitehead proves that mathematics does not precede knowledge—as the materialistic view supports—but instead it arises after a highly complicated process of abstraction. In other words, mathematics is not in nature but rather in the mind of the human being (Whitehead 1925, 19, 30): “mathematics is a divine madness of the human spirit” (1925, 20). Mathematics gets rid of the particular instance: “so long as you are dealing with pure mathematics, you are in the realm of complete and absolute abstraction” (Whitehead

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1925, 21); its postulates are based on other postulates that are assumed to be true (they do not exist in reality). According to Whitehead, in the historical course of scientific thought, a lot of reductions, presuppositions, and abstractions have been realized. When these ideas are standardized, they are accepted as true and not discussed, becoming part of a process of desegregation, individuation, and abstraction. A crucial moment in the process is individuation, which is known as the isolation of reality from the rest. With Galileo, the universe is isolated: “the conception of an isolated system is not the conception of substantial independence from the remainder of things, but of freedom from contingent dependence upon detailed items within the rest of the universe” (Whitehead 1925, 46). Whitehead says that the concept of matter is a consequence of assuming as true the principle of “simple location”: “by simple location I mean one major characteristic which refers equally to space and time, and other minor characteristics which are diverse as between space and time” (1925, 49). In a materialistic conception, with the determination of “the here and now,” the relation to the other realities is lost (Whitehead 1925, 49). This gave rise to a mechanistic and materialistic vision of nature that reigns from the seventeenth century, and it became the orthodox creed (Whitehead 1925, 50). Whitehead is aware that, with a materialistic mentality of nature, neither time nor memory can be explained; and this attitude extends to the concepts of substance and quality (Whitehead 1925, 51). They presuppose very high levels of abstraction, and that is how we conceive reality. Whitehead’s critique of materialism can then be read critically to refer to the philosophical assumptions that form the basis for the AS paradigm’s presuppositions and conceptualizations. He resists simplifying complexity with easy solutions, for instance, to assert independence in duality, or monism in which one part subsumes the other, and, for example, puts the mind into matter or matter within the mind (Whitehead 1925, 55), or the transformation of duality into dualism (independence of the parts). So the main problem is that we cannot explain life—neither the organism nor its functions (Whitehead 1925, 57). As in the seventeenth century the mechanistic explanations were the dogma of scientific faith, in the nineteenth century this paradigm was replaced with idealism, in which the ultimate meaning of mental reality is entirely and purely (clinically) cognitive (Whitehead 1925, 63). But this proposal also fails when trying to explain the organism (Whitehead 1925, 64). Whitehead indicates that the doctrine of materialism is useful to the extent that its limitations are assumed, but, for this reason, it cannot be

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applied to the entities of nature. Entities, even the most basic, are agencies in a world of relationships. Even electrons, or the most basic particles, are organisms. The organism is understood within a major organism of which it forms part. Organisms are found at all levels, and systemically even society is an interwoven “nexus.” An electron, which is an organism, in the human body (another organism), is not the same as an electron outside it, in another organism (Whitehead 1925, 79). Therefore, it is not possible to understand any entity outside the relationship of which it forms part. Given the considerable limitations of materialism, Whitehead proposes to replace it with the doctrine of the organism (Whitehead 1925, 80). The process of knowledge is a process of constitution, which is always open, because everything is process. Moreover, materialism further excludes all possible ethics: if molecules move blindly and determinedly (regarding cause and effect relations according to laws that precede their existence) and the person is made of molecules, then the person is also determined, and there is no room to speak of responsibility or ethics. Materialism entails assuming the doctrine of determination, which leads one to think that motives determine the will and that motives are antecedents that come from the states of mind and states of the body (Whitehead 1925, 78). This plots the problem of agency, as the person’s behavior is a result of the reactions to the environment. This is also helpful for critiquing the AS mentality, since in its various proposals we observe how self-determination ends up being the only ethical reference: to the extent that you want something this becomes valid. In order to understand Whitehead and his philosophy of the organism, it is convenient to start from how the “actual entities” emerge. What exists, what has existed, and what will exist, runs a path from indeterminacy to determination. Thus it comes into existence in the current situation, and this is actual entity: to be fully formed and determined (Kraus 1998, 60); determined by what is in itself and not by external agency (Kraus 1998, 60); determined by the relationship with the rest of the universe (Kraus 1998, 60). This is a process of determination that is very complex and with diverse influences, but assuring and affirming that it is free in its determination (Whitehead 1978, 27). It is also excluded that their emergence is a creation from scratch, but it is claimed that it is a creative act (Kraus 1998, 60). The emergence of the present entity follows a process of decision in which it converges past and future, and thus the entity reaches to have a meaning (Whitehead 1978, 43). Whitehead often calls this process of determination “synthesis,” not in the Hegelian way but

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as a process of crystallization or condensation of a very complex confluence that we will try to explain briefly. Whitehead’s terminology is complicated, very extensive, and detailed. The reader should note, as minimum references for understanding the “actual entity,” in addition to the terms already explained, the terms nature, eternal object, and God. “Eternal objects” are abstract model patterns of what things can be. The process of constitution of the present entity comprises entrance of the eternal objects in the world. On the other hand, nature is the world of relationships of all the other current entities that precede it and constitutes the world where the new entity will emerge. Nature is a set and eternal objects as well. God, for Whitehead, seems part of the eternal object, insofar as it is a reference, gives an order to the world, and is the perfect realization of everything. This has potential value. However, it is not an eternal object, for God changes, while eternal objects do not. God also grows and does not know the future (Whitehead 1925). God is a reference for what awakens and attracts the world to a concrete process. God is part of the world, and the world is part of God. God attracts from desire (Whitehead 1978, 344). He is the “unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality” (Whitehead 1978, 343). God has physical feelings, and his nature is that of “superject” (Kraus 1998, 57), which means efficient cause from the future (Kraus 1998, 55). When speaking of God, a clarification must be made to avoid confusion. The God of Whitehead does not identify with the God of any religion. It is a concept, like all others, and is difficult to explain. Whitehead’s thinking evolves, and the experts in it have not reached a single meaning of many terms. The fourth element to explain the emergence of the actual entity is the actual entity itself, because there is freedom in the body. Freedom is distributed among God, eternal objects, nature and the organism itself. Whitehead’s proposal to divide freedom between these four concepts is important for the IPS’s characterization because it will be a point of reference for human action. We think that, if Whitehead has the doctrine of the present entity as the reference for understanding all human and natural processes, then it is also legitimate to understand it as a reference for interpreting the human act. The human act will spring from both the interiority of the actual entity itself and from its natural relations with the other actual entities, such as the exercise of apprehension of eternal objects (behind which we could see cognitive exercises) and the attractiveness aroused by the contemplation of God. Nor is the act circumscribed by the

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present, but in the present, it is equally past and future. And the act is not an isolated event; it follows the doctrine of the organism. The organism arises in a unified event in which a particular pattern is concretized, but the pattern also includes aspects of the event. Therefore, there are processes about an intrinsic reality and extrinsic to the same event. This happens in a constantly relational world, since an event is constituted in relation to other events (Whitehead 1925, 103). Somehow, what is defined is part of the definition. The relational character is never lost. The interrelation is part of what it means to be an organism: “the concept of an organism includes, therefore, the concept of the inter-action of organisms” (Whitehead 1925, 103). “The organism is a unit of emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal objects, emerging for its own sake” (Whitehead 1925, 107). Another key to understanding the emergence of the “actual entity” is that it converges past, present, and future. Time is unified in its emergence. This multiple convergence is a process of synthesis of the timeline. The past conditions for the trajectory that travels and the future are brought forwards by attracting. Present– past–future is not a mere succession, but they influence each other, and all are “present” in the present (Kraus 1998, 15–19). There is a game of memory and anticipation (Kraus 1998, 56). To conclude this commentary to the emergence of the current entity, it asserts that its determination does not mean a static notion, since an actual entity “never really is” (Whitehead 1978, 85) because it never loses its character of a process. The emergence of the “actual entity” is described as a process of synthesis as noted, in the sense of a process of convergence of all the elements described. In Whitehead, feelings are of great importance because, on the one hand, they are associated with the emergence of the “actual entity” and on the other hand the feeling of satisfaction will be one of the greatest experiences possible. The feeling emerges in the emergence of the entity and/or its experience and is a guarantee of the unity of the event. The feeling is the way the past becomes present and separable and inseparable from the value arising from the abstraction of feeling (Kraus 1998, 61–2). Satisfaction is a feeling that represents unity in the diversity of feelings (Kraus 1998, 61). The feeling emerges when an eternal object is learned and then the actual entity “enjoys” its experience (Kraus 1998, 63). The enjoyment of existence is the greatest feeling and the most desirable. The good life is the better life (Whitehead 1929, 30), which means to maximize the satisfaction of living (Whitehead 1929, 5–23). For Whitehead, to know something has to do with the constitution itself. The reference term, in this case, is “prehension.” For him, “the word

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perceives is, in our common usage, shot through and through the notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word prehension, even with the adjective ‘cognitive’ omitted. I will use the word prehension for the uncognitive apprehension: by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive” (Whitehead 1925, 69). An entity happens to be perceived when we are conscious through the perceptive senses. The perceived entity will be called a sense-object. Sense-object is the admission in time and space and its own perception requires the cognitive process: “the cognitive perception of sense-object is the awareness of the prehensive unification” (Whitehead 1925, 70). “Space and time will emerge from the sense-object” (Whitehead 1925, 71). “Perception is simply the cognition of prehensive unification” (Whitehead 1925, 71). “Perception is cognition of prehension” (Whitehead 1925, 71). Concrete experience will shift the idea of a simple location because time and space are the result of the process of entry and not its precedent. The key is that, with the term “concrete experience,” the unity is saved (Whitehead 1925, 69). That is why we talk about “prehensive unification.” The starting point is the unification and the different ways of thinking are just different perspectives. Space and time will emerge later, for the first is the unity of experience. Knowing that the process never stops, “concrete fact is process” (Whitehead 1925, 70) and its individuation never loses the relational character: “each event is an individual matter of fact issuing from an individualization of the substance activity. But individualization does not mean substantial independence” (Whitehead 1925, 70). Prehension is identified with the entrance into nature—“the realities of nature are the prehension in nature”—which is why the experience is governed by the same principle that governs the “actual entity.” Whitehead wants to save and restate the unity of the constituent fact. The intention by which the term “prehension” is used is to guarantee the unity of the event, a unit that belongs to reality and is not an addition, nor constructed by the sum of parts or ingredients (Whitehead 1925, 72). The word “event” is important to point out what happens. There are no specific facts, but events. In the event, the present converges the past and the future (Whitehead 1925, 72). Nature is a united and organic whole. The affirmation of unity must be given at the beginning, otherwise there is no way to truly reach it, nor could the concept of order in nature be affirmed (Whitehead 1925, 73). Now, with this clear, we can go on to see the two aspects of the process of perception but avoiding the understanding of each moment as accounts of a rosary. This would be a misinterpretation because it isolates each moment (Kraus 1998, 22). Presentational immediacy and causal

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efficacy cannot be independent between them. Nor is there a temporal sequence between them, for one does not precede the other. To separate them and to assign, for example, a sensorial awareness to the presentational immediacy as their exclusive thing is to leave the door open to Descartes and Kant (Whitehead 1925, 82). We have noted that the perceptive process follows the doctrine of the emergence of the “present entity.” Perception is a process of self-realization of the actual entities (Kraus 1998, 76). Perception begins with enjoyment because the enjoyment and emergence of the entity are the same, for one enjoys being one among many (Whitehead 1978, 45). From there will come a growth in consciousness because what was already in place from the beginning is objectified. In the study, the same is being contemplated from different perspectives and allows one to go deeper and identify more and more data. Each data is a “perspective defined by his own eternal objects” (Whitehead 1978, 154). The cognitive exercise should not be disconnected from experience and life. This is because Whitehead links reason with life, as the function of reason is none other than promoting the art of living (Whitehead 1929, 2). Knowledge is also linked to feelings, because growing in knowledge is the same as growing in the clarification of feelings. The initial vague sense contains everything, but it is made explicit (Kraus 1998, 79–80). The initial feelings are vague and go through a process of concretion (Whitehead 1978, 163). Thus, the data are enhanced and intensified (Kraus 1998, 80). In this process, the vectorial character of its origin is preserved from the real object (Whitehead 1978, 120) and thus unity is achieved in the knowledge. Since there is no temporal distance, no sequence between “causal efficacy” and “presentational immediacy,” neither one can be said to be unconscious and another conscious; one is somehow recovering the concept of Aristotle’s act where perception is not a constructive process but an act. We find a good summary of Whitehead’s proposal in Frisina (2002). Whitehead also understands the person as an organism. Human organisms are not different from other realities that exist. Whitehead notes that to be a body is the same as having interests. Having interests is the same as having needs. And everything that exists has needs, whether they know it or not, so everything is an organism. The terms interests and needs, in turn, refer to the term value and to the process of valuing. Value is not something assigned or functional. The value of each thing is understood in ontological terms. Things are what they are by the value they embody. The difference between the various agencies is that, while some have fixed

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interests, others, like human beings, appear as not merely having fixed interests. In the development of music, art, or intellectual life, there are clear signs of how human beings pursue interests that have led to all things created by them. Whitehead adds that randomly trying to explain why there are various bodies seems an unsatisfactory output and is rather a way of recognizing one’s ignorance, because the random seems a feeble explanation. Whitehead does not explain its appearance but only says it seems more reasonable to speak of a gradual processual development. The main statement about Whitehead that builds his thesis is that all organisms are aimed at maximizing the intensity of the experience. So the terms experience and maximize need to be further clarified. First, not all organisms are maximized in the same way. While a certain type of organism is achieved by maximizing the mere replication, for another type of organism the process is much more creative and involves the redefinition of relations themselves. The experience is understood in aesthetic and moral terms. Experience is a self-constituent process. Therefore the kind of experience the organism has will also determine what kind of organism it is. Second, the experience falls within the scope of the meeting and relationship. And things are what the relationships that they engage in are. So the experience is self-constituent. The world is made for action patterns so that each agent’s experiences are not the same. In the process of human experience, two aspects are identified. These are “causal efficacy” and “presentational immediacy.” They are not a sequence, but there is a sequence where the values are discovered. This means that experience can be known in any way through the organism, since the value has ontological sense. “Causal efficacy” is a direct apprehension of the entity that is what we see. The “presentational immediacy” is where apprehension culminates, and qualities (shape, color, etc.) are discovered. “Causal efficacy” is the experience through which we feel directly the connections that hold and knit the world together. “Presentational immediacy” is the discussion of the data. The “causal efficacy” and “presentational immediacy” of Whitehead are two co-existing forms of prehension given in experience. We have noted that these are forms of self-establishing ourselves. After the apprehension in the totality of its two aspects, it is the act that constitutes us. This is so for all entities. The difference is that, in some organizations, the way of doing apprehension is fixed and determined. Other organizations do apprehension more creatively. The prehension is the act of actively grasping what happens in the past to appoint at present. It involves both “causal efficacy” as the “presentational immediacy,” and the latter involves accepting what has

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been achieved by the “causal efficacy.” This means that this process is not a purely rational exercise but an exercise that mobilizes all we are (also cognition but more than just that), hence its constituent character. The start of the experience equals life itself. Life is experience, because to live is to live games. The mode of being human is projective and proactive. According to Whitehead, human beings are always trying to maximize their relationships. Due to this proactive stance, man is constantly an experiencing being, which adds a processual aspect in how each person grows rather than a prescriptive unitary linear growth path. Every human being’s lifetime growth occurs by a cycle that can be repeated over and over: excitement, novelty, experience culminated with the generation of new expectations that require renewed cycles for the maximization of experience.

2.5. Conclusions from the philosophical authors Our interest in introducing Whitehead and Wang Yangming, additionally to Aristotle and Polo, who are the foremost basis for IPS, lies in their holistic complicated vision of what it means to be alive and to act. This is important in IPS. In AS, when the subject acts, (s)he does few things. But in contrast, in IPS when the person acts, (s)he does a lot of things, and the main thing is that (s)he is defining who (s)he is. So it is not possible to keep the premise of a relation between a subject and an object even when the connection is the focal point of growth, as the AS paradigm’s way of understanding alters and instrumentalizes its meaning. Finally, in putting together Aristotle, Polo, Whitehead, and Wang we aim to gather East and West traditions both in the past and present to help support the crosscultural relevance of the IPS paradigm.5 All of the above philosophers share several perspectives that are fundamental for the IPS paradigm: (1) The human being exists in nature with uniqueness and internal relation with everyone and everything. The uniqueness of a person comes from his/her form to be in relation with. Being human and 5

There are other authors that also reject the distinction subject–object, for example Dennett, Dewey, and Thelen and Smith. However, we do not use their contributions because we think that they solve the problem by destroying the self. In Thelen and Smith’s work, the self is not the agent and the intentionality is not present, but the agent is the context. Dennett and Dewey do not recognize the person and his uniqueness, because the experiencing persons are only the products of random probabilistic combination.

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living as a human person is the same. Other ways to see uniqueness are with the meaning by the use of the word “intimacy” in the sections earlier in this chapter. Our intimacy is what makes us unique persons. Therefore, uniqueness concerns not only how we collectively are (and what we have as common nature) as a (human) species, which has (the various forms of Aristotelian) reason, but it also regards each one as a distinct person, additionally. Intimacy ensures that each person is a particular person and they cannot be understood only as the general “we,” or the abstract “humankind,” or “society” because each one and their relation among persons cannot be exchanged or substituted with another. Far from being a difficult demand concerning how to live in relationships with others (the following point), intimacy is what allows us to have a deeper relationship (to both ourselves and in how we relate to any other person) because our relation’s locus is not external, but internal. The intimacy makes the person more than one’s acts and productions: the person is always “additionally.” (2) AS considers the activity as a technical question, which is oriented in its outcomes (production) via which the self is knowable. AS adds an ethical integrity quality, and a moral evaluative purpose in personal acts only as a concern of action at the end of development as an extra finally added domain (in the higher states when one self-authors a self-actualized way of being). In contrast, acting in IPS always has a moral action at the core of it, which maintains personal moral inquiry regarding how to live, what to do, what not to do, and when, and generally to live meaningfully (in accordance with the good) in mutual relations for systemic co-existence and growth. IPS (based on the works of Aristotle, Polo, Whitehead, and Wang) sees action (praxis) as one ongoing way in which to restructure our being and our relationships. For Aristotle our actions always turn back to affect who we are (becoming) (Scalzo 2017; NE 1114a) and we are/become what our relationships are (NE 1114a). The IPS paradigm assumes Aristotle’s conception of virtue (action with virtue, or lacking virtue) as having a clear retroactivity over the human being (NE 1114a). We can find the same retroactivity in the way whereby Polo understands the will (Polo 1998b, 5–68). Polo also has a clear vision that we exist in our relations because “nothing human is real without personal coexistence” (Polo 1998a, 178). It is not possible to exist as one person alone. Whitehead also “begins by assuming entities are

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constituted by the relations they create with previous entities” (Frisina 1991). Also, Wang says that every being (person or not) shares his/her reference to the same pattern (“Li”), while the pattern is concrete differently in each one (Frisina 2002). So everything that exists is defined by its relationships and to act is always to act responding to the relationships. (3) Taking into account the previous point, it is easy to understand the following: this relationship to our actions and their retroactivity over who we are and becoming (an internal relationship in the case of the human being) pushes us to act whereby the personal and the systemic vision are a unity. A systemic vision in IPS is based on the notion that our internal ethical quality of relation to our integrity simultaneously bears implications for one’s relationship with others and nature. These are all taken as parts of a differentiated unity. The term system can be defined as a series of identifiable realities. But this is not enough due to the kinds of relations that exist between them: “when one element is modified all others are modified” (Polo 2007b, 261). For within the IPS paradigm things in the broader (social) system are what a person and a person’s relations are (becoming). A wider system cannot grow without personal and relational growth inside it. A person cannot grow unless one’s chosen relations grow as they are linked internally, but they cannot grow without the concrete purpose each person gives to each life rendering it meaningful and with an ethical quality integral to it. And in the IPS paradigm, the person is considered as one particular kind of system, which is a free and open system. Hence the direction (and purpose) of personal and systemic growth is always open and fluid, and it depends upon how each one chooses to answers the evaluative aspects involved in choosing how to live a good, ethical, and meaningful life personally and in relation to others in the system. The claim of systemic consideration is not a unique characteristic of the IPS paradigm’s presupposition, however. There are people of AS that also claim something similar when considering dynamics aspects, for instance in Ryan (1995). Even out of the discussion between AS and IPS, there are psychologies (such as the work of Thelen and Smith’s “development systems approach,” or put forward by philosophers including Dewey) that claim the systemic reality as the basic assumption. But all of these have a very different conception of the agency, which drives them

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to not consider the person as a system with the adjectives of open and free, as we have presented. (4) It is foundational in the IPS paradigm on the self and action that the systemic view must be understood as exclusively (Orón 2015b) associated with very specific features: of persons being open and free systems. Within the free and open system, IPS understands that the radicals of nature, the subject, and the person are being processually integrated from within each person and not about normative alignment with moral rules that dictate how to act these three fundamentals. This inner self-integrating process requires a deep trusting in inner organismic experiencing, balancing affective, intuitive, and rational cognition not internally to a self-enclosed psychological boundary. But it is being examined in reference to one’s own intimacy, as part of an ongoing examination, response, reflection, and correction concerning how each person relates to another and others more broadly as relations evolve. So the reference here is not a mere abstract–cognitive processing quality but rather a moral and affective–relational activity. The openness of the system is due to the intimacy of each person, so the growth is unrestricted, and the freedom of the system is, first of all, to grow one’s freedom for. (5) Growth and perfection are the same. Moreover, the growth and the person are two sides of the same coin. Our proposal (IPS) rejects a static vision of the self. In the same way that we have expressed “we are what our relationships are”, now we can add, “we are what our way to grow is.” In the IPS mindset these two thoughts cannot be separated, and this happens thanks to improving personal relationships, maximizing our experience in Whitehead’s terminology, and the capacity for growth in relation. The growth of the person, in one’s relations and systemic growth, cannot be separated, as there is no such thing as autonomous integrative development in IPS. Once human growth is understood as an autonomous function relying on the mastery of a subject, there would be no growth. In AS, there is a gaining of efficacy by expanding the subject’s mastery, but the self is always the same, and it is not a person but a subject. In IPS, the growth is an improving, maximizing quality of the relationships (with other persons and with oneself). So the self is changing because it is related to the relationships.

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(6) Action. The action of IPS is in coherence and continuity with the uniqueness, and the relational character whereby free and open systems require careful choosing of how to act in order to grow. Acting (action) is fundamentally a moral/ethical activity. The action could then be understood in our proposal as an ongoing systematic answering of an internal “calling” of being who one truly is, with the aim to grow as an ethical and integrated being– in the sense of becoming even more and genuinely the person who one is. This is the only activity, and this intentionality drives all our actions. Hence action in IPS is personal action with a fundamental ethical texture, and personal acting carries with it a personal ethical intention. IPS involves a unified (complicated, differentiated) self, and all the actions one does and how one relates are also unified for the internal calling, so there is no division in some actions and domains of acting that aim to cover various needs. Cognition, in IPS, is an act and it is not a production (Aristotle), which allows us to extract the temporal and spatial character of acting. And this recognizes what is known as something known (Polo), knowing the “li” and redefining our relations (Wang) in the middle of the experience (Whitehead). (7) Integration could be a summarized dense notion because it implies all the previous aspects. Integration, differentiation, identity, and growth are various sides of the same phenomenon, expressing different perspectives. Our definition of integration shows this: “To integrate entails a maturation in which different aspects and relations differentiate and optimize to the same extent that they place themselves in a relationship with one another” (Orón 2015b, 114). So far, we have made a brief presentation from the main philosophical referents for IPS. Now we are going to present the main psychological referents, being Carl Rogers and Viktor Frankl.

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3. Key authors of reference in psychology for the Inter-Processual Self 3.1. Carl Rogers Carl Ransom Rogers (1902–87) gradually developed his person-centered therapy (1961, 1964), although he used the term “client-centered” only because he concretely referred to the person-centered approach to growth in a therapy setting where one person is the therapist and the other one is the client. His first works argued for non-directive therapy principles for the clinical treatment of problem children more successfully and sustainably than traditional more directive child therapy methods. His belief lay in the conscious attitudes towards oneself and the role of congruence between one’s immediate (inner) experience of self and one’s self-ideal in bringing about personality adjustment and growth in children (Rogers 1931). Following his early work, Rogers received a professorship in psychology at Ohio State University in 1939. Increasingly, since 1940, his works become more radically humanistic, with his book Some Newer Concepts in Psychotherapy representing the first milestone leading towards his mature work (the client-centered therapy). Rogers’ work was hugely influenced by his direct experience; Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank’s theory is closely related to Rogers’ personalized and non-directive therapy approach. The most prominent links are the Rankian principles that the individual’s self is not just a battlefield between impersonal forces, as the Freudian psychoanalysis purports, but that each individual is a unique person, and the aim of therapy is the acceptance by each person of one’s own uniqueness. For this to happen, an-other (e.g., a therapist) must become the central figure in a person’s growth process, but the goals of growth must be decided upon freely by the growing person through a direct experiencing of the present in a therapeutic relation rather than through a “dead” mental model of a remembered past situation (Raskin and Rogers 2000). Rogers’ mature work (Rogers 1989; Raskin and Rogers 2000) is the complete revised theory of personality and growth, analyzed systematically, that he originally published in the decade 1951–61. At the core of this work is the revolutionary principle that a self-directed process of human growth is set in motion once a particular kind of relationship exists between a person and another. At the core of Rogers’ theory for human growth lies the pervasive notion of unconditional mutual trust binding persons in a relationship as basis for growth— as noted, he focused on a person who in the role of client relates to the therapist who is

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the other in order to contextualize his theory (Rogers 1961; Raskin and Rogers 1989). Within this context, a special kind of inter-personal relational climate is born—one that is characterized by genuineness, empathy, and non-judgmental caring. It allows—according to Rogers—a person to gradually fully accept and appreciate the fullness of who one is (and the other). Self-acceptance is operationalized by the acceptance of the totality of one’s inner felt experiencing process (Akrivou 2008), without censoring one’s inner feelings or denying these. Both as the presupposition and as the consequence of the Rogerian model of growth, there exists a deep, authentic relation (Rogers 1961, 1965a, 1965b, 1995a, 1995b) that is binding the relating persons (Rogers 1951, 1961) in such a way whereby the systemic growth of both and each one is enabled. For Rogers, processual dialoguing is inherent in the helping relationship as much as relations more broadly (Rogers 1951; Raskin and Rogers 2000). In his contextualization of human relations in the field of therapist–patient (client) settings, Rogers suggests a therapist’s understanding of the self– other system, human action, and growth as consistent with our proposal (a psychotherapist with IPS). The patient (client) is also described as in a growth process once they fully trust the other and their own organismic “non-directive” growth process. This process involves joint growth whereby persons learn to accept each one’s uniqueness, difference, and totality while they progressively assume shared responsibility for mutual growth; for Rogers, this changes not only the patient but the therapist as well (Rogers 1951, 1961). In more systematic terms, the person-centered theory of Rogers has been summarized in 19 propositions (Rogers, 1951), including: (1) being the center of one’s own experience; (2) perceiving the world and others accepting one’s (and others) own unique “reality” while not abandoning a process to create a shared perspective; (3) that a person reacts as an organized whole to the phenomenal world; (4) that the basic tendency of each person is to maintain, actualize, and enhance the experiencing organism; (5) a key role being given to emotional experiencing as equally important to rational–cognitivist understanding for human integrative growth (here attention has been paid to kinds of emotion that involve seeking particular aspects of behavior (as opposed to a consummatory kind of emotivist experiencing) and striving to increase intensity in the organism—this signifies the

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significance of behavior for the maintenance and growth of the person); trusting an internal frame of reference, opposed to external (normative) moral universals to align with; that the structure and uniqueness of the self is gradually formed as a result of evaluative interaction with others in organized, fluid (but consistent), conceptual, perceptual patterns; values being attached to experiences; that value-laden texture of experiencing is part of the personal self-concept evolution in content and structure (understood to either be experienced directly or “naturally arising,” or as being introjected from others, in this latter case they are often distortedly symbolized to become subsequently internalized); that under certain conditions involving no threat to the selfstructure being perceived by the organism, the structure of the self adaptively revises itself to assimilate and incorporate inconsistent new experiences and values in a way that makes them internally “felt” and “owned”; the more inconsistent experiences and newer experiences are incorporated and genuinely accepted as part of oneself (and one’s older and more consistent self-structure), the more is the person able to accept others as separate and unique, and as persons. Here Rogers proposes something that allows self and other and broader acceptance. Rogers suggests, “that there is an organismic basis for the valuing process within the human individual; that this valuing process is effective to the degree that the individual is open to his experiencing; that in persons relatively open to their experiencing there is an important commonality or universality of value directions; that these directions make for the constructive enhancement of the individual and his community, and for the survival and evolution of his species” (1964, 160). Rogers’ work shows that this organismic valuing process is gradually being released via an increasing self-acceptance and awareness of each person’s singularity. This enables the recovery of innate personal valuing systems that, while they are not introjections by societal moral rules and norms, continue expressing common universal ethical norms inherent to our shared nature of being humans (Rogers 1951).

The propositions in point 12 allow Rogers to open a space for personal, relational, and systemic virtuous growth that is reminiscent of Aristotle’s

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understanding of virtuous being as the ground on which to scaffold eudaimonia and action for the common good. This entire process of internalizing new experiences and values that we find in Rogers (1951, 1961, 2000) is a theorized path to personal happiness via increasing capacity to accept oneself as a unique being accompanied with an increased self-direction on the basis of responsibility whereby growth in the self is consistent with Polo’s notion of “freedom for” others. For Rogers, self-directed being and action are not about autonomous selfauthoring whatever one wishes (Rogers agrees with Polo in our view that freedom is not about freedom from). Instead of this, freedom in Rogers is about learning to accept others as unique persons in an increasing inner acceptance of a shared humanity predicament. This, for Rogers, signifies the end of his process whereby it is empathy (for oneself and an-other) that drives responsibility and a humanist stance in the world. Genuine selfacceptance is possible thanks to an-other (the therapist) accepting oneself, so growth here happens exclusively within a dynamic relational basis. When this happens, the growth starts and everything changes. Being faithful to one’s inside world of understanding allows growing authentic self-expression of who each person deeply and really is. With this process (grounded in interpersonal/relational trust, empathy, and mutual acceptance), growth happens along various important dimensions of personality, namely (an increase in positive and full) self-regard, together with a shifting of the locus of evaluation from an external one to a more authentically organismic one, meaning shifting standards and values from what other people and prevailing conventions and morality in society consent to as moral universals regarding what to believe and how to behave (Rogers 1961). Finally, for Rogers, an increasingly trustworthy inner experiencing capacity ensues from this process, which is about a shifting from a rigid and mentalist mode of experiencing who one is and how to relate to the world to a processual, open, and more naturalist/organismic inner experiencing capacity whereby the focus becomes responding authentically to the immediacy of what is being experienced in each given moment (Rogers 1961, 131). Rogers opines that this gradually allows the highest state of human growth that he sees associated with a full personal trust in one’s own inner organismic valuing process (1964, 167). Based on the above, Rogers’ model of human personal growth is premised upon the active mutual relational acceptance that occurs between persons who grow individually albeit systemically, as persons are internally connected in the system via intimate relationships in which they freewillingly wish to co-participate. When integrative growth happens

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processually, it gradually allows the highest state of human growth that Rogers sees associated with a full trusting in each one’s personal inner organismic valuing process (1964, 167). This occurs “[a]s the individual … accepts into his self-structure more of his organic experiences … he finds that he is replacing his present value system – based largely upon introjections which have been distortedly symbolized – with a continuing free organismic valuing process” (1951, 522). Rogers posits that he is convinced that there is “a natural depth” in every person’s inner experience, trusting our own organismic process of valuing at arriving at shared ethical values more than external morality sources (Rogers and Stevens 1967). Rogers understands the person as not wholly identified with nature and he often uses the word spirit: “[t]o make one’s spirit to what is going on now, and to discover in that present process whatever structure it appears to have – this to me is one of the qualities of the good life, the mature life, as I see clients approach it” (Rogers 1961, 189). It is a live, self-integrating process founded upon freedom/openness: “[t]he fully functioning person, on the other hand, not only experiences but utilizes the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, and voluntary chooses and wills that which is also absolutely determined” (Rogers 1961, 191). So being a person exceeds these (abstract) divisions between subjective and objective by the very free act. A more specific point about Rogers is how he uses the word “spirit” in his work. Although the common use of this is as a synonym for style or environment, Rogers speaks of the “full life” on many occasions. This fullness of life is understood as an experience in the spirit, thereby indicating each person’s privacy. This enforces Rogers’ view of the person as not fully identified with nature but only part of nature; however, Rogers defends it, asserting that it is a live, processual integrating of all the human elements whereby each reinforces an increasing trust in one’s inner organism to reach freedom as an organismic process of bridging the subjective and the objective realms. Rogers knows he is not a philosopher, and so he is cognizant that he cannot offer a philosophical argument to resolve the problem regarding the separation of the subject(ive) and the object(ive). But in his work, he discovers that being a person exceeds these (abstract) divisions by the very free act: “I am not so naïve as to suppose that this fully resolves the issue between subjective and objective, between freedom and necessity. Nevertheless it has meaning for me that the more the person is living the good life, the more he will experience a freedom of choice, and the more his choices will be effectively implemented in his behavior” (Rogers 1961, 193). So for Rogers, being recognized (conceptualized) as a person means more than

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human nature or being recognized as (any) subject, but in the full life these three are in harmony.

3.2. Viktor Frankl The notion of transcendentality is central in Viktor Frankl (1905–97) (see Frankl 1984, 1998, 2000): for Frankl, a person closed in herself cannot be understood as transcendental. Moreover, a person is always a complicated unity, which is more than the sum of its parts. The transcendentality involves intimacy and personal donation, as the interpersonal relationship is from the inside. This can be found in Viktor Frankl, as studies have already shown (Sellés 2015). It is also important for our proposal because it entails discovering that each human person is more than their several characteristics. Additionally, Frankl acknowledges that the person is a complicated being and cannot be understood as a monism, but it is necessary to appeal to different co-existing realities to grasp the person’s being more profoundly. These comprise physical, psychic, and spiritual realities. However, Frankl states that the dual is not synonymous with dualistic because the latter implies opposition; nevertheless he maintains that “the human person is a unitary–totality” (Frankl 1977, 16). The physical stresses the body (which is received by one’s parents); the psychic refers to everything received by the biography and education in the course of each person’s life and broader context. The spiritual, for Frankl, is not transferable and not transmittable from parents to children (Frankl 1987, 140–41), and it transcends the biological, genetic, and cultural history: “the spiritual is a gift of transcendence” (Frankl 1987, 170). “The term 'spiritual' is not primarily religious connotation, but specifically refers exclusively to the human dimension” (Frankl 1984a, 101); hence human beings and human–social systems do not have the same dimensions or properties in common with other living and natural systems. Especially the spiritual dimension of being human is unknowable by scientific means, Franks explains, because “the properly human, which makes man, is outside the framework of a seemingly scientific human conception” (Frankl 2000, 90). “A person does not understand itself, but from the point of view of transcendence (Transzendenz)” (Frankl 2000, 114). It is this transcendentality that gives the person sense, because “there is no situation in life that is really meaningless” (Frankl 1977, 110). Frankl maintains the maxim that being a man (human person) means becoming a man (human person), which in agreement with Rogers (1961) is about becoming fully, who one already is. This occurs due to the

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concurrent exercise of freedom and responsibility (Frankl 1963, 94). Freedom and responsibility are not characteristics of the human condition, but constituents of being and acting as human, which for Frankl requires acceptance of the spiritual dimension in understanding what is to be human and in grasping human nature as spiritual being (Frankl 1990, 77– 8). Growing and acting is not something to “have” (having); rather, it is something that “is” (being) (Frankl 1986, 141–2; 1996, 87). Thus in order to become a more mature (grown) person, one must be able to spend one’s life in a genuinely personal way that derives personal meaning (Frankl 1963, 96). However, this notion of growing for Frankl is about learning to exercise freedom for responsibility (Frankl 1977, 57). Responsibility is not an individualist journey of actualizing oneself (“authoring one’s self,” as Kegan suggested in 1994), nor a perfection of oneself as a being who learns to perfectly perform the action prescribed by a categorical imperative (as Kant would like). For Frankl, responsibility is about the capacity for transcendence (Frankl 1977, 64): a responsibility and the moral courage involved in walking one’s own personal destination path according to improving one’s nature and identity. This, therefore, as noted, is the responsibility for freedom. Freedom cannot be taken away from each person unless a person chooses to abdicate it (Frankl 1987, 174). Freedom is for personal delivery (Frankl 1998, 48). The starting point for the delivery is to accept what one is (Frankl 1984b, 159). This dynamic should not be understood as a necessity. The human being cannot be reduced to any requirements that are necessary to assemble who one must be, as to Frankl “necessity and freedom are not in the same plane” (Frankl 1987, 172). With a focus in “being” instead of “having,” Frankl proposed as a remedy for mental illness that help to the patient should fall into the account that he “is”, not what he “has,” or passes, or suffers. This approach aims to distance oneself from a disease (Sellés 2015, 76), because “the disease comes from nature, but healing comes from spirit” (Frankl 1990, 194). The key to being lies in a free and responsible delivery, and it is the meaning of life. This sense has to be found. The person does not have to “give” or “invent” a meaning to her life nor to follow what is prescribed and expected of her, but to genuinely “find” it (Frankl 1977, 32, 99–102; 1987, 18; 1986, 21; 2000, 38). When the person finds her personal meaning of life and lives according to it, this person is happy (Frankl 1987, 66). So Frankl (1998) believes that healing is not returning the person to their pre-illness state; he throws a person forwards to a more grown state: “[t]he human being is projected beyond himself, he goes to something that is not himself: to something or someone, a sense that must be met or

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another human being whom we meet. One thing that we serve or a person we love” (Frankl 1998, 149). “I exist in the face of something that can not be something, it has to be a somebody, a person or—because I totally exceed my person—a superperson (Super-Person)” (Frankl 1987, 287). This helps us to understand that freedom, in Frankl’s thought, is freedom for delivering loving. It is a love that transcends the physical aspects because it is an intimate meeting (Frankl 1984b, 46) of persons as transcendental beings. Love captures what is unique and singular in the other (Frankl 1998, 211; 1984b, 155). The terms, being a person, transcendentality, uniqueness, freedom, responsibility, the meaning of life, and delivery of loving, are mutually complementary (Frankl 1977, 1984b, 1987, 1998). We will show later that, following Frankl and Polo’s suggestions, these notion of complementary and interrelated grounding concepts linking identity, integration, freedom/openness, and relation regarding human personal and systemic growth are at the basis of our proposal. We have completed this section with a focus on all key theorists and their understanding of self, being, action, and human growth, which is the theoretical basis upon which the foundation of our proposal rests. In the next chapter, we continue with our new theoretical frame grounding the Inter-processual Self (IPS) paradigm on the self, action, and human development.

CHAPTER SIX THE INTER-PROCESSUAL SELF (IPS) MODEL OF HUMAN AGENCY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Based on the works discussed in the previous chapter, the main features of agency and human development of IPS involve questions concerning what it means to be a human being (a person) and how human being grows. We explore these questions below.

1. Who is the human being—and the self—in IPS? A person The human being is first and foremost a person, not just a “subject” as in the AS paradigm. This assumption constitutes the starting point for human action (agency) in IPS. In contrast, the (idealist) modern AS subject is a closed being, even if it is required of it to be very active (since it is constituted by its acts as the logical necessity of acting, as the AS subject is nothing more and aside from its actions). However, if the subject’s actions are the subject, then the subject is being closed by its act.1 Instead, the person in IPS is complicated and as a duality lacks symmetry, being more than its actions, even if actions have later implications for the person. Polo’s nature’s radical incorporates the Aristotelian tradition by which the human being has one concrete form to be, defined by nature. Our nature is everything that human beings have received from the past (Aristotle 1941). On the one hand, our virtues are voluntary and the means via which our nature comes to life via reason; this is tied to the notion that “the virtues are voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow part-causes of our states of character, and it is by being persons of a certain kind that we set the end to be so and so), the vices also will be voluntary,” as Aristotle observes in Nicomachean Ethics (III.5 22–25). But on the other hand, 1

Polo characterizes the Idealist as the modern radical, which he critiques as incomplete but not false.

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character and actions are not voluntary in the same manner; as per the Nichomachean Ethics, even if we direct “the beginning of our states of character, the gradual process how we grow our character is not obvious any more than it is in illnesses; because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the states are voluntary” (NE III.5 1115a). This nature has one way to be and to grow (in virtue) insofar as we understand the above and each one’s responsibility for our character and choices of action regarding how we relate. The subject according to Polo has its apex in the I, which expresses and manifests a (unique and specific) human essence, but primarily the human being is a person as one who reveals oneself through one’s essence. The term “person” expresses the uniqueness, the intimacy, the interiority of each human being (Polo 1998a). Having interiority and intimacy implies that human being is always “additionally”; it means that all the things that we know about one human being never saturate what a human being is. The uniqueness of each human being comes from it, because he/she is more than his or her appearance; for this reason, human beings are not interchangeable. (Human) nature points to one way for each person to be and to grow, but persons have unlimited potential growth. A person is reachable by transcendental anthropology, but not by the typical reasoning (Sellés 2006). Knowing the person through transcendental anthropology makes it possible for others to discern within a person the mark of the personal transcendentals as a system unity. This direct appeal to a transcendental anthropology means there is no way of knowing the person through her rational activity and abstractly, even though acts do not substitute for the acting person. This comes as something evident from within an IPS mindset and no proof is sought after. Wang speaks of metaphysical premises with thanks to the wisdom that can overcome the limitations and thus can recognize the internal relationship of all things. Polo accepts this too. In the same way, Frankl says that the person can only be known directly; it is not a rational access, although neither is it against reason—it is a trans-rational approach (Frankl 2000, 40). Hence, we can only know the person from the transcendence (Frankl 1998, 114) in the IPS paradigm’s mindset and its underlying premise is that a person is more than one’s actions.

1.1. The main reference of maturation Development and maturity here are not conditional upon following a specific “rule” or an abstract universal frame of reference that certifies growth has been achieved, as opposed to AS (where the reference of

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maturation is a rule). In IPS, the rule of development depends on each person’s unique identity and a sense of purpose and calling while development is in the service of improving growth in an interdependent relationship. If we try to formulate one rule, the only rule that is possible is being/becoming this person you genuinely are, which profoundly respects personal and personal relational growth as parts of human nature. This acknowledges the space for personal expression and personal relations where the personal is always a safe space. In IPS there is not a rule, but there is a reference as to what can guide or facilitate human integrative development because not everything makes growth towards increasing human integrity possible. The primary reference of maturation in IPS is the person: all the person in one’s past, present, and future—extending this in relational growth terms it is the totality of the relating persons in their past, present, and future expression and internal relation. This is evident in Roger’s model that relies upon a helping and benevolent authentic dialoguing relationship between a therapist and a person (client). The processual growth that frees inner and inner–outer processual dialoguing, is theorized to happen via an increasingly free inner organismic experiencing focus, whereby “[i]nternal communication is clear with feelings and symbols well matched; there is an experiencing of effective choice of new ways of thinking, and a sensing of a possibility of a right choice” (Rogers 1961, 154). Rogers’ stage six allows this through a capacity for acceptance of inner processing, with “both a feeling and what constitutes its content being accepted” (1964, 146–8) and an immediacy of experiencing that gradually enables the broadening and the richness of the self’s inner integrity capacity (Rogers 1961). However, the catalyst in Roger’s work for how maturation happens is the increase in the quality and immediacy of a relationship between the two relating persons, as premised upon a continuation of mutually seeking (mature) integrity relations. In Frankl’s theory, also, there is no rule in the sense, “man is the only being who cannot be determined” (Frankl 1963, 94). Be authentic: be who you are, recognizing your own singularity2 and the internal call to exist in front of other human beings (Frankl 1987, 287) as well as the internal constituents of being spiritual, responsible, and free (Frankl 1990, 77–8), looking for the meaning of a person’s life (Frankl 1984a). The human being is not just a “subject”; first and before this, all the human being is a person, and this assumption constitutes the starting point for human action (agency) in IPS. A person is reachable by transcendental 2

Frankl follows Kierkegaard in this issue (Sellés 2014, 107).

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anthropology, since personal transcendentals allow the subject to know, love, or grow “personally,” in a unified fashion. Just as the subject is dependent on personal being, the subject can be a subject—not an object— and can grow based on Polo. Since the term “subject” depends on that of being a “person”, about each human being, the latter is a more complete and accurate denomination. As mentioned above, this direct appeal to a transcendental anthropology is a way of indicating that there is no way of knowing the person through the rational activity. It comes as something obvious from within an IPS mindset, which needs no proof. In fact, if there was proof, it would not be evident and would become provable. Wang expresses precisely this in similar terms as Polo. He speaks of metaphysical premises with thanks to the wisdom that can overcome the limitations and thus can recognize the internal relationship of all things. The person can only be known from the transcendence (Frankl 1998, 114). Modernist (AS) conception of human beings and human growth is cognizant (rationally) that the subject must exist by logical necessity, but as the subject is nothing more than its actions the notion of the subject who acts is shallow or at least incomplete. The most that can be known in AS about the subject concerns that there can be someone behind these actions; for example, for Descartes, “I think, therefore I know.” In the IPS paradigm’s mindset, a person is always more than the way she manifests herself. In this capacity, being a person can grow all along the process of development, but it is always critical to accept one’s humanity and others who cannot be defined as “objects.” It is not defined as a subject—or the subject is the person who remains and grows as a person insofar as (s)he accepts and exposes her or his vulnerable humanity and relates to other persons, as equal and inescapably sharing a common human condition. The person, however, is not a logical assumption: it is an existential affirmation, a pre-requirement. The person is a pre-reflexive selfcomprehension (Frankl 1987, 86) and the starting point to begin anything (Rogers 1961, 163–82). This implies: (a) a person is understood as part of how one relates to another person and other persons in their internal relation; (b) a person understood only within a personal identity and history—that is, in regard to how a present act is related to one’s prior and subsequent acts; and (c) personal responsibility for one’s actions emanates from one’s humanity, a core predicament of being/remaining/growing as a person.

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1.2. Personal agency Following what we have just shown, in IPS, agency is produced by a person, not a subject. An agent is, therefore, a person, understood as a free system. One does not require the subject to act to know himself (as in AS). How “knowing thy-self” happens is through personal understanding (and acceptance). According to Polo, the I (1998a, 54) is found at the level of the human essence, of the soul in Aristotelian terms (as in NE 1102a– 1102b.40). But the human nature of all persons is that they are complicated beings; they are more than just subjects. Alternatively, it is because they are persons that they can be subjects, according to Aristotle and Polo. For Polo (1988a, 145–237), access to the subject comes through personal being, while in the AS paradigm of self and development the subject is accessible only through its actions. This will lead to the term subject’s having different characterizations, depending on the philosophical framework in question. Frankl and Rogers know that the person supports the subject, and thanks to being a specific person the subject exists; for this reason, “the subject can never become an object for itself” (Frankl 1990, 231). Asserting that the person is the agent allow us to consider at the same time that: (a) personal actions are very important, but it is not a technical situation that the subject masters the object—it is an internal expression of what and who one is/grows towards; and (b) the person is always safe in acting because the person is more than the person’s acts (persons are transcendental).

1.3. Self-recognition In IPS, the self is recognized through the quality of his/her relationships with another person(s), animals, and even nature, not from one’s “boundary” to what is non-self in the object world, as in AS. The self exists and is considered in its present, past, and potential future, while the self is known through one’s relationships (a) to oneself (respecting one’s own identity and inner life) and (b) to any other person, in their concreteness and specificity. But in an IPS model of growth, “Who is the person?” and “How can one grow to be(come) a person?” are not separate questions; they are the same issue. Also in IPS, defining the development and defining the subject (in IPS terms, the person) is the same because things are what they are due to their way to growth. According to Rogers, becoming a person is to become who one fundamentally and essentially is (Rogers 1961, 107–8). Frankl asserts this too. Polo embraces the

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Aristotelian heritage that a person can find a calling to be what one is, and from this premise of Aristotle, according to Polo, emanates the possibility of human freedom (Polo 2007b, 181–242).

2. Development in IPS In models inspired by an IPS conception of growth, growth is coherent and harmonious. It is a systemic integration between affective, intuitive, and rationalist cognitive faculties in the self. Operating in a mature state, or being an integrated person in the IPS cognition, requires capacity and will for maintaining and growing in internal integrity in relation with others with whom one relates, and this is ethically demanding. As noted, Polo’s idea of development and growth is similar (Polo 1985, 23–5), while integrative growth is not the result of a simple multiplication or addition. Growing does not mean adding more of the same, but instead differentiation through perfection. Polo gives the embryo as an example. The embryo’s cells do not solely multiply; instead, they do so while differentiating themselves from one another, in such a way that growth entails a formal potentialization. Formal potency is what allows us to speak about growth. Every form of growth has a limit marked by its unity, which sets a limit to biological growth. But human growth does not behave in this way: it is unrestricted, thanks to the cognitive growth that takes over from biological growth. In the case of animals, their own natural unity sets a limit for their growth, but this is not the case in the personal reality of human beings. Rogers presents a curious paradox: “The more I am opened to the realities in me and in the other person, the less do I find myself wishing to rush into fix things” (1961, 21). At the same time, “the more I am simply willing to be myself, in all this complexity of life and the more I am willing to accept the realities in myself and in the other person, the more change seems to be stirred up” (Rogers 1961, 22). From this personal acceptance, it is understood that a person’s experience “is for me the highest authority” (Rogers 1961, 23). Rogers is confident that persons have a basically positive direction. He is also aware that existential fears, self-defense, aggression (Rogers 1961, 26) are powerful, but the patient discovers “highly positive directional tendencies which exist in them, as in all of us, at the deepest levels” (Rogers 1961, 27) and thus he acknowledges the trusting of the own organismic process of valuing and experiencing as a superior state of growth and human integrity. In Frankl, a person grows by the search for meaning. The search for meaning is not something that is created, but something that is. And it is

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not some-(object)thing, but rather a way of life that is characterized by personal delivery: “The human being is projected beyond himself, he goes to something that is not himself: to something or someone, a sense that must be met or another human being whom we meet. One thing that we serve or a person we love” (Frankl 1998, 149). Later he points out, “I exist in the face of something that cannot be something, it has to be a somebody, a person” (Frankl 1978, 287).

2.1. Notion of integration and how the self-integrating process happens In IPS, the person is already understood as a unity. Integrative development involves a systemic growth process, in that both the person and the quality of one’s relations to others grow systemically. Integration in the IPS model entails a maturation that requires differentiation, but differentiation is entailed in integration as two intertwined dynamics; they are two sides of one phenomenon of what it is to be an integrated person (Akrivou 2008). This is because “different aspects and relations differentiate and optimize to the same extent that they place themselves in a relation with one another. In other words, integration is the dynamic that explains how growth or human maturity happens; even more: integration is the dynamic that describes the evolution and functioning of open, free systems” (Orón 2015b, 114). This way of understanding integration is congruent with the fact that any system cannot be explained in itself, but only in the complex plexus of its relations (Orón and Sánchez-Cañizares 2017). If a system were defined aside of the extra-system, then “to integrate” would be the outcome of putting coherence between the system and the extra-system. But as has been pointed out (Orón and Sánchez-Cañizares 2017), from mathematics, physics, neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology, system and extrasystem are defined at the same time, so “to integrate” is an activity and cannot be a mere result. “To integrate” is the activity of the same system that grows as a result of improving the relationships with the extra-system, and they co-evolve together “pari passu.” IPS understands personal growth as a systemic growth dynamic. Once a systemic view is adopted, there is no requirement of synthesis (as in the AS case). The integration in the systemic view happens at the outset, while the relationship between a person and another person exists from the very beginning all through the end. On the other hand, a unity/unification does not require a dissolution of the previous identities between two persons in a mature relationship– a higher state of an already-accomplished unity

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(Orón 2015b). Integration happens by systemic growth within integrity relations, whereby every element of the system grows thanks to the internal relationships between the relating parts (persons). How to develop (to become more integrated) is a continuous process and involves rationalist cognition, feelings, and intuitive knowing, in opposition to AS where it is mostly performed via cognitive action and maturation mainly in the cognitive dimension. The systemic view of integration requires differentiation—that is, identifying the distinctiveness of each person (part of a relationship) such that none of her different identities is lost in the process towards a more mature relation; instead, the growth process preserves the difference. Neither of the earlier elements (persons’ distinct identities) disappears with their systemic growth, but a highest degree or state of integration is a further maturation of the previous state (instead of the overcoming of the previous state). Therefore, a relationship can grow in integrity further across time. The main point here is that the integrative (growth) process happens because of the relationship and the fact that it grows (Orón 2015b), which characterises IPS. Hence the dynamic of personal growth in relations in IPS lacks the aim for a “fusion” between self and other that is a characteristic of AS models.

2.2. What it is to mature in IPS In IPS, to mature has to do with being able to solve specific personal challenges of each stage of growth in each person’s life and to promote the growth of everyone involved in that stage, thus maintaining and increasing the quality of relations between the relating persons. In this sense, adolescents are not mature when they become an adult; rather, they are mature if they can face their life challenges improving their relationships with others (peers and adults) (Orón and Echarte 2017). To mature is then to be able to face one’s personal situation inside one’s personal development concerning how one relates to specific others.3 So, it means that (to be) “mature” (as an adjective) does not belong to a specific, higher, last stage of growth. Each moment of a person’s life— with growth in integration, identity, and differentiation— has a different and uniquely complicated way to live systemically in processual terms in a mature way (Akrivou 2008). One person is mature—irrespectively of how old one is— insofar as this person is ready to face the challenges of this particular time. 3

It is very interesting, congruently with this, how Erikson understood the stage of life as a challenge. Each age has its own challenge that needs to be faced. In this sense, to mature does not mean to become an adult. But Erikson’s formulation here helps to understand what is expressed in this section.

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To call “mature” the person who is only in the last stage of a growth ladder, means that the previous stages are being understood merely as means and as a reference to the latest stage. According to our perspective, that is wrong in ethical and ontological terms. We suggest understanding each moment in accordance with the challenges that arise from it and with reference to the past, present, and future growth. If maturity is the last milestone and the goal to achieve this also implies that mature persons only can be given the responsibility to drive the lives of others and decide what is right for them, we suggest that this is wrong too. Every stage presents its richness. For instance, a generation without young people is a generation that struggles to create novelty, while midlife adults focus on how knowledge may change, and how things may change for system prosperity. It is worth noting that a significant number of scientific breakthroughs occur in the young and early mid-adulthood (Ramón y Cajal 1898, 35–115). At stage seven of Rogers/Gendlin (Rogers 1951, 1961; Rogers and Dymond 1954; Gendlin 1978/1997) one accepts one’s own contradictions and one’s full humanity, with “a growing sense of ownership of the changing feelings, (bringing about) a basic trust in one’s own inward process … a trust … in the total organismic process” (Rogers 1961, 151). This is where an experiencing focus enables empathy and produces good inner and outer dialoguing ethics. Integration in IPS is a pure process-type experiencing, in which each situation is experienced and interpreted in its newness. The self becomes increasingly a reflexive awareness, less frequently a perceived object, and much more a felt process4 (Rogers 1961, 152). Rogers’ work is further developed by Gendlin (1962, 1969, 1978/1997, 1991), whose research focuses on pure inner experiencing processing, emphasizing the notion of “felt meaning” (Gendlin 1978/1997, 4 Roger’s explanation on the interprocessual self (Rogers 1951, 1961; Rogers and Dymond 1954) should not be mistaken as meaning that, in IPS, feeling and intuitive knowing dominates the rational mind, because it is “unlabeled experiencing” that invites different forms of cognition to an inner dialoguing process (Gendlin 1991). To explain IPS’s trust in one’s own self-integrating process, Rogers clearly explains that loosening personal constructs differs from losing them, but the process whereby rationalist knowing becomes stronger, richer, and more sensitive is when “the person learns to trust that personal constructs, after disappearing, are tentatively being reformulated, but more organically,” while a person allows them to be “submitted to validation against further experience” (Rogers 1961, 153). Instead, this experiencing process “is clear with feelings, intuitive understanding and abstract symbols (being) well matched” (Rogers 1961, 154); it is seen to allow a refined and more focused attention and awareness of reality, alongside balanced and more contextually sensitive response capacities.

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1991) that enables the abandonment of habituated/learned automatic response mechanisms facing one’s relations. In short, from the IPS paradigm, for the person to become more integrated—a more mature being—requires that challenges relevant to each person’s own unique life (stage, or phase) must be faced and resolved in an appropriate way expressing and facing each person’s identity.5

2.3. Understanding development and progression As noted, in an IPS model of human growth, the person and one’s human development are inseparable. The more prescriptive AS stage models theories presented earlier describe broad commonalities within a vast and large “global” population, but IPS understands that knowing these general abstract patterns does not provide an answer to the integrative development of each concrete and specific person. Growth and maturation can be different even between diverse aspects of the same person. The progression and moving towards growth is not linear and can exist forwards and backwards, insofar as it has a meaning in one’s personal history and identity. For this reason, it should be noted that each “stage” is characterized by its own richness and neither stage can be seen as superior to, nor canceling, the other stages. The conception of considering a stage as superior to another comes from the assumption of the adult as the model of reference of maturity. And this AS/Piagetian premise has been rejected. Our conceptualization of person as a free and open system implies that growth could be both positive and negative. Concerning growth, there is no rule outside the reference to the person, although that does not mean that everything is possible. Rogers remarked that, according to his experience, when the person is faithful to his interiority and is free to express oneself, it is very common to notice a lot of similarities in the realm of diversity. And this commonality is neither dependent on the therapist’s personality, nor seem to be due to the influences of any one 5

As an example, to help explain in a more narrative way since we lack personal life story data, Eriksson refers to relevant challenges: basic trust vs. basic mistrust; autonomy vs. shame and doubt; initiative vs. guilt; industry vs. inferiority; identity vs. confusion; intimacy vs. isolation; generativity vs. stagnation; ego integrity vs. despair. To this process is added a last: “The gerotranscendence is a change in the meta-perspective of a materialistic and rational vision to a more cosmic and transcendent, accompanied usually by an increase in life satisfaction.” “The gerotranscendent experiences a new sense of cosmic communion with the spirit of the universe, a redefinition of time, life and death, as well as a redefinition of the self” (Erikson 1994, 127).

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culture (Rogers 1964). We think that this commonality comes from the transcendental aspects that Polo pointed out, presented in Chapter Two: “co-existence-with,” “personal freedom,” “personal knowledge,” and “personal love.” We have noted that these four are fundamental constituent realities of human being. And this makes it easy to understand the Rogerian quote that is the quintessence of IPS: ‘be who you are.’

2.4. The goal of development The purpose of development is to be able to enhance and deepen the quality of one’s relationships with others and nature at large, so that they are characterized as relations of integrity. AS understands integrity as the union of different aspects of the self in its effort to become a master. IPS understands integrity as a larger relation of everything improving the same relationships. For this reason, the growth of the system of which a person is a part includes the development of other persons as well as their relational qualities. In IPS, human development has no predefined end a priori; and any unity (experienced in the self) is always a temporal situation. In this way, integrity is a dynamic, fragile, and temporary state. To talk about the unity is invariably precipitated, as growth remains open. Kohlberg’s stage seven (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990), which sharply denies/transcends his prior conceptualization of moral maturity as a mainly cognitive–rationalist growth process, manifests well a broader goal of development and a high-level capacity of integrity that is a good fit in IPS. Instead, Kohlberg’s stage seven agrees with the IPS paradigm’s premise that people can—and do—evolve in a free and personally significant and responsive way. They also have trust such that they adhere to and express their inner inquiry and calling as they change, with no fear of distancing from an externally defined morality common standard and a shared notion of what is a principled character for each age. Kohlberg’s revised conception of the “highest” form of moral maturity presents stage seven more as an alternative paradigm or mode of human growth than as another higher stage of his cognitive moral development (CMD) model, as we explained in Chapter Four. In stage seven, integrity is unexpectedly theorized not as a principled character (as in the AS paradigm); rather, it is understood as a naturally flowing, epistemological, and ontological perspective on ethics, a genuinely “felt” choice to be ethical, experienced holistically from inside out. This is not a rational character alignment but an integrity that is naturally emerging in the self as a common shared universal human capability, not always requiring rational proof, nor a conscious process. In Kohlberg’s seventh stage, the question ‘Why live?’

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is hardly a moral one per se; it is an ontological question, and it is grounded in inwardly freely adhered-to choices (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990, 192). Integrity in Kohlberg’s stage seven is entrusted upon one’s inner valuing process to act in a non-egoistic and non-dualistic way when facing ethical challenges, expressing fully one’s humanity. Based on this radically new understanding of integrity as fluid and non-dualistic, and emerging out of a deep experiencing, it is seen as a process connecting oneself with the whole of life, rather than a specific moral framework. Integrity is also approached as a temporary state— rather than a permanently possessed one (Akrivou 2008; Kolb 2015)—and reflexively, “such as when on a mountaintop or before the ocean. At such a time, what is ordinarily background becomes foreground, and the self is no longer figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and ourselves as part of that unity; the recognition of one’s finite character from the perspective of the infinite, when thoroughly and courageously explored, leads to a figure-ground shift that reveals the positive validity of the cosmic perspective implicit in it” (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990, 193–5). As we have already highlighted, for Polo growth is unrestricted. Frankl understands growth under the category of personal meeting, which is always open, and Rogers also sees that the person does not have limitations in expressing oneself. Wang understands growth as a maximization of the internal relationships between heaven–earth– humanity, and Whitehead as a maximization of the quality of relationships. Definitively for IPS, growth is the same as to live, to be who I am truly, improving the quality of relationships, as a personal expression of oneself. All of them are synonyms in the IPS paradigm.

2.5. How to understand what exists before the developmental process In AS, the starting point is the distance separating the subject from the object and the assumption that the self—which is statically defined—aims to harness the tool of cognition to extend its mastery. In IPS, the starting point is personal acceptance: to be considered as a person, to know and accept oneself. Hence, the IPS model of growth requires of one to accept oneself. The precondition of IPS is to recognize what it means to be a person, in terms of one’s intimacy and uniqueness. However, to know and accept oneself in IPS is not involved in autonomous terms; it involves accepting oneself inside one’s relationships with concrete others and with

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nature as well. For this, the role of empathic relations is crucial, as Rogerian psychotherapy shows. This allows us to understand the starting point of growth. In AS, the starting point does not have to do with growth because the definition of the self and its activity are different things, as we suggested earlier. Even to act, in AS, is an option. In IPS, the starting point for the self and its growth is the same: there is no starting point out of growth and it is impossible to distinguish between them because acknowledging and accepting oneself is to accept growth’s internal dynamic. I am a gift to myself and I discover the inner calling to be a gift. Rogers’ experience shows that growth starts when a person accepts and freely expresses oneself.

2.6. Identity, differentiation, growth, and integration In IPS, identity, differentiation, growth, and integration are different facets and conceptualizations of the same phenomenon, the same reality. For example, identity is a particular kind and quality of relationships, so a higher-level identity in IPS requires a higher and more mature level of relationships; this path resembles the path towards integration as requiring a systemic growth in different relations that become more integrated via increasing differentiation. A system’s growth (which includes various persons in their relationships) expects to raise the quality of relationships that are part of this system, but this is not endangered by others’ growth and differentiation that allows persons to relate in their uniqueness and different identities. Here, the core analysis classifying the theories in AS or IPS and the philosophical origins of this classification is complete. It is not true that all the differences between AS and IPS are present in the same intensity in every author, nor that the classification of a theory as AS or IPS means that the approach has nothing to do with the alternative model. For instance, that the ego or the subject and its development are described as two separate things in ego development and subject–object theory makes these models belong to the AS model. This is so because, in IPS, it is impossible to make an actual separation (only analytically) between the two (as we showed in IPS, the self/person is who it is thanks to each person’s unique, own way to grow). As Wang says, the difference between subject and object is only a mental conceptualization of nature under the categories of cause and effect, no more. This feature is more difficult to describe in non-stage models (e.g., in Ryan’s proposal, because Ryan considers more inter-relational aspects of growth). But, as we have suggested, Ryan and Kegan and Loevinger/Cook-Greuter are all in the AS

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taxonomy because, despite the differences shown in their work, each has a high view of the self-subject. In the next section, we present a summary of the above regarding a contrast between IPS and AS (see also tables 1 and 2, displayed earlier).

3. Model of the self and how the IPS model sees the agent in the AS model The self in an IPS model cannot be defined autonomously, but instead can only be set from inside a system of which a person is a part. However, in an IPS paradigm, it is not enough to have a systemic view of the human being. The key question is what kind of system is appropriate for a human being. Accordingly, a human being is understood here as a free system (Polo 2007a, 2007b). A person, a human being as a free system, cannot be described via fixed goals. The notion of ‘openness’ means something that is revealed; it means something that manifests itself. Also regarding human beings, it is through their intimacy that they express themselves. The expression ‘through’ or ‘from one’s intimacy’ is important, as it guarantees the unity of human actions and, therefore, that all of them are internally related. Their internal relation means that all actions of one person are integrated into the same person and have no meaning other than this. Since the feature of openness is always present, human growth is an unlimited feature of the free, open system: “a feature of an open system is that the relations between its elements are ever more intense and integrated” (Polo 2007b, 123). The concept of “freedom” means a nonpredetermined direction of growth and the possibility of both a positive or negative kind of growth for each person. Positive growth is an integrating growth, whereas negative growth is a disintegrating kind of growth. The latter is present in pathology (Polo 2007b, 124). But integration places conditions on growth, because nothing is missed and everything improves. That does not assume an autonomous subject’s setting a goal for growth, as personal growth is achievable and manifests itself in several ways.6 By the way in which IPS understands one’s difference from another person, or a subject–object relation emerges as their relationship and shared activity progresses, the differences between a subject and an object make up an emergent feature (instead of a permanent state, boundary, or category).

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Neuroscience also associates pathologies with disintegration in what is called “disconnection syndromes” (Sepulcre, Sabuncu, and Johnson 2012).

CHAPTER SEVEN CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT AS AND IPS

1. Key terms in distinguishing AS and IPS In this section, we refer to four interrelated key constructs: integration, intentional existence, cognition, and freedom. These constructs are important for our proposal, and here we suggest that they are not understood as four separate domains or problems in comparison with AS. Moreover, in this chapter, we explain the understanding of each of these and their relations in the IPS paradigm and how it is in sharp contrast with how the AS paradigm understands them. The analysis that follows is summarized in Table 3.

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1.1 Integration The modern paradigm with a focus on the Autonomous Self (AS) understands integration as something that is an aspirational goal at the end of the developmental process. The self is perceived as lacking integration, and therefore the possibility of human action with a systematic pursuit of integrity happens only at the end (states) of human development. The AS paradigm also understands that, to achieve integration, the (autonomous) self-subject must be triggered by motivational tendencies in the self, which also requires the autonomous agency of the acting subject–agent. Especially in self-determination theory (e.g., Ryan 1995), an important role is attributed to intrinsic motivation and self-regulatory mechanisms in the self. In the post-Piagetian adult development models, effort towards progression instead rests upon the individual’s rational cognition (e.g., to harness and internalize lower states of subject–object relations in Kegan 1994; or to develop by resolving ego challenges with an increasing synthetic capacity in the self, as in Loevinger 1976; and via cognitive mastery aiming for the subject–agent to defeat and transcend the notion of the self altogether, in Cook-Greuter 1999). Here, integration is used mainly as a means, which allows the subject who has achieved a reasonable degree of cognitive and social mastery at the high end of development to maintain further goal-directedness that is often oriented towards integrating one’s inner increased complexity (Akrivou 2008). Alternatively, in cognitive development models, the AS subject is expected to further wish to increase personal control and mastery (which happens even after formal operations in constructivist adult development models such as in Kegan 1994). But while there is a sense in many AS stage models that the self is changing (as it succeeds in mastering a way of approaching the world via an abstract cognitive mode), there is still no change in the quality of relations as Hegelian dialectics becomes another way for the master to assert one’s power over situations and relational challenges in the social world (e.g., in Kegan 1994). This may remind that personal vulnerability is always part of being human and what is involved in responding to the call of being (human) is never fully recognised nor resolved in these theories (Akrivou and Orón 2016). In contrast, the IPS paradigm requires a personal action and mindset whereby integration is always part of being human; it is there as a part of feeling oneself as human since the very beginning. Further integrative growth is also a premise of IPS, but it has a unique essence. “To integrate entails a maturation in which different aspects and relations differentiate and optimize to the same extent that they place themselves in a relationship with one another” (Orón 2015b, 114). Such maturation

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depends on the quality and dialogic ethics in one’s systemic relations with others, but it can happen in any direction given that human beings are understood as an open, free dynamic system. Personal and mutual intelligence, and value and affect-laden choices, allows different relations to mature in various ways, but the key concern in IPS is how both relating persons can flourish as part of the way in which a relationship develops. Hence, by the nature of the very acceptance of being a person, one understands oneself and others as integrated human beings. Integration is the way in which things happen, or relations grow. Integration is occurring through the person’s activity, but it does not need to be supported by one’s autonomous agency. Wang and Whitehead are clear examples in this regard. Wang opines that, if one mineral is used to heal illness, this is because we as persons share something in common with nature. And Whitehead suggests that entities are what they are thanks to their relations. Every entity (whether inorganic or organic) pursues an action that aims to maximize the intensity of the experience of the organism, or the cognitive kind of intense experience: the inorganic is maximized if replicated, while the organic and mental activity is maximized insofar as they succeed in redefining their relationships. So the growth happens not due to the individual autonomy but thanks to the quality, intensity, and evolution of internal connections between organisms that make up a system. Integration in IPS is neither a means nor an indicator that a person is in a (highest) last stage. But it is an indication that a person is growing because it is a requirement of every growth’s state, and that is a process of growing integration. A growing integration is a process of higher acceptance and relatedness (giving) in systemic relations of I– thou, and hence it seeks and allows a systemic growth. According to Polo, “the characteristic of the truth of man is his dynamic integrity” (Polo 2007b, 47). So gaining in integration is the sign that there is growth. Integrity in IPS is merely the state of growing in integration; therefore, integrity is fluid and part of an acceptance of an organismic immersion in its surrounding relations and responding ethically to them. It cannot be expected to be autonomously or permanently possessed. This is manifested well in Kohlberg’s seventh stage of development (Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990). Maintaining and growing one’s integrity is part of keeping and improving the quality of relationships with a systemic view of the self and growth. So in IPS integration is the very way whereby human beings live and grow; each one has to maintain integration via quality responses systematically examining how one relates to other organisms in a system. It is worth noticing that, in AS, it is better to use the word integrity,

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whereas in the IPS paradigm the most appropriate term is integration (for more details about integration, see Orón 2015b). The importance of emotion within the notion of integration in IPS As a final point, regarding how AS and the IPS paradigms maintain a profoundly different understanding of the notion of integration, it should be noted here that they differ in how they understand the role of affect (emotion). As expressed in earlier chapters, the primary focus of the AS model’s integration is a growth in the purely rational–cognitive dimension that inspires personal being and action. Emotion and more broadly the passions are mainly outside the focus of integrative development. Further, AS sees emotions as threatening the motivational growth process, and the aspirational ideal of achieving integration mainly as a cognitivist project. Hence, AS models pay an excessive tribute to self-regulatory processes in the self to harness and master emotional self-control: indeed, the regulatory model is a crucial reference model enabling motivational processes in AS. In contrast, a fundamental assumption in the IPS proposal is that we understand emotional integration as integral to being an integrated person and at the service of the personal development. In the IPS paradigm, the emotional reality experienced by each person needs to be accepted and integrated, and it has a catalytic role in the global– maturational development of the person. In our proposal we believe that, unless a person accepts and profoundly listens to the information that all different emotions and emotional moments convey, it is not possible for a person to answer the evaluative question about how best to act to enable flourishing and growth in systemic relations. This means that emotion is at the very core of processes, allowing choices for personal acts from within freedom and with an ethical and responsible will to act responsibly. Therefore, in IPS, any given emotional situation becomes a starting point for the person to engage in genuinely felt personal growth as an integrated human being. Regarding the role of emotion, we provide a systematic theoretical analysis and critically discuss the importance of emotional integration in IPS in Chapter Nine. This is accompanied by a focus on emotional education, as we consider learning more broadly the basis of the growth process.

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1.2 Intentional purpose The (post)modern paradigm of self, action, and human growth—or AS— understands that some intentionality is required in the process of seeking optimal ways regarding the questions, “How to preserve the subject’s autonomy (how can the subject be preserved in the most effectively manner)?” and “How to maintain self-motivation to ascend and complete one’s growth gaining integration?” In the AS paradigm, intentional purpose mainly aims to seek “how to preserve the subject’s autonomy” and “how to maintain self-motivation to complete one’s integrative development.” Its first theme is manifested in Kegan and Lahey (Kegan 1994; Kegan and Lahey 2001; Lahey 1987), while the second is shown in Ryan’s SDT (Ryan 1995). Therefore, in AS, the notion of intentional purpose is required because it is the way to autonomously cover the needs that pertain to self-constitution, or improving one’s mastery over the object world. A main premise of AS is that the needs are fragmented, multiple, domain-specific manifestations, and therefore each domain’s needs are satisfied by “local” motivational, psychological processes (Ryan 1995). In the end, a subject may find oneself with various “selves” (Ryan 1995) or various subject–object relationships (Kegan 1994), and the problem of the fragmented self shows up with increasing self-complexity and differentiation (Johnson 2000). In AS development, to achieve being integrated is also conceptualized as another need. However, this is not the case in IPS.1 One example is Maslow’s (1943) earlier model aiming for self-actualization as the final need in the self, which is also a need fitting the AS paradigm, while Ryan’s (1995) satisfaction of needs is believed to refer mainly to competence, relatedness, and autonomy. This legitimizes agency oriented towards selfactualization but which is autonomous and not related to others’ growth (except if a subject–agent decides to do so as part of one’s self-authoring project). Also, as noted earlier, a main premise of AS is that needs are fragmented, diverse, and domain specific, and therefore Ryan proposes that each domain-specific need requires domain-specific motivations in the subject’s self-system. This is a view of needs that enables fragmentation of the self, and fragmentation and separation between an agent–subject and other agents (whose needs may be viewed as antagonistic and mutually exclusive). Also, Ryan’s model shows belief that one can be more 1

This is in contrast to Aristotle (NE 1103a.26), who posits that everything that belongs to nature has the formal presentation of a need, but human being’s growth cannot be conceptualized as a need because it is neither caused by nature nor is against nature.

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successful in self-motivation in one domain but not others, therefore one can have domain-specific degrees of integrated (or less so) selves. Therefore, these models’ consequence is that, in the end, a subject may find oneself with various “selves” (Ryan 1995) or different subject–object relationships (Kegan 1994), and this potentially accepts that the subject is fragmented and objectified (despite the initial premise of the subject– master). Also, each self-as-subject’s autonomous satisfaction of needs in AS is seen as legitimizing agency in either amoral terms, or by utilizing any terms of reference that fit in with the needs of the acting subject’s key intention to increase self-consistency (e.g., Ryan 1995): if something is consistent with the self it is good, and it then is something the acting subject should pursue, hence it will “feel good” (positive affect). In the opposite case, if something is hampering self-consistency then it is seen as morally bad, and pursuing this action will “feel bad” (negative affect). Hence, in AS, we see an absence of Aristotle’s notion of flourishing (happiness), as something that involves an evaluative moral basis (Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002). Instead, AS through action allows the self to constitute and actualize itself as legitimate, and this absence of a moral texture in the theory also leads to the notion that intentionality of the acting subject in AS is more about enabling a descriptive notion of happiness; this focuses on the reduction of the negative affect that intentionally aims at feeling good (see, as noted earlier, related work by Phillips et al. 2017). Therefore, AS lacks a rigorous theoretical premise whereby intentional purpose in the acting subject pursues how to be a good person, in addition to maintaining a positive affective selfexperience. It should be noted, however, that this description does not fit with Kant, whose work we have used as a philosophical reference of AS. Indeed, both Kegan (1994) and Ryan (1995) undertake the postmodern moral relativist assumption, and they clearly avoid linking human development with a moral evaluative aspect of being and growing. All these models are victims of the broader modernist psychology understanding of the person and the self-system as a boundary: there is no reference outside the self-system of the agent, and it is difficult to assume an objective reality outside subjective evaluations of things. Modern and postmodern are two different versions, and they both exist as competing models inside the same AS paradigm. Apparently these are two different perspectives, but not different enough: we agree with Polo’s suggestion (Polo 2007b) that postmodern is the logical conclusion of modernism (for a characterization of the modern paradigm in philosophy in contrast to the classical one, see Appendix). Through a modern perspective in how it is

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extended in human development theories, the AS maintains an aspirational ideal of growth whereby the (autonomous) subject–agent’s self is who is behind the activity; but he does not have any special goal outside the selfactualization of the acting person. Lacking a clear purpose and, given the moral and ontological basis, being weak, as noted in earlier chapters, the expectations of all AS models are that their achieved benefits turn out to be very short lived, and there is a need to keep oneself motivated to autonomously “seek a higher stage.” And this is the moment at which postmodern models of human development show up, in that they address this very important problem that the benefits do not need to be more than an immediate feeling of good effect. There is another reason why modern philosophy at large has been classified in the same taxonomy as the modern and postmodern psychology of human development. For example, if Kegan’s and Ryan’s models are concerned with the achievement of self-consistency, Kant’s preoccupation is about inner-rule-consistency (in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals of 1996): in how persons must deal with the basic principles of rights and of virtues, what matters is that the moral law(rule) has to be universal. In Kant (1996), consistency means universality of virtues and rights, as we of course know, and hence the subject–agent is required to will to align with the moral laws. Ultimately, however, there is no personal relationship, no intentional growth. In the modern philosophical foundations of AS, the law is a logical and objective impersonal rule, and everything is under the rule. In IPS, the law is only one service that allows a better relationship, so the rule is not imposed; it is the trust in the personal and shared sense of being human that is called upon when trying to answer the question how to be a better person and to enable relational and systemic growth when relating with other fellow humans. In IPS, a person does not relate to another as someone whose need is to enforce the moral rule to oneself and to others (as the Kantian subject would be expected to do). In summary, AS sees intentionality only as the internal impulse for autonomous subjects to satisfy various needs. One example could be Maslow, who conceptualized everything as a need (Maslow and Lewis 1987). In Ryan (2000), the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia is understood as another need (to feel happy) that people have and which has to be satisfied; or the indicator that every need has been satisfied is falsely believed to be premised upon each subject’s subjective satisfaction of needs (autonomous subjective satisfaction of needs is quintessential in AS). Ryan thinks of needs mainly as competence, relatedness, and autonomy, and their satisfaction brings happiness; however, again, in Ryan

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(1995, 2000) no evaluative moral question is attached to how to satisfy these needs by morally being a good person. Perry is another author whose work is based on AS: he sees the internal calling of finding meaning as another necessity (Perry and Chickering 1997). Instead, for IPS, the meaning is not a need but a notion of purposeful existence, a calling that has to be answered, because growth cannot be conceptualized as a need. Human development and growth has to be conceptualized as a “calling.” Everything that belongs to nature has the formal presentation of need. But human being’s growth cannot be conceptualized as a need because it is not made by nature (although it is not against nature). A need requires being satisfied; on satisfaction it disappears, because an equilibrium has been reached. Satisfying needs does not prompt growth, only conservation and self-maintenance. It is an adaptive mechanism, typical of AS, whereas in IPS growth is unrestricted. So, in AS, there is an entrapment in that the intentional purpose is understood as a need, as a fulfillment of needs. From this assumption, AS models talk about domain-specific integrative processes in the self (e.g., Ryan 1995, 2000). It allows them also to divide the person into several needs (so also in domains). Each need is one domain, and it is possible to satisfy one need/domain and not another need/domain. The AS paradigm denies the unity of the person as a founding condition of being human; and for this reason, its analytic thinking slots in very well with these models that we classify as fitting better with the AS paradigm. And the notion of purpose and a calling behind the intentionality of the acting person to act in one way and not in another has been reduced from a matter of motivation towards a matter of need satisfaction. Hence, AS has a more reductionist approach regarding the notion of intentionality in the self, and it requires the notion of lacking integration as part of being human. From within an IPS paradigm’s understanding, intentional purpose is being understood in a strikingly different way. Intentionality is more about the question of the person: “How can I be what I am, but in a higher degree or quality in how I express myself and in how I relate to other fellow humans?” Human beings are understood as “additionally,” in a capacity for radical openness, and newness, or unrestricted personal growth potentiality. Therefore, the person cannot be reduced to one’s nature, but instead, it is via one’s intentional volition that one carefully chooses how to grow in systemic relations with other parts of a given system to achieve a higher-level quality of (relational–systemic) being and by contributing to ethical systemic growth with a sense of responsibility and phronesis (the moral–practical wisdom in Aristotle, required for

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systemic growth linked with broader system eudaimonia, as presented in Chapter Six). Human development aims towards a higher level of perfection whereby one expresses more profoundly and with sincerity one’s calling and purpose as spiritual being. This is believed to enable a person to be/become more internally coherent (in growing integration) and able to relate in more ethical ways in systemic terms with others. Accordingly, each human being is a person who is the only possible agent for bringing about integration in the self and choosing how to grow in relations of mutuality. Intentionality is important for the IPS conception of a person as a free, open system, enabling one to “see” opportunities (animals seem more necessities). Further, a person who “sees” opportunities also discovers alternatives, becoming who one is in a more coherently way. In this respect, it would not be found in earlier states of personal history and relations (Orón 2015a, 2015b). So to understand what the mechanism in IPS involves, we need consider not a paradigm of adaptation but one of des-adaptation. This intentional purpose (or motivation, to use AS terminology) is, however, not domain specific; nevertheless it depends greatly on how the different environments to which a person relates enable and let a person express oneself as a person—it is a question of “facilitat[ing] growth” (Rogers 1961, 40). The end of intentional purpose is to a higher degree of internal consistency in one’s being, and integration creates a more coherent and more unified self who relates to others in more sincere and authentic ways. This, as noted, cannot occur unless within a systemic growth paradigm, wherein other relations also grow as part of an intentional, purposeful action that also supports personal growth. Therefore, in IPS, what is morally good and what is morally bad is defined with consideration to further growing one’s relationships. In previous sections of this book, we have presented Polo’s transcendental anthropology, considering it to be the best explanation of what “letting the person be a person” (which Rogers and Frankl support) means philosophically. Polo’s four transcendentals are not characteristics or things that qualify the activity because they belong to the act of being. They show us who the person is. When the person acts according to his act of being, he grows. This means that every act allowing the person to live according to who one is promotes personal development and systemic growth. The four transcendentals are also convertibles, which implies that they have to co-develop towards a purpose. When persons are allowed to live expressing/improving their personal co-existence-with, personal freedom, personal knowing, and personal love, it is the overall person who grows as a unity (in IPS, the person is always in integration). These

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philosophical principles, which are the basis of our philosophical, anthropological, personalist proposal (IPS) do not have a direct translation in psychology. It would be a complete misunderstanding and a quite shallow move to match personal co-existence-with with sociability, personal freedom with autonomy, personal knowing with cognition, and personal love with feeling. The four transcendentals are present in every single act as the essence of one’s actions. Being/becoming who/what I am really is, therefore, one constitutional call (a calling and not a need). In IPS, needs and callings are distinct. We think that Frankl has very well conceptualized what it means to opine that the person has a calling, an inner, personal calling. His anthropology is in its main lines transcendental, as in Polo (Sellés 2015). Frankl knows that the corporal and psychological aspects of the human being do not explain everything in the human being, because man is a physic–psychic unity, but this unity does not make up the total man because the spiritual is essential to the genuinely total (Frankl 1998, 117). This spiritual reality looks for meaning, which is to devote oneself to another, as Frankl notes in one of his interviews.2 To be a person means to be intentionally directed for meaning and for another fellow man, whereas in AS being a subject means to be directed to some object. So it is clear that, in IPS, intentional purpose is not domain dependent because growth belongs to the system.

1.3 Cognition revisited The AS paradigm understands cognition as a production (poiesis) and not as an act(ion) (praxis); so the knowledge that ensues is the product (output) of an autonomous subject. The modern (AS) view of cognition understands it as having a purpose that is to control a specific object and the object world, and thus it is understood as the faculty allowing a subject to manipulate and master the object world. This autonomous (AS) mindset regarding cognition understands that what is in each subject’s mind is his/her subjective or objective representation of the object; hence the AS paradigm and its assumptions are congruent with representational theories of cognition (Frisina 2002). Such a representational role of cognition, which characterizes the mindset behind the AS paradigm, is expected to operate in two different ways. First, a subject is creating a (mental) representation of an object and sets of objects, and second, the object/s is/are impressing and penetrating 2

Interview of Frankl by K.-H. Fleckenstein in Lukas 2008, 22.

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the subject’s cognition and acting to create “a representative (mental) copy” of themselves. But in any case the object is the intentional creation of the mind. The inter-processual view of the self and growth (IPS) understands cognition “as an act (praxis) within a whole activity of living.” With this definition, we try to gather Aristotelian and Polian philosophical, classical tradition with the theories of Whitehead and the neo-Confucian virtue philosophy of Wang. All three lines of philosophy understand cognition in different but reconcilable ways. The differences only arise because the authors are concerned about diverse issues. Below, we will note Aristotle’s and Polo’s effort to understand cognition “as an act,” and Whitehead’s and Wang’s understanding of cognition “within a whole activity of living.” For Aristotle, the soul of a human being has two parts: one is irrational, and the other has rationality (NE 1102a.29–30). Please notice the change between the verbs to be and to have: one part of the soul is not rational, but it has rationality (reason), according to Aristotle. Wang is very sensitive, proposing that an understanding of cognition in the order of possessing it is a great mistake. But we think that Aristotle and Wang are using the concept of possession here in a very different way. In Aristotle, possession means that a person is the agent and—as Polo extended Aristotle—human being’s cognition enables a real knowledge of reality. This means that we can know not only characteristics of reality, but reality itself: what things are. And in this sense, Aristotle and Polo understand the Aristotelian reference on reality being possessed via persons who have and choose how to orient their reason (NE 1102a.29–30). Wang, on the other hand, rejects the term possession concerning knowledge because in his time, as later occurs in modernity, people understand possession in the way of manipulating and mastering things (which was not a relevant notion regarding the understanding of possession in the classical paradigm in philosophy). For Wang, knowledge is the same as act(ing) because via knowing we are defining what is a personal relationship by which one comes to know. We have presented how Whitehead understands knowledge. Wang and Whitehead encourage us to consider knowledge as an existential act, while Aristotle and Polo allow us to understand the moment of acting as comprising an ethical–practical being’s orienting reason to reach the knowledge of reality.

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1.4 Human freedom Freedom is another key word that needs to be explained here, since AS and IPS use it in very different ways. In AS, freedom is “mastery” (Kegan 1994), “self-determination” (Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000), or an “oblivion of the self” (Cook-Greuter 2000), as it refers to “being free of every object,” or “having a free will,” or “being free of the self.” Freedom is something that can be achieved, and something that can be possessed as one characteristic of the mature person. Kegan understands freedom as mastery, and even the same personal development as the way to reach a real and permanent freedom. In each stage, the subject makes one step forward to freedom, by mastering one domain more, one object more. Even in the last stage, the subject wants to satisfy a need to be free even from one’s own thought and mindset. At this point, it is very difficult to identify what or who the self is, because it is possible to do this neither through his body nor through his psychology. Maybe the self is recognizable in what he has done with his body, psyche, or thought. But the self is always recognizable thanks to its mastery along the entire development path, which brings it to the real and permanent freedom. So, for Kegan, freedom means to be free from everything and everyone. Ryan (1995, 2000) understands freedom as self-determination. The organism has a special goal, which is self-consistency. To reach this situation, the subject needs to fulfill, one after another, each of his necessities. Autonomy, competence, relation are the three universal psychological needs in the self (Ryan 2000). They allow him to make the way of integration that at the end is conceptualized as another need. Intrinsic motivation, internalization, and emotional integration are these requirements. When the subject has fulfilled all of these needs, the subject can regulate its behavior. And the main action of self-regulation is selfdetermination. It does not matter what the subject determines; it may seek to be independent, or the contrary. The only thing of real importance is that the subject is the only origin of the determination. So for Ryan (1995, 2000), freedom is freedom of the will. The person who has satisfied all of his/her needs has free will. This freedom can be recognized because there is no responsibility outside the autonomously acting self. Cook-Greuter (1999) understands freedom as oblivion of blurring of the self. The self in its development passes through a lot of different stages, each with various ego challenges. In this ego process, the self seems to be always the only focus of its self-reference, but at the end of the growth path it is required of one to discover that the real issue and problem of one’s life should instead be(come) to pass over one’s personal

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situation, and self-escape and vanish in a whole unity of the transpersonal– post-symbolic stages. “[P]eople at this stage are more at ease with a fluid, open-ended self-identity, that is, with ‘not-knowing’ who they are, whereas those at all earlier ego stages show stage-specific anxieties when their present self-sense becomes threatened or unclear” (1999, 236); so, for Cook-Greuter (1999) to be free means to be free from myself. Kegan (1994) critiques this last stage, but he considers it the natural consequence of his own last stage because, as he had noted, the self is free of his own thought without questions such as, “Who is (s)he then?” As noted, in AS, freedom belongs to the order of nature and so could be possessed or not, and needs to be conquered. In IPS, freedom belongs to the order of the person. Freedom is not a mere thing that can be possessed or not; instead, it means something that human beings are. Freedom has not to be conquered, but rather freedom is expressed. Polo has different conceptualizations: “freedom of,” “freedom for,” “transcendental freedom,” “native freedom,” and “freedom of destination.” Polo criticizes the modern radical—which we suggest supports AS—by asserting that it only accepts the “freedom of.” This is a real freedom, but the aspect considered in isolation with the deepest meaning of freedom can be misunderstood, and presents a lot of problems. For Polo, the main reference for understanding freedom is transcendental freedom. If this concept is clear, the rest will find its own meaning and all together will show the grandeur of the human being. Freedom, in its strong meaning, neither resides in nature nor is it something that can be achieved thanks to the intelligence or the will. That is why it is not something that can be achieved or possessed; it is not a characteristic of our way to act. Freedom has its main reference as the person’s act of being; it has to do with who the person “is” (and not with what the person “has,” or how the person acts or behaves). Freedom is not a characteristic of the intelligence or the will, because due to our being free we can think or will. The intelligence without freedom is spontaneity, and the will ends up being a whim (Polo 1988b). Freedom also has to do with our “additionality”, because the person is always safe and cannot be fixed, and also permits us an unrestricted growth. Freedom has to do with “personal love” because it allows us to offer ourselves to the intimacy meeting (Polo 1998a). This transcendental freedom is divided into “native freedom” and “destination freedom.” Native freedom means to recognize oneself in one’s originality and to accept our condition of being a child – that is, to accept me as someone created. Destination freedom is the internal calling to offer our intimacy (Polo 1995a). This allows us to make differences between “freedom from” and “freedom for.” Freedom from is

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the freedom of the modern subject’s point of view, and it is important also because the transcendental freedom catches up with our nature thanks to the activity of our intelligence and our will. And “freedom for” teaches the “freedom from” where to go and for what purpose (Polo 2007b). Rogers explains that it is indispensable to allow the person to express freely. This is usually received with fear, because people tend to think that if anyone expresses oneself freely, the monster that all of us have inside will show up and only bad things will happen. But without freedom it is impossible to understand Rogers’ therapy. Everything starts with freedom: from the very beginning, the therapist has to welcome everything from the person who is in the position of a client. If the therapist does not welcome the violence that the client wears inside him/her, it will not be possible for the client to accept that (s)he has violence inside him/her, which is something that responsible further growth will require personal responses. The therapy of Roger allows the client to reconcile with him(her)self in order to accept, and then he/she can choose how to grow. The client has to hear the voice that calls inside. Rogers notes that, when the person can express oneself freely, (s)he notices the vividness of all personal feelings that are being experienced inside and often denied or repressed. According to Rogers: “He feels loving and tender and considerate and cooperative, as well as hostile, or lustful or angry. He feels interest and zest and curiosity, as well as laziness or apathy …. His feeling when he lives closely and acceptingly with their complexity, operates in a constructive harmony rather than sweeping him into some uncontrollably evil path” (Rogers 1961, 177). This liberty of expression is grounded in respecting internal liberty to enable a deep understanding of personal identity (Rogers 1961, 17). It is via the expression of the inter-personal acceptance (Rogers 1961, 33–50) and via unconditional empathy that responsibility is made possible (Rogers 1961, 55–6). It is not a liberty (freedom) that needs to achieve several goals and actualize needs; it is not a liberty from others and from oneself that allows one a sense of power and self-liberation, a sense of mastering the world (or one’s own life being autonomously authored). It is a freedom for being who I am truly as a person, including nature and purposefully growing one’s nature (Rogers 1961, 122–3). This liberty flows more clearly in the last stage, but it is not a liberty that I have to conquer. Instead, it is a freedom for being myself. Frankl suffered an ordeal during his stay in a concentration camp; he wrote about this in his well-known book Man’s Search for Meaning (Frankl 1984a). It is obvious that, in that situation, there is nothing similar with “freedom from,” but even in conditions like this Frankl declares that everyone is free, because the human being has an “internal freedom” that

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no one can remove (Frankl 1984a, 40–41). Maybe we cannot have the opportunity to choose what to do to live our freedom—given the surrounding broader historical context—but we can choose how to live (Frankl 1984a, 40–41). This freedom does not belong to the order of needs, but to a higher level, which is a personal level (Frankl 1987, 172). The human being is free because (s)he is not determined to behave in predetermined and in concrete ways. Each human has to make a personal decision, from his/her own sense of responsibility and the meaning that ensues from it (Frankl 1987, 172). When the human being assumes the responsibility of one’s own destination is when a person is/becomes a proper human being (Frankl 1963, 94). This freedom ensures meaningful being: the freedom that Frankl assumes is not something that the human being has; it belongs to the order of being (Sellés 2015). Freedom, responsibility, and spirituality belong to the order of constitution of the human being and are not something that can be possessed or not (Frankl 1990: 77–8). The main reference for freedom is “freedom for” here too, therefore, because “[f]reedom is impossible without a destination; freedom can only be freedom for a destination” (Frankl 1963, 96). A summary of the above in reference to how AS and IPS understand the key constructs of integration, intentional purpose, cognition, and freedom has been provided above, in Table 3.

2. How other theories understand the self So far, various philosophers’ and psychologists’ works that we have found of relevance have been characterized as more congruent with either the AS or the IPS paradigm on the self and development. This systematic classification of the literature has not argued that the various authors and works are a complete and perfect fit with AS or IPS. Instead, due to the richness of their research, sources, and influences, as well as the historical context and personal experience of the classified authors, it has been noted that aspects of their work may indeed show mixed elements. But the main theory premises of these authors also allow us to argue why we suggest a fit within AS or IPS, because we show that works categorized as all fitting within AS or IPS sustain a common vision of the self, agency, and its development. In this section, we discuss a few more important works that can be possibly categorized as neither AS nor IPS with clarity and conceptual consistency. These are the theories by John Dewey, Humberto Maturana, and Francisco Varela, and also Esther Thelen and Linda B. Smith.

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Before going on, we need to remember that the contraposition between AS and IPS is theoretical. It means that they are ideal types, as Max Weber proposed (1949).3 The ideal types are difficult to find exactly in reality (e.g., a 100% selfish or 100% generous person), but they are very useful to characterize reality. So it is not strange to find other proposals that have elements of both. All of these authors make a clear critique of AS, and so we share with them this critical review. The authors we present in this section have a commonality with IPS in that they also take very seriously the concept of a system (which we presented as a basic premise of IPS). However, following a careful critical examination, we do not agree with them in the way they choose to address their difference with AS or the embracement of a systemic vision of self and growth. Our view is that, because of the background and the philosophical influences on the works of these authors, they do not consider the full dimension of the human being. In particular, they do not consider nor make central to their theory the uniqueness and personal identity and ontology of human beings. Besides this, AS and IPS have one thing in common: both talk about the self. However, the authors in this section instead put into serious question the very existence of the self, because they propose that the self is not the support and the locus of agency and intentionality. Rather, for all of the authors’ work in this section—due to the core theory premises of their models—the agent finally ends up being rather the context than the self, the person. This is not always noticeable with the first view of each of these works, though. It is the context that drives the situation of acting, growing, and learning. Also, it is clearer that neither of them recognizes a clear intentionality in the self. The self is always understood to act following some change in the environment and with the sole purpose of maintaining self-consistency. This aim of self-consistency reminds us clearly of AS. So, strangely, all of the authors of this section, in the end, fall into the trap of AS types of assumptions. The aim of self-consistency requires a strong self, and this is the main rule under which everything about being a person is submitted too. And this is due to the notion that all the theorists we critically present in this section understand the human action as a mere adaptation. So all of them have problems in understanding creativity in human beings and the possibility of bringing novelty, even in the case of some of the works that

3

The concept of “ideal type” was first developed in the paper “Objectivity in the theory of the social sciences and of social policy,” in Weber 1929.

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recognize these aspects, such as Dewey for instance. However, there is not enough support and internal coherence even in this case. Finally, the theorists’ works we present here tends to conceptualize cognition as a product that emerges from a previous activity. Hence, cognition always appears late in response to an action that responds to a change between an agent and a context.

2.1 John Dewey Our critical analysis of Dewey (1859–1952) relies on his works (Dewey 1925, 1934, 1997, 2005) and the excellent volume on Dewey’s views Experience, Nature, and Freedom edited by Richard J. Bernstein (1960). Dewey is perhaps among the most influential philosophers in the United States and his philosophy grounds American pragmatism and instrumentalism. We find that aspects of Dewey’s work support the IPS paradigm; however, important aspects of his philosophy are equally strong in their support of AS, and we will present these here. While Dewey’s philosophical influence has been huge, he has also been strongly critiqued for (a) an anti-intellectual position that only insofar as something has a practical end is this thing meaningful, valuable, or true; (b) his promoting an ethic of person primarily understood as Homo faber, constantly making and doing, and (c) de-emphasizing the more personal and profound aspects of experience in human lives (Dewey and Bernstein 1960). This, in our view, ends up reducing the person to a being of a merely adaptive nature, and that is not consistent with IPS’s and Aristotle’s deeper understanding of nature’s radical. In his early works, by 1903 (the date he publishes his work on logic as the science of inquiry in logical theory) Dewey has been largely influenced by Hegel’s organic unity with “its synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, (thought and reality) … operating as a release, a liberation” (xxi). Dewey’s Hegelian influence phase made him confident that Hegel’s organic unity would be the basis for the destruction of all philosophical dualisms in the spirit of progress. On this basis, the young Dewey opined that “experience is realistic, not abstract. Physical life is the fullest manifestation. The New Psychology … wants the logic of facts” (Dewey and Bernstein 1960). In this way, Dewey conceptualizes the world in the same materialistic view as Dennett: “Dewey and Dennett both seem to agree that there is no real accounting for the transition from inorganic to organic entities. The emergence of the organism is simply a product of random juxtapositions” (Frisina 2002, 57). We find this limited and insufficient.

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His second and most popular work phase lasts from 1903 to 1925, when Dewey develops his famous educational and social philosophy. He critiques the easygoing approach to education and classical liberalism more broadly, arguing for the importance of deliberate direction and firm guidance, and order. On intelligence, he posits that human beings as a species are not naturally gifted with intelligence, so society and education should develop “the proper use of intelligence … to come to grips with the complex pressing problems” in the contemporary life-world and secure values “which make life worth living” (xvi). However, Dewey believes, “man is not naturally intelligent or rational. Intelligence is not a faculty of the mind which can be exercised at will. It consists of a set of habits and dispositions, which, like a tender plant, need to be carefully and deliberately cultivated, for otherwise it will wither away” (Dewey and Bernstein 1960, x). Here, regarding habits, it should be noted that Dewey opines that under habitual human functioning there is no experience, and only insofar as a process is introduced to break a habit, and a new one experience emerges. We partly disagree with Dewey here in the formulation of IPS because, paying attention to Aristotle (NE 1144b. 25– 30), the habit exists because virtue happens through the activity of reason and also implies all dimensions of being, because, in fact, it is a mode of being. And taking Polo into account, we also reject Dewey’s proposal about habit because habits help us to maintain and to improve the better/good experience (Murillo 2001). We think that Dewey has a very reductive and perhaps poor vision of what the habit is. This is, in our view, because Dewey follows Williams James’ thought about the notion of habit in human life, rather than its original understanding in Aristotle (Gómez Tolón 1999). Dewey’s argument continues to defend the important role theorists think intelligence has for securing a democratic society and his openly critical view (in the Child and the Curriculum in 1902, Dewey 1990) of the child(student)-centric view of education on the basis that it defends an empty concept of human development. Dewey posits that education must be a deliberate reconstruction of experience, while he opines that education aims are to create intelligent habits and, more precisely, the dispositions for inquiry. Regarding his thesis and work on education, Dewey’s analysis emphasizes rule-based development on helping young persons judge well what to value and how to do so in practical contexts. His work considers the role of community and education, as the normative rule-governing aspects of behavior are reproduced and transmitted via the community, in the existing social environment. This is why his critics accuse his work of

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being inspired by an ethic of adaptation and adjustment to the existing social environment. In this respect, we are in agreement with this critique of Dewey that it is not consistent with IPS, since Dewey’s answer to whether virtue can be taught is that it can and it ought to be, by developing the personal and social dispositions required as the basis for each person to arrive at intelligent, moral judgments (this links back to the importance he places on teaching and developing intelligence). We think this is also not consistent with Aristotle, for whom virtues are neither freely chosen by autonomous individuals independently of context, nor are they transmittable from the external context to the person; they are primarily internal disposition (NE 1106a.5–10). At the same time, this is bridging personal and communal realms together. However, experts on his work strongly deny this critique (Dewey and Bernstein 1960: xii–xiv) on the basis that, instead, it is a steady concern in Dewey’s work that the natural tendency of existing institutional order is to make man become a passively adaptive creature without freedom gradually. Based on this, it is argued (Dewey and Bernstein 1960) that Dewey’s idea is that human beings must reform and change institutions to become more consistent with ideal values. Hence the school should look like an ideal society and provide students with the instruments they need for effective self-directed adaptation to the social conditions. In line with his theory of education and knowledge, Dewey (1997) later emphasizes training methods such as inductive and deductive logic, abstract and concrete thinking, interpretation of facts, activity and role playing, language, and observation. Dewey’s theory on knowing and valuation is also produced during this second period, which includes Studies in Logical Theory (1903) and his later theory of inquiry published as part of his mature works (1938, 2013). For him, the foundation of knowledge and knowing it is not absolutely certain, but rather the hypothetical character, founded upon experimental science’s actively manipulating phenomena in the empirical object world to produce knowledge. Dewey’s understanding of reflective experiencing is understood as a logical process that disrupts the continuity of our nonreflective experiences (any other experience that does not entail inquiry). He conceptualizes accordingly five key milestones, starting with a felt tension, or difficulty arising that Dewey unfortunately understands and resolves in an adaptive–mechanical way that is consistent with his transactional view of human beings and experiences. But it is inconsistent with the importance of relationality and systemic growth in IPS. For Dewey, this means that an experience of reflective nature happens only when a conflict—a discrepancy, a tension—within the rest of the

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experience occurs (Dewey and Bernstein 1960). A reflective experience whereby the equilibrium of human organism is disturbed ends when there is a re-establishment of a new equilibrium based on how observation and experimenting allow one to accept or reject what disrupted the continuity of non-reflective experiencing. Regarding this, we find that Dewey’s philosophical background influences on the human being, inquiry, and the “new” problematic are narrowly focused on adaptation, which subsequently offers a narrow and reductive understanding of change and growth in human beings and collectives. Besides, it does not understand sufficiently the role of the entire human organism as a unity with a past– present–future identity and how it may not be possible for human beings to go ahead solving a conflict (of identity or conflict situation) experienced from within a current delimiting experience of this conflict. Such a resolution of conflict may be superficial and offer only “quick” fixes rather than real personal growth and progress. We posit consistently with IPS that any current experience of conflict cannot be meaningfully transcended and resolved sustainably unless a person deeply accepts one’s unique past and present identity. Therefore, we believe the axiomatic position of Dewey that the resolution and the locus of inquiry (and its potential chances for resolution) in fairly any conflict experience is delimiting and reductive. Instead, we put forward congruently, with how we conceptualize the inter-processual self, that a decision to move forwards in human beings is not of this nature. However, it should be noted here in defense of Dewey that his empiricism is non-reductive because his work promotes the idea of types of inquiry such as Aristotle’s “different subject matters.” But we believe, given our above critique, this answer by Dewey and Bernstein (1960) is not sufficient and not be fully relevant to the concern we express. Regarding valuing and valuation, Dewey emphasizes the types of experiencing whereby we value directly, in immediacy, by enjoying or praising something or not; as opposed to the more abstract belief or value judgments we hold. Dewey’s valuing arises via conflict and is analogous to the scientific judgment in the context of knowledge and inquiry. So, Dewey’s pragmatism emphasizes activity in both scientific and moral inquiry, as noted by Dewey and Bernstein (1960). One great contribution of Dewey that we recognize is that his thinking dethrones cognition in experience; he highlights emotions without denying some participation of cognition in experience. But Dewey ignores that beliefs are also present in experience, as we think they are. We also disagree with Dewey that the ontological value of the things is not relational, as we lay the foundations

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of IPS in process experiencing and relational ontological assumptions of things and what it means to be human. At the heart of Dewey’s theory thesis is his comprehensive work on experience and nature, produced in 1925, during his most important philosophical work phase laying all core presuppositions for his entire work. We agree with how Dewey’s new empiricism understands the experience and we agree on the value of Dewey’s emphasis on direct and present experience because this breaks the “regulatory” paradigm, understanding experience as a whole, by the person as a whole. Specifically, that experience designates how an organism interacts with its environment in both temporal and spatial dimensions, and involves more than knowing. Of course, Dewey further notes that he understands this organic interaction as a transaction (Dewey 1925). The transaction is understood in contrast to self-action and an inter-action. We also agree that it is a single unity of experiencing the connection between how experiencing happens and what is experienced. Each experience is each experience, in its concreteness and in the meaning it has within each person’s own unique identity and life. This is important in IPS presupposition, and Dewey indeed notes, “an experience has unity … constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience” (1934, 40). However, in IPS we do not understand emotions as something that makes the unity of experience. Therefore, regarding Dewey’s thinking that “emotions are attached to events and objects in their moment” (1934, 40) while “primary emotions … qualify the experience as a unity” (1934, 44), our suggestion—in the basic assumptions of IPS—is that emotions in IPS are an effect instead of a cause. So here there is some agreement with Dewey’s points above, but looking deeper we have clear disagreements. Moreover, we agree that (c) experience contains genuine connections of existential nature within itself (in agreement with James and also Whitehead). Regarding these axioms of Dewey (1925), we think that, in how he understands experience, he is congruent with Greek philosophy’s authentic appreciation of direct experiencing that portrays the Greek enlightened naturalism understanding human beings as part of nature whereby also for Dewey “moral and political concerns are not an intrusion into nature but continuous with it” (Dewey and Bernstein 1960: xxxix). We also are not in agreement with Dewey’s axiom that (d) experience is something separate from thought and something different from reason. We think that without cognition experience is not possible, at least human experience. So cognition is present in experience in our view, but cognition is not all the experience. On the contrary, Dewey does not

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oppose that cognition is present during all experience (Dewey and Bernstein 1960). There are contradictions in Dewey regarding cognition. He opposes that cognition is substantial among drivers of the experience, which breaks the dominant view that experience happens under the domination of cognition. Dewey would accept that some form of cognition is present in some way in experience since the experience has an internal unity (Dewey 1934), but he is imprecise and does not focus on cognition directly. In The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism, we read: “Perhaps some reader may now object that as matter of fact the entire experience is cognitive, but that the earlier parts of it are only imperfectly so, resulting in a phenomenon which is not real; while the latter part, being a more complete cognition, results in what is relatively, at least, more” (1905, 395). Importantly, as noted in the IPS conceptualization earlier, we agree with Dewey that subject–object is not a prerequisite of experience, but an emergent conceptualization that comes later. However, we disagree with him on the passive aspect of the experience. We think that, regarding this point, Dewey is not considering sufficiently the intentionality of the agent. We find other core premises of Dewey’s thought problematic as they involve problems we mentioned earlier. We think it is a problem that Dewey posits it is “difficult to know what would not be experience” (Dewey and Bernstein 1960, xxxvii), as this means all is experience but that “there is no experience in repetition (1934, 46). This is due to his conception of the habit that we critiqued earlier. We also disagree in that emotions are automatic reflexes, as Dewey argues—even if he agrees that emotions are “attached to events and objects in their movement. […] To become emotional, they must become parts of an inclusive and enduring situation that involves concern for objects and their issues. The jump or fright becomes emotional fear when there is found or thought to exist a threatening object that must be dealt with or escaped from” (1934, 48, 49). Although we do not have any issues with Dewey’s thinking of inquiry as about envisioning future possibilities, we are critical of the mechanical adaptation inspired by the process of inquiry, as a process that “continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close” (1934, 48). We see this as very delimiting for both the human beings and how they interact and relate, and we note that Dewey does not understand that growth and the production of newness by a person cannot go ahead without accepting fully one’s past and present identities, while a decision to move forward resolving the conflict the inquiry poses cannot just happen from within a conflict experience. Dewey considers that the human being can create something

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new when the equilibrium from resolving a conflict situation is recovered. But he does not explain what is so special and different in the human beings, as opposed to other organic species, that allows us to do this. We think that there is an inconsistent point in his thought, specifically where he affirms that no material aspects of human being emerge from the material, while at the same time he posits that immaterial aspects of human beings cannot be reduced to the material (Frisina 2002, 101–22). The main focus on the social and public aspects of experience in Dewey has been attacked as evidencing a failure to account for and theorize on the importance of personal and private aspects of experience. So Dewey is in some ways consistent with IPS and in others ways consistent with AS, we think, and therefore we cannot classify him as either to pay dues to Dewey. However, one aspect that drives us to consider that Dewey fits better with AS is his circular notion of change and experience. The circle in Dewey consists of habit, experience that breaks the habit, and the equilibrium, followed by inquiry process to recover the equilibrium (Dewey and Bernstein 1960). This recalls the strong AS focus in the subject’s self-constitution. Something that helps explain how we think Dewey fits better in AS is the materialism and the focus of recovering of equilibrium and self-constitution in his thought, therefore. Despite the fact that Dewey’s thought is not far from the position of Whitehead—who, however, we have taken as one of the philosophers of IPS—Dewey’s overall weak consideration of human relationships prevents us from using his work as a conceptual pillar of IPS. Instead, Whitehead’s work in conceptualizing his principle of maximization of experiencing, and his consideration of intentionality, justify our assertion that Whitehead is a better foundation for IPS than Dewey. Moreover, Whitehead is seriously considering the open interest of human beings as a foundational assumption of his theory. Whitehead also considers that the act is a personal act over the relationships; it is what makes a clearer consciousness that our relations have one effect over our self-constitution. Whitehead also has a clear assumption that human beings have one non-material part, and that it is not understood as something that has happened due to a statistical combination of material parts, but thanks to the development of the person as a unity of a transcendental nature. This justifies consideration of Whitehead as one of the foundational thinkers of the IPS paradigm. However, as the primary foundational works for IPS are Aristotle, Polo, and Wang, Whitehead’s contribution has to be critically integrated with the other philosophers of IPS. Whitehead’s main statement of “maximization of experience” is more the self-constitution of a subject or the reductive mechanical understanding of change as an adaptive

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process of recovering an equilibrium. This formulation leaves the door open to a higher meaning of what can be understood with Whitehead’s maximization. We have to remember that, in IPS, growth is unrestricted. In fact, Whitehead’s circle is not equilibrium–equilibrium broken– equilibrium recovered, as for Dewey. The circle of Whitehead is founded as expectation–new expectation, which is more open, and is congruent with the understanding of the human being and development as free and open systems, as noted.

2.2 Dynamic Systems Approach Throughout this book, we have presented the human being as a system, and specifically as one kind of system: open and free. The proper way to understand the human being is as a dynamic integrity (Polo 2007b, 47). So, it is clear that the words “system” and “dynamic” are very important references for our proposal. With these precedents, it would be a normal conclusion that we are thinking along the same lines as the “dynamic systems approach.” The theory of dynamic systems started in the second part of the twentieth century. It shows the greatest development in the fields of mathematics, physics, and engineering, and may be understood in several ways (Schwaninger 2009). We are going to focus on the application that this theory has had in the field of human development. Specifically, we intend to center our discussion on Esther Thelen and Linda Smith’s A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action (Thelen and Smith 1994), referencing it as “dynamic systems approach” as it were only one theory. The reason why we compare our proposal with the dynamic systems approach is that, as in the case of Dewey, sometimes, as we will see later, the insights of Maturana and Varela could be closer to AS, whereas in other moments, they are closer to IPS. We think that, in fact, these insights resemble neither AS nor IPS because the self is understood differently. The one thing AS and IPS have in common is that they both try to grasp the self. AS understands the self as a subject, whereas IPS understands the self as a person. But, as we are going to see, the theory of dynamic systems approach ends up discarding the self in the context. To clarify this book’s proposal, we discuss the theory of dynamic systems approach to reveal the differences between them. For Polo, the person is an open and free system. The dynamic systems approach presents differences between closed and open systems, but it does not consider free systems. It rejects the comprehension of domains (Thelen and Smith 1994), something that, in IPS, we have done as well.

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And even when the approach is focused on children, it is important to consider it in this book, which seeks to offer a proposal for every moment of life. We are interested not in what is written specifically about children, but in the dynamic through which they understand development. This dynamic is the same for children and adults, since the systemic reality is applied to every moment of life. It is very important to consider the way the body is understood in relation with its environment, because this is something that happens both in childhood and in adult life. Several pieces of research support the idea that the way we use our cognition is rooted in our body; this interrelation can be discovered not only by children but also by adults because the underlying dynamic is the same (Kontra, GoldinMeadow, and Beilock 2012). For this reason, we think that to speak of systemic reality is not a matter of age, but of human nature, which is systemic. Considering this, we will make a comparison between our proposal— IPS—and dynamic systems approach. We will show how our ways of understanding cognition, development, and identity are very different. But at the same time, we will bear in mind that the underlying content of dynamic systems and IPS is the same. We should take into account that this theory is in its first stages (Thelen and Smith 1994, 50), and some authors consider it a “conceptual metaphor” more than a theory of development (Holt 1997). Consequently, we are interested in comparing the ways in which each system works, but not in their conclusions, because their starting assumptions are very distinct. Any system can be seen as insufficient to constitute itself; and this failure of a system to establish itself as such can be shown from different disciplines including quantum physics, mathematics, neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy (Orón and Sanchez-Cañizares 2017). Any system calls for an extra-system, and only from that extra-system can the system be constituted. Every system needs extra-systemic assumptions, defined from outside the system. “Without the extra-systemic consideration, the studio system is meaningless, because the same system claims assumptions … knowledge of the extra-system is necessary to know the system” (Orón and Sánchez-Cañizares 2017, 617). The theory of systems, as it has been presented in several places (Cocchi et al. 2013; Smith 2005; Thelen and Smith 1994), is very useful for this book, but we have a clear disagreement with the extra-systems assumptions of the dynamic systems approach. From Polo’s transcendental anthropology, we disagree with the dynamic system definition of the element of any system’s only taking in account material aspects of the human being. We also disagree with the idea that the system could be understood without a

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reference to the extra-system, since, as Wang explains, it is not possible to understand one being outside of everything that exists. Aspects of the dynamic systems approach that are useful for IPS Now we present some points from dynamic systems that are important to our IPS model. We should warn that, for this book, it is not possible to make an exhaustive revision of dynamic systems theory. Instead, we will focus on what we consider important to better explain the IPS model. Regarding emotion, the dynamic systems approach involves the idea that emotional reality co-exists in relation with, and with bi-directional influences in, other aspects of human development, such as perception, body, cognition, or personality. We hold the same position in our chapter on emotion education. The way to explain this co-existence in dynamic systems is through the concept of causal circularity. Dynamic systems models critique the neurobiologist statement because the dynamic systems approach rejects the idea that human development is due to brain maturation. They accuse neurobiologists of supporting a very reductive way to understand the complexity of human development, because they try to explain development focusing only on one of the variables. Lewis (2005) supports this claim and looks over the same neuro-scientific research to show the multiple interactions. Theory of systems is congruent with our definition of integration, which entails “a maturation in which different aspects and relations differentiate and optimize to the same extent that they place themselves in a relationship with one another” (Camras 2011, 142). Dynamic systems approach ventures: “the data suggest that as development proceeds, infant responses become differentiated and their integration during an emotion episode will reflect contextual factors as much as the identity of the emotion” (Camras 2011, 142). Differentiation and integration are not only simultaneous, but they are also the process of growth. They happen at every level or aspect of human growth, which means that emotional growth happens thanks to the relationship with cognition growth and body growth. And the same could be said for the others. The co-growth is growth; for instance, motor development and perception are internally related because the growth of one of them is due to the growth of the other. And growth is always open in the sense that the same growth allows one to grow more. So growth happens via numerous repetitive and interactive cycles (Thelen and Smith 1994, 207–8). Dynamic systems are also helpful for the consideration of cognition. This theory rejects the notion that the formation of cognition is

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autonomous from other aspects of human growth (Smith 2005), which is consistent with our IPS model. There is a “corporealization cognition”— that is, intelligence arises from the interaction of an organism with the environment as a result of the sensory–motor activity. A triangle between cognition, body, and environment is present in action. It is this act that awakens growth (Smith 2005); this would be in line with our proposal, if it were not for the way Thelen and Smith (1996, 1998) understand the emergency, as we will see. Consideration of emergency leads Thelen and Smith to understand that cognition is an emergent product of intelligence. This arises in the inter-phase between the body and the world (Smith 2005) that is contradictory to ours. We think that it is one thing to define the context of the intellectual act, and another to say that intelligence is an emergent product of interaction. They do not understand cognition as an act, as Aristotle and Polo do. But, of course, it is helpful to show the context in which the cognitive act is given. Thelen and Smith also show that cognition is neither fixed nor static, but dynamic. This is because cognition is closely linked to experience, which by definition is spatial–temporal. Every experience changes the cognitive act (a new experience corresponds to a new concept) and, because of that, dynamic systems criticizes Piaget, who attributed to the child a theoretical conceptualization process, which is not necessary to understand his behavior. As Piaget opines that the child cannot make associations of a concept to an object, systems theory understands that the child cannot make the association between motor sequence and order without appealing to the conceptualization (Smith 2005). We approve of introducing physicality and the environment to show that the object is in the child’s experiencing of the object in one place and time. We find that a success in these works is that physicality and the environment are introduced, which shows that the object is in the child’s experience-theobject-in-one-place-and-time. But what does not seem justified is what is being denied (not acknowledged), which is that, at the same time, these above ideas are introduced as a cognitive act. We are also interested in their criticism of genetic determinism and reflection processes. They understand that these are not sufficient to explain human behavior. The authors studied the process that allows the child to walk, and concluded that this was a mere maturation process of the brain, however impossible to understand without considering the systemic reality, where events such as walking are attributed not to simple maturity but to multiple concurrences of interdependent elements (Kamm, Thelen, and Jensen 1990; Thelen and Smith 1994). This study helps us to realize that it is not possible to study analytically—instead of

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systemically—even a basic process, even more so in the case of more elaborated processes, such as the emotional maturation working thesis. Another focal point involves understanding that human development can be both linear and non-linear, quantitative and qualitative; it is needless to deny any possibilities. Since everything has its place as contexts, and changes made in development are not irreversible, we should reject a rigid conception of growth (Thelen and Smith 1994). Also, we should not consider that the “data” are something that comes from outside. Information is both interior and exterior to the body (Thelen and Smith 1994, xvi); this requires a joint consideration of what happens “inside” and “outside” the person at the same time. Therefore, they support our position that the person lives through a process of global events, not within domains. Dynamic systems are also helpful for understanding the alternative to regulation. The classical view of regulation rests on the idea that cognition inhibits emotions so that the person can act rationally. In dynamic systems (Thelen and Smith 1994, 308), the aim is to transcend the understanding of the neural inhibition level so that behavioral inhibition is not explained simply by appealing to the neural inhibition. Behavioral inhibition is an emergent property of the formation of attractors. Therefore, inhibition is a result of the system’s growth, and it occurs by the dominance of an attractor over another. An attractor can inhibit another when they are sufficiently separated. Inhibition is understood as a result of growth and maturation of the person. This idea—of competition between attractors— is not the regular way in which we understand the alternative to emotional regulation, but we find very useful the idea that inhibition is indeed a system growth. That is, it would no longer be a part of what regulates or controls another; it is to be understood as a change in the overall situation of the system. Moving from one developmental stage to another is achieved by a change of the whole system, and not for control. Systems theory argues that a change in any component leads to a change in the whole system and therefore cannot accept a regulatory vision in which a party, the stable element, controls the one that has been destabilized, because both of them change in the growth of the system. Some key concepts of the theory of dynamic systems Here we will not explain the whole theory, but just some elements needed to understand our proposal. A key concept is that of “attractors,” or preferred combinations, which are relatively stable but may have some degree of variability that depends on contextual factors and initial

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conditions. These are self-organized attractors (Camras 2011). Attractors are not things, but groups of neural activity trajectories over time (Thelen and Smith 1994, 217). Another concept is “phase change,” or qualitative changes in an organizational pattern to another, for example, a change from walking to running (Camras 2011). Systems are sensitive to the control-parameters that allow switching between states. Without them, there would be no change in the system. An example would be the parameter control child’s weight: unless the child reaches a certain weight, he will not begin to walk, even if he had perfectly developed muscular fitness and walking ability (Thelen and Smith 1994, 50–69). So Thelen and Smith explain growth as a result of a multiple occurrences of these— and other—elements that make degrees of freedom (possible evolution) definable in one way or another. Thelen and Smith distinguish between closed and open systems (1994, 51–69). Dynamic systems are far from functioning with the paradigm of “equilibrium.” Instead of balance, the authors speak of “coordination system,” understood as a requirement of the system itself. Coordination is given by how energy flows in the system. Thus, a system is in equilibrium when energy is evenly distributed at a particular time, and there is no flow from one region to another. Balance serves to explain the closed system, wherein different situations are the attractors’ balance system bearing one position to another. But an open system does not meet the law of equilibrium, as is the case of all biological systems. As open systems, the law of equilibrium does not govern them, violating the second law of thermodynamics. With the open system, complexity bestows the ability to selforganize—characterized by non-linearity, non-uniformity, and dynamic dissipative energy—which is the opposite of thermodynamic equilibrium. This capacity means that, given enough energy, new structures emerge as an effect of self-organization. Behavioral changes are also understood as effects of energy cooperation. Self-organization of the various energies leads not only to behavior change but also to the management of the multiple parameters. The various possible forms of self-organizing energy form different system states. A state of the system can absorb another system status and thus affect (reduce or increase) the degrees of freedom of the system. The degrees of freedom allow the possibility of different paths that may occur in the future—that is, alternative developments (Thelen and Smith 1994, 51–69).

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Criticism of the theory of dynamic systems We have already mentioned that our main disagreement with the dynamic systems approach lies in the definition of the system’s starting-up elements, made from the extra-system. The extra-system, in our case, is our preconception of what the person is, and her development. One of the approach’s several unjustified starting points is materialism. Materialism states that the systemic understanding of human reality can be a result of chemical reactions, and their evolution. What changes when discussing the human being is the “substrate material,” not only chemistry (Thelen and Smith 1994, 49). However, why is a non-substrate material rejected? The fundamental aim is to abolish the dualities of dynamic systems (Camras 2011), but by doing this, it suppresses everything that is not material, such as spiritual and psychic realities. However, to overcome dualism by denying human complexity is not an acceptable solution. All the theories examined in this section indicate a realization that the mere concurrence of various elements is not enough for growth to occur. Whereas it is true that the presence of all the elements is required to change the system, their mere appearance is not enough. More is required (Camras 2011). The problem lies in how systems theory understands that “more.” For systems theory, that “more” is the concept of emergence, a system property. Emergence involves temporary but coherent new forms, through ongoing processes (Smith 2005). This is an elusive definition as defined by its effects, and it is unclear which entity is something “more.” That “more” is not another element, but it seems that it is the same operation. If, on the one hand, emergence is the result, and on the other hand, we know that the sum of elements does not cause the operation, then who or what is working? The emergence causes itself, as the emergence taking place is the cause of the emergence–effect. But, can it be both a cause and an effect? We think that the consistency claimed for the system is necessary, but not sufficient. The distinction between necessary and sufficient is present in the term “precursor.” Interestingly, this does not concur with genetic determinism and the consideration that reflex movements can explain that a child walks. These are rejected because the reflex movements are just “precursors”, and not enough. There will be sufficiency when experiences and environment are placed such that they concern other human elements (Kamm, Thelen, and Jensen, 1990). This new element’s “experiences and environment” could also be described as “precursors.” This is because other elements such as cognition, intentionality, agency, or a rating system

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are missing; they are absent because cognition, intentionality, and agency are not being considered inside the experience (the act of experiencing). The appeal to energy is also confusing and inaccurate. Increased energy leads to the generation of new structures. And what is the source of that energy? Does it come from the current process? Can the functioning of what is generating create a qualitatively different structure? To Thelen and Smith, mental life is continuous with biological growth (1994, xii). Knowledge is an activity pattern over time (Thelen and Smith 1994, 39), and that pattern will be stable while nothing is broken. This is reminiscent of Dewey and his consideration of what is the experience and habit (Dewey 1934; Gómez Tolón 1999). In dynamic cognition systems, we have asserted it is a mere product of emergence. Cognition emerges in development through repeated cycles of perception–action–perception (Thelen and Smith 1994, 129). Product condition is evident once one understands that knowledge is a product of dynamic systems and not a causal prerequisite (Thelen and Smith 1994, 310). Cognitive time for Thelen and Smith is reduced to a point where it brings forth consistency. Thelen and Smith propose that such consistency is not only a result of a cognitive exercise but also depends on the experience that is being lived. That consistent time seeks to understand—describe— and so the world becomes a prediction about the future (Thelen and Smith 1994, 180–81). Consistent patterns that emerge, and serve as predictors, have been linked to cognition. But neither the pattern nor what is the pattern in cognition is explained; even what appears is confused. For Thelen and Smith, perception, action, and cognition are rooted in the same dynamic patternformation processes. The patterns are reflections of the experience of acting and perceiving the world (Thelen and Smith 1994, 161). Pattern and cognition end up being the same, since knowledge is a path-dependent activity involving the past and the present situation (Thelen and Smith 1994, 222). Also, if the patterns are associated with cognition, then the global context is the pattern of activity in real-time systems, a particular time and re-entry (Thelen and Smith 1994, 216). Then: pattern = cognition = context. Everything ends up being the same. In principle, Thelen and Smith understand that a design or teleology does not guide development, but it is resolved in the interaction (Thelen and Smith 1994, xv). Development is the same as self-organization: it is the result of processes of self-organization of the continued activity of living systems (Thelen and Smith 1994, 44). We might ask who directs growth, since on the one hand teleology is denied, and on the other hand self-constitution once achieved does not need more development. Systems theory states that the solution is the appearance of problems that require

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development, since the body has to solve the problems with the criterion of self-constitution. In development and evolution, changes consist of series of invented solutions that work. So the organism acquires some skills, objectives, and history (Thelen and Smith 1994, 145). This recalls Dewey, pointing to the habit of “mechanical repetition” and the disruption of habits when one starts a new path. When breaking the habit, the break becomes a growth momentum. So the nature that human beings endow with habits, intended as mechanical repetition, is the very nature that breaks habits (Gómez Tolón 1999). The dynamic systems approach claims that open systems do not work under the balancing test because they do it with self-organization, but what does not seem clear is that self-organization is distinct from equilibrium. This leads directly to the next discrepancy. For dynamic systems, there is no agent. No agent but multi-modal correspondence is the cause of development, rather than a product of development (Thelen and Smith 1994, 187). Nor is there any agent or any hierarchy, or plan, or program. Consistency is generated only by the relationships between the components and the constraints and opportunities offered by the environment. This implies that no causal element has priority (Smith 2005). The agent ends up being the same context. The context comes to “select,” “do,” and “adapt” the global order, and also knowledge (Thelen and Smith 1994, 216). All these verbs are attributed to the context. Therefore, the global context is the pattern of activity in real time and with multiple re-entries (Thelen and Smith 1994, 216). In the absence of an agent, the locus of control is neither outside nor inside. The locus of control resides in both the message from the genes and patterns created through those messages (Thelen and Smith 1994, 156). So, we think that the theory of dynamical systems converts the context in the agent. The agent is not a person. Also, proponents of the dynamic systems approach reject intentionality because if there is no agent, there can be no intentionality. The rejection of intentionality and hierarchical organization is emphatic, for example, in explaining how a child learns to walk (Heriza 1991; Kamm, Thelen, and Jensen 1990). Other studies look to something like intentionality in the behavior of the mother who favors development (Cerezo, Trenado, and Pons-Salvador 2012). But, as usual, the social does not have much presence in dynamic systems, beyond recognizing that everything is social (Thelen and Smith 1994, 320–30). In fact, when they focus on cognition, authors offer a complete explanation without giving a particular value to the social relation (as shown in Smith 2005). In overturning cognition,

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agent, intentionality, and teleology it is normal not to know free systems; there is no freedom because there is no place to go.

2.3 Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela The collaborative work of Humberto Maturana (1928–) and Francisco Varela (1946–2001) challenges fundamental taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of cognition, its relation to experience and reality, and the related ethical implications relevant to what it is to be human and ethical pertinent prerogatives to human agency. They propose a theoretical understanding of cognition as embodied action. This intellectual project aims to bring forth a theoretical understanding of cognition and experience, with the purpose to bridge—in intellectual terms—Buddhism and its inspired meditative psychology with a less scientific view of cognitive science (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Their work (Maturana 1970, 1975; Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991) comprises an original synthetic approach encompassing philosophy, cognitive science, neurobiology, and a theory of experience and human consciousness (Dennett 1993; Hallowell 2009). Their project aims to enhance the natural abilities and the ethical imperatives for empathy and love in how human beings act and respond to the world. Therefore, the work of Maturana and Varela is driven by the noble and correct intention to understand cognition in a way that convinces people to logically intend to act with care and ethical sensitivity to promote the survival and the positive evolution of our common species. We find this an important, but also a controversial, project. Here we proceed with a short presentation of each theorist and their combined work, and our critical evaluation of this theory according to our theory of IPS, and how it differs from AS. We also show why we consider this model clearly classified as neither AS nor IPS. This theory reminds us strangely of the Kantian premise regarding agency tied to rational intent and the concept of self-constitution in Korsgaard. Humberto Maturana represents the biological theory school on cognition. His research (1970, 1975) aims to discover and theorize on universal pattern(s) of organization characterizing all the living systems, explaining their difference from all other physical systems that are nonliving. He suggests that the nervous system of all living organisms and systems is circular, enabling a circular spiral process of self-making. He calls this specific kind of universal growth pattern, autopoiesis. Therefore, the emphasis here is on the “self-referential and self-organizing nature of

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the network of production processes that produce and transform one another in a continual process of self-making” (Kolb 2015, 62). This presupposes a definition of a circular, albeit clear, boundary that allows each living system to autonomously define, shape, and maintain its preferred relationship with the world, or the notion of system closure (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). So in this theory, the first step is to create the boundary between subject and no-subject (= object). This notion of autonomous self recalls the AS approach to the mastery of the world and how a subject relates to others, and therefore it is not congruent with IPS. Indeed, evidence of the closeness lies in Ryan and Deci’s suggesting that autopoiesis is a foundational basis of an autonomous self and its integrative dynamics: “It is this organisational tendency that in evolutionary perspective represents the deep structure on which the sense of self and autonomy in humans is built” (Ryan and Deci 2004, 471). Francisco Varela’s “enactive” approach to cognition emphasizes a conviction that cognition is not a pre-existent world’s representation by a pre-existent mind. Cognition is rather theorized as the ongoing enactment between the mind and the world based on a history and the action response variety performed by living beings (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Varela’s approach to cognition proposes a more “holistic” view of cognition, an anti-thesis of cognitivist view in cognitive science. Cognitivism understands the mind as a device with input–output functions and also serves to critique Daniel Dennett’s ideas. For example, Varela posits that the basis of the argument is that notions such as cognitive structures—and explicitly knowing, believing, and desiring—are presupposed in our self-understanding and psychological theory more broadly, and this is not a clear argument (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 12). As Whitehead thinks, it is difficult to admit that cognition or mind simply emerge from randomness (Frisina 2002, 57), because if there is no cognition and no mind from the very beginning, the activity is only a random combination of possibilities. This is also proposed by Dennett (Frisina 2002, 57). In Whitehead’s mentality, there is no room for sequentialism (i.e., causality chains); the proposal is entirely systemic, and the process involves improving (for an excellent review of his proposal, see Kraus 1998). Whitehead’s alternative proposal corresponds to the organism (Whitehead 1925). This work is an attempted synthesis of cognitive science and the theory of experience. It attempts to synthesize the work of Merleau-Ponty with Buddhist mindfulness psychology and related meditation doctrines. Regarding how we critically situate IPS vis-à-vis this project, the following can be observed. First, Varela and colleagues (1991) are

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inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of lived experience and the understanding of human experience as both transcendental (with which we agree in IPS) and intentional. Regarding this, however, the notion of intentionality differs from how it is understood in IPS. Intentionality here is inspired by Brentano’s understanding of intentionality as a necessary “direction toward an object” inherent in all mental states in their separate functioning. This is close to the subject–object understanding of intentionality with which we disagree. Varela and colleagues’ way of understanding intentionality is derived from their starting point of aiming towards autopoiesis. The autopoiesis also assumes self-constitution as the goal and as a need. So the intentionality is practically and functionally focused, and thus the only option is a single object focus. And the same happens with cognition. Also, there is a single focus in problem solving to achieve the object–goal. Any kind of intentionality that assumes the creative and free calling of the being “who I am” is rejected as irrelevant, and we also believe that the different needs and calls cannot be separated from them because in system mentality everything is defined by the internal relationship. In other words, we are assuming that human being is an organism and not a sequential mechanism in which the parts can be defined independently and can even operate independently too. Second, Varela and colleagues (1991) attempt to synthesize Buddhist doctrines within their model of human cognition and in particular the noself and that of non-dualism in its expression as a “middle way” in the Buddhist philosophy of Nagarjuna. This idea is not in agreement with IPS, as its response to AS (and mainstream cognitive science) notion of modular and “fragmented” self is the abolition of the self. However, it is equally inconsistent with AS’s main theory premise that accepts the fragmented and multiple selves. The notion of embodiment in this work defends a (distinctly Buddhist) idea of a selfless mindfulness proposing that the tension between a fragmented self and a no-self is indeed solvable once being in the world is understood as “inseparable from our bodies, our language and our social and cultural history, in short our embodiment” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 149). In relevance to these points, we think that when Maturana and Varela are discussing the system they are thinking only in terms of closed systems and they do not know (or recognize) that there are other kinds of systems with the characteristics of being open and free. And to be aware that the closed system interacts with another closed system is not enough to recognize the system as an open system. Evidence that their definition of system fits very well with closed systems is, for instance, the claim that “the living organization can only be characterized unambiguously by specifying the

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network of interactions of components which constitute a living system as a whole, that is, as a ‘unity’” (Valera, Maturana, and Uribe 1974, 187). So it is normal that the focus here is how to preserve the unity. To do this, they assume that the system has one domain, and it aims at self-regulation: “Thus an autopoietic system has a domain in which it can compensate for perturbations through the realization of its autopoiesis, and in this domain it remains a unity” (Valera, Maturana, and Uribe 1974, 188). And it is very clear that, for their notion of development, it is not necessary to understand the system. It is a secondary phenomenon that adds nothing: “We also claim that all biological phenomenology, including reproduction and evolution, is secondary to the establishment of this unitary organization” (Valera, Maturana, and Uribe 1974, 187). Of course, in our critical review, it can be noted that without the characteristics of free and open it is not possible to recognize the uniqueness of each living system. It is only a matter of components. This model of cognition agrees with Taylor’s idea of humans as “selfinterpreting animals” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 12). But, rather than agreeing with Taylor’s critical doubt of the possibility of a cognitive “science,” Varela and his colleagues (1991) declare their purpose to move beyond the opposition and the rift separating the actuality of experience from (cognitive) science to embrace both because both are necessary for a pluralistic society. Also, Maturana and colleagues (Maturana 1970, 1975; Maturana and Varela 1980, 1987; Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991) suggest that the process of knowledge in cognition is just like the larger life processes. We like in their work that, where they embark on how they understand cognition, they break apart sharply from mainstream cognitive science’s cognitivist paradigm’s computational model of the mind that is expressed by the main classical school of cognitive science known as cognitive realism in its varieties of cognitivism, emergence, and the society of mind (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). They do this defending their alternative cognitive model known as embodied cognition, which we explain in subsequent paragraphs. This step allows them to understand growth as a spiral process of autopoiesis (Maturana 1970, 1975; Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974), as noted. Simultaneously their thesis is that there is universality in this pattern of growth that allows their view of cognition to qualify as a systems theory of cognition enabling autonomously emergent properties (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 151). On the one hand, we disagree with them that the operation of a cell or the organisms of living systems is not specifiable through simple input and output terms, and whereby meaning is not prescribed from outside the system. This at first

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glance is in agreement with our concepts of free and open system founding IPS. But what is not accepted here is that the input and output are merely reactive. Further, the thesis that in living systems “the meaning of this or that interaction … is the result of the organisation and history of the system itself” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 157) is an argument in defense of properties of autonomous systems and thus closer to the AS paradigm of self and development. The basis of these ideas is a rejection of neo-Darwinian premises of evolutionary theory grounded on the concept of adaptationism (based upon gradual modification, diversification via mutation and recombination, and the mechanism of natural selection). But the theory of embodied mind instead imposes a different (their own) paradigm of evolution and development premised upon the analysis of evolutionary processes according to four basic doctrines (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 196–7), namely: (1) the unit of evolution is a network capable of rich self-organizing configuration repertoires; (2) under structural coupling involving an organism and a medium there is an ongoing process of satisfying; (3) there is a non-unique mode whereby each unit of selection changes is interwoven; and (4) a co-implicative relation exists between inner organismic and outer causal factors that allow the “organism and medium to mutually specify each other” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 197). Even if in isolated and decontextualized reading one or more of the premises may contain some truth, the overall meaning within the context of the theory with no omissions does not appear too far from a neo-Darwinist perspective. In addition to our critique of the previous points, we find there is an overall lack of clarity in these works, perhaps due to a controversial inner contradiction in the progression of argument in the work of Maturana and Varela (Maturana 1970; Maturana and Varela 1980, 1987; Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). The next line of argument in these theorists’ view of cognitive processing (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991) is that any act of an intellectual and reflective nature is bounded by each author’s (scientist’s, agent’s) own subjective cognition, but that this is not autonomously formed; rather, it is a part of a larger background (of any reflective act) rooted in specific biological, social, and cultural beliefs and practices. So far, the argument looks as if it differs from the autonomous self and is closer to IPS, as it critiques the assumption of independent thinking responses by an autonomous mind in response to a predefined objective reality. We agree that the subject–object is an emergent property, a product of our better knowledge of what has happened earlier. But when the subject is excluded here, the person is also excluded, because for them the subject is the main premise. And we think

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that the person is present from the very beginning. At the same time, the notion of being is a concept. It is not in reference to the concreteness of each person’s intentional purpose that excludes the person’s radical from his or her view of cognition. Finally, in how the argument in Maturana and Varela ends, ultimately cognitive structure is rooted in the philosophical thoughts of a supposedly embodied person (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 11). But our disagreement here is that they consider a person to be more precisely constituted by doing rather than by being (Maturana and Poerksen 2004). Of course, this part of the theory brings it closer to the view of agency in AS as a logical necessity of action. While that there is a self is not accepted (in line with Buddhist thought), the way in which these theorists understand the embodied person brings them closely to AS. This is so on the basis that an autonomous self as a global universal in evolutionary perspective seems added to represent the broad structure on which human autonomy is the founding assumption of growth (noted by Ryan and Deci 2014). The function of this argument in the theory of Varela and Maturana is of course precisely—as noted earlier—Maturana’s (1970) conceptualization of an aim towards autopoiesis, a universal circular spiral process that enables each living being to autonomously define and shape its boundaries to others and to the world in a way that allows autonomous self-making and growth by each organism. We also disagree with how Maturana and Varela understand cognition, as a product of activity, which appears at the end. For us (in IPS), cognition is an act present in all human activity from the very beginning. The contrast with IPS is clear: cognition as a product versus cognition as an act; cognition at the end versus cognition from the very beginning. As an overall conclusion, we feel that it is difficult and perhaps unwise to deconstruct this whole theory in a way that classifies it as AS or IPS. We prefer not to classify this theory of Maturana and Varela because the problem is, above all, that it has been built from inner inconsistencies. This is perhaps due to the excessively synthetic approach in how these authors are combining potentially incompatible and possibly inconsistent and contradictory theory premises and origins in order to succeed in their intellectual and ethical project. Despite the goodness of their intent, we feel this theory project lacks a clear conceptual basis in both methodological and theory clarity terms. However, if they were classifiable, they would finally be more consistent with AS despite the fact that a lot of initial assumptions founding AS are being broken (Dennett 1993). Finally, this theory ends up falling within an AS paradigm because the conceptualization of the self falls within the authors’ boundaries and its only goal is understood as self-constitution. Also, however, Varela and

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Maturana are not precisely AS because it is not clear in their theory whether the agent is the organism or the environment. And this is because they do not accept any other kind of intentionality besides its aiming towards self-constitution.

3. Summary of how life and personal/interpersonal agency are understood within AS and IPS From all the previous sections in the book, we have presented our conceptual basis and the supporting moral psychology basis and key constructs that correspond to our theoretical proposal of IPS and show how it is different from AS. We can summarize here with reference to the previous proposal how AS and IPS, these two contrasting paradigms on the self and human action, differ sharply regarding their vision and proposal regarding life and agency more broadly. Specifically, the paradigm of the Autonomous Self is rooted in modern thought in the modern analytic philosophical proposal (Appendix). The implication is that AS and models that belong in the AS paradigm are congruent with understanding the self in a more reductive way: the self is a subject who acts (a logical necessity of its actions). As noted earlier, the AS paradigm still qualifies an agent as a person insofar as one displays free will cognitive mastery to prove a rational capacity of deciding what to want (Frankfourt 1971). In the AS paradigm, the goal is to arrive at the right “mindset,” which enables personal freedom. This relies heavily on the mastery of some cognitive mechanisms (via System 1 or System 2 mastery) and regulatory self-control (we discuss the self-regulation paradigm in the next chapter as a basic premise of AS that relies on educational and socialization processes of habituation). Cognition is a means for AS to develop the right mindset on how to act in life and increasingly improve means–ends choices that enable, first, selfactualization and, later in life, action with integrity. Systemic action in AS is focused on fulfilling the individual needs or goals of all agents involved. How the AS mindset understands this concept (keyword) is as various domains of conflicting or congruent needs, interests, and webs of relations that need to be negotiated or effectively managed to avoid risks. Growth is primarily external and domain specific and needs to be manifest and measured because AS paradigm is more focused on external recognition and achievement. The personal and interpersonal value in AS is conditioned, which we explain later in the book. The self and other and broader systemic relations in AS are based on formal roles, and the needs

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and interests of those agents involved. Conflict and dialects are key parts of the vocabulary of the AS proposal and agency, premised on competing needs for the mastery of achievement, prestige, or affiliation motivation. Development in AS requires a perspective regarding how to integrate different or competing inner or social domains, and aims to resolve a perceived fragmentation and dualism in the self and the world. AS agency with maturity is premised upon some form of cognitive or relational growth, and we noted earlier that this is manifested via two conflicting and competing modes of AS ways of knowing and acting: (a) an Autonomous/Rationalist cognitive mode of being (which we called ARS) and acting that is oriented towards cognitive mastery (system 2/slow/thinking) and emotional self-regulation allowing the mastery of emotions (the passions), or alternatively (b) an Autonomous/Processual mode of being and acting (which we called APS). This is oriented towards more affective/intuitivist and relationist modes of being that enable adaptive action capacity and more contextually intelligent practical responses in life. Most of the models that belong to the AS paradigm of self and action recognize this dualism, and some models in more recent years seem to be oriented towards the second latter mode as an aspirational ideal in AS that is developmentally superior. The paradigm of the inter-processual self is rooted in the classical virtue ethics proposal of Aristotle’s and Leonardo Polo’s virtue ethics (see Appendix), neo-Confucian Wang’s virtue theory, and Whitehead’s process philosophy as noted in Chapter Five. IPS’s proposal is premised upon a transcendental anthropological philosophy (see Table 2). The goal of being is being and becoming more of the person one really is and living a good life that enables systemic growth in personal relations based on personal intimacy and in terms of free and open systems. Enable personal and interpersonal and systemic growth in relationship, so as to enable growth potential with a teleological concern (“eudaimonia”) whereby the acting agent and others affected can sustainably grow and flourish. IPS is a normative proposal whereby personal agency belongs in the teleological philosophical understanding of how to live as an ethical being. The goal of all personal action in IPS is to act with maturity and to fulfill “a calling” (a sense of moral purpose) that is unique for each singular person and which is adapted to each one’s life phase and particulars. The goal of action is to systematically act with personal and relational integrity on the basis of

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being free for (a qualitative kind of freedom we explained in Chapter Five) and having co-existence-with. Personal love is natural in both the singularity of each human life and our shared humanity, and from this emanates action that fulfills self-respect and personal growth. Personal and relational systemic integrity are means for enabling positive personal, relational, and systemic growth that enables wider qualitative happiness (eudaimonia). In IPS, there is no boundary between self and others or self and non-self, and all is internally connected. Consequently, our action towards others returns to us and affects our ethical quality and our personal growth as much as it impacts the wider system. Therefore, qualitatively choosing how to act is profoundly significant in our normative virtue ethics proposal. The systemic focus in IPS is qualitative, and it is to improve the quality of personal relations while authentically expressing our intimacy in all the groups and communities to which we belong. Intimacy enabling personal choice of action with the heart and not just the mind is a key presupposition in how the person akin to the IPS paradigm chooses to act in systemic impact terms. Systemic action is premised on personal intimacy, which is a gift of being (human). Systemic action and growth in IPS requires virtue (as a unity of character). The world from within the IPS paradigm is being intuitively felt and understood as intimate webs of personal relations that via ethics of dialogue can become platforms for growth. Living a good life is as much an end as it is the very process of growth, and once the world is understood this way growth is unrestrictive. Sustainable growth involves both praxis and poiesis and requires the master virtue of ethical–practical wisdom. This is because the IPS paradigm understands the world as internally connected (Wang’s Li and li). Agency in IPS is premised on a moral psychology that integrates affective–relational, cognitive–rational, and moral–practical sides of practical wisdom as different facets of a morally good agency that is sensitive to the particulars, others’ responses, and the broader context. Ethical communication in IPS requires learning how to naturally and systemically arrive at Aristotle’s ethos, pathos, and logos stemming from personal character. But communication in IPS requires learning and ongoing effort in our personal relations, and it is not something to learn autonomously either as a technical skill or as a permanently possessed property. Ethical communication arises from moments when ethical relations are present and manifested. Communication in IPS is also premised on ethical dialoguing and a genuine valuing of inquiry, as opposed to other forms of communication in interpersonal and social relations. Motivation in IPS terms is internal to the person and internal to each personal relation persons form, and it is

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systematically concerned with how to positively affect others’ ethical growth and flourishing as much as the acting person. The relations between the acting person and others in IPS involve respecting others’ roles and identities but are not confined to role distance and formal role conventions; they are grounded on a person–person relational response for mutual growth. But such relations in IPS systemically inquire as to which forms of personal and relational integrity are needed for ethical growth to occur in free and open system terms regarding the acting persons and others involved or affected. Valuing others and oneself in IPS is unconditional. Personal and interpersonal development in the IPS paradigm aims to develop oneself as a good person living a good life in community via the development of capacities of trusting, openness to vulnerability in mutual–relational terms. Ethically mature personal agency in IPS relies upon gradual naturalistic growth of each person respecting the person as a complex albeit always integrated unity. For this very reason, in the IPS normative proposal, there is no meaning or sense in distinguishing between emotional/intuitive/relationist versus cognitive/ rationalist/individualist aspects, and cognition and action are not seen as separate domains. The IPS proposal relies on assumptions linked with nonrepresentational theories. Finally, to effectively fulfill the presuppositions of the IPS theory proposal one must discard the AS logic and fully embrace the alternative understanding of the world, the self, human action, and life associated with IPS. However, as the modern paradigm heavily influences real life, we suggest that persons often act with a mix of AS and IPS action logics, and it is a process to grow in the terms of interprocessual growth proposal. This is presented in Table 4.

PART II HOW THE INTER-PROCESSUAL SELF MAY CHANGE OUR APPROACH TO LIFE

CHAPTER EIGHT THE PROCESS OF HUMAN GROWTH

1. Introduction In contradiction to the traditional approach—associated with the AS paradigm, of a sequence from the individual, personal, and theoretical to the public, social, and practical—the division criterion that has been followed for the previous chapters is in line with the IPS proposal.1 Similarly, the Aristotelian differentiation between “logos” and “nous” will allow us to bring out the close connection existing among ethics (Nicomachean Ethics) and politics. In a simplified and general way, whereas nous is usually known to refer to the inductive knowledge of principles, logos refers to the discursive knowledge of the concrete with a logical character. This simplification can lead to assuming that nous and logos are two independent ways of thinking, at least insofar as one can be exercised and not the other. Even more, from that independence, it could follow that the realm of the logos is that of the individual, personal, and practical, where the nous takes care of the theoretical, public, or social differentiation that is avoided if the presupposition of independence is not assumed. Following Lee and Long (2007), we will state that this dualistic division is not justified. Lee and Long (2007) understand that the nous allows access to the immediate objects and not just to the logos. The key to understanding the relationship between the logos and the nous is a concept of individuality 1

In our opinion, this dualistic comprehension made by the traditional division corresponds logically with other dualistic counterpositions as well: theory and practice, individuality and commonality, substance and accidents. On the other hand, by overcoming the exclusive dualism between nous and logos we are also overcoming the previous dualisms. Dualism would understand that there may be some independence between the parts, but duality would reject such independence. We insist on a clarification already made, that to reject dualism is not to reject duality. To reject duality would mean falling into monism and nullifying the complexity of life.

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that grasps “the concrete” in relation to “the universal,” a position that can be considered dual but not dualistic. To highlight the interrelationship between nous and logos, Lee and Long (2007) also state that the exercise of episteme (understanding) and phronesis (practical wisdom) requires the conjunction of logos and nous. Logos and nous, in short, require each other; the knowledge of principles cannot be demonstrated, because they are principles. On the other hand, the logos is necessary to be able to experience the concrete, which is the last foundation that allows the nous to grasp the universals. But the concrete without the nous cannot be known, for the knowledge of these principles is required; in turn, however, such knowledge only arises before the concrete. The logos helps to organize the concrete in a coherent way, since it gathers sensitive impressions into a unit. It is a condition of possibility of experience, and universals are generated from it. In short: the logos requires the nous because without it there is no way to gather the concrete in the communality; and the nous requires the logos because the universal is built in contact with the concrete. Finally, we could take a look at how perception is understood to involve the origin of the independence of logos and nous, as well as to discern evidence that they are mutually required in truth. When, in the process of perception, it is affirmed that in the known object the substance and the accident are independent, it is being justified that the nous knows the stable principles that justify the substance, whereas the logos studies, logically and discursively, the accidents. Therefore, when perception is understood as perceiving substances and accidents, disintegration occurs between nous and logos. In such cases, the process of perception is either a constructive process of the subject or a copy of reality. However, as we showed already, Aristotle understands perception as an act, not as a process. Therefore, perception cannot be understood as mere construction or copying. Since the perceptive process in which individuality is present requires logos and nous, we cannot maintain the classical divisions of theory and practice, or individual and collective, or private and public. Inspired by Aristotle’s division between ethics and politics, before dealing with the process of growth, we will address education and emotional education, what we consider to be the basis of the process of growth.

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2. Basis of the growth process 2.1. Education Philosophers of reference for IPS To support our model of education, we briefly introduce the philosophers on whom we rely to develop our proposal: Leonardo Polo, Francisco Altarejos, Richard Stanley Peters, Alfred North Whitehead, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Leonardo Polo’s educational proposal derives from his anthropological vision, summarized in an essay called “Helping to Grow” (Polo 2006; original title, “Ayudar a crecer”). We emphasize three main aspects: the character of system, unrestricted openness, and his idea of being a person. (A)Understanding the person as a system is a guarantee of an integral or holistic education. The character of system obliges rejection of any type of reductionist division in education. For educating not only has to deal with all the issues that affect the human, but also those issues must be interrelatedly treated, according to the systemic character of the human being. Human integration cannot be achieved by the mere sum of parts. (B) Polo understands the human being as a “radically open” being, with an inner call to growth, who never becomes all that he can be. As a consequence, growth should be the purpose of education, which becomes the true subject of every human being. Education is not merely a desirable activity, but rather a necessary one. Unlike the rest of the animals, human beings need education to acquire what they are capable of. In this sense, education is not limited to specific periods of life, although the initial stages are the most sensitive. According to Polo, to educate is not to produce something external to the person; it is something that happens “in the person.” In this sense, when the evaluation of the educational process focuses on the external result, the same educational fact is distorted. (C) The character of being a person is unavoidable to have a good conceptualization of education. This refers to the singularity that identifies each of us. We owe our existence to a particular act. On the one hand, there is in every human being an awareness of filial

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relation to his origin. On the other hand, nobody is born isolated; all of us are co-existing beings, hence we are born being in society already. That is why education is not linked to a deficiency of knowledge, but to the fact of “being a child,” which is maintained throughout life. These three educational principles are completed with several other ideas. For Polo, technique is not an accessory. The human being is a Homo faber; without technique, there would have been no evolution. Technique is something radical for the human being since it belongs to the “modern radical,” which we have already explored. The problem arises when technique does not depend on personal character, and it turns against man. If the projects that men develop do not rely on the project of being a man, then, they happen to depend on the small projects that they perform. In other words, “man develops projects, because he is the project.” In order to develop projects, he uses his imagination; that is why it is also important to have a proper education of imagination. Moreover, the education of the family is fundamentally an education of affectivity that leads to a way of seeing and understanding the world. Without a proper education of imagination, the education of affectivity would end in fantasy. Polo also proposes to educate in truth and friendship. Francisco Altarejos is a philosopher of education who has extended the line opened by Leonardo Polo. Altarejos (Altarejos 1999, 2004; Altarejos and Naval 2000) understands education as human formation. Since human potentiality is not determined, but rather it can do many things, education has a minimal orientation but does not direct growth to a specific point. This allows human beings to display their full potential. The social reality of the person is of great importance, not only because the human being is not simply gregarious, but also because his human existence depends on the concurrence of other existences. Educating is understood only as an interpersonal encounter, and it is a reciprocal action. There is no self-education. Altarejos’ definition of education is, “the reciprocal action of aid to human perfection, intentionally directed to reason, and directed from it, insofar as it promotes the formation of ethically good habits” (Altarejos and Naval 2000, 31). Altarejos does not ignore that educational activity produces (kinesis) many things, but he agrees with Polo that education must be an act (praxis), which means that education should have meaning (and value) in itself, and not by what can happen later. It also prevents the excessive application of the principle of experience that would imply that the experience itself is educational. The educational act is played in the

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relationship between educator and educating. Education is essentially teleological: its 'final end' is the very growth of the person, and that must be present in every other partial end. Such motivation towards the final end cannot be characterized as a necessity, since a necessity is satisfied, but unrestricted growth is not. The final end is understood as a personal call, and education is also understood as an aid, because each one should make his own way (Altarejos and Naval 2000, 178). Altarejos’ proposal highlights the ethical dimension of education (Altarejos 1999). In this sense, it prevents the false dissociation between ethics and technique and the harmfulness of focusing on results (exams). An ethical act presupposes freedom. The educational act is subjective rather than objective communication, which implies that the basis of education is the interpersonal encounter, and personal example: what the educator is, is more important than what he (she) says (Rassam 1976). Growth in the interpersonal relationship is an educational way to discover “the man behind the teacher and the possible friend behind the man” (Rassam 1976, 64). Altarejos considers that it is better to focus on the proposal of virtuous growth as an experience of personal development instead of following ideal values (Altarejos 1999, 107–64). Richard Stanley Peters, one of the great referents in the philosophy of education, states that the purpose of education should be to make men and women better, and this is not achieved by a mere training of abilities (Peters 1966, 29–30). A mastery of skills does not guarantee education, because education is much more. Peters often contrasts the “technical man” with the “educated man.” This does not exclude the development of skills in educational work. Rather, education points to a way of life, a vision of the world and life that is meaningful in its own right and cannot be conceptualized in a utilitarian way (Peters 1966, 1967), because its purpose is intrinsic to the person (Peters 1966, 27). Certainly, education has a cognitive aspect, but that consists not in knowing things, but instead causes, their organization, and the same principles of organization, with a great critical spirit. Therefore, the student should know the weaknesses of what is known in the same learning process. Cognition is also subject to growth, because it seeks to achieve a knowledge that transforms the whole person (1966, 30–35). Peters is well aware that education must promote action from within the person. The fact that someone behaves according to a certain norm does not guarantee education (1966, 39). Education should promote growth in freedom; it requires students to perform their own personal processes, in order not to fall into indoctrination (1966, 42–5). Education also has a social component, so the educator should awaken the interest for

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the student to explore the different forms of thought and conduct present in the social, including justice (1966, 52–3). Peters unites personal selfrealization with the social: education seeks to promote social integration by loving and being loved, generating fraternity, a reason why competition is a mistake (1966, 56–8). Moreover, he argues that a motivation centered on mastery, competence, and manipulation can degenerate into compulsion and obsession if these are not intrinsically linked to something valuable that makes sense to them (1966, 61). When what is valuable in itself is not clear, then the diversity of independent tasks emerges in the educational act (1966, 75). Peters has a fairly complete view of the human and the educational act: he considers ethics to be present from the beginning of it and he rejects some reductive perspectives that do not recognize human complexity (1966, 89–113). Alfred North Whitehead rests his educational proposal on his cosmology of organism philosophy. Thus it achieves a global understanding of education and prevents technical reductions. Education and the growth of the organism are not independent realities: existence, living, working, and so on, happen to be the same. Whitehead unites reason and life in the face of an intellectualized and cold view of reason, for the function of reason is none other than to promote the art of living (Whitehead 1929, 2). He rejects the mere survival of evolutionism and the search for equilibrium (1929, 19), and he proposes to maximize the satisfaction of living (Whitehead 1929, 5). The good life is the better life (1929, 30) and any division between theory and practice is artificial since intellectual development is at the service of development (1957, 15). He rejects cognitive or utilitarian interpretations (doing something for the benefit received), since the real utility is in the art of living (1957, 20). He educates himself to live well and better, not to make use of life. For Whitehead, education is more than merely theoretical: “A man simply well informed is the most tiresome and useless thing on earth” (1957, 15). To educate theoretically is to teach “inert ideas” (1957, 16) that do not arouse curiosity, nor provide discernment, nor facilitate the faculty of domination. Curiosity, discernment, and mastery must be present in every educational act (1957, 21). Moreover, the approach of first learning theoretically, and then applying that knowledge, is contrary to the reality of what an organism is (1957, 21–3). Whitehead’s educational proposal is global because “the essence of education is to be

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religious”2 (1957, 34) and integrative because there can be no general and then specific education (1957, 29–31). Lawrence Kohlberg is another reference for our educational framework because he understands development to be the goal of education (Kohlberg and Mayer 1972). Following Rogers’ discovery of ethics as the crux of the educational proposal, Kohlberg will experience an evolution in his view of education, from a more cognitive position to a moral one that affects life (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg 1989). His new proposal slogan is “just community” (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg 1989), which turns the school community into a community of life by focusing not on the acquisition of knowledge, but on sharing the actual lives of people. The school as a “just community” will enable the understanding and experiencing of justice (1989, 25). Moral discussion is not useful if it is not about real life; democracy serves to guarantee that the student can make a path of free thought instead of reproducing the expectations of the teacher (1989, 27). Kohlberg is an inspiring source for our IPS proposal, but, at the same time, he presents serious problems. On the one hand, he himself acknowledges that his proposal is only valid when the student has passed the stage of the formal operation3 (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg 1989, 269), which is a serious limitation. On the other hand, we think that Kohlberg subordinates the person to the community. The community is idealized as if it were an a priori Kantian outside. However, for our study, we are not interested in prolonging the criticism we make of Kohlberg’s proposal, but rather in highlighting the powerful idea of the school as in close connection with real life, which implies that the teacher is not a trainer of students. A teacher is a person who, thanks to interpersonal relationships, also lives processes of growth. Education in IPS In this book, we support the idea that AS is an incomplete way of understanding the self and human development. And we critique AS also as a problematic (and potentially distorting) way to understand the role of the self, regarding knowledge, human relations, and, more broadly, ethics and human action. But our critique does not reject all that is premised on 2

By calling it “religious,” he is directing towards God; however, we have already noted that Whitehead’s God is not in relationship with any religion, but with the perfect realization of the process that draws him to himself. 3 This occurs when the person can manipulate mental concepts detached from reality.

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AS. On the contrary, we support the notion that there is a risk of a potential misunderstanding of the self and human/personal development if the radical of the subject is fully rejected and ignored. We propose that the radical of the person may become the focal point from within which both the nature and the subject-master’s quest for actualization are being integrated. The radical of person recognizes the uniqueness of each person, the fact that each person is not understood as anyone, part of a social or another conceptual abstract category (e.g., a group of students, a group of professors–educators, a group of academics–scientists, a spiritual group). In IPS, a person is not a logical addition of key characteristics (psychological or social), but it is far and beyond a transcendental being. So persons’ transcendental act of being is the proper basis for IPS. The structure of the IPS mindset is a triadic and complicated unity that binds the person’s internal calling and purpose with his/her nature (what is received in both material and immaterial and the cultural foundations linked with a person), and his/her self as subject-master (our capacity to create novelty and transform the world). This complex unity is very important in grasping this chapter with its focus on education. Based on the above, this chapter is helpful for understanding IPS in a way that reconstitutes AS in a more appropriate way for human growth and development. This is especially important on the topic of education. There is one key point that is common in all that education implies: it refers to the process and context of the relationship between an educator (a person) and the students who are being educated. This is a common complex problem when an educator is alone with a group of students—no matter if it is as few as 15, a medium group of around 45 students, or a larger group of a hundred students or more. Embarking on an educational program involves always some ambiguity, expressed in the following questions. What has an educator to do? What is the best way to act (teach, relate) for the students to have grown in significant ways by the end of the class? What kinds of activities may a teacher choose to carry out, and what should they avoid? What is the goal/aim of an educational intervention? Are relationships with the student important, and how? Is it important to praise and correct them? And there are many more. All these questions end up pointing to the way of being and the behavior of the educator(s). While it is true that certain kinds of behavior are utterly rejected (e.g., certain ways to praise and critique students), most of the educator behaviors need a proper basis and a good framework to be of relevance Table 5 below could serve as both an index and a summary to delineate our proposal of education premised on IPS versus an AS mindset.

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Based on Table 5, 11 points are important to distinguish regarding how to approach education from within an IPS mindset versus the dominant AS perspective on education’s role for the personal growth of learners. Within the real contexts of educational experience, there are moments in which an AS has to be rejected in favor of IPS. This brings a polarity, an unbridgeable tension between AS and IPS, of the kind AS “versus” IPS. In this case, the second needs to replace the first. But there are times in which AS has to be reintegrated into an IPS frame, “from the inside.” This means that a juxtaposition of them is not possible, but a reinterpretation from a different perspective that takes into account more seriously the interpersonal relationships making present the personal dimension (“the inside”) of each one may be proposed. We may need to explain on what basis we decide to use the first or the second way. Some problematic aspects of education will arise when the second way is required—AS to be integrated into IPS—in cases where the consequences of the AS model visibly dominate. But even in this case, authentic platforms for interpersonal growth will arise as opportunities with huge potential for growth. Putting aside momentarily the context of higher (university and college) education and focusing in the previous years of the secondary school, we support that, unless the primary goal of an educational framework (or intervention) be the personal maturation of the student, all the rightful goals/means may really end up being pernicious to the person’s development. Indeed, Rogers insisted systematically that there are several preconditions to the growth of a person. Inspired by Rogers’ famous book On Becoming a Person (1961), this can be summarized in the expression: let the person be a person the self who he/she truly is. With this statement, we have already started talking about the premise of goals as shown in our previous table. Now we systematically cover every aspect of education summarized in Table 5. Goals: competence and needs versus personal maturation Competence and needs cannot be in themselves an educational goal; this is because they belong to the order of needs. Although we agree that every person needs to grow in his/her competence, autonomy, and relational existence, various life challenges may result from fragmenting and destabilizing the person, and, as a result, carrying out whatever commitments a person has undertaken in a given life point will be complicated. This belongs to the order of natural needs, but they have no relevance to the order of a personal sense of purpose. Therefore, in

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contrast, we suggest that the goal of education should be focused on the aim of developing persons with an intentional sense of purpose, which is to say, a “personal calling” (i.e., personal existence or existential purpose). If we confuse needs with an intentional purpose, we will end up reducing the latter to another human need, which involves a reductionist view of the person, and an altering of the goals of education to something of lower status that is hence not ethical. This seems to be the case, for instance, of Reiss and White (2014), when they state that education should have two different goals. One of the main premises of IPS—as we have defined it—is that the person should be able to harmonically integrate the self as nature and the self as subject. In contrast, from an AS perspective, any added dimension as a consequence of the “needs” education attempt to satisfy, becomes irrelevant. For example, a domain of education can be related to beliefs, religious perspective, and moral aspects as opposed to scientific knowing, when, in fact, what is salient for change is how the “individual” is being considered. In this case, the individual seems to be not a single person but a social category or a group of people that an individual is thought to represent. But when there is not a goal that has the quality of personal calling for a further and unrestricted growth, the wellbeing ends up being a single goal instead of a meaningful telos. What can the telos and purpose be of an education premised upon IPS? The only possible purpose should be to enable the capacity for a kind of free personal acting whereby the person is allowed to be able to fully accept herself and become in more fullness and salience the self, the person she truly is (Rogers). There cannot be another goal and purpose in any educational program beyond this. Besides our reference to the work of Rogers to understand from a more philosophical standpoint what it means to be a person, Polo’s four personal transcendentals are useful. These transcendentals are interpersonal relation, personal freedom (for), personal knowing, and personal love. Although they are hierarchically organized (in ascending order), they do not constitute independent, loosely connected aspects. Instead, each of them contains the rest, which guarantees the unrestricted and complicated growth potential in each human being, while at the same time ensuring that the person will not be reduced to something rational and linear, as the commonality in being a person is that each person is something more that is “additionally” to the sum of her different parts, and which is therefore not graspable (Sellés 2006). This multi-dimensional unity that is internally connected in a hierarchical organization of the four constituent parts could be understood

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also as a pedagogical way to understand the overall purpose and goal of education, both in broad terms and relating to concrete programs or areas of education. We hypothesize that, as the four transcendentals cannot be considered independently from one another, so is the case with education goals as a whole. The idea of promoting anything that refers to what it means to be human in practicing a certain profession or knowledge area/discipline, and so on, should be the starting point for defining an educational purpose. What precisely should be promoted is different in every discipline, and we are not covering all such applications systematically; instead, we provide a general framework for thinking how to approach them. The goal of this chapter is to highlight AS and IPS as two different models of education, formulated as follows: (1) To promote the inter-personal relationship: it is not possible to understand a person as an independent and autonomous individual. The person is always within a relationship with another person, and various persons and groups of persons (including the present, past, and future people who are encountered by a person, as well as how a person relates to the natural world of the living and non-living entities, and the cosmos, the universe). (2) To promote personal freedom for by means of education that is being provided to each person: everyone has an internal calling to acknowledge and respond to. This is not an artificially assumed value or goal, but rather something that has to be discovered from within the human being’s own personal organism, since it is in a relationship with the unique being (person) that we are, we can be, and we may be destined to be. This means that education should try to avoid the person–learner’s being ever more confused or lost in an eternal movement of seeking for the sake of seeking. By contrast, an intentional purpose, a sense of internal and personal calling, promotes the very authenticity of being what one already is, developing each human being’s nature virtuously and looking for how to grow in a way that is appropriately inspired by personal love and self-respect for the unique being each one is. (3) To promote the personal knowing for all involved persons, students, and educators: this refers to the fact that we, and the things and persons we collaborate with in the aim of knowing, are more than a compendium of characteristics or qualities. We are capable of knowing more than that: we can know the real being, the

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person. Once the face of the other person appears, she can be recognized. When that happens, the question, “What are you going to do?” is more salient, because it enables growth in intimacy. This inquiry is also closely linked with another question: “Who do you want to be?” (in the way you recognize others and yourself, and how you relate to other things). This is ever more relevant in the educational context whereby both educators and learners grow in the way they come to see and respond to this inquiry. This is at the heart of transformation of both as part of an educational experience. (4) To promote personal love: this principle refers to the fact that our internal calling is the intimate encounter between persons. This kind of loving genuinely who one is, is endless; it is always growing. For this reason, some people see that God offers a personal relationship that can fulfill the internal calling because this growth is always open, whereas in some personal relationships, even expressing who we are in our uniqueness, the relation may become vulnerable or finish. Furthermore, an educational curriculum should integrate effectively all these four aspects of its structure, content, and pedagogy. This transcends the ideal approach of covering each one independently. Of course, this may seem a utopia for many, besides the reach of what educators and educational acts should resolve. However, the end goal should have the capacity of pointing to an aspired future, to move the person. And if the higher aim of education is not stated in these terms, education itself ends up blocking the personal growth of the learners and the educators alike. The quality of a good education is its capacity to create pathways towards reaching this higher purpose without reducing it to something lesser than it. That is why the verb “to promote” has been chosen for describing the top mission and educational goals. The notion of autonomy requires some attention at this stage. It is difficult to find authors in the literature of psychology and human development that do not consider autonomy as a goal. Based on the above, we state that this could be pernicious for every human being. We are going to explain this using a metaphor involving the construction of a table. We can imagine that a table needs to be constructed. If we assume autonomy as a goal, the starting point in the thinking of the table’s design could be, for instance, how to make a strong table, with sturdy legs. However, everyone can notice that there is a question that is previous to this: what is the table needed for? Knowing precisely the potential uses and purposes

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of the object-table will guide us in how to construct it. The table might have no legs because what is needed is a foldable table to carry or one that is attached to the wall. Obviously, as a metaphor, the example has insufficient use. But it can help to understand better what is being communicated in this section. Coming back to education as a topic, if autonomy is considered as a goal, is it for self-consistency, self-control, or the self-authorship and mastery of one’s professional and personal destiny in a professional role, or other similar terms as ends in themselves. Thus, the question of whether power or mastery is in play arises, and, accordingly, where their purpose lies, and so on. The educational model based upon the promotion of increasing mastery via individual autonomous subject growth (Black and Deci 2000) are conceptually premised upon AS, and the same goes for selfdetermination theory key premises (Deci et al. 1991). Nevertheless, considering Polo’s four personal transcendentals and their focus on the uniqueness of the human being can provide some missing links, as we show in the IPS proposal. Means for education: skills and abilities in the realm of interpersonal relationships in real-life contexts and specific situations We think that the means for the development of human beings should be in accordance with the natural constitution of a unique person. We say “one with others” instead of “one among others,” in order to convey that human beings are naturally social. Animals live in aggregations but not in groups; even when they seem to show a group behavioral pattern, they only act as an addition of individualities without being able to act as a group (Hamann et al. 2011; Seed and Tomasello 2010; Tomasello 2014). Persons in communities act in ways that transcend a mere addition of individualities. Animals have skills, and some of them are even more efficient in using them than human beings. To approach educational concerns on means as if education were only the development of a person’s abilities and skills is, in fact, to consider man as an ape or any other animal, albeit more capable and advanced. We disagree with this reductionist Darwinian view. Michael Tomasello, current co-director of the Max Plank Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, shows that great apes understand perfectly what agency means, even in more sophisticated ways than human agents (Tomasello 2014). The great ape knows that he is an agent with a purpose that is a goal (e.g., to get one piece of food that is available); he also knows that other great apes are acting as agents, and use

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their agency to get to the purpose. But great apes, like the rest of animals, never make up a group even when they develop actions such as hunting in which there is usually a structural organization with roles. To act as a group means to have a common and shared goal—that is, a shared good. To have the same good, as apes have, is not to have a common good, because the commonality of the good is premised upon community and collaboration. For this reason, in order not to treat children and learners as apes or animals, we suggest that a higher means has to be the shared relational identity that binds us in our human predicament, while all the skill and abilities must be in a second hierarchical placement, albeit another means. Team: focus on relevant goals to internal growth while personal growth is processually growing/improving relationships The aim of growth in the AS paradigm concerns benefiting a social group, “a team”. It is a means for each person to become more efficient in the way they work with others in teams and groups. Hence, in AS the human being is, in fact, considered in mechanical terms, understood as if it is destined to “function” efficiently as a good complex machinery and technological system. As a consequence, in the name of increased efficiency, various additional and diverse skills and abilities may be required to become the focus of education and training, to enable selfmastery and the mastery of domains and objective that a person may not be expected to master without those relevant skills. In the IPS perspective, the person is considered an end in itself and not a means, as well as the way she relates to a group, the team, or more broadly the community. Each person’s purpose is to grow and increase personal co-existence, which is to say personal relationships. The community does not just encompass the members of a given social group, but also considers each person as an irreplaceable part (not as an abstract category but in her concreteness and specificity). The notion of the community may involve not only the members of the group, but also “who is absent, and outside of the group,” and consider their good as well. Subject matter: domains; mastery (AS) versus platforms for growth (IPS) This section presents AS and IPS paradigms as alternatives. In AS, each subject matter is understood as independent: they are all domains that need to be known and approached as individual “topics.” Even in the case of

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(secondary) school, learning is often focused on subject matters under the paradigm of a “project” that still refers to different project domains. Thinking of how to go beyond a subject-matter division in the curriculum, and its domain such as the notion of growth involved, an educational movement that tries to introduce the school to real life may be relevant. Instead of saying, “One object moves in one direction in a given speed,” an educator might rather note, “This train from London to Cambridge departs at 7am.” Even better would be a real expedition of the class, organized by the students, in which they could see how this experience becomes learning, and how the whole experience has helped the person to grow. However, although this is a clear improvement, even in this case each subject remains a domain because the goal is, after all, to make the journey and to learn from “this” expedition. It might be better to understand what is involved in IPS paradigm’s reconceptualization of work in education if the notion of “project” is used in education: for example an educational “project” involves a visit to the castle district in the French region La Loire, finding appropriate funding and making the trip affordable for participation, enabling group and individual practices for learning some French and trying to practice it in the local context via appropriate activities, actively experimenting and trying French cooking, getting familiar and appreciating key highlights of the French culture, its history, and its geography, and so on. In this case, the consideration of the subject matter as a domain vanishes and what remains is the mentality of “domain” in understanding and organizing how to know and educate, and a kind of growth that happens via this domain. So even though this example achieves a higher level of change—from the subject matter to the project as a domain—this still involves abstraction, albeit at a higher level. Each project ends up being a new and transitory abstracted domain that is envisaged to promote personal growth. All projects have their own meaning outside of everything else. So, eventually, life is still understood as a fragmented life and it would be difficult to find a unified meaning to it (Murillo 1999). Although working through “projects” might be better compared with organizing education via subject domains, it is a tool that is only relevant when organizing a curriculum (a structural solution). A tool cannot be qualified as good by itself—aside from the use and purpose attributed to it by the person who uses it—but instead we can define something as “good” (tool or practice, or method, etc.) only insofar as (a) it serves a genuinely good purpose, and (b) it is being given to and used by a virtuous, morally mature person. In this case, the educator’s purpose, which is qualified as a

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good, is to educate students in specific virtues and ways of life that can enhance a good life and happiness. In brief, what we suggest is that if educators—and anyone who is involved in educating people (including policymakers)—have a wrong (or narrow, or distorted, or weakly coherent) perspective of education, they are apt to use and understand tools in an indifferent, or even worse, way. An example is the techno-rational application of tools and structures in education as if they were ends in themselves. On the contrary, the attitude towards the way of understanding (meaning making) of the educators— and any key stakeholders that relate to learners in an educational framework—is the main catalyst for human growth and transformation (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2011). Inspiring confidence and considering the growth of the student as a whole unity—a person who is trustworthy and valuable in herself—releases the human potential to grow within any curriculum structure. Indeed, the PISA studies and McKinsey report(s) show that the quality of an education system will never be above the quality of the educators. This affirmation is supported by the comparative empirical study of 20 different educational systems around the world. Even these reports show that any financial investment in education (buildings, marketing, resources such as technology, and any resource investment other than appointing and developing excellent educators) is not directly related to a real improvement in educational quality and outputs or outcomes (Encabo 2011). This is the view on education that enables prosperity and the flourishing of human beings, communities, and societies from within the IPS paradigm. In IPS, the subject matter is no more than a platform, which means that the main reference of every educational activity cannot be assumed as taken for granted or forgotten. Every subject matter and every discipline is/becomes a new opportunity to improve our personal relationships. Every event (such as a lecture, time for individual and team projects or at the schoolyard, meetings, and even personal and relational time students spend together after they leave the school or campus) is part of a specific educational experience. In this case, the different subjects are considered to be of equal importance, and there is not a sense that one particular subject or theory perspective will dominate others. So, maths is not more important than poetry, or philosophy (or philosophy of religion), or art class. Similarly, in a business school curriculum, courses on business management, finance, and economics would not be seen as higher in their educational value than ethics, human and personal development, business and society, or any other subjects, because they are all parts of the entire

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undividable educational experience. This means there is no longer a hierarchical classification of subjects as of first order, or core, and of second order regarding importance and their intended weight or influence in achieving growth and being qualified within a particular educational program or degree. Naturally each subject or project may indeed require different levels of effort and dedication in order to succeed, but the key point is that in every moment there is a complementarity and unidirectionality of how less demanding (easier) and more demanding (more difficult) subjects work to grow the person as a unity after having learned from all these. Understanding education from the IPS perspective does not mean changing the entire activity (and sets of activities), structures, and contents of education, but rather just re-thinking and further developing the various aspects of these when the newly understood holistic purpose and goal of education is not being served, or when it is not clearly respected. As noted in the case where activities, forms, structures, and content of education are working against, or not supporting, the purpose of education, the problematic matters should be changed. The purpose of education at all levels, through an IPS perspective, is to promote integrative human growth within the context of preparing human beings to participate in a society inspired by virtue and the sake of human flourishing or happiness. The promotion of human growth involves the systemic processual integrative growth (their self, understood as an integrated unity), while it is both the learners’ and the educators’ integrative growth that can only transform the learners and the quality of the educational experience. The entire organizational context (a school, a university department, or a faculty such as the business school, etc.) are in need of a more profound level transformation to become contexts for ethics and sustainability (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2015) through the promotion of personal and interpersonal growth in line with an IPS mindset (rather than “any” personal growth). We provide additional details in terms of activities that do not respect the goal of education consistent with an IPS view. Several studies show that what really motivates human beings (as persons, not just as mastersubjects) is not achieving rapid advancement up a career ladder of a profession, or increasing their earnings via wages and bonuses. It is rather the dedication, effort, and the consideration that others in a profession and society at large attribute to one’s work, and how one’s work helps others to respect themselves as systemically growing human beings and within a higher quality of relating (relating to the self and others in integrity) that has meaning in itself (Ariely, Kamenica, and Prelec 2008; Norton,

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Mochon, and Ariely 2012). Even in this research, the prospect of higher financial success has been found to have counterproductive effects on the person’s happiness when a cognitive activity is required. This means that many business and economics programs and departments are offering a type of education (when the key activities promote values such as financial success and career advancement narrowly seen) that does not support the growth of the overall person. Even in this case, some of the activities may remain the same, but a fundamental reorganization of the context, the environment, or “habitus” (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2015) within which these activities are being performed requires a transformation. We need to be concerned that all the means of education provide the quality required for persons to fit well within their internal relationships and within the holistic IPS-inspired educational context. How people (educators, administrators, deans, and higher administrators) “talk” about the goals of money, profession, and education, and even further how they genuinely understand these goals, is what makes a difference, and it is very important. To make evident the purpose of every activity is not something that can be taken for granted; even when one activity is maintained, it is its purpose that requires fundamental transformation for a transition from an AS to an IPS educational model. Transferability: depending on external (AS) or interior (whole person character) development (IPS) The issue of transferability is just a natural conclusion of acting from (within) the corresponding paradigm (of AS or IPS). Transferability refers to concerns as to whether students are able to apply (transfer) skills and knowledge beyond the classroom, to real life, and in a way that enables a lifelong learning and growth. This type of concern arises when considering each subject-matter as a domain in itself and the problem of how to apply (transfer) the acquired knowledge in one subject to another. This (ASinspired) way of understanding is often the dominant status quo in education for easier feasibility reasons, and assumes and proposes that teaching a subject should focus on the transferability of each disciplinary body of knowledge; this often leads to naïve and simplistic views against theoretical perspectives, based on the “quick and dirty” way to show that a certain subject or discipline can score well in reference to the relevant metrics (Pellegrino and Hilton 2013). From the perspective of IPS, it is evident that, if a discipline or any subject is not understood as a separate domain, the transferability of skills is not a real concern. Instead of taking such a surface-level approach to “showing,” transferability may instead

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jeopardize the entire integrity and quality (and the overall real transferability) of an educational degree as a whole. The issue of transferability is, in the end, an issue concerning human action. The problem of transferability (in the earlier examples whereby it is also accompanied by a weak vision of how to serve it, even more than in other cases) is, in fact, a consequence of a reductive vision of human action. If human action is being understood as a linear aggregation of different faculties, then the problem of the unification between them shows up. In AS, human action and the self are fragmented and nonunitary. When students learn under this mentality of aggregation of skills and faculties, they learn to act this way as if it were “normal,” while we suggest we need to introduce a new normative notion—that is, “a new normal” (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2015). If we teach, and more broadly educate, with the mentality of development of the unity of human action, learners will absorb to act as a unity, which is in itself transferable (acting as a unity is incongruent with a notion that one learns a skill in an educational context that needs transferring, hence the issue of transferability becomes entirely irrelevant). It is not the purpose of this book to develop a systematic theory of human action, and it is not even necessary since the foundational scholars of IPS provide extensive theoretical insights on the matter. Overall, IPSbased education understands the theory of human action according to nonrepresentational theories that support the unity of knowledge and action (for example, Frisina 2002). Consistently, we can infer that all the classical levels or dimensions relevant to knowing and acting are not independent faculties, but rather are interrelated. We are talking about the body’s faculties, cognition, emotion, and also about the social, interpersonal, and personal meaning and value systems and beliefs. All of them need to act as a naturally connected whole, as Aristotle understands nature. Any mental framework gives us one coherent way of understanding the world; one’s self, others (relations), and society at large. This conceptual framework is the basis for perception, cognition, and emotion. It is a basis for a way to live and act. It is the personal belief systems that provide the end goals and the means for a good life and enabling not only the flourishing for each person who acts, but equally all who are affected (irrespective if they are actively participating or not). This is what matters. In the IPS model, the belief system of the person is always active (and in processual systemic terms, while a person acts) under the paradigm of inter-processual life. In the AS model, however, the belief system is almost always disconnected and a stagnant outside (lifeless) abstraction, because it focuses on skills and abilities, as domains that exist separately and related only by an

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outside mental framework. In the IPS model, the skills and abilities are interconnected and connected with the valuing organismic process of the student’s inner experiencing process, while they are organically emerging from within systemic processual dialoguing between educators and learners (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2015; Rogers 1964). So when a student is in a different context, (s)he will act starting from within their own integrity—that is, they will be displaying a human action consistent with their own belief systems, and the relevant skills will be naturally present. There is a difference, for the purpose of education, between persons with a capacity for ethics, and persons with the ability to follow moral rules within any outside contexts of morality (Akrivou and Orón 2016). For this reason, in the IPS paradigm, the transferability is “naturally” done due to the overall educational frame’s being consistent with IPS. Praise and correction: person and outcome (value judgments) (AS) versus effort and process (inquiry) (IPS) The idea that the teacher–educator needs to utilize praise and correction in education has been widespread idea since the twentieth century (Burnett 2002; Conroy et al. 2009); we also know it should be contingent to context and used wisely (Becker et al. 1967). For example, it is important to bear in mind that regularly using praise for the intelligence of children, adolescents, or adults can undermine their motivation and even performance (Mueller and Dweck 1998). We suggest that the notion of a regular reliance on motivating people and developing habits via the use of reward and sanctioning conforms entirely to the AS model on how to relate to and manage human beings and students. In the IPS model, praise and correction, and broadly rewards or sanctions, are not so important for any outcome. Of course, students make mistakes, or the learners’ activities and coursework require feedback and corrections. But there are two very distinct ways in which to understand and make use of feedback in each model. Carol Dweck has performed a very interesting research study over 30 years that supports our suggestion that there are two very contrasting ways to educate based on how to behave towards students and the respective consequences (Dweck 2000, 2007). We apply this suggestion in the direct context of a classroom.

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We see clearly in this section that in this case AS and IPS are two entirely irreconcilable alternative ways of knowing and acting. In AS, the way to talk/understand is by making a statement or commenting involving judgment of the situation and growth. In the table above, we also included in the AS way of understanding when the educator sees and responds to the student–learner as an outside object that is not affected by the way the teacher relates to him/her. This approach to speech avoids growth—of both parties! It is as if what is being communicated is that the endpoint of growth is given and has been reached. In IPS, in contrast, the way to talk is different. First, the teacher– educator uses conversational learning and inquiry. One direct example is doing this by asking questions, but there are more ways in which it may be achieved. Also, here in IPS, the teacher–educator always refrains from assuming that something is “terminally” wrong with the student (as the student is not a fixed object but a person). Instead, the teacher–educator utilizes internal dialogue in the self and externally to explore and seek to recognize what is wrong with the process, or the very cognition and ways of understanding of the teacher–learner that gave rise to the previous (poor performance, for example) situation. In our table, we also included in the IPS way of understanding that the educator sees and responds to the student–learner from within a sense of respecting the uniqueness of the person and understanding his/her self as transcendental; the teacher uses internal reflection and inner contemplation to revisit and improve the way (s)he relates to the learner. In the case of the IPS mindset hence, the key is that the “door is always open,” while the teacher–educator actively becomes involved with how the student may be able to engage better. In this case, the educator is willing to grow and transform himself to help the student grow and to assist the growth in terms of the educational relationship. Growth, in IPS, as noted, is unrestricted, so the corresponding way to think and behave in IPS manifests this assumption on the self and growth. The way to speak in AS is moralistic and moralizing. The person or the task is qualified as “good or bad” by displaying a normative value judgment that is readily connected to a way of doing things (“bad”) versus another one (“good”). This way to speak is not only very disrespectful but is also a real mistake, because an error by the student is just that—an error. For instance, providing an essay that is poorly structured or analyzed is not a normatively bad thing or a normatively good thing; and the learner who provided the weak essay is not a bad person rather than a good person because of that. A correct activity is only a correct activity; it is not good or bad (activity or person) in normative terms. Moreover, in every level

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there is something that the student is not readily able to display; instead, it is through the educational process, the feedback, and the relationship with the educator that the student may learn and grow gradually to display what is learned. Motivation: external achievement (AS) or being motivated by common development (IPS) Every child learner is naturally motivated to grow and develop. If a learner has lost his/her natural motivation, this may mean that her/his nature has been damaged. Motivation is closely related with a personal encounter. The problem of motivation shows up in secondary school and in college years in a more remarkable way than in very early school age, or in much older adults. The literature of motivation acknowledges a long history in itself and regarding education (Gonzalez 1999). Instead of a systematic review of this literature, which is being done by other authors, in the context of this book we will point out the key ways in which AS and IPS diverge. Aristotelian and Polo’s ethics (Polo 1997) certainly show that the first issue to consider regarding human action is the end (telos) it is oriented towards. The ultimate end—happiness or human flourishing—is not eligible. However, means may be chosen. The means that may lead to happiness as pathways may differ according to the perspectives and needs of people involved. Human flourishing is closely related to giving meaning and depth to the human action. Polo, following Aristotle closely, discovered another factor that may be crucial to Aristotle’s discussion on the means–end relationship: the personal act. We have already criticized the desire to maintain the constitution of the self as a pre-existing (a priori) motif from any person’s action as insufficient (Korsgaard 2009). We have already marked differences between the order of needs and the order of personal calling. Polo extended Aristotle’s discussion on human nature, by distinguishing a nature based on necessity and a (potentially higher) personal nature. Accordingly, he stated that the order of necessity belongs to human nature, while the order of the calling makes human action a personal act—that is to say, it does not belong to the realm of human essence (equal to every human being) but exists with the personal, unique, and irreplaceable character of being a person. This extends Aristotle’s insights that motivation must be in line with nature—and internal to the self—by proposing a higher level of motivation (beyond needs or natural necessities) whereby the motivation comes from a calling that can give rise to personal acts of responsibility. Assuming as a practical definition of

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human beings Polo’s understanding of men as “the improver, perfectible” beings, human perfection entails the potential to reach a higher way of being for which a respective inner motivation may be required. This involves a more authentic and a deeper way of being that is still the same person but grown; so this motivation is about being motivated to become more deeply and more fully the self that I am now (Rogers 1961). Whereas it is true that people often desire/want and strive towards what they may lack or not have, this is not enough because to cover needs belongs to the order of nature and lacks a desire relevant to becoming a better (more grown) person. The latter motivation belongs to the personal act of being, which includes the wish to be better for another human being, in terms of being part of a higher quality of relationship with him/her to remain connected in intimacy. Sadly, in psychology this is often forgotten, since most motivation theories tend to focus exclusively on highlighting the appeal of good in cognitive terms (mental Contrast of motivation: be aware of the distance of the present situation and the wanted situation) and provide resources to reach it in behavior and action (Implement intentions: how to make decisions in order to achieve the goals) (Duckworth et al. 2011, 2013; Gollwitzer and Oettingen 2011). However, the desire for perfection is a basic assumption of psychology’s motivation theory. Besides, the dominant vision of psychology belongs to AS, and thus it prioritizes the enabling of resources at the level of the cognition and the will (self), but something as fundamental as the desire to improve as a person and in relation to specific others is often neglected or even forgotten. Valuing the “person”: conditioned upon other things (AS) versus unconditional (IPS) This section is closely linked to and flows from the previous sections, especially concerning motivation and the role of “praise and correction” in education. If we consider the latter, when the teacher–educator praises and corrects, the student–learner is making a direct or indirect connection between himself, the student, and anything that supports this connection for the benefit of the student’s potential to grow. In AS, the connection is indirect and often conditional on the achievement of other things; whereas in IPS the connection is direct, open, and unconditional (while responsibility in the context of freedom and openness are maintained). As Dweck shows very clearly (Dweck 2000), when the praise or the correction is focused in the person or the outcome, the student–learner feels that the relation with the teacher is due to the quality of his/her work.

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The problem is not the teacher or the teacher’s cognition, but rather that the external object–student may be good or bad (which is invoked by the reliance on normative values in AS models of correction and praise). Hence it is natural that the student–learner wonders (often with anguish and fear), “What is going to happen if my work is not ‘good’? Is my relationship safe? Will every error/poor quality be understood as something that jeopardizes the relationship and my personal growth potential?” Instead, in IPS, following some good relevant specialized literature (Caine, Caine, and McClintic 2005; Salas Silva 2003), we suggest that the term “relaxed alertness” is relevant. That education should be “relaxed” means that the relationships between teacher and student should be unconditional and, as Rogers explains (1951, 1961), there is not a direct threat or a clear rule or objective against which to measure if the relationship (the therapeutic relationship in Rogers’ work) is endangered, failing to qualify. No matter what happens, the personal relationship is always safe as personal growth in the context of education and cannot be conceived outside this inter-processual relational frame. It does not matter if the student fails in terms of the mark or input (quality of effort) or even if in behavioral terms there is a need for improvement or correction. In personal relationship terms, the key is to realize that the student–learner relationship must always be safe. The component of “alertness” in education makes reference to the fact that the reality is always a challenge. No matter how challenging difficulties are, the reality should not be hidden. It is not the same for a parent in conversation with his(her) child to say, “You have failed your exams, so you are going to be penalized and you will pass the weekend studying instead of hanging out with friends,” instead of, “You have failed your school marks, so you need to study more, and we are going to study together this weekend, and because of this and as a penalty you will hang out with your friends later.” Here it may appear that acting in the IPS mindset is hard, requiring a lot from the educator because the educator cannot educate in the distance, whether this is physical or personal. Teacher: an intrinsic role to personal growth (IPS) The figure of the teacher is frequently addressed in the educational literature as developing a specific role modeling of a facilitator of students’ personal growth. An example of this framework could be the well-known paradigm of scaffolding (Cummins and Gibbons 2002;

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Gibbons and Hammond 2005; Hogan and Pressley 1997). The teacher is supposed to perform a subsidiary function. Since the student is not selfregulated, the teacher should help him(her) (English and Kitsantas 2013). We do not entirely reject this vision (albeit that we will critique the notion of the educator as a contextual variable) because certainly some aspect of the role of the teacher–educator is to develop a transitory service. However, this is not the most important educator role. Besides, such a specialized proposition as the above (e.g., scaffolding) cannot guarantee in itself that the quality and values conveyed are in line with an IPS frame. It rather has to be placed in the proper context to make it consistent or inconsistent with an IPS framework. In this context, the school is not a theatre, nor a simulation of “real life.” Simply put, in IPS, the school, the university, and any educational setting is real life. The teacher–educator, who is at the center of the educational context, needs to grow while practicing this social and professional role (and, of course, the same is true for the students), as well as in every moment of his/her life. So for that to happen, the teacher should realize that the service he/she is developing is a possibility for his/her own growth and that growth is precisely what makes him/her able to catalyze growth in the students, taking into account their uniqueness. Every student needs to be treated as a person, and this implies that the teacher relates to him/her as the person he/she is. This makes the habitus of a classroom a relational– dialogic habitus, a dialogue between teachers–educators and students– learners, which is not abstract but rather implies intimacies; it creates an intimately personal dialogic relationship. This is why a relationship in the IPS model demands high levels of commitment and responsibility. Development: different areas or domains in the self (AS), versus different meanings and points of view (IPS) Regarding development, the starting point is how IPS understands the self and its development, which has been systematically exposed in the first section of the book, and summarized by tables 1 and 2 in Part I of this book. The given “normal” status quo way to understand the human development is through approaching the self as fragmentary, involving different domains or aspects of the self, whereby integration happens at some final point of development. In AS, personal development is focused on: promoting the cognitive development, emotional maturation, and psychosocial aspects of the self, and even its moral development. The “moral self” may be a component to add to the development of “the self as author” and the “self as master” (McAdams 1990a, 1990b) to make sure

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that self-mastery and authorship are not indifferent to moral and legal boundaries. These various “development areas” are mainly understood as independently existing in the AS paradigm, which also explains why the main psychological AS models of human development deal with the problem of integration usually as something that “suddenly appears” in the last stages (Akrivou 2008). In IPS, however, all the elements given above are understood just as different aspects, or points of view of a unitary self of the person, who remains an integrated being along all the trajectory of personal growth. Of course, the growth of a person as a free and open system is unrestricted and not a linear or stage process (refer back to our tables 1, 2, and 3 in the first part of the book). So, these elements that make up the richness and complexity of the self are not different realities in IPS. In IPS, development integrates cognitive, emotional, and intuitive growth as parts of the same growth and interrelated aspects of human cognition. Particular importance in human development is given to the emotional development of the person, not only as education in any case promotes cognitive growth, but also because emotion is central to conveying information that can channel and facilitate the personal growth process. The human being is born with a state of initial excitement, which does not have any emotion associated with it. As soon as the child starts to have experiences of himself and others in the initial state, the initial excitability reports pleasant and unpleasant experienced situations (Kolb 2015, 200; Jack, Garrod, and Schyns 2014). As long as the child experiences the emotions, he starts to classify them with more accuracy and richness and to make internal links between them. The environment of this experience is the personal encounters in education and broader life (Eilan et al. 2005), so that all the traditional domains of the human development are in fact a unique, unified growth of the human being as a unity. As a consequence, this natural relation between the classical areas of growth should be reflected in the way to educate. Emotional education: integration

emotional

regulation

versus

emotional

For a systematic analysis of how education can promote emotion integration consistently with IPS, in addition to the differences within the dominant approaches regarding emotional education that are consistent with AS, we refer the reader to the following section of this chapter. It is not possible to systematically show how this approach may reflect overall changes in the vision, purpose, curricula, and pedagogy of various

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educational levels dealing with a particular age group of students–learners who face specific age-related intimacy and identity challenges. While future works will develop and empirically test how relevant educational practices change, we highlight at this point that emotional development has an important place in the overall growth of the person who each student–learner is. As our concluding remarks for this section, we present five salient points regarding changes in education appropriate for the IPS paradigm: (1) Current understandings of education and related propositions that are based on the AS paradigm as the dominant platform are being premised upon a conceptualization of the person who does not respect the uniqueness of both the students–learners and educators– teachers. They often involve a concern for the student’s growth while understanding the role (and the role of the teacher–educator) as an external, neutral variable whose duty is to promote that growth. In contrast, IPS’s notion of education regarding the purpose of personal growth understands the learner as a unity but also considers the educator. The main premise in IPS is that the student’s growth is not possible unless the entire systemic growth of both teachers and learners happens. (2) The changes we are proposing demand first an overall shift in perspective on the role and purpose of education, based on an IPS mindset that also involves the need to take a step back and adopt a critical attitude towards education in the AS paradigm. Through this traditional perspective, some aspects of the educational vision, goals, and frame are problematic and pose challenges regarding the overall matter of “developed” human beings (in IPS terms). Growth and human action cannot be "fixed" with additions of elements or extra interventions added on an AS base. However, some of the proposed additions to the problematic AS frames of education may instead work well, once they are part of an IPS mindset regarding education. (3) Key aspects of AS and effects in the education and the growth of students–learners may work for a while, but they are not providing sustainable effects that enable lifelong and unlimited growth in human beings after they graduate from an educational degree. Hence, aspects of AS educational frameworks could instead be useful in the short term, while they are also efficient in financial

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terms and as a basis for evaluation against many (AS-inspired) current metrics of educational goodness and efficiency. However, they may be very problematic in the long run and even have unanticipated negative consequences insofar as they modify the notion of human nature, as well as natural and good ways to grow in covering needs while discovering a sense of purpose and a sense of responsibility. Of course, some of the suggested IPS educational frameworks and philosophies may be critiqued from the opposite perspective (weaknesses of IPS comprise its pertaining only to short-term effects, being more expensive at the beginning, and struggling to show efficiency when scored against the current given metrics that assess the quality and the outcomes of educational programs). (4) While the entire philosophy, goals, and purpose of education are

radically different from within the IPS mindset on education, specific “localized” good models, instruments, structures, and pedagogies that exist within the current view may be also relevant (albeit in a transformed meaning) within an IPS framework, and they need to be retained. Overall, various AS models may still exist as partial aspects of IPS educational models once it is clear that they have a role to play in a specific setting and design. (5) The entire educational frame and philosophy along with its design and activity need to be transformed, based on the IPS model. This involves major areas of action for which authority is required, as the IPS model would start from an entire set of education. Therefore, to implement the suggested educational changes, inspired senior administrators (heads, principals, boards of education, ministers of education, presidents/vice chancellors, deputy vice chancellors) and middle management (deans, department heads, and directors of teaching and learning) in schools and universities are required (Akrivou and BradburyHuang 2015), who understand and have the power and the vision to holistically implement an IPS perspective on education. Changes may not effectively start from pushing individual educators to adopt an IPS model. Let us finish with another metaphor. In this case, it is a cautionary tale. Two men were working in the quarry. Both of them suffer the same sweltering temperatures and the same bossy boss; they sweat the same;

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they carry the same heavy rocks; they earn the same; they work the same hours. And someone who accidentally went to the quarry approached one of the workers and asked, “What are you doing?” And the first worker said: “Here I am in this damn place, you see, all day breaking stones and bearing the unbearable. But what matters is that I am making a profit from them and we deliver excellent products based on the market rankings.” Then the visitor went to the second worker and asked, “What are you doing?” And he said: “Here I am building a children’s community center, and after this I am creating activities that may help with earning money to pay for a better future for my children, while educational practices are put in place in a way whereby all children, of all backgrounds, may learn to work and play. And in teaching them, I am every day a better and happier being because this is my life’s work and I love doing it. I feel I am partaking in the good purpose of helping to reduce bias and inequality in education and in society.”

There are, however, some issues within which AS and IPS remain irreconcilable. For instance, concerning the goals and purpose of education, it has been noted that AS and IPS are incommensurable ways of thinking and acting. As in the cautionary tale, a change in purpose changes everything. We conclude with an inquiry that forces each of us to take a personal stance in answering it. And in the same way educating and being involved in the various roles in education is very much about taking a personal stance (and acting accordingly, as in IPS cognition and action are not separate); we should ask, when this child leaves school, how will (s)he flourish, and what will (s)he remember as significant? What sort of change (growth) does the right answer to this inquiry require of me?

2.2. Emotional education as integration Emotional education in AS: emotional regulation The regulatory is the model of reference in emotional education in AS. Character education arises to fill gaps in the way of promoting the autonomy of the subject, as proposed by Rousseau and Kant (Bernal et al. 2015). The overvaluation of cognition and self-realization in personal development leads to relativism, which can be overcome by a revaluation of emotion and the contributions of positive psychology, with Seligman as the main reference. From this perspective, character education seeks to provide skills and capabilities, being examples of this revival of character education—though not in those words—in the SELF, which lies in Dewey, and CASEL, resting on Goleman (Bernal et al. 2015). Although these programs have been proved to be ineffective, they retain some value

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(Bernal, González-Torres, and Naval 2015; Vargas Villalobos and González-Torres 2009). We think there is a common denominator in all these proposals and different versions: they all rely, with different intensity, on regulation, as the best way to intervene. An important difference between them is the purpose of the regulation, but it is always accepted that the more general sense of “put under the rule” is regularly applied. The most prominent disadvantage of this perspective is that it seeks to make changes without even considering that the conceptual background may be wrong. In our opinion, since they conceptually belong to AS, an addition of values, virtues, or moral principles on this basis does not solve the problem. Some consider that the basis of autonomy is not enough, and needs to be completed in order to enhance the wellbeing (Cammeron, Dutton, and Quinn 2003; Duckworth, Steen, and Seligman 2005). Others find they need to add a set of values and principles (Bernal et al. 2015), which raises the issue of justification. Why is it necessary to add these things? And why were they not added before? We believe this cannot be arranged on AS grounds, but rather it needs an IPS perspective. In all these proposals, it is also easy to find that a reference to Aristotelian concepts of virtue and happiness is omnipresent, although not always consistent and sometimes just as a historical reference (Bernal et al. 2015; Cammeron et al. 2003; Moore 2015; Soledad and Chávez 2008; Vargas Villalobos and González-Torres 2009). Indeed, virtuous behavior is not something external to man, but rather human actions shape men’s character and are an essential part of being human (Murillo 2012). Goleman is the reference to positive psychology that dominates in the field of emotional education, from an AS paradigm, as shown in his regulatory view. “EI [emotional intelligence] includes self-control, enthusiasm, persistence, and the ability to motivate yourself … there is an old-fashioned word that encompasses all range of skills that integrate EI: character” (Goleman 1995, 28). We understand by positive psychology "the scientific study of positive experiences and positive individual traits and institutions that facilitate their development” (Duckworth et al. 2005). Thus, it seeks to remove suffering and achieves wellbeing, and it takes one more step that does not happen spontaneously. It highlights three domains: (1) domain of pleasure; (2) domain of the commitment; (3) domain of meaning (Duckworth et al. 2005). Positive psychology in the educational field has been consolidated by the Positive Organizational Scholarship (Cammeron et al. 2003), which is our main source at this part. We can affirm that the AS model is realized in

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emotional regulation, since it is the unquestioned intellectual background behind every author in this research line. These authors also try to take a step beyond positive psychology, not content with not-be-bad (implying to look for something else that entails not only avoiding bad being), to focus on flowering and personal development, following Aristotle: Our thinking here has been guided by the Aristotelian notion of eudemonia, which holds that well-being is not a consequence of virtuous action but rather an inherent aspect of such action. Virtues, at the individual or organizational level, may or may not have long-term desirable consequences—these are interesting empirical questions – but such outcomes are not what we mean by fulfillments. (Cammeron et al. 2003, 39)

However, their interpretation of Aristotle is not consistent with their proposal. They share an independent conception of personal and social virtues: “A second generative idea is that some virtues are, by nature, attributes of organizations, not individuals. The existence of social relationships and collectivities is a prerequisite to virtues such as peace, equity, forgiveness, justice, compassion, and love” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 30). In opposition, Aristotle considers virtues to be a system. Additionally, AS authors state that virtues are something that can be chosen: “For example, virtues are freely chosen and are often displayed irrespective of, or in contradiction to, organizational constraints” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 30). Virtues are not fulfillment in themselves, but rather they drive to fulfillment: “Virtues lead to human fulfillment even though they are pursued for their own sake (Aristotle’s eudemonia), not to obtain a personal reward or benefit” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 30). This is a utilitarian view of virtue. The same authors fall into a syncretism that, according to the content of the perpetrators, would be difficult to sustain: “At the same time, we see no benefit of strenuously documenting the unlikely thesis that positive social science is a mere footnote to Lao-Tsu, Confucius, Aristotle, Aquinas, William James, John Dewey, Carl Rogers, or Abraham Maslow” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 24). Moreover, the key terms they highlight are character strength, gratitude, resilience, courage, wisdom, and transcendence (Cammeron et al. 2003, 29), all of them in the realm of the AS paradigm:

x Hope is precisely defined as “a positive motivational state that is

based on an interactively derived sense of successful (1) agency

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(goal-directed energy) and (2) pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 253).

x Gratitude is “being aware of and thankful for the good things that happen” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 82). (It becomes AS in the context, with reference to the others.)

x Transcendence is the ability to overcome circumstances, opening a

new way thanks to self-control, target setting, decision making, self-management, and establishing transcendence products. “Transcendent behavior is self-determined behaviour that overrides constraining personal or environmental factors and effects extraordinary (positive) change” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 122–3).

x “A notion of courage that draws upon an individual’s ability to

reason and act based upon his or her internalized, intuitive, emotional, and cognitive dimensions of the highest values embedded in an organizational form” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 144). “Courage is a willingness to confront risk to do what one thinks is right” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 216). Courage is “to do what he believed was the right thing to do” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 217).

x “A strength is the ability to provide consistent, near-perfect performance in a given activity” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 114).

x There are moments in which the authors understand resilience as a

capacity for recovering, and other moments where it has a meaning closer to resistance. “Resilience refers to the maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 95); in any case, resilience is always one product of our self-reinforce: “Resilience is an outcome of the self-reinforcing nature” (Cammeron et al. 2003, 103).

Other terms used and not explained, such as faith and wisdom, show a very emotional and affective way of considering human experience; even love is considered a subjective experience (Cammeron et al. 2003, 267) or positive affect (Cammeron et al. 2003, 330). The paradigm for emotional education is profoundly regulatory (Cammeron et al. 2003, 190–92).

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Emotional education in IPS: emotional integration is integral part of the IPS cognition As we have already shown, we understand emotional integration as at the service of personal development. This is because as we underlined in Part I of the book and tables 1-3 emotion(al integration) is an integral part of the IPS cognition and not a separate or an opposing domain. Therefore, we seek at this point a different conceptualization of emotional management, leaving the regulation model and asking what is the proper situation of growth aside from the urgent need to do something. The new paradigm is integration, since its aim is to integrate the emotional reality in the global maturational development of the person so that the person can grow and perform personal acts of freedom and responsibility. We, therefore, propose the following definition: emotional education means to take a given emotional situation as a starting point to the personal growth paradigm within a personal integration. The word “integration” is also used in the model of emotional regulation as emotional integration, but with different meanings. For example, in the regulatory model, Bisquerra Alzina understands emotional education as an educational, ongoing process that aims to promote the development of emotional competencies as an essential element of the integral development of the person. That is, the result of the intervention is integration, which according to that model occurs at the end of the intervention, as happens when the focus is on emotional instead of personal items (Bisquerra Alzina and Perez Escoda 2007, 2012). In our proposal, the word integration is given a different meaning because integration is not what happens at the end; rather, it is related to the way things happen (Orón 2015b). Integration is a process rather than a result. Along with educational elements of direct emotional significance, this realization leads to our treatment of other issues that apparently seem far from the emotionally charged topics. In the person, everything has to do with everything from the beginning, and one aspect cannot be affected without affecting every other. Therefore, trying to generate a movement in one of them as if it were independent from the others is to ignore the systemic reality of human beings (Polo 2007b). Integrating entails a maturation in which different aspects and relations differentiate and optimize to the same extent to which they place themselves in relation to each other (Orón 2015b). To be rigorous, rather than talk about emotional education, we should speak of personal education, since the former term indicates a direct intervention in emotion, which is something “technical.” Direct

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intervention in the person’s emotional realm can be uniquely relevant when we are talking about pathological conditions, such as anxiety or depression, or in a healthy situation when we are talking about emergency situations that demand the self to do something immediately in an emotionally charged situation in order to avoid a situation of emotional rupture as described by Goleman (Goleman 2012). However, when it comes to serving the young in their normal growth situation, another paradigm is needed, since the regulator is not at the service of the maturation but exists to solve a problem. As we have already indicated, sensation seeking can be considered a moment of opportunities, not forgetting the vulnerability that entails (Dobbs 2011), since the young comprise as a group a great carrier of innovations for society (Ramon y Cajal 1898, 35, 115). To understand the basis of our proposal, emotional education as emotional integration, we need to start by asking: what is the personal situation and the challenge that we need to face in each moment of our life? And based on that answer, we proceed with the following question: what to do with the emotional issue? Let us consider these two steps. Following Erikson (1994), each age presents its own challenge.

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Emotional education should answer this question at each age: how are we going to understand emotional education so as to help the person in his personal growth according to the challenge presented at his age? For instance, in childhood, this might be achieved through what is called sensitivity education or education in amazement or wander approach (Carson 2012; L’Ecuyer 2014). This is well known since ancient times, as Aristotle noted: the need of being educated was, since youth, as Plato says, to please and grieve as they should, “something that” everyone has experienced since childhood, and so it is difficult to erase (NE II.3). This is proper emotional education, which seeks to promote some emotions and not others directly. In this case, it is to acquire sensitivity to certain events such that our emotions move us in the direction that does well. This emotional education should be related to aesthetic education, but it does not have a purely hedonistic value. Feeling good is not something objective, but to “please and grieve as they should,” which is to say, according to what is good for humans. In adolescence, we find that the neuropsychological maturation time span teen–young adult is standardized in the triad of executive functions, personal identity, and socialization (Blakemore 2008, 2012; Crone and Dahl 2012; Crone and Güro 2013; Pfeifer and Blakemore 2012). Executive function is an umbrella term that brings together a wide variety of operations such as decision making, comparison of alternatives, monitoring of action, inhibition of unwanted responses, and so on (Gomez and Tirapu-Ustárroz 2012). Executive functions should not be linked exclusively to the intelligence or control, because in truth they are present in all human actions, and the neural network that supports them—the frontoparietal network—needs to be recruited for almost any action or voluntary perception and even proactive involuntary perception (Zanto and Gazzaley 2013). Socialization and identity are particularly interdependent: the former emphasizes the issue of interpersonal relationships; the latter, self-understanding. Being young is linked with a sense of a stable foundation, which arises from a reality that is one’s personal family security. The child comes from the security provided by his family, and knows who he is thanks to family references. In adolescence, a new paradigm emerges, in which the adolescent discovers that, first, his relationships with his parents are not what they used to be; and second, his relationships with his equals are particularly intensified. These and other changes force a distinct identity, which needs to be re-understood. According to the way he understands himself in the new situation, he will define how to live his social relationships in a particular way.

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The focus in the young adult stage is intimacy, although traditionally AS has prevailed (as we can see in Perry). Young adults, according to Erikson, should rather focus on their unique challenge of knowing how to live the experience of intimacy or become isolated. Isolation refers to the failure of living an interpersonal relationship of “intimacy,” by living a superficial experience. When that challenge is well resolved, the ability to love is acquired (Erikson 1994). The relationship between identity and intimacy has been shown in large intervals of life (20–50 years) (Sneed et al. 2012) and especially in college years (Huang 2006). Each period should not be understood as a closed one, since all of them are related and every dimension is present in each period, but with a different intensity. Psychotherapy (Siegel 2013) also states they cannot be separated since all refer to identity, facing the question: “Who am I?” The question to be answered personally requires a metacognition of the person (to “think their thinking”), and this is related to the maturation of executive functions. But the question of identity arises when the young man discovers diversity and should take a particular position to answer the question of who he is. So we do not agree with Perry (1998) that the answer to diversity consists primarily in promoting commitments. The answer must be in terms of identity and intimacy, and from there, then, to meet commitments. Otherwise, commitments are disembodied because they are just based on what Perry calls “faith” (Perry 1998, 149–69). To take a position in diversity is preceded by resolving identity issues and interpersonal encounter from intimacy. In this section, we will not show how emotion education is understood in each period; our purpose is to show that a general conception of emotion education should not be applied to all ages, as has been done by AS, using models from adult development. What to do with the emotional issue? Our rethinking leads to leave behind the regulatory paradigm and pass to the integrator paradigm. Integration seeks emotional realism that happens in such a way that a person can develop his (her) life, feeling it as his (her) own, in the interpersonal encounter. This does not imply intervening directly and exclusively in emotion, but rather acting on all personal dimensions including, of course, emotional. Therefore, educational interventions on topics such as personal beliefs can be understood as a genuine emotional education, in which having a particular belief affects emotional behaviors (Dweck 2000) and resilience (Yeager and Dweck 2012). Carol Dweck has studied, over more than 30

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years, the impact of two types of beliefs: fixed and incremental. A fixed belief tends to be that we can change reality, but just very little. Since reality does not change as a result of my effort, my intelligence, my personality, my relationships, my personal situation are basically what they are and little can be done when I discover the limits in each sector. On the other hand, the incremental belief thinks that, with effort, help, rectifying mistakes, patience, generating alternatives and short-term goals, a real growth can happen. The author has studied these beliefs applied to personal intelligence, personal characteristics, or relationships. This has allowed her to discover that an incremental belief opens a positive emotional reaction to failure. Other authors point out that elements corresponding to the values or principles also have an impact on emotional experience (Tough 2013; Vargas Villalobos and González-Torres 2009) or the importance of ethical dimensions in relation to emotion (Narvaez 2007, 2008). All this would confirm that human being is a system instead of a mere sum of parts, where everything is related to everything. This is changing the way of thinking about emotion itself. Whereas the regulatory model enhances that emotion is the cause of comfort or discomfort and because of that is interested in having it under control, the integrator model emphasizes that emotion is an effect, the result of maturing growth, so the intervention is not on the emotion, but on the process of personal growth. The emotion is seen as the effect of a certain way of behaving in a particular context. This claim that the feeling is fundamentally an effect needs to be explained. The sentiment is understood in the model of emotional integration in two senses: the effect and the trend. Let us consider these briefly (for further development see Orón 2015a) According to Polo, “a feeling is information about the advisability of one object to the faculty” (Polo 1988a, 276). The power is updated when a specific operation, called a concrete object, occurs. This update is not indifferent to the authority (Sellés 2010, 109). Feelings may be positive or negative depending on what has happened to the faculty, but positive or negative is not directly associated with pleasant or unpleasant. This view on the feeling—as the confluence of the act, the faculty, and the object—was introduced by Aristotle (NE 1174b.15–20). The feeling is something that “follows” the confluence of the act, the faculty, and the object. There will also be many feelings and states of the faculties. Feelings constitute indirect information because we report not an object, or an act, or a faculty, but the given relationship between the three elements. They address where we “stay” rather than who we “are” (Polo 1988a,

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276). Therefore, feelings cannot serve to measure the real, either to base ethics or to be the basis of decision making, and not to make judgments of the person. The person is more than his intelligence, his will, and his feelings. Emotions, in this respect, give us information, so we have to know them well, but that does not mean that we should let ourselves be carried away by them automatically. The second meaning of the feeling is as a trend, or “a form of control” (Sellés 2010, 110) that encourages one to continue in the same way or to make a change in the operation running. But this, too, does not mean that decisions should be taken based on feelings. They should be considered, of course, but also related to other elements such as personal belief systems (Orón 2014). Therefore, the educational action proposed by the emotional integration is for a person (learner) to make a journey of personal knowledge, trying to get all the information locked in sentiments and to promote decision making on a broader framework, which is personal growth. Emotional integration should not focus on techniques of selfcontrol, since that is not the goal—personal growth is. The regulatory model tends to have goals such as self-esteem and wellbeing. In contrast, for the integrative model, self-esteem and wellbeing are no longer targets. This does not mean they do not have their place in it. In the integrative model, welfare provides an environment in which to carry out an educational intervention, but it is not its end. Self-esteem becomes, in the integrative model, another indicator of personal evolution that has to be combined with others such as responsibility or free personal delivery. The aim of the integrative model will support the person to renew its identity and open to an interpersonal encounter. This presents some problems for neuropsychology, which clearly discovers that welfare does not cure any wounds but requires cognitive reevaluation (Denkova, Dolcos, and Dolcos 2014; Ricciardi et al. 2013). Reevaluating cognition is not controlling the emotion, but rather promoting a change of personal existential state, where personal reality is valued from a different perspective according to one’s beliefs. The re-evaluation is reassessment, which requires emotion and beliefs. We have already noted that there cannot be a cognitive exercise without emotion, and there is no emotion without cognitive exercise. Therefore, cognitive assessment ends up being re-growth in the way a person understands/feels about herself. Another element that leads us not to consider wellbeing objectively is found in the evolution of life. The appearance of emotion seems to be in order to further knowledge of the individual situation and better evaluation of reality, for memory and decision making rather than the emergence of

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hedonism (Narvaez 2008; Perlovsky 2013). We do not have emotions to be good, nor for our life to be well resolved. Wellbeing should be for more than just to be fine. The integrative model understands that any emotional situation is good to take a step forwards in personal growth. Therefore, the educational intervention is based primarily on making the first path of knowledge of all the information enclosed in the feeling in order to return to solve the situation in terms of an elementary but important question: ‘What kind of person do you want to be?’ And we invite readers to answer this question taking into account the particular situation of each age. It is necessary to discover the importance of the acts we perform, so acting is not a matter of defining a behavior, but rather, a way of being.

CHAPTER NINE IPS APPLIED TO GOVERNANCE AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

1. Inter-Processual Self and Governance In the two sections of this chapter, we contextualize and relate our theoretical proposal (inter-processual self) to governance and business management. This is an important life sphere influencing the common good and eudaimonia via various kinds of institutions. The institutions have distinct or overlapping authority affecting the common good at various national and international levels in the political and social organization of communities locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally, as well as at the level of the economy (business organizations). Throughout this section we associate AS and IPS paradigms of self, action, and human growth with governance across various forms of institutions governing “polis,” and we suggest related conceptions of work and agency that correspond to the ways in which AS and IPS contrast in how governance is understood and practiced in its structural, organizational behavior as well as its role and representation-related aspects. We start by introducing the concept of governance in the related literature, the notion of the common good in governance, and then we continue by associating these concepts with the theory of self, action, and meaning making inherent in our proposal (IPS) versus competing conceptions (AS).

1.1. Introduction Governance is associated with some notion of leading authority and choices involving means–ends relations with regard to following some definition of the good and justice. The word originated in the Greek word “kyvernao” (to steer towards an end goal) and carried over to Latin as “gubernare” (to govern, to steer). Governance is also directly from the

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(classical and modern) Greek “kratos” (state/authority), “krateia” (rule), and the suffix “kratia” (authority).Indeed, excellent governance ensures sustained human growth (which captures both personal and broader systemic growth for all parts involved), while poor governance diminishes and hampers it. We propose “building bridges” across various forms of “polis” (local, national, and international level institutions). In our everyday life, a wide array of institutions whose work and mission involve exercising some form of government co-exist and have become a very fundamental life sphere and process guiding public life. Indeed, the types of institutions and the forms of governance they represent form a quite dense and often overlapping landscape in which legitimacy is drawn from various political and social communities serving the Aristotelian polis (McCall 2016). Not until late in the twentieth century did the notion of governance and its importance receive renewed attention from civil society, agencies, social and organizational scientists, and philanthropists. So this presents a clear difficulty in terms of relating the debate regarding existing forms of government and their conceptions of governance today to a theoretical, normative proposal (in our case, our proposal linking the self, and knowing–understanding and action). In the empirical sphere, there are some attempts to understand governance from within institutions that partake in global governance and from within academics in the governance literature, and we will refer to each of these briefly. Regarding the first group’s effort to understand and define what is good governance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offered a policy paper in 1997. In this, governance is defined as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority …. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (quoted in UNDP 2006). Other international institutions, such as the World Bank, associate governance with a set of choices and methods through which political power is exercised and how the value underpinning nations’ political, economic, and social resources for development is managed (UNDP 2006). Some academic colleagues who empirically study governance state that excellent governance is about enabling a capacity for recognition and responding to issues that allows stable and inclusive societies via core values (Mingus and Horiuchi 2012, 116). Others emphasize that governance legitimizes choices involving power structures, sources, and ideology that lead to some groups and participants benefiting more or less

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from a certain way, method, culture, or structure/process of governance and the intended and unintended consequences tied to these (Frederickson 1997). Continuing from there, other academic colleagues stress normative aspects of governance, suggesting that it is tied to ethical choices relevant to competing ways of valuing (Stout 2013, 2014). This leads much of the related literature to orient itself towards research that aspires to discover descriptively which are the most appropriate superior governance forms enabling spaces for negotiating competing moral values between communities affected and whereby these allow compatible trade-offs, compromises, and choices (for review, Stout and Love 2015, 2013). Negotiations and trade-offs regarding moral values are linked with the notion of a society of control (Love 2013); authors here establish governance theories on the grounds that they have a static and mechanistic understanding of existence, while alternative theories that pose a radically collectivist approach to governance are also critiqued (Stout and Love 2016). These definitions and approaches to the topic emphasize the problem of conflict and control in the way of understanding governance and its usefulness, whereby via the governance aims to function as a sphere which restores an equilibrium in society via enabling stability and inclusivity (Mingus and Horiuchi 2012), or a chosen way to resolve and control the dominant value choices in society (Love 2013, Stout 2013). However, there are very few attempts by scholars in this literature towards new proposals on governance which overcome the weaknesses of the empirically observed “modern” types. One of the new proposals (Stout and Love 2013) is focused on empirically synthesizing existing types of governance (2013; i.e. the four existing ideal so-called Atomistic, Holographic, Fragmented, and Institutional governance types) and via a synthetic Hegelian method arrive at an abstract higher-level-type which they call “integrative”. This proposed higher type is according to the authors a “superior” relational process ontology because its creation comes from leading edge theoretical work synthesizing all other types, and it fits the current contexts (Stout and Love 2015). This work involves useful debates, arguments, and inductive analysis of existing governance types. But in our view, an aspired proposed synthesis method as a way to resolve the problem of good governance is about has some challenges. First, it does not consider irreconcilable tensions and differences that distinguish the current forms and types of governance due to historical, cultural, and diverse philosophical groundings from which they originate. Second, in the proposed solutions (e.g., in Stout and Love 2013), a significant effort is focused on one

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universal ideal type assuming an external shared universal point of reference for all societies and geographies regarding what is good involving issues such as sources of power (e.g., oligarchy, democracy, various forms of authoritarianism, or hybrids), power structure (e.g., valuing integrative governance, or separation, or federalism as an ideal), and also the ideological basis of governance (e.g., republic vs. monarchy, authoritarian vs. libertarian, statism vs. anarchy, globalist vs. local) and its ontological and normative basis. Our effort here is to understand what excellent governance entails and to suggest that (morally) good governance enabling the common good is associated better with our proposal (IPS) than with AS. We start with some observations. All various kinds and forms of governance that we have summarized are legitimate forms deriving legitimacy from some form of political, moral, and social community as noted. A shared purpose can be that all governance forms seek to achieve a common good that logically should be a broader systemic level of happiness for all involved communities and persons. On the other hand, a real problem becomes the question of how to collaborate in an inclusive way, which enables a commonly shared governance work effort involving the search of optimal pathways (means) to the shared telos of life by all who partake (eudaimonia) and not exclusively to the members of the governance sphere. However, our proposal understands governance not as a technical matter or a chosen “rule” (a type of polity, a choice of specific competencies, skills or abilities for the office holders) nor as an end in itself. As various forms of governance arise from diverse philosophical, cultural, ideological, and so on, choices guiding its structure, leadership, and decision-making processes, their agents who collaborate within and across these are influenced in different ways to answer evaluative questions about how ethically good choices of means–ends relations are possible. Our proposal regarding how to resolve the issue of governance is premised on how we answer the question (what morally-practical superior governance is about) depends on the way we understand the self and relations, as well as human action and implications on who we are and how we develop as moral beings. Hence, we seek to emphasize a theory of morally good agency and action via governance. Our proposal seeks to restore an inclusive theory of governance which builds bridges and enables for the common good and which allows a collaborative process of growing relations which is being exercised across the various institutions which cohabitate our political communities at various levels. This also involves

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the bridging across the cultural, philosophical/normative, epistemological, power/ideological differences. Also, an important observation is that the modern conception of governance as representational and as premised on a hypothesized social contract (Sandel 2010, MacIntyre 1988) legitimizes an exclusive understanding of governance, in that it is considered a legitimate entitlement of mainly all who hold office. Instead the basis of our proposal is strikingly different; it is based on an understanding of governance as inclusive and as naturally a part of human nature, as being a zoon politicon (Pol. 1, 21253a) is for us essentially tied to our shared human nature, in agreement with Aristotle in the above reference. This consequently means that governance must be thought of as inclusive to all persons (citizens) because it serves as a way to further grow (improve) our nature and our relations, via a shared seeking of ways we can all prosper and attain happiness without winners or losers. Such would be the telos of governance, while we consider this telos a very realistic quest and not an abstract ideal one. Some of the current academic works and efforts to synthesize existing models of governance involve a juxtaposition of alternatives assuming (perhaps due to the empirically derived nature of this data on existing governance typologies) that inseparable dualisms exist at some level to start with. One sharp dualism is a perceived separation (contrast) between the individual happiness versus a more shared, social level of flourishing. Valuing one over the other results in different political ideologies and values regarding governance. Indeed, we know that this perceived dualism is rooted centuries back, examining the social and economic history and the history of knowledge and philosophy since the early modern times (for details, refer to González-Enciso 2016; Scalzo and Alford 2016). At the time of writing, we often associate the person with being an individual subject–agent who has to rationally pursue one’s self-interested aims in a narrowly individualistic way. Such perception of individuals means that once associated with a given group, there is an irreconcilable division between the in-group and the out-group, which also means an assumption of antagonistic and competing cross-group interests and conflicts which are always linked with a pursuit of power. This is often contrasted with the notion of a more socially driven (impersonal, or depersonalised) action associated with seeking “the good” and flourishing in the broader social realm with an aim to replace the person(s) who partake in polis with an impersonal notion of the social and authority. Unfortunately, often this latter leads to legitimizing some notion of the good that is a certain majority’s good (the greater good) or the good of some groups within the

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population (e.g., we know that the minority of tremendously rich elites globally became richer during the decades of global neoliberal capitalism; or a failed effort to replace this with a communistic notion of the greater good). However, we know the common good is something different (Melé 2009). Speaking in more practical and simple terms and with common sense in this section of the book, it means to ensure the goods that ensue are goods in common. It is the commonality of these goods for all involved persons/citizens and groups, therefore, that ensures good governance. Therefore, a key challenge involved is to ensure decision making and action that facilitate the shared capacity for co-orientation of all involved, which translates into virtuous human action oriented to the making of the Aristotelian notion of common good (MacIntyre 2007) and the broader Aristotelian–Thomistic traditions on the common good (Pinto 2015). We, therefore, understand the problem of excellent governance as one associated with the notion and the rationality of the common good (Pinto 2015), which ties harmoniously together the notion of personal and broader collective flourishing and involves both personal and collective shared action on the basis of friendship, sociability cooperation, and a caring for personal and others’ fulfillment. We disagree with the utilitarian construct of the greater good (or the good of the majority) whereby every governance model produces winners and losers; also what we argue here is sharply opposed to the increasingly popular idea since the later capitalism phases from the 1980s onwards establishing a morality that governance is an amoral, rational technocratic task that must be performed by amoral or “neutral” agents (Akrivou and Sison 2016). Hence on this basis too, in our proposal, it is entirely meaningless to start conceptualizing models that identify or separate governance effects, benefits, and outcomes whereby “my own good”, “your own good”, “another group’s good,” and “the collective good” are thought of as separate and distinctive, fragmented domains. As noted in the first part of the book, our understanding of the notion of personal flourishing does not merely capture descriptive notions of happiness associated with seeking to feel good/positive affect (joy, excitement, actualization) and avoiding feeling bad (sadness, fear, shame) as ends in themselves. Instead our understanding of personal flourishing is consistent with an Aristotelian understanding that it is primarily a normative–evaluative question that aims to the choice of personal action oriented towards “being a good person,” which involves the unity of virtues and emphasis on moral–practical aspects of character. So

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especially the moral–practical aspects of IPS action, which ensure the Aristotelian phronesis, are emphasized here. These observations serve as a starting ground regarding how to associate AS and IPS paradigms of self, action, and human growth with governance as a critical life sphere, and related conceptions of work and agency. As noted earlier in this book, the so-called “autonomous self” (AS) and the “inter-processual self” (IPS) offer two contrasting paradigms of moral character maturity that give rise to opposing kinds and qualities of moral valuing and meaning making (Akrivou and Orón 2016) and corresponding action/agency contextualized in governance. We suggest that being a person more akin to either the AS or the IPS paradigm predicts and influences how personal responsibility related to improving relationships and roles in and via governance is understood and lived. We start now by presenting how AS approaches governance. Later we show how governance is approached from within the IPS paradigm, which requires a complete abandonment of AS action logics. At that point, we support the analysis pertinent to our proposal with a presentation of keywords in the works of philosophers of relevance that contextually are useful for associating the IPS paradigm with theory and approaching the act of governing and governance of the “polis.” Then we discuss the implication of these and how they translate to IPS conceptions of agency, action, and relations in governance; and how these contrast with the AS’s action logic in governance.

1.2. Governance in the AS paradigm The “autonomous self” (AS) as an ideal type is valuing the self as an autonomous and rationalist subject-agent, or an autonomous subject seeking ways for the mastery of various domains and relations involved in governance. In the AS the aim is to grow via the mastery of the object world, choosing some form of strategic action which fits the subject-agent by a rationally calculated self-interest. In this section, we provide some presuppositions guiding how governance is conceived and designed within the AS paradigm, and how AS in governance key roles practice governance, and we see these two as interrelated. The presuppositions under the AS paradigm about understanding governance as an aspiration to some abstract ideal aiming to harness and control human nature. AS is likely to understand governance as a technical field outside human nature and with a legitimate mandate to legislate, act, and coordinate human activity with the aim to master and discipline the natural tendency of men. For it being human is feared and doubted as

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something anarchic, catastrophic, and entailing the notions of separation, fragmentation, and antagonism. This dates back to the key philosophers of reference, namely Descartes, as presented in the first part of our book. Therefore, an approach towards governance in AS aims to create mechanisms for mastery and orderly management of the governance process that may be entrusted to groups of experts, or elites, or even many specialized public servants. In AS the notion of diversity– which is inherent in being human– is experienced as a battle across domains which are thought of as incommensurable. AS is oriented towards the reduction of risk and the notion of security, a sense of control exclusively tied to the sphere of governance. The key words here are “management” and “mastery,” which also entail forms of organizing governance that aim to manage risk and uncertainty, and to discipline human nature. Conflict in AS is understood as a battle of wills (of autonomous subject-agents and the interests they represent). Negotiation is seen as the technical-rational way to resolve this issue and governance aims to facilitate and master this process. Being (seen) as an amoral and technically excellent occupant of the governance sphere is a rule which maintains the legitimacy of the governance– and its exclusivity–irrespectively of the degree to which it actually produces winners and losers. Here negotiation is not a moral act but rather a mental practical–technical game between various players who rationally adjust strategies and positions seeking to maximize wins and minimize losses. This approach, therefore, involves a heavy reliance on moral rules, imperatives, the mastery of the relevant conventions, and a reliance on formal or tacit codes to be followed. Also the key emphasis on forms of rational excellence that support this (AS) approach to governance emphasizes technical knowledge (technai in Aristotle), and hence practical and technical rationality is the form of rational excellence associated with conceptions of work and agency– action that demonstrates excellence in governance in AS. A key issue in the process of governance involving the AS paradigm applied in governance is how to overcome the subjectivism linked with the liberal democratic pluralist expression of diverse values and “wills,” via some scientific and technical (impersonal) approach to help synthesize disagreement. AS governance has therefore a rational solution for this challenge that emphasizes practical–technical reason. The solution is the AS inspired notion of governance premised upon majority–minority rules, the authority of representation, and the notion of positional and hierarchical legitimacy combined. This can assist AS in the choice between two approaches to governance, as set out below.

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The first option brings AS close to a choice of action valuing an amoral form of practical–technical judgment decision process in resolving governance dilemmas and in promoting action via the authority of the will of all who represent key and senior governance roles in key institutions. It has been explained why (Howse 1997) understanding of prudential action as a purely practical–technical form of rational excellence often renders governance morally blind in that any particular solution or choice involving the relations between the means and the ends pursued assumes that the basis of beliefs of all who are affected should be the same. Hence (albeit not always intentionally or intending to act with vice– panourgia), AS tries to control and cancel the diverse bases of beliefs in all human communities involved. This way to action in governance associated with the mindset of AS values agency, and action and related approaches relevant to the job and organizational design that appear close to the position of the “neutral” third-party observer who applies bureaucratic clinical rationality and rules to resolve technical issues of disagreement. Instead, the emphasis should be on an ethical–practical judgment or phronesis, a form of rational excellence that Aristotle associates with action (praxis). For this sort of rational excellence, a bare emphasis on techno-rational action is unfortunately associated with vice (panourgia) and not just with virtue precisely because it does not emanate from the unity of moral character of the person who acts (Scalzo 2017). The second alternative brings AS more closely akin to the service of liberalist modern values via elevating the art of rational (albeit amoral) negotiation as a way that inspires conceptions of agency, work, and role and organizational design in governance consistent with the AS paradigm. Here, dialectics are adopted as the best approach alongside a valuing process without strong normative foundations regarding the ethical and practical limits of process (Mutch 2016). Negotiation from processual dialectics governed by discursive rhetoric can take two forms: it is either a rationalist kind whereby strategic planning rules (corresponding to ARS); or it is more opportunistic and of a relationist kind whereby strategic action and alliance building is preferred (corresponding to APS). These two forms of AS are both aiming at gaining power on the basis of mastery over competing interests without a clear teleological consideration and invite for ways of being and acting which maintain autonomy and a sense of mastery and control. We concur with Sandel (2010) on his analysis that the liberal idealization of consensus is not the morally best nor the most effective way to approach ethical–practical aspects of life and governance more broadly. Rational negotiation requires compromises that are not value free and most often produce winners and

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losers. However, it also aspires to an ideal whereby a win–win outcome is, mentally, always a possibility in how problems of conflicting understandings, needs, interests, and ways of perceiving the good and the choice of relevant means are finally resolved. The problem here again is that it is assumed that either negotiation is based on a shared basis for beliefs and ways to understand reality, which is not true as there are diverse and complicated sources for ethics and morals guiding what is good and how to go about it, or dialectics are valued as an ongoing process with an amoral or unclear teleological purpose. AS governance in both its forms is less likely to inquire on the ethical implications of our actions back to who we are and how relations (and trust) are being affected. As we saw in our book’s part I in AS integrity is considered as a domain in the self which is relevant only at some later point in life and action. AS approaches governance via action logics that emphasize practical– technical mastery in agency, and depends on who are the “players,” their relative power, and in how to best “play the game” with an emphasis on the outcomes (winning, or winning as much as one can win without losing much). On the one hand, this is not morally and practically enabling personal and relational moral development of character, for reasons explained by virtue ethicists such as Koehn (1997). Playing well in governance under a conception emphasizing dialectics and the mastery of the art of negotiation, therefore, involves a practical and technical ability mastery. AS’s purpose of negotiation is to win as much as possible a majority of goals that maximize autonomously the interests supported by each involved AS agent. Generally AS values “risk” calculation and avoidance models and relevant action towards respecting and coevaluating means and ways of valuing that can only ensure win–win outcomes for all involved and serve the self-fulfillment of all. This kind of deliberation as negotiation will always try to simulate the intelligence of artificial intelligence because the reality is that robots can then still play better and win over human beings, so as a conception of human action it has further troubling ethical implications that are not part of our focus here. So in AS when the mature moral agency is a presence, there is a preference for rule-oriented ethics (Sandel 2007) aiming to control the excessively autonomous conception of agency that underlies AS. Rule based normativity is based on ensuing principled action in governance and on maintaining an exclusive separation of the governance sphere from the sphere of life and the notion of politics as a shared responsibility.

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Often, AS agency is inspired or guided by a utilitarian approach, or a quest of an ideal of freedom: this assigns governance the task of ensuring the welfare of a majority of stakeholders, and sets out clear choices for minority or vulnerable stakeholders in making sacrifices for the prosperity of the majority (Sandel 2010). It emphasizes a way of capturing moral valuing that has clear legitimacy among the governing elites and its political representation in society (e.g., a utilitarian framework that ensures the greatest good, prioritizing questions of efficiency and quantifiable aspects of the good). An implication of the AS mindset is that it does not actually build shared pathways whereby the involved parties personally dialogue with one another, generating to find and seek together a broader set of choices and options for all involved, and it is weak in understanding and pursuing the common good. AS governance may instead invent a synthetic process of representation or accept technical solutions, whereby differences are being resolved without the meaningful personal involvement of all who are affected. The AS conception of moral agency in governance has influenced conceptions of ideal governance based on economic and broader rationalities (Weber 1956a, 1956b; Scalzo 2012) that have inspired a broad swath of liberal Western societies and economies in the twentieth century.

1.3. Governance in the IPS paradigm As noted in the first part of our book, IPS understands and values the singularity and uniqueness of being human assuming openness and freedom for (Polo 1998a, 2007a). Key assumptions tied to IPS are that we are fundamentally relational (co-existence with); we are able for an intelligent generation of alternatives when in dialogue with each other (personal freedom); our agent intellect allows us personal knowing; and we grow via choices made in a dynamic process of giving and receiving without losing freedom in the process (personal love). IPS is about (re)learning to be a person while integrating the nature and the subjectagent fundamentals. How IPS “sees” and lives the relations and how IPS understands and resolves the problem of governance can be summarised along the following lines. IPS is confident in and about relations and values and enjoys the wonder in the process of life, which is fundamentally that life involves political action. So IPS governance involves an inclusive notion of governance that aims to build bridges for the common good via a participatory-relational moral growth process. The common purpose involves a shared responsibility for all who partake to figure a way to

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resolve differences which elevates personal and relational growth premised upon the nature of each person. It aims to enable the common good, which does not leave out anyone and figures out ways to live in common which do not produce winners and losers. IPS governance is modelled upon the common growth of everyone especially via practicalethical reason, in a moral dialoguing relational process. . All our referenced philosophers are relevant to what we have noted so far, but besides Aristotle’s work on his Politics (Aristotle 1995b, 1941) and the foundations he sets in his Nicomachean (and Eudemian) Ethics (Aristotle 1985, 1995a), not all our philosophers have explicitly talked about how key concepts may be applied in politics and the governance of the polis (public and social community and life at national/local, regional, and international/global levels). As our analysis later in this chapter is only applying fundamental concepts from all philosophers by extending their work, it is useful to make a recollection here of key concerns and constructs in the philosophical works that ground our proposal, and only then to use these creatively for analysis and discussion. Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics first, and then in his Politics, explicitly argues that a theory and approach to governance must be rooted in virtue ethics assumptions, whereby the following observations apply: (a) Excellent governance is not about a concept or model in abstraction, but its presupposition is its normative locus in virtue ethics assumptions. Briefly, therefore, for Aristotle the normativity inherent in the notion of excellent governance is rooted in the personal moral–intellectual virtue of all who partake in governance, and the idea of virtue in character requires a contemplative life whereby genuine and systematic practicing of moral inquiry enables ethically–practically wise action in persons and collectives (NE X.7 1177b; X.8 1178b, 1179a). Hence before we talk about governance, we have first to understand and accept the assumptions of virtue ethics that are given in the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1995a). Then, Aristotle opines that, (b) although it is human nature (NE 1177) and therefore it is morally good for (wo)men to strive towards their own personal selffulfillment and (the form of) happiness (Aristotle 1995a) to further develop their nature well, governance is a very important life sphere because it extends our nature that is not self-sufficient (NE 1179a). Aristotle’s understanding of politics is therefore that the

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governance of the polis had to be designed and exercised acknowledging that it is part of the human nature in Aristotle’s emphasis on man as a political and rational animal by nature (NE 1177; NE 1094). This means for our proposal that governance as a life sphere is not an activity that is exclusively tied and allows onesided power and authority confined to the elites. Instead, it means that governance is a requirement for inclusive and collaborative administration with an emphasis on quality relations between interacting persons, aiming to enable the wellbeing and happiness of all. Partaking in this, exercising an ethic for mutual virtuous conduct, and showing a genuine care and empathy for other fellow citizens or administrators are important stepping stones in the process of personal and interpersonal and systemic ethical character development. This inter-processual ethical growth is the kind of human growth that enables true happiness via gradual coorientation of all involved in good and meaningful means and ends choices and relations. Subsequently, Aristotle goes on to define that, (c) excellence governance means specifically ethically–practically good governance that enables the creation of ethical knowledge and action and whereby it must be linked to teleological concerns, so that we can ensure it serves both the personal and the broader selffulfillment enabling the flourishing and the happiness of all involved (eudaimonia) (NE 1177a). Thus, regarding the key question, “What is governance for and what should be its purpose?”, we suggest that it ought to be the ultimate end of human life, which is flourishing (eudaimonia). Accordingly we recommend that governance’s telos according to eudaimonia should be the process enabling the real welfare of all involved beyond national/local, ideological, demographic, or any other dividers, and requires empathic understanding, relationality, and care for other fellow human beings (closely related or distant to us), which means also the capacity for benevolence (from the Latin bene-volere). Indeed, the Aristotelian concept of happiness, eudaimonia (NE 1177a), is the proper object of politics (NE 1094), of which governance is part, to ensure the common good. In the paragraph under (b) above, we see that Aristotle associates human action to understand and practice excellent governance with human nature that is perfectly reasonable, as we know its centrality in the Aristotelian thought. The Greek philosopher presents life as a continuing

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line that links all organisms harmoniously in a shared flourishing. Therefore, another keyword for us in this chapter is the notion of “nature” (NE 1177). Translating this to governance in terms of our proposal (the IPS paradigm), the wellbeing (personal self-fulfillment in Aristotle; see 1995a) and the flourishing of all species and the broader system consisting of living and non-living human and non-human organisms are integral to governance in our model, which binds broader humanist ethos and ecological responsibility as sine qua non. Finally, there is Aristotle’s emphasis on friendship as part of the higher goals of human existence; indeed, for Aristotle, it is more vicious to neglect the needs of a friend and a brother than the needs of one who is a stranger (Aristotle, NE 1160a). As we show later, a human action exhibiting phronesis, which values friendship, or close collaboration more broadly (Melé 2012), is a critical part of the IPS model applied to governance in the broader polis (and in business, as we suggest in the next subsection). Therefore, for the IPS conception of governance, friendliness and friendly collaborative ethos that guide human beings and collectives how to understand and conceive what excellent moral–practical agency is about are higher-level goals that must be ensured by governance for the common good in all who partake and all who are directly or less directly affected. This is so because enabling the growth of bonds of friendship between fellow humans without boundaries (geographical, racial/demographic or social, national/international) ensures our existence and life can share in common in ways that improve everyone’s life and all of this also improves all human beings as virtuous persons who lead virtuous lives, and act virtuously. In agreement with the emphasis on friendship in Aristotle, Polo’s work emphasizes co-existence-with, which we choose as a foundation for how IPS applies to governance: for Polo (1998a, 78), the capacity for coexistence is one of the transcendental dimensions of human beings and being human. Co-existence also entails freedom, but, as we noted in the theoretical part of this work, this means much more than the quality of personal actions, as in Polo only certain human actions can be called free within a range of alternatives that we have at our disposal enabling genuine and ethical delivery in our personal actions (Polo 1998a, 1998b). Consistently for IPS, it is impossible to undo the relational and co-existent aspects of being human; and applied to governance it means that relationality and relational growth process ontologies must be integral and vital means and ends of the governance model consistent with our model. For Whitehead, a keyword is “organism” (Whitehead 1925); for him, everything that exists is an organism, and it is almost impossible to

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discover one organism outside other ones and autonomously. Each organism (including human beings) is part of other organisms (including other human beings). Applying this to how IPS influences governance as a life sphere, our proposed governance model is a process of organismic relational symbiotic growth whereby it is impossible to conceive and understand/enable one’s good autonomously (or by excluding others and everyone’s good). How IPS applies to governance as a life sphere requires governance processes that allow a symbiotic relational growth whereby the common good and each person’s good are intertwined and mutually served, and where this is possible systematically and both in the process and the visible and intangible outcomes of governance. For Wang, in agreement with Whitehead’s notion of organisms, everything is strongly internally connected; and there is even a stronger emphasis on the notion that human beings’ telos and aims are to put together heaven and earth (Ching 1976; Ivanhoe 2002; Nivison 1996; Tu 1976). This means that the purpose of human action is how to practically (not just theoretically) unify heaven and earth, such that the action to improve our relations is a key part of our human purpose. Applying this in IPS theory relevant to how to think about governance as a concrete and applied life sphere, it means that governance requires actors who can work to practically improve our relations with one another and act in genuine ways acknowledging each one of us as internally connected and a part of the greater principles that make up our world. This is the reason why, later in this chapter, we emphasize the importance of Aristotelian phronesis as a character cardinal virtue that enables the unity of IPS virtuous agency. As we saw, the (modern) history of governance conceptions increasingly imposes false dichotomies and dualisms that often end up with theorists of governance presenting a form of government (e.g., a radically democratic one in the case of Stout and Love 2013, 2015, 2016) as the telos of governance. In accordance with Wang and all the philosophers of reference to IPS, a key aspect of IPS application in the governance life sphere is to overcome the cognitive illusion of “boundary” and silos that artificially create false and unresolvable dualisms (such as separating notions of individual self-interested action to promote one’s and one’s friends’ good, the good of other fellow humans, and the common good). Via our proposal we thus return to the imperative to restore a teleological argument around governance that enables both personal and system-wide growth and happiness. We therefore suggest that, even in the noblest efforts, the idealization that a form of governance and one certain ideology in itself suffices to resolve issues regarding a perfect form of “good” governance that can resolve perfectly questions of justice and fairness is

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false. A measure of the good is, for us (in total agreement with Aristotle 1941), virtue in persons who are partaking in governance and administration and equally in persons who, as citizens or strangers, relate to the administration and to each other. And hence in IPS it is this very ongoing personal and ethical relational process that develops the quality of our character and how each one relates to each other and different communities and the personal, mutual and systemic growth that is tied to the notion of persons as free and open systems (fully explained in the first part of this book). For without a basis of virtuous personal and interpersonal character, even superior forms of governance such as a purely democratic one end up producing winners, losers, and disenfranchised/excluded persons and communities. Accordingly, with the above points regarding key terms and concepts in Aristotle, Polo, Whitehead, and Wang applied in the foundation of our IPS theory and its application in governance, we suggest that IPSemanating governance must be something practically useful for enabling a better life for all in both the quality, and the content and spirit of the related decisions, and in the pathways and ethical choices that accompany their implementation. But in terms of answering, “What is a better life?”, we would merely suggest that governance consistent with our IPS theory has one operative goal: to improve the quality of our relationships with each other (and other species and the ecosystem and planet we live in as interdependent organisms) and to enable a shared and broader happiness and co-existence valuing our commonality and our diversity. Therefore, we suggest that a key aspect of IPS governance is responsive–relational anthropological basis with the purpose of eudaimonia. While this concurs with Stout and Love’s suggested relational process ontology (2013b), we believe our proposal is going one step further and is more in depth regarding the definition of the “ethical” ways of valuing involved, in addition to, as we will see, the requirements for the kind of human character to populate and action governance. For example, one may argue that governance in a town consists of managing social and economic relations, which requires acknowledging all the people and groups that co-exist, recognizing what each strives for and what each lacks, realizing how they are related, and enabling a genuinely relational process concerning how to manage these relations (acting with phronesis as opposed to cunning or panourgia, which demonstrates vice and manipulative intent). We suggest that, in this example, the purpose of governance has to go a step further, acting to improve interpersonal and inter-group relations and how they act in common for the common good.

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This requires understanding more in depth what is really “relations” binding not only fellow persons and citizens who subjectively feel they are good and are growing as ethical persons, but also how to cultivate well our/their relations in a way for each and all to improve both personal and mutual and systemic capacity to live in common and be able to flourish while their actions enable a genuine system-wide eudaimonia (which also places a concern for who may be absent or excluded from the conversations such as the weakest, disenfranchised, or different “other” members of communities or even strangers). In how we speak and understand “relational” governance, we refer to how a broader notion of values of friendship, co-existence with, cooperative humanist ethics and benevolence are present in the work of the philosophers of relevance in the IPS proposal. This is a necessary step that requires a cross-reference to all the detailed theoretical presentation of grounding philosophers and our proposal in the first part of this book. This is important partly in order to armor IPS applied in governance against the depersonalization and amoral approach to governance in other models and theories of governance (e.g., the ideals of bureaucratic Weberian governance, valuing agents who act in governance as “neutral” third-party observers, or reductionist notions of relations between rational autonomous agents with competing interests who relate to one another as cold, narrowly rational, and self-interested Homo oeconomicus). However, it is also important to understand how impersonal and rationalistic proposals that aspire to some universal moral rule of followership as part of exhibiting morally good action are not sufficient for IPS. Expanding further, just to highlight the contrast and to strengthen our point regarding how IPS humane, ethical action differs, it is clear that we lay the foundations for our suggested governance paradigm on the broader philosophical movement of personalism (Burgos 2012; Deweer 2017; Melé 2009; Buford 2017; Pahman 2015; Polo 1995, 2007a, 2007b), as an anthropological position that avoids the dualism of individualism versus collectivism while serving both the human person and the common good. Personalist philosophy in a simplified definition is rooted in various philosophical and political works that emphasize the centrality of the human person and her inherent dignity, rooting the origin and the telos of all human action in meaningful personal and social relations. It sees these drivers as linked with the notion of human freedom apart from its liberal definitions that emphasize autonomy and independence, and instead brings freedom closer to the notion of freedom for collaboration with other fellow humans for the common good as essential for the good life and the telos of eudaimonia (Melé 2009; Moratalla and Moratalla 2013; Polo 2007a). But,

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as we noted earlier in the first part of the book, within personalist philosophy we limit IPS theory foundations (and IPS application in governance) with the philosophical transcendental anthropological personalism of Leonardo Polo (1998a, 2007a, 2007b). These foundations, as described above, can also be justified by the fact that they lack the problems associated with current governance models rooted in the concept of ideal type. Many of them are characterized by the inherent impossibility of transcending dualisms involving different political, ideological, and sociological belief systems, ideas, values, and concerns, which cannot be simultaneously addressed without ending up with dualistic value sets and related choices (examples of the dualisms that arise in the values informing the philosophy of governance are, among others, efficiency versus effectiveness, efficiency vs. ethics, individualistic vs. collectivistic governance models, or liberal vs. socialist governance foundations). As noted earlier, a fundamental value of IPS theory and its application in the governance life sphere is the acknowledgment of the more profound human and systemic bond that is integral to being human. This requires human action in all life domains (here in relevance to governance), which dares and is able to move beyond the silos and the dualisms separating individualist or group (sociologically based) conceptions of the good with an anchor on a self-interested agency. Therefore, the systemic–relational foundation of IPS theory is premised upon a demanding notion of the mature and ethically developed character in IPS. Moral–practical aspects associated with IPS in governance At the core of IPS is the idea of being an integrated person (a unityrespecting identity) relating to others in open and free systems (Orón and Akrivou, 2017 forthcoming). This means for IPS that the self, the other, and the wider system are co-existing and grow systemically in a dynamically evolving relationship within the self and other persons whereby in personal and interpersonal terms each participating part is closely related to the whole, but always maintains its distinctive identity and is irreplaceable (individuality in ethical relation). As noted in the IPS model, to display personal integrity and ethical action is not understood in relation to domain-specific autonomous agency. It requires one to embrace and value and employ oneself, others, and the world as an integrally related whole: in IPS, integration entails differentiation and integration as intertwined in the self-system and in how one relates to others as interindependent organisms whose personal growth is integrally premised upon

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mutual and systemic symbiotic growth not as a cognitive abstraction but as part of personal relational meaningful growth. This way of being and understanding associated with our proposal (IPS) gives rise to distinct ways of acting that fundamentally transform the purpose, nature, and processes by which governance is being brought to life. Drawing from the philosophers of reference, we show how IPS’s responsive relationality—which acknowledges both others’ difference and uniqueness, and a systemic organismic view of social reality—nurtures action with a shared humanity and has the purpose of building pathways to collective and shared trust and responsibility. The moral psychology of IPS enables an understanding of and a respect for other fellow humans stemming from integrating the three universal fundamental roots of “who we really are,” acknowledging what we have in common and a value for a shared humanity while it respects, trusts, and wishes to engage with others in their cultural and personal distinctiveness with an aim in understanding. Therefore, governance inspired by the IPS model integrates (from within a humanist–personalist anthropology position) the three fundamental roots of being human: (1) “Nature,” all of which relies on the cultural, traditional, and individual sources and foundations of each participating person and group; (2) the “modern subject–agent,” which captures the commonality that makes up distinct agent behaviors guided by the human drive to create novelty via actions; (3) the unique predicament involved in each fellow human being as “a person” (and not as a commodity or a selfless subjectivity), which forbids the use of others as means and also pushes for a responsible and ethical choice and consideration of the means–ends relations behind our actions. IPS-laden meaning making, valuing, and action are grounded in a personalist and relational anthropology, whereby personal, interpersonal, and systemic growth always involves moral choice in integrity relationships. Integrity, relationship, and growth all rely on open and free system assumptions (Akrivou and Orón 2016). IPS-inspired action, in understanding, organizing, and working with others in governance (within the same or across various institutions), desires, values, and chooses freely dialogue as a moral act (not a game or strategy), which emphasizes phronetic action—that is, a moral–practical form of rational excellence in Aristotle. Dialogue is premised on virtuous agency action and is not fixed in IPS. Dialoguing is an act of conversing with others with the purpose of improving the understanding of how best to go about the relational and systemic growth that increases eudaimonia. Therefore, IPS in governance chooses dialogue as a moral act as a way to approach meaning making and

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action that ensures good governance for the common good: dialogue emanates from IPS as guided by the person as a dependent rational animal (as discussed earlier, in reference to Aristotle’s understanding) with the aim of improving the quality of relationships between those who are affected directly or indirectly. This action choice in IPS approaching governance seeks to achieve a solid understanding of others, with the acknowledgment that dialogue is the noblest means we have for the process of developing a shared understanding of perspectives and a common goal, and processing how to achieve the common good, starting from our different perceptions and our subjective personal experiencing process. We mentioned earlier how the humanistic psychology of Rogers understands dialogue in the context of the I–thou relation and we need not expand further here. However, it may be important to note, especially as we wish to sketch how IPS as ideal type engages with governance in sharp distinction from AS, that IPS approaches disagreement and dialogue with openness and inquiry, trusting dialogue as a process and the I–thou relation to assist in any disagreement. IPS, in contrast to AS, avoids strategic calculations and the act of approaching meetings and encounters relevant to different opinions and disagreement with a need for predefined goals, agenda, and processes (actions that we have associated with AS’s preference for negotiation from strategic action). Therefore, how mutual and common growth happens for IPS involves the valuing of identity, integration, differentiation, and moral dialogue in the context of the I–Thou organismic bonding in the chosen process. IPS-inspired ways of valuing and implementing governance emphasize a teleology whereby the ethical component in action is an end in itself and whereby the ethical core of action arises and ends in the acting persons themselves, rather than being primarily concerned with ends external to the acting persons. This is in line with Aristotelian teleology and the priority and meaning of “action” over production in Aristotle (Scalzo 2010a, 2016, 2017). For Aristotle, “action” is an activity whereby the acting person can become better (more mature, more virtuous). Thus, this results in valuing acting well and for the good as an end in itself, outside of the outcome it produces as part of how “action” is defined and prioritized (MacIntyre 1982). As a result, IPS’s way of understanding and valuing things and human action cannot encourage or conceive of the notion of human freedom as independent and autonomous, nor can it autonomously act in support of some abstract ideals and goals and values within a relational void (Buford 2017). IPS cannot autonomously choose one morality over others, nor can it think it is possible for anyone to act as a neutral third-party amoral

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agent. IPS-inspired governance aims to author independently (not even in roles of representation of interest groups) how the world we inhabit should be for others to live well based on one’s perspective of what living well and eudaimonia entails. The moral psychology akin to IPS applied in governance means it is impossible for anyone to think in a detached, abstract, and independent/objective way on matters of right/wrong values of governance. Since IPS (consistent with Aristotle) prioritizes action over production and values action that arises and ends in the acting persons’ ethical betterment as its primary concern, IPS-inspired frameworks of governance prioritize the direct co-involvement of various groups and persons involved in direct relation whereby the very process of collaboration enables personal and systemic growth and a gradual coorientation of perspectives and understanding of how best to arrive at eudaimonia by choice of the right pathways and means to the right ends for all involved. Within this framework of IPS, self and agency in ethical governance communication from person–person that aspires to the I–Thou relations described by Buber and Roger practices and enables work cultures and interaction climates that nurture the habituation and the development of persons’ interpersonal and intergroup communication as a moral and intellectual virtue. That means transcending rhetorical and thinking excellence to support a morally good communication that respects and masters the rules of rhetoric. Instead, communication emanates from the unity of persons as integrated and complicated virtuous beings who exert moral influence not from a role of legitimate authority and the power it confines, but from the ethical qualities of a morally good person whose communication is an action aiming towards morally good leadership (for more detail, see Meyer 2017). This all practically involves the Aristotelian triad ethos–pathos–logos, which for Aristotle is a moral character skill that only a virtuous person can exhibit (Aristotle 1991). The approach to self-valuing, action, and related conceptions of work and organizational design inspired by IPS in governance replaces a direction towards risk with an orientation towards trusting as the basis of beliefs that sustain and underpin IPS-inspired governance. IPS displays wonder and relates to others with a sense of commonality and what it means to be a human (natural) person, along with the uniqueness of each human being’s nature and personal distinctiveness. This opens up a more genuinely relational, responsive free action space whereby the root of freedom is ethical responsibility for collaborative work with other persons (Akrivou and Orón 2016; Akrivou and Todorow 2015). This has to take

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into account vulnerability and individuality and an acknowledgment of a shared humanity by all collaborators. As a result, the values and action logics of governance more akin to IPS enables broader boundary-less collaboration and action that inquires into and scaffolds the building of bridges across national, local, and international institutions via trusting, dialogic inquiry and responsive, ethical human relational systemic growth oriented towards system-wide eudaimonia. Aristotelian phronesis or practical wisdom is at the core of conceptions of agency, action, and related conceptions of organizational behavior, design and work in how our proposal applies in governance, and we analyze this in the next subsection. Aristotelian phronesis: a vital character foundation for governance inspired by IPS Of course, the IPS-inspired way of valuing and acting applied in the complicated and often fragmented political and social life sphere of governing and governance requires rather courageous ways of approaching action that seeks a strong foundation of moral character maturity. Thus it emphasizes forms of practicing action on the basis of related virtues and forms of rational excellence associated with moral-practical wisdom, a key Aristotelian concept. The Aristotelian concept of phronesis (the closest but not perfectly accurate translation of the concept in modern years is “prudential judgment” or “practical wisdom”) is a very important kind of excellence that is valued and processually nurtured by IPS-inspired governance. Phronesis is a term Aristotle utilized to capture the ethical–practical or rational human excellence, as noted in the theoretical part of this book. More specifically, the original classical philosophy tradition (Aristotle, Aquinas) introduces the concept phronesis as one of capturing a moral virtue and also encompassing a cognitive component. Unfortunately, in the passages of time, the original concept lost its accuracy via the evolution in philosophical eras from the classical to the modern one (see Appendix). Hence, it is not surprising that more recent scholars such as cognitive theorists of knowing and knowledge in organizations draw from descriptive empirical studies. They arrive at a narrower definition of a concept, which operationalizes phronesis with an exclusive focus on the cognitive aspect that enables practically wise judgment and congruent action with the understanding of phronesis as a purely intellectual habit (Scalzo 2017). For Aristotle, phronesis is the kind of excellence that the Greek philosopher values as an important component guiding reason when

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dealing with morally and practically excellent (wise) human action (praxis). It is reasonable, then, to understand why Aristotelian phronesis is capturing a core virtue, which represents the moral character excellence in a wise practical orientation of personal action towards knowing and doing the right thing in the right way. Therefore, it requires an explicit and demonstrated link between the choice of the right (suitable) means to achieve the right end by the acting person (NE, 1144a). Aristotelian phronesis is a moral character excellence of the acting person/agent or a moral virtue that enables the “unity of all virtues” (NE 1103a). The justification for this is as follows. Like in all kinds of knowledge in Aristotle it supposes an integration – only possible from the moral character maturity of the acting persons- of the realm of the logos (the singular personal, and practical way) with the nous (involving the shareduniversal aspect available to all persons as theoretical, public, or social moral norms and particulars). So in accordance with Lee and Long (2007), a dualistic division is not a premise of prudential action despite its ethicalpractical focus. (a) The virtue of choosing the suitable means to the right ends is not possible unless it emerges from the character of a virtuous person, and the Aristotelian phronesis must be displayed in such a way to clearly demonstrate its contrast to the vice of craftiness (the original Greek word in Aristotle NE 1103a is panourgia). (b) It requires from the acting person to be able to display careful and practically wise attention to the particulars, and thus it is a complicated moral and intellectual activity that needs to be performed systematically by carefully performing deliberation and choice or decision making (NE1140a–b) that responds to the particular contexts, others’ responses, concrete situations, and eventualities. This is clearly beyond a simple (learned, memorized, or internalized) normativity rule and convention followership (but it also requires an understanding and respect for widely accepted moral universals and “moral absolutes”). The moral virtue of phronesis requires a “qualified agent account” (Hursthouse 1999, 28), in that it should be no standard neutral (or morally indifferent) “third-party observer” but a truly virtuous person who would perform an action with careful and sensitive consideration of the particulars and then carefully decide on the right means to achieve a right end.

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(c) It is a central thesis in Aristotelian philosophy that character maturity requires the “unity of the virtues,” whereby none of the single virtues can be independently displayed; it is seen in integration and in harmony with all other virtues (Healow 2015; Telfer 1990). Aristotle suggests phronesis as a virtue that does the groundwork for other virtues, with a crucial coordinating role to play to enable the integration of all other moral virtues, as without this it is impossible to expect any other character moral virtues. Phronesis precisely allows the complicated intellectual and personal capacity of connecting all moral and intellectual virtues in order to wisely judge what is the right means to practically achieve the right end, one that allows and enables a solid progress towards a shared flourishing for all involved (eudaimonia). For this reason, Aristotle suggests phronesis as a charioteer that guides and a mother that begets all the other virtues (NE 1145a); without phronesis, no genuine virtue exists in a unity relation to the overall character virtue of the acting person (Scalzo and Alford 2016). As every bit of virtue-knowledge is connected, to judge or evaluate any action morally is to compare its worth relative to that of others. Therefore, Aristotelian phronesis requires a deeper and genuine level of personal/human development to be displayed and part of a well-developed character (integrating differentiated moral, intellectual, emotional facets) that is very important for moral agency and action for the governance political and social life sphere. Moral–practical rational excellence is a master character virtue; it enables IPS action that seeks and inquires and collaboratively works with others over time and often without rationally subordinating “the good” to time and other external pressures. This action results in a kind of shared distributed leadership in IPS governance, leading to the discovery of common pathways for mutually and systemically good action (Scalzo 2013). This allows all who partake in governance and the communities who are involved and affected to feel respected genuinely intuitively and an integral part of the process and the concerns behind choices of means to reach the morally right ends. This naturally involves being able to be oneself and grow as an ethical person, while genuinely caring for and enabling other fellow persons—with whom one personally relates—to grow in their own distinctiveness and singularity enables a sense of virtuous being and citizenship. This acknowledges self-growth, responsibility, and the singularity and uniqueness of each person. It also enables a sense of genuine bonds and

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communal ties that each person freely wishes to adhere to, and a sense of being/becoming genuinely more human, an equal among equals albeit without erasing the miracle of what is involved in being human: each person’s distinct identities and modes of being, and expression, and transcendental-ness. And this nevertheless asks for a naturally felt and freely chosen personal responsibility for each other’s growth via morally good means and ends choices and a genuine concern for the other as a fellow human person. These render IPS’s phronetic action relevant to the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom as the ethical–practical form of rational excellence in action, which is a profoundly different way of understanding and practicing agency and organizational and work design and the culture involved in IPS-inspired governance. Such action in IPS processually and systematically balances (integrates) a responsive mutual giving of oneself while acting with concern and a genuine care for how mutual and wider systems of relational growth can be ensured in ways that enable positive growth for each party and for the system as a whole. In IPS, this means that ethical choice on the basis of human, responsible freedom matters a great deal because human persons are sensitive systems wherein growth can happen in positive directions and, alas, in negative directions as well. Contrary to the application of technical reason, which is ambivalent (it can be used well or badly), practical wisdom ensures that the uses of reason via the freely adaptable ethical system will serve the personally meaningful action that enables personal good and flourishing. It also serves the good of everyone and systematically cares to act in a genuinely benevolent, friendly, empathetic, and sociable manner to carefully and wisely promote and facilitate the fulfillment and happiness of all involved and broader system-wide growth; this serves the common good as understood in the Aristotelian–Thomistic virtue tradition and as captured in Polo’s work with key concepts such as co-existence-with and freedom for. We saw earlier, however, how Wang’s neo-Confusion system virtue philosophy and Whitehead’s process philosophy also care to theorize and conceptualize concepts and links expressing precisely this idea, for example in Wang’s reference to “li” and “Li” as two interrelated realms of the same phenomenon linking personal action and system-wide qualities that are co-influenced in every way we act. In the context of a responsive relational anthropology and its basis in a personalist ethics that characterizes the IPS paradigm and guides how to value and act within genuine collaborative relations, human relationships are ongoing opportunities and challenges for personal and interpersonal

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ethical growth and maturation (Akrivou and Orón 2016). In this ethical growth, the process unites a sense of a valued shared humanity. Each person has a complicated, transcendental uniqueness, which is constituted in different and distinct biological, cultural, psychological, social, personal and broader identities and histories. Growth in IPS, however, is always capable of being positive and/or negative. Thus, IPS’s ethical stance at the core of action is a more profound awareness that systemic growth may mean both positive and negative growth (decreasing). And therefore personal action needs to be practically wise (with phronesis) choice of the right means for the right ends (flourishing) for each acting agent’s action, so as not to assist negative growth to facilitate progress towards the common good. This is because how we grow as persons and in relational systems directly impacts the common good. Positive growth increases and multiplies each person’s welfare and the common good, and encourages a shared sense of purpose towards eudaimonia’s becoming a realist and feasible pathway. Negative growth divides and threatens the personal welfare and the common good alike, and it leads to increasing doubt that eudaimonia is indeed possible for all involved. So negative growth gives way to self-interested calculations of win–lose scenarios that rarely can transform into the good of all concerned persons and groups, as we know well from rules that allow the mastery of non-cooperative and even cooperative game theory and related mathematics (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Hence, trusting in IPS is not a strategically calculated position as part of a game, nor a superficially optimistic approach, nor a fixed position or moral universal, nor something that results from emotional choices overshadowing critical ones. Trusting is driven by practical reason, and an acknowledgment that all things and beings are internally connected and related; thus distrusting rapidly becomes a system-wide property. As noted, for IPS, “ethical growth” is meaningless outside of a genuine dialogic mutuality that makes the growth and prosperity of all parties involved possible, without sacrificing minorities and single persons/groups for the sake of the majority. IPS co-orients stakeholders on how to act in relationships of synergy and trust. This description of governance inspired by IPS is compatible with how J. A. Pérez López describes the concept of freely adaptable ethical systems (1991, 1993). According to him, three different conceptions of organizations—the mechanistic, the psycho-sociological, and the anthropological models—are consistent with three possible types of systems, including stable, ultra-stable, and freely adaptable (Pérez López 1991, 1993, 135). In Pérez López, the ethical system is presented as the

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highest form of work compared with that which is associated with stable or closed system(s) and with ultra-stable or open system(s), which all relate to different forms of organizational systems and theory (1993). There are significant cultural foundations in the outside context of institutions and organizations that are important to strengthen and support a moral action consistent with the IPS model. This requires the nurturing of a culture whereby the basis of co-participation is rooted in personal virtue (with a purpose for personal, interpersonal, and broader human development), premised on personalist dialogic ethics (Akrivou, BoladeOgunfodun, and Adewale 2016; Akrivou and Todorow 2015). Accordingly, the function and meaning of IPS-inspired governance are not just to enable effective, efficient, or fair solutions based on one criterion or another of moral value, as is the case in AS. The higher-level function and telos of governance inspired by IPS is to help all persons and groups involved to find and give meaning to what they do and their growth, along with how this growth allows everyone to enable value and the growth of other fellow members of the community (i.e., not just the groups of people who are incumbents of governance). Based on all the above analysis in this chapter, we can practically ask: what do IPS-inspired conceptions of governance philosophy, structures, and approaches to action look like? They comprise relational ethical commitment to a shared humanity as much as respect and a promotion of human freedom valuing friendliness and the genuine need to enable self– other flourishing and relational growth. This means a process that nurtures and does not hamper or diminish the willingness and the capacity of the persons and communities and stakeholders involved so as to collaborate across boundaries and fragmentations, seeking solutions with a systemic humanistic and ecological perspective and with the common good in mind. An important part of this process is the genuine respect for and welcoming of self and others as complicated and differentiated beings, always with an acknowledgement of others’ integrity and ontology as persons. This can be evidenced; it is not a theoretical or practical openness but one that is authentically felt and intuited by all who partake and by the degree to which, process and outcome wise, the rationality of the common good is ensured in how work design, work culture, and agency are practiced (Pinto 2015). The commonality of the good must ensure broader systemic level flourishing and win–wins as key concerns behind moral–practical action in how governance systems are organized and led and in what personal action means: the relevant choices of means–ends relations must be appropriate and morally good actions that systematically and genuinely enable personal, interpersonal, and shared growth. IPS-inspired

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conceptions of governance see roles, relationships, and action as constitutive avenues for virtuous human development and welfare, “in virtue of which the thing which is disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else” (Aristotle 1941, Met V, 1022b). Therefore, an individualist and excessively liberal notion of freedom from– oriented towards “escaping” others and mutually ethical relations– is not consistent with IPS-inspired governance, as it does not help personal and interpersonal growth. Self-discipline, critical inner reflection, and contemplation (Aristotle 1941; MacIntyre 1982) instead are encouraged as prerequisites for personalist dialogic ethics. However, collaborative and humanistic means are specially chosen for key governance roles, as opposed to means for effective governing that involve discipline, power, coercion, or limiting others’ choices, which threatens personal or group welfare and dignity. IPS’s basis in a genuinely relational, albeit responsive and ethically minded, anthropology points to an active responsive governance that nurtures virtue and communal shared responsibility via participation, transparency, and respect on the basis of friendship and a sense of shared citizenship in the “polis” between those in charge of governance, others who work in governance roles, and, more broadly, persons and communities affected by the quality of governance (this category can comprise a nation, a community, the global community, etc.). In contrast to traditional governance systems, dialogic ethics do not simply aim to decide, on the basis of morality, whose influence over a matter of right versus wrong prevails (Kidder 1995; Badaracco 1997). Based on all the above analysis, we summarize below, in Table 8, the proposed IPS “ideal type” of governance based on some key terms, consistently with the literature on governance. Despite the fact that the locus of virtue is internal to the person and that a good (virtuous) person exists for Aristotle independently of society, or an imperfect society of which one is part (in the case of work in organizations as per Sison and Fontrodona 2012), it is still neither possible nor consistent with IPS to separate personal ethics and the political dimension of action, or politics. As the practical manifestation of virtue and each person’s virtue is for Aristotle primarily via politics, in IPS, and in Aristotle (Aristotle 1941, Met V, 1022b), personal ethics and politics cannot be understood in separate activities, because even a good (virtuous) citizen cannot be understood independently of a (virtuous) society and of social structure itself (in its dual government–citizenship integrated dimension).

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Table 8 summarizes what we have presented in the previous three subsections of this chapter.

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Governance is political in the Aristotelian sense: Aristotelian idea of governance as part of human nature, aiming to enable life as a continuing line that links harmoniously all organisms (human and non-human) in a shared flourishing. Governance seeks building bridges for the common good. Moral locus is the person (not the individual, and not the abstract collective community) and mutual growth in personally meaningful ethical relations. Use of ethical–practical forms of human rational excellence orients inquiry as to how to improve the systemic quality of relations; seeks ethical–practical knowledge creation via personal relations. Political praxis: based on ontology, psychosocial theory, epistemology, and ethics.

Virtuous economy at the service of human flourishing: humanistic and ecological responsibility on the basis of a relational economy based on IPS. Economy of gift; ecological and sustainability-oriented economics. Common good theory of the firm (Sison and Fontrodona 2012; Sison 2016) and its correspondent concept of work (Pinto 2015). Freely adaptable ethical systems and anthropological organizational theory (Pérez López 1991, 1993). Avoidance of impersonal techno-rational management. Ethics at the heart of purpose, vision, and mission.

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governance. Aristotelian notion of friendship at the service of governance, which allows good life and happiness for all affected Personalistic foundations—trusting, wonder. Unity of virtues in self and personal relations. Self-inquiry, “how to be a morally good person,” leads to Aristotelian phronesis, or practical wisdom, which integrates cognitive, practical, ethical, and affective aspects; integration – only possible from the moral character maturity of the acting persons- of the realm of the logos) with the nous A genuinely inter-processual systemic-moral dialoguing ethic oriented to the co-creation of shared decision pathways – Building bridges for the common good.

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We present in Table 8 a concise summary regarding our model of governance premised upon the IPS theory. For consistency and comparability, we use some of the conceptual headings used by Stout and Love in 2013 and 2015. Tables 1–4 and Table 9 help support this table theoretically. We suggest that ours is a more demanding proposal ethically, and that it maintains a clear theoretical basis. We avoid a Hegelian synthesis method such as Stout and Love employ in their work suggesting a merger of various “ideal types” of governance models (2013); this bestows to our proposal on governance a transparent and clear conceptual consistency. Our proposal also highlights the importance of mutual self–other system growth premised upon personalist virtue ethics in free and open systems on the basis of differentiation- integrationidentity and relation (Table 3) as its basis of “scientific” (conceptual) integrity. The teleological purpose of this governance proposal is the pursuit of eudaimonia. This is a systemic and systematic orientation to the common good, not as an abstract aspirational ideal but as a progressive gradual relational practice that genuinely seeks to enable happiness for all who are involved as well as all who are affected (human and non-human organisms, i.e. our planetary ecosystem). The term “all affected” refers to persons and all nature’s organisms that integrate an anthropological and a naturalistic orientation regarding whose eudaimonia we suggest as the telos of IPS governance. We explain that, for us, in consistency with Aristotle, this is not a grand-level abstract principle but primarily means practical ways for human agency coordinated via governance mechanism, which achieves the betterment of our relations and a common system-level flourishing. While in this pursuit, a key distinction has been for us, as per Aristotle, that the practice of virtue is politics (1985, 1179a.32–1181b.25); politics is not a telos in itself or in the service of the economy of a polis.

2. Inter-processual self and management of business organizations In this section, we address how to apply an IPS-inspired understanding of governance that is particularly pertinent for firms and business organizations in particular. It should be noted that what has been written in the previous section of this book is also applicable here in order to distinguish basic orientations corresponding with the AS versus the IPS moral psychology in matters of governance. However, in addition, we add further reflections, on the basis that well-developed works in both economic and normative virtue theory, with very contrasting and

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competing assumptions about the nature of firms, their telos, and agency in business organizations, are already available. We start from this point so as to proceed in our endeavor to relate systematically the contrasting ideas in economic and normative theory about the nature and purposes of firms and our proposal.

2.1. Introduction: economic vs. normative theory Regarding the underlying assumptions about governance for business organizations, debates are ongoing on the nature of the firm and the degree to which firms have a moral status aside and distinct from their economic raison d’être. There are two main contrasting ideas on this and the nature of the corporation. The first, the mainstream idea, understands firms as solely commercial and economic media whereby their purpose is linked with a reductionist view of profit maximization for the firm shareholders, who invest their capital in the firm, but not for any other group (stakeholder) involved or affected by them. The second idea, instead, understands firms as social communities that resemble political and social organizations, characterized by diversified and complex networks of relations, and sets of duties and roles. Although this second approach involves various kinds of literature, for example social ontology and heterodox economic authors whose thinking is based on philosophy of economics, we refer here uniquely to the neoAristotelian virtue ethicists’ view of the firms. This fits with the notion that the nature and purposes of firms are relevant to ethical and not merely economic purposes. As such, this latter idea of work is more consistent with the theoretical foundations of IPS as set out in this book. Depending on which idea from the above literature is pursued, different assumptions ensue regarding the governance of the firm and its underlying assumptions. We will now summarize the two alternative conceptions of the firm and then explain how they are supported by these contrasting conceptions of human agency. We suggest that the IPS model better explains, in a more comprehensive and profound way, the person and personal action and role integrity. By introducing the core assumptions regarding the self, action, and integrity in IPS, we suggest that IPS provides a theoretically reliable way of understanding human activity and growth related to the firm. Moreover, the competing AS paradigm is incomplete and overly focused on one dimension of being human. Thus, we intend to contribute with a better understanding of human development and human integrity as it relates to management and leadership.

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2.2. Competing theoretical assumptions on the firm Conception of the firm based on neoclassical economic theory Only recently have debates in social, economic and normative theory attended to the problem of the ontology of firms (i.e., what they are). Economic analysis has preferred the easier topic – that is, the purpose of a firm or “what a firm is for.” The assumption in mainstream economic theory has been that firms simply exist to act as rational economic agents in the economy with the purpose of maximizing profits, which is the return for shareholders’ capital invested in the legal form of firms as incorporations. Since Coase’s theory about the firm as a key foundation in economic theory (Coase 1937) came to answer the question “Why does the firm exist?” by responding that it exists to minimize transaction costs by allowing entrepreneurs to manage and allocate resources and production, the conception of the firm based on neoclassical economic theory has been available. This conception enabled reliance on the standard methods of mainstream economics and microeconomics (Bratton 1989). Subsequently, since the 1970s, the economic literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1983)—which came to dominate the thinking in the disciplines of economics and management theory resulting from it— has described relations in the firm as a reductionist construct according to which a firm is simply seen as a “nexus of economic contracts” and agents were bound to rationally negotiate these relations in a strategic way that legitimizes the pursuit of each person’s or group’s rational self-interest. This comprehension of firms in neoclassical economics then understands firms in an economical way of thinking as mere legal entities aiming to maximize the profits of the firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Coase 1937). Accordingly, not only shareholders, governors/leaders, and stakeholders (internal or external to the firm) alike are understood as clearly rational, self-interested maximizers, seeking to maximize selfinterests (Ross 1973). The resulting view of human agency, which is linked to this aspect of the firm, legitimizes agency on the basis of selfinterested individualism, transaction-cost, and shareholder-centric views of the firm and governance (Eisenhardt 1989; Fontrodona and Sison 2006; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Shareholders themselves are seen as uniquely and barely economic self-seeking maximizers who only invest in firms aiming for the best possible return on investment for the financial capital invested and who have no moral concerns or conscience and orientations. Further, stakeholders are understood in antagonistic economic relations to shareholders and are seen as the others within the firm (employees) who

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are thought to aim towards satisfying needs that are antagonistic and by definition conflicting with shareholders’ needs and interests. Hence, the theory of the firm rooted in neoclassical economics understands that governance of the firm has to rely on foundations whereby professional management is hired to act as a buffer that protects and pursues shareholder interests as their primary duty against the interests of all other groups (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jehle 2001). Hence, from within this perspective, the firm’s purpose is to maximize efficiency in how managers minimize transaction costs and of course reduce information asymmetries while they are seen as the nearly “exclusive” agents of shareholders to whom the governance and the management of firms is entrusted (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ross 1973) as “good stewards” of the shareholders (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997). Within this kind of idea about the firm’s professional management is entrusted the governance of firms in a conception that legitimizes the “controlling” and regulating of internal and external relationships, operating as agents who work autonomously outside other groups of social relations to ensure and serve the needs and interests of the shareholders– principals. Accordingly, this agency theory was enshrined starting in the late 1970s as the predominant theory when it comes to understanding the governance of firms tied to the role of professional managers. This model of managers/leaders as agents understands them as mainly rational maximizers of their own self-interest and automatically implies distrust of managerial judgment unless institutional arrangements are effectively designed to help align management’s self-interest with that of the firm (roughly translated into the interests of shareholders–principals). Besides this, neoclassical economic theory promotes a notion of effective governance that values the pursuit of the ideal of technocratic, valueneutral or amoral (Deetz 1992) and narrowly rational behavior (Hendry 2004; Akrivou, Bolade-Ogunfodun, and Adewale 2016) by managers who exercise governance. Conception of the firm based on neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics The conception of firms based on virtue normative philosophy builds on a long tradition grounded on the work of Aristotle and the work of the contemporary (Aristotelian) philosopher A. MacIntyre (1982), who critiques modern conceptions of firm as incompatible with virtue and resulting in the violation of the moral and material wellbeing of various communities and social groups involved including employees (MacIntyre

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1982). MacIntyre suggests that the firm and business more broadly “is at variance with central features of the modern economic order” (MacIntyre 2007, 254). To reduce this pessimistic critique, virtue ethicists have more recently started to debate in greater detail that businesses are alternatively thought of as another form of human community (Solomon 1992), albeit an imperfect one (McCall 2016). This allows for the first time the possibility of moving on theoretically to an understanding of firms, their purposes, and the kinds of relations involved in the economy away from the reductionist and amoral (purely economistic) understanding we see in the neoclassical economics; instead, firms are now seen as forms of communities of persons, with the latter defined in similar terms to those developed above (Solomon 1992; Sison 2016). This also allows the possibility of linking the common good of the firm and the broader common good at a higher level of political–social organization (Dierksmeier 2011; Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013; Sison, Hartman, and Fontrodona 2012). This is possible, as some have argued, insofar as the political common good is linked through subsidiarity (Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013) to the common good of the firm. Accordingly, the theory of the common good of the firm has criticized the mainstream theory of the firm rooted in economics, and the former has also offered insights on the ontology of the firm mainly drawing from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics and philosophical anthropology. Sison, guided by important philosophical sources on the nature of the human person, community, and society (Sison 2016), conceives of an alternative, the so-called common-good theory of the firm, viewing businesses as ‘communities of persons’ laying the foundations for a strikingly contrasting view of firms and governance associated with moral concerns and normative foundations and presuppositions. Briefly, we set out below some core foundations in this understanding of firms and governance. Sison (2016; Sison and Fontrodona 2012) puts forward a normative presupposition that creates a new ontological understanding of firms as integral to the political, social organization (the polis). However, firms are seen as clearly subordinate parts of the polis or polity, which could be a nation or a federation of states or nations. Therefore, the operation and purpose of the firm become part of a common affair involved in governing the polis, which, via representative politics, has to be governed for the “common good.” Equally, the Common Good of the Firm (Sison and Fontrodona 2012) is the construct capturing the normative presupposition (i.e. that firms are in subsidiarity relations with the broader sphere of

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governance in the polis), whereby it is argued that the telos (or purpose) of firms in this subsidiary relation is the pursuit of the broader common good, which is linked to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia we referred to earlier (Sison 2016; Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013). To capture this normative condition of subordination of the corporation to the polis, the notion of the “common good of the firm” has been introduced to establish an alternative ethical framework within which to understand and justify corporate action. A specific target for virtue ethicists has been the conventional assumption that shareholders maintain exclusive firm ownership rights. In contrast, the theory of the common good of the firm proposes an alternative understanding of the social and ethical bases of the corporation, based on Aristotelian and Thomistic conceptions of human and social nature. The common good of the firm is not the aggregation of various individuals’ good based on individualistic self-maximizing agency, since it is not a theory of collaborative work premised upon moral individualism or decentralized collectivism (Sison 2016). MacIntyre offers a definition: “the common goods of those at work together are achieved in producing goods and services that contribute to the life of the community and in becoming excellent at producing them” (1982, 170). Sison and Fontrodona (2012), following MacIntyre, explain the meaning of the term “common good” rooted in Aristotelian references on the purpose of political communities oriented towards the telos (end goal) of achieving eudaimonia, which recognizes the humanity of all involved and the distinctiveness of each human (natural) person (Akrivou and Orón 2016). The common good theory’s normative presupposition is that corporations are not independent, but somewhat subsidiary to a superordinate and political higher-order organization. Therefore, the common good of broader political communities requires corporations to accept their own interests as subsidiary to the broader political order organization prosperity (polis) and not to deny their importance. This theory, which establishes material and financial interests and goals beyond striving to maximize profits for shareholders, sets normative requirements for corporations at the service of their members’ material and moral personal development, with employees as a key group, along with external communities and stakeholders (Doh and Stumpf 2005; Maak and Pless 2006; Maak 2007). This normative theory of the firm also understands businesses as imperfect communities: it should be clarified that “perfect” or “imperfect” is related not to desirability or preference satisfaction but to whether

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communities are able to fulfill by themselves their own ends, autonomously. Insofar as firms are dependent on persons, families, and societies, they are labeled imperfect communities. Albeit imperfect, communities’ firms/businesses cannot escape their subsidiarity to the broader common good (Dierksmeier 2011; Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013). So, businesses cannot autonomously pursue their own self-interest (shareholders’ profit maximization) as the key preoccupation in this theory opposite to mainstream economics, is not whether corporations are vehicles for serving (any) members interests but how to make them an integral dutiful part of the political and social community and a subsidiarity principled manner whereby businesses contribute to the common good (Sison 2016). The “common good of the firm” is not the numeric or quantitative aggregation of various individual goods, but must indeed be a good in common. To fulfill their role, businesses must explicitly aim at the development of habits or virtues that link moral aspects of practice with the common good (MacIntyre 1982). Three qualitative and process issues that transform the identity and ontology of the firm from the mainstream view must be addressed. Accordingly, collaborative or participatory work is the key condition that enables the common good of the firm, while firms’ internal organization and culture must prioritize the integral virtuous development of all members. This elevates the importance of the Aristotelian construct of “praxis,” being “the decisive outcome or result of the activity … found in the subject himself [or herself], in the form of an operative habit, not outside” the human being (Sison 2016, 105). It also links moral aspects of practice and virtuous character formation with the common good of firms, and it changes their role in the economy and society. Aristotle’s emphasis on praxis normatively prescribes for the common good of the firm clear primacy of praxis over poiesis. The latter is the objective, external, and quantifiable/material dimension of participatory work, whereas praxis is the subjective dimension of work (which gives rise to knowledge, skills, habits, virtues, and meanings for all the human beings involved in this work as co-producers—so this is not about knowledge as an abstract organizational asset). As in Aristotle, virtues are primarily intrinsic and not extrinsic or instrumental goods, there is a natural conflict between praxis and poiesis. This understanding of firms is that they are moral communities that depend primarily on the moral character of persons (all their members associated with practices in their distinctive roles) to ensure the common good. For Sison, in his echoing Aristotle, personal virtue is the basis for the common good of the firm and the fulfillment of the inseparability of

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praxis and poiesis while giving precedence to praxis (Sison and Fontrodona 2013) as noted. So in this theory, the moral status of the firm as a community is not conferred to the firm (as a legal person), but it is essentially tied to natural persons, who need to act following virtue as moral agents. Organizational employees and other groups who partake in the common good are seen as tied to the moral obligation to essentially influence and take part in the good governance of businesses of course within the framework of their roles, which reduces the autonomy and separation between management and other groups (Sison and Fontrodona 2012) These two competing views about the firm, its purpose, and its reason of being and respective assumptions clarifying roles, sets of responsibilities, normative conditions, and obligations, rely, as we have seen, on strikingly contrasting assumptions about human agency; this gives rise to competing understandings of the context of governance and the moral character and personal qualities it requires. In our view, these two alternative theories of firms correspond to two competing conceptions of human agency, integrity, and moral character. We suggest that the first is apparently compatible with the moral psychology of an autonomous self (AS), whereas the second sets demanding ethical requirements that may be compatible with the AS ideal type insofar as it reaches moral excellence, but it straightforwardly benefits from the moral psychology more akin to IPS.

2.3. Competing assumptions on agency and the management of business organizations AS and mainstream theories of the firm The mainstream theory of the firm and corporate governance rooted in neo-liberal economics (Ghoshal 2005; Victor and Underwood Stephens 1994) adopts a descriptive and empirical lens to approach normative questions associated with human agency (Pinto and Lisboa Cordaro 2017). This requires a notion of individualist or at least clearly autonomous agency whereby a person is encouraged to adopt notions of work and agency valuing rational and self-interested action and decision processes (Pinto 2015). This adopts an aspirational conception of associated human agency that aspires to being/becoming a pure utility-maximizing Homo oeconomicus who utilizes reason narrowly to fit in with these aims (Pinto 2015). Logically, a Homo oeconomicus is not expected to violate the law or moral universals and is expected to act dutifully within the confines of

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reason that supports the role-related primary duties of the agent, but it is important to act in a strategically good manner to pursue one’s goals. Acting consistently with this empirical understanding of normatively correct action in the context of the firm requires leaders and managers to personally act as dutiful stewards who rationally clearly prioritize pursuit of the maximization of theirs and shareholders’ interests perceiving the employees and other groups who are affected by the firm’s conduct, processes, and outputs/outcomes as in antagonistic relations or as potential sources of risk. Accordingly, the governance of firms is expected to be conducted by various levels of leadership and management to ensure work that preserves the descriptively derived business ethics associated with the persons and the communities of practices as Homo oeconomicus (Pinto 2015). Bureaucratic management is the most notoriously known form of such models for organizing production (poiesis) at the individual and the collective levels. This ensures technical and amoral rationality performed via formal chains of command and control and via informal mutual influencing processes (Pinto and Lisboa Cordaro 2017). Groups of agents in key roles, in order to prove their worth, are expected to effectively operate as rational autonomous decision makers who work to achieve predetermined ends, associated with how to maximize the financial selfinterest of the shareholders–principals, assuming they “own” the firm and its resources while their remuneration and other policies are in place to ensure the minimization of information asymmetries and that persons and communities keep functioning as utility-maximizing rational economic beings. However, to avoid the perils linked with being a utility maximizing Homo oeconomicus in exclusively the firm and the economy as a domain of action requires an external addition of moral codes and rules that require compliance as part of translating what integrity and morally good action means in the context of the firm. The AS paradigm of self and human action corresponds to this descriptive theory of the firm which is derived from neoclassical economics. AS’s aspirational ideals guiding self-system and agency conception is consistent with a notion of a self who lacks unity and therefore orients itself to various domains and focal “objects” (Kegan 1982, 1994; Ryan 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000, 2004) guiding how and what is relevant in terms of having integrity and a utility-maximizing notion of being ethical, whereby even principled and morally mature actors in the AS paradigm are legitimized to serve their primary duties ethically (Mansell 2013). Accordingly, AS conceptions of agency and

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action legitimize forms of action and work in governance and management, with a clear rationalist focus on duties that spring from the incumbent’s role and that correspond to autonomous and independent agents, and the mastery of independent, separate relationships (with shareholders and other groups experienced as different, separate, and independent domains), aiming to align them with those of the shareholders as opposed to adopting open and transparent stakeholder dialogue processes that require a genuine trusting in the shared human condition and our capacity for ethical–practical reason. Instead, the conception of agency (AS) associated with this theory of firms is broadly comfortable with human agency that seeks practical ends in the sense of being output driven (poiesis) and which seeks technical skill perfection (technai). In terms of the overall ends of the firm, agency here is of the AS kind as autonomously chosen moral and action frameworks, while conforming to formal moral codes ensures that agency will not seek a genuine moral enquiry as to the meaning and purpose linking personal, interpersonal, and common conceptions of work, agency, personal and communal values, and work itself, nor will it systematically engage in dialogic moral inquiry that may question the lack of a normative criterion regarding the nature and the purpose of firms in the society. On the other hand, a conception of agency compatible with the AS paradigm will support a democratic deliberation process understood as an ethically neutral decision process. Democracy will be a form of expressing opinions and negotiating differences between various agents as autonomous selves based on power and the notion of competing interests as keywords that allow and legitimize forms of agency compatible with AS (and which are not threatening the concept of moral individualist agency as a utilitymaximizing notion of Homo oeconomicus in this view of the firm and the economy) and its corresponding moral psychology. This means that managerial positional power and authority at all levels premised upon an AS paradigm (in either its ARS or APS forms/mindsets as presented earlier in this book) is systematically relied upon a mainstream approach to economics that produces winners and losers (Akrivou 2016). This is premised upon a struggle for mastery, and control of both who appoints and who to appoint in the managerial hierarchy; it also pertains how to master and manipulate the means and process of deliberation for a certain desired strategic goal to arise. Hence here in AS agency and means for agency and outcomes such as negotiation are not understood as ethical acts of dialoguing as they are in IPS; they are grasped and used as strategic tools even if the intentions are more idealistically based on which ideological premises underpin action in AS. A key aspect of AS is that

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balancing action is narrowly rationally self-interested—for example, moral virtues such as courage or excessive generosity may be avoided or pursued insofar as they can be used to preserve order and power and related power and ideological status quo. This is also compatible with AS agency as it all requires and legitimizes strategic autonomous effort aiming to master key relational networks and decision process and outcomes dynamics, since it is part of the very normative fabric of this conception of the firm and work those decisions are made democratic majority–minority relations via the power of way and will. This is a more strategic and instrumental form of co-existence and work that has little to do with the profound way our philosophers of reference in IPS understand human and personal relations and dialogue as a moral act for mutual growth and which genuinely allows personal freedom. Clearly, AS self-integrity’s related moral agency ensures dutiful action, as well as sound moral, financial, and general management practices, and may in the short term be effective for the firm’s good without significantly hindering the common good. AS moral agency succeeds in managing the common good of the firm strategically, based on leaders’ judgment of how stakeholder satisfaction can be aligned with the needs of the shareholders as the latter is thought of in terms of primary duties. This ensures a formal legal alignment to moral imperatives relevant to other stakeholders and the honest avoidance of harm. It is effective, but it is not proactive enough and is not inclusive enough of stakeholders’ directly felt needs and perspectives; it also fails to capture the ongoing and shifting nature of human needs, while it is set on avoiding direct engagement and face-toface dialogue with stakeholders, especially when dialogue and disagreement become costly and require time and effort. Action logics that are more compatible with the moral psychology of AS become, over time, limits in how AS moral agency expressed as governance-related action logic can nurture system-wide trust and growth. We suggest AS’s governance to nurture trust may logically engage some key business stakeholders in the short term, but it fails to embrace the needs of other groups and persons in the internal and the external firm environment in a long-term and sustained manner. The groups related to the firm, whether internally or externally, are thought of as separate domains whose conflicting needs and expectations can be efficiently and rationally managed, but such action emphasizes strategic alignment on the basis of similar short-term interests rather than longer-term mutual growth. This hinders the firm from listening, investing in inquiry, and understanding all involved parties’ distinct ways of evaluation, as well as the potential to reach higher-level solutions that are better compared with a

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single prevailing perspective as to how to go about the common good of the firm. Therefore, AS integrity is good for achieving the firm’s shortterm financial effective governance, but it may be less sustainable in the long term especially since, where it pursues the common good theory of the firm as prescribed, it loses the willful determination to profit maximization that is proposed for governance with AS moral characteristics following the neoclassical theory of the firm’s idea about the firm’s purpose and goals guiding what good governance entails. Besides these points which pertain to the particularities of the idea about the firm’s ontology and reason of being in the neoclassical economics, all the previous analysis on the traits and ways whereby AS approaches governance we discussed in the earlier chapter of governance apply here. IPS and the Common Good Theory of the firm The normative theory of the common good of the firm, tied strictly with Aristotelian philosophy and virtue ethics (see Sison 2016), sets a demanding ethical premise regarding which moral psychology is the corresponding one to fulfill the common good of the firm. Although this is a relatively new theory (Sison and Fontrodona 2012; Sison 2016), it assumes the rationality of the common good and its grounding concepts from the Aristotelian–Thomistic classical philosophy (Aristotle 1995a, 1995b; Aquinas 1888–1906, 1918–30, 2012). Through this perspective, they are not at all empty abstract concepts, but become tangible and practically relevant once the nature of work and the nature of personal and social action are recognized (Finnis 1980; Pinto 2015). On a sophisticated analysis of the Common Good Theory of the firm’s understanding of work as ergon,1 it is found that the social and collaborative conception of work in this theory, and its equal profound significance for self-determination and self-perfection, have been established by Pinto (2015). In our view, this is consistent with the moral 1

Regarding this, Pinto (2015) summarizes as follows: for Aristotle, beyond a theorization of work as social act it is an inherently personal–human function, in the sense of action oriented primarily to personal moral and integral perfection and growth. Hence an acknowledgement of the unity of knowing (thought) and action for work as ergon exists in Aristotle, which also explains why in our proposal we rely on a non-representational theorization of being, knowing, and acting (Frisina 2000) connecting across our key philosophical works. This forms the theory basis in IPS—of course understood and meta-analysed through the prism of history of knowledge (Appendix).

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psychology of IPS. To start with, it is fair to note that, at first hand, it appears that this theory is also compatible with the moral psychology of AS if one takes into account the argument, “it entails a subject being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of making decisions about himself, and with a tendency towards self-determination” (Pinto 2015, 61). However, if one carefully reads the further qualitative analysis accompanying this opening statement, it is obvious that it is more directly in harmony with the moral psychology in our proposal (IPS) due to the suggestions listed below. (a) Interdependently of any objective content, human action in the conception of work in the CGT of the firm must be oriented towards the realization of one’s humanity, and it should fulfill the moral purpose and calling of being a person, via action and production guided by a moral–practical reason (Pinto 2015, 61). This is definitely congruent with our philosophers of reference: for example, we can note IPS’s emphasis on the notion of being, on action that aims to enable human growth beyond the notion of fulfillment of needs and towards the notion of responding to a calling, on the kind of moral and practical form of excellence, and on the notion of human nature and human growth as involving evaluative normative choices associated with a deeper moral inquiry regarding one’s perfection in being a morally good person understood as a free and open system. (b) The importance of self-determination and self-perfection in the CGT of the firm is not in order to assume an individualistic and autonomous conception of agency, but to emphasize human freedom and to avoid any case in which this theory may be used to justify the community’s authority to use force on its members, a community that according to Thomistic thought does not possess a true common good (Pinto 2015, 62). In this theory, the firm must always have the prime responsibility to determine the most appropriate and best means and processes to perform any assigned work (Pinto 2015, citing Alford and Naughton 2001). This echoes our proposal’s emphasis on human beings as free and open systems who, as social and reasonable beings, can and should be trusted to act in a morally good and responsible manner. (c) Beyond the idea that personal virtues are foundations for the common good that balances personal and shared aspects of being

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and acting (work in this case), the common good also requires the allocation of a primary importance to the notion of personal fulfillment so as to permit personal goods as sine qua non conditions for the realization of the truly common good of the firm, not as an end in itself but as a means for the preservation of the broader systemic eudaimonia that the firm has to serve as its subsidiary community (Pinto 2015; Sison and Fontrodona 2012). This clearly recalls our emphasis on an understanding and valuing of the person as a transcendental being (“additionally”) whereby self-love is not in conflict but enables a moral quality of being and acting that expresses the Polian transcendentals of co-existencewith and freedom for. Finally, it has been shown very convincingly by Pinto (2015) that the Aristotelian concept of benevolent and genuine friendship (the personal work of each person who works in the firm to be oriented towards enabling virtue and self-fulfillment and happiness for other workers, as this is meaningful in their transcendental being) is another key dimension of collaborative work in the Common Good Theory of the firm. And this is clearly relevant to the systemic and relational bases of IPS, as they are especially expressed in Aristotle, Polo, and Wang and as they are materialized in the humanist psychology of Rogers and the Buberian I– Thou personalist philosophy, presented systematically earlier (in this book’s theoretical part). Hence we suggest that the Common Good Theory of the firm (Sison and Fontrodona 2012; Sison 2016) is very congruent with the moral psychology of IPS, in our view. According to IPS, a strong degree of the locus of personal action is rooted in the ethical self-system of persons who are entrusted and expected to act with phronesis in order to enable personal growth as part of action aimed as systemic growth in the relations between all who partake in a firm as an imperfect community that is, however, a social community of persons. All these persons perform work in the firm conceived as ergon (see earlier references, Pinto 2015 and Aristotle’s works cited in this book) as citizens who are members of a given moral community and bonded with ties of friendship and love for self and other. Now we explain how moral and practically wise action located in the moral system of the person as a unity that is always characterized by integrity emanates from within our proposal (a moral psychology of IPS) and the role it plays in the Common Good Theory of the firm.

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Being integrated into IPS is always about self-love as much as it is about freedom for and systemic co-existence-with. To integrate, in the IPS model, entails continuing relational systemic growth whereby further growth and maturation requires the embracement and acceptance of differentiation and the complicated unity that is involved in becoming more of who each person (the self and the other/others) really is. Expanding and improving the quality of relatedness within a system where all other organisms (in this case, persons) grow involves mutual growth that respects both identity and community, and an action that understands and supports self-determined action and fulfillment. This process respects and enables humanity within conditions of free, open systemic view of social and human relations. In the definition of integrity in IPS, human integrity involves integration, differentiation identity, and genuine relation(ality) on the basis of free and open systems as different facets of the very same phenomenon (Akrivou and Orón 2016). This is because “integration entails differentiation, in which different aspects and relations differentiate and optimize to the same extent that they place themselves in a relation with one another. In other words, integration is the dynamic that explains how growth or human maturity happens; [what is more,] integration is the dynamic that describes the evolution and functioning of open, free systems” (Orón 2015b, 114). Here, the self and others are always seen in an integral relationship whereby mutual positive growth in relationships is possible once grounded in human virtue on the basis of friendliness, benevolence, sociality, genuine collaborative mutuality, and a capacity and openness for dialogic systematic inquiry (in order to understand how to promote each other’s good and the good in common via a phronetic kind of reason guiding action and relevant choices involving means–ends relations). Hence, we see that all these conditions are part of how work and human relations are being theorized in the common good of the firm theory (Pinto 2015) The moral psychology of IPS integrity maintains a strikingly different understanding of the self, and how it grows in relation to others. The self and integrity are a unity, a dynamically ethically growing relationship within which each part is closely related to the whole, while always maintaining its internal identity and the valuing of self-determined action (whereby, as noted by Pinto in 2015, 62, personal fulfillment contributes to bona communia, “good community,” i.e., the means of preservation of eudaimonia). An ethical–practical and systemic–relational view of personal social relations (with friendliness and empathy inspiring the I–Thou relations) in

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free and open systems, therefore, links our proposed moral psychology and the conception of agency required to fulfill work in the Common Good Theory of the firm. We suggest thus that the moral psychology that corresponds to our proposal (IPS) provides a philosophically grounded conception of personal ethical agency that can fulfill well the more profound challenges that the governance ethics required in the CGT of the firm involves. Regarding how the IPS paradigm informs how governance and management role incumbents understand and accomplish their work in the CGT of the firm, they are important nodal organisms who, as part of an inseparable whole and an a priori union, work collaboratively with other fellow members to enable a harmonious, sustainable relationship and coexistence between a variety of groups therein (shareholders, employees, community, customers, suppliers, government) whose members partake in work in conditions of equality and of difference (based on their distinct roles). For IPS’s action with systematic integrity, leadership and governance are obliged to partake as much as everyone else in the systematic process of dialoguing as a systemic moral act that is oriented towards seeking how best to improve the quality of relations in the system. This is in order to enable the self-fulfillment of each of its parts (and persons more concretely), by seeking to exercise phronetic action and production whereby various parts of the system reach a better understanding of what constitute the most appropriate ethical–practical pathways and means to achieve and preserve eudaimonia. This understanding is also achieved by all persons’ tolerating and listening to each other’s perspectives on the most proper means or pathways available, facilitated by moral–practical reason to continue making progress in this shared endeavor for the common good. In this project, governance action that corresponds most closely with an IPS paradigm is open and tolerant and understands genuinely that there are no predetermined ends and axioms on how the firm should go about attaining its common good (e.g., here, leading and management roles do not think shareholder primacy is more important than any other group’s self-fulfillment, nor perceive an a priori dualism between fulfilling the needs of shareholders, of employees, or of broader stakeholders who are internal or external to the firm). Relationships are not seen as separate domains linked in hierarchical terms in IPS, while IPS’s integrity always requires the moral action that emanates from the self as an always-integrated unity, whereby it is impossible to decide how to best act by separating cognitive–rationalist from affective and ethical aspects of being a person. Therefore, narrow instrumental reason guiding action, or

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action as an amoral or purely technical or narrowly rational response, is not valued in the moral self-system of IPS as a genuinely phronetic action that can be performed and followed. Instead, such action may be performed as a way for enabling system-wide inquiry, or as a way for remaining vulnerable and seeking to morally improve and learn from failures, and also as a way for externalizing a human vulnerability and showing that perhaps others’ friendliness and support may be required. More broadly, as noted, the common good of the firm based on IPS places a higher importance on the moral dialoguing action. Here, a moral psychology of leadership and management congruent with IPS wishes to act as the benevolent conductor of an orchestra, in ways whereby phronesis is a growing aspect in the self and in systems of relations in the broader system. So, leading and managing aims to enable personal and relational growth involving an increasing capacity for ethical–practical forms of excellence that help the system to behave in increasingly high shared responsibility. Key relationships are ongoing opportunities and challenges because trusting each other’s and a shared humanity enables further personal and systemic growth based on trust (Akrivou and Orón 2016). Besides, the systemic organismic growth compatible with IPS maintaining identity, differentiation, and integrity while being in relationship is the only path available to expand relational systemic growth further. This is a particular aspect of governance in IPS concerning the CGT firm (Sison 2016). We, therefore, show how our proposal, the moral psychology of IPS, involves an organismic benevolent relational quality that, in our view, allows collectives to work in common for a higher purpose (Alford and Naughton 2002), required for the common good of the polis to which the firm is subsidiary. This explains why we suggest our proposal harmoniously matches the sophisticated conception of work and human relations (Pinto 2015) in the Common Good Theory of the firm (Sison 2016). Further to our analysis, we suggest that the IPS paradigm enables action that orients relational systemic co-existence and growth displaying wonder and trust in what it means to be a human person, and acknowledges that living as a systemic/relational being requires that we trust others to express their approaches and responses as part of the very nature of ethics. This a priori excludes IPS action to relate to the other via a notion of power, control, domination, and mastery, instead requiring a genuine trust in oneself and the other, in common humanity, while it involves and is nurtured by care and concern (Akrivou and Orón 2016). This requires abandoning a cognitive mental construction of the other via

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the mediation of one’s own mind’s projected abstract mental image and rather embracing “the otherness” of the other being, which practically necessitates an ethically oriented dialogical habitus (Akrivou and Todorow 2014). IPS integrity also frees the agent to be fully a person who “believes” in utilizing, but also transcending reason as itself a potentially fallible tool that can blind the passions in certain circumstances. This all enables IPS integrity to act in the direction of the creation of contexts and of actual ethical dialogues (Akrivou, Bolade-Ogunfodun, and Adewale 2016) that aim to scaffold systemic growth via the growth of all persons involved. Hence, it improves the quality of our relationships (with those who engage based on this ethic) and is not only the best (the only way) to human development (Orón and Akrivou 2016), but also ensures the patient and continual creation of moral capital (Sison 2003) that gradually develops/nurtures/supports shared decision processes and collaboration on the basis of diverse parties, communities, and persons’ different needs and perspectives, as each of them understands these. This contrasting quality and starting point in IPS self-integrity directs persons acting in governance roles in leadership and in management to maintain a shared sense of their own and all others’ humanity while enabling mutual growth premised upon an increasingly shared human coorientation and action. Processually evolving IPS integrity responses that face potentially complicated tensions, clashes, or diversity across the value systems of those involved are solved based on a relational dialogic ethic that understands dialogue as a moral act and that therefore needs time and like-minded communities within which to be fruitful. IPS action that faces conflict, complexity, and disagreement is thus premised upon its reliance on personal virtue as the grounding condition for dialogue to work critically and holistically. It aims for a dialoguing ethic to scaffold integral relationships of trust between the various parties involved in action relevant to the sustainable governance of the firm. This implies: (a) a personally felt and intuited relation to one’s personal integrity, refusing to divide one’s inner and professional self; (b) broader civic and professional (direct employer) duties; and (c) a personally felt relationship of shared humanity vis-à-vis all persons and groups—irrespective of having a personal direct or indirect, more or less self-interested, and more or less affectively charged personal and professional relationship—with those directly or indirectly involved in a sustainable and ethically superior corporate governance for the common good that involves the wellbeing and the prosperity of all as equals. These three complicated, interdependent relationships are understood as a systemic (integral) whole that cannot be fragmented, while IPS moral agency grasps that any part of

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this systemic whole is integral to all other parts and therefore one is unable to grow irrespective of how others grow. In each given moment, the substance of IPS integrity is understood as impossible to be performed autonomously. It trusts and seeks for dialogic authenticity and responsiveness; in the case of governance, it aims for a conversational ethic that directly integrates across (Akrivou 2008) various value “systems” and requires others’ integrity to be present along with a personalist virtue ethic. First, this means the acknowledging of each one’s personal affections (freedom for; love as personal offering to another); second, it entails a genuine care and concern for others involved embracing singularity, otherness, and a shared humanity ethos. IPS integrity in governance involves avoiding heroic leadership models as much as eschewing mechanistic and technically inspired toolkits for dialogue and instead inspires an economy of gift (Benedict XVI, 2009) that is opposed to an economy of pure self-interest (Scalzo 2016). IPS integrity reflects the leadership that is able to catalyze a configuration of the firm and society relevant to the logic of gift as an expression of fraternity (Scalzo 2010). The IPS self-integrity ethic is therefore premised upon personalism and an ethic of virtue and benevolent co-responsiveness premised upon personal virtue. This requires that all involved have an authentic relationship with their personal integrity (Rasjzi 2007; Akrivou 2008; Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang 2011; Koehn 2005) and a commitment to a genuinely benevolent humanism to help others grow and prosper. On this premise, IPS alone commits to and catalyzes mutually driven responsive relationality through benevolent mutual collaboration space for learning and growth (Bradbury-Huang 2010), while respecting difference and diversity among different moral actors and groups. The downside of this IPS virtue is, therefore, that principles are not primary drivers of virtue (Sison, Hartman, and Fontrodona 2012), but are instead premised on and vulnerable to all involved maintaining an ongoing commitment to acting virtuously based on the IPS moral personal integrity capacity and a genuine adherence to personal and shared humanity expressed via genuine collaborative work. This process of understanding and acting in the governance of the firm linked with the IPS integrity model over time has a major effect, which, as a key positive consequence of IPS-styled governance, explains why the latter is not just effective, but also sustainable. It also explains the largerlevel construct and mechanism by which IPS moral agency applied in senior leadership in the context of corporate governance ensures a lasting ethical system of governance and a longer relationship between business

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and society based upon trust, mutual co-existence and respect, and governance transparency. The IPS governance style develops broader moral options and builds shared decision-making processes, thus uniting various social groups and persons in the firm’s internal and external environment and building significant moral capital along with the political and moral advantages associated with it (Kane 2001, Sison 2003). We therefore show why IPS is in our view harmonious in normative and ontological and in descriptive terms to support work and agency as theorized in the Common Good Theory of the firm in Sison (2016) in comparison to the other plausible alternative, which is the moral psychology of AS in the higher stages of moral maturity in the literature of modern psychology. Based on the above, IPS integrity can be said to understand the role of leaders and managers in governance as impossible to associate working within the assumptions of the principal–agent theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976), but not less effective in its communicative and purposeful action. Governance more akin to IPS aims to bring about a superior governance of the firm as a moral community that seeks the best ways to collaborate for the common good. This governance inquires and seeks how best to act to enable a capacity for building bridges, and nurturing spaces for participatory collaboration among genuinely wellintended, full-hearted, and authentic participation that respects “otherness” (Akrivou and Todorow 2016) and remains sensitive to the particulars and specificity of the other (Koehn 1998). Within the IPS paradigm, the way the relationship between the firm and its governance faces various groups that partake in the firm’s common good is understood and experienced as an integral relationship that is sensitive to all related parts and maintains virtue, grounded upon an ethic that includes a dialogue process (Akrivou, Bolade-Ogunfodun, and Adewale 2016). Accordingly, an IPS mindset builds moral capital in a way that is not an open and value-neutral deliberation, but rather one that is indeed oriented towards reaching common decision pathways to a notion of shared prosperity within the context of Aristotle’s (1941) understanding of happiness, or eudaimonia as the telos of all human agency. IPS moral agency creates an ethical context whereby stakeholders who mutually develop moral capital can exercise their moral intuition while they can also be trusted to act in a practically wise, albeit self-restrained, manner, to deliberate on the appropriate ends. The choices that emanate from the leadership style associated with IPS self-integrity build moral capital and trust across time and are therefore mindful of the need to cultivate system-level practical wisdom. IPS is

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consequently a more systemic, relational, and pragmatic understanding of what is involved in being a senior leader and governing for the common good in a way that generates moral capital (Kane 2001; Sison 2003). IPS amply satisfies the concerns associated with virtue ethics and the theory of the common good of the firm (Sison 2016) and has various direct and broader consequences that are mainly positive. The “costs” associated with IPS governance are found in the time required for all the system-level benefits and effects to display their “full bloom.” Additionally, IPS does not prioritize maximizing shareholders’ economic and profit-related interests for the sake of developing broader prosperity, as well as nurturing the personal virtue of shareholders themselves and all the various persons involved in the internal and external environment of the firm. In the IPSrelated paradigm on the self and integrity (Akrivou and Orón 2016), and in its resulting conception of governance that we suggest here, praxis takes precedence over poiesis, while the two maintain a balanced relationship. IPS leadership purposefully orients human action towards a path of eudaimonia via the nurturing and development of personal and individual learning that promotes practical wisdom in its classical sense (Aristotle 1941; Sison 2015; Scalzo 2017; Scalzo and Alford 2016).

AN EPILOGUE

This epilogue aims to serve as a general reflection on the significant ethical consequences that are premised upon an AS versus an IPS path for the self, human action, and human development. We use a less technical and more fluid and metaphorical narrative, in the form of a dialogue between IPS and AS, in order to show how an increased expression of mastery over the shared condition of humanity will turn towards a transhuman intelligent new species, powerful, but senseless.

1. A figurative dialogue between AS turning into the transhumanist self-will and IPS IPS: What are you doing, human being? AS: I am exercising my power and control over nature. AS tried this path and it was so successful that AS spent time to climb it further. IPS: And now that you have all this power and the full control of nature, what else will you do, human being? AS: I want to explore the same thing further, to the fullness of my power, my self-mastery, self-determination, self-control, and self-domination. So AS spent time doing this, and AS saw himself becoming even more powerful, able to control and master anything that exists. IPS: You got it, human being: you can be the owner of heaven and earth, and also of yourself. So what else do you want, human being? AS: I want to be my own maker. IPS: But you already exist as a human being! How can you be your own maker? AS: I will exceed the definition according to which I am a natural human being. I will become a post-human being. I will re-create myself as a synthesis of others. As I use wood to create a chair and nuclear technology to control the world, I’ll use myself to create some kind of human being that does not exist naturally. I am thus my raw material.

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IPS: But how can you be both raw materials and creator at the very same time? Who are you, post-human? AS: I am my mind. I am my will. Pure mind and pure will. I am everything in the Universe. I am God. IPS: AS, please listen to me. Be the human being who integrates your mind and will into the self you really are, that of a human being!!!! AS: What? No way. IPS: I love you, still… and despite this monster you are becoming. This figurative dialogue between AS and IPS represents the natural evolution of the two modes insofar as we exaggerate in our use of imagination concerning what could happen if we continue within the path of growth that is consistent with their basic premises. The cult of transhumanism is the result of the natural evolution of AS (although transhumanism dislikes the notions of “evolution,” “natural,” or “religion”). In the figurative dialogue above, it is easy to recognize the evolution of AS towards a transhumanist being in full control of his rationalist knowledge and will to unnaturally re-create himself, or what it means to be human. We can trace a parallel between this story and the biblical one, the account of creation. Transhumanism considers religion as an authentic breaking out of human beings’ nature (Bostrom 2005b), but transhumanism perfectly meets these very same requirements that make it more a religion, a cult (Evans 2014; Maxwell Milne 2010) than an academic discipline. Transhumanism does not like “evolution”: it has been suggested that transhumanism is a break with Darwin. Adaptation is over, because the problem of life creation has been overcome and put aside. Transhumanism wants to overcome Darwinism on the basis that “humanity (is) not as the endpoint of evolution but as an early stage” (Bostrom 2005a, 3). According to thinkers in transhumaniam, individual improvement will be transmitted from generation to generation to allow humans “making the jump” (Koch 2010) towards becoming their own species’ master and creator. Transhumanism renders evolution expired and irrelevant by an exercise of will (Bishop 2010) and self-determination (Bostrom 2005b). However—as we will see in what follows—the term “nature” or “natural” is reinterpreted, since in transhumanism “nothing is natural or, even better, natural is what I choose it to be” (Echarte Alonso 2014, 39). The starting question for this hypothetical dialogue—“What else will you do, human being?”—is the question that IPS repeatedly asks AS (in other words, where do you want to go? What will you do when you’ve got everything you want to achieve?). AS, however, wants to do many more

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things. AS is a major producer; it is the perfect product of the modern radical. AS (in its evolution towards a transhumanist consciousness) produces for the sake of producing more novelty- any novelty. In opposition to IPS’s notion of the self as an open and free system with a purpose and unity, the transhumanist evolution of AS considers human corporeality as an amorphous material that can be transformed like “modeling dough.” AS wants more, but he does not know why he wants what he wants, just to keep moving. Kegan’s epilogue (Kegan 1994) exemplifies this. AS has a clear identity and purpose problem: the subject does not know who he is, something that Kant expresses and we have developed in more specialized terminology through various sections of this book. This reference might seem hard to believe for whoever has not heard of transhumanism as an intellectual path of work. However, there are universities, governments, associations, and economies that actively promote this cruel “vision” of the evolution of humankind (Bostrom 2005a; Hodges 2010). Readers might also think that this “narrative” style is exaggerating, but, when Nick Bostrom—one of the major figures of transhumanism—tells the story of this “movement” (Bostrom 2005a), he goes way back to Sumerian times, to the epic of Gilgamesh of 1700 BC. The story of King Gilgamesh is relevant because he is a tyrant king. The gods, to punish him, sent a warrior, who became a friend with the king. Then, the gods punished the warrior with an early death and Gilgamesh went in search of immortality for his friend. Bostrom used this story to show how immortality has been what men sought throughout human history, which, in fact, is a human wish to overcome his very human nature. We can assert that the real problem of being is the very recognition of us (in IPS) as beings that are essentially nature (Aristotle) and of the unity of all natural things being heaven–earth and mankind (Wang). That is why we suggest that transhumanism takes the nature of the subject–master beyond any imagined limit, lacking the courage to set boundaries for human action without considering the huge negative ethical consequences of such pursuit. Transhumanism is the product of the great landmarks and the great philosophical references in modernism. The epic story of Gilgamesh, based on the abuse of power and the pain caused by the death of a loved one, will help us later to clarify further transhumanism. As systematically analyzed in this book, AS is based on modernist philosophy, and is rooted in Descartes’ and Kant’s attitude to knowledge and their philosophy as prominent figures of the Western modernity premised upon the reign of scientific rationality. Transhumanism is based on Descartes and Kant as well, and post-rationalist philosophers like

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Rousseau (Hughes 2012) and Nietzsche (Bostrom 2005a; Maxwell Milne 2010). However, the postmodern era is the radicalization of positions that were already latent in modernity (Pastor and García-Cuadrado 2014). Now we examine how Bostrom understands transhumanism, as “[t]he intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason (totally dismantled from any emotion). This is purported to be especially possible by developing and making widely available technologies in order to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities” (Bostrom 2015, 4). Although transhumanism is presented in a very attractive way, there have been many reactions to it since it holds countless threats to ethics and the humanity (McNamee and Edwards, 2006). Among them, Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2003, 2004) has recognized and critiqued Bostrom (Bostrom 2005b). However, philosophers and intellectuals alarming humanity over these risks have not been sufficient so far. As we have argued in this book, the main problem for making sense of these theories is how they understand the self and the person, as well as human development and growth (and their ends). Transhumanism posits a philosophical problem (Benedikter, Giordano, and Fitzgerald 2010), as we will show now in some key notions. Nature—natural The conception of nature/natural in transhumanism is a materialistic and relativist one, as a raw material to be used for work that aims to master and transform. Transhumanism takes advantage of the confusion of the general public and many relativist intellectuals that extend the term species to propose that a human being as a species may belong to different species simultaneously (Ingmar and Savulescu 2010). The materialism in transhumanism can be noticed since nature is reduced only to the body, and the mind and will are not part of nature (Pastor and García-Cuadrado 2014). To say that something is natural is simply a matter of statistical frequency. Transhumanism prefers (wills) to understand natural merely as usual. Hence, if “unnatural” means “unusual,” the changing norms of what humanity considers usual demonstrates that, although emerging technologies are unusual, or novel, this fact says little about the ends they serve, whether they should be used (Tennison 2012). Nature is also a relative concept because it is a social construct; in transhumanism “nothing is natural or, better, natural is what I choose it to be” (Echarte Alonso 2014, 39). The human essence is no more

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than a cultural construct of how a civilization perceives itself to be (Benedikter et al. 2010). With these premises, nature merely is understood as being there for matter to be manipulated in any way it is wished. After manipulating the environment, and technology to the extent that it becomes almost as intelligent as the human species (e.g., artificial intelligence), it is turning now to manipulate humans. Also, insofar as the human being is a matter to be handled (Bishop 2010), there is no difference between human nature and the rest of nature. Reason—will Reason and will have been in a somewhat confused situation in transhumanist ideology because, initially, they do not belong to nature. We say “initially,” partly because they too are considered another kind of “material” to be used for improvements to the world and to our body. For example, a human being may want to have brain implants that help him to go beyond the boundaries of the mind. But beyond this, reason and will are far more than nature. The reason and will are part of the “I”: “[w]e can no longer speak of the human condition or even of the post-human condition.” Instead, the right way of speaking for transhumanism is the expansion towards “the intelligent condition” (McNamee and Edwards 2006, 513). According to transhumanist thought, the orientation and purpose of the will and the reason are to control (Bostrom 2005a), which means to overcome the weakness in technology and the use of reason (Hughes 2010). If altering certain genes makes us smarter, writes Koch (2010), why not do so in order to conquer the realm of being an intelligent species? The will ends up being higher than reason—since it is the will that says what is natural and what is not (Van Hilvoorde and Landeweerd, 2010). The will is free, it is purported, and it will not even have to pay attention to the senses. The will to dominate about all truth is what matters for transhumanism (Pastor and García-Cuadrado 2014). This powerful will (that has thrown away its humanity) makes us get out of the process exhibited by Darwin (Bishop 2010). If modernism is the scientific reason of the rationalist I, in postmodernism the self is the will itself, a totally free will (Pastor and García-Cuadrado 2014).

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Enhancement—weakness Under this project, there is a clear goal: to overcome the weakness in technology and the use of reason (Bostrom 2005b; Hughes 2010). There is a real enthusiasm with potentiation (the sense of this word is enhancement) (Koch 2010). As Bostrom, the guru of transhumanism, argues, “current human nature can be improved through the use of applied science and other rational methods, which can make it possible to increase life expectancy, extend our intellectual and physical limits, and give us greater control over our own mental states and moods. Technologies include not only current ones, such as genetic engineering and information technology, but also advances for future developments such as immersive virtual reality, nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence” (Bostrom 2005b, 202).1 Technology is a means that enhances the power of the will to transform (itself and anything). Nature is simply a matter to be handled. After performing this manipulation to the environment, food, and biodiversity, the technological re-engineering is to be done with human beings as well (Bishop 2010). The transforming power center lies in our corporeality, which is a somewhat indefinite matter that can be handled at will (Pastor and Garcia-Cuadrado 2014). Thus, we can modify the biological roulette (Tennison 2012).2 The aim, as noted, is to overcome the weaknesses and to achieve full control of our species’ destiny and life at large. Transhumanism also aims 1

According to him, “genetic engineering, psychopharmacology, anti-aging therapies, neural interfaces, advanced tools for information management, drugs to improve memory, computers embedded in the body and cognitive techniques” (Bostrom 2015, 6) are to be used to transform the humanity into a post-humanist new species. Having absolute faith in the technique itself to transform what is human is the output. 2 One of the areas where this is already being done is in the manipulation of embryos. It regards the “principle of procreative beneficence” proposed by Julian Savulescu. This, according to transhumanists, normatively authorizes parents— assigning them a freedom of will seemingly related to a moral obligation—to use any techniques of genetic manipulation and assisted human reproduction available to create children with the optimum opportunity to enjoy the best life possible (Bostrom 2005a). Apart from the highly questionable issues regarding the ethics of this “morality,” we now know that this manipulation involves high risks, so it is stated, “Moreover, when current knowledge of genetic and epigenetic processes and evidence of the risks of assisted reproductive technologies are taken into account, we find sufficient reason to abstain from the use of current techniques of genetic manipulation and embryonic selection” (Güell 2014, 427).

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to conquer control of our emotions (Bostrom 2005b). In order to justify it, a strange kind of moralizing is used, since supporters of transhumanism consider this as an exercise of responsibility. It is posited that we ought to act on our nature, as this is the best way to save human morality. However, morality can be assured because belonging to the species Homo sapiens means the acceptance of limits and vulnerability. There is not a mechanism that links an externally dogmatically infused value with the genuine human being’s integrity. The same aspiration to wellbeing without morality is a threat because morality is not linked to the species (Ingmar and Savulescu 2010). Ingmar and Savulescu (2010) even argue that the moral improvement required by humanity itself purports transhumanism, so to be more human, should be that we all ought to accept becoming gradually post-human! Personal identity—personal moral In the previous section, we discussed critically the most obscure argument of transhumanism to ensure it links to a dark vision of humanity. There is another confusing theme in transhumanism: identity and morality (which, as we have seen, for transhumanism are linked). The aim of transhumanist thinking is to demonstrate that the post-human is worthy and does not involve a moral detriment of the former human being. The appeal made by transhumanist morality vision is clear. Throughout history—for example, Nazism—technological power abuses occur when the power lies in governments rather than individuals. To avoid this—according to transhumanists—power must be returned to the people. Every person then can freely decide what to do with power and develop his own ethics. Transhumanism rhetoric claims, “we will achieve the best post-human future when we ensure that technologies are safe, make them available to everyone, and respect the right of individuals to control [their own bodies]” (Bostrom 2005a, 17). The best defense against the atrocities against human beings is to pass power to each human to decide about the uses of their powers (Bostrom 2005b). This new unbounded notion of morality as an empty container replaces and discards the real human being’s own organismic process involving the careful practice of our reason–emotion–intuition to reflect on what is right and wrong for everyone and regarding humanity. This is a troubling use of the term “morality” that is deprived of ethics. The concept of identity becomes problematic as well when a person is reduced to her intellectual meaning system. Identity must always remain open since it is a changing concept; otherwise, it would become a

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limitation (Tennison 2012). Because of the distance created in this view between the self and one’s physicality, identity is above and beyond the corporeal being: “I am not my body.” Transhumanism takes this to mean that the body can be modified with no limit as to how and to what end and with what costs this might incur (Koch 2010). And this is precisely what really matters. In fact, the underlying issue is how far body modification is possible without altering identity (Echarte Alonso 2014). At this point, we have a problem with dignity as this concept is used in many documents of international order, and even in core AS philosophy (e.g., in Kant’s categorical imperative). ‘Human dignity’ is used in reference to something that is intrinsic to human beings by virtue of being, which leads to respecting human life (Jotterand 2010). However, Bostrom thinks that dignity rests on moral capacity, and that post-humans are fully worthy of respect and valuable in themselves as ends (Bostrom 2005b). Transhumanism speaks of “moral person” as a creature with equal rights, even in its lacking the very human essence and identity. Interestingly, the word “person” (that we keep as the ground of IPS) is rejected by transhumanism while it refers to the philosophy of identity. In response to Fukuyama, Wilson argues that “once a creature has the capacities to reach the appropriate standard for moral personality, that creature ought to be considered as an equal to all other moral persons, regardless how superior in capacities any other creatures may be” (2007, 419). There is then a moral standard from which this being is considered a "moral person," and because of that, he has the same rights as another moral person of varying capacities. He says that this point is not arbitrary and thus relies on Kant(!) to draw support and evidence that that being is treated as an end in itself. Therefore, the author avoids recognizing this as a problem of moral superiority, because everybody (transhumans equally as humans) passes the threshold that enables access to justice possibilities (a sense of justice and a capacity for any conception of the good), something that it is neither clear nor realistic.

2. Concluding reflection In this epilogue, there is a question that remains mysterious. Why, at the end of the dialogue, does IPS tell AS, who transforms into transhumanism, “I love you”? As we mentioned earlier, the origins of the transhumanism movement can be placed in the seeking for development of the AS models, particularly the overly cognitivist models like Kegan’s. Similarly, with the common origins of AS in the Cartesian and Kantian philosophies, the

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origins of transhumanism are based on the same attitude that leads to the quest for power and domination to help avoid being manipulated by the object world. Conversely, IPS starts from admiration, curiosity, and trust looking to reality and the human world as a complicated unity (e.g., in Wang’s philosophy). Erikson (1994) notes strikingly that the debate between basic trust and basic mistrust is crucially played and decided in the first two years of age. IPS, as we have shown, is growing in a natural and open–free–fluid unrestricted path, and the quality of the way one relates to others and the sincerity to one’s own inner integrity allow this processual and relational–interdependent path of growth. AS is not IPS’s enemy, but rather an opportunity to develop its own potential for growth. Relational growth in systemic terms is impossible without love, especially within an IPS mindset. We finish by repeating what we have been saying in the book from the beginning. AS’s mono-dimensional focus on cognitive–rationalist mastery poses various limits and ethical challenges, but in itself is not “bad” in normative terms. The error is, preferably, pretending to be understood as the main aspect of humanity and growth, outside the whole person and nature. We agree, together with AS, that human beings should create something new on earth, and regarding themselves and their relations as objects, but this is not a good starting point. Alas, when AS is the only starting point, the natural order of evolution of the AS mindset is transhumanism. The proper starting point for every academic discipline should be, instead, the person. A person is a unique and irreplaceable human being, unique in her intimacy and identity of human being as a transcendental rather than a logical premise (personal radical). From here, it is worth discovering the nature that we have received regarding our body, family, surrounding culture, place in history, and so on. This Aristotelian premise complements the person and provides them with the predicament of what to do with their freedom and responsibility. But nature must not only be received and acknowledged (mentally); it should also be accepted, welcomed, and valued. This reception and acceptance of our nature, added to the unique person each of is, creates growth that is just perfect for what I (not anyone) received (nature’s radical in reference to Aristotle). In the light of these two radicals (the person and nature), the modern radical becomes meaningful as a subject–agent and the quest for mastery, far from being problematic, appears in all its real strength. However, why would IPS speak to AS by saying: “I love you”? Aristotle and Polo have been, along with Wang Yangming and Alfred N. Whitehead, the main philosophers of reference for IPS along with the humanistic psychologies of Carl Rogers and Viktor Frankl. Rogers (2000)

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says that the key to psychotherapy success is the quality of the relationship between the patient and the psychotherapist. Only as a result of a good relationship (of greater acceptance, confidence, and appreciation), can the person discover within himself the capacity to attain his personal development (Rogers 2000, 41). A person accepts others to the extent that is being accepted first, and that is the only way that a realistic vision can emerge (Rogers 2000, 67–9). IPS says “I love you” to AS, so that AS can lose his fear and be confident, able to accept his weaknesses (opening the possibility of growth) and willing to travel together with IPS in an integrative growth path that increases the integrity of both in a relational process of rehumanization.

APPENDIX THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

1. Human knowledge from the classical perspective: from Aristotle to Polo through Thomas Aquinas 1.1. Aristotle and the Greek radical The real reach of human rationality is a gnoseological problem that depends largely on the various functions attributed to human intelligence in its task of knowing and understanding reality. As Aristotle states at the very beginning of his Metaphysica, human beings are made different by their desire to know (Met, I, 1, 980a 1); knowing is essential to man. The Aristotelian conception of science is very different from the conceptions that prevail today. Unlike the current reigning scientific provisionalism, according to which scientific truths cannot be considered definitive, “Aristotle himself explicitly states that the conclusions drawn by genuine scientific demonstrations must necessarily have the character of necessary and eternal truths” (Vigo 2007, 50). This is made possible by the combination of a rigorous scientific method––the syllogism, which he develops in the Organon––with the requirement that the starting points of science, called first principles or axioms that are obvious and indemonstrable, are “true and capable of producing the conviction that they are true” (Vigo 2007, 52). This attitude is based on confidence in the reality of things, and the human capacity to access that reality—in other words, to know it. According to Murillo, “we can say that the truth is being in as far as it is known” (2010, 11), establishing an intimate connection between knowledge and metaphysics, which we will explore later. Aristotle’s interest in nature has been much explored. His natural philosophy has inspired studies in psychology, biology, and zoology. Following a long tradition of thought in relation to nature, he distinguishes inanimate things—that which lacks life—from that which has life and is able to keep itself in movement. The latter is characterized by a certain

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principle of animation, which explains self-movement capabilities that distinguish living beings, and which was identified with the psyche or soul. “The soul is a formal determination and more precisely, a kind of present (entelecheia) corresponding to a natural body, to the extent that it has the potentiality of life” (Vigo 2007, 96). In the case of human beings and the higher animals, there is a connection between the soul and knowledge. Living beings can be classified into three hierarchical and inclusive domains: plants, which have basic life functions that are described as vegetative; animals, which are also endowed with sensory or perception functions; and human beings, which are a “special kind of animal” characterized by the functions of reason and thought (Polo 2009, 55 and following). Aristotle defines knowledge as an “immaterial possession of a form” (De Anima, II and III; Polo 2009, 125) and performs a detailed study of the faculties of knowledge. Perception is a type of activity proper to the soul that takes place through the body in relation to a sensible object, but has the capacity to receive from an object a formal determination alone (without the corresponding matter), making the perceptive faculty like its object in a certain way (Vigo 2007, 102; Polo 2009, 107). Perception is the basis of other faculties such as memory and imagination. Thanks to memory, knowledge can be accumulated, facilitating learning; while imagination acts as a “bridge” between the sense faculties and thought. The latter type of activity is reserved for human beings and supposes “a decisive broadening of the scope of knowledge, to the extent that the intellectual faculties make possible forms of knowledge, such as experience (empeiría), art (techne), prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis), science (episteme) and theoretical wisdom (sophia), which constitute the fundamental ways to deploy human rationality (Met. I, 1–2; EN VI 1–9)” (Vigo 2007, 105). Among the different types of knowledge mentioned, for Aristotle, scientific knowledge is characterized by a universal knowledge through causes (Met. 1), which is also sought for itself, without looking for a concrete use. Among the diverse branches of science, he highlights a purely theoretical knowledge that is of utmost universality and corresponds to the first principles and ultimate causes: wisdom (sophia). The fact that human knowledge cannot be reduced to sensible knowledge is evident because there are activities that cannot be attributed to any material body; rather, they are attributed to thought, which Aristotle called “intellect” (noûs). The intellect, just as the sense faculty, is activated by its object, from which it receives its intelligible or essential form that is stripped of matter; however, unlike the sense faculty, it does not depend on

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any bodily organ. In contrast to Plato, for Aristotle, knowing does not involve the capturing of ideas, but rather reality itself through the intellect’s ability to “digest” or “identify” with the form of the known object, which is known as “intentionality.” In short, “to know [for Aristotle] is not, therefore, to possess a ‘representation’ or copy of a thing, but rather the intellect in act 'is' what is known in action, because it assimilates the shape of the known object” (Corazón 2002, 26). Aristotle solves the problem of the relationship between sensible and intellectual knowledge by postulating that there is an “active intellect or agent” that can recognize the underlying intelligible forms of sensible reality. Unlike the “passive intellect,” which is linked to perception and is therefore corruptible, the agent intellect is independent of the body and, therefore, maintains permanent activity and is immortal (Vigo 2007, 107). There is also a difference between theoretical and practical intellect (or reason), depending on the object. Practical reason also apprehends reality, but this practical apprehension adds the idea of the good to the theoretical apprehension of reality inasmuch as it is true. Since practical reason is secondary in relation to theoretical reason, we are able to distinguish a genuine good from an apparent good (Sellés 2000, 27). Aristotle does not contrast thought (knowledge) with activity (action). According to Vigo (2007, 121), this unity is apparent in the discussion of the virtues of the rational soul, which Aristotle made clear in NE VI, along with the development of the idea of a science of being, which he looked at in Met I, 1–2. There is thus a close relationship between knowledge and action—that is, human action, which is the subject of Aristotle’s Ethics, transcending the mere satisfaction of immediate needs, as in the case of animals, to deal with the “realization of a very wide range of activities aimed at shaping one’s life according to a certain ideal representation of the good life, which is the kind of action proper to human beings and is what Aristotle called praxis, in the strict sense of the term” (Vigo 2007, 110). It is worth noting that one is only capable of praxis if one has some rational representation of what a good life means. That is, Aristotelian ethics is premised on a proper human function (ergon) that expresses reason. Human excellence or virtue resides in rightly fulfilling this function in accordance with reason (Sison 2015, 242). As already mentioned, only human beings are capable of rational action. Animal movement is driven by immediate appetitive desires. Human beings also present emotional reactions to different situations (thymos) and desires of a rational nature (boúlesis)—that is, involving the practical intellect—beyond perception, memory, and imagination (Vigo

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2007, 185). This intellective process is characterized by the disposition of the best-suited means to achieving an end, known as deliberation, and that supposes openness to a future horizon of possibilities that permits one to distance oneself from the immediate and consider human life as a totality of meaning. It is the intellectual virtue of prudence (phronesis) that allows us to recognize what constitutes a good life, and, ultimately, happiness (Scalzo and Alford 2016).

1.2 The Christian radical and the systematization of a realist theory of knowledge Christianity made a notable development over the Greek radical. Along with a different conception of time and the meaning of history, the Christian notion of the person made it necessary to expand the theory of knowledge. St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, found in Platonic philosophy an excellent starting point from which to discuss the relationship between the natural and the supernatural worlds, between the earthly and the divine cities. Platonic ideas become “designed by God,” and intelligence captures the reality underlying the sensible thanks to a “divine enlightenment.” This requires an upright, almost ascetic will, which allows us to aspire to real goods and, ultimately, God Himself. Arab commentators transmitted Aristotelian metaphysics to medieval scholasticism and, with it, the possibility of greater confidence in nature and reason. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) principally developed Aristotelian intuitions on human knowledge (especially in De Veritate), a task in which he tried to reconcile the doctrine of the Greek philosopher with Christian Revelation. According to Aquinas, human intelligence contains something divine—the agent intellect—that allows man to know and love God, his natural end. Thomistic doctrine is a genuine attempt to reconcile natural or philosophical truth with revealed or theological truth (Gilson 2004, 63). This doctrine was continued and recently completed by the Spanish philosopher Leonardo Polo (1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1994, 1996)1 in his ambitious project to restore the classical sense of philosophy (Polo 2009, 322), which is why he is included in this section, despite interrupting the chronological order.

1

This section follows the scheme that Juan Fernando Sellés (2010) presented in his course on the theory of knowledge, where he systematizes the Polian argument. See Sellés, 1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007, 2008.

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First, it is noteworthy that human knowledge is plural in that it corresponds to the different human levels, which are irreducible to one another, hierarchical and necessary—that is, they cannot act otherwise. These levels include sensible, rational, intellectual, and personal. Many epistemologies, especially modern ones, limit themselves to the former two, disdaining the higher modes of knowing. Focusing on those levels, notice that reason cannot account for itself; superior knowledge that is immediate rather than discursive and that captures reason in a global way is needed. This kind of knowledge is called intellectual. Meanwhile, personal knowledge allows for personal or intimate knowing because reason is not a person but rather is “of the person.” In short, “realizing” that we have reason or the realization that we are a person does not correspond to rational knowledge, and much less so to sensible knowledge. In the next section, we present these levels, which constitute Polo’s proposals and which we consider the most comprehensive theory. Sensible and rational knowledge As mentioned, human knowledge is not simple and allows for levels, which are arranged hierarchically. The first level corresponds to sensible knowledge; thanks to this we know external reality through the senses, which are the organic support for the sense faculty (Polo 2009, 107). Sense-related objects or forms are called sensible, and they can be proper, common, and by accident. A proper sensible object corresponds to that which is perceived by one sense and cannot be known by any other (e.g., colors, sounds, tastes, smells, wetness); a common sensible object, which can be known with several sense (e.g., size, movement, rest, number, figure) and an object that is sensible by accident is perceived by common sensory, realizing the difference between the various acts of the external senses. External senses, according to their hierarchy, are touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight (Polo 2009, 137). The inner senses, which have an organic base (the brain), are superior to the external and provide insight into issues that are not actually present in physical reality (Polo 2009, 161). They are (1) the common sensory or sensory perception—knowledge of the difference in acts of knowing the external senses; (2) imagination or fantasy—representation of absent objects, whose purpose is the image; (3) memory—re-objectification of the past, whose object is memory; and (4) cogitative (estimate in the case of animals)—projection of the future, whose aim is the project. All of these levels are necessary for reason to know.

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Reality can also be known through non-sensitive means, thanks to thought, which the Greeks called logos. Reason is an immaterial power (without body). However, it is a passive power, which needs to be activated to know. This results in a necessary binomial, that of a demonstrative and discursive knowing that depends on first principles captured by a higher function, which, for the Greeks, is manifested in the dianoia–nous relationship that appears throughout the entire history of philosophy (Cruz Cruz 2009, 15; Sellés 1999a, 57). It is also known as possible understanding because, unlike agent understanding, reason is initially a passive power that must be activated. “This means that reason presupposes, as an ontological and critical condition of possibility, the intellect” (Cruz Cruz 2009, 21). Therefore, reason is the highest cognoscitive faculty in man, although it is not the highest kind of knowledge. It is immaterial, its objects are ideas, and it knows its actions through acquired habits—that is, it does not just know, but rather “knows that it knows.” In addition, it has no threshold at the time of knowing, unlike the senses that, by relying on a material body, cannot access sensible objects exceeding a certain limit, whether higher or lower (e.g., certain sounds, sunlight). It also differs from the senses in that it can deny its objects, and can therefore know the idea of being and non-being. Once updated, it ceases to be a passive power to be an active power, able to know more and more since its capacity for knowing is limitless. Reason admits, as suggested, a double use, both theoretical and practical, although both uses are a sole power (S. Theol., I ps. q. 79, a. 7, co). The soul’s potentialities are only distinguished by reason from the diverse formality of its objects—that is, by the objects proper to each. During the thirteenth century, scholasticism extensively studied and discussed this distinction and, despite the different positions, unanimous agreement emerged that the distinction is uncovered by knowing its end. Throughout all of his work, St. Thomas uses different names for both concepts, highlighting the fact that denomination is a secondary problem (Sellés 1999b, 18–19). When updated, reason exercises acts of knowing, immanent operations, while acquiring certain cognitive perfections called habits, which are here understood in the classical sense as “a perfection that intelligence immanently acquires and that enhances the perfection of this faculty, enabling it to learn more than it previously knew” (Sellés 1999a, 11). Plato and Aristotle initiated the study of the intellectual habits (NE I, VI), while medieval Arab and Christian thinkers took it back up during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Haya 1992; Murillo 1998b). Intelligence

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grows according to its nature and in the order of its end— that is, the truth. Habits are an added perfection to the nature of a faculty, in this case, “intelligence’s growth in knowledge with reference to the truth” (Sellés 1999a, 26). Clearly, we can know our acts of knowledge, which is proper to habits, thanks to which “we know that we know.” The first act that it exercises is that of abstracting. Abstracting happens in the present and involves a cognitive act that does not exist in physical reality. Presence is therefore a purely mental act and is apart from movement, which only exists in physical reality. While abstraction is not temporal, it is familiar with time because it articulates the content of the inner superior senses. By abstracting, reason presents the objects of the inner senses and universalizes them—that is, it removes their particularities, but in a limited way because it knows through forming a thought object, which is in itself limited. There is a difference between abstracting and knowing the act of abstracting, which amounts to the difference between the act of abstracting and the abstractive habit. The act of abstracting is an immanent operation that is finished by knowing the abstract object, while the abstracting habit is a stable disposition. This habit is a perfection that is acquired once a single act is illuminated—that is, realizing the abstraction of an object is enough to know what can be done in others. Now, just as we know the act of abstraction through the abstracting habit, we do not know the latter on its own, but rather through synderesis, which is a superior, intellectual kind of knowing. Knowledge progressively proceeds according to thought-objects that are increasingly more general, according to species and genera, allowing for definitions (and, to reach definitions, it is necessary to know the genus and specific differences). This procedure contains a risk in that it ignores the real principles (Aristotelian four causes), because it only captures that which is accidental from sensible reality. The generalizing habits allow us to realize that we generalize—that is, we know the acts that know general objects. Formal disciplines like logic, dialectics, rhetoric or sophistry and much of contemporary positive science operate according to this habitual mode. The first act on the path of reason that allows for the progressive discovery of physical reality as it is corresponds to concept- or simple apprehension, by which we know the material and formal causes that make up substances. The act of conceiving is one of the least cognoscitive acts of reason since it is easier for reason to know ideas than physical reality itself. Concept is the knowledge of the real formal cause behind causes, the link between one and many, form and matter. In conceiving,

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reason has to confront the immaterial and timeless part of abstraction with the material and temporal part of physical reality or, which is the same, to know the physical substances. Concept is intentional with respect to reality, but not in the same way as abstraction. The distinction between abstract and concept contains the solution to the problem of universals (Sellés 1995, 323–6), according to which universals are mere words or logical terms (Abelard, Ockham). This position is against St. Thomas’s idea of intentionality. One cannot access reality without the mediation of concept. The conceptual habit is an intrinsic perfection of reason in virtue of which acts of conceiving of reason are known. Judgment is a rational act that composes and divides, affirms or denies some property (an accident) of a thing (a substance). It knows that the fruit of its act is true—formal, not transcendental—because it adjusts to reality upon confronting the union or separation of concepts with the same reality. It also knows movement—that is, efficient causality. After a plurality of judgments, it discovers what is compatible between realities and their movements, and that they are linked according to an order. Thus, it allows one to know the final cause and the unity of the physical universe’s order. Thanks to the act of judgment, one can know if reality is true, if it adjusts appropriately to physical reality. However, to distinguish between true and false judgments—false ones being those that do not conform to reality—there is a judicative science or habit, which is acquired and allows us to know all the acts of theoretical reason in need of judgment. The act of judgment allows one to explicitly know, for the first time, the truth, as well as the fact that lying is possible. The act of laying foundations, also called demonstration or reasoning, seeks what is first—that is, the foundation of physical reality, the principle of the four causes that are known in the act of judging. While one finds out the “what” or “how” of things, and ultimately the essence of the physical universe, through judgment, one finds out the “why” of things—the act of being of the physical universe. However, reason can only know the act of being as the basis of the physical realm because knowing its internal character requires superior knowledge. The act of laying foundations exhausts this operative path because it encounters a reality that it cannot unravel. The habit by which the act of laying foundations is known corresponds to the habit of logical axioms. It has three rules: identity (A is A), noncontradiction (A is not non-A), and causality (A is the cause of A). We must remember that reason is a unique faculty with two uses. Practical reason is more potential than theoretical reason, because, by

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being open to the truth, theoretical reason adheres to truth when possessing it. Theoretical reason does not get things wrong; rather, it reasons with a lack of rigor in the search for truth. Practical reason, however, is open to many possibilities—to the point that it can be on the side of error; thus, it is never closed. Therefore, it is upright if it is rectified and corrected. To fulfill its purpose, reason relies on the cogitative, which values the sensible realm; in other words, the practical intellect needs particular reason to apply universal laws to particular situations. If it did not mediate this power, the universal realm would not explain that which is individually operable. Acts of conceiving beget possible or feasible goods (also called exemplary ideas). The habit of practical conception involves realizing that we know the goodness of physical reality—and, thanks to it, the will can embolden reason to correctly order conceptions in relation to action, towards the external. The “problem of universals,” and the corresponding rise of voluntarism, is closely related to neglecting this power without which the will fulfills this cognoscitive function, regardless of any rational reference to the concrete realm. In reality, when “the use of the cogitative faculty supports the will,” (Thomas Aquinas, S. Theol., I ps., q. 111, a. 2, ad 2.) the cogitative helps the will to appreciate the good in its concrete form. In short, the cogitative refers to “all concrete reality in its temporality” (Sellés 1999b, 43). For Aristotle, practical knowledge is reason insofar as it aims at practical activity; it refers to “know-how,” which accounts for three, hierarchically ordered levels: art, politics, and ethics. The lowest level, art, seeks the transformation of external reality through despotic action; politics, for its part, refers to a realm of free activity. Finally, ethics pursues perfecting actions through the development of virtues. Acts of practical reason are not actions, but rather acts and their known-objects are mental forms that correspond to their acts. Theoretical reason does not need action to know, while practical reason cannot know without it. Practical reason conditions the possibility of acting. One takes action in the active life to know, not to take action for its own sake, which is why practical reason gives human and personal meaning to action. “One acts to grow cognoscitively (as well as for the will to grow) because action for action’s sake amounts to dispossessing action of its meaning” (Sellés 1999a, 68). Action without meaning only corresponds to human beings in their animal sense. Practical reason has four acts within its reach (Thomas Aquinas, S. Theol., II–II, q. 153): the practical concept, counsel or deliberation, practical judgment, and the act of command (imperium) (Scalzo and Alford 2016).

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The next level corresponds to intellectual knowledge. As mentioned, many philosophers have already addressed the distinction between intellect (nous, intellectus) and reason (dianoia, ratio), and the superiority of the former, over the imperfection of the later (Thomas Aquinas, S. Theol., I, q. 79). The word intellect is derived from “intus legere,” which means something like “to read inside of” or to intuit the essence of a thing, the innermost parts of a being. Intellectual and personal knowledge Following the thread of our classification, just as reason knows what is beneath it and only a part of it, reason does not know itself as a power or faculty and much less does it know what is above it—that is, intellectual knowledge. This requires a higher act that activates it, since it is initially a passive power and requires that which is already in action. Aristotle called the act that triggers reason “acting intellect” or “agent intellect” (intellectus agens), which is equivalent to the act of being human insofar as it is cognizant at the level of the act of being. The will is lower and is in potency with respect to the intellect. The agent intellect is in act and has a natural habit by which it updates the reason and will, which is to say that it illuminates both theoretical and practical first principles. The agent intellect uses an innate instrument to activate intelligence synderesis. It also has an intermediate habit, from first principles, by which it knows the fundamentals of reality outside of the mind; moreover it has another superior habit, that of wisdom, by which the soul knows itself since the soul opens a window onto the most intimate aspects of a person. Synderesis is not acquired, but rather is an innate habit by which one can possess the knowledge and mastery of all human powers. Aquinas calls this habit “natural reason,” and it is what establishes the moral order. It is the source of all acquired, rational, posterior knowledge because it is the tool that the human person uses to activate all her operative paths, including formal, theoretical, and practical (to know and give them more capacity through acquired habits). The human person also activates, knows, and perfects the will, which in itself is not cognoscitive and cannot be known through reason. In addition to the operative paths of reason and the potential of the will, synderesis knows the sensible powers, and therefore is the opening by which the person knows human nature, which is common to all men. It knows these powers directly and experientially without reasoning. It enlightens what is beneath the person and that which belongs to the person

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(not what the person is). In modern philosophy, synderesis corresponds with the “self.” Of course, the self is not the person because man is not reduced to his self, such that synderesis allows us to know human beings in their humanity, but not in their personal intimacy (it knows a “what,” but not a “who”). Synderesis is essential for ethics because it activates intelligence to exercise standards and the will to develop virtues and adapt to real goods. It also acts as the principle of prudence because it allows prudence to know the pre-existent ends (S. Theol., II–II, q. 47). The habit of first principles (NE, VI, 1141a) is known as intellect. Medieval philosophy distinguished rational knowledge—described as meditative, processual, discursive—from intellectual knowledge, considered direct, intuitive, and experiential. The first principles, the fundamental realities that are the start of others, are the theme of this habit. These are the real extra-mental acts of being: the act of being in the universe, the act of being divine and dependence with respect to others or transcendental causality. This habit looks towards the highest external and is the foundation of certain knowledge on all worldly reality since it is presupposed when knowing said reality (we know that the universe exists, that God exists, and that the former depends on the latter). Metaphysics is the philosophical discipline that corresponds to this habit and, strictly speaking, comprises the study of the act of being in the universe as distinct from its essence or ontology; this study coincides with its essence or natural theology and the dependence of the act of being created with respect to the act of being divine. Finally, the habit of wisdom is the highest human habit, the most cognoscitive tool of the agent intellect, whose theme is human intimacy (Polo 1985, 274). Thanks to this habit, we know that we are a novel and unique person with a singular meaning. This habit’s theme, like the habit of first principles, is higher than the habit itself, such that we can know, in part, who we are and who we are called to be. The philosophical discipline that corresponds to this habit is called transcendental anthropology, which studies the personal and human act of being open to divine transcendence and that examines, therefore, human intimacy. The habit of wisdom understands that the personal and human act of being is composed of several dimensions that are linked (only God is of a single structure), and that these dimensions also have a hierarchical differentiation. The lower dimensions are subordinate to higher ones and they are natively open to the act of being superior to any other perfection acquired in the course of a lifetime. One of these perfections is personal freedom, which is an activity of the spirit. Personal freedom should be oriented towards a higher activity—that is, personal knowing, because

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each person is a distinct truth in the personal sense. Therefore, freedom has to be guided by personal truth—that which each person is and will be. The highest personal perfection of intimacy is personal love—each person is a different love—which is overflowing: accepting, giving, and the gift. It is through the gift that human beings show through their works that they love, accept, and give. None of these cognoscitive levels allows us to know who we are. Personal knowing is human knowing at the level of the act of being (Sellés 2008, 555). Each person is a different personal knowing that surpasses every faculty at her disposal and, therefore, every kind of knowledge herein developed. The habit of wisdom does not lead us to wholly know ourselves, nor to the theme proper to this kind of personal knowing. The agent intellect is a kind of knowledge that is naturally capable of activating other potential cognoscitive levels. Despite Aristotle’s discovery of the agent intellect’s having undergone various interpretations, it should be conceived, as Sellés suggests, as the “personal act of being” (Sellés 2008, 516). Studying it is difficult because “its activity is not easily seen. It is an unconscious activity that does not contain or reveal the thought essence, nor is it the reason of what these or other essences think” (Polo 1964, 309). However, the key is found in personalization (Sellés 2008, 559). From the point of view of the personal being, the person is knowing beyond what he knows (has) through his faculties. This does not mean that the act of personal being is equivalent to knowing; there are other transcendentals that are co-agents—co-existence and freedom—with it (the act of being is a co-act). The agent intellect uses synderesis—the pinnacle of the soul—to activate reason, while it universalizes images from fantasy, but its own theme must be a distinct personal cognoscitive reality, since knowledge is not auto-reflexive. The theme of the agent intellect is therefore he who knows the agent intellect wholly—that is, his Creator, a cognoscitive act of being who knows our personal cognoscitive being, the Divine Being. Of course its act goes beyond the agent intellect, for which the agent intellect’s active knowledge about God is proper to a knowledge that is more like faith than clarity; it seeks personal meaning in God. The highest natural knowledge is natural faith. Above the agent intellect’s personal knowledge, we find supernatural faith (lumen fidei), which consists of the elevation of the agent intellect by God in this life. Faith is not an alternative to knowledge, as many think, but rather a new and superior way of knowing, and its themes are overflowing with light. According to Christian Revelation, there is a higher cognoscitive elevation that is related to knowledge through the light

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of glory (lumen gloriae) and is reserved for those who, in this life, are faithful in pursuit of the personal meaning that God gives them. We know this personal God in the same way He knows us through contemplating Him. The agent intellect, a human light received directly from God, is elevated with the divine light of faith. The agent intellect is at the level of the act of personal being, and the person is opening both to lower and higher realms. The human person is cognoscitively open to God, and only knows himself fully through God from whom this knowledge proceeds. Table 9 displays the levels of knowledge herein developed and the overall cognoscitive hierarchy.

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2. Human knowledge from the modern perspective: from Ockham to Hegel through Descartes, Hume, and Kant 2.1. A paradigm shift: the origin of individualism It has become clear that, for Aristotle, as well as for classical thinkers in general, the thought-object is “purely intentional” with respect to the reality from which it is abstracted. In other words, that which is known is intentionally the same as reality. This stance is known as “realism” and presupposes the existence of universals outside of the mind. However, in the sixteenth century, many saw the faith threatened by Aristotelian– Thomistic doctrine and began to doubt the intentionality of human knowledge. Human beings commonly make the mistake of wanting to more quickly and absolutely arrive at the finish line on the path to knowledge, or, which is the same, we aspire to complete knowledge without respecting its rational mediations—thought-objects or ideas. In short, we often want to absolutely and intuitively know, while forgetting about the human condition. The origin of “modern thought” can be found in the nominalism of the late Middle Ages (Gillespie 2008, 20; Gregory 2012; Gilson 2004), following a tradition that, in general terms, is against the authority of Aristotle. More specifically, the followers of Aquinas and Scotus are called “real” or “antique,” while the adherents of Ockham are known as “nominals” or “moderni” (Gilson 2004, 630). The modern way implies a supremacy of intuition over abstraction, being the origin of what is now called “representationalism.” According to this view, that which we immediately know is not reality found in the nature of things, but rather it is a representative or substitute that happens inside the mind (Llano 1999, 171–8). Ockham’s road to nominalism begins with Scotus, whose theological theses tentatively remained within the Orthodoxy, but were later a source of significant deviation, from which it was very difficult to resume (Polo 1985, 144). Duns Scotus (1266–1308), a Scottish philosopher and theologian with a Franciscan education (and a characteristic optimism regarding the material world), was the last great figure of medieval scholasticism. Educated at Oxford and influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas’s Aristotelianism, the mathematical ideal within the scientific tradition— Bacon and Grosseteste—and the Franciscan Augustinianism taught by his teachers in Paris, he sought to better synthesize Augustinianism and Thomism. One of the first problems that Scotus faced, which in a way is the beginning of a split that was later difficult to overcome, is the relationship

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between philosophy and theology. Scotus opposes reason and faith: philosophy deals with demonstrable truths, with its formal object being the first principles; theology, meanwhile, deals with believable truths, and its object is the truths of faith—God in as far as God. Scotus believes that God is not a rational object—that the truths of faith cannot be apprehended rationally, nor can the truths of reason be apprehended by faith. This is precisely why God reveals Himself, since nothing of what is provable by reason is revealed by God and vice versa. The line of the ancient pagan philosophers cannot be followed as if God had not revealed Himself. Metaphysics emerges as the point of contact between philosophy and theology, but from a new perspective (Honnefelder 2002). To achieve the sphere of metaphysics, the philosopher must know, as a theologian, that the physical world is contingent and radically dependent on the creative will that works contingently. Faith is needed to transcend natural philosophy and access metaphysics, from which theology and the human science of the divine is conceived. For St. Thomas Aquinas, access to knowledge of God is possible by analogy to the creatures (not equivocally or univocally) since God’s essence is strictly inaccessible to human knowledge, and there is a relationship between the two. For Scotus, however, God is beyond human intellect and therefore philosophy can never reach God in Himself, but rather insofar as being. However, for man to know the reality of God, he introduces the idea that “being is univocal,” a peculiar notion of being, absolutely indeterminate and univocal to all beings. The consideration of being through this perspective opens a new alternative to traditional metaphysics by basing it on something new (Muralt 2008). Scotus presents the problem of proving the existence of God by making the demonstrations as a priori as possible, noting necessary and absolute relationships between concepts he uses and neglecting the starting point of experience that St. Thomas was so careful to include. For him, any worthwhile demonstration must proceed from a necessary cause and reach a conclusion through syllogistic reasoning; demonstrations by effect, like the St. Thomas pathways, are relative. One can conclude from the necessary to the contingent, but not vice versa. Philosophy offers a knowledge of God that is (non-personal) abstract and rational, searching not just for God’s existence, but also for the existence of the infinite because the infinite formally constitutes the essence of God. By highlighting divine infinity, he stops at the contingency of creation, which gives rise to the doctrine of voluntarism, according to which the laws of nature and morality are radically contingent on God’s will. One of the characteristic features of Scotism is its insistence on the freedom of the

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divine will and the contingent nature of its effects, which is based on a univocal being, and not on analog acts of existence; a separator act has to intervene to ensure the contingency of the possible, and this is the role of the will. The possible emanates from the necessary through an act of freedom—that is, God creates if He wants to, and He does not create more than that because He wants it so. The only reason why God wanted certain things is found in His will. God’s will is not subject to the rule of good, but rather the other way around. Righteousness is part of His very will and no law is right until it has been accepted by the will of God, which is unlimited. His conception of freedom tends more towards voluntarism than intellectualism. The essential features of this metaphysical alternative continue into modern thought (Muralt 2008, 37 and 67; Muralt 2002). It is important to emphasize that the Scotist metaphysics implies recognizing in the individual the ontological value that was not present in the scholastic tradition. The individual takes precedence over the universal and knowledge of the singular is the most perfect. For Scotus, only the individual exists and everything that exists in the individual is in some way individual or individualized. He rejects the overvaluation of the universal prevalent in Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, and opens the way towards the individualism of modern philosophy. On the theological level, and taken to the extreme, these doctrines involve structurally similar consequences, as seen in the conception of divine omnipotence, relationships of grace and human freedom, the Church and the State, and so on. Divine will is sovereignly free, and God can want and do anything because His power is absolute with respect to that which does not include contradiction. This potentia absoluta dei excludes the definition of divine action as substantially intelligent, voluntary, and provident. However, another Franciscan, William of Ockham (1280–1349), took this new metaphysics to its logical extreme. With a strong sense of the concrete, of individual freedom and complex social entities, he wanted to free the Church of absolutism in political power. Even more than Scotus, he restricts the scope of philosophical demonstration, emphasizing the separation between theology and philosophy. Ockham was vigorously opposed to the realism with which medieval philosophy responded to the problem of universals. For him, universals are mere names (terms) and do not exist outside of thought. Reality does not exist beyond the particular; the only substances are individual things and their properties; and the singular is first in the order of being and knowing. It is empirical and ontologically the first and indispensable intelligible, and enjoys full logical, ontological, and epistemological autonomy. For St.

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Thomas, science deals with the universal, although, properly, there is only the individual. For Ockham, there is only the individual and he alone is the object of science. The word that apparently refers to a concept actually designates a confusingly known object, hence the understanding to know the singular does not need intermediaries of any kind. Although the existence of God is reduced to mere probability, Ockham highlights the radical contingency of being created as a result of an omnipotent God’s creative decision. Divine omnipotence sustains and justifies the ontological–theological view of the world and life. The potential of God is unlimited and can do anything that is possible (i.e., that does not involve contradiction). Following Scotus, he understands freedom as the capacity for self-determination, of wanting or not wanting something concrete, but unlike Scotus, he does not believe that human will naturally tends towards the infinite good. Singularity is a being’s most radical way of being; it is his way of being. The ways of being in metaphysics (potency and act, per se and per accidens, essence and existence, substance and accident) are ways of speaking or indicating since everything that exists, exists in act. Ockham rejects the real distinction between essence and existence, while attacking the metaphysics of essences, considering it invalid hypothetical knowledge. The famous “Ockham’s Razor” refers to the “principle of economy” under which entities should not be unnecessarily multiplied. The problem is that applying this methodological principle to the idea of an omnipotent God makes countless non-contradictory possibilities of a fact equally valid. We cannot know the intelligible forms of things empirically and, therefore, by not having access to the intrinsic structure of reality, the ultimate argument for existence is the divine will. The argument thus falls into extreme theologism. Ockham took from Scotus the distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge, but he interpreted intuitive knowledge in the line of empiricism: the main characteristics of intuition are immediacy and evidence (Gilson 2004, 69). He resolved the intuition of non-immediate reality—that is, nonexistence—by attending to a theological argument. However, human access to God, unlike in the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition, is not cognitive (i.e., natural), but rather is acquired through supernatural faith, which falls into fideism. In short, for Ockham, sensible knowledge is intuitive; it directly knows physical reality, while reason creates mental representations that do not conform to reality and to which human beings merely put a name. On the one hand, man has ideas and relates them, which he calls truth, and, on the

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other hand, there is a physical reality—where the good is located—that can be known through the senses and that the will can want. In other words, reason can think, but cannot know. This is the result of Ockham’s breaking of the connection between reason and the senses—between thought and reality—by postulating that ideas do not refer to physical reality; he also breaks the harmony between reason and the will by arguing that the will conforms to concrete physical reality. Nominalism is a reduction in the scope of reality by reducing being to fact, and in the scope of knowledge by reducing truth to fiction or a logical possibility. Reason can only develop hypothetical theories, but cannot know the truth. According to this doctrine, “we know with certainty whether or not things exists (intuitive knowledge), but from there everything else is more or less reasoned explanations with which we try to make sense of reality” (Corazón 2002, 30). However, if there is no truth, there can be no science in the strict sense; or rather, it is reduced to empirical evidence from changing facts (Cruz Cruz 2009, 15). The nominalist theory of knowledge greatly impacted the ethical sphere because one cannot prove that the moral law is necessary and absolute. Just as universal ideas were eliminated in the field of ontology, ethics saw the elimination of the idea of an immutable law since the will of God can create a different order and, for example, send one to do something that is prohibited. From the moment that universal archetypes are suppressed, there is no longer a barrier to contain the arbitrariness of divine power and God’s omnipotent freedom because there is no longer a proper foundation for ethics. The entire created universe, including the moral law, is contingent—not just in its existence, but also in its essence. Ockham, who can be considered the father of modern philosophy, initiated an irreconcilable alternative: on the one hand, reason, universal ideas, and truth, and, on the other hand, the will, singular good, senses, and physical reality (Sellés 2010, 71). Naturally, this split inspired two traditions: the “rationalist” tradition, which defends the need for truth— that is, reason takes precedence—and the “empiricist” tradition, which pursues the contingency of the good and sensible experience—the will takes precedence. As Ockham’s philosophy gained ground in European universities during the fourteenth century, the scholastic philosophers started losing confidence in their own principles, ushering in the decline of medieval philosophy (Gilson 2004, 108).

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2.2. Cartesian rationalism In the wake of nominalism, philosophy entered into a deep crisis because knowledge was no longer considered an adjustment to the reality of things and became instead competing hypothetical theories. Such an understanding led to skepticism because the intellect’s ability to know the highest realities was increasingly doubted. It is in this context that Descartes, who is considered the father of modern philosophy, proposed a new method for overcoming the “fiction” that knowledge had turned into. René Descartes (1596–1650) received his education in the new metaphysics and, in his Discourse on Method, he relates how his studies led him to skepticism and the recognition that nothing he had learned was useful in his life (Gilson 2004, 116). He was thus determined to find certainty, something that could stand the test of skepticism. Educated in Ockham’s and Luther’s theology of an arbitrary and unpredictable God, he set out to build a new science based on the natural light of reason and the eternal truth of mathematics alone (Yates, 1972). In 1637, he published his fundamental work in French, which was meant for a more popular audience. Entitled Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences, or known more simply as Discourse on the Method, it aimed to show that a method, rather than intelligence or learning, is needed on the path to discovering truth. His Discourse, written autobiographically, is the first chapter in the history of self-creation, which replaced the classical model. The wise man’s knowledge is a “mathesis universalis” (universal science) to which anyone free of prejudice has access and may apply his method to achieve certainty. Certainty is an intuitive knowledge that is reached through the light of reason when it discovers innate ideas, especially mathematics. “Descartes does not conceive of knowledge as a vital act, as a perfect activity that possess an end” (Murillo 2010, 68), thus it loses the intentionality of knowledge—it does not correspond to reality, but rather to ideas or impressions. These ideas should not come from sensible experience, but rather must be innate to ensure that knowledge is deductive and can escape the possibility of error that the senses hold. Knowing is no longer being “open” to reality, but rather to examine data and test it, making sure it is clear and distinct. Reality must be approached indirectly—through the principle of causality (ideas are caused). In Meditations, Descartes argues that the ultimate source of doubt is the possibility of being deceived by an omnipotent God, and that the mere possibility of this is enough to refute the most certain of truths and, therefore, to end his project. This leads to the hypothesis of the “evil genie” that misleads us, supposing that he is able to question both the

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external world and the abstract entities of mathematics. Thus, science becomes impossible and Descartes is forced to wonder if he himself exists; radical doubt is a consequence of the nominalist conception of an omnipotent God. He solves skepticism through methodical doubt, which allows for certainty of his thoughts alone (“I think, therefore I am”). While there is no way to be certain of reality, we can be certain of judgments, which cannot be doubted unless we think about them; then we cannot think of them without at the same time thinking that they are true. Thus, they cannot be doubted. For the mature Descartes, judgment is a combination of two mental capacities: the will and the understanding, of which the former predominates. Judgment is, therefore, a determination of the will. Descartes’ fundamental principle is generally understood as selfconsciousness or subjectivity; however, what he means by thinking about oneself is different from the ordinary notion of self-consciousness. Descartes does not think we are self-conscious because we can think of ourselves as an object; for him, everything we know is known only when it is perceived and represented in the imagination by the will. The perceived object is transformed into a coordinate system that he calls extension. The world is only true when it is represented or constructed. This construction of the world is its representation or objectification. Thought as representation is always a representation for a subject; consequently, the subject is necessarily required in every act of thought, and all consciousness is self-consciousness. Thus, Descartes’ answer to an omnipotent God leads to a new vision of human beings—that is, res cogitans. In Descartes’ scheme, faith and theology are replaced by certainty and natural science. Moreover, certainty is a voluntary, rather than a cognoscitive, operation. The principle of this new science is individual autonomy that arises from the self-affirmation of the human will. To master nature one must first master himself, breaking free of the illusions of imagination thanks to methodical doubt. With the triumph of subjectivity, the world no longer pre-exists man, but rather is an artifact created by him. Descartes begins a “representational” theory of knowledge, according to which we do not know the reality, but rather ideas or representations of things.

2.3. Hume’s empiricism Once the rationalist epistemological view that knowledge cannot be obtained directly from the senses and observation—that one must make way for the representation of the world—is accepted, science comes to

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occupy a central place. In the same way as Descartes, John Locke (1632– 1704) thought that the mind can produce an accurate thought through analytical reflection. However, he rejected innate ideas on the grounds that they contain a kind of teleologism or natural tendency towards good and truth. On the contrary, man accesses knowledge through sensory experience. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he studies the extent and limits of knowledge and asserts that the mind is like “a blank slate” on which experience writes. For Locke, ideas are mere mind content—not a reality, as Plato argued—and come from a combination of sensations (Taylor 1996), which are a kind of elemental, simple ideas that reflection uses to build more complex ideas (relationships, modes, substances). There are three ideas of substance that the human mind can form: extensive (world), thinking (the self), and infinite (God); and although one can know of the existence of these realities, one cannot know their nature. To reach true and reliable knowledge, it is enough to avoid prejudices and arguments of authority throughout the process of building ideas. Additionally, for Locke, the idea of man is reduced to his capacity of self-awareness, continuous self-control of the mind, where the core of the person is the “self.” Man’s relationship with nature—corporality—does not have an effect for the purposes of determining identity, whose foundation is found in memory, in the continuity of memory itself, and in something psychological and entirely subjective. For Locke, the person is reduced to a state of consciousness—that is, a human being is only a person if she is conscious and remembers her actions, an idea that later brought many problems in the following centuries. Although Locke starts the empiricist line, he was unable to rid himself of certain rationalist influence, and his epistemological insights were carried to their logical conclusion with Hume’s radical empiricism. David Hume (1711–76) completely dissociated philosophy from metaphysics, a step that was certainly implicit in rationalist philosophy, even if rationalists did not explicitly intend for it.1 In fact, empiricism and rationalism are two sides of the same coin: both doubt, or rather admit as a 1

Rationalist metaphysics is possible as a science because rational knowledge of the substances (the self, world, God) is possible, even though they focus on reason. Deduction is the rationalist approach to knowledge and its preferred scientific model is mathematics because of its axiomatic and deductive character. Empiricism, however, favors induction, which begins with sensory experience to reach general laws. Its scientific model is physics because of its inductive and experimental character. Thus, metaphysics is not possible as a science because experience cannot access the substances.

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“hypothesis,” the existence of extra-mental reality. They hold that the only certainty is the mind and the ideas contained therein. For both, philosophy must begin by considering the problem of knowledge, although they vary substantially in how to access said knowledge: whereas for rationalism reason is a reliable source, for empiricism only sensory experience can be relied upon. Hume shared Locke’s goal of reaching a kind of thought free from all authority and prejudice (Hume 1977, 426), but he did not think that reason can order the passions, which presupposes the determination of the true and the good. Reason’s capacity is merely limited to calculating the best way to meet the passions’ demands, which are spontaneous movements of human nature that lack any teleology or possible moral value. There is nothing more than perceptions; the “self” of which Locke spoke cannot be a perception and therefore must be a fiction, a “meeting of perceptions” that occurs very quickly, forming an instantaneous representation of relationships of similarity, contiguity, and causality in continuous change that cannot be identified with the self. It is also impossible to be sure that things, once perceived, will continue to exist. There is no way to rationally prove causality, which is the result of seeing certain things happen habitually, one after the other. While he does not allow for the idea of personal identity and selfobjectification, relationships, despite being fiction and appearance, can help build a past with which the self can identify thanks to collective memory, or common sense, although the self is not capable of immediate recall. If, for Hume, we can only know that which corresponds to a sensible impression, many of our beliefs are unfounded. In The History of Natural Religion, he explains how religion originates in the psychological feelings of dread and fear of the unknown, and in the human desire for immortality. Religious beliefs have evolved from primitive polytheism to monotheism following a process of progressive rationalization. In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he investigates the rational basis of religion, putting a theist (a traditional believer) in dialogue with a deist (a believer without affiliation to any official church) and an agnostic skeptic,2 with whom he ultimately identifies. Faced with skepticism, only doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction are fitting (e.g.,, the simultaneous presence of a loving God and evil in the world). 2

Hume’s skepticism is, like Cartesian doubt, a method for destroying the dogmatism of reason and allowing for belief and morality. It aims towards a means, not an end. Hume strongly opposed absolute certainties, which he linked to a lack of freedom and intolerance.

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For Hume, society is the most natural and primitive sphere and is born out of the passions’ complex dynamics, which move human actions. History and culture are not alien to nature and the confrontation between the two is solved by recovering practical reason, which is found in designing a blend between the impulses of a human nature that is homogeneous and unchanging—what motivates action—and the way in which reason serves said motivations, aiming towards the greatest possible efficiency. His understanding of practical reason, therefore, deviates from the classical interpretation and falls into utilitarianism. Human actions are moved by affections and passions, which have nothing to do with teleological natural tendencies. It thus becomes necessary to take theoretical reason into account, which is limited to calculating how to most efficiently take advantage of the passions’ momentum. The natural course of events—be they natural or social—do not come from an intrinsic order aimed towards their own ends, but rather are the result of habit. Under the guise of the so-called law, there are only prejudices, beliefs, and mental habits consolidated over time, all of which lack real substance or rational design. Society is the result of human passions, natural and spontaneous movements, and blind and amoral tendencies. Reason is a slave, rather than the guide, to the passions. If virtue is not determined by practical reason, but rather is defined pragmatically in terms of prosperity, morality is equated with the economy, though not absolutely; rather, it is dependent on the exercise of a technical reason that, above the feelings and passions, leads society to a higher state.

2.4. Kantian idealism: a synthesis between rationalism and empiricism Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was educated in the rationalist tradition and, according to his own account, awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” after reading Hume, who convinced him of the inevitably non-analytical nature of the relationship of causality and the weak foundation on which the metaphysics of essences was built. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant roundly attacks metaphysics and he places all his confidence in science, in which he finds new light. He was convinced that modern science and morality were both possible and desirable; this stance was critical in making way for the Enlightenment. A corollary to the destruction of metaphysics is found in the impossibility of knowing things in themselves, which Kant called

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noumena, and instead only knowing their appearances or fainómenos3 (phenomena), which is what knowledge receives from reality. However, Kant, an admirer of Newton’s physics, rejects Hume’s criticism of the principle of causality4 and supports the necessary knowledge of the laws of nature, though not those of reality. Physics, which combines rational and empirical–experimental activity, constitutes the model of science over mathematics, as rationalism had favored. There is no way of knowing the order that things have in themselves; we can only know what is ordered according to our abilities or powers. Kant realized that reason can fall into contradictions (antinomies),5 which threaten the mathesis universalis project, returning humanity once again to skepticism. Antinomies are resolved by recognizing the limitations of our rational capacities. For Kant, reason knows starting from (pure) understanding and from a (practical) moral sense. The correct use of reason enables the mastery of human nature and freedom and, therefore, perpetual progress and peace. Kant was fully aware of the conflict that modern thought’s quintessential uprooting of man from nature provoked between the realm of nature and freedom. His philosophy is an effort to resolve this antinomy without subjecting himself to nature. He built his philosophical system based on two principles he considered incontestable and that somehow most manifested the confrontation between necessity and freedom—that is, Newton’s physics and moral obligation. While this duality was already present starting with Descartes, Kant's philosophy only accentuated it. Kant’s answer to this gnoseological problem is to propose a synthesis between empiricism and rationalism: sensible experience informs the “material” of knowledge, but reason imposes the “form,” ordering the impressions received in space and time and then conceptualizing them with understanding through concepts and categories.6 According to Kant, 3

Etymologically, fainómenos means “what appears” or “what is manifested.” For Descartes, causality, like substance, is an idea in reason that is entirely rational, innate, universal, and necessary. For Hume, it is an idea that is particular and contingent, a weak perception, the result of experience—and it is supported by belief, habit, or custom. For Kant, it is a pure, a priori concept of category and amounts to the way in which understanding orders the data that make up the material of knowledge that sensibility provides. 5 There is a contradiction when you can prove two states that oppose each other, in a strictly contradictory way; for example, that causality necessarily includes freedom and, simultaneously, excludes it. Antinomies are causal, and come from duty and freedom. 6 That which is known through experience—sensible impressions—is always a posteriori (i.e., reached after experience), whereas the way in which experience is 4

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all our knowledge begins with experience thanks to sensibility—a faculty of intuitions—and the spirit’s ability to take in representations. The data that sensibility provides are linked and unified by understanding, which is a faculty of concepts. Intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty. Kant was aware that sensible intuition, the level of mere facts, leads to skepticism, as had happened to Hume; but, at the same time, he was aware that concepts do not by themselves reach the reality of things because they lack content. He proposed to introduce a level of understanding between both, which he defined as the faculty of thinking an object of sensible intuition. The faculties (sensibility and understanding) are irreducible to each other, but they are indeed complementary. There are no innate ideas, but rather ways of perceiving—a priori forms of sensibility—and of understanding—a priori forms of understanding innate to the subject who knows. Scientific knowledge—an epistemological problem—involves making representations of reality that, while they do not access reality itself, can be considered true to the extent that they receive their logical consistency from a priori forms of human reason. Scientific laws are the result of both experimental activity and rational activity of human understanding. A priori analytic judgments provide universal and necessary knowledge, but “the archetype of knowledge is intuition, which is an immediate knowledge of reality” (Murillo 2010, 72). Nature “is there” to be structured by human reason and things do not exist for themselves, but rather insofar as they are our representations (Llano 1999). That is, the being of phenomena consists in appearing in the form of representation. Kant was convinced that his response to the gnoseological problem was revolutionary because the object was no longer what determines the subject in knowledge, but to the contrary, the subject became an active principle that is projected onto the known object. However, his theory of knowledge leads him to the conclusion that only phenomenological reality can be known, to the exclusion of noumenal realities—like God, the world, the soul—of which we do not have any empirical knowledge whatsoever, and, therefore, the possibility of ordered is always a priori (i.e., it does not depend on experience). In turn, there are a priori forms of sensibility—space and time—and a priori forms of understanding—empirical concepts and pure categories or concepts. The former produce an initial synthesis—the phenomenon—that is the result of organizing sensory impressions in space and time. Understanding makes a second synthesis by applying concepts to phenomena, thanks to which we can know, order, and understand phenomena.

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metaphysics as a science.7 For Kant, the subject is as unknowable as the thing itself, “the self is only something that accompanies representations[. It is] an unknown, a condition of scientific knowledge’s possibility” (Murillo 2010, 77). Kant’s followers generally regard his resignation of metaphysics’ scientific character as a resignation of knowledge. The idealistic current that Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel later took up put even more emphasis on subjectivity with their tendency to accept as reality that which is in the mind, consciousness, which, thanks to the influence Kantian, they linked with freedom.

2.5 Hegel’s objective idealism The philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) was aimed at overcoming the fracture between freedom and necessity/reason and nature that Kant pointed out. Kant’s failure to resolve this antagonism—the object of his third antinomy—and bringing it from the plane of reality to the plane of consciousness meant he renounced the possibility of true knowledge and ended up in a kind of subjective belief. In an attempt to integrate both realities, Hegel began by highlighting the failures of the French and English traditions and developing a new approach. He proposed explaining how the process that led to the necessity–freedom fracture came about, to then overcome it with the establishment of a definitive ethical society in which freedom would be fully realized in a way that does not destroy nature and is in full accordance with reason. Hegel tried to develop the idea that truth is the unity of opposites, the “dialectic.” For this, he relied on Schelling, for whom nature and spirit/freedom and necessity are the same in the Absolute. To do this, he felt it necessary to turn philosophy into dialectic, a principle that is present throughout the history of philosophy, which is to say that unity is acquired by overcoming the contradictions and imposing reason. With this resource, Hegel sought to provide an explanation for the genesis and continuous evolution of the universe, capturing an absolute spirit in its eternity; or that eternity would became an absolute knowledge in which all contradiction and antinomy would be overcome. Thus, philosophy became the history of philosophy, an all-encompassing 7 Kant denies the scientific possibility of a transcendent metaphysics, but admits the possibility of a transcendental metaphysics, a theory of knowledge that considers the subjective or transcendental conditions of knowledge in relation to noumenal realities, which cannot be known with certainty, but also cannot be definitely proven to not exist.

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account of the genesis of human knowledge, and explained how, throughout history, the universal and absolute consciousness, which he called “spirit” (Geist), expresses itself.8 The spirit represents the evolution that leads to the reconciliation of opposites (the individual and the community, the natural and the conventional, the human and the divine), and the march of history would become the manifestation of the spirit, which, overcoming conflicts and contradictions, dialectically evolves into a perfect and supreme rationality and a perfect and definitive ethical community. The spirit, conceived as the Absolute, is the true subject of history, which becomes itself finite and particular and acts through men. Selfawareness fully coincides with the fullness of the individual’s selfconsciousness since, thanks to man’s capacity for thought, the spirit becomes more and more conscious. Finite human reason cannot alone carry out this process and needs autonomous and sovereign reason that is able to bring all men to full and definitive freedom and unity found in the perfect political community, the achievement of which represents the end of history. By manifesting itself in history, the spirit (the Absolute, God, the Idea) alienates itself,9 but, by its very nature, it alienates itself to find itself again. God manifests Himself in the world through man, who has spirit. The manifestation of the spirit is carried out on three linked and overlapping but different levels: the subjective, the objective, and the absolute. The subjective spirit takes place in the life of every man who has a natural consciousness and corresponds to the soul or the reflective self. Individual conscience, which is cognoscitive and desiring, is motivated by particular appetites. The objective spirit is the life of political communities, collective knowledge, which is improved by the development of law and morality. At this level, through education and work, reason shows itself in the world. The passions move—but do not control—communities that are the manifestation of the spirit rather than the result of natural forces. Desires are regulated and limited by education and rational social conventions proper to every society. The subjective becomes objective and rational. 8 Hegel identifies Geist, the world, history, God, and reason with one another, falling into a kind of pantheism. 9 From the Latin alius (other), alienation means “to become something other than oneself for oneself.” Alienation means becoming alien to oneself insofar as an activity, determining oneself, making oneself a thing. Determinations are alien to the activity that produces them.

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To solve the necessity–freedom problem, Kant appeals to the fullness of a transcendent God’s self-consciousness. Hegel, however, relies on a worldly and immanent spirit, a universal consciousness, spirit or absolute reason, which continually and progressively synthesizes opposites, eventually resulting in unity. In this context, the truth becomes the absolute knowledge of totality, which will come to pass at the end of history where everything will be intelligible. However, Hegel confuses man’s being with his knowledge and he does not address man’s inability to encompass the entire universe in his self-consciousness without being able to go beyond himself. Moreover, Hegel found great difficulty in saving the individual—the subjective plane of moral intention—from the imminent and growing power of the state—the objective plane of ethics— that eventually eliminates individual freedom, making the individual increasingly insignificant until her disappearance. Modern philosophy centered on the subject was developed in three main stages: Descartes, Hume, and Kant. For Descartes, the rational subject originates and founds knowledge; Hume defines man as subject to experience; and Kant emphasizes that both sensibility and understanding are necessary for knowledge, and that the subject has faculties that enable both science and moral action. Whereas Descartes and Hume consider the ability to know fundamental to subjectivity, Kant emphasizes free will as the basis of morality and, although knowledge depends on phenomena, the subject determines the object by giving them form. To the extent that the subject’s forms make up the objectivity of phenomena, Kant falls into subjective idealism. Hegel’s idealism continues Kant’s critique of knowledge, according to which one cannot know “the thing itself”. Hegel, meanwhile, continues to emphasize subjectivity. However, this subjectivity is not proper to the individual or the “transcendental subject,” but rather to the absolute spirit—that is, the only true knowledge is “absolute” or divine knowledge. Hegel aims to build a philosophy that has absolute value, “exhausting the ability to know everything. In a word, Hegel seeks absolute knowledge” (Corazón 2002, 33). In Hegel, being and knowing are identified together; in other words, reality is based on knowledge. “One of the problems of idealism is that the possibility of knowing, which tries to assert itself against excessive concern for the limits of reason, as it is represented by Kant as well as empiricists, ends up implying that to know anything one is required to know everything. The need for knowledge that is systematic and absolute led to a profusion of different systems that tried to take into account everything that is known. But knowledge of reality, both natural and

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human, has always exceeded systems that consider pure reason alone” (Murillo 2010, 78).

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Kleio Akrivou is Associate Professor of Business Ethics and Organisational Behaviour (Human Development) at the University of Reading’s Henley Business School in the United Kingdom. She is also Visiting Scholar at the University of Navarra’s institutes for Business and Humanism and Culture and Society in Spain. She has a PhD with a crossdisciplinary focus on Moral Psychology, Adult Learning and Development, and Behavioral Science from Case Western Reserve University (United States). Previous to her PhD, she also completed crossdisciplinary bachelor’s and master’s degrees with a focus on Management and Economics (with Sociological and Political Theory) and International Commerce and Development (with International Law). Her earlier research focused on cognitive approaches to moral maturity and behavioral psychology in constructivist adult development theory and cognitive psychology. Springer published her first monograph, Differentiation and Integration in Adult Development, in 2008. Her interdisciplinary research interests cross (Moral) Philosophy, Psychology, Philosophy of Management, and Educational and Pedagogical Research. Since 2013, her research has focused on the unity of thought and the self, meaning making, and action, with a key concern for ethical human development, action, and relations, applying these to the executive leadership of complex and environmentally responsible organizations, and government, administration, and academic aspects of higher education. Dr. Akrivou’s current work centers on non-representational theories of knowledge on how to approach and understand the self and action, aiming to integrate moral psychology with classical philosophical works on the self, knowing, and life. In 2016, Dr. Akrivou and Professor Alejo Sison co-edited the book Challenges of Capitalism for Virtue Ethics and the Common Good (Edward Elgar), a collection of articles written to highlight the lack of focus on the “common good” in contemporary capitalism and its origins in medieval and early modern life; and to provide insights into how virtue ethics can be applied to reorient organizations/businesses and work as part of an ethical and humanistic economy–society relation. Dr. Akrivou serves on the editorial boards of AMLE and Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics. She is also the Academic Director of the Henley Business School’s MSc in Management and its Lead Institutional

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Representative for Principles of Responsible Management Education (PRME), a United Nations-backed international educational institution. José Víctor Orón Semper earned his PhD in Education and Psychology and works as a researcher in the Mind–Brain Group of the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Navarra (Spain). He also holds degrees in Religious Studies, Neuroscience and Cognition, and Bioethics. His professional career began as a high school teacher: he worked for 15 years as a teacher and tutor, dedicating a lot of time to assisting his students with their personal growth. This experience strongly influences his current research. His interests center on emotional education because students’ satisfactory progress in school and development rests on the quality of their interpersonal relationships, which have their own language in the emotional key. From the beginning, his research has been interdisciplinary, and he is particularly adept at the intersection of Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, and Pedagogy. This interdisciplinary approach guarantees understanding emotions and emotional education in all their complexity. Indeed, other fields of research, such as Neuroscience and Education, Human Development and Ethics, are important to the development of emotional education. Orón’s research is developed on two levels—both in the academic field and with an educational intervention program. In terms of academic research, he works in conjunction with the University of Reading (UK) and the Popular Autonomous University of Puebla (Mexico). Regarding educational intervention, his educational program UpToYou (www.uptoyoueducacion.com) works with schools and families; he is also currently working on a related program for the business sector because emotional education is effective in improving interpersonal relationships independently of age. Orón has implemented the UpToYou program in several cities in Spain, as well as in Mexico, Brazil, and Cameroon. The UpToYou program is supported by UpToYou Foundation, and the academic research of UpToYou by the Mind–Brain Group. Various scholarships have boosted the program’s work, and all UpToYou publications develop interdisciplinary research that gives theoretical and academic bases to the UpToYou proposal. Germán R. Scalzo is currently Professor of Business Ethics at the Universidad Panamericana (Mexico) and a member of the Mexican National Research Institute. He received a degree in Business Administration from Universidad Austral (Argentina) and his MA and PhD in Government and Organizational Culture from the Institute for

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Business and Humanism, University of Navarra (Spain). Early on in his career, he showed keen interest in humanistic management and Corporate Social Responsibility as a practitioner, combining an assistantship as Business Ethics professor at Universidad Austral with a professional job at Johnson & Johnson of Argentina, and then at Openware (Globant) as head of HR and CSR. During that time, he served on different organizational boards, such as the board of Global Compact in Argentina, and founded a civil association for the promotion of CSR in the region, which is now the main referent in the area. In 2008, he began his PhD at the University of Navarra and worked as a teacher’s assistant to Miguel Alfonso Martínez Echevarría in courses on Philosophy of Economics and the History of Economic Thought. He defended his PhD thesis in 2012, unanimously obtaining summa cum laude. It traces the origin of modern economic rationality through analysis of the major traditions of thought’s philosophical foundations and their relationship to matters of a practical nature (politics, ethics, and economics). His research interests include epistemological and anthropological foundations of human action in business, with a focus on virtue ethics in a personalist key, as well as recovered notions of the gift in society. In 2013, he won the Robin Cosgrove Prize for Ethics in Finance. He has undertaken research stays at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, the Catholic University of America, and Duke University (USA), as well as at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome. He has served as a visiting professor at Universidad Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo (Peru) and Strathmore University (Kenya). He recently published Racionalidad Económica: Fundamentos, Evolución y Sentido (Economic Rationality: Foundations, Evolution and Meaning; Ed. Sindéresis, 2017).