The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

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J.--' ,' '

A QUINCY COLLEGE PUBLICATION

THE INFINITE GOD AND THE SUMl\lA FRATRIS ALEXANDR!

By Meldon C. Wass O.F.M., Ph.D. ,,,

FORVM �

BOOKS Franciscan Herald Press

Chicago, Illinois 60609

THE INFINITE Goo and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

by Meldon C. Wass O.F.M., Ph.D. © 1964 by Franciscan Herald Press 1434 West 51st St., Chicago, Ill. 60609

QUINCY COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS

·

Board of Editors

Allan B. Wolter O.F.M., Ph.D. General Editor Pacific L. Hug O.F.M., Ph.D. Owen J. Blum O.F.M., Ph.D.

Imprimi Potest: Dominic Limacher O.F.M. Minister Provincial

Nihil Obstat: Allan B. Wolter O.F.M. Censor Deputatus

Imprimatur: Most Rev. Cletus F. O'Donnell, D.D Vicar General, Archdiocese of Chicago March 25, 1964

"The Nihil Obstat and Imprimatur are official declarations that a book or pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is contained therein that those who have granted the Nihil Obstat and Imprimatur agree with the c·ontents, opinions, or statements expressed."

MADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11

TO LOVE TRUTH AND TO LIVE BY IT TO BE KIND THESE ARE THE MARKS OF A GOOD MAN SUCH WAS MY FATHER I FEEL PRIVILEGED IN DEDICATING THIS BOOK TO HIM.

111

PREFACE

The modern philosophic mind is certainly alive to the difficulties attending the concept of infinity as applied to the Absolute. Hmv, for instance, does one even begin to infer the existence of the actually infinite from the finite data of experience? Where in the long course of historical thought lie the first deliberate efforts of the human mind to focus this problem and unlock the secret of a rationally satisfying solution? This personally intriguing quest led me back to the Summa fralris Alexandri, a monumental work tradition­ ally attributed to the Irrefragable Doctor, but whose au­ thenticity is challenged today. There we find a remarkably consistent theory of divine infinity which is in itself-quite apart from any other doctrines of the authentic Alexander -a very valuable contribution. Hence, partly because the Summa fratris Alexandri, especially in its treatment of divine infinity, is a self-contained work, no attempt is here made to compare the doctrine of the Summa with that of Alexander himself. There is all the more reason for this restraint, since the authentic works of Alexander are only partially published and the question of the Summa's authenticity still subject to discussion. Noteworthy in this connection the very name Summa fratris A lexandri was not the original title given this work when the Quaracchi Fathers began its publication in 1924. This was before the authenticity of the work was seriously questioned. As a consequence the first three tomes of the Quaracchi edition, containing the first two books of this theological synthesis, bear the title: Docloris Irrefragabilis, Alexandri de Hales Ordinis Minorum, Summa Theo­ logica. Almost two decades intervened between the pub-

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lication of the third and fourth tomes, and the title page of the latter reflects something of the ensuing controversy about the author of the work. It reads: Doctoris Irrefrag­ abilis Alexandri de Hales, Ordinis Minorum, Summa Theologica, seu sic ab origine dicta "Summa fratris Alex­ andri". For reasons of convenience throughout this study, I have referred to the work by its original title or simply as the Summa. In quoting from the Summa, we have adopted a modern and more simplified form of reference. The Roman numerals, I, II, and so on, refer to the tome, and the Arabic numeral that follows refers to the consecutive numbers given to the questions in each tome by the edi­ tors of the Quaracchi edition. To pinpoint the reference more precisely, I have added the page number plus the column (a or b) where the latter is thought to be help­ ful. The following reference: I, 34, p. 56a, for example, would be read, Tome I, question 34, page 56, the first column. In this connection, I might mention that I have used the customary method of referring to J. P. Migne's Patro­ logiae Cursus Completus according to which PL 122, for example, refers to volume 122 of the Series Latina and PG 3, for instance, indicates volume 3 of the Series Graeca. The Bibliography includes not only the works that have an immediate bearing on the present study but also some which concern the general problem of infinity and may interest the reader who wishes to pursue the subject further. It is a pleasure to acknowledge publically the schol­ arly assistance offered me by members of the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University. The sustained interest and encouragement afforded by my Franciscan confreres at that center of learning and by others else-

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where, is no less deserving of gratitude. To none, how­ ever, do I owe a greater debt than to Father Allan Wolter, O.F.M., whose learned counsel and quiet humor remain with me as gTacious memories of an otherwise laborious task. M.C.W. Quincy College September 16, 1963.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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IX

Chapter One: Introductory Remarks . . I Notes to Chapter One . . . . . . . . . 10 Chapter Two: The Conceptual Background . . . 14 I. How Natural Knowledge of God Occurs . . 14 II. The Proofs for God's Existence . . . . . 30 1. The Proof from Being . . . . . . 30 2. The Proof from Causality . 32 3. The Proof from Truth . . . . . . 33 4. The Proof from Goodness . . . 34 5. The Proof from the Degrees of Perfection . . . . . . . 35 III. The Perfections of God . . . . . . . 36 Notes to Chapter Two . . . . . . . 41 Chapter Three: The Infinite Sea of Substance . . . 47 I. The Meaning of Infinite . . . . . 48 II. Proof of God's Infinity . . . . . . 53 I. Proof from Omnipotence . . . . . 53 2. Proof from God's Inexhaustible Being . 58 3. Proof from Causality . . . . . 59 III. Objections to God's Infinity . . . . 60 . 68 IV. Infinity, a Property of God . Notes to Chapter Three . . . . . . . 69 Chapter Four: God's Omnipresence, Eternity and Omniscience . . . . . . . 71 . . 71 I. The Omnipresence of God . . . . 76 II. The Eternity of God . . . . . 80 III. The Omniscience of God . Notes to Chapter Four . . . . . . . 85 . . . 91 EPILOGUE . . 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY . ix

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS The current emphasis on linguistic analysis has made contemporary philosophers more sensitive to the various nuances of meaning that philosophical terms have had at different periods of history. But even one who is not an analyst might find it profitable to note the many and interesting shifts of meaning that the term "infinity" (apeiria) and its derivatives have undergone in the course of time. At the very dawn of Greek philosophy, the l\1ilesians show a decided interest in infinity. Anaximander had his apeiron. This was the boundless originating principle. Deathless, imperishable, even divine, it was the beginning and the end of all that is. Anaximenes, in his turn, postu­ lated air as his primary element. It too was divine and infinite in extent. It held the universe together and was responsible for its unity. Anaxagoras, the Ionian, and Democritus, the atomist, held that the infinite was a com­ pound of homogeneous parts. All of the above "physicists" have this in common that they regard the infinite as a modification of substance, rather than substance itself. All make of the infinite a principle or source. It alone has no principle but is itself the principle of all else. It somehow encompasses all that exists. Furthermore, the infinite is held to be uncreated and indestructible. By some it was said to steer or guide I

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

all things, those, that is, who had not the benefit of Anaxagoras's nous. In direct contradiction to these tenets, Parmenides, the Eleatic, developed a severe monism that left no room for speculation on the infinite. Only being exists, and this is finite and complete in itself. Non-being is not and change is just an illusion. Only immutable being exists. Non-being cannot even be thought. If being is whole and complete in itself and finite, then infinity is relegated to the realm of non-being. It simply does not exist. Melissus, however, another Elcatic, associates himself rather with the Milesians in this matter of infinity. His being is indeed whole and complete in itself, but-and this is important-this being is infinite nevertheless. The ability to divorce complete and finite, on his part, repre­ sents an important insight. 1\-Ielissus spoke better than did his master, Parmenides. Besides the above mentioned notions, there was yet another conception of infinity that developed alongside that of the "physicists" and the Eleatics, that of the Pytha­ goreans. For them, the infinite was substance. Numbers are the principles of things. They are the limits that bring things into being from the unlimited. Much later, Plato will adopt this Pythagorean theory and combine it with his conception of the Ideas in order to explain the noumenal and phenomenal universe. In the Platonic theory, the indefinite is identified with the more and the less. Hotter and colder, for instance, refer to a temperature continuum capable of infinite extension in either direction, yet each actual object has a definite temperature. In other words, limit or definiteness has been impressed upon the more or less to produce the noumenal and phenomenal existent.

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')

Introductory Remarks

Thus, both for Plato and the Pythagoreans, the in­ finite is somehow substance itself, not an attribute of substance. But was this infinite substance regarded as perfect? Plato, there is good reason to believe, would answer in the negative. What the Pythagoreans would say on this matter is difficult to determine. In due course of time, Aristotle examined all these theories of his predecessors in quite hard-headed fashion, as ·was his wont. After mature deliberation, the Stagirite concludes that an actually infinite substance or attribute of substance is incomprehensible. An actually infinite body is absurd. The infinite can only have some sort of potential existence. Time and process, for instance, are potentially infinite. Magnitude admits of division ad infinitum. Only the potentially infinite, he concludes, is intelligible, and this in terms of a series of steps, or processes each of which is finite. The actually infinite, however, is unintelligible. 1 The point to note is that for Aristotle, any infinity other than a potential infinity implies imperfection. For the perfect is finished, complete. Medieval thinkers, gen­ erally, not only regard infinity as a perfection but as one proper to God. This marked difference between the Aristotelian and scholastic views on actual infinity and perfection 2 has provoked the curiosity of historians of philosophy as to just when and how this change took place. 3 L. Sweeney, in particular, has done a number of studies on this problem, 4 but he narrowed the scope of his investigations still further. His aim was to discover just what theologian first conceived of infinity as an in­ trinsic and essential perfection of the divine essence. He contrasts infinity as an intrinsic and essential perfection with infinity predicated merely by way of 3

The Infinite God and the Summa Fralris Alexandri

extrinsic denomination. Consider, for instance, the divine power. If God is able to cause an infinite number of endlessly varied creatures, his creative power can be char­ acterized as infinite, but only with respect to its effect, to which alone the term properly and, so to speak, intrinsi­ cally belongs. The real reason God's power is called infinite is to be found in something extrinsic to itself, namely its effect. It is not precisely because the power itself or the substance in which it inheres is intrinsically infinite. Infinity as an essential, intrinsic perfection implies something more. "The divine being itself may be termed infinite in its subsistency", he explains, only if it is "totally free from the limiting determination of any sort of potency". 5 Posed in these terms, Sweeney remarks, 6 the problem can easily be discerned if the Middle Ages are seen against Greek antiquity and Holy Scripture. By the thirteenth century almost all theologians were describing God as infinite in His very being. Yet no­ where in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, or Proclus can such a description be found, nor even in the Old and New Testaments. The question is, then, where and how such a doctrine arose.

It was in this context that Sweeney began his search for the theologian who first ascribed infinity to God's very being. After outlining the doctrine of divine infinity as found in Western theologians after the middle of the thirteenth century, he noted the almost complete absence of what he sought in ,vriters of the previous century. Accordingly he determined to start his research with the year 1250 and to work backwards. Seemingly impressed with his discovery of the gradually decreasing prominence authors before 1250 accorded the concept of divine in­ finity, he concluded that the man he sought would be 4

Introductory Remarks

found nearer to that date than to 1150, perhaps even in the decade immediately preceding 1250.7 \Vhatever is to be said of this developmental prob­ lem, however, it will become abundantly clear from our study that even before 1245 in the Summa fratris Alex­ andri, there is a rather highly advanced theory of divine infinity by Sweeney's standards. Be that as it may, however, we shall leave to others the solution of the difficult, if interesting, question as to how the medieval notion of divine infinity gradually evolved and just where the Summa fits into the picture. "\Ve shall confine our own study to discussing the doctrine of infinity as we find it presented in this early and monu­ mental Franciscan synthesis of theology. In the following chapter we shall set forth the gen­ eral conceptual background against which this doctrine is presented. Only then shall we take up the doctrine itself and discuss the arguments adduced in its favor and the objections that can be brought against it. In a final chapter, we shall consider some applications of the notion made by the Summa before summing up our conclusions. Before proceeding with this plan, however, a word about the Summa itself seems in order. For this work, during the past few decades, has been the subject of no little controversy. 8 There were those who on good author­ ity questioned both its authenticity as a work of Alexander of Hales as well as the early date at which it was supposed to have been written. At present, we are in possession of certain facts which have been brought to light by the research of the Franciscan Fathers of Quaracchi, especially by the late Victorin Doucet. The latter's findings appear in the Prolegomena to Book III of the Summa. 9 It is now certainly established that by far the greater part of the first three books was composed between the years 5

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

124 1 and 1245, the year Alexander died. Minor sections were added later and depend on the works of St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, Odo Rigaldus and \Villiam of Melitona. The fourth book, however, was not added until after Pope Alexander IV ordered the completion of the unfinished Summa in the Bull De fontibus paradisi (October 7, 1255) and is mainly the work of William of Melitona. 10 Alexander, however, cannot be considered the author of even the first three parts, at least not in the ordinary sense of the word. Despite the general external tradition, especially the Bull of Pope Alexander IV, ascribing the work to Hales, there is more than a grain of truth to Roger Bacon's remark: 11 Adscripserunt ei illam magnam Summam, quae est plus quam pondus unius equi, quam ipse non fecit sed alii. Ei tamen propter reverentium fuit ascripta et vocatur Summa fratris Alexandri.

Internal criteria clearly prove that the composition of the Summa was a group project, probably of Alexander's disciples, who sometimes slavishly copy his opinions, but at other times abandon or openly contradict his well established teachings. In fact it sometimes happens that the compilers overlook some of Alexander's finest passages in favor of more common, but less advanced views. Fur­ thermore, the writers do not always agree even with them­ selves. In some cases contrary solutions are given to the same question. There is thus an obvious lack of unity to be found in the Summa. Proof that it is definitely a com­ pilation could be drawn from the following considera­ tions. Those responsible for the different parts of the work did not use the same source material. Books I and III draw extensively upon the works of John of La Rochelle, 6

Introductory Remarks

which is not the case with Book II. The latter is more philosophical and discards the Glossa of Alexander. What is more, there are notable redactional differences between this book and the other two which seem to have come from the same hand. An obvious question at this point would be: Just who were the compilers of the Summa fratris A lexandri? There seems to be a general agreement among those who have studied the problem that the first three books, except for the few additions referred to earlier, go back to two main redactors. As opposed to Book II, Books I and III are very similar by reason of their manner of quoting authorities as well as the authors quoted, their wording of the doxologies and introductory formulas. There is most probably one main redactor for Books I and III, called "Inquirens" because of his penchant for using expressions such as "inquirendum est", "conse­ quenter quaerendum est", "est quaerere de", "procedamus ad inquisitionem", "inquiramus" in the introductory for­ mulas. He would be responsible for the inserting of materials, the redaction of prologues, doxologies, the order and the formulas introducing the questions. The other, or others, are responsible for elaborating and transcribing materials. The part of "Inquirens" is greater in Book I than in Book III. Book II also has one main redactor, called "Con­ siderans" because of his partiality for introducing ques­ tions with phrases such as "consideratio vero", "sequitur consideratio utrum" or "considerandum est". His duties as regards Book II would be much the same as those of "lnquirens" in Books I and III. Most probably "Con­ siderans" also had his collaborators. Now, who was "Inquirens" and who was "Consider­ ans"? They certainly seem to be different persons. While 7

The Infin ite God and the Summa Fratris A lexandri

the identity of "Considerans" cannot be determined with any probability, at least not at the present stage of re­ search, Doucet tentatively identified "Inquirens" of Books I and III with John of La Rochelle, much of whose material is certain! y iJJcorporated in these books. On the other hand, any absolute identification of "Inquirens" with John runs into great difficulties. Several times Book I I I quotes the opinion of John of La Rochelle under the designation of "quidam" and not infrequently the text of Books I and III, though agreeing verbatim with John's authentic works, make such stupid mistakes as omitting an argument but retaining the response to it, or retaining references to quotations treated elsewhere in John's own works, but not in the Summa itself. On the other hand, if Alexander of Hales is not the author of the Summa in the usual or unqualified sense of that word, there must have been some special reason why his name was connected with the work. His role in its composition, in a word, must have involved something more than merely supplying much of the material it con­ tains. Was it because he was the one who first conceived of composing the work and outlined its general plan? Or did he perhaps go further, functioning as a director or general supervisor of the work? These are questions we cannot answer with any measure of certainty today. What opinions we may choose to hold on the subject, will de­ pend on the relative weight we attach to the testimonies of Roger Bacon and Pope Alexander IV. At any rate, Alexander of Hales does not seem to have been one of those directly responsible for redacting the text. Even though most of its material may go back to the works of Alexander as its main source, the Summa as a whole represents a mosaic of the teachings of various Franciscan theologians, known and anonymous, who lived 8

In t roductory Remarks

in the monastery of Paris between 1230 and 1 245. As such we can hardly expect of it that unity we tend to look for in the work of a single author. Nevertheless, historically speaking, this theological synthesis was a great achievement. All earlier Summae, from the days of Anselm of Laon at the beginning of the t,velfth century onward, were of comparatively limited scope, whereas the Summa fratris Alexandri aims at giving a complete and comprehensive presentation of all theo­ logical questions in a systematic way. 1 2 As such it will serve as a model for the subsequent Summas of Albert, Aquinas and other scholastics. Perhaps the real reason why the Summa fratris Alex­ andri, though compiled by others, was ascribed to Hales is to be found in the fact that it is the first outstanding product of the new methods of teaching theology at Paris for which Alexander was mainly responsible. 1 3 The Bull Parens scientiarum of Pope Gregory IX (April, 1 23 1 ) , which settled the two year Masters' strike and is often called the :Magna Charta of the University of Paris, led to a number of important changes in the teaching methods and content of the theological curric­ ulum. Alexander, we recall, not only was a member of the delegation of Parisian Masters called to Rome by Gregory IX to settle the strike, but he was also a prime mover in the new scholastic movement that followed. 14 Among other things, Pope Gregory IX had insisted that theologians act as theologians and not as philosophers (nee philosophos se ostentent, sed satagant fieri theo­ docti) . They should discuss only those questions that can be solved by the use of Holy Scripture and the Fathers. This exhortation may have been responsible in part for the renewed attempts not only to summarize, but also to systematize theology along the lines of a "science" as 9

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alcxandri

Aristotle conceived it. The opening question of the Summa, Utrum doctrina theologiae sit scientia?, may not be insignificant in this connection. Also reflected in the Summa is the increased interest in Aristotelian philos0phy evinced by the Paris theologians following the great strike. 1 5 The Aristotelianism of the Summa, of course, like that of this period generally, is liberally colored by Avicennian notions, which incident­ ally made it more acceptable to the revered Augustinian traditions. 1 6 While it is true that the Summa, generally speaking, represents a mosaic of various, even conflicting opinions, it is interesting to note that the theory of divine infinity it contains has a rather remarkable consistency. Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that not only the key text : Utrum divina essentia sit finita vel infinita, which we propose to analyze, but also the supporting texts which we shall use, seem to be taken in toto from the portions redacted by "Inquirens" . 1 7 Be that as it may, however, our purpose is not to identify the precise source of the varied and ramified citations that we shall employ in the present analysis. is For we believe that one of the fruits of this study will be the proof that the Summa does possess a unified and coherent theory of divine infinity. Indeed, little will be added to the essential features of this doctrine by the great scholastics of the thirteenth century with whom even our present day conceptions on this topic seem to have come to maturity. NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE I Aristotle developed his ideas on infinity against the background of those of his predecessors. Confer chapters 4 to 8 of Book III of the Physica (202b 30 - 208b 25) . Our account of the early history of the notion has been presented largely as he saw it.

Introductory Remarks 2 This does not say that every instance of an actual infinity (for example, an actually infinite multitude) is regarded as something perfect or even possible. 3 See for example, .E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York: Random House, 1 955, page 57 1 , note 26. For a good introduction t o the problem of the Christian conception of God's infinity, see idem, "L'Infinite divine chez saint Augustin", A ugustinus Magister (Paris: Etudes Augustini­ ennes, 1 954) , I, 569-574, especially page 569. 4 For a list of Sweeney's principal articles on this subject, see the Bibliography. 5 Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Divine Infinity: 1 1 50-1 250", The Modern Schoolman, XXXV (1 957-1 958) , 47. 6 Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Are Apeiria and Aoristia Synonyms?", The Modern Schoolman, XXXIII ( 1 955-1956) , 272. 7 Sweeney later seems to have modified some of his opinions on the basis of research done on the works of St. John Damascene. Confer, for instance, the concluding remarks in L. Sweeney, S.J ., "Damascene and Divine Infinity", The New Scholasticism, XXXV ( 1 96 1 ) , 76-1 06. 8 Confer Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., "The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa", Franciscan Studies, VII (1 947) , 26-4 1 ; 274-3 1 2. 9 Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., Prolegomena ad Summam Halesianam, i.e. A lexandri de Hales Summa theologica seu sic ab origine dicta "Summa fratris A lexandri", tom. IV, Lib. III-I : Prologomena Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi) : Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaven­ turae, 1 948. The article of Doucet cited in note 8 above is an English translation of part of these Prolegomena. I O The text of the Bull De fontibus paradisi of Alexander IV is printed in the first part of the Quaracchi edition of the Summa, tom. I, pp. vii-viii. As the editors note there seems to have been some confusion about its date. 1 1 This text from Bacon's Opus minus (1 267) can be found in J. S. Brewer, Fr. R ogeri Bacon opera quaedam hactenus inedita (Rer. Brit. Medii Aevi Scriptores, 1 5) , London: 1 859, 325-329, and is reprinted in the Prolegomena to the edition of Alexander of Hales, Glossa in q uatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, I Quaracchi, Florentiae: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaven­ turae, 1 95 1 , 24•-25•. 12 The Summa may originally have been conceived as a kind of "Poor Friars' encyclopedia of theology". Because of their poverty,

11

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri the student friars could hardly afford extensive libraries or to pay scribes to copy out lengthy passages or even complete works that might be found useful for their work. The famous Douai MS 434 seems to be such a collection in which more than five hundred questions and extracts of contemporary works have been gathered. In contradistinction to such an arbitrary, disorderly "encyclo­ pedia" in which the same topics are treated over and over again, the Summa provided the Franciscan students at Paris with an extremely systematical treatment of each topic, with a complete status quaestionis and the latest and best solution of the day. 1 3 We are indebted to some unpublished lectures of Damian Van den Eynde, O.F.M. for this idea. 14 Alexander had already caused considerable comment by his de­ cision to use the Sentences of Peter Lombard as a textbook, so to speak, for his ordinary lectures in theology. Confer the Prole­ gomena to Alexander's Glossa, p. 65•. 15 In 1 2 1 0 the provincial Council of Paris, under the presidency of Peter of Corbeil, archbishop of Sens, forbade the public or private teaching of Aristotle's writings on natural philosophy or commentaries thereon under penalty of excommunication. In 1 2 1 5 the statutes of the University sanctioned by Robert of Courson forbade the study of the Metaphysics as well as all the books on physics or natural science with whatever expositions that had been made of them. While the teaching of Aristotle was still forbidden in Paris at the time of the great strike, it was authorized not only in England, but at Toulouse, where the masters not only availed themselves of this liberty but even ad­ vertised that the books of natural science forbidden in Paris could be freely studied in Toulouse. Confer the interesting docu­ ment in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. by H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, tom. I, Parisiis: Ex typis Fratrum Delalain, 1 889, pp. 1 29-1 3 1 , especially p. 1 3 1 in this connection. When the masters left Paris during the two year strike, they were no longer bound by these restrictions. As might be expected, they eagerly turned to study the proscribed works of Aristotle and Avicenna which, as Gilson puts it, "provided the Parisian masters with principles so vastly superior to anything they had ever known that their discovery amounted to a revelation", (History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 244) . It was inevitable that when the masters returned to Paris after the strike, this new knowledge of Aristotle's works should reveal itself in their writings. Even though Gregory IX renewed

12

Introductory Remarks the interdiction against the teaching of the Stagirite (April 1 3, 1 23 1 ) , his prohibition contained the mitigating clause that the Physics were forbidden only until they had been submitted to censorship and purged of errors. The pope himself only ten days later appointed a sort of commission to carry out this revision. And while there is no evidence that the theologians charged with this task accomplished any great results, from 1 2 3 1 on, Aristotle's writings o n physics and metaphysics were studied extensively and Aristotelian ideas were referred to more and more in ex professo theological works. 1 6 Confer E Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", A rchives d'histoire doctrinale e t litteraire du m oyen age, IV (1 930) , 5-1 49. 1 7 In the Prolegomena to Book III of the Summa, the editors have indicated the probable sources used by the redactors for each of the questions in the first three books. Confer tome IV of the Quaracchi edition, pp. ccxlvii-cccvi. 1 8 Such a study will have to wait until more of the source material referred to by the Prolegomena to Book III of the Summa is made available in editions. The Franciscan Fathers of Quaracchi are at work on this project at present. The complete Glossa of Alexander are available (Cf. note 1 1 supra) as well as his Quaestiones disputatae antequam esset /rater, 3 vols. (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1 960) .

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{3hapter 2

THE CO�CEPTUAL BACKGROUND The theory of infinity found in the Summa fratris Alexandri can be treated adequately only in the general context of ideas within which the argument for infinity develops. Under this heading three main topics deserve to be treated: ( 1) a general account of the Summa's theory as to how man arrives at a philosophical knowl­ edge of God, (2) the actual proofs for God's existence utilized by the Summa, and (3) a word about some specific divine attributes necessary for understanding tbe argu­ ments for divine infinity.

I How Natural Know ledge of God Occurs The fact that we do possess a natural knowledge of God is stressed by the Summa. Indeed one of the philo­ sophical points of interest about the work, as Boehner has pointed out, is that it represents one of the early scholastic attempts at a genuine "theologic". 1 Boehner borrowed this designation from Borgmann, who seems to have been the first in our own day to reintroduce this truly Aristotelian term (0EoAoyLK�) 2 to indicate a "scientific" metaphysics in which natural theology is not divorced from ontology or isolated as a special subscience, but is rather the pre­ dominant or unifying element of a coherent metaphysics.a As the Summa beautifully expresses it : Prima philosophia est theologia philosophorum . 4 14

The Conceptual Back. ground

To use another of Borgmann's insights, we might say there is another point of resemblance between the Sum• ma's approach to God and that of Aristotle. The latter called the theological and cosmogonical speculations of the poets theology, whereas he reserved the term "theo­ logic" for his own rational and purely philosophical ap­ proach to God and the "separate substances". \Ve shall use this term in a similar fashion to distin­ guish natural or philosophical theology from theology proper, which is based upon divine revelation. \Vhile the Summa is primarily a theological synthesis, it recognizes metaphysics as autonomous in principle, as Boehner has noted, and uses it as a handmaid in the tradition of the best medieval theologians. 5 In what was intended as a Prologue to the work as a whole, we are told: 6 Tota christianae fidei disciplina pertinet ad duo: ad fidem e t intelligentiam Conditoris et fidem atque m­ telligentiam Salvatoris.

And in the parts that follow, in texts too numerous to mention, the Summa makes clear its position that there are two ways of knowing the Creator and the Saviour, namely, that of natural reason and that of theology proper. In the tract entitled De cognitione Dei in via we are told explicitly that we can know God by reason. This is clear among other things from the analogy existing be­ tween our affective and cognitive powers. The affective side of our nature tends toward good, and the cognitive toward truth. If we can desire the highest good, we must also be able to know the highest truth, for no one can love what he does not know. 7 Further along in this same tract, the Summa insists that both good and bad men can know God. 8 The good will reach a higher degree of this knowl15

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

edge concerning God, than will those not so well disposed. In explanation of this idea, a distinction is made between cernere and videre. 9 Videre connotes the perception of a thing without the awareness of the species to which it be­ longs or without th.e differentiation of the particular species in question from other similar species. Cernere, on the other hand, implies a distinct and specific percep­ tion of a thing. For example, one sees a man far off in the distance, but is unable to decide whether it is a man or an animal or simply an inanimate body. To this act the notion of videre applies, but cernere does not. If, however, one is able to ascertain that what is being perceived is really a man, that is, that it belongs to the species, man, then one can be said to discern (cernere) the object in question. The last seems to be something over and above natural cognition so far as God is concerned. It implies some sort of supernatural discernment by the aid of grace and faith. The natural knowledge ·we have of God is more akin to the indistinct videre. We see God by means of his natural effects under the aspect of goodness, because this goodness can be shared in by creatures. 1 o Just how these various ideas are interrelated will be­ come clearer if we consider for the moment the Summa's distinction between the ratio inferior and ratio superior. Interest in this Augustinian distinction, which has its roots in Plato and Plotinus, 1 1 though eclipsed at the time of Boethius, was revived again in the twelfth century through the translations Gundissalinus made of the vmrks of the Arabic and Jewish philosophers. In fact, Gundis­ salinus implicitly identifies the Augustianian distinction with the duae facies animae of which Avicenna and Algazel speak. 1 2 Other influences in the twelfth century entered this stream of thought. The distinction between ratio and intelligentia (which came to be identified with the inferior and superior reason respectively) is to be 16

The Conceptual Background

found in many commentaries on Boethius's De consola­ tione philosophiae, at this time. Another was the syn­ deresis problem which came to the Scholastics by way of Peter Lombard's Sentences. 1 3 All of these notions had their impact on the Franciscans at Paris at the time the Summa was composed. It is interesting to note that John of La Rochelle, whose ,vorks were certainly used in the Summa and who may himself have been one of the compilers, has woven many of these ideas together in his Summa de anima. 1 4 Thus, for example, he accepts Avicenna's "two-faced soul" theory, combining it with Augustine's superior and in­ ferior reason, and he makes the former the seat of syn­ deresis. At the time the Summa was composed, just how would the ordinary student at Paris regard the distinction of ratio superior and inferior? 1 5 He would conceive them much as follows. These are not two really distinct powers or faculties, but merely two aspects or "faces" of the same soul or mind. When the mind looks upward, that is, when it contemplates God and spiritual realities, it is function­ ing as ra tio superior, whereas when it looks downward, that is, when it considers the material and sensible objects that make up the world about us, it functions as ratio inferior. In the former role it needs no bodily organ, whereas as lower reason indiget sensu et imaginatione. Consequently, even when the brain is damaged, higher reason can still act. That is why, our medieval authors explain, prophecies can occur where an individual is in a state of frenzy or is mad. 1 6 In general ratio inferior is that portion of the intel­ lect which guides us in our life of action. As facies deorsum, Avicenna explains, it is virtus agendi. It is the seat of prudence which enables one to lead a moral life, 17

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

though in Peter Lombard and some of the medieval mystical writers this prudence becomes associated with sensualitas and prudence of the flesh. Higher reason is perfected by the virtue of wisdom and the knowledge of highest causes and i� required for a life of contempla­ tion. 1 7 The fact that the Augustinian theory is combined after the time of Gundissalinus with that of Avicenna (in whom are both Plotinian and Aristotelian notions) 1 8 suggests a further question : How does this ratio superior and inferior distinction fit in with the notions of agent and possible intellect? Fortunately there is a section in the Summa dealing expressly with this problem. The editors in the Prolegomena to Book III point out further that John of La Rochelle's Summa de anima seems to be the principal source for this section. 19 What is interesting about the Summa's discussion of the distinctions to be made in the soul's rational powers and their functions is that both the Aristotelian and Augustinian theories are presented. There is no attempt to decide between them but the Summa's concern is to show how the two can be correlated. We are at that stage in the history of ideas where these two divergent concep­ tions of how knowledge occurs first confront one another and are being weighed in the balance. Divine illumina­ tion, not necessarily supernatural, is admittedly required for some, but not for all of our knowledge. It is active when the mind functions as superior but not as inferior reason. The Aristotelian division of agent and possible intellect is called upon to explain how the inferior intel­ lect, which guides us in our everyday activities in the world of sensible and material objects, is able to form universal notions about the same. The agent intellect works upon the sense images; it abstracts intelligible fea18

The Concep tual Back ground

tures of material things and impresses them upon the possible intellect. But where knowledge of God or in­ corporeal and spiritual matters are involved, some illum­ ination from the rationes aeternae or uncreated light is required. Later scholastics like Roger Marston, 20 for example, attempted to reconcile the two streams of thought by identifying Aristotle's agent intellect with Augustine's God, the uncreated light. The Summa, however, insists that the agent intellect is part and parcel of the indi­ vidual's mind and not some separate substance, be it God or some lesser Intelligence. 2 1 For not all the ideas we possess are so transcendent in character that some special illumination on the part of the rationes aeternae is re­ quired. Needless to say, when some influence from above is required to account for certain notions which the ratio superior possesses, the Summa does not have recourse to any theory of ontologism. This "knowledge" is impressed upon the superior intellect at birth, as it were, so that it may, and often is, referred to as "innate", but it is present there in the way that habitual knowledge is present in the mind, ready to be recalled and to become actual knmvledge when the intellect turns its face upward to contemplate higher things . 2 2 \Vhen this occurs, it is the agent intellect that may be said to be directly affected so that it is in and through the agent intellect, which has these superior notions per modum habitus, that the same are impressed upon the possible intellect . 2 =1 One last point should be made while we are on this subject. Recall that mention was made above 2 4 of the distinction between the knowledge of God possessed by the good man and that which the evil man has. The reason for this lies in the fact that the ratio superior, by 19

The Infinite God and the Summa Fra tris A lexandri

which God is known, is also the seat of sy nderesis, which as the "spark of conscience" contains the "natural law written in the heart". 2 5 The sinful man, however, who is guided only by carnal prudence and whose whole concern is with the things of· this world, refuses to make use of his higher reason and the habitual knowledge of God and the moral law it contains. Such a man may not only have an erroneous conscience 2 0 but he can also be i gnor­ ant of God. 2 1 Let this suffice as a general description of the rational faculties or powers by which man comes to a knowledge of God. It remains to say something about the specific notions or ideas which are impressed from above and the way in which the mind ascends to the knmvledge of the Supreme Being. We say "notions" advisedly since there seems to be a difference between the Augustinian and Avicennian interpretation as to how superior reason or the "upturned face" of the soul is enlightened from above. As Gilson pointed out, medieval theories of illumination gained something by fusing ideas from Arabic philosophy with those of St. Augustine. As he puts it,� 8 Chez saint Augustin, la doctrine de l'i llumination porte sur la verite des jugements et non sur le contenu des concepts. Avicenne, au contraire, apportait aux hommes du moyen age une doctrine de l'illumi nation ou ce sont les fonnes intelligibles, done les concepts, qui sont con­ fercs du dehors a l'intellcct humain.

What concepts specifically come by way of illumina­ tion, according to the Sum ma? They are what we ordi­ narily call the transcendental notions, such as "being", " one " , " true " an d " good". Tl1e S umma, however, spea k· s both of the simple concepts (ens, u nwn, verum and

20

The Concep t ua l Background

bonum) and those which specifically refer to God (ens primum, verum primum, and bonum primum) as being impressed (on the possible intellect) or innate (in the agent intellect) _ 2 9 Is there perhaps a process envisioned here akin to that of Henry of Ghent, who insisted that by the very fact that the mind forms a general notion of being, it already has implicitly a simple concept which is proper to God? Scotus has nicely summarized his views on this subject as follows: 3 0 To know any being as 'this being' is already to conceive God in a very indistinct way; for 'being' is included, as it were, as part of the concept. This is the first step. The second step consists in removing the 'this' and con­ ceiving simply 'being'. For 'being', in so far as it is a concept and not simply a part of a concept, is already conceived as analogically common to God and creature. e are in the third stage, if the concept of 'being' which pertains to God is distinguished from the concept of 'being' which pertains only analogically, that is, if, for instance, God is conceived as a being that is negatively undetermined, that is, incapable of being determined, while a creature is conceived as a being that is priva­ tively undetermined. ,1v

There is an aura of mystery about the precise way in which the innate or impressed ideas function in this connection among all the illuminationists of the thir­ teenth century. Recall Henry's interesting illustration of the "sheep in wolf's clothing". 3 1 According to the Summa, every thing bears in itself the seal of its origin by reason of its conformity with the threefold causality which gave it being. God's power (efficient causality) , attributed to the Father, 3 2 stamps unity upon the creature; God's wisdom (formal or exem­ plar causality) , attributed to the Son, makes it (ontologi21

The ln{tnile God and the Summ a Fra lris Alexa ndri

cally) true, whereas God's goodness (final causality) , attributed to the Holy Spirit, marks it with beauty or goodness. 3 3 Do these characteristics, perhaps, which are stamped upon a thing trigget the process of i1lumination? That is to say, do these innate notions, habitually possessed by the ratio superior (as agent intelJect) actually enlighten or illumine the possible intellect, only when confronted with creatures sealed with unity, truth and goodness? The agent intellect after all, according to Aristotelian concep­ tions, only acts in the presence of sensible or material things. On the other hand, medievals ,vho make use of the Augustinian distinction of a superior and inferior reason often point out that if knowledge of God is only perfected in the ratio superior, it begins already with the ratio inferior. The Summa may be hinting at something of the sort when it says: 3 4 Dicendum quod creatura medium est ad cognoscendum Deum secundum quod habetur cognitio de Deo per habitum acquisitum per experientiam sensibilium.

On the other hand, the text of Alcher, which the Summa ascribes to St. Augustine, seems to limit the knowledge of God, at least in any true sense of the word, to the in­ tellect functioning as superior reason. 3 5 Possibly the solution to the problem lies in making clear just what kind of knowledge of God would result if only the ratio inferior were operative. Would it be such knowledge as idolaters possess whose gods are made in the image and likeness of men and animals? Such, according to the Summa are certainly not making use of the ratio superior or the habitus innatus according to which knowledge of the true God is present in the soul from birth.36 It may be that this is one of those portions of the Summa, where the doctrine is not wholly consistent and

22

The Conceptual Background

reflects the work of more than one compiler. For that reason, we shall not try to determine precisely how far inferior reason can take us along the way to God. The important thing seems to be that if our knowledge of God begins with creatures, we can not proceed very far in developing a theologic or metaphysics without illumina­ tion entering into the picture. This becomes clear if we consider how the Summa conceives the ascent of the mind to God in terms of the three ways of pseudo-Denis. In De divinis nominibus, the pseudo-Areopagite ex­ plains that we do not have a direct and comprehensive insight into the very nature of God. The reason given is that the divine nature is "unknowable and transcends all reason and understanding". Rather, we know God indirectly from the orderly arrangement of existing things, which God has made and which bear the image and stamp of his exemplar ideas. And how does this come about? According to pseudo-Denis, the human mind must begin by negating of its ideas the imperfection associated with the creatures whence these ideas stem. Next, the concepts, thus refined, are each raised to an eminent degree of perfection. Finally, the complex of eminent attributes, thus achieved, is asserted of God, whose existence is established by way of causality. In the words of Eriugena's translation, familiar to all the schoolmen : 3 7 Numquid itaque est verum dicere, quia Deum cognosci­ mus non ex sua natura-incognoscibile enim hoc omnem rationem et intellectum superans-sed ex omnium exis­ tentium ordinatione, ex ipso praetenta, et imagines quasdam et similitudines divinorum ejus paradigmatum habente, in summum omnium via et ordine secundum virtutem redeundum omnium ablatione, et eminentia, in omnium causa.

The general viewpoint of pseudo-Denis is accepted, but with some modification. Thus the Summa, reflecting

23

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri

as it does the Aristotelian notion of metaphysics or theo­ logic as a science of causes, begins with the via causalitatis, but the arguments themselves are not Aristotelian in origin. The trinitarian stamp of unity, truth and goodness suggest that the causal approach will be in terms of effi­ cient, formal or exemplar causality, and final causality and will terminate in a God of power, wisdom and good­ ness. That is why the Summa defines metaphysics or "first philosophy" as "the knowledge of the first causes, which are goodness, wisdom and power". 3 8 The actual proofs used in the Summa will be consid­ ered in the following section. But what we wish to note here is that the causal way gives us only the relative attributes of God, not his absolute properties.� 9 Furthermore, even to obtain a proper concept of God under the aspect of such relative attributes, it seems one must pass to the via eminentiae. Consider the notion of good, for instance, and how we think the Summa would explain St. Augustine's dictum: 4 0 Bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle hoc et illud et vide Ipsum Bonum, si potes, i ta Deum videbis l

The agent and possible intellect functioning as inferior reason can abstract a general or universal notion of good from creatures. This however is not the vision of God as simply The Good, which Augustine has in mind, for the latter comes from above, and exists-if we have interpreted the Summa's theory correctly-only per modum h a bitus in the agent intellect as part of the native endowment of the soul as superior reason. But in the process of abstracting the universal notion of good common to creatures, this latent imprint of the ratio aeterna habitually present in the unconscious storehouse of the mind somehow becomes effective, with the result that the agent intellect impresses 24

The Conceptual Background

upon the possible intellect something more than a species abstracted from creatures. What is impressed is the trans­ cendent notion of good as applying properly to God and only analogically to creatures. The mind then would seem to have two separate notions, the one proper to God and the other common to creatures. These two notions, as Henry of Ghent will point out later, are often confused because of their great similarity to one another. 4 1 Either notion, of course, is analogous to the other. The name ''g°ood", however, should designate per prius its most perfect referent, namely God, and only per posterius those things which participate in divine goodness. The same would seem to apply to all simple no­ 4 tions 2 that are proper to God, even causal notions in so far as these transcend the causal concepts that can be derived from creatures. For the Summa quotes with ap­ proval the words of St. John Damascene: 43 I psa creatio et permanentia et gubernatio rerum magni­ tudinem divinae praedicant naturae; unde omnibus cog­ nitio existendi Deum naturaliter inserta est.

Thus, God's power (efficient causality) as creative rather than merely formative, or as conserving its effects in existence, rather than merely reshaping existing materials, these, certainly, would be causal concepts that could not be derived from creatures. Again, God's wisdom (final causality) as supreme governing agency in the world, this likewise would transcend any notion that can be abstracted from creatures in the way abstraction is understood by Aristotle. And the Summa expressly adds that such knowl­ edge omnibus naturaliter inserta est. Needless to say, when man sets out to prove the existence of God by reason, this mechanism is uncon­ sciously at work. As the Summa nicely expresses it : 4 4

25

The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri . . . cum movetur anima secundum partem superiorem rationis et habitum similitudinis primae veritatis super­ iori parti rationis impressum, eo modo quo recolit suum principium per hoc quod videt se non esse a se . . . hoc . . . modo non potest ignorare Deum esse in ratione sui principii.

On the other hand, if we remain ignorant of God, or conceive him in the image "of corruptible man and birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things" as St. Paul says in Romans I quoted by the Summa, then our soul is moved only secundum partem inferiorem rationis, quae est ad con­ templandas creaturas. Et hoc modo potest non cog­ noscere Deum esse, cum scilicet per peccatum et errorem aversa a Deo obtenebratur, eo modo quo